Produced by Srinivasan Sriram, David King, and the Online
Distributed Proofreading Team





VEDÂNTA-SÛTRAS

_With the Commentary by_

SA@NKARÂCHÂRYA

_Translated by_
GEORGE THIBAUT

_Part I_




CONTENTS.


INTRODUCTION

VEDÂNTA-SÛTRAS WITH THE COMMENTARY BY SA@NKARÂCHÂRYA.

ADHYÂYA I.

  Pâda I.

  Pâda II.

  Pâda III.

  Pâda IV.

ADHYÂYA II.

  Pâda I.

  Pâda II.

       *       *       *       *       *

Transliteration of Oriental Alphabets adopted for the Translations of
the Sacred Books of the East.

[Transcriber's Note: This book contains many words with one or two
letters in the word printed in italics; those letters are transcribed by
enclosing them in slashes, e.g. "karmakâ/nd/a" has the letters "nd" in
italics.  Also, the symbol "@" is used before the letter "n" to indicate
a horizontal bar across the top.]




INTRODUCTION.


To the sacred literature of the Brahmans, in the strict sense of the
term, i.e. to the Veda, there belongs a certain number of complementary
works without whose assistance the student is, according to Hindu
notions, unable to do more than commit the sacred texts to memory. In
the first place all Vedic texts must, in order to be understood, be read
together with running commentaries such as Sâya/n/a's commentaries on
the Sa/m/hitâs and Brâhma/n/as, and the Bhâshyas ascribed to Sa@nkara on
the chief Upanishads. But these commentaries do not by themselves
conduce to a full comprehension of the contents of the sacred texts,
since they confine themselves to explaining the meaning of each detached
passage without investigating its relation to other passages, and the
whole of which they form part; considerations of the latter kind are at
any rate introduced occasionally only. The task of taking a
comprehensive view of the contents of the Vedic writings as a whole, of
systematising what they present in an unsystematical form, of showing
the mutual co-ordination or subordination of single passages and
sections, and of reconciling contradictions--which, according to the
view of the orthodox commentators, can be apparent only--is allotted to
a separate sâstra or body of doctrine which is termed Mîmâ/m/sâ, i.e.
the investigation or enquiry [Greek: kat ezochaen], viz. the enquiry
into the connected meaning of the sacred texts.

Of this Mîmâ/m/sâ two branches have to be distinguished, the so-called
earlier (pûrva) Mîmâ/m/sâ, and the later (uttara) Mîmâ/m/sâ. The former
undertakes to systematise the karmakâ/nd/a, i.e. that entire portion of
the Veda which is concerned with action, pre-eminently sacrificial
action, and which comprises the Sa/m/hitâs and the Brâhma/n/as exclusive
of the Âra/n/yaka portions; the latter performs the same service with
regard to the so-called j/ñ/ânaka/nd/a, i.e. that part of the Vedic
writings which includes the Âra/n/yaka portions of the Brâhma/n/as, and
a number of detached treatises called Upanishads. Its subject is not
action but knowledge, viz. the knowledge of Brahman.

At what period these two /s/âstras first assumed a definite form, we are
unable to ascertain. Discussions of the nature of those which constitute
the subject-matter of the Pûrva Mîmâ/m/sâ must have arisen at a very
early period, and the word Mîmâ/m/sâ itself together with its
derivatives is already employed in the Brâhma/n/as to denote the doubts
and discussions connected with certain contested points of ritual. The
want of a body of definite rules prescribing how to act, i.e. how to
perform the various sacrifices in full accordance with the teaching of
the Veda, was indeed an urgent one, because it was an altogether
practical want, continually pressing itself on the adhvaryus engaged in
ritualistic duties. And the task of establishing such rules was moreover
a comparatively limited and feasible one; for the members of a certain
Vedic sâkhâ or school had to do no more than to digest thoroughly their
own brâhma/n/a and sa/m/hitâ, without being under any obligation of
reconciling with the teaching of their own books the occasionally
conflicting rules implied in the texts of other sâkhâs. It was assumed
that action, as being something which depends on the will and choice of
man, admits of alternatives, so that a certain sacrifice may be
performed in different ways by members of different Vedic schools, or
even by the followers of one and the same sâkhâ.

The Uttara Mîmâ/m/sâ-/s/âstra may be supposed to have originated
considerably later than the Pûrva Mîmâ/m/sâ. In the first place, the
texts with which it is concerned doubtless constitute the latest branch
of Vedic literature. And in the second place, the subject-matter of
those texts did not call for a systematical treatment with equal
urgency, as it was in no way connected with practice; the mental
attitude of the authors of the Upanishads, who in their lucubrations on
Brahman and the soul aim at nothing less than at definiteness and
coherence, may have perpetuated itself through many generations without
any great inconvenience resulting therefrom.

But in the long run two causes must have acted with ever-increasing
force, to give an impulse to the systematic working up of the teaching
of the Upanishads also. The followers of the different Vedic sâkhâs no
doubt recognised already at an early period the truth that, while
conflicting statements regarding the details of a sacrifice can be got
over by the assumption of a vikalpa, i.e. an optional proceeding, it is
not so with regard to such topics as the nature of Brahman, the relation
to it of the human soul, the origin of the physical universe, and the
like. Concerning them, one opinion only can be the true one, and it
therefore becomes absolutely incumbent on those, who look on the whole
body of the Upanishads as revealed truth, to demonstrate that their
teaching forms a consistent whole free from all contradictions. In
addition there supervened the external motive that, while the
karmakâ/nd/a of the Veda concerned only the higher castes of
brahmanically constituted society, on which it enjoins certain
sacrificial performances connected with certain rewards, the
j/ñ/ânâkâ/nd/a, as propounding a certain theory of the world, towards
which any reflecting person inside or outside the pale of the orthodox
community could not but take up a definite position, must soon have
become the object of criticism on the part of those who held different
views on religious and philosophic things, and hence stood in need of
systematic defence.

At present there exists a vast literature connected with the two
branches of the Mîmâ/m/sâ. We have, on the one hand, all those works
which constitute the Pûrva Mîmâ/m/sâ-/s/âstra--or as it is often,
shortly but not accurately, termed, the Mîmâ/m/sâ-/s/âstra--and, on the
other hand, all those works which are commonly comprised under the name
Vedânta-/s/âstra. At the head of this extensive literature there stand
two collections of Sûtras (i.e. short aphorisms constituting in their
totality a complete body of doctrine upon some subject), whose reputed
authors are Jainini and Bâdarâya/n/a. There can, however, be no doubt
that the composition of those two collections of Sûtras was preceded by
a long series of preparatory literary efforts of which they merely
represent the highly condensed outcome. This is rendered probable by the
analogy of other /s/âstras, as well as by the exhaustive thoroughness
with which the Sûtras perform their task of systematizing the teaching
of the Veda, and is further proved by the frequent references which the
Sûtras make to the views of earlier teachers. If we consider merely the
preserved monuments of Indian literature, the Sûtras (of the two
Mîmâ/m/sâs as well as of other /s/âstras) mark the beginning; if we,
however, take into account what once existed, although it is at present
irretrievably lost, we observe that they occupy a strictly central
position, summarising, on the one hand, a series of early literary
essays extending over many generations, and forming, on the other hand,
the head spring of an ever broadening activity of commentators as well
as virtually independent writers, which reaches down to our days, and
may yet have some future before itself.

The general scope of the two Mîmâ/m/sâ-sûtras and their relation to the
Veda have been indicated in what precedes. A difference of some
importance between the two has, however, to be noted in this connexion.
The systematisation of the karmakâ/nd/a of the Veda led to the
elaboration of two classes of works, viz. the Kalpa-sûtras on the one
hand, and the Pûrva Mîmâ/m/sâ-sûtras on the other hand. The former give
nothing but a description as concise as possible of the sacrifices
enjoined in the Brâhma/n/as; while the latter discuss and establish the
general principles which the author of a Kalpa-sûtra has to follow, if
he wishes to render his rules strictly conformable to the teaching of
the Veda. The j/ñ/ânakâ/nd/a of the Veda, on the other hand, is
systematised in a single work, viz. the Uttara Mîmâ/m/sâ or
Vedânta-sûtras, which combine the two tasks of concisely stating the
teaching of the Veda, and of argumentatively establishing the special
interpretation of the Veda adopted in the Sûtras. This difference may be
accounted for by two reasons. In the first place, the contents of the
karmakâ/nd/a, as being of an entirely practical nature, called for
summaries such as the Kalpa-sûtras, from which all burdensome
discussions of method are excluded; while there was no similar reason
for the separation of the two topics in the case of the purely
theoretical science of Brahman. And, in the second place, the
Vedânta-sûtras throughout presuppose the Pûrva Mîmâ/m/sâ-sûtras, and may
therefore dispense with the discussion of general principles and methods
already established in the latter.

The time at which the two Mîmâ/m/sâ-sûtras were composed we are at
present unable to fix with any certainty; a few remarks on the subject
will, however, be made later on. Their outward form is that common to
all the so-called Sûtras which aims at condensing a given body of
doctrine in a number of concise aphoristic sentences, and often even
mere detached words in lieu of sentences. Besides the Mîmâ/m/sâ-sûtras
this literary form is common to the fundamental works on the other
philosophic systems, on the Vedic sacrifices, on domestic ceremonies, on
sacred law, on grammar, and on metres. The two Mîmâ/m/sâ-sûtras occupy,
however, an altogether exceptional position in point of style. All
Sûtras aim at conciseness; that is clearly the reason to which this
whole species of literary composition owes its existence. This their aim
they reach by the rigid exclusion of all words which can possibly be
spared, by the careful avoidance of all unnecessary repetitions, and, as
in the case of the grammatical Sûtras, by the employment of an
arbitrarily coined terminology which substitutes single syllables for
entire words or combination of words. At the same time the manifest
intention of the Sûtra writers is to express themselves with as much
clearness as the conciseness affected by them admits of. The aphorisms
are indeed often concise to excess, but not otherwise intrinsically
obscure, the manifest care of the writers being to retain what is
essential in a given phrase, and to sacrifice only what can be supplied,
although perhaps not without difficulty, and an irksome strain of memory
and reflection. Hence the possibility of understanding without a
commentary a very considerable portion at any rate of the ordinary
Sûtras. Altogether different is the case of the two Mîmâ/m/sâ-sûtras.
There scarcely one single Sûtra is intelligible without a commentary.
The most essential words are habitually dispensed with; nothing is, for
instance, more common than the simple ommission of the subject or
predicate of a sentence. And when here and there a Sûtra occurs whose
words construe without anything having to be supplied, the phraseology
is so eminently vague and obscure that without the help derived from a
commentary we should be unable to make out to what subject the Sûtra
refers. When undertaking to translate either of the Mîmâ/m/sâ-sûtras we
therefore depend altogether on commentaries; and hence the question
arises which of the numerous commentaries extant is to be accepted as a
guide to their right understanding.

The commentary here selected for translation, together with
Bâdarâya/n/a's Sûtras (to which we shall henceforth confine our
attention to the exclusion of Jaimini's Pûrva Mîmâ/m/sâ-sûtras), is the
one composed by the celebrated theologian /S/a@nkara or, as he is
commonly called, /S/a@nkarâ/k/ârya. There are obvious reasons for this
selection. In the first place, the /S/a@nkara-bhâshya represents the
so-called orthodox side of Brahminical theology which strictly upholds
the Brahman or highest Self of the Upanishads as something different
from, and in fact immensely superior to, the divine beings such as
Vish/n/u or Siva, which, for many centuries, have been the chief objects
of popular worship in India. In the second place, the doctrine advocated
by /S/a@nkara is, from a purely philosophical point of view and apart
from all theological considerations, the most important and interesting
one which has arisen on Indian soil; neither those forms of the Vedânta
which diverge from the view represented by /S/a@nkara nor any of the
non-Vedântic systems can be compared with the so-called orthodox Vedânta
in boldness, depth, and subtlety of speculation. In the third place,
/S/a@nkara's bhâashya is, as far as we know, the oldest of the extant
commentaries, and relative antiquity is at any rate one of the
circumstances which have to be taken into account, although, it must be
admitted, too much weight may easily be attached to it. The
/S/a@nkara-bhâshya further is the authority most generally deferred to
in India as to the right understanding of the Vedânta-sûtras, and ever
since /S/a@nkara's time the majority of the best thinkers of India have
been men belonging to his school. If in addition to all this we take
into consideration the intrinsic merits of /S/a@nkara's work which, as a
piece of philosophical argumentation and theological apologetics,
undoubtedly occupies a high rank, the preference here given to it will
be easily understood.

But to the European--or, generally, modern--translator of the
Vedânta-sûtras with /S/a@nkara's commentary another question will of
course suggest itself at once, viz. whether or not /S/a@nkara's
explanations faithfully render the intended meaning of the author of the
Sûtras. To the Indian Pandit of /S/a@nkara's school this question has
become an indifferent one, or, to state the case more accurately, he
objects to it being raised, as he looks on /S/a@nkara's authority as
standing above doubt and dispute. When pressed to make good his position
he will, moreover, most probably not enter into any detailed comparison
of /S/a@nkara's comments with the text of Bâdarâya/n/a's Sûtras, but
will rather endeavour to show on speculative grounds that /S/a@nkara's
philosophical view is the only true one, whence it of course follows
that it accurately represents the meaning of Bâdarâya/n/a, who himself
must necessarily be assured to have taught the true doctrine. But on the
modern investigator, who neither can consider himself bound by the
authority of a name however great, nor is likely to look to any Indian
system of thought for the satisfaction of his speculative wants, it is
clearly incumbent not to acquiesce from the outset in the
interpretations given of the Vedânta-sûtras--and the Upanishads--by
/S/a@nkara and his school, but to submit them, as far as that can be
done, to a critical investigation.

This is a task which would have to be undertaken even if /S/a@nkara's
views as to the true meaning of the Sûtras and Upanishads had never been
called into doubt on Indian soil, although in that case it could perhaps
hardly be entered upon with much hope of success; but it becomes much
more urgent, and at the same time more feasible, when we meet in India
itself with systems claiming to be Vedântic and based on interpretations
of the Sûtras and Upanishads more or less differing from those of
/S/a@nkara. The claims of those systems to be in the possession of the
right understanding of the fundamental authorities of the Vedânta must
at any rate be examined, even if we should finally be compelled to
reject them.

It appears that already at a very early period the Vedânta-sûtras had
come to be looked upon as an authoritative work, not to be neglected by
any who wished to affiliate their own doctrines to the Veda. At present,
at any rate, there are very few Hindu sects not interested in showing
that their distinctive tenets are countenanced by Bâdarâya/n/a's
teaching. Owing to this the commentaries on the Sûtras have in the
course of time become very numerous, and it is at present impossible to
give a full and accurate enumeration even of those actually existing,
much less of those referred to and quoted. Mr. Fitz-Edward Hall, in his
Bibliographical Index, mentions fourteen commentaries, copies of which
had been inspected by himself. Some among these (as, for instance,
Râmânuja's Vedânta-sâra, No. XXXV) are indeed not commentaries in the
strict sense of the word, but rather systematic expositions of the
doctrine supposed to be propounded in the Sûtras; but, on the other
hand, there are in existence several true commentaries which had not
been accessible to Fitz-Edward Hall. It would hardly be practical--and
certainly not feasible in this place--to submit all the existing
bhâshyas to a critical enquiry at once. All we can do here is to single
out one or a few of the more important ones, and to compare their
interpretations with those given by /S/a@nkara, and with the text of the
Sûtras themselves.

The bhâshya, which in this connexion is the first to press itself upon
our attention, is the one composed by the famous Vaish@nava theologian
and philosopher Râmânuja, who is supposed to have lived in the twelfth
century. The Râmânuja or, as it is often called, the /S/rî-bhâshya
appears to be the oldest commentary extant next to /S/a@nkara's. It is
further to be noted that the sect of the Râmânujas occupies a
pre-eminent position among the Vaishnava, sects which themselves, in
their totality, may claim to be considered the most important among all
Hindu sects. The intrinsic value of the /S/rî-bhâshya moreover is--as
every student acquainted with it will be ready to acknowledge--a very
high one; it strikes one throughout as a very solid performance due to a
writer of extensive learning and great power of argumentation, and in
its polemic parts, directed chiefly against the school of /S/a@nkara, it
not unfrequently deserves to be called brilliant even. And in addition
to all this it shows evident traces of being not the mere outcome of
Râmânuja's individual views, but of resting on an old and weighty
tradition.

This latter point is clearly of the greatest importance. If it could be
demonstrated or even rendered probable only that the oldest bhâshya
which we possess, i.e. the /S/a@nkara-bhâshya, represents an
uninterrupted and uniform tradition bridging over the interval between
Bâdarâya/n/a, the reputed author of the Sûtras, and /S/a@nkara; and if,
on the other hand, it could be shown that the more modern bhâshyas are
not supported by old tradition, but are nothing more than bold attempts
of clever sectarians to force an old work of generally recognised
authority into the service of their individual tenets; there would
certainly be no reason for us to raise the question whether the later
bhâshyas can help us in making out the true meaning of the Sûtras. All
we should have to do in that case would be to accept /S/a@nkara's
interpretations as they stand, or at the utmost to attempt to make out,
if at all possible, by a careful comparison of /S/a@nkara's bhâshya with
the text of the Sûtras, whether the former in all cases faithfully
represents the purport of the latter.

In the most recent book of note which at all enters into the question as
to how far we have to accept /S/a@nkara as a guide to the right
understanding of the Sûtras (Mr. A. Gough's Philosophy of the
Upanishads) the view is maintained (pp. 239 ff.) that /S/a@nkara is the
generally recognised expositor of true Vedânta doctrine, that that
doctrine was handed down by an unbroken series of teachers intervening
between him and the Sûtrakâra, and that there existed from the beginning
only one Vedânta doctrine, agreeing in all essential points with the
doctrine known to us from /S/a@nkara's writings. Mr. Gough undertakes to
prove this view, firstly, by a comparison of /S/a@nkara's system with
the teaching of the Upanishads themselves; and, secondly, by a
comparison of the purport of the Sûtras--as far as that can be made out
independently of the commentaries--with the interpretations given of
them by /S/a@nkara. To both these points we shall revert later on.
Meanwhile, I only wish to remark concerning the former point that, even
if we could show with certainty that all the Upanishads propound one and
the same doctrine, there yet remains the undeniable fact of our being
confronted by a considerable number of essentially differing theories,
all of which claim to be founded on the Upanishads. And with regard to
the latter point I have to say for the present that, as long as we have
only /S/a@nkara's bhâshya before us, we are naturally inclined to find
in the Sûtras--which, taken by themselves, are for the greater part
unintelligible--the meaning which /S/a@nkara ascribes to them; while a
reference to other bhâshyas may not impossibly change our views at
once.--Meanwhile, we will consider the question as to the unbroken
uniformity of Vedântic tradition from another point or view, viz. by
enquiring whether or not the Sûtras themselves, and the
/S/a@nkara-bhâshya, furnish any indications of there having existed
already at an early time essentially different Vedântic systems or lines
of Vedântic speculation.

Beginning with the Sûtras, we find that they supply ample evidence to
the effect that already at a very early time, viz. the period antecedent
to the final composition of the Vedânta-sûtras in their present shape,
there had arisen among the chief doctors of the Vedânta differences of
opinion, bearing not only upon minor points of doctrine, but affecting
the most essential parts of the system. In addition to Bâdarâya/n/a
himself, the reputed author of the Sûtras, the latter quote opinions
ascribed to the following teachers: Âtreya, Â/s/marathya, Au/d/ulomi,
Kârsh/n/âgini, Kâ/s/ak/ri/tsna, Jaimini, Bâdari. Among the passages
where diverging views of those teachers are recorded and contrasted
three are of particular importance. Firstly, a passage in the fourth
pâda of the fourth adhyâya (Sûtras 5-7), where the opinions of various
teachers concerning the characteristics of the released soul are given,
and where the important discrepancy is noted that, according to
Au/d/ulomi, its only characteristic is thought (/k/aitanya), while
Jaimini maintains that it possesses a number of exalted qualities, and
Bâdarâya/n/a declares himself in favour of a combination of those two
views.--The second passage occurs in the third pâda of the fourth
adhyâya (Sûtras 7-14), where Jaimini maintains that the soul of him who
possesses the lower knowledge of Brahman goes after death to the highest
Brahman, while Bâdari--whose opinion is endorsed by /S/a@nkara--teaches
that it repairs to the lower Brahman only--Finally, the third and most
important passage is met with in the fourth pâda of the first adhyâya
(Sûtras 20-22), where the question is discussed why in a certain passage
of the Brhadâra/n/yaka Brahman is referred to in terms which are
strictly applicable to the individual soul only. In connexion therewith
the Sûtras quote the views of three ancient teachers about the relation
in which the individual soul stands to Brahman. According to
Â/s/marathya (if we accept the interpretation of his view given by
/S/a@nkara and /S/a@nkara's commentators) the soul stands to Brahman in
the bhedâbheda relation, i.e. it is neither absolutely different nor
absolutely non-different from it, as sparks are from fire. Audulomi, on
the other hand, teaches that the soul is altogether different from
Brahman up to the time when obtaining final release it is merged in it,
and Kâ/s/ak/ri/tsna finally upholds the doctrine that the soul is
absolutely non-different from Brahman; which, in, some way or other
presents itself as the individual soul.

That the ancient teachers, the ripest outcome of whose speculations and
discussions is embodied in the Vedânta-sûtras, disagreed among
themselves on points of vital importance is sufficiently proved by the
three passages quoted. The one quoted last is specially significant as
showing that recognised authorities--deemed worthy of being quoted in
the Sûtras--denied that doctrine on which the whole system of /S/a@nkara
hinges, viz. the doctrine of the absolute identity of the individual
soul with Brahman.

Turning next to the /S/a@nkara-bhâshya itself, we there also meet with
indications that the Vedântins were divided among themselves on
important points of dogma. These indications are indeed not numerous:
/S/a@nkara, does not on the whole impress one as an author particularly
anxious to strengthen his own case by appeals to ancient authorities, a
peculiarity of his which later writers of hostile tendencies have not
failed to remark and criticise. But yet more than once /S/a@nkara also
refers to the opinion of 'another,' viz., commentator of the Sûtras, and
in several places /S/a@nkara's commentators explain that the 'other'
meant is the V/ri/ttikâra (about whom more will be said shortly). Those
references as a rule concern minor points of exegesis, and hence throw
little or no light on important differences of dogma; but there are two
remarks of /S/a@nkara's at any rate which are of interest in this
connexion. The one is made with reference to Sûtras 7-14 of the third
pâda of the fourth adhyâya; 'some,' he says there, 'declare those
Sûtras, which I look upon as setting forth the siddhânta view, to state
merely the pûrvapaksha;' a difference of opinion which, as we have seen
above, affects the important question as to the ultimate fate of those
who have not reached the knowledge of the highest Brahman.--And under I,
3, 19 /S/a@nkara, after having explained at length that the individual
soul as such cannot claim any reality, but is real only in so far as it
is identical with Brahman, adds the following words, 'apare tu vâdina/h/
pâramârthikam eva jaiva/m/ rûpam iti manyante asmadîyâ/s/ /k/a ke/k/it,'
i.e. other theorisers again, and among them some of ours, are of opinion
that the individual soul as such is real.' The term 'ours,' here made
use of, can denote only the Aupanishadas or Vedântins, and it thus
appears that /S/a@nkara himself was willing to class under the same
category himself and philosophers who--as in later times the Râmânujas
and others--looked upon the individual soul as not due to the fictitious
limitations of Mâyâ, but as real in itself; whatever may be the relation
in which they considered it to stand to the highest Self.

From what precedes it follows that the Vedântins of the school to which
/S/a@nkara himself belonged acknowledged the existence of Vedântic
teaching of a type essentially different from their own. We must now
proceed to enquire whether the Râmânuja system, which likewise claims to
be Vedânta, and to be founded on the Vedânta-sûtras, has any title to be
considered an ancient system and the heir of a respectable tradition.

It appears that Râmânuja claims--and by Hindu writers is generally
admitted--to follow in his bhâshya the authority of Bodhâyana, who had
composed a v/ri/tti on the Sûtras. Thus we read in the beginning of the
/S/rî-bhâshya (Pandit, New Series, VII, p. 163),
'Bhagavad-bodhâyanak/ri/tâ/m/ vistîrnâ/m/ brahmasûtra-v/ri/tti/m/
pûrvâ/k/âryâ/h/ sa/m/kikshipus tanmatânusâre/n/a sûtrâksharâ/n/i
vyâkhyâsyante.' Whether the Bodhâyana to whom that v/ri/tti is ascribed
is to be identified with the author of the Kalpa-sûtra, and other works,
cannot at present be decided. But that an ancient v/ri/tti on the Sûtras
connected with Bodhâyana's name actually existed, there is not any
reason to doubt. Short quotations from it are met with in a few places
of the /S/rî-bhâshya, and, as we have seen above, /S/a@nkara's
commentators state that their author's polemical remarks are directed
against the V/ri/ttikâra. In addition to Bodhâyana, Râmânuja appeals to
quite a series of ancient teachers--pûrvâ/k/âryâs--who carried on the
true tradition as to the teaching of the Vedânta and the meaning of the
Sûtras. In the Vedârthasa@ngraha--a work composed by Râmânuja
himself--we meet in one place with the enumeration of the following
authorities: Bodhâyana, /T/a@nka, Drami/d/a, Guhadeva, Kapardin,
Bharu/k/i, and quotations from the writings of some of these are not
unfrequent in the Vedârthasa@ngraha, as well as the /S/rî-bhâshya. The
author most frequently quoted is Drami/d/a, who composed the
Drami/d/a-bhâshya; he is sometimes referred to as the bhâshyakâra.
Another writer repeatedly quoted as the vâkyakâra is, I am told, to be
identified with the /T/a@nka mentioned above. I refrain from inserting
in this place the information concerning the relative age of these
writers which may be derived from the oral tradition of the Râmânuja
sect. From another source, however, we receive an intimation that
Drami/d/â/k/ârya or Dravi/d/â/k/ârya preceded /S/a@nkara in point of
time. In his /t/îkâ on /S/a@nkara's bhâshya to the Chândogya Upanishad
III, 10, 4, Ânandagiri remarks that the attempt made by his author to
reconcile the cosmological views of the Upanishad with the teaching of
Sm/ri/ti on the same point is a reproduction of the analogous attempt
made by the Dravi/d/â/k/ârya.

It thus appears that that special interpretation of the Vedânta-sûtras
with which the /S/rî-bhâshya makes us acquainted is not due to
innovating views on the part of Râmânuja, but had authoritative
representatives already at a period anterior to that of /S/a@nkara. This
latter point, moreover, receives additional confirmation from the
relation in which the so-called Râmânuja sect stands to earlier sects.
What the exact position of Râmânuja was, and of what nature were the
reforms that rendered him so prominent as to give his name to a new
sect, is not exactly known at present; at the same time it is generally
acknowledged that the Râmânujas are closely connected with the so-called
Bhâgavatas or Pâ/ñk/arâtras, who are known to have existed already at a
very early time. This latter point is proved by evidence of various
kinds; for our present purpose it suffices to point to the fact that,
according to the interpretation of the most authoritative commentators,
the last Sûtras of the second pâda of the second adhyâya
(Vedânta-sûtras) refer to a distinctive tenet of the Bhâgavatas--which
tenet forms part of the Râmânuja system also--viz. that the highest
being manifests itself in a fourfold form (vyûha) as Vâsudeva,
Sa@nkarsha/n/a, Pradyumna, Aniruddha, those four forms being identical
with the highest Self, the individual soul, the internal organ (manas),
and the principle of egoity (aha@nkâra). Whether those Sûtras embody an
approval of the tenet referred to, as Râmânuja maintains, or are meant
to impugn it, as /S/a@nkara thinks; so much is certain that in the
opinion of the best commentators the Bhâgavatas, the direct forerunners
of the Râmânujas, are mentioned in the Sûtras themselves, and hence must
not only have existed, but even reached a considerable degree of
importance at the time when the Sûtras were composed. And considering
the general agreement of the systems of the earlier Bhâgavatas and the
later Râmânujas, we have a full right to suppose that the two sects were
at one also in their mode of interpreting the Vedânta-sûtras.

The preceding considerations suffice, I am inclined to think, to show
that it will by no means be wasted labour to enquire how Râmânuja
interprets the Sûtras, and wherein he differs from /S/a@nkara. This in
fact seems clearly to be the first step we have to take, if we wish to
make an attempt at least of advancing beyond the interpretations of
scholiasts to the meaning of the Sûtras themselves. A full and
exhaustive comparison of the views of the two commentators would indeed
far exceed the limits of the space which can here he devoted to that
task, and will, moreover, be made with greater ease and advantage when
the complete Sanskrit text of the /S/rî-bhâshya has been printed, and
thus made available for general reference. But meanwhile it is possible,
and--as said before--even urged upon a translator of the Sûtras to
compare the interpretations, given by the two bhâshyakâras, of those
Sûtras, which, more than others, touch on the essential points of the
Vedânta system. This will best be done in connexion with a succinct but
full review of the topics discussed in the adhikara/n/as of the
Vedânta-sûtras, according to /S/a@nkara; a review which--apart from the
side-glances at Râmânuja's comments--will be useful as a guide through
the Sûtras and the /S/a@nkara-bhâshya. Before, however, entering on that
task, I think it advisable to insert short sketches of the philosophical
systems of /S/a@nkara as well as of Râmânuja, which may be referred to
when, later on discrepancies between the two commentators will be noted.
In these sketches I shall confine myself to the leading features, and
not enter into any details. Of /S/a@nkara's system we possess as it is
more than one trustworthy exposition; it may suffice to refer to
Deussen's System of the Vedânta, in which the details of the entire
system, as far as they can be learned from the Sûtra-bhâshya, are
represented fully and faithfully, and to Gough's Philosophy of the
Upanishads which, principally in its second chapter, gives a lucid
sketch of the /S/a@nkara Vedânta, founded on the Sûtra-bhâshya, the
Upanishad bhâshyas, and some later writers belonging to /S/a@nkara's
school. With regard to Râmânuja's philosophy our chief source was,
hitherto, the Râmânuja chapter in the Sarvadar/s/a/n/asa/m/graha; the
short sketch about to be given is founded altogether on the
/S/rî-bhâshya itself.

What in /S/a@nkara's opinion the Upanishads teach, is shortly as
follows.--Whatever is, is in reality one; there truly exists only one
universal being called Brahman or Paramâtman, the highest Self. This
being is of an absolutely homogeneous nature; it is pure 'Being,' or,
which comes to the same, pure intelligence or thought (/k/aitanya,
j/ñ/âna). Intelligence or thought is not to be predicated of Brahman as
its attribute, but constitutes its substance, Brahman is not a thinking
being, but thought itself. It is absolutely destitute of qualities;
whatever qualities or attributes are conceivable, can only be denied of
it.--But, if nothing exists but one absolutely simple being, whence the
appearance of the world by which we see ourselves surrounded, and, in
which we ourselves exist as individual beings?--Brahman, the answer
runs, is associated with a certain power called Mâyâ or avidyâ to which
the appearance of this entire world is due. This power cannot be called
'being' (sat), for 'being' is only Brahman; nor can it be called
'non-being' (asat) in the strict sense, for it at any rate produces the
appearance of this world. It is in fact a principle of illusion; the
undefinable cause owing to which there seems to exist a material world
comprehending distinct individual existences. Being associated with this
principle of illusion, Brahman is enabled to project the appearance of
the world, in the same way as a magician is enabled by his
incomprehensible magical power to produce illusory appearances of
animate and inanimate beings. Mâyâ thus constitutes the upâdâna, the
material cause of the world; or--if we wish to call attention to the
circumstance that Mâyâ belongs to Brahman as a /s/akti--we may say that
the material cause of the world is Brahman in so far as it is associated
with Mâyâ. In this latter quality Brahman is more properly called
Î/s/vara, the Lord.

Mâyâ, under the guidance of the Lord, modifies itself by a progressive
evolution into all the individual existences (bheda), distinguished by
special names and forms, of which the world consists; from it there
spring in due succession the different material elements and the whole
bodily apparatus belonging to sentient Beings. In all those apparently,
individual forms of existence the one indivisible Brahman is present,
but, owing to the particular adjuncts into which Mâyâ has specialised
itself, it appears to be broken up--it is broken up, as it were--into a
multiplicity, of intellectual or sentient principles, the so-called
jîvas (individual or personal souls). What is real in each jîva is only
the universal Brahman itself; the whole aggregate of individualising
bodily organs and mental functions, which in our ordinary experience
separate and distinguish one jîva from another, is the offspring of Mâyâ
and as such unreal.

The phenomenal world or world of ordinary experience (vyavahâra) thus
consists of a number of individual souls engaged in specific cognitions,
volitions, and so on, and of the external material objects with which
those cognitions and volitions are concerned. Neither the specific
cognitions nor their objects are real in the true sense of the word, for
both are altogether due to Mâyâ. But at the same time we have to reject
the idealistic doctrine of certain Bauddha schools according to which
nothing whatever truly exists, but certain trains of cognitional acts or
ideas to which no external objects correspond; for external things,
although not real in the strict sense of the word, enjoy at any rate as
much reality as the specific cognitional acts whose objects they are.

The non-enlightened soul is unable to look through and beyond Mâyâ,
which, like a veil, hides from it its true nature. Instead of
recognising itself to be Brahman, it blindly identifies itself with its
adjuncts (upâdhi), the fictitious offspring of Mâyâ, and thus looks for
its true Self in the body, the sense organs, and the internal organ
(manas), i.e. the organ of specific cognition. The soul, which in
reality is pure intelligence, non-active, infinite, thus becomes limited
in extent, as it were, limited in knowledge and power, an agent and
enjoyer. Through its actions it burdens itself with merit and demerit,
the consequences of which it has to bear or enjoy in series of future
embodied existences, the Lord--as a retributor and dispenser--allotting
to each soul that form of embodiment to which it is entitled by its
previous actions. At the end of each of the great world periods called
kalpas the Lord retracts the whole world, i.e. the whole material world
is dissolved and merged into non-distinct Mâyâ, while the individual
souls, free for the time from actual connexion with upâdhis, lie in deep
slumber as it were. But as the consequences of their former deeds are
not yet exhausted, they have again to enter on embodied existence as
soon as the Lord sends forth a new material world, and the old round of
birth, action, death begins anew to last to all eternity as it has
lasted from all eternity.

The means of escaping from this endless sa/ms/ára, the way out of which
can never be found by the non-enlightened soul, are furnished by the
Veda. The karmaká/nd/a indeed, whose purport it is to enjoin certain
actions, cannot lead to final release; for even the most meritorious
works necessarily lead to new forms of embodied existence. And in the
j/ñ/ânakâ/nd/a of the Veda also two different parts have to be
distinguished, viz., firstly, those chapters and passages which treat of
Brahman in so far as related to the world, and hence characterised by
various attributes, i.e. of Î/s/vara or the lower Brahman; and,
secondly, those texts which set forth the nature of the highest Brahman
transcending all qualities, and the fundamental identity of the
individual soul with that highest Brahman. Devout meditation on Brahman
as suggested by passages of the former kind does not directly lead to
final emancipation; the pious worshipper passes on his death into the
world of the lower Brahman only, where he continues to exist as a
distinct individual soul--although in the enjoyment of great power and
knowledge--until at last he reaches the highest knowledge, and, through
it, final release.--That student of the Veda, on the other hand, whose
soul has been enlightened by the texts embodying the higher knowledge of
Brahman, whom passages such as the great saying, 'That art thou,' have
taught that there is no difference between his true Self and the highest
Self, obtains at the moment of death immediate final release, i.e. he
withdraws altogether from the influence of Mâyâ, and asserts himself in
his true nature, which is nothing else but the absolute highest Brahman.

Thus /S/a@nkara.--According to Râmânuja, on the other hand, the teaching
of the Upanishads has to be summarised as follows.--There exists only
one all-embracing being called Brahman or the highest Self of the Lord.
This being is not destitute of attributes, but rather endowed with all
imaginable auspicious qualities. It is not 'intelligence,'--as
/S/a@nkara maintains,--but intelligence is its chief attribute. The Lord
is all-pervading, all-powerful, all-knowing, all-merciful; his nature is
fundamentally antagonistic to all evil. He contains within himself
whatever exists. While, according to /S/a@nkara, the only reality is to
be found in the non-qualified homogeneous highest Brahman which can only
be defined as pure 'Being' or pure thought, all plurality being a mere
illusion; Brahman--according to Râmânuja's view--comprises within itself
distinct elements of plurality which all of them lay claim to absolute
reality of one and the same kind. Whatever is presented to us by
ordinary experience, viz. matter in all its various modifications and
the individual souls of different classes and degrees, are essential
real constituents of Brahman's nature. Matter and souls (a/k/it and
/k/it) constitute, according to Râmânuja's terminology, the body of the
Lord; they stand to him in the same relation of entire dependence and
subserviency in which the matter forming an animal or vegetable body
stands to its soul or animating principle. The Lord pervades and rules
all things which exist--material or immaterial--as their antaryâmin; the
fundamental text for this special Râmânuja tenet--which in the writings
of the sect is quoted again and again--is the so-called antaryâmin
brâhma/n/a. (B/ri/. Up. III, 7) which says, that within all elements,
all sense organs, and, lastly, within all individual souls, there abides
an inward ruler whose body those elements, sense-organs, and individual
souls constitute.--Matter and souls as forming the body of the Lord are
also called modes of him (prakâra). They are to be looked upon as his
effects, but they have enjoyed the kind of individual existence which is
theirs from all eternity, and will never be entirely resolved into
Brahman. They, however, exist in two different, periodically
alternating, conditions. At some times they exist in a subtle state in
which they do not possess those qualities by which they are ordinarily
known, and there is then no distinction of individual name and form.
Matter in that state is unevolved (avyakta); the individual souls are
not joined to material bodies, and their intelligence is in a state of
contraction, non-manifestation (sa@nko/k/a). This is the pralaya state
which recurs at the end of each kalpa, and Brahman is then said to be in
its causal condition (kâra/n/âvasthâ). To that state all those
scriptural passages refer which speak of Brahman or the Self as being in
the beginning one only, without a second. Brahman then is indeed not
absolutely one, for it contains within itself matter and souls in a
germinal condition; but as in that condition they are so subtle as not
to allow of individual distinctions being made, they are not counted as
something second in addition to Brahman.--When the pralaya state comes
to an end, creation takes place owing to an act of volition on the
Lord's part. Primary unevolved matter then passes over into its other
condition; it becomes gross and thus acquires all those sensible
attributes, visibility, tangibility, and so on, which are known from
ordinary experience. At the same time the souls enter into connexion
with material bodies corresponding to the degree of merit or demerit
acquired by them in previous forms of existence; their intelligence at
the same time undergoes a certain expansion (vikâ/s/a). The Lord,
together with matter in its gross state and the 'expanded' souls, is
Brahman in the condition of an effect (káryâvasthâ). Cause and effect
are thus at the bottom the same; for the effect is nothing but the cause
which has undergone a certain change (pari/n/âma). Hence the cause being
known, the effect is known likewise.

Owing to the effects of their former actions the individual souls are
implicated in the sa/m/sâra, the endless cycle of birth, action, and
death, final escape from which is to be obtained only through the study
of the j/ñ/ânakâ/nd/a of the Veda. Compliance with the injunctions of
the karmakâ/nd/a does not lead outside the sa/m/sâra; but he who,
assisted by the grace of the Lord, cognizes--and meditates on--him in
the way prescribed by the Upanishads reaches at his death final
emancipation, i.e. he passes through the different stages of the path of
the gods up to the world of Brahman and there enjoys an everlasting
blissful existence from which there is no return into the sphere of
transmigration. The characteristics of the released soul are similar to
those of Brahman; it participates in all the latter's glorious qualities
and powers, excepting only Brahman's power to emit, rule, and retract
the entire world.

The chief points in which the two systems sketched above agree on the
one hand and diverge on the other may be shortly stated as
follows.--Both systems teach advaita, i.e. non-duality or monism. There
exist not several fundamentally distinct principles, such as the
prak/r/iti and the purushas of the Sâ@nkhyas, but there exists only one
all-embracing being. While, however, the advaita taught by /S/a@nkara is
a rigorous, absolute one, Râmânuja's doctrine has to be characterised as
visish/t/a advaita, i.e. qualified non-duality, non-duality with a
difference. According to Sankara, whatever is, is Brahman, and Brahman
itself is absolutely homogeneous, so that all difference and plurality
must be illusory. According to Râmânuja also, whatever is, is Brahman;
but Brahman is not of a homogeneous nature, but contains within itself
elements of plurality owing to which it truly manifests itself in a
diversified world. The world with its variety of material forms of
existence and individual souls is not unreal Mâyâ, but a real part of
Brahman's nature, the body investing the universal Self. The Brahman of
/S/a@nkara is in itself impersonal, a homogeneous mass of objectless
thought, transcending all attributes; a personal God it becomes only
through its association with the unreal principle of Mâyâ, so
that--strictly speaking--/S/a@nkara's personal God, his Î/s/vara, is
himself something unreal. Râmânuja's Brahman, on the other hand, is
essentially a personal God, the all-powerful and all-wise ruler of a
real world permeated and animated by his spirit. There is thus no room
for the distinction between a param nirgu/n/am and an apara/m/ sagu/n/am
brahma, between Brahman and Î/s/vara.--/S/a@nkara's individual soul is
Brahman in so far as limited by the unreal upâdhis due to Mâyâ. The
individual soul of Râmânuja, on the other hand, is really individual; it
has indeed sprung from Brahman and is never outside Brahman, but
nevertheless it enjoys a separate personal existence and will remain a
personality for ever--The release from sa/m/sâra means, according to
/S/a@nkara, the absolute merging of the individual soul in Brahman, due
to the dismissal of the erroneous notion that the soul is distinct from
Brahman; according to Râmânuja it only means the soul's passing from the
troubles of earthly life into a kind of heaven or paradise where it will
remain for ever in undisturbed personal bliss.--As Râmânuja does not
distinguish a higher and lower Brahman, the distinction of a higher and
lower knowledge is likewise not valid for him; the teaching of the
Upanishads is not twofold but essentially one, and leads the enlightened
devotee to one result only [1].

I now proceed to give a conspectus of the contents of the Vedânta-sûtras
according to /S/a@nkara in which at the same time all the more important
points concerning which Râmânuja disagrees will be noted. We shall here
have to enter into details which to many may appear tedious. But it is
only on a broad substratum of accurately stated details that we can hope
to establish any definite conclusions regarding the comparative value of
the different modes of interpretation which have been applied to the
Sûtras. The line of investigation is an entirely new one, and for the
present nothing can be taken for granted or known.--In stating the
different heads of discussion (the so-called adhikara/n/as), each of
which comprises one or more Sûtras, I shall follow the subdivision into
adhikara/n/as adopted in the Vyâsâdhika-ra/n/amâlâ, the text of which is
printed in the second volume of the Bibliotheca Indica edition of the
Sûtras.


FIRST ADHYÂYA.
PÂDA I.


The first five adhikara/n/as lay down the fundamental positions with
regard to Brahman. Adhik. I (1) [2] treats of what the study of the
Vedânta presupposes. Adhik. II (2) defines Brahman as that whence the
world originates, and so on. Adhik. III (3) declares that Brahman is the
source of the Veda. Adhik. IV (4) proves Brahman to be the uniform topic
of all Vedânta-texts. Adhik. V (5-11) is engaged in proving by various
arguments that the Brahman, which the Vedânta-texts represent as the
cause of the world, is an intelligent principle, and cannot be
identified with the non-intelligent pradhâna from which the world
springs according to the Sâ@nkhyas.

With the next adhikara/n/a there begins a series of discussions of
essentially similar character, extending up to the end of the first
adhyâya. The question is throughout whether certain terms met with in
the Upanishads denote Brahman or some other being, in most cases the
jîva, the individual soul. /S/a@nkara remarks at the outset that, as the
preceding ten Sûtras had settled the all-important point that all the
Vedânta-texts refer to Brahman, the question now arises why the enquiry
should be continued any further, and thereupon proceeds to explain that
the acknowledged distinction of a higher Brahman devoid of all qualities
and a lower Brahman characterised by qualities necessitates an
investigation whether certain Vedic texts of primâ facie doubtful import
set forth the lower Brahman as the object of devout meditation, or the
higher Brahman as the object of true knowledge. But that such an
investigation is actually carried on in the remaining portion of the
first adhyâya, appears neither from the wording of the Sûtras nor even
from /S/a@nkara's own treatment of the Vedic texts referred to in the
Sûtras. In I, 1, 20, for instance, the question is raised whether the
golden man within the sphere of the sun, with golden hair and beard and
lotus-coloured eyes--of whom the Chândogya Upanishad speaks in 1, 6,
6--is an individual soul abiding within the sun or the highest Lord.
/S/a@nkara's answer is that the passage refers to the Lord, who, for the
gratification of his worshippers, manifests himself in a bodily shape
made of Mâyâ. So that according to /S/a@nkara himself the alternative
lies between the sagu/n/a Brahman and some particular individual soul,
not between the sagu/n/a Brahman and the nirgu/n/a Brahman.

Adhik. VI (12-19) raises the question whether the ânandamaya, mentioned
in Taittirîya Upanishad II, 5, is merely a transmigrating individual
soul or the highest Self. /S/a@nkara begins by explaining the Sûtras on
the latter supposition--and the text of the Sûtras is certainly in
favour of that interpretation--gives, however, finally the preference to
a different and exceedingly forced explanation according to which the
Sûtras teach that the ânandamaya is not Brahman, since the Upanishad
expressly says that Brahman is the tail or support of the
ânandamaya[3].--Râmânuja's interpretation of Adhikara/n/a VI, although
not agreeing in all particulars with the former explanation of
/S/a@nkara, yet is at one with it in the chief point, viz. that the
ânandamaya is Brahman. It further deserves notice that, while /S/a@nkara
looks on Adhik. VI as the first of a series of interpretatory
discussions, all of which treat the question whether certain Vedic
passages refer to Brahman or not, Râmânuja separates the adhikara/n/a
from the subsequent part of the pâda and connects it with what had
preceded. In Adhik. V it had been shown that Brahman cannot be
identified with the pradhâna; Adhik. VI shows that it is different from
the individual soul, and the proof of the fundamental position of the
system is thereby completed[4].--Adhik. VII (20, 21) demonstrates that
the golden person seen within the sun and the person seen within the
eye, mentioned in Ch. Up. I, 6, are not some individual soul of high
eminence, but the supreme Brahman.--Adhik. VIII (22) teaches that by the
ether from which, according to Ch. Up. I, 9, all beings originate, not
the elemental ether has to be understood but the highest
Brahman.--Adhik. IX (23). The prâ/n/a also mentioned in Ch. Up. I, ii, 5
denotes the highest Brahman[5]--Adhik. X (24-27) teaches that the light
spoken of in Ch. Up. III, 13, 7 is not the ordinary physical light but
the highest Brahman[6].--Adhik. XI (28-31) decides that the prâ/n/a
mentioned in Kau. Up. III, 2 is Brahman.


PÂDA II.


Adhik. I (1-8) shows that the being which consists of mind, whose body
is breath, &c., mentioned in Ch. Up. III, 14, is not the individual
soul, but Brahman. The Sûtras of this adhikara/n/a emphatically dwell on
the difference of the individual soul and the highest Self, whence
/S/a@nkara is obliged to add an explanation--in his comment on Sûtra
6--to the effect that that difference is to be understood as not real,
but as due to the false limiting adjuncts of the highest Self.--The
comment of Râmânuja throughout closely follows the words of the Sûtras;
on Sûtra 6 it simply remarks that the difference of the highest Self
from the individual soul rests thereon that the former as free from all
evil is not subject to the effects of works in the same way as the soul
is [7].--Adhik. II (9, 10) decides that he to whom the Brahmans and
Kshattriyas are but food (Ka/th/a. Up. I, 2, 25) is the highest
Self.--Adhik. III (11, 12) shows that the two entered into the cave
(Ka/th/a Up. I, 3, 1) are Brahman and the individual soul[8].--Adhik. IV
(13-17) shows that the person within the eye mentioned in Ch. Up. IV,
15, 1 is Brahman.--Adhik. V (18-20) shows that the ruler within
(antarâymin) described in B/ri/. Up. III, 7, 3 is Brahman. Sûtra 20
clearly enounces the difference of the individual soul and the Lord;
hence /S/a@nkara is obliged to remark that that difference is not
real.--Adhik. VI (21-23) proves that that which cannot be seen, &c,
mentioned in Mu/nd/aka Up. I, 1, 3 is Brahman.--Adhik. VII (24-32) shows
that the âtman vai/s/vânara of Ch. Up. V, 11, 6 is Brahman.


PÂDA III.


Adhik. I (1-7) proves that that within which the heaven, the earth, &c.
are woven (Mu/nd/. Up. II, 2, 5) is Brahman.--Adhik. II (8, 9) shows
that the bhûman referred to in Ch. Up. VII, 23 is Brahman.--Adhik. III
(10-12) teaches that the Imperishable in which, according to B/ri/. Up.
III, 8, 8, the ether is woven is Brahman.--Adhik. IV (13) decides that
the highest person who is to be meditated upon with the syllable Om,
according to Pra/s/na Up. V, 5, is not the lower but the higher
Brahman.--According to Râmânuja the two alternatives are Brahman and
Brahmâ (jîvasamash/t/irûpoz/nd/âdhipatis /k/aturmukha/h/).--Adhik. V and
VI (comprising, according to /S/a@nkara, Sûtras l4-2l) discuss the
question whether the small ether within the lotus of the heart mentioned
in Ch. Up. VIII, 1 is the elemental ether or the individual soul or
Brahman; the last alternative being finally adopted. In favour of the
second alternative the pûrvapakshin pleads the two passages Ch. Up.
VIII, 3, 4 and VIII, 12, 3, about the serene being (samprasâda); for by
the latter the individual soul only can be understood, and in the
chapter, of which the latter passage forms part, there are ascribed to
it the same qualities (viz. freeness from sin, old age, death, &c.) that
were predicated in VIII, 1, of the small ether within the heart.--But
the reply to this is, that the second passage refers not to the
(ordinary) individual soul but to the soul in that state where its true
nature has become manifest, i.e. in which it is Brahman; so that the
subject of the passage is in reality not the so-called individual soul
but Brahman. And in the former of the two passages the soul is mentioned
not on its own account, but merely for the purpose of intimating that
the highest Self is the cause through which the individual soul
manifests itself in its true nature.--What Râmânuja understands by the
âvirbhâva of the soul will appear from the remarks on IV, 4.

The two next Sûtras (22, 23) constitute, according to /S/a@nkara, a new
adhikara/n/a (VII), proving that he 'after whom everything shines, by
whose light all this is lighted' (Ka/th/a Up. II, 5, 15) is not some
material luminous body, but Brahman itself.--According to Râmânuja the
two Sûtras do not start a new topic, but merely furnish some further
arguments strengthening the conclusion arrived at in the preceding
Sûtras.[9]

Adhik. VIII (24, 25) decides that the person of the size of a thumb
mentioned in Ka/th/a Up. II, 4, 12 is not the individual soul but
Brahman.

The two next adhikara/n/as are of the nature of a digression. The
passage about the a@ngush/th/amâtra was explained on the ground that the
human heart is of the size of a span; the question may then be asked
whether also such individuals as belong to other classes than mankind,
more particularly the Gods, are capable of the knowledge of Brahman: a
question finally answered in the affirmative.--This discussion leads in
its turn to several other digressions, among which the most important
one refers to the problem in what relation the different species of
beings stand to the words denoting them (Sûtra 28). In connexion
herewith /S/a@nkara treats of the nature of words (/s/abda), opposing
the opinion of the Mîmâ/m/saka Upavarsha, according to whom the word is
nothing but the aggregate of its constitutive letters, to the view of
the grammarians who teach that over and above the aggregate of the
letters there exists a super-sensuous entity called 'spho/t/a,' which is
the direct cause of the apprehension of the sense of a word (Adhik. IX;
Sûtras 26-33).

Adhik. X (34-38) explains that /S/ûdras are altogether disqualified for
Brahmavidyâ.

Sûtra 39 constitutes, according to /S/a@nkara, a new adhikara/n/a (XI),
proving that the prâ/n/a in which everything trembles, according to
/K/a/th/a Up. II, 6, 2, is Brahman.--According to Râmânuja the Sûtra
does not introduce a new topic but merely furnishes an additional reason
for the decision arrived at under Sûtras 24, 25, viz. that the
a@ngus/th/amâtra is Brahman. On this supposition, Sûtras 24-39 form one
adhikara/n/a in which 26-38 constitute a mere digression led up to by
the mention made of the heart in 25.--The a@ngus/th/mâtra is referred to
twice in the Ka/th/a Upanishad, once in the passage discussed (II, 4,
12), and once in II, 6, 17 ('the Person not larger than a thumb'). To
determine what is meant by the a@ngus/th/mâtra, Râmânuja says, we are
enabled by the passage II, 6, 2, 3, which is intermediate between the
two passages concerning the a@ngus/th/mâtra, and which clearly refers to
the highest Brahman, of which alone everything can be said to stand in
awe.

The next Sûtra (40) gives rise to a similar difference of opinion.
According to /S/a@nkara it constitutes by itself a new adhikara/n/a
(XII), proving that the 'light' (jyotis) mentioned in Ch. Up. VIII, 12,
3 is the highest Brahman.--According to Râmânuja the Sûtra continues the
preceding adhikara/n/a, and strengthens the conclusion arrived at by a
further argument, referring to Ka/th/a Up. II, 5, 15--a passage
intermediate between the two passages about the a@ngush/th/amâtra--which
speaks of a primary light that cannot mean anything but Brahman. The
Sûtra has in that case to be translated as follows: '(The
a@ngush/th/amâtra is Brahman) because (in a passage intervening between
the two) a light is seen to be mentioned (which can be Brahman only).'

The three last Sûtras of the pâda are, according to /S/a@nkara, to be
divided into two adhikara/n/as (XIII and XIV), Sûtra 41 deciding that
the ether which reveals names and forms (Ch. Up. VIII, 14) is not the
elemental ether but Brahman; and 42, 43 teaching that the vij/ñ/ânamaya,
'he who consists of knowledge,' of B/ri/. Up. IV, 3, 7 is not the
individual soul but Brahman.--According to Râmânuja the three Sûtras
make up one single adhikara/n/a discussing whether the Chandogya
Upanishad passage about the ether refers to Brahman or to the individual
soul in the state of release; the latter of these two alternatives being
suggested by the circumstance that the released soul is the subject of
the passage immediately preceding ('Shaking off all evil as a horse
shakes off his hair,' &c.). Sûtra 41 decides that 'the ether (is
Brahman) because the passage designates the nature of something else,'
&c. (i.e. of something other than the individual soul; other because to
the soul the revealing of names and forms cannot be ascribed, &c.)--But,
an objection is raised, does not more than one scriptural passage show
that the released soul and Brahman are identical, and is not therefore
the ether which reveals names and forms the soul as well as
Brahman?--(The two, Sûtra 42 replies, are different) 'because in the
states of deep sleep and departing (the highest Self) is designated as
different' (from the soul)--which point is proved by the same scriptural
passages which /S/a@nkara adduces;--and 'because such terms as Lord and
the like' cannot be applied to the individual soul (43). Reference is
made to IV, 4, 14, where all jagadvyâpâra is said to belong to the Lord
only, not to the soul even when in the state of release.


PÂDA IV.


The last pâda of the first adhyâya is specially directed against the
Sâ@nkhyas.

The first adhikara/n/a (1-7) discusses the passage Ka/th/a Up. I, 3, 10;
11, where mention is made of the Great and the Undeveloped--both of them
terms used with a special technical sense in the Sâ@nkhya-/s/âstra,
avyakta being a synonym for pradhâna.--/S/a@nkara shows by an exhaustive
review of the topics of the Ka/th/a Upanishad that the term avyakta has
not the special meaning which the Sâ@nkhyas attribute to it, but denotes
the body, more strictly the subtle body (sûkshma /s/arîra), but at the
same time the gross body also, in so far as it is viewed as an effect of
the subtle one.

Adhik. II (8-10) demonstrates, according to /S/a@nkara, that the
tricoloured ajâ spoken of in /S/ve. Up. IV, 5 is not the pradhâna of the
Sânkhyas, but either that power of the Lord from which the world
springs, or else the primary causal matter first produced by that
power.--What Râmânuja in contradistinction from /S/a@nkara understands
by the primary causal matter, follows from the short sketch given above
of the two systems.

Adhik. III (11-13) shows that the pa/ñk/a pa/ñk/ajanâ/h/ mentioned in
B/ri/. Up. IV, 4, 17 are not the twenty-five principles of the
Sâ@nkhyas.--Adhik. IV (14, 15) proves that Scripture does not contradict
itself on the all-important point of Brahman, i.e. a being whose essence
is intelligence, being the cause of the world.

Adhik. V (16-18) is, according to /S/a@nkara, meant to prove that 'he
who is the maker of those persons, of whom this is the work,' mentioned
in Kau. Up. IV, 19, is not either the vital air or the individual soul,
but Brahman.--The subject of the adhikara/n/a is essentially the same in
Râmânuja's view; greater stress is, however, laid on the adhikara/n/a
being polemical against the Sâ@nkhyas, who wish to turn the passage into
an argument for the pradhâna doctrine.

The same partial difference of view is observable with regard to the
next adhikara/n/a (VI; Sûtras 19-22) which decides that the 'Self to be
seen, to be heard,' &c. (B/ri/. Up. II, 4, 5) is the highest Self, not
the individual soul. This latter passage also is, according to Râmânuja,
made the subject of discussion in order to rebut the Sâ@nkhya who is
anxious to prove that what is there inculcated as the object of
knowledge is not a universal Self but merely the Sâ@nkhya purusha.

Adhik. VII (23-27) teaches that Brahman is not only the efficient or
operative cause (nimitta) of the world, but its material cause as well.
The world springs from Brahman by way of modification (pari/n/âma; Sûtra
26).--Râmânuja views this adhikara/n/a as specially directed against the
Se/s/vara-sâ@nkhyas who indeed admit the existence of a highest Lord,
but postulate in addition an independent pradhâna on which the Lord acts
as an operative cause merely.

Adhik. VIII (28) remarks that the refutation of the Sâ@nkhya views is
applicable to other theories also, such as the doctrine of the world
having originated from atoms.

After this rapid survey of the contents of the first adhyâya and the
succinct indication of the most important points in which the views of
/S/a@nkara and Râmânuja diverge, we turn to a short consideration of two
questions which here naturally present themselves, viz., firstly, which
is the principle on which the Vedic passages referred to in the Sûtras
have been selected and arranged; and, secondly, if, where /S/a@nkara and
Râmânuja disagree as to the subdivision of the Sûtras into
Adhikara/n/as, and the determination of the Vedic passages discussed in
the Sûtras, there are to be met with any indications enabling us to
determine which of the two commentators is right. (The more general
question as to how far the Sûtras favour either /S/a@nkara's or
Râmânuja's general views cannot be considered at present.)

The Hindu commentators here and there attempt to point out the reason
why the discussion of a certain Vedic passage is immediately followed by
the consideration of a certain other one. Their explanations--which have
occasionally been referred to in the notes to the translation--rest on
the assumption that the Sûtrakâra in arranging the texts to be commented
upon was guided by technicalities of the Mîmâ/m/sâ-system, especially by
a regard for the various so-called means of proof which the Mîmâ/m/saka
employs for the purpose of determining the proper meaning and position
of scriptural passages. But that this was the guiding principle, is
rendered altogether improbable by a simple tabular statement of the
Vedic passages referred to in the first adhyâya, such as given by
Deussen on page 130; for from the latter it appears that the order in
which the Sûtras exhibit the scriptural passages follows the order in
which those passages themselves occur in the Upanishads, and it would
certainly be a most strange coincidence if that order enabled us at the
same time to exemplify the various pramâ/n/as of the Mîmâ/m/sâ in their
due systematic succession.

As Deussen's statement shows, most of the passages discussed are taken
from the Chândogya Upanishad, so many indeed that the whole first
adhyâya may be said to consist of a discussion of all those Chândogya
passages of which it is doubtful whether they are concerned with Brahman
or not, passages from the other Upanishads being brought in wherever an
opportunity offers. Considering the prominent position assigned to the
Upanishad mentioned, I think it likely that the Sûtrakâra meant to begin
the series of doubtful texts with the first doubtful passage from the
Chândogya, and that hence the sixth adhikara/n/a which treats of the
anândamaya mentioned in the Taittirîya Upanishad has, in agreement with
Râmânuja's views, to be separated from the subsequent adhikara/n/as, and
to be combined with the preceding ones whose task it is to lay down the
fundamental propositions regarding Brahman's nature.--The remaining
adhikara/n/as of the first pâda follow the order of passages in the
Chândogya Upanishad, and therefore call for no remark; with the
exception of the last adhikara/n/a, which refers to a Kaushîtaki
passage, for whose being introduced in this place I am not able to
account.--The first adhikara/n/a of the second pâda returns to the
Chândogya Upanishad. The second one treats of a passage in the Ka/th/a
Upanishad where a being is referred to which eats everything. The reason
why that passage is introduced in this place seems to be correctly
assigned in the /S/rî-bhâshya, which remarks that, as in the preceding
Sûtra it had been argued that the highest Self is not an enjoyer, a
doubt arises whether by that being which eats everything the highest
Self can be meant[10]--The third adhikara/n/a again, whose topic is the
'two entered into the cave' (Ka/th/a Up. I, 3, 1), appears, as Râmânuja
remarks, to come in at this place owing to the preceding adhikara/n/a;
for if it could not be proved that one of the two is the highest Self, a
doubt would attach to the explanation given above of the 'eater' since
the 'two entered into the cave,' and the 'eater' stand under the same
prakara/n/a, and must therefore be held to refer to the same
matter.--The fourth adhikara/n/a is again occupied with a Chândogya
passage.--The fifth adhikara/n/a, whose topic is the Ruler within
(antaryâmin), manifestly owes its place, as remarked by Râmânuja also,
to the fact that the Vedic passage treated had been employed in the
preceding adhikara/n/a (I, 2, 14) for the purpose of strengthening the
argument [11].--The sixth adhikara/n/a, again, which discusses 'that
which is not seen' (adre/s/ya; Mu/nd/. Up. I, 1, 6), is clearly
introduced in this place because in the preceding adhikara/n/a it had
been said that ad/ri/sh/t/a, &c. denote the highest Self;--The reasons
to which the last adhikara/n/a of the second pâda and the first and
third adhikara/n/as of the third pâda owe their places are not apparent
(the second adhikara/n/a of the third pâda treats of a Chândogya
passage). The introduction, on the other hand, of the passage from the
Pra/s/na Upanishad treating of the akshara. O/m/kâra is clearly due to
the circumstance that an akshara, of a different nature, had been
discussed in the preceding adhikara/n/a.--The fifth and sixth
adhikara/n/as investigate Chândogya passages.--The two next Sûtras (22,
23) are, as remarked above, considered by /S/a@nkara to constitute a new
adhikara/n/a treating of the 'being after which everything shines'
(Mu/nd/. Up. II, 2, 10); while Râmânuja looks on them as continuing the
sixth adhikara/n/a. There is one circumstance which renders it at any
rate probable that Râmânuja, and not /S/a@nkara, here hits the intention
of the author of the Sûtras. The general rule in the first three pâdas
is that, wherever a new Vedic passage is meant to be introduced, the
subject of the discussion, i.e. that being which in the end is declared
to be Brahman is referred to by means of a special word, in most cases a
nominative form [12]. From this rule there is in the preceding part of
the adhyâya only one real exception, viz. in I, 2, 1, which possibly may
be due to the fact that there a new pâda begins, and it therefore was
considered superfluous to indicate the introduction of a new topic by a
special word. The exception supplied by I, 3, 19 is only an apparent
one; for, as remarked above, Sûtra 19 does not in reality begin a new
adhikara/n/a. A few exceptions occurring later on will be noticed in
their places.--Now neither Sûtra 22 nor Sûtra 23 contains any word
intimating that a new Vedic passage is being taken into consideration,
and hence it appears preferable to look upon them, with Râmânuja, as
continuing the topic of the preceding adhikara/n/a.--This conclusion
receives an additional confirmation from the position of the next
adhikara/n/a, which treats of the being 'a span long' mentioned in
Ka/th/a Up. II, 4, 12; for the reason of this latter passage being
considered here is almost certainly the reference to the alpa/s/ruti in
Sûtra 21, and, if so, the a@ngush/th/amátra properly constitutes the
subject of the adhikara/n/a immediately following on Adhik. V, VI;
which, in its turn, implies that Sûtras 22, 23 do not form an
independent adhikara/n/a.--The two next adhikara/n/as are digressions,
and do not refer to special Vedic passages.--Sûtra 39 forms a new
adhikara/n/a, according to /S/a@nkara, but not according to Râmânuja,
whose opinion seems again to be countenanced by the fact that the Sûtra
does not exhibit any word indicative of a new topic. The same difference
of opinion prevails with regard to Sûtra 40, and it appears from the
translation of the Sûtra given above, according to Râmânuja's view, that
'jyoti/h/' need not be taken as a nominative.--The last two
adhikara/n/as finally refer, according to Râmânuja, to one Chândogya
passage only, and here also we have to notice that Sûtra 42 does not
comprise any word intimating that a new passage is about to be
discussed.

From all this we seem entitled to draw the following conclusions. The
Vedic passages discussed in the three first pâdas of the Vedánta-sûtras
comprise all the doubtful--or at any rate all the more important
doubtful--passages from the Chândogya Upanishad. These passages are
arranged in the order in which the text of the Upanishad exhibits them.
Passages from other Upanishads are discussed as opportunities offer,
there being always a special reason why a certain Chândogya passage is
followed by a certain passage from some other Upanishad. Those reasons
can be assigned with sufficient certainty in a number of cases although
not in all, and from among those passages whose introduction cannot be
satisfactorily accounted for some are eliminated by our following the
subdivision of the Sûtras into adhikara/n/as adopted by Râmânuja, a
subdivision countenanced by the external form of the Sûtras.

The fourth pâda of the first adhyâya has to be taken by itself. It is
directed specially and avowedly against Sâ@nkhya-interpretations of
Scripture, not only in its earlier part which discusses isolated
passages, but also--as is brought out much more clearly in the
/S/rî-bhâshya than by /S/a@nkara--in its latter part which takes a
general survey of the entire scriptural evidence for Brahman being the
material as well as the operative cause of the world.

Deussen (p. 221) thinks that the selection made by the Sûtrakâra of
Vedic passages setting forth the nature of Brahman is not in all cases
an altogether happy one. But this reproach rests on the assumption that
the passages referred to in the first adhyâya were chosen for the
purpose of throwing light on what Brahman is, and this assumption can
hardly be upheld. The Vedânta-sûtras as well as the Pûrvâ
Mîmâ/m/sâ-sûtras are throughout Mîmâ/m/sâ i.e. critical discussions of
such scriptural passages as on a primâ facie view admit of different
interpretations and therefore necessitate a careful enquiry into their
meaning. Here and there we meet with Sutrâs which do not directly
involve a discussion of the sense of some particular Vedic passage, but
rather make a mere statement on some important point. But those cases
are rare, and it would be altogether contrary to the general spirit of
the Sutrâs to assume that a whole adhyâya should be devoted to the task
of showing what Brahman is. The latter point is sufficiently determined
in the first five (or six) adhikara/n/as; but after we once know what
Brahman is we are at once confronted by a number of Upanishad passages
concerning which it is doubtful whether they refer to Brahman or not.
With their discussion all the remaining adhikara/n/as of the first
adhyâya are occupied. That the Vedânta-sûtras view it as a particularly
important task to controvert the doctrine of the Sâ@nkhyas is patent
(and has also been fully pointed out by Deussen, p. 23). The fifth
adhikara/n/a already declares itself against the doctrine that the world
has sprung from a non-intelligent principle, the pradhâna, and the
fourth pâda of the first adhyâya returns to an express polemic against
Sâ@nkhya interpretations of certain Vedic statements. It is therefore
perhaps not saying too much if we maintain that the entire first adhyâya
is due to the wish, on the part of the Sûtrakâra, to guard his own
doctrine against Sâ@nkhya attacks. Whatever the attitude of the other
so-called orthodox systems may be towards the Veda, the Sâ@nkhya system
is the only one whose adherents were anxious--and actually attempted--to
prove that their views are warranted by scriptural passages. The
Sâ@nkhya tendency thus would be to show that all those Vedic texts which
the Vedântin claims as teaching the existence of Brahman, the
intelligent and sole cause of the world, refer either to the pradhâna or
some product of the pradhâna, or else to the purusha in the Sânkhya
sense, i.e. the individual soul. It consequently became the task of the
Vedântin to guard the Upanishads against misinterpretations of the kind,
and this he did in the first adhyâya of the Vedânta-sûtras, selecting
those passages about whose interpretation doubts were, for some reason
or other, likely to arise. Some of the passages singled out are
certainly obscure, and hence liable to various interpretations; of
others it is less apparent why it was thought requisite to discuss them
at length. But this is hardly a matter in which we are entitled to find
fault with the Sûtrakára; for no modern scholar, either European or
Hindu, is--or can possibly be--sufficiently at home, on the one hand, in
the religious and philosophical views which prevailed at the time when
the Sûtras may have been composed, and, on the other hand, in the
intricacies of the Mîmâ/m/sâ, to judge with confidence which Vedic
passages may give rise to discussions and which not.

Notes:

[Footnote 1: The only 'sectarian' feature of the Srî-bhâshya is, that
identifies Brahman with Vish/n/u or Nârâya/n/a; but this in no way
affects the interpretations put on the Sûtras and Upanishads. Nârâya/n/a
is in fact nothing but another name of Brahman.]

[Footnote 2: The Roman numerals indicate the number of the adhikara/n/a;
the figures in parentheses state the Sûtras comprised in each
adhikara/n/a.]

[Footnote 3: Deussen's supposition (pp. 30, 150) that the passage
conveying the second interpretation is an interpolation is liable to two
objections. In the first place, the passage is accepted and explained by
all commentators; in the second place, /S/a@nkara in the passage
immediately preceding Sûtra 12 quotes the adhikara/n/a 'ânandamayo s
bhyâsàt' as giving rise to a discussion whether the param or the aparam
brahman is meant. Now this latter point is not touched upon at all in
that part of the bhâshya which sets forth the former explanation, but
only in the subsequent passage, which refutes the former and advocates
the latter interpretation.]

[Footnote 4: Eva/m/ jij/ñ/anasya brahma/nas/
/ko/tanabhogvabhutaga/d/arupsattvara, istamomayapradhânâd vyâv/ri/ttir
uktâ, idânî/m/ karmava/s/vat trigu/n/atmakaprik/ri/u
sa/m/sangammittanâmâvidhân intadukhasagaranimajjaonî/s/addhâ/h/. /k/i
pratya gaumano nyan nikhilaheyapratauîka/m/ miatimyanandam brahmeti
pratipadyate, anandamayo bhyásât.]

[Footnote 5: There is no reason to consider the passage 'atra ke/k/it'
in /S/a@nkara's bhashya on Sutra 23 an interpolation as Deussen does (p.
30). It simply contains a criticism passed by /S/a@nkara on other
commentators.]

[Footnote 6: To the passages on pp. 150 and 153 of the Sanskrit text,
which Deussen thinks to be interpolations, there likewise applies the
remark made in the preceding note.]

[Footnote 7: Gîvaysa iva parasyâpi brahma/n/a/h/ /s/arîrantarvaititvam
abhyupagata/m/ /k/et tadvad eva
/s/arîrasainbandhaprayuktasukhadukhopabhogapraptir hi /k/en na,
hetuvai/s/eshyat, na hi /s/arîrântarvartitvam eva
sukhadukhopabhogahetu/h/ api tu pu/n/yapàparnpakarmaparavasatva/m/ ta/k/
/K/àpahatapâpmana/h/ parahâtmano na sambhavati.]

[Footnote 8: The second interpretation given on pp. 184-5 of the
Sanskrit text (beginning with apara âha) Deussen considers to be an
interpolation, caused by the reference to the Paingi upanishad in
/S/a@nkara's comment on I, 3, 7 (p. 232). But there is no reason
whatsoever for such an assumption. The passage on p. 232 shows that
/S/a@nkara considered the explanation of the mantra given in the
Paingi-upanishad worth quoting, and is in fact fully intelligible only
in case of its having been quoted before by /S/a@nkara himself.--That
the 'apara' quotes the B/ri/hadára/n/yaka not according to the Ka/n/va
text--to quote from which is /S/a@nkara's habit--but from the
Madhyandina text, is due just to the circumstance of his being an
'apara,' i.e. not /S/a@nkara.]

[Footnote 9: Ita/s/ /k/aitad evam. Anuk/ri/tes tasya /k/a. Tasya
daharâkâsasya parabrahma/n/o snukârâd ayam apahatapâpmatvâdigu/n/ako
vimuktabandha/h/ pratyagâtmâ na daharakâ/s/a/h/ tadanukâras tatsâmya/m/
tathâ hi pratyagâlmanozpi vimuktasya parabrahmânukâra/h/ srûyate yadâ
pa/s/ya/h/ pa/s/yate rukmavar/n/a/m/ kartâram î/s/a/m/ purusha/m/
brahmayoni/m/ tadâ vidvân pu/n/yapâpe vidhûya nira/ñg/ana/h/ parama/m/
sâmyam upaitîty atos'nukartâ prajâpativâkyanirdish/t/a/h/ anukârya/m/
para/m/ brahma na daharâkâ/s/a/h/. Api /k/a smaryate. Sa/m/sâri/n/oszpi
muktâvasthâyâ/m/ paramasâmyâpattilaksha/n/a/h/ parabrahmânukâra/h/
smaryate ida/m/ j/ñ/ânam upâsritya, &c.--Ke/k/id anuk/ri/tes tasya
/k/âpi smaryate iti /k/a sûtradvayam adhikara/n/ântara/m/ tam eva
bhântam anubhâti sarva/m/ tasya bhâsâ sarvam ida/m/ vibhâtîty asyâ/h/
/s/rute/h/ parabrahmaparatvanir/n/ayâya prav/ri/tta/m/ vadanti. Tat tv
ad/ris/yatvâdigu/n/ako dharmokte/h/ dyubhvâdyâyatana/m/ sva/s/abdâd ity
adhi kara/n/advayena tasya prakara/n/asya brahmavishayatvapratipâdanât
jyoti/sk/ara/n/âbhidhânât ity âdishu parasya brahma/n/o
bhârûpatvâvagates /k/a pûrvapakshânutthânâd ayukta/m/
sûtrâksharavairûpya/k/ /k/a.]

[Footnote 10: Yadi paramâtmâ na bhoktâ eva/m/ taihi bhokt /i/tayâ
pratîyamâno jîva eva syâd ity âsankyâha attâ.]

[Footnote 11: Sthânâdivyapade/s/â/k/ /k/a ity atra ya/h/ /k/akshushi
tish/th/ann ity âdinâ pratipâdyamâna/m/ /k/akshushi
sthitiniyamanâdika/m/ paramâtmana eveti siddha/m/ k/ri/tvâ
akshipurushasya paramâtmatva/m/ sâdhitam idâni/m/ tad eva samarthayate
antaryâû.]

[Footnote 12: Ânandamaya/h/ I, 1, 12; anta/h/ I, i, 20; âkâ/s/a/h/ I, 1,
22; prâna/h/ I, 1, 23; jyoti/h/ I, 1, 24; prâna/h/ I, 1, 28; attâ I, 2,
9; guhâ/m/ pravish/t/au I, 2, 11; antara I, 2,13; antaryâmî I, 2, 18;
ad/ris/yatvâdigu/n/aka/h/ I, 2, 21; vai/s/vânara/h/ I, 2, 24;
dyubhvâdyâyatanam I, 3, 1; bhûmâ I, 3, 8; aksheram I, 3, 10; sa/h/ I, 3,
13; dahara/h/ I, 3, 14; pramita/h/ I, 3, 24; (jyoti/h/ 40;) âkâ/s/a/h/
I, 3,41.]


SECOND ADHYÂYA.


The first adhyâya has proved that all the Vedânta-texts unanimously
teach that there is only one cause of the world, viz. Brahman, whose
nature is intelligence, and that there exists no scriptural passage
which can be used to establish systems opposed to the Vedânta, more
especially the Sâ@nkhya system. The task of the two first pâdas of the
second adhyâya is to rebut any objections which may be raised against
the Vedânta doctrine on purely speculative grounds, apart from
scriptural authority, and to show, again on purely speculative grounds,
that none of the systems irreconcilable with the Vedânta can be
satisfactorily established.


PÂDA I.


Adhikara/n/a I refutes the Sâ@nkhya objection that the acceptation of
the Vedânta system involves the rejection of the Sâ@nkhya doctrine which
after all constitutes a part of Sm/ri/ti, and as such has claims on
consideration.--To accept the Sâ@nkhya-sm/ri/ti, the Vedântin replies,
would compel us to reject other Sm/ri/tis, such as the Manu-sm/ri/ti,
which are opposed to the Sâ@nkhya doctrine. The conflicting claims of
Sm/ri/tis can be settled only on the ground of the Veda, and there can
be no doubt that the Veda does not confirm the Sâ@nkhya-sm/ri/ti, but
rather those Sm/ri/tis which teach the origination of the world from an
intelligent primary cause.

Adhik. II (3) extends the same line of argumentation to the
Yoga-sm/ri/ti.

Adhik. III (4-11) shows that Brahman, although of the nature of
intelligence, yet may be the cause of the non-intelligent material
world, and that it is not contaminated by the qualities of the world
when the latter is refunded into Brahman. For ordinary experience
teaches us that like does not always spring from like, and that the
qualities of effected things when the latter are refunded into their
causes--as when golden ornaments, for instance, are melted and thereby
become simple gold again--do not continue to exist in those
causes.--Here also the argumentation is specially directed against the
Sâ@nkhyas, who, in order to account for the materiality and the various
imperfections of the world, think it necessary to assume a causal
substance participating in the same characteristics.

Adhik. IV (12) points out that the line of reasoning followed in the
preceding adhikara/n/a is valid also against other theories, such as the
atomistic doctrine.

The one Sûtra (13) constituting Adhik. V teaches, according to
/S/a@nkara, that although the enjoying souls as well as the objects of
fruition are in reality nothing but Brahman, and on that account
identical, yet the two sets may practically be held apart, just as in
ordinary life we hold apart, and distinguish as separate individual
things, the waves, ripples, and foam of the sea, although at the bottom
waves, ripples, and foam are all of them identical as being neither more
nor less than sea-water.--The /S/rî-bhâshya gives a totally different
interpretation of the Sûtra, according to which the latter has nothing
whatever to do with the eventual non-distinction of enjoying souls and
objects to be enjoyed. Translated according to Râmânuja's view, the
Sûtra runs as follows: 'If non-distinction (of the Lord and the
individual souls) is said to result from the circumstance of (the Lord
himself) becoming an enjoyer (a soul), we refute this objection by
instances from every-day experience.' That is to say: If it be
maintained that from our doctrine previously expounded, according to
which this world springs from the Lord and constitutes his body, it
follows that the Lord, as an embodied being, is not essentially
different from other souls, and subject to fruition as they are; we
reply that the Lord's having a body does not involve his being subject
to fruition, not any more than in ordinary life a king, although himself
an embodied being, is affected by the experiences of pleasure and pain
which his servants have to undergo.--The construction which Râmânuja
puts on the Sûtra is not repugnant either to the words of the Sûtra or
to the context in which the latter stands, and that it rests on earlier
authority appears from a quotation made by Râmànuja from the
Drami/d/abhâshyakâra[13].

Adhik. VI (14-20) treats of the non-difference of the effect from the
cause; a Vedânta doctrine which is defended by its adherents against the
Vai/s/eshikas according to whom the effect is something different from
the cause.--The divergent views of /S/a@nkara and Râmânuja on this
important point have been sufficiently illustrated in the general sketch
of the two systems.

Adhik. VII (21-23) refutes the objection that, from the Vedic passages
insisting on the identity of the Lord and the individual soul, it
follows that the Lord must be like the individual soul the cause of
evil, and that hence the entire doctrine of an all-powerful and all-wise
Lord being the cause of the world has to be rejected. For, the Sûtrakîra
remarks, the creative principle of the world is additional to, i.e.
other than, the individual soul, the difference of the two being
distinctly declared by Scripture.--The way in which the three Sûtras
constituting this adhikara/n/a are treated by /S/a@nkara on the one hand
and Râmânuja on the other is characteristic. Râmânuja throughout simply
follows the words of the Sûtras, of which Sûtra 21 formulates the
objection based on such texts as 'Thou art that,' while Sûtra 22 replies
that Brahman is different from the soul, since that is expressly
declared by Scripture. /S/a@nkara, on the other hand, sees himself
obliged to add that the difference of the two, plainly maintained in
Sûtra 22, is not real, but due to the soul's fictitious limiting
adjuncts.

Adhik. VIII (24, 25) shows that Brahman, although destitute of material
and instruments of action, may yet produce the world, just as gods by
their mere power create palaces, animals, and the like, and as milk by
itself turns into curds.

Adhik. IX (26-29) explains that, according to the express doctrine of
Scripture, Brahman does not in its entirety pass over into the world,
and, although emitting the world from itself, yet remains one and
undivided. This is possible, according to /S/a@nkara, because the world
is unreal; according to Râmânuja, because the creation is merely the
visible and tangible manifestation of what previously existed in Brahman
in a subtle imperceptible condition.

Adhik. X (30, 31) teaches that Brahman, although destitute of
instruments of action, is enabled to create the world by means of the
manifold powers which it possesses.

Adhik. XI (32, 33) assigns the motive of the creation, or, more properly
expressed, teaches that Brahman, in creating the world, has no motive in
the strict sense of the word, but follows a mere sportive impulse.

Adhik. XII (34-36) justifies Brahman from the charges of partiality and
cruelty which might be brought against it owing to the inequality of
position and fate of the various animate beings, and the universal
suffering of the world. Brahman, as a creator and dispenser, acts with a
view to the merit and demerit of the individual souls, and has so acted
from all eternity.

Adhik. XIII (37) sums up the preceding argumentation by declaring that
all the qualities of Brahman--omniscience and so on--are such as to
capacitate it for the creation of the world.


PÂDA II.


The task of the second pâda is to refute, by arguments independent of
Vedic passages, the more important philosophical theories concerning the
origin of the world which are opposed to the Vedânta view.--The first
adhikara/n/a (1-10) is directed against the Sâ@nkhyas, whose doctrine
had already been touched upon incidentally in several previous places,
and aims at proving that a non-intelligent first cause, such as the
pradhâna of the Sâ@nkhyas, is unable to create and dispose.--The second
adhikara/n/a (11-17) refutes the Vai/s/eshika tenet that the world
originates from atoms set in motion by the ad/ri/sh/t/a.--The third and
fourth adhikara/n/as are directed against various schools of Bauddha
philosophers. Adhik. III (18-27) impugns the view of the so-called
sarvâstitvavâdins, or bâhyârthavâdins, who maintain the reality of an
external as well as an internal world; Adhik. IV (28-32) is directed
against the vij/ñ/ânavâdins, according to whom ideas are the only
reality.--The last Sûtra of this adhikara/n/a is treated by Râmânuja as
a separate adhikara/n/a refuting the view of the Mâdhyamikas, who teach
that everything is void, i.e. that nothing whatever is real.--Adhik. V
(33-36) is directed against the doctrine of the Jainas; Adhik. VI
(37-41) against those philosophical schools which teach that a highest
Lord is not the material but only the operative cause of the world.

The last adhikara/n/a of the pâda (42-45) refers, according to the
unanimous statement of the commentators, to the doctrine of the
Bhâgavatas or Pâ/ñk/arâtras. But /S/a@nkara and Râmânuja totally
disagree as to the drift of the Sûtrakâra's opinion regarding that
system. According to the former it is condemned like the systems
previously referred to; according to the latter it is approved
of.--Sûtras 42 and 43, according to both commentators, raise objections
against the system; Sûtra 42 being directed against the doctrine that
from the highest being, called Vâsudeva, there is originated
Sa@nkarsha/n/a, i.e. the jiva, on the ground that thereby those
scriptural passages would be contradicted which teach the soul's
eternity; and Sûtra 43 impugning the doctrine that from Sa@nkarsha/n/a
there springs Pradyumna, i.e. the manas.--The Sûtra on which the
difference of interpretation turns is 44. Literally translated it runs,
'Or, on account of there being' (or, 'their being') 'knowledge and so
on, there is non-contradiction of that.'--This means, according to
/S/a@nkara, 'Or, if in consequence of the existence of knowledge and so
on (on the part of Sa@nkarsha/n/a, &c. they be taken not as soul, mind,
&c. but as Lords of pre-eminent knowledge, &c.), yet there is
non-contradiction of that (viz. of the objection raised in Sûtra 42
against the Bhâgavata doctrine).'--According to Râmânuja, on the other
hand, the Sûtra has to be explained as follows: 'Or, rather there is
noncontradiction of that (i.e. the Pa/ñk/arâtra doctrine) on account of
their being knowledge and so on (i.e. on account of their being
Brahman).' Which means: Since Sa@nkarsha/n/a and so on are merely forms
of manifestation of Brahman, the Pâ/ñk/arâtra doctrine, according to
which they spring from Brahman, is not contradicted.--The form of the
Sûtra makes it difficult for us to decide which of the two
interpretations is the right one; it, however, appears to me that the
explanations of the 'vâ' and of the 'tat,' implied in Râmânuja's
comment, are more natural than those resulting from /S/a@nkara's
interpretation. Nor would it be an unnatural proceeding to close the
polemical pâda with a defence of that doctrine which--in spite of
objections--has to be viewed as the true one.


PÂDA III.


The third pâda discusses the question whether the different forms of
existence which, in their totality, constitute the world have an origin
or not, i.e. whether they are co-eternal with Brahman, or issue from it
and are refunded into it at stated intervals.

The first seven adhikara/n/as treat of the five elementary
substances.--Adhik. I (1-7) teaches that the ether is not co-eternal
with Brahman, but springs from it as its first effect.--Adhik. II (8)
shows that air springs from ether; Adhik. IV, V, VI (10; 11; 12) that
fire springs from air, water from fire, earth from water.--Adhik. III
(9) explains by way of digression that Brahman, which is not some
special entity, but quite generally 'that which is,' cannot have
originated from anything else.

Adhik. VII (13) demonstrates that the origination of one element from
another is due, not to the latter in itself, but to Brahman acting in
it.

Adhik. VIII (14) teaches that the reabsorption of the elements into
Brahman takes place in the inverse order of their emission.

Adhik. IX (15) remarks that the indicated order in which the emission
and the reabsorption of the elementary substances take place is not
interfered with by the creation and reabsorption of the organs of the
soul, i.e. the sense organs and the internal organ (manas); for they
also are of elemental nature, and as such created and retracted together
with the elements of which they consist.

The remainder of the pâda is taken up by a discussion of the nature of
the individual soul, the jîva.--Adhik. X (16) teaches that expressions
such as 'Devadatta is born,' 'Devadatta has died,' strictly apply to the
body only, and are transferred to the soul in so far only as it is
connected with a body.

Adhik. XI (17) teaches that the individual soul is, according to
Scripture, permanent, eternal, and therefore not, like the ether and the
other elements, produced from Brahman at the time of creation.--This
Sûtra is of course commented on in a very different manner by /S/a@nkara
on the one hand and Râmânuja on the other. According to the former, the
jîva is in reality identical--and as such co-eternal--with Brahman; what
originates is merely the soul's connexion with its limiting adjuncts,
and that connexion is moreover illusory.--According to Râmânuja, the
jîva is indeed an effect of Brahman, but has existed in Brahman from all
eternity as an individual being and as a mode (prakâra) of Brahman. So
indeed have also the material elements; yet there is an important
distinction owing to which the elements may be said to originate at the
time of creation, while the same cannot be said of the soul. Previously
to creation the material elements exist in a subtle condition in which
they possess none of the qualities that later on render them the objects
of ordinary experience; hence, when passing over into the gross state at
the time of creation, they may be said to originate. The souls, on the
other hand, possess at all times the same essential qualities, i.e. they
are cognizing agents; only, whenever a new creation takes place, they
associate themselves with bodies, and their intelligence therewith
undergoes a certain expansion or development (vikâsa); contrasting with
the unevolved or contracted state (sanko/k/a) which characterised it
during the preceding pralaya. But this change is not a change of
essential nature (svarûpânyathâbhâva) and hence we have to distinguish
the souls as permanent entities from the material elements which at the
time of each creation and reabsorption change their essential
characteristics.

Adhik. XII (18) defines the nature of the individual soul. The Sûtra
declares that the soul is 'j/ñ/a.' This means, according to /S/a@nkara,
that intelligence or knowledge does not, as the Vai/s/eshikas teach,
constitute a mere attribute of the soul which in itself is essentially
non-intelligent, but is the very essence of the soul. The soul is not a
knower, but knowledge; not intelligent, but intelligence.--Râmânuja, on
the other hand, explains 'j/ñ/a' by 'j/ñ/at/ri/,' i.e. knower, knowing
agent, and considers the Sûtra to be directed not only against the
Vai/s/eshikas, but also against those philosophers who--like the
Sâ@nkhyas and the Vedântins of /S/a@nkara's school--maintain that the
soul is not a knowing agent, but pure /k/aitanya.--The wording of the
Sûtra certainly seems to favour Râmânuja's interpretation; we can hardly
imagine that an author definitely holding the views of /S/a@nkara
should, when propounding the important dogma of the soul's nature, use
the term j/ñ/a of which the most obvious interpretation j/ñ/ât/ri/, not
j/ñ/ânam.

Adhik. XIII (19-32) treats the question whether the individual soul is
a/n/u, i.e. of very minute size, or omnipresent, all-pervading
(sarvagata, vyâpin). Here, again, we meet with diametrically opposite
views.--In /S/a@nkara's opinion the Sûtras 19-38 represent the
pûrvapaksha view, according to which the jîva is a/n/u, while Sûtra 29
formulates the siddhânta, viz. that the jîva, which in reality is
all-pervading, is spoken of as a/n/u in some scriptural passages,
because the qualities of the internal organ--which itself is
a/n/u--constitute the essence of the individual soul as long as the
latter is implicated in the sa/m/sâra.--According to Râmânuja, on the
other hand, the first Sûtra of the adhikara/n/a gives utterance to the
siddhânta view, according to which the soul is of minute size; the
Sûtras 20-25 confirm this view and refute objections raised against it;
while the Sûtras 26-29 resume the question already mooted under Sûtra
18, viz. in what relation the soul as knowing agent (j/ñ/ât/ri/) stands
to knowledge (j/ñ/âna).--In order to decide between the conflicting
claims of these two interpretations we must enter into some
details.--/S/a@nkara maintains that Sûtras 19-28 state and enforce a
pûrvapaksha view, which is finally refuted in 29. What here strikes us
at the outset, is the unusual length to which the defence of a mere
primâ facie view is carried; in no other place the Sûtras take so much
trouble to render plausible what is meant to be rejected in the end, and
an unbiassed reader will certainly feel inclined to think that in 19-28
we have to do, not with the preliminary statement of a view finally to
be abandoned, but with an elaborate bonâ fide attempt to establish and
vindicate an essential dogma of the system. Still it is not altogether
impossible that the pûrvapaksha should here be treated at greater length
than usual, and the decisive point is therefore whether we can, with
/S/a@nkara, look upon Sûtra 29 as embodying a refutation of the
pûrvapaksha and thus implicitly acknowledging the doctrine that the
individual soul is all-pervading. Now I think there can be no doubt that
/S/a@nkara's interpretation of the Sûtra is exceedingly forced.
Literally translated (and leaving out the non-essential word
'prâj/ñ/avat') the Sûtra runs as follows: 'But on account of that
quality (or "those qualities;" or else "on account of the quality--or
qualities--of that") being the essence, (there is) that designation (or
"the designation of that").' This /S/a@nkara maintains to mean, 'Because
the qualities of the buddhi are the essence of the soul in the sa/m/sâra
state, therefore the soul itself is sometimes spoken of as a/n/u.' Now,
in the first place, nothing in the context warrants the explanation of
the first 'tat' by buddhi. And--which is more important--in the second
place, it is more than doubtful whether on /S/a@nkara's own system the
qualities of the buddhi--such as pleasure, pain, desire, aversion,
&c.--can with any propriety be said to constitute the essence of the
soul even in the sa/m/sâra state. The essence of the soul in whatever
state, according to /S/a@nkara's system, is knowledge or intelligence;
whatever is due to its association with the buddhi is non-essential or,
more strictly, unreal, false.

There are no similar difficulties in the way of Râmânuja's
interpretation of the adhikara/n/a. He agrees with /S/a@nkara in the
explanation of Sûtras 19-35, with this difference that he views them as
setting forth, not the pûrvapaksha, but the siddhânta. Sûtras 26-28 also
are interpreted in a manner not very different from /S/a@nkara's,
special stress being laid on the distinction made by Scripture between
knowledge as a mere quality and the soul as a knowing agent, the
substratum of knowledge. This discussion naturally gives rise to the
question how it is that Scripture in some places makes use of the term
vij/ñ/âna when meaning the individual soul. The answer is given in Sûtra
29, 'The soul is designated as knowledge because it has that quality for
its essence,' i.e. because knowledge is the essential characteristic
quality of the soul, therefore the term 'knowledge' is employed here and
there to denote the soul itself. This latter interpretation gives rise
to no doubt whatever. It closely follows the wording of the text and
does not necessitate any forced supplementation. The 'tu' of the Sûtra
which, according to /S/a@nkara, is meant to discard the pûrvapaksha,
serves on Râmânuja's view to set aside a previously-raised objection; an
altogether legitimate assumption.

Of the three remaining Sûtras of the adhikara/n/a (30-32), 30 explains,
according to /S/a@nkara, that the soul may be called a/n/u, since, as
long as it exists in the sa/m/sâra condition, it is connected with the
buddhi. According to Râmânuja the Sûtra teaches that the soul may be
called vij/ñ/âna because the latter constitutes its essential quality as
long as it exists.--Sûtra 31 intimates, according to /S/a@nkara, that in
the states of deep sleep, and so on, the soul is potentially connected
with the buddhi, while in the waking state that connexion becomes
actually manifest. The same Sûtra, according to Râmânuja, teaches that
j/ñ/ât/ri/tva is properly said to constitute the soul's essential
nature, although it is actually manifested in some states of the soul
only.--In Sûtra 32, finally, /S/a@nkara sees a statement of the doctrine
that, unless the soul had the buddhi for its limiting adjunct, it would
either be permanently cognizing or permanently non-cognizing; while,
according to Râmânuja, the Sûtra means that the soul would either be
permanently cognizing or permanently non-cognizing, if it were pure
knowledge and all-pervading (instead of being /jñ/ât/ri/ and a/n/u, as
it is in reality).--The three Sûtras can be made to fit in with either
interpretation, although it must be noted that none of them explicitly
refers to the soul's connexion with the buddhi.

Adhik. XIV and XV (33-39; 40) refer to the kart/ri/tva of the jîva, i.e.
the question whether the soul is an agent. Sûtras 33-39 clearly say that
it is such. But as, according to /S/a@nkara's system, this cannot be the
final view,--the soul being essentially non-active, and all action
belonging to the world of upâdhis,--he looks upon the next following
Sûtra (40) as constituting an adhikara/n/a by itself, and teaching that
the soul is an agent when connected with the instruments of action,
buddhi, &c., while it ceases to be so when dissociated from them, 'just
as the carpenter acts in both ways,' i.e. just as the carpenter works as
long as he wields his instruments, and rests after having laid them
aside.--Râmânuja, perhaps more naturally, does not separate Sûtra 40
from the preceding Sûtras, but interprets it as follows: Activity is
indeed an essential attribute of the soul; but therefrom it does not
follow that the soul is always actually active, just as the carpenter,
even when furnished with the requisite instruments, may either work or
not work, just as he pleases.

Adhik. XVI (41, 42) teaches that the soul in its activity is dependent
on the Lord who impels it with a view to its former actions.

Adhik. XVII (43-53) treats of the relation of the individual soul to
Brahman. Sûtra 43 declares that the individual soul is a part (a/ms/a)
of Brahman, and the following Sûtras show how that relation does not
involve either that Brahman is affected by the imperfections,
sufferings, &c. of the souls, or that one soul has to participate in the
experiences of other souls. The two commentators of course take entirely
different views of the doctrine that the soul is a part of Brahman.
According to Râmânuja the souls are in reality parts of Brahman[14];
according to Sa@nkara the 'a/ms/a' of the Sûtra must be understood to
mean 'a/ms/a iva,' 'a part as it were;' the one universal indivisible
Brahman having no real parts, but appearing to be divided owing to its
limiting adjuncts.--One Sûtra (50) in this adhikara/n/a calls for
special notice. According to Sa@nkara the words 'âbhâsa eva /k/a' mean
'(the soul is) a mere reflection,' which, as the commentators remark, is
a statement of the so-called pratibimbavâda, i.e. the doctrine that the
so-called individual soul is nothing but the reflection of the Self in
the buddhi; while Sûtra 43 had propounded the so-called ava/kkh/edavâda,
i.e. the doctrine that the soul is the highest Self in so far as limited
by its adjuncts.--According to Râmânuja the âbhâsa of the Sûtra has to
be taken in the sense of hetvâbhâsa, a fallacious argument, and the
Sûtra is explained as being directed against the reasoning of those
Vedântins according to whom the soul is Brahman in so far as limited by
non-real adjuncts[15].


PÂDA IV.


Adhik. I, II, III (1-4; 5-6; 7) teach that the prâ/n/as (by which
generic name are denoted the buddhîndriyas, karmen-driyas, and the
manas) spring from Brahman; are eleven in number; and are of minute size
(a/n/u).

Adhik. IV, V, VI (8; 9-12; 13) inform us also that the mukhya prâ/n/a,
i.e. the vital air, is produced from Brahman; that it is a principle
distinct from air in general and from the prâ/n/as discussed above; and
that it is minute (a/n/u).

Adhik. VII and VIII (14-16; 17-19) teach that the prâ/n/as are
superintended and guided in their activity by special divinities, and
that they are independent principles, not mere modifications of the
mukhya prâ/n/a.

Adhik. IX (20-22) declares that the evolution of names and forms (the
nâmarûpavyâkara/n/a) is the work, not of the individual soul, but of the
Lord.

Notes:

[Footnote 13: Lokavat, Yathâ loke râja/s/âsanânuvartinâ/m/ /k/a
râjânugrahanigrahak/ri/takhadukhayoges'pi na sa/s/arîraîvamâtre/n/a
sâsake râjany api /s/âsanânuv/ri/ttyauv/ri/ttinimittasukhadukhayor
bhokt/ri/vaprasa@nga/h/. Yathâha Drami/d/abhâshyakâra/h/ yathâ loke râjâ
pra/k/uradanda/s/ûke ghores'narthasa/m/ka/t/es'pi prade/s/e
vartamânoszpi vyajanâdyavadhûtadeho doshair na sprisyate abhipretâ/ms/
/k/a lokân paripipâlayishati bhogâ/ms/ /k/a gandhâdîn
avi/s/vajanopabhogyân dhârayati tathâsau loke/s/varo
bhramatsvasâmait/h/ya/k/amato doshair na sp/ris/yate rakshati /k/a lokân
brahmalokâdi/ms/ /k/âvi/s/vajanopabhogyân dhârayatîti.]

[Footnote 14: Gîvasya kart/ri/tva/m/ paramapurushâyattam ity uktam.
Idânîm kim aya/m/ gîva/h/ parasmâd atyantabhinna/h/ uta param eva brahma
bhrântam uta brahmaivopâdhyava/kkh/innam atha brahmâ/ms/a iti
sa/m/sayyate /s/rutivipraticpatte/h/ sa/m/saya/h/. Nanu tadananyam
ârambha/n/a/s/abdâdibhya/h/ adhika/m/ tu bhedanirdesâd ity atraivâyam
aitho nir/n/îta/h/ Satya/m/ sa eva nânâtvaikatva/s/rutivipratipattyâ
skshipya jîvasya brahmâ/ms/atvopapâdanena vi/s/eshato nir/n/îyate. Yâvad
dhi jîvasya brahmâ/m/satva/m/ na nir/n/îtam tâvaj jîvasya
brahmanosnanyatva/m/ brahma/n/as tasmâd adhikatvâ/m/ /k/a na
pratitish/th/ati. Ki/m/ tâvat prâptam. Atyanta/m/ bhinna iti. Kuta/h/.
J/ñ/âj/ñ/nau dvâv ityâdibhedanirde/s/ât. J/ñ/âj/ñ/ayor abheda/s/rutayas
tv agninâ si/ñk/ed itivad viruddhârthapratipâdanâd aupa/k/ârikya/h/,
Brahma/n/os/ms/o jîva ity api na sâdhîya/h/, ekavastvekade/s/avâ/k/î hy
a/ms/a/s/sabda/h/, jîvasya brahmaikade/s/atve tadgatâ doshâ brahma/n/i
bhaveyu/h/. Na /k/a brahmakha/nd/o jîva ity a/ms/atvopapatti/h/
kha/nd/anânarhatvâd brahma/n/a/h/ prâguktadoshaprasa@ngâ/k/ /k/a, tasmâd
atyantabhinnasya tada/ms/atva/m/ durupapâdam. Yadvâ bhrânta/m/ brahmaiva
jîva/h/. Kuta/h/. Tat tvam asi ayam âtmâ
brahmetyâdibrahmâtmabhâvopade/s/ât, nânâtmatvavâdinyas tu
pratyakshâdisiddhârthânuvâditvâd ananyathâsiddhâdvaitopade/s/aparâbhi/h/
/s/rutibhi/h/ pratyakshâdaya/s/ /k/a avidyântargata/h/
khyâpyante.--Athavâ brahmaivânâdyupâdhyava/kkh/inna/m/ jîva/h/. Kuta/h/.
Tata eva brahmâtmabhâvopade/s/at. Na /k/âyam upâdhir bhrântiparikalpita
ita vaktu/m/ sakya/m/ bandhamokshâdivyavasthânupapatter. Ity eva/m/
prâtptesbhidhîyate. Brahmâ/ms/a iti. Kuta/h/. Nânâvyapade/s/âd anyathâ
/k/aikatvena vyapade/s/âd ubhayathâ hi vyapade/s/o d/ris/yate.
Nâvâvyapade/s/as tâvat
srash/tri/tva/rig/yatva--niyant/ri/tvaniyâmyatva--sarvaj/ñ/atvâj/ñ/atva--
svâdhînatvaparâdhînatva--/s/uddhatvâ/s/uddhatva--
kalyâ/n/agu/n/âkaratvaviparîtatva--patitva/s/eshatvâdibhir d/ris/yate.
Anyathâ /k/âbhedena vyapade/s/os pi tat tvam asi ayam âtmâ
brahmetyâdibhir d/ris/yate. Api dâ/s/akitavâditvam apy adhîyate eke,
brahma dâsâ brahma dâsâ brahmeme kitavâ ity âtharva/n/ikâ brahma/n/o
dâ/s/akitavâditvam apy adhîyate, tata/s/ /k/a sarvajîvavyâpitvena abhedo
vyapadi/s/yata it artha/h/. Evam ubhayavyapade/s/amukhyatvasiddhaye
jîvosya/m/ brahma/n/os/ms/a ity abhyupagantavya/h/.]

[Footnote 15: Nanu bhrântabrahmajîvavâdeszpy avidyâk/ri/topâdhibhedâd
bhogavyavasthâdaya upapadyanta ata âha, âbhâsa eva /k/a.
Akha/nd/aikarasaprakâ/s/amâtratvarûpasya
svarûpatirodhânapûrvakopâdhibhedopapâdanahetur âbhâsa eva.
Prakâ/s/aikasvarûpasya prakâ/s/atirodhâna/m/ prakâ/s/anâ/s/a eveti prâg
evopapâditam. Âbhâsâ eveti vâ pâ/th/a/h/, tathâ sati hetava âbhâsâ/h/.]


THIRD ADHYÂYA.
PÂDA I.


Adhik. I (1-7) teaches that the soul, when passing out of the body at
the time of death, remains invested with the subtle material elements
(bhûtasûkshma) which serve as an abode to the prâ/n/as attached to the
soul.

Adhik. II (8-11) shows that, when the souls of those who had enjoyed the
reward of their good works in the moon descend to the earth in order to
undergo a new embodiment, there cleaves to them a remainder (anu/s/aya)
of their former deeds which determines the nature of the new embodiment.

Adhik. III (12-21) discusses the fate after death of those whom their
good works do not entitle to pass up to the moon.

Adhik. IV, V, VI (22; 23; 24-27) teach that the subtle bodies of the
souls descending from the moon through the ether, air, &c., do not
become identical with ether, air, &c., but only like them; that the
entire descent occupies a short time only; and that, when the souls
finally enter into plants and so on, they do not participate in the life
of the latter, but are merely in external contact with them.


PÂDA II.


Adhik. I (1-6) treats of the soul in the dreaming state. According to
/S/a@nkara the three first Sûtras discuss the question whether the
creative activity ascribed to the soul in some scriptural passages
produces things as real as those by which the waking soul is surrounded,
or not; Sûtra 3 settles the point by declaring that the creations of the
dreaming soul are mere 'Mâyâ,' since they do not fully manifest the
character of real objects. Sûtra 4 adds that dreams, although mere Mâyâ,
yet have a prophetic quality. Sûtras 5 and 6 finally reply to the
question why the soul, which after all is a part of the Lord and as such
participates in his excellencies, should not be able to produce in its
dreams a real creation, by the remark that the soul's knowledge and
power are obscured by its connexion with the gross body.

The considerably diverging interpretation given of this adhikara/n/a by
Râmânuja has the advantage of more closely connecting the Sûtras with
each other. According to him the question is not whether the creations
of a dream are real or not, but whether they are the work of the
individual soul or of the Lord acting within the soul. Sûtras 1 and 2
set forth the pûrvapaksha. The creations of dreams (are the work of the
individual soul); for thus Scripture declares: 'And the followers of
some /s/âkâs declare (the soul to be) a creator,' &c. The third Sûtra
states the siddhânta view: 'But the creations of dreams are Mâyâ, i.e.
are of a wonderful nature (and as such cannot be effected by the
individual soul), since (in this life) the nature (of the soul) is not
fully manifested.' Concerning the word 'mâyâ,' Râmânuja remarks,
'mâyâ/s/abdo hy â/sk/aryavâ/k/î janaka/s/ya kule jâtâ devamâyeva nirmitâ
ityâdishu tathâ dar/s/anât.' The three remaining Sûtras are exhibited in
the /S/rî-bhâshya in a different order, the fourth Sûtra, according to
/S/a@nkara, being the sixth according to Râmânuja. Sûtras 4 and 5
(according to Râmânuja's numeration) are explained by Râmânuja very much
in the same way as by /S/a@nkara; but owing to the former's statement of
the subject-matter of the whole adhikara/n/a they connect themselves
more intimately with the preceding Sûtras than is possible on
/S/a@nkara's interpretation. In Sûtra 6 (sû/k/aka/s/ /k/â hi) Râmânuja
sees a deduction from the siddhânta of the adhikara/n/a, 'Because the
images of a dream are produced by the highest Lord himself, therefore
they have prophetic significance.'

Adhik. II teaches that in the state of deep dreamless sleep the soul
abides within Brahman in the heart.

Adhik. III (9) expounds the reasons entitling us to assume that the soul
awakening from sleep is the same that went to sleep.--Adhik. IV (9)
explains the nature of a swoon.

Adhik. V (11-21) is, according to /S/a@nkara, taken up with the question
as to the nature of the highest Brahman in which the individual soul is
merged in the state of deep sleep. Sûtra 11 declares that twofold
characteristics (viz. absence and presence of distinctive attributes,
nirvi/s/eshatva and savi/s/eshatva) cannot belong to the highest Brahman
even through its stations, i.e. its limiting adjuncts; since all
passages which aim at setting forth Brahman's nature declare it to be
destitute of all distinctive attributes.--The fact, Sûtra 12 continues,
that in many passages Brahman is spoken of as possessing distinctive
attributes is of no relevancy, since wherever there are mentioned
limiting adjuncts, on which all distinction depends, it is specially
stated that Brahman in itself is free from all diversity; and--Sûtra 13
adds--in some places the assumption of diversity is specially objected
to.--That Brahman is devoid of all form (Sûtra 14), is the pre-eminent
meaning of all Vedânta-texts setting forth Brahman's nature.--That
Brahman is represented as having different forms, as it were, is due to
its connexion with its (unreal) limiting adjuncts; just as the light of
the sun appears straight or crooked, as it were, according to the nature
of the things he illuminates (15).--The B/ri/hadâra/n/yaka expressly
declares that Brahman is one uniform mass of intelligence (16); and the
same is taught in other scriptural passages and in Sm/ri/ti (l7).--At
the unreality of the apparent manifoldness of the Self, caused by the
limiting adjuncts, aim those scriptural passages in which the Self is
compared to the sun, which remains one although his reflections on the
surface of the water are many (18).--Nor must the objection be raised
that that comparison is unsuitable, because the Self is not material
like the sun, and there are no real upâdhis separate from it as the
water is from the sun; for the comparison merely means to indicate that,
as the reflected image of the sun participates in the changes, increase,
decrease, &c., which the water undergoes while the sun himself remains
unaffected thereby, so the true Self is not affected by the attributes
of the upâdhis, while, in so far as it is limited by the latter, it is
affected by them as it were (19, 20).--That the Self is within the
upâdhis, Scripture declares (21).

From the above explanation of this important adhikara/n/a the one given
in the Srî-bhâshya differs totally. According to Râmânuja the
adhikara/n/a raises the question whether the imperfections clinging to
the individual soul (the discussion of which has now come to an end)
affect also the highest Lord who, according to Scripture, abides within
the soul as antaryâmin. 'Notwithstanding the abode (of the highest Self
within the soul) (it is) not (affected by the soul's imperfections)
because everywhere (the highest Self is represented) as having twofold
characteristics (viz. being, on one hand, free from all evil,
apahatapâpman, vijara, vim/ri/tyu, &c., and, on the other hand, endowed
with all auspicious qualities, satyakâma, satyasa/m/kalpa, &c.)
(11).--Should it be objected that, just as the soul although essentially
free from evil--according to the Prajâpativâkya in the Chândogya--yet is
liable to imperfections owing to its connexion with a variety of bodies,
so the antaryâmin also is affected by abiding within bodies; we deny
this because in every section of the chapter referring to the antaryâmin
(in the B/ri/hadâra/n/yaka) he is expressly called the Immortal, the
ruler within; which shows him to be free from the shortcomings of the
jiva (12).--Some, moreover, expressly assert that, although the Lord and
the soul are within one body, the soul only is imperfect, not the Lord
(dvâ supar/n/â sayujâ sakhâyâ) (13).--Should it be said that, according
to the Chândogya, Brahman entered together with the souls into the
elements previously to the evolution of names and forms, and hence
participates in the latter, thus becoming implicated in the sa/m/sára;
we reply that Brahman, although connected with such and such forms, is
in itself devoid of form, since it is the principal element (agent;
pradhâna) in the bringing about of names and forms (according to
'âkâ/s/o ha vai nâmarûpayor nirvahitâ') (14).--But does not the passage
'satya/m/ j/ñ/ânam anantam brahma' teach that Brahman is nothing but
light (intelligence) without any difference, and does not the passage
'neti neti' deny of it all qualities?--As in order, we reply, not to
deprive passages as the one quoted from the Taittirîya of their purport,
we admit that Brahman's nature is light, so we must also admit that
Brahman is satyasa/m/kalpa, and so on; for if not, the passages in which
those qualities are asserted would become purportless (15).--Moreover
the Taittirîya passage only asserts so much, viz. the prakâ/s/arûpatâ of
Brahman, and does not deny other qualities (l6).--And the passage 'neti
neti' will be discussed later on.--The ubhayali@ngatva of Brahman in the
sense assigned above is asserted in many places /S/ruti and Sm/ri/ti
(17).--Because Brahman although abiding in many places is not touched by
their imperfections, the similes of the reflected sun, of the ether
limited by jars, &c., are applicable to it (18).--Should it be said that
the illustration is not an appropriate one, because the sun is
apprehended in the water erroneously only while the antaryâmin really
abides within all things, and therefore must be viewed as sharing their
defects (19); we reply that what the simile means to negative is merely
that Brahman should, owing to its inherence in many places, participate
in the increase, decrease, and so on, of its abodes. On this view both
similes are appropriate (20).--Analogous similes we observe to be
employed in ordinary life, as when we compare a man to a lion (21).

Sûtras 22-30 constitute, according to /S/a@nkara, a new adhikara/n/a
(VI), whose object it is to show that the clause 'not so, not so' (neti
neti; B/ri/hadâr) negatives, not Brahman itself, but only the two forms
of Brahman described in the preceding part of the chapter. Sûtras 23-26
further dwell on Brahman being in reality devoid of all distinctive
attributes which are altogether due to the upâdhis. The last four Sûtras
return to the question how, Brahman being one only, the souls are in so
many places spoken of as different from it, and, two explanatory
hypotheses having been rejected, the conclusion is arrived at that all
difference is unreal, due to fictitious limiting adjuncts.

According to Rámânuja, Sûtras 22 ff. continue the discussion started in
Sûtra 11. How, the question is asked, can the ubhayali@ngatva of Brahman
be maintained considering that the 'not so, not so' of the
B/ri/hadâra/n/yaka denies of Brahman all the previously mentioned modes
(prakâra), so that it can only be called that which is (sanmâtra)?--The
reply given in Sûtra 22 is that 'not so, not so' does not deny of
Brahman the distinctive qualities or modes declared previously (for it
would be senseless at first to teach them, and finally to deny them
again[16]), but merely denies the prâk/ri/taitâvattva, the previously
stated limited nature of Brahman, i.e. it denies that Brahman possesses
only the previously mentioned qualifications. With this agrees, that
subsequently to 'neti neti' Scripture itself enunciates further
qualifications of Brahman. That Brahman as stated above is not the
object of any other means of proof but Scripture is confirmed in Sûtra
23, 'Scripture declares Brahman to be the non-manifest.'--And the
intuition (sákshâtkkâra) of Brahman ensues only upon its sa/m/râdhana,
i.e. upon its being perfectly pleased by the worshipper's devotion, as
Scripture and Sm/ri/ti declare (24).--That this interpretation of 'neti'
is the right one, is likewise shown by the fact that in the same way as
prakâ/s/a, luminousness, j/ñ/âna, intelligence, &c., so also the quality
of being differentiated by the world (prapa/ñk/avsish/t/atâ) is intuited
as non-different, i.e. as likewise qualifying Brahman; and that
prakâ/s/a, and so on, characterise Brahman, is known through repeated
practice (on the part of /ri/shis like Vâmadeva) in the work of
sa/m/râdhana mentioned before (25).--For all these reasons Brahman is
connected with the infinite, i.e. the infinite number of auspicious
qualities; for thus the twofold indications (li@nga) met with in
Scripture are fully justified (26).--In what relation, then, does the
a/k/id vastu, i.e. the non-sentient matter, which, according to the
b/ri/hadara/n/yaka, is one of the forms of Brahman, stand to the
latter?--Non-sentient beings might, in the first place, be viewed as
special arrangements (sa/m/sthanaviseshâ/h/) of Brahman, as the coils
are of the body of the snake; for Brahman is designated as both, i.e.
sometimes as one with the world (Brahman is all this, &c.), sometimes as
different from it (Let me enter into those elements, &c.) (27).--Or, in
the second place, the relation of the two might be viewed as analogous
to that of light and the luminous object which are two and yet one, both
being fire (28).--Or, in the third place, the relation is like that
stated before, i.e. the material world is, like the individual souls
(whose case was discussed in II, 3, 43), a part--a/ms/a--of Brahman (29,
30).

Adhik. VII (31-37) explains how some metaphorical expressions, seemingly
implying that there is something different from Brahman, have to be
truly understood.

Adhik. VIII (38-41) teaches that the reward of works is not, as Jaimini
opines, the independent result of the works acting through the so-called
apûrva, but is allotted by the Lord.


PÂDA III.


With the third pâda of the second adhyâya a new section of the work
begins, whose task it is to describe how the individual soul is enabled
by meditation on Brahman to obtain final release. The first point to be
determined here is what constitutes a meditation on Brahman, and, more
particularly, in what relation those parts of the Upanishads stand to
each other which enjoin identical or partly identical meditations. The
reader of the Upanishads cannot fail to observe that the texts of the
different /s/âkhâs contain many chapters of similar, often nearly
identical, contents, and that in some cases the text of even one and the
same /s/âkhâ exhibits the same matter in more or less varied forms. The
reason of this clearly is that the common stock of religious and
philosophical ideas which were in circulation at the time of the
composition of the Upanishads found separate expression in the different
priestly communities; hence the same speculations, legends, &c. reappear
in various places of the sacred Scriptures in more or less differing
dress. Originally, when we may suppose the members of each Vedic school
to have confined themselves to the study of their own sacred texts, the
fact that the texts of other schools contained chapters of similar
contents would hardly appear to call for special note or comment; not
any more than the circumstance that the sacrificial performances
enjoined on the followers of some particular /s/âkhâ were found
described with greater or smaller modifications in the books of other
/s/âkhâs also. But already at a very early period, at any rate long
before the composition of the Vedânta-sûtras in their present form, the
Vedic theologians must have apprehended the truth that, in whatever
regards sacrificial acts, one /s/âkhâ may indeed safely follow its own
texts, disregarding the texts of all other /s/âkhâs; that, however, all
texts which aim at throwing light on the nature of Brahman and the
relation to it of the human soul must somehow or other be combined into
one consistent systematical whole equally valid for the followers of all
Vedic schools. For, as we have had occasion to remark above, while acts
may be performed by different individuals in different ways, cognition
is defined by the nature of the object cognised, and hence can be one
only, unless it ceases to be true cognition. Hence the attempts, on the
one hand, of discarding by skilful interpretation all contradictions met
with in the sacred text, and, on the other hand, of showing what
sections of the different Upanishads have to be viewed as teaching the
same matter, and therefore must be combined in one meditation. The
latter is the special task of the present pâda.

Adhik. I and II (1-4; 5) are concerned with the question whether those
vidyâs, which are met with in identical or similar form in more than one
sacred text, are to be considered as constituting several vidyâs, or one
vidyâ only. /S/a@nkara remarks that the question affects only those
vidyâs whose object is the qualified Brahman; for the knowledge of the
non-qualified Brahman, which is of an absolutely uniform nature, can of
course be one only wherever it is set forth. But things lie differently
in those cases where the object of knowledge is the sagu/n/am brahma or
some outward manifestation of Brahman; for the qualities as well as
manifestations of Brahman are many. Anticipating the subject of a later
adhikara/n/a, we may take for an example the so-called /S/â/nd/ilyavidyâ
which is met with in Ch. Up. III, 14, again--in an abridged form--in
B/ri/. Up. V, 6, and, moreover, in the tenth book of the
/S/atapathabráhma/n/a (X, 6, 3). The three passages enjoin a meditation
on Brahman as possessing certain attributes, some of which are specified
in all the three texts (as, for instance, manomayatva, bhârûpatva),
while others are peculiar to each separate passage (prâ/n/a/s/arîratva
and satyasa/m/kalpatva, for instance, being mentioned in the Chândogya
Upanishad and /S/atapatha-brâhma/n/a, but not in the B/ri/hadâra/n/yaka
Upanishad, which, on its part, specifies sarvava/s/itva, not referred to
in the two other texts). Here, then, there is room for a doubt whether
the three passages refer to one object of knowledge or not. To the
devout Vedântin the question is not a purely theoretical one, but of
immediate practical interest. For if the three texts are to be held
apart, there are three different meditations to be gone through; if, on
the other hand, the vidyâ is one only, all the different qualities of
Brahman mentioned in the three passages have to be combined into one
meditation.--The decision is here, as in all similar cases, in favour of
the latter alternative. A careful examination of the three passages
shows that the object of meditation is one only; hence the meditation
also is one only, comprehending all the attributes mentioned in the
three texts.

Adhik. III (6-8) discusses the case of vidyâs being really separate,
although apparently identical. The examples selected are the
udgîthavidyâs of the Chândogya Upanishad (I, 1-3) and the
B/ri/hadâra/n/yaka Upanishad (I, 3), which, although showing certain
similarities--such as bearing the same name and the udgîtha being in
both identified with prâ/n/a--yet are to be held apart, because the
subject of the Chândogya vidyâ is not the whole udgîtha but only the
sacred syllabic Om, while the B/ri/hadâra/n/yaka Upanishad represents
the whole udgîtha as the object of meditation.

Sûtra 9 constitutes in /S/a@nkara's view a new adhikara/n/a (IV),
proving that in the passage, 'Let a man meditate' (Ch. Up. I, 1, 1), the
O/m/kâra and the udgîtha stand in the relation of one specifying the
other, the meaning being, 'Let a man meditate on that O/m/kâra which,'
&c.--According to Râmânuja's interpretation, which seems to fall in more
satisfactorily with the form and the wording of the Sûtra, the latter
merely furnishes an additional argument for the conclusion arrived at in
the preceding adhikara/n/a.--Adhik. V (10) determines the unity of the
so-called prâ/n/a-vidyâs and the consequent comprehension of the
different qualities of the prâ/n/a, which are mentioned in the different
texts, within one meditation.

Adhik. VI comprises, according to /S/a@nkara, the Sûtras 11-13. The
point to be settled is whether in all the meditations on Brahman all its
qualities are to be included or only those mentioned in the special
vidyâ. The decision is that the essential and unalterable attributes of
Brahman, such as bliss and knowledge, are to be taken into account
everywhere, while those which admit of a more or less (as, for instance,
the attribute of having joy for its head, mentioned in the Taitt. Up.)
are confined to special meditations.--Adhik. VII (14, 15), according to
/S/a@nkara, aims at proving that the object of Ka/th/a. Up. III, 10, 11
is one only, viz. to show that the highest Self is higher than
everything, so that the passage constitutes one vidyâ only.--Adhik. VIII
(16, 17) determines, according to /S/a@nkara, that the Self spoken of in
Ait. Âr. II, 4, 1, 1 is not a lower form of the Self (the so-called
sûtrâtman), but the highest Self; the discussion of that point in this
place being due to the wish to prove that the attributes of the highest
Self have to be comprehended in the Aitarcyaka meditation.

According to Râmânuja the Sûtras 11-17 constitute a single adhikara/n/a
whose subject is the same as that of /S/a@nkara's sixth adhikar/n/a.
Sûtras 11-13 are, on the whole, explained as by /S/a@nkara; Sûtra 12,
however, is said to mean, 'Such attributes as having joy for its head,
&c. are not to be viewed as qualities of Brahman, and therefore not to
be included in every meditation; for if they were admitted as qualities,
difference would be introduced into Brahman's nature, and that would
involve a more or less on Brahman's part.' Sûtras 14-17 continue the
discussion of the passage about the priya/s/irastva.--If
priya/s/irastva, &c. are not to be viewed as real qualities of Brahman,
for what purpose does the text mention them?--'Because,' Sûtra 14
replies, 'there is no other purpose, Scripture mentions them for the
purpose of pious meditation.'--But how is it known that the Self of
delight is the highest Self? (owing to which you maintain that having
limbs, head, &c. cannot belong to it as attributes.)--'Because,' Sûtra
15 replies, 'the term "Self" (âtmâ ânandamaya) is applied to it.'--But
in the previous parts of the chapter the term Self (in âtma pra/n/amaya,
&c.) is applied to non-Selfs also; how then do you know that in âtmâ
ânandamaya it denotes the real Self?--'The term Self,' Sûtra 16 replies,
'is employed here to denote the highest Self as in many other passages
(âtmaâ vâ idam eka, &c.), as we conclude from the subsequent passage,
viz. he wished, May I be many.'--But, an objection is raised, does not
the context show that the term 'Self,' which in all the preceding
clauses about the prâ/n/amaya, &c. denoted something other than the
Self, does the same in ânandamaya âtman, and is not the context of
greater weight than a subsequent passage?--To this question asked in the
former half of 17 (anvayâd iti /k/et) the latter half replies, 'Still it
denotes the Self, owing to the affirmatory statement,' i.e. the fact of
the highest Self having been affirmed in a previous passage also, viz.
II, 1, 'From that Self sprang ether.'

Adhik. IX (18) discusses a minor point connected with the
prâ/n/asa/m/vâda.--The subject of Adhik. X (19) has been indicated
already above under Adhik. I.--Adhik. XI (20-22) treats of a case of a
contrary nature; in B/ri/. Up. V, 5, Brahman is represented first as
abiding in the sphere of the sun, and then as abiding within the eye; we
therefore, in spite of certain counter-indications, have to do with two
separate vidyâs.--Adhik. XII (23) refers to a similar case; certain
attributes of Brahman mentioned in the Râ/n/âyanîya-khila have not to be
introduced into the corresponding Chândogya vidyâ, because the stated
difference of Brahman's abode involves difference of vidyâ.--Adhik. XIII
(24) treats of another instance of two vidyas having to be held apart.

Adhik. XIV (25) decides that certain detached mantras and brâhma/n/a
passages met with in the beginning of some Upanishads--as, for instance,
a brâhma/n/a about the mahâvrata ceremony at the beginning of the
Aitareya-âra/n/yaka--do, notwithstanding their position which seems to
connect them with the brahmavidyâ, not belong to the latter, since they
show unmistakable signs of being connected with sacrificial acts.

Adhik. XV (26) treats of the passages stating that the man dying in the
possession of true knowledge shakes off all his good and evil deeds, and
affirms that a statement, made in some of those passages only, to the
effect that the good and evil deeds pass over to the friends and enemies
of the deceased, is valid for all the passages.

Sûtras 27-30 constitute, according to /S/a@nkara, two adhikara/n/as of
which the former (XVI; 27, 28) decides that the shaking off of the good
and evil deeds takes place--not, as the Kaush. Up. states, on the road
to Brahman's world--but at the moment of the soul's departure from the
body; the Kaushitaki statement is therefore not to be taken
literally.--The latter adhikara/n/a (XVII; 29, 30) treats of the cognate
question whether the soul that has freed itself from its deeds proceeds
in all cases on the road of the gods (as said in the Kaush. Up.), or
not. The decision is that he only whose knowledge does not pass beyond
the sagu/n/am brahma proceeds on that road, while the soul of him who
knows the nirgu/n/am brahma becomes one with it without moving to any
other place.

The /S/rî-bhâshya treats the four Sûtras as one adhikara/n/a whose two
first Sûtras are explained as by /S/a@nkara, while Sûtra 29 raises an
objection to the conclusion arrived at, 'the going (of the soul on the
path of the gods) has a sense only if the soul's freeing itself from its
works takes place in both ways, i.e. partly at the moment of death,
partly on the road to Brahman; for otherwise there would be a
contradiction' (the contradiction being that, if the soul's works were
all shaken off at the moment of death, the subtle body would likewise
perish at that moment, and then the bodiless soul would be unable to
proceed on the path of the gods). To this Sûtra 30 replies, 'The
complete shaking off of the works at the moment of death is possible,
since matters of that kind are observed in Scripture,' i.e. since
scriptural passages show that even he whose works are entirely
annihilated, and who has manifested himself in his true shape, is yet
connected with some kind of body; compare the passage, 'para/m/ jyotir
upasampadya svena rûpe/n/abhinishpadyate sa tatra paryeti krî/d/an
ramamâna/h/ sa svarâ/d/ bhavati tasya sarveshu lokeshu kâma/k/âro
bhavati.' That subtle body is not due to karman, but to the soul's
vidyâmâhâtmya.--That the explanation of the /S/rî-bhâshya agrees with
the text as well as /S/a@nkara's, a comparison of the two will show;
especially forced is /S/a@nkara's explanation of 'arthavattvam
ubhayathâ,' which is said to mean that there is arthavattva in one case,
and non-arthavattva in the other case.

The next Sûtra (31) constitutes an adhikara/n/a (XVIII) deciding that
the road of the gods is followed not only by those knowing the vidyâs
which specially mention the going on that road, but by all who are
acquainted with the sagu/n/a-vidyâs of Brahman.--The explanation given
in the /S/rî-bhâshya (in which Sûtras 31 and 32 have exchanged places)
is similar, with the difference however that all who meditate on
Brahman--without any reference to the distinction of nirgu/n/a and
sagu/n/a--proceed after death on the road of the gods. (The
/S/rî-bhâshya reads 'sarveshâm,' i.e. all worshippers, not 'sarvâsâm,'
all sagu/n/a-vidyâs.)

Adhik. XIX (32) decides that, although the general effect of true
knowledge is release from all forms of body, yet even such beings as
have reached perfect knowledge may retain a body for the purpose of
discharging certain offices.--In the /S/rî-bhâshya, where the Sûtra
follows immediately on Sûtra 30, the adhikara/n/a determines, in close
connexion with 30, that, although those who know Brahman as a rule
divest themselves of the gross body--there remaining only a subtle body
which enables them to move--and no longer experience pleasure and pain,
yet certain beings, although having reached the cognition of Brahman,
remain invested with a gross body, and hence liable to pleasure and pain
until they have fully performed certain duties.

Adhik. XX (33) teaches that the negative attributes of Brahman mentioned
in some vidyâs--such as its being not gross, not subtle, &c.--are to be
included in all meditations on Brahman.--Adhik. XXI (34) determines that
Kâ/th/a Up. III, 1, and Mu. Up. III, 1, constitute one vidyâ only,
because both passages refer to the highest Brahman. According to
Râmânuja the Sûtra contains a reply to an objection raised against the
conclusion arrived at in the preceding Sûtra.--Adhik. XXII (35, 36)
maintains that the two passages, B/ri/. Up. III, 4 and III, 5,
constitute one vidyâ only, the object of knowledge being in both cases
Brahman viewed as the inner Self of all.--Adhik. XXIII (37) on the
contrary decides that the passage Ait. Âr. II, 2, 4, 6 constitutes not
one but two meditations.--Adhik. XXIV (38) again determines that the
vidyâ of the True contained in B/ri/. Up. V, 4, 5, is one
only--According to Râmânuja, Sûtras 35-38 constitute one adhikara/n/a
only whose subject is the same as that of XXII according to /S/a@nkara.

Adhik. XXV (39) proves that the passages Ch. Up. VIII, 1 and B/ri/. Up.
IV, 4, 22 cannot constitute one vidyâ, since the former refers to
Brahman as possessing qualities, while the latter is concerned with
Brahman as destitute of qualities.--Adhik. XXVI (40, 41) treats,
according to /S/a@nkara, of a minor question connected with Ch. Up. V,
11 ff.--According to the /S/rî-bhâshya, Sûtras 39-41 form one
adhikara/n/a whose first Sûtra reaches essentially the same conclusion
as /S/a@nkara under 39. Sûtras 40, 41 thereupon discuss a general
question concerning the meditations on Brahman. The qualities, an
opponent is supposed to remark, which in the two passages discussed are
predicated of Brahman--such as va/s/itva, satyakâmatva, &c.--cannot be
considered real (pâramârthika), since other passages (sa esha neti neti,
and the like) declare Brahman to be devoid of all qualities. Hence those
qualities cannot be admitted into meditations whose purpose is final
release.--To this objection Sûtra 40 replies, '(Those qualities) are not
to be left off (from the meditations on Brahman), since (in the passage
under discussion as well as in other passages) they are stated with
emphasis[17].'--But, another objection is raised, Scripture says that he
who meditates on Brahman as satyakâma, &c. obtains a mere perishable
reward, viz. the world of the fathers, and similar results specified in
Ch. Up. VIII, 2; hence, he who is desirous of final release, must not
include those qualities of Brahman in his meditation.--To this objection
Sûtra 41 replies, 'Because that (i.e. the free roaming in all the
worlds, the world of the fathers, &c.) is stated as proceeding therefrom
(i.e. the approach to Brahman which is final release) in the case of
(the soul) which has approached Brahman;' (therefore a person desirous
of release, may include satyakâmatva, &c. in his meditations.)

Adhik. XXVII (42) decides that those meditations which are connected
with certain matters forming constituent parts of sacrificial actions,
are not to be considered as permanently requisite parts of the
latter.--Adhik. XXVIII (43) teaches that, in a B/ri/. Up. passage and a
similar Ch. Up. passage, Vâyu and Prâ/n/a are not to be identified, but
to be held apart.--Adhik. XXIX (44-52) decides that the firealtars made
of mind, &c., which are mentioned in the Agnirahasya, do not constitute
parts of the sacrificial action (so that the mental, &c. construction of
the altar could optionally be substituted for the actual one), but
merely subjects of meditations.

Adhik. XXX (53, 54) treats, according to /S/a@nkara, in the way of
digression, of the question whether to the Self an existence independent
of the body can be assigned, or not (as the Materialists
maintain).--According to the /S/rî-bhâshya the adhikara/n/a does not
refer to this wide question, but is concerned with a point more
immediately connected with the meditations on Brahman, viz. the question
as to the form under which, in those meditations, the Self of the
meditating devotee has to be viewed. The two Sûtras then have to be
translated as follows: 'Some (maintain that the soul of the devotee has,
in meditations, to be viewed as possessing those attributes only which
belong to it in its embodied state, such as j/ñ/at/ri/tva and the like),
because the Self is (at the time of meditation) in the body.'--The next
Sûtra rejects this view, 'This is not so, but the separatedness (i.e.
the pure isolated state in which the Self is at the time of final
release when it is freed from all evil, &c.) (is to be transferred to
the meditating Self), because that will be[18] the state (of the Self in
the condition of final release).'

Adhik. XXXI (55, 56) decides that meditations connected with constituent
elements of the sacrifice, such as the udgitha, are, in spite of
difference of svara in the udgitha, &c., valid, not only for that
/s/âkhâ in which the meditation actually is met with, but for all
/s/âkhâs.--Adhik. XXXII (57) decides that the Vai/s/vânara Agni of Ch.
Up. V, 11 ff. is to be meditated upon as a whole, not in his single
parts.--Adhik. XXXIII (58) teaches that those meditations which refer to
one subject, but as distinguished by different qualities, have to be
held apart as different meditations. Thus the daharavidyâ,
/S/a/nd/ilyavidyâ, &c. remain separate.

Adhik. XXXIV (59) teaches that those meditations on Brahman for which
the texts assign one and the same fruit are optional, there being no
reason for their being cumulated.--Adhik. XXXV (60) decides that those
meditations, on the other hand, which refer to special wishes may be
cumulated or optionally employed according to choice.--Adhik. XXXVI
(61-66) extends this conclusion to the meditations connected with
constituent elements of action, such as the udgîtha.


PÂDA IV.


Adhik. I (1-17) proves that the knowledge of Brahman is not kratvartha,
i.e. subordinate to action, but independent.--Adhik. II (18-20) confirms
this conclusion by showing that the state of the pravrâjins is enjoined
by the sacred law, and that for them vidyâ only is prescribed, not
action.--Adhik. III (21, 22) decides that certain clauses forming part
of vidyâs are not mere stutis (arthavâdas), but themselves enjoin the
meditation.--The legends recorded in the Vedânta-texts are not to be
used as subordinate members of acts, but have the purpose of
glorifying--as arthavâdas--the injunctions with which they are connected
(Adhik. IV, 23, 24).--For all these reasons the ûrdhvaretasa/h/ require
no actions but only knowledge (Adhik. V, 25).--Nevertheless the actions
enjoined by Scripture, such as sacrifices, conduct of certain kinds,
&c., are required as conducive to the rise of vidyâ in the mind (Adhik.
VI, 26, 27).--Certain relaxations, allowed by Scripture, of the laws
regarding food, are meant only for cases of extreme need (Adhik. VII,
28-3l).--The â/s/ramakarmâ/n/i are obligatory on him also who does not
strive after mukti (Adhik. VIII, 32-35).--Those also who, owing to
poverty and so on, are anâ/s/rama have claims to vidyâ (Adhik. IX,
36-39).--An ûrdhvaretas cannot revoke his vow (Adhik. X, 40).--Expiation
of the fall of an ûrdhvaretas (Adhik. XI, 41, 42).--Exclusion of the
fallen ûrdhvaretas in certain cases (Adhik. XII, 43).--Those
meditations, which are connected with subordinate members of the
sacrifice, are the business of the priest, not of the yajamâna (Adhik.
XIII, 44-46).--B/ri/. Up. III, 5, 1 enjoins mauna as a third in addition
to bâlya and pâ/nd/itya (Adhik. XIV, 47-49).--By bâlya is to be
understood a childlike innocent state of mind (Adhik. XV, 50).

Sûtras 51 and 52 discuss, according to Râmânuja, the question when the
vidyâ, which is the result of the means described in III, 4, arises.
Sûtra 51 treats of that vidyâ whose result is mere exaltation
(abhyudaya), and states that 'it takes place in the present life, if
there is not present an obstacle in the form of a prabalakarmântara (in
which latter case the vidyâ arises later only), on account of Scripture
declaring this (in various passages).'--Sûtra 52, 'Thus there is also
absence of a definite rule as to (the time of origination of) that
knowledge whose fruit is release, it being averred concerning that one
also that it is in the same condition (i.e. of sometimes having an
obstacle, sometimes not).'--/S/a@nkara, who treats the two Sûtras as two
adhikara/n/as, agrees as to the explanation of 51, while, putting a
somewhat forced interpretation on 52, he makes it out to mean that a
more or less is possible only in the case of the sagu/n/a-vidyâs.

Notes:

[Footnote 16: All the mentioned modes of Brahman are known from
Scripture only, not from ordinary experience. If the latter were the
case, then, and then only, Scripture might at first refer to them
'anuvâdena,' and finally negative them.]

[Footnote 17: Râmânuja has here some strong remarks on the improbability
of qualities emphatically attributed to Brahman, in more than one
passage, having to be set aside in any meditation: 'Na /k/a
mâtâpit/ri/sahasrebhyo-pi vatsalatara/m/ sâstra/m/ pratârakavad
apâramârthikau nirasanîyau gu/n/au pramâ/n/ântarâpratipannau
âdare/n/opadi/s/ya sa/m/sâra/k/akraparivartanena pûrvam eva
bambhramyamânân mumukshûn bhûyo-pi bhramayitum alam.']

[Footnote 18: The /S/rî-bh­âshya as well as several other commentaries
reads tadbhâvabhâvitvât for /S/an@kara's tadbhâvâbhâvitvât.]


FOURTH ADHYÂYA.
PÂDA I.


Adhikara/n/a I (1, 2).--The meditation on the Âtman enjoined by
Scripture is not an act to be accomplished once only, but is to be
repeated again and again.

Adhik. II (3).--The devotee engaged in meditation on Brahman is to view
it as constituting his own Self.

Adhik. III (4).--To the rule laid down in the preceding adhikara/n/a the
so-called pratîkopâsanas, i.e. those meditations in which Brahman is
viewed under a symbol or outward manifestation (as, for instance, mano
brahmety upâsîta) constitute an exception, i.e. the devotee is not to
consider the pratîka as constituting his own Self.

Adhik. IV (5).--In the pratîkopâsanas the pratîka is to be meditatively
viewed as being one with Brahman, not Brahman as being one with the
pratîka.--Râmânuja takes Sûtra 5 as simply giving a reason for the
decision arrived at under Sûtra 4, and therefore as not constituting a
new adhikara/n/a.

Adhik. V (6).--In meditations connected with constitutives of
sacrificial works (as, for instance, ya evâsau tapati tam udgîtham
upâsîta) the idea of the divinity, &c. is to be transferred to the
sacrificial item, not vice versa. In the example quoted, for instance,
the udgîtha is to be viewed as Âditya, not Âditya as the udgîtha.

Adhik. VI (7-10).--The devotee is to carry on his meditations in a
sitting posture.--/S/a@nkara maintains that this rule does not apply to
those meditations whose result is sa/m/yagdar/s/ana; but the Sûtra gives
no hint to that effect.

Adhik. VII (11).--The meditations may be carried on at any time, and in
any place, favourable to concentration of mind.

Adhik. VIII (12).--The meditations are to be continued until
death.--/S/a@nkara again maintains that those meditations which lead to
sa/m/yagdar/s/ana are excepted.

Adhik. IX (13).--When through those meditations the knowledge of Brahman
has been reached, the vidvân is no longer affected by the consequences
of either past or future evil deeds.

Adhik. X (14).--Good deeds likewise lose their efficiency.--The literal
translation of the Sûtra is, 'There is likewise non-attachment (to the
vidvân) of the other (i.e. of the deeds other than the evil ones, i.e.
of good deeds), but on the fall (of the body, i.e. when death takes
place).' The last words of the Sûtra, 'but on the fall,' are separated
by /S/a@nkara from the preceding part of the Sûtra and interpreted to
mean, 'when death takes place (there results mukti of the vidvân, who
through his knowledge has freed himself from the bonds of
works).'--According to Râmânuja the whole Sûtra simply means, 'There is
likewise non-attachment of good deeds (not at once when knowledge is
reached), but on the death of the vidvân[19].'

Adhik. XI (15).--The non-operation of works stated in the two preceding
adhikara/n/as holds good only in the case of anârabdhakârya works, i.e.
those works which have not yet begun to produce their effects, while it
does not extend to the ârabdhakârya works on which the present existence
of the devotee depends.

Adhik. XII (16, 17).--From the rule enunciated in Adhik. X are excepted
such sacrificial performances as are enjoined permanently (nitya): so,
for instance, the agnihotra, for they promote the origination of
knowledge.

Adhik. XIII (18).--The origination of knowledge is promoted also by such
sacrificial works as are not accompanied with the knowledge of the
upâsanas referring to the different members of those works.

Adhik. XIV (19).--The ârabdhakârya works have to be worked out fully by
the fruition of their effects; whereupon the vidvân becomes united with
Brahman.--The 'bhoga' of the Sûtra is, according to /S/a@nkara,
restricted to the present existence of the devotee, since the complete
knowledge obtained by him destroys the nescience which otherwise would
lead to future embodiments. According to Râmânuja a number of embodied
existences may have to be gone through before the effects of the
ârabdhakârya works are exhausted.


PÂDA II.


This and the two remaining pâdas of the fourth adhyâya describe the fate
of the vidvân after death. According to /S/a@nkara we have to
distinguish the vidvân who possesses the highest knowledge, viz. that he
is one with the highest Brahman, and the vidvân who knows only the lower
Brahman, and have to refer certain Sûtras to the former and others to
the latter. According to Râmânuja the vidvân is one only.

Adhik. I, II, III (1-6).--On the death of the vidvân (i.e. of him who
possesses the lower knowledge, according to /S/a@nkara) his senses are
merged in the manas, the manas in the chief vital air (prâ/n/a), the
vital air in the individual soul (jîva), the soul in the subtle
elements.--According to Râmânuja the combination (sampatti) of the
senses with the manas, &c. is a mere conjunction (sa/m/yoga), not a
merging (laya).

Adhik. IV (7).--The vidvân (i.e. according to /S/a@nkara, he who
possesses the lower knowledge) and the avidvân, i.e. he who does not
possess any knowledge of Brahman, pass through the same stages (i.e.
those described hitherto) up to the entrance of the soul, together with
the subtle elements, and so on into the nâ/d/îs.--The vidvân also
remains connected with the subtle elements because he has not yet
completely destroyed avidyâ, so that the immortality which Scripture
ascribes to him (am/ri/tatva/m/ hi vidvân abhya/s/nute) is only a
relative one.--Râmânuja quotes the following text regarding the
immortality of the vidvân:

    'Yadâ sarve pramu/k/yante kâmâ yessya h/ri/di sthitâ/h/ atha
    martyosm/ri/to bhavaty atra brahma sama/s/nute,'

and explains that the immortality which is here ascribed to the vidvân
as soon as he abandons all desires can only mean the
destruction--mentioned in the preceding pâda--of all the effects of good
and evil works, while the 'reaching of Brahman' can only refer to the
intuition of Brahman vouchsafed to the meditating devotee.

Adhik. V (8-11) raises; according to /S/a@nkara, the question whether
the subtle elements of which Scripture says that they are combined with
the highest deity (teja/h/ parasyâ/m/ devatâyâm) are completely merged
in the latter or not. The answer is that a complete absorption of the
elements takes place only when final emancipation is reached; that, on
the other hand, as long as the sa/m/sâra state lasts, the elements,
although somehow combined with Brahman, remain distinct so as to be able
to form new bodies for the soul.

According to Râmânuja the Sûtras 8-11 do not constitute a new
adhikara/n/a, but continue the discussion of the point mooted in 7. The
immortality there spoken of does not imply the separation of the soul
from the body, 'because Scripture declares sa/m/sâra, i.e. embodiedness
up to the reaching of Brahman' (tasya tâvad eva /k/ira/m/ yâvan na
vimokshye atha sampatsye) (8).--That the soul after having departed from
the gross body is not disconnected from the subtle elements, is also
proved hereby, that the subtle body accompanies it, as is observed from
authority[20] (9).--Hence the immortality referred to in the scriptural
passage quoted is not effected by means of the total destruction of the
body (10).

Adhik. VI (12-14) is of special importance.--According to /S/a@nkara the
Sûtras now turn from the discussion of the departure of him who
possesses the lower knowledge only to the consideration of what becomes
of him who has reached the higher knowledge. So far it has been taught
that in the case of relative immortality (ensuing on the apara vidyâ)
the subtle elements, together with the senses and so on, depart from the
body of the dying devotee; this implies at the same time that they do
not depart from the body of the dying sage who knows himself to be one
with Brahman.--Against this latter implied doctrine Sûtra 12 is supposed
to formulate an objection. 'If it be said that the departure of the
prâ/n/as from the body of the dying sage is denied (viz. in B/ri/. Up.
IV, 4, 5, na tasya prâ/n/a utkrâmanti, of him the prâ/n/as do not pass
out); we reply that in that passage the genitive "tasya" has the sense
of the ablative "tasmât," so that the sense of the passage is, "from
him, i.e. from the jîva of the dying sage, the prâ/n/as do not depart,
but remain with it."'--This objection /S/a@nkara supposes to be disposed
of in Sûtra 13. 'By some there is given a clear denial of the departure
of the prâ/n/as in the case of the dying sage,' viz. in the passage
B/ri/. Up. III, 2, 11, where Yâj/ñ/avalkya instructs Ârtabhâga that,
when this man dies, the prâ/n/as do not depart from it (asmât; the
context showing that asmât means 'from it,' viz. from the body, and not
'from him,' viz. the jîva).--The same view is, moreover, confirmed by
Sm/ri/ti passages.

According to Râmânuja the three Sûtras forming /S/a@nkara's sixth
adhikara/n/a do not constitute a new adhikara/n/a at all, and, moreover,
have to be combined into two Sûtras. The topic continuing to be
discussed is the utkrânti of the vidvân. If, Sûtra 12 says, the utkrânti
of the prâ/n/as is not admitted, on the ground of the denial supposed to
be contained in B/ri/. Up. IV, 4, 5; the reply is that the sense of the
tasya there is '/s/ârîrât' (so that the passage means, 'from him, i.e.
the jîva, the prâ/n/as do not depart'); for this is clearly shown by the
reading of some, viz. the Mâdhyandinas, who, in their text of the
passage, do not read 'tasya' but 'tasmât.'--With reference to the
instruction given by Yâj/ñ/avalkya to Ârtabhâga, it is to be remarked
that nothing there shows the 'ayam purusha' to be the sage who knows
Brahman.--And, finally, there are Sm/ri/ti passages declaring that the
sage also when dying departs from the body.

Adhik. VII and VIII (15, 16) teach, according to /S/a@nkara, that, on
the death of him who possesses the higher knowledge, his prâ/n/as,
elements, &c. are merged in Brahman, so as to be no longer distinct from
it in any way.

According to Râmânuja the two Sûtras continue the teaching about the
prâ/n/as, bhûtas, &c. of the vidvân in general, and declare that they
are finally merged in Brahman, not merely in the way of conjunction
(sa/m/yoga), but completely.[21]

Adhik. IX (17).--/S/a@nkara here returns to the owner of the aparâ
vidyâ, while Râmânuja continues the description of the utkrânti of his
vidvân.--The jîva of the dying man passes into the heart, and thence
departs out of the body by means of the ná/d/is; the vidvân by means of
the nâ/d/i called sushum/n/â, the avidvân by means of some other nâ/d/î.

Adhik. X (18, 19).--The departing soul passes up to the sun by means of
a ray of light which exists at night as well as during day.

Adhik. XI (20, 21).--Also that vidvân who dies during the dakshi/n/âyana
reaches Brahman.


PÂDA III.


Adhik. I, II, III (1-3) reconcile the different accounts given in the
Upanishads as to the stations of the way which leads the vidvân up to
Brahman.

Adhik. IV (4-6)--By the 'stations' we have, however, to understand not
only the subdivisions of the way but also the divine beings which lead
the soul on.

The remaining part of the pâda is by /S/a@nkara divided into two
adhikara/n/as. Of these the former one (7-14) teaches that the Brahman
to which the departed soul is led by the guardians of the path of the
gods is not the highest Brahman, but the effected (kârya) or qualified
(/s/agu/n/a) Brahman. This is the opinion propounded in Sûtras 7-11 by
Bâdari, and, finally, accepted by /S/a@nkara in his commentary on Sûtra
14. In Sûtras 12-14 Jaimini defends the opposite view, according to
which the soul of the vidvân goes to the highest Brahman, not to the
kâryam brahma. But Jaimini's view, although set forth in the latter part
of the adhikara/n/a, is, according to /S/a@nkara, a mere pûrvapaksha,
while Bâdari's opinion represents the siddhânta.--The latter of the two
adhikara/n/as (VI of the whole pâda; 15, 16) records the opinion of
Bâdarâya/n/a on a collateral question, viz. whether, or not, all those
who worship the effected Brahman are led to it. The decision is that
those only are guided to Brahman who have not worshipped it under a
pratîka form.

According to Râmânuja, Sûtras 7-16 form one adhikara/n/a only, in which
the views of Bâdari and of Jaimini represent two pûrvapakshas, while
Bâdarâya/n/a's opinion is adopted as the siddhânta. The question is
whether the guardians of the path lead to Brahman only those who worship
the effected Brahman, i.e. Hira/n/yagarbha, or those who worship the
highest Brahman, or those who worship the individual soul as free from
Prak/ri/ti, and having Brahman for its Self (ye pratyagâtmâna/m/
prak/ri/tiviyukta/m/ brahmâtmakam upâsate).--The first view is
maintained by Bâdari in Sûtra 7, 'The guardians lead to Brahman those
who worship the effected Brahman, because going is possible towards the
latter only;' for no movement can take place towards the highest and as
such omnipresent Brahman.--The explanation of Sûtra 9 is similar to that
of /S/a@nkara; but more clearly replies to the objection (that, if
Hira/n/yagarbha were meant in the passage, 'purusho /s/a mânava/h/ sa
etân brahma gamayati,' the text would read 'sa etân brahmâ/n/am
gamayati') that Hira/n/yagarbha is called Brahman on account of his
nearness to Brahman, i.e. on account of his prathamajatva.--The
explanation of 10, 11 is essentially the same as in /S/a@nkara; so also
of l2-l4.--The siddhânta view is established in Sûtra 13, 'It is the
opinion of Bâdarâya/n/a that it, i.e. the ga/n/a of the guardians, leads
to Brahman those who do not take their stand on what is pratîka, i.e.
those who worship the highest Brahman, and those who meditate on the
individual Self as dissociated from prak/ri/ti, and having Brahman for
its Self, but not those who worship Brahman under pratîkas. For both
views--that of Jaimini as well as that of Bâdari--are faulty.' The kârya
view contradicts such passages as 'asmâ/k/ charîrât samutthâya para/m/
jyotir upasampadya,' &c.; the para view, such passages as that in the
pa/ñk/âgni-vidyâ, which declares that ya ittha/m/ vidu/h/, i.e. those
who know the pa/ñk/âgni-vidyâ, are also led up to Brahman.


PÂDA IV.


Adhik. I (1-3) returns, according to /S/a@nkara, to the owner of the
parâ vidyâ, and teaches that, when on his death his soul obtains final
release, it does not acquire any new characteristics, but merely
manifests itself in its true nature.--The explanation given by Râmânuja
is essentially the same, but of course refers to that vidvân whose going
to Brahman had been described in the preceding pâda.

Adhik. II (4) determines that the relation in which the released soul
stands to Brahman is that of avibhâga, non-separation. This, on
/S/a@nkara's view, means absolute non-separation, identity.--According
to Râmânuja the question to be considered is whether the released soul
views itself as separate (p/ri/thagbhûta) from Brahman, or as
non-separate because being a mode of Brahman. The former view is
favoured by those /S/ruti and Sm/ri/ti passages which speak of the soul
as being with, or equal to, Brahman; the latter by, such passages as tat
tvam asi and the like.[22]

Adhik. III (5-7) discusses the characteristics of the released soul
(i.e. of the truly released soul, according to /S/a@nkara). According to
Jaimini the released soul, when manifesting itself in its true nature,
possesses all those qualities which in Ch. Up. VIII, 7, 1 and other
places are ascribed to Brahman, such as apahatapâpmatva,
satyasa/m/kalpatva, &c., ai/s/varya.--According to Au/d/ulomi the only
characteristic of the released soul is /k/aitanya.--According to
Bâdarâyana the two views can be combined (/S/a@nkara remarking that
satyasa/m/kalpatva, &c. are ascribed to the released soul
vyavahârâpekshayâ).

Adhik. IV (8-9) returns, according to /S/a@nkara, to the aparâ vidyâ,
and discusses the question whether the soul of the pious effects its
desires by its mere determination, or uses some other means. The former
alternative is accepted--According to Râmânuja the adhikara/n/a simply
continues the consideration of the state of the released, begun in the
preceding adhikara/n/a. Of the released soul it is said in Ch. Up. VIII,
12, 3 that after it has manifested itself in its true nature it moves
about playing and rejoicing with women, carriages, and so on. The
question then arises whether it effects all this by its mere sa/m/kalpa
(it having been shown in the preceding adhikara/n/a that the released
soul is, like the Lord, satyasa/m/kalpa), or not. The answer is in
favour of the former alternative, on account of the explicit declaration
made in Ch. Up. VIII, 2, 'By his mere will the fathers come to receive
him.'

Adhik. V (10-14) decides that the released are embodied or disembodied
according to their wish and will.

Adhik. VI (11, 12) explains how the soul of the released can animate
several bodies at the same time.--Sûtra 12 gives, according to
/S/a@nkara, the additional explanation that those passages which declare
the absence of all specific cognition on the part of the released soul
do not refer to the partly released soul of the devotee, but either to
the soul in the state of deep sleep (svâpyaya = sushupti), or to the
fully released soul of the sage (sampatti = kaivalya).--Râmânuja
explains that the passages speaking of absence of consciousness refer
either to the state of deep sleep, or to the time of dying (sampatti =
mata/n/am according to 'vân manasi sampadyate,' &c.).

Adhik. VII (17-21).--The released jîvas participate in all the
perfections and powers of the Lord, with the exception of the power of
creating and sustaining the world. They do not return to new forms of
embodied existence.

After having, in this way, rendered ourselves acquainted with the
contents of the Brahma-sûtras according to the views of /S/a@nkara as
well as Râmânuja, we have now to consider the question which of the two
modes of interpretation represents--or at any rate more closely
approximates to the true meaning of the Sûtras. That few of the Sûtras
are intelligible if taken by themselves, we have already remarked above;
but this does not exclude the possibility of our deciding with a fair
degree of certainty which of the two interpretations proposed agrees
better with the text, at least in a certain number of cases.

We have to note in the first place that, in spite of very numerous
discrepancies,--of which only the more important ones have been singled
out in the conspectus of contents,--the two commentators are at one as
to the general drift of the Sûtras and the arrangement of topics. As a
rule, the adhikara/n/as discuss one or several Vedic passages bearing
upon a certain point of the system, and in the vast majority of cases
the two commentators agree as to which are the special texts referred
to. And, moreover, in a very large number of cases the agreement extends
to the interpretation to be put on those passages and on the Sûtras.
This far-reaching agreement certainly tends to inspire us with a certain
confidence as to the existence of an old tradition concerning the
meaning of the Sûtras on which the bulk of the interpretations of
/S/a@nkara as well as of Râmânuja are based.

But at the same time we have seen that, in a not inconsiderable number
of cases, the interpretations of /S/a@nkara and Râmânuja diverge more or
less widely, and that the Sûtras affected thereby are, most of them,
especially important because bearing on fundamental points of the
Vedânta system. The question then remains which of the two
interpretations is entitled to preference.

Regarding a small number of Sûtras I have already (in the conspectus of
contents) given it as my opinion that Râmânuja's explanation appears to
be more worthy of consideration. We meet, in the first place, with a
number of cases in which the two commentators agree as to the literal
meaning of a Sûtra, but where /S/a@nkara sees himself reduced to the
necessity of supplementing his interpretation by certain additions and
reservations of his own for which the text gives no occasion, while
Râmânuja is able to take the Sûtra as it stands. To exemplify this
remark, I again direct attention to all those Sûtras which in clear
terms represent the individual soul as something different from the
highest soul, and concerning which /S/a@nkara is each time obliged to
have recourse to the plea of the Sûtra referring, not to what is true in
the strict sense of the word, but only to what is conventionally looked
upon as true. It is, I admit, not altogether impossible that
/S/a@nkara's interpretation should represent the real meaning of the
Sûtras; that the latter, indeed, to use the terms employed by Dr.
Deussen, should for the nonce set forth an exoteric doctrine adapted to
the common notions of mankind, which, however, can be rightly understood
by him only to whose mind the esoteric doctrine is all the while
present. This is not impossible, I say; but it is a point which requires
convincing proofs before it can be allowed.--We have had, in the second
place, to note a certain number of adhikara/n/as and Sûtras concerning
whose interpretation /S/a@nkara and Râmânuja disagree altogether; and we
have seen that not unfrequently the explanations given by the latter
commentator appear to be preferable because falling in more easily with
the words of the text. The most striking instance of this is afforded by
the 13th adhikara/n/a of II, 3, which treats of the size of the jîva,
and where Râmânuja's explanation seems to be decidedly superior to
/S/a@nkara's, both if we look to the arrangement of the whole
adhikara/n/a and to the wording of the single Sûtras. The adhikara/n/a
is, moreover, a specially important one, because the nature of the view
held as to the size of the individual soul goes far to settle the
question what kind of Vedânta is embodied in Bâdarâya/n/a's work.

But it will be requisite not only to dwell on the interpretations of a
few detached Sûtras, but to make the attempt at least of forming some
opinion as to the relation of the Vedânta-sûtras as a whole to the chief
distinguishing doctrines of /S/a@nkara as well as Râmânuja. Such an
attempt may possibly lead to very slender positive results; but in the
present state of the enquiry even a merely negative result, viz. the
conclusion that the Sûtras do not teach particular doctrines found in
them by certain commentators, will not be without its value.

The first question we wish to consider in some detail is whether the
Sûtras in any way favour /S/a@nkara's doctrine that we have to
distinguish a twofold knowledge of Brahman, a higher knowledge which
leads to the immediate absorption, on death, of the individual soul in
Brahman, and a lower knowledge which raises its owner merely to an
exalted form of individual existence. The adhyâya first to be considered
in this connexion is the fourth one. According to /S/a@nkara the three
latter pâdas of that adhyâya are chiefly engaged in describing the fate
of him who dies in the possession of the lower knowledge, while two
sections (IV, 2, 12-14; IV, 4, 1-7) tell us what happens to him who,
before his death, had risen to the knowledge of the highest Brahman.
According to Râmânuja, on the other hand, the three pâdas, referring
throughout to one subject only, give an uninterrupted account of the
successive steps by which the soul of him who knows the Lord through the
Upanishads passes, at the time of death, out of the gross body which it
had tenanted, ascends to the world of Brahman, and lives there for ever
without returning into the sa/m/sâra.

On an a priori view of the matter it certainly appears somewhat strange
that the concluding section of the Sûtras should be almost entirely
taken up with describing the fate of him who has after all acquired an
altogether inferior knowledge only, and has remained shut out from the
true sanctuary of Vedântic knowledge, while the fate of the fully
initiated is disposed of in a few occasional Sûtras. It is, I think, not
too much to say that no unbiassed student of the Sûtras would--before
having allowed himself to be influenced by /S/a@nkara's
interpretations--imagine for a moment that the solemn words, 'From
thence is no return, from thence is no return,' with which the Sûtras
conclude, are meant to describe, not the lasting condition of him who
has reached final release, the highest aim of man, but merely a stage on
the way of that soul which is engaged in the slow progress of gradual
release, a stage which is indeed greatly superior to any earthly form of
existence, but yet itself belongs to the essentially fictitious
sa/m/sâra, and as such remains infinitely below the bliss of true mukti.
And this à priori impression--which, although no doubt significant,
could hardly be appealed to as decisive--is confirmed by a detailed
consideration of the two sets of Sûtras which /S/a@nkara connects with
the knowledge of the higher Brahman. How these Sûtras are interpreted by
/S/a@nkara and Râmânuja has been stated above in the conspectus of
contents; the points which render the interpretation given by Râmânuja
more probable are as follows. With regard to IV, 2, 12-14, we have to
note, in the first place, the circumstance--relevant although not
decisive in itself--that Sûtra 12 does not contain any indication of a
new topic being introduced. In the second place, it can hardly be
doubted that the text of Sûtra 13, 'spash/t/o hy ekeshâm,' is more
appropriately understood, with Râmânuja, as furnishing a reason for the
opinion advanced in the preceding Sûtra, than--with /S/a@nkara--as
embodying the refutation of a previous statement (in which latter case
we should expect not 'hi' but 'tu'). And, in the third place, the 'eke,'
i.e. 'some,' referred to in Sûtra 13 would, on /S/a@nkara's
interpretation, denote the very same persons to whom the preceding Sûtra
had referred, viz. the followers of the Kâ/n/va-/s/âkhâ (the two Vedic
passages referred to in 12 and 13 being B/ri/. Up. IV, 4, 5, and III, 2,
11, according to the Kâ/n/va recension); while it is the standing
practice of the Sûtras to introduce, by means of the designation 'eke,'
members of Vedic /s/âkhâs, teachers, &c. other than those alluded to in
the preceding Sûtras. With this practice Râmânuja's interpretation, on
the other hand, fully agrees; for, according to him, the 'eke' are the
Mâdhyandinas, whose reading in B/ri/. Up. IV, 4, 5, viz. 'tasmât,'
clearly indicates that the 'tasya' in the corresponding passage of the
Kâ/n/vas denotes the /s/ârira, i.e. the jîva. I think it is not saying
too much that /S/a@nkara's explanation, according to which the 'eke'
would denote the very same Kâ/n/vas to whom the preceding Sûtra had
referred--so that the Kâ/n/vas would be distinguished from themselves as
it were--is altogether impossible.

The result of this closer consideration of the first set of Sûtras,
alleged by /S/a@nkara to concern the owner of the higher knowledge of
Brahman, entitles us to view with some distrust /S/a@nkara's assertion
that another set also--IV, 4, 1-7--has to be detached from the general
topic of the fourth adhyâya, and to be understood as depicting the
condition of those who have obtained final absolute release. And the
Sûtras themselves do not tend to weaken this preliminary want of
confidence. In the first place their wording also gives no indication
whatever of their having to be separated from what precedes as well as
what follows. And, in the second place, the last Sûtra of the set (7)
obliges /S/a@nkara to ascribe to his truly released souls qualities
which clearly cannot belong to them; so that he finally is obliged to
make the extraordinary statement that those qualities belong to them
'vyavahârâpekshayâ,' while yet the purport of the whole adhikara/n/a is
said to be the description of the truly released soul for which no
vyavahâra exists! Very truly /S/a@nkara's commentator here remarks,
'atra ke/k/in muhyanti akha/n/da/k/inmâtrajânân muktasyâjñânâbhâvât kuta
âj/ñ/ânika-dharmayoga/h/,' and the way in which thereupon he himself
attempts to get over the difficulty certainly does not improve matters.

In connexion with the two passages discussed, we meet in the fourth
adhyâya with another passage, which indeed has no direct bearing on the
distinction of aparâ and parâ vidyâ, but may yet be shortly referred to
in this place as another and altogether undoubted instance of
/S/a@nkara's interpretations not always agreeing with the text of the
Sûtras. The Sûtras 7-16 of the third pâda state the opinions of three
different teachers on the question to which Brahman the soul of the
vidvân repairs on death, or--according to Râmânuja--the worshippers of
which Brahman repair to (the highest) Brahman. Râmânuja treats the views
of Bâdari and Jaimini as two pûrvapakshas, and the opinion of
Bâdarâya/n/a--which is stated last--as the siddhânta. /S/a@nkara, on the
other hand, detaching the Sûtras in which Bâdarâya/n/a's view is set
forth from the preceding part of the adhikara/n/a (a proceeding which,
although not plausible, yet cannot be said to be altogether
illegitimate), maintains that Bâdari's view, which is expounded first,
represents the siddhânta, while Jaimini's view, set forth subsequently,
is to be considered a mere pûrvapaksha. This, of course, is altogether
inadmissible, it being the invariable practice of the Vedânta-sûtras as
well as the Pûrva Mîmâ/m/sâ-sûtras to conclude the discussion of
contested points with the statement of that view which is to be accepted
as the authoritative one. This is so patent that /S/a@nkara feels
himself called upon to defend his deviation from the general rule
(Commentary on IV, 4, 13), without, however, bringing forward any
arguments but such as are valid only if /S/a@nkara's system itself is
already accepted.

The previous considerations leave us, I am inclined to think, no choice
but to side with Râmânuja as to the general subject-matter of the fourth
adhyâya of the Sûtras. We need not accept him as our guide in all
particular interpretations, but we must acknowledge with him that the
Sûtras of the fourth adhyâya describe the ultimate fate of one and the
same vidvân, and do not afford any basis for the distinction of a higher
and lower knowledge of Brahman in /S/a@nkara's sense.

If we have not to discriminate between a lower and a higher knowledge of
Brahman, it follows that the distinction of a lower and a higher Brahman
is likewise not valid. But this is not a point to be decided at once on
the negative evidence of the fourth adhyâya, but regarding which the
entire body of the Vedânta-sûtras has to be consulted. And intimately
connected with this investigation--in fact, one with it from a certain
point of view--is the question whether the Sûtras afford any evidence of
their author having held the doctrine of Mâyâ, the principle of
illusion, by the association with which the highest Brahman, in itself
transcending all qualities, appears as the lower Brahman or Î/s/vara.
That Râmânuja denies the distinction of the two Brahmans and the
doctrine of Mâyâ we have seen above; we shall, however, in the
subsequent investigation, pay less attention to his views and
interpretations than to the indications furnished by the Sûtras
themselves.

Placing myself at the point of view of a /S/a@nkara, I am startled at
the outset by the second Sûtra of the first adhyâya, which undertakes to
give a definition of Brahman. 'Brahman is that whence the origination
and so on (i.e. the sustentation and reabsorption) of this world
proceed.' What, we must ask, is this Sûtra meant to define?--That
Brahman, we are inclined to answer, whose cognition the first Sûtra
declares to constitute the task of the entire Vedânta; that Brahman
whose cognition is the only road to final release; that Brahman in fact
which /S/a@nkara calls the highest.--But, here we must object to
ourselves, the highest Brahman is not properly defined as that from
which the world originates. In later Vedântic writings, whose authors
were clearly conscious of the distinction of the higher absolute Brahman
and the lower Brahman related to Mâyâ or the world, we meet with
definitions of Brahman of an altogether different type. I need only
remind the reader of the current definition of Brahman as
sa/k/-/k/id-ânanda, or, to mention one individual instance, refer to the
introductory /s/lokas of the Pa/ñk/ada/s/î dilating on the sa/m/vid
svayam-prabhâ, the self-luminous principle of thought which in all time,
past or future, neither starts into being nor perishes (P.D. I, 7).
'That from which the world proceeds' can by a /S/a@nkara be accepted
only as a definition of Î/s/vara, of Brahman which by its association
with Mâyâ is enabled to project the false appearance of this world, and
it certainly is as improbable that the Sûtras should open with a
definition of that inferior principle, from whose cognition there can
accrue no permanent benefit, as, according to a remark made above, it is
unlikely that they should conclude with a description of the state of
those who know the lower Brahman only, and thus are debarred from
obtaining true release. As soon, on the other hand, as we discard the
idea of a twofold Brahman and conceive Brahman as one only, as the
all-enfolding being which sometimes emits the world from its own
substance and sometimes again retracts it into itself, ever remaining
one in all its various manifestations--a conception which need not by
any means be modelled in all its details on the views of the
Râmânujas--the definition of Brahman given in the second Sûtra becomes
altogether unobjectionable.

We next enquire whether the impression left on the mind by the manner in
which Bâdarâya/n/a defines Brahman, viz. that he does not distinguish
between an absolute Brahman and a Brahman associated with Mâyâ, is
confirmed or weakened by any other parts of his work. The Sûtras being
throughout far from direct in their enunciations, we shall have to look
less to particular terms and turns of expression than to general lines
of reasoning. What in this connexion seems specially worthy of being
taken into account, is the style of argumentation employed by the
Sûtrakâra against the Sâ@nkhya doctrine, which maintains that the world
has originated, not from an intelligent being, but from the
non-intelligent pradhâna. The most important Sûtras relative to this
point are to be met with in the first pâda of the second adhyâya. Those
Sûtras are indeed almost unintelligible if taken by themselves, but the
unanimity of the commentators as to their meaning enables us to use them
as steps in our investigation. The sixth Sûtra of the pâda mentioned
replies to the Sâ@nkhya objection that the non-intelligent world cannot
spring from an intelligent principle, by the remark that 'it is thus
seen,' i.e. it is a matter of common observation that non-intelligent
things are produced from beings endowed with intelligence; hair and
nails, for instance, springing from animals, and certain insects from
dung.--Now, an argumentation of this kind is altogether out of place
from the point of view of the true /S/â@nkara. According to the latter
the non-intelligent world does not spring from Brahman in so far as the
latter is intelligence, but in so far as it is associated with Mâyâ.
Mâyâ is the upâdâna of the material world, and Mâyâ itself is of a
non-intelligent nature, owing to which it is by so many Vedântic writers
identified with the prak/ri/ti of the Sâ@nkhyas. Similarly the
illustrative instances, adduced under Sûtra 9 for the purpose of showing
that effects when being reabsorbed into their causal substances do not
impart to the latter their own qualities, and that hence the material
world also, when being refunded into Brahman, does not impart to it its
own imperfections, are singularly inappropriate if viewed in connexion
with the doctrine of Mâyâ, according to which the material world is no
more in Brahman at the time of a pralaya than during the period of its
subsistence. According to /S/â@nkara the world is not merged in Brahman,
but the special forms into which the upâdâna of the world, i.e. Mâyâ,
had modified itself are merged in non-distinct Mâyâ, whose relation to
Brahman is not changed thereby.--The illustration, again, given in Sûtra
24 of the mode in which Brahman, by means of its inherent power,
transforms itself into the world without employing any extraneous
instruments of action, 'kshîravad dhi,' 'as milk (of its own accord
turns into curds),' would be strangely chosen indeed if meant to bring
nearer to our understanding the mode in which Brahman projects the
illusive appearance of the world; and also the analogous instance given
in the Sûtra next following, 'as Gods and the like (create palaces,
chariots, &c. by the mere power of their will)'--which refers to the
real creation of real things--would hardly be in its place if meant to
illustrate a theory which considers unreality to be the true character
of the world. The mere cumulation of the two essentially heterogeneous
illustrative instances (kshîravad dhi; devâdivat), moreover, seems to
show that the writer who had recourse to them held no very definite
theory as to the particular mode in which the world springs from
Brahman, but was merely concerned to render plausible in some way or
other that an intelligent being can give rise to what is non-intelligent
without having recourse to any extraneous means.[23]

That the Mâyâ doctrine was not present to the mind of the Sûtrakâra,
further appears from the latter part of the fourth pâda of the first
adhyâya, where it is shown that Brahman is not only the operative but
also the material cause of the world. If anywhere, there would have been
the place to indicate, had such been the author's view, that Brahman is
the material cause of the world through Mâyâ only, and that the world is
unreal; but the Sûtras do not contain a single word to that effect.
Sûtra 26, on the other hand, exhibits the significant term
'pari/n/âmât;' Brahman produces the world by means of a modification of
itself. It is well known that later on, when the terminology of the
Vedânta became definitely settled, the term 'pari/n/âvada' was used to
denote that very theory to which the followers of /S/a@nkara are most
violently opposed, viz. the doctrine according to which the world is not
a mere vivarta, i.e. an illusory manifestation of Brahman, but the
effect of Brahman undergoing a real change, may that change be conceived
to take place in the way taught by Râmânuja or in some other
manner.--With regard to the last-quoted Sûtra, as well as to those
touched upon above, the commentators indeed maintain that whatever terms
and modes of expression are apparently opposed to the vivartavâda are in
reality reconcilable with it; to Sûtra 26, for instance, Govindânanda
remarks that the term 'pari/n/âma' only denotes an effect in general
(kâryamâtra), without implying that the effect is real. But in cases of
this nature we are fully entitled to use our own judgment, even if we
were not compelled to do so by the fact that other commentators, such as
Râmânuja, are satisfied to take 'pari/n/âma' and similar terms in their
generally received sense.

A further section treating of the nature of Brahman is met with in III,
2, 11 ff. It is, according to /S/a@nkara's view, of special importance,
as it is alleged to set forth that Brahman is in itself destitute of all
qualities, and is affected with qualities only through its limiting
adjuncts (upâdhis), the offspring of Mâyâ. I have above (in the
conspectus of contents) given a somewhat detailed abstract of the whole
section as interpreted by /S/a@nkara on the one hand, and Râmânuja on
the other hand, from which it appears that the latter's opinion as to
the purport of the group of Sûtras widely diverges from that of
/S/a@nkara. The wording of the Sûtras is so eminently concise and vague
that I find it impossible to decide which of the two commentators--if
indeed either--is to be accepted as a trustworthy guide; regarding the
sense of some Sûtras /S/a@nkara's explanation seems to deserve
preference, in the case of others Râmânuja seems to keep closer to the
text. I decidedly prefer, for instance, Râmânuja's interpretation of
Sûtra 22, as far as the sense of the entire Sûtra is concerned, and more
especially with regard to the term 'prak/ri/taitâvattvam,' whose proper
force is brought out by Râmânuja's explanation only. So much is certain
that none of the Sûtras decidedly favours the interpretation proposed by
/S/a@nkara. Whichever commentator we follow, we greatly miss coherence
and strictness of reasoning, and it is thus by no means improbable that
the section is one of those--perhaps not few in number--in which both
interpreters had less regard to the literal sense of the words and to
tradition than to their desire of forcing Bâdarâya/n/a's Sûtras to bear
testimony to the truth of their own philosophic theories.

With special reference to the Mâyâ doctrine one important Sûtra has yet
to be considered, the only one in which the term 'mâyâ' itself occurs,
viz. III, 2, 3. According to /S/a@nkara the Sûtra signifies that the
environments of the dreaming soul are not real but mere Mâyâ, i.e.
unsubstantial illusion, because they do not fully manifest the character
of real objects. Râmânuja (as we have seen in the conspectus) gives a
different explanation of the term 'mâyâ,' but in judging of /S/a@nkara's
views we may for the time accept /S/a@nkara's own interpretation. Now,
from the latter it clearly follows that if the objects seen in dreams
are to be called Mâyâ, i.e. illusion, because not evincing the
characteristics of reality, the objective world surrounding the waking
soul must not be called Mâyâ. But that the world perceived by waking men
is Mâyâ, even in a higher sense than the world presented to the dreaming
consciousness, is an undoubted tenet of the /S/â@nkara Vedânta; and the
Sûtra therefore proves either that Bâdarâya/n/a did not hold the
doctrine of the illusory character of the world, or else that, if after
all he did hold that doctrine, he used the term 'mâyâ' in a sense
altogether different from that in which /S/a@nkara employs it.--If, on
the other hand, we, with Râmânuja, understand the word 'mâyâ' to denote
a wonderful thing, the Sûtra of course has no bearing whatever on the
doctrine of Mâyâ in its later technical sense.

We now turn to the question as to the relation of the individual soul to
Brahman. Do the Sûtras indicate anywhere that their author held
/S/a@nkara's doctrine, according to which the jîva is in reality
identical with Brahman, and separated from it, as it were, only by a
false surmise due to avidyâ, or do they rather favour the view that the
souls, although they have sprung from Brahman, and constitute elements
of its nature, yet enjoy a kind of individual existence apart from it?
This question is in fact only another aspect of the Mâyâ question, but
yet requires a short separate treatment.

In the conspectus I have given it as my opinion that the Sûtras in which
the size of the individual soul is discussed can hardly be understood in
/S/a@nkara's sense, and rather seem to favour the opinion, held among
others by Râmânuja, that the soul is of minute size. We have further
seen that Sûtra 18 of the third pâda of the second adhyâya, which
describes the soul as 'j/ñ/a,' is more appropriately understood in the
sense assigned to it by Râmânuja; and, again, that the Sûtras which
treat of the soul being an agent, can be reconciled with /S/a@nkara's
views only if supplemented in a way which their text does not appear to
authorise.--We next have the important Sûtra II, 3, 43 in which the soul
is distinctly said to be a part (a/ms/a) of Brahman, and which, as we
have already noticed, can be made to fall in with /S/a@nkara's views
only if a/ms/a is explained, altogether arbitrarily, by 'a/ms/a iva,'
while Râmânuja is able to take the Sûtra as it stands.--We also have
already referred to Sûtra 50, 'âbhâsa eva /k/a,' which /S/a@nkara
interprets as setting forth the so-called pratibimbavâda according to
which the individual Self is merely a reflection of the highest Self.
But almost every Sûtra--and Sûtra 50 forms no exception--being so
obscurely expressed, that viewed by itself it admits of various, often
totally opposed, interpretations, the only safe method is to keep in
view, in the case of each ambiguous aphorism, the general drift and
spirit of the whole work, and that, as we have seen hitherto, is by no
means favourable to the pratibimba doctrine. How indeed could Sûtra 50,
if setting forth that latter doctrine, be reconciled with Sûtra 43,
which says distinctly that the soul is a part of Brahman? For that 43
contains, as /S/a@nkara and his commentators aver, a statement of the
ava/kkh/edavâda, can itself be accepted only if we interpret a/ms/a by
a/ms/a iva, and to do so there is really no valid reason whatever. I
confess that Râmânuja's interpretation of the Sûtra (which however is
accepted by several other commentators also) does not appear to me
particularly convincing; and the Sûtras unfortunately offer us no other
passages on the ground of which we might settle the meaning to be
ascribed to the term âbhâsa, which may mean 'reflection,' but may mean
hetvâbhâsa, i.e. fallacious argument, as well. But as things stand, this
one Sûtra cannot, at any rate, be appealed to as proving that the
pratibimbavâda which, in its turn, presupposes the mâyâvâda, is the
teaching of the Sûtras.

To the conclusion that the Sûtrakâra did not hold the doctrine of the
absolute identity of the highest and the individual soul in the sense of
/S/a@nkara, we are further led by some other indications to be met with
here and there in the Sûtras. In the conspectus of contents we have had
occasion to direct attention to the important Sûtra II, 1, 22, which
distinctly enunciates that the Lord is adhika, i.e. additional to, or
different from, the individual soul, since Scripture declares the two to
be different. Analogously I, 2, 20 lays stress on the fact that the
/s/ârîra is not the antaryâmin, because the Mâdhyandinas, as well as the
Kâ/n/vas, speak of him in their texts as different (bhedena enam
adhîyate), and in 22 the /s/ârîra and the pradhâna are referred to as
the two 'others' (itarau) of whom the text predicates distinctive
attributes separating them from the highest Lord. The word 'itara' (the
other one) appears in several other passages (I, 1, 16; I, 3, 16; II, 1,
21) as a kind of technical term denoting the individual soul in
contradistinction from the Lord. The /S/â@nkaras indeed maintain that
all those passages refer to an unreal distinction due to avidyâ. But
this is just what we should like to see proved, and the proof offered in
no case amounts to more than a reference to the system which demands
that the Sûtras should be thus understood. If we accept the
interpretations of the school of /S/a@nkara, it remains altogether
unintelligible why the Sûtrakâra should never hint even at what
/S/a@nkara is anxious again and again to point out at length, viz. that
the greater part of the work contains a kind of exoteric doctrine only,
ever tending to mislead the student who does not keep in view what its
nature is. If other reasons should make it probable that the Sûtrakâra
was anxious to hide the true doctrine of the Upanishads as a sort of
esoteric teaching, we might be more ready to accept /S/a@nkara's mode of
interpretation. But no such reasons are forthcoming; nowhere among the
avowed followers of the /S/a@nkara system is there any tendency to treat
the kernel of their philosophy as something to be jealously guarded and
hidden. On the contrary, they all, from Gau/d/apâda down to the most
modern writer, consider it their most important, nay, only task to
inculcate again and again in the clearest and most unambiguous language
that all appearance of multiplicity is a vain illusion, that the Lord
and the individual souls are in reality one, and that all knowledge but
this one knowledge is without true value.

There remains one more important passage concerning the relation of the
individual soul to the highest Self, a passage which attracted our
attention above, when we were reviewing the evidence for early
divergence of opinion among the teachers of the Vedânta. I mean I, 4,
20-22, which three Sûtras state the views of Â/s/marathya, Au/d/ulomi,
and Kâ/s/akr/ri/tsna as to the reason why, in a certain passage of the
B/ri/hadâra/n/yaka, characteristics of the individual soul are ascribed
to the highest Self. The siddhânta view is enounced in Sûtra 22,
'avasthiter iti Kâ/s/ak/ri/tsna/h/' i.e. Kâ/s/ak/ri/tsna (accounts for
the circumstance mentioned) on the ground of the 'permanent abiding or
abode.' By this 'permanent abiding' /S/a@nkara understands the Lord's
abiding as, i.e. existing as--or in the condition of--the individual
soul, and thus sees in the Sûtra an enunciation of his own view that the
individual soul is nothing but the highest Self, 'avik/ri/ta/h/
parame/s/varo jîvo nânya/h/.' Râmânuja on the other hand, likewise
accepting Kâ/saak/ri/tsna's opinion as the siddhânta view, explains
'avasthiti' as the Lord's permanent abiding within the individual soul,
as described in the antaryâmin-brâhma/n/a.--We can hardly maintain that
the term 'avasthiti' cannot have the meaning ascribed to it by
Sa@/n/kara, viz. special state or condition, but so much must be urged
in favour of Râmânuja's interpretation that in the five other places
where avasthiti (or anavasthiti) is met with in the Sûtras (I, 2, 17;
II, 2, 4; II, 2, 13; II, 3, 24; III, 3, 32) it regularly means permanent
abiding or permanent abode within something.

If, now, I am shortly to sum up the results of the preceding enquiry as
to the teaching of the Sûtras, I must give it as my opinion that they do
not set forth the distinction of a higher and lower knowledge of
Brahman; that they do not acknowledge the distinction of Brahman and
Î/s/vara in /S/a@nkara's sense; that they do not hold the doctrine of
the unreality of the world; and that they do not, with /S/a@nkara,
proclaim the absolute identity of the individual and the highest Self. I
do not wish to advance for the present beyond these negative results.
Upon Râmânuja's mode of interpretation--although I accept it without
reserve in some important details--I look on the whole as more useful in
providing us with a powerful means of criticising /S/a@nkara's
explanations than in guiding us throughout to the right understanding of
the text. The author of the Sûtras may have held views about the nature
of Brahman, the world, and the soul differing from those of /S/a@nkara,
and yet not agreeing in all points with those of Râmânuja. If, however,
the negative conclusions stated above should be well founded, it would
follow even from them that the system of Bâdarâya/n/a had greater
affinities with that of the Bhâgavatas and Râmanuja than with the one of
which the /S/a@nkara-bhâshya is the classical exponent.

It appears from the above review of the teaching of the Sûtras that only
a comparatively very small proportion of them contribute matter enabling
us to form a judgment as to the nature of the philosophical doctrine
advocated by Bâdarâya/n/a. The reason of this is that the greater part
of the work is taken up with matters which, according to /S/a@nkara's
terminology, form part of the so-called lower knowledge, and throw no
light upon philosophical questions in the stricter sense of the word.
This circumstance is not without significance. In later works belonging
to /S/a@nkara's school in which the distinction of a higher and lower
vidyâ is clearly recognised, the topics constituting the latter are
treated with great shortness; and rightly so, for they are unable to
accomplish the highest aim of man, i.e. final release. When we
therefore, on the other hand, find that the subjects of the so-called
lower vidyâ are treated very fully in the Vedânta-sûtras, when we
observe, for instance, the almost tedious length to which the
investigation of the unity of vidyâs (most of which are so-called
sagu/n/a, i.e. lower vidyâs) is carried in the third adhyâya, or the
fact of almost the whole fourth adhyâya being devoted to the ultimate
fate of the possessor of the lower vidyâ; we certainly feel ourselves
confirmed in our conclusion that what /S/a@nkara looked upon as
comparatively unimportant formed in Bâdarâya/n/a's opinion part of that
knowledge higher than which there is none, and which therefore is
entitled to the fullest and most detailed exposition.

The question as to what kind of system is represented by the
Vedânta-sûtras may be approached in another way also. While hitherto we
have attempted to penetrate to the meaning of the Sûtras by means of the
different commentaries, we might try the opposite road, and, in the
first place, attempt to ascertain independently of the Sûtras what
doctrine is set forth in the Upanishads, whose teaching the Sûtras
doubtless aim at systematising. If, it might be urged, the Upanishads
can be convincingly shown to embody a certain settled doctrine, we must
consider it at the least highly probable that that very same
doctrine--of whatever special nature it may be--is hidden in the
enigmatical aphorisms of Bâdarâya/n/a.[24]

I do not, however, consider this line of argumentation a safe one. Even
if it could be shown that the teaching of all the chief Upanishads
agrees in all essential points (a subject to which some attention will
be paid later on), we should not on that account be entitled
unhesitatingly to assume that the Sûtras set forth the same doctrine.
Whatever the true philosophy of the Upanishads may be, there remains the
undeniable fact that there exist and have existed since very ancient
times not one but several essentially differing systems, all of which
lay claim to the distinction of being the true representatives of the
teaching of the Upanishads as well as of the Sûtras. Let us suppose, for
argument's sake, that, for instance, the doctrine of Mâyâ is distinctly
enunciated in the Upanishads; nevertheless Râmânuja and, for all we know
to the contrary, the whole series of more ancient commentators on whom
he looked as authorities in the interpretation of the Sûtras, denied
that the Upanishads teach Mâyâ, and it is hence by no means impossible
that Bâdarâya/n/a should have done the same. The à priori style of
reasoning as to the teaching of the Sûtras is therefore without much
force.

But apart from any intention of arriving thereby at the meaning of the
Sûtras there, of course, remains for us the all-important question as to
the true teaching of the Upanishads, a question which a translator of
the Sûtras and /S/a@nkara cannot afford to pass over in silence,
especially after reason has been shown for the conclusion that the
Sûtras and the /S/a@nkara-bhâshya do not agree concerning most important
points of Vedântic doctrine. The Sûtras as well as the later
commentaries claim, in the first place, to be nothing more than
systematisations of the Upanishads, and for us a considerable part at
least of their value and interest lies in this their nature. Hence the
further question presents itself by whom the teaching of the Upanishads
has been most adequately systematised, whether by Bâdarâya/n/a, or
/S/a@nkara, or Râmânuja, or some other commentator. This question
requires to be kept altogether separate from the enquiry as to which
commentator most faithfully renders the contents of the Sûtras, and it
is by no means impossible that /S/a@nkara, for instance, should in the
end have to be declared a more trustworthy guide with regard to the
teaching of the Upanishads than concerning the meaning of the Sûtras.

We must remark here at once that, whatever commentator may be found to
deserve preference on the whole, it appears fairly certain already at
the outset that none of the systems which Indian ingenuity has succeeded
in erecting on the basis of the Upanishads can be accepted in its
entirety. The reason for this lies in the nature of the Upanishads
themselves. To the Hindu commentator and philosopher the Upanishads came
down as a body of revealed truth whose teaching had, somehow or other,
to be shown to be thoroughly consistent and free from contradictions; a
system had to be devised in which a suitable place could be allotted to
every one of the multitudinous statements which they make on the various
points of Vedântic doctrine. But to the European scholar, or in fact to
any one whose mind is not bound by the doctrine of /S/ruti, it will
certainly appear that all such attempts stand self-condemned. If
anything is evident even on a cursory review of the Upanishads--and the
impression so created is only strengthened by a more careful
investigation--it is that they do not constitute a systematic whole.
They themselves, especially the older ones, give the most unmistakable
indications on that point. Not only are the doctrines expounded in the
different Upanishads ascribed to different teachers, but even the
separate sections of one and the same Upanishad are assigned to
different authorities. It would be superfluous to quote examples of what
a mere look at the Chândogya Upanishad, for instance, suffices to prove.
It is of course not impossible that even a multitude of teachers should
agree in imparting precisely the same doctrine; but in the case of the
Upanishads that is certainly not antecedently probable. For, in the
first place, the teachers who are credited with the doctrines of the
Upanishads manifestly belonged to different sections of Brahminical
society, to different Vedic /s/âkhâs; nay, some of them the tradition
makes out to have been kshattriyas. And, in the second place, the
period, whose mental activity is represented in the Upanishads, was a
creative one, and as such cannot be judged according to the analogy of
later periods of Indian philosophic development. The later philosophic
schools as, for instance, the one of which /S/a@nkara is the great
representative, were no longer free in their speculations, but strictly
bound by a traditional body of texts considered sacred, which could not
be changed or added to, but merely systematised and commented upon.
Hence the rigorous uniformity of doctrine characteristic of those
schools. But there had been a time when, what later writers received as
a sacred legacy, determining and confining the whole course of their
speculations, first sprang from the minds of creative thinkers not
fettered by the tradition of any school, but freely following the
promptings of their own heads and hearts. By the absence of school
traditions, I do not indeed mean that the great teachers who appear in
the Upanishads were free to make an entirely new start, and to assign to
their speculations any direction they chose; for nothing can be more
certain than that, at the period as the outcome of whose philosophical
activity the Upanishads have to be considered, there were in circulation
certain broad speculative ideas overshadowing the mind of every member
of Brahminical society. But those ideas were neither very definite nor
worked out in detail, and hence allowed themselves to be handled and
fashioned in different ways by different individuals. With whom the few
leading conceptions traceable in the teaching of all Upanishads first
originated, is a point on which those writings themselves do not
enlighten us, and which we have no other means for settling; most
probably they are to be viewed not as the creation of any individual
mind, but as the gradual outcome of speculations carried on by
generations of Vedic theologians. In the Upanishads themselves, at any
rate, they appear as floating mental possessions which may be seized and
moulded into new forms by any one who feels within himself the required
inspiration. A certain vague knowledge of Brahman, the great hidden
being in which all this manifold world is one, seems to be spread
everywhere, and often issues from the most unexpected sources.
/S/vetaketu receives instruction from his father Uddâlaka; the proud
Gârgya has to become the pupil of Ajâta/s/atru, the king of Kâ/s/î;
Bhujyu Sâhyâyani receives answers to his questions from a Gandharva
possessing a maiden; Satyakâma learns what Brahman is from the bull of
the herd he is tending, from Agni and from a flamingo; and Upako/s/ala
is taught by the sacred fires in his teacher's house. All this is of
course legend, not history; but the fact that the philosophic and
theological doctrines of the Upanishads are clothed in this legendary
garb certainly does not strengthen the expectation of finding in them a
rigidly systematic doctrine.

And a closer investigation of the contents of the Upanishads amply
confirms this preliminary impression. If we avail ourselves, for
instance, of M. Paul Régnaud's Matériaux pour servir à l'Histoire de la
Philosophie de l'Inde, in which the philosophical lucubrations of the
different Upanishads are arranged systematically according to topics, we
can see with ease how, together with a certain uniformity of general
leading conceptions, there runs throughout divergence in details, and
very often not unimportant details. A look, for instance, at the
collection of passages relative to the origination of the world from the
primitive being, suffices to show that the task of demonstrating that
whatever the Upanishads teach on that point can be made to fit into a
homogeneous system is an altogether hopeless one. The accounts there
given of the creation belong, beyond all doubt to different stages of
philosophic and theological development or else to different sections of
priestly society. None but an Indian commentator would, I suppose, be
inclined and sufficiently courageous to attempt the proof that, for
instance, the legend of the âtman purushavidha, the Self in the shape of
a person which is as large as man and woman together, and then splits
itself into two halves from which cows, horses, asses, goats, &c. are
produced in succession (B/ri/. Up. I, 1, 4), can be reconciled with the
account given of the creation in the Chândogya Upanishad, where it is
said that in the beginning there existed nothing but the sat, 'that
which is,' and that feeling a desire of being many it emitted out of
itself ether, and then all the other elements in due succession. The
former is a primitive cosmogonic myth, which in its details shows
striking analogies with the cosmogonic myths of other nations; the
latter account is fairly developed Vedânta (although not Vedânta
implying the Mâyâ doctrine). We may admit that both accounts show a
certain fundamental similarity in so far as they derive the manifold
world from one original being; but to go beyond this and to maintain, as
/S/a@nkara does, that the âtman purushavidha of the B/ri/hadâra/n/yaka
is the so-called Virâg of the latter Vedânta--implying thereby that that
section consciously aims at describing only the activity of one special
form of Î/s/vara, and not simply the whole process of creation--is the
ingenious shift of an orthodox commentator in difficulties, but nothing
more.

How all those more or less conflicting texts came to be preserved and
handed down to posterity, is not difficult to understand. As mentioned
above, each of the great sections of Brahminical priesthood had its own
sacred texts, and again in each of those sections there existed more
ancient texts which it was impossible to discard when deeper and more
advanced speculations began in their turn to be embodied in literary
compositions, which in the course of time likewise came to be looked
upon as sacred. When the creative period had reached its termination,
and the task of collecting and arranging was taken in hand, older and
newer pieces were combined into wholes, and thus there arose collections
of such heterogeneous character as the Chândogya and B/ri/hadâra/n/yaka
Upanishads. On later generations, to which the whole body of texts came
down as revealed truth, there consequently devolved the inevitable task
of establishing systems on which no exception could be taken to any of
the texts; but that the task was, strictly speaking, an impossible one,
i.e. one which it was impossible to accomplish fairly and honestly,
there really is no reason to deny.

For a comprehensive criticism of the methods which the different
commentators employ in systematizing the contents of the Upanishads
there is no room in this place. In order, however, to illustrate what is
meant by the 'impossibility,' above alluded to, of combining the various
doctrines of the Upanishads into a whole without doing violence to a
certain number of texts, it will be as well to analyse in detail some
few at least of /S/a@nkara's interpretations, and to render clear the
considerations by which he is guided.

We begin with a case which has already engaged our attention when
discussing the meaning of the Sûtras, viz. the question concerning the
ultimate fate of those who have attained the knowledge of Brahman. As we
have seen, /S/a@nkara teaches that the soul of him who has risen to an
insight into the nature of the higher Brahman does not, at the moment of
death, pass out of the body, but is directly merged in Brahman by a
process from which all departing and moving, in fact all considerations
of space, are altogether excluded. The soul of him, on the other hand,
who has not risen above the knowledge of the lower qualified Brahman
departs from the body by means of the artery called sushum/n/â, and
following the so-called devayâna, the path of the gods, mounts up to the
world of Brahman. A review of the chief Upanishad texts on which
/S/a@nkara founds this distinction will show how far it is justified.

In a considerable number of passages the Upanishads contrast the fate of
two classes of men, viz. of those who perform sacrifices and meritorious
works only, and of those who in addition possess a certain kind of
knowledge. Men of the former kind ascend after death to the moon, where
they live for a certain time, and then return to the earth into new
forms of embodiment; persons of the latter kind proceed on the path of
the gods--on which the sun forms one stage--up to the world of Brahman,
from which there is no return. The chief passages to that effect are Ch.
Up. V, 10; Kaush. Up. I, 2 ff.; Mu/nd/. Up. I, 2, 9 ff.; B/ri/. Up. VI,
2, 15 ff.; Pra/s/na Up. I, 9 ff.--In other passages only the latter of
the two paths is referred to, cp. Ch. Up. IV, 15; VIII 6, 5; Taitt. Up.
I, 6; B/ri/. Up. IV, 4, 8, 9; V, 10; Maitr. Up. VI, 30, to mention only
the more important ones.

Now an impartial consideration of those passages shows I think, beyond
any doubt, that what is meant there by the knowledge which leads through
the sun to the world of Brahman is the highest knowledge of which the
devotee is capable, and that the world of Brahman to which his knowledge
enables him to proceed denotes the highest state which he can ever
reach, the state of final release, if we choose to call it by that
name.--Ch. Up. V, 10 says, 'Those who know this (viz. the doctrine of
the five fires), and those who in the forest follow faith and
austerities go to light,' &c.--Ch. Up. IV, 15 is manifestly intended to
convey the true knowledge of Brahman; Upako/s/ala's teacher himself
represents the instruction given by him as superior to the teaching of
the sacred fires.--Ch. Up. VIII, 6, 5 quotes the old /s/loka which says
that the man moving upwards by the artery penetrating the crown of the
head reaches the Immortal.--Kaush. Up. I, 2--which gives the most
detailed account of the ascent of the soul--contains no intimation
whatever of the knowledge of Brahman, which leads up to the Brahman
world, being of an inferior nature.--Mu/nd/. Up. I, 2, 9 agrees with the
Chândogya in saying that 'Those who practise penance and faith in the
forest, tranquil, wise, and living on alms, depart free from passion,
through the sun, to where that immortal Person dwells whose nature is
imperishable,' and nothing whatever in the context countenances the
assumption that not the highest knowledge and the highest Person are
there referred to.--B/ri/. Up. IV, 4, 8 quotes old /s/lokas clearly
referring to the road of the gods ('the small old path'), on which
'sages who know Brahman move on to the svargaloka and thence higher on
as entirely free.--That path was found by Brahman, and on it goes
whoever knows Brahman.'--B/ri/. Up. VI, 2, 15 is another version of the
Pa/ñk/âgnividyâ, with the variation, 'Those who know this, and those who
in the forest worship faith and the True, go to light,' &c.--Pra/s/na
Up. 1, 10 says, 'Those who have sought the Self by penance, abstinence,
faith, and knowledge gain by the northern path Âditya, the sun. There is
the home of the spirits, the immortal free from danger, the highest.
From thence they do not return, for it is the end.'--Maitr. Up. VI, 30
quotes /s/lokas, 'One of them (the arteries) leads upwards, piercing the
solar orb: by it, having stepped beyond the world of Brahman, they go to
the highest path.'

All these passages are as clear as can be desired. The soul of the sage
who knows Brahman passes out by the sushum/n/â, and ascends by the path
of the gods to the world of Brahman, there to remain for ever in some
blissful state. But, according to /S/a@nkara, all these texts are meant
to set forth the result of a certain inferior knowledge only, of the
knowledge of the conditioned Brahman. Even in a passage apparently so
entirely incapable of more than one interpretation as B/ri/. Up. VI, 2,
15, the 'True,' which the holy hermits in the forest are said to
worship, is not to be the highest Brahman, but only
Hira/n/yagarbha!--And why?--Only because the system so demands it, the
system which teaches that those who know the highest Brahman become on
their death one with it, without having to resort to any other place.
The passage on which this latter tenet is chiefly based is B/ri/. Up.
IV, 4, 6, 7, where, with the fate of him who at his death has desires,
and whose soul therefore enters a new body after having departed from
the old one, accompanied by all the prâ/n/as, there is contrasted the
fate of the sage free from all desires. 'But as to the man who does not
desire, who not desiring, freed from desires is satisfied in his
desires, or desires the Self only, the vital spirits of him (tasya) do
not depart--being Brahman he goes to Brahman.'

We have seen above (p. lxxx) that this passage is referred to in the
important Sûtras on whose right interpretation it, in the first place,
depends whether or not we must admit the Sûtrakâra to have acknowledged
the distinction of a parâ and an aparâ vidyâ. Here the passage interests
us as throwing light on the way in which /S/a@nkara systematises. He
looks on the preceding part of the chapter as describing what happens to
the souls of all those who do not know the highest Brahman, inclusive of
those who know the lower Brahman only. They pass out of the old bodies
followed by all prâ/n/as and enter new bodies. He, on the other hand,
section 6 continues, who knows the true Brahman, does not pass out of
the body, but becomes one with Brahman then and there. This
interpretation of the purport of the entire chapter is not impossibly
right, although I am rather inclined to think that the chapter aims at
setting forth in its earlier part the future of him who does not know
Brahman at all, while the latter part of section 6 passes on to him who
does know Brahman (i.e. Brahman pure and simple, the text knowing of no
distinction of the so-called lower and higher Brahman). In explaining
section 6 /S/a@nkara lays stress upon the clause 'na tasya prâ/n/a
utkrâmanti,' 'his vital spirits do not pass out,' taking this to signify
that the soul with the vital spirits does not move at all, and thus does
not ascend to the world of Brahman; while the purport of the clause may
simply be that the soul and vital spirits do not go anywhere else, i.e.
do not enter a new body, but are united, somehow or other, with Brahman.
On /S/a@nkara's interpretation there immediately arises a new
difficulty. In the /s/lokas, quoted under sections 8 and 9, the
description of the small old path which leads to the svargaloka and
higher on clearly refers--as noticed already above--to the path through
the veins, primarily the sushum/n/â, on which, according to so many
other passages, the soul of the wise mounts upwards. But that path is,
according to /S/a@nkara, followed by him only who has not risen above
the lower knowledge, and yet the /s/lokas have manifestly to be
connected with what is said in the latter half of 6 about the owner of
the parâ vidyâ. Hence /S/a@nkara sees himself driven to explain the
/s/lokas in 8 and 9 (of which a faithful translation is given in
Professor Max Müller's version) as follows:

8. 'The subtle old path (i.e. the path of knowledge on which final
release is reached; which path is subtle, i.e. difficult to know, and
old, i.e. to be known from the eternal Veda) has been obtained and fully
reached by me. On it the sages who know Brahman reach final release
(svargaloka/s/abda/h/ samnihitaprakara/n/ât mokshâbhidhâyaka/h/).

9. 'On that path they say that there is white or blue or yellow or green
or red (i.e. others maintain that the path to final release is, in
accordance with the colour of the arteries, either white or blue, &c.;
but that is false, for the paths through the arteries lead at the best
to the world of Brahman, which itself forms part of the sa/m/sâra); that
path (i.e. the only path to release, viz. the path of true knowledge) is
found by Brahman, i.e. by such Brâhma/n/as as through true knowledge
have become like Brahman,' &c.

A significant instance in truth of the straits to which thorough-going
systematisers of the Upanishads see themselves reduced occasionally!

But we return to the point which just now chiefly interests us. Whether
/S/a@nkara's interpretation of the chapter, and especially of section 6,
be right or wrong, so much is certain that we are not entitled to view
all those texts which speak of the soul going to the world of Brahman as
belonging to the so-called lower knowledge, because a few other passages
declare that the sage does not go to Brahman. The text which declares
the sage free from desires to become one with Brahman could not, without
due discrimination, be used to define and limit the meaning of other
passages met with in the same Upanishad even--for as we have remarked
above the B/ri/hadâra/n/yaka contains pieces manifestly belonging to
different stages of development;--much less does it entitle us to put
arbitrary constructions on passages forming part of other Upanishads.
Historically the disagreement of the various accounts is easy to
understand. The older notion was that the soul of the wise man proceeds
along the path of the gods to Brahman's abode. A later--and, if we like,
more philosophic--conception is that, as Brahman already is a man's
Self, there is no need of any motion on man's part to reach Brahman. We
may even apply to those two views the terms aparâ and parâ--lower and
higher--knowledge. But we must not allow any commentator to induce us to
believe that what he from his advanced standpoint looks upon as an
inferior kind of cognition, was viewed in the same light by the authors
of the Upanishads.

We turn to another Upanishad text likewise touching upon the point
considered in what precedes, viz. the second Brâhma/n/a of the third
adhyâya of the B/ri/hadâra/n/yaka. The discussion there first turns upon
the grahas and atigrahas, i.e. the senses and organs and their objects,
and Yâjñavalkya thereupon explains that death, by which everything is
overcome, is itself overcome by water; for death is fire. The colloquy
then turns to what we must consider an altogether new topic, Ârtabhâga
asking, 'When this man (ayam purusha) dies, do the vital spirits depart
from him or not?' and Yâjñavalkya answering, 'No, they are gathered up
in him; he swells, he is inflated; inflated the dead (body) is
lying.'--Now this is for /S/a@nkara an important passage, as we have
already seen above (p. lxxxi); for he employs it, in his comment on
Ved.-sûtra IV, 2, 13, for the purpose of proving that the passage B/ri/.
Up. IV, 4, 6 really means that the vital spirits do not, at the moment
of death, depart from the true sage. Hence the present passage also must
refer to him who possesses the highest knowledge; hence the 'ayam
purusha' must be 'that man,' i.e. the man who possesses the highest
knowledge, and the highest knowledge then must be found in the preceding
clause which says that death itself may be conquered by water. But, as
Râmânuja also remarks, neither does the context favour the assumption
that the highest knowledge is referred to, nor do the words of section
11 contain any indication that what is meant is the merging of the Self
of the true Sage in Brahman. With the interpretation given by Râmânuja
himself, viz. that the prâ/n/as do not depart from the jîva of the dying
man, but accompany it into a new body, I can agree as little (although
he no doubt rightly explains the 'ayam purusha' by 'man' in general),
and am unable to see in the passage anything more than a crude attempt
to account for the fact that a dead body appears swollen and
inflated.--A little further on (section 13) Ârtabhâga asks what becomes
of this man (ayam purusha) when his speech has entered into the fire,
his breath into the air, his eye into the sun, &c. So much here is clear
that we have no right to understand by the 'ayam purusha' of section 13
anybody different from the 'ayam purusha' of the two preceding sections;
in spite of this /S/a@nkara--according to whose system the organs of the
true sage do not enter into the elements, but are directly merged in
Brahman--explains the 'ayam purusha' of section 13 to be the
'asa/m/yagdar/s/in,' i.e. the person who has not risen to the cognition
of the highest Brahman. And still a further limiting interpretation is
required by the system. The asa/m/yagdar/s/in also--who as such has to
remain in the sa/m/sâra--cannot do without the organs, since his jîva
when passing out of the old body into a new one is invested with the
subtle body; hence section 13 cannot be taken as saying what it clearly
does say, viz. that at death the different organs pass into the
different elements, but as merely indicating that the organs are
abandoned by the divinities which, during lifetime, presided over them!

The whole third adhyâya indeed of the B/ri/hadâra/n/yaka affords ample
proof of the artificial character of /S/a@nkara's attempts to show that
the teaching of the Upanishads follows a definite system. The eighth
brâhma/n/a, for instance, is said to convey the doctrine of the highest
non-related Brahman, while the preceding brâhma/n/as had treated only of
Î/s/vara in his various aspects. But, as a matter of fact, brâhma/n/a 8,
after having, in section 8, represented Brahman as destitute of all
qualities, proceeds, in the next section, to describe that very same
Brahman as the ruler of the world, 'By the command of that Imperishable
sun and moon stand apart,' &c.; a clear indication that the author of
the Upanishad does not distinguish a higher and lower Brahman
in--/S/a@nkara's sense.--The preceding brâhma/n/a (7) treats of the
antaryâmin, i.e. Brahman viewed as the internal ruler of everything.
This, according to /S/a@nkara, is the lower form of Brahman called
Î/s/vara; but we observe that the antaryâmin as well as the so-called
highest Brahman described in section 8 is, at the termination of the two
sections, characterised by means of the very same terms (7, 23: Unseen
but seeing, unheard but hearing, &c. There is no other seer but he,
there is no other hearer but he, &c.; and 8, 11: That Brahman is unseen
but seeing, unheard but hearing, &c. There is nothing that sees but it,
nothing that hears but it, &c.).--Nothing can be clearer than that all
these sections aim at describing one and the same being, and know
nothing of the distinctions made by the developed Vedânta, however valid
the latter may be from a purely philosophic point of view.

We may refer to one more similar instance from the Chândogya Upanishad.
We there meet in III, 14 with one of the most famous vidyâs describing
the nature of Brahman, called after its reputed author the
Sâ/nd/ilya-vidyâ. This small vidyâ is decidedly one of the finest and
most characteristic texts; it would be difficult to point out another
passage setting forth with greater force and eloquence and in an equally
short compass the central doctrine of the Upanishads. Yet this text,
which, beyond doubt, gives utterance to the highest conception of
Brahman's nature that Sâ/nd/ilya's thought was able to reach, is by
/S/a@nkara and his school again declared to form part of the lower vidyâ
only, because it represents Brahman as possessing qualities. It is,
according to their terminology, not j/ñ/âna, i.e. knowledge, but the
injunction of a mere upâsanâ, a devout meditation on Brahman in so far
as possessing certain definite attributes such as having light for its
form, having true thoughts, and so on. The Râmânujas, on the other hand,
quote this text with preference as clearly describing the nature of
their highest, i.e. their one Brahman. We again allow that /S/a@nkara is
free to deny that any text which ascribes qualities to Brahman embodies
absolute truth; but we also again remark that there is no reason
whatever for supposing that Sâ/nd/ilya, or whoever may have been the
author of that vidyâ, looked upon it as anything else but a statement of
the highest truth accessible to man.

We return to the question as to the true philosophy of the Upanishads,
apart from the systems of the commentators.--From what precedes it will
appear with sufficient distinctness that, if we understand by philosophy
a philosophical system coherent in all its parts, free from all
contradictions and allowing room for all the different statements made
in all the chief Upanishads, a philosophy of the Upanishads cannot even
be spoken of. The various lucubrations on Brahman, the world, and the
human soul of which the Upanishads consist do not allow themselves to be
systematised simply because they were never meant to form a system.
/S/â/nd/ilya's views as to the nature of Brahman did not in all details
agree with those of Yâj/ñ/avalkya, and Uddâlaka differed from both. In
this there is nothing to wonder at, and the burden of proof rests
altogether with those who maintain that a large number of detached
philosophic and theological dissertations, ascribed to different
authors, doubtless belonging to different periods, and not seldom
manifestly contradicting each other, admit of being combined into a
perfectly consistent whole.

The question, however, assumes a different aspect, if we take the terms
'philosophy' and 'philosophical system,' not in the strict sense in
which /S/a@nkara and other commentators are not afraid of taking them,
but as implying merely an agreement in certain fundamental features. In
this latter sense we may indeed undertake to indicate the outlines of a
philosophy of the Upanishads, only keeping in view that precision in
details is not to be aimed at. And here we finally see ourselves driven
back altogether on the texts themselves, and have to acknowledge that
the help we receive from commentators, to whatever school they may
belong, is very inconsiderable. Fortunately it cannot be asserted that
the texts on the whole oppose very serious difficulties to a right
understanding, however obscure the details often are. Concerning the
latter we occasionally depend entirely on the explanations vouchsafed by
the scholiasts, but as far as the general drift and spirit of the texts
are concerned, we are quite able to judge by ourselves, and are even
specially qualified to do so by having no particular system to advocate.

The point we will first touch upon is the same from which we started
when examining the doctrine of the Sûtras, viz. the question whether the
Upanishads acknowledge a higher and lower knowledge in /S/a@nkara's
sense, i.e. a knowledge of a higher and a lower Brahman. Now this we
find not to be the case. Knowledge is in the Upanishads frequently
opposed to avîdyâ, by which latter term we have to understand ignorance
as to Brahman, absence of philosophic knowledge; and, again, in several
places we find the knowledge of the sacrificial part of the Veda with
its supplementary disciplines contrasted as inferior with the knowledge
of the Self; to which latter distinction the Mu/nd/aka Up. (I, 4)
applies the terms aparâ and parâ vîdyâ. But a formal recognition of the
essential difference of Brahman being viewed, on the one hand, as
possessing distinctive attributes, and, on the other hand, as devoid of
all such attributes is not to be met with anywhere. Brahman is indeed
sometimes described as sagu/n/a and sometimes as nirgu/n/a (to use later
terms); but it is nowhere said that thereon rests a distinction of two
different kinds of knowledge leading to altogether different results.
The knowledge of Brahman is one, under whatever aspects it is viewed;
hence the circumstance (already exemplified above) that in the same
vidyâs it is spoken of as sagu/n/a as well as nirgu/n/a. When the mind
of the writer dwells on the fact that Brahman is that from which all
this world originates, and in which it rests, he naturally applies to it
distinctive attributes pointing at its relation to the world; Brahman,
then, is called the Self and life of all, the inward ruler, the
omniscient Lord, and so on. When, on the other hand, the author follows
out the idea that Brahman may be viewed in itself as the mysterious
reality of which the whole expanse of the world is only an outward
manifestation, then it strikes him that no idea or term derived from
sensible experience can rightly be applied to it, that nothing more may
be predicated of it but that it is neither this nor that. But these are
only two aspects of the cognition of one and the same entity.

Closely connected with the question as to the double nature of the
Brahman of the Upanishads is the question as to their teaching
Mâyâ.--From Colebrooke downwards the majority of European writers have
inclined towards the opinion that the doctrine of Mâyâ, i.e. of the
unreal illusory character of the sensible world, does not constitute a
feature of the primitive philosophy of the Upanishads, but was
introduced into the system at some later period, whether by Bâdarâya/n/a
or /S/a@nkara or somebody else. The opposite view, viz. that the
doctrine of Mâyâ forms an integral element of the teaching of the
Upanishads, is implied in them everywhere, and enunciated more or less
distinctly in more than one place, has in recent times been advocated
with much force by Mr. Gough in the ninth chapter of his Philosophy of
the Upanishads.

In his Matériaux, &c. M. Paul Régnaud remarks that 'the doctrine of
Mâyâ, although implied in the teaching of the Upanishads, could hardly
become clear and explicit before the system had reached a stage of
development necessitating a choice between admitting two co-existent
eternal principles (which became the basis of the Sâ@nkhya philosophy),
and accepting the predominance of the intellectual principle, which in
the end necessarily led to the negation of the opposite principle.'--To
the two alternatives here referred to as possible we, however, have to
add a third one, viz. that form of the Vedânta of which the theory of
the Bhâgavatas or Râmânujas is the most eminent type, and according to
which Brahman carries within its own nature an element from which the
material universe originates; an element which indeed is not an
independent entity like the pradhâna of the Sâ@nkhyas, but which at the
same time is not an unreal Mâyâ but quite as real as any other part of
Brahman's nature. That a doctrine of this character actually developed
itself on the basis of the Upanishads, is a circumstance which we
clearly must not lose sight of, when attempting to determine what the
Upanishads themselves are teaching concerning the character of the
world.

In enquiring whether the Upanishads maintain the Mâyâ doctrine or not,
we must proceed with the same caution as regards other parts of the
system, i.e. we must refrain from using unhesitatingly, and without
careful consideration of the merits of each individual case, the
teaching--direct or inferred--of any one passage to the end of
determining the drift of the teaching of other passages. We may admit
that some passages, notably of the B/ri/hadâra/n/yaka, contain at any
rate the germ of the later developed Mâyâ doctrine[25], and thus render
it quite intelligible that a system like /S/a@nkara's should evolve
itself, among others, out of the Upanishads; but that affords no valid
reason for interpreting Mâyâ into other texts which give a very
satisfactory sense without that doctrine, or are even clearly repugnant
to it. This remark applies in the very first place to all the accounts
of the creation of the physical universe. There, if anywhere, the
illusional character of the world should have been hinted at, at least,
had that theory been held by the authors of those accounts; but not a
word to that effect is met with anywhere. The most important of those
accounts--the one given in the sixth chapter of the Chândogya
Upanishad--forms no exception. There is absolutely no reason to assume
that the 'sending forth' of the elements from the primitive Sat, which
is there described at length, was by the writer of that passage meant to
represent a vivarta rather than a pari/n/âma that the process of the
origination of the physical universe has to be conceived as anything
else but a real manifestation of real powers hidden in the primeval
Self. The introductory words, addressed to /S/vetaketu by Uddâlaka,
which are generally appealed to as intimating the unreal character of
the evolution about to be described, do not, if viewed impartially,
intimate any such thing[26]. For what is capable of being proved, and
manifestly meant to be proved, by the illustrative instances of the lump
of clay and the nugget of gold, through which there are known all things
made of clay and gold? Merely that this whole world has Brahman for its
causal substance, just as clay is the causal matter of every earthen
pot, and gold of every golden ornament, but not that the process through
which any causal substance becomes an effect is an unreal one.
We--including Uddâlaka--may surely say that all earthen pots are in
reality nothing but earth--the earthen pot being merely a special
modification (vikâra) of clay which has a name of its own--without
thereby committing ourselves to the doctrine that the change of form,
which a lump of clay undergoes when being fashioned into a pot, is not
real but a mere baseless illusion.

In the same light we have to view numerous other passages which set
forth the successive emanations proceeding from the first principle.
When, for instance, we meet in the Ka/th/a Up. I, 3, 10, in the serial
enumeration of the forms of existence intervening between the gross
material world and the highest Self (the Person), with the
'avyâk/ri/ta,' the Undeveloped, immediately below the purusha; and when
again the Mu/nd/aka Up. II, 1, 2, speaks of the 'high Imperishable'
higher than which is the heavenly Person; there is no reason whatever to
see in that 'Undeveloped' and that 'high Imperishable' anything but that
real element in Brahman from which, as in the Râmânuja system, the
material universe springs by a process of real development. We must of
course render it quite clear to ourselves in what sense the terms 'real'
and 'unreal' have to be understood. The Upanishads no doubt teach
emphatically that the material world does not owe its existence to any
principle independent from the Lord like the pradhâna of the Sâ@nkhyas;
the world is nothing but a manifestation of the Lord's wonderful power,
and hence is unsubstantial, if we take the term 'substance' in its
strict sense. And, again, everything material is immeasurably inferior
in nature to the highest spiritual principle from which it has emanated,
and which it now hides from the individual soul. But neither
unsubstantiality nor inferiority of the kind mentioned constitutes
unreality in the sense in which the Mâyâ of /S/a@nkara is unreal.
According to the latter the whole world is nothing but an erroneous
appearance, as unreal as the snake, for which a piece of rope is
mistaken by the belated traveller, and disappearing just as the imagined
snake does as soon as the light of true knowledge has risen. But this is
certainly not the impression left on the mind by a comprehensive review
of the Upanishads which dwells on their general scope, and does not
confine itself to the undue urging of what may be implied in some
detached passages. The Upanishads do not call upon us to look upon the
whole world as a baseless illusion to be destroyed by knowledge; the
great error which they admonish us to relinquish is rather that things
have a separate individual existence, and are not tied together by the
bond of being all of them effects of Brahman, or Brahman itself. They do
not say that true knowledge sublates this false world, as /S/a@nkara
says, but that it enables the sage to extricate himself from the
world--the inferior mûrta rûpa of Brahman, to use an expression of the
B/ri/hadâra/n/yaka--and to become one with Brahman in its highest form.
'We are to see everything in Brahman, and Brahman in everything;' the
natural meaning of this is, 'we are to look upon this whole world as a
true manifestation of Brahman, as sprung from it and animated by it.'
The mâyâvâdin has indeed appropriated the above saying also, and
interpreted it so as to fall in with his theory; but he is able to do so
only by perverting its manifest sense. For him it would be appropriate
to say, not that everything we see is in Brahman, but rather that
everything we see is out of Brahman, viz. as a false appearance spread
over it and hiding it from us.

Stress has been laid[27] upon certain passages of the B/ri/hadâra/n/yaka
which seem to hint at the unreality of this world by qualifying terms,
indicative of duality or plurality of existence, by means of an added
'iva,' i.e. 'as it were' (yatrânyad iva syât; yatra dvaitam iva bhavati;
âtmâ dhyâyatîva lelâyatîva). Those passages no doubt readily lend
themselves to Mâyâ interpretations, and it is by no means impossible
that in their author's mind there was something like an undeveloped Mâyâ
doctrine. I must, however, remark that they, on the other hand, also
admit of easy interpretations not in any way presupposing the theory of
the unreality of the world. If Yâj/ñ/avalkya refers to the latter as
that 'where there is something else as it were, where there is duality
as it were,' he may simply mean to indicate that the ordinary opinion,
according to which the individual forms of existence of the world are
opposed to each other as altogether separate, is a mistaken one, all
things being one in so far as they spring from--and are parts
of--Brahman. This would in no way involve duality or plurality being
unreal in /S/a@nkara's sense, not any more than, for instance, the modes
of Spinoza are unreal because, according to that philosopher, there is
only one universal substance. And with regard to the clause 'the Self
thinks as it were' it has to be noted that according to the commentators
the 'as it were' is meant to indicate that truly not the Self is
thinking, but the upadhis, i.e. especially the manas with which the Self
is connected. But whether these upadhis are the mere offspring of Mâyâ,
as /S/a@nkara thinks, or real forms of existence, as Râmânuja teaches,
is an altogether different question.

I do not wish, however, to urge these last observations, and am ready to
admit that not impossibly those iva's indicate that the thought of the
writer who employed them was darkly labouring with a conception akin
to--although much less explicit than--the Mâyâ of /S/a@nkara. But what I
object to is, that conclusions drawn from a few passages of, after all,
doubtful import should be employed for introducing the Mâyâ doctrine
into other passages which do not even hint at it, and are fully
intelligible without it.[28]

The last important point in the teaching of the Upanishads we have to
touch upon is the relation of the jîvas, the individual souls to the
highest Self. The special views regarding that point held by /S/a@nkara
and Râmânuja, as have been stated before. Confronting their theories
with the texts of the Upanishads we must, I think, admit without
hesitation, that /S/a@nkara's doctrine faithfully represents the
prevailing teaching of the Upanishads in one important point at least,
viz. therein that the soul or Self of the sage--whatever its original
relation to Brahman may be--is in the end completely merged and
indistinguishably lost in the universal Self. A distinction, repeatedly
alluded to before, has indeed to be kept in view here also. Certain
texts of the Upanishads describe the soul's going upwards, on the path
of the gods, to the world of Brahman, where it dwells for unnumbered
years, i.e. for ever. Those texts, as a type of which we may take, the
passage Kaushît. Up. I--the fundamental text of the Râmânujas concerning
the soul's fate after death--belong to an earlier stage of philosophic
development; they manifestly ascribe to the soul a continued individual
existence. But mixed with texts of this class there are others in which
the final absolute identification of the individual Self with the
universal Self is indicated in terms of unmistakable plainness. 'He who
knows Brahman and becomes Brahman;' 'he who knows Brahman becomes all
this;' 'as the flowing rivers disappear in the sea losing their name and
form, thus a wise man goes to the divine person.' And if we look to the
whole, to the prevailing spirit of the Upanishads, we may call the
doctrine embodied in passages of the latter nature the doctrine of the
Upanishads. It is, moreover, supported by the frequently and clearly
stated theory of the individual souls being merged in Brahman in the
state of deep dreamless sleep.

It is much more difficult to indicate the precise teaching of the
Upanishads concerning the original relation of the individual soul to
the highest Self, although there can be no doubt that it has to be
viewed as proceeding from the latter, and somehow forming a part of it.
Negatively we are entitled to say that the doctrine, according to which
the soul is merely brahma bhrântam or brahma mayopadhikam, is in no way
countenanced by the majority of the passages bearing on the question. If
the emission of the elements, described in the Chândogya and referred to
above, is a real process--of which we saw no reason to doubt--the jîva
âtman with which the highest Self enters into the emitted elements is
equally real, a true part or emanation of Brahman itself.

After having in this way shortly reviewed the chief elements of Vedântic
doctrine according to the Upanishads, we may briefly consider
/S/a@nkara's system and mode of interpretation--with whose details we
had frequent opportunities of finding fault--as a whole. It has been
said before that the task of reducing the teaching of the whole of the
Upanishads to a system consistent and free from contradictions is an
intrinsically impossible one. But the task once being given, we are
quite ready to admit that /S/a@nkara's system is most probably the best
which can be devised. While unable to allow that the Upanishads
recognise a lower and higher knowledge of Brahman, in fact the
distinction of a lower and higher Brahman, we yet acknowledge that the
adoption of that distinction furnishes the interpreter with an
instrument of extraordinary power for reducing to an orderly whole the
heterogeneous material presented by the old theosophic treatises. This
becomes very manifest as soon as we compare /S/a@nkara's system with
that of Râmânuja. The latter recognises only one Brahman which is, as we
should say, a personal God, and he therefore lays stress on all those
passages of the Upanishads which ascribe to Brahman the attributes of a
personal God, such as omniscience and omnipotence. Those passages, on
the other hand, whose decided tendency it is to represent Brahman as
transcending all qualities, as one undifferenced mass of impersonal
intelligence, Râmânuja is unable to accept frankly and fairly, and has
to misinterpret them more or less to make them fall in with his system.
The same remark holds good with regard to those texts which represent
the individual soul as finally identifying itself with Brahman; Râmânuja
cannot allow a complete identification but merely an assimilation
carried as far as possible. /S/a@nkara, on the other hand, by skilfully
ringing the changes on a higher and a lower doctrine, somehow manages to
find room for whatever the Upanishads have to say. Where the text speaks
of Brahman as transcending all attributes, the highest doctrine is set
forth. Where Brahman is called the All-knowing ruler of the world, the
author means to propound the lower knowledge of the Lord only. And where
the legends about the primary being and its way of creating the world
become somewhat crude and gross, Hira/n/yagarbha and Virâj are summoned
forth and charged with the responsibility. Of Virâj Mr. Gough remarks
(p. 55) that in him a place is provided by the poets of the Upanishads
for the purusha of the ancient /ri/shis, the divine being out of whom
the visible and tangible world proceeded. This is quite true if only we
substitute for the 'poets of the Upanishads' the framers of the orthodox
Vedânta system--for the Upanishads give no indication whatever that by
their purusha they understand not the simple old purusha but the Virâj
occupying a definite position in a highly elaborate system;--but the
mere phrase, 'providing a place' intimates with sufficient clearness the
nature of the work in which systematisers of the Vedântic doctrine are
engaged.

/S/a@nkara's method thus enables him in a certain way to do justice to
different stages of historical development, to recognise clearly
existing differences which other systematisers are intent on
obliterating. And there has yet to be made a further and even more
important admission in favour of his system. It is not only more
pliable, more capable of amalgamating heterogeneous material than other
systems, but its fundamental doctrines are manifestly in greater harmony
with the essential teaching of the Upanishads than those of other
Vedântic systems. Above we were unable to allow that the distinction
made by /S/a@nkara between Brahman and Î/s/vara is known to the
Upanishads; but we must now admit that if, for the purpose of
determining the nature of the highest being, a choice has to be made
between those texts which represent Brahman as nirgu/n/a, and those
which ascribe to it personal attributes, /S/a@nkara is right in giving
preference to texts of the former kind. The Brahman of the old
Upanishads, from which the souls spring to enjoy individual
consciousness in their waking state, and into which they sink back
temporarily in the state of deep dreamless sleep and permanently in
death, is certainly not represented adequately by the strictly personal
Î/s/vara of Râmânuja, who rules the world in wisdom and mercy. The older
Upanishads, at any rate, lay very little stress upon personal attributes
of their highest being, and hence /S/a@nkara is right in so far as he
assigns to his hypostatised personal Î/s/vara[29] a lower place than to
his absolute Brahman. That he also faithfully represents the prevailing
spirit of the Upanishads in his theory of the ultimate fate of the soul,
we have already remarked above. And although the Mâyâ doctrine cannot,
in my opinion, be said to form part of the teaching of the Upanishads,
it cannot yet be asserted to contradict it openly, because the very
point which it is meant to elucidate, viz. the mode in which the
physical universe and the multiplicity of individual souls originate, is
left by the Upanishads very much in the dark. The later growth of the
Mâyâ doctrine on the basis of the Upanishads is therefore quite
intelligible, and I fully agree with Mr. Gough when he says regarding it
that there has been no addition to the system from without but only a
development from within, no graft but only growth. The lines of thought
which finally led to the elaboration of the full-blown Mâyâ theory may
be traced with considerable certainty. In the first place, deepening
speculation on Brahman tended to the notion of advaita being taken in a
more and more strict sense, as implying not only the exclusion of any
second principle external to Brahman, but also the absence of any
elements of duality or plurality in the nature of the one universal
being itself; a tendency agreeing with the spirit of a certain set of
texts from the Upanishads. And as the fact of the appearance of a
manifold world cannot be denied, the only way open to thoroughly
consistent speculation was to deny at any rate its reality, and to call
it a mere illusion due to an unreal principle, with which Brahman is
indeed associated, but which is unable to break the unity of Brahman's
nature just on account of its own unreality. And, in the second place, a
more thorough following out of the conception that the union with
Brahman is to be reached through true knowledge only, not unnaturally
led to the conclusion that what separates us in our unenlightened state
from Brahman is such as to allow itself to be completely sublated by an
act of knowledge; is, in other words, nothing else but an erroneous
notion, an illusion.--A further circumstance which may not impossibly
have co-operated to further the development of the theory of the world's
unreality will be referred to later on.[30]

We have above been obliged to leave it an open question what kind of
Vedânta is represented by the Vedânta-sûtras, although reason was shown
for the supposition that in some important points their teaching is more
closely related to the system of Râmânuja than to that of /S/a@nkara. If
so, the philosophy of /S/a@nkara would on the whole stand nearer to the
teaching of the Upanishads than the Sûtras of Bâdarâya/n/a. This would
indeed be a somewhat unexpected conclusion--for, judging a priori, we
should be more inclined to assume a direct propagation of the true
doctrine of the Upanishads through Bâdarâya/n/a to /S/a@nkara--but a
priori considerations have of course no weight against positive evidence
to the contrary. There are, moreover, other facts in the history of
Indian philosophy and theology which help us better to appreciate the
possibility of Bâdarâya/n/a's Sûtras already setting forth a doctrine
that lays greater stress on the personal character of the highest being
than is in agreement with the prevailing tendency of the Upanishads.
That the pure doctrine of those ancient Brahminical treatises underwent
at a rather early period amalgamations with beliefs which most probably
had sprung up in altogether different--priestly or
non-priestly--communities is a well-known circumstance; it suffices for
our purposes to refer to the most eminent of the early literary
monuments in which an amalgamation of the kind mentioned is observable,
viz. the Bhagavadgîtâ. The doctrine of the Bhagavadgîtâ represents a
fusion of the Brahman theory of the Upanishads with the belief in a
personal highest being--K/ri/sh/n/a or Vish/n/u--which in many respects
approximates very closely to the system of the Bhâgavatas; the attempts
of a certain set of Indian commentators to explain it as setting forth
pure Vedânta, i.e. the pure doctrine of the Upanishads, may simply be
set aside. But this same Bhagavadgîtâ is quoted in Bâdarâya/n/a's Sûtras
(at least according to the unanimous explanations of the most eminent
scholiasts of different schools) as inferior to /S/ruti only in
authority. The Sûtras, moreover, refer in different places to certain
Vedântic portions of the Mahâbhârata, especially the twelfth book,
several of which represent forms of Vedânta distinctly differing from
/S/a@nkara's teaching, and closely related to the system of the
Bhâgavatas.

Facts of this nature--from entering into the details of which we are
prevented by want of space--tend to mitigate the primâ facie strangeness
of the assumption that the Vedânta-sûtras, which occupy an intermediate
position between the Upanishads and /S/a@nkara, should yet diverge in
their teaching from both. The Vedânta of Gau/d/apâda and /S/a@nkara
would in that case mark a strictly orthodox reaction against all
combinations of non-Vedic elements of belief and doctrine with the
teaching of the Upanishads. But although this form of doctrine has ever
since /S/a@nkara's time been the one most generally accepted by
Brahminic students of philosophy, it has never had any wide-reaching
influence on the masses of India. It is too little in sympathy with the
wants of the human heart, which, after all, are not so very different in
India from what they are elsewhere. Comparatively few, even in India,
are those who rejoice in the idea of a universal non-personal essence in
which their own individuality is to be merged and lost for ever, who
think it sweet 'to be wrecked on the ocean of the Infinite.'[31] The
only forms of Vedântic philosophy which are--and can at any time have
been--really popular, are those in which the Brahman of the Upanishads
has somehow transformed itself into a being, between which and the
devotee there can exist a personal relation, love and faith on the part
of man, justice tempered by mercy on the part of the divinity. The only
religious books of widespread influence are such as the Râmâyan of
Tulsidâs, which lay no stress on the distinction between an absolute
Brahman inaccessible to all human wants and sympathies, and a shadowy
Lord whose very conception depends on the illusory principle of Mâyâ,
but love to dwell on the delights of devotion to one all-wise and
merciful ruler, who is able and willing to lend a gracious ear to the
supplication of the worshipper.

       *       *       *       *       *

The present translation of the Vedânta-sûtras does not aim at rendering
that sense which their author may have aimed at conveying, but strictly
follows /S/a@nkara's interpretation. The question as to how far the
latter agrees with the views held by Bâdarâya/n/a has been discussed
above, with the result that for the present it must, on the whole, be
left an open one. In any case it would not be feasible to combine a
translation of /S/a@nkara's commentary with an independent version of
the Sûtras which it explains. Similar considerations have determined the
method followed in rendering the passages of the Upanishads referred to
in the Sûtras and discussed at length by /S/a@nkara. There also the
views of the commentator have to be followed closely; otherwise much of
the comment would appear devoid of meaning. Hence, while of course
following on the whole the critical translation published by Professor
Max Müller in the earlier volumes of this Series, I had, in a not
inconsiderable number of cases, to modify it so as to render
intelligible /S/a@nkara's explanations and reasonings. I hope to find
space in the introduction to the second volume of this translation for
making some general remarks on the method to be followed in translating
the Upanishads.

I regret that want of space has prevented me from extracting fuller
notes from later scholiasts. The notes given are based, most of them, on
the /t/îkâs composed by Ânandagiri and Govindânanda (the former of which
is unpublished as yet, so far as I know), and on the Bhâmatî.

My best thanks are due to Pa/nd/its Râma Mi/s/ra /S/âstrin and
Ga@ngâdhara /S/âstrin of the Benares Sanskrit College, whom I have
consulted on several difficult passages. Greater still are my
obligations to Pa/nd/it Ke/s/ava /S/âstrin, of the same institution, who
most kindly undertook to read a proof of the whole of the present
volume, and whose advice has enabled me to render my version of more
than one passage more definite or correct.

Notes:

[Footnote 19: Nanu vidusho z pi setikartavyatâkopâsananirv/ri/ttaye
v/ri/shyannâdiphalânîsh/t/âny eva katha/m/ teshâ/m/ virodhâd vinâ/s/a
u/k/yate. Tatrâha pâte tv iti. /S/arîrapâte tu teshâ/m/ vinâ/s/a/h/
/s/arîrapâtâd ûrdhv/m/ tu vidyânugu/n/ad/ri/sh/t/aphalâni suk/ri/tâni
na/s/yantîty artha/h/.]

[Footnote 20: Upalabhyate hi devayânena panthâ ga/kkh/ato vidushas tam
pratibrûuyât satyam brûyâd iti /k/andramasâ sa/m/vâdava/k/anena
/s/arîrasadbhâva/h/, ata/h/ sûkshma/s/arîram anuvartate.]

[Footnote 21: When the jîva has passed out of the body and ascends to
the world of Brahman, it remains enveloped by the subtle body until it
reaches the river Vijarâ. There it divests itself of the subtle body,
and the latter is merged in Brahman.].

[Footnote 22: Kim aya/m/ para/m/, yotir upasampanna/h/
saivabandhavinirmukta/h/ pratyagatma svatmana/m/ paramâtmana/h/
p/rit/hagbhutam anubhavati uta tatprahâratayâ tadavibhaktam iti visnye
so, /s/nate sarvân kamân saha brahma/n/â vipas/k/itâ pasya/h/ pasyate
rukmavar/n/a/m/ kartaram ìsa/m/ purusha/m/ brahmayoni/m/ tadâ vidvin
pu/n/yapape vidhuya nirañgana/h/ parama/m/ sâmyam upaiti ida/m/ jñanam
upasritya mama sâdharinyam âgata/h/ sarve, punopajâyante pralayena
vyathanti /k/etyadysruysm/nt/ibhyo muktasta pare/n/a
sâhityasâmyasádharmyâvagamât p/ri/thagbhutam anubhavatîu prâpte
u/k/yate. Avibhâgeneti. Parasmâd brahmana/h/ svatmanam
avibhâgenânubhavati mukta/h/. Kuta/h/. D/ri/shtatvât. Para/m/
brahmopasampadya niv/ri/ttavidyânrodhanasya yathâtathyena svâtamano
d/ri/sh/ta/tvât. Svatmana/h/ ssvarûpa/m/ hi tat tvam asy ayam âtmâ
brahma aitadâtmyam ida/m/ sarva/m/ sarva/m/ khalv ida/m/
brahnetyâdisâmânâdhikara/n/yanirdesai/h/ ya âtmani tishtan atmano ntaro
yam âtmâ na veda yastatmâ sarîra/m/ ya âtmânam antaro yamayati
âtmântaryamy am/ri/tah anta/h/ pravishta/h/ sâstâ anânâm ityâdibhis /k/a
paramatmâtmaka/m/ ta/kk/harîtatayâ tatprakâtabhûtam iti pratipâditam
avashitei iti kasak/ri/stnety atrâto vibhagenaha/m/ brahmâsmîty
cvanubhavati.]

[Footnote 23: /S/a@nkara's favourite illustrative instance of the
magician producing illusive sights is--significantly enough--not known
to the Sûtras.]

[Footnote 24: Cp. Gough's Philosophy of the Upanishads, pp. 240 ff.]

[Footnote 25: It is well known that, with the exception of the
/S/vitâsvatara and Maitrâyanîya, none of the chief Upanishads exhibits
the word 'mâyâ.' The term indeed occurs in one place in the
B/ri/hadâra/n/yaka; but that passage is a quotation from the /Ri/k
Sa/m/bitâ in which mâyâ means 'creative power.' Cp. P. Régnaud, La Mâyâ,
in the Revue de l'Histoire des Religions, tome xii, No. 3, 1885.]

[Footnote 26: As is demonstrated very satisfactorily by Râmânuja.]

[Footnote 27: Gough, Philosophy of the Upanishads pp. 213 ff.]

[Footnote 28: I cannot discuss in this place the Mâyâ passages of the
Svetâsvatara and the Maitrâyanîya Upanishads. Reasons which want of
space prevents me from setting forth in detail induce me to believe that
neither of those two treatises deserves to be considered by us when
wishing to ascertain the true immixed doctrine of the Upanishads.]

[Footnote 29: The Î/s/vara who allots to the individual souls their new
forms of embodiment in strict accordance with their merit or demerit
cannot be called anything else but a personal God. That this personal
conscious being is at the same time identified with the totality of the
individual souls in the unconscious state of deep dreamless sleep, is
one of those extraordinary contradictions which thorough-going
systematisers of Vedântic doctrine are apparently unable to avoid
altogether.]

[Footnote 30: That section of the introduction in which the point
referred to in the text is touched upon will I hope form part of the
second volume of the translation. The same remark applies to a point
concerning which further information had been promised above on page v.]

[Footnote 31:

  Così tra questa
  Immensità s'annega il pensier mio,
  E il naufrago m' e dolce in qnesto mare.
  LEOPARDI.
]




VEDÂNTA-SÛTRAS

WITH

/S/A@NKARA BHÂSHYA.

/S/A@NKARA'S INTRODUCTION


FIRST ADHYÂYA.

FIRST PÂDA.


REVERENCE TO THE AUGUST VÂSUDEVA!

It is a matter not requiring any proof that the object and the
subject[32] whose respective spheres are the notion of the 'Thou' (the
Non-Ego[33]) and the 'Ego,' and which are opposed to each other as much
as darkness and light are, cannot be identified. All the less can their
respective attributes be identified. Hence it follows that it is wrong
to superimpose[34] upon the subject--whose Self is intelligence, and
which has for its sphere the notion of the Ego--the object whose sphere
is the notion of the Non-Ego, and the attributes of the object, and
_vice versâ_ to superimpose the subject and the attributes of the
subject on the object. In spite of this it is on the part of man a
natural[35] procedure--which which has its cause in wrong knowledge--not
to distinguish the two entities (object and subject) and their
respective attributes, although they are absolutely distinct, but to
superimpose upon each the characteristic nature and the attributes of
the other, and thus, coupling the Real and the Unreal[36], to make use
of expressions such as 'That am I,' 'That is mine.[37]'--But what have
we to understand by the term 'superimposition?'--The apparent
presentation, in the form of remembrance, to consciousness of something
previously observed, in some other thing.[38]

Some indeed define the term 'superimposition' as the superimposition of
the attributes of one thing on another thing.[39] Others, again, define
superimposition as the error founded on the non-apprehension of the
difference of that which is superimposed from that on which it is
superimposed.[40] Others[41], again, define it as the fictitious
assumption of attributes contrary to the nature of that thing on which
something else is superimposed. But all these definitions agree in so
far as they represent superimposition as the apparent presentation of
the attributes of one thing in another thing. And therewith agrees also
the popular view which is exemplified by expressions such as the
following: 'Mother-of-pearl appears like silver,' 'The moon although one
only appears as if she were double.' But how is it possible that on the
interior Self which itself is not an object there should be superimposed
objects and their attributes? For every one superimposes an object only
on such other objects as are placed before him (i.e. in contact with his
sense-organs), and you have said before that the interior Self which is
entirely disconnected from the idea of the Thou (the Non-Ego) is never
an object. It is not, we reply, non-object in the absolute sense. For it
is the object of the notion of the Ego[42], and the interior Self is
well known to exist on account of its immediate (intuitive)
presentation.[43] Nor is it an exceptionless rule that objects can be
superimposed only on such other objects as are before us, i.e. in
contact with our sense-organs; for non-discerning men superimpose on the
ether, which is not the object of sensuous perception, dark-blue colour.

Hence it follows that the assumption of the Non-Self being superimposed
on the interior Self is not unreasonable.

This superimposition thus defined, learned men consider to be Nescience
(avidyâ), and the ascertainment of the true nature of that which is (the
Self) by means of the discrimination of that (which is superimposed on
the Self), they call knowledge (vidyâ). There being such knowledge
(neither the Self nor the Non-Self) are affected in the least by any
blemish or (good) quality produced by their mutual superimposition[44].
The mutual superimposition of the Self and the Non-Self, which is termed
Nescience, is the presupposition on which there base all the practical
distinctions--those made in ordinary life as well as those laid down by
the Veda--between means of knowledge, objects of knowledge (and knowing
persons), and all scriptural texts, whether they are concerned with
injunctions and prohibitions (of meritorious and non-meritorious
actions), or with final release[45].--But how can the means of right
knowledge such as perception, inference, &c., and scriptural texts have
for their object that which is dependent on Nescience[46]?--Because, we
reply, the means of right knowledge cannot operate unless there be a
knowing personality, and because the existence of the latter depends on
the erroneous notion that the body, the senses, and so on, are identical
with, or belong to, the Self of the knowing person. For without the
employment of the senses, perception and the other means of right
knowledge cannot operate. And without a basis (i.e. the body[47]) the
senses cannot act. Nor does anybody act by means of a body on which the
nature of the Self is not superimposed[48]. Nor can, in the absence of
all that[49], the Self which, in its own nature is free from all
contact, become a knowing agent. And if there is no knowing agent, the
means of right knowledge cannot operate (as said above). Hence
perception and the other means of right knowledge, and the Vedic texts
have for their object that which is dependent on Nescience. (That human
cognitional activity has for its presupposition the superimposition
described above), follows also from the non-difference in that respect
of men from animals. Animals, when sounds or other sensible qualities
affect their sense of hearing or other senses, recede or advance
according as the idea derived from the sensation is a comforting or
disquieting one. A cow, for instance, when she sees a man approaching
with a raised stick in his hand, thinks that he wants to beat her, and
therefore moves away; while she walks up to a man who advances with some
fresh grass in his hand. Thus men also--who possess a higher
intelligence--run away when they see strong fierce-looking fellows
drawing near with shouts and brandishing swords; while they confidently
approach persons of contrary appearance and behaviour. We thus see that
men and animals follow the same course of procedure with reference to
the means and objects of knowledge. Now it is well known that the
procedure of animals bases on the non-distinction (of Self and
Non-Self); we therefore conclude that, as they present the same
appearances, men also--although distinguished by superior
intelligence--proceed with regard to perception and so on, in the same
way as animals do; as long, that is to say, as the mutual
superimposition of Self and Non-Self lasts. With reference again to that
kind of activity which is founded on the Veda (sacrifices and the like),
it is true indeed that the reflecting man who is qualified to enter on
it, does so not without knowing that the Self has a relation to another
world; yet that qualification does not depend on the knowledge,
derivable from the Vedânta-texts, of the true nature of the Self as free
from all wants, raised above the distinctions of the Brâhma/n/a and
Kshattriya-classes and so on, transcending transmigratory existence. For
such knowledge is useless and even contradictory to the claim (on the
part of sacrificers, &c. to perform certain actions and enjoy their
fruits). And before such knowledge of the Self has arisen, the Vedic
texts continue in their operation, to have for their object that which
is dependent on Nescience. For such texts as the following, 'A
Brâhma/n/a is to sacrifice,' are operative only on the supposition that
on the Self are superimposed particular conditions such as caste, stage
of life, age, outward circumstances, and so on. That by superimposition
we have to understand the notion of something in some other thing we
have already explained. (The superimposition of the Non-Self will be
understood more definitely from the following examples.) Extra-personal
attributes are superimposed on the Self, if a man considers himself
sound and entire, or the contrary, as long as his wife, children, and so
on are sound and entire or not. Attributes of the body are superimposed
on the Self, if a man thinks of himself (his Self) as stout, lean, fair,
as standing, walking, or jumping. Attributes of the sense-organs, if he
thinks 'I am mute, or deaf, or one-eyed, or blind.' Attributes of the
internal organ when he considers himself subject to desire, intention,
doubt, determination, and so on. Thus the producer of the notion of the
Ego (i.e. the internal organ) is superimposed on the interior Self,
which, in reality, is the witness of all the modifications of the
internal organ, and vice versá the interior Self, which is the witness
of everything, is superimposed on the internal organ, the senses, and so
on. In this way there goes on this natural beginning--and endless
superimposition, which appears in the form of wrong conception, is the
cause of individual souls appearing as agents and enjoyers (of the
results of their actions), and is observed by every one.

With a view to freeing one's self from that wrong notion which is the
cause of all evil and attaining thereby the knowledge of the absolute
unity of the Self the study of the Vedânta-texts is begun. That all the
Vedânta-texts have the mentioned purport we shall show in this so-called
/S/âriraka-mîmâ/m/sâ.[50]

Of this Vedânta-mîmâ/m/sâ about to be explained by us the first Sûtra is
as follows.

1. Then therefore the enquiry into Brahman.

The word 'then' is here to be taken as denoting immediate consecution;
not as indicating the introduction of a new subject to be entered upon;
for the enquiry into Brahman (more literally, the desire of knowing
Brahman) is not of that nature[51]. Nor has the word 'then' the sense of
auspiciousness (or blessing); for a word of that meaning could not be
properly construed as a part of the sentence. The word 'then' rather
acts as an auspicious term by being pronounced and heard merely, while
it denotes at the same time something else, viz. immediate consecution
as said above. That the latter is its meaning follows moreover from the
circumstance that the relation in which the result stands to the
previous topic (viewed as the cause of the result) is non-separate from
the relation of immediate consecution.[52]

If, then, the word 'then' intimates immediate consecution it must be
explained on what antecedent the enquiry into Brahman specially depends;
just as the enquiry into active religious duty (which forms the subject
of the Pûrvâ Mîmâ/m/sâ) specially depends on the antecedent reading of
the Veda. The reading of the Veda indeed is the common antecedent (for
those who wish to enter on an enquiry into religious duty as well as for
those desirous of knowing Brahman). The special question with regard to
the enquiry into Brahman is whether it presupposes as its antecedent the
understanding of the acts of religious duty (which is acquired by means
of the Pûrvâ Mîmâ/m/sâ). To this question we reply in the negative,
because for a man who has read the Vedânta-parts of the Veda it is
possible to enter on the enquiry into Brahman even before engaging in
the enquiry into religious duty. Nor is it the purport of the word
'then' to indicate order of succession; a purport which it serves in
other passages, as, for instance, in the one enjoining the cutting off
of pieces from the heart and other parts of the sacrificial animal.[53]
(For the intimation of order of succession could be intended only if the
agent in both cases were the same; but this is not the case), because
there is no proof for assuming the enquiry into religious duty and the
enquiry into Brahman to stand in the relation of principal and
subordinate matter or the relation of qualification (for a certain act)
on the part of the person qualified[54]; and because the result as well
as the object of the enquiry differs in the two cases. The knowledge of
active religious duty has for its fruit transitory felicity, and that
again depends on the performance of religious acts. The enquiry into
Brahman, on the other hand, has for its fruit eternal bliss, and does
not depend on the performance of any acts. Acts of religious duty do not
yet exist at the time when they are enquired into, but are something to
be accomplished (in the future); for they depend on the activity of man.
In the Brahma-mîmá/m/sâ, on the other hand, the object of enquiry, i.e.
Brahman, is something already accomplished (existent),--for it is
eternal,--and does not depend on human energy. The two enquiries differ
moreover in so far as the operation of their respective fundamental
texts is concerned. For the fundamental texts on which active religious
duty depends convey information to man in so far only as they enjoin on
him their own particular subjects (sacrifices, &c.); while the
fundamental texts about Brahman merely instruct man, without laying on
him the injunction of being instructed, instruction being their
immediate result. The case is analogous to that of the information
regarding objects of sense which ensues as soon as the objects are
approximated to the senses. It therefore is requisite that something
should be stated subsequent to which the enquiry into Brahman is
proposed.--Well, then, we maintain that the antecedent conditions are
the discrimination of what is eternal and what is non-eternal; the
renunciation of all desire to enjoy the fruit (of one's actions) both
here and hereafter; the acquirement of tranquillity, self-restraint, and
the other means[55], and the desire of final release. If these
conditions exist, a man may, either before entering on an enquiry into
active religious duty or after that, engage in the enquiry into Brahman
and come to know it; but not otherwise. The word 'then' therefore
intimates that the enquiry into Brahman is subsequent to the acquisition
of the above-mentioned (spiritual) means.

The word 'therefore' intimates a reason. Because the Veda, while
declaring that the fruit of the agnihotra and similar performances which
are means of happiness is non-eternal (as, for instance. Ch. Up. VIII,
1, 6, 'As here on earth whatever has been acquired by action perishes so
perishes in the next world whatever is acquired by acts of religious
duty'), teaches at the same time that the highest aim of man is realised
by the knowledge of Brahman (as, for instance, Taitt. Up. II, 1, 'He who
knows Brahman attains the highest'); therefore the enquiry into Brahman
is to be undertaken subsequently to the acquirement of the mentioned
means.

By Brahman is to be understood that the definition of which will be
given in the next Sûtra (I, 1, 2); it is therefore not to be supposed
that the word Brahman may here denote something else, as, for instance,
the brahminical caste. In the Sûtra the genitive case ('of Brahman;' the
literal translation of the Sûtra being 'then therefore the desire of
knowledge of Brahman') denotes the object, not something generally
supplementary (/s/esha[56]); for the desire of knowledge demands an
object of desire and no other such object is stated.--But why should not
the genitive case be taken as expressing the general complementary
relation (to express which is its proper office)? Even in that case it
might constitute the object of the desire of knowledge, since the
general relation may base itself on the more particular one.--This
assumption, we reply, would mean that we refuse to take Brahman as the
direct object, and then again indirectly introduce it as the object; an
altogether needless procedure.--Not needless; for if we explain the
words of the Sûtra to mean 'the desire of knowledge connected with
Brahman' we thereby virtually promise that also all the heads of
discussion which bear on Brahman will be treated.--This reason also, we
reply, is not strong enough to uphold your interpretation. For the
statement of some principal matter already implies all the secondary
matters connected therewith. Hence if Brahman, the most eminent of all
objects of knowledge, is mentioned, this implies already all those
objects of enquiry which the enquiry into Brahman presupposes, and those
objects need therefore not be mentioned, especially in the Sûtra.
Analogously the sentence 'there the king is going' implicitly means that
the king together with his retinue is going there. Our interpretation
(according to which the Sûtra represents Brahman as the direct object of
knowledge) moreover agrees with Scripture, which directly represents
Brahman as the object of the desire of knowledge; compare, for instance,
the passage, 'That from whence these beings are born, &c., desire to
know that. That is Brahman' (Taitt. Up. III, 1). With passages of this
kind the Sûtra only agrees if the genitive case is taken to denote the
object. Hence we do take it in that sense. The object of the desire is
the knowledge of Brahman up to its complete comprehension, desires
having reference to results[57]. Knowledge thus constitutes the means by
which the complete comprehension of Brahman is desired to be obtained.
For the complete comprehension of Brahman is the highest end of man,
since it destroys the root of all evil such as Nescience, the seed of
the entire Sa/m/sâra. Hence the desire of knowing Brahman is to be
entertained.

But, it may be asked, is Brahman known or not known (previously to the
enquiry into its nature)? If it is known we need not enter on an enquiry
concerning it; if it is not known we can not enter on such an enquiry.

We reply that Brahman is known. Brahman, which is all-knowing and
endowed with all powers, whose essential nature is eternal purity,
intelligence, and freedom, exists. For if we consider the derivation of
the word 'Brahman,' from the root b/ri/h, 'to be great,' we at once
understand that eternal purity, and so on, belong to Brahman[58].
Moreover the existence of Brahman is known on the ground of its being
the Self of every one. For every one is conscious of the existence of
(his) Self, and never thinks 'I am not.' If the existence of the Self
were not known, every one would think 'I am not.' And this Self (of
whose existence all are conscious) is Brahman. But if Brahman is
generally known as the Self, there is no room for an enquiry into it!
Not so, we reply; for there is a conflict of opinions as to its special
nature. Unlearned people and the Lokâyatikas are of opinion that the
mere body endowed with the quality of intelligence is the Self; others
that the organs endowed with intelligence are the Self; others maintain
that the internal organ is the Self; others, again, that the Self is a
mere momentary idea; others, again, that it is the Void. Others, again
(to proceed to the opinion of such as acknowledge the authority of the
Veda), maintain that there is a transmigrating being different from the
body, and so on, which is both agent and enjoyer (of the fruits of
action); others teach that that being is enjoying only, not acting;
others believe that in addition to the individual souls, there is an
all-knowing, all-powerful Lord[59]. Others, finally, (i.e. the
Vedântins) maintain that the Lord is the Self of the enjoyer (i.e. of
the individual soul whose individual existence is apparent only, the
product of Nescience).

Thus there are many various opinions, basing part of them on sound
arguments and scriptural texts, part of them on fallacious arguments and
scriptural texts misunderstood[60]. If therefore a man would embrace
some one of these opinions without previous consideration, he would bar
himself from the highest beatitude and incur grievous loss. For this
reason the first Sûtra proposes, under the designation of an enquiry
into Brahman, a disquisition of the Vedânta-texts, to be carried on with
the help of conformable arguments, and having for its aim the highest
beatitude.

So far it has been said that Brahman is to be enquired into. The
question now arises what the characteristics of that Brahman are, and
the reverend author of the Sûtras therefore propounds the following
aphorism.

2. (Brahman is that) from which the origin, &c. (i.e. the origin,
subsistence, and dissolution) of this (world proceed).

The term, &c. implies subsistence and re-absorption. That the origin is
mentioned first (of the three) depends on the declaration of Scripture
as well as on the natural development of a substance. Scripture declares
the order of succession of origin, subsistence, and dissolution in the
passage, Taitt. Up. III, 1, 'From whence these beings are born,' &c. And
with regard to the second reason stated, it is known that a substrate of
qualities can subsist and be dissolved only after it has entered,
through origination, on the state of existence. The words 'of this'
denote that substrate of qualities which is presented to us by
perception and the other means of right knowledge; the genitive case
indicates it to be connected with origin, &c. The words 'from which'
denote the cause. The full sense of the Sûtra therefore is: That
omniscient omnipotent cause from which proceed the origin, subsistence,
and dissolution of this world--which world is differentiated by names
and forms, contains many agents and enjoyers, is the abode of the fruits
of actions, these fruits having their definite places, times, and
causes[61], and the nature of whose arrangement cannot even be conceived
by the mind,--that cause, we say, is Brahman. Since the other forms of
existence (such as increase, decline, &c.) are included in origination,
subsistence, and dissolution, only the three latter are referred to in
the Sûtra. As the six stages of existence enumerated by Yâska[62] are
possible only during the period of the world's subsistence, it
might--were they referred to in the Sûtra--be suspected that what is
meant are not the origin, subsistence, and dissolution (of the world) as
dependent on the first cause. To preclude this suspicion the Sûtra is to
be taken as referring, in addition to the world's origination from
Brahman, only to its subsistence in Brahman, and final dissolution into
Brahman.

The origin, &c. of a world possessing the attributes stated above cannot
possibly proceed from anything else but a Lord possessing the stated
qualities; not either from a non-intelligent prâdhana[63], or from
atoms, or from non-being, or from a being subject to transmigration[64];
nor, again, can it proceed from its own nature (i.e. spontaneously,
without a cause), since we observe that (for the production of effects)
special places, times, and causes have invariably to be employed.

(Some of) those who maintain a Lord to be the cause of the world[65],
think that the existence of a Lord different from mere transmigrating
beings can be inferred by means of the argument stated just now (without
recourse being had to Scripture at all).--But, it might be said, you
yourself in the Sûtra under discussion have merely brought forward the
same argument!--By no means, we reply. The Sûtras (i.e. literally 'the
strings') have merely the purpose of stringing together the flowers of
the Vedânta-passages. In reality the Vedânta-passages referred to by the
Sûtras are discussed here. For the comprehension of Brahman is effected
by the ascertainment, consequent on discussion, of the sense of the
Vedânta-texts, not either by inference or by the other means of right
knowledge. While, however, the Vedânta-passages primarily declare the
cause of the origin, &c., of the world, inference also, being an
instrument of right knowledge in so far as it does not contradict the
Vedânta-texts, is not to be excluded as a means of confirming the
meaning ascertained. Scripture itself, moreover, allows argumentation;
for the passages, B/ri/. Up. II, 4, 5 ('the Self is to be heard, to be
considered'), and Ch. Up. VI, 14, 2 ('as the man, &c., having been
informed, and being able to judge for himself, would arrive at Gandhâra,
in the same way a man who meets with a teacher obtains knowledge'),
declare that human understanding assists Scripture[66].

Scriptural text, &c.[67], are not, in the enquiry into Brahman, the only
means of knowledge, as they are in the enquiry into active duty (i.e. in
the Pûrva Mimâ/m/sâ), but scriptural texts on the one hand, and
intuition[68], &c., on the other hand, are to be had recourse to
according to the occasion: firstly, because intuition is the final
result of the enquiry into Brahman; secondly, because the object of the
enquiry is an existing (accomplished) substance. If the object of the
knowledge of Brahman were something to be accomplished, there would be
no reference to intuition, and text, &c., would be the only means of
knowledge. The origination of something to be accomplished depends,
moreover, on man since any action either of ordinary life, or dependent
on the Veda may either be done or not be done, or be done in a different
way. A man, for instance, may move on either by means of a horse, or by
means of his feet, or by some other means, or not at all. And again (to
quote examples of actions dependent on the Veda), we meet in Scripture
with sentences such as the following: 'At the atirâtra he takes the
sho/d/asin cup,' and 'at the atirâtra he does not take the sho/d/asin
cup;' or, 'he makes the oblation after the sun has risen,' and, 'he
makes the oblation when the sun has not yet risen.' Just as in the
quoted instances, injunctions and prohibitions, allowances of optional
procedure, general rules and exceptions have their place, so they would
have their place with regard to Brahman also (if the latter were a thing
to be accomplished). But the fact is that no option is possible as to
whether a substance is to be thus or thus, is to be or not to be. All
option depends on the notions of man; but the knowledge of the real
nature of a thing does not depend on the notions of man, but only on the
thing itself. For to think with regard to a post, 'this is a post or a
man, or something else,' is not knowledge of truth; the two ideas, 'it
is a man or something else,' being false, and only the third idea, 'it
is a post,' which depends on the thing itself, falling under the head of
true knowledge. Thus true knowledge of all existing things depends on
the things themselves, and hence the knowledge of Brahman also depends
altogether on the thing, i.e. Brahman itself.--But, it might be said, as
Brahman is an existing substance, it will be the object of the other
means of right knowledge also, and from this it follows that a
discussion of the Vedânta-texts is purposeless.--This we deny; for as
Brahman is not an object of the senses, it has no connection with those
other means of knowledge. For the senses have, according to their
nature, only external things for their objects, not Brahman. If Brahman
were an object of the senses, we might perceive that the world is
connected with Brahman as its effect; but as the effect only (i.e. the
world) is perceived, it is impossible to decide (through perception)
whether it is connected with Brahman or something else. Therefore the
Sûtra under discussion is not meant to propound inference (as the means
of knowing Brahman), but rather to set forth a Vedânta-text.--Which,
then, is the Vedânta-text which the Sûtra points at as having to be
considered with reference to the characteristics of Brahman?--It is the
passage Taitt. Up. III, 1, 'Bh/ri/gu Vâru/n/i went to his father
Varu/n/a, saying, Sir, teach me Brahman,' &c., up to 'That from whence
these beings are born, that by which, when born, they live, that into
which they enter at their death, try to know that. That is Brahman.' The
sentence finally determining the sense of this passage is found III, 6:
'From bliss these beings are born; by bliss, when born, they live; into
bliss they enter at their death.' Other passages also are to be adduced
which declare the cause to be the almighty Being, whose essential nature
is eternal purity, intelligence, and freedom.

That Brahman is omniscient we have been made to infer from it being
shown that it is the cause of the world. To confirm this conclusion, the
Sûtrakâra continues as follows:

3. (The omniscience of Brahman follows) from its being the source of
Scripture.

Brahman is the source, i.e. the cause of the great body of Scripture,
consisting of the /Ri/g-veda and other branches, which is supported by
various disciplines (such as grammar, nyâya, purâ/n/a, &c.); which
lamp-like illuminates all things; which is itself all-knowing as it
were. For the origin of a body of Scripture possessing the quality of
omniscience cannot be sought elsewhere but in omniscience itself. It is
generally understood that the man from whom some special body of
doctrine referring to one province of knowledge only originates, as, for
instance, grammar from Pâ/n/ini possesses a more extensive knowledge
than his work, comprehensive though it be; what idea, then, shall we
have to form of the supreme omniscience and omnipotence of that great
Being, which in sport as it were, easily as a man sends forth his
breath, has produced the vast mass of holy texts known as the
/Ri/g-veda, &c., the mine of all knowledge, consisting of manifold
branches, the cause of the distinction of all the different classes and
conditions of gods, animals, and men! See what Scripture says about him,
'The /Ri/g-veda, &c., have been breathed forth from that great Being'
(B/ri/. Up. II, 4, 10).

Or else we may interpret the Sûtra to mean that Scripture consisting of
the /Ri/g-veda, &c., as described above, is the source or cause, i.e.
the means of right knowledge through which we understand the nature of
Brahman. So that the sense would be: through Scripture only as a means
of knowledge Brahman is known to be the cause of the origin, &c., of the
world. The special scriptural passage meant has been quoted under the
preceding Sûtra 'from which these beings are born,' &c.--But as the
preceding Sûtra already has pointed out a text showing that Scripture is
the source of Brahman, of what use then is the present Sûtra?--The words
of the preceding Sûtra, we reply, did not clearly indicate the
scriptural passage, and room was thus left for the suspicion that the
origin, &c., of the world were adduced merely as determining an
inference (independent of Scripture). To obviate this suspicion the
Sûtra under discussion has been propounded.

But, again, how can it be said that Scripture is the means of knowing
Brahman? Since it has been declared that Scripture aims at action
(according to the Pûrva Mîmâ/m/sâ Sûtra I, 2, 1, 'As the purport of
Scripture is action, those scriptural passages whose purport is not
action are purportless'), the Vedânta-passages whose purport is not
action are purportless. Or else if they are to have some sense, they
must either, by manifesting the agent, the divinity or the fruit of the
action, form supplements to the passages enjoining actions, or serve the
purpose of themselves enjoining a new class of actions, such as devout
meditation and the like. For the Veda cannot possibly aim at conveying
information regarding the nature of accomplished substances, since the
latter are the objects of perception and the other means of proof (which
give sufficient information about them; while it is the recognised
object of the Veda to give information about what is not known from
other sources). And if it did give such information, it would not be
connected with things to be desired or shunned, and thus be of no use to
man. For this very reason Vedic passages, such as 'he howled, &c.,'
which at first sight appear purposeless, are shown to have a purpose in
so far as they glorify certain actions (cp. Pû. Mî. Sû. I, 2, 7,
'Because they stand in syntactical connection with the injunctions,
therefore their purport is to glorify the injunctions'). In the same way
mantras are shown to stand in a certain relation to actions, in so far
as they notify the actions themselves and the means by which they are
accomplished. So, for instance, the mantra, 'For strength thee (I cut;'
which accompanies the cutting of a branch employed in the
dar/s/apûr/n/amâsa-sacrifice). In short, no Vedic passage is seen or can
be proved to have a meaning but in so far as it is related to an action.
And injunctions which are defined as having actions for their objects
cannot refer to accomplished existent things. Hence we maintain that the
Vedânta-texts are mere supplements to those passages which enjoin
actions; notifying the agents, divinities, and results connected with
those actions. Or else, if this be not admitted, on the ground of its
involving the introduction of a subject-matter foreign to the
Vedânta-texts (viz. the subject-matter of the Karmakâ/nd/a of the Veda),
we must admit (the second of the two alternatives proposed above viz.)
that the Vedânta-texts refer to devout meditation (upâsanâ) and similar
actions which are mentioned in those very (Vedânta) texts. The result of
all of which is that Scripture is not the source of Brahman.

To this argumentation the Sûtrakâra replies as follows:

4. But that (Brahman is to be known from Scripture), because it is
connected (with the Vedânta-texts) as their purport.

The word 'but' is meant to rebut the pûrva-paksha (the primâ facie view
as urged above). That all-knowing, all-powerful Brahman, which is the
cause of the origin, subsistence, and dissolution of the world, is known
from the Vedânta-part of Scripture. How? Because in all the
Vedânta-texts the sentences construe in so far as they have for their
purport, as they intimate that matter (viz. Brahman). Compare, for
instance, 'Being only this was in the beginning, one, without a second'
(Ch. Up. VI, 2, 1); 'In the beginning all this was Self, one only' (Ait.
Âr. II, 4, 1, 1); 'This is the Brahman without cause and without effect,
without anything inside or outside; this Self is Brahman perceiving
everything' (B/ri/. Up. II, 5, 19); 'That immortal Brahman is before'
(Mu. Up. II, 2, 11); and similar passages. If the words contained in
these passages have once been determined to refer to Brahman, and their
purport is understood thereby, it would be improper to assume them to
have a different sense; for that would involve the fault of abandoning
the direct statements of the text in favour of mere assumptions. Nor can
we conclude the purport of these passages to be the intimation of the
nature of agents, divinities, &c. (connected with acts of religious
duty); for there are certain scriptural passages which preclude all
actions, actors, and fruits, as, for instance, B/ri/. Up. II, 4, 13,
'Then by what should he see whom?' (which passage intimates that there
is neither an agent, nor an object of action, nor an instrument.) Nor
again can Brahman, though it is of the nature of an accomplished thing,
be the object of perception and the other means of knowledge; for the
fact of everything having its Self in Brahman cannot be grasped without
the aid of the scriptural passage 'That art thou' (Ch. Up. VI, 8, 7).
Nor can it rightly be objected that instruction is purportless if not
connected with something either to be striven after or shunned; for from
the mere comprehension of Brahman's Self, which is not something either
to be avoided or endeavoured after, there results cessation of all pain,
and thereby the attainment of man's highest aim. That passages notifying
certain divinities, and so on, stand in subordinate relation to acts of
devout meditation mentioned in the same chapters may readily be
admitted. But it is impossible that Brahman should stand in an analogous
relation to injunctions of devout meditation, for if the knowledge of
absolute unity has once arisen there exists no longer anything to be
desired or avoided, and thereby the conception of duality, according to
which we distinguish actions, agents, and the like, is destroyed. If the
conception of duality is once uprooted by the conception of absolute
unity, it cannot arise again, and so no longer be the cause of Brahman
being looked upon as the complementary object of injunctions of
devotion. Other parts of the Veda may have no authority except in so far
as they are connected with injunctions; still it is impossible to impugn
on that ground the authoritativeness of passages conveying the knowledge
of the Self; for such passages have their own result. Nor, finally, can
the authoritativeness of the Veda be proved by inferential reasoning so
that it would be dependent on instances observed elsewhere. From all
which it follows that the Veda possesses authority as a means of right
knowledge of Brahman.

Here others raise the following objection:--Although the Veda is the
means of gaining a right knowledge of Brahman, yet it intimates Brahman
only as the object of certain injunctions, just as the information which
the Veda gives about the sacrificial post, the âhavanîya-fire and other
objects not known from the practice of common life is merely
supplementary to certain injunctions[69]. Why so? Because the Veda has
the purport of either instigating to action or restraining from it. For
men fully acquainted with the object of the Veda have made the following
declaration, 'The purpose of the Veda is seen to be the injunction of
actions' (Bhâshya on Jaimini Sûtra I, 1, 1); 'Injunction means passages
impelling to action' (Bh. on Jaim. Sû. I, 1, 2); 'Of this (viz. active
religious duty) the knowledge comes from injunction' (part of Jaim. Sû.
I, 1, 5); 'The (words) denoting those (things) are to be connected with
(the injunctive verb of the vidhi-passage) whose purport is action'
(Jaim. Sû. I, 1, 25); 'As action is the purport of the Veda, whatever
does not refer to action is purportless' (Jaim. Sû. I, 2, 1). Therefore
the Veda has a purport in so far only as it rouses the activity of man
with regard to some actions and restrains it with regard to others;
other passages (i.e. all those passages which are not directly
injunctive) have a purport only in so far as they supplement injunctions
and prohibitions. Hence the Vedânta-texts also as likewise belonging to
the Veda can have a meaning in the same way only. And if their aim is
injunction, then just as the agnihotra-oblation and other rites are
enjoined as means for him who is desirous of the heavenly world, so the
knowledge of Brahman is enjoined as a means for him who is desirous of
immortality.--But--somebody might object--it has been declared that
there is a difference in the character of the objects enquired into, the
object of enquiry in the karma-kâ/nd/a (that part of the Veda which
treats of active religious duty) being something to be accomplished,
viz. duty, while here the object is the already existent absolutely
accomplished Brahman. From this it follows that the fruit of the
knowledge of Brahman must be of a different nature from the fruit of the
knowledge of duty which depends on the performance of actions[70].--We
reply that it must not be such because the Vedânta-texts give
information about Brahman only in so far as it is connected with
injunctions of actions. We meet with injunctions of the following kind,
'Verily the Self is to be seen' (B/ri/. Up. II, 4, 5); 'The Self which
is free from sin that it is which we must search out, that it is which
we must try to understand' (Ch. Up. VIII, 7, 1); 'Let a man worship him
as Self' (B/ri/. Up. I, 4, 7); 'Let a man worship the Self only as his
true state' (B/ri/. Up. I, 4, 15); 'He who knows Brahman becomes
Brahman' (Mu. Up. III, 2, 9). These injunctions rouse in us the desire
to know what that Brahman is. It, therefore, is the task of the
Vedânta-texts to set forth Brahman's nature, and they perform that task
by teaching us that Brahman is eternal, all-knowing, absolutely
self-sufficient, ever pure, intelligent and free, pure knowledge,
absolute bliss. From the devout meditation on this Brahman there results
as its fruit, final release, which, although not to be discerned in the
ordinary way, is discerned by means of the /s/âstra. If, on the other
hand, the Vedânta-texts were considered to have no reference to
injunctions of actions, but to contain statements about mere
(accomplished) things, just as if one were saying 'the earth comprises
seven dvipas,' 'that king is marching on,' they would be purportless,
because then they could not possibly be connected with something to be
shunned or endeavoured after.--Perhaps it will here be objected that
sometimes a mere statement about existent things has a purpose, as, for
instance, the affirmation, 'This is a rope, not a snake,' serves the
purpose of removing the fear engendered by an erroneous opinion, and
that so likewise the Vedânta-passages making statements about the
non-transmigrating Self, have a purport of their own (without reference
to any action), viz. in so far as they remove the erroneous opinion of
the Self being liable to transmigration.--We reply that this might be so
if just as the mere hearing of the true nature of the rope dispels the
fear caused by the imagined snake, so the mere hearing of the true
nature of Brahman would dispel the erroneous notion of one's being
subject to transmigration. But this is not the case; for we observe that
even men to whom the true nature of Brahman has been stated continue to
be affected by pleasure, pain, and the other qualities attaching to the
transmigratory condition. Moreover, we see from the passage, /Bri/. Up.
II, 4, 5, 'The Self is to be heard, to be considered, to be reflected
upon,' that consideration and reflection have to follow the mere
hearing. From all this it results that the sâstra can be admitted as a
means of knowing Brahman in so far only as the latter is connected with
injunctions.

To all this, we, the Vedântins, make the following reply:--The preceding
reasoning is not valid, on account of the different nature of the fruits
of actions on the one side, and of the knowledge of Brahman on the other
side. The enquiry into those actions, whether of body, speech, or mind,
which are known from /S/ruti and Sm/ri/ti, and are comprised under the
name 'religious duty' (dharma), is carried on in the Jaimini Sûtra,
which begins with the words 'then therefore the enquiry into duty;' the
opposite of duty also (adharma), such as doing harm, &c., which is
defined in the prohibitory injunctions, forms an object of enquiry to
the end that it may be avoided. The fruits of duty, which is good, and
its opposite, which is evil, both of which are defined by original Vedic
statements, are generally known to be sensible pleasure and pain, which
make themselves felt to body, speech, and mind only, are produced by the
contact of the organs of sense with the objects, and affect all animate
beings from Brahman down to a tuft of grass. Scripture, agreeing with
observation, states that there are differences in the degree of pleasure
of all embodied creatures from men upward to Brahman. From those
differences it is inferred that there are differences in the degrees of
the merit acquired by actions in accordance with religious duty;
therefrom again are inferred differences in degree between those
qualified to perform acts of religious duty. Those latter differences
are moreover known to be affected by the desire of certain results
(which entitles the man so desirous to perform certain religious acts),
worldly possessions, and the like. It is further known from Scripture
that those only who perform sacrifices proceed, in consequence of the
pre-eminence of their knowledge and meditation, on the northern path (of
the sun; Ch. Up. V, 10, 1), while mere minor offerings, works of public
utility and alms, only lead through smoke and the other stages to the
southern path. And that there also (viz. in the moon which is finally
reached by those who have passed along the southern path) there are
degrees of pleasure and the means of pleasure is understood from the
passage 'Having dwelt there till their works are consumed.' Analogously
it is understood that the different degrees of pleasure which are
enjoyed by the embodied creatures, from man downward to the inmates of
hell and to immovable things, are the mere effects of religious merit as
defined in Vedic injunctions. On the other hand, from the different
degrees of pain endured by higher and lower embodied creatures, there is
inferred difference of degree in its cause, viz. religious demerit as
defined in the prohibitory injunctions, and in its agents. This
difference in the degree of pain and pleasure, which has for its
antecedent embodied existence, and for its cause the difference of
degree of merit and demerit of animated beings, liable to faults such as
ignorance and the like, is well known--from /S/ruti, Sm/ri/ti, and
reasoning--to be non-eternal, of a fleeting, changing nature
(sa/m/sâra). The following text, for instance, 'As long as he is in the
body he cannot get free from pleasure and pain' (Ch. Up. VIII, 12, 1),
refers to the sa/m/sâra-state as described above. From the following
passage, on the other hand, 'When he is free from the body then neither
pleasure nor pain touches him,' which denies the touch of pain or
pleasure, we learn that the unembodied state called 'final release'
(moksha) is declared not to be the effect of religious merit as defined
by Vedic injunctions. For if it were the effect of merit it would not be
denied that it is subject to pain and pleasure. Should it be said that
the very circumstance of its being an unembodied state is the effect of
merit, we reply that that cannot be, since Scripture declares that state
to be naturally and originally an unembodied one. 'The wise who knows
the Self as bodiless within the bodies, as unchanging among changing
things, as great and omnipresent does never grieve' (Ka. Up. II, 22);
'He is without breath, without mind, pure' (Mu. Up. II, 1, 2); 'That
person is not attached to anything' (B/ri/. Up. IV, 3, 15)[71]. All
which passages establish the fact that so-called release differs from
all the fruits of action, and is an eternally and essentially
disembodied state. Among eternal things, some indeed may be 'eternal,
although changing' (pari/n/âminitya), viz. those, the idea of whose
identity is not destroyed, although they may undergo changes; such, for
instance, are earth and the other elements in the opinion of those who
maintain the eternity of the world, or the three gu/n/as in the opinion
of the Sâ@nkhyas. But this (moksha) is eternal in the true sense, i.e.
eternal without undergoing any changes (kû/ta/sthanitya), omnipresent as
ether, free from all modifications, absolutely self-sufficient, not
composed of parts, of self-luminous nature. That bodiless entity in
fact, to which merit and demerit with their consequences and threefold
time do not apply, is called release; a definition agreeing with
scriptural passages, such as the following: 'Different from merit and
demerit, different from effect and cause, different from past and
future' (Ka. Up. I, 2, 14). It[72] (i.e. moksha) is, therefore, the same
as Brahman in the enquiry into which we are at present engaged. If
Brahman were represented as supplementary to certain actions, and
release were assumed to be the effect of those actions, it would be
non-eternal, and would have to be considered merely as something holding
a pre-eminent position among the described non-eternal fruits of actions
with their various degrees. But that release is something eternal is
acknowledged by whoever admits it at all, and the teaching concerning
Brahman can therefore not be merely supplementary to actions.

There are, moreover, a number of scriptural passages which declare
release to follow immediately on the cognition of Brahman, and which
thus preclude the possibility of an effect intervening between the two;
for instance, 'He who knows Brahman becomes Brahman' (Mu. Up. III, 2,
9); 'All his works perish when He has been beheld, who is the higher and
the lower' (Mu. Up. II, 2, 8); 'He who knows the bliss of Brahman fears
nothing' (Taitt. Up. II, 9); 'O Janaka, you have indeed reached
fearlessness' (B/ri/. Up. IV, 2, 4); 'That Brahman knew its Self only,
saying, I am Brahman. From it all this sprang' (B/ri/. Up. I, 4, 10);
'What sorrow, what trouble can there be to him who beholds that unity?'
(Îs. Up. 7.) We must likewise quote the passage,--B/ri/. Up. I, 4, 10,
('Seeing this the /Ri/shi Vâmadeva understood: I was Manu, I was the
sun,') in order to exclude the idea of any action taking place between
one's seeing Brahman and becoming one with the universal Self; for that
passage is analogous to the following one, 'standing he sings,' from
which we understand that no action due to the same agent intervenes
between the standing and the singing. Other scriptural passages show
that the removal of the obstacles which lie in the way of release is the
only fruit of the knowledge of Brahman; so, for instance, 'You indeed
are our father, you who carry us from our ignorance to the other shore'
(Pr. Up. VI, 8); 'I have heard from men like you that he who knows the
Self overcomes grief. I am in grief. Do, Sir, help me over this grief of
mine' (Ch. Up. VII, 1, 3); 'To him after his faults had been rubbed out,
the venerable Sanatkumâra showed the other side of darkness' (Ch. Up.
VII, 26, 2). The same is the purport of the Sûtra, supported by
arguments, of (Gautama) Âkârya, 'Final release results from the
successive removal of wrong knowledge, faults, activity, birth, pain,
the removal of each later member of the series depending on the removal
of the preceding member' (Nyây. Sû. I, i, 2); and wrong knowledge itself
is removed by the knowledge of one's Self being one with the Self of
Brahman.

Nor is this knowledge of the Self being one with Brahman a mere
(fanciful) combination[73], as is made use of, for instance, in the
following passage, 'For the mind is endless, and the Vi/s/vedevas are
endless, and he thereby gains the endless world' (B/ri/. Up. III, 1,
9)[74]; nor is it an (in reality unfounded) ascription
(superimposition)[75], as in the passages, 'Let him meditate on mind as
Brahman,' and 'Âditya is Brahman, this is the doctrine' (Ch. Up. III,
18, 1; 19, 1), where the contemplation as Brahman is superimposed on the
mind, Âditya and so on; nor, again, is it (a figurative conception of
identity) founded on the connection (of the things viewed as identical)
with some special activity, as in the passage, 'Air is indeed the
absorber; breath is indeed the absorber[76]' (Ch. Up. IV, 3, 1; 3); nor
is it a mere (ceremonial) purification of (the Self constituting a
subordinate member) of an action (viz. the action of seeing, &c.,
Brahman), in the same way as, for instance, the act of looking at the
sacrificial butter[77]. For if the knowledge of the identity of the Self
and Brahman were understood in the way of combination and the like,
violence would be done thereby to the connection of the words whose
object, in certain passages, it clearly is to intimate the fact of
Brahman and the Self being really identical; so, for instance, in the
following passages, 'That art thou' (Ch. Up. VI, 8, 7); 'I am Brahman'
(B/ri/. Up. I, 4, 10); 'This Self is Brahman' (B/ri/. Up. II, 5, 19).
And other texts which declare that the fruit of the cognition of Brahman
is the cessation of Ignorance would be contradicted thereby; so, for
instance, 'The fetter of the heart is broken, all doubts are solved'
(Mu. Up. II, 2, 8). Nor, finally, would it be possible, in that case,
satisfactorily to explain the passages which speak of the individual
Self becoming Brahman: such as 'He who knows Brahman becomes Brahman'
(Mu. Up. III, 2, 9). Hence the knowledge of the unity of Brahman and the
Self cannot be of the nature of figurative combination and the like. The
knowledge of Brahman does, therefore, not depend on the active energy of
man, but is analogous to the knowledge of those things which are the
objects of perception, inference, and so on, and thus depends on the
object of knowledge only. Of such a Brahman or its knowledge it is
impossible to establish, by reasoning, any connection with actions.

Nor, again, can we connect Brahman with acts by representing it as the
object of the action of knowing. For that it is not such is expressly
declared in two passages, viz. 'It is different from the known and again
above (i.e. different from) the unknown' (Ken. Up. I, 3); and 'How
should he know him by whom he knows all this?' (B/ri/. Up. II, 4, 13.)
In the same way Brahman is expressly declared not to be the object of
the act of devout meditation, viz. in the second half of the verse, Ken.
Up. I, 5, whose first half declares it not to be an object (of speech,
mind, and so on), 'That which is not proclaimed by speech, by which
speech is proclaimed, that only know to be Brahman, not that on which
people devoutly meditate as this.' If it should be objected that if
Brahman is not an object (of speech, mind, &c.) the sâstra can
impossibly be its source, we refute this objection by the remark that
the aim of the sâstra is to discard all distinctions fictitiously
created by Nescience. The sâstra's purport is not to represent Brahman
definitely as this or that object, its purpose is rather to show that
Brahman as the eternal subject (pratyagâtman, the inward Self) is never
an object, and thereby to remove the distinction of objects known,
knowers, acts of knowledge, &c., which is fictitiously created by
Nescience. Accordingly the sâstra says, 'By whom it is not thought by
him it is thought, by whom it is thought he does not know it; unknown by
those who know it, it is known by those who do not know it' (Ken. Up.
II, 3); and 'Thou couldst not see the seer of sight, thou couldst not
hear the hearer of hearing, nor perceive the perceiver of perception,
nor know the knower of knowledge' (B/ri/. Up. III, 4, 2). As thereby
(i.e. by the knowledge derived from the sâstra) the imagination of the
transitoriness of Release which is due to Nescience is discarded, and
Release is shown to be of the nature of the eternally free Self, it
cannot be charged with the imperfection of non-eternality. Those, on the
other hand, who consider Release to be something to be effected properly
maintain that it depends on the action of mind, speech, or body. So,
likewise, those who consider it to be a mere modification.
Non-eternality of Release is the certain consequence of these two
opinions; for we observe in common life that things which are
modifications, such as sour milk and the like, and things which are
effects, such as jars, &c., are non-eternal. Nor, again, can it be said
that there is a dependance on action in consequence of (Brahman or
Release) being something which is to be obtained[78]; for as Brahman
constitutes a person's Self it is not something to be attained by that
person. And even if Brahman were altogether different from a person's
Self still it would not be something to be obtained; for as it is
omnipresent it is part of its nature that it is ever present to every
one, just as the (all-pervading) ether is. Nor, again, can it be
maintained that Release is something to be ceremonially purified, and as
such depends on an activity. For ceremonial purification (sa/m/skâra)
results either from the accretion of some excellence or from the removal
of some blemish. The former alternative does not apply to Release as it
is of the nature of Brahman, to which no excellence can be added; nor,
again, does the latter alternative apply, since Release is of the nature
of Brahman, which is eternally pure.--But, it might be said, Release
might be a quality of the Self which is merely hidden and becomes
manifest on the Self being purified by some action; just as the quality
of clearness becomes manifest in a mirror when the mirror is cleaned by
means of the action of rubbing.--This objection is invalid, we reply,
because the Self cannot be the abode of any action. For an action cannot
exist without modifying that in which it abides. But if the Self were
modified by an action its non-eternality would result therefrom, and
texts such as the following, 'unchangeable he is called,' would thus be
stultified; an altogether unacceptable result. Hence it is impossible to
assume that any action should abide in the Self. On the other hand, the
Self cannot be purified by actions abiding in something else as it
stands in no relation to that extraneous something. Nor will it avail to
point out (as a quasi-analogous case) that the embodied Self (dehin, the
individual soul) is purified by certain ritual actions which abide in
the body, such as bathing, rinsing one's mouth, wearing the sacrificial
thread, and the like. For what is purified by those actions is that Self
merely which is joined to the body, i.e. the Self in so far as it is
under the power of Nescience. For it is a matter of perception that
bathing and similar actions stand in the relation of inherence to the
body, and it is therefore only proper to conclude that by such actions
only that something is purified which is joined to the body. If a person
thinks 'I am free from disease,' he predicates health of that entity
only which is connected with and mistakenly identifies itself with the
harmonious condition of matter (i.e. the body) resulting from
appropriate medical treatment applied to the body (i.e. the 'I'
constituting the subject of predication is only the individual embodied
Self). Analogously that I which predicates of itself, that it is
purified by bathing and the like, is only the individual soul joined to
the body. For it is only this latter principle of egoity
(aha/m/kart/ri/), the object of the notion of the ego and the agent in
all cognition, which accomplishes all actions and enjoys their results.
Thus the mantras also declare, 'One of them eats the sweet fruit, the
other looks on without eating' (Mu. Up. III, 1, 1); and 'When he is in
union with the body, the senses, and the mind, then wise people call him
the Enjoyer' (Ka. Up. III, 1, 4). Of Brahman, on the other hand, the two
following passages declare that it is incapable of receiving any
accretion and eternally pure, 'He is the one God, hidden in all beings,
all-pervading, the Self within all beings, watching over all works,
dwelling in all beings, the witness, the perceiver, the only one; free
from qualities' (/S/v. Up. VI, 11); and 'He pervaded all, bright,
incorporeal, scatheless, without muscles, pure, untouched by evil'
(Î/s/. Up. 8). But Release is nothing but being Brahman. Therefore
Release is not something to be purified. And as nobody is able to show
any other way in which Release could be connected with action, it is
impossible that it should stand in any, even the slightest, relation to
any action, excepting knowledge.

But, it will be said here, knowledge itself is an activity of the mind.
By no means, we reply; since the two are of different nature. An action
is that which is enjoined as being independent of the nature of existing
things and dependent on the energy of some person's mind; compare, for
instance, the following passages, 'To whichever divinity the offering is
made on that one let him meditate when about to say vasha/t/' (Ait.
Brâhm. III, 8, 1); and 'Let him meditate in his mind on the sandhyâ.'
Meditation and reflection are indeed mental, but as they depend on the
(meditating, &c.) person they may either be performed or not be
performed or modified. Knowledge, on the other hand, is the result of
the different means of (right) knowledge, and those have for their
objects existing things; knowledge can therefore not be either made or
not made or modified, but depends entirely on existing things, and not
either on Vedic statements or on the mind of man. Although mental it
thus widely differs from meditation and the like.

The meditation, for instance, on man and woman as fire, which is founded
on Ch. Up. V, 7, 1; 8, 1, 'The fire is man, O Gautama; the fire is
woman, O Gautama,' is on account of its being the result of a Vedic
statement, merely an action and dependent on man; that conception of
fire, on the other hand, which refers to the well-known (real) fire, is
neither dependent on Vedic statements nor on man, but only on a real
thing which is an object of perception; it is therefore knowledge and
not an action. The same remark applies to all things which are the
objects of the different means of right knowledge. This being thus that
knowledge also which has the existent Brahman for its object is not
dependent on Vedic injunction. Hence, although imperative and similar
forms referring to the knowledge of Brahman are found in the Vedic
texts, yet they are ineffective because they refer to something which
cannot be enjoined, just as the edge of a razor becomes blunt when it is
applied to a stone. For they have for their object something which can
neither be endeavoured after nor avoided.--But what then, it will be
asked, is the purport of those sentences which, at any rate, have the
appearance of injunctions; such as, 'The Self is to be seen, to be heard
about?'--They have the purport, we reply, of diverting (men) from the
objects of natural activity. For when a man acts intent on external
things, and only anxious to attain the objects of his desire and to
eschew the objects of his aversion, and does not thereby reach the
highest aim of man although desirous of attaining it; such texts as the
one quoted divert him from the objects of natural activity and turn the
stream of his thoughts on the inward (the highest) Self. That for him
who is engaged in the enquiry into the Self, the true nature of the Self
is nothing either to be endeavoured after or to be avoided, we learn
from texts such as the following: 'This everything, all is that Self'
(B/ri/, Up. II, 4, 6); 'But when the Self only is all this, how should
he see another, how should he know another, how should he know the
knower?' (B/ri/. Up. IV, 5, 15); 'This Self is Brahman' (B/ri/. Up. II,
5, 19). That the knowledge of Brahman refers to something which is not a
thing to be done, and therefore is not concerned either with the pursuit
or the avoidance of any object, is the very thing we admit; for just
that constitutes our glory, that as soon as we comprehend Brahman, all
our duties come to an end and all our work is over. Thus /S/ruti says,
'If a man understands the Self, saying, "I am he," what could he wish or
desire that he should pine after the body?' (B/ri/. Up. IV, 4, 12.) And
similarly Sm/ri/ti declares, 'Having understood this the understanding
man has done with all work, O Bhârata' (Bha. Gîtâ XV, 20). Therefore
Brahman is not represented as the object of injunctions.

We now proceed to consider the doctrine of those who maintain that there
is no part of the Veda which has the purport of making statements about
mere existent things, and is not either an injunction or a prohibition,
or supplementary to either. This opinion is erroneous, because the soul
(purusha), which is the subject of the Upanishads, does not constitute a
complement to anything else. Of that soul which is to be comprehended
from the Upanishads only, which is non-transmigratory, Brahman,
different in nature from the four classes of substances[79], which forms
a topic of its own and is not a complement to anything else; of that
soul it is impossible to say that it is not or is not apprehended; for
the passage, 'That Self is to be described by No, no!' (B/ri/. Up. III,
9, 26) designates it as the Self, and that the Self is cannot be denied.
The possible objection that there is no reason to maintain that the soul
is known from the Upanishads only, since it is the object of
self-consciousness, is refuted by the fact that the soul of which the
Upanishads treat is merely the witness of that (i.e. of the object of
self-consciousness, viz. the jîvâtman). For neither from that part of
the Veda which enjoins works nor from reasoning, anybody apprehends that
soul which, different from the agent that is the object of
self-consciousness, merely witnesses it; which is permanent in all
(transitory) beings; uniform; one; eternally unchanging; the Self of
everything. Hence it can neither be denied nor be represented as the
mere complement of injunctions; for of that very person who might deny
it it is the Self. And as it is the Self of all, it can neither be
striven after nor avoided. All perishable things indeed perish, because
they are mere modifications, up to (i.e. exclusive of) the soul. But the
soul is imperishable[80], as there is no cause why it should perish; and
eternally unchanging, as there is no cause for its undergoing any
modification; hence it is in its essence eternally pure and free. And
from passages, such as 'Beyond the soul there is nothing; this is the
goal, the highest road' (Ka. Up. I, 3, 11), and 'That soul, taught in
the Upanishads, I ask thee' (B/ri/. Up. III, 9, 26), it appears that the
attribute of resting on the Upanishads is properly given to the soul, as
it constitutes their chief topic. To say, therefore, that there is no
portion of the Veda referring to existing things, is a mere bold
assertion.

With regard to the quotations made of the views of men acquainted with
the purport of the /S/âstra (who alone were stated to have declared that
the Veda treats of actions) it is to be understood that they, having to
do with the enquiry into duty, refer to that part of the /S/âstra which
consists of injunctions and prohibitions. With regard to the other
passage quoted ('as action is the purport of the Veda, whatever does not
refer to action is purportless') we remark that if that passage were
taken in an absolutely strict sense (when it would mean that only those
words which denote action have a meaning), it would follow that all
information about existent things is meaningless[81]. If, on the other
hand, the Veda--in addition to the injunctions of activity and cessation
of activity--does give information about existent things as being
subservient to some action to be accomplished, why then should it not
give information also about the existent eternally unchangeable Self?
For an existent thing, about which information is given, does not become
an act (through being stated to be subservient to an act).--But, it will
be said, although existent things are not acts, yet, as they are
instrumental to action, the information given about such things is
merely subservient to action.--This, we reply, does not matter; for
although the information may be subservient to action, the things
themselves about which information is given are already intimated
thereby as things which have the power of bringing about certain
actions. Their final end (prayojana) indeed may be subserviency to some
action, but thereby they do not cease to be, in the information given
about them, intimated in themselves.--Well, and if they are thus
intimated, what is gained thereby for your purpose[82]? We reply that
the information about the Self, which is an existing thing not
comprehended from other sources, is of the same nature (as the
information about other existent things); for by the comprehension of
the Self a stop is put to all false knowledge, which is the cause of
transmigration, and thus a purpose is established which renders the
passages relative to Brahman equal to those passages which give
information about things instrumental to actions. Moreover, there are
found (even in that part of the Veda which treats of actions) such
passages as 'a Brâhma/n/a is not to be killed,' which teach abstinence
from certain actions. Now abstinence from action is neither action nor
instrumental to action. If, therefore, the tenet that all those passages
which do not express action are devoid of purport were insisted on, it
would follow that all such passages as the one quoted, which teach
abstinence from action, are devoid of purport--a consequence which is of
course unacceptable. Nor, again, can the connexion in which the word
'not' stands with the action expressed by the verb 'is to be
killed'--which action is naturally established[83]--be used as a reason
for assuming that 'not' denotes an action non-established elsewhere[84],
different from the state of mere passivity implied in the abstinence
from the act of killing. For the peculiar function of the particle 'not'
is to intimate the idea of the non-existence of that with which it is
connected, and the conception of the non-existence (of something to be
done) is the cause of the state of passivity. (Nor can it be objected
that, as soon as that momentary idea has passed away, the state of
passivity will again make room for activity; for) that idea itself
passes away (only after having completely destroyed the natural impulse
prompting to the murder of a Brâhma/n/a, &c., just as a fire is
extinguished only after having completely consumed its fuel). Hence we
are of opinion that the aim of prohibitory passages, such as 'a
Brâhma/n/a is not to be killed,' is a merely passive state, consisting
in the abstinence from some possible action; excepting some special
cases, such as the so-called Prajâpati-vow, &c.[85] Hence the charge of
want of purpose is to be considered as referring (not to the
Vedânta-passages, but only) to such statements about existent things as
are of the nature of legends and the like, and do not serve any purpose
of man.

The allegation that a mere statement about an actually existent thing
not connected with an injunction of something to be done, is purposeless
(as, for instance, the statement that the earth contains seven dvîpas)
has already been refuted on the ground that a purpose is seen to exist
in some such statements, as, for instance, 'this is not a snake, but a
rope.'--But how about the objection raised above that the information
about Brahman cannot be held to have a purpose in the same way as the
statement about a rope has one, because a man even after having heard
about Brahman continues to belong to this transmigratory world?--We
reply as follows: It is impossible to show that a man who has once
understood Brahman to be the Self, belongs to the transmigratory world
in the same sense as he did before, because that would be contrary to
the fact of his being Brahman. For we indeed observe that a person who
imagines the body, and so on, to constitute the Self, is subject to fear
and pain, but we have no right to assume that the same person after
having, by means of the Veda, comprehended Brahman to be the Self, and
thus having got over his former imaginings, will still in the same
manner be subject to pain and fear whose cause is wrong knowledge. In
the same way we see that a rich householder, puffed up by the conceit of
his wealth, is grieved when his possessions are taken from him; but we
do not see that the loss of his wealth equally grieves him after he has
once retired from the world and put off the conceit of his riches. And,
again, we see that a person possessing a pair of beautiful earrings
derives pleasure from the proud conceit of ownership; but after he has
lost the earrings and the conceit established thereon, the pleasure
derived from them vanishes. Thus /S/ruti also declares, 'When he is free
from the body, then neither pleasure nor pain touches him' (Ch. Up.
VIII, 12, 1). If it should be objected that the condition of being free
from the body follows on death only, we demur, since the cause of man
being joined to the body is wrong knowledge. For it is not possible to
establish the state of embodiedness upon anything else but wrong
knowledge. And that the state of disembodiedness is eternal on account
of its not having actions for its cause, we have already explained. The
objection again, that embodiedness is caused by the merit and demerit
effected by the Self (and therefore real), we refute by remarking that
as the (reality of the) conjunction of the Self with the body is itself
not established, the circumstance of merit and demerit being due to the
action of the Self is likewise not established; for (if we should try to
get over this difficulty by representing the Self's embodiedness as
caused by merit and demerit) we should commit the logical fault of
making embodiedness dependent on merit and demerit, and again merit and
demerit on embodiedness. And the assumption of an endless retrogressive
chain (of embodied states and merit and demerit) would be no better than
a chain of blind men (who are unable to lead one another). Moreover, the
Self can impossibly become an agent, as it cannot enter into intimate
relation to actions. If it should be said that the Self may be
considered as an agent in the same way as kings and other great people
are (who without acting themselves make others act) by their mere
presence, we deny the appositeness of this instance; for kings may
become agents through their relation to servants whom they procure by
giving them wages, &c., while it is impossible to imagine anything,
analogous to money, which could be the cause of a connexion between the
Self as lord and the body, and so on (as servants). Wrong imagination,
on the other hand, (of the individual Self, considering itself to be
joined to the body,) is a manifest reason of the connexion of the two
(which is not based on any assumption). This explains also in how far
the Self can be considered as the agent in sacrifices and similar
acts[86]. Here it is objected that the Self's imagination as to the
body, and so on, belonging to itself is not false, but is to be
understood in a derived (figurative) sense. This objection we invalidate
by the remark that the distinction of derived and primary senses of
words is known to be applicable only where an actual difference of
things is known to exist. We are, for instance, acquainted with a
certain species of animals having a mane, and so on, which is the
exclusive primary object of the idea and word 'lion,' and we are
likewise acquainted with persons possessing in an eminent degree certain
leonine qualities, such as fierceness, courage, &c.; here, a well
settled difference of objects existing, the idea and the name 'lion' are
applied to those persons in a derived or figurative sense. In those
cases, however, where the difference of the objects is not well
established, the transfer of the conception and name of the one to the
other is not figurative, but simply founded on error. Such is, for
instance, the case of a man who at the time of twilight does not discern
that the object before him is a post, and applies to it the conception
and designation of a man; such is likewise the case of the conception
and designation of silver being applied to a shell of mother-of-pearl
somehow mistaken for silver. How then can it be maintained that the
application of the word and the conception of the Ego to the body, &c.,
which application is due to the non-discrimination of the Self and the
Not-Self, is figurative (rather than simply false)? considering that
even learned men who know the difference of the Self and the Not-Self
confound the words and ideas just as common shepherds and goatherds do.

As therefore the application of the conception of the Ego to the body on
the part of those who affirm the existence of a Self different from the
body is simply false, not figurative, it follows that the embodiedness
of the Self is (not real but) caused by wrong conception, and hence that
the person who has reached true knowledge is free from his body even
while still alive. The same is declared in the /S/ruti passages
concerning him who knows Brahman: 'And as the slough of a snake lies on
an ant-hill, dead and cast away, thus lies this body; but that
disembodied immortal spirit is Brahman only, is only light' (B/ri/. Up.
IV, 4, 7); and 'With eyes he is without eyes as it were, with ears
without ears as it were, with speech without speech as it were, with a
mind without mind as it were, with vital airs without vital airs as it
were.' Sm/ri/ti also, in the passage where the characteristic marks are
enumerated of one whose mind is steady (Bha. Gîtâ II, 54), declares that
he who knows is no longer connected with action of any kind. Therefore
the man who has once comprehended Brahman to be the Self, does not
belong to this transmigratory world as he did before. He, on the other
hand, who still belongs to this transmigratory world as before, has not
comprehended Brahman to be the Self. Thus there remain no unsolved
contradictions.

With reference again to the assertion that Brahman is not fully
determined in its own nature, but stands in a complementary relation to
injunctions, because the hearing about Brahman is to be followed by
consideration and reflection, we remark that consideration and
reflection are themselves merely subservient to the comprehension of
Brahman. If Brahman, after having been comprehended, stood in a
subordinate relation to some injunctions, it might be said to be merely
supplementary. But this is not the case, since consideration and
reflection no less than hearing are subservient to comprehension. It
follows that the /S/âstra cannot be the means of knowing Brahman only in
so far as it is connected with injunctions, and the doctrine that on
account of the uniform meaning of the Vedânta-texts, an independent
Brahman is to be admitted, is thereby fully established. Hence there is
room for beginning the new /S/âstra indicated in the first Sûtra, 'Then
therefore the enquiry into Brahman.' If, on the other hand, the
Vedânta-texts were connected with injunctions, a new /S/âstra would
either not be begun at all, since the /S/âstra concerned with
injunctions has already been introduced by means of the first Sûtra of
the Pûrva Mîmâ/m/sâ, 'Then therefore the enquiry into duty;' or if it
were begun it would be introduced as follows: 'Then therefore the
enquiry into the remaining duties;' just as a new portion of the Pûrva
Mîmâ/m/sâ Sûtras is introduced with the words, 'Then therefore the
enquiry into what subserves the purpose of the sacrifice, and what
subserves the purpose of man' (Pû. Mî. Sû. IV, 1, 1). But as the
comprehension of the unity of Brahman and the Self has not been
propounded (in the previous /S/âstra), it is quite appropriate that a
new /S/âstra, whose subject is Brahman, should be entered upon. Hence
all injunctions and all other means of knowledge end with the cognition
expressed in the words, 'I am Brahman;' for as soon as there supervenes
the comprehension of the non-dual Self, which is not either something to
be eschewed or something to be appropriated, all objects and knowing
agents vanish, and hence there can no longer be means of proof. In
accordance with this, they (i.e. men knowing Brahman) have made the
following declaration:--'When there has arisen (in a man's mind) the
knowledge, "I am that which is, Brahman is my Self," and when, owing to
the sublation of the conceptions of body, relatives, and the like, the
(imagination of) the figurative and the false Self has come to an
end[87]; how should then the effect[88] (of that wrong imagination)
exist any longer? As long as the knowledge of the Self, which Scripture
tells us to search after, has not arisen, so long the Self is knowing
subject; but that same subject is that which is searched after, viz.
(the highest Self) free from all evil and blemish. Just as the idea of
the Self being the body is assumed as valid (in ordinary life), so all
the ordinary sources of knowledge (perception and the like) are valid
only until the one Self is ascertained.'

(Herewith the section comprising the four Sûtras is finished[89].)

So far it has been declared that the Vedânta-passages, whose purport is
the comprehension of Brahman being the Self, and which have their object
therein, refer exclusively to Brahman without any reference to actions.
And it has further been shown that Brahman is the omniscient omnipotent
cause of the origin, subsistence, and dissolution of the world. But now
the Sâ@nkhyas and others being of opinion that an existent substance is
to be known through other means of proof (not through the Veda) infer
different causes, such as the pradhâna and the like, and thereupon
interpret the Vedânta-passages as referring to the latter. All the
Vedânta-passages, they maintain, which treat of the creation of the
world distinctly point out that the cause (of the world) has to be
concluded from the effect by inference; and the cause which is to be
inferred is the connexion of the pradhâna with the souls (purusha). The
followers of Ka/n/âda again infer from the very same passages that the
Lord is the efficient cause of the world while the atoms are its
material cause. And thus other argumentators also taking their stand on
passages apparently favouring their views and on fallacious arguments
raise various objections. For this reason the teacher
(Vyâsa)--thoroughly acquainted as he is with words, passages, and means
of proof--proceeds to state as primâ facie views, and afterwards to
refute, all those opinions founded on deceptive passages and fallacious
arguments. Thereby he at the same time proves indirectly that what the
Vedânta-texts aim at is the comprehension of Brahman.

The Sâ@nkhyas who opine that the non-intelligent pradhâna consisting of
three constituent elements (gu/n/a) is the cause of the world argue as
follows. The Vedânta-passages which you have declared to intimate that
the all-knowing all-powerful Brahman is the cause of the world can be
consistently interpreted also on the doctrine of the pradhâna being the
general cause. Omnipotence (more literally: the possession of all
powers) can be ascribed to the pradhâna in so far as it has all its
effects for its objects. All-knowingness also can be ascribed to it,
viz. in the following manner. What you think to be knowledge is in
reality an attribute of the gu/n/a of Goodness[90], according to the
Sm/ri/ti passage 'from Goodness springs knowledge' (Bha. Gîtâ XIV, 17).
By means of this attribute of Goodness, viz. knowledge, certain men
endowed with organs which are effects (of the pradhâna) are known as
all-knowing Yogins; for omniscience is acknowledged to be connected with
the very highest degree of 'Goodness.' Now to the soul (purusha) which
is isolated, destitute of effected organs, consisting of pure
(undifferenced) intelligence it is quite impossible to ascribe either
all-knowingness or limited knowledge; the pradhâna, on the other hand,
because consisting of the three gu/n/as, comprises also in its pradhâna
state the element of Goodness which is the cause of all-knowingness. The
Vedânta-passages therefore in a derived (figurative) sense ascribe
all-knowingness to the pradhâna, although it is in itself
non-intelligent. Moreover you (the Vedântin) also who assume an
all-knowing Brahman can ascribe to it all-knowingness in so far only as
that term means capacity for all knowledge. For Brahman cannot always be
actually engaged in the cognition of everything; for from this there
would follow the absolute permanency of his cognition, and this would
involve a want of independence on Brahman's part with regard to the
activity of knowing. And if you should propose to consider Brahman's
cognition as non-permanent it would follow that with the cessation of
the cognition Brahman itself would cease. Therefore all-knowingness is
possible only in the sense of capacity for all knowledge. Moreover you
assume that previously to the origination of the world Brahman is
without any instruments of action. But without the body, the senses, &c.
which are the instruments of knowledge, cognition cannot take place in
any being. And further it must be noted that the pradhâna, as consisting
of various elements, is capable of undergoing modifications, and may
therefore act as a (material) cause like clay and other substances;
while the uncompounded homogeneous Brahman is unable to do so.

To these conclusions he (Vyâsa) replies in the following Sûtra.

5. On account of seeing (i.e. thinking being attributed in the
Upanishads to the cause of the world; the pradhâna) is not (to be
identified with the cause indicated by the Upanishads; for) it is not
founded on Scripture.

It is impossible to find room in the Vedânta-texts for the
non-intelligent pradhâna, the fiction of the Sâ@nkhyas; because it is
not founded on Scripture. How so? Because the quality of seeing, i.e.
thinking, is in Scripture ascribed to the cause. For the passage, Ch.
Up. VI, 2, (which begins: 'Being only, my dear, this was in the
beginning, one only, without a second,' and goes on, 'It thought (saw),
may I be many, may I grow forth. It sent forth fire,') declares that
this world differentiated by name and form, which is there denoted by
the word 'this,' was before its origination identical with the Self of
that which is and that the principle denoted by the term 'the being' (or
'that which is') sent forth fire and the other elements after having
thought. The following passage also ('Verily in the beginning all this
was Self, one only; there was nothing else blinking whatsoever. He
thought, shall I send forth worlds? He sent forth these worlds,' Ait.
Âr. II, 4, 1, 2) declares the creation to have had thought for its
antecedent. In another passage also (Pr. Up. VI, 3) it is said of the
person of sixteen parts, 'He thought, &c. He sent forth Prâ/n/a.' By
'seeing' (i.e. the verb 'seeing' exhibited in the Sûtra) is not meant
that particular verb only, but any verbs which have a cognate sense;
just as the verb 'to sacrifice' is used to denote any kind of offering.
Therefore other passages also whose purport it is to intimate that an
all-knowing Lord is the cause of the world are to be quoted here, as,
for instance, Mu. Up. I, 1, 9, 'From him who perceives all and who knows
all, whose brooding consists of knowledge, from him is born that
Brahman, name and form and food.'

The argumentation of the Sâ@nkhyas that the pradhâna may be called
all-knowing on account of knowledge constituting an attribute of the
gu/n/a Goodness is inadmissible. For as in the pradhâna-condition the
three gu/n/as are in a state of equipoise, knowledge which is a quality
of Goodness only is not possible[91]. Nor can we admit the explanation
that the pradhâna is all-knowing because endowed with the capacity for
all knowledge. For if, in the condition of equipoise of the gu/n/as, we
term the pradhâna all-knowing with reference to the power of knowledge
residing in Goodness, we must likewise term it little-knowing, with
reference to the power impeding knowledge which resides in Passion and
Darkness.

Moreover a modification of Goodness which is not connected with a
witnessing (observing) principle (sâkshin) is not called knowledge, and
the non-intelligent pradhâna is destitute of such a principle. It is
therefore impossible to ascribe to the pradhâna all-knowingness. The
case of the Yogins finally does not apply to the point under
consideration; for as they possess intelligence, they may, owing to an
excess of Goodness in their nature, rise to omniscience[92].--Well then
(say those Sâ@nkhyas who believe in the existence of a Lord) let us
assume that the pradhâna possesses the quality of knowledge owing to the
witnessing principle (the Lord), just as the quality of burning is
imparted to an iron ball by fire.--No, we reply; for if this were so, it
would be more reasonable to assume that that which is the cause of the
pradhâna having the quality of thought i.e. the all-knowing primary
Brahman itself is the cause of the world.

The objection that to Brahman also all-knowingness in its primary sense
cannot be ascribed because, if the activity of cognition were permanent,
Brahman could not be considered as independent with regard to it, we
refute as follows. In what way, we ask the Sâ@nkhya, is Brahman's
all-knowingness interfered with by a permanent cognitional activity? To
maintain that he, who possesses eternal knowledge capable to throw light
on all objects, is not all-knowing, is contradictory. If his knowledge
were considered non-permanent, he would know sometimes, and sometimes he
would not know; from which it would follow indeed that he is not
all-knowing. This fault is however avoided if we admit Brahman's
knowledge to be permanent.--But, it may be objected, on this latter
alternative the knower cannot be designated as independent with
reference to the act of knowing.--Why not? we reply; the sun also,
although his heat and light are permanent, is nevertheless designated as
independent when we say, 'he burns, he gives light[93].'--But, it will
again be objected, we say that the sun burns or gives light when he
stands in relation to some object to be heated or illuminated; Brahman,
on the other hand, stands, before the creation of the world, in no
relation to any object of knowledge. The cases are therefore not
parallel.--This objection too, we reply, is not valid; for as a matter
of fact we speak of the Sun as an agent, saying 'the sun shines' even
without reference to any object illuminated by him, and hence Brahman
also may be spoken of as an agent, in such passages as 'it thought,'
&c., even without reference to any object of knowledge. If, however, an
object is supposed to be required ('knowing' being a transitive verb
while 'shining' is intransitive), the texts ascribing thought to Brahman
will fit all the better.--What then is that object to which the
knowledge of the Lord can refer previously to the origin of the
world?--Name and form, we reply, which can be defined neither as being
identical with Brahman nor as different from it, unevolved but about to
be evolved. For if, as the adherents of the Yoga-/s/âstra assume, the
Yogins have a perceptive knowledge of the past and the future through
the favour of the Lord; in what terms shall we have to speak of the
eternal cognition of the ever pure Lord himself, whose objects are the
creation, subsistence, and dissolution of the world! The objection that
Brahman, previously to the origin of the world, is not able to think
because it is not connected with a body, &c. does not apply; for
Brahman, whose nature is eternal cognition--as the sun's nature is
eternal luminousness--can impossibly stand in need of any instruments of
knowledge. The transmigrating soul (sa/m/sârin) indeed, which is under
the sway of Nescience, &c., may require a body in order that knowledge
may arise in it; but not so the Lord, who is free from all impediments
of knowledge. The two following Mantras also declare that the Lord does
not require a body, and that his knowledge is without any obstructions.
'There is no effect and no instrument known of him, no one is seen like
unto him or better; his high power is revealed as manifold, as inherent,
acting as knowledge and force.' 'Grasping without hands, hasting without
feet, he sees without eyes, he hears without ears. He knows what can be
known, but no one knows him; they call him the first, the great person'
(/S/v. Up. VI, 8; III, 19).

But, to raise a new objection, there exists no transmigrating soul
different from the Lord and obstructed by impediments of knowledge; for
/S/ruti expressly declares that 'there is no other seer but he; there is
no other knower but he' (B/ri/. Up. III, 7, 23). How then can it be said
that the origination of knowledge in the transmigrating soul depends on
a body, while it does not do so in the case of the Lord?--True, we
reply. There is in reality no transmigrating soul different from the
Lord. Still the connexion (of the Lord) with limiting adjuncts,
consisting of bodies and so on, is assumed, just as we assume the ether
to enter into connexion with divers limiting adjuncts such as jars,
pots, caves, and the like. And just as in consequence of connexion of
the latter kind such conceptions and terms as 'the hollow (space) of a
jar,' &c. are generally current, although the space inside a jar is not
really different from universal space, and just as in consequence
thereof there generally prevails the false notion that there are
different spaces such as the space of a jar and so on; so there prevails
likewise the false notion that the Lord and the transmigrating soul are
different; a notion due to the non-discrimination of the (unreal)
connexion of the soul with the limiting conditions, consisting of the
body and so on. That the Self, although in reality the only existence,
imparts the quality of Selfhood to bodies and the like which are
Not-Self is a matter of observation, and is due to mere wrong
conception, which depends in its turn on antecedent wrong conception.
And the consequence of the soul thus involving itself in the
transmigratory state is that its thought depends on a body and the like.

The averment that the pradhâna, because consisting of several elements,
can, like clay and similar substances, occupy the place of a cause while
the uncompounded Brahman cannot do so, is refuted by the fact of the
pradhâna not basing on Scripture. That, moreover, it is possible to
establish by argumentation the causality of Brahman, but not of the
pradhâna and similar principles, the Sûtrakâra will set forth in the
second Adhyâya (II, 1, 4, &c.).

Here the Sâ@nkhya comes forward with a new objection. The difficulty
stated by you, he says, viz. that the non-intelligent pradhâna cannot be
the cause of the world, because thought is ascribed to the latter in the
sacred texts, can be got over in another way also, viz. on the ground
that non-intelligent things are sometimes figuratively spoken of as
intelligent beings. We observe, for instance, that people say of a
river-bank about to fall, 'the bank is inclined to fall (pipatishati),'
and thus speak of a non-intelligent bank as if it possessed
intelligence. So the pradhâna also, although non-intelligent, may, when
about to create, be figuratively spoken of as thinking. Just as in
ordinary life some intelligent person after having bathed, and dined,
and formed the purpose of driving in the afternoon to his village,
necessarily acts according to his purpose, so the pradhâna also acts by
the necessity of its own nature, when transforming itself into the
so-called great principle and the subsequent forms of evolution; it may
therefore figuratively be spoken of as intelligent.--But what reason
have you for setting aside the primary meaning of the word 'thought' and
for taking it in a figurative sense?--The observation, the Sâ@nkhya
replies, that fire and water also are figuratively spoken of as
intelligent beings in the two following scriptural passages, 'That fire
thought; that water thought' (Ch. Up. VI, 2, 3; 4). We therefrom
conclude that thought is to be taken in a figurative sense there also
where Being (Sat) is the agent, because it is mentioned in a chapter
where (thought) is generally taken in a figurative sense[94].

To this argumentation of the Sâdkhya the next Sûtra replies:

6. If it is said that (the word 'seeing') has a figurative meaning, we
deny that, on account of the word Self (being applied to the cause of
the world).

Your assertion that the term 'Being' denotes the non-intelligent
pradhâna, and that thought is ascribed to it in a figurative sense only,
as it is to fire and water, is untenable. Why so? On account of the term
'Self.' For the passage Ch. Up. VI, 2, which begins 'Being only, my
dear, this was in the beginning,' after having related the creation of
fire, water, and earth ('it thought,' &c.; 'it sent forth fire,' &c.),
goes on--denoting the thinking principle of which the whole chapter
treats, and likewise fire, water, and earth, by the
term--'divinities'--as follows, 'That divinity thought: Let me now enter
those three divinities with this living Self (jîva. âtman) and evolve
names and forms.' If we assumed that in this passage the non-intelligent
pradhâna is figuratively spoken of as thinking, we should also have to
assume that the same pradhâna--as once constituting the subject-matter
of the chapter--is referred to by the term 'that divinity.' But in that
case the divinity would not speak of the jîva as 'Self.' For by the term
'Jîva' we must understand, according to the received meaning and the
etymology of the word, the intelligent (principle) which rules over the
body and sustains the vital airs. How could such a principle be the Self
of the non-intelligent pradhâna? By 'Self' we understand (a being's) own
nature, and it is clear that the intelligent Jîva cannot constitute the
nature of the non-intelligent pradhâna. If, on the other hand, we refer
the whole chapter to the intelligent Brahman, to which thought in its
primary sense belongs, the use of the word 'Self' with reference to the
Jîva is quite adequate. Then again there is the other passage, 'That
which is that subtle essence, in it all that exists has its self. It is
the true. It is the Self. That art thou, O /S/vetaketu' (Ch. Up. VI, 8,
7, &c.). Here the clause 'It is the Self' designates the Being of which
the entire chapter treats, viz. the subtle Self, by the word 'Self,' and
the concluding clause, 'that art thou, O /S/vetaketu,' declares the
intelligent /S/vetaketu to be of the nature of the Self. Fire and water,
on the other hand, are non-intelligent, since they are objects (of the
mind), and since they are declared to be implicated in the evolution of
names and forms. And as at the same time there is no reason for
ascribing to them thought in its primary sense--while the employment of
the word 'Self' furnishes such a reason with reference to the Sat--the
thought attributed to them must be explained in a figurative sense, like
the inclination of the river-bank. Moreover, the thinking on the part of
fire and water is to be understood as dependent on their being ruled
over by the Sat. On the other hand, the thought of the Sat is, on
account of the word 'Self,' not to be understood in a figurative
sense.[95]

Here the Sâ@nkhya comes forward with a new objection. The word 'Self,'
he says, may be applied to the pradhâna, although unintelligent, because
it is sometimes figuratively used in the sense of 'that which effects
all purposes of another;' as, for instance, a king applies the word
'Self' to some servant who carries out all the king's intentions,
'Bhadrasena is my (other) Self.' For the pradhâna, which effects the
enjoyment and the emancipation of the soul, serves the latter in the
same way as a minister serves his king in the affairs of peace and war.
Or else, it may be said, the one word 'Self' may refer to
non-intelligent things as well as to intelligent beings, as we see that
such expressions as 'the Self of the elements,' 'the Self of the
senses,' are made use of, and as the one word 'light' (jyotis) denotes a
certain sacrifice (the jyotish/t/oma) as well as a flame. How then does
it follow from the word 'Self' that the thinking (ascribed to the cause
of the world) is not to be taken in a figurative sense?

To this last argumentation the Sûtrakâra replies:

7. (The pradhâna cannot be designated by the term 'Self') because
release is taught of him who takes his stand on that (the Sat).

The non-intelligent pradhâna cannot be the object of the term 'Self'
because in the passage Ch. Up. VI, 2 ff., where the subtle Sat which is
under discussion is at first referred to in the sentence, 'That is the
Self,' and where the subsequent clause, 'That art thou, O /S/vetaketu,'
declares the intelligent /S/vetaketu to have his abode in the Self, a
passage subsequent to the two quoted (viz. 'a man who has a teacher
obtains true knowledge; for him there is only delay as long as he is not
delivered, then he will be perfect') declares final release. For if the
non-intelligent pradhâna were denoted by the term 'Sat' and did
comprehend--by means of the phrase 'That art thou'--persons desirous of
final release who as such are intelligent, the meaning could only be
'Thou art non-intelligent;' so that Scripture would virtually make
contradictory statements to the disadvantage of man, and would thus
cease to be a means of right knowledge. But to assume that the faultless
/s/âstra is not a means of right knowledge, would be contrary to reason.
And if the /s/âstra, considered as a means of right knowledge, should
point out to a man desirous of release, but ignorant of the way to it, a
non-intelligent Self as the real Self, he would--comparable to the blind
man who had caught hold of the ox's tail[96]--cling to the view of that
being the Self, and thus never be able to reach the real Self different
from the false Self pointed out to him; hence he would be debarred from
what constitutes man's good, and would incur evil. We must therefore
conclude that, just as the /s/âstra teaches the agnihotra and similar
performances in their true nature as means for those who are desirous of
the heavenly world, so the passage 'that is the Self, that art thou, O
/S/vetaketu,' teaches the Self in its true nature also. Only on that
condition release for him whose thoughts are true can be taught by means
of the simile in which the person to be released is compared to the man
grasping the heated axe (Ch. Up. VI, 16). For in the other case, if the
doctrine of the Sat constituting the Self had a secondary meaning only,
the cognition founded on the passage 'that art thou' would be of the
nature of a fanciful combination only[97], like the knowledge derived
from the passage, 'I am the hymn' (Ait. Âr. II, 1, 2, 6), and would lead
to a mere transitory reward; so that the simile quoted could not convey
the doctrine of release. Therefore the word 'Self' is applied to the
subtle Sat not in a merely figurative sense. In the case of the faithful
servant, on the other hand, the word 'Self' can--in such phrases as
'Bhadrasena is my Self'--be taken in a figurative sense, because the
difference between master and servant is well established by perception.
Moreover, to assume that, because words are sometimes seen to be used in
figurative senses, a figurative sense may be resorted to in the case of
those things also for which words (i.e. Vedic words) are the only means
of knowledge, is altogether indefensible; for an assumption of that
nature would lead to a general want of confidence. The assertion that
the word 'Self' may (primarily) signify what is non-intelligent as well
as what is intelligent, just as the word 'jyotis' signifies a certain
sacrifice as well as light, is inadmissible, because we have no right to
attribute to words a plurality of meanings. Hence (we rather assume
that) the word 'Self' in its primary meaning refers to what is
intelligent only and is then, by a figurative attribution of
intelligence, applied to the elements and the like also; whence such
phrases as 'the Self of the elements,' 'the Self of the senses.' And
even if we assume that the word 'Self' primarily signifies both classes
of beings, we are unable to settle in any special case which of the two
meanings the word has, unless we are aided either by the general heading
under which it stands, or some determinative attributive word. But in
the passage under discussion there is nothing to determine that the word
refers to something non-intelligent, while, on the other hand, the Sat
distinguished by thought forms the general heading, and /S/vetaketu,
i.e. a being endowed with intelligence, is mentioned in close proximity.
That a non-intelligent Self does not agree with /S/vetaketu, who
possesses intelligence, we have already shown. All these circumstances
determine the object of the word 'Self' here to be something
intelligent. The word 'jyotis' does moreover not furnish an appropriate
example; for according to common use it has the settled meaning of
'light' only, and is used in the sense of sacrifice only on account of
the arthavâda assuming a similarity (of the sacrifice) to light.

A different explanation of the Sûtra is also possible. The preceding
Sûtra may be taken completely to refute all doubts as to the word 'Self'
having a figurative or double sense, and then the present Sûtra is to be
explained as containing an independent reason, proving that the doctrine
of the pradhâna being the general cause is untenable.

Hence the non-intelligent pradhâna is not denoted by the word 'Self.'
This the teacher now proceeds to prove by an additional reason.

8. And (the pradhâna cannot be denoted by the word 'Self') because there
is no statement of its having to be set aside.

If the pradhâna which is the Not-Self were denoted by the term 'Being'
(Sat), and if the passage 'That is the Self, that art thou, O
/S/vetaketu,' referred to the pradhâna; the teacher whose wish it is to
impart instruction about the true Brahman would subsequently declare
that the pradhâna is to be set aside (and the true Brahman to be
considered); for otherwise his pupil, having received the instruction
about the pradhâna, might take his stand on the latter, looking upon it
as the Non-Self. In ordinary life a man who wishes to point out to a
friend the (small) star Arundhatî at first directs his attention to a
big neighbouring star, saying 'that is Arundhatî,' although it is really
not so; and thereupon he withdraws his first statement and points out
the real Arundhatî. Analogously the teacher (if he intended to make his
pupil understand the Self through the Non-Self) would in the end
definitely state that the Self is not of the nature of the pradhâna. But
no such statement is made; for the sixth Prapâ/th/aka arrives at a
conclusion based on the view that the Self is nothing but that which is
(the Sat).

The word 'and' (in the Sûtra) is meant to notify that the contradiction
of a previous statement (which would be implied in the rejected
interpretation) is an additional reason for the rejection. Such a
contradiction would result even if it were stated that the pradhâna is
to be set aside. For in the beginning of the Prapâ/th/aka it is
intimated that through the knowledge of the cause everything becomes
known. Compare the following consecutive sentences, 'Have you ever asked
for that instruction by which we hear what cannot be heard, by which we
perceive what cannot be perceived, by which we know what cannot be
known? What is that instruction? As, my dear, by one clod of clay all
that is made of clay is known, the modification (i.e. the effect) being
a name merely which has its origin in speech, while the truth is that it
is clay merely,' &c. Now if the term 'Sat' denoted the pradhâna, which
is merely the cause of the aggregate of the objects of enjoyment, its
knowledge, whether to be set aside or not to be set aside, could never
lead to the knowledge of the aggregate of enjoyers (souls), because the
latter is not an effect of the pradhâna. Therefore the pradhâna is not
denoted by the term 'Sat.'--For this the Sûtrakâra gives a further
reason.

9. On account of (the individual Soul) going to the Self (the Self
cannot be the pradhâna).

With reference to the cause denoted by the word 'Sat,' Scripture says,
'When a man sleeps here, then, my dear, he becomes united with the Sat,
he is gone to his own (Self). Therefore they say of him, "he sleeps"
(svapiti), because he is gone to his own (svam apîta).' (Ch. Up. VI, 8,
1.) This passage explains the well-known verb 'to sleep,' with reference
to the soul. The word, 'his own,' denotes the Self which had before been
denoted by the word Sat; to the Self he (the individual soul) goes, i.e.
into it it is resolved, according to the acknowledged sense of api-i,
which means 'to be resolved into.' The individual soul (jîva) is called
awake as long as being connected with the various external objects by
means of the modifications of the mind--which thus constitute limiting
adjuncts of the soul--it apprehends those external objects, and
identifies itself with the gross body, which is one of those external
objects[98]. When, modified by the impressions which the external
objects have left, it sees dreams, it is denoted by the term 'mind[99].'
When, on the cessation of the two limiting adjuncts (i.e. the subtle and
the gross bodies), and the consequent absence of the modifications due
to the adjuncts, it is, in the state of deep sleep, merged in the Self
as it were, then it is said to be asleep (resolved into the Self). A
similar etymology of the word 'h/ri/daya' is given by /s/ruti, 'That
Self abides in the heart. And this is the etymological explanation: he
is in the heart (h/ri/di ayam).' (Ch. Up. VIII, 3, 3.) The words
a/s/anâya and udanyâ are similarly etymologised: 'water is carrying away
what has been eaten by him;' 'fire carries away what has been drunk by
him' (Ch. Up. VI, 8, 3; 5). Thus the passage quoted above explains the
resolution (of the soul) into the Self, denoted by the term 'Sat,' by
means of the etymology of the word 'sleep.' But the intelligent Self can
clearly not resolve itself into the non-intelligent pradhâna. If, again,
it were said that the pradhâna is denoted by the word 'own,' because
belonging to the Self (as being the Self's own), there would remain the
same absurd statement as to an intelligent entity being resolved into a
non-intelligent one. Moreover another scriptural passage (viz. 'embraced
by the intelligent--praj/ñ/a--Self he knows nothing that is without,
nothing that is within,' B/ri/. Up. IV, 3, 21) declares that the soul in
the condition of dreamless sleep is resolved into an intelligent entity.
Hence that into which all intelligent souls are resolved is an
intelligent cause of the world, denoted by the word 'Sat,' and not the
pradhâna.--A further reason for the pradhâna not being the cause is
subjoined.

10. On account of the uniformity of view (of the Vedânta-texts, Brahman
is to be considered the cause).

If, as in the argumentations of the logicians, so in the Vedânta-texts
also, there were set forth different views concerning the nature of the
cause, some of them favouring the theory of an intelligent Brahman being
the cause of the world, others inclining towards the pradhâna doctrine,
and others again tending in a different direction; then it might perhaps
be possible to interpret such passages as those, which speak of the
cause of the world as thinking, in such a manner as to make them fall in
with the pradhâna theory. But the stated condition is absent since all
the Vedânta-texts uniformly teach that the cause of the world is the
intelligent Brahman. Compare, for instance, 'As from a burning fire
sparks proceed in all directions, thus from that Self the prâ/n/as
proceed each towards its place; from the prâ/n/as the gods, from the
gods the worlds' (Kau. Up. III, 3). And 'from that Self sprang ether'
(Taitt. Up. II, 1). And 'all this springs from the Self' (Ch. Up. VII,
26, 1). And 'this prâ/n/a is born from the Self' (Pr. Up. III, 3); all
which passages declare the Self to be the cause. That the word 'Self'
denotes an intelligent being, we have already shown.

And that all the Vedânta-texts advocate the same view as to an
intelligent cause of the world, greatly strengthens their claim to be
considered a means of right knowledge, just as the corresponding claims
of the senses are strengthened by their giving us information of a
uniform character regarding colour and the like. The all-knowing Brahman
is therefore to be considered the cause of the world, 'on account of the
uniformity of view (of the Vedânta-texts).'--A further reason for this
conclusion is advanced.

11. And because it is directly stated in Scripture (therefore the
all-knowing Brahman is the cause of the world).

That the all-knowing Lord is the cause of the world, is also declared in
a text directly referring to him (viz. the all-knowing one), viz. in the
following passage of the mantropanishad of the /S/vetâ/s/vataras (VI, 9)
where the word 'he' refers to the previously mentioned all-knowing Lord,
'He is the cause, the lord of the lords of the organs, and there is of
him neither parent nor lord.' It is therefore finally settled that the
all-knowing Brahman is the general cause, not the non-intelligent
pradhâna or anything else.

In what precedes we have shown, availing ourselves of appropriate
arguments, that the Vedânta-texts exhibited under Sûtras I, 1-11, are
capable of proving that the all-knowing, all-powerful Lord is the cause
of the origin, subsistence, and dissolution of the world. And we have
explained, by pointing to the prevailing uniformity of view (I, 10),
that all Vedânta-texts whatever maintain an intelligent cause. The
question might therefore be asked, 'What reason is there for the
subsequent part of the Vedânta-sûtras?' (as the chief point is settled
already.)

To this question we reply as follows: Brahman is apprehended under two
forms; in the first place as qualified by limiting conditions owing to
the multiformity of the evolutions of name and form (i.e. the
multiformity of the created world); in the second place as being the
opposite of this, i.e. free from all limiting conditions whatever.
Compare the following passages: B/ri/. Up. IV, 5, 15, 'For where there
is duality as it were, then one sees the other; but when the Self only
is all this, how should he see another?' Ch. Up. VII, 24, 1, 'Where one
sees nothing else, hears nothing else, understands nothing else, that is
the greatest. Where one sees something else, hears something else,
understands something else, that is the little. The greatest is
immortal; the little is mortal;' Taitt. Up. III, 12, 7, 'The wise one,
who having produced all forms and made all names, sits calling (the
things by their names[100]);' /S/v. Up. VI, 19, 'Who is without parts,
without actions, tranquil, without faults, without taint, the highest
bridge of immortality, like a fire that has consumed its fuel;' B/ri/.
Up. II, 3, 6, 'Not so, not so;' B/ri/. Up. III, 8, 8, 'It is neither
coarse nor fine, neither short nor long;' and 'defective is one place,
perfect the other.' All these passages, with many others, declare
Brahman to possess a double nature, according as it is the object either
of Knowledge or of Nescience. As long as it is the object of Nescience,
there are applied to it the categories of devotee, object of devotion,
and the like[101]. The different modes of devotion lead to different
results, some to exaltation, some to gradual emancipation, some to
success in works; those modes are distinct on account of the distinction
of the different qualities and limiting conditions[102]. And although
the one highest Self only, i.e. the Lord distinguished by those
different qualities constitutes the object of devotion, still the fruits
(of devotion) are distinct, according as the devotion refers to
different qualities. Thus Scripture says, 'According as man worships
him, that he becomes;' and, 'According to what his thought is in this
world, so will he be when he has departed this life' (Ch. Up. III, 14,
1). Sm/ri/ti also makes an analogous statement, 'Remembering whatever
form of being he leaves this body in the end, into that form he enters,
being impressed with it through his constant meditation' (Bha. Gîtâ
VIII, 6).

Although one and the same Self is hidden in all beings movable as well
as immovable, yet owing to the gradual rise of excellence of the minds
which form the limiting conditions (of the Self), Scripture declares
that the Self, although eternally unchanging and uniform, reveals
itself[103] in a graduated series of beings, and so appears in forms of
various dignity and power; compare, for instance (Ait. Âr. II, 3, 2, 1),
'He who knows the higher manifestation of the Self in him[104],' &c.
Similarly Sm/ri/ti remarks, 'Whatever being there is of power, splendour
or might, know it to have sprung from portions of my glory' (Bha. Gîtâ,
X, 41); a passage declaring that wherever there is an excess of power
and so on, there the Lord is to be worshipped. Accordingly here (i.e. in
the Sûtras) also the teacher will show that the golden person in the
disc of the Sun is the highest Self, on account of an indicating sign,
viz. the circumstance of his being unconnected with any evil (Ved. Sû.
I, 1, 20); the same is to be observed with regard to I, 1, 22 and other
Sûtras. And, again, an enquiry will have to be undertaken into the
meaning of the texts, in order that a settled conclusion may be reached
concerning that knowledge of the Self which leads to instantaneous
release; for although that knowledge is conveyed by means of various
limiting conditions, yet no special connexion with limiting conditions
is intended to be intimated, in consequence of which there arises a
doubt whether it (the knowledge) has the higher or the lower Brahman for
its object; so, for instance, in the case of Sûtra I, 1, 12[105]. From
all this it appears that the following part of the /S/âstra has a
special object of its own, viz. to show that the Vedânta-texts teach, on
the one hand, Brahman as connected with limiting conditions and forming
an object of devotion, and on the other hand, as being free from the
connexion with such conditions and constituting an object of knowledge.
The refutation, moreover, of non-intelligent causes different from
Brahman, which in I, 1, 10 was based on the uniformity of the meaning of
the Vedânta-texts, will be further detailed by the Sûtrakâra, who, while
explaining additional passages relating to Brahman, will preclude all
causes of a nature opposite to that of Brahman.

12. (The Self) consisting of bliss (is the highest Self) on account of
the repetition (of the word 'bliss,' as denoting the highest Self).

The Taittirîya-upanishad (II, 1-5), after having enumerated the Self
consisting of food, the Self consisting of the vital airs, the Self
consisting of mind, and the Self consisting of understanding, says,
'Different from this which consists of understanding is the other inner
Self which consists of bliss.' Here the doubt arises whether the phrase,
'that which consists of bliss,' denotes the highest Brahman of which it
had been said previously, that 'It is true Being, Knowledge, without
end,' or something different from Brahman, just as the Self consisting
of food, &c., is different from it.--The pûrvapakshin maintains that the
Self consisting of bliss is a secondary (not the principal) Self, and
something different from Brahman; as it forms a link in a series of
Selfs, beginning with the Self consisting of food, which all are not the
principal Self. To the objection that even thus the Self consisting of
bliss may be considered as the primary Self, since it is stated to be
the innermost of all, he replies that this cannot be admitted, because
the Self of bliss is declared to have joy and so on for its limbs, and
because it is said to be embodied. If it were identical with the primary
Self, joy and the like would not touch it; but the text expressly says
'Joy is its head;' and about its being embodied we read, 'Of that former
one this one is the embodied Self' (Taitt. Up. II, 6), i.e. of that
former Self of Understanding this Self of bliss is the embodied Self.
And of what is embodied, the contact with joy and pain cannot be
prevented. Therefore the Self which consists of bliss is nothing but the
transmigrating Soul.

To this reasoning we make the following reply:--By the Self consisting
of bliss we have to understand the highest Self, 'on account of
repetition.' For the word 'bliss' is repeatedly applied to the highest
Self. So Taitt. Up. II, 7, where, after the clause 'That is
flavour'--which refers back to the Self consisting of bliss, and
declares it to be of the nature of flavour--we read, 'For only after
having perceived flavour can any one perceive delight. Who could
breathe, who could breathe forth if that Bliss existed not in the ether
(of the heart)? For he alone causes blessedness;' and again, II, 8, 'Now
this is an examination of Bliss;' 'He reaches that Self consisting of
Bliss;' and again, II, 9, 'He who knows the Bliss of Brahman fears
nothing;' and in addition, 'He understood that Bliss is Brahman' (III,
6). And in another scriptural passage also (B/ri/. Up. III, 9, 28),
'Knowledge and bliss is Brahman,' we see the word 'bliss' applied just
to Brahman. As, therefore, the word 'bliss' is repeatedly used with
reference to Brahman, we conclude that the Self consisting of bliss is
Brahman also. The objection that the Self consisting of bliss can only
denote the secondary Self (the Sa/m/sârin), because it forms a link in a
series of secondary Selfs, beginning with the one consisting of food, is
of no force, for the reason that the Self consisting of bliss is the
innermost of all. The /S/âstra, wishing to convey information about the
primary Self, adapts itself to common notions, in so far as it at first
refers to the body consisting of food, which, although not the Self, is
by very obtuse people identified with it; it then proceeds from the body
to another Self, which has the same shape with the preceding one, just
as the statue possesses the form of the mould into which the molten
brass had been poured; then, again, to another one, always at first
representing the Non-Self as the Self, for the purpose of easier
comprehension; and it finally teaches that the innermost Self[106],
which consists of bliss, is the real Self. Just as when a man, desirous
of pointing out the star Arundhatî to another man, at first points to
several stars which are not Arundhatî as being Arundhatî, while only the
star pointed out in the end is the real Arundhatî; so here also the Self
consisting of bliss is the real Self on account of its being the
innermost (i.e. the last). Nor can any weight be allowed to the
objection that the attribution of joy and so on, as head, &c., cannot
possibly refer to the real Self; for this attribution is due to the
immediately preceding limiting condition (viz. the Self consisting of
understanding, the so-called vij/ñ/ânakosa), and does not really belong
to the real Self. The possession of a bodily nature also is ascribed to
the Self of bliss, only because it is represented as a link in the chain
of bodies which begins with the Self consisting of food, and is not
ascribed to it in the same direct sense in which it is predicated of the
transmigrating Self. Hence the Self consisting of bliss is the highest
Brahman.

13. If (it be objected that the term ânandamaya, consisting of bliss,
can) not (denote the highest Self) on account of its being a word
denoting a modification (or product); (we declare the objection to be)
not (valid) on account of abundance, (the idea of which may be expressed
by the affix maya.)

Here the pûrvapakshin raises the objection that the word ânandamaya
(consisting of bliss) cannot denote the highest Self.--Why?--Because the
word ânandamaya is understood to denote something different from the
original word (i.e. the word ânanda without the derivative affix maya),
viz. a modification; according to the received sense of the affix maya.
'Ânandamaya' therefore denotes a modification, just as annamaya
(consisting of food) and similar words do.

This objection is, however, not valid, because 'maya' is also used in
the sense of abundance, i.e. denotes that where there is abundance of
what the original word expresses. So, for instance, the phrase 'the
sacrifice is annamaya' means 'the sacrifice is abounding in food' (not
'is some modification or product of food'). Thus here Brahman also, as
abounding in bliss, is called ânandamaya. That Brahman does abound in
bliss follows from the passage (Taitt. Up. II, 8), where, after the
bliss of each of the different classes of beings, beginning with man,
has been declared to be a hundred times greater than the bliss of the
immediately preceding class, the bliss of Brahman is finally proclaimed
to be absolutely supreme. Maya therefore denotes abundance.

14. And because he is declared to be the cause of it, (i.e. of bliss;
therefore maya is to be taken as denoting abundance.)

Maya must be understood to denote abundance, for that reason also that
Scripture declares Brahman to be the cause of bliss, 'For he alone
causes bliss' (Taitt. Up. II, 7). For he who causes bliss must himself
abound in bliss; just as we infer in ordinary life, that a man who
enriches others must himself possess abundant wealth. As, therefore,
maya may be taken to mean 'abundant,' the Self consisting of bliss is
the highest Self.

15. Moreover (the ânandamaya is Brahman because) the same (Brahman)
which had been referred to in the mantra is sung, (i.e. proclaimed in
the Brâhma/n/a passage as the ânandamaya.)

The Self, consisting of joy, is the highest Brahman for the following
reason also[107]. On the introductory words 'he who knows Brahman
attains the highest' (Taitt. Up. II, 1), there follows a mantra
proclaiming that Brahman, which forms the general topic of the chapter,
possesses the qualities of true existence, intelligence, infinity; after
that it is said that from Brahman there sprang at first the ether and
then all other moving and non-moving things, and that, entering into the
beings which it had emitted, Brahman stays in the recess, inmost of all;
thereupon, for its better comprehension, the series of the different
Selfs ('different from this is the inner Self,' &c.) are enumerated, and
then finally the same Brahman which the mantra had proclaimed, is again
proclaimed in the passage under discussion, 'different from this is the
other inner Self, which consists of bliss.' To assume that a mantra and
the Brâhma/n/a passage belonging to it have the same sense is only
proper, on account of the absence of contradiction (which results
therefrom); for otherwise we should be driven to the unwelcome inference
that the text drops the topic once started, and turns to an altogether
new subject.

Nor is there mentioned a further inner Self different from the Self
consisting of bliss, as in the case of the Self consisting of food,
&c.[108] On the same (i.e. the Self consisting of bliss) is founded,
'This same knowledge of Bh/ri/gu and Varu/n/a; he understood that bliss
is Brahman' (Taitt. Up. III, 6). Therefore the Self consisting of bliss
is the highest Self.

16. (The Self consisting of bliss is the highest Self,) not the other
(i.e. the individual Soul), on account of the impossibility (of the
latter assumption).

And for the following reason also the Self consisting of bliss is the
highest Self only, not the other, i.e. the one which is other than the
Lord, i.e. the transmigrating individual soul. The personal soul cannot
be denoted by the term 'the one consisting of bliss.' Why? On account of
the impossibility. For Scripture says, with reference to the Self
consisting of bliss, 'He wished, may I be many, may I grow forth. He
brooded over himself. After he had thus brooded, he sent forth whatever
there is.' Here, the desire arising before the origination of a body,
&c., the non-separation of the effects created from the creator, and the
creation of all effects whatever, cannot possibly belong to any Self
different from the highest Self.

17. And on account of the declaration of the difference (of the two, the
ânandamaya cannot be the transmigrating soul).

The Self consisting of bliss cannot be identical with the transmigrating
soul, for that reason also that in the section treating of the Self of
bliss, the individual soul and the Self of bliss are distinctly
represented as different; Taitt. Up. II, 7, 'It (i.e. the Self
consisting of bliss) is a flavour; for only after perceiving a flavour
can this (soul) perceive bliss.' For he who perceives cannot be that
which is perceived.--But, it may be asked, if he who perceives or
attains cannot be that which is perceived or attained, how about the
following /S/ruti- and Smr/ri/ti-passages, 'The Self is to be sought;'
'Nothing higher is known than the attainment of the Self[109]?'--This
objection, we reply, is legitimate (from the point of view of absolute
truth). Yet we see that in ordinary life, the Self, which in reality is
never anything but the Self, is, owing to non-comprehension of the
truth, identified with the Non-Self, i.e. the body and so on; whereby it
becomes possible to speak of the Self in so far as it is identified with
the body, and so on, as something not searched for but to be searched
for, not heard but to be heard, not seized but to be seized, not
perceived but to be perceived, not known but to be known, and the like.
Scripture, on the other hand, denies, in such passages as 'there is no
other seer but he' (B/ri/. Up. III, 7, 23), that there is in reality any
seer or hearer different from the all-knowing highest Lord. (Nor can it
be said that the Lord is unreal because he is identical with the unreal
individual soul; for)[110] the Lord differs from the soul
(vij/ñ/ânâtman) which is embodied, acts and enjoys, and is the product
of Nescience, in the same way as the real juggler who stands on the
ground differs from the illusive juggler, who, holding in his hand a
shield and a sword, climbs up to the sky by means of a rope; or as the
free unlimited ether differs from the ether of a jar, which is
determined by its limiting adjunct, (viz. the jar.) With reference to
this fictitious difference of the highest Self and the individual Self,
the two last Sûtras have been propounded.

18. And on account of desire (being mentioned as belonging to the
ânandamaya) no regard is to be had to what is inferred, (i.e. to the
pradhâna inferred by the Sâ@nkhyas.)

Since in the passage 'he desired, may I be many, may I grow forth,'
which occurs in the chapter treating of the ânandamaya (Taitt. Up. II,
6), the quality of feeling desire is mentioned, that which is inferred,
i.e. the non-intelligent pradhâna assumed by the Sâ@nkhyas, cannot be
regarded as being the Self consisting of bliss and the cause of the
world. Although the opinion that the pradhâna is the cause of the world,
has already been refuted in the Sûtra I, 1, 5, it is here, where a
favourable opportunity presents itself, refuted for a second time on the
basis of the scriptural passage about the cause of the world feeling
desire, for the purpose of showing the uniformity of view (of all
scriptural passages).

19. And, moreover, it (i.e. Scripture) teaches the joining of this (i.e.
the individual soul) with that, (i.e. the Self consisting of bliss), on
that (being fully known).

And for the following reason also the term, 'the Self consisting of
bliss,' cannot denote either the pradhâna or the individual soul.
Scripture teaches that the individual soul when it has reached knowledge
is joined, i.e. identified, with the Self of bliss under discussion,
i.e. obtains final release. Compare the following passage (Taitt. Up.
II, 7), 'When he finds freedom from fear, and rest in that which is
invisible, incorporeal, undefined, unsupported, then he has obtained the
fearless. For if he makes but the smallest distinction in it there is
fear for him.' That means, if he sees in that Self consisting of bliss
even a small difference in the form of non-identity, then he finds no
release from the fear of transmigratory existence. But when he, by means
of the cognition of absolute identity, finds absolute rest in the Self
consisting of bliss, then he is freed from the fear of transmigratory
existence. But this (finding absolute rest) is possible only when we
understand by the Self consisting of bliss, the highest Self, and not
either the pradhâna or the individual soul. Hence it is proved that the
Self consisting of bliss is the highest Self.

But, in reality, the following remarks have to be made concerning the
true meaning of the word 'ânandamaya[111].' On what grounds, we ask, can
it be maintained that the affix 'maya' after having, in the series of
compounds beginning with annamaya and ending with vij/ñ/ânamaya, denoted
mere modifications, should all at once, in the word ânandamaya, which
belongs to the same series, denote abundance, so that ânandamaya would
refer to Brahman? If it should be said that the assumption is made on
account of the governing influence of the Brahman proclaimed in the
mantra (which forms the beginning of the chapter, Taitt. Up. II), we
reply that therefrom it would follow that also the Selfs consisting of
food, breath, &c., denote Brahman (because the governing influence of
the mantra extends to them also).--The advocate of the former
interpretation will here, perhaps, restate an argument already made use
of above, viz. as follows: To assume that the Selfs consisting of food,
and so on, are not Brahman is quite proper, because after each of them
an inner Self is mentioned. After the Self of bliss, on the other hand,
no further inner Self is mentioned, and hence it must be considered to
be Brahman itself; otherwise we should commit the mistake of dropping
the subject-matter in hand (as which Brahman is pointed out by the
mantra), and taking up a new topic.--But to this we reply that, although
unlike the case of the Selfs consisting of food, &c., no inner Self is
mentioned after the Self consisting of bliss, still the latter cannot be
considered as Brahman, because with reference to the Self consisting of
bliss Scripture declares, 'Joy is its head. Satisfaction is its right
arm. Great satisfaction is its left arm. Bliss is its trunk. Brahman is
its tail, its support.' Now, here the very same Brahman which, in the
mantra, had been introduced as the subject of the discussion, is called
the tail, the support; while the five involucra, extending from the
involucrum of food up to the involucrum of bliss, are merely introduced
for the purpose of setting forth the knowledge of Brahman. How, then,
can it be maintained that our interpretation implies the needless
dropping of the general subject-matter and the introduction of a new
topic?--But, it may again be objected, Brahman is called the tail, i.e.
a member of the Self consisting of bliss; analogously to those passages
in which a tail and other members are ascribed to the Selfs consisting
of food and so on. On what grounds, then, can we claim to know that
Brahman (which is spoken of as a mere member, i.e. a subordinate matter)
is in reality the chief matter referred to?--From the fact, we reply, of
Brahman being the general subject-matter of the chapter.--But, it will
again be said, that interpretation also according to which Brahman is
cognised as a mere member of the ânandamaya does not involve a dropping
of the subject-matter, since the ânandamaya himself is Brahman.--But, we
reply, in that case one and the same Brahman would at first appear as
the whole, viz. as the Self consisting of bliss, and thereupon as a mere
part, viz. as the tail; which is absurd. And as one of the two
alternatives must be preferred, it is certainly appropriate to refer to
Brahman the clause 'Brahman is the tail' which contains the word
'Brahman,' and not the sentence about the Self of Bliss in which Brahman
is not mentioned. Moreover, Scripture, in continuation of the phrase,
'Brahman is the tail, the support,' goes on, 'On this there is also the
following /s/loka: He who knows the Brahman as non-existing becomes
himself non-existing. He who knows Brahman as existing him we know
himself as existing.' As this /s/loka, without any reference to the Self
of bliss, states the advantage and disadvantage connected with the
knowledge of the being and non-being of Brahman only, we conclude that
the clause, 'Brahman is the tail, the support,' represents Brahman as
the chief matter (not as a merely subordinate matter). About the being
or non-being of the Self of bliss, on the other hand, a doubt is not
well possible, since the Self of bliss distinguished by joy,
satisfaction, &c., is well known to every one.--But if Brahman is the
principal matter, how can it be designated as the mere tail of the Self
of bliss ('Brahman is the tail, the support')?--Its being called so, we
reply, forms no objection; for the word tail here denotes that which is
of the nature of a tail, so that we have to understand that the bliss of
Brahman is not a member (in its literal sense), but the support or
abode, the one nest (resting-place) of all worldly bliss. Analogously
another scriptural passage declares, 'All other creatures live on a
small portion of that bliss' (B/ri/. Up. IV, 3, 32). Further, if by the
Self consisting of bliss we were to understand Brahman we should have to
assume that the Brahman meant is the Brahman distinguished by qualities
(savi/s/esha), because it is said to have joy and the like for its
members. But this assumption is contradicted by a complementary passage
(II, 9) which declares that Brahman is the object neither of mind nor
speech, and so shows that the Brahman meant is the (absolute) Brahman
(devoid of qualities), 'From whence all speech, with the mind, turns
away unable to reach it, he who knows the bliss of that Brahman fears
nothing.' Moreover, if we speak of something as 'abounding in
bliss[112],' we thereby imply the co-existence of pain; for the word
'abundance' in its ordinary sense implies the existence of a small
measure of what is opposed to the thing whereof there is abundance. But
the passage so understood would be in conflict with another passage (Ch.
Up. VII, 24), 'Where one sees nothing else, hears nothing else,
understands nothing else, that is the Infinite;' which declares that in
the Infinite, i.e. Brahman, there is nothing whatever different from it.
Moreover, as joy, &c. differ in each individual body, the Self
consisting of bliss also is a different one in each body. Brahman, on
the other hand, does not differ according to bodies; for the mantra at
the beginning of the chapter declares it to be true Being, knowledge,
infinite, and another passage says, 'He is the one God, hidden in all
beings, all-pervading, the Self within all beings' (/S/v. Up. VI, 11).
Nor, again, does Scripture exhibit a frequent repetition of the word
'ânandamaya;' for merely the radical part of the compound (i.e. the word
ânanda without the affix maya) is repeated in all the following
passages; 'It is a flavour, for only after seizing flavour can any one
seize bliss. Who could breathe, who could breathe forth, if that bliss
existed not in the ether? For he alone causes blessedness;' 'Now this is
an examination of bliss;' 'He who knows the bliss of that Brahman fears
nothing;' 'He understood that bliss is Brahman.' If it were a settled
matter that Brahman is denoted by the term, 'the Self consisting of
bliss,' then we could assume that in the subsequent passages, where
merely the word 'bliss' is employed, the term 'consisting of bliss' is
meant to be repeated; but that the Self consisting of bliss is not
Brahman, we have already proved by means of the reason of joy being its
head, and so on. Hence, as in another scriptural passage, viz. 'Brahman
is knowledge and bliss' (B/ri/. Up. III, 9, 28), the mere word 'bliss'
denotes Brahman, we must conclude that also in such passages as, 'If
that bliss existed not in the ether,' the word bliss is used with
reference to Brahman, and is not meant to repeat the term 'consisting of
bliss.' The repetition of the full compound, 'consisting of bliss,'
which occurs in the passage, 'He reaches that Self consisting of bliss'
(Taitt. Up. II, 8), does not refer to Brahman, as it is contained in the
enumeration of Non-Selfs, comprising the Self of food, &c., all of which
are mere effects, and all of which are represented as things to be
reached.--But, it may be said, if the Self consisting of bliss, which is
said to have to be reached, were not Brahman--just as the Selfs
consisting of food, &c. are not Brahman--then it would not be declared
(in the passage immediately following) that he who knows obtains for his
reward Brahman.--This objection we invalidate by the remark that the
text makes its declaration as to Brahman--which is the tail, the
support--being reached by him who knows, by the very means of the
declaration as to the attainment of the Self of bliss; as appears from
the passage, 'On this there is also this /s/loka, from which all speech
returns,' &c. With reference, again, to the passage, 'He desired: may I
be many, may I grow forth,' which is found in proximity to the mention
of the Self consisting of bliss, we remark that it is in reality
connected (not with the Self of bliss but with) Brahman, which is
mentioned in the still nearer passage, 'Brahman is the tail, the
support,' and does therefore not intimate that the Self of bliss is
Brahman. And, on account of its referring to the passage last quoted
('it desired,' &c.), the later passage also, 'That is flavour,' &c., has
not the Self of bliss for its subject.--But, it may be objected, the
(neuter word) Brahman cannot possibly be designated by a masculine word
as you maintain is done in the passage, 'He desired,' &c.--In reply to
this objection we point to the passage (Taitt. Up. II, 1), 'From that
Self sprang ether,' where, likewise, the masculine word 'Self' can refer
to Brahman only, since the latter is the general topic of the chapter.
In the knowledge of Bh/ri/gu and Varu/n/a finally ('he knew that bliss
is Brahman'), the word 'bliss' is rightly understood to denote Brahman,
since we there meet neither with the affix 'maya,' nor with any
statement as to joy being its head, and the like. To ascribe to Brahman
in itself joy, and so on, as its members, is impossible, unless we have
recourse to certain, however minute, distinctions qualifying Brahman;
and that the whole chapter is not meant to convey a knowledge of the
qualified (savi/s/esha) Brahman is proved by the passage (quoted above),
which declares that Brahman transcends speech and mind. We therefore
must conclude that the affix maya, in the word ânandamaya, does not
denote abundance, but expresses a mere effect, just as it does in the
words annamaya and the subsequent similar compounds.

The Sûtras are therefore to be explained as follows. There arises the
question whether the passage, 'Brahman is the tail, the support,' is to
be understood as intimating that Brahman is a mere member of the Self
consisting of bliss, or that it is the principal matter. If it is said
that it must be considered as a mere member, the reply is, 'The Self
consisting of bliss on account of the repetition.' That means: Brahman,
which in the passage 'the Self consisting of bliss,' &c., is spoken of
as the tail, the support, is designated as the principal matter (not as
something subordinate). On account of the repetition; for in the
memorial /s/loka, 'he becomes himself non-existing,' Brahman alone is
reiterated. 'If not, on account of the word denoting a modification; not
so, on account of abundance.' In this Sûtra the word 'modification' is
meant to convey the sense of member. The objection that on account of
the word 'tail,' which denotes a mere member, Brahman cannot be taken as
the principal matter must be refuted. This we do by remarking that there
is no difficulty, since a word denoting a member may be introduced into
the passage on account of prâ/k/urya[113]. Prâ/k/urya here means a
phraseology abounding in terms denoting members. After the different
members, beginning with the head and ending with the tail, of the Selfs,
consisting of food, &c. have been enumerated, there are also mentioned
the head and the other limbs of the Self of bliss, and then it is added,
'Brahman is the tail, the support;' the intention being merely to
introduce some more terms denoting members, not to convey the meaning of
'member,' (an explanation which is impossible) because the preceding
Sûtra already has proved Brahman (not to be a member, but) to be the
principal matter. 'And because he is declared to be the cause of it.'
That means: Brahman is declared to be the cause of the entire aggregate
of effects, inclusive of the Self, consisting of bliss, in the following
passage, 'He created all whatever there is' (Taitt. Up. II, 6). And as
Brahman is the cause, it cannot at the same time be called the member,
in the literal sense of the word, of the Self of bliss, which is nothing
but one of Brahman's effects. The other Sûtras also (which refer to the
Self of bliss[114]) are to be considered, as well as they may, as
conveying a knowledge of Brahman, which (Brahman) is referred to in the
passage about the tail.

20. The one within (the sun and the eye) (is the highest Lord), on
account of his qualities being declared[115].

The following passage is found in Scripture (Ch. Up. I, 6, 6 ff.), 'Now
that person bright as gold who is seen within the sun, with beard bright
as gold and hair bright as gold, bright as gold altogether to the very
tips of his nails, whose eyes are like blue lotus; his name is Ut, for
he has risen (udita) above all evil. He also who knows this rises above
all evil. So much with reference to the devas.' And further on, with
reference to the body, 'Now the person who is seen in the eye,' &c. Here
the following doubt presents itself. Do these passages point out, as the
object of devotion directed on the sphere of the sun and the eye, merely
some special individual soul, which, by means of a large measure of
knowledge and pious works, has raised itself to a position of eminence;
or do they refer to the eternally perfect highest Lord?

The pûrvapakshin takes the former view. An individual soul, he says, is
referred to, since Scripture speaks of a definite shape. To the person
in the sun special features are ascribed, such as the possession of a
beard as bright as gold and so on, and the same features manifestly
belong to the person in the eye also, since they are expressly
transferred to it in the passage, 'The shape of this person is the same
as the shape of that person.' That, on the other hand, no shape can be
ascribed to the highest Lord, follows from the passage (Kau. Up. I, 3,
15), 'That which is without sound, without touch, without form, without
decay.' That an individual soul is meant follows moreover from the fact
that a definite abode is mentioned, 'He who is in the sun; he who is in
the eye.' About the highest Lord, who has no special abode, but abides
in his own glory, no similar statement can be made; compare, for
instance, the two following passages, 'Where does he rest? In his own
glory?' (Ch. Up. VII, 24, 1); and 'like the ether he is omnipresent,
eternal.' A further argument for our view is supplied by the fact that
the might (of the being in question) is said to be limited; for the
passage, 'He is lord of the worlds beyond that, and of the wishes of the
devas,' indicates the limitation of the might of the person in the sun;
and the passage, 'He is lord of the worlds beneath that and of the
wishes of men,' indicates the limitation of the might of the person in
the eye. No limit, on the other hand, can be admitted of the might of
the highest Lord, as appears from the passage (B/ri/. Up. IV, 4, 22),
'He is the Lord of all, the king of all things, the protector of all
things. He is a bank and a boundary so that these worlds may not be
confounded;' which passage intimates that the Lord is free from all
limiting distinctions. For all these reasons the person in the eye and
the sun cannot be the highest Lord.

To this reasoning the Sûtra replies, 'The one within, on account of his
qualities being declared.' The person referred to in the passages
concerning the person within the sun and the person within the eye is
not a transmigrating being, but the highest Lord. Why? Because his
qualities are declared. For the qualities of the highest Lord are
indicated in the text as follows. At first the name of the person within
the sun is mentioned--'his name is Ut'--and then this name is explained
on the ground of that person being free from all evil, 'He has risen
above all evil.' The same name thus explained is then transferred to the
person in the eye, in the clause, 'the name of the one is the name of
the other.' Now, entire freedom from sin is attributed in Scripture to
the highest Self only; so, for instance (Ch. Up. VIII, 7, 1), 'The Self
which is free from sin,' &c. Then, again, there is the passage, 'He is
/Ri/k, he is Sâman, Uktha, Yajus, Brahman,' which declares the person in
the eye to be the Self of the /Ri/k, Sâman, and so on; which is possible
only if that person is the Lord who, as being the cause of all, is to be
considered as the Self of all. Moreover, the text, after having stated
in succession /Ri/k and Sâman to have earth and fire for their Self with
reference to the Devas, and, again, speech and breath with reference to
the body, continues, '/Ri/k and Sâman are his joints,' with reference to
the Devas, and 'the joints of the one are the joints of the other,' with
reference to the body. Now this statement also can be made only with
regard to that which is the Self of all. Further, the passage,
'Therefore all who sing to the Vînâ sing him, and from him also they
obtain wealth,' shows that the being spoken of is the sole topic of all
worldly songs; which again holds true of the highest Lord only. That
absolute command over the objects of worldly desires (as displayed, for
instance, in the bestowal of wealth) entitles us to infer that the Lord
is meant, appears also from the following passage of the Bhagavad-gîtâ
(X, 41), 'Whatever being there is possessing power, glory, or strength,
know it to be produced from a portion of my energy[116].' To the
objection that the statements about bodily shape contained in the
clauses, 'With a beard bright as gold,' &c., cannot refer to the highest
Lord, we reply that the highest Lord also may, when he pleases, assume a
bodily shape formed of Mâyâ, in order to gratify thereby his devout
worshippers. Thus Sm/ri/ti also says, 'That thou seest me, O Nârada, is
the Mâyâ emitted by me; do not then look on me as endowed with the
qualities of all beings.' We have further to note that expressions such
as, 'That which is without sound, without touch, without form, without
decay,' are made use of where instruction is given about the nature of
the highest Lord in so far as he is devoid of all qualities; while
passages such as the following one, 'He to whom belong all works, all
desires, all sweet odours and tastes' (Ch. Up. III, 14, 2), which
represent the highest Lord as the object of devotion, speak of him, who
is the cause of everything, as possessing some of the qualities of his
effects. Analogously he may be spoken of, in the passage under
discussion, as having a beard bright as gold and so on. With reference
to the objection that the highest Lord cannot be meant because an abode
is spoken of, we remark that, for the purposes of devout meditation, a
special abode may be assigned to Brahman, although it abides in its own
glory only; for as Brahman is, like ether, all-pervading, it may be
viewed as being within the Self of all beings. The statement, finally,
about the limitation of Brahman's might, which depends on the
distinction of what belongs to the gods and what to the body, has
likewise reference to devout meditation only. From all this it follows
that the being which Scripture states to be within the eye and the sun
is the highest Lord.

21. And there is another one (i.e. the Lord who is different from the
individual souls animating the sun, &c.), on account of the declaration
of distinction.

There is, moreover, one distinct from the individual souls which animate
the sun and other bodies, viz. the Lord who rules within; whose
distinction (from all individual souls) is proclaimed in the following
scriptural passage, 'He who dwells in the sun and within the sun, whom
the sun does not know, whose body the sun is, and who rules the sun
within; he is thy Self, the ruler within, the immortal' (B/ri/. Up. III,
7, 9). Here the expression, 'He within the sun whom the sun does not
know,' clearly indicates that the Ruler within is distinct from that
cognising individual soul whose body is the sun. With that Ruler within
we have to identify the person within the sun, according to the tenet of
the sameness of purport of all Vedânta-texts. It thus remains a settled
conclusion that the passage under discussion conveys instruction about
the highest Lord.

22. The âkâ/s/a, i.e. ether (is Brahman) on account of characteristic
marks (of the latter being mentioned).

In the Chândogya (I, 9) the following passage is met with, 'What is the
origin of this world?' 'Ether,' he replied. 'For all these beings take
their rise from the ether only, and return into the ether. Ether is
greater than these, ether is their rest.'--Here the following doubt
arises. Does the word 'ether' denote the highest Brahman or the
elemental ether?--Whence the doubt?--Because the word is seen to be used
in both senses. Its use in the sense of 'elemental ether' is well
established in ordinary as well as in Vedic speech; and, on the other
hand, we see that it is sometimes used to denote Brahman, viz. in cases
where we ascertain, either from some complementary sentence or from the
fact of special qualities being mentioned, that Brahman is meant. So,
for instance, Taitt. Up. II, 7, 'If that bliss existed not in the
ether;' and Ch. Up. VIII, 14, 'That which is called ether is the
revealer of all forms and names; that within which forms and names
are[117] that is Brahman.' Hence the doubt.--Which sense is then to be
adopted in our case?--The sense of elemental ether, the pûrvapakshin
replies; because this sense belongs to the word more commonly, and
therefore presents itself to the mind more readily. The word 'ether'
cannot be taken in both senses equally, because that would involve a
(faulty) attribution of several meanings to one and the same word. Hence
the term 'ether' applies to Brahman in a secondary (metaphorical) sense
only; on account of Brahman being in many of its attributes, such as all
pervadingness and the like, similar to ether. The rule is, that when the
primary sense of a word is possible, the word must not be taken in a
secondary sense. And in the passage under discussion only the primary
sense of the word 'ether' is admissible. Should it be objected that, if
we refer the passage under discussion to the elemental ether, a
complementary passage ('for all these beings take their rise from the
ether only, &c.') cannot be satisfactorily accounted for; we reply that
the elemental ether also may be represented as a cause, viz. of air,
fire, &c. in due succession. For we read in Scripture (Taitt. Up. II,
1), 'From that Self sprang ether, from ether air, from air fire, and so
on.' The qualities also of being greater and of being a place of rest
may be ascribed to the elemental ether, if we consider its relations to
all other beings. Therefore we conclude that the word 'ether' here
denotes the elemental ether.

To this we reply as follows:--The word ether must here be taken to
denote Brahman, on account of characteristic marks of the latter being
mentioned. For the sentence, 'All these beings take their rise from the
ether only,' clearly indicates the highest Brahman, since all
Vedânta-texts agree in definitely declaring that all beings spring from
the highest Brahman.--But, the opponent may say, we have shown that the
elemental ether also may be represented as the cause, viz. of air, fire,
and the other elements in due succession.--We admit this. But still
there remains the difficulty, that, unless we understand the word to
apply to the fundamental cause of all, viz. Brahman, the affirmation
contained in the word 'only' and the qualification expressed by the word
'all' (in 'all beings') would be out of place. Moreover, the clause,
'They return into the ether,' again points to Brahman, and so likewise
the phrase, 'Ether is greater than these, ether is their rest;' for
absolute superiority in point of greatness Scripture attributes to the
highest Self only; cp. Ch. Up. III, 14, 3, 'Greater than the earth,
greater than the sky, greater than heaven, greater than all these
worlds.' The quality of being a place of rest likewise agrees best with
the highest Brahman, on account of its being the highest cause. This is
confirmed by the following scriptural passage: 'Knowledge and bliss is
Brahman, it is the rest of him who gives gifts' (B/ri/. Up. III, 9, 28).
Moreover, Jaivali finding fault with the doctrine of /S/âlâvatya, on
account of (his sâman) having an end (Ch. Up. I, 8, 8), and wishing to
proclaim something that has no end chooses the ether, and then, having
identified the ether with the Udgîtha, concludes, 'He is the Udgîtha
greater than great; he is without end.' Now this endlessness is a
characteristic mark of Brahman. To the remark that the sense of
'elemental ether' presents itself to the mind more readily, because it
is the better established sense of the word âkâ/s/a, we reply, that,
although it may present itself to the mind first, yet it is not to be
accepted, because we see that qualities of Brahman are mentioned in the
complementary sentences. That the word âkâ/s/a is also used to denote
Brahman has been shown already; cp. such passages as, 'Ether is the
revealer of all names and forms.' We see, moreover, that various
synonyma of âkâ/s/a are employed to denote Brahman. So, for instance,
/Ri/k Sa/m/h. I, 164, 39, 'In which the Vedas are[118], in the
Imperishable one (i.e. Brahman), the highest, the ether (vyoman), on
which all gods have their seat.' And Taitt. Up. III, 6, 'This is the
knowledge of Bh/ri/gu and Varu/n/a, founded on the highest ether
(vyoman).' And again, 'Om, ka is Brahman, ether (kha) is Brahman' (Ch.
Up. IV, 10, 5), and 'the old ether' (B/ri/. Up. V, 1)[119]. And other
similar passages. On account of the force of the complementary passage
we are justified in deciding that the word 'ether,' although occurring
in the beginning of the passage, refers to Brahman. The case is
analogous to that of the sentence, 'Agni (lit. the fire) studies a
chapter,' where the word agni, although occurring in the beginning, is
at once seen to denote a boy[120]. It is therefore settled that the word
'ether' denotes Brahman.

23. For the same reason breath (is Brahman).

Concerning the udgîtha it is said (Ch. Up. I, 10, 9), 'Prastot/ri/, that
deity which belongs to the prastâva, &c.,' and, further on (I, 11, 4;
5), 'Which then is that deity? He said: Breath. For all these beings
merge into breath alone, and from breath they arise. This is the deity
belonging to the prastâva.' With reference to this passage doubt and
decision are to be considered as analogous to those stated under the
preceding Sûtra. For while in some passages--as, for instance, 'For
indeed, my son, mind is fastened to prâ/n/a,' Ch. Up. VI, 8, 2; and,
'the prâ/n/a of prâ/n/a,' B/ri/. Up. IV, 4, 18--the word 'breath' is
seen to denote Brahman, its use in the sense of a certain modification
of air is better established in common as well as in Vedic language.
Hence there arises a doubt whether in the passage under discussion the
word prâ/n/a denotes Brahman or (ordinary) breath. In favour of which
meaning have we then to decide?

Here the pûrvapakshin maintains that the word must be held to denote the
fivefold vital breath, which is a peculiar modification of wind (or
air); because, as has been remarked already, that sense of the word
prâ/n/a is the better established one.--But no, an objector will say,
just as in the case of the preceding Sûtra, so here also Brahman is
meant, on account of characteristic marks being mentioned; for here also
a complementary passage gives us to understand that all beings spring
from and merge into prâ/n/a; a process which can take place in connexion
with the highest Lord only.--This objection, the pûrvapakshin replies,
is futile, since we see that the beings enter into and proceed from the
principal vital air also. For Scripture makes the following statement
(Sat. Br. X, 3, 3, 6), 'When man sleeps, then into breath indeed speech
merges, into breath the eye, into breath the ear, into breath the mind;
when he awakes then they spring again from breath alone.' What the Veda
here states is, moreover, a matter of observation, for during sleep,
while the process of breathing goes on uninterruptedly, the activity of
the sense organs is interrupted and again becomes manifest at the time
of awaking only. And as the sense organs are the essence of all material
beings, the complementary passage which speaks of the merging and
emerging of the beings can be reconciled with the principal vital air
also. Moreover, subsequently to prâ/n/a being mentioned as the divinity
of the prastâva the sun and food are designated as the divinities of the
udgitha and the pratibâra. Now as they are not Brahman, the prâ/n/a
also, by parity of reasoning, cannot be Brahman.

To this argumentation the author of the Sûtras replies: For the same
reason prâ/n/a--that means: on account of the presence of characteristic
marks--which constituted the reason stated in the preceding Sûtra--the
word prâ/n/a also must be held to denote Brahman. For Scripture says of
prâ/n/a also, that it is connected with marks characteristic of Brahman.
The sentence, 'All these beings merge into breath alone, and from breath
they arise,' which declares that the origination and retractation of all
beings depend on prâ/n/a, clearly shows prâ/n/a to be Brahman. In reply
to the assertion that the origination and retractation of all beings can
be reconciled equally well with the assumption of prâ/n/a denoting the
chief vital air, because origination and retractation take place in the
state of waking and of sleep also, we remark that in those two states
only the senses are merged into, and emerge from, the chief vital air,
while, according to the scriptural passage, 'For all these beings, &c.,'
all beings whatever into which a living Self has entered, together with
their senses and bodies, merge and emerge by turns. And even if the word
'beings' were taken (not in the sense of animated beings, but) in the
sense of material elements in general, there would be nothing in the way
of interpreting the passage as referring to Brahman.--But, it may be
said, that the senses together with their objects do, during sleep,
enter into prâ/n/a, and again issue from it at the time of waking, we
distinctly learn from another scriptural passage, viz. Kau. Up. III, 3,
'When a man being thus asleep sees no dream whatever, he becomes one
with that prâ/n/a alone. Then speech goes to him with all names,'
&c.--True, we reply, but there also the word prâ/n/a denotes (not the
vital air) but Brahman, as we conclude from characteristic marks of
Brahman being mentioned. The objection, again, that the word prâ/n/a
cannot denote Brahman because it occurs in proximity to the words 'food'
and 'sun' (which do not refer to Brahman), is altogether baseless; for
proximity is of no avail against the force of the complementary passage
which intimates that prâ/n/a is Brahman. That argument, finally, which
rests on the fact that the word prâ/n/a commonly denotes the vital air
with its five modifications, is to be refuted in the same way as the
parallel argument which the pûrvapakshin brought forward with reference
to the word 'ether.' From all this it follows that the prâ/n/a, which is
the deity of the prastâva, is Brahman.

Some (commentators)[121] quote under the present Sûtra the following
passages, 'the prâ/n/a of prâ/n/a' (B/ri/. Up. IV, 4, 18), and 'for to
prâ/n/a mind is fastened' (Ch. Up. VI, 8, 2). But that is wrong since
these two passages offer no opportunity for any discussion, the former
on account of the separation of the words, the latter on account of the
general topic. When we meet with a phrase such as 'the father of the
father' we understand at once that the genitive denotes a father
different from the father denoted by the nominative. Analogously we
infer from the separation of words contained in the phrase, 'the breath
of breath,' that the 'breath of breath' is different from the ordinary
breath (denoted by the genitive 'of breath'). For one and the same thing
cannot, by means of a genitive, be predicated of--and thus distinguished
from--itself. Concerning the second passage we remark that, if the
matter constituting the general topic of some chapter is referred to in
that chapter under a different name, we yet conclude, from the general
topic, that that special matter is meant. For instance, when we meet in
the section which treats of the jyotish/t/oma sacrifice with the
passage, 'in every spring he is to offer the jyotis sacrifice,' we at
once understand that the word denotes the jyotish/t/oma. If we therefore
meet with the clause 'to prâ/n/a mind is fastened' in a section of which
the highest Brahman is the topic, we do not for a moment suppose that
the word prâ/n/a should there denote the ordinary breath which is a mere
modification of air. The two passages thus do not offer any matter for
discussion, and hence do not furnish appropriate instances for the
Sûtra. We have shown, on the other hand, that the passage about the
prâ/n/a, which is the deity of the prastâva, allows room for doubt,
pûrvapaksha and final decision.

24. The 'light' (is Brahman), on account of the mention of feet (in a
passage which is connected with the passage about the light).

Scripture says (Ch. Up. III, 13, 7), 'Now that light which shines above
this heaven, higher than all, higher than everything, in the highest
worlds beyond which there are no other worlds that is the same light
which is within man.' Here the doubt presents itself whether the word
'light' denotes the light of the sun and the like, or the highest Self.
Under the preceding Sûtras we had shown that some words which ordinarily
have different meanings yet in certain passages denote Brahman, since
characteristic marks of the latter are mentioned. Here the question has
to be discussed whether, in connexion with the passage quoted,
characteristic marks of Brahman are mentioned or not.

The pûrvapakshin maintains that the word 'light' denotes nothing else
but the light of the sun and the like, since that is the ordinary
well-established meaning of the term. The common use of language, he
says, teaches us that the two words 'light' and 'darkness' denote
mutually opposite things, darkness being the term for whatever
interferes with the function of the sense of sight, as, for instance,
the gloom of the night, while sunshine and whatever else favours the
action of the eye is called light. The word 'shines' also, which the
text exhibits, is known ordinarily to refer to the sun and similar
sources of light; while of Brahman, which is devoid of colour, it cannot
be said, in the primary sense of the word, that it 'shines.' Further,
the word jyotis must here denote light because it is said to be bounded
by the sky ('that light which shines above this heaven'). For while it
is impossible to consider the sky as being the boundary of Brahman,
which is the Self of all and the source of all things movable or
immovable, the sky may be looked upon as forming the boundary of light,
which is a mere product and as such limited; accordingly the text says,
'the light beyond heaven.'--But light, although a mere product, is
perceived everywhere; it would therefore be wrong to declare that it is
bounded by the sky!--Well, then, the pûrvapakshin replies, let us assume
that the light meant is the first-born (original) light which has not
yet become tripartite[122]. This explanation again cannot be admitted,
because the non-tripartite light does not serve any purpose.--But, the
pûrvapakshin resumes, Why should its purpose not be found therein that
it is the object of devout meditation?--That cannot be, we reply; for we
see that only such things are represented as objects of devotion as have
some other independent use of their own; so, for instance, the sun
(which dispels darkness and so on). Moreover the scriptural passage,
'Let me make each of these three (fire, water, and earth) tripartite,'
does not indicate any difference[123]. And even of the non-tripartite
light it is not known that the sky constitutes its boundary.--Well, then
(the pûrvapakshin resumes, dropping the idea of the non-tripartite
light), let us assume that the light of which the text speaks is the
tripartite (ordinary) light. The objection that light is seen to exist
also beneath the sky, viz. in the form of fire and the like, we
invalidate by the remark that there is nothing contrary to reason in
assigning a special locality to fire, although the latter is observed
everywhere; while to assume a special place for Brahman, to which the
idea of place does not apply at all, would be most unsuitable. Moreover,
the clause 'higher than everything, in the highest worlds beyond which
there are no other worlds,' which indicates a multiplicity of abodes,
agrees much better with light, which is a mere product (than with
Brahman). There is moreover that other clause, also, 'That is the same
light which is within man,' in which the highest light is identified
with the gastric fire (the fire within man). Now such identifications
can be made only where there is a certain similarity of nature; as is
seen, for instance, in the passage, 'Of that person Bhû/h/ is the head,
for the head is one and that syllable is one' (B/ri/. Up. V, 5, 3). But
that the fire within the human body is not Brahman clearly appears from
the passage, 'Of this we have visible and audible proof' (Ch. Up. III,
13, 7; 8), which declares that the fire is characterised by the noise it
makes, and by heat; and likewise from the following passage, 'Let a man
meditate on this as that which is seen and heard.' The same conclusion
may be drawn from the passage, 'He who knows this becomes conspicuous
and celebrated,' which proclaims an inconsiderable reward only, while to
the devout meditation on Brahman a high reward would have to be
allotted. Nor is there mentioned in the entire passage about the light
any other characteristic mark of Brahman, while such marks are set forth
in the passages (discussed above) which refer to prâ/n/a and the ether.
Nor, again, is Brahman indicated in the preceding section, 'the Gâyatrî
is everything whatsoever exists,' &c. (III, 12); for that passage makes
a statement about the Gâyatrî metre only. And even if that section did
refer to Brahman, still Brahman would not be recognised in the passage
at present under discussion; for there (in the section referred to) it
is declared in the clause, 'Three feet of it are the Immortal in
heaven'--that heaven constitutes the abode; while in our passage the
words 'the light above heaven' declare heaven to be a boundary. For all
these reasons the word jyotis is here to be taken in its ordinary
meaning, viz. light.

To this we make the following reply. The word jyotis must be held to
denote Brahman. Why? On account of the feet (quarters) being mentioned.
In a preceding passage Brahman had been spoken of as having four feet
(quarters). 'Such is the greatness of it; greater than it is the Person
(purusha). One foot of it are all the beings, three feet of it are the
Immortal in heaven.' That which in this passage is said to constitute
the three-quarter part, immortal and connected with heaven, of Brahman,
which altogether comprises four quarters; this very same entity we
recognise as again referred to in the passage under discussion, because
there also it is said to be connected with heaven. If therefore we
should set it aside in our interpretation of the passage and assume the
latter to refer to the ordinary light, we should commit the mistake of
dropping, without need, the topic started and introducing a new subject.
Brahman, in fact, continues to form the subject-matter, not only of the
passage about the light, but likewise of the subsequent section, the
so-called Sâ/nd/ilya-vidyâ (Ch. Up. III, 14). Hence we conclude that in
our passage the word 'light' must be held to denote Brahman. The
objection (raised above) that from common use the words 'light' and 'to
shine' are known to denote effected (physical) light is without force;
for as it is known from the general topic of the chapter that Brahman is
meant, those two words do not necessarily denote physical light only to
the exclusion of Brahman[124], but may also denote Brahman itself, in so
far as it is characterised by the physical shining light which is its
effect. Analogously another mantra declares, 'that by which the sun
shines kindled with heat' (Taitt. Br. III, 12, 9, 7). Or else we may
suppose that the word jyotis here does not denote at all that light on
which the function of the eye depends. For we see that in other passages
it has altogether different meanings; so, for instance, B/ri/. Up. IV,
3, 5, 'With speech only as light man sits,' and Taitt. Sa. I, 6, 3, 3,
'May the mind, the light, accept,' &c. It thus appears that whatever
illuminates (in the different senses of the word) something else may be
spoken of as 'light.' Hence to Brahman also, whose nature is
intelligence, the term 'light' may be applied; for it gives light to the
entire world. Similarly, other scriptural passages say, 'Him the shining
one, everything shines after; by his light all this is lighted' (Kau.
Up. II, 5, 15); and 'Him the gods worship as the light of lights, as the
immortal' (B/ri/. Up. IV, 4, 16). Against the further objection that the
omnipresent Brahman cannot be viewed as bounded by heaven we remark that
the assignment, to Brahman, of a special locality is not contrary to
reason because it subserves the purpose of devout meditation. Nor does
it avail anything to say that it is impossible to assign any place to
Brahman because Brahman is out of connexion with all place. For it is
possible to make such an assumption, because Brahman is connected with
certain limiting adjuncts. Accordingly Scripture speaks of different
kinds of devout meditation on Brahman as specially connected with
certain localities, such as the sun, the eye, the heart. For the same
reason it is also possible to attribute to Brahman a multiplicity of
abodes, as is done in the clause (quoted above) 'higher than all.' The
further objection that the light beyond heaven is the mere physical
light because it is identified with the gastric fire, which itself is a
mere effect and is inferred from perceptible marks such as the heat of
the body and a certain sound, is equally devoid of force; for the
gastric fire may be viewed as the outward appearance (or symbol) of
Brahman, just as Brahman's name is a mere outward symbol. Similarly in
the passage, 'Let a man meditate on it (the gastric light) as seen and
heard,' the visibility and audibility (here implicitly ascribed to
Brahman) must be considered as rendered possible through the gastric
fire being the outward appearance of Brahman. Nor is there any force in
the objection that Brahman cannot be meant because the text mentions an
inconsiderable reward only; for there is no reason compelling us to have
recourse to Brahman for the purpose of such and such a reward only, and
not for the purpose of such and such another reward. Wherever the text
represents the highest Brahman--which is free from all connexion with
distinguishing attributes--as the universal Self, it is understood that
the result of that instruction is one only, viz. final release.
Wherever, on the other hand, Brahman is taught to be connected with
distinguishing attributes or outward symbols, there, we see, all the
various rewards which this world can offer are spoken of; cp. for
instance, B/ri/. Up. IV, 4, 24, 'This is he who eats all food, the giver
of wealth. He who knows this obtains wealth.' Although in the passage
itself which treats of the light no characteristic mark of Brahman is
mentioned, yet, as the Sûtra intimates, the mark stated in a preceding
passage (viz. the mantra, 'Such is the greatness of it,' &c.) has to be
taken in connexion with the passage about the light as well. The
question how the mere circumstance of Brahman being mentioned in a not
distant passage can have the power of divorcing from its natural object
and transferring to another object the direct statement about light
implied in the word 'light,' may be answered without difficulty. The
passage under discussion runs[125], 'which above this heaven, the
light.' The relative pronoun with which this clause begins intimates,
according to its grammatical force[126], the same Brahman which was
mentioned in the previous passage, and which is here recognised (as
being the same which was mentioned before) through its connexion with
heaven; hence the word jyotis also--which stands in grammatical
co-ordination to 'which'--must have Brahman for its object. From all
this it follows that the word 'light' here denotes Brahman.

25. If it be objected that (Brahman is) not (denoted) on account of the
metre being denoted; (we reply) not so, because thus (i.e. by means of
the metre) the direction of the mind (on Brahman) is declared; for thus
it is seen (in other passages also).

We now address ourselves to the refutation of the assertion (made in the
pûrvapaksha of the preceding Sûtra) that in the previous passage also
Brahman is not referred to, because in the sentence, 'Gâyatrî is
everything whatsoever here exists,' the metre called Gâyatrî is spoken
of.--How (we ask the pûrvapakshin) can it be maintained that, on account
of the metre being spoken of, Brahman is not denoted, while yet the
mantra 'such is the greatness of it,' &c., clearly sets forth Brahman
with its four quarters?--You are mistaken (the pûrvapakshin replies).
The sentence, 'Gâyatrî is everything,' starts the discussion of Gâyatrî.
The same Gâyatrî is thereupon described under the various forms of all
beings, earth, body, heart, speech, breath; to which there refers also
the verse, 'that Gâyatrî has four feet and is sixfold.' After that we
meet with the mantra, 'Such is the greatness of it.' &c. How then, we
ask, should this mantra, which evidently is quoted with reference to the
Gâyatrî (metre) as described in the preceding clauses, all at once
denote Brahman with its four quarters? Since therefore the metre Gâyatrî
is the subject-matter of the entire chapter, the term 'Brahman' which
occurs in a subsequent passage ('the Brahman which has thus been
described') must also denote the metre. This is analogous to a previous
passage (Ch. Up. III, 11, 3, 'He who thus knows this Brahma-upanishad'),
where the word Brahma-upanishad is explained to mean Veda-upanishad. As
therefore the preceding passage refers (not to Brahman, but) to the
Gâyatrî metre, Brahman does not constitute the topic of the entire
section.

This argumentation, we reply, proves nothing against our position.
'Because thus direction of the mind is declared,' i.e. because the
Brahma/n/a passage, 'Gâyatrî indeed is all this,' intimates that by
means of the metre Gâyatrî the mind is to be directed on Brahman which
is connected with that metre. Of the metre Gâyatrî, which is nothing but
a certain special combination of syllables, it could not possibly be
said that it is the Self of everything. We therefore have to understand
the passage as declaring that Brahman, which, as the cause of the world,
is connected with that product also whose name is Gâyatrî, is 'all
this;' in accordance with that other passage which directly says, 'All
this indeed is Brahman' (Kh. Up. III, 14, 1). That the effect is in
reality not different from the cause, we shall prove later on, under
Sûtra II, 1, 14. Devout meditation on Brahman under the form of certain
effects (of Brahman) is seen to be mentioned in other passages also, so,
for instance, Ait. Âr. III, 2, 3, 12, 'For the Bahv/rik/as consider him
in the great hymn, the Adhvaryus in the sacrificial fire, the Chandogas
in the Mahâvrata ceremony.' Although, therefore, the previous passage
speaks of the metre, Brahman is what is meant, and the same Brahman is
again referred to in the passage about the light, whose purport it is to
enjoin another form of devout meditation.

Another commentator[127] is of opinion that the term Gâyatrî (does not
denote Brahman in so far as viewed under the form of Gâyatrî, but)
directly denotes Brahman, on account of the equality of number; for just
as the Gâyatrî metre has four feet consisting of six syllables each, so
Brahman also has four feet, (i.e. quarters.) Similarly we see that in
other passages also the names of metres are used to denote other things
which resemble those metres in certain numerical relations; cp. for
instance, Ch. Up. IV, 3, 8, where it is said at first, 'Now these five
and the other five make ten and that is the K/ri/ta,' and after that
'these are again the Virâj which eats the food.' If we adopt this
interpretation, Brahman only is spoken of, and the metre is not referred
to at all. In any case Brahman is the subject with which the previous
passage is concerned.

26. And thus also (we must conclude, viz. that Brahman is the subject of
the previous passage), because (thus only) the declaration as to the
beings, &c. being the feet is possible.

That the previous passage has Brahman for its topic, we must assume for
that reason also that the text designates the beings and so on as the
feet of Gâyatrî. For the text at first speaks of the beings, the earth,
the body, and the heart[128], and then goes on 'that Gâyatrî has four
feet and is sixfold.' For of the mere metre, without any reference to
Brahman, it would be impossible to say that the beings and so on are its
feet. Moreover, if Brahman were not meant, there would be no room for
the verse, 'Such is the greatness,' &c. For that verse clearly describes
Brahman in its own nature; otherwise it would be impossible to represent
the Gâyatrî as the Self of everything as is done in the words, 'One foot
of it are all the beings; three feet of it are what is immortal in
heaven.' The purusha-sûkta also (/Ri/k Sa/m/h. X, 90) exhibits the verse
with sole reference to Brahman. Sm/ri/ti likewise ascribes to Brahman a
like nature, 'I stand supporting all this world by a single portion of
myself' (Bha. Gîtâ X, 42). Our interpretation moreover enables us to
take the passage, 'that Brahman indeed which,' &c. (III, 12, 7), in its
primary sense, (i.e. to understand the word Brahman to denote nothing
but Brahman.) And, moreover, the passage, 'these are the five men of
Brahman' (III, 13, 6), is appropriate only if the former passage about
the Gâyatrî is taken as referring to Brahman (for otherwise the
'Brahman' in 'men of Brahman' would not be connected with the previous
topic). Hence Brahman is to be considered as the subject-matter of the
previous passage also. And the decision that the same Brahman is
referred to in the passage about the light where it is recognised (to be
the same) from its connexion with heaven, remains unshaken.

27. The objection that (the Brahman of the former passage cannot be
recognised in the latter) on account of the difference of designation,
is not valid because in either (designation) there is nothing contrary
(to the recognition).

The objection that in the former passage ('three feet of it are what is
immortal in heaven'), heaven is designated as the abode, while in the
latter passage ('that light which shines above this heaven'), heaven is
designated as the boundary, and that, on account of this difference of
designation, the subject-matter of the former passage cannot be
recognised in the latter, must likewise be refuted. This we do by
remarking that in either designation nothing is contrary to the
recognition. Just as in ordinary language a falcon, although in contact
with the top of a tree, is not only said to be on the tree but also
above the tree, so Brahman also, although being in heaven, is here
referred to as being beyond heaven as well.

Another (commentator) explains: just as in ordinary language a falcon,
although not in contact with the top of a tree, is not only said to be
above the top of the tree but also on the top of the tree, so Brahman
also, which is in reality beyond heaven, is (in the former of the two
passages) said to be in heaven. Therefore the Brahman spoken of in the
former passage can be recognised in the latter also, and it remains
therefore a settled conclusion that the word 'light' denotes Brahman.

28. Prâ/n/a (breath) is Brahman, that being understood from a connected
consideration (of the passages referring to prâ/n/a).

In the Kaushîtaki-brâhma/n/a-upanishad there is recorded a legend of
Indra and Pratardana which begins with the words, 'Pratardana, forsooth,
the son of Divodâsa came by means of fighting and strength to the
beloved abode of Indra' (Kau. Up. III, 1). In this legend we read: 'He
said: I am prâ/n/a, the intelligent Self (praj/ñ/âtman), meditate on me
as Life, as Immortality' (III, 2). And later on (III, 3), 'Prâ/n/a
alone, the intelligent Self, having laid hold of this body, makes it
rise up.' Then, again (III, 8), 'Let no man try to find out what speech
is, let him know the speaker.' And in the end (III, 8), 'That breath
indeed is the intelligent Self, bliss, imperishable, immortal.'--Here
the doubt presents itself whether the word prâ/n/a denotes merely
breath, the modification of air, or the Self of some divinity, or the
individual soul, or the highest Brahman.--But, it will be said at the
outset, the Sûtra I, 1, 21 already has shown that the word prâ/n/a
refers to Brahman, and as here also we meet with characteristic marks of
Brahman, viz. the words 'bliss, imperishable, immortal,' what reason is
there for again raising the same doubt?--We reply: Because there are
observed here characteristic marks of different kinds. For in the legend
we meet not only with marks indicating Brahman, but also with marks
pointing to other beings Thus Indra's words, 'Know me only' (III, 1)
point to the Self of a divinity; the words, 'Having laid hold of this
body it makes it rise up,' point to the breath; the words, 'Let no man
try to find out what speech is, let him know the speaker,' point to the
individual soul. There is thus room for doubt.

If, now, the pûrvapakshin maintains that the term prâ/n/a here denotes
the well-known modification of air, i.e. breath, we, on our side, assert
that the word prâ/n/a must be understood to denote Brahman.--For what
reason?--On account of such being the consecutive meaning of the
passages. For if we examine the connexion of the entire section which
treats of the prâ/n/a, we observe that all the single passages can be
construed into a whole only if they are viewed as referring to Brahman.
At the beginning of the legend Pratardana, having been allowed by Indra
to choose a boon, mentions the highest good of man, which he selects for
his boon, in the following words, 'Do you yourself choose that boon for
me which you deem most beneficial for a man.' Now, as later on prâ/n/a
is declared to be what is most beneficial for man, what should prâ/n/a
denote but the highest Self? For apart from the cognition of that Self a
man cannot possibly attain what is most beneficial for him, as many
scriptural passages declare. Compare, for instance, /S/ve. Up. III, 8,
'A man who knows him passes over death; there is no other path to go.'
Again, the further passage, 'He who knows me thus by no deed of his is
his life harmed, not by theft, not by bhrû/n/ahatyâ' (III, 1), has a
meaning only if Brahman is supposed to be the object of knowledge. For,
that subsequently to the cognition of Brahman all works and their
effects entirely cease, is well known from scriptural passages, such as
the following, 'All works perish when he has been beheld who is the
higher and the lower' (Mu. Up. II, 2, 8). Moreover, prâ/n/a can be
identified with the intelligent Self only if it is Brahman. For the air
which is non-intelligent can clearly not be the intelligent Self. Those
characteristic marks, again, which are mentioned in the concluding
passage (viz. those intimated by the words 'bliss,' 'imperishable,'
'immortal') can, if taken in their full sense, not be reconciled with
any being except Brahman. There are, moreover, the following passages,
'He does not increase by a good action, nor decrease by a bad action.
For he makes him whom he wishes to lead up from these worlds do a good
deed; and the same makes him whom he wishes to lead down from these
worlds do a bad deed;' and, 'He is the guardian of the world, he is the
king of the world, he is the Lord of the world' (Kau. Up. III, 8). All
this can be properly understood only if the highest Brahman is
acknowledged to be the subject-matter of the whole chapter, not if the
vital air is substituted in its place. Hence the word prâ/n/a denotes
Brahman.

29. If it be said that (Brahman is) not (denoted) on account of the
speaker denoting himself; (we reply that this objection is not valid)
because there is in that (chapter) a multitude of references to the
interior Self.

An objection is raised against the assertion that prâ/n/a denotes
Brahman. The word prâ/n/a, it is said, does not denote the highest
Brahman, because the speaker designates himself. The speaker, who is a
certain powerful god called Indra, at first says, in order to reveal
himself to Pratardana, 'Know me only,' and later on, 'I am prâ/n/a, the
intelligent Self.' How, it is asked, can the prâ/n/a, which this latter
passage, expressive of personality as it is, represents as the Self of
the speaker, be Brahman to which, as we know from Scripture, the
attribute of being a speaker cannot be ascribed; compare, for instance,
B/ri/. Up. III, 8, 8, 'It is without speech, without mind.' Further on,
also, the speaker, i.e. Indra, glorifies himself by enumerating a number
of attributes, all of which depend on personal existence and can in no
way belong to Brahman, 'I slew the three-headed son of Tvash/tri/; I
delivered the Arunmukhas, the devotees, to the wolves,' and so on. Indra
may be called prâ/n/a on account of his strength. Scripture says,
'Strength indeed is prâ/n/a,' and Indra is known as the god of strength;
and of any deed of strength people say, 'It is Indra's work.' The
personal Self of a deity may, moreover, be called an intelligent Self;
for the gods, people say, possess unobstructed knowledge. It thus being
a settled matter that some passages convey information about the
personal Self of some deity, the other passages also--as, for instance,
the one about what is most beneficial for man--must be interpreted as
well as they may with reference to the same deity. Hence prâ/n/a does
not denote Brahman.

This objection we refute by the remark that in that chapter there are
found a multitude of references to the interior Self. For the passage,
'As long as prâ/n/a dwells in this body so long surely there is life,'
declares that that prâ/n/a only which is the intelligent interior
Self--and not some particular outward deity--has power to bestow and to
take back life. And where the text speaks of the eminence of the
prâ/n/as as founded on the existence of the prâ/n/a, it shows that that
prâ/n/a is meant which has reference to the Self and is the abode of the
sense-organs.[129]

Of the same tendency is the passage, 'Prâ/n/a, the intelligent Self,
alone having laid hold of this body makes it rise up;' and the passage
(which occurs in the passus, 'Let no man try to find out what speech
is,' &c.), 'For as in a car the circumference of the wheel is set on the
spokes and the spokes on the nave, thus are these objects set on the
subjects (the senses) and the subjects on the prâ/n/a. And that prâ/n/a
indeed is the Self of prâ/n/a, blessed, imperishable, immortal.' So also
the following passage which, referring to this interior Self, forming as
it were the centre of the peripherical interaction of the objects and
senses, sums up as follows, 'He is my Self, thus let it be known;' a
summing up which is appropriate only if prâ/n/a is meant to denote not
some outward existence, but the interior Self. And another scriptural
passage declares 'this Self is Brahman, omniscient'[130] (B/ri/. Up. II,
5, 19). We therefore arrive at the conclusion that, on account of the
multitude of references to the interior Self, the chapter contains
information regarding Brahman, not regarding the Self of some
deity.--How then can the circumstance of the speaker (Indra) referring
to himself be explained?

30. The declaration (made by Indra about himself, viz. that he is one
with Brahman) (is possible) through intuition vouched for by Scripture,
as in the case of Vâmadeva.

The individual divine Self called Indra perceiving by means of
/ri/shi-like intuition[131]--the existence of which is vouched for by
Scripture--its own Self to be identical with the supreme Self, instructs
Pratardana (about the highest Self) by means of the words 'Know me
only.'

By intuition of the same kind the /ri/shi Vâmadeva reached the knowledge
expressed in the words, 'I was Manu and Sûrya;' in accordance with the
passage, 'Whatever deva was awakened (so as to know Brahman) he indeed
became that' (B/ri/. Up. I, 4, 10). The assertion made above (in the
pûrvapaksha of the preceding Sûtra) that Indra after saying, 'Know me
only,' glorifies himself by enumerating the slaying of Tvash/tri/'s son
and other deeds of strength, we refute as follows. The death of
Tvash/tri/'s son and similar deeds are referred to, not to the end of
glorifying Indra as the object of knowledge--in which case the sense of
the passage would be, 'Because I accomplished such and such deeds,
therefore know me'--but to the end of glorifying the cognition of the
highest Self. For this reason the text, after having referred to the
slaying of Tvash/tri/'s son and the like, goes on in the clause next
following to exalt knowledge, 'And not one hair of me is harmed there.
He who knows me thus by no deed of his is his life harmed.'--(But how
does this passage convey praise of knowledge?)--Because, we reply, its
meaning is as follows: 'Although I do such cruel deeds, yet not even a
hair of mine is harmed because I am one with Brahman; therefore the life
of any other person also who knows me thus is not harmed by any deed of
his.' And the object of the knowledge (praised by Indra) is nothing else
but Brahman which is set forth in a subsequent passage, 'I am prâ/n/a,
the intelligent Self.' Therefore the entire chapter refers to Brahman.

31. If it be said (that Brahman is) not (meant), on account of
characteristic marks of the individual soul and the chief vital air
(being mentioned); we say no, on account of the threefoldness of devout
meditation (which would result from your interpretation); on account of
(the meaning advocated by us) being accepted (elsewhere); and on account
of (characteristic marks of Brahman) being connected (with the passage
under discussion).

Although we admit, the pûrvapakshin resumes, that the chapter about the
prâ/n/a does not furnish any instruction regarding some outward deity,
since it contains a multitude of references to the interior Self; still
we deny that it is concerned with Brahman.--For what reason?--Because it
mentions characteristic marks of the individual soul on the one hand,
and of the chief vital air on the other hand. The passage, 'Let no man
try to find out what speech is, let him know the speaker,' mentions a
characteristic mark of the individual soul, and must therefore be held
to point out as the object of knowledge the individual soul which rules
and employs the different organs of action such as speech and so on. On
the other hand, we have the passage, 'But prâ/n/a alone, the intelligent
Self, having laid hold of this body makes it rise up,' which points to
the chief vital air; for the chief attribute of the vital air is that it
sustains the body. Similarly, we read in the colloquy of the vital airs
(Pra. Up. II, 3), concerning speech and the other vital airs, 'Then
prâ/n/a (the chief vital air) as the best said to them: Be not deceived;
I alone dividing myself fivefold support this body and keep it.' Those,
again, who in the passage quoted above read 'this one (masc.), the
body[132]' must give the following explanation, Prâ/n/a having laid hold
of this one, viz. either the individual soul or the aggregate of the
sense organs, makes the body rise up. The individual soul as well as the
chief vital air may justly be designated as the intelligent Self; for
the former is of the nature of intelligence, and the latter (although
non-intelligent in itself) is the abode of other prâ/n/as, viz. the
sense organs, which are the instruments of intelligence. Moreover, if
the word prâ/n/a be taken to denote the individual soul as well as the
chief vital air, the prâ/n/a and the intelligent Self may be spoken of
in two ways, either as being non-different on account of their mutual
concomitance, or as being different on account of their (essentially
different) individual character; and in these two different ways they
are actually spoken of in the two following passages, 'What is prâ/n/a
that is praj/ñ/â, what is praj/ñ/â that is prâ/n/a;' and, 'For together
do these two live in the body and together do they depart.' If, on the
other hand, prâ/n/a denoted Brahman, what then could be different from
what? For these reasons prâ/n/a does not denote Brahman, but either the
individual soul or the chief vital air or both.

All this argumentation, we reply, is wrong, 'on account of the
threefoldness of devout meditation.' Your interpretation would involve
the assumption of devout meditation of three different kinds, viz. on
the individual soul, on the chief vital air, and on Brahman. But it is
inappropriate to assume that a single sentence should enjoin three kinds
of devout meditation; and that all the passages about the prâ/n/a really
constitute one single sentence (one syntactical whole) appears from the
beginning and the concluding part. In the beginning we have the clause
'Know me only,' followed by 'I am prâ/n/a, the intelligent Self,
meditate on me as Life, as Immortality;' and in the end we read, 'And
that prâ/n/a indeed is the intelligent Self, blessed, imperishable,
immortal.' The beginning and the concluding part are thus seen to be
similar, and we therefore must conclude that they refer to one and the
same matter. Nor can the characteristic mark of Brahman be so turned as
to be applied to something else; for the ten objects and the ten
subjects (subjective powers)[133] cannot rest on anything but Brahman.
Moreover, prâ/n/a must denote Brahman 'on account of (that meaning)
being accepted,' i.e. because in the case of other passages where
characteristic marks of Brahman are mentioned the word prâ/n/a is taken
in the sense of 'Brahman.' And another reason for assuming the passage
to refer to Brahman is that here also, i.e. in the passage itself there
is 'connexion' with characteristic marks of Brahman, as, for instance,
the reference to what is most beneficial for man. The assertion that the
passage, 'Having laid hold of this body it makes it rise up,' contains a
characteristic mark of the chief vital air, is untrue; for as the
function of the vital air also ultimately rests on Brahman it can
figuratively be ascribed to the latter. So Scripture also declares, 'No
mortal lives by the breath that goes up and by the breath that goes
down. We live by another in whom these two repose' (Ka. Up. II, 5, 5).
Nor does the indication of the individual soul which you allege to occur
in the passage, 'Let no man try to find out what speech is, let him know
the speaker,' preclude the view of prâ/n/a denoting Brahman. For, as the
passages, 'I am Brahman,' 'That art thou,' and others, prove, there is
in reality no such thing as an individual soul absolutely different from
Brahman, but Brahman, in so far as it differentiates itself through the
mind (buddhi) and other limiting conditions, is called individual soul,
agent, enjoyer. Such passages therefore as the one alluded to, (viz.
'let no man try to find out what speech is, let him know the speaker,')
which, by setting aside all the differences due to limiting conditions,
aim at directing the mind on the internal Self and thus showing that the
individual soul is one with Brahman, are by no means out of place. That
the Self which is active in speaking and the like is Brahman appears
from another scriptural passage also, viz. Ke. Up. I, 5, 'That which is
not expressed by speech and by which speech is expressed that alone know
as Brahman, not that which people here adore.' The remark that the
statement about the difference of prâ/n/a and praj/ñ/â (contained in the
passage, 'Together they dwell in this body, together they depart') does
not agree with that interpretation according to which prâ/n/a is
Brahman, is without force; for the mind and the vital air which are the
respective abodes of the two powers of cognition and action, and
constitute the limiting conditions of the internal Self may be spoken of
as different. The internal Self, on the other hand, which is limited by
those two adjuncts, is in itself non-differentiated, so that the two may
be identified, as is done in the passage 'prâ/n/a is praj/ñ/â.'

The second part of the Sûtra is explained in a different manner
also[134], as follows: Characteristic marks of the individual soul as
well as of the chief vital air are not out of place even in a chapter
whose topic is Brahman. How so? 'On account of the threefoldness of
devout meditation.' The chapter aims at enjoining three kinds of devout
meditation on Brahman, according as Brahman is viewed under the aspect
of prâ/n/a, under the aspect of praj/ñ/â, and in itself. The passages,
'Meditate (on me) as life, as immortality. Life is prâ/n/a,' and 'Having
laid hold of this body it makes it rise up. Therefore let man worship it
alone as uktha,' refer to the prâ/n/a aspect. The introductory passage,
'Now we shall explain how all things become one in that praj/ñ/â,' and
the subsequent passages, 'Speech verily milked one portion thereof; the
word is its object placed outside;' and, 'Having by praj/ñ/â taken
possession of speech he obtains by speech all words &c.,' refer to the
praj/ñ/â aspect. The Brahman aspect finally is referred to in the
following passage, 'These ten objects have reference to praj/ñ/â, the
ten subjects have reference to objects. If there were no objects there
would be no subjects; and if there were no subjects there would be no
objects. For on either side alone nothing could be achieved. But that is
not many. For as in a car the circumference of the wheel is set on the
spokes and the spokes on the nave, thus are these objects set on the
subjects and the subjects on the prâ/n/a.' Thus we see that the one
meditation on Brahman is here represented as threefold, according as
Brahman is viewed either with reference to two limiting conditions or in
itself. In other passages also we find that devout meditation on Brahman
is made dependent on Brahman being qualified by limiting adjuncts; so,
for instance (Ch. Up. III, 14, 2), 'He who consists of mind, whose body
is prâ/n/a.' The hypothesis of Brahman being meditated upon under three
aspects perfectly agrees with the prâ/n/a chapter[135]; as, on the one
hand, from a comparison of the introductory and the concluding clauses
we infer that the subject-matter of the whole chapter is one only, and
as, on the other hand, we meet with characteristic marks of prâ/n/a,
praj/ñ/â, and Brahman in turns. It therefore remains a settled
conclusion that Brahman is the topic of the whole chapter.

Notes:

[Footnote 32: The subject is the universal Self whose nature is
intelligence (/k/u); the object comprises whatever is of a
non-intelligent nature, viz. bodies with their sense organs, internal
organs, and the objects of the senses, i.e. the external material
world.]

[Footnote 33: The object is said to have for its sphere the notion of
the 'thou' (yushmat), not the notion of the 'this' or 'that' (idam), in
order better to mark its absolute opposition to the subject or Ego.
Language allows of the co-ordination of the pronouns of the first and
the third person ('It is I,' 'I am he who,' &c.; ete vayam, ame vayam
âsmahe), but not of the co-ordination of the pronouns of the first and
second person.]

[Footnote 34: Adhyâsa, literally 'superimposition' in the sense of
(mistaken) ascription or imputation, to something, of an essential
nature or attributes not belonging to it. See later on.]

[Footnote 35: Natural, i.e. original, beginningless; for the modes of
speech and action which characterise transmigratory existence have
existed, with the latter, from all eternity.]

[Footnote 36: I.e. the intelligent Self which is the only reality and
the non-real objects, viz. body and so on, which are the product of
wrong knowledge.]

[Footnote 37: 'The body, &c. is my Self;' 'sickness, death, children,
wealth, &c., belong to my Self.']

[Footnote 38: Literally 'in some other place.' The clause 'in the form
of remembrance' is added, the Bhâmatî remarks, in order to exclude those
cases where something previously observed is recognised in some other
thing or place; as when, for instance, the generic character of a cow
which was previously observed in a black cow again presents itself to
consciousness in a grey cow, or when Devadatta whom we first saw in
Pâ/t/aliputra again appears before us in Mâhishmatî. These are cases of
recognition where the object previously observed again presents itself
to our senses; while in mere remembrance the object previously perceived
is not in renewed contact with the senses. Mere remembrance operates in
the case of adhyâsa, as when we mistake mother-of-pearl for silver which
is at the time not present but remembered only.]

[Footnote 39: The so-called anyathâkhyâtivâdins maintain that in the act
of adhyâsa the attributes of one thing, silver for instance, are
superimposed on a different thing existing in a different place,
mother-of-pearl for instance (if we take for our example of adhyâsa the
case of some man mistaking a piece of mother-of-pearl before him for a
piece of silver). The âtmakhyâtivâdins maintain that in adhyâsa the
modification, in the form of silver, of the internal organ and action
which characterise transmigratory existence have existed, with the
latter, from all eternity.]

[Footnote 40: This is the definition of the akhyâtivâdins.]

[Footnote 41: Some anyathâkhyâtivâdins and the Mâdhyamikas according to
Ânanda Giri.]

[Footnote 42: The pratyagâtman is in reality non-object, for it is
svayamprakâ/s/a, self-luminous, i.e. the subjective factor in all
cognition. But it becomes the object of the idea of the Ego in so far as
it is limited, conditioned by its adjuncts which are the product of
Nescience, viz. the internal organ, the senses and the subtle and gross
bodies, i.e. in so far as it is jîva, individual or personal soul. Cp.
Bhâmatî, pp. 22, 23: '/k/idâtmaiva svayamprakâ/s/oszpi
buddhyâdivishayavi/kkh/ura/n/ât katha/mk/id asm
upratyayavishayoszha/m/kârâspada/m/ jîva iti /k/a jantur iti /k/a
ksheuajña iti /k/âkhyâyate.']

[Footnote 43: Translated according to the Bhâmatî. We deny, the objector
says, the possibility of adhyâsa in the case of the Self, not on the
ground that it is not an object because self-luminous (for that it may
be an object although it is self-luminous you have shown), but on the
ground that it is not an object because it is not manifested either by
itself or by anything else.--It is known or manifest, the Vedântin
replies, on account of its immediate presentation (aparokshatvât), i.e.
on account of the intuitional knowledge we have of it. Ânanda Giri
construes the above clause in a different way:
asmatpratyayâvishayatveszpy aparokshatvâd ekântenâvishayatvâbbâvât
tasminn aha@nkârâdyadhyâsa ity artha/h/. Aparokshatvam api kai/sk/id
âtmano nesh/t/am ity âsa@nkyâha pratyagâtmeti.]

[Footnote 44: Tatraiva/m/ sati evambhûtavastutattvâvadhâra/n/e sati.
Bhâ. Tasminn adhyâse uktarîtyâzvidyâvmake sati. Go. Yatrâtmani
buddhyâdau vâ yasya buddhyâder âtmano vâdhyâsa/h/ tena
buddhyâdi-nâsztmânâ va k/ri/tenâsz/s/anayâdidoshe/n/a /k/aitanyagu/n/ena
/k/âtmânâtmâ vâ vastuto na svalpenâpi yujyate. Ânanda Giri.]

[Footnote 45: Whether they belong to the karmakâ/nd/â, i.e. that part of
the Veda which enjoins active religious duty or the j/ñ/ânakâ/nd/a, i.e.
that part of the Veda which treats of Brahman.]

[Footnote 46: It being of course the function of the means of right
knowledge to determine Truth and Reality.]

[Footnote 47: The Bhâmatî takes adhish/th/ânam in the sense of
superintendence, guidance. The senses cannot act unless guided by a
superintending principle, i.e. the individual soul.]

[Footnote 48: If activity could proceed from the body itself,
non-identified with the Self, it would take place in deep sleep also.]

[Footnote 49: I.e. in the absence of the mutual superimposition of the
Self and the Non-Self and their attributes.]

[Footnote 50: The Mîmâ/m/sâ, i.e. the enquiry whose aim it is to show
that the embodied Self, i.e. the individual or personal soul is one with
Brahman. This Mîmâ/m/sâ being an enquiry into the meaning of the
Vedânta-portions of the Veda, it is also called Vedânta mîmâ/m/sâ.]

[Footnote 51: Nâdhikârârtha iti. Tatra hetur brahmeti. Asyârtha/h/, kám
ayam atha/s/abdo brahmaj/ñ/âne/kkh/yâ/h/ kim vântar/n/îtavi/k/ârasya
athave/kkh/âvi/s/esha/n/aj/ñ/ânasyârambhârtha/h/. Nâdya/h/ tasyâ
mîmâ/m/sâpravartikâyâs tadapravartyatvâd anârabhyatvât tasyâ/s/
/k/ottaratra pratyadhikara/n/am apratipâdanât. Na
dvitîyoztha/s/abdenânantaryoktidvârâ vi/s/ish/t/âdhikâryasamarpa/n/e
sâdhana/k/atush/t/ayâsampannânâ/m/ brahmadhîtadvi/k/ârayor anarthitvâd
vi/k/ârânârambhân na /k/a vi/k/âravidhiva/s/âd adhikârî kalpya/h/
prârambhasyâpi tulyatvâd adhikâri/n/a/s/ /k/a vidhyapekshitopâdhitvân na
t/ri/tîya/h/ brahmaj/ñ/ânasyânandasâkshâtkâratvenâdhikâryatve z
pyaprâdhânyâd atha/s/abdâsambandhât tasmân nârambhârthateti. Ânanda
Giri.]

[Footnote 52: Any relation in which the result, i.e. here the enquiry
into Brahman may stand to some antecedent of which it is the effect may
be comprised under the relation of ânantarya.]

[Footnote 53: He cuts off from the heart, then from the tongue, then
from the breast.]

[Footnote 54: Where one action is subordinate to another as, for
instance, the offering of the prayâjas is to the
dar/s/apûr/n/amâsa-sacrifice, or where one action qualifies a person for
another as, for instance, the offering of the dar/s/apûr/n/amâsa
qualifies a man for the performance of the Soma-sacrifice, there is
unity of the agent, and consequently an intimation of the order of
succession of the actions is in its right place.]

[Footnote 55: The 'means' in addition to /s/ama and dama are
discontinuance of religious ceremonies (uparati), patience in suffering
(titikshâ), attention and concentration of the mind (samâdhâna), and
faith (/s/raddhâ).]

[Footnote 56: According to Pâ/n/ini II, 3, 50 the sixth (genitive) case
expresses the relation of one thing being generally supplementary to, or
connected with, some other thing.]

[Footnote 57: In the case of other transitive verbs, object and result
may be separate; so, for instance, when it is said 'grâma/m/
ga/kkh/ati,' the village is the object of the action of going, and the
arrival at the village its result. But in the case of verbs of desiring
object and result coincide.]

[Footnote 58: That Brahman exists we know, even before entering on the
Brahma-mîmâ/m/sâ, from the occurrence of the word in the Veda, &c., and
from the etymology of the word we at once infer Brahman's chief
attributes.]

[Footnote 59: The three last opinions are those of the followers of the
Nyâya, the Sâ@nkhya, and the Yoga-philosophy respectively. The three
opinions mentioned first belong to various materialistic schools; the
two subsequent ones to two sects of Bauddha philosophers.]

[Footnote 60: As, for instance, the passages 'this person consists of
the essence of food;' 'the eye, &c. spoke;' 'non-existing this was in
the beginning,' &c.]

[Footnote 61: So the compound is to be divided according to Ân. Gi. and
Go.; the Bhâ. proposes another less plausible division.]

[Footnote 62: According to Nirukta I, 2 the six bhâvavikârâ/h/ are:
origination, existence, modification, increase, decrease, destruction.]

[Footnote 63: The pradhâna, called also prak/ri/ti, is the primal causal
matter of the world in the /S/â@nkhya-system. It will be fully discussed
in later parts of this work. To avoid ambiguities, the term pradhâna has
been left untranslated. Cp. Sâ@nkhya Kârikâ 3.]

[Footnote 64: Ke/k/it tu hira/n/yagaroha/m/ sa/m/sâri/n/am evâgamâj
jagaddhetum â/k/akshate. Ânanada Giri.]

[Footnote 65: Viz. the Vai/s/eshikas.]

[Footnote 66: Âtmana/h/ /s/ruter ity artha/h/. Ânanda Giri.]

[Footnote 67: Text (or direct statement), suggestive power (linga),
syntactical connection (vâkya), &c., being the means of proof made use
of in the Pûrva Mîmâ/m/sâ.]

[Footnote 68: The so-called sâkshâtkâra of Brahman. The &c. comprises
inference and so on.]

[Footnote 69: So, for instance, the passage 'he carves the sacrificial
post and makes it eight-cornered,' has a purpose only as being
supplementary to the injunction 'he ties the victim to the sacrificial
post.']

[Footnote 70: If the fruits of the two /s/âstras were not of a different
nature, there would be no reason for the distinction of two /s/âstras;
if they are of a different nature, it cannot be said that the knowledge
of Brahman is enjoined for the purpose of final release, in the same way
as sacrifices are enjoined for the purpose of obtaining the heavenly
world and the like.]

[Footnote 71: The first passage shows that the Self is not joined to the
gross body; the second that it is not joined to the subtle body; the
third that is independent of either.]

[Footnote 72: Ânanda Giri omits 'ata/h/.' His comment is:
p/ri/thagjij/ñ/âsâvishayatvâ/k/ /k/a dharmâdyasp/ri/sh/t/atva/m/
brahma/n/o yuktam ityâha; tad iti; ata/h/ /s/abdapâ/th/e dharmâdyasparse
karmaphalavailaksba/n/ya/m/ hetûk/ri/tam.--The above translation follows
Govindânanda's first explanation. Tat kaivalyam brahmaiva
karmaphalavilaksha/n/atvâd ity artha/h/.]

[Footnote 73: Sampat. Sampan nâmâlpe vastuny âlambane sâmânyena
kena/k/in mahato vastuna/h/ sampâdanam. Ânanda Giri.]

[Footnote 74: In which passage the mind, which may be called endless on
account of the infinite number of modifications it undergoes, is
identified with the Vi/s/vedevas, which thereby constitute the chief
object of the meditation; the fruit of the meditation being immortality.
The identity of the Self with Brahman, on the other hand, is real, not
only meditatively imagined, on account of the attribute of intelligence
being common to both.]

[Footnote 75: Adhyâsa/h/ /s/âstratoitasmi/m/s taddhî/h/. Sampadi
sampâdyamânasya prâdhânyenânudhyânam, adhyâse tu âlambanasyeti
vi/s/esha/h/. Ânanda Giri.]

[Footnote 76: Air and breath each absorb certain things, and are,
therefore, designated by the same term 'absorber.' Seya/m/
sa/m/vargad/ri/sh/t/ir vâyau prâ/n/e /k/a da/s/â/s/âgata/m/ jagad
dar/s/ayati yathâ jîvâtmani b/rim/ha/n/akriyayâ
brahmad/ri/sh/t/iram/ri/tatvâyaphalâyakalpata iti. Bhâmati.]

[Footnote 77: The butter used in the upâ/ms/uyâja is ceremonially
purified by the wife of the sacrificer looking at it; so, it might be
said, the Self of him who meditates on Brahman (and who as
kart/ri/--agent--stands in a subordinate anga-relation to the karman of
meditation) is merely purified by the cognition of its being one with
Brahman.]

[Footnote 78: An hypothesis which might be proposed for the purpose of
obviating the imputation to moksha of non-eternality which results from
the two preceding hypotheses.]

[Footnote 79: Viz. things to be originated (for instance, gha/t/a/m/
karoti), things to be obtained (grâma/m/ ga/kkh/ati), things to be
modified (suvar/n/a/m/ ku/nd/ala/m/ karoti), and things to be
ceremonially purified (vrîhîn prokshati).]

[Footnote 80: Whence it follows that it is not something to be avoided
like transitory things.]

[Footnote 81: That, for instance, in the passage 'he is to sacrifice
with Soma,' the word 'soma,' which does not denote an action, is devoid
of sense.]

[Footnote 82: I.e. for the purpose of showing that the passages
conveying information about Brahman as such are justified. You have (the
objector maintains) proved hitherto only that passages containing
information about existent things are admissible, if those things have a
purpose; but how does all this apply to the information about Brahman of
which no purpose has been established?]

[Footnote 83: It is 'naturally established' because it has natural
motives--not dependent on the injunctions of the Veda, viz. passion and
the like.]

[Footnote 84: Elsewhere, i.e. outside the Veda.]

[Footnote 85: The above discussion of the prohibitory passages of the
Veda is of a very scholastic nature, and various clauses in it are
differently interpreted by the different commentators. /S/a@nkara
endeavours to fortify his doctrine, that not all parts of the Veda refer
to action by an appeal to prohibitory passages which do not enjoin
action but abstinence from action. The legitimacy of this appeal might
be contested on the ground that a prohibitory passage also, (as, for
instance, 'a Brâhma/n/a is not to be killed,') can be explained as
enjoining a positive action, viz. some action opposed in nature to the
one forbidden, so that the quoted passage might be interpreted to mean
'a determination, &c. of not killing a Brâhma/n/a is to be formed;' just
as we understand something positive by the expression 'a
non-Brâhma/n/a,' viz. some man who is a kshattriya or something else. To
this the answer is that, wherever we can, we must attribute to the word
'not' its primary sense which is the absolute negation of the word to
which it is joined; so that passages where it is joined to words
denoting action must be considered to have for their purport the entire
absence of action. Special cases only are excepted, as the one alluded
to in the text where certain prohibited actions are enumerated under the
heading of vows; for as a vow is considered as something positive, the
non-doing of some particular action must there be understood as
intimating the performance of some action of an opposite nature. The
question as to the various meanings of the particle 'not' is discussed
in all treatises on the Pûrvâ Mîmâ/m/sâ; see, for instance,
Arthasamgraha, translation, p. 39 ff.]

[Footnote 86: The Self is the agent in a sacrifice, &c. only in so far
as it imagines itself to be joined to a body; which imagination is
finally removed by the cognition of Brahman.]

[Footnote 87: The figurative Self, i.e. the imagination that wife,
children, possessions, and the like are a man's Self; the false Self,
i.e. the imagination that the Self acts, suffers, enjoys, &c.]

[Footnote 88: I.e. the apparent world with all its distinctions.]

[Footnote 89: The words in parentheses are not found in the best
manuscripts.]

[Footnote 90: The most exalted of the three constituent elements whose
state of equipoise constitutes the pradhâna.]

[Footnote 91: Knowledge can arise only where Goodness is predominant,
not where the three qualities mutually counterbalance one another.]

[Footnote 92: The excess of Sattva in the Yogin would not enable him to
rise to omniscience if he did not possess an intelligent principle
independent of Sattva.]

[Footnote 93: Ananda Giri comments as follows: paroktânupapatlim
nirasitum p/rikkh/ati idam iti. Prak/ri/tyarthâbhâvât pratyayârthâbhâvâd
vâ brahma/n/o sarvaj/ñ/ateti pra/s/nam eva praka/t/ayati katham iti.
Prathama/m/ pratyâha yasyeti. Ukta/m/ vyatirckadvârâ viyz/rin/oti
anityatve hîti. Dvitiya/m/ /s/a@nkate j/ñ/âneti. Svato nityasyâpi
j/ñ/ânasya tattadarthâva/kkh/innasya kâryatvât tatra svâtantryam
pratyayârtho brahma/n/a/h/ sidhyatîty âha.--The knowledge of Brahman is
eternal, and in so far Brahman is not independent with regard to it, but
it is independent with regard to each particular act of knowledge; the
verbal affix in 'jânâti' indicating the particularity of the act.]

[Footnote 94: In the second Kha/nd/a of the sixth Prapâ/th/aka of the
Ch. Up. 'aikshata' is twice used in a figurative sense (with regard to
fire and water); it is therefore to be understood figuratively in the
third passage also where it occurs.]

[Footnote 95: So that, on this latter explanation, it is unnecessary to
assume a figurative sense of the word 'thinking' in any of the three
passages.]

[Footnote 96: A wicked man meets in a forest a blind person who has lost
his way, and implores him to lead him to his village; instead of doing
so the wicked man persuades the blind one to catch hold of the tail of
an ox, which he promises would lead him to his place. The consequence is
that the blind man is, owing to his trustfulness, led even farther
astray, and injured by the bushes, &c., through which the ox drags him.]

[Footnote 97: Cp. above, p. 30.]

[Footnote 98: So according to the commentators, not to accept whose
guidance in the translation of scholastic definitions is rather
hazardous. A simpler translation of the clause might however be given.]

[Footnote 99: With reference to Ch. Up. VI, 8, 2.]

[Footnote 100: The wise one, i.e. the highest Self; which as jîvâtman is
conversant with the names and forms of individual things.]

[Footnote 101: I.e. it is looked upon as the object of the devotion of
the individual souls; while in reality all those souls and Brahman are
one.]

[Footnote 102: Qualities, i.e. the attributes under which the Self is
meditated on; limiting conditions, i.e. the localities--such as the
heart and the like--which in pious meditation are ascribed to the Self.]

[Footnote 103: Ânanda Giri reads âvish/t/asya for âvishk/ri/tasya.]

[Footnote 104: Cp. the entire passage. All things are manifestations of
the highest Self under certain limiting conditions, but occupying
different places in an ascending scale. In unsentient things, stones,
&c. only the sattâ, the quality of being manifests itself; in plants,
animals, and men the Self manifests itself through the vital sap; in
animals and men there is understanding; higher thought in man alone.]

[Footnote 105: Ânanda Giri on the preceding passage beginning from 'thus
here also:' na kevala/m/ dvaividhyam brahma/n/a/h/ /s/rutism/ri/tyor eva
siddha/m/ ki/m/ tu sûtrak/ri/to api matam ity âha, evam iti,
/s/rutism/ri/tyor iva prak/ri/te pi /s/âstre dvairûpyam brahma/n/o
bhavati; tatra sopâdhikabrahmavishayam antastaddharmâdhikara/n/am
udâharati âdityeti; uktanyâya/m/ tulyade/s/eshu prasârayati evam iti;
sopâdhikopade/s/avan nirupâdhikopade/s/a/m/ dar/s/ayati evam ityâdinâ,
âtmaj/ñ/@ana/m/ nir/n/etavyam iti sambandha/h/; ayaprasa@ngam âha
pareti; annamayâdyupâdhidvârokasya katham paravidyâvishayatva/m/ tatrâha
upâdhîti; nir/n/ayakramam âha vâkyeti, uktârtham adhikara/n/a/m/
kvâstîty âsa@nkyokta/m/ yatheti.]

[Footnote 106: After which no other Self is mentioned.]

[Footnote 107: The previous proofs were founded on li@nga; the argument
which is now propounded is founded on prakara/n/a.]

[Footnote 108: While, in the case of the Selfs consisting of food and so
on, a further inner Self is duly mentioned each time. It cannot,
therefore, be concluded that the Selfs consisting of food, &c., are
likewise identical with the highest Self referred to in the mantra.]

[Footnote 109: Yadi labdhâ na labdhavya/h/ katha/m/ tarhi paramâtmano
vastutobhinnena jîvâtmanâ paramâtmâ labhyata ity artha/h/. Bhâmatî.]

[Footnote 110: Yathâ paramesvarâd bhinno jîvâtmâ drash/t/â na bhavaty
evam gîvâtmanozpi drash/t/ur na bhinna/h/ parame/s/vara iti,
jîvasyânirvâ/k/yarve parame/s/varozpy anirvâ/k/ya/h/ syâd ity ata âha
parame/s/varas tv avidyâkalpitâd iti. Ananda Giri.]

[Footnote 111: The explanation of the ânandamaya given hitherto is here
recalled, and a different one given. The previous explanation is
attributed by Go. Ân. to the v/ri/ttikâra.]

[Footnote 112: In which sense, as shown above, the word ânandamaya must
be taken if understood to denote Brahman.]

[Footnote 113: I.e. the word translated hitherto by abundance.]

[Footnote 114: See I, 1, 15-19. ]

[Footnote 115: The preceding adhikara/n/a had shown that the five Selfs
(consisting of food, mind, and so on), which the Taitt. Up. enumerates,
are introduced merely for the purpose of facilitating the cognition of
Brahman considered as devoid of all qualities; while that Brahman itself
is the real object of knowledge. The present adhikara/n/a undertakes to
show that the passage about the golden person represents the savi/s/esha
Brahman as the object of devout meditation.]

[Footnote 116: So that the real giver of the gifts bestowed by princes
on poets and singers is Brahman.]

[Footnote 117: Or else 'that which is within forms and names.']

[Footnote 118: Viz. as intimating it. Thus Ân. Gi. and Go. Ân. against
the accent of /rik/á/h/. Sâya/n/a explains /rik/á/h/ as genitive.]

[Footnote 119: O/m/kârasya pratîkatvena vâ/k/akatvena lakshakatvena vâ
brahmatvam uktam, om iti, ka/m/ sukha/m/ tasyârthendriyayogajatva/m/
vârayitu/m/ kham iti, tasya bhûtâka/s/atva/m/ vyâseddhum purâ/n/am ity
uktam. Ân. Gi.]

[Footnote 120: The doubt about the meaning of a word is preferably to be
decided by means of a reference to preceding passages; where that is not
possible (the doubtful word occurring at the beginning of some new
chapter) complementary, i.e. subsequent passages have to be taken into
consideration.]

[Footnote 121: The v/ri/ttikâra, the commentators say.]

[Footnote 122: I.e. which has not been mixed with water and earth,
according to Ch. Up. VI, 3, 3. Before that mixture took place light was
entriely separated from the other elements, and therefore bounded by the
latter.]

[Footnote 123: So as to justify the assumption that such a thing as
non-tripartite light exists at all.]

[Footnote 124: Brahma/n/o vyava/kkh/idya teja/h/samarpakatva/m/
vi/s/eshakatvam, tadabhâvozvi/s/eshakatvam. Ân. Gi.]

[Footnote 125: If we strictly follow the order of words in the
original.]

[Footnote 126: Svasâmarthyena sarvanâmna/h/
sannihitaparâmar/s/itvava/s/ena.]

[Footnote 127: The v/ri/ttikâra according to Go. Ân. in his /t/îkâ on
the bhâshya to the next Sûtra.]

[Footnote 128: Concerning the difficulty involved in this
interpretation, cp. Deussen, p. 183, note.]

[Footnote 129: The text runs, 'astitve /k/a prâ/n/ânâ/m/ ni/hs/reyasam,'
and Go. Ân. explains 'astitve prâ/n/asthitau prâ/n/ânâ/m/ indriyâ/n/âm
sthitir ity arthata/h/ /s/rutim âha.' He as well as Ân. Gi. quotes as
the text of the scriptural passage referred to 'athâto ni/hs/reyasâdânam
ity âdi.' But if instead of 'astitve /k/a' we read 'asti tv eva,' we get
the concluding clause of Kau. Up. III, 2, as given in Cowell's
edition.].

[Footnote 130: Whence we know that the interior Self referred to in the
Kau. Up. is Brahman.]

[Footnote 131: I.e. spontaneous intuition of supersensible truth,
rendered possible through the knowledge acquired in former existences.]

[Footnote 132: Ima/m/ /s/arîram instead of ida/m/ /s/arîram.]

[Footnote 133: Pa/ñk/a /s/abdâdaya/h/ pa/ñk/a p/ri/thivyâdaya/s/ /k/a
da/s/a bhûtamâtrâ/h/ pa/ñk/a buddhîndriyâ/n/i pa/ñk/a buddhaya iti
da/s/a praj/ñ/âmâtrâ/h/. Yadvâ j/ñ/ânendriyârthâ/h/ pa/ñk/a
karzmendriyârthâ/s/ /ka/ pa/ñk/eti da/s/a bhûtamâtrâ/h/
dvividhânîndriyâ/n/i praj/ñ/âmâtrâ da/s/eti bhâva/h/. Ân. Gi.]

[Footnote 134: Viz. by the v/ri/ttikâra.]

[Footnote 135: Ihâpi tad yujyate explaining the 'iha tadyogât' of the
Sûtra.]




SECOND PÂDA.

REVERENCE TO THE HIGHEST SELF!


In the first pâda Brahman has been shown to be the cause of the origin,
subsistence, and reabsorption of the entire world, comprising the ether
and the other elements. Moreover, of this Brahman, which is the cause of
the entire world, certain qualities have (implicitly) been declared,
such as all-pervadingness, eternity, omniscience, its being the Self of
all, and so on. Further, by producing reasons showing that some words
which are generally used in a different sense denote Brahman also, we
have been able to determine that some passages about whose sense doubts
are entertained refer to Brahman. Now certain other passages present
themselves which because containing only obscure indications of Brahman
give rise to the doubt whether they refer to the highest Self or to
something else. We therefore begin the second and third pâdas in order
to settle those doubtful points.

1. (That which consists of mind is Brahman) because there is taught what
is known from everywhere.

Scripture says, 'All this indeed is Brahman, beginning, ending, and
breathing in it; thus knowing let a man meditate with calm mind. Now man
is made of determination (kratu); according to what his determination is
in this world so will he be when he has departed this life. Let him
therefore form this determination: he who consists of mind, whose body
is breath (the subtle body),' &c. (Ch. Up. III, 14). Concerning this
passage the doubt presents itself whether what is pointed out as the
object of meditation, by means of attributes such as consisting of mind,
&c., is the embodied (individual) soul or the highest Brahman.

The embodied Self, the pûrvapakshin says.--Why?--Because the embodied
Self as the ruler of the organs of action is well known to be connected
with the mind and so on, while the highest Brahman is not, as is
declared in several scriptural passages, so, for instance (Mu. Up. II,
1, 2), 'He is without breath, without mind, pure.'--But, it may be
objected, the passage, 'All this indeed is Brahman,' mentions Brahman
directly; how then can you suppose that the embodied Self forms the
object of meditation?--This objection does not apply, the pûrvapakshin
rejoins, because the passage does not aim at enjoining meditation on
Brahman, but rather at enjoining calmness of mind, the sense being:
because Brahman is all this, tajjalân, let a man meditate with a calm
mind. That is to say: because all this aggregate of effects is Brahman
only, springing from it, ending in it, and breathing in it; and because,
as everything constitutes one Self only, there is no room for passion;
therefore a man is to meditate with a calm mind. And since the sentence
aims at enjoining calmness of mind, it cannot at the same time enjoin
meditation on Brahman[136]; but meditation is separately enjoined in the
clause, 'Let him form the determination, i.e. reflection.' And thereupon
the subsequent passage, 'He who consists of mind, whose body is breath,'
&c. states the object of the meditation in words indicatory of the
individual soul. For this reason we maintain that the meditation spoken
of has the individual soul for its object. The other attributes also
subsequently stated in the text, 'He to whom all works, all desires
belong,' &c. may rightly be held to refer to the individual soul. The
attributes, finally, of being what abides in the heart and of being
extremely minute which are mentioned in the passage, 'He is my Self
within the heart, smaller than a corn of rice, smaller than a corn of
barley,' may be ascribed to the individual soul which has the size of
the point of a goad, but not to the unlimited Brahman. If it be objected
that the immediately following passage, 'greater than the earth,' &c.,
cannot refer to something limited, we reply that smallness and greatness
which are mutually opposite cannot indeed be ascribed to one and the
same thing; and that, if one attribute only is to be ascribed to the
subject of the passage, smallness is preferable because it is mentioned
first; while the greatness mentioned later on may be attributed to the
soul in so far as it is one with Brahman. If it is once settled that the
whole passage refers to the individual soul, it follows that the
declaration of Brahman also, contained in the passage, 'That is Brahman'
(III, 14, 4), refers to the individual soul[137], as it is clearly
connected with the general topic. Therefore the individual soul is the
object of meditation indicated by the qualities of consisting of mind
and so on.

To all this we reply: The highest Brahman only is what is to be
meditated upon as distinguished by the attributes of consisting of mind
and so on.--Why?--'On account of there being taught here what is known
from everywhere.' What is known from all Vedânta-passages to be the
sense of the word Brahman, viz. the cause of the world, and what is
mentioned here in the beginning words of the passage, ('all this indeed
is Brahman,') the same we must assume to be taught here as distinguished
by certain qualities, viz. consisting of mind and so on. Thus we avoid
the fault of dropping the subject-matter under discussion and needlessly
introducing a new topic.--But, it may be said, it has been shown that
Brahman is, in the beginning of the passage, introduced merely for the
purpose of intimating the injunction of calmness of mind, not for the
purpose of intimating Brahman itself.--True, we reply; but the fact
nevertheless remains that, where the qualities of consisting of mind,
&c. are spoken of, Brahman only is proximate (i.e. mentioned not far off
so that it may be concluded to be the thing referred to), while the
individual soul is neither proximate nor intimated by any word directly
pointing to it. The cases of Brahman and the individual soul are
therefore not equal.

2. And because the qualities desired to be expressed are possible (in
Brahman; therefore the passage refers to Brahman).

Although in the Veda which is not the work of man no wish in the strict
sense can be expressed[138], there being no speaker, still such phrases
as 'desired to be expressed,' may be figuratively used on account of the
result, viz. (mental) comprehension. For just as in ordinary language we
speak of something which is intimated by a word and is to be received
(by the hearer as the meaning of the word), as 'desired to be
expressed;' so in the Veda also whatever is denoted as that which is to
be received is 'desired to be expressed,' everything else 'not desired
to be expressed.' What is to be received as the meaning of a Vedic
sentence, and what not, is inferred from the general purport of the
passage. Those qualities which are here desired to be expressed, i.e.
intimated as qualities to be dwelt on in meditation, viz. the qualities
of having true purposes, &c. are possible in the highest Brahman; for
the quality of having true purposes may be ascribed to the highest Self
which possesses unimpeded power over the creation, subsistence, and
reabsorption of this world. Similarly the qualities of having true
desires and true purposes are attributed to the highest Self in another
passage, viz. the one beginning, 'The Self which is free from sin' (Ch.
Up. VIII, 7, 1). The clause, 'He whose Self is the ether,' means 'he
whose Self is like the ether;' for Brahman may be said to be like the
ether on account of its omnipresence and other qualities. This is also
expressed by the clause, 'Greater than the earth.' And the other
explanation also, according to which the passage means 'he whose Self is
the ether' is possible, since Brahman which as the cause of the whole
world is the Self of everything is also the Self of the ether. For the
same reasons he is called 'he to whom all works belong, and so on.' Thus
the qualities here intimated as topics of meditation agree with the
nature of Brahman. We further maintain that the terms 'consisting of
mind,' and 'having breath for its body,' which the pûrvapakshin asserts
cannot refer to Brahman, may refer to it. For as Brahman is the Self of
everything, qualities such as consisting of mind and the like, which
belong to the individual soul, belong to Brahman also. Accordingly
/S/ruti and Sm/ri/ti say of Brahman, 'Thou art woman, thou art man; thou
art youth, thou art maiden; thou as an old man totterest along on thy
staff; thou art born with thy face turned everywhere' (/S/ve. Up. IV,
3), and 'its hands and feet are everywhere, its eyes and head are
everywhere, its ears are everywhere, it stands encompassing all in the
world' (Bha. Gîtâ III, 13).

The passage (quoted above against our view), 'Without breath, without
mind, pure,' refers to the pure (unrelated) Brahman. The terms
'consisting of mind; having breath for its body,' on the other hand,
refer to Brahman as distinguished by qualities. Hence, as the qualities
mentioned are possible in Brahman, we conclude that the highest Brahman
only is represented as the object of meditation.

3. On the other hand, as (those qualities) are not possible (in it), the
embodied (soul is) not (denoted by manomaya, &c.).

The preceding Sûtra has declared that the qualities mentioned are
possible in Brahman; the present Sûtra states that they are not possible
in the embodied Self. Brahman only possesses, in the manner explained,
the qualities of consisting of mind, and so on; not the embodied
individual soul. For qualities such as expressed in the words, 'He whose
purposes are true, whose Self is the ether, who has no speech, who is
not disturbed, who is greater than the earth,' cannot easily be
attributed to the embodied Self. By the term 'embodied' (/s/ârîra) we
have to understand 'residing' in a body. If it be objected that the Lord
also resides in the body[139], we reply, True, he does reside in the
body, but not in the body only; for /s/ruti declares him to be
all-pervading; compare, 'He is greater than the earth; greater than the
atmosphere, omnipresent like the ether, eternal.' The individual soul,
on the other hand, is in the body only, apart from which as the abode of
fruition it does not exist.

4. And because there is a (separate) denotation of the object of
activity and of the agent.

The attributes of consisting of mind, and so on, cannot belong to the
embodied Self for that reason also, that there is a (separate)
denotation of the object of activity and of the agent. In the passage,
'When I shall have departed from hence I shall obtain him' (Ch. Up. III,
14, 4), the word 'him' refers to that which is the topic of discussion,
viz. the Self which is to be meditated upon as possessing the attributes
of consisting of mind, &c., as the object of an activity, viz. as
something to be obtained; while the words, 'I shall obtain,' represent
the meditating individual Self as the agent, i.e. the obtainer. Now,
wherever it can be helped, we must not assume that one and the same
being is spoken of as the agent and the object of the activity at the
same time. The relation existing between a person meditating and the
thing meditated upon requires, moreover, different abodes.--And thus for
the above reason, also, that which is characterised by the attributes of
consisting of mind, and so on, cannot be the individual soul.

5. On account of the difference of words.

That which possesses the attributes of consisting of mind, and so on,
cannot be the individual soul, for that reason also that there is a
difference of words.

That is to say, we meet with another scriptural passage of kindred
subject-matter (/S/at. Brâ. X, 6, 3, 2), 'Like a rice grain, or a barley
grain, or a canary seed or the kernel of a canary seed, thus that golden
person is in the Self.' There one word, i.e. the locative 'in the Self,'
denotes the embodied Self, and a different word, viz. the nominative
'person,' denotes the Self distinguished by the qualities of consisting
of mind, &c. We therefrom conclude that the two are different.

6. And on account of Sm/ri/ti.

Sm/ri/ti also declares the difference of the embodied Self and the
highest Self, viz. Bha. Gîtâ XVIII, 61, 'The Lord, O Arjuna, is seated
in the heart of all beings, driving round by his magical power all
beings (as if they were) mounted on a machine.'

But what, it may be asked, is that so-called embodied Self different
from the highest Self which is to be set aside according to the
preceding Sûtras? /S/ruti passages, as well as Sm/ri/ti, expressly deny
that there is any Self apart from the highest Self; compare, for
instance, B/ri/. Up. III, 7, 23, 'There is no other seer but he; there
is no other hearer but he;' and Bha. Gîtâ XIII, 2, 'And know me also, O
Bhârata, to be the kshetiaj/ñ/a in all kshetras.'

True, we reply, (there is in reality one universal Self only.) But the
highest Self in so far as it is limited by its adjuncts, viz. the body,
the senses, and the mind (mano-buddhi), is, by the ignorant, spoken of
as if it were embodied. Similarly the ether, although in reality
unlimited, appears limited owing to certain adjuncts, such as jars and
other vessels. With regard to this (unreal limitation of the one Self)
the distinction of objects of activity and of agents may be practically
assumed, as long as we have not learned--from the passage, 'That art
thou'--that the Self is one only. As soon, however, as we grasp the
truth that there is only one universal Self, there is an end to the
whole practical view of the world with its distinction of bondage, final
release, and the like.

7. If it be said that (the passage does) not (refer to Brahman) on
account of the smallness of the abode (mentioned), and on account of the
denotations of that (i.e. of minuteness); we say, no; because (Brahman)
has thus to be contemplated, and because the case is analogous to that
of ether.

On account of the limitation of its abode, which is mentioned in the
clause, 'He is my Self within the heart,' and on account of the
declaration as to its minuteness contained in the direct statement, 'He
is smaller than a grain of rice,' &c.; the embodied soul only, which is
of the size of an awl's point, is spoken of in the passage under
discussion, and not the highest Self. This assertion made above (in the
pûrvapaksha of Sûtra I, and restated in the pûrvapaksha of the present
Sûtra) has to be refuted. We therefore maintain that the objection
raised does not invalidate our view of the passage. It is true that a
thing occupying a limited space only cannot in any way be spoken of as
omnipresent; but, on the other hand, that which is omnipresent, and
therefore in all places may, from a certain point of view, be said to
occupy a limited space. Similarly, a prince may be called the ruler of
Ayodhyâ although he is at the same time the ruler of the whole
earth.--But from what point of view can the omnipresent Lord be said to
occupy a limited space and to be minute?--He may, we reply, be spoken of
thus, 'because he is to be contemplated thus.' The passage under
discussion teaches us to contemplate the Lord as abiding within the
lotus of the heart, characterised by minuteness and similar
qualities--which apprehension of the Lord is rendered possible through a
modification of the mind--just as Hari is contemplated in the sacred
stone called /S/âlagrâm. Although present everywhere, the Lord is
pleased when meditated upon as dwelling in the heart. The case is,
moreover, to be viewed as analogous to that of the ether. The ether,
although all-pervading, is spoken of as limited and minute, if
considered in its connexion with the eye of a needle; so Brahman also.
But it is an understood matter that the attributes of limitation of
abode and of minuteness depend, in Brahman's case, entirely on special
forms of contemplation, and are not real. The latter consideration
disposes also of the objection, that if Brahman has its abode in the
heart, which heart-abode is a different one in each body, it would
follow that it is affected by all the imperfections which attach to
beings having different abodes, such as parrots shut up in different
cages, viz. want of unity, being made up of parts, non-permanency, and
so on.

8. If it is said that (from the circumstance of Brahman and the
individual soul being one) there follows fruition (on the part of
Brahman); we say, no; on account of the difference of nature (of the
two).

But, it may be said, as Brahman is omnipresent like ether, and therefore
connected with the hearts of all living beings, and as it is of the
nature of intelligence and therefore not different from the individual
soul, it follows that Brahman also has the same fruition of pleasure,
pain, and so on (as the individual soul). The same result follows from
its unity. For in reality there exists no transmigratory Self different
from the highest Self; as appears from the text, 'There is no other
knower but he' (B/ri/. Up. III, 7, 23), and similar passages. Hence the
highest Self is subject to the fruition connected with transmigratory
existence.

This is not so, we reply; because there is a difference of nature. From
the circumstance that Brahman is connected with the hearts of all living
beings it does not follow that it is, like the embodied Self, subject to
fruition. For, between the embodied Self and the highest Self, there is
the difference that the former acts and enjoys, acquires merit and
demerit, and is affected by pleasure, pain, and so on; while the latter
is of the opposite nature, i.e. characterised by being free from all
evil and the like. On account of this difference of the two, the
fruition of the one does not extend to the other. To assume merely on
the ground of the mutual proximity of the two, without considering their
essentially different powers, that a connexion with effects exists (in
Brahman's case also), would be no better than to suppose that space is
on fire (when something in space is on fire). The same objection and
refutation apply to the case of those also who teach the existence of
more than one omnipresent Self. In reply to the assertion, that because
Brahman is one and there are no other Selfs outside it, Brahman must be
subject to fruition since the individual soul is so, we ask the
question: How have you, our wise opponent, ascertained that there is no
other Self? You will reply, we suppose, from scriptural texts such as,
'That art thou,' 'I am Brahman,' 'There is no other knower but he,' and
so on. Very well, then, it appears that the truth about scriptural
matters is to be ascertained from Scripture, and that Scripture is not
sometimes to be appealed to, and on other occasions to be disregarded.

Scriptural texts, such as 'that art thou,' teach that Brahman which is
free from all evil is the Self of the embodied soul, and thus dispel
even the opinion that the embodied soul is subject to fruition; how then
should fruition on the part of the embodied soul involve fruition on the
part of Brahman?--Let, then, the unity of the individual soul and
Brahman not be apprehended on the ground of Scripture.--In that case, we
reply, the fruition on the part of the individual soul has wrong
knowledge for its cause, and Brahman as it truly exists is not touched
thereby, not any more than the ether becomes really dark-blue in
consequence of ignorant people presuming it to be so. For this reason
the Sûtrakâra says[140] 'no, on account of the difference.' In spite of
their unity, fruition on the part of the soul does not involve fruition
on the part of Brahman; because there is a difference. For there is a
difference between false knowledge and perfect knowledge, fruition being
the figment of false knowledge while the unity (of the Self) is revealed
by perfect knowledge. Now, as the substance revealed by perfect
knowledge cannot be affected by fruition which is nothing but the
figment of false knowledge, it is impossible to assume even a shadow of
fruition on Brahman's part.

9. The eater (is the highest Self) since what is movable and what is
immovable is mentioned (as his food).

We read in the Ka/th/avallî (I, 2, 25), 'Who then knows where He is, He
to whom the Brahmans and Kshattriyas are but food, and death itself a
condiment?' This passage intimates, by means of the words 'food' and
'condiment,' that there is some eater. A doubt then arises whether the
eater be Agni or the individual soul or the highest Self; for no
distinguishing characteristic is stated, and Agni as well as the
individual soul and the highest Self is observed to form, in that
Upanishad, the subjects of questions[141].

The pûrvapakshin maintains that the eater is Agni, fire being known from
Scripture as well (cp. B/ri/. Up. I, 4, 6) as from ordinary life to be
the eater of food. Or else the individual soul may be the eater,
according to the passage, 'One of them eats the sweet fruit' (Mu. Up.
III, 1, 1). On the other hand, the eater cannot be Brahman on account of
the passage (which forms the continuation of the one quoted from the Mu.
Up.), 'The other looks on without eating.'

The eater, we reply, must be the highest Self 'because there is
mentioned what is movable and what is immovable.' For all things movable
and immovable are here to be taken as constituting the food, while death
is the condiment. But nothing beside the highest Self can be the
consumer of all these things in their totality; the highest Self,
however, when reabsorbing the entire aggregate of effects may be said to
eat everything. If it is objected that here no express mention is made
of things movable and things immovable, and that hence we have no right
to use the (alleged) mention made of them as a reason, we reply that
this objection is unfounded; firstly, because the aggregate of all
living beings is seen to be meant from the circumstance of death being
the condiment; and, secondly, because the Brahmans and Kshattriyas may
here, on account of their pre-eminent position, be viewed as instances
only (of all beings). Concerning the objection that the highest Self
cannot be an eater on account of the passage quoted ('the other looks on
without eating'), we remark that that passage aims at denying the
fruition (on the part of the highest Self) of the results of works, such
fruition being mentioned in immediate proximity, but is not meant to
negative the reabsorption of the world of effects (into Brahman); for it
is well established by all the Vedânta-texts that Brahman is the cause
of the creation, subsistence, and reabsorption of the world. Therefore
the eater can here be Brahman only.

10. And on account of the topic under discussion. That the highest Self
only can be the eater referred to is moreover evident from the passage
(Ka. Up. I, 2, 18), ('The knowing Self is not born, it dies not'), which
shows that the highest Self is the general topic. And to adhere to the
general topic is the proper proceeding. Further, the clause, 'Who then
knows where he is,' shows that the cognition is connected with
difficulties; which circumstance again points to the highest Self.

11. The 'two entered into the cave' (are the individual soul and the
highest Self), for the two are (intelligent) Selfs (and therefore of the
same nature), as it is seen (that numerals denote beings of the same
nature).

In the same Ka/th/avallî we read (I, 3, 1), 'There are the two drinking
the reward of their works in the world, (i.e. the body,) entered into
the cave, dwelling on the highest summit. Those who know Brahman call
them shade and light; likewise those householders who perform the
Tri/n/â/k/iketa sacrifice.'

Here the doubt arises whether the mind (buddhi) and the individual soul
are referred to, or the individual soul and the highest Self. If the
mind and the individual soul, then the individual soul is here spoken of
as different from the aggregate of the organs of action, (i.e. the
body,) among which the mind occupies the first place. And a statement on
this point is to be expected, as a question concerning it is asked in a
preceding passage, viz. I, 1, 20, 'There is that doubt when a man is
dead--some saying he is; others, he is not. This I should like to know
taught by thee; this is the third of my boons.' If, on the other hand,
the passage refers to the individual soul and the highest Self, then it
intimates that the highest Self is different from the individual soul;
and this also requires to be declared here, on account of the question
contained in the passage (I, 2, 14), 'That which thou seest as different
from religious duty and its contrary, from effect and cause, from the
past and the future, tell me that.'

The doubt to which the passage gives rise having thus been stated, a
caviller starts the following objection: neither of the stated views can
be maintained.--Why?--On account of the characteristic mark implied in
the circumstance that the two are said to drink, i.e. to enjoy, the
fruit of their works in the world. For this can apply to the intelligent
individual soul only, not to the non-intelligent buddhi. And as the dual
form 'drinking' (pibantau) shows that both are drinking, the view of the
two being the buddhi and the individual soul is not tenable. For the
same reason the other opinion also, viz. of the two being the individual
soul and the highest Self, cannot be maintained; for drinking (i.e. the
fruition of reward) cannot be predicated of the highest Self, on account
of the mantra (Mu. Up. III, 1, 1), 'The other looks on without eating.'

These objections, we reply, are without any force. Just as we see that
in phrases such as 'the men with the umbrella (lit. the umbrella-men)
are walking,' the attribute of being furnished with an umbrella which
properly speaking belongs to one man only is secondarily ascribed to
many, so here two agents are spoken of as drinking because one of them
is really drinking. Or else we may explain the passage by saying that,
while the individual soul only drinks, the Lord also is said to drink
because he makes the soul drink. On the other hand, we may also assume
that the two are the buddhi and the individual soul, the instrument
being figuratively spoken of as the agent--a figure of speech
exemplified by phrases such as 'the fuel cooks (the food).' And in a
chapter whose topic is the soul no two other beings can well be
represented as enjoying rewards. Hence there is room for the doubt
whether the two are the buddhi and the individual soul, or the
individual soul and the highest Self.

Here the pûrvapakshin maintains that the former of the two stated views
is the right one, because the two beings are qualified as 'entered into
the cave.' Whether we understand by the cave the body or the heart, in
either case the buddhi and the individual soul may be spoken of as
'entered into the cave.' Nor would it be appropriate, as long as another
interpretation is possible, to assume that a special place is here
ascribed to the omnipresent Brahman. Moreover, the words 'in the world
of their good deeds' show that the two do not pass beyond the sphere of
the results of their good works. But the highest Self is not in the
sphere of the results of either good or bad works; according to the
scriptural passage, 'It does not grow larger by works nor does it grow
smaller.' Further, the words 'shade and light' properly designate what
is intelligent and what is non-intelligent, because the two are opposed
to each other like light and shade. Hence we conclude that the buddhi
and the individual soul are spoken of.

To this we make the following reply:--In the passage under discussion
the individual soul (vij/ñ/ânâtman) and the highest Self are spoken of,
because these two, being both intelligent Selfs, are of the same nature.
For we see that in ordinary life also, whenever a number is mentioned,
beings of the same class are understood to be meant; when, for instance,
the order is given, 'Look out for a second (i.e. a fellow) for this
bull,' people look out for a second bull, not for a horse or a man. So
here also, where the mention of the fruition of rewards enables us to
determine that the individual soul is meant, we understand at once, when
a second is required, that the highest Self has to be understood; for
the highest Self is intelligent, and therefore of the same nature as the
soul.--But has it not been said above that the highest Self cannot be
meant here, on account of the text stating that it is placed in the
cave?--Well, we reply, /s/ruti as well as sm/ri/ti speaks of the highest
Self as placed in the cave. Compare, for instance (Ka. Up. I, 2, 12),
'The Ancient who is hidden in the cave, who dwells in the abyss;' Taitt.
Up. II, 1, 'He who knows him hidden in the cave, in the highest ether;'
and, 'Search for the Self entered into the cave.' That it is not
contrary to reason to assign to the omnipresent Brahman a special
locality, for the purpose of clearer perception, we have already
demonstrated. The attribute of existing in the world of its good works,
which properly belongs to one of the two only, viz. to the individual
soul, may be assigned to both, analogously to the case of the men, one
of whom carries an umbrella. Their being compared to light and shade
also is unobjectionable, because the qualities of belonging and not
belonging to this transmigratory world are opposed to each other, like
light and shade; the quality of belonging to it being due to Nescience,
and the quality of not belonging to it being real. We therefore
understand by the two 'entered into the cave,' the individual soul and
the highest Self.--Another reason for this interpretation follows.

12. And on account of the distinctive qualities (mentioned).

Moreover, the distinctive qualities mentioned in the text agree only
with the individual Self and the highest Self. For in a subsequent
passage (I, 3, 3), 'Know the Self to be the charioteer, the body to be
the chariot,' which contains the simile of the chariot, the individual
soul is represented as a charioteer driving on through transmigratory
existence and final release, while the passage (9), 'He reaches the end
of his journey, and that is the highest place of Vish/n/u,' represents
the highest Self as the goal of the driver's course. And in a preceding
passage also, (I, 2, 12, 'The wise, who by means of meditation on his
Self, recognises the Ancient who is difficult to be seen, who has
entered into the dark, who is hidden in the cave, who dwells in the
abyss, as God, he indeed leaves joy and sorrow far behind,') the same
two beings are distinguished as thinker and as object of thought. The
highest Self is, moreover, the general topic. And further, the clause,
'Those who know Brahman call them,' &c., which brings forward a special
class of speakers, is in its place only if the highest Self is accepted
(as one of the two beings spoken of). It is therefore evident that the
passage under discussion refers to the individual soul and the highest
Self.

The same reasoning applies to the passage (Mu. Up. III, 1, 1), 'Two
birds, inseparable friends,' &c. There also the Self is the general
topic, and hence no two ordinary birds can be meant; we therefore
conclude from the characteristic mark of eating, mentioned in the
passage, 'One of them eats the sweet fruit,' that the individual soul is
meant, and from the characteristic marks of abstinence from eating and
of intelligence, implied in the words, 'The other looks on without
eating,' that the highest Self is meant. In a subsequent mantra again
the two are distinguished as the seer and the object of sight. 'Merged
into the same tree (as it were into water) man grieves at his own
impotence (anî/s/â), bewildered; but when he sees the other Lord
(î/s/a.) contented and knows his glory, then his grief passes away.'

Another (commentator) gives a different interpretation of the mantra,
'Two birds inseparable,' &c. To that mantra, he says, the final decision
of the present head of discussion does not apply, because it is
differently interpreted in the Pai@ngi-rahasya Brâhma/n/a. According to
the latter the being which eats the sweet fruit is the sattva; the other
being which looks on without eating, the individual soul (j/ñ/a); so
that the two are the sattva and the individual soul (kshetraj/ñ/a). The
objection that the word sattva might denote the individual soul, and the
word kshetraj/ñ/a, the highest Self, is to be met by the remark that, in
the first place, the words sattva and kshetraj/ñ/a have the settled
meaning of internal organ and individual soul, and are in the second
place, expressly so interpreted there, (viz. in the Pai@ngi-rahasya,)
'The sattva is that by means of which man sees dreams; the embodied one,
the seer, is the kshetraj/ñ/a; the two are therefore the internal organ
and the individual soul.' Nor does the mantra under discussion fall
under the pûrvapaksha propounded above. For it does not aim at setting
forth the embodied individual soul, in so far as it is characterised by
the attributes connected with the transmigratory state, such as acting
and enjoying; but in so far rather as it transcends all attributes
connected with the sa/m/sâra and is of the nature of Brahman, i.e. is
pure intelligence; as is evident from the clause, 'The other looks on
without eating.' That agrees, moreover, with /s/ruti and sm/ri/ti
passages, such as, 'That art thou,' and 'Know me also to be the
individual soul' (Bha. Gîtâ XIII, 2). Only on such an explanation of the
passage as the preceding one there is room for the declaration made in
the concluding passage of the section, 'These two are the sattva and the
kshetraj/ñ/a; to him indeed who knows this no impurity
attaches[142].'--But how can, on the above interpretation, the
non-intelligent sattva (i.e. the internal organ) be spoken of as an
enjoyer, as is actually done in the clause, 'One of them eats the sweet
fruit?'--The whole passage, we reply, does not aim at setting forth the
fact that the sattva is an enjoyer, but rather the fact that the
intelligent individual soul is not an enjoyer, but is of the nature of
Brahman. To that end[143] the passage under discussion metaphorically
ascribes the attribute of being an enjoyer to the internal organ, in so
far as it is modified by pleasure, pain, and the like. For all acting
and enjoying is at the bottom based on the non-discrimination (by the
soul) of the respective nature of internal organ and soul: while in
reality neither the internal organ nor the soul either act or enjoy; not
the former, because it is non-intelligent; not the latter, because it is
not capable of any modification. And the internal organ can be
considered as acting and enjoying, all the less as it is a mere
presentment of Nescience. In agreement with what we have here
maintained, Scripture ('For where there is as it were duality there one
sees the other,' &c.; B/ri/. Up. IV, 5, 15) declares that the practical
assumption of agents, and so on--comparable to the assumption of the
existence of elephants, and the like, seen in a dream--holds good in the
sphere of Nescience only; while the passage, 'But when the Self only is
all this, how should he see another?' declares that all that practically
postulated existence vanishes for him who has arrived at discriminative
knowledge.

13. The person within (the eye) (is Brahman) on account of the agreement
(of the attributes of that person with the nature of Brahman).

Scripture says, 'He spoke: The person that is seen in the eye that is
the Self. This is the immortal, the fearless, this is Brahman. Even
though they drop melted butter or water on it (the eye) it runs away on
both sides,' &c. (Ch. Up. IV, 15, 1).

The doubt here arises whether this passage refers to the reflected Self
which resides in the eye, or to the individual Self, or to the Self of
some deity which presides over the sense of sight, or to the Lord.

With reference to this doubt the pûrvapakshin argues as follows: What is
meant (by the person in the eye) is the reflected Self, i.e. the image
of a person (reflected in the eye of another): for of that it is well
known that it is seen, and the clause, 'The person that is seen in the
eye,' refers to it as something well known. Or else we may appropriately
take the passage as referring to the individual Self. For the individual
Self (cognitional Self, vij/ñ/ânâtman) which perceives the colours by
means of the eye is, on that account, in proximity to the eye; and,
moreover, the word 'Self' (which occurs in the passage) favours this
interpretation. Or else the passage is to be understood as referring to
the soul animating the sun which assists the sense of sight; compare the
passage (B/ri/. Up. V, 5, 2), 'He (the person in the sun) rests with his
rays in him (the person in the right eye).' Moreover, qualities such as
immortality and the like (which are ascribed to the subject of the
scriptural passage) may somehow belong to individual deities. The Lord,
on the other hand[144], cannot be meant, because a particular locality
is spoken of.

Against this we remark that the highest Lord only can be meant here by
the person within the eye.--Why?--'On account of the agreement.' For the
qualities mentioned in the passage accord with the nature of the highest
Lord. The quality of being the Self, in the first place, belongs to the
highest Lord in its primary (non-figurative or non-derived) sense, as we
know from such texts as 'That is the Self,' 'That art thou.' Immortality
and fearlessness again are often ascribed to him in Scripture. The
location in the eye also is in consonance with the nature of the highest
Lord. For just as the highest Lord whom Scripture declares to be free
from all evil is not stained by any imperfections, so the station of the
eye also is declared to be free from all stain, as we see from the
passage, 'Even though they drop melted butter or water on it it runs
away on both sides.' The statement, moreover, that he possesses the
qualities of sa/m/yadvâma, &c. can be reconciled with the highest Lord
only (Ch. Up. IV, 15, 2, 'They call him Sa/m/yadvâma, for all blessings
(vâma) go towards him (sa/m/yanti). He is also vâmanî, for he leads
(nayati) all blessings (vâma). He is also Bhâmanî, for he shines (bhâti)
in all worlds'). Therefore, on account of agreement, the person within
the eye is the highest Lord.

14. And on account of the statement of place, and so on.

But how does the confined locality of the eye agree with Brahman which
is omnipresent like the ether?--To this question we reply that there
would indeed be a want of agreement if that one locality only were
assigned to the Lord. For other localities also, viz. the earth and so
on, are attributed to him in the passage, 'He who dwells in the earth,'
&c. (B/ri/. Up. III, 7, 3). And among those the eye also is mentioned,
viz. in the clause, 'He who dwells in the eye,' &c. The phrase 'and so
on,' which forms part of the Sûtra, intimates that not only locality is
assigned to Brahman, although not (really) appropriate to it, but that
also such things as name and form, although not appropriate to Brahman
which is devoid of name and form, are yet seen to be attributed to it.
That, in such passages as 'His name is ut, he with the golden beard'
(Ch. Up. I, 6, 7, 6), Brahman although devoid of qualities is spoken of,
for the purposes of devotion, as possessing qualities depending on name
and form, we have already shown. And we have, moreover, shown that to
attribute to Brahman a definite locality, in spite of his omnipresence,
subserves the purposes of contemplation, and is therefore not contrary
to reason[145]; no more than to contemplate Vish/n/u in the sacred
/s/âlagrâm.

15. And on account of the passage referring to that which is
distinguished by pleasure (i.e. Brahman).

There is, moreover, really no room for dispute whether Brahman be meant
in the passage under discussion or not, because the fact of Brahman
being meant is established 'by the reference to that which is
distinguished by pleasure.' For the same Brahman which is spoken of as
characterised by pleasure in the beginning of the chapter[146], viz. in
the clauses, 'Breath is Brahman, Ka is Brahman, Kha is Brahman,' that
same Brahman we must suppose to be referred to in the present passage
also, it being proper to adhere to the subject-matter under discussion;
the clause, 'The teacher will tell you the way[147],' merely announcing
that the way will be proclaimed [by the teacher; not that a new subject
will be started].--How then, it may be asked, is it known that Brahman,
as distinguished by pleasure, is spoken of in the beginning of the
passage?--We reply: On hearing the speech of the fires, viz. 'Breath is
Brahman, Ka is Brahman, Kha is Brahman,' Upako/s/ala says, 'I understand
that breath is Brahman, but I do not understand that Ka or Kha is
Brahman.' Thereupon the fires reply, 'What is Ka is Kha, what is Kha is
Ka.' Now the word Kha denotes in ordinary language the elemental ether.
If therefore the word Ka which means pleasure were not applied to
qualify the sense of 'Kha,' we should conclude that the name Brahman is
here symbolically[148] given to the mere elemental ether as it is (in
other places) given to mere names and the like. Thus also with regard to
the word Ka, which, in ordinary language, denotes the imperfect pleasure
springing from the contact of the sense-organs with their objects. If
the word Kha were not applied to qualify the sense of Ka we should
conclude that ordinary pleasure is here called Brahman. But as the two
words Ka and Kha (occur together and therefore) qualify each other, they
intimate Brahman whose Self is pleasure. If[149] in the passage referred
to (viz. 'Breath is Brahman, Ka is Brahman, Kha is Brahman') the second
Brahman (i.e. the word Brahman in the clause 'Ka is Brahman') were not
added, and if the sentence would run 'Ka, Kha is Brahman,' the word Ka
would be employed as a mere qualifying word, and thus pleasure as being
a mere quality would not be represented as a subject of meditation. To
prevent this, both words--Ka as well as Kha--are joined with the word
Brahman ('Ka (is) Brahman, Kha (is) Brahman'). For the passage wishes to
intimate that pleasure also, although a quality, should be meditated
upon as something in which qualities inhere. It thus appears that at the
beginning of the chapter Brahman, as characterised by pleasure, is
spoken of. After that the Gârhapatya and the other sacred fires proclaim
in turns their own glory, and finally conclude with the words, 'This is
our knowledge, O friend, and the knowledge of the Self;' wherein they
point back to the Brahman spoken of before. The words, 'The teacher will
tell you the way' (which form the last clause of the concluding
passage), merely promise an explanation of the way, and thus preclude
the idea of another topic being started. The teacher thereupon saying,
'As water does not cling to a lotus leaf, so no evil deed clings to one
who knows it' (which words intervene between the concluding speech of
the fires and the information given by the teacher about the person
within the eye) declares that no evil attacks him who knows the person
within the eye, and thereby shows the latter to be Brahman. It thus
appears that the teacher's intention is to speak about that Brahman
which had formed the topic of the instruction of the fires; to represent
it at first as located in the eye and possessing the qualities of
Sa/m/yadvâma and the like, and to point out afterwards that he who thus
knows passes on to light and so on. He therefore begins by saying, 'That
person that is seen in the eye that is the Self.'

16. And on account of the statement of the way of him who has heard the
Upanishads.

The person placed in the eye is the highest lord for the following
reason also. From /s/ruti as well as sm/ri/ti we are acquainted with the
way of him who has heard the Upanishads or the secret knowledge, i.e.
who knows Brahman. That way, called the path of the gods, is described
(Pra. Up. I, 10), 'Those who have sought the Self by penance,
abstinence, faith, and knowledge gain by the northern path the sun. This
is the home of the spirits, the immortal, free from fear, the highest.
From thence they do not return;' and also (Bha. Gîtâ VIII, 24), 'Fire,
light, the bright fortnight, the six months of the northern progress of
the sun, on that way those who know Brahman go, when they have died, to
Brahman.' Now that very same way is seen to be stated, in our text, for
him who knows the person within the eye. For we read (Ch. Up. IV, 15,
5), 'Now whether people perform obsequies for him or no he goes to
light;' and later on, 'From the sun (he goes) to the moon, from the moon
to lightning. There is a person not human, he leads them to Brahman.
This is the path of the gods, the path that leads to Brahman. Those who
proceed on that path do not return to the life of man.' From this
description of the way which is known to be the way of him who knows
Brahman we ascertain that the person within the eye is Brahman.

17. (The person within the eye is the highest), not any other Self; on
account of the non-permanency (of the other Selfs) and on account of the
impossibility (of the qualities of the person in the eye being ascribed
to the other Selfs).

To the assertion made in the pûrvapaksha that the person in the eye is
either the reflected Self or the cognitional Self (the individual soul)
or the Self of some deity the following answer is given.--No other Self
such as, for instance, the reflected Self can be assumed here, on
account of non-permanency.--The reflected Self, in the first place, does
not permanently abide in the eye. For when some person approaches the
eye the reflection of that person is seen in the eye, but when the
person moves away the reflection is seen no longer. The passage 'That
person within the eye' must, moreover, be held, on the ground of
proximity, to intimate that the person seen in a man's own eye is the
object of (that man's) devout meditation (and not the reflected image of
his own person which he may see in the eye of another man). [Let, then,
another man approach the devout man, and let the latter meditate on the
image reflected in his own eye, but seen by the other man only. No, we
reply, for] we have no right to make the (complicated) assumption that
the devout man is, at the time of devotion, to bring close to his eye
another man in order to produce a reflected image in his own eye.
Scripture, moreover, (viz. Ch. Up. VIII, 9, 1, 'It (the reflected Self)
perishes as soon as the body perishes,') declares the non-permanency of
the reflected Self.--And, further, 'on account of impossibility' (the
person in the eye cannot be the reflected Self). For immortality and the
other qualities ascribed to the person in the eye are not to be
perceived in the reflected Self.--Of the cognitional Self, in the second
place, which is in general connexion with the whole body and all the
senses, it can likewise not be said that it has its permanent station in
the eye only. That, on the other hand, Brahman although all-pervading
may, for the purpose of contemplation, be spoken of as connected with
particular places such as the heart and the like, we have seen already.
The cognitional Self shares (with the reflected Self) the impossibility
of having the qualities of immortality and so on attributed to it.
Although the cognitional Self is in reality not different from the
highest Self, still there are fictitiously ascribed to it (adhyâropita)
the effects of nescience, desire and works, viz, mortality and fear; so
that neither immortality nor fearlessness belongs to it. The qualities
of being the sa/m/yadvâma, &c. also cannot properly be ascribed to the
cognitional Self, which is not distinguished by lordly power
(ai/s/varya).--In the third place, although the Self of a deity (viz.
the sun) has its station in the eye--according to the scriptural
passage, 'He rests with his rays in him'--still Selfhood cannot be
ascribed to the sun, on account of his externality (parâgrûpatva).
Immortality, &c. also cannot be predicated of him, as Scripture speaks
of his origin and his dissolution. For the (so-called) deathlessness of
the gods only means their (comparatively) long existence. And their
lordly power also is based on the highest Lord and does not naturally
belong to them; as the mantra declares, 'From terror of it (Brahman) the
wind blows, from terror the sun rises; from terror of it Agni and Indra,
yea, Death runs as the fifth.'--Hence the person in the eye must be
viewed as the highest Lord only. In the case of this explanation being
adopted the mention (of the person in the eye) as something well known
and established, which is contained in the words 'is seen' (in the
phrase 'the person that is seen in the eye'), has to be taken as
referring to (the mental perception founded on) the /s/âstra which
belongs to those who know; and the glorification (of devout meditation)
has to be understood as its purpose.

18. The internal ruler over the devas and so on (is Brahman), because
the attributes of that (Brahman) are designated.

In B/ri/. Up. III, 7, 1 ff. we read, 'He who within rules this world and
the other world and all beings,' and later on, 'He who dwells in the
earth and within the earth, whom the earth does not know, whose body the
earth is, who rules the earth within, he is thy Self, the ruler within,
the immortal,' &c. The entire chapter (to sum up its contents) speaks of
a being, called the antaryâmin (the internal ruler), who, dwelling
within, rules with reference to the gods, the world, the Veda, the
sacrifice, the beings, the Self.--Here now, owing to the unusualness of
the term (antaryâmin), there arises a doubt whether it denotes the Self
of some deity which presides over the gods and so on, or some Yogin who
has acquired extraordinary powers, such as, for instance, the capability
of making his body subtle, or the highest Self, or some other being.
What alternative then does recommend itself?

As the term is an unknown one, the pûrvapakshin says, we must assume
that the being denoted by it is also an unknown one, different from all
those mentioned above.--Or else it may be said that, on the one hand, we
have no right to assume something of an altogether indefinite character,
and that, on the other hand, the term antaryâmin--which is derived from
antaryamana (ruling within)--cannot be called altogether unknown, that
therefore antaryâmin may be assumed to denote some god presiding over
the earth, and so on. Similarly, we read (B/ri/. Up. III, 9, 16), 'He
whose dwelling is the earth, whose sight is fire, whose mind is light,'
&c. A god of that kind is capable of ruling the earth, and so on,
dwelling within them, because he is endowed with the organs of action;
rulership is therefore rightly ascribed to him.--Or else the rulership
spoken of may belong to some Yogin whom his extraordinary powers enable
to enter within all things.--The highest Self, on the other hand, cannot
be meant, as it does not possess the organs of action (which are
required for ruling).

To this we make the following reply.--The internal ruler, of whom
Scripture speaks with reference to the gods, must be the highest Self,
cannot be anything else.--Why so?--Because its qualities are designated
in the passage under discussion. The universal rulership implied in the
statement that, dwelling within, it rules the entire aggregate of
created beings, inclusive of the gods, and so on, is an appropriate
attribute of the highest Self, since omnipotence depends on (the
omnipotent ruler) being the cause of all created things.--The qualities
of Selfhood and immortality also, which are mentioned in the passage,
'He is thy Self, the ruler within, the immortal,' belong in their
primary sense to the highest Self.--Further, the passage, 'He whom the
earth does not know,' which declares that the internal ruler is not
known by the earth-deity, shows him to be different from that deity; for
the deity of the earth knows itself to be the earth.--The attributes
'unseen,' 'unheard,' also point to the highest Self, which is devoid of
shape and other sensible qualities.--The objection that the highest Self
is destitute of the organs of action, and hence cannot be a ruler, is
without force, because organs of action may be ascribed to him owing to
the organs of action of those whom he rules.--If it should be objected
that [if we once admit an internal ruler in addition to the individual
soul] we are driven to assume again another and another ruler ad
infinitum; we reply that this is not the case, as actually there is no
other ruler (but the highest Self[150]). The objection would be valid
only in the case of a difference of rulers actually existing.--For all
these reasons, the internal ruler is no other but the highest Self.

19. And (the internal ruler is) not that which the Sm/ri/ti assumes,
(viz. the pradhâna,) on account of the statement of qualities not
belonging to it.

Good so far, a Sâ@nkhya opponent resumes. The attributes, however, of
not being seen, &c., belong also to the pradhâna assumed by the
Sâ@nkhya-sm/ri/ti, which is acknowledged to be devoid of form and other
sensible qualities. For their Sm/ri/ti says, 'Undiscoverable,
unknowable, as if wholly in sleep' (Manu I, 5). To this pradhâna also
the attribute of rulership belongs, as it is the cause of all effects.
Therefore the internal ruler may be understood to denote the pradhâna.
The pradhâna has, indeed, been set aside already by the Sûtra I, 1, 5,
but we bring it forward again, because we find that attributes belonging
to it, such as not being seen and the like, are mentioned in Scripture.

To this argumentation the Sûtrakâra replies that the word 'internal
ruler' cannot denote the pradhâna, because qualities not belonging to
the latter are stated. For, although the pradhâna may be spoken of as
not being seen, &c, it cannot be spoken of as seeing, since the
Sâ@nkhyas admit it to be non-intelligent. But the scriptural passage
which forms the complement to the passage about the internal ruler
(B/ri/. Up. III, 7, 23) says expressly, 'Unseen but seeing, unheard but
hearing, unperceived but perceiving, unknown but knowing.'--And Selfhood
also cannot belong to the pradhâna.

Well, then, if the term 'internal ruler' cannot be admitted to denote
the pradhâna, because the latter is neither a Self nor seeing; let us
suppose it to denote the embodied (individual) soul, which is
intelligent, and therefore hears, sees, perceives, knows; which is
internal (pratya/ñk/), and therefore of the nature of Self; and which is
immortal, because it is able to enjoy the fruits of its good and evil
actions. It is, moreover, a settled matter that the attributes of not
being seen, &c., belong to the embodied soul, because the agent of an
action, such as seeing, cannot at the same time be the object of the
action. This is declared in scriptural passages also, as, for instance
(B/ri/. Up. III, 4, 2), 'Thou couldst not see the seer of sight.' The
individual soul is, moreover, capable of inwardly ruling the complex of
the organs of action, as it is the enjoyer. Therefore the internal ruler
is the embodied soul.--To this reasoning the following Sûtra replies.

20. And the embodied soul (also cannot be understood by the internal
ruler), for both also (i.e. both recensions of the B/ri/had Âra/n/yaka)
speak of it as different (from the internal ruler).

The word 'not' (in the Sûtra) has to be supplied from the preceding
Sûtra. Although the attributes of seeing, &c., belong to the individual
soul, still as the soul is limited by its adjuncts, as the ether is by a
jar, it is not capable of dwelling completely within the earth and the
other beings mentioned, and to rule them. Moreover, the followers of
both /s/âkhâs, i.e. the Kâ/n/vas as well as the Mâdhyandinas, speak in
their texts of the individual soul as different from the internal ruler,
viz. as constituting, like the earth, and so on, his abode and the
object of his rule. The Kâ/n/vas read (B/ri/. Up. III, 7, 22), 'He who
dwells in knowledge;' the Mâdhyandinas, 'He who dwells in the Self.' If
the latter reading is adopted, the word 'Self' denotes the individual
soul; if the former, the individual soul is denoted by the word
'knowledge;' for the individual soul consists of knowledge. It is
therefore a settled matter that some being different from the individual
soul, viz. the lord, is denoted by the term 'internal ruler.'--But how,
it may be asked, is it possible that there should be within one body two
seers, viz. the lord who rules internally and the individual soul
different from him?--Why--we ask in return--should that be
impossible?--Because, the opponent replies, it is contrary to scriptural
passages, such as, 'There is no other seer but he,' &c., which deny that
there is any seeing, hearing, perceiving, knowing Self, but the internal
ruler under discussion.--May, we rejoin, that passage not have the
purpose of denying the existence of another ruler?--No, the opponent
replies, for there is no occasion for another ruler (and therefore no
occasion for denying his existence), and the text does not contain any
specification, (but merely denies the existence of any other seer in
general.)

We therefore advance the following final refutation of the opponent's
objection.--The declaration of the difference of the embodied Self and
the internal ruler has its reason in the limiting adjunct, consisting of
the organs of action, presented by Nescience, and is not absolutely
true. For the Self within is one only; two internal Selfs are not
possible. But owing to its limiting adjunct the one Self is practically
treated as if it were two; just as we make a distinction between the
ether of the jar and the universal ether. Hence there is room for those
scriptural passages which set forth the distinction of knower and object
of knowledge, for perception and the other means of proof, for the
intuitive knowledge of the apparent world, and for that part of
Scripture which contains injunctions and prohibitions. In accordance
with this, the scriptural passage, 'Where there is duality, as it were,
there one sees another,' declares that the whole practical world exists
only in the sphere of Nescience; while the subsequent passage, 'But when
the Self only is all this, how should he see another?' declares that the
practical world vanishes in the sphere of true knowledge.

21. That which possesses the attributes of invisibility and so on (is
Brahman), on account of the declaration of attributes.

Scripture says, 'The higher knowledge is this by which the
Indestructible is apprehended. That which cannot be seen nor seized,
which is without origin and qualities, without eyes and ears, without
hands and feet, the eternal, all-pervading, omnipresent, infinitesimal,
that which is imperishable, that it is which the wise regard as the
source of all beings' (Mu. Up. I, 1, 5; 6).--Here the doubt arises
whether the source of all beings which is spoken of as characterised by
invisibility, &c. be the prâdhana or the embodied soul, or the highest
Lord.

We must, the pûrvapakshin says, understand by the source of all beings
the non-intelligent prâdhana because (in the passage immediately
subsequent to the one quoted) only non-intelligent beings are mentioned
as parallel instances. 'As the spider sends forth and draws in its
thread, as plants grow on the earth, as from the living man hairs spring
forth on the head and the body, thus everything arises here from the
Indestructible.'--But, it may be objected, men and spiders which are
here quoted as parallel instances are of intelligent nature.--No, the
pûrvapakshin replies; for the intelligent being as such is not the
source of the threads and the hair, but everybody knows that the
non-intelligent body of the spider ruled by intelligence is the source
of the threads; and so in the case of man also.--While, moreover, in the
case of the preceding Sûtra, the pradhâna hypothesis could not be
accepted, because, although some qualities mentioned, such as
invisibility and so on, agreed with it, others such as being the seer
and the like did not; we have here to do only with attributes such as
invisibility which agree with the pradhâna, no attribute of a contrary
nature being mentioned.--But the qualities mentioned in the
complementary passage (Mu. Up. I, 1, 9), 'He who knows all and perceives
all,' do not agree with the non-intelligent pradhâna; how, then, can the
source of all beings be interpreted to mean the pradhâna?--To this the
pûrvapakshin replies: The passage, 'The higher knowledge is that by
which the Indestructible is apprehended, that which cannot be seen,'
&c., points, by means of the term 'the Indestructible,' to the source of
all beings characterised by invisibility and similar attributes. This
same 'Indestructible' is again mentioned later on in the passage, 'It is
higher than the high Imperishable.' Now that which in this latter
passage is spoken of as higher than the Imperishable may possess the
qualities of knowing and perceiving everything, while the pradhâna
denoted by the term 'the Imperishable' is the source of all beings.--If,
however, the word 'source' (yoni) be taken in the sense of operative
cause, we may by 'the source of the beings' understand the embodied Self
also, which, by means of merit and demerit, is the cause of the origin
of the complex of things.

To this we make the following reply.--That which here is spoken of as
the source of all beings, distinguished by such qualities as
invisibility and so on, can be the highest Lord only, nothing
else.--Whereupon is this conclusion founded?--On the statement of
attributes. For the clause, 'He who is all-knowing, all-perceiving,'
clearly states an attribute belonging to the highest Lord only, since
the attributes of knowing all and perceiving all cannot be predicated
either of the non-intelligent pradhâna or the embodied soul whose power
of sight is narrowed by its limiting conditions. To the objection that
the qualities of knowing and perceiving all are, in the passage under
discussion, attributed to that which is higher than the source of all
beings--which latter is denoted by the term 'the Imperishable'--not to
the source itself, we reply that this explanation is inadmissible
because the source of all beings, which--in the clause, 'From the
Indestructible everything here arises'--is designated as the material
cause of all created beings, is later on spoken of as all-knowing, and
again as the cause of all created beings, viz. in the passage (I, 1, 9),
'From him who knows all and perceives all, whose brooding consists of
knowledge, from him is born that Brahman, name, form, and food.' As
therefore the Indestructible which forms the general topic of discussion
is, owing to the identity of designation, recognised (as being referred
to in the later passage also), we understand that it is the same
Indestructible to which the attributes of knowing and perceiving all are
ascribed.--We further maintain that also the passage, 'Higher than the
high Imperishable,' does not refer to any being different from the
imperishable source of all beings which is the general topic of
discussion. We conclude this from the circumstance that the passage, 'He
truly told that knowledge of Brahman through which he knows the
imperishable true person,' (I, 2, 13; which passage leads on to the
passage about that which is higher than the Imperishable,) merely
declares that the imperishable source of all beings, distinguished by
invisibility and the like--which formed the subject of the preceding
chapter--will be discussed. The reason why that imperishable source is
called higher than the high Imperishable, we shall explain under the
next Sûtra.--Moreover, two kinds of knowledge are enjoined there (in the
Upanishad), a lower and a higher one. Of the lower one it is said that
it comprises the /Ri/g-veda and so on, and then the text continues, 'The
higher knowledge is that by which the Indestructible is apprehended.'
Here the Indestructible is declared to be the subject of the higher
knowledge. If we now were to assume that the Indestructible
distinguished by invisibility and like qualities is something different
from the highest Lord, the knowledge referring to it would not be the
higher one. For the distinction of lower and higher knowledge is made on
account of the diversity of their results, the former leading to mere
worldly exaltation, the latter to absolute bliss; and nobody would
assume absolute bliss to result from the knowledge of the
pradhâna.--Moreover, as on the view we are controverting the highest
Self would be assumed to be something higher than the imperishable
source of all beings, three kinds of knowledge would have to be
acknowledged, while the text expressly speaks of two kinds
only.--Further, the reference to the knowledge of everything being
implied in the knowledge of one thing--which is contained in the passage
(I, 1, 3), 'Sir, what is that through which if it is known everything
else becomes known?'--is possible only if the allusion is to Brahman the
Self of all, and not either to the pradhâna which comprises only what is
non-intelligent or to the enjoyer viewed apart from the objects of
enjoyment.--The text, moreover, by introducing the knowledge of Brahman
as the chief subject--which it does in the passage (I, 1, 1), 'He told
the knowledge of Brahman, the foundation of all knowledge, to his eldest
son Atharvan'--and by afterwards declaring that out of the two kinds of
knowledge, viz. the lower one and the higher one, the higher one leads
to the comprehension of the Imperishable, shows that the knowledge of
the Imperishable is the knowledge of Brahman. On the other hand, the
term 'knowledge of Brahman' would become meaningless if that
Imperishable which is to be comprehended by means of it were not
Brahman. The lower knowledge of works which comprises the /Ri/g-veda,
and so on, is mentioned preliminarily to the knowledge of Brahman for
the mere purpose of glorifying the latter; as appears from the passages
in which it (the lower knowledge) is spoken of slightingly, such as (I,
2, 7), 'But frail indeed are those boats, the sacrifices, the eighteen
in which this lower ceremonial has been told. Fools who praise this as
the highest good are subject again and again to old age and death.'
After these slighting remarks the text declares that he who turns away
from the lower knowledge is prepared for the highest one (I, 2, 12),
'Let a Bráhama/n/a after he has examined all these worlds which are
gained by works acquire freedom from all desires. Nothing that is
eternal (not made) can be gained by what is not eternal (made). Let him
in order to understand this take fuel in his hand and approach a guru
who is learned and dwells entirely in Brahman.'--The remark that,
because the earth and other non-intelligent things are adduced as
parallel instances, that also which is compared to them, viz. the source
of all beings must be non-intelligent, is without foundation, since it
is not necessary that two things of which one is compared to the other
should be of absolutely the same nature. The things, moreover, to which
the source of all beings is compared, viz. the earth and the like, are
material, while nobody would assume the source of all beings to be
material.--For all these reasons the source of all beings, which
possesses the attributes of invisibility and so on, is the highest Lord.

22. The two others (i.e. the individual soul and the pradhâna) are not
(the source of all beings) because there are stated distinctive
attributes and difference.

The source of all beings is the highest Lord, not either of the two
others, viz. the pradhâna and the individual soul, on account of the
following reason also. In the first place, the text distinguishes the
source of all beings from the embodied soul, as something of a different
nature; compare the passage (II, 1, 2), 'That heavenly person is without
body, he is both without and within, not produced, without breath and
without mind, pure.' The distinctive attributes mentioned here, such as
being of a heavenly nature, and so on, can in no way belong to the
individual soul, which erroneously considers itself to be limited by
name and form as presented by Nescience, and erroneously imputes their
attributes to itself. Therefore the passage manifestly refers to the
Person which is the subject of all the Upanishads.--In the second place,
the source of all beings which forms the general topic is represented in
the text as something different from the pradhâna, viz. in the passage,
'Higher than the high Imperishable.' Here the term 'Imperishable' means
that undeveloped entity which represents the seminal potentiality of
names and forms, contains the fine parts of the material elements,
abides in the Lord, forms his limiting adjunct, and being itself no
effect is high in comparison to all effects; the whole phrase, 'Higher
than the high Imperishable,' which expresses a difference then clearly
shows that the highest Self is meant here.--We do not on that account
assume an independent entity called pradhâna and say that the source of
all beings is stated separately therefrom; but if a pradhâna is to be
assumed at all (in agreement with the common opinion) and if being
assumed it is assumed of such a nature as not to be opposed to the
statements of Scripture, viz. as the subtle cause of all beings denoted
by the terms 'the Undeveloped' and so on, we have no objection to such
an assumption, and declare that, on account of the separate statement
therefrom, i.e. from that pradhâna, 'the source of all beings' must mean
the highest Lord.--A further argument in favour of the same conclusion
is supplied by the next Sûtra.

23. And on account of its form being mentioned.

Subsequently to the passage, 'Higher than the high Imperishable,' we
meet (in the passage, 'From him is born breath,' &c.) with a description
of the creation of all things, from breath down to earth, and then with
a statement of the form of this same source of beings as consisting of
all created beings, 'Fire is his head, his eyes the sun and the moon,
the quarters his ears, his speech the Vedas disclosed, the wind his
breath, his heart the universe; from his feet came the earth; he is
indeed the inner Self of all things.' This statement of form can refer
only to the highest Lord, and not either to the embodied soul, which, on
account of its small power, cannot be the cause of all effects, or to
the pradhâna, which cannot be the inner Self of all beings. We therefore
conclude that the source of all beings is the highest Lord, not either
of the other two.--But wherefrom do you conclude that the quoted
declaration of form refers to the source of all beings?--From the
general topic, we reply. The word 'he' (in the clause, 'He is indeed the
inner Self of all things') connects the passage with the general topic.
As the source of all beings constitutes the general topic, the whole
passage, from 'From him is born breath,' up to, 'He is the inner Self of
all beings,' refers to that same source. Similarly, when in ordinary
conversation a certain teacher forms the general topic of the talk, the
phrase, 'Study under him; he knows the Veda and the Vedâ@ngas
thoroughly,' as a matter of course, refers to that same teacher.--But
how can a bodily form be ascribed to the source of all beings which is
characterised by invisibility and similar attributes?--The statement as
to its nature, we reply, is made for the purpose of showing that the
source of all beings is the Self of all beings, not of showing that it
is of a bodily nature. The case is analogous to such passages as, 'I am
food, I am food, I am the eater of food' (Taitt. Up. III, 10,
6).--Others, however, are of opinion[151] that the statement quoted does
not refer to the source of all beings, because that to which it refers
is spoken of as something produced. For, on the one hand, the
immediately preceding passage ('From him is born health, mind, and all
organs of sense, ether, air, light, water, and the earth, the support of
all') speaks of the aggregate of beings from air down to earth as
something produced, and, on the other hand, a passage met with later on
('From him comes Agni, the sun being his fuel,' up to 'All herbs and
juices') expresses itself to the same purpose. How then should all at
once, in the midst of these two passages (which refer to the creation),
a statement be made about the nature of the source of all beings?--The
attribute of being the Self of all beings, (which above was said to be
mentioned in the passage about the creation, 'Fire is his head,' &c., is
not mentioned there but) is stated only later on in a passage subsequent
to that which refers to the creation, viz. 'The Person is all this,
sacrifice,' &c. (II, 1, 10).--Now, we see that /s/ruti as well as
sm/ri/ti speaks of the birth of Prajâpati, whose body is this threefold
world; compare /Ri/g-veda Sa/m/h. X, 121, 1, 'Hira/n/ya-garbha arose in
the beginning; he was the one born Lord of things existing. He
established the earth and this sky; to what God shall we offer our
oblation?' where the expression 'arose' means 'he was born.' And in
sm/ri/ti we read, 'He is the first embodied one, he is called the
Person; as the primal creator of the beings Brahman was evolved in the
beginning.' This Person which is (not the original Brahman but) an
effect (like other created beings) may be called the internal Self of
all beings (as it is called in II, 1, 4), because in the form of the
Self of breath it abides in the Selfs of all beings.--On this latter
explanation (according to which the passage, 'Fire is his head,' &c.,
does not describe the nature of the highest Lord, and can therefore not
be referred to in the Sûtra) the declaration as to the Lord being the
'nature' of all which is contained in the passage, 'The Person is all
this, sacrifice,' &c., must be taken as the reason for establishing the
highest Lord, (i.e. as the passage which, according to the Sûtra, proves
that the source of all beings is the highest Lord[152].)

24. Vai/s/vânara (is the highest Lord) on account of the distinction
qualifying the common terms (Vai/s/vânara and Self).

(In Ch. Up. V, 11 ff.) a discussion begins with the words, 'What is our
Self, what is Brahman?' and is carried on in the passage, 'You know at
present that Vai/s/vânara Self, tell us that;' after that it is declared
with reference to Heaven, sun, air, ether, water, and earth, that they
are connected with the qualities of having good light, &c., and, in
order to disparage devout meditation on them singly, that they stand to
the Vai/s/vânara in the relation of being his head, &c., merely; and
then finally (V, 18) it is said, 'But he who meditates on the
Vai/s/vânara Self as measured by a span, as abhivimâna[153], he eats
food in all worlds, in all beings, in all Selfs. Of that Vai/s/vânara
Self the head is Sutejas (having good light), the eye Vi/s/varûpa
(multiform), the breath P/ri/thagvartman (moving in various courses),
the trunk Bahula (full), the bladder Rayi (wealth), the feet the earth,
the chest the altar, the hairs the grass on the altar, the heart the
Gârhapatya fire, the mind the Anvâhârya fire, the mouth the Âhavanîya
fire.'--Here the doubt arises whether by the term 'Vai/s/vânara' we have
to understand the gastric fire, or the elemental fire, or the divinity
presiding over the latter, or the embodied soul, or the highest
Lord.--But what, it may be asked, gives rise to this doubt?--The
circumstance, we reply, of 'Vai/s/vânara' being employed as a common
term for the gastric fire, the elemental fire, and the divinity of the
latter, while 'Self' is a term applying to the embodied soul as well as
to the highest Lord. Hence the doubt arises which meaning of the term is
to be accepted and which to be set aside.

Which, then, is the alternative to be embraced?--Vai/s/vânara, the
pûrvapakshin maintains, is the gastric fire, because we meet, in some
passages, with the term used in that special sense; so, for instance
(B/ri/. Up. V, 9), 'Agni Vai/s/vânara is the fire within man by which
the food that is eaten is cooked.'--Or else the term may denote fire in
general, as we see it used in that sense also; so, for instance
(/Ri/g-veda Sa/m/h. X, 88, 12), 'For the whole world the gods have made
the Agni Vai/s/vânara a sign of the days.' Or, in the third place, the
word may denote that divinity whose body is fire. For passages in which
the term has that sense are likewise met with; compare, for instance,
/Ri/g-veda Sa/m/h. I, 98, 1, 'May we be in the favour of Vai/s/vânara;
for he is the king of the beings, giving pleasure, of ready grace;' this
and similar passages properly applying to a divinity endowed with power
and similar qualities. Perhaps it will be urged against the preceding
explanations, that, as the word Vai/s/vânara is used in co-ordination
with the term 'Self,' and as the term 'Self' alone is used in the
introductory passage ('What is our Self, what is Brahman?'),
Vai/s/vânara has to be understood in a modified sense, so as to be in
harmony with the term Self. Well, then, the pûrvapakshin rejoins, let us
suppose that Vai/s/vânara is the embodied Self which, as being an
enjoyer, is in close vicinity to the Vai/s/vânara fire,[154] (i.e. the
fire within the body,) and with which the qualification expressed by the
term, 'Measured by a span,' well agrees, since it is restricted by its
limiting condition (viz. the body and so on).--In any case it is evident
that the term Vai/s/vânara does not denote the highest Lord.

To this we make the following reply.--The word Vai/s/vânara denotes the
highest Self, on account of the distinction qualifying the two general
terms.--Although the term 'Self,' as well as the term 'Vai/s/vânara,'
has various meanings--the latter term denoting three beings while the
former denotes two--yet we observe a distinction from which we conclude
that both terms can here denote the highest Lord only; viz. in the
passage, 'Of that Vai/s/vânara Self the head is Sutejas,' &c. For it is
clear that that passage refers to the highest Lord in so far as he is
distinguished by having heaven, and so on, for his head and limbs, and
in so far as he has entered into a different state (viz. into the state
of being the Self of the threefold world); represents him, in fact, for
the purpose of meditation, as the internal Self of everything. As such
the absolute Self may be represented, because it is the cause of
everything; for as the cause virtually contains all the states belonging
to its effects, the heavenly world, and so on, may be spoken of as the
members of the highest Self.--Moreover, the result which Scripture
declares to abide in all worlds--viz. in the passage, 'He eats food in
all worlds, in all beings, in all Selfs'--is possible only if we take
the term Vai/s/vânara to denote the highest Self.--The same remark
applies to the declaration that all the sins are burned of him who has
that knowledge, 'Thus all his sins are burned,' &c. (Ch. Up. V, 24,
3).--Moreover, we meet at the beginning of the chapter with the words
'Self' and 'Brahman;' viz. in the passage, 'What is our Self, what is
Brahman?' Now these are marks of Brahman, and indicate the highest Lord
only. Hence he only can be meant by the term Vai/s/vânara.

25. (And) because that which is stated by Sm/ri/ti (i.e. the shape of
the highest Lord as described by Sm/ri/ti) is an inference (i.e. an
indicatory mark from which we infer the meaning of /S/ruti).

The highest Lord only is Vai/s/vânara, for that reason also that
Sm/ri/ti ascribes to the highest Lord only a shape consisting of the
threefold world, the fire constituting his mouth, the heavenly world his
head, &c. So, for instance, in the following passage, 'He whose mouth is
fire, whose head the heavenly world, whose navel the ether, whose feet
the earth, whose eye the sun, whose ears the regions, reverence to him
the Self of the world.' The shape described here in Sm/ri/ti allows us
to infer a /S/ruti passage on which the Sm/ri/ti rests, and thus
constitutes an inference, i.e. a sign indicatory of the word
'Vai/s/vânara' denoting the highest Lord. For, although the quoted
Sm/ri/ti passage contains a glorification[155], still even a
glorification in the form in which it there appears is not possible,
unless it has a Vedic passage to rest on.--Other Sm/ri/ti passages also
may be quoted in connexion with this Sûtra, so, for instance, the
following one, 'He whose head the wise declare to be the heavenly world,
whose navel the ether, whose eyes sun and moon, whose ears the regions,
and whose feet the earth, he is the inscrutable leader of all beings.'

26. If it be maintained that (Vai/s/vânara is) not (the highest Lord) on
account of the term (viz. Vai/s/vânara, having a settled different
meaning), &c., and on account of his abiding within (which is a
characteristic of the gastric fire); (we say) no, on account of the
perception (of the highest Lord), being taught thus (viz. in the gastric
fire), and on account of the impossibility (of the heavenly world, &c.
being the head, &c. of the gastric fire), and because they (the
Vâjasaneyins) read of him (viz. the Vai/s/vânara) as man (which term
cannot apply to the gastric fire).

Here the following objection is raised.--Vai/s/vânara cannot be the
highest Lord, on account of the term, &c., and on account of the abiding
within. The term, viz. the term Vai/s/vânara, cannot be applied to the
highest Lord, because the settled use of language assigns to it a
different sense. Thus, also, with regard to the term Agni (fire) in the
passage (/S/at. Brâ. X, 6, 1, 11), 'He is the Agni Vai/s/vânara.' The
word '&c.' (in the Sûtra) hints at the fiction concerning the three
sacred fires, the gârhapatya being represented as the heart, and so on,
of the Vai/s/vânara Self (Ch. Up. V, 18, 2[156]).--Moreover, the
passage, 'Therefore the first food which a man may take is in the place
of homa' (Ch. Up. V, 19, 1), contains a glorification of (Vai/s/vânara)
being the abode of the oblation to Prâ/n/a[157]. For these reasons we
have to understand by Vai/s/vânara the gastric fire.--Moreover,
Scripture speaks of the Vai/s/vânara as abiding within. 'He knows him
abiding within man;' which again applies to the gastric fire only.--With
reference to the averment that on account of the specifications
contained in the passage, 'His head is Sutejas,' &c., Vai/s/vânara is to
be explained as the highest Self, we (the pûrvapakshin) ask: How do you
reach the decision that those specifications, although agreeing with
both interpretations, must be assumed to refer to the highest Lord only,
and not to the gastric fire?--Or else we may assume that the passage
speaks of the elemental fire which abides within and without; for that
that fire is also connected with the heavenly world, and so on, we
understand from the mantra, 'He who with his light has extended himself
over earth and heaven, the two halves of the world, and the atmosphere'
(/Ri/g-veda Sa/m/h. X, 88, 3).--Or else the attribute of having the
heavenly world, and so on, for its members may, on account of its power,
be attributed to that divinity which has the elemental fire for its
body.--Therefore Vai/s/vânara is not the highest Lord.

To all this we reply as follows.--Your assertions are unfounded,
'because there is taught the perception in this manner.' The reasons
(adduced in the former part of the Sûtra), viz. the term, and so on, are
not sufficient to make us abandon the interpretation according to which
Vai/s/vânara is the highest Lord.--Why?--On account of perception being
taught in this manner, i.e. without the gastric fire being set aside.
For the passages quoted teach the perception of the highest Lord in the
gastric fire, analogously to such passages as 'Let a man meditate on the
mind as Brahman' (Ch. Up. III, 18, 1).--Or else they teach that the
object of perception is the highest Lord, in so far as he has the
gastric fire called Vai/s/vânara for his limiting condition; analogously
to such passages as 'He who consists of mind, whose body is breath,
whose form is light' (Ch. Up. III, 14, 2[158]). If it were the aim of
the passages about the Vai/s/vânara to make statements not concerning
the highest Lord, but merely concerning the gastric fire, there would be
no possibility of specifications such as contained in the passage 'His
head is Sutejas,' &c. That also on the assumption of Vai/s/vânara being
either the divinity of fire or the elemental fire no room is to be found
for the said specifications, we shall show under the following
Sûtra.--Moreover, if the mere gastric fire were meant, there would be
room only for a declaration that it abides within man, not that it is
man. But, as a matter of fact, the Vâjasaneyins speak of him--in their
sacred text--as man, 'This Agni Vai/s/vânara is man; he who knows this
Agni Vai/s/vânara as man-like, as abiding within man,' &c. (/S/at. Brâ.
X, 6, 1, 11). The highest Lord, on the other hand, who is the Self of
everything, may be spoken of as well as man, as abiding within
man.--Those who, in the latter part of the Sûtra, read 'man-like'
(puru-shavidham) instead of 'man' (purusham), wish to express the
following meaning: If Vai/s/vânara were assumed to be the gastric fire
only, he might be spoken of as abiding within man indeed, but not as
man-like. But the Vâjasaneyins do speak of him as man-like, 'He who
knows him as man-like, as abiding within man.'--The meaning of the term
man-like is to be concluded from the context, whence it will be seen
that, with reference to nature, it means that the highest Lord has the
heaven for his head, &c., and is based on the earth; and with reference
to man, that he forms the head, &c., and is based on the chin (of the
devout worshipper[159]).

27. For the same reasons (the Vai/s/vânara) cannot be the divinity (of
fire), or the element (of fire).

The averment that the fanciful attribution of members contained in the
passage 'His head is Sutejas,' &c. may apply to the elemental fire also
which from the mantras is seen to be connected with the heavenly world,
&c., or else to the divinity whose body is fire, on account of its
power, is refuted by the following remark: For the reasons already
stated Vai/s/vânara is neither the divinity nor the element. For to the
elemental fire which is mere heat and light the heavenly world and so on
cannot properly be ascribed as head and so on, because an effect cannot
be the Self of another effect.--Again, the heavenly world cannot be
ascribed as head, &c. to the divinity of fire, in spite of the power of
the latter; for, on the one hand, it is not a cause (but a mere effect),
and on the other hand its power depends on the highest Lord. Against all
these interpretations there lies moreover the objection founded on the
inapplicability of the term 'Self.'

28. Jaimini (declares that there is) no contradiction even on the
assumption of a direct (worship of the highest Lord as Vai/s/vânara).

Above (Sûtra 26) it has been said that Vai/s/vânara is the highest Lord,
to be meditated upon as having the gastric fire either for his outward
manifestation or for his limiting condition; which interpretation was
accepted in deference to the circumstance that he is spoken of as
abiding within--and so on.--The teacher Jaimini however is of opinion
that it is not necessary to have recourse to the assumption of an
outward manifestation or limiting condition, and that there is no
objection to refer the passage about Vai/s/vânara to the direct worship
of the highest Lord.--But, if you reject the interpretation based on the
gastric fire, you place yourself in opposition to the statement that
Vai/s/vânara abides within, and to the reasons founded on the term, &c.
(Sû. 26).--To this we reply that we in no way place ourselves in
opposition to the statement that Vai/s/vânara abides within. For the
passage, 'He knows him as man-like, as abiding within man,' does not by
any means refer to the gastric fire, the latter being neither the
general topic of discussion nor having been mentioned by name
before.--What then does it refer to?--It refers to that which forms the
subject of discussion, viz. that similarity to man (of the highest Self)
which is fancifully found in the members of man from the upper part of
the head down to the chin; the text therefore says, 'He knows him as
man-like, as abiding within man,' just as we say of a branch that it
abides within the tree[160].--Or else we may adopt another
interpretation and say that after the highest Self has been represented
as having the likeness to man as a limiting condition, with regard to
nature as well as to man, the passage last quoted ('He knows him as
abiding within man') speaks of the same highest Self as the mere witness
(sâkshin; i.e. as the pure Self, non-related to the limiting
conditions).--The consideration of the context having thus shown that
the highest Self has to be resorted to for the interpretation of the
passage, the term 'Vai/s/vânara' must denote the highest Self in some
way or other. The word 'Vi/s/vânara' is to be explained either as 'he
who is all and man (i.e. the individual soul),' or 'he to whom souls
belong' (in so far as he is their maker or ruler), and thus denotes the
highest Self which is the Self of all. And the form 'Vai/s/vânara' has
the same meaning as 'Vi/s/vânara,' the taddhita-suffix, by which the
former word is derived from the latter, not changing the meaning; just
as in the case of râkshasa (derived from rakshas), and vâyasa (derived
from vayas).--The word 'Agni' also may denote the highest Self if we
adopt the etymology agni=agra/n/î, i.e. he who leads in front.--As the
Gârhapatya-fire finally, and as the abode of the oblation to breath the
highest Self may be represented because it is the Self of all.

But, if it is assumed that Vai/s/vânara denotes the highest Self, how
can Scripture declare that he is measured by a span?--On the explanation
of this difficulty we now enter.

29. On account of the manifestation, so Â/s/marathya opines.

The circumstance of the highest Lord who transcends all measure being
spoken of as measured by a span has for its reason 'manifestation.' The
highest Lord manifests himself as measured by a span, i.e. he specially
manifests himself for the benefit of his worshippers in some special
places, such as the heart and the like, where he may be perceived.
Hence, according to the opinion of the teacher Â/s/marathya, the
scriptural passage which speaks of him who is measured by a span may
refer to the highest Lord.

30. On account of remembrance; so Bâdari opines.

Or else the highest Lord may be called 'measured by a span' because he
is remembered by means of the mind which is seated in the heart which is
measured by a span. Similarly, barley-corns which are measured by means
of prasthas are themselves called prasthas. It must be admitted that
barley-grains themselves have a certain size which is merely rendered
manifest through their being connected with a prastha measure; while the
highest Lord himself does not possess a size to be rendered manifest by
his connexion with the heart. Still the remembrance (of the Lord by
means of the mind) may be accepted as offering a certain foundation for
the /S/ruti passage concerning him who is measured by a span.--Or
else[161] the Sûtra may be interpreted to mean that the Lord, although
not really measured by a span, is to be remembered (meditated upon) as
being of the measure of a span; whereby the passage is furnished with an
appropriate sense.--Thus the passage about him who is measured by a span
may, according to the opinion of the teacher Bâdari, be referred to the
highest Lord, on account of remembrance.

31. On the ground of imaginative identification (the highest Lord may be
called prâde/s/amâtra), Jaimini thinks; for thus (Scripture) declares.

Or else the passage about him who is measured by a span may be
considered to rest on imaginative combination.--Why?--Because the
passage of the Vâjasaneyibrâhma/n/a which treats of the same topic
identifies heaven, earth, and so on--which are the members of
Vai/s/vânara viewed as the Self of the threefold world--with certain
parts of the human frame, viz. the parts comprised between the upper
part of the head and the chin, and thus declares the imaginative
identity of Vai/s/vânara with something whose measure is a span. There
we read, 'The Gods indeed reached him, knowing him as measured by a span
as it were. Now I will declare them (his members) to you so as to
identify him (the Vai/s/vânara) with that whose measure is a span; thus
he said. Pointing to the upper part of the head he said: This is what
stands above (i.e. the heavenly world) as Vai/s/vânara (i.e. the head of
Vai/s/vânara[162]). Pointing to the eyes he said: This is he with good
light (i.e. the sun) as Vai/s/vânara (i.e. the eye of V.). Pointing to
the nose he said: This is he who moves on manifold paths (i.e. the air)
as Vai/s/vânara (i.e. the breath of V.). Pointing to the space (ether)
within his mouth he said: This is the full one (i.e. the ether) as
Vai/s/vânara. Pointing to the saliva within his mouth he said: This is
wealth as Vai/s/vânara (i.e. the water in the bladder of V.). Pointing
to the chin he said: This is the base as Vai/s/vânara (i.e. the feet of
V.).'--Although in the Vâjasaneyi-brâhma/n/a the heaven is denoted as
that which has the attribute of standing above and the sun as that which
has the attribute of good light, while in the Chândogya the heaven is
spoken of as having good light and the sun as being multiform; still
this difference does not interfere (with the unity of the vidyâ)[163],
because both texts equally use the term 'measured by a span,' and
because all /s/âkhâs intimate the same.--The above explanation of the
term 'measured by a span,' which rests on imaginative identification,
the teacher Jaimini considers the most appropriate one.

32. Moreover they (the Jâbâlas) speak of him (the highest Lord) in that
(i.e. the interstice between the top of the head and the chin which is
measured by a span).

Moreover the Jâbâlas speak in their text of the highest Lord as being in
the interstice between the top of the head and the chin. 'The unevolved
infinite Self abides in the avimukta (i.e. the non-released soul). Where
does that avimukta abide? It abides in the Vara/n/â and the Nâsî, in the
middle. What is that Vara/n/â, what is that Nâsî?' The text thereupon
etymologises the term Vara/n/â as that which wards off (vârayati) all
evil done by the senses, and the term Nâsî as that which destroys
(nâ/s/ayati) all evil done by the senses; and then continues, 'And what
is its place?--The place where the eyebrows and the nose join. That is
the joining place of the heavenly world (represented by the upper part
of the head) and of the other (i.e. the earthly world represented by the
chin).' (Jâbâla Up. I.)--Thus it appears that the scriptural statement
which ascribes to the highest Lord the measure of a span is appropriate.
That the highest Lord is called abhivimâna refers to his being the
inward Self of all. As such he is directly measured, i.e. known by all
animate beings. Or else the word may be explained as 'he who is near
everywhere--as the inward Self--and who at the same time is measureless'
(as being infinite). Or else it may denote the highest Lord as him who,
as the cause of the world, measures it out, i.e. creates it. By all this
it is proved that Vai/s/vânara is the highest Lord.

Notes:

[Footnote 136: The clause 'he is to meditate with a calm mind' if taken
as a gu/n/avidhi, i.e. as enjoining some secondary matter, viz. calmness
of mind of the meditating person, cannot at the same time enjoin
meditation; for that would involve a so-called split of the sentence
(vâkyabheda).]

[Footnote 137: Jîvezpi dehâdib/rim/hanâj jyâstvanyâyâd vâ brahmatety
artha/h/. Ân. Gi.]

[Footnote 138: The discussion is brought on by the term 'vivakshita' in
the Sûtra whose meaning is 'expressed, aimed at,' but more literally
'desired to be expressed.']

[Footnote 139: Because he is vyâpin.]

[Footnote 140: Another interpretation of the later part of Sûtra.]

[Footnote 141: Cp. Ka/th/a Up, I, 1, 13; 20; I, 2, 14.]

[Footnote 142: Freedom from impurity can result only from the knowledge
that the individual soul is in reality Brahman. The commentators explain
rajas by avidyâ.]

[Footnote 143: Tadartham iti, jîvasya brahmasiddhyartham iti yâvat,
/k/aitanya/kh/âyâpannâ dhî/h/sukhâdinâ pari/n/amata iti, tatra
purushozpi bhakt/ri/tvam ivânubhavati na tattvata iti vaktum
adhyâropayati. Ânanda Giri.]

[Footnote 144: Who, somebody might say, is to be understood here,
because immortality and similar qualities belong to him not somehow
only, but in their true sense.]

[Footnote 145: The /t/îkâs say that the contents of this last sentence
are hinted at by the word 'and' in the Sûtra.]

[Footnote 146: I.e. at the beginning of the instruction which the sacred
fires give to Upako/s/ala, Ch. Up. IV, 10 ff.]

[Footnote 147: Which words conclude the instruction given by the fires,
and introduce the instruction given by the teacher, of which the passage
'the person that is seen in the eye,' &c. forms a part.]

[Footnote 148: Â/s/rayântarapratyayasyâ/s/rayântare kshepa/h/
pratîka/h/, yathâ brahma/s/abda/h/ paramâtmavishayo nâmâdishu kshipyate.
Bhâ.]

[Footnote 149: The following sentences give the reason why, although
there is only one Brahman, the word Brahman is repeated.]

[Footnote 150: According to Scripture, Nira@nku/s/a/m/
sarvaniyantritva/m/ /s/rauta/m/ na /k/a tâdri/s/e sarvaniyantari bhedo
na /k/ânumâna/m/ /s/rutibhâditam uttish/th/ati. Ânanda Giri. Or else, as
Go. Ân. remarks, we may explain: as the highest Self is not really
different from the individual soul. So also Bhâmatî: Na /h/ânavasthâ, na
hi niyantrantara/m/ tena niyamyate ki/m/ tu yo jîvo niyantâ
lokasiddha/h/ sa paramâtmevopâdhyava/kkh/edakalpitabheda/h/.]

[Footnote 151: V/ri/ttik/ri/dvyâkhyâm dûshayati, Go. Ân.; ekade/s/ina/m/
dûshayati, Ânanda Giri; tad etat paramatenâkshepasamâdhânâbhyâ/m/
vyâkhyâya svamatena vyâ/k/ash/t/e, puna/h/ /s/abdozpi pûrvasmâd
vi/s/esha/m/ dyotayann asyesh/t/atâ/m/ sû/k/ayati, Bhâmatî.--The
statement of the two former commentators must be understood to mean--in
agreement with the Bhâmatî--that /S/a@nkara is now going to refute the
preceding explanation by the statement of his own view. Thus Go. Ân.
later on explains 'asmin pakshe' by 'svapakshe.']

[Footnote 152: The question is to what passage the 'rûpopanyâsât' of the
Sûtra refers.--According to the opinion set forth first it refers to Mu.
Up. II, 1, 4 ff.--But, according to the second view, II, 1, 4 to II, 1,
9, cannot refer to the source of all beings, i.e. the highest Self,
because that entire passage describes the creation, the inner Self of
which is not the highest Self but Prajâpati, i.e. the Hira/n/yagarbha or
Sûtrâtman of the later Vedânta, who is himself an 'effect,' and who is
called the inner Self, because he is the breath of life (prâ/n/a) in
everything.--Hence the Sûtra must be connected with another passage, and
that passage is found in II, 1, 10, where it is said that the Person
(i.e. the highest Self) is all this, &c.]

[Footnote 153: About which term see later on.]

[Footnote 154: Sârîre laksha/n/ayâ vai/s/vânara/s/abdopapattim âha
tasyeti. Ân. Gi.]

[Footnote 155: And as such might be said not to require a basis for its
statements.]

[Footnote 156: Na /k/a gârhapatyâdih/ri/dayâditâ brahma/n/a/h/
sambhavinî. Bhâmatî.]

[Footnote 157: Na /k/a prâ/n/âhutyadhikara/n/atâ z nyatra ja/th/arâgner
yujyate. Bhâmatî.]

[Footnote 158: According to the former explanation the gastric fire is
to be looked on as the outward manifestation (pratîka) of the highest
Lord; according to the latter as his limiting condition.]

[Footnote 159: I.e. that he may be fancifully identified with the head
and so on of the devout worshipper.]

[Footnote 160: Whereby we mean not that it is inside the tree, but that
it forms a part of the tree.--The Vai/s/vânara Self is identified with
the different members of the body, and these members abide within, i.e.
form parts of the body.]

[Footnote 161: Parimâ/n/asya h/ri/da/y/advârâropitasya smaryamâ/n/e
katham âropo vishayavishayitvena bhedâd ity â/s/a@nkya vyâkhyântaram âha
prâde/s/eti. Ânanda Giri.]

[Footnote 162: Atra sarvatra vai/s/vânara/s/abdas tada@ngapara/h/. Go.
Ân.]

[Footnote 163: Which unity entitles us to use the passage from the
/S/at. Brâ. for the explanation of the passage from the Ch. Up.]




THIRD PÂDA.

REVERENCE TO THE HIGHEST SELF!


1. The abode of heaven, earth, and so on (is Brahman), on account of the
term 'own,' i.e. Self.

We read (Mu. Up. II, 2, 5), 'He in whom the heaven, the earth, and the
sky are woven, the mind also with all the vital airs, know him alone as
the Self, and leave off other words! He is the bridge of the
Immortal.'--Here the doubt arises whether the abode which is intimated
by the statement of the heaven and so on being woven in it is the
highest Brahman or something else.

The pûrvapakshin maintains that the abode is something else, on account
of the expression, 'It is the bridge of the Immortal.' For, he says, it
is known from every-day experience that a bridge presupposes some
further bank to which it leads, while it is impossible to assume
something further beyond the highest Brahman, which in Scripture is
called 'endless, without a further shore' (B/ri/. Up. II, 4, 12). Now if
the abode is supposed to be something different from Brahman, it must be
supposed to be either the pradhâna known from Sm/ri/ti, which, as being
the (general) cause, may be called the (general) abode; or the air known
from /S/ruti, of which it is said (B/ri/. Up. III, 7, 2, 'Air is that
thread, O Gautama. By air as by a thread, O Gautama, this world and the
other world and all beings are strung together'), that it supports all
things; or else the embodied soul which, as being the enjoyer, may be
considered as an abode with reference to the objects of its fruition.

Against this view we argue with the sûtrakâra as follows:--'Of the world
consisting of heaven, earth, and so on, which in the quoted passage is
spoken of as woven (upon something), the highest Brahman must be the
abode.'--Why?--On account of the word 'own,' i.e. on account of the word
'Self.' For we meet with the word 'Self' in the passage, 'Know him alone
as the Self.' This term 'Self' is thoroughly appropriate only if we
understand the highest Self and not anything else.--(To propound another
interpretation of the phrase 'sva/s/abdât' employed in the Sûtra.)
Sometimes also Brahman is spoken of in /S/ruti as the general abode by
its own terms (i.e. by terms properly designating Brahman), as, for
instance (Ch. Up. VI. 8, 4), 'All these creatures, my dear, have their
root in the being, their abode in the being, their rest in the
being[164].'--(Or else we have to explain 'sva/s/abdena' as follows), In
the passages preceding and following the passage under discussion
Brahman is glorified with its own names[165]; cp. Mu. Up. II, 1, 10,
'The Person is all this, sacrifice, penance, Brahman, the highest
Immortal,' and II, 2, 11, 'That immortal Brahman is before, is behind,
Brahman is to the right and left.' Here, on account of mention being
made of an abode and that which abides, and on account of the
co-ordination expressed in the passage, 'Brahman is all' (Mu. Up. II, 2,
11), a suspicion might arise that Brahman is of a manifold variegated
nature, just as in the case of a tree consisting of different parts we
distinguish branches, stem, and root. In order to remove this suspicion
the text declares (in the passage under discussion), 'Know him alone as
the Self.' The sense of which is: The Self is not to be known as
manifold, qualified by the universe of effects; you are rather to
dissolve by true knowledge the universe of effects, which is the mere
product of Nescience, and to know that one Self, which is the general
abode, as uniform. Just as when somebody says, 'Bring that on which
Devadatta sits,' the person addressed brings the chair only (the abode
of Devadatta), not Devadatta himself; so the passage, 'Know him alone as
the Self,' teaches that the object to be known is the one uniform Self
which constitutes the general abode. Similarly another scriptural
passage reproves him who believes in the unreal world of effects, 'From
death to death goes he who sees any difference here' (Ka. Up. II, 4,
11). The statement of co-ordination made in the clause 'All is Brahman'
aims at dissolving (the wrong conception of the reality of) the world,
and not in any way at intimating that Brahman is multiform in
nature[166]; for the uniformity (of Brahman's nature) is expressly
stated in other passages such as the following one, 'As a mass of salt
has neither inside nor outside, but is altogether a mass of taste, thus
indeed has that Self neither inside nor outside, but is altogether a
mass of knowledge' (B/ri/. Up. IV, 5, 13).--For all these reasons the
abode of heaven, earth, &c. is the highest Brahman.--Against the
objection that on account of the text speaking of a 'bridge,' and a
bridge requiring a further bank, we have to understand by the abode of
heaven and earth something different from Brahman, we remark that the
word 'bridge' is meant to intimate only that that which is called a
bridge supports, not that it has a further bank. We need not assume by
any means that the bridge meant is like an ordinary bridge made of clay
and wood. For as the word setu (bridge) is derived from the root si,
which means 'to bind,' the idea of holding together, supporting is
rather implied in it than the idea of being connected with something
beyond (a further bank).

According to the opinion of another (commentator) the word 'bridge' does
not glorify the abode of heaven, earth, &c., but rather the knowledge of
the Self which is glorified in the preceding clause, 'Know him alone as
the Self,' and the abandonment of speech advised in the clause, 'leave
off other words;' to them, as being the means of obtaining immortality,
the expression 'the bridge of the immortal' applies[167]. On that
account we have to set aside the assertion that, on account of the word
'bridge,' something different from Brahman is to be understood by the
abode of heaven, earth, and so on.

2. And on account of its being designated as that to which the Released
have to resort.

By the abode of heaven, earth, and so on, we have to understand the
highest Brahman for that reason also that we find it denoted as that to
which the Released have to resort.--The conception that the body and
other things contained in the sphere of the Not-self are our Self,
constitutes Nescience; from it there spring desires with regard to
whatever promotes the well-being of the body and so on, and aversions
with regard to whatever tends to injure it; there further arise fear and
confusion when we observe anything threatening to destroy it. All this
constitutes an endless series of the most manifold evils with which we
all are acquainted. Regarding those on the other hand who have freed
themselves from the stains of Nescience desire aversion and so on, it is
said that they have to resort to that, viz. the abode of heaven, earth,
&c. which forms the topic of discussion. For the text, after having
said, 'The fetter of the heart is broken, all doubts are solved, all his
works perish when He has been beheld who is the higher and the lower'
(Mu. Up. II, 2, 8), later on remarks, 'The wise man freed from name and
form goes to the divine Person who is greater than the great' (Mu. Up.
III, 2, 8). That Brahman is that which is to be resorted to by the
released, is known from other scriptural passages, such as 'When all
desires which once entered his heart are undone then does the mortal
become immortal, then he obtains Brahman' (B/ri/. Up. IV, 4, 7). Of the
pradhâna and similar entities, on the other hand, it is not known from
any source that they are to be resorted to by the released. Moreover,
the text (in the passage, 'Know him alone as the Self and leave off
other words') declares that the knowledge of the abode of heaven and
earth, &c. is connected with the leaving off of all speech; a condition
which, according to another scriptural passage, attaches to (the
knowledge of) Brahman; cp. B/ri/. Up. IV, 4, 21, 'Let a wise Brâhma/n/a,
after he has discovered him, practise wisdom. Let him not seek after
many words, for that is mere weariness of the tongue.'--For that reason
also the abode of heaven, earth, and so on, is the highest Brahman.

3. Not (i.e. the abode of heaven, earth, &c. cannot be) that which is
inferred, (i.e. the pradhâna), on account of the terms not denoting it.

While there has been shown a special reason in favour of Brahman (being
the abode), there is no such special reason in favour of anything else.
Hence he (the sûtrakâra) says that that which is inferred, i.e. the
pradhâna assumed by the Sâ@nkhya-sm/ri/ti, is not to be accepted as the
abode of heaven, earth, &c.--Why?--On account of the terms not denoting
it. For the sacred text does not contain any term intimating the
non-intelligent pradhâna, on the ground of which we might understand the
latter to be the general cause or abode; while such terms as 'he who
perceives all and knows all' (Mu. Up. I, 1, 9) intimate an intelligent
being opposed to the pradhâna in nature.--For the same reason the air
also cannot be accepted as the abode of heaven, earth, and so on.

4. (Nor) also the individual soul (prâ/n/abh/ri/t).

Although to the cognitional (individual) Self the qualities of Selfhood
and intelligence do belong, still omniscience and similar qualities do
not belong to it as its knowledge is limited by its adjuncts; thus the
individual soul also cannot be accepted as the abode of heaven, earth,
&c., for the same reason, i.e. on account of the terms not denoting
it.--Moreover, the attribute of forming the abode of heaven, earth, and
so on, cannot properly be given to the individual soul because the
latter is limited by certain adjuncts and therefore non-pervading (not
omnipresent)[168].--The special enunciation (of the individual soul) is
caused by what follows[169].--The individual soul is not to be accepted
as the abode of heaven, earth, &c. for the following reason also.

5. On account of the declaration of difference.

The passage 'Know him alone as the Self' moreover implies a declaration
of difference, viz. of the difference of the object of knowledge and the
knower. Here the individual soul as being that which is desirous of
release is the knower, and consequently Brahman, which is denoted by the
word 'self' and represented as the object of knowledge, is understood to
be the abode of heaven, earth, and so on.--For the following reason also
the individual soul cannot be accepted as the abode of heaven, earth,
&c.

6. On account of the subject-matter.

The highest Self constitutes the subject-matter (of the entire chapter),
as we see from the passage, 'Sir, what is that through which, when it is
known, everything else becomes known?' (Mu. Up. I, 1, 3) in which the
knowledge of everything is declared to be dependent on the knowledge of
one thing. For all this (i.e. the entire world) becomes known if Brahman
the Self of all is known, not if only the individual soul is
known.--Another reason against the individual soul follows.

7. And on account of the two conditions of standing and eating (of which
the former is characteristic of the highest Lord, the latter of the
individual soul).

With reference to that which is the abode of heaven, earth, and so on,
the text says, 'Two birds, inseparable friends,' &c. (Mu. Up. III, 1,
1). This passage describes the two states of mere standing, i.e. mere
presence, and of eating, the clause, 'One of them eats the sweet fruit,'
referring to the eating, i.e. the fruition of the results of works, and
the clause, 'The other one looks on without eating,' describing the
condition of mere inactive presence. The two states described, viz. of
mere presence on the one hand and of enjoyment on the other hand, show
that the Lord and the individual soul are referred to. Now there is room
for this statement which represents the Lord as separate from the
individual soul, only if the passage about the abode of heaven and earth
likewise refers to the Lord; for in that case only there exists a
continuity of topic. On any other supposition the second passage would
contain a statement about something not connected with the general
topic, and would therefore be entirely uncalled for.--But, it may be
objected, on your interpretation also the second passage makes an
uncalled-for statement, viz. in so far as it represents the individual
soul as separate from the Lord.--Not so, we reply. It is nowhere the
purpose of Scripture to make statements regarding the individual soul.
From ordinary experience the individual soul, which in the different
individual bodies is joined to the internal organs and other limiting
adjuncts, is known to every one as agent and enjoyer, and we therefore
must not assume that it is that which Scripture aims at setting forth.
The Lord, on the other hand, about whom ordinary experience tells us
nothing, is to be considered as the special topic of all scriptural
passages, and we therefore cannot assume that any passage should refer
to him merely casually[170].--That the mantra 'two birds,' &c. speaks of
the Lord--and the individual soul we have already shown under I, 2,
11.--And if, according to the interpretation given in the
Pai@ngi-upanishad (and quoted under I, 2, 11), the verse is understood
to refer to the internal organ (sattva) and the individual soul (not to
the individual soul and the Lord), even then there is no contradiction
(between that interpretation and our present averment that the
individual soul is not the abode of heaven and earth).--How so?--Here
(i.e. in the present Sûtra and the Sûtras immediately preceding) it is
denied that the individual soul which, owing to its imagined connexion
with the internal organ and other limiting adjuncts, has a separate
existence in separate bodies--its division being analogous to the
division of universal space into limited spaces such as the spaces
within jars and the like--is that which is called the abode of heaven
and earth. That same soul, on the other hand, which exists in all
bodies, if considered apart from the limiting adjuncts, is nothing else
but the highest Self. Just as the spaces within jars, if considered
apart from their limiting conditions, are merged in universal space, so
the individual soul also is incontestably that which is denoted as the
abode of heaven and earth, since it (the soul) cannot really be separate
from the highest Self. That it is not the abode of heaven and earth, is
therefore said of the individual soul in so far only as it imagines
itself to be connected with the internal organ and so on. Hence it
follows that the highest Self is the abode of heaven, earth, and so
on.--The same conclusion has already been arrived at under I, 2, 21; for
in the passage concerning the source of all beings (which passage is
discussed under the Sûtra quoted) we meet with the clause, 'In which
heaven and earth and the sky are woven.' In the present adhikara/n/a the
subject is resumed for the sake of further elucidation.

8. The bhûman (is Brahman), as the instruction about it is additional to
that about the state of deep sleep (i.e. the vital air which remains
awake even in the state of deep sleep).

We read (Ch. Up. VII, 23; 24), 'That which is much (bhûman) we must
desire to understand.--Sir, I desire to understand it.--Where one sees
nothing else, hears nothing else, understands nothing else, that is what
is much (bhûman). Where one sees something else, hears something else,
understands something else, that is the Little.'--Here the doubt arises
whether that which is much is the vital air (prâ/n/a) or the highest
Self.--Whence the doubt?--The word 'bhûman,' taken by itself, means the
state of being much, according to its derivation as taught by Pâ/n/ani,
VI, 4, 158. Hence there is felt the want of a specification showing what
constitutes the Self of that muchness. Here there presents itself at
first the approximate passage, 'The vital air is more than hope' (Ch.
Up. VII, 15, 1), from which we may conclude that the vital air is
bhûman.--On the other hand, we meet at the beginning of the chapter,
where the general topic is stated, with the following passage, 'I have
heard from men like you that he who knows the Self overcomes grief. I am
in grief. Do, Sir, help me over this grief of mine;' from which passage
it would appear that the bhûman is the highest Self.--Hence there arises
a doubt as to which of the two alternatives is to be embraced, and which
is to be set aside.

The pûrvapakshin maintains that the bhûman is the vital air, since there
is found no further series of questions and answers as to what is more.
For while we meet with a series of questions and answers (such as, 'Sir,
is there something which is more than a name?'--'Speech is more than
name.'--'Is there something which is more than speech?'--'Mind is more
than speech'), which extends from name up to vital air, we do not meet
with a similar question and answer as to what might be more than vital
air (such as, 'Is there something which is more than vital air?'--'Such
and such a thing is more than vital air'). The text rather at first
declares at length (in the passage, 'The vital air is more than hope,'
&c.) that the vital air is more than all the members of the series from
name up to hope; it then acknowledges him who knows the vital air to be
an ativâdin, i.e. one who makes a statement surpassing the preceding
statements (in the passage, 'Thou art an ativâdin. He may say I am an
ativâdin; he need not deny it'); and it thereupon (in the passage, 'But
he in reality is an ativâdin who declares something beyond by means of
the True'[171]),--not leaving off, but rather continuing to refer to the
quality of an ativâdin which is founded on the vital air,--proceeds, by
means of the series beginning with the True, to lead over to the bhûman;
so that we conclude the meaning to be that the vital air is the
bhûman.--But, if the bhûman is interpreted to mean the vital air, how
have we to explain the passage in which the bhûman is characterised.
'Where one sees nothing else?' &c.--As, the pûrvapakshin replies, in the
state of deep sleep we observe a cessation of all activity, such as
seeing, &c., on the part of the organs merged in the vital air, the
vital air itself may be characterised by a passage such as, 'Where one
sees nothing else.' Similarly, another scriptural passage (Pra. Up. IV,
2; 3) describes at first (in the words, 'He does not hear, he does not
see,' &c.) the state of deep sleep as characterised by the cessation of
the activity of all bodily organs, and then by declaring that in that
state the vital air, with its five modifications, remains awake ('The
fires of the prâ/n/as are awake in that town'), shows the vital air to
occupy the principal position in the state of deep sleep.--That passage
also, which speaks of the bliss of the bhûman ('The bhûman is bliss,'
Ch. Up. VII, 23), can be reconciled with our explanation, because Pra.
Up. IV, 6 declares bliss to attach to the state of deep sleep ('Then
that god sees no dreams and at that time that happiness arises in his
body').--Again, the statement, 'The bhûman is immortality' (Ch. Up. VII,
24, 1), may likewise refer to the vital air; for another scriptural
passage says, 'Prâ/n/a is immortality' (Kau. Up. III, 2).--But how can
the view according to which the bhûman is the vital air be reconciled
with the fact that in the beginning of the chapter the knowledge of the
Self is represented as the general topic ('He who knows the Self
overcomes grief,' &c.)?--By the Self there referred to, the pûrvapakshin
replies, nothing else is meant but the vital air. For the passage, 'The
vital air is father, the vital air is mother, the vital air is brother,
the vital air is sister, the vital air is teacher, the vital air is
Brâhma/n/a' (Ch. Up. VII, 15, 1), represents the vital air as the Self
of everything. As, moreover, the passage, 'As the spokes of a wheel rest
in the nave, so all this rests in prâ/n/a,' declares the prâ/n/a to be
the Self of all--by means of a comparison with the spokes and the nave
of a wheel--the prâ/n/a may be conceived under the form of bhûman, i.e.
plenitude.--Bhûman, therefore, means the vital air.

To this we make the following reply.--Bhûman can mean the highest Self
only, not the vital air.--Why?--'On account of information being given
about it, subsequent to bliss.' The word 'bliss' (samprasâda) means the
state of deep sleep, as may be concluded, firstly, from the etymology of
the word ('In it he, i.e. man, is altogether
pleased--samprasîdati')--and, secondly, from the fact of samprasâda
being mentioned in the B/ri/hadâra/n/yaka together with the state of
dream and the waking state. And as in the state of deep sleep the vital
air remains awake, the word 'samprasâda' is employed in the Sûtra to
denote the vital air; so that the Sûtra means, 'on account of
information being given about the bhûman, subsequently to (the
information given about) the vital air.' If the bhûman were the vital
air itself, it would be a strange proceeding to make statements about
the bhûman in addition to the statements about the vital air. For in the
preceding passages also we do not meet, for instance, with a statement
about name subsequent to the previous statement about name (i.e. the
text does not say 'name is more than name'), but after something has
been said about name, a new statement is made about speech, which is
something different from name (i.e. the text says, 'Speech is more than
name'), and so on up to the statement about vital air, each subsequent
statement referring to something other than the topic of the preceding
one. We therefore conclude that the bhûman also, the statement about
which follows on the statement about the vital air, is something other
than the vital air. But--it may be objected--we meet here neither with a
question, such as, 'Is there something more than vital air?' nor with an
answer, such as, 'That and that is more than vital air.' How, then, can
it be said that the information about the bhûman is given subsequently
to the information about the vital air?--Moreover, we see that the
circumstance of being an ativâdin, which is exclusively connected with
the vital air, is referred to in the subsequent passage (viz. 'But in
reality he is an ativâdin who makes a statement surpassing (the
preceding statements) by means of the True'). There is thus no
information additional to the information about the vital air.--To this
objection we reply that it is impossible to maintain that the passage
last quoted merely continues the discussion of the quality of being an
ativâdin, as connected with the knowledge of the vital air; since the
clause, 'He who makes a statement surpassing, &c. by means of the True,'
states a specification.--But, the objector resumes, this very statement
of a specification may be explained as referring to the vital air. If
you ask how, we refer you to an analogous case. If somebody says, 'This
Agnihotrin speaks the truth,' the meaning is not that the quality of
being an Agnihotrin depends on speaking the truth; that quality rather
depends on the (regular performance of the) agnihotra only, and speaking
the truth is mentioned merely as a special attribute of that special
Agnihotrin. So our passage also ('But in reality he is an ativâdin who
makes a statement, &c. by means of the True') does not intimate that the
quality of being an ativâdin depends on speaking the truth, but merely
expresses that speaking the truth is a special attribute of him who
knows the vital air; while the quality of being an ativâdin must be
considered to depend on the knowledge of the vital air.--This objection
we rebut by the remark that it involves an abandonment of the direct
meaning of the sacred text. For from the text, as it stands, we
understand that the quality of being an ativâdin depends on speaking the
truth; the sense being: An ativâdin is he who is an ativâdin by means of
the True. The passage does not in anyway contain a eulogisation of the
knowledge of the vital air. It could be connected with the latter only
on the ground of general subject-matter (prakara/n/a)[172]; which would
involve an abandonment of the direct meaning of the text in favour of
prakara/n/a[173].--Moreover, the particle but ('But in reality he is,'
&c.), whose purport is to separate (what follows) from the
subject-matter of what precedes, would not agree (with the prâ/n/a
explanation). The following passage also, 'But we must desire to know
the True' (VII, 16), which presupposes a new effort, shows that a new
topic is going to be entered upon.--For these reasons we have to
consider the statement about the ativâdin in the same light as we should
consider the remark--made in a conversation which previously had turned
on the praise of those who study one Veda--that he who studies the four
Vedas is a great Brâhma/n/a; a remark which we should understand to be
laudatory of persons different from those who study one Veda, i.e. of
those who study all the four Vedas. Nor is there any reason to assume
that a new topic can be introduced in the form of question and answer
only; for that the matter propounded forms a new topic is sufficiently
clear from the circumstance that no connexion can be established between
it and the preceding topic. The succession of topics in the chapter
under discussion is as follows: Nârada at first listens to the
instruction which Sanatkumâra gives him about various matters, the last
of which is Prâ/n/a, and then becomes silent. Thereupon Sanatkumâra
explains to him spontaneously (without being asked) that the quality of
being an ativâdin, if merely based on the knowledge of the vital
air--which knowledge has for its object an unreal product,--is devoid of
substance, and that he only is an ativâdin who is such by means of the
True. By the term 'the True' there is meant the highest Brahman; for
Brahman is the Real, and it is called the 'True' in another scriptural
passage also, viz. Taitt. Up. II, 1, 'The True, knowledge, infinite is
Brahman.' Nârada, thus enlightened, starts a new line of enquiry ('Might
I, Sir, become an ativâdin by the True?') and Sanatkumâra then leads
him, by a series of instrumental steps, beginning with understanding, up
to the knowledge of bhûman. We therefrom conclude that the bhûman is
that very True whose explanation had been promised in addition to the
(knowledge of the) vital air. We thus see that the instruction about the
bhûman is additional to the instruction about the vital air, and bhûman
must therefore mean the highest Self, which is different from the vital
air. With this interpretation the initial statement, according to which
the enquiry into the Self forms the general subject-matter, agrees
perfectly well. The assumption, on the other hand (made by the
pûrvapakshin), that by the Self we have here to understand the vital air
is indefensible. For, in the first place, Self-hood does not belong to
the vital air in any non-figurative sense. In the second place,
cessation of grief cannot take place apart from the knowledge of the
highest Self; for, as another scriptural passage declares, 'There is no
other path to go' (/S/vet. Up. VI, 15). Moreover, after we have read at
the outset, 'Do, Sir, lead me over to the other side of grief' (Ch. Up.
VII, 1, 3), we meet with the following concluding words (VII, 26, 2),
'To him, after his faults had been rubbed out, the venerable Sanatkumâra
showed the other side of darkness.' The term 'darkness' here denotes
Nescience, the cause of grief, and so on.--Moreover, if the instruction
terminated with the vital air, it would not be said of the latter that
it rests on something else. But the brâhma/n/a (Ch. Up. VII, 26, 1) does
say, 'The vital air springs from the Self.' Nor can it be objected
against this last argument that the concluding part of the chapter may
refer to the highest Self, while, all the same, the bhûman (mentioned in
an earlier part of the chapter) may be the vital air. For, from the
passage (VII, 24, 1), ('Sir, in what does the bhûman rest? In its own
greatness,' &c.), it appears that the bhûman forms the continuous topic
up to the end of the chapter.--The quality of being the bhûman--which
quality is plenitude--agrees, moreover, best with the highest Self,
which is the cause of everything.

9. And on account of the agreement of the attributes (mentioned in the
text).

The attributes, moreover, which the sacred text ascribes to the bhûman
agree well with the highest Self. The passage, 'Where one sees nothing
else, hears nothing else, understands nothing else, that is the bhûman,'
gives us to understand that in the bhûman the ordinary activities of
seeing and so on are absent; and that this is characteristic of the
highest Self, we know from another scriptural passage, viz. 'But when
the Self only is all this, how should he see another?' &c. (B/ri/. Up.
IV, 5, 15). What is said about the absence of the activities of seeing
and so on in the state of deep sleep (Pra. Up. IV, 2) is said with the
intention of declaring the non-attachedness of the Self, not of
describing the nature of the prâ/n/a; for the highest Self (not the
vital air) is the topic of that passage. The bliss also of which
Scripture speaks as connected with that state is mentioned only in order
to show that bliss constitutes the nature of the Self. For Scripture
says (B/ri/. Up. IV, 3, 32), 'This is his highest bliss. All other
creatures live on a small portion of that bliss.'--The passage under
discussion also ('The bhûman is bliss. There is no bliss in that which
is little (limited). The bhûman only is bliss') by denying the reality
of bliss on the part of whatever is perishable shows that Brahman only
is bliss as bhûman, i.e. in its plenitude,--Again, the passage, 'The
bhûman is immortality,' shows that the highest cause is meant; for the
immortality of all effected things is a merely relative one, and another
scriptural passage says that 'whatever is different from that (Brahman)
is perishable' (B/ri/. Up. III, 4, 2).--Similarly, the qualities of
being the True, and of resting in its own greatness, and of being
omnipresent, and of being the Self of everything which the text mentions
(as belonging to the bhûman) can belong to the highest Self only, not to
anything else.--By all this it is proved that the bhûman is the highest
Self.

10. The Imperishable (is Brahman) on account of (its) supporting (all
things) up to ether.

We read (B/ri/. Up. III, 8, 7; 8). 'In what then is the ether woven,
like warp and woof?--He said: O Gârgî, the Brâhma/n/as call this the
akshara (the Imperishable). It is neither coarse nor fine,' and so
on.--Here the doubt arises whether the word 'akshara' means 'syllable'
or 'the highest Lord.'

The pûrvapakshin maintains that the word 'akshara' means 'syllable'
merely, because it has, in such terms as akshara-samâmnâya, the meaning
of 'syllable;' because we have no right to disregard the settled meaning
of a word; and because another scriptural passage also ('The syllable Om
is all this,' Ch. Up. II, 23, 4) declares a syllable, represented as the
object of devotion, to be the Self of all.

To this we reply that the highest Self only is denoted by the word
'akshara.'--Why?--Because it (the akshara) is said to support the entire
aggregate of effects, from earth up to ether. For the sacred text
declares at first that the entire aggregate of effects beginning with
earth and differentiated by threefold time is based on ether, in which
it is 'woven like warp and woof;' leads then (by means of the question,
'In what then is the ether woven, like warp and woof?') over to the
akshara, and, finally, concludes with the words, 'In that akshara then,
O Gârgî, the ether is woven, like warp and woof.'--Now the attribute of
supporting everything up to ether cannot be ascribed to any being but
Brahman. The text (quoted from the Ch. Up.) says indeed that the
syllable Om is all this, but that statement is to be understood as a
mere glorification of the syllable Om considered as a means to obtain
Brahman.--Therefore we take akshara to mean either 'the Imperishable' or
'that which pervades;' on the ground of either of which explanations it
must be identified with the highest Brahman.

But--our opponent resumes--while we must admit that the above reasoning
holds good so far that the circumstance of the akshara supporting all
things up to ether is to be accepted as a proof of all effects depending
on a cause, we point out that it may be employed by those also who
declare the pradhâna to be the general cause. How then does the previous
argumentation specially establish Brahman (to the exclusion of the
pradhâna)?--The reply to this is given in the next Sûtra.

11. This (supporting can), on account of the command (attributed to the
Imperishable, be the work of the highest Lord only).

The supporting of all things up to ether is the work of the highest Lord
only.--Why?--On account of the command.--For the sacred text speaks of a
command ('By the command of that akshara, O Gârgî, sun and moon stand
apart!' III, 8, 9), and command can be the work of the highest Lord
only, not of the non-intelligent pradhâna. For non-intelligent causes
such as clay and the like are not capable of command, with reference to
their effects, such as jars and the like.

12. And on account of (Scripture) separating (the akshara) from that
whose nature is different (from Brahman).

Also on account of the reason stated in this Sûtra Brahman only is to be
considered as the Imperishable, and the supporting of all things up to
ether is to be looked upon as the work of Brahman only, not of anything
else. The meaning of the Sûtra is as follows. Whatever things other than
Brahman might possibly be thought to be denoted by the term 'akshara,'
from the nature of all those things Scripture separates the akshara
spoken of as the support of all things up to ether. The scriptural
passage alluded to is III, 8, 11, 'That akshara, O Gârgî, is unseen but
seeing, unheard but hearing, unperceived but perceiving, unknown but
knowing.' Here the designation of being unseen, &c. agrees indeed with
the pradhâna also, but not so the designation of seeing, &c., as the
pradhâna is non-intelligent.--Nor can the word akshara denote the
embodied soul with its limiting conditions, for the passage following on
the one quoted declares that there is nothing different from the Self
('there is nothing that sees but it, nothing that hears but it, nothing
that perceives but it, nothing that knows but it'); and, moreover,
limiting conditions are expressly denied (of the akshara) in the
passage, 'It is without eyes, without ears, without speech, without
mind,' &c. (III, 8, 8). An embodied soul without limiting conditions
does not exist[174].--It is therefore certain beyond doubt that the
Imperishable is nothing else but the highest Brahman.

13. On account of his being designated as the object of sight (the
highest Self is meant, and) the same (is meant in the passage speaking
of the meditation on the highest person by means of the syllable Om).

(In Pra. Up. V, 2) the general topic of discussion is set forth in the
words, 'O Satyakâma, the syllable Om is the highest and also the other
Brahman; therefore he who knows it arrives by the same means at one of
the two.' The text then goes on, 'Again, he who meditates with this
syllable Om of three mâtrâs on the highest Person,' &c.--Here the doubt
presents itself, whether the object of meditation referred to in the
latter passage is the highest Brahman or the other Brahman; a doubt
based on the former passage, according to which both are under
discussion.

The pûrvapakshin maintains that the other, i.e. the lower Brahman, is
referred to, because the text promises only a reward limited by a
certain locality for him who knows it. For, as the highest Brahman is
omnipresent, it would be inappropriate to assume that he who knows it
obtains a fruit limited by a certain locality. The objection that, if
the lower Brahman were understood, there would be no room for the
qualification, 'the highest person,' is not valid, because the vital
principal (prâ/n/a) may be called 'higher' with reference to the
body[175].

To this we make the following reply: What is here taught as the object
of meditation is the highest Brahman only.--Why?--On account of its
being spoken of as the object of sight. For the person to be meditated
upon is, in a complementary passage, spoken of as the object of the act
of seeing, 'He sees the person dwelling in the castle (of the body;
purusham puri/s/ayam), higher than that one who is of the shape of the
individual soul, and who is himself higher (than the senses and their
objects).' Now, of an act of meditation an unreal thing also can be the
object, as, for instance, the merely imaginary object of a wish. But of
the act of seeing, real things only are the objects, as we know from
experience; we therefore conclude, that in the passage last quoted, the
highest (only real) Self which corresponds to the mental act of complete
intuition[176] is spoken of as the object of sight. This same highest
Self we recognise in the passage under discussion as the object of
meditation, in consequence of the term, 'the highest person.'--But--an
objection will be raised--as the object of meditation we have the
highest person, and as the object of sight the person higher than that
one who is himself higher, &c.; how, then, are we to know that those two
are identical?--The two passages, we reply, have in common the terms
'highest' (or 'higher,' para) and 'person.' And it must not by any means
be supposed that the term jîvaghana[177] refers to that highest person
which, considered as the object of meditation, had previously been
introduced as the general topic. For the consequence of that supposition
would be that that highest person which is the object of sight would be
different from that highest person which is represented as the object of
meditation. We rather have to explain the word jîvaghana as 'He whose
shape[178] is characterised by the jîvas;' so that what is really meant
by that term is that limited condition of the highest Self which is
owing to its adjuncts, and manifests itself in the form of jîvas, i.e.
individual souls; a condition analogous to the limitation of salt (in
general) by means of the mass of a particular lump of salt. That limited
condition of the Self may itself be called 'higher,' if viewed with
regard to the senses and their objects.

Another (commentator) says that we have to understand by the word
'jîvaghana' the world of Brahman spoken of in the preceding sentence
('by the Sâman verses he is led up to the world of Brahman'), and again
in the following sentence (v. 7), which may be called 'higher,' because
it is higher than the other worlds. That world of Brahman may be called
jîvaghana because all individual souls (jîva) with their organs of
action may be viewed as comprised (sa@nghâta = ghana) within
Hira/n/yagarbha, who is the Self of all organs, and dwells in the
Brahma-world. We thus understand that he who is higher than that
jîvaghana, i.e. the highest Self, which constitutes the object of sight,
also constitutes the object of meditation. The qualification, moreover,
expressed in the term 'the highest person' is in its place only if we
understand the highest Self to be meant. For the name, 'the highest
person,' can be given only to the highest Self, higher than which there
is nothing. So another scriptural passage also says, 'Higher than the
person there is nothing--this is the goal, the highest road.' Hence the
sacred text, which at first distinguishes between the higher and the
lower Brahman ('the syllable Om is the higher and the lower Brahman'),
and afterwards speaks of the highest Person to be meditated upon by
means of the syllable Om, gives us to understand that the highest Person
is nothing else but the highest Brahman. That the highest Self
constitutes the object of meditation, is moreover intimated by the
passage declaring that release from evil is the fruit (of meditation),
'As a snake is freed from its skin, so is he freed from evil.'--With
reference to the objection that a fruit confined to a certain place is
not an appropriate reward for him who meditates on the highest Self, we
finally remark that the objection is removed, if we understand the
passage to refer to emancipation by degrees. He who meditates on the
highest Self by means of the syllable Om, as consisting of three mâtrâs,
obtains for his (first) reward the world of Brahman, and after that,
gradually, complete intuition.

14. The small (ether) (is Brahman) on account of the subsequent
(arguments).

We read (Ch. Up. VIII, 1, 1), 'There is this city of Brahman, and in it
the palace, the small lotus, and in it that small ether. Now what exists
within that small ether that is to be sought for, that is to be
understood,' &c.--Here the doubt arises whether the small ether within
the small lotus of the heart of which Scripture speaks, is the elemental
ether, or the individual soul (vij/ñ/ânâtman), or the highest Self. This
doubt is caused by the words 'ether' and 'city of Brahman.' For the word
'ether,' in the first place, is known to be used in the sense of
elemental ether as well as of highest Brahman. Hence the doubt whether
the small ether of the text be the elemental ether or the highest ether,
i.e. Brahman. In explanation of the expression 'city of Brahman,' in the
second place, it might be said either that the individual soul is here
called Brahman and the body Brahman's city, or else that the city of
Brahman means the city of the highest Brahman. Here (i.e. in consequence
of this latter doubt) a further doubt arises as to the nature of the
small ether, according as the individual soul or the highest Self is
understood by the Lord of the city.

The pûrvapakshin maintains that by the small ether we have to understand
the elemental ether, since the latter meaning is the conventional one of
the word âkâ/s/a. The elemental ether is here called small with
reference to its small abode (the heart).--In the passage, 'As large as
this ether is, so large is that ether within the heart,' it is
represented as constituting at the same time the two terms of a
comparison, because it is possible to make a distinction between the
outer and the inner ether[179]; and it is said that 'heaven and earth
are contained within it,' because the whole ether, in so far as it is
space, is one[180].--Or else, the pûrvapakshin continues, the 'small
one' may be taken to mean the individual soul, on account of the term,
'the city of Brahman.' The body is here called the city of Brahman
because it is the abode of the individual soul; for it is acquired by
means of the actions of the soul. On this interpretation we must assume
that the individual soul is here called Brahman metaphorically. The
highest Brahman cannot be meant, because it is not connected with the
body as its lord. The lord of the city, i.e. the soul, is represented as
dwelling in one spot of the city (viz. the heart), just as a real king
resides in one spot of his residence. Moreover, the mind (manas)
constitutes the limiting adjunct of the individual soul, and the mind
chiefly abides in the heart; hence the individual soul only can be
spoken of as dwelling in the heart. Further, the individual soul only
can be spoken of as small, since it is (elsewhere; /S/vet. Up. V, 8)
compared in size to the point of a goad. That it is compared (in the
passage under discussion) to the ether must be understood to intimate
its non difference from Brahman.--Nor does the scriptural passage say
that the 'small' one is to be sought for and to be understood, since in
the clause, 'That which is within that,' &c., it is represented as a
mere distinguishing attribute of something else[181].

To all this we make the following reply:--The small ether can mean the
highest Lord only, not either the elemental ether or the individual
soul.--Why?--On account of the subsequent reasons, i.e. on account of
the reasons implied in the complementary passage. For there, the text
declares at first, with reference to the small ether, which is enjoined
as the object of sight, 'If they should say to him,' &c.; thereupon
follows an objection, 'What is there that deserves to be sought for or
that is to be understood?' and thereon a final decisive statement, 'Then
he should say: As large as this ether is, so large is that ether within
the heart. Both heaven and earth are contained within it.' Here the
teacher, availing himself of the comparison of the ether within the
heart with the known (universal) ether, precludes the conception that
the ether within the heart is small--which conception is based on the
statement as to the smallness of the lotus, i.e. the heart--and thereby
precludes the possibility of our understanding by the term 'the small
ether,' the elemental ether. For, although the ordinary use of language
gives to the word 'ether' the sense of elemental ether, here the
elemental ether cannot be thought of, because it cannot possibly be
compared with itself.--But, has it not been stated above, that the
ether, although one only, may be compared with itself, in consequence of
an assumed difference between the outer and the inner ether?--That
explanation, we reply, is impossible; for we cannot admit that a
comparison of a thing with itself may be based upon a merely imaginary
difference. And even if we admitted the possibility of such a
comparison, the extent of the outer ether could never be ascribed to the
limited inner ether. Should it be said that to the highest Lord also the
extent of the (outer) ether cannot be ascribed, since another scriptural
passage declares that he is greater than ether (/S/a. Brâ, X, 6, 3, 2),
we invalidate this objection by the remark, that the passage (comparing
the inner ether with the outer ether) has the purport of discarding the
idea of smallness (of the inner ether), which is primâ facie established
by the smallness of the lotus of the heart in which it is contained, and
has not the purport of establishing a certain extent (of the inner
ether). If the passage aimed at both, a split of the sentence[182] would
result.--Nor, if we allowed the assumptive difference of the inner and
the outer ether, would it be possible to represent that limited portion
of the ether which is enclosed in the lotus of the heart, as containing
within itself heaven, earth, and so on. Nor can we reconcile with the
nature of the elemental ether the qualities of Self-hood, freeness from
sin, and so on, (which are ascribed to the 'small' ether) in the
following passage, 'It is the Self free from sin, free from old age,
from death and grief, from hunger and thirst, of true desires, of true
purposes.'--Although the term 'Self' (occurring in the passage quoted)
may apply to the individual soul, yet other reasons exclude all idea of
the individual soul being meant (by the small ether). For it would be
impossible to dissociate from the individual soul, which is restricted
by limiting conditions and elsewhere compared to the point of a goad,
the attribute of smallness attaching to it, on account of its being
enclosed in the lotus of the heart.--Let it then be assumed--our
opponent remarks--that the qualities of all-pervadingness, &c. are
ascribed to the individual soul with the intention of intimating its
non-difference from Brahman.--Well, we reply, if you suppose that the
small ether is called all-pervading because it is one with Brahman, our
own supposition, viz. that the all-pervadingness spoken of is directly
predicated of Brahman itself, is the much more simple one.--Concerning
the assertion that the term 'city of Brahman' can only be understood, on
the assumption that the individual soul dwells, like a king, in one
particular spot of the city of which it is the Lord, we remark that the
term is more properly interpreted to mean 'the body in so far as it is
the city of the highest Brahman;' which interpretation enables us to
take the term 'Brahman' in its primary sense[183]. The highest Brahman
also is connected with the body, for the latter constitutes an abode for
the perception of Brahman[184]. Other scriptural passages also express
the same meaning, so, for instance, Pra. Up. V, 5, 'He sees the highest
person dwelling in the city' (purusha = puri/s/aya), &c., and B/ri/. Up.
II, 5, 18, 'This person (purusha) is in all cities (bodies) the dweller
within the city (puri/s/aya).'--Or else (taking brahmapura to mean
jîvapura) we may understand the passage to teach that Brahman is, in the
city of the individual soul, near (to the devout worshipper), just as
Vish/n/u is near to us in the Sâlagrâma-stone.--Moreover, the text
(VIII, 1, 6) at first declares the result of works to be perishable ('as
here on earth whatever has been acquired by works perishes, so perishes
whatever is acquired for the next world by good actions,' &c.), and
afterwards declares the imperishableness of the results flowing from a
knowledge of the small ether, which forms the general subject of
discussion ('those who depart from hence after having discovered the
Self and those true desires, for them there is freedom in all worlds').
From this again it is manifest that the small ether is the highest
Self.--We now turn to the statement made by the pûrvapakshin,'that the
sacred text does not represent the small ether as that which is to be
sought for and to be understood, because it is mentioned as a
distinguishing attribute of something else,' and reply as follows: If
the (small) ether were not that which is to be sought for and to be
understood, the description of the nature of that ether, which is given
in the passage ('as large as this ether is, so large is that ether
within the heart'), would be devoid of purport.--But--the opponent might
say--that descriptive statement also has the purport of setting forth
the nature of the thing abiding within (the ether); for the text after
having raised an objection (in the passage, 'And if they should say to
him: Now with regard to that city of Brahman and the palace in it, i.e.
the small lotus of the heart, and the small ether within the heart, what
is there within it that deserves to be sought for or that is to be
understood?') declares, when replying to that objection, that heaven,
earth, and so on, are contained within it (the ether), a declaration to
which the comparison with the ether forms a mere introduction.--Your
reasoning, we reply, is faulty. If it were admitted, it would follow
that heaven, earth, &c., which are contained within the small ether,
constitute the objects of search and enquiry. But in that case the
complementary passage would be out of place. For the text carrying on,
as the subject of discussion, the ether that is the abode of heaven,
earth, &c.--by means of the clauses, 'In it all desires are contained,'
'It is the Self free from sin,' &c., and the passage, 'But those who
depart from hence having discovered the Self, and the true desires' (in
which passage the conjunction 'and' has the purpose of joining the
desires to the Self)--declares that the Self as well, which is the abode
of the desires, as the desires which abide in the Self, are the objects
of knowledge. From this we conclude that in the beginning of the passage
also, the small ether abiding within the lotus of the heart, together
with whatever is contained within it as earth, true desires, and so on,
is represented as the object of knowledge. And, for the reasons
explained, that ether is the highest Lord.

15. (The small ether is Brahman) on account of the action of going (into
Brahman) and of the word (brahmaloka); for thus it is seen (i.e. that
the individual souls go into Brahman is seen elsewhere in Scripture);
and (this going of the souls into Brahman constitutes) an inferential
sign (by means of which we may properly interpret the word
'brahmaloka').

It has been declared (in the preceding Sûtra) that the small (ether) is
the highest Lord, on account of the reasons contained in the subsequent
passages. These subsequent reasons are now set forth.--For this reason
also the small (ether) can be the highest Lord only, because the passage
complementary to the passage concerning the small (ether) contains a
mention of going and a word, both of which intimate the highest Lord. In
the first place, we read (Ch. Up. VIII, 3, 2), 'All these creatures, day
after day going into that Brahma-world, do not discover it.' This
passage which refers back, by means of the word 'Brahma-world,' to the
small ether which forms the general subject-matter, speaks of the going
to it of the creatures, i.e. the individual souls, wherefrom we conclude
that the small (ether) is Brahman. For this going of the individual
souls into Brahman, which takes place day after day in the state of deep
sleep, is seen, i.e. is met with in another scriptural passage, viz. Ch.
Up. VI, 8, 1, 'He becomes united with the True,' &c. In ordinary life
also we say of a man who lies in deep sleep, 'he has become Brahman,'
'he is gone into the state of Brahman.'--In the second place, the word
'Brahma-world,' which is here applied to the small (ether) under
discussion, excludes all thought of the individual soul or the elemental
ether, and thus gives us to understand that the small (ether) is
Brahman.--But could not the word 'Brahma-world' convey as well the idea
of the world of him whose throne is the lotus[185]?--It might do so
indeed, if we explained the compound 'Brahma-world' as 'the world of
Brahman.' But if we explain it on the ground of the coordination of both
members of the compound--so that 'Brahma-world' denotes that world which
is Brahman--then it conveys the idea of the highest Brahman only.--And
that daily going (of the souls) into Brahman (mentioned above) is,
moreover, an inferential sign for explaining the compound
'Brahma-world,' on the ground of the co-ordination of its two
constituent members. For it would be impossible to assume that all those
creatures daily go into the world of the effected (lower) Brahman; which
world is commonly called the Satyaloka, i.e. the world of the True.

16. And on account of the supporting also (attributed to it), (the small
ether must be the Lord) because that greatness is observed in him
(according to other scriptural passages).

And also on account of the 'supporting' the small ether can be the
highest Lord only.--How?--The text at first introduces the general
subject of discussion in the passage, 'In it is that small ether;'
declares thereupon that the small one is to be compared with the
universal ether, and that everything is contained in it; subsequently
applies to it the term 'Self,' and states it to possess the qualities of
being free from sin, &c.; and, finally, declares with reference to the
same general subject of discussion, 'That Self is a bank, a limitary
support (vidh/ri/ti), that these worlds may not be confounded.' As
'support' is here predicated of the Self, we have to understand by it a
supporting agent. Just as a dam stems the spreading water so that the
boundaries of the fields are not confounded, so that Self acts like a
limitary dam in order that these outer and inner worlds, and all the
different castes and â/s/ramas may not be confounded. In accordance with
this our text declares that greatness, which is shown in the act of
holding asunder, to belong to the small (ether) which forms the subject
of discussion; and that such greatness is found in the highest Lord
only, is seen from other scriptural passages, such as 'By the command of
that Imperishable, O Gârgî, sun and moon; are held apart' (B/ri/. Up.
III, 8, 9). Similarly, we read in another passage also, about whose
referring to the highest Lord there is no doubt, 'He is the Lord of all,
the king of all things, the protector of all things. He is a bank and a
limitary support, so that these worlds may not be confounded' (B/ri/.
Up. IV, 4, 22)--Hence, on account of the 'supporting,' also the small
(ether) is nothing else but the highest Lord.

17. And on account of the settled meaning.

The small ether within cannot denote anything but the highest Lord for
this reason also, that the word 'ether' has (among other meanings) the
settled meaning of 'highest Lord.' Compare, for instance, the sense in
which the word 'ether' is used in Ch. Up. VIII, 14, 'He who is called
ether is the revealer of all forms and names;' and Ch. Up. I, 9, 1, 'All
these beings take their rise from the ether,' &c. On the other hand, we
do not meet with any passage in which the word 'ether' is used in the
sense of 'individual soul.'--We have already shown that the word cannot,
in our passage, denote the elemental ether; for, although the word
certainly has that settled meaning, it cannot have it here, because the
elemental ether cannot possibly be compared to itself, &c. &c.

18. If it be said that the other one (i.e. the individual soul) (is
meant) on account of a reference to it (made in a complementary
passage), (we say) no, on account of the impossibility.

If the small (ether) is to be explained as the highest Lord on account
of a complementary passage, then, the pûrvapakshin resumes, we point out
that another complementary passage contains a reference to the other
one, i.e. to the individual soul: 'Now that serene being (literally:
serenity, complete satisfaction), which after having risen out from this
earthly body and having reached the highest light, appears in its true
form, that is, the Self; thus he spoke' (Ch. Up. VIII, 3, 4). For there
the word 'serenity,' which is known to denote, in another scriptural
passage, the state of deep sleep, can convey the idea of the individual
soul only when it is in that state, not of anything else. The 'rising
from the body' also can be predicated of the individual soul only whose
abode the body is; just as air, &c., whose abode is the ether, are said
to arise from the ether. And just as the word 'ether,' although in
ordinary language not denoting the highest Lord, yet is admitted to
denote him in such passages as, 'The ether is the revealer of forms and
names,' because it there occurs in conjunction with qualities of the
highest Lord, so it may likewise denote the individual soul Hence the
term 'the small ether' denotes in the passage under discussion the
individual soul, 'on account of the reference to the other.'

Not so, we reply, 'on account of the impossibility.' In the first place,
the individual soul, which imagines itself to be limited by the internal
organ and its other adjuncts, cannot be compared with the ether. And, in
the second place, attributes such as freedom from evil, and the like,
cannot be ascribed to a being which erroneously transfers to itself the
attributes of its limiting adjuncts. This has already been set forth in
the first Sûtra of the present adhikara/n/a, and is again mentioned here
in order to remove all doubt as to the soul being different from the
highest Self. That the reference pointed out by the pûrvapakshin is not
to the individual soul will, moreover, be shown in one of the next
Sûtras (I, 3, 21).

19. If it be said that from the subsequent (chapter it appears that the
individual soul is meant), (we point out that what is there referred to
is) rather (the individual soul in so far) as its true nature has become
manifest (i.e. as it is non-different from Brahman).

The doubt whether, 'on account of the reference to the other,' the
individual soul might not possibly be meant, has been discarded on the
ground of 'impossibility.' But, like a dead man on whom am/ri/ta has
been sprinkled, that doubt rises again, drawing new strength from the
subsequent chapter which treats of Prajâpati. For there he (Prajâpati)
at the outset declares that the Self, which is free from sin and the
like, is that which is to be searched out, that which we must try to
understand (Ch. Up. VIII, 7, 1); after that he points out that the seer
within the eye, i.e. the individual soul, is the Self ('that person that
is seen in the eye is the Self,' VIII, 7, 3); refers again and again to
the same entity (in the clauses 'I shall explain him further to you,'
VIII, 9, 3; VIII, 10, 4); and (in the explanations fulfilling the given
promises) again explains the (nature of the) same individual soul in its
different states ('He who moves about happy in dreams is the Self,'
VIII, 10, 1; 'When a man being asleep, reposing, and at perfect rest
sees no dreams, that is the Self,' VIII, 11, 1). The clause attached to
both these explanations (viz. 'That is the immortal, the fearless; that
is Brahman') shows, at the same time, the individual soul to be free
from sin, and the like. After that Prajâpati, having discovered a
shortcoming in the condition of deep sleep (in consequence of the
expostulation of Indra, 'In that way he does not know himself that he is
I, nor does he know these beings,' VIII, 11, 2), enters on a further
explanation ('I shall explain him further to you, and nothing more than
this'), begins by blaming the (soul's) connexion with the body, and
finally declares the individual soul, when it has risen from the body,
to be the highest person. ('Thus does that serene being, arising from
this body, appear in its own form as soon as it has approached the
highest light. That is the highest person.')--From this it appears that
there is a possibility of the qualities of the highest Lord belonging to
the individual soul also, and on that account we maintain that the term,
'the small ether within it,' refers to the individual soul.

This position we counter-argue as follows. 'But in so far as its nature
has become manifest.' The particle 'but' (in the Sûtra) is meant to set
aside the view of the pûrvapakshin, so that the sense of the Sûtra is,
'Not even on account of the subsequent chapter a doubt as to the small
ether being the individual soul is possible, because there also that
which is meant to be intimated is the individual soul, in so far only as
its (true) nature has become manifest.' The Sûtra uses the expression
'he whose nature has become manifest,' which qualifies jîva., the
individual soul, with reference to its previous condition[186].--The
meaning is as follows. Prajâpati speaks at first of the seer
characterised by the eye ('That person which is within the eye,' &c.);
shows thereupon, in the passage treating of (the reflection in) the
waterpan, that he (viz. the seer) has not his true Self in the body;
refers to him repeatedly as the subject to be explained (in the clauses
'I shall explain him further to you'); and having then spoken of him as
subject to the states of dreaming and deep sleep, finally explains the
individual soul in its real nature, i.e. in so far as it is the highest
Brahman, not in so far as it is individual soul ('As soon as it has
approached the highest light it appears in its own form'). The highest
light mentioned, in the passage last quoted, as what is to be
approached, is nothing else but the highest Brahman, which is
distinguished by such attributes as freeness from sin, and the like.
That same highest Brahman constitutes--as we know from passages such as
'that art thou'--the real nature of the individual soul, while its
second nature, i.e. that aspect of it which depends on fictitious
limiting conditions, is not its real nature. For as long as the
individual soul does not free itself from Nescience in the form of
duality--which Nescience may be compared to the mistake of him who in
the twilight mistakes a post for a man--and does not rise to the
knowledge of the Self, whose nature is unchangeable, eternal
Cognition--which expresses itself in the form 'I am Brahman'--so long it
remains the individual soul. But when, discarding the aggregate of body,
sense-organs and mind, it arrives, by means of Scripture, at the
knowledge that it is not itself that aggregate, that it does not form
part of transmigratory existence, but is the True, the Real, the Self,
whose nature is pure intelligence; then knowing itseif to be of the
nature of unchangeable, eternal Cognition, it lifts itself above the
vain conceit of being one with this body, and itself becomes the Self,
whose nature is unchanging, eternal Cognition. As is declared in such
scriptural passages as 'He who knows the highest Brahman becomes even
Brahman' (Mu. Up. III, 2, 9). And this is the real nature of the
individual soul by means of which it arises from the body and appears in
its own form.

Here an objection may be raised. How, it is asked, can we speak of the
true nature (svarûpa) of that which is unchanging and eternal, and then
say that 'it appears in its own form (true nature)?' Of gold and similar
substances, whose true nature becomes hidden, and whose specific
qualities are rendered non-apparent by their contact with some other
substance, it may be said that their true nature is rendered manifest
when they are cleaned by the application of some acid substance; so it
may be said, likewise, that the stars, whose light is during daytime
overpowered (by the superior brilliancy of the sun), become manifest in
their true nature at night when the overpowering (sun) has departed. But
it is impossible to speak of an analogous overpowering of the eternal
light of intelligence by whatever agency, since, like ether, it is free
from all contact, and since, moreover, such an assumption would be
contradicted by what we actually observe. For the (energies of) seeing,
hearing, noticing, cognising constitute the character of the individual
soul, and that character is observed to exist in full perfection, even
in the case of that individual soul which has not yet risen beyond the
body. Every individual soul carries on the course of its practical
existence by means of the activities of seeing, hearing, cognising;
otherwise no practical existence at all would be possible. If, on the
other hand, that character would realise itself in the case of that soul
only which has risen above the body, the entire aggregate of practical
existence, as it actually presents itself prior to the soul's rising,
would thereby be contradicted. We therefore ask: Wherein consists that
(alleged) rising from the body? Wherein consists that appearing (of the
soul) in its own form?

To this we make the following reply.--Before the rise of discriminative
knowledge the nature of the individual soul, which is (in reality) pure
light, is non-discriminated as it were from its limiting adjuncts
consisting of body, senses, mind, sense-objects and feelings, and
appears as consisting of the energies of seeing and so on. Similarly--to
quote an analogous case from ordinary experience--the true nature of a
pure crystal, i.e. its transparency and whiteness, is, before the rise
of discriminative knowledge (on the part of the observer),
non-discriminated as it were from any limiting adjuncts of red or blue
colour; while, as soon as through some means of true cognition
discriminative knowledge has arisen, it is said to have now accomplished
its true nature, i.e. transparency and whiteness, although in reality it
had already done so before. Thus the discriminative knowledge, effected
by /S/ruti, on the part of the individual soul which previously is
non-discriminated as it were from its limiting adjuncts, is (according
to the scriptural passage under discussion) the soul's rising from the
body, and the fruit of that discriminative knowledge is its
accomplishment in its true nature, i.e. the comprehension that its
nature is the pure Self. Thus the embodiedness and the non-embodiedness
of the Self are due merely to discrimination and non-discrimination, in
agreement with the mantra, 'Bodiless within the bodies,' &c. (Ka. Up. I,
2, 22), and the statement of Sm/ri/ti as to the non-difference between
embodiedness and non-embodiedness 'Though dwelling in the body, O
Kaunteya, it does not act and is not tainted' (Bha. Gî. XIII, 31). The
individual soul is therefore called 'That whose true nature is
non-manifest' merely on account of the absence of discriminative
knowledge, and it is called 'That whose nature has become manifest' on
account of the presence of such knowledge. Manifestation and
non-manifestation of its nature of a different kind are not possible,
since its nature is nothing but its nature (i.e. in reality is always
the same). Thus the difference between the individual soul and the
highest Lord is owing to wrong knowledge only, not to any reality,
since, like ether, the highest Self is not in real contact with
anything.

And wherefrom is all this to be known?--From the instruction given by
Prajâpati who, after having referred to the jîva ('the person that is
seen in the eye,' &c.), continues 'This is the immortal, the fearless,
this is Brahman.' If the well-known seer within the eye were different
from Brahman which is characterised as the immortal and fearless, it
would not be co-ordinated (as it actually is) with the immortal, the
fearless, and Brahman. The reflected Self, on the other hand, is not
spoken of as he who is characterised by the eye (the seer within the
eye), for that would render Prajâpati obnoxious to the reproach of
saying deceitful things.--So also, in the second section, the passage,
'He who moves about happy in dreams,' &c. does not refer to a being
different from the seeing person within the eye spoken of in the first
chapter, (but treats of the same topic) as appears from the introductory
clause, 'I shall explain him further to you.' Moreover[187], a person
who is conscious of having seen an elephant in a dream and of no longer
seeing it when awake discards in the waking state the object which he
had seen (in his sleep), but recognises himself when awake to be the
same person who saw something in the dream.--Thus in the third section
also Prajâpati does indeed declare the absence of all particular
cognition in the state of deep sleep, but does not contest the identity
of the cognising Self ('In that way he does not know himself that he is
I, nor all these beings'). The following clause also, 'He is gone to
utter annihilation,' is meant to intimate only the annihilation of all
specific cognition, not the annihilation of the cogniser. For there is
no destruction of the knowing of the knower as--according to another
scriptural passage (B/ri/. Up. IV, 3, 30)--that is imperishable.--Thus,
again, in the fourth section the introductory phrase of Prajâpati is, 'I
shall explain him further to you and nothing different from this;' he
thereupon refutes the connexion (of the Self) with the body and other
limiting conditions ('Maghavat, this body is mortal,' &c.), shows the
individual soul--which is there called 'the serene being'--in the state
when it has reached the nature of Brahman ('It appears in its own
form'), and thus proves the soul to be non-different from the highest
Brahman whose characteristics are immortality and fearlessness.

Some (teachers) however are of opinion that if the highest Self is meant
(in the fourth section) it would be inappropriate to understand the
words 'This (him) I will explain further,' &c., as referring to the
individual soul, and therefore suppose that the reference is (not to the
individual soul forming the topic of the three preceding sections, but)
to the Self possessing the qualities of freeness from sin, &c., which
Self is pointed out at the beginning of the entire chapter (VII,
1).--Against this interpretation we remark that, in the first place, it
disregards the direct enunciation of the pronoun (i.e. the 'this' in
'this I will explain') which rests on something approximate (i.e. refers
to something mentioned not far off), and, in the second place, is
opposed to the word 'further' (or 'again') met with in the text, since
from that interpretation it would follow that what had been discussed in
the preceding sections is not again discussed in the subsequent section.
Moreover, if Prajâpati, after having made a promise in the clause, 'This
I shall explain' (where that clause occurs for the first time), did
previously to the fourth section explain a different topic in each
section, we should have to conclude that he acted deceitfully.--Hence
(our opinion about the purport of the whole chapter remains valid, viz.
that it sets forth how) the unreal aspect of the individual soul as
such--which is a mere presentation of Nescience, is stained by all the
desires and aversions attached to agents and enjoyers, and is connected
with evils of various kinds--is dissolved by true knowledge, and how the
soul is thus led over into the opposite state, i.e. into its true state
in which it is one with the highest Lord and distinguished by freedom
from sin and similar attributes. The whole process is similar to that by
which an imagined snake passes over into a rope as soon as the mind of
the beholder has freed itself from its erroneous imagination.

Others again, and among them some of ours (asmadîyâ/s/ /k/a. ke/k/it),
are of opinion that the individual soul as such is real. To the end of
refuting all these speculators who obstruct the way to the complete
intuition of the unity of the Self this /s/ârîraka-/s/âstra has been set
forth, whose aim it is to show that there is only one highest Lord ever
unchanging, whose substance is cognition[188], and who, by means of
Nescience, manifests himself in various ways, just as a thaumaturg
appears in different shapes by means of his magical power. Besides that
Lord there is no other substance of cognition.--If, now, the Sûtrakâra
raises and refutes the doubt whether a certain passage which (in
reality) refers to the Lord does refer to the individual soul, as he
does in this and the preceding Sûtras[189], he does so for the following
purpose. To the highest Self which is eternally pure, intelligent and
free, which is never changing, one only, not in contact with anything,
devoid of form, the opposite characteristics of the individual soul are
erroneously ascribed; just as ignorant men ascribe blue colour to the
colourless ether. In order to remove this erroneous opinion by means of
Vedic passages tending either to prove the unity of the Self or to
disprove the doctrine of duality--which passages he strengthens by
arguments--he insists on the difference of the highest Self from the
individual soul, does however not mean to prove thereby that the soul is
different from the highest Self, but, whenever speaking of the soul,
refers to its distinction (from the Self) as forming an item of ordinary
thought, due to the power of Nescience. For thus, he thinks, the Vedic
injunctions of works which are given with a view to the states of acting
and enjoying, natural (to the non-enlightened soul), are not
stultified.--That, however, the absolute unity of the Self is the real
purport of the /s/âstra's teaching, the Sûtrakâra declares, for
instance, in I, 1, 30[190]. The refutation of the reproach of futility
raised against the injunctions of works has already been set forth by
us, on the ground of the distinction between such persons as possess
full knowledge, and such as do not.

20. And the reference (to the individual soul) has a different meaning.

The alleged reference to the individual soul which has been pointed out
(by the pûrvapakshin) in the passage complementary to the passage about
the small ether ('Now that serene being,' &c., VIII, 3, 4) teaches, if
the small ether is interpreted to mean the highest Lord, neither the
worship of the individual soul nor any qualification of the subject
under discussion (viz. the small ether), and is therefore devoid of
meaning.--On that account the Sûtra declares that the reference has
another meaning, i.e. that the reference to the individual soul is not
meant to determine the nature of the individual soul, but rather the
nature of the highest Lord. In the following manner. The individual soul
which, in the passage referred to, is called the serene being, acts in
the waking state as the ruler of the aggregate comprising the body and
the sense-organs; permeates in sleep the na/d/îs of the body, and enjoys
the dream visions resulting from the impressions of the waking state;
and, finally, desirous of reaching an inner refuge, rises in the state
of deep sleep beyond its imagined connexion with the gross and the
subtle body, reaches the highest light, i.e. the highest Brahman
previously called ether, and thus divesting itself of the state of
specific cognition appears in its own (true) nature. The highest light
which the soul is to reach and through which it is manifested in its
true nature is the Self, free from sin and so on, which is there
represented as the object of worship.--In this sense the reference to
the individual soul can be admitted by those also who maintain that in
reality the highest Lord is meant.

21. If it be said that on account of the scriptural declaration of the
smallness (of the ether) (the Lord cannot be meant; we reply that) that
has been explained (before).

The pûrvapakshin has remarked that the smallness of the ether stated by
Scripture ('In it is that small ether') does not agree with the highest
Lord, that it may however be predicated of the individual soul which (in
another passage) is compared to the point of a goad. As that remark
calls for a refutation we point out that it has been refuted already, it
having been shown--under I, 2, 7--that a relative smallness may be
attributed to the Lord. The same refutation is--as the Sûtra points
out--to be applied here also.--That smallness is, moreover, contradicted
by that scriptural passage which compares (the ether within the heart)
with the known (universal) ether. ('As large as is this ether so large
is the ether within the heart.')

22. On account of the acting after (i.e. the shining after), (that after
which sun, moon, &c. are said to shine is the highest Self), and
(because by the light) of him (all this is said to be lighted).

We read (Mu. Up. II, 2, 10, and Ka. Up. V, 15), 'The sun does not shine
there, nor the moon and the stars, nor these lightnings, much less this
fire. After him when he shines everything shines; by the light of him
all this is lighted.' The question here arises whether he 'after whom
when he shines everything shines, and by whose light all this is
lighted,' is some luminous substance, or the highest Self (prâj/ñ/a
âtman).

A luminous substance, the pûrvapakshin maintains.--Why?--Because the
passage denies the shining only of such luminous bodies as the sun and
the like. It is known (from every-day experience) that luminous bodies
such as the moon and the stars do not shine at daytime when the sun,
which is itself a luminous body, is shining. Hence we infer that that
thing on account of which all this, including the moon, the stars, and
the sun himself, does not shine is likewise a thing of light. The
'shining after' also is possible only if there is a luminous body
already, for we know from experience that 'acting after' (imitation) of
any kind takes place only when there are more than one agent of similar
nature; one man, for instance, walks after another man who walks
himself. Therefore we consider it settled that the passage refers to
some luminous body.

To this we reply that the highest Self only can be meant.--Why?--On
account of the acting after. The shining after mentioned in the passage,
'After him when he shines everything shines,' is possible only if the
prâj/ñ/a Self, i.e. the highest Self, is understood. Of that prâj/ñ/a
Self another scriptural passage says, 'His form is light, his thoughts
are true' (Ch. Up. III, 14, 2). On the other hand, it is not by any
means known that the sun, &c. shines after some other luminous body.
Moreover, on account of the equality of nature of all luminous bodies
such as the sun and the like, there is no need for them of any other
luminous body after which they should shine; for we see that a lamp, for
instance, does not 'shine after' another lamp. Nor is there any such
absolute rule (as the pûrvapakshin asserted) that acting after is
observed only among things of similar nature. It is rather observed
among things of dissimilar nature also; for a red-hot iron ball acts
after, i.e. burns after the burning fire, and the dust of the ground
blows (is blown) after the blowing wind.--The clause 'on account of the
acting after' (which forms part of the Sûtra) points to the shining
after (mentioned in the scriptural /s/loka under discussion); the clause
'and of him' points to the fourth pâda of the same /s/loka. The meaning
of this latter clause is that the cause assigned for the light of the
sun, &c. (in the passage 'by the light of him everything is lighted')
intimates the prâj/ñ/a Self. For of that Self Scripture says, 'Him the
gods worship as the light of lights, as immortal time' (B/ri/. Up. IV,
4, 16). That, on the other hand, the light of the sun, the moon, &c,
should shine by some other (physical) light is, in the first place, not
known; and, in the second place, absurd as one (physical) light is
counteracted by another.--Or else the cause assigned for the shining
does not apply only to the sun and the other bodies mentioned in the
/s/loka; but the meaning (of the last pâda) rather is--as we may
conclude from the comprehensive statement 'all this'--that the
manifestation of this entire world consisting of names and forms, acts,
agents and fruits (of action) has for its cause the existence of the
light of Brahman; just as the existence of the light of the sun is the
cause of the manifestation of all form and colour.--Moreover, the text
shows by means of the word 'there' ('the sun does not shine there,' &c.)
that the passage is to be connected with the general topic, and that
topic is Brahman as appears from Mu. Up. II, 2, 5, 'In whom the heaven,
the earth, and the sky are woven,' &c. The same appears from a passage
subsequent (on the one just quoted and immediately preceding the passage
under discussion). 'In the highest golden sheath there is the Brahman
without passion and without parts; that is pure, that is the light of
lights, that is it which they know who know the Self.' This passage
giving rise to the question, 'How is it the light of lights?' there is
occasion for the reply given in 'The sun does not shine there,' &c.--In
refutation of the assertion that the shining of luminous bodies such as
the sun and the moon can be denied only in case of there being another
luminous body--as, for instance, the light of the moon and the stars is
denied only when the sun is shining--we point out that it has been shown
that he (the Self) only can be the luminous being referred to, nothing
else. And it is quite possible to deny the shining of sun, moon, and so
on with regard to Brahman; for whatever is perceived is perceived by the
light of Brahman only so that sun, moon, &c. can be said to shine in it;
while Brahman as self-luminous is not perceived by means of any other
light. Brahman manifests everything else, but is not manifested by
anything else; according to such scriptural passages as, 'By the Self
alone as his light man sits,' &c. (B/ri/. Up. IV, 3, 6), and 'He is
incomprehensible, for he cannot be comprehended '(B/ri/. Up. IV, 2, 4).

23. Moreover Sm/ri/ti also speaks of him (i.e. of the prâj/ñ/a Self as
being the universal light).

Moreover that aspect of the prâj/ñ/a Self is spoken of in Sm/ri/ti also,
viz. in the Bhagavad Gîtâ (XV, 6, 12), 'Neither the sun, nor the moon,
nor the fire illumines that; having gone into which men do not return,
that is my highest seat.' And 'The light which abiding in the sun
illumines the whole world, and that which is in the moon and that which
is in the fire, all that light know to be mine.'

24. On account of the term, (viz. the term 'lord' applied to it) the
(person) measured (by a thumb) (is the highest Lord).

We read (Ka. Up. II, 4, 12), 'The person of the size of a thumb stands
in the middle of the Self,' &c., and (II, 4, 13), 'That person, of the
size of a thumb, is like a light without smoke, lord of the past and of
the future, he is the same to-day and to-morrow. This is that.'--The
question here arises whether the person of the size of a thumb mentioned
in the text is the cognitional (individual) Self or the highest Self.

The pûrvapakshin maintains that on account of the declaration of the
person's size the cognitional Self is meant. For to the highest Self
which is of infinite length and breadth Scripture would not ascribe the
measure of a span; of the cognitional Self, on the other hand, which is
connected with limiting adjuncts, extension of the size of a span may,
by means of some fictitious assumption, be predicated. Sm/ri/ti also
confirms this, 'Then Yama drew forth, by force, from the body of
Satyavat the person of the size of a thumb tied to Yama's noose and
helpless' (Mahâbh. III, 16763). For as Yama could not pull out by force
the highest Self, the passage is clearly seen to refer to the
transmigrating (individual soul) of the size of a thumb, and we thence
infer that the same Self is meant in the Vedic passage under discussion.

To this we reply that the person a thumb long can only be the highest
Lord.--Why?--On account of the term 'lord of the past and of the
future.' For none but the highest Lord is the absolute ruler of the past
and the future.--Moreover, the clause 'this is that' connects the
passage with that which had been enquired about, and therefore forms the
topic of discussion. And what had been enquired about is Brahman, 'That
which thou seest as neither this nor that, as neither effect nor cause,
as neither past nor future, tell me that' (I, 2, 14).--'On account of
the term,' i.e. on account of the direct statement, in the text, of a
designation, viz. the term 'Lord,' we understand that the highest Lord
is meant[191].--But still the question remains how a certain extension
can be attributed to the omnipresent highest Self.--The reply to this is
given, in the next Sûtra.

25. But with reference to the heart (the highest Self is said to be of
the size of a span), as men are entitled (to the study of the Veda).

The measure of a span is ascribed to the highest Lord, although
omnipresent with reference to his abiding within the heart; just as to
ether (space) the measure of a cubit is ascribed with reference to the
joint of a bamboo. For, on the one hand, the measure of a span cannot be
ascribed directly to the highest Self which exceeds all measure, and, on
the other hand, it has been shown that none but the highest Lord can be
meant here, on account of the term 'Lord,' and so on.--But--an objection
may be raised--as the size of the heart varies in the different classes
of living beings it cannot be maintained that the declaration of the
highest Self being of the size of a thumb can be explained with
reference to the heart.--To this objection the second half of the Sûtra
replies: On account of men (only) being entitled. For the /s/âstra,
although propounded without distinction (i.e. although not itself
specifying what class of beings is to proceed according to its
precepts), does in reality entitle men[192] only (to act according to
its precepts); for men only (of the three higher castes) are, firstly,
capable (of complying with the precepts of the /s/âstra); are, secondly,
desirous (of the results of actions enjoined by the /s/âstra); are,
thirdly, not excluded by prohibitions; and are, fourthly, subject to the
precepts about the upanayana ceremony and so on[193]. This point has
been explained in the section treating of the definition of adhikâra
(Pûrva Mîm. S. VI, 1).--Now the human body has ordinarily a fixed size,
and hence the heart also has a fixed size, viz. the size of a thumb.
Hence, as men (only) are entitled to study and practise the /s/âstra,
the highest Self may, with reference to its dwelling in the human heart,
be spoken of as being of the size of a thumb.--In reply to the
pûrvapakshin's reasoning that on account of the statement of size and on
account of Sm/ri/ti we can understand by him who is of the size of a
thumb the transmigrating soul only, we remark that--analogously to such
passages as 'That is the Self,' 'That art thou'--our passage teaches
that the transmigrating soul which is of the size of a thumb is (in
reality) Brahman. For the Vedânta-passages have a twofold purport; some
of them aim at setting forth the nature of the highest Self, some at
teaching the unity of the individual soul with the highest Self. Our
passage teaches the unity of the individual soul with the highest Self,
not the size of anything. This point is made clear further on in the
Upanishad, 'The person of the size of a thumb, the inner Self, is always
settled in the heart of men. Let a man draw that Self forth from his
body with steadiness, as one draws the pith from a reed. Let him know
that Self as the Bright, as the Immortal' (II, 6, 17).

26. Also (beings) above them, (viz. men) (are qualified for the study
and practice of the Veda), on account of the possibility (of it),
according to Bâdarâya/n/a.

It has been said above that the passage about him who is of the size of
a thumb has reference to the human heart, because men are entitled to
study and act according to the /s/âstra. This gives us an occasion for
the following discussion.--It is true that the /s/âstra entitles men,
but, at the same time, there is no exclusive rule entitling men only to
the knowledge of Brahman; the teacher, Bâdarâya/n/a, rather thinks that
the /s/âstra entitles those (classes of beings) also which are above
men, viz. gods, and so on.--On what account?--On the account of
possibility.--For in their cases also the different causes on which the
qualification depends, such as having certain desires, and so on, may
exist. In the first place, the gods also may have the desire of final
release, caused by the reflection that all effects, objects, and powers
are non-permanent. In the second place, they may be capable of it as
their corporeality appears from mantras, arthavâdas, itihâsas,
purâ/n/as, and ordinary experience. In the third place, there is no
prohibition (excluding them like /S/ûdras). Nor does, in the fourth
place, the scriptural rule about the upanayana-ceremony annul their
title; for that ceremony merely subserves the study of the Veda, and to
the gods the Veda is manifest of itself (without study). That the gods,
moreover, for the purpose of acquiring knowledge, undergo discipleship,
and the like, appears from such scriptural passages as 'One hundred and
one years Indra lived as a disciple with Prajâpati' (Ch. Up. VIII, 11,
3), and 'Bh/ri/gu Vâru/n/i went to his father Varu/n/a, saying, "Sir,
teach me Brahman"' (Taitt. Up. III, 1).--And the reasons which have been
given above against gods and /ri/shis being entitled to perform
religious works (such as sacrifices), viz. the circumstance of there
being no other gods (to whom the gods could offer sacrifices), and of
there being no other /ri/shis (who could be invoked during the
sacrifice), do not apply to the case of branches of knowledge. For Indra
and the other gods, when applying themselves to knowledge, have no acts
to perform with a view to Indra, and so on; nor have Bh/ri/gu and other
/ri/shis, in the same case, to do anything with the circumstance of
their belonging to the same gotra as Bh/ri/gu, &c. What, then, should
stand in the way of the gods' and /ri/shis' right to acquire
knowledge?--Moreover, the passage about that which is of the size of a
thumb remains equally valid, if the right of the gods, &c. is admitted;
it has then only to be explained in each particular case by a reference
to the particular size of the thumb (of the class of beings spoken of).

27. If it be said that (the corporeal individuality of the gods
involves) a contradiction to (sacrificial) works; we deny that, on
account of the observation of the assumption (on the part of the gods)
of several (forms).

If the right of the gods, and other beings superior to men, to the
acquisition of knowledge is founded on the assumption of their
corporeality, &c., we shall have to admit, in consequence of that
corporeality, that Indra and the other gods stand in the relation of
subordinate members (a@nga) to sacrificial acts, by means of their being
present in person just as the priests are. But this admission will lead
to 'a contradiction in the sacrificial acts,' because the circumstance
of the gods forming the members of sacrificial acts by means of their
personal presence, is neither actually observed nor possible. For it is
not possible that one and the same Indra should, at the same time, be
present in person at many sacrifices.

To this we reply, that there is no such contradiction.--Why?--On account
of the assumption of several (forms). For it is possible for one and the
same divine Self to assume several forms at the same time.--How is that
known?--From observation.--For a scriptural passage at first replies to
the question how many gods there are, by the declaration that there are
'Three and three hundred, three and three thousand,' and subsequently,
on the question who they are, declares 'They (the 303 and 3003) are only
the various powers of them, in reality there are only thirty-three gods'
(B/ri/. Up. III, 9, 1, 2); showing thereby that one and the same divine
Self may at the same time appear in many forms. After that it proceeds
to show that these thirty-three gods themselves are in reality contained
in six, five, &c., and, finally, by replying to the question, 'Who is
the one god?' that Breath is the one god, shows that the gods are all
forms of Breath, and that Breath, therefore, can at the same time appear
in many forms.--Sm/ri/ti also has a similar statement, 'A Yogin, O hero
of the Bharatas, may, by his power, multiply his Self in many thousand
shapes, and in them walk about on the earth. In some he may enjoy the
objects, in others he may undergo dire penance, and, finally, he may
again retract them all, just as the sun retracts the multitude of his
rays.' If such Sm/ri/ti passages as the above declare that even Yogins,
who have merely acquired various extraordinary powers, such as subtlety
of body, and the like, may animate several bodies at the same time, how
much more capable of such feats must the gods be, who naturally possess
all supernatural powers. The gods thus being able to assume several
shapes, a god may divide himself into many forms and enter into relation
with many sacrifices at the same time, remaining all the while unseen by
others, in consequence of his power to render himself invisible.

The latter part of the Sûtra may be explained in a different manner
also, viz. as meaning that even beings enjoying corporeal individuality
are seen to enter into mere subordinate relation to more than one
action. Sometimes, indeed, one individual does not at the same time
enter into subordinate relation to different actions; one Brâhma/n/a,
for instance, is not at the same time entertained by many entertainers.
But in other cases one individual stands in subordinate relation to many
actions at the same time; one Brâhma/n/a, for instance, may constitute
the object of the reverence done to him by many persons at the same
time. Similarly, it is possible that, as the sacrifice consists in the
parting (on the part of the sacrificer with some offering) with a view
(to some divinity), many persons may at the same time part with their
respective offerings, all of them having in view one and the same
individual divinity. The individuality of the gods does not, therefore,
involve any contradiction in sacrificial works.

28. If it be said (that a contradiction will result) in respect of the
word; we refute this objection on the ground that (the world) originates
from the word, as is shown by perception and inference.

Let it then be granted that, from the admission of the corporeal
individuality of the gods, no contradiction will result in the case of
sacrificial works. Still a contradiction will result in respect of the
'word' (/s/abda).--How?--The authoritativeness of the Veda has been
proved 'from its independence,' basing on the original (eternal)
connection of the word with its sense ('the thing signified')[194]. But
now, although a divinity possessing corporeal individuality, such as
admitted above, may, by means of its supernatural powers, be able to
enjoy at the same time the oblations which form part of several
sacrifices yet it will, on account of its very individuality, be subject
to birth and death just as we men are, and hence, the eternal connexion
of the eternal word with a non-eternal thing being destroyed, a
contradiction will arise with regard to the authoritativeness proved to
belong to the word of the Veda.

To this we reply that no such contradiction exists.--Why?--'On account
of their origin from it.' For from that very same word of the Veda the
world, with the gods and other beings, originates.--But--an objection
will be raised--in Sûtra I, 1, 2 ('That whence there is the origin, &c.
of this world') it has been proved that the world originates from
Brahman; how then can it be said here that it originates from the word?
And, moreover, even if the origin of the world from the word of the Veda
be admitted, how is the contradiction in regard to the word removed
thereby, inasmuch as the Vasus, the Rudras, the Âdityas, the
Vi/s/vedevas, and the Maruts[195] are non-eternal beings, because
produced; and if they are non-eternal, what is there to preclude the
non-eternality of the Vedic words Vasu, &c. designating them? For it is
known from every-day life that only when the son of Devadatta is born,
the name Yaj/ñ/adatta is given to him (lit. made for him)[196]. Hence we
adhere to our opinion that a contradiction does arise with regard to the
'word.'

This objection we negative, on the ground that we observe the eternity
of the connexion between such words as cow, and so on, and the things
denoted by them. For, although the individuals of the (species denoted
by the word) cow have an origin, their species[197] does not have an
origin, since of (the three categories) substances, qualities, and
actions the individuals only originate, not the species. Now it is with
the species that the words are connected, not with the individuals,
which, as being infinite in number, are not capable of entering into
that connexion. Hence, although the individuals do not originate, no
contradiction arises in the case of words such as cow, and the like,
since the species are eternal. Similarly, although individual gods are
admitted to originate, there arises no contradiction in the case of such
words as Vasu, and the like, since the species denoted by them are
eternal. And that the gods, and so on, belong to different species, is
to be concluded from the descriptions of their various personal
appearance, such as given in the mantras, arthavâdas, &c. Terms such as
'Indra' rest on the connexion (of some particular being) with some
particular place, analogously to terms such as 'army-leader;' hence,
whoever occupies that particular place is called by that particular
name.--The origination of the world from the 'word' is not to be
understood in that sense, that the word constitutes the material cause
of the world, as Brahman does; but while there exist the everlasting
words, whose essence is the power of denotation in connexion with their
eternal sense (i.e. the âk/r/itis denoted), the accomplishment of such
individual things as are capable of having those words applied to them
is called an origination from those words.

How then is it known that the world originates from the word?--'From
perception and inference.' Perception here denotes Scripture which, in
order to be authoritative, is independent (of anything else).
'Inference' denotes Sm/r/iti which, in order to be authoritative,
depends on something else (viz. Scripture). These two declare that
creation is preceded by the word. Thus a scriptural passage says, 'At
the word these Prajâpati created the gods; at the words were poured out
he created men; at the word drops he created the fathers; at the words
through the filter he created the Soma cups; at the words the swift ones
he created the stotra; at the words to all he created the /s/astra; at
the word blessings he created the other beings.' And another passage
says, 'He with his mind united himself with speech (i.e. the word of the
Veda.--B/ri/. Up. I, 2, 4). Thus Scripture declares in different places
that the word precedes the creation.--Sm/r/ti also delivers itself as
follows, 'In the beginning a divine voice, eternal, without beginning or
end, formed of the Vedas was uttered by Svayambhû, from which all
activities proceeded.' By the 'uttering' of the voice we have here to
understand the starting of the oral tradition (of the Veda), because of
a voice without beginning or end 'uttering' in any other sense cannot be
predicated.--Again, we read, 'In the beginning Mahe/s/vara shaped from
the words of the Veda the names and forms of all beings and the
procedure of all actions.' And again, 'The several names, actions, and
conditions of all things he shaped in the beginning from the words of
the Veda' (Manu I, 21). Moreover, we all know from observation that any
one when setting about some thing which he wishes to accomplish first
remembers the word denoting the thing, and after that sets to work. We
therefore conclude that before the creation the Vedic words became
manifest in the mind of Prajâpati the creator, and that after that he
created the things conesponding to those words. Scripture also, where it
says (Taitt. Brâ. II, 2, 4, 2) 'uttering bhûr he created the earth,'
&c., shows that the worlds such as the earth, &c. became manifest, i.e.
were created from the words bhûr, &c. which had become manifest in the
mind (of Prajâpati).

Of what nature then is the 'word' with a view to which it is said that
the world originates from the 'word?'--It is the spho/t/a, the
pûrvapakshin says.[198] For on the assumption that the letters are the
word, the doctrine that the individual gods, and so on, originates from
the eternal words of the Veda could not in any way be proved, since the
letters perish as soon as they are produced (i.e. pronounced). These
perishable letters are moreover apprehended as differing according to
the pronunciation of the individual speaker. For this reason we are able
to determine, merely from the sound of the voice of some unseen person
whom we hear reading, who is reading, whether Devadatta or Yaj/ñ/adatta
or some other man. And it cannot be maintained that this apprehension of
difference regarding the letters is an erroneous one; for we do not
apprehend anything else whereby it is refuted. Nor is it reasonable to
maintain that the apprehension of the sense of a word results from the
letters. For it can neither be maintained that each letter by itself
intimates the sense, since that would be too wide an assumption;[199]
nor that there takes place a simultaneous apprehension of the whole
aggregate of letters; since the letters succeed one another in time. Nor
can we admit the explanation that the last letter of the word together
with the impressions produced by the perception of the preceding letters
is that which makes us apprehend the sense. For the word makes us
apprehend the sense only if it is itself apprehended in so far as having
reference to the mental grasp of the constant connexion (of the word and
the sense), just as smoke makes us infer the existence of fire only when
it is itself apprehended; but an apprehension of the last letter
combined with the impressions produced by the preceding letters does not
actually take place, because those impressions are not objects of
perception.[200] Nor, again, can it be maintained that (although those
impressions are not objects of perception, yet they may be inferred from
their effects, and that thus) the actual perception of the last letter
combined with the impressions left by the preceding letters--which
impressions are apprehended from their effects--is that which intimates
the sense of the word; for that effect of the impressions, viz. the
remembrance of the entire word, is itself something consisting of parts
which succeed each other in time.--From all this it follows that the
spho/t/a is the word. After the apprehending agent, i.e. the buddhi,
has, through the apprehension of the several letters of the word,
received rudimentary impressions, and after those impressions have been
matured through the apprehension of the last letter, the spho/t/a
presents itself in the buddhi all at once as the object of one mental
act of apprehension.--And it must not be maintained that that one act of
apprehension is merely an act of remembrance having for its object the
letters of the word; for the letters which are more than one cannot form
the object of one act of apprehension.--As that spho/t/a is recognised
as the same as often as the word is pronounced, it is eternal; while the
apprehension of difference referred to above has for its object the
letters merely. From this eternal word, which is of the nature of the
spho/t/a and possesses denotative power, there is produced the object
denoted, i.e. this world which consists of actions, agents, and results
of action.

Against this doctrine the reverend Upavarsha maintains that the letters
only are the word.--But--an objection is raised--it has been said above
that the letters no sooner produced pass away!--That assertion is not
true, we reply; for they are recognised as the same letters (each time
they are produced anew).--Nor can it be maintained that the recognition
is due to similarity only, as in the case of hairs, for instance; for
the fact of the recognition being a recognition in the strict sense of
the word is not contradicted by any other means of proof.--Nor, again,
can it be said that the recognition has its cause in the species (so
that not the same individual letter would be recognised, but only a
letter belonging to the same species as other letters heard before);
for, as a matter of fact, the same individual letters are recognised.
That the recognition of the letters rests on the species could be
maintained only if whenever the letters are pronounced different
individual letters were apprehended, just as several cows are
apprehended as different individuals belonging to the same species. But
this is actually not the case; for the (same) individual letters are
recognised as often as they are pronounced. If, for instance, the word
cow is pronounced twice, we think not that two different words have been
pronounced, but that the same individual word has been repeated.--But,
our opponent reminds us, it has been shown above, that the letters are
apprehended as different owing to differences of pronunciation, as
appears from the fact that we apprehend a difference when merely hearing
the sound of Devadatta or Yaj/ñ/adatta reading.--Although, we reply, it
is a settled matter that the letters are recognised as the same, yet we
admit that there are differences in the apprehension of the letters; but
as the letters are articulated by means of the conjunction and
disjunction (of the breath with the palate, the teeth, &c.), those
differences are rightly ascribed to the various character of the
articulating agents and not to the intrinsic nature of the letters
themselves. Those, moreover, who maintain that the individual letters
are different have, in order to account for the fact of recognition, to
assume species of letters, and further to admit that the apprehension of
difference is conditioned by external factors. Is it then not much
simpler to assume, as we do, that the apprehension of difference is
conditioned by external factors while the recognition is due to the
intrinsic nature of the letters? And this very fact of recognition is
that mental process which prevents us from looking on the apprehension
of difference as having the letters for its object (so that the opponent
was wrong in denying the existence of such a process). For how should,
for instance, the one syllable ga, when it is pronounced in the same
moment by several persons, be at the same time of different nature, viz.
accented with the udâtta, the anudâtta, and the Svarita and nasal as
well as non-nasal[201]? Or else[202]--and this is the preferable
explanation--we assume that the difference of apprehension is caused not
by the letters but by the tone (dhvani). By this tone we have to
understand that which enters the ear of a person who is listening from a
distance and not able to distinguish the separate letters, and which,
for a person standing near, affects the letters with its own
distinctions, such as high or low pitch and so on. It is on this tone
that all the distinctions of udâtta, anudâtta, and so on depend, and not
on the intrinsic nature of the letters; for they are recognised as the
same whenever they are pronounced. On this theory only we gain a basis
for the distinctive apprehension of the udâtta, the anudâtta, and the
like. For on the theory first propounded (but now rejected), we should
have to assume that the distinctions of udâtta and so on are due to the
processes of conjunction and disjunction described above, since the
letters themselves, which are ever recognised as the same, are not
different. But as those processes of conjunction and disjunction are not
matter of perception, we cannot definitely ascertain in the letters any
differences based on those processes, and hence the apprehension of the
udâtta and so on remains without a basis.--Nor should it be urged that
from the difference of the udâtta and so on there results also a
difference of the letters recognised. For a difference in one matter
does not involve a difference in some other matter which in itself is
free from difference. Nobody, for instance, thinks that because the
individuals are different from each other the species also contains a
difference in itself.

The assumption of the spho/t/a is further gratuitous, because the sense
of the word may be apprehended from the letters.--But--our opponent here
objects--I do not assume the existence of the spho/t/a. I, on the
contrary, actually perceive it; for after the buddhi has been impressed
by the successive apprehension of the letters of the word, the spho/t/a
all at once presents itself as the object of cognition.--You are
mistaken, we reply. The object of the cognitional act of which you speak
is simply the letters of the word. That one comprehensive cognition
which follows upon the apprehension of the successive letters of the
word has for its object the entire aggregate of the letters constituting
the word, and not anything else. We conclude this from the circumstance
that in that final comprehensive cognition there are included those
letters only of which a definite given word consists, and not any other
letters. If that cognitional act had for its object the spho/t/a--i.e.
something different from the letters of the given word--then those
letters would be excluded from it just as much as the letters of any
other word. But as this is not the case, it follows that that final
comprehensive act of cognition is nothing but an act of remembrance
which has the letters of the word for its object.--Our opponent has
asserted above that the letters of a word being several cannot form the
object of one mental act. But there he is wrong again. The ideas which
we have of a row, for instance, or a wood or an army, or of the numbers
ten, hundred, thousand, and so on, show that also such things as
comprise several unities can become the objects of one and the same
cognitional act. The idea which has for its object the word as one whole
is a derived one, in so far as it depends on the determination of one
sense in many letters[203]; in the same way as the idea of a wood, an
army, and so on. But--our opponent may here object--if the word were
nothing else but the letters which in their aggregate become the object
of one mental act, such couples of words as jârâ and râjâ or pika and
kapi would not be cognised as different words; for here the same letters
are presented to consciousness in each of the words constituting one
couple.--There is indeed, we reply, in both cases a comprehensive
consciousness of the same totality of letters; but just as ants
constitute the idea of a row only if they march one after the other, so
the letters also constitute the idea of a certain word only if they
follow each other in a certain order. Hence it is not contrary to reason
that the same letters are cognised as different words, in consequence of
the different order in which they are arranged.

The hypothesis of him who maintains that the letters are the word may
therefore be finally formulated as follows. The letters of which a word
consists--assisted by a certain order and number--have, through
traditional use, entered into a connexion with a definite sense. At the
time when they are employed they present themselves as such (i.e. in
their definite order and number) to the buddhi, which, after having
apprehended the several letters in succession, finally comprehends the
entire aggregate, and they thus unerringly intimate to the buddhi their
definite sense. This hypothesis is certainly simpler than the
complicated hypothesis of the grammarians who teach that the spho/t/a is
the word. For they have to disregard what is given by perception, and to
assume something which is never perceived; the letters apprehended in a
definite order are said to manifest the spho/t/a, and the spho/t/a in
its turn is said to manifest the sense.

Or let it even be admitted that the letters are different ones each time
they are pronounced; yet, as in that case we necessarily must assume
species of letters as the basis of the recognition of the individual
letters, the function of conveying the sense which we have demonstrated
in the case of the (individual) letters has then to be attributed to the
species.

From all this it follows that the theory according to which the
individual gods and so on originate from the eternal words is
unobjectionable.

29. And from this very reason there follows the eternity of the Veda.

As the eternity of the Veda is founded on the absence of the remembrance
of an agent only, a doubt with regard to it had been raised owing to the
doctrine that the gods and other individuals have sprung from it. That
doubt has been refuted in the preceding Sûtra.--The present Sûtra now
confirms the, already established, eternity of the Veda. The eternity of
the word of the Veda has to be assumed for this very reason, that the
world with its definite (eternal) species, such as gods and so on,
originates from it.--A mantra also ('By means of the sacrifice they
followed the trace of speech; they found it dwelling in the /ri/shis,'
/Ri/g-veda Sa/m/h. X, 71, 3) shows that the speech found (by the
/ri/shis) was permanent.--On this point Vedavyâsa also speaks as
follows: 'Formerly the great /ri/shis, being allowed to do so by
Svayambhû, obtained, through their penance, the Vedas together with the
itihâsas, which had been hidden at the end of the yuga.'

30. And on account of the equality of names and forms there is no
contradiction (to the eternity of the word of the Veda) in the
renovation (of the world); as is seen from /S/ruti and Sm/ri/ti.

If--the pûrvapakshin resumes--the individual gods and so on did, like
the individual animals, originate and pass away in an unbroken
succession so that there would be no break of the course of practical
existence including denominations, things denominated and agents
denominating; the connexion (between word and thing) would be eternal,
and the objection as to a contradiction with reference to the word
(raised in Sùtra 27) would thereby be refuted. But if, as /S/ruti and
Sm/ri/ti declare, the whole threefold world periodically divests itself
of name and form, and is entirely dissolved (at the end of a kalpa), and
is after that produced anew; how can the contradiction be considered to
have been removed?

To this we reply: 'On account of the sameness of name and form.'--Even
then the beginninglessness of the world will have to be admitted (a
point which the teacher will prove later on: II, 1, 36). And in the
beginningless sa/m/sâra we have to look on the (relative) beginning, and
the dissolution connected with a new kalpa in the same light in which we
look on the sleeping and waking states, which, although in them
according to Scripture (a kind of) dissolution and origination take
place, do not give rise to any contradiction, since in the later waking
state (subsequent to the state of sleep) the practical existence is
carried on just as in the former one. That in the sleeping and the
waking states dissolution and origination take place is stated Kaush.
Up. III, 3, 'When a man being asleep sees no dream whatever he becomes
one with that prâ/n/a alone. Then speech goes to him with all names, the
eye with all forms, the ear with all sounds, the mind with all thoughts.
And when he awakes then, as from a burning fire, sparks proceed in all
directions, thus from that Self the prâ/n/as proceed, each towards its
place; from the prâ/n/as the gods, from the gods the worlds.'

Well, the pûrvapakshin resumes, it may be that no contradiction arises
in the case of sleep, as during the sleep of one person the practical
existence of other persons suffers no interruption, and as the sleeping
person himself when waking from sleep may resume the very same form of
practical existence which was his previously to his sleep. The case of a
mahâpralaya (i.e. a general annihilation of the world) is however a
different one, as then the entire current of practical existence is
interrupted, and the form of existence of a previous kalpa can be
resumed in a subsequent kalpa no more than an individual can resume that
form of existence which it enjoyed in a former birth.

This objection, we reply, is not valid. For although a mahâpralaya does
cut short the entire current of practical existence, yet, by the favour
of the highest Lord, the Lords (î/s/vara), such as Hira/n/yagarbha and
so on, may continue the same form of existence which belonged to them in
the preceding kalpa. Although ordinary animated beings do not, as we
see, resume that form of existence which belonged to them in a former
birth; still we cannot judge of the Lords as we do of ordinary beings.
For as in the series of beings which descends from man to blades of
grass a successive diminution of knowledge, power, and so on, is
observed--although they all have the common attribute of being
animated--so in the ascending series extending from man up to
Hira/n/yagarbha, a gradually increasing manifestation of knowledge,
power, &c. takes place; a circumstance which /S/ruti and Sm/ri/ti
mention in many places, and which it is impossible to deny. On that
account it may very well be the case that the Lords, such as
Hira/n/yagarbha and so on, who in a past kalpa were distinguished by
superior knowledge and power of action, and who again appear in the
present kalpa, do, if favoured by the highest Lord, continue (in the
present kalpa) the same kind of existence which they enjoyed in the
preceding kalpa; just as a man who rises from sleep continues the same
form of existence which he enjoyed previously to his sleep. Thus
Scripture also declares, 'He who first creates Brahman (Hira/n/yagarbha)
and delivers the Vedas to him, to that God who is the light of his own
thoughts, I, seeking for release, go for refuge' (/S/vet. Up. VI, 18).
/S/aunaka and others moreover declare (in the Anukrama/n/îs of the Veda)
that the ten books (of the /Ri/g-veda) were seen by Madhu/kkh/andas and
other /ri/shis.[204] And, similarly, Sm/ri/ti tells us, for every Veda,
of men of exalted mental vision (/ri/shis) who 'saw' the subdivisions of
their respective Vedas, such as kâ/nd/as and so on. Scripture also
declares that the performance of the sacrificial action by means of the
mantra is to be preceded by the knowledge of the /ri/shi and so on, 'He
who makes another person sacrifice or read by means of a mantra of which
he does not know the /ri/shi, the metre, the divinity, and the
Brâhma/n/a, runs against a post, falls into a pit[205], &c. &c.,
therefore one must know all those matters for each mantra' (Ârsheya
Brâhma/n/a, first section).--Moreover, religious duty is enjoined and
its opposite is forbidden, in order that the animate beings may obtain
pleasure and escape pain. Desire and aversion have for their objects
pleasure and pain, known either from experience or from Scripture, and
do not aim at anything of a different nature. As therefore each new
creation is (nothing but) the result of the religious merit and demerit
(of the animated beings of the preceding creation), it is produced with
a nature resembling that of the preceding creation. Thus Sm/ri/ti also
declares, 'To whatever actions certain of these (animated beings) had
turned in a former creation, to the same they turn when created again
and again. Whether those actions were harmful or harmless, gentle or
cruel, right or wrong, true or untrue, influenced by them they proceed;
hence a certain person delights in actions of a certain
kind.'--Moreover, this world when being dissolved (in a mahâpralaya) is
dissolved to that extent only that the potentiality (/s/akti) of the
world remains, and (when it is produced again) it is produced from the
root of that potentiality; otherwise we should have to admit an effect
without a cause. Nor have we the right to assume potentialities of
different kind (for the different periods of the world). Hence, although
the series of worlds from the earth upwards, and the series of different
classes of animate beings such as gods, animals, and men, and the
different conditions based on caste, â/s/rama, religious duty and fruit
(of works), although all these we say are again and again interrupted
and thereupon produced anew; we yet have to understand that they are, in
the beginningless sa/m/sara, subject to a certain determinateness
analogous to the determinateness governing the connexion between the
senses and their objects. For it is impossible to imagine that the
relation of senses and sense-objects should be a different one in
different creations, so that, for instance, in some new creation a sixth
sense and a corresponding sixth sense-object should manifest themselves.
As, therefore, the phenomenal world is the same in all kalpas and as the
Lords are able to continue their previous forms of existence, there
manifest themselves, in each new creation, individuals bearing the same
names and forms as the individuals of the preceding creations, and,
owing to this equality of names and forms, the admitted periodical
renovations of the world in the form of general pralayas and general
creations do not conflict with the authoritativeness of the word of the
Veda. The permanent identity of names and forms is declared in /S/ruti
as well as Sm/ri/ti; compare, for instance, /Ri/k. Sa/m/h. X, 190, 3,
'As formerly the creator ordered sun and moon, and the sky, and the air,
and the heavenly world;' which passage means that the highest Lord
arranged at the beginning of the present kalpa the entire world with sun
and moon, and so on, just as it had been arranged in the preceding
kalpa. Compare also Taitt. Brâhm. III, 1, 4, 1, 'Agni desired: May I
become the consumer of the food of the gods; for that end he offered a
cake on eight potsherds to Agni and the K/ri/ttikâs.' This passage,
which forms part of the injunction of the ish/t/i to the Nakshatras,
declares equality of name and form connecting the Agni who offered and
the Agni to whom he offered.[206]

Sm/ri/ti also contains similar statements to be quoted here; so, for
instance, 'Whatever were the names of the /ri/shis and their powers to
see the Vedas, the same the Unborn one again gives to them when they are
produced afresh at the end of the night (the mahâpralaya). As the
various signs of the seasons return in succession in their due time,
thus the same beings again appear in the different yugas. And of
whatever individuality the gods of the past ages were, equal to them are
the present gods in name and form.'

31. On account of the impossibility of (the gods being qualified) for
the madhu-vidyâ, &c., Jaimini (maintains) the non-qualification (of the
gods for the Brahma-vidyâ).

A new objection is raised against the averment that the gods, &c. also
are entitled to the knowledge of Brahman. The teacher, Jaimini,
considers the gods and similar beings not to have any claim.--Why?--On
account of the impossibility, in the case of the so-called Madhu-vidyâ,
&c. If their claim to the knowledge of Brahman were admitted, we should
have to admit their claim to the madhu-vidyâ ('the knowledge of the
honey') also, because that also is a kind of knowledge not different
(from the knowledge of Brahman). But to admit this latter claim is not
possible; for, according to the passage, 'The Sun is indeed the honey of
the devas' (Ch. Up. III, 1, 1), men are to meditate on the sun (the god
Âditya) under the form of honey, and how, if the gods themselves are
admitted as meditating worshippers, can Âditya meditate upon another
Âditya?--Again, the text, after having enumerated five kinds of nectar,
the red one, &c. residing in the sun, and after having stated that the
five classes of gods, viz. the Vasus, Rudras, Âdityas, Maruts, and
Sâdhyas, live on one of these nectars each, declares that 'he who thus
knows this nectar becomes one of the Vasus, with Agni at their head, he
sees the nectar and rejoices, &c., and indicates thereby that those who
know the nectars enjoyed by the Vasus, &c., attain the greatness of the
Vasus, &c.' But how should the Vasus themselves know other Vasus
enjoying the nectar, and what other Vasu-greatness should they desire to
attain?--We have also to compare the passages 'Agni is one foot, Âditya
is one foot, the quarters are one foot' (Ch. Up. III, 18, 2); 'Air is
indeed the absorber' (Ch. Up. IV, 3, 1); 'Âditya is Brahman, this is the
doctrine.' All these passages treat of the meditation on the Self of
certain divinities, for which meditation these divinities themselves are
not qualified.--So it is likewise impossible that the /ri/shis
themselves should be qualified for meditations connected with /ri/shis,
such as expressed in passages like B/ri/. Up. II, 2, 4, 'These two are
the /ri/shis Gautama and Bharadvâja; the right Gautama, the left
Bharadvâja.'--Another reason for the non-qualification of the gods is
stated in the following Sûtra.

32. And (the devas, &c. are not qualified) on account of (the words
denoting the devas, &c.) being (used) in the sense of (sphere of) light.

To that sphere of light, the pûrvapakshin resumes, which is stationed in
the sky, and during its diurnal revolutions illumines the world, terms
such as Âditya, i.e. the names of devas, are applied, as we know from
the use of ordinary language, and from Vedic complementary
passages[207]. But of a mere sphere of light we cannot understand how it
should be endowed with either a bodily form, consisting of the heart and
the like, or intelligence, or the capability of forming wishes[208]. For
mere light we know to be, like earth, entirely devoid of intelligence.
The same observation applies to Agni (fire), and so on. It will perhaps
be said that our objection is not valid, because the personality of the
devas is known from the mantras, arthavâdas, itihâsas, purâ/n/as, and
from the conceptions of ordinary life[209]; but we contest the relevancy
of this remark. For the conceptions of ordinary life do not constitute
an independent means of knowledge; we rather say that a thing is known
from ordinary life if it is known by the (acknowledged) means of
knowledge, perception, &c. But none of the recognised means of
knowledge, such as perception and the like, apply to the matter under
discussion. Itihâsas and purâ/n/as again being of human origin, stand
themselves in need of other means of knowledge on which to base. The
arthavâda passages also, which, as forming syntactical wholes with the
injunctory passages, have merely the purpose of glorifying (what is
enjoined in the latter), cannot be considered to constitute by
themselves reasons for the existence of the personality, &c. of the
devas. The mantras again, which, on the ground of direct enunciation,
&c., are to be employed (at the different stages of the sacrificial
action), have merely the purpose of denoting things connected with the
sacrificial performance, and do not constitute an independent means of
authoritative knowledge for anything[210].--For these reasons the devas,
and similar beings, are not qualified for the knowledge of Brahman.

33. Bâdarâya/n/a, on the other hand, (maintains) the existence (of
qualification for Brahma-vidyâ on the part of the gods); for there are
(passages indicatory of that).

The expression 'on the other hand' is meant to rebut the pûrvapaksha.
The teacher, Bâdarâya/n/a, maintains the existence of the qualification
on the part of the gods, &c. For, although the qualification of the gods
cannot be admitted with reference to the madhu-vidyâ, and similar topics
of knowledge, in which the gods themselves are implicated, still they
may be qualified for the pure knowledge of Brahman, qualification in
general depending on the presence of desire, capability, &c.[211] Nor
does the impossibility of qualification in certain cases interfere with
the presence of qualification in those other cases where it is not
impossible. To the case of the gods the same reasoning applies as to the
case of men; for among men also, all are not qualified for everything,
Brâhma/n/as, for instance, not for the râjasûya-sacrifice[212].

And, with reference to the knowledge of Brahman, Scripture, moreover,
contains express hints notifying that the devas are qualified; compare,
for instance, /Br/i. Up. I, 4, 10, 'Whatever Deva was awakened (so as to
know Brahman) he indeed became that; and the same with /ri/shis;' Ch.
Up. VIII, 7, 2, 'They said: Well, let us search for that Self by which,
if one has searched it out, all worlds and all desires are obtained.
Thus saying, Indra went forth from the Devas, Viro/k/ana from the
Asuras.' Similar statements are met with in Sm/ri/ti, so, for instance,
in the colloquy of the Gandharva and Yâj/ñ/avalkya[213].--Against the
objection raised in the preceding Sûtra (32) we argue as follows. Words
like âditya, and so on, which denote devas, although having reference to
light and the like, yet convey the idea of certain divine Selfs
(persons) endowed with intelligence and pre-eminent power; for they are
used in that sense in mantras and arthavâda passages. For the devas
possess, in consequence of their pre-eminent power, the capability of
residing within the light, and so on, and to assume any form they like.
Thus we read in Scripture, in the arthavâda passage explaining the words
'ram of Medhâtithi,' which form part of the Subrahma/n/ya-formula, that
'Indra, having assumed the shape of a ram, carried off Medhâtithi, the
descendant of Ka/n/va' (Sha/d/v. Br. I, 1). And thus Sm/ri/ti says that
'Âditya, having assumed the shape of a man, came to Kuntî.' Moreover,
even in such substances as earth, intelligent ruling beings must be
admitted to reside, for that appears from such scriptural passages as
'the earth spoke,' 'the waters spoke,' &c. The non-intelligence of light
and the like, in so far as they are mere material elements, is admitted
in the case of the sun (âditya), &c. also; but--as already
remarked--from the use of the words in mantras and arthavâdas it appears
that there are intelligent beings of divine nature (which animate those
material elements).

We now turn to the objection (raised above by the pûrvapakshin) that
mantras and arthavâdas, as merely subserving other purposes, have no
power of setting forth the personality of the devas, and remark that not
the circumstance of subordination or non-subordination to some other
purpose, but rather the presence or absence of a certain idea furnishes
a reason for (our assuming) the existence of something. This is
exemplified by the case of a person who, having set out for some other
purpose, (nevertheless) forms the conviction of the existence of leaves,
grass, and the like, which he sees lying on the road.--But, the
pûrvapakshin may here object, the instance quoted by you is not strictly
analogous. In the case of the wanderer, perception, whose objects the
grass and leaves are, is active, and through it he forms the conception
of their existence. In the case of an arthavâda, on the other hand,
which, as forming a syntactical unity with the corresponding injunctory
passage, merely subserves the purpose of glorifying (the latter), it is
impossible to determine any energy having a special object of its own.
For in general any minor syntactical unity, which is included in a more
comprehensive syntactical unity conveying a certain meaning, does not
possess the power of expressing a separate meaning of its own. Thus, for
instance, we derive, from the combination of the three words
constituting the negative sentence, '(Do) not drink wine,' one meaning
only, i.e. a prohibition of drinking wine, and do not derive an
additional meaning, viz. an order to drink wine, from the combination of
the last two words, 'drink wine.'--To this objection we reply, that the
instance last quoted is not analogous (to the matter under discussion).
The words of the sentence prohibiting the drinking of wine form only one
whole, and on that account the separate sense which any minor
syntactical unity included in the bigger sentence may possess cannot be
accepted. In the case of injunction and arthavâda, on the other hand,
the words constituting the arthavâda form a separate group of their own
which refers to some accomplished thing[214], and only subsequently to
that, when it comes to be considered what purpose they subserve, they
enter on the function of glorifying the injunction. Let us examine, as
an illustrative example, the injunctive passage, 'He who is desirous of
prosperity is to offer to Vâyu a white animal.' All the words contained
in this passage are directly connected with the injunction. This is,
however, not the case with the words constituting the corresponding
arthavâda passage, 'For Vâyu is the swiftest deity; Vâyu he approaches
with his own share; he leads him to prosperity.' The single words of
this arthavâda are not grammatically connected with the single words of
the injunction, but form a subordinate unity of their own, which
contains the praise of Vâyu, and glorify the injunction, only in so far
as they give us to understand that the action enjoined is connected with
a distinguished divinity. If the matter conveyed by the subordinate
(arthavâda) passage can be known by some other means of knowledge, the
arthavâda acts as a mere anuvâda, i.e. a statement referring to
something (already known)[215]. When its contents are contradicted by
other means of knowledge it acts as a so-called gu/n/avâda, i.e. a
statement of a quality[216]. Where, again, neither of the two mentioned
conditions is found, a doubt may arise whether the arthavâda is to be
taken as a gu/n/avâda on account of the absence of other means of
knowledge, or as an arthavâda referring to something known (i.e. an
anuvâda) on account of the absence of contradiction by other means of
proof. The latter alternative is, however, to be embraced by reflecting
people.--The same reasoning applies to mantras also.

There is a further reason for assuming the personality of the gods. The
Vedic injunctions, as enjoining sacrificial offerings to Indra and the
other gods, presuppose certain characteristic shapes of the individual
divinities, because without such the sacrificer could not represent
Indra and the other gods to his mind. And if the divinity were not
represented to the mind it would not be possible to make an offering to
it. So Scripture also says, 'Of that divinity for which the offering is
taken he is to think when about to say vausha/t/' (Ai. Br. III, 8, 1).
Nor is it possible to consider the essential form (or character) of a
thing to consist in the word only[217]; for word (denoting) and thing
(denoted) are different. He therefore who admits the authoritativeness
of the scriptural word has no right to deny that the shape of Indra, and
the other gods, is such as we understand it to be from the mantras and
arthavâdas.--Moreover, itihâsas and purâ/n/as also--because based on
mantra and arthavâda which possess authoritative power in the manner
described--are capable of setting forth the personality, &c. of the
devas. Itihâsa and purâ/n/a can, besides, be considered as based on
perception also. For what is not accessible to our perception may have
been within the sphere of perception of people in ancient times.
Sm/ri/ti also declares that Vyâsa and others conversed with the gods
face to face. A person maintaining that the people of ancient times were
no more able to converse with the gods than people are at present, would
thereby deny the (incontestable) variety of the world. He might as well
maintain that because there is at present no prince ruling over the
whole earth, there were no such princes in former times; a position by
which the scriptural injunction of the râjasûya-sacrifice[218] would be
stultified. Or he might maintain that in former times the spheres of
duty of the different castes and â/s/ramas were as generally unsettled
as they are now, and, on that account, declare those parts of Scripture
which define those different duties to be purposeless. It is therefore
altogether unobjectionable to assume that the men of ancient times, in
consequence of their eminent religious merit, conversed with the gods
face to face. Sm/ri/ti also declares that 'from the reading of the Veda
there results intercourse with the favourite divinity' (Yoga Sûtra II,
44). And that Yoga does, as Sm/ri/ti declares, lead to the acquirement
of extraordinary powers, such as subtlety of body, and so on, is a fact
which cannot be set aside by a mere arbitrary denial. Scripture also
proclaims the greatness of Yoga, 'When, as earth, water, light, heat,
and ether arise, the fivefold quality of Yoga takes place, then there is
no longer illness, old age, or pain for him who has obtained a body
produced by the fire of Yoga' (/S/vet. Up. II, 12). Nor have we the
right to measure by our capabilities the capability of the /ri/shis who
see the mantras and brâhma/n/a passages (i.e. the Veda).--From all this
it appears that the itihâsas and purâ/n/as have an adequate basis.--And
the conceptions of ordinary life also must not be declared to be
unfounded, if it is at all possible to accept them.

The general result is that we have the right to conceive the gods as
possessing personal existence, on the ground of mantras, arthavâdas,
itihâsas, purâ/n/as, and ordinarily prevailing ideas. And as the gods
may thus be in the condition of having desires and so on, they must be
considered as qualified for the knowledge of Brahman. Moreover, the
declarations which Scripture makes concerning gradual emancipation[219]
agree with this latter supposition only.

34. Grief of him (i.e. of Jâna/s/ruti) (arose) on account of his hearing
a disrespectful speech about himself; on account of the rushing on of
that (grief) (Raikva called him /S/ûdra); for it (the grief) is pointed
at (by Raikva).

(In the preceding adhikara/n/a) the exclusiveness of the claim of men to
knowledge has been refuted, and it has been declared that the gods, &c.
also possess such a claim. The present adhikara/n/a is entered on for
the purpose of removing the doubt whether, as the exclusiveness of the
claim of twice-born men is capable of refutation, the /S/ûdras also
possess such a claim.

The pûrvapakshin maintains that the /S/ûdras also have such a claim,
because they may be in the position of desiring that knowledge, and
because they are capable of it; and because there is no scriptural
prohibition (excluding them from knowledge) analogous to the text,
'Therefore[220] the /S/ûdra is unfit for sacrificing' (Taitt. Sa/m/h.
VII, 1, 1, 6). The reason, moreover, which disqualifies the /S/ûdras for
sacrificial works, viz. their being without the sacred fires, does not
invalidate their qualification for knowledge, as knowledge can be
apprehended by those also who are without the fires. There is besides an
inferential mark supporting the claim of the /S/ûdras; for in the
so-called sa/m/varga-knowledge he (Raikva) refers to Jâna/s/ruti
Pautrâya/n/a, who wishes to learn from him, by the name of /S/ûdra 'Fie,
necklace and carnage be thine, O /S/ûdra, together with the cows' (Ch.
Up. IV, 2, 3). Sm/ri/ti moreover speaks of Vidûra and others who were
born from /S/ûdra mothers as possessing eminent knowledge.--Hence the
/S/ûdra has a claim to the knowledge of Brahman.

To this we reply that the /S/ûdras have no such claim, on account of
their not studying the Veda. A person who has studied the Veda and
understood its sense is indeed qualified for Vedic matters; but a
/S/ûdra does not study the Veda, for such study demands as its
antecedent the upanayana-ceremony, and that ceremony belongs to the
three (higher) castes only. The mere circumstance of being in a
condition of desire does not furnish a reason for qualification, if
capability is absent. Mere temporal capability again does not constitute
a reason for qualification, spiritual capability being required in
spiritual matters. And spiritual capability is (in the case of the
/S/ûdras) excluded by their being excluded from the study of the
Veda.--The Vedic statement, moreover, that the /S/ûdra is unfit for
sacrifices intimates, because founded on reasoning, that he is unfit for
knowledge also; for the argumentation is the same in both
cases[221].--With reference to the pûrvapakshin's opinion that the fact
of the word '/S/ûdra' being enounced in the sa/m/varga-knowledge
constitutes an inferential mark (of the /S/ûdra's qualification for
knowledge), we remark that that inferential mark has no force, on
account of the absence of arguments. For the statement of an inferential
mark possesses the power of intimation only in consequence of arguments
being adduced; but no such arguments are brought forward in the passage
quoted.[222] Besides, the word '/S/ûdra' which occurs in the
sa/m/varga-vidyâ would establish a claim on the part of the /S/ûdras to
that one vidyâ only, not to all vidyâs. In reality, however, it is
powerless, because occurring in an arthavâda, to establish the /S/ûdras'
claim to anything.--The word '/S/ûdra' can moreover be made to agree
with the context in which it occurs in the following manner. When
Jâna/s/ruti Pautrâya/n/a heard himself spoken of with disrespect by the
flamingo ('How can you speak of him, being what he is, as if he were
like Raikva with the car?' IV, 1, 3), grief (su/k/) arose in his mind,
and to that grief the /ri/shi Raikva alludes with the word /S/ûdra, in
order to show thereby his knowledge of what is remote. This explanation
must be accepted because a (real) born /S/ûdra is not qualified (for the
sa/m/varga-vidyâ). If it be asked how the grief (su/k/) which had arisen
in Jânasruti's mind can be referred to by means of the word /S/ûdra, we
reply: On account of the rushing on (âdrava/n/a) of the grief. For we
may etymologise the word /S/ûdra by dividing it into its parts, either
as 'he rushed into grief (/S/u/k/am abhidudrâva) or as 'grief rushed on
him,' or as 'he in his grief rushed to Raikva;' while on the other hand
it is impossible to accept the word in its ordinary conventional sense.
The circumstance (of the king actually being grieved) is moreover
expressly touched upon in the legend[223].

35. And because the kshattriyahood (of Jâna/s/ruti) is understood from
the inferential mark (supplied by his being mentioned) later on with
/K/aitraratha (who was a kshattriya himself).

Jâna/s/ruti cannot have been a /S/ûdra by birth for that reason also
that his being a kshattriya is understood from an inferential sign, viz.
his being mentioned together (in one chapter) with the kshattriya
/K/aitraratha Abhipratârin. For, later on, i.e. in the passage
complementary to the sa/m/varga-vidyâ, a kshattriya /K/aitrarathi
Abhipratârin is glorified, 'Once while /S/aunaka Kâpeya and Abhipratârin
Kâkshaseni were being waited on at their meal a religious student begged
of them' (Ch. Up. IV, 3, 5). That this Abhipratârin was a /K/aitrarathi
(i.e. a descendant of /K/itraratha) we have to infer from his connexion
with a Kâpeya. For we know (from /S/ruti) about the connexion of
/K/itraratha himself with the Kâpeyas ('the Kâpeyas made /K/itraratha
perform that sacrifice;' Tâ/nd/ya. Br. XX, 12, 5), and as a rule
sacrificers of one and the same family employ officiating priests of one
and the same family. Moreover, as we understand from Scripture ('from
him a /K/aitrarathi descended who was a prince[224]') that he
(/K/aitraratha) was a prince, we must understand him to have been a
kshattriya. The fact now of Jâna/s/ruti being praised in the same vidyâ
with the kshattriya Abhipratârin intimates that the former also was a
kshattriya. For as a rule equals are mentioned together with equals.
That Jâna/s/ruti was a kshattriya we moreover conclude from his sending
his door-keeper and from other similar signs of power (mentioned in the
text).--Hence the /S/ûdras are not qualified (for the knowledge of
Brahman).

36. On account of the reference to ceremonial purifications (in the case
of the higher castes) and on account of their absence being declared (in
the case of the /S/ûdras).

That the /S/ûdras are not qualified, follows from that circumstance also
that in different places of the vidyâs such ceremonies as the upanayana
and the like are referred to. Compare, for instance, /S/at. Br. XI, 5,
3, 13, 'He initiated him as a pupil;' Ch. Up. VII, 1, 1, 'Teach me, Sir!
thus he approached him;' Pra. Up. I, 1, 'Devoted to Brahman, firm in
Brahman, seeking for the highest Brahman they, carrying fuel in their
hands, approached the venerable Pippalâda, thinking that he would teach
them all that.'--Thus the following passage also, 'He without having
made them undergo the upanayana (said) to them' (Ch. Up. V, 11, 7),
shows that the upanayana is a well-established ceremony[225].--With
reference to the /S/ûdras, on the other hand, the absence of ceremonies
is frequently mentioned; so, for instance, Manu X, 4, where they are
spoken of as 'once born' only ('the /S/ûdra is the fourth caste,
once-born'), and Manu X, 126, 'In the /S/ûdra there is not any sin, and
he is not fit for any ceremony.'

37. And on account of (Gautama) proceeding (to initiate Jâbâla) on the
ascertainment of (his) not being that (i.e. a /S/ûdra).

The /S/ûdras are not qualified for that reason also that Gautama, having
ascertained Jâbâla not to be a /S/ûdra from his speaking the truth,
proceeded to initiate and instruct him. 'None who is not a Brâhma/n/a
would thus speak out. Go and fetch fuel, friend, I shall initiate you.
You have not swerved from the truth' (Ch. Up. IV, 4, 5); which
scriptural passage furnishes an inferential sign (of the /S/ûdras not
being capable of initiation).

38. And on account of the prohibition, in Sm/ri/ti, of (the /S/ûdras')
hearing and studying (the Veda) and (knowing and performing) (Vedic)
matters.

The /S/ûdras are not qualified for that reason also that Sm/ri/ti
prohibits their hearing the Veda, their studying the Veda, and their
understanding and performing Vedic matters. The prohibition of hearing
the Veda is conveyed by the following passages: 'The ears of him who
hears the Veda are to be filled with (molten) lead and lac,' and 'For a
/S/ûdra is (like) a cemetery, therefore (the Veda) is not to be read in
the vicinity of a /S/ûdra.' From this latter passage the prohibition of
studying the Veda results at once; for how should he study Scripture in
whose vicinity it is not even to be read? There is, moreover, an express
prohibition (of the /S/ûdras studying the Veda). 'His tongue is to be
slit if he pronounces it; his body is to be cut through if he preserves
it.' The prohibitions of hearing and studying the Veda already imply the
prohibition of the knowledge and performance of Vedic matters; there
are, however, express prohibitions also, such as 'he is not to impart
knowledge to the /S/ûdra,' and 'to the twice-born belong study,
sacrifice, and the bestowal of gifts.'--From those /S/ûdras, however,
who, like Vidura and 'the religious hunter,' acquire knowledge in
consequence of the after effects of former deeds, the fruit of their
knowledge cannot be withheld, since knowledge in all cases brings about
its fruit. Sm/ri/ti, moreover, declares that all the four castes are
qualified for acquiring the knowledge of the itihâsas and purâ/n/as;
compare the passage, 'He is to teach the four castes' (Mahâbh.).--It
remains, however, a settled point that they do not possess any such
qualification with regard to the Veda.

39. (The prâ/n/a is Brahman), on account of the trembling (predicated of
the whole world).

The discussion of qualification for Brahma-knowledge--on which we
entered as an opportunity offered--being finished we return to our chief
topic, i.e. the enquiry into the purport of the Vedânta-texts.--We read
(Ka. Up. II, 6, 2), 'Whatever there is, the whole world when gone forth
trembles in the prâ/n/a. It (the prâ/n/a) is a great terror, a raised
thunderbolt. Those who know it become immortal[226].'--This passage
declares that this whole world trembles, abiding in prâ/n/a, and that
there is raised something very terrible, called a thunderbolt, and that
through its knowledge immortality is obtained. But as it is not
immediately clear what the prâ/n/a is, and what that terrible
thunderbolt, a discussion arises.

The pûrvapakshin maintains that, in accordance with the ordinary meaning
of the term, prâ/n/a denotes the air with its five modifications, that
the word 'thunderbolt' also is to be taken in its ordinary sense, and
that thus the whole passage contains a glorification of air. For, he
says, this whole world trembles, abiding within air with its five
forms--which is here called prâ/n/a--and the terrible thunderbolts also
spring from air (or wind) as their cause. For in the air, people say,
when it manifests itself in the form of Parjanya, lightning, thunder,
rain, and thunderbolts manifest themselves.--Through the knowledge of
that air immortality also can be obtained; for another scriptural
passage says, 'Air is everything by itself, and air is all things
together. He who knows this conquers death.'--We therefore conclude that
the same air is to be understood in the passage under discussion.

To this we make the following reply.--Brahman only can be meant, on
account of what precedes as well as what follows. In the preceding as
well as the subsequent part of the chapter Brahman only is spoken of;
how then can it be supposed that in the intermediate part all at once
the air should be referred to? The immediately preceding passage runs as
follows, 'That only is called the Bright, that is called Brahman, that
alone is called the Immortal. All worlds are contained in it, and no one
goes beyond it.' That the Brahman there spoken of forms the topic of our
passage also, we conclude, firstly, from proximity; and, secondly, from
the circumstance that in the clause, 'The whole world trembles in
prâ/n/a' we recognise a quality of Brahman, viz. its constituting the
abode of the whole world. That the word prâ/n/a can denote the highest
Self also, appears from such passages as 'the prâ/n/a of prâ/n/a'
(B/ri/. Up. IV, 4, 18). Being the cause of trembling, moreover, is a
quality which properly appertains to the highest Self only, not to mere
air. Thus Scripture says, 'No mortal lives by the prâ/n/a and the breath
that goes down. We live by another in whom these two repose' (Ka. Up.
II, 5 5). And also in the passage subsequent to the one under
discussion, ('From terror of it fire burns, from terror the sun burns,
from terror Indra and Vâyu, and Death as the fifth run away,') Brahman,
and not the air, must be supposed to be spoken of, since the subject of
that passage is represented as the cause of fear on the part of the
whole world inclusive of the air itself. Thence we again conclude that
the passage under discussion also refers to Brahman, firstly, on the
ground of proximity; and, secondly, because we recognise a quality of
Brahman, viz. its being the cause of fear, in the words, 'A great
terror, a raised thunderbolt.' The word 'thunderbolt' is here used to
denote a cause of fear in general. Thus in ordinary life also a man
strictly carries out a king's command because he fearfully considers in
his mind, 'A thunderbolt (i.e. the king's wrath, or threatened
punishment) is hanging over my head; it might fall if I did not carry
out his command.' In the same manner this whole world inclusive of fire,
air, sun, and so on, regularly carries on its manifold functions from
fear of Brahman; hence Brahman as inspiring fear is compared to a
thunderbolt. Similarly, another scriptural passage, whose topic is
Brahman, declares, 'From terror of it the wind blows, from terror the
sun rises; from terror of it Agni and Indra, yea, Death runs as the
fifth.'--That Brahman is what is referred to in our passage, further
follows from the declaration that the fruit of its cognition is
immortality. For that immortality is the fruit of the knowledge of
Brahman is known, for instance, from the mantra, 'A man who knows him
only passes over death, there is no other path to go' (/S/vet. Up. VI,
15).--That immortality which the pûrvapakshin asserts to be sometimes
represented as the fruit of the knowledge of the air is a merely
relative one; for there (i.e. in the chapter from which the passage is
quoted) at first the highest Self is spoken of, by means of a new topic
being started (B/ri/. Up. III, 4), and thereupon the inferior nature of
the air and so on is referred to. ('Everything else is evil.')--That in
the passage under discussion the highest Self is meant appears finally
from the general subject-matter; for the question (asked by Na/k/iketas
in I, 2, 14, 'That which thou seest as neither this nor that, as neither
effect nor cause, as neither past nor future tell me that') refers to
the highest Self.

40. The light (is Brahman), on account of that (Brahman) being seen (in
the scriptural passage).

We read in Scripture, 'Thus does that serene being, arising from this
body, appear in its own form as soon as it has approached the highest
light' (Ch. Up. VIII, 12, 3). Here the doubt arises whether the word
'light' denotes the (physical) light, which is the object of sight and
dispels darkness, or the highest Brahman.

The pûrvapakshin maintains that the word 'light' denotes the well-known
(physical) light, because that is the conventional sense of the word.
For while it is to be admitted that in another passage, discussed under
I, 1, 24, the word 'light' does, owing to the general topic of the
chapter, divest itself of its ordinary meaning and denote Brahman, there
is in our passage no similar reason for setting the ordinary meaning
aside. Moreover, it is stated in the chapter treating of the nâ/d/îs of
the body, that a man going to final release reaches the sun ('When he
departs from this body then he departs upwards by those very rays;' Ch.
Up. VIII, 6, 5). Hence we conclude that the word 'light' denotes, in our
passage, the ordinary light.

To this we make the following reply.--The word 'light' can denote the
highest Brahman only, on account of that being seen. We see that in the
whole chapter Brahman is carried on as the topic of discussion. For the
Self, which is free from sin, &c. is introduced as the general
subject-matter in VIII, 7, 1 ('the Self which is free from sin'); it is
thereupon set forth as that which is to be searched out and to be
understood (VIII, 7, 1); it is carried on by means of the clauses, 'I
shall explain that further to you' (VIII, 9, 3 ff.); after that freedom
from body is said to belong to it, because it is one with light ('when
he is free from the body then neither pleasure nor pain touches him,'
VIII, 12, 1)--and freedom from body is not possible outside Brahman--and
it is finally qualified as 'the highest light, the highest person'
(VIII, 12, 3).--Against the statement, made by the pûrvapakshin, that
Scripture speaks of a man going to release as reaching the sun, we
remark, that the release there referred to is not the ultimate one,
since it is said to be connected with going and departing upwards. That
the ultimate release has nothing to do with going and departing upwards
we shall show later on.

41. The ether is (Brahman), as it is designated as something different,
&c. (from name and form).

Scripture says, 'He who is called ether, (âkâ/s/a) is the revealer of
all forms and names. That within which these forms and names are
contained is the Brahman, the Immortal, the Self (Ch. Up. VIII, 14, 1).

There arising a doubt whether that which here is called ether is the
highest Brahman or the ordinary elemental ether, the pûrvapakshin
declares that the latter alternative is to be embraced, firstly, because
it is founded on the conventional meaning of the word 'ether;' and,
secondly, because the circumstance of revealing names and forms can very
well be reconciled with the elemental ether, as that which affords room
(for all things). Moreover, the passage contains no clear indicatory
mark of Brahman, such as creative power, and the like.

To this we reply, that the word 'ether' can here denote the highest
Brahman only, because it is designated as a different thing, &c. For the
clause, 'That within which these two are contained is Brahman,'
designates the ether as something different from names and forms. But,
excepting Brahman, there is nothing whatever different from name and
form, since the entire world of effects is evolved exclusively by names
and forms. Moreover, the complete revealing of names and forms cannot be
accomplished by anything else but Brahman, according to the text which
declares Brahman's creative agency, 'Let me enter (into those beings)
with this living Self (jîva âtman), and evolve names and forms' (Ch. Up.
VI, 3, 2). But--it may be said--from this very passage it is apparent
that the living Self also (i.e. the individual soul) possesses revealing
power with regard to names and forms.--True, we reply, but what the
passage really wishes to intimate, is the non-difference (of the
individual soul from the highest Self). And the very statement
concerning the revealing of names and forms implies the statement of
signs indicatory of Brahman, viz. creative power and the
like.--Moreover, the terms 'the Brahman, the Immortal, the Self' (VIII,
14) indicate that Brahman is spoken of.

42. And (on account of the designation) (of the highest Self) as
different (from the individual soul) in the states of deep sleep and
departing.

In the sixth prapâ/th/aka of the B/ri/hadâra/n/yaka there is given, in
reply to the question, 'Who is that Self?' a lengthy exposition of the
nature of the Self, 'He who is within the heart, among the prâ/n/as, the
person of light, consisting of knowledge' (B/ri/. Up. IV, 3, 7). Here
the doubt arises, whether the passage merely aims at making an
additional statement about the nature of the transmigrating soul (known
already from other sources), or at establishing the nature of the
non-transmigrating Self.

The pûrvapakshin maintains that the passage is concerned with the nature
of the transmigrating soul, on account of the introductory and
concluding statements. For the introductory statement, 'He among the
prâ/n/as who consists of knowledge,' contains marks indicatory of the
embodied soul, and so likewise the concluding passage, 'And that great
unborn Self is he who consists of cognition,' &c. (IV, 4, 22). We must
therefore adhere to the same subject-matter in the intermediate passages
also, and look on them as setting forth the same embodied Self,
represented in its different states, viz. the waking state, and so on.

In reply to this, we maintain that the passage aims only at giving
information about the highest Lord, not at making additional statements
about the embodied soul.--Why?--On account of the highest Lord being
designated as different from the embodied soul, in the states of deep
sleep and of departing from the body. His difference from the embodied
soul in the state of deep sleep is declared in the following passage,
'This person embraced by the intelligent (prâj/ñ/a) Self knows nothing
that is without, nothing that is within.' Here the term, 'the person,'
must mean the embodied soul; for of him it is possible to deny that he
knows, because he, as being the knower, may know what is within and
without. The 'intelligent Self,' on the other hand, is the highest Lord,
because he is never dissociated from intelligence, i.e.--in his
case--all-embracing knowledge.--Similarly, the passage treating of
departure, i.e. death ('this bodily Self mounted by the intelligent Self
moves along groaning'), refers to the highest Lord as different from the
individual Self. There also we have to understand by the 'embodied one'
the individual soul which is the Lord of the body, while the
'intelligent one' is again the Lord. We thus understand that 'on account
of his being designated as something different, in the states of deep
sleep and departure,' the highest Lord forms the subject of the
passage.--With reference to the pûrvapakshin's assertion that the entire
chapter refers to the embodied Self, because indicatory marks of the
latter are found in its beginning, middle, and end, we remark that in
the first place the introductory passage ('He among the prâ/n/as who
consists of cognition') does not aim at setting forth the character of
the transmigrating Self, but rather, while merely referring to the
nature of the transmigrating Self as something already known, aims at
declaring its identity with the highest Brahman; for it is manifest that
the immediately subsequent passage, 'as if thinking, as if moving'[227],
aims at discarding the attributes of the transmigrating Self. The
concluding passage again is analogous to the initial one; for the words,
'And that great unborn Self is he who,' &c., mean: We have shown that
that same cognitional Self, which is observed among the prâ/n/as, is the
great unborn Self, i.e. the highest Lord--He, again, who imagines that
the passages intervening (between the two quoted) aim at setting forth
the nature of the transmigrating Self by representing it in the waking
state, and so on, is like a man who setting out towards the east, wants
to set out at the same time towards the west. For in representing the
states of waking, and so on, the passage does not aim at describing the
soul as subject to different states or transmigration, but rather as
free from all particular conditions and transmigration. This is evident
from the circumstance that on Janaka's question, which is repeated in
every section, 'Speak on for the sake of emancipation,' Yaj/ñ/avalkya
replies each time, 'By all that he is not affected, for that person is
not attached to anything' (B/ri/. Up. IV, 3, 14-16). And later on he
says (IV, 3, 22), 'He is not followed by good, not followed by evil, for
he has then overcome all the sorrows of the heart.' We have, therefore,
to conclude that the chapter exclusively aims at setting forth the
nature of the non-transmigrating Self.

43. And on account of such words as Lord, &c.

That the chapter aims at setting forth the nature of the
non-transmigrating Self, we have to conclude from that circumstance also
that there occur in it terms such as Lord and so on, intimating the
nature of the non-transmigrating Self, and others excluding the nature
of the transmigrating Self. To the first class belongs, for instance,
'He is the lord of all, the king of all things, the protector of all
things.' To the latter class belongs the passage, 'He does not become
greater by good works, nor smaller by evil works.'--From all which we
conclude that the chapter refers to the non-transmigrating highest Lord.

Notes:

[Footnote 164: From passages of which nature we may infer that in the
passage under discussion also the 'abode' is Brahman.]

[Footnote 165: From which circumstance we may conclude that the passage
under discussion also refers to Brahman.]

[Footnote 166: Yat sarvam avidyâropita/m/ tat sarva/m/ paramârthato
brahma na tu yad brahma tat sarvam ity artha/h/. Bhâmatî.]

[Footnote 167: So that the passage would have to be translated, 'That,
viz. knowledge, &c. is the bridge of the Immortal.']

[Footnote 168: Bhogyasya bhokt/ris/eshatvât tasyâyatanatvam uktam
â/s/a@nkyâha na /k/eti, jîvasyâd/ri/sh/t/advârâ dyubhvâdinimittatvezpi
na sâkshât tadâyatanatvam aupâdhikatvenâvibhutvâd ity artha/h/. Ânanda
Giri.]

[Footnote 169: It would not have been requisite to introduce a special
Sûtra for the individual soul--which, like the air, is already excluded
by the preceding Sûtra--if it were not for the new argument brought
forward in the following Sûtra which applies to the individual soul
only.]

[Footnote 170: If the individual soul were meant by the abode of heaven,
earth, &c., the statement regarding Î/s/vara made in the passage about
the two birds would be altogether abrupt, and on that ground
objectionable. The same difficulty does not present itself with regard
to the abrupt mention of the individual soul which is well known to
everybody, and to which therefore casual allusions may be made.--I
subjoin Ânanda Giri's commentary on the entire passage:
Jîvasyopâdhyaikyenâvivakshitatvât tadj/ñ/ânezpi sarvaj/ñ/ânasiddhes
tasyâyatanatvâdyabhâve hetvantara/m/ vâ/k/yam ity â/s/a@nkya sûtre/n/a
pariharati kuta/sk/etyâdinâ. Tad vyâ/k/ash/t/e dyubhvâdîti. Nirde/s/am
eva dar/s/ayati tayor iti. Vibhaktyartham âha tâbhyâ/m/ /k/eti.
Sthitye/s/varasyâdanâj jîvasa/m/grahezpi katham î/s/varasyaiva
vi/s/vâyatanatva/m/ tadâha yadîti. Î/s/varasyâyanatvenâprak/ri/tatve
jîvap/ri/thakkathanânupapattir ity uktam eva vyatirekadvârâha anyatheti.
Jîvasyâyatanatvenâprak/ri/tatve tulyânupapattir iti /s/a@nkate nanviti.
Tasyaikyârtha/m/ lokasiddhasyânuvâdatvân naivam ity âha neti.
Jîvasyâpûrvatvâbhâvenâpratipâdyatvam eva praka/t/ayati kshetraj/ñ/o
hîti. Î/s/varasyâpi lokavâdisiddhatvâd apratipâdyatety â/s/a@nkyâha
î/s/varas tv iti.]

[Footnote 171: As might be the primâ facie conclusion from the particle
'but' introducing the sentence 'but he in reality,' &c.]

[Footnote 172: It being maintained that the passage referred to is to be
viewed in connexion with the general subject-matter of the preceding
past of the chapter.]

[Footnote 173: And would thus involve a violation of a fundamental
principle of the Mîmâ/m/sâ.]

[Footnote 174: A remark directed against the possible attempt to explain
the passage last quoted as referring to the embodied soul.]

[Footnote 175: Pi/nd/a/h/ sthûlo deha/h/, prâ/n/a/h/ sûtrâtmâ. Ânanda
Giri.-The lower Brahman (hira/n/yagarbha on sûtrâtman) is the vital
principle (prâ/n/a) in all creatures.]

[Footnote 176: Sa/m/yagdar/s/ana, i.e. complete seeing or intuition; the
same term which in other places--where it is not requisite to insist on
the idea of 'seeing' in contradistinction from 'reflecting' or
'meditating'--is rendered by perfect knowledge.]

[Footnote 177: Translated above by 'of the shape of the individual
soul.']

[Footnote 178: Pa/n/ini III, 3, 77, 'mûrtta/m/ ghana/h/.']

[Footnote 179: So that the interpretation of the pûrvapakshin cannot be
objected to on the ground of its involving the comparison of a thing to
itself.]

[Footnote 180: So that no objection can be raised on the ground that
heaven and earth cannot be contained in the small ether of the heart.]

[Footnote 181: Viz. of that which is within it. Ânanda Giri proposes two
explanations: na /k/eti, paravi/s/esha/n/atvenety atra paro daharâkâ/s/a
upâdânât tasminn iti saptamyanta-ta/kkh/abdasyeti /s/esha/h/. Yadvâ
para/s/abdo s nta/h/sthavastuvishayas tadvi/s/esha/n/alvena tasminn iti
daharâkâ/s/asyokter ity artha/h/. Ta/kkh/abdasya
samnik/ri/sh/t/ânvayayoge viprak/ri/sh/t/ânvayasya jaghanyatvâd
âkâ/s/ântargata/m/ dhyeyam iti bhâva/h/.]

[Footnote 182: A vâkyabheda--split of the sentence--takes place
according to the Mîmâm/s/â when one and the same sentence contains two
new statements which are different.]

[Footnote 183: While the explanation of Brahman by jîva would compel us
to assume that the word Brahman secondarily denotes the individual
soul.]

[Footnote 184: Upalabdher adhish/th/ânam brahma/n/a deha ishyate.
Tenâsâdhâra/n/atvena deho brahmapuram bhavet. Bhâmatî.]

[Footnote 185: I.e. Brahmâ, the lower Brahman.]

[Footnote 186: The masculine 'âvirbhûtasvarûpa/h/' qualifies the
substantive jîva/h/ which has to be supplied. Properly speaking the jîva
whose true nature has become manifest, i.e. which has become Brahman, is
no longer jîva; hence the explanatory statement that the term jîva is
used with reference to what the jîva was before it became Brahman.]

[Footnote 187: To state another reason showing that the first and second
chapters of Prajâpati's instruction refer to the same subject.]

[Footnote 188: I.e. of whom cognition is not a mere attribute.]

[Footnote 189: Although in reality there is no such thing as an
individual soul.]

[Footnote 190: Nanu jîvabrahma/n/or aikyam na kvâpi sûtrakâro mukhato
vadati kim tu sarvatra bhedam eva, ato naikyam ish/t/am tatrâha
pratipâdyam tv iti.]

[Footnote 191: This last sentence is directed against the possible
objection that '/s/abda,' which the Sûtra brings forward as an argument
in favour of the highest Lord being meant, has the sense of 'sentence'
(vâkya), and is therefore of less force than li@nga, i.e. indicatory or
inferential mark which is represented in our passage by the
a@ngush/th/amâtratâ of the purusha, and favours the jîva interpretation.
/S/abda, the text remarks, here means /s/ruti, i.e. direct enunciation,
and /s/ruti ranks, as a means of proof, higher than li@nga.]

[Footnote 192: I.e. men belonging to the three upper castes.]

[Footnote 193: The first reason excludes animals, gods, and /ri/shis.
Gods cannot themselves perform sacrifices, the essential feature of
which is the parting, on the part of the sacrificer, with an offering
meant for the gods. /Ri/shis cannot perform sacrifices in the course of
whose performance the ancestral /ri/shis of the sacrificer are
invoked.--The second reason excludes those men whose only desire is
emancipation and who therefore do not care for the perishable fruits of
sacrifices.--The third and fourth reasons exclude the /S/ûdras who are
indirectly disqualified for /s/âstric works because the Veda in
different places gives rules for the three higher castes only, and for
whom the ceremony of the upanayana--indispensable for all who wish to
study the Veda--is not prescribed.--Cp. Pûrva Mîmâ/m/sâ Sûtras VI, 1.]

[Footnote 194: The reference is to Pûrva Mîmâ/m/sâ Sûtras I, 1, 5 (not
to I, 2, 21, as stated in Muir's Sanskrit Texts, III, p. 69).]

[Footnote 195: In which classes of beings all the gods are comprised.]

[Footnote 196: Which shows that together with the non-eternality of the
thing denoted there goes the non-eternality of the denoting word.]

[Footnote 197: Âk/ri/ti, best translated by [Greek: eidos].]

[Footnote 198: The pûrvapakshin, i.e. here the grammarian maintains, for
the reasons specified further on, that there exists in the case of words
a supersensuous entity called spho/t/a which is manifested by the
letters of the word, and, if apprehended by the mind, itself manifests
the sense of the word. The term spho/t/a may, according as it is viewed
in either of these lights, be explained as the manifestor or that which
is manifested.--The spho/t/a is a grammatical fiction, the word in so
far as it is apprehended by us as a whole. That we cannot identify it
with the 'notion' (as Deussen seems inclined to do, p. 80) follows from
its being distinctly called vâ/k/aka or abhidhâyaka, and its being
represented as that which causes the conception of the sense of a word
(arthadhîhetu).]

[Footnote 199: For that each letter by itself expresses the sense is not
observed; and if it did so, the other letters of the word would have to
be declared useless.]

[Footnote 200: In order to enable us to apprehend the sense from the
word, there is required the actual consciousness of the last letter plus
the impressions of the preceding letters; just as smoke enables us to
infer the existence of fire only if we are actually conscious of the
smoke. But that actual consciousness does not take place because the
impressions are not objects of perceptive consciousness.]

[Footnote 201: 'How should it be so?' i.e. it cannot be so; and on that
account the differences apprehended do not belong to the letters
themselves, but to the external conditions mentioned above.]

[Footnote 202: With 'or else' begins the exposition of the finally
accepted theory as to the cause why the same letters are apprehended as
different. Hitherto the cause had been found in the variety of the
upâdhis of the letters. Now a new distinction is made between
articulated letters and non-articulated tone.]

[Footnote 203: I.e. it is not directly one idea, for it has for its
object more than one letter; but it may be called one in a secondary
sense because it is based on the determinative knowledge that the
letters, although more than one, express one sense only.]

[Footnote 204: Which circumstance proves that exalted knowledge
appertains not only to Hira/n/yagarbha, but to many beings.]

[Footnote 205: Viz. naraka, the commentaries say.]

[Footnote 206: Asmin kalpe sarveshâm prâ/n/inâm dâhapâkaprakâ/s/akârî
yozyam agnir d/ris/yate sozyam agni/h/ pûrvasmin kalpe manushya/h/ san
devatvapadaprâpaka/m/ karmânush/th/âyâsmin kalpa etaj janma labdhavân
ata/h/ pûrvasmin kalpe sa manushyo bhâvinî/m/ sa/m/j/ñ/âm â/sri/tyâgnir
iti vyapadi/s/yate.--Sâya/n/a on the quoted passage.]

[Footnote 207: As, for instance, 'So long as Âditya rises in the east
and sets in the west' (Ch. Up. III, 6, 4).]

[Footnote 208: Whence it follows that the devas are not personal beings,
and therefore not qualified for the knowledge of Brahman.]

[Footnote 209: Yama, for instance, being ordinarily represented as a
person with a staff in his hand, Varu/n/a with a noose, Indra with a
thunderbolt, &c. &c.]

[Footnote 210: On the proper function of arthavâda and mantra according
to the Mîmâ/m/sâ, cp. Arthasa/m/graha, Introduction.]

[Footnote 211: See above, p. 197.]

[Footnote 212: Which can be offered by kshattriyas only.]

[Footnote 213: /S/rautali@ngenânumânabâdha/m/ dar/s/ayitvâ smârtenâpi
tadbâdha/m/ dar/s/âyati smârtam iti. Ki/m/ atra brahma am/ri/tam ki/m/
svid vedyam anuttamam, /k/intayet tatra vai gatvâ gandharvo mâm
ap/rikkh/ata, Vi/s/vâvasus tato râjan vedântaj/ñ/ânakovida iti
mokshadharme janakayâj/ñ/avalkyasa/m/vâdât prahlâdâjagarasa/m/vadâ/k/
/k/oktânumânâsiddhir ity artha/h/.]

[Footnote 214: As opposed to an action to be accomplished.]

[Footnote 215: Of this nature is, for instance, the arthavâda, 'Fire is
a remedy for cold.']

[Footnote 216: Of this nature is, for instance, the passage 'the
sacrificial post is the sun' (i.e. possesses the qualities of the sun,
luminousness, &c.; a statement contradicted by perception).]

[Footnote 217: And therefore to suppose that a divinity is nothing but a
certain word forming part of a mantra.]

[Footnote 218: The râjasûya-sacrifice is to be offered by a prince who
wishes to become the ruler of the whole earth.]

[Footnote 219: In one of whose stages the being desirous of final
emancipation becomes a deva.]

[Footnote 220: The commentaries explain 'therefore' by 'on account of
his being devoid of the three sacred fires.' This explanation does not,
however, agree with the context of the Taitt. Sa/m/h.]

[Footnote 221: The /S/ûdra not having acquired a knowledge of Vedic
matters in the legitimate way, i.e. through the study of the Veda under
the guidance of a guru, is unfit for sacrifices as well as for vidyâ.]

[Footnote 222: The li@nga contained in the word '/S/ûdra' has no proving
power as it occurs in an arthavâda-passage which has no authority if not
connected with a corresponding injunctive passage. In our case the
li@nga in the arthavâda-passage is even directly contradicted by those
injunctions which militate against the /S/ûdras' qualification for Vedic
matters.]

[Footnote 223: Ha/m/savâkyâd âtmanoznâdara/m/ /s/rutvâ jâna/s/rute/h/
/s/ug utpannety etad eva katha/m/ gamyate yenâsau /s/ûdra/s/abdena
sâ/k/yate tatrâha sp/ris/yate /k/eti. Ânanda Giri.]

[Footnote 224: I translate this passage as I find it in all MSS. of
/S/a@nkara consulted by me (noting, however, that some MSS. read
/k/aitrarathinâmaika/h/). Ânanda Giri expressly explains tasmâd by
/k/aitrarathad ity artha/h/.--The text of the Tâ/nd/ya Br. runs:
tasmâ/k/ /k/aitrarathînâm eka/h/ kshatrapatir gâyate, and the commentary
explains: tasmât kâra/n/âd adyâpi /k/itrava/ms/otpannânâ/m/ madhye eka
eva râjâ kshatrapatir balâdhipatir bhavati.--Grammar does not authorise
the form /k/ahraratha used in the Sûtra.]

[Footnote 225: The king A/s/vapati receives some Brâhma/n/as as his
pupils without insisting on the upanayana. This express statement of the
upanayana having been omitted in a certain case shows it to be the
general rule.]

[Footnote 226: As the words stand in the original they might be
translated as follows (and are so translated by the pûrvapakshin),
'Whatever there is, the whole world trembles in the prâ/n/a, there goes
forth (from it) a great terror, viz. the raised thunderbolt.']

[Footnote 227: The stress lies here on the 'as if.' which intimate that
the Self does not really think or move.]




FOURTH PÂDA.

REVERENCE TO THE HIGHEST SELF!


1. If it be said that some (mention) that which is based on inference
(i.e. the pradhâna); we deny this, because (the term alluded to) refers
to what is contained in the simile of the body (i.e. the body itself);
and (that the text) shows.

In the preceding part of this work--as whose topic there has been set
forth an enquiry into Brahman--we have at first defined Brahman (I, 1,
2); we have thereupon refuted the objection that that definition applies
to the pradhâna also, by showing that there is no scriptural authority
for the latter (I, 1, 5), and we have shown in detail that the common
purport of all Vedânta-texts is to set forth the doctrine that Brahman,
and not the pradhâ/n/a, is the cause of the world. Here, however, the
Sâ@nkhya again raises an objection which he considers not to have been
finally disposed of.

It has not, he says, been satisfactorily proved that there is no
scriptural authority for the pradhâna; for some /s/âkhâs contain
expressions which seem to convey the idea of the pradhâna. From this it
follows that Kapila and other supreme /ri/shis maintain the doctrine of
the pradhâna being the general cause only because it is based on the
Veda.--As long therefore as it has not been proved that those passages
to which the Sâ@nkhyas refer have a different meaning (i.e. do not
allude to the pradhâna), all our previous argumentation as to the
omniscient Brahman being the cause of the world must be considered as
unsettled. We therefore now begin a new chapter which aims at proving
that those passages actually have a different meaning.

The Sâ@nkhyas maintain that that also which is based on inference, i.e.
the pradhâna, is perceived in the text of some /s/âkhâs. We read, for
instance, they say, in the Kâ/th/aka (I, 3, 11), 'Beyond the Great there
is the Undeveloped, beyond the Undeveloped there is the Person.' There
we recognise, named by the same names and enumerated in the same order,
the three entities with which we are acquainted from the
Sâ@nkhya-sm/ri/ti, viz. the great principle, the Undeveloped (the
pradhâna), and the soul[228]. That by the Undeveloped is meant the
pradhâna is to be concluded from the common use of Sm/ri/ti and from the
etymological interpretation of which the word admits, the pradhâna being
called undeveloped because it is devoid of sound and other qualities. It
cannot therefore be asserted that there is no scriptural authority for
the pradhâna. And this pradhâna vouched for by Scripture we declare to
be the cause of the world, on the ground of Scripture, Sm/ri/ti, and
ratiocination.

Your reasoning, we reply, is not valid. The passage from the Kâ/th/aka
quoted by you intimates by no means the existence of that great
principle and that Undeveloped which are known from the
Sâ@nkhya-sm/ri/ti. We do not recognise there the pradhâna of the
Sâ@nkhyas, i.e. an independent general cause consisting of three
constituting elements; we merely recognise the word 'Undeveloped,' which
does not denote any particular determined thing, but may--owing to its
etymological meaning, 'that which is not developed, not
manifest'--denote anything subtle and difficult to distinguish. The
Sâ@nkhyas indeed give to the word a settled meaning, as they apply it to
the pradhâna; but then that meaning is valid for their system only, and
has no force in the determination of the sense of the Veda. Nor does
mere equality of position prove equality of being, unless the latter be
recognised independently. None but a fool would think a cow to be a
horse because he sees it tied in the usual place of a horse. We,
moreover, conclude, on the strength of the general subject-matter, that
the passage does not refer to the pradhâna the fiction of the Sâ@nkhyas,
'on account of there being referred to that which is contained in the
simile of the body.' This means that the body which is mentioned in the
simile of the chariot is here referred to as the Undeveloped. We infer
this from the general subject-matter of the passage and from the
circumstance of nothing else remaining.--The immediately preceding part
of the chapter exhibits the simile in which the Self, the body, and so
on, are compared to the lord of a chariot, a chariot, &c., 'Know the
Self to be the lord of the chariot, the body to be the chariot, the
intellect the charioteer, and the mind the reins. The senses they call
the horses, the objects of the senses their roads. When he (the Self) is
in union with the body, the senses and the mind, then wise people call
him the enjoyer.' The text then goes on to say that he whose senses, &c.
are not well controlled enters into sa/m/sâra, while he who has them
under control reaches the end of the journey, the highest place of
Vish/n/u. The question then arises: What is the end of the journey, the
highest place of Vish/n/u? Whereupon the text explains that the highest
Self which is higher than the senses, &c., spoken of is the end of the
journey, the highest place of Vish/n/u. 'Beyond the senses there are the
objects, beyond the objects there is the mind, beyond the mind there is
the intellect, the great Self is beyond the intellect. Beyond the great
there is the Undeveloped, beyond the Undeveloped there is the Person.
Beyond the Person there is nothing--this is the goal, the highest Road.'
In this passage we recognise the senses, &c. which in the preceding
simile had been compared to horses and so on, and we thus avoid the
mistake of abandoning the matter in hand and taking up a new subject.
The senses, the intellect, and the mind are referred to in both passages
under the same names. The objects (in the second passage) are the
objects which are (in the former passage) designated as the roads of the
senses; that the objects are beyond (higher than) the senses is known
from the scriptural passage representing the senses as grahas, i.e.
graspers, and the objects as atigrahas, i.e. superior to the grahas
(B/ri/ Up. III, 2). The mind (manas) again is superior to the objects,
because the relation of the senses and their objects is based on the
mind. The intellect (buddhi) is higher than the mind, since the objects
of enjoyment are conveyed to the soul by means of the intellect. Higher
than the intellect is the great Self which was represented as the lord
of the chariot in the passage, 'Know the Self to be the lord of the
chariot.' That the same Self is referred to in both passages is manifest
from the repeated use of the word 'Self;' that the Self is superior to
intelligence is owing to the circumstance that the enjoyer is naturally
superior to the instrument of enjoyment. The Self is appropriately
called great as it is the master.--Or else the phrase 'the great Self'
may here denote the intellect of the first-born Hira/n/yagarbha which is
the basis of all intellects; in accordance with the following
Sm/ri/ti-passage it is called mind, the great one; reflection, Brahman;
the stronghold, intellect; enunciation, the Lord; highest knowledge,
consciousness; thought, remembrance[229], and likewise with the
following scriptural passage, 'He (Hira/n/ya-garbha) who first creates
Brahman and delivers the Vedas to him' (/S/vet. Up. VI, 18). The
intellect, which in the former passage had been referred to under its
common name buddhi, is here mentioned separately, since it may be
represented as superior to our human intellects. On this latter
explanation of the term 'the great Self,' we must assume that the
personal Self which in the simile had been compared to the charioteer
is, in the latter passage, included in the highest person (mentioned
last); to which there is no objection, since in reality the personal
Self and the highest Self are identical.--Thus there remains now the
body only which had before been compared to a chariot. We therefore
conclude that the text after having enumerated the senses and all the
other things mentioned before, in order to point out the highest place,
points out by means of the one remaining word, viz. avyakta, the only
thing remaining out of those which had been mentioned before, viz. the
body. The entire passage aims at conveying the knowledge of the unity of
the inward Self and Brahman, by describing the soul's passing through
sa/m/sâra and release under the form of a simile in which the body, &c.
of the soul--which is affected by Nescience and therefore joined to a
body, senses, mind, intellect, objects, sensations, &c.--are compared to
a chariot, and so on.--In accordance with this the subsequent verse
states the difficulty of knowing the highest place of Vish/n/u ('the
Self is hidden in all beings and does not shine forth, but it is seen by
subtle seers through their sharp and subtle intellect'), and after that
the next verse declares Yoga to be the means of attaining that
cognition. 'A wise man should keep down speech in the mind, he should
keep down the mind in intelligence, intelligence he should keep down
within the great Self, and he should keep that within the quiet
Self.'--That means: The wise man should restrain the activity of the
outer organs such as speech, &c., and abide within the mind only; he
should further restrain the mind which is intent on doubtful external
objects within intelligence, whose characteristic mark is decision,
recognising that indecision is evil; he should further restrain
intelligence within the great Self, i.e. the individual soul or else the
fundamental intellect; he should finally fix the great Self on the calm
Self, i.e. the highest Self, the highest goal, of which the whole
chapter treats.--If we in this manner review the general context, we
perceive that there is no room for the pradhâna imagined by the
Sânkhyas.

2. But the subtle (body is meant by the term avyakta) on account of its
capability (of being so designated).

It has been asserted, under the preceding Sûtra, that the term 'the
Undeveloped' signifies, on account of the general subject-matter and
because the body only remains, the body and not the pradhâna of the
Sâ@nkhyas.--But here the following doubt arises: How can the word
'undeveloped' appropriately denote the body which, as a gross and
clearly appearing thing, should rather be called vyakta, i.e. that which
is developed or manifested?

To this doubt the Sûtra replies that what the term avyakta denotes is
the subtle causal body. Anything subtle may be spoken of as Undeveloped.
The gross body indeed cannot directly be termed 'undeveloped,' but the
subtle parts of the elements from which the gross body originates may be
called so, and that the term denoting the causal substance is applied to
the effect also is a matter of common occurrence; compare, for instance,
the phrase 'mix the Soma with cows, i.e. milk' (/Ri/g-veda. S. IX, 46,
4). Another scriptural passage also--'now all this was then undeveloped'
(B/ri/. Up. I, 4, 7)--shows that this, i.e. this developed world with
its distinction of names and forms, is capable of being termed
undeveloped in so far as in a former condition it was in a merely
seminal or potential state, devoid of the later evolved distinctions of
name and form.

3. (Such a previous seminal condition of the world may be admitted) on
account of its dependency on him (the Lord); (for such an admission is)
according to reason.

Here a new objection is raised.--If, the opponent says, in order to
prove the possibility of the body being called undeveloped you admit
that this world in its antecedent seminal condition before either names
or forms are evolved can be called undeveloped, you virtually concede
the doctrine that the pradhâna is the cause of the world. For we
Sâ@nkhyas understand by the term pradhâna nothing but that antecedent
condition of the world.

Things lie differently, we rejoin. If we admitted some antecedent state
of the world as the independent cause of the actual world, we should
indeed implicitly, admit the pradhâna doctrine. What we admit is,
however, only a previous state dependent on the highest Lord, not an
independent state. A previous stage of the world such as the one assumed
by us must necessarily be admitted, since it is according to sense and
reason. For without it the highest Lord could not be conceived as
creator, as he could not become active if he were destitute of the
potentiality of action. The existence of such a causal potentiality
renders it moreover possible that the released souls should not enter on
new courses of existence, as it is destroyed by perfect knowledge. For
that causal potentiality is of the nature of Nescience; it is rightly
denoted by the term 'undeveloped;' it has the highest Lord for its
substratum; it is of the nature of an illusion; it is a universal sleep
in which are lying the transmigrating souls destitute for the time of
the consciousness of their individual character.[230] This undeveloped
principle is sometimes denoted by the term âkâ/s/a, ether; so, for
instance, in the passage, 'In that Imperishable then, O Gârgî, the ether
is woven like warp and woof' (B/ri/. Up. III, 8, 11). Sometimes, again,
it is denoted by the term akshara, the Imperishable; so, for instance
(Mu. Up. II, 1, 2), 'Higher, than the high Imperishable.' Sometimes it
is spoken of as Mâyâ, illusion; so, for instance (/S/ve. Up. IV, 10),
'Know then Prak/ri/ti is Mâyâ, and the great Lord he who is affected
with Mâyâ.' For Mâyâ is properly called undeveloped or non-manifested
since it cannot be defined either as that which is or that which is
not.--The statement of the Kâ/th/aka that 'the Undeveloped is beyond the
Great one' is based on the fact of the Great one originating from the
Undeveloped, if the Great one be the intellect of Hira/n/yagarbha. If,
on the other hand, we understand by the Great one the individual soul,
the statement is founded on the fact of the existence of the individual
soul depending on the Undeveloped, i.e. Nescience. For the continued
existence of the individual soul as such is altogether owing to the
relation in which it stands to Nescience. The quality of being beyond
the Great one which in the first place belongs to the Undeveloped, i.e.
Nescience, is attributed to the body which is the product of Nescience,
the cause and the effect being considered as identical. Although the
senses, &c. are no less products of Nescience, the term 'the
Undeveloped' here refers to the body only, the senses, &c. having
already been specially mentioned by their individual names, and the body
alone being left.--Other interpreters of the two last Sûtras give a
somewhat different explanation[231].--There are, they say, two kinds of
body, the gross one and the subtle one. The gross body is the one which
is perceived; the nature of the subtle one will be explained later on.
(Ved. Sû. III, 1, 1.) Both these bodies together were in the simile
compared to the chariot; but here (in the passage under discussion) only
the subtle body is referred to as the Undeveloped, since the subtle body
only is capable of being denoted by that term. And as the soul's passing
through bondage and release depends on the subtle body, the latter is
said to be beyond the soul, like the things (arthavat), i.e. just as the
objects are said to be beyond the senses because the activity of the
latter depends on the objects.--But how--we ask interpreters--is it
possible that the word 'Undeveloped' should refer to the subtle body
only, while, according to your opinion, both bodies had in the simile
been represented as a chariot, and so equally constitute part of the
topic of the chapter, and equally remain (to be mentioned in the passage
under discussion)?--If you should rejoin that you are authorised to
settle the meaning of what the text actually mentions, but not to find
fault with what is not mentioned, and that the word avyakta which occurs
in the text can denote only the subtle body, but not the gross body
which is vyakta, i.e. developed or manifest; we invalidate this
rejoinder by remarking that the determination of the sense depends on
the circumstance of the passages interpreted constituting a syntactical
whole. For if the earlier and the later passage do not form a whole they
convey no sense, since that involves the abandonment of the subject
started and the taking up of a new subject. But syntactical unity cannot
be established unless it be on the ground of there being a want of a
complementary part of speech or sentence. If you therefore construe the
connexion of the passages without having regard to the fact that the
latter passage demands as its complement that both bodies (which had
been spoken of in the former passage) should be understood as referred
to, you destroy all syntactical unity and so incapacitate yourselves
from arriving at the true meaning of the text. Nor must you think that
the second passage occupies itself with the subtle body only, for that
reason that the latter is not easily distinguished from the Self, while
the gross body is easily so distinguished on account of its readily
perceived loathsomeness. For the passage does not by any means refer to
such a distinction--as we conclude from the circumstance of there being
no verb enjoining it--but has for its only subject the highest place of
Vish/n/u, which had been mentioned immediately before. For after having
enumerated a series of things in which the subsequent one is always
superior to the one preceding it, it concludes by saying that nothing is
beyond the Person.--We might, however, accept the interpretation just
discussed without damaging our general argumentation; for whichever
explanation we receive, so much remains clear that the Kâ/th/aka passage
does not refer to the pradhâna.

4. And (the pradhâna cannot be meant) because there is no statement as
to (the avyakta) being something to be cognised.

The Sâ@nkhyas, moreover, represent the pradhâna as something to be
cognised in so far as they say that from the knowledge of the difference
of the constitutive elements of the pradhâna and of the soul there
results the desired isolation of the soul. For without a knowledge of
the nature of those constitutive elements it is impossible to cognise
the difference of the soul from them. And somewhere they teach that the
pradhâna is to be cognised by him who wishes to attain special
powers.--Now in the passage under discussion the avyakta is not
mentioned as an object of knowledge; we there meet with the mere word
avyakta, and there is no sentence intimating that the avyakta is to be
known or meditated upon. And it is impossible to maintain that a
knowledge of things which (knowledge) is not taught in the text is of
any advantage to man.--For this reason also we maintain that the word
avyakta cannot denote the pradhâna.--Our interpretation, on the other
hand, is unobjectionable, since according to it the passage mentions the
body (not as an object of knowledge, but merely) for the purpose of
throwing light on the highest place of Vish/n/u, in continuation of the
simile in which the body had been compared to a chariot.

5. And if you maintain that the text does speak (of the pradhâna as an
object of knowledge) we deny that; for the intelligent (highest) Self is
meant, on account of the general subject-matter.

Here the Sâ@nkhya raises a new objection, and maintains that the
averment made in the last Sûtra is not proved, since the text later on
speaks of the pradhâna--which had been referred to as the
Undeveloped--as an object of knowledge. 'He who has perceived that which
is without sound, without touch, without form, without decay, without
taste, eternal, without smell, without beginning, without end, beyond
the great and unchangeable, is freed from the jaws of death' (Ka. Up.
II, 3, 15). For here the text speaks of the pradhâna, which is beyond
the great, describing it as possessing the same qualities which the
Sâ@nkhya-sm/ri/ti ascribes to it, and designating it as the object of
perception. Hence we conclude that the pradhâna is denoted by the term
avyakta.

To this we reply that the passage last quoted does represent as the
object of perception not the pradhâna but the intelligent, i.e. the
highest Self. We conclude this from the general subject-matter. For that
the highest Self continues to form the subject-matter is clear from the
following reasons. In the first place, it is referred to in the passage,
'Beyond the person there is nothing, this is the goal, the highest
Road;' it has further to be supplied as the object of knowledge in the
passage, 'The Self is hidden in all beings and does not shine forth,'
because it is there spoken of as difficult to know; after that the
restraint of passion, &c. is enjoined as conducive to its cognition, in
the passage, 'A wise man should keep down speech within the mind;' and,
finally, release from the jaws of death is declared to be the fruit of
its knowledge. The Sâ@nkhyas, on the other hand, do not suppose that a
man is freed from the jaws of death merely by perceiving the pradhâna,
but connect that result rather with the cognition of the intelligent
Self.--The highest Self is, moreover, spoken of in all Vedânta-texts as
possessing just those qualities which are mentioned in the passage
quoted above, viz. absence of sound, and the like. Hence it follows,
that the pradhâna is in the text neither spoken of as the object of
knowledge nor denoted by the term avyakta.

6. And there is question and explanation relative to three things only
(not to the pradhâna).

To the same conclusion we are led by the consideration of the
circumstance that the Ka/th/avallî-upanishad brings forward, as subjects
of discussion, only three things, viz. the fire sacrifice, the
individual soul, and the highest Self. These three things only Yama
explains, bestowing thereby the boons he had granted, and to them only
the questions of Na/k/iketas refer. Nothing else is mentioned or
enquired about. The question relative to the fire sacrifice is contained
in the passage (Ka. Up. I, 1, 13), 'Thou knowest, O Death, the fire
sacrifice which leads us to Heaven; tell it to me, who am full of
faith.' The question as to the individual soul is contained in I, 1, 20,
'There is that doubt when a man is dead, some saying, he is; others, he
is not. This I should like to know, taught by thee; this is the third of
my boons.' And the question about the highest Self is asked in the
passage (I, 2, 14), 'That which thou seest as neither this nor that, as
neither effect nor cause, as neither past nor future, tell me
that.'--The corresponding answers are given in I, 1, 15, 'Yama then told
him that fire sacrifice, the beginning of all the worlds, and what
bricks are required for the altar, and how many;' in the passage met
with considerably later on (II, 5, 6; 7), 'Well then, O Gautama, I shall
tell thee this mystery, the old Brahman and what happens to the Self
after reaching death. Some enter the womb in order to have a body as
organic beings, others go into inorganic matter according to their work
and according to their knowledge;' and in the passage (I, 2, 18), 'The
knowing Self is not born nor does it die,' &c.; which latter passage
dilates at length on the highest Self. But there is no question relative
to the pradhâna, and hence no opportunity for any remarks on it.

Here the Sâ@nkhya advances a new objection. Is, he asks, the question
relative to the Self which is asked in the passage, 'There is that doubt
when a man is dead,' &c., again resumed in the passage, 'That which thou
seest as neither this nor that,' &c, or does the latter passage raise a
distinct new question? If the former, the two questions about the Self
coalesce into one, and there are therefore altogether two questions
only, one relative to the fire sacrifice, the other relative to the
Self. In that case the Sûtra has no right to speak of questions and
explanations relating to three subjects.--If the latter, you do not
consider it a mistake to assume a question in excess of the number of
boons granted, and can therefore not object to us if we assume an
explanation about the pradhâna in excess of the number of questions
asked.

To this we make the following reply.--We by no means assume a question
in excess of the number of boons granted, being prevented from doing so
by the influence of the opening part of that syntactical whole which
constitutes the Ka/th/avallî-upanishad. The Upanishad starts with the
topic of the boons granted by Yama, and all the following part of the
Upanishad--which is thrown into the form of a colloquy of Yama and
Na/k/iketas--carries on that topic up to the very end. Yama grants to
Na/k/iketas, who had been sent by his father, three boons. For his first
boon Na/k/iketas chooses kindness on the part of his father towards him,
for his second boon the knowledge of the fire sacrifice, for his third
boon the knowledge of the Self. That the knowledge of the Self is the
third boon appears from the indication contained in the passage (I, 1,
20), 'There is that doubt--; this is the third of my boons.'--If we
therefore supposed that the passage, 'That which thou seest as neither
this nor that,' &c., raises a new question, we should thereby assume a
question in excess of the number of boons granted, and thus destroy the
connexion of the entire Upanishad.--But--the Sâ@nkhya will perhaps
interpose--it must needs be admitted that the passage last quoted does
raise a new question, because the subject enquired about is a new one.
For the former question refers to the individual soul, as we conclude
from the doubt expressed in the words, 'There is that doubt when a man
is dead--some saying, he is; others, he is not.' Now this individual
soul, as having definite attributes, &c., cannot constitute the object
of a question expressed in such terms as, 'This which thou seest as
neither this nor that,' &c.; the highest Self, on the other hand, may be
enquired about in such terms, since it is above all attributes. The
appearance of the two questions is, moreover, seen to differ; for the
former question refers to existence and non-existence, while the latter
is concerned with an entity raised above all definite attributes, &c.
Hence we conclude that the latter question, in which the former one
cannot be recognised, is a separate question, and does not merely resume
the subject of the former one.--All this argumentation is not valid, we
reply, since we maintain the unity of the highest Self and the
individual Self. If the individual Self were different from the highest
Self, we should have to declare that the two questions are separate
independent questions, but the two are not really different, as we know
from other scriptural passages, such as 'Thou art that.' And in the
Upanishad under discussion also the answer to the question, 'That which
thou seest as neither this nor that,' viz. the passage, 'The knowing
Self is not born, it dies not'--which answer is given in the form of a
denial of the birth and death of the Self-clearly shows that the
embodied Self and the highest Self are non-different. For there is room
for a denial of something only when that something is possible, and the
possibility of birth and death exists in the embodied Self only, since
it is connected with the body, but not in the highest Self.--There is,
moreover, another passage conveying the same meaning, viz. II, 4, 4,
'The wise when he knows that that by which he perceives all objects in
sleep or in waking, is the great omnipresent Self, grieves no more.'
This passage makes the cessation of all grief dependent on the knowledge
of the individual Self, in so far as it possesses the qualities of
greatness and omnipresence, and thereby declares that the individual
Self is not different from the highest Self. For that the cessation of
all sorrow is consequent on the knowledge of the highest Self, is a
recognised Vedânta tenet.--There is another passage also warning men not
to look on the individual Self and the highest Self as different
entities, viz. II, 4, 10, 'What is here the same is there; and what is
there the same is here. He who sees any difference here goes from death
to death.'--The following circumstance, too, is worthy of consideration.
When Na/k/iketas has asked the question relating to the existence or
non-existence of the soul after death, Yama tries to induce him to
choose another boon, tempting him with the offer of various objects of
desire. But Na/k/iketas remains firm. Thereupon Death, dwelling on the
distinction of the Good and the Pleasant, and the distinction of wisdom
and ignorance, praises Na/k/iketas, 'I believe Na/k/iketas to be one who
desires knowledge, for even many pleasures did not tear thee away' (I,
2, 4); and later on praises the question asked by Na/k/iketas, 'The wise
who, by means of meditation on his Self, recognises the Ancient who is
difficult to be seen, who has entered into the dark, who is hidden in
the cave, who dwells in the abyss, as God, he indeed leaves joy and
sorrow far behind' (I, 2, 12). Now all this means to intimate that the
individual Self and the highest Self are non-different. For if
Na/k/iketas set aside the question, by asking which he had earned for
himself the praise of Yama, and after having received that praise asked
a new question, all that praise would have been bestowed on him unduly.
Hence it follows that the question implied in I, 2, 14, 'That which thou
seest as neither this nor that,' merely resumes the topic to which the
question in I, 1, 20 had referred.--Nor is there any basis to the
objection that the two questions differ in form. The second question, in
reality, is concerned with the same distinction as the first. The first
enquires about the existence of the soul apart from the body, &c.; the
second refers to the circumstance of that soul not being subject to
sa/m/sâra. For as long as Nescience remains, so long the soul is
affected with definite attributes, &c.; but as soon as Nescience comes
to an end, the soul is one with the highest Self, as is taught by such
scriptural texts as 'Thou art that.' But whether Nescience be active or
inactive, no difference is made thereby in the thing itself (viz. the
soul). A man may, in the dark, mistake a piece of rope lying on the
ground for a snake, and run away from it, frightened and trembling;
thereon another man may tell him, 'Do not be afraid, it is only a rope,
not a snake;' and he may then dismiss the fear caused by the imagined
snake, and stop running. But all the while the presence and subsequent
absence of his erroneous notion, as to the rope being a snake, make no
difference whatever in the rope itself. Exactly analogous is the case of
the individual soul which is in reality one with the highest soul,
although Nescience makes it appear different. Hence the reply contained
in the passage, 'It is not born, it dies not,' is also to be considered
as furnishing an answer to the question asked in I, 1, 20.--The Sûtra is
to be understood with reference to the distinction of the individual
Self and the highest Self which results from Nescience. Although the
question relating to the Self is in reality one only, yet its former
part (I, 1, 20) is seen specially to refer to the individual Self, since
there a doubt is set forth as to the existence of the soul when, at the
time of death, it frees itself from the body, and since the specific
marks of the sa/m/sâra-state, such as activity, &c. are not denied;
while the latter part of the question (I, 2, 14), where the state of
being beyond all attributes is spoken of, clearly refers to the highest
Self.--For these reasons the Sûtra is right in assuming three topics of
question and explanation, viz. the fire sacrifice, the individual soul,
and the highest Self. Those, on the other hand, who assume that the
pradhâna constitutes a fourth subject discussed in the Upanishad, can
point neither to a boon connected with it, nor to a question, nor to an
answer. Hence the pradhâna hypothesis is clearly inferior to our own.

7. And (the case of the term avyakta) is like that of the term mahat.

While the Sâ@nkhyas employ the term 'the Great one,' to denote the
first-born entity, which is mere existence[232] (? viz. the intellect),
the term has a different meaning in Vedic use. This we see from its
being connected with the Self, &c. in such passages as the following,
'The great Self is beyond the Intellect' (Ka. Up. I, 3, 10); 'The great
omnipresent Self' (Ka. Up. I, 2, 23); 'I know that great person' (/S/ve.
Up. III, 8). We thence conclude that the word avyakta also, where it
occurs in the Veda, cannot denote the pradhâna.--The pradhâna is
therefore a mere thing of inference, and not vouched for by Scripture.

8. (It cannot be maintained that ajâ means the pradhâna) because no
special characteristic is stated; as in the case of the cup.

Here the advocate of the pradhâna comes again forward and maintains that
the absence of scriptural authority for the pradhâna is not yet proved.
For, he says, we have the following mantra (/S/ve. Up. IV, 5), 'There is
one ajâ[233], red, white, and black, producing manifold offspring of the
same nature. There is one aja who loves her and lies by her; there is
another who leaves her after having enjoyed her.'--In this mantra the
words 'red,' 'white,' and 'black' denote the three constituent elements
of the pradhâna. Passion is called red on account of its colouring, i.e.
influencing property; Goodness is called white, because it is of the
nature of Light; Darkness is called black on account of its covering and
obscuring property. The state of equipoise of the three constituent
elements, i.e. the pradhâna, is denoted by the attributes of its parts,
and is therefore called red-white-black. It is further called ajâ, i.e.
unborn, because it is acknowledged to be the fundamental matter out of
which everything springs, not a mere effect.--But has not the word ajâ
the settled meaning of she-goat?--True; but the ordinary meaning of the
word cannot be accepted in this place, because true knowledge forms the
general subject-matter.--That pradhâna produces many creatures
participating in its three constituent elements. One unborn being loves
her and lies by her, i.e. some souls, deluded by ignorance, approach
her, and falsely imagining that they experience pleasure or pain, or are
in a state of dulness, pass through the course of transmigratory
existence. Other souls, again, which have attained to discriminative
knowledge, lose their attachment to prak/ri/ti, and leave her after
having enjoyed her, i.e. after she has afforded to them enjoyment and
release.--On the ground of this passage, as interpreted above, the
followers of Kapila claim the authority of Scripture for their pradhâna
hypothesis.

To this argumentation we reply, that the quoted mantra by no means
proves the Sâ@nkhya doctrine to be based on Scripture. That mantra,
taken by itself, is not able to give additional strength to any
doctrine. For, by means of some supposition or other, the terms ajâ, &c.
can be reconciled with any doctrine, and there is no reason for the
special assertion that the Sâ@nkhya doctrine only is meant. The case is
analogous to that of the cup mentioned in the mantra, 'There is a cup
having its mouth below and its bottom above' (B/ri/. Up. II, 2, 3). Just
as it is impossible to decide on the ground of this mantra taken by
itself what special cup is meant--it being possible to ascribe, somehow
or other, the quality of the mouth being turned downward to any cup--so
here also there is no special quality stated, so that it is not possible
to decide from the mantra itself whether the pradhâna is meant by the
term ajâ, or something else.--But in connexion with the mantra about the
cup we have a supplementary passage from which we learn what kind of cup
is meant, 'What is called the cup having its mouth below and its bottom
above is this head.'--Whence, however, can we learn what special being
is meant by the ajâ of the /S/vetâ/s/vatara-upanishad?--To this question
the next Sûtra replies.

9. But the (elements) beginning with light (are meant by the term ajâ);
for some read so in their text.

By the term ajâ we have to understand the causal matter of the four
classes of beings, which matter has sprung from the highest Lord and
begins with light, i.e. comprises fire, water, and earth.--The word
'but' (in the Sûtra) gives emphasis to the assertion.--This ajâ is to be
considered as comprising three elementary substances, not as consisting
of three gu/n/as in the Sâ@nkhya sense. We draw this conclusion from the
fact that one /s/âkhâ, after having related how fire, water, and earth
sprang from the highest Lord, assigns to them red colour, and so on.
'The red colour of burning fire (agni) is the colour of the elementary
fire (tejas), its white colour is the colour of water, its black
colour the colour of earth,' &c. Now those three elements--fire, water,
and earth--we recognise in the /S/vetâ/s/vatara passage, as the words
red, white, and black are common to both passages, and as these words
primarily denote special colours and can be applied to the Sâ@nkhya
gu/n/as in a secondary sense only. That passages whose sense is beyond
doubt are to be used for the interpretation of doubtful passages, is a
generally acknowledged rule. As we therefore find that in the
/S/vetâ/s/vatara--after the general topic has been started in I, 1, 'The
Brahman-students say, Is Brahman the cause?'--the text, previous to the
passage under discussion, speaks of a power of the highest Lord which
arranges the whole world ('the Sages devoted to meditation and
concentration have seen the power belonging to God himself, hidden in
its own qualities'); and as further that same power is referred to in
two subsequent complementary passages ('Know then, Prak/ri/ti is Mâyâ,
and the great Lord he who is affected with Mâyâ;' 'who being one only
rules over every germ;' IV, 10, 11); it cannot possibly be asserted that
the mantra treating of the ajâ refers to some independent causal matter
called pradhâna. We rather assert, on the ground of the general
subject-matter, that the mantra describes the same divine power referred
to in the other passages, in which names and forms lie unevolved, and
which we assume as the antecedent condition of that state of the world
in which names and forms are evolved. And that divine power is
represented as three-coloured, because its products, viz. fire, water,
and earth, have three distinct colours.--But how can we maintain, on the
ground of fire, water, and earth having three colours, that the causal
matter is appropriately called a three-coloured ajâ? if we consider, on
the one hand, that the exterior form of the genus ajâ (i.e. goat) does
not inhere in fire, water, and earth; and, on the other hand, that
Scripture teaches fire, water, and earth to have been produced, so that
the word ajâ cannot be taken in the sense 'non-produced[234].'--To this
question the next Sûtra replies.

10. And on account of the statement of the assumption (of a metaphor)
there is nothing contrary to reason (in ajâ denoting the causal matter);
just as in the case of honey (denoting the sun) and similar cases.

The word ajâ neither expresses that fire, water, and earth belong to the
goat species, nor is it to be explained as meaning 'unborn;' it rather
expresses an assumption, i.e. it intimates the assumption of the source
of all beings (which source comprises fire, water, and earth), being
compared to a she-goat. For as accidentally some she-goat might be
partly red, partly white, partly black, and might have many young goats
resembling her in colour, and as some he-goat might love her and lie by
her, while some other he-goat might leave her after having enjoyed her;
so the universal causal matter which is tri-coloured, because comprising
fire, water, and earth, produces many inanimate and animate beings
similar to itself, and is enjoyed by the souls fettered by Nescience,
while it is abandoned by those souls which have attained true
knowledge.--Nor must we imagine that the distinction of individual
souls, which is implied in the preceding explanation, involves that
reality of the multiplicity of souls which forms one of the tenets of
other philosophical schools. For the purport of the passage is to
intimate, not the multiplicity of souls, but the distinction of the
states of bondage and release. This latter distinction is explained with
reference to the multiplicity of souls as ordinarily conceived; that
multiplicity, however, depends altogether on limiting adjuncts, and is
the unreal product of wrong knowledge merely; as we know from scriptural
passages such as, 'He is the one God hidden in all beings,
all-pervading, the Self in all beings,' &c.--The words 'like the honey'
(in the Sûtra) mean that just as the sun, although not being honey, is
represented as honey (Ch. Up. III, 1), and speech as a cow (B/ri/. Up.
V, 8), and the heavenly world, &c. as the fires (B/ri/. Up. VI, 2, 9),
so here the causal matter, although not being a she-goat, is
metaphorically represented as one. There is therefore nothing contrary
to reason in the circumstance of the term ajâ being used to denote the
aggregate of fire, water, and earth.

11. (The assertion that there is scriptural authority for the pradhâna,
&c. can) also not (be based) on the mention of the number (of the
Sankhya categories), on account of the diversity (of the categories) and
on account of the excess (over the number of those categories).

The attempt to base the Sâ@nkhya doctrine on the mantra speaking of the
ajâ having failed, the Sâ@nkhya again comes forward and points to
another mantra: 'He in whom the five "five-people" and the ether rest,
him alone I believe to be the Self; I who know believe him to be
Brahman' (B/ri/. Up. IV, 4, 17). In this mantra we have one word which
expresses the number five, viz. the five-people, and then another word,
viz. five, which qualifies the former; these two words together
therefore convey the idea of five pentads, i.e. twenty-five. Now as many
beings as the number twenty-five presupposes, just so many categories
the Sânkhya system counts. Cp. Sâ@nkhya Kârikâ, 3: 'The fundamental
causal substance (i.e. the pradhâna) is not an effect. Seven
(substances), viz. the Great one (Intellect), and so on, are causal
substances as well as effects. Sixteen are effects. The soul is neither
a causal substance nor an effect.' As therefore the number twenty-five,
which occurs in the scriptural passage quoted, clearly refers to the
twenty-five categories taught in the Sâ@nkhya-sm/ri/ti, it follows that
the doctrine of the pradhâna, &c. rests on a scriptural basis.

To this reasoning we make the following reply.--It is impossible to base
the assertion that the pradhâna, &c. have Scripture in their favour on
the reference to their number which you pretend to find in the text, 'on
account of the diversity of the Sâ@nkhya categories.' The Sâ@nkhya
categories have each their individual difference, and there are no
attributes belonging in common to each pentad on account of which the
number twenty-five could be divided into five times five. For a number
of individually separate things can, in general, not be combined into
smaller groups of two or three, &c. unless there be a special reason for
such combination.--Here the Sâ@nkhya will perhaps rejoin that the
expression five (times) five is used only to denote the number
twenty-five which has five pentads for its constituent parts; just as
the poem says, 'five years and seven Indra did not rain,' meaning only
that there was no rain for twelve years.--But this explanation also is
not tenable. In the first place, it is liable to the objection that it
has recourse to indirect indication.[235] In the second place, the
second 'five' constitutes a compound with the word 'people,' the
Brâhma/n/a-accent showing that the two form one word only.[236] To the
same conclusion we are led by another passage also (Taitt. Sa/m/h. I, 6,
2, 2, pa/ñk/ânâ/m/ tvâ pa/ñk/ajanânâm, &c.) where the two terms
constitute one word, have one accent and one case-termination. The word
thus being a compound there is neither a repetition of the word 'five,'
involving two pentads, nor does the one five qualify the other, as the
mere secondary member of a compound cannot be qualified by another
word.--But as the people are already denoted to be five by the compound
'five-people,' the effect of the other 'five' qualifying the compound
will be that we understand twenty-five people to be meant; just as the
expression 'five five-bundles' (pa/ñk/a pa/ñk/apulya/h/) conveys the
idea of twenty-five bundles.--The instance is not an analogous one, we
reply. The word 'pa/ñk/apûli' denotes a unity (i.e. one bundle made up
of five bundles) and hence when the question arises, 'How many such
bundles are there?' it can be qualified by the word 'five,' indicating
that there are five such bundles. The word pa/ñk/ajanâ/h/, on the other
hand, conveys at once the idea of distinction (i.e. of five distinct
things), so that there is no room at all for a further desire to know
how many people there are, and hence no room for a further
qualification. And if the word 'five' be taken as a qualifying word it
can only qualify the numeral five (in five-people); the objection
against which assumption has already been stated.--For all these reasons
the expression the five five-people cannot denote the twenty-five
categories of the Sâ@nkhyas.--This is further not possible 'on account
of the excess.' For on the Sâ@nkhya interpretation there would be an
excess over the number twenty-five, owing to the circumstance of the
ether and the Self being mentioned separately. The Self is spoken of as
the abode in which the five five-people rest, the clause 'Him I believe
to be the Self' being connected with the 'in whom' of the antecedent
clause. Now the Self is the intelligent soul of the Sâ@nkhyas which is
already included in the twenty-five categories, and which therefore, on
their interpretation of the passage, would here be mentioned once as
constituting the abode and once as what rests in the abode! If, on the
other hand, the soul were supposed not to be compiled in the twenty-five
categories, the Sâ@nkhya would thereby abandon his own doctrine of the
categories being twenty-five. The same remarks apply to the separate
mention made of the ether.--How, finally, can the mere circumstance of a
certain number being referred to in the sacred text justify the
assumption that what is meant are the twenty-five Sâ@nkhya categories of
which Scripture speaks in no other place? especially if we consider that
the word jana has not the settled meaning of category, and that the
number may be satisfactorily accounted for on another interpretation of
the passage.

How, then, the Sâ@nkhya will ask, do you interpret the phrase 'the five
five-people?'--On the ground, we reply, of the rule Pâ/n/ini II, 1, 50,
according to which certain compounds formed with numerals are mere
names. The word pa/ñk/ajanâ/h/ thus is not meant to convey the idea of
the number five, but merely to denote certain classes of beings. Hence
the question may present itself, How many such classes are there? and to
this question an answer is given by the added numeral 'five.' There are
certain classes of beings called five-people, and these classes are
five. Analogously we may speak of the seven seven-/ri/shis, where again
the compound denotes a class of beings merely, not their number.--Who
then are those five-people?--To this question the next Sûtra replies.

12. (The pa/ñk/ajanâ/h/ are) the breath and so on, (as is seen) from the
complementary passage.

The mantra in which the pa/ñk/ajanâ/h/ are mentioned is followed by
another one in which breath and four other things are mentioned for the
purpose of describing the nature of Brahman. 'They who know the breath
of breath, the eye of the eye, the ear of the ear, the food of food, the
mind of mind[237].' Hence we conclude, on the ground of proximity, that
the five-people are the beings mentioned in this latter mantra.--But
how, the Sâ@nkhya asks, can the word 'people' be applied to the breath,
the eye, the ear, and so on?--How, we ask in return, can it be applied
to your categories? In both cases the common meaning of the word
'people' has to be disregarded; but in favour of our explanation is the
fact that the breath, the eye, and so on, are mentioned in a
complementary passage. The breath, the eye, &c. may be denoted by the
word 'people' because they are connected with people. Moreover, we find
the word 'person,' which means as much as 'people,' applied to the
prâ/n/as in the passage, 'These are the five persons of Brahman' (Ch.
Up. III, 13, 6); and another passage runs, 'Breath is father, breath is
mother,' &c. (Ch. Up. VII, 15, 1). And, owing to the force of
composition, there is no objection to the compound being taken in its
settled conventional meaning[238].--But how can the conventional meaning
be had recourse to, if there is no previous use of the word in that
meaning?--That may be done, we reply, just as in the case of udbhid and
similar words[239]. We often infer that a word of unknown meaning refers
to some known thing because it is used in connexion with the latter. So,
for instance, in the case of the following words: 'He is to sacrifice
with the udbhid; he cuts the yûpa; he makes the vedi.' Analogously we
conclude that the term pa/ñk/ajanâ/h/, which, from the grammatical rule
quoted, is known to be a name, and which therefore demands a thing of
which it is the name, denotes the breath, the eye, and so on, which are
connected with it through their being mentioned in a complementary
passage.--Some commentators explain the word pa/ñk/ajanâ/h/ to mean the
Gods, the Fathers, the Gandharvas, the Asuras, and the Rakshas. Others,
again, think that the four castes together with the Nishâdas are meant.
Again, some scriptural passage (/Ri/g-veda Sa/m/h. VIII, 53, 7) speaks
of the tribe of 'the five-people,' meaning thereby the created beings in
general; and this latter explanation also might be applied to the
passage under discussion. The teacher (the Sûtrakâra), on the other
hand, aiming at showing that the passage does not refer to the
twenty-five categories of the Sâ@nkhyas, declares that on the ground of
the complementary passage breath, &c. have to be understood.

Well, let it then be granted that the five-people mentioned in the
Mâdhyandina-text are breath, &c. since that text mentions food also (and
so makes up the number five). But how shall we interpret the
Kâ/n/va-text which does not mention food (and thus altogether speaks of
four things only)?--To this question the next Sûtra replies.

13. In the case of (the text of) some (the Kâ/n/vas) where food is not
mentioned, (the number five is made full) by the light (mentioned in the
preceding mantra).

The Kâ/n/va-text, although not mentioning food, makes up the full number
five, by the light mentioned in the mantra preceding that in which the
five-people are spoken of. That mantra describes the nature of Brahman
by saying, 'Him the gods worship as the light of lights.'--If it be
asked how it is accounted for that the light mentioned in both texts
equally is in one text to be employed for the explanation of the
five-people, and not in the other text; we reply that the reason lies in
the difference of the requirements. As the Mâdhyandinas meet in one and
the same mantra with breath and four other entities enabling them to
interpret the term, 'the five-people,' they are in no need of the light
mentioned in another mantra. The Kâ/n/vas, on the other hand, cannot do
without the light. The case is analogous to that of the
Sho/d/a/s/in-cup, which, according to different passages, is either to
be offered or not to be offered at the atirâtra-sacrifice.

We have proved herewith that Scripture offers no basis for the doctrine
of the pradhâna. That this doctrine cannot be proved either by Sm/ri/ti
or by ratiocination will be shown later on.

14. (Although there is a conflict of the Vedânta-passages with regard to
the things created, such as) ether and so on; (there is no such conflict
with regard to the Lord) on account of his being represented (in one
passage) as described (in other passages), viz. as the cause (of the
world).

In the preceding part of the work the right definition of Brahman has
been established; it has been shown that all the Vedânta-texts have
Brahman for their common topic; and it has been proved that there is no
scriptural authority for the doctrine of the pradhâna.--But now a new
objection presents itself.

It is not possible--our opponent says--to prove either that Brahman is
the cause of the origin, &c. of the world, or that all Vedânta-texts
refer to Brahman; because we observe that the Vedânta-texts contradict
one another. All the Vedânta-passages which treat of the creation
enumerate its successive steps in different order, and so in reality
speak of different creations. In one place it is said that from the Self
there sprang the ether (Taitt. Up. II, 1); in another place that the
creation began with fire (Ch. Up. VI, 2, 3); in another place, again,
that the Person created breath and from breath faith (Pr. Up. VI, 4); in
another place, again, that the Self created these worlds, the water
(above the heaven), light, the mortal (earth), and the water (below the
earth) (Ait. Âr. II, 4, 1, 2; 3). There no order is stated at all.
Somewhere else it is said that the creation originated from the
Non-existent. 'In the beginning this was non-existent; from it was born
what exists' (Taitt. Up. II, 7); and, 'In the beginning this was
non-existent; it became existent; it grew' (Ch. Up. III, 19, 1). In
another place, again, the doctrine of the Non-existent being the
antecedent of the creation is impugned, and the Existent mentioned in
its stead. 'Others say, in the beginning there was that only which is
not; but how could it be thus, my dear? How could that which is be born
of that which is not?' (Ch. Up. VI, 2, 1; 2.) And in another place,
again, the development of the world is spoken of as having taken place
spontaneously, 'Now all this was then undeveloped. It became developed
by form and name' (B/ri/. Up. I, 4, 7).--As therefore manifold
discrepancies are observed, and as no option is possible in the case of
an accomplished matter[240], the Vedânta-passages cannot be accepted as
authorities for determining the cause of the world, but we must rather
accept some other cause of the world resting on the authority of
Sm/ri/ti and Reasoning.

To this we make the following reply.--Although the Vedânta-passages may
be conflicting with regard to the order of the things created, such as
ether and so on, they do not conflict with regard to the creator, 'on
account of his being represented as described.' That means: such as the
creator is described in any one Vedânta-passage, viz. as all-knowing,
the Lord of all, the Self of all, without a second, so he is represented
in all other Vedânta-passages also. Let us consider, for instance, the
description of Brahman (given in Taitt. Up. II, 1 ff.). There it is said
at first, 'Truth, knowledge, infinite is Brahman.' Here the word
'knowledge,' and so likewise the statement, made later on, that Brahman
desired (II, 6), intimate that Brahman is of the nature of intelligence.
Further, the text declares[241] that the cause of the world is the
general Lord, by representing it as not dependent on anything else. It
further applies to the cause of the world the term 'Self' (II, 1), and
it represents it as abiding within the series of sheaths beginning with
the gross body; whereby it affirms it to be the internal Self within all
beings. Again--in the passage, 'May I be many, may I grow forth'--it
tells how the Self became many, and thereby declares that the creator is
non-different from the created effects. And--in the passage, 'He created
all this whatever there is'--it represents the creator as the Cause of
the entire world, and thereby declares him to have been without a second
previously to the creation. The same characteristics which in the above
passages are predicated of Brahman, viewed as the Cause of the world, we
find to be predicated of it in other passages also, so, for instance,
'Being only, my dear, was this in the beginning, one only, without a
second. It thought, may I be many, may I grow forth. It sent forth fire'
(Ch. Up. VI, 2, 1; 3), and 'In the beginning all this was Self, one
only; there was nothing else blinking whatsoever. He thought, shall I
send forth worlds?' (Ait. Âr. II, 4, 1, 1; 2.) The Vedânta-passages
which are concerned with setting forth the cause of the world are thus
in harmony throughout.--On the other hand, there are found conflicting
statements concerning the world, the creation being in some places said
to begin with ether, in other places with fire, and so on. But, in the
first place, it cannot be said that the conflict of statements
concerning the world affects the statements concerning the cause, i.e.
Brahman, in which all the Vedânta-texts are seen to agree--for that
would be an altogether unfounded generalization;--and, in the second
place, the teacher will reconcile later on (II, 3) those conflicting
passages also which refer to the world. And, to consider the matter more
thoroughly, a conflict of statements regarding the world would not even
matter greatly, since the creation of the world and similar topics are
not at all what Scripture wishes to teach. For we neither observe nor
are told by Scripture that the welfare of man depends on those matters
in any way; nor have we the right to assume such a thing; because we
conclude from the introductory and concluding clauses that the passages
about the creation and the like form only subordinate members of
passages treating of Brahman. That all the passages setting forth the
creation and so on subserve the purpose of teaching Brahman, Scripture
itself declares; compare Ch. Up. VI, 8, 4, 'As food too is an offshoot,
seek after its root, viz. water. And as water too is an offshoot, seek
after its root, viz. fire. And as fire too is an offshoot, seek after
its root, viz. the True.' We, moreover, understand that by means of
comparisons such as that of the clay (Ch. Up. VI, 1, 4) the creation is
described merely for the purpose of teaching us that the effect is not
really different from the cause. Analogously it is said by those who
know the sacred tradition, 'If creation is represented by means of (the
similes of) clay, iron, sparks, and other things; that is only a means
for making it understood that (in reality) there is no difference
whatever' (Gau/d/ap. Kâ. III, 15).--On the other hand, Scripture
expressly states the fruits connected with the knowledge of Brahman, 'He
who knows Brahman obtains the highest' (Taitt. Up. II, 1); 'He who knows
the Self overcomes grief' (Ch. Up. VII, 1, 3); 'A man who knows him
passes over death' (/S/ve. Up. III, 8). That fruit is, moreover,
apprehended by intuition (pratyaksha), for as soon as, by means of the
doctrine, 'That art thou,' a man has arrived at the knowledge that the
Self is non-transmigrating, its transmigrating nature vanishes for him.

It remains to dispose of the assertion that passages such as 'Non-being
this was in the beginning' contain conflicting statements about the
nature of the cause. This is done in the next Sûtra.

15. On account of the connexion (with passages treating of Brahman, the
passages speaking of the Non-being do not intimate absolute
Non-existence).

The passage 'Non-being indeed was this in the beginning' (Taitt. Up. II,
7) does not declare that the cause of the world is the absolutely
Non-existent which is devoid of all Selfhood. For in the preceding
sections of the Upanishad Brahman is distinctly denied to be the
Non-existing, and is defined to be that which is ('He who knows the
Brahman as non-existing becomes himself non-existing. He who knows the
Brahman as existing him we know himself as existing'); it is further, by
means of the series of sheaths, viz. the sheath of food, &c.,
represented as the inner Self of everything. This same Brahman is again
referred to in the clause, 'He wished, may I be many;' is declared to
have originated the entire creation; and is finally referred to in the
clause, 'Therefore the wise call it the true.' Thereupon the text goes
on to say, with reference to what has all along been the topic of
discussion, 'On this there is also this /s/loka, Non-being indeed was
this in the beginning,' &c.--If here the term 'Non-being' denoted the
absolutely Non-existent, the whole context would be broken; for while
ostensibly referring to one matter the passage would in reality treat of
a second altogether different matter. We have therefore to conclude
that, while the term 'Being' ordinarily denotes that which is
differentiated by names and forms, the term 'Non-being' denotes the same
substance previous to its differentiation, i.e. that Brahman is, in a
secondary sense of the word, called Non-being, previously to the
origination of the world. The same interpretation has to be applied to
the passage 'Non-being this was in the beginning' (Ch. Up. III, 19, 1);
for that passage also is connected with another passage which runs, 'It
became being;' whence it is evident that the 'Non-being' of the former
passage cannot mean absolute Non-existence. And in the passage, 'Others
say, Non-being this was in the beginning' (Ch. Up. VI, 2, 1), the
reference to the opinion of 'others' does not mean that the doctrine
referred, to (according to which the world was originally absolutely
non-existent) is propounded somewhere in the Veda; for option is
possible in the case of actions but not in the case of substances. The
passage has therefore to be looked upon as a refutation of the tenet of
primitive absolute non-existence as fancifully propounded by some
teachers of inferior intelligence; a refutation undertaken for the
purpose of strengthening the doctrine that this world has sprung from
that which is.--The following passage again, 'Now this was then
undeveloped,' &c. (B/ri/. Up. I, 4, 7), does not by any means assert
that the evolution of the world took place without a ruler; as we
conclude from the circumstance of its being connected with another
passage in which the ruler is represented as entering into the evolved
world of effects, 'He entered thither to the very tips of the
finger-nails' &c. If it were supposed that the evolution of the world
takes place without a ruler, to whom could the subsequent pronoun 'he'
refer (in the passage last quoted) which manifestly is to be connected
with something previously intimated? And as Scripture declares that the
Self, after having entered into the body, is of the nature of
intelligence ('when seeing, eye by name; when hearing, ear by name; when
thinking, mind by name'), it follows that it is intelligent at the time
of its entering also.--We, moreover, must assume that the world was
evolved at the beginning of the creation in the same way as it is at
present seen to develop itself by names and forms, viz. under the
rulership of an intelligent creator; for we have no right to make
assumptions contrary to what is at present actually observed. Another
scriptural passage also declares that the evolution of the world took
place under the superintendence of a ruler, 'Let me now enter these
beings with this living Self, and let me then evolve names and forms'
(Ch. Up. VI, 3, 2). The intransitive expression 'It developed itself'
(vyâkriyata; it became developed) is to be viewed as having reference to
the ease with which the real agent, viz. the Lord, brought about that
evolution. Analogously it is said, for instance, that 'the cornfield
reaps itself' (i.e. is reaped with the greatest ease), although there is
the reaper sufficient (to account for the work being done).--Or else we
may look on the form vyâkriyata as having reference to a necessarily
implied agent; as is the case in such phrases as 'the village is being
approached' (where we necessarily have to supply 'by Devadatta or
somebody else').

16. (He whose work is this is Brahman), because (the 'work') denotes the
world.

In the Kaushîtaki-brâhma/n/a, in the dialogue of Bâlâki and
Ajàta/s/atru, we read, 'O Bâlâki, he who is the maker of those persons,
he of whom this is the work, he alone is to be known' (Kau. Up. IV, 19).
The question here arises whether what is here inculcated as the object
of knowledge is the individual soul or the chief vital air or the
highest Self.

The pûrvapakshin maintains that the vital air is meant. For, in the
first place, he says, the clause 'of whom this is the work' points to
the activity of motion, and that activity rests on the vital air. In the
second place, we meet with the word 'prâ/n/a' in a complementary passage
('Then he becomes one with that prâ/n/a alone'), and that word is well
known to denote the vital air. In the third place, prâ/n/a is the maker
of all the persons, the person in the sun, the person in the moon, &c.,
who in the preceding part of the dialogue had been enumerated by Bâlâki;
for that the sun and the other divinities are mere differentiations of
prâ/n/a we know from another scriptural passage, viz. 'Who is that one
god (in whom all the other gods are contained)? Prâ/n/a and he is
Brahman, and they call him That' (B/ri/. Up. III, 9, 9).--Or else, the
pûrvapakshin continues, the passage under discussion represents the
individual soul as the object of knowledge. For of the soul also it can
be said that 'this is the work,' if we understand by 'this' all
meritorious and non-meritorious actions; and the soul also, in so far as
it is the enjoyer, can be viewed as the maker of the persons enumerated
in so far as they are instrumental to the soul's fruition. The
complementary passage, moreover, contains an inferential mark of the
individual soul. For Ajâta/s/atru, in order to instruct Bâlâki about the
'maker of the persons' who had been proposed as the object of knowledge,
calls a sleeping man by various names and convinces Bâlâki, by the
circumstance that the sleeper does not hear his shouts, that the prâ/n/a
and so on are not the enjoyers; he thereupon wakes the sleeping man by
pushing him with his stick, and so makes Bâlâki comprehend that the
being capable of fruition is the individual soul which is distinct from
the prâ/n/a. A subsequent passage also contains an inferential mark of
the individual soul, viz. 'And as the master feeds with his people, nay,
as his people feed on the master, thus does this conscious Self feed
with the other Selfs, thus those Selfs feed on the conscious Self' (Kau.
Up. IV, 20). And as the individual soul is the support of the prâ/n/a,
it may itself be called prâ/n/a.--We thus conclude that the passage
under discussion refers either to the individual soul or to the chief
vital air; but not to the Lord, of whom it contains no inferential marks
whatever.

To this we make the following reply.--The Lord only can be the maker of
the persons enumerated, on account of the force of the introductory part
of the section. Bâlâki begins his colloquy with Ajâta/s/atru with the
offer, 'Shall I tell you Brahman?' Thereupon he enumerates some
individual souls residing in the sun, the moon, and so on, which
participate in the sight of the secondary Brahman, and in the end
becomes silent. Ajâta/s/atru then sets aside Bâlâki's doctrine as not
referring to the chief Brahman--with the words, 'Vainly did you
challenge me, saying, Shall I tell you Brahman,' &c.--and proposes the
maker of all those individual souls as a new object of knowledge. If now
that maker also were merely a soul participating in the sight of the
secondary Brahman, the introductory statement which speaks of Brahman
would be futile. Hence it follows that the highest Lord himself is
meant.--None, moreover, but the highest Lord is capable of being the
maker of all those persons as he only is absolutely
independent.--Further, the clause 'of whom this is the work' does not
refer either to the activity of motion nor to meritorious and
non-meritorious actions; for neither of those two is the topic of
discussion or has been mentioned previously. Nor can the term 'work'
denote the enumerated persons, since the latter are mentioned
separately--in the clause, 'He who is the maker of those persons'--and
as inferential marks (viz. the neuter gender and the singular number of
the word karman, work) contradict that assumption. Nor, again, can the
term 'work' denote either the activity whose object the persons are, or
the result of that activity, since those two are already implied in the
mention of the agent (in the clause, 'He who is the maker'). Thus there
remains no other alternative than to take the pronoun 'this' (in 'He of
whom this is the work') as denoting the perceptible world and to
understand the same world--as that which is made--by the term
'work.'--We may indeed admit that the world also is not the previous
topic of discussion and has not been mentioned before; still, as no
specification is mentioned, we conclude that the term 'work' has to be
understood in a general sense, and thus denotes what first presents
itself to the mind, viz. everything which exists in general. It is,
moreover, not true that the world is not the previous topic of
discussion; we are rather entitled to conclude from the circumstance
that the various persons (in the sun, the moon, &c.) which constitute a
part of the world had been specially mentioned before, that the passage
in question is concerned with the whole world in general. The
conjunction 'or' (in 'or he of whom,' &c.) is meant to exclude the idea
of limited makership; so that the whole passage has to be interpreted as
follows, 'He who is the maker of those persons forming a part of the
world, or rather--to do away with this limitation--he of whom this
entire world without any exception is the work.' The special mention
made of the persons having been created has for its purpose to show that
those persons whom Bâlâki had proclaimed to be Brahman are not Brahman.
The passage therefore sets forth the maker of the world in a double
aspect, at first as the creator of a special part of the world and
thereupon as the creator of the whole remaining part of the world; a way
of speaking analogous to such every-day forms of expression as, 'The
wandering mendicants are to be fed, and then the Brâhma/n/as[242].' And
that the maker of the world is the highest Lord is affirmed in all
Vedânta-texts.

17. If it be said that this is not so, on account of the inferential
marks of the individual soul and the chief vital air; we reply that that
has already been explained.

It remains for us to refute the objection that on account of the
inferential marks of the individual soul and the chief vital air, which
are met with in the complementary passage, either the one or the other
must be meant in the passage under discussion, and not the highest
Lord.--We therefore remark that that objection has already been disposed
of under I, 1, 31. There it was shown that from an interpretation
similar to the one here proposed by the pûrvapakshin there would result
a threefold meditation one having Brahman for its object, a second one
directed on the individual soul, and a third one connected with the
chief vital air. Now the same result would present itself in our case,
and that would be unacceptable as we must infer from the introductory as
well as the concluding clauses, that the passage under discussion refers
to Brahman. With reference to the introductory clause this has been
already proved; that the concluding passage also refers to Brahman, we
infer from the fact of there being stated in it a pre-eminently high
reward, 'Warding off all evil he who knows this obtains pre-eminence
among all beings, sovereignty, supremacy.'--But if this is so, the sense
of the passage under discussion is already settled by the discussion of
the passage about Pratarda/n/a (I, 1, 31); why, then, the present
Sûtra?--No, we reply; the sense of our passage is not yet settled, since
under I, 1, 31 it has not been proved that the clause, 'Or he whose work
is this,' refers to Brahman. Hence there arises again, in connexion with
the present passage, a doubt whether the individual soul and the chief
vital air may not be meant, and that doubt has again to be refuted.--The
word prâ/n/a occurs, moreover, in the sense of Brahman, so in the
passage, 'The mind settles down on prâ/n/a' (Ch. Up. VI, 8, 2).--The
inferential marks of the individual soul also have, on account of the
introductory and concluding clauses referring to Brahman, to be
explained so as not to give rise to any discrepancy.

18. But Jaimini thinks that (the reference to the individual soul) has
another purport, on account of the question and answer; and thus some
also (read in their text).

Whether the passage under discussion is concerned with the individual
soul or with Brahman, is, in the opinion of the teacher Jaimini, no
matter for dispute, since the reference to the individual soul has a
different purport, i.e. aims at intimating Brahman. He founds this his
opinion on a question and a reply met with in the text. After
Ajâta/s/atru has taught Bâlâki, by waking the sleeping man, that the
soul is different from the vital air, he asks the following question,
'Bâlâki, where did this person here sleep? Where was he? Whence came he
thus back?' This question clearly refers to something different from the
individual soul. And so likewise does the reply, 'When sleeping he sees
no dream, then he becomes one with that prâ/n/a alone;' and, 'From that
Self all prâ/n/as proceed, each towards its place, from the prâ/n/as the
gods, from the gods the worlds.'--Now it is the general Vedânta doctrine
that at the time of deep sleep the soul becomes one with the highest
Brahman, and that from the highest Brahman the whole world proceeds,
inclusive of prâ/n/a, and so on. When Scripture therefore represents as
the object of knowledge that in which there takes place the deep sleep
of the soul, characterised by absence of consciousness and utter
tranquillity, i.e. a state devoid of all those specific cognitions which
are produced by the limiting adjuncts of the soul, and from which the
soul returns when the sleep is broken; we understand that the highest
Self is meant.--Moreover, the Vâjasaneyi/s/âkhâ, which likewise contains
the colloquy of Bâlâki and Ajâta/s/atru, clearly refers to the
individual soul by means of the term, 'the person consisting of
cognition' (vij/ñ/ânamaya), and distinguishes from it the highest Self
('Where was then the person consisting of cognition? and from whence did
he thus come back?' B/ri/. Up. II, 1, 16); and later on, in the reply to
the above question, declares that 'the person consisting of cognition
lies in the ether within the heart.' Now we know that the word 'ether'
may be used to denote the highest Self, as, for instance, in the passage
about the small ether within the lotus of the heart (Ch. Up. VIII, 1,
1). Further on the B/ri/. Up. says, 'All the Selfs came forth from that
Self;' by which statement of the coming forth of all the conditioned
Selfs it intimates that the highest Self is the one general cause.--The
doctrine conveyed by the rousing of the sleeping person, viz. that the
individual soul is different from the vital air, furnishes at the same
time a further argument against the opinion that the passage under
discussion refers to the vital air.

19. (The Self to be seen, to be heard, &c. is the highest Self) on
account of the connected meaning of the sentences.

We read in the B/ri/hadâra/n/yaka, in the Maitreyî-brâhma/n/a the
following passage, 'Verily, a husband is not dear that you may love the
husband, &c. &c.; verily, everything is not dear that you may love
everything; but that you may love the Self therefore everything is dear.
Verily, the Self is to be seen, to be heard, to be perceived, to be
marked, O Maitreyî! When the Self has been seen, heard, perceived, and
known, then all this is known' (B/ri/. Up. IV, 5, 6).--Here the doubt
arises whether that which is represented as the object to be seen, to be
heard, and so on, is the cognitional Self (the individual soul) or the
highest Self.--But whence the doubt?--Because, we reply, the Self is, on
the one hand, by the mention of dear things such as husband and so on,
indicated as the enjoyer whence it appears that the passage refers to
the individual soul; and because, on the other hand, the declaration
that through the knowledge of the Self everything becomes known points
to the highest Self.

The pûrvapakshin maintains that the passage refers to the individual
soul, on account of the strength of the initial statement. The text
declares at the outset that all the objects of enjoyment found in this
world, such as husband, wife, riches, and so on, are dear on account of
the Self, and thereby gives us to understand that the enjoying (i.e. the
individual) Self is meant; if thereupon it refers to the Self as the
object of sight and so on, what other Self should it mean than the same
individual Self?--A subsequent passage also (viz. 'Thus does this great
Being, endless, unlimited, consisting of nothing but knowledge, rise
from out of these elements, and vanish again after them. When he has
departed there is no more knowledge'), which describes how the great
Being under discussion rises, as the Self of knowledge, from the
elements, shows that the object of sight is no other than the
cognitional Self, i.e. the individual soul. The concluding clause
finally, 'How, O beloved, should he know the knower?' shows, by means of
the term 'knower,' which denotes an agent, that the individual soul is
meant. The declaration that through the cognition of the Self everything
becomes known must therefore not be interpreted in the literal sense,
but must be taken to mean that the world of objects of enjoyment is
known through its relation to the enjoying soul.

To this we make the following reply.--The passage makes a statement
about the highest Self, on account of the connected meaning of the
entire section. If we consider the different passages in their mutual
connexion, we find that they all refer to the highest Self. After
Maitreyî has heard from Yâj/ñ/avalkya that there is no hope of
immortality by wealth, she expresses her desire of immortality in the
words, 'What should I do with that by which I do not become immortal?
What my Lord knoweth tell that to me;' and thereupon Yâj/ñ/avalkya
expounds to her the knowledge of the Self. Now Scripture as well as
Sm/ri/ti declares that immortality is not to be reached but through the
knowledge of the highest Self.--The statement further that through the
knowledge of the Self everything becomes known can be taken in its
direct literal sense only if by the Self we understand the highest
cause. And to take it in a non-literal sense (as the pûrvapakshin
proposes) is inadmissible, on account of the explanation given of that
statement in a subsequent passage, viz. 'Whosoever looks for the Brahman
class elsewhere than in the Self, is abandoned by the Brahman class.'
Here it is said that whoever erroneously views this world with its
Brahmans and so on, as having an independent existence apart from the
Self, is abandoned by that very world of which he has taken an erroneous
view; whereby the view that there exists any difference is refuted. And
the immediately subsequent clause, 'This everything is the Self,' gives
us to understand that the entire aggregate of existing things is
non-different from the Self; a doctrine further confirmed by the similes
of the drum and so on.--By explaining further that the Self about which
he had been speaking is the cause of the universe of names, forms, and
works ('There has been breathed forth from this great Being what we have
as /Ri/gveda,' &c.) Yâj/ñ/avalkya again shows that it is the highest
Self.--To the same conclusion he leads us by declaring, in the paragraph
which treats of the natural centres of things, that the Self is the
centre of the whole world with the objects, the senses and the mind,
that it has neither inside nor outside, that it is altogether a mass of
knowledge.--From all this it follows that what the text represents as
the object of sight and so on is the highest Self.

We now turn to the remark made by the pûrvapakshin that the passage
teaches the individual soul to be the object of sight, because it is, in
the early part of the chapter denoted as something dear.

20. (The circumstance of the soul being represented as the object of
sight) indicates the fulfilment of the promissory statement; so
Â/s/marathya thinks.

The fact that the text proclaims as the object of sight that Self which
is denoted as something, dear indicates the fulfilment of the promise
made in the passages, 'When the Self is known all this is known,' 'All
this is that Self.' For if the individual soul were different from the
highest Self, the knowledge of the latter would not imply the knowledge
of the former, and thus the promise that through the knowledge of one
thing everything is to be known would not be fulfilled. Hence the
initial statement aims at representing the individual Self and the
highest Self as non-different for the purpose of fulfilling the promise
made.--This is the opinion of the teacher Â/s/marathya[243].

21. (The initial statement identifies the individual soul and the
highest Self) because the soul when it will depart (from the body) is
such (i.e. one with the highest Self); thus Au/d/ulomi thinks.

The individual soul which is inquinated by the contact with its
different limiting adjuncts, viz. body, senses, and mind (mano-buddhi),
attains through the instrumentality of knowledge, meditation, and so on,
a state of complete serenity, and thus enables itself, when passing at
some future time out of the body, to become one with the highest Self;
hence the initial statement in which it is represented as non-different
from the highest Self. This is the opinion of the teacher
Au/d/ulomi.--Thus Scripture says, 'That serene being arising from this
body appears in its own form as soon as it has approached the highest
light' (Ch. Up. VIII, 12, 3).--In another place Scripture intimates, by
means of the simile of the rivers, that name and form abide in the
individual soul, 'As the flowing rivers disappear in the sea, having
lost their name and their form, thus a wise man freed from name and form
goes to the divine Person who is greater than the great' (Mu. Up. III,
2, 8). I.e. as the rivers losing the names and forms abiding in them
disappear in the sea, so the individual soul also losing the name and
form abiding in it becomes united with the highest person. That the
latter half of the passage has the meaning here assigned to it, follows
from the parallelism which we must assume to exist between the two
members of the comparison[244].

22. (The initial statement is made) because (the highest Self) exists in
the condition (of the individual soul); so Kâ/s/ak/ri/tsna thinks.

Because the highest Self exists also in the condition of the individual
soul, therefore, the teacher Kâ/s/ak/ri/tsna thinks, the initial
statement which aims at intimating the non-difference of the two is
possible. That the highest Self only is that which appears as the
individual soul, is evident from the Brâhma/n/a-passage, 'Let me enter
into them with this living Self and evolve names and forms,' and similar
passages. We have also mantras to the same effect, for instance, 'The
wise one who, having produced all forms and made all names, sits calling
the things by their names' (Taitt. Âr. III, 12, 7)[245]. And where
Scripture relates the creation of fire and the other elements, it does
not at the same time relate a separate creation of the individual soul;
we have therefore no right to look on the soul as a product of the
highest Self, different from the latter.--In the opinion of the teacher
Kâ/s/ak/ri/tsna the non-modified highest Lord himself is the individual
soul, not anything else. Â/s/marathya, although meaning to say that the
soul is not (absolutely) different from the highest Self, yet intimates
by the expression, 'On account of the fulfilment of the promise'--which
declares a certain mutual dependence--that there does exist a certain
relation of cause and effect between the highest Self and the individual
soul[246]. The opinion of Au/d/ulomi again clearly implies that the
difference and non-difference of the two depend on difference of
condition[247]. Of these three opinions we conclude that the one held by
Kâ/s/ak/ri/tsna accords with Scripture, because it agrees with what all
the Vedânta-texts (so, for instance, the passage, 'That art thou') aim
at inculcating. Only on the opinion of Kâ/s/ak/ri/tsna immortality can
be viewed as the result of the knowledge of the soul; while it would be
impossible to hold the same view if the soul were a modification
(product) of the Self and as such liable to lose its existence by being
merged in its causal substance. For the same reason, name and form
cannot abide in the soul (as was above attempted to prove by means of
the simile of the rivers), but abide in the limiting adjunct and are
ascribed to the soul itself in a figurative sense only. For the same
reason the origin of the souls from the highest Self, of which Scripture
speaks in some places as analogous to the issuing of sparks from the
fire, must be viewed as based only on the limiting adjuncts of the soul.

The last three Sûtras have further to be interpreted so as to furnish
replies to the second of the pûrvapakshin's arguments, viz. that the
B/ri/hadâra/n/yaka passage represents as the object of sight the
individual soul, because it declares that the great Being which is to be
seen arises from out of these elements. 'There is an indication of the
fulfilment of the promise; so Â/s/marathya thinks.' The promise is made
in the two passages, 'When the Self is known, all this is known,' and
'All this is that Self.' That the Self is everything, is proved by the
declaration that the whole world of names, forms, and works springs from
one being, and is merged in one being[248]; and by its being
demonstrated, with the help of the similes of the drum, and so on, that
effect and cause are non-different. The fulfilment of the promise is,
then, finally indicated by the text declaring that that great Being
rises, in the form of the individual soul, from out of these elements;
thus the teacher Â/s/marathya thinks. For if the soul and the highest
Self are non-different, the promise that through the knowledge of one
everything becomes known is capable of fulfilment.--'Because the soul
when it will depart is such; thus Au/d/ulomi thinks.' The statement as
to the non-difference of the soul and the Self (implied in the
declaration that the great Being rises, &c.) is possible, because the
soul when--after having purified itself by knowledge, and so on--it will
depart from the body, is capable of becoming one with the highest Self.
This is Au/d/ulomi's opinion.--'Because it exists in the condition of
the soul; thus Kâ/s/ak/ri/tsna opines.' Because the highest Self itself
is that which appears as the individual soul, the statement as to the
non-difference of the two is well-founded. This is the view of the
teacher Kâ/s/ak/ri/tsna.

But, an objection may be raised, the passage, 'Rising from out of these
elements he vanishes again after them. When he has departed there is no
more knowledge,' intimates the final destruction of the soul, not its
identity with the highest Self!--By no means, we reply. The passage
means to say only that on the soul departing from the body all specific
cognition vanishes, not that the Self is destroyed. For an objection
being raised--in the passage, 'Here thou hast bewildered me, Sir, when
thou sayest that having departed there is no more knowledge'. Scripture
itself explains that what is meant is not the annihilation of the Self,
'I say nothing that is bewildering. Verily, beloved, that Self is
imperishable, and of an indestructible nature. But there takes place
non-connexion with the mâtrâs.' That means: The eternally unchanging
Self, which is one mass of knowledge, cannot possibly perish; but by
means of true knowledge there is effected its dissociation from the
mâtrâs, i.e. the elements and the sense organs, which are the product of
Nescience. When the connexion has been solved, specific cognition, which
depended on it, no longer takes place, and thus it can be said, that
'When he has departed there is no more knowledge.'

The third argument also of the pûrvapakshin, viz. that the word
'knower'--which occurs in the concluding passage, 'How should he know
the knower?'--denotes an agent, and therefore refers to the individual
soul as the object of sight, is to be refuted according to the view of
Kâ/s/ak/ri/tsna.--Moreover, the text after having enumerated--in the
passage, 'For where there is duality as it were, there one sees the
other,' &c.--all the kinds of specific cognition which belong to the
sphere of Nescience declares--in the subsequent passage, 'But when the
Self only is all this, how should he see another?'--that in the sphere
of true knowledge all specific cognition such as seeing, and so on, is
absent. And, again, in order to obviate the doubt whether in the absence
of objects the knower might not know himself, Yâj/ñ/avalkya goes on,
'How, O beloved, should he know himself, the knower?' As thus the latter
passage evidently aims at proving the absence of specific cognition, we
have to conclude that the word 'knower' is here used to denote that
being which is knowledge, i.e. the Self.--That the view of
Kâ/s/ak/ri/tsna is scriptural, we have already shown above. And as it is
so, all the adherents of the Vedânta must admit that the difference of
the soul and the highest Self is not real, but due to the limiting
adjuncts, viz. the body, and so on, which are the product of name and
form as presented by Nescience. That view receives ample confirmation
from Scripture; compare, for instance, 'Being only, my dear, this was in
the beginning, one, without a second' (Ch. Up. VI, 2, 1); 'The Self is
all this' (Ch. Up. VII, 25, 2); 'Brahman alone is all this' (Mu. Up. II,
2, 11); 'This everything is that Self' (B/ri/. Up. II, 4, 6); 'There is
no other seer but he' (B/ri/. Up. III, 7, 23); 'There is nothing that
sees but it' (B/ri/. Up. III, 8, 11).--It is likewise confirmed by
Sm/ri/ti; compare, for instance, 'Vâsudeva is all this' (Bha. Gî. VII,
19); 'Know me, O Bhârata, to be the soul in all bodies' (Bha. Gî. XIII,
2); 'He who sees the highest Lord abiding alike within all creatures'
(Bha. Gî. XIII, 27).--The same conclusion is supported by those passages
which deny all difference; compare, for instance, 'If he thinks, that is
one and I another; he does not know' (B/ri/. Up. I, 4, 10); 'From death
to death he goes who sees here any diversity' (B/ri/. Up. IV, 4, 19).
And, again, by those passages which negative all change on the part of
the Self; compare, for instance, 'This great unborn Self, undecaying,
undying, immortal, fearless is indeed Brahman' (B/ri/. Up. IV,
24).--Moreover, if the doctrine of general identity were not true, those
who are desirous of release could not be in the possession of
irrefutable knowledge, and there would be no possibility of any matter
being well settled; while yet the knowledge of which the Self is the
object is declared to be irrefutable and to satisfy all desire, and
Scripture speaks of those, 'Who have well ascertained the object of the
knowledge of the Vedânta' (Mu. Up. III, 2, 6). Compare also the passage,
'What trouble, what sorrow can there be to him who has once beheld that
unity?' (I/s/. Up. 7.)--And Sm/ri/ti also represents the mind of him who
contemplates the Self as steady (Bha. Gî. II, 54).

As therefore the individual soul and the highest Self differ in name
only, it being a settled matter that perfect knowledge has for its
object the absolute oneness of the two; it is senseless to insist (as
some do) on a plurality of Selfs, and to maintain that the individual
soul is different from the highest Self, and the highest Self from the
individual soul. For the Self is indeed called by many different names,
but it is one only. Nor does the passage, 'He who knows Brahman which is
real, knowledge, infinite, as hidden in the cave' (Taitt. Up. II, 1),
refer to some one cave (different from the abode of the individual
soul)[249]. And that nobody else but Brahman is hidden in the cave we
know from a subsequent passage, viz. 'Having sent forth he entered into
it' (Taitt. Up. II, 6), according to which the creator only entered into
the created beings.--Those who insist on the distinction of the
individual and the highest Self oppose themselves to the true sense of
the Vedânta-texts, stand thereby in the way of perfect knowledge, which
is the door to perfect beatitude, and groundlessly assume release to be
something effected, and therefore non-eternal[250]. (And if they attempt
to show that moksha, although effected, is eternal) they involve
themselves in a conflict with sound logic.

23. (Brahman is) the material cause also, on account of (this view) not
being in conflict with the promissory statements and the illustrative
instances.

It has been said that, as practical religious duty has to be enquired
into because it is the cause of an increase of happiness, so Brahman has
to be enquired into because it is the cause of absolute beatitude. And
Brahman has been defined as that from which there proceed the
origination, sustentation, and retractation of this world. Now as this
definition comprises alike the relation of substantial causality in
which clay and gold, for instance, stand to golden ornaments and earthen
pots, and the relation of operative causality in which the potter and
the goldsmith stand to the things mentioned; a doubt arises to which of
these two kinds the causality of Brahman belongs.

The pûrvapakshin maintains that Brahman evidently is the operative cause
of the world only, because Scripture declares his creative energy to be
preceded by reflection. Compare, for instance, Pra. Up. VI, 3; 4: 'He
reflected, he created prâ/n/a.' For observation shows that the action of
operative causes only, such as potters and the like, is preceded by
reflection, and moreover that the result of some activity is brought
about by the concurrence of several factors[251]. It is therefore
appropriate that we should view the prime creator in the same light. The
circumstance of his being known as 'the Lord' furnishes another
argument. For lords such as kings and the son of Vivasvat are known only
as operative causes, and the highest Lord also must on that account be
viewed as an operative cause only.--Further, the effect of the creator's
activity, viz. this world, is seen to consist of parts, to be
non-intelligent and impure; we therefore must assume that its cause also
is of the same nature; for it is a matter of general observation that
cause and effect are alike in kind. But that Brahman does not resemble
the world in nature, we know from many scriptural passages, such as 'It
is without parts, without actions, tranquil, without fault, without
taint' (/Sv/e. Up. VI, 19). Hence there remains no other alternative but
to admit that in addition to Brahman there exists a material cause of
the world of impure nature, such as is known from Sm/ri/ti[252], and to
limit the causality of Brahman, as declared by Scripture, to operative
causality.

To this we make the following reply.--Brahman is to be acknowledged as
the material cause as well as the operative cause; because this latter
view does not conflict with the promissory statements and the
illustrative instances. The promissory statement chiefly meant is the
following one, 'Have you ever asked for that instruction by which that
which is not heard becomes heard; that which is not perceived,
perceived; that which is not known, known?' (Ch. Up. VI, 1, 3.) This
passage intimates that through the cognition of one thing everything
else, even if (previously) unknown, becomes known. Now the knowledge of
everything is possible through the cognition of the material cause,
since the effect is non-different from the material cause. On the other
hand, effects are not non-different from their operative causes; for we
know from ordinary experience that the carpenter, for instance, is
different from the house he has built.--The illustrative example
referred to is the one mentioned (Ch. Up. VI, 1, 4), 'My dear, as by one
clod of clay all that is made of clay is known, the modification (i.e.
the effect) being a name merely which has its origin in speech, while
the truth is that it is clay merely;' which passage again has reference
to the material cause. The text adds a few more illustrative instances
of similar nature, 'As by one nugget of gold all that is made of gold is
known; as by one pair of nail-scissors all that is made of iron is
known.'--Similar promissory statements are made in other places also,
for instance, 'What is that through which if it is known everything else
becomes known?' (Mu. Up. I, 1, 3.) An illustrative instance also is
given in the same place, 'As plants grow on the earth' (I, 1,
7).--Compare also the promissory statement in B/ri/. Up. IV, 5, 6, 'When
the Self has been seen, heard, perceived, and known, then all this is
known;' and the illustrative instance quoted (IV, 5, 8), 'Now as the
sounds of a drum if beaten cannot be seized externally, but the sound is
seized when the drum is seized or the beater of the drum.'--Similar
promissory statements and illustrative instances which are to be found
in all Vedânta-texts are to be viewed as proving, more or less, that
Brahman is also the material cause of the world. The ablative case also
in the passage, 'That from whence (yata/h/) these beings are born,' has
to be considered as indicating the material cause of the beings,
according to the grammatical rule, Pâ/n/. I, 4, 30.--That Brahman is at
the same time the operative cause of the world, we have to conclude from
the circumstance that there is no other guiding being. Ordinarily
material causes, indeed, such as lumps of clay and pieces of gold, are
dependent, in order to shape themselves into vessels and ornaments, on
extraneous operative causes such as potters and goldsmiths; but outside
Brahman as material cause there is no other operative cause to which the
material cause could look; for Scripture says that previously to
creation Brahman was one without a second.--The absence of a guiding
principle other than the material cause can moreover be established by
means of the argument made use of in the Sûtra, viz. accordance with the
promissory statements and the illustrative examples. If there were
admitted a guiding principle different from the material cause, it would
follow that everything cannot be known through one thing, and thereby
the promissory statements as well as the illustrative instances would be
stultified.--The Self is thus the operative cause, because there is no
other ruling principle, and the material cause because there is no other
substance from which the world could originate.

24. And on account of the statement of reflection (on the part of the
Self).

The fact of the sacred texts declaring that the Self reflected likewise
shows that it is the operative as well as the material cause. Passages
like 'He wished, may I be many, may I grow forth,' and 'He thought, may
I be many, may I grow forth,' show, in the first place, that the Self is
the agent in the independent activity which is preceded by the Self's
reflection; and, in the second place, that it is the material cause
also, since the words 'May I be many' intimate that the reflective
desire of multiplying itself has the inward Self for its object.

25. And on account of both (i.e. the origin and the dissolution of the
world) being directly declared (to have Brahman for their material
cause).

This Sûtra supplies a further argument for Brahman's being the general
material cause.--Brahman is the material cause of the world for that
reason also that the origination as well as the dissolution of the world
is directly spoken of in the sacred texts as having Brahman for their
material cause, 'All these beings take their rise from the ether and
return into the ether' (Ch. Up. I, 9, 1). That that from which some
other thing springs and into which it returns is the material cause of
that other thing is well known. Thus the earth, for instance, is the
material cause of rice, barley, and the like.--The word 'directly' (in
the Sûtra) notifies that there is no other material cause, but that all
this sprang from the ether only.--Observation further teaches that
effects are not re-absorbed into anything else but their material
causes.

26. (Brahman is the material cause) on account of (the Self) making
itself; (which is possible) owing to modification.

Brahman is the material cause for that reason also that Scripture--in
the passage, 'That made itself its Self' (Taitt. Up. II, 7)--represents
the Self as the object of action as well as the agent.--But how can the
Self which as agent was in full existence previously to the action be
made out to be at the same time that which is effected by the
action?--Owing to modification, we reply. The Self, although in full
existence previously to the action, modifies itself into something
special, viz. the Self of the effect. Thus we see that causal
substances, such as clay and the like, are, by undergoing the process of
modification, changed into their products.--The word 'itself' in the
passage quoted intimates the absence of any other operative cause but
the Self.

The word 'pari/n/âmât' (in the Sûtra) may also be taken as constituting
a separate Sûtra by itself, the sense of which would be: Brahman is the
material cause of the world for that reason also, that the sacred text
speaks of Brahman and its modification into the Self of its effect as
co-ordinated, viz. in the passage, 'It became sat and tyat, defined and
undefined' (Taitt. Up. II, 6).

27. And because Brahman is called the source.

Brahman is the material cause for that reason also that it is spoken of
in the sacred texts as the source (yoni); compare, for instance, 'The
maker, the Lord, the person who has his source in Brahman' (Mu. Up. III,
1, 3); and 'That which the wise regard as the source of all beings' (Mu.
Up. I, 1, 6). For that the word 'source' denotes the material cause is
well known from the use of ordinary language; the earth, for instance,
is called the yoni of trees and herbs. In some places indeed the word
yoni means not source, but merely place; so, for instance, in the
mantra, 'A yoni, O Indra, was made for you to sit down upon' (/Ri/k.
Sa/m/h. I, 104, 1). But that in the passage quoted it means 'source'
follows from a complementary passage, 'As the spider sends forth and
draws in its threads,' &c.--It is thus proved that Brahman is the
material cause of the world.--Of the objection, finally, that in
ordinary life the activity of operative causal agents only, such as
potters and the like, is preceded by reflection, we dispose by the
remark that, as the matter in hand is not one which can be known through
inferential reasoning, ordinary experience cannot be used to settle it.
For the knowledge of that matter we rather depend on Scripture
altogether, and hence Scripture only has to be appealed to. And that
Scripture teaches that the Lord who reflects before creation is at the
same time the material cause, we have already explained. The subject
will, moreover, be discussed more fully later on.

28. Hereby all (the doctrines concerning the origin of the world which
are opposed to the Vedânta) are explained, are explained.

The doctrine according to which the pradhâna is the cause of the world
has, in the Sûtras beginning with I, 1, 5, been again and again brought
forward and refuted. The chief reason for the special attention given to
that doctrine is that the Vedânta-texts contain some passages which, to
people deficient in mental penetration, may appear to contain
inferential marks pointing to it. The doctrine, moreover, stands
somewhat near to the Vedânta doctrine since, like the latter, it admits
the non-difference of cause and effect, and it, moreover, has been
accepted by some of the authors of the Dharma-sûtras, such as Devala,
and so on. For all these reasons we have taken special trouble to refute
the pradhâna doctrine, without paying much attention to the atomic and
other theories. These latter theories, however, must likewise be
refuted, as they also are opposed to the doctrine of Brahman being the
general cause, and as slow-minded people might think that they also are
referred to in some Vedic passages. Hence the Sûtrakâra formally
extends, in the above Sûtra, the refutation already accomplished of the
pradhâna doctrine to all similar doctrines which need not be demolished
in detail after their great protagonist, the pradhâna doctrine, has been
so completely disposed of. They also are, firstly, not founded on any
scriptural authority; and are, secondly, directly contradicted by
various Vedic passages.--The repetition of the phrase 'are explained' is
meant to intimate that the end of the adhyâya has been reached.

Notes:

[Footnote 228: The Great one is the technical Sâ@nkhya-term for buddhi,
avyakta is a common designation of pradhâna or prak/ri/ti, and purusha
is the technical name of the soul. Compare, for instance, Sâ@nkhya Kâr.
2, 3.]

[Footnote 229: Sa/m/kalpavikalparûpamanana/s/aktyâ haira/n/yagarbhî
buddhir manas tasyâ/h/ vyash/t/imana/h/su samash/t/itayâ vyâptim âha
mahân iti. Sa/m/kalpâdi/s/ktitayâ tarhi sa/m/dehâtmatva/m/ tatrâha matir
iti. Mahatvam upapâdayati brahmeti. Bhogyajâtâdhâratvam âha pûr iti.
Ni/sk/ayâtmakatvam âha buddhir iti. Kîrti/s/aktimattvam âha khyâtir iti.
Niyamana/s/aktimatvam aha î/s/vara iti. Loke yat prak/ri/sh/t/a/m/
j/ñ/ânam tatosnatirekam âha praj/ñ/eti. Tatphalam api tato
nârthântaravishayam ity âha sa/m/vid iti. /K/itpradhânatvam âha /k/itir
iti. J/ñ/atasarvârtbânusa/m/dhâna/s/aktim âha sm/ri/tis /k/eti. Ânanda
Giri.]

[Footnote 230: Nanu na bîja/s/aktir vidyayâ dahyate vastutvâd âtmavan
nety âha avidyeti. Ke/k/it tu pratijîvam avidya/s/aktibhedam i/kkh/anti
tan na avyaktâvyâk/ri/tâdi/s/abdâyâs tasyâ bhedakâbhâvâd ekatvexpi
sva/s/aktyâ vi/k/itrakâryakaratvâd ity âha avyakteti. Na /k/a tasyâ
jîvâ/s/rayatva/m/ jîva/s/abdavâ/k/yasya kalpitatvâd avidyârûpatvât
ta/kkh/abdalakshyasya brahmâvyatirekâd ity âha parame/s/vareti.
Mâyâvidyayor bhedâd î/s/varasya mâyâ/s/rayatva/m/ jîvânâm
avidyâ/s/rayateti vadanta/m/ pratyâha mâyâmayîti. Yathâ mâyâvino mâyâ
paratantrâ tathaishâpîty artha/h/. Pratîtau tasyâ/s/ /k/etanâpekshâm âha
mahâsuptir iti. Ânanda Giri.]

[Footnote 231: Sûtradvayasya v/ri/ttik/ri/dvyâkhyânam utthâpayati. Go.
Ân. Â/k/âryade/s/îyamatam utthâpayati. Ân. Gi.]

[Footnote 232: The commentators give different explanations of the
Sattâmâtra of the text.--Sattâmâtre sattvapradhânaprak/ri/ter
âdyapari/n/âme. Go. Ân.--Bhogâpavargapurushârthasya
maha/kkh/abditabuddhikâryatvât purushâpekshitaphalakâra/n/a/m/ sad
u/k/yate tatra bhâvapratyayos'pi svarûpârtho na sâmânyavâ/k/î
kâryânumeya/m/ mahan na pratyaksham iti mâtra/s/abda/h/. Ânanda Giri.]

[Footnote 233: As the meaning of the word ajâ is going to be discussed,
and as the author of the Sûtras and /S/a@nkara seem to disagree as to
its meaning (see later on), I prefer to leave the word untranslated in
this place.--/S/a@nkara reads--and explains,--in the mantra, sarûpâ/h/
(not sarûpâm) and bhuktabhogâm, not bhuktabhogyâm.]

[Footnote 234: Here there seems to be a certain discrepancy between the
views of the Sûtra writer and /S/a@nkara. Govindânanda notes that
according to the Bhâshyak/ri/t ajâ means simply mâyâ--which
interpretation is based on prakara/n/a--while, according to the
Sûtra-k/ri/t, who explains ajâ on the ground of the Chândogya-passage
treating of the three primary elements, ajâ denotes the aggregate of
those three elements constituting an avântaraprak/ri/ti.--On
/S/a@nkara's explanation the term ajâ presents no difficulties, for mâyâ
is ajâ, i.e. unborn, not produced. On the explanation of the Sûtra
writer, however, ajâ cannot mean unborn, since the three primary
elements are products. Hence we are thrown back on the rû/dh/i
signification of ajâ, according to which it means she-goat. But how can
the avântara-prak/ri/ti be called a she-goat? To this question the next
Sûtra replies.]

[Footnote 235: Indication (laksha/n/â, which consists in this case in
five times five being used instead of twenty-five) is considered as an
objectionable mode of expression, and therefore to be assumed in
interpretation only where a term can in no way be shown to have a direct
meaning.]

[Footnote 236: That pa/ñk/ajanâ/h/ is only one word appears from its
having only one accent, viz. the udâtta on the last syllable, which
udâtta becomes anudâtta according to the rules laid down in the Bhâshika
Sûtra for the accentuation of the /S/atapatha-brâhma/n/a.]

[Footnote 237: So in the Mâdhyandina recension of the Upanishad; the
Kâ/n/va recension has not the clause 'the food of food.']

[Footnote 238: This in answer to the Sánkhya who objects to jana when
applied to the prâna, &c. being interpreted with the help of laksha/n/â;
while if referred to the pradhâna, &c. it may be explained to have a
direct meaning, on the ground of yaugika interpretation (the pradhâna
being jana because it produces, the mahat &c. being jana because they
are produced). The Vedãntin points out that the compound pa/ñk/ajanâ/h/
has its own rû/dh/i-meaning, just as a/s/vakar/n/a, literally horse-ear,
which conventionally denotes a certain plant.]

[Footnote 239: We infer that udbhid is the name of a sacrifice because
it is mentioned in connexion with the act of sacrificing; we infer that
the yûpa is a wooden post because it is said to be cut, and so on.]

[Footnote 240: Option being possible only in the case of things to be
accomplished, i.e. actions.]

[Footnote 241: According to Go. Ân. in the passage, 'That made itself
its Self' (II, 7); according to Ân. Giri in the passage, 'He created
all' (II, 6).]

[Footnote 242: By the Brâhma/n/as being meant all those Brâhma/n/as who
are not at the same time wandering mendicants.]

[Footnote 243: The comment of the Bhâmatî on the Sûtra runs as follows:
As the sparks issuing from a fire are not absolutely different from the
fire, because they participate in the nature of the fire; and, on the
other hand, are not absolutely non-different from the fire, because in
that case they could be distinguished neither from the fire nor from
each other; so the individual souls also--which are effects of
Brahman--are neither absolutely different from Brahman, for that would
mean that they are not of the nature of intelligence; nor absolutely
non-different from Brahman, because in that case they could not be
distinguished from each other, and because, if they were identical with
Brahman and therefore omniscient, it would be useless to give them any
instruction. Hence the individual souls are somehow different from
Brahman and somehow non-different.--The technical name of the doctrine
here represented by Â/s/marathya is bhedâbhedavâda.]

[Footnote 244: Bhâmatî: The individual soul is absolutely different from
the highest Self; it is inquinated by the contact with its different
limiting adjuncts. But it is spoken of, in the Upanishad, as
non-different from the highest Self because after having purified itself
by means of knowledge and meditation it may pass out of the body and
become one with the highest Self. The text of the Upanishad thus
transfers a future state of non-difference to that time when difference
actually exists. Compare the saying of the Pâ/ñk/arâtrikas: 'Up to the
moment of emancipation being reached the soul and the highest Self are
different. But the emancipated soul is no longer different from the
highest Self, since there is no further cause of difference.'--The
technical name of the doctrine advocated by Au/d/ulomi is
satyabhedavâda.]

[Footnote 245: Compare the note to the same mantra as quoted above under
I, 1, 11.]

[Footnote 246: And not the relation of absolute identity.]

[Footnote 247: I.e. upon the state of emancipation and its absence.]

[Footnote 248: Upapâdita/m/ /k/eti, sarvasyâtmamâtratvam iti /s/esha/h/.
Upapâdanaprakâra/m/ sû/k/ayati eketi. Sa yathârdrendhanâgner
ityâdinaikaprasavatvam, yathâ sarvâsâm apâm ityâdinâ
/k/aikapralayatva/m/ sarvasyoktam. Ân. Gi.]

[Footnote 249: So according to Go. Ân. and Ân. Gi., although their
interpretations seem not to account sufficiently for the ekâm of the
text.--Kâ/mk/id evaikâm iti jîvasthânâd anyâm ity artha/h/. Go.
Ân.--Jîvabhâvena pratibimbâdhârâtiriktâm ity artha/h/. Ân. Gi.]

[Footnote 250: While release, as often remarked, is eternal, it being in
fact not different from the eternally unchanging Brahman.]

[Footnote 251: I.e. that the operative cause and the substantial cause
are separate things.]

[Footnote 252: Viz. the Sâ@nkhya-sm/ri/ti.]




SECOND ADHYÂYA.

FIRST PÂDA.

REVERENCE TO THE HIGHEST SELF!


1. If it be objected that (from the doctrine expounded hitherto) there
would result the fault of there being no room for (certain) Sm/ri/tis;
we do not admit that objection, because (from the rejection of our
doctrine) there would result the fault of want of room for other
Sm/ri/tis.

It has been shown in the first adhyâya that the omniscient Lord of all
is the cause of the origin of this world in the same way as clay is the
material cause of jars and gold of golden ornaments; that by his
rulership he is the cause of the subsistence of this world once
originated, just as the magician is the cause of the subsistence of the
magical illusion; and that he, lastly, is the cause of this emitted
world being finally reabsorbed into his essence, just as the four
classes of creatures are reabsorbed into the earth. It has further been
proved, by a demonstration of the connected meaning of all the
Vedânta-texts, that the Lord is the Self of all of us. Moreover, the
doctrines of the pradhâna, and so on, being the cause of this world have
been refuted as not being scriptural.--The purport of the second
adhyâya, which we now begin, is to refute the objections (to the
doctrine established hitherto) which might be founded on Sm/ri/ti and
Reasoning, and to show that the doctrines of the pradhâna, &c. have only
fallacious arguments to lean upon, and that the different Vedânta-texts
do not contradict one another with regard to the mode of creation and
similar topics.--The first point is to refute the objections based on
Sm/ri/ti.

Your doctrine (the pûrvapakshin says) that the omniscient Brahman only
is the cause of this world cannot be maintained, 'because there results
from it the fault of there being no room for (certain) Sm/ri/tis.' Such
Sm/ri/tis are the one called Tantra which was composed by a /ri/shi and
is accepted by authoritative persons, and other Sm/ri/tis based on
it[253]; for all of which there would be no room if your interpretation
of the Veda were the true one. For they all teach that the
non-intelligent pradhâna is the independent cause of the world. There is
indeed room (a raison d'être) for Sm/ri/tis like the Manu-sm/ri/ti,
which give information about matters connected with the whole body of
religious duty, characterised by injunction[254] and comprising the
agnihotra and similar performances. They tell us at what time and with
what rites the members of the different castes are to be initiated; how
the Veda has to be studied; in what way the cessation of study has to
take place; how marriage has to be performed, and so on. They further
lay down the manifold religious duties, beneficial to man, of the four
castes and â/s/ramas[255]. The Kâpila Sm/ri/ti, on the other hand, and
similar books are not concerned with things to be done, but were
composed with exclusive reference to perfect knowledge as the means of
final release. If then no room were left for them in that connexion
also, they would be altogether purposeless; and hence we must explain
the Vedânta-texts in such a manner as not to bring them into conflict
with the Sm/ri/tis mentioned[256].--But how, somebody may ask the
pûrvapakshin, can the eventual fault of there being left no room for
certain Sm/ri/tis be used as an objection against that sense of /S/ruti
which--from various reasons as detailed under I, 1 and ff.--has been
ascertained by us to be the true one, viz. that the omniscient Brahman
alone is the cause of the world?--Our objection, the pûrvapakshin
replies, will perhaps not appear valid to persons of independent
thought; but as most men depend in their reasonings on others, and are
unable to ascertain by themselves the sense of /S/ruti, they naturally
rely on Sm/ri/tis, composed by celebrated authorities, and try to arrive
at the sense of /S/ruti with their assistance; while, owing to their
esteem for the authors of the Sm/ri/tis, they have no trust in our
explanations. The knowledge of men like Kapila Sm/ri/ti declares to have
been /ri/shi-like and unobstructed, and moreover there is the following
/S/ruti-passage, 'It is he who, in the beginning, bears in his thoughts
the son, the /ri/shi, kapila[257], whom he wishes to look on while he is
born' (/S/ve. Up. V, 2). Hence their opinion cannot be assumed to be
erroneous, and as they moreover strengthen their position by
argumentation, the objection remains valid, and we must therefore
attempt to explain the Vedânta-texts in conformity with the Sm/ri/tis.

This objection we dispose of by the remark, 'It is not so because
therefrom would result the fault of want of room for other
Sm/ri/tis.'--If you object to the doctrine of the Lord being the cause
of the world on the ground that it would render certain Sm/ri/tis
purposeless, you thereby render purposeless other Sm/ri/tis which
declare themselves in favour of the said doctrine. These latter
Sm/ri/ti-texts we will quote in what follows. In one passage the highest
Brahman is introduced as the subject of discussion, 'That which is
subtle and not to be known;' the text then goes on, 'That is the
internal Self of the creatures, their soul,' and after that remarks
'From that sprang the Unevolved, consisting of the three gu/n/as, O best
of Brâhma/n/as.' And in another place it is said that 'the Unevolved is
dissolved in the Person devoid of qualities, O Brâhma/n/a.'--Thus we
read also in the Purâ/n/a, 'Hear thence this short statement: The
ancient Nârâya/n/a is all this; he produces the creation at the due
time, and at the time of reabsorption he consumes it again.' And so in
the Bhagavadgîtâ also (VII, 6), 'I am the origin and the place of
reabsorption of the whole world.' And Âpastamba too says with reference
to the highest Self, 'From him spring all bodies; he is the primary
cause, he is eternal, he is unchangeable' (Dharma Sûtra I, 8, 23, 2). In
this way Sm/ri/ti, in many places, declares the Lord to be the efficient
as well as the material cause of the world. As the pûrvapakshin opposes
us on the ground of Sm/ri/ti, we reply to him on the ground of Sm/ri/ti
only; hence the line of defence taken up in the Sûtra. Now it has been
shown already that the /S/ruti-texts aim at conveying the doctrine that
the Lord is the universal cause, and as wherever different Sm/ri/tis
conflict those maintaining one view must be accepted, while those which
maintain the opposite view must be set aside, those Sm/ri/tis which
follow /S/ruti are to be considered as authoritative, while all others
are to be disregarded; according to the Sûtra met with in the chapter
treating of the means of proof (Mîm. Sûtra I, 3, 3), 'Where there is
contradiction (between /S/ruti and Sm/ri/ti) (Sm/ri/ti) is to be
disregarded; in case of there being no (contradiction) (Sm/ri/ti is to
be recognised) as there is inference (of Sm/ri/ti being founded on
/S/ruti).'--Nor can we assume that some persons are able to perceive
supersensuous matters without /S/ruti, as there exists no efficient
cause for such perception. Nor, again, can it be said that such
perception may be assumed in the case of Kapila and others who possessed
supernatural powers, and consequently unobstructed power of cognition.
For the possession of supernatural powers itself depends on the
performance of religious duty, and religious duty is that which is
characterised by injunction[258]; hence the sense of injunctions (i.e.
of the Veda) which is established first must not be fancifully
interpreted in reference to the dicta of men 'established' (i.e. made
perfect, and therefore possessing supernatural powers) afterwards only.
Moreover, even if those 'perfect' men were accepted as authorities to be
appealed to, still, as there are many such perfect men, we should have,
in all those cases where the Sm/ri/tis contradict each other in the
manner described, no other means of final decision than an appeal to
/S/ruti.--As to men destitute of the power of independent judgment, we
are not justified in assuming that they will without any reason attach
themselves to some particular Sm/ri/ti; for if men's inclinations were
so altogether unregulated, truth itself would, owing to the multiformity
of human opinion, become unstable. We must therefore try to lead their
judgment in the right way by pointing out to them the conflict of the
Sm/ri/tis, and the distinction founded on some of them following /S/ruti
and others not.--The scriptural passage which the pûrvapakshin has
quoted as proving the eminence of Kapila's knowledge would not justify
us in believing in such doctrines of Kapila (i.e. of some Kapila) as are
contrary to Scripture; for that passage mentions the bare name of Kapila
(without specifying which Kapila is meant), and we meet in tradition
with another Kapila, viz. the one who burned the sons of Sagara and had
the surname Vâsudeva. That passage, moreover, serves another purpose,
(viz. the establishment of the doctrine of the highest Self,) and has on
that account no force to prove what is not proved by any other means,
(viz. the supereminence of Kapila's knowledge.) On the other hand, we
have a /S/ruti-passage which proclaims the excellence of Manu[259], viz.
'Whatever Manu said is medicine' (Taitt. Sa/m/h. II, 2, 10, 2). Manu
himself, where he glorifies the seeing of the one Self in everything
('he who equally sees the Self in all beings and all beings in the Self,
he as a sacrificer to the Self attains self-luminousness,' i.e. becomes
Brahman, Manu Sm/ri/ti XII, 91), implicitly blames the doctrine of
Kapila. For Kapila, by acknowledging a plurality of Selfs, does not
admit the doctrine of there being one universal Self. In the Mahabhârata
also the question is raised whether there are many persons (souls) or
one; thereupon the opinion of others is mentioned, 'There are many
persons, O King, according to the Sâ@nkhya and Yoga philosophers;' that
opinion is controverted 'just as there is one place of origin, (viz. the
earth,) for many persons, so I will proclaim to you that universal
person raised by his qualities;' and, finally, it is declared that there
is one universal Self, 'He is the internal Self of me, of thee, and of
all other embodied beings, the internal witness of all, not to be
apprehended by any one. He the all-headed, all-armed, all-footed,
all-eyed, all-nosed one moves through all beings according to his will
and liking.' And Scripture also declares that there is one universal
Self, 'When to a man who understands the Self has become all things,
what sorrow, what trouble can there be to him who once beheld that
unity?' (Î/s/. Up 7); and other similar passages. All which proves that
the system of Kapila contradicts the Veda, and the doctrine of Manu who
follows the Veda, by its hypothesis of a plurality of Selfs also, not
only by the assumption of an independent pradhâna. The authoritativeness
of the Veda with regard to the matters stated by it is independent and
direct, just as the light of the sun is the direct means of our
knowledge of form and colour; the authoritativeness of human dicta, on
the other hand, is of an altogether different kind, as it depends on an
extraneous basis (viz. the Veda), and is (not immediate but) mediated by
a chain of teachers and tradition.

Hence the circumstance that the result (of our doctrine) is want of room
for certain Sm/ri/tis, with regard to matters contradicted by the Veda,
furnishes no valid objection.--An additional reason for this our opinion
is supplied by the following Sûtra.

2. And on account of the non-perception of the others (i.e. the effects
of the pradhâna, according to the Sâ@nkhya system).

The principles different from the pradhâna, but to be viewed as its
modifications which the (Sâ@nkhya) Sm/ri/ti assumes, as, for instance,
the great principle, are perceived neither in the Veda nor in ordinary
experience. Now things of the nature of the elements and the sense
organs, which are well known from the Veda, as well as from experience,
may be referred to in Sm/ri/ti; but with regard to things which, like
Kapila's great principle, are known neither from the Veda nor from
experience--no more than, for instance, the objects of a sixth
sense--Sm/ri/ti is altogether impossible. That some scriptural passages
which apparently refer to such things as the great principle have in
reality quite a different meaning has already been shown under I, 4, 1.
But if that part of Sm/ri/ti which is concerned with the effects (i.e.
the great principle, and so on) is without authority, the part which
refers to the cause (the pradhâna) will be so likewise. This is what the
Sûtra means to say.--We have thus established a second reason, proving
that the circumstance of there being no room left for certain Sm/ri/tis
does not constitute a valid objection to our doctrine.--The weakness of
the trust in reasoning (apparently favouring the Sâ@nkhya doctrine) will
be shown later on under II, 1, 4 ff.

3. Thereby the Yoga (Sm/ri/ti) is refuted.

This Sûtra extends the application of the preceding argumentation, and
remarks that by the refutation of the Sâ@nkhya-sm/ri/ti the
Yoga-sm/ri/ti also is to be considered as refuted; for the latter also
assumes, in opposition to Scripture, a pradhâna as the independent cause
of the world, and the 'great principle,' &c. as its effects, although
neither the Veda nor common experience favour these views.--But, if the
same reasoning applies to the Yoga also, the latter system is already
disposed of by the previous arguments; of what use then is it formally
to extend them to the Yoga? (as the Sûtra does.)--We reply that here an
additional cause of doubt presents itself, the practice of Yoga being
enjoined in the Veda as a means of obtaining perfect knowledge; so, for
instance, B/ri/. Up. II, 4, 5, '(The Self) is to be heard, to be
thought, to be meditated upon[260].' In the /S/vetâ/s/vatara Upanishad,
moreover, we find various injunctions of Yoga-practice connected with
the assumption of different positions of the body; &c.; so, for
instance, 'Holding his body with its three erect parts even,' &c. (II,
8).

Further, we find very many passages in the Veda which (without expressly
enjoining it) point to the Yoga, as, for instance, Ka. Up. II, 6, 11,
'This, the firm holding back of the senses, is what is called Yoga;'
'Having received this knowledge and the whole rule of Yoga' (Ka. Up. II,
6, 18); and so on. And in the Yoga-/s/âstra itself the passage, 'Now
then Yoga, the means of the knowledge of truth,' &c. defines the Yoga as
a means of reaching perfect knowledge. As thus one topic of the /s/âstra
at least (viz. the practice of Yoga) is shown to be authoritative, the
entire Yoga-sm/ri/ti will have to be accepted as unobjectionable, just
as the Sm/ri/ti referring to the ash/t/akâs[261].--To this we reply that
the formal extension (to the Yoga, of the arguments primarily directed
against the Sâ@nkhya) has the purpose of removing the additional doubt
stated in the above lines; for in spite of a part of the Yoga-sm/ri/ti
being authoritative, the disagreement (between Sm/ri/ti and /S/ruti) on
other topics remains as shown above.--Although[262] there are many
Sm/ri/tis treating of the soul, we have singled out for refutation the
Sâ@nkhya and Yoga because they are widely known as offering the means
for accomplishing the highest end of man and have found favour with many
competent persons. Moreover, their position is strengthened by a Vedic
passage referring to them, 'He who has known that cause which is to be
apprehended by Sâ@nkhya and Yoga he is freed from all fetters' (/S/ve.
Up. VI, 13). (The claims which on the ground of this last passage might
be set up for the Sâ@nkhya and Yoga-sm/ri/tis in their entirety) we
refute by the remark that the highest beatitude (the highest aim of man)
is not to be attained by the knowledge of the Sâ@nkhya-sm/ri/ti
irrespective of the Veda, nor by the road of Yoga-practice. For
Scripture itself declares that there is no other means of obtaining the
highest beatitude but the knowledge of the unity of the Self which is
conveyed by the Veda, 'Over death passes only the man who knows him;
there is no other path to go' (/S/ve. Up. III, 8). And the Sâ@nkhya and
Yoga-systems maintain duality, do not discern the unity of the Self. In
the passage quoted ('That cause which is to be apprehended by Sâ@nkhya
and Yoga') the terms 'Sâ@nkhya' and 'Yoga' denote Vedic knowledge and
meditation, as we infer from proximity[263]. We willingly allow room for
those portions of the two systems which do not contradict the Veda. In
their description of the soul, for instance, as free from all qualities
the Sâ@nkhyas are in harmony with the Veda which teaches that the person
(purusha) is essentially pure; cp. B/ri/. Up. IV, 3, 16. 'For that
person is not attached to anything.' The Yoga again in giving rules for
the condition of the wandering religious mendicant admits that state of
retirement from the concerns of life which is known from scriptural
passages such as the following one, 'Then the parivrâjaka with
discoloured (yellow) dress, shaven, without any possessions,' &c.
(Jâbâla Upan. IV).

The above remarks will serve as a reply to the claims of all
argumentative Sm/ri/tis. If it be said that those Sm/ri/tis also assist,
by argumentation and proof, the cognition of truth, we do not object to
so much, but we maintain all the same that the truth can be known from
the Vedânta-texts only; as is stated by scriptural passages such as
'None who does not know the Veda perceives that great one' (Taitt. Br.
III, 12, 9, 7); 'I now ask thee that person taught in the Upanishads'
(B/ri/. Up, III, 9, 26); and others.

4. (Brahman can) not (be the cause of the world) on account of the
difference of character of that, (viz. the world); and its being such,
(i.e. different from Brahman) (we learn) from Scripture.

The objections, founded on Sm/ri/ti, against the doctrine of Brahman
being the efficient and the material cause of this world have been
refuted; we now proceed to refute those founded on Reasoning.--But (to
raise an objection at the outset) how is there room for objections
founded on Reasoning after the sense of the sacred texts has once been
settled? The sacred texts are certainly to be considered absolutely
authoritative with regard to Brahman as well as with regard to religious
duty (dharma).--(To this the pûrvapakshin replies), The analogy between
Brahman and dharma would hold good if the matter in hand were to be
known through the holy texts only, and could not be approached by the
other means of right knowledge also. In the case of religious duties,
i.e. things to be done, we indeed entirely depend on Scripture. But now
we are concerned with Brahman which is an accomplished existing thing,
and in the case of accomplished things there is room for other means of
right knowledge also, as, for instance, the case of earth and the other
elements shows. And just as in the case of several conflicting
scriptural passages we explain all of them in such a manner as to make
them accord with one, so /S/ruti, if in conflict with other means of
right knowledge, has to be bent so as to accord with the letter.
Moreover, Reasoning, which enables us to infer something not actually
perceived in consequence of its having a certain equality of attributes
with what is actually perceived, stands nearer to perception than
/S/ruti which conveys its sense by tradition merely. And the knowledge
of Brahman which discards Nescience and effects final release terminates
in a perception (viz. the intuition--sâkshâtkâra--of Brahman), and as
such must be assumed to have a seen result (not an unseen one like
dharma)[264]. Moreover, the scriptural passage, 'He is to be heard, to
be thought,' enjoins thought in addition to hearing, and thereby shows
that Reasoning also is to be resorted to with regard to Brahman. Hence
an objection founded on Reasoning is set forth, 'Not so, on account of
the difference of nature of this (effect).'--The Vedântic opinion that
the intelligent Brahman is the material cause of this world is untenable
because the effect would in that case be of an altogether different
character from the cause. For this world, which the Vedântin considers
as the effect of Brahman, is perceived to be non-intelligent and impure,
consequently different in character from Brahman; and Brahman again is
declared by the sacred texts to be of a character different from the
world, viz. intelligent and pure. But things of an altogether different
character cannot stand to each other in the relation of material cause
and effect. Such effects, for instance, as golden ornaments do not have
earth for their material cause, nor is gold the material cause of
earthen vessels; but effects of an earthy nature originate from earth
and effects of the nature of gold from gold. In the same manner this
world, which is non-intelligent and comprises pleasure, pain, and
dulness, can only be the effect of a cause itself non-intelligent and
made up of pleasure, pain, and dulness; but not of Brahman which is of
an altogether different character. The difference in character of this
world from Brahman must be understood to be due to its impurity and its
want of intelligence. It is impure because being itself made up of
pleasure, pain, and dulness, it is the cause of delight, grief,
despondency, &c., and because it comprises in itself abodes of various
character such as heaven, hell, and so on. It is devoid of intelligence
because it is observed to stand to the intelligent principle in the
relation of subserviency, being the instrument of its activity. For the
relation of subserviency of one thing to another is not possible on the
basis of equality; two lamps, for instance, cannot be said to be
subservient to each other (both being equally luminous).--But, it will
be said, an intelligent instrument also might be subservient to the
enjoying soul; just as an intelligent servant is subservient to his
master.--This analogy, we reply, does not hold good, because in the case
of servant and master also only the non-intelligent element in the
former is subservient to the intelligent master. For a being endowed
with intelligence subserves another intelligent being only with the
non-intelligent part belonging to it, viz. its internal organ, sense
organs, &c.; while in so far as it is intelligent itself it acts neither
for nor against any other being. For the Sâ@nkhyas are of opinion that
the intelligent beings (i.e. the souls) are incapable of either taking
in or giving out anything[265], and are non-active. Hence that only
which is devoid of intelligence can be an instrument. Nor[266] is there
anything to show that things like pieces of wood and clods of earth are
of an intelligent nature; on the contrary, the dichotomy of all things
which exist into such as are intelligent and such as are non-intelligent
is well established. This world therefore cannot have its material cause
in Brahman from which it is altogether different in character.--Here
somebody might argue as follows. Scripture tells us that this world has
originated from an intelligent cause; therefore, starting from the
observation that the attributes of the cause survive in the effect, I
assume this whole world to be intelligent. The absence of manifestation
of intelligence (in this world) is to be ascribed to the particular
nature of the modification[267]. Just as undoubtedly intelligent beings
do not manifest their intelligence in certain states such as sleep,
swoon, &c., so the intelligence of wood and earth also is not manifest
(although it exists). In consequence of this difference produced by the
manifestation and non-manifestation of intelligence (in the case of men,
animals, &c., on the one side, and wood, stones, &c. on the other side),
and in consequence of form, colour, and the like being present in the
one case and absent in the other, nothing prevents the instruments of
action (earth, wood, &c.) from standing to the souls in the relation of
a subordinate to a superior thing, although in reality both are equally
of an intelligent nature. And just as such substances as flesh, broth,
pap, and the like may, owing to their individual differences, stand in
the relation of mutual subserviency, although fundamentally they are all
of the same nature, viz. mere modifications of earth, so it will be in
the case under discussion also, without there being done any violence to
the well-known distinction (of beings intelligent and
non-intelligent).--This reasoning--the pûrvapakshin replies--if valid
might remove to a certain extent that difference of character between
Brahman and the world which is due to the circumstance of the one being
intelligent and the other non-intelligent; there would, however, still
remain that other difference which results from the fact that the one is
pure and the other impure. But in reality the argumentation of the
objector does not even remove the first-named difference; as is declared
in the latter part of the Sûtra, 'And its being such we learn from
Scripture.' For the assumption of the intellectuality of the entire
world--which is supported neither by perception nor by inference,
&c.--must be considered as resting on Scripture only in so far as the
latter speaks of the world as having originated from an intelligent
cause; but that scriptural statement itself is contradicted by other
texts which declare the world to be 'of such a nature,' i.e. of a nature
different from that of its material cause. For the scriptural passage,
'It became that which is knowledge and that which is devoid of
knowledge' (Taitt. Up. II, 6), which teaches that a certain class of
beings is of a non-intelligent nature intimates thereby that the
non-intelligent world is different from the intelligent
Brahman.--But--somebody might again object--the sacred texts themselves
sometimes speak of the elements and the bodily organs, which are
generally considered to be devoid of intelligence, as intelligent
beings. The following passages, for instance, attribute intelligence to
the elements. 'The earth spoke;' 'The waters spoke' (/S/at. Br. VI, 1,
3, 2; 4); and, again, 'Fire thought;' 'Water thought' (Ch. Up. VI, 2, 3;
4). Other texts attribute intelligence to the bodily organs, 'These
prâ/n/as when quarrelling together as to who was the best went to
Brahman' (B/ri/. Up. VI, 1, 7); and, again, 'They said to Speech: Do
thou sing out for us' (B/ri/. Up. I, 3, 2).--To this objection the
pûrvapakshin replies in the following Sûtra.

5. But (there takes place) denotation of the superintending (deities),
on account of the difference and the connexion.

The word 'but' discards the doubt raised. We are not entitled to base
the assumption of the elements and the sense organs being of an
intellectual nature on such passages as 'the earth spoke,' &c. because
'there takes place denotation of that which presides.' In the case of
actions like speaking, disputing, and so on, which require intelligence,
the scriptural passages denote not the mere material elements and
organs, but rather the intelligent divinities which preside over earth,
&c., on the one hand, and Speech, &c., on the other hand. And why so?
'On account of the difference and the connexion.' The difference is the
one previously referred to between the enjoying souls, on the one hand,
and the material elements and organs, on the other hand, which is
founded on the distinction between intelligent and non-intelligent
beings; that difference would not be possible if all beings were
intelligent. Moreover, the Kaushîtakins in their account of the dispute
of the prâ/n/as make express use of the word 'divinities' in order to
preclude the idea of the mere material organs being meant, and in order
to include the superintending intelligent beings. They say, 'The deities
contending with each for who was the best;' and, again, 'All these
deities having recognised the pre-eminence in prâ/n/a' (Kau. Up. II,
14).--And, secondly, Mantras, Arthavâdas, Itihâsas, Purâ/n/as, &c. all
declare that intelligent presiding divinities are connected with
everything. Moreover, such scriptural passages as 'Agni having become
Speech entered into the mouth' (Ait. Âr. II, 4, 2, 4) show that each
bodily organ is connected with its own favouring divinity. And in the
passages supplementary to the quarrel of the prâ/n/as we read in one
place how, for the purpose of settling their relative excellence, they
went to Prajâpati, and how they settled their quarrel on the ground of
presence and absence, each of them, as Prajâpati had advised, departing
from the body for some time ('They went to their father Prajâpati and
said,' &c,; Ch. Up. V, 1, 7); and in another place it is said that they
made an offering to prâ/n/a (B/ri/. Up. VI, 1, 13), &c.; all of them
proceedings which are analogous to those of men, &c., and therefore
strengthen the hypothesis that the text refers to the superintending
deities. In the case of such passages as, 'Fire thought,' we must assume
that the thought spoken of is that of the highest deity which is
connected with its effects as a superintending principle.--From all this
it follows that this world is different in nature from Brahman, and
hence cannot have it for its material cause.

To this objection raised by the pûrvapakshin the next Sûtra replies.

6. But it is seen.

The word 'but' discards the pûrvapaksha.

Your assertion that this world cannot have originated from Brahman on
account of the difference of its character is not founded on an
absolutely true tenet. For we see that from man, who is acknowledged to
be intelligent, non-intelligent things such as hair and nails originate,
and that, on the other hand, from avowedly non-intelligent matter, such
as cow-dung, scorpions and similar animals are produced.--But--to state
an objection--the real cause of the non-intelligent hair and nails is
the human body which is itself non-intelligent, and the non-intelligent
bodies only of scorpions are the effects of non-intelligent dung.--Even
thus, we reply, there remains a difference in character (between the
cause, for instance, the dung, and the effect, for instance, the body of
the scorpion), in so far as some non-intelligent matter (the body) is
the abode of an intelligent principle (the scorpion's soul), while other
non-intelligent matter (the dung) is not. Moreover, the difference of
nature--due to the cause passing over into the effect--between the
bodies of men on the one side and hair and nails on the other side, is,
on account of the divergence of colour, form, &c., very considerable
after all. The same remark holds good with regard to cow-dung and the
bodies of scorpions, &c. If absolute equality were insisted on (in the
case of one thing being the effect of another), the relation of material
cause and effect (which after all requires a distinction of the two)
would be annihilated. If, again, it be remarked that in the case of men
and hair as well as in that of scorpions and cow-dung there is one
characteristic feature, at least, which is found in the effect as well
as in the cause, viz. the quality of being of an earthy nature; we reply
that in the case of Brahman and the world also one characteristic
feature, viz. that of existence (sattâ), is found in ether, &c. (which
are the effects) as well as in Brahman (which is the cause).--He,
moreover, who on the ground of the difference of the attributes tries to
invalidate the doctrine of Brahman being the cause of the world, must
assert that he understands by difference of attributes either the
non-occurrence (in the world) of the entire complex of the
characteristics of Brahman, or the non-occurrence of any (some or other)
characteristic, or the non-occurrence of the characteristic of
intelligence. The first assertion would lead to the negation of the
relation of cause and effect in general, which relation is based on the
fact of there being in the effect something over and above the cause
(for if the two were absolutely identical they could not be
distinguished). The second assertion is open to the charge of running
counter to what is well known; for, as we have already remarked, the
characteristic quality of existence which belongs to Brahman is found
likewise in ether and so on. For the third assertion the requisite
proving instances are wanting; for what instances could be brought
forward against the upholder of Brahman, in order to prove the general
assertion that whatever is devoid of intelligence is seen not to be an
effect of Brahman? (The upholder of Brahman would simply not admit any
such instances) because he maintains that this entire complex of things
has Brahman for its material cause. And that all such assertions are
contrary to Scripture, is clear, as we have already shown it to be the
purport of Scripture that Brahman is the cause and substance of the
world. It has indeed been maintained by the pûrvapakshin that the other
means of proof also (and not merely sacred tradition) apply to Brahman,
on account of its being an accomplished entity (not something to be
accomplished as religious duties are); but such an assertion is entirely
gratuitous. For Brahman, as being devoid of form and so on, cannot
become an object of perception; and as there are in its case no
characteristic marks (on which conclusions, &c. might be based),
inference also and the other means of proof do not apply to it; but,
like religious duty, it is to be known solely on the ground of holy
tradition. Thus Scripture also declares, 'That doctrine is not to be
obtained by argument, but when it is declared by another then, O
dearest! it is easy to understand' (Ka. Up. I, 2, 9). And again, 'Who in
truth knows it? Who could here proclaim it, whence this creation
sprang?' (/Ri/g-v. Sa/m/h. X, 129, 6). These two mantras show that the
cause of this world is not to be known even by divine beings
(î/s/vara)[268] of extraordinary power and wisdom.

There are also the following Sm/ri/ti passages to the same effect: 'Do
not apply reasoning to those things which are uncognisable[269];'
'Unevolved he is called, uncognisable, unchangeable;' 'Not the legions
of the gods know my origin, not the great /ri/shis. For I myself am in
every way the origin of the gods and great /ri/shis' (Bha. Gî. X,
2).--And if it has been maintained above that the scriptural passage
enjoining thought (on Brahman) in addition to mere hearing (of the
sacred texts treating of Brahman) shows that reasoning also is to be
allowed its place, we reply that the passage must not deceitfully be
taken as enjoining bare independent ratiocination, but must be
understood to represent reasoning as a subordinate auxiliary of
intuitional knowledge. By reasoning of the latter type we may, for
instance, arrive at the following conclusions; that because the state of
dream and the waking state exclude each other the Self is not connected
with those states; that, as the soul in the state of deep sleep leaves
the phenomenal world behind and becomes one with that whose Self is pure
Being, it has for its Self pure Being apart from the phenomenal world;
that as the world springs from Brahman it cannot be separate from
Brahman, according to the principle of the non-difference of cause and
effect, &c.[270] The fallaciousness of mere reasoning will moreover be
demonstrated later on (II, 1, 11).--He[271], moreover, who merely on the
ground of the sacred tradition about an intelligent cause of the world
would assume this entire world to be of an intellectual nature would
find room for the other scriptural passage quoted above ('He became
knowledge and what is devoid of knowledge') which teaches a distinction
of intellect and non-intellect; for he could avail himself of the
doctrine of intellect being sometimes manifested and sometimes
non-manifested. His antagonist, on the other hand (i.e. the Sâ@nkhya),
would not be able to make anything of the passage, for it distinctly
teaches that the highest cause constitutes the Self of the entire world.

If, then, on account of difference of character that which is
intelligent cannot pass over into what is non-intelligent, that also
which is non-intelligent (i.e. in our case, the non-intelligent pradhâna
of the Sâ@nkhyas) cannot pass over into what is intelligent.--(So much
for argument's sake,) but apart from that, as the argument resting on
difference of character has already been refuted, we must assume an
intelligent cause of the world in agreement with Scripture.

7. If (it is said that the effect is) non-existent (before its
origination); we do not allow that because it is a mere negation
(without an object).

If Brahman, which is intelligent, pure, and devoid of qualities such as
sound, and so on, is supposed to be the cause of an effect which is of
an opposite nature, i.e. non-intelligent, impure, possessing the
qualities of sound, &c., it follows that the effect has to be considered
as non-existing before its actual origination. But this consequence
cannot be acceptable to you--the Vedântin--who maintain the doctrine of
the effect existing in the cause already.

This objection of yours, we reply, is without any force, on account of
its being a mere negation. If you negative the existence of the effect
previous to its actual origination, your negation is a mere negation
without an object to be negatived. The negation (implied in
'non-existent') can certainly not have for its object the existence of
the effect previous to its origination, since the effect must be viewed
as 'existent,' through and in the Self of the cause, before its
origination as well as after it; for at the present moment also this
effect does not exist independently, apart from the cause; according to
such scriptural passages as, 'Whosoever looks for anything elsewhere
than in the Self is abandoned by everything' (B/ri/. Up. II, 4, 6). In
so far, on the other hand, as the effect exists through the Self of the
cause, its existence is the same before the actual beginning of the
effect (as after it).--But Brahman, which is devoid of qualities such as
sound, &c., is the cause of this world (possessing all those
qualities)!--True, but the effect with all its qualities does not exist
without the Self of the cause either now or before the actual beginning
(of the effect); hence it cannot be said that (according to our
doctrine) the effect is non-existing before its actual beginning.--This
point will be elucidated in detail in the section treating of the
non-difference of cause and effect.

8. On account of such consequences at the time of reabsorption (the
doctrine maintained hitherto) is objectionable.

The pûrvapakshin raises further objections.--If an effect which is
distinguished by the qualities of grossness, consisting of parts,
absence of intelligence, limitation, impurity, &c., is admitted to have
Brahman for its cause, it follows that at the time of reabsorption (of
the world into Brahman), the effect, by entering into the state of
non-division from its cause, inquinates the latter with its properties.
As therefore--on your doctrine--the cause (i.e. Brahman) as well as the
effect is, at the time of reabsorption, characterised by impurity and
similar qualities, the doctrine of the Upanishads, according to which an
omniscient Brahman is the cause of the world, cannot be upheld.--Another
objection to that doctrine is that in consequence of all distinctions
passing at the time of reabsorption into the state of non-distinction
there would be no special causes left at the time of a new beginning of
the world, and consequently the new world could not arise with all the
distinctions of enjoying souls, objects to be enjoyed and so on (which
are actually observed to exist).--A third objection is that, if we
assume the origin of a new world even after the annihilation of all
works, &c. (which are the causes of a new world arising) of the enjoying
souls which enter into the state of non-difference from the highest
Brahman, we are led to the conclusion that also those (souls) which have
obtained final release again appear in the new world.--If you finally
say, 'Well, let this world remain distinct from the highest Brahman even
at the time of reabsorption,' we reply that in that case a reabsorption
will not take place at all, and that, moreover, the effect's existing
separate from the cause is not possible.--For all these reasons the
Vedânta doctrine is objectionable.

To this the next Sûtra replies.

9. Not so; as there are parallel instances.

There is nothing objectionable in our system.--The objection that the
effect when being reabsorbed into its cause would inquinate the latter
with its qualities does not damage our position 'because there are
parallel instances,' i.e. because there are instances of effects not
inquinating with their qualities the causes into which they are
reabsorbed. Things, for instance, made of clay, such as pots, &c., which
in their state of separate existence are of various descriptions, do
not, when they are reabsorbed into their original matter (i.e. clay),
impart to the latter their individual qualities; nor do golden ornaments
impart their individual qualities to their elementary material, i.e.
gold, into which they may finally be reabsorbed. Nor does the fourfold
complex of organic beings which springs from earth impart its qualities
to the latter at the time of reabsorption. You (i.e. the pûrvapakshin),
on the other hand, have not any instances to quote in your favour. For
reabsorption could not take place at all if the effect when passing back
into its causal substance continued to subsist there with all its
individual properties. And[272] that in spite of the non-difference of
cause and effect the effect has its Self in the cause, but not the cause
in the effect, is a point which we shall render clear later on, under
II, 1, 14.

Moreover, the objection that the effect would impart its qualities to
the cause at the time of reabsorption is formulated too narrowly
because, the identity of cause and effect being admitted, the same would
take place during the time of the subsistence (of the effect, previous
to its reabsorption). That the identity of cause and effect (of Brahman
and the world) holds good indiscriminately with regard to all time (not
only the time of reabsorption), is declared in many scriptural passages,
as, for instance, 'This everything is that Self' (B/ri/. Up. II, 4, 6);
'The Self is all this' (Ch. Up. VII, 25, 2); 'The immortal Brahman is
this before' (Mu. Up. II, 2, 11); 'All this is Brahman' (Ch. Up. III,
14, 1).

With regard to the case referred to in the /S/ruti-passages we refute
the assertion of the cause being affected by the effect and its
qualities by showing that the latter are the mere fallacious
superimpositions of nescience, and the very same argument holds good
with reference to reabsorption also.--We can quote other examples in
favour of our doctrine. As the magician is not at any time affected by
the magical illusion produced by himself, because it is unreal, so the
highest Self is not affected by the world-illusion. And as one dreaming
person is not affected by the illusory visions of his dream because they
do not accompany the waking state and the state of dreamless sleep; so
the one permanent witness of the three states (viz. the highest Self
which is the one unchanging witness of the creation, subsistence, and
reabsorption of the world) is not touched by the mutually exclusive
three states. For that the highest Self appears in those three states,
is a mere illusion, not more substantial than the snake for which the
rope is mistaken in the twilight. With reference to this point teachers
knowing the true tradition of the Vedânta have made the following
declaration, 'When the individual soul which is held in the bonds of
slumber by the beginningless Mâyâ awakes, then it knows the eternal,
sleepless, dreamless non-duality' (Gau/d/ap. Kâr. I, 16).

So far we have shown that--on our doctrine--there is no danger of the
cause being affected at the time of reabsorption by the qualities of the
effect, such as grossness and the like.--With regard to the second
objection, viz. that if we assume all distinctions to pass (at the time
of reabsorption) into the state of non-distinction there would be no
special reason for the origin of a new world affected with distinctions,
we likewise refer to the 'existence of parallel instances.' For the case
is parallel to that of deep sleep and trance. In those states also the
soul enters into an essential condition of non-distinction;
nevertheless, wrong knowledge being not yet finally overcome, the old
state of distinction re-establishes itself as soon as the soul awakes
from its sleep or trance. Compare the scriptural passage, 'All these
creatures when they have become merged in the True, know not that they
are merged in the True. Whatever these creatures are here, whether a
lion, or a wolf, or a boar, or a worm, or a midge, or a gnat, or a
mosquito, that they become again' (Ch. Up. VI, 9, 2; 3) For just as
during the subsistence of the world the phenomenon of multifarious
distinct existence, based on wrong knowledge, proceeds unimpeded like
the vision of a dream, although there is only one highest Self devoid of
all distinction; so, we conclude, there remains, even after
reabsorption, the power of distinction (potential distinction) founded
on wrong knowledge.--Herewith the objection that--according to our
doctrine--even the finally released souls would be born again is already
disposed of. They will not be born again because in their case wrong
knowledge has been entirely discarded by perfect knowledge.--The last
alternative finally (which the pûrvapakshin had represented as open to
the Vedântin), viz. that even at the time of reabsorption the world
should remain distinct from Brahman, precludes itself because it is not
admitted by the Vedântins themselves.--Hence the system founded on the
Upanishads is in every way unobjectionable.

10. And because the objections (raised by the Sâ@nkhya against the
Vedânta doctrine) apply to his view also.

The doctrine of our opponent is liable to the very same objections which
he urges against us, viz. in the following manner.--The objection that
this world cannot have sprung from Brahman on account of its difference
of character applies no less to the doctrine of the pradhâna being the
cause of the world; for that doctrine also assumes that from a pradhâna
devoid of sound and other qualities a world is produced which possesses
those very qualities. The beginning of an effect different in character
being thus admitted, the Sâ@nkhya is equally driven to the doctrine that
before the actual beginning the effect was non-existent. And, moreover,
it being admitted (by the Sâ@nkhya also) that at the time of
reabsorption the effect passes back into the state of non-distinction
from the cause, the case of the Sâ@nkhya here also is the same as
ours.--And, further, if (as the Sâ@nkhya also must admit) at the time of
reabsorption the differences of all the special effects are obliterated
and pass into a state of general non-distinction, the special fixed
conditions, which previous to reabsorption were the causes of the
different worldly existence of each soul, can, at the time of a new
creation, no longer be determined, there being no cause for them; and if
you assume them to be determined without a cause, you are driven to the
admission that even the released souls have to re-enter a state of
bondage, there being equal absence of a cause (in the case of the
released and the non-released souls). And if you try to avoid this
conclusion by assuming that at the time of reabsorption some individual
differences pass into the state of non-distinction, others not, we reply
that in that case the latter could not be considered as effects of the
pradhâna[273].--It thus appears that all those difficulties (raised by
the Sâ@nkhya) apply to both views, and cannot therefore be urged against
either only. But as either of the two doctrines must necessarily be
accepted, we are strengthened--by the outcome of the above
discussion--in the opinion that the alleged difficulties are no real
difficulties[274].

11. If it be said that, in consequence of the ill-foundedness of
reasoning, we must frame our conclusions otherwise; (we reply that) thus
also there would result non-release.

In matters to be known from Scripture mere reasoning is not to be relied
on for the following reason also. As the thoughts of man are altogether
unfettered, reasoning which disregards the holy texts and rests on
individual opinion only has no proper foundation. We see how arguments,
which some clever men had excogitated with great pains, are shown, by
people still more ingenious, to be fallacious, and how the arguments of
the latter again are refuted in their turn by other men; so that, on
account of the diversity of men's opinions, it is impossible to accept
mere reasoning as having a sure foundation. Nor can we get over this
difficulty by accepting as well-founded the reasoning of some person of
recognised mental eminence, may he now be Kapila or anybody else; since
we observe that even men of the most undoubted mental eminence, such as
Kapila, Ka/n/âda, and other founders of philosophical schools, have
contradicted one another.

But (our adversary may here be supposed to say), we will fashion our
reasoning otherwise, i.e. in such a manner as not to lay it open to the
charge of having no proper foundation. You cannot, after all, maintain
that no reasoning whatever is well-founded; for you yourself can found
your assertion that reasoning has no foundation on reasoning only; your
assumption being that because some arguments are seen to be devoid of
foundation other arguments as belonging to the same class are likewise
devoid of foundation. Moreover, if all reasoning were unfounded, the
whole course of practical human life would have to come to an end. For
we see that men act, with a view to obtaining pleasure and avoiding pain
in the future time, on the assumption that the past, the present, and
the future are uniform.--Further, in the case of passages of Scripture
(apparently) contradicting each other, the ascertainment of the real
sense, which depends on a preliminary refutation of the apparent sense,
can be effected only by an accurate definition of the meaning of
sentences, and that involves a process of reasoning. Thus Manu also
expresses himself: 'Perception, inference, and the /s/âstra according to
the various traditions, this triad is to be known well by one desiring
clearness in regard to right.--He who applies reasoning not contradicted
by the Veda to the Veda and the (Sm/ri/ti) doctrine of law, he, and no
other, knows the law' (Manu Sm/ri/ti XII, 105, 106). And that 'want of
foundation', to which you object, really constitutes the beauty of
reasoning, because it enables us to arrive at unobjectionable arguments
by means of the previous refutation of objectionable arguments[275]. (No
fear that because the pûrvapaksha is ill-founded the siddhânta should be
ill-founded too;) for there is no valid reason to maintain that a man
must be stupid because his elder brother was stupid.--For all these
reasons the want of foundation cannot be used as an argument against
reasoning.

Against this argumentation we remark that thus also there results 'want
of release.' For although with regard to some things reasoning is
observed to be well founded, with regard to the matter in hand there
will result 'want of release,' viz. of the reasoning from this very
fault of ill-foundedness. The true nature of the cause of the world on
which final emancipation depends cannot, on account of its excessive
abstruseness, even be thought of without the help of the holy texts;
for, as already remarked, it cannot become the object of perception,
because it does not possess qualities such as form and the like, and as
it is devoid of characteristic signs, it does not lend itself to
inference and the other means of right knowledge.--Or else (if we adopt
another explanation of the word 'avimoksha') all those who teach the
final release of the soul are agreed that it results from perfect
knowledge. Perfect knowledge has the characteristic mark of uniformity,
because it depends on accomplished actually existing things; for
whatever thing is permanently of one and the same nature is acknowledged
to be a true or real thing, and knowledge conversant about such is
called perfect knowledge; as, for instance, the knowledge embodied in
the proposition, 'fire is hot.' Now, it is clear that in the case of
perfect knowledge a mutual conflict of men's opinions is impossible. But
that cognitions founded on reasoning do conflict is generally known; for
we continually observe that what one logician endeavours to establish as
perfect knowledge is demolished by another, who, in his turn, is treated
alike by a third. How therefore can knowledge, which is founded on
reasoning, and whose object is not something permanently uniform, be
perfect knowledge?--Nor can it be said that he who maintains the
pradhâna to be the cause of the world (i.e. the Sâ@nkhya) is the best of
all reasoners, and accepted as such by all philosophers; which would
enable us to accept his opinion as perfect knowledge.--Nor can we
collect at a given moment and on a given spot all the logicians of the
past, present, and future time, so as to settle (by their agreement)
that their opinion regarding some uniform object is to be considered
perfect knowledge. The Veda, on the other hand, which is eternal and the
source of knowledge, may be allowed to have for its object firmly
established things, and hence the perfection of that knowledge which is
founded on the Veda cannot be denied by any of the logicians of the
past, present, or future. We have thus established the perfection of
this our knowledge which reposes on the Upanishads, and as apart from it
perfect knowledge is impossible, its disregard would lead to 'absence of
final release' of the transmigrating souls. Our final position therefore
is, that on the ground of Scripture and of reasoning subordinate to
Scripture, the intelligent Brahman is to be considered the cause and
substance of the world.

12. Thereby those (theories) also which are not accepted by competent
persons are explained.

Hitherto we have refuted those objections against the Vedânta-texts
which, based on reasoning, take their stand on the doctrine of the
pradhâna being the cause of the world; (which doctrine deserves to be
refuted first), because it stands near to our Vedic system, is supported
by somewhat weighty arguments, and has, to a certain extent, been
adopted by some authorities who follow the Veda.--But now some
dull-witted persons might think that another objection founded on
reasoning might be raised against the Vedânta, viz. on the ground of the
atomic doctrine. The Sûtrakâra, therefore, extends to the latter
objection the refutation of the former, considering that by the conquest
of the most dangerous adversary the conquest of the minor enemies is
already virtually accomplished. Other doctrines, as, for instance, the
atomic doctrine of which no part has been accepted by either Manu or
Vyâsa or other authorities, are to be considered as 'explained,' i.e.
refuted by the same reasons which enabled us to dispose of the pradhâna
doctrine. As the reasons on which the refutation hinges are the same,
there is no room for further doubt. Such common arguments are the
impotence of reasoning to fathom the depth of the transcendental cause
of the world, the ill-foundedness of mere Reasoning, the impossibility
of final release, even in case of the conclusions being shaped
'otherwise' (see the preceding Sûtra), the conflict of Scripture and
Reasoning, and so on.

13. If it be said that from the circumstance of (the objects of
enjoyment) passing over into the enjoyer (and vice versâ) there would
result non-distinction (of the two); we reply that (such distinction)
may exist (nevertheless), as ordinary experience shows.

Another objection, based on reasoning, is raised against the doctrine of
Brahman being the cause of the world.--Although Scripture is
authoritative with regard to its own special subject-matter (as, for
instance, the causality of Brahman), still it may have to be taken in a
secondary sense in those cases where the subject-matter is taken out of
its grasp by other means of right knowledge; just as mantras and
arthavâdas have occasionally to be explained in a secondary sense (when
the primary, literal sense is rendered impossible by other means of
right knowledge[276]). Analogously reasoning is to be considered invalid
outside its legitimate sphere; so, for instance, in the case of
religious duty and its opposite[277].--Hence Scripture cannot be
acknowledged to refute what is settled by other means of right
knowledge. And if you ask, 'Where does Scripture oppose itself to what
is thus established?' we give you the following instance. The
distinction of enjoyers and objects of enjoyment is well known from
ordinary experience, the enjoyers being intelligent, embodied souls,
while sound and the like are the objects of enjoyment. Devadatta, for
instance, is an enjoyer, the dish (which he eats) an object of
enjoyment. The distinction of the two would be reduced to non-existence
if the enjoyer passed over into the object of enjoyment, and vice versâ.
Now this passing over of one thing into another would actually result
from the doctrine of the world being non-different from Brahman. But the
sublation of a well-established distinction is objectionable, not only
with regard to the present time when that distinction is observed to
exist, but also with regard to the past and the future, for which it is
inferred. The doctrine of Brahman's causality must therefore be
abandoned, as it would lead to the sublation of the well-established
distinction of enjoyers and objects of enjoyment.

To the preceding objection we reply, 'It may exist as in ordinary
experience.' Even on our philosophic view the distinction may exist, as
ordinary experience furnishes us with analogous instances. We see, for
instance, that waves, foam, bubbles, and other modifications of the sea,
although they really are not different from the sea-water, exist,
sometimes in the state of mutual separation, sometimes in the state of
conjunction, &c. From the fact of their being non-different from the
sea-water, it does not follow that they pass over into each other; and,
again, although they do not pass over into each other, still they are
not different from the sea. So it is in the case under discussion also.
The enjoyers and the objects of enjoyment do not pass over into each
other, and yet they are not different from the highest Brahman. And
although the enjoyer is not really an effect of Brahman, since the
unmodified creator himself, in so far as he enters into the effect, is
called the enjoyer (according to the passage, 'Having created he entered
into it,' Taitt. Up. II, 6), still after Brahman has entered into its
effects it passes into a state of distinction, in consequence of the
effect acting as a limiting adjunct; just as the universal ether is
divided by its contact with jars and other limiting adjuncts. The
conclusion is, that the distinction of enjoyers and objects of enjoyment
is possible, although both are non-different from Brahman, their highest
cause, as the analogous instance of the sea and its waves demonstrates.

14. The non-difference of them (i.e. of cause and effect) results from
such terms as 'origin' and the like.

The[278] refutation contained in the preceding Sûtra was set forth on
the condition of the practical distinction of enjoyers and objects of
enjoyment being acknowledged. In reality, however, that distinction does
not exist because there is understood to be non-difference (identity) of
cause and effect. The effect is this manifold world consisting of ether
and so on; the cause is the highest Brahman. Of the effect it is
understood that in reality it is non-different from the cause, i.e. has
no existence apart from the cause.--How so?--'On account of the
scriptural word "origin" and others.' The word 'origin' is used in
connexion with a simile, in a passage undertaking to show how through
the knowledge of one thing everthing is known; viz. Ch. Up. VI, 1, 4,
'As, my dear, by one clod of clay all that is made of clay is known, the
modification (i.e. the effect; the thing made of clay) being a name
merely which has its origin in speech, while the truth is that it is
clay merely; thus,' &c.--The meaning of this passage is that, if there
is known a lump of clay which really and truly is nothing but clay[279],
there are known thereby likewise all things made of clay, such as jars,
dishes, pails, and so on, all of which agree in having clay for their
true nature. For these modifications or effects are names only, exist
through or originate from speech only, while in reality there exists no
such thing as a modification. In so far as they are names (individual
effects distinguished by names) they are untrue; in so far as they are
clay they are true.--This parallel instance is given with reference to
Brahman; applying the phrase 'having its origin in speech' to the case
illustrated by the instance quoted we understand that the entire body of
effects has no existence apart from Brahman.--Later on again the text,
after having declared that fire, water, and earth are the effects of
Brahman, maintains that the effects of these three elements have no
existence apart from them, 'Thus has vanished the specific nature of
burning fire, the modification being a mere name which has its origin in
speech, while only the three colours are what is true' (Ch. Up. VI, 4,
1).--Other sacred texts also whose purport it is to intimate the unity
of the Self are to be quoted here, in accordance with the 'and others'
of the Sûtra. Such texts are, 'In that all this has its Self; it is the
True, it is the Self, thou art that' (Ch. Up. VI, 8, 7); 'This
everything, all is that Self' (/Bri/. Up. II, 4, 6); 'Brahman alone is
all this' (Mu. Up. II, 2, 11); 'The Self is all this' (Ch. Up. VII, 25,
2); 'There is in it no diversity' (Bri. Up. IV, 4, 25).--On any other
assumption it would not be possible to maintain that by the knowledge of
one thing everything becomes known (as the text quoted above declares).
We therefore must adopt the following view. In the same way as those
parts of ethereal space which are limited by jars and waterpots are not
really different from the universal ethereal space, and as the water of
a mirage is not really different from the surface of the salty
steppe--for the nature of that water is that it is seen in one moment
and has vanished in the next, and moreover, it is not to be perceived by
its own nature (i.e. apart from the surface of the desert[280])--; so
this manifold world with its objects of enjoyment, enjoyers and so on
has no existence apart from Brahman.--But--it might be objected--Brahman
has in itself elements of manifoldness. As the tree has many branches,
so Brahman possesses many powers and energies dependent on those powers.
Unity and manifoldness are therefore both true. Thus, a tree considered
in itself is one, but it is manifold if viewed as having branches; so
the sea in itself is one, but manifold as having waves and foam; so the
clay in itself is one, but manifold if viewed with regard to the jars
and dishes made of it. On this assumption the process of final release
resulting from right knowledge may be established in connexion with the
element of unity (in Brahman), while the two processes of common worldly
activity and of activity according to the Veda--which depend on the
karmakâ/nd/a--may be established in connexion with the element of
manifoldness. And with this view the parallel instances of clay &c.
agree very well.

This theory, we reply, is untenable because in the instance (quoted in
the Upanishad) the phrase 'as clay they are true' asserts the cause only
to be true while the phrase 'having its origin in speech' declares the
unreality of all effects. And with reference to the matter illustrated
by the instance given (viz. the highest cause, Brahman) we read, 'In
that all this has its Self;' and, again, 'That is true;' whereby it is
asserted that only the one highest cause is true. The following passage
again, 'That is the Self; thou art that, O /S/vetaketu!' teaches that
the embodied soul (the individual soul) also is Brahman. (And we must
note that) the passage distinctly teaches that the fact of the embodied
soul having its Self in Brahman is self-established, not to be
accomplished by endeavour. This doctrine of the individual soul having
its Self in Brahman, if once accepted as the doctrine of the Veda, does
away with the independent existence of the individual soul, just as the
idea of the rope does away with the idea of the snake (for which the
rope had been mistaken). And if the doctrine of the independent
existence of the individual soul has to be set aside, then the opinion
of the entire phenomenal world--which is based on the individual
soul--having an independent existence is likewise to be set aside. But
only for the establishment of the latter an element of manifoldness
would have to be assumed in Brahman, in addition to the element of
unity.--Scriptural passages also (such as, 'When the Self only is all
this, how should he see another?' B/ri/. Up. II, 4, 13) declare that for
him who sees that everything has its Self in Brahman the whole
phenomenal world with its actions, agents, and results of actions is
non-existent. Nor can it be said that this non-existence of the
phenomenal world is declared (by Scripture) to be limited to certain
states; for the passage 'Thou art that' shows that the general fact of
Brahman being the Self of all is not limited by any particular state.
Moreover, Scripture, showing by the instance of the thief (Ch. VI, 16)
that the false-minded is bound while the true-minded is released,
declares thereby that unity is the one true existence while manifoldness
is evolved out of wrong knowledge. For if both were true how could the
man who acquiesces in the reality of this phenomenal world be called
false-minded[281]? Another scriptural passage ('from death to death goes
he who perceives therein any diversity,' B/ri/. Up. IV, 4, 19) declares
the same, by blaming those who perceive any distinction.--Moreover, on
the doctrine, which we are at present impugning, release cannot result
from knowledge, because the doctrine does not acknowledge that some kind
of wrong knowledge, to be removed by perfect knowledge, is the cause of
the phenomenal world. For how can the cognition of unity remove the
cognition of manifoldness if both are true?

Other objections are started.--If we acquiesce in the doctrine of
absolute unity, the ordinary means of right knowledge, perception, &c.,
become invalid because the absence of manifoldness deprives them of
their objects; just as the idea of a man becomes invalid after the right
idea of the post (which at first had been mistaken for a man) has
presented itself. Moreover, all the texts embodying injunctions and
prohibitions will lose their purport if the distinction on which their
validity depends does not really exist. And further, the entire body of
doctrine which refers to final release will collapse, if the distinction
of teacher and pupil on which it depends is not real. And if the
doctrine of release is untrue, how can we maintain the truth of the
absolute unity of the Self, which forms an item of that doctrine?

These objections, we reply, do not damage our position because the
entire complex of phenomenal existence is considered as true as long as
the knowledge of Brahman being the Self of all has not arisen; just as
the phantoms of a dream are considered to be true until the sleeper
wakes. For as long as a person has not reached the true knowledge of the
unity of the Self, so long it does not enter his mind that the world of
effects with its means and objects of right knowledge and its results of
actions is untrue; he rather, in consequence of his ignorance, looks on
mere effects (such as body, offspring, wealth, &c.) as forming part of
and belonging to his Self, forgetful of Brahman being in reality the
Self of all. Hence, as long as true knowledge does not present itself,
there is no reason why the ordinary course of secular and religious
activity should not hold on undisturbed. The case is analogous to that
of a dreaming man who in his dream sees manifold things, and, up to the
moment of waking, is convinced that his ideas are produced by real
perception without suspecting the perception to be a merely apparent
one.--But how (to restate an objection raised above) can the
Vedânta-texts if untrue convey information about the true being of
Brahman? We certainly do not observe that a man bitten by a rope-snake
(i.e. a snake falsely imagined in a rope) dies, nor is the water
appearing in a mirage used for drinking or bathing[282].--This
objection, we reply, is without force (because as a matter of fact we do
see real effects to result from unreal causes), for we observe that
death sometimes takes place from imaginary venom, (when a man imagines
himself to have been bitten by a venomous snake,) and effects (of what
is perceived in a dream) such as the bite of a snake or bathing in a
river take place with regard to a dreaming person.--But, it will be
said, these effects themselves are unreal!--These effects themselves, we
reply, are unreal indeed; but not so the consciousness which the
dreaming person has of them. This consciousness is a real result; for it
is not sublated by the waking consciousness. The man who has risen from
sleep does indeed consider the effects perceived by him in his dream
such as being bitten by a snake, bathing in a river, &c. to be unreal,
but he does not on that account consider the consciousness he had of
them to be unreal likewise.--(We remark in passing that) by this fact of
the consciousness of the dreaming person not being sublated (by the
waking consciousness) the doctrine of the body being our true Self is to
be considered as refuted[283].--Scripture also (in the passage, 'If a
man who is engaged in some sacrifice undertaken for some special wish
sees in his dream a woman, he is to infer therefrom success in his
work') declares that by the unreal phantom of a dream a real result such
as prosperity may be obtained. And, again, another scriptural passage,
after having declared that from the observation of certain unfavourable
omens a man is to conclude that he will not live long, continues 'if
somebody sees in his dream a black man with black teeth and that man
kills him,' intimating thereby that by the unreal dream-phantom a real
fact, viz. death, is notified.--It is, moreover, known from the
experience of persons who carefully observe positive and negative
instances that such and such dreams are auspicious omens, others the
reverse. And (to quote another example that something true can result
from or be known through something untrue) we see that the knowledge of
the real sounds A. &c. is reached by means of the unreal written
letters. Moreover, the reasons which establish the unity of the Self are
altogether final, so that subsequently to them nothing more is required
for full satisfaction[284]. An injunction as, for instance, 'He is to
sacrifice' at once renders us desirous of knowing what is to be
effected, and by what means and in what manner it is to be effected; but
passages such as, 'Thou art that,' 'I am Brahman,' leave nothing to be
desired because the state of consciousness produced by them has for its
object the unity of the universal Self. For as long as something else
remains a desire is possible; but there is nothing else which could be
desired in addition to the absolute unity of Brahman. Nor can it be
maintained that such states of consciousness do not actually arise; for
scriptural passages such as, 'He understood what he said' (Ch. Up. VII,
18, 2), declare them to occur, and certain means are enjoined to bring
them about, such as the hearing (of the Veda from a teacher) and the
recital of the sacred texts. Nor, again, can such consciousness be
objected to on the ground either of uselessness or of erroneousness,
because, firstly, it is seen to have for its result the cessation of
ignorance, and because, secondly, there is no other kind of knowledge by
which it could be sublated. And that before the knowledge of the unity
of the Self has been reached the whole real-unreal course of ordinary
life, worldly as well as religious, goes on unimpeded, we have already
explained. When, however, final authority having intimated the unity of
the Self, the entire course of the world which was founded on the
previous distinction is sublated, then there is no longer any
opportunity for assuming a Brahman comprising in itself various
elements.

But--it may be said--(that would not be a mere assumption, but)
Scripture itself, by quoting the parallel instances of clay and so on,
declares itself in favour of a Brahman capable of modification; for we
know from experience that clay and similar things do undergo
modifications.--This objection--we reply--is without force, because a
number of scriptural passages, by denying all modification of Brahman,
teach it to be absolutely changeless (kû/t/astha). Such passages are,
'This great unborn Self; undecaying, undying, immortal, fearless, is
indeed Brahman' (B/ri/. Up. IV, 4, 25); 'That Self is to be described by
No, no' (B/ri/. Up. III, 9, 26); 'It is neither coarse nor fine' (B/ri/.
Up. III, 8, 8). For to the one Brahman the two qualities of being
subject to modification and of being free from it cannot both be
ascribed. And if you say, 'Why should they not be both predicated of
Brahman (the former during the time of the subsistence of the world, the
latter during the period of reabsorption) just as rest and motion may be
predicated (of one body at different times)?' we remark that the
qualification, 'absolutely changeless' (kû/t/astha), precludes this. For
the changeless Brahman cannot be the substratum of varying attributes.
And that, on account of the negation of all attributes, Brahman really
is eternal and changeless has already been demonstrated.--Moreover,
while the cognition of the unity of Brahman is the instrument of final
release, there is nothing to show that any independent result is
connected with the view of Brahman, by undergoing a modification,
passing over into the form of this world. Scripture expressly declares
that the knowledge of the changeless Brahman being the universal Self
leads to a result; for in the passage which begins, 'That Self is to be
described by No, no,' we read later on, 'O Janaka, you have indeed
reached fearlessness' (B/ri/. Up. IV, 2, 4). We have then[285] to accept
the following conclusion that, in the sections treating of Brahman, an
independent result belongs only to the knowledge of Brahman as devoid of
all attributes and distinctions, and that hence whatever is stated as
having no special fruit of its own--as, for instance, the passages about
Brahman modifying itself into the form of this world--is merely to be
applied as a means for the cognition of the absolute Brahman, but does
not bring about an independent result; according to the principle that
whatever has no result of its own, but is mentioned in connexion with
something else which has such a result, is subordinate to the
latter[286]. For to maintain that the result of the knowledge of Brahman
undergoing modifications would be that the Self (of him who knows that)
would undergo corresponding modifications[287] would be inappropriate,
as the state of filial release (which the soul obtains through the
knowledge of Brahman) is eternally unchanging.

But, it is objected, he who maintains the nature of Brahman to be
changeless thereby contradicts the fundamental tenet according to which
the Lord is the cause of the world, since the doctrine of absolute unity
leaves no room for the distinction of a Ruler and something ruled.--This
objection we ward off by remarking that omniscience, &c. (i.e. those
qualities which belong to Brahman only in so far as it is related to a
world) depend on the evolution of the germinal principles called name
and form, whose essence is Nescience. The fundamental tenet which we
maintain (in accordance with such scriptural passages as, 'From that
Self sprang ether,' &c.; Taitt. Up. II, 1) is that the creation,
sustentation, and reabsorption of the world proceed from an omniscient,
omnipotent Lord, not from a non-intelligent pradhâna or any other
principle. That tenet we have stated in I, 1, 4, and here we do not
teach anything contrary to it.--But how, the question may be asked, can
you make this last assertion while all the while you maintain the
absolute unity and non-duality of the Self?--Listen how. Belonging to
the Self, as it were, of the omniscient Lord, there are name and form,
the figments of Nescience, not to be defined either as being (i.e.
Brahman), nor as different from it[288], the germs of the entire expanse
of the phenomenal world, called in /S/rutî and Sm/ri/ti the illusion
(mâyâ), power (/s/aktî), or nature (prak/ri/ti) of the omniscient Lord.
Different from them is the omniscient Lord himself, as we learn from
scriptural passages such as the following, 'He who is called ether is
the revealer of all forms and names; that within which these forms and
names are contained is Brahman' (Ch. Up. VIII, 14, 1); 'Let me evolve
names and forms' (Ch. Up. VI, 3, 2); 'He, the wise one, who having
divided all forms and given all names, sits speaking (with those names)'
(Taitt. Âr. III, 12, 7); 'He who makes the one seed manifold' (/S/ve.
Up. VI, l2).--Thus the Lord depends (as Lord) upon the limiting adjuncts
of name and form, the products of Nescience; just as the universal ether
depends (as limited ether, such as the ether of a jar, &c.) upon the
limiting adjuncts in the shape of jars, pots, &c. He (the Lord) stands
in the realm of the phenomenal in the relation of a ruler to the
so-called jîvas (individual souls) or cognitional Selfs (vij/ñ/ânâtman),
which indeed are one with his own Self--just as the portions of ether
enclosed in jars and the like are one with the universal ether--but are
limited by aggregates of instruments of action (i.e. bodies) produced
from name and form, the presentations of Nescience. Hence the Lord's
being a Lord, his omniscience, his omnipotence, &c. all depend on the
limitation due to the adjuncts whose Self is Nescience; while in reality
none of these qualities belong to the Self whose true nature is cleared,
by right knowledge, from all adjuncts whatever. Thus Scripture also
says, 'Where one sees nothing else, hears nothing else, understands
nothing else, that is the Infinite' (Ch. Up. VII, 24, 1); 'But when the
Self only has become all this, how should he see another?' (B/ri/. Up.
II, 4, 13.) In this manner the Vedânta-texts declare that for him who
has reached the state of truth and reality the whole apparent world does
not exist. The Bhagavadgîtâ also ('The Lord is not the cause of actions,
or of the capacity of performing actions, or of the connexion of action
and fruit; all that proceeds according to its own nature. The Lord
receives no one's sin or merit. Knowledge is enveloped by Ignorance;
hence all creatures are deluded;' Bha. Gî. V, 14; 15) declares that in
reality the relation of Ruler and ruled does not exist. That, on the
other hand, all those distinctions are valid, as far as the phenomenal
world is concerned, Scripture as well as the Bhagavadgîtâ states;
compare B/ri/. Up. IV, 4, 22, 'He is the Lord of all, the king of all
things, the protector of all things; he is a bank and boundary, so that
these worlds may not be confounded;' and Bha. Gî. XVIII, 61, 'The Lord,
O Arjuna, is seated in the region of the heart of all beings, turning
round all beings, (as though) mounted on a machine, by his delusion.'
The Sûtrakâra also asserts the non-difference of cause and effect only
with regard to the state of Reality; while he had, in the preceding
Sûtra, where he looked to the phenomenal world, compared Brahman to the
ocean, &c., that comparison resting on the assumption of the world of
effects not yet having been refuted (i.e. seen to be unreal).--The view
of Brahman as undergoing modifications will, moreover, be of use in the
devout meditations on the qualified (sagu/n/a) Brahman.

15. And because only on the existence (of the cause) (the effect) is
observed.

For the following reason also the effect is non-different from the
cause, because only when the cause exists the effect is observed to
exist, not when it does not exist. For instance, only when the clay
exists the jar is observed to exist, and the cloth only when the threads
exist. That it is not a general rule that when one thing exists another
is also observed to exist, appears, for instance, from the fact, that a
horse which is other (different) from a cow is not observed to exist
only when a cow exists. Nor is the jar observed to exist only when the
potter exists; for in that case non-difference does not exist, although
the relation between the two is that of an operative cause and its
effect[289].--But--it may be objected--even in the case of things other
(i.e. non-identical) we find that the observation of one thing regularly
depends on the existence of another; smoke, for instance, is observed
only when fire exists.--We reply that this is untrue, because sometimes
smoke is observed even after the fire has been extinguished; as, for
instance, in the case of smoke being kept by herdsmen in jars.--Well,
then--the objector will say--let us add to smoke a certain qualification
enabling us to say that smoke of such and such a kind[290] does not
exist unless fire exists.--Even thus, we reply, your objection is not
valid, because we declare that the reason for assuming the
non-difference of cause and effect is the fact of the internal organ
(buddhi) being affected (impressed) by cause and effect jointly[291].
And that does not take place in the case of fire and smoke.--Or else we
have to read (in the Sûtra) 'bhâvât,' and to translate, 'and on account
of the existence or observation.' The non-difference of cause and effect
results not only from Scripture but also from the existence of
perception. For the non-difference of the two is perceived, for
instance, in an aggregate of threads, where we do not perceive a thing
called 'cloth,' in addition to the threads, but merely threads running
lengthways and crossways. So again, in the threads we perceive finer
threads (the aggregate of which is identical with the grosser threads),
in them again finer threads, and so on. On the ground of this our
perception we conclude that the finest parts which we can perceive are
ultimately identical with their causes, viz. red, white, and black (the
colours of fire, water, and earth, according to Ch. Up. VI, 4); those,
again, with air, the latter with ether, and ether with Brahman, which is
one and without a second. That all means of proof lead back to Brahman
(as the ultimate cause of the world; not to pradhâna, &c.), we have
already explained.

16. And on account of that which is posterior (i.e. the effect) being
that which is.

For the following reason also the effect is to be considered as
non-different (from the cause). That which is posterior in time, i.e.
the effect, is declared by Scripture to have, previous to its actual
beginning, its Being in the cause, by the Self of the cause merely. For
in passages like, 'In the beginning, my dear, this was that only which
is' (Ch. Up. VI, 2, 3); and, 'Verily, in the beginning this was Self,
one only' (Ait. Ar. II, 4, 1, 1), the effect which is denoted by the
word 'this' appears in grammatical co-ordination with (the word
denoting) the cause (from which it appears that both inhere in the same
substratum). A thing, on the other hand, which does not exist in another
thing by the Self of the latter is not produced from that other thing;
for instance, oil is not produced from sand. Hence as there is
non-difference before the production (of the effect), we understand that
the effect even after having been produced continues to be non-different
from the cause. As the cause, i.e. Brahman, is in all time neither more
nor less than that which is, so the effect also, viz. the world, is in
all time only that which is. But that which is is one only; therefore
the effect is non-different from the cause.

17. If it be said that on account of being denoted as that which is not
(the effect does) not (exist before it is actually produced); (we reply)
not so, (because the term 'that which is not' denotes) another quality
(merely); (as appears) from the complementary sentence.

But, an objection will be raised, in some places Scripture speaks of the
effect before its production as that which is not; so, for instance, 'In
the beginning this was that only which is not' (Ch. Up. III, 19, 1); and
'Non-existent[292] indeed this was in the beginning' (Taitt. Up. II, 7).
Hence Being (sattvam) cannot be ascribed to the effect before its
production.

This we deny. For by the Non-existence of the effect previous to its
production is not meant absolute Non-existence, but only a different
quality or state, viz. the state of name and form being unevolved, which
state is different from the state of name and form being evolved. With
reference to the latter state the effect is called, previous to its
production, non-existent although then also it existed identical with
its cause. We conclude this from the complementary passage, according to
the rule that the sense of a passage whose earlier part is of doubtful
meaning is determined by its complementary part. With reference to the
passage. 'In the beginning this was non-existent only,' we remark that
what is there denoted by the word 'Non-existing' is--in the
complementary passage, 'That became existent'--referred to by the word
'that,' and qualified as 'Existent.'

The word 'was' would, moreover, not apply to the (absolutely)
Non-existing, which cannot be conceived as connected with prior or
posterior time.--Hence with reference to the other passage also,
'Non-existing indeed,' &c., the complementary part, 'That made itself
its Self,' shows, by the qualification which it contains, that absolute
Non-existence is not meant.--It follows from all this that the
designation of 'Non-existence' applied to the effect before its
production has reference to a different state of being merely. And as
those things which are distinguished by name and form are in ordinary
language called 'existent,' the term 'non-existent' is figuratively
applied to them to denote the state in which they were previously to
their differentiation.

18. From reasoning and from another Vedic passage.

That the effect exists before its origination and is non-different from
the cause, follows from reasoning as well as from a further scriptural
passage.

We at first set forth the argumentation.--Ordinary experience teaches us
that those who wish to produce certain effects, such as curds, or
earthen jars, or golden ornaments, employ for their purpose certain
determined causal substances such as milk, clay, and gold; those who
wish to produce sour milk do not employ clay, nor do those who intend to
make jars employ milk and so on. But, according to that doctrine which
teaches that the effect is non-existent (before its actual production),
all this should be possible. For if before their actual origination all
effects are equally non-existent in any causal substance, why then
should curds be produced from milk only and not from clay also, and jars
from clay only and not from milk as well?--Let us then maintain, the
asatkâryavâdin rejoins, that there is indeed an equal non-existence of
any effect in any cause, but that at the same time each causal substance
has a certain capacity reaching beyond itself (ati/s/aya) for some
particular effect only and not for other effects; that, for instance,
milk only, and not clay, has a certain capacity for curds; and clay
only, and not milk, an analogous capacity for jars.--What, we ask in
return, do you understand by that 'ati/s/aya?' If you understand by it
the antecedent condition of the effect (before its actual origination),
you abandon your doctrine that the effect does not exist in the cause,
and prove our doctrine according to which it does so exist. If, on the
other hand, you understand by the ati/s/aya a certain power of the cause
assumed to the end of accounting for the fact that only one determined
effect springs from the cause, you must admit that the power can
determine the particular effect only if it neither is other (than cause
and effect) nor non-existent; for if it were either, it would not be
different from anything else which is either non-existent or other than
cause and effect, (and how then should it alone be able to produce the
particular effect?) Hence it follows that that power is identical with
the Self of the cause, and that the effect is identical with the Self of
that power.--Moreover, as the ideas of cause and effect on the one hand
and of substance and qualities on the other hand are not separate ones,
as, for instance, the ideas of a horse and a buffalo, it follows that
the identity of the cause and the effect as well as of the substance and
its qualities has to be admitted. Let it then be assumed, the opponent
rejoins, that the cause and the effect, although really different, are
not apprehended as such, because they are connected by the so-called
samavâya connexion[293].--If, we reply, you assume the samavâya
connexion between cause and effect, you have either to admit that the
samavâya itself is joined by a certain connexion to the two terms which
are connected by samavâya, and then that connexion will again require a
new connexion (joining it to the two terms which it binds together), and
you will thus be compelled to postulate an infinite series of
connexions; or else you will have to maintain that the samavâya is not
joined by any connexion to the terms which it binds together, and from
that will result the dissolution of the bond which connects the two
terms of the samavâya relation[294].--Well then, the opponent rejoins,
let us assume that the samavâya connexion as itself being a connexion
may be connected with the terms which it joins without the help of any
further connexion.--Then, we reply, conjunction (sa/m/yoga) also must be
connected with the two terms which it joins without the help of the
samavâya connexion; for conjunction also is a kind of
connexion[295].--Moreover, as substances, qualities, and so on are
apprehended as standing in the relation of identity, the assumption of
the samavâya relation has really no purport.

In what manner again do you--who maintain that the cause and the effect
are joined by the samavâya relation--assume a substance consisting of
parts which is an effect to abide in its causes, i.e. in the material
parts of which it consists? Does it abide in all the parts taken
together or in each particular part?--If you say that it abides in all
parts together, it follows that the whole as such cannot be perceived,
as it is impossible that all the parts should be in contact with the
organs of perception. (And let it not be objected that the whole may be
apprehended through some of the parts only), for manyness which abides
in all its substrates together (i.e. in all the many things), is not
apprehended so long as only some of those substrates are
apprehended.--Let it then be assumed that the whole abides in all the
parts by the mediation of intervening aggregates of parts[296].--In that
case, we reply, we should have to assume other parts in addition to the
primary originative parts of the whole, in order that by means of those
other parts the whole could abide in the primary parts in the manner
indicated by you. For we see (that one thing which abides in another
abides there by means of parts different from those of that other
thing), that the sword, for instance, pervades the sheath by means of
parts different from the parts of the sheath. But an assumption of that
kind would lead us into a regressus in infinitum, because in order to
explain how the whole abides in certain given parts we should always
have to assume further parts[297].--Well, then, let us maintain the
second alternative, viz. that the whole abides in each particular
part.--That also cannot be admitted; for if the whole is present in one
part it cannot be present in other parts also; not any more than
Devadatta can be present in /S/rughna and in Pâ/t/aliputra on one and
the same day. If the whole were present in more than one part, several
wholes would result, comparable to Devadatta and Yaj/ñ/adatta, who, as
being two different persons, may live one of them at /S/rughna and the
other at Pâ/t/aliputra.--If the opponent should rejoin that the whole
may be fully present in each part, just as the generic character of the
cow is fully present in each individual cow; we point out that the
generic attributes of the cow are visibly perceived in each individual
cow, but that the whole is not thus perceived in each particular part.
If the whole were fully present in each part, the consequence would be
that the whole would produce its effects indifferently with any of its
parts; a cow, for instance, would give milk from her horns or her tail.
But such things are not seen to take place.

We proceed to consider some further arguments opposed to the doctrine
that the effect does not exist in the cause.--That doctrine involves the
conclusion that the actual origination of an effect is without an agent
and thus devoid of substantial being. For origination is an action, and
as such requires an agent[298], just as the action of walking does. To
speak of an action without an agent would be a contradiction. But if you
deny the pre-existence of the effect in the cause, it would have to be
assumed that whenever the origination of a jar, for instance, is spoken
of the agent is not the jar (which before its origination did not exist)
but something else, and again that when the origination of the two
halves of the jar is spoken of the agent is not the two halves but
something else. From this it would follow that the sentence, 'the jar is
originated' means as much as 'the potter and the other (operative)
causes are originated[299].' But as a matter of fact the former sentence
is never understood to mean the latter; and it is, moreover, known that
at the time when the jar originates, the potter, &c. are already in
existence.--Let us then say, the opponent resumes, that origination is
the connexion of the effect with the existence of its cause and its
obtaining existence as a Self.--How, we ask in reply, can something
which has not yet obtained existence enter into connexion with something
else? A connexion is possible of two existing things only, not of one
existing and one non-existing thing or of two non-existing things. To
something non-existing which on that account is indefinable, it is
moreover not possible to assign a limit as the opponent does when
maintaining that the effect is non-existing before its origination; for
experience teaches us that existing things only such as fields and
houses have limits, but not non-existing things. If somebody should use,
for instance, a phrase such as the following one, 'The son of a barren
woman was king previously to the coronation of Pûr/n/avarman' the
declaration of a limit in time implied in that phrase does not in
reality determine that the son of the barren woman, i.e. a mere
non-entity, either was or is or will be king. If the son of a barren
woman could become an existing thing subsequently to the activity of
some causal agent, in that case it would be possible also that the
non-existing effect should be something existing, subsequently to the
activity of some causal agent. But we know that the one thing can take
place no more than the other thing; the non-existing effect and the son
of the barren woman are both equally non-entities and can never
be.--But, the asatkâryavâdin here objects, from your doctrine there
follows the result that the activity of causal agents is altogether
purposeless. For if the effect were lying already fully accomplished in
the cause and were non-different from it, nobody would endeavour to
bring it about, no more than anybody endeavours to bring about the cause
which is already fully accomplished previously to all endeavour. But as
a matter of fact causal agents do endeavour to bring about effects, and
it is in order not to have to condemn their efforts as altogether
useless that we assume the non-existence of the effect previously to its
origination.--Your objection is refuted, we reply, by the consideration
that the endeavour of the causal agent may be looked upon as having a
purpose in so far as it arranges the causal substance in the form of the
effect. That, however, even the form of the effect (is not something
previously non-existing, but) belongs to the Self of the cause already
because what is devoid of Selfhood cannot be begun at all, we have
already shown above.--Nor does a substance become another substance
merely by appearing under a different aspect. Devadatta may at one time
be seen with his arms and legs closely drawn up to his body, and another
time with his arms and legs stretched out, and yet he remains the same
substantial being, for he is recognised as such. Thus the persons also
by whom we are surrounded, such as fathers, mothers, brothers, &c.,
remain the same, although we see them in continually changing states and
attitudes; for they are always recognised as fathers, mothers, brothers,
and so on. If our opponent objects to this last illustrative example on
the ground that fathers, mothers, and so on remain the same substantial
beings, because the different states in which they appear are not
separated from each other by birth or death, while the effect, for
instance a jar, appears only after the cause, for instance the clay, has
undergone destruction as it were (so that the effect may be looked upon
as something altogether different from the cause); we rebut this
objection by remarking that causal substances also such as milk, for
instance, are perceived to exist even after they have entered into the
condition of effects such as curds and the like (so that we have no
right to say that the cause undergoes destruction). And even in those
cases where the continued existence of the cause is not perceived, as,
for instance, in the case of seeds of the fig-tree from which there
spring sprouts and trees, the term 'birth' (when applied to the sprout)
only means that the causal substance, viz. the seed, becomes visible by
becoming a sprout through the continual accretion of similar particles
of matter; and the term 'death' only means that, through the secession
of those particles, the cause again passes beyond the sphere of
visibility. Nor can it be said that from such separation by birth and
death as described just now it follows that the non-existing becomes
existing, and the existing non-existing; for if that were so, it would
also follow that the unborn child in the mother's womb and the new-born
babe stretched out on the bed are altogether different beings.

It would further follow that a man is not the same person in childhood,
manhood, and old age, and that terms such as father and the like are
illegitimately used.--The preceding arguments may also be used to refute
the (Bauddha doctrine) of all existence being momentary only[300].

The doctrine that the effect is non-existent previously to its actual
origination, moreover, leads to the conclusion that the activity of the
causal agent has no object; for what does not exist cannot possibly be
an object; not any more than the ether can be cleft by swords and other
weapons for striking or cutting. The object can certainly not be the
inherent cause; for that would lead to the erroneous conclusion that
from the activity of the causal agent, which has for its object the
inherent cause, there results something else (viz. the effect). And if
(in order to preclude this erroneous conclusion) the opponent should say
that the effect is (not something different from the cause, but) a
certain relative power (ati/s/aya) of the inherent cause; he thereby
would simply concede our doctrine, according to which the effect exists
in the cause already.

We maintain, therefore, as our final conclusion, that milk and other
substances are called effects when they are in the state of curds and so
on, and that it is impossible, even within hundreds of years, ever to
bring about an effect which is different from its cause. The fundamental
cause of all appears in the form of this and that effect, up to the last
effect of all, just as an actor appears in various robes and costumes,
and thereby becomes the basis for all the current notions and terms
concerning the phenomenal world.

The conclusion here established, on the ground of reasoning, viz. that
the effect exists already before its origination, and is non-different
from its cause, results also from a different scriptural passage. As
under the preceding Sûtra a Vedic passage was instanced which speaks of
the non-existing, the different passage referred to in the present Sûtra
is the one (Ch. Up. VI, 2, 1) which refers to that which is. That
passage begins, 'Being only was this in the beginning, one without a
second,' refers, thereupon, to the doctrine of the Non-existent being
the cause of the world ('Others say, Non-being was this in the
beginning'), raises an objection against that doctrine ('How could that
which is be born of that which is not?'), and, finally, reaffirms the
view first set forth, 'Only Being was this in the beginning.' The
circumstance that in this passage the effect, which is denoted by the
word 'this,' is by Scripture, with reference to the time previous to its
origination, coordinated with the cause denoted by the term 'Being,'
proves that the effect exists in--and is non-different from--the cause.
If it were before its origination non-existing and after it inhered in
its cause by samavâya, it would be something different from the cause,
and that would virtually imply an abandonment of the promise made in the
passage, 'That instruction by which we hear what is not heard,' &c. (VI,
1, 3). The latter assertion is ratified, on the other hand, through the
comprehension that the effect exists in--and is not different from-the
cause.

19. And like a piece of cloth.

As of a folded piece of cloth we do not know clearly whether it is a
piece of cloth or some other thing, while on its being unfolded it
becomes manifest that the folded thing was a piece of cloth; and as, so
long as it is folded, we perhaps know that it is a piece of cloth but
not of what definite length and width it is, while on its being unfolded
we know these particulars, and at the same time that the cloth is not
different from the folded object; in the same way an effect, such as a
piece of cloth, is non-manifest as long as it exists in its causes, i.e.
the threads, &c. merely, while it becomes manifest and is clearly
apprehended in consequence of the operations of shuttle, loom, weaver,
and so on.--Applying this instance of the piece of cloth, first folded
and then unfolded, to the general case of cause and effect, we conclude
that the latter is non-different from the former.

20. And as in the case of the different vital airs.

It is a matter of observation that when the operations of the different
kinds of vital air--such as prâ/n/a the ascending vital air, apâna the
descending vital air, &c.--are suspended, in consequence of the breath
being held so that they exist in their causes merely, the only effect
which continues to be accomplished is life, while all other effects,
such as the bending and stretching of the limbs and so on, are stopped.
When, thereupon, the vital airs again begin to act, those other effects
also are brought about, in addition to mere life.--Nor must the vital
airs, on account of their being divided into classes, be considered as
something else than vital air; for wind (air) constitutes their common
character. Thus (i.e. in the manner illustrated by the instance of the
vital airs) the non-difference of the effect from the cause is to be
conceived.--As, therefore, the whole world is an effect of Brahman and
non-different from it, the promise held out in the scriptural passage
that 'What is not heard is heard, what is not perceived is perceived,
what is not known is known' (Ch. Up. VI, 1, 3) is fulfilled[301].

21. On account of the other (i.e. the individual soul) being designated
(as non-different from Brahman) there would attach (to Brahman) various
faults, as, for instance, not doing what is beneficial.

Another objection is raised against the doctrine of an intelligent cause
of the world.--If that doctrine is accepted, certain faults, as, for
instance, doing what is not beneficial, will attach (to the intelligent
cause, i.e. Brahman), 'on account of the other being designated.' For
Scripture declares the other, i.e. the embodied soul, to be one with
Brahman, as is shown by the passage, 'That is the Self; that art thou, O
/S/vetaketu!' (Ch. Up. VI, 8, 7.)--Or else (if we interpret 'the other'
of the Sûtra in a different way) Scripture declares the other, i.e.
Brahman, to be the Self of the embodied soul. For the passage, 'Having
created that he entered into it,' declares the creator, i.e. the
unmodified Brahman, to constitute the Self of the embodied soul, in
consequence of his entering into his products. The following passage
also, 'Entering (into them) with this living Self I will evolve names
and forms' (Ch. Up. VI, 3, 2), in which the highest divinity designates
the living (soul) by the word 'Self,' shows that the embodied Self is
not different from Brahman. Therefore the creative power of Brahman
belongs to the embodied Self also, and the latter, being thus an
independent agent, might be expected to produce only what is beneficial
to itself, and not things of a contrary nature, such as birth, death,
old age, disease, and whatever may be the other meshes of the net of
suffering. For we know that no free person will build a prison for
himself, and take up his abode in it. Nor would a being, itself
absolutely stainless, look on this altogether unclean body as forming
part of its Self. It would, moreover, free itself, according to its
liking, of the consequences of those of its former actions which result
in pain, and would enjoy the consequences of those actions only which
are rewarded by pleasure. Further, it would remember that it had created
this manifold world; for every person who has produced some clearly
appearing effect remembers that he has been the cause of it. And as the
magician easily retracts, whenever he likes, the magical illusion which
he had emitted, so the embodied soul also would be able to reabsorb this
world into itself. The fact is, however, that the embodied soul cannot
reabsorb its own body even. As we therefore see that 'what would be
beneficial is not done,' the hypothesis of the world having proceeded
from an intelligent cause is unacceptable.

22. But the separate (Brahman, i.e. the Brahman separate from the
individual souls) (is the creator); (the existence of which separate
Brahman we learn) from the declaration of difference.

The word 'but' discards the pûrvapaksha.--We rather declare that that
omniscient, omnipotent Brahman, whose essence is eternal pure cognition
and freedom, and which is additional to, i.e. different from the
embodied Self, is the creative principle of the world. The faults
specified above, such as doing what is not beneficial, and the like, do
not attach to that Brahman; for as eternal freedom is its characteristic
nature, there is nothing either beneficial to be done by it or
non-beneficial to be avoided by it. Nor is there any impediment to its
knowledge and power; for it is omniscient and omnipotent. The embodied
Self, on the other hand, is of a different nature, and to it the
mentioned faults adhere. But then we do not declare it to be the creator
of the world, on account of 'the declaration of difference.' For
scriptural passages (such as, 'Verily, the Self is to be seen, to be
heard, to be perceived, to be marked,' B/ri/. Up. II, 4, 5; 'The Self we
must search out, we must try to understand,' Ch. Up. VIII, 7, 1; 'Then
he becomes united with the True,' Ch. Up. VI, 8, 1; 'This embodied Self
mounted by the intelligent Self,' B/ri/. Up. IV, 3, 35) declare
differences founded on the relations of agent, object, and so on, and
thereby show Brahman to be different from the individual soul.--And if
it be objected that there are other passages declaratory of
non-difference (for instance, 'That art thou'), and that difference and
non-difference cannot co-exist because contradictory, we reply that the
possibility of the co-existence of the two is shown by the parallel
instance of the universal ether and the ether limited by a
jar.--Moreover, as soon as, in consequence of the declaration of
non-difference contained in such passages as 'that art thou,' the
consciousness of non-difference arises in us, the transmigratory state
of the individual soul and the creative quality of Brahman vanish at
once, the whole phenomenon of plurality, which springs from wrong
knowledge, being sublated by perfect knowledge, and what becomes then of
the creation and the faults of not doing what is beneficial, and the
like? For that this entire apparent world, in which good and evil
actions are done, &c., is a mere illusion, owing to the
non-discrimination of (the Self's) limiting adjuncts, viz. a body, and
so on, which spring from name and form the presentations of Nescience,
and does in reality not exist at all, we have explained more than once.
The illusion is analogous to the mistaken notion we entertain as to the
dying, being born, being hurt, &c. of ourselves (our Selfs; while in
reality the body only dies, is born, &c.). And with regard to the state
in which the appearance of plurality is not yet sublated, it follows
from passages declaratory of such difference (as, for instance, 'That we
must search for,' &c.) that Brahman is superior to the individual soul;
whereby the possibility of faults adhering to it is excluded.

23. And because the case is analogous to that of stones, &c. (the
objections raised) cannot be established.

As among minerals, which are all mere modifications of earth,
nevertheless great variety is observed, some being precious gems, such
as diamonds, lapis lazuli, &c., others, such as crystals and the like,
being of medium value, and others again stones only fit to be flung at
dogs or crows; and as from seeds which are placed in one and the same
ground various plants are seen to spring, such as sandalwood and
cucumbers, which show the greatest difference in their leaves, blossoms,
fruits, fragrancy, juice, &c.; and as one and the same food produces
various effects, such as blood and hair; so the one Brahman also may
contain in itself the distinction of the individual Selfs and the
highest Self, and may produce various effects. Hence the objections
imagined by others (against the doctrine of Brahman being the cause of
the world) cannot be maintained.--Further[302] arguments are furnished
by the fact of all effect having, as Scripture declares, their origin in
speech only, and by the analogous instance of the variety of dream
phantoms (while the dreaming person remains one).

24. If you object on the ground of the observation of the employment (of
instruments); (we say), No; because as milk (transforms itself, so
Brahman does).

Your assertion that the intelligent Brahman alone, without a second, is
the cause of the world cannot be maintained, on account of the
observation of employment (of instruments). For in ordinary life we see
that potters, weavers, and other handicraftsmen produce jars, cloth, and
the like, after having put themselves in possession of the means thereto
by providing themselves with various implements, such as clay, staffs,
wheels, string, &c.; Brahman, on the other hand, you conceive to be
without any help; how then can it act as a creator without providing
itself with instruments to work with? We therefore maintain that Brahman
is not the cause of the world.

This objection is not valid, because causation is possible in
consequence of a peculiar constitution of the causal substance, as in
the case of milk. Just as milk and water turn into curds and ice
respectively, without any extraneous means, so it is in the case of
Brahman also. And if you object to this analogy for the reason that
milk, in order to turn into curds, does require an extraneous agent,
viz. heat, we reply that milk by itself also undergoes a certain amount
of definite change, and that its turning is merely accelerated by heat.
If milk did not possess that capability of itself, heat could not compel
it to turn; for we see that air or ether, for instance, is not compelled
by the action of heat to turn into sour milk. By the co-operation of
auxiliary means the milk's capability of turning into sour milk is
merely completed. The absolutely complete power of Brahman, on the other
hand, does not require to be supplemented by any extraneous help. Thus
Scripture also declares, 'There is no effect and no instrument known of
him, no one is seen like unto him or better; his high power is revealed
as manifold, as inherent, acting as force and knowledge' (/S/ve. Up. VI,
8). Therefore Brahman, although one only, is, owing to its manifold
powers, able to transform itself into manifold effects; just as milk is.

25. And (the case of Brahman is) like that of gods and other beings in
ordinary experience.

Well, let it be admitted that milk and other non-intelligent things have
the power of turning themselves into sour milk, &c. without any
extraneous means, since it is thus observed. But we observe, on the
other hand, that intelligent agents, as, for instance, potters, proceed
to their several work only after having provided themselves with a
complete set of instruments. How then can it be supposed that Brahman,
which is likewise of an intelligent nature, should proceed without any
auxiliary?

We reply, 'Like gods and others.' As gods, fathers, /ri/shis, and other
beings of great power, who are all of intelligent nature, are seen to
create many and various objects, such as palaces, chariots, &c., without
availing themselves of any extraneous means, by their mere intention,
which is effective in consequence of those beings' peculiar power--a
fact vouchsafed by mantras, arthavâdas, itihâsas, and purâ/n/as;--and as
the spider emits out of itself the threads of its web; and as the female
crane conceives without a male; and as the lotus wanders from one pond
to another without any means of conveyance; so the intelligent Brahman
also may be assumed to create the world by itself without extraneous
means.

Perhaps our opponent will argue against all this in the following
style.--The gods and other beings, whom you have quoted as parallel
instances, are really of a nature different from that of Brahman. For
the material causes operative in the production of palaces and other
material things are the bodies of the gods, and not their intelligent
Selfs. And the web of the spider is produced from its saliva which,
owing to the spider's devouring small insects, acquires a certain degree
of consistency. And the female crane conceives from hearing the sound of
thunder. And the lotus flower indeed derives from its indwelling
intelligent principle the impulse of movement, but is not able actually
to move in so far as it is a merely intelligent being[303]; it rather
wanders from pond to pond by means of its non-intelligent body, just as
the creeper climbs up the tree.--Hence all these illustrative examples
cannot be applied to the case of Brahman.

To this we reply, that we meant to show merely that the case of Brahman
is different from that of potters and similar agents. For while potters,
&c., on the one side, and gods, &c., on the other side, possess the
common attribute of intelligence, potters require for their work
extraneous means (i.e. means lying outside their bodies) and gods do
not. Hence Brahman also, although intelligent, is assumed to require no
extraneous means. So much only we wanted to show by the parallel
instance of the gods, &c. Our intention is to point out that a
peculiarly conditioned capability which is observed in some one case (as
in that of the potter) is not necessarily to be assumed in all other
cases also.

26. Either the consequence of the entire (Brahman undergoing change) has
to be accepted, or else a violation of the texts declaring Brahman to be
without parts.

Hitherto we have established so much that Brahman, intelligent, one,
without a second, modifying itself without the employment of any
extraneous means, is the cause of the world.--Now, another objection is
raised for the purpose of throwing additional light on the point under
discussion.--The consequence of the Vedânta doctrine, it is said, will
be that we must assume the entire Brahman to undergo the change into its
effects, because it is not composed of parts. If Brahman, like earth and
other matter, consisted of parts, we might assume that a part of it
undergoes the change, while the other part remains as it is. But
Scripture distinctly declares Brahman to be devoid of parts. Compare,
'He who is without parts, without actions, tranquil, without fault,
without taint' (/Sv/e. Up. VI, 19); 'That heavenly person is without
body, he is both without and within, not produced' (Mu. Up. II, 1, 2);
'That great Being is endless, unlimited, consisting of nothing but
knowledge' (B/ri/. Up. II, 4, 12); 'He is to be described by No, no'
(B/ri/. Up. III, 9, 2,6); 'It is neither coarse nor fine' (B/ri/. Up.
III, 8, 8); all which passages deny the existence of any distinctions in
Brahman.--As, therefore, a partial modification is impossible, a
modification of the entire Brahman has to be assumed. But that involves
a cutting off of Brahman from its very basis.--Another consequence of
the Vedântic view is that the texts exhorting us to strive 'to see'
Brahman become purposeless; for the effects of Brahman may be seen
without any endeavour, and apart from them no Brahman exists.--And,
finally, the texts declaring Brahman to be unborn are contradicted
thereby.--If, on the other hand--in order to escape from these
difficulties--we assume Brahman to consist of parts, we thereby do
violence to those texts which declare Brahman not to be made up of
parts. Moreover, if Brahman is made up of parts, it follows that it is
non-eternal.--Hence the Vedântic point of view cannot be maintained in
any way.

27. But (this is not so), on account of scriptural passages, and on
account of (Brahman) resting on Scripture (only).

The word 'but' discards the objection.--We deny this and maintain that
our view is not open to any objections.--That the entire Brahman
undergoes change, by no means follows from our doctrine, 'on account of
sacred texts.' For in the same way as Scripture speaks of the origin of
the world from Brahman, it also speaks of Brahman subsisting apart from
its effects. This appears from the passages indicating the difference of
cause and effect '(That divinity thought) let me enter into these three
divinities with this living Self and evolve names and forms;' and, 'Such
is the greatness of it, greater than it is the Person; one foot of him
are all things, three feet are what is immortal in heaven' (Ch. Up. III,
12, 6); further, from the passages declaring the unmodified Brahman to
have its abode in the heart, and from those teaching that (in dreamless
sleep) the individual soul is united with the True. For if the entire
Brahman had passed into its effects, the limitation (of the soul's union
with Brahman) to the state of dreamless sleep which is declared in the
passage, 'then it is united with the True, my dear,' would be out of
place; since the individual soul is always united with the effects of
Brahman, and since an unmodified Brahman does not exist (on that
hypothesis). Moreover, the possibility of Brahman becoming the object of
perception by means of the senses is denied while its effects may thus
be perceived. For these reasons the existence of an unmodified Brahman
has to be admitted.--Nor do we violate those texts which declare Brahman
to be without parts; we rather admit Brahman to be without parts just
because Scripture reveals it. For Brahman which rests exclusively on the
holy texts, and regarding which the holy texts alone are
authoritative--not the senses, and so on--must be accepted such as the
texts proclaim it to be. Now those texts declare, on the one hand, that
not the entire Brahman passes over into its effects, and, on the other
hand, that Brahman is without parts. Even certain ordinary things such
as gems, spells, herbs, and the like possess powers which, owing to
difference of time, place, occasion, and so on, produce various opposite
effects, and nobody unaided by instruction is able to find out by mere
reflection the number of these powers, their favouring conditions, their
objects, their purposes, &c.; how much more impossible is it to conceive
without the aid of Scripture the true nature of Brahman with its powers
unfathomable by thought! As the Purâ/n/a says: 'Do not apply reasoning
to what is unthinkable! The mark of the unthinkable is that it is above
all material causes[304].' Therefore the cognition of what is
supersensuous is based on the holy texts only.

But--our opponent will say--even the holy texts cannot make us
understand what is contradictory. Brahman, you say, which is without
parts undergoes a change, but not the entire Brahman. If Brahman is
without parts, it does either not change at all or it changes in its
entirety. If, on the other hand, it be said that it changes partly and
persists partly, a break is effected in its nature, and from that it
follows that it consists of parts. It is true that in matters connected
with action (as, for instance, in the case of the two Vedic injunctions
'at the atirâtra he is to take the sho/d/a/s/in-cup,' and 'at the
atirâtra he is not to take the sho/d/a/s/in-cup') any contradiction
which may present itself to the understanding is removed by the optional
adoption of one of the two alternatives presented as action is dependent
on man; but in the case under discussion the adoption of one of the
alternatives does not remove the contradiction because an existent thing
(like Brahman) does not (like an action which is to be accomplished)
depend on man. We are therefore met here by a real difficulty.

No, we reply, the difficulty is merely an apparent one; as we maintain
that the (alleged) break in Brahman's nature is a mere figment of
Nescience. By a break of that nature a thing is not really broken up
into parts, not any more than the moon is really multiplied by appearing
double to a person of defective vision. By that element of plurality
which is the fiction of Nescience, which is characterised by name and
form, which is evolved as well as non-evolved, which is not to be
defined either as the Existing or the Non-existing, Brahman becomes the
basis of this entire apparent world with its changes, and so on, while
in its true and real nature it at the same time remains unchanged,
lifted above the phenomenal universe. And as the distinction of names
and forms, the fiction of Nescience, originates entirely from speech
only, it does not militate against the fact of Brahman being without
parts.--Nor have the scriptural passages which speak of Brahman as
undergoing change the purpose of teaching the fact of change; for such
instruction would have no fruit. They rather aim at imparting
instruction about Brahman's Self as raised above this apparent world;
that being an instruction which we know to have a result of its own. For
in the scriptural passage beginning 'He can only be described by No, no'
(which passage conveys instruction about the absolute Brahman) a result
is stated at the end, in the words 'O Janaka, you have indeed reached
fearlessness' (B/ri/. Up. IV, 2, 4).--Hence our view does not involve
any real difficulties.

28. For thus it is in the (individual) Self also, and various (creations
exist in gods[305], &c.).

Nor is there any reason to find fault with the doctrine that there can
be a manifold creation in the one Self, without destroying its
character. For Scripture teaches us that there exists a multiform
creation in the one Self of a dreaming person, 'There are no chariots in
that state, no horses, no roads, but he himself creates chariots,
horses, and roads' (B/ri/. Up. IV, 3, 10). In ordinary life too
multiform creations, elephants, horses, and the like are seen to exist
in gods, &c., and magicians without interfering with the unity of their
being. Thus a multiform creation may exist in Brahman also, one as it
is, without divesting it of its character of unity.

29. And because the objection (raised against our view) lies against his
(the opponent's) view likewise.

Those also who maintain that the world has sprung from the pradhâna
implicitly teach that something not made up of parts, unlimited, devoid
of sound and other qualities--viz. the pradhâna--is the cause of an
effect--viz. the world--which is made up of parts, is limited and is
characterised by the named qualities. Hence it follows from that
doctrine also either that the pradhâna as not consisting of parts has to
undergo a change in its entirety, or else that the view of its not
consisting of parts has to be abandoned.--But--it might be pleaded in
favour of the Sâ@nkhyas--they do not maintain their pradhâna to be
without parts; for they define it as the state of equilibrium of the
three gu/n/as, Goodness, Passion, and Darkness, so that the pradhâna
forms a whole containing the three gu/n/as as its parts.--We reply that
such a partiteness as is here proposed does not remove the objection in
hand because still each of the three qualities is declared to be in
itself without parts[306]. And each gu/n/a by itself assisted merely by
the two other gu/n/as constitutes the material cause of that part of the
world which resembles it in its nature[307].--So that the objection lies
against the Sâ@nkhya view likewise.--Well, then, as the reasoning (on
which the doctrine of the impartiteness of the pradhâna rests) is not
absolutely safe, let us assume that the pradhâna consists of parts.--If
you do that, we reply, it follows that the pradhâna cannot be eternal,
and so on.--Let it then be said that the various powers of the pradhâna
to which the variety of its effects is pointing are its parts.--Well, we
reply, those various powers are admitted by us also who see the cause of
the world in Brahman.

The same objections lie against the doctrine of the world having
originated from atoms. For on that doctrine one atom when combining with
another must, as it is not made up of parts, enter into the combination
with its whole extent, and as thus no increase of bulk takes place we do
not get beyond the first atom.[308] If, on the other hand, you maintain
that the atom enters into the combination with a part only, you offend
against the assumption of the atoms having no parts.

As therefore all views are equally obnoxious to the objections raised,
the latter cannot be urged against any one view in particular, and the
advocate of Brahman has consequently cleared his doctrine.

30. And (the highest divinity is) endowed with all (powers) because that
is seen (from Scripture).

We have stated that this multiform world of effects is possible to
Brahman, because, although one only, it is endowed with various
powers.--How then--it may be asked--do you know that the highest Brahman
is endowed with various powers?--He is, we reply, endowed with all
powers, 'because that is seen.' For various scriptural passages declare
that the highest divinity possesses all powers, 'He to whom all actions,
all desires, all odours, all tastes belong, he who embraces all this,
who never speaks, and is never surprised' (Ch. Up. III, 14, 4); 'He who
desires what is true and imagines what is true' (Ch. Up. VIII, 7, 1);
'He who knows all (in its totality), and cognizes all (in its detail')
(Mu. Up. I, 1, 9); 'By the command of that Imperishable, O Gárgì, sun
and moon stand apart' (B/ri/. Up. III, 8, 9); and other similar
passages.

31. If it be said that (Brahman is devoid of powers) on account of the
absence of organs; (we reply that) this has been explained (before).

Let this be granted.--Scripture, however, declares the highest divinity
to be without (bodily) organs of action[309]; so, for instance, in the
passage, 'It is without eyes, without ears, without speech, without
mind' (B/ri/. Up. III, 8, 8). Being such, how should it be able to
produce effects, although it may be endowed with all powers? For we know
(from mantras, arthavâdas, &c.) that the gods and other intelligent
beings, though endowed with all powers, are capable of producing certain
effects only because they are furnished with bodily instruments of
action. And, moreover, how can the divinity, to whom the scriptural
passage, 'No, no,' denies all attributes, be endowed with all powers?

The appropriate reply to this question has been already given above. The
transcendent highest Brahman can be fathomed by means of Scripture only,
not by mere reasoning. Nor are we obliged to assume that the capacity of
one being is exactly like that which is observed in another. It has
likewise been explained above that although all qualities are denied of
Brahman we nevertheless may consider it to be endowed with powers, if we
assume in its nature an element of plurality, which is the mere figment
of Nescience. Moreover, a scriptural passage ('Grasping without hands,
hastening without feet, he sees without eyes, he hears without ears'
/S/ve. Up. III, 19) declares that Brahman although devoid of bodily
organs, possesses all possible capacities.

32. (Brahman is) not (the creator of the world), on account of (beings
engaging in any action) having a motive.

Another objection is raised against the doctrine of an intelligent cause
of the world.--The intelligent highest Self cannot be the creator of the
sphere of this world, 'on account of actions having a purpose.'--We know
from ordinary experience that man, who is an intelligent being, begins
to act after due consideration only, and does not engage even in an
unimportant undertaking unless it serves some purpose of his own; much
less so in important business. There is also a scriptural passage
confirming this result of common experience, 'Verily everything is not
dear that you may have everything; but that you may love the Self
therefore everything is dear' (B/ri/. Up. II, 4, 5). Now the undertaking
of creating the sphere of this world, with all its various contents, is
certainly a weighty one. If, then, on the one hand, you assume it to
serve some purpose of the intelligent highest Self, you thereby sublate
its self-sufficiency vouched for by Scripture; if, on the other hand,
you affirm absence of motive on its part, you must affirm absence of
activity also.--Let us then assume that just as sometimes an intelligent
person when in a state of frenzy proceeds, owing to his mental
aberration, to action without a motive, so the highest Self also created
this world without any motive.--That, we reply, would contradict the
omniscience of the highest Self, which is vouched for by
Scripture.--Hence the doctrine of the creation proceeding from an
intelligent Being is untenable.

33. But (Brahman's creative activity) is mere sport, such as we see in
ordinary life.

The word 'but' discards the objection raised.--We see in every-day life
that certain doings of princes or other men of high position who have no
unfulfilled desires left have no reference to any extraneous purpose;
but proceed from mere sportfulness, as, for instance, their recreations
in places of amusement. We further see that the process of inhalation
and exhalation is going on without reference to any extraneous purpose,
merely following the law of its own nature. Analogously, the activity of
the Lord also may be supposed to be mere sport, proceeding from his own
nature[310], without reference to any purpose. For on the ground neither
of reason nor of Scripture can we construe any other purpose of the
Lord. Nor can his nature be questioned.[311]--Although the creation of
this world appears to us a weighty and difficult undertaking, it is mere
play to the Lord, whose power is unlimited. And if in ordinary life we
might possibly, by close scrutiny, detect some subtle motive, even for
sportful action, we cannot do so with regard to the actions of the Lord,
all whose wishes are fulfilled, as Scripture says.--Nor can it be said
that he either does not act or acts like a senseless person; for
Scripture affirms the fact of the creation on the one hand, and the
Lord's omniscience on the other hand. And, finally, we must remember
that the scriptural doctrine of creation does not refer to the highest
reality; it refers to the apparent world only, which is characterised by
name and form, the figments of Nescience, and it, moreover, aims at
intimating that Brahman is the Self of everything.

34. Inequality (of dispensation) and cruelty (the Lord can) not (be
reproached with), on account of his regarding (merit and demerit); for
so (Scripture) declares.

In order to strengthen the tenet which we are at present defending, we
follow the procedure of him who shakes a pole planted in the ground (in
order to test whether it is firmly planted), and raise another objection
against the doctrine of the Lord being the cause of the world.--The
Lord, it is said, cannot be the cause of the world, because, on that
hypothesis, the reproach of inequality of dispensation and cruelty would
attach to him. Some beings, viz. the gods and others, he renders
eminently happy; others, as for instance the animals, eminently unhappy;
to some again, as for instance men, he allots an intermediate position.
To a Lord bringing about such an unequal condition of things, passion
and malice would have to be ascribed, just as to any common person
acting similarly; which attributes would be contrary to the essential
goodness of the Lord affirmed by /S/ruti and Sm/ri/ti. Moreover, as the
infliction of pain and the final destruction of all creatures would form
part of his dispensation, he would have to be taxed with great cruelty,
a quality abhorred by low people even. For these two reasons Brahman
cannot be the cause of the world.

The Lord, we reply, cannot be reproached with inequality of dispensation
and cruelty, "because he is bound by regards." If the Lord on his own
account, without any extraneous regards, produced this unequal creation,
he would expose himself to blame; but the fact is, that in creating he
is bound by certain regards, i.e. he has to look to merit and demerit.
Hence the circumstance of the creation being unequal is due to the merit
and demerit of the living creatures created, and is not a fault for
which the Lord is to blame. The position of the Lord is to be looked on
as analogous to that of Parjanya, the Giver of rain. For as Parjanya is
the common cause of the production of rice, barley, and other plants,
while the difference between the various species is due to the various
potentialities lying hidden in the respective seeds, so the Lord is the
common cause of the creation of gods, men, &c., while the differences
between these classes of beings are due to the different merit belonging
to the individual souls. Hence the Lord, being bound by regards, cannot
be reproached with inequality of dispensation and cruelty.--And if we
are asked how we come to know that the Lord, in creating this world with
its various conditions, is bound by regards, we reply that Scripture
declares that; compare, for instance, the two following passages, 'For
he (the Lord) makes him, whom he wishes to lead up from these worlds, do
a good deed; and the same makes him, whom he wishes to lead down from
these worlds, do a bad deed' (Kaush. Up. III, 8)[312]; and, 'A man
becomes good by good work, bad by bad work' (B/ri/. Up. III, 2, 13).
Sm/ri/ti passages also declare the favour of the Lord and its opposite
to depend on the different quality of the works of living beings; so,
for instance, 'I serve men in the way in which they approach me' (Bha.
Gî. IV, 11).

35. If it be objected that it (viz. the Lord's having regard to merit
and demerit) is impossible on account of the non-distinction (of merit
and demerit, previous to the first creation); we refute the objection on
the ground of (the world) being without a beginning.

But--an objection is raised--the passage, 'Being only this was in the
beginning, one, without a second,' affirms that before the creation
there was no distinction and consequently no merit on account of which
the creation might have become unequal. And if we assume the Lord to
have been guided in his dispensations by the actions of living beings
subsequent to the creation, we involve ourselves in the circular
reasoning that work depends on diversity of condition of life, and
diversity of condition again on work. The Lord may be considered as
acting with regard to religious merit after distinction had once arisen;
but as before that the cause of inequality, viz. merit, did not exist,
it follows that the first creation must have been free, from
inequalities.

This objection we meet by the remark, that the transmigratory world is
without beginning.--The objection would be valid if the world had a
beginning; but as it is without beginning, merit and inequality are,
like seed and sprout, caused as well as causes, and there is therefore
no logical objection to their operation.--To the question how we know
that the world is without a beginning, the next Sûtra replies.

36. (The beginninglessness of the world) recommends itself to reason and
is seen (from Scripture).

The beginninglessness of the world recommends itself to reason. For if
it had a beginning it would follow that, the world springing into
existence without a cause, the released souls also would again enter
into the circle of transmigratory existence; and further, as then there
would exist no determining cause of the unequal dispensation of pleasure
and pain, we should have to acquire in the doctrine of rewards and
punishments being allotted, without reference to previous good or bad
action. That the Lord is not the cause of the inequality, has already
been remarked. Nor can Nescience by itself be the cause, and it is of a
uniform nature. On the other hand, Nescience may be the cause of
inequality, if it be considered as having regard to merit accruing from
action produced by the mental impressions or wrath, hatred, and other
afflicting passions[313]. Without merit and demerit nobody can enter
into existence, and again, without a body merit and demerit cannot be
formed; so that--on the doctrine of the world having a beginning--we are
led into a logical see-saw. The opposite doctrine, on the other hand,
explains all matters in a manner analogous to the case of the seed and
sprout, so that no difficulty remains.--Moreover, the fact of the world
being without a beginning, is seen in /S/ruti and Sm/ri/ti. In the first
place, we have the scriptural passage, 'Let me enter with this living
Self (jîva)', &c. (Ch. Up. VI, 3, 2). Here the circumstance of the
embodied Self (the individual soul) being called, previously to
creation, 'the living Self'--a name applying to it in so far as it is
the sustaining principle of the prâ/n/as--shows that this phenomenal
world is without a beginning. For if it had a beginning, the prâ/n/as
would not exist before that beginning, and how then could the embodied
Self be denoted, with reference to the time of the world's beginning, by
a name which depends on the existence of those prâ/n/as. Nor can it be
said that it is so designated with a view to its future relation to the
prâ/n/as; it being a settled principle that a past relation, as being
already existing, is of greater force than a mere future
relation.--Moreover, we have the mantra, 'As the creator formerly
devised (akalpaya) sun and moon (/Ri/. Sa/m/h. X, 190, 3), which
intimates the existence of former Kalpas. Sm/ri/ti also declares the
world to be without a beginning, 'Neither its form is known here, nor
its end, nor its beginning, nor its support' (Bha. Gî. XV, 3). And the
Purâ/n/a also declares that there is no measure of the past and the
future Kalpas.

37. And because all the qualities (required in the cause of the world)
are present (in Brahman).

The teacher has now refuted all the objections, such as difference of
character, and the like, which other teachers have brought forward
against what he had established as the real sense of the Veda, viz. that
the intelligent Brahman is the cause and matter of this world.

Now, before entering on a new chapter, whose chief aim it will be to
refute the (positive) opinions held by other teachers, he sums up the
foregoing chapter, the purport of which it was to show why his view
should be accepted.--Because, if that Brahman is acknowledged as the
cause of the world, all attributes required in the cause (of the world)
are seen to be present--Brahman being all-knowing, all-powerful, and
possessing the great power of Mâyâ,--on that account this our system,
founded on the Upanishads, is not open to any objections.

Notes:

[Footnote 253: The Sm/ri/ti called Tantra is the Sâ@nkhya/s/âstra as
taught by Kapila; the Sm/ri/ti-writers depending on him are Âsuri,
Pa/ñk/a/s/ikha, and others.]

[Footnote 254: Mîmâ/m/sâ Sû. I, 1, 2: /k/odanâlaksha/n/osxrtho
dharma/h/. Commentary: /k/odanâ iti kriyâyâ/h/ pravartaka/m/ va/k/anam
âhu/h/.]

[Footnote 255: Purushârtha; in opposition to the rules referred to in
the preceding sentence which are kratvartha, i.e. the acting according
to which secures the proper performance of certain rites.]

[Footnote 256: It having been decided by the Pûrvâ Mîmâ/m/sâ already
that Sm/ri/tis contradicted by /S/ruti are to be disregarded.]

[Footnote 257: On the meaning of 'kapila' in the above passage, compare
the Introduction to the Upanishads, translated by Max Müller, vol. ii,
p. xxxviii ff.--As will be seen later on, /S/a@nkara, in this bhâshya,
takes the Kapila referred to to be some /ri/shi.]

[Footnote 258: I.e. religious duty is known only from the injunctive
passages of the Veda.]

[Footnote 259: After it has been shown that Kapila the dvaitavâdin is
not mentioned in /S/ruti, it is now shown that Manu the sarvâtmavâdin is
mentioned there.]

[Footnote 260: In which passage the phrase 'to be meditated upon'
(nididhyâsâ) indicates the act of mental concentration characteristic of
the Yoga.]

[Footnote 261: The ash/t/akâs (certain oblations to be made on the
eighth days after the full moons of the seasons hemanta and /s/i/s/ira)
furnish the stock illustration for the doctrine of the Pûrvâ Mim. that
Sm/ri/ti is authoritative in so far as it is based on /S/ruti.]

[Footnote 262: But why--it will be asked--do you apply yourself to the
refutation of the Sâ@nkhya and Yoga only, and not also to that of other
Sm/ri/tis conflicting with the Vedânta views?]

[Footnote 263: I.e. from the fact of these terms being employed in a
passage standing close to other passages which refer to Vedic
knowledge.]

[Footnote 264: The cognition of Brahman terminates in an act of
anubhava; hence as it has been shown that reasoning is more closely
connected with anubhava than /S/ruti is, we have the right to apply
reasoning to /S/ruti.--Ânanda Giri comments on the passage from
anubhavâvasânam as follows: brahmasâkshâtkârasya mokshopâyatayâ
prâdhânyât tatra /s/abdâd api parokshago/k/arâd
aparokshârthasâdharmyago/k/aras tarkosxntara@ngam iti tasyaiva
balavatvam ity artha/h/. Aitihyamâtre/n/a pravâdapâramparyamâtre/n/a
parokshatayeti yâvat. Anubhavasya prâdhânye tarkasyoktanyâyena tasminn
antara@ngatvâd âgamasya /k/a bahira@ngatvâd antara@ngabahira@ngayor
antara@nga/m/ balavad ity nyâyâd ukta/m/ tarkasya balavattvam.
Anubhavaprâdhânya/m/ tu nâdyâpi siddham ity â/s/a@nkyâhânubhaveti. Nanu
Brahmaj/ñ/âdna/m/ vaidikatvâd dharmavad ad/ri/sh/t/aphalam esh/t/avya/m/
tat kutosxsyânubhavâvasânâvidyânivartakatva/m/ tatrâha moksheti.
Adhish/th/ânasâkshâtkârasya /s/uktyâdj/ñ/âne
tadavidyâtatkâryanivartakatvad/ri/sh/t/e/h/, brahmaj/ñ/ânasyâpi
tarkava/s/âd asambhâvanâdinirâsadvârâ sâkshâtkârâvasâyinas
tadavidyâdinivartakatvenaiva muktihetuteti nâd/ri/sh/t/aphalatety
artha/h/.]

[Footnote 265: Nirati/s/ayâ/h/, upajanâpâyadharma/s/ûnyatva/m/
nirati/s/ayatvam. Ân. Gi.]

[Footnote 266: A sentence replying to the possible objection that the
world, as being the effect of the intelligent Brahman, might itself be
intelligent.]

[Footnote 267: In the case of things commonly considered
non-intelligent, intelligence is not influenced by an internal organ,
and on that account remains unperceived; samaste jagati satoszpi
/k/aitanyasya tatra tatrânta/h/kara/n/apari/n/âmânuparâgâd anupalabdhir
aviruddhâ. Ân. Gi.]

[Footnote 268: On î/s/vara in the above meaning, compare Deussen, p. 69,
note 41.]

[Footnote 269: The line 'prak/ri/tibhya/h/ param,' &c. is wanting in all
MSS. I have consulted.]

[Footnote 270: Ânanda Giri on the above passage: /s/rutyâkâ@nkshita/m/
tarkam eva mananavidhivishayam udâharati svapnânteti. Svapnajâgaritayor
mithovyabhi/k/ârâd âtmana/h/ svabhâvatas tadvattvâbhâvâd avasthâ dvayena
tasya svatosxsa/m/p/ri/ktatvam ato jîvasyâvasthâvatvena nâbrahmatvam ity
artha/h/. Tathâpi dehâditâdâtmyenâtmano bhâvân na
ni/h/prapa/ñk/abrahmatety â/s/a@nkyâha sa/m/prasâde /k/eti. Satâ somya
tadâ sa/m/panno bhavatîti /s/rute/h/ sushupte
ni/h/prapa/ñk/asadâtmatvâvagamâd âtmanas tathâvidhabrahmatvasiddhir ity
artha/h/. Dvaitagrâhipratyakshâdivirodhât katham
âtmanosxdvitîyabrahmatvam ity â/s/a@nkya tajjatvâdihetunâ
brahmâtiriktavastvabhâvasiddher adhyakshâdînâm atatvâvedakaprâmâ/n/yâd
avirodhâd yuktam âtmano xsvitîyabrahmatvam ity âha prapa/ñk/asyeti.]

[Footnote 271: Let us finally assume, merely for argument's sake, that a
vailaksha/n/ya of cause and effect is not admissible, and enquire
whether that assumption can be reconciled more easily with an
intelligent or a non-intelligent cause of the world.]

[Footnote 272: Nanu pralayakâle kâryadharmâ/s/ /k/en nâvatish/th/eran na
tarhi kâra/n/adharmâ api tish/th/eyus tayor abhedât
tatrâhânanyatveszpîti. Ân. Gi.]

[Footnote 273: For if they are effects of the pradhâna they must as such
be reabsorbed into it at the time of general reabsorption.]

[Footnote 274: And that the Vedânta view is preferable because the
nullity of the objections has already been demonstrated in its case.]

[Footnote 275: The whole style of argumentation of the Mîmâ/m/sâ would
be impossible, if all reasoning were sound; for then no pûrvapaksha view
could be maintained.]

[Footnote 276: The following arthavâda-passage, for instance, 'the
sacrificial post is the sun,' is to be taken in a metaphorical sense;
because perception renders it impossible for us to take it in its
literal meaning.]

[Footnote 277: Which are to be known from the Veda only.]

[Footnote 278: Pari/n/âmavâdam avalambyâpâtato virodha/m/ samadhâya
vivartavâdam â/s/ritya paramasamâdhânam âha. Ân. Gi.]

[Footnote 279: Ânanda Giri construes differently: etad uktam iti,
paramârthato vij/ñ/âtam iti sambandha/h/.]

[Footnote 280: D/ri/sh/t/eti kadâ/k/id dr/ri/sh/t/a/m/ punar nash/t/am
anityam iti yâvat.--D/ri/sh/t/agraha/n/asû/k/ita/m/ pratîtikâlesxpi
sattârâhitya/m/ tatraiva hetvantaram âha svarûpe/n/eti. Ân. Gi.]

[Footnote 281: In the passage alluded to he is called so by implication,
being compared to the 'false-minded' thief who, knowing himself to be
guilty, undergoes the ordeal of the heated hatchet.]

[Footnote 282: I.e. ordinary experience does not teach us that real
effects spring from unreal causes.]

[Footnote 283: Svapnajâgraddehayor vyabhi/k/ârezpi pratyabhij/ñ/ânât
tadanugatâtmaikyasiddhe/s/ /k/aitanyasya /k/a dehadharmatve rûtmano
dehadvayâtiredkasiddher dehâtrâtmavâdo na yukta ity artha/h/. Ân. Gi.]

[Footnote 284: As long as the 'vyavahâra' presents itself to our mind,
we might feel inclined to assume in Brahman an element of manifoldness
whereby to account for the vyavahâra; but as soon as we arrive at true
knowledge, the vyavahâra vanishes, and there remains no longer any
reason for qualifying in any way the absolute unity of Brahman.]

[Footnote 285: Tatreti, s/ri/sh/t/yâdi/s/rutînâ/m/ svârthe phatavaikalye
satîti yâvat. Ân. Gi.]

[Footnote 286: A Mîmâ/m/sâ principle. A sacrificial act, for instance,
is independent when a special result is assigned to it by the sacred
texts; an act which is enjoined without such a specification is merely
auxiliary to another act.]

[Footnote 287: According to the /S/rutî 'in whatever mode he worships
him into that mode he passes himself.']

[Footnote 288: Tattvânyatvâbhyâm iti, na hîsvaratvena te niru/k/yete
ja/d/âjadayor abhedâyogât nâpi tatoxnyatvenax niruktim arhata/h/
svâtantrye/n/a sattâsphûrtyasambhavât na hi j/ad/am aga/d/ânapekshya/m/
sattâsphûrtimad upalakshyate ja/d/atvabha@ngaprasa@ngât tasmâd
avidyâtmake nâmarûpe ity artha/h/. Ân. Gi.]

[Footnote 289: So that from the instance of the potter and the jar we
cannot conclude that the relation of clay and the jar is only that of
nimitta and naimittika, not that of non-difference.]

[Footnote 290: For instance, smoke extending in a long line whose base
is connected with some object on the surface of the earth.]

[Footnote 291: I.e. (as Ân. Gi. explains) because we assume the relation
of cause and effect not merely on the ground of the actual existence of
one thing depending on that upon another, but on the additional ground
of the mental existence, the consciousness of the one not being possible
without the consciousness of the other.--Tadbhâvânuvidhâyibhâvatvam
tadbhânânuvidhâyibhânatva/m/ /k/â kâryasya kâra/n/ânanyatve hetur
dhûmavi/s/eshasya /k/âgnibhâvânuvidhâyibhâvatvesxpi na
tadbhânânuvidhâyibhânatvam agnibhânasya dhûmabhânâdhînatvât.]

[Footnote 292: For simplicity's sake, asat will be translated henceforth
by non-existing.]

[Footnote 293: Samavâya, commonly translated by inherence or intimate
relation, is, according to the Nyâya, the relation connecting a whole
and its parts, substances, and qualities, &c.]

[Footnote 294: Samavâyasya svâtantryapaksha/m/ dûshayati
anabhyupagamyamâne/k/eti. Samavâyasya samavâyibhi/h/ sambandho neshyate
ki/m/ tu svâtantryam evety atrâvayavâvayavinor dravyagu/n/âdînâ/m/ /k/a.
viprakarsha/h/ syât sa/m/nidhâyakâbhâvâd ity artha/h/. Ân. Gi.]

[Footnote 295: A conclusion which is in conflict with the Nyâya tenet
that sa/m/yoga, conjunction, as, for instance, of the jar and the ground
on which it stands, is a quality (gu/n/a) inherent in the two conjoined
substances by means of the samavaya relation.]

[Footnote 296: So that the whole can be apprehended by us as such if we
apprehend a certain part only; analogously to our apprehending the whole
thread on which a garland of flowers is strung as soon as we apprehend
some few of the flowers.]

[Footnote 297: Kalpântaram utthâpayati atheti, tathâ /k/a
yathâvayavai/h/ sûtra/m/ kusumâni vyâpnuvat katipayakusumagraha/n/expi
g/r/ihyate tathâ katipayavayavagraha/n/expi bhavaty avayavino graha/n/am
ity artha/h/. Tatra kim ârambhakâvayavair eva teshv avayavî vartteta
ki/m/ vâ tadatiriklâvayavair iti vikalpyâdyam pratyâha tadâpîti. Yatra
yad varttate tat tadatiriktâvayavair eva tatra vartamâna/m/ drish/l/am
iti d/ri/sh/t/antagarbha/m/ hetum â/k/ash/l/e ko/s/eti. Dvitîyam
dûshayati anavastheti. Kalpitânantâvayavavyavahitatayâ
prak/ri/tâvayavino dûraviprakarshât tantunish/th/atvam pa/t/asya na syâd
iti bhâva/h/. An. Gi.]

[Footnote 298: I.e. a something in which the action inheres; not a
causal agent.]

[Footnote 299: Every action, /S/a@nkâra says, requires an agent, i.e. a
substrate in which the action takes place. If we deny that the jar
exists in the clay even before it is actually originated, we lose the
substrate for the action of origination, i.e. entering into existence
(for the non-existing jar cannot be the substratum of any action), and
have to assume, for that action, other substrates, such as the operative
causes of the jar.]

[Footnote 300: Which doctrine will be fully discussed in the second pâda
of this adhyâya.]

[Footnote 301: Because it has been shown that cause and effect are
identical; hence if the cause is known, the effect is known also.]

[Footnote 302: Which arguments, the commentators say, are hinted at by
the 'and' of the Sûtra.]

[Footnote 303: The right reading appears to be 'svayam eva /k/etanâ' as
found in some MSS. Other MSS. read /k/etana/h/.]

[Footnote 304: Prak/ri/tibhya iti,
pratyakshad/ri/sh/t/apadârthasvabhâvebhyo yat para/m/ vilaksha/n/am
â/k/âryâdyupade/s/agamya/m/ tad a/k/intyam ity arta/h/ Ân. Gi.]

[Footnote 305: This is the way in which /S/a@nkara divides the Sûtra;
Ân. Gi. remarks to 'lokezspo, &c.: âtmani /k/eti vyâkhyâya vi/k/itrâ/s/
/k/a hîti vyâ/k/ash/t/e.']

[Footnote 306: So that if it undergoes modifications it must either
change in its entirety, or else--against the assumption--consist of
parts.]

[Footnote 307: The last clause precludes the justificatory remark that
the stated difficulties can be avoided if we assume the three gu/n/as in
combination only to undergo modification; if this were so the inequality
of the different effects could not be accounted for.]

[Footnote 308: As an atom has no parts it cannot enter into partial
contact with another, and the only way in which the two can combine is
entire interpenetration; in consequence of which the compound of two
atoms would not occupy more space than one atom.]

[Footnote 309: The Sûtra is concerned with the body only as far as it is
an instrument; the case of extraneous instruments having already been
disposed of in Sûtra 24.]

[Footnote 310: The nature (svabhàva) of the Lord is, the commentators
say, Mâyâ joined with time and karman.]

[Footnote 311: This clause is an answer to the objection that the Lord
might remain at rest instead of creating a world useless to himself and
the cause of pain to others. For in consequence of his conjunction with
Mâyâ the creation is unavoidable. Go. Ân. Avidyâ naturally tends towards
effects, without any purpose. Bhâ.

Ân. Gi. remarks: Nanu lîládâv asmadâdînâm akasmâd eva niv/ri/tter api
darsanâd î/s/varasyâpi mâyâmayyâm lîlâyâm tathâ-bhâve vinâpi
sa/my/agj/ñ/âna/m/ sa/m/sârasamu/kkh/ittir ili tatrâha na /ke/ti.
Anirvâ/ky/â khalv avidyâ paras/yes/varasya /k/a. svabhâvo lîleti
/kok/yate tatra na prâtîtikasvabhâvâyâm anupapattir avataratîty
artha/h/.]

[Footnote 312: From this passage we must not--the commentators
say--infer injustice on the part of the Lord; for the previous merit or
demerit of a being determines the specific quality of the actions which
he performs in his present existence, the Lord acting as the common
cause only (as Parjanya does).]

[Footnote 313: Râgadveshamohâ râgadayas le /k/a purusha/m/ dukhâdibhi/h/
kli/s/yantîtá kle/s/âs tesb/âm/ kartneapia/vi/uyanugu/rr/âs tâbhir
áksbipta/m/ dharmâdilaksbilaksha/n/a/m/ kurma tadapekshâvidyâ. Ân. Gi.]




SECOND PADA.

REVERENCE TO THE HIGHEST SELF!


1. That which is inferred (by the Sâ@nkhyas, viz. the pradhâna) cannot
be the cause (of the world), on account of the orderly arrangement (of
the world) being impossible (on that hypothesis).

Although it is the object of this system to define the true meaning of
the Vedânta-texts and not, like the science of Logic, to establish or
refute some tenet by mere ratiocination, still it is incumbent on
thorough students of the Vedânta to refute the Sâ@nkhya and other
systems which are obstacles in the way of perfect knowledge. For this
purpose a new chapter is begun. (Nor must it be said that the refutation
of the other systems ought to have preceded the establishment of the
Vedânta position; for) as the determination of the sense of the
Vedânta-passages directly subserves perfect knowledge, we have at first,
by means of such a determination, established our own position, since
this is a task more important than the refutation of the views
entertained by others.

Here an opponent might come forward and say that we are indeed entitled
to establish our own position, so as to define perfect knowledge which
is the means of release to those desirous of it, but that no use is
apparent of a refutation of other opinions, a proceeding productive of
nothing but hate and anger.--There is a use, we reply. For there is some
danger of men of inferior intelligence looking upon the Sâ@nkhya and
similar systems as requisite for perfect knowledge, because those
systems have a weighty appearance, have been adopted by authoritative
persons, and profess to lead to perfect knowledge. Such people might
therefore think that those systems with their abstruse arguments were
propounded by omniscient sages, and might on that account have faith in
them. For this reason we must endeavour to demonstrate their intrinsic
worthlessness.

But, it might be said, the Sâ@nkhya and similar systems have already
been impugned in several Sûtras of the first adhyâya (I, 1, 5, 18; I, 4,
28); why, then, controvert them again?--The task--we reply--which we are
now about to undertake differs from what we have already accomplished.
As the Sâ@nkhyas and other philosophers also quote, in order to
establish their own positions, the Vedânta-passages and interpret them
in such a manner as to make them agree with their own systems, we have
hitherto endeavoured to show that their interpretations are altogether
fallacious. Now, however, we are going to refute their arguments in an
independent manner, without any reference to the Vedânta-texts.

The Sâ@nkhyas, to make a beginning with them, argue as follows.--Just as
jars, dishes, and other products which possess the common quality of
consisting of clay are seen to have for their cause clay in general; so
we must suppose that all the outward and inward (i.e. inanimate and
animate) effects which are endowed with the characteristics of pleasure,
pain, and dulness[314] have for their causes pleasure, pain, and dulness
in general. Pleasure, pain, and dulness in their generality together
constitute the threefold pradhâna. This pradhâna which is
non-intelligent evolves itself spontaneously into multiform
modifications[315], in order thus to effect the purposes (i.e.
enjoyment, release, and so on) of the intelligent soul.--The existence
of the pradhâna is to be inferred from other circumstances also, such as
the limitation of all effects and the like[316].

Against this doctrine we argue as follows.--If you Sânkhyas base your
theory on parallel instances merely, we point out that a non-intelligent
thing which, without being guided by an intelligent being, spontaneously
produces effects capable of subserving the purposes of some particular
person is nowhere observed in the world. We rather observe that houses,
palaces, couches, pleasure-grounds, and the like--things which according
to circumstances are conducive to the obtainment of pleasure or the
avoidance of pain--are made by workmen endowed with intelligence. Now
look at this entire world which appears, on the one hand, as external
(i.e. inanimate) in the form of earth and the other elements enabling
(the souls) to enjoy the fruits of their various actions, and, on the
other hand, as animate, in the form of bodies which belong to the
different classes of beings, possess a definite arrangement of organs,
and are therefore capable of constituting the abodes of fruition; look,
we say, at this world, of which the most ingenious workmen cannot even
form a conception in their minds, and then say if a non-intelligent
principle like the pradhâna is able to fashion it! Other non-intelligent
things such as stones and clods of earth are certainly not seen to
possess analogous powers. We rather must assume that just as clay and
similar substances are seen to fashion themselves into various forms, if
worked upon by potters and the like, so the pradhâna also (when
modifying itself into its effects) is ruled by some intelligent
principle. When endeavouring to determine the nature of the primal cause
(of the world), there is no need for us to take our stand on those
attributes only which form part of the nature of material causes such as
clay, &c., and not on those also which belong to extraneous agents such
as potters, &c.[317] Nor (if remembering this latter point) do we enter
into conflict with any means of right knowledge; we, on the contrary,
are in direct agreement with Scripture which teaches that an intelligent
cause exists.--For the reason detailed in the above, i.e. on account of
the impossibility of the 'orderly arrangement' (of the world), a
non-intelligent cause of the world is not to be inferred.--The word
'and' (in the Sûtra) adds other reasons on account of which the pradhâna
cannot be inferred, viz. 'on account of the non-possibility of
endowment,' &c. For it cannot be maintained[318] that all outward and
inward effects are 'endowed' with the nature of pleasure, pain, and
dulness, because pleasure, &c. are known as inward (mental) states,
while sound, &c. (i.e. the sense-objects) are known as being of a
different nature (i.e. as outward things), and moreover as being the
operative causes of pleasure, &c.[319] And, further, although the
sense-object such as sound and so on is one, yet we observe that owing
to the difference of the mental impressions (produced by it) differences
exist in the effects it produces, one person being affected by it
pleasantly, another painfully, and so on[320].--(Turning to the next
Sâ@nkhya argument which infers the existence of the pradhâna from the
limitation of all effects), we remark that he who concludes that all
inward and outward effects depend on a conjunction of several things,
because they are limited (a conclusion based on the observation that
some limited effects such as roof and sprout, &c. depend on the
conjunction of several things), is driven to the conclusion that the
three constituents of the pradhâna, viz. Goodness, Passion, and
Darkness, likewise depend on the conjunction of several
antecedents[321]; for they also are limited[322].--Further[323], it is
impossible to use the relation of cause and effect as a reason for
assuming that all effects whatever have a non-intelligent principle for
their antecedent; for we have shown already that that relation exists in
the case of couches and chairs also, over whose production intelligence
presides.

2. And on account of (the impossibility of) activity.

Leaving the arrangement of the world, we now pass on to the activity by
which it is produced.--The three gu/n/as, passing out of the state of
equipoise and entering into the condition of mutual subordination and
superordination, originate activities tending towards the production of
particular effects.--Now these activities also cannot be ascribed to a
non-intelligent pradhâna left to itself, as no such activity is seen in
clay and similar substances, or in chariots and the like. For we observe
that clay and the like, and chariots--which are in their own nature
non-intelligent--enter on activities tending towards particular effects
only when they are acted upon by intelligent beings such as potters, &c.
in the one case, and horses and the like in the other case. From what is
seen we determine what is not seen. Hence a non-intelligent cause of the
world is not to be inferred because, on that hypothesis, the activity
without which the world cannot be produced would be impossible.

But, the Sâ@nkhya rejoins, we do likewise not observe activity on the
part of mere intelligent beings.--True; we however see activity on the
part of non-intelligent things such as chariots and the like when they
are in conjunction with intelligent beings.--But, the Sâ@nkhya again
objects, we never actually observe activity on the part of an
intelligent being even when in conjunction with a non-intelligent
thing.--Very well; the question then arises: Does the activity belong to
that in which it is actually observed (as the Sâ@nkhya says), or to that
on account of the conjunction with which it is observed (as the Vedântin
avers)?--We must, the Sâ@nkhya replies, attribute activity to that in
which it is actually seen, since both (i.e. the activity and its abode)
are matter of observation. A mere intelligent being, on the other hand,
is never observed as the abode of activity while a chariot is. The[324]
existence of an intelligent Self joined to a body and so on which are
the abode of activity can be established (by inference) only; the
inference being based on the difference observed between living bodies
and mere non-intelligent things, such as chariots and the like. For this
very reason, viz. that intelligence is observed only where a body is
observed while it is never seen without a body, the Materialists
consider intelligence to be a mere attribute of the body.--Hence
activity belongs only to what is non-intelligent.

To all this we--the Vedântins--make the following reply.--We do not mean
to say that activity does not belong to those non-intelligent things in
which it is observed; it does indeed belong to them; but it results from
an intelligent principle, because it exists when the latter is present
and does not exist when the latter is absent. Just as the effects of
burning and shining, which have their abode in wood and similar
material, are indeed not observed when there is mere fire (i.e. are not
due to mere fire; as mere fire, i.e. fire without wood, &c., does not
exist), but at the same time result from fire only as they are seen when
fire is present and are not seen when fire is absent; so, as the
Materialists also admit, only intelligent bodies are observed to be the
movers of chariots and other non-intelligent things. The motive power of
intelligence is therefore incontrovertible.--But--an objection will be
raised--your Self even if joined to a body is incapable of exercising
moving power, for motion cannot be effected by that the nature of which
is pure intelligence.--A thing, we reply, which is itself devoid of
motion may nevertheless move other things. The magnet is itself devoid
of motion, and yet it moves iron; and colours and the other objects of
sense, although themselves devoid of motion, produce movements in the
eyes and the other organs of sense. So the Lord also who is all-present,
the Self of all, all-knowing and all-powerful may, although himself
unmoving, move the universe.--If it finally be objected that (on the
Vedânta doctrine) there is no room for a moving power as in consequence
of the oneness (aduality) of Brahman no motion can take place; we reply
that such objections have repeatedly been refuted by our pointing to the
fact of the Lord being fictitiously connected with Mâyâ, which consists
of name and form presented by Nescience.--Hence motion can be reconciled
with the doctrine of an all-knowing first cause; but not with the
doctrine of a non-intelligent first cause.

3. If it be said (that the pradhâna moves) like milk or water, (we reply
that) there also (the motion is due to intelligence).

Well, the Sâ@nkhya resumes, listen then to the following instances.--As
non-sentient milk flows forth from its own nature merely for the
nourishment of the young animal, and as non-sentient water, from its own
nature, flows along for the benefit of mankind, so the pradhâna also,
although non-intelligent, may be supposed to move from its own nature
merely for the purpose of effecting the highest end of man.

This argumentation, we reply, is unsound again; for as the adherents of
both doctrines admit that motion is not observed in the case of merely
non-intelligent things such as chariots, &c., we infer that water and
milk also move only because they are directed by intelligent powers.
Scriptural passages, moreover (such as 'He who dwells in the water and
within the water, who rules the water within,' B/ri/. Up. III, 7, 4;
and, 'By the command of that Akshara, O Gârgî, some rivers flow to the
East,' &c., B/ri/. Up. III, 8, 9), declare that everything in this world
which flows is directed by the Lord. Hence the instances of milk and
water as belonging themselves to that class of cases which prove our
general principle[325] cannot be used to show that the latter is too
wide.--Moreover, the cow, which is an intelligent being and loves her
calf, makes her milk flow by her wish to do so, and the milk is in
addition drawn forth by the sucking of the calf. Nor does water move
either with absolute independence--for its flow depends on the declivity
of the soil and similar circumstances--or independently of an
intelligent principle, for we have shown that the latter is present in
all cases.--If, finally, our opponent should point to Sûtra II, 1, 24 as
contradicting the present Sûtra, we remark that there we have merely
shown on the ground of ordinary experience that an effect may take place
in itself independently of any external instrumental cause; a conclusion
which does not contradict the doctrine, based on Scripture, that all
effects depend on the Lord.

4. And because (the pradhâna), on account of there existing nothing
beyond it, stands in no relation; (it cannot be active.)

The three gu/n/as of the Sâ@nkhyas when in a state of equipoise form the
pradhâna. Beyond the pradhâna there exists no external principle which
could either impel the pradhâna to activity or restrain it from
activity. The soul (purusha), as we know, is indifferent, neither moves
to--nor restrains from--action. As therefore the pradhâna stands in no
relation, it is impossible to see why it should sometimes modify itself
into the great principle (mahat) and sometimes not. The activity and
non-activity (by turns) of the Lord, on the other hand, are not contrary
to reason, on account of his omniscience and omnipotence, and his being
connected with the power of illusion (mâya).

5. Nor (can it be said that the pradhâna modifies itself spontaneously)
like grass, &c. (which turn into milk); for (milk) does not exist
elsewhere (but in the female animal).

Let this be (the Sâ@nkhya resumes). Just as grass, herbs, water, &c.
independently of any other instrumental cause transform themselves, by
their own nature, into milk; so, we assume, the pradhâna also transforms
itself into the great principle, and so on. And, if you ask how we know
that grass transforms itself independently of any instrumental cause; we
reply, 'Because no such cause is observed.' For if we did perceive some
such cause, we certainly should apply it to grass, &c. according to our
liking, and thereby produce milk. But as a matter of fact we do no such
thing. Hence the transformation of grass and the like must be considered
to be due to its own nature merely; and we may infer therefrom that the
transformation of the pradhâna is of the same kind.

To this we make the following reply.--The transformation of the pradhâna
might be ascribed to its own nature merely if we really could admit that
grass modifies itself in the manner stated by you; but we are unable to
admit that, since another instrumental cause is observed. How? 'Because
it does not exist elsewhere.' For grass becomes milk only when it is
eaten by a cow or some other female animal, not if it is left either
uneaten or is eaten by a bull. If the transformation had no special
cause, grass would become milk even on other conditions than that of
entering a cow's body. Nor would the circumstance of men not being able
to produce milk according to their liking prove that there is no
instrumental cause; for while some effects can be produced by men,
others result from divine action only[326]. The fact, however, is that
men also are able, by applying a means in their power, to produce milk
from grass and herbs; for when they wish to procure a more abundant
supply of milk they feed the cow more plentifully and thus obtain more
milk from her.--For these reasons the spontaneous modification of the
pradhâna cannot be proved from the instance of grass and the like.

6. Even if we admit (the Sâ@nkhya position refuted in what precedes, it
is invalidated by other objections) on account of the absence of a
purpose (on the part of the pradhâna).

Even if we, accommodating ourselves to your (the Sâ@nkhya's) belief,
should admit what has been disproved in the preceding Sûtra, viz. that
the pradhâna is spontaneously active, still your opinion would lie open
to an objection 'on account of the absence of a purpose.' For if the
spontaneous activity of the pradhâna has, as you say, no reference to
anything else, it will have no reference not only to any aiding
principle, but also to any purpose or motive, and consequently your
doctrine that the pradhâna is active in order to effect the purpose of
man will become untenable. If you reply that the pradhâna does not
indeed regard any aiding principle, but does regard a purpose, we remark
that in that case we must distinguish between the different possible
purposes, viz. either enjoyment (on the part of the soul), or final
release, or both. If enjoyment, what enjoyment, we ask, can belong to
the soul which is naturally incapable of any accretion (of pleasure or
pain)[327]? Moreover, there would in that case be no opportunity for
release[328].--If release, then the activity of the pradhâna would be
purposeless, as even antecedently to it the soul is in the state of
release; moreover, there would then be no occasion for the perception of
sounds, &c.[329]--If both, then, on account of the infinite number of
the objects of pradhâna to be enjoyed (by the soul)[330], there would be
no opportunity for final release. Nor can the satisfaction of a desire
be considered as the purpose of the activity of the pradhâna; for
neither the non-intelligent pradhâna nor the essentially pure soul can
feel any desire.--If, finally, you should assume the pradhâna to be
active, because otherwise the power of sight (belonging to the soul on
account of its intelligent nature) and the creative power (belonging to
the pradhâna) would be purposeless; it would follow that, as the
creative power of the pradhâna does not cease at any time any more than
the soul's power of sight does, the apparent world would never come to
an end, so that no final release of the soul could take place[331].--It
is, therefore, impossible to maintain that the pradhâna enters on its
activity for the purposes of the soul.

7. And if you say (that the soul may move the pradhâna) as the (lame)
man (moves the blind one) or as the magnet (moves the iron); thus also
(the difficulty is not overcome).

Well then--the Sâ@nkhya resumes, endeavouring to defend his position by
parallel instances--let us say that, as some lame man devoid of the
power of motion, but possessing the power of sight, having mounted the
back of a blind man who is able to move but not to see, makes the latter
move; or as the magnet not moving itself, moves the iron, so the soul
moves the pradhâna.--Thus also, we reply, you do not free your doctrine
from all shortcomings; for this your new position involves an
abandonment of your old position, according to which the pradhâna is
moving of itself, and the (indifferent, inactive) soul possesses no
moving power. And how should the indifferent soul move the pradhâna? A
man, although lame, may make a blind man move by means of words and the
like; but the soul which is devoid of action and qualities cannot
possibly put forth any moving energy. Nor can it be said that it moves
the pradhâna by its mere proximity as the magnet moves the iron; for
from the permanency of proximity (of soul and pradhâna) a permanency of
motion would follow. The proximity of the magnet, on the other hand (to
the iron), is not permanent, but depends on a certain activity and the
adjustment of the magnet in a certain position; hence the (lame) man and
the magnet do not supply really parallel instances.--The pradhâna then
being non-intelligent and the soul indifferent, and there being no third
principle to connect them, there can be no connexion of the two. If we
attempted to establish a connexion on the ground of capability (of being
seen on the part of the pradhâna, of seeing on the part of the soul),
the permanency of such capability would imply the impossibility of final
release.--Moreover, here as well as before (in the preceding Sûtra) the
different alternatives connected with the absence of purpose (on the
pradhâna's part) have to be considered[332].--The highest Self, on the
other hand (which is the cause of the world, according to the
Vedântins), is characterised by non-activity inherent in its own nature,
and, at the same time, by moving power inherent in Mâyâ and is thus
superior (to the soul of the Sâ@nkhyas).

8. And, again, (the pradhâna cannot be active) because the relation of
principal (and subordinate matter) is impossible (between the three
gu/n/as).

For the following reason also activity on the part of the pradhâna is
not possible.--The condition of the pradhâna consists in the three
gu/n/as, viz. goodness, passion, and darkness, abiding in themselves in
a state of equipoise without standing to one another in the relation of
mutual superiority or inferiority. In that state the gu/n/as cannot
possibly enter into the relation of mutual subserviency because thereby
they would forfeit their essential characteristic, viz. absolute
independence. And as there exists no extraneous principle to stir up the
gu/n/as, the production of the great principle and the other
effects--which would acquire for its operative cause a non-balanced
state of the gu/n/as--is impossible.

9. And although another inference be made, (the objections remain in
force) on account of the (pradhâna) being devoid of the power of
intelligence.

But--the Sâ@nkhya resumes--we draw another inference, so as to leave no
room for the objection just stated. We do not acknowledge the gu/n/as to
be characterised by absolute irrelativity and unchangeableness, since
there is no proof for such an assumption. We rather infer the
characteristics of the gu/n/as from those of their effects, presuming
that their nature must be such as to render the production of the
effects possible. Now the gu/n/as are admitted to be of an unsteady
nature; hence the gu/n/as themselves are able to enter into the relation
of mutual inequality, even while they are in a state of equipoise.

Even in that case, we reply, the objections stated above which were
founded on the impossibility of an orderly arrangement of the world,
&c., remain in force on account of the pradhâna being devoid of the
power of intelligence. And if (to escape those objections) the Sâ@nkhya
should infer (from the orderly arrangement of the world, &c.), that the
primal cause is intelligent, he would cease to be an antagonist, since
the doctrine that there is one intelligent cause of this multiform world
would be nothing else but the Vedântic doctrine of Brahman.--Moreover,
if the gu/n/as were capable of entering into the relation of mutual
inequality even while in the state of equipoise, one of two things would
happen; they would either not be in the condition of inequality on
account of the absence of an operative cause; or else, if they were in
that condition, they would always remain in it; the absence of an
operative cause being a non-changing circumstance. And thus the doctrine
would again be open to the objection stated before[333].

10. And moreover (the Sâ@nkhya doctrine) is objectionable on account of
its contradictions.

The doctrine of the Sâ@nkhyas, moreover, is full of contradictions.
Sometimes they enumerate seven senses, sometimes eleven[334]. In some
places they teach that the subtle elements of material things proceed
from the great principle, in other places again that they proceed from
self-consciousness. Sometimes they speak of three internal organs,
sometimes of one only[335]. That their doctrine, moreover, contradicts
/S/ruti, which teaches that the Lord is the cause of the world, and
Sm/ri/ti, based on /S/ruti, is well known.--For these reasons also the
Sâ@nkhya system is objectionable.

Here the Sâ@nkhya again brings a countercharge--The system of the
Vedântins also, he says, must be declared to be objectionable; for it
does not admit that that which suffers and that which causes
suffering[336] are different classes of things (and thereby renders
futile the well-established distinction of causes of suffering and
suffering beings). For those who admit the one Brahman to be the Self of
everything and the cause of the whole world, have to admit also that the
two attributes of being that which causes suffering and that which
suffers belong to the one supreme Self (not to different classes of
beings). If, then, these two attributes belong to one and the same Self,
it never can divest itself of them, and thus Scripture, which teaches
perfect knowledge for the purpose of the cessation of all suffering,
loses all its meaning. For--to adduce a parallel case--a lamp as long as
it subsists as such is never divested of the two qualities of giving
heat and light. And if the Vedântin should adduce the case of water with
its waves, ripples, foam, &c.[337], we remark that there also the waves,
&c. constitute attributes of the water which remain permanently,
although they by turns manifest themselves, and again enter into the
state of non-manifestation; hence the water is never really destitute of
waves, not any more than the lamp is ever destitute of heat and
light.--That that which causes suffering, and that which suffers
constitute different classes of things is, moreover, well known from
ordinary experience. For (to consider the matter from a more general
point of view) the person desiring and the thing desired[338] are
understood to be separate existences. If the object of desire were not
essentially different and separate from the person desiring, the state
of being desirous could not be ascribed to the latter, because the
object with reference to which alone he can be called desiring would
already essentially be established in him (belong to him). The latter
state of things exists in the case of a lamp and its light, for
instance. Light essentially belongs to the lamp, and hence the latter
never can stand in want of light; for want or desire can exist only if
the thing wanted or desired is not yet obtained.

(And just as there could be no desiring person, if the object of desire
and the desiring person were not essentially separate), so the object of
desire also would cease to be an object for the desiring person, and
would be an object for itself only. As a matter of fact, however, this
is not the case; for the two ideas (and terms), 'object of desire' and
'desiring person,' imply a relation (are correlative), and a relation
exists in two things, not in one only. Hence the desiring person and the
object of desire are separate.--The same holds good with regard to what
is not desired (object of aversion; anartha) and the non-desiring person
(anarthin).

An object of desire is whatever is of advantage to the desiring person,
an object of aversion whatever is of disadvantage; with both one person
enters into relation by turns. On account of the comparative paucity of
the objects of desire, and the comparative multitude of the objects of
aversion, both may be comprised under the general term, 'object of
aversion.' Now, these objects of aversion we mean when we use the term
'causes of suffering,' while by the term 'sufferer' we understand the
soul which, being one, enters into successive relations with both (i.e.
the objects of desire and the objects of aversion). If, then, the causes
of suffering and the sufferer constitute one Self (as the Vedânta
teaches), it follows that final release is impossible.--But if, on the
other hand, the two are assumed to constitute separate classes, the
possibility of release is not excluded, since the cause of the connexion
of the two (viz. wrong knowledge) may be removed.

All this reasoning--we, the Vedântins, reply--is futile, because on
account of the unity of the Self the relation, whose two terms are the
causes of suffering, and the sufferer cannot exist (in the Self).--Our
doctrine would be liable to your objection if that which causes
suffering and that which suffers did, while belonging to one and the
same Self, stand to each other in the relation of object and subject.
But they do not stand in that relation just because they are one. If
fire, although it possesses different attributes, such as heat and
light, and is capable of change, does neither burn nor illumine itself
since it is one only; how can the one unchangeable Brahman enter with
reference to itself into the relation of cause of suffering and
sufferer?--Where then, it may be asked, does the relation discussed
(which after all cannot be denied altogether) exist?--That, we reply, is
not difficult to see[339]. The living body which is the object of the
action of burning is the sufferer; the sun, for instance, is a cause of
suffering (burning).--But, the opponent rejoins, burning is a pain, and
as such can affect an intelligent being only, not the non-intelligent
body; for if it were an affection of the mere body, it would, on the
destruction of the body, cease of itself, so that it would be needless
to seek for means to make it cease.--But it is likewise not observed, we
reply, that a mere intelligent being destitute of a body is burned and
suffers pain.--Nor would you (the Sâ@nkhya) also assume that the
affection called burning belongs to a mere intelligent being. Nor can
you admit[340] a real connexion of the soul and the body, because
through such a connexion impurity and similar imperfections would attach
to the soul[341]. Nor can suffering itself be said to suffer. And how
then, we ask, can you explain the relation existing between a sufferer
and the causes of suffering? If (as a last refuge) you should maintain
that the sattva-gu/n/a is that which suffers, and the gu/n/a called
passion that which causes suffering, we again object, because the
intelligent principle (the soul) cannot be really connected with these
two[342]. And if you should say that the soul suffers as it were because
it leans towards[343] the sattva-gu/n/a, we point out that the
employment of the phrase, 'as it were,' shows that the soul does not
really suffer.

If it is understood that its suffering is not real, we do not object to
the phrase 'as it were[344].' For the amphisbena also does not become
venomous because it is 'a serpent as it were' ('like a serpent'), nor
does the serpent lose its venom because it is 'like an amphisbena.' You
must therefore admit that the relation of causes of suffering and of
sufferers is not real, but the effect of Nescience. And if you admit,
that, then my (the Vedântic) doctrine also is free from objections[345].

But perhaps you (the Sâ@nkhya) will say that, after all, suffering (on
the part of the soul) is real[346]. In that case, however, the
impossibility of release is all the more undeniable[347], especially as
the cause of suffering (viz. the pradhâna) is admitted to be
eternal.--And if (to get out of this difficulty) you maintain that,
although the potentialities of suffering (on the part of the soul) and
of causing suffering (on the part of the pradhâna) are eternal, yet
suffering, in order to become actual, requires the conjunction of the
two--which conjunction in its turn depends on a special reason, viz. the
non-discrimination of the pradhâna by the soul--and that hence, when
that reason no longer exists, the conjunction of the two comes to an
absolute termination, whereby the absolute release of the soul becomes
possible; we are again unable to accept your explanation, because that
on which the non-discrimination depends, viz. the gu/n/a, called
Darkness, is acknowledged by you to be eternal.

And as[348] there is no fixed rule for the (successive) rising and
sinking of the influence of the particular gu/n/as, there is also no
fixed rule for the termination of the cause which effects the
conjunction of soul and pradhâna (i.e. non-discrimination); hence the
disjunction of the two is uncertain, and so the Sâ@nkhyas cannot escape
the reproach of absence of final release resulting from their doctrine.
To the Vedântin, on the other hand, the idea of final release being
impossible cannot occur in his dreams even; for the Self he acknowledges
to be one only, and one thing cannot enter into the relation of subject
and object, and Scripture, moreover, declares that the plurality of
effects originates from speech only. For the phenomenal world, on the
other hand, we may admit the relation of sufferer and suffering just as
it is observed, and need neither object to it nor refute it.

Herewith we have refuted the doctrine which holds the pradhâna to be the
cause of the world. We have now to dispose of the atomic theory.

We begin by refuting an objection raised by the atomists against the
upholders of Brahman.--The Vai/s/eshikas argue as follows: The qualities
which inhere in the substance constituting the cause originate qualities
of the same kind in the substance constituting the effect; we see, for
instance, that from white threads white cloth is produced, but do not
observe what is contrary (viz. white threads resulting in a piece of
cloth of a different colour). Hence, if the intelligent Brahman is
assumed as the cause of the world, we should expect to find intelligence
inherent in the effect also, viz. the world. But this is not the case,
and consequently the intelligent Brahman cannot be the cause of the
world.--This reasoning the Sûtrakâra shows to be fallacious, on the
ground of the system of the Vai/s/eshikas themselves.

II. Or (the world may originate from Brahman) as the great and the long
originate from the short and the atomic.

The system of the Vai/s/eshikas is the following:--The atoms which
possess, according to their special kind[349], the qualities of colour,
&c., and which are of spherical form[350], subsist during a certain
period[351] without producing any effects[352]. After that, the unseen
principle (ad/ri/sh/ta/), &c.[353], acting as operative causes and
conjunction constituting the non-inherent cause[354], they produce the
entire aggregate of effected things, beginning with binary atomic
compounds. At the same time the qualities of the causes (i.e. of the
simple atoms) produce corresponding qualities in the effects. Thus, when
two atoms produce a binary atomic compound, the special qualities
belonging to the simple atoms, such as white colour, &c., produce a
corresponding white colour in the binary compound. One special quality,
however, of the simple atoms, viz. atomic sphericity, does not produce
corresponding sphericity in the binary compound; for the forms of
extension belonging to the latter are said to be minuteness (a/n/utva)
and shortness. And, again, when two binary compounds combining produce a
quaternary atomic compound, the qualities, such as whiteness, &c.,
inherent in the binary compounds produce corresponding qualities in the
quaternary compounds; with the exception, however, of the two qualities
of minuteness and shortness. For it is admitted that the forms of
extension belonging to quaternary compounds are not minuteness and
shortness, but bigness (mahattva) and length. The same happens[355] when
many simple atoms or many binary compounds or a simple atom and a binary
compound combine to produce new effects.

Well, then, we say, just as from spherical atoms binary compounds are
produced, which are minute and short, and ternary compounds which are
big and long, but not anything spherical; or as from binary compounds,
which are minute and short, ternary compounds, &c., are produced which
are big and long, not minute and short; so this non-intelligent world
may spring from the intelligent Brahman. This is a doctrine to which
you--the Vai/s/eshika--cannot, on your own principles, object.

Here the Vai/s/eshika will perhaps come forward with the following
argumentation[356]. As effected substances, such as binary compounds and
so on, are engrossed by forms of extension contrary to that of the
causal substances, the forms of extension belonging to the latter, viz.
sphericity and so on, cannot produce similar qualities in the effects.
The world, on the other hand, is not engrossed by any quality contrary
to intelligence owing to which the intelligence inherent in the cause
should not be able to originate a new intelligence in the effect. For
non-intelligence is not a quality contrary to intelligence, but merely
its negation. As thus the case of sphericity is not an exactly parallel
one, intelligence may very well produce an effect similar to itself.

This argumentation, we rejoin, is not sound. Just as the qualities of
sphericity and so on, although existing in the cause, do not produce
corresponding effects, so it is with intelligence also; so that the two
cases are parallel so far. Nor can the circumstance of the effects being
engrossed by a different form of extension be alleged as the reason of
sphericity, &c. not originating qualities similar to themselves; for the
power of originating effects belongs to sphericity, &c. before another
form of extension begins to exist. For it is admitted that the substance
produced remains for a moment devoid of qualities, and that thereupon
only (i.e. after that moment) its qualities begin to exist. Nor, again,
can it be said that sphericity, &c. concentrate their activity on
originating other forms of extension[357], and therefore do not
originate forms of extension belonging to the same class as their own;
for it is admitted that the origin of other forms is due to other
causes; as the Sûtras of Ka/n/abhuj (Ka/n/âda) themselves declare
(Vai/s/. Sût. VII, 1, 9, 'Bigness is produced from plurality inherent in
the causes, from bigness of the cause and from a kind of accumulation;'
VII, 1, 10, 'The contrary of this (the big) is the minute;' VII, 1, 17,
'Thereby length and shortness are explained[358]').--Nor, again, can it
be said that plurality, &c. inherent in the cause originate (like
effects) in consequence of some peculiar proximity (in which they are
supposed to stand to the effected substance), while sphericity, &c. (not
standing in a like proximity) do not; for when a new substance or a new
quality is originated, all the qualities of the cause stand in the same
relation of inherence to their abode (i.e. the causal substance in which
they inhere). For these reasons the fact of sphericity, &c. not
originating like effects can be explained from the essential nature of
sphericity, &c. only, and the same may therefore be maintained with
regard to intelligence[359].

Moreover, from that observed fact also, that from conjunction
(sa/m/yoga) there originate substances, &c. belonging to a class
different (from that to which conjunction itself belongs), it follows
that the doctrine of effects belonging to the same class as the causes
from which they spring is too wide. If you remark against this last
argument that, as we have to do at present with a substance (viz.
Brahman), it is inappropriate to instance a quality (viz. conjunction)
as a parallel case; we point out that at present we only wish to explain
the origination of effects belonging to a different class in general.
Nor is there any reason for the restriction that substances only are to
be adduced as examples for substances, and qualities only for qualities.
Your own Sûtrakâra adduces a quality as furnishing a parallel case for a
substance (Vai/s/. Sût. IV, 2, 2, 'On account of the conjunction of
things perceptible and things imperceptible being imperceptible the body
is not composed of five elements'). Just as the conjunction which
inheres in the perceptible earth and the imperceptible ether is not
perceptible, the body also, if it had for its inherent cause the five
elements which are part of them perceptible, part of them imperceptible,
would itself be imperceptible; but, as a matter of fact, it is
perceptible; hence it is not composed of the five elements. Here
conjunction is a quality and the body a substance.--The origin of
effects different in nature (from the cause) has, moreover, been already
treated of under II, 1; 6.--Well then, this being so, the matter has
been settled there already (why then is it again discussed
here?)-Because, we reply, there we argued against the Sâ@nkhya, and at
present we have to do with the Vai/s/eshika.--But, already once, before
(II, 1, 3) a line of argument equally applicable to a second case was
simply declared to extend to the latter also; (why then do you not
simply state now that the arguments used to defeat the Sâ@nkhya are
equally valid against the Vai/s/eshika?)--Because here, we reply, at the
beginning of the examination of the Vai/s/eshika system we prefer to
discuss the point with arguments specially adapted to the doctrine of
the Vai/s/eshikas.

12. In both cases also (in the cases of the ad/ri/sh/t/a inhering either
in the atoms or the soul) action (of the atoms) is not (possible); hence
absence of that (viz. creation and pralaya).

The Sûtrakâra now proceeds to refute the doctrine of atoms being the
cause of the world.--This doctrine arises in the following manner. We
see that all ordinary substances which consist of parts as, for
instance, pieces of cloth originate from the substances connected with
them by the relation of inherence, as for instance threads, conjunction
co-operating (with the parts to form the whole). We thence draw the
general conclusion that whatever consists of parts has originated from
those substances with which it is connected by the relation of
inherence, conjunction cooperating. That thing now at which the
distinction of whole and parts stops and which marks the limit of
division into minuter parts is the atom.--This whole world, with its
mountains, oceans, and so on, is composed of parts; because it is
composed of parts it has a beginning and an end[360]; an effect may not
be assumed without a cause; therefore the atoms are the cause of the
world. Such is Ka/n/âda's doctrine.--As we observe four elementary
substances consisting of parts, viz. earth, water, fire, and air (wind),
we have to assume four different kinds of atoms. These atoms marking the
limit of subdivision into minuter parts cannot be divided themselves;
hence when the elements are destroyed they can be divided down to atoms
only; this state of atomic division of the elements constitutes the
pralaya (the periodical destruction of the world). After that when the
time for creation comes, motion (karman) springs up in the aerial atoms.
This motion which is due to the unseen principle[361] joins the atom in
which it resides to another atom; thus binary compounds, &c. are
produced, and finally the element of air. In a like manner are produced
fire, water, earth, the body with its organs. Thus the whole world
originates from atoms. From the qualities inhering in the atoms the
qualities belonging to the binary compounds are produced, just as the
qualities of the cloth result from the qualities of the threads.--Such,
in short, is the teaching of the followers of Ka/n/âda.

This doctrine we controvert in the following manner.--It must be
admitted that the atoms when they are in a state of isolation require
action (motion) to bring about their conjunction; for we observe that
the conjunction of threads and the like is effected by action. Action
again, which is itself an effect, requires some operative cause by which
it is brought about; for unless some such cause exists, no original
motion can take place in the atoms. If, then, some operative cause is
assumed, we may, in the first place, assume some cause analogous to seen
causes, such as endeavour or impact. But in that case original motion
could not occur at all in the atoms, since causes of that kind are, at
the time, impossible. For in the pralaya state endeavour, which is a
quality of the soul, cannot take place because no body exists then. For
the quality of the soul called endeavour originates when the soul is
connected with the internal organ which abides in the body. The same
reason precludes the assumption of other seen causes such as impact and
the like. For they all are possible only after the creation of the world
has taken place, and cannot therefore be the causes of the original
action (by which the world is produced).--If, in the second place, the
unseen principle is assumed as the cause of the original motion of the
atoms, we ask: Is this unseen principle to be considered as inhering in
the soul or in the atom? In both cases it cannot be the cause of motion
in the atoms, because it is non-intelligent. For, as we have shown above
in our examination of the Sâ@nkhya system, a non-intelligent thing which
is not directed by an intelligent principle cannot of itself either act
or be the cause of action, and the soul cannot be the guiding principle
of the ad/ri/sh/t/a because at the time of pralaya its intelligence has
not yet arisen[362]. If, on the other hand, the unseen principle is
supposed to inhere in the soul, it cannot be the cause of motion in the
atoms, because there exists no connexion of it with the latter. If you
say that the soul in which the unseen principle inheres is connected
with the atoms, then there would result, from the continuity of
connexion[363], continuity of action, as there is no other restricting
principle.--Hence, there being no definite cause of action, original
action cannot take place in the atoms; there being no action,
conjunction of the atoms which depends on action cannot take place;
there being no conjunction, all the effects depending on it, viz. the
formation of binary atomic compounds, &c., cannot originate.

How, moreover, is the conjunction of one atom with another to be
imagined? Is it to be total interpenetration of the two or partial
conjunction? If the former, then no increase of bulk could take place,
and consequently atomic size only would exist; moreover, it would be
contrary to what is observed, as we see that conjunction takes place
between substances having parts (prade/s/a). If the latter, it would
follow that the atoms are composed of parts.--Let then the atoms be
imagined to consist of parts.--If so, imagined things being unreal, the
conjunction also of the atoms would be unreal and thus could not be the
non-inherent cause of real things. And without non-inherent causes
effected substances such as binary compounds, &c. could not originate.
And just as at the time of the first creation motion of the atoms
leading to their conjunction could not take place, there being no cause
of such motion; thus at the time of a general pralaya also no action
could take place leading to their separation, since for that occurrence
also no definite seen cause could be alleged. Nor could the unseen
principle be adduced as the cause, since its purport is to effect
enjoyment (of reward and punishment on the part of the soul), not to
bring about the pralaya. There being then no possibility of action to
effect either the conjunction or the separation of the atoms, neither
conjunction nor separation would actually take place, and hence neither
creation nor pralaya of the world.--For these reasons the doctrine of
the atoms being the cause of the world must be rejected.

13. And because in consequence of samavâya being admitted a regressus in
infinitum results from parity of reasoning.

You (the Vai/s/eshika) admit that a binary compound which originates
from two atoms, while absolutely different from them, is connected with
them by the relation of inherence; but on that assumption the doctrine
of the atoms being the general cause cannot be established, 'because
parity involves here a retrogressus ad infinitum.' For just as a binary
compound which is absolutely different from the two constituent atoms is
connected with them by means of the relation of inherence (samavâya), so
the relation of inherence itself being absolutely different from the two
things which it connects, requires another relation of inherence to
connect it with them, there being absolute difference in both cases. For
this second relation of inherence again, a third relation of inherence
would have to be assumed and so on ad infinitum.--But--the Vai/s/eshika
is supposed to reply--we are conscious of the so-called samavâya
relation as eternally connected with the things between which it exists,
not as either non-connected with them or as depending on another
connexion; we are therefore not obliged to assume another connexion, and
again another, and so on, and thus to allow ourselves to be driven into
a regressus in infinitum.--Your defence is unavailing, we reply, for it
would involve the admission that conjunction (sa/m/yoga) also as being
eternally connected with the things which it joins does, like samavâya,
not require another connexion[364]. If you say that conjunction does
require another connexion because it is a different thing[365] we reply
that then samavâya also requires another connexion because it is
likewise a different thing. Nor can you say that conjunction does
require another connexion because it is a quality (gu/n/a), and samavâya
does not because it is not a quality; for (in spite of this difference)
the reason for another connexion being required is the same in both
cases[366], and not that which is technically called 'quality' is the
cause (of another connexion being required)[367].--For these reasons
those who acknowledge samavâya to be a separate existence are driven
into a regressus in infinitum, in consequence of which, the
impossibility of one term involving the impossibility of the entire
series, not even the origination of a binary compound from two atoms can
be accounted for.--For this reason also the atomic doctrine is
inadmissible.

14. And on account of the permanent existence (of activity or
non-activity).

Moreover, the atoms would have to be assumed as either essentially
active (moving) or essentially non-active, or both or neither; there
being no fifth alternative. But none of the four alternatives stated is
possible. If they were essentially active, their activity would be
permanent so that no pralaya could take place. If they were essentially
non-active, their non-activity would be permanent, and no creation could
take place. Their being both is impossible because self-contradictory.
If they were neither, their activity and non-activity would have to
depend on an operative cause, and then the operative causes such as the
ad/ri/sh/t/a being in permanent proximity to the atoms, permanent
activity would result; or else the ad/ri/sh/t/a and so on not being
taken as operative causes, the consequence would be permanent
non-activity on the part of the atoms.--For this reason also the atomic
doctrine is untenable.

15. And on account of the atoms having colour, &c., the reverse (of the
Vai/s/eshika tenet would take place); as thus it is observed.

Let us suppose, the Vai/s/eshikas say, all substances composed of parts
to be disintegrated into their parts; a limit will finally be reached
beyond which the process of disintegration cannot be continued. What
constitutes that limit are the atoms, which are eternal (permanent),
belong to four different classes, possess the qualities of colour, &c.,
and are the originating principles of this whole material world with its
colour, form, and other qualities.

This fundamental assumption of the Vai/s/eshikas we declare to be
groundless because from the circumstance of the atoms having colour and
other qualities there would follow the contrary of atomic minuteness and
permanency, i.e. it would follow that, compared to the ultimate cause,
they are gross and non-permanent. For ordinary experience teaches that
whatever things possess colour and other qualities are, compared to
their cause, gross and non-permanent. A piece of cloth, for instance, is
gross compared to the threads of which it consists, and non permanent;
and the threads again are non-permanent and gross compared to the
filaments of which they are made up. Therefore the atoms also which the
Vai/s/eshikas admit to have colour, &c. must have causes compared to
which they are gross and non-permanent. Hence that reason also which
Ka/n/âda gives for the permanence of the atoms (IV, 1, 1, 'that which
exists without having a cause is permanent') does not apply at all to
the atoms because, as we have shown just now, the atoms are to be
considered as having a cause.--The second reason also which Ka/n/âda
brings forward for the permanency of the atoms, viz. in IV, 1, 4, 'the
special negation implied in the term non-eternal would not be
possible[368]' (if there did not exist something eternal, viz. the
atoms), does not necessarily prove the permanency of the atoms; for
supposing that there exists not any permanent thing, the formation of a
negative compound such as 'non-eternal' is impossible. Nor does the
existence of the word 'non-permanent' absolutely presuppose the
permanency of atoms; for there exists (as we Vedântins maintain) another
permanent ultimate Cause, viz. Brahman. Nor can the existence of
anything be established merely on the ground of a word commonly being
used in that sense, since there is room for common use only if word and
matter are well-established by some other means of right knowledge.--The
third reason also given in the Vai/s/. Sûtras (IV, 1, 5) for the
permanency of the atoms ('and Nescience') is unavailing. For if we
explain that Sûtra to mean 'the non-perception of those actually
existing causes whose effects are seen is Nescience,' it would follow
that the binary atomic compounds also are permanent[369]. And if we
tried to escape from that difficulty by including (in the explanation of
the Sûtra as given above) the qualification 'there being absence of
(originating) substances,' then nothing else but the absence of a cause
would furnish the reason for the permanency of the atoms, and as that
reason had already been mentioned before (in IV, 1, 1) the Sûtra IV, 1,
5 would be a useless restatement.--Well, then (the Vai/s/eshika might
say), let us understand by 'Nescience' (in the Sûtra) the impossibility
of conceiving a third reason of the destruction (of effects), in
addition to the division of the causal substance into its parts, and the
destruction of the causal substance; which impossibility involves the
permanency of the atoms[370].--There is no necessity, we reply, for
assuming that a thing when perishing must perish on account of either of
those two reasons. That assumption would indeed have to be made if it
were generally admitted that a new substance is produced only by the
conjunction of several causal substances. But if it is admitted that a
causal substance may originate a new substance by passing over into a
qualified state after having previously existed free from
qualifications, in its pure generality, it follows that the effected
substance may be destroyed by its solidity being dissolved, just as the
hardness of ghee is dissolved by the action of fire[371].--Thus there
would result, from the circumstance of the atoms having colour, &c., the
opposite of what the Vai/s/eshikas mean. For this reason also the atomic
doctrine cannot be maintained.

16. And as there are difficulties in both cases.

Earth has the qualities of smell, taste, colour, and touch, and is
gross; water has colour, taste, and touch, and is fine; fire has colour
and touch, and is finer yet; air is finest of all, and has the quality
of touch only. The question now arises whether the atoms constituting
the four elements are to be assumed to possess the same greater or
smaller number of qualities as the respective elements.--Either
assumption leads to unacceptable consequences. For if we assume that
some kinds of atoms have more numerous qualities, it follows that their
solid size (mûrti) will be increased thereby, and that implies their
being atoms no longer. That an increase of qualities cannot take place
without a simultaneous increase of size we infer from our observations
concerning effected material bodies.--If, on the other hand, we assume,
in order to save the equality of atoms of all kinds, that there is no
difference in the number of their qualities, we must either suppose that
they have all one quality only; but in that case we should not perceive
touch in fire nor colour and touch in water, nor taste, colour, and
touch in earth, since the qualities of the effects have for their
antecedents the qualities of the causes. Or else we must suppose all
atoms to have all the four qualities; but in that case we should
necessarily perceive what we actually do not perceive, viz. smell in
water, smell and taste in fire, smell, taste, and colour in air.--Hence
on this account also the atomic doctrine shows itself to be
unacceptable.

17. And as the (atomic theory) is not accepted (by any authoritative
persons) it is to be disregarded altogether.

While the theory of the pradhâna being the cause of the world has been
accepted by some adherents of the Veda--as, for instance, Manu--with a
view to the doctrines of the effect existing in the cause already, and
so on, the atomic doctrine has not been accepted by any persons of
authority in any of its parts, and therefore is to be disregarded
entirely by all those who take their stand on the Veda.

There are, moreover, other objections to the Vai/s/eshika doctrine.--The
Vai/s/eshikas assume six categories, which constitute the subject-matter
of their system, viz. substance, quality, action, generality,
particularity, and inherence. These six categories they maintain to be
absolutely different from each other, and to have different
characteristics; just as a man, a horse, a hare differ from one another.
Side by side with this assumption they make another which contradicts
the former one, viz. that quality, action, &c. have the attribute of
depending on substance. But that is altogether inappropriate; for just
as ordinary things, such as animals, grass, trees, and the like, being
absolutely different from each other do not depend on each other, so the
qualities, &c. also being absolutely different from substance, cannot
depend on the latter. Or else let the qualities, &c. depend on
substance; then it follows that, as they are present where substance is
present, and absent where it is absent, substance only exists, and,
according to its various forms, becomes the object of different terms
and conceptions (such as quality, action, &c.); just as Devadatta, for
instance, according to the conditions in which he finds himself is the
object of various conceptions and names. But this latter alternative
would involve the acceptation of the Sâ@nkhya doctrine[372] and the
abandonment of the Vai/s/eshika standpoint.--But (the Vai/s/eshika may
say) smoke also is different from fire and yet it is dependent on
it.--True, we reply; but we ascertain the difference of smoke and fire
from the fact of their being apperceived in separation. Substance and
quality, on the other hand, are not so apperceived; for when we are
conscious of a white blanket, or a red cow, or a blue lotus, the
substance is in each case cognised by means of the quality; the latter
therefore has its Self in the substance. The same reasoning applies to
action, generality, particularity, and inherence.

If you (the Vai/s/eshika) say that qualities, actions, &c. (although not
non-different from substances) may yet depend on the latter because
substances and qualities stand in the relation of one not being able to
exist without the other (ayutasiddhi[373]); we point out that things
which are ayutasiddha must either be non-separate in place, or
non-separate in time, or non-separate in nature, and that none of these
alternatives agrees with Vai/s/eshika principles. For the first
alternative contradicts your own assumptions according to which the
cloth originating from the threads occupies the place of the threads
only, not that of the cloth, while the qualities of the cloth, such as
its white colour, occupy the place of the cloth only, not that of the
threads. So the Vai/s/eshika-sûtras say (I, 1, 10), 'Substances
originate another substance and qualities another quality.' The threads
which constitute the causal substance originate the effected substance,
viz. the cloth, and the qualities of the threads, such as white colour,
&c., produce in the cloth new corresponding qualities. But this doctrine
is clearly contradicted by the assumption of substance and quality being
non-separate in place.--If, in the second place, you explain
ayutasiddhatva as non-separation in time, it follows also that, for
instance, the right and the left horn of a cow would be
ayutasiddha.--And if, finally, you explain it to mean 'non-separation in
character,' it is impossible to make any further distinction between the
substance and the quality, as then quality is conceived as being
identical with substance.

Moreover, the distinction which the Vai/s/eshikas make between
conjunction (sa/m/yoga) as being the connexion of things which can exist
separately, and inherence (samavâya) as being the connexion of things
which are incapable of separate existence is futile, since the cause
which exists before the effect[374] cannot be said to be incapable of
separate existence. Perhaps the Vai/s/eshika will say that his
definition refers to one of the two terms only, so that samavâya is the
connexion, with the cause, of the effect which is incapable of separate
existence. But this also is of no avail; for as a connexion requires two
terms, the effect as long as it has not yet entered into being cannot be
connected with the cause. And it would be equally unavailing to say that
the effect enters into the connexion after it has begun to exist; for if
the Vai/s/eshika admits that the effect may exist previous to its
connexion with the cause, it is no longer ayutasiddha (incapable of
separate existence), and thereby the principle that between effect and
cause conjunction and disjunction do not take place is violated.[375]
And[376] just as conjunction, and not samavâya, is the connexion in
which every effected substance as soon as it has been produced stands
with the all-pervading substances as ether, &c.--although no motion has
taken place on the part of the effected substance--so also the connexion
of the effect with the cause will be conjunction merely, not samavâya.

Nor is there any proof for the existence of any connexion, samavâya or
sa/m/yoga, apart from the things which it connects. If it should be
maintained that sa/m/yoga and samavâya have such an existence because we
observe that there are names and ideas of them in addition to the names
and ideas of the things connected, we point out that one and the same
thing may be the subject of several names and ideas if it is considered
in its relations to what lies without it. Devadatta although being one
only forms the object of many different names and notions according as
he is considered in himself or in his relations to others; thus he is
thought and spoken of as man, Brâhma/n/a learned in the Veda, generous,
boy, young man, father, grandson, brother, son-in-law, &c. So, again,
one and the same stroke is, according to the place it is connected with,
spoken of and conceived as meaning either ten, or hundred, or thousand,
&c. Analogously, two connected things are not only conceived and denoted
as connected things, but in addition constitute the object of the ideas
and terms 'conjunction' or 'inherence' which however do not prove
themselves to be separate entities.--Things standing thus, the
non-existence of separate entities (conjunction, &c.), which entities
would have to be established on the ground of perception, follows from
the fact of their non-perception.--Nor, again[377], does the
circumstance of the word and idea of connexion having for its object the
things connected involve the connexion's permanent existence, since we
have already shown above that one thing may, on account of its relations
to other things, be conceived and denoted in different ways.

Further[378], conjunction cannot take place between the atoms, the soul,
and the internal organ, because they have no parts; for we observe that
conjunction takes place only of such substances as consist of parts. If
the Vai/s/eshika should say that parts of the atoms, soul and mind may
be assumed (in order to explain their alleged conjunction), we remark
that the assumption of actually non-existing things would involve the
result that anything might be established; for there is no restrictive
rule that only such and such non-existing things--whether contradictory
to reason or not--should be assumed and not any other, and assumptions
depend on one's choice only and may be carried to any extent. If we once
allow assumptions, there is no reason why there should not be assumed a
further hundred or thousand things, in addition to the six categories
assumed by the Vai/s/eshikas. Anybody might then assume anything, and we
could neither stop a compassionate man from assuming that this
transmigratory world which is the cause of so much misery to living
beings is not to be, nor a malicious man from assuming that even the
released souls are to enter on a new cycle of existences.

Further, it is not possible that a binary atomic compound, which
consists of parts, should be connected with the simple indivisible atoms
by an intimate connexion (sa/ms/lesha) any more than they can thus be
connected with ether; for between ether and earth, &c. there does not
exist that kind of intimate connexion which exists, for instance,
between wood and varnish[379].

Let it then be said (the Vai/s/eshika resumes) that the samavâya
relation must be assumed, because otherwise the relation of that which
abides and that which forms the abode--which relation actually exists
between the effected substance and the causal substance--is not
possible.--That would, we reply, involve the vice of mutual dependence;
for only when the separateness of cause and effect is established, the
relation of the abode and that which abides can be established; and only
when the latter relation is established, the relation of separateness
can be established. For the Vedântins acknowledge neither the
separateness of cause and effect, nor their standing to each other in
the relation of abode and thing abiding, since according to their
doctrine the effect is only a certain state of the
cause[380].--Moreover, as the atoms are limited (not of infinite
extension), they must in reality consist of as many parts as we
acknowledge regions of space[381], whether those be six or eight or ten,
and consequently they cannot be permanent; conclusions contrary to the
Vai/s/eshika doctrine of the indivisibility and permanency of the
atoms.--If the Vai/s/eshika replies that those very parts which are
owing to the existence of the different regions of space are his
(indestructible) atoms; we deny that because all things whatever,
forming a series of substances of ever-increasing minuteness, are
capable of dissolution, until the highest cause (Brahman) is reached.
Earth--which is, in comparison with a binary compound, the grossest
thing of all--undergoes decomposition; so do the substances following
next which belong to the same class as earth; so does the binary
compound; and so does, finally, the atom which (although the minutest
thing of all) still belongs to the same general class (i.e. matter) with
earth, &c. The objection (which the Vai/s/eshika might possibly raise
here again) that things can be decomposed only by the separation of
their parts[382], we have already disposed of above, where we pointed
out that decomposition may take place in a manner analogous to the
melting of ghee. Just as the hardness of ghee, gold, and the like, is
destroyed in consequence of those substances being rendered liquid by
their contact with fire, no separation of the parts taking place all the
while; so the solid shape of the atoms also may be decomposed by their
passing back into the indifferenced condition of the highest cause. In
the same way the origination of effects also is brought about not merely
in the way of conjunction of parts; for we see that milk, for instance,
and water originate effects such as sour milk and ice without there
taking place any conjunction of parts.

It thus appears that the atomic doctrine is supported by very weak
arguments only, is opposed to those scriptural passages which declare
the Lord to be the general cause, and is not accepted by any of the
authorities taking their stand on Scripture, such as Manu and others.
Hence it is to be altogether disregarded by highminded men who have a
regard for their own spiritual welfare.

18. (If there be assumed) the (dyad of) aggregates with its two causes,
(there takes place) non-establishment of those (two aggregates).

The reasons on account of which the doctrine of the Vai/s/eshikas cannot
be accepted have been stated above. That doctrine may be called
semi-destructive (or semi-nihilistic[383]). That the more thorough
doctrine which teaches universal non-permanency is even less worthy of
being taken into consideration, we now proceed to show.

That doctrine is presented in a variety of forms, due either to the
difference of the views (maintained by Buddha at different times), or
else to the difference of capacity on the part of the disciples (of
Buddha). Three principal opinions may, however, be distinguished; the
opinion of those who maintain the reality of everything (Realists,
sarvâstitvavâdin); the opinion of those who maintain that thought only
is real (Idealists, vij/ñ/ànavâdin); and the opinion of those who
maintain that everything is void (unreal; Nihilists,
/s/ûnyavâdin[384]).--We first controvert those who maintain that
everything, external as well as internal, is real. What is external is
either element (bhûta) or elementary (bhautika); what is internal is
either mind (/k/itta) or mental (/k/aitta). The elements are earth,
water, and so on; elemental are colour, &c. on the one hand, and the eye
and the other sense-organs on the other hand. Earth and the other three
elements arise from the aggregation of the four different kinds of
atoms; the atoms of earth being hard, those of water viscid, those of
fire hot, those of air mobile.:--The inward world consists of the five
so-called 'groups' (skandha), the group of sensation (rûpaskandha), the
group of knowledge (vij/ñ/ânaskandha), the group of feeling
(vedanâskandha), the group of verbal knowledge (samj/ñ/âskandha), and
the group of impressions (sa/m/skâraskandha)[385]; which taken together
constitute the basis of all personal existence[386].

With reference to this doctrine we make the following remarks.--Those
two aggregates, constituting two different classes, and having two
different causes which the Bauddhas assume, viz. the aggregate of the
elements and elementary things whose cause the atoms are, and the
aggregate of the five skandhas whose cause the skandhas are, cannot, on
Bauddha principles, be established, i.e. it cannot be explained how the
aggregates are brought about. For the parts constituting the (material)
aggregates are devoid of intelligence, and the kindling (abhijvalana) of
intelligence depends on an aggregate of atoms having been brought about
previously[387]. And the Bauddhas do not admit any other permanent
intelligent being, such as either an enjoying soul or a ruling Lord,
which could effect the aggregation of the atoms. Nor can the atoms and
skandhas be assumed to enter on activity on their own account; for that
would imply their never ceasing to be active[388]. Nor can the cause of
aggregation be looked for in the so-called abode (i.e. the
âlayavij/ñ/âna-pravâha, the train of self-cognitions); for the latter
must be described either as different from the single cognitions or as
not different from them. (In the former case it is either permanent, and
then it is nothing else but the permanent soul of the Vedântins; or
non-permanent;) then being admitted to be momentary merely, it cannot
exercise any influence and cannot therefore be the cause of the motion
of the atoms[389]. (And in the latter case we are not further advanced
than before.)--For all these reasons the formation of aggregates cannot
be accounted for. But without aggregates there would be an end of the
stream of mundane existence which presupposes those aggregates.

19. If it be said that (the formation of aggregates may be explained)
through (Nescience, &c.) standing in the relation of mutual causality;
we say 'No,' because they merely are the efficient causes of the origin
(of the immediately subsequent links).

Although there exists no permanent intelligent principle of the nature
either of a ruling Lord or an enjoying soul, under whose influence the
formation of aggregates could take place, yet the course of mundane
existence is rendered possible through the mutual causality[390] of
Nescience and so on, so that we need not look for any other combining
principle.

The series beginning with Nescience comprises the following members:
Nescience, impression, knowledge, name and form, the abode of the six,
touch, feeling, desire, activity, birth, species, decay, death, grief,
lamentation, pain, mental affliction, and the like[391]. All these terms
constitute a chain of causes and are as such spoken of in the Bauddha
system, sometimes cursorily, sometimes at length. They are, moreover,
all acknowledged as existing, not by the Bauddhas only, but by the
followers of all systems. And as the cycles of Nescience, &c. forming
uninterrupted chains of causes and effects revolve unceasingly like
water-wheels, the existence of the aggregates (which constitute bodies
and minds) must needs be assumed, as without such Nescience and so on
could not take place.

This argumentation of the Bauddha we are unable to accept, because it
merely assigns efficient causes for the origination of the members of
the series, but does not intimate an efficient cause for the formation
of the aggregates. If the Bauddha reminds us of the statement made above
that the existence of aggregates must needs be inferred from the
existence of Nescience and so on, we point out that, if he means thereby
that Nescience and so on cannot exist without aggregates and hence
require the existence of such, it remains to assign an efficient cause
for the formation of the aggregates. But, as we have already shown--when
examining the Vaijeshika doctrine--that the formation of aggregates
cannot be accounted for even on the assumption of permanent atoms and
individual souls in which the ad/ri/sh/t/a abides[392]; how much less
then are aggregates possible if there exist only momentary atoms not
connected with enjoying souls and devoid of abodes (i.e. souls), and
that which abides in them (the ad/ri/sh/t/a).--Let us then assume (the
Bauddha says) that Nescience, &c. themselves are the efficient cause of
the aggregate.--But how--we ask--can they be the cause of that without
which--as their abode--they themselves are not capable of existence?
Perhaps you will say that in the eternal sa/m/sâra the aggregates
succeed one another in an unbroken chain, and hence also Nescience, and
so on, which abide in those aggregates. But in that case you will have
to assume either that each aggregate necessarily produces another
aggregate of the same kind, or that, without any settled rule, it may
produce either a like or an unlike one. In the former case a human body
could never pass over into that of a god or an animal or a being of the
infernal regions; in the latter case a man might in an instant be turned
into an elephant or a god and again become a man; either of which
consequences would be contrary to your system.--Moreover, that for the
purpose of whose enjoyment the aggregate is formed is, according to your
doctrine, not a permanent enjoying soul, so that enjoyment subserves
itself merely and cannot be desired by anything else; hence final
release also must, according to you, be considered as subserving itself
only, and no being desirous of release can be assumed. If a being
desirous of both were assumed, it would have to be conceived as
permanently existing up to the time of enjoyment and release, and that
would be contrary to your doctrine of general impermanency.--There may
therefore exist a causal relation between the members of the series
consisting of Nescience, &c., but, in the absence of a permanent
enjoying soul, it is impossible to establish on that ground the
existence of aggregates.

20. (Nor can there be a causal relation between Nescience, &c.), because
on the origination of the subsequent (moment) the preceding one ceases
to be.

We have hitherto argued that Nescience, and so on, stand in a causal
relation to each other merely, so that they cannot be made to account
for the existence of aggregates; we are now going to prove that they
cannot even be considered as efficient causes of the subsequent members
of the series to which they belong.

Those who maintain that everything has a momentary existence only admit
that when the thing existing in the second moment[393] enters into being
the thing existing in the first moment ceases to be. On this admission
it is impossible to establish between the two things the relation of
cause and effect, since the former momentary existence which ceases or
has ceased to be, and so has entered into the state of non-existence,
cannot be the cause of the later momentary existence.--Let it then be
said that the former momentary existence when it has reached its full
development becomes the cause of the later momentary existence.--That
also is impossible; for the assumption that a fully developed existence
exerts a further energy, involves the conclusion that it is connected
with a second moment (which contradicts the doctrine of universal
momentariness).--Then let the mere existence of the antecedent entity
constitute its causal energy.--That assumption also is fruitless,
because we cannot conceive the origination of an effect which is not
imbued with the nature of the cause (i.e. in which the nature of the
cause does not continue to exist). And to assume that the nature of the
cause does continue to exist in the effect is impossible (on the Bauddha
doctrine), as that would involve the permanency of the cause, and thus
necessitate the abandonment of the doctrine of general
non-permanency.--Nor can it be admitted that the relation of cause and
effect holds good without the cause somehow giving its colouring to the
effect; for that doctrine might unduly be extended to all
cases[394].--Moreover, the origination and cessation of things of which
the Bauddha speaks must either constitute a thing's own form or another
state of it, or an altogether different thing. But none of these
alternatives agrees with the general Bauddha principles. If, in the
first place, origination and cessation constituted the form of a thing,
it would follow that the word 'thing' and the words 'origination' and
'cessation' are interchangeable (which is not the case).--Let then,
secondly, the Bauddha says, a certain difference be assumed, in
consequence of which the terms 'origination' and 'cessation' may denote
the initial and final states of that which in the intermediate state is
called thing.--In that case, we reply, the thing will be connected with
three moments, viz. the initial, the intermediate, and the final one, so
that the doctrine of general momentariness will have to be
abandoned.--Let then, as the third alternative, origination and
cessation be altogether different from the thing, as much as a buffalo
is from a horse.--That too cannot be, we reply; for it would lead to the
conclusion that the thing, because altogether disconnected with
origination and cessation, is everlasting. And the same conclusion would
be led up to, if we understood by the origination and cessation of a
thing merely its perception and non-perception; for the latter are
attributes of the percipient mind only, not of the thing itself.--Hence
we have again to declare the Bauddha doctrine to be untenable.

21. On the supposition of there being no (cause: while yet the effect
takes place), there results contradiction of the admitted principle;
otherwise simultaneousness (of cause and effect).

It has been shown that on the doctrine of general non-permanency, the
former momentary existence, as having already been merged in
non-existence, cannot be the cause of the later one.--Perhaps now the
Bauddha will say that an effect may arise even when there is no
cause.--That, we reply, implies the abandonment of a principle admitted
by yourself, viz. that the mind and the mental modifications originate
when in conjunction with four kinds of causes[395]. Moreover, if
anything could originate without a cause, there would be nothing to
prevent that anything might originate at any time.--If, on the other
hand, you should say that we may assume the antecedent momentary
existence to last until the succeeding one has been produced, we point
out that that would imply the simultaneousness of cause and effect, and
so run counter to an accepted Bauddha tenet, viz. that all things[396]
are momentary merely.

22. Cessation dependent on a sublative act of the mind, and cessation
not so dependent cannot be established, there being no (complete)
interruption.

The Bauddhas who maintain that universal destruction is going on
constantly, assume that 'whatever forms an object of knowledge and is
different from the triad is produced (sa/m/sk/ri/ta) and momentary.' To
the triad there mentioned they give the names 'cessation dependent on a
sublative act of the mind,' 'cessation not dependent on such an act,'
and 'space.' This triad they hold to be non-substantial, of a merely
negative character (abhâvamâtra), devoid of all positive
characteristics. By 'cessation dependent on a sublative act of the
mind,' we have to understand such destruction of entities as is preceded
by an act of thought[397]; by 'cessation not so dependent' is meant
destruction of the opposite kind[398]; by 'space' is meant absence in
general of something covering (or occupying space). Out of these three
non-existences 'space' will be refuted later on (Sûtra 24), the two
other ones are refuted in the present Sûtra.

Cessation which is dependent on a sublative act of the mind, and
cessation which is not so dependent are both impossible, 'on account of
the absence of interruption.' For both kinds of cessation must have
reference either to the series (of momentary existences) or to the
single members constituting the series.--The former alternative is
impossible, because in all series (of momentary existences) the members
of the series stand in an unbroken relation of cause and effect so that
the series cannot be interrupted[399].--The latter alternative is
likewise inadmissible, for it is impossible to maintain that any
momentary existence should undergo complete annihilation entirely
undefinable and disconnected (with the previous state of existence),
since we observe that a thing is recognised in the various states
through which it may pass and thus has a connected existence[400]. And
in those cases also where a thing is not clearly recognised (after
having undergone a change) we yet infer, on the ground of actual
observations made in other cases, that one and the same thing continues
to exist without any interruption.--For these reasons the two kinds of
cessation which the Bauddhas assume cannot be proved.

23. And on account of the objections presenting themselves in either
case.

The cessation of Nescience, &c. which, on the assumption of the
Bauddhas, is included in the two kinds of cessation discussed hitherto,
must take place either in consequence of perfect knowledge together with
its auxiliaries, or else of its own accord. But the former alternative
would imply the abandonment of the Bauddha doctrine that destruction
takes place without a cause, and the latter alternative would involve
the uselessness of the Bauddha instruction as to the 'path'[401]. As
therefore both alternatives are open to objections, the Bauddha doctrine
must be declared unsatisfactory.

24. And in the case of space also (the doctrine of its being a
non-entity is untenable) on account of its not differing (from the two
other kinds of non-entity).

We have shown so far that of the triad declared by the Bauddhas to be
devoid of all positive characteristics, and therefore non-definable, two
(viz. prati-sa/m/khyâvirodha and aprati) cannot be shown to be such; we
now proceed to show the same with regard to space (ether, âkâ/s/a).

With regard to space also it cannot be maintained that it is
non-definable, since substantiality can be established in the case of
space no less than in the case of the two so-called non-entities treated
of in the preceding Sûtras. That space is a real thing follows in the
first place from certain scriptural passages, such as 'space sprang from
the Self.'--To those, again, who (like the Bauddhas) disagree with us as
to the authoritativeness of Scripture we point out that the real
existence of space is to be inferred from the quality of sound, since we
observe that earth and other real things are the abodes of smell and the
other qualities.--Moreover, if you declare that space is nothing but the
absence in general of any covering (occupying) body, it would follow
that while one bird is flying--whereby space is occupied--there would be
no room for a second bird wanting to fly at the same time. And if you
should reply that the second bird may fly there where there is absence
of a covering body, we point out that that something by which the
absence of covering bodies is distinguished must be a positive entity,
viz. space in our sense, and not the mere non-existence of covering
bodies[402].--Moreover, the Bauddha places himself, by his view of
space, in opposition to other parts of his system. For we find, in the
Bauddha Scriptures, a series of questions and answers (beginning, 'On
what, O reverend Sir, is the earth founded?'), in which the following
question occurs, 'On what is the air founded?' to which it is replied
that the air is founded on space (ether). Now it is clear that this
statement is appropriate only on the supposition of space being a
positive entity, not a mere negation.--Further, there is a
self-contradiction in the Bauddha statements regarding all the three
kinds of negative entities, it being said, on the one hand, that they
are not positively definable, and, on the other hand, that they are
eternal. Of what is not real neither eternity nor non-eternity can be
predicated, since the distinction of subjects and predicates of
attribution is founded entirely on real things. Anything with regard to
which that distinction holds good we conclude to be a real thing, such
as jars and the like are, not a mere undefinable negation.

25. And on account of remembrance.

The philosopher who maintains that all things are momentary only would
have to extend that doctrine to the perceiving person (upalabdh/ri/)
also; that is, however, not possible, on account of the remembrance
which is consequent on the original perception. That remembrance can
take place only if it belongs to the same person who previously made the
perception; for we observe that what one man has experienced is not
remembered by another man. How, indeed, could there arise the conscious
state expressed in the sentences, 'I saw that thing, and now I see this
thing,' if the seeing person were not in both cases the same? That the
consciousness of recognition takes place only in the case of the
observing and remembering subject being one, is a matter known to every
one; for if there were, in the two cases, different subjects, the state
of consciousness arising in the mind of the remembering person would be,
'_I_ remember; another person made the observation.' But no such state
of consciousness does arise.--When, on the other hand, such a state of
consciousness does arise, then everybody knows that the person who made
the original observation, and the person who remembers, are different
persons, and then the state of consciousness is expressed as follows, 'I
remember that that other person saw that and that.'--In the case under
discussion, however, the Vainâ/s/ika himself--whose state of
consciousness is, 'I saw that and that'--knows that there is one
thinking subject only to which the original perception as well as the
remembrance belongs, and does not think of denying that the past
perception belonged to himself, not any more than he denies that fire is
hot and gives light.

As thus one agent is connected with the two moments of perception and
subsequent remembrance, the Vainâ/s/ika has necessarily to abandon the
doctrine of universal momentariness. And if he further recognises all
his subsequent successive cognitions, up to his last breath, to belong
to one and the same subject, and in addition cannot but attribute all
his past cognitions, from the moment of his birth, to the same Self, how
can he maintain, without being ashamed of himself, that everything has a
momentary existence only? Should he maintain that the recognition (of
the subject as one and the same) takes place on account of the
similarity (of the different self-cognitions; each, however, being
momentary only), we reply that the cognition of similarity is based on
two things, and that for that reason the advocate of universal
momentariness who denies the existence of one (permanent) subject able
mentally to grasp the two similar things simply talks deceitful nonsense
when asserting that recognition is founded on similarity. Should he
admit, on the other hand, that there is one mind grasping the similarity
of two successive momentary existences, he would thereby admit that one
entity endures for two moments and thus contradict the tenet of
universal momentariness.--Should it be said that the cognition 'this is
similar to that' is a different (new) cognition, not dependent on the
apperception of the earlier and later momentary existences, we refute
this by the remark that the fact of different terms--viz. 'this' and
'that'--being used points to the existence of different things (which
the mind grasps in a judgment of similarity). If the mental act of which
similarity is the object were an altogether new act (not concerned with
the two separate similar entities), the expression 'this is similar to
that' would be devoid of meaning; we should in that case rather speak of
'similarity' only.--Whenever (to add a general reflexion) something
perfectly well known from ordinary experience is not admitted by
philosophers, they may indeed establish their own view and demolish the
contrary opinion by means of words, but they thereby neither convince
others nor even themselves. Whatever has been ascertained to be such and
such must also be represented as such and such; attempts to represent it
as something else prove nothing but the vain talkativeness of those who
make those attempts. Nor can the hypothesis of mere similarity being
cognised account for ordinary empirical life and thought; for (in
recognising a thing) we are conscious of it being that which we were
formerly conscious of, not of it being merely similar to that. We admit
that sometimes with regard to an external thing a doubt may arise
whether it is that or merely is similar to that; for mistakes may be
made concerning what lies outside our minds. But the conscious subject
never has any doubt whether it is itself or only similar to itself; it
rather is distinctly conscious that it is one and the same subject which
yesterday had a certain sensation and to-day remembers that
sensation.--For this reason also the doctrine of the Nihilists is to be
rejected.

26. (Entity) does not spring from non-entity on account of that not
being observed.

The system of the Vainâ/s/ikas is objectionable for this reason also
that those who deny the existence of permanent stable causes are driven
to maintain that entity springs from non-entity. This latter tenet is
expressly enunciated by the Bauddhas where they say, 'On account of the
manifestation (of effects) not without previous destruction (of the
cause).' For, they say, from the decomposed seed only the young plant
springs, spoilt milk only turns into curds, and the lump of clay has
ceased to be a lump when it becomes a jar. If effects did spring from
the unchanged causes, all effects would originate from all causes at
once, as then no specification would be required[403]. Hence, as we see
that young plants, &c. spring from seeds, &c. only after the latter have
been merged in non-existence, we hold that entity springs from
non-entity.

To this Bauddha tenet we reply, '(Entity does) not (spring) from
non-entity, on account of that not being observed.' If entity did spring
from non-entity, the assumption of special causes would be purportless,
since non-entity is in all cases one and the same. For the non-existence
of seeds and the like after they have been destroyed is of the same kind
as the non-existence of horns of hares and the like, i.e. non-existence
is in all cases nothing else but the absence of all character of
reality, and hence there would be no sense (on the doctrine of
origination from non-existence) in assuming that sprouts are produced
from seeds only, curds from milk only, and so on. And if
non-distinguished non-existence were admitted to have causal efficiency,
we should also have to assume that sprouts, &c. originate from the horns
of hares, &c.--a thing certainly not actually observed.--If, again, it
should be assumed that there are different kinds of non-existence having
special distinctions--just as, for instance, blueness and the like are
special qualities of lotuses and so on--we point out that in that case
the fact of there being such special distinctions would turn the
non-entities into entities no less real than lotuses and the like. In no
case non-existence would possess causal efficiency, simply because, like
the horn of a hare, it is non-existence merely.--Further, if existence
sprang from non-existence, all effects would be affected with
non-existence; while as a matter of fact they are observed to be merely
positive entities distinguished by their various special
characteristics. Nor[404] does any one think that things of the nature
of clay, such as pots and the like, are the effects of threads and the
like; but everybody knows that things of the nature of clay are the
effects of clay only.--The Bauddha's tenet that nothing can become a
cause as long as it remains unchanged, but has to that end to undergo
destruction, and that thus existence springs from non-existence only is
false; for it is observed that only things of permanent nature which are
always recognised as what they are, such as gold, &c., are the causes of
effects such as golden ornaments, and so on. In those cases where a
destruction of the peculiar nature of the cause is observed to take
place, as in the case of seeds, for instance, we have to acknowledge as
the cause of the subsequent condition (i.e. the sprout) not the earlier
condition in so far as it is destroyed, but rather those permanent
particles of the seed which are not destroyed (when the seed as a whole
undergoes decomposition).--Hence as we see on the one hand that no
entities ever originate from nonentities such as the horns of a hare,
and on the other hand that entities do originate from entities such as
gold and the like the whole Bauddha doctrine of existence springing from
non-existence has to be rejected.--We finally point out that, according
to the Bauddhas, all mind and all mental modifications spring from the
four skandhas discussed above and all material aggregates from the
atoms; why then do they stultify this their own doctrine by the fanciful
assumption of entity springing from non-entity and thus needlessly
perplex the mind of every one?

27. And thus (on that doctrine) there would be an accomplishment (of
ends) in the case of non-active people also.

If it were admitted that entity issues from non-entity, lazy inactive
people also would obtain their purposes, since 'non-existence' is a
thing to be had without much trouble. Rice would grow for the husbandman
even if he did not cultivate his field; vessels would shape themselves
even if the potter did not fashion the clay; and the weaver too lazy to
weave the threads into a whole, would nevertheless have in the end
finished pieces of cloth just as if he had been weaving. And nobody
would have to exert himself in the least either for going to the
heavenly world or for obtaining final release. All which of course is
absurd and not maintained by anybody.--Thus the doctrine of the
origination of entity from non-entity again shows itself to be futile.

28. The non-existence (of external things) cannot be maintained, on
account of (our) consciousness (of them).

There having been brought forward, in what precedes, the various
objections which lie against the doctrine of the reality of the external
world (in the Bauddha sense), such as the impossibility of accounting
for the existence of aggregates, &c., we are now confronted by those
Bauddhas who maintain that only cognitions (or ideas, vij/ñ/âna)
exist.--The doctrine of the reality of the external world was indeed
propounded by Buddha conforming himself to the mental state of some of
his disciples whom he perceived to be attached to external things; but
it does not represent his own true view according to which cognitions
alone are real.

According to this latter doctrine the process, whose constituting
members are the act of knowledge, the object of knowledge, and the
result of knowledge[405], is an altogether internal one, existing in so
far only as it is connected with the mind (buddhi). Even if external
things existed, that process could not take place but in connexion with
the mind. If, the Bauddhas say, you ask how it is known that that entire
process is internal and that no outward things exist apart from
consciousness, we reply that we base our doctrine on the impossibility
of external things. For if external things are admitted, they must be
either atoms or aggregates of atoms such as posts and the like. But
atoms cannot be comprehended under the ideas of posts and the like, it
being impossible for cognition to represent (things as minute as) atoms.
Nor, again, can the outward things be aggregates of atoms such as
pillars and the like, because those aggregates can neither be defined as
different nor as non-different from the atoms[406].--In the same way we
can show that the external things are not universals and so on[407].

Moreover, the cognitions--which are of a uniform nature only in so far
as they are states of consciousness--undergo, according to their
objects, successive modifications, so that there is presented to the
mind now the idea of a post, now the idea of a wall, now the idea of a
jar, and so on. Now this is not possible without some distinction on the
part of the ideas themselves, and hence we must necessarily admit that
the ideas have the same forms as their objects. But if we make this
admission, from which it follows that the form of the objects is
determined by the ideas, the hypothesis of the existence of external
things becomes altogether gratuitous. From the fact, moreover, of our
always being conscious of the act of knowledge and the object of
knowledge simultaneously it follows that the two are in reality
identical. When we are conscious of the one we are conscious of the
other also; and that would not happen if the two were essentially
distinct, as in that case there would be nothing to prevent our being
conscious of one apart from the other. For this reason also we maintain
that there are no outward things.--

Perception is to be considered as similar to a dream and the like. The
ideas present to our minds during a dream, a magical illusion, a mirage
and so on, appear in the twofold form of subject and object, although
there is all the while no external object; hence we conclude that the
ideas of posts and the like which occur in our waking state are likewise
independent of external objects; for they also are simply ideas.--If we
be asked how, in the absence of external things, we account for the
actual variety of ideas, we reply that that variety is to be explained
from the impressions left by previous ideas[408]. In the beginningless
sa/m/sâra ideas and mental impressions succeed each other as causes and
effects, just as the plant springs from the seed and seeds are again
produced from the plant, and there exists therefore a sufficient reason
for the variety of ideas actually experienced. That the variety of ideas
is solely due to the impressions left on the mind by past ideas follows,
moreover, from the following affirmative and negative judgments: we both
(the Vedântins as well as the Bauddhas) admit that in dreams, &c. there
presents itself a variety of ideas which arise from mental impressions,
without any external object; we (the Bauddhas) do not admit that any
variety of ideas can arise from external objects, without mental
impressions.--Thus we are again led to conclude that no outward things
exist.

To all this we (the Vedântins) make the following reply.--The
non-existence of external things cannot be maintained because we are
conscious of external things. In every act of perception we are
conscious of some external thing corresponding to the idea, whether it
be a post or a wall or a piece of cloth or a jar, and that of which we
are conscious cannot but exist. Why should we pay attention to the words
of a man who, while conscious of an outward thing through its
approximation to his senses, affirms that he is conscious of no outward
thing, and that no such thing exists, any more than we listen to a man
who while he is eating and experiencing the feeling of satisfaction
avers that he does not eat and does not feel satisfied?--If the Bauddha
should reply that he does not affirm that he is conscious of no object
but only that he is conscious of no object apart from the act of
consciousness, we answer that he may indeed make any arbitrary statement
he likes, but that he has no arguments to prove what he says. That the
outward thing exists apart from consciousness, has necessarily to be
accepted on the ground of the nature of consciousness itself. Nobody
when perceiving a post or a wall is conscious of his perception only,
but all men are conscious of posts and walls and the like as objects of
their perceptions. That such is the consciousness of all men, appears
also from the fact that even those who contest the existence of external
things bear witness to their existence when they say that what is an
internal object of cognition appears like something external. For they
practically accept the general consciousness, which testifies to the
existence of an external world, and being at the same time anxious to
refute it they speak of the external things as 'like something
external.' If they did not themselves at the bottom acknowledge the
existence of the external world, how could they use the expression 'like
something external?' No one says, 'Vish/n/umitra appears like the son of
a barren mother.' If we accept the truth as it is given to us in our
consciousness, we must admit that the object of perception appears to us
as something external, not like something external.--But--the Bauddha
may reply--we conclude that the object of perception is only like
something external because external things are impossible.--This
conclusion we rejoin is improper, since the possibility or impossibility
of things is to be determined only on the ground of the operation or
non-operation of the means of right knowledge; while on the other hand,
the operation and non-operation of the means of right knowledge are not
to be made dependent on preconceived possibilities or impossibilities.
Possible is whatever is apprehended by perception or some other means of
proof; impossible is what is not so apprehended. Now the external things
are, according to their nature, apprehended by all the instruments of
knowledge; how then can you maintain that they are not possible, on the
ground of such idle dilemmas as that about their difference or
non-difference from atoms?--Nor, again, does the non-existence of
objects follow from the fact of the ideas having the same form as the
objects; for if there were no objects the ideas could not have the forms
of the objects, and the objects are actually apprehended as
external.--For the same reason (i.e. because the distinction of thing
and idea is given in consciousness) the invariable concomitance of idea
and thing has to be considered as proving only that the thing
constitutes the means of the idea, not that the two are identical.
Moreover, when we are conscious first of a pot and then of a piece of
cloth, consciousness remains the same in the two acts while what varies
are merely the distinctive attributes of consciousness; just as when we
see at first a black and then a white cow, the distinction of the two
perceptions is due to the varying blackness and whiteness while the
generic character of the cow remains the same. The difference of the one
permanent factor (from the two--or more--varying factors) is proved
throughout by the two varying factors, and vice versâ the difference of
the latter (from the permanent factor) by the presence of the one
(permanent factor). Therefore thing and idea are distinct. The same view
is to be held with regard to the perception and the remembrance of a
jar; there also the perception and the remembrance only are distinct
while the jar is one and the same; in the same way as when conscious of
the smell of milk and the taste of milk we are conscious of the smell
and taste as different things but of the milk itself as one only.

Further, two ideas which occupy different moments of time and pass away
as soon as they have become objects of consciousness cannot
apprehend--or be apprehended by--each other. From this it follows that
certain doctrines forming part of the Bauddha system cannot be upheld;
so the doctrine that ideas are different from each other; the doctrine
that everything is momentary, void, &c.; the doctrine of the distinction
of individuals and classes; the doctrine that a former idea leaves an
impression giving rise to a later idea; the doctrine of the distinction,
owing to the influence of Nescience, of the attributes of existence and
non-existence; the doctrine of bondage and release (depending on absence
and presence of right knowledge)[409].

Further, if you say that we are conscious of the idea, you must admit
that we are also conscious of the external thing. And if you rejoin that
we are conscious of the idea on its own account because it is of a
luminous nature like a lamp, while the external thing is not so; we
reply that by maintaining the idea to be illuminated by itself you make
yourself guilty of an absurdity no less than if you said that fire burns
itself. And at the same time you refuse to accept the common and
altogether rational opinion that we are conscious of the external thing
by means of the idea different from the thing! Indeed a proof of
extraordinary philosophic insight!--It cannot, moreover, be asserted in
any way that the idea apart from the thing is the object of our
consciousness; for it is absurd to speak of a thing as the object of its
own activity. Possibly you (the Bauddha) will rejoin that, if the idea
is to be apprehended by something different from it, that something also
must be apprehended by something different and so on ad infinitum. And,
moreover, you will perhaps object that as each cognition is of an
essentially illuminating nature like a lamp, the assumption of a further
cognition is uncalled for; for as they are both equally illuminating the
one cannot give light to the other.--But both these objections are
unfounded. As the idea only is apprehended, and there is consequently no
necessity to assume something to apprehend the Self which witnesses the
idea (is conscious of the idea), there results no regressus ad
infinitum. And the witnessing Self and the idea are of an essentially
different nature, and may therefore stand to each other in the relation
of knowing subject and object known. The existence of the witnessing
Self is self-proved and cannot therefore be denied.--Moreover, if you
maintain that the idea, lamplike, manifests itself without standing in
need of a further principle to illuminate it, you maintain thereby that
ideas exist which are not apprehended by any of the means of knowledge,
and which are without a knowing being; which is no better than to assert
that a thousand lamps burning inside some impenetrable mass of rocks
manifest themselves. And if you should maintain that thereby we admit
your doctrine, since it follows from what we have said that the idea
itself implies consciousness; we reply that, as observation shows, the
lamp in order to become manifest requires some other intellectual agent
furnished with instruments such as the eye, and that therefore the idea
also, as equally being a thing to be illuminated, becomes manifest only
through an ulterior intelligent principle. And if you finally object
that we, when advancing the witnessing Self as self-proved, merely
express in other words the Bauddha tenet that the idea is
self-manifested, we refute you by remarking that your ideas have the
attributes of originating, passing away, being manifold, and so on
(while our Self is one and permanent).--We thus have proved that an
idea, like a lamp, requires an ulterior intelligent principle to render
it manifest.

29. And on account of their difference of nature (the ideas of the
waking state) are not like those of a dream.

We now apply ourselves to the refutation of the averment made by the
Bauddha, that the ideas of posts, and so on, of which we are conscious
in the waking state, may arise in the absence of external objects, just
as the ideas of a dream, both being ideas alike.--The two sets of ideas,
we maintain, cannot be treated on the same footing, on account of the
difference of their character. They differ as follows.--The things of
which we are conscious in a dream are negated by our waking
consciousness. 'I wrongly thought that I had a meeting with a great man;
no such meeting took place, but my mind was dulled by slumber, and so
the false idea arose.' In an analogous manner the things of which we are
conscious when under the influence of a magic illusion, and the like,
are negated by our ordinary consciousness. Those things, on the other
hand, of which we are conscious in our waking state, such as posts and
the like, are never negated in any state.--Moreover, the visions of a
dream are acts of remembrance, while the visions of the waking state are
acts of immediate consciousness; and the distinction between remembrance
and immediate consciousness is directly cognised by every one as being
founded on the absence or presence of the object. When, for instance, a
man remembers his absent son, he does not directly perceive him, but
merely wishes so to perceive him. As thus the distinction between the
two states is evident to every one, it is impossible to formulate the
inference that waking consciousness is false because it is mere
consciousness, such as dreaming consciousness; for we certainly cannot
allow would-be philosophers to deny the truth of what is directly
evident to themselves. Just because they feel the absurdity of denying
what is evident to themselves, and are consequently unable to
demonstrate the baselessness of the ideas of the waking state from those
ideas themselves, they attempt to demonstrate it from their having
certain attributes in common with the ideas of the dreaming state. But
if some attribute cannot belong to a thing on account of the latter's
own nature, it cannot belong to it on account of the thing having
certain attributes in common with some other thing. Fire, which is felt
to be hot, cannot be demonstrated to be cold, on the ground of its
having attributes in common with water. And the difference of nature
between the waking and the sleeping state we have already shown.

30. The existence (of mental impressions) is not possible on the
Bauddha view, on account of the absence of perception (of external
things).

We now proceed to that theory of yours, according to which the variety
of ideas can be explained from the variety of mental impressions,
without any reference to external things, and remark that on your
doctrine the existence of mental impressions is impossible, as you do
not admit the perception of external things. For the variety of mental
impressions is caused altogether by the variety of the things perceived.
How, indeed, could various impressions originate if no external things
were perceived? The hypothesis of a beginningless series of mental
impressions would lead only to a baseless regressus ad infinitum,
sublative of the entire phenomenal world, and would in no way establish
your position.--The same argument, i.e. the one founded on the
impossibility of mental impressions which are not caused by external
things, refutes also the positive and negative judgments, on the ground
of which the denier of an external world above attempted to show that
ideas are caused by mental impressions, not by external things. We
rather have on our side a positive and a negative judgment whereby to
establish our doctrine of the existence of external things, viz. 'the
perception of external things is admitted to take place also without
mental impressions,' and 'mental impressions are not admitted to
originate independently of the perception of external
things.'--Moreover, an impression is a kind of modification, and
modifications cannot, as experience teaches, take place unless there is
some substratum which is modified. But, according to your doctrine, such
a substratum of impressions does not exist, since you say that it cannot
be cognised through any means of knowledge.

31. And on account of the momentariness (of the âlayavij/ñ/âna, it
cannot be the abode of mental impressions).

If you maintain that the so-called internal cognition
(âlayavij/ñ/âna[410]) assumed by you may constitute the abode of the
mental impressions, we deny that, because that cognition also being
admittedly momentary, and hence non-permanent, cannot be the abode of
impressions any more than the quasi-external cognitions
(prav/ri/ttivij/ñ/âna). For unless there exists one continuous principle
equally connected with the past, the present, and the future[411], or an
absolutely unchangeable (Self) which cognises everything, we are unable
to account for remembrance, recognition, and so on, which are subject to
mental impressions dependent on place, time, and cause. If, on the other
hand, you declare your âlayavij/ñ/âna to be something permanent, you
thereby abandon your tenet of the âlayavij/ñ/âna as well as everything
else being momentary.--Or (to explain the Sûtra in a different way) as
the tenet of general momentariness is characteristic of the systems of
the idealistic as well as the realistic Bauddhas, we may bring forward
against the doctrines of the former all those arguments dependent on the
principle of general momentariness which we have above urged against the
latter.

We have thus refuted both nihilistic doctrines, viz. the doctrine which
maintains the (momentary) reality of the external world, and the
doctrine which asserts that ideas only exist. The third variety of
Bauddha doctrine, viz. that everything is empty (i.e. that absolutely
nothing exists), is contradicted by all means of right knowledge, and
therefore requires no special refutation. For this apparent world, whose
existence is guaranteed by all the means of knowledge, cannot be denied,
unless some one should find out some new truth (based on which he could
impugn its existence)--for a general principle is proved by the absence
of contrary instances.

32. And on account of its general deficiency in probability.

No further special discussion is in fact required. From whatever new
points of view the Bauddha system is tested with reference to its
probability, it gives way on all sides, like the walls of a well dug in
sandy soil. It has, in fact, no foundation whatever to rest upon, and
hence the attempts to use it as a guide in the practical concerns of
life are mere folly.--Moreover, Buddha by propounding the three mutually
contradictory systems, teaching respectively the reality of the external
world, the reality of ideas only, and general nothingness, has himself
made it clear either that he was a man given to make incoherent
assertions, or else that hatred of all beings induced him to propound
absurd doctrines by accepting which they would become thoroughly
confused.--So that--and this the Sûtra means to indicate--Buddha's
doctrine has to be entirely disregarded by all those who have a regard
for their own happiness.

33. On account of the impossibility (of contradictory attributes) in one
thing, (the Jaina doctrine is) not (to be accepted).

Having disposed of the Bauddha doctrine we now turn to the system of the
Gymnosophists (Jainas).

The Jainas acknowledge seven categories (tattvas), viz. soul (jîva),
non-soul (ajîva), the issuing outward (âsrava), restraint (sa/m/vara),
destruction (nirjara), bondage (bandha), and release (moksha)[412].
Shortly it may be said that they acknowledge two categories, viz. soul
and non-soul, since the five other categories may be subsumed under
these two.--They also set forth a set of categories different from the
two mentioned. They teach that there are five so-called astikâyas
('existing bodies,' i.e. categories), viz. the categories of soul
(jîva), body (pudgala), merit (dharma), demerit (adharma), and space
(âkâ/s/a). All these categories they again subdivide in various fanciful
ways[413].--To all things they apply the following method of reasoning,
which they call the saptabha@ngînaya: somehow it is; somehow it is not;
somehow it is and is not; somehow it is indescribable; somehow it is and
is indescribable; somehow it is not and is indescribable; somehow it is
and is not and is indescribable.

To this unsettling style of reasoning they submit even such conceptions
as that of unity and eternity[414].

This doctrine we meet as follows.--Your reasoning, we say, is
inadmissible 'on account of the impossibility in one thing.' That is to
say, it is impossible that contradictory attributes such as being and
non-being should at the same time belong to one and the same thing; just
as observation teaches us that a thing cannot be hot and cold at the
same moment. The seven categories asserted by you must either be so many
and such or not be so many and such; the third alternative expressed in
the words 'they either are such or not such' results in a cognition of
indefinite nature which is no more a source of true knowledge than doubt
is. If you should plead that the cognition that a thing is of more than
one nature is definite and therefore a source of true knowledge, we deny
this. For the unlimited assertion that all things are of a non-exclusive
nature is itself something, falls as such under the alternative
predications 'somehow it is,' 'somehow it is not,' and so ceases to be a
definite assertion. The same happens to the person making the assertion
and to the result of the assertion; partly they are, partly they are
not. As thus the means of knowledge, the object of knowledge, the
knowing subject, and the act of knowledge are all alike indefinite, how
can the Tîrthakara (Jina) teach with any claim to authority, and how can
his followers act on a doctrine the matter of which is altogether
indeterminate? Observation shows that only when a course of action is
known to have a definite result people set about it without hesitation.
Hence a man who proclaims a doctrine of altogether indefinite contents
does not deserve to be listened to any more than a drunken man or a
madman.--Again, if we apply the Jaina reasoning to their doctrine of the
five categories, we have to say that on one view of the matter they are
five and on another view they are not five; from which latter point of
view it follows that they are either fewer or more than five. Nor is it
logical to declare the categories to be indescribable. For if they are
so, they cannot be described; but, as a matter of fact, they are
described so that to call them indescribable involves a contradiction.
And if you go on to say that the categories on being described are
ascertained to be such and such, and at the same time are not
ascertained to be such and such, and that the result of their being
ascertained is perfect knowledge or is not perfect knowledge, and that
imperfect knowledge is the opposite of perfect knowledge or is not the
opposite; you certainly talk more like a drunken or insane man than like
a sober, trustworthy person.--If you further maintain that the heavenly
world and final release exist or do not exist and are eternal or
non-eternal, the absence of all determinate knowledge which is implied
in such statements will result in nobody's acting for the purpose of
gaining the heavenly world and final release. And, moreover, it follows
from your doctrine that soul, non-soul, and so on, whose nature you
claim to have ascertained, and which you describe as having existed from
all eternity, relapse all at once into the condition of absolute
indetermination.--As therefore the two contradictory attributes of being
and non-being cannot belong to any of the categories--being excluding
non-being and vice versâ non-being excluding being--the doctrine of the
Ârhat must be rejected.--The above remarks dispose likewise of the
assertions made by the Jainas as to the impossibility of deciding
whether of one thing there is to be predicated oneness or plurality,
permanency or non-permanency, separateness or norn-separateness, and so
on.--The Jaina doctrine that aggregates are formed from the atoms--by
them called pudgalas--we do not undertake to refute separately as its
refutation is already comprised in that of the atomistic doctrine given
in a previous part of this work.

34. And likewise (there results from the Jaina, doctrine)
non-universality of the Self.

We have hitherto urged against the Jaina doctrine an objection resulting
from the syâdvâda, viz. that one thing cannot have contradictory
attributes. We now turn to the objection that from their doctrine it
would follow that the individual Self is not universal, i.e. not
omnipresent.--The Jainas are of opinion that the soul has the same size
as the body. From this it would follow that the soul is not of infinite
extension, but limited, and hence non-eternal like jars and similar
things. Further, as the bodies of different classes of creatures are of
different size, it might happen that the soul of a man--which is of the
size of the human body--when entering, in consequence of its former
deeds, on a new state of existence in the body of an elephant would not
be able to fill the whole of it; or else that a human soul being
relegated to the body of an ant would not be able to find sufficient
room in it. The same difficulty would, moreover, arise with regard to
the successive stages of one state of existence, infancy, youth, and old
age.--But why, the Jaina may ask, should we not look upon the soul as
consisting of an infinite number of parts capable of undergoing
compression in a small body and dilatation in a big one?--Do you, we ask
in return, admit or not admit that those countless particles of the soul
may occupy the same place or not?--If you do not admit it, it follows
that the infinite number of particles cannot be contained in a body of
limited dimensions.--If you do admit it, it follows that, as then the
space occupied by all the particles may be the space of one particle
only, the extension of all the particles together will remain
inconsiderable, and hence the soul be of minute size (not of the size of
the body). You have, moreover, no right to assume that a body of limited
size contains an infinite number of soul particles.

Well the, the Jaina may reply, let us assume that by turns whenever the
soul enters a big body some particles accede to it while some withdraw
from it whenever it enters a small body.--To this hypothesis the next
Sûtra furnishes a reply.

35. Nor is non-contradiction to be derived from the succession (of parts
acceding to and departing from the soul), on account of the change, &c.
(of the soul).

Nor can the doctrine of the soul having the same size as the body be
satisfactorily established by means of the hypothesis of the successive
accession and withdrawal of particles. For this hypothesis would involve
the soul's undergoing changes and the like. If the soul is continually
being repleted and depleted by the successive addition and withdrawal of
parts, it of course follows that it undergoes change, and if it is
liable to change it follows that it is non-permanent, like the skin and
similar substances. From that, again, it follows that the Jaina doctrine
of bondage and release is untenable; according to which doctrine 'the
soul, which in the state of bondage is encompassed by the ogdoad of
works and sunk in the ocean of sa/m/sâra, rises when its bonds are
sundered, as the gourd rises to the surface of the water when it is
freed from the encumbering clay[415].'--Moreover, those particles which
in turns come and depart have the attributes of coming and going, and
cannot, on that account, be of the nature of the Self any more than the
body is. And if it be said that the Self consists of some permanently
remaining parts, we remark that it would be impossible to determine
which are the permanent and which the temporary parts.--We have further
to ask from whence those particles originate when they accede to the
soul, and into what they are merged when they detach themselves from it.
They cannot spring from the material elements and re-enter the elements;
for the soul is immaterial. Nor have we any means to prove the existence
of some other, general or special, reservoir of
soul-particles.--Moreover, on the hypothesis under discussion the soul
would be of indefinite nature, as the size of the particles acceding and
departing is itself indefinite.--On account of all these and similar
difficulties it cannot be maintained that certain particles by turns
attach themselves to, and detach themselves from, the soul.

The Sûtra may be taken in a different sense also. The preceding Sûtra
has proved that the soul if of the same size as the body cannot be
permanent, as its entering into bigger and smaller bodies involves its
limitation. To this the Gymnosophist may be supposed to rejoin that
although the soul's size successively changes it may yet be permanent,
just as the stream of water is permanent (although the water continually
changes). An analogous instance would be supplied by the permanency of
the stream of ideas while the individual ideas, as that of a red cloth
and so on, are non-permanent.--To this rejoinder our Sûtra replies that
if the stream is not real we are led back to the doctrine of a general
void, and that, if it is something real, the difficulties connected with
the soul's changing, &c. present themselves and render the Jaina view
impossible.

36. And on account of the permanency of the final (size of the soul) and
the resulting permanency of the two (preceding sizes) there is no
difference (of size, at any time).

Moreover, the Jainas themselves admit the permanency of the final size
of the soul which it has in the state of release. From this it follows
also that its initial size and its intervening sizes must be
permanent[416], and that hence there is no difference between the three
sizes. But this would involve the conclusion that the different bodies
of the soul have one and the same size, and that the soul cannot enter
into bigger and smaller bodies.--Or else (to explain the Sûtra in a
somewhat different way) from the fact that the final size of the soul is
permanent, it follows that its size in the two previous conditions also
is permanent. Hence the soul must be considered as being always of the
same size--whether minute or infinite--and not of the varying size of
its bodies.--For this reason also the doctrine of the Arhat has to be
set aside as not in any way more rational than the doctrine of Buddha.

37. The Lord (cannot be the cause of the world), on account of the
inappropriateness (of that doctrine).

The Sûtrakâra now applies himself to the refutation of that doctrine,
according to which the Lord is the cause of the world only in so far as
he is the general ruler.--But how do you know that that is the purport
of the Sûtra (which speaks of the Lord 'without any
qualification')?--From the circumstance, we reply, that the teacher
himself has proved, in the previous sections of the work, that the Lord
is the material cause as well as the ruler of the world. Hence, if the
present Sûtra were meant to impugn the doctrine of the Lord in general,
the earlier and later parts of the work would be mutually contradictory,
and the Sûtrakâra would thus be in conflict with himself. We therefore
must assume that the purport of the present Sûtra is to make an
energetic attack on the doctrine of those who maintain that the Lord is
not the material cause, but merely the ruler, i.e. the operative cause
of the world; a doctrine entirely opposed to the Vedântic tenet of the
unity of Brahman.

The theories about the Lord which are independent of the Vedânta are of
various nature. Some taking their stand on the Sâ@nkhya and Yoga systems
assume that the Lord acts as a mere operative cause, as the ruler of the
pradhâna and of the souls, and that pradhâna, soul, and Lord are of
mutually different nature.--The Máhe/s/varas (/S/aivas) maintain that
the five categories, viz. effect, cause, union, ritual, the end of pain,
were taught by the Lord Pa/s/upati (/S/iva) to the end of breaking the
bonds of the animal (i.e. the soul); Pa/s/upati is, according to them,
the Lord, the operative cause.--Similarly, the Vai/s/eshikas and others
also teach, according to their various systems, that the Lord is somehow
the operative cause of the world.

Against all these opinions the Sûtra remarks 'the Lord, on account of
the inappropriateness.' I.e. it is not possible that the Lord as the
ruler of the pradhâna and the soul should be the cause of the world, on
account of the inappropriateness of that doctrine. For if the Lord is
supposed to assign to the various classes of animate creatures low,
intermediate, and high positions, according to his liking, it follows
that he is animated by hatred, passion, and so on, is hence like one of
us, and is no real Lord. Nor can we get over this difficulty by assuming
that he makes his dispositions with a view to the merit and demerit of
the living beings; for that assumption would lead us to a logical
see-saw, the Lord as well as the works of living beings having to be
considered in turns both as acting and as acted upon. This difficulty is
not removed by the consideration that the works of living beings and the
resulting dispositions made by the Lord form a chain which has no
beginning; for in past time as well as in the present mutual
interdependence of the two took place, so that the beginningless series
is like an endless chain of blind men leading other blind men. It is,
moreover, a tenet set forth by the Naiyâyikas themselves that
'imperfections have the characteristic of being the causes of action'
(Nyâya Sùtra I, 1, 18). Experience shows that all agents, whether they
be active for their own purposes or for the purposes of something else,
are impelled to action by some imperfection. And even if it is admitted
that an agent even when acting for some extrinsic purpose is impelled by
an intrinsic motive, your doctrine remains faulty all the same; for the
Lord is no longer a Lord, even if he is actuated by intrinsic motives
only (such as the desire of removing the painful feeling connected with
pity).--Your doctrine is finally inappropriate for that reason also that
you maintain the Lord to be a special kind of soul; for from that it
follows that he must be devoid of all activity.

38. And on account of the impossibility of the connexion (of the Lord
with the souls and the pradhâna).

Against the doctrine which we are at present discussing there lies the
further objection that a Lord distinct from the pradhâna and the souls
cannot be the ruler of the latter without being connected with them in a
certain way. But of what nature is that connexion to be? It cannot be
conjunction (sa/m/yoga), because the Lord, as well as the pradhâna and
the souls, is of infinite extent and devoid of parts. Nor can it be
inherence, since it would be impossible to define who should be the
abode and who the abiding thing. Nor is it possible to assume some other
connexion, the special nature of which would have to be inferred from
the effect, because the relation of cause and effect is just what is not
settled as yet[417].--How, then, it may be asked, do you--the
Vedântins--establish the relation of cause and effect (between the Lord
and the world)?--There is, we reply, no difficulty in our case, as the
connexion we assume is that of identity (tâdâtmya). The adherent of
Brahman, moreover, defines the nature of the cause, and so on, on the
basis of Scripture, and is therefore not obliged to render his tenets
throughout conformable to observation. Our adversary, on the other hand,
who defines the nature of the cause and the like according to instances
furnished by experience, may be expected to maintain only such doctrines
as agree with experience. Nor can he put forward the claim that
Scripture, because it is the production of the omniscient Lord, may be
used to confirm his doctrine as well as that of the Vedântin; for that
would involve him in a logical see-saw, the omniscience of the Lord
being established on the doctrine of Scripture, and the authority of
Scripture again being established on the omniscience of the Lord.--For
all these reasons the Sâ@nkhya-yoga hypothesis about the Lord is devoid
of foundation. Other similar hypotheses which likewise are not based on
the Veda are to be refuted by corresponding arguments.

39. And on account of the impossibility of rulership (on the part of the
Lord).

The Lord of the argumentative philosophers is an untenable hypothesis,
for the following reason also.--Those philosophers are obliged to assume
that by his influence the Lord produces action in the pradhâna, &c. just
as the potter produces motion in the clay, &c. But this cannot be
admitted; for the pradhâna, which is devoid of colour and other
qualities, and therefore not an object of perception, is on that account
of an altogether different nature from clay and the like, and hence
cannot be looked upon as the object of the Lord's action.

40. If you say that as the organs (are ruled by the soul so the pradhâna
is ruled by the Lord), we deny that on account of the enjoyment, &c.

Well, the opponent might reply, let us suppose that the Lord rules the
pradhâna in the same way as the soul rules the organ of sight and the
other organs which are devoid of colour, and so on, and hence not
objects of perception.

This analogy also, we reply, proves nothing. For we infer that the
organs are ruled by the soul, from the observed fact that the soul feels
pleasure, pain, and the like (which affect the soul through the organs).
But we do not observe that the Lord experiences pleasure, pain, &c.
caused by the pradhâna. If the analogy between the pradhâna and the
bodily organs were a complete one, it would follow that the Lord is
affected by pleasure and pain no less than the transmigrating souls are.

Or else the two preceding Sûtras may be explained in a different way.
Ordinary experience teaches us that kings, who are the rulers of
countries, are never without some material abode, i.e. a body; hence, if
we wish to infer the existence of a general Lord from the analogy of
earthly rulers, we must ascribe to him also some kind of body to serve
as the substratum of his organs. But such a body cannot be ascribed to
the Lord, since all bodies exist only subsequently to the creation, not
previously to it. The Lord, therefore, is not able to act because devoid
of a material substratum; for experience teaches us that action requires
a material substrate.--Let us then arbitrarily assume that the Lord
possesses some kind of body serving as a substratum for his organs (even
previously to creation).--This assumption also will not do; for if the
Lord has a body he is subject to the sensations of ordinary
transmigratory souls, and thus no longer is the Lord.

41. And (there would follow from that doctrine) either finite duration
or absence of omniscience (on the Lord's part).

The hypothesis of the argumentative philosophers is invalid, for the
following reason also.--They teach that the Lord is omniscient and of
infinite duration, and likewise that the pradhâna, as well as the
individual souls, is of infinite duration. Now, the omniscient Lord
either defines the measure of the pradhâna, the souls, and himself, or
does not define it. Both alternatives subvert the doctrine under
discussion. For, on the former alternative, the pradhâna, the souls, and
the Lord, being all of them of definite measure, must necessarily be of
finite duration; since ordinary experience teaches that all things of
definite extent, such as jars and the like, at some time cease to exist.
The numerical measure of pradhâna, souls, and Lord is defined by their
constituting a triad, and the individual measure of each of them must
likewise be considered as defined by the Lord (because he is
omniscient). The number of the souls is a high one[418]. From among this
limited number of souls some obtain release from the sa/m/sâra, that
means their sa/m/sâra comes to an end, and their subjection to the
samsâra comes to an end. Gradually all souls obtain release, and so
there will finally be an end of the entire sa/m/sâra and the sa/m/sâra
state of all souls. But the pradhâna which is ruled by the Lord and
which modifies itself for the purposes of the soul is what is meant by
sa/m/sâra. Hence, when the latter no longer exists, nothing is left for
the Lord to rule, and his omniscience and ruling power have no longer
any objects. But if the pradhâna, the souls, and the Lord, all have an
end, it follows that they also have a beginning, and if they have a
beginning as well as an end, we are driven to the doctrine of a general
void.--Let us then, in order to avoid these untoward conclusions,
maintain the second alternative, i.e. that the measure of the Lord
himself, the pradhâna, and the souls, is not defined by the Lord.--But
that also is impossible, because it would compel us to abandon a tenet
granted at the outset, viz. that the Lord is omniscient.

For all these reasons the doctrine of the argumentative philosophers,
according to which the Lord is the operative cause of the world, appears
unacceptable.

42. On account of the impossibility of the origination (of the
individual soul from the highest Lord, the doctrine of the Bhâgavatas
cannot be accepted).

We have, in what precedes, refuted the opinion of those who think that
the Lord is not the material cause but only the ruler, the operative
cause of the world. We are now going to refute the doctrine of those
according to whom he is the material as well as the operative
cause.--But, it may be objected, in the previous portions of the present
work a Lord of exactly the same nature, i.e. a Lord who is the material,
as well as the operative, cause of the world, has been ascertained on
the basis of Scripture, and it is a recognised principle that Sm/ri/ti,
in so far as it agrees with Scripture, is authoritative; why then should
we aim at controverting the doctrine stated?--It is true, we reply, that
a part of the system which we are going to discuss agrees with the
Vedânta system, and hence affords no matter for controversy; another
part of the system, however, is open to objection, and that part we
intend to attack.

The so-called Bhâgavatas are of opinion that the one holy (bhagavat)
Vâsudeva, whose nature is pure knowledge, is what really exists, and
that he, dividing himself fourfold, appears in four forms (vyûha), as
Vâsudeva, Sa@nkarsha/n/a, Pradyumna, and Aniruddha. Vâsudeva denotes the
highest Self, Sa@nkarsha/n/a the individual soul, Pradyumna the mind
(manas), Aniruddha the principle of egoity (aha@nkâra). Of these four
Vâsudeva constitutes the ultimate causal essence, of which the three
others are the effects.--The believer after having worshipped Vâsudeva
for a hundred years by means of approach to the temple (abhigamana),
procuring of things to be offered (upâdâna), oblation (îjyâ), recitation
of prayers, &c. (svâdhyâya), and devout meditation (yoga), passes beyond
all affliction and reaches the highest Being.

Concerning this system we remark that we do not intend to controvert the
doctrine that Nârâya/n/a, who is higher than the Undeveloped, who is the
highest Self, and the Self of all, reveals himself by dividing himself
in multiple ways; for various scriptural passages, such as 'He is
onefold, he is threefold' (Ch. Up. VII, 26, 2), teach us that the
highest Self appears in manifold forms. Nor do we mean to object to the
inculcation of unceasing concentration of mind on the highest Being
which appears in the Bhâgavata doctrine under the forms of reverential
approach, &c.; for that we are to meditate on the Lord we know full well
from Sm/ri/ti and Scripture. We, however, must take exception to the
doctrine that Sa@nkarsha/n/a springs from Vâsudeva, Pradyumna from
Sa@nkarsha/n/a, Aniruddha from Pradyumna. It is not possible that from
Vâsudeva, i.e. the highest Self, there should originate Sa@nkarsha/n/a,
i.e. the individual soul; for if such were the case, there would attach
to the soul non-permanency, and all the other imperfections which belong
to things originated. And thence release, which consists in reaching the
highest Being, could not take place; for the effect is absorbed only by
entering into its cause.--That the soul is not an originated thing, the
teacher will prove later on (II, 3, 17). For this reason the Bhâgavata
hypothesis is unacceptable.

43. And (it is) not (observed that) the instrument is produced from the
agent.

The Bhâgavata hypothesis is to be rejected for that reason also, that
observation never shows us an instrument, such as a hatchet and the
like, to spring from an agent such as Devadatta, or any other workman.
But the Bhâgavatas teach that from an agent, viz. the individual soul
termed Sa@nkarsha/n/a, there springs its instrument, viz. the internal
organ termed Pradyumna, and again from this offspring of the agent
another instrument, viz. the aha@nkâra termed Aniruddha. Such doctrines
cannot be settled without observed instances. And we do not meet with
any scriptural passage in their favour.

44. Or (if) in consequence of the existence of knowledge, &c. (Vâsudeva,
&c. be taken as Lords), yet there is non-exclusion of that (i.e. the
objection raised in Sûtra 42).

Let us then--the Bhâgavatas may say--understand by Sa@nkarsha/n/a, and
so on, not the individual soul, the mind, &c., but rather Lords, i.e.
powerful beings distinguished by all the qualities characteristic of
rulers, such as pre-eminence of knowledge and ruling capacity, strength,
valour, glory. All these are Vâsudevas free from faults, without a
substratum (not sprung from pradhâna), without any imperfections. Hence
the objection urged in Sûtra 42 does not apply.

Even on this interpretation of your doctrine, we reply, the
'non-exclusion of that,' i.e. the non-exclusion of the impossibility of
origination, can be established.--Do you, in the first place, mean to
say that the four individual Lords, Vâsudeva, and so on, have the same
attributes, but do not constitute one and the same Self?--If so, you
commit the fault of uselessly assuming more than one Lord, while all the
work of the Lord can be done by one. Moreover, you offend thereby
against your own principle, according to which there is only one real
essence, viz. the holy Vâsudeva.--Or do you perhaps mean to say that
from the one highest Being there spring those four forms possessing
equal attributes?--In that case the objection urged in Sûtra 42 remains
valid. For Sa@nkarsha/n/a cannot be produced from Vâsudeva, nor
Pradyumna from Sa@nkarsha/n/a, nor Aniruddha from Pradyumna, since (the
attributes of all of them being the same) there is no supereminence of
any one of them. Observation shows that the relation of cause and effect
requires some superiority on the part of the cause--as, for instance, in
the case of the clay and the jar (where the cause is more extensive than
the effect)--and that without such superiority the relation is simply
impossible. But the followers of the Pâ/ñk/arâtra do not acknowledge any
difference founded on superiority of knowledge, power, &c. between
Vâsudeva and the other Lords, but simply say that they all are forms of
Vâsudeva, without any special distinctions. The forms of Vâsudeva cannot
properly be limited to four, as the whole world, from Brahman down to a
blade of grass, is understood to be a manifestation of the supreme
Being.

45. And on account of contradictions.

Moreover, manifold contradictions are met with in the Bhâgavata system,
with reference to the assumption of qualities and their bearers.
Eminence of knowledge and ruling capacity, strength, valour, and glory
are enumerated as qualities, and then they are in some other place
spoken of as Selfs, holy Vâsudevas, and so on.--Moreover, we meet with
passages contradictory of the Veda. The following passage, for instance,
blames the Veda, 'Not having found the highest bliss in the Vedas
/S/â/nd/ilya studied this /s/âstra.'--For this reason also the
Bhâgavata doctrine cannot be accepted.

Notes:

[Footnote 314: The characteristics of Goodness, Passion, and Darkness,
the three constituent elements (gu/n/a) of the pradhâna. Sâ. Kâ. 12,
13.]

[Footnote 315: Viz. the great principle (mahat). ahanka a, &c. Sâ. Kâ.
3.]

[Footnote 316: The arguments here referred to are enumerated in the Sâ.
Kâ. 15: Sâ. Sûtras I, 189 ff.]

[Footnote 317: If we attempt to infer the nature of the universal cause
from its effects on the ground of parallel instances, as, for instance,
that of an earthen jar whose material cause is clay, we must remember
that the jar has sprung from clay not without the co-operation of an
intelligent being, viz. the potter.]

[Footnote 318: As had been asserted above for the purpose of inferring
therefrom, according to the principle of the equality of cause and
effect, the existence of the three constituents of the pradhâna.]

[Footnote 319: And a thing cannot consist of that of which it is the
cause.]

[Footnote 320: Which differences cannot be reconciled with the Sâ@nkhya
hypothesis of the object itself consisting of either pleasure or pain,
&c.--'If things consisted in themselves of pleasure, pain, &c., then
sandal ointment (which is cooling, and on that account pleasant in
summer) would be pleasant in winter also; for sandal never is anything
but sandal.--And as thistles never are anything but thistles they ought,
on the Sâ@nkhya hypothesis, to be eaten with enjoyment not only by
camels but by men also.' Bhâ.]

[Footnote 321: Sa/m/sargapûrvakatvaprasa@nga iti gu/n/ânâ/m/
sa/m/s/ri/sh/t/ânekavastuprak/ri/tikatvaprasaktir ity artha/h/. Ân. Gi.]

[Footnote 322: For they limit one another.]

[Footnote 323: To proceed to the argument 'from the separateness of
cause and effect' (Sâ. Kâ. 15).]

[Footnote 324: The next sentences furnish the answer to the question how
the intelligent Self is known at all if it is not the object of
perception.--Pratyakshatvâbhâve katham âtmasiddhir ity âsa@nkya anumânâd
ity âha, prav/ri/ttîti. Anumânasiddhasya /k/etanasya na
pravr/i/ttyâ/s/rayateti dar/s/ayitum evakâra/h/. Katham anumânam ity
apekshâyâ/m/ tatprakâra/m/; sû/k/ayati kevaleti. Vailaksha/n/ya/m/
prâ/n/âdimattvam. Ân. Gi.]

[Footnote 325: Viz. that whatever moves or acts does so under the
influence of intelligence.--Sâdhyapakshanikshiptatva/m/ sâdhyavati
pakshe pravish/t/atvam eva ta/k/ /k/a sapakshanizkshiptatvasyâpy
upalaksha/n/am, anpanyâso na vyabhi/k/ârabhûmin ity artha/h/. Ân. Gi.]

[Footnote 326: It might be held that for the transformation of grass
into milk no other cause is required than the digestive heat of the
cow's body; but a reflecting person will acknowledge that there also the
omniscient Lord is active. Bhâ.]

[Footnote 327: Anâdheyâti/s/ayasya
sukhadukhaprâptiparihârarûpâti/s/aya/s/ûnyasyety artha/h/. Ân. Gi.]

[Footnote 328: For the soul as being of an entirely inactive nature
cannot of itself aim at release, and the pradhâna aims--ex
hypothesi--only at the soul's undergoing varied experience.]

[Footnote 329: I.e. for the various items constituting enjoyment or
experience.]

[Footnote 330: T/ri/tîyes'pi katipaya/s/abdâdyupalabdhir vâ
samastatadupalabdhir vâ bhoga iti vikalpyâdye sarveshâm ekadaiva
mukti/h/ syâd iti manvâno dvitîya/m/ pratyâha ubhayârthateti. Ân. Gi.]

[Footnote 331: The MSS. of Ânanda Giri omit sa/m/sârânu/kkh/edât; the
Bhâmatî's reading is: Sarga/s/aktyanu/kkh/edavad
d/ri/k/s/aktyanu/kkh/edât.]

[Footnote 332: On the theory that the soul is the cause of the
pradhâna's activity we again have to ask whether the pradhâna acts for
the soul's enjoyment or for its release, &c.]

[Footnote 333: Anantaro dosho mahadâdikâryotpâdâyoga/h/. Ân. Gi.]

[Footnote 334: In the former case the five intellectual senses are
looked upon as mere modifications of the sense of touch.]

[Footnote 335: Buddhi in the latter case being the generic name for
buddhi, aha@nkâra, and manas.]

[Footnote 336: Lit. that which burns and that which is burned, which
literal rendering would perhaps be preferable throughout. As it is, the
context has necessitated its retention in some places.--The sufferers
are the individual souls, the cause of suffering the world in which the
souls live.]

[Footnote 337: In the case of the lamp, light and heat are admittedly
essential; hence the Vedântin is supposed to bring forward the sea with
its waves, and so on, as furnishing a case where attributes pass away
while the substance remains.]

[Footnote 338: 'Artha,' a useful or beneficial thing, an object of
desire.]

[Footnote 339: In reality neither suffering nor sufferers exist, as the
Vedântin had pointed out in the first sentences of his reply; but there
can of course be no doubt as to who suffers and what causes suffering in
the vyavahârika-state, i.e. the phenomenal world.]

[Footnote 340: In order to explain thereby how the soul can experience
pain.]

[Footnote 341: And that would be against the Sâ@nkhya dogma of the
soul's essential purity.]

[Footnote 342: So that the fact of suffering which cannot take place
apart from an intelligent principle again remains unexplained.]

[Footnote 343: Âtmanas tapte sattve pratibîmitatvâd yuktâ taptir iti
/s/a@nkate sattveti. An. Gi.]

[Footnote 344: For it then indicates no more than a fictitious
resemblance.]

[Footnote 345: The Sâ@nkhya Pûrvapakshin had objected to the Vedânta
doctrine that, on the latter, we cannot account for the fact known from
ordinary experience that there are beings suffering pain and things
causing suffering.--The Vedântin in his turn endeavours to show that on
the Sâ@nkhya doctrine also the fact of suffering remains inexplicable,
and is therefore to be considered not real, but fictitious merely, the
product of Nescience.]

[Footnote 346: Not only 'suffering as it were,' as it had been called
above.]

[Footnote 347: For real suffering cannot be removed by mere distinctive
knowledge on which--according to the Sâ@nkhya also--release depends.]

[Footnote 348: This in answer to the remark that possibly the
conjunction of soul and pradhâna may come to an end when the influence
of Darkness declines, it being overpowered by the knowledge of Truth.]

[Footnote 349: I.e. according as they are atoms of earth, water, fire,
or air.]

[Footnote 350: Parima/nd/ala, spherical is the technical term for the
specific form of extension of the atoms, and, secondarily, for the atoms
themselves. The latter must apparently be imagined as infinitely small
spheres. Cp. Vi/s/. Sût. VII, 1, 20.]

[Footnote 351: Viz. during the period of each pralaya. At that time all
the atoms are isolated and motionless.]

[Footnote 352: When the time for a new creation has come.]

[Footnote 353: The &c. implies the activity of the Lord.]

[Footnote 354: The inherent (material) cause of an atomic compound are
the constituent atoms, the non-inheient cause the conjunction of those
atoms, the operative causes the ad/ri/sh/ta/ and the Lord's activity
which make them enter into conjunction.]

[Footnote 355: I.e. in all cases the special form of extension of the
effect depends not on the special extension of the cause, but on the
number of atoms composing the cause (and thereby the effect).]

[Footnote 356: In order to escape the conclusion that the non-acceptance
of the doctrine of Brahman involves the abandonment of a fundamental
Vai/s/eshika principle.]

[Footnote 357: I.e. forms of extension different from sphericity, &c.]

[Footnote 358: The first of the three Sûtras quoted comprises, in the
present text of the Vai/s/eshika-sûtras, only the following words,
'Kâra/n/abahutvâ/k/ /k/a;' the /k/a of the Sûtra implying, according to
the commentators, mahattva and pra/k/aya.--According to the
Vai/s/eshikas the form of extension called a/n/u, minute, has for its
cause the dvitva inherent in the material causes, i.e. the two atoms
from which the minute binary atomic compound originates.--The form of
extension called mahat, big, has different causes, among them bahutva,
i.e. the plurality residing in the material causes of the resulting
'big' thing; the cause of the mahattva of a ternary atomic compound, for
instance, is the tritva inherent in the three constituent atoms. In
other cases mahattva is due to antecedent mahattva, in others to
pra/k/aya, i.e. accumulation. See the Upaskâra on Vai/s/. Sût. VII, 1,
9; 10.]

[Footnote 359: I.e. if the Vai/s/eshikas have to admit that it is the
nature of sphericity, &c. not to produce like effects, the Vedântin also
may maintain that Brahman produces an unlike effect, viz. the
non-intelligent world.]

[Footnote 360: Like other things, let us say a piece of cloth, which
consists of parts.]

[Footnote 361: Or, more particularly, to the conjunction of the atoms
with the souls to which merit and demerit belong.--Ad/ri/sh/t/âpeksham
ad/ri/sh/t/avatkshetraj/ñ/asa/my/ogâpeksham iti yâvat. Ãn. Gi.]

[Footnote 362: According to the Vai/s/eshikas intelligence is not
essential to the soul, but a mere adventitious quality arising only when
the soul is joined to an internal organ.]

[Footnote 363: The soul being all-pervading.]

[Footnote 364: Which is inadmissible on Vai/s/eshika principles, because
sa/m/yoga as being a quality is connected with the things it joins by
samavâya.]

[Footnote 365: Viz. from those things which are united by conjunction.
The argument is that conjunction as an independent third entity requires
another connexion to connect it with the two things related to each
other in the way of conjunction.]

[Footnote 366: Viz. the absolute difference of samavâya and sa/m/yoga
from the terms which they connect.]

[Footnote 367: Action (karman), &c. also standing in the samavâya
relation to their substrates.]

[Footnote 368: Our Vai/s/eshika-sûtras read 'pratishedhabhâva/h/;' but
as all MSS. of Sa@nkara have 'pratishedhâbhâva/h/' I have kept the
latter reading and translated according to Ânandagiri's explanation:
Kâryam anityam iti kârye vireshato nityatvanishedho na syâd yadi
kâra/n/eszpy anityatvam atozs/n/ûnâ/m/ kâra/n/ânâ/m/ nityateti
sûtrârtha/h/.]

[Footnote 369: Because they also are not perceptible; the ternary
aggregates, the so-called trasare/n/us, constituting the minima
perceptibilia.]

[Footnote 370: As they have no cause which could either be disintegrated
or destroyed.]

[Footnote 371: This according to the Vedânta view. If atoms existed they
might have originated from avidyâ by a mere pari/n/âma and might again
be dissolved into avidyâ, without either disintegration or destruction
of their cause taking place.]

[Footnote 372: The Sâ@nkhyas looking on everything (except the soul) as
being the pradhâna in various forms.--There is no need of assuming with
Govindânanda that by the Sâ@nkhya of the text we have to understand the
Vedânta.]

[Footnote 373: Yayor dvayor madhya ekam avina/s/yad aparâ/s/ritam
evâvatish/th/ate tâv ayutasiddhau yathâvayavâvayavinau.]

[Footnote 374: The connexion of cause and effect is of course samavâya.]

[Footnote 375: If the effect can exist before having entered into
connexion with the cause, the subsequent connexion of the two is no
longer samavâya but sa/m/yoga; and that contradicts a fundamental
Vai/s/eshika principle.]

[Footnote 376: This clause replies to the objection that only those
connexions which have been produced by previous motion are to be
considered conjunctions.]

[Footnote 377: A clause meant to preclude the assumption that the
permanent existence of the things connected involves the permanent
existence of the connexion.]

[Footnote 378: It having been shown above that atoms cannot enter into
sa/m/yoga with each other, it is shown now that sa/m/yoga of the soul
with the atoms cannot be the cause of the motion of the latter, and that
sa/m/yoga of soul and manas cannot be the cause of cognition.]

[Footnote 379: Ekasambandhyâkarsha/n/e yatra
sambandhyantarâkarsha/n/a/m/ tatra sa/m/slesha/h/, sa tu sâvayavânâ/m/
jatukâsh/th/âdînâ/m/ d/ri/sh/t/o na tu niravayavai/h/ sâvayâvânâm, ato
dvya/n/ukasya sâvayavasya niravayavena paramâ/n/unâ sa nopapadyate.
Brahmavidyâbh.]

[Footnote 380: In answer to the question how, in that case, the
practically recognised relation of abode, &c. existing between the cause
and the effect is accounted for.]

[Footnote 381: For they must in that case have a northern end, an
eastern end, &c.]

[Footnote 382: And that on that account the atoms which he considers as
the ultimate simple constituents of matter cannot be decomposed.]

[Footnote 383: Because according to their opinion difference of size
constitutes difference of substance, so that the continuous change of
size in animal bodies, for instance, involves the continual perishing of
old and the continual origination of new substances.]

[Footnote 384: The following notes on Bauddha doctrines are taken
exclusively from the commentaries on the /S/a@nkarabhâshya, and no
attempt has been made to contrast or reconcile the Brahminical accounts
of Bauddha psychology with the teaching of genuine Bauddha books. Cp. on
the chief sects of the Buddhistic philosophers the Bauddha chapter of
the Sarvadar/s/a/n/asa/m/graha.--The Nihilists are the Mádhyamikas; the
Idealists are the Yogâ/k/âras; the Sautrântikas and the Vaibháshikas
together constitute the class of the Realists.--I subjoin the account
given of those sects in the Brahmavidyâbhara/n/a.--Buddhasya hi
mâdhyamika-yogá/k/âra-sautrântika-vaibhâshikasamj/ñ/akâs /k/atvâra/h/
/s/ishyâ/h/. Tatra buddhena prathama/m/ yân prati sarva/m/ /s/ûnyam ity
upadish/t/a/m/ te màdhyamikâs te hi guru/n/â yathokta/m/ tathaiva
/s/raddhayâ g/ri/hîtavanta iti k/ri/tvâ nâpak/ri/sh/t/â/h/ puna/s/ /k/a
taduktasyârthasya buddhyanusâre/n/âkshepasyâk/ri/tatvân
notk/ri/sh/t/abuddhaya iti mâdhyamikâ/h/. Anyais tu /s/ishyair guru/n/â
sarva/s/ûnyatva upadish/t/e j/ñ/ânâtiriktasya sarvasya /s/ûnyatvam astu
nâmeti gurûktir yoga iti bauddai/h/ paribhâshitopetâ/h/ tad upari /k/a
j/ñ/ânasya tu /s/ûnyatva/m/ na sa/m/bhavati tathâtve
jagadândhyaprasa@ngât sûnyasiddher apy asa/m/bhavâ/k/ /k/eti buddhamate
â/k/âratvena paribhâshita âkshepos'pi k/ri/ta iti yogâ/k/ârâ/h/
vij/ñ/ânamâtrâstitvavâdina/h/. Tadanataram anyai/h/ /s/ishyai/h/
pratîtisiddhasya katha/m/ /s/ûnyatva/m/ vaktu/m/ /s/akyam ato j/ñ/ânavad
vâhyârthos'pi satya ity ukte tarhi tathaiva sos'stu, para/m/ tu so
s'numeyo na tu pratyaksha ity ukte tathâ@ngîk/ri/tyaiva/m/ /s/ishyamatim
anus/ri/tya kiyatparyanta/m/ sûtra/m/ bhavishyatîti tai/h/ p/ri/sh/t/am
atas te sautrântikâ/h/. Anye punar yady aya/m/ gha/t/a iti pratîtibalâd
vâhyos'rtha upeyate tarhi tasyâ eva pratîter aparokshatvât sa katha/m/
parokshos'to vâhyos'rtho na pratyaksha iti bhâshâ viruddhety âkshipann
atas te vaibhâshikâ/h/.]

[Footnote 385: The rûpaskandha comprises the senses and their objects,
colour, &c.; the sense-organs were above called bhautika, they here
re-appear as /k/aittika on account of their connexion with thought.
Their objects likewise are classed as /k/aittika in so far as they are
perceived by the senses.--The vij/ñ/ânaskandha comprises the series of
self-cognitions (ahamaham ity âlayavj/ñ/ânapravâha/h/), according to all
commentators; and in addition, according to the Brahmavidyâbhara/n/a,
the knowledge, determinate and indeterminate, of external things
(savikalpaka/m/ nirvikalpaka/m/ /k/a prav/ri/ttivij/ñ/ânasamj/ñ/itam).--
The vedanâskandha comprises pleasure, pain, &c.--The samj/ñ/âskandha
comprises the cognition of things by their names (gaur a/s/va
ityâdi/s/abdasamjalpitapratyaya/h/, Ân. Gi.; gaur a/s/va ityeva/m/
nâmavi/s/ish/t/asavikalpaka/h/ pratyaya/h/, Go. Ân.; sa/m/j/ñ/â
yaj/ñ/adattâdipadatadullekhî savikalpapratyayo vâ, dvitîyapakshe
vij/ñ/ânapadena savikalpapratyayo na grâhy/h/, Brahmavidyâbh.). The
sa/m/skâraskandha comprises passion, aversion, &c., dharma and
adharma.--Compare also the Bhâmatî.--The vij/ñ/ânaskandha is /k/itta,
the other skandhas /k/aitta.]

[Footnote 386: It has to be kept in view that the sarvâstitvavâdins as
well as the other Bauddha sects teach the momentariness (ksha/n/ikatva),
the eternal flux of everything that exists, and are on that ground
controverted by the upholders of the permanent Brahman.]

[Footnote 387: Mind, on the Bauddha doctrine, presupposes the existence
of an aggregate of atoms, viz. the body.]

[Footnote 388: In consequence of which no release could take place.]

[Footnote 389: The Brahmavidyâbhara/n/a explains the last clause--from
ksha/n/ikatvâ/k/ /k/a--somewhat differently: Api /k/a paramâ/n/ûnâm api
ksha/n/ikatvâbhyupagamân melana/m/ na sambhavati, paramâ/n/ûnâ/m/
melana/m/ paramâ/n/ukriyâdhînam, tathâ /k/a svakriyâ/m/ prati
paramâ/n/ûnâ/m/ kâra/n/atvât kriyâpûraksha/n/e paramâ/n/ubhir bhâvyam
kriyâ /s/rayatayâ kriyâksha/n/eszpi teshâm avasthânam apekshitam eva/m/
melanakshaneszpi, nahi melanâ/s/rayasyâbhâve melanarûpâ prav/ri/ttir
upapadyate, tathâ /k/a sthiraparamâ/n/usâdhyâ melanarûpâ prav/ri/tti/h/
katha/m/ teshâm ksha/n/ikatve bhavet.--Ânanda Giri also divides and
translates differently from the translation in the text.]

[Footnote 390: The kâra/n/atvât of /S/a@nkara explains the pratyayatvât
of the Sûtra; kârya/m/ praty ayate janakatvena ga/kkh/ati.]

[Footnote 391: The commentators agree on the whole in their explanations
of the terms of this series.--The following is the substance of the
comment of the Brahmavidyâbhara/n/a: Nescience is the error of
considering that which is momentary, impure, &c. to be permanent, pure,
&c.--Impression (affection, sa/m/skâra) comprises desire, aversion, &c.,
and the activity caused by them.--Knowledge (vij/ñ/âna) is the
self-consciousness (aham ity âlayavij/ñ/ânasya v/ri/ttilâbha/h/)
springing up in the embryo.--Name and form is the rudimentary flake--or
bubble-like condition of the embryo.--The abode of the six
(sha/d/âyatana) is the further developed stage of the embryo in which
the latter is the abode of the six senses.--Touch (spar/s/a) is the
sensations of cold, warmth, &c. on the embryo's part.--Feeling (vedaná)
the sensations of pleasure and pain resulting therefrom.--Desire
(t/ri/sh/n/â) is the wish to enjoy the pleasurable sensations and to
shun the painful ones.--Activity (upâdâna) is the effort resulting from
desire,--Birth is the passing out from the uterus.--Species (jâti) is
the class of beings to which the new-born creature belongs.--Decay
(jarâ).--Death (mara/n/am) is explained as the condition of the creature
when about to die (mumûrshâ).--Grief (/s/oka) the frustration of wishes
connected therewith.--Lament (paridevanam) the lamentations on that
account.--Pain (du/h/kha) is such pain as caused by the five
senses.--Durmanas is mental affliction.--The 'and the like' implies
death, the departure to another world and the subsequent return from
there.]

[Footnote 392: Ânanda Giri and Go. Ânanda explain:
Â/s/râya/s/rayibhûteshv iti bhokt/ri/vi/s/esha/n/am
ad/ri/sh/t/â/s/rayeshv ity artha/h/.--The Brahrma-vidyâbhara/n/a says:
Nityeshv â/s/râya/s/rayibhûteshv a/n/ushv abhyupagamyamâneshu
bhokt/ri/shu /k/a satsv ity anvaya/h/. Â/s/râya/s/rayibhûteshv ity
asyopakâryopakârakabhâvaprâpteshv ity artha/h/.--And with regard to the
subsequent â/s/rayâ/s/rayi/s/ûnyeshu: â/s/rayâ/s/rayitva/s/ûnyeshu,
aya/m/ bhâva/h/, sthireshu paramâ/n/ushu yadanvaye paramâ/n/ûnâ/m/
sa/m/ghâtâpatti/h/ yadvyatireke /k/a na tad upakârakam upakâryâ/h/
paramâ/n/ava/h/ yena tatk/ri/to bhoga/h/ prârthyate sa tatra karteti
grahîtu/m/ /s/akyate, ksha/n/ikeshu tu param/n/ushu
anvayavyatirekagrahasyânekaksha/n/asâdhyasyâsa/m/bhavân
nopakâryopakârakabhâvo nirdhârayitu/m/ /s/akya/h/.--Ananda Giri remarks
on the latter: Ad/ri/sh/t/â/s/rayakârt/ri/râhityam âhâ/s/rayeti. Another
reading appears to be â/s/ayâ/s/raya/s/ûnyeshu.]

[Footnote 393: Bauddhânâ/m/ ksha/n/apadena gha/t/âdir eva padârtho
vyavahriyate na tu tadatinkta/h/ ka/sk/it ksha/n/o nâma hâlosti.
Brahmâvidyâbh.]

[Footnote 394: And whereupon then could be established the difference of
mere efficient causes such as the potter's staff, &c., and material
causes such as clay, &c.?]

[Footnote 395: These four causes are the so-called defining cause
(adhipati-pratyaya), the auxiliary cause (sahakâripratyaya), the
immediate cause (samanantarapratyaya), and the substantial cause
(âlambanapratyaya).--I extract the explanation from the
Brahmavidyâbhara/n/a: Adhipatir indriya/m/ tad dhi /k/akshurádirûpam
utpannasya j/ñ/ânasya rûpâdivishayatâ/m/ niya/kkh/ati niyâmaka/s/ /k/a
lokedhipatir ity u/k/yate. Sahakârî âloka/h/.
Samanantarapratyaya/h/pûrvaj/ñ/ânam, bauddhamate hi
ksha/n/ikaj/ñ/anasa/m/tatau pûrvaj/ñ/ânam uttaraj/ñ/âsya kârana/m/ tad
eva /k/a mana ity u/k/yate. Âlambana/m/ gha/t/âdi/h/. Etân hetûn pratîya
prâpya /k/akshurâdijanyam ity âdi.]

[Footnote 396: Sa/m/skâra iti, tanmate pûrvaksha/n/a eva hetubhûta/h/
sa/m/skâro vâsaneti /k/a vyavahriyate kârya/m/ tu tadvishayatayâ
karmavyutpattyâ sa/m/skâra/h/, tathâ /k/a kâryakâra/n/âtmaka/m/ sarva/m/
bhâvarûpa/m/ ksha/n/ikam iti pratij/ñ/ârtha/h/. Brahmavidyâbhara/n/a.]

[Footnote 397: As when a man smashes a jar having previously formed the
intention of doing so.]

[Footnote 398: I.e. the insensible continual decay of things.--Viparîta
iti pratiksha/n/a/m/ gha/t/âdînâ/m/ yuktyâ sâdhyamânoku/s/alair
avagantum a/s/akya/h/ sûkshmo vinâ/s/opratisa/m/khyânirodha/h/.
Brahmâv.]

[Footnote 399: A series of momentary existences constituting a chain of
causes and effects can never be entirely stopped; for the last momentary
existence must be supposed either to produce its effect or not to
produce it. In the former case the series is continued; the latter
alternative would imply that the last link does not really exist, since
the Bauddhas define the sattâ of a thing as its causal efficiency (cp.
Sarvadar/s/a/n/asa/m/graha). And the non-existence of the last link
would retrogressively lead to the non-existence of the whole series.]

[Footnote 400: Thus clay is recognised as such whether it appears in the
form of a jar, or of the potsherds into which the jar is broken, or of
the powder into which the potsherds are ground.--Analogously we infer
that even things which seem to vanish altogether, such as a drop of
water which has fallen on heated iron, yet continue to exist in some
form.]

[Footnote 401: The knowledge that everything is transitory, pain, &c.]

[Footnote 402: What does enable us to declare that there is
âvara/n/âbhâva in one place and not in another? Space; which therefore
is something real.]

[Footnote 403: If the cause were able, without having undergone any
change, to produce effects, it would at the same moment produce all the
effects of which it is capable.--Cp. on this point the
Sarvadar/s/a/n/asa/m/graha.]

[Footnote 404: This is added to obviate the remark that it is not a
general rule that effects are of the same nature as their causes, and
that therefore, after all, existent things may spring from
non-existence.]

[Footnote 405: According to the vij/ñ/ânavâdin the cognition specialised
by its various contents, such as, for instance, the idea of blue colour
is the object of knowledge; the cognition in so far as it is
consciousness (avabhâsa) is the result of knowledge; the cognition in so
far as it is power is mâna, knowledge; in so far as it is the abode of
that power it is pramât/ri/, knowing subject.]

[Footnote 406: If they are said to be different from the atoms they can
no longer be considered as composed of atoms; if they are non-different
from atoms they cannot be the cause of the mental representations of
gross non-atomic bodies.]

[Footnote 407: Avayavâvayavirûpo vâhyosrtho nâsti /k/en mâ bhûd
jâtivyaktyâdirûpas tu syâd ity â/s/rankyâha evam iti. Jâtyâdînâ/m/
vyaktyâdînâm /k/âtyantabhinnatve svâtantryaprasa@ngâd atyantâbhinnatve
tadvadevâtadbhâvâd bhinnâbhinnatvasya viruddhatvâd avayavâvayavibhedavaj
gâtivyaktyâdibhedosxpi nâstîty artha/h/.]

[Footnote 408: Vâsanâ, above translated by mental impression, strictly
means any member of the infinite series of ideas which precedes the
present actual idea.]

[Footnote 409: For all these doctrines depend on the comparison of ideas
which is not possible unless there be a permanent knowing subject in
addition to the transitory ideas.]

[Footnote 410: The vij/ñ/ânaskandha comprises vij/ñ/ânas of two
different kinds, the âlayavij/ñ/âna and the prav/ri/ttivij/ñ/âna. The
âlayavij/ñ/âna comprises the series of cognitions or ideas which refer
to the ego; the prav/ri/ttivij/ñ/âna comprises those ideas which refer
to apparently external objects, such as colour and the like. The ideas
of the latter class are due to the mental impressions left by the
antecedent ideas of the former class.]

[Footnote 411: Viz. in the present case the principle that what presents
itself to consciousness is not non-existent.]

[Footnote 412: Soul and non-soul are the enjoying souls and the objects
of their enjoyment; âsrava is the forward movement of the senses towards
their objects; sa/m/vara is the restraint of the activity of the senses;
nirjara is self-mortification by which sin is destroyed; the works
constitute bondage; and release is the ascending of the soul, after
bondage has ceased, to the highest regions.--For the details, see
Professor Cowell's translation of the Ârhata chapter of the
Sarvadar/s/a/n/asa/m/graha.]

[Footnote 413: Cp. translation of Sarvadar/s/a/n/asa/m/graha, p. 59.]

[Footnote 414: And so impugn the doctrine of the one eternal Brahman.]

[Footnote 415: Cp. Sarvadar/s/a/n/asa/m/graha translation, p. 58.]

[Footnote 416: The inference being that the initial and intervening
sizes of the soul must be permanent because they are sizes of the soul,
like its final size.]

[Footnote 417: The special nature of the connexion between the Lord and
the pradhâna and the souls cannot be ascertained from the world
considered as the effect of the pradhâna acted upon by the Lord; for
that the world is the effect of the pradhâna is a point which the
Vedântins do not accept as proved.]

[Footnote 418: I.e. a high one, but not an indefinite one; since the
omniscient Lord knows its measure.]