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_PUBLISHED JANUARY 4, 1897._

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[Illustration: Frontispiece.]

       *       *       *       *       *




FORTY-ONE YEARS IN INDIA

FROM

Subaltern to Commander-in-Chief

BY

FIELD-MARSHAL LORD ROBERTS OF KANDAHAR
V.C., K.P., G.C.B., G.C.S.I., G.C.I.E.


[Illustration: Seal]


_FIRST EDITION IN ONE VOLUME_


WITH FORTY ILLUSTRATIONS


LONDON
RICHARD BENTLEY AND SON
Publishers in Ordinary to Her Majesty the Queen
1898
[_All rights reserved_]






_A NEW EDITION, BEING THE TWENTY-NINTH_






_TO THE COUNTRY TO WHICH I AM SO PROUD OF BELONGING,

TO THE ARMY TO WHICH I AM SO DEEPLY INDEBTED,

AND TO MY WIFE,

WITHOUT WHOSE LOVING HELP

MY 'FORTY-ONE YEARS IN INDIA'

COULD NOT BE THE HAPPY RETROSPECT IT IS,

I DEDICATE THIS BOOK._

       *       *       *       *       *






PREFACE TO THE FIRST EDITION.

       *       *       *       *       *

I would never have ventured to intrude upon the public with my
personal reminiscences had I not been urged to do so by friends who,
being interested themselves in what I was able to tell them of India
as my father knew it, and as I found it and left it, persuaded me that
my experiences of the many and various aspects under which I have
known the wonderful land of my adoption and its interesting peoples
would be useful to my countrymen. It was thought that I might thus
contribute towards a more intimate knowledge of the glorious heritage
our forefathers have bequeathed to us, than the greater number of them
possess, and towards helping them to understand the characteristics
and requirements of the numerous and widely different races by whom
India is inhabited.

It is difficult for people who know nothing of Natives to understand
and appreciate the value they set on cherished customs, peculiar
idiosyncrasies, and fixed prejudices, all of which must be carefully
studied by those who are placed in the position of their Rulers, if
the suzerain Power is to keep their respect and gain their gratitude
and affection.

The Natives of India are particularly observant of character, and
intelligent in gauging the capabilities of those who govern them; and
it is because the English Government is trusted that a mere handful
of Englishmen are able to direct the administration of a country with
nearly three hundred millions of inhabitants, differing in race,
religion, and manners of life. Throughout all the changes which India
has undergone, political and social, during the present century, this
feeling has been maintained, and it will last so long as the services
are filled by honourable men who sympathize with the Natives, respect
their prejudices, and do not interfere unnecessarily with their habits
and customs.

My father and I spent between us nearly ninety years in India. The
most wonderful of the many changes that took place during that time
may be said to date from the Mutiny. I have endeavoured in the
following pages to explain the causes which, I believe, brought
about that terrible event--an event which for a while produced a
much-to-be-regretted feeling of racial antagonism. Happily, this
feeling did not last long; even when things looked blackest for us, it
was softened by acts of kindness shown to Europeans in distress, and
by the knowledge that, but for the assistance afforded by the Natives
themselves, the restoration of order, and the suppression of a fierce
military insurrection, would have been a far more arduous task. Delhi
could not have been taken without Sikhs and Gurkhas; Lucknow could
not have been defended without the Hindustani soldiers who so nobly
responded to Sir Henry Lawrence's call; and nothing that Sir John
Lawrence might have done could have prevented our losing, for a time,
the whole of the country north of Calcutta, had not the men of the
Punjab and the Derajat[*] remained true to our cause.

[Note *: Tracts beyond the Indus.]

It has been suggested that all outward signs of the Mutiny should
be obliterated, that the monument on the Ridge at Delhi should be
levelled, and the picturesque Residency at Lucknow allowed to fall
into decay. This view does not commend itself to me. These relics of
that tremendous struggle are memorials of heroic services performed
by Her Majesty's soldiers, Native as well as British; and by the
civilians who shared the duties and dangers of the army. They are
valuable as reminders that we must never again allow ourselves to be
lulled into fancied security; and above all, they stand as warnings
that we should never do anything that can possibly be interpreted by
the Natives into disregard for their various forms of religion.

The Mutiny was not an unmitigated evil, for to it we owe the
consolidation of our power in India, as it hastened on the
construction of the roads, railways, and telegraphs, so wisely and
thoughtfully planned by the Marquis of Dalhousie, and which have
done more than anything to increase the prosperity of the people and
preserve order throughout the country. It was the Mutiny which brought
Lord Canning into closer communication with the Princes of India, and
paved the way for Lord Lytton's brilliant conception of the Imperial
Assemblage--a great political success which laid the foundation of
that feeling of confidence which now, happily, exists between the
Ruling Chiefs and the Queen-Empress. And it was the Mutiny which
compelled us to reorganize our Indian Army and make it the admirable
fighting machine it now is.

In the account I have given of our relations with Afghanistan and
the border tribes, I have endeavoured to bring before my readers
the change of our position in India that has been the inevitable
consequence of the propinquity upon our North-West Frontier of a
first-class European Power. The change has come about so gradually,
and has been so repeatedly pronounced to be chimerical by authorities
in whom the people of Great Britain had every reason to feel
confidence, that until recently it had attracted little public
attention, and even now a great majority of my countrymen may scarcely
have realized the probability of England and Russia ever being near
enough to each other in Asia to come into actual conflict. I impute no
blame to the Russians for their advance towards India. The force of
circumstances--the inevitable result of the contact of civilization
with barbarism--impelled them to cross the Jaxartes and extend their
territories to the Khanates of Turkestan and the banks of the Oxus,
just as the same uncontrollable force carried us across the Sutlej and
extended our territories to the valley of the Indus. The object I have
at heart is to make my fellow-subjects recognize that, under these
altered conditions, Great Britain now occupies in Asia the position of
a Continental Power, and that her interests in that part of the globe
must be protected by Continental means of defence.

The few who have carefully and steadily watched the course of events,
entertained no doubt from the first as to the soundness of these
views; and their aim has always been, as mine is now, not to sound an
alarm, but to give a warning, and to show the danger of shutting our
eyes to plain facts and their probable consequences.

Whatever may be the future course of events, I have no fear of the
result if we are only true to ourselves and to India. Thinking Natives
thoroughly understand the situation; they believe that the time must
come when the territories of Great Britain and Russia in their part of
Asia will be separated only by a common boundary line, and they would
consider that we were wanting in the most essential attributes of
Rulers if we did not take all possible precautions, and make every
possible preparation to meet such an eventuality.

I send out this book in the earnest hope that the friendly
anticipations of those who advised me to write it may not be seriously
disappointed; and that those who care to read a plain, unvarnished
tale of Indian life and adventure, will bear in mind that the writer
is a soldier, not a man of letters, and will therefore forgive all
faults of style or language.

ROBERTS.

_30th September_, 1896.




       *       *       *       *       *


[Illustration: KASHMIR GATE AT DELHI.]


CONTENTS.

CHAPTER I.

Voyage to India--Life in Calcutta--A destructive
  cyclone--Home-sickness

CHAPTER II.

Bengal Horse Artillery--Incidents of the journey--New
  Friends

CHAPTER III.

With my father at Peshawar--Peshawar in 1852--Excitements
  of a frontier station--A flogging parade--Mackeson's
  assassination--The Jowaki expedition--A strange dream--A
  typical frontier fight

CHAPTER IV.

A trip to Khagan--The Vale of Kashmir--With the Horse
  Artillery--My first visit to Simla--Life at Peshawar--A
  staff appointment--The bump of locality

CHAPTER V.

Lord Dalhousie's Afghan policy
  --Treaty with Dost Mahomed--War with Persia
  --The advantage of the Amir's friendship
  --John Nicholson
  --'A pillar of strength on the frontier'

CHAPTER VI.

First tidings of the mutiny
  --Prompt action at Peshawar--A bold policy
  --The Movable Column--An annoying occurrence
  --I leave Peshawar

CHAPTER VII.

First symptoms of disaffection
  --Outbreak at Berhampur--Mangal Pandy
  --Court-Martial at Meerut--Mutiny at Meerut
  --The work of destruction--Want of energy
  --Hugh Gough's experiences
  --Nothing could arrest the mutiny

CHAPTER VIII.

General Anson--The news reaches Simla
  --Anson loses no time--A long list of troubles
  --John Lawrence--The Phulkian family
  --Death of General Anson

CHAPTER IX.

John Lawrence's wise measures
  --Disarmament at Peshawar
  --Salutary effect in the valley

CHAPTER X.

Neville Chamberlain's presence of mind
  --The command of the Column--Robert Montgomery
  --Disarmament at Mian Mir
  --A Drum-Head Court-Martial--Swift retribution

CHAPTER XI.

Ferozepore--Crawford Chamberlain at Multan
  --Chamberlain's masterly conduct
  --Nicholson succeeds Neville Chamberlain
  --Irresolution at Jullundur--General Mehtab Sing
  --Nicholson's soldierly instincts
  --More disarmaments

CHAPTER XII.

George Ricketts at Ludhiana--Pushing on to Delhi
  --In the camp before Delhi

CHAPTER XIII.

The first victory--Enthusiasm amongst the troops
  --Barnard's success at Badli-ki-Serai
  --The Flagstaff Tower--Position on the Ridge
  --Quintin Battye--The gallant little Gurkhas
  --Proposed assault--The besiegers besieged
  --Hard fighting--The centenary of Plassy

CHAPTER XIV.

A new appointment

CHAPTER XV.

Reinforcements begin to arrive
  --An assault again proposed--The attack on Alipur
  --Death of General Barnard
  --General Reed assumes command
  --Two V.C.'s--Treachery in camp
  --Fighting close up to the city walls
  --Sufferings of the sick and wounded
  --General Reed's health fails

CHAPTER XVI.

Archdale Wilson assumes command
  --Enemy baffled in the Sabzi Mandi
  --Efforts to exterminate the Feringhis
  --A letter from General Havelock
  --News of Henry Lawrence's death
  --Arrival of the Movable Column
  --The 61st Foot at Najafgarh

CHAPTER XVII.

Wilson's difficulties--Nicholson's resolve
  --Arrangements for the assault
  --Construction of breaching batteries
  --Nicholson expresses his satisfaction
  --Orders for the assault issued
  --Composition of the attacking columns

CHAPTER XVIII.

Delhi stormed--The scene at the Kashmir Gate
  --Bold front by Artillery and Cavalry
  --Nicholson wounded--The last I saw of Nicholson
  --Wilson wavers--Holding on to the walls of Delhi

CHAPTER XIX.

Capture of the Burn bastion
  --The 60th Rifles storm the palace
  --Hodson captures the King of Delhi
  --Nicholson's death--Gallantry of the troops
  --Praise from Lord Canning

CHAPTER XX.

Necessity for further action--Departure from Delhi
  --Action at Bulandshahr--Lieutenant Home's death
  --Knights-errant--Fight at Aligarh
  --Appeals from Agra--Collapse of the administration
  --Taken by surprise--The fight at Agra
  --An exciting chase--The Taj Mahal

CHAPTER XXI.

Infatuation of the authorities at Agra
  --A series of Mishaps
  --Result of indecision and incapacity

CHAPTER XXII.

Advantage of being a good horseman--News from Lucknow
  --Cawnpore--Heart-rending scenes--Start for Lucknow
  --An exciting Adventure
  --Arrival of Sir Colin Campbell
  --Plans for the advance

CHAPTER XXIII.

Sir Colin's preparations--The Alambagh
  --The Dilkusha and Martinière--Mayne's death
  --A tall-talk story--Ammunition required
  --A night march--The advance on Lucknow
  --Sir Colin wounded--The attack on the Sikandarbagh
  --Heroic deeds--The 4th Punjab Infantry

CHAPTER XXIV.

Henry Norman--The Shah Najaf--The mess-house
  --Planting the flag--A memorable meeting
  --The Residency

CHAPTER XXV.

Sir Colin's wise decision--Robert Napier
  --Impressions on visiting the Residency
  --Henry Lawrence--Lawrence as Statesman and Ruler
  --Lawrence's friendliness for Natives
  --A hazardous duty

CHAPTER XXVI.

Death of General Havelock--Appeals from Cawnpore
  --General Windham--The passage of the Ganges

CHAPTER XXVII.

The fight at Cawnpore--Unexpected visitors
  --A long chase--Unjur Tiwari--Bithur
  --Windham at Cawnpore

CHAPTER XXVIII.

The Fight at Khudaganj--A mêlée--Oudh or Rohilkand?

CHAPTER XXIX.

Mianganj--Curious effect of a mirage
  --The Dilkusha revisited--Passage of the Gumti
  --Capture of the Chakar Kothi
  --Capture of the iron bridge--Hodson mortally wounded
  --Outram's soldierly instinct--A lost opportunity
  --Sam Browne--Start for England
  --Death of Sir William Peel

CHAPTER XXX.

What brought about the Mutiny?
  --Religious fears of the people--The land question
  --The annexation of Oudh
  --Fulfilment of Malcolm's prophecy
  --The Delhi royal family--The Nana Sahib
  --The Native army--Greased cartridges
  --Limited number of British troops
  --Objection to foreign service
  --Excessive age of the British officers

CHAPTER XXXI.

Discontent of the Natives--Successful administrators
  --Paternal despotism--Money-lenders and the Press
  --Faddists--Cardinal points


CHAPTER XXXII.

Home again--Back in India--Allahabad and Cawnpore
  --The Viceroy's camp--State entry into Lucknow
  --The Talukdars of Oudh--Loyalty of the Talukdars
  --Cawnpore and Fatehgarh--The Agra Durbar

CHAPTER XXXIII.

Delhi under a different aspect--Lord Clyde
  --Umritsar and Lahore--The Lahore Durbar
  --Simla--Life at Simla


CHAPTER XXXIV.

The Staff Corps--With the Viceroy's camp again
  --The marble rocks--Lady Canning's death
  --Pig-sticking at Jamu--Lord Canning
  --Another cold-weather march--Gwalior and Jhansi
  --Departmental promotion

CHAPTER XXXV.

The Umbeyla expedition--The Akhund of Swat
  --The 'Eagle's Nest' and 'Crag piquet'
  --The death of Lord Elgin
  --Loyalty of our Pathan soldiers
  --Bunerwals show signs of submission
  --The conical hill--Umbeyla in flames
  --Bunerwals agree to our terms--Malka destroyed

CHAPTER XXXVI.

A voyage round the Cape--Cholera camps
  --The Abyssinian expedition--Landed at Zula


CHAPTER XXXVII.

Sir Robert Napier to command--Defective transport
  --King Theodore commits suicide--First A.Q.M.G.

CHAPTER XXXVIII.

Afzal Khan ousts Sher Ali
  --Sher Ali regains the Amirship
  --Foresight of Sir Henry Rawlinson
  --The Umballa Durbar

CHAPTER XXXIX.

The Lushais--The Lushai expedition
  --Defective transport again
  --Practice _versus_ theory--A severe march
  --Lushais foiled by Gurkhas
  --A successful turning movement--Murder of Lord Mayo

CHAPTER XL.

Lord Napier's care for the soldier
  --Negotiations with Sher Ali renewed
  --Sher Ali's demands

CHAPTER XLI.

A trip in the Himalayas--The famine in Behar
  --The Prince of Wales in India
  --Farewell to Lord Napier

CHAPTER XLII.

Lord Lytton becomes Viceroy
  --Difficulties with Sher Ali
  --Imperial assemblage at Delhi
  --Reception of the Ruling Chiefs
  --Queen proclaimed Empress of India
  --Political importance of the assemblage
  --Sher Ali proclaims a 'Jahad'
  --A journey under difficulties

CHAPTER XLIII.

Object of the first Afghan war
  --Excitement caused by Russia's advances

CHAPTER XLIV.

Effect of the Berlin Treaty at Kabul
  --Sher Ali decides against England
  --A meeting of portentous moment
  --Preparations for war--Letter from Sher Ali

CHAPTER XLV.

Shortcomings of my column
  --Attitude of the Border tribes

CHAPTER XLVI.

The Kuram valley--Conflicting news of the enemy
  --An apparently impregnable position
  --Spingawi route decided on--Disposition of the force
  --A night attack--Advantages of a night attack
  --Devotion of my orderlies
  --Threatening the enemy's rear--The Peiwar Kotal

CHAPTER XLVII.

Alikhel--Treachery of the tribesmen
  --Transport difficulties
  --Sher Ali looks to Russia for aid
  --Khost--An attack on our camp
  --An unsuccessful experiment
  --An unpleasant incident--Punjab Chiefs' Contingent

CHAPTER XLVIII.

Sher Ali's death--Premature negotiations
  --The treaty of Gandamak
  --Making friends with the tribesmen
  --Gloomy forebodings--Good-bye to Cavagnari

CHAPTER XLIX.

Massacre of the Embassy--The Kabul Field Force
  --Lord Lytton's foresightedness--Start for Kabul
  --Letter to the Amir
  --Proclamation to the people of Kabul
  --Yakub Khan's agents
  --Reasons for remaining at Alikhel

CHAPTER L.

Hector Macdonald and Sher Mahomed--Yakub Khan
  --A Proclamation and an Order
  --The _maliks_ of Logar--Attack on the Shutargardan
  --Reconnoitring roads leading to Kabul

CHAPTER LI.

The Afghan position--The fight at Charasia
  --Highlanders, Gurkhas, and Punjabis
  --Defeat of the Afghans--Kabul in sight
  --Deh-i-Mazang gorge--The enemy give us the slip

CHAPTER LII.

Guiding instructions--Visit to the Bala Hissar
  --Yakub Khan abdicates--The Proclamation
  --Administrative measures
  --Explosions in the Bala Hissar

CHAPTER LIII.

Afghans afraid to befriend us--Kabul Russianized
  --Yakub Khan's abdication accepted
  --State treasury taken over

CHAPTER LIV.

The amnesty Proclamation
  --Strength of the Kabul Field Force
  --Yakub Khan despatched to India

CHAPTER LV.

Political situation at Kabul
  --Serious trouble ahead
  --Macpherson attacks the Kohistanis
  --Combined movements--The uncertainty of war
  --The fight in the Chardeh valley--Forced to retire
  --Padre Adams earns the V.C.
  --Macpherson's column arrives
  --The captured guns recovered--Melancholy reflections

CHAPTER LVI.

Attack on the Takht-i-Shah
  --City people join the tribesmen
  --Increasing numbers of the enemy
  --Loss of the conical hill
  --Captain Vousden's gallantry
  --The retirement to Sherpur

CHAPTER LVII.

Sherpur--Defence of Sherpur--Arrest of Daud Shah
  --Rumours of an assault--Attack and counter-attack
  --Communication with India re-opened
  --Sherpur made safe

CHAPTER LVIII.

Two important questions--A Ruler required
  --News of Abdur Rahman Khan
  --Abdur Rahman in Afghan-Turkestan
  --Overtures made to Abdur Rahman

CHAPTER LIX.

Jenkins attacked near Charasia
  --Sir Donald Stewart reaches Kabul
  --Difficulties with Abdur Rahman
  --Abdur Rahman proclaimed Amir

CHAPTER LX.

Affairs at Kandahar--The Maiwand disaster
  --Relief from Kabul suggested
  --A force ordered from Kabul
  --Preparations for the march
  --The Kabul-Kandahar Field Force
  --Commissariat and Transport

CHAPTER LXI.

The order of marching--Ghazni and Kelat-i-Ghilzai
  --Food required daily for the force
  --A letter from General Phayre--Kandahar
  --Reconnoitring the enemy's position
  --A turning movement

CHAPTER LXII.

Commencement of the fight
  --72nd Highlanders and 2nd Sikhs
  --92nd Highlanders and 2nd Gurkhas
  --Ayub Khan's camp--Difficulties about supplies
  --Parting with the troops--A pleasing memory

CHAPTER LXIII.

Reception in England--A fruitless journey
  --Andaman Isles and Burma--The Madras Army
  --Measures for improving the Madras Army
  --Memories of Madras--An allegory

CHAPTER LXIV.

Disturbing action of Russia--Abdur Rahman Khan
  --The Rawal Pindi Durbar
  --Unmistakable loyalty of the Natives

CHAPTER LXV.

The Burma expedition--The Camp of Exercise at Delhi
  --Defence of the North-West Frontier
  --Quetta and Peshawar
  --Communications _versus_ fortifications
  --Sir George Chesney

CHAPTER LXVI.

Nursing for the soldier
  --Pacification of Burma considered
  --Measures recommended
  --The Buddhist priesthood
  --The Regimental Institute
  --The Army Temperance Association

CHAPTER LXVII.

Defence and Mobilization Committees
  --The Transport Department
  --Utilization of Native States' armies
  --Marquis of Lansdowne becomes Viceroy
  --Rajputana and Kashmir
  --Musketry instruction
  --Artillery and Cavalry training

CHAPTER LXVIII.

Extension of command
  --Efficiency of the Native Army
  --Concessions to the Native Army
  --Officering of the Native Army
  --The Hunza-Naga campaign
  --Visit to Nepal--A Nepalese entertainment
  --Proposed mission to the Amir
  --A last tour--Farewell entertainments
  --Last days in India

APPENDIX

INDEX

[Illustration: PEIWAR KOTAL.]

LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS


I. PORTRAIT OF FIELD-MARSHAL LORD ROBERTS.
    (_From a Photograph by Bourne and Shepherd,
    Simla, engraved upon wood by W. Cheshire_)     _Frontispiece_

II. THE KASHMIR GATE AT DELHI                _Over List of Contents_

III. THE PEIWAR KOTAL                   _Over List of Illustrations_

IV. PORTRAIT OF GENERAL SIR ABRAHAM ROBERTS, G.C.B.
    (_From a Photograph,
    engraved upon wood by W. Cheshire_)

V. PORTRAIT OF BRIGADIER-GENERAL JOHN NICHOLSON, C.B.
    (_From a Painting by J.R. Dicksee
    in possession of the Rev. Canon Seymour,
    engraved upon wood by George Pearson_)

VI. PORTRAIT OF MAJOR-GENERAL SIR HARRY TOMBS, V.C., G.C.B.
    (_From a Photograph by Messrs. Grillet and Co.,
    engraved upon wood by Swain_)

VII. PORTRAIT OF LIEUTENANT-GENERAL SIR JAMES HILLS-JOHNES,
    V.C., G.C.B.
    (_From a Photograph by Messrs. Bourne and Shepherd,
    engraved upon wood by George Pearson_)

VIII. PORTRAIT OF FIELD-MARSHAL SIR DONALD MARTIN STEWART,
    BART., G.C.B., G.C.S.I., C.I.E.
    (_From a Photograph by Messrs. Elliott and Fry,
    engraved upon wood by George Pearson_)

IX. PLAN OF THE ENGAGEMENT AT NAJAFGARH.
    (_From a Plan made by Lieutenant Geneste, by permission of
    Messrs. Wm. Blackwood and Sons_)

X. PLAN TO ILLUSTRATE THE SIEGE AND ATTACK OF DELHI,
    IN 1857

XI. PORTRAITS OF GENERAL SIR COLIN CAMPBELL (LORD CLYDE)
    AND MAJOR-GENERAL SIR WILLIAM MANSFIELD (LORD
    SANDHURST).
    (_From a Photograph taken in India,
    engraved upon wood by George Pearson_)

XII. PORTRAIT OF MAJOR-GENERAL SIR JAMES OUTRAM, G.C.B.
    (_From a Painting by Thomas Brigstocke, R.A.,
    engraved upon wood by George Pearson_)

XIII. PORTRAIT OF BRIGADIER-GENERAL SIR HENRY LAWRENCE,
    K.C.B. (_From a Photograph taken at Lucknow,
    engraved upon wood by Swain_)

XIV. PLAN TO ILLUSTRATE THE RELIEF OF LUCKNOW,
    IN 1857

XV. PLAN OF CAWNPORE

XVI. PLAN OF THE ENGAGEMENT AT KHUDAGANJ

XVII. PORTRAIT OF GENERAL SIR SAMUEL BROWNE, V.C., G.C.B.,
    K.C.S.I.
    (_From a Photograph by Messrs. Elliott and Fry,
    engraved upon wood by George Pearson_)

XVIII. PLAN TO ILLUSTRATE THE SIEGE AND CAPTURE OF LUCKNOW,
    IN 1858

XIX. PORTRAIT OF LADY ROBERTS (WIFE OF SIR ABRAHAM
    ROBERTS).
    (_From a Sketch by Carpenter,
    engraved upon wood by W. Cheshire_)

XX. PORTRAIT OF HIS EXCELLENCY EARL CANNING, K.G., G.C.B.,
    G.M.S.I., VICEROY AND GOVERNOR-GENERAL OF INDIA.
    (_From a Photograph by Messrs. Mayall,
    engraved upon wood by Swain_)

XXI. THE STORMING OF THE CONICAL HILL AT UMBEYLA BY THE
    101ST FOOT (BENGAL FUSILIERS).
    (_From a Sketch by General Sir John Adye, G.C.B., R.A.,
    engraved upon wood by W. Cheshire_)

XXII. PORTRAIT OF FIELD-MARSHAL LORD NAPIER OF MAGDALA,
    G.C.B., G.C.S.I.
    (_From a Photograph by Messrs. Maull and Fox,
    engraved upon wood by W. Cheshire_)

XXIII. PORTRAIT OF HIS EXCELLENCY THE EARL OF LYTTON,
    G.C.B., G.M.S.I., G.M.I.E., VICEROY OF INDIA.
    (_From a Photograph by Messrs. Maull and Fox,
    engraved upon wood by George Pearson_)

XXIV. THE ATTACK ON THE PEIWAR KOTAL.
    (_From a Painting by Vereker Hamilton,
    engraved upon wood by George Pearson_)

XXV. GENERAL ROBERTS'S GURKHA ORDERLIES.
    (_From a Water-colour Sketch
    by Colonel Woodthorpe, C.B., R.E.,
    engraved upon wood by W. Cheshire_)

XXVI. GENERAL ROBERTS'S SIKH ORDERLIES.
    (_From a Water-colour Sketch
    by Colonel Woodthorpe, C.B., R.E.,
    engraved upon wood by W. Cheshire_)

XXVII. ONE OF GENERAL ROBERTS'S PATHAN ORDERLIES.
    (_From a Water-colour Sketch
    by Colonel Woodthorpe, C.B., R.E.,
    engraved upon wood by W. Cheshire_)

XXVIII. ONE OF GENERAL ROBERTS'S PATHAN ORDERLIES.
    (_From a Water-colour Sketch
    by Colonel Woodthorpe, C.B., R.E.,
    engraved upon wood by W. Cheshire_)

XXIX. THE ENTRANCE TO THE BALA HISSAR--THE LAHORE GATE
    AT KABUL.
    (_From a Photograph,
    engraved upon wood by W. Cheshire_)

XXX. SKETCH SHOWING THE OPERATIONS IN THE CHARDEH
    VALLEY ON DECEMBER 10TH AND 11TH, 1879

XXXI. PLAN TO ILLUSTRATE THE DEFENCES OF SHERPUR AND
    THE OPERATIONS ROUND KABUL IN DECEMBER, 1879


XXXII. CROSSING THE ZAMBURAK KOTAL.
    (_From a Painting by the Chevalier Desanges,
    engraved upon wood by W. Cheshire_)

XXXIII. PLAN OF THE ROUTE TAKEN FROM KABUL TO KANDAHAR


XXXIV. SKETCH OF THE BATTLE-FIELD OF KANDAHAR

XXXV. PORTRAITS OF THE THREE COMMANDERS-IN-CHIEF IN INDIA
    (SIR DONALD STEWART, SIR FREDERICK ROBERTS, AND
    SIR ARTHUR HARDINGE).
    (_From a Photograph,
    engraved upon wood by Swain_)

XXXVI. PORTRAIT OF HIS EXCELLENCY THE MARQUIS OF
    DUFFERIN AND AVA, K.P., G.C.B., G.C.M.G., G.M.S.I.,
    G.M.I.E., F.R.S., VICEROY OF INDIA.
    (_From an engraving by the Fine Art Society of a portrait
    by the late Frank Holl, R.A., re-engraved
    upon wood by George Pearson_)

XXXVII. PORTRAIT OF HIS HIGHNESS ABDUR RAHMAN, AMIR OF
    AFGHANISTAN.
    (_From a Photograph,
    engraved upon wood by Swain_)

XXXVIII. MAP OF CENTRAL ASIA

XXXIX. PORTRAIT OF LADY ROBERTS OF KANDAHAR.
    (_From a Photograph by Messrs. Johnson and Hoffmann,
    engraved upon wood by George Pearson_)

XL. PORTRAIT OF HIS EXCELLENCY THE MARQUESS OF LANSDOWNE,
    K.G., G.C.M.G., G.M.S.I., G.M.I.E., VICEROY
    OF INDIA.
    (_From a Photograph by Messrs. Cowell, Simla,
    engraved upon wood by Swain_)

XLI. PORTRAIT OF FIELD-MARSHAL LORD ROBERTS ON HIS
    ARAB CHARGER 'VONOLEL.'
    (_From an Oil-painting by Charles Furse,
    made from an Instantaneous Photograph, and
    engraved upon wood by E. Whymper_)

       *       *       *       *       *





FORTY-ONE YEARS IN INDIA.




CHAPTER I.
1852

  Voyage to India--Life in Calcutta--A destructive cyclone
  --Home-sickness


Forty years ago the departure of a cadet for India was a much more
serious affair than it is at present. Under the regulations then in
force, leave, except on medical certificate, could only be obtained
once during the whole of an officer's service, and ten years had to be
spent in India before that leave could be taken. Small wonder, then,
that I felt as if I were bidding England farewell for ever when, on
the 20th February, 1852, I set sail from Southampton with Calcutta for
my destination. Steamers in those days ran to and from India but once
a month, and the fleet employed was only capable of transporting some
2,400 passengers in the course of a year. This does not include the
Cape route; but even taking that into consideration, I should doubt
whether there were then as many travellers to India in a year as there
are now in a fortnight at the busy season.

My ship was the Peninsular and Oriental Company's steamer _Ripon_,
commanded by Captain Moresby, an ex-officer of the Indian Navy, in
which he had earned distinction by his survey of the Red Sea. A few
Addiscombe friends were on board, leaving England under the same
depressing circumstances as myself, and what with wind and weather,
and the thought that at the best we were bidding farewell to home and
relations for ten long years, we were anything but a cheerful party
for the first few days of the voyage. Youth and high spirits had,
however, re-asserted themselves long before Alexandria, which place
we reached without incident beyond the customary halts for coaling at
Gibraltar and Malta. At Alexandria we bade adieu to Captain Moresby,
who had been most kind and attentive, and whose graphic accounts
of the difficulties he had had to overcome whilst mastering the
navigation of the Red Sea served to while away many a tedious hour.

On landing at Alexandria, we were hurried on board a large mast-less
canal boat, shaped like a Nile dahabeah. In this we were towed up the
Mahmoudieh canal for ten hours, until we arrived at Atfieh, on the
Nile; thence we proceeded by steamer, reaching Cairo in about sixteen
hours. Here we put up at Shepherd's Hotel for a couple of days, which
were most enjoyable, especially to those of the party who, like
myself, saw an eastern city and its picturesque and curious bazaars
for the first time. From Cairo the route lay across the desert for
ninety miles, the road being merely a cutting in the sand, quite
undistinguishable at night. The journey was performed in a conveyance
closely resembling a bathing-machine, which accommodated six people,
and was drawn by four mules. My five fellow-travellers were all
cadets, only one of whom (Colonel John Stewart, of Ardvorlich,
Perthshire) is now alive. The transit took some eighteen hours, with
an occasional halt for refreshments. Our baggage was carried on
camels, as were the mails, cargo, and even the coal for the Red Sea
steamers.

On arrival at Suez we found awaiting us the _Oriental_, commanded by
Captain Powell. A number of people met us there who had left England
a month before we did; but their steamer having broken down, they had
now to be accommodated on board ours. We were thus very inconveniently
crowded until we arrived at Aden, where several of the passengers left
us for Bombay. We were not, however, much inclined to complain, as
some of our new associates proved themselves decided acquisitions.
Amongst them was Mr. (afterwards Sir Barnes) Peacock, an immense
favourite with all on board, and more particularly with us lads. He
was full of fun, and although then forty-seven years old, and on his
way to Calcutta to join the Governor-General's Council, he took part
in our amusements as if he were of the same age as ourselves. His
career in India was brilliant, and on the expiration of his term of
office as member of Council he was made Chief Justice of Bengal.
Another of the passengers was Colonel (afterwards Sir John Bloomfield)
Gough, who died not long ago in Ireland, and was then on his way to
take up his appointment as Quartermaster-General of Queen's troops. He
had served in the 3rd Light Dragoons and on the staff of his cousin,
Lord Gough, during the Sutlej and Punjab campaigns, and was naturally
an object of the deepest veneration to all the youngsters on board.

At Madras we stopped to land passengers, and I took this opportunity
of going on shore to see some old Addiscombe friends, most of whom
were greatly excited at the prospect of a war in Burma. The transports
were then actually lying in the Madras roads, and a few days later
this portion of the expedition started for Rangoon.

At last, on the 1st April, we reached Calcutta, and I had to say
good-bye to the friends I had made during the six weeks' voyage, most
of whom I was never to meet again.

On landing, I received a letter from my father, who commanded the
Lahore division, informing me that the proprietor of Spence's Hotel
had been instructed to receive me, and that I had better put up there
until I reported myself at the Head-Quarters of the Bengal Artillery
at Dum-Dum. This was chilling news, for I was the only one of our
party who had to go to a hotel on landing. The Infantry cadets had
either been taken charge of by the Town Major, who provided them with
quarters in Fort William, or had gone to stay with friends, and the
only other Artilleryman (Stewart) went direct to Dum-Dum, where he
had a brother, also a gunner, who, poor follow, was murdered with his
young wife five years later by the mutineers at Gwalior. I was still
more depressed later on by finding myself at dinner _tête-à-tête_
with a first-class specimen of the results of an Indian climate.
He belonged to my own regiment, and was going home on medical
certificate, but did not look as if he could ever reach England. He
gave me the not too pleasing news that by staying in that dreary
hotel, instead of proceeding direct to Dum-Dum, I had lost a day's
service and pay, so I took care to join early the following morning.

A few years before, Dum-Dum had been a large military station, but
the annexation of the Punjab, and the necessity for maintaining
a considerable force in northern India, had greatly reduced the
garrison. Even the small force that remained had embarked for Burma
before my arrival, so that, instead of a large, cheery mess party, to
which I had been looking forward, I sat down to dinner with only one
other subaltern.

No time was lost in appointing me to a Native Field Battery, and I
was put through the usual laboratory course as a commencement to my
duties. The life was dull in the extreme, the only variety being an
occasional week in Fort William, where my sole duty was to superintend
the firing of salutes. Nor was there much in my surroundings to
compensate for the prosaic nature of my work. Fort William was not
then what it has since become--one of the healthiest stations
in India. Quite the contrary. The men were crowded into small
badly-ventilated buildings, and the sanitary arrangements were as
deplorable as the state of the water supply. The only efficient
scavengers were the huge birds of prey called adjutants, and so
great was the dependence placed upon the exertions of these unclean
creatures, that the young cadets were warned that any injury done to
them would be treated as gross misconduct. The inevitable result of
this state of affairs was endemic sickness, and a death-rate of over
ten per cent. per annum.[1]

Calcutta outside the Fort was but a dreary place to fall back upon. It
was wretchedly lighted by smoky oil-lamps set at very rare intervals.
The slow and cumbrous palankin was the ordinary means of conveyance,
and, as far as I was concerned, the vaunted hospitality of the
Anglo-Indian was conspicuous by its absence.

I must confess I was disappointed at being left so completely to
myself, especially by the senior military officers, many of whom were
personally known to my father, who had, I was aware, written to some
of them on my behalf. Under these circumstances, I think it is hardly
to be wondered at that I became terribly home-sick, and convinced
that I could never be happy in India. Worst of all, the prospects of
promotion seemed absolutely hopeless; I was a supernumerary Second
Lieutenant, and nearly every officer in the list of the Bengal
Artillery had served over fifteen years as a subaltern. This
stagnation extended to every branch of the Indian Army.

There were singularly few incidents to enliven this unpromising stage
of my career. I do, however, remember one rather notable experience
which came to me at that time, in the form of a bad cyclone. I was
dining out on the night in question. Gradually the wind grew higher
and higher, and it became evident that we were in for a storm of no
ordinary kind. Consequently, I left my friend's house early. A Native
servant, carrying a lantern, accompanied me to light me on my way. At
an angle of the road a sudden gust of wind extinguished the light. The
servant, who, like most Natives, was quite at home in the dark, walked
on, believing that I was following in his wake. I shouted to him as
loudly as I could, but the uproar was so terrific that he could not
hear a word, and there was nothing for it but to try and make my own
way home. The darkness was profound. As I was walking carefully along,
I suddenly came in contact with an object, which a timely flash of
lightning showed me was a column, standing in exactly the opposite
direction from my own house. I could now locate myself correctly, and
the lightning becoming every moment more vivid, I was enabled to grope
my way by slow degrees to the mess, where I expected to find someone
to show me my way home, but the servants, who knew from experience the
probable effects of a cyclone, had already closed the outside Venetian
shutters and barred all the doors. I could just see them through the
cracks engaged in making everything fast. In vain I banged at the door
and called at the top of my voice--they heard nothing. Reluctantly I
became convinced that there was no alternative but to leave my shelter
and face the rapidly increasing storm once more. My bungalow was not
more than half a mile away, but it took me an age to accomplish this
short distance, as I was only able to move a few steps at a time
whenever the lightning showed me the way. It was necessary to be
careful, as the road was raised, with a deep ditch on either side;
several trees had already been blown down, and lay across it, and huge
branches were being driven through the air like thistle-down. I found
extreme difficulty in keeping my feet, especially at the cross-roads,
where I was more than once all but blown over. At last I reached my
house, but even then my struggles were not quite at an end. It was a
very long time before I could gain admittance. The servant who had
been carrying the lantern had arrived, and, missing me, imagined that
I must have returned to the house at which I had dined. The men with
whom I chummed, thinking it unlikely that I should make a second
attempt to return home, had carefully fastened all the doors,
momentarily expecting the roof of the house to be blown off. I had to
continue hammering and shouting for a long time before they heard and
admitted me, thankful to be comparatively safe inside a house.

By morning the worst of the storm was over, but not before great
damage had been done. The Native bazaar was completely wrecked,
looking as if it had suffered a furious bombardment, and great havoc
had been made amongst the European houses, not a single verandah or
outside shutter being left in the station. As I walked to the mess, I
found the road almost impassable from fallen trees; and dead birds,
chiefly crows and kites, were so numerous that they had to be carried
off in cartloads. How I had made my way to my bungalow without
accident the night before was difficult to imagine. Even the column
against which I had stumbled was levelled by the fury of the blast.
This column had been raised a few years before to the memory of
the officers and men of the 1st Troop, 1st Brigade, Bengal Horse
Artillery, who were killed in the disastrous retreat from Kabul in
1841. It was afterwards rebuilt.

Dum-Dum in ruins was even more dreary than before the cyclone, and I
felt as if I could not possibly continue to live there much longer.
Accordingly I wrote to my father, begging him to try and get me sent
to Burma; but he replied that he hoped soon to get command of the
Peshawar division, and that he would then like me to join him. Thus,
though my desire to quit Dum-Dum was not to be immediately gratified,
I was buoyed up by the hope that a definite limit had now been placed
to my service in that, to me, uninteresting part of India, and my
restlessness and discontent disappeared as if by magic.

In time of peace, as in war, or during a cholera epidemic, a soldier's
moral condition is infinitely more important than his physical
surroundings, and it is in this respect, I think, that the subaltern
of the present day has an advantage over the youngster of forty years
ago. The life of a young officer during his first few months of exile,
before he has fallen into the ways of his new life and made friends
for himself, can never be very happy; but in these days he is
encouraged by the feeling that, however distasteful, it need not
necessarily last very long; and he can look forward to a rapid and
easy return to England and friends at no very distant period. At the
time I am writing of he could not but feel completely cut off from all
that had hitherto formed his chief interests in life--his family
and his friends--for ten years is an eternity to the young, and the
feeling of loneliness and home-sickness was apt to become almost
insupportable.

The climate added its depressing influence; there was no going to the
hills then, and as the weary months dragged on, the young stranger
became more and more dispirited and hopeless. Such was my case. I had
only been four months in India, but it seemed like four years. My joy,
therefore, was unbounded when at last my marching orders arrived.
Indeed, the idea that I was about to proceed to that grand field of
soldierly activity, the North-West Frontier, and there join my father,
almost reconciled me to the disappointment of losing my chance of
field service in Burma. My arrangements were soon made, and early in
August I bade a glad good-bye to Dum-Dum.


[Footnote 1: In the fifty-seven years preceding the Mutiny the annual
rate of mortality amongst the European troops in India was sixty-nine
per thousand, and in some stations it was even more appalling. The
Royal Commission appointed in 1864 to inquire into the sanitary
condition of the army in India expressed the hope that, by taking
proper precautions, the mortality might be reduced to the rate of
twenty per thousand per annum. I am glad to say that this hope has
been more than realized, the annual death-rate since 1882 having never
risen to seventeen per thousand.]

       *       *       *       *       *




CHAPTER II.
1852

Bengal Horse Artillery--Incidents of the journey--New Friends


When I went to India the mode of travelling was almost as primitive
as it had been a hundred, and probably five hundred, years before.
Private individuals for the most part used palankins, while officers,
regiments, and drafts were usually sent up country by the river route
as far as Cawnpore. It was necessarily a slow mode of progression--how
slow may be imagined from the fact that it took me nearly three months
to get from Dum-Dum to Peshawar, a distance now traversed with the
greatest ease and comfort in as many days. As far as Benares I
travelled in a barge towed by a steamer--a performance which took the
best part of a month to accomplish. From Benares to Allahabad it was a
pleasant change to get upon wheels, a horse-dâk having been recently
established between these two places. At Allahabad I was most kindly
received by Mr. Lowther, the Commissioner, an old friend of my
father's, in whose house I experienced for the first time that profuse
hospitality for which Anglo-Indians are proverbial. I was much
surprised and amused by the circumstance of my host smoking a _hookah_
even at meals, for he was one of the few Englishmen who still indulged
in that luxury, as it was then considered. The sole duty of one
servant, called the _hookah-bardar_, was to prepare the pipe for his
master, and to have it ready at all times.

My next resting-place was Cawnpore, my birthplace, where I remained
a few days. The Cawnpore division was at that time commanded by an
officer of the name of Palmer, who had only recently attained the
rank of Brigadier-General, though he could not have been less than
sixty-eight years of age, being of the same standing as my father.

From Cawnpore I went to Meerut, and there came across, for the first
time, the far-famed Bengal Horse Artillery, and made the acquaintance
of a set of officers who more than realized my expectations regarding
the wearers of the much-coveted jacket, association with whom created
in me a fixed resolve to leave no stone unturned in the endeavour to
become a horse gunner. Like the Cavalry and Infantry of the East India
Company's service, the Artillery suffered somewhat from the employment
of many of its best officers on the staff and in civil appointments;
the officers selected were not seconded or replaced in their
regiments. This was the case in a less degree, no doubt, in the Horse
Artillery than in the other branches, for its _esprit_ was great, and
officers were proud to belong to this _corps d'élite_. It certainly
was a splendid service; the men were the pick of those recruited by
the East India Company, they were of magnificent physique, and their
uniform was singularly handsome. The jacket was much the same as that
now worn by the Royal Horse Artillery, but instead of the busby they
had a brass helmet covered in front with leopard skin, surmounted by
a long red plume which drooped over the back like that of a French
Cuirassier. This, with white buckskin breeches and long boots,
completed a uniform which was one of the most picturesque and
effective I have ever seen on a parade-ground.

The metalled highway ended at Meerut, and I had to perform the
remainder of my journey to Peshawar, a distance of 600 miles, in a
palankin, or doolie.

This manner of travelling was tedious in the extreme. Starting after
dinner, the victim was carried throughout the night by eight men,
divided into reliefs of four. The whole of the eight were changed at
stages averaging from ten to twelve miles apart. The baggage was
also conveyed by coolies, who kept up an incessant chatter, and the
procession was lighted on its way by a torch-bearer, whose torch
consisted of bits of rag tied round the end of a stick, upon which
he continually poured the most malodorous of oils. If the
palankin-bearers were very good, they shuffled along at the rate of
about three miles an hour, and if there were no delays, forty or
forty-five miles could be accomplished before it became necessary to
seek shelter from the sun in one of the dâk-bungalows, or rest-houses,
erected by Government at convenient intervals along all the principal
routes. In these bungalows a bath could be obtained, and sorely it was
needed after a journey of thirteen or fourteen hours at a level of
only a few inches above an exceedingly dusty road. As to food, the
_khansamah_, like 'mine host' in the old country, declared himself
at the outset prepared to provide everything the heart of man could
desire; when, however, the traveller was safely cornered for the rest
of the day, the _menu_ invariably dwindled down to the elementary
and universal 'sudden death,' which meant a wretchedly thin chicken,
caught, decapitated, grilled, and served up within twenty minutes of
the meal being ordered. At dinner a variety was made by the chicken
being curried, accompanied by an unlimited supply of rice and chutney.

I was glad to be able to break the monotony of this long journey by
a visit to a half-sister of mine, who was then living at the
hill-station of Mussoorie. The change to the delightful freshness of a
Himalayan climate after the Turkish-bath-like atmosphere of the plains
in September was most grateful, and I thoroughly enjoyed the few days
I spent in the midst of the lovely mountain scenery.

My next station was Umballa. There I fell in with two other troops of
Horse Artillery, and became more than ever enamoured with the idea of
belonging to so splendid a service. From Umballa it was a two nights'
journey to Ludhiana, where I rested for the day, and there met a
cousin in the Survey Department, who had been suddenly ordered to
Lahore, so we agreed to travel together.

The next halting-place was Jullundur. To make a change, we hired a
buggy at this place, in which to drive the first stage, sending our
palankins on ahead; when we overtook them, we found, to our surprise,
that their number had increased to six. We were preparing for a start,
when it struck us that we ought to make some inquiries about the
additional four, which, from the luggage lying about, we assumed to
be occupied, but which appeared to be stranded for want of bearers to
carry them on. The doors were carefully closed, and it was some time
before we could get an answer to our offers of assistance. Eventually
a lady looked out, and told us that she and a friend, each accompanied
by two children and an _ayah_,[1] were on their way to Lahore; that
the bearers who had brought them so far had run away, and that they
were absolutely in despair as to how they were to proceed. It turned
out that the bearers, who had been engaged to carry the ladies on
the second stage towards Lahore, found it more amusing to attend the
ceremony of the installation of the Raja of Kaparthala, then going on,
than to fulfil their engagement. After discussing the situation, the
ladies were persuaded to get out of their palankins and into our
buggy. We divided the baggage and six doolies between our sixteen
bearers, and started off, my cousin, the _ayahs_, and I on foot. It
was then 10 p.m. We hoped relays of bearers for the whole party
would be forthcoming at the next stage, but we were doomed to
disappointment. Our reliefs were present, but none for the ladies.
We succeeded, however, in inducing our original bearers to come on a
further stage, thus arranging for the carriage of the _ayahs_, while
we two men trudged on beside the buggy for another ten or twelve
miles. It was a heavy, sandy road, and three stages were about as much
as the horse could manage.

Soon after daybreak next morning we reached the Bias river. Crossing
by a bridge of boats, we found on the other side a small one-roomed
house with a verandah running round it, built for the use of the
European overseer in charge of the road. On matters being explained,
this man agreed to turn out. The ladies and children were put inside,
and my cousin and I spent the day in the verandah; in the evening,
with the assistance of the overseer, we were able to get a sufficient
number of bearers to carry us all on to Mian Mir without further
adventure. In the course of conversation we found that one of the
ladies was the wife of Lieutenant Donald Stewart,[2] of the 9th Bengal
Infantry, and that she and her friend were returning to join their
respective husbands after spending the summer months at Simla. This
meeting was the beginning of a close friendship with Sir Donald and
Lady Stewart, which has lasted to the present day.

At Mian Mir (the military cantonment of Lahore) I stayed a few days
with another half-sister, and from there, as the weather was beginning
to get cooler, I travelled day and night. One evening about eight
o'clock I was disappointed at not having come across the usual
rest-house; lights could be seen, however, at no great distance, and
I proceeded towards them; they turned out to be the camp fires of a
Cavalry regiment which was halting there for the night. Being half
famished, and fearing that my craving for food was not likely to be
gratified unless someone in the camp would take pity upon my forlorn
condition, I boldly presented myself at the first tent I came across.
The occupant came out, and, on hearing the strait I was in, he with
kindly courtesy invited me to enter the tent, saying, 'You are just
in time to share our dinner.' My host turned out to be Major Crawford
Chamberlain,[3] commanding the 1st Irregular Cavalry, the famous
Skinner's Horse, then on its way to Peshawar. A lady was sitting at
the table--Mrs. Chamberlain--to whom I was introduced; I spent a very
pleasant evening, and in this way commenced another equally agreeable
and lasting friendship.


[Footnote 1: A Native woman-servant.]

[Footnote 2: Now Field Marshal Sir Donald Stewart, Bart., G.C.B.,
G.C.S.I.]

[Footnote 3: Now General Crawford Chamberlain, C.S.I., a brother of
General Sir Neville Chamberlain.]

       *       *       *       *       *




CHAPTER III.
1852-1853

  With my father at Peshawar--Peshawar in 1852--Excitements of a
  frontier station--A flogging parade--Mackeson's assassination
  --The Jowaki expedition--A strange dream--A typical frontier fight


Even the longest journey must come to an end at last, and early
in November I reached Peshawar. My father, who was then in his
sixty-ninth year, had just been appointed to command the division
with the temporary rank of Major-General. Old as this may appear at
a period when Colonels are superannuated at fifty-seven, and
Major-Generals must retire at sixty-two, my father did not consider
himself particularly unlucky. As for the authorities, they evidently
thought they were to be congratulated on having so young and active an
officer to place in a position of responsibility upon the North-West
Frontier, for amongst my father's papers I found letters from
the Adjutant-General and Quartermaster-General expressing high
satisfaction at his appointment to this difficult command.

It was a great advantage as well as a great pleasure to me to be with
my father at this time. I had left India an infant, and I had no
recollection of him until I was twelve years old, at which time he
came home on leave. Even then I saw very little of him, as I was at
school during the greater part of his sojourn in England, thus we met
at Peshawar almost as strangers. We did not, however, long remain so;
his affectionate greeting soon put an end to any feeling of shyness on
my part, and the genial and kindly spirit which enabled him to enter
into and sympathize with the feelings and aspirations of men younger
than himself, rendered the year I spent with him at Peshawar one
of the brightest and happiest of my early life. In one respect
particularly I benefited by the intercourse and confidence of the
year in question. My father spoke to me freely of his experiences in
Afghanistan, where he commanded during the Afghan war first a brigade,
and then Shah Shuja's contingent. The information I in this way
gathered regarding the characteristics of that peculiar country, and
the best means of dealing with its still more peculiar people, was
invaluable to me when I, in my turn, twenty-five years later, found
myself in command of an army in Afghanistan.

Eleven years only had elapsed since the first Afghan war, when my
father went to Peshawar and found himself again associated with
several Afghan friends; some had altogether settled in the Peshawar
district, for nearly all of those who had assisted us, or shown any
friendly feeling towards us, had been forced by Dost Mahomed Khan, on
his return as Amir to Kabul, to seek refuge in India. One of the chief
of these unfortunate refugees was Mahomed Usman Khan, Shah Shuja's
Wazir, or Prime Minister. He had been very intimate with my father, so
it was pleasant for them to meet again and talk over events in which
they had both played such prominent parts. Usman Khan died some years
ago; but visitors to India who travel as far as Peshawar may still
meet his sons, one of whom is the Commandant of the Khyber Rifles,
Lieutenant-Colonel Aslam Khan, C.I.E., a fine specimen of a Native
soldier and gentleman, who has proved his loyalty and done excellent
service to the State on many trying occasions.


[Illustration: GENERAL SIR ABRAHAM ROBERTS, G.C.B.

_From a photograph_.]


My father had also been on terms of intimacy with Dost Mahomed
himself and many other men of influence in Kabul, from whom, while at
Peshawar, he received most interesting letters, in which anxiety was
often expressed as to whether the English were amicably disposed
towards the Amir. To these communications my father was always careful
to send courteous and conciliatory replies. The correspondence which
took place confirmed him in his frequently expressed opinion that it
would be greatly to the advantage of the Government, and obviate
the necessity for keeping such large garrisons on the frontier, if
friendly relations could be established with the Amir, and with the
neighbouring tribes, who more or less looked to the Ruler of Kabul
as their Chief. My father accordingly addressed the Secretary to the
Government of India, and pointed out how successfully some of the most
experienced Anglo-Indian officials had managed barbarous tribes by
kindness and conciliation.

My father was prevented by ill-health from remaining long enough at
Peshawar to see the result of his proposals, but it was a source of
great satisfaction to him to learn before he left India[1] that they
were approved by Lord Dalhousie (the Governor-General), and that they
were already bearing fruit. That the Amir was himself ready to respond
to any overtures made to him was evident from a letter written by a
brother of the Dost's, which was discovered amongst the papers of
Colonel Mackeson (the Commissioner of Peshawar) after his death. It
was still more gratifying to my father to find that the views of
Mackeson's successor, Lieutenant-Colonel Herbert Edwardes, on this
subject entirely coincided with his own. This distinguished officer
and brilliant administrator zealously maintained this policy, and
succeeded in establishing such a good understanding with the Ruler
of Kabul that, when the Mutiny broke out, Afghanistan stood aloof,
instead of, as might have been the case, turning the scale against us.

The Peshawar division in 1852 was not only the most important, but
the largest, in India. It included besides Attock, Rawal Pindi, and
Jhelum, the hill-station of Murree, which had only been recently
occupied. The cantonment of Peshawar had been laid out by Sir Colin
Campbell (afterwards Lord Clyde), who commanded there when we first
occupied that place in 1849. He crowded the troops, European and
Native, into as small a space as possible in order that the station
might be the more easily protected from the raids of the Afridis
and other robber tribes, who had their homes in the neighbouring
mountains, and constantly descended into the valley for the sake of
plunder. To resist these marauders it was necessary to place guards
all round the cantonment. The smaller the enclosure, the fewer guards
would be required. From this point of view alone was Sir Colin's
action excusable; but the result of this overcrowding was what it
always is, especially in a tropical climate like that of India, and
for long years Peshawar was a name of terror to the English soldier
from its proverbial unhealthiness. The water-supply for the first
five-and-twenty years of our occupation was extremely bad, and
sanitary arrangements, particularly as regards Natives, were
apparently considered unnecessary.

In addition to the cordon of sentries round the cantonment, strong
piquets were posted on all the principal roads leading towards the
hills; and every house had to be guarded by a _chokidar_, or watchman,
belonging to one of the robber tribes. The maintaining this watchman
was a sort of blackmail, without consenting to which no one's horses
or other property were safe. The watchmen were armed with all sorts of
quaint old firearms, which, on an alarm being given, they discharged
in the most reckless manner, making it quite a work of danger to pass
along a Peshawar road after dark. No one was allowed to venture beyond
the line of sentries when the sun had set, and even in broad daylight
it was not safe to go any distance from the station.

In the autumn of 1851 an officer--Captain Frank Grantham, of the 98th
Foot--was riding with a young lady on the Michni road, not far from
the Artillery quarter-guard, when he was attacked by five hill-men.
Grantham was wounded so severely that he died in a few days, the
horses were carried off, but the girl was allowed to escape. She ran
as fast as she could to the nearest guard, and told her story; the
alarm was given, and the wounded man was brought in. The young lady
was called upon shortly afterwards to identify one of the supposed
murderers, but she could not recognize the man as being of the party
who made the attack; nevertheless, the murderer's friends were afraid
of what she might remember, and made an attempt one night to carry her
off. Fortunately, it was frustrated, but from that time, until she
left Peshawar, it was considered necessary to keep a guard over the
house in which she lived.

From all this my readers may probably think that Peshawar, as I first
knew it, was not a desirable place of residence; but I was very happy
there. There was a good deal of excitement and adventure; I made many
friends; and, above all, I had, to me, the novel pleasure of being
with my father.

It was the custom in those days for the General commanding one of the
larger divisions to have under him, and in charge of the Head-Quarter
station, a senior officer styled Brigadier. Soon after I went to
Peshawar, Sydney Cotton[2] held this appointment, and remained in
it for many years, making a great reputation for himself during the
Mutiny, and being eventually appointed to the command of the division.
The two senior officers on my father's staff were Lieutenant Norman[3]
and Lieutenant Lumsden,[4] the former Deputy Assistant-Adjutant-General
and the latter Deputy Assistant-Quartermaster-General. The high opinion
of them which my father had formed was subsequently justified by their
distinguished careers. Norman, with sixteen years' service, and at the
age of thirty-four, became Adjutant-General of the Army in India, and
a year or two later Secretary to Government in the Military Department.
He finished his Indian service as Military Member of Council. Lumsden
became Quartermaster-General, and afterwards Adjutant-General, the two
highest positions on the Indian staff.

There was a separate mess for all the staff officers, and I remember
a curious circumstance in connexion with that mess which, unless the
exception proves the rule, is strong evidence against the superstition
that thirteen is an unlucky number to sit down to dinner. On the 1st
January, 1853, thirteen of us dined together; eleven years after we
were all alive, nearly the whole of the party having taken part in the
suppression of the Mutiny, and five or six having been wounded.

From the time of my arrival until the autumn of 1853, nothing of
much importance occurred. I lived with my father, and acted as his
Aide-de-camp, while, at the same time, I did duty with the Artillery.
The 2nd Company, 2nd Battalion, to which I belonged, was composed of a
fine body of men, who had a grand reputation in the field, but, being
somewhat troublesome in quarters, had acquired the nickname of 'The
Devil's Own.' Because of the unusually good physique of the men, this
company was selected for conversion into a Mountain Battery, which it
was thought advisable to raise at that time. I was the only subaltern
with this battery for several months, and though my commanding officer
had no objection to my acting as A.D.C. to my father, he took good
care that I did my regimental duty strictly and regularly.

One very painful circumstance stamped itself on my memory. I was
obliged to be present at a flogging parade--the only one, I am glad to
say, I have ever had to attend, although the barbarous and degrading
custom of flogging in the army was not done away with until nearly
thirty years later.[5] A few years before I joined the service, the
number of lashes which might be given was limited to fifty, but even
under this restriction the sight was a horrible one to witness. The
parade to which I refer was ordered for the punishment of two men who
had been sentenced to fifty lashes each for selling their kits, and to
a certain term of imprisonment in addition. They were fine, handsome
young Horse Artillerymen, and it was hateful to see them thus treated.
Besides, one felt it was productive of harm rather than good, for it
tended to destroy the men's self-respect, and to make them completely
reckless. In this instance, no sooner had the two men been released
from prison than they committed the same offence again. They were a
second time tried by Court-Martial, and sentenced as before. How I
longed to have the power to remit the fifty lashes, for I felt that
selling their kits on this occasion was their way of showing their
resentment at the ignominious treatment they had been subjected to,
and of proving that flogging was powerless to prevent their repeating
the offence. A parade was ordered, as on the previous occasion. One
man was stripped to the waist, and tied to the wheel of a gun. The
finding and sentence of the Court-Martial were read out--a trumpeter
standing ready the while to inflict the punishment--when the
commanding officer, Major Robert Waller, instead of ordering him to
begin, to the intense relief of, I believe, every officer present,
addressed the prisoners, telling them of his distress at finding two
soldiers belonging to his troop brought up for corporal punishment
twice in a little more than six weeks, and adding that, however little
they deserved such leniency, if they would promise not to commit the
same offence again, and to behave better for the future, he would
remit the flogging part of the sentence. If the prisoners were not
happy, I was; but the clemency was evidently appreciated by them, for
they promised, and kept their words. I did not lose sight of these
two men for some years, and was always gratified to learn that their
conduct was uniformly satisfactory, and that they had become good,
steady soldiers.

The Commissioner, or chief civil authority, when I arrived at
Peshawar, was Colonel Mackeson, a well-known frontier officer who had
greatly distinguished himself during the first Afghan war by his work
among the Afridis and other border tribes, by whom he was liked and
respected as much as he was feared. During Shah Shuja's brief reign
at Kabul, Mackeson was continually employed on political duty in the
Khyber Pass and at Peshawar. On the breaking out of the insurrection
at Kabul, he was indefatigable in forwarding supplies and money to
Sir Robert Sale at Jalalabad, hastening up the reinforcements, and
maintaining British influence in the Khyber, a task of no small
magnitude when we remember that a religious war had been proclaimed,
and all true believers had been called upon to exterminate the
Feringhis. While at Peshawar, as Commissioner, his duties were arduous
and his responsibilities heavy--the more so as at that time the Afghan
inhabitants of the city were in a dangerous and excited state.

On the 10th September, 1853, we were horrified to learn that Mackeson
had been murdered by a religious fanatic. He was sitting in the
verandah of his house listening to appeals from the decisions of his
subordinates, when, towards evening, a man--who had been remarked
by many during the day earnestly engaged in his devotions, his
prayer-carpet being spread within sight of the house--came up and,
making a low salaam to Mackeson, presented him with a paper. The
Commissioner, supposing it to be a petition, stretched out his hand to
take it, when the man instantly plunged a dagger into his breast. The
noise consequent on the struggle attracted the attention of some of
the domestic servants and one of the Native officials. The latter
threw himself between Mackeson and the fanatic, and was himself
slightly wounded in his efforts to rescue his Chief.

Mackeson lingered until the 14th September. His death caused
considerable excitement in the city and along the border, increasing
to an alarming extent when it became known that the murderer had been
hanged and his body burnt. This mode of disposing of one of their dead
is considered by Mahomedans as the greatest insult that can be offered
to their religion, for in thus treating the corpse, as if it were that
of (by them) a hated and despised Hindu, the dead man is supposed to
be deprived of every chance of paradise. It was not without careful
and deliberate consideration that this course was decided upon, and it
was only adopted on account of the deterrent effect it would have upon
fanatical Mahomedans, who count it all gain to sacrifice their lives
by the murder of a heretic, and thereby secure, as they firmly
believe, eternal happiness, but loathe the idea of being burned, which
effectually prevents the murderer being raised to the dignity of a
martyr, and revered as a saint ever after.

It being rumoured that the Pathans intended to retaliate by
desecrating the late Commissioner's grave, it was arranged that he
should be buried within cantonment limits. A monument was raised to
his memory by public subscription, and his epitaph[6] was written by
the Governor-General himself.

Shortly before Mackeson's murder my father had found it necessary to
go to the hill-station of Murree; the hot weather had tried him very
much, and he required a change. He had scarcely arrived there, when
he was startled by the news of the tragedy which had occurred, and at
once determined to return, notwithstanding its being the most sickly
season of the year at Peshawar, for he felt that at a time of such
dangerous excitement it was his duty to be present. As a precautionary
measure, he ordered the 22nd Foot from Rawal Pindi to Peshawar. This
and other steps which he deemed prudent to take soon put an end to the
disturbances.

No sooner had matters quieted down at Peshawar than the Jowaki
Afridis, who inhabit the country immediately to the east of the Kohat
Pass, began to give trouble, and we went out into camp to select a
site for a post which would serve to cover the northern entrance to
the pass and keep the tribesmen under surveillance. The great change
of temperature, from the intense heat he had undergone in the summer
to the bitter cold of November nights in tents, was too severe a trial
for my father. He was then close on seventy, and though apparently
active as ever, he was far from well, consequently the doctors
strongly urged him not to risk another hot weather in India. It was
accordingly settled that he should return to England without delay.

Shortly before his departure, an incident occurred which I will relate
for the benefit of psychological students; they may, perhaps, be able
to explain it, I never could. My father had some time before issued
invitations for a dance which was to take place in two days' time--on
Monday, the 17th October, 1853. On the Saturday morning he appeared
disturbed and unhappy, and during breakfast he was silent and
despondent--very different from his usual bright and cheery self.
On my questioning him as to the cause, he told me he had had an
unpleasant dream--one which he had dreamt several times before, and
which had always been followed by the death of a near relation. As the
day advanced, in spite of my efforts to cheer him, he became more and
more depressed, and even said he should like to put off the dance. I
dissuaded him from taking this step for the time being; but that night
he had the same dream again, and the next morning he insisted on
the dance being postponed. It seemed to me rather absurd to have to
disappoint our friends because of a dream; there was, however, nothing
for it but to carry out my father's wishes, and intimation was
accordingly sent to the invited guests. The following morning the post
brought news of the sudden death of the half-sister at Lahore with
whom I had stayed on my way to Peshawar.

As my father was really very unwell, it was not thought advisable for
him to travel alone, so it was arranged that I should accompany him to
Rawal Pindi. We started from Peshawar on the 27th November, and drove
as far as Nowshera. The next day we went on to Attock. I found the
invalid had benefited so much by the change that it was quite safe for
him to continue the journey alone, and I consented the more readily to
leave him, as I was anxious to get back to my battery, which had been
ordered on service, and was then with the force assembled at Bazidkhel
for an expedition against the Bori villages of the Jowaki Afridis.

Having said farewell to my father, I started for Bazidkhel early on
the 29th November. At that time there was no direct road to that place
from Nowshera, nor was it considered safe to travel alone along the
slopes of the lower Afridi hills. I had, therefore, to go all the way
back to Peshawar to get to my destination. I rode as fast as relays of
horses could carry me, in the hope that I should reach Bazidkhel in
time for the fun; but soon after passing Nowshera I heard guns in the
direction of the Kohat Pass, and realized that I should be too late.
I was very disappointed at missing this, my first chance of active
service, and not accompanying the newly raised Mountain Train (as it
was then called) on the first occasion of its being employed in the
field.

The object of this expedition was to punish the Jowaki section of the
Afridis for their many delinquencies during the three previous years.
Numerous murders and raids on the Kohat and Peshawar districts,
the plunder of boats on the Indus, and the murder of a European
apothecary, were all traced to this tribe. They had been blockaded,
and their resort to the salt-mines near Bahadurkhel and to the markets
of Kohat and Peshawar had been interdicted, but these measures
produced no effect on the recalcitrant tribesmen. John (afterwards
Lord) Lawrence, who had come to Peshawar for the purpose of taking (sic)
over frontier affairs with Edwardes, the new Commissioner, held a
conference with the _maliks_[7] of the villages connected with the
Jowaki Pass, and being anxious to avoid hostilities, offered to
condone all past offences if the tribes would agree to certain
conditions, which, briefly, were that no further crimes should be
committed in British territory; that such criminals as had taken
refuge in their villages should be given up; and that for the future
criminals and outlaws flying from justice should not be afforded
an asylum in Jowaki lands. To the second condition the whole tribe
absolutely refused to agree. They stated, with truth, that from time
immemorial it was their custom to afford an asylum to anyone demanding
it, and that to surrender a man who had sought and found shelter with
them would be a disgrace which they could not endure.

Afridis have curious ideas as to the laws of hospitality; it is no
uncommon thing for them to murder their guests in cold blood, but it
is contrary to their code of honour to surrender a fugitive who has
claimed an asylum with them.

The sections of the tribe living nearest our territory agreed to the
first and third of our conditions, no doubt because they felt they
were in our power, and had suffered considerably from the blockade.
But the Bori Afridis would make no atonement for the past and give
no security for the future, although they admitted having robbed and
murdered our subjects. There was nothing for it, therefore, but to
send a force against them. This force consisted of rather more than
1,500 men, British and Native. The Afridis made no stand until we
reached their main position, when they offered a stout resistance,
which, however, proved of no avail against the gallantry of the Guides
and 66th (now 1st) Gurkhas. The Bori villages were then destroyed,
with a loss to us of eight men killed and thirty-one wounded.

Sufficient punishment having been inflicted, our force retired. The
rear-guard was hotly pressed, and it was late in the evening before
the troops got clear of the hills.

The tribesmen with whom we had just made friends sat in hundreds on
the ridges watching the progress of the fight. It was no doubt a great
temptation to them to attack the 'infidels' while they were at their
mercy, and considerable anxiety was felt by Lawrence and Edwardes
as to the part which our new allies would play; their relief was
proportionate when it was found they intended to maintain a neutral
attitude.

I shall not further describe the events of that day, more especially
as I was not fortunate enough to be in time to take part in the
proceedings. I have only referred to this expedition as being typical
of many little frontier fights, and because I remember being much
impressed at the time with the danger of trusting our communications
in a difficult mountainous country to people closely allied to those
against whom we were fighting. This over-confidence in the good faith
of our frontier neighbours caused us serious embarrassments a few
years later during the Umbeyla campaign.

The force remained in camp for some time for the protection of the men
employed in building the post, which was called Fort Mackeson, after
the murdered Commissioner. When it was completed we returned to
Peshawar.


[Footnote 1: Shortly before my father left Peshawar he received
the following letter from Colonel Outram, dated Calcutta, the 23rd
October, 1853: 'As I know that your views as to the policy that should
be pursued towards Dost Mahomed must be in accordance with those of
the Governor-General, I accordingly showed your letter to Grant,
Courtney, and Colonel Low, all of whom were glad to learn that you
entertained such sound views, opposed though they be with the general
clamour for war with the Kabulese which appears to be the cry of the
army. This, together with the wise forethought you displayed before
the Kabul insurrection (which, though at the time it found no favour
at Head-Quarters, was subsequently so mournfully established by the
Kabul massacre, which would have been prevented had your warnings
been attended to), shows how well you would combine the military and
political control of the country beyond the Indus.']

[Footnote 2: The late General Sir Sydney Cotton, G.C.B.]

[Footnote 3: Now General Sir Henry Norman, G.C.B., G.C.M.G., lately
Governor of Queensland.]

[Footnote 4: Now General Sir Peter Lumsden, G.C.B.]

[Footnote 5: 1881.]

[Footnote 6:

            'HERE LIES THE BODY OF FREDERICK MACKESON,

  LIEUTENANT-COLONEL IN THE BENGAL ARMY, COMPANION OF THE BATH, AND

 COMMISSIONER OF PESHAWAR, WHO WAS BORN SEPTEMBER 2ND, 1807, AND DIED

  SEPTEMBER 14TH, 1853, OF A WOUND INFLICTED BY A RELIGIOUS FANATIC.


He was the beau-ideal of a soldier--cool to conceive, brave to dare,
and strong to do. The Indian Army was proud of his noble presence in
its ranks--not without cause. On the dark page of the Afghan war the
name of "Mackeson" shines brightly out; the frontier was his post, and
the future his field. The defiles of the Khyber and the peaks of the
Black Mountain alike witness his exploits. Death still found him in
front. Unconquered enemies felt safer when he fell. His own Government
thus mourn the fall.

'The reputation of Lieutenant-Colonel Mackeson as a soldier is known
to and honoured by all. His value as a political servant of the State
is known to none better than to the Governor-General himself, who in a
difficult and eventful time had cause to mark his great ability, and
the admirable prudence, discretion, and temper, which added tenfold
value to the high soldierly qualities of his public character.

'The loss of Colonel Mackeson's life would have dimmed a victory; to
lose him thus, by the hand of a foul assassin, is a misfortune of
the heaviest gloom for the Government, which counted him amongst its
bravest and best.

'General orders of the Marquis Dalhousie, Governor-General of India,
3rd October, 1853.

'This monument was erected by his friends.']

[Footnote 7: Head men.]

       *       *       *       *       *




CHAPTER IV.
1854-1856

  A trip to Khagan--The Vale of Kashmir--With the Horse Artillery
  --My first visit to Simla--Life at Peshawar--A staff appointment
  --The bump of locality


I had had a great deal of fever during my eighteen months' residence
at Peshawar, and in April, 1854, I obtained six months' leave to
Kashmir. I travelled _viâ_ Murree to Abbottabad, along the route now
well known as the 'Gullies.' Here I was joined by Lieutenant George
Rodney Brown,[1] a subaltern of Horse Artillery, with whom I chummed
at Peshawar.

Abbottabad was a very small place in those days. It was named after
its first Deputy-Commissioner, James Abbott,[2] famous for his journey
_viâ_ Bokhara and Khiva to Russia in 1839, undertaken for the release
of Russian prisoners who were kept as slaves by the Turkomans. He had
just left, and had been succeeded as Deputy-Commissioner by a Captain
Becher, who, fortunately for us, was away in the district. I say
fortunately, because we were bent on visiting Khagan, and had obtained
permission from the Commissioner of Peshawar to do so. He had told
us to apply to Becher for assistance, but from what we heard of that
officer, it did not seem likely he would help us. Khagan was beyond
our border, and the inhabitants were said to be even more fanatical
than the rest of the frontier tribes. The Commissioner, however, had
given us leave, and as his Deputy appeared to be the kind of man
to create obstacles, we made up our minds to slip away before he
returned.

We started on the 21st May, and marched to Habibula-Ki-Ghari. Here the
road bifurcates, one branch leading to Kashmir, the other to Khagan.
We took the latter, and proceeded to Balakot, twelve miles further
on, which was then our frontier post. There we found a small guard of
Frontier Police, two of whom we induced to accompany us on our onward
journey for the purpose of assisting to look after the baggage and
collecting coolies. Three days' more marching brought us to Khagan.
The road almost the whole way from Balakot ran along a precipice
overhanging the Nainsukh river, at that time of year a rushing
torrent, owing to the melting of the snows on the higher ranges. The
track was rough, steep, and in some places very narrow. We crossed and
recrossed the river several times by means of snow-bridges, which,
spanning the limpid, jade-coloured water, had a very pretty effect. At
one point our _shikarris_[3] stopped, and proudly told us that on that
very spot their tribe had destroyed a Sikh army sent against them in
the time of Runjit Sing. It certainly was a place well chosen for a
stand, not more than fifty yards wide, with a perpendicular cliff on
one side and a roaring torrent on the other.

The people apparently did not object to our being in their country,
and treated us with much civility throughout our journey. We were
enjoying ourselves immensely, so when an official cover reached us
with the signature of the dreaded Deputy-Commissioner in the corner,
we agreed that it would be unwise to open it just then.

Khagan was almost buried in snow. The scenery was magnificent, and
became every moment more wonderful as we slowly climbed the steep
ascent in front of us; range after range of snow-capped mountains
disclosed themselves to our view, rising higher and higher into the
air, until at last, towering above all, Nanga Parbat[4] in all her
spotless beauty was revealed to our astonished and delighted gaze.

We could not get beyond Khagan. Our coolies refused to go further,
alleging as their reason the danger to be dreaded from avalanches
in that month; but I suspect that fear of hostility from the tribes
further north had more to do with their reluctance to proceed than
dread of falling avalanches. We remained at Khagan for two or
three days in the hope of being able to shoot an ibex, but we were
disappointed; we never even saw one.

We retraced our steps with considerable regret, and reached
Habibula-Ki-Ghari on the 31st May. Here we received a second official
document from Abbottabad. It contained, like the previous letter,
which we now looked at for the first time, orders for our immediate
return, and warnings that we were on no account to go to Khagan. Since
then Khagan has been more than once visited by British officers, and
now a road is in course of construction along the route we travelled,
as being a more direct line of communication with Gilghit than that
_viâ_ Kashmir.

We made no delay at Habibula-Ki-Ghari, but started at once for the
lovely Vale of Kashmir, where we spent the summer, amusing ourselves
by making excursions to all the places of interest and beauty we had
so often heard of, and occasionally shooting a bear. The place which
impressed me most was Martund,[5] where stand the picturesque ruins of
a once renowned Hindu temple. These noble ruins are the most striking
in size and position of all the existing remains of the past glories
of Kashmir.

From Martund we made our way to Vernag, the celebrated spring which
is supposed to be the source of the Jhelum river. The Moghul Emperor
Akbar built there a summer palace, and the arches, on which it is
said rested the private apartments of the lovely Nur Jehan, are still
visible.

We wandered over the beautiful and fertile Lolab valley, and pitched
our little camp in the midst of groves of chunar, walnut, apple,
cherry, and peach trees; and we marched up the Sind valley, and
crossed the Zojji La Pass leading into Thibet. The scenery all along
this route is extremely grand. On either side are lofty mountains,
their peaks wrapped in snow, their sides clothed with pine, and their
feet covered with forests, in which is to be found almost every kind
of deciduous tree. From time to time we returned for a few days to
Srinagar, the capital of Kashmir, to enjoy the pleasures of more
civilized society. Srinagar is so well known nowadays, and has been
so often described in poetry and prose, that it is needless for me to
dwell at length upon its delights, which, I am inclined to think, are
greater in imagination than in reality. It has been called the Venice
of the East, and in some respects it certainly does remind one of the
'Bride of the Sea,' both in its picturesqueness and (when one gets
into the small and tortuous canals) its unsavouriness. Even at the
time of which I am writing it was dilapidated, and the houses looked
exactly like those made by children out of a pack of cards, which a
puff of wind might be expected to destroy. Of late years the greater
part of the city has been injured by earthquakes, and Srinagar looks
more than ever like a card city. The great beauty of the place in
those days was the wooden bridges covered with creepers, and gay with
booths and shops of all descriptions, which spanned the Jhelum at
intervals for the three miles the river runs through the town--now,
alas! for the artistic traveller, no more. Booths and shops have been
swept away, and the creepers have disappeared--decidedly an advantage
from a sanitary point of view, but destructive of the quaint
picturesqueness of the town.

The floating gardens are a unique and very pretty characteristic of
Srinagar. The lake is nowhere deeper than ten or twelve feet, and in
some places much less. These gardens are made by driving stakes into
the bed of the lake, long enough to project three or four feet above
the surface of the water. These stakes are placed at intervals in an
oblong form, and are bound together by reeds and rushes twined in and
out and across, until a kind of stationary raft is made, on which
earth and turf are piled. In this soil seeds are sown, and the crops
of melons and other fruits raised in these fertile beds are extremely
fine and abundant.

The magnificent chunar-trees are another very beautiful feature of the
country. They grow to a great height and girth, and so luxuriant and
dense is their foliage that I have sat reading and writing for hours
during heavy rain under one of these trees and kept perfectly dry.

The immediate vicinity of Srinagar is very pretty, and the whole
valley of Kashmir is lovely beyond description: surrounded by
beautifully-wooded mountains, intersected with streams and lakes, and
gay with flowers of every description, for in Kashmir many of the
gorgeous eastern plants and the more simple but sweeter ones of
England meet on common ground. To it may appropriately be applied the
Persian couplet:

  'Agar fardos baru-i zamin ast, hamin ast, hamin ast'
  (If there be an Elysium on earth, it is this, it is this).

The soil is extremely productive; anything will grow in it. Put a
stick into the ground, and in an extraordinary short space of time it
becomes a tree and bears fruit. What were we about, to sell such a
country for three quarters of a million sterling? It would have made
the most perfect sanatorium for our troops, and furnished an admirable
field for British enterprise and colonization, its climate being as
near perfection as anything can be.

How sad it is that, in a country 'where every prospect pleases,
only man' should be 'vile'! And man, as he existed in Kashmir, was
vile--vile, because so miserable. The Mahomedan inhabitants were being
ground down by Hindu rulers, who seized all their earnings, leaving
them barely sufficient to keep body and soul together. What interest
could such people have in cultivating their land, or doing any work
beyond what was necessary to mere existence? However hard they might
labour, their efforts would benefit neither themselves nor their
children, and so their only thought was to get through life with
as little exertion as possible--in the summer sitting in the sun
absolutely idle the greater part of the day, and in the winter wrapped
up in their blankets, under which were concealed curious little
vessels called _kangris_, holding two or three bits of live charcoal.
Every Kashmiri still carries one of these _kangris_, as the most
economical way of keeping himself warm.

Early in September we said good-bye to the happy valley and returned
to Peshawar, where I rejoined the Mountain Battery.

In November, to my great delight, I was given my jacket. At first my
happiness was somewhat damped by the fact that the troop to which I
was posted was stationed at Umballa. I did not want to leave Peshawar,
and in the end I had not to do so, as a vacancy most opportunely
occurred in one of the troops of Horse Artillery at that station,
which was given to me.

Life on the frontier in those days had a great charm for most young
men; there was always something of interest going on; military
expeditions were constantly taking place, or being speculated upon,
and one lived in hope of being amongst those chosen for active
service. Peshawar, too, notwithstanding its unhealthiness, was a
favourite station with officers. To me it was particularly pleasant,
for it had the largest force of Artillery of any station in India
except Meerut; the mess was a good one, and was composed of as nice
a set of fellows as were to be found in the army. In addition to the
officers of the regiment, there were a certain number of honorary
members; all the staff and civilians belonged to the Artillery mess,
and on guest-nights we sat down as many as sixty to dinner. Another
attraction was the 'coffee shop,' an institution which has now almost
ceased to exist, at which we all congregated after morning parade and
freely discussed the home and local news.

The troop to which I was posted was composed of a magnificent body of
men, nearly all Irishmen, most of whom could have lifted me up
with one hand. They were fine riders, and needed to be so, for the
stud-horses used for Artillery purposes at that time were not the
quiet, well-broken animals of the present day. I used to try my
hand at riding them all in turn, and thus learnt to understand and
appreciate the amount of nerve, patience, and skill necessary to
the making of a good Horse Artillery 'driver,' with the additional
advantage that I was brought into constant contact with the men. It
also qualified me to ride in the officers' team for the regimental
brake. The brake, it must be understood, was drawn by six horses, each
ridden postilion fashion by an officer.

My troop was commanded by Captain Barr, a dear old fellow who had seen
a good deal of service and was much liked by officers and men, but
hardly the figure for a Horse Artilleryman, as he weighed about
seventeen stone. On a troop parade Barr took up his position well
in advance and made his own pace, but on brigade parades he had to
conform to the movements of the other arms, and on these occasions he
used to tell one of the subalterns as he galloped past him to come
'left about' at the right time without waiting for his order. This, of
course, we were always careful to do, and by the time we had come into
action Barr had caught us up and was at his post.

During the winter of 1854-55 I had several returns of Peshawar fever,
and by the beginning of the spring I was so reduced that I was given
eight months' leave on medical certificate, with orders to report
myself at Mian Mir at its expiration, in view to my going through the
riding course, there being no Riding-Master at Peshawar.

I decided to return to Kashmir in the first instance, and thence to
march across the Himalayas to Simla.

On my way into Kashmir I was fortunate enough to fall in with a very
agreeable travelling companion--Lieutenant John Watson.[6] He was then
Adjutant of the 1st Punjab Cavalry, and was looked upon as one of
the most promising officers of the Frontier Force. We spent a very
enjoyable time in Kashmir, and early in August I started for Simla
with two brother officers named Light and Mercer, whose acquaintance
I had only recently made, but who turned out to be very pleasant
fellow-travellers.

We marched _viâ_ Kishtwar, Chamba, and Dharmsala, a distance of about
400 miles, through most beautiful scenery. At the last-named place I
parted from my companions, who travelled onwards to Simla by the Kulu
valley, while I took the shorter route _viâ_ Bilaspur.

The Simla of those days was not the busy and important place it
has since become. The Governor-General seldom visited it, and the
Commander-in-Chief only spent a summer there occasionally. When I
arrived, Sir William Gomm, the Commander-in-Chief of that day, who had
been spending the hot weather months there, was about to give up his
command, and Colonel Grant,[7] who had been his Adjutant-General, had
left not long before.

The only thing of interest to myself which occurred during the month I
remained at Simla was that I lunched with Colonel Arthur Becher, the
Quartermaster-General. I think I hear my reader say, 'Not a very
remarkable event to chronicle.' But that lunch was a memorable one to
me; indeed, it was the turning-point in my career, for my host was
good enough to say he should like to have me in his department some
day, and this meant a great deal to me. Joining a department at that
time generally resulted in remaining in it for the greater part
of one's service. There was then no limit to the tenure of staff
appointments, and the object of every ambitious young officer was to
get into one department or another--political, civil, or the army
staff. My father had always impressed upon me that the political
department was _the_ one to aspire to, and failing that, the
Quartermaster-General's, as in the latter there was the best chance of
seeing service. I had cherished a sort of vague hope that I might some
day be lucky enough to become a Deputy Assistant-Quartermaster-General,
for although I fully recognized the advantages of a political career,
I preferred being more closely associated with the army, and I had seen
enough of staff work to satisfy myself that it would suit me; so the
few words spoken to me by Colonel Becher made me supremely happy.

It never entered into my head that I should get an early appointment;
the fact of the Quartermaster-General thinking of me as a possible
recruit was quite enough for me. I was in no hurry to leave the Horse
Artillery, to which I was proud of belonging, and in which I hoped to
see service while still on the frontier. I left Simla very pleased
with the result of my visit, and very grateful to Colonel Becher, who
proved a good friend to me ever after, and I made my way to Mian Mir,
where I went through the riding-school course, and then returned to
Peshawar.

(1856) The winter of 1855-56 passed much as the cold weather generally
does in the north of India. Our amusements consisted of an occasional
race-meeting or cricket match. Polo was unknown in those days, and
hunting the jackal, a sport which has been a source of so much
recreation to the Peshawar garrison for thirty odd years, had not then
been thought of. It was a pleasant change to visit the outposts, and
whenever I got the chance I rode over to Mardan, where the Corps
of Guides were stationed, commanded by that gallant soldier, Harry
Lumsden,[8] who had raised the corps in 1846 under the auspices of
Henry Lawrence. Many were the good gallops I enjoyed with his hawks,
hunting the _aubara_.[9] Of work there was plenty at Peshawar, for the
Brigadier, Sydney Cotton,[10] kept us alive with field days, carefully
instilling into us his idea that parade-grounds were simply useful for
drill and preliminary instruction, and that as soon as the rudiments
of a soldier's education had been learnt, the troops should leave
their nursery, and try as far as possible to practise in peace what
they would have to do in war. Sydney Cotton was never tired of
explaining that the machinery of war, like all other machinery, should
be kept, so to speak, oiled and ready for use.

My dream of a staff appointment was realized more quickly than I had
expected. In the early part of 1856 the Surveyor-General applied for
the services of two or three experienced officers to assist in the
survey of Kashmir. Lumsden, the D.A.Q.M.G., was one of those selected
for the duty, and I was appointed to officiate for him. So delighted
was I to get my foot on the lowest rung of the staff ladder, that I
cheerfully agreed to the condition my Captain insisted upon, that I
should perform my regimental duties in addition to the staff work.
Things went merrily with me for a short time, when most unexpectedly
my hopes of some day becoming Quartermaster-General of the Army in
India were dashed to the ground by the Governor-General refusing
to confirm my appointment, because I had not passed the prescribed
examination in Hindustani. A rule existed requiring a language test,
but it had seldom been enforced, certainly not in the case of 'acting
appointments,' so that this refusal came as a great blow to me. It
had, however, excellent results, for it made me determined to pass in
Hindustani. It was then May, and in July the half-yearly examination
was to be held. I forthwith engaged the best _munshi_[11] at Peshawar,
shut myself up, and studied Indian literature from morning till night,
until I felt pretty confident of success.

Just before the examination took place, the officer who had stepped
into my shoes when I was turned out (Lieutenant Mordaunt Fitz-Gerald,
of my own regiment) was offered an appointment in the Punjab Frontier
Force. He consulted me as to the advisability of accepting it, and
I told him I thought he ought not to do so. I considered this most
disinterested advice, for I had good reason to believe that I should
be re-appointed to the staff, should the appointment again become
vacant. Fortunately for me, Fitz-Gerald followed the usual procedure
of those who delight in consulting their friends. He listened to my
advice, and then decided not to follow it. Accordingly, he joined the
Punjab Frontier Force, whilst I, having passed the examination, went
back to the coveted appointment, and continued in the department, with
the exception of one or two short intervals, until 1878, when I left
it as Quartermaster-General.

The autumn of 1856 was a very sickly one at Peshawar; fever was rife
amongst the troops, and in the hope of shaking it off Brigadier Cotton
got permission to take a certain number into camp. It was September,
and the sun was still very hot, so that it was necessary to begin the
daily march long before dawn in order to reach the new camping ground
while it was still tolerably cool. We crossed the Kabul river at
Nowshera, which place was then being made into a station for troops,
and marched about the Yusafzai plain for three weeks. The chief
difficulty was the absence of water, and I had to prospect the country
every afternoon for a sufficient supply, and to determine, with regard
to this _sine quâ non_, where the camp should be pitched the next day.
On one occasion the best place I could discover was between two and
three miles off the main road. There was no difficulty in reaching it
by day, but I was afraid of some mistake being made when we had to
leave it in the small hours of the morning, few things being more
bewildering than to find one's way in the dark from a camp pitched in
the open country when once the tents have been struck. It was my duty
to lead the column and see that it marched off in the right direction;
knowing how anxious the Brigadier was that the new ground should be
reached while it was cool, and the men be thus saved from exposure to
the sun, I was careful to note my position with regard to the stars,
and to explain to the officer who was in orders to command the advance
guard the direction he must take. When the time came to start, and the
Brigadier was about to order the bugler to sound the march, I saw that
the advance guard was drawn up at right angles to the way in which we
had to proceed. The officer commanding it was positive he was right,
and in this he was supported by Brigadier Cotton and some of the other
officers; I was equally positive that he was wrong, and that if we
marched as he proposed, we should find ourselves several miles out
of our course. The Brigadier settled the question by saying I was
responsible for the troops going in the right direction, and ordering
me to show the way. The country was perfectly bare, there was not
a tree or object of any kind to guide me, and the distance seemed
interminable. I heard opinions freely expressed that I was on the
wrong road, and at last, when the Brigadier himself came up to me and
said he thought I must have lost the way, I really began to waver in
my conviction that I was right. At that moment my horse stumbled into
a ditch, which proved to be the boundary of the main road. I was
immensely relieved, the Brigadier was delighted, and from that moment
I think he was satisfied that I had, what is so essential to a
Quartermaster-General in the field, the bump of locality.

In October the Artillery moved into the practice camp at Chamkanie,
about five miles from Peshawar. It was intended that we should remain
there for a couple of months, but before the end of that time I had
to join the General at Rawal Pindi, where he had gone on a tour of
inspection. Being anxious not to shirk my regimental duty, I did not
leave Chamkanie until the last moment, and had but one day in which
to reach Rawal Pindi, a distance of one hundred miles, which I
accomplished on horseback between 7 a.m. and 6 p.m., only stopping at
Attock a short time for refreshment.

This tour with General Reed ended my staff duties for a time, as
the survey in Kashmir had come to an end and Lumsden rejoined his
appointment before Christmas.


[Footnote 1: Now a retired Major-General.]

[Footnote 2: Now General Sir James Abbott, K.C.B.]

[Footnote 3: Men who carry the guns, and point out the most likely
places for game, etc.]

[Footnote 4: 26,000 feet above the sea-level.]

[Footnote 5: Three miles east of Islamabad.]

[Footnote 6: Now General Sir John Watson, V.C., K.C.B.]

[Footnote 7: The late Field-Marshal Sir Patrick Grant, G.C.B.,
G.C.S.I.]

[Footnote 8: The late General Sir Harry Lumsden, K.C.S.I., C.B.]

[Footnote 9: Bastard florican.]

[Footnote 10: This officer arrived in India as a Cornet in the 24th
Light Dragoons in the year 1810, and although, when he reached
Peshawar with his regiment--the 22nd Foot--in 1853, he had been
forty-three years in the army, and was sixty-one years of age, he had
not even succeeded to the command of a battalion. He was an officer
of unusual energy and activity, a fine rider, a pattern drill, and a
thorough soldier all round. He was not fortunate enough to see much
active service, but it must have been a source of consolation to him
to feel, when ending his days as Governor of the Royal Hospital at
Chelsea, that it was in a great measure owing to his foresight and
decision that there was no serious disturbance at Peshawar during the
eventful summer of 1857.]

[Footnote 11: Instructor in Oriental languages.]

       *       *       *       *       *




CHAPTER V.
1856-1857

  Lord Dalhousie's Afghan policy--Treaty with Dost Mahomed
  --War with Persia--The advantage of the Amir's friendship
  --John Nicholson--'A pillar of strength on the frontier'


Towards the close of the year 1856, a rumour reached us that the Amir,
Dost Mahomed Khan, was shortly expected to arrive at Peshawar to meet
the Chief Commissioner, Sir John Lawrence, who had recently been made
a K.C.B.

Before describing the Amir's visit and its results, it seems desirable
that I should briefly explain how and why the visit was brought about,
and then endeavour to show what an important bearing its results had
on the great crisis which occurred so unexpectedly a few months later.

It will be remembered that the murdered Mackeson was succeeded
as Commissioner of Peshawar by Herbert Edwardes, one of the most
remarkable men that the Indian army has ever produced, and who, as I
have already mentioned, entirely concurred in my father's expressed
opinion as to the great advantage it would be for the Government of
India to enter into more friendly relations with the Ruler of Kabul.
They both held that the constant troubles all along our frontier were
in a great measure due to the Amir's hostility, and that such troubles
would increase rather than diminish unless we could succeed in
establishing an _entente cordiale_ with Dost Mahomed.

In 1854 Edwardes had a correspondence with the Governor-General on the
subject, and on one occasion expressed himself as follows: 'My own
feeling is, that we have much injured Dost Mahomed, and may very well
afford to let by-gones be by-gones. It would contribute much to
the security of this frontier if open relations of goodwill were
established at Kabul. There is a sullenness in our present relations,
as if both parties were brooding over the past, and expecting an
opportunity in the future. This keeps up excitement and unrest, and
prevents our influence and institutions taking root. I should be very
glad to see a new account opened on the basis of an open treaty of
friendship and alliance.'

Lord Dalhousie was quite in accord with Edwardes. He thought it very
desirable to be on better terms with Kabul, but believed this to be
a result difficult to attain. 'I give you,' he said in a letter to
Edwardes, _carte blanche_, and if you can only bring about such a
result as you propose, it will be a new feather in your cap.'

Lord Dalhousie was supported by the British Government in his opinion
as to the desirability of coming to a better understanding with the
Amir. War with Russia was then imminent, and the strained condition of
European politics made it expedient that we should be on more amicable
terms with Afghanistan.

The Governor-General thus wrote to Edwardes:

'Prospects of a war between Russia and Turkey are watched with
interest by all.... In England they are fidgety regarding this border
beyond all reason, and most anxious for that declared amity and that
formal renewal of friendly relations which you advocate in your
letter.'

The balance of Indian opinion, however, was against our making
overtures to Dost Mahomed. John Lawrence, at that time the great power
in the Punjab, was altogether opposed to Edwardes's policy in this
matter. He admitted that it might be wise to renew intercourse
with the Kabul ruler if he first expressed his regret for previous
misunderstandings; but later he wrote to Edwardes:

    'I dare say you are right; still, I cannot divest myself of the
    idea that it is _a mistake_, and will end in mixing us up in
    Afghan politics and affairs more than is desirable. The strength
    which a treaty can give us seems to be a delusion. It will be like
    the reed on which, if a man lean, it will break and pierce his
    hand.'

John Nicholson, Outram, and James Abbott agreed with Lawrence.
They urged that any advance on our part would be looked upon as an
indication of conscious weakness; and the probability was that an
arrogant, irritated Mussulman ruler would regard an overture as a
proof of our necessity, and would make our necessity his opportunity.
But Lord Dalhousie, while anxious to avoid any communication being
made which could be liable to misconstruction, saw neither objection
nor risk in opening the door to reconciliation, provided no undue
anxiety was displayed on our part. The Governor-General practically
left the matter in the hands of Edwardes, who lost no time in trying
to attain the desired object. The greatest forbearance and diplomatic
skill were necessary to bring the negotiations to a satisfactory
termination, but they were concluded at last, most successfully, and
to Edwardes alone is due the credit. It is instructive to read the
full record[1] of this tedious and difficult piece of diplomacy,
for it serves as an interesting example of Oriental subtlety and
circumlocution, contrasted with the straightforward dealing of a
high-minded Englishman.

The Amir wrote a letter to the Governor-General couched in most
satisfactory terms, which he forwarded to Peshawar by the hand of his
confidential secretary, and which received, as it deserved, a very
friendly reply. This resulted in Dost Mahomed sending his son and
heir-apparent, Sardar Ghulam Haidar Khan, to Peshawar, and deputing
him to act as his Plenipotentiary in the negotiations. Ghulam Haidar
Khan reached Peshawar in March, 1855, where he was met by the Chief
Commissioner, and on the 30th of that month the treaty was concluded.
'It guaranteed that we should respect the Amir's possessions in
Afghanistan, and never interfere with them; while the Amir engaged
similarly to respect British territory, and to be the friend of our
friends and the enemy of our enemies.'

The Governor-General had at first resolved to entrust to Edwardes the
duty of meeting the expected Envoy from Kabul, and orders to that
effect were issued. But Edwardes, more anxious for the success of
the negotiations than for his own honour and glory, wrote to
Lord Dalhousie suggesting that the Government of India should be
represented by the Chief Commissioner of the Punjab, and promising to
afford Sir John Lawrence all the assistance in his power. Edwardes
believed that the importance of the treaty would be enhanced in the
eyes of the Afghans by the presence of the higher official; and in
this opinion the Governor-General concurred. On the conclusion of the
treaty, Lord Dalhousie wrote to Edwardes: 'I congratulate you and
myself and all else concerned on this successful issue of the
negotiations, which have now lasted just a year.'

This treaty of March, 1855, was only preliminary to that for the
ratification of which the Amir came in person to Peshawar the
following year.

Towards the end of 1855 Dost Mahomed found himaelf in considerable
difficulties, and appealed to us for assistance. A revolt had occurred
at Herat, and a Persian army was preparing to besiege that fortress;
the chiefs and people of Kandahar were disaffected; and the province
of Balkh was threatened with invasion both by the King of Bokhara and
by Turkoman hordes. The Amir looked upon Herat as an integral part of
the Afghan dominions, and was very desirous of re-establishing his
authority over that place and preventing its falling into the hands of
the Persians; but he felt himself too weak to have any hope of success
without help from us in men and money. It was, therefore, Dost
Mahomed's interest to convince the British Government that the Shah
had infringed the conditions of an engagement entered into with us in
1853, under which Persia abandoned all claim to Herat. The Amir thus
hoped to establish a quarrel between England and Persia for his own
benefit, and to secure our assistance against the latter power. To
further this design, Dost Mahomed offered to come to Peshawar and
consult with the British authorities. Edwardes was in favour of the
proposed visit. John Lawrence was opposed to it, saying he did not
think much good would result from such a meeting, because it could
hardly be anticipated that the views of the Amir and the British
Government would coincide, and if Dost Mahomed should fail to obtain
what he wanted, his dissatisfaction would be a positive evil. The
Governor-General admitted the force of these objections, but in the
end considered that they should be set aside if the Amir was in
earnest in desiring a consultation. 'A refusal or an evasion to comply
with his wish,' Lord Dalhousie thought, 'might be misunderstood, and
although a meeting might lead to disappointment and disagreement, it
would, at any rate, put the relations of the British Government with
the Amir, as regards Herat, upon a clear footing.'

While this discussion was going on, the advance of a Persian army for
the purpose of besieging Herat, coupled with the insults offered to
the British flag at Teheran, led to the declaration of war between
England and Persia. The Chief Commissioner was therefore directed to
tell the Amir that he would be paid a periodical subsidy to aid him
in carrying on hostile operations against Persia, subject to certain
conditions. On receiving these instructions, the Chief Commissioner
directed Edwardes to invite the Amir to an interview. Dost Mahomed
accepted the invitation, but before the auspicious meeting could take
place Lord Dalhousie had left India, and Lord Canning reigned in his
stead. Lord Dalhousie resigned on the 29th February, 1856, after
having filled the arduous and responsible position of Governor-General
for no less than eight years, adding year by year fresh lustre to his
splendid reputation.

The first day of 1857 witnessed the meeting between the Amir of Kabul
and the Chief Commissioner of the Punjab. The Amir's camp was pitched
at the mouth of the Khyber Pass, and that of the Chief Commissioner on
the plain near Jamrud. Barr's troop of Horse Artillery formed part of
the escort, so I was in the midst of it all. On the occasion of the
Amir's first visit to the English camp, there was a force present
of upwards of 7,000 soldiers, including three regiments of British
Infantry; the troops lined the road for more than a mile, and it was
evident that their strength and soldierly appearance inspired the
Amir and his followers with a very salutary feeling of awe and
admiration.[2]

The result of the conferences between these two great personages was
an agreement confirming the treaty of the year before. In addition,
the Amir bound himself to keep up a certain number of regular troops
for the defence of Afghanistan, so long as the war with Persia
continued, in consideration of a monthly subsidy of Rs. 100,000 and
a gift of 4,000 muskets. He also engaged to communicate to the
Government of India any overtures he might receive from Persia, and
he consented to allow British officers to visit certain parts of his
dominions, either for the purpose of assisting his subjects against
Persia, or to ascertain that the subsidy was properly applied.

I have dwelt at some length on this treaty with Afghanistan, first,
because the policy of which this was the outcome was, as I have
already shown, initiated by my father; and, secondly, because I do not
think it is generally understood how important to us were its results.
Not only did it heal the wounds left open from the first Afghan war,
but it relieved England of a great anxiety at a time when throughout
the length and breadth of India there was distress, revolt, bloodshed,
and bitter distrust of our Native troops. Dost Mahomed loyally held
to his engagements during the troublous days of the Mutiny which so
quickly followed this alliance, when, had he turned against us, we
should assuredly have lost the Punjab; Delhi could never have been
taken; in fact, I do not see how any part of the country north of
Bengal could have been saved. Dost Mahomed's own people could not
understand his attitude. They frequently came to him during the
Mutiny, throwing their turbans at his feet, and praying him as a
Mahomedan to seize that opportunity for destroying the 'infidels.'
'Hear the news from Delhi,' they urged; 'see the difficulties the
Feringhis are in. Why don't you lead us on to take advantage of their
weakness, and win back Peshawar?'[3]

But I am anticipating, and must return to my narrative.

The clause of the treaty which interested me personally was that
relating to British officers being allowed to visit Afghanistan,
to give effect to which a Mission was despatched to Kandahar. It
consisted of three officers, the brothers Harry and Peter Lumsden, and
Dr. Bellew, together with two of Edwardes's trusted Native Chiefs. The
selection of Peter Lumsden as a member of this Mission again left the
Deputy Assistant-Quartermaster-Generalship vacant, and I was a second
time appointed to officiate in his absence.

Shortly afterwards the General of the division (General Reed) started
on his tour of inspection, taking me with him as his staff officer.
Jhelum was the first place we visited. Whether the sepoys had then
any knowledge of what was so soon to happen is doubtful. If they had,
there was no evidence that such was the case. Nothing could have
been more proper or respectful than their behaviour; no crimes were
reported, no complaints were made. The British officers, certainly,
had not the slightest idea of the storm that was brewing, for they
spoke in the warmest terms of their men.

From Jhelum we went to Rawal Pindi. John Lawrence happened to be in
camp there at the time, and looked on at the General's inspection.
At the conclusion of the parade he sent his secretary to ask me if
I would like to be appointed to the Public Works Department. I
respectfully declined the offer, though very grateful for its having
been made. Some of my friends doubted the wisdom of my refusing
a permanent civil appointment; but it meant having to give up
soldiering, which I could not make up my mind to do, and though only
officiating, I was already in the department to which of all others I
wished to belong.

Nowshera was the last station we visited. It was the beginning of
April, and getting rather hot for parading troops. I there met for the
first time the present Commander-in-Chief in India, General Sir George
White, who was then a subaltern in the 27th (Inniskilling) Regiment.

I recollect the commanding officer of the 55th, the Native Infantry
corps at this station, who had served all his life with clean-looking,
closely-shaven Hindustanis, pointing with a look of contempt, not to
say disgust, to some Sikhs (a certain proportion of whom had been
under recent orders enlisted in regiments of Native Infantry), and
expressing his regret that he could not get them to shave their beards
and cut their hair. 'They quite spoil the look of my regiment,' he
said. In less than two months' time the Hindustanis, of whom the
Colonel was so proud, had broken into open mutiny; the despised Sikhs
were the only men of the regiment who remained faithful; and the
commanding officer, a devoted soldier who lived for his regiment, and
who implored that his men might not have their arms taken away, as he
had 'implicit confidence' in them, and would 'stake his life on their
fidelity,' had blown his brains out because he found that confidence
misplaced.

Towards the end of April I was ordered to report on the capabilities
of Cherat (now well known to all who have been stationed at Peshawar)
as a sanatorium for European soldiers. I spent two or three days
surveying the hill and searching for water in the neighbourhood. It
was not safe to remain on the top at night, so I used to return each
evening to the plain below, where my tent was pitched. On one occasion
I was surprised to find a camp had risen up during my absence quite
close to my tent. I discovered that it belonged to Lieutenant-Colonel
John Nicholson, the Deputy-Commissioner, who was on his tour of
inspection, and very soon I received an invitation to dine with him,
at which I was greatly pleased. John Nicholson was a name to conjure
with in the Punjab. I had heard it mentioned with an amount of
respect--indeed, awe--which no other name could excite, and I was all
curiosity to see the man whose influence on the frontier was so great
that his word was law to the refractory tribes amongst whom he lived.
He had only lately arrived in Peshawar, having been transferred from
Bannu, a difficult and troublesome district ruled by him as it had
never been ruled before, and where he made such a reputation for
himself that, while he was styled 'a pillar of strength on the
frontier' by Lord Dalhousie, he was looked up to as a god by the
Natives, who loved as much as they feared him. By some of them he was
actually worshipped as a saint; they formed themselves into a sect,
and called themselves 'Nicholseyns.' Nicholson impressed me more
profoundly than any man I had ever met before, or have ever met since.
I have never seen anyone like him. He was the beau-ideal of a soldier
and a gentleman. His appearance was distinguished and commanding, with
a sense of power about him which to my mind was the result of his
having passed so much of his life amongst the wild and lawless
tribesmen, with whom his authority was supreme. Intercourse with
this man amongst men made me more eager than ever to remain on the
frontier, and I was seized with ambition to follow in his footsteps.
Had I never seen Nicholson again, I might have thought that the
feelings with which he inspired me were to some extent the result of
my imagination, excited by the astonishing stories I had heard of his
power and influence; my admiration, however, for him was immeasurably
strengthened when, a few weeks later, I served as his staff officer,
and had opportunities of observing more closely his splendid soldierly
qualities and the workings of his grand, simple mind.

[Illustration: BRIGADIER-GENERAL JOHN NICHOLSON, C.B.

_From a painting by J.R. Dicksee, in the possession of the Reverend
Canon Seymour._]

It was the end of April when I returned to Peshawar from Cherat, and
rapidly getting hot. On the strength of being a D.A.Q.M.G., I had
moved into a better house than I had hitherto been able to afford,
which I shared with Lieutenant Hovenden of the Engineers. We were
just settling down and making ourselves comfortable for the long hot
weather, when all our plans were upset by the breaking out of the
Mutiny.


[Footnote 1: See 'Memorials of the Life and Letters of Major-General
Sir Herbert Edwardes.']

[Footnote 2: 'Memorials of Major-General Sir Herbert Edwardes.']

[Footnote 3: _Ibid._]




CHAPTER VI.
1857

  First tidings of the mutiny--Prompt action at Peshawar
  --A bold policy--The Movable Column--An annoying occurrence
  --I leave Peshawar



The first threatenings of coming trouble were heard in the early part
of 1857. During the months of February, March, and April, rumours
reached us at Peshawar of mysterious _chupattis_ (unleavened cakes)
being sent about the country with the object, it was alleged, of
preparing the Natives for some forthcoming event. There was also an
evident feeling of unrest and dissatisfaction in the minds of the
sepoys. We heard that the 19th Native Infantry at Berhampur, a
military station about 100 miles from Calcutta, had broken open the
bells-of-arms,[1] and forcibly taken possession of their muskets and
ammunition; that a sepoy named Mangal Pandy,[2] belonging to the 34th
Native Infantry at Barrackpore, had attacked and severely wounded
the Adjutant and Sergeant-Major of his regiment; that it was found
necessary to disband the 19th on the 30th March, and the 34th on the
6th May; that bungalows had been burnt in several stations; and
that the sepoys at the Schools of Musketry had objected to use the
cartridges served out with the new rifles, because, it was asserted,
they were greased with a mixture of cow's fat and lard, the one being
as obnoxious to the prejudices of the Hindu as the other is to those
of the Mussulman.

It seems strange on looking back that these many warnings should have
passed almost unheeded, and that there should have been no suspicion
amongst the officers serving with Native regiments that discontent was
universal amongst the sepoys, and that a mutiny of the whole Bengal
Army was imminent. But at that time the reliance on the fidelity of
the Native troops was unbounded, and officers believed implicitly in
the contentment and loyalty of their men. Their faith in them was
extraordinary. Even after half the Native army had mutinied and many
officers had been murdered, those belonging to the remaining regiments
could not believe that their own particular men could be guilty of
treachery.

At Peshawar there was not the slightest suspicion of the extent to
which the evil had spread, and we were quite thunderstruck when, on
the evening of the 11th May, as we were sitting at mess, the telegraph
signaller rushed in breathless with excitement, a telegram in his
hand, which proved to be a message from Delhi 'to all stations in the
Punjab,' conveying the startling intelligence that a very serious
outbreak had occurred at Meerut the previous evening, that some of
the troopers from there had already reached Delhi, that the Native
soldiers at the latter place had joined the mutineers, and that many
officers and residents at both stations had been killed.

Lieutenant-Colonel Davidson, commanding the 16th Irregular Cavalry,
who happened to be dining at mess that evening, was the first to
recover from the state of consternation into which we were thrown
by the reading of this telegram. He told us it was of the utmost
importance that the Commissioner and the General should at once be put
in possession of this astounding news, and at the same time impressed
upon us the imperative necessity for keeping it secret.

Davidson then hurried off to the Commissioner, who with his deputy,
Nicholson, lived within a stone's-throw of the mess. Edwardes drove at
once to the General's house, while Nicholson came to our mess. He too
pointed out to us the importance of preventing the news from getting
about and of keeping it as long as possible from the Native soldiers.

We had at Peshawar three regiments of Native Cavalry and five of
Native Infantry, not less than 5,000 men, while the strength of the
two British regiments and the Artillery did not exceed 2,000. This
European force was more than sufficient to cope with the eight Native
corps, but in the event of any general disturbance amongst the Native
troops, we had to calculate on the probability of their being joined
by the 50,000 inhabitants of the city, and, indeed, by the entire
population of the Peshawar valley; not to speak of the tribes all
along the border, who were sure to rise.

It was an occasion for the gravest anxiety, and the delay of even a
few hours in the sepoys becoming aware of the disastrous occurrences
at Meerut and Delhi meant a great deal to us.

Fortunately for India, there were good men and true at Peshawar in
those days, when hesitation and irresolution would have been
fatal, and it is worthy of note that they were comparatively young
men--Edwardes was thirty-seven, Nicholson thirty-five; Neville
Chamberlain, the distinguished Commandant of the Punjab Frontier Force
(who was hastily summoned from Kohat, where he happened to be on his
tour of inspection), was thirty-seven; and the Brigadier, Sydney
Cotton, though much older, being sixty-five, was not only
exceptionally young for his years and full of energy and intelligence,
but actually much younger than the average of General officers
commanding stations in India.

At once, on hearing of the Mutiny, Edwardes, acting in unison with
Nicholson, sent to the post-office and laid hands on all Native
correspondence; the letters they thus secured showed but too plainly
how necessary was this precaution. The number of seditious papers
seized was alarmingly great; they were for the most part couched in
figurative and enigmatical language, but it was quite sufficiently
clear from them that every Native regiment in the garrison was more or
less implicated and prepared to join the rebel movement.

A strong interest attaches to these letters, for they brought to light
the true feeling of the Natives towards us at the time, and it was
evident from them that the sepoys had really been made to believe that
we intended to destroy their caste by various unholy devices, of
which the issue of contaminating cartridges was one. The seeds of
disaffection had been sown by agitators, who thought they saw an
opportunity for realizing their hope of overthrowing our rule,
maintained as it was by a mere handful of Europeans in the midst of a
vast population of Asiatics. This feeling of antagonism, only guessed
at before, was plainly revealed in these letters, never intended to
meet the European eye. Some corps did not appear to be quite so guilty
as others, but there could now be no doubt that all were tainted with
disloyalty, and that none of the Hindustani troops could any longer be
trusted.

In the afternoon of Tuesday, the 12th May, I received a note from the
General commanding the division directing me to present myself at his
house the following morning, which I accordingly did. Besides General
Reed I found there the Brigadier, Sydney Cotton; the Commissioner,
Herbert Edwardes; the Deputy Commissioner, John Nicholson;
Brigadier Neville Chamberlain, and Captain Wright, Deputy
Assistant-Adjutant-General, who, like myself, had been summoned to
record the decisions that might be arrived at.

This meeting was a most momentous one, and I remember being greatly
impressed with the calm and comprehensive view of the situation taken
by Edwardes and Nicholson. They had already been in communication with
the Chief Commissioner, and had, previous to the meeting, received a
telegram from him approving generally of the several proposals they
contemplated. John Lawrence also informed them that the authorities
at Lahore had decided on disarming the Native troops at Mian Mir that
very morning.

The problem to be solved was how the Punjab could best be made secure
with the small force of British troops available--all told not more
than 15,000, with 84 guns--against upwards of 65,000 Natives (of whom
42,000 were Hindustanis), with 62 guns.[3] In all stations Native
troops preponderated, and in some there were no European soldiers at
all.

Edwardes and Nicholson gave it as their opinion that the only chance
of keeping the Punjab and the frontier quiet lay in trusting the
Chiefs and people, and in endeavouring to induce them to side with us
against the Hindustanis. They undertook to communicate, regarding
the raising of levies and fresh troops, with their friends and
acquaintances along the border, who had proved such staunch allies in
1848-49, when we were fighting with the Sikhs. How nobly these loyal
men responded to the demand made upon them, and how splendidly the
frontier and Punjab soldiers whom they brought to our assistance
behaved, will be seen hereafter.

Amongst other matters of importance, it was proposed by those two able
soldier-civilians, Edwardes and Nicholson, that General Reed, as the
senior officer in the Punjab, should join the Chief Commissioner at
Rawal Pindi, leaving Brigadier Cotton in command at Peshawar; that a
Movable Column, composed of reliable troops, should be organized
at some convenient place in the Punjab,[4] prepared to move in any
direction where its services might be required; that the Hindustani
regiments should be scattered as much as possible, in order to prevent
dangerous combinations; that a detachment of Punjab Infantry from
Kohat should replace the Hindustani sepoys in the fort of Attock,
which was a very important position, as it contained a magazine, and
covered the passage of the Indus; and that a small guard of Pathan
levies, under a tried and trusty frontier Native officer, should be
placed in charge of the Attock ferry.

All these proposals were cordially and unanimously agreed to by the
military authorities present.

The question of the command of the Movable Column was then discussed.
It was considered essential that the officer selected should, in
addition to other necessary qualifications, have considerable
experience of the country, and an intimate knowledge of Native
soldiers. It was no ordinary command. On the action of the Movable
Column would depend, to a great extent, the maintenance of peace and
order throughout the Punjab, and it was felt that, at such a crisis,
the best man must be selected, irrespective of seniority. It was a
position for which Cotton and Nicholson would have given much, and for
which they were well qualified, but there was important work for them
to do at Peshawar. Neville Chamberlain was available, and there was
a general consensus of opinion that he should be appointed. It was
necessary, however, to refer the matter to the Chief Commissioner,
with a request that he would submit it for the orders of the
Commander-in-Chief. This course was adopted, and in a few hours a
reply was received from General Anson nominating Chamberlain to the
command. My anxiety as to the Commander-in-Chief's decision was very
considerable; for Brigadier Chamberlain, to my infinite delight and
astonishment, had offered, in the event of his being appointed, to
take me with him as his staff officer--the most wonderful piece of
good fortune that could have come to me; my readers must imagine
my feelings, for it is impossible for me to describe them. My most
sanguine hopes seemed about to be more than realized; for though the
serious aspect of affairs seemed to promise the chance of active
service, I little thought that I should be lucky enough to be employed
as the staff officer of such a distinguished soldier as Neville
Chamberlain.

When the meeting was over I was ordered to take the several messages,
which Wright and I had written out, to the telegraph office, and see
them despatched myself; as they disclosed more or less the measures
that had been decided upon, it was necessary to avoid any chance of
their falling into the hands of Native clerks. One of the messages[5]
contained a summary of the proceedings of the council, and was
addressed to the commanding officers of all stations in the Punjab,
with the view of imparting confidence, and letting them know what
steps were being taken for the protection of the British residents
throughout the province. This duty having been carried out, I returned
home in a not unpleasant frame of mind, for though the crisis was a
grave one, the outlook gloomy, and the end doubtful, the excitement
was great. There were stirring times in store for us, when every man's
powers would be tested, and the hopefulness of youth inclined me to
look only on the bright side of the situation.

My equanimity was somewhat disturbed later in the day by an occurrence
which caused me a good deal of annoyance at the time, though it
soon passed away. Nicholson came to my house and told me that the
proceedings at the meeting that morning had in some unaccountable
manner become known; and he added, much to my disgust, that it was
thought I might perhaps have been guilty of the indiscretion of
divulging them. I was very angry, for I had appreciated as much as
anyone the immense importance of keeping the decisions arrived at
perfectly secret; and I could not help showing something of the
indignation I felt at its having been thought possible that I could
betray the confidence reposed in me. I denied most positively having
done so; upon which Nicholson suggested that we should proceed
together to the telegraph office and see whether the information
could have leaked out from there. The signaller was a mere boy, and
Nicholson's imposing presence and austere manner were quite too much
for him; he was completely cowed, and, after a few hesitating denials,
he admitted having satisfied the curiosity of a friend who had
inquired of him how the authorities intended to deal with the
crisis. This was enough, and I was cleared. The result to me of this
unpleasant incident was a delightful increase of intimacy with the
man for whom above all others I had the greatest admiration and most
profound respect. As if to make up for his momentary injustice,
Nicholson was kinder to me than ever, and I felt I had gained in him a
firm and constant friend. So ended that eventful day.

At that time it was the custom for a staff officer, who had charge of
any Government property, to have a guard of Native soldiers in charge
of his house. That night it happened that my guard was furnished
by the 64th Native Infantry, a regiment with a particularly bad
reputation, and which had, in order to give effect to the measures
proposed at the morning's meeting, been ordered to leave Peshawar and
proceed to the outposts. The intercepted letters showed that this
regiment was on the point of mutinying, and I could not help feeling,
as I lay down on my bed, which, as usual in the hot weather, was
placed in the verandah for the sake of coolness, how completely I was
at the mercy of the sentry who walked up and down within a few feet of
me. Fortunately, he was not aware that his regiment was suspected, and
could not know the reason for the sudden order to march, or my career
might have been ended then and there.

Within a week from that time I had started for Rawal Pindi to be ready
to join the Movable Column, which was to be formed at Wazirabad as
soon as the troops could be got together. I took with me only just
enough kit for a hot-weather march, and left everything standing in my
house just as it was, little thinking that I should never return to it
or be quartered in Peshawar again.


[Footnote 1: Place where the arms and accoutrements of Native
regiments were kept.]

[Footnote 2: This name was the origin of the sepoys generally being
called Pandies.]

[Footnote 3: At Meerut, Delhi, and Rurki, and in the Punjab there
were:

                 _British Troops._

                                     MEN.    GUNS.
 2 Regiments of Cavalry             1,410
12 Regiments of Infantry           12,624
 9 Troops of Horse Artillery        1,017     54
 5 Light Field Batteries              415     30
10 Companies of Foot Artillerymen     837
                                   ------     --
                       Total       16,303     84


                 _Native Troops._

                                           MEN.   GUNS.
 7 Regiments of Light Cavalry             3,514
14 Regiments of Irregular Cavalry and
      Guides Cavalry                      8,519
31 Regiments of Regular Infantry       }
15 Regiments of Irregular Infantry and } 50,188
      Guides Infantry                  }
 3 Troops of Horse Artillery                411    18
 6 Light Field Batteries                    930    30 (3 batteries had
                                                      only 4 guns each)
 2 Mountain Batteries                       192    14 (1 battery had 8,
                                                      the other 6 guns)
 3 Companies of Foot Artillery              330
Head-Quarters and 12 Companies of
      Sappers and Miners                  1,394
                                         ------    --
                    Total                65,478    62

The above figures show the troops at full strength. There were
probably not more than 15,000 British soldiers in the Punjab available
for duty in May, 1857.]

[Footnote 4: The original proposal was that the Movable Column should
be formed at Jhelum, and composed of the 24th Foot from Rawal Pindi,
the 27th Foot from Nowshera, a troop of Horse Artillery from Peshawar,
a Native Field Battery from Jhelum, the Guides from Murdan, the 16th
Irregular Cavalry from Rawal Pindi, the Kumaon battalion from Murree,
the 1st Punjab Infantry from Bannu, and a wing of the 2nd Punjab
Cavalry from Kohat. But events developed so rapidly that before the
column was formed every one of these troops was otherwise employed. It
was thought unwise to unduly weaken the Peshawar valley; the troop of
Horse Artillery, therefore, stood fast, the 27th Foot was halted at
Attock, and the 24th Foot and Kumaon battalion were kept at their
stations ready to move towards the frontier. The Guides, 2nd Punjab
Cavalry, and 1st Punjab Infantry were ordered to Delhi, and the 16th
Irregular Cavalry and the Native Field Battery were not considered
sufficiently loyal to be employed on such a duty. Eventually, the
column was formed of one troop of Horse Artillery, one Field Battery,
and one Infantry regiment, all British and all from Sialkot.]

[Footnote 5: The full text of the message was as follows:

    'To Sir John Lawrence, Rawal Pindi, the Commander-in-Chief, Simla,
    and officers commanding all stations in the Punjab respectively;
    to be forwarded by the assistant in charge of the telegraph
    office, or post, as the case may be.

    'The senior military officer in the Punjab, Major-General Reed,
    having this morning received news of the disarming of the troops
    at Mian Mir, a council of war was held, consisting of General
    Reed, Brigadier Cotton, Brigadier Neville Chamberlain, Colonel
    Edwardes, and Colonel Nicholson, and the following measures were
    decided on, subject to the confirmation of the Commander-in-Chief.
    General Reed assumes the chief military command in the Punjab;
    his Head-Quarters will be the Head-Quarters of the Punjab Civil
    Government, and a Movable Column will be formed at Jhelum at once,
    consisting of [the troops were here detailed]. The necessary
    orders for this column have been issued. The column will move on
    every point in the Punjab where open mutiny requires to be put
    down by force, and officers commanding at all stations in the
    Punjab will co-operate with the column.']

       *       *       *       *       *




CHAPTER VII.
1857

  First symptoms of disaffection--Outbreak at Berhampur
  --Mangal Pandy--Court-Martial at Meerut--Mutiny at Meerut
  --The work of destruction--Want of energy
  --Hugh Gough's experiences--Nothing could arrest the mutiny


Before proceeding with the account of my experiences with the Movable
Column, and the subsequent operations for the suppression of the
rebellion, in which I was fortunate enough to take part, it will,
I think, be advisable, for the better understanding of the whole
situation, to devote a little time to the consideration of the
progress of events from the first appearance of symptoms of
disaffection in Lower Bengal, to the crisis I have just been
describing, when Peshawar became involved in the general disturbance.

The substitution of a new rifle for the old musket with which the
sepoys had hitherto been armed entailed a different kind of drill;
and in order that this drill should be speedily learned by the
whole Native army, depots were formed at convenient places for the
instruction of selected men from every corps, who, on becoming
proficient, were to return and instruct their own regiments. One of
these depots was at Dum-Dum, and as early as the 24th January General
Hearsay, commanding the Presidency division, reported to Head-Quarters
that he perceived an 'unpleasant feeling' amongst the Native soldiers
learning the new drill, caused by a belief instilled into them 'by
designing persons, most likely Brahmins,' that they were to be forced
to embrace Christianity, and that for the furtherance of this object
the new ball-cartridges received from the arsenal at Fort William were
greased with the fat of pigs and cows, with the intention of violating
the religious prejudices and destroying the caste of those who would
have to bite them.

A little later various acts of incendiarism took place at other
stations in the command, and Hearsay became more than ever convinced
that there was grave dissatisfaction amongst the troops. He therefore
ordered a Court of Inquiry to be held to enable him to ascertain the
real cause of the ill-feeling which so evidently existed.

In the General's opinion, the statements recorded in the proceedings
of this Court clearly established the fact, that the Native officers
and sepoys were undoubtedly imbued with the belief that an unholy
mixture of cow's fat and lard had been used in the manufacture of the
new cartridge, and he recommended that the rifle ammunition should in
future be made up with the same description of paper that had always
been used for the musket-cartridge, which, he conceived, would put an
end to their suspicions and uneasiness.

The General, however, was told in reply that it was impossible to use
the old paper for the new cartridge, as the bore of the rifle being
much smaller than that of the musket, thinner paper was indispensable;
and he was directed to inform the sepoys that the new paper, though
tougher and less bulky, was made of exactly the same material as the
old. With respect to the lubricating mixture, he was to announce that
the Government had authorized the preparation of a grease, composed of
wax and oil, which was to be made up and applied to the cartridges
by the men themselves. These orders were carefully explained to the
Native troops, but without any good result. Their religious objection
to the new cartridge was not removed, and they frankly acknowledged
their fears.

On the 6th February an officer of the 34th Native Infantry at
Barrackpore was informed by a sepoy of his company that the four
Native regiments at that station, fearing that they would be forced
to destroy their caste and become Christians, had determined to rise
against their officers, and when they had plundered and burned their
bungalows, to proceed to Calcutta and try to seize Fort William,
or, if that proved beyond their powers, to take possession of the
treasury.

This circumstance was reported to Government by General Hearsay on the
11th February. In the same letter he said, 'We have at Barrackpore
been living upon a mine ready for explosion,' and he reported a story
which had reached him from Dum-Dum of a sepoy, on his way to cook
his food with his _lota_[1] full of water, meeting a low-caste man
belonging to the arsenal where the Enfield cartridges were being
manufactured. This man, it was said, asked the sepoy to allow him to
drink from his _lota_. The sepoy, a Brahmin, refused, saying: 'I have
scoured my _lota_; you will defile it by your touch.' The low-caste
man replied: 'You think much of your caste, but wait a little: the
_Sahib-logue_[2] will make you bite cartridges soaked in cow's fat,
and then where will your caste be?' The sepoy no doubt believed the
man, and told his comrades what was about to happen, and the report
rapidly spread to other stations.

Early in March several of the Hindu sepoys belonging to the Dum-Dum
School of Musketry expressed their unwillingness to bite the new
cartridge, and the Commandant proposed that the drill should be
altered so as to admit of the cartridge being torn instead of bitten.
Hearsay supported the proposal, remarking that the new mode of loading
need not be made to appear as a concession to agitation, but as part
of the drill for the new weapon. Events, however, moved so quickly
that, before sanction could be received to this suggestion, the troops
at Berhampur had broken into open mutiny. They refused to receive
their ammunition, on the ground of its being polluted, even after
it was explained to them that they were not being given the new
cartridges, but those which had been made up in the regiment a year
before. That night they broke open the bells-of-arms, and carried off
their muskets.

The Government then became aware that prompt action was necessary.
They decided that such open mutiny could not be excused on the grounds
of religious scruples, and ordered the regiment to be disbanded. As
Berhampur was somewhat isolated, and some distance from European
troops, it was arranged that the disbandment should take place at the
Head-Quarters of the Presidency division, and the 19th Native Infantry
was accordingly ordered to march to Barrackpore.

The revolt of this regiment brought forcibly before Lord Canning and
his advisers the perilous position of Lower Bengal, owing to the
paucity of European troops. Well may the authorities have been
startled, for between Calcutta and Meerut, a distance of 900 miles,
there were only four regiments of British infantry and a few scattered
Artillerymen, numbering in all less than 5,000, while the Native
troops amounted to upwards of 55,000. One of the four Infantry
regiments was at Fort William; but as only a portion of it could
be spared for the disbandment of the 19th, a special steamer was
despatched to Rangoon to bring over the 84th Foot. This regiment
reached Calcutta on the 20th March, and on the 31st the disbandment of
the mutinous Native Infantry regiment was carried out. The men were
paid up and escorted across the river Hughly, whence they were allowed
to proceed to their homes. They behaved in the most orderly manner on
the march from Berhampur and throughout the proceedings, and as they
left the parade-ground they cheered General Hearsay, and wished him a
long life, apparently well pleased at being let off so easily.

At Barrackpore itself an outbreak had occurred two days before in the
34th Native Infantry. As I have already related, the sepoy, Mangal
Pandy, shot at the sergeant-major.[3] The Adjutant, on hearing
what had happened, galloped to the parade-ground. As he neared the
quarter-guard he was fired at, and his horse shot by the mutineer, who
then badly wounded him with a sword as he was trying to disentangle
himself from the fallen animal. The General now appeared on the scene,
and, instantly grasping the position of affairs, rode straight at
Mangal Pandy, who stood at bay with his musket loaded, ready to
receive him. There was a shot, the whistle of a bullet, and a man fell
to the ground--but not the General; it was the fanatic sepoy himself,
who at the last moment had discharged the contents of his musket into
his own breast! The wretched man had been worked up to a pitch of
madness by the sepoys of his regiment, who stood by while he attacked
the Adjutant, and would have allowed him to kill their Commander, but
they were too great cowards to back him up openly. Mangal Pandy was
not dead. He was taken to the hospital, and eventually was tried by
a Court-Martial composed of Native officers, sentenced to death, and
hanged in the presence of all the troops at Barrackpore. The Native
officer in command of the quarter-guard met the same fate, and the
regiment was then disbanded.

The orders for the disbandment of the 19th and 34th Native Infantry
were directed to be read to every Native corps in the service, and
it was hoped that the quick retribution which had overtaken these
regiments would check the spirit of mutiny throughout the army. For
a time this hope appeared to be justified. Satisfactory reports were
received from different parts of Bengal, and anything like a serious
or general outbreak was certainly not contemplated by the authorities.
General Hearsay reported to Government that he had directed the
European troops, temporarily located at Barrackpore, to return to
their respective cantonments, as he did not think it probable that
he would require their presence again. About the same time Sir John
Lawrence, after visiting the Musketry School at Sialkot, wrote
hopefully to the Governor-General of the aspect of affairs in the
Punjab. Lord Canning and his advisers, owing to these favourable
reports, were on the point of sending the 84th Foot back to Burma,
when news reached them from Upper India of the calamitous occurrences
at Meerut and Delhi.

The Meerut division was commanded by Major-General Hewitt, an officer
of fifty years' service, and the station of Meerut by Brigadier
Archdale Wilson, Commandant of the Bengal Artillery. The garrison
consisted of the 6th Dragoon Guards, a troop of Horse Artillery, a
battery of Field Artillery, a company of Foot Artillery, the 1st
Battalion 60th Rifles, and three Native corps--the 3rd Light Cavalry,
and the 11th and 20th Native Infantry.

Towards the end of April incendiary fires began to take place, and
the Native soldiers evinced more or less disrespect in their manner
towards their officers. These signs of disaffection were followed
by the refusal of some of the troopers of the 3rd Light Cavalry to
receive their cartridges, although the commanding officer carefully
explained to them that they were not the new cartridges, but the very
same they had always used, and that according to the new drill they
were not required to bite them when loading their carbines.

A Court of Inquiry was held to investigate the matter, composed
entirely of Native officers, three of whom belonged to the offending
regiment. The verdict of the Court was that no adequate cause could be
assigned for the disobedience of orders in refusing to receive and use
the cartridges that were served out. 'The only conclusion the Court
can arrive at in regard to this point is that a report seems to have
got abroad which in some vague form attaches suspicion of impurity
to the materials used for making these cartridges, but the Court are
unanimously of opinion that there is nothing whatever objectionable in
the cartridges of the 3rd Regiment Light Cavalry, and that they may be
freely received and used as heretofore without in the slightest degree
affecting any religious scruple of either a Hindu or Mussulman, and if
any pretence contrary to that is urged, that it must be false.' This
opinion, it must be remembered, was the opinion of Natives, not
Europeans, and was given only sixteen days before the outbreak
occurred at Meerut.

After carefully reviewing the evidence brought before the Court, and
considering the opinion expressed by the Native officers who composed
it, the Commander-in-Chief decided to try the eighty-five men who had
refused to receive the cartridges by a General Court-Martial composed
entirely of their own countrymen. The Court was formed of six
Mahomedans and nine Hindus, six Native officers being brought over
from Delhi for the purpose.

The prisoners were tried on the 8th May, found guilty, and sentenced
to imprisonment with hard labour for ten years.

The following morning there was a parade of the whole of the Meerut
garrison, and the finding and sentence of the Court were read to the
men. The eighty-five troopers were then stripped of their uniform and
fetters were fastened on their ankles. As each culprit was marched
forward, he called on his comrades to rescue him, but no response came
from the ranks; and when the ceremony was finished the prisoners were
marched down the line and escorted to the gaol. In his report of the
parade to Army Head-Quarters, General Hewitt stated that 'the majority
of the prisoners seemed to feel acutely the degradation to which their
folly and insubordination had brought them. The remainder of the
troops are behaving steady and soldier-like.'

The action of the Meerut authorities in putting the prisoners in irons
on the parade-ground, in the presence of their regiment, before
being made over to the civil power, met with the disapproval of the
Commander-in-Chief and the Governor-General. The former expressed his
regret at the unusual procedure. The latter was more pronounced, and
thus expressed himself: 'The riveting of the men's fetters on parade,
occupying, as it did, several hours, in the presence of many who were
already ill-disposed and many who believed in the cartridge fable,
must have stung the brigade to the quick. The consigning the
eighty-five prisoners after such a ceremony to gaol with no other than
a Native guard over them was folly that is inconceivable.'

The procedure was no doubt unusual, and it certainly was most
imprudent, under the circumstances, to trust the gaol to a Native
guard. I think also, considering the number of the prisoners, and the
length of time necessary for riveting the fetters, that it was not
judicious to subject the troops to such a severe and protracted
trial of their nerves and patience; but, before acquiescing in Lord
Canning's sweeping condemnation, it should be considered that the
object of the punishment was to produce a deterrent effect on those
who were likely to follow the bad example that had been set them,
and as the offence of the troopers had been public and ostentatious,
General Hewitt no doubt thought it right to make the punishment as
marked and public as possible.

The next day was Sunday, and outwardly the cantonment of Meerut
had assumed its usual appearance of Sabbath calm; but there was an
undercurrent of unrest--there was considerable commotion in the Native
bazaars, which were unusually crowded, and had not the European
officers been blinded by over-confidence in their men, signs might
have been perceived amongst the Native soldiers of preparation for
some untoward event.

It was late in the day before the storm burst. The Chaplain of Meerut
tells us that he was about to start with his wife for evening service,
when the Native nurse warned them of coming danger, beseeching her
mistress to remain indoors, and, on being asked to explain, saying
there would be a fight with the sepoys. The idea seemed incredible,
and the Chaplain would have paid no attention to the warning had not
his wife been greatly alarmed. At her earnest request he took his two
children with them in the carriage, instead of leaving them in the
house with the _ayah_, as had been intended. It was soon apparent that
the _ayah_ had not spoken without reason, for before the church was
reached sounds of musketry were heard and columns of smoke were
seen rising above the quarter occupied by the Native troops. As the
Chaplain arrived at the church enclosure, the buglers of the 60th
Rifles, who were drawn up ready to enter the church, sounded the
'alarm' and the 'assembly.' The parade was dismissed, and as the
British soldiers rushed to the barracks for their arms and ammunition,
the congregation rapidly dispersed, some to their homes, others to
seek safety in the nearest quarter-guard.

It was the custom before the Mutiny for our soldiers to attend Divine
Service unarmed, save with their side-arms. The Native soldiers were
aware of this, and they no doubt calculated on the 60th Rifles being
safe and almost defenceless inside the church as soon as the bells
ceased tolling. What they were not aware of was the fact that, owing
to the lengthening days and the increasing heat, the evening church
parade had been ordered half an hour later than on the previous
Sunday. The mutineers therefore showed their hand half an hour too
soon, and as they galloped down the 60th Rifles lines they came upon
the men fully armed and rapidly falling in. Being thus disappointed in
their hope of surprising the white soldiers, the 3rd Cavalry proceeded
without a moment's delay to the gaol, broke into the cells, and
released their eighty-five comrades and all the other prisoners, about
1,200 in number.

While this was going on, the two Native Infantry regiments assembled
on their respective parade-grounds in wild excitement, discharging
their muskets at random, and setting fire to their own huts. The
British officers, hearing the tumult, hastened to their lines and did
their best to restore order, but in vain. The sepoys had gone too
far, and were absolutely deaf to threats and entreaties. They did not
attack their own officers, but warned them to get away, telling them
the Company's '_raj_'[4] was at an end. Their clemency, however, did
not extend to officers of other regiments.

Colonel Finnis, who had served forty years with the sepoys, and firmly
believed in their loyalty, was the first victim; he fell riddled with
bullets from a volley fired by the 20th, while exhorting the men of
his own regiment (the 11th) to be true to their salt. The work of
destruction then began in earnest, in which the population from the
bazaars and the neighbouring villages eagerly joined, for (as the
Commissioner reported) they were armed and ready for the onslaught
before the sepoys commenced the attack, plainly showing how perfectly
they were aware of what was about to happen. They poured forth in
thousands from every direction, and in a surprisingly short time
almost every bungalow belonging to a British officer serving with
Native troops was gutted and burnt. Besides Colonel Finnis, seven
officers, three officers' wives, two children, and every stray
European man, woman and child in the outskirts of the cantonments were
massacred.

It was now time for the sepoys to think of themselves. They had thrown
off all allegiance to the _Sarkar_;[5] they had been guilty of murder,
robbery, and incendiarism, and they knew that retribution must
speedily overtake them if they remained at Meerut; they therefore
lost no time in making their escape towards Delhi. They had had ample
opportunity for consultation with the Native officers from that
station, who had come to Meerut as members of the Court-Martial on the
men of the 3rd Light Cavalry, and they knew perfectly well that the
troops at Delhi were prepared to help them to seize the magazine and
resuscitate the old Moghul dynasty. 'To Delhi! To Delhi!' was their
cry, and off they went, leaving naught behind them in their lines
but the smouldering fires of their officers' houses and the lifeless
bodies of their English victims.

But it will be asked, Where were the British troops? Where indeed?
On the alarm being given, the British troops got under arms 'in an
incredibly short time,' but there was unaccountable delay in marching
them to the spot where their help was so greatly needed. The
Carabineers occupied barracks within a few hundred yards of the Native
Infantry lines, the 60th Rifles were only about a mile and a half
away, and the Artillery lay just beyond the 60th. The Brigadier
(Wilson) despatched one company of the Rifles to guard the treasury,
another he left to protect the barracks, and with the remainder,
accompanied by the Carabineers and Artillery, he leisurely proceeded
towards the Native Infantry lines. It was almost dark when he arrived,
but there was light enough to discern, from the ruined houses and the
dead bodies of the murdered officers lying about, in what a merciless
spirit the revolt had been perpetrated. A few shots were fired from
behind the burning huts, but not a single living being was visible,
except two or three Native troopers who were dimly perceptible in the
distance coming from the direction of the gaol, and it was evident
that the sepoys as a body had vanished. But whither? A lengthened
discussion took place as to what was the best course to pursue, which
only resulted in the troops being marched back to their own end of the
cantonment and bivouacking on the mall for the night. The General
and Brigadier, misled by the tumult in the city, which they could
distinctly hear, came to the conclusion that the sepoys had
congregated within its walls and might shortly be expected to attack
that part of the station where the European residents chiefly lived.
It was not discovered till the next morning that all three Native
regiments had made for Delhi.

It is easy to be wise after the event, but one cannot but feel that
there was unaccountable, if not culpable, want of energy displayed by
the Meerut authorities on this disastrous occasion. The officer
in command was afterwards severely censured for not acting with
sufficient promptitude on first hearing of the outbreak; for not
trying to find out where the mutineers had gone; and for not
endeavouring to overtake them before they reached Delhi. The
Government of India finally signified their disapproval by removing
General Hewitt from his command.

Wilson, the Brigadier, like everyone else at Meerut, appears to have
been completely taken by surprise. But why this should have been the
case, after the warning that had been given by the mutinous conduct
of the 3rd Cavalry, and why no steps should have been taken after the
exasperating parade on the 9th to guard against a possible, if not
probable, outbreak, is difficult to understand; and can only be
accounted for by that blind faith in the Native soldier, and disbelief
in his intention or ability to revolt, which led to such unfortunate
results all over India.

The following story will exemplify how completely the authorities at
Meerut were blinded by this misplaced confidence. On the afternoon of
the 9th the British officers of the 3rd Light Cavalry went to the gaol
to pay up the prisoners belonging to their regiment. When Lieutenant
Hugh Gough,[6] who was one of these officers, returned to his house,
a Hindu Native officer, belonging to the troop Gough was temporarily
commanding, told him that the men had determined to rescue their
comrades, and that the Native guard over the gaol had promised to help
them. Gough went at once to his commanding officer, Lieutenant-Colonel
Carmichael Smyth, and reported what he had heard, but the Colonel
pooh-poohed the idea as ridiculous, and told Gough he must not give
credence to anything so monstrous.

Later in the day Gough met Brigadier Wilson and told him of the
warning which had been given to him, without, however, producing any
impression; the information was received with the same contemptuous
disbelief displayed by Colonel Carmichael Smyth.

The following day (Sunday), late in the afternoon, the same Native
officer, attended by two troopers, galloped to Gough's house, shouting
to him that the _hala_[7] had begun, and that the Native Infantry were
firing on their officers. Gough mounted his horse, and, accompanied by
the three Cavalry soldiers, proceeded as quickly as possible to the
Infantry parade-ground, where he arrived just as the wild scene of
excitement and confusion I have before described was at its height.
The sepoys, some in uniform, some in their own Native clothes, were
rushing about in the maddest disorder, yelling, shouting, and dancing
as if possessed, while the flames from the burning huts shed a lurid
light on the demoniacal proceedings.

When Gough's party appeared in sight, the sepoys called to the three
troopers to get out of the way, as they wanted to shoot the _sahib_.
No notice being taken of this warning, they fired straight at the
whole party, but without hitting anyone. Gough, seeing things had gone
too far for him to do any good, rode off with his little escort to
his own lines, where he found the men busy saddling their horses, and
helping themselves to ammunition from the regimental magazine, which
they had broken open. He endeavoured in vain to allay the excitement;
one or two shots were fired at him by recruits, but no determined
attempt was made to take his life, and at last the Native officers
combined to force him away, saying they could no longer answer for his
safety.

It was then all but dark. Gough rode off towards the European lines,
still accompanied by his trusty Native escort, and on his way came
upon an enormous crowd of people from the bazaar, armed with swords,
sticks, and anything they could get hold of, who tried to stop him.
Through these he charged, closely followed by the Native officer and
two troopers, who did not leave him until he was within sight of
the Artillery mess. Then they pulled up, and said they could go no
further. Gough did all he could to persuade them to remain with
him, but to no purpose. They told him it was impossible for them to
separate themselves from their friends and relations, and making the
officer they had so carefully protected a respectful salaam, they rode
off to join their mutinous comrades. Gough never heard of them again,
though he tried hard to trace what had become of the men who proved
themselves such 'friends in need.'

However much the authorities at Meerut deserved to be censured for
their dilatoriness in dealing with the revolt in the first instance,
and their lack of energy in not trying to discover in what direction
the mutineers had gone, I doubt whether anything would have been
gained by following them up, or whether it would have been possible
to overtake them before they reached Delhi. Only a very few European
Cavalry were available for pursuit, for the Carabineers, having lately
arrived in India, were composed mainly of recruits still in the
riding-school, and their horses for the most part were quite unbroken.
These few, with the six Horse Artillery guns, might have been
despatched; but the mutineers had a considerable start, the Cavalry
could not have been overtaken, and as soon as the Infantry became
aware that they were being followed, they would have scattered
themselves over the country, the features of which were familiar to
them, and, favoured by the darkness, could have defied pursuit. Delhi
is forty miles from Meerut, and it would not have been possible for
the 60th Rifles, marching in the terrible heat of the month of May, to
have reached that place before the next evening (the 11th), and, as
was afterwards ascertained, the work of murder and devastation there
began on the morning of that day. The three Native Infantry regiments
and the battery of Artillery stationed at Delhi were prepared to
join the insurgent troopers from Meerut directly they arrived. The
magazine, with its vast stores of war material, was in the hands of
the King, and the 150,000 inhabitants of the city were ready to assist
in the massacre of the white men and women, and the destruction of
their property.

After careful consideration of all the circumstances of the revolt at
Meerut, I have come to the conclusion that it would have been futile
to have sent the small body of mounted troops available in pursuit of
the mutineers on the night of the 10th May, and that, considering
the state of feeling throughout the Native Army, no action, however
prompt, on the part of the Meerut authorities could have arrested the
Mutiny. The sepoys had determined to throw off their allegiance to the
British Government, and the when and the how were merely questions of
time and opportunity.


[Footnote 1: A metal drinking vessel, which the Hindu religiously
guards against defilement, and to which he clings as a cherished
possession when he has nothing else belonging to him in the world.]

[Footnote 2: European officers.]

[Footnote 3: Each Hindustani regiment had a European sergeant-major
and quartermaster-sergeant.]

[Footnote 4: Rule.]

[Footnote 5: British Government.]

[Footnote 6: Now Lieutenant-General Sir Hugh Gough, V.C., G.C.B.]

[Footnote 7: Tumult.]

       *       *       *       *       *




CHAPTER VIII
1857

  General Anson--The news reaches Simla--Anson loses no time
  --A long list of troubles--John Lawrence--The Phulkian family
  --Death of General Anson


While the events I have recounted were taking place, the
Commander-in-Chief and the Head-Quarters staff were on their way up
country inspecting the troops at the various stations _en route_ to
Simla, at which place it had been arranged that the summer of 1857 was
to be spent. The Commander-in-Chief in India at that time was General
the Hon. George Anson, an officer of forty-three years' service, but
without much Indian experience, having been only four years in the
country. He was an able, intelligent man, an excellent judge of
character, a great authority on whist and on horses, and he was well
known in London society, which was somewhat surprised when he accepted
an appointment in India--the command of the Meerut division. He did
not, however, remain long in that position, for he was soon given
the command of the Madras Army, and a year and a half later became
Commander-in-Chief in India. General Anson was present at Waterloo as
an Ensign, but had seen no service afterwards, and until he arrived in
India had held no high appointment.

When the Commander-in-Chief left Calcutta the previous autumn, all was
apparently quiet in the Native army. He visited the principal military
stations, amongst others Meerut and Delhi, and although reports of an
uneasy feeling amongst the Native troops in the Presidency division
had reached him from time to time, it was not until he arrived at
Umballa, about the middle of March, that these reports were confirmed
by personal communication with the sepoys attending the School of
Musketry which had been formed at that station.

On the occasion of the Commander-in-Chief's inspection of the School,
he learnt from the men of the various regiments under instruction how
strongly opposed they were to using a cartridge which they believed
to be injurious to their caste. Anson listened attentively to all the
sepoys had to say, and then explained to them in a manly, sensible
speech, that the old cartridge was not suited to the rifle about to be
introduced. A new cartridge had, therefore, to be made; but they must
not listen to any foolish rumour as to its being designed to destroy
their caste. He assured them, 'on the honour of a soldier like
themselves,' that it had never been, and never could be, the policy of
the British Government to coerce the religious feeling of either the
military or the civil population of India, or to interfere in any way
with their caste or customs. He told the Native officers to do all in
their power to allay the men's unfounded fears, and called upon them
to prove themselves worthy of the high character they had hitherto
maintained; he concluded by warning all ranks that the Government were
determined not to yield to insubordination, which would be visited
with the severest punishment.

The demeanour of the sepoys was most respectful, and when the parade
was over they expressed their high sense of the Commander-in-Chief's
goodness. They declared that he had removed their own objections,
but that the story was universally believed by their countrymen and
relations, and if they were to use the cartridge they must become
social outcasts.

General Anson, feeling that the doubts and anxieties of the men with
regard to the use of the new cartridges were by no means imaginary,
suspended their issue until a special report had been prepared as to
the composition of the paper in which they were wrapped.[1]

Having thus done all that he could at the time to allay any feeling of
uneasiness, and hoping that the news of the disbandment of the 19th
Native Infantry would check the spirit of insubordination, General
Anson continued his journey to Simla, that beautiful place in the
Himalayas, 7,000 feet above the sea, which has since become the seat
of the Government of India and Army Head-Quarters during the hot
weather months.

The Commander-in-Chief had been at Simla rather more than a month,
when, on the afternoon of Tuesday, the 12th May, an Aide-de-camp
galloped in from Umballa (the Head-Quarters station of the Sirhind
division), distant eighty miles, bringing with him a copy of the
telegraphic message which had been despatched from Delhi the previous
day to 'all stations in the Punjab,' and which had caused such
consternation at Peshawar on the evening of the 11th May.

Sir Henry Barnard, commanding the Sirhind division, desired the
Aide-de-camp (his own son) to inform the Commander-in-Chief that
the temper of the three Native regiments at Umballa was more than
doubtful, and that it seemed advisable that the three regiments of
British Infantry stationed in the hills near Simla should be ordered
at once to Umballa. So urgent did this seem to Barnard, that, in
anticipation of sanction from the Commander-in-Chief, he told his son
to warn the 75th Foot as he passed through Kasauli to be prepared for
an immediate move.

General Anson at once saw the necessity for taking prompt action. That
same afternoon he despatched an Aide-de-camp to Kasauli to order the
75th to proceed without delay to Umballa, and the 1st Bengal Fusiliers
at Dagshai to follow the 75th as soon as carriage could be collected;
also to warn the 2nd Bengal Fusiliers at Subathu to be ready to move.
Expresses were sent at the same [time] to Ferozepore and Jullundur
directing that a European guard should be placed in charge of the
magazine at the former place, and a detachment of European Infantry
thrown into the fort of Philour from the latter. The confidence
reposed in the Native army before the Mutiny was so great that these
two important magazines, like almost all the arsenals and magazines in
India, were guarded by Native soldiers, and subsequent events proved
that, but for General Anson's timely precautions, the mutineers
must have obtained possession of the magazines at Ferozepore and
Philour.[2]

Anson had not long to wait before he received confirmation of the
alarming news brought by General Barnard's son. The very next
afternoon a letter arrived from Meerut giving an account of the
outbreak on the 10th, and a few particulars of what had occurred at
Delhi. The Commander-in-Chief immediately decided on proceeding to
Umballa, to superintend personally the organization of the force
which, as he rightly judged, would have to be sent to Delhi. There
was no hesitation on General Anson's part, or delay in issuing the
necessary orders.[3] The 2nd Bengal Fusiliers were directed to march
to Umballa, and an Artillery officer was sent express to Philour with
instructions for a third-class siege-train to be got ready, and for
reserve Artillery and Infantry ammunition to be despatched to Umballa.
Orders were also issued for the Nasiri battalion, stationed at Jutog,
near Simla, and for the company of Native Artillery at Kangra and
Nurpur[4] to march with all expedition to Philour, for the purpose of
accompanying the siege-train; and for the Sirmur battalion of Gurkhas
at Dehra Dun, and the Sappers and Miners at Rurki, to proceed to
Meerut.

Having thus pressed forward the measures for the suppression of the
revolt which to him seemed most urgent, General Anson left Simla early
on the 14th May, within forty-eight hours of the receipt of the first
news of the outbreak, and reached Umballa the following morning. His
last act at Simla was to draft a circular which he hoped would have
the effect of allaying excitement in the Native army.

The report which Sir Henry Barnard had to make to the Chief on his
arrival at Umballa was not reassuring. The troops at that station
consisted of Her Majesty's 9th Lancers, two troops of Horse Artillery,
the 4th Bengal Light Cavalry, and two regiments of Native Infantry.
The 75th Foot and 1st Bengal Fusiliers had just marched in with only
thirty and seventy rounds of ammunition per man, respectively, and
(from want of carriage) without tents or baggage. The Commissariat and
Medical Departments were totally unprepared to meet the requirements
of a force suddenly ordered to take the field; there were no doolies
for the sick; supplies were difficult to collect, for the bazaars
were partially deserted; there was a scarcity of contractors, and no
ammunition was available nearer than Philour, eighty miles off.

At Delhi all the Europeans who had not escaped had been massacred, and
the city had been taken possession of by the Native garrison and the
mutinous troops from Meerut in the name of the old King.

At Meerut the European troops were entrenching themselves; the
surrounding district was in the most complete disorder, and the civil
courts powerless.

At Umballa and Jullundur, although the presence of European troops had
hitherto kept the Native regiments from open mutiny, it was evident
that they were not in the least to be depended upon.

At Ferozepore an aggravated revolt had occurred, and at Lahore it had
been found necessary to disarm all the Native troops.

From below Meerut there was no intelligence whatever, but it seemed
more than probable that the spirit of rebellion had broken out in many
stations, and later this was known to be the case.

To add to the Commander-in-Chief's anxieties, it was reported that the
Nasiri battalion at Jutog had got out of hand for a time and refused
to march to Philour, while a detachment of the same corps at Kasauli
plundered the treasury, rendering it necessary to send back 100 men
of the 75th Foot to reinforce the depot at that place, where a large
number of European soldiers' families were collected.

The behaviour of the Gurkhas gave rise to a panic at Simla,
which, however, did not last long. Lord William Hay,[5] who was
Deputy-Commissioner at the time, induced most of the ladies,
with their children, to seek a temporary asylum with the Raja of
Kiunthal.[6] Hay himself managed to keep Simla quiet, and the men
of the Nasiri battalion coming to their senses, order was restored
throughout the hills. The money taken from the Kasauli treasury was
nearly all voluntarily given up, and before the year was out the
battalion did us good service.

It was a long list of troubles that was placed before the
Commander-in-Chief. Disturbing as they all were, each requiring prompt
and special action, there was one amongst them which stood out in bold
relief--the situation at Delhi; and to wrest that stronghold from the
hands of the mutineers was, General Anson conceived, his most pressing
obligation. But could it be done with the means at his disposal?
He thought not; and in this opinion he was supported by the senior
officers at Umballa, with whom the question was anxiously discussed at
a conference held at Sir Henry Barnard's house on the 16th May.[7] It
was nevertheless determined to push on to Delhi, and General Hewitt
was asked what force he could spare from Meerut to co-operate with the
Umballa column. He was warned that time was an object, and that the
23rd May was the date on which his troops would probably be required
to start. All details were carefully considered. The first difficulty
to be overcome was the want of carriage. No organized system of
transport--one of the most essential requirements of an efficient
army--existed, and, owing to the restlessness and uncertainty which
prevailed throughout the country, the civil authorities were unable to
collect carts and camels with the usual rapidity.[8]

That afternoon General Anson received a letter from Sir John Lawrence
urging the importance of an immediate advance on Delhi, and giving an
outline of the measures he proposed to adopt in the Punjab. He asked
the Commander-in-Chief to give a general sanction to the arrangements,
and concluded with these words: "I consider this to be the greatest
crisis which has ever occurred in India. Our European force is so
small that, unless effectively handled in the outset, and brought to
bear, it will prove unequal to the emergency. But with vigour and
promptitude, under the blessing of God, it will prove irresistible."

Anson naturally hesitated to advance with an inefficient and only
partially equipped force against a strongly-fortified city with
an immense armed population, defended by many thousand desperate
mutineers, and in his reply (dated the 17th May) he put the case
plainly before Sir John Lawrence. He pointed out that the Europeans
were without tents; that there were no guns at Umballa or Meerut
heavier than six or nine pounders with which to batter down the walls
of Delhi; that the required amount of carriage could not be provided
in less than sixteen or twenty days; and that the three Native corps
at Umballa could not be depended upon. He asked Sir John whether he
considered 'it would be prudent to risk the small European force we
have here in an enterprise against Delhi,' and he wrote: 'My own view
of the state of things now is, by carefully collecting our resources,
having got rid of the bad materials which we cannot trust, and having
supplied their places with others of a better sort, it would not be
very long before we could proceed, without a chance of failure, in
whatever direction we might please.' Adding, 'this is now the opinion
of all here whom I have consulted--the Major-General and Brigadier,
the Adjutant-General, Quartermaster-General and Commissary-General.'
Anson concluded his letter with the following words: 'It would give me
great satisfaction to have your views upon the present crisis, for I
would trust to them more than to my experience.'

John Lawrence, who was straining every nerve to check the Mutiny and
prevent a general rising of the population, was impatient at the idea
of delay, and lost no time in giving Anson his opinion. He telegraphed
it briefly on the 20th, and the following day he wrote to the effect
that he knew Delhi well, having been stationed there for nearly
thirteen years, and it seemed incredible to him that mutineers could
hold and defend it; his belief was 'that, with good management on the
part of the civil officers, it would open its gates on the approach of
our troops.' He admitted that 'on military principles, in the present
state of affairs, it may not be expedient to advance on Delhi until
the Meerut force is prepared to act.' But he protested against
European soldiers being 'cooped up in their cantonments, tamely
awaiting the progress of events.' He went on to say: 'Pray only
reflect on the whole history of India. Where have we failed when
we acted vigorously? Where have we succeeded when guided by timid
counsels? Clive with 1,200 men fought at Plassy, in opposition to
the advice of his leading officers, beat 40,000 men, and conquered
Bengal.'

That Sir John Lawrence greatly under-estimated the difficulties which
Anson had to overcome we now know. Delhi did not open its gates on our
approach, but for more than three months defied all our efforts to
capture it. And in his eagerness to get the Commander-in-Chief
to think as he did, the resolute Chief Commissioner forgot that
Clive--not with 1,200 men, but with 3,000 disciplined troops--had to
deal in the open field with an enemy little better than a rabble;
whereas Anson had to attack a strong fortress, amply supplied with
stores and ammunition, possessing a powerful armament, and held
by soldiers who were not only well trained and equipped, but were
fighting for their lives, and animated by religious fanaticism.

Still, there can be no doubt that John Lawrence's views as to the
necessity for Delhi being taken at all hazards were correct. The
Governor-General held the same opinion, and strongly urged it upon
Anson, who loyally responded, and during the short time he remained at
Umballa strenuously exerted himself to equip the troops destined for
the arduous task.

While preparing for his advance on the Moghul capital, Anson did not
neglect to provide, as far as lay in his power, for the safety of
Umballa. The soldiers' wives and children were sent to Kasauli; a
place of refuge was made for the non-combatants at the church, round
which an entrenchment was thrown; a garrison, about 500 strong, was
formed of the sick and weakly men of the several European regiments,
assisted by some of the Patiala troops; and as an additional security
half the Native corps were sent into the district, and the other half
with the column to Delhi.

John Lawrence had strongly advocated the policy of trusting the
Maharaja of Patiala and the Rajas of Jhind and Nabha. The attitude of
these Chiefs was of extreme importance, for if they had not been well
disposed towards us, our communication with the Punjab would have been
imperilled. There was therefore much anxiety at Umballa as to the
course Patiala, Jhind, and Nabha (the three principal members of
the great Phulkian family) would elect to take. Douglas Forsyth,[9]
Deputy-Commissioner of Umballa, who was a personal friend of the
Maharaja of Patiala, at once sought an interview with him. He
was beginning to explain to the Maharaja the difficulties of the
situation, when he was interrupted by His Highness, who said he was
aware of all that had happened; on which Forsyth asked if it was
true that emissaries from the King of Delhi had come to Patiala. The
Maharaja pointed to some men seated at a little distance, saying,
'There they are.' Forsyth then asked for a word in private. As soon as
they were alone, he addressed the Maharaja thus: 'Maharaja _sahib_,
answer me one question: Are you for us, or against us?' The Maharaja's
reply was very hearty: 'As long as I live I am yours, but you know
I have enemies in my own country; some of my relations are against
me--my brother for one. What do you want done?' Forsyth then asked the
Maharaja to send some of his troops towards Kurnal to keep open the
Grand Trunk Road. The Maharaja agreed on the understanding that
Europeans should soon be sent to support them--a very necessary
condition, for he knew that his men could only be trusted so long as
there was no doubt of our ultimate success.

Patiala was true to his word, and throughout the Mutiny the Phulkian
Chiefs remained perfectly loyal, and performed the important service
of keeping open communication between Delhi and the Punjab.[10]

On the 19th May General Anson was cheered by hearing from John
Lawrence that the Corps of Guides and four trusty Punjab regiments
were proceeding by forced marches to join him. On the 21st he received
a message from the Governor-General informing him that European troops
were coming from Madras, Bombay, and Ceylon. He also heard of the
arrival of the siege-train at Umballa, and he had the satisfaction of
telegraphing to the Chief Commissioner that the first detachment of
the column destined for Delhi had started.

On the 23rd the Commander-in-Chief communicated his plan of operations
to General Hewitt. It was as follows: Two brigades were to advance
from Umballa, commanded by Brigadier Hallifax of the 75th Foot, and
Colonel Jones of the 60th Rifles; and one brigade from Meerut, under
the command of Brigadier Archdale Wilson. The two former were to be
concentrated at Kurnal by the 30th May, and were then to advance,
under General Anson, so as to arrive opposite Baghput on the 5th June,
at which place they were to be joined by the Meerut brigade, and the
united force was then to proceed to Delhi.

All his arrangements being now completed, Anson left Umballa on the
24th May, and reached Kurnal the following morning. On the 26th he was
struck down by cholera, and in a few hours succumbed to that fatal
disease. His last words expressed a hope that his country would do him
justice, and it is grievous to feel that, in estimating his work and
the difficulties he had to encounter, full justice has not been done
him. Anson has been undeservedly blamed for vacillation and want of
promptitude. He was told to 'make short work of Delhi,' but before
Delhi could be taken more men had perished than his whole force at
that time amounted to. The advice to march upon Delhi was sound, but
had it been rashly followed disaster would have been the inevitable
result. Had the Commander-in-Chief been goaded into advancing without
spare ammunition and siege Artillery, or with an insufficient force,
he must have been annihilated by the overwhelming masses of the
mutineers--those mutineers, who, we shall see later, stoutly opposed
Barnard's greatly augmented force at Badli-ki-Serai, would almost
certainly have repulsed, if not destroyed, a smaller body of troops.

On the death of General Anson the command of the Field Force devolved
on Major-General Sir Henry Barnard.


[Footnote 1: 'I am not so much surprised,' wrote General Anson to Lord
Canning on the 23rd March, 'at their objections to the cartridges,
having seen them. I had no idea they contained, or, rather, are
smeared with, such a quantity of grease, which looks exactly like fat.
After ramming down the ball, the muzzle of the musket is covered
with it. This, however, will, I imagine, not be the case with those
prepared according to the late instructions. But there are now
misgivings about the paper, and I think it so desirable that they
should be assured that no animal grease is used in its manufacture,
that I have ordered a special report to be made to me on that head
from Meerut, and until I receive an answer, and am satisfied that no
objectionable material is used, no firing at the depots by the sepoys
will take place. It would be easy to dismiss the detachments to their
regiments without any practice, on the ground that the hot weather is
so advanced, and that very little progress could be made, but I do not
think that would be admissible. The question, having been raised, must
be settled. It would only be deferred till another year, and I trust
that the measures taken by the Government when the objection was first
made, and the example of the punishment of the 19th Native Infantry
and of the other delinquents of the 70th, now being tried by a General
Court-Martial, will have the effect we desire.'--KAYE, vol. i., p.
558.]

[Footnote 2: Surely those whom God has a mind to destroy, He first
deprives of their senses; for not only were the magazines at Delhi and
Cawnpore allowed to fall into the enemy's hands, but the great arsenal
at Allahabad narrowly escaped the same fate. Up till May, 1857, this
fort was garrisoned only by Native soldiers. Early in that month sixty
worn-out European pensioners were brought to Allahabad from Chunar,
with whose assistance, and that of a few hastily raised Volunteers,
Lieutenants Russell and Tod Brown, of the Bengal Artillery, were able
to overawe and disarm the Native guard on the very night on which the
regiments to which they belonged mutinied in the adjoining cantonment.
These two gallant officers had taken the precaution to fill the
cellars below the armoury (which contained some 50,000 or 60,000
stands of arms) with barrels of powder, their intention being to blow
up the whole place in the event of the sepoys getting the upper hand.
This determination was known to all in the fort, and no doubt had
something to say to the guard submitting to be disarmed.]

[Footnote 3: He has been accused of dilatoriness and want of decision
after hearing the news.]

[Footnote 4: Places at the foot of the Himalayas.]

[Footnote 5: Now the Marquis of Tweeddale.]

[Footnote 6: A small hill state near Simla.]

[Footnote 7: It is a remarkable fact that the five senior officers at
this conference were all dead in less than seven weeks. General Anson,
Brigadier Hallifax, commanding the Umballa station, and Colonel
Mowatt, commanding the Artillery, died within ten days; Colonel
Chester, Adjutant-General of the Army, was killed at Badli-ki-Serai on
the 8th June, and Sir Henry Barnard died at Delhi on the 5th July.]

[Footnote 8: See Kaye's 'History of the Indian Mutiny,' vol. ii., p.
120.]

[Footnote 9: The late Sir Douglas Forsyth, K.C.S.I.]

[Footnote 10: See 'The Life of Sir Douglas Forsyth.']

       *       *       *       *       *




CHAPTER IX.
1857

  John Lawrence's wise measures--Disarmament at Peshawar
  --Salutary effect in the valley


I will now continue my story from the time I left Peshawar to join the
Movable Column.

On the 18th May Brigadier Chamberlain and I arrived at Rawal Pindi,
where we joined the Chief Commissioner, who had got thus far on his
way to his summer residence in the Murree Hills when tidings of the
disaster reached him. One of Sir John Lawrence's first acts after
talking over matters with Chamberlain was to summon Edwardes from
Peshawar, for he wished to consult with him personally about the
question of raising levies and enlisting more frontier men, the only
one of Edwardes's and Nicholson's proposals regarding which the Chief
Commissioner had any doubt; it appeared to him a somewhat risky step
to take, and he desired to give the matter very careful consideration
before coming to any decision. I remember being greatly struck with
the weight given by Lawrence to Edwardes's opinion. He called him his
Councillor, he eagerly sought his advice, and he evidently placed the
utmost reliance on his judgment.

During the six days that we remained at Rawal Pindi waiting for the
Movable Column to be assembled, I spent the greater part of my time
in the Chief Commissioner's office, drafting or copying confidential
letters and telegrams. I thus learned everything that was happening in
the Punjab, and became aware of the magnitude of the crisis through
which we were passing. This enabled me to appreciate the tremendous
efforts required to cope with the danger, and to understand that the
fate of Delhi and the lives of our countrymen and countrywomen in
Upper India depended upon the action taken by the authorities in the
Punjab. I realized that Sir John Lawrence thought of every detail, and
how correct was his judgment as to which of his subordinates could, or
could not, be trusted. The many European women and children scattered
over the province caused him the greatest anxiety, and he wisely
determined to collect them as much as possible at hill stations and
the larger centres, where they would be under the protection of
British troops; for this reason he ordered the families of the
European soldiers at Sialkot (who were being withdrawn to join the
Movable Column) to be sent to Lahore. But, notwithstanding all that
had occurred, and was daily occurring, to demonstrate how universal
was the spirit of disaffection throughout the Native Army, Brigadier
Frederick Brind, who commanded at Sialkot, could not be brought to
believe that the regiments serving under his command would ever prove
disloyal, and he strongly objected to carry out an order which he
denounced as 'showing a want of confidence in the sepoys.' John
Lawrence, however, stood firm. Brind was ordered to despatch the
soldiers' families without delay, and advised to urge the civilians
and military officers to send away their families at the same time. A
few of the ladies and children were sent off, but some were allowed to
remain until the troops mutinied, when the Brigadier was one of the
first to pay the penalty of his misplaced confidence, being shot down
by one of his own orderlies.

We had not been long at Rawal Pindi before we heard that the
uneasiness at Peshawar was hourly increasing, and that the detachment
of the 55th Native Infantry[1] at Nowshera had mutinied and broken
open the magazine. The military force in the Peshawar valley had been
considerably weakened by the withdrawal of the 27th Foot and Corps of
Guides; it was evident that disaffection was rapidly spreading, and
what was still more alarming was the ominously restless feelings
amongst the principal tribes on the frontier. Nicholson encountered
considerable difficulty in raising local levies, and there was a
general unwillingness to enlist. Our disasters in Kabul in 1841-42
had not been forgotten; our cause was considered desperate, and even
Nicholson could not persuade men to join it. It was clear that this
state of affairs must not be allowed to continue, and that some
decisive measures must quickly be taken, or there would be a general
rising along the frontier.

Matters seemed to be drawing to a head, when it was wisely determined
to disarm the Native regiments at Peshawar without delay. This
conclusion was come to at midnight on the 21st May, when the news of
the unfortunate occurrences at Nowshera reached Edwardes, who had
returned that morning from Rawal Pindi. He and Nicholson felt that
no time was to be lost, for if the sepoys heard that the regiment at
Nowshera had mutinied, it would be too late to attempt to disarm them.
Going forthwith to the Brigadier's house, they communicated their
views to Sydney Cotton, who thoroughly appreciated the urgency of the
case, and, acting with the most praiseworthy decision, summoned the
commanding officers of all the Native regiments to be at his house at
daybreak.

When they were assembled, the Brigadier carefully explained to
the officers how matters stood. He pointed out to them that their
regiments were known to be on the verge of mutiny, and that they must
be disarmed forthwith, ending by expressing his great regret at having
to take so serious a step.

The officers were quite aghast. They were persistent and almost
insubordinate in expressing their conviction that the measure was
wholly uncalled-for, that the sepoys were thoroughly loyal, and that,
notwithstanding what had occurred in other places, they had perfect
confidence in their men.

The Brigadier, who knew the officers well, felt that every allowance
should be made for them, called upon as they were to disarm the men
with whom they had been so long associated, and in whom they
still implicitly believed. But although he regarded the officers'
remonstrances as natural and excusable, Cotton never wavered in his
decision, for he was experienced enough to see that the evil was
widespread and deep-seated, and that any display of confidence or
attempt at conciliation in dealing with the disaffected regiments
would be worse than useless.

The parade, which was ordered for 7 a.m., was conducted with great
judgment. The European troops were skilfully disposed so as to render
resistance useless, and four out of the five regular Native regiments
were called upon to lay down their arms. The fifth regiment--the 21st
Native Infantry[2]--was exempted from this indignity, partly because
it had shown no active symptoms of disaffection, was well commanded
and had good officers, and partly because it would have been extremely
difficult to carry on the military duties of the station without some
Native Infantry.

The two regiments of Irregular Cavalry were also spared the disgrace
of being disarmed. It was hoped that the stake the Native officers
and men had in the service (their horses and arms being their own
property) would prevent them from taking an active part in the Mutiny,
and it was believed that the British officers who served with them,
and who for the most part were carefully selected, had sufficient
influence over their men to keep them straight. This hope proved to be
not altogether without foundation, for of the eighteen regiments of
Irregular Cavalry which existed in May, 1857, eight are still borne on
the strength of the Bengal Army; while of the ten regiments of Regular
Cavalry and seventy-four of Infantry, none of the former, and only
eleven of the latter, now remain.

How immediate and salutary were the effects of the disarmament on
the inhabitants of the Peshawar valley will be seen by the following
account which Edwardes gave of it. 'As we rode down to the disarming a
very few Chiefs and yeomen of the country attended us; and I remember
judging from their faces that they came to see which way the tide
would turn. As we rode back friends were as thick as summer flies, and
levies began from that moment to come in.'

The Subadar-Major of the 51st--one of the four regiments disarmed--had
a few days before written to the men of the 64th, who were divided
amongst the outposts, calling upon them to return to Peshawar in time
to join in the revolt fixed for the 22nd May. The letter ran; 'In
whatever way you can manage it, come into Peshawar on the 21st
instant. Thoroughly understand that point! In fact, eat there and
drink here.' The rapidity with which the disarmament had been carried
through spoilt the Subadar-Major's little game; he had, however, gone
too far to draw back, and on the night of the 22nd he deserted, taking
with him 250 men of the regiment. His hopes were a second time doomed
to disappointment. However welcome 250 muskets might have been to the
Afridis, 250 unarmed sepoys were no prize; and as our neighbours in
the hills had evidently come to the conclusion that our _raj_ was not
in such a desperate state as they had imagined, and that their best
policy was to side with us, they caught the deserters, with the
assistance of the district police, and made them over to the
authorities. The men were all tried by Court-Martial, and the
Subadar-Major was hanged in the presence of the whole garrison.

On the 23rd May, the day after the disarmament, news was received at
Peshawar that the 55th Native Infantry had mutinied at Mardan, and
that the 10th Irregular Cavalry, which was divided between Nowshera
and Mardan, had turned against us. A force was at once despatched to
restore order, and Nicholson accompanied it as political officer. No
sooner did the mutineers, on the morning of the 25th, catch sight
of the approaching column than they broke out of the fort and fled
towards the Swat hills. Nicholson pursued with his levies and mounted
police, and before night 120 fugitives were killed and as many more
made prisoners. The remainder found no welcome among the hill tribes,
and eventually became wanderers over the country until they died or
were killed. Poor Spottiswoode, the Colonel, committed suicide shortly
before the Peshawar troops reached Mardan.


[Footnote 1: The Head-Quarters of this regiment had been sent to
Mardan in place of the Guides.]

[Footnote 2: Now the 1st Bengal Infantry.]

       *       *       *       *       *




CHAPTER X.
1857

  Neville Chamberlain's presence of mind
  --The command of the Column--Robert Montgomery
  --Disarmament at Mian Mir
  --A Drum-Head Court-Martial--Swift retribution


While I was employed in the Chief Commissioner's office at Rawal Pindi
it became known that the Mutineers intended to make their stand at
Delhi, and immediately urgent demands came from the Head-Quarters of
the army for troops to be sent from the Punjab. Sir John Lawrence
exerted himself to the uttermost, even to the extent of denuding his
own province to a somewhat dangerous degree, and the Guides and 1st
Punjab Infantry, which had been told off for the Movable Column, were
ordered instead to proceed to Delhi.

The Guides, a corps second to none in Her Majesty's Indian Army, was
commanded by Captain Daly,[1] and consisted of three troops of Cavalry
and six companies of Infantry. The regiment had got as far as Attock,
when it received the order to proceed to Delhi, and pushed on at once
by double marches. The 4th Sikhs, under Captain Rothney, and the 1st
Punjab Infantry, under Major Coke,[2] followed in quick succession,
and later on the following troops belonging to the Punjab Frontier
Force were despatched towards Delhi: a squadron of the 1st Punjab
Cavalry, under Lieutenant John Watson (my companion in Kashmir);
a squadron of the 2nd Punjab Cavalry, under Lieutenant Charles
Nicholson[3] (John Nicholson's brother); a squadron of the 5th Punjab
Cavalry, under Lieutenant Younghusband; and the 2nd and 4th Punjab
Infantry, commanded respectively by Captains G. Green[4] and A.
Wilde.[5]

We (Brigadier Chamberlain and I) remained at Rawal Pindi until the
24th May to give our servants and horses time to reach Wazirabad, and
then started on a mail-cart for the latter place, which we reached
on the 27th. Lieutenant James Walker,[6] of the Bombay Engineers,
accompanied us as the Brigadier's orderly officer.

The Grand Trunk Road, which runs in a direct line from Calcutta to
Peshawar, was then in course of construction through the Punjab, and
in places was in rather an elementary condition. The drivers of the
mail-carts sent along their half-wild and entirely unbroken ponies at
racing speed, regardless alike of obstacles and consequences. With an
enterprising coachman the usual pace was about twelve miles an
hour, including stoppages. As we were recklessly flying along, the
Brigadier, who was sitting in front, perceived that one of the reins
had become unbuckled, and warned Walker and me to look out for an
upset. Had the coachman not discovered the state of his tackle all
might have been well, for the ponies needed no guiding along the
well-known road. Unfortunately, however, he became aware of what had
happened, lost his head, and pulled the reins; the animals dashed off
the road, there was a crash, and we found ourselves on the ground,
scattered in different directions. No great damage was done, and in a
few minutes we had righted the cart, re-harnessed the ponies, and were
rushing along as before.

In order that the authorities at Rawal Pindi might be able to
communicate with the Movable Column while on the march and away
from telegraph stations, which were few and far between in 1857, a
signaller accompanied us, and travelled with his instruments on a
second mail-cart, and wherever we halted for the day he attached his
wire to the main line. He had just completed the attachment on our
arrival at Wazirabad, when I observed that the instrument was working,
and on drawing the signaller's attention to it, he read off a message
which was at that moment being transmitted to the Chief Commissioner,
informing him of the death of the Commander-in-Chief at Kurnal the
previous day. This sad news did not directly affect the Movable
Column, as it had been organized by, and was under the orders of, the
Punjab Government, which for the time being had become responsible for
the military, as well as the civil, administration in the north of
India.

The column had marched into Wazirabad the day before we arrived.
It consisted of Major Dawes' troop of European Horse Artillery,
a European battery of Field Artillery, commanded by Captain
Bourchier,[7] and Her Majesty's 52nd Light Infantry, commanded by
Colonel George Campbell. In addition, and with a view to reducing the
Native garrison of Sialkot, a wing of the 9th Bengal Light Cavalry and
the 35th Native Infantry were attached to the column.

My first duty at Wazirabad was to call upon the senior officer,
Colonel Campbell, and inform him that Brigadier Chamberlain had come
to take over command of the Movable Column. I found the Colonel lying
on his bed trying to make himself as comfortable as it was possible
with the thermometer at 117° Fahrenheit. We had not met before, and he
certainly received me in a very off-hand manner. He never moved from
his recumbent position, and on my delivering my message, he told me he
was not aware that the title of Brigadier carried military rank
with it; that he understood Brigadier Chamberlain was only a
Lieutenant-Colonel, whereas he held the rank of Colonel in Her
Majesty's army; and that, under these circumstances, he must decline
to acknowledge Brigadier Chamberlain as his senior officer. I replied
that I would give his message to the Brigadier, and took my leave.

When Chamberlain heard what had occurred, he desired me to return to
Campbell and explain that he had no wish to dispute the question of
relative seniority, and that in assuming command of the column he
was only carrying out the orders of the Commander-in-Chief in India.
Campbell, who technically speaking had the right on his side, was
not to be appeased, and requested me to inform the Brigadier of his
determination not to serve under an officer whom he considered to be
his junior.

This was not a pleasant beginning to our duties with the column, and
Chamberlain thought that we had better take our departure and leave
Campbell in command until the question could be settled by superior
authority. Campbell was accordingly asked to march the troops to
Lahore, to which place we continued our journey by mail-cart.

At the same time a reference was made to Sir John Lawrence and
General Reed, which resulted in the decision that, under the peculiar
circumstances of the case, it was essential that an officer of Indian
experience should be in command of the column, and that Campbell,
having only been a very short time in the country, did not fulfil this
condition; but Campbell was told that, if he objected to serve under
Chamberlain, he could remain at Lahore with the Head-Quarters of his
regiment. Campbell, who at heart was really a very nice fellow and an
excellent officer, would not be separated from the 52nd, and agreed
to serve under the Brigadier, reserving to himself the right of
protesting when the new Commander-in-Chief should arrive in India.

There was probably another reason for Campbell not wishing to serve
under Chamberlain besides that of being senior to him in the army, in
the fact that the Brigadier was a servant of 'John Company,' while
Campbell belonged to the 'Queen's Service.' From the time of the
establishment of a local army there had existed an absurd and
unfortunate jealousy between the officers of the Queen's and Company's
services, and one of the best results of the Mutiny was its gradual
disappearance. This ill-feeling influenced not only fellow-countrymen,
but relations, even brothers, if they belonged to the different
services, and was distinctly prejudicial to the interests of the
Government. It is difficult to understand how so puerile a sentiment
could have been so long indulged in by officers who no doubt
considered themselves sensible Englishmen.[8]

On the 31st May we arrived at Lahore, where we found everyone in a
state of considerable excitement. Lahore was and is the great centre
of the Punjab, and to it non-combatants and English ladies with their
children were hurrying from all the outlying districts. In the city
itself there was a mixed population of nearly 100,000, chiefly Sikhs
and Mahomedans, many of the former old soldiers who had served in the
Khalsa Army. The fort, which was within the walls of the city, was
garrisoned by half a regiment of sepoys, one company of European
Infantry, and a few European Artillerymen. Mian Mir, five miles
off, was the Head-Quarters of the Lahore division; it was a long,
straggling cantonment, laid out for a much larger force than it has
ever been found necessary to place there, with the European Infantry
at one end and the European Artillery at the other, separated by
Native troops. This arrangement (which existed in almost every station
in India) is another proof of the implicit confidence placed in the
Native army--a confidence in mercenary soldiers of alien races which
seems all the more surprising when we call to mind the warnings
that for nearly a hundred years had been repeatedly given of the
possibility of disaffection existing amongst Native troops.

There were four Native regiments at Mian Mir, one of Cavalry and three
of Infantry, while the European portion of the garrison consisted of
one weak Infantry regiment, two troops of Horse Artillery, and four
companies of Foot Artillery. This force was commanded by Brigadier
Corbett, of the Bengal Army; he had been nearly forty years in the
service, was mentally and physically vigorous, and had no fear of
responsibility. Robert Montgomery[9] was then chief civil officer at
Lahore. He was of a most gentle and benevolent nature, with a rubicund
countenance and a short, somewhat portly figure, which characteristics
led to his being irreverently called 'Pickwick,' and probably if he
had lived in less momentous times he would never have been credited
with the great qualities which the crisis in the Punjab proved him to
possess.

On receipt of the telegraphic news of the outbreaks at Meerut and
Delhi, Montgomery felt that immediate action was necessary. He at once
set to work to discover the temper of the Native troops at Mian Mir,
and soon ascertained that they were disaffected to the core, and were
only waiting to hear from their friends in the south to break into
open mutiny. He thoroughly understood the Native character, and
realized the danger to the whole province of there being anything in
the shape of a serious disturbance at its capital; so after consulting
his various officials, Montgomery decided to suggest to the Brigadier
the advisability of disarming the sepoys, or, if that were considered
too strong a measure, of taking their ammunition from them. Corbett
met him quite half-way; he also saw that the danger was imminent, and
that prompt action was necessary, but he not unnaturally shrank from
taking the extreme step of disarming men whose loyalty had never until
then been doubted--a step, moreover, which he knew would be keenly
resented by all the regimental officers--he therefore at first only
agreed to deprive the sepoys of their ammunition; later in the day,
however, after thinking the matter over, he came to the conclusion
that it would be better to adopt Montgomery's bolder proposal, and he
informed him accordingly that he would 'go the whole hog.'

I do not think that Corbett's action on this occasion has been
sufficiently appreciated. That he decided rightly there can be no
doubt, but very few officers holding commands in India at that time
would have accepted such responsibility. His knowledge as to what had
happened at Meerut and Delhi was based on one or two meagre telegrams,
and the information Montgomery gave him as to the treacherous
intentions of the sepoys at Mian Mir had been obtained by means of
a spy, who, it was quite possible, might have been actuated by
interested motives.

Having made up his mind what should be done, Corbett had the good
sense to understand that success depended on its being done quickly,
and on the Native troops being kept absolutely in the dark as to what
was about to take place. A general parade was ordered for the next
morning, the 13th May, and it was wisely determined not to put off a
ball which was being given that evening to the officers of the 81st
Foot. The secret was confided to very few, and the great majority of
those who were taking part in the entertainment were ignorant of the
reason for a parade having been ordered the following morning--an
unusual proceeding which caused a certain amount of grumbling.

When the sepoys were drawn up, it was explained to them in their own
language that they were about to be deprived of their arms, in order
to put temptation out of their reach, and save them from the disgrace
of being led away by the evil example of other corps. Whilst they were
being thus addressed, the Horse Artillery and 81st Foot took up a
second line immediately in rear of the Native regiments, the guns
being quietly loaded with grape during the manoeuvre. The regiments
were then directed to change front to the rear, when they found
themselves face to face with the British troops. The order was given
to the sepoys to 'pile arms'; one of the regiments hesitated, but only
for a moment; resistance was hopeless, and the word of command was
sullenly obeyed.

The same morning the fort of Lahore was secured. Three companies of
the 81st marched into it at daylight, relieved the sepoys of their
guards, and ordered them to lay down their arms. Another company
of the same regiment travelled through the night in carriages to
Umritsar, the holy city of the Sikhs, and occupied the fortress
of Govindgarh. Montgomery had been very anxious about these two
strongholds, and it was a great satisfaction to him to know that they
were at length safely guarded by British bayonets.

Although, as I have said, we found Lahore in a state of considerable
excitement, it was satisfactory to see how fully the situation had
been grasped, and how everything that was possible had been done
to maintain order, and show the people of the Punjab that we were
prepared to hold our own. Montgomery's foresight and decision, and
Corbett's hearty and willing co-operation, checked, if not altogether
stopped, what, under less energetic management, would assuredly have
resulted in very grievous trouble. Excitement was inevitable. There
was a general stir throughout the province. Lahore was crowded with
the families of European soldiers, and with ladies who had come there
from various parts of the Punjab, all in terrible anxiety as to what
might be the ultimate fate of their husbands and relatives; some of
whom were with Native regiments, whose loyalty was more than doubtful;
some with the Movable Column, the destination of which was uncertain;
while others were already on their way to join the army hurrying to
Delhi.

The difficulty with Campbell having been settled, Chamberlain assumed
the command of the Movable Column, the advent of which on the 2nd June
was hailed with delight by all the Europeans at Lahore. A regiment of
British Infantry and two batteries of Artillery afforded a much needed
support to the handful of British soldiers keeping guard over the
great capital of the Punjab, and gave confidence to the Sikhs and
others disposed to be loyal, but who were doubtful as to the wisdom of
siding with us.

The disturbing element was the Native troops which accompanied the
column. They had not shown openly that they contemplated mutiny, but
we knew that they were not to be trusted, and were only watching for
an opportunity to break out and escape to Delhi with their arms.

I was living with the Brigadier in a house only a few minutes' walk
from the garden where the Native regiments were encamped, and the
spies we were employing to watch them had orders to come to me
whenever anything suspicious should occur. During the night of the
8th June one of these men awoke me with the news that the 35th Native
Infantry intended to revolt at daybreak, and that some of them had
already loaded their muskets. I awoke the Brigadier, who directed me
to go at once to the British officers of the regiment, tell them what
we had heard, and that he would be with them shortly. As soon as the
Brigadier arrived the men were ordered to fall in, and on their arms
being examined two of them were found to have been loaded. The sepoys
to whom the muskets belonged were made prisoners, and I was ordered to
see them lodged in the police-station.

Chamberlain determined to lose no time in dealing with the case, and
although Drum-Head Courts-Martial were then supposed to be obsolete,
he decided to revive, for this occasion, that very useful means of
disposing, in time of war, of grave cases of crime.

The Brigadier thought it desirable that the Court-Martial should be
composed of Native, rather than British, officers, as being likely to
be looked upon by the prisoners as a more impartial tribunal, under
the peculiar circumstances in which we were placed. This was made
possible by the arrival of the 1st Punjab Infantry--Coke's Rifles--a
grand regiment under a grand Commander. Raised in 1849, composed
chiefly of Sikhs and Pathans, and possessing Native officers of
undoubted loyalty, the 1st Punjab Infantry had taken part in almost
every frontier expedition during the previous eight years. Its history
was a glorious record of faithful and devoted service, such as can
only be rendered by brave men led by officers in whom they believe and
trust.[10] The Subadar-Major of the corps was a man called Mir Jaffir,
a most gallant Afghan soldier, who entered the British service during
the first Afghan war, and distinguished himself greatly in all the
subsequent frontier fights. This Native officer was made president
of the Court-Martial. The prisoners were found guilty of mutiny, and
sentenced to death. Chamberlain decided that they should be blown away
from guns, in the presence of their own comrades, as being the most
awe-inspiring means of carrying the sentence into effect.[11] A parade
was at once ordered. The troops were drawn up so as to form three
sides of a square; on the fourth side were two guns. As the prisoners
were being brought to the parade, one of them asked me if they were
going to be blown from guns. I said, 'Yes.' He made no further remark,
and they both walked steadily on until they reached the guns, to which
they were bound, when one of them requested that some rupees he had on
his person might be saved for his relations. The Brigadier answered:
'It is too late!' The word of command was given; the guns went off
simultaneously, and the two mutineers were launched into eternity.

It was a terrible sight, and one likely to haunt the beholder for many
a long day; but that was what was intended. I carefully watched
the sepoys' faces to see how it affected them. They were evidently
startled at the swift retribution which had overtaken their guilty
comrades, but looked more crest-fallen than shocked or horrified, and
we soon learnt that their determination to mutiny, and make the best
of their way to Delhi, was in nowise changed by the scene they had
witnessed.


[Footnote 1: The late General Sir Henry Daly, G.C.B.]

[Footnote 2: Now General Sir John Coke, G.C.B.]

[Footnote 3: Afterwards commanded by Lieutenant, now General, Sir
Dighton Probyn, V.C., G.C.V.O., K.C.B.]

[Footnote 4: The late Major-General Sir George Green, K.C.B.]

[Footnote 5: The late Lieutenant-General Sir Alfred Wilde, K.C.B.,
K.C.S.I.]

[Footnote 6: The late General James Walker, C.B., sometime
Surveyor-General in India.]

[Footnote 7: Now General Sir George Bourchier, K.C.B.]

[Footnote 8: Now, except for one short interval, every officer who has
joined the Indian Army since 1861 must, in the first instance, have
belonged or been attached to one of Her Majesty's British regiments:
the great majority have been educated at Sandhurst or Woolwich, and
all feel that they are members of the same army.]

[Footnote 9: The late Sir Robert Montgomery, G.C.B.]

[Footnote 10: During the operations in the Kohat Pass in February,
1850, within twelve months of the corps being raised, several of the
men were killed and wounded. Among the latter was a Pathan named
Mahomed Gul. He was shot through the body in two places, and as Coke
sat by him while he was dying, he said, with a smile on his face:
'_Sahib_, I am happy; but promise me one thing--don't let my old
mother want. I leave her to your care.']

[Footnote 11: Awe-inspiring certainly, but probably the most humane,
as being a sure and instantaneous mode of execution.]

       *       *       *       *       *




CHAPTER XI.
1857

  Ferozepore--Crawford Chamberlain at Multan
  --Chamberlain's masterly conduct
  --Nicholson succeeds Neville Chamberlain--Irresolution at Jullundur
  --General Mehtab Sing--Nicholson's soldierly instincts
  --More disarmaments


For a few days after our arrival at Lahore nothing could be settled as
to the further movements of the column. It was wanted in all parts of
the Punjab: Ferozeporo, Multan, Jhelum, Sialkot, Umritsar, Jullundur,
Philour, Ludhiana--all these places were more or less disturbed, and
all were clamorous for help.

At Ferozepore the Native regiments[1] broke out on the 13th May, when
they made a daring, but unsuccessful effort to seize the arsenal,
situated inside the fort and the largest in Upper India. Had that
fallen into the hands of the rebels, Delhi could not have been
captured without very considerable delay, for the besieging force
depended mainly upon Ferozepore for the supply of munitions of war.
The fort had been allowed to fall into bad repair, and the mutineers
had no difficulty in forcing their way inside; there, fortunately,
they were checked by the wall which surrounded the arsenal, and this
obstacle, insignificant as it was, enabled the guard to hold its own.
Originally this guard consisted entirely of Native soldiers, but, as
I have already recorded, after the outbreak at Meerut, Europeans
had been told off for the charge of this important post; so strong,
however, here as elsewhere, was the belief in the loyalty of the
sepoys, and so great was the reluctance to do anything which might
hurt their feelings, that the Native guard was not withdrawn. This
same guard, when the attack took place, did its best to assist the
assailants, and even prepared scaling-ladders to enable the latter to
gain access to the magazine enclosure. The Europeans, however,
were equal to the emergency; they overpowered and disarmed their
treacherous companions, and then succeeded in beating off and
dispersing the attacking party.

Being foiled in this attempt, the mutineers returned to the
cantonment, set fire to the church and other buildings, and then
started for Delhi. Ferozepore had a large European garrison, a
regiment of Infantry, a battery of Field Artillery, and a company of
Foot Artillery, and was supposed to be able to look after itself,
although affairs had been greatly mismanaged.

Multan had next to be considered. Matters at that station were very
unsettled, and indeed were causing the authorities grave anxiety, but
Multan was more fortunate than many places, in being in the hands of
an unusually able, experienced officer, Major Crawford Chamberlain.
Consequently, the Commander-in-Chief and Chief Commissioner agreed,
while fully appreciating the great value of Multan, that the presence
of British troops was less urgently needed there than elsewhere,
and it was decided they could not be spared from the Punjab for its
protection.

The garrison at Multan consisted of a troop of Native Horse Artillery,
two regiments of Native Infantry, and the 1st Irregular Cavalry,
composed entirely of Hindustanis from the neighbourhood of Delhi;
while in the old Sikh fort there were about fifty European
Artillerymen, in charge of a small magazine. The station was nominally
commanded by an officer who had been thirty-four years in the army,
and had great experience amongst Natives; but he had fallen into such
a bad state of health, that he was quite unfit to deal with the
crisis which had now arrived. The command, therefore, was practically
exercised by Chamberlain. Next to Delhi and Lahore, Multan was the
most important place in Upper India, as our communication with the sea
and southern India depended on its preservation.

To Chamberlain's own personality and extraordinary influence over the
men of the 1st Irregular Cavalry must be attributed his success. His
relations with them were of a patriarchal nature, and perfect mutual
confidence existed. He knew his hold over them was strong, and
he determined to trust them. But in doing so he had really no
alternative--had they not remained faithful, Multan must have been
lost to us. One of his first acts was to call a meeting at his house
of the Native officers of the Artillery, Infantry, and his own
regiment, to discuss the situation. Taking for granted the absolute
loyalty of these officers, he suggested that a written bond should
be given, in which the seniors of each corps should guarantee the
fidelity of their men. The officers of his regiment rose _en
masse_, and placing their signet-rings on the table, said: '_Kabúl
sir-o-chasm'_ ('Agreed to on our lives'). The Artillery Subadar
declared that his men had no scruples, and would fire in whichever
direction they were required; while the Infantry Native officers
pleaded that they had no power over their men, and could give no
guarantee. Thus, Chamberlain ascertained that the Cavalry were loyal,
the Artillery doubtful, and the Infantry were only biding their time
to mutiny.

Night after night sepoys, disguised beyond all recognition, attempted
to tamper with the Irregular Cavalry. The Wurdi-Major,[2] a
particularly fine, handsome _Ranagar_,[3] begged Chamberlain to
hide himself in his house, that he might hear for himself the open
proposals to mutiny, massacre, and rebellion that were made to him;
and the promises that, if they succeeded in their designs, he (the
Wurdi-Major) should be placed upon the _gaddi_[4] of Multan for his
reward. Chamberlain declined to put himself in such a position,
fearing he might not be able to restrain himself.

Matters now came to a climax. A Mahomedan Subadar of one of the Native
Infantry regiments laid a plot to murder Chamberlain and his family.
The plot was discovered and frustrated by Chamberlain's own men, but
it became apparent that the only remedy for the fast increasing evil
was to disarm the two Native Infantry regiments. How was this to be
accomplished with no Europeans save a few gunners anywhere near? Sir
John Lawrence was most pressing that the step should be taken at
once; he knew the danger of delay; at the same time, he thoroughly
appreciated the difficulty of the task which he was urging Chamberlain
to undertake, and he readily responded to the latter's request for a
regiment of Punjab Infantry to be sent to him. The 2nd Punjab Infantry
was, therefore, despatched from Dera Ghazi Khan, and at the same time
the 1st Punjab Cavalry arrived from Asni,[5] under Major Hughes,[6]
who, hearing of Chamberlain's troubles, had marched to Multan without
waiting for orders from superior authority. The evening of the day on
which these troops reached Multan, the British officers of the several
regiments were directed to assemble at the Deputy-Commissioner's
house, when Chamberlain told them of the communication he had received
from Sir John Lawrence, adding that, having reliable information that
the Native Infantry were about to mutiny, he had settled to disarm
them the next morning.

It was midnight before the meeting broke up. At 4 a.m. the Horse
Artillery troop and the two Native Infantry regiments were ordered to
march as if to an ordinary parade. When they had gone about a quarter
of a mile they were halted, and the Punjab troops moved quietly
between them and their lines, thus cutting them off from their spare
ammunition; at the same time the European Artillerymen took their
places with the guns of the Horse Artillery troop, and a carefully
selected body of Sikhs belonging to the 1st Punjab Cavalry, under
Lieutenant John Watson, was told off to advance on the troop and cut
down the gunners if they refused to assist the Europeans to work the
guns.

Chamberlain then rode up to the Native Infantry regiments, and after
explaining to them the reason for their being disarmed, he gave the
word of command, 'Pile arms!' Thereupon a sepoy of the 62nd shouted:
'Don't give up your arms; fight for them!' Lieutenant Thomson, the
Adjutant of the regiment, instantly seized him by the throat and threw
him to the ground. The order was repeated, and, wonderful to relate,
obeyed. The Native Infantry regiments were then marched back to their
lines, while the Punjab troops and Chamberlain's Irregulars remained
on the ground until the arms had been carted off to the fort.

It was a most critical time, and enough credit has never been given to
Chamberlain. Considering the honours which were bestowed on others
who took more or less conspicuous parts in the Mutiny, he was very
insufficiently rewarded for this timely act of heroism. Had he not
shown such undaunted courage and coolness, or had there been the
smallest hesitation, Multan would certainly have gone. Chamberlain
managed an extremely difficult business in a most masterly manner.
His personal influence insured his own regiment continuing loyal
throughout the Mutiny, and it has now the honour of being the 1st
Regiment of Bengal Cavalry, and the distinction of wearing a different
uniform from every other regiment in the service, being allowed to
retain the bright yellow which the troopers wore when they were first
raised by Colonel James Skinner, and in which they performed such
loyal service.[7]

At Jhelum and Sialkot it was decided that, as the Native troops had
been considerably reduced in numbers, the danger was not so great as
to require the presence of the Movable Column.

Umritsar had been made safe for the time, but it was a place the
importance of which could not be over-estimated, and it was thought
that keeping a strong column in its vicinity for a few days would
materially strengthen our position there. Moreover, Umritsar lay in
the direct route to Jullundur, where the military authorities had
proved themselves quite unfitted to deal with the emergency. It was
decided, therefore, that Umritsar should be our objective in the
first instance. We marched from Lahore on the 10th June, and reached
Umritsar the following morning.

News of a severe fight at Badli-ki-Serai had been received, which
increased our anxiety to push on to Delhi, for we feared the place
might be taken before we could get there. But to our mortification it
was decided that the column could not be spared just then even for
Delhi, as there was still work for it in the Punjab. To add to our
disappointment, we had to give up our trusted Commander; for a few
hours after our arrival at Umritsar a telegram came to Neville
Chamberlain offering him the Adjutant-Generalship of the Army in
succession to Colonel Chester, who had been killed at Badli-ki-Serai.
He accepted the offer, and I made certain I should go with him. My
chagrin, therefore, can easily be understood when he told me that I
must remain with the column, as it would be unfair to his successor to
take away the staff officer. We were now all anxiety to learn who
that successor should be, and it was a satisfaction to hear that John
Nicholson was the man.

Chamberlain left for Delhi on the 13th; but Nicholson could not join
for a few days, and as troops were much needed at Jullundur, it was
arranged that the column should move on to that place, under the
temporary command of Campbell, and there await the arrival of the new
Brigadier.

On my going to Campbell for orders, he informed me that he was no
longer the senior officer with the column, as a Colonel Denniss,
junior to him regimentally, but his senior in army rank, had just
rejoined the 52nd. Accordingly I reported myself to Denniss, who,
though an officer of many years' service, had never before held a
command, not even that of a regiment; and, poor man! was considerably
taken aback when he heard that he must be in charge of the column for
some days. He practically left everything to me--a somewhat trying
position for almost the youngest officer in the force. It was under
these circumstances I found what an able man Colonel Campbell really
was. He correctly gauged Denniss's fitness, or rather unfitness, for
the command, and appreciating the awkwardness of my position, advised
me so wisely that I had no difficulty in carrying on the work.

We reached Jullundur on the 20th, Nicholson taking over command the
same day. He had been given the rank of Brigadier-General, which
removed all grounds for objection on the part of Campbell, and the two
soon learnt to appreciate each other, and became fast friends.

Jullundur was in a state of the greatest confusion. The Native troops,
consisting of a regiment of Light Cavalry and two regiments of Native
Infantry, began to show signs of disaffection soon after the outbreak
at Meerut, and from that time until the 7th June, when they broke into
open mutiny, incendiary fires were almost of daily occurrence. The
want of resolution displayed in dealing with the crisis at Jullundur
was one of the regrettable episodes of the Mutiny. The European
garrison consisted of Her Majesty's 8th Foot and a troop of Horse
Artillery. The military authorities had almost a whole month's warning
of the mutinous intentions of the Native troops, but though they had
before them the example of the prompt and successful measures adopted
at Lahore and Peshawar, they failed to take any steps to prevent the
outbreak.

The Brigadier (Johnstone) was on leave at the commencement of the
Mutiny, and during his absence the treasure was placed in charge of
a European guard, in accordance with instructions from Sir John
Lawrence. This measure was reversed as soon as the Brigadier rejoined,
for fear of showing distrust of the sepoys, and another wise order
of the watchful Chief Commissioner--to disarm the Native troops--was
never carried out. The Commissioner, Major Edward Lake, one of Henry
Lawrence's most capable assistants, had also repeatedly urged upon
Johnstone the advisability of depriving the sepoys of their arms, but
his advice remained unheeded. When the inevitable revolt took place
European soldiers were allowed to be passive spectators while property
was being destroyed, and sepoys to disappear in the darkness of the
night carrying with them their muskets and all the treasure and
plunder they could lay their hands on.

A futile attempt at pursuit was made the following morning, but, as
will be seen, this was carried out in so half-hearted a manner, that
the mutineers were able to get safely across the Sutlej with their
loot, notwithstanding that the passage of this broad river had to be
made by means of a ferry, where only very few boats were available.
Having reached Philour, the British troops were ordered to push on to
Delhi, and as Jullundur was thus left without protection, Lake gladly
accepted the offer of the Raja of Kapurthala to garrison it with his
own troops.

There was no doubt as to the loyalty of the Raja himself, and his
sincere desire to help us; but the mismanagement of affairs at
Jullundur had done much to lower our prestige in the eyes of his
people, and there was no mistaking the offensive demeanour of his
troops. They evidently thought that British soldiers had gone never
to return, and they swaggered about in swash-buckler fashion, as only
Natives who think they have the upper hand can swagger.

It was clearly Lake's policy to keep on good terms with the Kapurthala
people. His position was much strengthened by the arrival of our
column; but we were birds of passage, and might be off at any moment,
so in order to pay a compliment to the officers and principal men with
the Kapurthala troops, Lake asked Nicholson to meet them at his house.
Nicholson consented, and a durbar was arranged. I was present on the
occasion, and was witness of rather a curious scene, illustrative
alike of Nicholson and Native character.

At the close of the ceremony Mehtab Sing, a general officer in the
Kapurthala Army, took his leave, and, as the senior in rank at the
durbar, was walking out of the room first, when I observed Nicholson
stalk to the door, put himself in front of Mehtab Sing and, waving him
back with an authoritative air, prevent him from leaving the room. The
rest of the company then passed out, and when they had gone, Nicholson
said to Lake: 'Do you see that General Mehtab Sing has his shoes
on?'[8] Lake replied that he had noticed the fact, but tried to excuse
it. Nicholson, however, speaking in Hindustani, said: 'There is no
possible excuse for such an act of gross impertinence. Mehtab Sing
knows perfectly well that he would not venture to step on his own
father's carpet save barefooted, and he has only committed this breach
of etiquette to-day because he thinks we are not in a position to
resent the insult, and that he can treat us as he would not have
dared to do a month ago.' Mehtab Sing looked extremely foolish, and
stammered some kind of apology; but Nicholson was not to be appeased,
and continued: 'If I were the last Englishman left in Jullundur, you'
(addressing Mehtab Sing) 'should not come into my room with your
shoes on;' then, politely turning to Lake, he added, 'I hope the
Commissioner will now allow me to order you to take your shoes off and
carry them out in your own hands, so that your followers may witness
your discomfiture.' Mehtab Sing, completely cowed, meekly did as he
was told.

Although in the kindness of his heart Lake had at first endeavoured to
smooth matters over, he knew Natives well, and he readily admitted
the wisdom of Nicholson's action. Indeed, Nicholson's uncompromising
bearing on this occasion proved a great help to Lake, for it had the
best possible effect upon the Kapurthala people; their manner at once
changed, all disrespect vanished, and there was no more swaggering
about as if they considered themselves masters of the situation.

Five or six years after this occurrence I was one of a pig-sticking
party at Kapurthala, given by the Raja in honour of the
Commander-in-Chief, Sir Hugh Rose.[9] When riding home in the evening
I found myself close to the elephant on which our host and the Chief
were sitting. The conversation happening to turn on the events of the
Mutiny, I asked what had become of General Mehtab Sing. The Raja,
pointing to an elephant a little distance off on which two Native
gentlemen were riding, said, 'There he is.' I recognized the General,
and making him a salaam, which he politely returned, I said to him, 'I
have not had the pleasure of meeting you since those hot days in June,
1857, when I was at Jullundur.' The Raja then asked me if I knew
Nicholson. On my telling him I had been his staff officer, and with
him at the durbar at Lake _Sahib's_ house, the Raja laughed heartily,
and said, 'Oh! then you saw Mehtab Sing made to walk out of the room
with his shoes in his hand? We often chaff him about that little
affair, and tell him that he richly deserved the treatment he received
from the great Nicholson _Sahib_.'

Sir Hugh Rose was greatly interested in the story, which he made me
repeat to him as soon as we got back to camp, and he was as much
struck as I was with this spontaneous testimony of a leading Native to
the wisdom of Nicholson's procedure.

On taking over command, Nicholson's first care was to establish an
effective system of intelligence, by means of which he was kept
informed of what was going on in the neighbouring districts; and,
fully recognizing the necessity for rapid movement in the event of any
sudden emergency, he organized a part of his force into a small
flying column, the infantry portion of which was to be carried in
_ekkas_.[10] I was greatly impressed by Nicholson's knowledge of
military affairs. He seemed always to know exactly what to do and the
best way to do it. This was the more remarkable because, though
a soldier by profession, his training had been chiefly that of a
civilian--a civilian of the frontier, however, where his soldierly
instincts had been fostered in his dealing with a lawless and unruly
people, and where he had received a training which was now to stand
him in good stead. Nicholson was a born Commander, and this was felt
by every officer and man with the column before he had been amongst
them many days.

The Native troops with the column had given no trouble since we left
Lahore. We were travelling in the direction they desired to go, which
accounted for their remaining quiet; but Nicholson, realizing the
danger of having them in our midst, and the probability of their
refusing to turn away from Delhi in the event of our having to retrace
our steps, resolved to disarm the 35th. The civil authorities in the
district urged that the same course should be adopted with the 33rd, a
Native Infantry regiment at Hoshiarpur, about twenty-seven miles from
Jullundur, which it had been decided should join the column. The
Native soldiers with the column already exceeded the Europeans in
number, and as the addition of another regiment would make the odds
against us very serious, it was arranged to disarm the 35th before the
33rd joined us.

We left Jullundur on the 24th June, and that afternoon, accompanied by
the Deputy-Commissioner of the district, I rode to Philour to choose a
place for the disarming parade. The next morning we started early, the
Europeans heading the column, and when they reached the ground we had
selected they took up a position on the right of the road, the two
batteries in the centre and the 52nd in wings on either flank. The
guns were unlimbered and prepared for action. On the left of the road
was a serai,[11] behind which the officer commanding the 35th was told
to take his regiment, and, as he cleared it, to wheel to the right,
thus bringing his men in column of companies facing the line of
Europeans. This manoeuvre being accomplished, I was ordered to tell
the commanding officer that the regiment was to be disarmed, and that
the men were to pile arms and take off their belts. The sepoys and
their British officers were equally taken aback; the latter had
received no information of what was going to happen, while the former
had cherished the hope that they would be able to cross the Sutlej,
and thence slip off with their arms to Delhi.

I thought I could discover relief in the British officers' faces,
certainly in that of Major Younghusband, the Commandant, and when I
gave him the General's order, he murmured, 'Thank God!' He had been
with the 35th for thirty-three years; he had served with it at the
siege of Bhurtpore, throughout the first Afghan war, and in Sale's
defence of Jalalabad; he had been proud of his old corps, but knowing
probably that his men could no longer be trusted, he rejoiced to feel
that they were not to be given the opportunity for further disgracing
themselves.[12] The sepoys obeyed the command without a word, and in a
few minutes their muskets and belts were all packed in carts and taken
off to the fort.

As the ceremony was completed, the 33rd arrived and was dealt with in
a similar manner; but the British officers of this regiment did not
take things so quietly--they still believed in their men, and the
Colonel, Sandeman, trusted them to any extent. He had been with the
regiment for more than two-and-thirty years, and had commanded it
throughout the Sutlej campaign. On hearing the General's order, he
exclaimed: 'What! disarm my regiment? I will answer with my life for
the loyalty of every man!' On my repeating the order the poor old
fellow burst into tears. His son, the late Sir Robert Sandeman, who
was an Ensign in the regiment at the time, told me afterwards how
terribly his father felt the disgrace inflicted upon the regiment of
which he was so proud.

It was known that the wing of the 9th Light Cavalry was in
communication with the mutineers at Delhi, and that the men were only
waiting their opportunity; so they would also certainly have been
disarmed at this time, but for the idea that such a measure might have
a bad effect on the other wing, which still remained at Sialkot. The
turn of this regiment, however, came a few days later.

Up till this time we all hoped that Delhi was our destination, but,
greatly to our surprise and disappointment, orders came that morning
directing the column to return to Umritsar; the state of the Punjab
was causing considerable anxiety, as there were several stations at
which Native corps still remained in possession of their arms.

The same afternoon I was in the Philour fort with Nicholson, when
the telegraph-signaller gave him a copy of a message from Sir Henry
Barnard to the authorities in the Punjab, begging that all Artillery
officers not doing regimental duty might be sent to Delhi, where their
services were urgently required. I at once felt that this message
applied to me. I had been longing to find myself at Delhi, and lived
in perpetual dread of its being captured before I could get there; now
at last my hopes seemed about to be realized in a legitimate
manner, but, on the other hand, I did not like the idea of leaving
Nicholson--the more closely I was associated with him the more I was
attracted by him--and I am always proud to remember that he did not
wish to part with me. He agreed, however, that my first duty was to my
regiment, and only stipulated that before leaving him I should find
someone to take my place, as he did not know a single officer with the
column. This I was able to arrange, and that evening Nicholson and I
dined _tête-à-tête_. At dawn the next morning I left by mail-cart for
Delhi, my only kit being a small bundle of bedding, saddle and bridle,
my servants having orders to follow with my horses, tents, and other
belongings.


[Footnote 1: One Cavalry and two Infantry.]

[Footnote 2: Native Adjutant.]

[Footnote 3: A name applied by the Hindus to any Rajput who has, or
whose ancestors have, been converted to Islam. There were several
_Rangars_ in the 1st Irregulars. One day in June, Shaidad Khan, a
Resaidar of this class, came to Chamberlain, and said: 'There was a
rumour that he (Chamberlain) had not as much confidence in _Rangars_
as in other classes of the regiment, and he came to be comforted'!
Chamberlain asked him to sit down, and sent to the banker of the
regiment for a very valuable sword which he had given him for safe
custody. It had belonged to one of the Amirs of Sindh, was taken in
battle, and given to Chamberlain by Major Fitzgerald, of the Sindh
Horse. On the sword being brought, Chamberlain handed it over to
Shaidad Khan and his sect for safety, to be returned when the Mutiny
was over. The tears rose to the Native officer's eyes, he touched
Chamberlain's knees, and swore that death alone would sever the bond
of fidelity of which the sword was the token. He took his leave,
thoroughly satisfied.]

[Footnote 4: Throne.]

[Footnote 5: A station since abandoned for Rajanpur.]

[Footnote 6: Now General Sir W. T. Hughes, K.C.B.]

[Footnote 7: The two disarmed regiments remained quietly at Multan for
more than a year, when, with unaccountable inconsistency, a sudden
spirit of revolt seized them, and in August, 1858, they broke out,
tried to get possession of the guns, murdered the Adjutant of the
Bombay Fusiliers, and then fled from the station. But order by that
time had been quite restored, our position in the Punjab was secure,
and nearly all the sepoys were killed or captured by the country
people.]

[Footnote 8: No Native, in Native dress, keeps his shoes on when he
enters a room, unless he intends disrespect.]

[Footnote 9: The late Field Marshal Lord Strathnairn, G.C.B.,
G.C.S.I.]

[Footnote 10: A kind of light cart.]

[Footnote 11: A four-walled enclosure for the accommodation of
travellers.]

[Footnote 12: It will be remembered that this was the regiment in
which two men had been found with loaded muskets, and blown away from
guns at Lahore.]

       *       *       *       *       *




CHAPTER XII.
1857

  George Ricketts at Ludhiana--Pushing on to Delhi
  --In the camp before Delhi


The mail-cart rattled across the bridge of boats, and in less than an
hour I found myself at Ludhiana, at the house of George Ricketts,[1]
the Deputy Commissioner. Ricketts's bungalow was a resting-place for
everyone passing through _en route_ to Delhi. In one room I found
Lieutenant Williams of the 4th Sikhs, who had been dangerously wounded
three weeks before, while assisting Ricketts to prevent the Jullundur
mutineers from crossing the Sutlej.

While I was eating my breakfast, Ricketts sat down by my side and
recounted a stirring tale of all that had happened at Philour
and Ludhiana consequent on the rising of the Native regiments at
Jullundur. The mutineers had made, in the first instance, for Philour,
a small cantonment, but important from the fact of its containing a
fair-sized magazine, and from its situation, commanding the passage
of the Sutlej. It was garrisoned by the 3rd Native Infantry, which
furnished the sole guard over the magazine--a danger which, as I have
mentioned, had fortunately been recognized by the Commander-in-Chief
when he first heard of the outbreak at Meerut. The men of the 3rd
remained quiet, and even did good service in helping to drag the guns
of the siege-train across the river, and in guarding the treasury,
until the mutineers from Jullundur arrived on the 8th June. They then
gave their British officers warning to leave them, saying they did not
mean to injure them or their property, but they had determined they
would no longer serve the _Sirkar_. Twelve British officers (there
could not have been more), confronted by 3,000 sepoys, felt themselves
powerless, and retired to the fort.

Ricketts had with him at that time an assistant named Thornton,[2] who
had gone to Philour to lodge some money in the treasury. This officer
had started to ride back to Ludhiana, when he suddenly became aware of
what had happened, and how perilous was the position. Had he consulted
his own safety, he would have returned and taken refuge in the
fort, instead of which he galloped on, having to pass close by the
mutineers, until he reached the bridge of boats, which, with admirable
coolness and presence of mind, he cut behind him, then, hurrying on,
he informed Ricketts of what had taken place; and that the rebels
might shortly be expected to attempt the passage of the river.
Fortunately the 4th Sikhs from Abbottabad had that very morning
marched into Ludhiana, and Ricketts hoped, with their assistance, to
hold the sepoys in check until the arrival of the British troops,
which he believed must have been despatched from Jullundur in pursuit
of the mutineers.

The garrison of Ludhiana consisted of a detachment of the 3rd Native
Infantry, guarding the fort, in which was stored a large amount of
powder. The detachment was commanded by Lieutenant Yorke, who, on
hearing Thornton's story, went at once to the fort. He was much liked
by his men, who received him quite civilly, but told him they knew
that their regiment had joined the rebels from Jullundur, and that
they themselves could no longer obey his orders. Ricketts then
understood that he had but the 4th Sikhs and a small party of troops
belonging to the Raja of Nabha to depend upon. There were only
two officers with the 4th Sikhs--Captain Rothney, in command, and
Lieutenant Williams, the Adjutant. Taking three companies of the
regiment under Williams, and two guns of the Nabha Artillery, one
dragged by camels, the other by horses, Ricketts started off towards
the bridge of boats. Galloping on alone, he found that the gap in the
bridge made by Thornton had not been repaired, which proved that the
rebels had not crossed by that passage, at all events. He widened the
gap by cutting adrift some more boats, and then had himself ferried
across the river, in order to ascertain the exact state of affairs at
Philour. He learnt that no tidings had been received of any British
troops having been sent from Jullundur in pursuit of the mutineers,
who, having failed to get across the bridge, owing to Thornton's
timely action, had gone to a ferry reported to be three miles up the
river.

Ricketts recrossed the river as quickly as he could, and joined
Williams. It was then getting dark, but, hoping they might still be
in time to check the rebels, they pushed on in the direction of the
ferry, which proved to be nearer six than three miles away. The ground
was rough and broken, as is always the case on the banks of Indian
rivers, swollen as they often are by torrents from the hills, which
leave behind boulders and debris of all kinds. They made but little
way; one of the gun-camels fell lame, the guides disappeared, and they
began to despair of reaching the ferry in time, when suddenly there
was a challenge and they know they were too late. The sepoys had
succeeded in crossing the river and were bivouacking immediately in
front of them.

It was not a pleasant position, but it had to be made the best of; and
both the civilian and the soldier agreed that their only chance was
to fight. Williams opened fire with his Infantry, and Ricketts took
command of the guns. At the first discharge the horses bolted with the
limber, and never appeared again; almost at the same moment Williams
fell, shot through the body. Ricketts continued the fight until his
ammunition was completely expended, when he was reluctantly obliged to
retire to a village in the neighbourhood, but not until he had killed,
as he afterwards discovered, about fifty of the enemy.

Ricketts returned to Ludhiana early the next morning, and later in
the day the mutineers passed through the city. They released some 500
prisoners who were in the gaol, and helped themselves to what food
they wanted, but they did not enter the cantonment or the fort. The
gallant little attempt to close the passage of the Sutlej was entirely
frustrated, owing to the inconceivable want of energy displayed by the
so-called 'pursuing force'; had it pushed on, the rebels must have
been caught in the act of crossing the river, when Ricketts's small
party might have afforded considerable help. The Europeans from
Jullundur reached Philour before dark on the 8th; they heard the
firing of Ricketts's guns, but no attempt was made by the officer in
command to ascertain the cause, and they came leisurely on to Ludhiana
the following day.

Having listened with the greatest interest to Ricketts's story, and
refreshed the inner man, I resumed my journey, and reached Umballa
late in the afternoon of the 27th, not sorry to get under shelter, for
the monsoon, which had been threatening for some days past, burst with
great fury as I was leaving Ludhiana.

On driving to the dâk-bungalow I found it crowded with officers, some
of whom had been waiting there for days for an opportunity to go on to
Delhi; they laughed at me when I expressed my intention of proceeding
at once, and told me that the seats on the mail-carts had to be
engaged several days in advance, and that I might make up my mind to
stay where I was for some time to come. I was not at all prepared for
this, and I determined to get on by hook or by crook; as a preliminary
measure, I made friends with the postmaster, from whose office the
mail-carts started. From him I learnt that my only chance was to
call upon the Deputy-Commissioner, by whose orders the seats were
distributed. I took the postmaster's advice, and thus became
acquainted with Douglas Forsyth, who in later years made a name for
himself by his energetic attempts to establish commercial relations
with Yarkand and Kashgar. Forsyth confirmed what I had already heard,
but told me that an extra cart was to be despatched that night, laden
with small-arm ammunition, on which I could, if I liked, get a seat,
adding: 'Your kit must be of the smallest, as there will be no room
for anything inside the cart.'

I returned to the dâk-bungalow, overjoyed at my success, to find
myself quite an important personage, with everyone my friend, like the
boy at school who is the lucky recipient of a hamper from home. 'Take
me with you!' was the cry on all sides. Only two others besides the
driver and myself could possibly go, and then only by carrying our
kits in our laps. It was finally arranged that Captain Law and
Lieutenant Packe should be my companions. Packe was lamed for life
by a shot through his ankle before we had been forty-eight hours
at Delhi, and Law was killed on the 23rd July, having greatly
distinguished himself by his gallantry and coolness under fire during
the short time he served with the force.

We got to Kurnal soon after daybreak on the 28th. It was occupied by a
few of the Raja of Jhind's troops, a Commissariat officer, and one or
two civilians, who were trying to keep the country quiet and collect
supplies. Before noon we passed through Panipat, where there was a
strong force of Patiala and Jhind troops, and early in the afternoon
we reached Alipur. Here our driver pulled up, declaring he would go no
further. A few days before there had been a sharp fight on the road
between Alipur and Delhi, not far from Badli-ki-Serai, where the
battle of the 8th June had taken place, and as the enemy were
constantly on the road threatening the rear of the besieging force,
the driver did not consider it safe to go on. We could not, however,
stop at Alipur, so after some consultation we settled to take the
mail-cart ponies and ride on to camp. We could hear the boom of guns
at intervals, and as we neared Delhi we came across several dead
bodies of the enemy. It is a curious fact that most of these bodies
were exactly like mummies; there was nothing disagreeable about them.

Why this should have been the case I cannot say, but I often wished
during the remainder of the campaign that the atmospheric influences,
which, I presume, had produced this effect, could assert themselves
more frequently.

We stopped for a short time to look at the position occupied by the
enemy at Badli-ki-Serai; but none of us were in the mood to enjoy
sight-seeing. We had never been to Delhi before, and had but the
vaguest notion where the Ridge (the position our force was holding)
was, or how the city was situated with regard to our camp. The sound
of heavy firing became louder and louder, and we knew that fighting
must be going on. The driver had solemnly warned us of the risk we
were running in continuing our journey, and when we came to the point
where the Grand Trunk Road bifurcates, one branch going direct to the
city and the other through the cantonment, we halted for a few minutes
to discuss which we should take. Fortunately for us, we settled to
follow that which led to the cantonment, and, as it was then getting
dark, we pushed on as fast as our tired ponies could go. The relief
to us when we found ourselves safe inside our own piquets may be
imagined. My father's old staff-officer, Henry Norman, who was then
Assistant-Adjutant-General at Head-Quarters, kindly asked me to share
his tent until I could make other arrangements. He had no bed to offer
me, but I required none, as I was thoroughly tired out, and all I
wanted was a spot on which to throw myself down. A good night's rest
quite set me up. I awoke early, scarcely able to believe in my good
fortune. I was actually at Delhi, and the city was still in the
possession of the mutineers.


[Footnote 1: George Ricketts, Esq., C.B., afterwards a member of the
Board of Revenue of the North-West Provinces.]

[Footnote 2: Thomas Thornton, Esq., C.S.I., afterwards Secretary to
the Government of India in the Foreign Department.]

       *       *       *       *       *




CHAPTER XIII.
1857

  The first victory--Enthusiasm amongst the troops
  --Barnard's success at Badli-ki-Serai--The Flagstaff Tower
  --Position on the Ridge--Quintin Battye--The gallant little Gurkhas
  --Proposed assault--The besiegers besieged--Hard fighting
  --The centenary of Plassy


Before entering on the narrative of what came under my own observation
during the three months I was at Delhi, I will relate what took place
after Sir Henry Barnard succeeded General Anson in command on the 26th
May, and how the little British force maintained itself against almost
overwhelming odds during the first three weeks of that memorable
siege.

Barnard had served as Chief of the Staff in the Crimea, and had held
various staff appointments in England; but he was an utter stranger to
India, having only arrived in the country a few weeks before. He
fully realized the difficulties of the position to which he had so
unexpectedly succeeded, for he was aware how unjustly Anson was being
judged by those who, knowing nothing of war, imagined he could have
started to attack Delhi with scarcely more preparation than would have
been necessary for a morning's parade. The officers of the column were
complete strangers to him, and he to them, and he was ignorant of the
characteristics and capabilities of the Native portion of his troops.
It must, therefore, have been with an anxious heart that he took over
the command.

One of Barnard's first acts was to get rid of the unreliable element
which Anson had brought away from Umballa. The Infantry he sent to
Rohtuk, where it shortly afterwards mutinied, and the Cavalry to
Meerut. That these troops should have been allowed to retain their
weapons is one of the mysteries of the Mutiny. For more than two
months their insubordination had been apparent, incendiarism had
occurred which had been clearly traced to them, and they had even gone
so far as to fire at their officers; both John Lawrence and Robert
Montgomery had pressed upon the Commander-in-Chief the advisability
of disarming them; but General Anson, influenced by the regimental
officers, who could not believe in the disaffection of their men, had
not grasped the necessity for this precautionary measure. The European
soldiers with the column, however, did not conceal their mistrust of
these sepoys, and Barnard acted wisely in sending them away; but it
was extraordinary that they should have been allowed to keep their
arms.

On the 5th June Barnard reached Alipur, within ten miles of Delhi,
where he decided to await the arrival of the siege-train and the
troops from Meerut.

The Meerut brigade, under Brigadier Wilson, had started on the 27th
May. It consisted of two squadrons of the Carabineers, Tombs's[1]
troop of Horse Artillery, Scott's Field Battery and two 18-pounder
guns, a wing of the 1st Battalion 60th Rifles, a few Native Sappers
and Miners, and a detachment of Irregular Horse.

Early on the 30th the village of Ghazi-u-din-nagar (now known as
Ghaziabad) close to the Hindun river, and about eleven miles from
Delhi, was reached. Thence it was intended to make a reconnaissance
towards Delhi, but about four o'clock in the afternoon a vedette
reported that the enemy were approaching in strength. A very careless
look-out had been kept, for almost simultaneously with the report a
round shot came tumbling into camp. The troops fell in as quickly as
possible, and the Artillery came into action. The Rifles crossed the
Hindun suspension bridge, and, under cover of our guns, attacked the
enemy, who were strongly posted in a village. From this position they
were speedily dislodged, and the victory was complete. Seven hundred
British soldiers defeated seven times their number, capturing five
guns and a large quantity of ammunition and stores. Our loss was one
officer and ten men killed, and one officer and eighteen men wounded.

The following day (Sunday) the enemy reappeared about noon, but
after two hours' fighting they were again routed, and on our troops
occupying their position, they could be seen in full retreat towards
Delhi. The rebels succeeded in taking their guns with them, for our
men, prostrated by the intense heat and parched with thirst, were
quite unable to pursue. We had one officer and eleven men killed, and
two officers and ten men wounded. Among the latter was an ensign of
the 60th Rifles, a boy named Napier, a most gallant young fellow, full
of life and spirit, who had won the love as well as the admiration of
his men. He was hit in the leg, and the moment he was brought into
camp it had to be amputated. When the operation was over, Napier was
heard to murmur, 'I shall never lead the Rifles again! I shall never
lead the Rifles again!' His wound he thought little of. What grieved
him was the idea of having to give up his career as a soldier, and to
leave the regiment he was so proud of. Napier was taken to Meerut,
where he died a few days afterwards.[2]

On the 1st June Wilson's force was strengthened by the Sirmur
battalion of Gurkhas,[3] a regiment which later covered itself with
glory, and gained an undying name by its gallantry during the siege of
Delhi.

On the 7th June Wilson's brigade crossed the Jumna at Baghput, and
at Alipur it joined Barnard's force, the men of which loudly cheered
their Meerut comrades as they marched into camp with the captured
guns. The siege-train had arrived the previous day, and Barnard was
now ready for an advance. His force consisted of about 600 Cavalry and
2,400 Infantry, with 22 field-guns. There were besides 150 European
Artillerymen, chiefly recruits, with the siege-train, which comprised
eight 18-pounders, four 8-inch and twelve 5-1/2-inch mortars. The
guns, if not exactly obsolete, were quite unsuited for the work that
had to be done, but they were the best procurable. George Campbell, in
his 'Memoirs of my Indian Career,' thus describes the siege-train as
he saw it passing through Kurnal: 'I could not help thinking that it
looked a very trumpery affair with which to bombard and take a great
fortified city;' and he expressed his 'strong belief that Delhi would
never be taken by that battery.'

Barnard heard that the enemy intended to oppose his march to Delhi,
and in order to ascertain their exact position he sent Lieutenant
Hodson (who had previously done good service for the Commander-in-Chief
by opening communication with Meerut) to reconnoitre the road. Hodson
reported that the rebels were in force at Badli-ki-Serai a little more
than halfway between Alipur and Delhi. Orders were accordingly issued
for an advance at midnight on the 7th June.

When it became known that a battle was imminent, there was great
enthusiasm amongst the troops, who were burning to avenge the
massacres of Meerut and Delhi. The sick in hospital declared they
would remain there no longer, and many, quite unfit to walk, insisted
on accompanying the attacking column, imploring their comrades not to
mention that they were ill, for fear they should not be allowed to
take part in the fight.[4]

[Illustration: MAJOR-GENERAL SIR HARRY TOMBS, V.C., G.C.B.

_From a photograph by Messrs. Grillet and Co._]

The mutineers had selected an admirable position on both sides of the
main road. To their right was a serai and a walled village capable
of holding large numbers of Infantry, and protected by an impassable
swamp. To their left, on some rising ground, a sand-bag battery for
four heavy guns and an 8-inch mortar had been constructed. On both
sides the ground was swampy and intersected by water-cuts, and about
a mile to the enemy's left, and nearly parallel to the road, ran the
Western Jumna Canal.

At the hour named, Brigadier Hope Grant,[5] commanding the Cavalry,
started with ten Horse Artillery guns, three squadrons of the 9th
Lancers, and fifty Jhind horsemen under Lieutenant Hodson, with the
object of turning the enemy's left flank. Shortly afterwards the main
body marched along the road until the lights in the enemy's camp
became visible. Colonel Showers, who had succeeded Hallifax in the
command of the 1st Brigade,[6] moved off to the right of the road, and
Colonel Graves, who had taken Jones's place with the 2nd Brigade,[7]
to the left. The heavy guns remained on the road with a battery of
Field Artillery on either flank. Just as day broke our guns advanced,
but before they were in position the fight began by a cannonade from
the rebel Artillery, which caused us severe loss. To this destructive
fire no adequate reply could be made; our guns were too few and of too
small calibre. To add to our difficulties, the Native bullock-drivers
of our heavy guns went off with their cattle, and one of the waggons
blew up. At this critical moment Barnard ordered Showers to charge the
enemy's guns, a service which was performed with heroic gallantry by
Her Majesty's 75th Foot, who carried the position at the point of the
bayonet, with a loss of 19 officers and men killed and 43 wounded.
Then, supported by the 1st Fusiliers, the same regiment dashed across
the road and burst open the gates of the serai. A desperate fight
ensued, but the sepoys were no match for British bayonets, and
they now learnt that their misdeeds were not to be allowed to go
unpunished. Graves's brigade, having passed round the _jhil_,[8]
appeared on the enemy's right rear, while Grant with his Cavalry and
Horse Artillery threatened their left. The defeat was complete, and
the rebels retreated hastily towards Delhi, leaving their guns on the
ground.

Although the men were much exhausted, Barnard determined to push on,
for he feared that if he delayed the rebels might rally, and occupy
another strong position.

From the cross-roads just beyond Badli-ki-Serai could be seen the
Ridge on which the British force was to hold its own for more than
three months during the heat of an Indian summer, and under the rain
of an Indian monsoon. At this point two columns were formed, Barnard
taking command of the one, which proceeded to the left towards the
cantonment, and Wilson of the other, which moved along the city road.
Wilson's column fought its way through gardens and enclosures until it
reached the western extremity of the Ridge. Barnard, as he came under
the fire of the enemy's guns, made a flank movement to the left, and
then, wheeling to his right, swept along the Ridge from the Flagstaff
Tower to Hindu Rao's house, where the two columns united, the rebels
flying before them.

Barnard had achieved a great success and with comparatively small
loss, considering the formidable position occupied by the enemy, their
great strength in Artillery, and their superiority in numbers.

Our casualties were 51 killed and 131 wounded. Among the former was
Colonel Chester, the Adjutant-General of the Army. Of the troops
opposed to us it was reckoned that 1,000 never returned to Delhi;
thirteen guns were captured, two of them being 24-pounders.

I have frequently wandered over the Ridge since 1857, and thought how
wonderfully we were aided by finding a ready-made position--not only a
coign of vantage for attack, but a rampart of defence, as Forrest[9]
describes it. This Ridge, rising sixty feet above the city, covered
the main line of communication to the Punjab, upon the retention of
which our very existence as a force depended. Its left rested on the
Jumna, unfordable from the time the snow on the higher ranges begins
to melt until the rainy season is over, and of sufficient width to
prevent our being enfiladed by field-guns; although, on the immediate
right, bazaars, buildings, and garden-walls afforded cover to the
enemy, the enclosed nature of the ground was so far advantageous that
it embarrassed and impeded them in their attempts to organize an
attack in force upon our flank or rear; and a further protection was
afforded by the Najafgarh _jhil_, which during the rains submerges a
vast area of land.

The distance of the Ridge from the city walls varied considerably. On
our right, where the memorial monument now stands, it was about 1,200
yards, at the Flagstaff Tower about a mile and a half, and at the end
near the river nearly two miles and a half. This rendered our left
comparatively safe, and it was behind the Ridge in this direction that
the main part of our camp was pitched. The Flagstaff Tower in the
centre was the general rendezvous for the non-combatants, and for
those of the sick and wounded who were able to move about, as they
could assemble there and hear the news from the front without much
risk of injury from the enemy's fire.

The Flagstaff Tower is interesting from the fact that it was here the
residents from the cantonment of Delhi assembled to make a stand,
on hearing that the rebels from Meerut were murdering the British
officers on duty within the city, that the three Native regiments and
battery of Field Artillery had joined the mutineers, and that at any
moment they themselves might expect to be attacked. The tower was 150
feet high, with a low parapet running round the top, approached by a
narrow winding staircase. Here the men of the party proposed to await
the attack. The ladies, who behaved with the utmost coolness and
presence of mind, were, with the wives and children of the few
European non-commissioned officers, placed for their greater safety on
the stairs, where they were all but suffocated by the stifling heat in
such a confined space. The little party on the roof consisted of some
twenty British officers, the same number of half-caste buglers and
drummers, and half a dozen European soldiers. Not a drop of water, not
a particle of food, was to be had. No help appeared to be coming from
Meerut, in the direction of which place many a longing and expectant
glance had been cast during the anxious hours of that miserable 11th
May. Constant and heavy firing was heard from the city and suburbs,
and the Cavalry were reported to be advancing on the cantonment.

Before evening the weary watchers realized that their position was
untenable, and that their only possible chance of escaping the fate
which had befallen the officers within the city (whose dead bodies had
been inhumanly sent in a cart to the Tower) lay in flight. Shortly
before dark the move was made, the women and children were crowded
into the few vehicles available, and accompanied by the men, some on
foot and some on horseback, they got away by the road leading towards
Umballa. They were only just in time, for before the last of the party
were out of sight of the cantonment, crowds of Natives poured into it,
burning, plundering, and destroying everything they could find.

Amongst the fugitives from Delhi was Captain Tytler, of the 38th
Native Infantry, who, after a variety of vicissitudes, reached Umballa
safely with his wife and children. When Anson's force was being formed
for the advance on Delhi, Tytler was placed in charge of the military
treasure chest, and through some unaccountable negligence Mrs. Tytler
was allowed to accompany him. I believe that, when Mrs. Tytler's
presence became known to the authorities, she would have been sent
out of camp to some safe place, but at that time she was not in a fit
state to travel, and on the 21st June, a few days after the force took
up its position under a heavy cannonade, she gave birth to a son
in the waggon in which she was accommodated. The infant, who was
christened Stanley Delhi Force, seems to have been looked upon by the
soldiery with quite a superstitious feeling, for the father tells us
that soon after its birth he overheard a soldier say; 'Now we shall
get our reinforcements; this camp was formed to avenge the blood
of innocents, and the first reinforcement sent to us is a new-born
infant.' Reinforcements did actually arrive the next day.

It was on the afternoon of the 8th June that the British force was
placed in position on the Ridge. The main piquet was established at
Hindu Rao's house, a large stone building, in former days the country
residence of some Mahratta Chief. About one hundred and eighty yards
further to the left was the observatory, near which our heavy gun
battery was erected. Beyond the observatory was an old Pathan mosque,
in which was placed an Infantry piquet with two field-guns. Still
further to the left came the Flagstaff Tower, held by a party of
Infantry with two more field-guns. At the extreme right of the Ridge,
overlooking the trunk road, there was a strong piquet with a heavy
battery.

This was the weak point of our defence. To the right, and somewhat
to the rear, was the suburb of Sabzi Mandi (vegetable market), a
succession of houses and walled gardens, from which the rebels
constantly threatened our flank. To protect this part of the position
as much as possible, a battery of three 18-pounders and an Infantry
piquet was placed on what was known as the General's Mound, with a
Cavalry piquet and two Horse Artillery guns immediately below.
In front of the Ridge the ground was covered with old buildings,
enclosures, and clumps of trees, which afforded only too perfect
shelter to the enemy when making their sorties.

As described by the Commanding Engineer, 'the eastern face of Delhi
rests on the Jumna, and at the season of the year during which our
operations were carried on, the stream may be described as washing the
face of the walls. The river front was therefore inaccessible to
the besieging force, while at the same time the mutineers and the
inhabitants of the city could communicate freely across the river by
means of the bridge of boats and ferries. This rendered it impossible
for us to invest Delhi, even if there had been a sufficient number
of troops for the purpose. We were only able, indeed, to direct our
attack against a small portion of the city wall, while throughout the
siege the enemy could freely communicate with, and procure supplies
from, the surrounding country.

'On the river front the defences consisted of an irregular wall with
occasional bastions and towers, and about one half of the length of
this face was occupied by the palace of the King of Delhi and its
outwork, the old Moghul fort of Selimgarh.

'The remaining defences consisted of a succession of bastioned fronts,
the connecting curtains being very long, and the outworks limited
to one crown-work at the Ajmir gate, and Martello towers mounting a
single gun, at the points where additional flanking fire to that given
by the bastions themselves was required.'[10]

The above description will give some idea of the strength of the great
city which the British force had come to capture. For more than two
months, however, our energies were devoted not to capturing the city,
but to defending ourselves, having to be ever on the watch to guard
our communication with the Punjab, and to repel the enemy's almost
daily sorties.

The defences of Delhi, which remain almost unaltered up to the present
day, were modernized forms of the ancient works that existed when
the city fell before Lord Lake's army in 1803. These works had been
strengthened and improved some years before the Mutiny by Lieutenant
Robert Napier.[11] How thoroughly and effectually that talented and
distinguished Engineer performed the duty entrusted to him, we who had
to attack Delhi could testify to our cost.

Barnard was not left long in doubt as to the intentions of the rebels,
who, the very afternoon on which he occupied the Ridge, attacked Hindu
Rao's house, where the Sirmur battalion, two companies of the 60th
Rifles, and two of Scott's guns had been placed. The enemy were driven
off before dark. The following day they began to cannonade from the
city walls, and in the afternoon repeated their attack.

That same morning a welcome reinforcement reached camp, the famous
Corps of Guides having arrived as fresh as if they had returned from
an ordinary field day, instead of having come off a march of nearly
600 miles, accomplished in the incredibly short time of twenty-two
days, at the most trying season of the year. The General, having
inspected them, said a few words of encouragement to the men, who
begged their gallant Commandant to say how proud they were to belong
to the Delhi Force. Their usefulness was proved that same afternoon,
when, in support of the piquets, they engaged the enemy in a
hand-to-hand contest, and drove them back to the city.

It was close up to the walls that Quintin Battye, the dashing
Commander of the Guides Cavalry, received his mortal wound. He was the
brightest and cheeriest of companions, and although only a subaltern
of eight years' service, he was a great loss. I spent a few hours with
him on my way to Delhi, and I remember how his handsome face glowed
when he talked of the opportunities for distinguishing themselves in
store for the Guides. Proud of his regiment, and beloved by his men,
who, grand fellows themselves, were captivated by his many soldierly
qualities, he had every prospect before him of a splendid career, but
he was destined to fall in his first fight. He was curiously fond of
quotations, and the last words he uttered were '_Dulce et decorum est
pro patriâ mori_.'

While our Infantry and Field Artillery were busily engaged with the
enemy, the few heavy guns we had were put in position on the Ridge.
Great things were hoped from them, but it was soon found that they
were not powerful enough to silence the enemy's fire, and that our
small supply of ammunition was being rapidly expended.[12] The rebels'
guns were superior in number and some in calibre to ours, and were
well served by the Native Artillerymen whom we had been at such pains
to teach. Barnard discovered, too, that his deficiencies in men and
_matériel_ prevented regular approaches being made. There were only
150 Native Sappers and Miners with our force, and Infantry could not
be spared for working parties.

On the 10th June another determined attack was made on Hindu Rao's
house, which was repulsed by the Sirmur battalion of Gurkhas under its
distinguished Commandant, Major Reid.[13] The mutineers quite hoped
that the Gurkhas would join them, and as they were advancing they
called out: 'We are not firing; we want to speak to you; we want you
to join us.' The little Gurkhas replied, 'Oh yes; we are coming,' on
which they advanced to within twenty paces of the rebels, and, firing
a well-directed volley, killed nearly thirty of them.

The next day the insurgents made a third attack, and were again
repulsed with considerable loss. They knew that Hindu Rao's house was
the key of our position, and throughout the siege they made the most
desperate attempts to capture it. But Barnard had entrusted this
post of danger to the Gurkhas, and all efforts to dislodge them were
unavailing. At first Reid had at his command only his own battalion
and two companies of the 60th Rifles; but on the arrival of the Guides
their Infantry were also placed at his disposal, and whenever he
sounded the alarm he was reinforced by two more companies of the 60th.
Hindu Rao's house was within easy range of nearly all the enemy's
heavy guns, and was riddled through and through with shot and shell.
Reid never quitted the Ridge save to attack the enemy, and never once
visited the camp until carried into it severely wounded on the day of
the final assault. Hindu Rao's house was the little Gurkhas' hospital
as well as their barrack, for their sick and wounded begged to be left
with their comrades instead of being taken to camp.[14]

Failing in their attempts on the centre of the position, the mutineers
soon after daylight on the 12th, having concealed themselves in the
ravines adjoining Metcalfe House, attacked the Flagstaff Tower, the
piquet of which was composed of two Horse Artillery guns and two
companies of the 75th Foot, under the command of Captains Dunbar and
Knox. A heavy fog and thick mist rolling up from the low ground near
the Jumna completely enveloped the Ridge and the left front of our
position, hiding everything in the immediate vicinity. The piquet
was on the point of being relieved by a detachment of the 2nd
Bengal Fusiliers, when a large body of the enemy, who had crept up
unobserved, made a rush at the Flagstaff Tower, and as nearly as
possible captured the guns. The piquet was hardly pressed, Knox
and several men were killed, and but for the timely arrival of two
companies of the 60th, the rebels would have gained the day.

This engagement was scarcely over, when masses of insurgents advanced
from the Sabzi Mandi upon Hindu Rao's house, and into the gardens on
the right flank of the camp, threatening the Mound piquet. Reserves
were called up, these attacks, in their turn, were repulsed and the
rebels were pursued for some distance. It was most fortunate that
both attacks did not take place simultaneously, as was the obvious
intention of the enemy, for our strength would not have been
sufficient to repel them both at the same moment.

In order to prevent the mutineers from coming to such close quarters
again, a piquet was placed in Metcalfe's House, and the Mound to the
rear of the ridge facing the Sabzi Mandi was strengthened. These
precautions ought to, and would, have been taken before, but for the
want of men. Our soldiers were scarcely ever off duty, and this fresh
demand made it impossible at times to provide a daily relief for the
several piquets.

Our resources in siege guns and ammunition were so limited, daily
sorties, disease, and heat were making such ravages amongst our
small force, there was so little hope of receiving any considerable
reinforcements, and it appeared to be of such paramount importance to
capture Delhi without further delay, that Barnard agreed to a proposal
for taking it by a _coup de main_.

The particular details of the project and disposition of the troops
were worked out by three young officers of Engineers, under the direct
orders of the General, and were kept a profound secret; even the
Commanding Engineer was not made acquainted with them. Secrecy was, of
course, of vital importance, but that the officers who ought to have
been chiefly concerned were kept in ignorance of the scheme, shows
there was little of that confidence so essential to success existing
between the Commander and those who were in the position of his
principal advisers. Practically the whole force was to be engaged,
divided into three columns--one to enter by the Kashmir gate, the
second by the Lahore gate, and the third was to attempt an escalade.
The three columns, if they succeeded in effecting an entrance, were to
work their way to the centre of the city, and there unite.

It was intended that these columns should move off from camp so as to
arrive at the walls just before daybreak; accordingly, at one o'clock
on the morning of the 13th June the troops were suddenly paraded and
ammunition served out, and then for the first time the Commanders
of the three columns and the staff were made acquainted with the
General's intentions. It so happened that the 75th Foot, which had
followed the enemy into the grounds of Metcalfe House after the
repulse on the Flagstaff Tower the previous morning, had through some
oversight never been recalled; their absence was only discovered when
the order was given for the regiment to turn out, and a considerable
time was wasted in sending for it and bringing it back to camp. Day
was breaking when this regiment received its ammunition, and all hope
of an unperceived advance to the walls had to be given up. The
troops were therefore dismissed, and allowed to turn in, having been
uselessly disturbed from their much-needed rest.

The failure to give effect to the young Engineer officers' plan may be
looked upon as a merciful dispensation of Providence, which saved us
from what would almost certainly have been an irreparable disaster.
When we think of the hard fighting encountered when the assault did
take place under much more favourable circumstances, and how the
columns at the end of that day were only just able to get inside the
city, those who had practical knowledge of the siege can judge what
chance there would have been of these smaller columns accomplishing
their object, even if they had been able to take the enemy by
surprise.

The 13th and 14th passed in comparative quiet; but early on the 15th
a strong force advanced from Delhi against the Metcalfe House piquet,
with the object of turning our left flank, but it was driven back with
considerable loss.

On the 17th we were attacked from almost every direction--a manoeuvre
intended to prevent our observing a battery which was being
constructed close to an Idgah,[15] situated on a hill to our right,
from which to enfilade our position on the Ridge. As it was very
important to prevent the completion of this battery, Barnard ordered
it to be attacked by two small columns, one commanded by Tombs, of the
Bengal Horse Artillery, the other by Reid. Tombs, with 400 of the 60th
Rifles and 1st Bengal Fusiliers, 30 of the Guides Cavalry, 20 Sappers
and Miners, and his own troop of Horse Artillery, moved towards the
enemy's left, while Reid, with four companies of the 60th and some
of his own Gurkhas, advanced through Kishenganj against their right.
Tombs drove the rebels through a succession of gardens till they
reached the Idgah, where they made an obstinate but unavailing
resistance. The gates of the mosque were blown open, and thirty-nine
of its defenders were killed. Tombs himself was slightly wounded, and
had two horses killed, making five which had been shot under this
gallant soldier since the commencement of the campaign. Reid's attack
was equally successful. He completely destroyed the battery, and
inflicted heavy loss on the enemy.

The next day but one the rebels issued from the city in great force,
and threatened nearly every part of our position. The fighting was
severe throughout the afternoon, the piquets having again and again
to be reinforced. Towards evening, while nearly all the Infantry were
thus engaged, a large party of the insurgents, passing unperceived
through the suburbs and gardens on our right, reappeared about a mile
and a half to our rear. Very few troops were left in camp, and all
Hope Grant, who was in command at the time, could collect was four or
five squadrons of Cavalry and twelve guns. He found the enemy in a
strong position, against which his light guns could make but little
impression, while their Artillery and well-placed Infantry did us
considerable damage. Tombs's troop especially suffered, and at one
time his guns were in imminent danger of being captured. Just at
this moment some of the Guides Cavalry rode up. 'Daly, if you do not
charge,' called out Tombs, 'my guns are taken.' Daly spurred into the
bushes, followed by about a dozen of his gallant Guides. He returned
with a bullet through his shoulder, but the momentary diversion saved
the guns.[16]

As long as it was light the steady fire of the Artillery and the
dashing charges of the Cavalry kept the rebels in check; but in the
dusk of the evening their superior numbers told: they very nearly
succeeded in turning our flank, and for some time the guns were again
in great jeopardy; the 9th Lancers and Guides, bent on saving them at
all hazards, charged the enemy; but, with a ditch and houses on each
side, their action was paralyzed, and their loss severe. All was now
in confusion, the disorder increasing as night advanced, when a small
body of Infantry (about 300 of the 60th Rifles) came up, dashed
forward, and, cutting a lane through the rebels, rescued the guns.[17]

Our loss in this affair amounted to 3 officers and 17 men killed, and
7 officers and 70 men wounded. Among the latter was Hope Grant,
who had his horse shot under him in a charge, and was saved by the
devotion of two men of his own regiment (the 9th Lancers) and a
Mahomedan sowar of the 4th Irregular Cavalry.

It was nearly midnight before the troops returned to camp. The enemy
had been frustrated in their attempt to force our rear, but they had
not been driven back; we had, indeed, been only just able to hold our
own. The result of the day added considerably to the anxiety of the
Commander. He saw that the rebels had discovered our weak point,
and that if they managed to establish themselves in our rear, our
communication with the Punjab would be cut off, our small force would
be invested, and without supplies and reinforcements it would be
impossible to maintain our position against the daily increasing
strength of the insurgents. Great was the despondency in camp when
the result of the day's fighting was known; but the fine spirit which
animated the force throughout the siege soon asserted itself, and our
men cheerfully looked forward to the next encounter with the enemy.

At daybreak Grant was again upon the ground, but found it abandoned.
Many dead men and horses were lying about, and a 9-pounder gun, left
by the enemy, was brought into camp.

The troops had scarcely got back, hoping for a little rest, when the
enemy again resumed their attack on the rear, and opened fire at so
short a distance that their shot came right through the camp. But on
this occasion they made no stand, and retreated as soon as our troops
showed themselves.

In order to strengthen our position in rear a battery of two
18-pounders was constructed, supported by Cavalry and Infantry
piquets, and most of the bridges over the drain from the Najafgarh
_jhil_ were destroyed.

For two days after the events I have just described the hard-worked
little body of troops had comparative rest, but our spies informed us
that the enemy were being largely reinforced, and that we might expect
to be hotly attacked on the 23rd.

For some time an idea had been prevalent amongst the Natives that the
English _raj_ was not destined to survive its hundredth year, and that
the centenary of Clive's victory on the field of Plassy on the 23rd
June, 1757, would see its downfall. This idea was strengthened in
the Native mind by the fact that the 23rd June, 1857, was a date
propitious alike for Hindus and Mahomedans; the Jattsa, a Hindu
religious festival, was to take place on that day, and there was also
to be a new moon, which the Mahomedans looked upon as a lucky omen;
the astrologers, therefore, declared that the stars in their courses
would fight for the mutineers. If, however, prophecies and omens alike
appeared to favour the rebels, fortune was not altogether unkind to
us, for on the 22nd a reinforcement reached Rhai, twenty-two miles
from Delhi, consisting of six Horse Artillery guns, a small party
of British Infantry, a squadron of the 2nd Punjab Cavalry, and the
Head-Quarters of the 4th Sikhs, numbering in all about 850 men.

A staff officer was sent at once to Rhai to hurry on the force and
tell them how urgently their assistance was required in camp; this
appeal was responded to with the utmost alacrity, and early the next
evening the welcome reinforcement made its appearance.

It had scarcely arrived before the Artillery on the city walls opened
fire, while guns, which had been brought into the suburbs, enfiladed
our right and concentrated a heavy fire on Hindu Rao's house which the
few guns we had in position were quite unable to silence. The rebel
Infantry occupied Kishenganj and Sabzi Mandi in force, and threatened
to advance on the Mound battery, while a constant musketry fire was
maintained upon the Ridge. Reid reported that the mutineers made a
desperate attack at about twelve o'clock, and that no men could have
fought better; they charged the Rifles, the Guides, and the Gurkhas
again and again. The cannonade raged fast and furious, and at one
time it seemed as though the day must be lost. Thousands were brought
against a mere handful of men; but Reid knew the importance of
his position, and was determined at all hazards to hold it until
reinforcements arrived.[18]

The mutineers were checked, but not driven off. The first attempt from
the Mound battery failed to repulse them, and Colonel Welchman, who
was in command, was dangerously wounded. Every available man in camp
had been engaged, and as a last resource the 2nd Fusiliers and the 4th
Sikhs, who had just arrived from Rhai, were sent to the front. Showers
was placed in command, and shortly before the day closed he succeeded
in forcing the enemy to retire. So the anniversary of Plassy saw us,
though hardly pressed, undefeated, and the enemy's hopes unfulfilled.
They lost over 1,000 men. Our casualties were 1 officer and 38 men
killed, and 3 officers and 118 men wounded. The heat all the while was
terrific, and several of our men were knocked over by the sun.

The lesson taught us by this severe fighting was the importance
of occupying the Sabzi Mandi, and thus preventing the enemy from
approaching too close to the camp and enfilading the Ridge. This
entailed more constant duty upon our already overworked soldiers, but
Barnard felt that it would not do to run the risk of another such
struggle.

A piquet of 180 Europeans was accordingly placed in the Sabzi Mandi,
part in a serai on one side of the Grand Trunk Road, and the rest in
a Hindu temple on the opposite side. These posts were connected by a
line of breastworks with the Hindu Rao piquets, and added considerably
to the strength of our position.

After the 23rd there were real or threatened attacks daily; but we
were left fairly undisturbed until the 27th June, when the Metcalfe
and Sabzi Mandi piquets were assaulted, and also the batteries on the
Ridge. These attempts were defeated without any very great loss, only
13 of our men being killed, and 1 officer and 48 men wounded.


[Footnote 1: The late Major-General Sir Harry Tombs, V.C., K.C.B.]

[Footnote 2: The Chaplain's Narrative of the siege of Delhi.]

[Footnote 3: Now the 1st Battalion, 2nd Gurkhas.]

[Footnote 4: 'Siege of Delhi; by an Officer who served there.']

[Footnote 5: The late General Sir Hope Grant, G.C.B.]

[Footnote 6: 75th and 1st Bengal Fusiliers.]

[Footnote 7: 1st Battalion 60th Rifles, 2nd Bengal Fusiliers, and
Sirmur battalion.]

[Footnote 8: Swampy ground.]

[Footnote 9: 'The Indian Mutiny,' by George W. Forrest.]

[Footnote 10: The bastions were small, each mounting from ten to
fourteen pieces of Artillery; they were provided with masonry parapets
about 12 feet in thickness, and were about 16 feet high. The curtain
consisted of a simple masonry wall or rampart 16 feet in height, 11
feet thick at top, and 14 or 15 feet at bottom. This main wall carried
a parapet loopholed for musketry 8 feet in height and 3 feet in
thickness. The whole of the land front was covered by a faussebraye of
varying thickness, ranging from 16 to 30 feet, and having a vertical
scarp wall 8 feet high; exterior to this was a dry ditch about 25
feet in width. The counterscarp was simply an earthen slope, easy to
descend. The glacis was very narrow, extending only 50 or 60 yards
from the counterscarp, and covering barely one-half of the walls
from the besiegers' view. These walls were about seven miles in
circumference, and included an area of about three square miles (see
Colonel Baird-Smith's report, dated September 17, 1857).]

[Footnote 11: The late Field Marshal Lord Napier of Magdala, G.C.B.,
G.C.S.I.]

[Footnote 12: So badly off were we for ammunition for the heavy guns
at this time, that it was found necessary to use the shot fired at
us by the enemy, and a reward was offered for every 24-pounder shot
brought into the Artillery Park.]

[Footnote 13: Now General Sir Charles Reid, G.C.B.]

[Footnote 14: Forrest's 'Indian Mutiny' and Norman's 'Narrative of the
Siege of Delhi,' two interesting accounts from which I shall often
quote.]

[Footnote 15: A Mahomedan place of worship and sacrifice.]

[Footnote 16: 'Siege of Delhi; by an Officer who served there.']

[Footnote 17: Forrest's 'The Indian Mutiny.']

[Footnote 18: Reid's own report.]

       *       *       *       *       *




CHAPTER XIV.
1857

  A new appointment


I will now continue my story from the 29th June, the morning after my
arrival in camp, when I awoke full of excitement, and so eager to hear
all my old friend Norman could tell me, that I am afraid he must have
been considerably bored with my questions.

It is impossible for me to describe my pleasure at finding myself a
member of a force which had already gained imperishable fame. I longed
to meet and know the men whose names were in everyone's mouth. The
hero of the day was Harry Tombs, of the Bengal Horse Artillery, an
unusually handsome man and a thorough soldier. His gallantry in the
attack on the Idgah, and wherever he had been engaged, was the general
talk of the camp. I had always heard of Tombs as one of the best
officers in the regiment, and it was with feelings of respectful
admiration that I made his acquaintance a few days later.

Jemmy Hills,[1] one of the subalterns in Tombs's troop, was an old
Addiscombe friend of mine; he delighted in talking of his Commander,
in dilating on his merits as a soldier and his skill in handling
each arm of the service. As a cool, bold leader of men Tombs was
unsurpassed: no fire, however hot, and no crisis, however unexpected,
could take him by surprise; he grasped the situation in a moment,
and issued his orders without hesitation, inspiring all ranks with
confidence in his power and capacity. He was somewhat of a martinet,
and was more feared than liked by his men until they realized what a
grand leader he was, when they gave him their entire confidence, and
were ready to follow him anywhere and everywhere.

Another very distinguished officer of my regiment, whom I now met for
the first time, and for whom I ever afterwards entertained the warmest
regard, was Edwin Johnson,[2] Assistant-Adjutant-General of the Bengal
Artillery, in which capacity he had accompanied Brigadier Wilson from
Meerut. He had a peculiarly bright intellect--somewhat caustic,
but always clever and amusing. He was a delightful companion, and
invariably gained the confidence of those with whom he worked.

[Illustration: LIEUTENANT-GENERAL SIR JAMES HILLS-JOHNES, V.C., G.C.B.
_from a photograph by Messrs. Bourne and Shepherd._]

Johnson was the first person on whom I called to report my arrival and
to find out with which troop or battery I was to do duty. He told me
that the Quartermaster-General wished to keep me in his department.
So, after visiting General Chamberlain,[3] who I knew would be anxious
to hear all that had been going on in the Movable Column since his
departure, I made my way to Colonel Becher, whom I found suffering
from the severe wound he had received a few days before, and asked him
what was to be my fate. He replied that the question had been raised
of appointing an officer to help the Assistant-Adjutant-General of
the Delhi Field Force, who found it impossible to carry on the daily
increasing work single-handed, and that Chamberlain had thought of me
for this post. Had Chamberlain's wish been carried out my career might
have been quite changed, but while he was discussing the question with
Sir Henry Barnard, Donald Stewart unexpectedly arrived in camp.

I was waiting outside Sir Henry Barnard's tent, anxious to hear what
decision had been come to, when two men rode up, both looking greatly
fatigued and half starved; one of them being Stewart. He told me
they had had a most adventurous ride; but before waiting to hear his
story,[4] I asked Norman to suggest Stewart for the new appointment--a
case of one word for Stewart and two for myself, I am afraid, for
I had set my heart on returning to the Quartermaster-General's
department. And so it was settled, to our mutual satisfaction, Stewart
becoming the D.A.A.G. of the Delhi Field Force, and I the D.A.Q.M.G.
with the Artillery.


[Footnote 1: Now Lieutenant-General Sir James Hills-Johnes, V.C.,
G.C.B.]

[Footnote 2: The late General Sir Edwin Johnson, G.C.B.]

[Footnote 3: Chamberlain had been given the rank of Brigadier-General
on his arrival at Delhi.]

[Footnote 4: The account of this adventurous ride is given in the
Appendix.  (Appendix I.)]

       *       *       *       *       *




CHAPTER XV.
1857

  Reinforcements begin to arrive--An assault again proposed
  --The attack on Alipur--Death of General Barnard
  --General Reed assumes command--Two V.C.'s--Treachery in camp
  --Fighting close up to the city walls
  --Sufferings of the sick and wounded--General Reed's health fails


That my readers may better understand our position at the time I
joined the Delhi Field Force, I might, I think, quote with advantage
from a letter[1] written the very day of my arrival by General Barnard
to Sir John Lawrence, in which he describes the difficulties of the
situation, hitherto met by the troops with the most determined courage
and endurance, but to which no end could be seen. When he took over
the command, he wrote, he was expected to be able to silence at once
the fire from the Mori and Kashmir bastions, and then to bring his
heavy guns into play on the walls and open a way into the city,
after which, it was supposed, all would be plain sailing. But this
programme, so plausible in theory, was absolutely impossible to put
into practice. In spite of every effort on our part, not a single one
of the enemy's guns was silenced; they had four to our one, while the
distance from the Ridge to the city walls was too great to allow of
our comparatively light guns making any impression on them. Under
these circumstances the only thing to be done was to construct
batteries nearer to the city, but before these could be begun,
entrenching tools, sandbags, and other necessary materials, of which
the Engineers were almost entirely destitute, had to be collected. The
troops were being worn out by constant sanguinary combats, and the
attacks to which they were exposed required every soul in camp to
repel them. It was never certain where the enemy intended to strike,
and it was only by the most constant vigilance that their intentions
could be ascertained, and the men were being incessantly withdrawn
during the scorching heat of the day from one place to another.
General Barnard concluded as follows: 'You may ask why we engage in
these constant combats. The reason simply is that when attacked we
must defend ourselves, and that to secure our camp, our hospitals, our
stores, etc., every living being has to be employed. The whole thing
is too gigantic for the force brought against it.'

Soon after Barnard wrote these lines reinforcements began to arrive,
and our position was gradually improved. By the 3rd July the following
troops had reached Delhi: four Horse Artillery guns (two British
and two Native), a detachment of European Foot Artillery, the
Head-Quarters of Her Majesty's 8th and 61st Foot, one squadron of the
5th Punjab Cavalry, the 1st Punjab Infantry, and some newly-raised
Sikh Sappers and Artillery. The strength of the force was thus
increased to nearly 6,600 men of all arms. The enemy's reinforcements,
however, were out of all proportion to ours--mutineers from Jullundur,
Nasirabad, Nimach, Kotah, Gwalior, Jhansi, and Rohilkand arrived about
this time. Those from Rohilkand crossed by the bridge of boats and
entered the city by the Calcutta gate; we could distinctly see them
from the Ridge, marching in perfect formation, with their bands
playing and colours flying. Indeed, throughout the siege the enemy's
numbers were constantly being increased, while they had a practically
unlimited number of guns, and the well-stocked magazine furnished them
with an inexhaustible supply of ammunition.

I found myself under fire for the first time on the 30th June, when an
attack was made on the Sabzi Mandi piquet and Hindu Rao's house. Eight
of our men were killed and thirty wounded; amongst the latter were
Yorke and Packe, both attached to the 4th Sikhs. It appeared certain
that these two officers were wounded by the Hindustanis of their own
regiment; Packe, who was shot through the ankle, being so close up to
the breastwork that it was scarcely possible for the bullet which hit
him to have come from the front. Consequently all the Hindustanis
in the 4th Sikhs were disarmed and turned out of camp, as it was
manifestly undesirable to have any but the most loyal soldiers in our
ranks.

[Illustration: FIELD-MARSHAL SIR DONALD MARTIN STEWART, BART., G.C.B.,
G.C.S.I., C.I.E.
_From a photograph by Messrs. Elliott and Fry._]

In the afternoon of the same day I was ordered to accompany a column
under Brigadier Showers, sent on reconnoitring duty towards the Idgah,
where we heard that the enemy were again constructing a battery. It
had not been commenced, but the intention to build one was evident,
for we found a number of entrenching tools, and a quantity of
sandbags.

The question of attempting to take the city by a _coup de main_ was
now again discussed. It was urged that our numbers, already small,
were being daily reduced by casualties and sickness; that the want of
proper equipment rendered it impossible to undertake regular siege
operations; and that a rising in the Punjab was imminent. The chances
of success were certainly more favourable than they were on the 13th
June. The force to be employed was stronger; all concerned--the staff,
commanders, and troops--were fully apprised of what was intended, and
of the part they would have to play; above all, the details of the
scheme, which was drawn up on much the same lines as the former one,
were carefully worked out by Lieutenant Alex. Taylor,[2] who had
recently come into camp, and was acting temporarily as Commanding
Engineer.

Of the supreme importance of regaining possession of Delhi there can
be no doubt whatever. But nevertheless the undertaking would, at that
time, have been a most desperate one, and only to be justified by
the critical position in which we were placed. In spite of the late
reinforcements, we were a mere handful compared with the thousands
within the walls. Success, therefore, depended on the completeness
of the surprise; and, as we could make no movement without its being
perceived by the enemy, surprise was impossible. Another strong reason
against assaulting at that time was the doubtful attitude of some
of the Hindustani Cavalry still with us; the whole of the effective
troops, too, would have to be employed, and the sick and wounded--a
large number--left to the mercy of the Native followers.

General Barnard carefully weighed all the arguments for and against
the proposal, and at last reluctantly consented to the attack being
made, but the discovery of a conspiracy amongst the Natives in camp
caused it to be countermanded--a great disappointment to many, and
there was much cavilling and discontent on the part of some, who could
not have sufficiently appreciated the difficulties and risks of the
undertaking, or the disastrous consequences of a repulse.

On the morning of the day on which it had been arranged that the
assault should be made, the staff at Delhi received a most valuable
addition in the person of Lieutenant-Colonel Baird-Smith, of the
Bengal Engineers. Summoned from Rurki to take the place of the Chief
Engineer, whose health had broken down, Baird-Smith was within sixty
miles of Delhi on the 2nd July, when news of the intended movement
reached him. He started at once, and arrived in camp early on the 3rd,
but only to find that the assault had been postponed.

On the afternoon of the 3rd July the enemy came out in force (5,000
or 6,000 strong with several guns), and occupied the suburbs to our
right. The troops were turned out, but instead of attacking us and
returning to the city as usual when it became dark, the rebels moved
off in the direction of Alipur, where we had an outpost, which was
held by Younghusband's squadron of the 5th Punjab Cavalry. They
reached Alipur about midnight, and had they attacked the serai at once
with Infantry, Younghusband and his men could hardly have escaped, but
fortunately they opened upon it with Artillery. This gave the sowars
time to mount and fall back on Rhai, the next post, ten miles to the
rear, which was garrisoned by the friendly troops of the Jhind Raja.
The sound of the guns being heard in camp, a column under the command
of Major Coke was got ready to pursue should the insurgents push up
the Trunk Road, or to cut them off should they try to make their way
back to the city. Besides his own corps (the 1st Punjab Infantry),
Coke was given a wing of the 61st Foot, six Horse and six Field
Artillery guns, one squadron of the Carabineers, one squadron of the
9th Lancers, and the Guides Cavalry; in all about 800 Infantry, 300
Cavalry, and 12 guns, and I was sent with him as staff officer.

It was generally believed that the enemy were on the look-out for
treasure coming from the Punjab, which was known to be under the
charge of a Native guard, and we quite expected to have a long chase
after them; we were, therefore, surprised to see them, as day broke,
crossing our front on their way back to Delhi.

The rebels were moving on fairly high ground, but between us and
them was a swamp rendered almost impassable by recent heavy rain. It
extended a considerable distance on either side, and as there was
no other way of getting at the rapidly retreating foe, it had to be
crossed. Our Artillery opened fire, and Coke advanced with the Cavalry
and Infantry. The swamp proved to be very difficult; in it men and
horses floundered hopelessly, and before we were clear the enemy had
got away with their guns; they were obliged, however, to leave behind
all the plunder taken from Alipur, and a considerable quantity
of ammunition. My share of the loot was a nice-looking, white,
country-bred pony, which I found tied to a tree. I promptly annexed
it, glad to save my own horse, and I congratulated myself on having
made a most useful addition to my small stud. It did not, however,
remain long in my possession, for a few days afterwards it was claimed
by its rightful owner, Lieutenant Younghusband.

The heat was great, and as the soldiers were much distressed, having
been under arms for ten hours, Coke halted the Infantry portion on the
banks of the Western Jumna Canal instead of returning direct to
camp. While we were enjoying a much-needed rest we were unexpectedly
attacked by some fresh troops (including about 800 Cavalry) which had
hurried out from the city. I was startled from a sound sleep by heavy
firing, and saw the enemy advancing within a few hundred yards of our
halting-place. Coke formed his Infantry along the bank of the canal,
and sent a mounted officer to recall the Cavalry and Artillery.
The enemy came on very boldly at first, but the steady fire of our
Infantry kept them at bay, and when the guns arrived we had no
difficulty in driving them off. They left 80 dead on the field; we had
on our side 3 killed and 23 wounded, besides losing several British
soldiers from sunstroke.

Major Coke was much grieved by the loss in this engagement of a Native
friend of his, a Chief of the Kohat border, by name Mir Mubarak Shah.
He was a grand specimen of a frontier Khan,[3] and on hearing that the
1st Punjab Infantry was ordered to Delhi expressed his determination
to accompany it. He got together a troop of eighty of his own
followers, and leaving Kohat on the 1st June, overtook Coke at Kurnal
on the 27th, a distance of nearly 600 miles. A day or two afterwards
Coke's men were approached by the Hindustanis of the 2nd Punjab
Cavalry, and some Native officers of the 9th Irregulars, who tried to
induce them to join in the rebellion. Advances were made in the first
instance to Mir Mubarak Shah and Mir Jaffir, the Subadar-Major of the
1st Punjab Infantry, who at once informed Coke of what was going on.
As soon as the regiment reached Delhi the matter was investigated, and
the Native officers who had endeavoured to tamper with the men were
identified, tried, and executed.

About noon on the 5th July we heard the woeful tidings that General
Barnard was seized with cholera. The army had never been free from
that terrible scourge since the Commander-in-Chief fell a victim to
it on the 26th May, and now it had attacked his successor, who was
carried off after a few hours' illness. The feeling of sadness amongst
the troops at the loss of their General was universal. Throughout the
six trying weeks he had been in command of the force he had never
spared himself. At work from morning till night in and about the
trenches, he personally attended to every detail, and had won the
respect and regard of all in camp.

Few Commanders were ever placed in a more difficult position than
Barnard. He arrived at Umballa when the Native troops, to whose
characteristics and peculiarities (as I have already remarked) he was
a complete stranger, were thoroughly disaffected, and within a week of
his taking over the command of the Sirhind division the Mutiny broke
out. Without any previous knowledge of Indian warfare, he found
himself in front of Delhi with a force altogether too weak to effect
the object for which it was intended and without any of the appliances
to ensure success; while those who did not realize the extreme risk
involved never ceased clamouring at a delay which was unavoidable, and
urging the General to undertake a task which was impossible.

Barnard has been blamed, and not unjustly, for mistrusting his own
judgment and for depending upon others for advice about matters on
which an experienced Commander ought to have been the best able to
decide. But every allowance must be made for the position he was
so unexpectedly called upon to fill and the peculiar nature of his
surroundings. Failing health, too, probably weakened the self-reliance
which a man who had satisfactorily performed the duties of Chief of
the Staff in the Crimea must at one time have possessed.

On the death of Sir Henry Barnard, General Reed assumed command. He
had joined the force on the morning of the action of Badli-ki-Serai,
but though senior to Barnard, he was too much knocked up by the
intense heat of the long journey from Peshawar to take part in the
action, and he had allowed Barnard to continue in command.

For the next few days we had a comparatively quiet time, of which
advantage was taken to render our position more secure towards the
rear. The secrecy and rapidity with which the enemy had made their way
to Alipur warned the authorities how easily our communication with the
Punjab might be cut off. Baird-Smith saw the necessity for remedying
this, and, acting on his advice, Reed had all the bridges over the
Western Jumna Canal destroyed for several miles, except one required
for our own use. The Phulchudder aqueduct, which carried the canal
water into the city, and along which horsemen could pass to the rear
of our camp, was blown up, as was also the Bussye bridge over the
drain from the Najafgarh _jhil_, about eight miles from camp.

We were not left long in peace, for on the morning of the 9th July the
enemy moved out of the city in great force, and for several hours kept
up an incessant cannonade on our front and right flank.

The piquet below the General's Mound happened to be held this day by
two guns of Tombs's troop, commanded by Second Lieutenant James Hills,
and by thirty men of the Carabineers under Lieutenant Stillman. A
little beyond, and to the right of this piquet, a Native officer's
party of the 9th Irregular Cavalry had been placed to watch the Trunk
Road. These men were still supposed to be loyal; the regiment to which
they belonged had a good reputation, and as Christie's Horse had
done excellent service in Afghanistan, where Neville and Crawford
Chamberlain had served with it as subalterns. It was, therefore,
believed at the Mound piquet that ample warning would be given of
any enemy coming from the direction of the Trunk Road, so that the
approach of some horsemen dressed like the men of the 9th Irregulars
attracted little notice.

Stillman and Hills were breakfasting together, when a sowar from the
Native officers' party rode up and reported that a body of the enemy's
Cavalry were in sight. Hills told the man to gallop to Head-Quarters
with the report, and to warn Tombs as he passed his tent. Hills and
Stillman then mounted their men, neither of them having the remotest
idea that the news of the enemy's advance had been purposely delayed
until there was not time to turn out the troops. They imagined that
the sowar was acting in good faith and had given them sufficient
notice, and while Hills moved his guns towards the position from which
he could command the Trunk Road, Stillman proceeded to the top of the
Mound in order to get a better view of the ground over which the enemy
were said to be advancing. The troop of the Carabineers was thus left
by itself to receive the first rush of the rebel Cavalry; it was
composed of young soldiers, some of them quite untrained, who turned
and broke.

The moment Hills saw the enemy he shouted, 'Action front!' and, in
the hope of giving his men time to load and fire a round of grape, he
gallantly charged the head of the column single-handed, cut down the
leading man, struck the second, and then was then ridden down himself.
It had been raining heavily, so Hills wore his cloak; which probably
saved his life, for it was cut through in many places, as were his
jacket and even his shirt.

As soon as the body of the enemy had passed on, Hills, extricating
himself from his horse, got up and searched for his sword, which he
had lost in the mêlée. He had just found it when he was attacked by
three men, two of whom were mounted; he fired at and wounded the first
man; then caught the lance of the second in his left hand, and ran him
through the body with his sword. The first assailant coming on again,
Hills cut him down, upon which he was attacked by the third man on
foot, who succeeded in wrenching his sword from him. Hills fell in
the struggle, and must have been killed, if Tombs, who had been duly
warned by the sowar, and had hurried out to the piquet, had not come
to the rescue and saved his plucky subaltern's life.[4]

Notwithstanding Hills's gallant attempt to stop the sowars, his men
had not time to fire a single round before they were upon them. Their
object, however, was not to capture these two guns, but to induce the
Native Horse Artillery to join them, and galloping past the piquet,
they made straight for the troop, and called upon the men to bring
away their guns. The Native Artillerymen behaved admirably: they not
only refused to respond to the call, but they begged the men of the
European troop, which was unlimbered close by, to fire through them on
the mutineers.

Knowing nothing of what was happening, I was standing by my tent,
watching my horses, which had just arrived from Philour, as they
crossed the bridge over the canal cut which ran at the rear of our
camp, when the enemy's Cavalry galloped over the bridge, and for a few
moments my animals seemed in considerable danger; the sowars, however,
having lost more than one-third of their number, and having failed in
their attempt to get hold of the Native Horse Artillery guns, were
bent upon securing their retreat rather than upon plunder. My
servants gave a wonderful account of the many perils they had
encountered--somewhat exaggerated, I dare say--but they had done me a
real good service, having marched 200 miles through a very disturbed
country, and arriving with animals and baggage in good order. Indeed,
throughout the Mutiny my servants behaved admirably. The _khidmatgar_
(table attendant) never failed to bring me my food under the hottest
fire, and the _saices_ (grooms) were always present with the horses
whenever they were required, apparently quite indifferent to the risks
they often ran. Moreover, they became imbued with such a warlike
spirit that, when I was invalided in April, 1858, four of them
enlisted in a regiment of Bengal Cavalry. The _khidmatgar_ died soon
after the Mutiny, but two of his brothers were afterwards in my
service; one, who was with me during the Lushai expedition and the
whole of the Afghan war, never left me for more than twenty years, and
we parted with mutual regret at Bombay on board the P. and O. steamer
in which I took my final departure from India in April, 1893.

Mine was not a solitary instance; not only the officers' servants,
but the followers belonging to European regiments, such as cook-boys,
_saices_ and _bhisties_ (water-carriers), as a rule, behaved in the
most praiseworthy manner, faithful and brave to a degree. So much was
this the case, that when the troopers of the 9th Lancers were called
upon to name the man they considered most worthy of the Victoria
Cross, an honour which Sir Colin Campbell purposed to confer upon the
regiment to mark his appreciation of the gallantry displayed by all
ranks during the campaign, they unanimously chose the head _bhistie_!
Considering the peculiar position we were in at the time, it is
somewhat remarkable that the conduct of the Native servants should
have been so generally satisfactory. It speaks as well, I think, for
the masters as the servants, and proves (what I have sometimes heard
denied) that Native servants are, as a rule, kindly and considerately
treated by their European masters.

To return to my story. The cannonade from within and without the city
continued unceasing, and the enemy had again to be driven out of the
near suburbs. This duty was entrusted to General Chamberlain, whom
I accompanied as one of his staff officers. His column consisted of
about 800 Infantry and six guns, a few more men joining us as we
passed the Ridge. This was the first occasion on which I had witnessed
fighting in gardens and walled enclosures, and I realized how
difficult it was to dislodge men who knew how to take advantage of the
cover thus afforded. Our soldiers, as usual, fought well against very
heavy odds, and before we were able to force the enemy back into the
city we had lost 1 officer and 40 men killed, and 8 officers and 163
men wounded, besides 11 poor fellows missing: every one of whom
must have been murdered. The enemy had nearly 500 men killed, and
considerably more than that number wounded.

The result of the day's experience was so far satisfactory that it
determined General Reed to get rid of all the Hindustani soldiers
still remaining in camp. It was clear that the Native officers' party
near the Mound piquet had been treacherous; none of them were ever
seen again, and it was generally believed that they had joined the
enemy in their dash through the camp. The other Native soldiers did
not hesitate to denounce their Hindustani comrades as traitors; the
latter were consequently all sent away, except a few men of the 4th
Irregular Cavalry who were deprived of their horses and employed
solely as orderlies. It was also thought advisable to take the guns
from the Native troop of Horse Artillery. A few of the younger men
belonging to it deserted, but the older soldiers continued faithful,
and did good work in the breaching batteries.

There was a short lull after our fight on the 9th--a sure sign that
the enemy's loss was heavier than they had calculated upon. When the
mutineers received reinforcements we were certain to be attacked
within a few hours, but if no fresh troops arrived on the scene we
could generally depend upon a day or two's respite.

Our next fight was on the 14th July. The rebels came out on that
morning in great numbers, attacking Hindu Rao's house and the Sabzi
Mandi piquets, and supported by a continuous fire of Artillery from
the walls. For some hours we remained on the defensive, but as the
enemy's numbers increased, and we were greatly harassed by their
fire, a column was formed to dislodge them. It was of about the usual
strength, viz., 800 Infantry and six Horse Artillery guns, with the
addition of a few of the Guides Cavalry and of Hodson's newly-raised
Horse. The command was given to Brigadier Showers, and I was sent as
his staff officer; Reid joined in at the foot of the Ridge with all
the men that could be spared, and Brigadier-General Chamberlain also
accompanied the column.

We moved on under a very heavy fire until we reached an enclosure the
wall of which was lined with the enemy. The troops stopped short, when
Chamberlain, seeing that they hesitated, called upon them to follow
him, and gave them a splendid example by jumping his horse over the
wall. The men did follow him, and Chamberlain got a ball in his
shoulder.

We had great difficulty in driving the enemy back; they contested
every inch of the ground, the many serais and walled gardens affording
them admirable cover; but our troops were not to be withstood;
position after position was carried until we found ourselves in sight
of the Lahore gate and close up to the walls of the city. In our
eagerness to drive the enemy back we had, however, come too far. It
was impossible to remain where we were. Musketry from the walls and
grape from the heavy guns mounted on the Mori and other bastions
committed terrible havoc. Men were falling on all sides, but the
getting back was hazardous to the last degree. Numerous as the enemy
were, they had not the courage to stand against us as long as we
advanced, but the first sign of retreat was the signal for them to
leave their shelter and press us the whole way to camp.

When the retirement commenced I was with the two advanced guns in
action on the Grand Trunk Road. The subaltern in charge was severely
wounded, and almost at the same moment one of his sergeants, a smart,
handsome fellow, fell, shot through the leg. Seeing some men carrying
him into a hut at the side of the road, I shouted: 'Don't put him
there; he will be left behind; get a doolie for him, or put him on the
limber.' But what with the incessant fire from the enemy's guns, the
bursting of shells, the crashing of shot through the branches of the
trees, and all the din and hubbub of battle, I could not have been
heard, for the poor fellow with another wounded man was left in the
hut, and both were murdered by the mutineers. So many of the men with
the two guns were _hors de combat_, and the horses were so unsteady
(several of them being wounded), that there was great difficulty in
limbering up, and I was helping the drivers to keep the horses quiet,
when I suddenly felt a tremendous blow on my back which made me faint
and sick, and I was afraid I should not be able to remain on my horse.
The powerless feeling, however, passed off, and I managed to stick
on until I got back to camp. I had been hit close to the spine by a
bullet, and the wound would probably have been fatal but for the fact
that a leather pouch for caps, which I usually wore in front near
my pistol, had somehow slipped round to the back; the bullet passed
through this before entering my body, and was thus prevented from
penetrating very deep.

The enemy followed us closely right up to our piquets, and but for the
steadiness of the retirement our casualties must have been even more
numerous than they were. As it was, they amounted to 15 men killed, 16
officers and 177 men wounded, and 2 men missing.

The enemy's loss was estimated at 1,000. For hours they were seen
carrying the dead in carts back to the city.

My wound, though comparatively slight, kept me on the sick-list for a
fortnight, and for more than a month I could not mount a horse or put
on a sword-belt. I was lucky in that my tent was pitched close to that
of John Campbell Brown, one of the medical officers attached to the
Artillery. He had served during the first Afghan war, with Sale's
force, at Jalalabad, and throughout both the campaigns in the Punjab,
and had made a great reputation for himself as an army surgeon. He
looked after me while I was laid up, and I could not have been in
better hands.

The Delhi Force was fortunate in its medical officers. Some of the
best in the army were attached to it, and all that was possible to be
done for the sick and wounded under the circumstances was done. But
the poor fellows had a bad time of it. A few of the worst cases were
accommodated in the two or three houses in the cantonment that had
escaped destruction, but the great majority had to put up with such
shelter from the burning heat and drenching rain as an ordinary
soldiers' tent could provide. Those who could bear the journey and
were not likely to be fit for duty for some time were sent away to
Meerut and Umballa; but even with the relief thus afforded, the
hospitals throughout the siege were terribly overcrowded. Anæsthetics
were freely used, but antiseptics were practically unknown,
consequently many of the severely wounded died, and few amputation
cases survived.

A great aggravation to the misery and discomfort in hospital was the
plague of flies. Delhi is at all times noted for having more than its
share of these drawbacks to life in the East, but during the siege
they were a perfect pest, and for the short time I was laid up I fully
realized the suffering which our sick and wounded soldiers had to
endure. At night the inside of my tent was black with flies. At the
first ray of light or the smallest shake to the ropes, they were all
astir, and for the rest of the day there was no peace; it was even
difficult to eat without swallowing one or more of the loathsome
insects. I had to brush them away with one hand while I put the food
into my mouth with the other, and more than once I had to rush from
the table, a fly having eluded all my efforts to prevent his going
down my throat.

As soon as I could get about a little, but before I was able to
perform my legitimate work, I was employed in helping to look after
the conservancy of the camp and its surroundings--an extremely
disagreeable but most important duty, for an Indian army must always
have a large following, for which sanitary arrangements are a
difficulty. Then, large convoys of camels and bullock-carts arrived
daily with supplies and stores, and a considerable number of transport
animals had to be kept in readiness to follow up the enemy with a
suitably sized force, whenever we could drive them out of the city.
Without any shelter, and often with insufficient food, deaths amongst
the animals were of constant occurrence, and, unless their carcases
could at once be removed, the stench became intolerable. Every
expedient was resorted to to get rid of this nuisance. Some of the
carcases were dragged to a distance from camp, some were buried, and
some were burnt, but, notwithstanding all our efforts, many remained
to be gradually devoured by the jackals which prowled about the camp,
and by the innumerable birds of prey which instinct had brought to
Delhi from the remotest parts of India.[5]

At a time when the powers of each individual were taxed to the
uttermost, the strain on the Commander of the force was terribly
severe. Mind and body were incessantly at work. Twice in the short
space of six weeks had the officer holding this responsible position
succumbed, and now a third was on the point of breaking down.
Major-General Reed's health, never very strong, completely failed, and
on the 17th July, only twelve days after succeeding Sir Henry Barnard,
he had to give up the command and leave the camp on sick certificate.


[Footnote 1: See Kaye's 'History of the Indian Mutiny.']

[Footnote 2: Now General Sir Alexander Taylor, G.C.B.]

[Footnote 3: Mahomedans of good family are so styled in northern
India.]

[Footnote 4: Tombs and Hills both received the Victoria Cross for
their gallantry.]

[Footnote 5: 'Adjutants,' never seen in ordinary times further north
than Bengal, appeared in hundreds, and were really useful scavengers.]

       *       *       *       *       *




CHAPTER XVI.
1857

  Archdale Wilson assumes command--Enemy baffled in the Sabzi Mandi
  --Efforts to exterminate the Feringhis
  --A letter from General Havelock--News of Henry Lawrence's death
  --Arrival of the Movable Column--The 61st Foot at Najafgarh


General Reed was succeeded by Brigadier Archdale Wilson, the officer
who commanded the Meerut column at the beginning of the campaign, and
who was so successful in the fights on the Hindun. Though a soldier of
moderate capacity, Wilson was quite the best of the senior officers
present, three of whom were superseded by his selection. Two of these,
Congreve, Acting-Adjutant-General of Queen's troops, and Graves, who
had been Brigadier at Delhi when the Mutiny broke out, left the camp
on being passed over; the third, Longfield, took Wilson's place as
Brigadier.

Wilson's succession to the command gave great relief to the troops on
account of the systematic manner in which he arranged for the various
duties, and the order and method he introduced. The comparative rest
to the troops, as well as the sanitary improvements he effected, did a
good deal for the health of the force. Wilson also took advantage of
the reinforcements we had received to strengthen our position. As far
as possible he put a stop to the practice of following up the enemy
close to the city walls when they were driven off after an attack (a
practice which had cost us many valuable lives), contenting himself
with preventing the rebels from remaining in the immediate vicinity of
our advanced posts.

The day after Reed's departure another sharp and prolonged attack was
made upon the Ridge batteries and Sabzi Mandi piquets, and in the
afternoon a column was sent to drive the enemy away. It consisted
of four Horse Artillery guns, 750 Infantry, and the Guides Cavalry.
Lieutenant-Colonel Jones, of the 60th Rifles, commanded the column,
and, having gained experience from the lesson we had received on the
14th, he took care not to approach too near to the city walls, but
cleared the Sabzi Mandi, and took up a good position, where he
remained for some little time. This unusual procedure seemed to
disconcert the enemy, most of whom returned to the city, while those
who remained to fight did not come to such close quarters as on
previous occasions. Nevertheless, we had 1 officer and 12 men killed,
3 officers and 66 men wounded, and 2 men were missing.

The four following days passed without any serious attack being made,
but an unfortunate accident occurred about this time to a cousin of
mine, Captain Greensill, of the 24th Foot. He was attached to the
Engineer department, and was ordered to undertake some reconnoitring
duty after dark. On nearing the enemy's position he halted his escort,
in order not to attract attention, and proceeded alone to examine the
ground. The signal which he had arranged to give on his return was
apparently misunderstood, for as he approached the escort fired; he
was mortally wounded, and died in great agony the next morning.

The last severe contest took place in the Sabzi Mandi on the 18th,
for by this time the Engineers' incessant labour had resulted in the
clearing away of the old serais and walled gardens for some distance
round the posts held by our piquets in that suburb. The 'Sammy
House' piquet, to the right front of Hindu Rao's house, was greatly
strengthened, and cover was provided for the men occupying it--a very
necessary measure, exposed as the piquet was to the guns on the Burn
and Mori bastions, and within grape range of the latter, while the
enemy's Infantry were enabled to creep close up to it unperceived.

The improvements we had made in this part of our position were, no
doubt, carefully watched and noted by the rebels, who, finding
that all attempts to dislodge us on the right ended in their own
discomfiture, determined to try whether our left was not more
vulnerable than they had found it in the earlier days of the siege.
Accordingly early on the 23rd they sallied forth from the Kashmir
gate, and, occupying Ludlow Castle and its neighbourhood, shelled
Metcalfe House, the stable piquet, and the mosque piquet on the Ridge.
As all attempts to silence the enemy's guns with our Artillery proved
unavailing, and it was feared that if not dislodged they would
establish a battery at Ludlow Castle, a small column under Brigadier
Showers moved out by a cutting through the Ridge on our left, its
object being (in conjunction with the Metcalfe House piquets) to turn
the enemy's right and capture their guns.

The troops detailed for this duty consisted of six Horse Artillery
guns, 400 British Infantry, 360 of the 1st Punjab Infantry, and a
party of the Guides Cavalry, in addition to 250 men detached from the
Metcalfe House piquets. The advance of the column up the road leading
towards the Kashmir gate appeared to be unnoticed until it arrived
close to the enemy, who then opened with grape. Our troops pressed
on, and in their eagerness to capture the guns, which were being
withdrawn, got too near the city walls. Here Showers was wounded, and
the command devolved on Lieutenant-Colonel Jones, of the 60th, who
skilfully conducted the retirement. Our loss was 1 officer and 11 men
killed, 5 officers and 34 men wounded. Captain Law, one of my two
companions on the mail-cart from Umballa, was the officer killed.

The enemy were fairly quiet between the 23rd and 31st July, on which
date they moved out of the city in considerable strength, with the
intention of making a temporary bridge across the cut in the swampy
ground I have before described, and so threatening our rear. A column
under Coke was sent to the other side of the cut to intercept the
enemy should they succeed in getting across; this column was joined
at Alipur by the Kumaon battalion (composed of Gurkhas and hill-men),
about 400 strong, which had just arrived from the Punjab as escort
to a large store of ammunition. The services of these troops were,
however, not required, for the rain, which had been coming down in
torrents for some hours, had caused such a rush of water that the
bridge was carried away before it was completed. The enemy then
retired towards the city. On reaching the suburbs they were reinforced
by a large body of Infantry, and a most determined attack was made on
the right of our position. This occurred about sunset, and all night
the roar of musketry and artillery was kept up without a moment's
cessation.

The next day was the anniversary of a great Mahomedan festival, when
it was the custom for the King to pray and make sacrifice at the
Idgah, in commemoration of Abraham's intended offering up of
Ishmail.[1] On this particular occasion, however, the sacrifices were
to be dispensed with in deference to Hindu prejudices,[2] and in
their stead a tremendous united effort was to be made by Hindus and
Mussulmans to exterminate the Feringhis. All the morning of the
1st August mosques and Hindu temples were crowded with worshippers
offering up prayers for the success of the great attempt, and in the
afternoon the rebels, mad with excitement and fanaticism, issued
in countless numbers from the city gates, and, shouting the Moslem
battle-cry, advanced and threw themselves on our defences. They were
driven back by our deadly volleys, but only for a moment; they quickly
reformed and made a fresh attack, to be stopped again by our steady,
uncompromising fire. Time after time they rallied and hurled
themselves against our breastworks. All that night and well on into
the next day the fight continued, and it was past noon before the
devoted fanatics became convinced that their gods had deserted them,
that victory was not for them, and that no effort, however heroic on
their part, could drive us from the Ridge. The enemy's loss was heavy,
ours trifling, for our men were admirably steady, well protected by
breastworks, and never allowed to show themselves except when the
assailants came close up. We had only 1 officer and 9 men killed and
36 men wounded.

The officer was Lieutenant Eaton Travers, of the 1st Punjab Infantry.
He had been seven years with the regiment, and had been present
with it in nearly all the many frontier fights in which it had been
engaged. He was a bright, happy fellow, and a great friend of mine. As
Major Coke, his commanding officer, published in regimental orders:
'This gallant soldier and true-hearted gentleman was beloved and
respected by the officers and men of the regiment. His loss is an
irreparable one.'

The enemy were much depressed by the failure of the Bakhra Id attack,
from which they had expected great things. They began to despair of
being able to drive us from our position on the Ridge, which for seven
weeks had been so hotly contested. They heard that Nicholson with his
Movable Column was hastening to our assistance, and they felt that,
unless they could gain some signal victory before reinforcements
reached us, we should take our place as the besiegers, instead of
being, as hitherto, the besieged. Disaffection within the city walls
was on the increase; only the semblance of authority remained to the
old and well-nigh impotent King, while some of his sons, recognizing
their perilous position, endeavoured to open negotiations with us.
Many of the sepoys were reported to be going off to their homes, sick
and weary of a struggle the hopelessness of which they had begun to
realize.

Our work, however, was far from being finished. Notwithstanding losses
from death and desertion, the enemy still outnumbered us by about
eight or nine to one.

All this time our communication with the Punjab was maintained, and we
regularly received letters and newspapers from England by the northern
route; but for several weeks we had had no news from the south.
Rumours of disasters occasionally reached us, but it was not until the
second week in July that we heard of the fight at Agra, the retirement
of our troops, and the flight of all the residents into the fort.

These scraps of intelligence, for they were mere scraps, written often
in Greek character, some screwed into a quill, some sewn between the
double soles of a man's shoe, and some twisted up in the messenger's
hair, were eagerly looked for, and as eagerly deciphered when they
came. It was cheering to learn that Allahabad was safe, that Lucknow
was still holding out, that troops from Madras, Ceylon, and the
Mauritius had reached Calcutta, and that Lord Elgin, taking a
statesmanlike view of the situation, had diverted to India[3] the
force intended for the China expedition, and we fondly hoped that some
of the six British regiments reported by one messenger to have arrived
at Cawnpore would be sent to the assistance of the Delhi Force.

Strangely enough, we knew nothing of the death of Sir Henry Lawrence
or General Wheeler, and had not even heard for certain that Cawnpore
had fallen and that Lucknow was besieged, while there were constant
reports that Wheeler was marching up the Trunk Road. Being most
anxious to get some authentic intelligence, Norman[4] on the 15th July
wrote a letter in French addressed to General Wheeler at Cawnpore, or
whoever might be in command between that place and Delhi, giving an
account of our position at Delhi, and expressing a hope that troops
would soon march to our assistance. The letter was entrusted to two
sepoys of the Guides, who carried out their difficult task most
faithfully, and on the 3rd August returned with the following reply
from General Havelock, addressed to Major-General Reed:

    'Cawnpore, left bank of the Ganges,
    '_25th July, 1857._

    'MY DEAR GENERAL,

    'Yesterday I saw Captain Norman's letter of the 15th instant from
    Delhi, addressed to Sir Hugh Wheeler. That gallant officer and the
    whole of his force were destroyed on the 27th June by a base act
    of treachery. Sir Henry Somerset is Commander-in-Chief in India
    and Sir Patrick Grant in Bengal. Under the orders of the supreme
    Government I have been sent to retrieve affairs here. I have
    specific instructions from which I cannot depart. I have sent a
    duplicate of your letter to Sir P. Grant. In truth, though most
    anxious to march on Delhi, I have peremptory orders to relieve
    Lucknow. I have, thank God, been very successful. I defeated the
    enemy at Futtehpore on the 12th, and Pandu Naddi on the 15th, and
    this place, which I recaptured on the 16th. On each occasion I
    took all the guns. Immense reinforcements are coming from England
    and China. Sir Patrick Grant will soon be in the field himself.
    Lucknow holds out. Agra is free for the present. I am sorry to
    hear you are not quite well. I beg that you will let me hear from
    you continually.'

Two days afterwards another letter was received; this time from
Lieutenant-Colonel Fraser-Tytler, A.Q.M.G., with Havelock's force. It
was addressed to Captain Earle, A.Q.M.G., Meerut, and ran as follows:

    'Cawnpore, _July 27th_.

    'General Havelock has crossed the river to relieve Lucknow, which
    will be effected four days hence. He has a strong force with him,
    and he has already thrashed the Nana and completely dispersed his
    force. We shall probably march to Delhi with four or five thousand
    Europeans and a heavy Artillery, in number, not in weight. The
    China force is in Calcutta, 5,000 men. More troops expected
    immediately. We shall soon be with you.'

These sanguine expectations were never fulfilled! Instead of Lucknow
being relieved in four days, it was nearly four months before that
result was achieved, and instead of troops from Cawnpore coming to
help us at Delhi, the troops from Delhi formed the chief part of the
force which relieved Lucknow.

While we were rejoicing at the prospect of being reinforced by a large
number of British soldiers, a gloom was cast over the whole camp by
the rumour that Sir Henry Lawrence was dead. As the first British
Ruler of the Punjab, Henry Lawrence was known by reputation to, and
respected by, every man belonging to the Delhi Force, and all realized
what a serious loss his death would be to the beleaguered garrison of
Lucknow. Much time, however, was not given us for lamentation, for at
the end of the first week in August another attempt was made to drive
us from the Metcalfe House piquets. Guns were again brought out
through the Kashmir gate, and posted at Ludlow Castle and the
Kudsiabagh; at the same time a number of Infantry skirmishers kept up
an almost constant fire from the jungle in front of our position. The
losses at the piquets themselves were not heavy, good cover having
been provided; but the communications between the piquets and our main
position were much exposed and extremely hazardous for the reliefs. It
was felt that the enemy could not be allowed to remain in such close
proximity to our outposts, and Showers (who had recovered from his
slight wound) was again ordered to drive them off, for which purpose
he was given a strong body of Infantry, composed of Europeans, Sikhs,
and Gurkhas, a troop of Horse Artillery, a squadron of the 9th
Lancers, and the Guides Cavalry. The result was a very brilliant
little affair. The orders on this occasion were to 'move up silently
and take the guns at Ludlow Castle.' The small column proceeded in the
deepest silence, and the first sound heard at dawn on the 12th August
was the challenge of the enemy's sentry, '_Ho come dar?_' (Who comes
there?). A bullet in his body was the reply. A volley of musketry
followed, and effectually awoke the sleeping foe, who succeeded in
letting off two of their guns as our men rushed on the battery.
An Irish soldier, named Reegan, springing forward, prevented the
discharge of the third gun. He bayoneted the gunner in the act of
applying the port-fire, and was himself severely wounded. The rebel
Artillerymen stood to their guns splendidly, and fought till they were
all killed. The enemy's loss was severe; some 250 men were killed, and
four guns were captured. On our side 1 officer and 19 men were killed,
7 officers and 85 men wounded, and 5 men missing. Amongst the wounded
was the gallant Commander of the column, and that fine soldier, Major
John Coke, the Commandant of the 1st Punjab Infantry. The return to
camp was a stirring sight: the captured guns were brought home in
triumph, pushed along by the soldiers, all madly cheering, and the
horses ridden by men carrying their muskets with bayonets fixed.

The following morning the Punjab Movable Column arrived. Nicholson had
preceded it by a few days, and from him I heard all about his fight
with the Sialkot mutineers at Trimmu Ghat and the various marches and
counter-marches which he had made since I left him at Philour.

The column was a most welcome addition to our force. It now consisted
of the 52nd Light Infantry, a wing of the 61st Foot, a Field Battery,
a wing of the 1st Baluch Regiment, and the 2nd Punjab Infantry, beside
200 newly-raised Multani Cavalry and 400 military police. This brought
up our effective force to about 8,000 rank and file of all arms.[5] A
more powerful siege-train than we had hitherto possessed was on its
way from Ferozepore, and three companies of the 8th Foot, detachments
of Artillery and the 60th Rifles, the 4th Punjab Infantry, and about
100 recruits for the 4th Sikhs were also marching towards Delhi. In
addition, a small contingent from Kashmir and a few of the Jhind
Raja's troops were shortly expected, after the arrival of which
nothing in the shape of reinforcements could be looked for from the
north.

Nor could we hope for any help from the south, for no definite news
had been received from Havelock since his letter of the 25th of July,
and rumours had reached us that, finding it impossible to force his
way to Lucknow, he had been obliged to retire upon Cawnpore. It was
felt, therefore, that if Delhi were to be taken at all, it must be
taken quickly, before our augmented numbers should be again diminished
by sickness and casualties.

The enemy knew our position as well as we did, and appreciating the
great value the siege-train would be to us, they decided on making a
supreme effort to intercept it. A few days before they had been foiled
by Hodson in an attempt to cut off our communication with the Punjab,
and were determined to ensure success on this occasion by employing a
really formidable force. This force left Delhi on the 24th August, and
proceeded in the direction of the Najafgarh _jhil_.

At daybreak the following morning Nicholson started with sixteen Horse
Artillery guns, 1,600 Infantry and 450 Cavalry, his orders being to
overtake the enemy and bring them to action. I hoped to have been of
the party, but Nicholson's request to have me as his staff officer
was refused, as I had not been taken off the sick-list, though I
considered my wound was practically healed.

It proved a most difficult march. The rain fell in torrents, and the
roads were mere quagmires. In the first nine miles two swamps had to
be got through, on crossing which Nicholson heard that the insurgents
were at Najafgarh, twelve miles further off. He determined to push on,
and at 4 p.m. he found them occupying a strong position about a mile
and three-quarters in length. In front was an old serai which was held
in force with four guns, and on either side and in rear of the serai
was a village equally strongly held; while running round the enemy's
right and rear was a huge drainage cut, swollen by the heavy rain.
This cut, or nulla, was crossed by a bridge immediately behind the
rebels' position. Nicholson advanced from a side-road, which brought
him on their right with the nulla flowing between him and them. Even
at the ford the water was breast-high, and it was with much difficulty
and not without a good deal of delay that our troops crossed under a
heavy fire from the serai. It was getting late, and Nicholson had only
time to make a hasty reconnaissance. He decided to attack the serai,
drive out the mutineers, and then, changing front to the left, to
sweep down their line and get possession of the bridge.

As the Infantry were about to advance, Nicholson thus addressed
them: 'Men of the 61st, remember what Sir Colin Campbell said at
Chilianwala, and you have heard that he said the same to his gallant
Highland Brigade at the Alma. I have the same request to make of you
and the men of the 1st Bengal Fusiliers. Hold your fire until within
twenty or thirty yards, then fire and charge, and the serai is yours.'
Our brave soldiers followed these directions to the letter, and, under
cover of Artillery fire, carried the serai. Front was then changed to
the left as had been arranged, and the line swept along the enemy's
defences, the rebels flying before them over the bridge. They
confessed to a loss of more than 800 men, and they left in our hands
thirteen field-pieces and a large quantity of ammunition, besides all
their camp equipage, stores, camels, and horses. Our casualties were 2
officers and 23 men killed, and 3 officers and 68 men wounded--two of
the officers mortally, the third dangerously.

The enemy in the city, imagining from the size of the force sent with
Nicholson that we could not have many troops left in camp, attacked us
in great strength on the following morning (26th), but were beaten off
with a loss on our side of only 8 killed and 13 wounded.


[Footnote 1: According to the religion of Islam, Ishmail, not Isaac,
was to have been offered up by Abraham.]

[Footnote 2: Forrest's 'The Indian Mutiny.']

[Footnote 3: Since writing the above it has been brought to my notice
that the promptitude with which the troops were diverted to India
was due in a great measure to the foresight of Sir George Grey, the
Governor of the Cape, who, on hearing of the serious state of affairs
in India, immediately ordered all transports which touched at the Cape
on their way to take part in the China Expeditionary Force, to proceed
directly to Calcutta instead of to Singapore. He also despatched as
many of the Cape garrison as he could spare, with stores, etc., to
India. It is right, therefore, that he should share with Lord Elgin
the credit of having so quickly grasped the magnitude of the crisis
through which India was passing.]

[Footnote 4: Owing to Brigadier-General Chamberlain having been placed
_hors de combat_ by the severe wound he received the previous day,
Norman was carrying on the duties of Adjutant-General.]

[Footnote 5: There were besides in camp at this time 1,535 sick and
wounded, notwithstanding that several hundred men had been sent away.]

       *       *       *       *       *




CHAPTER XVII.
1857

  Wilson's difficulties--Nicholson's resolve
  --Arrangements for the assault--Construction of breaching batteries
  --Nicholson expresses his satisfaction--Orders for the assault issued
  --Composition of the attacking columns


By the 6th September all the reinforcements that could be expected,
including the siege train (consisting of thirty-two pieces of ordnance
with ample ammunition) had arrived in camp, and the time had now come
when it was necessary for Wilson to determine whether Delhi was to be
assaulted, or whether the attempt must be given up. Long exposure to
sun and rain began to tell terribly on the troops; sickness increased
to an alarming extent, and on the 31st August there were 2,368 men in
hospital--a number which, six days later, had risen to 2,977.

Norman, on whose figures implicit reliance can be placed, states that
on this date the total number of effective rank and file of all arms,
Artillery, Engineers, Cavalry, and Infantry, including gun-Lascars,
Native drivers, newly-raised Sikh Pioneers, and recruits for the
Punjab regiments, was 8,748.

The strength of the British troops was 3,217, composed of 580
Artillery, 443 Cavalry, and 2,294 Infantry. The Infantry corps were
mere skeletons, the strongest being only 409 effective rank and file.
The 52nd, which had arrived three weeks before with 600 healthy men,
had already dwindled to 242 fit for duty.

The above numbers are exclusive of the Kashmir Contingent of 2,200
men and four guns, which had by this time reached Delhi; and several
hundred men of the Jhind troops (previously most usefully employed
in keeping open our communication with Kurnal) were, at the Raja's
particular request, brought in to share in the glory of the capture of
Delhi, the Raja himself accompanying them.

No one was more alive than the Commander of the Delhi Field Force to
the fact that no further aid could be expected, and no one realized
more keenly than he did that the strength of the little army at
his disposal was diminishing day by day. But Wilson had never been
sanguine as to the possibility of capturing Delhi without aid from the
south. In a letter to Baird-Smith dated the 20th August, he discussed
at length his reasons for not being in a position to 'hold out any
hope of being able to take the place until supported by the force from
below.' He now was aware that no troops could be expected from the
south, and Sir John Lawrence plainly told him that he had sent him the
last man he could spare from the Punjab. On the 29th August Lawrence
wrote to Wilson: 'There seem to be very strong reasons for assaulting
as soon as practicable. Every day's delay is fraught with danger.
Every day disaffection and mutiny spread. Every day adds to the danger
of the Native Princes taking part against us.' But Wilson did not find
it easy to make up his mind to assault. He was ill. Responsibility and
anxiety had told upon him. He had grown nervous and hesitating, and
the longer it was delayed the more difficult the task appeared to him.

[Illustration: SKETCH TO ILLUSTRATE THE ENGAGEMENT AT NAJAFGARH IN
AUGUST, 1857.]

Fortunately for the continuance of our rule in India, Wilson had about
him men who understood, as he was unable to do, the impossibility of
our remaining any longer as we were. They knew that Delhi must
either be taken or the army before it withdrawn. The man to whom
the Commander first looked for counsel under these conditions--
Baird-Smith, of the Bengal Engineers--proved himself worthy of the
high and responsible position in which he was placed. He too was ill.
Naturally of a delicate constitution, the climate and exposure had
told upon him severely, and the diseases from which he was suffering
were aggravated by a wound he had received soon after his arrival in
camp. He fully appreciated the tremendous risks which an assault
involved, but, in his opinion, they were less than were those of
delay. Whether convinced or not by his Chief Engineer's arguments,
Wilson accepted his advice and directed him to prepare a plan of
attack.

Baird-Smith was strongly supported by Nicholson, Chamberlain, Daly,
Norman, and Alex. Taylor. They were one and all in communication with
the authorities in the Punjab, and they knew that if 'Delhi were not
taken, and that speedily, there would be a struggle not only for
European dominion, but even for European existence within the Punjab
itself.'[1]

Our position in that province was, indeed, most critical. An
attempted conspiracy of Mahomedan tribes in the Murree Hills, and an
insurrection in the Gogaira district, had occurred. Both these affairs
were simply attempts to throw off the British yoke, made in the belief
that our last hour was come. The feeling that prompted them was not
confined to the Mahomedans; amongst all classes and races in the
Punjab a spirit of restlessness was on the increase; even the most
loyally disposed were speculating on the chances of our being able to
hold our own, and doubting the advisability of adhering to our cause.
On the part of the Sikhs of the Manjha[2] there was an unwillingness
to enlist, and no good recruits of this class could be obtained until
after Delhi had fallen.

It was under these critical circumstances that a council of war was
convened to decide definitely whether the assault should take place or
not.

Nicholson was not a man of many intimacies, but as his staff officer
I had been fortunate enough to gain his friendship. I was constantly
with him, and on this occasion I was sitting in his tent before he set
out to attend the council. He had been talking to me in confidential
terms of personal matters, and ended by telling me of his intention
to take a very unusual step should the council fail to arrive at any
fixed determination regarding the assault. 'Delhi must be taken,' he
said, 'and it is absolutely essential that this should be done at
once; and if Wilson hesitates longer, I intend to propose at to-day's
meeting that he should be superseded.' I was greatly startled, and
ventured to remark that, as Chamberlain was _hors de combat_ from his
wound, Wilson's removal would leave him, Nicholson, senior officer
with the force. He smiled as he answered: 'I have not overlooked that
fact. I shall make it perfectly clear that, under the circumstances, I
could not possibly accept the command myself, and I shall propose that
it be given to Campbell, of the 52nd; I am prepared to serve under him
for the time being, so no one can ever accuse me of being influenced
by personal motives.'

Happily, Nicholson was not called upon to take so unusual a step. I
walked with him to the Head-Quarters camp, waited in great excitement
until the council of war was over, and, when Nicholson issued from the
General's tent, learnt, to my intense relief, that Wilson had agreed
to the assault.

That Nicholson would have carried out his intention if the council had
come to a different conclusion I have not the slightest doubt, and
I quite believe that his masterful spirit would have effected its
purpose and borne down all opposition. Whether his action would have
been right or wrong is another question, and one on which there is
always sure to be great difference of opinion. At the time it seemed
to me that he was right. The circumstances were so exceptional--Wilson
would have proved himself so manifestly unfit to cope with them had
he decided on further delay--and the consequences of such delay would
have been so calamitous and far-reaching, that even now, after many
years have passed, and after having often thought over Nicholson's
intended action and discussed the subject with other men, I have not
changed my opinion.

In anticipation of an attack on Delhi, preparations had been commenced
early in September, one of the first of these being to form a trench
to the left of the 'Sammy House,' at the end of which a battery was
constructed for four 9-pounders and two 24-pounder howitzers. The
object of this battery was to prevent sorties from the Lahore or Kabul
gates passing round the city wall to annoy our breaching batteries,
and also to assist in keeping down the fire from the Mori bastion.[3]
This battery, moreover, led the enemy to believe that we should attack
them from our right, whereas it had been resolved to push the main
attack from our left, where we could approach nearer to the walls
under cover, and where our flank was completely protected by the
river. The Engineers had also employed themselves in getting ready
10,000 fascines, as many gabions, and 100,000 sand-bags, besides
field-magazines, scaling-ladders, and spare platforms.

On the 7th September Wilson issued an order informing the force that
arrangements for the assault would be commenced at once. He dwelt upon
the hardships and fatigue which had been cheerfully borne by officers
and men, and expressed his hope that they would be rewarded for their
past labours, 'and for a cheerful endurance of still greater fatigue
and exposure.' He reminded the troops of the reasons for the deadly
struggle in which they were engaged, and he called upon all ranks to
co-operate heart and soul in the arduous work now before them.

Ground was broken that evening. Unfortunately Baird-Smith was not able
to personally superintend the construction of the breaching batteries,
but he had in his second-in-command, Alex. Taylor, a thoroughly
practical Engineer, who not only knew how to work himself, but how to
get work out of others. Ever alert and cheerful, he was trusted and
looked up to by all his subordinates, and was of all others the very
man to be placed in charge of such a difficult and dangerous duty.

The first battery, known as No. 1, was traced out in two parts, about
700 yards from the Mori bastion, which the right half, with its five
18-pounders and one 8-inch howitzer, was intended to silence; while
the left half, with its four 24-pounders, was to hold the Kashmir
bastion in check.

All night the Engineers worked at the battery, but although before day
broke it was nearly finished and armed, it was not ready to open fire
until close on sunrise. The enemy did not fail to take advantage of
this chance. They poured in round after round of shot and grape,
causing many casualties. Their fire slackened as our guns were
gradually able to make themselves felt, and by the afternoon it was
silenced. Nothing remained of the Mori bastion but a heap of ruins.
No. 1 battery was commanded by Major James Brind,[4] the bravest of
the brave. It was said of him that he 'never slept'; and Reid (of
'Hindu Rao' fame) wrote of him: 'On all occasions the exertions of
this noble officer were indefatigable. He was always to be found where
his presence was most required; and the example he set to officers and
men was beyond all praise.'

No. 2 battery was next taken in hand. This was erected in front of
Ludlow Castle, and about 500 yards from the Kashmir gate. Like No. 1,
it was formed in two parts, the right half being intended for
seven heavy howitzers and two 18-pounders, and the left for nine
24-pounders, commanded respectively by Majors Kaye and Campbell. All
these guns were intended to breach the Kashmir bastion, where the main
assault was to be made.

Up till this time the enemy had imagined that the attack would be
delivered from our right, and they were quite taken by surprise when,
on the evening of the 8th September, we occupied Ludlow Castle.

Baird-Smith showed his grasp of the situation in attacking from
our left, notwithstanding the greater distance of this part of our
position from the city wall. No counter-attack could be made on that
flank, and the comparatively open ground between the Kashmir and Mori
bastions would assist us in protecting the assaulting columns.

As soon as the enemy discovered their mistake, they did their utmost
to prevent our batteries being constructed; but the Engineers were
not to be deterred. By the morning of the 11th No. 2 battery was
completed, armed, and unmasked, and No. 3 and No. 4 batteries were
marked out in the Kudsiabagh. No. 3, commanded by Major Scott, was
constructed for six 18-pounders, and twelve 5-1/2-inch mortars under
Captain Blunt. Norman in his narrative says: 'The establishment of
Major Scott's battery within 180 yards of the wall, to arm which
heavy guns had to be dragged from the rear under a constant fire of
musketry, was an operation that could rarely have been equalled in
war.' During the first night of its construction 89 men were killed
and wounded; but with rare courage the workmen continued their task.
They were merely unarmed pioneers; and with that passive bravery so
characteristic of Natives, as man after man was knocked over, they
would stop a moment, weep a little over a fallen friend, place his
body in a row along with the rest, and then work on as before.[5]

No. 4 battery, armed with ten heavy mortars, and commanded by Major
Tombs, was placed under the shelter of an old building, about half-way
between No. 2 and No. 3 batteries.[6]

I was posted to the left half of No. 2 battery, and had charge of the
two right guns. At eight o'clock on the morning of the 11th September
we opened fire on the Kashmir bastion and the adjoining curtain, and
as the shots told and the stones flew into the air and rattled down,
a loud cheer burst from the Artillerymen and some of the men of
the Carabineers and 9th Lancers who had volunteered to work in the
batteries. The enemy had got our range with wonderful accuracy, and
immediately on the screen in front of the right gun being removed, a
round shot came through the embrasure, knocking two or three of us
over. On regaining my feet, I found that the young Horse Artilleryman
who was serving the vent while I was laying the gun had had his right
arm taken off.

In the evening of the same day, when, wearied with hard work and
exhausted by the great heat, we were taking a short rest, trusting to
the shelter of the battery for protection, a shower of grape came into
us, severely wounding our commander, Campbell, whose place was taken
by Edwin Johnson. We never left the battery until the day of the
assault--the 14th--except to go by turns into Ludlow Castle for our
meals. Night and day the overwhelming fire was continued, and the
incessant boom and roar of guns and mortars, with the ceaseless
rain of shot and shell on the city, warned the mutineers that their
punishment was at hand. We were not, however, allowed to have it all
our own way. Unable to fire a gun from any of the three bastions we
were breaching, the enemy brought guns into the open and enfiladed
our batteries. They sent rockets from their martello towers, and they
maintained a perfect storm of musketry from their advanced trench and
from the city walls. No part of the attack was left unsearched by
their fire, and though three months' incessant practice had made our
men skilful in using any cover they had, our losses were numerous, 327
officers and men being killed and wounded between the 7th and 14th
September.

On the evening of the 13th September Nicholson came to see whether we
gunners had done our work thoroughly enough to warrant the assault
being made the next morning. He was evidently satisfied, for when he
entered our battery he said: 'I must shake hands with you fellows; you
have done your best to make my work easy to-morrow.'

Nicholson was accompanied by Taylor, who had to make certain that
the breaches were practicable, and for this purpose he detailed four
subaltern officers of Engineers to go to the walls as soon as it was
dark, and report upon the condition they were in. Greathed and Home
were told off for the Water bastion breach, and Medley and Lang[7] for
that of the Kashmir bastion. Lang asked to be allowed to go while it
was yet daylight; Taylor agreed, and with an escort of four men of the
60th Rifles he crept to the edge of the cover in the Kudsiabagh, and
then, running up the glacis, sat on top of the counterscarp for a few
seconds studying the ditch and the two breaches. On his return Lang
reported the breaches to be practicable; as, however, it was desirable
to ascertain whether ladders would be necessary, he was sent again
after dark, in company with Medley. They took a ladder and a
measuring-rod with them, and were escorted by an officer and
twenty-four riflemen, of whom all but six were left under cover in the
Kudsiabagh. Lang slipped into the ditch, which he found to be sixteen
feet deep. Medley handed him the ladder and rod, and followed him with
two riflemen, the other four remaining on the crest of the glacis to
cover their retreat. With the help of the ladder they ascended the
berm and measured the height of the wall. Two minutes more, and they
would have reached the top of the breach, but, quiet as they had been,
their movements had attracted attention, and several of the enemy
were heard running towards the breach. The whole party reascended as
rapidly as possible, and, throwing themselves on the grass, waited in
breathless silence, hoping the sepoys would go away, and that they
might be able to make another attempt to reach the top of the breach.
The rebels, however, gave no signs of retiring, and as all needful
information had been obtained, they determined to run for it. A volley
was fired at the party as they dashed across the open, but no one was
hit.

Greathed and Home had been equally successful, and by midnight
Baird-Smith was able to report to General Wilson that both breaches
were practicable.

Baird-Smith urged the importance of attacking without delay. He
pointed out the impossibility of continuing the high pressure at which
nearly every man[8] in the force had been working during the past few
days; that the tension was becoming too severe to last; and that every
hour that passed without assaulting was a loss to us and a gain to the
enemy.

Before Wilson and Baird-Smith separated, orders had been issued for
the attack to be made at daybreak the next morning, the 14th.

It was arranged that there were to be four assaulting columns and one
reserve column.

The first, second and third columns, which were to operate on our
left, were under the command of Brigadier-General Nicholson, who
personally led No. 1 column. It consisted of:

  MEN.
  Her Majesty's 75th Foot                       300
  1st Bengal Fusiliers                          250
  2nd Punjab Infantry                           450
                                              -----
  Total                                       1,000

and was meant to storm the breach near the Kashmir bastion.

[Note: I am indebted to the kindness of Mrs. Barter, the widow of my
gallant friend and comrade. General Richard Barter, C.B., who served
throughout the Mutiny with the 75th Foot, first as Adjutant and
afterwards as Captain, for the above 'Daily State' and for the
following extract from that officer's diary:

'In the evening the order was published for the storming of Delhi a
little before daybreak the next morning, September 14, and we each
of us looked carefully to the reloading of our pistols, filling of
flasks, and getting as good protection as possible for our heads,
which would be exposed so much going up the ladders. I wound two
puggris or turbans round my old forage cap, with the last letter from
the hills [Mrs. Barter was then at Kasauli, in the Himalayas] in the
top, and committed myself to the care of Providence. There was not
much sleep that night in our camp. I dropped off now and then, but
never for long, and whenever I woke I could see that there was a light
in more than one of the officers' tents, and talking was going on in
a low tone amongst the men, the snapping of a lock or springing of a
ramrod sounding far in the still air, telling of preparation for
the coming strife. A little after midnight we fell in as quietly as
possible, and by the light of a lantern the orders for the assault
were then read to the men. They were to the following purport: Any
officer or man who might be wounded was to be left where he fell; no
one was to step from the ranks to help him, as there were no men to
spare. If the assault were successful he would be taken away in the
doolies, or litters, and carried to the rear, or wherever he could
best receive medical assistance. If we failed, wounded and sound
should be prepared to bear the worst. There was to be no plundering,
but all prize taken was to be put into a common stock for fair
division after all was over. No prisoners were to be made, as we
had no one to guard them, and care was to be taken that no women or
children were injured. To this the men answered at once, by "No fear,
sir." The officers now pledged their honours on their swords to abide
by these orders, and the men then promised to follow their example.
At this moment, just as the regiment was about to march off, Father
Bertrand came up in his vestments, and, addressing the Colonel, begged
for permission to bless the regiment, saying: "We may differ some
of us in matters of religion, but the blessing of an old man and a
clergyman can do nothing but good." The Colonel at once assented, and
Father Bertrand, lifting his hands to Heaven, blessed the regiment in
a most impressive manner, offering up at the same time a prayer for
our success and for mercy on the souls of those soon to die.']

No. 2 column, under Brigadier Jones, of Her Majesty's 61st Foot,
consisted of:

  MEN.
  Her Majesty's 8th Foot              250
  2nd Bengal Fusiliers                250
  4th Sikhs                           350
                                      ---
  Total                               850

and was intended for the storming of the breach near the Water
bastion.

No. 3 column, under Colonel Campbell, of Her Majesty's 52nd Light
Infantry, consisted of:

  MEN.
  Her Majesty's 52nd Light Infantry         200
  Kumaon Battalion                          250
  1st Punjab Infantry                       500
                                            ---
  Total                                     950

and was told off to enter the Kashmir gate after it had been blown in.

No. 4 column was to operate on our right. It was commanded by Major
Reid, of the Sirmur battalion, and was composed of that regiment, the
Guides Infantry, and such men from the piquets (European and Native)
as could be spared. Its strength was 860 men, besides 1,200 of the
Kashmir Contingent, and its orders were to attack the suburbs of
Kisenganj and Paharipur, and support the main attack by effecting an
entrance at the Kabul gate.

The Reserve column, under Brigadier Longfield, Her Majesty's 8th Foot,
was told to await the result of the attack, and afford assistance
wherever required. It consisted of:

  MEN.
  Her Majesty's 61st Foot                    250
  4th Punjab Infantry                        450
  Wing Baluch battalion                      300
                                           -----
  Total                                    1,000

with 300 of the Jhind Contingent.

There were besides 200 of the 60th Rifles, who were to cover the
advance of Nicholson's columns, and join the reserve as soon as the
assaults had been carried out.

In order to provide these five columns, in all hardly 5,000 strong,
the services of every man who could bear arms had to be put into
requisition. Piquets were weakened to a dangerous extent, and many of
the sick and wounded who ought to have been in hospital were utilized
for the protection of the camp.


[Footnote 1: Punjab Administration Report, 1857-58.]

[Footnote 2: The tract of country between the Sutlej and Ravi rivers.]

[Footnote 3: Norman's narrative.]

[Footnote 4: The late General Sir James Brind, G.C.B.]

[Footnote 5: 'The Indian Mutiny,' by Forrest.]

[Footnote 6: When his Royal Highness the Prince of Wales was coming to
India in 1875, I obtained permission from Lord Napier of Magdala, who
was then Commander-in-Chief, to erect miniature embrasures to mark
the gun of direction of each of the breaching batteries; and on these
embrasures are recorded the number, armament, and object of the
batteries.]

[Footnote 7: Colonel Arthur Lang is the only one of the four now
alive.]

[Footnote 8: Nearly every man was on duty. The daily state of the
several corps must have been very similar to the following one of the
75th Foot.

   DAILY STATE
   OF
   H.M.'S 75TH REGIMENT

  Camp Delhi, 13th September, 1857.

+--------------------+--------------+------------+----------------+
|                    |   Sergeants. |  Drummers. | Rank and File. |
+--------------------+--------------+------------+----------------+
| Fit to turn out    |       1      |     5      |       37       |
| On duty            |      29      |     6      |      361       |
+--------------------+--------------+------------+----------------+

  (Sd.) E. COURTENAY,
  Sergt.-Major,
  75th Regt.

  True copy,
  (Sd.) R. BARTER, Lieut.-Adj.,
  75th Regiment.]

       *       *       *       *       *




CHAPTER XVIII.
1857

  Delhi stormed--The scene at the Kashmir Gate
  --Bold front by Artillery and Cavalry--Nicholson wounded
  --The last I saw of Nicholson--Wilson wavers--
  Holding on to the walls of Delhi


It was intended, as I have before said, that the assault should be
delivered at break of day, but many of the men belonging to the
regiments of the storming force had been on piquet all night, and it
took some time for them to rejoin their respective corps. A further
delay was caused by our having to destroy the partial repairs to the
breaches which the enemy had succeeded in effecting during the night,
notwithstanding the steady fire we had kept up.

While we were thus engaged, the Infantry were ordered to lie down
under cover. Standing on the crenellated wall which separated Ludlow
Castle from the road, I saw Nicholson at the head of his column, and
wondered what was passing through his mind. Was he thinking of the
future, or of the wonderful part he had played during the past four
months? At Peshawar he had been Edwardes's right hand. At the head
of the Movable Column he had been mainly instrumental in keeping the
Punjab quiet, and at Delhi everyone felt that during the short time
he had been with us he was our guiding star, and that but for his
presence in the camp the assault which he was about to lead would
probably never have come off. He was truly 'a tower of strength.' Any
feeling of reluctance to serve under a Captain of the Company's army,
which had at first been felt by some, had been completely overcome by
his wonderful personality. Each man in the force, from the General in
command to the last-joined private soldier, recognized that the man
whom the wild people on the frontier had deified--the man of whom a
little time before Edwardes had said to Lord Canning, 'You may rely
upon this, that if ever there is a desperate deed to be done in India,
John Nicholson is the man to do it'--was one who had proved himself
beyond all doubt capable of grappling with the crisis through which we
were passing--one to follow to the death. Faith in the Commander who
had claimed and been given the post of honour was unbounded, and every
man was prepared 'to do or die' for him.

The sun had risen high in the heavens, when the breaching guns
suddenly ceased, and each soldier felt he had but a brief moment in
which to brace himself for the coming conflict. Nicholson gave the
signal. The 60th Rifles with a loud cheer dashed to the front in
skirmishing order, while at the same moment the heads of the first and
second columns appeared from the Kudsiabagh and moved steadily towards
the breaches.

No sooner were the front ranks seen by the rebels than a storm of
bullets met them from every side, and officers and men fell thick on
the crest of the glacis. Then, for a few seconds, amidst a blaze of
musketry, the soldiers stood at the edge of the ditch, for only one or
two of the ladders had come up, the rest having been dropped by their
killed or wounded carriers. Dark figures crowded on the breach,
hurling stones upon our men and daring them to come on. More ladders
were brought up, they were thrown into the ditch, and our men, leaping
into it, raised them against the escarp on the other side. Nicholson,
at the head of a part of his column, was the first to ascend the
breach in the curtain. The remainder of his troops diverged a little
to the right to escalade the breach in the Kashmir bastion. Here
Lieutenants Barter and Fitzgerald, of the 75th Foot, were the first to
mount, and here the latter fell mortally wounded. The breaches were
quickly filled with dead and dying, but the rebels were hurled back,
and the ramparts which had so long resisted us were our own.

The breach at the Water bastion was carried by No. 2 column. No sooner
was its head seen emerging from the cover of the old Custom-house than
it was met by a terrible discharge of musketry. Both the Engineer
officers (Greathed and Hovenden) who were leading it fell severely
wounded, and of the thirty-nine men who carried the ladders
twenty-nine were killed or wounded in as many seconds. The ladders
were immediately seized by their comrades, who, after one or two vain
attempts, succeeded in placing them against the escarp. Then, amidst
a shower of stones and bullets, the soldiers ascended, rushed the
breach, and, slaying all before them, drove the rebels from the walls.

No. 3 column had in the meanwhile advanced towards the Kashmir gate
and halted. Lieutenants Home and Salkeld, with eight Sappers and
Miners and a bugler of the 52nd Foot, went forward to blow the gate
open. The enemy were apparently so astounded at the audacity of
this proceeding that for a minute or two they offered but slight
resistance. They soon, however, discovered how small the party was and
the object for which it had come, and forthwith opened a deadly fire
upon the gallant little band from the top of the gateway, from the
city wall, and through the open wicket.

The bridge over the ditch in front of the gateway had been destroyed,
and it was with some difficulty that the single beam which remained
could be crossed. Home with the men carrying the powder-bags got
over first. As the bags were being attached to the gate, Sergeant
Carmichael was killed and Havildar Madhoo wounded; the rest then
slipped into the ditch to allow the firing party which had come up
under Salkeld to carry out its share of the duty.

While endeavouring to fire the charge, Salkeld, being shot through
the leg and arm, handed the slow-match to Corporal Burgess, who fell
mortally wounded, but not until he had successfully performed his
task.

As soon as the explosion had taken place, Bugler Hawthorne sounded
the regimental call of the 52nd. Meeting with no response, he sounded
twice again. The noise of firing and shouting was so great that
neither the sound of the bugle nor that of the explosion reached the
column, but Campbell, after allowing the firing party what he thought
was sufficient time, gave the order to advance. Captain Crosse, of the
52nd, was the first to reach the gate, followed closely by Corporal
Taylor of his own company, and Captain Synge of the same regiment, who
was Campbell's Brigade-Major. In single file along the narrow plank
they crossed the ditch in which lay the shattered remnant of the
gallant little band; they crept through the wicket, which was the only
part blown in, and found the interior of the gateway blocked by an
18-pounder gun, under which were lying the scorched bodies of two or
three sepoys, who had evidently been killed by the explosion. The rest
of the column followed as rapidly as the precarious crossing would
admit, and when Campbell got inside he found himself face to face with
both Nicholson's and Jones's columns, which, after mounting the three
breaches, poured in a mingled crowd into the open space between the
Kashmir gate and the church.

No. 4 column advanced from the Sabzi Mandi towards Kisenganj and
Paharipur. Reid, the commander, was unfortunately wounded early in the
day. Several other officers were either killed or wounded, and for
a little time a certain amount of confusion existed owing to some
misconception as to whether the command of the column should be
exercised by the senior officer with the regular troops, or by the
political officer with the Kashmir Contingent. The fighting was very
severe. The enemy were in great numbers, and strongly posted on
the banks of the canal--indeed, at one time there appeared to be a
likelihood of their breaking into our weakly-guarded camp or turning
the flank of our storming parties. The guns at Hindu Rao's house,
however, prevented such a catastrophe by pouring shrapnel into the
ranks of the rebels; and just at the critical moment Hope Grant
brought up the Cavalry brigade, which had been covering the assaulting
columns. The Horse Artillery dashed to the front and opened fire upon
the enemy. From the gardens and houses of Kisenganj, only two or three
hundred yards off, the mutineers poured a deadly fire of musketry on
our men, and from the bastion near the Lahore gate showers of grape
caused serious losses amongst them. Owing to the nature of the ground
the Cavalry could not charge. Had they retired the guns would have
been captured, and had the guns been withdrawn the position would have
been lost. For two hours the troopers drawn up in battle array sat
motionless, while their ranks were being cruelly raked. Not a man
wavered. Hope Grant and four of his staff had their horses killed
under them; two of them were wounded, and Hope Grant himself was hit
by a spent shot. In Tombs's troop of Horse Artillery alone, 25 men out
of 50 were wounded, and 17 horses either killed or wounded. The
9th Lancers had 38 casualties amongst the men, and lost 71 horses.
'Nothing daunted,' wrote Hope Grant, 'those gallant soldiers held
their trying position with patient endurance; and on my praising them
for their good behaviour, they declared their readiness to stand the
fire as long as I chose. The behaviour of the Native Cavalry,' he
added, 'was also admirable. Nothing could be steadier; nothing could
be more soldierlike than their bearing.'

The bold front shown by the Horse Artillery and Cavalry enabled No. 4
column to retire in an orderly manner behind Hindu Rao's house, and
also assisted the Kashmir Contingent in its retreat from the Idgah,
where it was defeated with the loss of four guns. The repulse of this
column added considerably to our difficulties by freeing many hundreds
to take part in the fight which was being fiercely carried on within
the city.

Meanwhile the three assaulting columns had made good their lodgment on
the walls. The guns in the Kashmir and Water bastions had been turned
so as to allow of their being used against the foe, and preparations
were made for the next move.

Nicholson's orders were to push his way to the Ajmir gate, by the road
running inside the city wall, and to clear the ramparts and bastions
as he went. Jones was to make for the Kabul gate, and Campbell for the
Jama Masjid.

These three columns reformed inside the Kashmir gate, from which
point the first and second practically became one. Nicholson, being
accidentally separated from his own column for a short time, pushed on
with Campbell's past the church, in the direction of the Jama Masjid,
while the amalgamated column under Jones's leadership took the rampart
route past the Kabul gate (on the top of which Jones had planted a
British flag), capturing as they advanced all the guns they found
on the ramparts, and receiving no check until the Burn bastion was
reached by some of the more adventurous spirits. Here the enemy,
taking heart at seeing but a small number of opponents, made a stand.
They brought up a gun, and, occupying all the buildings on the south
side of the rampart with Infantry, they poured forth such a heavy fire
that a retirement to the Kabul gate had to be effected.

It was at this point that Nicholson rejoined his own column. His
haughty spirit could not brook the idea of a retirement; however
slight the check might be, he knew that it would restore to the rebels
the confidence of which our hitherto successful advance had deprived
them, and, believing that there was nothing that brave men could not
achieve, he determined to make a fresh attempt to seize the Burn
bastion.

The lane which was again to be traversed was about 200 yards long,
with the city wall and rampart on the right, and on the left
flat-roofed houses with parapets, affording convenient shelter for the
enemy's sharp-shooters.

As the troops advanced up this lane the mutineers opened upon them a
heavy and destructive fire. Again and again they were checked, and
again and again they reformed and advanced. It was in this lane that
Major Jacob, the gallant Commander of the 1st Bengal Fusiliers, fell,
mortally wounded. His men wanted to carry him to the rear, but he
would not allow them to remain behind for him, and refused their help,
urging them to press forward against the foe. The officers, leading
far ahead of their men, were shot down one after the other, and the
men, seeing them fall, began to waver. Nicholson, on this, sprang
forward, and called upon the soldiers to follow him. He was instantly
shot through the chest.

A second retirement to the Kabul gate was now inevitable, and there
all that was left of the first and second columns remained for the
night.

Campbell's column, guided by Sir Theophilus Metcalfe, who from his
intimate acquaintance with the city as Magistrate and Collector of
Delhi was able to conduct it by the route least exposed to the enemy's
fire, forced its way to the vicinity of the Jama Masjid, where it
remained for half an hour, hoping that the other columns would come to
its assistance. They, however, as has been shown, had more than enough
to do elsewhere, and Campbell (who was wounded), seeing no chance of
being reinforced, and having no Artillery or powder-bags with which to
blow in the gates of the Jama Masjid, fell back leisurely and in order
on the church, where he touched what was left of the Reserve column,
which had gradually been broken up to meet the demands of the
assaulting force, until the 4th Punjab Infantry alone remained to
represent it.

While what I have just described was taking place, I myself was with
General Wilson. Edwin Johnson and I, being no longer required with the
breaching batteries, had been ordered to return to our staff duties,
and we accordingly joined the General at Ludlow Castle, where he
arrived shortly before the assaulting columns moved from the cover of
the Kudsiabagh.

Wilson watched the assault from the top of the house, and when he was
satisfied that it had proved successful, he rode through the Kashmir
gate to the church, where he remained for the rest of the day.

He was ill and tired out, and as the day wore on and he received
discouraging reports, he became more and more anxious and depressed.
He heard of Reid's failure, and of Reid himself having been severely
wounded; then came the disastrous news that Nicholson had fallen, and
a report (happily false) that Hope Grant and Tombs were both killed.
All this greatly agitated and distressed the General, until at last he
began seriously to consider the advisability of leaving the city and
falling back on the Ridge.

I was ordered to go and find out the truth of these reports, and to
ascertain exactly what had happened to No. 4 column and the Cavalry on
our right.

Just after starting on my errand, while riding through the Kashmir
gate, I observed by the side of the road a doolie, without bearers,
and with evidently a wounded man inside. I dismounted to see if I
could be of any use to the occupant, when I found, to my grief and
consternation, that it was John Nicholson, with death written on his
face. He told me that the bearers had put the doolie down and gone off
to plunder; that he was in great pain, and wished to be taken to the
hospital. He was lying on his back, no wound was visible, and but for
the pallor of his face, always colourless, there was no sign of the
agony he must have been enduring. On my expressing a hope that he was
not seriously wounded, he said: 'I am dying; there is no chance for
me.' The sight of that great man lying helpless and on the point of
death was almost more than I could bear. Other men had daily died
around me, friends and comrades had been killed beside me, but I never
felt as I felt then--to lose Nicholson seemed to me at that moment to
lose everything.

I searched about for the doolie-bearers, who, with other
camp-followers, were busy ransacking the houses and shops in the
neighbourhood, and carrying off everything of the slightest value they
could lay their hands on. Having with difficulty collected four men,
I put them in charge of a sergeant of the 61st Foot. Taking down his
name, I told him who the wounded officer was, and ordered him to go
direct to the field hospital.

That was the last I saw of Nicholson. I found time to ride several
times to the hospital to inquire after him, but I was never allowed to
see him again.

Continuing my ride, I soon came up with Hope Grant's brigade. It had
shortly before been relieved from its perilous and unpleasant position
as a target for the enemy by the timely arrival of the Guides Infantry
and a detachment of the Baluch battalion. I was rejoiced to find Tombs
alive and unhurt, and from him and other officers of my regiment I
learnt the tremendous peppering they had undergone. Hodson was also
there with his newly-raised regiment, some officers of the 9th
Lancers, and Dighton Probyn, Watson, and Younghusband, of the Punjab
Cavalry. Probyn was in great spirits, having fallen temporarily
into the command of his squadron, owing to Charles Nicholson (John
Nicholson's younger brother) having been selected to take Coke's place
with the 1st Punjab Infantry. Probyn retained his command throughout
the campaign, for Charles Nicholson was wounded that very morning
while gallantly leading his regiment. His right arm was being
amputated when his heroic brother was carried mortally wounded into
the same hospital, and laid on the bed next to him.

It seemed so important to acquaint the General without delay that Hope
Grant and Tombs were both alive, that the Cavalry had been relieved
from their exposed position, and that there was no need for further
anxiety about Reid's column, that I galloped back to the church as
quickly as possible.

The news I was able to give for the moment somewhat cheered the
General, but did not altogether dispel his gloomy forebodings; and the
failure of Campbell's column (which just at that juncture returned to
the church), the hopelessness of Nicholson's condition, and, above
all, the heavy list of casualties he received later, appeared to crush
all spirit and energy out of him. His dejection increased, and he
became more than ever convinced that his wisest course was to withdraw
from the city. He would, I think, have carried out this fatal measure,
notwithstanding that every officer on his staff was utterly opposed
to any retrograde movement, had it not been his good fortune to have
beside him a man sufficiently bold and resolute to stimulate his
flagging energies. Baird-Smith's indomitable courage and determined
perseverance were never more conspicuous than at that critical moment,
when, though suffering intense pain from his wound, and weakened by
a wasting disease, he refused to be put upon the sick-list; and on
Wilson appealing to him for advice as to whether he should or should
not hold on to the position we had gained, the short but decisive
answer, 'We _must_ hold on,' was given in such a determined and
uncompromising tone that it put an end to all discussion.

Neville Chamberlain gave similar advice. Although still suffering from
his wound, and only able to move about with difficulty, he had taken
up his position at Hindu Rao's house, from which he exercised, as
far as his physical condition would allow, a general supervision and
control over the events that took place on the right of the Ridge. He
was accompanied by Daly and a very distinguished Native officer of the
Guides, named Khan Sing Rosa, both of whom, like Chamberlain, were
incapacitated by wounds from active duty. From the top of Hindu Rao's
house Chamberlain observed the first successes of the columns, and
their subsequent checks and retirements, and it was while he was there
that he received two notes from General Wilson. In the first, written
after the failure of the attacks on the Jama Masjid and the Lahore
gate, the General asked for the return of the Baluch battalion, which,
at Chamberlain's request, had been sent to reinforce Reid's column,
and in it he expressed the hope that 'we shall be able to hold what
we have got.' In the second note, written at four o'clock in the
afternoon, the General asked whether Chamberlain 'could do anything
from Hindu Rao's house to assist,' adding, 'our numbers are
frightfully reduced, and we have lost so many senior officers that the
men are not under proper control; indeed, I doubt if they could be got
to do anything dashing. I want your advice. If the Hindu Rao's piquet
cannot be moved, I do not think we shall be strong enough to take the
city.' Chamberlain understood General Wilson's second note to imply
that he contemplated withdrawing the troops from the city, and he
framed his reply accordingly. In it he urged the necessity for holding
on to the last; he pointed out the advantages already gained, and the
demoralization thereby inflicted upon the enemy. The dying Nicholson
advocated the same course with almost his latest breath. So angry and
excited was he when he was told of the General's suggestion to retire,
that he exclaimed, 'Thank God I have strength yet to shoot him, if
necessary.' There was no resisting such a consensus of responsible and
reliable opinion, and Wilson gave up all idea of retreating.

During the afternoon of the 14th, Norman, Johnson, and I, at the
General's desire and for his information, visited every position
occupied by our troops within the city walls. In some places there
was great confusion--men without their officers, and officers without
their men--all without instructions, and not knowing what was going on
in their immediate neighbourhood, the inevitable result of the rapid
advance. We did what we could to remedy matters, and were able to
report to Wilson that our troops were holding the wall from the Water
bastion to the Kabul gate in sufficient strength. But this was all the
comfort we could give him. The fact is, too much had been attempted
on that eventful morning. We should have been satisfied with gaining
possession of the Kashmir and Water bastions, and getting a lodgment
within the city walls. This was as much as three such weak columns
should have tried, or been asked to accomplish. No one who was
present on that occasion, and experienced the difficulty, indeed
impossibility, of keeping soldiers in hand while engaged in fighting
along narrow streets and tortuous lanes, would ever again attempt what
was expected of the assaulting columns.

While engaged in this duty we (Norman, Johnson and I) were attacked by
a party of the enemy who had been hiding in considerable numbers in a
side-lane watching for a chance. A fight ensued; we had only a small
guard with us, but, fortunately, the firing was heard by the men of a
near piquet, some of whom came to our help. With their assistance we
drove off the sepoys, but in the scrimmage my poor mare was shot. She
was a very useful animal, and her death was a great loss to me at the
time.

At sunset on the 14th of September only a very small portion of the
walls of Delhi was in our possession. The densely-populated city
remained to be conquered. The magazine, the palace, and the Fort of
Selimgarh, all strongly fortified, were still in the hands of the
enemy. The narrow strip of ground we had gained had been won at severe
loss. Three out of the four officers who commanded the assaulting
columns had been disabled, and 66 officers and 1,104 men had been
killed and wounded.

The night of the 14th was spent by the General and staff in 'Skinner's
house,'[1] close to the church. Rest was badly needed, for almost
everyone in the force, officers and men alike, had been hard at work,
night and day, for a week. That night, luckily, we were allowed to be
at peace, for whether it was that the rebels were as tired as we were,
or that they were busy making preparations for further resistance,
they did not disturb us; and when day broke we were all refreshed and
ready to continue the struggle. At one time, indeed, early in the
evening, the enemy appeared from their movements to be preparing to
attack us, but just at that moment the band of the 4th Punjab Infantry
struck up 'Cheer, Boys, Cheer!' upon which the men of the regiment did
cheer, most lustily, and other regiments caught up and continued the
inspiriting hurrahs, which apparently had the effect of disconcerting
the mutineers and keeping them quiet.


[Footnote 1: The house belonged to the Skinner family, and was
originally built by James Skinner, a Eurasian, who served the Moghul
Emperor with great distinction towards the end of the last century.
When Lord Lake broke up that Mahomedan Prince's power, Skinner entered
the service of the East India Company and rose to the rank of Major.
He was also a C.B. He raised the famous Skinner's Horse, now the 1st
Bengal Cavalry. His father was an officer in one of His Majesty's
regiments of Foot, and after one of Lord Clive's battles married a
Rajput lady of good family, who with her father and mother had been
taken prisoners. Skinner himself married a Mahomedan, so that he had
an interest in the three religions, Christian, Hindu, and Mahomedan,
and on one occasion, when left on the ground severely wounded, he made
a vow that if his life were spared he would build three places of
worship--a church, a temple, and a mosque. He fulfilled his vow, and
a few years later he built the church at Delhi, and the temple and
mosque which are in close proximity to it.]

       *       *       *       *       *




CHAPTER XIX.
1857

  Capture of the Burn bastion--The 60th Rifles storm the palace
  --Hodson captures the King of Delhi--Nicholson's death
  --Gallantry of the troops--Praise from Lord Canning


On the morning of the 15th the situation was reviewed, and
preparations made for the conquest of the city. Order was restored
amongst the troops, who, as I have shown, had become somewhat
demoralized by the street fighting. Regiments and brigades were got
together; raids were made on all the store shops within reach, and
every bottle of beer and spirits was broken.[1] Some of the liquor
would doubtless have been of great use in the hospitals, but there was
no means of removing it, and the General wisely determined that it was
best to put temptation out of the men's way. Guns and mortars were
placed into position for shelling the city and palace, and a few
houses near, where the enemy's sharpshooters had established
themselves, were seized and occupied. We soon, however, gave up
attacking such positions, for we found that street fighting could not
be continued without the loss of more men than we had to spare, and
that the wisest plan would be to keep the soldiers under cover as much
as possible while we sapped from house to house. A battery commanding
Selimgarh and part of the palace was constructed in the college
gardens, and a breach was made in the wall of the magazine, which was
captured the next morning with but slight loss.

On the 16th, and again on the 18th, Chamberlain took command of the
troops inside the city while the General rested for a few hours. He
was, as he expressed himself in a note to Chamberlain, 'completely
done.'

The enemy now began to draw in their line. The suburbs were evacuated,
and riding through the Sabzi Mandi, Kisenganj and Paharipur, we gazed
with wonder at the size and strength of the works raised against us by
the mutineers, in attacking which we had experienced such heavy loss
during the early days of the siege, and from which No. 4 column had
been obliged to retire on the day of the assault.

The smaller the position that had to be defended, the greater became
the numbers concentrated in our immediate front, and every inch of our
way through the city was stoutly disputed; but the advance, though
slow, was steady, and considering the numbers of the insurgents, and
the use they made at close quarters of their Field Artillery, our
casualties were fewer than could have been expected.

I had been placed under the orders of Taylor, Baird-Smith's
indefatigable Lieutenant, who directed the advance towards the Lahore
gate. We worked through houses, courtyards, and lanes, until on the
afternoon of the 19th we found ourselves in rear of the Burn bastion,
the attempt to take which on the 14th had cost the life of the gallant
Nicholson and so many other brave men. We had with us fifty European
and fifty Native soldiers, the senior officer of the party being
Captain Gordon, of the 75th Foot. A single door separated us from the
lane which led to the Burn bastion. Lang, of the Engineers, burst this
door open, and out dashed the party. Rushing across the lane and up
the ramp, the guard was completely surprised, and the bastion was
seized without our losing a man.

Early the next day we were still sapping our way towards the Lahore
gate, when we suddenly found ourselves in a courtyard in which were
huddled together some forty or fifty _banias_,[2] who were evidently
as much in terror of the sepoys as they were of us. The men of our
party nearly made an end of these unfortunates before their officers
could interfere, for to the troops (Native and European alike) every
man inside the walls of Delhi was looked upon as a rebel, worthy of
death. These people, however, were unarmed, and it did not require
a very practised eye to see that they were inoffensive. We thought,
however, that a good fright would do them no harm, and might possibly
help us, so for a time we allowed them to believe that they were
looked upon as traitors, but eventually told them their lives would
be spared if they would take us in safety to some place from which
we might observe how the Lahore gate was guarded. After considerable
hesitation and consultation amongst themselves they agreed to two of
their party guiding Lang and me, while the rest remained as hostages,
with the understanding that, if we did not return within a given time,
they would be shot.

Our trembling guides conducted us through houses, across courtyards,
and along secluded alleys, without our meeting a living creature,
until we found ourselves in an upper room of a house looking out on
the Chandni Chauk,[3] and within fifty yards of the Lahore gate.

From the window of this room we could see beneath us the sepoys
lounging about, engaged in cleaning their muskets and other
occupations, while some, in a lazy sort of fashion, were acting as
sentries over the gateway and two guns, one of which pointed in the
direction of the Sabzi Mandi, the other down the lane behind the
ramparts leading to the Burn bastion and Kabul gate. I could see from
the number on their caps that these sepoys belonged to the 5th Native
Infantry.

Having satisfied ourselves of the feasibility of taking the Lahore
gate in rear, we retraced our steps.

The two _banias_ behaved well throughout, but were in such a terrible
fright of anything happening to us that they would not allow us to
leave the shelter of one house until they had carefully reconnoitred
the way to the next, and made sure that it was clear of the enemy.
This occasioned so much delay that our friends had almost given us up,
and were on the point of requiring the hostages to pay the penalty for
the supposed treachery of our guides, when we reappeared on the scene.

We then discussed our next move, and it was decided to repeat the
manoeuvre which had been so successful at the Burn bastion. The troops
were brought by the route we had just traversed, and drawn up behind a
gateway next to the house in which we had been concealed. The gate was
burst open, and rushing into the street, we captured the guns, and
killed or put to flight the sepoys whom we had watched from our upper
chamber a short time before, without losing a man ourselves.

This was a great achievement, for we were now in possession of the
main entrance to Delhi, and the street of the city leading direct from
the Lahore gate to the palace and Jama Masjid. We proceeded up this
street, at first cautiously, but on finding it absolutely empty, and
the houses on either side abandoned, we pushed on until we reached
the Delhi Bank. Here there was firing going on, and round shot flying
about from a couple of guns placed just outside the palace. But this
was evidently an expiring effort. The great Mahomedan mosque had just
been occupied by a column under the command of Major James Brind;
while Ensign McQueen,[4] of the 4th Punjab Infantry, with one of his
own men had pluckily reconnoitred up to the chief gateway of the
palace, and reported that there were but few men left in the Moghul
fort.

The honour of storming this last stronghold was appropriately reserved
for the 60th Rifles, the regiment which had been the first to engage
the enemy on the banks of the Hindun, nearly four months before, and
which throughout the siege had so greatly distinguished itself.

Home, of the Engineers, the hero of the Kashmir gate exploit, first
advanced with some Sappers and blew in the outer gate. At this, the
last struggle for the capture of Delhi, I wished to be present, so
attached myself for the occasion to a party of the 60th Rifles, under
the command of Ensign Alfred Heathcote. As soon as the smoke of
the explosion cleared away, the 60th, supported by the 4th Punjab
Infantry, sprang through the gateway; but we did not get far, for
there was a second door beyond, chained and barred, which was with
difficulty forced open, when the whole party rushed in. The recesses
in the long passage which led to the palace buildings were crowded
with wounded men, but there was very little opposition, for only a
few fanatics still held out. One of these--a Mahomedan sepoy in the
uniform of a Grenadier of the 37th Native Infantry--stood quietly
about thirty yards up the passage with his musket on his hip. As we
approached he slowly raised his weapon and fired, sending the bullet
through McQueen's helmet. The brave fellow then advanced at the
charge, and was, of course, shot down. So ended the 20th September, a
day I am never likely to forget.

At sunrise on the 21st a royal salute proclaimed that we were again
masters in Delhi, and that for the second time in the century the
great city had been captured by a British force.

Later in the day General Wilson established his Head-Quarters in the
Dewan-i-khas (the King's private hall of audience), and, as was in
accordance with the fitness of things, the 60th Rifles and the Sirmur
battalion of Gurkhas[5] were the first troops of Her Majesty's army
to garrison the palace of the Moghuls, in which the traitorous and
treacherous massacre of English men, women and children had been
perpetrated.

The importance of securing the principal members of the Royal Family
was pressed upon the General by Chamberlain and Hodson, who both
urged that the victory would be incomplete if the King and his male
relatives were allowed to remain at large. Wilson would not consent
to any force being sent after them, and it was with considerable
reluctance that he agreed to Hodson going on this hazardous duty with
some of his own men only. The last of the Moghul Emperors had taken
refuge in Humayun's tomb, about seven miles from Delhi, where, on the
afternoon of the 21st, he surrendered to Hodson on receiving a promise
from that officer that his own life and the lives of his favourite
wife and her son should be spared. Hodson brought them all into Delhi
and placed them under a European guard in a house in the Chandni
Chauk, thus adding one more to the many valuable services he had
rendered throughout the siege.

I went with many others the next day to see the King; the old man
looked most wretched, and as he evidently disliked intensely being
stared at by Europeans, I quickly took my departure. On my way back I
was rather startled to see the three lifeless bodies of the King's two
sons and grandson lying exposed on the stone platform in front of the
_Kotwali_. On enquiry I learnt that Hodson had gone a second time
to Humayun's tomb that morning with the object of capturing these
Princes, and on the way back to Delhi had shot them with his own
hand--an act which, whether necessary or not, has undoubtedly cast a
blot on his reputation. His own explanation of the circumstance was
that he feared they would be rescued by the mob, who could easily have
overpowered his small escort of 100 sowars, and it certainly would
have been a misfortune had these men escaped. At the time a thirst for
revenge on account of the atrocities committed within the walls of
Delhi was so great that the shooting of the Princes seemed to the
excited feelings of the army but an act of justice; and there were
some men, whose opinions were entitled to the greatest respect, who
considered the safety of the British force would have been endangered
by the escape of the representatives of the house of Taimur, and that
for this reason Hodson's act was justified.

My own feeling on the subject is one of sorrow that such a brilliant
soldier should have laid himself open to so much adverse criticism.
Moreover, I do not think that, under any circumstances, he should
have done the deed himself, or ordered it to be done in that summary
manner, unless there had been evident signs of an attempt at a rescue.

But it must be understood that there was no breach of faith on
Hodson's part, for he steadily refused to give any promise to
the Princes that their lives should be spared; he did, however,
undoubtedly by this act give colour to the accusations of
blood-thirstiness which his detractors were not slow to make.

The news that we had occupied the palace, and were in complete
possession of the city of Delhi, consoled Nicholson on his deathbed.
From the first there was little hope that this valuable life could
be saved. He was taken into hospital in a fainting condition from
internal hemorrhage, and he endured excruciating agony; but, wrote
General Chamberlain, 'throughout those nine days of suffering he bore
himself nobly; not a lament or sigh ever passed his lips.' His every
thought was given to his country, and to the last he materially aided
the military authorities by his clear-sighted, sound, and reliable
advice. His intellect remained unclouded to the end. With his latest
breath he sent messages of tender farewell to his mother, hoping she
would be patient under his loss, and to his oldest and dearest friend,
Herbert Edwardes. After his death some frontier Chiefs and Native
officers of the Multani Horse were permitted to see him, and I was
told that it was touching beyond expression to see these strong men
shed tears as they looked on all that was left of the leader they so
loved and honoured.

       *       *       *       *       *

Thus ended the great siege of Delhi, and to no one could the tidings
of its fall have brought more intense relief and satisfaction than to
the Chief Commissioner of the Punjab. Although in the first instance
Sir John Lawrence certainly under-estimated the strength of the Delhi
defences and the difficulties with which General Anson had to contend,
he fully realized them later, and even at the risk of imperilling the
safety of his own province by denuding it of troops, he provided the
means for the capture of the rebel stronghold, and consequently the
army of Delhi felt they owed him a deep debt of gratitude.

Like Norman when writing his narrative of the siege, I feel I cannot
conclude my brief account of it without paying my small tribute of
praise and admiration to the troops who bore themselves so nobly from
the beginning to the end. Their behaviour throughout was beyond
all praise, their constancy was unwearied, their gallantry most
conspicuous; in thirty-two different fights they were victorious over
long odds, being often exposed to an enemy ten times their number,
who, moreover, had the advantage of ground and superior Artillery;
they fought and worked as if each one felt that on his individual
exertions alone depended the issue of the day; they willingly, nay,
cheerfully, endured such trials as few armies have ever been exposed
to for so long a time. For three months, day after day, and for the
greater part of the day, every man had to be constantly under arms,
exposed to a scorching Indian sun, which was almost as destructive as,
and much harder to bear than, the enemy's never-ceasing fire. They saw
their comrades struck down by cholera, sunstroke, and dysentery, more
dispiriting a thousand times than the daily casualties in action.
They beheld their enemies reinforced while their own numbers rapidly
decreased. Yet they never lost heart, and at last, when it became
evident that no hope of further reinforcements could be entertained,
and that if Delhi were to be taken at all it must be taken at once,
they advanced to the assault with as high a courage and as complete a
confidence in the result, as if they were attacking in the first flush
and exultation of troops at the commencement of a campaign, instead
of being the remnant of a force worn out, by twelve long weeks of
privation and suffering, by hope deferred (which truly 'maketh the
heart sick'), and by weary waiting for the help which never came.
Batteries were thrown up within easy range of the walls, than which
a more heroic piece of work was never performed; and finally, these
gallant few, of whom England should in very truth be everlastingly
proud, stormed in the face of day a strong fortress defended by 30,000
desperate men, provided with everything necessary to defy assault.

The list of killed and wounded bears witness to the gallantry of all
arms of the service. The effective force at Delhi never amounted
to 10,000 men. Of these 992 were killed and 2,845 wounded, besides
hundreds who died of disease and exposure. Where all behaved nobly, it
is difficult to particularize; but it will not, I hope, be considered
invidious if I specially draw my readers' attention to the four corps
most constantly engaged: the 60th Rifles, the Sirmur battalion of
Gurkhas, the Guides, and the 1st Punjab Infantry. Placed in the very
front of the position, they were incessantly under fire, and their
losses in action testify to the nature of the service they performed.
The 60th Rifles left Meerut with 440 of all ranks; a few days before
the assault they received a reinforcement of nearly 200, making a
total of 640; their casualties were 389. The Sirmur battalion began
with 450 men, and were joined by a draft of 90, making a total of 540;
their loss in killed and wounded amounted to 319. The strength of
the Guides when they joined was 550 Cavalry and Infantry, and their
casualties were 303. The 1st Punjab Infantry arrived in Delhi with
3 British officers and 664 Natives of all ranks. Two of the British
officers were killed, and the third severely wounded, and of the
Natives, 8 officers[6] and 200 men were killed and wounded; while out
of the British officers attached to the regiment during the siege 1
was killed and 4 wounded. Further, it is a great pleasure to me to
dwell on the splendid service done by the Artillery and Engineers. The
former, out of their small number, had 365 killed or disabled, and the
latter two-thirds of their officers and 293 of their men. I cannot
more appropriately conclude this chapter than by quoting the words of
Lord Canning, who, as Governor-General of India, wrote as follows in
giving publication to the Delhi despatches: 'In the name of outraged
humanity, in memory of innocent blood ruthlessly shed, and in
acknowledgment of the first signal vengeance inflicted on the foulest
treason, the Governor-General in Council records his gratitude to
Major-General Wilson and the brave army of Delhi. He does so in the
sure conviction that a like tribute awaits them, not in England only,
but wherever within the limits of civilization the news of their
well-earned triumph shall reach.'


[Footnote 1: A report was circulated that a large number of our men
had fallen into the trap laid for them by the Native shopkeepers, and
were disgracefully drunk. I heard that a few men, overcome by heat and
hard work, had given way to temptation, but I did not see a single
drunken man throughout the day of the assault, although, as I have
related, I visited every position held by our troops within the walls
of the city.]

[Footnote 2: Sellers of grain and lenders of money.]

[Footnote 3: 'Silver Bazaar,' the main street of Delhi, in which
were, and still are, situated all the principal jewellers' and
cloth-Merchants' shops.]

[Footnote 4: Now Lieutenant-General Sir John McQueen, K.C.B.]

[Footnote 5: The Gurkhas became such friends with the men of the 1st
Battalion 60th Rifles during the siege--the admiration of brave men
for brave men--that they made a special request to be allowed to wear
the same uniform as their 'brothers' in the Rifles. This was acceded
to, and the 2nd Gurkhas are very proud of the little red line on their
facings.]

[Footnote 6: Amongst the Native officers killed was Subadar Ruttun
Sing, who fell mortally wounded in the glacis. He was a Patiala Sikh,
and had been invalided from the service. As the 1st Punjab Infantry
neared Delhi, Major Coke saw the old man standing in the road with two
swords on. He begged to be taken back into the service, and when Coke
demurred he said: 'What! my old corps going to fight at Delhi without
me! I hope you will let me lead my old Sikh company into action again.
I will break these two swords in your cause.' Coke acceded to the old
man's wish, and throughout the siege of Delhi he displayed the most
splendid courage. At the great attack on the 'Sammy House' on the 1st
and 2nd August, when Lieutenant Travers of his regiment was killed,
Ruttun Sing, amidst a shower of bullets, jumped on to the parapet and
shouted to the enemy, who were storming the piquet: 'If any man wants
to fight, let him come here, and not stand firing like a coward! I
am Ruttun Sing, of Patiala.' He then sprang down among the enemy,
followed by the men of his company, and drove them off with heavy
loss.

On the morning of the assault the regiment had marched down to the
rendezvous at Ludlow Castle, 'left in front.' While waiting for the
Artillery to fire a few final rounds at the breaches, the men sat
down, and, falling in again, were doing so 'right in front.' Ruttun
Sing came up to Lieutenant Charles Nicholson, who was commanding the
regiment, and said: 'We ought to fall in "left in front," thereby
making his own company the leading one in the assault. In a few
minutes more Ruttun Sing was mortally wounded, and Dal Sing, the
Jemadar of his company, a man of as great courage as Ruttun Sing, but
not of the same excitable nature, was killed outright.]

       *       *       *       *       *




CHAPTER XX.
1857

  Necessity for further action--Departure from Delhi
  --Action at Bulandshahr--Lieutenant Home's death--Knights-errant
  --Fight at Aligarh--Appeals from Agra
  --Collapse of the administration--Taken by surprise
  --The fight at Agra--An exciting chase--The Taj Mahal


The fall of Delhi was loudly proclaimed, and the glad tidings spread
like wildfire throughout the length and breadth of India, bringing
intense relief to Europeans everywhere, but more especially to those
in the Punjab, who felt that far too great a strain was being put upon
the loyalty of the people, and that failure at Delhi would probably
mean a rising of the Sikhs and Punjabis. Salutes were fired in
honour of the victory at all the principal stations, but the Native
population of the Punjab could not at first be made to believe that
the Moghul capital, with its hordes of defenders, could have been
captured by the small English army they saw marching through their
province a few months before. Even at that time it seemed all too
small for the task before it, and since then they knew it had dwindled
down to less than half its numbers. It was not, indeed, until they had
ocular demonstration of our success, in the shape of the loot which
some of the Native followers belonging to the besieging force took
back to their homes, that they became convinced of the reality of our
victory.

[Illustration: PLAN TO ILLUSTRATE THE SIEGE OF DELHI, 1857]

Sir John Lawrence being painfully alive to the weakness of our
position in the Punjab, as compared to the great strength of the
Sikhs, on hearing the news of the capture of Delhi, begged General
Wilson to send back at once a British regiment as a practical proof
that our triumph was complete, and that he no longer needed so many
troops. But though the city was in our possession, a great deal
remained to be done before a single soldier could be spared. Above all
things, it was necessary to open up communication with Cawnpore and
Lucknow, in order to ascertain exactly the state of affairs in that
part of the country. We had heard of the failure of Havelock's
attempts to reach Lucknow, and of his having been obliged in the end
to retire to Cawnpore and wait for reinforcements, but we had not been
able to learn whether such reinforcements had reached him, or how long
the beleaguered garrison of Lucknow was likely to hold out.

No time was wasted at Delhi. On the 21st September, the very day
after the palace was occupied, it was decided to despatch a column
to Cawnpore; but, on account of the weakened condition of the whole
force, there was considerable difficulty in detailing the troops
for its composition. The total strength of the corps[1] eventually
selected amounted to 750 British and 1,900 Native soldiers, with
sixteen field-guns.

No officer of note or high rank being available, the command of the
column should have been given to the senior regimental officer serving
with it, viz., Colonel Hope Grant, of the 9th Lancers; but for some
unexplained motive Lieutenant-Colonel Greathed, of the 8th Foot, was
chosen by General Wilson. Captain Bannatyne, of the same regiment, was
appointed his Brigade-Major, and I was sent with the column as Deputy
Assistant-Quartermaster-General. On the fall of Delhi the whole of
the Head-Quarters staff returned to Simla, except Henry Norman, whose
soldierly instincts made him prefer accompanying the column, in order
that he might be ready to join Sir Colin Campbell, the newly-appointed
Commander-in-Chief, who had shortly before arrived in India.

Nicholson's funeral was taking place as we marched out of Delhi, at
daybreak on the morning of the 24th September. It was a matter of
regret to me that I was unable to pay a last tribute of respect to my
loved and honoured friend and Commander by following his body to the
grave, but I could not leave the column. That march through Delhi in
the early morning light was a gruesome proceeding. Our way from the
Lahore gate by the Chandni Chauk led through a veritable city of
the dead; not a sound was to be heard but the falling of our own
footsteps; not a living creature was to be seen. Dead bodies
were strewn about in all directions, in every attitude that the
death-struggle had caused them to assume, and in every stage of
decomposition. We marched in silence, or involuntarily spoke in
whispers, as though fearing to disturb those ghastly remains of
humanity. The sights we encountered were horrible and sickening to the
last degree. Here a dog gnawed at an uncovered limb; there a vulture,
disturbed by our approach from its loathsome meal, but too completely
gorged to fly, fluttered away to a safer distance. In many instances
the positions of the bodies were appallingly life-like. Some lay with
their arms uplifted as if beckoning, and, indeed, the whole scene was
weird and terrible beyond description. Our horses seemed to feel the
horror of it as much as we did, for they shook and snorted in evident
terror. The atmosphere was unimaginably disgusting, laden as it was
with the most noxious and sickening odours.

It is impossible to describe the joy of breathing the pure air of the
open country after such a horrible experience; but we had not escaped
untainted. That night we had several cases of cholera, one of the
victims being Captain Wilde, the Commandant of the 4th Punjab
Infantry. He was sent back to Delhi in a hopeless condition, it was
thought, but he recovered, and did excellent work at the head of his
fine regiment during the latter part of the campaign.

After a march of eleven miles we reached Ghazi-uddin nagar, to find
the place deserted. We halted the next day. The baggage animals were
out of condition after their long rest at Delhi; and it was necessary
to overhaul their loads and get rid of the superfluous kit and plunder
which the followers had brought away with them. We were accompanied
on our march by a few enterprising civilians, who had found their way
into Delhi the day after we took possession of the palace. Amongst
them was Alfred Lyall,[2] a schoolfellow of mine at Eton. He was
on his way to take up the appointment of Assistant-Magistrate at
Bulandshahr, where he was located when the Mutiny broke out. As
we rode along he gave me a most interesting little history of his
personal experiences during the early days of May, from the time when
the first symptoms of the coming storm were felt, until that when the
surrounding country rose _en masse_, and he and those with him had
to seek shelter at Meerut. I should like to repeat his story for the
benefit of my readers, but I refrain, as it would lose so much by my
telling; and I hope that some day Sir Alfred Lyall may be induced to
tell his own story in the picturesque and attractive language which is
so well known and so much appreciated by the reading public.

Early on the morning of the 28th, Norman, Lyall, and I, marching with
Watson's Cavalry, two or three miles in advance of the column, arrived
at cross-roads, one leading to Bulandshahr, the other to Malagarh, a
fort belonging to a Mahomedan of the name of Walidad Khan, who, when
the British rule was in abeyance, assumed authority over the district
in the name of the Emperor of Delhi. We halted, and, having put out
our piquets, lay down and waited for the dawn. From information
obtained by the civil officers with the column, we suspected that
large numbers of mutineers were collected in the neighbourhood.

We were not left long in doubt as to the correctness of our
surmisings, for we were soon rudely awakened by the rattle of shots
exchanged between our vedettes and those of the enemy. Information was
sent back at once to the advance guard and to our Commander, while we
set to work to ascertain the enemy's exact position; this proved to be
at Bulandshahr, and we were within a couple of miles of the main body.

As we advanced the rebel Cavalry fell back, and when we got under fire
of their guns, our Horse Artillery came into action; our Infantry
coming up, found the enemy occupying an extremely strong position, in
the gaol and a walled serai at the entrance to the town, their left
being covered by the enclosed gardens and ruined houses of the
deserted civil station, within which they were collected in
considerable force. From these points they were driven by the 75th
Foot, who, in a most dashing manner, captured two 9-pounder guns,
while a third was taken by the Cavalry. The rebels then began to
retreat, and were followed up by a small body of Cavalry, under
Drysdale,[3] of the 9th Lancers, with whom were Sarel, of the same
regiment, Augustus Anson of the 84th Foot, and myself. We soon became
entangled in narrow streets, but at last found ourselves in a gateway
leading out of the town, which was crowded with bullock-carts, flying
townspeople, and a number of the enemy, some on horseback, some on
foot. There we had hard fighting; Sarel was wounded in the act of
running a sepoy through the body, the forefinger of his right hand
being taken off by a bullet, which then passed through his left arm;
Anson was surrounded by mutineers, and performed prodigies of valour,
for which he was rewarded with the Victoria Cross. I was riding a
Waziri horse, which had belonged to John Nicholson, and as it had been
a great favourite of his, I had commissioned a friend to buy him for
me at the sale of Nicholson's effects. He was naturally impetuous,
and, being now greatly excited by the firing and confusion, plunged
about a good deal. He certainly was not a comfortable mount on that
day, but all the same he saved my life. In the midst of the mêlée I
observed a sepoy taking deliberate aim at me, and tried to get at him,
but the crowd between him and me prevented my reaching him. He fired;
my frightened animal reared, and received in his head the bullet which
was intended for me.[4]

The work fell chiefly on the Cavalry and Horse Artillery. Major Ouvry,
who commanded them, must have been a proud man that day, for they
behaved splendidly. Two of Blunt's guns also, under an old Addiscombe
friend of mine named Cracklow, did excellent service. The 9th Lancers,
under Drysdale, performed wonders; and the three squadrons of Punjab
Cavalry, under their gallant young leaders, Probyn, Watson, and
Younghusband, and the squadron of Hodson's Horse, under Hugh Gough,
showed of what good stuff they were made. Our casualties were 6 men
killed, 6 officers and 35 men wounded. The enemy's loss was 300.
A large quantity of ammunition and baggage fell into our hands,
including many articles plundered from European men and women.

After the fight was over, the column passed through the town, and our
camp was pitched about a mile beyond, on the banks of the Kali Naddi.
The same afternoon Malagarh was reconnoitred, but was found to be
deserted, a satisfactory result of the morning's action, for the fort,
if defended, would have given us some trouble to take. Walidad Khan
evidently hoped to become a power in the district, for he had begun to
make gun-carriages, and we found roughly-cast guns on the lathes ready
for boring out. It was decided that Malagarh Fort, which was full of
articles of every description taken from the English residents, should
be destroyed. Its demolition, however, took some time to effect, and
as we could not move till transport came from Meerut to convey our
wounded officers and men back to that place, the column halted at
Bulandshahr for four days.

On the afternoon of the 1st October the fort was blown up, and most
unfortunately, while superintending the operation, Lieutenant Home was
killed.[5] The mine had been laid and the slow-match lighted, but the
explosion not following as quickly as was expected, Home thought the
match must have gone out, and went forward again to relight it. At
that moment the mine blew up. His death was greatly felt in camp,
happening as it did when all the excitement of battle was over.

We left Bulandshahr, and said good-bye to Lyall on the 3rd October,
feeling that he was being placed in a position of considerable risk,
thrown as he was on his own resources, with general instructions to
re-establish the authority of the British Government. He was not,
however, molested, and after two or three days he was joined by a
small body of troops from Meerut. During the months that followed
he and his escort had several alarms and some smart skirmishes; for
Rohilkand, a large tract of country to the east of Bulandshahr, was
held by the rebels until the following spring, and Lyall's district
was constantly traversed by bodies of mutinous sepoys.

On the afternoon of the same day we reached Khurja, a fair-sized
Mahomedan town, from which some of our Cavalry soldiers were
recruited. The first thing that met our eyes on arrival at this place
was a skeleton, ostentatiously placed against the side of a bridge
leading to the encamping-ground; it was headless, and the bones were
hacked and broken. It was pronounced by more than one doctor to be the
skeleton of a European woman. This sight maddened the soldiery, who
demanded vengeance, and at one time it seemed that the town of Khurja
would have to pay the penalty for the supposed crime. The whole force
was greatly excited. At length calmer counsels prevailed. The people
of the town protested their innocence, and expressed their anxiety to
be our humble servants; they were, as a whole, given the benefit of
the doubt, but some soldiers found in the town, belonging to regiments
which had mutinied, were tried, and hanged or acquitted according to
the evidence given.

Some excitement was caused on reaching camp by the appearance of a
fakir seated under a tree close to where our tents were pitched. The
man was evidently under a vow of silence, which Hindu devotees often
make as a penance for sin, or to earn a title to more than a fair
share of happiness in a future life. On our addressing him, the fakir
pointed to a small wooden platter, making signs for us to examine it.
The platter had been quite recently used for mixing food in, and
at first there seemed to be nothing unusual about it. On closer
inspection, however, we discovered that a detachable square of wood
had been let in at the bottom, on removing which a hollow became
visible, and in it lay a small folded paper, that proved to be a note
from General Havelock, written in the Greek character, containing
the information that he was on his way to the relief of the Lucknow
garrison, and begging any Commander into whose hands the communication
might fall to push on as fast as possible to his assistance, as he
sorely needed reinforcements, having few men and no carriage to speak
of. This decided Greathed to proceed with as little delay as might be
to Cawnpore.

Just before we left Bulandshahr, a spy reported to me that an English
lady was a prisoner in a village some twenty miles off, and that she
was anxious to be rescued. As on cross-examination, however, the story
did not appear to me to be very reliable, I told the man he must bring
me some proof of the presence of the lady in the village. Accordingly,
on the arrival of the column at Khurja, he appeared with a piece of
paper on which was written 'Miss Martindale.' This necessitated the
matter being inquired into, and I obtained the Brigadier's permission
to make a detour to the village in question. I started off,
accompanied by Watson and Probyn, with their two squadrons of Cavalry.
We timed our march so as to reach our destination just before dawn;
the Cavalry surrounded the village, and with a small escort we three
proceeded up the little street to the house where the guide told us
the lady was confined. Not only was the house empty, but, with the
exception of a few sick and bedridden old people, there was not a
soul in the village. There had evidently been a hasty retreat, which
puzzled me greatly, as I had taken every precaution to ensure secrecy,
for I feared that if our intention to rescue the lady became known she
would be carried off. As day broke we searched the surrounding crops,
and found the villagers and some soldiers hidden amongst them. They
one and all denied that there was the slightest truth in the story,
and as it appeared a waste of time to further prosecute the fruitless
search, we were on the point of starting to rejoin our camp, when
there was a cry from our troopers of '_Mem sahib hai!_' (Here is the
lady), and presently an excessively dusky girl about sixteen years of
age appeared, clad in Native dress. We had some difficulty in getting
the young woman to tell us what had happened; but on assuring her that
no harm should be done to those with whom she was living, she told us
that she was the daughter of a clerk in the Commissioner's office at
Sitapur; that all her family had been killed when the rising took
place at that station, and that she had been carried off by a sowar to
his home. We asked her if she wished to come away with us. After some
hesitation she declined, saying the sowar had married her (after the
Mahomedan fashion), and was kind to her, and she had no friends and
relations to go to. On asking her why she had sent to let us know she
was there, she replied that she thought she would like to join the
British force, which she heard was in the neighbourhood, but on
further reflection she had come to the conclusion it was best for
her to remain where she was. After talking to her for some time, and
making quite sure she was not likely to change her mind, we rode
away, leaving her to her sowar, with whom she was apparently quite
content.[6] I need hardly say we got unmercifully chaffed on our
return to camp, when the result of our expedition leaked out.

At Somna, where we halted for the night, we heard that the Mahomedan
insurgents, the prisoners released from gaol, and the rebel Rajputs of
the neighbourhood, were prepared to resist our advance on Aligarh, and
that they expected to be aided by a large number of mutineers from
Delhi. We came in sight of Aligarh shortly before daybreak on the 5th
October. Our advance was stopped by a motley crowd drawn up before
the walls, shouting, blowing horns, beating drums, and abusing the
Feringhis in the choicest Hindustani; but, so far as we could see,
there were no sepoys amongst them. The Horse Artillery coming up,
these valiant defenders quickly fled inside the city and closed the
gates, leaving two guns in our possession. Thinking we should be sure
to attack and take the place, they rushed through it to the other
side, and made for the open country. But we had had enough of street
fighting at Delhi. Our Cavalry and Artillery were divided into two
parties, which moved round the walls, one to the right and the other
to the left, and united in pursuit of the fugitives at the further
side. We followed them for several miles. Some had concealed
themselves in the high crops, and were discovered by the Cavalry on
their return march to camp. Ouvry formed a long line, and one by one
the rebels, starting up as the troopers rode through the fields, were
killed, while our loss was trifling.

The inhabitants of Aligarh had apparently had a bad time of it under
the rebel rule, for they expressed much joy at the result of the
morning's work, and were eager in their proffers to bring in supplies
for our troops and to otherwise help us.

Ill as we could afford to weaken our column, it was so necessary
to keep the main line of communication open, and put a stop to the
disorder into which the country had fallen, that it was decided to
leave two companies of Punjabis at Aligarh, as a guard to the young
civilian who was placed in charge of the district.

Fourteen miles from Aligarh on the road to Cawnpore there lived two
Rajputs, twin brothers, who had taken such a prominent part in the
rebellion that a price had been put on their heads, and for the future
peace of the district it was considered necessary to capture them. In
order to surprise them the more completely, it was given out that the
column was to march towards Agra, from which place disquieting news
had been received, while secret orders were issued to proceed towards
Cawnpore. The Cavalry went on in advance, and while it was still dark,
succeeded in surrounding the village of Akrabad, where dwelt the
brothers. In attempting to escape they were both killed, and three
small guns were found in their house loaded and primed, but we had
arrived too suddenly to admit of their being used against us. We
discovered besides a quantity of articles which must have belonged
to European ladies--dresses, books, photographs, and knick-knacks
of every description--which made us feel that the twins had richly
deserved their fate.

We halted on the 7th, and on the 8th marched across country to
Bryjgarh (a prettily situated village under a fortified hill), our
object being to get nearer to Agra, the reports from which place had
been causing us anxiety, and likewise to put ourselves in a position
to intercept the Rohilkand mutineers, who we were told were on their
way to Lucknow.

No sooner had we got to Bryjgarh than we received information that the
detachment we had left behind at Aligarh was not likely to be left
undisturbed, and at the same time an urgent call for assistance came
from Agra, where a combined attack by insurgents from Gwalior, Mhow,
and Delhi was imminent. Fifty of Hodson's Horse, under a European
officer, and a sufficient number of Infantry to make the detachment we
had left there up to 200, were at once despatched to Aligarh. It was
clear, too, that the appeal from Agra must be responded to, for it
was an important place, the capital of the North-West Provinces; the
troops and residents had been shut up in the fort for more than
three months, and the letters, which followed each other in quick
succession, showed that the authorities were considerably alarmed. It
was felt, therefore, that it was imperative upon us to turn our steps
towards Agra, but it entailed our marching forty-eight miles out
of our way, and having to give up for the time any idea of aiding
Havelock in the relief of Lucknow.

The column marched at midnight on the 8th October, the Horse Artillery
and Cavalry, which I accompanied, pushing on as fast as possible. We
had done thirty-six miles, when we were advised from Agra that there
was no need for so much haste, as the enemy, having heard of our
approach, were retiring; we accordingly halted, nothing loath, till
the Infantry came up.

Early the next morning, the 10th October, we reached Agra. Crossing
the Jumna by a bridge of boats, we passed under the walls of the
picturesque old fort built by the Emperor Akbar nearly 300 years
before.

The European residents who had been prisoners within the walls of the
fort for so long streamed out to meet and welcome us, overjoyed at
being free at last. We presented, I am afraid, but a sorry appearance,
as compared to the neatly-dressed ladies and the spick-and-span troops
who greeted us, for one of the fair sex was overheard to remark, 'Was
ever such a dirty-looking lot seen?' Our clothes were, indeed, worn
and soiled, and our faces so bronzed that the white soldiers were
hardly to be distinguished from their Native comrades.

Our questions as to what had become of the enemy, who we had been
informed had disappeared with such unaccountable celerity on hearing
of the advance of the column, were answered by assurances that there
was no need to concern ourselves about them, as they had fled across
the Kari Naddi, a river thirteen miles away, and were in full retreat
towards Gwalior. It was a little difficult to believe in the complete
dispersion of the formidable rebel army, the mere rumoured approach
of which had created such consternation in the minds of the Agra
authorities, and had caused the many urgent messages imploring us to
push on.

Our doubts, however, were met with the smile of superior knowledge.
We were informed that the rebels had found it impossible to get
their guns across to the Agra side of the stream, and that, feeling
themselves powerless without them to resist our column, they had taken
themselves off with the least possible delay. We were asked with
some indignation, 'Had not the whole country round been scoured
by thoroughly trustworthy men without a trace of the enemy being
discovered?' And we were assured that we might take our much-needed
rest in perfect confidence that we were not likely to be disturbed.
We were further told by those who were responsible for the local
Intelligence Department, and who were repeatedly questioned, that they
had no doubt whatever their information was correct, and that there
was no need to follow up the enemy until our troops were rested and
refreshed.

We were then not aware of what soon became painfully apparent, that
neither the information nor the opinions of the heads of the civil
and military administration at Agra were to be relied upon. That
administration had, indeed, completely collapsed; there was no
controlling authority; the crisis had produced no one in any
responsible position who understood the nature of the convulsion
through which we were passing; and endless discussion had resulted (as
must always be the case) in fatal indecision and timidity.

We could hardly have been expected to know that the government of so
great a province was in the hands of men who were utterly unfit to
cope with the difficulties of an emergency such as had now arisen,
although in quieter times they had filled their positions with credit
to themselves and advantage to the State.

That this was the case can be proved beyond a doubt, but I do not give
it as an excuse for our being caught napping by the enemy, which
we certainly were. We ought, of course, to have reconnoitred the
surrounding country for ourselves, and posted our piquets as usual;
and we ought not to have been induced to neglect these essential
military precautions by the confident assertion of the Agra
authorities that the enemy were nowhere in our neighbourhood.

The Brigadier gave orders for our camp to be pitched as soon as the
tents should arrive, but he saw no necessity for posting piquets
until the evening. Accordingly, I marked out the camp on the brigade
parade-ground, which had been selected as best suited for the
purpose--a grassy, level, open spot, a mile and a half from the fort.
On the left and rear were the ruined lines of the two Native Infantry
regiments which had been disarmed and sent to their homes, and the
charred remains of the British officers' houses. To the right and
front there was cultivation, and the high crops, almost ready to be
reaped, shut out the view of the country beyond.

As the tents and baggage could not arrive for some time, I got leave
to go with Norman, Watson, and a few others to breakfast in the fort.
We had scarcely sat down, bent on enjoying such an unusual event as a
meal in ladies' society, when we were startled by the report of a gun,
then another and another. Springing to our feet, there was a general
exclamation of, 'What can it mean? Not the enemy, surely!' But the
enemy it was, as we were soon convinced by our host, who, having gone
to a point from which he could get a view of the surrounding country,
came back in hot haste, to tell us that an action was taking place.

We who belonged to the column hurried down the stairs, jumped on
our horses, and galloped out of the fort and along the road in the
direction of the firing. We had got but half-way to camp, when we were
met and almost borne down by an enormous crowd, consisting of men,
women, and children of every shade of colour, animals and baggage all
mixed up in inextricable confusion. On they rushed, struggling and
yelling as if pursued by demons.

The refugees from the fort, tired of their long imprisonment, had
taken advantage of the security which they thought was assured by the
arrival of the column to visit their deserted homes. Two-thirds of the
150,000 inhabitants of the city had also flocked out to see the troops
who had taken part in the capture of Delhi (the report of which
achievement was still universally disbelieved), to watch our camp
being pitched, and to see what was going on generally. All this varied
crowd, in terror at the first sound of firing, made for the fort and
city, and were met in their flight by the heavy baggage of the
column on its way to camp. Instantly, elephants, camels, led horses,
doolie-bearers carrying the sick and wounded, bullocks yoked to
heavily-laden carts, all becoming panic-stricken, turned round and
joined in the stampede. Elephants, as terrified as their _mahouts_[7],
shuffled along, screaming and trumpeting; drivers twisted the tails
of their long-suffering bullocks with more than usual energy and
heartlessness, in the vain hope of goading them into a gallop; and
camels had their nostrils rent asunder by the men in charge of them,
in their unsuccessful endeavours to urge their phlegmatic animals into
something faster than their ordinary stately pace.

Into this surging multitude we rushed, but for a time our progress was
completely checked. Eventually, however, by dint of blows, threats,
and shouts, we managed to force our way through the motley crowd and
reach the scene of action. What a sight was that we came upon! I seem
to see it now as distinctly as I did then. Independent fights were
going on all over the parade-ground. Here, a couple of Cavalry
soldiers were charging each other. There, the game of bayonet _versus_
sword was being carried on in real earnest. Further on, a party of
the enemy's Cavalry were attacking one of Blunt's guns (which they
succeeded in carrying off a short distance). Just in front, the 75th
Foot (many of the men in their shirt-sleeves) were forming square to
receive a body of the rebel horse. A little to the left of the 75th,
Remmington's troop of Horse Artillery and Bourchier's battery
had opened fire from the park without waiting to put on their
accoutrements, while the horses were being hastily harnessed by the
Native drivers and _saices_. Still further to the left, the 9th
Lancers and Gough's squadron of Hodson's Horse were rapidly saddling
and falling in. On the right the 8th Foot and the 2nd and 4th Punjab
Infantry were busy getting under arms, while beyond, the three
squadrons of Punjab Cavalry, under Probyn and Younghusband, were
hurrying to get on the enemy's flank.

Watson galloped off to take command of the Punjab Cavalry, and Norman
and I rode in different directions to search for the Brigadier. While
thus employed, I was stopped by a dismounted _sowar_, who danced about
in front of me, waving his _pagri_[8] before the eyes of my horse with
one hand, and brandishing his sword with the other. I could not get
the frightened animal near enough to use my sword, and my pistol (a
Deane and Adams revolver), with which I tried to shoot my opponent,
refused to go off, so I felt myself pretty well at his mercy, when, to
my relief, I saw him fall, having been run through the body by a man
of the 9th Lancers who had come to my rescue.

Being unable to find the Brigadier, I attached myself to the next
senior officer, Major Frank Turner, who commanded the Artillery.
Gradually the enemy were beaten off, and the troops formed themselves
up ready for pursuit, or whatever they might be called upon to do. At
this juncture Greathed appeared on the ground.

With less experienced troops the surprise--and a thorough surprise it
was--would in all probability have had serious results. Most of the
men were asleep under the few tents which had already arrived, or such
shelter as could be obtained near at hand, when first one round shot,
then another, came right into their midst from a battery concealed
in the high crops to our right front. At the same time half a dozen
rebels, one of them playing the _nagàra_,[9] rode quietly up to the
Quarter-Guard of the 9th Lancers and cut down the sentry. Being
dressed, like Probyn's men, in red, they were mistaken for them, and
were thus enabled to get close to the guard. This act was quickly
followed by a general rush of the enemy's Cavalry, which brought about
the series of fights that were going on when we appeared on the scene.
The Commander was not to be found; no one knew who was the senior
officer present; consequently each regiment and battery had to act
according to its own discretion. The troops got ready with incredible
rapidity, and set to work to drive the enemy off the ground. The
Artillery replied to the insurgents' guns; the Infantry did what they
could, but were hampered by the fear of doing more injury to their
friends than their foes, and thus the brunt of the work fell upon the
Cavalry. The 9th Lancers made a succession of brilliant charges. One
troop especially distinguished itself by recovering Blunt's captured
gun; the Captain (French) was killed, and the subaltern (Jones),
covered with wounds, was left on the ground for dead. Watson, Probyn,
and Younghusband, with their three squadrons, cleared our right flank,
capturing two guns and some standards; and Hugh Gough, with his
squadron, performed a similar duty on the left.

Probyn greatly distinguished himself on this occasion. In one of the
charges he got separated from his men, and was for a time surrounded
by the enemy, two of whom he slew. In another charge he captured a
standard. For these and numerous acts of gallantry during the Mutiny,
he was, to the great delight of his many friends in the column,
awarded the Victoria Cross.

When Greathed arrived, the order for a general advance was given,
and we were just moving off in pursuit of the rebels, when the
3rd European Regiment and a battery of Field Artillery under
Lieutenant-Colonel Cotton arrived from the fort. This officer, being
senior to our Brigadier, took command of the force, and untimely
delay was caused while he learnt the details of our position. Having
satisfied himself that the enemy must be followed up, he endorsed
Greathed's order, and off we again started.

We soon overtook the retreating foe, who every now and then turned and
made an ineffectual stand. At the end of about four miles we came upon
their camp; it covered a considerable space, and must have taken
a long time to transport and pitch--a circumstance which made the
ignorance on the part of the Agra authorities as to the close
proximity of the enemy appear even more unaccountable than before.

Our Infantry were now pretty well done up; they had been on the move,
with one or two short intervals, for nearly sixty hours, and the 3rd
Europeans were not in trim for a long and hot day's work after such a
lengthened period of inactivity in the fort, and clad, as they were,
in thick scarlet uniform. The enemy, however, could not be allowed to
carry off their guns; so, leaving the Infantry to amuse themselves by
making hay in the rebels' camp, we pushed forward with the Cavalry and
Artillery. It was a most exciting chase. Property of all sorts and
descriptions fell into our hands, and before we reached the Kari Naddi
we had captured thirteen guns, some of them of large calibre, and a
great quantity of ammunition. The enemy's loss on this occasion was
not very great, owing to the extraordinary facility with which Native
troops can break up and disappear, particularly when crops are on the
ground.

While watching a few of the rebel Cavalry making their escape along
the opposite bank of the Kari Naddi, I noticed about a dozen men
belonging to the 2nd and 4th Punjab Infantry quenching their thirst in
the stream. Carried away by excitement, they had managed to keep up
with the pursuit, never thinking of the inevitable trudge back to
Agra, which meant that, by the time they arrived there, they would
have accomplished a march of not less than 70 miles without a halt,
besides having had a severe fight with an enemy greatly superior in
numbers.

Our casualties were slight: 12 officers and men were killed, 54
wounded, and 2 missing, besides some 20 camp-followers killed and
wounded.

There is no doubt that the enemy were almost as much taken by surprise
as we were. They knew that we were on our way from Aligarh, and had
arranged (as we afterwards heard) with the people of the city to
destroy the bridge of boats in time to prevent our crossing. But our
movements were sufficiently rapid to prevent their carrying their
intention into effect; and although the insurgents were informed that
we had actually crossed the river they refused to believe the report,
and, it was said, hanged the man who brought it. Their incredulity was
strengthened by the small dimensions of the ground taken up for our
camp, and the few tents which were pitched, and they made up their
minds that these were only being prepared for the troops belonging
to the Agra garrison, and so anticipated an easy victory. Their
astonishment first became known when they were repulsed by the 75th
Foot, and were heard to say to one another, '_Arrah bhai! ye Diliwhale
hain!_' (I say, brother! these are the fellows from Delhi!).

We halted at Agra on the 11th, 12th, and 13th October, partly to
rest the men and transport animals, but chiefly on account of the
difficulty we had in getting out of the clutches of the North-West
Provinces Government, the local authorities not caring to be left to
their own resources. Our wounded were taken to the fort, and lodged in
the Moti Masjid,[10] which exquisite little building had been turned
into a hospital. The men were well taken care of by the ladies, who
seemed to think they could never do enough for the Delhi column.

I now for the first time saw the lovely Taj Mahal--that beautiful,
world-famed memorial of a man's devotion to a woman, a husband's
undying love for a dead wife. I will not attempt to describe the
indescribable. Neither words nor pencil could give to the most
imaginative reader the slightest idea of the all-satisfying beauty and
purity of this glorious conception. To those who have not already
seen it, I would say: 'Go to India. The Taj alone is well worth the
journey.'


[Footnote 1: Two troops of Horse Artillery, with four guns and one
howitzer each, commanded respectively by Captains Remmington and
Blunt. One Field Battery, with six guns, commanded by Captain
Bourchier. One British Cavalry regiment, the 9th Lancers, reduced to
300 men, commanded by Major Ouvry. Two British Infantry regiments (the
8th and 75th Foot), commanded respectively by Major Hinde and Captain
Gordon, which could only number between them 450 men. Detachments of
three Punjab Cavalry regiments, the 1st, 2nd and 5th, commanded by
Lieutenants John Watson, Dighton Probyn and George Younghusband,
numbering in all 320 men. A detachment of Hodson's Horse, commanded by
Lieutenant Hugh Gough, and consisting of 180 men. Two Punjab Infantry
regiments, commanded by Captains Green and Wilde, each about 600 men;
and 200 Sappers and Miners, with whom were Lieutenants Home and Lang.]

[Footnote 2: Afterwards Sir Alfred Lyall, G.C.I.E., K.C.B.,
Lieutenant-Governor of the North-West Provinces, and now a member of
the Indian Council.]

[Footnote 3: Now General Sir William Drysdale, K.C.B.]

[Footnote 4: The horse, although badly hurt, was not killed, and
eventually did me good service.]

[Footnote 5: This was the Engineer officer who had such a miraculous
escape when he blew in the Kashmir gate at Delhi, for which act of
gallantry he had been promised the Victoria Cross.]

[Footnote 6: A few years afterwards she communicated with the civil
authorities of the district, and made out such a pitiful story of
ill-treatment by her Mahomedan husband, that she was sent to Calcutta,
where some ladies were good enough to look after her.]

[Footnote 7: Men in charge of the elephants.]

[Footnote 8: Turban.]

[Footnote 9: Native kettle-drum.]

[Footnote 10: Pearl Mosque.]

       *       *       *       *       *




CHAPTER XXI.
1857

  Infatuation of the authorities at Agra--A series of Mishaps
  --Result of indecision and incapacity


During our three days' halt at Agra we were told the story of all that
had happened before we came, and a sad story it was of incapacity and
neglected opportunity. The Lieutenant-Governor, an able, intelligent
man under ordinary circumstances, had, unfortunately, no firmness of
character, no self-reliance. Instead of acting on his own convictions,
he allowed himself to be entirely led by men about him, who had not
sufficient knowledge of Natives to enable them to grasp how completely
the latter's attitude towards us had been changed by the loss of our
military hold over the country.[1]

Deaf to warnings from those who did understand the magnitude of the
danger, the Lieutenant-Governor refused to listen to the Maharaja
Scindia, who, influenced by the wise counsels of his astute and
enlightened minister, Dinkar Rao, told him that the whole Native army
was disloyal, and that the men of his own (the Gwalior) Contingent[2]
were as bad as the rest. The authorities refused to allow the ladies
and children at Gwalior to be sent into Agra for safety; they objected
to arrangements being made for accommodating the non-combatants inside
the walls of the fort, because, forsooth, such precautions would show
a want of confidence in the Natives! and the sanction for supplies
being stored in the fort was tardily and hesitatingly accorded. It was
not, indeed, until the mutinous sepoys from Nimach and Nasirabad were
within sixty miles of Agra that orders were given to put the fort in
a state of defence and provision it, and it was not until they had
reached Futtehpore Sikri, twenty-three miles from Agra, that the women
and children were permitted to seek safety within the stronghold.[3]

Fortunately, however, notwithstanding the intermittent manner in which
instructions were issued, there was no scarcity of supplies, for,
owing to the foresight and energy of Lieutenant Henry Chalmers,
the executive Commissariat officer, assisted by that prince of
contractors, Lalla Joti Persâd, and ably supported by Mr. Reade, the
civilian next in rank to the Lieutenant-Governor, food was stored in
sufficient quantities, not only for the garrison, but for all the
refugees from the surrounding districts.[4]

Mr. Drummond, the magistrate of the district, who had from the first
been the chief opponent of precautionary measures for the security of
the residents, had the audacity to set the Lieutenant-Governor's order
for victualling the fort at defiance. He forbad grain or provisions
being sold to the Commissariat contractor, whose duty it was to
collect supplies, and positively imprisoned one man for responding to
the contractor's demands. It was at this official's instigation that
the Native police force was largely increased, instead of being done
away with altogether, as would have been the sensible course; and
as there was an insufficiency of weapons wherewith to arm the
augmentation, a volunteer corps of Christians, lately raised, was
disbanded, and their arms distributed amongst the Mahomedan police. So
far was this infatuated belief in the loyalty of the Natives carried
that it was proposed to disarm the entire Christian population, on the
pretext that their carrying weapons gave offence to the Mahomedans! It
was only on the urgent remonstrance of some of the military officers
that this preposterous scheme was abandoned.[5] The two Native
regiments stationed at Agra were not disarmed until one of the British
officers with them had been killed and another wounded. The gaol,
containing 5,000 prisoners, was left in charge of a Native guard,
although the superintendent, having reliable information that the
sepoys intended to mutiny, begged that it might be replaced by
European soldiers. The Lieutenant-Governor gave his consent to this
wise precaution, but afterwards not only allowed himself to be
persuaded to let the Native guard remain, but authorized the
removal of the European superintendent, on the plea of his being an
alarmist.[6]

On the 4th July Mr. Colvin, the Lieutenant-Governor, whose health had
been very indifferent for some time, was induced, much against his
will, to retire to the fort, and for the time being the management of
affairs passed into the hands of Brigadier Polwhele. There was little
improvement--indecision reigned supreme. Notwithstanding that the
gradual approach of the mutineers from Gwalior and Nasirabad was well
known, no preparations were made, no plan of action decided upon.
Polwhele, who was a brave old soldier, and had seen a great deal of
service, had, indeed, wisely come to the conclusion that the rebels
would never venture to attack a fort like Agra, and that, if left
alone, they would in all probability continue their march towards
Delhi. The available troops numbered less than 1,000 effective men,
and Polwhele felt that, by going out to attack the enemy, there would
be a grave risk of the seat of government falling into the hands of
the disaffected police and city people.

Unfortunately, however, the Brigadier allowed himself to be overruled,
and when the mutineers were reported to have arrived at Shahganj, four
miles from Agra, he gave way to the cry to 'Go out and do something!'
and issued orders for the troops to fall in.

A series of mishaps then occurred. It was one o'clock in the afternoon
of the 5th July before the column[7] was ready to start; the men in
their thick red uniform suffered greatly from the heat and thirst; the
enemy, 9,000 strong, with twelve guns, instead of being at Shahganj,
were found to be strongly entrenched at Sarsia, some distance farther
off. A protracted engagement then took place, and our troops, having
expended all their ammunition, were obliged to retreat, leaving many
dead and a gun on the field.

Meanwhile the city and cantonment were in a state of uproar. The first
gun was the signal for the guard at the gaol to release the 5,000
prisoners, who, as they appeared in the streets, still wearing their
fetters, caused a perfect panic amongst the respectable inhabitants;
while the evil-disposed made for the cantonment, to plunder, burn, and
murder. Some of the residents who had not sought shelter in the fort,
confident that our troops would gain an easy victory, on hearing of
their defeat hurried with all speed to that place of refuge, and for
the most part succeeded in reaching it; but a few were overtaken and
killed by the mob, aided by the trusted police, who had early in the
day broken into open mutiny.[8]

With one or two exceptions the officials, military and civil alike,
were utterly demoralized by all these disastrous occurrences, the
result of their own imbecility. For two days no one was allowed
to leave the fort or approach from the outside. Within was dire
confusion; without, the mob had it all their own way.

Early in August a despatch was received from the Governor-General
acknowledging the receipt of the report on the fight of the 5th July,
and directing that Brigadier Polwhele should be removed from the
command of his brigade. On the 9th September Mr. Colvin died; he
never recovered the shock of the Mutiny. As a Lieutenant-Governor
in peace-time he was considered to have shown great ability in the
management of his province, and he was highly respected for his
uprightness of character. One cannot but feel that it was in a great
measure due to his failing health that, when the time of trial came,
he was unable to accept the responsibility of directing affairs
himself, or to act with the promptitude and decision which were
demanded from all those occupying prominent positions in 1857.

Mr. Reade, the next senior civilian, assumed charge of the government
on Mr. Colvin's death, until orders were received from the Government
of India vesting the supreme authority in a military officer, and
appointing Colonel Hugh Fraser, of the Bengal Engineers, to be Mr.
Colvin's successor with the rank and position of a Chief Commissioner.
Lord Canning was doubtless induced to make this selection in
consequence of the courage and ability Colonel Fraser had displayed
during the Burmese War, and also on account of the sound advice he
had given to the Lieutenant-Governor in the early days of the
outbreak--advice which unfortunately was ignored. Mr. Reade, who had
proved himself worthy of his high position, gave Colonel Fraser
his cordial and unqualified support, but that officer, like his
predecessor, was in bad health, and found it difficult to exercise the
much-needed control. A constant state of panic continued to exist, and
no reliable information could be obtained of what was going on even in
the immediate neighbourhood. The relief afforded by the news of the
fall of Delhi was great, but short-lived, for it was quickly followed
by a report that the whole rebel army had fled from Delhi and was
hastening towards Agra, and that the mutineers from Gwalior and
Central India were advancing to attack the fort. Again all was
confusion. Reports as to the movements of the enemy were never the
same for two days together; at last what appeared to be authentic
intelligence was received: the Gwalior troops were said to be close
at hand, and those urgent appeals for assistance which were sent to
Greathed caused us to turn our steps towards Agra.

Our object having been attained, we were all anxious to depart. The
Chief Commissioner, however, was quite as anxious that we should
remain; firmly believing that the Gwalior troops would reappear, he
suggested that we should follow them up at least as far as Dholpur;
but this proposal Greathed firmly refused to accede to. The orders he
had received were to open up the country[9] between the Jumna and
the Ganges, and he had not forgotten the little note from Havelock
discovered in the fakir's platter.

At last the column was allowed to leave. The evening before our
departure Norman and I called on the Chief Commissioner to say
good-bye. We found Colonel Fraser greatly depressed, and inclined
to take a most gloomy view of the situation, evidently thinking the
restoration of our rule extremely doubtful. His last words to us were,
'We shall never meet again.'[10] He looked extremely ill, and his
state of health probably accounted for his gloomy forebodings. We, on
the contrary, were full of health and hope. Having assisted at the
capture of Delhi, the dispersion of the enemy who had attempted to
oppose us on our way through the Doab, and the troops we were serving
with having recently achieved a decisive victory at Agra over a foe
four times their number, we never doubted that success would attend
us in the future as in the past, and we were now only anxious to
join hands with Havelock, and assist in the relief of the sufferers
besieged in Lucknow.


[Footnote 1: 'They regarded the Mutiny as a military revolt; the rural
disturbances as the work of the mobs. The mass of the people they
considered as thoroughly loyal, attached to our rule as well from
gratitude as from self-interest, being thoroughly conscious of the
benefits it had conferred upon them. Holding these opinions, they did
not comprehend either the nature or the magnitude of the crisis. To
their inability to do so, many lives and much treasure were needlessly
sacrificed.'--'The Indian Mutiny,' Thornhill.]

[Footnote 2: The Gwalior Contingent was raised in 1844, after the
battles of Punniar and Maharajpore, to replace the troops of Maharaja
Scindia ordered to be reduced. It consisted of five batteries of
Artillery, two regiments of Cavalry, and seven regiments of Infantry,
officered by British officers belonging to the Indian Army, and
paid for out of the revenues of districts transferred to British
management.]

[Footnote 3: 'The Indian Mutiny,' Thornhill.]

[Footnote 4: Throughout the campaign the Commissariat Department never
failed: the troops were invariably well supplied, and, even during the
longest marches, fresh bread was issued almost daily.]

[Footnote 5: 'The Indian Mutiny,' Thornhill.]

[Footnote 6: 'The Indian Mutiny,' Thornhill.]

[Footnote 7: It consisted of the 3rd European Regiment, 568 strong,
a battery of Field Artillery, with Native drivers and a few European
Artillerymen, and about 100 mounted Militia and Volunteers, composed
of officers, civilians and others who had taken refuge in Agra.]

[Footnote 8: The police were suspected of having invited the
insurgents who defeated Polwhele to Agra.]

[Footnote 9: Known as the Doab.]

[Footnote 10: Colonel Fraser died within nine months of our leaving
Agra.]

       *       *       *       *       *




CHAPTER XXII.
1857

  Advantage of being a good horseman--News from Lucknow
  --Cawnpore--Heart-rending scenes--Start for Lucknow
  --An exciting Adventure--Arrival of Sir Colin Campbell
  --Plans for the advance


On the 14th October we moved camp to the left bank of the Jumna, where
we were joined by a small party of Artillerymen with two 18-pounder
guns, and some convalescents belonging to the regiments with us, who
had been left behind at Delhi--300 in all. Our camp was pitched in a
pretty garden called the Rambagh, only a short distance from Agra,
where we gave a picnic to the ladies who had been so kind to our
wounded men--a rough sort of entertainment, as may be imagined, but
much enjoyed by the easily-pleased people who had been prisoners for
so long, to whom the mere getting away from the fort for a few hours
was a relief.

On the morning of the 15th we commenced our march towards Mainpuri, a
small station seventy miles from Agra, which we reached on the 18th.
While on our way there, Hope Grant, Colonel of the 9th Lancers,
arrived in camp to take over the command of the column. He had
remained at Delhi when superseded by Greathed, and being naturally
indignant at the treatment he had received, he protested against it,
and succeeded in getting the order appointing Greathed to the command
cancelled.

Had an officer been specially selected on account of his possessing
a more intimate acquaintance with Native soldiers and a longer
experience of India, Hope Grant would no doubt have accepted the
inevitable. But Greathed did not know as much of the country and
Native troops as Hope Grant did; he had seen no service before he
came to Delhi, and while there had no opportunity of showing that he
possessed any particular qualification for command; he certainly did
not exhibit any while in charge of the column, and everyone in the
force was pleased to welcome Hope Grant as its leader.

The Raja of Mainpuri, who had openly joined the rebels, fled the day
before we marched in, leaving behind him several guns and a quantity
of powder. We halted on the 20th, blew up his fort and destroyed the
powder. The European part of the station was in ruins, but a relation
of the Raja had been able to prevent the Government treasury from
being plundered, and he made over to us two and a half lakhs of
rupees.

The civilians of the Mainpuri district were amongst the refugees at
Agra, and took advantage of our escort to return to their station.
We had also been joined by some officers whom the mutiny of their
regiments had left without employment; they were a welcome addition
to our Punjab regiments, as the limited number of British officers
attached to these corps had been considerably reduced by the
constantly recurring casualties. One of these officers was a Captain
Carey, whose story, as he told it to me, of his escape from the
massacre at Cawnpore and his subsequent experiences is, I think, worth
repeating.

In the month of May Carey went into Wheeler's entrenchment with the
rest of the garrison; a few days before the investment, however, Sir
Henry Lawrence sent his Military Secretary, Captain Fletcher Hayes, to
Cawnpore, to report on what course events were taking at that place,
and, if possible, to communicate with Delhi. His escort was the 2nd
Oudh Irregular Cavalry. Hayes had already made Carey's acquaintance,
and, on finding him at Cawnpore, asked him to accompany him to Delhi,
which invitation Carey gladly accepted. When they got close to Bewar,
where the road to Mainpuri branched off, Hayes, wishing to gain
information from the civil authorities as to the state of the country
through which their route to Delhi lay, rode off to the latter place
with Carey, having first ordered the escort to proceed towards Delhi,
and having arranged with the British officers to catch them up at the
end of the next day's march. The following day, as the two friends
approached the encamping ground where they were to overtake the
escort, they beheld the regiment marching steadily along the road
in regular formation; there was nothing to warn them that it had
revolted, for as there were only three British officers with the
corps, whose dress was almost the same as the men's, their absence was
not noticed.

Suddenly, when they had got within two or three hundred yards of the
regiment, the troopers with one accord broke into shouts and yells,
and, brandishing their swords, galloped towards Hayes and Carey,
who, turning their horses, made with all possible speed back towards
Mainpuri. Hayes, who was an indifferent rider, was soon overtaken and
cut to pieces, while Carey, one of the best horsemen in the army,
and beautifully mounted, escaped; the _sowars_ followed him for some
distance, but a wide irrigation cut, which he alone was able to clear,
put an end to the pursuit. Carey reached his destination in safety,
and, with the other Europeans from Mainpuri, sought refuge in the Agra
fort, where he spent the following five months. It was afterwards
ascertained that the three British officers with the escort had been
murdered by the _sowars_ shortly before Hayes and Carey came in sight.

On the 21st October we reached Bewar, the junction of the roads from
Meerut, Agra, Fatehgarh, and Cawnpore, at which point the Brigadier
received a communication from Sir James Outram, written in Greek
character, from the Lucknow Residency, begging that aid might be sent
as soon as possible, as provisions were running short.[1] The note was
rolled up inside a quill, which the Native messenger had cunningly
concealed in the heart of his thick walking-stick. Outram's urgent
summons determined the Brigadier to push on. So the next day we made
a march of twenty-eight miles to Goorsahaigunj, and on the 23rd we
reached Miran-ki-Serai, close to the ruined Hindu city of Kanoj.

The same day I went on as usual with a small escort to reconnoitre,
and had passed through the town, when I was fired upon by a party of
the rebels, consisting of some 300 Cavalry, 500 Infantry, and four
guns, who, having heard of the approach of the column, were trying to
get away before it arrived. Their Cavalry and Infantry were on the
opposite bank of a fairly wide stream, called the Kali Naddi, through
which were being dragged some heavy pieces of cannon. I retired
a short distance, and sent back word to the advance guard, which
hastened to my assistance. A few rounds from our Artillery caused the
enemy to abandon their guns, the Infantry dispersed and disappeared,
the Cavalry fled, and we, crossing the stream, had a smart gallop
after them for about four miles over a fine grassy plain. On we flew,
Probyn's and Watson's squadrons leading the way in parallel lines,
about a mile apart. I was with the latter, and we had a running fight
till we reached the Ganges, into which plunged those of the _sowars_
whom we had not been able to overtake; we reined up, and saw the
unlucky fugitives struggling in the water, men and horses rolling over
each other; they were gradually carried down by the swiftly running
stream, and but a very few reached the opposite bank.

Our casualties were trifling, only some half-dozen men wounded, while
my horse got a gash on his quarter from a sabre. Watson had the
forefinger of his right hand badly cut in an encounter with a young
_sowar_; I chaffed him at allowing himself to be nearly cut down by a
mere boy, upon which he laughingly retorted: 'Well, boy or not, he was
bigger than you.'

It was on this occasion that I first recognized the advantage of
having the carbine slung on the trooper's back while in action,
instead of being carried in the bucket, as is the custom with our
British Cavalry. Several of the enemy's loose horses were going about
with carbines on their saddles, while their dismounted riders were at
an enormous disadvantage in trying to defend themselves from their
mounted adversaries with only their swords. I saw, too, one of
Watson's men saved from a fierce cut across the spine by having his
carbine on his back. More recent experience has quite satisfied me
that this is the only way this weapon should be carried when actual
fighting is going on.

Three more marches brought us to Cawnpore, where we arrived on the
26th October.

We now for the first time heard the miserable 'story of Cawnpore.' We
were told how, owing to Sir Hugh Wheeler's misplaced belief in the
loyalty of the sepoys, with whom he had served for upwards of half a
century, and to the confiding old soldier's trust in the friendship of
the miscreant Nana, and in the latter's ability to defend him until
succour should arrive, he had neglected to take precautionary measures
for laying in supplies or for fortifying the two exposed barracks
which, for some unaccountable reason, had been chosen as a place of
refuge, instead of the easily defensible and well-stored magazine. Our
visit to this scene of suffering and disaster was more harrowing than
it is in the power of words to express; the sights which met our eyes,
and the reflections they gave rise to, were quite maddening, and could
not but increase tenfold the feelings of animosity and desire for
vengeance which the disloyalty and barbarity of the mutineers in other
places had aroused in the hearts of our British soldiers. Tresses of
hair, pieces of ladies' dresses, books crumpled and torn, bits of work
and scraps of music, just as they had been left by the wretched owners
on the fatal morning of the 27th June, when they started for that
terrible walk to the boats provided by the Nana as the bait to induce
them to capitulate.[2] One could not but picture to one's self the
awful suffering those thousand Christian souls of both sexes and
of all ages must have endured during twenty-one days of misery and
anxiety, their numbers hourly diminished by disease, privation, the
terrific rays of a June sun, and the storm of shot, shell, and bullets
which never ceased to be poured into them. When one looked on the
ruined, roofless barracks, with their hastily constructed parapet and
ditch (a mere apology for a defence), one marvelled how 465 men, not
more than half of them soldiers by profession, could have held out
for three long weeks against the thousands of disciplined troops and
hordes of armed retainers whom the Nana was able to bring to the
attack.

It is impossible to describe the feelings with which we looked on the
Sati-Choura Ghat, where was perpetrated the basest of all the Nana's
base acts of perfidy;[3] or the intense sadness and indignation which
overpowered us as we followed the road along which 121 women and
children (many of them well born and delicately nurtured) wended
their weary way, amidst jeers and insults, to meet the terrible fate
awaiting them. After their husbands and protectors had been slain, the
wretched company of widows and orphans were first taken to the Savada
house, and then to the little Native hut, where they were doomed to
live through two more weeks of intensest misery, until at length the
end came, and the last scene in that long drama of foulest treachery
and unequalled brutality was enacted. Our unfortunate countrywomen,
with their little children, as my readers will remember, were murdered
as the sound of Havelock's avenging guns was heard.

We found at Cawnpore some men who had fought their way from Allahabad
with Havelock's force, from whom we heard of the difficulties they had
encountered on their way, and the subsequent hardships the gallant
little force had to endure in its attempts to reach Lucknow. They also
told us that Havelock and Outram, with only 3,179 men of all arms, and
14 guns, had succeeded in forcing their way through that great city
with a loss of 700, but only to be themselves immediately surrounded
by the vast multitude of the enemy, who for three whole months had
vainly endeavoured to overpower the heroic defenders of the Residency.

At Cawnpore there were very few troops. The Head-Quarters of the 64th
Foot, under Colonel Wilson, and some recovered invalids belonging
to regiments which had gone to Lucknow, had held it for more than a
month, within an entrenchment thrown up on the river bank to protect
the bridge of boats. Just before we arrived four companies of the
93rd Highlanders had marched in. It was the first time I had seen a
Highland regiment, and I was duly impressed by their fine physique,
and not a little also by their fine dress. They certainly looked
splendid in their bonnets and kilts--a striking contrast to my
war-worn, travel-stained comrades of the Movable Column. An _avant
courier_ of the Naval Brigade had also come in, sent on by Captain
William Peel, of H.M.S. _Shannon_, to arrange for the rest of the
blue-jackets who were about to arrive--the first naval officer, I
imagine, who had ever been sent on duty so far up the country as
Cawnpore.

Other troops were rapidly being pushed up, and officers who had been
on leave to England were daily arriving, having hurried out to join
their different regiments in various parts of India. Amongst these was
an old friend and brother subaltern of mine, Augustus Otway Mayne,
whom, greatly to my satisfaction, Hope Grant appointed D.A.Q.M.G. to
help me, for there was now more work to be done than I could well get
through.

The day after our arrival at Cawnpore we heard that the new
Commander-in-Chief, Sir Colin Campbell, was to leave Calcutta that
evening to take command of the force with which he hoped to effect the
relief of the Lucknow garrison, and with this news came an order to
Hope Grant from Sir Colin to get into communication with the Alambagh,
a small garden-house not quite two miles from the city of Lucknow,
built by one of the Begums of the ex-King of Oudh, in which the sick
and wounded, tents and spare stores, had been left in charge of a
small detachment, when Outram and Havelock advanced towards the
Residency on the 25th September.

On the 30th October we left Cawnpore, and crossed the Ganges into
Oudh, taking with us the four companies of the 93rd Highlanders, and
the men belonging to Havelock's force, whom I have mentioned as having
been left behind on account of sickness.

On the 31st we were at Bani bridge, more than half-way to the
Alambagh, when a telegram reached the Brigadier directing him to halt
until Sir Colin Campbell (who had got as far as Cawnpore) should
arrive.

Hope Grant did not think the ground we were on well adapted for a
prolonged halt; that afternoon, therefore, I went off with Mayne to
reconnoitre the country for a more suitable place. We fixed upon
an open plain at the village of Bhantira, about three miles nearer
Lucknow. We met with no opposition that day, but the country people
in the neighbourhood had shown marked hostility by killing one or two
soldiers and every camp-follower who had strayed from the main road;
so we were careful to examine Bhantira and all the neighbouring
villages, but were unable to discover the slightest sign of an enemy.

As the next day's march was such a very short one, we did not start
until 7 a.m., instead of before daybreak as usual. Mayne and I rode on
ahead with a couple of _sowars_, and reached the site we had chosen
for the camp without meeting a single suspicious-looking individual.
We then sent back the escort to bring up the camp colour-men, and
while waiting for them, we entered into conversation with some passing
pilgrims, who told us they were on their way to Benares to procure
holy water from the Ganges. Suddenly a bullet whizzed over our heads,
fired from the direction from which we had just come. Looking back,
to our amazement we saw a crowd of armed men at a distance of between
three and four hundred yards, completely cutting us off from the
column. The whole plain was alive with them. When they saw they were
observed, they advanced towards us, shouting and firing. Fortunately
for us, we had made ourselves perfectly acquainted with the country
the previous day, and instantly realized that escape by our right (as
we faced Lucknow) was impossible, because of a huge impassable _jhil_.
There was another _jhil_ to our left front, but at some little
distance off, and our only chance seemed to be in riding hard enough
to get round the enemy's flank before they could get close enough to
this _jhil_ to stop us.

Accordingly, we put spurs to our horses and galloped as fast as they
could carry us to our left; the enemy turned in the same direction,
and made for a village we must pass, and which we could see was
already occupied. The firing got hotter and more uncomfortable as
we neared this village, the walls of which we skirted at our best
possible pace. We cleared the village, and hoped we had distanced the
rebels, when suddenly we came upon a deep _nulla_. Mayne got safely to
the other side, but my horse stumbled and rolled over with me into the
water at the bottom. In the fall my hand was slightly cut by my sword,
which I had drawn, thinking we might have to fight for our lives; the
blood flowed freely, and made the reins so slippery when I tried to
remount, that it was with considerable difficulty I got into the
saddle. The enemy were already at the edge of the _nulla_, and
preparing to fire, so there was no time to be lost. I struggled
through the water and up the opposite bank, and ducking my head to
avoid the shots, now coming thick and fast, galloped straight into
some high cultivation in which Mayne had already sought shelter.
Finally we succeeded in making our way to the main body of the force,
where we found Hope Grant in great anxiety about us, as he had heard
the firing and knew we were ahead. The dear old fellow evinced his
satisfaction at our safe return by shaking each of us heartily by the
hand, repeating over and over again in his quick, quaint way, 'Well,
my boys, well, my boys, very glad to have you back! never thought
to see you again.' The column now moved on, and we found ourselves
opposed to a vast body of men, not soldiers, but country people,
who in those days were all armed warriors, and who spent their time
chiefly in fighting with each other. As we approached the crowd
turned, opened out, and fled in every direction, spreading over the
plain and concealing themselves in the long grass. We gave chase and
killed many, but a large proportion escaped. Favoured by the high
crops, they disappeared with that marvellous celerity with which
Natives can almost instantly become invisible, leaving in our
possession a 9-pounder brass gun. On this occasion we had thirty
killed and wounded.

We could not at the time understand where the men had sprung from
who so suddenly attacked us; but it afterwards transpired that some
powerful _zemindars_[4] in the neighbourhood had collected all the
forces they could get together, and established them after dark in the
very villages we had so carefully examined the previous afternoon and
had found completely deserted, with the intention of falling upon the
column as it passed in the early morning. The unusually late hour at
which the march was made, however, disconcerted their little plan,
and giving up all hope of the force coming that day, they consoled
themselves by trying to get hold of Mayne and myself.

We halted on the 3rd and 4th November. On the 5th, Hope Grant sent
a force to the Alambagh for the purpose of escorting a long line of
carts and camels laden with provisions and ammunition, which the
Commander-in-Chief was desirous of having near at hand, in case the
relief of the Lucknow garrison should prove a more prolonged operation
than he hoped or anticipated it was likely to be.

As we neared the Alambagh the enemy's guns opened on us from our
right, while their Cavalry threatened us on both flanks. They were
easily disposed of, and we deposited the stores, receiving in exchange
a number of sick and wounded who were to be sent back to Cawnpore.

A curious incident happened at the Alambagh. I was employed inside the
enclosure, when all at once I heard a noise and commotion some little
distance off. Getting on to the roof, I looked over the plain, and saw
our troops flying in every direction; there was no firing, no enemy in
sight, but evidently something was wrong; so I mounted my horse and
rode to the scene of confusion, where I found that the ignominious
flight of our troops was caused by infuriated bees which had been
disturbed by an officer of the 9th Lancers thoughtlessly thrusting a
lance into their nest. There were no serious consequences, but the
Highlanders were heard to remark on the unsuitability of their dress
for an encounter with an enemy of that description.

On the 9th November Sir Colin Campbell joined the column, accompanied
by his Chief of the Staff, Brigadier-General Mansfield.[5]

[Illustration: LORDS CLYDE AND SANDHURST.
(SIR COLIN CAMPBELL AND SIR WILLIAM MANSFIELD.)
_From a photograph taken in India._]

The following morning we were surprised to hear that a European from
the Lucknow garrison had arrived in camp. All were keen to see him,
and to hear how it was faring with those who had been shut up in
the Residency for so long; but the new-comer was the bearer of very
important information from Sir James Outram, and to prevent any chance
of its getting about, the Commander-in-Chief kept the messenger, Mr.
Kavanagh, a close prisoner in his own tent.

Outram, being anxious that the officer in command of the relieving
force should not follow the same route taken by himself and Havelock,
and wishing to communicate his ideas more at length than was possible
in a note conveyed as usual by a spy, Kavanagh, a clerk in an office
in Lucknow, pluckily volunteered to carry a letter. It was an offer
which appealed to the heart of the 'Bayard of the East,' as Outram has
been appropriately called, and just such an errand as he himself,
had he been in a less responsible position, would have delighted to
undertake. Outram thoroughly understood the risk of the enterprise,
and placed it clearly before the brave volunteer, who, nothing
daunted, expressed his readiness to start at once, and his confidence
in being able to reach the British camp.

Disguised as a Native, and accompanied by a man of Oudh, on whose
courage and loyalty he was convinced he could rely, Kavanagh left the
Residency after dark on the 9th and got safely across the Gumti. He
and his guide remained in the suburbs mixing with the people until
the streets might be expected to be pretty well empty, when they
re-crossed the river and got safely through the city. They were
accosted more than once on their way, but were saved by the readiness
of the Native, who it had been arranged should answer all inquiries,
though Kavanagh, having been born and bred in the country, could
himself speak the language fluently. On the morning of the 10th they
made themselves known to a piquet of Punjab Cavalry on duty near the
Alambagh.

Outram, profiting by his own experience, wished the relieving column
to be spared having to fight its way through the streets of Lucknow.
This was all the more necessary because the enemy, calculating on our
following the same route as before, had destroyed the bridge over the
canal and made extensive preparations to oppose our advance in that
direction. Outram explained his views most clearly, and sent with his
letter a plan on which the line he proposed we should take was plainly
marked. He recommended that the advance should be made, by the
Dilkusha[6] and Martinière,[7] and that the canal should be crossed
by the bridge nearest the Gumti. Outram showed his military acumen
in suggesting this route, as our right flank would be covered by the
river, and therefore could only be molested by a comparatively distant
fire. Sir Colin, appreciating all the advantages pointed out, readily
accepted and strictly adhered to this plan of advance, except that,
instead of crossing the canal by the bridge, we forded it a little
nearer the river, a wise divergence from Outram's recommendation, and
one which he would assuredly have advised had he been aware that the
canal was fordable at this spot, as it kept us altogether clear of the
streets.

Outram did not touch in his despatch upon any question but the
all-important one of how the junction between his own and the
relieving forces could best be effected. Many other matters, however,
claimed the earnest consideration of the Commander-in-Chief before he
could proceed. He had to determine what was to be done to secure the
safety of the women and children in the Residency, after the first
most pressing duty of relieving the garrison had been accomplished.
Cawnpore was again in great danger from the Gwalior mutineers, who,
foiled at Agra, and finding that the Maharaja Sindhia would not
espouse their cause, had placed themselves under the orders of the
Rani of Jhansi and Tantia Topi, the vile Mahratta whom the Nana made
use of to carry out the massacre of the Sati-Choura Ghat; led by
this man the rebels were seriously threatening Cawnpore, and it was
necessary to take steps for its security. Then again the city of
Lucknow had to be thought of; its capture and the restoration of
British authority were alike essential, but our Chief knew that he
had neither the time nor the means at his disposal to undertake this
important operation at once. He therefore made up his mind that so
soon as the Residency had been relieved he would withdraw altogether
from Lucknow, and place a force at the Cawnpore side of the city, to
form the nucleus of the army with which he hoped later on to take the
place, and to keep open communication with his Head-Quarters, while
he himself should hurry back to Cawnpore, taking with him all the
non-combatants and the sick and wounded.


[Footnote 1: No account of the quantity and description of supplies
stored in the Residency had been kept, or, if kept, it was destroyed
when the Mutiny broke out. Captain James, the energetic Commissariat
officer, on receiving Sir Henry Lawrence's order to provision the
Residency, spent his time riding about the country buying supplies of
all descriptions, which were stored wherever room could be found for
them. James was very severely wounded at the fight at Chinhut, and was
incapacitated the greater part of the siege. It was only by degrees
that some of the supplies were discovered; no one knew how much had
been collected, and no record of the quantities issued from day to
day could be kept. When Outram joined hands with Inglis, his first
question was, 'How much food is there?' Thanks to Sir Henry Lawrence's
foresight, there was an ample supply, not only for the original
garrison, but for the numbers by which it was augmented on the arrival
of the relieving force. Of this, however, Outram must have been
ignorant when he despatched the little note to which I have alluded in
the text.]

[Footnote 2: On the 25th June, after twenty-one days of intense
suffering--with his numbers so reduced as to render further defence
scarcely possible, with starvation staring him in the face, and with
no hope of succour--Sir Hugh Wheeler most reluctantly consented to
capitulate. The first overtures were made by the Nana, who, despairing
of being able to capture the position, and with disaffection in his
own camp, sent the following message to the General: 'All those who
are in no way connected with the acts of Lord Dalhousie, and are
willing to lay down their arms, shall receive a safe passage to
Allahabad.' This missive, which was without signature, was in the
handwriting of Azimula Khan, a Mahomedan who had been employed by the
Nana as his Agent in England, and was addressed, 'To the subjects of
Her Most Gracious Majesty Queen Victoria.' General Wheeler agreed
to give up the fortification, the treasure, and the Artillery, on
condition that each man should be allowed to carry his arms and sixty
rounds of ammunition, that carriages should be provided for the
conveyance of the wounded, the women, and the children, and
that boats, with a sufficiency of flour, should be ready at the
neighbouring _ghat_ (landing-place). The Nana accepted these
conditions, and three officers of the garrison were deputed to go to
the river and see that the boats were properly prepared. They found
about forty boats moored, and apparently ready for departure, and in
their presence a show of putting supplies on board was made.]

[Footnote 3: The Nana never intended that one of the garrison should
leave Cawnpore alive, and during the night of the 26th June he
arranged with Tantia Topi to have soldiers and guns concealed at the
Sati-Choura Ghat to open fire upon the Europeans he had been unable to
conquer as soon as the embarkation had been effected and they could no
longer defend themselves and their helpless companions in misery. The
river was low and the boats were aground, having been purposely drawn
close to the shore. When the last man had stepped on board, at a given
signal the boatmen jumped into the water and waded to the bank. They
had contrived to secrete burning charcoal in the thatch of most of the
boats; this soon blazed up, and as the flames rose and the dry wood
crackled, the troops in ambush on the shore opened fire. Officers and
men tried in vain to push off the boats; three only floated, and of
these two drifted to the opposite side, where sepoys were waiting to
murder the passengers. The third boat floated down the stream, and of
the number on board four eventually escaped--Lieutenants Thomson and
Delafosse, both of the 53rd Native Infantry, Private Murphy of the
84th Foot, and Gunner Sullivan, of the Bengal Artillery. The rest
of the officers and men were killed or drowned, and the women and
children who escaped were carried off as prisoners.]

[Footnote 4: Permanent occupiers of the land, either of the landlord
class, as in Bengal, Oudh, and the North-West Provinces, or of the
yeoman class, as in the Punjab.]

[Footnote 5: Afterwards General Lord Sandhurst, G.C.B., G.C.S.I.]

[Footnote 6: The Dilkusha house was built at the beginning of the
century by a king of Oudh as a hunting-box and country residence, and
close to it he cleared away the jungle and laid out a large park,
which he stocked with herds of deer and other game.]

[Footnote 7: The Martinière was built by Claude Martin, a French
soldier of fortune, who came out to India, under Count de Lally,
in the stirring days of 1757. In 1761 he was taken prisoner by the
English at Pondicherry and sent to Bengal. After the conclusion of
the war he enlisted in the English Army, and on attaining the rank of
Captain he got permission to attach himself to the Court of the King
of Oudh, where he soon obtained supreme influence, and became to all
practical purposes Prime Minister. He remained an officer of the East
India Company's Service, and at the time of his death held the rank
of Major-General. He amassed a large fortune, and by his will founded
colleges at Lucknow, Calcutta, and Lyons, the place of his birth. His
directions that his house at the former place should never be sold,
but should 'serve as a college for educating children and men in
the English language and religion,' were carried out by the British
Government, and Martin lies buried in its vault.]

       *       *       *       *       *




CHAPTER XXIII.
1857

  Sir Colin's preparations--The Alambagh
  --The Dilkusha and Martinière--Mayne's death--A tall-talk story
  --Ammunition required--A night march--The advance on Lucknow
  --Sir Colin wounded--The attack on the Sikandarbagh
  --Heroic deeds--The 4th Punjab Infantry


The next morning, the 11th, I had the honour of making the
Commander-in-Chief's acquaintance. The manner of my introduction was
peculiarly unceremonious. I had left my own tent to be repaired at
Cawnpore, and was sharing one with Norman, who was well known to, and
greatly believed in by, His Excellency, whose Brigade-Major he had
been at Peshawar. Before we were out of bed we heard Sir Colin's
voice outside. He had come to speak to Norman about his plans for
the future, and as the conversation seemed likely to be of a very
confidential nature, and it was too dark for him to see me, I asked
Norman to make my presence known. Sir Colin said to Norman somewhat
roughly, 'Who is he?' and on my name being mentioned, he asked if I
were to be trusted. Norman having vouched for my discretion, the
old Chief was apparently satisfied, and then ensued an intensely
interesting discussion on Outram's letter, Kavanagh's description of
the state of affairs in the Residency, and the manner in which it was
best to carry out Outram's recommendations.

That same afternoon the Commander-in-Chief reviewed the column, which
now amounted to about 600 Cavalry and 3,500 Infantry, with 42 guns.[1]
The parade was under the command of Hope Grant, who had been given the
rank of Brigadier-General, and put in executive command of the whole
force.

Sir Colin spoke a few inspiriting words to each regiment and battery,
being particularly appreciative and complimentary in his remarks to
the Delhi troops, who certainly looked the picture of workmanlike
soldiers; and, considering what they had accomplished, there was
nothing invidious in the Chief's singling them out. The Bengal
Artillery came in for a large share of praise; he had a strong liking
for them, having been with them on service,[2] and seen of what good
stuff they were made. He recognized several old acquaintances amongst
the officers, and freely expressed his satisfaction at having such
reliable batteries to help him in the hazardous operation he was about
to undertake. He was careful also to say a few words of commendation
to the four squadrons of Punjab Cavalry, and the two regiments of
Punjab Infantry, the only Native troops, except the Sappers, with the
column.

That evening orders were issued for a march to the Alambagh the
following morning. It may perhaps seem as if Sir Colin was rather
leisurely in his movements, but he had ascertained that the Lucknow
garrison was in no immediate want of food, as had been reported, and
he was determined to leave nothing undone to ensure the success of the
undertaking. He personally attended to the smallest detail, and he had
to arrange for the transport of the sick and wounded, and the women
and children, shut up in the Residency, numbering in all not less than
fifteen hundred souls.

Everything being ready, we began our march towards Lucknow, one and
all eager to have a share in the rescue of our suffering countrywomen
and their children from a most perilous position, and in relieving
soldiers who had so long and so nobly performed the most harassing
duty, while they cheerfully endured the greatest privations.

We had proceeded but a short distance, when the advance guard was
fired upon by some guns in position on our right, near the old fort of
Jalalabad. An extensive swamp protected the enemy's right flank, while
on their left were a number of water-cuts and broken ground. The
Infantry and Artillery wheeled round and attacked the battery in
front, while Hugh Gough pushed on with his squadron of Cavalry to see
if he could find a way through the apparently impassable swamp to the
enemy's right and rear. Bourchier's battery coming up in the nick of
time, the hostile guns were soon silenced, and Gough, having succeeded
in getting through the _jhil_, made a most plucky charge, in which he
captured two guns and killed a number of the enemy. For his gallant
conduct on this occasion Gough was awarded the Victoria Cross, the
second of two brothers to win this much-coveted distinction.

The next morning Adrian Hope, who commanded a brigade, was ordered to
seize the Jalalabad fort, but finding it evacuated, he blew up one of
the walls, and so rendered it indefensible.

On the afternoon of the 13th I accompanied the Commander-in-Chief in a
reconnaissance towards the Charbagh bridge and the left front of the
Alambagh, a ruse to deceive the enemy as to the real line of our
advance. When riding along he told me, to my infinite pride and
delight, that I was to have the honour of conducting the force to the
Dilkusha. The first thing I did on returning to camp was to find a
good guide. We had only about five miles to go; but it was necessary
to make sure that the direction taken avoided obstacles which might
impede the passage of the Artillery. I was fortunate in finding a
fairly intelligent Native, who, after a great deal of persuasion,
agreed, for a reward, to take me by a track over which guns could
travel. I never let this man out of my sight, and made him show me
enough of the road to convince me he knew the way and meant fair
dealing.

The Alambagh now proved most useful; all our camp equipage was packed
inside the enclosure, for we took no tents with us, and all our spare
stores were left there. A rough description of semaphore, too, was
constructed on the highest point of the building, by means of which we
were able to communicate with the Residency. It was put in Orders that
the troops were to breakfast early the next morning, and that they
were to take three days' rations in their haversacks; while sufficient
for fourteen days was to be carried by the Commissariat.

Just before we started on the 14th November we were strengthened by
the arrival of 200 of the Military Train equipped as Cavalry, two
Madras Horse Artillery guns, and another company of Madras Sappers.

Captain Moir, of the Bengal Artillery, was placed in charge of the
Alambagh, with a garrison consisting of the 75th Foot, 50 of the
regiment of Ferozepore,[3] and a few Artillerymen. The 75th was the
first regiment to move down from the hills when the news of the
outbreak at Meerut reached Head-Quarters; it had done grand service,
had suffered heavily during the siege of Delhi, and had well earned,
and badly needed, a rest. It was now only 300 strong, and had lost in
six months 9 officers, in action and from disease, besides 12 wounded.
The officers were all friends of mine, and I was very sorry to leave
them behind, particularly Barter, the Adjutant, a jolly, good-hearted
Irishman, and an excellent officer.

We marched at 9 a.m., keeping to the south of the Alambagh and the
Jalalabad fort. We then struck across the fields to the ground now
occupied by the Native Cavalry lines, and on to the open space upon
which the present race-course is marked out. On reaching this point
the Dilkusha came in sight about a mile in front. As we approached, a
few shots were fired at us; but the enemy rapidly disappeared as the
Cavalry and Horse Artillery, followed by the Infantry of the advance
guard, in skirmishing order, passed through an opening which had been
hastily made in the wall of the enclosure.

The gallop across the Dilkusha park was quite a pretty sight: deer,
which had been quietly browsing, bounded away on all sides, frightened
by our approach and the rattle of the guns; while the routed sepoys
flew down the grassy slope leading to the Martinière. We reined up for
a few seconds to look at the view which opened out before us. In front
rose the fluted masonry column of the Martinière, 123 feet high;
directly behind, the picturesque building itself, and in the distance
the domes and minarets of the mosques and palaces within the city of
Lucknow; all looked bright and fair in the morning sun.

We could see that the Martinière was occupied; a crowd of sepoys were
collected round the building; and as we showed ourselves on the brow
of the hill, a number of round shot came tumbling in amongst us.

Remmington's troop of Horse Artillery, Bourchier's battery, and a
heavy howitzer brought up by Captain Hardy, now came into action,
and under cover of their fire the 8th Foot and 1st battalion of
Detachments attacked and drove the enemy out of the Martinière, while
the Cavalry pursued them as far as the canal.

On this occasion my friend Watson greatly distinguished himself.
Entirely alone he attacked the enemy's Cavalry, and was at once
engaged with its leader and six of the front men; he fought gallantly,
but the unequal contest could not have lasted much longer had not
Probyn, who, with his own and Watson's squadrons, was only about 300
yards off, become aware of his comrade's critical position, and dashed
to his assistance. For this 'and gallantry on many other occasions,'
Hope Grant recommended Watson for the Victoria Cross, which he duly
received.[4]

By noon on the 14th we had occupied the Dilkusha and Martinière, and
placed our outposts along the right bank of the canal from the river
to the point immediately opposite Banks's house. The left bank was
held in force by the rebels. Early in the afternoon I went with Hope
Grant, accompanied by a small force of Cavalry, to ascertain whether
it would be possible to ford the canal somewhere close to the river,
and we succeeded in finding a place by which the whole force crossed
two days later. Our movements were fortunately not noticed by the
enemy, whose attention was concentrated on the roads leading direct to
the city from the Dilkusha and Martinière, by which they expected our
advance to be made.

Sir Colin, meanwhile, had fixed his Head-Quarters in the Martinière,
on the topmost pinnacle of which he caused a semaphore to be erected
for communication with Outram. From this post of vantage Kavanagh was
able to point out to the Commander-in-Chief the different objects of
most interest to him--the positions taken up by the enemy; the group
of buildings, of which the Chatta Manzil[5] was the most conspicuous,
then occupied by the gallant troops led by Outram and Havelock, who,
by overwhelming numbers alone, had been prevented from carrying their
glorious enterprise to a successful issue; the Residency, where,
thanks to Sir Henry Lawrence's foresight and admirable arrangements,
a handful of heroic Britons had been able to defy the hordes of
disciplined soldiers and armed men who, for nearly three months,
day and night, had never ceased to attack the position; and the
Kaisarbagh, that pretentious, garish palace of the Kings of Oudh, the
centre of every kind of evil and debauchery.

Later in the day the enemy made a determined attack on our centre,
which was checked by Brigadier Little advancing with the 9th Lancers
and some guns. On a few rounds being fired, they retired from the
immediate neighbourhood of the canal, and in the belief that there
would be no further trouble that day, the Cavalry and Artillery
returned to the Martinière; but the guns were hardly unlimbered before
heavy firing was heard from the direction of Banks's house.

I galloped off with Mayne to ascertain the cause. Some little distance
from the canal we separated, Mayne going to the left, I to the right.
I found the piquets hotly engaged, and the officer in command begged
me to get him some assistance. I returned to Hope Grant to report
what was going on, but on the way I met the supports coming up, and
presently they were followed by the remainder of Hope's and Russell's
brigades. Russell had, early in the day, with soldierly instinct,
seized two villages a little above the bridge to the north of Banks's
house; this enabled him to bring a fire to bear upon the enemy as
they advanced, and effectually prevented their turning our left. Hope
opened fire with Remmington's troop, Bourchier's battery, and some of
Peel's 24-pounders, and as soon as he found it had taken effect and
the rebels were shaken, he proceeded to push them across the canal and
finally drove them off with considerable loss.

Hope's and Russell's united action, by which our left flank was
secured, was most timely, for had it been turned, our long line
of camels, laden with ammunition, and the immense string of carts
carrying supplies, would in all probability have been captured. As it
was, the rear guard, under Lieutenant-Colonel Ewart,[6] of the 93rd
Highlanders, had a hot time of it; it was frequently attacked, and its
progress was so slow that it was more than twenty-four hours between
the Alambagh and the Dilkusha.

At the conclusion of the fight I heard, with great grief, that my poor
friend Mayne had been killed, shot through the breast a few seconds
after he had left me. He was seen to turn his horse, and, after going
a short distance, fall to the ground; when picked up he was quite
dead. This was all I could learn. No one was able to tell me where his
body had been taken, and I looked for it myself all that evening in
vain.

At daybreak the next morning, accompanied by Arthur Bunny, the cheery
Adjutant of Horse Artillery, I began my search afresh, and at
length we discovered the body inside a doolie under the wall of the
Martinière. As there was no knowing how soon our services might be
required, we decided to bury the poor fellow at once. I chose a spot
close by for his grave, which was dug with the help of some gunners,
and then Bunny and I, aided by two or three brother officers, laid our
friend in it just as he was, in his blue frock-coat and long boots,
his eyeglass in his eye, as he always carried it. The only thing I
took away was his sword, which I eventually made over to his family.
It was a sad little ceremony. Overhanging the grave was a young tree,
upon which I cut the initials 'A.O.M.'--not very deep, for there was
little time: they were quite distinct, however, and remained so long
enough for the grave to be traced by Mayne's friends, who erected the
stone now to be seen.

The whole of that day (the 15th) was spent in preparing for the
advance. The Dilkusha was turned into a general depot, where the sick
and wounded were placed, also the Ordnance park and stores of every
description. A rough defence was thrown up round the building, and a
garrison was left to protect it, consisting of five Field guns, half
the 9th Lancers, the Military Train, a squadron of Punjab Cavalry, and
the 8th Foot, the whole under the command of Little, the Brigadier of
Cavalry.

In the afternoon Sir Colin made a feint to the left of our position
for the purpose of diverting the attention of the enemy from the
real line of advance. He massed the Artillery in this direction, and
ordered a constant mortar fire to be kept up during the night on the
Begum palace and the barracks. To further strengthen the belief that
operations would be carried on from our left, some of the piquets
on our right were drawn in; this induced the enemy to make a slight
demonstration in that direction. They crossed the canal, but were
speedily driven back by the Madras Horse Artillery guns. They then
opened fire with a 12-pounder howitzer from the west side of the
Gumti, when a really most extraordinary incident happened, which I am
not sure I should have the courage to relate, were it not that Sir
Dighton Probyn and Sir John Watson, who were close by and saw what
took place, are able to vouch for the accuracy of my story.

A shell, fortunately a blind one, from the enemy's howitzer came into
Watson's squadron, which was drawn up under the bank of the Martinière
tank; it struck a trooper's saddle in front, and must have lifted the
man partly out of it, for it passed between his thigh and the horse,
tearing the saddle[7] to shreds, and sending one piece of it high into
the air. The horse was knocked down, but not hurt; the man's thigh was
only badly bruised, and he was able to ride again in a few days. One
of Watson's officers, Captain Cosserat, having examined the man and
horse, came up and reported their condition to Watson, who, of course,
was expecting to be told they were both dead, and added: 'I think we
had better not tell this story in England, for no one would believe
it.' I myself was close to the squadron, and distinctly saw what
happened, [8]

All that day (the 15th) I had been very hard at work, and was greatly
looking forward to what I hoped would be a quiet night, when an
Aide-de-camp appeared, who informed me that the Commander-in-Chief
desired my presence at the Martinière.

On reporting myself to His Excellency, he told me that he was not
satisfied that a sufficient reserve of small-arm ammunition had been
brought with the force, and that the only chance of getting more in
time was to send back to the Alambagh for it that night, adding that
he could neither afford the time nor spare the troops which would be
required, were the business of fetching the additional supply to
be postponed until the following day. Sir Colin then asked me if
I thought I could find my way back to the Alambagh in the dark. I
answered, 'I am sure I can.' I might have hesitated to speak so
confidently had I not taken the precaution of placing the man who
had acted as my guide on the 14th in charge of some Afghan
_chuprassies_[9] attached to the Quartermaster-General's department,
with strict orders not to lose sight of him. I thought, therefore,
I would have him to depend upon if my own memory failed me. The
Commander-in-Chief impressed very strongly upon me the great necessity
for caution, and told me I could take what escort I thought necessary,
but that, whatever happened, I must be back by daybreak, as he had
signalled to Outram that the force would advance on the morrow. Sir
Colin desired that the Ordnance officer, whose fault it was that
sufficient ammunition had not been brought, should go back with me and
be left at the Alambagh.

It was then dusk, and there was no time to be lost. In the first
instance I went to my General, and reporting the orders I had received
from the Commander-in-Chief, consulted him about my escort. Hope Grant
strongly urged my taking with me a troop of the 9th Lancers, as well
as some Native Cavalry, but for a night trip I thought it would be
better to employ Natives only. I knew that my one chance of success
depended on neither being seen nor heard, and Native Cavalry move more
quietly than British, chiefly because their scabbards are of wood,
instead of steel. I felt, too, that if we came across the enemy, which
was not improbable, and got scattered, Natives would run less risk,
and be better able to look after themselves. All this I explained to
the General, but in the kindness of his heart he pressed me to take
the Lancers, telling me he would feel happier about me if I had my own
countrymen with me; but I stuck to my own opinion, and it was arranged
that I was to be accompanied by Younghusband and Hugh Gough, with
their respective squadrons of Native Cavalry. I took leave of my kind
and considerate General, and hurried off first to warn the two Cavalry
officers, then to the Dilkusha to tell Lieutenant Tod Brown, in charge
of the Ordnance depot, that his assistant was to go with me, and
lastly to arrange with the Commissariat officer for camels upon which
to bring back the ammunition.

It was quite dark before I got to the place where my servants had
collected, and where I expected to find my guide. What was my horror
to hear that he had disappeared! He had made his escape in the
confusion consequent on the enemy's attacks the previous afternoon.
What was to be done now? I was in despair--and became more and more
doubtful of my ability to find the Alambagh in the dark. By daylight,
and with the aid of a compass, which I always carried about me, I
should have had little difficulty, even though the country we had to
get over was intersected by ravines and water-courses, not to speak of
the uncompromising _jhil_ near the Jalalabad fort. However, go I must.
I could not possibly tell the Commander-in-Chief that I was unable to
carry out a duty for which he had selected me--there was nothing for
it but to trust to my own recollection of the route and hope for the
best.

Everything having been put in train, I returned to the Artillery
bivouac, managed a hasty dinner, mounted a fresh horse, and, about
9 p.m., started off, accompanied by Younghusband, Hugh Gough, the
unlucky Ordnance officer, two squadrons of Cavalry, and 150 camels.

We got on well enough until we reached the broken ground near the
present Native Cavalry lines, when we lost the road, or rather track,
for road there was none. We could see nothing but the lights of the
enemy's piquets at an uncomfortably short distance to our right. I
struck a match, and made out from the compass the right direction; but
that did not help us to clear the ravines, which, in our efforts to
turn or get through them, made our way appear interminable. At length
we found ourselves upon open ground; but, alas! having edged off too
much to our right we were in close proximity to the enemy's piquets,
and could distinctly hear their voices. We halted to collect the long
string of camels, and as soon as they were got in order started off
again. I led the way, every few minutes striking a light to see how
the compass was pointing, and to take an anxious look at my watch, for
I was beginning to fear I should not be able to accomplish my task by
the given time. Our pace was necessarily slow, and our halts frequent,
for the little party had to be carefully kept together.

At last the Jalalabad fort was reached and passed. I then told Hugh
Gough, whose squadron was in front, that we had better halt, for
we could not be far from the Alambagh, and I was afraid that if we
approached in a body we should be fired upon, in which case the
camel-drivers would assuredly run away, there would be a stampede
amongst the camels, and we might find it difficult to make ourselves
known. I decided it would be best for me to go on alone, and arranged
with Gough that he should remain where he was until I returned.

The Alambagh proved to be farther off than I calculated, and I was
beginning to fear I had lost my way, when all at once a great wall
loomed in front of me, and I could just make out the figure of the
sentry pacing up and down. I hailed him, and ordered him to ask the
sergeant of the guard to summon the officer on duty. When the latter
appeared, I explained to him my object in coming, and begged him to
have the ammunition boxes ready for lading by the time I returned with
the camels. I then rode back to where I had left Gough, and the whole
procession proceeded to the Alambagh.

Already half the night was gone; but beyond the time required for
loading the camels there was no delay; the utmost assistance was
afforded us, and ere long we started on our return journey.

Day had dawned before we came in sight of the Dilkusha, and by the
time I had made the ammunition over to the Ordnance officer it was
broad daylight. As I rode up to the Martinière I could see old Sir
Colin, only partially dressed, standing on the steps in evident
anxiety at my non-arrival.

He was delighted when at last I appeared, expressed himself very
pleased to see me, and, having made many kind and complimentary
remarks as to the success of the little expedition, he told me to go
off and get something to eat as quickly as possible, for we were to
start directly the men had breakfasted. That was a very happy moment
for me, feeling that I had earned my Chief's approbation and justified
his selection of me. I went off to the Artillery camp, and refreshed
the inner man with a steak cut off a gun bullock which had been killed
by a round shot on the 14th.

At 8 a.m. the troops moved off. I was ordered to go with the advance
guard.[10] Hope's and Russell's brigades came next, with Travers's
Heavy battery, Peel's Naval Brigade, and Middleton's Field battery.

Greathed's brigade (except the 8th Foot left at the Dilkusha), with
Bourchier's battery, remained to guard our left flank until mid-day,
when it was ordered to follow the column and form its rear guard.

The offer of a Native who volunteered to guide us was accepted, and
Sir Colin, who rode just behind the advance guard, had Kavanagh with
him, whose local knowledge proved very valuable.

The enemy had been so completely taken in by the previous day's
reconnaissance that they had not the slightest suspicion we should
advance from our right, the result being that we were allowed to cross
the canal without opposition.[11] We kept close along the river bank,
our left being partially concealed by the high grass. About a mile
beyond the canal we turned sharp to the left, and passed through the
narrow street of a small village, coming immediately under fire from
some houses on our right, and from the top of a high wall above and
beyond them, which turned out to be the north-east corner of the
Sikandarbagh.

The greatest confusion ensued, and for a time there was a complete
block. The Cavalry in advance were checked by a fierce fire poured
directly on them from the front: they were powerless, and the only
thing for them to do was to force their way back, down the confined
lane we had just passed up, which by this time was crammed with
Infantry and Artillery, making 'confusion worse confounded.' As soon
as the Cavalry had cleared out, the 53rd lined the bank which ran
along the side of the lane nearest the Sikandarbagh, and by their fire
caused all those of the rebels who had collected outside the walls
to retire within the enclosure. This opened a road for Blunt, who,
leading his guns up the bank with a splendid courage, unlimbered and
opened fire within sixty yards of the building.

Blunt found himself under a heavy fire from three different
directions--on the right from the Sikandarbagh; on the left and left
front from the barracks, some huts (not twenty yards off), and a
serai; and in front from the mess-house, Kaisarbagh, and other
buildings. In these three directions he pointed his guns, regardless
of deadly fire, especially from the huts on the left.

It would, however, have been impossible for the advance guard to have
held its ground much longer, so it was with a feeling of the utmost
relief that I beheld Hope's brigade coming up the lane to our
assistance. A company of the 53rd, in the most brilliant manner,
forced the enemy from the position they held on our left front, and
the Highlanders, without a moment's hesitation, climbed on to the
huts--the point, as I have already said, from which the heaviest fire
proceeded; they tore off the roofs, and, leaping into the houses,
drove the enemy before them right through the serai and up to the
barracks, which they seized, and for the remainder of the operations
these barracks were held by the 93rd.

This action on the part of the Highlanders was as serviceable as it
was heroic, for it silenced the fire most destructive to the attacking
force; but for all that, our position was extremely critical, and Sir
Colin, perceiving the danger, at once decided that no further move
could be attempted until we had gained possession of the Sikandarbagh.
It was, indeed, a formidable-looking place to attack, about 130 yards
square, surrounded by a thick brick wall twenty feet high, carefully
loopholed, and flanked at the corners by circular bastions. There
was only one entrance, a gateway on the south side, protected by
a traverse of earth and masonry, over which was a double-storied
guard-room. Close to the north side of the enclosure was a pavilion
with a flat roof prepared for musketry, and from the whole place an
incessant fire was being kept up.

Sir Colin, in order to get a better view of the position, and thus be
able to decide in what direction the attack could most advantageously
be made, rode up the bank and placed himself close to one of Blunt's
guns. Mansfield and Hope Grant were on either side, and Augustus
Anson and I were directly behind, when I heard the Commander-in-Chief
exclaim, 'I am hit.' Luckily it was only by a spent bullet, which had
passed through a gunner (killing him on the spot) before it struck Sir
Colin on the thigh, causing a severe contusion, but nothing more. It
was a moment of acute anxiety until it was ascertained that no great
damage had been done.

By this time one of Travers's guns and a howitzer, which with
considerable difficulty had been dragged up the bank, opened fire on
the point selected by Sir Colin for the breach--the south-east corner
of the wall surrounding the Sikandarbagh.[12] Instantly Hardy (Captain
of the battery) was killed and the senior Subaltern wounded: Blunt's
charger was shot, and of the few men under his command 14 Europeans
and 6 Gun Lascars were killed or wounded; 20 of the troop-horses were
also knocked over.[13]

While the heavy guns were at work on the breach, Adrian Hope, with the
53rd, cleared off a body of the enemy who had collected on our left
front, and connected the barracks with the main attack by a line of
skirmishers.

In less than half an hour an opening three feet square and three feet
from the ground had been made in the wall. It would have been better
had it been larger, but time was precious; Sir Colin would not wait,
and ordered the assault to begin. The Infantry had been lying down,
under such slight cover as was available, impatiently awaiting for
this order. The moment it reached them, up they sprang with
one accord, and with one voice uttered a shout which must have
foreshadowed defeat to the defenders of the Sikandarbagh. The 93rd
under Lieutenant-Colonel Ewart, and the 4th Punjab Infantry under
Lieutenant Paul, led the way, closely followed by the 53rd under
Lieutenant-Colonel Gordon[14] of the 93rd Highlanders, and one of the
battalions of Detachments under Major Roger Barnston.

It was a magnificent sight, a sight never to be forgotten--that
glorious struggle to be the first to enter the deadly breach, the
prize to the winner of the race being certain death! Highlanders and
Sikhs, Punjabi Mahomedans, Dogras[15] and Pathans, all vied with each
other in the generous competition.[16]

A Highlander was the first to reach the goal, and was shot dead as he
jumped into the enclosure; a man of the 4th Punjab Infantry came next,
and met the same fate. Then followed Captain Burroughs and Lieutenant
Cooper, of the 93rd, and immediately behind them their Colonel
(Ewart), Captain Lumsden, of the 30th Bengal Infantry,[17] and a
number of Sikhs and Highlanders as fast as they could scramble through
the opening. A drummer-boy of the 93rd must have been one of the first
to pass that grim boundary between life and death, for when I got in
I found him just inside the breach, lying on his back quite dead--a
pretty, innocent-looking, fair-haired lad, not more than fourteen
years of age.

The crush now became so great in the men's eagerness to get through
the opening and join the conflict within, that a regular block was the
consequence, which every minute became more hopeless. One party
made for the gateway and another for a barred window[18] close by,
determined to force an entrance by them. The traverse having
been rushed by the 4th Punjab Infantry gallantly led by a Dogra
Subadar,[19] a Punjabi Mahomedan of this distinguished corps behaved
with the most conspicuous bravery. The enemy, having been driven out
of the earthwork, made for the gateway, the heavy doors of which were
in the act of being closed, when the Mahomedan (Mukarrab Khan by name)
pushed his left arm, on which he carried a shield, between them, thus
preventing their being shut; on his hand being badly wounded by a
sword-cut, he drew it out, instantly thrusting in the other arm, when
the right hand was all but severed from the wrist.[20] But he gained
his object--the doors could not be closed, and were soon forced open
altogether, upon which the 4th Punjab Infantry, the 53rd, 93rd, and
some of the Detachments, swarmed in.

This devoted action of Mukarrab Khan I myself witnessed, for, with
Augustus Anson, I got in immediately behind the storming party. As
we reached the gateway, Anson was knocked off his horse by a bullet,
which grazed the base of the skull just behind the right ear, and
stunned him for a moment--the next, he was up and mounted again, but
was hardly in the saddle when his horse was shot dead.

The scene that ensued requires the pen of a Zola to depict. The
rebels, never dreaming that we should stop to attack such a formidable
position, had collected in the Sikandarbagh to the number of upwards
of 2,000, with the intention of falling upon our right flank so soon
as we should become entangled amongst the streets and houses of the
Hazratganj.[21] They were now completely caught in a trap, the only
outlets being by the gateway and the breach, through which our troops
continued to pour. There could therefore be no thought of escape, and
they fought with the desperation of men without hope of mercy, and
determined to sell their lives as dearly as they could. Inch by inch
they were forced back to the pavilion, and into the space between it
and the north wall, where they were all shot or bayoneted. There they
lay in a heap as high as my head, a heaving, surging mass of dead and
dying inextricably entangled. It was a sickening sight, one of those
which even in the excitement of battle and the flush of victory make
one feel strongly what a horrible side there is to war. The wretched
wounded men could not get clear of their dead comrades, however great
their struggles, and those near the top of this ghastly pile of
writhing humanity vented their rage and disappointment on every
British officer who approached by showering upon him abuse of the
grossest description.

The firing and fighting did not cease altogether for some time after
the main body of the rebels were destroyed. A few got up into the
guard-room above the gateway, and tried to barricade themselves in;
others sought shelter in the bastions, but none escaped the vengeance
of the soldiers. There were some deadly combats between the mutinous
sepoys and the Sikhs. Eventually all the rebels were killed, save
three or four who dropped over the wall on the city side. It is to
be hoped they lived to tell the tale of the dauntless courage which
carried everything before it.

Considering the tremendous odds which those who first entered through
the breach were exposed to, and the desperate nature of the fighting,
our losses were astonishingly small. The 93rd had 2 officers and 23
men (including the Sergeant-Major) killed, and 7 officers and 61 men
wounded.

The 4th Punjab Infantry went into action with four British officers,
of whom two were killed and one was severely wounded. Sixty-nine of
the Native officers and men were also killed or wounded.[22]


[Footnote 1: Besides the troops from Delhi, the force consisted of
Peel's Naval Brigade, with eight heavy guns and howitzers; Middleton's
Field Battery of Royal Artillery (the first that had ever served in
India), and two companies of garrison Royal Artillery, under Travers
and Longden, equipped with heavy guns and mortars; a company of Royal
Engineers under Lieutenant Lennox, V.C.;[*] a few Bengal, and two
newly-raised companies of Punjab Sappers; the 93rd Highlanders,
Head-Quarters and wing of the 23rd Royal Welsh Fusiliers, and of
the 53rd Foot; part of the 82nd Foot, and detachments of the 5th
Fusiliers, 64th, 78th, 84th, and 90th Foot, and Madras Fusiliers,
regiments which had gone into the Residency with Outram and Havelock.
The Infantry was brigaded as follows:

  Wing 53rd Foot              \
  93rd Highlanders            | Commanded by Brigadier the Hon.
  Battalion of detachments    | Adrian Hope, 93rd Highlanders.
  4th Punjab Infantry         /

  8th Foot                    \
  Battalion of detachments    | Commanded by Brigadier Greathed,
  2nd Punjab Infantry         / 8th Foot.

  Wing 23rd Fusiliers         \ Commanded by Brigadier D.
  Two companies 82nd Foot     / Russell, 84th Foot.]

  [*Note: Afterwards General Sir Wilbraham Lennox, V.C., K.C.B.]

[Footnote 2: Sir Colin Campbell had served throughout the Punjab
Campaign and on the Peshawar frontier.]

[Footnote 3: Now the 14th (Sikhs) Bengal Infantry.]

[Footnote 4: During one of Watson's many reconnaissances he received a
cut on the face from a sabre. One of the 2nd Punjab Cavalrymen, seeing
what had happened, rushed to Probyn, and said: 'Watson _sahib_ has got
a wound which is worth a lakh of rupees!']

[Footnote 5: Built by a king of Oudh for the ladies of his harem.
It takes its name from the gilt umbrella (Chatta) with which it is
adorned. Now the Lucknow Club.]

[Footnote 6: Now General Sir John Ewart, K.C.B.]

[Footnote 7: It was a Native saddle, such as Irregular Cavalry used in
those days, made of felt without a tree.]

[Footnote 8: On one occasion, when I was telling this story to General
Sir Samuel Browne, V.C., he said that something similar happened at
the battle of Sadulapur on December 2, 1848. He (Browne) was Adjutant
of his regiment (the 46th Native Infantry), which was drawn up in
line, with a troop of Horse Artillery, commanded by Major Kinleside,
on its right flank. Seeing that something unusual had occurred, Browne
rode up to the troop, and found that one of the men had had his saddle
carried away from under him by a small round shot. The man, who
happened at the moment to be standing up in his stirrups, escaped with
a bruise, as did the horse.]

[Footnote 9: A kind of more or less responsible servant or messenger,
so called from wearing a chuprass, or badge of office.]

[Footnote 10: It consisted of Blunt's troop of Horse Artillery, the
wing of the 53rd Foot, and Gough's squadron of Hodson's Horse.]

[Footnote 11: We had not, however, gone far, when a body of rebel
Infantry, about 2,000 strong, managing to elude Greathed's brigade,
crossed the canal, and, creeping quietly up, rushed the Martinière.
Sir Colin had left Lieutenant Patrick Stewart, an unusually promising
officer of the Bengal Engineers, on the top of the Martinière to keep
Outram informed of our movements by means of the semaphore, and
while Stewart was sending a message he and Watson (who was with him)
observed the enemy close up to the building. They flew down the
staircase, jumped on their horses, and, joining Watson's squadron and
the two Madras Native Horse Artillery guns, rode to the city side
of the Martinière to try and cut off the enemy, who, finding no one
inside the building, and seeing their line of retreat threatened, made
the best of their way back to the city. Several were killed by the
Horse Artillery, which opened upon them with grape, and by Watson's
_sowars_.]

[Footnote 12: This wall has long since been built up, and the whole
place is so overgrown with jungle that it was with difficulty I could
trace the actual site of the breach when I last visited Lucknow in
1893.]

[Footnote 13: Blunt's troop, when it left Umballa in May, 1857,
consisted of 93 Europeans and 20 Native Gun Lascars. It suffered so
severely at Delhi that only five guns could be manned when it marched
from there in September, and after the fight at Agra its total loss
amounted to 12 killed and 25 wounded. Four guns could then with
difficulty be manned. When Blunt left the troop in January, 1858, to
take command of Bourchier's Field Battery, 69 out of the 113 men with
whom he had commenced the campaign had been killed or wounded! The
troop would have been unserviceable, had men not volunteered for
it from other corps, and drivers been posted to it from the Royal
Artillery. At the commencement of the Mutiny Blunt was a subaltern,
and in ten months he found himself a Lieutenant-Colonel and a C.B.
Quick promotion and great rewards indeed, but nothing more than he
richly deserved; for seldom, if ever, has a battery and its commander
had a grander record to show.]

[Footnote 14: Captain Walton was the senior officer of the regiment
present, and took a conspicuous part in leading it, but as in
Sir Colin Campbell's opinion he was too junior to be in command,
Lieutenant-Colonel Gordon was appointed as a temporary measure.]

[Footnote 15: The word 'Dogra' was originally applied to the Rajput
clans in the hills and sub-montane tracts to the north of the Ravi.
In later years it included hill Rajputs south of the Ravi, and in
military parlance all these Rajputs who enlisted in our ranks came to
be called Dogras.]

[Footnote 16: In consequence of the behaviour of the 4th Punjab
Infantry on this occasion, and in other engagements in which they
served with the 93rd Highlanders, the officers and men of the latter
corps took a great liking to the former regiment, and some years after
the Mutiny two officers of the 93rd, who were candidates for the Staff
Corps, specially applied to be posted to the 4th Punjab Infantry.]

[Footnote 17: Attached as Interpreter to the 93rd Highlanders.]

[Footnote 18: It was here Captain Walton, of the 53rd, was severely
wounded.]

[Footnote 19: Subadar Gokal Sing was mentioned by the
Commander-in-Chief in despatches for his conduct on this occasion.]

[Footnote 20: For this act of heroism Mukarrab Khan was given the
Order of Merit, the Indian equivalent to the Victoria Cross, but
carrying with it an increase of pay. At the end of the campaign
Mukarrab Khan left the service, but when his old Commanding officer,
Colonel Wilde, went to the Umbeyla expedition in 1863, Mukarrab Khan
turned up and insisted on serving with him as an orderly.]

[Footnote 21: One of the principal thoroughfares of Lucknow.]

[Footnote 22: Lieutenant Paul, the Commandant, was killed. Lieutenant
Oldfield mortally, and Lieutenant McQueen severely, wounded.
Lieutenant Willoughby, who brought the regiment out of action, was
quite a lad, and was killed at Ruhiya the following April. Both he
and McQueen were recommended for the V.C. for their gallantry on
this occasion. After the fight was over, one of the Native officers,
bemoaning the loss of the British officers, asked me who would be sent
to replace them. He added: '_Sahib, ham log larai men bahut tez hain,
magar jang ka bandobast nahin jante_' ('Sir, we can fight well, but
we do not understand military arrangements'). What the old soldier
intended to convey to me was his sense of the inability of himself and
his comrades to do without the leadership and general management of
the British officers.]

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CHAPTER XXIV.
1857

  Henry Norman--The Shah Najaf--The mess-house--Planting the flag
  --A memorable meeting--The Residency


The operation which I have tried to describe in the last chapter
was not completed until well on in the afternoon, when the movement
towards the Residency was at once proceeded with. To the left as we
advanced the ground was fairly open (with the exception of quite a
small village) for about 1,100 yards in the direction of the British
Infantry mess-house. To the right also, for about 300 yards, there was
a clear space, then a belt of jungle intersected by huts and small
gardens extending for about 400 yards farther, as far as the Shah
Najaf,[1] a handsome white-domed tomb, surrounded by a court-yard, and
enclosed by high masonry loopholed walls; and beyond the Shah Najaf
rose the Kadam Rasul,[2] another tomb standing on a slight eminence.

But little opposition was experienced from the village, which was
carried by the Infantry, while the Artillery were brought up to open
fire on the Shah Najaf and Kadam Rasul. The latter was soon occupied
by the 2nd Punjab Infantry, belonging to Greathed's brigade, which had
by this time joined the main body; but the Shah Najaf proved a harder
nut to crack. This building was almost concealed by dense jungle, and
its great strength therefore remained unsuspected until we got quite
close up to it.

Barnston's battalion of Detachments advanced in skirmishing order,
under cover of our guns. One of the shells most unfortunately burst
prematurely, wounding Major Barnston so severely that he died soon
afterwards. Whether it was that the men were depressed by the loss of
their leader, or that they were not prepared for the very damaging
fire which suddenly poured upon them, I know not, but certain it is
that they wavered, and for a few minutes there was a slight panic. The
Commander-in-Chief, with Hope Grant, Mansfield, Adrian Hope, and their
respective staffs, were sitting on their horses anxiously awaiting the
result of the attack, when all at once it became apparent that there
was a retrograde movement on the part of some of the men, who were
emerging from the belt of jungle and hastening towards us. Norman
was the first to grasp the situation. Putting spurs to his horse,
he galloped into their midst, and called on them to pull themselves
together; the men rallied at once, and advanced into the cover from
which they had for the moment retreated. I had many opportunities for
noting Norman's coolness and presence of mind under fire. On this
particular occasion these qualities were most marked, and his action
was most timely.

More Infantry were brought up, but without avail. The enemy evidently
were determined to prevent the capture of the Shah Najaf. Fire was now
opened upon us from a heavy gun on the other side of the Gumti (the
first shot from which blew up one of the ammunition waggons belonging
to the Naval Brigade), and all the cannon that were collected at the
Kaisarbagh and mess-house were brought to bear upon us. The musketry
fire was incessant, and Peel's men suffered so severely that one of
his guns could not be worked.

Sir Colin was beginning to get extremely anxious, and no wonder--the
position was most uncomfortable, and the prospect very gloomy. Three
hours since the attack began! The day was rapidly drawing to a close,
and we were no nearer our object; on the contrary, the opposition
became every moment stronger, and the fire more deadly. A retreat was
not to be thought of; indeed, our remaining so long stationary had
been an encouragement to the enemy, and every one felt that the only
chance for the little British army fighting against 30,000 desperate
mutineers, with every advantage of position and intimate knowledge of
locality in their favour, was to continue to advance at all hazards;
and this our gallant old Chief decided to do. Placing himself at the
head of the 93rd, he explained to the only too eager Highlanders the
dangerous nature of the service, and called on them to follow him.
There was no mistaking the response; cheer after cheer rent the air
as they listened to the words of the Chief they knew so well, and
believed in so thoroughly, assuring him of their readiness to follow
whithersoever he should lead, do whatever he should direct. They moved
off, followed by Peel's guns dragged by sailors and some of the Madras
Fusiliers, the advance of the party being covered by Middleton's Field
battery, which dashed to the front and opened with grape.

Almost instantaneously the narrow path along which we were proceeding
was choked with wounded officers and dead and struggling horses. It
was here that Sir Archibald Alison, Sir Colin's Aide-de-camp, lost his
arm, and his brother (another Aide-de-camp) was wounded. Adrian Hope's
horse was shot dead--indeed, very few escaped injury, either to
themselves or their horses. I was one of the lucky few. On reaching
the wall of the Shah Najaf enclosure, it was found to be twenty feet
high, no entrance could be seen, and there were no scaling-ladders
available, so there was nothing for it but to endeavour to breach the
massive wall.[3] The 24-pounders hammered away at it for some time,
but proved quite unequal to the task; though only a few yards off,
they made no impression whatever, and it seemed as if the attempt to
take the position must be abandoned. Peel was, therefore, ordered to
withdraw his guns under cover of some rockets, which were discharged
into the enclosure, and Hope was directed to retire as soon as he
could collect the killed and wounded.

Captain Allgood, Sir Colin's trusted Assistant Quartermaster-General,
was the bearer of the order. He and Hope, after consulting together,
determined that before the latter obeyed they would try to discover
if there did not exist an opening in some other part of the walls.
Assisted by a sergeant of the 93rd, they set about their search, and
actually did find a narrow gap, through which they could see that the
enemy, terrified and thrown into confusion by the exploding rockets
falling amongst them, were fast abandoning the building. The two
friends helped each other through the gap, and, followed by some
Highlanders, they proceeded across the now deserted enclosure to
secure the only gateway, which was on the opposite side to that which
we had attacked; and Allgood had the great pleasure of announcing
to the Commander-in-Chief that there was no need to retire, for the
formidable position was in our possession.

It was getting dark when at length we occupied the Shah Najaf; some of
us got on to the top of the building to take a look round. There was
just light enough to show us a sepoy sauntering unconcernedly up to
the gate, evidently in happy ignorance of what had happened. He soon
discovered that his comrades were no longer masters of the situation,
and, letting his musket fall, he made all haste to the river, into
which he dropped, and swam to the other side.

Sir Colin and my General took up their quarters in the Shah Najaf, but
only nominally, for after a scratch dinner we all joined the troops,
who bivouacked where they stood.

The force was disposed in a semicircle, extending from the Shah
Najaf to the barracks. The wounded were placed in the huts near the
Sikandarbagh, where they passed a most comfortless night, for when
the sun set it rapidly got cold, and the hospital arrangements were
necessarily on a very limited scale.

By this time I was dead beat, having been for sixty hours continually
in the saddle, except when I lay down for a short nap on the night of
the 14th.

We were not allowed, however, to have a very long night's rest. Hours
before dawn on the 17th we were roused by the beating of drums and
ringing of bells (an impotent attempt on the part of the rebel leaders
to excite the enthusiasm of their followers), which caused the troops
to prepare for an attack and stand to their arms. But the enemy were
not in a mood to encounter us in the open, small as our numbers were;
they had suffered heavily the day before, and they must have begun to
realize that their strongest positions were inadequate against British
pluck and determination.

The mess-house was the next point to be carried, but the
Commander-in-Chief thought it would be prudent to make our left quite
secure in the first instance. The duty of occupying the houses and
gardens situated between the barracks and Banks's house was entrusted
to Brigadier Russell. Four bungalows,[4] in which the officers of the
32nd Foot had lived, were first seized. Russell then pushed on towards
Banks's house, which it was necessary to occupy, as it commanded the
crossing over the canal, by which we communicated with the Dilkusha,
and by which it was thought that the people rescued from the Residency
would have to be brought away. Russell, avoiding the main road,
advanced under cover of his Artillery, and forced the rebels to
vacate this important position, and Banks's house was held during the
remainder of the operations by 50 men of the 2nd Punjab Infantry,
under Lieutenant F. Keen.[5]

In the meantime a heavy fire from Peel's guns had been opened on the
mess-house--a double-storied building, situated on slightly rising
ground, surrounded by a ditch 12 feet broad, and beyond that at some
little distance by a loop-holed wall.

Our losses on the previous day had been very severe, and Sir Colin,
anxious to spare his men as much as possible, decided to batter the
place freely with Artillery before permitting it to be attacked.
Peel's guns and Longden's mortars were therefore brought to bear upon
it, and kept up a continual fire until 3 p.m., when the enemy seemed
to think they had had enough, their musketry fire slackened off, and
the Commander-in-Chief, considering the assault might safely be made,
gave the order to advance. The attacking party was commanded by
Brevet-Major Wolseley,[6] of the 90th Light Infantry, and consisted of
a company of his own regiment, a piquet of the 53rd Foot under Captain
Hopkins, and a few men of the 2nd Punjab Infantry under Captain
Powlett, supported by Barnston's Detachments, under Captain Guise, of
the 90th.

The building and its many outhouses were carried with a rush, and
the enemy, who hastily retreated to the Moti Mahal,[7] were followed
across the road, where our troops were stopped by the high wall which
enclosed that building. Wolseley then sent for some Sappers, who
quickly opened out a space through which they all passed. The Moti
Mahal was hotly defended, but without avail, and ere the sun set the
last position which separated the relieved from the relieving forces
was in our possession.

As the party moved off to attack the mess-house, Sir Colin, who, on
his white horse, was interestedly watching the proceedings, ordered me
to procure a regimental colour and place it on one of the turrets
of the building, that Outram might be able to judge how far we had
advanced. I rode off accordingly to the 2nd Punjab Infantry, standing
close by, and requested the Commandant, Captain Green, to let me have
one of his colours. He at once complied, and I galloped with it to the
mess-house. As I entered, I was met by Sir David Baird (one of Sir
Colin's Aides-de-camp), and Captain Hopkins, of the 53rd Foot, by both
of whom I was assisted in getting the flag with its long staff up the
inconveniently narrow staircase, and in planting it on the turret
nearest the Kaisarbagh, which was about 850 yards off. No sooner did
the enemy perceive what we were about, than shot after shot was aimed
at the colour, and in a very few minutes it was knocked over, falling
into the ditch below. I ran down, picked it up, and again placed it in
position, only for it to be once more shot down and hurled into the
ditch, just as Norman and Lennox (who had been sent by Sir Colin to
report what was going on in the interior of the Kaisarbagh) appeared
on the roof. Once more I picked up the colour, and found that this
time the staff had been broken in two. Notwithstanding, I managed
to prop it up a third time on the turret, and it was not again hit,
though the enemy continued to fire at it for some time.

Outram, unwilling to risk unnecessary loss of men, did not greatly
extend his position until he was sure we were close at hand, but he
was not idle. While Sir Colin was slowly working his way towards him
on the 16th, he had gradually occupied such buildings as lay in the
direction of our advance. From the mess-house we could see the British
flag flying on the top of the engine-house, only a short distance
beyond the Moti Mahal, which satisfactory piece of intelligence Norman
went down to report to Sir Colin, who, with his Chief of the Staff,
had just arrived. I followed Norman, and we two made our way to the
western wall of the Pearl Palace enclosure, outside which Outram and
Havelock were standing together. They had run the gauntlet of the
enemy's fire in coming from the engine house; Colonel Robert Napier
and two other officers who accompanied them, having been wounded, had
to be carried back. Some of Lennox's Sappers set to work, and soon
made a hole in the wall[8] large enough for these two distinguished
men to pass through.

I had never before met either of them. In Afghanistan Outram had been
a friend of my father, who had often spoken to me about him in terms
of the warmest admiration, and his courage and chivalry were known and
appreciated throughout India. It was therefore with feelings of the
most lively interest that I beheld this man, whose character I so
greatly admired. He was then fifty-four years of age, strong and
broad-shouldered, in no way broken down by the heavy load of
responsibility and anxiety he had had to bear, or the hardships he had
gone through. Havelock, the hero of a hundred fights, on the contrary,
looked ill, worn and depressed, but brightened up a little when Norman
told him he had been made a K.C.B.

Sir Colin waited to receive these two heroes on the ground sloping
down from the mess-house, and it was there that the meeting between
the three veterans took place. A most impressive and memorable scene
was that meeting, which has been well depicted in the historical
picture by Barker.

As if to show the rage and disappointment of the enemy at this
evidence of the success of our operations, every gun in the Kaisarbagh
was turned upon us, and it was under a shower of shot and shell that
the interview was held; it did not last long, for it was neither the
time nor the place to discuss plans for the future. All Sir Colin
could then say was that the troops should be removed outside Lucknow
as soon as the women and children had been brought away, and he
expressed his 'thankfulness that the relief of the garrison had been
accomplished.'

[Illustration: MAJOR-GENERAL SIR JAMES OUTRAM, G.C.B.
_From a painting by Thomas Brigstocke, R.A._]

Norman and I obtained permission to accompany Outram and Havelock back
to the Residency. It was intensely but painfully interesting to visit
this scene of so many acts of heroism, and of so much suffering
endured with unexampled fortitude. We first went to the posts occupied
by Havelock's force in the Chatta Manzil, and in other buildings which
have long since disappeared. At one of these we stopped to watch the
Artillery trying to silence the enemy's guns on the opposite side of
the river. We talked to the men, who were keen to hear news from the
outer world and the story of our advance. It was some little time
before we discovered in one of them the Commander of the battery,
Captain William Olpherts,[9] for in his soiled and torn summer
clothing, his face thin, worn, and begrimed with smoke, it was
difficult to distinguish the officer from his men, and it was under
these levelling circumstances that I had the honour of making the
acquaintance of my distinguished brother officer, whose audacious
courage on the occasion of Havelock's advance over the Charbagh bridge
had won the admiration of everyone in the force, and gained for him
the Victoria Cross.

We next came to the Bailey-guard; and as we looked at the battered
walls and gateway, not an inch without a mark from a round shot or
bullet, we marvelled that Aitken and Loughman could have managed to
defend it for nearly five months. There was plenty of evidence on all
the surrounding buildings of the dangerous nature of the service which
they and their gallant Native comrades had so admirably performed.
Although we were pressed for time, we could not resist stopping to
speak to some of the Native officers and sepoys, whose magnificent
loyalty throughout the siege was one of the most gratifying features
of the Mutiny.

At length we came to the Residency itself, where we met a few old
friends and acquaintances, who welcomed us with the most touching
enthusiasm. Mrs. (afterwards Lady) Inglis and the Rev. J.P. Harris and
his wife I had known at Peshawar; there were also Mrs. Fletcher Hayes,
the widow of the poor fellow whose murder by the men of his own escort
near Mainpuri I have related, and Mrs. Case, the widow of the brave
Major of the 32nd, who lost his life at the affair of Chinhut. Mrs.
Inglis showed us the tiny room which she and her children had shared
with Mrs. Case all through the siege; but it was difficult to get any
of them to speak of their miserable experiences, which were too sad
and terrible, and too recent to be talked about, and they naturally
preferred to dwell on their thankfulness for the relief that had come
at last, and to listen to our account of what had happened in other
places.

It was too late then to go round the position; that had to be left
for another day; indeed, it was quite dark when we returned to
Head-Quarters, established by our Chief in the open, his soldierly
instincts prompting him to remain with his troops.


[Footnote 1: Shah Najaf is the tomb of Ghazi-ud-din Haidar, first King
of Oudh, built by himself. It derives its name from Najaf, the hill
on which is built the tomb of Ali, the son-in-law of Mahomed, and of
which tomb this is said to be a copy.]

[Footnote 2: The Kadam Rasul, or Prophet's footprint, a Mahomedan
place of worship, which contained a stone bearing the impress of the
foot of the Prophet, brought from Arabia by a pilgrim. During the
Mutiny the holy stone was carried off.]

[Footnote 3: Lieutenant Salmon, R.N. (now Admiral Sir Nowell Salmon,
K.C.B.), climbed up a tree overhanging this wall, in order to see what
was going on behind it; he succeeded in obtaining useful information,
but on being perceived, was fired at and badly wounded. He received
the V.C.]

[Footnote 4: Marked D on the map.]

[Footnote 5: Now Major-General Keen, C.B. It was an extremely
responsible charge for so young an officer with such a small party, as
it was very isolated and exposed to attack.]

[Footnote 6: Now Field-Marshal Viscount Wolseley, K.P.,
Commander-in-Chief.]

[Footnote 7: Called the Pearl Palace from the fancied resemblance of
one of its domes (since destroyed) to the curve of a pearl.]

[Footnote 8: A slab let into the south-west corner of the wall marks
the spot.]

[Footnote 9: Now General Sir William Olpherts, V.C., K.C.B.]

       *       *       *       *       *




CHAPTER XXV.
1857

  Sir Colin's wise decision--Robert Napier
  --Impressions on visiting the Residency--Henry Lawrence
  --Lawrence as Statesman and Ruler
  --Lawrence's friendliness for Natives--A hazardous duty


The night of the 17th passed off quietly. Before daybreak the next
morning the troops were under arms. Thousands of the enemy had
collected in the Kaisarbagh, and for the protection of the mess-house,
the Tara Koti, about 200 yards to the south-west, was seized and held,
as from this position a flanking fire could be brought to bear upon
any enemy advancing from the Kaisarbagh.

The most difficult part of Sir Colin's task had yet to be
accomplished--the bringing away of the women and children, and the
sick and wounded, from the Residency--and the question of how this
could best be done was one which caused the Commander-in-Chief much
anxious thought. Many, amongst whom were Outram and Hope Grant,
pressed him to attack the Kaisarbagh and capture the city in the first
instance; but 45 officers and 496 men out of our small force had been
killed or wounded; Sir Colin, therefore, decided that it would be to
the last degree imprudent to attempt such an undertaking with his
reduced numbers, and became more than ever determined to confine his
operations to the relief of the garrison.

That the Chief was right there can be no room for doubt. This force
was barely strong enough for the service it had to perform. Every man
was on duty day and night; there was no reserve to fall back upon; and
had he listened to these proposals, and allowed himself to be drawn
into complications in the city, it is more than probable that those
he had come to succour would have been sacrificed. The wisdom of his
decision was fully proved by subsequent events, and unreservedly
acknowledged by Hope Grant and others who at the time differed from
him in their ideas of the course which should be adopted.

From the Dilkusha to the Residency was not less than five miles; every
yard of the way had to be guarded, and the garrison at the former
place was so attenuated that it had to be reinforced by the withdrawal
of part of the 75th Foot from the Alambagh. Fortunately this could be
done without dangerously weakening that post, as it had been lately
strengthened by the arrival of a small body of troops from Cawnpore.

It had now to be settled whether the evacuation should be effected
by the route we had ourselves followed, which was circuitous and in
places difficult for the wheeled vehicles necessary for the conveyance
of the sick and wounded, and the women and children; or by the way
past the barracks and Banks's house, which was shorter and had the
advantage of a metalled road throughout. But unless Russell, whose
brigade was in position at the barracks, could make the latter line
secure, it would be too hazardous to adopt, and up to the present the
reports from Russell had not been very promising. He had been
hardly pressed on the 17th, and had sent word that he could make no
impression on the enemy without heavy guns. Colonel Biddulph, the
Deputy-Quartermaster-General, was therefore ordered to proceed to
the barracks to ascertain how guns could best be sent to Russell's
assistance, and report to the Commander-in-Chief on the whole
situation. I was told to go with him and bring back the required
information.

We found Russell in a very uncomfortable position, exposed to a hot
fire and closely surrounded by the enemy, who were holding the British
Infantry hospital and other buildings within a few yards of him.

I remained with Russell while Biddulph reconnoitred the ground between
the barracks, the canal, and the Sikandarbagh. It was found covered
with villages and walled enclosures, but he discovered a path secure
from the enemy's fire, along which he was able to bring to Russell's
assistance a 9-pounder gun, a 24-pounder howitzer, and four 5-1/2-inch
mortars. As the 9-pounder was fired, a round shot from one of the
enemy's 18-pounders struck the mud wall immediately in front of it,
scattering great clods of earth, which knocked over Bourchier and
another officer; the round shot then hit Brigadier Russell, just
grazing the back of his neck, actually cutting his watch-chain in two,
and causing partial paralysis of the lower limbs for some days.

Russell being for the time _hors de combat_, Biddulph assumed command,
and ordered me to return to Head-Quarters, report what had happened,
and inform Sir Colin that he intended to attack the hospital and
endeavour to drive the enemy out of his immediate neighbourhood.

I never saw Biddulph again. I had scarcely delivered my message to the
Chief when heavy firing was heard from the direction of the barracks,
and shortly afterwards a determined attack was made by the rebels on
the piquets placed between the Sikandarbagh and the barracks, which
was repulsed by Remmington's troop of Horse Artillery, with two
companies of Infantry belonging to the 23rd and 53rd Foot, brought up
by the Commander-in-Chief himself, who expressed to Remmington his
warm approval of the brilliant manner in which his troop had come into
action.

Sir Colin now received information that Biddulph was killed, and that
Hale, who succeeded to the command of the brigade, had attacked and
taken the hospital, but had been forced to abandon it, as the thatched
roof had been set on fire by the shells showered upon it by the enemy,
who were keeping our troops constantly on the alert. This decided Sir
Colin to give up the idea of withdrawing the relieved garrison by
Banks's house.

Early on the following morning, the 19th, I was sent by the
Commander-in-Chief to the Residency with a note for Sir James Outram,
containing the information that arrangements for the withdrawal were
now complete, and that conveyances for the women, children, sick, and
wounded would be sent as soon as they arrived from the Dilkusha.

When he had read the note Sir James questioned me as to the road, and
asked me particularly if I had noticed the openings made in the walls
of houses and enclosures, and whether I thought they were large enough
for the guns, carts, and carriages to get through. I replied that I
had not observed them very particularly, but I was inclined to
think some of them were certainly rather small. My answer, to my
astonishment, roused the ire of a wounded officer lying on a couch at
the end of the room, for he wrathfully asked me whether I had measured
the openings, and on my saying I had not, he added: 'You had better
wait to give your opinion until you know what you are talking about;
those openings were made by my orders, and I am quite sure they are
the necessary size.' The officer was no other than Colonel Robert
Napier, who, as I have already stated, was badly wounded on the 17th.
I felt myself considerably snubbed, but Sir James kindly came to the
rescue, and explained that I had merely answered his question and had
not offered any opinion of my own: Colonel Napier, however, was not
to be appeased, and I could plainly see that I had incurred his
displeasure, and that he thought me a very bumptious youngster. I do
not know whether the Chief of the Staff[1] ever heard of it, but it
was some satisfaction to me to find afterwards that I was right in my
estimation of the size of those apertures, some of which had to be
enlarged before the guns and carriages could pass through.

By sunset that day the women and children had been brought away and
collected in the Sikandarbagh. Not a very agreeable resting-place, for
though the 2,000 dead mutineers had been got out of sight, they were
merely slightly covered over in a ditch which they themselves had
recently dug outside the north wall to strengthen the defences. The
survivors of the siege, however, had become too inured to horrors of
all kinds, and were too thankful for their deliverance from the fate
which for months had constantly threatened them, to be over-sensitive.

It was a sad little assemblage; all were more or less broken down and
out of health, while many were widows or orphans, having left their
nearest and dearest in the Residency burial-ground. Officers and men
accorded them a respectful welcome, and by their efforts to help them
showed how deeply they felt for their forlorn condition, while our old
Chief had a comfortable tea prepared for them. When night set in, the
road having been carefully reconnoitred beforehand, the melancholy
convoy with its guard of soldiers started for the Dilkusha, where it
arrived in safety, and was warmly received by the officers of the 9th
Lancers and the rest of the garrison, who did all that circumstances
would allow to make the ladies and children comfortable.

During the 20th, 21st, and 22nd, everything that was worth removing
and for which carriage could be provided was brought away. Such a
miscellaneous collection it was--jewels and other valuables belonging
to the ex-royal family, twenty-five lakhs of treasure, stores of all
kinds, including grain, and as many of the 200 guns discovered in the
palace as were considered likely to be of use.

The troops were not moved away from the Residency till midnight on the
22nd, and I had several opportunities before then of going over the
position, to every point of which some thrilling story was attached,
and of renewing acquaintance with many of the garrison whom I had
known before. Amongst them was Sam Lawrence, of the 32nd Foot, a
friend of Peshawar days, who, for his gallant defence of the Redan,
was awarded the Victoria Cross. I was shown Innes's advanced post,
named after McLeod Innes,[2] a talented Engineer officer, who also
subsequently gained that coveted reward; the Cawnpore battery, where
so many valuable lives had been sacrificed, and the room where Sir
Henry Lawrence received his mortal wound; then I climbed up to the
tower, from which a good view of the city and the posts held by the
enemy could be obtained.

The more I saw, the more I wondered at what had been achieved by such
a mere handful of men against such vast numbers. It was specially
pleasant to me to listen to the praises bestowed on the officers of my
own regiment, of whom nine were present when the siege commenced, and
only one escaped to the end unwounded, while five were killed or died
of their injuries. Of the other three, one was wounded three different
times, and both the others once.

All were loud, too, in their praises of the Engineer officers. During
the latter part of the siege the rebels, finding they could not carry
the position by assault, tried hard to undermine the defences; but our
Engineers were ever on the watch, and countermined so successfully
that they were able to frustrate the enemy's designs on almost every
occasion.

The wonderful manner in which the Hindustani soldiers held their
ground, notwithstanding that they were incessantly taunted by their
mutinous comrades for aiding the Feringhis against their own people,
was also much dilated upon.

The casualties during the siege were extremely heavy. When it
commenced on the 1st of July, the strength of the garrison was 927
Europeans and 765 Natives. Of the former, 163 were civilians--brave
and useful, but untrained to arms; of the latter, 118 were pensioners,
many of whom were old and decrepit. Up to the arrival of Outram and
Havelock (a period of eighty-seven days), 350 Europeans and 133
natives were either killed or died of wounds and disease. Of the noble
and unselfish conduct of the ladies and soldiers' wives, everyone
spoke in the highest terms and with the warmest appreciation. They
suffered, without a murmur, the most terrible hardships; they devoted
themselves to the sick and wounded in the hospital, and were ever
ready to help in any way that was useful. Two ladies were killed, and
nine died, during the siege.

The contemplation of the defence of Lucknow, and the realization of
the noble qualities it called forth in the defenders, cannot but
excite in the breast of every British man and woman, as it did in
mine, feelings of pride and admiration. But what impressed me more
than even the glorious defence was the foresight and ability of the
man who made that defence possible.

Henry Lawrence was, apparently, the only European in India who, from
the very first, formed an accurate estimate of the extent of the
danger which threatened our rule in the early part of 1857, and who,
notwithstanding his thorough appreciation of the many good qualities
of Native soldiers, was not misled into a mistaken belief in the
absolute loyalty of the Native army. Fourteen years before Lawrence
had predicted the Mutiny[3] and the course it would take, and when
events shaped themselves as he had foreseen, he gave it as his opinion
that the disaffection would be general and widespread. But while his
intimate knowledge of Native character led him to this conviction,
so great was his influence with Natives--perhaps by reason of that
knowledge--that he was able to delay the actual outbreak at Lucknow
until his measures for the defence of the Residency were completed,
and he persuaded a considerable number of sepoys, not only to continue
in their allegiance, but to share with their European comrades the
dangers and privations of the siege--a priceless service, for without
their aid the defence could not have been made.

[Illustration: BRIGADIER-GENERAL SIR HENRY LAWRENCE, K.C.B.
_From a photograph taken at Lucknow._]

In no part of India was there greater need for the services of a
strong, enlightened, and sympathetic Ruler and Statesman. Difficult as
were the positions in which many men in authority were placed in
1857, none was more difficult than that in which Henry Lawrence found
himself when he took over the Chief Commissionership of Oudh in the
spring of that year. His colleagues in the administration were at
feud with each other, and by their ignorance of the proper methods of
dealing with the people they had succeeded in alienating all classes.

While Lawrence was engaged in pouring oil on these troubled waters,
and in earning the gratitude of the people by modifying the previous
year's undue assessment, signs appeared of the disaffection, which
had begun amongst the troops at Barrackpore, having spread to the
cantonments in Oudh. Sir Henry met this new trouble in the same
intelligent and conciliatory spirit as that in which he had dealt with
his civil difficulties. He summoned to a durbar some Native officers
who had displayed a very proper feeling of loyalty by arresting
several fanatics who had tried to tamper with the soldiery, and he
liberally rewarded them, pointing out at the same time in forcible
language the disgrace to a soldier of being faithless to his salt. But
while doing everything in his power to keep the Natives loyal, and
with a certain amount of success, he did not neglect to take every
possible precaution.

When first he heard of the outbreak at Meerut, he telegraphed to the
Governor-General advising him to send for British troops to China and
Ceylon, and to call on the Nepalese to assist; at the same time
he applied to Lord Canning for, and obtained, the rank of
Brigadier-General, which gave him military as well as civil control--a
very necessary measure, for none of the senior military officers in
Oudh were men to be relied upon; indeed, as in so many other places,
they had to be effaced when the troubles began.

Very early in the day Henry Lawrence commenced his preparations for
the defence of the Residency; he cleared the ground of all cover
in its immediate vicinity, as far as it was possible to do so; he
fortified it, mounted guns, stored ammunition, powder, and firewood;
arranged for a proper supply of water; collected food, which proved
sufficient, not only for the original number of refugees, but for the
3,000 additional mouths belonging to Outram and Havelock's force; in
fact, he did everything which forethought and ingenuity could suggest
to enable the garrison to hold out in what he foresaw would be a long
and deadly struggle against fearful odds. There was no fort, as there
was at Agra, capable of sheltering every European in Oudh, and strong
enough to defy any number of mutineers, nor was there, as at Cawnpore,
a well-stocked and strongly-fortified magazine to depend upon. But
Henry Lawrence was not cast down by the difficulties which surrounded
him; he was fully alive to the danger, but he recognized that his
best, indeed, his only, chance of delaying the inevitable rebellion
until (as he hoped) assistance might arrive, was to show a bold front.

On the 27th May Lawrence wrote to Lord Canning as follows: 'Hitherto
the country has been kept quiet, and we have played the Irregulars
against the line regiments; but being constituted of exactly the same
material, the taint is fast pervading them, and in a few weeks, if not
days--unless Delhi be in the interim captured--there will be but one
feeling throughout the army, a feeling that our prestige is gone, and
that feeling will be more dangerous than any other. Religion, fear,
hatred, one and all have their influence; but there is still a
reverence for the Company's _ikbâl_[4]--when it is gone we shall have
few friends indeed. The tone and talk of many have greatly altered
during the last few days, and we are now asked, almost in terms of
insolence, whether Delhi is captured, or when it will be. It was
only just after the Kabul massacre, and when we hesitated to advance
through the Khyber, that, in my memory, such a tone ever before
prevailed.[5]

Feeling all this so strongly, it is the more remarkable that Henry
Lawrence never lost heart, but struggled bravely on 'to preserve the
soldiery to their duty and the people to their allegiance,' while
at the same time he was, as I have shown, making every conceivable
preparation to meet the outbreak whenever it should come.

There is no doubt that Henry Lawrence was a very remarkable man; his
friendly feeling for Natives, and his extraordinary insight into
their character, together with his military training and his varied
political experience, peculiarly fitted him to be at the head of a
Government at such a crisis.[6]

All this, however, is a digression from my narrative, to which I must
now return.

While the withdrawal was being effected, Peel's guns distracted the
enemy's attention from the proceedings by keeping up a perpetual and
destructive fire on the Kaisarbagh, thus leading the rebels to believe
that our whole efforts were directed to taking that place. By the
evening of the 22nd three large breaches had been made, and the enemy
naturally expected an assault to take place the next morning. But the
object of that heavy fire had already been accomplished; the women and
children, the sick and wounded, were all safe in the Dilkusha; no one
was left in the Residency but the garrison, on duty for the last time
at the posts they had so long and so bravely defended, and they were
to leave at midnight.

As the clock struck twelve, in the deepest silence and with the utmost
caution, the gallant little band evacuated the place, and passed down
the long line of posts, first those held by Outram's and Havelock's
men, and then those occupied by the relieving force, until they
reached the Martinière Park. As they moved on, Outram's and Havelock's
troops fell in behind, and were followed by the relieving force, which
brought up the rear. The scheme for this very delicate movement had
been most carefully considered beforehand by General Mansfield, the
clever Chief of the Staff, who clearly explained to all concerned the
parts they had to play, and emphatically impressed upon them that
success depended on his directions being followed to the letter, and
on their being carried out without the slightest noise or confusion.

Sir Colin Campbell and Hope Grant, surrounded by their respective
staffs, watched the movement from a position in front of the
Sikandarbagh, where a body of Artillery and Infantry were held in
readiness for any emergency. When the time arrived for the advanced
piquets to be drawn in, the enemy seemed to have become suspicious,
for they suddenly opened fire with guns and musketry from the
Kaisarbagh, and for a moment we feared our plans had been discovered.
Fortunately, one of Peel's rocket-carts was still in position beyond
the Moti Mahal, and the celerity with which the officer in charge
replied to this burst of fire apparently convinced the enemy we were
holding our ground, for the firing soon ceased, and we breathed again.

Mansfield had taken the precaution to have with him an officer from
Hale's brigade, which was on the left rear of our line of posts, that
he might go back and tell his Brigadier when the proper time came for
the latter to move off in concert with the rest of the force; but this
officer had not, apparently, understood that he would have to return
in the dark, and when Mansfield directed him to carry out the duty for
which he had been summoned, he replied that he did not think he could
find his way. Mansfield was very angry, and with reason, for it was
of supreme importance that the retirement should be simultaneous, and
turning to me, he said: 'You have been to Hale's position: do you
think you could find your way there now?' I answered: 'I think I can.'
Upon which he told me to go at once, and ordered the officer belonging
to the brigade to accompany me. I then asked the General whether he
wished me to retire with Hale's party or return to him. He replied:
'Return to me here, that I may be sure the order has been received.'

I rode off with my companion, and soon found I had undertaken to
perform a far from easy, and rather hazardous, duty. I had only been
over the ground twice--going to and returning from the position on the
18th--and most of the villages then standing had since been burnt.
There was no road, but any number of paths, which seemed to lead in
every direction but the right one; at last, however, we arrived at our
destination, I delivered the order to Colonel Hale, and set out on
my return journey alone. My consternation was great on reaching the
Sikandarbagh, where I had been ordered to report myself to Mansfield,
to find it deserted by the Generals, their staffs, and the troops; not
a creature was to be seen. I then began to understand what a long time
it had taken me to carry out the errand upon which I had been sent,
much longer, no doubt, than Mansfield thought possible. I could not
help feeling that I was not in at all a pleasant position, for any
moment the enemy might discover the force had departed, and come out
in pursuit. As it turned out, however, happily for me, they remained
for some hours in blissful ignorance of our successful retirement,
and, instead of following in our wake, continued to keep up a heavy
fire on the empty Residency and other abandoned posts. Turning my
horse's head in the direction I knew the troops must have taken, I
galloped as fast as he could carry me until I overtook the rear guard
just as it was crossing the canal, along the right bank of which the
greater part of the force had been placed in position. When I reported
myself to Mansfield, he confessed that he had forgotten all about me,
which somewhat surprised me, for I had frequently noticed how exactly
he remembered the particulars of any order he gave, no matter how long
a time it took to execute it.


[Footnote 1: Colonel Napier was Chief of the Staff to Sir James
Outram.]

[Footnote 2: Now Lieutenant-General McLeod Innes, V.C.]

[Footnote 3: _Calcutta Review_, 1843. After commenting on the habitual
carelessness of Government and its disregard of ordinary military
precautions and preparations, Henry Lawrence had shown how possible it
was that a hostile party might seize Delhi, and, if the outbreak were
not speedily suppressed, what grave consequences might ensue. 'Let
this happen,' he said, 'on June 2, and does any sane man doubt that
twenty-four hours would swell the hundreds of rebels into thousands,
and in a week every ploughshare in the Delhi States would be turned
into a sword? And when a sufficient force had been mustered, which
could not be effected within a month, should we not then have a more
difficult game to play than Clive at Plassy or Wellington at Assaye?
We should then be literally striking for our existence at the
most inclement season of the year, with the prestige of our name
tarnished.' Going on to suggest that Meerut, Umballa, and Agra might
say that they had no troops to spare from their own necessities, or
that they had no carriage, 'Should we not, then,' he wrote, 'have to
strike anew for our Indian Empire?]

[Footnote 4: Prestige, or, rather, good luck.]

[Footnote 5: 'Life of Sir Henry Lawrence.']

[Footnote 6: In Sir Henry Lawrence's 'Life' two memoranda appear,
one by Lieutenant (now Lieutenant-General) McLeod Innes, Assistant
Engineer at Lucknow in 1857, the other by Sir Henry Lawrence himself.
They are worthy of perusal, and will give the reader some insight into
Lawrence's character; they will also exemplify how necessary it is
for anyone placed in a position of authority in India to study the
peculiarities of the people and gain their confidence by kindness and
sympathy, to which they readily respond, and, above all, to be firm
and decided in his dealings with them. Firmness and decision are
qualities which are appreciated more than all others by Natives; they
expect them in their Rulers, and without them no European can have any
power over them, or ever hope to gain their respect and esteem.

(See Appendix II).]

       *       *       *       *       *




CHAPTER XXVI.
1857

  Death of General Havelock--Appeals from Cawnpore
  --General Windham--The passage of the Ganges


The Relief of the Lucknow garrison was now accomplished--a grand
achievement indeed, of which any Commander might well be proud,
carried out as it had been in every particular as originally planned,
thus demonstrating with what care each detail had been thought out,
and how admirably movement after movement had been executed.

November the 23rd was spent in arranging for the march to Cawnpore,
and in organizing the division which was to be left in position, under
Outram, in and about the Alambagh; it was to be strong enough to hold
its own, and to keep open communication with Head-Quarters.

[Illustration: PLAN TO ILLUSTRATE THE RELIEF OF LUCKNOW, IN 1857]

My time was chiefly occupied in assisting in the distribution of
transport, and in carrying out Hope Grant's directions as to the order
in which the troops were to march. Round the Dilkusha the scene of
confusion was bewildering in the extreme; women, children, sick
and wounded men, elephants, camels, bullocks and bullock-carts,
grass-cutters' ponies, and doolies with their innumerable bearers, all
crowded together. To marshal these incongruous elements and get them
started seemed at first to be an almost hopeless task. At last the
families were got off in two bodies, each under a married officer
whose wife was of the party, and through whom all possible
arrangements for their comfort were to be made, and their place on the
line of march, position in camp, etc., determined.

In the afternoon the force was gratified by the issue of a General
Order by the Commander-in-Chief thanking the troops for the manner in
which the very difficult and harassing service of the Relief had been
performed. Alluding to the withdrawal, he said it was a model of
discipline and exactitude, the result of which was that the rebels
were completely thrown off their guard, and the retirement had been
successfully carried out in the face of 50,000 of the enemy along a
most inconveniently narrow and tortuous lane--the only line of retreat
open.

The following morning Hope Grant's division marched to the Alambagh.
On arrival there, our transport was sent back for Outram's division,
which joined us the morning after, bringing with it General Havelock's
dead body. He had died the previous day--'a martyr to duty,' as the
Commander-in-Chief expressed it in his General Order. The brave old
soldier, who had served with distinction in four campaigns before the
Mutiny--Burma, Afghanistan, Gwalior, and the Sutlej--was buried inside
the Alambagh enclosure, respected and honoured by the whole army, but
more especially by those who had shared in his noble efforts to rescue
the Lucknow garrison.

A wash and change of clothes, in which we were now able to indulge,
were much-appreciated luxuries. From the time we had left the Alambagh
every officer and man had been on duty without cessation, and slept,
if they slept at all, on the spot where the close of day found them
fighting.

It was a rough experience, but, notwithstanding the exposure, hard
work, and a minimum of sleep, there was no great sickness amongst the
troops. The personal interest which every man in the force felt in
the rescue of his countrymen and countrywomen, in addition to the
excitement at all times inseparable from war, was a stimulant
which enabled all ranks to bear up in a marvellous manner against
long-continued privations and hardships--for body and mind are equally
affected by will--and there was no doubt about the will in this
instance to endure anything that was necessary for the speedy
achievement of the object in view. Personally, I was in the best
of health, and though I almost lived on horseback, I never felt
inconvenience or fatigue.

The 25th and 26th were busy days, spent in allotting camp equipage
and making the necessary arrangements for fitting out Outram's
force--4,000 strong, with 25 guns and howitzers and 10 mortars.

At 11 a.m. on the 27th we started on our return march towards
Cawnpore.[1] It was a strange procession. Everything in the shape of
wheeled carriage and laden animals had to keep to the road, which was
narrow, and for the greater part of the way raised, for the country
at that time of the year was partly under water, and _jhils_ were
numerous. Thus, the column was about twelve miles in length, so that
the head had almost reached the end of the march before the rear could
start. Delays were constant and unavoidable, and the time each day's
journey occupied, as well as the mode of conveyance--country carts
innocent of springs--must have been most trying to delicate women and
wounded men. Fortunately there was no rain; but the sun was still hot
in the daytime, causing greater sensitiveness to the bitter cold at
night.

My place was with the advance guard, as I had to go on ahead to mark
out the camp and have ramps got ready to enable the carts to be taken
off the raised roads. Soon after leaving the Alambagh we heard the
sound of guns from the direction of Cawnpore, and when we reached
Bani bridge (about thirteen miles on, where a small post had been
established) the officer in command told us that there had been heavy
firing all that day and the day before.

Camp was pitched about two miles further on late in the afternoon; but
my work was not over till midnight, when the rear guard arrived, for
it took all that time to form up the miscellaneous convoy.

Next morning we made an early start, in order to reach our
destination, if possible, before dark. Having received no information
from Cawnpore for more than ten days, the Commander-in-Chief was
beginning to feel extremely anxious, and the firing we had heard the
previous day had greatly increased his uneasiness, for there seemed
little room for doubt that the Gwalior rebels were making an attack on
that place. The probability that this would happen had been foreseen
by Sir Colin, and was one of his reasons for determining to limit the
operations at Lucknow to the withdrawal of the garrison.

We had not proceeded far, when firing was again heard, and by noon
all doubt as to its meaning was ended by a Native who brought a note
marked 'Most urgent,' written in Greek character, and addressed to
'General Sir Colin Campbell, or any officer commanding troops on the
Lucknow road.' This turned out to be a communication from General
Windham, who had been placed in command at Cawnpore when the
Commander-in-Chief left for Lucknow on the 9th of November. It was
dated two days earlier, and told of an attack having been made, that
there had been hard fighting, and that the troops were sorely pressed;
in conclusion Windham earnestly besought the Chief to come to his
assistance with the least possible delay.

Two other letters followed in quick succession, the last containing
the disappointing and disheartening intelligence that Windham, with
the greater part of his troops, had been driven into the entrenchment,
plainly showing that the city and cantonment were in the possession
of the enemy, and suggesting the possibility of the bridge of boats
having been destroyed.

Sir Colin, becoming impatient to learn the exact state of the case,
desired me to ride on as fast as I could to the river; and if I
found the bridge broken, to return at once, but if it were still in
existence to cross over, try and see the General, and bring back all
the information I could obtain.

I took a couple of sowars with me, and on reaching the river I found,
under cover of a hastily-constructed _tête-de-pont_, a guard of
British soldiers, under Lieutenant Budgen, of the 82nd Foot, whose
delight at seeing me was most effusively expressed. He informed me
that the bridge was still intact, but that it was unlikely it would
long remain so, for Windham was surrounded except on the river side,
and the garrison was 'at its last gasp.'

I pushed across and got into the entrenchment, which was situated on
the river immediately below the bridge of boats. The confusion inside
was great, and I could hardly force my way through the mass of men who
thronged round my horse, eager to learn when help might be expected;
they were evidently demoralized by the ill-success which had attended
the previous days' operations, and it was not until I reassured them
with the news that the Commander-in-Chief was close at hand that
I managed to get through the crowd and deliver my message to the
General.

The 'hero of the Redan,' whom I now saw for the first time, though the
fame of his achievement had preceded him to India, was a handsome,
cheery-looking man of about forty-eight years of age, who appeared, in
contrast to the excited multitude I had passed, thoroughly calm and
collected; and notwithstanding the bitter disappointment it must have
been to him to be obliged to give up the city and retire with his
wholly inadequate force into the entrenchment, he was not dispirited,
and had all his wits about him. In a few words he told me what had
happened, and desired me to explain to the Commander-in-Chief that,
although the city and cantonment had to be abandoned, he was still
holding the enemy in check round the assembly-rooms (which were
situated outside and to the west front of the entrenchment), thus
preventing their approaching the bridge of boats near enough to injure
it.

I was about to start back to Head-Quarters, when suddenly loud cheers
broke from the men, caused by the appearance in their midst of the
Commander-in-Chief himself. After I had left him, Sir Colin became
every minute more impatient and fidgety, and ere long started off
after me, accompanied by Mansfield and some other staff officers. He
was recognized by the soldiers, some of whom had known him in
the Crimea, and they at once surrounded him, giving enthusiastic
expression to their joy at seeing him again.

The Chief could now judge for himself as to how matters stood, so, as
there was plenty of work in camp for me, I started back to rejoin my
own General. On my way I stopped to speak to Budgen, whom I found in
a most dejected frame of mind. Unfortunately for him, he had used
exactly the same words in describing the situation at Cawnpore to Sir
Colin as he had to me, which roused the old Chief's indignation, and
he flew at the wretched man as he was sometimes apt to do when greatly
put out, rating him soundly, and asking him how he dared to say of Her
Majesty's troops that they were 'at their last gasp.'

I found Hope Grant about four miles from the river bank, where the
camp was being pitched. Sir Colin did not return till after dark, when
we were told that the rest of Windham's troops had been driven inside
the entrenchment, which only confirmed what we had suspected, for
flames were seen mounting high into the air from the direction of the
assembly-rooms, which, it now turned out, had been set on fire by the
enemy--an unfortunate occurrence, as in them had been stored the camp
equipage, kits, clothing, etc., belonging to most of the regiments
which had crossed the Ganges into Oudh. But what was more serious
still was the fact that the road was now open for the rebels' heavy
guns, which might be brought to bear upon the bridge of boats at any
moment.

Owing to the length of the march (thirty-two or thirty-three miles),
some of the carts and the heavy guns did not arrive till daybreak.
Scarcely had the bullocks been unyoked, before the guns were ordered
on to the river bank, where they formed up, and so effectually plied
the enemy with shot and shell that the passage of the river was
rendered comparatively safe for our troops.

When the men had breakfasted, the order was given to cross over. Sir
Colin accompanied the column as far as the bridge, and then directed
Hope Grant, with the Horse Artillery and most of the Cavalry,
Bourchier's battery and Adrian Hope's brigade, to move to the
south-east of the city and take up a position on the open ground which
stretched from the river to the Grand Trunk Road, with the canal
between us and the enemy. By this arrangement communication with
Allahabad, which had been temporarily interrupted, was restored,
a very necessary measure, for until the road was made safe,
reinforcements, which on account of the paucity of transport had to
be sent up in small detachments, could not reach us, nor could the
families and sick soldiers be sent down country.

The passage of the huge convoy over the bridge of boats, under the
protection of Greathed's brigade, was a most tedious business,
occupying thirty hours, from 3 p.m. on the 29th till about 9 p.m. on
the 30th, when Inglis brought over the rear guard. During its transit
the enemy fired occasionally on the bridge, and tried to destroy it by
floating fire-rafts down the river; fortunately they did not succeed,
and the convoy arrived without accident on the ground set apart for it
in the rear of our camp.

For the three first days of December I was chiefly employed in
reconnoitring with the Native Cavalry the country to our left and
rear, to make sure that the rebels had no intention of attempting to
get round that flank, and in making arrangements for the despatch of
the families, the sick, and the wounded, to Allahabad _en route_ to
Calcutta. We improvised covers for some of the carts, in which we
placed the women and children and the worst cases amongst the men; but
with all our efforts to render them less unfit for the purpose, these
carts remained but rough and painful conveyances for delicate women
and suffering men to travel in.

We were not left altogether unmolested by the enemy during these days.
Round shot kept continually falling in our midst, particularly in the
neighbourhood of the Commander-in-Chief's tent, the exact position of
which must have somehow been made known to the rebels, otherwise they
could not have distinguished it from the rest of the camp, as it
was an unpretentious hill tent, such as was then used by subaltern
officers.

Until the women left camp on the night of the 3rd December, we were
obliged to act on the defensive, and were not able to stop the enemy's
fire completely, though we managed to keep it under control by
occupying the point called Generalganj, and strengthening the piquets
on our right and left flank. On the 4th a second unsuccessful attempt
was made to destroy the bridge of boats by means of fire-rafts, and on
the 5th there were several affairs at the outposts, all of which ended
in the discomfiture of the rebels without any great loss to ourselves;
Lieutenant-Colonel Ewart of the 93rd Highlanders, who lost his arm on
the 1st, and Captain Crutchley of the same regiment, who was severely
wounded, being the only casualties amongst the officers.


[Footnote 1: Our force consisted of the troops which Sir Colin had
reviewed on the Alambagh plain on the 11th instant, with the exception
of the 75th Foot, which was transferred to Outram's division. We had,
however, in their place, the survivors of the 32nd Foot, and of the
Native regiments who had behaved so loyally during the siege. These
latter were formed into one battalion, called the Regiment of
Lucknow--the present 16th Bengal Infantry. The 32nd Foot, which was
not up to full strength (1,067) when the Mutiny broke out, had in
1857-58 no less than 610 men killed and wounded, exclusive of 169
who died from disease. We had also with us, and to them was given an
honoured place, 'the remnant of the few faithful pensioners who had
alone, of many thousands in Oudh, responded to the call of Sir Henry
Lawrence to come in to aid the cause of those whose salt they had
eaten.'--Lecture on the Relief of Lucknow, by Colonel H.W. Norman.]

       *       *       *       *       *




CHAPTER XXVII.
1857

  The fight at Cawnpore--Unexpected visitors--A long chase
  --Unjur Tiwari--Bithur--Windham at Cawnpore


The time had now arrived to give the Gwalior troops a repetition of
the lesson taught them at Agra on the 10th October. They had had
it all their own way since then; and having proved too strong for
Windham, they misunderstood the Commander-in-Chief remaining for so
long on the defensive, and attributed his inaction to fear of their
superior prowess.

Sunday, the 6th December, was one of those glorious days in which the
European in northern India revels for a great part of the winter,
clear and cool, with a cloudless sky. I awoke refreshed after a good
night's rest, and in high spirits at the prospect before us of
a satisfactory day's work; for we hoped to drive the enemy from
Cawnpore, and to convince those who had witnessed, if not taken part
in, the horrible brutalities perpetrated there, that England's hour
had come at last.

The 42nd Highlanders, a battery of Royal Artillery, and detachments of
several different corps, had quite lately been added to the force,
so that the Commander-in-Chief had now at his disposal about 5,000
Infantry, 600 Cavalry, and 35 guns. The Infantry were divided into
four brigades, commanded respectively by Greathed, Adrian Hope,
Inglis, and Walpole.[1] The Cavalry brigade, consisting of the
same regiments which had come with us from Delhi, was commanded by
Brigadier Little, the Artillery[2] by Major-General Dupuis, and the
Engineers by Colonel Harness, General Windham being placed in charge
of the entrenchments.

Opposed to this force there were 25,000 men, with 40 guns, not
all disciplined soldiers, but all adepts in the use of arms, and
accustomed to fighting. They were divided into two distinct bodies,
one composed of the Gwalior Contingent, the Rani of Jhansi's
followers, and the mutinous regiments which had been stationed in
Bundelkand, Central India, and Rajputana, which occupied the right
of the enemy's position, covering their line of retreat by the Kalpi
road. The other consisted of the troops--regular and irregular--which
had attached themselves to the Nana, and held the city and the ground
which lay between it and the Ganges, their line of retreat being along
the Grand Trunk Road to Bithur. Tantia Topi was in command of the
whole force, while the Nana remained with his own people on the left
flank.

On the centre and left the enemy were very strongly posted, and could
only be approached through the city and by way of the difficult broken
ground, covered with ruined houses, stretching along the river bank.

While the men were eating their breakfasts, and the tents were being
struck, packed, and sent to the rear, Sir Colin carefully explained
his plan of operations to the Commanding officers and the staff; this
plan was, to make a feint on the enemy's left and centre, but to
direct the real attack on their right, hoping thus to be able to
dispose of this portion of Tantia Topi's force, before assistance
could be obtained from any other part of the line.

With this view Windham was ordered to open with every gun within
the entrenchment at 9 a.m.; while Greathed, supported by Walpole,
threatened the enemy's centre. Exactly at the hour named, the roar of
Windham's Artillery was heard, followed a few minutes later by the
rattle of Greathed's musketry along the bank of the canal. Meanwhile,
Adrian Hope's brigade was drawn up in fighting formation behind the
Cavalry stables on our side of the Trunk Road, and Inglis's brigade
behind the racecourse on the other side. At eleven o'clock the order
was given to advance. The Cavalry and Horse Artillery moved to the
left with instructions to cross the canal by a bridge about two miles
off, and to be ready to fall upon the enemy as they retreated along
the Kalpi road. Walpole's brigade, covered by Smith's Field battery,
crossed the canal by a bridge immediately to the left of Generalganj,
cleared the canal bank, and, by hugging the wall of the city,
effectually prevented reinforcements reaching the enemy's right.

Peel's and Longden's heavy guns, and Bourchier's and Middleton's Field
batteries, now opened on some brick-kilns and mounds which the enemy
were holding in strength on our side of the canal, and against which
Adrian Hope's and Inglis's brigades advanced in parallel lines,
covered by the 4th Punjab Infantry in skirmishing order.

It was a sight to be remembered, that advance, as we watched it from
our position on horseback, grouped round the Commander-in-Chief.
Before us stretched a fine open grassy plain; to the right the dark
green of the Rifle Brigade battalions revealed where Walpole's brigade
was crossing the canal. Nearer to us, the 53rd Foot, and the 42nd and
93rd Highlanders in their bonnets and kilts, marched as on parade,
although the enemy's guns played upon them and every now and then a
round shot plunged through their ranks or ricocheted over their heads;
on they went without apparently being in the least disconcerted, and
without the slightest confusion.

As the brick-kilns were neared, the 4th Punjab Infantry, supported by
the 53rd Foot, charged the enemy in grand style, and drove them across
the canal. Here there occurred a slight check. The rebels, having been
reinforced, made a stand, and bringing guns to bear upon the bridge
within grape range, they must have done us great damage but for the
timely arrival of Peel and his sailors with a heavy gun. This put new
life into the attacking party; with a loud cheer they dashed across
the bridge, while Peel poured round after round from his 24-pounder on
the insurgents with most salutary effect. The enemy faced about and
retired with the utmost celerity, leaving a 9-pounder gun in our
possession.

The whole of Hope's brigade, followed by Inglis's, now arrived on the
scene and proceeded to cross the canal, some by the bridge, while
others waded through the water. Having got to the other side, both
brigades re-formed, and moved rapidly along the Kalpi road. We
(the Commander-in-Chief, Hope Grant, and their respective staffs)
accompanied this body of troops for about a mile and a half, when the
rebels' camp came in sight. A few rounds were fired into it, and then
it was rushed.

We were evidently unexpected visitors; wounded men were lying about in
all directions, and many sepoys were surprised calmly cooking their
frugal meal of unleavened bread. The tents were found to be full of
property plundered from the city and cantonment of Cawnpore--soldiers'
kits, bedding, clothing, and every description of miscellaneous
articles; but to us the most valuable acquisition was a quantity of
grain and a large number of fine bullocks, of which those best suited
for Ordnance purposes were kept, and the rest were made over to the
Commissariat.

That portion of the rebel force with which we had been engaged was now
in full retreat, and Sir Colin wished to follow it up at once; but
the Cavalry and Horse Artillery had not arrived, so that considerable
delay occurred; while we were waiting the Chief arranged to send
Mansfield with a small force[3] round to the north of Cawnpore, and,
by thus threatening the road along which the Nana's troops must
retreat, compel them to evacuate the city. The 23rd Royal Welsh
Fusiliers and a detachment of the 38th Foot were to be left to look
after the deserted camp, and Inglis's brigade was to move along the
Kalpi road in support of the Cavalry and Horse Artillery. But where
were the much-needed and anxiously-expected mounted troops? It was not
like them to be out of the way when their services were required; but
it was now nearly two o'clock, they had not appeared, and the days
were very short. What was to be done? The enemy could not be allowed
to carry off their guns and escape punishment. Suddenly the old Chief
announced that he had determined to follow them up himself with
Bourchier's battery and his own escort.

What a chase we had! We went at a gallop, only pulling up occasionally
for the battery to come into action, 'to clear our front and flanks.'
We came up with a goodly number of stragglers, and captured several
guns and carts laden with ammunition. But we were by this time
overtaking large bodies of the rebels, and they were becoming too
numerous for a single battery and a few staff officers to cope with.
We had outstripped the Commander-in-Chief, and Hope Grant decided to
halt, hoping that the missing Cavalry and Horse Artillery might soon
turn up. We had not to wait long. In about a quarter of an hour they
appeared among some trees to our left, even more put out than we were
at their not having been to the front at such a time. Their guide had
made too great a détour, but the sound of our guns showed them his
mistake, and they at once altered their course and pushed on in the
direction of the firing. Sir Colin had also come up, so off we started
again, and never drew rein until we reached the Pandu Naddi, fourteen
miles from Cawnpore. The rout was complete. Finding themselves
pressed, the sepoys scattered over the country, throwing away their
arms and divesting themselves of their uniform, that they might pass
for harmless peasants. Nineteen guns, some of them of large calibre,
were left in our hands. Our victory was particularly satisfactory in
that it was achieved with but slight loss to ourselves, the casualties
being 2 officers and 11 men killed, and 9 officers and 76 men wounded.

Hope Grant now desired me to hurry back to Cawnpore before it got too
dark, and select the ground for the night's bivouac. As there was some
risk in going alone, Augustus Anson volunteered to accompany me.
We had got about half-way, when we came across the dead body of
Lieutenant Salmond, who had been acting Aide-de-camp to my General,
and must have got separated from us in the pursuit. His throat was
cut, and he had a severe wound on the face. Soon after we met Inglis's
brigade, which, in accordance with my instructions, I turned back. On
reaching the Gwalior Contingent camp, we heard that an attempt had
been made to recapture it, which had been repulsed by the troops left
in charge.

It was dusk by the time we reached the junction of the Kalpi and Grand
Trunk roads, and we agreed that this would be a good place for a
bivouac, the city being about a mile in front, and Mansfield's column
less than two miles to the left. I marked out the ground, and showed
each corps as it came up the position it was to occupy. When all this
was over I was pretty well tired out and ravenously hungry; but food
there was none, so I had made up my mind to lie down, famished as I
was. Just then I came across some sleeping men, who to my joy turned
out to be Dighton Probyn and the officers of the 2nd Punjab Cavalry,
who were magnanimous enough to forgive the abrupt interruption to
their slumbers, and to supply me with some cold mutton, bread, and a
bottle of beer. Never was man more grateful for a meal, and never was
a meal more thoroughly enjoyed. I lay down beside my friends and was
soon fast asleep, in spite of the bitter cold and being much troubled
about my horse; neither for him nor myself was there a vestige of
covering to be found.

The next morning I was astir by cockcrow. Patrols who had been sent
forward to ascertain the truth of a rumour which had reached the
Commander-in-Chief the previous evening, to the effect that the city
had been evacuated, returned with confirmation of the report; but the
news in other respects was far from satisfactory. Mansfield's movement
had caused the enemy to retire, but they had got away without loss,
and had succeeded in carrying off all their guns; so that only one
half of Tantia Topi's force had really been dealt with; the other
half still remained to be disposed of, and to Hope Grant's great
satisfaction and my delight, the duty of following them up was
entrusted to him.

His orders were to go to Bithur, as it was thought likely that the
Nana's troops would retire on that place. But as the news was not
very reliable, Hope Grant was told to use his own discretion, and act
according to circumstances.

For several days I had been trying unsuccessfully to get hold of some
Natives upon whom I could rely to bring me trustworthy information as
to the enemy's movements. It is always of the utmost importance that a
Quartermaster-General on service should have the help of such men, and
I was now more than ever in need of reliable intelligence. In this
emergency I applied to Captain Bruce, the officer in charge of the
Intelligence Department which had been established at Cawnpore for the
purpose of tracing the whereabouts of those rebels who had taken
a prominent part in the atrocities. I was at once supplied with a
first-rate man, Unjur Tiwari by name,[4] who from that moment until
I left India for England in April, 1858, rendered me most valuable
service. He was a Brahmin by caste, and belonged to the 1st Native
Infantry. In a few words I explained what I required of him, and he
started at once for Bithur, promising to meet me the next day on the
line of march.

[Illustration: PLAN OF CAWNPORE. 1857.]

Early on the afternoon of the 8th we marched out of Cawnpore, and at
sunset Unjur Tiwari, true to his promise, made his appearance at the
point where the road turns off to Bithur. He told me that the Nana had
slept at that place the night before, but hearing of our approach, had
decamped with all his guns and most of his followers, and was now at a
ferry some miles up the river, trying to get across and make his way
to Oudh. We had come thirteen miles, and had as many more to go before
we could get to the ferry, and as there was nothing to be gained
by arriving there in the dark, a halt was ordered for rest and
refreshment. At midnight we started again, and reached Sheorajpur
(three miles from the ferry) at daybreak. Here we left our
impedimenta, and proceeded by a cross-country road. Presently a couple
of mounted men belonging to the enemy, not perceiving who we were,
galloped straight into the escort. On discovering their mistake, they
turned and tried to escape, but in vain; one was killed, the other
captured, and from him we learnt that the rebels were only a short
distance ahead. We pushed on, and soon came in sight of them and of
the river; crowds were collected on the banks, and boats were being
hurriedly laden, some of the guns having already been placed on board.
Our troops were ordered to advance, but the ground along the river
bank was treacherous and very heavy. Notwithstanding, the Artillery
managed to struggle through, and when the batteries had got to within
1,000 yards of the ferry, the enemy appeared suddenly to discover
our presence, and opened upon us with their Artillery. Our batteries
galloped on, and got considerably nearer before they returned the
fire; after a few rounds the rebels broke and fled. The ground was so
unfavourable for pursuit, being full of holes and quicksands, that
nearly all escaped, except a few cut up by the Cavalry. Fifteen guns
were captured, with one single casualty on our side--the General
himself--who was hit on the foot by a spent grape-shot, without,
happily, being much hurt.

Hope Grant's successful management of this little expedition
considerably enhanced the high opinion the Commander-in-Chief had
already formed of his ability. He was next ordered to proceed to
Bithur and complete the destruction of that place, which had been
begun by Havelock in July. We found the palace in good order--there
was little evidence that it had been visited by an avenging force, and
in one of the rooms which had been occupied by the treacherous Azimula
Khan, I came across a number of letters, some unopened, and some
extremely interesting, to which I shall have to refer later on.

We left Adrian Hope's brigade at Bithur to search for treasure
reported to have been buried near the palace, and returned to
Cawnpore, where we remained for about ten days, not at all sorry for
the rest.

During this time of comparative idleness, I went over the ground where
the troops under Windham had been engaged for three days, and heard
many comments on the conduct of the operations. All spoke in high
terms of Windham's dash and courage, but as a Commander he was
generally considered to have failed.

Windham was without doubt placed in an extremely difficult position.
The relief of the garrison at Lucknow was of such paramount importance
that Sir Colin Campbell was obliged to take with him every available
man,[5] and found it necessary to order Windham to send all
reinforcements after him as soon as they arrived, although it was
recognized as probable that Tantia Topi, with the large force then
assembled near Kalpi, would advance on Cawnpore as soon as the
Commander-in-Chief was committed to his difficult undertaking.
Windham's orders were to improve the defences of the entrenchment; to
carefully watch the movements of the Gwalior army; and to make as much
display as possible of the troops at his command by encamping them in
a conspicuous position outside the city; but he was not on any account
to move out to attack, unless compelled to do so in order to prevent
the bombardment of the entrenchment. The safety of this entrenchment
was of great importance, for it contained a number of guns, quantities
of ammunition and other warlike stores, and it covered, as already
shown, the bridge of boats over the Ganges.

Windham loyally carried out his instructions, but he subsequently
asked for and obtained leave to detain any troops arriving at Cawnpore
after the 14th of November, as he did not feel himself strong enough,
with the force at his disposal, to resist the enemy if attacked. But
even after having received this sanction he twice despatched strong
reinforcements to Lucknow, thus weakening himself considerably in
order to give Sir Colin all possible help.

Windham eventually had at his disposal about 1,700 Infantry and eight
guns, the greater part of which were encamped as directed, outside the
city, close to the junction of the Delhi and Kalpi roads, while the
rest were posted in and around the entrenchment. Meanwhile the rebels
were slowly approaching Cawnpore in detachments, with the evident
intention of surrounding the place. On the 17th two bodies of troops
were pushed on to Shuli and Shirajpur, within fifteen miles of the
city, and a little less than that distance from each other. Windham
thought that if he could manage to surprise either of these, he could
prevent the enemy from concentrating, and he drew up a scheme for
giving effect to this plan, which he submitted for the approval of the
Commander-in-Chief. No reply came, and after waiting a week he gave up
all idea of attempting to surprise the detachments, and determined to
try and arrest the rebels' advance by attacking the main body, still
some distance off. Accordingly he broke up his camp, and marched six
miles along the Kalpi road, on the same day that the Gwalior force
moved some distance nearer to Cawnpore. The next morning, the 25th,
the enemy advanced to Pandu Naddi, within three miles of Windham's
camp.

Windham now found himself in a very critical position. With only 1,200
Infantry[6] and eight light guns, he was opposed to Tantia Topi with
an army of 25,000 men and forty guns. He had to choose whether he
would fight these enormous odds or retire: he decided that to fight
was the least of the two evils, and he was so far successful that
he drove back that portion of the opposing force immediately in
his front, and captured three guns; but being unable to press his
advantage on account of the paucity of men and the total absence of
Cavalry, he had perforce to fall back--a grievous necessity. He was
followed the whole way, insulted and jeered at, by the rebel horsemen.
The result of the day was to give confidence to the wily Mahratta
leader; he pushed on to Cawnpore, and attacked Windham with such
vehemence that by nightfall on the 28th the British troops were driven
inside the entrenchment, having had 315 men killed and wounded, and
having lost all their baggage and camp equipage.

Windham undoubtedly laid himself open to censure. His defence was
that, had he received the Commander-in-Chief's authority to carry out
his plan for surprising the rebels, he would certainly have broken up
their army, and the disaster could not have occurred. But surely when
he decided that circumstances had so changed since Sir Colin's orders
were given as to justify him in disregarding them, he should have
acted on his own responsibility, and taken such steps as appeared to
him best, instead of applying for sanction to a Commander far from
the scene of action, and so entirely ignorant of the conditions under
which the application was made, as to render it impossible for him to
decide whether such sanction should be given. The march which Windham
made towards the enemy on the 24th was quite as grave a disobedience
of orders as would have been the surprise movement he contemplated
on the 17th; but while the former placed him in a most dangerous
position, and one from which it was impossible to deal the enemy a
decisive blow, the latter, if successful, would have deserved, and
doubtless would have received, the highest praise.


[Footnote 1: Greathed's brigade consisted of the 8th and 64th Foot and
2nd Punjab Infantry. Adrian Hope's brigade consisted of the 53rd Foot,
42nd and 93rd Highlanders, and 4th Punjab Infantry. Inglis's brigade
consisted of the 23rd Fusiliers, 32nd and 82nd Foot. Walpole's brigade
consisted of the 2nd and 3rd Battalions Rifle Brigade and a detachment
of the 38th Foot.]

[Footnote 2: The Artillery consisted of Peel's Naval Brigade, Blunt's,
Bridge's and Remmington's troops of Horse Artillery, Bourchier's,
Middleton's, and Smith's Field batteries, and Longden's Heavy
battery.]

[Footnote 3: Mansfield was given the two Rifle Brigade battalions, the
93rd Highlanders, Longden's Heavy, and Middleton's Field battery.]

[Footnote 4: Unjur Tiwari's career was a very remarkable one. A sepoy
in the 1st Bengal Native Infantry, he was at Banda when the Mutiny
broke out, and during the disturbances at that place he aided
a European clerk and his wife to escape, and showed his
disinterestedness by refusing to take a gold ring, the only reward
they had to offer him. He then joined Havelock's force, and rendered
excellent service as a spy; and although taken prisoner more than
once, and on one occasion tortured, he never wavered in his loyalty to
us. Accompanying Outram to Lucknow, he volunteered to carry a letter
to Cawnpore, and after falling into the hands of the rebels, and
being cruelly ill-treated by them, he effected his escape, and safely
delivered Outram's message to Sir Colin Campbell. He then worked
for me most faithfully, procuring information which I could always
thoroughly rely upon; and I was much gratified when he was rewarded by
a grant of Rs. 3,000, presented with a sword of honour, and invested
with the Order of British India, with the title of Sirdar Bahadur. I
was proportionately distressed some years later to find that, owing to
misrepresentations of enemies when he was serving in the Oudh Military
Police, Unjur Tiwari had been deprived of his rewards, and learning he
was paralyzed and in want, I begged Lord Napier to interest himself in
the matter, the result being that the brave old man was given a yearly
pension of Rs. 1,200 for his life. He was alive when I left India,
and although he resided some distance from the railway he always had
himself carried to see me whenever I travelled in his direction.]

[Footnote 5: The garrison left at Cawnpore consisted of:

  Four companies of the 64th Foot, and small
  detachments of other regiments             450 men.
  Sailors                                     47 men.
                                             --------
  Total                                      497

with a hastily organized bullock battery of four field guns, manned
partly by Europeans and partly by Sikhs.]

[Footnote 6: The force was composed of the 34th Foot, and portions of
the 82nd and 88th Foot, and 2nd Battalion Rifle Brigade; with four
9-pounders, manned partly by Royal and Bengal gunners and partly by
Sikhs; and four 6-pounders, manned by Madras Native gunners.]

       *       *       *       *       *




CHAPTER XXVIII.
1857-1858

  The Fight at Khudaganj--A mêlée--Oudh or Rohilkand?


Our stay at Cawnpore was more prolonged than the Commander-in-Chief
intended or wished it to be, but want of transport made it impossible
for us to move until the carts returned which had gone to Allahabad
with the women and children and the sick soldiers. We were thus
delayed until the 23rd December, on which date we commenced our march
towards Fatehgarh.

At Chobipur, two marches from Cawnpore, where we spent Christmas Day,
we were joined by the troops who had been left behind at Bithur;
they had not succeeded in discovering any considerable quantity of
treasure, some silver vessels of various kinds being the only result
of their labours.

The Commander-in-Chief's object in moving on Fatehgarh was to restore
order throughout the Doab and open communication between the Punjab
and Bengal.

A brigade under Brigadier Walpole had been despatched on the 16th,
with orders to clear the country along the left bank of the Jumna up
to Mainpuri, where he was to be joined by Brigadier Seaton with a
strong column from Delhi, and whence the united force was to advance
on Fatehgarh.

We reached Gursahaiganj, where the road turns off to Fatehgarh, on the
31st, and here the main body of the army halted on New Year's Day,
1858; but information having been received that 5,000 rebels under the
Nawab of Farakabad had partly destroyed the suspension bridge over
the Kali Naddi, about five miles ahead, and had then gone off towards
Fatehgarh, Adrian Hope's brigade was sent forward to repair the damage
and watch the bridge.

Early the following morning Sir Colin, with Mansfield and the rest of
his staff, went on to inspect progress, leaving orders for the rest of
the force to follow later in the day. Very soon, however, Hope Grant
received an urgent message from the Chief of the Staff, telling him to
push on the troops with all possible speed, as the enemy had returned,
and were now in strength on the other side of the Kali Naddi.

We (Sir Hope and his staff) started off with the Horse Artillery and
Cavalry, and found, on reaching the bridge, that the rebels were
occupying the village of Khudaganj, just across the river, and only
about 300 yards off, from which advantageous position they were
pouring a heavy fire on Hope's brigade. Our piquets on the further
side of the stream had been strengthened by a wing of the 53rd Foot,
and a wing of the 93rd Highlanders had been placed in reserve behind
the bridge on the nearer side, the rest of the regiment having been
despatched to watch a ford some distance down the river, while a
battery of Field Artillery had been brought into action in reply to
the enemy's guns. Immediately on the arrival of the main body, three
of Peel's guns, under Vaughan, his First Lieutenant, were pushed
across the bridge to the further side, and getting under shelter of
a convenient building, opened fire on the village, and on a toll-bar
directly in its front, about which the enemy were collected in
considerable numbers. Our Infantry now crossed over, followed by the
Cavalry and Horse Artillery--a tedious operation, as there had not
been time to fully repair the bridge, and in one place planks had only
been laid for half its width, necessitating horses being led, and
Infantry passing over in sections. Moreover, the enemy had got the
exact range, and several casualties occurred at this spot; one round
shot alone killed and wounded six men of the 8th Foot. Vaughan at
last succeeded in silencing the gun which had troubled us most, and
preparations were made for an attack on the village. While we were
watching the proceedings, the Interpreter to the Naval Brigade, Henry
Hamilton Maxwell, a brother officer of mine who had been standing
close to me, was very badly wounded in the leg, and both Sir Colin and
Sir Hope were hit by spent bullets, luckily without being much hurt.

There was a feeling throughout the army that Sir Colin was inclined to
favour Highlanders unduly; and a rumour got about that the 93rd were
to be allowed the honour of delivering the assault on Khudaganj, which
was highly resented by the 53rd, and they determined that on this
occasion, at any rate, the Highlanders should not have it all their
own way. The 53rd was composed of a remarkably fine set of fellows,
chiefly Irish, and it was Mansfield's own regiment; wishing,
therefore, to do an old comrade a good turn, he had placed Major
Payn,[1] one of the senior officers, in command of the piquets. Payn
was a fine dashing soldier, and a great favourite with the men, who
calculated on his backing them up if they upset Sir Colin's little
plan. Whether what happened was with or without Payn's permission, I
cannot say, but we were all waiting near the bridge for the attacking
party to form when suddenly the 'advance' was sounded, then the
'double,' followed by a tremendous cheer, and we saw the 53rd charge
the enemy. Sir Colin was very angry, but the 53rd could not be brought
back, and there was nothing for it but to support them. Hope's and
Greathed's troops were instantly pushed on, and the Cavalry and Horse
Artillery were ordered to mount.

The ground gradually sloped upwards towards Khudaganj, and the
regiments moving up to the attack made a fine picture. The 93rd
followed the impulsive 53rd, while Greathed's brigade took a line to
the left, and as they neared the village the rebels hastily limbered
up their guns and retired. This was an opportunity for mounted troops
such as does not often occur; it was instantly seized by Hope Grant,
who rode to the Cavalry, drawn up behind some sand hills, and gave the
word of command, 'Threes left, trot, march.' The words had hardly left
his lips before we had started in pursuit of the enemy, by this time
half a mile ahead, the 9th Lancers leading the way, followed by
Younghusband's, Gough's, and Probyn's squadrons. When within 300 yards
of the fugitives, the 'charge' was sounded, and in a few seconds we
were in their midst. A regular mêlée ensued, a number of the rebels
were killed, and seven guns captured in less than as many minutes. The
General now formed the Cavalry into a long line, and, placing himself
at the head of his own regiment (the 9th Lancers), followed up the
flying foe. I rode a little to his left with Younghusband's squadron,
and next to him came Tyrrell Ross, the doctor.[2] As we galloped
along, Younghusband drew my attention with great pride to the
admirable manner in which his men kept their dressing.

On the line thundered, overtaking groups of the enemy, who every now
and then turned and fired into us before they could be cut down,
or knelt to receive us on their bayonets before discharging their
muskets. The chase continued for nearly five miles, until daylight
began to fail and we appeared to have got to the end of the fugitives,
when the order was given to wheel to the right and form up on the
road. Before, however, this movement could be carried out, we overtook
a batch of mutineers, who faced about and fired into the squadron at
close quarters. I saw Younghusband fall, but I could not go to his
assistance, as at that moment one of his _sowars_ was in dire peril
from a sepoy who was attacking him with his fixed bayonet, and had I
not helped the man and disposed of his opponent, he must have been
killed. The next moment I descried in the distance two sepoys making
off with a standard, which I determined must be captured, so I rode
after the rebels and overtook them, and while wrenching the staff out
of the hands of one of them, whom I cut down, the other put his musket
close to my body and fired; fortunately for me it missed fire, and I
carried off the standard.[3]

[Illustration: Plan of the Engagement on the Banks of the KALI NADI at
KHUDAGANJ January 2nd. 1858.]

Tyrrell Ross, attracted by a party of men in the rear of the squadron
bending over the fallen Younghusband, now came up, and, to everyone's
great grief, pronounced the wound to be mortal. From the day that I
had annexed Younghusband's pony at the siege of Delhi we had been so
much together, and had become such fast friends, that it was a great
shock to me to be told that never again would my gallant comrade lead
the men in whom he took such soldierly pride.[4]

When the wounded had been attended to, we returned to camp, where
we found Sir Colin waiting to welcome us, and we received quite an
ovation from our comrades in the Infantry and Artillery. We must
have presented a curious spectacle as we rode back, almost every
man carrying some trophy of the day, for the enemy had abandoned
everything in their flight, and we found the road strewn with laden
carts and palankins, arms, Native clothing, etc. Our losses were
surprisingly small--only 10 men killed, and 30 men and 2 officers
wounded.

The next day the column marched to Fatehgarh, which we found deserted.
The rebels had fled so precipitately that they had left the bridge
over the Ganges intact, and had not attempted to destroy the valuable
gun-carriage factory in the fort, which was then placed in the charge
of Captain H. Legeyt Bruce.[5]

We remained a whole month at Fatehgarh, and loud were the complaints
in camp at the unaccountable delay. It was the general opinion that
we ought to move into Rohilkand, and settle that part of the country
before returning to Lucknow; this view was very strongly held by
Sir Colin Campbell, and those who accused him of "indecision,
dilatoriness, and wasting the best of the cold weather" could not have
known how little he deserved their censure. The truth was, that the
Governor-General and the Commander-in-Chief were not in accord as to
the order in which the several military operations should be taken in
hand; the latter urged that Rohilkand should be dealt with first, and
settled before the end of the cold weather; he thought that the troops
would then be the better for a rest, and that Lucknow could very well
wait till the following autumn. Lord Canning opined, on the other hand
(and I entirely agree with him), that, while it was most desirable
that order should be restored in Rohilkand, and indeed throughout the
whole of the North-West Provinces, the possession of Lucknow was of
'far greater value.' 'Every eye,' Lord Canning wrote, 'is upon Oudh as
it was upon Delhi: Oudh is not only the rallying-place of the sepoys,
the place to which they all look, and by the doings in which their own
hopes and prospects rise or fall; but it represents a dynasty; there
is a king of Oudh "seeking his own."' He pointed out that there was an
uneasy feeling amongst the Chiefs of Native States, who were intently
watching our attitude with regard to Lucknow, and that even in
'far-off Burma' news from Lucknow was anxiously looked for. The
Governor-General laid great stress also upon the advisability of
employing as soon and as close to their own country as possible the
troops from Nepal which, at Sir Henry Lawrence's suggestion, had been
applied for to, and lent us by, the Nepalese Government.

The visit of Jung Bahadur (the Prime Minister of Nepal) to England a
few years before had opened his eyes to our latent power, and he had
been able to convince his people that time alone was required for us
to recover completely from the blow which had been dealt us by the
Mutiny, and that it was therefore to their advantage to side with us.
Lord Canning wisely judged, however, that it would be highly imprudent
to allow the province immediately adjoining Nepal to continue in a
state of revolt, and he felt that neither Jung Bahadur nor his Gurkhas
would be satisfied unless they were allowed to take an active part in
the campaign.


[Footnote 1: The late General Sir William Payn, K.C.B.]

[Footnote 2: Tyrrell Ross was well known as a skilful surgeon, and
much esteemed as a staunch friend. He had just returned from England,
and had that very morning been placed in medical charge of the Cavalry
Brigade. When the order to mount was given, Ross asked the General
where he wished him to be, pointing out that he would not be of much
use in the rear if there were a pursuit across country. Hope Grant
replied: 'Quite so; I have heard that you are a good rider and can
use your sword. Ride on my left, and help to look after my third
squadron.' This Ross did as well as any Cavalry officer could have
done.]

[Footnote 3: For these two acts I was awarded the Victoria Cross.]

[Footnote 4: Younghusband met with an extraordinary accident during
the fight at Agra. While pursuing one of the Gwalior rebels, he fell
with his horse into a disused well, fifty feet deep, and was followed
by two of his men, also mounted. Ropes were brought, and the bodies
were hauled up, when, to the astonishment of everyone, Younghusband
was found to be alive, and, beyond being badly bruised, uninjured.
He had fallen to the bottom in a sitting position, his back resting
against the side of the well, and his legs stretched out in front
of him, while his horse fell standing and across him. He was thus
protected from the weight of the other two horses and their riders,
who were all killed.]

[Footnote 5: Now Major-General H.L. Bruce, C.B.]

       *       *       *       *       *




CHAPTER XXIX.
1858

  Mianganj--Curious effect of a mirage--The Dilkusha revisited
  --Passage of the Gumti--Capture of the Chakar Kothi
  --Capture of the iron bridge--Hodson mortally wounded
  --Outram's soldierly instinct--A lost opportunity--Sam Browne
  --Start for England--Death of Sir William Peel


Our prolonged stay at Fatehgarh was not altogether without advantage.
Such a large force being concentrated in the neighbourhood secured the
safety of the Doab for the time being, and as Fatehgarh was equally
conveniently situated for an advance, either into Rohilkand or upon
Lucknow, the rebels were kept in a state of uncertainty as to the
direction of our next move.

At length it was decided that Lucknow was to be our first objective,
and Sir Colin at once communicated with Outram and Napier as to the
best means of conducting the siege. Then, leaving Hope Grant to take
the division across the Ganges, the Chief went to Allahabad, the
temporary Head-Quarters of the supreme Government, to discuss the
situation with the Governor-General.

We marched through Cawnpore, and on the 8th February reached Unao,
where we found encamped the 7th Hussars, a troop of Royal Horse
Artillery, the 38th Foot and the 79th Highlanders.

Sir Colin on his return from Allahabad on the 10th issued a General
Order detailing the regiments, staff, and Commanders who were to take
part in the 'Siege of Lucknow.'[1] Hope Grant, who had been made
a Major-General for the 'Relief of Lucknow,' was appointed to the
command of the Cavalry division, and I remained with him as D.A.Q.M.G.

Rumours had been flying about that the Nana was somewhere in the
neighbourhood, but 'Wolf!' had been cried so often with regard to him,
that but little notice was taken of the reports, until my faithful
spy, Unjur Tiwari, brought me intelligence that the miscreant really
was hiding in a small fort about twenty-five miles from our camp. Hope
Grant started off at once, taking with him a compact little force, and
reached the fort early next morning (17th February), just too late
to catch the Nana, who, we were told, had fled precipitately before
daybreak. We blew up the fort, and for the next few days moved by
short marches towards Lucknow, clearing the country as we went of
rebels, small parties of whom we frequently encountered. On the 23rd
we reached Mianganj, a small fortified town on the old Cawnpore and
Lucknow road, where some 2,000 of the enemy had ensconced themselves.
Our advance guard having been fired upon as we approached, the
column was halted and the baggage placed in safety, while Hope
Grant reconnoitred the position in order to see where it could most
advantageously be attacked. We found the town enclosed by a high
loop-holed wall with circular bastions at the four corners and at
regular intervals along the sides, the whole being surrounded by a wet
ditch, while the gateways had been strengthened by palisades. Large
bodies of the enemy's Cavalry hovered about our reconnoitring party,
only to retire as we advanced, apparently not liking the look of the
7th Hussars and 9th Lancers, who formed the General's escort.

After a careful inspection, Hope Grant decided to breach the
north-west angle of the wall, as from a wood near the Infantry could
keep down the fire of the enemy's sharpshooters, and the heavy guns
would be in a measure protected while the walls were being bombarded.
A sufficiently good breach was made in about two hours, and the 53rd
Regiment, having been selected for the honour of leading the assault,
was told to hold itself in readiness. Hope Grant then spoke a few
words of encouragement to the men, and their Colonel (English) replied
on their behalf that they might be depended upon to do their duty. The
signal was given; the Horse Artillery, under Lieutenant-Colonel Frank
Turner, galloped to within grape range of the town, and covered by
their fire the 53rd marched in steadily until they got within 100
yards of the walls, when, with a ringing cheer, they dashed through
the water in the ditch and entered the breach. Hopkins, the plucky
Captain of the light company, was the first inside the walls, followed
closely by Augustus Anson and an adventurous Post-Captain of the Royal
Navy, who, being unemployed, came to see what 'a winter's campaign in
India' was like.[2] There was a good deal of hand-to-hand fighting,
and the enemy lost about 500 men, those who tried to escape being cut
down by the Cavalry outside the walls. We took about the same number
of prisoners, but as none of these were soldiers, and vowed they had
been forced to take up arms against us, the General, as much to their
astonishment as to their delight, ordered them to be set free. Our
losses were small.

Next day we halted while the walls were being destroyed and the
place rendered indefensible. As I was superintending the work of
destruction, the horrors of war were once more brought very forcibly
before me by the appearance of an infirm old man, who besought me to
spare his house, saying: 'Yesterday I was the happy father of five
sons: three of them lie there' (pointing to a group of dead bodies);
'where the other two are, God only knows. I am old and a cripple, and
if my house is burned there is nothing left for me but to die.' Of
course I took care that his house and property were left untouched.

On the 25th February we marched to Mohan, a picturesquely situated
village on the bank of the Sai Naddi, which stream we crossed the next
day and encamped on a fine grassy plain, there to remain until it
should be time to join the army before Lucknow.

While we were halting at this place, Watson and I had rather a curious
adventure. During a morning's ride my greyhound put up a _nilghai_[3]
so close to us that Watson, aiming a blow at him with his sword,
gashed his quarter. Off he started, and we after him at full speed;
the chase continued for some miles without our getting much nearer,
when, all at once, we beheld moving towards us from our right front
a body of the enemy's Cavalry. We were in an awkward position; our
horses were very nearly dead beat, and we could hardly hope to get
away if pursued. We pulled up, turned round, and trotted back, very
quietly at first, that our horses might recover their breath before
the enemy got to closer quarters and we should have to ride for our
lives. Every now and then we looked back to see whether they were
gaining upon us, and at last we distinctly saw them open out and make
as if to charge down upon us. We thought our last hour was come. We
bade each other good-bye, agreeing that each must do his best to
escape, and that neither was to wait for the other, when lo! as
suddenly as they had appeared, the horsemen vanished, as though the
ground had opened and swallowed them; there was nothing to be seen
but the open plain, where a second before there had been a crowd of
mounted men. We could hardly believe our eyes, or comprehend at first
that what we had seen was simply a mirage, but so like reality that
anyone must have been deceived. Our relief, on becoming convinced
that we had been scared by a phantom enemy, was considerable; but
the apparition had the good effect of making us realize the folly
of having allowed ourselves to be tempted so far away from our camp
without escort of any kind in an enemy's country, and we determined
not to risk it again.[4]

While we were occupied in clearing the country to the north of
the Cawnpore-Lucknow road, the main body of the army, with the
siege-train, Engineer park, Naval Brigade,[5] ammunition, and stores
of all kinds, had gradually been collecting at Bhantira, to which
place we were ordered to proceed on the 1st March. We had a
troublesome march across country, and did not reach the Head-Quarters
camp until close on midnight. There was much difficulty in getting the
guns through the muddy nullas and up the steep banks, and but for
the assistance of the elephants the task could hardly have been
accomplished. It was most curious and interesting to see how these
sagacious creatures watched for and seized the moment when their help
was needed to get the guns up the steep inclines; they waited till
the horses dragging the gun could do no more and were coming to a
stand-still, when one of them would place his forehead against the
muzzle and shove until the gun was safely landed on the top of the
bank.

We started early on the morning of the 2nd for Lucknow, Hope Grant
taking command of the Cavalry division for the first time.

On nearing the Alambagh, we bore to our right past the Jalalabad fort,
where Outram's Engineers were busily engaged in constructing fascines
and gabions for the siege, and preparing spars and empty casks for
bridging the Gumti. As we approached the Mahomedbagh we came under the
fire of some of the enemy's guns placed in a grove of trees; but no
sooner had the Artillery of our advance guard opened fire than the
rebels retired, leaving a gun in our hands. We moved on to the
Dilkusha, which we found unoccupied. The park had been greatly
disfigured since our last visit, most of the finest trees having been
cut down.

My General was now placed in charge of the piquets, a position for
which he was admirably fitted and in which he delighted. He rode well,
without fatigue to himself or his horse, so that any duty entailing
long hours in the saddle was particularly congenial to him. I
invariably accompanied him in his rounds, and in after-years I often
felt that I owed Hope Grant a debt of gratitude for the practical
lessons he gave me in outpost duty.

Strong piquets with heavy guns were placed in and around the Dilkusha,
as well as in the Mahomedbagh. The main body of the army was encamped
to the rear of the Dilkusha, its right almost on the Gumti, while its
left stretched for two miles in the direction of the Alambagh. Hope
Grant, wishing to be in a convenient position in case of an attack,
spent the night in the Mahomedbagh piquet, and Anson, the D.A.A.G.,
and I kept him company.

On the 3rd some of the troops left at Bhantira came into camp, and
on the 5th General Franks arrived. His division, together with
the Nepalese Contingent, 9,000 strong, brought the numbers at the
Commander-in-Chief's disposal up to nearly 31,000 men, with 164
guns;[6] not a man too many for the capture of a city twenty miles in
circumference, defended by 120,000 armed men, who for three months and
a half had worked incessantly at strengthening the defences, which
consisted of three lines, extending lengthwise from the Charbagh
bridge to the Gumti, and in depth from the canal to the Kaisarbagh.

In Napier's carefully prepared plan, which Sir Colin decided to adopt,
it was shown that the attack should be made on the east, as that
side offered the smallest front, it afforded ground for planting
our Artillery, which the west side did not, and it was the shortest
approach to the Kaisarbagh, a place to which the rebels attached the
greatest importance; more than all, we knew the east side, and were
little acquainted with the west. Napier further recommended that the
attack should be accompanied by a flank movement on the north, with
the object of taking in reverse the first and second lines of the
enemy's defences.[7] A division was accordingly sent across the
Gumti for this purpose, and the movement, being entirely successful,
materially aided in the capture of the city. The passage of the river
was effected by means of two pontoon bridges made of empty barrels,
and thrown across the stream a little below the Dilkusha. They were
completed by midnight on the 5th March, and before day broke the
troops detailed for this service had crossed over.

Outram, who, since the 'Relief of Lucknow,' had been maintaining his
high reputation by keeping the enemy in check before the Alambagh,
commanded this division, with Hope Grant as his second in command. As
soon as it was light we moved away from the river to be out of reach
of the Martinière guns, and after marching for about two miles we came
in view of the enemy; the Artillery of the advance guard got to within
a thousand yards and opened fire, upon which the rebels broke and
fled. The Bays pursued them for a short distance, but with very little
result, the ground being intersected with nullas, and the enemy
opening upon them with heavy guns, they had to retire precipitately,
with the loss of their Major, Percy Smith, whose body, unhappily, had
to be abandoned.

About noon we encamped close to Chinhut, and Hope Grant took special
care that day to see the piquets were well placed, for the rebels
were in great numbers, and we were surrounded by ravines and wooded
enclosures. It was thought by some that he was unnecessarily anxious
and careful, for he rode several times over the ground; but the next
morning proved how right he was to leave nothing to chance.

While we were at breakfast, information was brought in that the enemy
were advancing in force, and directly afterwards half a dozen round
shot were sent into our camp; the troops fell in, the Infantry moved
out, and Hope Grant took the Horse Artillery and Cavalry to our right
flank, where the mutineers were collected in considerable numbers. In
less than an hour we had driven them off, but we were not allowed to
follow them up, as Outram did not wish to get entangled in the suburbs
until heavy guns had arrived. The piquets were strengthened and pushed
forward, affording another opportunity for a useful lesson in outpost
duty.

All that day and the next I accompanied my General in his
reconnaissance of the enemy's position, as well as of the ground near
the Gumti, in order to determine where the heavy guns could best
be placed, so as effectually to enfilade the enemy's first line of
defences along the bank of the canal. On returning to report progress
to Outram at mid-day on the 8th, we found Sir Colin Campbell and
Mansfield with him, arranging for a joint attack the following day;
after their consultation was over, they all rode with us to see the
site Hope Grant had selected for the battery. It was a slightly
elevated piece of ground about half a mile north of the Kokrel nulla,
fairly concealed by a bend of the river; but before it could be made
use of it was considered necessary to clear the rebels out of the
position they were occupying between the nulla and the iron bridge,
the key to which was the Chakar Kothi, and Outram was directed to
attack this point the next morning.

At 2 a.m. on the 9th the heavy guns, escorted by the 1st Bengal
Fusiliers, were sent forward to within 600 yards of the enemy.
The troops then moved off in two parties, that on the right being
commanded by Hope Grant. We marched along the Fyzabad road, the two
Rifle Brigade battalions leading the way in skirmishing order, with
the Cavalry well away to the right. The rebels retired as we advanced,
and Walpole, commanding one of our brigades, by wheeling to his left
on reaching the opposite bank of the nulla, was enabled to enfilade
their position. The column was then halted, and I was sent to inform
Outram as to our progress.

When I had delivered my message, and was about to return, Outram
desired me to stay with him until the capture of the Chakar Kothi
(which he was just about to attempt) should be accomplished, that I
might then convey to Hope Grant his orders as to what further action
would be required of him; meanwhile Outram sent a messenger to tell
my General what he was about to do, in view of his co-operating on the
right.[8]

The Chakar Kothi was attacked and taken, and the enemy, apparently
having lost heart, fled precipitately. One of the 1st Bengal
Fusiliers' colours was placed on the top of this three-storied
building by Ensign Jervis to show the Commander-in-Chief that it was
in our possession, and that the time had come for him to attack the
first line of the enemy's defences. We then continued our advance to
the river, where the parties united, and I rejoined Hope Grant.

It was now only 2 p.m., and there was plenty of time to place the
heavy guns in position before dark. Major Lothian Nicholson,[9]
Outram's Commanding Engineer, was superintending this operation, when
he thought he perceived that the enemy had abandoned their first line,
but he could not be quite sure. It was most necessary to ascertain for
certain whether this was the case, as the Infantry of Hope's brigade,
which had attacked and driven the rebels out of the Martinière, could
be seen preparing to assault the works at the other side of the river.
A discussion ensued as to how this knowledge could be obtained, and a
young subaltern of the 1st Bengal Fusiliers, named Butler,[10] offered
to swim across the Gumti, and, if he found the enemy had retired,
to communicate the fact to Hope's men. This feat was successfully
accomplished by the plucky young volunteer; he found the enemy had
retired, and, on giving the information to Hope, the brigade advanced,
and before nightfall the whole of the enemy's first line was in our
possession--a success which had been achieved with but slight loss to
us, the chief casualty during the day being William Peel, the gallant
Commander of the Naval Brigade, who had been seriously wounded while
in command of a battery near the Dilkusha.

The next day, the 10th, Outram's camp was moved close up to the Gumti,
and batteries were constructed from which fire could be poured on the
mess-house and the Kaisarbagh. For the protection of these works,
and to prevent an attack in force being made on the main part of the
column, Hope Grant kept moving about with the Horse Artillery and
Cavalry between the river and the Sitapur road, our reconnaissance
extending beyond the old cantonment. We had several little fights,
in one of which a very promising officer named Sandford, who had
succeeded Younghusband in command of the 5th Punjab Cavalry squadron,
was killed.

At daybreak on the morning of the 11th the batteries opened fire on
the enemy's second line of defence; at the same time Outram himself
led a strong body of Infantry along the river with the object of
securing the approaches to the bridges. On reaching the Fyzabad road,
about half a mile from the iron bridge, Outram placed the 1st Bengal
Fusiliers in a mosque, with orders to entrench themselves and hold
the post, while he pushed on to the stone bridge about a mile away.
Outram's advance was covered by Hope Grant's Horse Artillery and
Cavalry, but we had to keep at some distance away to the right, in
order to avoid houses and walled enclosures. Soon after crossing the
Sitapur road we heard guns to our left, and proceeding at a smart
trot, came up with Outram just as he was about to attack a large body
of the rebels, who, finding themselves in an awkward position, with
the river in their rear and their retreat by the iron bridge cut off,
made but a feeble resistance before they broke and fled. Some few
escaped by the stone bridge, but the greater number, including the
whole of the mutinous 15th Irregular Cavalry, made for the old
cantonment. We pursued with our Cavalry, and very few of them got
away. A couple of guns and a quantity of plunder were left behind by
the enemy, who evidently had not expected us and were quite unprepared
for our attack. Outram pushed on to the stone bridge, but finding he
was losing men from the fire poured upon us by the rebels from the
opposite side of the river, he fell back to the mosque where he had
left the Fusiliers.

That afternoon, as there was nothing particular for the Cavalry to do,
the General, Anson, and I rode across the river to see how matters
were progressing on the left of the attack. We reached the
Head-Quarters camp just as Sir Colin was about to receive a visit of
ceremony from the Nepalese General, the famous Jung Bahadur. Our old
Chief, in honour of the occasion, had doffed his usual workman-like
costume, and wore General's full-dress uniform, but he was quite
thrown into the shade by the splendour of the Gurkha Prince, who was
most gorgeously attired, with magnificent jewels in his turban, round
his neck, and on his coat.

I looked at Jung Bahadur with no small interest, for his deeds of
daring had made him conspicuous amongst probably the bravest race of
men in the world, and the fact that a high-born Hindu, such as he was,
should, fifty years ago, have so far risen superior to caste prejudice
as to cross the sea and visit England, proved him to be a man of
unusually strong and independent mind. He was about five feet eight
inches high--tall for a Gurkha--with a well-knit, wiry figure, a
keen, dauntless eye, and a firm, determined mouth--in every respect a
typical, well-bred Nepalese. The interview did not last long, for Sir
Colin disliked ceremonial, and, shortly after the Nepalese Prince had
taken his seat, news was brought in that the assault on the Begum
Kothi had been successfully completed, upon which Sir Colin made the
necessity for attending to business an excuse for taking leave of his
distinguished visitor, and the interview came to an end.

I then obtained leave to go to the scene of the recent fight, and,
galloping across the canal by the bridge near Banks's house, soon
found myself at the Begum Kothi. There I was obliged to dismount, for
even on foot it was a difficult matter to scramble over the breach.
The place was most formidable, and it was a marvel that it had been
taken with comparatively so little loss on our side. The bodies of a
number of Highlanders and Punjabis were lying about, and a good many
wounded men were being attended to, but our casualties were nothing in
proportion to those of the enemy, 600 or 700 of whom were buried
the next day in the ditch they had themselves dug for their own
protection. A very determined stand had been made by the sepoys when
they found there was no chance of getting away. There were many tales
of hair-breadth escapes and desperate struggles, and on all sides I
hoard laments that Hodson should have been one of those dangerously,
if not mortally, wounded in the strife. Hodson had been carried to
Banks's house, and to the inquiry I made on my way back to camp, as to
his condition, the answer was, 'Little, if any, hope.'

A great stride in the advance had been made on this day. Outram
had accomplished all that was expected of him, and he was now
busy constructing additional batteries for the bombardment of the
Kaisarbagh; while Lugard,[11] from his newly-acquired position at the
Begum Kothi, was also able to bring fire to bear upon that doomed
palace.

Hodson died the following day (the 12th). As a soldier, I had a very
great admiration, for him, and, in common with the whole army, I
mourned his early death.[12]

On the 13th Lugard's division was relieved by Franks's, and to Jung
Bahadur and his Gurkhas, only too eager for the fray, was entrusted
the conduct of operations along the line of the canal between Banks's
house and the Charbagh bridge. On our side of the river nothing of
importance occurred.

The capture of the Imambara (a mosque situated between the Begum Kothi
and the Kaisarbagh) was accomplished early next morning. The assault
was led by Brasyer's Sikhs and a detachment of the 10th Foot,
supported by the remainder of that regiment and the 90th Light
Infantry. After a short but very severe struggle, the enemy were
forced to retire, and were so closely pursued that the storming party
suddenly found themselves in a building immediately overlooking the
Kaisarbagh.

It had not been intended to advance that day beyond the Imambara,
but, recognizing the advantage of the position thus gained, and the
demoralized condition of the rebels, Franks wisely determined to
follow up his success. Reinforcements were hurried forward, the troops
holding the Sikandarbagh and the Shah Najaf were ordered to act in
concert, and before nightfall the Kaisarbagh, the mess-house, and the
numerous buildings situated between those places and the Residency,
were in our possession.

By means of the field telegraph, Outram was kept accurately informed
as to the movements of Franks's division, and he could have afforded
it valuable assistance had he been allowed to cross the Gumti with his
three brigades of Infantry. Outram, with his soldierly instinct, felt
that this was the proper course to pursue; but in reply to his request
to be allowed to push over the river by the iron bridge, he received
from the Commander-in-Chief through Mansfield the unaccountably
strange order that he must not attempt it, if it would entail his
losing 'a single man.' Thus a grand opportunity was lost. The bridge,
no doubt, was strongly held, but with the numerous guns which Outram
could have brought to bear upon its defenders its passage could have
been forced without serious loss; the enemy's retreat would have been
cut off, and Franks's victory would have been rendered complete,
which it certainly was not, owing to Outram's hands having been so
effectually tied.

Lucknow was practically in our hands on the evening of the 14th March,
but the rebels escaped with comparatively slight punishment, and the
campaign, which should have then come to an end, was protracted for
nearly a year by the fugitives spreading themselves over Oudh, and
occupying forts and other strong positions, from which they were able
to offer resistance to our troops until towards the end of May, 1859,
thus causing the needless loss of thousands of British soldiers.[13]
Sir Colin saw his mistake when too late. The next day orders were
issued for the Cavalry to follow up the mutineers, who were understood
to have fled in a northerly direction. One brigade under Campbell (the
Colonel of the Bays) was directed to proceed to Sandila, and another,
under Hope Grant, towards Sitapur. But the enemy was not seen by
either. As usual, they had scattered themselves over the country and
entirely disappeared, and many of the rebels who still remained in the
city seized the opportunity of the Cavalry being absent to get away.

Outram's command on the left bank of the Gumti was now broken up, with
the view to his completing the occupation of the city. Accordingly, on
the 16th, he advanced from the Kaisarbagh with Douglas's brigade[14]
and Middleton's battery, supported by the 20th Foot and Brasyer's
Sikhs, and occupied in quick succession, and with but slight
resistance, the Residency, the Machi Bhawan, and the great Imambara,
thus taking in reverse the defences which had been thrown up by the
enemy for the protection of the two bridges. As Outram pushed on, the
rebels retreated, some across the stone bridge towards Fyzabad, and
some through the city towards the Musabagh. They made two attacks to
cover their retirement, one on Walpole's piquets, which enabled
a large number (20,000 it was said) to get away in the Fyzabad
direction, and another on the Alambagh, which was much more serious,
for the garrison had been reduced to less than a thousand men, and the
rebels' force was considerable, consisting of Infantry, Cavalry and
Artillery. They attacked with great determination, and fought for four
hours and a half before they were driven off.

It was not a judicious move on Sir Colin's part to send the Cavalry
miles away from Lucknow just when they could have been so usefully
employed on the outskirts of the city. This was also appreciated when
too late, and both brigades were ordered to return, which they did on
the 17th. Even then the Cavalry were not made full use of, for instead
of both brigades being collected on the Lucknow bank of the river,
which was now the sole line of retreat left open to the enemy (the
bridges being in our possession), one only (Campbell's) was sent
there, Hope Grant being directed to take up his old position on the
opposite side of the Gumti, from which we had the mortification of
watching the rebels streaming into the open country from the Musabagh,
without the smallest attempt being made by Campbell to stop or pursue
them. His brigade had been placed on the enemy's line of retreat on
purpose to intercept them, but he completely failed to do what was
expected of him. We, on our side, could do nothing, for an unfordable
river flowed between us and the escaping mutineers.[15]

There was one more fight in Lucknow. The Moulvie[16] of Fyzabad (who
from the first was one of the prominent leaders of the rebellion) had
returned at the head of a considerable force, and had placed himself
in a strongly-fortified position in the very centre of the city. It
was not without a severe struggle that he was dislodged by the 93rd
Highlanders and 4th Punjab Infantry under Lugard. The brunt of the
fighting fell upon the last-named regiment, the gallant Commander
(Wilde) of which, and his second in command,[17] were severely
wounded. The Moulvie made his escape, but his followers were pursued,
and many of them were cut up. Thus at last the city was cleared of
rebels, and we were once more masters in Lucknow.

On the 22nd March Hope Grant was ordered to proceed to Kursi, a small
town about twenty-five miles off between the Sitapur and Fyzabad
roads, reported to be occupied in force by the enemy.

We started at midnight with a brigade of Infantry, 1,000 Cavalry, two
troops of Horse Artillery, and eight heavy guns and mortars. We were
delayed some hours by the heavy guns and their escort (the 53rd Foot)
taking a wrong turn when leaving the city, which resulted in the enemy
being warned of our approach in time to clear out before we arrived.

On hearing they had gone, Hope Grant pushed on with the mounted
portion of the force, and we soon came in sight of the enemy in full
retreat. The Cavalry, commanded by Captain Browne,[18] was ordered
to pursue. It consisted of Browne's own regiment (the 2nd Punjab
Cavalry), a squadron of the 1st Punjab Cavalry under Captain Cosserat,
and three Horse Artillery guns. At the end of two miles, Browne came
upon a body of the mutineers formed up on an open plain. The Cavalry
charged through them three times, each time thinning their ranks
considerably, but they never wavered, and in the final charge avenged
themselves by killing Macdonnell (the Adjutant of the 2nd Punjab
Cavalry), and mortally wounding Cosserat. I arrived on the ground with
Hope Grant just in time to witness the last charge and the fall of
these two officers, and deplorable as we felt their loss to be, it was
impossible not to admire the gallantry and steadiness of the sepoys,
every one of whom fought to the death.

[Illustration: GENERAL SIR SAMUEL BROWNE, V.C., G.C.B., K.C.S.I.
_From a photograph by Messrs. Elliott and Fry._]

As soon as Browne could got his men together, the pursuit of the enemy
was continued; no further opposition was met with, and fourteen guns
fell into our hands.

On the 24th we retraced our steps, halting for the night at the old
cantonment of Muriao, where we buried poor Macdonnell. On the 25th we
crossed the Gumti, and pitched our camp near the Dilkusha.

Lucknow was now completely in our possession, and our success had been
achieved with remarkably slight loss, a result which was chiefly
due to the scientific manner in which the siege operations had been
carried on under the direction of our talented Chief Engineer, Robert
Napier, ably assisted by Colonel Harness; and also to the good use
which Sir Colin Campbell made of his powerful force of Artillery. Our
casualties during the siege amounted to only 16 British officers, 3
Native officers, and 108 men killed; 51 British officers, 4 Native
officers, and 540 men wounded, while 13 men were unaccounted for.

The capture of Lucknow, though not of such supreme importance in its
consequences as the taking of Delhi, must have convinced the rebels
that their cause was now hopeless. It is true that Jhansi had not yet
fallen, and that the rest of Oudh, Rohilkand, and the greater part
of Central India remained to be conquered, but there was no very
important city in the hands of the enemy, and the subjugation of the
country was felt to be merely a matter of time. Sir Hugh Rose, after a
brilliant campaign, had arrived before Jhansi, columns of our troops
were traversing the country in every direction, and the British Army
had been so largely increased that, on the 1st of April, 1858, there
were 96,000 British soldiers in India, besides a large body of
reliable Native troops, some of whom, although hurriedly raised, had
already shown that they were capable of doing good service--a very
different state of affairs from that which prevailed six months
before.

For some time I had been feeling the ill effects of exposure to the
climate and hard work, and the doctor, Campbell Browne, had been
urging me to go on the sick-list; that, of course, was out of the
question until Lucknow had fallen. Now, however, I placed myself in
Browne's hands, hoping that a change to the Hills was all that was
needed to set me up; but the doctors insisted on a trip to England. It
was a heavy blow to me to have to leave while there was still work to
be done, but I had less hesitation than I should have had if most
of my own immediate friends had not already gone. Several had been
killed, others had left sick or wounded; Watson had gone to Lahore,
busily engaged in raising a regiment of Cavalry;[19] Probyn was on his
way home, invalided; Hugh Gough had gone to the Hills to recover from
his wounds; and Norman and Stewart were about to leave Lucknow with
Army Head-Quarters.

On the 1st April, the sixth anniversary of my arrival in
India, I made over my office to Wolseley, who succeeded me as
Deputy-Assistant-Quartermaster-General on Hope Grant's staff, and
towards the middle of the month I left Lucknow.

The Commander-in-Chief was most kind and complimentary when I took
leave of him, and told me that, in consideration of my services,
he would bestow upon me the first permanent vacancy in the
Quartermaster-General's Department, and that he intended to recommend
that I should be given the rank of Brevet-Major so soon as I should
be qualified by becoming a regimental Captain. I was, of course, much
gratified by his appreciative words and kindly manner; but the brevet
seemed a long way off, for I had only been a First Lieutenant for less
than a year, and there were more than a hundred officers in the Bengal
Artillery senior to me in that rank!

I marched to Cawnpore with Army Head-Quarters. Sir William Peel, who
was slowly recovering from his wound, was of the party. We reached
Cawnpore on the 17th, and the next day I said good-bye to my friends
on the Chief's staff. Peel and I dined together on the 19th, when to
all appearances he was perfectly well, but on going into his room
the next morning I found he was in a high fever, and had some
suspicious-looking spots about his face. I went off at once in search
of a doctor, and soon returned with one of the surgeons of the 5th
Fusiliers, who, to my horror--for I had observed that Peel was nervous
about himself--exclaimed with brutal frankness the moment he entered
the room, 'You have got small-pox.' It was only too true. On being
convinced that this was the case, I went to the chaplain, the Rev.
Thomas Moore, and told him of Peel's condition. Without an instant's
hesitation, he decided the invalid must come to his house to be taken
care of. That afternoon I had the poor fellow carried over, and there
I left him in the kind hands of Mrs. Moore, the _padre's_ wife, who
had, as a special case, been allowed to accompany her husband to
Cawnpore. Peel died on the 27th. On the 4th May I embarked at Calcutta
in the P. and O. steamer _Nubia_, without, alas! the friend whose
pleasant companionship I had hoped to have enjoyed on the voyage.

[Illustration: PLAN TO ILLUSTRATE THE SIEGE AND CAPTURE OF LUCKNOW,
March, 1858]


[Footnote 1: The Infantry portion of the army was divided into three
divisions, commanded respectively by Outram, Lugard, and Walpole. This
was exclusive of Franks's column, which joined at Lucknow and made a
fourth division. The Artillery was placed under Archdale Wilson, and
the Engineers under Robert Napier. Sir Colin's selection of Commanders
caused considerable heart-burnings, especially amongst the senior
officers who had been sent out from England for the purpose of being
employed in the field. But, as the Chief explained to the Duke of
Cambridge, the selection had been made with the greatest care, it
having been found that 'an officer unexperienced in war in India
cannot act for himself ... it is quite impossible for him to be able
to weigh the value of intelligence ... he cannot judge what are the
resources of the country, and he is totally unable to make an estimate
for himself of the resistance the enemy opposed to him is likely to
offer.' Sir Colin wound up his letter as follows: 'I do not wish to
undervalue the merits of General or other officers lately arrived
from England, but merely to indicate to your Royal Highness the
difficulties against which they have to contend. What is more, the
state of things at present does not permit of trusting anything to
chance, or allowing new-comers to learn, except under the command of
others.'--Shadwell's 'Life of Lord Clyde.']

[Footnote 2: The late Captain Oliver Jones, who published his
experiences under that title.]

[Footnote 3: Literally 'blue cow,' one of the bovine antelopes.]

[Footnote 4: A few days afterwards, when we were some miles from the
scene of our adventure, I was awakened one morning by the greyhound
licking my face; she had cleverly found me out in the midst of a large
crowded camp.]

[Footnote 5: Peel had changed his 24-pounders for the more powerful
64-pounders belonging to H.M.S. _Shannon_.]

[Footnote 6:

  Naval Brigade                   431
  Artillery                     1,745
  Engineers                       865
  Cavalry                       3,169
  Infantry                     12,498
  Franks's Division             2,880
  Nepalese Contingent           9,000
                               ------
                               30,588]

[Footnote 7: Kaye, in his 'History of the Indian Mutiny,' gives
the credit for originating this movement to the Commander-in-Chief
himself; but the present Lord Napier of Magdala has letters in his
possession which clearly prove that the idea was his father's,
and there is a passage in General Porter's 'History of the Royal
Engineers,' vol. ii., p. 476, written after he had read Napier's
letters to Sir Colin Campbell, which leaves no room for doubt as to my
version being the correct one.]

[Footnote 8: Outram's division consisted of the 23rd Royal Welsh
Fusiliers, 79th Highlanders, 2nd and 3rd battalions of the Rifle
Brigade, 1st Bengal Fusiliers, 2nd Punjab Infantry, D'Aguilar's,
Remmington's and Mackinnon's troops of Horse Artillery, Gibbon's and
Middleton's Field Batteries, and some Heavy guns, 2nd Dragoon Guards,
9th Lancers, 2nd Punjab Cavalry, and Watson's and Sandford's squadrons
of the 1st and 5th Punjab Cavalry.]

[Footnote 9: The late Lieutenant-General Sir Lothian Nicholson,
K.C.B.]

[Footnote 10: Now Colonel Thomas Butler, V.C.]

[Footnote 11: Now General the Right Hon. Sir Edward Lugard, G.C.B.]

[Footnote 12: It was current in camp, and the story has often been
repeated, that Hodson was killed in the act of looting. This certainly
was not the case. Hodson was sitting with Donald Stewart in the
Head-Quarters camp, when the signal-gun announced that the attack on
the Begum Kothi was about to take place. Hodson immediately mounted
his horse, and rode off in the direction of the city. Stewart, who had
been ordered by the Commander-in-Chief to accompany the troops, and
send an early report to his Excellency of the result of the assault,
had his horse ready, and followed Hodson so closely that he kept him
in sight until within a short distance of the fighting, when Stewart
stopped to speak to the officer in charge of Peel's guns, which had
been covering the advance of the troops. This delayed Stewart for a
few minutes only, and as he rode into the court-yard of the palace a
Highland soldier handed him a pistol, saying, 'This is your pistol,
sir; but I thought you were carried away mortally wounded a short time
ago?' Stewart at once conjectured that the man had mistaken him for
Hodson. In face they were not much alike, but both were tall, well
made and fair, and Native soldiers had frequently saluted one for the
other. It is clear from this account that Hodson could not have been
looting, as he was wounded almost as soon as he reached the palace.]

[Footnote 13: In the month of May, 1858, alone, not less than a
thousand British soldiers died of sunstroke, fatigue and disease, and
about a hundred were killed in action.]

[Footnote 14: Consisting of the 23rd Fusiliers, 79th Highlanders, and
1st Bengal Fusiliers.]

[Footnote 15: Captain Wale, a gallant officer who commanded a newly
raised corps of Sikh Cavalry, lost his life on this occasion. He
persuaded Campbell to let him follow up the enemy, and was shot dead
in a charge. His men behaved extremely well, and one of them, by name
Ganda Sing, saved the life of the late Sir Robert Sandeman, who was a
subaltern in the regiment. The same man, two years later, saved the
late Sir Charles Macgregor's life during the China war, and when I was
Commander-in-Chief in India I had the pleasure of appointing him to be
my Native Aide-de-Camp. Granda Sing, who has now the rank of Captain
and the title of _Sirdar Bahadur_, retired last year with a handsome
pension and a small grant of land.]

[Footnote 16: A Mahomedan Priest.]

[Footnote 17: Now General Cockburn Hood, C.B.]

[Footnote 18: Now General Sir Samuel Browne, V.C., G.C.B. This popular
and gallant officer, well known to every Native in Upper India as
'S[=a]m Br[=u]n _Sahib_,' and to the officers of the whole of Her
Majesty's army as the inventor of the sword-belt universally adopted
on service, distinguished himself greatly in the autumn of 1858. With
230 sabres of his own regiment and 350 Native Infantry, he attacked a
party of rebels who had taken up a position at Nuria, a village at the
edge of the Terai, about ten miles from Pilibhit. Browne managed to
get to the rear of the enemy without being discovered; a hand-to-hand
fight then ensued, in which he got two severe wounds--one on the knee,
from which he nearly bled to death, the other on the left shoulder,
cutting right through the arm. The enemy were completely routed, and
fled, leaving their four guns and 300 dead on the ground. Browne was
deservedly rewarded with the V.C.]

[Footnote 19: The present 13th Bengal Lancers.]

       *       *       *       *       *




CHAPTER XXX.

  What brought about the Mutiny?
  --Religious fears of the people--The land question
  --The annexation of Oudh--Fulfilment of Malcolm's prophecy
  --The Delhi royal family--The Nana Sahib--The Native army
  --Greased cartridges--Limited number of British troops
  --Objection to foreign service--Excessive age of the British officers


'What brought about the Mutiny?' and 'Is there any chance of a similar
rising occurring again?' are questions which are constantly being put
to me; I will now endeavour to answer them, though it is not a very
easy task--for I feel that my book will be rendered more interesting
and complete to many if I endeavour to give them some idea of the
circumstances which, in my opinion, led to that calamitous crisis in
the history of our rule in India, and then try to show how I think a
repetition of such a disaster may best be guarded against.

The causes which brought about the Mutiny were so various, and some of
them of such long standing, that it is difficult to point them out as
concisely as I could wish; but I will be as brief as possible.

During the first years of our supremacy in India, Hindus and
Mahomedans alike were disposed to acquiesce in our rule--the blessings
of rest and peace after a long reign of strife and anarchy were too
real not to be appreciated; but as time went by, a new generation
sprang up by whom past miseries were forgotten, and those who had real
grievances, or those who were causelessly discontented, were all ready
to lay the blame for their real or fancied troubles on their foreign
rulers. Mahomedans looked back to the days of their Empire in India,
but failed to remember how completely, until we broke the Mahratta
power, the Hindus had got the upper hand. Their Moulvies taught them
that it was only lawful for true Mussulmans to submit to the rule of
an infidel if there was no possibility of successful revolt, and they
watched for the chance of again being able to make Islam supreme. The
Hindus had not forgotten that they had ousted the Mahomedans, and they
fancied that the fate of the British _raj_ might also be at their
mercy.

The late Sir George Campbell, in his interesting memoirs, says: 'The
Mutiny was a sepoy revolt, not a Hindu rebellion.' I do not altogether
agree with him; for, although there was no general rising of the rural
population, the revolt, in my judgment, would never have taken place
had there not been a feeling of discontent and disquiet throughout
that part of the country from which our Hindustani sepoys chiefly
came, and had not certain influential people been thoroughly
dissatisfied with our system of government. This discontent and
dissatisfaction were produced by a policy which, in many instances,
the Rulers of India were powerless to avoid or postpone, forced upon
them as it was by the demands of civilization and the necessity for a
more enlightened legislation. Intriguers took advantage of this state
of affairs to further their own ends. Their plan of action was to
alienate the Native army, and to increase the general feeling of
uneasiness and suspicion, by spreading false reports as to the
intentions of the authorities in regard to the various measures which
had been adopted to promote the welfare and prosperity of the masses.
It can hardly be questioned that these measures were right and proper
in themselves, but they were on that account none the less obnoxious
to the Brahmin priesthood, or distasteful to the Natives generally.
In some cases also they were premature, and in others they were not
carried out as judiciously as they might have been, or with sufficient
regard to the feelings and prejudices of the people.

The prohibition of _sati_ (burning widows on the funeral pyres of
their husbands); the putting a stop to female infanticide; the
execution of Brahmins for capital offences; the efforts of
missionaries and the protection of their converts; the removal of all
legal obstacles to the remarriage of widows; the spread of western and
secular education generally; and, more particularly, the attempt to
introduce female education, were causes of alarm and disgust to the
Brahmins, and to those Hindus of high caste whose social privileges
were connected with the Brahminical religion. Those arbiters of
fate, who were until then all-powerful to control every act of their
co-religionists, social, religious or political, were quick to
perceive that their influence was menaced, and that their sway would
in time be wrested from them, unless they could devise some means for
overthrowing our Government. They knew full well that the groundwork
of this influence was ignorance and superstition, and they stood
aghast at what they foresaw would be the inevitable result of
enlightenment and progress. Railways and telegraphs were specially
distasteful to the Brahmins: these evidences of ability and strength
were too tangible to be pooh-poohed or explained away. Moreover,
railways struck a direct blow at the system of caste, for on them
people of every caste, high and low, were bound to travel together.

The fears and antagonism of the Brahmins being thus aroused, it
was natural that they should wish to see our rule upset, and they
proceeded to poison the minds of the people with tales of the
Government's determination to force Christianity upon them, and
to make them believe that the continuance of our power meant the
destruction of all they held most sacred.

Nor was opportunity wanting to confirm, apparently, the truth of their
assertions. In the gaols a system of messing had been established
which interfered with the time-honoured custom of every man being
allowed to provide and cook his own food. This innovation was most
properly introduced as a matter of gaol discipline, and due care was
taken that the food of the Hindu prisoners should be prepared by
cooks of the same or superior caste. Nevertheless, false reports were
disseminated, and the credulous Hindu population was led to believe
that the prisoners' food was in future to be prepared by men of
inferior caste, with the object of defiling and degrading those for
whom it was prepared. The news of what was supposed to have happened
in the gaols spread from town to town and from village to village,
the belief gradually gaining ground that the people were about to be
forced to embrace Christianity.

As the promiscuous messing story did not greatly concern the
Mahomedans, other cries were made use of to create suspicion and
distrust amongst the followers of the Prophet. One of these, which
equally affected the Hindu and Mahomedan, was the alleged unfairness
of what was known in India as the land settlement, under which system
the right and title of each landholder to his property was examined,
and the amount of revenue to be paid by him to the paramount Power, as
owner of the soil, was regulated.

The rapid acquisition of territory by the East India Company, and
the establishment of its supremacy as the sovereign Power throughout
India, were necessarily effected by military operations; but as peace
and order were established, the system of land revenue, which had
been enforced in an extremely oppressive and corrupt manner under
successive Native Rulers and dynasties, had to be investigated and
revised. With this object in view, surveys were made, and inquiries
instituted into the rights of ownership and occupancy, the result
being that in many cases it was found that families of position and
influence had either appropriated the property of their humbler
neighbours, or evaded an assessment proportionate to the value of
their estates. Although these inquiries were carried out with the best
intentions, they were extremely distasteful to the higher classes,
while they failed to conciliate the masses. The ruling families deeply
resented our endeavours to introduce an equitable determination of
rights and assessment of land revenue. They saw that it would put an
end to the system of pillage and extortion which had been practised
from time immemorial; they felt that their authority was being
diminished, and that they would no longer be permitted to govern their
estates in the same despotic manner as formerly. On the other hand,
although the agricultural population generally benefited materially
by our rule, they could not realize the benevolent intentions of a
Government which tried to elevate their position and improve their
prospects. Moreover, there were no doubt mistakes made in the
valuation of land, some of it being assessed at too high a rate, while
the revenue was sometimes collected in too rigid a manner, sufficient
allowance not being made for the failure of crops. Then the harsh
law for the sale of proprietary rights in land to realize arrears of
land-tax was often enforced by careless revenue authorities in far too
summary a manner. The peasantry of India were, and still are, ignorant
and apathetic. Accustomed from the earliest days to spoliation and
oppression, and to a periodical change of masters, they had some
reason to doubt whether the rule of the Feringhis would be more
permanent than that of the Moghuls or the Mahrattas. Much as a just
and tolerant Government would have been to their advantage, they were
unable to appreciate it, and if they had appreciated it, they were too
timid and too wanting in organization to give it their open support.
Under these social and political conditions, the passive attitude of
the rural population failed to counterbalance the active hostility
of a large section of the upper classes, and of their predatory
followers, who for centuries had lived by plunder and civil war.

Another weighty cause of discontent, chiefly affecting the wealthy and
influential classes, and giving colour to the Brahmins' accusation
that we intended to upset the religion and violate the most cherished
customs of the Hindus, was Lord Dalhousie's strict enforcement of
the doctrine of the lapse of property in the absence of direct or
collateral heirs, and the consequent appropriation of certain Native
States, and the resumption of certain political pensions by the
Government of India. This was condemned by the people of India as
grasping, and as an unjustifiable interference with the institutions
of the country, and undoubtedly made us many enemies.[1]

Later on, the annexation of Oudh, which was one of those measures
forced on the Rulers of India in the interests of humanity and good
government, and which could hardly have been longer delayed, created
suspicion and apprehension amongst all the Native States. For more
than sixty years Governor-General after Governor-General had pointed
out the impossibility of a civilized Government tolerating in the
midst of its possessions the misrule, disorder, and debauchery
which were desolating one of the most fertile and thickly-populated
districts in India.

As early as 1801 Lord Wellesley wrote: 'I am satisfied that no
effectual security can be provided against the ruin of the province
of Oudh until the exclusive management of the civil and military
government of that country shall be transferred to the Company under
suitable provisions for the Nawab and his family.'

In 1831 Lord William Bentinck warned the King of Oudh that, unless
he would consent to rule his territories in accordance with the
principles of good government and the interest of the people, the East
India Company would assume the entire administration of the province,
and would make him a state prisoner.

In 1847 Lord Hardinge went in person to Lucknow and solemnly
reiterated the warning, giving the King two years to reform his
administration.

In 1851 Colonel Sleeman, the Resident at Lucknow, whose sympathy with
the Rulers of Native States was thought to be even too great, and
who was the last person to exaggerate the misrule existing in Oudh,
reported to Lord Dalhousie that the state of things had become
intolerable, and that, if our troops were withdrawn from Oudh, the
landholders would in one month's time overrun the province and pillage
Lucknow. It is true Sleeman, with his Native proclivities, did not
contemplate annexation; his advice was to 'assume the administration,'
but not to 'grasp the revenues of the country.' The same mode of
procedure had been advocated by Henry Lawrence six years before in an
article which appeared in the _Calcutta Review_. His words were: 'Let
Oudh be at last governed, not for one man, the King, but for the King
and his people. Let the administration of the country be Native; let
not one rupee come into the Company's coffers.'

Sleeman was followed in 1854 by Colonel Outram, than whom he could
not have had a more admirable successor, or one less likely to be
unnecessarily hard upon a State which, with all its shortcomings, had
been loyal to us for nearly a century. Colonel Outram, nevertheless,
fully endorsed the views of his predecessor. General Low, the then
Military Member of Council, who twenty years before, when Resident
at Lucknow, had deprecated our assuming even temporarily the
administration of Oudh, thinking our action would be misunderstood by
the people, now also stated his conviction that 'it was the paramount
duty of the British Government to interfere at once for the protection
of the people of Oudh.'

In summing up the case, Lord Dalhousie laid three possible courses of
action before the authorities in England. The King of Oudh might be
forced to abdicate, his province being incorporated in the British
dominions; or he might be maintained in his royal state as a
subsidized Prince, the actual government being permanently transferred
to the East India Company; or the transfer of the government to
the East India Company might be for a limited period only. The
Governor-General recommended the second course, but the Court of
Directors and Her Majesty's Ministers decided to adopt the first,
and requested Lord Dalhousie to carry out the annexation before he
resigned his office.

This measure, so long deferred and so carefully considered, could
hardly, in my opinion, have been avoided by a civilized and civilizing
Government. It was at last adopted with the utmost reluctance, and
only after the experiment of administering a province for the benefit
of the Natives, without annexing it, had been tried in the Punjab
and had signally failed. To use Lord Dalhousie's words, it was amply
justified on the ground that 'the British Government would be guilty
in the sight of God and man if it were any longer to aid in sustaining
by its countenance an administration fraught with suffering to
millions.' But the Natives generally could not understand the
necessity for the measure, or believe in the reasons which influenced
us; many of them, therefore, considered it an unprovoked usurpation,
and each Ruler of a Native State imagined that his turn might come
next.

Thus, the annexation of Oudh in one sense augmented that weakness in
our position as an eastern Power which, so to speak, had its source
in our strength. So long as there was a balance of power
between ourselves and Native States--Mahratta, Rajput, Sikh, or
Mahomedan--they were prevented by their mutual jealousies and
religious differences from combining against us; but when that balance
was destroyed and we became the paramount Power in India, the period
of danger to us began, as was prophesied by the far-seeing Malcolm in
the early days of our first conquests. We had now become objects of
suspicion and dread to all the lesser Powers, who were ready to sink
their own disputes in the consideration of the best means to check the
extension of our rule and overthrow our supremacy; while we, inflated
by our power and satisfied with our apparent security, became more
dogmatic and uncompromising in enforcing principles which, though
sound and just in themselves, were antipathetic to Native ideas and
traditions. By a great many acts and measures we made them feel how
completely our ideas differed from theirs. They preferred their own,
and strongly resented our increasing efforts to impose ours upon them.
Even those amongst the Native Princes who were too enlightened to
believe that we intended to force our religion upon them and change
all their customs, felt that their power was now merely nominal, and
that every substantial attribute of sovereignty would soon disappear
if our notions of progress continued to be enforced.

At a time when throughout the country there existed these feelings of
dissatisfaction and restless suspicion, it was not to be expected that
the most discontented and unfriendly of the Native Rulers would not
seize the opportunity to work us mischief. The most prominent of these
amongst the Mahomedans were the royal family of Delhi and the ex-King
of Oudh, and, amongst the Hindus, Dundu Pant, better known by English
people as the 'Nana Sahib.'

All three considered themselves badly treated, and no doubt, from
their point of view, their grievances were not altogether groundless.
The King of Oudh's I have already indicated, and when his province was
annexed, he was removed to Calcutta. Having refused the yearly pension
of twelve lakhs[2] of rupees offered to him, and declined to sign the
treaty by which his territory was made over to the British Government,
he sent his mother, his son, and his brother to England to plead his
cause for him.

The most influential of the three discontented Rulers, or, at all
events, the one whom the rebellious of all castes and religions were
most inclined to put forward as their nominal leader, was the head of
the Delhi royal family, by name Bahadur Shah. He was eighty years old
in 1857, and had been on the throne for twenty years. His particular
grievance lay in the fact of our decision that on his death the
title of King, which we had bestowed on the successors of the Moghul
Emperor, should be abolished, and his family removed from Delhi.

In the early part of the century Lord Wellesley pointed out the danger
of allowing a Mahomedan Prince, with all the surroundings of royalty,
to remain at the seat of the old Moghul government, but the question
was allowed to remain in abeyance until 1849, when Lord Dalhousie
reconsidered it, and obtained the sanction of the authorities in
England to the removal of the Court from Delhi to a place about
fourteen miles off, where the Kutub tower stands. At the same time the
Heir Apparent was to be told that on his father's death the title of
King of Delhi would cease.

Lord Dalhousie had been only a short time in India when he took
up this question, and he could not properly have appreciated the
estimation in which the Natives held the King of Delhi, for he wrote
in support of his proposals 'that the Princes of India and its people
had become entirely indifferent to the condition of the King or his
position.' But when the decision of the British Government on the
subject reached India, he had been more than two years in the country,
and although his views as to the desirability of the measure remained
unchanged, the experience he had gained enabled him to gauge more
accurately the feelings of the people, and, with the advice of his
Council, he came to the conclusion that it would be wiser to let
affairs remain _in statu quo_ during Bahadur Shah's lifetime. The
royal family were informed accordingly, and an agreement was drawn up,
signed, sealed, and witnessed, by which the Heir Apparent accepted the
conditions to be imposed upon him on the death of his father, who was
to be allowed to remain in Delhi during his lifetime, with all the
paraphernalia of royalty.

However satisfactory this arrangement might be to the Government of
India, to every member of the Delhi royal family it must have seemed
oppressive and humiliating to the last degree. Outwardly they appeared
to accept the inevitable quietly and submissively, but they were only
biding their time, and longing for an opportunity to throw off the
hated English yoke. The war with Persia in 1856 seemed to offer the
chance they wanted. On the pretence that the independence of Herat
was threatened by the Amir of Kabul, the Persians marched an army to
besiege that place. As this act was a violation of our treaty with
Persia made three years before, Her Majesty's Government directed that
an army should be sent from India to the Persian Gulf. The troops had
scarcely left Bombay before the Lieutenant-Governor of the North-West
Provinces was warned by a Native correspondent that the King of
Delhi was intriguing with the Shah of Persia. At the same time a
proclamation was posted on the walls of the Jama Masjid (Shah Jehan's
famous mosque at Delhi), to the effect that a Persian army was coming
to relieve India from the presence of the English, and calling on all
true believers to rise and fight against the heretics. Reports were
also diligently circulated of our being defeated on the shores of
the Persian Gulf, and the people were made to believe that their
opportunity had arrived, and that the time was now favourable for a
successful rebellion.

Of the three principal movers in the events which immediately preceded
the Mutiny, the Nana Sahib was by far the most intelligent, and had
mixed most with Europeans. He was the adopted son and heir of the last
of the Peshwas, the Chiefs of the Mahratta confederacy. His cause of
dissatisfaction was the discontinuance to him of a pension which, at
the close of the Mahratta war in 1818, was granted to the Peshwa, on
the clear understanding that it was to cease at his death. The Peshwa
died in 1851, leaving the Nana an enormous fortune; but he was not
content. The lapse of the pension, to which he was not entitled,
rankled in his breast, and when all his efforts to get it restored
to him proved of no avail, he became thoroughly disgusted and
disaffected. After failing to obtain in India a reconsideration of
the decision of the Government on the subject, he sent to England
as confidential agent a Mahomedan of the name of Azimula Khan, who
remained three years in Europe, residing for the most part in London;
but he also visited Paris, Constantinople, and the Crimea, arriving at
the latter place when we, in alliance with the French, were besieging
Sebastopol. He was a man of no rank or position in his own country, a
mere agent of the Nana's, but he was received into the best English
society, was everywhere treated as a royal Prince, and became engaged
to a young English girl, who agreed to follow him to India to be
married. All this was revealed by the correspondence to which I have
referred as having been found in the Nana's palace of Bithur. The
greater number of these letters were from people in England--not a few
from ladies of rank and position. One elderly dame called him her dear
eastern son. There were numerous letters from his English _fiancée_,
and two from a Frenchman of the name of Lafont,[3] relating to some
business with the French settlement of Chandernagore, with which he
had been entrusted by Azimula Khan, acting for the Nana. Written, as
these letters were, immediately before the Mutiny, in which the Nana
was the leading spirit, it seems probable that '_les principales
choses_,' to which Lafont hopes to bring satisfactory answers, were
invitations to the disaffected and disloyal in Calcutta, and perhaps
the French settlers at Chandernagore, to assist in the effort about to
be made to throw off the British yoke. A portion of the correspondence
was unopened, and there were several letters in Azimula's own
handwriting which had not been despatched. Two of these were to Omar
Pasha at Constantinople, and told of the sepoys' discontent and the
troubled state of India generally. That the Nana was intriguing with
the King of Delhi, the Nawab of Oudh, and other great personages, has
been proved beyond a doubt, although at the time he was looked upon by
the British residents at Cawnpore as a perfectly harmless individual,
in spite of its being known that he considered himself aggrieved on
account of his having been refused the continuance of the pension, and
because a salute of guns (such as it is the custom to give to Native
Princes on entering British territory) had not been accorded to him.

While the spirit of rebellion was thus being fostered and stirred into
active existence throughout the country, it was hardly to be hoped
that the Native army would be allowed to remain unaffected by a
movement which could not easily attain formidable proportions without
the assistance of the Native soldiers, who themselves, moreover, had
not remained unmoved spectators of all that had happened during the
previous thirty or forty years. The great majority of the sepoys were
drawn from the agricultural classes, especially in the province
of Oudh, and were therefore directly interested in all questions
connected with rights of property, tenure of land, etc.; and questions
of religion and caste affected them equally with the rest of the
population.

Quietly, but surely, the instigators of rebellion were preparing the
Native army for revolt. The greatest cunning and circumspection were,
however, necessary to success. There were so many opposing interests
to be dealt with, Mahomedans and Hindus being as violently hostile to
each other, with regard to religion and customs, as they were to us.
Soldiers, too, of all ranks had a great stake in their profession.
Some had nearly served their time for their pensions, that greatest
of all attractions to the Native to enter the army, for the youngest
recruit feels that, if he serves long enough, he is sure of an income
sufficient to enable him to sit in the sun and do nothing for the rest
of his days--a Native's idea of supreme happiness. The enemies of our
rule generally, and the fanatic in particular, were, however, equal
to the occasion. They took advantage of the widespread discontent to
establish the belief that a systematic attack was to be made on the
faith and habits of the people, whether Hindu or Mahomedan, and, as a
proof of the truth of their assertions, they alleged that the Enfield
cartridges which had been recently issued to the army were greased
with a mixture of cows' fat and lard, the one being as obnoxious to
the Hindu as the other is to the Mahomedan. The news spread throughout
the Bengal Presidency; the sepoys became alarmed, and determined to
suffer any punishment rather than pollute themselves by biting the
contaminating cartridge, as their doing so would involve loss of
caste, which to the Hindu sepoy meant the loss of everything to him
most dear and sacred in this world and the next. He and his family
would become outcasts, his friends and relations would look on him
with horror and disgust, while eternal misery, he believed, would be
his doom in the world to come.

It has been made quite clear that a general belief existed amongst the
Hindustani sepoys that the destruction of their caste and religion had
been finally resolved upon by the English, as a means of forcing them
to become Christians, and it seems extraordinary that the English
officers with Native regiments were so little aware of the strength of
this impression amongst their men.

The recent researches of Mr. Forrest in the records of the Government
of India prove that the lubricating mixture used in preparing the
cartridges was actually composed of the objectionable ingredients,
cows' fat and lard, and that incredible disregard of the soldiers'
religious prejudices was displayed in the manufacture of these
cartridges. When the sepoys complained that to bite them would destroy
their caste, they were solemnly assured by their officers that they
had been greased with a perfectly unobjectionable mixture. These
officers, understanding, as all who have come in contact with Natives
are supposed to understand, their intense abhorrence of touching the
flesh or fat of the sacred cow or the unclean pig, did not believe it
possible that the authorities could have been so regardless of the
sepoys' feelings as to have allowed it to be used in preparing their
ammunition: they therefore made this statement in perfect good faith.
But nothing was easier than for the men belonging to the regiments
quartered near Calcutta to ascertain, from the low-caste Native
workmen employed in manufacturing the cartridges at the Fort William
arsenal, that the assurances of their officers were not in accordance
with facts, and they were thus prepared to credit the fables which the
sedition-mongers so sedulously spread abroad, to the effect that the
Government they served and the officers who commanded them had entered
into a deliberate conspiracy to undermine their religion.

Notwithstanding all the evil influence brought to bear on the Native
army, I do not think that the sepoys would have proved such ready
instruments in the hands of the civilian intriguers, had that army
been organized, disciplined, and officered in a satisfactory manner,
and had there been a sufficient proportion of British troops in India
at the time. To the great preponderance of Native, as compared with
British, troops may be attributed the fact that the sepoys dared to
break into open mutiny. Moreover, the belief of the Natives in the
invincibility of the British soldier, which formerly enabled small
numbers of Europeans to gain victories over large Native armies, had
been seriously weakened by the lamentable occurrences at Kabul during
the first Afghan war, terminating in the disastrous retreat in the
winter of 1841-42.

To add to the exalted idea the sepoys were beginning to entertain of
their own importance, they were pampered by their officers and the
civil Government to a most absurd extent, being treated under all
circumstances with far greater consideration than the European
soldiers. For instance, in the time of Lord William Bentinck flogging
was abolished in the Native army,[4] while still in full swing amongst
British soldiers, and sepoys were actually allowed to witness the
humiliation of their white comrades when this degrading form of
punishment was inflicted upon them.

In the early days of our connexion with India, we had no need for
an army. Living, as we were, on sufferance in a foreign land for
commercial purposes, armed men were only required to guard the
factories. As these factories increased in size and importance, these
armed men were given a semi-military organization, and in time they
were formed into levies as a reserve to the few Europeans entertained
by the merchants, to enable them to hold their own against the French,
who were then beginning to dispute with us for supremacy in southern
India. When employed in the field, the Native troops were associated
with a varying proportion of British soldiers, but the number of the
latter was limited by the expense of their maintenance, the difficulty
of supplying them from England, and the unadvisability of locking up a
part of the British army in distant stations, which at that time
were very inaccessible and generally unhealthy. Native troops were
therefore raised in continually increasing numbers, and after the
battle of Plassey the Native army was rapidly augmented, especially
in the Bengal Presidency; and, trained and led as it was by British
officers, it achieved remarkable successes.

During the thirteen years preceding the Mutiny, the Native army,
numbering 217,000 men and 176 guns, was increased by 40,000 men and 40
guns, but no addition was made to the small British force of 38,000
until 1853, when one regiment was added to each Presidency, or less
than 3,000 soldiers in all. This insignificant augmentation was
subsequently more than neutralized by the withdrawal of six British
regiments from India to meet the requirements of the Crimean and
Persian wars. Lord Dalhousie, Governor-General in 1854, saw the danger
of this great preponderance of Native troops. He represented that the
annexations and conquests which had taken place during his tenure of
office necessitated a proportional increase of British soldiers; he
protested against the withdrawal of a single European regiment, either
on account of the war with Russia or for operations in the Persian
Gulf, and he solemnly warned Her Majesty's Government that the
essential element of our strength in India was the presence of a large
number of British troops.

No attention, however, was paid to Lord Dalhousie's representations by
the authorities in England, who doubtless thought they understood the
requirements of India better than the Governor-General, with his
more than six years' experience of the country. In spite of his
remonstrances, two regiments were ordered to England, and four were
sent later to the Persian Gulf, with the result which I have already
stated.

When the Mutiny broke out, the whole effective British force in India
only amounted to 36,000 men, against 257,000 Native soldiers,[5] a
fact which was not likely to be overlooked by those who hoped and
strived to gain to their own side this preponderance of numerical
strength, and which was calculated to inflate the minds of the sepoys
with a most undesirable sense of independence. An army of Asiatics,
such as we maintain in India, is a faithful servant, but a treacherous
master; powerfully influenced by social and religious prejudices with
which we are imperfectly acquainted, it requires the most careful
handling; above all, it must never be allowed to lose faith in the
prestige or supremacy of the governing race. When mercenaries feel
that they are indispensable to the maintenance of that authority which
they have no patriotic interest in upholding, they begin to consider
whether it would not be more to their advantage to aid in overthrowing
that authority, and if they decide that it would be, they have little
scruple in transferring their allegiance from the Government they
never loved, and have ceased to fear, to the power more in accordance
with their own ideas, and from which, they are easily persuaded, they
will obtain unlimited benefits.

A fruitful cause of dissatisfaction in our Native army, and one which
pressed more heavily upon it year by year, as our acquisitions of
territory in northern India became more extended, was the sepoy's
liability to service in distant parts of India, entailing upon him a
life amongst strangers differing from him in religion and in all their
customs, and far away from his home, his family, and his congenial
surroundings--a liability which he had never contemplated except in
the event of war, when extra pay, free rations and the possibility
of loot, would go far to counterbalance the disadvantages of
expatriation. Service in Burma, which entailed crossing the sea, and,
to the Hindu, consequent loss of caste, was especially distasteful. So
great an objection, indeed, had the sepoys to this so-called 'foreign
service,' and so difficult did it become to find troops to relieve the
regiments, in consequence of the bulk of the Bengal army not being
available for service beyond the sea, that the Court of Directors
sanctioned Lord Canning's proposal that, after the 1st September,
1856, 'no Native recruit shall be accepted who does not at the time of
his enlistment undertake to serve beyond the sea whether within
the territories of the Company or beyond them.' This order, though
absolutely necessary, caused the greatest dissatisfaction amongst
the Hindustani sepoys, who looked upon it as one of the measures
introduced by the _Sirkar_ for the forcible, or rather fraudulent,
conversion of all the Natives to Christianity.[6]

That the long-existing discontent and growing disloyalty in our
Native army might have been discovered sooner, and grappled with in a
sufficiently prompt and determined manner to put a stop to the Mutiny,
had the senior regimental and staff officers been younger, more
energetic, and intelligent, is an opinion to which I have always been
strongly inclined. Their excessive age, due to a strict system of
promotion by seniority which entailed the employment of Brigadiers of
seventy, Colonels of sixty, and Captains of fifty, must necessarily
have prevented them performing their military duties with the energy
and activity which are more the attributes of younger men, and must
have destroyed any enthusiasm about their regiments, in which there
was so little hope of advancement or of individual merit being
recognized. Officers who displayed any remarkable ability were allowed
to be taken away from their own corps for the more attractive and
better-paid appointments appertaining to civil employ or the Irregular
service. It was, therefore, the object of every ambitious and capable
young officer to secure one of these appointments, and escape as soon
as possible from a service in which ability and professional zeal
counted for nothing.[7]

So far as I understand the causes which led to the rebellion of 1857,
I have now answered the question, 'What brought about the Mutiny?' The
reply to the second question, 'Is there any chance of a similar rising
occurring again?' must be left to another chapter.


[Footnote 1: In this matter it seems to me that Lord Dalhousie's
policy has been unfairly criticized. The doctrine of lapse was no
new-fangled theory of the Governor-General, but had been recognized
and acted upon for many years by the Native dynasties which preceded
the East India Company. Under the Company's rule the Court of
Directors had investigated the subject, and in a series of despatches
from 1834 to 1846 had laid down that, in certain cases, the selection
and adoption of an heir by a Native Ruler was an incontestable right,
subject only to the formal sanction of the suzerain Power, while in
other cases such a procedure was optional, and could only be permitted
as a special favour. Lord Dalhousie concurred in the view that each
case should be considered and decided on its merits. His words were:
'The Government is bound in duty, as well as in policy, to act on
every such occasion with the purest integrity, and in the most
scrupulous observance of good faith. Where even a shadow of doubt can
be shown, the claim should at once be abandoned. But where the right
to territory by lapse is clear, the Government is bound to take that
which is justly and legally its due, and to extend to that territory
the benefits of our sovereignty, present and prospective.']

[Footnote 2: In those days £120,000.]

[Footnote 3:

    'Benares,
    '_April 4, 1857._

    'MON CHER AZIMULA KHAN,

    'Je suis parti de Cawnpore le premier du mois et suis arrivé ici
    ce matin, je partirai ce soir et serai à Chandernagore le 7 au
    matin, dans la journée je ferai une visite au Gouverneur et
    le lendemain irai à Calcutta, je verrai notre Consul General.
    Ecrivez-moi et adressez-moi vos lettres, No. 123, Dhurumtollah. Je
    voudrais que vous puissiez m'envoyer des fonds au moins 5 ou
    600 Rs. sans retard, car je ne resterai à Calcutta que le temps
    nécessaire pour tout arranger et _le bien arranger_. Je suppose 48
    heures à Calcutta et deux ou trois jours au plus à Chandernagore,
    ne perdez pas de temps mais répondez de suite. Pour toutes les
    principales choses les réponses seraient satisfaisantes, soyez-en
    assuré.

    'Faites en sorte de me répondre sans délai afin que je ne sois pas
    retenu à Calcutta.

    'Présentez mes compliments respectueux.

    'Rappelez-moi au souvenir de Baba Sahib, et croyez moi,
    'Votre bien dévoué
    'A. LAFONT.

    'Mon adresse à Chandernagore, "Care of Mesdames Albert."

    'N.B.--Mais écrivez-moi à _Calcutta_, car je serai chaque jour là,
    en chemin de fer, je fais le trajet en 20 minutes. Si vous avez
    quelque chose de pressé à me communiquer vous le pouvez faire par
    télégraph en Anglais seulement.
    'A.L.'


    'Chandernagore,
    '_April 9, 1857._

    'MON CHER AZIMULA KHAN,

    'J'ai tout arrangé, _j'apporterai une lettre_, et elle sera
    satisfaisante _cette lettre_ me sera donnée le 14 et le 15 je
    partirai pour Cawnpore. Mes respects à son Altesse.

    'Votre tout dévoué
    'A. LAFONT.']

[Footnote 4: Flogging was re-introduced in 1845.]

[Footnote 5: This does not include the bodies of armed and trained
police, nor the lascars attached to the Artillery as fighting men.
These amounted to many thousands.]

[Footnote 6: In a letter to Lord Canning, which Sir Henry Lawrence
wrote on the 9th May, 1857, he gave an interesting account of a
conversation he had had with a Brahmin Native officer of the Oudh
Artillery, who was most persistent in his belief that the Government
was determined to make the people of India Christians. He alluded
especially to the new order about enlistment, our object being, he
said, to make the sepoys go across the sea in order that they might be
obliged to eat what we liked; and he argued that, as we had made our
way through India, had won Bhartpur, Lahore, etc., by fraud, so it
might be possible that we would mix bone-dust with grain sold to
Hindus. Sir Henry Lawrence was quite unable to convince the Native
officer; he would give us credit for nothing, and although he would
not say that he himself _did_ or did _not_ believe, he kept repeating,
'I tell you Natives are all like sheep; the leading one tumbles, and
down all the rest roll over him.']

[Footnote 7: It is curious to note how nearly every military officer
who held a command or high position on the staff in Bengal when the
Mutiny broke out, disappeared from the scene within the first few
weeks, and was never heard of officially again. Some were killed, some
died of disease, but the great majority failed completely to fulfil
the duties of the positions they held, and were consequently
considered unfit for further employment. Two Generals of divisions
were removed from their commands, seven Brigadiers were found wanting
in the hour of need, and out of the seventy-three regiments of Regular
Cavalry and Infantry which mutinied, only four Commanding officers
were given other commands, younger officers being selected to raise
and command the new regiments.]

       *       *       *       *       *




CHAPTER XXXI.

  Discontent of the Natives--Successful administrators
  --Paternal despotism--Money-lenders and the Press--Faddists
  --Cardinal points


The India of to-day is altogether a different country from the
India of 1857. Much has been done since then to improve the civil
administration, and to meet the legitimate demands of the Native
races. India is more tranquil, more prosperous, and more civilized
than it was before the Mutiny, and the discipline, efficiency, and
mobility of the Native army have been greatly improved. Much, however,
still remains to be done, and a good deal might with advantage be
undone, to secure the contentment of the Natives with our rule.

Our position has been materially strengthened by the provision of main
and subsidiary lines of communication by road and railway; by the
great network of telegraphs which now intersects the country; and by
the construction of canals. These great public works have largely
increased the area of land under cultivation, minimized the risk of
famine, equalized the prices of agricultural produce, and developed a
large and lucrative export trade. Above all, while our troops can now
be assembled easily and rapidly at any centre of disturbance, the
number of British soldiers has been more than doubled and the number
of Native soldiers has been materially reduced. Moreover, as regards
the Native equally with the British army of India, I believe that
a better feeling never existed throughout all ranks than exists at
present.

Nevertheless, there are signs that the spirit of unrest and discontent
which sowed the seeds of the Mutiny is being revived. To some extent
this state of things is the natural result of our position in
India, and is so far unavoidable, but it is also due to old faults
reappearing--faults which require to be carefully watched and guarded
against, for it is certain that, however well disposed as soldiers the
men in our ranks may be, their attitude will inevitably be influenced
by the feelings of the people generally, more especially should their
hostility be aroused by any question connected with religion.

For a considerable time after the Mutiny we became more cautious and
conciliatory in administrative and legislative matters, more intent
on doing what would keep the Chiefs and Rulers satisfied, the masses
contented, and the country quiet, than on carrying out our own ideas.
Gradually this wholesome caution is being disregarded. The Government
has become more and more centralized, and the departmental spirit
very strong. Each department, in its laudable wish for progress and
advancement, is apt to push on measures which are obnoxious to the
Natives, either from their not being properly understood, or from
their being opposed to their traditions and habits of life, thus
entailing the sacrifice of many cherished customs and privileges. Each
department admits in theory the necessity for caution, but in practice
presses for liberty of action to further its own particular schemes.

Of late years, too, the tendency has been to increase the number of
departments and of secretariat offices under the supreme Government,
and this tendency, while causing more work to devolve on the supreme
Government than it can efficiently perform, results in lessening
the responsibility of provincial Governments by interference in the
management of local concerns. It is obvious that in a country like
India, composed as it is of great provinces and various races
differing from one another in interests, customs, and religions, each
with its own peculiar and distinct necessities, administrative details
ought to be left to the people on the spot. The Government of India
would then be free to exercise a firm and impartial control over the
Empire and Imperial interests, while guiding into safe channels,
without unduly restraining, intelligent progress.

In times of peace the administration is apt to fall too exclusively
into the hands of officials whose ability is of the doctrinaire type;
they work hard, and can give logical and statistical reasons for the
measures they propose, and are thus able to make them attractive to,
and believed in by, the authorities. But they lack the more perfect
knowledge of human nature, and the deeper insight into, and greater
sympathy with, the feelings and prejudices of Asiatics, which those
possessed in a remarkable degree who proved by their success that they
had mastered the problem of the best form of government for India.
I allude to men like Thomas Munro, Mountstuart Elphinstone, John
Malcolm, Charles Metcalfe, George Clerk, Henry and John Lawrence,
William Sleeman, James Outram, Herbert Edwardes, John Nicholson, and
many others. These administrators, while fully recognizing the need
for a gradual reform, understood the peculiarities of our position
in the east, the necessity for extreme caution and toleration, and a
'live and let live' policy between us and the Natives. The sound and
broad views of this class of public servant are not always appreciated
either in India or England, and are too often put aside as
unpractical, obstructive, and old-fashioned.

Amongst the causes which have produced discontent of late years,
I would mention our forest laws and sanitary regulations, our
legislative and fiscal systems--measures so necessary that no
one interested in the prosperity of India could cavil at their
introduction, but which are so absolutely foreign to Native ideas,
that it is essential they should be applied with the utmost gentleness
and circumspection.

I think, also, that the official idea of converting the young Princes
and Nobles of India into English gentlemen by means of English tutors
and English studies should be carried out with great care and caution.
It has not hitherto invariably succeeded, and the feeling in many
States is strongly opposed to it. The danger of failure lies in the
wholesome restraint of the tutor being suddenly removed, and in the
young Prince being left at too early an age to select his advisers and
companions. The former, perhaps not unnaturally, are interested
in proving that the training of their young Ruler by his European
governor or tutor has not resulted in good either to himself or his
people, while the latter are too often of the lowest class of European
adventurers.

The proceedings and regulations of the Forest Department, desirable
as they may be from a financial and agricultural point of view, have
provoked very great irritation in many parts of India. People who have
been accustomed from time immemorial to pick up sticks and graze their
cattle on forest lands, cannot understand why they should now be
forbidden to do so, nor can they realize the necessity for preserving
the trees from the chance of being destroyed by fire, a risk to which
they were frequently exposed from the Native custom of making use of
their shelter while cooking, and of burning the undergrowth to enrich
the grazing.

The action taken by the Government in sanitary matters has also
aroused much ill-feeling and apprehension. Sanitary precautions are
entirely ignored in eastern countries. The great majority of the
people can see no good in them, and no harm in using the same tank
for drinking purposes and for bathing and washing their clothes. The
immediate surroundings of their towns and villages are most offensive,
being used as the general receptacles for dead animals and all kinds
of filth. Cholera, fever, and other diseases, which carry off hundreds
of thousands every year, are looked upon as the visitation of God,
from which it is impossible, even were it not impious to try, to
escape; and the precautionary measures insisted upon by us in our
cantonments, and at the fairs and places of pilgrimage, are viewed
with aversion and indignation. Only those who have witnessed the
personal discomfort and fatigue to which Natives of all ages and both
sexes willingly submit in their struggle to reach some holy shrine on
the occasion of a religious festival, while dragging their weary limbs
for many hundreds of miles along a hot, dusty road, or being huddled
for hours together in a crammed and stifling railway carriage, can
have any idea of the bitter disappointment to the pilgrims caused
by their being ordered to disperse when cholera breaks out at such
gatherings, without being given the opportunity of performing their
vows or bathing in the sacred waters.[1]

Further, our legislative system is based on western ideas, its object
being to mete out equal justice to the rich and poor, to the Prince
and peasant. But our methods of procedure do not commend themselves
to the Indian peoples. Eastern races are accustomed to a paternal
despotism, and they conceive it to be the proper function of the local
representatives of the supreme Power to investigate and determine on
the spot the various criminal and civil cases which come under the
cognizance of the district officials. Legal technicalities and
references to distant tribunals confuse and harass a population which,
with comparatively few exceptions, is illiterate, credulous, and
suspicious of underhand influence. An almost unlimited right of
appeal from one court to another, in matters of even the most trivial
importance, not only tends to impair the authority of the local
magistrate, but gives an unfair advantage to the wealthy litigant
whose means enable him to secure the services of the ablest pleader,
and to purchase the most conclusive evidence in support of his claims.
For it must be remembered than in India evidence on almost any subject
can be had for the buying, and the difficulty, in the administration
of justice, of discriminating between truth and falsehood is thereby
greatly increased. Under our system a horde of unscrupulous pleaders
has sprung up, and these men encourage useless litigation, thereby
impoverishing their clients, and creating much ill-feeling against our
laws and administration.

Another point worthy of consideration is the extent to which, under
the protection of our legal system, the peasant proprietors of
India are being oppressed and ruined by village shop-keepers and
money-lenders. These men advance money at a most exorbitant rate of
interest, taking as security the crops and occupancy rights of the
cultivators of the soil. The latter are ignorant, improvident, and
in some matters, such as the marriage ceremonies of their families,
inordinately extravagant. The result is that a small debt soon swells
into a big one, and eventually the aid of the law courts is invoked to
oust the cultivator from a holding which, in many cases, has been
in the possession of his ancestors for hundreds of years. The
money-lender has his accounts to produce, and these can hardly be
disputed, the debtor as a rule being unable to keep accounts of his
own, or, indeed, to read or write. Before the British dominion
was established in India, the usurer no doubt existed, but his
opportunities were fewer, his position more precarious, and his
operations more under control than they are at present. The
money-lender then knew that his life would not be safe if he exacted
too high interest for the loans with which he accommodated his
customers, and that if he became too rich, some charge or other would
be trumped up against him, which would force him to surrender a large
share of his wealth to the officials of the State in which he was
living. I do not say that the rough-and-ready methods of Native
justice in dealing with money-lenders were excusable or tolerable, but
at the same time I am inclined to think that, in granting these men
every legal facility for enforcing their demands and carrying on their
traffic, we may have neglected the interests of the agriculturists,
and that it might be desirable to establish some agency under the
control of Government, which would enable the poorer landholders to
obtain, at a moderate rate of interest, advances proportionate to the
security they had to offer.[2]

Another danger to our supremacy in India is the license allowed to
the Native press in vilifying the Government and its officials, and
persistently misrepresenting the motives and policy of the ruling
Power. In a free country, where the mass of the population is well
educated, independent, and self-reliant, a free press is a most
valuable institution, representing as it does the requirements and
aspirations of important sections of the community, and bringing to
light defects and abuses in the social and political system. In a
country such as Great Britain, which is well advanced in the art of
self-government, intolerant and indiscriminate abuse of public men
defeats its own object, and misstatements of matters of fact can be
at once exposed and refuted. Like most of the developments of
civilization which are worth anything, the English press is a plant
of indigenous growth, whereas in India the Native press is an exotic
which, under existing conditions, supplies no general want, does
nothing to refine, elevate, or instruct the people, and is used by its
supporters and promoters--an infinitesimal part of the population--as
a means of gaining its selfish ends, and of fostering sedition, and
racial and religious animosities. There are, I am afraid, very few
Native newspapers actuated by a friendly or impartial spirit towards
the Government of India, and to Asiatics it seems incredible that we
should permit such hostile publications to be scattered broadcast over
the country, unless the assertions were too true to be disputed, or
unless we were too weak to suppress them. We gain neither credit nor
gratitude for our tolerant attitude towards the Native press--our
forbearance is misunderstood; and while the well-disposed are
amazed at our inaction, the disaffected rejoice at being allowed to
promulgate baseless insinuations and misstatements which undermine our
authority, and thwart our efforts to gain the goodwill and confidence
of the Native population.

Yet another danger to the permanence of our rule in India lies in the
endeavours of well-intentioned faddists to regulate the customs and
institutions of eastern races in accordance with their own ideas.
The United Kingdom is a highly civilized country, and our habits and
convictions have been gradually developed under the influences of our
religion and our national surroundings. Fortunately for themselves,
the people of Great Britain possess qualities which have made them
masters of a vast and still expanding Empire. But these qualities have
their defects as well as their merits, and one of the defects is a
certain insularity of thought, or narrow-mindedness--a slowness to
recognize that institutions which are perfectly suitable and right for
us may be quite unsuited, if not injurious, to other races, and that
what may not be right for us to do is not necessarily wrong for people
of a different belief, and with absolutely different traditions and
customs.

Gradually the form of Government in the United Kingdom has become
representative and democratic, and it is therefore assumed by some
people, who have little, if any, experience of the east, that
the Government of India should be guided by the utterances of
self-appointed agitators who pose as the mouth-pieces of an oppressed
population. Some of these men are almost as much aliens[3] as
ourselves, while others are representatives of a class which, though
intellectually advanced, has no influence amongst the races in whom
lies the real strength of India. Municipal self-government has been
found to answer well in the United Kingdom, and it is held, therefore,
that a similar system must be equally successful in India. We in
England consume animal food and alcoholic liquors, but have no liking
for opium; an effort has accordingly been made to deprive our Asiatic
fellow-subjects, who, as a rule, are vegetarians, and either total
abstainers or singularly abstemious in the matter of drink, of a small
and inexpensive stimulant, which they find necessary to their health
and comfort. British institutions and ideas are the embodiment of
what long experience has proved to us to be best for ourselves; but
suddenly to establish these institutions and enforce these ideas on
a community which is not prepared for them, does not want them, and
cannot understand them, must only lead to suspicion and discontent.
The Government of India should, no doubt, be progressive in its
policy, and in all things be guided by the immutable principles of
right, truth, and justice; but these principles ought to be applied,
not necessarily as we should apply them in England, but with due
regard to the social peculiarities and religious prejudices of the
people whom it ought to be our aim to make better and happier.

It will be gathered from what I have written that our administration,
in my opinion, suffers from two main defects. First, it is internally
too bureaucratic and centralizing in its tendencies; and, secondly, it
is liable to be forced by the external pressure of well-meaning but
irresponsible politicians and philanthropists to adopt measures which
may be disapproved of by the authorities on the spot, and opposed to
the wishes, requirements, and interests of the people. It seems to me
that for many years to come the best form of government for India will
be the intelligent and benevolent despotism which at present rules the
country. On a small scale, and in matters of secondary importance,
representative institutions cannot perhaps do much harm, though I am
afraid they will effect but little good. On a large scale, however,
such a system of government would be quite out of place in view of
the fact that ninety-nine out of every hundred of the population are
absolutely devoid of any idea of civil responsibility, and that the
various races and religious sects possess no bond of national union.

In reply, then, to the question, 'Is there any chance of a Mutiny
occurring again?' I would say that the best way of guarding against
such a calamity is--

    By never allowing the present proportion of British to Native
    soldiers to be diminished or the discipline and efficiency of the
    Native army to become slack.

    By taking care that men are selected for the higher civil and
    military posts whose self-reliance, activity, and resolution are
    not impaired by age, and who possess a knowledge of the country
    and the habits of the peoples.

    By recognizing and guarding against the dogmatism of theorists and
    the dangers of centralization.

    By rendering our administration on the one hand firm and strong,
    on the other hand tolerant and sympathetic; and last, but not
    least, by doing all in our power to gain the confidence of the
    various races, and by convincing them that we have not only the
    determination, but the ability to maintain our supremacy in India
    against all assailants.

If these cardinal points are never lost sight of, there is, I believe,
little chance of any fresh outbreak disturbing the stability of our
rule in India, or neutralizing our efforts to render that country
prosperous, contented, and thoroughly loyal to the British Crown.


[Footnote 1: Few acts have been more keenly resented than the closing
of the great Hurdwar Fair in the autumn of 1892, on account of a
serious outbreak of cholera. It was looked upon by the Natives as a
direct blow aimed at their religion, and as a distinct departure from
the religious tolerance promised in Her Majesty's proclamation of
1858. The mysterious mud marks on mango-trees in Behar have been
attributed by some to a self-interested motive on the part of certain
priests to draw the attention of Hindus to the sanctity of some temple
outside the limits of British jurisdiction, where the devotees would
be at liberty to assemble in any numbers without being troubled by
officious inspectors, and where they could remain as long as they
pleased, irrespective of the victims daily claimed by cholera, that
unfailing avenger of the neglect of sanitary laws in the east.]

[Footnote 2: The proposal would seem to be quite a practical one, for
I read in the _Times_ of the 28th November, 1894, that the Government
of New Zealand invited applications for Consols in connexion with the
scheme for granting loans at a reasonable rate of interest to farmers
on the security of their holdings.]

[Footnote 3: I allude to the Parsis, who came from Persia, and whose
religion and customs are as distinct from those of the Natives of
India as are our own.]

       *       *       *       *       *




CHAPTER XXXII.
1858-1859

  Home again--Back in India--Allahabad and Cawnpore
  --The Viceroy's camp--State entry into Lucknow
  --The Talukdars of Oudh--Loyalty of the Talukdars
  --Cawnpore and Fatehgarh--The Agra Durbar


I travelled home _viâ_ Corfu, Trieste, Venice, and Switzerland,
arriving in England towards the end of June. The intense delight
of getting 'home' after one's first term of exile can hardly be
exaggerated, and certainly cannot be realized, save by those who have
gone through the exile, and been separated, as I had been for years,
from all that made the happiness of my early life. Every English tree
and flower one comes across on first landing is a distinct and lively
pleasure, while the greenness and freshness are a delicious rest to
the eye, wearied with the deadly whitey-brown sameness of dried-up
sandy plains, or the all-too gorgeous colouring of eastern cities and
pageants.

My people were living in Ireland, in the county of Waterford, so after
only a short sojourn in London, for the very necessary re-equipment
of the outer man, I hastened over there. I found my father well
and strong for a man of seventy-four, and to all appearance quite
recovered from the effects of his fifty years of Indian service, and,
to my great joy, my mother was looking almost as young, and quite as
beautiful, as I had left her six years before. My little sister, too,
always an invalid, was very much as when I had parted from her--full
of loving-kindness for everyone, and, though unable to move without
help, perfectly happy in the many resources she had within herself,
and the good she was able to do in devoting those resources to the
benefit of others.

There, too, I found my fate, in the shape of Nora Bews, a young lady
living with a married sister not far from my father's place, who a
few months later consented to accompany me on my return to India. The
greater part of my leave was, therefore, spent in Ireland.

During the winter months I hunted with the Curraghmore hounds, and was
out with them the day before Lord Waterford was killed. We had no run,
and at the end of the day, when wishing us good-bye, he said: 'I hope,
gentlemen, we shall have better luck next time.' 'Next time' there was
'better luck' as regarded the hunting, but the worst of all possible
luck for Lord Waterford's numerous friends; in returning home after a
good run, and having killed two foxes, his horse stumbled over quite
a small ditch, throwing his rider on his head; the spinal cord was
snapped and the fine sportsman breathed his last in a few moments.

I was married on the 17th May, 1859, in the parish church of
Waterford. While on our wedding tour in Scotland, I received a command
to be present on the 8th June at Buckingham Palace, when the Queen
proposed to honour the recipients of the Victoria Cross by presenting
the decoration with Her Majesty's own hands.

Being anxious that my wife should be spared the great heat of a
journey to India in July, the hottest month of the year in the Red
Sea, and the doctors being very decided in their opinion that I should
not return so soon, I had applied for a three months' extension of
leave, and quite calculated on getting it, so our disappointment
was great when the answer arrived and I found that, if I took the
extension, I should lose my appointment in the Quartermaster-General's
Department. This, we agreed, was not to be thought of, so there was
nothing for it but to face the disagreeable necessity as cheerfully
as we could. We made a dash over to Ireland, said good-bye to our
relations, and started for India on the 27th June.

[Illustration: LADY ROBERTS
(WIFE OF SIR ABRAHAM ROBERTS).
_From a sketch by Carpenter._]

The heat in the Red Sea proved even worse than I had anticipated. Our
captain pronounced it the hottest trip he had ever made. Twice was the
ship turned round to steam against the wind for a short time in order
to revive some of the passengers, who were almost suffocated.

We passed the wreck of the _Alma_, a P. and O. vessel which had struck
on a coral reef not far from Mocha. The wreck had happened in the dead
of night, and there had been only time to get the passengers into the
boats, in which they were rowed to another reef near at hand; there
they had remained for eighty hours in their scanty night garments, and
without the smallest shelter, until rescued by a friendly steamer. The
officers and crew were still on the rock when we passed, endeavouring
to get up the mails and the passengers' property. We supplied them
with provisions and water, of which they were badly in need, and then
had to leave them in their extremely uncomfortable position.

We could not complain of lack of air after we passed Aden, for we
forthwith encountered the south-west monsoon, then at its height, and
on entering the Bay of Bengal we experienced something very nearly
akin to a cyclone. We broke our rudder; the lightships, on which a
certain number of pilots were always to be found, had all been blown
out to sea; and as we had only just sufficient coal to take us up the
Hugli when the pilot should appear, we did not dare to keep up steam.
Thus we had to remain at the mercy of the winds and waves for some
days, until at length a brig with a pilot on board was sent to look
for us, and eventually we arrived in Calcutta, in rather a dilapidated
condition, on the 30th July.

We were not cheered by the orders I found awaiting me, which were to
proceed to Morar and join Brigadier-General Sir Robert Napier, then in
command of the Gwalior district. Morar in the month of August is one
of the hottest places in India, and my wife was considerably the worse
for our experiences at sea. However, a Calcutta hotel never has many
attractions, and at that time of year was depressing and uncomfortable
to the last degree; in addition, I had rather a severe attack of my
old enemy, Peshawar fever, so we started on our journey 'up country'
with as little delay as possible.

The railway at that time was not open further than Raniganj; thence we
proceeded for a hundred miles in a 'dâk-ghari,' when, changing into
doolies, we continued our journey to Hazaribagh, a little cantonment
about twenty miles off the main road, where some relations of mine
were living; but a day or two after our arrival at their hospitable
house, I was ordered back to Calcutta.

I left my wife with our kind friends, and retraced my steps in
considerable elation of spirits, for the China expedition was even
then being talked about, and I hoped this sudden summons might
possibly mean that I was to be sent with it in some capacity. On
reaching Calcutta, however, I was told that I had been appointed
to organize and take charge of the large camp to be formed for the
triumphal progress which Lord Canning proposed to make through Oudh,
the North-West Provinces, and the Punjab, with the view of meeting
the principal feudatory Chiefs, and rewarding those who had been
especially loyal during the rebellion. I was informed that the tents
were in store in the arsenal at Allahabad, and that the camp must be
ready at Cawnpore on the 15th October, on which date the Viceroy would
arrive, and a day or two later commence his stately procession towards
Lucknow.

While I was in England a Royal Proclamation had announced to the
people of India that the Queen had taken over the government of their
country, which had hitherto been held in trust for Her Majesty by the
Honourable East India Company. This fact had been publicly proclaimed,
with befitting ceremony, throughout the length and breadth of the
land, on the 1st November, 1858. At the same time it was announced
that Her Majesty's representative in India was henceforth to be styled
Viceroy and Governor-General of India, and it was with the object of
emphasizing this Proclamation, and impressing the Native mind with the
reality of Queen Victoria's power and authority, that Lord Canning
decided on undertaking this grand tour.

While in Calcutta on this occasion, I was offered a post in the
Revenue Survey Department. I refused it, for, although as a married
man the higher pay was a tempting bait, the recollection of the
excitement and variety of the year of the Mutiny was still fresh upon
me, and I had no wish to leave the Quartermaster-General's Department.
I therefore started for Allahabad, picking up my wife _en route_.

It was then the middle of the rains, and the bridge of boats over
the Jumna had been taken down, so we had to cross in ferry-boats--
dâk-gharis, horses, and all--rather a perilous-looking proceeding,
for the river was running at a tremendous pace, and there was some
difficulty in keeping the boat's head straight. At Allahabad we
stayed with a brother officer of mine in the fort, while I was
getting the camp equipage out of store, and the tents pitched for
inspection. There had not been a large camp for many years, and
everything in India deteriorates so rapidly, that I found most of the
tents in such a state of mildew and decay as to render it necessary
to renew them almost entirely before they could be used for such a
splendid occasion as that of the first Viceroy's first march through
the re-conquered country.

From Allahabad we proceeded to Cawnpore, where I had a busy time
arranging for the multifarious requirements of such an enormous camp;
and sometimes I despaired of its being completed by the appointed
date. However, completed it was; and on the 15th October Lord and Lady
Canning arrived, and expressed themselves so pleased with all the
arrangements, and were so kindly appreciative of the exertions I had
made to be ready for them by the appointed time, that I felt myself
fully rewarded for all my trouble.

The next day I took my wife to call upon Lady Canning, whose
unaffected and simple, yet perfectly dignified manner completely
charmed her, and from that day she was devoted, in common with
everyone who was at all intimately associated with Lady Canning, to
the gentle, gracious lady, who was always kindness itself to her.

On the 18th the Viceroy made his first march towards Lucknow. The camp
equipage was in duplicate, so that everyone on arriving at the new
halting-place found things exactly the same as in the tents they had
left.

The camp occupied a considerable space; for, in addition to the
Viceroy's large _entourage_, ground had to be provided for the
Commander-in-Chief and the officers of Army Head-Quarters, who
were marching with us; then there were the post-office, telegraph,
workshops, _toshikhana_,[1] commissariat, and a host of other offices
to be accommodated, beside the escort, which consisted of a battery of
Horse Artillery, a squadron of British Cavalry, a regiment of British
Infantry, a regiment of Native Cavalry, a regiment of Native Infantry,
and the Viceroy's Bodyguard. For the Viceroy, his staff, guests, and
secretaries alone, 150 large tents were pitched in the main street,
and when we came to a station the duplicate tents were also pitched.
For the transport of this portion of the camp equipage 80 elephants
and 500 camels were required.[2]

It is very difficult to give any idea of the extraordinary spectacle a
big camp like this presents on the line of march. The followers, as a
rule, are accompanied by their wives and families, who are piled upon
the summits of laden carts, or perched on the loads borne by the
baggage animals. In the two camps marching together (Lord Canning's
and Lord Clyde's) there could not have been less than 20,000
men, women, and children--a motley crowd streaming along about
four-and-twenty miles of road, for the day's march was usually about
twelve miles, and before every one had cleared out of the camp
occupied the night before, the advance guard had begun to arrive on
the ground to be occupied the next day. The strictest discipline had
to be maintained, or this moving colony would have been a serious
calamity to the peasantry, for the followers would have spread
themselves over the country like a flight of locusts, and taken
anything they could lay their hands on, representing themselves
as _Mulk-i-Lord-Sahib-Ke-Naukar_,[3] whom according to immemorial
tradition it was death to resist. The poor, frightened country-people,
therefore, hardly ventured to remonstrate at the _mahouts_ walking off
with great loads of their sugar-cane, or to object to the compulsory
purchase of their farm produce for half its value. There was a great
deal of this kind of raiding at the commencement of the march, and
I was constantly having complaints made to me by the villagers; but
after I had inflicted on the offenders a few summary and tolerably
severe punishments, and made the peasants to understand it was not the
_Mulk-i-Lord-Sahib's_ wish that they should submit to such treatment
from his servants, order was established, and I had very rarely any
trouble.

Our first halt was at Lucknow. Sir Hope Grant was commanding the
division, and had established himself very comfortably in the
Dilkusha. He had written asking me to bring my wife straight there and
stay with him during the Viceroy's visit, as it was still very hot in
tents during the day. An invitation which I gladly accepted, for it
was pleasant to think of being with my old General again, and I wanted
to introduce him to my wife.

The next day, the 22nd October, the state entry was made into Lucknow.
It must have been an imposing sight, that long array of troops
and guns, with Lord Canning in the centre, accompanied by the
Commander-in-Chief, and surrounded by their respective staffs in full
uniform. Lord Canning, though at that time not given to riding, looked
remarkably well on horseback; for he had a fine head and shoulders,
and sat his horse well; on foot, his height, not being quite in
proportion, rather detracted from the dignity of his presence.

I headed the procession, leading it across the Charbagh bridge, the
scene of Havelock's fiercest encounter, past the Machi Bhawan, and the
Residency, to the Kaisarbagh, in front of which were drawn up in a
body the Talukdars of Oudh, who had with difficulty been persuaded
to come and make their obeisance, for, guiltily conscious of their
disloyalty during the rebellion, they did not feel at all sure that
the rumours that it was intended to blow them all away from guns, or
to otherwise summarily dispose of them, were not true. They salaamed
respectfully as the Viceroy passed, and the cavalcade proceeded to the
Martinière park, where the camp, which I had pitched the previous day,
lay spread before us, in all the spotless purity of new white tents
glistening in a flood of brilliant sunshine. The streets through which
we passed were crowded with Natives, who--cowed, but not tamed--looked
on in sullen defiance, very few showing any sign of respect for the
Viceroy.

Sir William and Lady Mansfield, and several other people from our camp
were also staying with Sir Hope Grant, and that evening the whole
Dilkusha party went to a state dinner given by Lord and Lady Canning.
The latter was a delightful hostess; the shyest person was set at ease
by her kindly, sympathetic manner, and she had the happy knack of
making her guests feel that her entertainments were a pleasure to
herself--the surest way of rendering them enjoyable to those she
entertained.

I made use of the next week, which was for me a comparatively idle
time, to take my wife over the ground by which we had advanced two
years before, and explain to her the different positions held by the
enemy. She was intensely interested in visiting the Sikandarbagh, the
Shah Najaf, the mess-house, and, above all, that glorious memorial
of almost superhuman courage and endurance, the Residency, ruined,
roofless, and riddled by round shot and bullets. Very little had then
been done towards opening out the city, and the surroundings of the
Residency were much as they had been during the defence--a labyrinth
of streets and lanes; it was therefore easier for the stranger to
realize exactly what had taken place than it is now that the landmarks
have been cleared away, and well-laid-out gardens and broad roads have
taken the place of jungle and narrow alleys.

On the 26th the Viceroy held a grand durbar for the reception of the
Talukdars. It was the first function of the sort I had witnessed, and
was an amusing novelty to my wife, who, with Lady Canning and some
of the other ladies in camp, viewed the proceedings from behind a
semi-transparent screen, it not being considered at that time the
thing for ladies to appear at ceremonials when Natives were present.
The whole scene was very impressive, though not as brilliant in
colouring as it would have been in any other part of India, owing
to the Chiefs of Oudh being clad in simple white, as is the custom
amongst Rajputs.

The Talukdars, to the number of one hundred and sixty, were ushered to
their places in strict order of seniority, the highest in rank being
the last to arrive. They were arranged in a half semicircle on the
right of the Viceroy's chair of state, while on the left the Europeans
were seated according to their official rank. When all was ready, the
words 'Attention! Royal salute! Present arms!' were heard without,
warning those within of the Viceroy's approach, and, as the bugles
sounded and the guns thundered forth their welcome, Lord Canning,
accompanied by the Commander-in-Chief, and preceded by their staffs,
entered the tent.

Everyone rose, and remained standing until the great man took his
seat, when the Foreign Secretary came forward, and, making a low bow,
informed His Excellency that all who had been summoned to attend the
durbar were present. The Chiefs were then brought up and introduced
to the Viceroy one by one; each made a profound obeisance, and, as
a token of allegiance, presented an offering of gold mohurs,
which, according to etiquette, the Viceroy just touched by way of
acknowledgment. The presents from the Government to the Chiefs were
then handed in on trays, and placed on the ground in front of each,
the value of the present being regulated according to the rank and
position of the recipient. This part of the ceremony being over, the
Viceroy rose and addressed the Talukdars.

After expressing his pleasure at meeting them in their own country, he
gave them an assurance that, so long as they remained faithful to the
Government, they should receive every consideration; he told them that
a new era had commenced in Oudh, and that henceforth they would be
allowed to revert to the conditions under which they had held their
estates prior to the annexation of the province. When Lord Canning had
finished speaking, a translation of his address in Urdu was read
to the Talukdars by Mr. Beadon, the Foreign Secretary; _atar_ and
_pan_[4] were then handed round, and the Viceroy took his departure
with the same formalities as those with which the durbar had been
opened.

There is some excuse to be made for the attitude of the Talukdars,
who, from their point of view, had little reason to be grateful to the
British Government. These powerful Chiefs, whose individual revenues
varied from £10,000 to £15,000 a year, and who, in their jungle
fastnesses, often defied their sovereign's troops, had suddenly been
deprived of all the authority which in the confusion attending a long
period of misgovernment they had gradually usurped, as well as of a
considerable proportion of the landed property which, from time to
time, they had forcibly appropriated. The conversion of feudal Chiefs
into ordinary law-abiding subjects is a process which, however
beneficial to the many, is certain to be strenuously resisted by the
few.

In March, 1858, when Lucknow was captured, a Proclamation was issued
by the Government of India confiscating the proprietary rights in the
soil. The object in view was not merely to punish contumacious Chiefs,
but also to enable the Government to establish the revenue system on
a sounder and firmer footing. Talukdars who submitted were to receive
their possessions as a free gift direct from the Government; while
those who had done good service, whether men of Oudh or strangers,
might be rewarded by grants of confiscated property.

The Proclamation was considered in many influential quarters too
arbitrary and sweeping a measure; Outram protested against it, and
Lord Ellenborough (the President of the Board of Control) condemned
it; but Lord Canning was backed up by the British public, and Lord
Ellenborough resigned to save his Cabinet from being wrecked. That
Outram and Ellenborough took the right view of the case is, I think,
shown by the fact that Lord Canning cancelled the Proclamation on his
first visit to Lucknow. By that time he had come to recognize that the
Talukdars had reasonable grounds for their discontent, and he wisely
determined to take a step which not only afforded them the greatest
relief and satisfaction, but enlisted their interest on the side
of Government. From that day to this, although, from time to time,
subsequent legislation has been found necessary to save the peasantry
from oppression, the Chiefs of Oudh have been amongst the most loyal
of Her Majesty's Indian subjects.

We remained a few days longer at Lucknow. Lord and Lady Canning
entertained all the residents, while a ball was given by the latter in
the Chatta Manzil to the strangers in camp, and the city and principal
buildings were illuminated in the Viceroy's honour with those curious
little oil-lamps which are the most beautiful form of illumination,
the delineation of every line, point, and pinnacle with myriads of
minute lights producing a wonderfully pretty effect.

On the 29th the first march was made on the return journey to
Cawnpore. My duty was to go on ahead, select the best site for the
next day's camping-ground, and make all necessary arrangements for
supplies, etc. I waited till the Viceroy had given his orders, and
then my wife and I started off, usually in the forenoon; sometimes
we remained till later in the day, lunching with one or other of our
friends in camp, and on very rare occasions, such as a dinner-party at
the Viceroy's or the Commander-in-Chief's, we drove on after dinner by
moonlight. But that was not until we had been on the march for some
time and I felt that the head Native in charge of the camp was to
be trusted to make no mistake. It was a life of much interest and
variety, and my wife enjoyed the novelty of it all greatly.

Lord Canning held his second durbar at Cawnpore on the 3rd November,
when he received the principal Chiefs of Bundelkand, the Maharaja of
Rewa, the Maharaja of Benares, and a host of lesser dignitaries.

It was on this occasion that, in accordance with the Proclamation
which had already announced that the Queen had no desire to extend her
territorial possessions, and that the estates of Native Princes were
to be scrupulously respected, the Chiefs were informed that the right
of adoption was conceded to them. This meant that, in default of male
issue, they were to be allowed to adopt sons according to the Indian
custom of adoption, and that the British Government would recognize
the right of the chosen heir to succeed as Ruler of the State as well
as to inherit the personal property of the Chief by whom he had been
adopted. There had been no clear rule on this point previously, each
case having been considered on its own merits, but the doctrine that
adoption should not be recognized, and that, in default of natural
heirs, the State should lapse and be annexed by the supreme
Government, had been enforced in a good many instances. Lord Canning's
announcement therefore caused the liveliest satisfaction to certain
classes throughout India, and did more than any other measure to
make the feudatory Princes believe in the sincerity of the amnesty
Proclamation.[5]

Our next move was to Fatehgarh, eight marches from Cawnpore, where,
on the 15th November, a third durbar was held, at which was received,
amongst other leading men of Rohilkand whose services were considered
worthy of acknowledgment, the Nawab of Rampur, who had behaved
with distinguished loyalty in our time of trouble. This Mahomedan
Nobleman's conduct was the more meritorious in that the surrounding
country swarmed with rebels, and was the home of numbers of the
mutinous Irregular Cavalry, while the close proximity of Rampur to
Delhi, whence threats of vengeance were hurled at the Nawab unless he
espoused the King's cause, rendered his position extremely precarious.

From Fatehgarh we proceeded to Agra, nine marches, only halting on
Sundays, and consequently everyone appreciated being stationary there
for a few days. The camp was pitched on the parade-ground, the scene
of the fight of the 10th October, 1857. Here the Viceroy received some
of the bigger potentates, who were accompanied by large retinues, and,
as far as the _spectacle_ went, it was one of the grandest and most
curious gatherings we had yet witnessed.

The occasions are rare on which a Viceroy has the opportunity of
receiving in durbar the great vassals of our Indian Empire, but when
these assemblies can be arranged they have a very useful effect,
and should not be looked upon as mere empty ceremonials. This was
especially the case at a time when the country had so recently been
convulsed by intestine war, and when the Native Princes were anxiously
considering how their prospects would be affected by Her Majesty's
assumption of the administration of India.

The Chief of highest rank on this occasion was the Maharaja of
Gwalior, who, as I have already stated, influenced by his courageous
Minister, Dinkar Rao, had remained faithful to us. Like most Mahratta
Princes of that time, he was very imperfectly educated. Moreover, he
was possessed of a most wayward disposition, frequently threatening,
when thwarted in any way, to throw up the reins of government, and
take refuge in the jungle; manners he had none.

Next came the enlightened head of the Princely house of Jaipur, the
second in importance of the great Chiefs of Rajputana.

He was succeeded by the Karaoli Raja, whose following was the most
quaint of all. Amongst the curious signs of his dignity he had on his
escort four tigers, each chained on a separate car, and guarded by
strange-looking men in brass helmets.

The Maharao Raja of Ulwar was the next to arrive, seated on a
superb elephant, eleven feet high, magnificently caparisoned with
cloth-of-gold coverings, and chains and breastplates of gold. He was a
promising-looking lad who had succeeded to his estate only two years
before; but he soon fell into the hands of low intriguers, who
plundered his dominions and so oppressed his people that the British
Government had to take over the management of his State.

After Ulwar came the Nawab of Tonk, the descendant of an adventurer
from Swat, on the Peshawar border, who had become possessed of
considerable territory in Rajputana. The Nawab stood by us in the
Mutiny, when his capital was plundered by Tantia Topi.

The sixth in rank was the Jât Ruler of Dholpur, a bluff,
coarse-looking man, and a very rude specimen of his race.

Last of all arrived the Nawab of Jaora, a handsome, perfectly-dressed
man of considerable refinement of manner, and with all the courtesy of
a well-bred Mahomedan. Though a feudatory of the rebellious Holkar of
Indore, he kept aloof from all Mahratta intrigues, and behaved well to
us.

Some of the highest of the Rajput Chiefs declined to attend, alleging
as an excuse the distance of their capitals from Agra; but the truth
is that these Rulers, the best blood of India, had never bowed their
heads to any Power, not even that of the Moghul, and they considered
it would be derogatory to their dignity to obey the summons of the
representative of a sovereign, of whom they considered themselves the
allies and not the mere feudatories.[6]

Those of the Chieftains attending this durbar who had shown
conspicuous loyalty during the rebellion were not allowed to leave
without receiving substantial rewards. Sindhia had territory
bestowed on him to the value of £30,000 a year. Jaipur was given the
confiscated property of Kôt K[=a]sim, yielding £5,000 a year, while
others were recompensed according to the importance of the services
rendered.


[Footnote 1: The depository for jewels and other valuables kept for
presentation to Native Chiefs at durbars.]

[Footnote 2: The following details will give some idea of the
magnitude of the arrangements required for the Viceroy's camp alone.
Besides those above mentioned there were 500 camels, 500 bullocks and
100 bullock carts for transport of camp equipage, 40 _sowari_ (riding)
elephants, 527 coolies to carry the glass windows belonging to the
larger tents, 100 _bhisties_, and 40 sweepers for watering and keeping
the centre street clean. These were in addition to the private baggage
animals, servants, and numberless riding and driving horses, for all
of which space and shelter had to be provided.]

[Footnote 3: Servants of the Lord of the Country, or
Governor-General.]

[Footnote 4: A few drops of attar of roses are given to each person,
and a small packet of _pan_, which is composed of slices of betel-nut
smeared with lime and wrapped in a leaf of the betel-tree.]

[Footnote 5: The question of Native Rulers having the right to adopt
heirs was first brought to Lord Canning's notice by the three Phulkian
chiefs--Patiala, Jhind and Nabha--who jointly requested in 1858 that
the right of adoption might be accorded to them as a reward for the
services they had rendered during the Mutiny. The request was refused
at the time on the ground that it had never been the custom of the
country, though it had occasionally been done. Since then, however,
Lord Canning had come to see that the uncertainty which prevailed as
to the rights of succession was harassing to the owners of land, and
undesirable in many ways, and he urged upon the Secretary of State
that some distinct rule on the subject might with advantage be laid
down. He wrote as follows: 'The crown of England stands forth the
unquestioned Ruler and paramount Power in all India, and is now for
the first time brought face to face with its feudatories. There is a
reality in the suzerainty of the Sovereign of England which has never
existed before, which is not only felt, but eagerly acknowledged
by the Chiefs. A great convulsion has been followed by such a
manifestation of our strength as India has never seen; and if this in
its turn be followed by an act of general and substantial grace, over
and above the special rewards which have already been given to those
whose services deserve them, the measure will be seasonable and
appreciated.' Lord Canning's proposals met with the cordial approval
of Her Majesty's Government, and his announcement at Cawnpore rejoiced
the hearts of the Chiefs, one of whom, the Maharaja of Rewa, was a
leper and had no son. He said, on hearing the Viceroy's words, 'They
dispel an evil wind which has long been blowing upon me.']

[Footnote 6: These Rajput Chiefs, however, accepted Lord Lytton's
invitation to attend the Imperial Assemblage at Delhi on the 1st
January, 1877, and having once given their allegiance to the 'Empress
of India,' they have since been the most devotedly loyal of Her
Majesty's feudatory Princes.]

       *       *       *       *       *




CHAPTER XXXIII.
1859-1860

  Delhi under a different aspect--Lord Clyde--Umritsar and Lahore
  --The Lahore Durbar--Simla--Life at Simla


We remained at Agra until the 9th December. There was so much of
beauty and interest in and around the place, that Lady Canning found
a wealth of subjects for her facile pencil, and was well content to
remain there. There were the usual banquets to the residents, and
entertainments given by the Agra people to those in camp, one of them
being a party in the Taj gardens, to give us an opportunity of seeing
the tomb by moonlight, when it certainly looks its loveliest. My wife
was more delighted even than I had anticipated with the perfect
beauty of the Taj and the exquisite little mosque in the fort, the
Moti-Masjid. I greatly enjoyed showing her all that was worth seeing,
and witnessing her pleasure on first viewing these wonderful works of
art.

There was no halt again, except the usual one on Sunday, until we
reached Meerut on the 21st December.

Three marches from Agra a fire broke out in Lady Canning's tent soon
after she had retired for the night, caused by the iron pipe of
the stove, which passed through the side of the tent, becoming
over-heated. Lady Canning's tents were on one side of the big
dining-tent, and the Viceroy's on the other. Immediately on perceiving
the fire, Lady Canning ran across to awaken her husband, but the
Native sentry, who did not know her or understand a word of what she
was saying, would not let her in, and, in despair of being able to
make anyone hear, she rushed off to the tent of Sir Edward Campbell,
the Military Secretary, which was nearest her own. She succeeded
in awaking him, and then flew back to try and save some of her own
treasures. The first thing she thought of was her portfolio of
drawings, which she dragged outside; but it had already been partially
burned, and most of the valuable and characteristic sketches she had
made at the different durbars were destroyed. She next tried to rescue
her jewels, many of which she had worn the night before; her pearls
were lying on the dressing-table, and she was only just in time to
save them; one of the strings had caught fire, and several of the
pearls were blackened. She swept them off the table into a towel, and
threw them into a tub of water standing outside. Her wardrobe was
completely destroyed. More damage would have been done had not the
Private Secretary, Mr. Lewin Bowring, on the alarm being given,
hurried to the dining-tent, and, with great presence of mind, ordered
the Native Cavalry sentry to cut the ropes, causing it to fall at
once, and preventing the fire from spreading. Some office boxes and
records were destroyed, but nothing more. We were as usual in the
advance camp, and did not hear what had happened until next morning,
when Lady Canning arrived dressed in Lady Campbell's clothes; and as
Lady Canning was tall, and Lady Campbell was short, the effect was
rather funny.

Christmas was spent at Meerut, where I met several of my brother
officers, amongst others my particular friend Edwin Johnson, whom I
had the great pleasure of introducing to my wife. With scarcely
an exception, my friends became hers, and this added much to the
happiness of our Indian life.

Delhi, our next halting-place, was certainly not the least interesting
in our tour. Lord Canning was anxious to understand all about the
siege, and visited the different positions; the Ridge and its
surroundings, the breaches, and the palace, were the chief points
of interest. There were two 'Delhi men' besides myself to explain
everything to him, Sir Edward Campbell, who was with the 60th Rifles
throughout, and one of the best officers in the regiment, and Jemmy
Hills, who had now become the Viceroy's Aide-de-camp; while in Lord
Clyde's camp there were Norman, Stewart, and Becher.

I had, of course, taken my wife to the scenes of the fights at Agra,
Aligarh, and Bulandshahr, but Delhi had the greatest fascination for
her. It is certainly an extraordinarily attractive place, setting
aside the peculiar interest of the siege. For hundreds of years it had
been the seat of Government under Rulers of various nationalities and
religions; few cities have the remains of so much pomp and glory, and
very few bear the traces of having been besieged so often, or could
tell of so much blood spilt in their defence, or of such quantities of
treasure looted from them. When Tamerlane captured Delhi in 1398 the
city was given over to massacre for five days, 'some streets being
rendered impassable by heaps of dead'; and in 1739 the Persian
conqueror, Nadir Shah, after sacking the place for fifty-eight days
and massacring thousands of its inhabitants, carried off thirty-two
millions sterling of booty.

Although the fierce nature of the struggle that Delhi had gone through
in 1857 was apparent everywhere, the inhabitants seemed now to have
forgotten all about it. The city was as densely populated as it had
ever been; the Chandni Chauk was gay as formerly with draperies of
bright-coloured stuffs; jewellers and shawl-merchants carried on their
trades as briskly as ever, and were just as eager in their endeavours
to tempt the _Sahib log_ to spend their money as if trade had never
been interrupted; so quickly do Orientals recover from the effects of
a devastating war.

We left Delhi on the 3rd January, 1860, marching _viâ_ Karnal. When at
this place my wife went to see Lady Canning, as she often did if we
remained at all late in camp. On this particular occasion she found
her busy with the English mail, which had just arrived, so she said
she would not stay then, but would come next day instead. Lady
Canning, however, would not let my wife go until she had read her part
of a letter from Lady Waterford, which she thought would amuse her. It
was in answer to one from Lady Canning, in which she had described
the camp, and given her sister a list of all the people in it. Lady
Waterford wrote: 'Your Quartermaster-General must be the son of
General Roberts, who lives near Waterford; he came home on leave last
year. I must tell you an amusing little anecdote about his father. One
night, when the General was dining at Curraghmore, he found himself
sitting next the Primate of Ireland, with whom he entered into
conversation. After some time they discovered they had known each
other in the days of their youth, but had never met since a certain
morning on which they went out to fight a duel on account of some
squabble at a mess; happily the quarrel was stopped without any harm
being done, each feeling equally relieved at being prevented from
trying to murder the other, as they had been persuaded they were in
honour bound to do. The two old gentlemen made very merry over their
reminiscences.'

For some time I had been indulging a hope that I might be sent to
China with my old General, Hope Grant, who had been nominated to the
command of the expedition which, in co-operation with the French, was
being prepared to wipe out the disgrace of the repulse experienced
early in the year, by the combined French and English naval squadrons
in their attack on the Taku forts. My hope, however, was doomed to
disappointment. Lord Clyde decided to send Lumsden and Allgood as
A.Q.M.G.'s with the force, and I was feeling very low in consequence.
A day or two afterwards we dined with the Cannings, and Lord Clyde
took my wife in to dinner. His first remark to her was: 'I think I
have earned your gratitude, if I have not managed to satisfy everyone
by these China appointments.' On my wife asking for what she was
expected to be grateful, he said: 'Why, for not sending your husband
with the expedition, of course. I suppose you would rather not be
left in a foreign country alone a few months after your marriage? If
Roberts had not been a newly-married man, I would have sent him.'
This was too much for my wife, who sympathized greatly with my
disappointment, and she could not help retorting: 'I am afraid I
cannot be very grateful to you for making my husband feel I am ruining
his career by standing in the way of his being sent on service. You
have done your best to make him regret his marriage.' The poor old
Chief was greatly astonished, and burst out in his not too refined
way: 'Well, I'll be hanged if I can understand you women! I have done
the very thing I thought you would like, and have only succeeded in
making you angry. I will never try to help a woman again.' My wife
saw that he had meant to be kind, and that it was, as he said, only
because he did not 'understand women' that he had made the mistake.
She was soon appeased, and in the end she and Lord Clyde became great
friends.

The middle of January found us at Umballa, where Lord Canning met in
state all the Cis-Sutlej Sikh Chiefs. Fine, handsome men they most of
them were, and magnificently attired. The beautifully delicate tints
which the Sikhs are so fond of, the warlike costumes of some of the
Sirdars, the quiet dignity of these high-born men who had rendered
us such signal service in our hour of need, made the scene most
picturesque and impressive. The place of honour was given to the
Maharaja of Patiala (the grandfather of the present Maharaja), as the
most powerful of the Phulkian Princes; and he was followed by his
neighbours of Nabha and Jhind, all three splendid specimens of
well-bred Sikhs, of stately presence and courtly manners. They were
much gratified at having the right of adoption granted to their
families, and at being given substantial rewards in the shape of
extension of territory.

The Sikh Chiefs were followed by Rajas of minor importance, chiefly
from the neighbouring hills, whom the Viceroy had summoned in order to
thank them for assistance rendered during the Mutiny. Many of them had
grievances to be redressed; others had favours to ask; and the Viceroy
was able to more or less satisfy them by judiciously yielding to
reasonable demands, and by bestowing minor powers on those who were
likely to use them well. The wisdom of this policy of concession
on Lord Canning's part was proved in after years by its successful
results.

On the 29th January the Raja of Kapurthala came out to meet the
Viceroy one march from Jullundur. He had supplemented the valuable
assistance rendered to Colonel Lake in the early days of the Mutiny
by equipping and taking into Oudh a force of 2,000 men, which he
personally commanded in six different actions. The Viceroy cordially
thanked him for this timely service, and in recognition of it, and his
continued and conspicuous loyalty, bestowed upon him large estates in
Oudh, where he eventually became one of the chief Talukdars. This Raja
was the grandfather of the enlightened nobleman who came to England
three years ago.

After visiting Umritsar, gay with brilliant illuminations in honour
of the Viceroy, and crowded with Sikhs come to welcome the Queen's
representative to their sacred city, we arrived at Lahore on the 10th
February.

Early the following morning Lord Canning made his state entry. As we
approached the citadel the long line of mounted Chiefs drawn up to
receive the Viceroy came into view. A brilliant assemblage they
formed, Sikh Sirdars, stately Hill Rajputs, wildly picturesque
Multanis and Baluchis with their flowing locks floating behind them,
sturdy Tawanas from the Salt range, all gorgeously arrayed in every
colour of the rainbow, their jewels glittering in the morning sun,
while their horses, magnificently caparisoned in cloth-of-gold saddle
cloths, and gold and silver trappings, pranced and curvetted under
pressure of their severe bits. As the procession appeared in sight
they moved forward in one long dazzling cavalcade, each party of
Chiefs being headed by the Commissioner of the district from which
they came; they saluted as they approached the Viceroy, and then
passing him fell in behind, between the Body Guard and the Artillery
of the escort. A royal salute was fired from the fort as we passed
under the city walls; we then wound through the civil station of
Anárkáli, and on to camp where the garrison of Mian Mir, under the
command of Major-General Sir Charles Windham, was drawn up to receive
the Viceroy.

At nightfall there were illuminations and a procession of elephants;
the Viceroy, seated in a superb howdah, led the way through the
brilliantly lighted city. Suddenly a shower of rockets was discharged
which resulted in a stampede of the elephants, who rushed through the
narrow streets, and fled in every direction, to the imminent peril and
great discomfort of the riders. In time they were quieted and
brought back, only to become again unmanageable at a fresh volley of
fireworks; a second time they were pacified, and as they seemed to be
getting accustomed to the noise and lights, the procession proceeded
to the garden of the old palace. Here the elephants were drawn up,
when all at once a fresh discharge of rockets from every side drove
them mad with fright, and off they bolted under the trees, through
gates, and some of them could not be pulled up until they had gone far
into the country. Howdahs were crushed, hats torn off, but, strange to
say, there was only one serious casualty; an officer was swept out of
his howdah by the branch of a tree, and falling to the ground, had his
thigh broken. Lord Clyde declared that a general action was not half
so dangerous, and he would much sooner have been in one!

The Lahore durbar, at which the Punjab Chiefs were received, surpassed
any former ceremonials in point of numbers and splendour of effect.
Many of Runjit Singh's Sirdars were present, and many who had fought
against us in the Sutlej and Punjab campaigns, but had now become our
fast friends. The Chiefs quite spontaneously prepared and presented
Lord Canning with an address, and, in reply, his Excellency made
an eloquent and telling speech, commenting in terms of the highest
appreciation on the courage and loyalty displayed by the Nobles and
people of the Punjab during the Mutiny.

While the camp was marching to Sialkot, where the Maharaja of Kashmir
and some of the leading men of the Punjab were to be received, the
Viceroy, accompanied by Lady Canning, Lord Clyde, and a small staff,
went on a flying visit to Peshawar, with the object of satisfying
himself, by personal examination of our position there, as to the
advisability or otherwise of a retirement cis-Indus--a retrograde
movement which John Lawrence was still in favour of. The visit,
however, only served to strengthen Lord Canning in his preconceived
opinion that Peshawar must be held on to as our frontier station.

My wife remained at Mian Mir with our good friends Doctor and Mrs.
Tyrrell Ross until it was time for her to go to Simla, and the kind
thoughtfulness of Lord Canning, who told me the camp now worked so
well that my presence was not always necessary, enabled me to be with
her from time to time.

Lord Canning's tour was now nearly over, and we marched without any
halt of importance from Sialkot to Kalka at the foot of the hills,
where, on the 9th April, the camp was broken up. It was high time to
get into cooler regions, for the heat of the tents in the day had
become very oppressive.

Thus ended a six months' march of over a thousand miles--a march never
likely to be undertaken again by any other Viceroy of India, now that
railway trains run from Calcutta to Peshawar, and saloon carriages
have taken the place of big tents.

This progress through India had excellent results. The advantages of
the representative of the Sovereign meeting face to face the principal
feudatories and Chiefs of our great dependency were very considerable,
and the opportunity afforded to the Viceroy of personally
acknowledging and rewarding the services of those who had helped us,
and of showing that he was not afraid to be lenient to those who had
failed to do so, provided they should remain loyal in the future, had
a very good effect over the whole of India. The wise concessions also
announced at the different durbars as regards the adoption by Native
Rulers of successors to their estates, and the grant to Native
gentlemen of such a share as they were fitted for in the government
of the country, were undoubtedly more appreciated than any other
description of reward given for assistance in the Mutiny.

My duty with the Viceroy being ended, I returned to Mian Mir to fetch
my wife and the little daughter, who had made her appearance on the
10th March, and escort them both to Simla. The journey up the hill was
a tedious one. Carriages were not then used as they are now, and my
wife travelled in a _jampan_, a kind of open, half-reclining sedan
chair, carried by relays of four men, while I rode or walked by her
side. She had been greatly exhausted by the heat of the journey from
Mian Mir, but as we ascended higher and higher up the mountain side,
and the atmosphere became clearer and fresher, she began to revive.
Four hours, however, of this unaccustomed mode of travelling in her
weak state had completely tired her out, so on finding a fairly
comfortable bungalow at the end of the first stage, I decided to
remain there the next day. After that we went on, stage by stage,
until we reached Simla. Our house, 'Mount Pleasant,' was on the very
top of a hill; up and up we climbed through the rhododendron forest,
along a path crimson with the fallen blossom, till we got to the top,
when a glorious view opened out before our delighted eyes. The wooded
hills of Jakho and Elysium in the foreground, Mahasu and the beautiful
Shalli peaks in the middle distance, and beyond, towering above all,
the everlasting snows glistening in the morning sun, formed a picture
the beauty of which quite entranced us both. I could hardly persuade
my wife to leave it and come into the house. Hunger and fatigue,
however, at length triumphed. Our servants had arranged everything in
our little abode most comfortably; bright fires were burning in the
grates, a cosy breakfast was awaiting us, and the feeling that at last
we had a home of our own was very pleasant.

Lord Canning did not remain long at Simla. His Council in Calcutta was
about to lose its President, Sir James Outram, who was leaving India
on account of failing health; and as the suggestion to impose an
income-tax was creating a good deal of agitation, the Viceroy hurried
back to Calcutta, deeming it expedient to be on the spot.

The measures necessary for the suppression of the Mutiny had emptied
the Government coffers; and although a large loan had been raised,
the local authorities found it impossible to cope with the increased
expenditure. Lord Canning had, therefore, applied to the Government in
England for the services of a trained financier; and Mr. Wilson, who
had a great reputation in this respect, was sent out. He declared the
only remedy to be an income-tax, and he was supported in this view
by the merchants of Calcutta. Other Europeans, however, who were
intimately acquainted with India, pointed out that it was not
advisable to ignore the dislike of Natives to such direct taxation;
and Sir Charles Trevelyan, Governor of Madras, argued well and wisely
against the scheme. Instead, however, of confining his action in the
matter to warning and advising the supreme Government, he publicly
proclaimed his opposition, thus giving the signal for agitation to all
the malcontents in India. Lord Elphinstone, the Governor of Bombay,
followed Trevelyan's example, but in a less pronounced manner,
and these attacks from the minor Presidencies proved a serious
embarrassment to the action of the Government. In spite of all this
antagonism, the income-tax was passed, and Sir Charles Trevelyan's
unusual procedure led to his recall.

Lord Canning left Simla for his long and trying journey in May, about
the hottest time of the year. On my taking leave of him, he told
me that Sir Hugh Rose, then commanding the Bombay army, had been
appointed to succeed Lord Clyde, who had long been anxious to return
to England, and that Sir Hugh, though he intended to go to Calcutta
himself, wished the Head-Quarters of the Army to remain at Simla; a
question about which we had been rather anxious, as it would have been
an unpleasant breaking up of all our plans, had I been ordered to
Calcutta.

Life at Simla was somewhat monotonous. The society was not very large
in those days; but there were a certain number of people on leave
from the plains, who then, as at present, had nothing to do but amuse
themselves, consequently there was a good deal of gaiety in a small
way; but we entered into it very little. My wife did not care much
about it, and had been very ill for the greater part of the summer.
She had made two or three kind friends, and was very happy in her
mountain home, though at times, perhaps, a little lonely, as I had to
be in office the greater part of each day.

In the autumn we made a trip into the interior of the hills, beyond
Simla, which was a new and delightful experience for my wife. We
usually started in the morning, sending our servants on about half
way, when they prepared breakfast for us in some pretty, shady spot;
there we remained, reading, writing, or resting, until after lunch,
and it was time to move on, that we might get to our halting place for
the night before dinner.

It was a lovely time of the year, when the autumn tints made the
forest gorgeous, and the scarlet festoons of the Himalayan vine stood
out in brilliant contrast to the dark green of the solemn deodar,
amongst the branches of which it loves to twine itself.

       *       *       *       *       *




CHAPTER XXXIV.
1860

  The Staff Corps--With the Viceroy's camp again--The marble rocks
  --Lady Canning's death--Pig-sticking at Jamu--Lord Canning
  --Another cold-weather march--Gwalior and Jhansi
  --Departmental promotion

In 1860 an important alteration was made in the organization of the
army in India, by the passing of a Bill for the amalgamation of the
local European Forces with the Royal Army.

On the transfer of the administration of India from the Honourable
East India Company to the Crown, a question arose as to the conditions
under which the European soldiers had enlisted. The Government
contended that the conditions were in no way affected by the abolition
of the Company. The soldiers, on the other hand, claimed to be
re-enlisted, and on this being refused they asked for their discharge.
This was granted, and 10,000 out of the 16,000 men serving in the
local army had to be sent to England. These men were replaced and the
local Forces were kept up to strength by fresh drafts from England;
but, from the date of the amalgamation, enlistment to serve solely in
India was to cease.

There was great difference of opinion as to the advisability of this
measure; officers of the Queen's service for the most part, and
notably Sir Hugh Rose, were in favour of it, but it was not generally
popular in India. It was feared that the change would result in a
great increase to the military charges which the Indian Government
would be called upon to pay; that, notwithstanding such increase,
there would be a serious diminution in the control exercised by that
Government over the administration and organization of the British
Army in India; and that, under the pressure of political emergency in
Europe, troops might be withdrawn and Indian requirements disregarded.
On the other hand, those in favour of the Bill thought that, after the
transfer of India to the Crown, the maintenance of a separate Force
uncontrolled by the Horse Guards would be an anomaly. There was, no
doubt, much to be said on both sides of the question, but, although it
has been proved that the fears of those opposed to the change were not
altogether without foundation, in my opinion it was unavoidable, and
has greatly benefited both services.

The amalgamation considerably accelerated my promotion, for, in order
to place the Indian Ordnance Corps on the same footing as those of the
Royal service, the rank of Second Captain had to be introduced into
the former, a rank to which I attained in October, 1860, only,
however, to hold it for one day, as the next my name appeared in the
_Gazette_ as a Brevet Major.

The same year saw the introduction of the Staff Corps. This was the
outcome of the disappearance during the Mutiny of nearly the whole of
the Regular regiments of the Bengal Army, and their replacement by
Irregular regiments. But, as under the Irregular system the number of
British officers with each corps was too limited to admit of their
promotion being carried on regimentally, as had been done under the
Regular system,[1] some organization had to be devised by which the
pay and promotion of all officers joining the Indian Army in future
could be arranged. Many schemes were put forward; eventually one
formulated by Colonel Norman was, with certain modifications, accepted
by the Secretary of State, the result being that all officers about
to enter the Indian Army were to be placed on one list, in which they
would be promoted after fixed periods of service;[2] and all those
officers who had been thrown out of employment by the disbandment
of their regiments, or by the substitution of the Irregular for the
Regular system, were to have the option of joining it. The term Staff
Corps, however, was a misnomer, for the constitution of the Corps and
the training of its officers had no special connection with staff
requirements.

Towards the end of the summer the Viceroy announced his intention of
making a march through Central India, and I was again ordered to take
charge of his camp, which was to be formed at Benares. My wife and her
baby remained at Simla with our friends the Donald Stewarts, and I
left her feeling sure that with them she would be happy and well taken
care of.

Sir Hugh Rose was at Allahabad, and as I passed through that place I
availed myself of the opportunity to pay my respects to the new Chief,
being anxious to meet an officer whom I had held in great admiration
from the time when, as _Chargé d'affaires_ at Constantinople, his
pluck and foresight practically saved Turkey in her time of peril
from Russia's threatened attack--admiration increased by the masterly
manner in which he had conducted the Central India campaign, in spite
of almost overwhelming difficulties from want of transport and
other causes, and a severe attack of sunstroke, which would have
incapacitated many men. Sir Hugh Rose, when I first met him at
Allahabad, was fifty-nine years of age, tall, slight, with refined
features, rather delicate-looking, and possessing a distinctly
distinguished appearance. He received me most kindly, and told me
that he wished me to return to Head-Quarters when the Viceroy could
dispense with my services.

The camp this year was by no means on so grand a scale as the
preceding one. The escort was much smaller, and the Commander-in-Chief
with Army Head-Quarters did not march with us as on the previous
occasion.

Lord and Lady Canning arrived by steamer at Benares on the 6th
November, and I went on board to meet them. Lord Canning was cordial
and pleasant as usual, but I did not think he looked well. Lady
Canning was charming as ever; she reproached me for not having brought
my wife, but when I told her how ill she had been, she agreed that
camp was not quite the place for her.

Benares, to my mind, is a most disappointing city; the streets
are narrow and dirty, there are no fine buildings, and it is only
interesting from its being held so sacred by the Hindus. The view of
the city and burning ghâts from the river is picturesque and pretty,
but there is nothing else worth seeing.

Two days were occupied in getting the camp to Mirzarpur, on the
opposite bank of the Ganges. There was no bridge, and everything had
to be taken over in boats; 10,000 men, 1,000 horses, 2,000 camels,
2,000 bullocks, besides all the tents, carts, and baggage, had to be
ferried across the great river. The 180 elephants swam over with their
_mahouts_ on their backs to keep their heads straight and urge them
on; the stream was rapid, and it was a difficult business to land them
safely at the other side, but at last it was accomplished, and our
only casualty was one camel, which fell overboard.

The march to Jubbulpur lay through very pretty scenery, low hills
and beautiful jungle, ablaze with the flame-coloured blossom of the
dhâk-tree. Game abounded, and an occasional tiger was killed. Lord
Canning sometimes accompanied the shooting expeditions, but not often,
for he was greatly engrossed in, and oppressed by, his work, which he
appeared unable to throw off. Even during the morning's drive he was
occupied with papers, and on reaching camp he went straight to his
office tent, where he remained the whole day till dinner-time,
returning to it directly the meal was over, unless there were
strangers present with whom he wished to converse.

At Jubbulpur the Viceroy held a durbar for the Maharaja Tukaji Holkar
of Indore, and some minor Chiefs of that part of the country. Holkar's
conduct during the Mutiny was not altogether above suspicion, but,
considering that the only troops at his disposal belonged to the
mutinous Indore Contingent, which consisted mainly of Hindustanis
enlisted by English officers, over whom he could not be expected to
exercise much control, Lord Canning gave him the benefit of the doubt,
and was willing to attribute his equivocal behaviour to want of
ability and timidity, rather than to disloyalty, and therefore allowed
him to come to the durbar.

Another potentate received at this time by the Viceroy was the Begum
of Bhopal, who, being a powerful and skilful Ruler, and absolutely
loyal to the British Government, had afforded us most valuable
assistance during the rebellion. She was one of those women whom the
East has occasionally produced, endowed with conspicuous talent and
great strength of character, a quality which, from its rarity amongst
Indian women, gives immense influence to those who possess it. Lord
Canning congratulated the Begum on the success with which she had
governed her country, thanked her for her timely help, and
bestowed upon her a large tract of country as a reward. She was
a determined-looking little woman, and spoke fluently in her own
language; she personally managed the affairs of her State, and wrote a
remarkably interesting account of her travelling experiences during a
pilgrimage to Mecca.

Just as the Begum took her departure, news was brought in of the
presence of a tiger two or three miles from the cantonment, and as
many of us as could get away started off in pursuit. Not considering
myself a first-rate shot, I thought I should be best employed with the
beaters, but, as good luck would have it, the tiger broke from the
jungle within a few yards of my elephant: I could not resist having a
shot, and was fortunate enough to knock him over.

While at Jubbulpur, I visited the famous marble rocks on the Nerbudda.
We rowed up the river for about a mile, when the stream began to
narrow, and splendid masses of marble came into view. The cliffs rise
to about a hundred feet in height, pure white below, gradually shading
off to gray at the top. The water at their base is of a deep brown
colour; perfectly transparent and smooth, in which the white rocks are
reflected with the utmost distinctness. In the crevices hang numerous
beehives, whose inmates one has to be careful not to disturb, for on
the bank are the graves of two Englishmen who, having incautiously
aroused the vicious little creatures, were attacked and drowned in
diving under the water to escape from their stings.

A few days later the Viceroy left camp, and proceeded to Lucknow,
where he held another durbar for the Talukdars of Oudh. Lady Canning
continued to march with us to Mirzapur, where I took her on board her
barge, and bade her farewell--a last farewell, for I never saw this
good, beautiful, and gifted woman again.

The camp being broken up, I returned towards the end of February to my
work in the Quartermaster-General's Office at Simla. I found the place
deep in snow; it looked very beautiful, but the change of temperature,
from the great heat of Central India to several degrees of frost, was
somewhat trying. My wife had benefited greatly from the fine bracing
air, and both she and our baby appeared pictures of health; but a day
or two after my arrival the little one was taken ill, and died within
one week of her birthday--our first great sorrow.

We passed a very quiet, uneventful summer, and in the beginning of
October we left Simla for Allahabad, where I had received instructions
to prepare a camp for the Viceroy, who had arranged to hold an
investiture of the Star of India, the new Order which was originally
designed to honour the principal Chiefs of India who had done us
good service, by associating them with some of the highest and most
distinguished personages in England, and a few carefully selected
Europeans in India. Lord Canning was the first Grand Master, and Sir
Hugh Rose the first Knight.

The durbar at which the Maharajas Sindhia and Patiala, the Begum of
Bhopal, and the Nawab of Rampur were invested, was a most imposing
ceremony. The Begum was the cynosure of all eyes--a female Knight
was a novelty to Europeans as well as to Natives--and there was much
curiosity as to how she would conduct herself; but no one could have
behaved with greater dignity or more perfect decorum, and she made a
pretty little speech in Urdu in reply to Lord Canning's complimentary
address. She was dressed in cloth-of-gold, and wore magnificent
jewels; but the effect of her rich costume was somewhat marred by a
funny little wreath of artificial flowers, woollen mittens, and black
worsted stockings with white tips. When my wife visited the Begum
after the durbar, she showed her these curious appendages with great
pride, saying she wore them because they were 'English fashion.' This
was the first occasion on which ladies were admitted to a durbar, out
of compliment to the Begum.

That evening my wife was taken in to dinner by a man whose manner and
appearance greatly impressed her, but she did not catch his name when
he was introduced; she much enjoyed his conversation during dinner,
which was not to be wondered at, for, before she left the table, he
told her his name was Bartle Frere.[3] She never saw him again, but
she always says he interested her more than almost any of the many
distinguished men she has since met.

From Allahabad the Viceroy again visited Lucknow, this time with the
object of urging upon the Talukdars the suppression of the horrible
custom of female infanticide, which had its origin in the combined
pride and poverty of the Rajputs. In various parts of India attempts
had been made, with more or less success, to put a stop to this
inhuman practice. But not much impression had been made in Oudh, in
consequence of the inordinately large dowries demanded from the Rajput
fathers of marriageable daughters. Two hundred Talukdars attended
Lord Canning's last durbar, and, in reply to his feeling and telling
speech, declared their firm determination to do their best to
discourage the evil.

The Commander-in-Chief had decided to pass the winter in marching
through the Punjab, and inspecting the different stations for troops
in the north of India. The Head-Quarters camp had, therefore, been
formed at Jullundur, and thither we proceeded when the gathering at
Allahabad had dispersed. We had but just arrived, when we were shocked
and grieved beyond measure to hear of Lady Canning's death. Instead of
accompanying the Viceroy to Allahabad she had gone to Darjeeling,
and on her return, anxious to make sketches of the beautiful jungle
scenery, she arranged, alas! contrary to the advice of those with
her, to spend one night in the _terai_,[4] where she contracted
jungle-fever, to which she succumbed ten days after her return to
Calcutta. Her death was a real personal sorrow to all who had the
privilege of knowing her; what must it have been to her husband,
returning to England without the helpmate who had shared and lightened
the burden of his anxieties, and gloried in the success which crowned
his eventful career in India.

The Commander-in-Chief arrived in the middle of November, and all the
officers of the Head-Quarters camp went out to meet him. I was mounted
on a spirited nutmeg-gray Arab, a present from Allgood. Sir Hugh
greatly fancied Arabian horses, and immediately noticed mine. He
called me up to him, and asked me where I got him, and of what
caste he was. From that moment he never varied in the kindness and
consideration with which he treated me, and I always fancied I owed
his being well disposed towards me from the very first to the fact
that I was riding my handsome little Arab that day; he loved a good
horse, and liked his staff to be well mounted. A few days afterwards
he told me he wished me to accompany him on the flying tours he
proposed to make from time to time, in order to see more of the
country and troops than would be possible if he marched altogether
with the big camp.

We went to Umritsar, Mian Mir, and Sialkot; at each place there were
the usual inspections, mess dinners, and entertainments. The Chief's
visit made a break in the ordinary life of a cantonment, and the
residents were glad to take advantage of it to get up various
festivities; Sir Hugh, too, was most hospitably inclined, so that
there was always a great deal to do besides actual duty when we
arrived at a station.

Jamu, where the Ruler of Kashmir resides during the winter, is not far
from Sialkot, so Sir Hugh was tempted to accept an invitation from the
Maharaja to pay him a visit and enjoy some good pig-sticking, to my
mind the finest sport in the world. His Highness entertained us right
royally, and gave us excellent sport, but our pleasure was marred by
the Chief having a bad fall: he had got the first spear off a fine
boar, who, feeling himself wounded, turned and charged, knocking over
Sir Hugh's horse. All three lay in a heap together; the pig was dead,
the horse was badly ripped up, and the Chief showed no signs of life.
We carried him back to Jamu on a _charpoy_[5] and when he regained
consciousness we found that no great harm was done beyond a severely
bruised face and a badly sprained leg, which, though still very
painful two or three days later, did not prevent the plucky old fellow
from riding over the battle-field of Chilianwalla.

Very soon after this Norman, who was then Adjutant-General of the
Army, left Head-Quarters to take up the appointment of Secretary to
the Government of India in the Military Department. Before we parted
he expressed a hope that I would soon follow him, as a vacancy in the
Department was about to take place, which he said he was sure Lord
Canning would allow him to offer to me. Norman was succeeded as
Adjutant-General of the Indian Army by Edwin Johnson, the last officer
who filled that post, as it was done away with when the amalgamation
of the services was carried into effect.

Two marches from Jhelum my wife was suddenly taken alarmingly ill, and
had to remain behind when the camp moved on. Sir Hugh Rose most kindly
insisted on leaving his doctor (Longhurst) in charge of her, and told
me I must stay with her as long as was necessary. For three whole
weeks we remained on the encamping ground of Sahawar; at the end of
that time, thanks (humanly speaking) to the skill and care of our
Doctor, she was sufficiently recovered to be put into a doolie and
carried to Lahore, I riding a camel by her side, for my horses had
gone on with the camp.

While at Lahore I received a most kind letter from Norman, offering me
the post in the Secretariat which he had already told me was about
to become vacant. After some hesitation--for the Secretariat had its
attractions, particularly as regarded pay--I decided to decline the
proffered appointment, as my acceptance of it would have taken me away
from purely military work and the chance of service in the field. I
left my wife on the high-road to recovery, and hurried after the
camp, overtaking it at Peshawar just in time to accompany the
Commander-in-Chief on his ride along the Derajat frontier, a trip I
should have been very sorry to have missed. We visited every station
from Kohat to Rajanpur, a ride of about 440 miles. Brigadier-General
Neville Chamberlain, who was still commanding the Punjab Frontier
Force, met us at Kohat, and remained with us to the end. We did from
twenty-five to forty miles a day, and our baggage and servants,
carried on riding-camels, kept up with us.

This was my first experience of a part of India with which I had later
so much to do, and which always interested me greatly. At the time of
which I am writing it was a wild and lawless tract of country. As we
left Kohat we met the bodies of four murdered men being carried in,
but were told there was nothing unusual in such a sight. On one
occasion General Chamberlain introduced to Sir Hugh Rose two young
Khans, fine, handsome fellows, who were apparently on excellent terms.
A few days later we were told that one of them had been murdered by
his companion, there having been a blood-feud between their families
for generations; although these two had been brought up together, and
liked each other, the one whose clan had last lost a member by the
feud felt himself in honour bound to sacrifice his friend.

When I rejoined my wife at the end of the tour, I found her a great
deal worse than her letters had led me to expect, but she had been
much cheered by the arrival of a sister who had come out to pay us
a visit, and who lived with us until she married an old friend and
brother officer of mine named Sladen. We remained at Umballa till the
end of March; the only noteworthy circumstance that occurred there was
a parade for announcing to the troops that Earl Canning had departed,
and that the Earl of Elgin and Kincardine was now Viceroy of India.

There are few men whose conduct of affairs has been so severely
criticized as Lord Canning's, but there are still fewer who, as
Governors or Viceroys, have had to deal with such an overwhelming
crisis as the Mutiny. While the want of appreciation Lord Canning at
first displayed of the magnitude of that crisis may, with perfect
justice, be attributed to the fact that most of his advisers had
gained their experience only in Lower Bengal, and had therefore a very
imperfect knowledge of popular feeling throughout India, the very
large measure of success which attended his subsequent action was
undoubtedly due to his own ability and sound judgment.

That by none of Lord Canning's responsible councillors could the
extent of the Mutiny, or the position in Upper India, have been
grasped, was evident from the telegram[6] sent from Calcutta to the
Commander-in-Chief on the 31st May, three weeks after the revolt at
Meerut had occurred; but from the time Lord Canning left Calcutta
in January, 1858, and had the opportunity of seeing and judging for
himself, all that he did was wise and vigorous.

Outwardly Lord Canning was cold and reserved, the result, I think, of
extreme sensitiveness; for he was without doubt very warm-hearted,
and was greatly liked and respected by those about him, and there
was universal regret throughout India when, three months after his
departure, the news of his death was received.

We returned to Simla early in April. The season passed much as other
seasons had passed, except that there was rather more gaiety. The new
Viceroy remained in Calcutta; but Sir Hugh Rose had had quite enough
of it the year before, so he came up to the Hills, and established
himself at 'Barnes Court.' He was very hospitable, and having my
sister-in-law to chaperon, my wife went out rather more than she had
cared to do in previous years. We spent a good deal of our time also
at Mashobra, a lovely place, in the heart of the Hills, about six
miles from Simla, where the Chief had a house, which he was good
enough to frequently place at our disposal, when not making use of
it himself. It was an agreeable change, and one which we all greatly
enjoyed. But at the best one gets very tired of the Hills by the close
of the summer, and I was glad to start off towards the end of
October with my wife and her sister for Agra, where this year the
Head-Quarters camp was to be formed, as the Chief had settled the
cold-weather tour was to begin with a march through Bundelkand and
Central India, the theatre of his successful campaign.

The second march out we were startled by being told, when we awoke
in the morning, that Colonel Gawler, the Deputy-Adjutant-General of
Queen's troops, had been badly wounded in the night by a thief, who
got into his tent with the object of stealing a large sum of money
Gawler had received from the bank the previous day, and for greater
safety had placed under his pillow when he went to bed. In the middle
of the night his wife awoke him, saying there was someone in the tent,
and by the dim light of a small oil-lamp he could just see a dark
figure creeping along the floor. He sprang out of bed and seized the
robber; but the latter, being perfectly naked and oiled all over,
slipped through his hands and wriggled under the wall of the tent.
Gawler caught him by the leg just as he was disappearing, and they
struggled outside together. When despairing of being able to make his
escape, the thief stabbed Gawler several times with a knife, which was
tied by a string to his wrist. By this time Mrs. Gawler had been
able to arouse two Kaffir servants, one of whom tried to seize the
miscreant, but in his turn was stabbed. The second servant, however,
was more wary, and succeeded in capturing the thief; Kaffir fashion,
he knocked all the breath out of his body by running at him head
down and butting him in the stomach, when it became easy to bind the
miscreant hand and foot. It was a bad part of the country for thieves;
and when some four weeks later I went off on a flying tour with the
Commander-in-Chief, I did not leave my wife quite as happily as usual.
But neither she nor her sister was afraid. Each night they sent
everything at all valuable to be placed under the care of the guard,
and having taken this precaution, were quite easy in their minds.

[Illustration: THE EARL CANNING, K.G., G.C.B., G.M.S.I., VICEROY AND
GOVERNOR-GENERAL OF INDIA,
_From a photograph by Messrs. Mayall._]

When the camp reached Gwalior, the Maharaja Sindhia seemed to think
he could not do enough to show his gratitude to Sir Hugh Rose for his
opportune help in June, 1858,[7] when the Gwalior troops mutinied, and
joined the rebel army under the Rani of Jhansi and Tantia Topi. The
day after our arrival Sindhia held a grand review of his new army in
honour of our Chief. The next day there was an open-air entertainment
in the Phulbagh (garden of flowers); the third a picnic and elephant
fight, which, by the way, was a very tame affair. We had nerved
ourselves to see something rather terrific, instead of which the great
creatures twisted their trunks about each other in quite a playful
manner, and directly the play seemed to be turning into earnest they
were separated by their _mahouts_, being much too valuable to be
allowed to injure themselves. Each day there was some kind of
entertainment: pig-sticking or shooting expeditions in the morning,
and banquets, fireworks, and illuminations in the evening.

Gwalior is an interesting place. The fort is picturesquely situated
above a perpendicular cliff; the road up to it is very steep, and it
must have been almost impregnable in former days. It was made doubly
interesting to us by Sir Hugh Rose explaining how he attacked it, and
pointing out the spot where the Rani of Jhansi was killed in a charge
of the 8th Hussars.

Our next halt was Jhansi. Here also Sir Hugh had a thrilling tale to
tell of its capture, and of his having to fight the battle of the
Betwa against a large force brought to the assistance of the rebels by
Tantia Topi, while the siege was actually being carried on.

From Jhansi the big camp marched to Lucknow, _viâ_ Cawnpore; while the
Chief with a small staff (of which I was one) and light tents, made
a detour by Saugor, Jubbulpur, and Allahabad. We travelled through
pretty jungle for the most part, interspersed with low hills, and we
had altogether a very enjoyable trip. Sir Hugh was justly proud of the
splendid service the Central India Field Force had performed under
his command; and, as we rode along, it delighted him to point out the
various places where he had come in contact with the rebels.

While at Allahabad, on the 13th January--quite the coolest time of the
year--I had a slight sunstroke, which it took me a very long time to
get over completely. The sensible custom introduced by Lord Clyde,
of wearing helmets, was not always adhered to, and Sir Hugh Hose was
rather fond of cocked hats. On this occasion I was wearing this--for
India--most unsuitable head-dress, and, as ill-luck would have it, the
Chief kept me out rather late, going over the ground where the present
cantonment stands. I did not feel anything at the time, but an hour
later I was suddenly seized with giddiness and sickness, and for a
short time I could neither see nor hear. Plentiful douches of cold
water brought me round, and I was well enough in the afternoon to go
with the Chief to inspect the fort; but for months afterwards I never
lost the pain in my head, and for many years I was very susceptible to
the evil influence of the sun's rays.

We reached Lucknow towards the middle of January. Here, as elsewhere,
we had constant parades and inspections, for Sir Hugh carried out his
duties in the most thorough manner, and spared himself no trouble to
secure the efficiency and the well-being of the soldier. At the same
time, he was careful not to neglect his social duties; he took a
prominent part in all amusements, and it was mainly due to his liberal
support that we were able to keep up a small pack of hounds with
Head-Quarters, which afforded us much enjoyment during the winter
months.

From Lucknow we marched through Bareilly, Meerut, and Umballa, and the
30th March saw us all settled at Simla for the season.

Early in April Lord Elgin arrived in Simla for the hot weather,
and from that time to the present, Simla has continued to be the
Head-Quarters of the Government during the summer months.

About this time the changes necessitated by the amalgamation of
the services took place in the army staff. Edwin Johnson lost his
appointment in consequence, and Colonel Haythorne,[8] Adjutant-General
of Queen's troops, became Adjutant-General of the Army in India,
with Donald Stewart as his deputy. The order limiting the tenure of
employment on the staff in the same grade to five years was also now
introduced, which entailed my good friend Arthur Becher vacating the
Quartermaster-Generalship, after having held it for eleven years.
He was succeeded by Colonel Paton, with Lumsden as his deputy, and
Charles Johnson (brother of Edwin Johnson) and myself as assistants in
the Department.


[Footnote 1: Under the Regular system, which was modelled on the Royal
Army organization, each regiment of Native Cavalry had 22, and each
regiment of Native Infantry 25 British officers, who rose to the
higher grades by seniority. From this establishment officers were
taken, without being seconded, for the multifarious extra-regimental
duties on which the Indian Army was, and is still, employed, viz.,
Staff, Civil, Political, Commissariat, Pay, Public Works, Stud,
and Survey. With the Irregular system this was no longer possible,
although the number of British officers with each corps was (after
the Mutiny) increased from 3 to 9 with a Cavalry, and 3 to 8 with an
Infantry regiment.]

[Footnote 2: Captain after twelve years,[*] Major after twenty years,
and Lieutenant-Colonel after twenty-six years.]

[Footnote * to Footnote 2: Since reduced to eleven years.]

[Footnote 3: The late Sir Bartle Frere, Bart, G.C.B., G.C.S.I.]

[Footnote 4: The fever-giving tract of country at the foot of the
Himalayas.]

[Footnote 5: Native string bed.]

[Footnote 6: 'Your force of Artillery will enable us to dispose
of Delhi with certainty. I therefore beg that you will detach one
European Infantry regiment and a small force of European Cavalry to
the south of Delhi, without keeping them for operations there, so that
Aligarh may be recovered and Cawnpore relieved immediately.']

[Footnote 7: After the capture of Kalpi in May, 1858, Sir Hugh Rose,
worn out with fatigue and successive sunstrokes, was advised by his
medical officer to return at once to Bombay; his leave had been
granted, and his successor (Brigadier-General Napier) had been
appointed, when intelligence reached him to the effect that the rebel
army, under Tantia Topi and the Rani of Jhansi, had been joined by
the whole of Sindhia's troops and were in possession of the fort
of Gwalior with its well-supplied arsenal. Sir Hugh Rose at once
cancelled his leave, pushed on to Gwalior, and by the 30th of June had
re-captured all Sindhia's guns and placed him again in possession of
his capital.]

[Footnote 8: The late General Sir Edmund Haythorne, K.C.B.]

       *       *       *       *       *




CHAPTER XXXV.
1863

  The Umbeyla expedition--The Akhund of Swat
  --The 'Eagle's Nest' and 'Crag piquet'--The death of Lord Elgin
  --Loyalty of our Pathan soldiers--Bunerwals show signs of submission
  --The conical hill--Umbeyla in flames--Bunerwals agree to our terms
  --Malka destroyed



In the autumn of 1863, while we were preparing for the usual winter
tour, Sir Hugh Rose, who had accompanied Lord Elgin on a trip through
the hills, telegraphed to the Head-Quarters staff to join him at Mian
Mir without delay.

The news which greeted us on our arrival was indeed disturbing. Lord
Elgin was at Dharmsala in a dying condition, and the Chief had
been obliged to leave him and push on to Lahore, in consequence of
unsatisfactory reports from Brigadier-General Chamberlain, who was
just then commanding an expedition which had been sent into the
mountains near Peshawar, and had met with unexpected opposition. The
civil authorities on the spot reported that there existed a great deal
of excitement all along the border, that the tribes were collecting in
large numbers, that emissaries from Kabul had appeared amongst
them, and that, unless reinforcements could be sent up at once, the
Government would be involved in a war which must inevitably lead to
the most serious complications, not only on the frontier, but with
Afghanistan. In so grave a light did the Lieutenant-Governor, Sir
Robert Montgomery, view the position, that he contemplated the force
being withdrawn and the undertaking abandoned.

Sir Hugh had had nothing to do with the despatch of this expedition;
it had been decided on by the Government of India in consultation with
the Lieutenant-Governor of the Punjab. When the Commander-in-Chief was
communicated with, he expressed himself adverse to the proposal, and
placed his views at length before the Government, pointing out the
inexpediency of entering a difficult and unknown country, unless the
troops were properly equipped with transport, supplies, and reserve
ammunition; that time did not permit of their being so equipped before
the winter set in; and that, to provide a force of 5,000 men (the
strength considered necessary by the Government), the frontier would
have to be dangerously weakened. Moreover, he gave it as his opinion
that it would be better to postpone operations until the spring, when
everything could be perfectly arranged. Subsequent events proved how
sound was this advice. But before proceeding with my narrative it will
be as well to explain the circumstances with led the authorities to
undertake this expedition.

In 1857, when all our resources were required to quell internal
tumult, the Hindustani fanatics[1] took the opportunity to stir up
disturbances all along the Yusafzai frontier of the Peshawar district,
and, aided by the rebel sepoys who had fled to them for protection,
they made raids upon our border, and committed all kinds of
atrocities. We were obliged, therefore, to send an expedition against
them in 1858, which resulted in their being driven from their
stronghold, Sitana, and in the neighbouring tribes being bound down to
prevent them reoccupying that place. Three years later the fanatics
returned to their former haunts and built up a new settlement at
Malka; the old troubles recommenced, and for two years they had been
allowed to go on raiding, murdering, and attacking our outposts with
impunity. It was, therefore, quite time that measures should be taken
to effectually rid the frontier of these disturbers of the peace,
provided such measures could have been decided upon early enough in
the year to ensure success.

The Punjab Government advocated the despatch of a very strong force.
Accordingly, two columns were employed, the base of one being in the
Peshawar valley, and that of the other in Hazara. The Peshawar column
was to move by the Umbeyla Pass, the Buner frontier, and the Chamla
valley, thus operating on the enemy's line of retreat. This route
would not have been chosen, had not Chamberlain been assured by the
civil authorities that no hostility need be feared from the Bunerwals,
even if their country had to be entered, as they had given no trouble
for fifteen years, and their spiritual head, the Akhund of Swat,[2]
had no sympathy with the fanatics. It was not, therefore, considered
necessary to warn the Buner people of our approach until preparations
were completed; indeed, it was thought unadvisable to do so, as it was
important to keep the proposed line of advance secret. The strength of
the force was 6,000 men, with 19 guns, but to make up these numbers
the stations in Upper India had to be considerably weakened, and there
was no reserve nearer than Lahore.

The Peshawar column[3] being all ready for a start, a Proclamation was
forwarded to the Buner and other neighbouring tribes, informing
them of the object of the expedition, and stating that there was no
intention of interfering with them or their possessions.

On the following morning, the 20th October, the Umbeyla Pass was
entered, and by noon the kotal[4] was reached without any resistance
to speak of; but, from information brought in, it was evident that any
further advance would be stoutly opposed. The road turned out to be
much more difficult than had been anticipated, and the hurriedly
collected transport proved unequal to the strain. Not a single baggage
animal, except the ammunition mules, got up that night; indeed, it was
not until the morning of the 22nd--more than forty-eight hours after
they started--that the rear guard reached the kotal, a distance of
only six miles. As soon as it arrived Colonel Alex. Taylor, R.E., was
sent off with a body of Cavalry, under Lieutenant-Colonel Probyn, to
reconnoitre the road in front. The delay in reaching the top of the
pass had given the tribes time to collect, and when the reconnoitring
party entered the Chamla valley the Bunerwals could be seen about two
miles and a half off, occupying in force the range which separates
Buner and Chamla. Whatever may have been their first intention, they
apparently could not resist the temptation to try and cut off this
small body of Cavalry, for our horsemen on their return journey found
a large number of the trusted Buner tribe attempting to block the
mouth of the pass. A charge was made, but mounted men could not do
much in such a hilly country; the proceedings of the Bunerwals,
however, had been observed from the kotal, and Major Brownlow,[5] with
some of his own regiment (the 20th Punjab Infantry), was sent to the
assistance of the party. A hand-to-hand fight ensued, and the enemy
pressed our troops closely on their way back, coming right in amongst
them with the utmost daring.

There was now brought in to the Commissioner by a spy the copy of
a letter from the Hindustani fanatics, addressed to the Bunerwals,
telling them not to be taken in by our assurances that our only object
was to punish the fanatics, for our real intentions were to annex
Chamla, Buner, and Swat. This letter no doubt aroused the suspicions
of the tribes, and, encouraged by the slowness of our movements, they
all joined against us from Buner, Mahaban, and the Black Mountain.

On the 23rd large bodies of men with numerous standards were to be
seen approaching the mouth of the pass, and a day or two later a
report was received that our foes were to have the support of the
Akhund of Swat, which meant a most formidable accession of moral as
well as material strength, and put a stop, for the time being, to
any possibility of a successful advance being made with the force at
Chamberlain's disposal.

The position occupied by our troops was enclosed on the left (west)
by the Guru Mountain, which separates Umbeyla from Buner, and on the
right (east) by a range of hills, not quite so high. The main piquet
on the Guru occupied a position upon some precipitous cliffs known as
the Eagle's Nest, while that on the right was designated the 'Crag
piquet.' The Eagle's Nest was only large enough to accommodate 110
men, so 120 more were placed under the shelter of some rocks at its
base, and the remainder of the troops told off for the defence of the
left piquet were drawn up on and about a rocky knoll, 400 feet west of
the Eagle's Nest.

Some 2,000 of the enemy occupied a breastwork on the crest of a spur
of the Guru Mountain; and about noon on the 26th they moved down, and
with loud shouts attacked the Eagle's Nest. Their matchlock men posted
themselves to the greatest advantage in a wood, and opened a galling
fire upon our defences, while their swordsmen made a determined
advance. The nature of the ground prevented our guns from being
brought to bear upon the assailants, and they were thus able to
get across the open space in front of the piquet, and plant their
standards close under its parapet. For some considerable time they
remained in this position, all our efforts to dislodge them proving of
no avail. Eventually, however, they were forced to give way, and were
driven up the hill, leaving the ground covered with their dead, and a
great many wounded, who were taken into our hospitals and carefully
treated, while a still greater number were carried off by their
friends. Our losses were, 2 British officers, 1 Native officer, and
26 men killed; and 2 British officers, 7 Native officers, and 86 men
wounded.

The day following the fight the Bunerwals were told they might carry
away their dead, and we took advantage of their acceptance of this
permission to reason with them as to the uselessness of an unnecessary
sacrifice of their tribesmen, which would be the certain result of
further opposition to us. Their demeanour was courteous, and they
conversed freely with General Chamberlain and Colonel Reynell Taylor,
the Commissioner, but they made it evident that they were determined
not to give in.

Our position had now become rather awkward; there was a combination
against us of all the tribes between the Indus and the Kabul rivers,
and their numbers could not be less than 15,000 armed men. Mutual
animosities were for the time allowed to remain in abeyance, and
the tribes all flocked to fight under the Akhund's standard in the
interests of their common faith. Moreover, there was trouble in the
rear from the people along the Yusafzai border, who assisted the
enemy by worrying our lines of communication. Under these changed
conditions, and with such an inadequate force, Chamberlain came to
the conclusion that, for the moment, he could only remain on the
defensive, and trust to time, to the discouragement which repeated
unsuccessful attacks were sure to produce on the enemy, and to the
gradual decrease of their numbers, to break up the combination against
us; for, as these tribesmen only bring with them the quantity of food
they are able to carry, as soon as it is finished they are bound to
suspend operations till more can be procured.

For three weeks almost daily attacks were made on our position; the
enemy fought magnificently, some of them being killed inside our
batteries, and twice they gained possession of the 'Crag piquet,' the
key of the position, which it was essential should be retaken at all
hazards. On the second occasion General Chamberlain himself led the
attacking party, and was so severely wounded that he was obliged to
relinquish the command of the force.

The Lieutenant-Governor of the Punjab, being convinced that
reinforcements were necessary, in consultation with Colonels Durand[6]
and Norman (the Foreign and Military Secretaries, who had come to
Lahore to meet the Viceroy), and without waiting for the sanction of
the Commander-in-Chief, ordered to the frontier the three regiments
which had been detailed for the Viceroy's camp,[7] as well as the 93rd
Highlanders, then at Sialkot; and when Sir Hugh Rose on his arrival
at Lahore heard of the heavy losses the expeditionary force had
sustained, and of General Chamberlain being _hors de combat_ from his
wound, further reinforcements from every direction were hurried to the
front. Subsequently, however, it became a question whether the troops
should not be withdrawn altogether, and the punishment of the fanatics
given up, the Government of India and the Punjab Government being
completely in accord in favouring this view, while the Commissioner of
Peshawar, Major James (who had succeeded Reynell Taylor),[8] and Sir
Hugh Rose were as strongly opposed to a retrograde movement. The
Commander-in-Chief pointed out to the Government that the loss of
prestige and power we must sustain by retiring from the Umbeyla Pass
would be more disastrous, both from a military and political point
of view, than anything that could happen save the destruction of the
force itself, and that General Chamberlain, on whose sound judgment he
could rely, was quite sure that a retirement was unnecessary.

Unfortunately at this time the Viceroy died at Dharmsala, and the
question remained in abeyance pending the arrival of Sir William
Denison, Governor of Madras, who was coming round to take over the
reins of Government until a successor to Lord Elgin should be sent
from England.

In the meantime Sir Hugh Rose was most anxious to obtain exact
information respecting our position at Umbeyla, the means of operating
from it, the nature of the ground--in fact, all details which could
only be satisfactorily obtained by sending someone to report on the
situation, with whom he had had personal communication regarding
the points about which he required to be enlightened. He therefore
determined to despatch two officers on special service, whose duty it
would be to put the Commander-in-Chief in possession of all the facts
of the case; accordingly, Colonel Adye[9] (Deputy-Adjutant-General
of Royal Artillery) and I were ordered to proceed to Umbeyla without
delay.

Adye proved a most charming travelling companion, clever and
entertaining, and I think we both enjoyed our journey. We reached the
pass on the 25th November.

There had been no fighting for some days, and most of the wounded had
been removed. Sir Neville Chamberlain was still in camp, and I was
sorry to find him suffering greatly from his wound. We were much
interested in going over the piquets and listening to the story of the
different attacks made upon them, which had evidently been conducted
by the enemy with as much skill as courage.[10] The loyalty of our
Native soldiers struck me as having been most remarkable. Not a single
desertion had occurred, although all the Native regiments engaged,
with the exception of the Gurkhas and Punjab Pioneers, had amongst
them members of the several tribes we were fighting, and many of our
soldiers were even closely related to some of the hostile tribesmen;
on one occasion a young Buner sepoy actually recognized his own father
amongst the enemy's dead when the fight was over.[11]

We listened to many tales of the gallantry of the British officers.
The names of Brownlow, Keyes,[12] and Hughes[13] were on everyone's
lips, and Brownlow's defence of the Eagle's Nest on the 26th October,
and of the 'Crag piquet' on the 12th November, spoke volumes for his
coolness and pluck, and for the implicit faith reposed in him by the
men of the 20th Punjab Infantry, the regiment he had raised in 1857
when but a subaltern. In his official report the General remarked that
'to Major Brownlow's determination and personal example he attributed
the preservation of the "Crag piquet."' And Keyes's recapture of the
same piquet was described by Sir Neville as 'a most brilliant exploit,
stamping Major Keyes as an officer possessing some of the highest
military qualifications.' Brownlow and Keyes were both recommended for
the Victoria Cross.

We (Adye and I) had no difficulty in making up our minds as to
the course which ought to be taken. The column was daily being
strengthened by the arrival of reinforcements, and although the
combination of the tribesmen was still formidable, the enemy were
showing signs of being disheartened by their many losses, and of a
wish to come to terms.

Having consulted the civil and military authorities on the spot, we
informed the Commander-in-Chief that they were of opinion a withdrawal
would be most unwise, and that it was hoped that on the arrival of
General Garvock[14] (Chamberlain's successor) an advance would be made
into the Chamla valley, for there would then be a sufficient number
of troops to undertake an onward move, as well as to hold the present
position, which, as we told the Chief, was one of the strongest we had
ever seen.

Sir William Denison reached Calcutta on the 2nd December. A careful
study of the correspondence in connexion with the Umbeyla expedition
satisfied him that the Commander-in-Chief's views were correct, and
that a retirement would be unwise.

Sir Hugh Rose had previously requested to be allowed to personally
conduct the operations, and in anticipation of the Government acceding
to his request, he had sent a light camp to Hasan Abdal, from which
place he intended to push on to Umbeyla; and with the object of
collecting troops near the frontier, where they would be available
as a reserve should the expedition not be soon and satisfactorily
settled, he desired me to select an encamping-ground between Rawal
Pindi and Attock suitable for 10,000 men.

Leaving Adye in the pass, I started for Attock, where I spent three
days riding about in search of a promising site for the camp. I
settled upon a place near Hasan Abdal, which, however, was not in the
end made use of. The people of the country were very helpful to me;
indeed, when they heard I had been a friend of John Nicholson, they
seemed to think they could not do enough for me, and delighted in
talking of their old leader, whom they declared to be the greatest man
they had ever known.

On my return I marched up the pass with the Rev. W. G. Cowie[15] and
Probyn, who, with 400 Cavalry, had been ordered to the front to be in
readiness for a move into the Chamla valley. James, the Commissioner,
had been working to detach the Bunerwals from the combination against
us, and on the afternoon of our arrival a deputation of their headmen
arrived in camp, and before their departure the next morning they
promised to accompany a force proceeding to destroy Malka, and to
expel the Hindustani fanatics from the Buner country.

Later, however, a messenger came in to say they could not fulfil their
promise, being unable to resist the pressure brought to bear upon them
by their co-religionists. The man further reported that large numbers
of fresh tribesmen had appeared on the scene, and that it was intended
to attack us on the 16th. He advised the Commissioner to take the
initiative, and gave him to understand that if we advanced the
Bunerwals would stand aloof.

Sir Hugh Rose had been accorded permission to take command of the
troops in the field, and had sent word to General Garvock not 'to
attempt any operations until further orders.' James, however, thinking
that the situation demanded immediate action, as disturbances had
broken out in other parts of the Peshawar valley, deprecated delay,
and pressed Garvock to advance, telling him that a successful
fight would put matters straight. Garvock consented to follow the
Commissioner's advice, and arranged to move on the following day.

The force was divided into three columns. The first and
second--consisting of about 4,800 men, and commanded respectively by
Colonel W. Turner, C.B.,[16] and Lieutenant-Colonel Wilde, C.B.--were
to form the attacking party, while the third, about 3,000 strong,
under the command of Lieutenant-Colonel Vaughan,[17] was to be left
for the protection of the camp.

At daybreak, on the 15th, the troops for the advance, unencumbered by
tents or baggage, and each man carrying two days' rations, assembled
at the base of the 'Crag piquet.' Turner, an excellent officer, who
during the short time he had been at Umbeyla had inspired great
confidence by his soldierly qualities, had on the previous afternoon
reconnoitred to the right of the camp, and had discovered that
about 4,000 men were holding the village of Lalu, from which it was
necessary to dislodge them before Umbeyla could be attacked. On being
told to advance, therefore, Turner moved off in the direction of Lalu,
and, driving the enemy's piquets before him, occupied the heights
overlooking the valley, out of which rose, immediately in front about
200 yards off, a conical hill which hid Lalu from view. This hill,
which was crowded with Hindustani fanatics and their Pathan allies,
was a most formidable position; the sides were precipitous, and the
summit was strengthened by _sangars_.[18] No further move could be
made until the enemy were dislodged, so Turner lined the heights all
round with his Infantry, and opened fire with his Mountain guns.
Meanwhile, Wilde's column had cleared off the enemy from the front
of the camp, and formed up on Turner's left. On the advance being
sounded, Turner's Infantry rushed down the slopes, and in ten minutes
could be seen driving the enemy from the heights on his right; at the
same time the 101st Fusiliers, the leading regiment of Wilde's column,
made straight for the top of the conical hill, and, under cover of
the fire from the Mountain guns of both columns, and supported by
the Guides, 4th Gurkhas, and 23rd Pioneers, they climbed the almost
perpendicular sides. When near the top a short halt was made to give
the men time to get their breath; the signal being then given, amidst
a shower of bullets and huge stones, the position was stormed, and
carried at the point of the bayonet. It was a grand sight as Adye and
I watched it from Hughes's battery; but we were considerably relieved
when we perceived the enemy flying down the sides of the hill, and
heard the cheers of the gallant Fusiliers as they stood victorious on
the highest peak.

[Illustration: THE STORMING OF THE CONICAL HILL AT UMBEYLA BY THE
101ST FOOT (BENGAL FUSILIERS).
_From a sketch by General Sir John Adye, G.C.B., R.A._]

Now that the enemy were on the run it was the time to press them, and
this Turner did so effectually that the leading men of his column
entered Lalu simultaneously with the last of the fugitives. The
rapidity of this movement was so unexpected that it threw the enemy
inside the walls into confusion; they made no stand, and were soon in
full retreat towards Umbeyla and the passes leading into Buner.

While affairs were thus prospering on our right, the enemy, apparently
imagining we were too busy to think of our left, came in large
numbers from the village of Umbeyla, threatening the camp and the
communications of the second column. Wilde, however, was prepared for
them, and held his ground until reinforced by Turner, when he made a
forward movement. The Guides, and detachments of the 5th Gurkhas and
3rd Sikhs, charged down one spur, and the 101st down another; the
enemy were driven off with great slaughter, leaving a standard in
the hands of the Gurkhas, and exposing themselves in their flight to
Turner's guns. During the day they returned, and, gathering on the
heights, made several unsuccessful attacks upon our camp. At last,
about 2 p.m., Brownlow, who was in command of the right defences,
assumed the offensive, and, aided by Keyes, moved out of the
breastworks and, by a succession of well-executed charges, completely
cleared the whole front of the position, and drove the tribesmen with
great loss into the plain below.

All opposition having now ceased, and the foe being in full retreat,
the force bivouacked for the night. We had 16 killed and 67 wounded;
while our opponents admitted to 400 killed and wounded.

The next morning we were joined by Probyn with 200 sabres of the 11th
Bengal Lancers and the same number of the Guides; and after a hasty
breakfast the order was given to march into the Chamla valley. My duty
was to accompany the Mountain batteries and show them the way. As we
debouched into comparatively open country, the enemy appeared on a
ridge which completely covered our approach to Umbeyla, and we could
descry many standards flying on the most prominent points. The road
was so extremely difficult that it was half-past two o'clock before
the whole force was clear of the hills.

General Garvock, having made a careful reconnaissance of the enemy's
position, which was of great strength and peculiarly capable of
defence, had decided to turn their right, a movement which was to be
entrusted to the second column, and I was told to inform Turner that
he must try and cut them off from the Buner Pass as they retreated.
I found Turner close to Umbeyla and delivered my message. He moved
forward at once with the 23rd Pioneers and a wing of the 32nd Pioneers
in line, supported by the second wing, having in reserve a wing of the
7th Royal Fusiliers.

When we had passed the village of Umbeyla, which was in flames, having
been set fire to by our Cavalry, the wing of the 32nd was brought up
in prolongation of our line to the right. The advance was continued
to within about 800 yards of the Buner Pass, when Turner, observing a
large body of the enemy threatening his left flank, immediately sent
two companies of the Royal Fusiliers in that direction. Just at that
moment a band of _Ghazis_ furiously attacked the left flank, which
was at a disadvantage, having got into broken ground covered with low
jungle. In a few seconds five of the Pioneer British officers were
on the ground, one killed and four wounded; numbers of the men were
knocked over, and the rest, staggered by the suddenness of the
onslaught, fell back on their reserve, where they found the needed
support, for the Fusiliers stood as firm as a rock. At the
critical moment when the _Ghazis_ made their charge, Wright, the
Assistant-Adjutant-General, and I, being close by, rushed in amongst
the Pioneers and called on them to follow us; as we were personally
known to the men of both regiments, they quickly pulled themselves
together and responded to our efforts to rally them. It was lucky they
did so, for had there been any delay or hesitation, the enemy, who
thronged the slopes above us, would certainly have come down in great
numbers, and we should have had a most difficult task. As it was, we
were entirely successful in repulsing the _Ghazis_, not a man of
whom escaped. We counted 200 of the enemy killed; our losses were
comparatively slight--8 killed and 80 wounded.

We bivouacked for the night near the village of Umbeyla, and the next
morning the Bunerwals, who, true to their word, had taken no part in
the fighting on the 15th or 16th, came in and made their submission.

The question which now had to be decided was, whether a force fully
equipped and strong enough to overcome all opposition should be sent
to destroy the fanatic settlement of Malka, or whether the work of
annihilation should be entrusted to the Bunerwals, witnessed by
British officers. The latter course was eventually adopted, chiefly
on account of the delay which provisioning a brigade would entail--a
delay which the Commissioner was anxious to avoid--for although for
the present the combination had broken up, and most of the tribesmen
were dispersing to their homes, the Akhund of Swat and his followers
were still hovering about in the neighbourhood, and inaction on our
part would in all probability have led to a fresh gathering and
renewed hostilities.

The terms which were drawn up, and to which the Bunerwals agreed,
were:

    The breaking-up of the tribal gathering in the Buner Pass.

    The destruction of Malka; those carrying out the work to be
    accompanied by British officers and such escort as might be
    considered necessary by us.

    The expulsion of the Hindustanis from the Buner, Chamla, and
    Amazai countries.

    And, finally, it was stipulated that the headmen of their tribe
    should be left as hostages until such time as the requirements
    should have been fulfilled.

On the afternoon of Saturday, the 19th December, the little party
of British officers who were to witness the destruction of Malka
assembled at Umbeyla. Its members were Reynell Taylor (who was in
charge), Alex. Taylor (Commanding Engineer), two Survey officers,
Wright, Adye, and myself. Twenty-five Cavalry and 4 companies of the
Guides Infantry, under four officers, formed our escort, and it had
been arranged that we were to be accompanied by four leading Buner
Khans, with 2,000 followers, who would be responsible for our safety,
and destroy the fanatics' stronghold in our presence. Rain was falling
heavily, but as all our arrangements had been made, and delay was
considered undesirable, it was settled that we should make a start. It
was rough travelling, and it was almost dark when we reached Kuria,
only eight miles on our way, where we halted for the night, and where
we had to remain the next day, as the Bunerwals declared they could
not continue the journey until they had come to an understanding with
the Amazais, in whose territory Malka was situated.

We had noticed on leaving Umbeyla that, instead of 2,000 Bunerwals,
there were only about sixty or seventy at the most, and in reply to
our repeated questions as to what had become of the remainder, we were
told they would join us later on. It soon became evident, however,
that no more were coming, and that the Khans thought it wiser to trust
to their own influence with the Amazais rather than to intimidation.

We made a fresh start on the morning of the 21st. Malka was only
twelve miles off, but the way was so difficult, and our guides stopped
so often to consult with the numerous bands of armed men we came
across, that it was sunset before we arrived at our destination.

Malka was perched on a spur of the Mahabun mountain, some distance
below its highest peak. It was a strong, well-built place, with
accommodation for about 1,500 people. The Amazais did not attempt to
disguise their disgust at our presence in their country, and they
gathered in knots, scowling and pointing at us, evidently discussing
whether we should or should not be allowed to return.

The next morning Malka was set on fire, and the huge column of smoke
which ascended from the burning village, and was visible for miles
round, did not tend to allay the ill-feeling so plainly displayed. The
Native officers of the Guides warned us that delay was dangerous, as
the people were becoming momentarily more excited, and were vowing we
should never return. It was no use, however, to attempt to make a
move without the consent of the tribesmen, for we were a mere handful
compared to the thousands who had assembled around Malka, and we were
separated from our camp by twenty miles of most difficult country. Our
position was no doubt extremely critical, and it was well for us that
we had at our head such a cool, determined leader as Reynell Taylor. I
greatly admired the calm, quiet manner in which he went up and spoke
to the headmen, telling them that, the object of our visit having been
accomplished, we were ready to retrace our steps. At this the
Amazais became still further excited. They talked in loud tones, and
gesticulated in true Pathan fashion, thronging round Taylor, who stood
quite alone and perfectly self-possessed in the midst of the angry and
dangerous-looking multitude. At this crisis the Bunerwals came to our
rescue. The most influential of the tribe, a grey-bearded warrior,
who had lost an eye and an arm in some tribal contest, forced his way
through the rapidly increasing crowd to Taylor's side, and, raising
his one arm to enjoin silence, delivered himself as follows: 'You are
hesitating whether you will allow these English to return unmolested.
You can, of course, murder them and their escort; but if you do, you
must kill us Bunerwals first, for we have sworn to protect them, and
we will do so with our lives.' This plucky speech produced a quieting
effect, and taking advantage of the lull in the storm, we set out on
our return journey; but evidently the tribesmen did not consider the
question finally or satisfactorily settled, for they followed us the
whole way to Kuria. The slopes of the hills on both sides were covered
with men. Several times we were stopped while stormy discussions took
place, and once, as we were passing through a narrow defile, an armed
Amazai, waving a standard above his head, rushed down towards us.
Fortunately for us, he was stopped by some of those less inimically
disposed; for if he had succeeded in inciting anyone to fire a single
shot, the desire for blood would quickly have spread, and in all
probability not one of our party would have escaped.

On the 23rd December we reached our camp in the Umbeyla Pass, when the
force, which had only been kept there till our return, retired to the
plains and was broken up.

During my absence at Umbeyla my wife remained with friends at Mian Mir
for some time, and then made her way to Peshawar, where I joined her
on Christmas Day. She spent one night _en route_ in Sir Hugh Rose's
camp at Hasan Abdal, and found the Chief in great excitement and very
angry at such a small party having been sent to Malka, and placed at
the mercy of the tribes. He did not know that my wife had arrived, and
in passing her tent she heard him say: 'It was madness, and not one
of them will ever come back alive.' She was of course dreadfully
frightened. As soon as Sir Hugh heard she was in camp, he went to see
her, and tried to soften down what he knew she must have heard; but
he could not conceal his apprehension; and my poor wife's anxiety was
terrible, for she did not hear another word till the morning of the
day I returned to her.


[Footnote 1: In 1825 a religious adventurer from Bareilly made his
appearance on the Yusafzai frontier with about forty Hindustani
followers, and gave out that he was a man of superior sanctity, and
had a divine command to wage a war of extermination, with the aid of
all true believers, against the infidel. After studying Arabic at
Delhi, he proceeded to Mecca by way of Calcutta, and during this
journey his doctrines had obtained so great an ascendency over the
minds of the Mahomedans of Bengal that they have ever since supplied
the colony which Syad Ahmed Shah founded in Yusafzai with money and
recruits. The Syad was eventually slain fighting against the Sikhs,
but his followers established themselves at Sitana, and in the
neighbourhood of that place they continue to flourish, notwithstanding
that we have destroyed their settlements more than once during the
last forty years.]

[Footnote 2: The Akhund of Swat was a man of seventy years of age at
the time of the Umbeyla expedition; he had led a holy life, and had
gained such an influence over the minds of Mahomedans in general,
that they believed he was supplied by supernatural means with the
necessaries of life, and that every morning, on rising from his
prayers, a sum of money sufficient for the day's expenditure was found
under his praying carpet.]

[Footnote 3: The Peshawar column consisted of half of 19th Company
Royal Artillery, No. 3 Punjab Light Field Battery, the Peshawar and
Hazara Mountain Batteries, the 71st and 101st Foot, the Guides, one
troop 11th Bengal Lancers, one company Bengal Sappers and Miners, 14th
Sikhs, 20th Punjab Infantry, 32nd Pioneers, 1st, 3rd, 5th and 6th
Punjab Infantry, and 4th and 5th Gurkhas. The Hazara column consisted
of a wing of the 51st Foot, 300 Native Cavalry, a regiment of Native
Infantry and eight guns, holding Darband, Torbela, and Topi on the
Indus.]

[Footnote 4: The highest point of a pass crossing a mountain range.]

[Footnote 5: Now General Sir Charles Brownlow, G.C.B.]

[Footnote 6: The late Sir Henry Marion Durand, K.C.S.I., C.B.,
afterwards Lieutenant-Governor of the Punjab.]

[Footnote 7: 7th Royal Fusiliers, 23rd Pioneers, and 24th Punjab
Native Infantry.]

[Footnote 8: Reynell Taylor remained with the force as political
officer.]

[Footnote 9: General Sir John Adye, G.C.B.]

[Footnote 10: The expedition was an admirable school for training men
in outpost duty. The Pathans and Gurkhas were quite at home at such
work, and not only able to take care of themselves, but when stalked
by the enemy were equal to a counter-stalk, often most successful. The
enemy used to joke with Brownlow's and Keyes's men on these occasions,
and say, 'We don't want you. Where are the _lal pagriwalas?_ [as the
14th Sikhs were called from their _lal pagris_ (red turbans)] or the
_goralog_ [the Europeans]? They are better _shikar_ [sport]!' The
tribesmen soon discovered that the Sikhs and Europeans, though full of
fight, were very helpless on the hill-side, and could not keep their
heads under cover.]

[Footnote 11: Colonel Reynell Taylor, whilst bearing like testimony to
the good conduct of the Pathan soldiery, said the personal influence
of officers will always be found to be the only stand-by for the
Government interests when the religious cry is raised, and the
fidelity of our troops is being tampered with. Pay, pensions, and
orders of merit may, and would, be cast to the winds when the honour
of the faith was in the scale; but to snap the associations of years,
and to turn in his hour of need against the man whom he has proved
to be just and worthy, whom he has noted in the hour of danger, and
praised as a hero to his family, is just what a Pathan will not do--to
his honour be it said. The fact was that the officers in camp had been
so long and kindly associated with their soldiers that the latter were
willing to set them before their great religious teacher, the Akhund
of Swat ('Records of Expeditions against the North-West Frontier
Tribes').]

[Footnote 12: The late General Sir Charles Keyes, G.C.B.]

[Footnote 13: The late Major-General T. E. Hughes, C.B., Royal
Artillery.]

[Footnote 14: The late General Sir John Garvock, G.C.B.]

[Footnote 15: Now Bishop of Auckland and Primate of New Zealand.]

[Footnote 16: The late Brigadier-General Sir W. W. Turner, K.C.B.]

[Footnote 17: General Sir T. L. Vaughan, K.C.B.]

[Footnote 18: Stone breastworks.]

       *       *       *       *       *




CHAPTER XXXVI.
1864-1868

  A voyage round the Cape--Cholera camps--The Abyssinian expedition
  --Landed at Zula


Early in the New Year (1864) Sir Hugh Rose, with the Head-Quarters
camp, marched into Peshawar, where we remained until the middle of
February. The time was chiefly spent in inspections, parades, and
field-days, varied by an occasional run with the hounds. The hunting
about Peshawar was very fair, and we all, the Chief included, got a
great deal of fun out of our small pack.

On the 25th January a full-dress parade was held to announce to the
garrison that Sir John Lawrence had been appointed Viceroy of India,
and soon afterwards we left Peshawar and began our return march to
Simla.

We changed our house this year and took one close to the Stewarts, an
arrangement for which I was very thankful later, when my wife had a
great sorrow in the death of her sister, Mrs. Sladen, at Peshawar. It
was everything for her at such a time to have a kind and sympathizing
friend close at hand, when I was engaged with my work and could be
very little with her during the day. At this time, as at all others,
Sir Hugh Rose was a most considerate friend to us; he placed his house
at Mashobra at my wife's disposal, thus providing her with a quiet
resort which she frequently made use of and which she learned to love
so much that, when I returned to Simla as Commander-in-Chief, her
first thought was to secure this lovely 'Retreat' as a refuge from the
(sometimes) slightly trying gaiety of Simla.

The Commander-in-Chief was good enough to send in my name for a brevet
for the Umbeyla expedition, but the Viceroy refused to forward the
recommendation, for the reason that I was 'too junior to be made a
Lieutenant-Colonel.' I was then thirty-two!

Throughout the whole of 1864 I was more or less ill; the office work
(which never suited me quite as well as more active employment) was
excessive, for, in addition to the ordinary routine, I had undertaken
to revise the 'Bengal Route-Book,' which had become quite obsolete,
having been compiled in 1837, when Kurnal was our frontier station. A
voyage round the Cape was still considered the panacea for all Indian
ailments, and the doctors strongly advised my taking leave to England,
and travelling by that route.

We left Simla towards the end of October, and, after spending the next
three months in Calcutta, where I was chiefly employed in taking up
transports and superintending the embarkation of troops returning to
England, I was given the command of a batch of 300 time-expired men
on board the _Renown_, one of Green's frigate-built ships which was
chartered for their conveyance. Two hundred of the men belonged to
the 2nd and 3rd Battalions of the Rifle Brigade, the remainder to the
Artillery and various other corps; they had all been twelve years in
the army, and most of them were decorated for service in the Crimea
and Indian Mutiny.

At the inspection parade before we embarked, a certain number of men
were brought up for punishment for various offences committed on
the way down country; none of the misdemeanours appeared to me very
serious, so I determined to let the culprits off. I told the men that
we had now met for the first time and I was unwilling to commence our
acquaintance by awarding punishments; we had to spend three or four
months together, and I hoped they would show, by their good behaviour
while under my command, that I had not made a mistake in condoning
their transgressions. The officers seemed somewhat surprised at
my action in this matter, but I think it was proved by the men's
subsequent conduct that I had not judged them incorrectly, for they
all behaved in quite an exemplary manner throughout the voyage.

We had been on board more than six weeks, when one of the crew was
attacked by small pox--an untoward circumstance in a crowded ship. The
sailor was placed in a boat which was hung over the ship's side, and a
cabin-boy, the marks on whose face plainly showed that he had already
suffered badly from the disease, was told off to look after him. The
man recovered, and there was no other case. Shortly before we reached
St. Helena, scurvy appeared amongst the troops, necessitating
lime-juice being given in larger quantities, but what proved a more
effectual remedy was water-cress, many sacks of which were laid in
before we left the island.

On the 29th May, 1865, we sighted the 'Lizard,' and took a pilot on
board, who brought with him a few newspapers, which confirmed the
tidings signalled to us by an American ship that the war between the
Federals and Confederates was at an end. How eagerly we scanned the
journals, after having heard nothing from home for four months, but
the only piece of news we found of personal interest to ourselves was
that my father had been made a K.C.B.

On the 30th May we reached Portsmouth, and landed between two showers
of snow! I had a final parade of the men before leaving the ship, and
I was quite sorry to say good-bye to them; some of the poor fellows
were already beginning to be anxious about their future, and to regret
that their time with the colours was over.

My father, mother, and sister came up to London to meet us, very
little changed since I had left them six years before. I remained in
England till March, 1866, when I returned to India, leaving my wife
behind to follow in the autumn.

While I was at home, Sir Hugh Rose's term of the chief command in
India came to an end, and his place had been taken by Sir William
Mansfield. On my arrival in Calcutta, I received orders to join the
Allahabad division, and thither I proceeded. In October I went to
Calcutta to meet my wife and take her to Allahabad, where we remained
for nearly a year, her first experience of a hot season in the plains,
and a very bad one it was. Cholera was rife; the troops had to be sent
away into camps, more or less distant from the station, all of which
had to be visited once, if not twice, daily; this kept me pretty well
on the move from morning till night. It was a sad time for everyone.
People we had seen alive and well one day were dead and buried the
next; and in the midst of all this sorrow and tragedy the most
irksome--because such an incongruous--part of our experience was that
we had constantly to get up entertainments, penny readings, and the
like, to amuse the men and keep their minds occupied, for if once
soldiers begin to think of the terrors of cholera they are seized with
panic, and many get the disease from pure fright.

My wife usually accompanied me to the cholera camps, preferring to do
this rather than be left alone at home. On one occasion, I had just
got into our carriage after going round the hospital, when a young
officer ran after us to tell me a corporal in whom I had been much
interested was dead. The poor fellow's face was blue; the cholera
panic had evidently seized him, and I said to my wife, 'He will be the
next.' I had no sooner reached home than I received a report of his
having been seized.

We were fortunate in having at Allahabad as Chaplain the present
Bishop of Lahore, who, with his wife, had only lately come to India;
they never wearied in doing all that was possible for the soldiers.
Bishop Matthew is still one of our closest friends; his good, charming
and accomplished wife, alas! died some years ago.

We remained at Allahabad until August, 1867, when we heard that a
brigade from Bengal was likely to be required to take part in an
expedition which would probably be sent from Bombay to Abyssinia for
the relief of some Europeans whom the King, Theodore, had imprisoned,
and that the Mountain battery, on the strength of which my name was
still borne, would in such case be employed. I therefore thought I had
better go to Simla, see the authorities, and arrange for rejoining
my battery, if the rumour turned out to be true. The cholera had now
disappeared, so I was at liberty to take leave, and we both looked
forward to a cooler climate and a change to brighter scenes after the
wretched experience we had been through. On my arrival at Simla I
called upon the Commander-in-Chief and told him that, if my battery
was sent on service, I wished to join it and was quite ready to resign
my staff appointment.

Sir William Mansfield was particularly kind in his reception of me,
from which I augured well; but I could learn nothing definite, and it
was not until quite the end of September that it was announced that
Colonel Donald Stewart was to have command of the Bengal Brigade
with the Abyssinian Force, and that I was to be his Assistant-
Quartermaster-General. We at once hastened back to Allahabad, where
we only remained long enough to pack up what we wanted to take with
us, and arrange for the disposal of our property; thence we proceeded
to Calcutta, where, for the next two months, I had a busy time taking
up transports and superintending the equipment of the force.

I had often read and heard of the difficulties and delays experienced
by troops landing in a foreign country, in consequence of their
requirements not being all shipped in the same vessels with
themselves--men in one ship, camp equipage in another, transport and
field hospital in a third, or perhaps the mules in one and their
pack-saddles in another; and I determined to try and prevent these
mistakes upon this occasion. With Stewart's approval, I arranged that
each detachment should embark complete in every detail, which resulted
in the troops being landed and marched off without the least delay as
each vessel reached its destination.[1]

We were living with the Stewarts in the Commander-in-Chief's quarters
in Fort William, which His Excellency had placed at our disposal for
the time being. On the 1st November Calcutta was visited by the second
cyclone within my experience. We had arranged to go to the opera that
evening, but when it was time to start the wind was so high that there
seemed every chance of the carriage being blown over before we could
get there, so we decided not to attempt it. It was well we did, for
the few adventurous spirits who struggled through the storm had the
greatest difficulty in getting back to their homes. The opera-house
was unroofed before the performance was half over, and very little
of the building remained standing the next day. At bedtime we still
thought it was only a bad storm, but towards midnight the wind
increased to an alarming extent, and my wife awoke me, and begged me
to get up, as the windows were being burst open and deluges of rain
coming in. Stewart and I tried to reclose the windows, but the thick
iron bars had been bent in two and forced out of their sockets; a
heavy oak plate-chest and boxes, which we with much difficulty dragged
across the windows, were blown into the middle of the dining-room,
like so much cardboard, and the whole place was gradually flooded.
We were driven out of each room in turn, till at length we all took
refuge in a small box room, about ten feet wide, right in the middle
of the house, where we remained the rest of the night and 'hoped for
the day.'

Towards morning the wind abated, but what a scene of desolation was
that upon which we emerged! The rooms looked as if they could never be
made habitable again, and much of our property was floating about in a
foot of water.

My first thought was for the shipping, and I hurried down to the river
to see how my transports had fared. Things were much better than I
expected to find them--only two had been damaged. Most fortunately the
cyclone, having come from a different direction, was not accompanied
by a storm-wave such as that which worked so much mischief amongst the
shipping on a former occasion, but the destruction on land was even
greater: all the finest trees were torn up by the roots, a great part
of the Native bazaar was levelled, and lay from two to three feet deep
in water, while many houses were wholly or partly demolished. We came
across most curious sights when driving round Calcutta in the evening;
some of the houses were divided clean down the centre, one half
crumbled into a heap of ruins, the other half still standing and
displaying, as in a doll's house, the furniture in the different
stories.

The work of filling up and loading the vessels was greatly retarded,
owing to a large number of cargo boats having been sunk, consequently
it was the 5th December before the first transport got off; from that
date the others started in quick succession, and on the 9th January,
1868, Stewart and his staff left Calcutta in the P. and O. steamer
_Golconda_. The officers and men of the Mountain battery were also on
board, Captain Bogle in command, my friend Jemmy Hills in my place as
second Captain, and Collen[2] and Disney as subalterns. Mrs. Stewart
and my wife accompanied us as far as Aden, where they were left to the
kind care of Major-General Russell,[3] commanding there at the time,
until the arrival of the mail-steamer in which they were to proceed to
England.

On the 3rd February we anchored in Annesley Bay and landed at Zula.


[Footnote 1: The average strength of the regiments was as follows:
10th and 12th Bengal Cavalry, each 9 British officers, 13 Native
officers, 450 non-commissioned officers and men, 3 Native doctors, 489
horses, 322 mules, 590 followers. 21st and 23rd Punjab Infantry, each
9 British officers, 16 Native officers, 736 non-commissioned officers
and men, 3 Native doctors, 10 horses, 350 mules, 400 followers. I
found that six ships were required for the conveyance of a Cavalry and
four for that of an Infantry regiment; for the Mountain battery three
ships were necessary, and for the coolie corps (1,550 strong) four; in
all twenty-seven ships, besides nine tugs. In selecting ships, care
was taken to secure those intended for Artillery or Cavalry as high
'tween-decks as possible; a sufficient number of these were procurable
at Calcutta, either iron clippers from Liverpool or large North
American built traders, with decks varying from 7 feet 6 inches to 8
feet 2 inches high. I gave the preference to wooden ships, as being
cooler and more easily ventilated. The vessels taken up were each from
1,000 to 1,400 tons, averaging in length from 150 to 200 feet, with a
beam varying from 30 to 35 feet, and usually they had a clear upper
deck, where from forty to fifty animals were accommodated.]

[Footnote 2: Now Major-General Sir Edwin Collen, K.C.I.E., Military
Member of the Governor-General's Council.]

[Footnote 3: Now General Sir Edward Lechmere Russell, K.C.S.I.]

       *       *       *       *       *




CHAPTER XXXVII.
1868-1869

  Sir Robert Napier to command--Defective transport
  --King Theodore commits suicide--First A.Q.M.G


It will, perhaps, be as well to recall to the reader's mind that the
object of the expedition in which we were taking part was to rescue
some sixty Europeans, who, from one cause or another, had found their
way to Abyssinia, and been made prisoners by the King of that country.
Amongst these were four English officials, Mr. Rassam, and Captain
Cameron, who had at different times been the bearers of letters from
Queen Victoria to King Theodore, and Lieutenant Prideaux and Dr.
Blanc of the Bombay Army; the rest were chiefly French and German
missionaries, and artisans, with their wives and children. The
prisoners were confined in a fort built on the Magd[=a]la plateau,
9,150 feet above sea-level, and 379 miles inland from Annesley Bay.

The repeated demands of the British Government for the restoration of
the prisoners having been treated with contemptuous silence by the
King, Colonel Merewether, the Political Agent at Aden, who in July,
1867, had been directed to proceed to Massowa and endeavour to obtain
the release of the captives, and to make inquiries and collect
information in case of an expedition having to be sent, reported to
the Secretary of State that he had failed to communicate with the
King, and urged the advisability of immediate measures being taken to
prepare a force in India for the punishment of Theodore and the rescue
of the prisoners. Colonel Merewether added that in Abyssinia the
opinion had become very general that England knew herself to be
too weak to resent insult, and that amongst the peoples of the
neighbouring countries, even so far as Aden, there was a feeling of
contemptuous surprise at the continued long-suffering endurance of the
British Government.

On receipt of this communication, Her Majesty's Government, having
exhausted all their resources for the preservation of peace,
decided to send an expedition from India under the command of
Lieutenant-General Sir Robert Napier, the Commander-in-Chief of the
Bombay Army. After carefully considering the distance along which
operations would have to be prosecuted, and the necessity for holding
a number of detached posts, Napier gave it as his opinion that the
force should consist of not less than 12,000 men.[1]

Profiting by the experience of the Crimean War, the Government was
determined that the mobility of the force should not be hampered by
want of food and clothing. Stores of all descriptions were despatched
in unstinted quantities from England, and three of the steamers in
which they were conveyed were fitted up as hospital ships. But food,
clothing, and stores, however liberally supplied, would not take the
army to Magd[=a]la without transport.

The question as to the most suitable organization for the Land
Transport Corps occupied a good deal of Sir Robert Napier's attention
while the expedition was being fitted out, and caused a considerable
amount of correspondence between him and the Bombay Government. The
Commissary-General wished to keep the corps under his own orders, and
objected to its being given an entirely military organization. Sir
Robert Napier preferred to establish the corps on an independent
basis, but was at first overruled by the Bombay Government. While
acting in accordance with their orders, the Commander-in-Chief wrote:
'I believe that the success of systems depends more on the men who
work them than on the systems themselves; but I cannot accept without
protest a decision to throw such a body of men as the drivers of our
transport animals will be (if we get them) on an expedition in a
foreign country without a very complete organization to secure order
and discipline.' Eventually Sir Robert got his own way, but much
valuable time had been lost, and the corps was organized on too small
a scale;[2] the officers and non-commissioned officers were not sent
to Zula in sufficient time or in sufficient numbers to take charge of
the transport animals as they arrived.

A compact, properly-supervised train of 2,600 mules, with serviceable,
well-fitting pack-saddles, was sent from the Punjab; and from Bombay
came 1,400 mules and ponies and 5,600 bullocks, but these numbers
proving altogether inadequate to the needs of the expedition, they
were supplemented by animals purchased in Persia, Egypt, and on the
shores of the Mediterranean. The men to look after them were supplied
from the same sources, but their number, even if they had been
efficient, was insufficient, and they were a most unruly and
unmanageable lot. They demanded double the pay for which they had
enlisted, and struck work in a body because their demand was not at
once complied with. They refused to take charge of the five mules
each man was hired to look after, and when that number was reduced
to three, they insisted that one should be used as a mount for the
driver. But the worst part of the whole organization, or, rather, want
of organization, was that there had been no attempt to fit the animals
with pack-saddles, some of which were sent from England, some from
India, and had to be adjusted to the mules after they had been landed
in Abyssinia, where there was not an establishment to make the
necessary alterations. The consequence was that the wretched animals
became cruelly galled, and in a few weeks a large percentage were
unfit for work, and had to be sent to the sick depot.

Other results of having no properly arranged transport train, and
no supervision or discipline, were that mules were lost or stolen,
starved for want of food, or famished from want of water. The
condition of the unfortunate animals was such that, though they had
been but a few weeks in the country, when they were required to
proceed to Senafe, only sixty-seven miles distant, a very small
proportion were able to accomplish the march; hundreds died on the
way, and their carcases, quickly decomposing in the hot sun, became a
fruitful source of dangerous disease to the force.

On arrival at Zula, we were told that Sir Robert Napier was at Senafe,
the first station in the Hills, and the advanced depot for supplies.
We of the Bengal brigade were somewhat disconcerted at the orders
which awaited us, from which we learned that our brigade was to be
broken up; the troops were to proceed to the front; while Stewart was
to take command at Senafe, and I myself was to remain at Zula, as
senior staff officer. The disappointment was great, but, being the
last-comer, I had no unfairness to complain of, and I had plenty
to do. I spent the greater part of each day amongst the shipping,
superintending the embarkation and disembarkation of men, animals, and
stores.

Zula was not an attractive place of residence. The heat was
intense--117° in the daytime in my tent. The allowance of fresh water
was extremely limited,[3] while the number of scorpions was quite
the reverse, and the food, at the best, was not appetizing. Few who
remained there as long as I did escaped scurvy and horrible boils or
sores. I was fortunate, however, in finding in charge of the transport
arrangements afloat, my old friend and Eton schoolfellow, George
Tryon,[4] to whom I owed many a good dinner, and, what I appreciated
even more, many a refreshing bath on board the _Euphrates_, a
transport belonging to the British India Steam Navigation Company
which had been fitted up for Captain Tryon and his staff. Indeed, all
the officers of the Royal Navy were most helpful and kind, and I
have a very pleasant recollection of the hospitality I received from
Commodore Heath[5] and those serving under him.

During the four months I remained at Zula, Tryon and I were constantly
together, and I had plenty of opportunity for observing the masterly
manner in which he could grasp a situation, his intimate knowledge of
detail, and the strong hold he had over all those working with him,
not only the officers of the Royal Navy, but also the commanders of
the merchant vessels taken up as transports, and lying in Annesley
Bay.

On the 17th April news reached us that four days before Sir Robert
Napier had successfully attacked Magd[=a]la and released the
prisoners, having experienced but very slight opposition; and that
King Theodore, deserted by his army, which had apparently become
tired of his brutalities, had committed suicide.[6] A few days later
Major-General Russell, who had come from Aden to take over the command
at Zula, received orders to prepare for the embarkation of the force.
Arrangements were accordingly made to enable regiments and batteries
to be embarked on board the transports told off for them directly they
arrived from the front--a matter of the utmost importance, both on
account of the fearful heat at Zula, and the absence of a sufficient
water-supply.

On the 2nd June the Commander-in-Chief returned to Zula, and on the
10th he embarked on board the old Indian marine steamer _Feroze_ for
Suez. Sir Robert was good enough to ask me to accompany him, as he
wished to make me the bearer of his final despatches. My work was
ended, the troops had all left, and as I was pretty well knocked up,
I felt extremely grateful for the offer, and very proud of the great
honour the Chief proposed to confer upon me.

We reached Alexandria on the 20th June, and the next day I started in
the mail-steamer for Brindisi, arriving in London on the evening of
Sunday, the 28th. I received a note at my club from Edwin Johnson (who
was at that time Assistant Military Secretary to H.R.H. the Duke of
Cambridge), directing me to take the despatches without delay to the
Secretary of State for India. I found Sir Stafford and Lady Northcote
at dinner; Sir Stafford looked through the despatches, and when he had
finished reading them, he asked me to take them without delay to the
Commander-in-Chief, as he knew the Duke was most anxious to see them.
There was a dinner-party, however, that night at Gloucester House,
and the servant told me it was quite impossible to disturb His Royal
Highness; so, placing my card on the top of the despatches, I told the
man to deliver them at once, and went back to my club. I had scarcely
reached it when the Duke's Aide-de-camp made his appearance and told
me that he had been ordered to find me and take me back with him. The
Commander-in-Chief received me very kindly, expressing regret that I
had been sent away in the first instance; and Their Royal Highnesses
the Prince and Princess of Wales, who were present, were most
gracious, and asked many questions about the Abyssinian Expedition.

The next day I joined my wife, who was staying with my people at
Clifton, and on the 14th August, when the rewards for the
Abyssinian Expedition were published, my name appeared for a brevet
Lieutenant-Colonelcy.

I was now anxious to ascertain in what manner I was to be employed. My
five years as A.Q.M.G. were about to expire, and I thought I should
like to go back to my regiment for a time. I therefore applied for the
command of a battery of Horse Artillery. I was told, in answer to my
application, that it was not the custom to appoint an officer who had
been in staff employment for some time to the mounted branch, but
that, in consideration of my services, the Duke of Cambridge was
pleased to make an exception in my favour. I was posted to a battery
at Meerut, and warned to be ready to start in an early troopship.
Before the time for our departure arrived, however, I received a
letter from Lumsden, who had now become Quartermaster-General,
informing me that the Commander-in-Chief had recommended, and the
Government had approved of, the formation of a fresh grade--that of
First A.Q.M.G.--and that he was directed by Sir William Mansfield to
offer the new appointment to me--an offer which I gratefully accepted;
for though the command of a Horse Artillery battery would have been
most congenial, this unexpected chance of five years' further staff
employ was too good to be refused.

On the 4th January, 1869, having said good-bye to those dear to us,
two of whom I was never to see again, my wife and I, with a baby girl
who was born the previous July, embarked at Portsmouth on board the
s.s. _Helvetia_, which had been taken up for the conveyance of troops
to Bombay, the vessel of the Royal Navy in which we were to have
sailed having suddenly broken down. The _Helvetia_ proved most
unsuitable as a transport, and uncomfortable to the last degree for
passengers, besides which it blew a gale the whole way to Alexandria.
We were all horribly ill, and our child caught a fatal cold. We
thoroughly appreciated a change at Suez to the Indian trooper, the
_Malabar_, where everything possible was done for our comfort by our
kind captain (Rich, R.N.), and, indeed, by everyone on board; but,
alas! our beautiful little girl never recovered the cruel experience
of the _Helvetia_, and we had the terrible grief of losing her soon
after we passed Aden. She was buried at sea.

It was a very sad journey after that. There were several nice, kind
people amongst our fellow-passengers; but life on board ship at such
a time, surrounded by absolute strangers, was a terrible trial to us
both, and, what with the effects of the voyage and the anxiety and
sorrow she had gone through, my wife was thoroughly ill when we
arrived at Simla towards the end of February.


[Footnote 1: The numbers actually despatched from India were 13,548,
of whom 3,786 were Europeans. In addition, a company of Royal
Engineers was sent from England.]

[Footnote 2: At first it was thought that 10,000 mules, with a coolie
corps 3,000 strong, would suffice, but before the expedition was over,
it was found necessary to purchase 18,000 mules, 1,500 ponies, 1,800
donkeys, 12,000 camels, and 8,400 bullocks.]

[Footnote 3: Fresh water was obtained by condensing the sea-water;
there were few condensors, and no means of aerating the water.]

[Footnote 4: The late Admiral Sir George Tryon, K.C.B.]

[Footnote 5: Now Admiral Sir Leonid Heath, K.C.B.]

[Footnote 6: He is said to have killed in one month, or burnt alive,
more than 3,000 people. He pillaged and burnt the churches at Gondur,
and had many priests and young girls cast alive into the flames.]

       *       *       *       *       *




CHAPTER XXXVIII.
1869

  Afzal Khan ousts Sher Ali--Sher Ali regains the Amirship
  --Foresight of Sir Henry Rawlinson--The Umballa Durbar


In January, 1869, Sir John Lawrence, after a career which was
altogether unique, he having risen from the junior grades of
the Bengal Civil Service to the almost regal position of
Governor-General,[1] left India for good. He was succeeded as Viceroy
by Lord Mayo, one of whose first official acts was to hold a durbar at
Umballa for the reception of the Amir Sher Ali, who, after five years
of civil war, had succeeded in establishing himself on the throne
of Afghanistan, to which he had been nominated by his father, Dost
Mahomed Khan.[2]

Sher Ali had passed through a stormy time between the death of the
Dost, in June, 1863, and September, 1868. He had been acknowledged as
the rightful heir by the Government of India, and for the first three
years he held the Amirship in a precarious sort of way. His two elder
brothers, Afzal and Azim, and his nephew, Abdur Rahman (the present
Ruler of Afghanistan), were in rebellion against him. The death of
his favourite son and heir-apparent, Ali Khan, in action near
Khelat-i-Ghilzai, in 1865, grieved him so sorely that for a time his
reason was affected. In May, 1866, he was defeated near Ghazni (mainly
owing to the treachery of his own troops) by Abdur Rahman, who,
releasing his father, Afzal, from the prison into which he had been
cast by Sher Ali, led him in triumph to Kabul, and proclaimed him Amir
of Afghanistan.

The new Amir, Afzal, at once wrote to the Government of India
detailing what had occurred, and expressing a hope that the friendship
of the British, which he so greatly valued, would be extended to him.
He was told, in reply, that the Government recognized him as Ruler of
Kabul, but that, as Sher Ali still held Kandahar and Herat, existing
engagements with the latter could not be broken off. The evident
preference thus displayed for Sher Ali caused the greatest vexation to
the brothers Afzal and Azim, who showed their resentment by directing
an Envoy who had come from Swat to pay his respects to the new Amir
to return to his own country and set on foot a holy war against the
English; the Waziri _maliks_[3] in attendance at the court were
dismissed with presents and directions to harass the British frontier,
while an emissary was despatched on a secret mission to the Russians.

After his defeat near Ghazni, Sher Ali fled to Kandahar, and in the
January of the following year (again owing to treachery in his army)
he met with a second defeat near Khelat-i-Ghilzai, and lost Kandahar.

On this fact being communicated to the Government of India, Afzal Khan
was in his turn recognized as Amir of Kabul and Kandahar. But he was
at the same time informed that the British Government intended to
maintain a strict neutrality between the contending parties in
Afghanistan. John Lawrence, in his letter of the 20th of February,
said that 'neither men, nor arms, nor money, nor assistance of any
kind, have ever been supplied by my Government to Amir Sher Ali. Your
Highness and he, both equally unaided by me, have fought out the
battle, each upon your own resources. I purpose to continue the same
policy for the future. If, unhappily, the struggle for supremacy in
Afghanistan has not yet been brought to a close, and hostilities are
again renewed, I shall still side with neither party.'

This reply altogether failed to satisfy Afzal and Azim. They answered
it civilly, but at the same time they sent a copy of it to General
Romanofski, the Russian Governor of Tashkent, who was informed by
the new Amir that he had no confidence in the 'Lord _sahib's_ fine
professions of friendship, and that he was disgusted with the British
Government for the ingratitude and ill-treatment shown towards his
brother Azim.[4] He looked upon the Russians as his real and only
friends, hoped soon to send a regular Ambassador to the Russian camp,
and would at all times do his utmost to protect and encourage Russian
trade.'

In October of this year (1867) Afzal Khan died, and his brother Azim,
hastening to Kabul, took upon himself the Amirship. Abdur Rahman had
hoped to have succeeded his father, but his uncle having forestalled
him, he thought it politic to give in his allegiance to him, which he
did by presenting his dead father's sword, in durbar, to the new Amir,
who, like his predecessor, was now acknowledged by the Government of
India as Ruler of Kabul and Kandahar.

The tide, however, was beginning to turn in favour of Sher Ali. Azim
and Abdur Rahman quarrelled, and the former, by his extortions and
cruelties, made himself detested by the people generally.

In March, 1868, Sher Ali's eldest son, Yakub Khan, regained possession
of Kandahar for his father. In July father and son found themselves
strong enough to move towards Ghazni, where Azim Khan's army was
assembled. The latter, gradually deserted by his soldiers, took to
flight, upon which Sher Ali, after an absence of forty months, entered
Kabul on the 8th of September, and re-possessed himself of all his
dominions, with the exception of Balkh, where Azim and Abdur Rahman
(now reconciled to each other) still flew the flag of rebellion.

One of the newly-installed Amir's first acts was to inform the Viceroy
of his return to Kabul, and of the recovery of his kingdom. He
announced his desire to send some trusted representatives, or else
proceed himself in person, to Calcutta, 'for the purpose of showing
his sincerity and firm attachment to the British Government, and
making known his real wants.'

Sir John Lawrence, in his congratulatory reply, showed that a change
had come over his policy of non-interference in the internal affairs
of Afghanistan, for he stated that he was 'prepared, not only to
maintain the bonds of amity and goodwill which were established
between Dost Mahomed and the British Government, but, so far as may be
practicable, to strengthen those bonds'; and, as a substantial proof
of his goodwill, the Viceroy sent Sher Ali £60,000, aid which arrived
at a most opportune moment, and gave the Amir that advantage over his
opponents which is of incalculable value in Afghan civil war, namely,
funds wherewith to pay the army and bribe the opposite side.

The energetic and capable Abdur Rahman Khan had in the meantime
collected a sufficient number of troops in Turkestan to enable him to
move towards Kabul with his uncle Azim. On nearing Ghazni, he found
himself confronted by Sher Ali; the opposing forces were about equal
in strength, and on both sides there was the same scarcity of ready
money. Suddenly the report was received that money was being sent from
India to Sher Ali, and this turned the scale in his favour. Abdur
Rahman's men deserted in considerable numbers, and a battle fought
on the 3rd January, 1869, resulted in the total defeat of uncle and
nephew, and in the firmer consolidation of Sher Ali's supremacy.

The change in policy which induced the Government of India to assist
a struggling Amir with money, after its repeated and emphatic
declarations that interference was impossible, was undoubtedly brought
about by an able and elaborate memorandum written by the late Sir
Henry Rawlinson on the 28th July, 1868. In this paper Rawlinson
pointed out that, notwithstanding promises to the contrary, Russia was
steadily advancing towards Afghanistan. He referred to the increased
facilities of communication which would be the result of the recent
proposal to bring Turkestan into direct communication, _viâ_ the
Caspian, with the Caucasus and St. Petersburg. He dwelt at length upon
the effect which the advanced position of Russia in Central Asia would
have upon Afghanistan and India. He explained that by the occupation
of Bokhara Russia would gain a pretext for interfering in Afghan
politics, and 'that if Russia once assumes a position which, in virtue
either of an imposing military force on the Oxus, or of a dominant
political influence in Afghanistan, entitles her, in Native
estimation, to challenge our Asiatic supremacy, the disquieting effect
will be prodigious.'

'With this prospect before us,' Sir Henry asked, 'are we justified
in maintaining what has been sarcastically, though perhaps unfairly,
called Sir John Lawrence's policy of "masterly inaction"? Are we
justified in allowing Russia to work her way to Kabul unopposed, and
there to establish herself as a friendly power prepared to protect the
Afghans against the English?' He argued that it was contrary to
our interests to permit anarchy to reign in Afghanistan; that Lord
Auckland's famous doctrine of 'establishing a strong and friendly
Power on our North-West Frontier' was the right policy for India,
'that Dost Mahomed's successful management of his country was in a
great measure due to our aid, and that, if we had helped the son as we
had helped the father, Sher Ali would have summarily suppressed
the opposition of his brothers and nephews.' Rawlinson then added:
'Another opportunity now presents itself. The fortunes of Sher Ali are
again in the ascendant; he should be secured in our interests without
delay.'

Rawlinson's suggestions were not at the time supposed to commend
themselves to the Government of India. In the despatch in which they
were answered,[5] the Viceroy and his Councillors stated that
they still objected to any active interference in the affairs of
Afghanistan; they foresaw no limits to the expenditure which such a
move would entail, and they believed that the objects that they had at
heart might be attained by an attitude of readiness and firmness on
the frontier. It is worthy of note, however, that, after Sir Henry
Rawlinson's memorandum had been received by the Indian Government, and
notwithstanding these protests, the sum of £60,000 was sent to Sher
Ali, that Sir John Lawrence invited him 'to come to some place in
British territory for a personal meeting in order to discuss the best
manner in which a limited support might be accorded,' and that five
days from the time of writing the above-mentioned despatch, John
Lawrence sent a farewell letter to Sher Ali, expressing the earnest
hope of the British Government that His Highness's authority would be
established on a solid and permanent basis, and informing him that a
further sum of £60,000 would be supplied to him during the next few
months, and that future Viceroys would consider, from time to time,
what amount of practical assistance in the shape of money or war
materials should periodically be made over to him as a testimony of
their friendly feeling, and to the furtherance of his legitimate
authority and influence.

Sher Ali expressed himself as most grateful, and came to Umballa full
of hope and apparently thoroughly well disposed towards the British
Government. He was received with great state and ceremony, and Lord
Mayo was most careful to demonstrate that he was treating with an
independent, and not a feudatory, Prince.

At this conference Sher Ali began by unburdening himself of his
grievances, complaining to Lord Mayo of the manner in which his two
elder brothers had each in his turn been recognized as Amir, and
dwelling on the one-sided nature of the treaty made with his father,
by which the British Government only bound itself to abstain from
interfering with Afghanistan, while the Amir was to be 'the friend of
the friends and the enemy of the enemies of the Honourable East India
Company.' His Highness then proceeded to make known his wants, which
were that he and his lineal descendants on the throne that he had
won 'by his own good sword' should be acknowledged as the _de jure_
sovereigns of Afghanistan; that a treaty offensive and defensive
should be made with him; and that he should be given a fixed subsidy
in the form of an annual payment.

It was in regard to the first of these three demands that Sher Ali was
most persistent. He explained repeatedly and at some length that to
acknowledge the Ruler _pro tempore_ and _de facto_ was to invite
competition for a throne, and excite the hopes of all sorts of
candidates; but that if the British Government would recognize him and
his dynasty, there was nothing he would not do in order to evince his
gratitude.

These requests, the Amir was informed, were inadmissible. There could
be no treaty, no fixed subsidy, no dynastic pledges. He was further
told that we were prepared to discourage his rivals, to give him warm
countenance and support, and such material assistance as we considered
absolutely necessary for his immediate wants, if he, on his part,
would undertake to do all he could to maintain peace on our frontier
and to comply with our wishes in matters connected with trade.

As an earnest of our goodwill, the Amir was given the second £60,000
promised him by Sir John Lawrence, besides a considerable supply of
arms and ammunition,[6] and was made happy by a promise that European
officers should not be required to reside in any of his cities. Before
the conference took place, Lord Mayo had contemplated British agents
being sent to Kabul in order to obtain accurate information regarding
events in Central Asia, but on discovering how vehemently opposed Sher
Ali was to such an arrangement, he gave him this promise. Saiyad Nur
Mahomed, the Minister who accompanied the Amir, though equally averse
to European agents, admitted that 'the day might come when the
Russians would arrive, and the Amir would be glad, not only of British
officers as agents, but of arms and troops to back them.'

One request which the Amir made towards the close of the meeting the
Viceroy agreed to, which was that we should call Persia to account for
her alleged encroachments on the debatable ground of Sistan. This,
which seemed but an unimportant matter at the time, was one of the
chief causes of Sher Ali's subsequent estrangement; for the committee
of arbitration which inquired into it decided against the Amir,
who never forgave what he considered our unfriendly action in
discountenancing his claims.

The Umballa conference was, on the whole, successful, in that Sher Ali
returned to his own country much gratified at the splendour of his
reception, and a firm personal friend of Lord Mayo, whose fine
presence and genial manner had quite won the Amir's heart, although he
had not succeeded in getting from him everything he had demanded.


[Footnote 1: I should have mentioned that Sir John Lawrence was not
the only instance of a Bengal civilian rising to the position of
Governor-General, as a predecessor of his, Sir John Shore, afterwards
Lord Teignmouth, was appointed Governor-General in 1792, and held that
office until 1798.]

[Footnote 2: Dost Mahomed had several sons. Mahomed Akbar and Ghulam
Haidar, the two heirs-designate in succession, died before their
father. Sixteen other sons were alive in 1863, of whom the following
were the eldest:

  1. Mahomed Afzal Khan, aged 52 years } By a wife not of Royal blood.
  2. Mahomed Azim Khan     "  45   "   }  " "   "   "   "   "      "
  3. Sher Ali Khan         "  40   "   } By a favourite Popalzai wife.
  4. Mahomed Amir Khan     "  34   "   }  " "     "         "      "
  5. Mahomed Sharif Khan   "  30   "   }  " "     "         "      "
  6. Wali Mahomed Khan     "  33   "   } By a third wife.
  7. Faiz Mahomed Khan     "  25   "   }  " "    "    "

Afzal Khan had a son Abdur Rahman Khan, the present Amir of
Afghanistan, and Sher Ali had five sons--Ali Khan, Yakub Khan, Ibrahim
Khan, Ayub Khan, and Abdulla Jan.]

[Footnote 3: The headmen of villages in Afghanistan are styled
_maliks_.]

[Footnote 4: Azim Khan behaved well towards the Lumsden Mission, and
it was reported that he encouraged his father, Dost Mahomed Khan, not
to disturb the Peshawar frontier during the Mutiny.]

[Footnote 5: Dated 4th January, 1869.]

[Footnote 6: Besides the remainder of the aggregate sum of twelve
lakhs, 6,500 more rifles were forwarded to the frontier for
transmission to the Amir, and in addition four 18-pounder smooth-bore
guns, two 8-inch howitzers, and a Mountain battery of six 3-pounders
complete, with due proportion of ammunition and stores, together with
draught bullocks and nine elephants.]

       *       *       *       *       *




CHAPTER XXXIX.
1869-1871

  The Lushais--The Lushai expedition--Defective transport again
  --Practice _versus_ theory--A severe march
  --Lushais foiled by Gurkhas--A successful turning movement
  --Murder of Lord Mayo


We spent a very quiet year at Simla. My wife was far from strong, and
we had another great sorrow in the death of a baby boy three weeks
after his birth.

That winter I was left in charge of the Quartermaster-General's
office, and we moved into 'Ellerslie,' a larger and warmer house than
that in which we had lived during the summer.

Simla in the winter, after a fresh fall of snow, is particularly
beautiful. Range after range of hills clothed in their spotless
garments stretch away as far as the eye can reach, relieved in the
foreground by masses of reddish-brown perpendicular cliffs and
dark-green ilex and deodar trees, each bearing its pure white burden,
and decked with glistening fringes of icicles. Towards evening the
scene changes, and the snow takes the most gorgeous colouring from
the descending rays of the brilliant eastern sun--brilliant even in
mid-winter--turning opal, pink, scarlet, and crimson; gradually, as
the light wanes, fading into delicate lilacs and grays, which slowly
mount upwards, till at last even the highest pinnacle loses the
life-giving tints, and the whole snowy range itself turns cold and
white and dead against a background of deepest sapphire blue. The
spectator shivers, folds himself more closely in his wraps, and
retreats indoors, glad to be greeted by a blazing log-fire and a hot
cup of tea.

In the spring of the next year (1870) Sir William Mansfield's term
of command came to an end, and he was succeeded by Lord Napier of
Magd[=a]la. The selection of this distinguished officer for the
highest military position in India was greatly appreciated by the
Indian army, as no officer of that army had held it since the days of
Lord Clive.

In September a daughter was born, and that winter we again remained
at Simla. I amused myself by going through a course of electric
telegraphy, which may seem rather like a work of supererogation; but
during the Umbeyla campaign, when the telegraph office had to be
closed in consequence of all the clerks being laid up with fever, and
we could neither read nor send messages, I determined that I would on
the first opportunity learn electric signalling, in order that I might
be able to decipher and send telegrams should I ever again find myself
in a similar position.

In May my wife and I went for a march across the hills to Chakrata,
and thence to Mussoorie and back by way of Dehra Dun and the plains.
The object of this trip was to settle the boundary of Chakrata, and my
wife took the opportunity of my being ordered on this duty to get away
from Simla, as we had now been there for more than two years, and were
consequently rather longing for a change. Our route lay through most
beautiful scenery, and notwithstanding that the trip was a little
hurried, and that some of the marches were therefore rather long, we
enjoyed it immensely. When passing along the ridge of a very high
hill one afternoon, we witnessed rather a curious sight--a violent
thunderstorm was going on in the valley below us, while we ourselves
remained in the mildest, most serene atmosphere, enjoying bright
sunshine and a blue sky. Dense black clouds filled up the valley a
thousand feet beneath us, the thunder roared, the lightning flashed,
and soon we could hear the rush of waters in the streams below from
the torrents of rain which the clouds were discharging; but it was not
until we had crossed over the mountain, and descended to a low level
on the other side, that we fully realized the effects of the heavy
storm.

On our return to Simla we had the pleasure of a visit from
Major-General Donald Stewart, who had come up to receive Lord Mayo's
instructions before taking over his appointment as Superintendent
of the Andaman Islands. In September he and I travelled together to
Calcutta, to which place I was directed to proceed in order to make
arrangements for a military expedition into the country of the
Lushais, having been appointed senior staff officer to the force.

Lushai, situated between south-eastern Bengal and Burma, was a _terra
incognita_ to me, and I had only heard of it in connexion with the
raids made by its inhabitants upon the tea-gardens in its vicinity,
which had now spread too far away from Cachar for the garrison of that
small military station to afford them protection. From time to time
the Lushais had done the planters much damage, and carried off several
prisoners, and various attempts had been made in the shape of small
military expeditions to punish the tribesmen and rescue the captives;
but from want of proper organization, and from not choosing the right
time of the year, these attempts had hitherto been unsuccessful, and
our failures had the inevitable result of making the Lushais bolder.
Raids became more frequent and more destructive; until at last a
little European girl, named Mary Winchester, was carried off, and
kept by them as a prisoner; on this the Lieutenant-Governor of Bengal
declared that a punitive expedition was 'absolutely necessary for the
future security of the British subjects residing on the Cachar and
Chittagong frontiers.'

The despatch of a force was therefore decided upon; it was to consist
of two small columns[1]--one having its base at Cachar, the other at
Chittagong--commanded respectively by Brigadier-Generals Bourchier,
C.B., and C. Brownlow, C.B., supreme political power being also vested
in these two officers. Long experience had taught Lord Napier the
wisdom of having only one head in time of war, and he impressed upon
the Government his opinion that the civil officers, while acting as
advisers and as the channels of communication with the tribes, should
be subordinate to the control of the two Commanders, who, after having
been put in possession of the views and wishes of the Government,
should be held responsible for carrying them out loyally so far as
circumstances and the safety of the force would permit.

As the existence of the tea industry was at stake, the Lushais having
established a perfect terror on all the estates within their reach,
it was essential that they should be given a severe lesson, and this
could only be done by their principal villages, which lay at some
considerable distance from the base of operations, being visited in
force. The difficult country and the paucity of transport necessitated
the columns being lightly equipped; no tents were to be allowed, and
baggage and followers were to be reduced to a minimum. My instructions
were to fit out and despatch the two columns, and then join
Brigadier-General Bourchier at Cachar.

I was kept in Calcutta all October--not a pleasant month, the climate
then being very muggy and unhealthy. Everyone who could get away had
gone to the Hills or out to sea; and the offices being closed for the
Hindu holidays of the _Durga Puja,_ it was extremely difficult to get
work done. Everything for the Chittagong column had to be sent by
sea. The shipping of the elephants was rather interesting: they clung
desperately to the ground, trying hard to prevent themselves being
lifted from it; and when at last, in spite of all their struggles,
they were hoisted into the air, the helpless appearance of the huge
animals and their despairing little cries and whines were quite
pathetic. I found it trying work being on the river all day; my eyes
suffered from the glare, and I became so reduced that before I left
Calcutta I weighed scarcely over eight stone--rather too fine a
condition in which to enter on a campaign in a mountainous country, so
thickly covered with jungle as to make riding out of the question.

By the 3rd November the equipment and stores for both columns had been
despatched, and on the 16th I joined General Bourchier at the house of
that most hospitable of hosts, Mr. Edgar,[2] Deputy-Commissioner of
Cachar, who accompanied the left column as civil officer.

We left Cachar on the 23rd, and from the outset we had to make our own
roads, a labour which never ceased until the end of January, by which
date 110 miles had been completed. There was not the vestige of a
track to direct us; but I got hold of some people of the country, with
whom I made friends, and induced them to act as guides. Many a long
and weary reconnaissance had to be executed, however, before the line
of advance could be decided upon. The troops worked with a will, and,
notwithstanding the vapour-bath-like atmosphere of the valleys and the
difficult nature of the country, which was a succession of hill-ranges
covered with jungle forests, made almost impenetrable from the huge
creepers, and intersected by rivers and watercourses, a good road,
from six to eight feet wide, was constructed, with a sufficiently easy
gradient for laden elephants to travel over. Cutting one's way day
after day through these dense, gloomy forests, through which hardly a
ray of light penetrates, was most stifling and depressing. One could
hardly breathe, and was quite unable to enjoy the beauty of the
magnificent trees, the graceful bamboos and canes, and the wonderful
creepers, which abounded, and under other circumstances would have
been a source of pleasure; the difficulties we encountered, and the
consequent delay in our progress, quite prevented me from being in a
frame of mind to appreciate my picturesque surroundings.

It became evident from the first that our onward movements would be
greatly impeded by want of transport. Notwithstanding the experience
which ought to have been gained in many small mountain wars, the
Government had not been taught that a properly organized transport
corps was an absolute necessity, and that it was a mere waste of money
to collect a number of men and animals without providing trained
supervision. Fourteen hundred of our coolies were attached to
the Commissariat Department without anyone to look after them,
consequently officers and non-commissioned officers, who could ill be
spared from their regimental duties, had to be told off to organize
and work them.

To add to our troubles, cholera broke out amongst some Nepalese
coolies on their way to join us; out of 840, 251 died in a few days,
and a number deserted panic-stricken, while the rest were so weakened
and shaken that, notwithstanding the care bestowed upon them by their
able and energetic Commandant, Major H. Moore, only 387 joined the
column. We were not much better off in the matter of elephants, which
had been so carelessly selected that only 33 out of the 157 sent with
our column were of any use. All this resulted in our being obliged to
still further reduce our already small kits. Officers were allowed
only forty pounds of baggage, and soldiers twenty-four pounds, limits
within which it was rather difficult to keep. A couple of blankets
were essential, as we should have to operate over mountains five and
six thousand feet high; so was a waterproof sheet, for even if we
should be lucky enough to escape rain, the dew is so heavy in those
parts that it wets one just as thoroughly as a shower of rain. These
three items with my cloak and cork mattress--which is also a very
necessary adjunct in such a damp climate--amounted to thirty-one
pounds, leaving only nine pounds for a change of clothes, plate,
knife, fork, etc.--not too much for a four months' campaign. However,
'needs must,' and it is surprising how many things one considers
absolute necessities under ordinary circumstances turn out to have
been luxuries when we are obliged to dispense with them.

The advance portion of the column did not arrive at Tipai Mukh, only
eighty-four miles from Cachar, until the 9th December, which will give
an idea of the enforced slowness of our progress. Tipai Mukh proved a
very suitable place for our depot: it was situated at the junction
of two rivers, the Tipai and the Barak; thickly-wooded hills rose
precipitously on all sides, but on the right bank of the Barak there
was sufficient level space for all our requirements. With the help
of local coolies, the little Gurkhas were not long in running up
hospitals and storesheds; bamboo, the one material used in Lushailand
for every conceivable purpose, whether it be a house, a drinking
vessel, a bridge, a woman's ear-ring, or a musical instrument, grew
in profusion on the hillside. A trestle bridge was thrown across the
Tipai in a few hours, and about that bridge I have rather an amusing
story to relate. On my telling the young Engineer officer in charge of
the Sapper company that a bridge was required to be constructed with
the least possible delay, he replied that it should be done, but that
it was necessary to calculate the force of the current, the weight to
be borne, and the consequent strength of the timber required. Off he
went, urged by me to be as quick as he could. Some hours elapsed, and
nothing was seen of the Engineer, so I sent for him and asked him when
the bridge was to be begun. He answered that his plans were nearly
completed, and that he would soon be able to commence work. In the
meantime, however, and while these scientific calculations were being
made, the headman of the local coolies had come to me and said, if the
order were given, he would throw a good bridge over the river in no
time. I agreed, knowing how clever Natives often are at this kind
of work, and thinking I might just as well have two strings to this
particular bow. Immediately, numbers of men were to be seen felling
the bamboos on the hillside a short distance above the stream: these
were thrown into the river, and as they came floating down they were
caught by men standing up to their necks in water, who cut them to the
required length, stuck the uprights into the river-bed, and attached
them to each other by pieces laid laterally and longitudinally; the
flooring was then formed also of bamboo, the whole structure was
firmly bound together by strips of cane, and the bridge was pronounced
ready. Having tested its strength by marching a large number of men
across it, I sent for my Engineer friend. His astonishment on seeing a
bridge finished ready for use was great, and became still greater when
he found how admirably the practical woodmen had done their work; from
that time, being assured of their ability to assist him, he wisely
availed himself when difficulties arose of their useful, if
unscientific, method of engineering.

By the 14th December matters had so far progressed as to warrant an
advance. As our route now lay away from the river, scarcity of water
entailed greater care being taken in the selection of encamping
grounds, so on arriving at our halting-place each day I had to
reconnoitre ahead for a suitable site for our next resting-ground, a
considerable addition to the day's work. Road-making for the passage
of the elephants became more difficult, and transport was so deficient
that the troops could only be brought up very gradually. Thus, it was
the 22nd of the month before we reached the Tuibum river, only twenty
miles from Tipai Mukh. On our way we were met by some scouts from
the villages ahead of us, who implored of us to advance no further,
saying, if we would only halt, their headmen would come in and submit
to whatever terms we chose to make. The villagers were informed in
reply that our quarrel was not with them, and so long as we remained
unmolested, not the slightest injury should be done to them, their
villages, or their crops; but that we were determined to reach the
country of Lalbura, the Chief who had been the ringleader in the raids
upon the tea-gardens.

We pushed on as fast as the dense undergrowth would permit until
within about a mile of the river, where we found the road blocked by
a curious erection in the form of a gallows, from which hung two
grotesque figures, made of bamboo. A little further on it was a felled
tree which stopped us; this tree was studded all over with knife-like
pieces of bamboo, and from the incisions into which these were stuck
exuded a red juice, exactly the colour of blood. This was the Lushai
mode of warning us what would be our fate if we ventured further. We,
however, proceeded on our way, bivouacked for the night, and early the
next morning started off in the direction of some villages which we
understood lay in the road to our destination.

For the first thousand feet the ascent was very steep, and the path so
narrow that we could only march in single file. Suddenly we entered
upon a piece of ground cleared for cultivation, and as we emerged from
the forest we were received by a volley from a position about sixty
yards off. A young police orderly, who was acting as our guide, was
knocked over by my side, and a second volley wounded one of the
sepoys, on which we charged and the enemy retired up the hill. We came
across a large number of these _jooms_ (clearings), and at each there
was a like effort to oppose us, always with the same result. After
advancing in this way for the greater part of the day, alternately
through dense jungle and open spaces, and occasionally passing by
scattered cottages, we sighted a good-sized village, where it was
decided we should remain for the night. The day's march had been very
severe, the village being 4,000 feet above the river; and the troops
were so worn out with their exertions that it was with difficulty the
piquets could be got to construct proper shelter for themselves out of
the plentiful supply of trees and underwood ready at hand. Throughout
the night the enemy's sharpshooters kept up an annoying fire under
cover of the forest which surrounded the village, and so as soon as
day dawned a party moved out to clear the ground all round.

It was most aggravating to find from the view we got of the country
from this elevated position that the previous day's harassing march
had been an absolutely useless performance and an unnecessary waste of
time and strength. We could now distinctly see that this village did
not lead to Lalbura's country, as we had been led to believe it would,
and that there was no alternative but to retrace our steps as far as
the river. The men and animals were too tired to march that day, and
the next being Christmas, we made another halt, and commenced our
retirement on the 26th. This was an extremely nasty business, and
had to be carried out with very great caution. The ground, as I said
before, necessitated our proceeding in single file, and with only
250 fighting men (all that our deficient transport admitted of being
brought on to this point) it was difficult to guard the long line
of sick, wounded, and coolies. As soon as we began to draw in our
piquets, the Lushais, who had never ceased their fire, perceiving we
were about to retire, came down in force, and entered one end of the
village, yelling and screaming like demons, before we had got out
at the other. The whole way down the hill they pressed us hard,
endeavouring to get amongst the baggage, but were invariably baffled
by the Gurkhas, who, extending rapidly whenever the ground was
favourable, retired through their supports in admirable order, and
did not once give the enemy the chance of passing them. We had 3 men
killed and 8 wounded during the march, but the Lushais confessed
afterwards to a loss of between 50 and 60.

As we were given to understand that our short retrograde movement had
been interpreted into a defeat by the Lushais, the General wisely
determined to pay the village of Kholel another visit. Our doing so
had the best possible effect. A slight resistance was offered at the
first clearance, but by the time the ridge was reached the Chief,
having become convinced of the uselessness of further opposition,
submitted, and engaged to give hostages and keep open communication
with our depot at Tipai Mukh, a promise which he most faithfully
performed.

1872 opened auspiciously for me. On New Year's Day I was agreeably
surprised by a communication from the Quartermaster-General informing
me that, a vacancy having unexpectedly occurred, Lord Napier had
appointed me Deputy-Quartermaster-General. This was an important step
in my department, and I was proportionately elated.

A few days later I received the good news of the birth of a son at
Umballa on the 8th.

Paucity of transport and difficulty about supplies kept us stationary
on the Tuibum for some time, after which we moved on as before, the
Lushais retiring in front of us until the 25th, when they attacked
us while we were moving along a narrow ravine, with a stream at the
bottom and steep hills on either side. The first volley wounded the
General in the arm and hand, and killed his orderly. The enemy's
intention was evidently to push past the weak column along the
hillside and get amongst the coolies; but this attempt was again
foiled by the Gurkhas, who, flinging off their great-coats, rushed
into the stream and engaged the Lushais before they could get at the
baggage, pressing them up the mountain, rising 2,500 feet above us, as
fast as the precipitous nature of the ascent would allow. On the crest
we found the enemy occupying a good-sized village, out of which we
cleared them and took possession of it ourselves. On this occasion
we had only 4 killed and 8 wounded, including the General, while the
enemy lost about 60. In one place we found a heap of headless bodies.
The Lushais, if unable to remove their dead, invariably decapitate
them to prevent their adversaries from carrying off the heads, their
own mode of dealing with a slain enemy, as they believe that whoever
is in possession of the head will have the man to whom it belonged as
a slave in the next world.

To complete the success we had gained, the General sent me the next
day with a small party to burn the village of Taikum, belonging to the
people who had attacked us. It was past noon before we could make a
start, owing to the non-arrival of the elephants with the guns. When
they did come in, the poor huge creatures were so fatigued by their
climb that it was considered advisable to transfer their loads to
coolies, particularly as the route we had to traverse was reported to
be even more difficult than anything we had yet encountered. When we
had proceeded a short distance, we perceived that our way was blocked
a mile ahead by a most formidable-looking stockade, on one side of
which rose perpendicular cliffs, while on the other was a rocky
ravine. As the nature of the ground did not admit of my approaching
near enough to discover whether the Artillery could be placed so as to
cover the Infantry advance, and being anxious to avoid losing many
of my small party, I settled to turn the stockade by a detour up the
hillside. This manoeuvre took some time, owing to the uncompromising
nature of the country; but it was successful, for when we struck
the track, we found ourselves about a mile on the other side of the
stockade. The Lushais, on realizing what we were about, retired to
Taikum, which place came into view at 5 p.m. It was situated on the
summit of a hill 1,200 yards in front, and was crowded with men. The
guns were brought at once into action, and while Captain Blackwood[3]
was preparing his fuses, I advanced towards the village with the
Infantry. The first shell burst a little beyond the village, the
second was lodged in its very centre, for a time completely paralyzing
the Lushais. On recovering from the shock, they took to their heels
and scampered off in every direction, the last man leaving the village
just as we entered it. The houses, as usual, were made of bamboo, and
after it had been ascertained that there was no living creature inside
any of them, the place was set on fire, and we began our return
journey. There was a bright moon, but even aided by its light we did
not reach our bivouac until midnight. This ended the campaign so far
as opposition was concerned, for not another shot was fired either by
us or against us during the remaining six weeks we continued in the
country.

Soon after this we heard that some of the captives we had come to
relieve had been given up to the Chittagong column, and that Mary
Winchester was safe in General Brownlow's hands--very satisfactory
intelligence, showing as it did that the Lushais were beginning to
understand the advisability of acceding to our demands. The work of
our column, however, was not over, for although, from the information
we received of his whereabouts, we had given up hope of joining hands
with Brownlow, Bourchier determined that Lalbura's country must be
reached; he (Lalbura) being the chief offender, it would never have
done to let him think his stronghold lay beyond our power.

In order that we might be well out of Lushailand before the rains,
which usually begin in that part of the world about the middle of
March, and are extremely heavy, it was decided not to wait until a
road could be made for elephants, but to trust to coolie-carriage
alone, and to push on rapidly as soon as supplies sufficient for
twelve days could be collected. Kits were still further reduced,
officers and soldiers alike being only allowed a couple of blankets
and one or two cooking utensils.

We resumed our march on the 12th February; the route in many places
was strongly and skilfully stockaded, but the tidings of our successes
had preceded us, and our advance was unopposed. In five days we
reached the Chamfai valley, at the end of which, on a high hill,
Lalbura's village was situated.[4] Although Lalbura's father, Vonolel,
had been dead some years, the people still called the place Vonolel's
country. Vonolel had been a famous warrior, and they were evidently
very proud of his reputation. We were shown his tomb, which, like that
of all great Lushai braves, was decorated with the heads of human
beings (his slaves in paradise) and those of animals, besides
drinking-vessels and various kinds of utensils for his use in another
life.

Lalbura had taken himself off; but his headmen submitted to us and
accepted our terms. We remained at this place till the 21st, in
accordance with an agreement we had made with Brownlow to send up
signals on the night of the 20th in case his column should be anywhere
in the neighbourhood. During the three days we stayed amongst them
we mixed freely with the Lushais, who were greatly delighted and
astonished with all we had to show them. The telescope and the
burning-glass amused them greatly; our revolvers excited their
envy; and for the little Mountain guns they displayed the highest
veneration. But what seemed to astonish them more than anything was
the whiteness of our skins, particularly when on closer inspection
they discovered that our arms and bodies were even fairer than our
faces and hands, which to our eyes had become from long exposure so
bronzed as to make us almost unrecognizable as Europeans.

We were all glad that the duty entrusted to us had been satisfactorily
ended, and we were hoping that the Viceroy, who had taken a keen
personal interest in our proceedings, would be satisfied with the
result, when we were shocked and startled beyond measure by hearing
that Lord Mayo had been murdered by a convict while visiting the
Andaman Islands. The disastrous news arrived as we were in the midst
of firing signal-rockets, burning blue-lights, and lighting bonfires
to attract the attention of the Chittagong column. I could not help
thinking of the heavy loss India had sustained, for the manly,
open-hearted Governor-General had impressed the Native Chiefs in quite
an exceptional manner, and he was liked as well as respected by all
classes of Europeans and Natives. I felt also much for Donald Stewart,
to whom, I knew, such a terrible tragedy, happening while he was
Superintendent at Port Blair, would be a heavy blow.

On the 6th March we reached Tipai Mukh, where we bade farewell to our
Lushai friends, numbers of whom accompanied us to get possession of
the empty tins, bags, and casks which were got rid of at every stage.
The hostages and those who had assisted us were liberally rewarded,
and we parted on the best of terms, with promises on their part of
future good behaviour--promises which were kept for nearly twenty
years.

No one was sorry that the marching was at an end, and that the rest of
the journey back was to be performed in boats. Constant hard work and
exposure in a peculiarly malarious and relaxing climate had told upon
the whole force; while our having to depend for so long on tinned
meats, which were not always good, and consisted chiefly of pork, with
an occasional ration of mutton and salt beef, had been very trying to
the officers. One and all were 'completely worn out,' as the principal
medical officer reported; two out of our small number died, and the
General's condition gave cause for grave anxiety. For myself, having a
perfect horror of pork, I think I should have starved outright but
for the extraordinary culinary talent of Mr. Edgar, who disguised
the presence of the unclean animal in such a wonderful way in soups,
stews, etc., that I frequently partook of it without knowing what I
was eating. My wife and some anonymous kind friend sent by post small
tins of Liebig's extract, which were highly appreciated.

Cholera pursued us up to and beyond Cachar; the wretched coolies
suffered most, and it is a disease to which Gurkhas are peculiarly
susceptible, while a feast on a village pig from time to time probably
helped to make matters worse for them. Many of these grand little
soldiers and some of the Sikhs also fell victims to the scourge. My
orderly, a very smart young Gurkha, to my great regret, was seized
with it the day after I reached Cachar, and died next morning.

On my way to Simla, I spent a few days with Norman at Calcutta. The
whole place was in mourning on account of the terrible catastrophe
which had happened at Port Blair.


[Footnote 1: The Cachar column consisted of half of the Peshawar
Mountain battery, one company of Bengal Sappers and Miners, the 22nd
Punjab Infantry, 42nd and 44th Assam Light Infantry. The Chittagong
column consisted of the other half of the Mountain battery, the 27th
Punjab Infantry, and the 2nd and 4th Gurkhas. Each regiment was 500
strong, and each column was accompanied by 100 armed police.]

[Footnote 2: Now Sir John Edgar, K.C.S.I.]

[Footnote 3: Major Blackwood, who was killed at Maiwand, in command of
E Battery, R.H.A.]

[Footnote 4: Latitude 23° 26' 32", longitude (approximately) 93° 25';
within a short distance of Fort White, lately built in the Chin Hills.]

       *       *       *       *       *




CHAPTER XL.
1872-1873

  Lord Napier's care for the soldier
  --Negotiations with Sher Ali renewed--Sher Ali's demands


Lord Napier of Murchiston, the Governor of Madras, had been summoned
to Calcutta to act as Viceroy until Lord Northbrook, Lord Mayo's
successor, should arrive. He seemed interested in what I had to tell
him about Lushai, and Lord Napier of Magd[=a]la spoke in laudatory
terms of the manner in which the expedition had been carried out.

I reached Simla on the 1st of April, the twentieth anniversary of my
arrival in India. I found my wife, with the two children, settled in
Snowdon,[1] a house I had recently purchased. She had had much trouble
in my absence, having been at death's door herself, and having very
nearly lost our little son at Umballa three weeks after his birth
from a Native wet-nurse having tried to kill him. The English nurse's
suspicions had been aroused by one day finding a live coal in the
cradle, but she did not mention this discovery at the time for fear of
frightening my wife; but she determined to watch. A few days later,
while with our little girl in the next room, she heard the baby boy
choking, and rushed in to find, to her horror, blood on his lips, and
that he was struggling violently, as if to get rid of something in his
throat! She pushed down her finger and pulled out a sharp piece of
cane about two inches long; but other pieces had evidently gone down,
for the poor little fellow was in terrible agony for many days. It
turned out that the wretched woman hated the unwonted confinement of
her new life, and was determined to get away, but was too much afraid
of her husband to say so. He wanted her to remain for the sake of the
high pay this class of servant receives, so it appeared to the woman
that her only chance of freedom was to get rid of the child, and to
carry out her purpose she first attempted to set fire to the cradle,
and finding this did not succeed, she pulled some pieces of cane off
the chair upon which she was sitting, and shoved them down the child's
throat. She was, as my wife described her, a pretty, innocent,
timid-looking creature, to whom no one would ever have dreamt of
attributing such an atrocity. The boy was made extremely delicate for
several months by this misadventure, as his digestion had been ruined
for the time being, but eventually he completely recovered from its
effects.

In September the C.B. was conferred upon me for the Lushai Expedition.
Lord Napier informed me of the fact in a particularly kind little
note. I was very proud of being a member of the Bath, although at the
time a brevet would have been a more useful reward, as want of rank
was the reason Lord Napier had given for not allowing me to act as
Quartermaster-General, on Lumsden being temporarily appointed Resident
at Hyderabad.

We began our usual winter tour in the middle of October. At Mian Mir I
made the acquaintance of the Adjutant of the 37th Foot, the late Sir
Herbert Stewart, who was then a smart, good-looking subaltern, and I
recollect his bemoaning bitterly his bad luck in never having had a
chance of seeing service. How little at that time could it have been
anticipated that within twelve years he would see hard fighting in
Africa, and be killed as a Major-General in command of a column!

We visited several of the stations in the Punjab, and spent a few days
at Jamu as guest of the Maharaja of Kashmir, who treated us royally,
and gave us some excellent pig-sticking; and on the 21st December we
joined Head-Quarters at Lawrencepur for a large Camp of Exercise, to
be held on the identical ground which I had selected for the camp
which Sir Hugh Rose proposed to have eleven years before.

Lord Napier of Magd[=a]la did much to improve the efficiency of the
army by means of Camps of Exercise. He held one at Delhi in the winter
of 1871-72, and the Camp of which I am writing was most successful and
instructive. No Commander-in-Chief ever carried out inspections with
more thoroughness than did Lord Napier of Magd[=a]la. He spared
himself no trouble. On the hottest day he would toil through barrack
after barrack to satisfy himself that the soldiers were properly cared
for; Europeans and Natives were equally attended to, and many measures
conducive to the men's comfort date from the time he was in command in
India.

At the close of this camp Lumsden, who had returned to his appointment
from Hyderabad, gave up the Quartermaster-Generalship for good. We had
been greatly thrown together during the twenty-one years I had been in
India, and my wife and I were very sorry to bid farewell to him and
Mrs. Lumsden. He was succeeded by Edwin Johnson, pending whose arrival
I was now allowed to officiate.

From Lawrencepur I went with the Commander-in-Chief to Calcutta. Soon
after we arrived there I was asked by Sir Douglas Forsyth to accompany
him on his Mission to Yarkand and Kashgar. I should have much liked to
have done so, for the idea of a trip to these, at that time unknown,
regions possessed great fascinations for me. I was therefore well
pleased when Lord Napier told me he would not stand in the way of
my going, and proportionately disappointed when, the next day, His
Excellency said that on consideration he did not think I could be
spared just then, for the Quartermaster-General would be new to the
work at first, and he thought he would need my assistance.

The end of April saw us back in Simla, and in July Edwin Johnson
arrived.

During the summer of 1873 important events occurred which had much to
do with our subsequent relations with Afghanistan. The inquiries which
Sher Ali had begged Lord Mayo to make about Persian encroachments in
Sistan, had resulted in General Goldsmid[2] and Colonel Pollock[3]
being deputed in 1871 to proceed to Sistan to decide the question. The
settlement arrived at by these officers, which assigned to Afghanistan
the country up to the right bank of the Helmand, but nothing beyond,
satisfied neither the Shah nor the Amir, and the latter sent his
confidential Minister, Saiyad Nur Mahomed, the Afghan Commissioner
in the Sistan arbitration, to meet Lord Northbrook on his arrival in
Bombay for the purpose of appealing to him against the decision. It
could not, however, be reversed; but in a subsequent interview which
the new Viceroy accorded the Envoy, the latter was told that as soon
as Persia and Afghanistan had signified their acceptance of the
settlement, the Government of India would present the Amir with five
lakhs of rupees as compensation for the ceded territory which had for
a time belonged to Afghanistan.

The action of Her Majesty's Ministers in communication with Russia
regarding the northern boundary of Afghanistan was another matter
about which the Amir was greatly exercised; and Lord Northbrook,
thinking that all such vexed questions could be more satisfactorily
explained by personal communication than by letter, proposed to the
Amir that His Highness should consent to receive at Kabul a British
officer 'of high rank and dignity, in whom I have full confidence'
(Mr. Macnabb),[4] 'who will also explain to Your Highness,' wrote
the Viceroy, 'the negotiations which have now been satisfactorily
concluded with the Government of His Majesty the Emperor of Russia,
whereby the Russian Government have agreed to recognize and respect
the integrity and independence of the territories now in Your
Highness's possession.'

To this request Sher Ali replied that he considered it advisable that
one of his agents should first wait on the Viceroy to ascertain the
real views of the British Government on these important matters. This
was agreed to, and Saiyad Nur Mahomed was again selected to represent
the Amir. He reached Simla towards the end of June. On being informed
that Persia had unreservedly accepted the decision as to the Sistan
question, the Envoy declared that, whatever opinion the Amir might
hold as to his rights, His Highness would also scrupulously respect
that decision. With regard to the northern frontier, the Envoy begged
it to be clearly understood that the Afghan Government wished to be
allowed to make their own laws and follow their own customs within
their territories; that the internal affairs of the country should be
free from interference; and that the acknowledgment by Russia of the
Amir's claim to land south of the Oxus should be confirmed by Bokhara.
He further requested 'that the British Government would distinctly
promise that, in the event of any aggression on the Amir's
territories, they would consider the perpetrator of such aggression
as their own enemy.' It was explained to the Saiyad that the British
Government did not share the Amir's apprehension of Russia; that under
such circumstances as he contemplated, it would be the duty of the
Amir to refer to the British Government, who would decide whether it
was an occasion for assistance to be rendered by them, and what the
nature and extent of the assistance should be; moreover, that their
help must be conditional upon the Amir himself abstaining from
aggression, and on his unreserved acceptance of the advice of the
British Government in regard to his external relations.

Two other questions were discussed:

    (1) The location in certain towns in Afghanistan of British
    officers as representatives of the British Government.

    (2) The present assistance to be rendered to the Amir for the
    purpose of strengthening his country against foreign aggression.

On the first point the Envoy said he had no instructions, but that, in
his opinion, to ask Sher Ali to allow British officers to be located
in Afghanistan would give rise to mistrust and apprehension. He
recommended that a letter should be addressed to the Amir, pointing
out the desirability of a British officer being sent to inspect the
western and northern boundaries of Afghanistan, proceeding _viâ_
Kandahar and returning _viâ_ Kabul, where he might confer personally
with His Highness. This suggestion was carried out.

With regard to the second point under discussion, the Envoy stated
that 20,000 stand-of-arms were desired, laying very particular stress
on 5,000 Sniders being included in this number, and that hopes were
entertained by the Amir that he would be largely assisted with money.
In answer to this, the Saiyad was told that there was not then a
sufficient reserve supply of Sniders for the English troops in India,
and that it was impossible to spare more than 5,000 Enfields; that
this number should at once be placed at the Amir's disposal, and that
the remainder should be forwarded as soon as they were received from
England. He was further informed that five lakhs of rupees (exclusive
of the five lakhs promised the year before, as indemnification for the
loss of territory) would be given to Sher Ali.

A final letter from the Viceroy was sent to the Amir through Saiyad
Nur Mahomed, dated 6th September, 1873, summing up the result of the
conference. His Highness was told, with reference to a fear expressed
by the Envoy lest Russia should press for the establishment of a
Russian Mission and agents in Afghanistan, that Prince Gortschakoff
had officially intimated that, while he saw no objection to British
officers going to Kabul, he engaged that Russian agents should abstain
from doing so, and that, far from apprehending a Russian invasion of
Afghanistan, the British Government believed that the effect of the
recent arrangements had been to render the occurrence of such a
contingency more remote than ever. At the same time, being desirous of
seeing the Amir strong and his rule firmly established, the Government
were prepared to give him any reasonable assistance.

Sher Ali was greatly annoyed and disappointed at the result of his
Envoy's visit to Simla. He was of a very impulsive, passionate
disposition; his reply to the Viceroy's letter was discourteous and
sarcastic; he declined to receive a British officer at Kabul, and
although he condescended to accept the arms presented to him, he left
the ten lakhs of rupees untouched in the Peshawar treasury. Colonel
Valentine Baker, who was at that time travelling through Central Asia,
was forbidden by the Amir to pass through Afghanistan on his way
to India; and a few months later he refused to allow Sir Douglas
Forsyth's Mission to return to India by way of Afghanistan.


[Footnote 1: We lived in this house whenever we were in Simla, till
we left it in 1892. It has since been bought by Government for the
Commander-in-Chief's residence.]

[Footnote 2: General Sir Frederick Goldsmid, K.C.M.G.]

[Footnote 3: Major-General Sir Frederick Pollock, K.C.S.I.]

[Footnote 4: Sir Donald Macnabb, K.C.S.I., then Commissioner of
Peshawar.]

       *       *       *       *       *




CHAPTER XLI.
1873-1877

  A trip in the Himalayas--The famine in Behar
  --The Prince of Wales in India--Farewell to Lord Napier


In the beginning of October my wife and I started for a fortnight's
trip to the top of the Chor, a fine mountain sixty-two miles from
Simla, and close on 12,000 feet high. We were accompanied by a very
dear friend of ours--now no more--Colonel Baigrie, who was soon
afterwards made Quartermaster-General in Bombay. He was a talented
artist and delightful companion, and notwithstanding the old adage
that two are company and three none, we three enjoyed our holiday
immensely.

After crossing a stream called the Ghiri, below Fagu, the road passes
through beautiful forest and cliff scenery, and for the most part was
fairly easy, until the foot of the mountain was reached about six
miles from the top, when it became very precipitous and difficult. We
were the whole day doing this march, breakfasting in one place and
lunching in another higher up. There was a good deal of snow in the
shady spots. A few days before we had noticed that the top of the
mountain was white, but the sun was still too strong in the daytime
for the snow to lie long in exposed parts. The way being too steep
for my wife to ride or go in a dandy, we all three walked, or rather
climbed, up to the shoulder where our tents were pitched, about a mile
from the summit.

The forest through which we passed was very beautiful, commencing with
dark-green ilex, glistening holly, and sombre brown oak, interspersed
with groups of the dainty, graceful, white-stemmed birch, and wreathed
with festoons of the scarlet Himalayan vine. As we mounted higher,
trees became fewer and the foliage less luxuriant, till at length only
oaks were to be seen, their branches twisted into all sorts of weird,
fantastic shapes from the strength of the south-west monsoon. Huge
rocks became more frequent, covered with lichens and mosses of every
shade, from dark-green to brilliant crimson. At length trees and
shrubs were left behind, except the red-berried juniper, which grows
at a higher elevation here than any other bush, and flourishes in the
clefts of the rocks, where nothing else will exist. We got up in time
to see the most glorious sunset; the colours were more wonderful than
anything I had ever seen before, even in India. My wife urged Baigrie
to make a rough sketch, and note the tints, that he might paint a
picture of it later. He made the sketch, saying: 'If I attempted to
represent truly what we see before us, the painting would be rejected
by the good people at home as absurdly unreal, or as the work of a
hopeless lunatic.' There was such a high wind that our small tents had
a narrow escape of being blown away. That night the water was frozen
in our jugs, and it was quite impossible to keep warm.

We were up betimes the next morning, and climbed to the highest peak,
where we found breakfast awaiting us and a magnificent view of the
Himalayan ranges, right down to the plains on one side and up to the
perpetual snows on the other. We descended to the foot of the mountain
in the afternoon, and then returned, march by march, to Simla.

Towards the end of the month Lord Napier began his winter tour,
visiting the hill stations first. At Chakrata I made the acquaintance
of the 92nd Highlanders, that distinguished corps which stood me
in such good stead a few years later in Afghanistan. At the end of
November we found ourselves at Lucknow, in time to take part in Lord
Northbrook's state entry, and be present at a fête given to the
Viceroy in the Wingfield Park by Sir George Cooper, the Chief
Commissioner.

From Lucknow we went for a brief visit to a small Camp of Exercise
near Rurki, where Lord Napier left the Adjutant-General, Thesiger,[1]
in command, while he himself proceeded to visit some of the stations
in the Madras Presidency, and I returned for a short time to Simla.

While riding up the hill from Kalka, I had a novel experience. One
of those tremendous thunder-storms which are not uncommon in the
Himalayas came on; the rain was blinding and incessant, and the peals
of thunder were simultaneous with the lightning. At last there was a
tremendous crash; a flash, more vivid than the rest, passed right
in front of my horse's head, accompanied by a whizzing noise and a
sulphurous smell, completely blinding me for a second. Two Natives
travelling a few yards ahead of me fell flat on their faces, and I
thought they were killed, but it turned out they were only knocked
over and very much frightened.

Early in January, 1874, we received by telegram the infinitely sad
news of my father's death. We ought, I suppose, to have been prepared
for such an event, seeing that he was within a few months of his
ninetieth birthday; but he was so well and active, and took such a
keen interest in all that was going on, especially anything connected
with India, that we hardly realized his great age, and always hoped we
might see him once more. He had received the G.C.B. from Her Majesty's
hands at Windsor on the 8th December, and two days afterwards he wrote
me an account of the ceremony, and expressed himself much pleased and
gratified at the Queen's gracious manner to him. He said nothing about
his health, but we heard later that he had taken cold in the train on
his way home, and never recovered from the effects; he died on the
30th of December. His love for India had not been weakened by his
twenty years' absence from the country, and he never wearied of
being told of the wonderful changes which had taken place since his
day--changes which, for the most part, dated from the Mutiny, for up
till 1857 life in India was much the same as when my father first
landed in the beginning of the century.

A continued drought in Behar was at this time causing grave fears of
a famine, such as from time to time had desolated various parts of
India. Nine years before such a drought, and the absence of means
of communication, which prevented grain being thrown into the
famine-stricken districts in sufficient quantities, resulted
in one-fourth of the population of Orissa being carried off by
starvation, or disease consequent on starvation. So on this occasion
Lord Northbrook was determined, at all costs, to ward off such a
calamity. He sent Sir Richard Temple to Behar in the confident hope
that his unbounded resource and energy would enable him to cope with
the difficulties of the situation, a hope that was fully realized.
Relief works were at once commenced; a transport train was quickly
improvised, worked chiefly by military and police officers; and one
million tons of rice were distributed amongst the people. Not a life
was lost, but the cost to the State was enormous--six millions and a
half sterling.

In the beginning of February I was ordered by Government to proceed to
the famine districts to help Temple. I started at once; but I had
not been long in Behar before I was required to join the
Commander-in-Chief in Calcutta, His Excellency having determined to
nominate me Quartermaster-General, in succession to Johnson, who was
about to become Adjutant-General. Being only a Lieutenant-Colonel
in the army, I could not, according to the rules, be put at once
permanently into the appointment, which carried with it the rank of
Major-General. The difficulty was overcome, however, by my being
allowed to officiate till the following January, when, in the ordinary
course of promotion, I should become a Colonel.

Lord Northbrook spent the summer of 1874 in Calcutta, in
consequence of the famine necessities having to be met; and as the
Commander-in-Chief determined to follow his example, I took a house in
Calcutta, and my wife joined me in the middle of March--rather a bad
time of year to come down to the plains after spending the winter
amongst the snows of Simla. But she did not fancy Simla in the season
as a grass-widow, and had had quite enough of being alone.

We continued in Calcutta until August, when the Head-Quarters returned
to Simla, where we remained till November.

We had a standing camp at Umballa during the winter of 1874-75, doing
our inspections from there, and returning to the camp at intervals.
There was the usual visit to Calcutta in March, towards the end of
which month another daughter was born.

In October, 1875, I spent some time at Delhi, arranging for the Camp
of Exercise to be held there in January for His Royal Highness the
Prince of Wales. The camp was formed in the beginning of December,
and consisted of 17,000 men, in four divisions, commanded by
Major-Generals Sir Charles Reid, Macdonnell, the Hon. Arthur Hardinge,
and Donald Stewart.

The country round Delhi is particularly well suited for extended
manoeuvres, and full advantage was taken of the facilities it afforded
during the two months the Camp of Exercise lasted. The Prince of Wales
landed at Calcutta on the 23rd December; and Lord Napier with his
staff went down to meet His Royal Highness, whose reception was loyal
and hearty to a degree. As the _Serapis_, with the Prince on board,
steamed slowly up the Hughli, salutes were fired from Fort William and
three ships of the Royal Navy. All the vessels in the river were gay
with flags, their yards were manned, and good hearty English cheers
resounded from stem to stern of each ship as the Indian troopship,
carrying the heir to England's throne, came in sight. As soon as the
_Serapis_ was moored, the Viceroy went on board to greet the Prince
and conduct His Royal Highness to the gaily-decorated landing-stage,
where the principal officials, Native Princes, and chief inhabitants
of Calcutta were assembled. Troops lined the road from the river to
Government House, and the _maidan_ (the great open space in front) was
thronged with a dense crowd of Natives in their most brilliant gala
attire, eager to catch a glimpse of the son of the great Queen of
England.

That evening Lord Northbrook gave a State banquet. The next day there
was a reception of the Princes and Chiefs, followed by a levée, and
after dark the whole place was most beautifully illuminated. The
week that followed was taken up with entertainments of various
kinds--balls, races, and garden-parties, interspersed with official
visits--which I am afraid the Prince could not have found amusing--and
on New Year's Day, 1876, His Royal Highness held a Chapter of the
Order of the Star of India, after which the Commander-in-Chief
returned to Delhi to arrange to receive the Prince in that historical
city on the 11th January.

His Royal Highness's camp, and that of the Commander-in-Chief, were
pitched on the ground occupied by the British army during the siege.
The road, five miles in length, from the station to the camp was lined
with troops, and on the Ridge itself were placed six Rifle corps,
three of which had taken part in the siege.[2] The 2nd Gurkhas were
very appropriately drawn up immediately under Hindu Rao's house,
and when this point was reached, the Prince stopped and warmly
complimented the men on the distinguished service the regiment had
performed.

The next day there was a parade of all the troops in review order for
the inspection of the Prince, who was pleased to express his complete
satisfaction and approval of 'the steadiness under arms, soldier-like
bearing, and precision of movement, which distinguish the corps of the
three armies assembled at the camp at Delhi.'

That evening the Prince was present at a ball in the _diwan-i-khas_
(private audience hall) in the palace, given in His Royal Highness's
honour by the officers of the army.

The next few days were taken up with manoeuvres, which the Prince
attended, accompanied by Lumsden[3] and myself. The defence was
commanded by Reid, the attack by Hardinge, the latter's object being
to gain possession of the Ridge, with a view to future operations
against the city on the arrival of the main army from the Punjab. But
the attack did not meet with the success which attended Barnard in
1857, while the Commander of the defence proved himself as skilful in
protecting the Ridge against an enemy advancing from the north as
he had been, twenty years before, in repulsing one coming from the
opposite direction.

The Prince of Wales held another investiture of the Star of India
on the 7th of March at Allahabad, which Lord Napier and the staff
attended. At its close we took our leave of His Royal Highness, who
started that night for England.

In less than a fortnight our dear old Chief followed, and I saw him
off from Bombay on the 10th April. I was very low at parting with him,
for though in the earlier days of our acquaintance I used to think
he was not very favourably disposed towards me, when I became more
intimately associated with him nothing could exceed his kindness. He
was universally regretted by Europeans and Natives alike. The soldiers
recognized that he had carefully guarded their interests and worked
for their welfare, and the Native Princes and people felt that he
was in sympathy with them, and to this day they speak of _Lat Napier
Sahib_ with the deepest respect and affection.

Lord Napier was succeeded in the command by Sir Frederick Haines.


[Footnote 1: Now General Lord Chelmsford, G.C.B.]

[Footnote 2: 60th Rifles, 2nd Gurkhas, and 1st Punjab Infantry.]

[Footnote 3: Lumsden returned to Head-Quarters as Adjutant-General
on Edwin Johnson being appointed a member of the Indian Council in
London.]

       *       *       *       *       *




CHAPTER XLII.
1876-1878

  Lord Lytton becomes Viceroy--Difficulties with Sher Ali
  --Imperial assemblage at Delhi--Reception of the Ruling Chiefs
  --Queen proclaimed Empress of India
  --Political importance of the assemblage
  --Sher Ali proclaims a 'Jahad'--A journey under difficulties


With a new Commander-in-Chief came a new Viceroy, and it was while
we were in Bombay seeing the last of Lord Napier that the _Orontes_
steamed into the harbour with Lord Lytton on board. Little did I
imagine when making Lord Lytton's acquaintance how much he would have
to say to my future career.

His Excellency received me very kindly, telling me he felt that I was
not altogether a stranger, as he had been reading during the voyage
a paper I had written for Lord Napier, a year or two before, on
our military position in India, and the arrangements that would be
necessary in the event of Russia attempting to continue her advance
south of the Oxus. Lord Napier had sent a copy of this memorandum to
Lord Beaconsfield, by whom it had been given to Lord Lytton.

[Illustration: FIELD-MARSHAL LORD NAPIER OF MAGDALA, G.C.B., G.C.S.I.
_From a photograph by Messrs. Maull and Fox._]

During the summer of 1876 our frontier policy was frequently under
discussion. Sir Bartle Frere wrote two very strong letters after the
Conservative Government came into power in 1874, drawing attention
to the danger of our being satisfied with a policy of aloofness, and
pointing out the necessity for coming into closer relations with
the Amir of Afghanistan and the Khan of Khelat. Soon afterwards the
Secretary of State communicated with the Government of India as to the
advisability of establishing British agents in Afghanistan, and of
persuading the Amir to receive a temporary Embassy at Kabul, as had
originally been proposed by Lord Northbrook.

The members of Lord Northbrook's Council were unanimously opposed to
both these proposals, but they did not succeed in convincing Lord
Salisbury that the measures were undesirable; and on the resignation
of Lord Northbrook, the new Viceroy was furnished with special
instructions as to the action which Her Majesty's Government
considered necessary in consequence of the activity of Russia in
Central Asia, and the impossibility of obtaining accurate information
of what was going on in and beyond Afghanistan.

The question of the Embassy was dealt with at once; Lord Lytton
directed a letter to be sent to the Amir announcing his assumption
of the Viceroyalty, and his intention to depute Sir Lewis Pelly to
proceed to Kabul for the purpose of discussing certain matters with
His Highness.

To this communication a most unsatisfactory reply was received, and
a second letter was addressed to the Amir, in which he was informed
that, should he still decline to receive the Viceroy's Envoy after
deliberately weighing all the considerations commended to his serious
attention, the responsibility of the result would rest entirely on the
Government of Afghanistan, which would thus alienate itself from
the alliance of that Power which was most disposed and best able to
befriend it.

This letter was the cause of considerable excitement in Kabul,
excitement which ran so high that the necessity for proclaiming a
religious war was mooted; and, to complicate matters, the Amir at
this time received overtures from General Kauffmann, the Russian
Governor-General in Turkestan.

A delay of six weeks occurred before Sher Ali replied to Lord Lytton's
letter, and then he altogether ignored the Viceroy's proposal to send
a Mission to Kabul, merely suggesting that the British Government
should receive an Envoy from him, or that representatives from both
countries should meet and hold a conference on the border, or, as
another alternative, that the British Native Agent at Kabul should
return and discuss affairs with the Viceroy.

The last suggestion was accepted by the Government of India, and the
agent (Nawab Ata Mahomed Khan) arrived in Simla early in October. The
Nawab gave it as his opinion that the Amir's attitude of estrangement
was due to an accumulation of grievances, the chief of which were--the
unfavourable arbitration in the Sistan dispute; the want of success of
Saiyad Nur Mahomed's mission to India in 1873, when it was the desire
of the Amir's heart to enter into an offensive and defensive alliance
with the British Government; the interposition of Lord Northbrook's
Government on behalf of Yakub Khan;[1] the recent proceedings in
Khelat,[2] which the Amir thought were bringing us objectionably near
Kandahar; the transmission of presents through Afghanistan, to his
vassal, the Mir of Wakhan, without the Amir's permission;[3] and,
above all, the conviction that our policy was exclusively directed to
the furtherance of British interests without any thought for those of
Afghanistan.

As regarded the proposed Mission to Kabul, the Envoy said that His
Highness objected to it for many reasons. Owing to local fanaticism,
he could not insure its safety, and it seemed probable that, though of
a temporary nature to begin with, it might only be the thin end of the
wedge, ending in the establishment of a permanent Resident, as at the
courts of the Native Rulers in India. Furthermore, the Amir conceived
that, if he consented to this Mission, the Russians would insist upon
their right to send a similar one, and finally, he feared a British
Envoy might bring his influence to bear in favour of the release of
his son, Yakub Khan, with whom his relations were as strained as ever.

In answer, the Viceroy enumerated the concessions he was prepared to
make, and the conditions upon which alone he would consent to them;
and this answer the agent was directed to communicate to the Amir.

The concessions were as follows:

  (1) That the friends and enemies of either State should be those of
  the other.

  (2) That, in the event of unprovoked aggression upon Afghanistan
  from without, assistance should be afforded in men, money, and arms;
  and also that to strengthen the Amir against such aggression, the
  British Government was willing to fortify Herat and other points on
  the frontier, and, if desired, to lend officers to discipline the
  army.

  (3) That Abdulla Jan should be recognized as the Amir's successor to
  the exclusion of any other aspirant; and that the question of
  material aid in support of such recognition should be discussed by
  the Plenipotentiaries.

  (4) That a yearly subsidy should be paid to the Amir on the
  following conditions:

    That he should refrain from external aggression or provocation of
    his neighbours, and from entering into external relations without
    our knowledge.

    That he should decline all communication with Russia, and refer
    her agents to us.

    That British agents should reside at Herat and elsewhere on the
    frontier.

    That a mixed commission of British and Afghan officers should
    determine and demarcate the Amir's frontier.

    That arrangements should be made, by allowances or otherwise, for
    free circulation of trade on the principal trade routes.

    That similar arrangements should be made for a line of telegraph,
    the direction of which was to be subsequently determined.

    That Afghanistan should be freely opened to Englishmen, official
    and non-official, and arrangements made by the Amir, as far as
    practicable, for their safety, though His Highness would not be
    absolutely held responsible for isolated accidents.


The Viceroy concluded by suggesting that, if the Amir agreed to these
proposals, a treaty might be arranged between the agents of the
respective Governments, and ratified either at Peshawar, by the Amir
meeting Lord Lytton there, or at Delhi if the Amir accepted His
Excellency's invitation to be present at the Imperial Assemblage.

The Amir at the time vouchsafed no reply whatever to these proposals
or to the invitation to come to Delhi.

In the autumn of 1876 preparations were commenced for the 'Imperial
Assemblage,' which it was announced by the Viceroy would be held
at Delhi on the first day of January, 1877, for the purpose of
proclaiming to the Queen's subjects throughout India the assumption
by Her Majesty of the title of 'Empress of India.' To this Assemblage
Lord Lytton further announced that he proposed 'to invite the
Governors, Lieutenant-Governors, and Heads of Administration from all
parts of the Queen's Indian dominions, as well as the Princes, Chiefs,
and Nobles in whose persons the antiquity of the past is associated
with the prosperity of the present, and who so worthily contribute to
the splendour and stability of this great Empire.'

Delhi was selected as the place where the meeting between the Queen's
representative and the great nobles of India could most appropriately
be held, and a committee was appointed to make the necessary
arrangements. As a member of the committee I was deputed to proceed to
Delhi, settle about the sites for the camps, and carry out all details
in communication with the local authorities. The Viceroy impressed
upon me that the Assemblage was intended to emphasize the Proclamation
Lord Canning issued eighteen years before, by which the Queen assumed
the direct sovereignty of her eastern possessions, and that he wished
no trouble or expense to be spared in making the ceremony altogether
worthy of such a great historical event.

I returned to Simla in October, when my wife and I accompanied the
Commander-in-Chief on a very delightful march over the Jalauri Pass
through the Kulu valley, then over the Bubbu Pass and through the
Kangra valley to Chamba and Dalhousie. Our party consisted of the
Chief, his Doctor (Bradshaw), Persian interpreter (Moore), General and
Mrs. Lumsden, and ourselves. The first slight shower of snow had just
fallen on the Jalauri Pass, and as we crossed over we disturbed a
number of beautiful snow-pheasants and minals busily engaged in
scratching it away to get at their food. The scenery on this march is
very fine and varied; for the most part the timber and foliage are
superb, and the valleys are very fertile and pretty, lying close under
the snow-capped mountains.

Having inspected the 'Hill stations,' we proceeded to Peshawar,
where the Viceroy had arranged to hold a conference with the
Lieutenant-Governor of the Punjab and the Commissioner of Peshawar
about frontier affairs.

Early in December I was back again at Delhi, where I found the
arrangements for the several camps progressing most satisfactorily,
and canvas cities rising up in every direction, I had previously
chosen the site of the old cantonment for the camps of the Viceroy,
the Commander-in-Chief, and the principal officials, while for the
Assemblage itself I had selected ground about three miles off.

The Chiefs and Princes were all settled in their several camps ready
to meet the Viceroy, who, on his arrival, in a few graceful words
welcomed them to Delhi, and thanked them for responding to his
invitation. He then mounted, with Lady Lytton, on a state elephant,
and a procession was formed, which, I fancy, was about the most
gorgeous and picturesque which has ever been seen even in the East.
The magnificence of the Native Princes' retinues can hardly be
described; their elephant-housings were of cloth of gold, or
scarlet-and-blue cloths embroidered in gold and silver. The howdahs
were veritable thrones of the precious metals, shaded by the most
brilliant canopies, and the war-elephants belonging to some of
the Central India and Rajputana Chiefs formed a very curious and
interesting feature. Their tusks were tipped with steel; they wore
shields on their fore-heads, and breastplates of flashing steel;
chain-mail armour hung down over their trunks and covered their backs
and sides; and they were mounted by warriors clad in chain-mail, and
armed to the teeth. Delhi must have witnessed many splendid pageants,
when the Rajput, the Moghul, and the Mahratta dynasties, each in its
turn, was at the height of its glory; but never before had Princes and
Chiefs of every race and creed come from all parts of Hindustan, vying
with each other as to the magnificence of their _entourage_, and met
together with the same object--that of acknowledging and doing homage
to one supreme Ruler.

The next few days were spent by Lord Lytton in receiving the
sixty-three[4] Ruling Princes of India according to the strictest
etiquette. Each Prince, with his suite, was met at the entrance to
the camp, and conducted up the street to the durbar tent by mounted
officers, the salute to which he was entitled being fired while the
procession moved on. He was then presented by the Foreign Secretary to
the Viceroy, who placed him on a chair on his right, immediately
below a full-length portrait of Her Majesty. A satin banner, richly
embroidered with the Chief's armorial bearings, surmounted by the
Imperial crown, was next brought in by Highland soldiers and planted
in front of the throne, when the Viceroy, leading the particular Chief
towards it, thus addressed him: 'I present Your Highness with this
banner as a personal gift from Her Majesty the Queen, in commemoration
of her assumption of the title of Empress of India. Her Majesty trusts
that it may never be unfurled without reminding you not only of the
close union between the throne of England and your loyal and princely
house, but also of the earnest desire of the paramount power to see
your dynasty strong, prosperous, and permanent.'

His Excellency then placed round the Chief's neck a crimson ribbon, to
which was attached a very handsome gold medal[5] with the Queen's head
engraved on it, adding: 'I further decorate you, by command of Her
Majesty. May this medal be long worn by yourself, and long kept as
an heirloom in your family in remembrance of the auspicious date it
bears.'

The 1st January, 1877, saw the Queen proclaimed Empress of India, The
ceremony was most imposing, and in every way successful. Three tented
pavilions had been constructed on an open plain. The throne-pavilion
in the centre was a very graceful erection, brilliant in hangings and
banners of red, blue, and white satin magnificently embroidered in
gold, with appropriate emblems. It was hexagonal in shape, and rather
more than 200 feet in circumference. In front of this was the pavilion
for the Ruling Chiefs and high European officials, in the form of
a semicircle 800 feet long. The canopy was of Star of India
blue-and-white satin embroidered in gold, each pillar being surmounted
by an Imperial crown. Behind the throne was the stand for the
spectators, also in the form of a semicircle divided in the middle,
and likewise canopied in brilliant colours. Between these two blocks
was the entrance to the area.

Each Chief and high official sat beneath his own banner, which was
planted immediately behind his chair, and they were all mixed up as
much as possible to avoid questions of precedence, the result being
the most wonderful mass of colour, produced from the intermingling of
British uniforms and plumes with gorgeous eastern costumes, set off by
a blaze of diamonds and other precious stones.

All the British troops brought to Delhi for the occasion were paraded
to the north, and the troops and retainers belonging to the Native
Chiefs to the south, of the pavilion. Guards of Honour were drawn up
on either side of the throne and at each opening by which the Ruling
Chiefs were to enter the pavilion.

The guests being all seated, a flourish of trumpets by the heralds
exactly at noon announced the arrival of the Viceroy. The military
bands played a march, and Lord Lytton, accompanied by Lady Lytton,
their daughters, and his staff, proceeded to the pavilion. His
Excellency took his seat upon the throne, arrayed in his robes as
Grand Master of the Star of India, the National Anthem was played,
the Guards of Honour presented arms, while the whole of the vast
assemblage rose as one man. The Chief Herald was then commanded to
read the Proclamation. A flourish of trumpets was again sounded, and
Her Majesty was proclaimed Empress of India.

When the Chief Herald had ceased reading, the Royal Standard was
hoisted, and a salute of 101 salvoes of artillery was fired, with a
_feu de joie_ from the long line of troops. This was too much for the
elephants. As the _feu de joie_ approached nearer and nearer to
them they became more and more alarmed, and at last scampered off,
dispersing the crowd in every direction. When it ceased they were
quieted and brought back by their _mahouts_, only to start off again
when the firing recommenced; but, as it was a perfectly bare plain,
without anything for the great creatures to come in contact with,
there was no harm done beyond a severe shaking to their riders. As
the sound of the last salvo died away the Viceroy addressed the
assemblage. When he had ceased speaking, the assembly again rose _en
masse_ and joined the troops in giving several ringing cheers.

His Highness the Maharaja Sindhia then spoke as follows: '_Shah in
Shah Padishah_. May God bless you. The Princes of India bless you, and
pray that your sovereignty and power may remain steadfast for ever.'

Sir Salar Jung rose on behalf of the boy Nizam, and said: 'I am
desired by His Highness the Nizam to request your Excellency to convey
to Her Majesty, on the part of himself and the Chiefs of India, the
expression of their hearty congratulations on the assumption of the
title of Empress of India, and to assure the Queen that they pray for
her, and for the enduring prosperity of her Empire, both in India and
England.'

The Maharajas of Udaipur and Jaipur, in the name of the united Chiefs
of Rajputana, begged that a telegram might be sent to the Queen,
conveying their dutiful and loyal congratulations; and the Maharaja
of Kashmir expressed his gratification at the tenor of the Viceroy's
speech, and declared that he should henceforth consider himself secure
under the shadow of Her Majesty's protecting care.[6]

[Illustration: THE EARL OF LYTTON, G.C.B., G.M.S.I., G.M.I.E., VICEROY
or INDIA.
_From a photograph by Messrs. Maull and Fox._]


It is difficult to overrate the political importance of this great
gathering. It was looked upon by most of the Ruling Chiefs as the
result of the Prince of Wales's visit, and rejoiced in as an evidence
of Her Majesty's increased interest in, and appreciation of, the vast
Empire of India with its many different races and peoples.

I visited all the camps, and conversed with every one of the Princes
and Nobles, and each in turn expressed the same intense gratification
at the Viceroy's reception of him, the same fervent loyalty to the
Empress, and the same satisfaction that the new title should have been
announced with such appropriate splendour and publicity.

General rejoicings in honour of the occasion took place all over
India, in Native States as well as British cantonments. School-houses,
town halls, hospitals, and dispensaries were founded, large numbers of
prisoners were released, substantial additions were made to the pay of
all ranks in the Native Army, as well as a considerable increase in
numbers to the Order of British India; and the amnesty granted in 1859
was extended to all but murderers and leaders in the Mutiny.

When the Assemblage broke up, I started with Sir Frederick Haines
for a tour along the Derajat frontier. We visited Kohat, Bannu, Dera
Ismail Khan, and Multan; proceeded by steamer down the Indus to
Sukkur, and thence rode to Jacobabad. Then on to Kotri, from which
place we went to see the battle-field of Miani, where Sir Charles
Napier defeated the Amirs of Sind in 1843. From Kotri we travelled
to Simla _viâ_ Karachi and Bombay, where we were most hospitably
entertained by the Commander-in-Chief of Bombay (Sir Charles Stavely)
and his wife.

Afghan affairs were this year again giving the Viceroy a great deal
of anxiety. The Amir had eventually agreed to a discussion of Lord
Lytton's proposals being held, and for this purpose Saiyad Nur Mahomed
and Sir Lewis Pelly had met at Peshawar in January, 1877. The
meeting, unfortunately, ended in a rupture, owing to Sher Ali's
agent pronouncing the location of European officers in any part of
Afghanistan an impossibility; and what at this crisis complicated
matters to a most regrettable extent was the death of Saiyad Nur
Mahomed, who had been in failing health for some time.

On learning the death of his most trusted Minister, and the failure of
the negotiations, Sher Ali broke into a violent fit of passion, giving
vent to his fury in threatenings and invectives against the British
Government. He declared it was not possible to come to terms, and that
there was nothing left for him but to fight; that he had seven crores
of rupees, every one of which he would hurl at the heads of the
English, and he ended by giving orders for a _jahad_ (a religious war)
to be proclaimed.

For the time being nothing more could be done with Afghanistan, and
the Viceroy was able to turn his attention to the following important
questions: the transfer of Sind from Bombay to the Punjab, a measure
which had been unanimously agreed to by Lord Northbrook's Government;
the removal from the Punjab government of the trans-Indus tract of
country, and the formation of the latter into a separate district
under the control of a Chief Commissioner, who would be responsible
to the Government of India alone for frontier administration and
trans-frontier relations. This post Lord Lytton told me, as much to my
surprise as to my gratification, that he meant to offer to me, if his
views were accepted by the Secretary of State. It was above all others
the appointment I should have liked. I delighted in frontier life and
frontier men, who, with all their faults, are men, and grand men, too.
I had felt for years what an important factor the trans-Indus tribes
are in the defence of India, and how desirable it was that we should
be on better terms with them than was possible so long as our policy
consisted in keeping them at arm's length, and our only intercourse
with them was confined to punitive expeditions or the visits of their
head-men to our hard-worked officials, whose whole time was occupied
in writing long reports, or in settling troublesome disputes to the
satisfaction of no one.

I now hoped to be able to put a stop to the futile blockades and
inconclusive reprisals which had been carried on for nearly thirty
years with such unsatisfactory results, and I looked forward to
turning the wild tribesmen from enemies into friends, a strength
instead of a weakness, to our Government, and to bringing them by
degrees within the pale of civilization. My wife quite shared my
feelings, and we were both eager to begin our frontier life.

As a preliminary to my engaging in this congenial employment, Lord
Lytton proposed that I should take up the command of the Punjab
Frontier Force. I gladly acquiesced; for I had been a long time on the
staff, and had had three years of the Quartermaster-Generalship.
My friends expressed surprise at my accepting the position of
Brigadier-General, after having filled an appointment carrying with it
the rank of Major-General; but this was not my view. I longed for
a command, and the Frontier Force offered opportunities for active
service afforded by no other post.

We were in Calcutta when the question was decided, and started very
soon afterwards to make our arrangements for the breaking up of our
home at Simla. I took over the command of the Force on the 15th March,
1878. My wife accompanied me to Abbottabad--the pretty, quiet little
place in Hazara, about 4,000 feet above the sea, which was to be
henceforth our winter head-quarters. For the summer months we were to
be located in the higher hills, and my wife was anxious to see the
house which I had purchased from my predecessor, General Keyes, at
Natiagali. So off we set, nothing daunted by being told that we were
likely to find snow still deep in places.

For the first part of the way we got on well enough, my wife in a
dandy, I riding, and thirteen miles were accomplished without much
difficulty. Suddenly the road took a bend, and we found ourselves in
deep snow. Riding soon proved to be impossible, and the dandy-bearers
could not carry my wife further; so there was nothing for it but to
walk. We were seven miles from our destination, and at each step we
sank into the snow, which became deeper and deeper the higher we
ascended. On we trudged, till my wife declared she could go no
further, and sat down to rest, feeling so drowsy that she entreated me
to let her stay where she was. Fortunately I had a small flask with
me filled with brandy. I poured a little into the cup, mixed it with
snow, and administered it as a stimulant. This restored her somewhat,
and roused her from the state of lethargy into which she had fallen.
Again we struggled on. Soon it became dark, except for such light as
the stars, aided by the snow, afforded. More than once I despaired
of reaching the end of our journey; but, just as I had become quite
hopeless, we saw lights on the hill above us, and heard our servants,
who had preceded us, shouting to attract our attention. I answered,
and presently they came to our assistance. Half carrying, half
dragging her, we got my wife up the steep mountain-side; and at
length, about 9 p.m., we arrived at the little house buried in snow,
into which we crept through a hole dug in the snow wall, which
encircled it. We were welcomed by a blazing wood-fire and a most
cheering odour of dinner, to which we did full justice, after having
got rid of our saturated garments. Next morning we started on our
return journey at daybreak, for it was necessary to get over the worst
part of the road before the sun had had time to soften the snow, which
the night's frost had so thoroughly hardened that we slipped over it
without the least difficulty.

This was our only visit to our new possession, for very soon
afterwards I was informed that Lord Lytton wished me to spend the
summer at Simla, as the Lieutenant-Governor of the Punjab would be
there, and His Excellency was anxious to discuss the details of the
proposed Chief Commissionership. My wife, therefore, returned to Simla
at once, and I joined her at the end of May, having in the meanwhile
inspected every regiment and visited every post held by the Frontier
Force between Sind and Hazara--a most interesting experience, which I
thoroughly enjoyed.


[Footnote 1: The Amir's eldest son, who had rebelled on his younger
brother, Abdulla Jan, being nominated heir to the throne.]

[Footnote 2: Before Lord Northbrook left India he sent Major Sandeman
on a Mission to Khelat to re-open the Bolan Pass, and endeavour to
settle the differences between the Khan and the Baluchistan tribes,
and between the tribes themselves, who were all at loggerheads.]

[Footnote 3: Presents given by the British Government to the Mir of
Wakhan in recognition of his hospitable reception of the members of
the Forsyth Mission on their return from Yarkund.]

[Footnote 4: 'Besides the sixty-three Ruling Chiefs, there were nearly
three hundred titular Chiefs and persons of distinction collected
at the Imperial Assemblage, besides those included in the suites
of Ruling Chiefs.--J. Talboys Wheeler, 'History of the Delhi
Assemblage.']

[Footnote 5: These gold medals were also presented to the Governors,
Lieutenant-Governors, and other high officials, and to the members of
the Imperial Assemblage Committee.]

[Footnote 6: In endeavouring to describe this historical event, I have
freely refreshed my memory from Talboys Wheeler's 'History of the
Imperial Assemblage,' in which is given a detailed account of the
proceedings.]

       *       *       *       *       *




CHAPTER XLIII.
1878

  Object of the first Afghan war
  --Excitement caused by Russia's advances


Before continuing my story, it will, I think, be as well to recall to
the minds of my readers the train of events which led to England
and Russia becoming at the same moment solicitous for the Amir's
friendship, for it was this rivalry which was the immediate cause of
the second Afghan war.

Less than two hundred years ago the British Empire in the East and
Russia were separated from each other by a distance of 4,000 miles.
Russia's most advanced posts were at Orenburg and Petropaulovsk, while
England had obtained but an uncertain footing on the seaboard of
southern India. The French were our only European rivals in India, and
the advance of Russia towards the Oxus was as little anticipated as
was England's advance towards the Indus.

Thirty years later Russia began to absorb the hordes of the Kirghiz
steppes, which gave her occupation for more than a hundred years,
during which time England was far from idle. Bengal was conquered, or
ceded to us, the Madras Presidency established, and Bombay had become
an important settlement, with the result that, in the early part of
this century, the distance between the Russian and English possessions
had been diminished to less than 2,000 miles.

Our progress was now more rapid. While Russia was laboriously
crossing a barren desert, the North-West Provinces, the Carnatic, the
territories of the Peshwa, Sind, and the Punjab, successively came
under our rule, and by 1850 we had extended our dominions to the foot
of the mountains beyond the Indus.

Russia by this time, having overcome the difficulties of the desert,
had established herself at Aralsk, near the junction of the Syr Daria
with the waters of Lake Aral; so that in fifty years the distance
between the outposts of the two advancing Powers in Asia had been
reduced to about 1,000 miles.

Repeated successful wars with Persia, and our desertion of that Power
owing to the conviction that we could no longer defend her against
the Russians, had practically placed her at their mercy, and they had
induced Persia, in 1837, to undertake the siege of Herat. At the
same time, the Russian Ambassador at Teheran had despatched Captain
Vitkievitch to Kabul with letters from himself and from the Czar
to the Amir, in the hope of getting Dost Mahomed Khan to join the
Russians and Persians in their alliance against the English.

Vitkievitch's arrival at Kabul towards the end of 1837 had been
anticipated by Captain (afterwards Sir Alexander) Burnes, who had been
sent three months before by Lord Auckland on a Mission to the Amir,
ostensibly to improve our commercial relations with the Afghans, but
in reality to prevent them from joining the Russo-Persian alliance.

Burnes had been most cordially received by Dost Mahomed, who hoped,
with the help of the Indian Government, to recover the district of
Peshawar, which had been wrested from him by the Sikhs. Vitkievitch's
reception was proportionately discouraging, and for some weeks he
could not obtain an interview with the Amir.

The Dost's hopes, however, were not fulfilled. We declined to give him
any assistance towards regaining possession of Peshawar or defending
his dominions, should his refusal to join with Persia and Russia draw
down upon him the enmity of those Powers.

Vitkievitch, who had been patiently biding his time, was now taken
into favour by the Amir, who accorded him a reception which fully
compensated for the neglect with which he had previously been treated.

Burnes remained at Kabul until the spring of 1838, and then returned
to India to report that Dost Mahomed had thrown himself heart and soul
into the Russo-Persian alliance.

Under pressure from the English Ministry the Governor-General of India
determined to take the extreme measure of deposing an Amir who had
shown himself so hostilely inclined, and of placing on the throne
of Kabul a Ruler who, it was hoped, would feel that it was to his
interest to keep on good terms with us. It was for this object that
the first Afghan war[1] was undertaken, which ended in the murder of
our nominee, Shah Shuja, and the triumphant return of Dost Mahomed.
The disastrous failure of our action in this matter taught the British
Government that our frontier on the Sutlej was too far removed for us
to think of exercising any real influence in Afghanistan, and that the
time had not arrived to warrant our interfering in Afghan affairs.

After this came our war with the Sikhs, resulting in our conquest
of the Punjab, and our frontier becoming conterminous with that of
Afghanistan on the banks of the Indus.

There was a lull in the movements of Russia in Central Asia until
after the Crimean War of 1854-56, which, while temporarily checking
the designs of Russia in Europe, seems to have stimulated her progress
in the East. After the passage of the great desert, Russia found
herself in the midst of fertile and settled countries, whose provinces
fell under her control as rapidly as those of India had fallen under
ours, until in 1864 Chimkent was occupied, the point beyond which
Prince Gortchakoff stated that there was no intention on the part of
Russia to make further advances.

Notwithstanding these assurances, Tashkent was captured on the
29th June of the following year. In 1866 Khojent was successfully
assaulted. Tisakh fell on the 30th October; and in the spring of
1867 the fort of Yani-Kargan in the Nurata mountains was seized and
occupied.

Bokhara alone remained unconquered, but the Ruler of that State, after
vainly endeavouring to gain assistance from Afghanistan and to enlist
the sympathies of the Indian Government, was compelled to sue for
peace.

Important as these acquisitions were, they attracted but little
attention in England, owing partly to the policy of non-interference
which had been adopted as regards Central Asian affairs, and partly to
the British public being absorbed in European politics, until 1868,
when the occupation of Samarkand by Russia caused considerable
excitement, not to say consternation, amongst the authorities in
England.

Conferences took place in the spring of 1870 between Lord Clarendon,
the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and Baron Brunow, the
Russian Ambassador, with the object of determining a neutral zone,
which should be the limit of the possessions of England and Russia in
Central Asia. For nearly three years, Russia was persistent in her
endeavours to have Afghanistan placed outside the pale of British
influence; but the Indian Government were equally persistent in
pointing out the danger of agreeing to such an arrangement, and it was
not until the 31st January, 1873, that the boundary, which neither
England nor Russia might cross, was finally agreed upon.

Six months later the conquest of Khiva by Russia was effected. It
was at first given out that the expedition was to punish acts of
brigandage, and to rescue fifty Russian prisoners, but was on no
account to lead to a prolonged occupancy of the Khanate. Count
Schouvaloff, the Russian Statesman who was deputed to communicate the
object of the expedition to the British Government, declared that a
positive promise to this effect might be given to the British public,
as a proof of the friendly and pacific intentions of his master the
Czar; but, notwithstanding these assurances, the Russians never left
Khiva, and it has been a Russian possession from that time.

Thus, in a little more than twenty years, Russia had made a stride of
600 miles towards India, leaving but 400 miles between her outposts
and those of Great Britain. Russia's southern boundary was now, in
fact, almost conterminous with the northern boundary of Afghanistan,
near enough to cause the Ruler of that country considerable anxiety,
and make him feel that Russia had become a dreaded neighbour, and that
the integrity of his kingdom could not be maintained save by the
aid of one of the two great Powers between whose fire he now found
himself.

I have endeavoured to show how it was that Sher Ali, notwithstanding
his soreness and disappointment at the many rebuffs he had received
from us in the earlier part of his career, gratefully remembered
the timely aid afforded him by Sir John Lawrence, and the princely
reception accorded to him by Lord Mayo, and was still quite prepared
in 1873 to enter into friendly relations with us, provided we would
recognize his favourite son as his heir, and give a direct promise of
aid in the event of Russian aggression. Our refusal to accede to these
terms, added to our adverse decision in regard to the Sistan boundary,
turned Sher Ali from a friend into an enemy, and he decided, as his
father had done forty years before, to throw in his lot with Russia.


[Footnote 1: It is instructive to note how remarkably similar were the
circumstances which brought about the first and second Afghan wars,
viz., the presence of Russian officers at Kabul.]

       *       *       *       *       *




CHAPTER XLIV.
1878

  Effect of the Berlin Treaty at Kabul
  --Sher Ali decides against England--A meeting of portentous moment
  --Preparations for war--Letter from Sher Ali



In 1877 Russia declared war with Turkey; for more than a year fighting
had been going on between the two countries, and as it seemed possible
to the British Government that England might in the end be drawn into
the contest, it was deemed expedient to obtain help from India, and
a force of about 5,000 Native soldiers was despatched from Bombay to
Malta in response to the demand from home.

Russia answered this move on our part by increased activity in
Central Asia; and in June, 1878, it was reported by Major Cavagnari,
Deputy-Commissioner of Peshawar, that a Russian Envoy of the same rank
as the Governor-General of Tashkent was about to visit Kabul, and
that General Kauffmann had written to the Amir that the Envoy must
be received as an Ambassador deputed by the Czar himself. A few days
later further reports were received of Russian troops being mobilized,
and of the intention of Russia to establish cantonments on the ferries
of Kilif and Kerki on the Oxus.

The Amir, it was said, summoned a council of the leading Chiefs,
to discuss the question whether it would be most advantageous for
Afghanistan at this juncture to side with Russia or with England; it
was decided apparently in favour of the former, for from the moment
General Stolietoff's Mission set foot on Afghan territory it met with
an enthusiastic reception. Five miles from the capital Stolietoff and
his companions were welcomed by the Foreign Secretary. They were then
mounted on richly-caparisoned elephants, and escorted by a large body
of troops to the Bala Hissar, where the following morning they were
received in state by Sher Ali, and the nobles of highest degree in his
kingdom.[1]

On the eve of the day that the Mission entered Kabul, Stolietoff
received a despatch from General Kauffmann giving him the heads of the
Berlin Treaty, with the following commentary in the handwriting of
the Governor-General himself: 'If the news be true, it is indeed
melancholy;' adding, however, that the Congress had finished its
sittings, and that, therefore, the Envoy in his negotiations with
the Amir had better refrain from arranging any distinct measures, or
making any positive promises, and '_not go generally as far as would
have been advisable if war with England had been threatened_.'
Evidently these instructions greatly modified the basis of
Stolietoff's negotiations with Sher Ali; for, although the Russians
deny that an offensive and defensive alliance with the Afghan Ruler
was contemplated, it seems probable, from the tone of Kauffmann's
despatch, that the Envoy's instructions were elastic enough to admit
of such an arrangement had the circumstances of the case made it
desirable--_e.g._, had the Berlin Congress failed to establish peace
in Europe.

In telegraphing to the Secretary of State an account of these
proceedings at Kabul, the Viceroy requested explicit instructions from
Her Majesty's Government as to whether this conduct on the part of
Russia and Afghanistan was to be left to the Government of India to
deal with as a matter between it and the Amir, or whether, having
regard to Russia's formal promises, it would be treated as an Imperial
question. 'In the former case,' he concluded, 'I shall propose, with
your approval, to insist on an immediate suitable reception of a
British Mission.'

Lord Lytton's proposition was approved of by Her Majesty's Ministers,
and a letter[2] was at once written by the Viceroy to the Amir,
announcing that a Mission would shortly be despatched to Kabul with
General Sir Neville Chamberlain, at that time Commander-in-Chief in
Madras, as its responsible head.

Major Cavagnari was at the same time directed to inform the
authorities at Kabul that the object of the Mission was altogether
friendly, and that a refusal to grant it a free passage and safe
conduct, such as had been accorded to the Russian Envoy, would be
considered as an act of open hostility. Intimation of the Viceroy's
intentions reached Kabul on the 17th August, the day on which the
Amir's favourite son, Abdulla Jan, died. This untoward event was taken
advantage of to delay answering the Viceroy's letter, but it was not
allowed in any way to interfere with the progress of the negotiations
with Russia. When these were completed, Stolietoff inquired from Sher
Ali whether he meant to receive the English Mission, whereupon the
Amir asked for the General's advice in the matter. Stolietoff, while
replying somewhat evasively, gave Sher Ali to understand that the
simultaneous presence of Embassies from two countries in almost
hostile relations with each other would not be quite convenient, upon
which His Highness decided not to allow the British Mission to enter
Afghanistan. This decision, however, was not communicated to the
Viceroy, and on the 21st September the Mission[3] marched out of
Peshawar and encamped at Jamrud, three miles short of the Kyber Pass.

In consequence of the extremely hostile attitude of the Amir, and the
very unsatisfactory reply received from General Faiz Mahomed Khan,
commanding the Afghan troops in the Kyber Pass, to a letter[4] he had
written a few days before, Sir Neville Chamberlain suspected that the
advance of the Mission would be opposed, and, in order 'to reduce to
a minimum any indignity that might be offered to our Government,' he
deputed Major Cavagnari to ride on with a few sowars to Ali Masjid, a
fort ten miles beyond the mouth of the Pass, and demand leave for the
Mission to proceed.

When within a mile of the fort, Cavagnari was met by a body of
Afridis, who warned him that the road ahead was blocked by Afghans,
and that if he ventured further he would be fired upon. On this
Cavagnari halted, and while in the act of writing a letter to Faiz
Mahomed, complaining of the treatment he had met with, and informing
him that he and his companions intended to proceed until fired upon,
an act the responsibility for which would rest with the Amir's
representatives, a message was brought him from Faiz Mahomed to the
effect that he was coming to meet him, and would hear anything he had
to communicate.

The interview took place near a water-mill on the right bank of the
stream which flows under Ali Masjid. I have several times since ridden
past the spot and pictured to myself the meeting between the British
political officer and the Afghan General. It was a meeting of most
portentous moment, for its result would mean peace or war.

Faiz Mahomed's bearing was perfectly courteous, but he made it clear
that he did not intend to permit the Mission to pass, explaining that
he was only acting as a sentry under instructions from Kabul, and
that he was bound to resist the entrance of the Mission into
Afghan territory with all the force at his disposal. He spoke with
considerable warmth, and told Cavagnari that but for their personal
friendship he would, in obedience to the Amir's orders, have shot down
him and his escort.

Faiz Mahomed's followers were not so respectful in their bearing as
their Chief, and their manner warned Cavagnari that it was unadvisable
to prolong the conversation; he, therefore, took leave of the Afghan
General, and returned to Jamrud. The Mission was dissolved,[5] our
Agent at Kabul was ordered to return to India, and Cavagnari was
instructed to remain at Peshawar and arrange for alienating the
Afridis in the Khyber from the Amir's interests.

In reporting these circumstances to the Secretary of State, the
Government of India expressed their regret that this final endeavour
on their part to arrive at some definite understanding with the Amir
of Kabul should have been thus met with repudiation and affront, and
concluded their despatch in the following words: 'The repulse of Sir
Neville Chamberlain by Sher Ali at his frontier while the Russian
emissaries are still at his capital has proved the inutility of
diplomatic expedients, and has deprived the Amir of all claim upon our
further forbearance.'

It had been arranged that, if it were unfortunately found to be
necessary to support political efforts by military measures, two
columns should be mobilized, one at Sukkur on the Indus, for an
advance in the direction of Kandahar, the other at Kohat for
operations in the Kuram valley, and that I was to have command of the
latter. As soon, therefore, as the tidings of Sir Neville's repulse
was received, I started from Simla to be on the spot in case the
proposal to employ force should be sanctioned by the authorities in
England.

Between the time of my leaving Simla and my arrival at Kohat on
the 9th October, it was decided to employ a third column to make
a demonstration in the direction of the Khyber for the purpose of
clearing the Amir's troops out of the pass.[6]

The formation of this column was no doubt a wise move, as the Afghans
were holding Ali Masjid, the spot on which the insult had been offered
to our Envoy, and the presence of a force on this line would tend to
relieve the pressure against my column; but looked at from my point of
view, this third column was not quite so desirable, as it involved the
withdrawal of three of my most efficient regiments, and the transfer
of a large number of my transport animals to the Khyber for its use.
There was some consolation, however, in the fact that my old friend
Major-General Sir Samuel Browne, who had been named for the command in
the Khyber, was to be the gainer by my loss.

Major-General Donald Stewart, who was in England, was telegraphed for
to command the Kandahar column, the advanced portion of which, it was
intended, should push on under Major-General Biddulph to strengthen
Quetta.

The long-expected reply[7] from the Amir to the Viceroy's letter of
the 14th August was received at Simla on the 19th October. Its tone
was considered extremely discourteous; it contained no apology for the
public affront offered to the British Government, and indicated no
desire for improved relations.

The reply was at once communicated to the Secretary of State, who was
further informed that the Government of India proposed the following
measures:--

    The immediate issue of a manifesto which should define the cause
    of offence, declare a friendly disposition towards the Afghan
    people and reluctance to interfere in their internal affairs, and
    should fix the whole responsibility of what might happen upon the
    Amir.

    An advance into the Kuram valley as soon as the force at Kohat was
    ready to move.

    The expulsion of the Afghan troops holding the Khyber Pass.

    An advance from Quetta into Pishin, or, if necessary, to Kandahar.

Lord Cranbrook (who had succeeded the Marquis of Salisbury as
Secretary of State for India) replied[8] that he did not consider
matters to be at present ripe for taking the extreme measures
recommended by the Government of India, and that, before crossing the
frontiers of Afghanistan, a letter should be addressed to the Amir
demanding, in temperate language, an apology, and the acceptance of a
permanent Mission within Afghan limits; that sufficient time should be
given for the receipt of a reply to this letter (the text of which was
to be telegraphed to Lord Cranbrook for approval before despatch), and
that meanwhile the massing of troops should be continued, and adequate
forces assembled at the various points where the frontier would be
crossed if war were declared. The Secretary of State went on to say:
'There must be no mistake as to our show of power to enforce what we
require; this _locus penitentiæ _should be allowed before hostile acts
are committed against the Amir.'

These instructions were carried out, and on the 30th October the
ultimatum was despatched to Sher Ali, informing him that, unless his
acceptance of the conditions were received by the Viceroy not later
than the 20th November, he would be treated by the British Government
as a declared enemy.


[Footnote 1: On the 13th June, the day on which the Berlin Congress
held its first sitting, the news of the approach of General
Stolietoff's Mission reached Kabul. The Russians hoped that the
Mission might influence the decision of the Berlin Congress, and
although its despatch was repudiated by the Imperial Government at St.
Petersburg, it was subsequently ascertained on excellent authority
that the project of sending a Mission to Kabul was discussed three
times at the Council of Ministers, and, according to a statement in
the _Journal de St. Petersbourg_, orders were sent in April, 1878, to
General Kauffmann regarding its despatch. About the same time, the
Russian Minister of War proposed that the Army of the Caucasus should
be transferred bodily across the Caspian to Astrabad, whence the
troops would march in two columns on Herat; while three columns,
amounting in the aggregate to 14,000 men, were to move direct upon the
Oxus from Turkestan. The main part of this scheme was never carried
into effect, probably from its being found too great an undertaking at
a time when Russia had scarcely obtained a footing beyond the Caspian,
but the minor movement was partially carried out. The largest of the
three columns, under Kauffmann's own command, moved from Tashkent,
through Samarkand, to Jam, the most southern point of the Russian
possessions at that time, and within ten marches of Kilif, the main
ferry over the Oxus. There it remained for some weeks, when it
returned to Tashkent, the Afghan expedition being abandoned in
consequence of the Treaty of Berlin having been signed.]


[Footnote 2:

    'SIMLA,
    '14_th August,_ 1878.

    'The authentic intelligence which I have lately received of the
    course of recent events at Kabul and in the countries bordering on
    Afghanistan has rendered it necessary that I should communicate
    fully and without reserve with your Highness upon matters
    of importance which concern the interests of India and of
    Afghanistan. For this reason, I have considered it expedient to
    depute a special and confidential British Envoy of high rank, who
    is known to your Highness--his Excellency General Sir Neville
    Bowles Chamberlain, Knight Grand Cross of the Most Honourable
    Order of the Bath, Knight Grand Commander of the Most Exalted
    Order of the Star of India, Commander-in-Chief of the Madras
    Army--to visit your Highness immediately at Kabul, in order that
    he may converse personally with your Highness regarding these
    urgent affairs. It appears certain that they can best be arranged
    for the welfare and tranquillity of both States, and for the
    preservation of friendship between the two Governments, by a
    full and frank statement of the present position. This letter is
    therefore sent in advance to your Highness by the hand of Nawab
    Gholam Hussein Khan, C.S.I., a faithful and honoured Sirdar of my
    Government, who will explain all necessary details as to the time
    and manner of the Envoy's visit. It is asked that your Highness
    may be pleased to issue commands to your Sirdars, and to all other
    authorities in Afghanistan, upon the route between Peshawar
    and Kabul, that they shall make, without any delay, whatever
    arrangements are necessary and proper for effectively securing to
    my Envoy, the representative of a friendly Power, due safe conduct
    and suitable accommodation according to his dignity, while passing
    with his retinue through the dominions of your Highness.

    'I beg to express the high consideration I entertain for your
    Highness, and to subscribe myself.']

[Footnote 3: The Mission was composed of General Sir Neville
Chamberlain, G.C.B., G.C.S.I.; Major Cavagnari, C.S.I.; Surgeon-Major
Bellew, C.S.I.; Major O. St. John, R.E.; Captain St. V. Hammick,
43rd Foot; Captain F. Onslow, Madras Cavalry; Lieutenant Neville
Chamberlain, Central India Horse; Maharaj Pertap Sing of Jodhpur; and
Sirdar Obed Ulla Khan, of Tonk. Lieutenant-Colonel F. Jenkins and
Captain W. Battye were with the escort.]

[Footnote 4:

    'PESHAWAR,

    '15_th September_, 1878.

    (After compliments.) 'I write to inform you that, by command
    of His Excellency the Viceroy and Governor-General of India, a
    friendly Mission of British officers, with a suitable escort, is
    about to proceed to Kabul through the Khyber Pass, and intimation
    of the despatch of this Mission has been duly communicated to His
    Highness the Amir by the hand of the Nawab Ghulam Hussein Khan.

    'I hear that an official from Kabul has recently visited you at
    Ali Masjid, and he has doubtless instructed you in accordance with
    His Highness the Amir's commands. As, however, information has
    now been received that you have summoned from Peshawar the Khyber
    headmen with whom we were making arrangements for the safe conduct
    of the British Mission through the Khyber Pass, I therefore write
    to inquire from you whether, in accordance with the instructions
    you have received, you are prepared to guarantee the safety of the
    British Mission to Daka or not; and I request that a clear reply
    to this inquiry may be speedily communicated by the hand of
    the bearer of this letter, as I cannot delay my departure from
    Peshawar. It is well known that the Khyber tribes are in receipt
    of allowances from the Kabul Government, and also, like other
    independent tribes on this frontier, have relations with the
    British Government. It may be well to let you know that when the
    present negotiations were opened with the Khyber tribes, it was
    solely with the object of arranging with them for the safe conduct
    of the British Mission through the Khyber Pass, in the same manner
    as was done in regard to the despatch of our Agent, the Nawab
    Ghulam Hussein Khan; and the tribes were given clearly to
    understand that these negotiations were in no way intended to
    prejudice their relations with His Highness the Amir, as it was
    well known that the object of the British Mission was altogether
    of a friendly character to His Highness the Amir and the people of
    Afghanistan.

    'I trust that, in accordance with the instructions you have
    received from His Highness the Amir, your reply to this letter
    will be satisfactory, and that it will contain the required
    assurances that the Mission will be safely conducted to Daka. I
    shall expect to receive your reply to this letter not later than
    the 18th instant, so please understand that the matter is most
    urgent.

    'But at the same time, it is my duty to inform you, in a frank and
    friendly manner, that if your answer is not what I trust it will
    be, or if you delay to send an early reply, I shall have no
    alternative but to make whatever arrangements may seem to me best
    for carrying out the instructions I have received from my own
    Government.']

[Footnote 5: In a letter to Lord Lytton reporting the rebuff the
Mission had encountered, General Chamberlain wrote: 'No man was ever
more anxious than I to preserve peace and secure friendly solution,
and it was only when I plainly saw the Amir's fixed intention to drive
us into a corner that I told you we must either sink into a position
of merely obeying his behests on all points or stand on our rights
and risk rupture. Nothing could have been more distinct, nothing more
humiliating to the dignity of the British Crown and nation; and I
believe that but for the decision and tact of Cavagnari at one period
of the interview, the lives of the British officers and the Native
following were in considerable danger.']

[Footnote 6: The approximate strength of the three columns was as
follows:

                                    _Officers._  _Men._  _Guns._

  I. The Kandahar Field Force           265      12,599     78

  II. The Kuram Field Force             116       6,549     18

  III. The Peshawar Valley Field Force  325      15,854     48
                                       -----     ------    ---
                                        706      35,002    144]

[Footnote 7:

    'KABUL,
    '_6th October, 1878._

    (After compliments.) 'Your Excellency's despatch regarding the
    sending of a friendly Mission has been received through Nawab
    Gholam Hussein Khan; I understand its purport, but the Nawab had
    not yet an audience, nor had your Excellency's letters been seen
    by me when a communication was received to the address of my
    servant, Mirza Habibulla Khan, from the Commissioner of Peshawar,
    and was read. I am astonished and dismayed by this letter,
    written threateningly to a well-intentioned friend, replete with
    contentions, and yet nominally regarding a friendly Mission.
    Coming thus by force, what result, or profit, or fruit, could come
    of it? Following this, three other letters from above-mentioned
    source, in the very same strain, addressed to my officials, have
    been perused by me. Thus, during a period of a few days several
    letters from that quarter have all been before me, and none
    of them have been free from harsh expressions and hard words,
    repugnant to courtesy and politeness, and in tone contrary to the
    ways of friendship and intercourse. Looking to the fact that I
    am at this time assaulted by affliction and grief at the hand of
    fate, and that great trouble has possessed my soul, in the
    officials of the British Government patience and silence would
    have been specially becoming. Let your Excellency take into
    consideration this harsh and breathless haste with which the
    desired object and place of conference have been seized upon, and
    how the officials of the Government have been led into discussion
    and subjection to reproach. There is some difference between this
    and the pure road of friendship and goodwill. In alluding to those
    writings of the officials of the opposite Government which have
    emanated from them, and are at this time in the possession of
    my own officials, the latter have in no respect desired to show
    enmity or opposition towards the British Government, nor, indeed,
    do they with any other Power desire enmity or strife; but when any
    other Power, without cause or reason, shows animosity towards this
    Government, the matter is left in the hands of God, and to His
    will. The esteemed Nawab Gholam Hussein Khan, the bearer of this
    despatch, has, in accordance with written instructions received
    from the British Government, asked for permission to retire, and
    it has been granted.']

[Footnote 8: 25th October.]

       *       *       *       *       *




CHAPTER XLV.
1878

  Shortcomings of my column--Attitude of the Border tribes


It was a proud, albeit a most anxious, moment for me when I assumed
command of the Kuram Field Force; though a local Major-General, I was
only a Major in my regiment, and save for a short experience on one
occasion in Lushai, I had never had an opportunity of commanding
troops in the field. Earnestly longing for success, I was intensely
interested in ascertaining the qualities of those who were to aid me
in achieving it. To this end I lost no time in taking stock of the
several officers and corps who were to be associated with me, some of
whom were personally known to me, while others I had never met before;
and in endeavouring to satisfy myself as to their qualifications and
fitness for their several posts, I could not help feeling that they
must be equally anxious as to my capability for command, and that the
inspection must be of nearly as great moment to them as to me.

The results of a very close investigation were tolerably satisfactory,
but there were weak points in my armour which gave me grave cause for
anxiety.

I came to the conclusion that the force was not numerically strong
enough for the very difficult task before it--in the first instance,
the occupation of the Kuram valley and the expulsion of all Afghan
garrisons south of the Shutargardan Pass, and in the second, as
opportunity might offer, the pushing my reconnaissances into the Khost
valley, and, if military considerations would admit, the dislodging
the Amir's administration from that tract of country, so as to prevent
the Kabul Government drawing supplies from it. Finally, I was directed
to explore the roads leading to the unknown region beyond Khost.

The Shutargardan was not less than 180 miles from Kohat, the garrison
of which station would, on my departure, be reduced to a minimum, and
Rawal Pindi, the nearest place from which aid could be procured, was
130 miles still further off, separated from Kohat by an execrable road
and the swiftly-flowing river Indus, crossed by a precarious bridge of
boats. It had to be taken into account also that the various Afridi
tribes were watching their opportunity, and at the first favourable
moment, in common with the tribesmen nearer Kuram, they might be
expected to take advantage of our weakness and attack our convoys and
the small posts which had necessarily to be established along our line
of communication.

The attitude of the Mahomedan sepoys, of whom there were large numbers
in four out of my six Native Infantry regiments, was also a cause of
considerable anxiety; for I was aware that they were not altogether
happy at the prospect of taking part in a war against their
co-religionist, the Ruler of Afghanistan, and that the mullas were
already urging them to desert our cause.

Furthermore, I discovered that my only British Infantry Regiment, the
2nd Battalion of the 8th Foot, was sickly to a degree, and therefore
in an unserviceable condition. It was largely composed of quite
young, unacclimatized soldiers, peculiarly susceptible to fever--that
terrible scourge which fills the hospitals of our Punjab stations in
the autumn of each year. I rode out to meet the battalion on its way
into Kohat, and was horrified to see the long line of doolies and
ambulance-carts by which it was accompanied.

The inefficient state of the transport added to my anxieties.
Notwithstanding the difficulties experienced in former campaigns from
the same cause, the Government had neglected to take any steps for the
organization of a proper transport service while we were at peace;
consequently, when everything should have been ready for a start,
confusion reigned supreme in this all-important department. Large
numbers of camels, mules, and bullocks arrived daily, picked up at
exorbitant prices from anyone who would supply them; but most of these
animals were quite unfit to enter upon the hard work of a campaign,
and with a totally inexperienced and quite insufficient staff of
officers to supervise them, it was evident that the majority must
succumb at an early date.

Hardly had I realized these shortcomings in the constitution and
equipment of my column than I received intelligence which led me to
believe that the Afghans would hold the Peiwar Kotal (the pass leading
into Afghanistan over the range of mountains bounding the Kuram
valley) in great strength, and were determined to oppose our advance
at this point. Under these circumstances I felt myself justified in
representing to the powers at Simla that I considered the number of
troops at my disposal inadequate for the task they were expected to
perform, which representation resulted in the 23rd Pioneers, whose
transfer to the Khyber column had been under consideration, being left
with me, and the 72nd Highlanders, a battery of Field Artillery, and
the 28th Punjab Infantry, being sent to Kohat. Of these, however, I
was allowed to take on with me only one wing of the 72nd, half the
battery, and the 28th Punjab Infantry; and the last-named regiment I
could hardly consider as part of my force, for when we should arrive
at Thal, our furthest frontier post, it would have to be dropped,
with a wing of the 5th Punjab Cavalry and No. 2 Mountain Battery, to
garrison that place.

This small reinforcement was not given to me without considerable
demur on the part of the military authorities, who had made up
their minds that the Kuram column would meet with slight, if any,
opposition, and that the chief stand would be made in the Khyber. Lord
Lytton, however, supported my appeal, as did Sir Neville Chamberlain,
who was then acting as Military Member of Council, and who had
personal knowledge of the great natural strength of the Peiwar Kotal
position.

I next turned my attention to the transport, and endeavoured by all
the means I could think of to render it more efficient. A certain
portion of it I placed in regimental charge; I had the men instructed
in loading and unloading, and I took great care that the animals were
not overladen.

Happily, I had a very able staff. Major Galbraith, the
Assistant-Adjutant-General, though new to the work, proved
exceptionally good, and Captain Badcock, the chief Commissariat
officer, and Major Collett and Captain 'Dick' Kennedy, officers of
the Quartermaster-General's department, whom I had myself selected, I
could thoroughly depend upon.

As regards my own personal staff I was equally lucky, Captain Pretyman
of the R.A. being my A.D.C., and Lieutenant Neville Chamberlain, of
the Central India Horse, and Lieutenant-Colonel George Villiers, of
the Grenadier Guards, my Orderly officers.

As political adviser I had with me an old friend and schoolfellow,
Colonel Garrow Waterfield, Commissioner of Peshawar, who brought with
him a large following of Native gentlemen connected with the frontier,
by whom he thought our intercourse with the tribesmen would be
assisted. With scarcely an exception they proved loyal, and throughout
the campaign helped me materially.

Knowing how important it was to secure the interest of the Chiefs and
Khans of the border on our side, especially those who had influence in
the Kuram valley, we lost no opportunity of becoming acquainted with
them while we were at Kohat. They were friendly and full of promises,
but it was clear that the amount of assistance to be given by
them depended on whether or not our occupation of Kuram was to
be permanent, and on this important point I solicited definite
instructions. I reported to the Commander-in-Chief that, from all I
had learnt, the advent of a British force would be welcomed by the
people, provided they understood that it was the forerunner of
annexation; that in this case we should be regarded as deliverers, and
all the resources of the country would be placed at our disposal; but
if the people were led to believe that the force would be withdrawn
when our work was finished, and that they would be again handed over
to the tender mercies of the Kabul Government, we must expect no aid
from them, as they would naturally dread the resentment of their
Afghan rulers.

In reply, I was informed that I could assure the people of Kuram that
our occupation would be permanent; and my being enabled to make this
promise was undoubtedly the explanation of the friendly reception we
met with on entering the valley, and the cause of my receiving at the
same time a letter from the Chief of the Turis (the inhabitants of
the Kuram valley), inquiring when we might be expected, as they were
suffering greatly from the tyranny of the Afghan Government, and were
anxiously waiting the arrival of the British.

       *       *       *       *       *




CHAPTER XLVI.
1878

  The Kuram valley--Conflicting news of the enemy
  --An apparently impregnable position--Spingawi route decided on
  --Disposition of the force--A night attack
  --Advantages of a night attack--Devotion of my orderlies
  --Threatening the enemy's rear--The Peiwar Kotal


By the 15th November my column[1] (consisting of 1,345 British and
3,990 Native soldiers, with 13 guns) was concentrated at Thal, and on
the 20th--the limit of time given to the Amir--no reply having been
vouchsafed to the Viceroy's ultimatum, orders were issued to the three
columns to advance the next day.[2]

The Kuram valley, from which my force received its designation, is
about 60 miles long, and from 3 to 10 miles wide. On every side rise
high and magnificently-wooded mountains, those on the north and east
being the most lofty and precipitous, while on the north-west projects
the spur which runs down from Sika Bam, the highest peak of the Sufed
Koh range, upwards of 14,000 feet high. This spur forms the boundary
between Kuram and Afghanistan, and is crossed by the Peiwar Kotal. A
river, which varies from 100 to 500 yards in width, flows through the
valley, and the road, or, rather, track, which existed in 1878, ran
for the most part along its rocky bed. In the winter months the depth
of the water nowhere exceeded three feet, except after heavy rain, and
although the stream was rather swift, it could usually be forded
with very little risk. The valley itself had a bleak and deserted
appearance, save in the immediate vicinity of the few and
widely-scattered villages, around which were clustered fruit trees and
patches of cultivation.

For six weeks the thoughts of every one in the force had been turned
towards Kuram, consequently there was considerable excitement when at
3 a.m. on the 21st November the leading troops crossed the river into
Afghan territory and encamped eight miles from Thal. The next morning
we marched fifteen miles farther up the valley to Hazir Pir, where we
halted for one day to improve the road (in some places impracticable
for guns and transport) and to allow of the rear part of the column
closing up. As we proceeded on our way, the headmen from the different
villages came out to welcome us, and on arriving at Hazir Pir we found
a plentiful repast awaiting us spread under the shade of some trees.
Knives and forks were evidently considered unnecessary adjuncts by our
entertainers, so I unhesitatingly took my first lesson in eating roast
kid and pillaued chicken without their aid.

On the 24th we marched to the Darwazai defile, and the next day
proceeded through it to Kuram, forty-eight miles from Thal. We found
the fort evacuated by the Afghans, who had left behind one 6-pounder
gun.

Notwithstanding the proffers of assistance I had received, I could get
no reliable information as to the whereabouts of the enemy; from one
account I was led to believe that they were in full retreat, from
another that they were being strongly reinforced. So, to find out the
truth, I reconnoitred as far as the cantonment of Habib Kila, fifteen
miles ahead, and there ascertained that the Afghan army, consisting
(it was said) of 18,000 men and eleven guns, had left the place only
a short time before, and was then moving into position on the Peiwar
Kotal.

Depot hospitals were formed at Kuram, and all our surplus stores and
baggage were left there with the following garrison: Two guns of F/A,
Royal Horse Artillery, half of G/3, R.A., the squadron 10th Hussars,
one squadron 12th Bengal Cavalry, and the company of Bengal Sappers
and Miners, besides all the sick and weakly men of the column.

At 5 a.m. on the 28th the remainder of the force, with the exception
of the troops who had been dropped at the several halting-places to
keep open our line of communication, marched towards the Peiwar.

The stars were still shining when we started, but it was very dark,
and we were chilled to the bone by a breeze blowing straight off the
snows of the Sufed Koh; towards sunrise it died away, and was followed
by oppressive heat and clouds of dust. Our progress was slow, for the
banks of the numerous nullas which intersect the valleys had to be
ramped before the guns and baggage could pass over them.

On reaching Habib Kila, intelligence was again brought that the Amir's
troops were in disorderly retreat, and had abandoned their guns at the
foot of the pass. I at once pushed a reconnaissance in force up the
south-eastern slopes of the mountain under the command of Colonel
Gordon,[3] of the 29th Punjab Infantry, who discovered that, so far
from the enemy having abandoned their guns, they had taken up an
extremely strong position on the pass, from which they fired on the
reconnaissance party as it advanced, wounding one British, one Native
officer[4] and nine men.

As the Afghans seemed inclined to press Gordon, two guns were brought
into action, and, to cover his retirement, I sent out the 5th Gurkhas,
under Lieutenant-Colonel Fitz-Hugh, who skilfully effected this object
with the loss of only one Gurkha wounded.

Gordon brought me back the valuable piece of information that no
further advance in that direction was possible, save in single
file--valuable because, had I attempted a front attack, the sacrifice
of life must have been enormous, even if the attack had proved
successful, the possibility of which I still greatly doubt.

Our tents not having arrived, the force prepared to bivouac; but our
position proving untenable, from being within range of the Afghan
shells, we moved a mile to the rear. Strong piquets were posted on
the neighbouring heights, and the night passed without further
interruption.

We halted the two following days. Men and cattle were exhausted from
their fatiguing marches, and supplies had to be brought up before
we could advance further; besides, I required time to look about
me before making up my mind how the Peiwar Kotal could most
advantageously be attacked.

It was, indeed, a formidable position--a great deal more formidable
than I had expected--on the summit of a mountain rising abruptly 2,000
feet above us, and only approachable by a narrow, steep, and rugged
path, flanked on either side by precipitous spurs jutting out like
huge bastions, from which an overwhelming fire could be brought to
bear on the assailants. The mountain on the enemy's right did not look
much more promising for moving troops, and I could only hope that a
way might be found on their left by which their flank could be turned.
The country, however, in that direction was screened from view by
spurs covered with dense forests of deodar.

I confess to a feeling very nearly akin to despair when I gazed at
the apparently impregnable position towering above us, occupied, as I
could discern through my telescope, by crowds of soldiers and a large
number of guns.

My Chief Engineer, Colonel Perkins,[5] made a reconnaissance, which
only too surely confirmed Gordon's opinion; and he further ascertained
that a deep ravine lay between the ground occupied by our piquets on
the north and the kotal, so that an attack on the enemy's immediate
left seemed as hopeless as on his right, or to his front.

On the afternoon of the 29th I sent my Quartermaster-General, Major
Collett, with his assistant, Captain Carr, and a small escort, to the
top of a hill, which lay to the right rear of our camp, from which
they were able to get a fairly good view of the surrounding country.
Collett reported that, so far as he could judge, it seemed likely
that, as I had hoped, the enemy's left might be turned by a route over
what was known as the Spingawi Kotal, where it had been ascertained
that some Afghan troops were posted. This was encouraging, but before
I could finally decide on adopting this line of attack, it was
expedient to find out whether it was practicable for troops, and
whether the kotal itself was held in great strength. Accordingly,
early next morning, Collett was again despatched to make a closer
reconnaissance of the Spingawi approaches.

While all this was going on, I did everything I could think of to
prevent what was in my mind being suspected by the enemy or, indeed,
by my own troops. Each day more than once, accompanied by an imposing
number of officers and a considerable escort, I climbed the lofty spur
by which a direct attack would have to be covered, and everyone in
camp was made to believe that an attack in this direction was being
prepared for. I was particularly careful to have this idea impressed
on the Turis and the Afghan camel-drivers, by whom the enemy were
pretty sure to be informed of what was going on; and also on the
Mahomedan sepoys, whom I suspected of being half-hearted. I confided
my real plan to only three people, my two senior staff-officers,
Galbraith and Collett, and my A.D.C., Pretyman, for I knew, from the
nature of the country, that, under the most favourable circumstances,
the way must be difficult and circuitous, and its passage must occupy
several hours; and that if the Afghans got wind of the contemplated
movement, and should attack my small force while on the march and
divided, defeat if not annihilation would be inevitable, for the
surrounding tribes would be certain to join against us if once they
believed us to be in difficulties.

I had heard that the smallness of the column was being freely
commented on and discussed; indeed, people in Kuram did not care to
disguise their belief that we were hastening to our destruction. Even
the women taunted us. When they saw the little Gurkhas for the first
time, they exclaimed: 'Is it possible that these beardless boys think
they can fight Afghan warriors?' They little suspected that the brave
spirits which animated those small forms made them more than a match
for the most stalwart Afghan. There was no hiding from ourselves,
however, that the force was terribly inadequate for the work to be
done. But done it must be. A retirement was not to be thought of, and
delay would only add to our difficulties, as the Afghans were daily
being reinforced from Kabul, and we heard of still further additions
of both Artillery and Infantry being on their way.

Collett returned soon after noon on the 30th; he had done admirably
and brought me most useful information, the result of which was that
I determined to adopt the Spingawi route. The nights were long, and I
calculated that by starting at 10 p.m., and allowing for unforeseen
delays, we should reach the foot of the pass while it was still dark.

Fresh efforts were now made to distract the enemy's attention from the
real point of attack. In addition to the reconnoitring parties which
were ostentatiously moved towards the Peiwar, batteries were marked
out at points commanding the kotal, and a great display was made of
the arrival of the two Horse and three Field Artillery guns, which
I had left at Kuram till the last moment on account of scarcity of
forage at the front, and of the two squadrons of Bengal Cavalry, which
for the same reason I had sent back to Habib Kila. Even with these
additions the total strength of the force in camp, including British
officers, amounted to only 889 Europeans and 2,415 Natives, with 13
guns.

[Illustration: THE ATTACK ON THE PEIWAR KOTAL.
_From a painting by Vereker Hamilton._]

These attempts to mislead the enemy were entirely successful, for
the Afghans shelled the working parties in the batteries, and placed
additional guns in position on the south side of the pass, showing
distinctly that they were preparing for a front attack, while in our
camp also it was generally believed that this was the movement which
would be carried out the next morning.

When it became sufficiently dark to conceal our proceedings, all the
commanding and staff officers assembled in my tent, and I disclosed
to them my scheme for the attack, impressing upon them that success
depended upon our being able to surprise the enemy, and begging of
them not even to whisper the word 'Spingawi' to each other.

I had had sufficient time since I took over the command to test the
capabilities of the officers and regiments upon whom I had to depend,
so that I had now no difficulty in disposing the troops in the manner
most likely to ensure success.

For the turning movement I selected:

  4 guns F/A, R.H.A.,
  The wing 72nd Highlanders,
  No 1 Mountain Battery (4 guns),
  2nd and 29th Punjab Infantry,
  5th Gurkhas,
  23rd Pioneers--
  Total strength 2,263 men with 8 guns;

and I determined to command the attack myself, with Brigadier-General
Thelwall as second in command.

For the feint and for the defence of our camp I left under the command
of Brigadier-General Cobbe:

  2 guns F/A, R.H.A.,
  3 guns G/3, R.A.,
  2nd Battalion 8th Foot,[6]
  12th Bengal Cavalry,
  5th Punjab Infantry.

In all, a little more than 1,000 men with 5 guns.

At 10 p.m. on Sunday, the 1st December, the little column fell in,
in absolute silence, and began its hazardous march. Tents were left
standing and camp-fires burning; and so noiselessly were orders
carried out that our departure remained unsuspected even by those of
our own people who were left in camp.

The track (for there was no road) led for two miles due east, and
then, turning sharp to the north, entered a wide gorge and ran along
the bed of a mountain stream. The moonlight lit up the cliffs on the
eastern side of the ravine, but made the darkness only the more dense
in the shadow of the steep hills on the west, underneath which our
path lay, over piles of stones and heaps of glacier débris. A bitterly
cold wind rushed down the gorge, extremely trying to all, lightly clad
as we were in anticipation of the climb before us. Onward and upwards
we slowly toiled, stumbling over great boulders of rock, dropping
into old water-channels, splashing through icy streams, and halting
frequently to allow the troops in the rear to close up.

In spite of the danger incurred, I was obliged every now and then to
strike a match and look at my watch to see how the time was going. I
had calculated that, by starting as early as ten o'clock, there would
be an hour or two to spare for rest. The distance, however, proved
rather greater than was expected and the road much rougher, but these
facts were, to my mind, not sufficient to account for the slowness of
our progress, and I proceeded to the head of the column, anxious to
discover the true cause of the delay.

I had chosen the 29th Punjab Infantry to lead the way, on account of
the high reputation of Colonel John Gordon, who commanded it, and
because of the excellent character the regiment had always borne;
but on overtaking it my suspicions were excited by the unnecessarily
straggling manner in which the men were marching, and to which I
called Gordon's attention. No sooner had I done so than a shot was
fired from one of the Pathan companies, followed in a few seconds by
another. The Sikh companies of the regiment immediately closed up, and
Gordon's Sikh orderly whispered in his ear that there was treachery
amongst the Pathans.

It was a moment of intense anxiety, for it was impossible to tell how
far we were from the Spingawi Kotal, or whether the shots could be
heard by the enemy; it was equally impossible to discover by whom the
shots had been fired without delaying the advance, and this I was
loath to risk. So, grieved though I was to take any steps likely to
discredit a regiment with such admirable traditions, I decided to
change the order of the march by bringing one company of the
72nd Highlanders and the 5th Gurkhas to the front, and I warned
Lieutenant-Colonel Brownlow, in command of the 72nd, to keep a watch
over the Pathans with his three remaining companies, for I felt
that our enterprise had already been sufficiently imperilled by the
Pathans, and that hesitation would be culpable; for, unless we
could reach the kotal while our approach was still concealed by
the darkness, the turning movement would in all probability end in
disaster.

On the Gurkhas coming up, I told Major Fitz-Hugh, who commanded them,
that the moment he reached the foot of the kotal, he must front form
company, fix bayonets, and charge up the slope without waiting for
further orders.

Soon afterwards, and just as the first streak of dawn proclaimed the
approach of day, the enemy became aware of our presence, and fired
into us, when instantly I heard Fitz-Hugh give the word to charge.
Brownlow, at the head of his Highlanders, dashed forward in support,
and two guns of the Mountain battery coming up at the moment, I
ordered its Commandant, Captain Kelso, to come into action as soon as
he could find a position.

I was struck by the smile of satisfied pride and pleasure with
which he received the order. He was delighted, no doubt, that the
opportunity had arrived to prove what the battery--to perfect which he
had spared neither time nor labour--could do; but it was the last time
that gallant soldier smiled, for a few seconds later he was shot dead.

The Gurkhas, forgetting their fatigue, rapidly climbed the steep side
of the mountain, and, swarming into the first entrenchment, quickly
cleared it of the enemy; then, guided by the flashes of the Afghan
rifles, they pressed on, and, being joined by the leading company of
the 72nd, took possession of a second and larger entrenchment 200
yards higher up. Without a perceptible pause, the Highlanders and
Gurkhas together rushed a third position, the most important of all,
as it commanded the head of the pass.

The Spingawi Kotal was won; but we were surrounded by woods, which
were crowded with Afghans, some 400 of whom made a dashing but
ineffectual attempt to carry off their guns, left behind in the first
scare of our sudden attack. These men were dressed so exactly like
some of our own Native soldiers that they were not recognized until
they got within 100 yards of the entrenchment, and they would
doubtless have succeeded in accomplishing their purpose--as the
Highlanders and Gurkhas were busy pursuing the fugitives--had not
Galbraith, whom I had sent with an order to the front, hurriedly
collected a certain number of stragglers and met the Afghans with such
a murderous fire that they broke and fled, leaving seventy dead in a
space of about fifty yards square.

As the rising sun lighted up the scene of the conflict, the advantages
of a night attack became more apparent. The pass lay across the
shoulder of a mountain (9,400 feet above the sea), and through a
magnificent pine forest. Its approaches were commanded by precipitous
heights, defended by breastworks of felled trees, which completely
screened the defenders, who were quite comfortably placed in wide
ditches, from which they could fire deadly volleys without being in
the least exposed themselves. Had we not been able to surprise the
enemy before the day dawned, I doubt whether, any of us could have
reached the first entrenchment. As it was, the regiment holding it
fled in such a hurry that a sheepskin coat and from sixty to a hundred
rounds of ammunition were left behind on the spot where each man had
lain.

We had gained our object so far, but we were still a considerable
distance from the body of the Afghan army on the Peiwar Kotal.

Immediately in rear of the last of the three positions on the Spingawi
Kotal was a _murg_, or open grassy plateau, upon which I re-formed the
troops who had carried the assault. The 2nd Punjab Infantry, the 23rd
Pioneers, and the battery of Royal Horse Artillery were still behind;
but as the guns were being transported on elephants, I knew the
progress of this part of the force must be slow, and thinking it
unwise to allow the Afghans time to recover from their defeat, I
determined to push on with the troops at hand.

A field hospital was formed on the _murg_, and placed under a guard,
ammunition-pouches were re-filled, and off we started again, choosing
as our route the left of two hog-backed, thickly-wooded heights
running almost longitudinally in the direction of the Peiwar Kotal, in
the hope that from this route communication might be established with
our camp below. I was not disappointed, for very soon Captain Wynne,
in charge of the signalling, was able to inform Brigadier-General
Cobbe of our progress, and convey to him the order to co-operate with
me so far as his very limited numbers would permit.

Our advance was at first unopposed, but very slow, owing to the
density of the forest, which prevented our seeing any distance, and
made it difficult to keep the troops together.

At the end of two hours we arrived at the edge of a deep hollow, on
the further side of which, 150 yards off, the enemy were strongly
posted, and they at once opened fire upon us.

Fancy my dismay at this critical moment on discovering that the
Highlanders, Gurkhas, and the Mountain battery, had not come up! They
had evidently taken a wrong turn in the almost impenetrable forest,
and I found myself alone with the 29th Punjab Infantry. Knowing that
the missing troops could not be far off, I hoped that they would hear
the firing, which was each moment becoming heavier; but some time
passed, and there were no signs of their approach. I sent staff
officer after staff officer to search for them, until one only
remained, the Rev. J.W. Adams, who had begged to be allowed to
accompany me as Aide-de-camp for this occasion, and him I also
despatched in quest of the missing troops. After some time, which
seemed to me an age, he returned to report that no trace could he find
of them; so again I started him off in another direction. Feeling
the situation was becoming serious, and expecting that the Afghans,
encouraged by our inaction, would certainly attack us, I thought it
advisable to make a forward movement; but the attitude of the 29th
was not encouraging. I addressed them, and expressed a hope that they
would now by their behaviour wipe out the slur of disloyalty which
the firing of the signal shots had cast upon the regiment, upon which
Captain Channer,[7] who was just then in command, stepped forward, and
said he would answer for the Sikhs; but amongst the Pathans there
was an ominous silence, and Channer agreed with me that they did not
intend to fight. I therefore ordered Channer and his subaltern, Picot,
to advance cautiously down the slope with the Sikhs of the regiment,
following myself near enough to keep the party in sight. I had not
gone far, however, before I found that the enemy were much too
strongly placed to be attacked successfully by so few men; accordingly
I recalled Channer, and we returned to the position at the top of the
hill.

[Illustration: MY GURKHA ORDERLIES.
_From a water colour sketch by Colonel Woodthorpe, C.B., R.E._]

My orderlies[8] during this little episode displayed such touching
devotion that it is with feelings of the most profound admiration and
gratitude I call to mind their self-sacrificing courage. On this (as
on many other occasions) they kept close round me, determined that no
shot should reach me if they could prevent it; and on my being hit in
the hand by a spent bullet, and turning to look round in the direction
it came from, I beheld one of the Sikhs standing with his arms
stretched out trying to screen me from the enemy, which he could
easily do, for he was a grand specimen of a man, a head and shoulders
taller than myself.

To my great relief, on my return to the edge of the hollow, Adams met
me with the good tidings that he had found not only the lost troops,
but the Native Infantry of the rear portion of the column, and had
ascertained that the elephants with the guns were close at hand.

Their arrival was most opportune, for the enemy had been reinforced,
and, having discovered our numerical weakness, were becoming bolder;
they charged down the hill, and were now trying to force their way
up to our position, but our Mountain guns were quickly brought into
action, and under their cover another attempt was made to drive the
Afghans from their position. The 23rd Pioneers, under the command of
Colonel Currie, the two front companies led by Captain Anderson, moved
down the slope, and were soon lost to view in the thick wood at
the bottom of the dell; when they reappeared it was, to my great
disappointment, on the wrong side of the hollow: they had failed in
the attack, and Anderson and some men had been killed. The enemy's
position, it was found, could only be reached by a narrow causeway,
which was swept by direct and cross fires, and obstructed by trunks of
trees and a series of barricades.

It was evident to me that under these circumstances the enemy could
not be cleared out of their entrenchment by direct attack without
entailing heavy loss, which I could ill afford and was most anxious to
avoid. I therefore reconnoitred both flanks to find, if possible, a
way round the hill. On our left front was a sheer precipice; on the
right, however, I discovered, to my infinite satisfaction, that we
could not only avoid the hill which had defeated us, but could get
almost in rear of the Peiwar Kotal itself, and threaten the enemy's
retreat from that position.

At this juncture I was further cheered by the arrival of
Lieutenant-Colonel Perkins and Major McQueen, who, with the 5th Punjab
Infantry, had worked their way up the steep mountain-side, in the hope
of getting near to the Peiwar Kotal and co-operating with me. They
were, however, checked by the deep ravine I have before described,
and, guided by the sound of firing, pushed higher up the hill. They
brought me word that the Artillery left in camp had opened fire on the
kotal soon after daybreak, and had succeeded in silencing two of the
enemy's guns; that our Infantry had crept up within 1,400 yards of the
kotal, but were met by such a destructive fire that they could not
advance further; that Brigadier-General Cobbe had been severely
wounded, and that Colonel Barry Drew had assumed the command. Perkins
also gave me the useful information that he had observed on his way up
a spur from which the kotal position could be fired upon at a distance
of 1,100 yards. To this spot I ordered Lieutenant Sherries, who had
succeeded poor Kelso in command of the Mountain battery, to take his
guns, and I asked Perkins to return and tell Drew to press on to the
kotal, in the hope that Sherries's fire and the turning movement I was
about, to make would cause the enemy to retreat.

I sent the 29th Punjab Infantry back to the Spingawi to protect the
wounded. I left the 2nd Punjab Infantry in the position we had up till
now been occupying, and I took McQueen's regiment with me.

A few rounds from the Mountain battery, and the fact that their rear
was threatened and their retreat about to be cut off, soon produced
signs of wavering amongst the Afghans. Their Artillery fire slackened,
their Infantry broke, and about 2 p.m. Drew and Hugh Gough found it
possible to make a move towards the Peiwar Kotal. Gough was the first
to reach the crest, closely followed by Lieutenant Brabazon, his
orderly officer, and a fine plucky Dogra named Birbul. They were soon
joined by some hundreds of Turi levies collected by Waterfield and by
the 8th Foot. Another body of levies under Major Palmer,[9] who
had done good service by making a feint on the right of the Afghan
position, arrived about the same time. Plunder was of course the sole
object of the Turis, but their co-operation at the moment was useful,
and helped to swell our small numbers. The enemy having evacuated
their stronghold and retreated by the Alikhel road, abandoning in
their headlong flight guns, waggons, and baggage, were pursued by Hugh
Gough, whose Cavalry had by this time come up.

[Illustration: MY SIKH ORDERLIES.
_From a water colour sketch by Colonel Woodthorpe, C.B., R.E._]

The Peiwar Kotal was not visible from the route we had taken, but just
before daylight had quite gone I could make out with the aid of my
telescope a large body of Afghans moving towards the Shutargardan,
which made me feel quite satisfied that the enemy's position was in
our possession.

Night overtook us before we could reach the kotal, and as everyone was
thoroughly tired out, having been hard at work since 10 p.m. the night
before, with but little food, I thought it better to bivouac where we
were, on the southern slope of the Sika Ram mountain. It was hardly
a pleasant experience lying on the ground without even cloaks at an
elevation of 9,000 feet, and with the thermometer marking twenty
degrees of frost; but spite of cold and hunger, thoroughly content
with the day's work, and with my mind at rest, I slept as soundly as I
had ever done in the most luxurious quarters, and I think others did
the same. At any rate, no one that I could hear of suffered from that
night's exposure.

We continued our march at daybreak, and reached the kotal in an hour.

The examination of the enemy's position was very interesting. It was
of enormous natural strength, the dispositions made for its defence
were most complete and judicious, and the impossibility of taking
it by other than a turning movement was proved beyond a doubt; it
extended from the Spingawi to some commanding heights nearly a mile
south of the Peiwar Kotal; thus having a front of about four miles
facing due east. From right to left the position ran along a lofty and
rugged range of mountains, clothed with dense pine-forests. Towards
the eastern side the range was precipitous, but descended on the west
by a succession of upland meadows to the valley of the Hariab; it was
crossed by only two roads, viz., the Peiwar and Spingawi Kotals; at a
few other points there were paths, but too narrow and precipitous for
the passage of troops.

The Peiwar Kotal is a narrow depression in the ridge, commanded on
each side by high pine-clad mountains. The approach to it from the
Kuram valley was up a steep, narrow, zigzag path, commanded throughout
its entire length from the adjacent heights, and difficult to ascend
on account of the extreme roughness of the road, which was covered
with large fragments of rocks and boulders. Every point of the ascent
was exposed to fire from both guns and rifles, securely placed behind
breastworks constructed of pine-logs and stones. At the top of
the path was a narrow plateau, which was again commanded from the
thickly-wooded heights on each side, rising to an elevation of 500
feet.

The Afghan Commander had been quite confident of success, and was
only waiting for reinforcements to attack our camp; but these
reinforcements did not arrive until the afternoon of the 1st December,
just too late for him to carry out his intention. He had under his
command eight Regular regiments of the Afghan army, and eighteen
guns; while these numbers were augmented by hordes of neighbouring
tribesmen, who were only too glad to respond to the cry of a _jahad_
against the infidel, firmly believing that as true believers their
cause would be victorious.

Our loss at the Peiwar was not great--2 officers and 18 men killed,
and 3 officers and 75 men wounded. The Afghans suffered much more
severely, besides leaving in our possession all their guns, with
quantities of ammunition and other warlike stores.


[Footnote 1: The details of the column are given in the Appendix.
(Appendix III.)]

[Footnote 2: On the 30th November a subordinate officer of the Kabul
Government reached Sir Samuel Browne's camp at Daka, and delivered the
following letter from the Amir to the address of the Viceroy:

    'FROM HIS HIGHNESS THE AMIR OF KABUL TO THE VICEROY OF INDIA.
    'KABUL, _19th November, 1878_.

    'Be it known to your Excellency that I have received, and read
    from beginning to end, the friendly letter which your Excellency
    has sent, in reply to the letter I despatched by Nawab Ghulam
    Hussein Khan. With regard to the expressions used by your
    Excellency in the beginning of your letter, referring to the
    friendly character of the Mission and the goodwill of the British
    Government, I leave it to your Excellency, whose wisdom and
    justice are universally admitted, to decide whether any reliance
    can be placed upon goodwill, if it be evidenced by words only.
    But if, on the other hand, goodwill really consists of deeds and
    actions, then it has not been manifested by the various wishes
    that have been expressed, and the proposals that have been made by
    British officials during the last few years to officials of this
    God-granted Government--proposals which, from their nature, it was
    impossible for them to comply with.

    'One of these proposals referred to my dutiful son, the
    ill-starred wretch, Mahomed Yakub Khan, and was contained in a
    letter addressed by the officials of the British Government to
    the British Agent then residing in Kabul. It was written in that
    letter that, "if the said Yakub Khan be released and set at
    liberty, our friendship with the Afghan Government will be firmly
    cemented, but that otherwise it will not."

    'There are several other grounds of complaint of similar nature,
    which contain no evidence of goodwill, but which, on the contrary,
    were effective in increasing the aversion and apprehension already
    entertained by the subjects of this God-granted Government.

    'With regard to my refusal to receive the British Mission, your
    Excellency has stated that it would appear from my conduct that I
    was actuated by feelings of direct hostility towards the British
    Government.

    'I assure your Excellency that, on the contrary, the officials of
    this God-granted Government, in repulsing the Mission, were not
    influenced by any hostile or inimical feelings towards the British
    Government, nor did they intend that any insult or affront should
    be offered. But they were afraid that the independence of this
    Government might be affected by the arrival of the Mission,
    and that the friendship which has now existed between the two
    Governments for several years might be annihilated.

    'A paragraph in your Excellency's letter corroborates the
    statement which they have made to this Government. The feelings
    of apprehension which were aroused in the minds of the people of
    Afghanistan by the mere announcement of the intention of the
    British Government to send a Mission to Kabul, before the
    Mission itself had actually started or arrived at Peshawar, have
    subsequently been fully justified by the statement in your
    Excellency's letter, that I should be held responsible for any
    injury that might befall the tribes who acted as guides to the
    Mission, and that I should be called upon to pay compensation to
    them for any loss they might have suffered; and that if, at any
    time, these tribes should meet with ill-treatment at my hands, the
    British Government would at once take steps to protect them.

    'Had these apprehensions proved groundless, and had the object
    of the Mission been really friendly, and no force or threats of
    violence used, the Mission would, as a matter of course, have been
    allowed a free passage, as such Missions are customary and of
    frequent occurrence between allied States. I am now sincerely
    stating my own feelings when I say that this Government has
    maintained, and always will maintain, the former friendship which
    existed between the two Governments, and cherishes no feelings of
    hostility and opposition towards the British Government.

    'It is also incumbent upon the officials of the British Government
    that, out of respect and consideration for the greatness and
    eminence of their own Government, they should not consent to
    inflict any injury upon their well-disposed neighbours, and to
    impose the burden of grievous troubles upon the shoulders of
    their sincere friends. But, on the contrary, they should exert
    themselves to maintain the friendly feelings which have hitherto
    existed towards this God-granted Government, in order that the
    relations between the two Governments may remain on the same
    footing as before; and if, in accordance with the custom of allied
    States, the British Government should desire to send a purely
    friendly and temporary Mission to this country, with a small
    escort, not exceeding twenty or thirty men, similar to that which
    attended the Russian Mission, this servant of God will not oppose
    its progress.'

It was ascertained that this messenger had come to Basawal on the
22nd November, when, hearing of the capture of Ali Masjid by British
troops, he immediately returned to Kabul. The Amir's letter, though
dated the 19th November, was believed to have been re-written at Kabul
after the news of the fall of Ali Masjid. The text of this letter was
telegraphed to the Secretary of State on the 7th December; in reply
Lord Cranbrook pointed out that the letter evaded all the requirements
specified in the Viceroy's ultimatum, and could not have been accepted
even if it had reached him before the 20th November.]


[Footnote 3: Now General J. Gordon, C.B., Assistant Military
Secretary, Horse Guards.]

[Footnote 4: The Native officer was Subadar-Major Aziz Khan, a fine
old soldier who had seen hard work with his regiment during the
Mutiny, and in many a frontier expedition. He twice obtained the Order
of Merit for bravery in the field, and for his marked gallantry on one
occasion he had received a sword of honour and a _khilat_ (a dress of
honour or other present bestowed as a mark of distinction). Aziz Khan
was shot through the knee, and after a few days the wound became so
bad the Doctors told him that, unless he submitted to amputation, or
consented to take some stimulants in the shape of wine, he would die
of mortification. Aziz Khan, who was a strict and orthodox Mahomedan,
replied that, as both remedies were contrary to the precepts of the
religion by which he had guided his life, he would accept death rather
than disobey them. He died accordingly.]

[Footnote 5: Now General Sir Æneas Perkins, K.C.B.]

[Footnote 6: The strength of this battalion had now dwindled down to
348 men.]

[Footnote 7: Now Major-General Channer, V.C., C.B.]

[Footnote 8: I had six orderlies attached to me--two Sikhs, two
Gurkhas, and two Pathans. The Sikhs and Gurkhas never left me for a
day during the two years I was in Afghanistan. The Pathans behaved
equally well, but they fell sick, and had to be changed more than
once. Whenever I emerged from my tent, two or more of the orderlies
appeared and kept close by me. They had always good information as to
what was going on, and I could generally tell whether there was likely
to be trouble or not by the number in attendance; they put themselves
on duty, and decided how many were required. One of the Gurkhas is
since dead, but the other and the two Sikhs served with me afterwards
in Burma, and all three now hold the high position of Subadar in their
respective regiments.]

[Footnote 9: Now Major-General Sir Arthur Palmer, K.C.B.]

       *       *       *       *       *




CHAPTER XLVII.
1878-1879

  Alikhel--Treachery of the tribesmen--Transport difficulties
  --Sher Ali looks to Russia for aid--Khost--An attack on our camp
  --An unsuccessful experiment--An unpleasant incident
  --Punjab Chiefs' Contingent



Perceiving that further pursuit of the enemy would be useless, I
decided to halt a few days to admit of our overtaxed transport
bringing up supplies and tents, and to arrange for the occupation of
the Peiwar position during the winter months. But I considered that my
work would be incomplete if we stopped short of the Shutargardan Pass.
Moreover, it was very desirable that we should investigate this route,
and, if possible, get into friendly communication with some of the
sections of the Ghilzai tribe. The Jajis, through whose territory
the first part of the road ran, now showed themselves to be as
well disposed as the Turis; they readily brought in supplies, and
volunteered to labour for us, and from the information obtained by
the political officers, the inhabitants of the Hariab valley seemed
equally anxious to be friendly. The dislodgment of the Afghan army by
a much smaller force, from a position they had themselves chosen, had
evidently had a salutary effect.

As soon as I had leisure, I inquired from Colonel Gordon whether he
had been able to discover the men who had fired the signal shots on
the night of the 2nd, and whether he did not think that the Pathan
Native officers ought to be able to point out the offenders. Gordon
replied that he suspected the Jemadar of the Pathan company knew who
the culprits were, and that one soldier had confessed to firing the
second shot; moreover, he told me that eighteen Pathans had left the
regiment during the fight. On receiving this unpleasant information,
I assembled a Court of Inquiry, with orders to have the proceedings
ready for my consideration by the time I returned from the
Shutargardan.

[Illustration: ONE OF MY PATHAN ORDERLIES.
_From a water-colour sketch by Colonel Woodthorpe, C.B., R.E._]

Having despatched the sick and wounded to Kuram and made all necessary
arrangements, I marched on the 6th December to Alikhel, twelve miles
on the road to the Shutargardan. Before starting, I issued an order
thanking the troops for the efforts they had made to ensure success,
and I had the honour of communicating to them at the same time a
congratulatory message from the Queen.[1]

We reached the foot of the Shutargardan on the 8th, and reconnoitred
to the top of the pass the next morning. This point was 11,000 feet
above the sea, commanded a fine view of the Logar valley, and I
discovered from it that there was nothing between us and the immediate
vicinity of Kabul to prevent a force moving rapidly on that place.

We returned to Alikhel on the 10th, and, as it was important to retain
control of this advanced post, I decided to leave Captain Rennick in
political charge, a duty for which his nerve and determination of
character eminently fitted him. Colonel Waterfield, as a temporary
arrangement, remained there also with a battery of Artillery and two
regiments of Punjab Infantry, for the purpose of establishing friendly
relations with the neighbouring tribesmen.

From Alikhel there were said to be two roads leading to Kuram, besides
the difficult path over the Peiwar Kotal; and as it was of
great importance to gain a knowledge of an alternative line of
communication, in view of further trouble, I determined to explore one
of them, choosing that which appeared to be the shortest, and which I
heard had been used some time before by an Afghan Mountain battery.
This route was described as practicable for camels, and ran through
lands belonging to tribes whose headmen were with me, a fact which
should, I thought, ensure our being free from attack.

I left Alikhel on the 12th December, taking with me No. 1 Mountain
Battery, a wing 72nd Highlanders, the 5th Gurkhas, and the 23rd
Pioneers. The route lay for four miles along the banks of the Hariab
stream, a tributary of the Kuram river, through a valley which
gradually narrowed into a thickly-wooded ravine, three miles long: at
the end of this ravine the road, turning sharply to the left, ascended
till it reached an open grassy plateau, on which stood the hamlet of
Sapari. The inhabitants turned out to welcome us, bringing supplies,
and appearing so friendly that I settled to halt there for the night.
I had been warned, however, by the _maliks_ of some of the villages we
had passed through in the morning, that we should probably be attacked
on the march the next day, and that a defile which lay at the other
side of a mountain over which we had to cross would be particularly
dangerous to us. I determined, therefore, to send on troops that
evening to occupy the pass over this mountain, and to start the
baggage off long before daybreak, so that it should be out of the way
of the main body, which would also have to march at an early hour in
order to reach the kotal before the tribesmen had time to collect.

This could have been accomplished without difficulty, but for the
machinations of our false friends in the village, who directed on to
the precipitous path we had to ascend a stream of water which soon
turned into a sheet of ice, and when I arrived on the spot I found
the road blocked by fallen animals vainly struggling to regain their
footing. This caused so much delay that it was nearly noon before the
last camel had got over the pass.

The descent on the other side was scarcely less difficult, though free
from ice. We dropped 3,000 feet in the first two miles, down a way
which can only be described as a ruined staircase, with the steps
missing at intervals, ending in the defile against the dangers of
which we had been warned. This defile was certainly a nasty place to
be caught in, being five miles long, and so narrow that the camels'
loads struck against the rocks on either side; and it was impossible
to move flanking parties along the cliffs above, as they were
intersected by wide chasms running back for long distances.

It was important to secure the exit from this gorge without delay, and
for this purpose I pushed on four companies of the 23rd Pioneers, and
in support, when the ravine began to widen out a little, I hurried
on the Highlanders and the Mountain battery, leaving the Gurkhas to
protect the baggage and bring up the rear.

We only got possession of the exit just in time. The Pioneers,
by occupying commanding positions on either side of the opening,
effectually checkmated several large bodies of armed men who were
approaching from different directions, and whose leaders now declared
they had only come to help us! Later on we discovered still more
formidable gatherings, which doubtless would have all combined to
attack us, had they been in time to catch us in the ravine.

The tail of the column was followed and much harassed by the enemy;
but they were kept at bay by the steadiness of the gallant Gurkhas,
and so successful were they in safe-guarding the baggage, that,
although many of the drivers ran away at the first shot, leaving the
soldiers to lead the animals as well as defend them, not a single
article fell into the hands of the tribesmen. The regiment lost three
men killed, and Captain Powell and eleven men wounded. Captain Goad,
of the Transport Department, was also badly hurt.[2]

[Illustration: ONE OF MY PATHAN ORDERLIES.
_From a water-colour sketch by Colonel Woodthorpe, C.B., R.E._]

On Goad being knocked over, Sergeant Greer, of the 72nd Highlanders,
assisted by three privates, picked him up, and having placed him under
cover of a rock, they turned their attention to the enemy. They were
only four against large numbers, but by their cool and steady use of
the Martini-Henry rifle, which had shortly before been issued to the
British soldiers in India, they were enabled to hold their ground
until help arrived, when they succeeded in carrying the wounded
officer away.

I had observed in the advance on the Peiwar Kotal the skill and
gallantry displayed by Sergeant Greer, and noted him as a man fitted
for promotion. His distinguished conduct in rescuing and defending
Goad confirmed me in my opinion, and I accordingly recommended him
for a commission, which, to my great gratification, Her Majesty was
graciously pleased to bestow upon him.

That night we halted at the village of Keria; thence the route was
easy enough, so, leaving the troops to rest and recover from the last
hard march, I rode on to Kuram, where there was much to be done.

The ejectment of the Afghan ruler of Khost and the exploration of that
valley formed, it will be remembered, part of the programme given
to me to carry through, and it was very desirable that this service
should be completed before the winter rains set in. Peace and order
now reigned in Upper Kuram and in the neighbourhood of the Peiwar; but
there was a good deal of excitement in the lower part of the valley
and in Khost, our line of communication was constantly harassed by
raiders, convoys were continually threatened, outposts fired into, and
telegraph-wires cut. The smallness of my force made it difficult for
me to deal with these troubles, so I applied to the Commander-in-Chief
for the wing of the 72nd Highlanders left at Kohat, and the 5th Punjab
Cavalry at Thal to be ordered to join me at Kuram. At the same time I
moved up No. 2 Mountain Battery and the 28th Punjab Infantry, sending
the 29th Punjab Infantry to take the place of the 28th at Thal.

I was greatly hampered by want of transport. Arrangements had to be
made for sending the sick and wounded, as well as the captured guns,
to Kohat (the sight of the latter, I fancied, would have a good effect
on the tribes in our rear); but hard work, scarcity of forage, and
absence of supervision, had told, as was to be expected, on animals in
bad condition at the outset. Mules and camels died daily, reducing our
all too small numbers to such an extent that it was with considerable
difficulty the convoy was at last despatched.

From the first I foresaw that want of transport would be our greatest
difficulty, and so it proved; very few supplies could be obtained in
the vicinity of Kuram; the troops at Kohat had been drawing on the
adjacent districts ever since October, so that the purchasing
agents had every day to go further away to procure necessaries, and
consequently an increased number of animals were required for their
conveyance. My Commissary-General reported to me that only a few days'
provisions for the troops remained in hand, and that it was impossible
to lay in any reserve unless more transport could be provided. About
this reserve I was very anxious, for the roads might soon become
temporarily impassable from the rising of the rivers after the heavy
rain to be expected about Christmas. Contractors were despatched
to all parts of the country to procure camels, and I suggested to
Government that pack-bullocks should be bought at Mirzapur, and railed
up country, which suggestion being acted upon, the danger of the
troops having to go hungry was warded off.

The treacherous soldiers of the 29th Punjab Infantry had now to be
dealt with--a necessary, but most unpleasant, duty. A perusal of the
proceedings of the Court of Inquiry satisfied me that the two men who
discharged their rifles during the night-march, the Jemadar of their
company who failed to report their criminal action, and the eighteen
who deserted their colours during the engagement, should all be tried
by Court-Martial.

The prisoners were found guilty. The sepoy who fired the first shot
was sentenced to death, and the one who discharged the second to
two years' imprisonment with hard labour; the court, recognizing a
possibility that the latter, being a young soldier, might have loaded
and fired without intending treachery, gave him the benefit of the
doubt. The Jemadar was awarded seven years' transportation, and the
eighteen deserters terms varying from ten years to one year.

It was with deep regret that I confirmed these several sentences, but
it was necessary that a deterrent example should be made. Treachery
was altogether too grave a crime to be lightly dealt with, and
desertions amongst the Pathans were becoming of much too frequent
occurrence, particularly as the deserters invariably carried away with
them their rifles and ammunition.

The effect of these sentences was most salutary; there was not a
single desertion subsequent to the Court-Martial for more than a year,
although during that time the Mahomedan portion of my force were
severely tried by appeals from their co-religionists.

On Christmas Eve authentic intelligence was brought to me that, on
hearing of the defeat of the Afghan army, Sher Ali, with the members
of the Russian Mission then at Kabul, had fled to Turkestan, and that
his son, Yakub Khan, had been released from prison, and had assumed
the reins of Government.

About this time, also, Sir Samuel Browne, who was at Jalalabad,
received a letter[3] from the Amir, in which he announced his
intention of proceeding to St. Petersburg to lay his case before the
Czar and obtain the aid of Russia.

Sher Ali's disappearance and Yakub Khan's assumption of authority
suggested new possibilities to the Viceroy, who at once instructed
Major Cavagnari, the political officer with the Khyber column, to
communicate, if possible, with Yakub Khan, and explain to him that our
quarrel was with Sher Ali alone, that he might rest assured of the
friendly disposition of the British Government towards him personally,
and that, unless he took the initiative, hostilities would not be
resumed.

Before proceeding to Kuram, I invited all the Turis and Jajis who
had afforded us assistance to meet me in durbar that they might be
suitably rewarded. A goodly number responded to the invitation, and
were told, in accordance with the instructions I had received from
the Government of India, that they would henceforth be under British
protection; that no Amir of Afghanistan should ever again be permitted
to tyrannize over them; that while they would be expected to live
peaceably, neither their religion nor their customs would be
interfered with; that roads would be made and markets established, and
that whatever supplies they could provide for the use of the troops
would be liberally paid for.

After this I started for Khost, accompanied by Colonel Waterfield, the
political officer.

The column I took with me consisted of the squadron of the 10th
Hussars, 200 of the 72nd Highlanders, a wing of the 5th Punjab
Cavalry, the 21st and 28th Punjab Infantry, and Nos. 1 and 2 Mountain
Batteries. The corps were so weak that their total strength only
amounted to 2,000 men.

We reached Matun, the name given to some three villages grouped round
a small fort in the centre of the valley, on the 6th January, 1879.
The Afghan Governor, with whom I had been in communication, met me and
arranged to surrender the fort, on condition that his personal safety
should be guaranteed, and that he should be allowed to go either to
Kabul or India, as he might desire.

About half a mile from the fort I halted the column, and taking a
small escort of the 10th Hussars, I rode on with the Governor, who
invited me with my staff into his house. While tea was being handed
round, the Governor (Akram Khan by name) warned me that we should be
attacked, and that he could do nothing to prevent it, having only some
200 local militia and no regular troops. He further said that the
inhabitants of the valley were not directly opposed to the British
Government, and, if left to themselves, would give no trouble; but he
doubted their being able to resist the pressure put upon them by
a large number of tribesmen who had collected from the adjacent
districts, attracted by the smallness of the force, which they
believed 'had been delivered into their hands.'

This intelligence showed me I must be prepared for a scrimmage, so I
ordered the camp to be pitched in the form of a square as compactly as
possible, with the transport animals and impedimenta in the centre,
and strong piquets at the four angles. Cavalry patrols were sent out
as far as the broken and hilly nature of the ground would permit, and
every endeavour was made to ascertain the strength and whereabouts
of the enemy, but to no purpose: the enemy were invisible, and
the patrols reported that they had come across numbers of
peaceable-looking husbandmen, but no one else.

The night passed off quietly, but when advancing day made them
visible, multitudes of tribesmen were descried collecting on the
slopes of the neighbouring hills. Some friendly Natives were sent to
ascertain their intentions, followed by a Cavalry reconnoitring party,
when suddenly a number of camel-drivers and mule-men, who had gone to
the nearest village to procure fodder for their animals, came rushing
back to camp in the wildest terror and excitement, declaring that
the enemy seemed to rise as if by magic out of the ground, and that
several thousands were already in the village. No doubt some of these
were 'the peaceable-looking husbandmen' the patrols had encountered
the previous day. I now became somewhat anxious, not only for the
safety of the reconnoitring party, which appeared to be in danger of
being cut off, but for that of the whole force; such a mere handful as
we were compared to the numbers arrayed against us.

Vigorous action was evidently necessary. Accordingly, I ordered all
the available Cavalry (only 70 men of the 10th Hussars, and 155 of
the 5th Punjab Cavalry), under Colonel Hugh Gough, to follow the
reconnoitring party in case of their being so hard pressed as to have
to retire, and Captain Swinley's Mountain battery, with six companies
of the 28th Punjab Infantry, under Colonel Hudson,[4] to move out
in support. Colonel Drew I left in charge of the camp, with 200
Highlanders, the 21st Punjab Infantry, and a Mountain battery. I
myself joined Gough, who, by dismounted fire and several bold charges,
notwithstanding the difficult nature of the ground, succeeded in
driving the enemy to the highest ridges, over which Swinley's
well-directed fire eventually forced them to retreat.

Heavy firing was now heard in the direction of our camp, and I hurried
back, taking with me a troop of the 5th Punjab Cavalry. I found that
during my absence Drew had been attacked on two sides; he had been
able to prevent the enemy from coming to close quarters, but they were
still hovering about at no great distance, and I thought it advisable
to clear them away by moving out against them with all the troops
at my disposal. As we approached, they disappeared with their usual
rapidity; the 5th Punjab Cavalry, however, got in amongst some of
them, and we returned to camp with 100 prisoners, 500 head of cattle,
some sheep, and a large quantity of grain.

The tribesmen, however, had not been sufficiently punished to prevent
a repetition of the attack, probably with largely increased numbers;
so I ordered the destruction of the hamlets nearest us, in which they
had been sheltered and some of our camp followers had been murdered.

The next night a most unfortunate occurrence took place, resulting in
the death of six of our prisoners; but it was just one of those things
which could hardly have been foreseen or guarded against, and for
which, however lamentable, no one was to blame. The headmen of the
particular Waziri tribe to which the captives belonged had been
summoned during the day, and told that the men would be released on
payment of a sum of fifty rupees each. The money was paid down at once
for a certain number, who were immediately set free; but there was not
quite enough for all, and the headmen went off to procure what was
required for the ransom of the remainder. Soon after dark, however,
some of the enemy[5] were discovered creeping up the banks of a nulla
at the back of the camp, where the unransomed men were detained under
a guard; the nearest sentry instantly fired, and the piquets all round
took up the firing, thinking that another attack on the camp had
commenced. At the sound of the first shot the prisoners all jumped to
their feet, and calling to each other to escape, attempted to seize
the rifles belonging to the guard, upon which the Native officer in
command (a Pathan like themselves) told them that if they persisted in
trying to escape, they would be shot. His words had no effect, and to
prevent his men being overpowered, he gave the order to fire. Six
of the prisoners were killed and thirteen wounded. It was a most
regrettable affair, but a Court of Inquiry decided that the Native
officer had no option, and completely exonerated the guard from
acting with undue severity. The wounded were, of course, taken to our
hospital, and well cared for by our Doctors.[6]

The remainder of our sojourn in Khost was not marked by any incident
of particular interest. We marched to the end of the valley, and made
a careful survey of it and of the surrounding hills.

The instructions I received with regard to Khost were, to occupy the
valley and dislodge the Afghan administration therefrom. To my great
chagrin, the smallness of my force made it impossible for me to give
effect to these instructions as I could have wished. To have remained
in Khost under the circumstances would have been to court disaster;
the numbers of the enemy were daily increasing, and it would have been
impossible to hold our own. It was, however, of great importance, if
practicable, to retain some control over the valley, a peculiarly
productive district, which, if left alone by us, I feared would become
a centre of dangerous intrigue against any settled government in
Kuram. Accordingly I determined to try how placing Khost in charge of
one of our own Native officials would answer, and I selected for the
position Shahzada Sultan Jan, a Saddozai gentleman of good birth, and
a Sunni Mahomedan in religion, who, I thought, would be a _persona
grata_ to the Khostwals, and, if supported by some Native levies, and
associated in his administrative duties with the chief _maliks_ of
Khost, would be more likely to hold his own than anyone else I could
place there. This was, however, a mere experiment, and I did not
disguise from myself that its success was very doubtful; but it was
the only way in which I could attempt to carry out the orders of
Government, my hands being so completely tied by paucity of troops. I
had no fear for the Shahzada's personal safety, and I felt that, if
in the end I should be obliged to abandon Khost altogether for the
present, it could later, if necessary, be easily re-occupied with a
somewhat larger force.

Having decided on the course to be adopted, I held a durbar, which was
numerously attended, and addressed the people of Khost in much the
same way I had spoken to the Turis in Kuram, expressing a hope that
they would support the Shahzada's authority until a more permanent
form of government could be established.

On the 27th January we left Khost and made one march; the next day
I halted, so as to be near the Shahzada in case of need. The
intelligence brought to me that evening satisfied me that my
experiment would not answer, and that without troops (which I could
not spare) to support the newly-established authority at first
starting off, we could not hope to maintain any hold over the country;
for though the Khostwals themselves were perfectly content with the
arrangements I had made, they could not resist the tribesmen, who
directly our backs were turned began to show their teeth. Accordingly,
I decided to bring the Shahzada away while I could do so without
trouble. I marched back to Matun the next morning with 1,000 men
(Cavalry and Infantry) and four Mountain guns. We found Sultan Jan in
anything but a happy frame of mind, and quite ready to come away. So
having formally made the place over to the _maliks_, we started on our
return journey. As we departed, a collection of our tribal enemies
(about 3,000) who had been watching the proceedings took the
opportunity to attack us; but two weak squadrons of Cavalry, skilfully
handled by Hugh Gough, kept them in check, and we reached camp without
further molestation.

The next day, the last of January, we returned to Hazir Pir in Kuram.
There I received a visit from Sirdar Wali Mahomed Khan, brother of
Sher Ali, who was accompanied by several leading men of the Logar
valley, some of whom were of great assistance to me a few months
later. Wali Mahomed was a man of about fifty years of age; he had a
pleasing countenance, of the same Jewish type as the majority of the
Afghan nation, but he had a weak face and was evidently wanting in
character. He told me that he had fled from Kabul to escape the
vengeance of his nephew, Yakub Khan, who attributed his long
imprisonment by his father to the Sirdar's influence. Sir Samuel
Browne and Major Cavagnari, on the Khyber line, were conducting all
political negotiations with the Afghans, so I passed Wali Mahomed Khan
on to them.

During the month of February my time was chiefly employed in
inspecting the roads and the defensive posts which my talented
and indefatigable Chief Engineer was constructing, examining the
arrangements for housing the troops, and looking after the transport
animals and Commissariat depots. No more military demonstrations were
necessary, for the people were quietly settling down under British
rule. Convoys were no longer molested nor telegraph wires cut; but I
had one rather unpleasant incident with regard to a war Correspondent,
which, until the true facts of the case were understood, brought
me into disrepute with one of the leading London newspapers, the
representative of which I felt myself compelled to dismiss from the
Kuram Field Force.

Judging from his telegrams, which he brought to me to sign, the nerves
of the Correspondent in question must have been somewhat shaken by the
few and very distant shots fired at us on the 28th November. These
telegrams being in many instances absolutely incorrect and of the most
alarming nature, were of course not allowed to be despatched until
they had been revised in accordance with truth; but one, evidently
altered and added to after I had countersigned it, was brought to me
by the telegraph master. I sent for the Correspondent, who confessed
to having made the alterations, not apparently realizing that he had
done anything at all reprehensible, but he promised that he would
never do such a thing again. This promise was not kept; telegrams
appeared in his paper which I had not seen before despatch, and which
were most misleading to the British public. Moreover, his letters,
over which I could have no control, and which I heard of for the
first time when the copies of his paper arrived in Kuram, were most
subversive of the truth. It was on the receipt of these letters that I
felt it to be my duty to send the too imaginative author to the rear.

No one could be more anxious than I was to have all details of the
campaign made public. I considered it due to the people of Great
Britain that the press Correspondents should have every opportunity
for giving the fullest and most faithful accounts of what might happen
while the army was in the field, and I took special pains from the
first to treat the Correspondents with confidence, and give them such
information as it was in my power to afford. All I required from them
in return was that the operations should be truthfully reported, and
that any Correspondent who did not confine himself to the recording
of facts, and felt himself competent to criticize the conduct of the
campaign, should be careful to acquaint himself with the many and
varied reasons which a Commander must always have to consider before
deciding on any line of action.

What to my mind was so reprehensible in this Correspondent's conduct
was the publication, in time of war, and consequent excitement and
anxiety at home, of incorrect and sensational statements, founded on
information derived from irresponsible and uninformed sources, and
the alteration of telegrams after they had been countersigned by the
recognized authority, the result of which could only be to keep the
public in a state of apprehension regarding the force in the field,
and, what is even more to be deprecated, to weaken the confidence
of the troops in their Commander. It was satisfactory to me that my
action in the matter met with the fullest approval of the Viceroy.

About this time my column was strengthened by the arrival of the
Contingent provided by the Punjab Chiefs, under the command of
Brigadier General John Watson, my comrade of the Mutiny days. The
Contingent consisted of 868 Cavalry, and 2,685 Infantry with 13 guns,
which were placed in position along the line of communication, and
proved of great use in relieving the Regular army of escort duty.
The senior Native officer with the Punjabis was Bakshi Ganda Sing,
Commander-in-Chief of the Patiala army, a particularly handsome,
gentlemanly Sikh, with whom I have ever since been on terms of
friendly intercourse.

Towards the end of February I paid a visit to Kohat, where my wife met
me; we spent a week together, and I had the pleasure of welcoming to
the frontier that grand regiment, the 92nd Highlanders, which had
been sent up to be in readiness to join my column in the event of an
advance on Kabul becoming necessary.


[Footnote 1:

    'FROM THE VICEROY, LAHORE, TO GENERAL ROBERTS.
    '_6th December, 1878._

    'I have much pleasure in communicating to you and the force
    under your command the following telegram just received
    Her Majesty, and desire at the same time to add my warm
    congratulations on the success achieved. Message begins: "I have
    received the news of the decisive victory of General Roberts,
    and the splendid behaviour of my brave soldiers, with pride and
    satisfaction, though I must ever deplore the unavoidable loss of
    life. Pray inquire after the wounded in my name. May we continue
    to receive good news."']

[Footnote 2: Both officers died of their wounds soon afterwards.]

[Footnote 3:

    'FROM AMIR SHER ALI KHAN TO THE OFFICERS OF THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT.

    'Be it known to the officers of the British Government that this
    suppliant before God never supposed, nor wished, that the matters
    [in dispute] between you and myself should come to this issue
    [literally, "should come out from the curtain"], or that the veil
    of friendship and amity, which has for many years been upheld
    between two neighbours and adjoining States, should, without any
    cause, be thus drawn aside.

    'And since you have begun the quarrel and hostilities, and have
    advanced on Afghan territory, this suppliant before God, with the
    unanimous consent and advice of all the nobles, grandees, and of
    the army in Afghanistan, having abandoned his troops, his
    realm, and all the possessions of his crown, has departed with
    expedition, accompanied by a few attendants, to St. Petersburg,
    the capital of the Czar of Russia, where, before a congress, the
    whole history of the transactions between myself and yourselves
    will be submitted to all the Powers [of Europe]. If you
    have anything in dispute with me regarding State affairs in
    Afghanistan, you should institute and establish your case at St.
    Petersburg, and state and explain what you desire, so that the
    questions in dispute between us may be made known and clear to all
    the Powers. And surely the side of right will not be overlooked.
    If your intentions are otherwise, and you entertain hostile and
    vindictive feelings towards the people of Afghanistan, God alone
    is their Protector and real Preserver. Upon the course of action
    here above stated this suppliant before God has resolved and
    decided.']

[Footnote 4: The late Lieutenant-General Sir John Hudson, K.C.B., who
died as Commander-in-Chief of the Bombay Army.]

[Footnote 5: No doubt friends of the prisoners, who had come to help
them to escape.]

[Footnote 6: This occurrence was made great capital of by the anti-war
party at home. A member of the House of Commons, in commenting upon
it, said that 'some ninety prisoners, who had been taken, had been
tied together with ropes'; that 'on their making some attempt to
escape they were set upon, and many of them slaughtered in their
bonds'; and that 'the dead, the living, the dying, and the wounded
were left tied together, and lying in one confused mass of bodies.']

       *       *       *       *       *




CHAPTER XLVIII.
1879

  Sher Ali's death--Premature negotiations--The treaty of Gandamak
  --Making friends with the tribesmen--Gloomy forebodings
  --Good-bye to Cavagnari


I was informed by the Viceroy's Private Secretary in the beginning of
March that, unless satisfactory arrangements could soon be come to
with Yakub Khan, an onward move would have to be made. Accordingly I
now set about preparing for such a contingency.

Sher Ali had died in Afghan Turkestan on the 21st February, and, in
communicating the event to the Viceroy, Yakub Khan wrote that he was
anxious matters might be so arranged that 'the friendship of this
God-granted State with the illustrious British Government may remain
constant and firm.'

The new Amir was told in reply that Lord Lytton was prepared to enter
into negotiations for the conclusion of peace, and for the restoration
of a friendly alliance between the two Governments, provided that His
Highness renounced all claim to authority over the Khyber and Michni
Passes, and the independent tribes inhabiting the territory directly
connected with the main routes leading to India; that the district
of Kuram from Thal to the crest of the Shutargardan Pass, and the
districts of Pishin and Sibi, should remain under the control of the
British Government; that the foreign relations of Afghanistan should
be conducted in accordance with the advice and wishes of the British
Government; and that British officers should be accredited to the
Kabul Government, and permitted to reside at such places as might
hereafter be decided upon.

Yakub Khan's reply was not altogether satisfactory. He agreed to
British officers being deputed to Afghanistan on the understanding
that they should reside in Kabul, and abstain from interference in
State affairs; but he declined to renounce his authority over the
Khyber and Michni Passes and the tribes in their vicinity, and refused
to consent to Kuram, Pishin, and Sibi being placed under British
protection.

The Viceroy now determined to try what a personal conference between
the Amir and Cavagnari could effect towards a settlement of these
vexed questions, so in answering the Amir Cavagnari was directed
to convey a hint that an invitation to him to visit Kabul might be
productive of good results, and to point out that the places we
desired to occupy were looked upon as essential to the permanent
security of the Indian frontier. The Amir replied, expressing his
readiness to receive Cavagnari in his capital, and laying stress on
his determination to regulate his future conduct in strict conformity
with his professions of loyalty, but begged that he might not be
called upon to cede any portion of his territory.

Hardly had this letter, dated the 29th March, been received, than a
proclamation addressed by Yakub to the Khagianis, a tribe which had
been giving much trouble, was intercepted and brought to Cavagnari; in
it the Amir praised and complimented the Khagianis for their religious
zeal and fidelity to himself. He exhorted them to have no fear of the
infidels, against whom he was about to launch an irresistible force of
troops and _Ghazis_, and wound up as follows: 'By the favour of
God, and in accordance with the verse "Verily God has destroyed the
powerful ones," the whole of them will go to the fire of hell for
evermore. Therefore kill them to the extent of your ability.' A
curious commentary this on the Amir's protestation of loyalty.

Notwithstanding this piece of treachery, it was decided not to break
off negotiations, and Yakub Khan was informed by Cavagnari that a
Mission would proceed to Kabul so soon as the necessary arrangements
could be made for its reception. At the same time Lord Lytton himself
wrote to the Amir, telling him that, as he was willing to receive an
Envoy, Cavagnari would be deputed to visit Kabul, and communicate
unreservedly with him upon the questions at issue between the two
States.

I, personally, was not at all satisfied that the time had come for
negotiation, for I felt that the Afghans had not had the sense of
defeat sufficiently driven into them to convince them of our strength
and ability to punish breach of treaty, and, therefore, that a peace
made now, before they had been thoroughly beaten, would not be a
lasting one, and would only end in worse trouble in the near future.
The Afghans are an essentially arrogant and conceited people; they had
not forgotten our disastrous retreat from Kabul, nor the annihilation
of our array in the Khurd Kabul and Jagdalak Passes in 1842, and
believed themselves to be quite capable of resisting our advance on
Kabul. No great battle had as yet been fought; though Ali Masjid and
the Peiwar Kotal had been taken, a small force of the enemy had been
beaten by Charles Gough's brigade, near Jalalabad, and a successful
Cavalry skirmish had occurred near Kandahar, the Afghans had nowhere
suffered serious loss, and it was not to be wondered at if the
fighting men in distant villages, and in and around Kabul, Ghazni,
Herat, Balkh, and other places, still considered themselves undefeated
and capable of defying us. They and their leaders had to depend for
information as to recent events upon the garbled accounts of those who
had fought against us, and it was unlikely they would be shaken in
their belief in their superiority by such one-sided versions of what
had occurred. On many occasions I had been amused, in listening to
Afghan conversation, to find that, while they appeared thoroughly
conversant with and frequently alluded to their triumphs over us, they
seemed to know nothing, or had no recollection, of Sale's successful
defence of Jalalabad, or of Pollock's victorious march through the
Khyber Pass and the destruction by him of the chief bazaar in Kabul.

My ideas about the negotiations being premature were freely expressed
to Colonel Colley,[1] Lord Lytton's Private Secretary, who paid me a
visit in Kuram at this time, and had been a constant correspondent of
mine from the commencement of the war. Colley, however, explained to
me that, right or wrong, the Viceroy had no option in the matter; that
there was the strongest feeling in England against the continuance of
the war; and that, unless the new Amir proved actively hostile, peace
must be signed. He expressed himself sanguine that the terms of the
treaty which Cavagnari hoped to conclude with Yakub Khan would give us
an improved frontier, and a permanent paramount influence at Kabul,
the two points about which he said the Viceroy was most anxious, and
to which he assigned the first place in his political programme. Lord
Lytton foresaw that, whatever might be the future policy of the two
European Powers concerned, the contact of the frontiers of Great
Britain and Russia in Asia was only a matter of time, and his aim was
to make sure that the conterminous line, whenever it might be reached,
should be of our choosing, and not one depending on the exigencies of
the moment, or on the demands of Russia.

The Native agent (Bukhtiar Khan), who was the bearer of the Viceroy's
and Cavagnari's letters to the Amir, reached Kabul at the moment
when the Afghan officials who had accompanied Sher Ali in his flight
returned to that place from Turkestan. Counsel was held with these men
as to the manner of receiving the British Mission; but there was an
influential military party averse to peace, and the Amir was strongly
advised to abandon the English alliance and trust to Russia. Upon
hearing this, our agent became alarmed for the safety of the Mission,
and being apprehensive that Yakub Khan would not have the power to
protect its members from insult, he suggested to the Amir that he
should visit our camp instead of the British Mission coming to Kabul,
a suggestion which was ultimately adopted, the Viceroy considering
that it was infinitely the best arrangement that could be made.

On the 8th May the Amir arrived in Sir Samuel Browne's camp at
Gandamak, thirty miles on the Kabul side of Jalalabad, and on the
26th, owing to the tact and diplomatic skill of Louis Cavagnari, the
Treaty of Gandamak was signed, and so ended the first phase of the
second Afghan war.

Under the terms of the treaty, Yakub Khan agreed to the cession of
territory considered necessary by us, and bound himself to conduct
his foreign policy in accordance with the advice of the British
Government; while, on our side, we promised to support him against
external aggression. It was further arranged that a British
representative, with a suitable escort, should reside at Kabul;[2]
that the Amir should in like manner (if he desired it) depute an agent
to the Viceregal Court; that British agents with sufficient escorts
should be at liberty to visit the Afghan frontiers whenever, in the
interests of both countries, it was considered necessary by the
British Government; that there should be no hindrance to British
subjects trading peaceably within the Amir's dominions; that traders
should be protected, the transit of merchandise facilitated, and roads
kept in good order; that a line of telegraph should be constructed
from India to Kabul, at the expense of the British, but under the
protection of the Afghan Government; and that an annual subsidy of six
lakhs of rupees should be paid to the Amir and his successors.

The Khyber column was now withdrawn, with the exception of two
brigades, and orders were sent to the Kandahar column to prepare to
withdraw on the 1st September, the earliest date at which the troops
could safely march through the Bolan Pass. I was told to stay where
I was, as Kuram, by the treaty conditions, was to remain under our
control and be administered by the British Government.

On the 24th May I held a parade in honour of the Queen's birthday, at
which 6,450 officers and men were present.[3] They were thoroughly fit
and workmanlike, and being anxious that the tribesmen should see what
grand soldiers I had at hand should an advance be necessary, I invited
all the neighbouring clans to witness the display. The Afghans were
seated in picturesque groups round the flag-staff, when suddenly, as
the first round of the _feu-de-joie_ was fired, they started to their
feet, thinking that treachery was intended, and that they were
caught in a trap: they took to their heels, and we had considerable
difficulty in bringing them back, and in making them understand that
the firing which had so upset their equanimity was only a sign of
rejoicing on that auspicious anniversary. By degrees they became
assured that there was no thought of taking an unfair advantage of
them, and at the conclusion of the ceremony they were made happy by a
present of sheep. In the afternoon an impromptu rifle meeting was got
up. The matchlock men could not hold their own against our good shots
armed with Martini-Henry rifles, a fact which evidently greatly
impressed the tribesmen, some of whom then and there came forward and
promised that if I should be required to advance on Kabul they would
not oppose me.

I took advantage of our improved relations with the Afghans,
consequent on the ratification of the treaty, to enlarge our
geographical knowledge of the passes which lead from Kuram towards
Kabul, and the independent territories in the neighbourhood. The
presence of the troops, no doubt, had something to say to the cheerful
acquiescence of the tribesmen in these explorations, which they
appeared to look upon as the result of a wish to make ourselves
acquainted with the country assigned to us by the treaty, and having,
to use their own expression, lifted for us the _purdah_ (curtain) of
their country, they became most friendly, and took a curious pleasure
in pointing out to us the points of defence at which they would have
opposed us, had we been advancing as enemies.

Towards the end of June I heard from Lord Lytton that he wished me to
be one of the military members of a Commission of Inquiry into army
expenditure and organization which was about to be convened at Simla,
if I thought I could be spared from my post at Kuram. The people of
the valley had by this time settled down so contentedly, and the
tribesmen showed themselves so peacefully disposed, that I thought I
could safely leave my post for a time, before returning to take up my
abode in the neighbourhood for some years, as I hoped to do, when my
appointment as Frontier Commissioner should have received the sanction
of the authorities in England.

Meanwhile, however, some temporary arrangement was necessary for the
administration of Kuram, and I wrote to the Foreign Secretary (Alfred
Lyall), pointing out my views upon the subject.

Seeing how much could be done with these wild people by personal
influence, and how ready they were to submit to my decisions when
disputes arose amongst them--decisions at times literally given from
the saddle--I was very adverse to their being handed over to some
official who, from his training, would not be able to understand
dealing out the rough-and-ready justice which alone was suited to
these lawless beings, and who could not imagine any question being
properly settled without its having undergone the tedious process of
passing through the law courts. Such a rule would, I knew, disgust
a people accustomed to decide their quarrels at the point of the
sword--a people to whom law and order had been hitherto unknown,
and must be distasteful, until they had had time to realize their
beneficial effects. Profitable employment and judicious management
would in time, no doubt, turn them into peaceful subjects. Friendly
intercourse had already done much towards this end, and tribes who for
generations had been at feud with each other now met, when visiting
our camp, on common ground, without (much I think to their own
astonishment) wanting to cut each other's throats. What was further
required, I conceived, was the opening up of the country by means of
roads, which would facilitate intercommunication and give remunerative
employment to thousands who had hitherto lived by plunder and
bloodshed.

In answering my letter, the Foreign Secretary informed me that the
future of Kuram would be settled when I reached Simla, whither I
was to proceed so soon as I had seen the British Mission across the
frontier.

On the 15th July Major Cavagnari, who had been selected as 'the Envoy
and Plenipotentiary to His Highness the Amir of Kabul,' arrived in
Kuram, accompanied by Mr. William Jenkins, C.I.E., of the Civil
Service, and Lieutenant Hamilton, V.C., Surgeon-Major Kelly, 25
Cavalry and 50 Infantry of the Guides Corps. I, with some fifty
officers who were anxious to do honour to the Envoy and see the
country beyond Kuram, marched with Cavagnari to within five miles of
the crest of the Shutargardan Pass, where we encamped, and my staff
and I dined that evening with the Mission. After dinner I was asked to
propose the health of Cavagnari and those with him, but somehow I did
not feel equal to the task; I was so thoroughly depressed, and my mind
was filled with such gloomy forebodings as to the fate of these fine
fellows, that I could not utter a word. Like many others, I thought
that peace had been signed too quickly, before, in fact, we had
instilled that awe of us into the Afghan nation which would have been
the only reliable guarantee for the safety of the Mission. Had we
shown our strength by marching to Kabul in the first instance, whether
opposed or not, and there dictated the terms of the treaty, there
would have been some assurance for its being adhered to; as it was,
I could not help feeling there was none, and that the chances were
against the Mission ever coming back.

Cavagnari, however, showed no sign of sharing my forebodings; he and
his companions were in the best of spirits; he spoke most hopefully of
the future, and talked of a tour he hoped to make with me in the cold
weather along the northern and western frontiers of Afghanistan. Other
matters of intense interest to us both were discussed, and before
separating for the night it was arranged that Mrs. Cavagnari should
either join him in Kabul the following spring, or come and stay with
my wife and me in Kuram, where I had already laid the foundations of a
house near the beautifully situated village of Shalufzan.

Early next morning the Sirdar, who had been deputed by the Amir to
receive the Mission, came into camp, and soon we all started for the
top of the pass. We had gone about a mile, when we were joined by an
escort of Afghan Cavalry, dressed something like British Dragoons,
with the exception of their head-gear, which consisted of the
discarded helmets of the old Bengal Horse Artillery. They were mounted
on small, useful-looking horses, and were armed with smooth-bore
carbines and _tulwars_ (Native swords).

As we ascended, curiously enough, we came across a solitary magpie,
which I should not have noticed had not Cavagnari pointed it out and
begged me not to mention the fact of his having seen it to his wife,
as she would be sure to consider it an unlucky omen.

On reaching the Afghan camp, we were received in a large, tastefully
decorated tent, where tea was served, and we were afterwards conducted
to the top of the mountain, where carpets were spread and more tea
passed round, while we gazed on the fine view of the Logar valley
which stretched out beneath us.

On descending to the camp, we were invited to partake of dinner,
served in Oriental fashion on a carpet spread on the ground.
Everything was done most lavishly and gracefully, and nothing was
omitted that was calculated to do us honour. Nevertheless, I could not
feel happy as to the prospects of the Mission, and my heart sank as I
wished Cavagnari good-bye. When we had proceeded a few yards in our
different directions, we both turned round, retraced our steps, shook
hands once more, and parted for ever.

I did not delay at Kuram; there was nothing to keep me there, and the
prospect of getting back to my belongings and to civilization, now
that all active work was at an end, was too alluring to be withstood.
My wife met me at the foot of the Hills, and we drove up to Simla
together. I was greeted by Lord Lytton and many kind friends most
warmly, and had the gratification of hearing that I had been made a
K.C.B., and that I had been accorded the thanks of both Houses of
Parliament.

I was soon deep in the work of the Army Commission, which met for
the first time under the presidency of the Hon. Sir Ashley Eden,[4]
K.C.S.I., on the 1st August. The heavy loss to the revenues of India,
consequent on the unfavourable rate of exchange, rendered extensive
reductions in public expenditure imperative, and the object of this
Commission was to find out how the cost of the army could be reduced
without impairing its efficiency.

Very little was done at the first meeting, and at its close Eden
confessed to me that he did not at all see his way, and that he was
somewhat aghast at the difficulties of the task before the Commission.
To me it seemed clear that the maintenance of a separate army for each
presidency, Bengal, Bombay, and Madras, was at the root of the evils
it was our duty to consider and try to reform; and I promised the
President that, before the Commission again assembled, I would prepare
a scheme which might form a basis for them to work upon.

I considered it an anachronism, since railways and telegraphs had
annihilated distance, to keep up three Commanders-in-Chief, and
separate departments, each having an independent head, in the three
different presidencies. I put my ideas on paper, and Eden announced
himself in favour of my scheme, which substituted for the three
presidential armies four army corps, all subordinate to the
Commander-in-Chief in India. Portions of my recommendation began to
be carried into effect directly they had received the sanction of the
authorities in England--such as the amalgamation of the Commissariat,
Pay, Ordnance, and Stud departments--but it was not until April,
1895, sixteen years after the proposal had been recommended by the
Government of India, and although, during that period, four successive
Viceroys, each backed up by a unanimous Council, had declared
themselves strongly in favour of the change, that the finishing touch
was given to the new organization, by the abolition of the offices of
Commanders-in-Chief of Madras and Bombay, and the creation of four
Army Corps, namely, the Punjab, the Bengal, the Madras, and the
Bombay, each commanded by a Lieutenant-General.


[Footnote 1: The late Major-General Sir George Colley, K.C.B.]

[Footnote 2: Kabul was expressly selected by Yakub Khan as the place
where he wished the Embassy to reside.]

[Footnote 3: At this parade I had the great pleasure of decorating
Captain Cook with the Victoria Cross, and Subadar Ragobir Nagarkoti,
Jemadar Pursoo Khatri, Native Doctor Sankar Dass, and five riflemen of
the 5th Gurkhas, with the Order of Merit, for their gallant conduct
in the attack on the Spingawi Kotal, and during the passage of the
Mangior defile. It was a happy circumstance that Major Galbraith, who
owed his life to Captain Cook's intrepidity, and Major Fitz-Hugh,
whose life was saved by Jemadar (then Havildar) Pursoo Khatri, should
both have been present on the parade.]

[Footnote 4: Lieutenant-Governor of Bengal.]

       *       *       *       *       *




CHAPTER XLIX.
1879

  Massacre of the Embassy--The Kabul Field Force
  --Lord Lytton's foresightedness--Start for Kabul--Letter to the Amir
  --Proclamation to the people of Kabul--Yakub Khan's agents
  --Reasons for remaining at Alikhel


My wife and I thought and talked much over our new life on the
frontier, to which we both looked forward with great interest and
pleasure, but, before entering upon it, we settled to go home for
a time to place our boy at school and see our friends, and we were
arranging our plans accordingly, when suddenly our 'castles in the
air' were dashed to the ground by a ruthless blow from the hand of
Fate, and the whole of India, the whole of the civilized world, was
struck with grief, horror, and indignation at the awful news of the
massacre at Kabul of Cavagnari and his gallant companions.

Throughout the month of August telegrams and letters constantly came
from Cavagnari (now a Lieutenant-Colonel and a K.C.B.) to the Viceroy,
the Foreign Secretary, and myself, in which he always expressed
himself in such a manner as to lead to the belief that he was
perfectly content with his position, and felt himself quite secure;
and in his very last letter, dated the 30th August, received after his
death, he wrote: 'I personally believe that Yakub Khan will turn out
to be a very good ally, and that we shall be able to keep him to
his engagements.' His last telegram to the Viceroy, dated the 2nd
September, concluded with the words, 'All well.' Cavagnari mentioned
in one of his letters that the Afghan soldiers were inclined to be
mutinous, and in another that a dispute had arisen in the bazaar
between them and the men of the British escort, but at the same time
he expressed his confidence in the Amir's ability and determination
to maintain order; I could not, however, help being anxious about
Cavagnari, or divest myself of the feeling that he might be
over-estimating Yakub Khan's power, even if His Highness had the will,
to protect the Mission.

Between one and two o'clock on the morning of the 5th September, I was
awakened by my wife telling me that a telegraph man had been wandering
round the house and calling for some time, but that no one had
answered him.[1] I got up, went downstairs, and, taking the telegram
from the man, brought it up to my dressing-room, and opened it; it
proved to be from Captain Conolly, Political Officer at Alikhel, dated
the 4th September. The contents told me that my worst fears--fears I
had hardly acknowledged to myself--had been only too fully realized.
The telegram ran:

    'One Jelaladin Ghilzai, who says he is in Sir Louis Cavagnari's
    secret service, has arrived in hot haste from Kabul, and solemnly
    states that yesterday morning the Residency was attacked by three
    regiments who had mutinied for their pay, they having guns, and
    being joined by a portion of six other regiments. The Embassy
    and escort were defending themselves when he left about noon
    yesterday. I hope to receive further news.'

I was paralyzed for the moment, but was roused by my wife calling out,
'What is it? Is it bad news from Kabul?' She had divined my fears
about Cavagnari, and had been as anxious about him as I had been
myself. I replied, 'Yes, very bad, if true. I hope it is not.' But I
felt it was. I woke my A.D.C., and sent him off at once to the Viceroy
with the telegram. The evil tidings spread rapidly. I was no sooner
dressed than Mr. Alfred Lyall arrived. We talked matters over, I
despatched a telegram[2] to Captain Conolly, and we then went off to
Lord Lytton.

Early as it was, I found the Council assembled. The gravity of the
situation was thoroughly appreciated, and it was unanimously decided
that, should the disastrous report prove to be true, troops must
proceed to Kabul with the least possible delay to avenge or, if
happily incorrect or exaggerated, to support the Mission.

Sir Samuel Browne's force had been broken up, Sir Donald Stewart was
in far off Kandahar, and his troops had, all but a small number, left
on their return march to India; the Kuram force was, therefore, the
only one in a position to reach Kabul quickly, and I was ordered to
proceed at once to Kuram and resume my command.

As a preliminary measure, Brigadier-General Massy, who had been placed
in temporary command during my absence, was directed to move troops
to the Shutargardan, where they were to entrench themselves and await
orders, while Stewart was directed to stop all regiments on their way
back to India, and himself hold fast at Kandahar.

During the day further telegrams were received confirming the truth of
the first report, and telling of the Mission having been overwhelmed
and every member of it cruelly massacred; and later Captain Conolly
telegraphed that messengers had arrived from the Amir bringing two
letters addressed to me giving his version of what had occurred.

During the few hours I remained at Simla I was busily engaged in
discussing with Sir Frederick Haines the formation of the Kabul Field
Force,[3] as my new command was designated, and the many important
matters which had to be considered. More troops had to be hurried up,
for it would be necessary to hold Kuram in strength while I moved
on to Kabul, and, as communication by the Shutargardan could not be
depended upon after December, on account of snow, the Khyber route
would have to be opened out.

At the commencement of the last year's campaign my anxiety had been so
largely increased by having been given officers totally inexperienced
in war to fill the higher posts in the Kuram column, that I did not
hesitate to press upon the Commander-in-Chief, now that I had a far
more difficult operation to carry through, the importance of my senior
officers being tried men on whom I could implicitly rely; and I
succeeded in getting for the command of my two Infantry brigades
Herbert Macpherson[4] and T. D. Baker,[5] the Viceroy's Military
Secretary, both of whom had seen a good deal of service, while the
former had already commanded a brigade in the field.

To the command of the Artillery and Cavalry, Lieutenant-Colonel B.
Gordon and Brigadier-General Massy were appointed, neither of whom had
much experience of war. Gordon had served in Central India during
the Mutiny, and Massy by his pluck as a subaltern of Infantry in the
Crimea had gained for himself the _sobriquet_ of 'Redan' Massy. But
he had not served with Cavalry in the field, and from my slight
acquaintance with him I could not say whether he possessed the very
exceptional qualities required in a Cavalry Commander.

My staff had proved themselves so capable and reliable that I had no
wish to make any change; it was, however, materially strengthened by
the addition of Colonel MacGregor,[6] as 'Chief of the Staff,' with
Captain Combe,[7] 10th Hussars, and Lieutenant Manners Smith[8] as
Deputy-Assistant Quartermaster-Generals.

Mr. H.M. Durand[9] was attached to me as Political Secretary, and
Major Hastings as Political Officer, in place of Colonel Waterfield,
who was _hors de combat_ from a broken leg. Hugh Gough, with the rank
of Brigadier-General, and Major Mark Heathcote as his assistant, were
placed in charge of the lines of communication.

Before leaving Simla I paid a farewell visit to Lord Lytton. I found
him in a state of deep distress and depression. To a man of his
affectionate disposition, the fate of Cavagnari, for whom he had a
great personal regard, was a real grief. But on public grounds he felt
still more strongly the collapse of the Mission and the consequent
heavy blow to the policy he had so much at heart, viz., the
rectification of our defective frontier, and the rendering India
secure against foreign aggression--a policy which, though scouted at
the time by a party which later became all-powerful, has since been
justified by the action of successive Governments, Liberal and
Conservative alike, until at the present moment our frontier is
gradually becoming what Lord Lytton, with his clear foresightedness
and intelligent appreciation of our responsibilities and India's
requirements, would then have made it.

In answer to my request for instructions as to the line I should take
about our future relations with the Afghans, Lord Lytton said:
'You can tell them we shall never again altogether withdraw from
Afghanistan, and that those who help you will be befriended and
protected by the British Government.'

While I was with Lord Lytton, a telegram[10] was brought in from
Captain Conolly, reporting the details of the attack upon the Embassy,
as given to him by the messenger who had been entrusted by the Amir
to deliver the two letters addressed to me. In this telegram Conolly
solicited instructions as to what he was to communicate to the Amir in
reply to His Highness's request for aid, and inquired whether he was
at liberty to make terms with one Badshah Khan, an influential Ghilzai
Chief, who had come to Alikhel to offer his services.

The following telegram was sent in reply by the Foreign Secretary:

    'Your telegram 6th. Reply to the Amir at once from the Viceroy
    that a strong British force under General Roberts will march
    speedily on Kabul to his relief, from the Shutargardan, and
    that he should use all his resources to co-operate with, and
    facilitate, the advance of the troops through his country. Your
    proposal to subsidize Badshah Khan and accept his services is
    approved. Roberts will send detailed instructions.'

Late in the afternoon of the same day (September 6th) I left Simla,
accompanied by my wife as far as Umballa, where I found my staff
waiting for me. She saw us off in the train, bidding us a cheery
good-bye and good luck, but I am afraid the return journey must have
been a sad one for her.

Thought for the immediate future filled my mind as we sped on our way
to the front, and not a few difficulties connected with the proposed
advance on Kabul presented themselves to me. My chief causes for
anxiety were the insufficiency of transport, and the great extent of
the lines of communication which would have to be guarded. It would
be necessary to hold the country in strength from Thal to the
Shutargardan, a distance of 115 miles, until such time as the Khyber
route could be opened, and I felt that the force at my disposal
(7,500 men and 22 guns) was none too large for the work before
it, considering that I should have to provide a garrison for the
Shutargardan, if not for other posts between that place and Kabul.

My Commissariat arrangements, too, caused me many misgivings,
increased by the fact that Major Badcock, my chief Commissariat
Officer, and Major Collett, my Assistant Quartermaster-General, who
had afforded such valuable aid in Kuram, thinking the war was at an
end, had taken leave to England. My doubts vanished, however, and my
spirits rose at the sight of my brave troops, and the enthusiastic
welcome they gave me as I rode through Kuram on the 12th September on
my way to Alikhel. A splendid spirit pervaded the whole force; the
men's hearts were on fire with eager desire to press on to Kabul, and
be led against the miscreants who had foully massacred our countrymen,
and I felt assured that whatever it was possible for dauntless
courage, unselfish devotion, and firm determination to achieve, would
be achieved by my gallant soldiers.

On reaching Alikhel, Captain Conolly handed to me the Amir's
letters,[11] to which I replied at once, and the next day, under
instructions from the Government of India, I wrote to His Highness
that, in conformity with his own special request that an English
officer should be deputed as Envoy to his Court, and on condition that
he would himself be responsible for the protection and honourable
treatment of such an Envoy, Major Cavagnari and three British officers
had been allowed to go to Kabul, all of whom within six weeks had been
ruthlessly murdered by his troops and subjects; that his inability to
carry out the treaty engagements, and his powerlessness to establish
his authority, even in his own capital, having thus become apparent,
an English army would now advance on Kabul with the double object of
consolidating his Government, should he himself loyally do his best to
fulfil the terms of the treaty, and of exacting retribution from the
murderers of the British Mission. But that, although His Highness laid
great stress in his letter of the 4th September on the sincerity of
his friendship, my Government had been informed that emissaries had
been despatched from Kabul to rouse the country people and tribes
against us, and as this action appeared inconsistent with friendly
intentions, I considered it necessary for His Highness to send a
confidential representative to confer with me and explain his object.

I had little doubt as to the truth of the report that the Amir was
using every effort to incite the Ghilzais and other tribes to oppose
us, and I was confirmed in my conviction by a Native gentleman, Nawab
Ghulam Hussein Khan,[12] at one time our agent at Kabul, who told me
that, although he did not believe that Yakub Khan had actually planned
the massacre of the Embassy, he had certainly taken no steps to
prevent it, and that he, Ghulam Hussein Khan, was convinced that the
Amir was now playing us false. It was, therefore, a relief to
find awaiting me at Alikhel several of the leading men from the
neighbouring districts, to whom I had telegraphed, before leaving
Simla, asking them to meet me.

These men were profuse in their proffers of assistance, and, although
I did not place a great deal of faith in their promises, I came to the
conclusion that, notwithstanding Yakub Khan's treacherous efforts to
stir up the tribes, if I could only push on rapidly with a fairly
strong force, I need not anticipate any opposition that I could not
overcome. Everything depended on speed, but rapidity of movement
depended on the condition of the transport service, and my inspection
of the animals, as I passed through Kuram, was not calculated to
raise hopes of being able to make a very quick advance; for, owing
to continuous hard work and the want of a staff of trained transport
attendants, the numbers of animals had steadily diminished, and those
that remained were for the most part sickly and out of condition.

On the 16th of September I issued a Proclamation,[13] copies of which
I caused to be sent to the people of Kabul, Ghazni, and all the
neighbouring tribes; this, I hoped, would facilitate our advance, and
reassure those who had taken no part in the attack on the Residency.
I also wrote a letter[14] to the _maliks_ of the Logar valley, whose
territory we must enter directly we had crossed the Shutargardan, and
whose co-operation I was most anxious to obtain. On the 18th I again
wrote[15] to the Amir, enclosing copies of these two documents, and
informing him that I was still awaiting a reply to my first letter
and the arrival of His Highness's confidential representative; that I
hoped he would soon issue the necessary orders for the furtherance of
our plans and that he might rest assured of the support of the British
Government.

On the 19th September matters had so far progressed that I was able to
tell the Viceroy that Brigadier-General Baker was entrenched with his
brigade on the Shutargardan, and engaged in improving the road to
Kushi, the first halting-place in the Logar valley; that supplies were
being collected by means of local transport; that I was bringing up
reserve ammunition and treasure from the rear on Artillery waggons;
and that every possible effort was being made to render the force
mobile.

On the 20th I received the Amir's reply. He expressed regret that
he was unable to come to Alikhel himself, but intimated that he was
sending two confidential agents, his Mustaufi (Finance Minister),
Habibulla Khan, and his Wazir (Prime Minister), Shah Mahomed Khan, who
accordingly arrived the next day.

At each interview I had with these gentlemen during the three days
they remained in my camp, they impressed upon me that the Amir was
inclined to be most friendly, and that his only wish was to be guided
by the advice of the British Government. But, notwithstanding these
plausible assurances, I soon discovered that Yakub Khan's real object
in sending these two high officials was to stop the advance of the
force, and induce me to leave the punishment of the troops who had
committed the massacre in the hands of the Afghan authorities, or else
to delay us long enough to give time for the whole country to rise
against us.

As the conversations which were carried on at the meetings with the
Afghan agents are interesting, and have an important bearing on the
subsequent proceedings, I give in the Appendix* the notes taken at the
time by my Political Secretary.

(*Appendix V.)

I was anxious to keep one of the Amir's representatives with me, but
neither of them was willing to remain, so I felt bound to let them
both depart, taking with them the following letter to the Amir:

  TO HIS HIGHNESS THE AMIR OF KABUL.

    _Camp, Alikhel, 25th September, 1879._

    (After compliments.) I have received Your Highness's two letters
    of the 19th and 20th September (1st and 2nd Shawal), delivered
    to me by the hands of Your Highness's two confidential
    representatives, Mustaufi Habibulla Khan and Wazir Shah Mahomed.

    I am much obliged to Your Highness for sending me two such
    well-known men, and of such character as the Mustaufi and the
    Wazir. They have informed me of Your Highness's wishes, and I
    quite understand all they have told me. It is unfortunate that the
    season is so late, and that winter will soon be here; but there is
    yet time for a British army to reach Kabul before the great cold
    sets in.

    The Viceroy of India is much concerned that there should have been
    any delay in promptly acceding to Your Highness's request for
    advice and assistance, as conveyed in Your Highness's letters of
    the 3rd and 4th instant. It was His Excellency's earnest wish
    that troops should march on Kabul at once, so as to ensure Your
    Highness's personal safety and aid Your Highness in restoring
    peace and order at your capital.

    Unfortunately, the want of transport, and the necessity for
    collecting a certain amount of supplies, have caused a few weeks'
    delay; it is, however, a source of gratification and happiness to
    the Viceroy to learn that Your Highness's safety is not at present
    endangered, and His Excellency trusts Your Highness will be able
    to keep everything quiet in your kingdom, until such time as
    British troops may reach Kabul.

    I am glad to be able to inform Your Highness that news reached me
    yesterday of the departure of a considerable force from Kandahar
    under the command of a brave and distinguished officer, and that
    a large body of troops, under command of General Bright, were
    advancing rapidly from Peshawar to Jalalabad and onwards _viâ_
    Gandamak to Kabul. My own force will, I hope, be in a state to
    march before long. As Your Highness is aware, the Shutargardan has
    been occupied for some days. Meanwhile regiments of Cavalry and
    Infantry and batteries of Artillery have reached Kuram to replace
    those I am taking on with me, and to reinforce my own column
    should a necessity for more troops arise--a contingency I do not
    in the least expect.

    The Viceroy of India, in His Excellency's anxiety for Your
    Highness's welfare and safety, issued orders that each of the
    three armies, now advancing from Kandahar, Kuram, and the Khyber,
    should be strong enough to overcome any opposition Your Highness's
    enemies could possibly offer. That each is strong enough there can
    be no doubt.

    I understand that there is no one at Kelat-i-Ghilzai or Ghazni to
    stop the progress of the troops _en route_ from Kandahar. There is
    no reason, therefore, why they should not reach Kabul in a very
    short time.

    The Khyber tribes, having understood and appreciated the Treaty
    of peace made by Your Highness with the British Government in May
    last, have unanimously agreed to assist the troops from Peshawar
    in every way, and are now eager to keep the road through the
    Khyber safe, and to place all their transport animals at the
    disposal of the British Commander, who will thus be enabled to
    concentrate his force rapidly at Kabul. Through the kindness of
    Your Highness I have experienced much less difficulty than I could
    have expected, and I may now reasonably hope to be with Your
    Highness at least as soon as either the Kandahar or Khyber column.
    I look forward with great pleasure to the meeting with Your
    Highness, and trust that you will continue your kind assistance to
    obtain for me supplies and transport.

    I have carefully considered Your Highness's proposal that you
    yourself should be permitted to administer just punishment to the
    mutinous troops and others who shared in the treacherous and cruel
    attack on the British Envoy and his small escort, and thus save
    Her Majesty's troops the trouble, hardship, and privation which
    must necessarily be encountered by an advance on Kabul at this
    season of the year. I thank Your Highness most cordially, on the
    part of the Viceroy and Government of India, for this further
    proof of Your Highness's friendly feelings. Under ordinary
    circumstances such an offer would be gratefully and willingly
    accepted, but after what has recently occurred, I feel sure that
    the great British nation would not rest satisfied unless a British
    army marched to Kabul and there assisted Your Highness to inflict
    such punishments as so terrible and dastardly an act deserves.

    I have forwarded Your Highness's letters in original to the
    Viceroy; a copy of this, my reply, will be submitted by to-day's
    post for His Excellency's consideration. Meanwhile I have
    permitted Mustaufi Habibulla Khan and Wazir Shah Mahomed to take
    their leave and rejoin Your Highness.

I delayed my own departure from Alikhel until a sufficiency of
supplies had been collected at Kushi, and everything was ready for as
rapid an advance on Kabul as my limited transport would admit of; for,
so long as I remained behind, the people of Afghanistan could not
be sure of my intentions, and no doubt hoped that the Amir's
remonstrances would have the desired effect, and prevent our doing
more than occupying the Shutargardan, or making a demonstration toward
Kushi. My crossing the pass would, I knew, be the signal for all those
determined on opposition to assemble; it was politic, therefore, to
remain behind until the last moment.

When all arrangements were complete, so far as was possible with the
means at my disposal, I issued the following Field Force Order:

    'The Government of India having decided that a force shall proceed
    with all possible despatch to Kabul, in response to His Highness
    the Amir's appeal for aid, and with the object of avenging the
    dastardly murder of the British representative and his escort, Sir
    Frederick Roberts feels sure that the troops under his command
    will respond to the call with a determination to prove themselves
    worthy of the high reputation they have maintained during the
    recent campaign.

    'The Major-General need address no words of exhortation to
    soldiers whose courage and fortitude have been so well proved. The
    Afghan tribes are numerous, but without organization; the regular
    army is undisciplined, and whatever may be the disparity in
    numbers, such foes can never be formidable to British troops. The
    dictates of humanity require that a distinction should be
    made between the peaceable inhabitants of Afghanistan and the
    treacherous murderers for whom a just retribution is in store,
    and Sir Frederick Roberts desires to impress upon all ranks the
    necessity for treating the unoffending population with justice,
    forbearance, and clemency.

    'The future comfort and well-being of the force depend largely on
    the friendliness of our relations with the districts from which
    supplies must be drawn; prompt payment is enjoined for all
    articles purchased by departments and individuals, and all
    disputes must be at once referred to a political officer for
    decision.

    'The Major-General confidently looks forward to the successful
    accomplishment of the object of the expedition, and the
    establishment of order and a settled Government in Afghanistan.'


[Footnote 1: There are no such things as bells or knockers in India.]

[Footnote 2: 'Lose no time and spare no money to obtain reliable
information of what is going on in Kabul, and keep me constantly
informed by urgent telegrams. I am in hopes that Jelaladin's report
will turn out to be greatly exaggerated, if not untrue. As, however,
his intelligence is sure to spread and cause a certain amount of
excitement, warn General Massy and Mr. Christie (the Political Officer
in Kuram) to be on the alert.']

[Footnote 3: The Kabul Field Force was composed as follows:

  ARTILLERY.

  Lieutenant-Colonel B. L. Gordon, commanding.
  Captain J.W. Inge, Adjutant.
  F/A, Royal Horse Artillery, Major J. C. Smyth-Windham.
  G/3, Royal Artillery, Major Sydney Parry.
  No. 1 (Kohat) Mountain Battery (four guns), Captain Morgan.
  No. 2 (Derajât) Mountain Battery (four guns), Captain Swinley.
  Two Gatling guns, Captain Broadfoot.

  ENGINEERS.

  Lieutenant-Colonel Æ. Perkins, C.B., commanding.
  Lieutenant F. Spratt, Adjutant.
  Captain Woodthorpe, R.E., in charge of surveying.
  Captain Stratton, 22nd Regiment, in charge of signalling.
  Lieutenant F. Burn-Murdoch, R.E., Royal Engineer Park.

  CAVALRY.

  Brigadier-General W.D. Massy, commanding.
  Lieutenant J.P. Brabazon, 10th Hussars, Brigade-Major.
  9th Lancers, Lieutenant-Colonel R.S. Cleland.
  5th Punjab Cavalry, Major B. Williams.
  12th Bengal Cavalry, Major Green.
  14th Bengal Lancers, Lieutenant-Colonel Ross.

  1ST INFANTRY BRIGADE.

  Brigadier-General H. Macpherson, C.B., V.C., commanding.
  Captain G. de C. Morton, 6th Foot, Brigade-Major.
  67th Foot, Lieutenant-Colonel C.B. Knowles.
  92nd Highlanders, Lieutenant-Colonel G.H. Parker.
  28th Punjab Infantry, Lieutenant-Colonel J. Hudson.

  2ND INFANTRY BRIGADE.

  Brigadier-General T. D. Baker, C.B., 18th Foot, commanding.
  Captain W.C. Farwell, 26th Punjab Infantry, Brigade-Major.
  72nd Highlanders, Lieutenant-Colonel Brownlow.
  5th Gurkhas, Lieutenant-Colonel Fitz-Hugh.
  5th Punjab Infantry, Lieutenant-Colonel J. Macqueen.
  3rd Sikhs, Lieutenant-Colonel G.N. Money.
  23rd Pioneers, Lieutenant-Colonel Currie.]

[Footnote 4: The late Lieutenant-General Sir Herbert Macpherson, V.C.,
K.C.B., who died as Commander-in-Chief of Madras.]

[Footnote 5: The late Sir Thomas Baker, K.C.B., who died as
Quartermaster-General at the Horse Guards.]

[Footnote 6: The late Sir Charles MacGregor, K.C.B.]

[Footnote 7: Now Major-General Combe, C.B.]

[Footnote 8: This promising young officer greatly distinguished
himself at Kabul, and died a few years afterwards of cholera.]

[Footnote 9: Now Sir Mortimer Durand, K.C.S.I., K.C.I.E., British
Minister at Teheran.]

[Footnote 10: TELEGRAM DATED 6TH SEPTEMBER, 1879.

    _From_ CAPTAIN CONOLLY, ALIKHEL.

    _To_ FOREIGN SECRETARY, SIMLA.

    '_Clear the Line._--Sirkai Khan, bearer of the Amir's first
    letter, confirms previous reports of disaster, and describes how
    Badshah Khan visited the spot, and saw the dead bodies of the
    Envoy, staff, and escort. Of the latter, some nine sowars are said
    to have been out getting grass that day, and were not killed with
    the rest; defence was very stubborn, and the loss of the Kabulis
    heavy, put down at one hundred, or more. Finding they could not
    storm the place, the mutineers set fire to the doorway below,
    and, when that gave way, swarmed in and up to the upper story,
    overwhelmed the defenders, and sacked the place.

    'The second letter was brought by another messenger, servant of
    the Embassy _Mehmandar_, whose story in all but a few unimportant
    details is the same as that first received.

    'If an advance on Kabul is decided on to revenge massacre of
    Embassy, and also to quiet surrounding tribes, whom any (?) action
    would tempt to break out, it appears to me all-important to
    secure safe passage of the Shutargardan, and with this object to
    subsidize Badshah Khan handsomely.

    'I have detained the Kabul messengers pending receipt of
    instructions as to the line of policy to follow, and what to
    communicate to the Amir or Badshah Khan. The former invokes our
    aid; the latter expresses himself, through his messenger, anxious
    to serve us. Once in Logar valley, where they have had a bumper
    harvest, we could live on the country.']

[Footnote 11: TRANSLATION OF A LETTER FROM THE AMIR OF KABUL TO
GENERAL ROBERTS, DATED KABUL, 8 A.M., THE 3RD SEPTEMBER, 1879.

    (After compliments.) The troops who had assembled for pay at the
    Bala Hissar suddenly broke out and stoned their officers, and then
    all rushed to the Residency and stoned it, receiving in return a
    hail of bullets. Confusion and disturbance reached such a height
    that it was impossible to quiet it. People from Sherpur and
    country around the Bala Hissar, and city people of all classes,
    poured into the Bala Hissar and began destroying workshops,
    Artillery park, and magazine; and all the troops and people
    attacked the Residency. Meanwhile, I sent Daud Shah[*] to help the
    Envoy. On reaching the Residency, he was unhorsed by stones and
    spears, and is now dying. I then sent Sirdar Yahia Khan and my own
    son, the heir-apparent, with the Koran to the troops; but no use.
    I then sent well-known Syads and Mullahs of each class, but of no
    avail; up till now, evening, the disturbance continues. It will
    be seen how it ends. I am grieved with this confusing state of
    things. It is almost beyond conception. (Here follow the date and
    the Amir's seal.)

      (Note *: The Commander-in-Chief of the Afghan army.)


SECOND LETTER FROM THE AMIR, DATED KABUL, THE 4TH SEPTEMBER, 1879.

    Yesterday, from 8 a.m. till evening, thousands assembled to
    destroy the Embassy. There has been much loss of life on both
    sides. At evening they set fire to the Residency. All yesterday
    and up till now, I with five attendants have been besieged. I have
    no certain news of the Envoy, whether he and his people have
    been killed in their quarters, or been seized and brought out.
    Afghanistan is ruined; the troops, city, and surrounding country
    have thrown off their yoke of allegiance. Daud Shah is not
    expected to recover; all his attendants were killed. The workshops
    and magazine are totally gutted--in fact, my kingdom is ruined.
    After God, I look to the Government for aid and advice. My true
    friendship and honesty of purpose will be proved as clear as
    daylight. By this misfortune I have lost my friend, the Envoy, and
    also my kingdom. I am terribly grieved and perplexed. (Here follow
    the date and the Amir's seal.)]

[Footnote 12: The Nawab was on his way from Kandahar to Kabul, but on
hearing of the massacre he came to Alikhel.]

[Footnote 13: TRANSLATION OF A PROCLAMATION ISSUED BY MAJOR-GENERAL
SIR FREDERICK ROBERTS.

    _Alikhel, 16th September_, 1879.

    Be it known to all the Chiefs and the people of the country of
    Kabul and its dependencies that, in accordance with the Treaty
    concluded in May, 1879, corresponding to Jamdi-ul-Akhir 1296
    Hijri, between the two great Governments, and to the terms of
    which His Highness the Amir expressed his assent, and agreed to
    the location of an Envoy of Her Imperial Majesty the Empress, a
    British Envoy was, at the special request of His Highness the
    Amir, located at the Kabul Court, and the Amir guaranteed that he
    should be treated honourably and protected.

    Within six weeks after the said Envoy was received at and entered
    Kabul the whole Embassy was besieged and massacred in the very
    citadel of His Highness the Amir, who could not save or protect
    them from the hands of the soldiers and the people. From this, the
    lack of power of the Amir and the weakness of his authority in his
    capital itself are quite apparent and manifest. For this reason
    the British troops are advancing for the purpose of taking a
    public vengeance on behalf of the deceased as well as of obtaining
    satisfaction (_lit._, consolidation) of the terms entered into in
    the Treaty concluded. The British troops are entering Afghanistan
    for the purpose of strengthening the royal authority of His
    Highness the Amir on condition that His Highness loyally uses
    those powers for the maintenance of friendship and of amicable
    relations with the British Government. This is the only course by
    which the Amir's kingdom can remain intact, and (by which) also
    the friendly sentiments and sincerity expressed in his letter of
    the 4th September, 1879, after the occurrence of the (said) event
    can be proved.

    For the purpose of removing any doubt about the concord of the two
    Governments, the Amir has been addressed to depute a confidential
    agent to my camp. The British force will not punish or injure
    anyone except the persons who have taken part or joined in the
    massacre of the Embassy unless they offer opposition. All the
    rest, the small and great, who are unconcerned (therein) may rest
    assured of this. Carriage and supplies of every description should
    be brought into the British camp. Full price and hire shall be
    paid for everything that may be taken. Whereas mercy and
    humanity are the characteristics of this great Government, this
    proclamation is issued beforehand for the information of the
    people at large.]

[Footnote 14: TRANSLATION OF A LETTER FROM MAJOR-GENERAL SIR FREDERICK
ROBERTS TO CERTAIN _maliks_ OF THE LOGAR VALLEY.

    From the Proclamation already issued by me, you will have learnt
    the reasons for the march of the British troops to Kabul. Her
    Majesty's Government, by the movement of troops, intends to
    exact retribution for the massacre of the Embassy and to aid His
    Highness the Amir in restoring order.

    Let all those not concerned in the massacre rest assured, provided
    no opposition is shown, His Highness the Amir, in communications
    received by me, expresses his friendship, and wishes to continue
    amicable relations. As the British troops under my command will
    shortly enter the Logar valley I write to reassure you, and expect
    that you will inform all the residents of the valley not concerned
    in the late hateful massacre the purport of the Proclamation, and
    give every assistance in providing carriage and supplies required
    for the troops for which adequate hire and payment will be made. I
    hope that after the above assurance all the headmen will come to
    meet me in my camp where I shall be glad to see them.]

[Footnote 15: This letter is given in full in the Appendix.]

       *       *       *       *       *




CHAPTER L.
1879

  Hector Macdonald and Sher Mahomed--Yakub Khan
  --A Proclamation and an Order--The _maliks_ of Logar
  --Attack on the Shutargardan--Reconnoitring roads leading to Kabul


On the 27th September I made over the Kuram command to
Brigadier-General T. Gordon, and set out for Kushi, where Baker was
now encamped.

Just before I started I had the pleasure of welcoming my old friend
and brother officer, Major-General J. Hills, V.C., C.B., who had
been with Sir Donald Stewart as Assistant Adjutant-General from the
beginning of the campaign, and who had, the moment he heard there was
to be an advance on Kabul, come with all speed to place his services
at my disposal. Although I had no employment for Hills at the time,
there would be plenty for all to do at Kabul, and I was delighted to
have so good a soldier with me.

My escort consisted of the Head-Quarters of the Cavalry brigade, one
squadron 9th Lancers, 5th Punjab Cavalry, and detachments of the 5th
and 28th Punjab Infantry. We had only gone about halfway through the
pass when I pushed on with the Cavalry, in the hope of reaching the
camp on the top before dark, and was very soon met by twenty-five men
of the 92nd Highlanders, who brought me a note from Colonel Perkins,
R.E., in command on the Shutargardan, warning me that we were sure to
be attacked. We had not proceeded far, when at the narrowest part of
the defile we found the passage blocked by some 2,000 Afghans, and as
we approached a volley was fired from a party concealed by some rocks
on our left. I was told afterwards that it was intended for me, but I
remained unscathed, and the principal medical officer, Dr. Townsend,
who was riding on my right, and to whom I was talking at the moment,
was severely wounded. The Highlanders, supported by some dismounted
Cavalry, cleared away the enemy to the north, but as they clung to the
precipitous hills on the south, we had to wait till the main body of
the escort came up, when they were speedily dispersed.

Meanwhile, a sharp little engagement had taken place further up the
gorge, and as we advanced we could see the enemy retiring before a
detachment of the 92nd Highlanders, under Colour-Sergeant Hector
Macdonald, and of the 3rd Sikhs, under Jemadar Sher Mahomed, a Native
of Kabul. The manner in which the Colour-Sergeant and the Native
officer handled their men gave me a high opinion of them both.[1]

On the top of the Shutargardan Pass that evening I received the Amir's
reply[2] to my last letter, in which he expressed his gratitude for
the sympathy and support afforded him by the British Government, and
informed me that he had given orders to the Governor of Jalalabad that
the Khyber column should not meet with any opposition. I was also
given a letter from Sirdar Wali Mahomed Khan, and several other
Sirdars, professing loyalty to the British Government, and expressing
pleasure at my approach. And at the same time the rather embarrassing
information reached me that the Amir, desiring personal communication
with me, had already arrived in Baker's camp at Kushi, attended by his
son Musa Khan, a lad about seven years old, his father-in-law, and the
Commander-in-Chief of the Afghan army (Daud Shah), with a suite of 45
members and an escort of 200 men.

Although I had met with but slight opposition hitherto, it was evident
from the secret information I received that the Ghilzais were inclined
to be hostile, and intended to oppose us, and as it was important to
keep open communication with Alikhel through their country, I arranged
for the Shutargardan to be held by a Mountain battery, the 3rd Sikhs,
and the 21st Punjab Infantry, under the command of Lieutenant-Colonel
G.N. Money, an officer on whose judgment and coolness I knew I could
rely.

The next morning I rode to Kushi, where my first interview with the
Amir of Afghanistan took place.

I cannot say that I was favourably impressed by his appearance. He was
an insignificant-looking man, about thirty-two years of age, with a
receding forehead, a conical-shaped head, and no chin to speak of,
and he gave me the idea of being entirely wanting in that force of
character without which no one could hope to govern or hold in check
the warlike and turbulent people of Afghanistan. He was possessed,
moreover, of a very shifty eye, he could not look one straight in the
face, and from the first I felt that his appearance tallied exactly
with the double-dealing that had been imputed to him. His presence in
my camp was a source of the gravest anxiety to me. He was constantly
receiving and sending messages, and was no doubt giving his friends
at Kabul all the information he could collect as to our resources and
intentions. He had, however, come ostensibly as our ally, seeking
refuge from his mutinous soldiers, and whatever suspicions I might
secretly entertain, I could only treat him as an honoured guest, so
long as there was nothing proved against him.

My first visit to Yakub Khan was of a formal character. Nevertheless,
he seized the opportunity to urge strongly upon me the advisability
of delaying my advance, that he might have time, he said, to restore
order amongst his troops, and to punish those who had participated in
the attack on the Embassy. I replied that my orders were peremptory,
and that it was my duty, as it was my determination, to press on to
Kabul with all possible speed. Finding that his arguments had no
effect, he changed his tactics, and declared that he was much alarmed
for the safety of his family, whom he had left in the Bala Hissar;
that he had only one regiment on which he could depend; that he feared
when the others should hear of our approach they would break out
and attack the citadel; and that the innocent people in Kabul, not
considering it possible that a British force could get there so
quickly, had made no arrangements to convey their families away.

Feeling that anxiety for the safety of the families was not the true
cause for the Amir's efforts to delay us, and that his sole object
was to gain time for the development of plans for opposing our
advance--which subsequent events proved had been made with great
care--I told him it was impossible to accede to his wishes, but that
time would be given for all women and children to clear out of the
city if it should prove necessary to attack it. This necessity,
however, I was most anxious to avoid, and earnestly hoped that
our fighting would be over before we entered Kabul, for I had not
forgotten Delhi, and I dreaded the idea of the troops having to force
their way through narrow streets and crowded bazaars.

Yakub Khan was evidently much chagrined at my decision. He had left
Kabul hurriedly, his movements probably being hastened by hearing that
his uncle, Wali Mahomed Khan, and several other Sirdars with whom he
was at enmity, were on their way to join me. He had not even brought
a tent with him, and, had he succeeded in inducing me to delay our
advance, he would without doubt have returned to Kabul at once. As it
was, he was accommodated with a tent in the centre of the camp, and
the best arrangements possible, under the circumstances, made for his
entertainment.

When his own tents arrived, he asked leave to have them pitched
outside camp limits. To this I consented, at the same time ordering
that a guard of the same strength as my own should be detailed as his
escort, ostensibly to do him honour, but in reality that I might
be kept informed as to his movements. Unwelcome guest as he was, I
thought the least of two evils was to keep him now that we had got
him, as his presence in Kabul would be sure to increase the opposition
I felt certain we should encounter.

In response to the fears expressed by the Amir as to the safety of the
non-combatants, I issued the following Proclamation to the people of
Kabul:

    'Be it known to all that the British Army is advancing on Kabul to
    take possession of the city. If it be allowed to do so peacefully,
    well and good; if not, the city will be seized by force.
    Therefore, all well-disposed persons, who have taken no part in
    the dastardly murder of the British Envoy, or in the plunder of
    the Residency, are warned that, if they are unable to prevent
    resistance being offered to the entrance of the British army, and
    the authority of His Highness the Amir, they should make immediate
    arrangements for their own safety, either by coming to the British
    camp, or by such other measures as may seem fit to them. And as
    the British Government does not make war on women and children,
    warning is given that all women and children should be removed
    from the city beyond the reach of harm. The British Government
    desires to treat all classes with justice, and to respect their
    religion, feelings, and customs, while exacting full retribution
    from offenders. Every effort will, therefore, be made to prevent
    the innocent suffering with the guilty, but it is necessary that
    the utmost precaution should be taken against useless opposition.

    'After receipt of this Proclamation, therefore, all persons found
    armed in or about Kabul will be treated as enemies of the British
    Government; and, further, it must be distinctly understood that,
    if the entry of the British force is resisted, I cannot hold
    myself responsible for any accidental injury which may be done to
    the persons or property of even well-disposed people, who may have
    neglected this warning.'

At the same time, the matter having been brought to my notice by Lord
Lytton, and bearing in my mind that my father had told me one of
the chief causes of the outbreak in Kabul in 1841 was the Afghans'
jealousy of their women, and resentment at the European soldiers'
intimacy with them, I thought it well to impress upon all the
necessity for caution in this respect by publishing the following
Order:

    'Sir Frederick Roberts desires General officers, and officers
    commanding corps, to impress upon all officers under their command
    the necessity for constant vigilance in preventing irregularities
    likely to arouse the personal jealousies of the people of Kabul,
    who are, of all races, most susceptible as regards their women.

    'The deep-seated animosity of the Afghans towards the English has
    been mainly ascribed to indiscretions committed during the first
    occupation of Kabul, and the Major-General trusts that the same
    excellent discipline so long exhibited by the troops under his
    command will remove the prejudices of past years, and cause the
    British name to be as highly respected in Afghanistan as it is
    throughout the civilized world.[3]

On the 30th September (my forty-seventh birthday), all arrangements
which it was possible for me to make having been completed, the
Cavalry brigade marched eight miles to Zargunshahr, the first
halting-place on the way to Kabul. I accompanied it, for I was
informed that Wali Mahomed Khan and the Sirdars had arrived so far,
and I could not let them come on to my camp so long as the Amir was
still in it. I wished, also, to interview the Logar _maliks_ and
ascertain whether I could procure supplies from their valley. There
was bread-stuff with the force sufficient for fourteen days, but for
the transport of so much grain a large number of animals was required,
which could ill be spared, for carriage was so short that I could only
move a little more than half the troops at one time, and instead of
being able to march direct on Kabul with 6,000 men, a halt would have
to be made every other day to admit of the animals going back to bring
up the rear brigade, which practically meant my only having at my
disposal rather more than half that number at any one time. How
fervently I wished that those in authority, who never can see the
necessity for maintaining transport in time of peace, could be made to
realize the result of their short-sightedness--the danger of having to
divide a none too large force in an enemy's country, the consequent
risk of failure, the enormous increase of anxiety to the Commander,
the delay in achieving the object of the campaign, and the additional
labour to all concerned in an undertaking, arduous enough under the
most favourable circumstances, in a difficult country, and under
a burning eastern sun, even if possessed of good and sufficient
transport.

Stores had been collected at Kushi partly by means of local carriage,
and partly by our own animals doing the journey twice over from
Alikhel, a distance of thirty-six miles. So hard pressed was I for
transport that I had to make the Cavalry soldiers march on foot and
lead their horses laden with grain--an unusual piece of duty, which
was, however, performed with the cheerful alacrity which the troops of
the Kabul Field Force always displayed.

But all this is a digression. To return to my story. The _maliks_
of Logar, greatly to my relief, agreed to bring a certain amount of
supplies; while Wali Mahomed Khan and the other Sirdars were full of
protestations of loyalty and devotion. Most of them remained with me
all the time I was in Kabul, and some of them afforded me considerable
assistance. The Sirdars warned me to place no trust in the Amir, and
enlarged on the treachery of his conduct, but as I knew they looked
upon Yakub Khan as their own deadly enemy, I accepted their counsel
with some reservation. I was not, however, able to feel quite at ease
about the proceedings of my Royal guest, so I returned to Kushi that
same evening.

On the 1st October the whole of the Kabul Field Force was assembled in
the Logar valley.[4]

I waited at Kushi with the last of the Infantry until the morning of
the 2nd. Just as I was leaving camp, I became aware that firing was
going on in the direction of the Shutargardan, and later in the day I
received a report from Colonel Money as to what had happened there.

The enemy, emboldened by the diminished numbers of the garrison, and
undervaluing what might be accomplished by a small number of good
soldiers, had assembled in force, and occupied the crest of the
mountain, the only place from which heliographic communication with me
could be kept up. Money very properly decided that this could not be
permitted, and considered it best to take the initiative before the
enemy should become still stronger, so ordered an advance. Under cover
of the Mountain battery's fire, Major Griffiths, of the 3rd Sikhs,
with 200 of his own men and 50 of the 21st Punjab Infantry, supported
by 150 rifles of the latter corps, stormed the Afghans' position.
The assault, delivered in a most spirited manner, was perfectly
successful.

Major Griffiths, however, was wounded, also a signalling sergeant of
the 67th Foot and five men of the 3rd Sikhs, while the enemy left
thirty dead on the ground, and were pursued down the slope of the hill
without making any attempt to rally.

On the 3rd we marched fifteen miles to Zahidabad, where we first came
in sight of the fortified hill above Kabul. The rear guard was fired
into on the way, and we had considerable difficulty in crossing
the Logar river, as the water from a large irrigation cut had been
directed back into the stream just above the ford. Our only casualty
on this day was Captain 'Dick' Kennedy, who was wounded in the hand.

It was plain from these occurrences, and from the attack on the
Shutargardan, that the people generally were not disposed to be
friendly. From the Amir I could extract no information on this head,
although he must have been fully aware of the feelings and intentions
of his subjects. He was in constant communication with Kabul, and was
frequently being met by mounted messengers, who, from the haste with
which they travelled, as evidenced by the exhausted state of their
horses and the eagerness with which the Amir read the letters they
brought, appeared to be the bearers of important tidings.

It may be imagined how irritating and embarrassing was Yakub Khan's
presence, since his position in my camp enabled him to give the
leaders at Kabul accurate information as to our numbers and movements.
That he felt pretty sure of our discomfiture was apparent from his
change of manner, which, from being at first a mixture of extreme
cordiality and cringing servility, became as we neared Kabul distant,
and even haughty.

On the 5th October, one month from the receipt at Simla of the evil
tidings of the fate of the British Embassy, we reached the pretty
little village of Charasia, nestling in orchards and gardens, with a
rugged range of hills towering above it about a mile away. This range
descended abruptly on the right to permit the exit of the Logar river,
and rose again on its other side in precipitous cliffs, forming a fine
gorge[5] about halfway between our camp and Kabul city, now only from
ten to twelve miles distant.

An uncle of the Amir (Sirdar Nek Mahomed Khan), and a General in the
Afghan army, came out to meet Yakub Khan at this place; he remained
some time in earnest conversation with his nephew, and, as he was
about to remount his horse, called out in so loud a tone that it was
evidently meant for us all to hear, that he was 'now going to disperse
the troops.'[6] Very different, however, was the story brought to me
by an escaped Native servant of Cavagnari's, who came into our camp
later in the day. This man declared that preparations for fighting
were steadily being carried on; that the soldiers and townspeople were
streaming into the arsenal and supplying themselves with cartridges;
that large bodies of troops were moving out in our direction; and
that, when we advanced next day, we should certainly be opposed by a
formidable force. The Amir, on having this intelligence communicated
to him, pretended to disbelieve it utterly, and assured me that all
was at peace in the city, that Nek Mahomed would keep the troops
quiet, and that I should have no trouble; but I was not taken in by
his specious assurances.

Now more than ever I felt the want of sufficient transport! Had it
been possible to have the whole of my force with me, I should have
advanced at once, and have occupied that evening the range of hills I
have described; but Macpherson's brigade was still a march behind,
and all I could do was, immediately on arrival, to send back every
available transport animal to bring it up. I pushed forward Cavalry
patrols along the three roads leading to Kabul, and rode out myself to
reconnoitre the position in front. It was sufficiently strong to make
me wish I had a larger force. Towards evening groups of men appeared
on the skyline all round, giving unmistakable warning that the tribes
were gathering in large numbers.

From the information brought me by the Cavalry, and from my own
examination of the ground, I decided to advance along the left bank of
the river: and to facilitate this movement I determined to seize the
heights on either side of the gorge at daybreak, whether Macpherson's
brigade had arrived or not. That night strong piquets were thrown out
round the camp, and Cavalry patrols were ordered to proceed at dawn to
feel for the enemy. _L'homme propose, mais Dieu dispose_.


[Footnote 1: Macdonald, having subsequently further distinguished
himself, was given a commission, and is now commanding a regiment in
the Egyptian Army. Sher Mahomed was rewarded with the Order of Merit.]

[Footnote 2:

    FROM THE AMIR OF KABUL, DATED KUSHI, 27TH SEPTEMBER,1879.

    (After compliments.) Your friendly letter has reached me just at
    this moment, 8 p.m., the 10th Shawal (27th September), and opened
    the doors of joy and happiness on the face of my heart marked
    with affection. I feel perfectly certain and confident that the
    movements of Her Imperial Majesty's victorious troops are merely
    for the purpose of consolidating the foundation of my kingdom and
    strengthening the basis of my government.

    In truth, the sympathy of friends with friends is fitting and
    proper, and the indulgence and kindness of a great Government to
    a sincere and faithful friend are agreeable and pleasing. I am
    exceedingly gratified with, and thankful to, the representatives
    of the illustrious British Government for their expression of
    sympathy and their support of my cause. Your friendly and wise
    suggestion that none of the ignorant tribes of Afghanistan should
    oppose the British troops, so that the officers of the British
    Government should be the better able to support and protect me, is
    very acceptable and reasonable. Before I received your letter,
    I had sent orders repeatedly to the Governors of Jalalabad and
    Lalpura not to let anyone oppose or resist the British troops,
    and stringent orders have again been issued to the Governor of
    Jalalabad to use his utmost endeavours and efforts in this
    respect. The order in question to the address of the Governor of
    Jalalabad will be shown you to-morrow, and sent by an express
    courier.]

[Footnote 3: It was a matter of intense gratification to me that the
whole time we remained in Afghanistan, nearly two years, not a single
complaint was made by an Afghan of any soldier in my force having
interfered with the women of the country.]

[Footnote 4: The force was made up as follows:

--------------------------------------------------------
|                           |British  |  Other Ranks.  |
|                           |Officers.|----------------|
|                           |         |British.|Native.|
-------------------------------------------------------|
|Divisional, Brigade,       |         |        |       |
|and Departmental Staff     |   60    |        |       |
|F/A, R.H.A.                |    7    |   118  |       |
|G/3, R.A.                  |    7    |   137  |       |
|No. 2 Mountain Battery     |    3    |        |  223  |
|Two Gatling guns           |    1    |    34  |       |
|9th Lancers (one squadron) |    4    |   118  |       |
|5th Punjab Cavalry         |    7    |        |  325  |
|12th Bengal Cavalry        |    6    |        |  328  |
|14th Bengal Lancers        |    7    |        |  407  |
|67th Foot                  |   18    |   686  |       |
|72nd Highlanders           |   23    |   746  |       |
|92nd Highlanders           |   17    |   717  |       |
|5th Punjab Infantry        |    8    |        |  610  |
|5th Gurkhas                |    7    |        |  574  |
|23rd Pioneers              |    6    |        |  671  |
|28th Punjab Infantry       |    8    |        |  636  |
|7th Company Bengal Sappers |    3    |        |   93  |
|          and Miners       ---------------------------|
|                           |  192    | 2,558  |3,867  |
--------------------------------------------------------
]

[Footnote 5: Known as the _sang-i-nawishta_ (inscribed stone).]

[Footnote 6: Shortly after I was settled at Kabul, the following
letter, written by Nek Mahomed on the evening of the day he had been
with the Amir, to some person whom he wished to acquaint with the
state of affairs, was brought to me:

    'MY KIND FRIEND,--The truth is that to-day, at sunrise, I went to
    the camp, the Amir having summoned me. When I arrived, Mulla Shah
    Mahomed [the Wazir] first said to me, "Go back and tell the people
    to raise a holy war." I did not feel certain about what he said
    [or was not satisfied with this], [but] the Amir afterwards told
    me to go back that very hour and rouse the people to a _ghaza_. I
    got back to Kabul about 7 o'clock, and am collecting the people.
    Salaam.'

The letter was not addressed, but it was sealed with Nek Mahomed's
seal, and there was no reason to doubt its authenticity.]

       *       *       *       *       *




CHAPTER LI.
1879

  The Afghan position--The fight at Charasia
  --Highlanders, Gurkhas, and Punjabis--Defeat of the Afghans
  --Kabul in sight--Deh-i-Mazang gorge--The enemy give us the slip


The Cavalry having reported that the road through the
_sang-i-nawishta_ gorge was impassable, I started off a party[1]
before it was fully light on the 6th, to work at it and make it
practicable for guns. I was preparing to follow with an escort of
Cavalry to examine the pass and the ground beyond, when the growing
daylight discovered large numbers of Afghan troops in regular
formation crowning the hills that I ought to have been in a position
to occupy the preceding evening. No hurry, no confusion was apparent
in their movements; positions were taken up and guns placed with such
coolness and deliberation that it was evident regularly trained troops
were employed. Very soon I received reports of our Cavalry patrols
having been fired upon, and of their having been obliged to retire.

Immediate action was imperatively necessary; the Afghans had to be
dislodged from their strong position at any cost, or we should have
been surrounded by overwhelming numbers. Their occupation of the
heights was, I felt, a warning that must not be disregarded, and a
menace that could not be brooked.

Behind this range of hills lay the densely-crowded city of Kabul,
with the scarcely less crowded suburbs of Chardeh, Deh-i-Afghan, and
numberless villages thickly studded over the Kabul valley, all of
which were contributing their quota of warriors to assist the Regular
troops in disputing the advance of the British. It did not require
much experience of Asiatics to understand that, if the enemy were
allowed to remain undisturbed for a single night in the position they
had taken up, their numbers would increase to an extraordinary extent.

I now received a report from the rear that the road was blocked, and
that the progress of Macpherson's brigade would certainly be opposed;
while, on the crests of the hills to the right and left of my camp,
bodies of men began to assemble, who, I surmised (which surmise I
afterwards learnt was correct), were only waiting for the sun to go
down to make a general attack upon the camp under cover of dusk.

The situation was one of great anxiety. The whole force with me was
not more than 4,000 men and eighteen guns. The treacherous Amir and
his equally treacherous Ministers had, of course, kept the Afghan
Commander fully informed as to the manner in which my troops were
perforce divided; the position of every man and every gun with me was
known; and I feared that, as soon as we were engaged with the enemy,
the opportunity would be taken to attack my weakly-defended camp and
to engage Macpherson's small brigade, encumbered as it was with its
large convoy of stores and ammunition.

The numbers of the enemy were momentarily increasing, so delay would
assuredly make matters worse; the only chance of success, therefore,
was to take the initiative, and attack the Afghan main position at
once. Accordingly, I sent an officer with orders to the troops who
were moving towards the gorge not to commence work, but to take up
a defensive position until my plans were further developed. I sent
another messenger to Macpherson, informing him of my intention to take
immediate action, and telling him to keep a good look-out, and push on
to Charasia with all possible speed, and at the same time I reinforced
him by a squadron of Cavalry.

The Afghan position formed the arc of a circle, extending from the
_sang-i-nawishta_ gorge to the heights above Chardeh. Both sides of
the gorge were occupied by the enemy, as was a semi-detached hill to
the south of it, and sixteen guns were observed in position. The line
they had taken up occupied nearly three miles of country; and their
main position was the ridge, which, close to the gorge, rose 1,000
feet above the plain, running up at its western extremity to a peak
2,200 feet high. Thence the line stretched along the edge of some
lower heights to a rugged hill, the summit of which was about 1,800
feet above Charasia. In front of this formidable position were a
succession of sandy hills, forming a series of easily defensible
posts, and at the foot of these hills ran a bare stony belt, sloping
down to the cultivated land surrounding Charasia and the hamlet of
Khairabad.

My movements and reconnaissances up till now having led the enemy to
believe that I intended to deliver my attack on their left at the
_sang-i-nawishta_, they were seen to be concentrating their forces in
that direction. But this position could only have been carried with
such damaging loss to us that I determined to make the real attack by
an outflanking movement to their right.

The men having made a hasty breakfast, I despatched General Baker in
this direction, and placing at his disposal the troops noted below,[2]
I entrusted to him the difficult task of dislodging the enemy, while
I continued to distract their attention towards the gorge by making a
feint to their left.

Baker's little column assembled in a wooded enclosure close to
Charasia, where he left his field hospital and reserve ammunition, for
the safe guarding of which I sent him the 5th Punjab Infantry, while
he was further reinforced by 450 men of the 23rd Pioneers and three
Field Artillery guns. I was thus left with only six Horse Artillery
guns, 450 Cavalry, and between 600 and 700 Infantry for the protection
of the camp, where I was still handicapped by the presence of the Amir
and his untrustworthy following.

While Baker advanced to the left, the party near the _sang-i-nawishta_
gorge, commanded by Major White, of the 92nd Highlanders, was ordered
to threaten the pass and to prevent the enemy occupying any portion of
the Charasia village, to advance within Artillery range of the enemy's
main position above the gorge, and when the outflanking movement had
been thoroughly developed and the enemy were in full retreat, but not
before, to push the Cavalry through the gorge and pursue.

At about 11.30 a.m. Baker's leading troops emerged into the open, and
were immediately engaged with a crowd of armed Afghans, supported by a
considerable body of Regular troops. The General now sent one company
of the 72nd, under Captain Hunt, to turn the Afghans off a succession
of peaks situated at right angles to the ridge they were occupying on
their extreme right. Running along this ridge, and stretching across
the Indiki road to the sandhills, the Afghan right wing held a
line considerably in advance of their left on the hill above the
_sang-i-nawishta_ gorge, and one which could not easily be turned, for
the peaks the 72nd were sent to occupy were almost inaccessible, and
the fire from them swept the slopes up which our troops must advance.
These peaks, therefore, formed the key of the position, and their
defenders had to be dislodged from them at all hazards before anything
else could be attempted. The company of the 72nd with much difficulty
fought their way up, and gained a footing on the first peak, where
they were obliged to pause, until reinforced by two companies of the
5th Gurkhas under Captain Cook, V.C., when they advanced all together,
clearing the enemy from each successive point, while the remainder of
the 72nd breasted the hill, and, under cover of the Mountain guns,
attacked the position in front. But the enemy were obstinate, and the
extremely difficult nature of the ground somewhat checked the gallant
Highlanders. Seeing their dilemma, Baker despatched two companies of
the 5th Gurkhas, under Lieutenant-Colonel Fitz-Hugh, and 200 men of
the 5th Punjab Infantry, under Captain Hall, to their assistance;
while the 23rd Pioneers were brought up on the right, in support, and
a detachment of the 5th Punjab Infantry echeloned in rear, on the left
of the line.

The engagement now became hot, and the firing fast and furious.
My readers will, I am sure, be able to realize with what intense
excitement and anxiety I watched the proceedings. It was evident to
me that little progress could be made so long as the enemy retained
possession of the ridge, which the Afghan Commander apparently had
just begun to appreciate was the real point of attack, for his troops
could now be seen hurrying to this point, and it became more urgently
necessary than ever to carry the position before it could be
reinforced. At 2 p.m. it was seized; the Highlanders and Gurkhas could
no longer be resisted; the Afghans wavered, and then began to retreat,
exposed to a cross-fire that effectually prevented their rallying.

The brunt of this affair was borne by the 72nd, admirably led by their
company officers, under the skilful direction of Lieutenant-Colonel
Clarke and his Adjutant, Lieutenant Murray. I closely watched
their movements, and particularly observed one man pushing up the
precipitous hillside considerably in advance of everyone else, and
apparently utterly regardless of the shower of bullets falling round
him. I inquired about him later on, and found that he was a young
Irish private of the 72nd, named MacMahon, to whose coolness and
daring was in a great measure due the capture of this very strong
post. Her Majesty, I am glad to be able to relate, subsequently
rewarded this intrepid soldier by bestowing on him the Victoria Cross.

The general advance was now sounded, and gallantly was it responded
to. The main position was stormed by the Highlanders, Gurkhas, and
Punjab Infantry, each trying hard to be the first to close with its
defenders. The enemy fought desperately, charging down on the Gurkhas,
by whom, under the leadership of Lieutenant-Colonel Fitz-Hugh and his
Adjutant, Lieutenant Martin, they were repulsed and driven over the
crest with heavy loss.

The Afghans now took up a position some 600 yards in the rear of that
from which they had just been dislodged, where they made an obstinate
stand for half an hour, but they were again forced back on the
attacking party being strengthened by the arrival of two companies of
the 92nd Highlanders, sent to their assistance by Major White, who
had already successfully engaged the Afghan left above the
_sang-i-nawishta_ gorge. As the enemy's advanced posts on the hill to
the south, and directly in front of the gorge, prevented our guns from
coming within range of their position on the heights above, these
posts had to be disposed of as a preliminary to effective co-operation
with Baker; accordingly, about noon the hill was captured by two
companies of the 92nd, under Captain Cotton, and half a battery of
Field Artillery was advanced to a point whence Major Parry was able to
engage the Afghan guns posted above the gorge.

It was at this juncture, when Baker's troops, having carried the
main position, were proceeding to attack that to which the enemy had
retreated, that White despatched two companies of the 92nd, under
Captain Oxley, by whose timely aid the determined foe were at length
driven from this point of vantage also. The troops followed up their
success and advanced at the double, while our guns shelled the shaken
masses.

The Afghan right and centre now gave way completely; the enemy broke,
and fled down the slopes on the further side in a north-westerly
direction, eventually taking refuge in the Chardeh villages.

By 3.45 we were in possession of the whole of the main ridge. The
first objective having been thus gained, the troops, pivoting on their
right, brought round their left and advanced against the now exposed
flanks of the enemy's left wing, and simultaneously with this movement
White advanced from his position by the hill in front of the gorge,
and a little after four o'clock had gained possession of the pass and
twelve Afghan guns.

Completely outflanked and enfiladed by Baker's fire, the left wing of
the Afghan force made but little resistance; they rapidly abandoned
the height, and retired across the river toward the north-east,
pursued by the small body of Cavalry attached to White's force, under
Major Hammond, and a party of the 92nd, under Major Hay.

Baker now paused to allow of the Infantry's ammunition being
replenished, and then advanced along the ridge towards the pass, which
he reached in time to help the Cavalry who were engaged with the
enemy's rear guard at the river; the latter were driven off and forced
to retreat; but by this time the growing darkness made further pursuit
impossible. We were therefore compelled to rest satisfied with holding
the ground in advance by piquets and occupying both ends of the
_sang-i-nawishta_ defile, where the troops bivouacked for the night. I
was able to supply them with food from Charasia, and they were made as
comfortable as they could be under the circumstances.

While the fighting was taking place on the heights in front of
Charasia, the hills on both flanks of my camp were crowded with the
enemy, anxiously watching the result; they did not approach within the
Cavalry patrols, but one party caused so much annoyance to a picquet
by firing into it that it became necessary to dislodge it, a service
which was performed in a very daring manner by a few of the 92nd,
under Lieutenant Grant and Colour-Sergeant Hector Macdonald, the same
non-commissioned officer who had a few days before so distinguished
himself in the Hazardarakht defile.

Our casualties were wonderfully few, only 18 killed and 70 wounded,[3]
while the enemy left 300 dead behind them, and as they succeeded in
carrying numbers of their killed and wounded off the field, their loss
must have been heavy. I subsequently ascertained that we had opposed
to us, besides thirteen Regular regiments, between eight and ten
thousand Afghans. Ghilzais from Tezin and Hisarak had hurried up in
large numbers to join the enemy, but, luckily for us, arrived too
late. Of these some returned to their homes when they found the Afghan
army had been beaten, but the greater number waited about Kabul to
assist in any further stand that might be made by the Regular troops.

The heliograph, worked by Captain Stratton, of the 22nd Foot, had been
of the greatest use during the day, and kept me fully informed of all
details. The last message as the sun was sinking behind the hills,
confirming my own observations, was a most satisfactory one, to the
effect that the whole of the enemy's position was in our possession,
and that our victory was complete.

Throughout the day my friend (!) the Amir, surrounded by his Sirdars,
remained seated on a knoll in the centre of the camp watching the
progress of the fight with intense eagerness, and questioning everyone
who appeared as to his interpretation of what he had observed. So soon
as I felt absolutely assured of our victory, I sent an Aide-de-camp to
His Highness to convey the joyful intelligence of our success. It was,
without doubt, a trying moment for him, and a terrible disappointment
after the plans which I subsequently ascertained he and his adherents
at Kabul had carefully laid for our annihilation. But he received
the news with Asiatic calmness, and without the smallest sign of
mortification, merely requesting my Aide-de-camp to assure me that, as
my enemies were his enemies, he rejoiced at my victory.

Macpherson's brigade, with its impedimenta, arrived before it was
quite dark, so altogether I had reason to feel satisfied with the
day's results. But the fact still remained that not more than twelve
miles beyond stood the city of Kabul, with its armed thousands ready
to oppose us should an assault prove necessary. I had besides received
information of a further gathering of Ghilzais bent upon another
attack on the Shutargardan, and that reinforcements of Regular troops
and guns were hastening to Kabul from Ghazni. Prompt action was the
one and only means of meeting these threatened difficulties. My troops
had had more than enough for one day, and required rest, but needs
must when the devil (in the shape of Afghan hordes) drives. I resolved
to push on, and issued orders for tents to be struck at once and an
advance to be made at break of day.

At the first streak of dawn on the 7th I started, leaving Macpherson
to come on with the heavy baggage as quickly as he could. I marched by
the _sang-i-nawishta_ defile, where Major White met me and explained
to me his part in the victory of the previous day. From my inspection
of the ground, I had no difficulty in coming to the conclusion that
much of the success which attended the operations on this side was due
to White's military instincts and, at one supreme moment, his extreme
personal gallantry. It afforded me, therefore, very great pleasure to
recommend this officer for the Victoria Cross, an honour of which
more than one incident in his subsequent career proved him to be well
worthy.

Our rapid advance, following on the defeat of the previous day, had
the effect I hoped it would have. On arriving at Beni Hissar, a
considerable village, surrounded by orchards and gardens, only two
miles south of the far-famed citadel of the Bala Hissar, I sent out
Cavalry patrols to reconnoitre, who brought me the pleasing news that
the Bala Hissar had been evacuated, and the only part of the city
visible seemed to be deserted.

During the day I received visits from some of the chief merchants of
Kabul, who each told a different tale regarding the movements of the
defeated Afghan army and the intentions of the Afghan Commander. From
their conflicting accounts, however, I gathered that, fresh troops
having arrived from Kohistan, the remnants of the Charasia army had
joined them, and that the combined forces were then occupying
the range of hills immediately above Kabul, to the west, and had
determined to make another stand.

Having received intelligence that the enemy, if again defeated,
intended to retire towards Turkestan, I directed Brigadier-General
Massy, on the morning of the 8th October, to move out with the Cavalry
brigade and place himself across their line of retreat.[4] The brigade
started at 11 a.m., and, in order to avoid the city and adjacent
heights, made a considerable detour by Siah Sang and Sherpur, the new
Afghan cantonment. On reaching the latter place, Massy heliographed
to me that he had found it deserted, the magazine blown up, and
seventy-five guns[5] abandoned inside the enclosure, and that the
enemy were now occupying a ridge[6] which seemed to him to be
a prolongation of the Shahr-i-Darwaza range above Kabul; then,
continuing his march, he crossed a depression in this ridge called
the Nanachi Kotal, and wheeling to his left, and skirting the Asmai
heights on the western side, he soon came in sight of the Afghan camp,
pitched on the slope of the hills about a mile from Deh-i-Mazang.

Brigadier-General Massy was informed, in reply to his heliogram,
that Baker would be despatched at once to drive the enemy from their
position and force them to fall back upon the Cavalry, upon which
Massy immediately made the arrangements which appeared to him most
advisable for blocking, with the limited number of sabres at his
disposal, the several roads by which the enemy might attempt to
escape.

I could only spare to Baker a very small force (1,044 rifles, two
Mountain guns and one Gatling), for Macpherson's and White's troops
had not yet come up. He started off without a moment's delay, and,
driving the enemy's scouts before him, worked his way along the
Shahr-i-Darwaza heights to the west; but his progress was very slow,
owing to the extreme difficulty of the ground, and the day was far
spent before he found himself near enough to the enemy to use his
Artillery. To his delight, Baker perceived that he commanded the
Afghan camp and the rear of their main position; but his satisfaction
was considerably allayed when he discovered that between him and them
lay a deep gorge[7] with precipitous sides, through which ran the
Kabul river, and that before he could attack he would have to descend
1,600 feet, and then climb up the opposite side, which was nearly as
high and quite as steep.

Anxious as Baker was that there should be no delay in delivering the
assault, by the time his dispositions were made it had become too dark
to attempt it, and most reluctantly he had to postpone the movement
till daybreak the next day. He had ascertained that the Kabul river
was not fordable for Infantry except at a point which was commanded
by the enemy's camp, and was too far from support to warrant piquets
being pushed across at night. Nothing whatever could be seen, but
a very slight noise as of stealthy movement in the Afghan camp was
heard, and the fear seized Baker that the enemy might escape him. Soon
after 11 p.m., therefore, when the rising moon began in a measure
to dispel the darkness, Baker sent a strong patrol under a British
officer to feel for the enemy. The patrol came into contact with the
Afghan scouts on the river-bank, from some of whom, taken prisoners in
the struggle, they learned that the enemy had crept away under cover
of the night, and the greater number had dispersed to their own homes;
but about 800, mounted on Artillery horses, were reported to have
accompanied their Commander, Mahomed Jan, and to have escaped in the
direction of Bamian.

Meanwhile, Brigadier-General Massy, from his point of observation
beneath the Asmai heights, had perceived that it was impossible for
Baker to carry the enemy's main position by daylight; he tried
to communicate with Baker and ascertain his plans, but the party
despatched on this service were unable to get through the villages and
woods, which were all held by the enemy, and returned unsuccessful.
Massy then collected his scattered squadrons and bivouacked for the
night, being anxious that his men and horses should have food and
rest, and it not having struck him that the enemy might attempt to
escape during the hours of darkness.

The information that in very truth they had escaped was brought to
Baker at 4.30 a.m. He at once communicated it to Massy, telling him
at the same time that any movement the Cavalry might make in pursuit
would be supported by the troops under his immediate command, and
also by a brigade under Brigadier-General Macpherson, which I had
despatched to reinforce Baker; Macpherson and White, with their
respective troops, having arrived at Beni Hissar shortly after Baker
had started.

I joined Baker at this time, and great was my disappointment at being
told that the Afghans had given us the slip. I went carefully over the
ground, however, and satisfied myself that Baker had done all that was
possible under the circumstances, and that the enemy having eluded us
could not in any way be attributed to want of care or skill on his
part.

Massy scoured the country until nightfall on the 9th, but with very
little success, only one small party of fugitives being overtaken
about four-and-twenty miles on the road to Ghazni. Numbers, doubtless,
found shelter in the city of Kabul, others in the numerous villages
with which the richly-cultivated Chardeh valley was thickly studded,
and whose inhabitants were hostile to a man; others escaped to the
hills; and the remainder, having had ten hours' start, could not be
overtaken.

The enemy's camp was left standing, and twelve guns, some elephants,
camels, mules, and ponies, fell into our possession.

During that day our camp was moved nearer the city to Siah Sang, a
commanding plateau between the Kabul and Logar rivers, close to their
confluence, and less than a mile east of the Bala Hissar. The 5th
Gurkhas and two Mountain guns were left to hold the heights on which
Brigadier-General Baker had been operating, and the rest of the force
was concentrated on Siah Sang.


[Footnote 1: Twenty sabres, 9th Lancers, one squadron 5th Punjab
Cavalry, two guns, No. 2 Mountain battery, 284 rifles, 92nd
Highlanders, and 450 rifles, 23rd Pioneers.]

[Footnote 2: Two guns, No. 2 Mountain battery, two Gatling guns,
detachment 12th Bengal Cavalry, 72nd Highlanders, 5th Gurkhas (300
rifles), 5th Punjab Infantry (200 rifles), No. 7 Company Sappers and
Miners.]

[Footnote 3: During the fight the Infantry expended 41,090 rounds, of
which over 20,000 were fired by the 72nd Highlanders. The half-battery
G/3 R.A. fired 6 common shell (percussion fuses) and 71 shrapnel (time
fuses); total, 77 rounds. No. 2 Mountain Battery fired 10 common shell
and 94 shrapnel, total, 104 rounds. The two Gatlings fired 150 rounds.

At the tenth round one of the Gatlings jammed, and had to be taken to
pieces. This was the first occasion on which Gatling guns were used in
action. They were not of the present improved make, and, being found
unsatisfactory, were made but little use of.]

[Footnote 4: The troops available for this purpose were: One squadron
9th Lancers, 5th Punjab Cavalry, 12th Bengal Cavalry, and 14th Bengal
Lancers; total, 720 of all ranks.]

[Footnote 5: The guns included four English 18-pounders, one English
8-inch howitzer and two Afghan imitations of this weapon, and
forty-two bronze Mountain guns.]

[Footnote 6: The Asmai heights.]

[Footnote 7: The Deh-i-Mazang gorge.]

       *       *       *       *       *




CHAPTER LII.
1879

  Guiding instructions--Visit to the Bala Hissar--Yakub Khan abdicates
  --The Proclamation--Administrative measures
  --Explosions in the Bala Hissar


At last I was at Kabul, the place I had heard so much of from my
boy-hood, and had so often wished to see! The city lay beneath me,
with its mud-coloured buildings and its 50,000 inhabitants, covering
a considerable extent of ground. To the south-east corner of the city
appeared the Bala Hissar, picturesquely perched on a saddle just
beneath the Shahr-i-Darwaza heights, along the top of which ran
a fortified wall, enclosing the upper portion of the citadel and
extending to the Deh-i-Mazang gorge.

Kabul was reported to be perfectly quiet, and numbers of traders came
into our camp to dispose of their wares; but I forbade anyone to
enter the city until I had been able to decide upon the best means of
maintaining order amongst a population for the most part extremely
fanatical, treacherous, and vindictive.

So far our success had been complete: all opposition had been
overcome, Kabul was at our mercy, the Amir was in my camp ready to
agree to whatever I might propose, and it had been all done with
extraordinarily little loss to ourselves. Nevertheless, I felt my
difficulties were very far from being at an end--indeed, the part of
my duty still remaining to be accomplished was surrounded with far
greater difficulty, and was a source of much more anxiety to me than
the military task I had undertaken; for, with regard to the latter, I
possessed confidence in myself and my ability to perform it, whereas,
with respect to the political and diplomatic side of the question,
actual personal experience I had none, and I could only hope that
common-sense and a sense of justice would carry me through.

The instructions I had received from the Government of India were very
general in their character, for the Viceroy felt that any proceedings
must necessarily depend on the state of affairs obtaining at Kabul,
the acts and attitude of the Amir and his people, and the various
conditions impossible to foresee when the Foreign Office letter was
written to me on the 29th September. But, though general, they were
very comprehensive.

The troops were to be placed in strong and secure positions, such as
would give me complete control over the Amir's capital; any Afghan
soldiers remaining at Kabul, and the whole of the city population,
were to be disarmed; supplies were to be collected in sufficient
quantities to render my force independent in case of interruption
along the line of communication; Yakub Khan's personal safety was to
be secured, and adequate supervision maintained over his movements
and actions; a close investigation was to be instituted into all the
causes and circumstances connected with the 'totally unprovoked and
most barbarous attack by the Amir's soldiery and the people of his
capital upon the representative of an allied State, who was residing
under the Amir's protection in the Amir's fortress, in very close
proximity to the Amir himself, and whose personal safety and
honourable treatment had been solemnly guaranteed by the Ruler of
Afghanistan.'

The retribution to be exacted was to be adapted to the twofold
character of the offence, and was to be imposed upon the Afghan nation
in proportion as the offence was proved to be national, and as the
responsibility should be brought home to any particular community.
Further, the imposition of a fine, it was suggested upon the city of
Kabul 'would be in accordance with justice and precedent,' and the
demolition of fortifications and removal of buildings within range of
my defences, or which might interfere with my control over the city,
might be 'necessary as a military precaution.'

In forming my plans for the removal of obstructive buildings, I was to
consider 'whether they can be combined with any measures compatible
with justice and humanity for leaving a memorial of the retribution
exacted from the city in some manner and by some mark that will not be
easily obliterated.'

I was told that 'in regard to the punishment of individuals, it should
be swift, stern, and impressive, without being indiscriminate or
immoderate; its infliction must not be delegated to subordinate
officers of minor responsibility acting independently of your
instructions or supervision; and you cannot too vigilantly maintain
the discipline of the troops under your orders, or superintend their
treatment of the unarmed population, so long as your orders are obeyed
and your authority is unresisted. You will deal summarily in the
majority of cases with persons whose share in the murder of anyone
belonging to the British Embassy shall have been proved by your
investigations, but while the execution of justice should be as public
and striking as possible, it should be completed with all possible
expedition, since the indefinite prolongation of your proceedings
might spread abroad unfounded alarm.'

The despatch concluded with the words: 'It will probably be essential,
not only for the protection of your own camp from annoyance, but also
for the security of the well-affected population and for the general
maintenance of order, that you should assume and exercise supreme
authority in Kabul, since events have unfortunately proved that the
Amir has lost that authority, or that he has conspicuously failed to
make use of it.'

On the 10th I visited Sherpur, and the next day I went to the Bala
Hissar, and wandered over the scene of the Embassy's brave defence
and cruel end. The walls of the Residency, closely pitted with
bullet-holes, gave proof of the determined nature of the attack
and the length of the resistance. The floors were covered with
blood-stains, and amidst the embers of a fire were found a heap of
human bones. It may be imagined how British soldiers' hearts burned
within them at such a sight, and how difficult it was to suppress
feelings of hatred and animosity towards the perpetrators of such a
dastardly crime. I had a careful but unsuccessful search made for the
bodies of our ill-fated friends.

[Illustration: ENTRANCE TO THE BALA HISSAR, KABUL.
_From a photograph._]

The Bala Hissar, at one time of great strength, was now in a somewhat
dilapidated condition. It contained eighty-five guns, mortars and
howitzers, some of them of English manufacture, upwards of 250 tons of
gunpowder, stowed away in earthen vessels, many millions of Enfield
and Snider cartridges, and a large number of arms, besides quantities
of saddlery, clothing for troops, musical instruments, shot, shell,
caps, and accoutrements, and a vast amount of lead, copper and tin. It
would not have given us much trouble to storm the Bala Hissar, had we
been obliged to do so, for Artillery could have opened on it within
easy range, and there was cover for Infantry close up to the walls.

The reading of the Proclamation announcing the intentions of the
British Government with regard to the punishment of the city was
to take place in the Bala Hissar next day. The Amir had agreed to
accompany me. The leading people were invited to attend, and I had
given orders that all the troops were to take part in the procession,
so as to render as impressive as possible the ceremony, at which were
to be made known to the inhabitants of Kabul the terms imposed upon
them by the British Government. The object of my visit was to decide
how the troops might best be disposed so as to make the most imposing
display on the occasion.

I decided to detain in custody two Sirdars, Yahia Khan[1] and his
brother Zakariah Khan, the Mustaufi, and the Wazir, as these four
were Yakub Khan's principal advisers, and I was satisfied that their
influence was being used against us, and that so long as they were at
large a mine might be sprung upon me at any moment.

The Commander-in-Chief, Daud Shah, was also in the Amir's confidence;
but I determined to leave him at liberty, for, from what I could
learn, he had made an effort (not a very strong one, perhaps) to help
our unfortunate countrymen, and he had on several occasions since he
had been in my camp given me useful information; moreover, I hoped
to obtain further help from him, in which hope I was not altogether
disappointed.

As to what I ought to do with the Amir I was considerably puzzled.
Lord Lytton had urged upon me the necessity for weighing well the
advisability of prematurely breaking with him, as it was very possible
he might become a useful instrument in our hands, an eventuality which
I thoroughly understood; but I was not at all sure that Yakub Khan
would not break with me when he learnt my decision with regard to his
Ministers, and I had received more than one warning that, if he failed
to keep me from entering Kabul, he contemplated flight and a supreme
effort to raise the country against me.

Yakub Khan certainly did not deserve much consideration from us; for,
though no absolute proof was forthcoming of his having instigated the
attack upon the Embassy, he most certainly made not the slightest
effort to stop it or to save the lives of those entrusted to his
care, and throughout that terrible day showed himself to be, if not
a deliberate traitor, a despicable coward. Again, his endeavours to
delay the march of my force for the sole purpose of gaining sufficient
time to organize the destruction of the army to whose protection he
had appealed deprived him, to my mind, of the smallest claim to be
treated as an honourable ally.

My doubts as to what policy I ought to pursue with regard to Yakub
Khan were all solved by his own action on the morning of the 12th
October. He came to my tent before I was dressed, and asked for an
interview, which was, of course, accorded. The only chair I possessed
I offered to my Royal visitor, who seated himself, and then and there
announced that he had come to resign the Amirship, and that he was
only carrying out a determination made before he came to Kushi; he had
then allowed himself to be over-persuaded, but now his resolution was
fixed. His life, he said, had been most miserable, and he would rather
be a grass-cutter in the English camp than Ruler of Afghanistan; he
concluded by entreating me to allow his tent to be pitched close to
mine until he could go to India, to London, or wherever the Viceroy
might desire to send him. I placed a tent at his disposal, ordered
breakfast to be prepared for him, and begged him not to decide at
once, but think the matter over for some hours, adding that I would
see him again at ten o'clock, the hour appointed for him to accompany
me to the Bala Hissar in order that he might be present at the reading
of the Proclamation. At this time, it must be remembered, the Amir did
not know what the terms of the Proclamation were, and was entirely
ignorant of my intentions regarding his Ministers.

As arranged, I had another interview with Yakub Khan at ten o'clock,
when I found him unshaken in his resolve to abdicate, and unwilling,
under the circumstances, to be present at the ceremony which was about
to take place. He said, however, that he would send his eldest son,
and that all his Ministers should attend me. I begged him again to
reconsider the decision he had come to, and to think well over the
results to himself; but finding that he had finally[2] made up his
mind, I told His Highness I would telegraph his determination to the
Viceroy and ask for instructions; that he would not, of course, be
forced to continue to reign at Kabul against his will, but that I
would ask him to retain his title until I could receive a reply from
Simla.

At noon I proceeded to the Bala Hissar, accompanied by my staff, the
Heir-Apparent, the Ministers, and a large gathering of the chief
Sirdars of Kabul. Both sides of the road were lined with troops, of
whom I felt not a little proud that day. Notwithstanding that the duty
required of them had been severe and continuous, now that they were
required to take part in a ceremonial parade, they turned out as clean
and smart as one could wish to see them.

As the head of the procession entered the main gateway, the British
flag was run up, the bands played the National Anthem, and a salute of
thirty-one guns was fired.

On arriving at the public Hall of Audience, I dismounted, and
ascending the steps leading to it, I addressed the assembled
multitude, and read to them the following Proclamation, containing the
orders of the British Government:

    'In my Proclamation dated the 3rd October, I informed the people
    of Kabul that a British army was advancing to take possession of
    the city, and I warned them against offering any resistance to the
    entry of the troops and the authority of His Highness the Amir.
    That warning has been disregarded. The force under my command has
    now reached Kabul and occupied the Bala Hissar, but its advance
    has been pertinaciously opposed, and the inhabitants of the city
    have taken a conspicuous part in the opposition offered. They have
    therefore become rebels against His Highness the Amir, and have
    added to the guilt already incurred by them in abetting the
    murder of the British Envoy and his companions--a treacherous and
    cowardly crime which has brought indelible disgrace upon the
    Afghan people. It would be but a just and fitting reward for such
    misdeeds if the city of Kabul were now totally destroyed and its
    very name blotted out; but the great British Government ever
    desires to temper justice with mercy, and I now announce to the
    inhabitants of Kabul that the full retribution for their offence
    will not be exacted, and that the city will be spared.

    'Nevertheless, it is necessary that they should not escape all
    penalty, and, further, that the punishment inflicted should be
    such as will be felt and remembered. Therefore, such portions
    of the city buildings as now interfere with the proper military
    occupation of the Bala Hissar, and the safety and comfort of the
    British troops to be quartered in it, will be at once levelled
    with the ground; and, further, a heavy fine, the amount of which
    will be notified hereafter, will be imposed upon the inhabitants
    of Kabul, to be paid according to their several capacities. I
    further give notice to all, that, in order to provide for the
    restoration and maintenance of order, the city of Kabul and the
    surrounding country, to a distance of ten miles, are placed under
    martial law. With the consent of His Highness the Amir, a military
    Governor of Kabul will be appointed, to administer justice and
    punish with a strong hand all evil-doers. The inhabitants of Kabul
    and of the neighbouring villages are hereby warned to submit to
    his authority.

    'This punishment, inflicted upon the whole city, will not, of
    course, absolve from further penalties those whose individual
    guilt may be hereafter proved. A full and searching inquiry into
    the circumstances of the late outbreak will be held, and all
    persons convicted of having taken part in it will be dealt with
    according to their deserts.

    'With the view of providing effectually for the prevention of
    crime and disorder, and the safety of all well-disposed persons in
    Kabul, it is hereby notified that for the future the carrying of
    dangerous weapons, whether swords, knives, or firearms, within the
    streets of the city or within a distance of five miles from the
    city gates, is forbidden. After a week from the date of this
    Proclamation, any person found armed within those limits will be
    liable to the penalty of death. Persons having in their possession
    any articles whatsoever which formerly belonged to members of
    the British Embassy are required to bring them forthwith to the
    British camp. Anyone neglecting this warning will, if found
    hereafter in possession of any such articles, be subject to the
    severest penalties.

    'Further, all persons who may have in their possession any
    firearms or ammunition formerly issued to or seized by the Afghan
    troops, are required to produce them. For every country-made
    rifle, whether breech or muzzle loading, the sum of Rs. 3 will be
    given on delivery, and for every rifle of European manufacture Rs.
    5. Anyone found hereafter in possession of such weapons will be
    severely punished. Finally, I notify that I will give a reward
    of Rs. 50 for the surrender of any person, whether soldier or
    civilian, concerned in the attack on the British Embassy, or for
    such information as may lead directly to his capture. A similar
    sum will be given in the case of any person who may have fought
    against the British troops since the 3rd September (Shawal) last,
    and therefore become a rebel against His Highness the Amir. If any
    such person so surrendered or captured be a captain or subaltern
    officer of the Afghan army, the reward will be increased to Rs.
    75, and if a field officer to Rs. 120.'

The Afghans were evidently much relieved at the leniency of the
Proclamation, to which they listened with the greatest attention.
When I had finished reading it, I dismissed the assembly, with the
exception of the Ministers whom I had decided to make prisoners. To
them I explained that I felt it to be my duty to place them under
restraint, pending investigation into the part they had taken in the
massacre of the Embassy.

The following day I made a formal entry into the city, traversing all
its main streets, that the people might understand that it and they
were at our mercy. The Cavalry brigade headed the procession; I
followed with my staff and escort, and five battalions of Infantry
brought up the rear; there were no Artillery, for in some places the
streets were so narrow and tortuous that two men could hardly ride
abreast.

It was scarcely to be expected the citizens would give us a warm
welcome; but they were perfectly respectful, and I hoped the martial
and workmanlike appearance of the troops would have a salutary effect.

I now appointed Major-General James Hills, V.C., to be Governor of
Kabul for the time being, associating with him the able and respected
Mahomedan gentleman, Nawab Ghulam Hussein Khan, as the most likely
means of securing for the present order and good government in the
city. I further instituted two Courts--one political, consisting of
Colonel Macgregor, Surgeon-Major Bellew,[3] and Mahomed Hyat Khan, a
Mahomedan member of the Punjab Commission, and an excellent Persian
and Pushtu scholar, to inquire into the complicated circumstances
which led to the attack on the Residency, and to ascertain, if
possible, how far the Amir and his Ministers were implicated. The
other, a military Court, with Brigadier-General Massy as president,
for the trial of those Chiefs and soldiers accused of having taken
part in the actual massacre.[4]

Up to this time (the middle of October) communication with India had
been kept up by way of the Shutargardan, and I had heard nothing of
the approach of the Khyber column. It was so very necessary to open up
the Khyber route, in view of early snow on the Shutargardan, that I
arranged to send a small force towards Jalalabad, and to move the
Shutargardan garrison to Kabul, thus breaking off communication with
Kuram.

Colonel Money had beaten off another attack made by the tribesmen
on his position, but as they still threatened him in considerable
numbers, I despatched Brigadier-General Hugh Gough with some troops to
enable him to withdraw. This reinforcement arrived at a most opportune
moment, when the augmented tribal combination, imagining that the
garrison was completely at its mercy, had sent a message to Money
offering to spare their lives if they laid down their arms! So sure
were the Afghans of their triumph that they had brought 200 of
their women to witness it. On Gough's arrival, Money dispersed the
gathering, and his force left the Shutargardan, together with the
Head-Quarters and two squadrons of the 9th Lancers, which had been
ordered to join me from Sialkot, and afterwards proved a most valuable
addition to the Kabul Field Force.

I was sitting in my tent on the morning of the 16th October, when I
was startled by a most terrific explosion in the upper part of the
Bala Hissar, which was occupied by the 5th Gurkhas, while the 67th
Foot were pitched in the garden below. The gunpowder, stored in a
detached building, had somehow--we never could discover how--become
ignited, and I trembled at the thought of what would be the
consequences if the main magazine caught fire, which, with its 250
tons of gunpowder, was dangerously near to the scene of the explosion.
I at once sent orders to the Gurkhas and the 67th to clear out, and
not to wait even to bring away their tents, or anything but their
ammunition, and I did not breathe freely till they were all safe on
Siah Sang. The results of this disaster, as it was, were bad enough,
for Captain Shafto, R.A. (a very promising officer), a private of the
67th, the Subadar-Major of the 5th Gurkhas, and nineteen Natives, most
of them soldiers, lost their lives.

A second and more violent explosion took place two hours and a half
after the first, but there was no loss of life amongst the troops,
though several Afghans were killed at a distance of 400 yards from the
fort.

There was given on this occasion a very practical exemplification
of the good feeling existing between the European soldiers and the
Gurkhas. The 72nd and the 5th Gurkhas had been much associated from
the commencement of the campaign, and a spirit of _camaraderie_ had
sprung up between them, resulting in the Highlanders now coming
forward and insisting on making over their greatcoats to the little
Gurkhas for the night--a very strong proof of their friendship, for at
Kabul in October the nights are bitterly cold.

Two telegrams received about this time caused the greatest
gratification throughout the force. One was from the
Commander-in-Chief, conveying Her Majesty's expression of 'warm
satisfaction' at the conduct of the troops; the other was from the
Viceroy, expressing his 'cordial congratulations' and His Excellency's
'high appreciation of the ability with which the action was directed,
and the courage with which it was so successfully carried out.' I was
informed at the same time by Lord Lytton that, on the recommendation
of the Commander-in-Chief, I was given the local rank of
Lieutenant-General, to enable me to be placed in command of all the
troops in eastern Afghanistan, a force of 20,000 men and 46 guns, in
two divisions. The first division remained under my own immediate
command, and Major-General R. O. Bright, C.B.,[5] was appointed to the
command of the other. I was, of course very much pleased at this proof
of the confidence reposed in me.


[Footnote 1: Yahia Khan was Yakub Khan's father-in-law.]

[Footnote 2: At an interview which Major Hastings, the Political
Officer, and Mr. Durand, my Political Secretary, had with His Highness
at my request on the 23rd October, he said, referring to the subject
of the Amirship: 'I call God and the Koran to witness, and everything
a Mussulman holds sacred, that my only desire is to be set free, and
end my days in liberty. I have conceived an utter aversion for these
people. I always treated them well, and you see how they have rewarded
me. So long as I was fighting in one place or another, they liked me
well enough. Directly I became Amir, and consulted their own good by
making peace with you, they turned on me. Now I detest them all, and
long to be out of Afghanistan for ever. It is not that I am unable to
hold the country; I have held it before and could hold it again, but I
have no further wish to rule such a people, and I beg of you to let me
go. If the British Government wish me to stay, I will stay, as their
servant or as the Amir, if you like to call me so, until my son is of
an age to succeed me, or even without that condition; but it will
be wholly against my own inclination, and I earnestly beg to be set
free.']

[Footnote 3: Dr. Bellew was with the brothers Lumsden at Kandahar in
1857.]

[Footnote 4: My action in endorsing the proceedings of this court,
and my treatment of Afghans generally, were so adversely and severely
criticized by party newspapers and periodicals, and by members of the
Opposition in the House of Commons, that I was called upon for an
explanation of my conduct, which was submitted and read in both Houses
of Parliament by the Secretary of State for India, Viscount Cranbrook,
and the Under-Secretary of State for India, the Hon. E. Stanhope. In
the Parliamentary records of February, 1880, can be seen my reply to
the accusations, as well as an abstract statement of the executions
carried out at Kabul in accordance with the findings of the military
Court.]

[Footnote 5: Afterwards General Sir Robert Bright, G.C.B.]

       *       *       *       *       *




CHAPTER LIII.
1879

  Afghans afraid to befriend us--Kabul Russianized
  --Yakub Khan's abdication accepted--State treasury taken over


I had given much thought to the question of housing the troops during
the winter, which was now fast approaching. Some of the senior
officers were in favour of quartering them in the Bala Hissar, as
being the place with most prestige attached to it; but the fact that
there was not accommodation in it for the whole force, and that,
therefore, the troops would have to be separated, as well as the
dangerous proximity of the huge store of gunpowder, which could only
be got rid of by degrees, decided me to occupy in preference the
partly-fortified cantonment of Sherpur, about a mile north-east of the
city, and close to the ruins of the old British entrenchment. It was
enclosed on three sides by a high and massive loop-holed wall, and on
the fourth by the Bimaru heights, while it possessed the advantage of
having within its walls sufficient shelter in long ranges of brick
buildings for the British troops, and good hospital accommodation,
and there was ample space for the erection of huts for the Native
soldiers.

The drawback was that the great extent of its perimeter, more than
four and a half miles, made it a very difficult place to defend; but,
remembering the grievous results of General Elphinstone's force being
scattered in 1841, I thought the advantage of being able to keep my
troops together outweighed the disadvantage of having to defend so
long a line.

Materials for the Native soldiers' huts were brought from the Bala
Hissar, the demolition of which, as an act of retributive justice, I
had recommended to the Government of India, as it appeared to me that
the destruction of the fortified palace in which the massacre had
taken place, and which was the symbol of the power of the Afghans and
their boasted military strength, would be a more fitting punishment
for treachery and insult than any other we could inflict, and a more
lasting memorial of our ability to avenge our countrymen than any we
could raise. The tidings that their ancient citadel had been levelled
to the ground would, I felt sure, spread throughout the length and
breadth of Afghanistan, bearing with them a political significance
that could hardly be over-estimated.

I now set to work to collect supplies for the winter. A1 _khalsa_,
or State grain, we took as our right, the justice of this being
recognized both by the Amir and the people, but what was the property
of private individuals was purchased at a price the avaricious Afghan
could not resist. There had been a good harvest, and supplies were
abundant; but the people from the outlying districts were chary of
assisting us, for they knew from experience that all who befriended
the British would be sure to suffer when we took our departure.

I had repeated complaints brought to me of the harshness and injustice
with which those who had shown themselves well disposed towards us
were treated by the Amir on his return from signing the Treaty at
Gandamak, and most of the Afghans were so afraid of the Amir's
vengeance when they should again be left to his tender mercies, that
they held aloof, except those who, like Wali Mahomed Khan and his
following, were in open opposition to Yakub Khan, and some few who
were still smarting from recent injury and oppression.

I was frequently asked by the Afghans, when requiring some service to
be rendered, 'Are you going to remain?' Could I have replied in the
affirmative, or could I have said that we should continue to exercise
sufficient control over the Government of the country to prevent their
being punished for helping us, they would have served us willingly.
Not that I could flatter myself they altogether liked us, but
they would have felt it wise in their own interests to meet our
requirements; and, besides, the great mass of the people were heartily
sick and tired of a long continuance of oppression and misrule, and
were ready to submit (for a time, at least) to any strong and just
Government.

Lord Lytton, in the hope of saving from the resentment of the Amir
those who had been of use to us in the early part of the war, had
expressly stipulated in Article II. of the Gandamak Treaty that 'a
full and complete amnesty should be published, absolving all Afghans
from any responsibility on account of intercourse with the British
Forces during the campaign, and that the Amir should guarantee
to protect all persons, of whatever degree, from punishment or
molestation on that account.'

But this stipulation was not adhered to. Yakub Khan more than once
spoke to me about it, and declared that it was impossible to control
the turbulent spirits in Afghanistan without being supreme, and that
this amnesty, had it been published, would have tied his hands with
regard to those who had proved themselves his enemies.

His neglect to carry out this Article of the treaty added considerably
to my difficulty, as will be seen from the following letter from
Asmatula Khan, a Ghilzai Chief, to whom I wrote, asking him to meet me
at Kabul.

    'I received your kind letter on the 8th of Shawal [28th
    September], and understood its contents, and also those of the
    enclosed Proclamation to the people of Kabul. I informed all whom
    I thought fit of the contents of the Proclamation.

    'Some time ago I went to Gandamak to Major Cavagnari. He
    instructed me to obey the orders of the Amir, and made me over to
    His Highness. When Major Cavagnari returned to India, the Amir's
    officials confiscated my property, and gave the Chiefship to my
    cousin[1] [or enemy], Bakram Khan.

    'The oppression I suffered on your account is beyond description.
    They ruined and disgraced every friend and adherent of mine. On
    the return of Major Cavagnari to Kabul, I sent my Naib [deputy] to
    him, who informed him of my state. Major Cavagnari sent a message
    to me to the effect that I should recover my property by force if
    I could, otherwise I should go to the hills, and not come to Kabul
    until I heard from him. In the meantime I received news of the
    murder of the Envoy, and I am still in the hills.'

The thought of what might be in store for those who were now aiding me
troubled me a good deal. No doubt their help was not disinterested,
but they were 'friends in need,' and I could not be quite indifferent
to their future.

I had several interesting conversations with Yakub Khan, and in
discussing with him Sher Ali's reasons for breaking with us, he dwelt
on the fact that his father, although he did not get all he wished out
of Lord Mayo, was fairly satisfied and content with what had been done
for him, but when Saiyad Nur Mahomed returned from Simla in 1873,
he became thoroughly disgusted, and at once made overtures to the
Russians, with whom constant intercourse had since been kept up.

Yakub Khan's statements were verified by the fact that we found Kabul
much more Russian than English. The Afghan Sirdars and officers were
arrayed in Russian pattern uniforms, Russian money was found in the
treasury, Russian wares were sold in the bazaars, and although the
roads leading to Central Asia were certainly no better than those
leading to India, Russia had taken more advantage of them than we had
to carry on commercial dealings with Afghanistan.[2]

When I inquired of Yakub Khan what had become of the correspondence
which must have been carried on between his father and the Russians,
he declared that he had destroyed it all when on his way to Gandamak;
nevertheless, a certain number of letters[3] from Generals Kauffmann
and Stoliatoff came into my possession, and a draft of the treaty the
latter officer brought from Tashkent was made for me from memory by
the man who had copied it for Sher Ali, aided by the Afghan official
who was told off to be in attendance on Stoliatoff, and who had
frequently read the treaty.

In one of my last conversations with Yakub Khan, he advised me 'not to
lose sight of Herat and Turkestan.' On my asking him whether he had
any reason to suppose that his representatives in those places meant
to give trouble, he replied: 'I cannot say what they may do; but,
remember, I have warned you.' He, no doubt, knew more than he told
me, and I think it quite possible that he had some inkling of his
brother's[4] (Ayub Khan's) intentions, in regard to Kandahar, and he
probably foresaw that Abdur Rahman Khan would appear on the scene from
the direction of Turkestan.

I duly received an answer to my telegram regarding the abdication of
Yakub Khan, in which I was informed that His Highness's resignation
was accepted by Her Majesty's Government, and I was directed to
announce the fact to the people of Afghanistan in the following terms:

    'I, General Roberts, on behalf of the British Government, hereby
    proclaim that the Amir, having by his own free will abdicated,
    has left Afghanistan without a Government. In consequence of the
    shameful outrage upon its Envoy and suite, the British Government
    has been compelled to occupy by force of arms Kabul, the capital,
    and to take military possession of other parts of Afghanistan.

    'The British Government now commands that all Afghan authorities,
    Chiefs, and Sirdars do continue their functions in maintaining
    order, referring to me whenever necessary.

    'The British Government desire that the people shall be treated
    with justice and benevolence, and that their religious feelings
    and customs be respected.

    'The services of such Sirdars and Chiefs as assist in preserving
    order will be duly recognized, but all disturbers of the peace and
    persons concerned in attacks upon the British authority will meet
    with condign punishment.

    'The British Government, after consultation with the principal
    Sirdars, tribal Chiefs, and others representing the interests and
    wishes of the various provinces and cities, will declare its will
    as to the future permanent arrangements to be made for the good
    government of the people.'

This manifesto was issued on the 28th October, and the same day
I informed Yakub Khan that his abdication had been accepted, and
acquainted him with the orders passed by the British Government in
connexion with this fact.[5]

Yakub Khan showed no interest either in the Proclamation, a Persian
translation of which was read to him, or the Government's decision as
to himself, and made no comment beyond a formal '_bisyar khub_' ('very
good') and an inclination of the head.

I then told Yakub Khan that, as I was now charged with the government
of the country, it was necessary that I should take possession of the
treasury and all moneys therein. He signified his assent, but demurred
to certain sums being considered as public property, contending
that they formed part of his father's wealth, and that the British
Government might as well take from him his _choga_,[6] this
also having come from the pockets of the people. 'My father was
_Padishah_,' he said; 'there was no distinction between public and
private money. However,' he went on, 'I have given up the crown, and I
am not going to dispute about rupees. You may take all I have, down to
my clothes; but the money was my father's, and is mine by right.'

I replied that it was necessary that all money in his possession
should be given up, but that his private effects should not be
touched; that he would be given a receipt for the money, and that, if
the Government of India decided it to be his personal property, it
should be returned to him.

This Yakub Khan at first declined to accept, with some show of temper.
Eventually he came round, and said, 'Yes, give me a receipt, so that
no one may say hereafter that I carried off State money to which I
had no right. It can be easily made sure that I have no money when I
go.'[7]

Spite of all his shortcomings, I could not help feeling sorry for the
self-deposed Ruler, and before leaving him I explained that he would
be treated with the same consideration that had always been accorded
to him, that Nawab Sir Ghulam Hussein Khan[8] should have a tent next
to his, and that it should be the Nawab's care to look after his
comfort in every way, and that I should be glad to see him whenever he
wished for an interview. That same day, under instructions, I issued
the following further manifesto:

    'In my Proclamation of yesterday I announced that His Highness the
    Amir had of his own free will abdicated, and that for the present
    the government of Afghanistan would be carried on under my
    supervision. I now proclaim that, in order to provide for the cost
    of administration, I have taken possession of the State treasury,
    and that, until the British Government shall declare its will
    as to the permanent arrangements to be made for the future good
    government of the country, the collection of revenue and the
    expenditure of public money will be regulated by me. All persons
    concerned are hereby informed that they must obey without dispute
    or delay such orders as may be issued by me in regard to the
    payment of taxes and other connected matters; and I give plain
    warning that anyone resisting or obstructing the execution of such
    orders will be treated with the utmost severity as an enemy to the
    British Government.'


[Footnote 1: In Pushtu the word _tarbur_ signifies a cousin to any
degree, and is not unfrequently used as 'enemy,' the inference being
that in Afghanistan a cousin is necessarily an enemy.]

[Footnote 2: As I reported at the time, the magnitude of Sher
Ali's military preparations was, in my opinion, a fact of peculiar
significance. He had raised and equipped with arms of precision
sixteen regiments of Cavalry and sixty-eight of Infantry, while his
Artillery amounted to nearly 300 guns. Numbers of skilled artisans
were constantly employed in the manufacture of rifled cannon and
breech-loading small arms. Swords, helmets, uniforms, and other
articles of military equipment, were stored in proportionate
quantities. Upon the construction of the Sherpur cantonment Sher Ali
had expended an astonishing amount of labour and money. The size and
cost of this work may be judged from the fact that the main line of
rampart, with barrack accommodation, extended to a length of nearly
two miles under the western and southern slopes of the Bimaru hills,
while the original design was to carry the wall entirely round the
hills, a distance of four and a half miles, and the foundations were
laid for a considerable portion of this length. All these military
preparations must have been going on for some years, and were quite
unnecessary, except as a provision for contemplated hostilities with
ourselves. Sher Ali had refused during this time to accept the subsidy
we had agreed to pay him, and it is difficult to understand how their
entire cost could have been met from the Afghan treasury, the annual
gross revenue of the country at that time amounting only to about 80
lakhs of rupees.]

[Footnote 3: These letters, as well as my report to the Secretary to
the Government of India in the Foreign Department, with an account of
my conversation with Yakub Khan, are given in the Appendix.]

[Footnote 4: Sirdar Ayub Khan was Governor of Herat in 1879.]

[Footnote 5: There were present at the interview, besides myself,
Colonel Macgregor, Major Hastings, Surgeon-Major Bellew, Nawab Sir
Ghulam Hussein Khan, and Mr. H.M. Durand.]

[Footnote 6: A kind of mantle worn by Afghans.]

[Footnote 7: As Yakub Khan refused under one pretext or another to
deliver up any money, Major Moriarty, the officer in charge of the
Kabul Field Force treasure-chest, and Lieutenant Neville Chamberlain,
accompanied by an escort, searched a house in the city in which a
portion of Yakub Khan's money was said to be concealed. Upwards of
eight and a half lakhs of rupees, and a certain amount of jewellery
and gold coins, tillas and Russian five-rouble pieces, in all
amounting to nine and a half lakhs, were found. This sum was
subsequently refunded to the Afghan Government.]

[Footnote 8: The Nawab had been made a K.C.S.I.]

       *       *       *       *       *




CHAPTER LIV.
1879

  The amnesty Proclamation--Strength of the Kabul Field Force
  --Yakub Khan despatched to India


On the 1st November my Head-Quarters and the 1st division moved into
Sherpur, which the Engineers had prepared for winter quarters, and
where stores of provisions and forage were assuming satisfactory
proportions. The same day Brigadier-General Macpherson left Kabul with
a brigade of about 1,800 men and four guns to join hands with the
troops which I had lately heard were advancing from the Khyber, and
had reached Gandamak. I joined Macpherson the following morning at
Butkhak, about eleven miles from Kabul, where our first post towards
the Khyber had already been established. It was very important that
our communication with India should be by a route good enough for
wheeled carriages; I was therefore anxious to see for myself if it
were not possible to avoid the Khurd-Kabul Pass, which was said to be
very difficult. I had, besides, a strong wish to visit this pass, as
being the scene of Sir Robert Sale's fight with the tribesmen in
1841, and of the beginning of the massacre of General Elphinstone's
unfortunate troops in 1842.[1] The Afghan Commander-in-Chief, Daud
Shah, and several Ghilzai Chiefs, accompanied me; from them I learned
that an easier road did exist, running more to the east, and crossing
over the Lataband mountain. Personal inspection of the two lines
proved that Daud Shah's estimate of their respective difficulties
was correct; the Lataband route was comparatively easy, there was no
defile as on the Khurd-Kabul side, and the kotal, 8,000 feet above the
sea, was reached by a gradual ascent from Butkhak. However, I found
the Khurd-Kabul much less difficult than I had imagined it to be; it
might have been made passable for carts, but there was no object in
using it, as the Lataband route possessed the additional advantage
of being some miles shorter; accordingly I decided upon adopting the
latter as the line of communication with India.

Macpherson reported that the country beyond Khurd-Kabul was fairly
settled, and that, on the 7th, he had been able to open communication
with Brigadier-General Charles Gough, commanding Bright's leading
brigade. I was thus again brought into communication with India, and
in a position to clear my hospitals of those amongst the sick and
wounded who were not progressing favourably, and could not soon be fit
for duty.

By this time the Inquiry Commission had completed its difficult task
of trying to sift the truth concerning the fate of Cavagnari and his
companions from the mass of falsehood with which it was enveloped. The
progress had been slow, particularly when examination touched on the
part Yakub Khan had played in the tragedy; witnesses were afraid to
give evidence openly until they were convinced that he would not be
re-established in a position to avenge himself. The whole matter had
been gone into most fully, and a careful perusal of the proceedings
satisfied me that the Amir could not have been ignorant that an attack
on the Residency was contemplated. He may not have foreseen or desired
the massacre of the Embassy, but there was no room for doubt as to his
having connived at a demonstration against it, which, had it not ended
so fatally, might have served him in good stead as a proof of his
inability to guarantee the safety of foreigners, and thus obtain the
withdrawal of the Mission.

It was impossible, under these circumstances, that Yakub Khan could
ever be reinstated as Ruler of Kabul, and his remaining in his present
equivocal position was irksome to himself and most embarrassing to me.
I therefore recommended that he should be deported to India, to
be dealt with as the Government might decide after reviewing the
information elicited by the political Court of Inquiry, which to
me appeared to tell so weightily against the ex-Amir, that, in my
opinion, I was no longer justified in treating as rebels to his
authority Afghans who, it was now evident, had only carried out his
secret, if not his expressed, wishes when opposing our advance
on Kabul. I decided, therefore, to proclaim a free and complete
amnesty[2] to all persons not concerned, directly or indirectly,
in the attack on the Residency, or who were not found hereafter in
possession of property belonging to our countrymen or their escort, on
the condition that they surrendered their arms and returned to their
homes.

At Daud Shah's suggestion, I sent three influential Sirdars to the
Logar, Kohistan, and Maidan valleys, to superintend the collection of
the amount of forage which was to be levied from those districts;
and in order to lessen the consumption at Kabul, I sent away all
elephants,[3] spare bullocks, and sick transport animals. In
furtherance of the same object, as soon as Macpherson returned, I sent
Baker with a brigade into the Maidan district, about twenty miles from
Kabul, on the Ghazni road, where the troops could more easily be fed,
as it was the district from which a large proportion of our supplies
was expected, and I also despatched to India all time-expired men and
invalids who were no longer fit for service.[4]

Towards the end of November, Mr. Luke, the officer in charge of the
telegraph department, who had done admirable work throughout the
campaign, reported that communication was established with India. As,
however, cutting the telegraph-wires was a favourite amusement of the
tribesmen, a heliograph was arranged at suitable stations between
Landi Kotal and Kabul, which was worked with fair success to the
end of the war. Had we then possessed the more perfect heliographic
apparatus which is now available, it would have made us, in that
land of bright sun, almost independent of the telegraph, so far as
connexion with Landi Kotal was concerned.

Hearing that Baker was experiencing difficulty in collecting his
supplies, I joined him at Maidan to satisfy myself how matters stood.
The headmen in the neighbourhood refused to deliver the _khalsa_ grain
they had been ordered to furnish, and, assisted by a body of Ghilzais
from Ghazni and Wardak, they attacked our Cavalry charged with
collecting it, and murdered our agent, Sirdar Mahomed Hussein Khan.
For these offences I destroyed the chief _malik's_ fort and confiscated
his store of grain, after which there was no more trouble, and
supplies came in freely. I returned to Kabul, and Baker, with his
brigade, followed me on the 1st December.

That same day Yakub Khan was despatched by double marches to India,
careful precautions having been taken to prevent his being rescued on
the way. When saying good-bye to him, he thanked me warmly for the
kindness and consideration he had received, and assured me that he
left his wives and children in my hands in the fullest confidence that
they would be well treated and cared for.

A week later I sent off the two Sirdars, Yahia Khan and Zakariah Khan,
as well as the Wazir, whose guilt had been clearly proved, and whose
powerful influence, I had every reason to believe, was being used to
stir up the country against us. The Mustaufi I allowed to remain; he
had been less prominent than the others in opposing us, and, besides,
I had an idea that he might prove useful to me in the administration
of the country.


[Footnote 1: A most thrilling account of Elphinstone's retreat through
this pass is given in Kaye's 'History of the War in Afghanistan,' vol.
ii., p. 229.]

[Footnote 2: The amnesty Proclamation ran as follows:

    'KABUL,
    '_12th November, 1879._

    'To all whom it may concern. On the 12th October a Proclamation
    was issued in which I offered a reward for the surrender of any
    person who had fought against the British troops since the 3rd
    September, and had thereby become a rebel against the Amir Yakub
    Khan. I have now received information which tends to show that
    some, at least, of those who shared in the opposition encountered
    by the British troops during their advance on Kabul, were led to
    do so by the belief that the Amir was a prisoner in my camp, and
    had called upon the soldiery and people of Kabul to rise on his
    behalf. Such persons, although enemies to the British Government,
    were not rebels against their own Sovereign, and the great British
    Government does not seek for vengeance against enemies who no
    longer resist. It may be that few only of those who took up arms
    were thus led away by the statements of evil-minded men, but
    rather than punish the innocent with the guilty, I am willing to
    believe that all were alike deceived. On behalf of the British
    Government, therefore, I proclaim a free and complete amnesty to
    all persons who have fought against the British troops since the
    3rd September, provided that they now give up any arms in their
    possession and return to their homes. The offer of a reward for
    the surrender of such persons is now withdrawn, and they will
    not for the future be molested in any way on account of their
    opposition to the British advance; but it must be clearly
    understood that the benefits of this amnesty do not extend to
    anyone, whether soldier or civilian, who was concerned directly or
    indirectly in the attack upon the Residency, or who may hereafter
    be found in possession of any property belonging to members of the
    Embassy. To such persons no mercy will be shown. Further, I hold
    out no promise of pardon to those who, well knowing the Amir's
    position in the British camp, instigated the troops and people of
    Kabul to take up arms against the British troops. They have been
    guilty of wilful rebellion against the Amir's authority, and they
    will be considered and treated as rebels wherever found.']

[Footnote 3: There was a slight fall of snow on the 11th November,
followed by severe frost, and the elephants were beginning to suffer
from the cold. Three of them succumbed on the Lataband Kotal, much
to the annoyance of the olfactory nerves of all passers-by. It was
impossible to bury the huge carcasses, as the ground was all rock, and
there was not wood enough to burn them. So intense was the cold that
the ink froze in my pen, and I was obliged to keep my inkstand under
my pillow at night.]

[Footnote 4: This party marched towards India on the 14th November,
followed by a second convoy of sickly men on the 27th idem. On this
latter date the strength of the 1st and 2nd Divisions, Kabul Field
Force, and the Reserve at Peshawar was as follows:

---------------------------------------------------------------
                    | British Force. |  Native Force.  |Total.|
                    |----------------+-----------------|      |
                    |Officers.|Rank &| British |Troops.|      |
                    |         |File. |Officers.|       |      |
--------------------+---------+------+---------+-------+------|
1st Division, at    |         |      |         |       |      |
and around Kabul .. |   100   | 2,783|    71   | 5,060 | 8,014|
2nd Division, on    |         |      |         |       |      |
the Khyber line ... |    90   | 2,385|   118   | 8,590 |11,183|
                    |---------+------+---------+-------+------|
                    |   190   | 5,168|   189   |13,650 |19,197|
Reserve at Peshawar |    55   | 1,952|    49   | 4,654 | 6,710|
                    |---------+------+---------+-------+------|
                    |   245   | 7,120|   238   |18,304 |25,907|
---------------------------------------------------------------

    Total:--          483 British officers.
                    7,120 British troops.
                   18,304 Native troops.
    Grand total:-- 25,907 with 60 guns, 24 with 1st Division, and 36 with
                   2nd Division and the Reserve.]

       *       *       *       *       *




CHAPTER LV.
1879

  Political situation at Kabul--Serious trouble ahead
  --Macpherson attacks the Kohistanis--Combined movements
  --The uncertainty of war--The fight in the Chardeh valley
  --Forced to retire--Padre Adams earns the V.C.
  --Macpherson's column arrives
  --The captured guns recovered--Melancholy reflections


The general political situation, as it developed itself in the
early part of December, and the causes which appeared to me to have
contributed to produce it, may be briefly summarized as follows. After
the outbreak in the previous September and the massacre of our Envoy,
the advance of the British force was too rapid to give the Afghans, as
a nation, time to oppose us. At Charasia, the troops, aided by large
numbers of the disaffected townspeople, were conspicuously beaten in
the open field; their organization as an armed body was at an end, and
their leaders all sought personal safety in flight.

It appears probable that at this period the general expectation
amongst the Afghans was that the British Government would exact a
heavy retribution from the nation and city, and that, after vengeance
had been satisfied, the army would be withdrawn.

Thirty-seven years before, a British massacre had been followed by a
temporary occupation of the city of Kabul, and just as the troops of
Pollock and Nott, on that occasion, had sacked and destroyed the great
bazaar and then retired, so in 1879 the people believed that some
signal punishment would again be succeeded by the withdrawal of our
troops. Thus a period of doubt and expectation ensued after the battle
of Charasia; the Afghans were waiting on events, and the time had not
arrived for a general movement.

This pause, however, was marked by certain occurrences which doubtless
touched the national pride to the quick, and which were also
susceptible of being used by the enemies of the British Government to
excite into vivid fanaticism the religious sentiment, which has ever
formed a prominent trait in the Afghan character.

The prolonged occupation by foreign troops of the fortified cantonment
which had been prepared by the late Amir Sher Ali for his own army;
the capture of the large park of Artillery, and of the vast munitions
of war, which had raised the military strength of the Afghans to a
standard unequalled among Asiatic nations; the destruction of their
historic fortress, the residence of their Kings; and, lastly, the
deportation to India of their Amir and his principal Ministers,
were all circumstances which united to increase to a high pitch the
antipathy naturally felt towards a foreign invader.

The temper of the people being in this inflammable condition, it was
clear that only disunion and jealousy amongst their Chiefs prevented
their combining against us, and that if any impetus could be given
to their religious sentiment strong enough to unite the discordant
elements in a common cause, a powerful movement would be initiated,
having for its object our annihilation or expulsion from their
country.

Such an impetus was supplied by the fervent preaching of the aged
mulla Mushk-i-Alam,[1] who denounced the English in every mosque
throughout the country. The people were further incited to rise by the
appeals of the ladies of Yakub Khan's family to popular sympathy, and
bribed to do so by the distribution of the concealed treasure at their
command.

The mullas, in short, became masters of the situation, and, having
once succeeded in subordinating private quarrels to hatred of the
common foe, the movement rapidly assumed the aspect of a religious
war. The Afghan successes of 1841-42 were cited as examples of what
might happen again, and the people were assured that, if they would
only act simultaneously, the small British army in Sherpur would
be overwhelmed, and the plunder of our camp would be part of their
reward.

From time to time reports reached me of what was going on, and, from
the information supplied to me, I gathered that the Afghans intended
to gain possession of the city, and, after occupying the numerous
forts and villages in the neighbourhood of Sherpur, to surround the
cantonment.

It was under the stimulating influences of religious enthusiasm,
patriotic and military ardour, the prestige of former success, and
the hope of remuneration and plunder, that the Afghans took the field
against us early in December.

It was arranged that the forces from the south[2] should seize the
range of hills extending from Charasia to the Shahr-i-Darwaza heights,
including the fortifications of the upper Bala Hissar and the high
conical peak called the Takht-i-Shah; that those from the north[3]
should occupy the Asmai heights and hills to the north of Kabul; and
those from the west[4] should make direct for the city.

As it was evident to me that these several bodies, when once
concentrated at Kabul, would be joined by the thousands in the city,
and the inhabitants of the adjoining villages, I determined to try
and deal with the advancing forces in detail, and disperse them, if
possible, before the concentration could be effected. I had, however,
but a very imperfect idea of the extent of the combination, or of
the enormous numbers arrayed against us. My intelligence was most
defective; neither the nature of the country nor the attitude of the
people admitted of extended reconnaissances, and I was almost entirely
dependent for information on Afghan sources. Some of the Afghan
soldiers in our ranks aided me to the best of their ability, but by
the Sirdars, notably Wali Mahomed Khan, I was, either wilfully or from
ignorance, grossly misinformed as to the formidable character of the
rising. But that there was serious trouble ahead was plain enough when
the conflicting reports had been carefully sifted, and I therefore
thought it only prudent to telegraph to General Bright at Jalalabad to
push on the Guide Corps, although I was very much averse to augmenting
the Sherpur garrison, and thereby increasing the drain on our
supplies.

In the meantime immediate action was necessary to carry out my idea of
preventing the different sections of the enemy concentrating at Kabul.
I accordingly prepared two columns: one under Macpherson, whose orders
were to attack the tribesmen coming from the north before they could
join those advancing from the west; the other under Baker, who was
instructed to place himself across the line by which the enemy would
have to retreat when beaten, as I hoped they would be, by Macpherson.

Macpherson[5] started on the 8th towards Kila Aushar, about three
miles from Sherpur, _en route_ to Arghandeh. And on the following
morning Baker, with a small force,[6] proceeded to Chihal Dukhteran,
giving out that his destination was the Logar valley, and that he
would march by Charasia, as I had directed him to make a feint in that
direction, and then to turn to the west, and place himself between
Arghandeh and Maidan, on the Ghazni road.

To give Baker time to carry out this movement, I halted Macpherson at
Kila Aushar on the 9th, whence he sent out two reconnoitring
parties--one in the direction of Kohistan, the other, in charge of
Lieutenant-Colonel Lockhart,[7] A.Q.M.G., towards Arghandeh.

The intelligence brought in induced me to change my orders to
Macpherson. The first party reported that a very considerable force of
Kohistanis had collected at Karez-i-Mir, about ten miles north of
Kila Aushar, while Lockhart had discovered large numbers of the enemy
moving from Arghandeh and Paghman towards Kohistan. Accordingly, I
directed Macpherson to attack the Kohistanis, in the hope of being
able to disperse them before the people from Ghazni could join them;
and, as the part of the country through which he had to move was
unsuited to Horse Artillery and Cavalry, I ordered him to leave the
mounted portion of his column, except one squadron of Cavalry, at Kila
Aushar.

Macpherson made a rapid advance on the morning of the 10th December,
skirting the fringe of low hills which intervenes between Kohistan and
the Chardeh valley. He reached the Surkh Kotal--which divides western
Kohistan from the Arghandeh valley--without opposition. From this
point, however, the Kohistanis were sighted, occupying a position
about two miles to his right front, their centre on a steep, conical,
isolated hill, at the base of which lay the village of Karez-i-Mir.

Macpherson was now able to obtain a good view of the Paghman and
Chardeh valleys on his left and left rear, and the numerous standards
planted on the different knolls near the villages of Paghman gave
ample evidence of the presence of the enemy discovered by Lockhart the
previous day, and showed him that, unless he could quickly succeed in
scattering the Kohistanis, he would find himself attacked by an enemy
in his rear, in fact, between two fires.

Macpherson made his disposition for an attack with skill and rapidity.
Leaving Lieutenant-Colonel Money with one company of the 67th, five
companies of the 3rd Sikhs, and two guns, to hold the ridge, he sent
the remainder of the Sikhs to harass the enemy's left flank and
support the Cavalry, who were ordered to hover about and threaten the
line of retreat, while Macpherson himself went forward with the rest
of the force.

The Kohistanis retreated rapidly before our skirmishers, and the
attacking party, protected by a well-directed fire from Morgan's guns,
advanced with such promptitude that the enemy made no attempt to
rally until they reached the conical hill, where they made a stubborn
resistance. The hill was carried by assault, its defenders were driven
off, leaving seven standards on the field, and Morgan, bringing up his
Artillery, inflicted severe loss on the flying Kohistanis. On this
occasion Major Cook, V.C., of the 5th Gurkhas, was again noticed for
his conspicuous gallantry, and Major Griffiths, of the 3rd Sikhs,
greatly distinguished himself. Our casualties were one officer
(Lieutenant-Colonel Fitz-Hugh) and six men wounded.

It was evident that the tribesmen from the directions of Arghandeh and
Paghman intended to ascend the Surkh Kotal, but suddenly they appeared
to change their minds, on discovering, probably, that our troops
held all the commanding positions and that their allies were in full
flight.

Soon after noon on the 10th I received the report of Macpherson's
success and the enemy's retirement towards Arghandeh. I at once sent
off Lieutenant-Colonel B. Gordon, R.H.A., with orders to intercept
them with the Horse Artillery and Cavalry at Aushar; but when I rode
over myself later in the day to that place, I was much disappointed to
find that Gordon had not been able to give effect to my instructions,
as the enemy, on perceiving his troops, dispersed and took shelter in
the surrounding villages and on the slopes of the hills.

Macpherson encamped for the night between the Surkh Kotal and
Karez-i-Mir, and Baker, who had steadily pursued his march along a
very difficult road, halted a short distance west of Maidan and eight
miles only from Arghandeh.

To Macpherson I sent orders to march very early the next morning--the
11th--through Paghman towards Arghandeh and in Baker's direction; at
the same time I informed him that Massy, whom I had placed in command
of the troops at Aushar, would, according to directions from me, leave
that place at nine o'clock to co-operate with him, _viâ_ the Arghandeh
and Ghazni road. That evening Massy came to my room, and I carefully
explained to him his part in the next day's proceedings; I told him
that he was to advance cautiously and quietly by the road leading
directly from the city of Kabul towards Arghandeh, feeling for
the enemy; that he was to communicate with Macpherson and act in
conformity with that officer's movements; and I impressed upon him
that he was on no account to commit himself to an action until
Macpherson had engaged the enemy.

Up to this time the combination of tribesmen, which later proved so
formidable, had not been effected; Macpherson for the time being had
dispersed the Kohistanis and checked the force advancing from Ghazni
under the leadership of Mahomed Jan; the Logaris and Ghilzais were
merely watching events, and waiting to see how it fared with the
Kohistani and Ghazni factions, before committing themselves to
hostilities; they had but recently witnessed our successful advance
through their country; they knew that their homes and property would
be at our mercy should we be victorious, and they were uncertain as to
Baker's movements.

On the morning of the 11th December,[8] therefore, only one section
was actually in opposition to us, that led by Mahomed Jan, who during
the night of the 10th had taken up a position near the group of
villages known as Kila Kazi.

Further, I felt that Mahomed Jan must be disheartened at our recent
success, and at his failure to induce the Logaris to join him, and
doubtless felt that a movement towards Kabul would expose his left
flank to Macpherson, while his rear would be threatened by Baker.

The strength of Baker's and Macpherson's columns had been carefully
considered, as well as the routes they were to take. I was thoroughly
well acquainted with the ground comprised in the theatre of the
proposed operations, having frequently ridden over it during the
preceding two months; I was thus able to calculate to a nicety the
difficulties each column would have to encounter and the distances
they would have to cover, and arrange with the utmost precision the
hour at which each Commander should move off to insure a timely
junction. So that when I left Sherpur at ten o'clock on the 11th
December to take command of Macpherson's and Massy's columns as soon
as they should unite, I had no misgivings, and was sanguine that my
carefully arranged programme would result in the discomfiture of
Mahomed Jan; but the events which followed on that day afforded a
striking exemplification of the uncertainty of war, and of how even a
very slight divergence from a General's orders may upset plans made
with the greatest care and thought, and lead to disastrous results.

Massy could not have clearly understood the part he was meant to take
in co-operation with Macpherson, for instead of following the route I
had directed him to take, he marched straight across country to the
Ghazni road, which brought him face to face with the enemy before he
could be joined by Macpherson. In his explanatory report Massy stated
that he had been misled by a memorandum[9] which he received from the
Assistant Adjutant-General after his interview with me (although this
memorandum contained nothing contradictory of the orders I had given
him); that he understood from it that his business was to reach the
Ghazni road at its nearest point in the direction of Arghandeh, and
that he thought it better, with a thirty miles' march in prospect, to
take the most direct line in order to save his horses, to economize
time in a short December day, and to keep as near as he could to the
column with which he was to co-operate; further, he stated that he was
under the impression there was little likelihood of his meeting with
any of the enemy nearer than Arghandeh.

On starting from Aushar Massy detached a troop of the 9th Lancers to
communicate with Macpherson. This reduced his column to 247 British
and 44 Native Cavalry, with 4 Horse Artillery guns.

As the party moved along the Chardeh valley, a loud beating of drums
was heard, and Captain Bloomfield Gough, 9th Lancers, commanding the
advance guard, perceived when he had moved to about a mile north of
Kila Kazi, that the enemy were occupying hills on both sides of the
Ghazni road, about two miles to his left front, and sent back word to
that effect. Massy, not believing that the Afghans had collected
in any considerable numbers, continued to advance; but he was soon
undeceived by the crowds of men and waving standards which shortly
came into view moving towards Kila Kazi. He then ordered Major
Smith-Wyndham to open fire, but the range, 2,900 yards, being
considered by Colonel Gordon, the senior Artillery officer, too far
for his six-pounders, after a few rounds the guns were moved across
the Ghazni road, and again brought into action at 2,500 yards; as this
distance was still found to be too great, they were moved to 2,000
yards. The enemy now pressed forward on Massy's left flank, which was
also his line of retreat, and the guns had to be retired about a mile,
covered on the right and left by the 9th Lancers and the 14th Bengal
Lancers respectively, and followed so closely by the Afghans that when
fire was next opened they were only 1,700 yards distant. Four Horse
Artillery guns could do nothing against such numbers attacking without
any regular formation, and when the leading men came within carbine
range, Massy tried to stop them by dismounting thirty of the 9th
Lancers; but their fire 'had no appreciable effect.'

It was at this critical moment that I appeared on the scene. Warned by
the firing that an engagement was taking place, I galloped across the
Chardeh valley as fast as my horse could carry me, and on gaining the
open ground beyond Bhagwana, an extraordinary spectacle was presented
to my view. An unbroken line, extending for about two miles, and
formed of not less than between 9,000 and 10,000 men, was moving
rapidly towards me, all on foot save a small body of Cavalry on their
left flank--in fact, the greater part of Mahomed Jan's army. To meet
this formidable array, instead of Macpherson's and Massy's forces,
which I hoped I should have found combined, there were but 4 guns, 198
of the 9th Lancers under Lieutenant-Colonel Cleland, 40 of the 14th
Bengal Lancers under Captain Philip Neville, and at some little
distance Gough's troop of the 9th Lancers, who were engaged in
watching the enemy's Cavalry.

The inequality of the opposing forces was but too painfully apparent.
The first glance at the situation showed me the hopelessness of
continuing the struggle without Infantry. Up to that moment our
casualties had not been many, as Afghans seldom play at long bowls, it
being necessary for them to husband their ammunition, and when, as in
the present instance, they outnumber their adversaries by forty to
one, they universally try to come to close quarters and use their
knives.

My first thought was how to secure the best and shortest line of
retreat; it lay by Deh-i-Mazang, but in order to use it, the gorge
close by that village had to be held; for if the enemy reached it
first they would have no difficulty in gaining the heights above
Kabul, which would practically place the city at their mercy.

I was very anxious also to prevent any panic or disturbance taking
place in Kabul. I therefore told General Hills, who just
then opportunely joined me, to gallop to Sherpur, explain to
Brigadier-General Hugh Gough, who had been placed in temporary
command of that place, how matters stood, and order 200 of the 72nd
Highlanders to come to Deh-i-Mazang with the least possible delay. I
directed Hills, after having delivered this message, to make for the
city, shut the gates, and do all in his power to keep the people
quiet, while warning the Kizilbashes[10] to be prepared to defend
their quarter. I then despatched my nephew and A.D.C., Lieutenant John
Sherston, to Macpherson to inform him of what had happened, and desire
him to push on with the utmost speed.

Having taken these precautionary measures, I sent another A.D.C.,
Captain Pole Carew, to Brigadier-General Massy to direct him to try
and find a way by which the guns could retire in case of a necessity,
which appeared to me to be only too probable.

The engagement had now become a question of time. If Mahomed Jan could
close with and overwhelm our small force, Kabul would be his; but if,
by any possibility, his advance could be retarded until Macpherson
should come up, we might hope to retain possession of the city. It
was, therefore, to the Afghan leader's interest to press on, while it
was to ours to delay him as long as we possibly could.

Pole Carew presently returned with a message from Massy that the enemy
were close upon him, and that he could not keep them in check. I
desired Pole Carew to go back, order Massy to retire the guns, and
cover the movement by a charge of Cavalry.

The charge was led by Lieutenant-Colonel Cleland and Captain Neville,
the former of whom fell dangerously wounded; but the ground, terraced
for irrigation purposes and intersected by nullas, so impeded
our Cavalry that the charge, heroic as it was, made little or no
impression upon the overwhelming numbers of the enemy, now flushed
with the triumph of having forced our guns to retire. The effort,
however, was worthy of the best traditions of our British and Indian
Cavalry, and that it failed in its object was no fault of our gallant
soldiers. To assist them in their extremity, I ordered two of
Smyth-Windham's four guns to halt and come into action while the other
two continued to retire, but these had not gone far before they got
into such difficult ground that one had to be spiked and abandoned in
a water-cut, where Smyth-Windham found it when he came up after
having fired a few rounds at the fast advancing foe. I now ordered
Smyth-Windham to make for the village of Bhagwana with his three
remaining guns, as the only chance left of saving them. This he did,
and having reached the village, he again opened fire from behind a
low wall which enclosed the houses; but the ammunition being nearly
expended, and the enemy close at hand, there was nothing for it but to
limber up again and continue the retirement through the village. At
the further side, however, and forming part of its defences, was a
formidable obstacle in the shape of a ditch fully twelve feet deep,
narrowing towards the bottom; across this Smyth-Windham tried to take
his guns, and the leading horses had just begun to scramble up the
further bank, when one of the wheelers stumbled and fell, with the
result that the shafts broke and the gun stuck fast, blocking the only
point at which there was any possibility of getting the others across.

With a faint hope of saving the guns, I directed Captain
Stewart-Mackenzie, who had assumed command of the 9th Lancers on
Cleland being disabled, to make a second charge, which he executed
with the utmost gallantry,[11] but to no purpose; and in the meanwhile
Smyth-Windham had given the order to unhook and spike the guns.

By this time the enemy were within a few hundred yards of Bhagwana,
and the inhabitants had begun to fire at us from the roofs of their
houses. I was endeavouring to help some men out of the ditch, when the
headman of the village rushed at me with his knife, seeing which, a
Mahomedan[12] of the 1st Bengal Cavalry, who was following me on foot,
having just had his horse shot under him, sprang at my assailant, and,
seizing him round the waist, threw him to the bottom of the ditch,
thereby saving my life.[13]

Suddenly the Afghans stayed their advance for a few minutes, thinking,
as I afterwards learnt, that our Infantry were in the village--a
pause which allowed many of our Cavalry who had lost their horses to
escape.[14]

Directly we had got clear of the village the Cavalry reformed, and
retired slowly by alternate squadrons, in a manner which excited my
highest admiration, and reflected the greatest credit on the
soldierly qualities of Stewart-Mackenzie and Neville. From Bhagwana,
Deh-i-Mazang was three miles distant, and it was of vital importance
to keep the enemy back in order to give the Highlanders from Sherpur
time to reach the gorge.

For a time the Afghans continued to press on as before, but after a
while their advance gradually became slower and their numbers somewhat
decreased. This change in Mahomed Jan's tactics, it afterwards turned
out, was caused by Macpherson's advance guard coming into collision
with the rear portion of his army; it was of the greatest advantage
to us, as it enabled the 72nd to arrive in time to bar the enemy's
passage through the gorge. My relief was great when I beheld them,
headed by their eager Commander, Brownlow, doubling through the gap
and occupying the village of Deh-i-Mazang and the heights on either
side. The Cavalry greeted them with hearty cheers, and the volleys
delivered by the Highlanders from the roofs of the houses in the
village soon checked the Afghans, some of whom turned back, while
others made for Indiki and the slopes of the Takht-i-Shah. For a time,
at any rate, their hopes of getting possession of Kabul had been
frustrated.

It will be remembered that the orders I sent to Macpherson on the 10th
were that he was to march very early the next morning, as Massy with
the Horse Artillery and Cavalry would leave Aushar at 9 a.m., and that
he must join him on the Arghandeh road. Macpherson did not make so
early a start as I had intended; from one cause or another, he said,
he was not able to leave Karez-i-Mir before eight o'clock. On reaching
the Surkh Kotal he observed dense bodies of the enemy hurrying from
the Paghman and Arghandeh directions towards Kila Kazi, and he pushed
on, hoping to be able to deal with them individually before they had
time to concentrate. For the first three miles from the foot of the
pass the view was obstructed by a range of hills, and nothing could be
seen of the Horse Artillery and Cavalry; but soon after 10 a.m. the
booming of guns warned Macpherson that fighting was going on, but he
could not tell whether it was Baker's or Massy's troops which were
engaged. He was, however, not left long in doubt, for Lieutenant
Neville Chamberlain, attached to Macpherson as political officer, and
who had gone on with his advance guard, sent back word that he could
distinguish British Cavalry charging the Afghans, and as Baker had
only Native Cavalry with him, Macpherson knew at once that the action
was being fought by Massy. Suddenly the firing ceased, and he was
informed that the enemy were advancing on Kabul, and that their
vanguard had already reached the belt of orchards and enclosures, on
the further fringe of which the smoke from our guns and the charge of
our Cavalry had been seen.

Macpherson, feeling that something serious had occurred, called on his
men to make a further effort. At 12.30 p.m., less than an hour after
we had begun to retire, he reached the ground where the fight had
taken place. The dead bodies of our officers and men, stripped and
horribly mutilated, proved how fierce had been the struggle, and
the dropping shots which came from the fortified villages in the
neighbourhood and from the ravines, warned the Brigadier-General that
some of the enemy were still in the neighbourhood. But these men, so
bold in the confidence of overwhelming numbers when attacking Massy's
Cavalry, were not prepared to withstand Macpherson's Infantry; after a
brief resistance they broke and fled in confusion, some to Indiki, but
the greater number to the shelter of the hills south of Kila Kazi, to
which place Macpherson followed them, intending to halt there for the
night. This I did not allow him to do, for, seeing the heavy odds we
had opposed to us, and that the enemy were already in possession
of the Takht-i-Shah, thus being in a position to threaten the Bala
Hissar, I sent orders to him to fall back upon Deh-i-Mazang, where he
arrived about 7 p.m.

Meanwhile, Macpherson's baggage, with a guard of the 5th Gurkhas,
commanded by Major Cook, V.C., was attacked by some Afghans, who had
remained concealed in the Paghman villages, and it would probably have
fallen into their hands, as the Gurkhas were enormously outnumbered,
but for the timely arrival of four companies of the 3rd Sikhs, under
Major Griffiths, who had been left by Macpherson to see everything
safely down the pass. Cook himself was knocked over and stunned by
a blow, while his brother in the 3rd Sikhs received a severe
bullet-wound close to his heart.

During the retirement from Bhagwana, Macgregor, my Chief of the Staff,
Durand, Badcock, and one or two other staff officers, got separated
from me and were presently overtaken by an officer (Captain Gerald
Martin), sent by Macpherson to tell Massy he was coming to his
assistance as fast as his Infantry could travel; Martin informed
Macgregor that as he rode by Bhagwana he had come across our abandoned
guns, and that there was no enemy anywhere near them. On hearing this,
Macgregor retraced his steps, and, assisted by the staff officers with
him and a few Horse Artillerymen and Lancers, and some Gurkhas of
Macpherson's baggage guard picked up on the way, he managed to rescue
the guns and bring them into Sherpur that night. They had been
stripped of all their movable parts, and the ammunition-boxes had been
emptied; otherwise they were intact, and were fit for use the next
day.

I found assembled at Deh-i-Mazang Wali Mahomed and other Sirdars, who
had been watching with considerable anxiety the issue of the fight,
for they knew if the Afghans succeeded in their endeavours to enter
Kabul, all property belonging to people supposed to be friendly to us
would be plundered and their houses destroyed. I severely upbraided
these men for having misled me as to the strength and movements of
Mahomed Jan's army, and with having failed to fulfil their engagement
to keep me in communication with Baker. They declared they had been
misinformed themselves, and were powerless in the matter. It was
difficult to believe that this was the case, and I was unwillingly
forced to the conclusion that not a single Afghan could be trusted,
however profuse he might be in his assurances of fidelity, and that we
must depend entirely on our own resources for intelligence.

I waited at Deh-i-Mazang until Macpherson arrived, and thus did not
get back to Sherpur till after dark. I was gratified on my arrival
there to find that Hugh Gough had made every arrangement that could be
desired for the defence of the cantonment, and that by his own
cool and confident bearing he had kept the troops calm and steady,
notwithstanding the untoward appearance of some fugitives from the
field of battle, whose only too evident state of alarm might otherwise
have caused a panic.

For the safety of Sherpur I never for one moment had the smallest
apprehension during that eventful day. It was, I believe, thought by
some that if Mahomed Jan, instead of trying for the city, had made for
the cantonment, it would have fallen into his hands; but they were
altogether wrong, for there were a sufficient number of men within the
walls to have prevented such a catastrophe had Mahomed Jan been in
a position to make an attack; but this, with Macpherson's brigade
immediately in his rear, he could never have dreamt of attempting.

The city of Kabul remained perfectly quiet while all the excitement
I have described was going on outside. Hills, with a few Sikhs,
patrolled the principal streets, and even when the Afghan standard
appeared on the Takht-i-Shah there was no sign of disturbance.
Nevertheless, I thought it would be wise to withdraw from the city;
I could not tell how long the people would remain well disposed,
or whether they would assist us to keep the enemy out. I therefore
directed Hills to come away and make over his charge to an influential
Kizilbash named Futteh Khan. I also telegraphed to General Bright at
Jalalabad to reinforce Gandamak by a sufficient number of troops
to hold that post in case it should be necessary to order
Brigadier-General Charles Gough, who was then occupying it, to move
his brigade nearer to Kabul; for I felt sure that, unless I could
succeed in driving Mahomed Jan out of the neighbourhood of Kabul,
excitement would certainly spread along my line of communication.
I concluded my message to Bright thus: 'If the wire should be cut,
consider it a bad sign, and push on to Gandamak, sending Gough's
Brigade towards Kabul.'

I could not help feeling somewhat depressed at the turn things had
taken. I had no news from Baker, and we had undoubtedly suffered a
reverse, which I knew only too well would give confidence to the
Afghans, who, from the footing they had now gained on the heights
above Kabul, threatened the Bala Hissar, which place, stored as it was
with powder and other material of war, I had found it necessary to
continue to occupy. Nevertheless, reviewing the incidents of the 11th
December, as I have frequently done since, with all the concomitant
circumstances deeply impressed on my memory, I have failed to discover
that any disposition of my force different from that I made could have
had better results, or that what did occur could have been averted
by greater forethought or more careful calculation on my part. Two
deviations from my programme (which probably at the time appeared
unimportant to the Commanders in question) were the principal factors
in bringing about the unfortunate occurrences of that day. Had
Macpherson marched at 7 a.m. instead of 8, and had Massy followed the
route I had arranged for him to take, Mahomed Jan must have fallen
into the trap I had prepared for him.

Our casualties on the 11th were--killed, 4 British officers, 16
British and 9 Native rank and file; wounded, 4 British officers, 1
Native officer, 20 British and 10 Native rank and file.

[Illustration: SKETCH SHOWING THE OPERATIONS IN THE CHARDEH
    VALLEY ON DECEMBER 10TH AND 11TH, 1879]


[Footnote 1: Fragrance of the universe.]

[Footnote 2: Viz., Logar, Zurmat, the Mangal and Jadran districts, and
the intervening Ghilzai country.]

[Footnote 3: Kohistan.]

[Footnote 4: Maidan and Ghazni.]

[Footnote 5: Macpherson had with him the following troops: 4 guns
R.H.A.; 4 guns Mountain battery; 1 squadron 9th Lancers; 2 squadrons
14th Bengal Lancers; 401 rifles 67th Foot; 509 rifles 3rd Sikhs; 393
rifles 5th Ghurkas.]

[Footnote 6: Baker's column consisted of: 4 guns Mountain battery;
3 troops 5th Punjab Cavalry; 25 Sappers and Miners; 450 rifles 92nd
Highlanders; 450 rifles 5th Punjab Infantry.]

[Footnote 7: Now Lieutenant-General Sir William Lockhart, K.C.B.,
K.C.S.I.]

[Footnote 8: On the 11th December, the troops at and around Kabul
amounted to 6,352 men and 20 guns, which were thus disposed:

                                                _Men._     _Guns._
  Baker's column                                1,325         4
  Macpherson's column                           1,492         4
  Massy's column                                  351         4
  At Sherpur                                    3,184         8
                                                -----        --
                                                6,352        20
  There were besides at Butkhak and Lataband    1,343         2
  And the Guides Corps, which reached Sherpur}
  on the evening of the 11th December        }    679
                                                -----        --
                       Total                    8,374        22]


[Footnote 9: The memorandum was as follows:

    'Brigadier-General Massy will start at eight a.m. to-morrow with a
    squadron of Cavalry, join the Cavalry and Horse Artillery now
    out under Colonel Gordon, taking command thereof, and operating
    towards Arghandeh in conjunction with Brigadier-General
    Macpherson. The troops to return in the evening.']

[Footnote 10: Kizilbashes are Persians by nationality and Shiah
Mahomedans by religion. They formed the vanguard of Nadir Shah's
invading army, and after his death a number of them settled in Kabul
where they exercise considerable influence.]

[Footnote 11: Stewart-Mackenzie's horse was shot, and fell on him, and
he was extricated with the greatest difficulty.]

[Footnote 12: Mazr Ali was given the order of merit for his brave
action, and is now a Native officer in the regiment.]

[Footnote 13: Our Chaplain (Adams), who had accompanied me throughout
the day, behaved in this particular place with conspicuous gallantry.
Seeing a wounded man of the 9th Lancers staggering towards him,
Adams dismounted, and tried to lift the man on to his own charger.
Unfortunately, the mare, a very valuable animal, broke loose, and was
never seen again. Adams, however, managed to support the Lancer until
he was able to make him over to some of his own comrades.

Adams rejoined me in time to assist two more of the 9th who were
struggling under their horses at the bottom of the ditch. Without a
moment's hesitation, Adams jumped into the ditch. He was an unusually
powerful man, and by sheer strength dragged the Lancers clear of their
horses. The Afghans meanwhile had reached Bhagwana, and were so close
to the ditch that I thought my friend the padre could not possibly
escape. I called out to him to look after himself, but he paid no
attention to my warnings until he had pulled the almost exhausted
Lancers to the top of the slippery bank. Adams received the Victoria
Cross for his conduct on this occasion.]

[Footnote 14: These men were much impeded by their long boots and
their swords dangling between their legs; the sight, indeed, of
Cavalry soldiers trying to defend themselves on foot without a firearm
confirmed the opinion I had formed during the Mutiny, as to the
desirability for the carbine being slung on the man's back when going
into action. Lieutenant-Colonel Bushman (Colonel Cleland's successor)
curiously enough had brought with him from England a sling which
admitted of this being done, and also of the carbine being carried in
the bucket on all ordinary occasions. This pattern was adopted, and
during the remainder of the campaign the men of the 9th Lancers placed
their carbines on their backs whenever the enemy were reported to
be in sight. At the same time I authorized the adoption of an
arrangement--also brought to my notice by Colonel Bushman--by which
the sword was fastened to the saddle instead of round the man's body.
This mode of wearing the sword was for some time strenuously opposed
in this country, but its utility could not fail to be recognized, and
in 1891 an order was issued sanctioning its adoption by all mounted
troops.]

       *       *       *       *       *




CHAPTER LVI.
1879

  Attack on the Takht-i-Shah--City people join the tribesmen
  --Increasing numbers of the enemy--Loss of the conical hill
  --Captain Vousden's gallantry--The retirement to Sherpur


On the morning of the 12th I was cheered by hearing that the Guides
had arrived during the night under the command of Colonel P.
Jenkins--a most welcome reinforcement, for I knew how thoroughly to be
depended upon was every man in that distinguished corps.

The first thing now to be done was to endeavour to drive the Afghans
from the crest of the Takht-i-Shah; and I directed Macpherson, as soon
as his men had breakfasted, to attack the position from Deh-i-Mazang.
Just then my mind was considerably relieved by a heliogram from Baker
informing me that he was on his way back to Kabul. The message was
despatched from near Kila Kazi, within four miles of which place Baker
had encamped on the afternoon of the previous day.

Macpherson deputed the task of trying to dislodge the enemy to
Lieutenant-Colonel Money, of the 3rd Sikhs, with a detachment
consisting of 2 Mountain guns and 560 British and Native Infantry.

It was a most formidable position to attack. The slopes leading up
to it were covered with huge masses of jagged rock, intersected by
perpendicular cliffs, and its natural great strength was increased by
breastworks, and stockades thrown up at different points.

After a gallant and persistent attempt had been made, I ordered the
assault to be deferred; for I perceived that the enemy were being
reinforced from their rear, and to ensure success without great loss,
it would be necessary to attack them in rear as well as in the
front. The arrival of Baker's brigade made it possible to do this. I
therefore ordered Macpherson to hold the ground of which he had gained
possession until Baker could co-operate with him next morning from the
Beni Hissar side.

During the night Mahomed Jan, who had been joined by several thousands
from Logar and Wardak, occupied the villages situated between Beni
Hissar and the Bala Hissar and along the _sang-i-nawishta_ road.
Baker, who started at 8 a.m. on the 13th,[1] had, therefore, in the
first place, to gain the high ground above these villages, and, while
holding the point over-looking Beni Hissar, to wheel to his right and
move towards the Takht-i-Shah.

When he had proceeded some little distance, his advance guard reported
that large bodies of the enemy were moving up the slope of the ridge
from the villages near Beni Hissar. To check this movement, and
prevent the already very difficult Afghan position being still further
strengthened, Major White, who was in command of the leading portion
of the attacking party, turned and made for the nearest point on the
ridge. It was now a race between the Highlanders and the Afghans as to
who should gain the crest of the ridge first. The Artillery came into
action at a range of 1,200 yards, and under cover of their fire the
92nd, supported by the Guides, rushed up the steep slopes. They were
met by a furious onslaught, and a desperate conflict took place.
The leading officer, Lieutenant Forbes, a lad of great promise, was
killed, and Colour-Sergeant Drummond fell by his side. For a moment
even the brave Highlanders were staggered by the numbers and fury of
their antagonists, but only for a moment. Lieutenant Dick Cunyngham[2]
sprang forward to cheer them on, and confidence was restored. With
a wild shout the Highlanders threw themselves on the Afghans, and
quickly succeeded in driving them down the further side of the ridge.

By this successful movement the enemy's line was cut in two, and while
the Cavalry and a party of the 3rd Sikhs prevented their rallying in
the direction of Beni Hissar, the 92nd and Guides, protected by the
Mountain guns, which had been got on to the ridge, and the Field
Artillery from below, advanced towards the Takht-i-Shah. The Afghans
disputed every inch of the way, but by 11.30 a.m. White's men had
reached the foot of the craggy eminence which formed the enemy's main
position. They were here joined by some of the 72nd Highlanders, 3rd
Sikhs, and 5th Gurkhas, under the command of Lieutenant-Colonel Money,
who had fought their way from the upper Bala Hissar.

A brilliant charge by the combined troops now took place, the two
Highlands corps vying with each other for the honour of reaching the
summit first. It fell to the 72nd, Colour-Sergeant Yule[3] of that
regiment being the foremost man on the top. The enemy made a most
determined stand, and it was only after a severe struggle and heavy
loss that they were driven off the heights.

From my position at Sherpur I had the satisfaction of witnessing this
success. This satisfaction, however, was short-lived, for almost
immediately I received a report from the city that the inhabitants had
joined the tribesmen, and that the cantonment was being threatened;
indeed, I could see large bodies of armed men emerging from the city
and moving towards Siah Sang, whence the road between the Bala Hissar
and Sherpur would be commanded.

Having only too evidently lost control over the city, the value of
Deh-i-Mazang was gone, so I ordered Macpherson to abandon it and move
to the Shahr-i-Darwaza heights, taking with him six companies of the
67th Foot for the protection of the Bala Hissar, to which it was
desirable to hold on as long as possible. The remainder of his troops
I ordered to be sent to Sherpur. To Baker I signalled to leave a
party on the Takht-i-Shah under Lieutenant-Colonel Money, and to move
himself towards the cantonment with the rest of his troops, driving
the enemy off the Siah Sang on the way.

But from his point of vantage on the heights Baker could see, what
I could not, that the Afghans had occupied two strongly fortified
villages between Siah Sang and the Bala Hissar, from which it was
necessary to dislodge them in the first instance, and for this service
he detached the 5th Punjab Infantry and a battery of Artillery. It
was carried out in a masterly manner by Major Pratt, who soon gained
possession of one village. The other, however, was resolutely held,
and the Artillery failing to effect a breach, the gates were set on
fire; but even then a satisfactory opening was not made, and the place
was eventually captured by means of scaling-ladders hastily made of
poles tied together with the Native soldiers' turbans.

Baker was now able to turn his attention to Siah Sang, so I despatched
the Cavalry under Massy, to act with him when a signal success was
achieved. The enemy fought stubbornly, but were at last driven off.
The 5th Punjab Cavalry, led by Lieutenant-Colonel Williams and Major
Hammond, greatly distinguished themselves, and a grand charge was made
by the Guides and 9th Lancers, in which Captain Butson, of the latter
regiment, was killed, also the troop Sergeant-Major and 3 men; and
Captain Chisholme,[4] Lieutenant Trower, and 8 men were wounded.

This ended the operations on the 13th. Our losses during the day were:
killed, 2 British officers and 12 men; wounded, 2 British officers and
43 men, British and Native.

I was in great hopes that our successes and the heavy losses the enemy
had sustained would result in the breaking up of the combination
against us; but in case these hopes should not be realized, I
decided to do away with some of the smaller posts on the line of
communication, and order up more troops. Accordingly, I telegraphed to
General Bright to send on Charles Gough's brigade, and I directed the
detachment at Butkhak to return to Kabul, and that at Seh Baba to fall
back on Lataband. Having great confidence in its Commander, Colonel
Hudson, I determined to hold on to Lataband for a time, though by
so doing the numbers I might otherwise have had at Sherpur were
considerably diminished. Lataband was the most important link in the
chain of communication between Kabul and Jalalabad; it was in direct
heliographic connexion with Kabul; it had sufficient ammunition
and supplies to last over the date on which Gough should arrive at
Sherpur, and its being held would be a check on the Ghilzais, and
prevent his encountering any serious opposition. At the same time, I
could not disguise from myself that there was a certain amount of risk
attached to leaving so small a garrison in this somewhat isolated
position.

The night of the 13th passed quietly, but when day dawned on the 14th
crowds of armed men, with numerous standards, could be seen occupying
a hill on the Kohistan road; and as day advanced they proceeded in
vast numbers to the Asmai heights, where they were joined by swarms
from the city and the Chardeh valley. It then became apparent that the
combination was much more formidable than I had imagined, and that the
numbers of the enemy now in opposition to us were far greater than I
had dreamt was possible. Foiled in their attempt to close in upon us
from the south and west, the tribesmen had concentrated to the north,
and it was evident they were preparing to deliver an attack in great
strength from that quarter. I quickly decided to drive the enemy off
the Asmai heights, to cut their communication with Kohistan, and to
operate towards the north, much as I had operated the previous day to
the south of Sherpur.

At 9 a.m. I despatched Brigadier General Baker to the eastern slope of
the Asmai range with the following troops: 4 guns, Field Artillery; 4
guns, Mountain Artillery; 14th Bengal Lancers; 72nd Highlanders (192
rifles); 92nd Highlanders (100 rifles); Guides Infantry (460 rifles);
and 5th Punjab Infantry (470 rifles).

Covered by the fire of his Artillery, Baker seized the conical hill
which formed the northern boundary of the Aliabad Kotal, thus placing
himself on the enemy's line of communication, and preventing them
from being reinforced. He then proceeded to attack the Asmai heights,
leaving 2 Mountain guns, 64 men of the 72nd, and 60 Guides, under the
command of Lieutenant-Colonel W.H. Clarke, to hold the hill.

To aid Baker in his difficult task, I brought four guns into action
near the north-west corner of the cantonment, and I signalled to
Macpherson to give him every possible assistance. Macpherson at once
sent the 67th across the Kabul river to threaten the enemy's left
rear; while the marksmen of the regiment and the Mountain guns opened
fire from the northern slope of the Bala Hissar heights.

The enemy fought with the greatest obstinacy, but eventually our
troops reached the top of the hill, where, on the highest point, a
number of _ghazis_ had taken their stand, determined to sell their
lives dearly.

All this I eagerly watched from my place of observation. There was a
fierce struggle, and then, to my intense relief, I saw our men on the
topmost pinnacle, and I knew the position was gained.

It was now a little past noon, and I was becoming anxious about the
party left on the conical hill, as Macpherson had heliographed that
very large bodies of Afghans were moving northwards from Indiki, with
the intention, apparently, of effecting a junction with the tribesmen
who were occupying the hills in the Kohistan direction. I therefore
signalled to Baker to leave the 67th in charge of the Asmai heights,
and himself return to the lower ridge, giving him my reasons.

Baker at once despatched a detachment of the 5th Punjab Infantry,
under Captain Hall, to reinforce Clarke, who I could see might soon be
hard pressed, and I sent 200 rifles of the 3rd Sikhs (the only troops
available at the moment) to his assistance.

I watched what was taking place on the conical hill through my
telescope, and was startled to perceive that the enemy were, unnoticed
by him, creeping close up to Clarke's position. I could just see a
long Afghan knife appear above the ridge, steadily mounting higher and
higher, the bearer of which was being concealed by the contour of the
hill, and I knew it was only one of the many weapons which were being
carried by our enemies to the attack. The reinforcements were still
some distance off, and my heart sank within me, for I felt convinced
that after our recent victories the Afghans would never venture to
cross the open and attack British soldiers unless an overwhelming
superiority of numbers made success appear to them a certainty. Next I
heard the boom of guns and the rattle of musketry, and a minute or two
later (which, in my anxiety, seemed an eternity to me), I only too
plainly saw our men retreating down the hill, closely followed by the
enemy. The retirement was being conducted steadily and slowly, but
from that moment I realized, what is hard for a British soldier,
how much harder for a British commander, to realize, that we were
over-matched, and that we could not hold our ground.

Clarke,[5] as well as every man with him, fought splendidly; the
Afghans by force of numbers alone made themselves masters of the
position and captured two guns.[6]

While all that I have described was going on, the enemy began to
collect again on Siah Sang, and to make their way round the eastern
flank of the cantonment towards Kohistan.

I had sent orders in the morning to Lieutenant-Colonel Williams, who
was quartered with his regiment (the 5th Punjab Cavalry) in the King's
Garden, between Sherpur and the city, to be on the look-out, and not
to allow any of the enemy to pass in that direction. About 1 p.m. some
400 Afghans were observed moving along the left bank of the river:
these were met by Captain Vousden of the same regiment, who with one
troop was employed in reconnoitring; he most gallantly charged
in amongst them with only twelve of his men, the remainder being
effectually stopped by a heavy fire opened upon them from behind a
low wall. Vousden succeeded in dispersing these heavy odds, and in
inflicting severe loss upon them--a very brilliant service, for which
he received the Victoria Cross.

My object throughout these operations had been, as I hope I have
made clear, to break up the combination by dealing with the enemy in
detail, and preventing them getting possession of the city and the
Bala Hissar.

Up till noon on the 14th I had no idea of the extraordinary numbers
they were able to bring together, and I had no reason to believe that
it would be possible for them to cope with disciplined troops; but
the manner in which the conical hill had been retaken gave me a
more correct idea of their strength and determination, and shook my
confidence in the ability of my comparatively small force to resist
the ever-increasing hordes, on ground which gave every advantage to
numerical superiority. It was a bitter thought that it might be my
duty to retire for a time within the defences of Sherpur, a measure
which would involve the abandonment of the city and the Bala Hissar,
and which I knew, moreover, would give heart to the tribesmen.

I had to decide at once on the course I ought to pursue, for, if I
continued to act on the defensive, food and ammunition must be sent
before dark to Macpherson's brigade, occupying the hills above the
city, and arrangements must be made for Baker's retention of the Asmai
heights. I heliographed to Macpherson to inquire the direction in
which the enemy were moving, and whether their numbers were still
increasing. He replied that large masses were steadily advancing
from north, south, and west, and that their numbers were momentarily
becoming greater, to which the young officer in charge of the
signalling station added, 'The crowds of Afghans in the Chardeh valley
remind me of Epsom on the Derby day.'

This decided me; I determined to withdraw from all isolated positions,
and concentrate my force at Sherpur, thereby securing the safety of
the cantonment and avoiding what had now become a useless sacrifice of
life. I only too thoroughly recognized the evils of the measure, but I
considered that no other course would be justifiable, and that I must
act for the present entirely on the defensive, and wait until the
growing confidence of the enemy should afford me a favourable
opportunity for attacking them, or until reinforcements could arrive.

The inevitable order reached the two Generals at 2 p.m., and the
retirement was begun at once. The Afghans speedily discovered the
retrograde movement, and no sooner had each post in its turn been
evacuated than it was occupied by the enemy, who pressed our troops
the whole way back to the cantonment. There was hand-to-hand fighting,
and many splendid acts of courage were performed, Major Hammond, of
the Guides, earning the Victoria Cross; but throughout there was no
hurry or confusion, all was conducted with admirable coolness and
skill, and shortly after dark the troops and baggage were safe inside
Sherpur. That night the Afghans occupied the city and the Bala Hissar.

It is comparatively easy for a small body of well-trained soldiers,
such as those of which the army in India is composed, to act on the
offensive against Asiatics, however powerful they may be in point of
numbers. There is something in the determined advance of a compact,
disciplined body of troops which they can seldom resist. But a
retirement is a different matter. They become full of confidence and
valour the moment they see any signs of their opponents being unable
to resist them, and if there is the smallest symptom of unsteadiness,
wavering, or confusion, a disaster is certain to occur. It may be
imagined, therefore, with what intense anxiety I watched for hours
the withdrawal. The ground was all in favour of the Afghans, who,
unimpeded by impedimenta of any kind, swarmed down upon the mere
handful of men retreating before them, shouting cries of victory and
brandishing their long knives; but our brave men, inspired by the
undaunted bearing of their officers, were absolutely steady. They took
up position after position with perfect coolness; every movement was
carried out with as much precision as if they were manoeuvring on
an ordinary field-day; and the killed and wounded were brought away
without the slightest hurry or confusion. In fact, the whole of the
hazardous operation was most successfully and admirably carried out;
and as each regiment and detachment filed through the Head-Quarters
gateway I was able to offer my warm congratulations and heartfelt
thanks to my gallant comrades.

Our losses during the day were: 19 killed, including Captain Spens and
Lieutenant Gaisford, 72nd Highlanders, and 88 wounded, amongst whom
were Captain Gordon, 92nd Highlanders, Lieutenant Egerton, 72nd
Highlanders, and Captain Battye, of the Guides.[7]


[Footnote 1: His force consisted of 4 guns, Field Artillery; 4
Mountain guns; 1 squadron 9th Lancers; 5th Punjab Cavalry; 6 companies
92nd Highlanders; 7 companies Guides; and 300 3rd Sikhs; and
subsequently it was strengthened by 150 of the 5th Punjab Infantry.]

[Footnote 2: Dick Cunyngham received the Victoria Cross for
conspicuous gallantry and coolness on this occasion.]

[Footnote 3: This gallant non-commissioned officer was killed the
following day.]

[Footnote 4: Notwithstanding that his wound was most severe, Captain
Chisholme remained in the saddle, and brought the regiment out of
action.]

[Footnote 5: Clarke never recovered the loss of this post. He and I
had been cadets together at Sandhurst, and I often visited him while
he was in hospital at Sherpur. He was apparently suffering from no
disease, but gradually faded away, and died not long after he reached
India.]

[Footnote 6: General Baker, in his despatch, stated that 'No blame for
the loss of these guns is in any way to be attached to the officers
and men of No. 2 Mountain Battery.... Every credit is due to Captain
Swinley, the late Lieutenant Montanaro, and Lieutenant Liddell,
and the several Native officers, non-commissioned officers and men
composing the gun detachments, for the gallant manner in which they
stood to their guns to the last, and it was only on the sudden rush of
this overwhelming force of the enemy that they had to retire with the
loss of two guns.'

Of the men composing the gun detachments, one was killed and six
wounded, and Surgeon-Major Joshua Duke was specially mentioned for his
attention to the wounded under heavy fire.]

[Footnote 7: The same officer who so gallantly met his death during
the recent Chitral campaign, while commanding the regiment of which he
was so justly proud, and in which two brave brothers had been killed
before him--Quinton at Delhi, and Wigram during the first phase of the
Afghan war.]

       *       *       *       *       *




CHAPTER LVII.
1879

  Sherpur--Defence of Sherpur--Arrest of Daud Shah
  --Rumours of an assault--Attack and counter-attack
  --Communication with India re-opened--Sherpur made safe


The moment the gates were closed I telegraphed the result of the day's
operations to the Viceroy and Commander-in-Chief, for I knew that the
enemy's first thought would be to stop communication with India
by cutting the telegraph-wires. I reported that I had ordered
Brigadier-General Charles Gough's brigade to push on from Gandamak as
fast as possible; and I recommended that General Bright should have
more troops sent up to him, to allow of his keeping open the route to
Kabul, and of his reinforcing me should I find it impossible to clear
the country with the force at my disposal. It was a satisfaction to
be able to assure the authorities in these, to me, otherwise painful
telegrams, that there was no cause for anxiety as to the safety of the
troops; that sufficient supplies for men were stored in Sherpur for
nearly four months, and for animals for six weeks; that there
was abundance of firewood, medicines, and hospital comforts, and
sufficient ammunition both for guns and rifles to admit of an active
resistance being carried on for between three and four months.

It was fortunate there was no lack of provisions, for our numbers were
considerably increased by the presence of Wali Mahomed Khan and many
other Sirdars, who begged for shelter in Sherpur, on the plea that
their lives would not be safe were they to return to the city. They
were far from being welcome guests, for I could not trust them;
ostensibly, however, they were our friends, and I could not refuse
their petition. I therefore admitted them, on condition that each
Sirdar should only be accompanied by a specified number of followers.

The stormy occurrences of the 14th were succeeded by a period of
comparative calm, during which the entrenchments were strengthened,
and the heavy guns found in the Kabul arsenal were prepared for
service.

The great drawback to Sherpur, as I have already mentioned, was its
extent and the impossibility of reducing the line of defences owing to
the length of the Bimaru ridge. The cantonment was in the form of a
parallelogram, with the Bimaru heights running along, and protecting,
the northern side. Between this range and the hills, which form the
southern boundary of Kohistan, lay a lake, or rather _jhil_, a barrier
between which and the commanding Bimaru ridge no enemy would dare to
advance.

The massive wall on the south and west faces was twenty feet high,
covered at a distance of thirty feet by a lower wall fifteen feet
high; the southern wall was pierced at intervals of about 700 yards by
gateways, three in number, protected by lofty circular bastions, and
between these and at the four corners were a series of low bastions
which gave an admirable flanking fire. The wall on the western flank
was of similar construction, but had been considerably damaged at the
northern end, evidently by an explosion of gunpowder.

The weak part of our defence was on the eastern face, where the wall,
which had never been completed, was only seven feet high, and did not
extend for more than 700 yards from the south-east corner; the line
then ran to the north-west, and, skirting the village of Bimaru, ended
at the foot of the ridge.

From this description it will be seen that, though the perimeter[1]
of Sherpur was rather too large for a force of 7,000 effective men to
defend, its powers of resistance, both natural and artificial, were
considerable. It was absolutely necessary to hold the Bimaru ridge for
its entire length; to have given up any part of it would have been to
repeat the mistake which proved so disastrous to Elphinstone's army in
1841. In fact, the Bimaru heights were at once the strength and the
weakness of the position. So long as we could hold the heights we were
safe from attack from the north; but if we had been forced, either
from the weakness of our own garrison, or from any other cause, to
relinquish the command of this natural barrier, the whole of the
cantonment must have lain open to the enemy, and must forthwith have
become untenable.

The question of how Sherpur could best be defended had been carefully
considered by a committee,[2] assembled by my orders soon after
our arrival in Kabul; and a scheme had been drawn up detailing the
measures which should be adopted in case of attack.

On the recommendation of this committee six towers had been
constructed on the Bimaru heights, and shelter trenches and gunpits
made at the points where Infantry and Artillery fire could be used
with the greatest advantage. These trenches were now deepened and
prolonged, so as to form one continuous line of defence, protected by
an abattis; and the defences in the depression between the heights
were so arranged that fire could be brought to bear on an enemy
advancing from the north. To strengthen the north-east corner, a
battery was thrown up on the slope of the ridge, which was connected
with the tower above and the village below. The village itself was
loop-holed, the outlying buildings to the front made defensible,
and the open space to the north-east secured by abattis and wire
entanglements. The Native Field Hospital was strengthened in like
manner, and sand-bag parapets were piled upon the roof, which was
somewhat exposed.

The unfinished wall on the eastern face was raised by logs of wood,
and abattis and wire entanglements were placed in front. In the open
space lying between the Bimaru ridge and the north-west circular
bastion, a defence on the _laager_ system was constructed out of
gun-carriages and limbers captured from the enemy; while the village
of Ghulam Hasan Khan, which formed an excellent flanking defence along
the northern and western faces, was held as an independent post.

I divided the whole of the defences into five sections, under the
superintendence of five different commanders: Brigadier-General
Macpherson, Colonel Jenkins, Brigadier-General Hugh Gough,
Major-General Hills, and Colonel Brownlow. Brigadier-General Massy was
given the centre of the cantonment, where were collected the forage
and firewood; and Brigadier-General Baker commanded the reserve, which
was formed up at the depression in the Bimaru heights mentioned above,
that he might be able to move rapidly to either end of the ridge, the
weakest points in our defences.

The several sections were connected with each other and with my
Head-Quarters by a telegraph-wire, and visual signalling was
established at all important points.

In my arrangements for the defence of Sherpur I relied to a great
extent on the advice of my accomplished Chief Engineer, Colonel Æneas
Perkins, and it was mainly owing to him, and to the exertions of
his competent staff, that the work was carried on as rapidly and
satisfactorily as it was.

During these days of preparation the enemy remained comparatively
inactive, being chiefly employed in looting the city and emptying the
Amir's arsenal. The gunpowder had been destroyed as far as possible;
but a great deal still remained, and many tons of it were carried off
by the army of Mahomed Jan, who had now become the practical leader of
the Afghan combination, and had lately proclaimed Yakub Khan's eldest
son, Musa Khan, Amir.

On the afternoon of the 16th I received the welcome news that Colonel
Hudson had successfully resisted an attack on his position by the
Ghilzais--welcome because I could now feel assured that Lataband could
be depended upon to hold its own.

For the next five days nothing of much importance was done on either
side. The enemy took up positions daily in the neighbouring forts and
gardens, causing a few casualties, and some of our troops moved out to
dislodge them from those places from which they could specially annoy
us. I destroyed some of the forts, and removed other cover in the
immediate vicinity of the walls; but I did not undertake any large
sorties, for to have attempted to drive the enemy out of the outlying
posts, which I could not then have held, would have been a useless
waste of strength.

My chief trouble at this time was the presence of the Afghan Sirdars
within the cantonment. I had good reason to believe that some of them,
though full of protestations of friendship, had been in communication
with Mahomed Jan, the high-priest Mushk-i-Alam, and other Afghan
leaders, so that I felt sure that neither they nor their followers
were to be depended upon. I was also somewhat anxious about the Pathan
soldiers in our ranks, a feeling which I was unwilling to acknowledge
even to myself, for they had hitherto behaved with marked loyalty,
and done splendid service; but they were now being exposed to a most
severe trial, in that they were, as I knew, being constantly appealed
to by their co-religionists to join in the _jahad_ against us, and
bitterly reproached for serving their infidel masters. Whether they
would be strong enough to resist such appeals, it was impossible to
tell; but it would have been most unwise, as well as most painful
to me, to show the slightest suspicion of these fine soldiers. It
happened that the Corps of Guides and 5th Punjab Infantry, which had
of all regiments the largest number of Mahomedans amongst them, were
located at the two extremities of the Bimaru range, the points most
likely to be attacked; to have made any change in the disposition
would have been to show that they were suspected, so I determined
(after taking their commanding officers, Colonels Jenkins and McQueen,
into my confidence) to leave them where they were, and merely to
strengthen each post by a couple of companies of Highlanders.

I was also considerably exercised about the safety of the large stacks
of firewood, grain, and forage, for if anything had happened to them
we could not have continued to hold Sherpur. There were not enough
British soldiers to furnish guards for these stacks, so I was obliged
to have them watched for a time by officers; an opportune fall of
snow, however, on the night of the 18th, rendered incendiarism
impossible.

One other extremely unpleasant precaution I felt it my duty to take
was the placing of Daud Shah, Yakub Khan's Commander-in-Chief, under
arrest. I liked the man, and he had mixed freely with us all for more
than two months. He was not, however, absolutely above suspicion: some
of his near relatives were the most prominent amongst our enemies; and
I had been struck by a change in his manner towards me of late. In
trusting him to the extent I had done, I acted against the opinion of
almost everyone about me, and now that I had a doubt myself, I felt I
was not justified in leaving him at liberty, for if he were disposed
to make use of his opportunities to our disadvantage, his unrestrained
freedom of movement and observation would be certainly a source of
great danger.

For three or four days cloudy weather prevented heliograph
communication with Lataband, and messengers sent by Hudson had failed
to reach Sherpur, so that we were without any news from the outer
world; but on the afternoon of the 18th I received a letter from
Brigadier-General Charles Gough, conveying the disappointing
intelligence that he had only got as far as Jagdalak, twenty-one miles
from Gandamak, and that he did not consider himself strong enough to
advance on Kabul.

Gough no doubt felt himself in an awkward position. The line to his
rear was weakly held, the telegraph-wire on both sides of him was
cut, his rear guard had been attacked near Jagdalak, there was a
considerable collection of men on the hills to his front, and, as he
reported, 'the whole country was up.' Moreover, Major-General Bright,
under whom Gough was immediately serving, shared his opinion that it
would be wiser for him to wait until reinforcements came up from the
rear.

Gough, however, had with him 4 Mountain guns and 125 Artillerymen, 73
Sappers and Miners, 222 Native Cavalry, 487 British Infantry, and 474
Gurkhas; in all, 1,381 men, besides 36 officers--not a very large
force, but composed of excellent material, and large enough, I
considered, augmented, as it would be, by the Lataband detachment, to
move safely on Kabul. I had no hesitation, therefore, in sending Gough
peremptory orders to advance without delay, thus relieving him of all
responsibility in the event of anything unexpected occurring.

Hudson, at Lataband, as has already been recorded, was only victualled
until the 23rd, before which date I had calculated that Gough would
surely have relieved the garrison and brought the troops away. But now
all was uncertain, and it was incumbent upon me to send them food. The
difficulty as to how to get supplies to Lataband was solved by
some Hazaras, who had been working in our camp for several weeks,
volunteering to convey what was necessary, and it was arranged that
the provisions should be sent with two parties, one on the 19th, the
other on the 20th. The first got through safely, but the second almost
entirely fell into the hands of the enemy.

On the 21st a heliogram from Hudson informed me that Gough's brigade
was expected the next day; but as it had been found necessary to drop
his Cavalry at the several posts he passed on the way for their better
protection, I deemed it expedient to send him the 12th Bengal Cavalry,
for he had to pass through some fairly open country near Butkhak,
where they might possibly be of use to him. Accordingly, they started
at 3 a.m. on the 22nd, with instructions to halt at Butkhak should
that post be unoccupied, otherwise to push on to Lataband.

Finding the former place in possession of the Afghans, Major Green,
who was in command of the regiment, made for the further post, where
he arrived with the loss of only three men killed and three wounded.

It was not easy to get reliable information as to the movements or
intentions of the enemy while we were surrounded in Sherpur; but from
spies who managed to pass to and from the city under cover of night, I
gathered that plans were being made to attack us.

It was not, however, until the 21st that there were any very great
signs of activity. On that and the following day the several posts to
the east of the cantonment were occupied preparatory to an attack from
that quarter; and I was told that numbers of scaling-ladders were
being constructed. This looked like business. Next, information was
brought in that, in all the mosques, mullas were making frantic
appeals to the people to unite in one final effort to exterminate the
infidel; and that the aged Mushk-i-Alam was doing all in his power to
fan the flame of fanaticism, promising to light with his own hand
at dawn on the 23rd (the last day of the _Moharram_, when religious
exaltation amongst Mahomedans is at its height) the beacon-fire which
was to be the signal for assault.

The night of the 22nd was undisturbed, save by the songs and cries of
the Afghans outside the walls, but just before day the flames of the
signal-fire, shooting upwards from the topmost crag of the Asmai
range, were plainly to be seen, followed on the instant by a burst of
firing.

Our troops were already under arms and at their posts, waiting for the
assault, which commenced with heavy firing against the eastern and
southern faces. The most determined attack was directed against the
two sections commanded by Brigadier-General Hugh Gough and Colonel
Jenkins, who by their able dispositions proved themselves worthy of
the confidence I had reposed in them.

It was too dark at first to see anything in front of the walls, and
orders were given to reserve fire until the advancing masses of the
assailants could be clearly made out. Gough's Mountain guns, under
Lieutenant Sherries, then fired star-shells, which disclosed the
attacking force up to a thousand yards off. The 28th Punjab Infantry
were the first to open fire; then the Guides, the 67th, and 92nd, each
in their turn, greeted by their volleys the _ghazis_ who approached
close to the walls. Guns from every battery opened on the foe moving
forward to the attack, and from 7 to 10 a.m. the fight was carried on.
Repeated attempts were made to scale the south-eastern wall, and many
times the enemy got up as far as the abattis, but were repulsed,
heaps of dead marking the spots where these attempts had been most
persistent.[3]

Soon after 10 a.m. there was a slight lull in the fighting, leading us
to believe that the Afghans were recoiling before the breechloaders.
An hour later, however, the assault grew hot as ever, and finding we
could not drive the enemy back by any fire which could be brought
against them from the defences, I resolved to attack them in flank.
Accordingly, I directed Major Craster, with four Field Artillery guns,
and Lieutenant-Colonel Williams, with the 5th Punjab Cavalry, to move
out over the hollow in the Bimaru range and open fire on a body of the
enemy collected in and around the village of Kurja Kila. This fire had
the desired effect; the Afghans wavered and broke.

From that moment the attacking force appeared to lose heart, the
assault was no longer prosecuted with the same vigour, and by 1 p.m.
it had ceased altogether, and the enemy were in full flight.

This was the Cavalry's opportunity. I ordered Massy to follow in
pursuit with every available man, and before nightfall all the open
ground in the neighbourhood of Sherpur was cleared of the enemy.
Simultaneously with the movement of the Cavalry, a party was
despatched to destroy some villages near the southern wall which had
caused us much trouble, and whence it was necessary the enemy should
be driven, to facilitate the entrance of Brigadier-General Charles
Gough the next day, for that officer had arrived with his brigade
within about six miles of Sherpur, where I could see his tents, and
gathered from the fact of his pitching them that he meant to halt
there for the night. The villages were found to be occupied by
_ghazis_, who refused to surrender, preferring to remain and perish in
the buildings, which were then blown up. Two gallant Engineer
officers (Captain Dundas, V.C., and Lieutenant C. Nugent) were most
unfortunately killed in carrying out this duty.

The relief I felt when I had gathered my force inside the walls of
Sherpur on the evening of the 14th December was small compared to that
which I experienced on the morning of the 24th, when I realized that
not only had the assault been abandoned, but that the great tribal
combination had dissolved, and that not a man of the many thousands
who had been opposed to us the previous day remained in any of the
villages, or on the surrounding hills. It was difficult to form an
accurate estimate of the numbers opposed to us. As the Contingent from
the more distant districts advanced, they received accessions from
every place they passed, and as they neared Kabul they were joined by
the inhabitants of the numerous villages, and by the disaffected in
the city. It was calculated by those best able to judge that the
combined forces exceeded 100,000, and I myself do not think that an
excessive computation.

[Illustration: PLAN TO ILLUSTRATE THE DEFENCES OF SHERPUR AND
    THE OPERATIONS ROUND KABUL IN DECEMBER, 1879]

Our casualties between the 15th and the 23rd were remarkably few: 2
officers, 9 men, and 7 followers killed, and 5 officers, 41 men, and
22 followers wounded; while the enemy lost not less than 3,000.

I think I had great reason to be proud of my force. All night and
every night, the ground covered with snow and the thermometer marking
sixteen degrees of frost, officers and men were at their posts, and
each day every available man had to be hard at work strengthening the
defences. Native and European soldiers alike bore the hardships and
exposure with the utmost cheerfulness, and in perfect confidence that,
when the assault should take place, victory would be ours.

Early on the 24th the fort of Mahomed Sharif was occupied, and a force
moved out to escort Charles Gough's brigade into Sherpur, a precaution
which, however, was hardly necessary, as there was no enemy to be
seen.

I next set to work to re-open communication with India, Butkhak was
re-occupied, and the relaying of the telegraph was taken in hand.
General Hills resumed his position as military Governor of Kabul; the
dispensary and hospital were re-established in the city under the
energetic and intelligent guidance of Surgeon-Captain Owen;[4] and
in the hope of reassuring the people, I issued the following
Proclamation:

    'At the instigation of some seditious men, the ignorant people,
    generally not considering the result, raised a rebellion. Now many
    of the insurgents have received their reward, and as subjects
    are a trust from God, the British Government, which is just and
    merciful, as well as strong, has forgiven their guilt. It is now
    proclaimed that all who come in without delay will be pardoned,
    excepting only Mahomed Jan of Wardak, Mir Bacha of Kohistan,
    Samandar Khan of Logar, Ghulam Hyder of Chardeh, and the murderers
    of Sirdar Mahomed Hassan Khan. Come and make your submission
    without fear, of whatsoever tribe you may be. You can then remain
    in your houses in comfort and safety, and no harm will befall you.
    The British Government has no enmity towards the people. Anyone
    who rebels again will, of course, be punished. This condition is
    necessary. But all who come in without delay need have no fear or
    suspicion. The British Government speaks only that which is in its
    heart.'

The effect of this Proclamation was most satisfactory: the city and
the surrounding country quieted rapidly, shops were re-opened, and
before the close of the year the bazaars were as densely thronged as
ever. Most of the principal men of Logar and Kohistan came to pay
their respects to me; they were treated with due consideration, and
the political officers did all they could to find out what they
really wanted, so that some basis of an arrangement for the peaceful
administration of the country might be arrived at.

While taking these measures, which I thought would create confidence
in our clemency and justice, I endeavoured in other ways to prevent
a repetition of further serious troubles. Snow was still deep on the
ground, but I did not let it prevent my sending General Baker to
destroy a fort about twenty miles off, where dwelt an influential
_malik_, who was one of the chief ringleaders in the revolt. All
walled enclosures within 1,000 yards of the cantonment were razed to
the ground, roads fit for guns were made all round the outside walls
and towards the several gates of the city and Siah Sang, while two
bridges, strong enough for Artillery to pass over, were thrown across
the Kabul River.

The increased numbers to be accommodated on the arrival of Gough's
brigade necessitated the re-occupation of the Bala Hissar, the
defences of which were reconstructed so as to give a continuous line
of fire, and admit of free circulation round the walls; roads were
made through the lower Bala Hissar, and redoubts and towers were built
on the Shahr-i-Darwaza range.

A strong fort--Fort Roberts--was constructed on the south-west point
of Siah Sang, which commanded the Bala Hissar and the city; a smaller
one was built at the crossing of the river; and as these two forts
were not within sight of each other, a tower to connect them was
constructed at the north-west extremity of Siah Sang.

Sherpur was thus made safe; but for the absolute protection of the
city against an enemy operating from the Chardeh direction, a third
fort was erected on the Asmai heights, which completed a formidable
line of defences most skilfully carried out by Colonel Perkins and his
staff.


[Footnote 1: Four and a half miles.]

[Footnote 2: The committee consisted of Brigadier-General T. D.
Baker, Lieutenant Colonel Æ. Perkins, commanding Royal Engineers, and
Lieutenant-Colonel B. Gordon, commanding Royal Artillery.]

[Footnote 3: A curious exemplification of the passive courage and
indifference to danger of some Natives was the behaviour of an old
Mahomedan servant of mine. At this juncture, just at the time when the
fight was hottest, and I was receiving reports every few seconds from
the officers commanding the several posts, Eli Bux (a brother of the
man who had been with me throughout the Mutiny) whispered in my ear
that my bath was ready. He was quite unmoved by the din and shots, and
was carrying on his ordinary duties as if nothing at all unusual was
occurring.]

[Footnote 4: This hospital was admirably managed, and was attended by
a large number of patients, half of whom were women. The disease moat
prevalent in Kabul was ophthalmia, caused by dust, dirt, and exposure,
while cataract and other affections of the eye were very common. Dr.
Owen, amongst his other many qualifications, excelled as an oculist,
and his marvellous cures attracted sufferers from all parts of
Afghanistan.]

       *       *       *       *       *




CHAPTER LVIII.
1880

  Two important questions--A Ruler required--News of Abdur Rahman Khan
  --Abdur Rahman in Afghan-Turkestan--Overtures made to Abdur Rahman


The outlook in Afghanistan on the 1st January, 1880, was fairly
satisfactory; the tidings of the defeat and dispersion of the
tribesmen had spread far and wide, and had apparently had the effect
of tranquillizing the country even in remote Kandahar, where the
people had been greatly excited by the news of our retiring from
Sherpur, and by the exaggerated reports of their countrymen's success.
No complications now existed anywhere, and preparations were commenced
for Sir Donald Stewart's force in southern Afghanistan to move
towards Ghazni, in anticipation of the carrying out of a complete and
connected scheme[1] for the pacification of the country, and an early
withdrawal from northern Afghanistan. No withdrawal, however, would be
possible until durable foundations had been laid for the future
safety of the Indian frontier, and reliable guarantees given for the
continued good behaviour of India's Afghan neighbours.

The two questions, therefore, which chiefly exercised the minds of
people in authority, both in England and in India, with regard to
Afghan affairs were, What was to be done with Afghanistan now we had
got it? and, Who could be set up as Ruler with any chance of being
able to hold his own?

The second question depended a good deal on the decision which might
be arrived at with regard to the first, for the selection of a Ruler
could hardly be considered until it had been determined whether the
several provinces of Afghanistan were to be again formed into one
kingdom, or whether the political scheme for the future government of
the country should be based on the separation of the several States.

I myself had come to the conclusion, after much deliberation and
anxious thought, that the latter course was the least dangerous for us
to adopt. Disintegration had been the normal condition of Afghanistan,
except for a short period which ended as far back as 1818. Dost
Mahomed was the first since that time to attempt its unification, and
it took him (the strongest Amir of the century) eight years after his
restoration to establish his supremacy over Afghan-Turkestan, fourteen
years before Kandahar acknowledged his authority, and twenty-one years
ere he got possession of Herat, a consummation which was achieved only
just before his death. His successor, Sher Ali, was five years making
himself master of Afghanistan, and he could never have attained that
position but for the material assistance he received from us. I felt
it would be in the future as it had been in the past, and that there
would always be the danger of a Ruler, made supreme by the aid of our
money and our arms, turning against us for some supposed grievance, or
at the instigation of a foreign Power, as had happened with Sher Ali.
A strong, united Afghanistan was very desirable, no doubt, could we
be certain that its interests and ours would always remain identical;
but, in addition to the chance of its strength and unity being used
against us, there was the certainty that, even if the man we might
choose as Amir were to remain perfectly loyal, at his death Afghan
history would repeat itself; the succession to the throne would be
disputed, and the unification would have to begin all over again. For
these reasons I had no hesitation in giving it as my opinion that
Afghanistan should be disintegrated, and that we should not again
attempt to place the whole country under any one Sovereign.

My views must have commended themselves to the Government of India,
for in their despatch to the Secretary of State, dated 7th January,
1880, they indicated them as the line of policy they proposed to adopt
in pursuance of the object they had at heart, viz., the safety of the
Indian Empire and the tranquillity of its northern frontier; and in
the communication to myself, conveying their idea of the general
principles upon which the permanent settlement of Afghanistan should
be based, the Foreign Secretary wrote that all arrangements for
the establishment of a durable Government at Kabul depended on the
selection of a suitable Ruler for that province; and that, as it was
essential to clear away any apprehension that the British Government
contemplated territorial annexation, which might be caused by a
prolonged interregnum, it would be very advantageous if one of the
principal Sirdars, qualified by his family connexions, his local
influence, and his personal following, could be selected as the Ruler
of the Kabul State.

There was another very strong reason why the Government of India
should wish to find some one to whom the administration of the country
could safely be made over. The first warning notes of a General
Election were heard in India early in January. Afghan affairs were
being made a party question, and the policy of the Beaconsfield
Government with regard to them was being severely and adversely
criticized. Lord Lytton was, therefore, most anxious that a definite
conclusion should be arrived at as to the administration of
Afghanistan, and a period put to our occupation of the northern
province before the meeting of Parliament should take place.

The difficulty was to find the right man. Abdur Rahman, who I had
reason to believe would be acceptable to the army, was far away, I
could not find out where, and I could think of no one else at all
suitable. Under the circumstances, I deemed it advisable to open
negotiations with the several leaders of the late combination against
us, who were congregated at Ghazni, and had with them the young
Heir-apparent, Musa Khan. In the middle of January I had received two
communications from these people, one ostensibly written by Musa Khan
himself, the other signed by seventy of the most influential
chiefs; the tenor of both was the same; they demanded Yakub Khan's
restoration, and asserted his innocence as to the massacre of the
Embassy. I replied that Yakub Khan's return was impossible, and that
they must consider his abdication final, as he himself had declared
that he wished it to be,[2] and a few days later I deputed the
Mustaufi[3] to visit Ghazni, in the hope that he might be able to
induce the leaders to make some more feasible suggestion for the
government of the country.

The Mustaufi had scarcely started, before what seemed to be a reliable
report reached me that Abdur Rahman was at Kanduz, on his way to
Badakhshan, and I immediately communicated this news to Lord Lytton.

A fortnight later Abdur Rahman's mother, who resided at Kandahar,
informed Sir Donald Stewart that Ayub Khan had received a letter from
her son, in answer to an offer from Ayub to join him at Balkh and
march with him against the British. In this letter Abdur Rahman had
replied that he would have nothing to do with any of Sher Ali's
family, who had deceived him and dealt with him in the same
treacherous manner that characterized Sher Ali's dealings with the
British; further, that he had no intention of opposing the British,
knowing full well he was not strong enough to do so; that he could not
leave Russian territory without the permission of the Russians, whose
pensioner he was; and that, even if he got that permission, he could
not come either into Turkestan or Kabul without an invitation from us,
but that, if he received such an invitation, he would obey it as an
order. He concluded by advising Ayub Khan to make his submission to
the British, as opposition was useless. Sir Donald Stewart telegraphed
the substance of this communication to the Foreign Secretary, adding
that Abdur Rahman's family were well disposed towards us, and that
there would be no difficulty in communicating with the Sirdar through
them.

In the meantime, I had been careful to acquaint the Government of
India with my failure to come to any conclusion with the Ghazni
faction as to the future government of the country, and the
hopelessness of finding anyone of sufficient strength of character to
set up as Ruler of Kabul; and I had suggested, failing a really strong
man, the alternative of letting the Afghans choose for themselves some
Ruler, other than Yakub Khan, and thus leave us free to evacuate the
country.

About this time Mr. Lyall, the Foreign Secretary, came to Kabul on
a visit to me, and Captain West Ridgeway[4] took the place of my
Political Secretary, Mr. Durand, who left me to join the Foreign
Office at Simla, Mr. (now Sir) Lepel Griffin, Secretary to the Punjab
Government, being appointed Chief of the political staff at Kabul.

Lyall told me that the Indian Government fully appreciated the
difficulty I was in about finding a Ruler for the province, and that,
unless Abdur Rahman could be brought within negotiable distance, the
alternative I had suggested would have to be acted upon.

Lord Lytton, however, was very sanguine about Abdur Rahman, and he
warned Mr. Griffin, before he started for Kabul, that the Sirdar's
letter to Ayub Khan indicated possibilities that might have the most
important bearing on the solution of the difficult problem to be dealt
with in northern Afghanistan. It was Lord Lytton's wish to place Abdur
Rahman on the throne of Kabul, or, at least, to afford him the best
opportunity of winning his own way to that position. The difficulty
was to get at him, in the first instance, and, in the second, to
convince him of our wish and power to help him; while a not unnatural
hesitation on the Sirdar's part to enter Afghanistan without Russia's
permission had to be considered.

Lord Lytton impressed upon Mr. Griffin the necessity for overcoming
these difficulties in time to enable us to withdraw from northern
Afghanistan in the early autumn at latest; and he desired Sir Oliver
St. John (Sir Donald Stewart's political officer, who was at that time
in Calcutta), immediately on his return to Kandahar, to communicate
with Abdur Rahman, through his mother, the Viceroy's willingness to
make him Ruler of Kabul and Turkestan, if he would accept the terms
offered to him without delay.

The Viceroy communicated his views to the Secretary of State in the
following telegram:

    'Necessary to find without delay some Native authority to which we
    can restore northern Afghanistan without risk of immediate anarchy
    on our evacuation of Kabul not later than next autumn, and if
    possible earlier. No prospect of finding in the country any man
    strong enough for this purpose. I therefore advocate early public
    recognition of Abdur Rahman as legitimate heir of Dost Mahomed,
    and open deputation of Sirdars with British concurrence to offer
    him throne of Afghanistan as sole means of saving the country from
    anarchy. Do you approve?'

Lord Cranbrook's reply was as follows:

    'Assuming that Abdur Rahman is acceptable to the country, and that
    he would be content with northern Afghanistan, it is desirable to
    support him at Kabul; the more spontaneous any advances to him
    on the part of the Sirdars, and the less appearance of British
    influence, the better. But where is he? And how do you propose
    to learn his wishes and intentions? If invited by Chiefs, every
    inducement to bring him to Kabul should be then held out. Public
    recognition should not precede, but follow, his adoption by
    Sirdars, and his acceptance of the position.'

By the end of March authentic intelligence was received that
Abdur Rahman had made himself master of Afghan-Turkestan, and was
corresponding with the representative Sirdars at Kabul. It seemed,
therefore, that the time had arrived when distinct overtures might
be made to Abdur Rahman; accordingly, on the 1st April Mr. Griffin
addressed to him the following letter:

    'It has become known that you have entered Afghanistan, and
    consequently this letter is sent you by a confidential messenger,
    in order that you may submit to the British officers at Kabul
    any representations that you may desire to make to the British
    Government with regard to your object in entering Afghanistan.'

Abdur Rahman, in his friendly but guarded reply,[5] expressed in
general terms his hope of being recognized as Amir. He greatly
desired, he wrote, the friendship of the British, and their assistance
in restoring peace and order to Afghanistan; but at the same time,
he hinted that his obligations to the Russian Government for the
hospitality they had extended to him placed him in some doubt as to
the terms upon which our friendship might be accorded to him, and
while he expressed a desire for the permanent establishment of
Afghanistan, with our assistance and sympathy, he let it be understood
that he wished to consider himself under the protection of Russia as
well as of Great Britain.

In a verbal message, however, he added that he was ready to cross the
Hindu Kush to discuss matters with our officers, and he begged that
he might be furnished with information as to the 'nature of our
friendship' and 'its conditions.'

In answer, Mr. Griffin was directed to inform Abdur Rahman that the
relations of Afghanistan to the British and Russian Empires was a
subject the Government of India must decline to discuss with him, and
to explain that their declared determination had been the exclusion
of foreign influence and interference from Afghanistan, a cardinal
condition 'which had at all times and under all circumstances been
deemed essential for the permanent security of Her Majesty's Indian
Empire,' a condition, moreover, which had always been accepted by the
Government of the Czar, which had repeatedly renewed those assurances,
solemnly given to Her Majesty's Ministers, that 'Russia considered
Afghanistan as entirely beyond the sphere of her influence.'[6]

Early in April the Mustaufi (whom, it will be remembered, I had sent
to Ghazni to communicate with the Chiefs, and ascertain their ideas
and desires as to the future government of Kabul) returned without
having achieved much success. He had persuaded some of the leading men
to accompany him as far as Maidan, whence a few representatives came
on to Kabul as bearers of a document signed by Mahomed Jan, twelve
other Sirdars, and 189 influential tribesmen, setting forth their
views and wishes; but as these were all based upon the restoration of
Yakub Khan, their proposals could not be entertained.

On the 13th April I held a durbar, at which I received this
deputation; all the Sirdars, Chiefs, and _maliks_ of Kabul and many
Hazaras being present. Mr. Griffin, on the part of the Government,
told them that Yakub Khan could not be allowed to return to
Afghanistan, but that the names of any Sirdars, approved of by a large
proportion of the people for the Amirship, would be laid before the
Viceroy; that there was no intention of annexing Afghanistan, and
that there would be no occupation of any places except such as were
necessary for the safety of our Indian frontier. They were further
informed that the British army would be withdrawn as soon as the
country had settled down peacefully and an Amir, amicably disposed
towards us, had been selected; but that Kandahar would not again be
united to Kabul.

The effect produced was good. The deputation was greatly disappointed
that Yakub Khan was not to be permitted to return, but all present
felt that they had received a definite reply.


[Footnote 1: In reply to a reference made to me on the subject,
I represented that, before operations could be undertaken on so
extensive a scale as was proposed, it would be necessary to reinforce
the Kabul garrison and the several posts on the Kyber line by:

  One battery of Horse or Field Artillery.
  One Heavy battery.
  One Mountain battery.
  A detachment of Garrison Artillery.
  A brigade of Cavalry.
  Three companies of Sappers and Miners.
  Two regiments of British Infantry.
  Six regiments of Native Infantry.
  Drafts sufficient to raise each Infantry regiment at
  Kabul to 800 men.

This was agreed to; the reinforcements were sent up by degrees, and
a second division was formed at Kabul, to the command of which
Major-General J. Ross,[*] C.B., was appointed.]

  [Note *: Now General Sir John Ross, G.C.B.]

[Footnote 2: As the deportation of Yakub Khan was believed to be one
of the chief causes of recent disturbances, and as a powerful party in
the country still looked forward to having him back as their Ruler, I
was directed to make it clear to his adherents that the ex-Amir would
never be allowed to return to Afghanistan, and that his abdication
must be, as he himself at the time wished it to be, considered
irrevocable. In support of this decision, I was informed that the
unanimous verdict of guilty of murder, recorded against Yakub Khan
by Colonel Macgregor's Commission, was substantially endorsed by the
Chief Justice of Calcutta and the Advocate-General; and that, although
other authorities who had considered the evidence did not quite go so
far as these two high legal functionaries, the general conclusion
come to was that, if the Amir did not connive at the massacre of the
Mission, he made no attempt whatever to interpose on its behalf,
and that his whole conduct on that occasion betrayed a culpable
indifference to the fate of Sir Louis Cavagnari and his companions,
and a total disregard of the solemn obligation which he had contracted
with the British Government.]

[Footnote 3: I had released the Mustaufi from confinement when the
general amnesty was published on the 26th December, and he had
subsequently been usefully employed assisting the political officers
in revenue matters. I did not suppose that he had any great love for
the British, but he was anxious to see us out of the country, and was
wise enough to know that no armed opposition could effect his purpose,
and that it could only be accomplished by the establishment of a
stable government, under a Ruler that we could accept.]

[Footnote 4: Now Colonel Sir West Ridgeway, K.C.B.]

[Footnote 5: Abdur Rahman's letter is given in the Appendix.] (See
Appendix VIII.)

[Footnote 6: This letter from the Foreign Secretary to Mr. Griffin is
given in full in the Appendix. (Appendix IX.)]

       *       *       *       *       *




CHAPTER LIX.
1880

  Jenkins attacked near Charasia--Sir Donald Stewart reaches Kabul
  --Difficulties with Abdur Rahman--Abdur Rahman proclaimed Amir


Sir Donald Stewart's division, which, I have mentioned, it had been
decided should be sent to Kabul to take part in the pacification of
northern Afghanistan, left Kandahar[1] on the 30th March, and was
expected to arrive at Ghazni about the 21st April. On the 16th I
received a letter from Sir Donald, dated six days before, asking me to
send supplies to meet him. I, therefore, that same day despatched a
small column, under the command of Major General Ross, C.B., with the
articles of food required; and as I thought it likely that my object
in sending this force might be misunderstood, the deputation which
attended the durbar was told to explain matters to the Chiefs at
Maidan, and assure them that the advance would be peaceful unless
hostilities should be provoked by their own action. Notwithstanding
this precaution, I thought it quite possible the column would be
opposed, for the news concerning Abdur Rahman's advent was causing
considerable excitement; and whilst the soldiers and a proportion of
the tribesmen were disposed to welcome him as a deliverer, those from
Wardak and Logar resented his appearance on the scene as putting an
end to their hopes of having Yakub Khan reinstated.

With a view, therefore, to prevent the Logaris from joining any attack
which might be made on General Ross, I sent a party, 1,200 strong,
under Colonel Jenkins, in the direction of Charasia.

On the 22nd April Ross reached Sar-i-top, forty-one miles from Ghazni;
Sir Donald Stewart having arrived that same day at the latter place,
heliographic communication was at once opened with him, and the
welcome news was signalled that Sir Donald had fought an engagement at
Ahmedkhel on the 19th, and had been entirely successful. On receipt of
this intelligence I ordered a Royal salute to be fired in honour of
the victory, the announcement of which I hoped might have a quieting
effect on the excitement which prevailed around Kabul.

In this I was disappointed. On the evening of the 24th, Jenkins, who
was encamped at Charasia, heard that he was about to be attacked by
the Logaris, under Mahomed Hasan Khan. At once striking his tents,
and collecting his baggage in a sheltered spot, he ordered a party of
Cavalry to reconnoitre up the Logar valley, strengthened his piquets,
and sent off an express messenger to inform me of the situation.

I immediately despatched Brigadier-General Macpherson to Jenkins's
assistance. By 9 a.m. he had started, with four Mountain guns and
962 Infantry, followed later by two more guns and a troop of the 3rd
Punjab Cavalry; and as a support to Macpherson, Brigadier-General Hugh
Gough, with the Cavalry brigade and four Horse Artillery guns, was
ordered to take up a position half-way between Kabul and Charasia.

At 1 p.m. on the 25th Macpherson arrived on the high ground beyond the
_sang-i-nawishta_ gorge, whence he obtained a good view of Jenkins's
position; and seeing that the enemy formed a complete semicircle round
it, he pushed on. Jenkins had stood on the defensive from the early
morning, and the Afghans, who had advanced to within a couple of
hundred yards, were only kept at bay by the steadiness of his fire.

Macpherson first sent back the baggage to Sherpur, so as to free all
hands for action, and then proceeded to attack the left horn of the
semicircle. The enemy broke, fell back, and were completely scattered
by a well-directed Artillery fire; the surrounding hills were speedily
cleared, and the Cavalry and Horse Artillery pursued for four miles.
By four o'clock not a single living Afghan was to be seen; more than
200 had been killed, while our casualties were only four killed and
thirty-four wounded.

I came up just as the fight was over; and being sure from the decisive
character of the defeat that a retirement could not be misunderstood,
I ordered the troops to return to Kabul.

In anticipation of Sir Donald Stewart's arrival, and the consequent
necessity for my making over to him, as my senior, the supreme command
of the Kabul Field Force, I prepared a report[2] for his information,
which explained the general military situation in northern
Afghanistan, and contained a statement of economic details which I
thought would be of use to the Government, and concerning which an
experience of eighteen months in the field enabled me to give an
opinion with some confidence.

The strength of the Kabul Field Force at the end of April amounted to
nearly 14,000 men and thirty-eight guns, with 12,500 followers;[3]
besides 15,000 men and thirty guns on the Khyber line, under the
immediate command of Major-General Bright.

Sir Donald reached Kabul on the 5th May. On the same day we heard
that the Beaconsfield Administration had come to an end; that a new
Ministry had been formed under Mr. Gladstone; that Lord Lytton had
resigned, and was to be succeeded by the Marquis of Ripon; and that
the Marquis of Hartington had become Secretary of State for India.

Notwithstanding the pleasure of meeting an old friend in my new
Commander, that 5th of May was altogether not a happy day for me.
Lord Lytton's approaching departure was a source of real sorrow.
Personally, I felt that I was deeply indebted to him for the
confidence he had reposed in me, and for the warm support he had
invariably accorded me. I had hoped that he would have had the
gratification of seeing, while in office, the campaign in which he was
so much interested satisfactorily concluded, and with the prospect of
permanent results; and I dreaded that a change of Government might
mean a reversal of the policy which I believed to be the best for
the security of our position in India. Moreover, it was not in human
nature to feel absolute satisfaction in yielding up the supreme
command I had so greatly delighted in, into the hands of another, even
though that other was one for whom I had so great a personal regard,
and under whom I had already served in the field.

The amalgamated troops were now styled the Northern Afghanistan Field
Force, and I retained the command of the two divisions at Kabul, with
Major-General John Ross as second in command; while Major-General
Hills was given the brigades from Kandahar, which now became the third
division of the Force.

The idea in bringing Stewart away from Kandahar was that he should
occupy Ghazni and Kabul; that my divisions should operate in Kohistan
and in the direction of Bamian; that General Bright should move
against the Ghilzais; and that a column from Kuram should march over
the Shutargardan to Kabul. It was hoped that these operations would
have the effect of quieting the country, and, by the time they
had been carried out, it would be possible to evacuate northern
Afghanistan.

With a view to having my divisions thoroughly efficient and mobile for
the service they were expected to perform, I had largely replenished
the numbers of my transport animals, which had suffered greatly from
the strain put upon them in supplying the troops with food and other
necessaries during the winter months; they had been continuously at
work in the most inclement weather, numbers had died, and those that
remained required to be carefully looked after and given complete
rest to render them fit for the contemplated operations. Major Mark
Heathcote, who had taken, at my particular request, the arduous charge
of this department, wished to revert to regimental duty, so I applied
for, and obtained, the services of Lieutenant Colonel B. Low[4]
as Director of Transport, under whose energetic and intelligent
management the transport service was rendered as perfect as it was
possible to make it. In the end, circumstances prevented the concerted
movements for which these preparations were made being carried out,
but I reaped the benefit of them when later in the year I was required
to undertake a rapid march to Kandahar, which could not possibly have
been successfully accomplished had my transport not been in such
admirable condition.

In order to relieve the great pressure put upon the Commissariat
Department by having to provide for the increased number of troops at
Kabul, and with a view to opening up the roads upon which traffic had
been more or less impeded for some months, it was considered desirable
to send a strong brigade towards Maidan, which I accompanied, and
remained away from Kabul for some weeks. On my return, I found a
considerable change had taken place in the political situation. The
Mustaufi had been deported to India; the correspondence between Abdur
Rahman and Mr. Griffin had taken rather an unsatisfactory turn, and
the Sirdar's dealings with the leading Chiefs and tribesmen had given
cause to fear that, if he came to Kabul during our occupation, it
might be as an enemy rather than a friend.

The Mustaufi was a firm adherent of the Sher Ali faction, and, finding
there was no hope of Yakub Khan being reinstated, and that we were
negotiating with Abdur Rahman, he had espoused the cause of Yakub's
younger brother, Ayub Khan, and had been proved guilty of inciting the
Sirdars and Chiefs to oppose us. For this he was very properly sent
out of Afghanistan; nevertheless, I looked upon his removal as a
misfortune, for it broke up the only party that could possibly be
formed to counterbalance Abdur Rahman, who was astute enough to see
that the weaker our position became, the more chance there was of his
being able to get his own terms from us.

From the letters he had written to his friends and relations in
northern Afghanistan (the majority of which had fallen into our
hands), it was evident that he was doing all he could to strengthen
himself, even at our expense, and that he greatly disliked the idea of
Kandahar being separated from the kingdom of Kabul. Indeed, in one
of his communications to Mr. Griffin he had made it clear that he
expected the whole inheritance of his grandfather, Dost Mahomed Khan,
to be made over to him.

The uncertainty as to the result of the correspondence with Abdur
Rahman, the rumours in circulation regarding his real disposition and
plans, and the general excitement throughout the country, suggested
such grave doubts of the Sirdar's good faith that, in some quarters,
the question was seriously discussed whether it might not be necessary
to break off negotiations with him, and reinstate Yakub Khan, or else
set up his brother, Ayub Khan, as Amir.

I myself was altogether opposed to Yakub Khan's restoration, and as
to Ayub Khan, we were in total ignorance of his character and
proclivities, even if he had been near enough to treat with. It
appeared to me, moreover, that we had gone too far with Abdur Rahman
to throw him over because, in conformity with Afghan character and
tradition, he was not running quite straight. I, therefore, gave it as
my opinion that we should not change our tactics unless it was found
impossible to come to terms with him, or unless it was made evident on
his nearer approach to Kabul that the majority of his countrymen were
averse to have him as their Ruler.

Soon after this the situation began to improve, and early in July
Mr. Griffin was able to inform the Government of India that 'the
probabilities of a settlement with Abdur Rahman appear far more
favourable than they did last week....' 'Abdur Rahman has seen that
we have been fully informed of the game he has been playing, that
trickery and treachery would not be tolerated, and that, if he intends
coming to a settlement with us at all, he must be prepared to accept
our terms rather than dictate his own.'

A few days later a letter was received from Abdur Rahman, announcing
his arrival in Kohistan. His near approach, and the report that he
was willing to accept our terms, excited a keen and hopeful interest
throughout the country, for the Afghans had at length become convinced
that the only chance of getting rid of us was by agreeing to any form
of settled government we might establish, and they had grown heartily
tired of perpetual fighting and of having to maintain bands of
_ghazis_ to oppose us, who were eating them out of house and home.
With the exception of the Sher Ali faction, therefore, whose interests
were directly opposed to his, Abdur Rahman's advent was welcomed by
the people, and several of the most influential amongst them went to
meet him.

Towards the end of July Sir Donald Stewart was empowered to conclude
all political and military arrangements preparatory to withdrawing
from northern Afghanistan. Abdur Rahman was to be recognized as 'Amir
of Kabul'; he was to be provided with a sufficient number of guns to
strengthen effectively his occupation of the city, and he was to be
given as much money (within a maximum of ten lakhs) as was thought
necessary to meet his present wants. It was to be clearly explained to
Abdur Rahman that the Government of India would not engage to give him
a regular subsidy, or a continuous supply of arms or money, and that
after he had taken possession of his capital he would have to rely
upon his own resources for holding it. There was to be no treaty, and
all questions of reciprocal engagements between the two Governments
were to be postponed until some settled and responsible administration
had been consolidated.

General Stewart was directed to make the best arrangements he could
with Abdur Rahman for the protection of the tribes and individuals who
had assisted us, and the Sirdar was to be informed that, if he
desired our goodwill, he could give no better proof of his friendly
disposition than by his behaviour towards those of his own nation in
whom the British Government were interested.

Sir Donald Stewart considered that the best way of giving effect to
these instructions was to publicly proclaim Abdur Rahman as Amir of
Kabul; for this purpose he held a durbar on the 22nd July, at which
the Sirdar's representatives were received. Sir Donald, in a few
words, gave his reasons for summoning them to meet him, and Mr.
Griffin then explained more fully the motives by which the Government
of India were actuated in acknowledging the claims of Abdur Rahman.
Immediately after the durbar orders were issued for an early
retirement.

I was to withdraw my column by the Kuram route; but being anxious
to see something of the Khyber line while I had the opportunity, I
started off the following day to ride through the Jagdalak Pass to
Gandamak, where I was entertained by General Bright and his staff.
The next day I went on to Jalalabad, and was greatly interested
in wandering over the place where Sir Robert Sale in some measure
redeemed the lamentable failures of the first Afghan war.

My intention, when I left Kabul, was to ride as far as the Khyber
Pass, but suddenly a presentiment, which I have never been able to
explain to myself, made me retrace my steps and hurry back towards
Kabul--a presentiment of coming trouble which I can only characterize
as instinctive.

The feeling was justified when, about half-way between Butkhak and
Kabul, I was met by Sir Donald Stewart and my Chief of the Staff,[5]
who brought me the astounding news of the total defeat by Ayub Khan
of Brigadier-General Burrows's brigade at Maiwand, and of
Lieutenant-General Primrose,[6] with the remainder of his force, being
besieged at Kandahar.


[Footnote 1: Sir Donald Stewart's division was replaced at Kandahar by
troops from Bombay.]

[Footnote 2: The part of the report which deals with economic details
is given in the Appendix (see Appendix X.); the military portion is
omitted, as it was only intended for Sir Donald Stewart's information
at the time.]

[Footnote 3: Of these, more than 3,000 were doolie-bearers, and nearly
8,000 were _saices_ of Native Cavalry regiments, and men belonging to
the Transport and other Departments.]

[Footnote 4: Now Major-General Sir Robert Low, G.C.B.]

[Footnote 5: Colonel Macgregor and Lieutenant-Colonel Chapman had
changed places, the former joining Sir Donald Stewart as Chief of the
Staff, and the latter taking up the same position with me.]

[Footnote 6: Lieutenant-General Primrose succeeded Sir Donald Stewart
in command of the troops at Kandahar.]

       *       *       *       *       *




CHAPTER LX.
1880

  Affairs at Kandahar--The Maiwand disaster
  --Relief from Kabul suggested--A force ordered from Kabul
  --Preparations for the march--The Kabul-Kandahar Field Force
  --Commissariat and Transport


For more than six months rumours had been afloat of Ayub Khan's
determination to advance on Kandahar; but little attention was paid to
them by the authorities at that place until towards the end of May,
when a Sirdar, named Sher Ali,[1] who had been a few days before
formally installed as Wali, or Ruler, of Kandahar, informed the
political officer, Lieutenant-Colonel St. John, that the British
occupation of Kabul had had the effect of bringing about a
reconciliation between the various chiefs at Herat, who had placed
themselves under the leadership of Ayub Khan and induced him to
proclaim a _jahad_. Sher Ali, who evidently considered this news
authentic, declared his belief that his own troops,[2] who were then
engaged in collecting revenue in Zamindawar, would desert to Ayub Khan
as he approached Kandahar, and he begged that a brigade of British
soldiers might be sent to Girishk to support him.

On General Primrose communicating this information to the
Commander-in-Chief in India, he recommended to the Government that the
Bombay reserve division, located at Jacobabad, Hyderabad, and Karachi,
should be mobilized so soon as it became certain that Ayub Khan really
contemplated this move, as in his opinion the garrison at Kandahar
would be left dangerously weak after a brigade had been detached for
Girishk.

Ayub Khan's movements, however, were not ascertained until the 27th
June, when he had advanced halfway to the Helmand; it was too late
then to mobilize troops so far off as Jacobabad, Hyderabad, and
Karachi with any chance of their being in time to check his onward
march. The news of his approach spread rapidly, and had the most
disturbing effect in Kandahar and its neighbourhood. The Governor's
authority daily diminished, and many of the inhabitants left the city.

Ayub Khan had with him, when he started from Herat on the 15th June,
7,500 men and ten guns as the nucleus of an army, which he calculated,
as he moved forward, would be strongly reinforced by tribesmen,
levies, and _ghazis_.

On the 4th July a brigade, under the command of Brigadier-General
Burrows, started from Kandahar, and reached the Helmand on the 11th,
encamping on the near bank of the river opposite Girishk. On the
further bank Sirdar Sher Ali's troops were located, having with them
six guns. Two days afterwards these troops deserted in a body to the
enemy, but did not succeed in taking their Artillery with them, as
Burrows, on perceiving their intention, crossed the river and captured
the guns.

Brigadier-General Burrows's position had now entirely changed; instead
of there being a loyal force under the Wali, with which to co-operate
and prevent Ayub Khan crossing the Helmand, he found himself with an
inadequate number of troops, the Wali's men gone over to the enemy,
and the Wali himself a fugitive in the British camp. The Helmand was
fordable everywhere at that season, making it easy for Ayub to cut off
Burrows's retreat; the first twenty-five of the eighty miles by which
he was separated from Kandahar was a desert, and no supplies were
forthcoming owing to the hostile attitude of the people. Burrows
therefore determined to retire to Khushk-i-Nakhud, an important
position half-way to Kandahar, covering the road from Girishk, and
where supplies and water were plentiful.

Burrows reached Khushk-i-Nakhud on the 16th July. On the 22nd the
Commander-in-Chief in India, who had been inquiring from General
Primrose whether there were 'any routes from the Helmand passing by
the north to Ghazni, by which Ayub Khan might move with his guns,'
telegraphed to Primrose: 'You will understand that you have full
liberty to attack Ayub, if you consider you are strong enough to do
so. Government consider it of the highest political importance that
his force should be dispersed, and prevented by all possible means
from passing on to Ghazni.'

On the afternoon of the 26th information was received by
Brigadier-General Burrows that 2,000 of the enemy's Cavalry and a
large body of _ghazis_ had arrived at Maiwand, eleven miles off, and
that Ayub Khan was about to follow with the main body of his army.

To prevent Ayub Khan getting to Ghazni, General Burrows had to do one
of two things, either await him at Khushk-i-Nakhud, or intercept him
at Maiwand. After consulting with Colonel St. John, he determined to
adopt the latter course, as he hoped thus to be able to deal with the
_ghazis_ before they were joined by Ayub Khan.

The brigade started soon after 6 a.m. on the 27th. It was encumbered
by a large number of baggage animals, which Burrows considered could
not be left behind because of the hostile state of the country, and
the impossibility of detaching any part of his already too small force
for their protection.

At 10 a.m., when about half-way to Maiwand, a spy brought in
information that Ayub Khan had arrived at that place, and was
occupying it in force; General Burrows, however, considered it then
too late to turn back, and decided to advance. At a quarter to twelve
the forces came into collision, and the fight lasted until past three
o'clock. The Afghans, who, Burrows reported, numbered 25,000, soon
outflanked the British. Our Artillery expended their ammunition, and
the Native portion of the brigade got out of hand, and pressed back on
the few British Infantry, who were unable to hold their own against
the overwhelming numbers of the enemy. Our troops were completely
routed, and had to thank the apathy of the Afghans in not following
them up for escaping total annihilation.

Of the 2,476 men engaged at Maiwand, 934 were killed and 175 were
wounded and missing;[3] the remnant struggled on throughout the night
to Kandahar, where the first of the fugitives arrived early on the
morning of the 28th. Brigadier-General Burrows, who had two horses
shot under him during the engagement, was amongst the last to reach
Kandahar.

This lamentable story imparted to me by Stewart almost took my breath
away, and we eagerly discussed the situation as we rode back together
to Sherpur. It was impossible to predict how the news would affect
the recent arrangements entered into with Abdur Rahman, or what the
attitude of the tribesmen would be; but we agreed that, whatever might
happen in our immediate neighbourhood, the only means of affording
speedy relief to the Kandahar garrison was by sending a force from
Kabul.

It soon, however, became apparent, by telegrams received from Simla,
that the Government were in doubt as to the best course to pursue, and
looked to Quetta rather than Kabul as the place from which Kandahar
could be most conveniently and rapidly succoured. This was not
altogether surprising, for the authorities naturally hesitated to
weaken Kabul until matters had been finally settled with Abdur Rahman,
and it was only to be expected that, after what had occurred at
Maiwand, they should be alarmed at the idea of a force being cut
off from all communication with India during the four weeks, or
thereabouts, it would take to reach Kandahar. But there was really
no alternative, for, as Major-General Phayre[4] (commanding in
Baluchistan) reported,[5] the troops available for Field Service were
but few in number, it would require at least fifteen days to equip
them, and there was no organized transport at hand, the animals having
been sent to distant grazing grounds on account of the scarcity of
water and forage.

I knew nothing as to the actual condition of the troops in
Baluchistan, except that, as belonging to the Bombay Presidency, they
could not be composed of the best fighting races, and I had a strong
feeling that it would be extremely unwise to make use of any but the
most proved Native soldiers against Ayub Khan's superior numbers,
elated as his men must be with their victory at Maiwand.

The disaster to our arms caused, as was to be expected, considerable
excitement all along the border; indeed, throughout India the
announcement produced a certain feeling of uneasiness--a mere surface
ripple--but enough to make those who remembered the days of the Mutiny
anxious for better news from the north.

To me it seemed of such supreme importance that Kandahar should be
relieved without delay, and the reverse to our arms retrieved, that
I made up my mind to communicate my views to the Viceroy through
the Commander-in-Chief, in the hope that, when he realized that a
thoroughly efficient force was ready and willing to start from Kabul,
he would no longer hesitate as to what was best to do.

On the 30th July, I dined with Stewart, and, leaving his mess-tent
at an early hour, I retired to my own quarters, and wrote out the
following telegram in cipher, but, before despatching it, I showed it
to Stewart, for, although I knew that his views were in accord with
mine, I could not with propriety have sent it without his knowledge:

    'To Major-General Greaves,[6] Adjutant-General in India, Simla.

    'Kabul,
    '_30th July,_ 1880.

    'Personal and secret. I strongly recommend that a force be sent
    from this to Kandahar. Stewart has organized a very complete one
    consisting of nine regiments of Infantry, three of Cavalry, and
    three Mountain batteries. This will suffice to overcome all
    opposition _en route_; it will have the best possible effect
    on the country, and will be ready to go anywhere on reaching
    Kandahar, being fully equipped in all respects. He proposes
    sending me in command.

    'I am sure that but few Bombay regiments are able to cope with
    Afghans, and once the Kabul Field Force leaves this country, the
    chance of sending a thoroughly reliable and well-equipped column
    will be lost. The movement of the remainder of the Kabul troops
    towards India should be simultaneous with the advance of my
    division towards Kandahar, it being most desirable to limit the
    area of our responsibilities as soon as possible; at the same
    time, it is imperative that we should now show our strength
    throughout Afghanistan. The withdrawal, under existing
    circumstances, of the whole force from Kabul to India would
    certainly be misunderstood, both in Afghanistan and elsewhere. You
    need have no fears about my division. It can take care of itself,
    and will reach Kandahar under the month. I will answer for the
    loyalty and good feeling of the Native portion, and would propose
    to inform them that, as soon as matters have been satisfactorily
    settled at Kandahar, they will be sent straight back to India.
    Show this to Lyall.'

Exaggerated reports of the Maiwand affair being rife in the Kabul
bazaars, which were daily becoming crowded with armed Afghans from
Abdur Rahman's camp, and the prospect of troops having to leave at
once for Kandahar, made it more than ever necessary to bring the
negotiations with the new Amir to a speedy conclusion. It was
accordingly arranged that Mr. Griffin should meet him at Zimma, about
sixteen miles from Kabul. This interview had the happiest results,
and must have been extremely gratifying to Mr. Griffin, whom we all
heartily congratulated on the successful ending to the very delicate
and difficult negotiations which he had carried on with so much skill
and patience.

In taking leave of His Highness, Mr. Griffin invited him to come
to the British camp the following day to be received by Sir Donald
Stewart. Abdur Rahman himself was quite willing to come, and some of
his supporters were in favour of his doing so, but others vehemently
opposed the idea, and 'swore by their faith they would leave him if he
persisted.' After a stormy meeting with his Chiefs, the Amir wrote
to Mr. Griffin as follows: 'If you really wish me to come to you,
irrespective of the opinion of the people, I am quite ready to do
so. Please write and let me know your wishes. I am in the hands of
ignorant fools, who do not know their own interests, good or bad. What
can I do? I am most anxious to meet you.'

Upon receipt of this note Stewart decided that it would be impolitic
to press for an interview, for instead of strengthening the Amir, as
had been the intention, it was evident it would have the opposite
effect, so the meeting was given up.

On the morning of the 3rd August the telegram arrived from Lord Ripon,
which I had been so anxiously expecting, authorizing the despatch of a
force to Kandahar, and directing that I should be placed in command.

I heard afterwards that my message to the Adjutant-General was
received at Simla at a most opportune moment. Lyall took it without
delay to Lord Ripon, who from the first had been in favour of a force
being sent from Kabul, but had refrained from ordering the movement
in deference to the views held by some members of his Council, whose
longer experience of India, His Excellency considered, entitled their
opinions to be treated with respect.

I set to work at once to organize the column which I was to have the
great honour of commanding. In this most congenial duty I received
every possible assistance and encouragement from Stewart; he gave me
carte-blanche, and I should only have had myself to blame if every
unit had not been as efficiently equipped as circumstances would
admit.

I wished that the force should be composed, as far as possible, of
those who had served with me throughout the campaign; but as some of
the regiments (more especially Native corps) had been away from their
homes for two years, and had had more than their share of fighting,
besides having suffered heavy losses in action and through sickness, I
considered it right to consult their commanders before detailing the
troops. With the exception of three, who thought that their regiments
had been long enough away from India, all, to my great delight,
eagerly responded to my call, and I took upon myself to promise the
men that they should not be left to garrison Kandahar, but should be
sent back to India as soon as the fighting ceased.

When the several regiments were decided upon, every man not likely to
stand the strain of prolonged forced marches was weeded out, and the
scale of baggage, tents, and impedimenta was reduced to a minimum.[7]

I had no fear as to the officers and men ably and cheerfully
performing their part of the task; we had been long enough together to
enable us thoroughly to understand and trust each other, and I felt
that I could depend upon each and all to respond heartily to whatever
call I might make upon them.

The question of supplies was my greatest anxiety, and I had many
consultations with my experienced Commissariat officer, Major Badcock,
before I could feel satisfied in this respect.

The transport, as I have already recorded, was in good order; it was
fortunate that the soldiers had been practised in loading, leading,
and tending the animals, for the Afghan drivers deserted to a man a
march or two from Kabul, and the Hazaras followed their example on
reaching their own country. Sir Donald Stewart's account of the
troubles he had encountered during his march from Kandahar was not
very encouraging, and I should have been glad if I could have taken a
larger amount of supplies;[8] but on this point I had to be guided by
the number of animals that could be allotted to the column, which was
necessarily limited, as carriage had to be provided simultaneously for
the withdrawal of the rest of the army of occupation.

The strength of the force placed at my disposal consisted of 9,986
men of all ranks and eighteen guns, divided into three brigades of
Infantry, one brigade of Cavalry, and three batteries of Mountain
Artillery. There were, besides, over 8,000 followers[9] and 2,300
horses and gun-mules.

It was designated the Kabul-Kandahar Field Force.

Major-General J. Ross, C.B., was given the command of the Infantry
division, his three Brigadier-Generals being Herbert Macpherson, T.D.
Baker, and Charles Macgregor. Brigadier-General Hugh Gough commanded
the Cavalry brigade; Colonel Alured Johnson the Artillery; while
Colonel Æ. Perkins held the position of Commanding Royal Engineer;
Deputy-Surgeon-General J. Hanbury that of Principal Medical Officer;
and Lieutenant-Colonel E.F. Chapman, Chief of the Staff.

From the detail of the force given below,[10] it will be seen that
there was no wheeled Artillery, and that the number of guns was not
in proportion to the strength of the other branches. This was my own
doing; I was pressed to take more and heavier guns, but, after due
consideration, I decided that I would only have Mountain batteries. We
could not tell how long the Kandahar garrison would be able to hold
out, so that our first object must be to reach that place with the
least possible delay, and wheeled Artillery would, in a country where
there were practically no roads, have only prevented our moving as
rapidly as we might otherwise have done.

For the equipment of the force, inclusive of carriage for footsore
soldiers[11] and followers, and allowing ten per cent. spare, more
than 8,000[12] animals were required.

Fortunately, it turned out that a fair amount of Indian corn in the
ear was almost everywhere procurable, which was so nutritious that a
large majority of the Cavalry horses and transport animals reached
Kandahar in excellent condition.

Throughout the march great difficulties were experienced in procuring
food, but they were always overcome, with the able assistance of Major
Hastings and his political staff,[13] and by means of the admirable
arrangements made by the Commissariat[14] and Transport[15] officers,
who were quite untiring, and after the longest march, and with the
prospect of having to start again at an early hour the following
morning, had often to work far into the night.

The want of fuel was our chief drawback. We had on many occasions to
purchase houses and pull them to pieces for the sake of the wood to be
got out of them, and frequently there was nothing to cook with save
tiny roots of southernwood, which had to be dug out and collected
after a long day's march before the men could prepare their food and
satisfy their hunger.

One day's corn was carried by each animal in addition to the ordinary
load, and as far as Ghazni grain was tolerably plentiful; beyond that
we had to depend for forage on the crops still standing. At the end of
the day's march, certain fields were told off to the several brigades;
from these all that was required was cut and carried away, the fields
were then measured and assessed, and compensation was awarded by the
political officers, who also adjusted all claims on account of wrecked
houses, and fruit, vegetables, etc., brought in for the troops.

On Sunday, the 8th August, the force moved into camp by brigades, my
Head-Quarters being with the first and third Infantry brigades at
Beni Hissar, on the way to the Logar valley, which route I had chosen
instead of the slightly shorter line by Maidan, on account of the
greater facility it afforded for supplies.

Sir Donald Stewart paid us a farewell visit in the afternoon, and at 6
a.m. the following morning we began the march to Kandahar.


[Footnote 1: Sirdar Sher Ali had been appointed Governor of Kandahar
by the Amir Yakub Khan after the treaty of Gandamak, and had since
assisted Sir Donald Stewart in the civil administration of the
province.]

[Footnote 2: Local Native levies.]

[Footnote 3:

                                 _Killed_      _Missing_
  British officers                   20             9
     "    troops                    290            48
  Native     "                      624           118
                                    ---           ---
                                    934           175
                           Total, 1,109

Of the regimental followers 331 were killed and 7 were missing; 455
transport followers and drivers were reported as killed or missing,
but a number of these, being Afghans, probably joined the enemy.

A large quantity of arms and ammunition was lost, including over 1,000
rifles and carbines, and 600 or 700 swords and bayonets.

201 horses were killed, and 1,676 camels, 355 ponies, 24 mules, 291
donkeys, and 79 bullocks, were not forthcoming.]

[Footnote 4: Afterwards General Sir Robert Phayre, G.C.B.]

[Footnote 5: General Phayre reported on the 28th July that there
were only seven Native regiments in Baluchistan, three of which were
required for the lines of communication, leaving only four available
for Field Service; and that a battalion of British Infantry and a
battery of Field Artillery required for his column were a long way
off, being still in Sind.]

[Footnote 6: Now General Sir George Greaves, G.C.B., G.C.M.C.]

[Footnote 7:

  Each British  soldier was allowed for kit and
  camp-equipage,
  including great-coat and waterproof sheet            30 lbs.
  Each Native soldier                                  20  "
  Each public and private follower                     10  "
  Each European officer                                 1 mule.
  Every eight officers for mess                         1  "
  Each staff-officer for office purposes               80 lbs.
  Each Native officer                                  30  "]

[Footnote 8: The amount of supplies taken with the force was as
follows:

  FOR BRITISH TROOPS.

  Bread-stuff                                           5 days.
  Preserved vegetables                                 15  "
  Tea, sugar, salt, and rum                            30  "

  FOR NATIVE TROOPS AND FOLLOWERS.

  Flour                                                 5 days
  _Dal_ and salt                                       30  "
  Rum for spirit-drinking men                           8  "

  Sheep, ten days' supply for British troops and four issues for Native
  troops, with 20 per cent. spare. Nearly 5,000 sheep were purchased
  on the march. N.B.--There are no horned cattle in
  Afghanistan, except those used for the plough or transport.

In addition to the above, a small reserve of lime-juice, pea-soup, and
tinned meat was taken; these proved most useful, and might have been
increased with advantage had carriage been available.

I gave strict orders that the reserve of bread-stuff, flour, and sheep
was never to be used without my sanction, and that wherever
possible food for the day's consumption was to be purchased. We had
occasionally to trench upon the reserve, but we nearly made it up at
other places, and we arrived at Kandahar with three days' supplies in
hand.]

[Footnote 9: The followers consisted of:

  Doolie-bearers                                               2,192
  Transport and other departments                              4,698
  Private servants, and _saices_ of Native Cavalry regiments   1,244
                                                               -----
  Total                                                        8,134]

[Footnote 10: DETAIL OF FORCE.

1ST INFANTRY BRIGADE.

                                  _British_.     _Native_.
  92nd Highlanders                  651              --
  23rd Pioneers                                     701
  24th Punjab Native Infantry        --             575
  2nd Gurkhas                        --             501
                                    ---           -----
      Total                         651           1,777

2ND INFANTRY BRIGADE.

                                 _British_.      _Native_.
  72nd Highlanders                 787              --
  2nd Sikh Infantry                 --              612
  3rd Sikh Infantry                 --              570
  5th Gurkhas                       --              561
                                   ---            -----
      Total                        787            1,743

3RD INFANTRY BRIGADE.

  |                              | _British_. | _Native_. |
  |60th Rifles, 2nd Battalion    |    616     |    --     |
  |15th Sikhs                    |    --      |    650    |
  |25th Punjab Native Infantry   |    --      |    629    |
  |4th Gurkhas                   |    --      |    637    |
  |                              |    ___     |    ___    |
  |                     Total    |    616     |  1,916    |

  |CAVALRY BRIGADE.----------------------------------------
  |                              | _British_. | _Native_. |
  |9th Queen's Royal Lancers     |    318     |     --    |
  |3rd Bengal Cavalry            |    --      |    394    |
  |3rd Punjab Cavalry            |    --      |    408    |
  |Central India Horse           |    --      |    495    |
  |                              |    ___     |    ___    |
  |                     Total    |    318     |  1,297    |

  |ARTILLERY DIVISION.------------------------------------------
  |                                  _British.|Native.|Guns_. |
  |6-8th Royal Artillery--screw guns|   95    |  139  |  6    |
  |11-9th Royal Artillery           |   95    |  139  |  6    |
  |No. 2 Mountain Battery           |   --    |  140  |  6    |
  |                                 |  ___    |  ___  | ___   |
  |                        Total    |  190    |  418  |  18   |

  |TOTAL OF FORCE.----------------------------------------------

  |British troops                              2,562  |
  |Native     "                                7,151  |
  |British officers                              273  |
  |Guns                                           18  |
  |Cavalry horses                              1,779  |
  |Artillery mules                               450  |


  Two hundred rounds of ammunition were taken for each Infantry soldier:
  seventy rounds were carried by each man, thirty rounds were in reserve
  with the regiment, and a hundred rounds in the Field Park.

  Each Mountain battery had:

  Common shell                                264
  Double shell                                 60
  Shrapnel shell                              144
  Star shell                                   24
  Case shot                                    48
                                              ___

                                    Total     540 rounds.

  And thirty rounds per gun in the Field Park.]

[Footnote 11: British troops were allowed ponies at the rate of 2 per
cent, of strength. Native troops were allowed ponies at the rate of
2-1/2 per cent. of strength. Followers were allowed ponies at the rate
of 1-1/2 per cent. of strength.]

[Footnote 12:

  -------------------------------------------------------------
  |                   |Yabus, |      |Indian |        |        |
  |                   |  or   |Mules.|ponies.|Donkeys.|Camels. |
  |                   |Afghan |      |       |        |        |
  |                   |ponies.|      |       |        |        |
  -------------------------------------------------------------
  |Number of animals  |       |      |       |        |        |
  |  that left Kabul  | 1,589 | 4,510| 1,244 |    912 |   6[1*]|
  |Purchased during   |       |      |       |        |        |
  |  the march[2*]    |    35 |     1|   --  |    208 | 171    |
  |Number of animals  |       |      |       |        |        |
  |  that reached     |       |      |       |        |        |
  |  Kandahar         | 1,179 | 4,293| 1,138 |  1,078 | 177    |
  |Casualties during  |       |      |       |        |        |
  |  the march        |   445 |   218|   106 |     42 |        |
  --------------------------------------------------------------

  Note 1*: With hospital equipment.

  Note 2*: Only twice had animals to be taken against the will of the
  owners, and on both occasions the matter was amicably settled in the
  end.]

[Footnote 13: Major E. Hastings, Captain West Ridgeway, Major Euan
Smith, C.S.I., and Major M. Prothero.]

[Footnote 14: Major A. Badcock, Captain A. Rind, and Lieutenants
C. Fitzgerald, H. Hawkes, and H. Lyons Montgomery, all of the Bengal
Staff Corps.]

[Footnote 15: Lieutenant-Colonel R. Low, Bengal Staff Corps; Captain
W. Wynter, 33rd Foot; Captains G. H. Eliot and C. R. Macgregor, Bengal
Staff Corps; Lieutenants L. Booth, 33rd Foot, H. Elverson, 2nd Foot,
R. Fisher, 10th Hussars, R. Wilson, 10th Hussars, and C. Robertson,
8th Foot.]

       *       *       *       *       *




CHAPTER LXI.
1880

  The order of marching--Ghazni and Kelat-i-Ghilzai
  --Food required daily for the force--A letter from General Phayre
  --Kandahar--Reconnoitring the enemy's position--A turning movement


Before daybreak on the 11th August, as I was starting from camp, I
received my last communication from the outside world in the shape
of a telegram from my wife, sent off from a little village in
Somersetshire, congratulating me and the force, and wishing us all
God's speed. She had taken our children to England a few months
before, thinking that the war in Afghanistan was over, and that I
would soon be able to follow.

Four days brought us to the end of the Logar valley, a distance of
forty-six miles. So far the country was easy and supplies plentiful. I
thought it wise, however, not to attempt long distances at first, that
both men and animals might become gradually hardened before entering
on the difficult and scantily cultivated ground between Ghazni and
Kelat-i-Ghilzai, where I knew that forced marches were inevitable, and
that their powers of endurance would be sorely taxed. Moreover, it
was necessary to begin quietly, and organize some system by which
confusion in the crowded camping-grounds might be avoided, and the
physical strain upon everyone lightened as much as possible.

When it is remembered that the daily supply for over 18,000 men and
11,000 animals had to be drawn from the country after arrival in camp,
that food had to be distributed to every individual, that the fuel
with which it was cooked had often to be brought from long distances,
and that a very limited time was available for the preparation of
meals and for rest, it will readily be understood how essential it was
that even the stupidest follower should be able to find his place in
camp speedily, and that everyone should know exactly what to do and
how to set about doing it.

On the march and in the formation of the camps the same principles
were, as far as possible, applied each day. The 'rouse' sounded at
2.45 a.m., and by four o'clock tents had been struck, baggage loaded
up, and everything was ready for a start.

As a general rule, the Cavalry covered the movement at a distance of
about five miles, two of the four regiments being in front, with the
other two on either flank. Two of the Infantry brigades came next,
each accompanied by a Mountain battery; then followed the field
hospitals, Ordnance and Engineer parks, treasure, and the baggage,
massed according to the order in which the brigades were moving. The
third Infantry brigade with its Mountain battery and one or two troops
of Cavalry formed the rear guard.

A halt of ten minutes was made at the end of each hour, which at eight
o'clock was prolonged to twenty minutes to give time for a hasty
breakfast. Being able to sleep on the shortest notice, I usually took
advantage of these intervals to get a nap, awaking greatly refreshed
after a few minutes' sound sleep.

On arrival at the resting-place for the night, the front face of the
camp was told off to the brigade on rear guard, and this became the
leading brigade of the column on the next day's march. Thus every
brigade had its turn of rear guard duty, which was very arduous, more
particularly after leaving Ghazni, the troops so employed seldom
reaching the halting-ground before six or seven o'clock in the
evening, and sometimes even later.

One of the most troublesome duties of the rear guard was to prevent
the followers from lagging behind, for it was certain death for anyone
who strayed from the shelter of the column; numbers of Afghans always
hovered about on the look-out for plunder, or in the hope of being
able to send a Kafir, or an almost equally-detested Hindu, to eternal
perdition. Towards the end of the march particularly, this duty became
most irksome, for the wretched followers were so weary and footsore
that they hid themselves in ravines, making up their minds to die, and
entreating, when discovered and urged to make an effort, to be left
where they were. Every baggage animal that could possibly be spared
was used to carry the worn-out followers; but notwithstanding this and
the care taken by officers and men that none should be left behind,
twenty of these poor creatures were lost, besides four Native
soldiers.

The variation of temperature (at times as much as eighty degrees
between day and night) was most trying to the troops, who had to carry
the same clothes whether the thermometer was at freezing-point at
dawn or at 110° Fahr. at mid-day. Scarcity of water, too, was a great
trouble to them, while constant sand-storms, and the suffocating
dust raised by the column in its progress, added greatly to their
discomfort.

Daily reports regarding the health of the troops, followers, and
transport animals were brought to me each evening, and I made it my
business to ascertain how many men had fallen out during the day, and
what had been the number of casualties amongst the animals.

On the 12th August the Head-Quarters and main body of the force halted
to allow the Cavalry and the second Infantry brigade to push on and
get clear over the Zamburak Kotal (8,100 feet high) before the rest
of the column attempted its ascent. This kotal presented a serious
obstacle to our rapid progress, the gradient being in many places one
in four, and most difficult for the baggage animals; but by posting
staff officers at intervals to control the flow of traffic, and by
opening out fresh paths to relieve the pressure, we got over it much
more quickly than I had expected.

On the 15th we reached Ghazni, ninety-eight miles from Kabul, a place
of peculiar interest to me from the fact that it was for his share in
its capture, forty-one years before, that my father was given the C.B.

I was met by the Governor, who handed me the keys of the fortress, and
I placed my own guards and sentries in and around the city to prevent
collisions between the inhabitants and our troops, and also to make
sure that our demands for supplies were complied with. Up to this
point we had been fairly well off for food, forage, and water.

Our next march was across a barren, inhospitable track for twenty
miles to a place called Yarghati. On the way we passed Ahmedkhel,
where Sir Donald Stewart won his victory; the name had been changed
by the Natives to 'the Resting-place of Martyrs,' and the numerous
freshly-covered-in graves testified to the _ghazis'_ heavy losses. The
remains of the few British soldiers, who had been buried where they
had fallen, had been desecrated, and the bones were exposed to view
and scattered about.

At Chardeh, our next halting-place, a communication from Colonel
Tanner, Commanding at Kelat-i-Ghilzai, was brought to me by a Native
messenger; it was dated the 12th August, and informed me that Kandahar
was closely invested, but that the garrison had supplies for two
months and forage for fifteen days.

On the 21st we arrived at a point thirty miles from Kelat-i-Ghilzai,
whence we opened heliograph communication with that place, and were
told of an unsuccessful sortie made from Kandahar five days before, in
which General Brooke and eight other British officers had been killed.

[Illustration: CROSSING THE ZAMBURAK KOTAL.
_From a painting by the Chevalier Desanges._]


On the 23rd Kelat-i-Ghilzai was reached. The garrison[1] had been well
taken care of by Colonel Tanner,[2] and a large quantity of food for
man and beast had been collected; but I thought it unadvisable
at present to continue to hold the place, and have to keep open
communication between it and Kandahar, and as I could see no
compensating advantage in doing so, I determined to withdraw the
troops and take them along with me.

Colonel Tanner's report satisfied me there was no immediate danger to
be apprehended at Kandahar, so I decided to halt for one day; both men
and animals greatly needed rest after a continuous march of 225 miles.

I had endeavoured to keep the Government of India informed of my
progress by a message from Ghazni, and one from Oba Karez on the
18th August, but neither reached its destination. I now despatched a
message which was more successful, and was delivered at Simla on the
30th August. It was as follows:

    'KELAT-I-GHILZAI,
    '_23rd August,_ 1880.

    'The force under my command arrived here this morning. The
    authorities at Kandahar having stated on the 17th instant that
    they have abundant supplies and can make forage last until
    1st September, I halt to-morrow to rest the troops, and more
    especially the transport animals and camp-followers. The force
    left Ghazni on the 16th, and has marched 136 miles during the last
    eight days; the troops are in good health and spirits. From this I
    purpose moving by regular-stages, so that the men may arrive fresh
    at Kandahar. I hope to be in heliographic communication with
    Kandahar from Robat, distant twenty miles, on the 29th. If General
    Phayre reaches Takht-i-Pul, I should also hope to communicate with
    him and arrange a combined movement on Kandahar. I am taking the
    Kelat-i-Ghilzai garrison with me, making the Fort over to Mahomed
    Sadik Khan, a Toki Chief, who had charge of the place when we
    arrived in 1879; the present Governor, Sirdar Sherindil Khan,
    refuses to remain. We have met with no opposition during the
    march, and have been able to make satisfactory arrangements for
    supplies, especially forage, which at this season is plentiful.
    The Cavalry horses and Artillery mules are in excellent order; our
    casualties to date are, one soldier 72nd Highlanders, one sepoy
    23rd Pioneers, one 2nd Sikhs, two sepoys 3rd Sikhs dead; one sepoy
    4th Gurkhas, two sepoys 24th Punjab Native Infantry, one Duffadar
    3rd Punjab Cavalry missing; six camp-followers dead, five missing.
    The missing men have, I fear, been murdered. I telegraphed from
    Ghazni on the 15th, and from Oba Karez on the 18th August.'

I wrote also to Major-General Phayre, telling him of the date on
which I expected to reach Kandahar, and that if I heard of his being
anywhere near I would arrange my movements to suit his, in order that
the two forces might make a combined attack on Ayub Khan's position.

As I was afraid the supplies at Kandahar would be insufficient for the
additional troops about to be collected there, I sent General Phayre
a memorandum[3] of the amount of food required daily by my force, and
begged him to get pushed up from the rear such articles as were more
particularly wanted. I pointed out that we were badly off for boots,
and that the 92nd Highlanders had only one hundred greatcoats fit for
wear, which were used by the men on night duties.

On the 25th we marched to Jaldak, seventeen miles, and the same
distance the next day to Tirandaz, where I received a letter from
Lieutenant-General Primrose, informing me that Ayub Khan had raised
the siege on the 23rd, and was entrenching himself at Mazra, beyond
the Baba Wali Kotal, in the valley of the Arghandab.

I awoke on the morning of the 27th feeling very unwell, and soon found
I was in for an attack of fever. The heat during the day was becoming
more and more overpowering as we proceeded south, and I had lately
been feeling somewhat knocked up by it and by exposure to the sun. I
had now to give in for the time being, and was compelled to perform
the march in a doolie, a most ignominious mode of conveyance for a
General on service; but there was no help for it, for I could not sit
a horse.

That day the 3rd Bengal and 3rd Punjab Cavalry marched thirty-four
miles to Robat, in order to establish direct heliographic
communication with Kandahar. The main body halted about half-way, when
I again reported progress as follows:

    SHAHR-I-SAFA,
    '_27th August, 1880._

    'My force arrived here to-day. I received a letter yesterday,
    dated 25th, from Colonel St. John. He writes: "The rumours of the
    approach of your force have been sufficient to relieve the city
    from investment. On Monday night the villages on the east and
    south were abandoned by their mixed garrisons of _ghazis_ and
    regulars. Yesterday morning Ayub struck his camp, and marched to a
    position on the Arghandab, between Baba Wali and Sheikh Chela,
    due north of the city, and separated from it by a range of rocky
    hills. He has about 4,000 Infantry regulars, six 12-pounders and
    two 9-pounders rifled, four 6-pounder smooth-bore batteries, and
    one 4-pounder battery, 2,000 sowars, and perhaps twice that number
    of _ghazis_, of whom a third have firearms. The Kizilbashes and
    Kohistanis in his army, about 1,200 Infantry and 300 Cavalry,
    offered to desert and join us directly we made a show of attack.
    They are at last aware of Abdur Rahman's succession, but I think
    Ayub will remain unmolested until the arrival of the Kabul force,
    provided he waits, which is unlikely. He will, I expect, strike
    away north into Khakrez, on which line a vigorous pursuit will
    give us his guns. Maclaine, Royal Horse Artillery, is still a
    prisoner; I am making every effort to obtain his release, but I am
    not very hopeful of success. This morning, the 25th, I went to the
    field of the unlucky sortie of the 16th, and found the bodies of
    the poor fellows who fell there, some forty in number; they will
    be buried this afternoon. All the wounded are doing well. No
    signs or tidings of Phayre." General Gough, with two regiments of
    Cavalry, is at Robat; they are in heliographic communication
    with Kandahar. General Primrose heliographs that Ayub Khan has
    entrenched his camp at Baba Wali. The force marches for Robat
    to-morrow, seventeen miles distant from Kandahar.'

The following day the column joined the two Cavalry regiments at
Robat, where I was met by Lieutenant-Colonel St. John, from whom I
heard that Ayub Khan was likely to make a stand. I thought it prudent,
therefore, to halt on Sunday, the 29th, and divide the last twenty
miles into two short marches, in order that the men and animals might
arrive as fresh as possible, and fit for any work which might be
required of them; for should Ayub Khan retire towards Herat, he would
have to be followed up, and his army attacked and defeated wherever we
might overtake him.

Before leaving Robat, a letter arrived from General Phayre, which put
an end to all hope of his force being able to co-operate with mine,
for his leading brigade, he wrote, had only just got to the Kohjak
Pass. This was to be regretted, but it was unavoidable. I was well
aware of the strenuous efforts the gallant Commander had made to
relieve the beleaguered garrison, and I knew if co-operation had been
possible it would have been effected.

We encamped at Momund on the 30th, whence I sent the following
telegram to Simla:

    'My force arrived here to-day; we march to Kandahar to-morrow.
    General Primrose heliographs that a letter from Ayub's camp brings
    information that the mother of the late Heir-Apparent, Abdulla
    Jan, with other ladies, has been sent to Zamindawar. Arrival of
    the young Musa Jan in Ayub's camp is confirmed. Hashim Khan is
    also there. The position is being strengthened, especially on
    the Pir Paimal side, where two guns have been placed with two
    regiments. From further information, I learn that the Baba
    Wali Kotal is occupied by three regiments and two guns. The
    Kotal-i-Murcha is held by the Kabul regiments, and Ayub's own camp
    is at Mazra, where it is said that the majority of his guns are
    parked. I propose to encamp the Infantry to the west of Kandahar
    immediately under the walls, and the Cavalry under the walls to
    the south. Should I hear that Ayub contemplates flight, I shall
    attack without delay. If, on the contrary, he intends to resist,
    I shall take my own time. The country he is occupying is, from
    description and map, extremely difficult and easily defensible,
    and each separate advance will require careful study and
    reconnaissance to prevent unnecessary loss of life.'

On the morning of the 31st we marched into Kandahar, just over 313
miles from Kabul. The fever, which had attacked me rather sharply, had
left me extremely weak, and I was unable to ride the whole way. I got
on my horse, however, some distance from Kandahar to meet Generals
Primrose, Burrows, and Nuttall, who came out to receive the column. As
we approached the city, the whole garrison turned out and gave us a
hearty welcome; officers and men, Native and British, crowded round
us, loud in their expressions of gratitude for our having come so
quickly to their assistance. We, on our side, were all anxiety
to learn the particulars about Maiwand, how they had fared while
invested, and all they could tell us of Ayub Khan, his position,
strength of his army, etc.

I confess to being very greatly surprised, not to use a stronger
expression, at the demoralized condition of the greater part of the
garrison;[4] there were notable exceptions,[5] but the general bearing
of the troops reminded me of the people at Agra in 1857. They
seemed to consider themselves hopelessly defeated, and were utterly
despondent; they never even hoisted the Union Jack until the relieving
force was close at hand. The same excuses could not, however, be made
for them, who were all soldiers by profession, as we had felt inclined
to make for the residents at Agra, a great majority of whom were
women, children, and civilians. The walls[6] which completely
surrounded Kandahar were so high and thick as to render the city
absolutely impregnable to any army not equipped with a regular
siege-train. Scaling-ladders had been prepared by the enemy, and
there was an idea that an assault would be attempted; but for British
soldiers to have contemplated the possibility of Kandahar being taken
by an Afghan army showed what a miserable state of depression and
demoralization they were in.

[Illustration: Map: SKETCH OF THE ROUTE TAKEN ON THE MARCH FROM KABUL
TO KANDAHAR. AUGUST. 1880.]

I halted the column for two hours outside the south wall of the city,
where it was sheltered from the enemy's fire, Ayub Khan's position
being within long range directly north of Kandahar. While the men
rested and breakfasted, and the baggage animals were being unloaded,
fed, and watered, I went into the citadel to talk matters over with
General Primrose and Colonel St. John, and inquire whether there was
sufficient accommodation for the sick men of my force, numbering 940,
who needed to be taken into hospital. The thermometer now registered
105° Fahr. in tents during the day, but the nights were still bitterly
cold, and the sudden changes of temperature were extremely trying to
people in bad health.

On the advice of Lieutenant-Colonel Chapman, whose intimate
acquaintance with the neighbourhood of Kandahar, gained while serving
on Sir Donald Stewart's staff, was now most valuable to me, I
determined to take up a position to the west of the city, with my
right on the cantonment and my left touching Old Kandahar. This
enabled me to cover the city, gave me command of a good supply of
water, and placed me within striking distance of Ayub Khan's camp.

At 10 a.m. the first and third brigades moved off and occupied Piquet
Hill, Karez Hill, and the north-east spur of the hill above Old
Kandahar. A few shots were fired at the advance guard from distant
orchards, and the ground proved to be within range of some of the
enemy's Field-pieces on the Baba Wali Kotal, but it was a case of
Hobson's choice, as water was not to be found anywhere else at a
come-at-able distance.

Large numbers of men were to be seen crowning the Baba Wali Kotal, and
constructing shelter-trenches along the crest of the low black ridge,
which jutted out in a south-easterly direction from the more lofty
range on which the kotal is situated. Piquets were immediately sent to
occupy the northern spur of the Kohkeran Hill commanding the road to
Gundigan, the village of Abbasabad, the Karez Hill, the village of
Chihal Dukhtaran, the greater and lesser Piquet Hills, and the village
of Kalachi, all of which were found to be deserted.

From a cursory examination of the ground, I satisfied myself that any
attempt to carry the Baba Wali Kotal by direct attack must result in
very severe loss, and I determined to turn it. But before I could
decide how this could best be done, it was necessary to ascertain
the strength and precise extent of the Afghan position. I therefore
detailed a small party,[7] under the command of Brigadier-General Hugh
Gough, to make as complete a reconnaissance as time would allow. In
the meantime I despatched the following telegram to the authorities at
Simla:

    'KANDAHAR, _31st August,_ 1880.

    'The force under my command arrived here this morning without
    opposition. Enemy are said to be in considerable strength at
    Mazra, but the ridge of hills which divides Kandahar from the
    Arghandab completely covers their position, and at present I have
    only been able to ascertain that the Baba Wali Kotal and one or
    two other points on this ridge are held in great strength,
    and that the enemy are busily engaged in defensive works.
    Reconnaissances are now being conducted, and I shall soon, I hope,
    be sufficiently acquainted with affairs generally to enable me to
    arrange for an attack. The Kandahar garrison are in good health;
    the horses and transport animals appear to be in good condition.
    Major Vandeleur, 7th Fusiliers, has died of his wounds; the
    remainder of the wounded, both officers and men, are generally
    doing well. The troops from Kabul are in famous health and
    spirits. The assurance of the safety of this garrison enabled
    comparatively short marches to be made from Kelat-i-Ghilzai,
    which much benefited both men and animals. The Cavalry horses and
    Artillery mules are in excellent condition, and the transport
    animals are, as a rule, in very fair order. General Primrose has
    arranged for the sick of the force from Kabul being accommodated
    inside the city; many of the cases are sore feet; none are
    serious. To-morrow the telegraph line towards India will commence
    to be re-constructed, and as General Phayre is probably on this
    side of the Kohjak to-day, through communication should soon be
    restored.'

The reconnaissance, which started at 1 p.m., proceeded towards the
high ground immediately above the villages of Gundigan and Murghan.
Here the Infantry and guns were halted, while the Cavalry advanced
between two or three miles, avoiding the numerous orchards and
enclosures, and coming out in front of Pir Paimal, which was found to
be strongly entrenched.

As soon as the enemy's fire along this line had been drawn, the 3rd
Bengal Cavalry fell back, admirably handled by their Commandant,
Lieutenant-Colonel A. Mackenzie. In the meantime, two guns of No.
11 Battery 9th Brigade were brought into action, partly to test the
range, and partly to check the enemy, who were passing rapidly into
the gardens near Gundigan. The Infantry and Artillery then retired
within the line of piquets, and the moment they began to fall back the
Afghans came after them in great strength; they were so persistent
that I ordered the whole of the 3rd Brigade and part of the 1st
Brigade under arms. The enemy, however, were unable to come to close
quarters owing to the bold front shown by the 15th Sikhs, under the
command of Lieutenant-Colonel Hennessy, and before dark the troops
were all back in camp, with a loss of five men killed and fifteen
wounded.

From the information obtained by this reconnaissance, I found that it
was quite practicable to turn the Afghan right, and thus place myself
in rear of the Baba Wali range; I decided, therefore, to attack the
position the following morning. It was too close to our camp to risk
delay. Moreover, I knew that the retrograde movement of Gough's small
body would be construed into a defeat by the enemy, who, if we did not
move at once, would assuredly think that we were afraid to take the
initiative, and would become correspondingly bold.

I accordingly issued orders for the troops to breakfast at 7 a.m., and
for one day's cooked rations to be carried by the Infantry and two
days by the Cavalry and Horse Artillery. Brigades were to be in
position by eight o'clock, tents being previously struck and the
baggage stored in a walled enclosure.

The night passed quietly except for occasional bursts of musketry
along the line of piquets to the west, showing that the Afghans were
holding the villages they had occupied the previous evening.


[Footnote 1: The garrison consisted of 2 guns of C/2, Royal Artillery,
145 rifles of the 66th Foot, 100 of the 3nd Sind Horse, and the 2nd
Baluch Regiment, 639 strong.]

[Footnote 2: Now Lieutenant-General Sir Oriel Tanner, K.C.B.]

[Footnote 3: Estimate of daily requirements for the Kabul-Kandahar
Field Force and the Kelat-i-Ghilzai garrison:

  Europeans                  3,200
  Native troops              8,000
  Followers                  8,500
  Horses                     2,300
  Transport          --yabus 1,592,
            mules and ponies 5,926,
                        camels 400,
                       donkeys 400.

  Meat                       4,000 lbs.
  Bread-stuff                   40 maunds.[*]
  Vegetables                 4,000 lbs.
  Rice                         800  "
  Salt                         133  "
  Sugar                        600  "
  Tea                          150  "
  Rum, 25 per cent.             80 gallons.
  Atta                         320 maunds.
  Dall                          51-1/2 "
  Ghee                          19-1/4 "
  Salt                           8-1/2 "
  Grain                        700     "

  A. R. BADCOCK, Major,
  Deputy Commissary-General.

  KELAT-I-GHILZAI,
  _24th August,_ 1880.

  [Note *: A maund is equivalent to 80 lbs.]
]

[Footnote 4: The effective garrison consisted of 1,000 British
soldiers, 3,000 Native soldiers, and fifteen Field guns.]

[Footnote 5: One and all bore testimony to the unfailing good
behaviour and creditable bearing of the Royal Artillery and the Bombay
Sappers and Miners, not only during the investment, but in the very
trying time of the retreat from Maiwand.]

[Footnote 6: The walls had an average height of 30 feet, and breadth
of 15 feet on the north and east fronts.]

[Footnote 7: Two Royal Artillery guns, 3rd Bengal Cavalry, and 15th
Sikhs. Lieutenant-Colonel Chapman accompanied the party, and was of
great assistance to Brigadier-General Gough.]

       *       *       *       *       *




CHAPTER LXII.
1880

  Commencement of the fight--72nd Highlanders and 2nd Sikhs
  --92nd Highlanders and 2nd Gurkhas--Ayub Khan's camp
  --Difficulties about supplies--Parting with the troops
  --A pleasing memory


The next morning, the 1st September, in accordance with instructions
from Simla, I assumed command of the army in southern Afghanistan.
There was no return to show the strength or composition of General
Phayre's column, but the troops at Kandahar all told now amounted in
round numbers to 3,800 British and 11,000 Native soldiers, with 36
guns.

An hour before daybreak the whole of the troops were under arms, and
at 6 a.m. I explained to Generals Primrose and Ross and the officers
commanding brigades the plan of operations. Briefly, it was to
threaten the enemy's left (the Baba Wali Kotal), and to attack in
force by the village of Pir Paimal.

The Infantry belonging to the Kabul column, upon whom devolved the
duty of carrying the enemy's position, were formed up in rear of the
low hills which covered the front of our camp, their right being at
Piquet Hill and their left resting on Chitral Zina. The Cavalry of the
Kabul column were drawn up in rear of the left, ready to operate by
Gundigan towards the head of the Arghandab, so as to threaten the
rear of Ayub Khan's camp and his line of retreat in the direction of
Girishk. Four guns of E Battery Royal Horse Artillery, two companies
of the 2-7th Fusiliers, and four companies of the 28th Bombay
Infantry, were placed at the disposal of Brigadier-General Hugh Gough,
whose orders were to occupy with these troops the position above
Gundigan, which had been so useful during the previous day's
reconnaissance, and to push his Cavalry on to the Arghandab.

Guards having been detailed for the protection of the city, the
remainder of Lieutenant-General Primrose's troops were ordered to be
disposed as follows: Brigadier-General Daubeny's brigade to occupy the
ground between Piquet Hill and Chitral Zina as soon as the Infantry of
the Kabul-Kandahar Field Force advanced to the attack. The remnant of
Brigadier-General Burrows's brigade, with No. 5 Battery, 11th Brigade
Royal Artillery, under Captain Hornsby, and the Cavalry under
Brigadier-General Nuttall, to take up a position north of the
cantonment, from which the 40-pounders could be brought to bear on
the Baba Wali Kotal, while the Cavalry could watch the pass, called
Kotal-i-Murcha, and cover the city.

From an early hour it was clear that the enemy contemplated an
offensive movement; the villages of Gundigan and Gundi Mulla Sahibdab
were being held in strength, and a desultory fire was brought to bear
on the British front from the orchards connecting these two villages
and from the Baba Wali Kotal.

The Bombay Cavalry moved out at 7.30 a.m., and Daubeny's brigade at
eight o'clock. Burrows's troops followed, and shortly after 9 a.m.,
their disposition being completed, Captain Hornsby opened fire upon
the kotal, which was one mass of _ghazis_.

This feint, made by General Primrose's troops, having had the effect I
had hoped, of attracting the enemy's attention, I gave the order
for Major-General Ross to make the real attack with the 1st and 2nd
Brigades of his division. The 3rd Brigade, under Brigadier-General
Macgregor, I placed in front of the village of Abbasabad, with the
double object of being a reserve to the 1st and 2nd Brigades and of
meeting a possible counter-attack from the Baba Wali Kotal.

Ross's orders were to advance against Gundi Mulla Sahibdad, capture
the village, and then drive the enemy from the enclosures which lay
between it and the low spur of Pir Paimal hill. This duty he entrusted
to Brigadier-General Macpherson, and he directed Brigadier-General
Baker to advance to the west, to keep touch with the 1st Brigade, and
to clear the gardens and orchards in his immediate front.

Greig's 9-pounder and Robinson's 7-pounder (screw gun) batteries
covered the attack on Gundi Mulla Sahibdad, which was made by the
2nd Gurkhas, under Lieutenant-Colonel Arthur Battye, and the 92nd
Highlanders, under Lieutenant-Colonel G. Parker, supported by the 23rd
Pioneers, under Lieutenant-Colonel H. Collett, and the 24th Punjab
Infantry, under Colonel F. Norman. The village was carried with the
utmost gallantry, Highlanders and Gurkhas, always friendly rivals in
the race for glory, by turns outstripping each other in their efforts
to be first within its walls. The enemy sullenly and slowly withdrew,
a goodly number of _ghazis_ remaining to the very last to receive
a bayonet charge of the 92nd. Meanwhile, Baker's troops had been
threading their way through the narrow lanes and loop-holed enclosures
which lay in the line of their spirited attack; the resistance they
encountered was most stubborn, and it was during this advance that the
72nd lost their dashing Commander, Lieutenant-Colonel F. Brownlow,[1]
Captain Frome, and Lance-Sergeant Cameron, the latter a grand specimen
of a Highland soldier.

In the 2nd Brigade, the 72nd Highlanders and the 2nd Sikhs bore
the brunt of the fighting; they were the leading battalions, and
frequently had to fix bayonets to carry different positions or to
check the desperate rushes of the Afghans.

After continued and severe fighting, both leading brigades emerged
at the point of the hill close to Pir Paimal, and, wheeling to their
right, they pressed rapidly on, sweeping the enemy through the
thickly-wooded gardens which covered the western slopes, until noon,
when the whole of Pir Paimal was in our possession.[2]

During the early part of the advance the Afghans collected in great
strength on the low hills beneath the Baba Wali Kotal, evidently
preparing for a rush on our guns; their leaders could be seen urging
them on, and a portion of them came down the hill, but the main body
apparently refused to follow, and remained on the crest until the
position was turned, when they at once retreated.

Having become assured of General Ross's complete success, and seeing
that there was now no necessity for detaining Macgregor's (the 3rd)
brigade to meet a counter-attack, I pushed on with it to join Ross,
who, however, knowing how thoroughly he could depend upon his troops,
without waiting to be reinforced, followed up the retreating foe,
until he reached an entrenched position at the other side of the Baba
Wali Kotal, where the Afghans made another most determined stand.
_Ghazis_ in large numbers flocked to this spot from the rear, while
the guns on the kotal were turned round and brought to bear on our
men, already exposed to a heavy Artillery fire from behind the
entrenched camp.

It now became necessary to take this position by storm, and
recognizing the fact with true soldierly instinct, Major White, who
was leading the advanced companies of the 92nd, called upon the men
for just one charge more 'to close the business.' The battery of screw
guns had been shelling the position, and, under cover of its fire
and supported by a portion of the 2nd Gurkhas and 23rd Pioneers, the
Highlanders, responding with alacrity to their leader's call, dashed
forward and drove the enemy from their entrenchments at the point of
the bayonet.[3]

Major White was the first to reach the guns, being closely followed
by Sepoy Inderbir Lama, who, placing his rifle upon one of them,
exclaimed, 'Captured in the name of the 2nd (Prince of Wales' Own)
Gurkhas!'

Whilst the 1st Brigade was advancing towards the last position, a
half-battalion of the 3rd Sikhs (belonging to the 2nd Brigade), under
Lieutenant-Colonel G. Money, charged a body of Afghans and captured
three guns.

The enemy were now absolutely routed, but, owing to the nature of the
ground, it was impossible for General Ross to realize how complete had
been his victory, and he fully expected that the enemy would take up
a fresh position further on; he therefore ordered the 1st and 2nd
Brigades to halt while they replenished their ammunition, and then
proceeded for about a mile, when they suddenly came in sight of Ayub
Khan's enormous camp. It was entirely deserted, and apparently stood
as it had been left in the morning when the Afghans moved out to the
attack. With his camp was captured the whole of Ayub Khan's Artillery,
thirty-two pieces, including our two Horse Artillery guns[4] which had
been taken at Maiwand on the 27th July.

Further pursuit by the Infantry being valueless, the 1st and 2nd
Brigades halted on the far side of Mazra, where I with the 3rd Brigade
shortly afterwards joined them.

Brigadier-General Hugh Gough, having satisfied himself as to the
security of our left flank, scouted as far as Kohkeran, and then
proceeded with the Cavalry of the Kabul-Kandahar Field Force to
execute the extended movement entrusted to him. He crossed the
Arghandab, and pushed round to get in front of the line of the enemy's
retreat towards Khakrez. Some _ghazis_ and Irregular Afghan troops
were overtaken, but no Regular regiments were met with, the soldiers
having, as is their custom, quickly divested themselves of their
uniform and assumed the garb of harmless agriculturists.

Ayub Khan himself had fled early in the day with his principal
Sirdars.

As I rode into the abandoned camp, I was horrified to hear that the
body of Maclaine, the Horse Artillery officer who had been taken
prisoner at Maiwand, was lying with the throat cut about forty yards
from Ayub Khan's own tent. From what I could learn, the latter had
not actually ordered the murder, but as a word from him would have
prevented it, he must be held responsible for the assassination of an
officer who had fallen into his hands as a prisoner of war.

Our losses during the day comprised: killed, 3 British officers,[5]
1 Native officer, and 36 men; wounded, 11 British officers, 4 Native
officers, and 195 men, 18 of whom succumbed to their wounds. It was
difficult to estimate the loss of the enemy, but it must have been
heavy, as between Kandahar and the village of Pir Paimal alone 600
bodies were buried by us.

With the exception of the 1st Brigade, which remained at Mazra for the
night to protect the captured guns and stores, the troops all returned
to camp before 9 p.m.[6]

Utterly exhausted as I was from the hard day's work and the weakening
effects of my late illness, the cheers with which I was greeted by the
troops as I rode into Ayub Khan's camp and viewed the dead bodies of
my gallant soldiers nearly unmanned me, and it was with a very big
lump in my throat that I managed to say a few words of thanks to each
corps in turn. When I returned to Kandahar, and threw myself on the
bed in the little room prepared for me, I was dead-beat and quite
unequal to the effort of reporting our success to the Queen or to the
Viceroy. After an hour's rest, however, knowing how anxiously news
from Kandahar was looked for both in England and India, I managed
to pull myself together sufficiently to write out and despatch the
following telegram:

    'KANDAHAR,
    '_1st September, 1880_ (6 p.m.).

    'Ayub Khan's army was to-day defeated and completely dispersed
    with, I hope, comparatively slight loss on our side; his camp was
    captured, the two lost guns of E Battery, B Brigade Royal Horse
    Artillery were recovered, and several wheeled guns of various
    calibre fell to the splendid Infantry of this force; the Cavalry
    are still in pursuit. Our casualties are: 22nd Foot, Captain
    Straton, killed; 72nd Highlanders, Lieutenant-Colonel Brownlow,
    Captain Frome, killed, Captain Murray and Lieutenant Monro,
    wounded, 7 men killed, 18 wounded; 92nd Highlanders, Lieutenants
    Menzies and Donald Stewart wounded, 11 men killed and 39 wounded;
    2nd Gurkhas, Lieutenant-Colonel Battye, and 2nd Sikhs, Major
    Slater wounded. It is at present impossible to ascertain the
    casualties amongst the Native troops, but I have no reason to
    believe they are excessive; full details will be telegraphed
    to-morrow. The quite recently murdered remains of Lieutenant
    Maclaine, Royal Horse Artillery, were found on the arrival of the
    British troops in Ayub Khan's camp. Ayub Khan is supposed to have
    fled towards Herat.'

It can easily be imagined with what an intense sense of relief I awoke
on the morning of the 2nd September--the march had ended, Kandahar had
been relieved, Ayub Khan's army had been beaten and dispersed, and
there was an adequate force in southern Afghanistan to prevent further
disturbances.

Amongst the innumerable questions of detail which now confronted me
was the all-important one, and that which caused me greatest anxiety,
of how the large body of troops hastily concentrated at Kandahar, and
for which the produce of the country was quite inadequate, were to be
fed.

No supplies and very little forage were procurable between Quetta and
Kandahar, and in the neighbourhood of the latter place there was now
hardly anything in the shape of food for man or beast to be had for
love or money, the resources of this part of the country having been
quite exhausted. Relief could only be obtained by reducing the number
of mouths to be fed, and with this object I scattered the troops in
different directions, to posts as far distant from each other as
possible, consistent with safety; and in accordance with my promise to
the Kabul-Kandahar Field Force, that they should not be required to
garrison Kandahar when the fighting was at an end, I arranged to
despatch without delay to India the corps which had come with me from
northern Afghanistan.

[Illustration: SKETCH OF THE BATTLE-FIELD OF KANDAHAR]

One column proceeded to Maiwand to inter the bodies of our soldiers
who fell on the 27th July. The Cavalry brigade moved with a number
of sick men and transport animals to Kohkeran. Macgregor's brigade
started for Quetta on the 8th, and was followed soon after by Baker's
and Macpherson's brigades. I accompanied Macgregor in the hope that
the change to Quetta (where I remained about a month) would pick me
up, and enable me to meet Lord Ripon's wish that I should retain the
command in southern Afghanistan until some satisfactory settlement
could be arrived at.

Before leaving Kandahar I issued an order thanking all ranks of the
Kabul-Kandahar Field Force for the work they had so nobly performed,
and I had the gratification of acknowledging, on their behalf and my
own, congratulatory messages from the Queen, the Duke of Cambridge,
the Marquis of Ripon, and many others. On the way to Quetta I had
the further gratification of being informed by the Viceroy that Her
Majesty had been graciously pleased to make me a G.C.B., and to
appoint me Commander-in-Chief of the Madras Army.

I now heard that Abdur Rahman had been finally nominated Amir of
Kabul on the 10th August, and that immediately after the ceremony of
installation Sir Donald Stewart had marched the whole British force
of 6,678 men of all arms out of Kabul on their return to India. Sir
Donald left Peshawar to take up his appointment of Military Member of
Council at Simla on the 31st August, and by the 7th September the last
of his troops had arrived at the former place, except one brigade left
as a temporary measure in the Khyber Pass.

At Quetta I stayed with Sir Robert Sandeman, the capable Resident,
who by his great personal influence had done much to allay excitement
amongst the tribes, and to prevent serious trouble in Baluchistan
and along the border. I had never before been to that part of the
frontier, and I was greatly impressed by the hold Sandeman had
obtained over the country; he was intimately acquainted with every
leading man, and there was not a village, however out of the way,
which he had not visited. 'Sinniman _sahib_,' as the Natives called
him, had gained the confidence of the lawless Baluchis in a very
remarkable manner, and it was mainly owing to his power over them that
I was able to arrange with camel contractors to transport to Quetta
and Kandahar the huge stocks of winter clothing, medical comforts,
grain, and the various requirements of an army in the field, which
had been brought by rail to Sibi, and had there remained for want of
transport to take them further on.

As the change to Quetta did not benefit me, and as I found that,
owing to indifferent health, I was unable to carry on my duty with
satisfaction to myself, I applied to be relieved. My request was
acceded to, and I started on the 12th October for India.

Riding through the Bolan Pass I overtook most of the regiments of the
Kabul-Kandahar Field Force marching towards Sibi, thence to disperse
to their respective destinations. As I parted with each corps in turn
its band played 'Auld Lang Syne,' and I have never since heard that
memory-stirring air without its bringing before my mind's eye the last
view I had of the Kabul-Kandahar Field Force. I fancy myself crossing
and re-crossing the river which winds through the pass; I hear the
martial beat of drums and plaintive music of the pipes; and I see
Riflemen and Gurkhas, Highlanders and Sikhs, guns and horses, camels
and mules, with the endless following of an Indian army, winding
through the narrow gorges, or over the interminable boulders which
made the passage of the Bolan so difficult and wearisome to man and
beast.

I shall never forget the feeling of sadness with which I said good-bye
to the men who had done so much for me. I looked upon them all, Native
as well as British, as my valued friends. And well I might, for never
had a Commander been better served. From first to last a grand spirit
of _camaraderie_[7] pervaded all ranks. At the Peiwar Kotal, at
Charasia, and during the fighting round Kabul, all were eager to close
with the enemy, no matter how great the odds against them. Throughout
the march from Kabul all seemed to be animated with but one desire, to
effect, cost what it might in personal risk, fatigue, or discomfort,
the speedy release of their beleaguered fellow-soldiers in Kandahar;
and the unflagging energy and perseverance of my splendid troops
seemed to reach their full height, when they realized they were about
to put forth their strength against a hitherto successful enemy. Their
exemplary conduct, too, under circumstances often of the most
trying nature, cannot be praised in terms too strong or too full.
Notwithstanding the provocation caused by the cruel murder of any
stragglers who fell into the hands of the Afghans, not one act
infringing the rules of civilized warfare was committed by my troops.
The persons and property of the Natives were respected, and full
compensation for supplies was everywhere given. In short, the
inhabitants of the district through which we passed could not have
been treated with greater consideration nor with a lighter hand, had
they proved themselves friendly allies, and the conduct of the troops
will ever be to me as pleasing a memory as are the results which they
achieved.


[Footnote 1: Brownlow's death was a great loss, for throughout the
war he had frequently distinguished himself as a leader--at the Peiwar
Kotal, during the operations round Kabul, and notably on the 14th
December, when he won the admiration of the whole force by his
brilliant conduct in the attack on the Asmai heights.]

[Footnote 2: The following Native officers, British and Native
non-commissioned officers, and Native soldiers were brought forward as
having been very conspicuous during this part of the fight:

  Colour-Sergeant G. Jacobs      72nd Highlanders.
  Colour-Sergeant R. Lauder        "      "
  Lance-Corporal J. Gordon         "      "
  Subadar-Major Gurbaj Sing       2nd Sikhs.
  Jemadar Alla Sing                "    "
  Naick Dir Sing                   "    "
  Sepoy Hakim                      "    "
  Sepoy Taj Sing                   "    "
  Sepoy Pertap Sing                "    "
  Sepoy Bir Sing                   "    "]

[Footnote 3: During this engagement the following officers and men
were specially remarked for their gallantry:

  Major G. White                        92nd Highlanders.
  Lieutenant C. Douglas                  "       "
  Corporal William McGillvray            "       "
  Private Peter Grieve                   "       "
  Private D. Grey                        "       "
  Major Sullivan Becher                 2nd Gurkhas.
  Havildar Gopal Borah                   "     "
  Sepoy Inderbir Lama                    "     "
  Sepoy Tikaram Kwas                     "     "]

[Footnote 4: These guns were presented to me by the Indian Government,
and are now at the Royal Hospital Dublin.]

[Footnote 5: The third British officer killed was Captain Straton,
22nd Foot, Superintendent of Army Signalling, a most accomplished
officer, under whose direction signalling as applied to Field
Service reached a wonderful pitch of perfection. His energy knew no
difficulties, and his enthusiasm was beyond praise.]

[Footnote 6: The ammunition expended by the Kabul-Kandahar Field Force
on the 31st August and 1st September was:

                          _Rounds_.

  Gun                102   /Shrapnel shell     78
                           \Common     "       24
  Rifle           57,705   /Martini-Henry  15,129
                           \Snider         42,576

and in addition 313 rounds were fired by the Artillery, and 4,971
rounds by the Infantry of the Kandahar Garrison.]

[Footnote 7: The 72nd Highlanders and 5th Gurkhas were brigaded
together throughout the campaign, and at their return to India the
latter regiment presented the former with a shield bearing the
following inscription:

                       FROM THE

                MEN OF THE 5TH GURKHAS

                        TO THE

  MEN OF THE 72ND (DUKE OF ALBANY'S OWN) HIGHLANDERS,

                    IN REMEMBRANCE OF

            THE AFGHAN CAMPAIGN, 1878 TO 1880.


The gift was entirely spontaneous, and was subscribed for by the
Native officers, non-commissioned officers, and men.

In return, the non-commissioned officers and men of the 72nd gave the
5th Gurkhas a very handsome ebony, silver-mounted Drum-Major's staff.]

       *       *       *       *       *




CHAPTER LXIII.
1880-1884

  Reception in England--A fruitless journey--Andaman Isles and Burma
  --The Madras Army--Measures for improving the Madras Army
  --Memories of Madras--An allegory


On the 15th October I handed over my command to Major-General Phayre,
and started for England, making, by the desire of the Viceroy, a
diversion to Simla, where Lord Ripon received me most kindly, and,
to my great pride and pleasure, delivered to me a letter from the
Queen-Empress, written by Her Majesty's own hand, which conveyed in
the most gracious terms the Queen's satisfaction at the manner in
which the service entrusted to me had been performed, thanks to 'the
brave officers and men under my command,' sorrow 'for those of her
gallant soldiers who fell for Queen and country,' and anxiety for the
wounded. Her Majesty also wrote of 'the thrill of horror' with which
the news of the fate of Lieutenant Maclaine had been received, and
concluded with words of hope that my own health and that of the
troops would remain good, and that success might attend us 'till the
blessings of peace are restored.'

A gracious letter, truly! And to me a deeply appreciated reward for
what I had been able to do.

I landed at Dover on the 17th November. The reception I met with from
my countrymen was as enthusiastic as it was unexpected and gratifying.
After an absence of twelve years there must almost always be more or
less of sadness mingled with the pleasure of the home-coming, and two
vacant places in my family circle--those of my father and sister--cast
a deep shadow upon what would otherwise have been a most joyous
return, for my mother was alive to welcome me, and I found my children
flourishing and my wife well, notwithstanding all the anxiety she had
undergone.

I was fêted and feasted to almost an alarming extent, considering that
for nearly two years I had been restricted to campaigning diet; but it
surprised me very much to find that the kind people, by whom I was so
greatly honoured, invariably appeared to think the march from Kabul to
Kandahar was a much greater performance than the advance on Kabul the
previous autumn, while, to my mind, the latter operation was in every
particular more difficult, more dangerous, and placed upon me as the
Commander infinitely more responsibility. The force with which I
started from Kuram to avenge the massacre of our fellow-countrymen was
little more than half the strength of that with which I marched to
Kandahar. Immediately on crossing the Shutargardan I found myself in
the midst of a hostile and warlike people, entirely dependent on the
country for supplies, heavily handicapped by want of transport, and
practically as completely cut off from communication with India as
I was a year later on the march to Kandahar. The Afghans' fanatical
hatred of Europeans had been augmented by their defeats the year
before, and by the occurrences at Kabul, and they looked upon my small
column as a certain prey delivered into their hands by a sympathizing
and all-powerful Allah.

Before me was Kabul, with its large and well-equipped arsenal,
defended by an army better organized and more highly trained than that
possessed by any former Ruler of Afghanistan. On all sides of me were
tribesmen hurrying up to defend the approaches to their capital, and
had there been on our part the smallest hesitation or delay, we should
have found ourselves opposed by as formidable a combination as we had
to deal with two months later at Sherpur. Nothing could then have
saved the force, not one man of which I firmly believe would have ever
returned to tell the tale in India. Worse than all, I had in my own
camp a traitor, in the form of the Amir, posing as a friend to the
British Government and a refugee seeking our protection, while he was
at heart our bitterest enemy, and was doing everything in his power to
make my task more difficult and ensure our defeat.

The march to Kandahar was certainly much longer, the country was
equally unfriendly, and the feeding of so large a number of men and
animals was a continual source of anxiety. But I had a force capable
of holding its own against any Afghan army that could possibly be
opposed to it, and good and sufficient transport to admit of its
being kept together, with the definite object in view of rescuing our
besieged countrymen and defeating Ayub Khan; instead of, as at Kabul,
having to begin to unravel a difficult political problem after
accomplishing the defeat of the tribesmen and the Afghan army.

I could only account to myself for the greater amount of interest
displayed in the march to Kandahar, and the larger amount of credit
given to me for that undertaking, by the glamour of romance thrown
around an army of 10,000 men lost to view, as it were, for nearly a
month, about the fate of which uninformed speculation was rife and
pessimistic rumours were spread, until the tension became extreme,
and the corresponding relief proportionably great when that army
reappeared to dispose at once of Ayub and his hitherto victorious
troops.

I did not return to India until the end of 1881, six weeks out of
these precious months of leave having been spent in a wild-goose chase
to the Cape of Good Hope and back, upon my being nominated by Mr.
Gladstone's Government Governor of Natal and Commander of the Forces
in South Africa, on the death of Sir George Colley and the receipt of
the news of the disaster at Majuba Hill. While I was on my way out
to take up my command, peace was made with the Boers in the most
marvellously rapid and unexpected manner, A peace, alas! 'without
honour,' to which may be attributed the recent regrettable state of
affairs in the Transvaal--a state of affairs which was foreseen and
predicted by many at the time. My stay at Cape Town was limited to
twenty-four hours, the Government being apparently as anxious to get
me away from Africa as they had been to hurry me out there.

In August I spent three very enjoyable and instructive weeks as the
guest of His Imperial Majesty the Emperor of Germany, while the
manoeuvres at Hanover and Schleswig-Holstein were taking place.

Shortly before leaving England for Madras, I was asked by Mr.
Childers, the then Secretary of State for War, whether I would accept
the appointment of Quartermaster-General at the Horse Guards, in
succession to Sir Garnet Wolseley. The offer, in some ways, was
rather a temptation to me, for I had a great wish to take part in the
administration of our army; and had it been made sooner, before my
arrangements for going to Madras had been completed, I think I should
have accepted it at once; as it was, I begged to be allowed to join my
new command, and leave the question of the Quartermaster-Generalship
in abeyance until it was about to become vacant. This was agreed to,
and I started for Madras, taking my wife and two little daughters with
me, the boy being left at school in England.

On arriving in Madras, on the 27th November, I had the pleasure
to find myself associated as a colleague in Council with Mr.
Grant-Duff,[1] who had recently been appointed Governor of the
Presidency. We spent a few pleasant days with him and Mrs. Grant-Duff
at Government House, before proceeding to deposit our children at
Ootacamund, that Queen of Indian Hill-stations, which was to be our
home for four years. We spent Christmas there, and then went to Burma,
visiting the Andaman Islands on the way. We had on board our ship some
prisoners destined for that convict settlement, amongst whom cholera
unfortunately broke out a few hours after we left Madras. They were
accommodated just outside my wife's cabin, and their cries and groans
were most distressing. Very little could be done for them on board,
for the Native Doctor accompanying us possessed no remedy but castor
oil! and as the disease was spreading rapidly, I took upon myself to
have the party landed at Vizagapatam.

The cholera patients were put into tents on the sea-shore, under the
charge of a medical officer, and every arrangement possible for their
comfort and relief was made before we proceeded on our journey.

During our stay at Port Blair, the Head-Quarters of the Andaman
Administration, we were the guests of the hospitable Superintendent,
Lieutenant-Colonel Protheroe, who had been one of the political
officers on my staff in Afghanistan. The group of islands forming the
settlement are extremely beautiful, but it is tropical beauty, and one
pays the penalty for the luxuriant vegetation in the climate, which is
very much like a Turkish bath, hot and damp. While going through the
prisons, I came across some of the sepoys of the 29th Punjab Infantry
who deserted during the advance on the Peiwar Kotal. I was told that
they were behaving well, and might in time be allowed some remission
of their sentences.

A voyage of thirty-six hours brought us to Rangoon, where we had the
pleasure of meeting and being entertained by our old friends, Mr.
Bernard,[2] the Chief Commissioner of Burma, and his wife.

In 1882 Thyetmyo and Tonghu were the two frontier stations of Burma,
and I had been asked to consider the question of the defence of the
proposed railway termini at these places. I accordingly visited them
both, and as I thought I foresaw that the lines of railway could not
end as then contemplated, I recommended that the absolutely necessary
works only should be attempted, and that these should be as
inexpensive as possible. Ere many years had passed, the line, as I
anticipated, was completed to Mandalay.

The defences of Rangoon had also to be arranged for. An examination
of the approaches, however, satisfied me that no elaborate system of
fortification was necessary, and that Rangoon's best security lay in
her winding, dangerous river; so I gave it as my opinion that, with
two small batteries at Monkey Point and King's Point, and a couple of
torpedo-boats, Rangoon would be reasonably safe against attack.

Before leaving Burma I received letters from H.R.H. the Duke of
Cambridge and Mr. Childers, in which were repeated the offer of the
Quartermaster-Generalship at the Horse Guards. But I had by this
time begun to like my new work, and had no desire to leave Madras; I
therefore definitely declined the appointment.

From Burma we returned to Ootacamund, viâ Calcutta, where we spent a
few days with Lord and Lady Ripon and Sir Donald and Lady Stewart.

Life at 'Ooty' was very pleasant; such peace and repose I had never
before experienced; I thoroughly enjoyed the rest after the turmoil of
the preceding years, and I quite recovered my health, which had been
somewhat shattered. Unlike other hill-stations, Ootacamund rests on an
undulating tableland, 7,400 feet above the sea, with plenty of room in
the neighbourhood for riding, driving, and hunting; and, although
the scenery is nothing like as grand as in the Himalayas, there are
exquisite views to be had, and it is more restful and homelike. We
made many warm friends and agreeable acquaintances, who when our time
in Madras came to an end presented my wife with a very beautiful
clock 'as a token of esteem and affection'; we were very sorry to bid
farewell to our friends and to our Nilgiri home.

Each cold season I made long tours in order to acquaint myself with
the needs and capabilities of the men of the Madras Army. I tried hard
to discover in them those fighting qualities which had distinguished
their forefathers during the wars of the last and the beginning of
the present century. But long years of peace, and the security and
prosperity attending it, had evidently had upon them, as they always
seem to have on Asiatics, a softening and deteriorating effect; and I
was forced to the conclusion that the ancient military spirit had died
in them, as it had died in the ordinary Hindustani of Bengal and the
Mahratta of Bombay, and that they could no longer with safety be
pitted against warlike races, or employed outside the limits of
southern India.

It was with extreme reluctance that I formed this opinion with regard
to the successors of the old Coast Army, for which I had always
entertained a great admiration. For the sake of the British officers
belonging to the Madras Army, too, I was very loath to be convinced of
its inferiority, for many of them were devoted to their regiments, and
were justly proud of their traditions.

However, there was the army, and it was my business as its
Commander-in-Chief to do all that I possibly could towards rendering
it an efficient part of the war establishment of India.

Madrassies, as a rule, are more intelligent and better educated than
the fighting races of northern India, and I therefore thought it could
not be difficult to teach them the value of musketry, and make them
excel in it. To this end, I encouraged rifle meetings and endeavoured
to get General Officers to take an interest in musketry inspections,
and to make those inspections instructive and entertaining to the men.
I took to rifle-shooting myself, as did the officers on my personal
staff,[3] who were all good shots, and our team held its own in many
exciting matches at the different rifle meetings.

At that time the importance of musketry training was not so generally
recognized as it is now, especially by the senior officers, who had
all entered the service in the days of 'Brown Bess.' Some of them had
failed to note the remarkable alteration which the change from
the musket to the rifle necessitated in the system of musketry
instruction, or to study the very different conditions under which
we could hope to win battles in the present day, compared with those
under which some of our most celebrated victories had been won. It
required time and patience to inspire officers with a belief in the
wonderful shooting power of the Martini-Henry rifle, and it was even
more difficult to make them realize that the better the weapon, the
greater the necessity for its being intelligently used.

I had great faith in the value of Camps of Exercise, and
notwithstanding the difficulty of obtaining an annual grant to defray
their cost, I managed each year, by taking advantage of the movement
of troops in course of relief, to form small camps at the more
important stations, and on one occasion was able to collect 9,000
men together in the neighbourhood of Bangalore, where the
Commanders-in-Chief in India and of Bombay (Sir Donald Stewart and the
Hon. Arthur Hardinge) were present--the first and last time that
the 'three Chiefs' in India met together at a Camp of Exercise. The
Sappers and Miners were a brilliant exception to the rest of the
Madras Army, being indeed a most useful, efficient body of men, but
as no increase to that branch was considered necessary, I obtained
permission to convert two Infantry regiments into Pioneers on the
model of the Pioneer Corps of the Bengal Army, which had always
proved themselves so useful on service. Promotion amongst the British
officers was accelerated, recruits were not allowed to marry, or, if
married, to have their wives with them, and many other minor changes
were made which did much towards improving the efficiency of the
Native portion of the Madras Army; and I hope I was able to increase
the comfort and well-being of the British portion also by relaxing
irksome and useless restrictions, and by impressing upon commanding
officers the advisability of not punishing young soldiers with the
extreme severity which had hitherto been considered necessary.

I had been unpleasantly struck by the frequent Courts-Martial on the
younger soldiers, and by the disproportionate number of these lads to
be met with in the military prisons. Even when the prisoners happened
to be of some length of service, I usually found that they had
undergone previous imprisonments, and had been severely punished
within a short time of their enlistment. I urged that, in the first
two or three years of a soldier's service, every allowance should be
made for youth and inexperience, and that during that time faults
should, whenever practicable, be dealt with summarily, and not visited
with the heavier punishment which a Court-Martial sentence necessarily
carries with it, and I pointed out that this procedure might receive a
wider application, and become a guiding principle in the treatment
of soldiers generally. I suggested that all men in possession of a
good-conduct badge, or who had had no entry in their company defaulter
sheets for one year, should be granted certain privileges, such as
receiving the fullest indulgence in the grant of passes, consistent
with the requirements of health, duty, and discipline, and being
excused attendance at all roll-calls (including meals), except perhaps
at tattoo. I had often remarked that those corps in which indulgences
were most freely given contained the largest number of well-behaved
men, and I had been assured that such indulgences were seldom abused,
and that, while they were greatly appreciated by those who received
them, they acted as an incentive to less well conducted men to try and
redeem their characters.

[Illustration: THE THREE COMMANDERS-IN-CHIEF IN INDIA.
                GENERAL SIR FREDERICK SLEIGH ROBERTS.
GENERAL SIR ARTHUR E. HARDINGE.    GENERAL SIR DONALD MARTIN STEWART.]

The reports of commanding officers, on the results of these small
ameliorations, after a six months' trial, were so favourable that I
was able to authorize still further concessions as a premium on good
behaviour.

The Madras Presidency abounds in places of interest connected with our
earlier struggles in India, and it was possible to combine pleasure
with duty in a very delightful manner while travelling about the
country. My wife frequently accompanied me in my tours, and enjoyed as
much as I did our visits to many famous and beautiful places. Madras
itself recalled the struggles for supremacy between the English and
French in the middle of the eighteenth century. Arcot reminded one
that it was in the brilliant capture and still more brilliant defence
of the fort at that place that Clive's soldierly genius first became
conspicuous. Trichinopoly and Wandewash made one think of Stringer
Lawrence's and Eyre Coote's splendid services, and while standing on
the breach at Seringapatam, one was reminded of Wellington's early
life in India, and marvelled how heavily-armed men could have ventured
to cross the single plank which alone spanned the deep, broad ditch of
the inner defences.

I should like to dwell on the architectural wonders of Tanjore and
the Caves of Ellora; the magnificent entertainments and Princely
hospitality accorded to us by the Nizam of Hyderabad, the late
Maharajas of Mysore and Travancore, the Maharaja of Vizianagram, the
Raja of Cochin, and many other Rulers of Native States; the delights
of a trip along the west coast by the beautiful 'back-water,' and the
return journey through the glorious forests of Cannara and Mysore;
the pleasure of visiting the lovely 'White Lady'[4] and the wonderful
Kaveri falls; but to give my readers any idea of their marvels would
be to put too great a strain upon their patience, which I fear has
already been severely taxed.

The late Maharaja of Travancore was an unusually enlightened Native.
He spoke and wrote English fluently; his appearance was distinguished,
and his manners those of a well-bred, courteous English gentleman of
the old school. His speech on proposing the Queen's health was a model
of fine feeling and fine expression, and yet this man was steeped
in superstition. His Highness sat, slightly retired from the table,
between my wife and myself while dinner was going on; he partook of
no food or wine, but his close contact with us (he led my wife in to
dinner and took her out on his arm) necessitated his undergoing a
severe course of purification at the hands of the Brahmins as soon
as the entertainment was over; he dared not do anything without the
sanction of the priests, and he spent enormous sums in propitiating
them.

Notwithstanding the high civilization, luxury, and refinement to
be found in these Native States, my visits to them strengthened my
opinion that, however capable and enlightened the Ruler, he could have
no chance of holding his country if deprived of the guiding hand of
the British Government as embodied in the Resident. It is just that
control, so light in ordinary times as to be hardly perceptible, but
firm enough when occasion demands, which saves the State from being
rent by factions and internal intrigue, or swallowed up by a more
powerful neighbour, for, owing to the influence of the Brahmins and
the practical seclusion which caste prejudices entail, involving
ignorance of what is taking place immediately outside their own
palaces, the Native Princes of the less warlike peoples would have
no chance amidst the anarchy and confusion that would follow the
withdrawal of British influence.

A remark made to me by the late Sir Madhava Rao, ex-Minister of the
Baroda State, which exemplifies my meaning, comes back to me at this
moment. Sir Madhava was one of the most astute Hindu gentlemen in
India, and when discussing with him the excitement produced by the
'Ilbert Bill,' he said: 'Why do you English raise these unnecessary
questions? It is your doing, not ours. We have heard of the cry,
"India for the Indians," which some of your philanthropists have
raised in England; but you have only to go to the Zoological Gardens
and open the doors of the cages, and you will very soon see what would
be the result of putting that theory into practice. There would be
a terrific fight amongst the animals, which would end in the tiger
walking proudly over the dead bodies of the rest.' 'Whom,' I inquired,
'do you consider to be the tiger?' 'The Mahomedan from the North,' was
his reply.


[Illustration: THE MARQUIS OF DUFFERIN, K.P., G.C.B., G.C.M.G.,
G.M.S.I., G.M.I.E., VICEROY OF INDIA.

_From, an engraving by the Fine Art Society of a portrait by the late
Frank Holl, R.A._]


[Footnote 1: Now Sir Mount-Stuart Grant-Duff, G.C.S.I.]

[Footnote 2: Now Sir Charles Bernard, K.C.S.I.]

[Footnote 3: Lieutenant-Colonel G.T. Pretyman, R.A., was
Assistant Military Secretary until 1884, when he was succeeded by
Lieutenant-Colonel R. Pole-Carew, Coldstream Guards. Lieutenant
Neville Chamberlain, Central India Horse, and Captain Ian Hamilton,
the Gordon Highlanders, were Aides-de-camp.]

[Footnote 4: The finest of the Gassapa falls.]

       *       *       *       *       *




CHAPTER LXIV.
1885

  Disturbing action of Russia--Abdur Rahman Khan--The Rawal Pindi Durbar
  --Unmistakable loyalty of the Natives


In March, 1885, we again visited Calcutta. The Marquis of Ripon had
departed, and the Earl of Dufferin reigned in his stead.

Affairs on our north-west and south-east frontiers were at this time
in a very unsettled state. Indeed, the political outlook altogether
had assumed rather a gloomy aspect. Our relations with the French had
become somewhat strained in consequence of their interference with
Upper Burma and our occupation of Egypt; while Russia's activity in
the valley of the Oxus necessitated our looking after our interests in
Afghanistan. These considerations rendered it advisable to increase
the army in India by 11,000 British and 12,000 Native troops, bringing
the strength of the former up to nearly 70,000, with 414 guns, and
that of the latter to 128,636.

Russia's movements could not be regarded with indifference, for, while
we had retreated from our dominating position at Kandahar, she had
approached considerably nearer to Afghanistan, and in a direction
infinitely more advantageous than before for a further onward move.
Up to 1881 a Russian army advancing on Afghanistan would have had to
solve the difficult problem of the formidable Hindu Kush barrier, or
if it took the Herat line it must have faced the deserts of Khiva and
Bokhara. But all this was changed by Skobeloff's victories over the
Tekke Turkomans, which gave Merv and Sarakhs to Russia, and enabled
her to transfer her base from Orenburg to the Caspian--by far the most
important step ever made by Russia in her advance towards India. I
had some years before pointed out to the Government of India how
immeasurably Russia would gain, if by the conquest of Merv--a conquest
which I then looked upon as certain to be accomplished in the near
future--she should be able to make this transfer. My words were
unheeded or ridiculed at the time, and I, like others who thought as
I did, was supposed to be suffering from a disease diagnosed by a
distinguished politician as 'Mervousness.' But a little later those
words were verified. Merv had become a Russian possession, and
Turkestan was in direct communication by rail and steamer with St.
Petersburg. And can it be denied that this fact, which would have
enabled the army in the Caucasus to be rapidly transported to the
scene of operations, made it possible for General Komaroff practically
to dictate terms to the Boundary Commission which was sent to define
the northern limits of Afghanistan, and to forcibly eject an Afghan
garrison from Panjdeh under the eyes of British officers?

Lord Dufferin took up the reins of the Government of India at a time
when things had come to such a pass that a personal conference with
the Amir was considered necessary to arrange for the defence and
demarcation of His Highness's frontier, the strengthening of Herat,
the extension of the Sakkur-Sibi railway to Quetta, and the
discussion of the general situation. Abdur Rahman was therefore
invited to meet the Viceroy at Rawal Pindi, where a large standing
camp was prepared, and my wife and I were bidden amongst a numerous
company, including Their Royal Highnesses the Duke and Duchess
of Connaught, the Ruling Punjab Chiefs, and the high officers of
Government from various parts of India, to be the guests of His
Excellency and Lady Dufferin on the interesting occasion.

The meeting was fixed for the end of March, and as there was scarcely
time for us to return to Madras and get back again before then, we
proceeded leisurely up country, visiting different places and one or
two old friends on the way.

At Multan I received a cipher telegram from Sir Donald Stewart
informing me that it had been decided to mobilize two Army Corps, and
that I was to have command of the first. This was exciting news, and
we lost no time in making our way to Rawal Pindi, where we should be
in direct communication with Head-Quarters, and hoped to hear what had
taken place since we left Calcutta to make it necessary to prepare for
war.

I soon found out that this action on the part of the Government was
forced on them by the representatives of Russia on the Boundary
Commission, who were persistent in their attempts to encroach on
Afghan territory, in order that they might be in a position to control
the approaches to Herat, a Russian occupation of which fortress we
could not permit.

Abdur Rahman arrived at Rawal Pindi on the last day of March; he was
about forty-five years of age, and although he required a stick
to walk with, being a martyr to rheumatism, and very stout, his
appearance was decidedly dignified and imposing. He had a manly,
clever, and rather handsome face, marred only by the cruel expression
of the mouth, and his manner was sufficiently courteous though
somewhat abrupt.

Several semi-private meetings took place between the Viceroy and
the Amir, at the first of which His Highness, after expressing his
appreciation of the flattering and cordial reception he had met with,
reminded Lord Dufferin that he had consistently warned the British
Government of the approach of the Russians towards Afghanistan and of
the unsettling effect their advance was producing on the minds of
his countrymen; and he advocated the necessity for timely action. No
attention, he said, had been paid to his warnings, owing, probably, to
the strife of parties in England, and to the excessive caution of the
British Government.

Lord Dufferin, in reply, pointed out that the Amir had been advised
to strengthen northern Afghanistan, and that the services of Engineer
officers had been offered to him for the purpose of putting Herat into
a satisfactory state of defence. His Excellency declared that England
was resolved that a Russian advance on Herat should be met by a
declaration of war; that preparations were then being made to give
effect to that resolve; and that it was now absolutely necessary for
His Highness to make up his mind which of his two powerful neighbours
he would elect to choose as his ally.

[Illustration: HIS HIGHNESS ABDUR RAHMAN, AMIR OF AFGHANISTAN.]

Abdur Rahman thanked the Viceroy for his offer of help, but showed
plainly that he had no intention of availing himself of the services
of our Engineers. He vowed that his own personal wishes were entirely
in favour of a close and practical alliance with the British, but that
his subjects did not share his feelings towards us. They were 'rude,
uneducated, and suspicious.' He hoped that in time they might become
more disposed to be friendly, but at present he could not pretend
to rely upon them. He then disclosed the real reason for his ready
response to the Viceroy's invitation by saying that he would
gratefully receive the assistance of the British Government in the
shape of money, arms, and munitions of war.

At a later visit the conversation turned upon the difficulty of the
position in which the British members of the Boundary Commission were
placed, and the impossibility of the Afghan posts being able to hold
their own in the face of a Russian advance was explained to the Amir.
A map was produced, on which the country to the north of Herat was
carefully examined, and Russia's claims were made known to him. Abdur
Rahman's ideas of topography were not very accurate, but he displayed
considerable intelligence in his questions and perception of the
meaning of the answers, and eventually expressed his willingness to
leave the question of the delimitation of his northern frontier in the
hands of the British Government.

On the 6th April there was a parade of the troops, 17,000 in number,
and that evening the Amir was present at a state banquet, at which,
after the usual loyal toasts, the Viceroy proposed the Amir's health.
His Highness, in reply, expressed a fervent hope that the prosperity
of the British Empire might long endure, as with it the welfare of
Afghanistan was bound up. He had watched, he said, the progress of
India under British rule, and he hoped that Afghanistan might flourish
in like manner; and he ended with a prayer that the Almighty would
preserve Her Majesty's troops in safety, honour, and efficiency.

Two days later the Amir was publicly received in durbar by the
Viceroy, on whose right hand he was placed, while the Duke of
Connaught occupied the seat on his left. After a few words had been
exchanged, Abdur Rahman rose, and spoke as follows: 'I am deeply
sensible of the kindness which I have received from His Excellency the
Viceroy, and of the favour shown me by Her Majesty the Queen-Empress.
In return for this kindness and favour, I am ready with my army and
people to render any services that may be required of me or of the
Afghan nation. As the British Government has declared that it will
assist me in repelling any foreign enemy, so it is right and proper
that Afghanistan should unite in the firmest manner, and side by side
by the British Government.'

On being presented, amongst other gifts, with a sword of honour, he
said in a loud and determined voice: 'With this sword I hope to smite
any enemy of the British Government.'

That same evening the Viceroy received news of the Russian attack
on Panjdeh, and communicated it to the Amir, who heard it with
extraordinary equanimity, not appearing to attach any great importance
to the matter, and attributing the defeat of his troops to the
inferiority of their weapons. He observed that the excuse given by the
Russians, that the Afghans intended to attack them, was a frivolous
pretext, and declared all that his men had done was very properly to
make preparations to defend themselves.

Abdur Rahman had expressed a desire for a British decoration, so
shortly before his departure from India he was invested, informally,
with the G.C.S.I. As the train was moving off, he said to the British
officers assembled on the platform: 'I wish you all farewell, and
commend you to the care of God. May your Government endure and your
honour increase. I have been greatly pleased and gratified by the
sight of the British Army. I hope and am certain that the friendship
now existing between us will last for ever.'

Abdur Rahman had, indeed, every reason to be satisfied with the result
of his visit, for not only was Lord Ripon's promise that England
would defend his kingdom against foreign aggression ratified by Lord
Dufferin, but the Amir was given, in addition to the large sums of
money and the considerable amount of munitions of war already received
by him, ten lakhs of rupees, 20,000 breech-loading rifles, a Heavy
battery of four guns and two howitzers, a Mountain battery, and a
liberal supply of ammunition for both guns and rifles.

On the Amir's departure the great camp was broken up, and the troops
returned to their respective stations, all prepared to move towards
the Quetta frontier at a moment's notice. The Native Chiefs, in taking
their leave of the Viceroy, were profuse in their offers and promises
of help should a recourse to arms be found necessary; and Lord and
Lady Dufferin's numerous guests, who, like my wife and myself, had for
more than a fortnight been recipients of the most profuse hospitality,
wished their generous host and hostess a hearty good-bye.

Interesting as the whole proceeding had been, by far the most
gratifying result of the gathering was the unmistakable loyalty
displayed by the Native Rulers who were present, as well as by those
in distant parts of India, on hearing of the unprovoked attack made
by the Russians on the Afghan troops at Panjdeh, and our consequent
preparations for war. The greatest enthusiasm prevailed, and the
various military camps at Rawal Pindi were crowded with men desirous
of joining the ranks of our army. I was literally besieged by old
soldiers, begging that they might be allowed to return to the colours
and fight once more for the _Sirkar_; and one Native officer, who
had been with me in Afghanistan, came to me and said: 'I am afraid,
_sahib_, I am too old and infirm to do more work myself; but you
must take my two sons with you--they are ready to die for the
_Angrese_.'[1]

[Illustration: MAP OF CENTRAL ASIA (THE RUSSIAN FRONTIERS).]

We hastened back to Madras, and reached Ootacamund after seven
consecutive nights in the train, with a thermometer at 104° in the
daytime, the only pause in our journey being at Poona, where we spent
a few hours with our friend General Sir John Ross.

I left my horses at Lahore, and for some weeks lived in daily
expectation of being ordered back to the Punjab to take command of the
1st Army Corps. A change of Government, however, took place just
in time to prevent the war. Lord Salisbury's determined attitude
convinced Russia that no further encroachments on the Afghan frontier
would be permitted; she ceased the 'game of brag' she had been allowed
to play, and the Boundary Commission were enabled to proceed with the
work of delimitation.


[Footnote 1: A Native corruption of the word 'English.']

       *       *       *       *       *




CHAPTER LXV.
1885-1886

  The Burma expedition--The Camp of Exercise at Delhi
  --Defence of the North-West Frontier--Quetta and Peshawar
  --Communications _versus_ fortifications--Sir George Chesney


We only remained three months at 'Ooty,' for on the 8th July a
telegram arrived from Lord Dufferin announcing the Queen's approval of
my being appointed to succeed Sir Donald Stewart as Commander-in-Chief
in India, and granting me leave to visit England before taking up the
appointment.

At the end of a fortnight all our preparations for departure had been
made, and on the 18th August we left Bombay, in the teeth of the
monsoon.

Our boy, whose holidays had just commenced, met us at Venice, and we
loitered in Italy and Switzerland on our way home. I spent but six
weeks in England, returning to the East at the end of November, to
join my new command. I met Lord Dufferin at Agra, and accompanied him
to Gwalior, whither his Excellency went for the purpose of formally
restoring to the Maharaja Sindhia the much coveted fortress of
Gwalior, which had been occupied by us since 1858--an act of sound
policy, enabling us to withdraw a brigade which could be far more
usefully employed elsewhere.

At Gwalior we received the news of the capture of Mandalay, and I sent
a telegram to Lieutenant-General Prendergast,[1] to congratulate him
on the successful conduct of the Burma Expedition.

Affairs in Burma had been going from bad to worse from the time King
Thebaw came to the throne in 1878. Wholesale murders were of constant
occurrence within the precincts of the palace; dacoity was rife
throughout the country, and British officers were insulted to such
an extent that the Resident had to be withdrawn. In 1883 a special
Mission was sent by the King of Burma to Paris, with a view to making
such a treaty with the French Government as would enable him to appeal
to France for assistance, in the event of his being involved in
difficulties with England. The Mission remained eighteen months in
Paris, and succeeded in ratifying what the French called a 'Commercial
Convention,' under the terms of which a French Consul was located at
Mandalay, who soon gained sufficient ascendancy over King Thebaw
to enable him to arrange for the construction of a railway between
Mandalay and Tonghu, and the establishment of a French bank at
Mandalay, by means of which France would speedily have gained full
control over the principal sources of Burmese revenue, and power to
exclude British trade from the valley of the Irrawaddy. In furtherance
of these designs, the King picked a quarrel with a British trading
company, threatened to cancel their leases for cutting timber, and
demanded a fine of ten lakhs of rupees.

The Chief Commissioner proposed arbitration, but this was declined,
and the King refusing to modify his action with regard to the trading
company, the Viceroy proposed to the Secretary of State for India that
an ultimatum[2] should be sent to King Thebaw.

In approving of the ultimatum, Lord Randolph Churchill expressed his
opinion that its despatch should be concurrent with the movement of
troops and ships to Rangoon, that an answer should be demanded
within a specified time, and that if the ultimatum were rejected, an
immediate advance on Mandalay should be made.

A force[3] of nearly 10,000 men and 77 guns, under the command of
Lieutenant-General Prendergast, was accordingly ordered to be in
readiness at Thyetmyo by the 14th November, and as the reply of the
Burmese Government was tantamount to a refusal, Prendergast was
instructed to advance on Mandalay, with the result which it was
my pleasant duty to congratulate him upon in my capacity of
Commander-in-Chief of the Army in India.

From Gwalior I went to Delhi to prepare for a Camp of Exercise on a
much larger scale than had ever before been held. Many weak points
in the Commissariat and Transport Department having become only too
apparent when the mobilization of the two Army Corps had been imminent
the previous spring, it was considered necessary to test our readiness
for war, and orders for the strength and composition of the force to
be manoeuvred had been issued before Sir Donald Stewart left India.

The troops were divided into two Army Corps. The northern assembled at
Umballa, and the southern at Gurgaon, 25 miles from Delhi, the points
of concentration being 150 miles apart.

After a fortnight passed in brigade and divisional movements, the
opposing forces advanced, and on the 7th January they came into
contact on the historic battlefield of Panipat.[4]

Lord Dufferin, whose interest in the efficiency of the army induced
him to come all the way from Calcutta to witness the last two days'
manoeuvres, was present--with the twelve 'foreign officers'[5] from
the principal armies of Europe and America, who had been invited to
attend the camp--at a march-past of the whole force of 35,000 men on
the 18th. It was a fine sight, though marred by a heavy thunderstorm
and a perfect deluge of rain, and was really a greater test of what
the troops could do than if we had had the perfect weather we had
hoped for. The 'foreign officers' were, apparently, somewhat surprised
at the fine physique and efficiency of our Native soldiers, but they
all remarked on the paucity of British officers with the Indian
regiments, which I could not but acknowledge was, as it still is, a
weak point in our military organization.

When the camp was broken up, I accompanied the Viceroy to Burma, where
we arrived early in February, 1886. Lord Dufferin must, I think, have
been pleased at the reception he met with at Rangoon. The people
generally tried in every possible way to show their gratitude to the
Viceroy, under whose auspices the annexation of Upper Burma had been
carried out, and each nationality had erected a triumphal arch in its
own particular quarter of the town.

From Rangoon we went to Mandalay, where Lord Dufferin formally
announced the annexation by England of all that part of Upper Burma
over which King Thebaw had held sway. We then proceeded to Madras,
where I parted from the Viceregal party and travelled to Bombay to
meet my wife. Leaving her at Simla to arrange our house, which had
been considerably altered and added to, I proceeded to the North-West
Frontier, for the question of its defence was one which interested
me very deeply, and I hoped that, from the position I now held as a
member of the Government of India, I should be able to get my ideas on
this, to India, all-important subject listened to, if not altogether
carried out.

The defence of the frontier had been considered under the orders of my
predecessor by a Committee, the members of which had recorded their
several opinions as to the means which should be adopted to make
India secure. But Sir Donald Stewart relinquished his command before
anything could be done to give effect to the measures they advised.

The matter had therefore to be taken up afresh by me, and I carefully
studied the recommendations of the 'Defence Committee' before visiting
the frontier to refresh my memory by personal inspection as to the
points to be defended.

It seemed to me that none of the members, with the exception of Sir
Charles Macgregor and the secretary, Major W.G. Nicholson, at all
appreciated the great change which had taken place in our position
since the near approach of Russia, and our consequent promise to the
Amir to preserve the integrity of his kingdom, had widened the limit
of our responsibilities from the southern to the northern boundary of
Afghanistan.

Less than a year before we had been on the point of declaring war with
Russia because of her active interference with 'the authority of a
sovereign--our protected ally--who had committed no offence[6];' and
even now it was not certain that peace could be preserved, by reason
of the outrageous demands made by the Russian members of the Boundary
Commission as to the direction which the line of delimitation between
Russian and Afghan territory should take.

It was this widening of our responsibilities which prevented me from
agreeing with the recommendations of the Defence Committee, for the
majority of the members laid greater stress on the necessity
for constructing numerous fortifications, than upon lines of
communication, which I conceived to be of infinitely greater
importance, as affording the means of bringing all the strategical
points on the frontier into direct communication with the railway
system of India, and enabling us to mass our troops rapidly, should we
be called upon to aid Afghanistan in repelling attack from a foreign
Power.

Fortifications, of the nature of entrenched positions, were no
doubt, to some extent, necessary, not to guard against our immediate
neighbours, for experience had taught us that without outside
assistance they are incapable of a combined movement, but for the
protection of such depots and storehouses as would have to be
constructed, and as a support to the army in the field.

The line chosen at that time for an advance was by Quetta and
Kandahar. In the first instance, therefore, I wended my way to
Baluchistan, where I met and consulted with the Governor-General's
Agent, Sir Robert Sandeman, and the Chief Engineer of the Sind-Pishin
Railway, Brigadier-General Browne.[7]

We together inspected the Kwaja-Amran range, through which the
Kohjak tunnel now runs, and I decided that the best position for an
entrenched camp was to the rear of that range, in the space between
the Takatu and Mashalik mountains. This open ground was less than four
miles broad; nature had made its flanks perfectly secure, and in front
was a network of ravines capable of being made quite impassable by
simply flooding them. It was unfortunate that the railway had been
marked out in front instead of in rear of the Takatu range, and that
its construction was too far advanced before the question of defence
came to be considered to admit of its being altered, otherwise this
position would have been a complete protection for the line of rail
also.

Having come to a definite conclusion as to the measures to be taken
for meeting the offensive and defensive requirements of Quetta and the
Bolan Pass, I turned my attention to Peshawar and the Khyber Pass,
which were infinitely more difficult to deal with, because of the
political considerations involved.

Over the whole of Baluchistan we had entire control, so that in the
event of an army moving in that direction we could depend upon the
resources of the country being at our disposal, and the people
remaining, at least, neutral. But on the Peshawar side the
circumstances were altogether different: the tribes were hostile to a
degree, and no European's life was safe across the frontier. Except in
the Khyber itself (where the policy of establishing friendly relations
with the Afridis, and utilizing them to keep open the pass, had
been most successfully practised by the political officer,
Lieutenant-Colonel Warburton), we could not depend on the tribesmen
remaining passive, much less helping us if we advanced into
Afghanistan. While, should an army attempt to invade India from that
direction, we should to a certainty have every man of the 200,000
warlike people who inhabit the mountainous district from Chitral to
Baluchistan combining against us, and pouring into India from every
outlet.

For these reasons I recorded a strong opinion in opposition to the
proposals of the Defence Committee, which were in favour of the
construction of a large magazine at Peshawar and extensive entrenched
works at the mouth of the Khyber. I pointed out the extreme danger of
a position communication with which could be cut off, and which could
be more or less easily turned, for it was clear to me that until we
had succeeded in inducing the border tribes to be on friendly terms
with us, and to believe that their interests were identical with
ours, the Peshawar valley would become untenable should any general
disturbance take place; and that, instead of entrenchments close to
the Khyber Pass, we required a position upon which the garrisons
of Peshawar and Nowshera could fall back and await the arrival of
reinforcements.

For this position I selected a spot on the right bank of the Kabul
river, between Khairabad and the Indus; it commanded the passage of
the latter river, and could easily be strengthened by defensive works
outside the old fort of Attock.

It will be readily understood by those of my readers who have any
knowledge of our North-West Frontier, or are interested in the
question of the defence of India, that other routes exist between the
Bolan and the Khyber Passes which might be made use of either by an
army invading India, or by a force sent from India to the assistance
of Afghanistan; and by such it will probably be asked, as was the case
when my recommendations were being discussed, why I did not advise
these lines to be similarly guarded. My reply was, and is, that there
are no arsenals or depots near these passes to be protected, as at
Quetta and Rawul Pindi; that we should not be likely to use them for
an army moving into Afghanistan; that, although small parties of the
enemy might come by them, the main body of a force operating towards
India is bound to advance by the Khyber, for the reason that it would
debouch directly on highly cultivated country and good roads leading
to all the great cities of the Punjab; and finally that, even if our
finances would admit of the construction of such a long line of forts,
it would be impossible for our limited army to supply the garrisons
for them.

Having completed my inspection of the frontier, I returned to Simla
and drew up a memorandum declaring the conviction I had arrived at
after careful deliberation, that the improvement of our communications
was of far greater importance than the immediate construction of
forts and entrenchments, and that, while I would not spare money in
strengthening well-defined positions, the strategical value of which
was unmistakable, I would not trouble about those places the primary
importance of fortifying which was open to argument, and which might
never be required to be defended; these, I contended, might be left
alone, except so far as to make a careful study of their localities
and determine how they could best be taken advantage of should
occasion require. My note ended with the following words: 'Meanwhile I
would push on our communications with all possible speed; we must have
roads, and we must have railways; they cannot be made on short notice,
and every rupee spent upon them now will repay us tenfold hereafter.
Nothing will tend to secure the safety of the frontier so much as the
power of rapidly concentrating troops on any threatened point, and
nothing will strengthen our military position more than to open out
the country and improve our relations with the frontier tribes. There
are no better civilizers than roads and railways; and although some
of those recommended to be made may never be required for military
purposes, they will be of the greatest assistance to the civil power
in the administration of the country.'

Accompanying this paper was a statement of the defensive works which,
in my opinion, should be taken in hand without delay; also of the
positions which required careful study, and the roads and railways
which should be constructed, to make the scheme of defence complete.

Seven years later, when I gave up my command of the Army in India, I
had the supreme satisfaction of knowing that I left our North-West
Frontier secure, so far as it was possible to make it so, hampered
as we were by want of money. The necessary fortifications had been
completed, schemes for the defence of the various less important
positions had been prepared, and the roads and railways, in my
estimation of such vast importance, had either been finished or were
well advanced.

Moreover, our position with regard to the border tribes had gradually
come to be better understood, and it had been realized that they would
be a powerful support to whichever side might be able to count upon
their aid; the policy of keeping them at arm's length had been
abandoned, and the advantages of reciprocal communication were
becoming more appreciated by them and by us.

It was not to be expected that these results could be achieved without
a considerable amount of opposition, owing partly to the majority of
our countrymen (even amongst those who had spent the greater part of
their lives in India) failing to recognize the change that had taken
place in the relative positions of Great Britain and Russia in Asia,
and to their disbelief in the steady advance of Russia towards
Afghanistan being in any way connected with India, or in Russia's wish
or power to threaten our Eastern Empire.[8] The idea was very common,
too, amongst people who had not deeply considered the subject, that
all proposals for gaining control over our troublesome neighbours
on the border, or for facilitating the massing of troops, meant an
aggressive policy, and were made with the idea of annexing more
territory, instead of for the purpose of securing the safety of India,
and enabling us to fulfil our engagements.

Happily, the Viceroys who governed India while I was
Commander-in-Chief were not amongst those who held these opinions;
and while they had no expectation of India being invaded in the near
future, they realized that we could not unconcernedly look on while a
great Power was, step by step, creeping closer to our possessions. It
was a fortunate circumstance, too, that, for the first five years I
was at the head of the Army in India, I had as my military
colleague in Council the late General Sir George Chesney, a man of
unquestionable talent and sound judgment, to whose cordial support,
not only in frontier affairs, but in all my efforts to promote the
efficiency and welfare of the soldier, I was very greatly indebted.


[Footnote 1: Now General Sir Harry Prendergast, V.C., K.C.B.]

[Footnote 2: The ultimatum informed King Thebaw that the British
Government insisted upon an Envoy being received at Mandalay, with
free access to the King, without having to submit to any humiliating
ceremony; that proceedings against the trading company would not be
permitted; that a British Agent, with a suitable guard of honour and
steamer for his personal protection, must be permanently stationed at
the Burmese capital; that the Burmese Government must regulate their
external relations in accordance with British advice; and that proper
facilities must be granted for the opening up of British trade with
China viâ Bhamo.]

[Footnote 3: The force consisted of 364 seamen and 69 Marines formed
into a Naval Brigade, with 49 guns, including 27 machine guns, and
3,029 British and 6,005 Native soldiers, with 28 guns.]

[Footnote 4: Panipat is famous for three great battles fought in its
immediate neighbourhood: one in 1526, by the Emperor Baber against
Sultan Ibrahim, which resulted in the establishment of the Mogul
dynasty; the second in 1556, when the Emperor Akbar beat the Hindu
General of the Afghan usurper, and re-established the Moguls in power;
and the third in 1761, when Ahmed Shah Durani defeated the Mahrattas.]

[Footnote 5: I was much gratified at receiving subsequently from His
Imperial Majesty the Emperor William I. and from the Crown Princess of
Prussia autograph letters of acknowledgment of, and thanks for, the
reception accorded and the attention paid to Majors von Huene and von
Hagenau, the two representatives of the German army who attended these
manoeuvres.]

[Footnote 6: Words used by Mr. Gladstone when asking for a vote of
credit for £6,500,000 for special preparations in connection with the
Afghan difficulty.]

[Footnote 7: The late Major-General Sir James Browne, K.C.S.I., C.B.,
who, like Sir Robert Sandeman, died while holding the important and
responsible position of Governor-General's Agent in Baluchistan.]

[Footnote 8: A Statesman of high reputation in England was so strong
in his disbelief of the necessity for making any preparations in
India, that he publicly stated that if the only barrier between Russia
in Asia and Britain in Asia were a mountain ridge, or a stream, or a
fence, there would be no difficulty in preserving peace between Russia
and the United Kingdom.--Speech delivered by the Right Hon. John
Bright, M.P., at Birmingham on the 16th April, 1879.]

       *       *       *       *       *




CHAPTER LXVI.
1886

  Nursing for the soldier--Pacification of Burma considered
  --Measures recommended--The Buddhist priesthood
  --The Regimental Institute--The Army Temperance Association


Many interesting and important questions had to be dealt with during
this my first year as a member of the Viceroy's Council, and it was
pleasant to me to be able to bring before the Government of India a
scheme which my wife had had very much at heart for many years--for
supplying skilled nursing to the military hospitals in India. That
our sick soldiers (officers and men) should be entirely dependent for
nursing, even in times of the most dangerous illness, on the tender
mercies of 'the orderly on duty,' who, whether kind-hearted or the
reverse, was necessarily utterly untrained and ignorant of the
requirements of sickness, was a source of unhappiness to her, and had
been felt as a cruel want by many; but whenever she had discussed
the subject with those who might have helped her, she was told that
proposals for supplying this want had already been made, that the
Government could not, nor would they ever be able to, act on such
proposals, on account of the prohibitory expense, so she felt there
was no use in making any appeal until I might be in a position to
see that any suggestions made by her would be certain to receive the
careful consideration of Government. This time had now arrived, and
almost directly Lady Roberts returned to India in 1886 she drew up a
scheme for supplying lady nurses to the military hospitals throughout
India, and set to work to try and get the support of some of the
principal Medical officers. To her great joy, her recommendations
were accepted by Lord Dufferin and his Council, and her note upon the
subject was sent home to the Secretary of State, strongly backed up
by the Government of India. Lord Cross happily viewed the matter in
a favourable light, and consented, not only to a certain number of
nurses being sent out the following year as an experiment, but to the
whole of the cost of the movement being borne by the State, with the
exception of the provision of 'Homes in the Hills' for the nursing
sisters as health resorts, and to prevent the expense to Government
of their having to be sent home on sick-leave when worn out by their
trying work in the plains. The Secretary of State, however, declared
these Homes to be 'an important part' of the nursing scheme, 'and
indispensable to its practical working,' but considered that they
should be provided by private subscription, a condition my wife
undertook to carry out. She appealed to the Army in India to help her,
and with scarcely an exception every regiment and battery generously
responded--even the private soldiers subscribed largely in proportion
to their small means--so that by the beginning of the following year
my wife was able to set about purchasing and building suitable houses.

[Illustration: LADY ROBERTS OF KANDAHAR.
_From a photograph by Messrs. Johnson and Hoffmann._]

'Homes' were established at Murree, Kasauli and Quetta, in Bengal,
and at Wellington[1] in Madras, and by making a further appeal to the
officers of the army, and with the assistance of kind and liberal
friends in England and India, and the proceeds of various
entertainments, Lady Roberts was able to supply, in connexion with
the 'Homes' at Murree and Kasauli, wards for the reception of sick
officers, with a staff of nurses[2] in attendance, whose salaries,
passages, etc., are all paid out of 'Lady Roberts's Fund.' My wife was
induced to do this from having known many young officers succumb owing
to want of care and improper food at hotels or clubs on being sent to
the Hills after a hard fight for life in the plains, if they were not
fortunate enough to have personal friends to look after them. Although
it is anticipating events, I may as well say here that the nursing
experiment proved a complete success, and now every large military
hospital in India has its staff of nurses, and there are altogether 4
superintendents, 9 deputy superintendents, and 39 nursing sisters, in
India. There are many more wanted in the smaller stations, where there
is often great loss of life from lack of proper nursing, and surely,
as my wife pointed out in her first appeal, 'when one considers what
an expensive article the British soldier is, costing, as he does, £100
before landing in India, it seems certain that on the score of economy
alone, altogether setting aside the humane aspect of the question,
it is well worth the State's while to provide him with the skilled
nursing care' which has up to now saved so many lives.

That officers as well as men might benefit by the devotion of the
'nursing sister,' I was able to arrange in all the large hospitals
for some room, or rooms, used until then for other purposes, to be
appropriated for an officers' ward or wards, and these have proved
a great boon to the younger officers whose income does not admit of
their obtaining the expensive care of a nurse from one of the large
civil hospitals in the Presidency towns.

The next most interesting question, and also the most pressing, which
had to be considered by the Viceroy's Council during the summer of
1886, was the pacification of Upper Burma. People in England had
expressed surprise at this being so long delayed. It is extremely
easy, however, to sit at home and talk of what should be done, but
very difficult to say how to do it, and more difficult still to carry
it out. To establish law and order in a country nearly as large as
France, in which dacoity is looked upon as an honourable profession,
would be no light task even in Europe: but when the country to be
settled has a deadly climate for several months in the year, is
covered to a great extent with jungle, and is without a vestige of
a road, the task assumes gigantic proportions. In Upper Burma the
garrison was only sufficient to keep open communication along the line
of the Irrawaddy, and, to add to the embarrassment of the situation,
disaffection had spread to Lower Burma, and disturbances had broken
out in the almost unknown district between Upper Burma and Assam.

It was arranged to send strong reinforcements to Burma so soon as the
unhealthy season should be over and it would be safe for the troops
to go there, and Lieutenant-General Sir Herbert Macpherson (who had
succeeded me as Commander-in-Chief in Madras) was directed to proceed
thither.

In October my wife and I, with some of my staff, started from Simla on
a trip across the Hills, with the object of inspecting the stations of
Dhurmsala and Dalhousie before it was cool enough to begin my winter
tour in the plains. We crossed the Jalaurie Pass, between 11,000 and
12,000 feet high, and travelling through the beautiful Kulu valley and
over the Bubbu mountain, we finally arrived at Palampur, the centre
of the tea industry in the Kangra valley. Having been cut off from
telegraphic communication for some time, we went straight to the
telegraph-office for news, and found at the moment a message being
deciphered which brought me the terribly sad information that General
Macpherson had died of fever in Burma. In him the country had lost a
good soldier, and I a friend and comrade for whom I had a great
regard and admiration. We were discussing his untimely end, and I was
considering who should replace him, when a second message arrived.
This was from Lord Dufferin, telling me that he wished me to transfer
my Head-Quarters to Burma, and arrange to remain there until 'the neck
of the business was broken.'

I hurried to Calcutta, embarked in the first mail-steamer, and landed
at Rangoon on the 9th November.

Sir Charles Bernard (the Chief Commissioner) and General White had
done well under very difficult circumstances; but owing partly to
large districts being impassable from months of heavy rain, and partly
to the change in Commanders, unavoidable inaction had been forced upon
our troops, and the dacoits had in consequence made head against us.

Having been in constant correspondence with General White, I had been
kept informed of his plans, and, as his responsible Chief, I had
approved of them; I therefore had the somewhat complicated military
situation at my fingers' ends, and did not need to lose a single day
in arranging for a series of combined movements being carried on all
over the country.

It was hoped that the recently arrived reinforcements would be
sufficient for all requirements, but it soon became apparent that
the difficulties connected with the pacification of Burma had been
under-rated, and that, in addition to more troops, an efficient
civil administration would have to be provided, to take the place of
military authority so soon as anything like organized resistance had
been crushed; for to deal with ordinary robbers I conceived to be
work more suited to police than to soldiers. Upwards of thirty years'
experience had proved that the Burmese could not be relied upon for
this kind of service; I therefore recommended that a large body
of police should be raised in India without delay, and given a
semi-military organization, and in the meantime I asked for, and was
given, five additional regiments.

I felt very confident of success, for I had taken great care in the
selection of the brigade commanders and staff officers, and I knew
the troops could be depended upon in any emergency that was likely to
arise. Nevertheless, as the work they would have to perform was of
rather an unusual character, irksome as well as difficult, I thought
it advisable to issue some general instructions for the guidance
of the officers in command of the different columns.[3] These
instructions were carried out so intelligently, and the troops did
such good service, especially a very fine body of Mounted Infantry
raised and organized by Major Symons, of the South Wales Borderers,
that before I returned to India in February, 1887, I was able to
report that the country was gradually becoming quiet and the Burmese
reconciled to our rule. Most of the principal dacoit leaders had been
killed or captured, and villages which had been in their hands for
months were being reoccupied by their legitimate inhabitants; caravans
were coming into Mandalay almost daily from districts on the Chinese
borders; contracts for making roads were readily taken up, and there
was no difficulty in obtaining labour for the railway then being
constructed between Lower Burma and Mandalay, the first sod of which
was turned within a month of my arrival at that place.

In achieving these satisfactory results I was materially aided by the
hearty co-operation of Sir Charles Bernard and the civil officers
serving under him; while the entire absence of fanaticism amongst
the Burmese, and their cheerful, happy natures, facilitated our
intercourse with them. I received, besides, most valuable assistance
from the Buddhist _Poonghies_, or monks, with many of whom I made
friends. From the fact that education, secular and religious, is
imparted by these monks, and that every male, from the King to the
humblest peasant, was obliged to enter a monastery and wear the
saffron garb of a monk for a certain period, the priesthood had
enormous influence with the Burmese. There are no hereditary Chiefs or
Nobles in Burma, the _Poonghies_ being the advisers of the people and
the centre round which Native society revolves.

Our occupation of Upper Burma was necessarily a great blow to the
Buddhist priesthood, for many of the monasteries[4] were kept up
entirely by the King, Queen, and Ministers of State; and, as it was
most advisable to have the influence of the monks in our favour, I
recommended that a monthly stipend should be paid to the Archbishop
and two senior Bishops of Mandalay. They showed their gratitude by
doing all they could to help me, and when I was leaving the country
the old _Thathanabain_ (Archbishop) accompanied me as far as Rangoon.
We corresponded till his death, and I still hear occasionally from one
or other of my _Poonghie_ friends.

I remained only a short time in Calcutta on my return to India, and
then started off again for the North-West Frontier, in company with
General Chesney, who had previously expressed his general concurrence
in my defence proposals, but was anxious to see the several positions
and judge for himself, from an Engineer's point of view, of their
suitability to be treated as I suggested. It was a great source of
contentment to me to find that the sites chosen and the style of
entrenchments I had advocated commended themselves to my expert
companion.

Simla was more than usually gay during the summer of 1887, in
consequence of the numerous entertainments given in celebration of Her
Majesty's Jubilee. We had just added a ballroom to 'Snowdon,' and we
inaugurated its opening by a fancy ball on the 21st June, in honour of
the auspicious anniversary.

My name appeared in the Jubilee _Gazette_ as having been given the
Grand Cross of the Indian Empire, but what I valued still more was the
acceptance by the Government of India of my strong recommendation for
the establishment of a Club or Institute in every British regiment and
battery in India. In urging that this measure should be favourably
considered, I had said that the British Army in India could have no
better or more generally beneficial memorial of the Queen's Jubilee
than the abolition of that relic of barbarism, the canteen, and its
supersession by an Institute, in which the soldier would have under
the same roof a reading-room, recreation room, and a decently-managed
refreshment-room.

Lord Dufferin's Government met my views in the most liberal spirit,
and with the sanction of Lord Cross 'The Regimental Institute' became
a recognized establishment, a fact which my colleagues in Council
referred to as a second Jubilee honour for me!

At a time when nearly every soldier could read and write, and when
we hoped to attract to the army men of a better stamp and more
respectable antecedents than those of which it was composed in 'the
good old days,' it appeared to me a humiliating anachronism that the
degrading system of the canteen should still prevail, and that it was
impossible for any man to retain his self-respect if he were driven to
take his glass of beer under the rules by which regimental canteens
were governed. I believed, too, that the more the status of the rank
and file could be raised, and the greater the efforts made to provide
them with rational recreation and occupation in their leisure hours,
the less there would be of drunkenness, and consequently of crime, the
less immorality and the greater the number of efficient soldiers in
the army. Funds having been granted, a scheme was drawn up for the
erection of buildings and for the management of the Institutes.
Canteens were reduced in size, and such attractions as musical
instruments were removed to the recreation-rooms; the name 'liquor
bar' was substituted for that of 'canteen,' and, that there should be
no excuse for frequenting the 'liquor bar,' I authorized a moderate
and limited amount of beer to be served, if required, with the men's
suppers in the refreshment-room--an arrangement which has been
followed by the happiest results.

At first it was thought that these changes would cause a great falling
off in regimental funds, but experience has proved the reverse. With
good management, the profits from the coffee-shop and the soda-water
manufactory far exceed those to be derived from the canteen, and this
without permitting anyone outside the regiment to purchase from the
coffee-shop and without interfering at all with local tradesmen.

Another measure which I succeeded in carrying through the same year
was the amalgamation of the various sectarian societies that existed
in India for the prevention of drunkenness in the army into one
undenominational society, under the name of the Army Temperance
Association, which I hoped would admit of more united action and a
more advantageous use of funds, besides making it easier for the
Government to assist the movement. The different religious and 'total
abstinence' associations had no doubt done much towards the object
they had in view, but their work was necessarily spasmodic, and being
carried on independently of regimental authority, it was not always
looked upon with favour by officers.

There was of necessity at first a good deal of opposition on the part
of the promoters of the older societies, but those who were loudest in
denouncing my proposals soon came to understand that there was nothing
in the constitution of the Army Temperance Association which could in
any way interfere with total abstinence, and that the only difference
between their systems and mine consisted in mine being regimental in
its character, and including men for whom it was not necessary or
expedient to forego stimulants altogether, but who earnestly desired
to lead temperate lives, and to be strengthened in their resolve by
being allowed to share in the advantages of the new Institution.

To make the movement a complete success, it was above all things
important to secure the active co-operation of the ministers of the
various religions. To this end I addressed the heads of the different
churches, explaining my reasons and the results I hoped to attain
in establishing the amalgamated association, and I invited them to
testify their approval of the scheme by becoming patrons of it.
With two exceptions, the dignitaries to whom I appealed accepted
my invitation, and expressed sympathy with my aims and efforts,
an encouragement I had hardly dared to hope for, and a proof of
liberal-mindedness on the part of the prelates which was extremely
refreshing.

The Government of India were good enough to sanction the allotment of
a separate room in each soldiers' Institute for the exclusive use of
the Association, where alcohol in any shape was not admitted, and to
the grant of this room I attribute, in a great measure, the success of
the undertaking. The success was proved by the fact that, when I left
India, nearly one third of the 70,000 British soldiers in that country
were members or honorary members of the Army Temperance Association.


[Footnote 1: The homes at Quetta and Wellington were eventually taken
over by Government, and Lady Roberts' nurses, who worked in the
military hospitals at these stations, were replaced by Government
nurses when the increase to the Army Nursing Service admitted of this
being done.]

[Footnote 2: When the 'Homes in the Hills' are closed during the cold
months, these nurses attend sick officers in their own houses in the
plains, free of charge except travelling expenses.]

[Footnote 3: These instructions are given in the Appendix. (See
Appendix XI.)]

[Footnote 4: Monasteries in Burma are not merely dwelling-places for
the monks, but are the schools where all education is carried on.]

       *       *       *       *       *




CHAPTER LXVII.
1887-1888

  Defence and Mobilization Committees--The Transport Department
  --Utilization of Native States' armies
  --Marquis of Lansdowne becomes Viceroy--Rajputana and Kashmir
  --Musketry instruction--Artillery and Cavalry training


In December I made a prolonged tour along the North-West Frontier,
accompanied by my wife, who was greatly delighted at being able at
last to see many places and meet many people of whom she had often
heard me speak. Part of this trip was made in company with the Viceroy
and Lady Dufferin, who visited all the principal stations on the
frontier, including Quetta. I rode with Lord Dufferin through the
Khyber Pass, and to the top of the Kwaja Amran range, our visit to
this latter point resulting, as I earnestly hoped it would, in His
Excellency being convinced by personal inspection of the advantage to
be gained by making the Kohjak tunnel, and of the necessity for our
endeavouring to cultivate more friendly relations with the border
tribes. We ended this very enjoyable tour at Rawal Pindi in order to
be present at the winding-up of a Cavalry Camp of Exercise in the
neighbourhood. There were assembled together under the direction of
Major-General Luck one regiment of British and eight regiments of
Native Cavalry, with two batteries of Royal Horse Artillery, and it
was a pretty sight, their advance at full gallop, and the halt, as
of one man, of that long line of Cavalry within a few yards of the
Viceroy, for the Royal salute. The spectators were much impressed with
Lord Dufferin's nerve in being able to remain perfectly calm and still
on his horse in the face of such an onslaught, and it certainly did
seem rather close quarters; but General Luck knew his regiments, and
had confidence in his men, and we knew General Luck.

In the early part of 1888 I visited all the chief military stations in
the Bengal Presidency, and attended Camps of Exercise for all arms,
held at Rawal Pindi, Umballa, Meerut, and Lucknow, before going to
Calcutta for the usual discussion on the Budget; after which the
Government generally breaks up for the hot weather, and assembles in
Simla two or three weeks later.

During 1887 and 1888 much useful work was got through by the Defence
Committee, and by another Committee which was assembled for the
consideration of all questions bearing upon the mobilization of the
army. As Commander-in-Chief I presided over both, and was fortunate
in being able to secure as my secretaries two officers of exceptional
ability, Lieutenant-Colonel W. Nicholson, R.E., for defence, and
Lieutenant-Colonel E. Elles, R.A., for mobilisation. It was in a great
measure due to Colonel Nicholson's clear-sighted judgment on the many
knotty questions which came before us, and to his technical knowledge,
that the schemes for the defence of the frontier, and for the ports
of Bombay, Karachi, Calcutta, Rangoon and Madras, were carried out so
rapidly, thoroughly and economically as they were;[1] and with regard
to measures for rendering the army mobile, Colonel Elles proved
himself equally capable and practical. The Secretary to Government
in the Military Department, Major-General Edwin Collen, was a
particularly helpful member of the Committees[2] from his intimate
acquaintance with the various subjects which had to be discussed.

If my readers have had the patience to follow in detail the several
campaigns in which I took part, they will have grasped the fact that
our greatest difficulties on all occasions arose from the want of a
properly organized Transport Department, and they will understand
that I was able to make this very apparent when the necessity
for mobilizing rapidly only one Army Corps came to be seriously
considered. We were able to demonstrate conclusively the impossibility
of putting a force into the field, sufficiently strong to cope with a
European enemy, without a considerable increase to the existing number
of transport animals, and without some description of light cart
strong enough to stand the rough work of a campaign in a country
without roads; for it is no exaggeration to say that in the autumn of
1880, when I left Kandahar, it would have been possible to have picked
out the road thence to Quetta, and onward to Sibi, a distance of 250
miles, with no other guide than that of the line of dead animals and
broken-down carts left behind by the several columns and convoys that
had marched into Afghanistan by that route.

Soon after I took over the command of the Army in India, while
voyaging to Burma, I had brought this most pressing question of
transport to the notice of Lord Dufferin, who, with his usual quick
appreciation of a situation, at once fully recognized its urgency, and
promised to give me all possible help in my endeavour to render the
army mobile--a promise which he amply fulfilled by taking a keen
personal interest in the proceedings of the Committee, and giving his
hearty support to our various recommendations.[3]

Our labours resulted in several thousand good pack animals (chiefly
mules) being purchased, and information collected and recorded as
to the districts where others could be rapidly procured in case of
emergency. A transport service was established, for which officers had
to go through a regular course of instruction, and pass an examination
in the loading and general management of the animals. A prize was
offered for a strong, useful light cart; and when the most suitable
had been selected, large numbers were made up of the same pattern.[4]
The constitution of two Army Corps, to be in readiness for taking the
field on short notice, was decided upon, and the units to form the
several divisions and brigades were told off and provided with the
necessary equipment. A railway time-table was prepared, giving the
hours at which the troops should leave their stations so as to avoid
any block _en route_. Special platforms were constructed for training
and detraining Cavalry and Artillery, and storehouses were erected and
stocked at those stations where road marching would probably commence.
Finally the conclusions we had arrived at were embodied in a manual
entitled 'General Regulations for Mobilization.' It was extremely
gratifying to me to learn from India that this manual, with such
additions and alterations as our subsequent experience in Burma and
various frontier expeditions proved would be advantageous, was
the guide by which the Chitral relieving force was last year so
expeditiously and completely equipped and despatched.

Of the many subjects discussed and measures adopted during this the
last year of Lord Dufferin's Viceroyalty, I think the scheme for
utilizing the armies of Native States, as an auxiliary force for the
service of the Empire, was the most important both from a political
and military point of view.

The idea was, in the first instance, propounded by Lord Lytton, who
appointed a committee to consider the pros and cons of the question.
I was a member of that committee, but at that time I, in common with
many others, was doubtful as to the wisdom of encouraging a high state
of efficiency amongst the troops of independent States; the excellent
work, however, done by the Native Contingent I had with me in Kuram,
and the genuine desire of all ranks to be allowed to serve side by
side with our own soldiers, together with the unmistakable spirit of
loyalty displayed by Native Rulers when war with Russia was imminent
in 1885, convinced me that the time had arrived for us to prove to
the people of India that we had faith in their loyalty, and in their
recognition of the fact that their concern in the defence of the
Empire was at least as great as ours, and that we looked to them to
take their part in strengthening our rule and in keeping out all
intruders. I believed, too, that we had now little to fear from
internal trouble so long as our Government continued just and
sympathetic, but that, on the other hand, we could not expect to
remain free from outside interference, and that it would be wise to
prepare ourselves for a struggle which, as my readers must be aware, I
consider to be inevitable in the end. We have done much, and may
still do more, to delay it, but when that struggle comes it will be
incumbent upon us, both for political and military reasons, to make
use of all the troops and war material that the Native States can
place at our disposal, and it is therefore to our advantage to render
both as efficient and useful as possible.

The subject was, of course, most delicate and complex, and had to
be treated with the greatest caution, for not only was the measure
adapted to materially strengthen our military position in India, but
I was convinced it was politically sound, and likely to be generally
acceptable to the Native Rulers, provided we studied their wishes, and
were careful not to offend their prejudices and susceptibilities by
unnecessary interference.

It was very satisfactory to find how cordially the Chiefs responded
to Lord Dufferin's proposals, and extremely interesting to watch the
steady improvement in their armies under the guidance of carefully
selected British officers. Substantial results have been already
obtained, valuable help having been afforded to the Chitral expedition
by the transport trains organized by the Maharajas of Gwalior and
Jaipur, and by the gallantry of the Imperial Service Troops belonging
to His Highness the Maharaja of Kashmir at Hunza-Naga and during the
siege and relief of Chitral.

Two minor expeditions took place this year: one against the Thibetans
in retaliation for their having invaded the territory of our ally, the
Raja of Sikim; the other to punish the Black Mountain tribes for the
murder of two British officers. Both were a success from a military
point of view, but in the Black Mountain the determination of the
Punjab Government to limit the sphere of action of the troops, and
to hurry out of the country, prevented our reaping any political
advantage. We lost a grand opportunity for gaining control over this
lawless and troublesome district; no survey was made, no roads opened
out, the tribesmen were not made to feel our power, and, consequently,
very soon another costly expedition had to be undertaken.

In November, 1888, Lord Dufferin left India amidst a storm of regret
from all classes of Her Majesty's subjects. He was succeeded by Lord
Lansdowne, one of whose earliest communications to me rejoiced my
heart, for in it His Excellency inquired whether anything could be
done towards improving our relations with the frontier tribes. This
augured well for the abandonment of the traditional, selfish, and,
to my mind, short-sighted policy of keeping aloof, and I hoped that
endeavours would at last be made to turn the tribesmen into friendly
neighbours, to their advantage and ours, instead of being obliged
to have recourse to useless blockades or constant and expensive
expeditions for their punishment, or else to induce them to refrain
from troubling us by the payment of a heavy blackmail.

[Illustration: THE MARQUESS OF LANSDOWNE, K.G., G.C.M.G., G.M.S.I.,
G.M.I.E.. VICEROY OF INDIA.
_From a photograph by Cowell, Simla_.]

After a visit to the frontier in the autumn to see how the defences
were advancing, I attended a Cavalry Camp of Exercise at Delhi, and
an Artillery Practice Camp at Gurgaon, and then went to Meerut to
be present at the first meeting of the Bengal Presidency Rifle
Association, which was most interesting and successful. We spent
Christmas in camp--the first Christmas we had all been together for
ten years. Our boy, having left Eton, came out in the early part
of the year with a tutor, to be with us for eighteen months before
entering Sandhurst.

At the end of December I proceeded to Calcutta rather earlier than
usual, to pay my respects to the new Viceroy, and in January of the
following year, accompanied by my wife and daughter, I started off
on a long tour to inspect the local regiments in Central India and
Rajputana, and to ascertain what progress had been made in organizing
the Imperial Service Troops in that part of India.

Did space permit, I should like to tell my readers of the beauties of
Udaipur and the magnificent hospitality accorded to us there, as well
as at Bhopal, Jodhpur, Jaipur, and Ulwar, but, if I once began,
it would be difficult to stop, and I feel I have already made an
unconscionably heavy demand on the interest of the public in things
Indian, and must soon cease my 'labour of love.' I must therefore
confine myself to those subjects which I am desirous should be better
understood in England than they generally are.

Upon seeing the troops of the Begum of Bhopal and the Maharana of
Udaipur, I recommended that Their Highnesses should be invited to
allow their share of Imperial defence to take the form of paying for
the services of an increased number of officers with their respective
local corps,[5] for I did not think it would be possible to make any
useful addition to our strength out of the material of which their
small armies were composed. The men were relics of a past age, fit
only for police purposes, and it would have been a waste of time and
money to give them any special training. My recommendation, however,
was not accepted, and neither of these States takes any part in the
defence scheme.

At Jodhpur, on the contrary, there was splendid material, and a
most useful force was being organized by the Maharaja's brother,
Lieutenant-Colonel Sir Pertap Sing, himself a Rajput, and of the
bluest blood of India. The Cavalry were specially fine. The gallant
Rajput horsemen of Jodhpur had always been famous for their chivalrous
bravery, unswerving fidelity, and fearless self-devotion in their wars
with the Mahrattas and the armies of the Mogul Emperors, and I felt,
as the superbly mounted squadrons passed before me, that they had lost
none of their characteristics, and that blood and breeding must tell,
and would, if put to the test, achieve the same results now as of
old. There could be but one opinion as to the value of the 'Sirdar
Rissala,'[6] so named after the Maharaja's son and heir, Sirdar
Sing, a lad of only nine years old, who led the little army past the
saluting flag mounted on a beautiful thorough-bred Arab.

The Jaipur troops were much on a par with those of Bhopal and Udaipur.
I was glad, therefore, that in lieu of troops, the Maharaja had agreed
to organize, as his contribution to the Imperial service, a transport
corps of 1,000 fully-equipped animals.

At Ulwar I found the 600 Cavalry and 1,000 Infantry (all Rajputs) well
advanced in their drill and training; this was evidently owing to the
personal interest taken in them by the Maharaja, who seldom allowed a
day to pass without visiting the parade grounds.

By the end of March I had finished my tour in Central India and
Rajputana, and as the heat was every day becoming more intense, I was
not sorry to turn my steps northwards towards Kashmir, the army of
which State still remained to be inspected, and the measures most
suitable for its re-organization determined upon.

Our whole family party re-assembled at Murree early in April, and we
all went into the 'Happy Valley' together, where between business and
pleasure we spent a most delightful six weeks. The Maharaja personally
superintended the arrangements for our comfort. Our travelling was
made easy--indeed luxurious--and everything that the greatest care and
forethought and the most lavish hospitality could accomplish to make
our visit happy was done by the Maharaja and by the popular Resident,
Colonel Nisbet.

The Kashmir army was much larger than any of those belonging to the
Native States I had lately visited; it consisted of 18,000 men and 66
guns--more than was needed, even with the Gilgit frontier to guard.
Some of the regiments were composed of excellent material, chiefly
Dogras; but as the cost of such a force was a heavy drain upon the
State, and as many of the men were old and decrepit, I recommended
that the Maharaja should be invited to get rid of all who were
physically unfit, and to reduce his army to a total of 10,000
thoroughly reliable men and 30 guns. I knew this would be a very
difficult, and perhaps distasteful, task for the Commander-in-Chief
(who was also the Maharaja's brother), Raja Ram Sing, to perform, so
I recommended that a British officer should be appointed military
adviser to the Kashmir Government, under whose supervision the work of
reformation should be carried out.

At that time we had none of our own troops in the neighbourhood of
Gilgit, and as I thought it advisable, in case of disturbance, that
the Kashmir troops should be speedily put into such a state of
efficiency as would enable us to depend upon them to hold the passes
until help could arrive from India, I urged that the military adviser
should be given three British officers to assist him in carrying out
his difficult and troublesome duty; and at the same time I pointed
out that it was absolutely essential to construct at an early date a
serviceable road between Kashmir and Gilgit, as the sole approach to
that strategic position was not only difficult, but very dangerous.

All these proposals commended themselves to, and were acted upon by,
the Viceroy.

Lieutenant-Colonel Neville Chamberlain--a _persona grata_ to the
Kashmir authorities--was appointed Military Secretary to the Kashmir
State, and by his ability, tact, and happy way of dealing with
Natives, quickly overcame all obstacles. The Maharaja and his two
brothers, Rajas Ram Sing and Amar Sing, entered heartily into the
scheme; the army was remodelled and rendered fit for service; and an
excellent road was made to Gilgit.

During the summer of 1889 I was able to introduce several much needed
reforms in the annual course of musketry for the Native Army.
The necessity for these reforms had not been overlooked by my
distinguished predecessors, nor by the able officers who served under
them in the Musketry Department, but it had not been possible to do
much with a system which dated from a period when fire discipline was
not thought of, and when the whole object of the course was to make
soldiers individually good shots. After the Delhi Camp of Exercise
in 1885-86, when the want of fire control was almost the only point
unfavourably criticized by the foreign officers, the Army in India
made a great advance in this important branch of musketry training;
nevertheless, I felt that further progress was possible, and that the
course of instruction was not altogether as practical as it might be.
I therefore gave over the work of improvement in this respect to
an enthusiast in the matter of rifle-shooting and an officer of
exceptional energy and intelligence, Lieutenant-Colonel Ian Hamilton,
and directed him, as Assistant Adjutant-General of Musketry, to
arrange a course of instruction, in which the conditions should
resemble as nearly as possible those of field service, and in which
fire discipline should be developed to the utmost extent. He was most
successful in carrying out my wishes, and the results from the first
year's trial of the new system were infinitely better than even I had
anticipated.

Simultaneously with the improvement in musketry, a great advance was
made in gunnery. Artillery, like Infantry officers, had failed to
realize the value of the new weapon, and it required the teaching of
a man who himself thoroughly believed in and understood the
breech-loading gun to arouse Artillerymen to a sense of the tremendous
power placed in their hands, and to the importance of devoting much
more care and attention to practice than had hitherto been thought
necessary. Such a man was Major-General Nairne, and I was happily
able to induce the Government to revive in him the appointment of
Inspector-General of Artillery.

Under the unwearying supervision of this officer, there was quite as
remarkable an improvement in Artillery shooting as Colonel Hamilton
had effected in musketry. Practice camps were annually formed at
convenient localities, and all ranks began to take as much pride in
belonging to the 'best shooting battery' as they had hitherto taken
in belonging to the 'smartest,' the 'best-horsed,' or the
'best-turned-out' battery. I impressed upon officers and men that the
two things were quite compatible; that, according to my experience,
the smartest and best turned-out men made the best soldiers; and while
I urged every detail being most carefully attended to which could
enable them to become proficient gunners and take their proper place
on a field of battle, I expressed my earnest hope that the Royal
Artillery would always maintain its hitherto high reputation for
turn-out and smartness. The improvement in the Cavalry was equally
apparent. For this arm of the service also the Government consented to
an Inspector-General being appointed, and I was fortunate enough to
be able to secure for the post the services of Major-General Luck, an
officer as eminently fitted for this position as was General Nairne
for his.

Just at first the British officers belonging to Native Cavalry were
apprehensive that their sowars would be turned into dragoons, but
they soon found that there was no intention of changing any of their
traditional characteristics, and that the only object of giving them
an Inspector-General was to make them even better in their own way
than they had been before, the finest Irregular Cavalry in the world,
as I have not the slightest doubt they will always prove themselves to
be. Towards the end of the Simla season of 1889, Lord Lansdowne, to my
great satisfaction, announced his intention of visiting the frontier,
and asked me to accompany him.

We rode through the Khyber and Gomal Passes, visited Peshawar, Kohat,
Bannu, Dera Ismail Khan, and Quetta, looked into the Kohjak tunnel,
and attended some interesting manoeuvres, carried out with a view of
testing, in as practical a manner as possible, the defensive power
of the recently-finished Takatu-Mashalik entrenchment. The principal
works were fired upon by Artillery and Infantry, and, notwithstanding
the excellent practice made, infinitesimal damage was done, which
proved the suitability of the particular design adopted for the
defences.

Lord Lansdowne expressed himself greatly interested, and much
impressed by all he saw of the frontier; and he was confirmed in his
opinion as to the desirability of establishing British influence
amongst the border tribes. With this object in view, His Excellency
authorized Sir Robert Sandeman (the Governor-General's Agent at
Quetta) to establish a series of police posts in the Gomal Pass, and
encourage intercourse between the people of the Zhob district and
ourselves.

It was high time that something should be done in this direction,
for the Amir's attitude towards us was becoming day by day more
unaccountably antagonistic. He was gradually encroaching on territory
and occupying places altogether outside the limits of Afghan control;
and every movement of ours--made quite as much in His Highness's
interest as in our own--for strengthening the frontier and improving
the communications, evidently aroused in him distrust and suspicion as
to our motives.


[Footnote 1: The total coat of the coast and frontier defences
amounted to the very moderate sum of five crores of rupees, or about
three and a half millions sterling.]

[Footnote 2: The Committees consisted, besides the Military Member of
Council and myself, of the heads of Departments with the Government of
India and at Army Head-Quarters.]

[Footnote 3: When the report of the Mobilization Committee was
submitted to the Viceroy, he recorded a minute expressing his
'warm admiration of the manner in which the arduous duty had been
conducted,' and 'his belief that no scheme of a similar description
had ever been worked out with greater thoroughness, in more detail,
and with clearer apprehension of the ends to be accomplished.' He
concluded by conveying to the members an expression of his great
satisfaction at what had been done, and recording that 'the result
of the Committee's labours is a magnificent monument of industry and
professional ability.']

[Footnote 4: Statement of transport carriage maintained in India in
the years 1878 and 1893 for military purposes, exclusive of animals
registered by the civil authorities on the latter date, and liable to
be requisitioned in time of war:

  --------------------------------------------
  |          |                 |             |
  |Date      | September, 1878 | April, 1893 |
  |          |                 |             |
  |----------+-----------------+-------------|
  |Elephants.|      733        |      359    |
  |----------+-----------------+-------------|
  |Camels.   |    6,353        |    3,175    |
  |----------+-----------------+-------------|
  |Mules.    |    1,536        |   16,825    |
  |----------+-----------------+-------------|
  |Ponies.   |     ...         |      782    |
  |----------+-----------------+-------------|
  |Bullocks. |    1,424        |    7,211    |
  |----------+-----------------+-------------|
  |Donkeys.  |     ...         |       31    |
  |----------+-----------------+-------------|
  |Army      |                 |             |
  |Transport |     ...         |    5,316    |
  |Carts.    |                 |             |
  |----------+-----------------+-------------|
  |Field     |                 |             |
  |Ambulance |     ...         |      799    |
  |Carts.    |                 |             |
  |-------------------------------------------]

[Footnote 5: According to treaty, the Bhopal State pays nearly two
lakhs of rupees a year towards the cost of the local battalion
maintained by the British Government for the purpose of keeping order
within the State itself. The battalion, however, has only four,
instead of eight, British officers, and it appeared to me only
reasonable that the Begum should be invited to pay the additional
amount necessary to make the battalion as efficient as the rest of the
Native army, as a 'premium of insurance' for the peace and prosperity
which Her Highness's State enjoys under our protection, and as her
quota towards the general scheme for the defence of the Empire.]

[Footnote 6: Rissala is a body of Cavalry.]

       *       *       *       *       *




CHAPTER LXVIII.
1890-1893

  Extension of command--Efficiency of the Native Army
  --Concessions to the Native Army--Officering of the Native Army
  --The Hunza-Naga campaign--Visit to Nepal--A Nepalese entertainment
  --Proposed mission to the Amir--A last tour--Farewell entertainments
  --Last days in India


New Year's Day, 1890, found me in Calcutta, where I went to meet
Prince Albert Victor on his arrival in India. On my way thither I
received a letter from Mr. Edward Stanhope, Secretary of State for
War, telling me that he had heard from Lord Cross, the Secretary of
State for India, that there was a proposal to ask me to retain my
appointment of Commander-in-Chief in India for some time after the
expiration of the usual term of office; but that, while such an
arrangement would have his hearty approval, he thought the question
should be considered from another point of view, and that it would be
extremely agreeable to himself, and he felt to the Duke of Cambridge
also, if he could secure me for the post of Adjutant-General in
succession to Lord Wolseley. Mr. Stanhope went on to say he would
like to know whether I would be willing to accept the appointment, or
whatever position Lord Wolseley's successor would fill, should the
report of Lord Hartington's Commission cause a change to be made in
the staff at the Horse Guards.

I was pleased, though somewhat surprised, at this communication, and I
replied to the Right Honourable gentleman that I would gladly accept
the offer, and that I could arrange to join on the 1st October, when
the appointment would become vacant, but that, as Lord Lansdowne had
expressed a wish that I should remain in India over the next cold
season, I hoped, if it were possible, some arrangement might be made
to admit of my doing so. The idea of employment in England, now that I
allowed myself to dwell upon it, was very attractive, for dearly as
I loved my Indian command, and bitterly as I knew I should grieve at
leaving the country, the peoples, and the grand army, which were all
sources of such intense interest to me, I felt that the evil day at
longest could only be postponed for a few years, and that there is a
limit to the time that even the strongest European can with impunity
live in an eastern climate, while I was glad to think I should still
be in a position to work for my country and for the benefit of the
army.

From Calcutta I travelled north to Muridki, where a large force of
Horse Artillery and Cavalry was assembled for practice, and where we
had a standing camp, at which Prince Albert Victor did us the honour
of being our guest for the final manoeuvres. I think His Royal
Highness enjoyed the novelty of camp life, and was greatly attracted
by the picturesque and soldier-like appearance of the Native troops.
The Native officers were very proud at being presented to the grandson
of their Empress, and at His Royal Highness being appointed Honorary
Colonel of the 1st Punjab Cavalry.

Towards the end of April I returned to Simla for what I thought was to
be our last season in that place; and shortly after I got up there, a
telegram from Mr. Stanhope informed me that my appointment had been
accepted by the Cabinet, and that my presence in England was strongly
desired in the autumn. It was therefore with very great surprise that
I received a second telegram three weeks later from the Secretary
of State, telling me that, as it was then found to be impossible to
choose my successor, and as the exigencies of the public service
urgently required my presence in India, the Cabinet, with the approval
of Her Majesty and the concurrence of the Duke of Cambridge, had
decided to ask me to retain my command for two more years.

I felt it my duty to obey the wishes of the Queen, Her Majesty's
Government, and the Commander-in-Chief; but I fully realized that in
doing so I was forfeiting my chance of employment in England, and that
a long and irksome term of enforced idleness would in all probability
follow on my return home, and I did not attempt to conceal from Mr.
Stanhope that I was disappointed.

At the latter end of this year, and in the early part of 1891, it was
found necessary to undertake three small expeditions: one to Zhob,
under the leadership of Sir George White, for the protection of our
newly-acquired subjects in that valley; one on the Kohat border,
commanded by Sir William Lockhart, to punish the people of the
Miranzai valley for repeated acts of hostility; and the third, under
Major-General Elles,[1] against the Black Mountain tribes, who, quite
unsubdued by the fruitless expedition of 1888, had given trouble
almost immediately afterwards. All these were as completely successful
in their political results as in their military conduct. The columns
were not withdrawn until the tribesmen had become convinced that they
were powerless to sustain a hostile attitude towards us, and that it
was their interest, as it was our wish, that they should henceforth be
on amicable terms with us.

[Illustration: FIELD-MARSHAL LORD ROBERTS ON HIS ARAB CHARGER
'VONOLEL.'
_From an oil-painting by Charles Furse._]

While a considerable number of troops were thus employed, a fourth
expedition had to be hurriedly equipped and despatched in quite the
opposite direction to punish the Raja of Manipur, a petty State on
the confines of Assam, for the treacherous murder of Mr. Quinton, the
Chief Commissioner of Assam, and four other British officers.

Notwithstanding its inaccessibility, two columns, one from Burma, the
other from Cachar, quickly and simultaneously reached Manipur, our
countrymen were avenged, and the administration of the State was taken
over for a time by the Government of India.[2]

Towards the end of January the Cesarewitch came to Calcutta, where
I had the honour of being introduced to our august visitor, who
expressed himself as pleased with what he had seen of the country and
the arrangements made for His Imperial Highness's somewhat hurried
journey through India.

In April my military colleague in the Viceroy's Council for five
years, and my personal friend, General Sir George Chesney, left India,
to my great regret. We had worked together most harmoniously, and, as
he wrote in his farewell letter, there was scarcely a point in regard
to the Army in India about which he and I did not agree.

Sir George was succeeded by Lieutenant-General Brackenbury, who had
been Director of Military Intelligence at the War Office. I was
relieved to find that, although in some particulars my new coadjutor's
views differed from mine, we were in accord upon all essential points,
particularly as to the value of the Indian Army and the necessity for
its being maintained in a state of preparedness for war.

From the time I became Commander-in-Chief in Madras until I left India
the question of how to render the army in that country as perfect a
fighting machine as it was possible to make it, was the one which
caused me the most anxious thought, and to its solution my most
earnest efforts had been at all times directed.

The first step to be taken towards this end was, it seemed to me, to
substitute men of the more warlike and hardy races for the Hindustani
sepoys of Bengal, the Tamils and Telagus of Madras, and the so-called
Mahrattas of Bombay; but I found it difficult to get my views
accepted, because of the theory which prevailed that it was
necessary to maintain an equilibrium between the armies of the three
Presidencies, and because of the ignorance that was only too universal
with respect to the characteristics of the different races, which
encouraged the erroneous belief that one Native was as good as another
for purposes of war.

In former days, when the Native Army in India was so much stronger in
point of numbers than the British Army, and there existed no means
of rapid communication, it was only prudent to guard against a
predominance of soldiers of any one creed or nationality; but with
British troops nearly doubled and the Native Army reduced by more than
one-third, with all the forts and arsenals protected, and nearly the
whole of the Artillery manned by British soldiers, with railway and
telegraph communication from one end of India to the other, with the
risk of internal trouble greatly diminished, and the possibility of
external complications becoming daily more apparent, circumstances and
our requirements were completely altered, and it had become essential
to have in the ranks of our Native Army men who might confidently be
trusted to take their share of fighting against a European foe.

In the British Army the superiority of one regiment over another is
mainly a matter of training; the same courage and military instinct
are inherent in English, Scotch, and Irish alike, but no comparison
can be made between the martial value of a regiment recruited amongst
the Gurkhas of Nepal or the warlike races of northern India, and of
one recruited from the effeminate peoples of the south.

How little this was understood, even by those who had spent a great
part of their service in India, was a marvel to me; but, then, I
had had peculiar opportunities of judging of the relative fighting
qualities of Natives, and I was in despair at not being able to get
people to see the matter with my eyes, for I knew that nothing was
more sure to lead to disaster than to imagine that the whole Indian
Army, as it was then constituted, could be relied on in time of war.

General Chesney fortunately shared my opinions, and as Lords Dufferin
and Lansdowne trusted us, we were able to do a great deal towards
increasing the efficiency of the Native Army and improving the status
and prospects of the Native soldier. Several companies and regiments
composed of doubtful material were disbanded, and men of well-known
fighting castes entertained instead. Class regiments were formed,
as being more congenial to the men and more conducive to _esprit
de corps_; recruiting was made the business of carefully selected
officers who understood Native character, and whose duty it was to
become acquainted with the various tribes inhabiting the districts
from which the recruits for their own regiments were drawn; and
special arrangements were made with the Nepalese Government by which a
sufficient number of the best class of men could be obtained for our
thirteen Gurkha regiments.

The pay of Cavalry soldiers was improved, and it was pointed out to
the Government that an increase to the Infantry soldiers' pay
could not be long deferred;[3] the issue of good-conduct pay was
accelerated; _jagirs_[4] were sanctioned annually for a limited number
of specially distinguished Native officers; full pay was authorized
for recruits from date of enlistment instead of from the date of
joining their regiments; field _batta_[5] was sanctioned whenever
troops should be employed beyond sea or on service; pensions were
granted after a shorter period of service than heretofore; medals for
meritorious service and good conduct were given in commemoration of
Her Majesty's Jubilee; bronze war medals were sanctioned for all
authorized Government followers; a reserve, which it was arranged
should undergo an annual course of training, was formed for the
Artillery and Infantry; and a system of linked battalions was
organized, three battalions being grouped together, and the men being
interchangeable during war-time.

While the tendency of these alterations and concessions was to make
all ranks happy and contented, their training was carefully attended
to, and, as I have before mentioned, musketry particularly reached a
very high standard.

The one thing left undone, and which I should like to have been able
to accomplish before leaving India, was to induce the Government to
arrange for more British officers to be given to the Native regiments
in time of war. Nine to a Cavalry and eight to an Infantry corps may
be sufficient in time of peace, but that number is quite too small
to stand the strain of war. Indian soldiers, like soldiers of every
nationality, require to be led; and history and experience teach us
that eastern races (fortunately for us), however brave and accustomed
to war, do not possess the qualities that go to make leaders of men,
and that Native officers in this respect can never take the place
of British officers. I have known many Natives whose gallantry and
devotion could not be surpassed, but I have never known one who would
not have looked to the youngest British officer for support in time
of difficulty and danger. It is therefore most unwise to allow Native
regiments to enter upon a war with so much smaller a proportion of
British officers than is considered necessary for European regiments.
I have no doubt whatever of the fighting powers of our best Indian
troops; I have a thorough belief in, and admiration for, Gurkhas,
Sikhs, Dogras, Rajputs, Jats, and selected Mahomedans; I thoroughly
appreciate their soldierly qualities; brigaded with British troops, I
would be proud to lead them against any European enemy; but we cannot
expect them to do with less leading than our own soldiers require, and
it is, I maintain, trying them too highly to send them into action
with the present establishment of British officers.[6]

In the late autumn of 1891 our latest acquisition, the Zhob Valley,
was included in my frontier tour, which I had the pleasure of
making, for the greater part of the way, in the company of General
Brackenbury. He was prevented from getting as far as Quetta by an
accident which laid him up for some time, but not, as he told me,
before he had seen enough of the frontier to satisfy him that the
tribes were a factor in our system of defence which could not be
ignored, and that I had not exaggerated the importance of having them
on our side.

During this winter the brilliant little Hunza-Naga campaign took
place, which has been so graphically described in Mr. Knight's 'Where
Three Empires Meet.' It was brought about by Russia's intrigues with
the Rulers of the petty States on the northern boundary of Kashmir;
and our attention was first roused to the necessity for action by two
British officers, who were journeying to India by way of the Pamirs
and Gilgit, being forced by Russian soldiers to leave what the leader
of the party called 'newly-acquired Russian territory '[7]--territory
to which Russia had not the shadow of a claim.

In addition to this unjustifiable treatment of Captain Younghusband
and Lieutenant Davison, Colonel Yanoff crossed the Hindu Kush with his
Cossacks by the Korabhut Pass, and, after reconnoitring the country on
the borders of Kashmir, re-crossed the range by the Baroghil Pass.
As this was a distinct breach of the promises made by the Russian
Government, and an infringement of the boundary line as agreed to
between England and Russia in 1873, it was necessary to take steps to
prevent any recurrence of such interference, and a small force was
accordingly sent against the Chief of Hunza, who had openly declared
himself in favour of Russia. He made a desperate stand, but was
eventually driven from his almost inaccessible position by the
determined gallantry of our Indian troops, assisted by a Contingent
from Kashmir. Three Victoria Crosses were given for this business, and
many more were earned, but of necessity there must be a limit to the
disposal of decorations; and in an affair of this kind, in which all
proved themselves heroes, each individual must have felt himself
honoured by the small force being awarded such a large number of the
coveted reward, in proportion to its size.

We reaped the benefit of having taken this district under our own
control when Chitral required to be relieved, and the Hunza-Naga
people afforded Colonel Kelly such valuable help.

On the 1st January, 1892, I received an intimation that Her Majesty
had been graciously pleased to bestow a peerage upon me, and the same
day the Secretary of State for India offered me a further extension
of my appointment as Commander-in-Chief--an offer I would gladly have
accepted, as I knew it had been made with the concurrence of the
Viceroy, if I could have taken even a few months' leave to England.
But during a quarter of a century I had only been able to spend
eighteen months out of India, and I felt the need of change of climate
and a little rest after so many years of continued hard work. Under
the existing regulations a Commander-in-Chief could have no leave.
Lord Cross had tried to remedy this hard rule by bringing in the
'Officers' Leave Bill'; but as he informed Lord Lansdowne it was
impossible to get it through the House of Commons that session, I was
obliged very reluctantly to beg to be allowed to resign my command in
the spring of 1893.

Before returning to Simla for really the last time, my wife and I made
another trip to Burma as far as Mandalay, and after this was over
we paid a most interesting visit to Nepal, having received the very
unusual honour of an invitation to Khatmandu from Maharaja Bir
Shumsher Jung Rana Bahadur.

Khatmandu is about a hundred miles from our frontier station of
Segowli, by a very rough road over a succession of steep, high hills
and along deep, narrow valleys, which would have been quite impossible
for a lady to travel by but for the excellent arrangements made by
the Nepalese officials; the last descent was the worst of all; we
literally dropped from one rock to the next in some places. But on
reaching the base of the mountain all was changed. A beautifully
cultivated valley spread itself out before us; comfortable tents were
prepared for our reception, where we were met by some of the State
officials; and a perfectly appointed carriage-and-four was waiting
to carry us on to Khatmandu, where we were received by the Resident,
Lieutenant-Colonel Wylie, and his wife, old friends of ours. That
afternoon the Maharaja paid me a private visit.

The next morning the official call was made, which I returned soon
afterwards; and in the evening the Maharaja, accompanied by his eldest
son and eight of his brothers, all high officers of state, were
present at Mrs. Wylie's reception, wearing military frock-coats and
forage-caps. They all spoke English fluently; their manners were those
of well-bred gentlemen, easy and quiet, as free from awkwardness as
from forwardness; each, coming up in turn, talked very pleasantly
to Lady Roberts for a time, and then made way for someone else. The
Maharaja is extremely musical, and has several well-trained bands,
taught by an English bandmaster; three of them were in attendance, and
were directed to play selections from our favourite operas, and then a
number of the beautiful plaintive Nepalese airs. Altogether, we passed
a most agreeable evening.

The following day a review of all the troops (18,000 men and 78
guns)[8] was held on a ground one mile in length by half a mile in
breadth, perfectly level and well turfed. It would be considered a
fine parade-ground for the plains of India, and must have entailed a
considerable expenditure of time, labour, and money to make in such a
hilly place as Khatmandu.

On reaching the ground, I was received by the Maharaja and Deb
Shamsher Jung, the eldest of his many brothers, and the nominal
Commander-in-Chief of the army; we rode along the line together,
and the march past then began. Everything was done with the utmost
precision; there was no fuss or talking, and from first to last not a
single bugle sound was heard, showing how carefully officers and men
had been drilled. I was told that the executive Commander-in-Chief,
the third brother, by name Chandra Shamsher, had almost lived on the
parade-ground for weeks before my arrival. The Maharaja's sons
and brothers, who all knew their work, and were evidently fond of
soldiering, commanded the several divisions and brigades.

The troops were not, perhaps, turned out quite so smartly as those
in our service, and several of the officers were old and feeble; but
these were the only faults perceptible, and I came to the conclusion
that the great majority of the 18,000 men were quite as good as the
Gurkhas we enlist; and I could not help thinking that they would be a
valuable addition to our strength in the event of war.

General Chandra Shamsher is a very red-hot soldier. He said to my
wife: 'Lady Roberts, when are the Russians coming? I wish they would
make haste. We have 40,000 soldiers in Nepal ready for war, and there
is no one to fight!'

The next day a grand durbar was held, at which the King (the Maharaja
Dhiraj, as he is called) presided; he was an unusually handsome lad
of about eighteen years of age, fairer than most Nepalese, and very
refined looking. As on all previous occasions, everyone wore uniform
except the King, who had on a perfectly plain dress of spotless white.
Great deference is outwardly paid to the Dhiraj, but he has no power,
and is never consulted in matters of State, being considered too
sacred to be troubled with mundane affairs. Although a mere boy, he
had four wives, two of them daughters of the Maharaja Bir Shamsher
Jung.

After the durbar, I was shown over the principal school and hospital;
both appeared to be well conducted, and evidently no expense was
spared upon them. I was then taken to a magazine, in which were a
number of guns of various calibre and any amount of ammunition. I was
told there were several other magazines, which I had not time to see,
and a few miles from Khatmandu extensive workshops, where all kinds of
munitions of war were manufactured.

That evening, accompanied by Colonel and Mrs. Wylie, we attended a
reception at the Maharaja's palace. The durbar hall, which was filled
with men in uniform, was of beautiful proportions, and very handsomely
decorated and furnished. After the usual introductions and some
conversation with the chief officers, we were invited to visit the
Maharani in her own apartments, and having ascended a flight of steps
and passed through numerous corridors and luxuriously furnished rooms,
we were shown into a spacious apartment, the prevailing colour of
which was rose, lighted by lamps of the same colour. The Maharani
was sitting on a sofa at the further end of the room, gorgeously
apparelled in rose-coloured gauze dotted over with golden spangles;
her skirts were very voluminous, and she wore magnificent jewels on
her head and about her person. Two Maids of Honour stood behind her,
holding fans, and dressed in the same colour as their mistress, but
without jewels. On each side of her, forming a semicircle, were
grouped the ladies of the Court, all arrayed in artistically
contrasting colours; they were more or less pretty and refined
looking, and the Maharani herself was extremely handsome. My wife was
placed by her side on the sofa, and carried on a long conversation
with her through one of the ladies who spoke Hindustani and acted as
Interpreter. The Maharani presented Lady Roberts with a beautiful
little Chinese pug-dog, and the Maharaja gave me a gold-mounted
_kookri_ (Gurkha knife). After this little ceremony there was a grand
display of fireworks, and we took our leave.

Nothing could exceed the kindness we met with during our stay in
Nepal. The Maharaja endeavoured in every way to make our visit
enjoyable, and his brothers vied with each other in their efforts to
do us honour. It was impressed upon me that the Nepalese army was at
the disposal of the Queen-Empress, and hopes were repeatedly expressed
that we would make use of it in the event of war.

Notwithstanding the occasional differences which have occurred between
our Government and the Nepal Durbar, I believe that, ever since 1817,
when the Nepal war was brought to a successful conclusion by Sir David
Ochterlony, the Gurkhas have had a great respect and liking for us:
but they are in perpetual dread of our taking their country, and they
think the only way to prevent this is not to allow anyone to enter
it except by invitation, and to insist upon the few thus favoured
travelling by the difficult route that we traversed. Nepal can never
be required by us for defensive purposes, and as we get our best class
of Native soldiers thence, everything should, I think, be done to show
our confidence in the Nepalese alliance, and convince them that we
have no ulterior designs on the independence of their kingdom.

On leaving Nepal we made a short tour in the Punjab, and then went to
Simla for the season.

One of the subjects which chiefly occupied the attention of the
Government at this time was the unfriendly attitude of the Ruler of
Afghanistan towards us. Abdur Rahman Khan appeared to have entirely
forgotten that he owed everything to us, and that, but for our support
and lavish aid in money and munitions of war, he could neither have
gained nor held the throne of Kabul. We refused to Sher Ali much that
we could have gracefully granted and that would have made him a firm
friend, but in our dealings with Abdur Rahman we rushed into the other
extreme, and showered favours upon him; in fact, we made too much
of him, and allowed him to get out of hand. The result was that he
mistook the patience and forbearance with which we bore his fits
of temper for weakness, and was encouraged in an overweening and
altogether unjustifiable idea of his own importance; he considered
that he ought to be treated as the equal of the Shah of Persia, and
keenly resented not being allowed to communicate direct with Her
Majesty's Ministers.

In the hope of being able to establish more satisfactory relations
with the Amir, Lord Lansdowne invited him to come to India, and,
on His Highness pleading that his country was in too disturbed a
condition to admit of his leaving it, the Viceroy expressed his
willingness to meet him on the frontier, but Abdur Rahman evaded this
arrangement also under one pretext or another. It was at last proposed
to send me with a Mission as far as Jalalabad, a proposal I gladly
accepted, for I was sanguine enough to hope that, by personal
explanation, I should be able to remove the suspicions which the
Amir evidently entertained as to the motives for our action on the
frontier, and to convince him that our help in the time of his need
must depend upon our mutually agreeing in what manner that help should
be given, and on arrangements being completed beforehand to enable our
troops to be rapidly transported to the threatened points.

Abdur Rahman agreed to receive me in the autumn, and expressed
pleasure at the prospect of meeting me, but eventually he apparently
became alarmed at the size of the escort by which the Government
thought it necessary that I, as Commander-in-Chief, should be
accompanied; and, as the time approached for the Mission to start,
he informed Lord Lansdowne that his health would not permit of his
undertaking the journey to Jalalabad.

Thus the opportunity was lost to which I had looked forward as a
chance for settling many vexed questions, and I am afraid that there
has been very little improvement in our relations with Abdur Rahman
since then, and that we are no nearer the completion of our plans for
the defence of his kingdom than we were four years ago[9]--a defence
which (and this cannot be too strongly impressed upon the Amir) it
would be impossible for us to aid him to carry through unless Kabul
and Kandahar are brought into connexion with the railway system of
India.

In the autumn, just before we left Simla, our friends bestowed upon my
wife a farewell gift in the shape of a very beautiful diamond bracelet
and a sum of money for her fund for 'Homes in the Hills, and Officers'
Hospitals,' made doubly acceptable by the kind words with which Lord
Lansdowne, on behalf of the donors, presented it. Shortly afterwards
we bade a regretful adieu to our happy home of so many years, and made
our way to the Punjab for a final visit.

We spent a few days at Peshawar, and then went to Rawal Pindi to
be present at a Camp of Exercise, and see how the works under
construction for the protection of the arsenal were progressing.
These works had been put in hand in 1890, when, according to my
recommendation, it had been decided not to fortify Multan. No place in
the Punjab appeared to my mind to possess the same military value as
Rawal Pindi, its strategical importance with regard to the right
flank of the frontier line being hardly inferior to that of Quetta in
relation to the left flank; but of late the advisability of completing
the works had been questioned by my colleagues in Council, greatly
to my concern, for I felt that it would be unwise to leave the
elaboration of the defences of such a position until war should be
imminent.[10]

In January, 1893, a series of farewell entertainments were organized
for me at Lahore by the people of the Punjab, as touching as they
were highly appreciated, and intensely gratifying. Amongst the crowds
assembled in the Town Hall to bid me good-bye, I was greatly pleased
to see, besides the Maharaja of Kashmir, Chiefs and men from beyond
our frontier, from Kuram, from the confines of Baluchistan, even from
the wilds of Waziristan; for their presence on this occasion I felt to
be, not only a proof of their kindly feeling towards me personally,
and of their approval of the measures for their safety and welfare
that I had always advocated, but a very distinct sign of the much
to be desired change that was taking place in the sentiments of the
border tribes towards us as a nation.

Four addresses were presented to me, from the Sikh*, Hindu*, Mahomedan*,
and European* communities of the Punjab, respectively, which I will
venture to give in the Appendix, as I feel sure that the spirit of
loyalty which pervades them will be a revelation to many, and a source
of satisfaction to all who are interested in the country to which we
owe so much of our present greatness, and which I conceive to be the
brightest jewel in England's crown.

(See Appendices XII, XIII, XIV, AND XV.)

It was a wonderful and moving scene upon which we looked from the
platform of the Town Hall on this memorable occasion, made up as
it was of such different elements, each race and creed easily
recognizable from their different costumes and characteristics, but
all united by the same kindly desire to do honour to their departing
friend, or comrade, for there were a great number of old soldiers
present.

At each place that we visited on our way to Calcutta there was the
same display of kindly regret at our departure; friends assembled to
see us off at the railway-stations, bands played 'Auld lang syne,' and
hearty cheers speeded us on our way.

In February we went to Lucknow for a few days, when the Talukdars of
Oudh gave my wife and me an entertainment on a very splendid scale in
the Wingfield Park, and presented me with an address[11] and a sword
of honour.

On our return to Calcutta, just before we left for England, the
European community entertained me at a dinner, at which more than two
hundred were present, presided over by Sir James Mackay, K.C.I.E.,
Chairman of the Calcutta Chamber of Commerce. Sir James was far
too kind and eulogistic in speaking of my services, but for his
appreciative allusion to my wife I could only feel deeply gratified
and thankful. After dinner a reception was given to Lady Roberts and
myself, at which the Viceroy and Lady Lansdowne and all the principal
Native and European residents of Calcutta were assembled. An
address[12] was presented to me on this never-to be-forgotten
occasion, in which, to my supreme satisfaction, the Native noblemen
and gentlemen expressed their hearty approval of what had been done
during my tenure of office as Commander-in-Chief to strengthen the
defences of the frontier and render the army in India efficient,
and declared that 'we cheerfully bear our share of the cost, as in
possession of these protections against aggressions from without we
believe all who dwell within the borders of the land will find their
best guarantee for peace, and in peace the best safeguard they and
their children can possess to enable them to pass their lives in
happiness and prosperity, and escape the misery and ruin which follow
war and invasion.'

We travelled to Bombay _viâ_ Jeypur and Jodhpur. At both places we
were royally entertained by the Rulers of those states, and my staff
and I were given excellent sport amongst the wild boar, which was much
enjoyed by all, particularly by my son, who, having joined the King's
Royal Rifles at Rawal Pindi, was attached to me as A.D.C. during my
last six months in India, and had not before had an opportunity of
tasting the joys of pig-sticking.

At Jodhpur my friend the Maharaja Sir Pertap Sing gave us a signal
proof that the ancient valour of the Rajputs had not deteriorated in
the present day. I had wounded a fine boar, and on his making for some
rocky ground, where I could hardly have followed him on horseback, I
shouted to Sir Pertap to get between him and the rocks, and turn him
in my direction. The Maharaja promptly responded, but just as he came
face-to-face with the boar, his horse put his foot into a hole and
fell; the infuriated animal rushed on the fallen rider, and, before
the latter could extricate himself, gave him a severe wound in the leg
with his formidable tushes. On going to his assistance, I found Sir
Pertap bleeding profusely, but standing erect, facing the boar and
holding the creature (who was upright on his hind-legs) at arms'
length by his mouth. The spear without the impetus given by the horse
at full speed is not a very effective weapon against the tough hide
of a boar's back, and on realizing that mine did not make much
impression, Pertap Sing, letting go his hold of the boar's mouth,
quickly seized his hind-legs, and turned him over on his back, crying:
'_Maro, sahib, maro!_' ('Strike, sir, strike!') which I instantly did,
and killed him. Anyone who is able to realize the strength and weight
of a wild boar will appreciate the pluck and presence of mind of Sir
Pertap Sing in this performance. Fortunately, my wife and daughter,
who had been following the pig-stickers in a light cart, were close at
hand, and we were able to drive my friend home at once. The wound was
found to be rather a bad one, but it did not prevent Sir Pertap from
attending some tent-pegging and other amusements in the afternoon,
though he had to be carried to the scene.

A few months after my return to England the boar's head arrived,
set up, and with a silver plate attached to it, on which was an
inscription commemorating the adventure.

At Ahmedabad, where the train stopped while we lunched, I was
presented with an address by the President and members of the
Municipality, who, 'with loyal devotion to Her Imperial Majesty the
Queen and Empress of India, to whose glorious reign we sincerely wish
a continuance of brilliant prosperity,' expressed their hope that Lady
Roberts and I would have 'a happy voyage home and enjoyment of perfect
health and prosperity in future.'

The day before we left Bombay for England, the members of the Byculla
Club gave me a parting dinner. It was with great difficulty I could
get through my speech in response to the toast of my health on that
occasion, for, pleased and grateful as I was at this last mark of
friendship and approval from my countrymen, I could not help feeling
inexpressibly sad and deeply depressed at the thought uppermost in
my mind, that the time had come to separate myself from India and my
gallant comrades and friends, British and Native.

In dwelling on the long list of farewell addresses and entertainments
with which I was honoured on leaving India, I feel that I may be
laying myself open to the charge of egotism; but in writing of one's
own experiences it is difficult to avoid being egotistical, and
distasteful as it is to me to think that I may be considered so,
I would rather that, than that those who treated me so kindly and
generously should deem me unmindful or ungrateful.

Thus ended forty-one years in India. No one can, I think, wonder that
I left the country with heartfelt regret. The greater number of my
most valued friendships had been formed there; from almost everyone
with whom I had been associated, whether European or Native, civilian
or soldier, I had experienced unfailing kindness, sympathy, and
support; and to the discipline, bravery, and devotion to duty of the
Army in India, in peace and war, I felt that I owed whatever success
it was my good fortune to achieve.


[Footnote 1: The late Lieutenant-General Sir W.K. Elles, K.C.B.]

[Footnote 2: A detachment of the Calcutta Volunteer Rifles, at the
particular request of the regiment, took part in the expedition, and
did good service.]

[Footnote 3: The pay of the Native Infantry has been suitably
increased since I left India.]

[Footnote 4: _Jagirs_ are grants of land.]

[Footnote 5: _Batta_, extra allowances given to Native soldiers when
proceeding on field service.]

[Footnote 6: During the Mutiny the casualties amongst the British
officers with the six Punjab regiments which saw the most fighting
amounted to 60 per cent.! Luckily, these were able to be replaced by
officers belonging to corps which had mutinied. This supply, however,
has long since been used up, and it behoves the Government either
to provide an adequate reserve of officers, or to arrange for a
sufficient number being sent out from England whenever India is likely
to be engaged in a serious war.

+---------------------------------------------------------------------+
|             | Number of  |                 CASUALTIES               |
|             | Officers   +------------------------------------------+
|    CORPS.   | who did    |Killed | Died  |        |        |        |
|             | Duty with  |  in   |  of   |Died of |        |  In-   |
|             | each Corps.|Action.|Wounds.|Disease.|Wounded.|valided.|
+-------------+------------+-------+-------+--------+--------+--------+
| 1st Punjab  |            |       |       |        |        |        |
|  Cavalry (1 |            |       |       |        |        |        |
|  squadron)  |     12     |   1   |  ...  |  ...   |    6   |   7    |
| 2nd Punjab  |            |       |       |        |                 |
|  Cavalry    |     20     |   1   |  ...  |  ...   |    5   |   4    |
| 5th Punjab  |            |       |       |        |        |        |
|  Cavalry (1 |            |       |       |        |        |        |
|  squadron)  |      7     |   1   |   1   |  ...   |  ...   |  ...   |
| 1st Punjab  |            |       |       |        |        |        |
|  Infantry   |     15     |   3   |  ...  |  ...   |    6   |  ...   |
| 2nd Punjab  |            |       |       |        |        |        |
|  Infantry   |     22     |   3   |  ...  |  ...   |    4   |    3   |
| 4th Punjab  |            |       |       |        |        |        |
|   Infantry  |     24     |   2   |   3   |    2   |    8   |  ...   |
+-------------+------------+-------+-------+--------+--------+--------+
|   Total     |    100     |  11   |   4   |    2   |   29   |   14   |
+-------------+------------+-------+-------+--------+--------+--------+]

[Footnote 7: Captain Younghushand was at Bozai-Gumbaz, and Lieutenant
Davison on the Alichur Pamirs, both places being south of the Aksu
branch of the Oxus, flowing from the Little Pamir Lake.]

[Footnote 8: The Infantry comprised twenty-four battalions drawn up in
line of quarter columns. The Artillery consisted of one battery (six
7-pounders) carried on elephants, six batteries (six guns each,
5-pounders and 7-pounders) dragged by soldiers, and six batteries (six
guns each, 3-pounders and 5-pounders) carried by Bhutia coolies.]

[Footnote 9: I am not unmindful of the visit which Sir Mortimer Durand
paid to Kabul after I had left India, but on that occasion, I believe,
the question of the defence of Afghanistan was not discussed.]

[Footnote 10: The works were stopped after I left India, but not, I
was glad to think, before the redoubts had been finished, with the
communications thereto. The reasons given were that a change of
plans was necessary for economy's sake, and that the construction of
fortifications might induce the Natives to think we were doubtful of
the continuance of our supremacy. As regarded the first, I explained
that the total outlay for works and armaments was estimated at only
£332,274--considerably less than one half the cost of a British
line-of-battle ship; and as to the second, I urged that an argument
of this sort against frontier defences would hardly bear examination;
that the possibility of external attack was freely discussed in every
newspaper; that Russian movements and frontier difficulties were
known and commented on in every bazaar; that the construction of
fortifications in support of the Ruling Power had been an Oriental
practice from time immemorial; that our action in this respect was at
least as likely to instil the idea that we meant to retain our eastern
possessions at any cost, as to give an impression of weakness; that
the progressive re-organization and mobilization of our army were well
known to have reference to service beyond the frontier; and that we
had extended our confidence in this respect to Native Princes by
encouraging them to train their own troops and fit them to take their
place in line with ours.]

[Footnote 11: Given in the Appendix. (Appendix XVI.)]

[Footnote 12: _Ibid._ (Appendix XVII.)]

       *       *       *       *       *



APPENDIX



APPENDIX I.

(See Chapter XIV, Footnote 4.)


The 9th Native Infantry, to which Captain Donald Stewart belonged, was
divided between Aligarh, Mainpuri, Bulandshahr, and Etawa, Stewart
being with the Head-Quarters of the regiment at Aligarh.

The news from Meerut and Delhi had caused a certain amount of alarm
amongst the residents at Aligarh, and arrangements had been made for
sending away the ladies and children, but, owing to the confidence
placed in the men of the 9th, none of them had left the station.
Happen what might in other regiments, the officers were certain that
the 9th could never be faithless to their salt! The Native officers
and men were profuse in their expressions of loyalty, and as a proof
of their sincerity they arrested and disarmed several rebel sepoys,
who were making for their homes in Oudh and the adjoining districts.
As a further proof, they gave up the regimental pandit for
endeavouring to persuade them to mutiny. He was tried by a
Court-Martial composed of European and Native officers, found guilty,
and sentenced to be hanged. The sentence was carried out that same
afternoon. It was intended that the regiment should witness the
execution, but it did not reach the gaol in time; the men were
therefore marched back to their lines, and Stewart, in his capacity of
Interpreter, was ordered to explain to them the purpose for which
they had been paraded. While he was speaking a man of his own company
shouted out something. Stewart did not hear the words, and no one
would repeat them. The parade was then dismissed, when the same man,
tearing off his uniform, called upon his comrades not to serve a
Government which had hanged a Brahmin. A general uproar ensued. The
Commanding Officer ordered the few Sikhs in the regiment to seize the
ringleader; they did so, but not being supported by the rest they
released him. The Subadar Major was then told to arrest the mutineer,
but he took no notice whatever of the order. This Native officer had
been upwards of forty years in the regiment and was entitled to his
full pension. He had been a member of the Court-Martial which tried
the pandit, and, though a Brahmin himself, had given his vote in
favour of the prisoner being hanged; moreover he was a personal friend
of all the officers. Stewart, who had been for many years Adjutant,
knew him intimately, and believed implicitly in his loyalty. The man
had constantly discussed the situation with Stewart and others, and
had been mainly instrumental in disarming the sepoys who had passed
through Aligarh; and yet when the hour of trial came he failed as
completely as the last-joined recruit.

The British officers went amongst their men and tried to keep order,
but the excitement rapidly spread; some of the young soldiers began to
load, and the older ones warned the officers that it was time for them
to be off. The sepoys then plundered the treasury, broke open the gaol
doors, released the prisoners, and marched in a body towards Delhi.[1]

Stewart, being thus left without a regiment, attached himself to
the magistrate of the district, and took command of a small body of
volunteers sent from Agra by the Lieutenant-Governor of the North-West
Provinces, to aid the civil authorities in restoring order. Not caring
for this work, and thinking he might be more usefully employed,
Stewart made up his mind to find his way to Delhi; his idea was to try
and get there _viâ_ Meerut, but before deciding on the route, he went
to Agra, where he had been invited by the Lieutenant-Governor. At the
interview, Mr. Colvin advised Stewart to travel _viâ_ Muttra, as
the safer of the two routes, and told him that despatches had been
received from the Government in Calcutta for the Commander-in-Chief,
then understood to be with the army before Delhi. At the same time the
Lieutenant-Governor impressed upon Stewart that he was not giving him
any order to go, and that if he undertook to carry the despatches it
must be a voluntary act on his part, entailing no responsibility on
the Government of the North-West Provinces.

Stewart accepted the duty, and took his leave of Mr. Colvin as the sun
was setting on the 18th June, delighted at the chance of being able
to join the army before Delhi. He reached Muttra, thirty-five miles
distant, without mishap. The streets of this city were crowded
with men, all carrying arms of some sort; they showed no signs of
hostility, however, and even pointed out to Stewart the house of which
he was in search. The owner of this house, to whose care he had been
commended by the Agra authorities, was a Brahmin holding an official
position in the town. This Native gentleman behaved with civility,
but did not attempt to conceal his embarrassment at the presence of a
British officer, or his relief when Stewart announced his intention of
resuming his journey an hour or so before daybreak.

The Brahmin provided him with two sowars belonging to the Raja of
Bhartpur with orders to accompany him as far as Kosi. They were
cut-throat-looking individuals, and Stewart felt rather inclined to
dispense with their services, but, thinking it unwise to show any
signs of distrust, he accepted them with the best grace he could.

After riding fifteen or sixteen miles, Stewart's horse fell from
exhaustion, on which his so-called escort laughed uproariously, and
galloped off, leaving our poor traveller to his own devices.

Believing the horse could not recover, Stewart took off the saddle and
bridle and tramped to the nearest village, where he hoped to be
able to buy or hire an animal of some kind on which to continue his
journey. No one, however, would help him, and he was forced to seize
a donkey which he found grazing in a field hard by. About sunset he
reached Kosi, thirty-seven miles from Muttra. The _tehsildar_[2]
received him courteously, and gave him some bread and milk, but would
not hear of his staying for the night. He told him that his appearance
in the town was causing considerable excitement, and that he could not
be responsible for his safety. Stewart was much exhausted after his
hot ride, but as the _tehsildar_ stood firm there was nothing for him
to do but to continue his journey, and he consented to start if he
were provided with a horse. The _tehsildar_ promptly offered his own
pony, and as soon as it was dark Stewart set out for the Jaipur camp.
His progress during the night was slow, and it was not until eight
o'clock the next morning that he reached his destination, where he was
hospitably received by the Political Agent, Major Eden, who introduced
him to the Maharaja's Wazir. This official at first promised to give
Stewart a small escort as far as Delhi, but on various pretexts he put
him off from day to day. At the end of a week Stewart saw that the
Wazir either could not or would not give him an escort, and thinking
it useless to delay any longer, he made up his mind to start without
one.

There were several refugees in the camp, and one of them, Mr. Ford,
collector and magistrate of Gurgaon, offered to join Stewart in his
venture.

Stewart and his companion left the Jaipur camp on the afternoon of
the 27th June, and reached Palwal soon after dark. Ford sent for the
_kotwal_,[3] who was one of his own district officials, and asked him
for food. This was produced, but the _kotwal_ besought the _sahibs_ to
move on without delay, telling them that their lives were in imminent
danger, as there was a rebel regiment in the town, and he was quite
unable to protect them. So they continued their journey, and, escaping
from one or two threatened attacks by robbers, reached Badshahpur in
the morning. Here they rested during the heat of the day, being kindly
treated by the villagers, who were mostly Hindus.

The travellers were now not far from Delhi, but could hardly proceed
further without a guide, and the people of Badshahpur declined to
provide one. They pleaded that they were men of peace, and could not
possibly leave their village in such evil times. Suddenly a man from
the crowd, offered his services. His appearance was against him, and
the villagers declared that he was a notorious cattle-lifter, who was
strongly suspected of having set fire to the collector's (Mr. Ford's)
office at Gurgaon, in order that the evidences of his offences might
be destroyed. Not a pleasant _compagnon de voyage_, but there was
nothing for it but to accept his offer.

As soon as it was dark a start was made, and at daybreak on the
29th the minarets of Delhi rose out of the morning mist, while an
occasional shell might be seen bursting near the city.

On reaching the Hansi road, the guide, by name Jumna Das, who, in
spite of appearances, had proved true to his word, stopped and said he
could go no further. He would not take any reward that it was then in
the power of Stewart or Ford to offer him, but he expressed a hope
that, when the country became settled, the slight service he had
performed would not be forgotten. They gratefully assured him on this
point, and thanked him cordially, giving him at the same time a letter
testifying to his valuable service. Stewart then went to the nearest
village, and for a small reward found a man who undertook to conduct
them safely to one of our piquets.

One curious circumstance remarked by Stewart throughout the ride was
that the peasants and villagers, though not generally hostile to him,
had evidently made up their minds that the British _raj_ was at an
end, and were busily engaged in rendering their villages defensible,
to meet the troubles and disturbances which they considered would
surely follow on the resumption of Native rule.

It is difficult to over-estimate the pluck and enterprise displayed
by Stewart during this most adventurous ride. It was a marvel that he
ever reached Delhi. His coming there turned out to be the best thing
that ever happened to him, for the qualities which prompted him to
undertake and carried him through his dangerous journey, marked him as
a man worthy of advancement and likely to do well.

[Footnote 1: While the regiment was in the act of mutinying one of the
sepoys left the parade-ground, and running round to all the civilians'
houses, told the occupants what had happened, and warned them to make
their escape. He asked for no reward, and was never seen again.]

[Footnote 2: Native magistrate.]

[Footnote 3: City magistrate.]

       *       *       *       *       *




APPENDIX II.

(These two memoranda are referred to in the note in Chapter XXV,
Footnote 6.)

_Memorandum by Lieutenant McLeod Innes._


'1. Sir H. Lawrence joined at Lucknow about the end of March, 1857,
succeeding Mr. Coverley Jackson in the Chief Commissionership.

'2. On his arrival he found himself in the midst of troubles, of which
the most important were these:

    I. A general agitation of the empire, from the discontent of the
    soldiery.

    II. A weak European force at Oudh, with all the military
    arrangements defective.

    III. Grievous discontent among several classes of the population
    of Oudh, viz., the nobility of Lucknow and the members and
    retainers of the Royal Family, the official classes, the old
    soldiery, and the entire country population, noble and peasant
    alike.

'3. This third was due to disobedience of, or departure from, the
instructions laid down by Government at the annexation, as very
clearly shown in Lord Stanley's letter of October 13, 1858. The
promised pensions had either been entirely withheld or very sparingly
doled out; the old officials were entirely without employment;
three-quarters of the army the same; while the country Barons had, by
forced interpretation of rules, been deprived of the mass of their
estates, which had been parcelled out among their followers, who, for
clannish reasons, were more indignant at the spoliation and loss of
power and place of their Chiefs than they were glad for their own
individual acquisitions.

'4. The weakness of the European force could not be helped; it was
deemed politic to show the country that the annexation did not require
force.

'5. But the inefficiency of the military arrangements arose from mere
want of skill, and was serious, under the threatening aspect of the
political horizon.

'6. The discontent of the province, and the coming general storm, had
already found vent in the brigandage of Fuzl Ali, and the seditions of
the Fyzabad Moulvie.

'7. And with all these Sir H. Lawrence had to grapple immediately on
his arrival.

'8. But I may safely say that ten days saw the mass of them disappear.
The Fyzabad Moulvie had been seized and imprisoned. Fuzl Ali had been
surrounded and slain. The promised pensions had been paid, by Sir H.
Lawrence's peremptory orders, to the members and retainers of the
Royal Family. A recognition had been published of the fair rights of
the old Oudh officials to employment in preference to immigrants from
our old provinces, and instructions had been issued for giving it
effect. The disbanded soldiers of the Royal Army of Oudh were promised
preference in enlistment in the local corps and the police, and
a reorganization and increase to the latter, which were almost
immediately sanctioned, gave instant opportunities for the fulfilment
of the first instalment of these promises. While last, but not least,
durbars were held, in which Sir Henry Lawrence was able to proclaim
his views and policy, by which the landholders should be reinstated in
the possessions which they held at the annexation, the basis on which
the instructions had been originally issued, which had been hitherto
practically ignored, but to which he pledged himself to give effect.

'9. To strengthen his military position, he placed Artillery with the
European Infantry; he distributed his Irregular Cavalry; he examined
the city, decided on taking possession of the Muchee Bawn and
garrisoning it as a fort; and summoned in Colonel Fisher and Captain
George Hardinge; and with them, Brigadier Handscombe and Major
Anderson, consulted and arranged for future plans against the storms
which he saw to be impending.

'10. Much of this, and his policy for remaining in Oudh, and the
conduct of the defence of Lucknow, I know from recollections of what
he occasionally let drop to me in his confidential conversations while
inspecting the Muchee Bawn. He told me that nearly the whole army
would go; that he did not think the Sikhs would go; that in every
regiment there were men that, with proper management, would remain
entirely on our side; and that, therefore, he meant to segregate from
the rest of the troops the Sikhs and selected men, and to do his
best to keep them faithful allies when the rest should go; that, if
Cawnpore should hold out, we would not be attacked; but that if it
should fall, we would be invested, and more or less closely besieged;
that no troops could come to our relief before the middle of August;
that the besieging forces would, he thought, be confined to the
sepoys, for the people of the country had always liked our European
officers, whom they had frequently had to bless for the safety of
their lives and the honour of their families; and the whole Hindu
population had a lively recollection of our friendly line of conduct
in the late quarrel with the Mussulmans regarding the Hunnooman
Gurhee; that to hold out where we were was necessary, for the
slightest appearance of yielding, or of not showing a bold front,
would result in annihilation; that to hold out we must get provisions;
that to got provisions and prepare for an efficient defence we must
keep open our communication with the country, and keep the city quiet;
that to the former end the retention of the cantonment was necessary,
and of the Muchee Bawn to the latter, while the site of the permanent
defences, in case of the need of concentration, should be the
Residency.

'11. All this I know, as before said, from Sir Henry Lawrence's own
casual and hurried remarks to me. Whether they are officially recorded
anywhere I do not know; but they must have been written in letters
to various persons, and repeated to others of his subordinates at
Lucknow. I mention these matters thus early, as although the facts on
which they bear did not immediately occur, still, Sir Henry Lawrence
had prescience of them, and had decided on his line of policy.

'12. I understand, further, but not on authentic grounds, that Sir
Henry wrote at a very early stage to Sir H. Wheeler, urging him to
construct entrenchments at the magazine at Cawnpore, and to ensure his
command of the boats, whatever might happen; that he wrote early
to the Government, entreating them to divert one of the European
regiments in the course of relief, and divide it between Cawnpore and
Allahabad; and that subsequently he urged on Government to employ the
troops of the Persian expedition in Bengal, and to stop the Chinese
force for the same end, and to subsidize some of the Nepal troops for
the protection of our older provinces east of Oudh.

'13. To revert to the narrative, the measures already mentioned
so entirely pacified the province, that, in spite of the previous
discontent, the previous troubles, the proverbial turbulence of its
inhabitants, and the increasing agitation throughout the empire, there
was no difficulty experienced in collecting the revenue by the close
of April. And the subsequent disturbances were, as will be shown,
entirely due to the soldiery, and, till long after Sir Henry's death,
participated in only by them, by the city ruffians, and by a few of
the Mussulman families of the country population. The mass of the city
people and the entire Hindu population held aloof, and would have
nothing to say to the outbreak; and, with one single exception, every
Talookdar, to whom the chance offered itself, aided, more or less
actively, in the protection of European fugitives. This phase in the
character of the disturbances in Oudh is not generally known; but it
is nevertheless true, and is due emphatically and solely, under Divine
Providence, to the benignant personal character and the popular policy
of Sir Henry Lawrence.

'14. The 1st of May saw our disturbances commence with the mutiny of
the 7th Oudh Irregular Infantry. This, its suppression, and the durbar
in which he distributed rewards and delivered a speech on the aspect
of affairs, have been fully described elsewhere, and need not be
repeated by me.

'15. The durbar was held on the twelfth. I am not aware whether he had
any intelligence at that time of the Meerut outbreak. The telegrams,
when they did arrive, were vague; but he indubitably kept on his guard
immediately on receiving them. The Cavalry were piqueted between the
cantonments and the Residency, and the Infantry and Artillery were
kept prepared for movement. His plans were evidently already decided;
but they were to be effected simultaneously and not successively,
and the movements of the Europeans were somewhat dependent on the
arrangements of the Quarter-master-General's Department. It was not
until the sixteenth that the tents required for the 32nd were ready;
and the morning of the 17th May saw an entirely new and effective
disposition of the troops. Half the Europeans were at the Residency,
commanding the Iron Bridge; half, with the Artillery, were at the
south end of the cantonments; the bridge of boats was moved and under
control, while the Muchee Bawn, not yet sufficiently cleansed from
its old conglomeration of filth, was garrisoned by a selected body of
Native troops. The whole of these dispositions could not have been
effected at an earlier date, and Sir Henry would not do them piecemeal
or successively. Simultaneous, they were effective, and tended to
paralyze any seditious plots that may have been hatching. Successive
and piecemeal, they would have incited the sepoys to mutiny and the
turbulent to insurrection.'


_Memorandum, 18th May, inserted in Sir Henry's own hand in his ledger
book._

'Time is everything just now. Time, firmness, promptness,
conciliation, and prudence; every officer, each individual European,
high and low, may at this crisis prove most useful, or even dangerous.
A firm and cheerful aspect must be maintained--there must be no
bustle, no appearance of alarm, still less of panic; but, at the same
time, there must be the utmost watchfulness and promptness; everywhere
the first germ of insurrection must be put down instantly. Ten men may
in an hour quell a row which, after a day's delay, may take weeks
to put down. I wish this point to be well understood. In preserving
internal tranquillity, the Chiefs and people of substance may be most
usefully employed at this juncture; many of them have as much to lose
as we have. Their property, at least, is at stake. Many of them have
armed retainers--some few are good shots and have double-barrelled
guns. For instance [name illegible], can hit a bottle at 100 yards. He
is with the ordinary soldiers. I want a dozen such men, European or
Native, to arm their own people and to make _thannahs_ of their own
houses, or some near position, and preserve tranquillity within a
circuit around them.'

       *       *       *       *       *




APPENDIX III.

(Referred to in Chapter XLVI, Footnote 1.)

The column was composed as follows:

                                      _Men._     _Guns._

F Battery, A Brigade, R.H.A.,
commanded by Colonel W. Sterling       135          6

One squadron 10th Hussars,
commanded by Major Bulkeley            102

G Battery, 3rd Brigade, R.A.,
commanded by Major Sydney Parry         83          3

2nd Battalion 8th Foot,
commanded by Colonel Barry Drew        620

Wing 72nd Highlanders, commanded
by Lieutenant-Colonel F. Brownlow      405
                                     -----         --
Total British troops                 1,345          9


12th Bengal Cavalry, commanded
by Colonel Hugh Gough, V.C.            337

No. 1 Mountain Battery,
commanded by Captain Kelso             136          4

7th Company Bengal Sappers and Miners  113

2nd (Punjab Frontier Force) Infantry,
commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel
Tyndall                                647

5th (Punjab Frontier Force) Infantry,
commanded by Major McQueen             502

5th (Punjab Frontier Force) Gurkhas,
commanded by Major Fitz-Hugh           438

21st Punjab Infantry,
commanded by Major Collis              496

23rd Pioneers,
commanded by Colonel Currie            650

29th Punjab Infantry,
commanded by Colonel J.J. Gordon       671
                                     -----         --
Total Natives                        3,990          4
                                     -----         --
Grand total                          5,335         13

Lieutenant-Colonel Alexander Lindsay commanded the Artillery, Colonel
Æneas Perkins was Commanding Royal Engineer. Colonel Hugh Gough
commanded the Cavalry, Brigadier-Generals Cobbe (17th Foot) and
Thelwall (21st Punjab Infantry) the two Infantry brigades. Major
W. Galbraith (85th Foot) was Assistant-Adjutant-General; Major
H. Collett, Assistant, and Captains 'Dick' Kennedy and F. Carr,
Deputy-Assistant-Quartermasters-General. Captains G. de C. Morton and
A. Scott, V.C., Brigade-Majors. Captain A. Badcock, Chief Commissariat
officer; Captain J. Colquhoun, R.A., Commissary of Ordnance; Major
Moriarty, Captain Goad, and Lieutenant F. Maisey, Transport officers;
Captain A. Wynne (51st Foot), Superintendent of Field Telegraphs;
Captain R. Woodthorpe, R.E., Superintendent of Surveys;
Deputy-Surgeon-General F. Allen, Principal Medical officer; Rev. J. W.
Adams, Chaplain.

       *       *       *       *       *




APPENDIX IV.

(Referred to in Chapter XLIX, Footnote 15.)

_Translation of a letter from_ MAJOR-GENERAL SIR FREDERICK ROBERTS _to
His Highness_ THE AMIR OF KABUL.



    ALIKHEL, _18th September_, 1879.

    (After the usual compliments.) Your Highness's letter of the 28th
    Ramazan, with the enclosures from Herat and Turkestan, reached me
    last night. I have acquainted myself with the contents. I am glad
    to find your Highness is in good health, but sorry to hear of
    the unfortunate disturbances in your Highness's dominions. Your
    Highness's letter, in original, has been sent with enclosures to
    His Excellency the Viceroy. I have already informed your Highness
    of the wishes of His Excellency the Viceroy, and the reasons for
    the movements of the British troops, and I have requested your
    Highness to send a confidential representative to my camp. I
    am awaiting a reply to that letter, and the arrival of your
    Highness's confidential representative.

    In the meantime I have sent a Proclamation to the tribes, and
    letters to some of the Logar _maliks_, your Highness's subjects,
    to assure those not concerned in the hateful massacre, and asking
    them for assistance in carriage and supplies on payment. As it
    appears to me proper I should inform your Highness of what I have
    done, I enclose copies of the Proclamation to the tribes and of my
    letter to the Logar _maliks_, and hope that your Highness may also
    issue necessary orders for the furtherance of our plans. Rest
    assured of the support of the Government of India.

       *       *       *       *       *




APPENDIX V.

(Referred to in Chapter XLIV, Note *.)

_Notes of an interview between GENERAL SIR FREDERICK ROBERTS and
the AMIR'S AGENTS, MUSTAUFI HABIBULLA KHAN and WAZIR SHAH MAHOMED
KHAN. Dated ALIKHEL, 23rd September, 1879._


After compliments, General Roberts intimated to the Agents that at
their desire he had granted them a second interview. He now requested
them to be good enough to speak freely all that they wished him to
know.

The MUSTAUFI then spoke in the following sense: The interests of
England and Afghanistan are the same, and the Amir and his officials
are deeply grieved at the late occurrences in Kabul. Moreover, the
Amir is anxious to do whatever the British Government wishes, and
most desirous that the dignity of the British Government should be
maintained by any means which may seem proper to the Viceroy. But His
Highness cannot conceal from himself that the mutinous troops and
his people in general, ryots as well as soldiers, are in fear of
an indiscriminate revenge, which will fall alike upon innocent and
guilty. He hopes, therefore, that measures will be taken to guard
against the possibility of a general rising consequent on fear.

The Mustaufi was here reminded of the tenor of General Roberts's
Proclamation on 15th September. He answered that the people were too
ignorant to be acted upon by a Proclamation, and then went on as
follows:

Of course, it is possible that no such combination may take place. The
Afghans are selfish, and divided against themselves. Still, lest he
should be blamed if it should occur, the Amir thinks it right
to express his opinion, and give the British Government all the
information in his power. On the whole, his advice, as an earnest
friend, is that the advance of a British force on Kabul should be
delayed for a short time ('_Panjroz_'). In the interval he will
endeavour to disarm the Regular troops, raise new levies, and, by
the aid of the latter, punish all concerned in the late abominable
outrage. His idea is to get rid of Sher Ali's soldiery--always a
source of danger--and keep only 15,000 men for the future. It would
be very desirable to delay the advance until he could establish his
power. The Amir does not mean to imply that any Afghan army, were it
50,000 strong, could resist the British. The mutinous troops have
neither organization nor leaders. But the mutinous troops are of all
tribes; and if the British army destroys them, as it would undoubtedly
do in case of resistance, the whole country may combine against the
British and the Amir. It is for this reason that he advises delay, and
that the punishment of the guilty be left to him. The Viceroy may rest
assured that he will show no mercy. He will make an example which will
be conspicuous in the eyes of the world as the sun at noonday. Already
everyone in Kabul regards the Amir as an infidel, because of the
way in which he and his have thrown in their lot with the British
Government.

Notwithstanding all that has been said, however, things might go right
if the mutinous troops would keep together and attempt a stand. But
the Amir fears they will not do so. They are more likely to scatter
here and there, and raise the country. In that case there will be
constant attacks on the communications of the force, and the gathering
of supplies will be difficult. They would come chiefly from the
direction of Ghazni, partly also from Logar. If the tribes rise it
would be hard to collect them. Only one month remains before the
setting in of winter. Of course, it is impossible to say what may
happen. There may be no opposition, and the Amir is in any case ready
to do what the British Government desires. But he feels it is his duty
to express his strong opinion that the present season is unsuited for
a forward movement.

General Roberts replied that on behalf of the Viceroy he thanked the
Amir for his kind advice, which he was confident was the advice of
a friend. He said the matter was important, and required careful
consideration, and asked whether the Agents had anything more to bring
forward.

The Mustaufi then spoke as follows: The Amir's advice to delay the
advance is that of a sincere friend, and it is the best he can give.
But if the British Army is to march on Kabul, there is one thing more
which I am desired to say: let it march in such strength as to crush
all hopes of mischief, and put down all rebellion throughout the
country. You cannot wait for reinforcements. If you come, you must
come in full strength--in sufficient strength to put down all
opposition. There may be no opposition, but you cannot count on this.

General Roberts replied: The Amir's advice is of great importance,
and must be carefully considered. When His Highness first wrote,
announcing the outbreak at Kabul and asking for help, the first desire
of the Viceroy was to send British forces without delay. I was ordered
to Kuram at once to lead the force here. Simultaneously the Kandahar
force was ordered by telegram to return to Kandahar, which it was then
leaving, and to advance towards Kelat-i-Ghilzai, and instructions were
issued to collect a third force at Peshawar; all this was to help the
Amir. The Viceroy from the first contemplated the possibility of such
a general rising as the Amir now fears, and the several armies were,
therefore, by His Excellency's order, made up to such strength that
all Afghanistan combined could not stand against them for a moment.
The Kandahar troops were ready in a very short time, and are now
beyond Kandahar, on the road to Kabul.[1] The Peshawar force was
rapidly collected and pushed on; and the Amir may rest assured that
the British army is advancing in ample strength. I will think over the
Amir's advice, nevertheless, for it is important. But His Highness
must remember that the late occurrences at Kabul do not affect only
the English officers and the fifty or sixty men who were treacherously
killed--the honour of the English Government is concerned; and so long
as the bodies of these officers and men remain unburied or uncared for
in Kabul, I do not believe the English people will ever be satisfied.
They will require the advance of a British force, and the adequate
punishment of the crime. Still, the Amir's advice, which I am
convinced is that of a friend, must be carefully considered, and I
will think over it and give an answer later.

The MUSTAUFI then said: We quite understand what has been said about
the strength of the British army. Doubtless it is sufficient, and
all Afghanistan could not stand against it. But the Amir asked us to
mention, what I have hitherto forgotten, that there are in Turkestan
24 regiments of Infantry, 6 of Cavalry, and 56 guns. These troops were
the first to show a disaffected spirit at Mazar-i-Sharif; and putting
aside external enemies, there are Abdur Rahman and the sons of Azim
Khan waiting their chance. Herat again is doubtful; when the troops
there hear what has occurred at Kabul, there is no saying what they
may do. If Abdur Rahman ingratiates himself with these people, Herat
and Turkestan will be permanently severed from the Afghan dominions.
This is another reason why the advance of the British force should be
delayed, in order that the Amir may have time to gain over the Herat
and Turkestan troops.

GENERAL ROBERTS replied: All these reasons will have full
consideration. The Viceroy's first order was to push on at once to
help the Amir; but I am sure His Highness's advice is friendly, and
that in any case he will do his utmost to co-operate with the British
Government. Therefore every consideration will be given to what His
Highness has desired you to say.

The MUSTAUFI: The Viceroy may be sure the Amir will do what he
pleases.

The WAZIR: When the Amir learnt from General Roberts's letter that the
Viceroy had given General Roberts power to deal with the whole matter,
he was very pleased, knowing General Roberts's character as a soldier
and his kindness of heart.

GENERAL ROBERTS replied that he would carefully consider the proposals
brought forward, and give an answer later on. Meanwhile, he must
request the Agents to stay a day or two in camp until he should
have thoroughly weighed the Amir's advice, which was of the utmost
importance to both the British and Afghan Governments.

The interview then came to an end.

  (Signed)           H. M. DURAND,
  Political Secretary to General Roberts, K.C.B., V.C.,
  Commanding Kabul Field Force.

[Footnote 1: The Agents here seemed surprised and anxious.--H.M.D.]

       *       *       *       *       *




APPENDIX VI.

(Referred to in Chapter LIII, Footnote 3.)

_From LIEUTENANT-GENERAL SIR F. ROBERTS, K.C.B., V.C., Commanding
Kabul Field Force, to A.C. LYALL, ESQ., C.B., Secretary to the
Government of India, Foreign Department._


    KABUL, _22nd November,_ 1879.

    1. I Have the honour to submit a brief account of an interview
    which took place between the Amir Yakub Khan and myself on the
    22nd October. The interview was a private and informal one; but
    recent events have lent some interest to what passed on the
    occasion, and I have, therefore, thought it desirable that
    a report should be prepared for the information of the
    Governor-General in Council.

    2. After some conversation upon matters of no special importance,
    the Amir introduced his father's name, and thus gave me the
    opportunity I had often wished to have of leading him on to speak
    naturally and unconstrainedly about Sher Ali Khan's feelings and
    policy during the last ten years. I was most careful to avoid any
    expression of my own views upon the subject in order that I might,
    if possible, obtain from the Amir a perfectly spontaneous and
    truthful account of the circumstances which led, in his opinion,
    to Sher Ali's estrangement from ourselves and _rapprochement_ to
    Russia. In this I think I succeeded. Yakub Khan spoke readily
    and freely of all that had passed, and needed no question or
    suggestion from me to declare his conviction regarding the cause
    of his father's unfriendly attitude towards us during the past few
    years.

    3. The substance of the Amir's statement was as follows:

    'In 1869 my father was fully prepared to throw in his lot with
    you. He had suffered many reverses before making himself secure on
    the throne of Afghanistan; and he had come to the conclusion that
    his best chance of holding what he had won lay in an alliance with
    the British Government. He did not receive from Lord Mayo as
    large a supply of arms and ammunition as he had hoped, but,
    nevertheless, he returned to Kabul fairly satisfied, and so he
    remained until the visit of Saiyad Nur Muhammud to India in 1873.
    This visit brought matters to a head. The diaries received from
    Saiyad Nur Mahomed during his stay in India, and the report which
    he brought back on his return, convinced my father that he could
    no longer hope to obtain from the British Government all the aid
    that he wanted; and from that time he began to turn his attention
    to the thoughts of a Russian alliance. You know how this ended.

    'When my father received from the Government of India the letter
    informing him that a British Mission was about to proceed to
    Kabul, he read it out in durbar. The members of the Russian
    Embassy were present. After the reading was finished, Colonel
    Stolietoff rose, saluted the Amir and asked permission to leave
    Kabul. If permitted, he would, he said, travel without delay to
    Tashkent, and report the state of affairs to General Kauffmann,
    who would inform the Czar, and thus bring pressure to bear on
    England. He promised to return in six weeks or two months, and
    urged the Amir to do everything in his power meanwhile to prevent
    the British Mission from reaching Kabul.

    'Colonel Stolietoff never returned to Kabul. He lost no time in
    reaching Tashkent, where he remained for a few weeks, and he then
    started for Russia.

    'The Afghan official, Mirza Mahomed Hassan Khan, generally known
    as the "Dabir-ul-Mulk," who had travelled with Colonel Stolietoff
    from the Oxus to Kabul, accompanied him on his return journey to
    Tashkent. Here the Mirza was detained under pretence that orders
    would shortly be received from the Emperor, until the news of my
    father's flight from Kabul reached General Kauffmann. He was then
    permitted to leave. Two Aides-de-Camp were sent with him, one a
    European, the other a Native of Bokhara.

    'My father was strongly urged by General Kauffmann not to leave
    Kabul. At the same time the members of the Embassy were ordered to
    return to Tashkent, the Doctor being permitted to remain with my
    father if his services were required.

    'Throughout, the Russian Embassy was treated with great honour,'
    and at all stations between Mazar-i-Shariff and Kabul, orders were
    given for the troops to turn out, and for a salute to be fired on
    their arrival and departure.'

    4. I cannot, of course, vouch for the exact words used by Yakub
    Khan, but I am confident that the foregoing paragraph, which is
    written from notes taken at the time, contains a substantially
    accurate record of the conversation.

    5. It would be superfluous for me to advance any proof of the fact
    that for one reason or another Sher Ali did during the latter part
    of his reign fall away from us and incline towards an alliance
    with Russia. But I think the closeness of the connection between
    Russia and Kabul, and the extent of the Amir's hostility towards
    ourselves, has not hitherto been fully recognized. Yakub Khan's
    statements throw some light upon this question, and they are
    confirmed by various circumstances which have lately come to my
    knowledge. The prevalence of Russian coin and wares in Kabul,
    and the extensive military preparations made by Sher Ali of late
    years, appear to me to afford an instructive comment upon Yakub
    Khan's assertions. Our recent rupture with Sher Ali has, in fact,
    been the means of unmasking and checking a very serious conspiracy
    against the peace and security of our Indian Empire.

    6. The magnitude of Sher Ali's military preparations is, in my
    opinion, a fact of peculiar significance. I have already touched
    upon this point in a former letter, but I shall perhaps be excused
    for noticing it again. Before the outbreak of hostilities last
    year the Amir had raised and equipped with arms of precision 68
    regiments of Infantry and 16 of Cavalry. The Afghan Artillery
    amounted to nearly 300 guns. Numbers of skilled artizans were
    constantly employed in the manufacture of rifled cannon and
    breach-loading small arms. More than a million pounds of powder,
    and I believe several million rounds of home-made Snider
    ammunition, were in the Bala Hissar at the time of the late
    explosion. Swords, helmets, uniforms, and other articles of
    military equipment were stored in proportionate quantities.
    Finally, Sher Ali had expended upon the construction of the
    Sherpur cantonments an astonishing amount of labour and money. The
    extent and cost of this work may be judged of from the fact that
    the whole of the troops under my command will find cover during
    the winter within the cantonment, and the bulk of them in the main
    line of rampart itself, which extends to a length of nearly two
    miles under the southern and western slopes of the Bimaru hills.
    Sher Ali's original design was apparently to carry the wall
    entirely round the hills, a distance of nearly five miles, and the
    foundations were already laid for a considerable portion of this
    length. All these military preparations were quite unnecessary
    except as a provision for contemplated hostilities with ourselves,
    and it is difficult to understand how their entire cost could
    have been met from the Afghan treasury, the gross revenue of the
    country amounting only to about eighty lakhs of rupees per annum.

    7. I have referred to the prevalence of Russian coin and wares
    in Kabul as evidence of the growing connexion between Russia and
    Afghanistan. I am unable to find proof that the Czar's coin was
    introduced in any other way than by the usual channels of trade.
    It is quite possible that the bulk of it, if not the whole, came
    in gradually by this means, the accumulation of foreign gold in
    particular being considerable in this country, where little gold
    is coined. Nevertheless, it seems to me a curious fact that the
    amount of Russian money in circulation should be so large. No
    less than 13,000 gold pieces were found among the Amir's treasure
    alone; similar coins are exceedingly common in the city bazaar;
    and great numbers of them are known to be in possession of the
    Sirdars. Of course English goods of all kinds are plentiful
    here--that is inevitable, particularly with a considerable body
    of Hindu merchants settled in the city, but Russian goods also
    abound. Glass, crockery, silks, tea, and many other things which
    would seem to be far more easily procurable from India than from
    Russian territory, are to be found in great quantities. A habit,
    too, seems to have been growing up among the Sirdars and others of
    wearing uniforms of Russian cut, Russian buttons, Russian boots,
    and the like. Russian goods and Russian ways seem, in fact, to
    have become the fashion in Afghanistan.

       *       *       *       *       *




APPENDIX VII.

(Referred to in Chapter LIII, Footnote 3.)


_Translations of letters from _GENERAL-ADJUTANT VON KAUFFMANN,
_Governor-General of Turkestan, to the address of the_ AMIR OF
AFGHANISTAN, _received on 10th, Shaban, 1295, through_ GENERAL
STOLIETOFF, _9th August, 1878._

    Be it known to you that in these days the relations between the
    British Government and ours with regard to your kingdom require
    deep consideration. As I am unable to communicate my opinion
    verbally to you, I have deputed my agent, Major-General
    Stolietoff. This gentleman is a near friend of mine, and performed
    excellent services in the Russo-Turkish war, by which he earned
    favour of the Emperor. The Emperor has always had a regard for
    him. He will inform you of all that is hidden in my mind. I hope
    you will pay great attention to what he says, and believe him as
    you would myself, and, after due consideration, you will give him
    your reply. Meanwhile, be it known to you that your union and
    friendship with the Russian Government will be beneficial to
    the latter, and still more so to you. The advantages of a close
    alliance with the Russian Government will be permanently evident.

    This friendly letter is written by the Governor-General of
    Turkestan and Adjutant-General to the Emperor, Von Kauffmann,
    Tashkent, Jamadial Akbar, 1295 ( = June, 1878).


_To the_ AMIR _of the whole of Afghanistan_, SHER ALI KHAN.

    (After compliments.) Be it known to you that our relations with
    the British Government are of great importance to Afghanistan and
    its dependencies. As I am unable to see you, I have deputed my
    trustworthy (official) General Stolietoff to you. The General
    is an old friend of mine, and during the late Russo-Turkish war
    earned the favour of the Emperor by his spirit and bravery. He has
    become well known to the Emperor. This trustworthy person will
    communicate to you what he thinks best. I hope you will pay
    attention to what he says, and repose as much confidence in his
    words as if they were my own; and that you will give your answer
    in this matter through him. In the meantime, be it known to you
    that if a friendly treaty will be of benefit to us, it will be of
    far greater benefit to yourself.


GENERAL STOLIETOFF _sent the following letter, on his return to
Tashkent from Kabul, to the address of the Foreign Minister, _WAZIR
SHAH MAHOMED KHAN, _dated 23rd of the holy month of Ramazan, 1295 ( =
21st September, 1878)._

    Thank God, I reached Tashkent safely, and at an auspicious moment
    paid my respects to the Viceroy (Yaroni Padishah means 'half
    king'). I am trying day and night to gain our objects, and hope I
    shall be successful. I am starting to see the Emperor to-day, in
    order to inform His Majesty personally of our affairs. If God
    pleases, everything that is necessary will be done and affirmed.
    _I hope that those who want to enter the gate of Kabul from the
    east will see that the door is closed; then, please God, they will
    tremble._ I hope you will give my respects to His Highness the
    Amir. May God make his life long and increase his wealth! May you
    remain in good health, and know that the protection of God will
    arrange our affairs!

    (Signed) GENERAL STOLIETOFF.


_From_ GENERAL KAUFFMANN _to the_ AMIR, _dated Tashkent, 8th Zekada,
1295 ( = 22nd October, 1878)._

    (After compliments.) Be it known to you that your letter, dated
    12th Shawal, reached me at Tashkent on the 16th October, _i.e._,
    3rd Zekada, and I understood its contents. I have telegraphed an
    abstract of your letter to the address of the Emperor, and
    have sent the letter itself, as also that addressed to General
    Stolietoff, by post to Livadia, where the Emperor now is. I am
    informed on good authority that the English want to come to terms
    with you; and, as a friend, I advise you to make peace with them
    if they offer it.


_From_ GENERAL STOLIETOFF _to_ WAZIR SHAH MAHOMED KHAN, _dated 8th
October 1878._

    First of all, I hope you will be kind enough to give my respects
    to the Amir. May God make his life long and increase his wealth!
    I shall always remember his royal hospitality. I am busy day and
    night in his affairs, and, thank God, my labours have not been
    without result. The great Emperor is a true friend of the Amir's
    and of Afghanistan, and His Majesty will do whatever he may think
    necessary. Of course, you have not forgotten what I told you,
    that the affairs of kingdoms are like a country which has many
    mountains, valleys, and rivers. One who sits on a high mountain
    can see things well. By the power and order of God, there is no
    empire equal to that of our great Emperor. May God make his life
    long! Therefore, whatever our Government advises you, you should
    give ear to it. I tell you the truth that our Government is wise
    as a serpent and harmless as a dove. There are many things which
    you cannot understand, but our Government understands them well.
    It often happens that a thing which is unpleasant at first is
    regarded as a blessing afterwards. Now, my kind friend, I inform
    you that the enemy of your famous religion wants to make peace
    with you through the Kaisar (Sultan) of Turkey. Therefore you
    should look to your brothers who live on the other side of the
    river. If God stirs them up, and gives the sword of fight into
    their hands, then go on, in the name of God (Bismilla), otherwise
    you should be as a serpent; make peace openly, and in secret
    prepare for war, and when God reveals His order to you, declare
    yourself. It will be well, when the Envoy of your enemy wants to
    enter the country, if you send an able emissary, possessing the
    tongue of a serpent and full of deceit, to the enemy's country, so
    that he may with sweet words perplex the enemy's mind, and induce
    him to give up the intention of fighting with you.

    My kind friend, I entrust you to the protection of God. May God be
    the protector of the Amir's kingdom, and may trembling fall upon
    the limbs of your enemies! Amen.

    Write to me soon, and send the letter to the capital. Please write
    in Arabic characters, so that I may be able to read your letter.


_From_, GENERAL KAUFFMANN _to the_ AMIR OF AFGHANISTAN, _dated 30th
Zekada (=26th November,_ 1878).

    (After compliments.) I was much pleased to receive your letter,
    dated 24th Zekada, 1295 (=18th November, 1878), and to hear of
    your good health. I have also received a copy of the letter which
    you sent to the Governor-General. May God be pleased with you. The
    British Ministers have given a pledge to our Ambassador in London
    that they will not interfere with the independence of Afghanistan.
    I am directed by His Majesty the Emperor to communicate this news
    to you, and then, after forming friendship, to go to His Majesty.
    I intend to go to the Russian capital after I have arranged the
    affairs of this country (Turkestan). As I do not consider it
    advisable to keep your trusted officials, whom you are in want
    of, here any more, I send Mahomed Hassan Khan, Kamuah
    (Deputy-Governor), and Gholam Haidar Khan, with two officers, back
    to you. I hope you will consider me a well-wisher of your kingdom,
    and write to me now and then. I have given instructions that,
    until my return, every letter of yours which they receive at
    Turkestan should be forwarded to the capital. Your good fortune is
    a cause of happiness to me, and if any troubles come upon you, I
    also shall be grieved. Some presents have been sent by me through
    Mirza Mahomed Hassan, Kamuah; perhaps they may be accepted.


_Translation of a letter from,_ GENERAL KAUFFMANN _to_ GENERAL
VOZGONOFF, _dated Zel Hijja,_ 1295 _(=December,_ 1878).

    The Amir knows perfectly well that it is impossible for me to
    assist him with troops in winter. Therefore it is necessary that
    war should not be commenced at this unseasonable time. If the
    English, in spite of the Amir's exertions to avoid the war,
    commence it, you must then take leave of the Amir and start for
    Tashkent, because your presence in Afghanistan in winter is
    useless. Moreover, at such a juncture as the commencement of war
    in Afghanistan, you ought to come here and explain the whole thing
    to me, so that I may communicate it to the Emperor. This will be
    of great benefit to Afghanistan and to Russia.


_From_ GENERAL KAUFFMANN _to the_ AMIR OF AFGHANISTAN, dated _25th
December,_ 1878 _(Russian, 13th Muharram,_ 1296).

    Your letter, dated 27th Zel Hijja (=20th November), 1878, has
    reached me. I was pleased to hear tidings of your good health.
    The Emperor has caused the British Government to agree to the
    continuance of Afghan independence. The English Ministers have
    promised this. I earnestly request you not to leave your kingdom.
    As far as possible, consider your own interests, and do not lose
    your independence. For the present come to terms with the British
    Government. If you do not want to go back to Kabul for this
    purpose, you can write to your son, Mahomed Yakub Khan, to make
    peace with the English as you may direct him. Do not leave the
    soil of Afghanistan at this time, because it will be of benefit
    to you. My words are not without truth, because your arrival in
    Russian territory will make things worse.

       *       *       *       *       *




APPENDIX VII (cont.)


_From_ GENERAL KAUFFMANN _to the_ AMIR OF AFGHANISTAN, _received at
Mazir-i-Sharif on the 17th January, 1879_.

    I have received your friendly letter, dated 13th Zel Hijja (=8th
    December, 1878). In that letter you asked me to send you as many
    troops as could be got ready. I have written to you a letter to
    the effect that the Emperor, on account of your troubles, had
    communicated with the British Government, and that the Russian
    Ambassador at London had obtained a promise from the British
    Ministers to the effect that they would not injure the
    independence of Afghanistan. Perhaps you sent your letter before
    you got mine. Now, I have heard that you have appointed your son,
    Mahomed Yakub, as your Regent, and have come out of Kabul with
    some troops. I have received an order from the Emperor to the
    effect that it is impossible to assist you with troops now. I
    hope you will be fortunate. It all depends on the decree of God.
    Believe me, that the friendship which I made with you will be
    perpetual. It is necessary to send back General Vozgonoff and his
    companions. You can keep Dr. Yuralski with you if you please. No
    doubt the doctor will be of use to you and to your dependents. I
    hope our friendship will continue to be strengthened, and that
    intercourse will be carried on between us.


_From_ GENERAL KAUFFMANN _to the_ AMIR SHER ALI, _dated 29th December,
1878 (=17th Muharram, 1296)_.

    (After compliments.) The Foreign Minister, General Gortchakoff,
    has informed me by telegraph that the Emperor has directed me
    to trouble you to come to Tashkent for the present. I therefore
    communicate this news to you with great pleasure; at the same
    time, I may mention that I have received no instructions about
    your journey to St. Petersburg. My personal interview with you
    will increase our friendship greatly.

    _Translation of a letter from_ MAJOR-GENERAL IVANOFF, _Governor of
    Zarafshan, to the Heir-Apparent, _MAHOMED MUSA KHAN, _and others_.

    On the 26th of Rabi-ul-Awul, at an auspicious moment, I received
    your letter which you sent me, and understood its contents. I
    was very much pleased, and at once communicated it to General
    Kauffmann, the Governor-General. With regard to what you wrote
    about the friendly relations between the Russian and Afghan
    Governments, and your own desire for friendship, I have the
    honour to state that we are also desirous of being friends. The
    friendship between the two Governments existed in the time of the
    late Amir, and I hope that it will be increased and strengthened
    by Amir Mahomed Yakub Khan.

    May God change the wars in your country to happiness; may peace
    reign in it; and may your Government be strengthened! I have been
    forwarding all your letters to the Governor-General, General
    Kauffmann. May God keep you safe!

    The Zarafshan Province Governor, MAJOR-GENERAL IVANOFF.

    Written and sealed by the General. Written on 29th Mart (March),
    1879 (=5th Rabi-ul-Saui, 1296).

_Treaty between the RUSSIAN GOVERNMENT and AMIR SHER ALI KHAN;
_written from memory by MIRZA MAHOMED NABBI._

1. The Russian Government engages that the friendship of the Russian
Government with the Government of Amir Sher Ali Khan, Amir of all
Afghanistan, will be a permanent and perpetual one.

2. The Russian Government engages that, as Sirdar Abdulla Khan, son of
the Amir, is dead, the friendship of the Russian Government with
any person whom the Amir may appoint Heir-Apparent to the throne of
Afghanistan, and with the heir of the Heir-Apparent, will remain firm
and perpetual.

3. The Russian Government engages that if any foreign enemy attacks
Afghanistan, and the Amir is unable to drive him out, and asks the
assistance of the Russian Government, the Russian Government will
repel the enemy, either by means of advice, or by such other means as
it may consider proper.

4. The Amir of Afghanistan will not wage war with any foreign power
without consulting the Russian Government, and without its permission.

5. The Amir of Afghanistan engages that he will always report in a
friendly manner to the Russian Government what goes on in his kingdom.

6. The Amir of Afghanistan will communicate every wish and important
affair of his to General Kauffmann, Governor-General of Turkestan, and
the Governor-General will be authorized by the Russian Government to
fulfil the wishes of the Amir.

7. The Russian Government engages that the Afghan merchants who may
trade and sojourn in Russian territory will be safe from wrong, and
that they will be allowed to carry away their profits.

8. The Amir of Afghanistan will have the power to send his servants to
Russia to learn arts and trades, and the Russian officers will treat
them with consideration and respect as men of rank.

9. (Does not remember.)

10. I, Major-General Stolietoff Nicholas, being a trusted Agent of the
Russian Government, have made the above-mentioned Articles between the
Russian Government and the Government of Amir Sher Ali Khan, and have
put my seal to them.

       *       *       *       *       *




APPENDIX VIII.

(Referred to in Chapter LVIII, Footnote 5.)


_Letter from SIRDAR ABDUR RAHMAN KHAN to LEPEL GRIFFIN, ESQ.,
dated 15th April, 1880._

    Whereas at this happy time I have received your kind letter. In
    a spirit of justice and friendship you wrote to inquire what I
    wished in Afghanistan. My honoured friend, the servants of the
    great [British] Government know well that, throughout these twelve
    years of exile in the territories of the Emperor of Russia, night
    and day I have cherished the hope of revisiting my native land.
    When the late Amir Sher Ali Khan died, and there was no one to
    rule our tribes, I proposed to return to Afghanistan, but it
    was not fated [that I should do so]; then I went to Tashkent.
    Consequently, Amir Mahomed Yakub Khan, having come to terms and
    made peace with the British Government, was appointed Amir of
    Afghanistan; but since, after he had left you, he listened to the
    advice of every interested [dishonest] person, and raised fools to
    power, until the ignorant men directed the affairs of Afghanistan,
    which during the reign of my grandfather, who had eighteen able
    sons, was so managed that night was bright like day, Afghanistan
    was, in consequence, disgraced before all States, and ruined. Now,
    therefore, that you seek to learn my hopes and wishes, they are
    these: that as long as your Empire and that of Russia exist, my
    countrymen, the tribes of Afghanistan, should live quietly in ease
    and peace; that these two States should find us true and faithful,
    and that we should rest at peace between them [England and
    Russia], for my tribesmen are unable to struggle with Empires, and
    are ruined by want of commerce; and we hope of your friendship
    that, sympathizing with and assisting the people of Afghanistan,
    you will place them under the honourable protection of the two
    Powers. This would redound to the credit of both, would give peace
    to Afghanistan, and quiet and comfort to God's people. This is my
    wish; for the rest, it is yours to decide.

       *       *       *       *       *




APPENDIX IX.

(Referred to in Chapter LVIII, Footnote 6.)

_Letter from A. C. LYALL, ESQ., C.B., Secretary to the Government of
India, Foreign Department, to LEPEL H. GRIFFIN, Esq., C.S.I., Chief
Political Officer, Kabul, dated Simla, April, 1880._


    I have the honour to inform you that the Governor-General has
    received and considered in council your telegrams of the 22nd and
    23rd instant, forwarding the translation of a letter received by
    you from Sirdar Abdur Rahman on the 21st instant, together with
    a summary of certain oral explanations which accompanied that
    letter, and a statement of the recommendations suggested by it to
    Lieutenaut-General Sir Frederick Roberts and yourself.

    In conveying to you its instructions on the subject of this
    important communication, the Government of India considers it
    expedient to recapitulate the principles on which it has hitherto
    been acting in northern Afghanistan, and clearly to define the
    point of view from which it contemplates the present situation of
    affairs in that country. The single object to which, as you are
    well aware, the Afghan policy of this Government has at all times
    been directed and limited, is the security of the North-West
    frontier of India. The Government of India has, however, no less
    invariably held and acted on the conviction that the security of
    this frontier is incompatible with the intrusion of any foreign
    influence into the great border State of Afghanistan. To exclude
    or eject such influence the Government of India has frequently
    subsidized and otherwise assisted the Amirs of Kabul. It has also,
    more than once, taken up arms against them. But it has never
    interfered, for any other purpose, in the affairs of their
    kingdom. Regulating on this principle and limiting to this object
    the conduct of our relations with the rulers of Kabul, it was our
    long-continued endeavour to find in their friendship and their
    strength the requisite guarantees for the security of our own
    frontier. Failing in that endeavour, we were compelled to seek the
    attainment of the object to which our Afghan policy was, and is
    still, exclusively directed, by rendering the permanent security
    of our frontier as much as possible independent of such
    conditions.

    This obligation was not accepted without reluctance. Not even when
    forced into hostilities by the late Amir Sher Ali Khan's espousal
    of a Russian alliance, proposed by Russia in contemplation of a
    rupture with the British Government, did we relinquish our desire
    for the renewal of relations with a strong and friendly Afghan
    Power, and, when the son of Sher Ali subsequently sought our
    alliance and protection, they were at once accorded to him, on
    conditions of which His Highness professed to appreciate the
    generosity. The crime, however, which dissolved the Treaty of
    Gandamak, and the disclosures which followed that event, finally
    convinced the Government of India that the interests committed to
    its care could not but be gravely imperilled by further adhesion
    to a policy dependent for its fruition on the gratitude, the good
    faith, the assumed self-interest, or the personal character of any
    Afghan Prince.

    When, therefore, Her Majesty's troops re-entered Afghanistan in
    September last, it was with two well-defined and plainly-avowed
    objects. The first was to avenge the treacherous massacre of
    the British Mission at Kabul; the second was to maintain the
    safeguards sought through the Treaty of Gandamak, by providing
    for their maintenance guarantees of a more substantial and less
    precarious character.

    These two objects have been maintained: the first by the capture
    of Kabul and the punishment of the crime committed there, the
    second by the severance of Kandahar from the Kabul power.

    Satisfied with their attainment, the Government of India has no
    longer any motive or desire to enter into fresh treaty engagements
    with the Rulers of Kabul. The arrangements and exchange of
    friendly assurances with the Amir Sher Ali, though supplemented on
    the part of the Government of India by subsidies and favours of
    various kinds, wholly failed to secure the object of them,
    which was, nevertheless, a thoroughly friendly one, and no less
    conducive to the security and advantage of the Afghan than to
    those of the British Power. The treaty with Yakub Khan, which
    secured to him our friendship and material support, was equally
    ineffectual. Moreover, recent events and arrangements have
    fundamentally changed the situation to which our correspondence
    and engagements with the Amir of Afghanistan formally applied. Our
    advance frontier positions at Kandahar and Kuram have materially
    diminished the political importance of Kabul in relation to India,
    and although we shall always appreciate the friendship of its
    Ruler, our relations with him are now of so little importance to
    the paramount objects of our policy that we no longer require to
    maintain British agents in any part of his dominions.

    Our only reasons, therefore, for not immediately withdrawing our
    forces from northern Afghanistan have hitherto been--_first_, the
    excited and unsettled condition of the country round Kabul,
    with the attitude of hostility assumed by some leaders of armed
    gatherings near Ghazni; and, _secondly_, the inability of the
    Kabul Sirdars to agree among themselves on the selection of a
    Ruler strong enough to maintain order after our evacuation of the
    country.

    The first-named of these reasons has now ceased to exist. In a
    minute dated the 30th ultimo the Viceroy and Governor-General
    stated that 'the Government is anxious to withdraw as soon as
    possible the troops from Kabul and from all points beyond those
    to be occupied under the Treaty of Gandamak, except Kandahar. In
    order that this may be done, it is desirable to find a Ruler for
    Kabul, which will be separated from Kandahar. Steps,' continued
    His Excellency, 'are being taken for this purpose. Meanwhile, it
    is essential that we should make such a display of strength in
    Afghanistan as will show that we are masters of the situation,
    and will overawe disaffection.'... 'All that is necessary, from a
    political point of view, is for General Stewart to march to
    Ghazni, break up any opposition he may find there or in the
    neighbourhood, and open up direct communication with General Sir
    Frederick Roberts at Kabul.' The military operations thus defined
    have been accomplished by General Stewart's successful action
    before Ghazni.

    With regard to the second reason mentioned for the retention of
    our troops in northern Afghanistan, the appearance of Abdur
    Rahman as a candidate for the throne of Kabul, whose claims the
    Government of India has no cause to oppose, and who seems to be
    approved, and likely to be supported, by at least a majority of
    the population, affords fair ground for anticipating that our
    wishes in regard to the restoration, before our departure, of
    order in that part of the country will now be fulfilled.

    The Governor-General in Council has consequently decided that the
    evacuation of Kabul shall be effected not later than October next,
    and it is with special reference to this decision that the letter
    and message addressed to you by Sirdar Abdur Rahman have been
    carefully considered by His Excellency in Council.

    What first claims notice in the consideration of that letter is
    the desire that it expresses for the permanent establishment of
    Afghanistan with our assistance and sympathy under the joint
    protection of the British and Russian Empires. This suggestion,
    which is more fully developed in the Sirdar's unwritten message,
    cannot be entertained or discussed.

    As already stated, the primary object and declared determination
    of the Government of India have been the exclusion of foreign
    influence or interference from Afghanistan. This cardinal
    condition of amicable relations with Afghanistan has, at all times
    and in all circumstances, been deemed essential for the permanent
    security of Her Majesty's Indian Empire. As such, it has hitherto
    been firmly maintained by successive Governors-General of India
    under the explicit instructions of Her Majesty's Government. Nor
    has it ever been ignored, or officially contested, by the Russian
    Government. That Government, on the contrary, has repeatedly, and
    under every recent change of circumstances in Afghanistan, renewed
    the assurances solemnly given to the British Government that
    'Russia considers Afghanistan as entirely beyond the sphere of her
    influence.'

    It is true that negotiations at one time passed between the two
    Governments with a view to the mutual recognition of certain
    territories as constituting a neutral zone between their
    respective spheres of legitimate influence and action, and that at
    one time it was proposed by Russia to treat Afghanistan itself as
    a neutral territory. Those negotiations, however, having proved
    fruitless, the northern frontier of Afghanistan was finally
    determined by mutual agreement, and in 1876 the Russian Government
    formally reiterated its adherence to the conclusion that, 'while
    maintaining on either side the arrangement come to as regards the
    limits of Afghanistan, which is to remain outside the sphere of
    Russian action, the two Cabinets should regard as terminated the
    discussions relative to the intermediate zone, which promised no
    practical result.'

    The position of Afghanistan as defined and settled by these
    engagements was again distinctly affirmed on behalf of the Queen's
    Government by the Marquis of Salisbury in 1879, and the Government
    of India unreservedly maintains it in the fullest conviction
    of its essential necessity for the peaceable protection of Her
    Majesty's Indian dominions. It is therefore desirable that you
    should take occasion to inform Abdur Rahman that the relations of
    Afghanistan to the British and Russian Empires are matters which
    the Government of India must decline to bring into discussion with
    the Sirdar. The Afghan states and tribes are too contiguous
    with India, whose North-Western frontier they surround, for the
    Government of India ever willingly to accept partnership with
    any other Power in the exercise of its legitimate and recognized
    influence over those tribes and States.

    The Governor-General in Council is, nevertheless, most anxious
    that the Sirdar should not misunderstand the light in which his
    personal sentiments and obligations towards Russia are regarded
    by the Government of India. So long as the Rulers of Kabul were
    amenable to its advice, this Government has never ceased to
    impress on them the international duty of scrupulously respecting
    all the recognized rights and interests of their Russian
    neighbour, refraining from every act calculated to afford the
    Russian authorities in Central Asia any just cause of umbrage or
    complaint. The intelligence and good sense which are conspicuous
    in the Sirdar's letter and messages to you will enable him to
    appreciate the difference between conduct regulated on these
    principles and that which cost Sher Ali the loss of his throne.
    This Government does not desire, nor has it ever desired, to
    impose on any Ruler of Kabul conditions incompatible with that
    behaviour which Russia, as a powerful and neighbouring Empire, is
    entitled to expect from him; least of all can we desire to impose
    such conditions on a Prince who has received hospitality and
    protection in Russian territory. I am therefore to observe that,
    in the natural repugnance expressed by Abdur Rahman to conditions
    which 'might make him appear ungrateful' to those 'whose salt he
    has eaten,' the Governor-General in Council recognizes a sentiment
    altogether honourable to the Sirdar, and perfectly consistent with
    the sincerity of his professed goodwill towards ourselves.

    These observations will furnish you with a sufficient answer to
    the question asked by Abdur Rahman as to the 'nature of our
    friendship' and 'its conditions.'

    The frankness with which he has explained his position entitles
    him to receive from us a no less unreserved statement of our own.
    The Government of India cordially shares the wish expressed by
    Abdur Rahman that, between the British and Russian Empires, his
    'tribes and countrymen may live quietly in ease and peace.' We do
    not desire to place them in a position of unfriendliness towards a
    Power which is pledged to us to regard their country as 'entirely
    beyond the sphere of its action.' The injury to Afghan commerce
    caused by the present condition of Afghanistan, to which the
    Sirdar has alluded, is fully appreciated by the Government of
    India, and on the restoration of peace between the two countries
    the revival and development of trade intercourse need present no
    difficulty. As regards our own friendship, it will, if sincerely
    sought, be freely given, and fully continued so long as it is
    loyally reciprocated. But we attach to it no other condition. We
    have no concessions to ask or make, and the Sirdar will therefore
    perceive that there is really no matter for negotiation or bargain
    between him and us.

    On this point your reply to Abdur Rahman cannot be too explicit.
    Previous to the Sirdar's arrival in Turkestan, the hostility and
    treachery of those whose misconduct he admits and deplores had
    compelled the Government of India to make territorial arrangements
    of a material and permanent character for the better protection of
    our frontier. The maintenance of these arrangements is in no wise
    dependent on the assent or dissent, on the good will or ill-will,
    of any Chief at Kabul. The character of them has been so fully
    explained by you to all the other Kabul Sirdars that it is
    probably well known to Abdur Rahman. But in order that our present
    intercourse and future relations with the Sirdar may be perfectly
    clear of doubt on a point affecting the position he aspires
    to fill, the Governor-General in Council authorizes you, if
    necessary, to make him plainly understand that neither the
    district assigned to us by the Treaty of Gandamak, nor any part
    of the province of Kandahar, will ever be restored to the Kabul
    Power.

    As regards this last-mentioned province, the Government of India
    has been authorized by that of Her Majesty to give to Sher Ali
    Khan, the present Wali of Kandahar, a distinct assurance that
    he will be not only recognized, but maintained, by the British
    Government as the Ruler of that province. Sher Ali Khan is one of
    the Native nobles of Kandahar. He is administering the province
    with ability, good sense, and complete loyalty to the British
    Government, which has promised him the support of a British
    garrison so long as he requires such support. The Governor-General
    in Council cannot doubt that Sirdar Abdur Rahman will readily
    recognize the obligation incumbent on the honour of the British
    Government to keep faith with all who, whether at Kandahar or
    elsewhere, have proved themselves true and loyal adherents.
    Yakub Khan forfeited our alliance, and with it his throne, by
    mistrusting the assurances we gave him, and falsifying those
    which he had given to us. If, misled by his example, Yakub Khan's
    successor attempts to injure or oppress the friends of the British
    Government, its power will again be put forth to protect or avenge
    them. Similarly, if the next Kabul Ruler reintroduces into his
    Court or country foreign influences adverse to our own, the
    Government of India will again take such steps as it may deem
    expedient to deal with such a case. These contingencies, however,
    cannot occur if the sentiments of Abdur Rahman are such as
    he represents them to be. Meanwhile, the territorial and
    administrative arrangements already completed by us for the
    permanent protection of our own interests are not susceptible of
    negotiation or discussion with Abdur Rahman or any other claimant
    to the throne of Kabul.

    To the settlement of Herat, which is not included in these
    completed arrangements, the Governor-General in Council cannot
    authorize you to make or invite any reference in your reply to
    Abdur Rahman. The settlement of the future administration of
    Herat has been undertaken by Her Majesty's Government; with those
    present views in regard to this important question, the Government
    of India is not yet acquainted.

    Nor can our evacuation of Kabul constitute any subject for
    proposals in your correspondence with the Sirdar. This measure
    was determined on by the Government of India long before the
    appearance of Abdur Rahman as a candidate for the government of
    the country we are about to evacuate. It has not been caused by
    the hostility, and is not, therefore, conditional on the goodwill,
    of any Afghan Power.

    The Government of India is, however, very willing to carry out the
    evacuation of Kabul in the manner most conducive to the personal
    advantage of Abdur Rahman, whose interests we believe to be, more
    than those of any other Sirdar, in accordance with the general
    interests of the Afghan people. For this reason it is desirable
    that you should inform Abdur Rahman of our intention to evacuate
    Kabul, and our desire to take that opportunity of unconditionally
    transferring to his authority the whole of the country from which
    our troops will be withdrawn. You are authorized to add that our
    military and political officers at Kabul will be empowered to
    facilitate any practical arrangement suggested by the Sirdar for
    promptly and peaceably effecting, in co-operation with him, the
    transfer thus contemplated on his behalf. Such arrangement must,
    however, be consistent with our obligations towards those who have
    served and aided the British Government during our occupation of
    those territories.

    For this purpose, it appears to the Governor-General in Council
    desirable that the Sirdar should lose no time in proceeding to
    Kabul, and there settling, in conference with General Stewart and
    yourself, such preliminary arrangements as may best promote the
    undisturbed establishment of his future government.

    The Governor-General in Council has, however, no desire to press
    this suggestion, should it appear to the Sirdar that his presence
    at Kabul, previous to the withdrawal of our troops for the purpose
    of personal conference with the British authorities, might have
    the effect of weakening his popularity, or compromising his
    position in the eyes of his future subjects.

    The point is one which must be left entirely to the Sirdar's own
    judgment and inclination.

    But Abdur Rahman is doubtless aware that there are at present,
    in and around Kabul, personages not destitute of influence, who
    themselves aspire to the sovereignty he seeks, and that the family
    of Yakub has still numerous personal adherents, who may possibly
    take advantage of the withdrawal of our troops to oppose the
    Sirdar's authority if he is not personally present to assert it.

    It should on both sides he remembered and understood that it is
    not the policy of this Government to impose upon the Afghan people
    an unpopular Ruler or to interfere uninvited in the administration
    of a friendly one. If Abdur Rahman proves able and disposed to
    conciliate the confidence of his countrymen, without forfeiting
    the good understanding which he seeks with us, he will assuredly
    find his best support in our political appreciation of that fact.
    Our reason for unconditionally transferring to him the government
    of the country, from which our forces will in any case be
    withdrawn a few months hence, is that, on the whole, he appears to
    be the Chief best able to restore order in that country, and also
    best entitled to undertake such a task. In his performance of it
    he will receive, if he requires it, our assistance. But we neither
    need nor wish to hamper, by preliminary stipulations or provisoes,
    his independent exercise of a sovereignty which he declares
    himself anxious to maintain on a footing of peace and friendship
    with the British Government.

    The present statement of the views and intentions of His
    Excellency the Governor-General in Council respecting Abdur Rahman
    will enable you to represent them with adequate accuracy in your
    reply to the Sirdar's friendly overtures, and it will now be your
    duty to convey to Abdur Rahman, without any avoidable delay,
    the answer of the Government of India to the letter and message
    received from him. His Excellency feels assured that you will give
    full expression to the spirit of candour and goodwill in which
    these communications have been received and are reciprocated.

    But I am to impress on your attention the importance of avoiding
    any expression which might appear to suggest or admit matter for
    negotiation or discussion in reference to the relative positions
    of the Sirdar and the Government of India.

    In conclusion, I am to request that on receipt of this letter you
    will be so good as to lose no time in submitting its contents to
    General Sir Donald Stewart, should he then have reached Kabul.
    In any case, you will, of course, communicate them to General
    Roberts, and act upon them in consultation with the chief military
    authority on the spot.

       *       *       *       *       *




APPENDIX X.

(Referred to in Chapter LIX, Footnote 2.)

_Extract from a Report by LIEUTENANT-GENERAL SIR FREDERICK ROBERTS,
V.C., K.C.B., to the QUARTERMASTER-GENERAL IN INDIA, dated Kabul,
17th April, 1880._

25. I think I have now dealt with all the points of military
importance connected with the military position in northern
Afghanistan, but there are a few questions of more general interest
which I desire to bring to the notice of His Excellency the
Commander-in-Chief and the Government of India.

26. First with regard to rations. The daily scale of issue to Native
troops is given in the margin.

[Sidenote: _Daily ration of Native soldiers_:

  Atta[1]      12 chittacks [2]
  Dall[3]       2 chittacks
  Ghi[4]        1 chittack
  Salt          1/3 chittack
  Meat          1 lb. bi-weekly
  Rum           1 dram  "      ]

It has been found throughout the campaign, even when the men were
employed upon hard work, that '12 chittacks' of 'atta' daily are amply
sufficient for the Native troops, supplemented, as of late, through
the liberality of Government, by a bi-weekly issue of 1 lb. of
meat. In a climate like Afghanistan, where the inhabitants are all
meat-eaters, this liberality has been most wise. Every endeavour was
made, before this sanction was granted, to supply the Native portion
of the force with meat on payment, and I attribute to this in great
measure the sound health and excellent stamina which they now exhibit.

With regard to the issue of rum, I would suggest that it should not be
issued free to Native troops, except under exceptional circumstances
of fatigue and weather, but that the Commissariat Department should
be authorized to have in store a sufficiency of rum to admit of a
bi-weekly issue to such troops as drink the spirit, _on payment_, and
then only on the recommendation of the Medical Officer, and under the
sanction of the General Officer commanding. On all occasions when rum
is sanctioned, either free or on payment, those who do not partake
of spirits should he allowed a ration of tea and sugar under similar
conditions.

27. The scale of rations for Native followers requires no alteration.

[Sidenote: _Daily ration of European soldiers_:

  Meat             1-1/4 lb.
  Bread            1-1/4 lb.
  Vegetables       1-1/4 lb.
  Rice                 4 oz.
  Salt               2/3 oz.
  Tea                3/4 oz.
  Sugar                3 oz.
  Rum                  1 dr.]

28. The European rations now under issue in Kabul are as per margin,
and with reference to them I would make the following remarks:
The increase of 1/4 lb. in bread and meat is, in my opinion, very
desirable, for not only is the meat, as a rule, on service inferior to
that served in cantonments, but the extras which can be procured from
the coffee-shop are not here forthcoming. When the vegetable ration
consists of potatoes, 1 lb. is sufficient, but when it is made of
mixed vegetables 1-1/4 lb. is necessary. The substitution of _dall_
for any portion of the vegetable ration I consider undesirable.

Tinned soups and meats and biscuits are most valuable, and should be
liberally supplied to every force in the field. They are portable and
liked by the men, to whom they furnish a very welcome change of diet.
I would very strongly recommend that a much larger issue of these
articles than has hitherto been sanctioned should be provided.

[Sidenote: Firewood.]

29. A question which has arisen during this campaign, and which may
crop up again, has been the provision of firewood for cooking to
Native troops and followers. Throughout the winter firewood could not
be purchased at Kabul, and it was absolutely necessary to issue it to
these men. This was done at the rate of one _seer_[5] per man, but
this amount is not arbitrary, and might, under certain circumstances,
be diminished. Since roads were re-opened and markets re-established
the issue of wood has been discontinued. In framing any future rules
for the guidance of a force in the field, the question of providing
firewood through the Commissariat Department for Native troops and
followers, free or on payment, should be vested in the General
Officers commanding.

[Sidenote: Shoes.]

30. The scale of clothing authorized by Government for Native troops
and followers was found, even in the rigorous climate of Afghanistan,
to be most liberal, except that during the very coldest weather a
second blanket was required. This want I was able to meet from stock
in hand, and as the weather became milder these extra blankets were
withdrawn and returned into store. Warm stockings, too, are very
necessary in a climate where frostbite is not uncommon; fortunately,
some thousands were procured locally and issued to followers. The
ordinary Native shoe of India, as provided by the Commissariat
Department, is utterly unfitted for a country such as Afghanistan.
Major Badcock will send to Peshawar (where they can easily be made up)
a pattern Kabali shoe, which I am convinced would be found admirably
suited for Native troops and followers crossing the frontier. We are
now almost entirely dependent on the local market for our shoes.

[Sidenote: Ammunition boots.]

A large supply of English-made ammunition boots should always
accompany a force in the field, in order to allow those Natives who
use them, and who are often crippled by wearing other descriptions of
shoe, to obtain them on payment at the moderate rate now fixed, viz.,
Rs. 4 per pair.

[Sidenote: Waterproof sheets.]

The country-made waterproof sheets, though slightly heavier, have
proved themselves quite as serviceable, if not more so, than the
English-made ones.

At the close of the campaign, I would very strongly recommend that an
intelligent committee should be required to go thoroughly into
these questions of clothing for troops, British and Native, and for
followers. I would also suggest that when a decision is arrived at,
sealed patterns of every article approved should be deposited at all
manufacturing centres and in all the large jails, so that when certain
articles are required they need only be called for, and precious time
(often wasted in reference and correspondence) saved.

[Sidenote: Doolie-bearers.]

31. The number of doolie-bearers with the two divisions of the Kabul
Field Force now at Kabul is 3,536, with the very moderate sick report
of 35, or 1 per cent. of strength.

  Doolies and dandies are distributed as follows:

  British troops         {doolies, 3 per cent.
                         {dandies, 2 per cent.

  Native troops          {doolies, 2 per cent.
                         {dandies, 3 per cent.

--a percentage which I consider sufficient for field-service, as, in
the event of any unusual number of casualties, transport animals could
and would be made use of, and it is most undesirable to increase the
number of followers.

[Sidenote: The Lushai dandy.]

The Lushai dandy for this sort of warfare is much preferable to the
carpet or dhurrie dandy, as it can be made into a bed, and men are not
so liable to fall out of it.

[Sidenote: Bourke's doolie.]

Bourke's doolie is very good, but liable to get out of order, and
difficult to repair when broken; the ordinary kind is fairly good and
serviceable.

[Sidenote: Field-service tents.]

32. I would urge that in future all field-service tents should be
made after the pattern of the Mountain Battery tent, single fly
for Natives, double for Europeans, and that the poles should be
constructed on the telescopic principle: that is, that no thinning
of the wood where it enters the socket should be allowed either on
uprights or ridge-pole, and that the old system of paring away should
be abandoned. Instead, the upper section should sit flat on the lower.
Doubtless the sockets will have to be longer and stronger than those
now in use, but this is the only means by which tents can be adapted
to mule and pony carriage, which will no doubt in future wars be our
chief means of transport.

[Sidenote: Waler horses.]

33. The Waler horses of the Cavalry and Artillery have stood the
strain remarkably well, considering the hard work and great exposure
they have had to bear, and also that for a considerable time they were
entirely deprived of green food. I feel sure this information will
be most satisfactory, seeing that, for the future, the Artillery and
Cavalry in India must mainly depend upon the Australian market for
their remounts.

[Sidenote: Committee to record suggestions on equipment.]

34. As there are some minor points of detail which might
advantageously be considered by those who have had the experience of
recent service, I have convened a committee, with Colonel MacGregor,
C.B., as President, which will take suggestions and record opinions
regarding packing transport animals, equipment, kit, dress, etc., of
both officers and men of the several branches of the service. From
the constitution of the committee, I feel certain that their
recommendations cannot but be valuable, and I hope to have the honour
of submitting them shortly for the consideration of His Excellency the
Commander-in-Chief.


[Footnote 1: Flour.]

[Footnote 2: A chittack = 2 ounces.]

[Footnote 3: A kind of pea.]

[Footnote 4: Clarified butter.]

[Footnote 5: A seer = 2 lb.]


       *       *       *       *       *




APPENDIX XI. (Referred to in Chapter LXVI, Footnote 3.)

INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE GUIDANCE OF GENERAL AND OTHER OFFICERS COMMANDING
COLUMNS IN BURMA.

MANDALAY, _20th. November, 1886._

The following general instructions for the guidance of
Brigadier-Generals and Officers in command of columns are published by
order of His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief in India:

_1st_.--Columns sent out for the pacification of a district, or in
pursuit of a particular gang of dacoits, must be amply provided and
able to keep the field for ten days at least. To enable this to be
done without employing an undue number of transport animals, it is
necessary that every endeavour be made to obtain grain for Cavalry
horses and Transport ponies from the villages passed through; careful
inquiry must be made as to where supplies can be obtained locally, and
the line of advance determined accordingly. Arrangements must be made
for replenishing the supply when necessary from depots which must be
formed at convenient centres when the nature of the operations may
necessitate it. These depots should be pushed forward from time to
time as the troops advance. The work of a column obliged to return to
its base of supply before it has had an opportunity of completing the
object of the expedition must be more harmful than beneficial, as its
failure emboldens the enemy and weakens the confidence of the people
in our power to protect them and to reach the offenders.

_2nd_.--Where two or more columns are acting in concert, the details
of time and place of movement should be settled beforehand with the
greatest nicety, and the commanding officers of all such columns
should be provided with the same maps, or tracings from them, so that
subsequent changes of plan, rendered necessary by later information,
may be understood and conformed to by all. Officers commanding columns
must do their utmost to get into, and keep up, communication with one
another. This can be effected by:

  Visual signalling,
  Spies and scouts,
  Patrolling.

_3rd_.--Movements to be executed in concert with the troops in other
brigades or commands, or likely to tell directly or indirectly on the
districts commanded by other officers, will be fully communicated to
those officers, both beforehand and when in progress.

_4th_.--Brigadier-Generals are empowered to give very liberal
remuneration for the effective service of guides and for information
involving danger to those who give it. They may delegate this power to
selected officers in detached commands, but a close watch must be kept
on expenditure under this head. Opportunities should be afforded to
timid informers who are afraid to compromise themselves by entering
camp to interview officers at some distance out and in secrecy.

_5th_.--Cavalry horses and Mounted Infantry ponies must be saved as
much as is compatible with occasional forced and rapid marches. On
ordinary occasions the riders should dismount, from time to time, and
march alongside of their horses or ponies.

_6th_.--The special attention of all officers is called to the careful
treatment of pack-animals, and officers in command of columns and
parties will be held strictly responsible that the animals are
properly loaded for the march, saved as much as possible during it,
and carefully attended to and fed after it. Officers in command will
ascertain by daily personal supervision and inspection that these
orders are carried out.

_7th_.--It must be remembered that the chief object of traversing
the country with columns is to cultivate friendly relations with the
inhabitants, and at the same time to put before them evidences of
our power, thus gaining their good-will and their confidence. It is
therefore the bounden duty of commanding officers to ascertain that
the troops under their command are not permitted to injure the
property of the people or to wound their susceptibilities.

_8th_.--The most injurious accounts of our intentions have been
circulated amongst, and believed by, the people, and too much pains
cannot be taken to eradicate this impression, and to assure the people
both by act and word of our good-will towards the law-abiding. Chief
men of districts should he treated with consideration and distinction.
The success of the present operations will much depend on the tact
with which the inhabitants are treated.

_9th_.--When there is an enemy in arms against British rule, all
arrangements must be made not only to drive him from his position,
but also to surround the position so as to inflict the heaviest loss
possible. Resistance overcome without inflicting punishment on the
enemy only emboldens him to repeat the game, and thus, by protracting
operations, costs more lives than a severe lesson promptly
administered, even though that lesson may cause some casualties on
our side. Arrangements should be made to surround villages and jungle
retreats with Cavalry, and afterwards to hunt them closely with
Infantry. In the pursuit the broadest margin possible will be drawn
between leaders of rebellion and the professional dacoit on the one
part, and the villagers who have been forced into combinations against
us. _Bohs_ and leaders will generally be found heading the column of
fugitives, and a portion of the Cavalry should be directed to pursue
them without wasting time over the rank and file of the enemy.

_10th_.--Unless otherwise ordered, columns of occupation should move
in short marches, halting at the principal towns and villages. This
will give civil officers opportunities for becoming thoroughly
acquainted with their districts, and give military officers time to
reconnoitre and sketch the country.

_11th_.--Where troops are likely to be quartered for some time, bamboo
platforms should be erected to keep the men off the ground. Tents, if
afterwards provided, can be pitched on the platforms.

_12th_.--The greatest latitude will be allowed to Brigadier-Generals
and officers in local command in ordering and carrying out movements
for the pacification of their districts. They will, however, report as
fully as possible all movements intended and in progress, through
the regular channel, for the information of His Excellency the
Commander-in-Chief.

_13th_.--Civil officers will be detailed under the orders of the Chief
Commissioner to accompany columns. As they are in a position to reward
loyalty and good service, they will be able to obtain more reliable
guides and intelligence than the military officers can hope to get.
The Chief Commissioner has authorized selected Burmans, men of
position who may look for official appointments, being employed as
scouts by the civil officers of districts and being attached to
columns. These scouts should wear some distinguishing and conspicuous
mark or badge to prevent them being fired on by the troops. They
should not be called upon to take the front when approaching an
unbroken enemy, or where ambuscades may be expected, but their
services will be most valuable in gaining information, and later in
hunting down the individuals of a broken-up gang.

_14th_.--Absolute secrecy must be maintained regarding movements
against the enemy and every device resorted to to mislead him.

_15th_.--When civil officers accompany columns, all prisoners will be
handed over to them for disposal. When no civil officer is present,
the officer commanding the column will, _ex officio_, have magisterial
powers to inflict punishment up to two years' imprisonment, or 30
lashes. Offenders deserving heavier punishment must be reserved for
disposal by the civil officers.

_16th_.--Officers commanding columns will be held responsible that the
troops are not kept in unhealthy districts, and that, when a locality
has proved itself unhealthy, the troops are removed at the earliest
possible opportunity. Military officers are responsible for the
location of the troops. The requisitions of civil officers will be
complied with, whenever practicable, but military officers are to
judge in all matters involving the military or sanitary suitability of
a position.

_17th_.--In the class of warfare in which we are now engaged, where
night surprises and ambuscades are the only formidable tactics of the
enemy, the greatest care must be taken to ensure the safety of the
camp at night. To meet ambuscades, which usually take the form of a
volley followed by flight, and which, in very dense jungle, it may
be impossible to discover or guard against by means of flankers, His
Excellency the Commander-in-Chief would wish the following plan to be
tried: Supposing, for instance, the fire of the enemy to be delivered
from the right, a portion of the force in front should be ready to
dash along the road for 100 yards, or so, or until some opening in
the jungle offers itself. The party should then turn to the right and
sweep round with a view to intercepting the enemy in his flight. A
party in rear should similarly enter the jungle to their right with
the same object. The centre of the column would hold the ground and
protect the baggage or any wounded men. The different parties must be
previously told off, put under the command of selected leaders, and
must act with promptitude and dash. Each party must be kept in compact
order, and individual firing must be prohibited, except when there is
a clear prospect. Past experience suggests the adoption of some such
plan as the above, but in guerilla warfare officers must suit their
tactics to the peculiar and ever-varying circumstances in which they
may find themselves engaged.

_18th_.--The Government have ordered a general disarmament of the
country, as soon as the large bands of rebels and dacoits are
dispersed. The orders for this disarmament direct that all firearms
are to be taken from the people, but that a moderate number may be
returned to responsible villagers who are loyal and are able to
defend themselves. No firearms will be returned save under registered
licenses; and licenses will be given only for villages which can
produce a certain number (5 to 10) guns, and are either stockaded or
fenced against sudden attack. The duty of disarming lies on civil
officers and the police; but as it is desirable that the disarmament
should be effected as quickly as possible, officers commanding posts
and columns will give such assistance as may be in their power in
carrying it out.

       *       *       *       *       *




APPENDIX XII.

(Referred to in Chapter LXVIII, Note *.)

_To His EXCELLENCY THE RIGHT HONOURABLE FREDERICK BARON ROBERTS
OF KANDAHAR AND WATERFORD, BART., V.C., G.C.B., G.C.I.E., R.A.,
Commander-in-Chief of Her Majesty's Forces in India._

MAY IT PLEASE YOUR EXCELLENCY,

We, the undersigned, representing the Sikhs of the Punjab, most
respectfully beg to approach Your Excellency with this humble address
of farewell on Your Lordship's approaching departure from this
country. We cannot give adequate expression to the various ideas which
are agitating our minds at this juncture, relating as they do to the
past, present, and future, making us feel, at one and the same time,
grateful, happy, and sorrowful. The success which Your Excellency has
achieved in Asia is such as makes India and England proud of it. The
history of the British Empire in India has not, at least for the last
thirty years, produced a hero like Your Lordship, whose soldier-like
qualities are fully known to the world. The country which had been the
cradle of Indian invasions came to realize the extent of your power
and recognized your generalship. The victories gained by Sale, Nott,
and Pollock in the plains of Afghanistan have been shadowed by those
gained by Your Excellency. The occupation of Kabul and the glorious
battle of Kandahar are among the brightest jewels in the diadem of
Your Lordship's Baronage. Your Excellency's achievements checked
the aggressive advance of the Great Northern Bear, whose ambitious
progress received a check from the roar of a lion in the person of
Your Lordship; and a zone of neutral ground has now been fixed, and a
line of peace marked by the Boundary Commission. The strong defences
which Your Excellency has provided on the frontier add another bright
stone to the building of your fame, and constitute in themselves a
lasting memorial of Your Excellency's martial skill. Never had any
British General to face more arduous tasks, and none has proved more
completely successful in overcoming them than Your Lordship. The
result is that India has been rendered safe from the fear of invasion
from without. Your Excellency is not only adorned with heroic
qualifications, but the love and affection with which the people of
India regard Your Lordship show what admirable qualities are exhibited
in the person of Your Excellency. Terrible in war and merciful in
peace, Your Excellency's name has become a dread to the enemies of
England and lovely to your friends. The interest which Your Lordship
has always taken in the welfare of those with whom you have worked in
India is well known to everybody. The Sikhs in particular are, more
than any other community in India, indebted to Your Lordship. We find
in Your Excellency a true friend of the Sikh community--a community
which is always devoted heart and soul to the service of Her Most
Gracious Majesty the Empress of India. No one understands better than
Your Excellency the value of a Sikh soldier, and we feel very grateful
that the military authorities recognize the necessity of requiring
every Sikh recruit to be baptized according to the Sikh religion
before admission to the Army--a practice which makes the Sikhs more
true and faithful, and which preserves the existence of a very
useful community. The Sikhs are said to be born soldiers, but
they undoubtedly make very good citizens in time of peace also.
Unfortunately, however, they have had no opportunity of fully
developing their mental powers, so as to enable them to advance with
the spirit of the age. We thank God that Your Excellency was among
those who most desired to see the Sikhs refined and educated by
establishing a Central College in the Punjab for the use of the Sikh
people, and we confidently hope that the Sikhs, of whom a large
portion is under Your Excellency's command, will give their mite in
support of this national seminary. The subscriptions given by Your
Lordship, His Excellency the Viceroy, and His Honour the late
Lieutenant-Governor, were very valuable to the Institution, and the
Sikhs are highly gratified by the honour Your Excellency has lately
given to the Khalsa Diwan by becoming its honorary patron. In
conclusion, we beg only to repeat that it is quite beyond our power to
state how much we are indebted to Your Excellency, and how much we are
affected by the news that Your Lordship will shortly leave this land.
The very idea of our separation from the direct contact of so strong
and affectionate a leader, as Your Excellency undoubtedly is, makes us
feel very sorrowful; but as our hearts and prayers will always be with
you and Lady Roberts, we shall be consoled if Your Excellency would
only keep us in your memory, and on arrival in England assure Her Most
Gracious Majesty, the Mother-Empress, that all Sikhs, whether high or
low, strong or weak, old or young, are heartily devoted to her Crown
and her representatives in this country. Before retiring, we thank
Your Excellency for the very great honour that has been done to the
people of Lahore by Your Lordship's visit to this city.

       *       *       *       *       *




APPENDIX XIII.

(Referred to in Chapter LXVIII, Note *.)


_To HIS EXCELLENCY GENERAL THE RIGHT HONOURABLE FREDERICK BARON
ROBERTS OF KANDAHAR AND WATERFORD, BART., V.C., G.C.B., G.C.I.E.,
R.A., Commander-in-Chief of Her Majesty's Forces in India._

MAY IT PLEASE YOUR EXCELLENCY,

We are proud to stand in Your Lordship's presence to-day on behalf of
the Hindus of the Punjab, the loyal subjects of the Queen-Empress, who
appreciate the countless blessings which British Rule has conferred
upon this country, to give expression to the feelings of gratitude
which are uppermost in their hearts. We feel it really an honour that
we are able to show our appreciation of British Rule in the presence
of the eminent soldier and statesman who has taken an important
part in making the India of to-day what it is--contented within
and strengthened against aggression from abroad. The Punjab is
the province where the military strength of the Empire is being
concentrated, and the bravery of the warlike races inhabiting it,
which furnish the flower of Her Gracious Majesty's forces of the Army
in India, has been conspicuously displayed on several occasions during
the last thirty years. We Hindus have availed ourselves the most of
the facilities which British Rule has provided for the progress of the
people in commercial enterprise, educational advance, and political
progress. We are, therefore, all the more proud that we have been
allowed to-day to greet in person the mighty soldier, the sympathetic
Commander, and the sagacious Statesman, the record of whose
distinguished career in the East is virtually the history of nearly
half a century of glorious victories--victories both of peace and
war--achieved by the British Power in Asia, to show how intense is
our gratitude towards the Queen-Empress and one of her eminent
representatives in India, who have striven to do their duty by the
people of this country, and done it to the satisfaction of the people
and of their Gracious Sovereign. The interests of India and England
are identical, and the Hindus of the Punjab regard British Rule as a
Providential gift to this country--an agency sent to raise the people
in the scale of civilization. Anything that is done to guarantee
the continuance of the present profoundly peaceful condition of the
country is highly appreciated by us, and we are, therefore, all the
more grateful to Your Lordship for all that your courage, foresight,
sagacity, and high statesmanship have been able to achieve. At a time
when all the races and communities inhabiting this frontier province,
which has been truly described as the sword-hand in India, are vying
with each other in showing their high appreciation of the good work
done by Your Excellency, of which not the least significant proof lies
in the arrangement for the defence of the country at all vulnerable
points of the frontier, the Hindus are anxious to show that they yield
to none in the enthusiasm which marks the demonstrations held in your
honour. But Your Excellency commands our esteem and regard on other
grounds also. The deep interest that you have throughout your career
felt in the welfare of the sepoy, and the closest ties of genuine
friendship which you have established with many a notable of our
community, have laid us under deep obligations to Your Excellency. The
encouragement that you have given to the organization of the Imperial
Service Troops of the Native States is also gratefully appreciated by
us; and only the other day we were gratified to learn the high opinion
Your Excellency entertained of the appearance and military equipment
of the Imperial Service Troops of Jammu and Kashmir, the most
important Hindu State in this part of India. We should be wanting in
duty, we feel, did we not on this occasion give expression to the
great regret which the news of your approaching departure from India
has caused among the Hindus of the Punjab, who feel that they are
parting from a kind friend and a sympathetic Ruler. At the same time,
we feel that the country will not lose the benefit of your mature
experience and wise counsel for long; for we are hopeful that you may
some day be called upon to guide the helm of the State in India, a
work for which you are so specially fitted. In conclusion, we have
only to pray to the Father of All Good that He may shower His choicest
blessings upon you and your consort--that noble lady who has, in
addition to cheering you in your hard and onerous work in India,
herself done a great deal for the comfort of the soldier and the
sepoy, and that He may grant you many years of happy life--a life
which has done so much for the Queen-Empress's dominions, and which
may yet do much more.

       *       *       *       *       *




APPENDIX XIV.

(Referred to in Chapter LXVIII, Note *.)

_To HIS EXCELLENCY GENERAL THE RIGHT HONOURABLE FREDERICK BARON
ROBERTS OF KANDAHAR AND WATERFORD, BART., V.C., G.C.B., G.C.I.E.,
R.A., Commander-in-Chief of Her Majesty's Forces in India._

MAY IT PLEASE YOUR EXCELLENCY,

We, the Mahomedans of the Punjab, have dared to approach Your
Excellency with this address with eyes tear-bedimmed, but a face
smiling. The departure of a noble and well-beloved General like
yourself from our country is in itself a fact that naturally fills our
eyes with tears. What could be more sorrowful than this, our farewell
to an old officer and patron of ours, who has passed the prominent
portion of his life in our country, developed our young progeny to
bravery and regular soldiery, decorated them with honours, and created
them to high titles? Your Excellency's separation is the harder to
bear for the men of the Punjab because it is our Punjab that is proud
of the fact that about forty years ago the foundation stone of all
your famous and noble achievements, which not only India, but England,
rightly boasts of, was laid down in one of its frontier cities, and
that the greater part of your indomitable energies was spent in the
Punjab frontier defence. If, therefore, we are sad at separating from
Your Excellency, it will not in any way be looked upon as strange.
But these feelings of sorrow are mixed with joy when we see that the
useful officer whom in 1852 we had welcomed at Peshawar, when the star
of his merits was beginning to rise, departs from us in splendour and
glory in the capacity of the Commander-in-Chief of the Armies of a
vast Empire like India, and is an example of the highest type to
all soldiers. This address is too brief for a detail of all the
meritorious services rendered by your Excellency in the Punjab, India
and other foreign countries from that early epoch to this date. Your
zeal in the Mutiny of 1857, your heroic achievements in the Abyssinian
and Afghan wars, your repeated victories of Kandahar, and your
statesmanlike conduct of the Burma wars--all these are facts which
deserve to be written in golden characters in the annals of Indian
history. Your appointment as legislative and executive member of the
Supreme Council of the Government of India for a considerable period
has proved a source of blessings to the whole of India, and Your
Excellency deserves an ample share of the credit due to the Council
for all its useful regulations and reforms. The great liking that
men of noble birth in India have been showing for some time towards
military service is a clear demonstration of the excellent treatment
received at your hands by military officers, as in the reforms made
by you in the military pay and pension and other regulations. Another
boon for which the Natives of India will always remember your name
with gratitude, is that you have fully relied upon, and placed your
confidence in, the Natives, thus uniting them the more firmly to the
British Crown, making them more loyal, and establishing the good
relations between the Rulers and the ruled on a firmer footing to
their mutual good. Especially as Mussalmans of the Punjab are we proud
that before Your Excellency's departure you have had the opportunity
of reviewing the Imperial Service Troops of the Mahomedan State of
Bhawalpur, one of the leading Native States of the Punjab, whose
Ruler's efforts to make his troops worthy to take their place by the
side of British troops for the defence of India is only one instance
of the spirit of active loyalty which we are glad to say animates the
entire Mussalman community of the Punjab. Disturbances arising from
foreign intrusions are not unknown to us, and we have not sufficient
words to thank your Lordship for the admirable management of the
frontier defence work carried on to protect our country from all
possible encroachments. The greatest pleasure and satisfaction,
however, that we Mahomedans feel in presenting this address to Your
Lordship emanates from the idea that you go on your way home to your
native country with a high and favourable opinion of the Mahomedans of
India, true and loyal subjects to Her Majesty the Queen-Empress, whose
number exceeds six crores, and who are rapidly growing. During the
Mutiny of 1857 the Chieftains and soldiers of our nation spared
neither money nor arms in the reduction and submission of the rebels.
Your Lordship is also aware what loyalty was displayed by the
Mahomedans of India during the Afghan and Egyptian wars, waged against
their own co-religionists, and the cheerfulness shown by them in
following your Lordship in all your victories. Frontier services, such
as the Kabul Embassy and the Delimitation Commission, rendered by the
officers of our creed are also well known to you. We are therefore
sanguine that Your Lordship's own observation will enable all the
members of the Ruling race in India to form an opinion of the
relations that exist between us and the British Crown. The Mahomedans
of India and the Punjab are proud of being the devoted subjects of the
Queen-Empress. In so acting we perform our religious duties, for our
sacred religion enjoins upon us faithfulness and obedience towards our
Ruling monarch, and teaches us to regard the Christians as our own
brethren. The regard and esteem which we should have, therefore, for
a Christian Government, as that of our kind mother the Queen-Empress,
needs no demonstration. Although, for certain reasons which we need
not detail here, our nation has been deficient in education, and we
have been left much behind in obtaining civil employment, we hope that
your long experience of our service will prove a good testimonial in
favour of the warlike spirit, military genius, and loyalty of
our nation, and if the circle of civil employment has become too
straitened for us, the military line will be generously opened to us.
We do not want to encroach upon Your Lordship's valuable time any
further. We therefore finish our address, offering our heartfelt
thanks to your Lordship for all those kindnesses you have been wont to
show during your time towards India and Indians in general, and the
Punjab and Punjabis in particular, and take leave of Your Lordship
with the following prayer: 'May God bless thee wherever thou mayest
be, and may thy generosities continue to prevail upon us for a long
time.' While actuated by these feelings, we are not the less aware
that our country owes a great deal to Lady Roberts, to whom we beg
that Your Excellency will convey our heartfelt thanks for her lively
interest in the welfare of Indian soldiers in particular and the
people generally. In conclusion, we wish Your Excellencies God-speed
and a pleasant and safe voyage. That Your Excellencies may have
long, happy, and prosperous lives, and achieve ever so many more
distinctions and honours, and return to us very shortly in a still
higher position, to confer upon the Empire the blessings of a
beneficent Rule, is our heartfelt and most sincere prayer.

       *       *       *       *       *




APPENDIX XV.

(Referred to in Chapter LXVIII, Note *.)

_To His EXCELLENCY GENERAL THE RIGHT HONOURABLE FREDERICK BARON
ROBERTS OF KANDAHAR AND WATERFORD, BART., V.C., G.C.B., G.C.I.E.,
R.A., Commander-in-Chief of Her Majesty's Forces in India._

MAY IT PLEASE YOUR EXCELLENCY,

We, the representatives of the European community in the Punjab, are
the prouder to-day of our British blood, in that it links us in close
kinship, to one who has so bravely maintained the honour of the
British Empire alike in the years of peace and storm that India has
seen during the last three decades. During the Mutiny Your Excellency
performed feats of gallantry that are historic. Since then your
career has been one of brilliant success and growing military renown.
Whenever, in the histories of war, men speak of famous marches, that
from Kabul to Kandahar comes straightway to the lips. When our mind
turns to military administration, we remember the unqualified
success of Your Excellency's career as Quartermaster-General and as
Commander-in-Chief of Her Majesty's Forces in India, in both of which
high offices you have added honour and glory to your great name, which
will never be forgotten in India. When the private soldier, rightly or
wrongly, thinks he has a grievance, his desire is only that somehow it
may be brought to the notice of Your Excellency, from whom, through
experience, he expects full justice and generous sympathy. When we
look towards our frontier and see the strategic railways and roads,
and the strong places of arms that threaten the invader, we know that
for those safeguards the Empire is in no small degree indebted to
the resolute wisdom of Your Excellency as military adviser to the
Government of India. Last, but not least, as a Statesman, Your
Excellency ranks second to none in the Empire in the opinion of your
countrymen in this North-West frontier province; and we should gladly
welcome the day, if it might ever arrive, when Your Excellency
returned to India. It is here that we see most clearly the passage of
events beyond our borders and mark the signs of brooding trouble; and
our hope has always been that, when that trouble should break forth,
yours might be the hand to guide England's flag to victory again. The
Punjab is the sword of India, and Your Excellency has had the courage
to lean most strongly upon that sword. It is here that the pulse of
the army beats in India; it is hence that the enemies of our country
shall feel the downright blow; and it is here that the greatest
grief is felt in parting from so true a soldier and so far-seeing a
Statesman as Your Excellency. It is meet, therefore, that here we
should assemble upon this occasion of farewell to express the great
sorrow which we, the representatives of the Europeans in the Punjab,
feel at the prospect of losing so soon the clear brain and strong hand
that Your Excellency has always brought to the control of the Army in
India and to the solution of all questions of political or military
moment. In doing so, we mourn for the loss of one of the best
statesmen, the best general, and the best friend to the soldier in
India. We say nothing of the kindly relations Your Excellency has
always been able to establish with the other races in India; our
fellow-subjects here will doubtless do so in their turn. We say
nothing of Your Excellency's and Lady Roberts' charming social
qualities, nor Her Ladyship's philanthropic work in India. We are here
only to express our grief at parting with one whom we value so highly
for the sake of our common country, and our hope that as your past has
been full of glory to the Empire and honour to yourself, so may your
future be; and that you may be spared for many years to wield the
sword and guide the counsels of our country.

       *       *       *       *       *




APPENDIX XVI.

(Referred to in Chapter LXVIII, Footnote 11.)

_To His EXCELLENCY GENERAL THE RIGHT HONOURABLE FREDERICK BARON
ROBERTS OF KANDAHAR AND WATERFORD, BART., V.C., G.C.B., G.C.I.E.,
R.A., Commander-in-Chief of Her Imperial Majesty's Army in India._

MAY IT PLEASE YOUR EXCELLENCY,

We, the Talukdars of Oudh, as loyal and faithful subjects of the
Empress of India, avail ourselves of the present opportunity of
offering Your Excellency a most cordial and respectful welcome to the
Capital of Oudh.

The long and valuable services rendered by Your Excellency to the
Crown and the country are well known to, and are deeply appreciated
by, us. Your Excellency's wise and vigorous administration of Her
Majesty's Army in India has won for you our respectful admiration;
while your prowess in the battlefield, and your wisdom in Council
during the eventful period of your supreme command of Her Majesty's
Indian Forces, have inspired us with confidence in your great military
talents and your single-minded and earnest devotion to duty. In many
a battle you have led the British Army to victory, and the brilliant
success which has invariably attended the British Arms under Your
Excellency's command has added to the glory of the British Empire.

But the pride and pleasure we feel at being honoured by Your
Excellency's presence in our capital town give place to sorrow and
regret at the approaching retirement of Your Excellency from the great
service of which you are an ornament.

In grateful acknowledgment of the most important services rendered by
Your Excellency to our Empress and our country, we beg to be allowed
the privilege of presenting you with a Sword of Indian manufacture,
which will, we hope, from time to time, remind you of us and of Oudh.

Wishing Your Lordship a safe and pleasant voyage home, and a long and
happy life,

  We subscribe ourselves,
  Your Lordship's most humble
  and obedient servants,
  THE TALUKDARS OF OUDH.

       *       *       *       *       *




APPENDIX XVII.

(Referred to in Chapter LXVIII, Footnote 12.)

_To His EXCELLENCY GENERAL THE RIGHT HONOURABLE SIR FREDERICK
SLEIGH, BARON ROBERTS OF KANDAHAR AND WATERFORD, BART., V.C., G.C.B.,
G.C.I.E., D.C.L., LL.D., R.A., Commander-in-Chief in India._


YOUR EXCELLENCY,

Viewing with concern and regret your approaching departure from India,
we beg--in bidding you farewell--to express our admiration of your
life and work as Commander-in-Chief of the Imperial Forces in India,
and to request you to permit your portrait to be placed in the Town
Hall of Calcutta, in token for the present generation of their high
appreciation of your eminent services, and in witness to a
future generation of the esteem in which you were held by your
contemporaries.

With foresight denoting wise statesmanship, Governments which you have
served have initiated and maintained a policy of Frontier Defence, and
encouraged the increased efficiency of the Forces.

In the furtherance of these objects we recognize the salient points
of your career and character whilst holding the high rank of
Commander-in-Chief.

In your continued efforts to ameliorate the condition of the private
soldier we recognize broad humanity. In the increasing efficiency of
the Army, which, in our belief, characterizes your tenure of command,
we recognize high soldierly qualities. In the state of strength which
the Frontier Defences have attained, mainly due, we believe, to you,
we recognize practical sagacity, conspicuous ability in discernment of
requirements, and in pursuit of your aims an unwearying industry, a
resolute persistence, and a determination that no difficulty can turn,
in which a noble example for all true workers may be found.

In a word, your life and work are to us identified with Frontier
Defence and Efficient Forces. We cheerfully bear our share of the
cost, as in possession of these protections against aggression from
without, we believe all who dwell within the borders of the land will
find their best guarantee for peace, and in peace the best safeguard
they and their children can possess to enable them to pass their lives
in happiness and prosperity, and escape the misery and ruin which
follow war and invasion. For all that you have done to give them such
security, we feel you deserve, and we freely give, our heartfelt
thanks.

Within the limitations of a farewell address, we hardly feel justified
in personal allusions trenching on your private life, but we cannot
refrain from noticing with responsive sympathy the feeling of personal
attachment to yourself which is widespread throughout India, and
assuring you that we share in it to the fullest extent that private
feeling can be affected by public services. We endorse our assurance
with an expression of the wish that, in whatever part of the British
Empire your future life may be spent, it may be attended, as in the
past, with honour, and, by the blessing of God, with health and
happiness for yourself and all those you hold dear.

It is the prerogative of the Crown alone to bestow honours on those
who have served their country well, and none have been better merited
than those which you enjoy, and to which, we trust, additions may be
made. It is the privilege of a community to make public profession
of merit in a fellow-citizen where they consider it is due, and in
availing ourselves of the privilege to make this public recognition of
the great services which, in our opinion, you have rendered to India,
we beg with all sincerity to add a hearty God-speed and a regretful
Farewell.

  We have the honour to be,
  Your Excellency,
  Your obedient servants.

  CALCUTTA,
  _11th March, 1893._





INDEX

PERSONS.

Abbott, General Sir James, K.C.B.
Abdulla Jan
Abdur Rahman
Adams, Rev. W. J.
Adye, General Sir John
Afzal Khan
Ahmed Shah Durani
Aitken, Major
Akbar, The Emperor
Akram Khan
Albert Victor, H.R.H. Prince
Ali
Ali Khan
Alison, Sir Archibald
Alla Sing, Jemadar
Allen, Surgeon-General
Allgood, Captain
Amar Sing, Raja
Anderson, Captain
Anderson, Major
Anson, Major Augustus
Anson, General the Hon. G.
Aslam Khan, Lieutenant-Colonel, C.I.E.
Asmatulla Khan
Ata Mahomed Khan, Nawab
Auckland, Lord
Ayub Khan
Azim Khan
Azimulla Khan
Aziz Khan, Subadar Major


Baber, The Emperor
Badcock, Major
Badshah Khan
Bahadur Shah
Baigrie, Colonel
Baird, Sir David
Baird-Smith, Colonel
Baker, Brigadier-General Sir Thomas
Baker, Colonel Valentine
Bakram Khan
Bannatyne, Captain
Barnard, Major-General Sir Henry
Barnston, Major Roger
Barr, Captain
Barter, Major Richard
  Mrs.
Battye, Captain Wigram
  Colonel Arthur
  Frederick, Captain
  Quintin, Lieutenant
Beaconsfield, The Earl of
Beadon, Sir Cecil
Becher, Captain
  Major-General Arthur
  Major Sullivan
Bellew, Dr.
Benares, Maharaja of
Bentinck, Lord William
Bernard, Sir Charles
Bertrand, Father
Bhartpur, Raja of
Bhopal, Begum of
Biddulph, Brigadier-General M.
Biddulph, Colonel
Birbul
Birsing, Sepoy
Blackwood, Major
Blanc, Dr.
Blunt, Colonel
Bogle, Captain
Booth, Lieutenant
Bourchier, General Sir George, K.C.B.
Bowring, Mr. Lewin
Brabazon, Lieutenant
Brackenbury, General
Bradshaw, Dr.
Brasyer, Colonel
Bridge, Captain
Bright, John, The Right Hon.
  General Sir Robert, G.C.B.
Brind, Brigadier Frederick
  General Sir James, G.C.B.
Broadfoot, Captain
Brooke, Brigadier-General
Brown, Major-General Rodney
  Major Tod
Browne, Dr. John Campbell
  Sir James
  General Sir Samuel, V.C., G.C.B., K.C.S.I.
Brownlow, Colonel F.
Brownlow, General Sir Charles, G.C.B.
Bruce, Major-General H. Legeyt, C.B.
Brunow, Baron
Budgen, Lieutenant
Bukhtiar Khan, 377
Bulkeley, Major
Bunny, Lieutenant Arthur
Burgess, Corporal
Burn-Murdoch, Lieutenant
Burnes, Sir Alexander
Burroughs, Captain
Burrows, Brigadier
Bushman, Colonel
Butler, Colonel Thomas. V.C.
Butson, Captain


Cambridge, H.R.H. the Duke of
Cameron, Captain
  Lance-Sergeant
Campbell, Colonel (Bays)
Campbell, Colonel
Campbell, Lady
  Major
  Sir Colin.  _See_ Clyde
  Sir Edward
  Sir George
Canning, Lady
Canning, Viscount, Governor-General and Viceroy,
  succeeds Lord Dalhousie;
  condemns action of Meerut authorities;
  praises General Wilson and the Army of Delhi;
  advised by Sir Henry Lawrence;
  not in accord with Sir Colin Campbell;
  insists on employment of Nepalese troops;
  proposals regarding native recruits;
  Viceregal progress;
  passes the income tax against much opposition;
  marches through Central India;
  durbar at Jubbulpore;
  durbar at Lucknow;
  durbar at Allahabad;
  third durbar at Lucknow;
  loses his wife;
  leaves India;
  unjustly criticized;
  his character
Carey
Carmichael
Carr, Captain
Case
  Mrs.
Cavagnari, Lieutenant-Colonel Sir Louis, K.C.B.
Cavagnari, Lady
Cesarewitch, H.I.H. the
Chalmers, Major Henry
Chamberlain, General Crawford, C.S.I.
Chamberlain, General Sir Neville
Chamberlain, Colonel Neville
Chamberlain, Mrs.
Chandra Shamsher
Channer, Major-General, V.C., C.B.
Chapman, Lieutenant-Colonel
Chelmsford, General Lord, G.C.B.
Chesney, Sir George
Chester, Colonel
Childers, The Right Hon. Hugh
Chisholme, Captain
Christie, Mr.
Churchill, Lord Randolph
Clarendon, The Earl of
Clarke, Lieutenant-Colonel
Cleland, Lieutenant-Colonel
Clerk, Sir George
Clive, Lord
Clyde, Lord (Sir Colin Campbell)
  lays out cantonment of Peshawar;
  substituted helmets for cocked hats;
  orders to his men at the Alma;
  appointed Commander-in-Chief in India;
  starts for relief of Lucknow;
  takes command of relieving force;
  plans and preparations for the relief;
  his personal attention to details;
  fixes his Head-Quarters in the Martinière;
  makes a feint;
  orders more ammunition;
  wounded;
  selects point for breach;
  orders assault of Sikandarbagh;
  leads the 93rd to the attack
  his aide-de-camp wounded;
  quartered in the Shah Najaf;
  his prudence;
  orders second assault;
  orders colours to be planted on mess-house;
  meeting with Havelock and Outram;
  his soldierly instincts;
  evacuation of the Residency;
  thanks the troops for their services;
  march to Cawnpore, 200-203;
  defeats Nana Sahib and Tantia Topi at Cawnpore;
  high opinion of Hope Grant;
  favoured Highlanders unduly;
  action at Khudaganj;
  invidious selection of commanders;
  prepares for siege of Lucknow;
  adopts Napier's plan of attack;
  interview with Jung Bahadur;
  makes an error of judgment;
  his good use of artillery;
  kindness of heart;
  accompanies Lord Canning to Peshawar;
  succeeded by Sir Hugh Rose
Cobbe, Brigadier
Cochin, Raja of
Coke, General Sir John, G.C.B.
Collen, Major-General Sir Edwin, K.C.I.E.
Collett, Colonel
Colley, Major-General Sir George, K.C.B.
Collis, Major
Colquhoun, Captain
Colvin, Mr.
Combe, Major-General, C.B.
Congreve, Colonel
Connaught, H.R.H. the Duchess of
Connaught, H.R.H. the Duke of
Conolly, Captain
Cook, Major
Cooper, Lieutenant
  Sir George
Coote, Sir Eyre
Corbett, Brigadier
Cosserat, Captain
Cotton, Captain
  General Sir Sydney, G.C.B.
  Lieutenant-Colonel
Courtney, Mr.
Cowie, Rev. W. G.
Cracklow, Lieutenant
Cranbrook, Earl of
Craster, Major
Cross, The Viscount
Crosse, Captain
Crutchley, Captain
Cunnyngham, Lieutenant Dick
Currie, Colonel


D'Aguilar, Major
Dalhousie, The Marquess of (Governor-General of India),
  his epitaph on Colonel Mackeson;
  his Afghan policy;
  treaty with Dost Mahomed;
  resigns
Dal Sing, Jemadar
Daly, General Sir Henry, G.C.B.
Daubeny, Brigadier-General
Daud Shah
Davidson, Colonel
Davison, Lieutenant
Dawes, Major
Deb Shamsher Jung
Delafosse, Lieutenant
Delhi, King of
Denison, Sir William
Denniss, Colonel
Dholpur, Raja of
Dinkar Rao, 154
Dir Sing, Naick
Disney, Lieutenant
Dost Mahomed Khan
Douglas, Brigadier
  Lieutenant C.
Drew, Colonel Barry
Drummond, Colour-Sergeant
  Mr.
Drysdale, General Sir William, K.C.B.
Dufferin, The Marchioness of
Dufferin, The Marquess of
Duke, Dr. Joshua
Dunbar, Captain
Dundas, Captain, V.C.,
Dundu Pant. _See_ Nana Sahib
Dupuis, Major-General
Durand, Sir Henry Marion, K.C.S.I., C.B.
  Sir Mortimer, K.C.S.I., K.C.I.E.


Earle, Captain
Eden, Major
  Sir Ashley
Edgar, Sir John, K.C.S.I.
Edwardes, Sir Herbert, Commissioner of Peshawar;
  his remarkable character;
  advocates friendly relations with Kabul;
  strongly supported by Lord Dalhousie;
  his magnanimity;
  Lawrence's counsellor;
  John Nicholson's dearest friend;
Egerton, Lieutenant
Elgin, The Earl of, Viceroy of India
Eli Bux
Eliot, Captain
Ellenborough, Lord
Elles, Lieutenant-Colonel E.
  Lieutenant-General Sir W. K., K.C.B.
Elphinstone, General
  Lord
  Mountstuart
Elverson, Lieutenant
English, Colonel
Ewart, General Sir John, K.C.B.


Faiz Mahomed Khan
Farakabad, Nawab of
Farwell, Major
Finnis, Colonel
Fisher, Colonel
  Lieutenant
Fitzgerald, Lieutenant
Fitzgerald, Lieutenant Mordaunt
  Lieutenant C.
  Major
Fitz-Hugh, Lieutenant-Colonel
Forbes, Lieutenant
Ford, Mr.
Forrest, Mr. George
Forsyth, Sir Douglas, C.B., K.C.S.I.
Franks, Major-General
Fraser, Colonel
Fraser-Tytler, Colonel
French, Captain
Frere, Sir Bartle, Bart., G.C.B., G.C.S.I.
Frome, Captain
Futteh Khan
Fuzl Ali
Fyzabad, Moulvie of


Gaisford, Lieutenant
Galbraith, Major
Ganda Sing, Captain
  Bakshi
Garvock, General Sir John, G.C.B.
Gawler, Colonel
  Mrs.
Ghazi-ud-din Haidar
Ghulam Haidar Khan, Sardar
Ghulam Hussein Khan, Nawab Sir, K.C.S.I.
Ghulam Hyder
Gibbon, Major
Gladstone, The Right Hon. W.E.
Goad, Captain
Gokal Sing, Jemadar
Goldsmid, General Sir Frederick, K.C.M.G.
Gomm, Sir William
Gopal Borah, Havildar
Gordon, Captain
  Captain
  Colonel B.
  General John
  Brigadier-General T.
  Lance-Corporal
  Lieutenant-Colonel
Gortchakoff, Prince
Gough, Brigadier-General Charles
Gough, Captain Bloomfield
  Lieutenant-General Sir Hugh, V.C., G.C.B.
  Lord
  Sir John
Grant, Lieutenant
  General Sir Hope, G.C.B.
  Field-Marshal Sir Patrick, G.C.B., G.C.S.I.
Grant-Duff, Lady
  Sir Mount Stewart, G.C.S.I.
Grantham, Captain Frank
Graves, Brigadier
Greathed, Brigadier-General
Greathed, Lieutenant
Greaves, General Sir George, G.C.B., G.C.M.G.
Green, Major
  Major-General Sir George, K.C.B.
Greensill, Captain
Greer, Sergeant
Greig, Lieutenant
Grey, Sir George
  Private
Grieve, Private
Griffin, Sir Lepel
Griffiths, Major
Guise, Captain
Gurbaj Sing, Subadar-Major
Gwalior, Maharaja of


Habibulla Khan, Mirza
  Mustaufi
Hagenau, Major von
Haines, Sir Frederick
Hakim, Sepoy
Hale, Brigadier
Hall, Captain
Hallifax, Brigadier
Hammick, Captain St. V.
Hamilton, Lieutenant
  Colonel Ian
Hammond, Major
Hanbury, Surgeon-General
Handscombe, Brigadier
Hardinge, Captain George
  General the Hon. A.E.
  The Viscount
Hardy, Captain
Harness, Colonel
Harris, Rev. J.
Hartington, The Marquis of
Hashim Khan
Hastings, Major
Havelock, General Sir Henry, K.C.B.
  letter from;
  fails to force his way to Lucknow;
  note from, in Greek character;
  made K.C.B.;
  meeting with Sir Colin Campbell;
  his death
Hawkes, Lieutenant
Hawthorne, Bugler
Hay, Lord William.  _See_ Tweeddale
  Major
Hayes, Captain Fletcher
  Mrs.
Haythorne, General Sir Edmund, K.C.B.
Hearsay, General
Heath, Admiral Sir Leopold, K.C.B.
Heathcote, Lieutenant A.
  Major Mark
Hennessy, Colonel
Hewitt, General
Hills-Johnes, Lieutenant-General Sir James, V.C., G.C.B.
Hinde, Major
Hodson, Major
Holkar, Maharaja
Home, Lieutenant
Hood, General Cockburn
Hope, Colonel the Hon. Adrian
Hopkins, Captain
Hornsby, Captain
Hovenden, Lieutenant
Hudson, Lieutenant-General Sir John, K.C.B.
Huene, Major von
Hughes, General Sir W. T., K.C.B.
Hughes, Major-General T. E., C.B.
Hunt, Captain
Hyderabad, Nizam of


Ibrahim Khan
  Sultan
Inderbir Lama, Sepoy
Inge, Captain
Inglis, Brigadier
Inglis, Lady
Innes, Lieutenant-General McLeod, V.C.
Ivanoff, General


Jacob, Major
Jacobs, Colour-Sergeant
Jackson, Mr. Coverley
Jaipur, Maharaja of
James, Captain
  Major
Jaora, Nawab of
Jelaladin Ghilzai
Jenkins, Colonel F.
Jenkins, Mr. William
Jervis, Ensign
Jhansi, Rani of
Jhind, Raja of
Jodhpur, Maharaja of
Johnson, Colonel Alured
  Major Charles
  General Sir Edwin, G.C.B.
Johnstone, Brigadier
Jones, Captain Oliver
Jones, Lieutenant
  Lieutenant-Colonel John
  Brigadier
Jumna Das
Jung Bahadur
  Sir Salar


Kapurthala, Raja of
Karaoli, Raja
Kashmir, Maharaja of
Kauffmann, General
Kavanagh, Mr.
Kaye, Major
Kaye, Sir John
Keen, Major-General, C.B.
Kelly, Dr.
  Colonel
Kelso, Captain
Kennedy, Captain 'Dick'
Keyes, General Sir Charles, G.C.B.
Khan Sing Rosa
Khelat, Khan of
Kinleside, Major
Kiunthal, Raja of
Knight, Mr.
Knowles, Colonel
Knox, Captain
Komaroff, General


Lafont, A.,
Lake, Colonel Edward
  Lord
Lalbura, Chief
Lalla Joti Persâd
Lally, Count de
Lang, Colonel
Lansdowne, The Marquis of
Lansdowne, The Marchioness of
Lauder, Colour-Sergeant
Law, Captain
Lawrence, Lord, Chief Commissioner of the Punjab;
  made K.C.B.;
  opposed to Edwardes' frontier policy;
  meets Dost Mahomed;
  hopeful of affairs in Punjab;
  urges advance on Delhi;
  trusts the Phulkian Rajas;
  his wise measures for preserving order in the Punjab;
  gratitude of Army of Delhi to;
  begs for return of troops to Punjab;
  favours a retirement cis-Indus;
  appointed Viceroy;
  leaves India for good;
  his unique career;
  neutrality towards rival Amirs;
  his policy of 'masterly inaction';
  subsidizes Sher Ali;
  farewell letter to the Amir;
Lawrence, Sir Henry, K.C.B.
  Corps of Guides raised under his auspices;
  first British ruler of the Punjab;
  foresight in provisioning the Lucknow Residency;
  his admirable arrangements for its defence;
  predicted the Mutiny fourteen years before its occurrence;
  his character as a Statesman and Ruler;
  friendliness for Natives;
  suggests employment of Nepalese troops;
  opposed to annexation of Oudh;
  letter to Lord Canning;
  his dispositions for coping with the Mutiny;
  memorandum in his ledger-book;
Lawrence, Captain Samuel, V.C.
  Major Stringer
Lennox, General Sir Wilbraham, V.C., K.C.B.
Liddell, Lieutenant
Lindsay, Colonel
Little, Brigadier
Lockhart, Lieutenant-General Sir William, K.C.B., K.C.S.I.
Longden, Captain
Longfield, Brigadier
Longhurst, Dr.
Loughman, Captain
Low, Colonel
Low, General
Low, Major-General Sir Robert, G.C.B.
Lowther, Commissioner
Luck, General
Lugard, General the Right Hon. Sir Edward, G.C.B.
Luke, Mr.
Lumsden, Captain
  General Sir Harry, K.C.S.I., K.C.B.
  General Sir Peter, G.C.B.
  Lady
Lyall, Sir Alfred, G.C.I.E., K.C.B.
Lyons-Montgomery, Lieutenant
Lytton, The Earl of
Lytton, The Countess of


Macdonald, Colour-Sergeant
Macdonnell, Captain
Macdonnell, Major-General
MacGregor, Captain C.R
MacGregor, Sir Charles, K.C.B.
Mackay, Sir James, K.C.I.E.
Mackenzie, Lieutenant-Colonel A.
Mackeson, Colonel
Mackinnon, Major
Maclaine, Lieutenant
MacMahon, Private
Macnabb, Sir Donald, K.C.S.I.
Macpherson, Lieutenant-General Sir Herbert, V.C., K.C.B.
Macqueen, Colonel
Madhoo, Havildar
Mahomed, The Prophet
  Hussein Khan, Mirza
  Nabbi, Mirza
  Hyat Khan
  Jan
Mahomed, Sadik Khan
  Usman Khan
Mainpuri, Raja of
Maisey, Lieutenant
Malcolm, Sir John
Mangal Pandy
Manipur, Raja of
Manners-Smith, Lieutenant
Mansfield, Sir William.  _See_ Sandhurst
Martin, Claude
  Captain Gerald
  Lieutenant
Martindale, Miss
Massy, Brigadier-General
Matthew, Bishop
  Mrs.
Maxwell, Major Henry Hamilton
Mayne, Lieutenant Otway
Mayo, Lord
Mazr Ali, Jemadar
McGillivray, Corporal
McQueen, Sir John
Medley, Lieutenant
Mehtab Sing, General
Menzies, Lieutenant
Merewether, Colonel
Metcalfe, Sir Charles
  Sir Theophilus
Middleton, Major
Mir Bacha
  Mubarak Shah
  Jaffir
Moir, Captain
Money, Colonel G. N.
Monro, Lieutenant
Montanaro, Lieutenant
Montgomery, Sir Robert, G.C.B.
Moore, Major Henry
  Rev. Thomas
  Mrs.
Moresby, Captain
Morgan, Captain
Moriarty, Major
Morton, Captain G. de C.
Mowatt, Colonel
Mukarrab Khan, Sepoy
Munro, Sir Thomas
Murphy, Private
Murray, Lieutenant
Musa Khan
Mushk-i-Alam
Mysore, Maharaja of


Nabha, Raja of
Nadir Shah
Nairne, Major-General
Nana Sahib
Napier, Ensign
Napier (of Magd[=a]la), Field-Marshal Lord, G.C.B., K.C.S.I.
Napier, Lord (of Murchiston)
  Sir Charles
Nek Mahomed Khan
Nepal, Maharaja of
Nepal, Maharani of
Neville, Captain Philip
Nicholson, Lieutenant Charles
  Colonel W.G.
  Brigadier-General John, C.B.
    a name to conjure with in the Punjab;
    the beau-ideal of a soldier and a gentleman;
    takes command of Movable Column;
    punishment of Mehtab Sing;
    his soldierly instincts;
    defeats the rebels at Najafgarh;
    his masterful spirit;
    the man to do a desperate deed;
    the first to ascend the breach;
    mortally wounded;
    the author's last sight of him;
    his anger at the suggestion of retreat;
    his death;
    his funeral
  Lieutenant-General Sir Lothian, K.C.B.
Nisbet, Colonel
Norman, Colonel F.
  General Sir Henry, G.C.B., G.C.M.G.
Northbrook, The Earl of
Northcote, Lady
  Sir Stafford
Nott, General
Nugent, Lieutenant
Nur Jehan
Nuttall, General


Obed Ulla Khan, Sirdar
Ochterlony, Sir David
Oldfield, Lieutenant
Olpherts, General Sir William, V.C., K.C.B.
Omar Pasha
Onslow, Captain
Oudh, Begum of
  King of
Outram, General Sir James, G.C.B.
  the Bayard of the East;
  his military acumen;
  his courage and chivalry;
  differs with Sir Colin Campbell;
  interview with the author;
  commands an Infantry division at siege of Lucknow;
  preparation for the siege;
  maintains his high reputation;
  captures the Chakar Kothi;
  accomplished all that was expected of him;
  overruled by Sir Colin Campbell;
  completes the occupation of Lucknow;
  his views on the administration of Oudh;
  leaves India on account of failing health;
Ouvry, Major
Owen, Dr.
Oxley, Captain


Packe, Lieutenant
Palmer, Brigadier-General
  Major-General Sir Arthur, K.C.B.
Parker, Colonel
Parry, Major
Patiala, Maharaja of
Paton, Colonel
Paul, Lieutenant
Payn, General Sir William, K.C.B.
Peacock, Sir Barnes
Peel, Sir William
Pelly, Sir Lewis
Perkins, General Sir Æneas, K.C.B.
Persia, Shah of
Pertap Sing, Maharaja
Pertap Sing, sepoy
Peshwa, The
Phayre, General Sir Robert, G.C.B.
Picot, Lieutenant
Pole-Carew, Lieutenant-Colonel, C.B.
Pollock, General Sir George
  Major-General Sir Frederick, K.C.S.I.
Polwhele, Brigadier
Porter, General
Powell, Captain
  Captain
Powlett, Captain
Pratt, Major
Prendergast, General Sir Harry, V.C., K.C.B.
Pretyman, Lieutenant-Colonel, C.B.
Prideaux, Lieutenant
Primrose, General
Probyn, General Sir Dighton, V.C., G.C.V.O., K.C.B.
Protheroe, Colonel
Prussia, Crown Princess of
Pursoo Khatri, Jemadar


Quinton, Mr.


Ragobir Nagarkoti, Subadar
Ram Sing, Raja
Rampur, Nawab of
Rao, Sir Madhava
Rassam, Mr.
Rawlinson, Sir Henry
Reade, Mr.
Reed, General
Reegan, Private
Reid, General Sir Charles, G.C.B.
Remmington, Captain
Rennick, Captain
Rewa, Maharaja of
Rich, Captain
Ricketts, George, C.B.
Ridgeway, Colonel Sir West K.C.B.
Rind, Captain
Ripon, The Marchioness of
Ripon, The Marquis of
Roberts, General Sir Abraham
Roberts, Hon. Frederick Hugh Sherston
Roberts, Lady (widow of Sir Abraham)
Roberts, The Hon. Aileen Mary
Roberts, The Hon. Ada Edwina
Roberts, Miss
Roberts, Lady
Roberts, Field-Marshal Lord, V.C., K.P., G.C.B., G.C.S.I., G.C.I.E.,
  leaves England;
  arrives in India;
  life in Calcutta;
  journey to Peshawar;
  at Peshawar;
  visits Kashmir;
  joins Horse Artillery;
  at Umballa;
  revisits Kashmir;
  first visit to Simla;
  returns to Peshawar;
  at Mian Mir;
  first Staff appointment;
  studies native languages;
  passes examination;
  rides a hundred miles in one day;
  tour with General Reed;
  witnesses meeting between Dost Mahomed and Sir John Lawrence;
  second Staff appointment;
  second tour with General Reed;
  refuses appointment in P.W.D.;
  reports on sanatorium of Cherat;
  first meeting with Nicholson;
  returns to Peshawar;
  hears first tidings of Mutiny;
  at a Council of War;
  Staff Officer to Brigadier Chamberlain;
  at the mercy of a sentry;
  starts for Rawal Pindi;
  with Sir John Lawrence at Rawal Pindi;
  joins Movable Column at Wazirabad;
  _en route_ to Delhi;
  at Lahore;
  arrives at Delhi;
  before Delhi;
  appointed D.A.Q.M.G. with Artillery;
  first under fire;
  fidelity of his servants;
  wounded;
  intimacy with Nicholson;
  knocked over by a round shot;
  last sight of Nicholson;
  charger killed;
  takes part in storming of the palace;
  leaves Delhi with Greathed's column for Cawnpore;
  in action at Bulandshahr;
  narrow escape;
  in fight at Aligarh;
  in fight at Agra;
  first sight of Taj Mahal;
  leaves Agra;
  arrives at Cawnpore;
  meets Sir Colin Campbell;
  marches to Lucknow;
  meets with a night adventure;
  in the storming of the Sikandarbagh;
  in the attack on the Shah Najaf;
  plants the colours on the mess-house;
  accompanies Outram and Havelock to the Residency;
  meets the 'hero of the Redan';
  in fight at Cawnpore;
  in fight at Khudaganj;
  wins the V.C.;
  at the siege of Lucknow;
  with Outram at capture of the Chakar Kothi;
  meets Jung Bahadur;
  complimented by the Commander-in-Chief;
  his views on the Mutiny;
  on our present position in India;
  takes furlough;
  marries;
  receives the V.C. from the hands of the Queen;
  returns to India;
  refuses post in Revenue Survey;
  accompanies Lord Canning on his Viceregal progress;
  loses chance of service in China;
  visits Simla;
  accompanies Lord Canning through Central India;
  returns to Simla;
  ordered to Allahabad;
  accompanies Commander-in-Chief on tour;
  returns to Simla;
  again on tour with Commander-in-Chief;
  has a sunstroke;
  made A.Q.M.G.;
  serves with Umbeyla expedition;
  too junior to be a Lieutenant-Colonel;
  voyage round the Cape;
  at home again;
  returns to India;
  serves with Abyssinian Expedition;
  bearer of the Abyssinian despatches;
  first A.Q.M.G.;
  returns to India;
  birth of daughter;
  serves with Lushai Expedition;
  receives the C.B.;
  officiating Q.M.G.;
  with the Prince of Wales at Delhi;
  first meeting with Lord Lytton;
  takes part in the Imperial Assemblage at Delhi;
  accepts command of Punjab Frontier Force;
  assumes command of Kuram Field Force;
  shortcomings of his column;
  his able staff;
  advances into the Kuram valley;
  takes the Peiwar Kotal;
  devotion of his orderlies;
  congratulated by the Queen;
  hampered by want of transport;
  punishment of treachery;
  action at Khost;
  misrepresented in the House of Commons;
  dismisses a war correspondent;
  holds a Queen's birthday parade;
  farewell to Cavagnari;
  serves on the Army Commission;
  his recommendations gradually carried out;
  appointed Commander of Kabul Field Force;
  starts for Kabul;
  correspondence with Yakub Khan;
  issues a Proclamation to the people of Kabul;
  meeting with Yakub Khan;
  issues a Proclamation and an order;
  takes the Shutargardan;
  defeats the Afghans at Charasia;
  advances on Kabul;
  instructions from the Government of India;
  inspects the Embassy and the Bala Hissar;
  receives abdication of Yakub Khan;
  issues a Proclamation;
  makes a formal entry into Kabul;
  adopts measures for carrying on administration;
  misrepresented in House of Commons;
  congratulated by the Queen and the Viceroy;
  wintering at Kabul;
  attacked by the tribesmen on all sides;
  life saved by Mazr Ali;
  storming of the Takht-i-Shah;
  further attacks;
  concentrates his forces at Sherpur;
  strengthens his defences;
  arrests Daud Shah;
  defeats and disperses the tribesmen;
  reopens communication with India;
  issues a Proclamation;
  fortifies Sherpur;
  negotiations at Kabul;
  holds a durbar;
  hands over supreme command to Sir Donald Stewart;
  visits Jalalabad;
  hears news of Maiwand;
  telegram to Adjutant-General;
  appointed Commander of Kabul-Kandahar Field Force;
  preparations for the march;
  details of the Force;
  commissariat and transport;
  starts for Kandahar;
  order of marching;
  reaches Ghazni;
  reaches Kelat-i-Ghilzai;
  telegraphs progress to Government;
  food required daily for the force;
  down with fever;
  reports progress;
  letter from General Phayre;
  telegraphs to Simla;
  reaches Kandahar;
  demoralized condition of the garrison;
  encamps to the west of the city;
  reconnoitres the enemy's position;
  assumes command of the Army of Southern Afghanistan;
  defeats Ayub Khan;
  and captures his camp;
  telegraphs the news;
  difficulties about supplies;
  congratulated by the Queen and the Duke of Cambridge;
  made G.C.B.;
  appointed Commander-in-Chief of the Madras Army;
  proceeds to Quetta;
  parting with the troops;
  pleasant memories;
  receives autograph letter from the Queen;
  reception in England;
  appointed Governor of Natal and Commander of the Forces
      in South Africa;
  witnesses the manoeuvres of the German Army;
  offered the Quartermaster-Generalship;
  proceeds to Madras;
  visits the Andaman Islands;
  proceeds to Burma;
  declines the Quartermaster-Generalship;
  measures for improving the Madras Army;
  memories of Madras;
  visits Calcutta;
  meeting with Abdur Rahman at Rawal Pindi;
  returns to Madras;
  appointed Commander-in-Chief in India;
  brief visit to England;
  accompanies Lord Dufferin to Gwalior;
  proceeds to Delhi;
  Camp of Exercise at Delhi;
  accompanies Lord Dufferin to Burma;
  proceeds to the North-West Frontier;
  makes a tour of inspection;
  draws up a memorandum on frontier defence;
  Lady Roberts's Homes;
  sends reinforcements to Burma;
  lands at Rangoon;
  measures for pacification of Upper Burma;
  inspects North-West Frontier with General Chesney;
  receives Grand Cross of the Indian Empire;
  establishes 'Regimental Institutes';
  establishes the Army Temperance Association;
  makes a tour with Lord Dufferin along the North-West Frontier;
  official inspections;
  presides over Defence and Mobilization Committees;
  supports Lord Dufferin's scheme for the utilization of
      Native States' armies;
  visits the frontier;
  spends Christmas in camp;
  visits Calcutta;
  makes a tour of inspection in Central India and Rajputana;
  and in Kashmir;
  remodels the system of musketry instruction for the Native Army;
  improvements in Artillery and Cavalry;
  visits the frontier with Lord Lansdowne;
  offered the post of Adjutant-General;
  meets Prince Albert Victor in Calcutta;
  entertains  the  Prince at Muridki;
  extension of command;
  meets the Cesarewitch in Calcutta;
  views on the Native Army;
  steps taken to increase its efficiency;
  concession to the Native Army;
  unable to remedy the under-officering of Native regiments;
  inspects the Zhob valley with General Brackenbury;
  raised to the peerage;
  visits Burma;
  visits Nepal;
  review of the Maharaja's troops;
  a grand durbar;
  an evening reception at the palace;
  a short tour in the Punjab;
  proposed Mission to the Amir;
  the Mission abandoned;
  adieu to Simla;
  final tour in the Punjab;
  farewell entertainments at Lahore;
    at Lucknow;
    and at Calcutta;
  pig-sticking at Jaipur and Jodhpur;
  address from the municipality of Ahmedabad;
  parting dinner at the Byculla Club;
  the end of forty-one years in India;
  letter to Yakub Khan;
  interview with Yakub Khan's agents;
  official report on interview with Yakub Khan;
  extract from Report on Commissariat;
  instructions to officers commanding Column in Burma;
  farewell address from Sikhs of the Punjab;
    from Hindus of the Punjab;
    from Mahomedans of the Punjab;
    from the European community of the Punjab;
    from the Talukdars of Oudh;
    from the citizens of Calcutta
Robertson, Lieutenant
Robinson, Lieutenant
Romanofski, General
Rose, Sir Hugh. _See_ Strathnairn
Ross, General Sir John, G.C.B.
Ross, Lieutenant-Colonel
  Dr. Tyrrell
  Mrs. Tyrrell
Rothney, Captain
Runjit Sing
Russell, Brigadier D.
Russell, General Sir Edward Lechmere, K.C.S.I.
Russell, Lieutenant
Russia, Czar of
Ruttun Sing, Subadar


St. John, Sir Oliver
Saiyad Nur Mahomed
Sale, Sir Robert
Salisbury, The Marquis of
Salkeld, Lieutenant
Salmon, Sir Nowell
Salmond, Lieutenant
Samandar Khan
Sandeman, Colonel
  Sir Robert
Sandford, Major
Sandhurst, General Lord, G.C.B., G.C.S.I. (Sir William Mansfield)
Sandhurst, Lady
Sankar Dass, Native Doctor
Sarel, Captain
Schouvaloff, Count
Scott, Captain A.
  Major
Seaton, Brigadier
Shafto, Captain
Shah Jehan
Shah Mahomed Khan
Shah Shuja
Shaidad Khan, Resaidar
Sher Ali, Amir
Sher Ali, Sirdar
Sherindil Khan, Sirdar
Sher Mahomed, Jemadar
Sherries, Lieutenant
Sherston, Lieutenant John
Shore, Sir John. _See_ Teignmouth
Showers, Brigadier
Sikim, Raja of
Sindhia, Maharaja
Sirdar Sing
Skinner, James
Skobeleff, General
Sladen, Mrs.
Slater, Major
Sleeman, Colonel
Smith, Captain
  Major Euan
  Major Percy
Smyth, Colonel
Smyth-Windham, Major
Somerset, Sir Henry
Spens, Captain
Spottiswoode, Colonel
Spratt, Lieutenant
Stanhope, The Hon. E.
Stanley, Lord
Staveley, Lady
  Sir Charles
Sterling, Colonel
Stewart, John
  Patrick
  Field-Marshal Sir Donald Martin, Bart., G.C.B., G.C.S.I., C.I.E.
  Lieutenant Donald
  Lady
  Sir Herbert
Stewart-Mackenzie, Captain
Stillman, Lieutenant
Stolietoff, General
Strathnairn, Field-Marshal Lord, G.C.B., G.C.S.I. (Sir Hugh Rose)
Stratton, Captain
Sullivan, Gunner
Sultan Jan, Shahzada
Swat, Akhund of
Swinley, Captain
Syad Ahmed Shah
Symons, Major
Synge, Captain


Taj Sing, Sepoy
Tamerlane
Tanner, Lieutenant-General Sir Oriel, K.C.B.
Tantia Topi
Taylor, Corporal
  Colonel Reynell
  General Sir Alexander, G.C.B.
Teignmouth, Lord
Temple, Sir Richard
Thebaw, King
Thelwall, Brigadier
Theodore, King
Thesiger, General. _See_ Chelmsford
Thomson, Lieutenant
  Lieutenant
Thornhill, M.
Thornton, Thomas, C.S.I.
Tikaram Kwas, Sepoy
Tombs, Major-General Sir Harry, V.C., K.C.B.
Tonk, Nawab of
Townsend, Dr.
Travancore, Maharaja of
Travers, Lieutenant Eaton
Trevelyan, Sir Charles
Trower, Lieutenant
Tryon, Admiral Sir George, K.C.B.
Turner, Colonel F.
  Brigadier-General Sir W.W., K.C.B.
Tweeddale, William Hay, Marquess of
Tyndall, Colonel
Tytler, Captain
  Mrs.


Udaipur, Maharana of
Ulwar, Maharaja of
Unjur Tiwari


Vandeleur, Major
Vaughan, Lieutenant
   General Sir T. L., K.C.B.
Victoria, H.M. Queen
Villiers, Colonel
Vitkievitch, Captain
Vizianagram, Maharaja of
Vonolel, Chief
Vousden, Captain
Vozgonoff, General

Wakhan, Mir of
Wale, Captain
Wales, H.R.H. the Prince of
Wales, H.R.H. the Princess of
Walidad Khan
Wali Mahomed Khan
Walker, General James, C.B.
Waller, Major Robert
Walpole, Brigadier
Walton, Captain
Warburton, Colonel
Waterfield, Colonel Garrow
Waterford, The Marchioness of
  The Marquess of
Watson, General Sir John, V.C., K.C.B.
Welchman, Colonel
Wellesley, The Marquess
Wellington, Duke of
Wheeler, Sir Hugh
   Talboys
White, Sir George
Wilde, Lieutenant-General Sir Alfred, K.C.B., K.C.S.I.
William I., The Emperor
Williams, Lieutenant
   Colonel
Willoughby, Lieutenant
Wilson, Sir Archdale
Wilson, Colonel
   James
   Lieutenant
Winchester, Mary
Windham, Sir Charles
Wolseley, Field-Marshal Viscount, K.P. Commander-in-Chief
Woodthorpe, Captain
Wright, Major
Wylie, Colonel
   Mrs.
Wynne, Captain
Wynter, Captain

Yahia Khan
Yakub Khan
Yanoff, Colonel
Yorke, Lieutenant
Younghusband, Captain F.
   Lieutenant George
   Major
Yule, Colour-Sergeant
Yuralski, Doctor


Zakariah Khan




INDEX



CHIEF PUBLIC EVENTS.


Abdul Rahman proclaimed Amir
Abolition of offices of Commanders-in-Chief, Bombay and Madras
Abyssinian Expedition
Afghan War, first
Agra, Fight at
Ahmedkhel, Battle of
Aligarh, Fight at
Alipur, Attack on
Army Commission
   Temperance Association, Establishment of
Assassination of Colonel Mackeson
   of Lord Mayo
Assaye, Battle of


Barrackpore, Outbreak at
Berhampur, Outbreak at
Berlin Treaty
Black Mountain Expeditions
Bulandshahr, Action at
Burma Expedition


Cawnpore, Fight at
   Massacre at
Cesarewitch visits India
Charasia, Fights at
Chardeh Valley, Fight in the
Chitral Expedition


Delhi, Camp of Exercise at
  Siege of;
  the first victory;
  enthusiasm of the troops;
  Barnard's success;
  the Flagstaff Tower;
  attacking force placed in position;
  the weak point of our defence;
  defences;
  death of Quintin Battye;
  the besiegers besieged;
  hard fighting;
  arrival  of reinforcements;
  death of Barnard;
  Reed takes command;
  treachery in camp;
  more hard fighting;
  sufferings of sick and wounded;
  Wilson takes command;
  Nicholson and the Movable Column arrive;
  Baird-Smith plans attack;
  breaching batteries at work;
  the assault;
  Nicholson wounded;
  storming of the palace;
  Hodson captures the King;
  Hodson shoots the Princes;
  Nicholson dies;
  the siege ended
Dost Mahomed, Treaty with
  Death of


European Forces, Amalgamation of the


Ferozepore, Outbreak at


Gandamak, Treaty of
Gatling Guns, First use of
Gwalior fortress, Rendition of


Homes in the Hills, Establishment of
Hunza-Naga Campaign
Hurdwar Fair, closing of


Imperial assemblage of 1877


Jowaki Expedition


Kabul, Cavagnari's Mission to
  Expedition
  Massacre of Embassy at
  Repulse of British Mission to
  Russian Mission to
Kandahar, Defeat of Ayub Khan at
  March to
Khost, Action at
Khudaganj, Fight at
Kohat, Expedition near
Kuram Expedition


Lucknow, Relief of;
  Sir Colin's preparations;
  the advance begun;
  reinforcements arrive;
  attack by the enemy;
    ammunition wanting;
    the advance;
    Sir Colin wounded;
    attack on the Sikandarbagh;
    the Shah Najaf;
    the relief effected;
    meeting of the Generals;
    the evacuation
  Siege of;
    Napier's plan adopted;
    capture of the Chakar Kothi;
    capture of the iron bridge;
    visit from Jung Bahadur;
    Hodson mortally wounded;
    Sir Colin's mistake;
    the city taken
Lushai Expedition


Maiwand, Disaster at
Majuba Hill, Disaster at
Mandalay, Capture of
Manipur Expedition
Meerut, Mutiny at
Merv, Russian Occupation of
Mianganj, Taking of
Mian Mir, Disarmament at
Multan, Disarmament at
Mutiny, The, of 1857-1858;
  Causes of;
  Chances of its recurrence;
  First tidings of;
  New light on;
  Predicted by Sir Henry Lawrence;
  and by Sir John Malcolm


Oudh, Annexation of


Panipat, Three Battles of
Panjdeh, Incident at
Peiwar Kotal, Taking of
Persia, War with
Plassy, Battle of
  Centenary of
Prince Albert Victor visits India
Prince of Wales visits India


Regimental Institutes, Establishment of
Royal Proclamation of 1859


Sheorajpur, Fight at
Sher Ali, Death of
  Russian Treaty with
Shutargardan, Attack on the
Sikandarbagh, Attack on the
Sikim Expedition
Staff-Corps, Introduction of the


Takht-i-Shah, Taking of the


Umbeyla Expedition
Upper Burma, Annexation of


Zhob Expedition




THE END.