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THE INFLUENCE OF SEA POWER UPON HISTORY 1660-1783

by

A. T. MAHAN, D.C.L., LL.D.

Author of "The Influence of Sea Power upon the French
Revolution and Empire, 1793-1812," etc.

Twelfth Edition







[Illustration]



Boston
Little, Brown and Company

Copyright, 1890,
by Captain A. T. Mahan.

Copyright, 1918,
by Ellen Lyle Mahan.

Printed in the United States of America




PREFACE.


The definite object proposed in this work is an examination of the
general history of Europe and America with particular reference to the
effect of sea power upon the course of that history. Historians
generally have been unfamiliar with the conditions of the sea, having
as to it neither special interest nor special knowledge; and the
profound determining influence of maritime strength upon great issues
has consequently been overlooked. This is even more true of particular
occasions than of the general tendency of sea power. It is easy to say
in a general way, that the use and control of the sea is and has been
a great factor in the history of the world; it is more troublesome to
seek out and show its exact bearing at a particular juncture. Yet,
unless this be done, the acknowledgment of general importance remains
vague and unsubstantial; not resting, as it should, upon a collection
of special instances in which the precise effect has been made clear,
by an analysis of the conditions at the given moments.

A curious exemplification of this tendency to slight the bearing of
maritime power upon events may be drawn from two writers of that
English nation which more than any other has owed its greatness to the
sea. "Twice," says Arnold in his History of Rome, "Has there been
witnessed the struggle of the highest individual genius against the
resources and institutions of a great nation, and in both cases the
nation was victorious. For seventeen years Hannibal strove against
Rome, for sixteen years Napoleon strove against England; the efforts
of the first ended in Zama, those of the second in Waterloo." Sir
Edward Creasy, quoting this, adds: "One point, however, of the
similitude between the two wars has scarcely been adequately dwelt on;
that is, the remarkable parallel between the Roman general who finally
defeated the great Carthaginian, and the English general who gave the
last deadly overthrow to the French emperor. Scipio and Wellington
both held for many years commands of high importance, but distant from
the main theatres of warfare. The same country was the scene of the
principal military career of each. It was in Spain that Scipio, like
Wellington, successively encountered and overthrew nearly all the
subordinate generals of the enemy before being opposed to the chief
champion and conqueror himself. Both Scipio and Wellington restored
their countrymen's confidence in arms when shaken by a series of
reverses, and each of them closed a long and perilous war by a
complete and overwhelming defeat of the chosen leader and the chosen
veterans of the foe."

Neither of these Englishmen mentions the yet more striking
coincidence, that in both cases the mastery of the sea rested with the
victor. The Roman control of the water forced Hannibal to that long,
perilous march through Gaul in which more than half his veteran troops
wasted away; it enabled the elder Scipio, while sending his army from
the Rhone on to Spain, to intercept Hannibal's communications, to
return in person and face the invader at the Trebia. Throughout the
war the legions passed by water, unmolested and unwearied, between
Spain, which was Hannibal's base, and Italy, while the issue of the
decisive battle of the Metaurus, hinging as it did upon the interior
position of the Roman armies with reference to the forces of Hasdrubal
and Hannibal, was ultimately due to the fact that the younger brother
could not bring his succoring reinforcements by sea, but only by the
land route through Gaul. Hence at the critical moment the two
Carthaginian armies were separated by the length of Italy, and one was
destroyed by the combined action of the Roman generals.

On the other hand, naval historians have troubled themselves little
about the connection between general history and their own particular
topic, limiting themselves generally to the duty of simple chroniclers
of naval occurrences. This is less true of the French than of the
English; the genius and training of the former people leading them to
more careful inquiry into the causes of particular results and the
mutual relation of events.

There is not, however, within the knowledge of the author any work
that professes the particular object here sought; namely, an estimate
of the effect of sea power upon the course of history and the
prosperity of nations. As other histories deal with the wars,
politics, social and economical conditions of countries, touching upon
maritime matters only incidentally and generally unsympathetically, so
the present work aims at putting maritime interests in the foreground,
without divorcing them, however, from their surroundings of cause and
effect in general history, but seeking to show how they modified the
latter, and were modified by them.

The period embraced is from 1660, when the sailing-ship era, with its
distinctive features, had fairly begun, to 1783, the end of the
American Revolution. While the thread of general history upon which
the successive maritime events is strung is intentionally slight, the
effort has been to present a clear as well as accurate outline.
Writing as a naval officer in full sympathy with his profession, the
author has not hesitated to digress freely on questions of naval
policy, strategy, and tactics; but as technical language has been
avoided, it is hoped that these matters, simply presented, will be
found of interest to the unprofessional reader.

                                                 A. T. MAHAN

DECEMBER, 1889.




CONTENTS.


INTRODUCTORY.

History of Sea Power one of contest between nations, therefore
  largely military                                                   1
Permanence of the teachings of history                               2
Unsettled condition of modern naval opinion                          2
Contrasts between historical classes of war-ships                    2
Essential distinction between weather and lee gage                   5
Analogous to other offensive and defensive positions                 6
Consequent effect upon naval policy                                  6
Lessons of history apply especially to strategy                      7
Less obviously to tactics, but still applicable                      9

ILLUSTRATIONS:
  The battle of the Nile, A.D. 1798                                 10
  Trafalgar, A.D. 1805                                              11
  Siege of Gibraltar, A.D. 1779-1782                                12
  Actium, B.C. 31, and Lepanto, A.D. 1571                           13
  Second Punic War, B.C. 218-201                                    14

Naval strategic combinations surer now than formerly                22
Wide scope of naval strategy                                        22


CHAPTER I.

DISCUSSION OF THE ELEMENTS OF SEA POWER.

The sea a great common                                              25
Advantages of water-carriage over that by land                      25
Navies exist for the protection of commerce                         26
Dependence of commerce upon secure seaports                         27
Development of colonies and colonial posts                          28
Links in the chain of Sea Power: production, shipping, colonies     28
General conditions affecting Sea Power:
   I. Geographical position                                         29
  II. Physical conformation                                         35
 III. Extent of territory                                           42
  IV. Number of population                                          44
   V. National character                                            50
  VI. Character and policy of governments                           58
        England                                                     59
        Holland                                                     67
        France                                                      69
Influence of colonies on Sea Power                                  82
The United States:
  Its weakness in Sea Power                                         83
  Its chief interest in internal development                        84
  Danger from blockades                                             85
  Dependence of the navy upon the shipping interest                 87
Conclusion of the discussion of the elements of Sea Power           88
Purpose of the historical narrative                                 89


CHAPTER II.

STATE OF EUROPE IN 1660.--SECOND ANGLO-DUTCH WAR, 1665-1667.--SEA
BATTLES OF LOWESTOFT AND OF THE FOUR DAYS

Accession of Charles II. and Louis XIV.                             90
Followed shortly by general wars                                    91
French policy formulated by Henry IV. and Richelieu                 92
Condition of France in 1660                                         93
Condition of Spain                                                  94
Condition of the Dutch United Provinces                             96
Their commerce and colonies                                         97
Character of their government                                       98
Parties in the State                                                99
Condition of England in 1660                                        99
Characteristics of French, English, and Dutch ships                101
Conditions of other European States                                102
Louis XIV. the leading personality in Europe                       103
His policy                                                         104
Colbert's administrative acts                                      105
Second Anglo-Dutch War, 1665                                       107
Battle of Lowestoft, 1665                                          108
Fire-ships, compared with torpedo-cruisers                         109
The group formation                                                112
The order of battle for sailing-ships                              115
The Four Days' Battle, 1666                                        117
Military merits of the opposing fleets                             126
Soldiers commanding fleets, discussion                             127
Ruyter in the Thames, 1667                                         132
Peace of Breda, 1667                                               132
Military value of commerce-destroying                              132

CHAPTER III.

WAR OF ENGLAND AND FRANCE IN ALLIANCE AGAINST THE UNITED
PROVINCES, 1672-1674.--FINALLY, OF FRANCE AGAINST COMBINED
EUROPE, 1674-1678.--SEA BATTLES OF SOLEBAY, THE TEXEL, AND
STROMBOLI.

Aggressions of Louis XIV. on Spanish Netherlands                   139
Policy of the United Provinces                                     139
Triple alliance between England, Holland, and Sweden               140
Anger of Louis XIV.                                                140
Leibnitz proposes to Louis to seize Egypt                          141
His memorial                                                       142
Bargaining between Louis XIV. and Charles II.                      143
The two kings declare war against the United Provinces             144
Military character of this war                                     144
Naval strategy of the Dutch                                        144
Tactical combinations of De Ruyter                                 145
Inefficiency of Dutch naval administration                         145
Battle of Solebay, 1672                                            146
Tactical comments                                                  147
Effect of the battle on the course of the war                      148
Land campaign of the French in Holland                             149
Murder of John De Witt, Grand Pensionary of Holland                150
Accession to power of William of Orange                            150
Uneasiness among European States                                   150
Naval battles off Schoneveldt, 1673                                151
Naval battle of the Texel, 1673                                    152
Effect upon the general war                                        154
Equivocal action of the French fleet                               155
General ineffectiveness of maritime coalitions                     156
Military character of De Ruyter                                    157
Coalition against France                                           158
Peace between England and the United Provinces                     158
Sicilian revolt against Spain                                      159
Battle of Stromboli, 1676                                          161
Illustration of Clerk's naval tactics                              163
De Ruyter killed off Agosta                                        165
England becomes hostile to France                                  166
Sufferings of the United Provinces                                 167
Peace of Nimeguen, 1678                                            168
Effects of the war on France and Holland                           169
Notice of Comte d'Estrées                                          170


CHAPTER IV.

ENGLISH REVOLUTION.--WAR OF THE LEAGUE OF AUGSBURG,
1688-1697.--SEA BATTLES OF BEACHY HEAD AND LA HOUGUE.

Aggressive policy of Louis XIV.                                    173
State of French, English, and Dutch navies                         174
Accession of James II.                                             175
Formation of the League of Augsburg                                176
Louis declares war against the Emperor of Germany                  177
Revolution in England                                              178
Louis declares war against the United Provinces                    178
William and Mary crowned                                           178
James II. lands in Ireland                                         179
Misdirection of French naval forces                                180
William III. lands in Ireland                                      181
Naval battle of Beachy Head, 1690                                  182
Tourville's military character                                     184
Battle of the Boyne, 1690                                          186
End of the struggle in Ireland                                     186
Naval battle of La Hougue, 1692                                    189
Destruction of French ships                                        190
Influence of Sea Power in this war                                 191
Attack and defence of commerce                                     193
Peculiar characteristics of French privateering                    195
Peace of Ryswick, 1697                                             197
Exhaustion of France: its causes                                   198


CHAPTER V.

WAR OF THE SPANISH SUCCESSION, 1702-1713.--SEA BATTLE OF MALAGA.

Failure of the Spanish line of the House of Austria                201
King of Spain wills the succession to the Duke of Anjou            202
Death of the King of Spain                                         202
Louis XIV. accepts the bequests                                    203
He seizes towns in Spanish Netherlands                             203
Offensive alliance between England, Holland, and Austria           204
Declarations of war                                                205
The allies proclaim Carlos III. King of Spain                      206
Affair of the Vigo galleons                                        207
Portugal joins the allies                                          208
Character of the naval warfare                                     209
Capture of Gibraltar by the English                                210
Naval battle of Malaga, 1704                                       211
Decay of the French navy                                           212
Progress of the land war                                           213
Allies seize Sardinia and Minorca                                  215
Disgrace of Marlborough                                            216
England offers terms of peace                                      217
Peace of Utrecht, 1713                                             218
Terms of the peace                                                 219
Results of the war to the different belligerents                   219
Commanding position of Great Britain                               224
Sea Power dependent upon both commerce and naval strength          225
Peculiar position of France as regards Sea Power                   226
Depressed condition of France                                      227
Commercial prosperity of England                                   228
Ineffectiveness of commerce-destroying                             229
Duguay-Trouin's expedition against Rio de Janeiro, 1711            230
War between Russia and Sweden                                      231


CHAPTER VI.

THE REGENCY IN FRANCE.--ALBERONI IN SPAIN.--POLICIES OF WALPOLE
AND FLEURI.--WAR OF THE POLISH SUCCESSION.--ENGLISH CONTRABAND
TRADE IN SPANISH AMERICA.--GREAT BRITAIN DECLARES WAR AGAINST
SPAIN.--1715-1739.

Death of Queen Anne and Louis XIV.                                 232
Accession of George I.                                             232
Regency of Philip of Orleans                                       233
Administration of Alberoni in Spain                                234
Spaniards invade Sardinia                                          235
Alliance of Austria, England, Holland, and France                  235
Spaniards invade Sicily                                            236
Destruction of Spanish navy off Cape Passaro, 1718                 237
Failure and dismissal of Alberoni                                  239
Spain accepts terms                                                239
Great Britain interferes in the Baltic                             239
Death of Philip of Orleans                                         241
Administration of Fleuri in France                                 241
Growth of French commerce                                          242
France in the East Indies                                          243
Troubles between England and Spain                                 244
English contraband trade in Spanish America                        245
Illegal search of English ships                                    246
Walpole's struggles to preserve peace                              247
War of the Polish Succession                                       247
Creation of the Bourbon kingdom of the Two Sicilies                248
Bourbon family compact                                             248
France acquires Bar and Lorraine                                   249
England declares war against Spain                                 250
Morality of the English action toward Spain                        250
Decay of the French navy                                           252
Death of Walpole and of Fleuri                                     253


CHAPTER VII.

WAR BETWEEN GREAT BRITAIN AND SPAIN, 1739.--WAR OF THE AUSTRIAN
SUCCESSION, 1740.--FRANCE JOINS SPAIN AGAINST GREAT BRITAIN,
1744.--SEA BATTLES OF MATTHEWS, ANSON, AND HAWKE.--PEACE OF
AIX-LA-CHAPELLE, 1748.

Characteristics of the wars from 1739 to 1783                      254
Neglect of the navy by French government                           254
Colonial possessions of the French, English, and Spaniards         255
Dupleix and La Bourdonnais in India                                258
Condition of the contending navies                                 259
Expeditions of Vernon and Anson                                    261
Outbreak of the War of the Austrian Succession                     262
England allies herself to Austria                                  262
Naval affairs in the Mediterranean                                 263
Influence of Sea Power on the war                                  264
Naval battle off Toulon, 1744                                      265
Causes of English failure                                          267
Courts-martial following the action                                268
Inefficient action of English navy                                 269
Capture of Louisburg by New England colonists, 1745                269
Causes which concurred to neutralize England's Sea Power           269
France overruns Belgium and invades Holland                        270
Naval actions of Anson and Hawke                                   271
Brilliant defence of Commodore l'Étenduère                         272
Projects of Dupleix and La Bourdonnais in the East Indies          273
Influence of Sea Power in Indian affairs                           275
La Bourdonnais reduces Madras                                      276
Peace of Aix-la-Chapelle, 1748                                     277
Madras exchanged for Louisburg                                     277
Results of the war                                                 278
Effect of Sea Power on the issue                                   279


CHAPTER VIII.

SEVEN YEARS' WAR, 1756-1763.--ENGLAND'S OVERWHELMING POWER AND
CONQUESTS ON THE SEAS, IN NORTH AMERICA, EUROPE, AND EAST AND WEST
INDIES.--SEA BATTLES: BYNG OFF MINORCA; HAWKE AND CONFLANS; POCOCK
AND D'ACHÉ IN EAST INDIES.

Peace of Aix-la-Chapelle leaves many questions unsettled           281
Dupleix pursues his aggressive policy                              281
He is recalled from India                                          282
His policy abandoned by the French                                 282
Agitation in North America                                         283
Braddock's expedition, 1755                                        284
Seizure of French ships by the English, while at peace             285
French expedition against Port Mahon, 1756                         285
Byng sails to relieve the place                                    286
Byng's action off Port Mahon, 1756                                 286
Characteristics of the French naval policy                         287
Byng returns to Gibraltar                                          290
He is relieved, tried by court-martial, and shot                   290
Formal declarations of war by England and France                   291
England's appreciation of the maritime character of the war        291
France is drawn into a continental struggle                        292
The Seven Years' War (1756-1763) begins                            293
Pitt becomes Prime Minister of England                             293
Operations in North America                                        293
Fall of Louisburg, 1758                                            294
Fall of Quebec, 1759, and of Montreal, 1760                        294
Influence of Sea Power on the continental war                      295
English plans for the general naval operations                     296
Choiseul becomes Minister in France                                297
He plans an invasion of England                                    297
Sailing of the Toulon fleet, 1759                                  298
Its disastrous encounter with Boscawen                             299
Consequent frustration of the invasion of England                  300
Project to invade Scotland                                         300
Sailing of the Brest fleet                                         300
Hawke falls in with it and disperses it, 1759                      302
Accession of Charles III. to Spanish throne                        304
Death of George II.                                                304
Clive in India                                                     305
Battle of Plassey, 1757                                            306
Decisive influence of Sea Power upon the issues in India           307
Naval actions between Pocock and D'Aché, 1758, 1759                307
Destitute condition of French naval stations in India              309
The French fleet abandons the struggle                             310
Final fall of the French power in India                            310
Ruined condition of the French navy                                311
Alliance between France and Spain                                  313
England declares war against Spain                                 313
Rapid conquest of French and Spanish colonies                      314
French and Spaniards invade Portugal                               316
The invasion repelled by England                                   316
Severe reverses of the Spaniards in all quarters                   316
Spain sues for peace                                               317
Losses of British mercantile shipping                              317
Increase of British commerce                                       318
Commanding position of Great Britain                               319
Relations of England and Portugal                                  320
Terms of the Treaty of Paris                                       321
Opposition to the treaty in Great Britain                          322
Results of the maritime war                                        323
Results of the continental war                                     324
Influence of Sea Power in countries politically unstable           324
Interest of the United States in the Central American Isthmus      325
Effects of the Seven Years' War on the later history of
  Great Britain                                                    326
Subsequent acquisitions of Great Britain                           327
British success due to maritime superiority                        328
Mutual dependence of seaports and fleets                           329


CHAPTER IX.

COURSE OF EVENTS FROM THE PEACE OF PARIS TO 1778.--MARITIME WAR
CONSEQUENT UPON THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION.--SEA BATTLE OFF USHANT.

French discontent with the Treaty of Paris                         330
Revival of the French navy                                         331
Discipline among French naval officers of the time                 332
Choiseul's foreign policy                                          333
Domestic troubles in Great Britain                                 334
Controversies with the North American colonies                     334
Genoa cedes Corsica to France                                      334
Dispute between England and Spain about the Falkland Islands       335
Choiseul dismissed                                                 336
Death of Louis XV.                                                 336
Naval policy of Louis XVI.                                         337
Characteristics of the maritime war of 1778                        338
Instructions of Louis XVI. to the French admirals                  339
Strength of English navy                                           341
Characteristics of the military situation in America               341
The line of the Hudson                                             342
Burgoyne's expedition from Canada                                  343
Howe carries his army from New York to the Chesapeake              343
Surrender of Burgoyne, 1777                                        343
American privateering                                              344
Clandestine support of the Americans by France                     345
Treaty between France and the Americans                            346
Vital importance of the French fleet to the Americans              347
The military situation in the different quarters of the globe      347
Breach between France and England                                  350
Sailing of the British and French fleets                           350
Battle of Ushant, 1778                                             351
Position of a naval commander-in-chief in battle                   353


CHAPTER X.

MARITIME WAR IN NORTH AMERICA AND WEST INDIES, 1778-1781.--ITS
INFLUENCE UPON THE COURSE OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION.--FLEET
ACTIONS OFF GRENADA, DOMINICA, AND CHESAPEAKE BAY.

D'Estaing sails from Toulon for Delaware Bay, 1778                 359
British ordered to evacuate Philadelphia                           359
Rapidity of Lord Howe's movements                                  360
D'Estaing arrives too late                                         360
Follows Howe to New York                                           360
Fails to attack there and sails for Newport                        361
Howe follows him there                                             362
Both fleets dispersed by a storm                                   362
D'Estaing takes his fleet to Boston                                363
Howe's activity foils D'Estaing at all points                      363
D'Estaing sails for the West Indies                                365
The English seize Sta. Lucia                                       365
Ineffectual attempts of D'Estaing to dislodge them                 366
D'Estaing captures Grenada                                         367
Naval battle of Grenada, 1779; English ships crippled              367
D'Estaing fails to improve his advantages                          370
Reasons for his neglect                                            371
French naval policy                                                372
English operations in the Southern States                          375
D'Estaing takes his fleet to Savannah                              375
His fruitless assault on Savannah                                  376
D'Estaing returns to France                                        376
Fall of Charleston                                                 376
De Guichen takes command in the West Indies                        376
Rodney arrives to command English fleet                            377
His military character                                             377
First action between Rodney and De Guichen, 1780                   378
Breaking the line                                                  380
Subsequent movements of Rodney and De Guichen                      381
Rodney divides his fleet                                           381
Goes in person to New York                                         381
De Guichen returns to France                                       381
Arrival of French forces in Newport                                382
Rodney returns to the West Indies                                  382
War between England and Holland                                    382
Disasters to the United States in 1780                             382
De Grasse sails from Brest for the West Indies, 1781               383
Engagement with English fleet off Martinique                       383
Cornwallis overruns the Southern States                            384
He retires upon Wilmington, N.C., and thence to Virginia           385
Arnold on the James River                                          385
The French fleet leaves Newport to intercept Arnold                385
Meets the English fleet off the Chesapeake, 1781                   386
French fleet returns to Newport                                    387
Cornwallis occupies Yorktown                                       387
De Grasse sails from Hayti for the Chesapeake                      388
Action with the British fleet, 1781                                389
Surrender of Cornwallis, 1781                                      390
Criticism of the British naval operations                          390
Energy and address shown by De Grasse                              392
Difficulties of Great Britain's position in the war of 1778        392
The military policy best fitted to cope with them                  393
Position of the French squadron in Newport, R.I., 1780             394
Great Britain's defensive position and inferior numbers            396
Consequent necessity for a vigorous initiative                     396
Washington's opinions as to the influence of Sea Power on the
  American contest                                                 397


CHAPTER XI.

MARITIME WAR IN EUROPE, 1779-1782.

Objectives of the allied operations in Europe                      401
Spain declares war against England                                 401
Allied fleets enter the English Channel, 1779                      402
Abortive issue of the cruise                                       403
Rodney sails with supplies for Gibraltar                           403
Defeats the Spanish squadron of Langara and relieves the place     404
The allies capture a great British convoy                          404
The armed neutrality of the Baltic powers, 1780                    405
England declares war against Holland                               406
Gibraltar is revictualled by Admiral Derby                         407
The allied fleets again in the Channel, 1781                       408
They retire without effecting any damage to England                408
Destruction of a French convoy for the West Indies                 408
Fall of Port Mahon, 1782                                           409
The allied fleets assemble at Algesiras                            409
Grand attack of the allies on Gibraltar, which fails, 1782         410
Lord Howe succeeds in revictualling Gibraltar                      412
Action between his fleet and that of the allies                    412
Conduct of the war of 1778 by the English government               412
Influence of Sea Power                                             416
Proper use of the naval forces                                     416


CHAPTER XII.

EVENTS IN THE EAST INDIES, 1778-1781.--SUFFREN SAILS FROM BREST
FOR INDIA, 1781.--HIS BRILLIANT NAVAL CAMPAIGN IN THE INDIAN SEAS,
1782, 1783.

Neglect of India by the French government                          419
England at war with Mysore and with the Mahrattas                  420
Arrival of the French squadron under Comte d'Orves                 420
It effects nothing and returns to the Isle of France               420
Suffren sails from Brest with five ships-of-the-line, 1781         421
Attacks an English squadron in the Cape Verde Islands, 1781        422
Conduct and results of this attack                                 424
Distinguishing merits of Suffren as a naval leader                 425
Suffren saves the Cape Colony from the English                     427
He reaches the Isle of France                                      427
Succeeds to the chief command of the French fleet                  427
Meets the British squadron under Hughes at Madras                  427
Analysis of the naval strategic situation in India                 428
The first battle between Suffren and Hughes, Feb. 17, 1782         430
Suffren's views of the naval situation in India                    433
Tactical oversights made by Suffren                                434
Inadequate support received by him from his captains               435
Suffren goes to Pondicherry, Hughes to Trincomalee                 436
The second battle between Suffren and Hughes, April 12, 1782       437
Suffren's tactics in the action                                    439
Relative injuries received by the opposing fleets                  441
Contemporaneous English criticisms upon Hughes's conduct           442
Destitute condition of Suffren's fleet                             443
His activity and success in supplying wants                        443
He communicates with Hyder Ali, Sultan of Mysore                   443
Firmness and insight shown by Suffren                              445
His refusal to obey orders from home to leave the Indian Coast     446
The third battle between Suffren and Hughes, July 6, 1782          447
Qualities shown by Hughes                                          449
Stubborn fighting by the British admiral and captains              449
Suffren deprives three captains of their commands                  449
Dilatory conduct of Admiral Hughes                                 450
Suffren attacks and takes Trincomalee                              450
Strategic importance of this success                               451
Comparative condition of the two fleets in material for repairs    451
The English government despatches powerful reinforcements          452
The French court fails to support Suffren                          452
The fourth battle between Suffren and Hughes, Sept. 3, 1782        453
Mismanagement and injuries of the French                           455
Contrast between the captains in the opposing fleets               456
Two ships of Suffren's fleet grounded and lost                     457
Arrival of British reinforcements under Admiral Bickerton          458
Approach of bad-weather season; Hughes goes to Bombay              458
Military situation of French and English in India                  459
Delays of the French reinforcements under Bussy                    460
Suffren takes his fleet to Achem, in Sumatra                       460
He returns to the Indian coast                                     461
Arrival of Bussy                                                   461
Decline of the French power on shore                               461
The English besiege Bussy in Cuddalore by land and sea             462
Suffren relieves the place                                         462
The fifth battle between Suffren and Hughes, June 20, 1783         463
Decisive character of Suffren's action                             463
News of the peace received at Madras                               463
Suffren sails for France                                           464
His flattering reception everywhere                                464
His distinguishing military qualities                              465
His later career and death                                         466


CHAPTER XIII.

EVENTS IN THE WEST INDIES AFTER THE SURRENDER OF YORKTOWN.--
ENCOUNTERS OF DE GRASSE WITH HOOD.--THE SEA BATTLE OF THE
SAINTS.--1781-1782.

Maritime struggle transferred from the continent to West Indies    468
De Grasse sails for the islands                                    469
French expedition against the island of St. Christopher,
  January, 1782                                                    469
Hood attempts to relieve the garrison                              470
Manoeuvres of the two fleets                                       471
Action between De Grasse and Hood                                  472
Hood seizes the anchorage left by De Grasse                        473
De Grasse attacks Hood at his anchorage                            474
Hood maintains his position                                        475
Surrender of the garrison and island                               475
Merits of Hood's action                                            476
Criticism upon De Grasse's conduct                                 477
Rodney arrives in West Indies from England                         479
Junction of Rodney and Hood at Antigua                             479
De Grasse returns to Martinique                                    479
Allied plans to capture Jamaica                                    479
Rodney takes his station at Sta. Lucia                             480
The French fleet sails and is pursued by Rodney                    480
Action of April 9, 1782                                            481
Criticism upon the action                                          483
The chase continued; accidents to French ships                     484
The naval battle of the Saints, April 12, 1782                     485
Rodney breaks the French line                                      488
Capture of the French commander-in-chief and five
  ships-of-the-line                                                489
Details of the action                                              489
Analysis of the effects of Rodney's manoeuvre                      491
Tactical bearing of improvements in naval equipment                493
Lessons of this short naval campaign                               495
Rodney's failure to pursue the French fleet                        496
Examination of his reasons and of the actual conditions            497
Probable effect of this failure upon the conditions of peace       498
Rodney's opinions upon the battle of April 12                      499
Successes achieved by Rodney during his command                    500
He is recalled by a new ministry                                   500
Exaggerated view of the effects of this battle upon the war        500
Subsequent career of De Grasse                                     501
Court-martial ordered upon the officers of the French fleet        502
Findings of the court                                              502
De Grasse appeals against the finding                              503
He is severely rebuked by the king                                 503
Deaths of De Grasse, Rodney, and Hood                              504


CHAPTER XIV.

CRITICAL DISCUSSION OF THE MARITIME WAR OF 1778.

The war of 1778 purely maritime                                    505
Peculiar interest therefore attaching to it                        506
Successive steps in the critical study of a war                    507
Distinction between "object" and "objective"                       507
Parties to the war of 1778                                         507
Objects of the different belligerents                              508
Foundations of the British Empire of the seas                      510
Threatened by the revolt of the colonies                           510
The British fleet inferior in numbers to the allies                511
Choice of objectives                                               511
The fleets indicated as the keys of the situation everywhere       513
Elements essential to an active naval war                          514
The bases of operations in the war of 1778:--
    In Europe                                                      515
    On the American continent                                      515
    In the West Indies                                             516
    In the East Indies                                             518
Strategic bearing of the trade-winds and monsoons                  518
The bases abroad generally deficient in resources                  519
Consequent increased importance of the communications              519
The navies the guardians of the communications                     520
Need of intermediate ports between Europe and India                520
Inquiry into the disposition of the naval forces                   521
Difficulty of obtaining information at sea                         521
Perplexity as to the destination of a naval expedition             522
Disadvantages of the defensive                                     523
England upon the defensive in 1778                                 523
Consequent necessity for wise and vigorous action                  524
The key of the situation                                           525
British naval policy in the Napoleonic wars                        525
British naval policy in the Seven Years' War                       527
Difficulties attending this policy                                 527
Disposition of the British navy in the war of 1778                 528
Resulting inferiority on many critical occasions                   528
Effect on the navy of the failure to fortify naval bases           529
The distribution of the British navy exposes it to being
  out-numbered at many points                                      531
The British naval policy in 1778 and in other wars compared        532
Naval policy of the allies                                         535
Divergent counsels of the coalition                                536
"Ulterior objects"                                                 537
The allied navies systematically assume a defensive attitude       538
Dangers of this line of action                                     538
Glamour of commerce-destroying                                     539
The conditions of peace, 1783                                      540

INDEX                                                              543




LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS.


LIST OF MAPS.

  I. Mediterranean Sea                                              15
 II. English Channel and North Sea                                 107
III. Indian Peninsula and Ceylon                                   257
 IV. North Atlantic Ocean                                          532


PLANS OF NAVAL BATTLES.

_In these plans, when the capital letters A, B, C, and D are used, all
positions marked by the same capital are simultaneous._

    I. Four Days' Battle, 1666                                     119
   II. Four Days' Battle, 1666                                     124
  III. Battle of Solebay, 1672                                     146
   IV. Battle of the Texel, 1673                                   153
    V. Battle of Stromboli, 1676                                   161
  V a. Pocock and D'Aché, 1758                                     161
   VI. Battle of Beachy Head, 1690                                 183
 VI a. Battle of La Hougue, 1692                                   183
  VII. Matthews's Action off Toulon, 1744                          265
VII a. Byng's Action off Minorca, 1756                             265
 VIII. Hawke and Conflans, 1759                                    303
   IX. Battle of Ushant, 1778                                      351
    X. D'Estaing and Byron, 1779                                   368
   XI. Rodney and De Guichen, April 17, 1780                       378
  XII. Arbuthnot and Destouches, 1781                              386
 XIII. Suffren at Porto Praya, 1781                                423
  XIV. Suffren and Hughes, February 17, 1782                       431
   XV. Suffren and Hughes, April 12, 1782                          438
  XVI. Suffren and Hughes, July 6, 1782                            447
 XVII. Suffren and Hughes, September 3, 1782                       454
XVIII. Hood and De Grasse, January, 1782                           470
  XIX. Hood and De Grasse, January, 1782                           472
   XX. Rodney and De Grasse, April 9, 1782                         482
  XXI. Rodney's Victory, April 12, 1782                            486




INFLUENCE

OF

SEA POWER UPON HISTORY.




INTRODUCTORY.


The history of Sea Power is largely, though by no means solely, a
narrative of contests between nations, of mutual rivalries, of
violence frequently culminating in war. The profound influence of sea
commerce upon the wealth and strength of countries was clearly seen
long before the true principles which governed its growth and
prosperity were detected. To secure to one's own people a
disproportionate share of such benefits, every effort was made to
exclude others, either by the peaceful legislative methods of monopoly
or prohibitory regulations, or, when these failed, by direct violence.
The clash of interests, the angry feelings roused by conflicting
attempts thus to appropriate the larger share, if not the whole, of
the advantages of commerce, and of distant unsettled commercial
regions, led to wars. On the other hand, wars arising from other
causes have been greatly modified in their conduct and issue by the
control of the sea. Therefore the history of sea power, while
embracing in its broad sweep all that tends to make a people great
upon the sea or by the sea, is largely a military history; and it is
in this aspect that it will be mainly, though not exclusively,
regarded in the following pages.

A study of the military history of the past, such as this, is enjoined
by great military leaders as essential to correct ideas and to the
skilful conduct of war in the future. Napoleon names among the
campaigns to be studied by the aspiring soldier, those of Alexander,
Hannibal, and Cæsar, to whom gunpowder was unknown; and there is a
substantial agreement among professional writers that, while many of
the conditions of war vary from age to age with the progress of
weapons, there are certain teachings in the school of history which
remain constant, and being, therefore, of universal application, can
be elevated to the rank of general principles. For the same reason the
study of the sea history of the past will be found instructive, by its
illustration of the general principles of maritime war,
notwithstanding the great changes that have been brought about in
naval weapons by the scientific advances of the past half century, and
by the introduction of steam as the motive power.

It is doubly necessary thus to study critically the history and
experience of naval warfare in the days of sailing-ships, because
while these will be found to afford lessons of present application and
value, steam navies have as yet made no history which can be quoted as
decisive in its teaching. Of the one we have much experimental
knowledge; of the other, practically none. Hence theories about the
naval warfare of the future are almost wholly presumptive; and
although the attempt has been made to give them a more solid basis by
dwelling upon the resemblance between fleets of steamships and fleets
of galleys moved by oars, which have a long and well-known history, it
will be well not to be carried away by this analogy until it has been
thoroughly tested. The resemblance is indeed far from superficial. The
feature which the steamer and the galley have in common is the ability
to move in any direction independent of the wind. Such a power makes a
radical distinction between those classes of vessels and the
sailing-ship; for the latter can follow only a limited number of
courses when the wind blows, and must remain motionless when it fails.
But while it is wise to observe things that are alike, it is also wise
to look for things that differ; for when the imagination is carried
away by the detection of points of resemblance,--one of the most
pleasing of mental pursuits,--it is apt to be impatient of any
divergence in its new-found parallels, and so may overlook or refuse
to recognize such. Thus the galley and the steamship have in common,
though unequally developed, the important characteristic mentioned,
but in at least two points they differ; and in an appeal to the
history of the galley for lessons as to fighting steamships, the
differences as well as the likeness must be kept steadily in view, or
false deductions may be made. The motive power of the galley when in
use necessarily and rapidly declined, because human strength could not
long maintain such exhausting efforts, and consequently tactical
movements could continue but for a limited time;[1] and again, during
the galley period offensive weapons were not only of short range, but
were almost wholly confined to hand-to-hand encounter. These two
conditions led almost necessarily to a rush upon each other, not,
however, without some dexterous attempts to turn or double on the
enemy, followed by a hand-to-hand _mêlée_. In such a rush and such a
_mêlée_ a great consensus of respectable, even eminent, naval opinion
of the present day finds the necessary outcome of modern naval
weapons,--a kind of Donnybrook Fair, in which, as the history of
_mêlées_ shows, it will be hard to know friend from foe. Whatever may
prove to be the worth of this opinion, it cannot claim an historical
basis in the sole fact that galley and steamship can move at any
moment directly upon the enemy, and carry a beak upon their prow,
regardless of the points in which galley and steamship differ. As yet
this opinion is only a presumption, upon which final judgment may well
be deferred until the trial of battle has given further light. Until
that time there is room for the opposite view,--that a _mêlée_
between numerically equal fleets, in which skill is reduced to a
minimum, is not the best that can be done with the elaborate and
mighty weapons of this age. The surer of himself an admiral is, the
finer the tactical development of his fleet, the better his captains,
the more reluctant must he necessarily be to enter into a _mêlée_ with
equal forces, in which all these advantages will be thrown away,
chance reign supreme, and his fleet be placed on terms of equality
with an assemblage of ships which have never before acted together.[2]
History has lessons as to when _mêlées_ are, or are not, in order.

The galley, then, has one striking resemblance to the steamer, but
differs in other important features which are not so immediately
apparent and are therefore less accounted of. In the sailing-ship, on
the contrary, the striking feature is the difference between it and
the more modern vessel; the points of resemblance, though existing and
easy to find, are not so obvious, and therefore are less heeded. This
impression is enhanced by the sense of utter weakness in the
sailing-ship as compared with the steamer, owing to its dependence
upon the wind; forgetting that, as the former fought with its equals,
the tactical lessons are valid. The galley was never reduced to
impotence by a calm, and hence receives more respect in our day than
the sailing-ship; yet the latter displaced it and remained supreme
until the utilization of steam. The powers to injure an enemy from a
great distance, to manoeuvre for an unlimited length of time without
wearing out the men, to devote the greater part of the crew to the
offensive weapons instead of to the oar, are common to the sailing
vessel and the steamer, and are at least as important, tactically
considered, as the power of the galley to move in a calm or against
the wind.

In tracing resemblances there is a tendency not only to overlook
points of difference, but to exaggerate points of likeness,--to be
fanciful. It may be so considered to point out that as the
sailing-ship had guns of long range, with comparatively great
penetrative power, and carronades, which were of shorter range but
great smashing effect, so the modern steamer has its batteries of
long-range guns and of torpedoes, the latter being effective only
within a limited distance and then injuring by smashing, while the
gun, as of old, aims at penetration. Yet these are distinctly tactical
considerations, which must affect the plans of admirals and captains;
and the analogy is real, not forced. So also both the sailing-ship and
the steamer contemplate direct contact with an enemy's vessel,--the
former to carry her by boarding, the latter to sink her by ramming;
and to both this is the most difficult of their tasks, for to effect
it the ship must be carried to a single point of the field of action,
whereas projectile weapons may be used from many points of a wide
area.

The relative positions of two sailing-ships, or fleets, with reference
to the direction of the wind involved most important tactical
questions, and were perhaps the chief care of the seamen of that age.
To a superficial glance it may appear that since this has become a
matter of such indifference to the steamer, no analogies to it are to
be found in present conditions, and the lessons of history in this
respect are valueless. A more careful consideration of the
distinguishing characteristics of the lee and the weather "gage,"[3]
directed to their essential features and disregarding secondary
details, will show that this is a mistake. The distinguishing feature
of the weather-gage was that it conferred the power of giving or
refusing battle at will, which in turn carries the usual advantage of
an offensive attitude in the choice of the method of attack. This
advantage was accompanied by certain drawbacks, such as irregularity
introduced into the order, exposure to raking or enfilading cannonade,
and the sacrifice of part or all of the artillery-fire of the
assailant,--all which were incurred in approaching the enemy. The
ship, or fleet, with the lee-gage could not attack; if it did not wish
to retreat, its action was confined to the defensive, and to receiving
battle on the enemy's terms. This disadvantage was compensated by the
comparative ease of maintaining the order of battle undisturbed, and
by a sustained artillery-fire to which the enemy for a time was unable
to reply. Historically, these favorable and unfavorable
characteristics have their counterpart and analogy in the offensive
and defensive operations of all ages. The offence undertakes certain
risks and disadvantages in order to reach and destroy the enemy; the
defence, so long as it remains such, refuses the risks of advance,
holds on to a careful, well-ordered position, and avails itself of the
exposure to which the assailant submits himself. These radical
differences between the weather and the lee gage were so clearly
recognized, through the cloud of lesser details accompanying them,
that the former was ordinarily chosen by the English, because their
steady policy was to assail and destroy their enemy; whereas the
French sought the lee-gage, because by so doing they were usually able
to cripple the enemy as he approached, and thus evade decisive
encounters and preserve their ships. The French, with rare exceptions,
subordinated the action of the navy to other military considerations,
grudged the money spent upon it, and therefore sought to economize
their fleet by assuming a defensive position and limiting its efforts
to the repelling of assaults. For this course the lee-gage, skilfully
used, was admirably adapted so long as an enemy displayed more courage
than conduct; but when Rodney showed an intention to use the advantage
of the wind, not merely to attack, but to make a formidable
concentration on a part of the enemy's line, his wary opponent, De
Guichen, changed his tactics. In the first of their three actions the
Frenchman took the lee-gage; but after recognizing Rodney's purpose he
manoeuvred for the advantage of the wind, not to attack, but to refuse
action except on his own terms. The power to assume the offensive, or
to refuse battle, rests no longer with the wind, but with the party
which has the greater speed; which in a fleet will depend not only
upon the speed of the individual ships, but also upon their tactical
uniformity of action. Henceforth the ships which have the greatest
speed will have the weather-gage.

It is not therefore a vain expectation, as many think, to look for
useful lessons in the history of sailing-ships as well as in that of
galleys. Both have their points of resemblance to the modern ship;
both have also points of essential difference, which make it
impossible to cite their experiences or modes of action as tactical
_precedents_ to be followed. But a precedent is different from and
less valuable than a principle. The former may be originally faulty,
or may cease to apply through change of circumstances; the latter has
its root in the essential nature of things, and, however various its
application as conditions change, remains a standard to which action
must conform to attain success. War has such principles; their
existence is detected by the study of the past, which reveals them in
successes and in failures, the same from age to age. Conditions and
weapons change; but to cope with the one or successfully wield the
others, respect must be had to these constant teachings of history in
the tactics of the battlefield, or in those wider operations of war
which are comprised under the name of strategy.

It is however in these wider operations, which embrace a whole theatre
of war, and in a maritime contest may cover a large portion of the
globe, that the teachings of history have a more evident and permanent
value, because the conditions remain more permanent. The theatre of
war may be larger or smaller, its difficulties more or less
pronounced, the contending armies more or less great, the necessary
movements more or less easy, but these are simply differences of
scale, of degree, not of kind. As a wilderness gives place to
civilization, as means of communication multiply, as roads are opened,
rivers bridged, food-resources increased, the operations of war become
easier, more rapid, more extensive; but the principles to which they
must be conformed remain the same. When the march on foot was replaced
by carrying troops in coaches, when the latter in turn gave place to
railroads, the scale of distances was increased, or, if you will, the
scale of time diminished; but the principles which dictated the point
at which the army should be concentrated, the direction in which it
should move, the part of the enemy's position which it should assail,
the protection of communications, were not altered. So, on the sea,
the advance from the galley timidly creeping from port to port to the
sailing-ship launching out boldly to the ends of the earth, and from
the latter to the steamship of our own time, has increased the scope
and the rapidity of naval operations without necessarily changing the
principles which should direct them; and the speech of Hermocrates
twenty-three hundred years ago, before quoted, contained a correct
strategic plan, which is as applicable in its principles now as it was
then. Before hostile armies or fleets are brought into con_tact_ (a
word which perhaps better than any other indicates the dividing line
between tactics and strategy), there are a number of questions to be
decided, covering the whole plan of operations throughout the theatre
of war. Among these are the proper function of the navy in the war;
its true objective; the point or points upon which it should be
concentrated; the establishment of depots of coal and supplies; the
maintenance of communications between these depots and the home base;
the military value of commerce-destroying as a decisive or a secondary
operation of war; the system upon which commerce-destroying can be
most efficiently conducted, whether by scattered cruisers or by
holding in force some vital centre through which commercial shipping
must pass. All these are strategic questions, and upon all these
history has a great deal to say. There has been of late a valuable
discussion in English naval circles as to the comparative merits of
the policies of two great English admirals, Lord Howe and Lord St.
Vincent, in the disposition of the English navy when at war with
France. The question is purely strategic, and is not of mere
historical interest; it is of vital importance now, and the principles
upon which its decision rests are the same now as then. St. Vincent's
policy saved England from invasion, and in the hands of Nelson and his
brother admirals led straight up to Trafalgar.

It is then particularly in the field of naval strategy that the
teachings of the past have a value which is in no degree lessened.
They are there useful not only as illustrative of principles, but also
as precedents, owing to the comparative permanence of the conditions.
This is less obviously true as to tactics, when the fleets come into
collision at the point to which strategic considerations have brought
them. The unresting progress of mankind causes continual change in the
weapons; and with that must come a continual change in the manner of
fighting,--in the handling and disposition of troops or ships on the
battlefield. Hence arises a tendency on the part of many connected
with maritime matters to think that no advantage is to be gained from
the study of former experiences; that time so used is wasted. This
view, though natural, not only leaves wholly out of sight those broad
strategic considerations which lead nations to put fleets afloat,
which direct the sphere of their action, and so have modified and will
continue to modify the history of the world, but is one-sided and
narrow even as to tactics. The battles of the past succeeded or failed
according as they were fought in conformity with the principles of
war; and the seaman who carefully studies the causes of success or
failure will not only detect and gradually assimilate these
principles, but will also acquire increased aptitude in applying them
to the tactical use of the ships and weapons of his own day. He will
observe also that changes of tactics have not only taken place _after_
changes in weapons, which necessarily is the case, but that the
interval between such changes has been unduly long. This doubtless
arises from the fact that an improvement of weapons is due to the
energy of one or two men, while changes in tactics have to overcome
the inertia of a conservative class; but it is a great evil. It can be
remedied only by a candid recognition of each change, by careful study
of the powers and limitations of the new ship or weapon, and by a
consequent adaptation of the method of using it to the qualities it
possesses, which will constitute its tactics. History shows that it is
vain to hope that military men generally will be at the pains to do
this, but that the one who does will go into battle with a great
advantage,--a lesson in itself of no mean value.

We may therefore accept now the words of a French tactician, Morogues,
who wrote a century and a quarter ago: "Naval tactics are based upon
conditions the chief causes of which, namely the arms, may change;
which in turn causes necessarily a change in the construction of
ships, in the manner of handling them, and so finally in the
disposition and handling of fleets." His further statement, that "it
is not a science founded upon principles absolutely invariable," is
more open to criticism. It would be more correct to say that the
application of its principles varies as the weapons change. The
application of the principles doubtless varies also in strategy from
time to time, but the variation is far less; and hence the recognition
of the underlying principle is easier. This statement is of sufficient
importance to our subject to receive some illustrations from
historical events.

The battle of the Nile, in 1798, was not only an overwhelming victory
for the English over the French fleet, but had also the decisive
effect of destroying the communications between France and Napoleon's
army in Egypt. In the battle itself the English admiral, Nelson, gave
a most brilliant example of grand tactics, if that be, as has been
defined, "the art of making good combinations preliminary to battles
as well as during their progress." The particular tactical combination
depended upon a condition now passed away, which was the inability of
the lee ships of a fleet at anchor to come to the help of the weather
ones before the latter were destroyed; but the principles which
underlay the combination, namely, to choose that part of the enemy's
order which can least easily be helped, and to attack it with superior
forces, has not passed away. The action of Admiral Jervis at Cape St.
Vincent, when with fifteen ships he won a victory over twenty-seven,
was dictated by the same principle, though in this case the enemy was
not at anchor, but under way. Yet men's minds are so constituted that
they seem more impressed by the transiency of the conditions than by
the undying principle which coped with them. In the strategic effect
of Nelson's victory upon the course of the war, on the contrary, the
principle involved is not only more easily recognized, but it is at
once seen to be applicable to our own day. The issue of the enterprise
in Egypt depended upon keeping open the communications with France.
The victory of the Nile destroyed the naval force, by which alone the
communications could be assured, and determined the final failure; and
it is at once seen, not only that the blow was struck in accordance
with the principle of striking at the enemy's line of communication,
but also that the same principle is valid now, and would be equally so
in the days of the galley as of the sailing-ship or steamer.

Nevertheless, a vague feeling of contempt for the past, supposed to be
obsolete, combines with natural indolence to blind men even to those
permanent strategic lessons which lie close to the surface of naval
history. For instance, how many look upon the battle of Trafalgar, the
crown of Nelson's glory and the seal of his genius, as other than an
isolated event of exceptional grandeur? How many ask themselves the
strategic question, "How did the ships come to be just there?" How
many realize it to be the final act in a great strategic drama,
extending over a year or more, in which two of the greatest leaders
that ever lived, Napoleon and Nelson, were pitted against each other?
At Trafalgar it was not Villeneuve that failed, but Napoleon that was
vanquished; not Nelson that won, but England that was saved; and why?
Because Napoleon's combinations failed, and Nelson's intuitions and
activity kept the English fleet ever on the track of the enemy, and
brought it up in time at the decisive moment.[4] The tactics at
Trafalgar, while open to criticism in detail, were in their main
features conformable to the principles of war, and their audacity was
justified as well by the urgency of the case as by the results; but
the great lessons of efficiency in preparation, of activity and energy
in execution, and of thought and insight on the part of the English
leader during the previous months, are strategic lessons, and as such
they still remain good.

In these two cases events were worked out to their natural and
decisive end. A third may be cited, in which, as no such definite end
was reached, an opinion as to what should have been done may be open
to dispute. In the war of the American Revolution, France and Spain
became allies against England in 1779. The united fleets thrice
appeared in the English Channel, once to the number of sixty-six sail
of the line, driving the English fleet to seek refuge in its ports
because far inferior in numbers. Now, the great aim of Spain was to
recover Gibraltar and Jamaica; and to the former end immense efforts
both by land and sea were put forth by the allies against that nearly
impregnable fortress. They were fruitless. The question suggested--and
it is purely one of naval strategy--is this: Would not Gibraltar have
been more surely recovered by controlling the English Channel,
attacking the British fleet even in its harbors, and threatening
England with annihilation of commerce and invasion at home, than by
far greater efforts directed against a distant and very strong outpost
of her empire? The English people, from long immunity, were
particularly sensitive to fears of invasion, and their great
confidence in their fleets, if rudely shaken, would have left them
proportionately disheartened. However decided, the question as a point
of strategy is fair; and it is proposed in another form by a French
officer of the period, who favored directing the great effort on a
West India island which might be exchanged against Gibraltar. It is
not, however, likely that England would have given up the key of the
Mediterranean for any other foreign possession, though she might have
yielded it to save her firesides and her capital. Napoleon once said
that he would reconquer Pondicherry on the banks of the Vistula. Could
he have controlled the English Channel, as the allied fleet did for a
moment in 1779, can it be doubted that he would have conquered
Gibraltar on the shores of England?

To impress more strongly the truth that history both suggests
strategic study and illustrates the principles of war by the facts
which it transmits, two more instances will be taken, which are more
remote in time than the period specially considered in this work. How
did it happen that, in two great contests between the powers of the
East and of the West in the Mediterranean, in one of which the empire
of the known world was at stake, the opposing fleets met on spots so
near each other as Actium and Lepanto? Was this a mere coincidence, or
was it due to conditions that recurred, and may recur again?[5] If the
latter, it is worth while to study out the reason; for if there should
again arise a great eastern power of the sea like that of Antony or of
Turkey, the strategic questions would be similar. At present, indeed,
it seems that the centre of sea power, resting mainly with England and
France, is overwhelmingly in the West; but should any chance add to
the control of the Black Sea basin, which Russia now has, the
possession of the entrance to the Mediterranean, the existing
strategic conditions affecting sea power would all be modified. Now,
were the West arrayed against the East, England and France would go at
once unopposed to the Levant, as they did in 1854, and as England
alone went in 1878; in case of the change suggested, the East, as
twice before, would meet the West half-way.

At a very conspicuous and momentous period of the world's history, Sea
Power had a strategic bearing and weight which has received scant
recognition. There cannot now be had the full knowledge necessary for
tracing in detail its influence upon the issue of the second Punic
War; but the indications which remain are sufficient to warrant the
assertion that it was a determining factor. An accurate judgment upon
this point cannot be formed by mastering only such facts of the
particular contest as have been clearly transmitted, for as usual the
naval transactions have been slightingly passed over; there is needed
also familiarity with the details of general naval history in order to
draw, from slight indications, correct inferences based upon a
knowledge of what has been possible at periods whose history is well
known. The control of the sea, however real, does not imply that an
enemy's single ships or small squadrons cannot steal out of port,
cannot cross more or less frequented tracts of ocean, make harassing
descents upon unprotected points of a long coast-line, enter blockaded
harbors. On the contrary, history has shown that such evasions are
always possible, to some extent, to the weaker party, however great
the inequality of naval strength. It is not therefore inconsistent
with the general control of the sea, or of a decisive part of it, by
the Roman fleets, that the Carthaginian admiral Bomilcar in the fourth
year of the war, after the stunning defeat of Cannæ, landed four
thousand men and a body of elephants in south Italy; nor that in the
seventh year, flying from the Roman fleet off Syracuse, he again
appeared at Tarentum, then in Hannibal's hands; nor that Hannibal sent
despatch vessels to Carthage; nor even that, at last, he withdrew in
safety to Africa with his wasted army. None of these things prove that
the government in Carthage could, if it wished, have sent Hannibal the
constant support which, as a matter of fact, he did not receive; but
they do tend to create a natural impression that such help could have
been given. Therefore the statement, that the Roman preponderance at
sea had a decisive effect upon the course of the war, needs to be made
good by an examination of ascertained facts. Thus the kind and degree
of its influence may be fairly estimated.

   [Illustration: MEDITERRANEAN SEA]

At the beginning of the war, Mommsen says, Rome controlled the seas.
To whatever cause, or combination of causes, it be attributed, this
essentially non-maritime state had in the first Punic War established
over its sea-faring rival a naval supremacy, which still lasted. In
the second war there was no naval battle of importance,--a
circumstance which in itself, and still more in connection with other
well-ascertained facts, indicates a superiority analogous to that
which at other epochs has been marked by the same feature.

As Hannibal left no memoirs, the motives are unknown which determined
him to the perilous and almost ruinous march through Gaul and across
the Alps. It is certain, however, that his fleet on the coast of Spain
was not strong enough to contend with that of Rome. Had it been, he
might still have followed the road he actually did, for reasons that
weighed with him; but had he gone by the sea, he would not have lost
thirty-three thousand out of the sixty thousand veteran soldiers with
whom he started.

While Hannibal was making this dangerous march, the Romans were
sending to Spain, under the two elder Scipios, one part of their
fleet, carrying a consular army. This made the voyage without serious
loss, and the army established itself successfully north of the Ebro,
on Hannibal's line of communications. At the same time another
squadron, with an army commanded by the other consul, was sent to
Sicily. The two together numbered two hundred and twenty ships. On its
station each met and defeated a Carthaginian squadron with an ease
which may be inferred from the slight mention made of the actions, and
which indicates the actual superiority of the Roman fleet.

After the second year the war assumed the following shape: Hannibal,
having entered Italy by the north, after a series of successes had
passed southward around Rome and fixed himself in southern Italy,
living off the country,--a condition which tended to alienate the
people, and was especially precarious when in contact with the mighty
political and military system of control which Rome had there
established. It was therefore from the first urgently necessary that
he should establish, between himself and some reliable base, that
stream of supplies and reinforcements which in terms of modern war is
called "communications." There were three friendly regions which
might, each or all, serve as such a base,--Carthage itself, Macedonia,
and Spain. With the first two, communication could be had only by sea.
From Spain, where his firmest support was found, he could be reached
by both land and sea, unless an enemy barred the passage; but the sea
route was the shorter and easier.

In the first years of the war, Rome, by her sea power, controlled
absolutely the basin between Italy, Sicily, and Spain, known as the
Tyrrhenian and Sardinian Seas. The sea-coast from the Ebro to the
Tiber was mostly friendly to her. In the fourth year, after the battle
of Cannæ, Syracuse forsook the Roman alliance, the revolt spread
through Sicily, and Macedonia also entered into an offensive league
with Hannibal. These changes extended the necessary operations of the
Roman fleet, and taxed its strength. What disposition was made of it,
and how did it thereafter influence the struggle?

The indications are clear that Rome at no time ceased to control the
Tyrrhenian Sea, for her squadrons passed unmolested from Italy to
Spain. On the Spanish coast also she had full sway till the younger
Scipio saw fit to lay up the fleet. In the Adriatic, a squadron and
naval station were established at Brindisi to check Macedonia, which
performed their task so well that not a soldier of the phalanxes ever
set foot in Italy. "The want of a war fleet," says Mommsen, "paralyzed
Philip in all his movements." Here the effect of Sea Power is not even
a matter of inference.

In Sicily, the struggle centred about Syracuse. The fleets of Carthage
and Rome met there, but the superiority evidently lay with the latter;
for though the Carthaginians at times succeeded in throwing supplies
into the city, they avoided meeting the Roman fleet in battle. With
Lilybæum, Palermo, and Messina in its hands, the latter was well based
in the north coast of the island. Access by the south was left open
to the Carthaginians, and they were thus able to maintain the
insurrection.

Putting these facts together, it is a reasonable inference, and
supported by the whole tenor of the history, that the Roman sea power
controlled the sea north of a line drawn from Tarragona in Spain to
Lilybæum (the modern Marsala), at the west end of Sicily, thence round
by the north side of the island through the straits of Messina down to
Syracuse, and from there to Brindisi in the Adriatic. This control
lasted, unshaken, throughout the war. It did not exclude maritime
raids, large or small, such as have been spoken of; but it did forbid
the sustained and secure communications of which Hannibal was in
deadly need.

On the other hand, it seems equally plain that for the first ten years
of the war the Roman fleet was not strong enough for sustained
operations in the sea between Sicily and Carthage, nor indeed much to
the south of the line indicated. When Hannibal started, he assigned
such ships as he had to maintaining the communications between Spain
and Africa, which the Romans did not then attempt to disturb.

The Roman sea power, therefore, threw Macedonia wholly out of the war.
It did not keep Carthage from maintaining a useful and most harassing
diversion in Sicily; but it did prevent her sending troops, when they
would have been most useful, to her great general in Italy. How was it
as to Spain?

Spain was the region upon which the father of Hannibal and Hannibal
himself had based their intended invasion of Italy. For eighteen years
before this began they had occupied the country, extending and
consolidating their power, both political and military, with rare
sagacity. They had raised, and trained in local wars, a large and now
veteran army. Upon his own departure, Hannibal intrusted the
government to his younger brother, Hasdrubal, who preserved toward him
to the end a loyalty and devotion which he had no reason to hope from
the faction-cursed mother-city in Africa.

At the time of his starting, the Carthaginian power in Spain was
secured from Cadiz to the river Ebro. The region between this river
and the Pyrenees was inhabited by tribes friendly to the Romans, but
unable, in the absence of the latter, to oppose a successful
resistance to Hannibal. He put them down, leaving eleven thousand
soldiers under Hanno to keep military possession of the country, lest
the Romans should establish themselves there, and thus disturb his
communications with his base.

Cnæus Scipio, however, arrived on the spot by sea the same year with
twenty thousand men, defeated Hanno, and occupied both the coast and
interior north of the Ebro. The Romans thus held ground by which they
entirely closed the road between Hannibal and reinforcements from
Hasdrubal, and whence they could attack the Carthaginian power in
Spain; while their own communications with Italy, being by water, were
secured by their naval supremacy. They made a naval base at Tarragona,
confronting that of Hasdrubal at Cartagena, and then invaded the
Carthaginian dominions. The war in Spain went on under the elder
Scipios, seemingly a side issue, with varying fortune for seven years;
at the end of which time Hasdrubal inflicted upon them a crushing
defeat, the two brothers were killed, and the Carthaginians nearly
succeeded in breaking through to the Pyrenees with reinforcements for
Hannibal. The attempt, however, was checked for the moment; and before
it could be renewed, the fall of Capua released twelve thousand
veteran Romans, who were sent to Spain under Claudius Nero, a man of
exceptional ability, to whom was due later the most decisive military
movement made by any Roman general during the Second Punic War. This
seasonable reinforcement, which again assured the shaken grip on
Hasdrubal's line of march, came by sea,--a way which, though most
rapid and easy, was closed to the Carthaginians by the Roman navy.

Two years later the younger Publius Scipio, celebrated afterward as
Africanus, received the command in Spain, and captured Cartagena by a
combined military and naval attack; after which he took the most
extraordinary step of breaking up his fleet and transferring the
seamen to the army. Not contented to act merely as the "containing"[6]
force against Hasdrubal by closing the passes of the Pyrenees, Scipio
pushed forward into southern Spain, and fought a severe but indecisive
battle on the Guadalquivir; after which Hasdrubal slipped away from
him, hurried north, crossed the Pyrenees at their extreme west, and
pressed on to Italy, where Hannibal's position was daily growing
weaker, the natural waste of his army not being replaced.

The war had lasted ten years, when Hasdrubal, having met little loss
on the way, entered Italy at the north. The troops he brought, could
they be safely united with those under the command of the unrivalled
Hannibal, might give a decisive turn to the war, for Rome herself was
nearly exhausted; the iron links which bound her own colonies and the
allied States to her were strained to the utmost, and some had already
snapped. But the military position of the two brothers was also
perilous in the extreme. One being at the river Metaurus, the other in
Apulia, two hundred miles apart, each was confronted by a superior
enemy, and both these Roman armies were between their separated
opponents. This false situation, as well as the long delay of
Hasdrubal's coming, was due to the Roman control of the sea, which
throughout the war limited the mutual support of the Carthaginian
brothers to the route through Gaul. At the very time that Hasdrubal
was making his long and dangerous circuit by land, Scipio had sent
eleven thousand men from Spain by sea to reinforce the army opposed to
him. The upshot was that messengers from Hasdrubal to Hannibal, having
to pass over so wide a belt of hostile country, fell into the hands of
Claudius Nero, commanding the southern Roman army, who thus learned
the route which Hasdrubal intended to take. Nero correctly appreciated
the situation, and, escaping the vigilance of Hannibal, made a rapid
march with eight thousand of his best troops to join the forces in the
north. The junction being effected, the two consuls fell upon
Hasdrubal in overwhelming numbers and destroyed his army; the
Carthaginian leader himself falling in the battle. Hannibal's first
news of the disaster was by the head of his brother being thrown into
his camp. He is said to have exclaimed that Rome would now be mistress
of the world; and the battle of Metaurus is generally accepted as
decisive of the struggle between the two States.

The military situation which finally resulted in the battle of the
Metaurus and the triumph of Rome may be summed up as follows: To
overthrow Rome it was necessary to attack her in Italy at the heart of
her power, and shatter the strongly linked confederacy of which she
was the head. This was the objective. To reach it, the Carthaginians
needed a solid base of operations and a secure line of communications.
The former was established in Spain by the genius of the great Barca
family; the latter was never achieved. There were two lines
possible,--the one direct by sea, the other circuitous through Gaul.
The first was blocked by the Roman sea power, the second imperilled
and finally intercepted through the occupation of northern Spain by
the Roman army. This occupation was made possible through the control
of the sea, which the Carthaginians never endangered. With respect to
Hannibal and his base, therefore, Rome occupied two central positions,
Rome itself and northern Spain, joined by an easy interior line of
communications, the sea; by which mutual support was continually
given.

Had the Mediterranean been a level desert of land, in which the Romans
held strong mountain ranges in Corsica and Sardinia, fortified posts
at Tarragona, Lilybæum, and Messina, the Italian coast-line nearly to
Genoa, and allied fortresses in Marseilles and other points; had they
also possessed an armed force capable by its character of traversing
that desert at will, but in which their opponents were very inferior
and therefore compelled to a great circuit in order to concentrate
their troops, the military situation would have been at once
recognized, and no words would have been too strong to express the
value and effect of that peculiar force. It would have been perceived,
also, that the enemy's force of the same kind might, however inferior
in strength, make an inroad, or raid, upon the territory thus held,
might burn a village or waste a few miles of borderland, might even
cut off a convoy at times, without, in a military sense, endangering
the communications. Such predatory operations have been carried on in
all ages by the weaker maritime belligerent, but they by no means
warrant the inference, irreconcilable with the known facts, "that
neither Rome nor Carthage could be said to have undisputed mastery of
the sea," because "Roman fleets sometimes visited the coasts of
Africa, and Carthaginian fleets in the same way appeared off the coast
of Italy." In the case under consideration, the navy played the part
of such a force upon the supposed desert; but as it acts on an element
strange to most writers, as its members have been from time immemorial
a strange race apart, without prophets of their own, neither
themselves nor their calling understood, its immense determining
influence upon the history of that era, and consequently upon the
history of the world, has been overlooked. If the preceding argument
is sound, it is as defective to omit sea power from the list of
principal factors in the result, as it would be absurd to claim for it
an exclusive influence.

Instances such as have been cited, drawn from widely separated periods
of time, both before and after that specially treated in this work,
serve to illustrate the intrinsic interest of the subject, and the
character of the lessons which history has to teach. As before
observed, these come more often under the head of strategy than of
tactics; they bear rather upon the conduct of campaigns than of
battles, and hence are fraught with more lasting value. To quote a
great authority in this connection, Jomini says: "Happening to be in
Paris near the end of 1851, a distinguished person did me the honor to
ask my opinion as to whether recent improvements in firearms would
cause any great modifications in the way of making war. I replied that
they would probably have an influence upon the details of tactics, but
that in great strategic operations and the grand combinations of
battles, victory would, now as ever, result from the application of
the principles which had led to the success of great generals in all
ages; of Alexander and Cæsar, as well as of Frederick and Napoleon."
This study has become more than ever important now to navies, because
of the great and steady power of movement possessed by the modern
steamer. The best-planned schemes might fail through stress of weather
in the days of the galley and the sailing-ship; but this difficulty
has almost disappeared. The principles which should direct great naval
combinations have been applicable to all ages, and are deducible from
history; but the power to carry them out with little regard to the
weather is a recent gain.

The definitions usually given of the word "strategy" confine it to
military combinations embracing one or more fields of operations,
either wholly distinct or mutually dependent, but always regarded as
actual or immediate scenes of war. However this may be on shore, a
recent French author is quite right in pointing out that such a
definition is too narrow for naval strategy. "This," he says, "differs
from military strategy in that it is as necessary in peace as in war.
Indeed, in peace it may gain its most decisive victories by occupying
in a country, either by purchase or treaty, excellent positions which
would perhaps hardly be got by war. It learns to profit by all
opportunities of settling on some chosen point of a coast, and to
render definitive an occupation which at first was only transient." A
generation that has seen England within ten years occupy successively
Cyprus and Egypt, under terms and conditions on their face transient,
but which have not yet led to the abandonment of the positions taken,
can readily agree with this remark; which indeed receives constant
illustration from the quiet persistency with which all the great sea
powers are seeking position after position, less noted and less
noteworthy than Cyprus and Egypt, in the different seas to which their
people and their ships penetrate. "Naval strategy has indeed for its
end to found, support, and increase, as well in peace as in war, the
sea power of a country;" and therefore its study has an interest and
value for all citizens of a free country, but especially for those who
are charged with its foreign and military relations.

The general conditions that either are essential to or powerfully
affect the greatness of a nation upon the sea will now be examined;
after which a more particular consideration of the various maritime
nations of Europe at the middle of the seventeenth century, where the
historical survey begins, will serve at once to illustrate and give
precision to the conclusions upon the general subject.

       *       *       *       *       *

    NOTE.--The brilliancy of Nelson's fame, dimming as it does that
    of all his contemporaries, and the implicit trust felt by
    England in him as the one man able to save her from the schemes
    of Napoleon, should not of course obscure the fact that only one
    portion of the field was, or could be, occupied by him.
    Napoleon's aim, in the campaign which ended at Trafalgar, was to
    unite in the West Indies the French fleets of Brest, Toulon, and
    Rochefort, together with a strong body of Spanish ships, thus
    forming an overwhelming force which he intended should return
    together to the English Channel and cover the crossing of the
    French army. He naturally expected that, with England's
    interests scattered all over the world, confusion and
    distraction would arise from ignorance of the destination of the
    French squadrons, and the English navy be drawn away from his
    objective point. The portion of the field committed to Nelson
    was the Mediterranean, where he watched the great arsenal of
    Toulon and the highways alike to the East and to the Atlantic.
    This was inferior in consequence to no other, and assumed
    additional importance in the eyes of Nelson from his conviction
    that the former attempts on Egypt would be renewed. Owing to
    this persuasion he took at first a false step, which delayed his
    pursuit of the Toulon fleet when it sailed under the command of
    Villeneuve; and the latter was further favored by a long
    continuance of fair winds, while the English had head winds. But
    while all this is true, while the failure of Napoleon's
    combinations must be attributed to the tenacious grip of the
    English blockade off Brest, _as well as_ to Nelson's energetic
    pursuit of the Toulon fleet when it escaped to the West Indies
    and again on its hasty return to Europe, the latter is fairly
    entitled to the eminent distinction which history has accorded
    it, and which is asserted in the text. Nelson did not, indeed,
    fathom the intentions of Napoleon. This may have been owing, as
    some have said, to lack of insight; but it may be more simply
    laid to the usual disadvantage under which the defence lies
    before the blow has fallen, of ignorance as to the point
    threatened by the offence. It is insight enough to fasten on the
    key of a situation; and this Nelson rightly saw was the fleet,
    not the station. Consequently, his action has afforded a
    striking instance of how tenacity of purpose and untiring energy
    in execution can repair a first mistake and baffle deeply laid
    plans. His Mediterranean command embraced many duties and cares;
    but amid and dominating them all, he saw clearly the Toulon
    fleet as the controlling factor there, and an important factor
    in any naval combination of the Emperor. Hence his attention was
    unwaveringly fixed upon it; so much so that he called it "his
    fleet," a phrase which has somewhat vexed the sensibilities of
    French critics. This simple and accurate view of the military
    situation strengthened him in taking the fearless resolution and
    bearing the immense responsibility of abandoning his station in
    order to follow "his fleet." Determined thus on a pursuit the
    undeniable wisdom of which should not obscure the greatness of
    mind that undertook it, he followed so vigorously as to reach
    Cadiz on his return a week before Villeneuve entered Ferrol,
    despite unavoidable delays arising from false information and
    uncertainty as to the enemy's movements. The same untiring ardor
    enabled him to bring up his own ships from Cadiz to Brest in
    time to make the fleet there superior to Villeneuve's, had the
    latter persisted in his attempt to reach the neighborhood. The
    English, very inferior in aggregate number of vessels to the
    allied fleets, were by this seasonable reinforcement of eight
    veteran ships put into the best possible position strategically,
    as will be pointed out in dealing with similar conditions in the
    war of the American Revolution. Their forces were united in one
    great fleet in the Bay of Biscay, interposed between the two
    divisions of the enemy in Brest and Ferrol, superior in number
    to either singly, and with a strong probability of being able to
    deal with one before the other could come up. This was due to
    able action all round on the part of the English authorities;
    but above all other factors in the result stands Nelson's
    single-minded pursuit of "his fleet."

    This interesting series of strategic movements ended on the 14th
    of August, when Villeneuve, in despair of reaching Brest, headed
    for Cadiz, where he anchored on the 20th. As soon as Napoleon
    heard of this, after an outburst of rage against the admiral, he
    at once dictated the series of movements which resulted in Ulm
    and Austerlitz, abandoning his purposes against England. The
    battle of Trafalgar, fought October 21, was therefore separated
    by a space of two months from the extensive movements of which
    it was nevertheless the outcome. Isolated from them in point of
    time, it was none the less the seal of Nelson's genius, affixed
    later to the record he had made in the near past. With equal
    truth it is said that England was saved at Trafalgar, though the
    Emperor had then given up his intended invasion; the destruction
    there emphasized and sealed the strategic triumph which had
    noiselessly foiled Napoleon's plans.

FOOTNOTES:

[1] Thus Hermocrates of Syracuse, advocating the policy of thwarting
the Athenian expedition against his city (B.C. 413) by going boldly to
meet it, and keeping on the flank of its line of advance, said: "As
their advance must be slow, we shall have a thousand opportunities to
attack them; but if they clear their ships for action and in a body
bear down expeditiously upon us, they must ply hard at their oars, and
_when spent with toil_ we can fall upon them."

[2] The writer must guard himself from appearing to advocate elaborate
tactical movements issuing in barren demonstrations. He believes that
a fleet seeking a decisive result must close with its enemy, but not
until some advantage has been obtained for the collision, which will
usually be gained by manoeuvring, and will fall to the best drilled
and managed fleet. In truth, barren results have as often followed
upon headlong, close encounters as upon the most timid tactical
trifling.

[3] A ship was said to have the weather-gage, or "the advantage of the
wind," or "to be to windward," when the wind allowed her to steer for
her opponent, and did not let the latter head straight for her. The
extreme case was when the wind blew direct from one to the other; but
there was a large space on either side of this line to which the term
"weather-gage" applied. If the lee ship be taken as the centre of a
circle, there were nearly three eighths of its area in which the other
might be and still keep the advantage of the wind to a greater or less
degree. Lee is the opposite of weather.

[4] See note at end of Introductory Chapter, page 23.

[5] The battle of Navarino (1827) between Turkey and the Western
Powers was fought in this neighborhood.

[6] A "containing" force is one to which, in a military combination,
is assigned the duty of stopping, or delaying the advance of a portion
of the enemy, while the main effort of the army or armies is being
exerted in a different quarter.




CHAPTER I.

DISCUSSION OF THE ELEMENTS OF SEA POWER.


The first and most obvious light in which the sea presents itself from
the political and social point of view is that of a great highway; or
better, perhaps, of a wide common, over which men may pass in all
directions, but on which some well-worn paths show that controlling
reasons have led them to choose certain lines of travel rather than
others. These lines of travel are called trade routes; and the reasons
which have determined them are to be sought in the history of the
world.

Notwithstanding all the familiar and unfamiliar dangers of the sea,
both travel and traffic by water have always been easier and cheaper
than by land. The commercial greatness of Holland was due not only to
her shipping at sea, but also to the numerous tranquil water-ways
which gave such cheap and easy access to her own interior and to that
of Germany. This advantage of carriage by water over that by land was
yet more marked in a period when roads were few and very bad, wars
frequent and society unsettled, as was the case two hundred years ago.
Sea traffic then went in peril of robbers, but was nevertheless safer
and quicker than that by land. A Dutch writer of that time, estimating
the chances of his country in a war with England, notices among other
things that the water-ways of England failed to penetrate the country
sufficiently; therefore, the roads being bad, goods from one part of
the kingdom to the other must go by sea, and be exposed to capture by
the way. As regards purely internal trade, this danger has generally
disappeared at the present day. In most civilized countries, now, the
destruction or disappearance of the coasting trade would only be an
inconvenience, although water transit is still the cheaper.
Nevertheless, as late as the wars of the French Republic and the First
Empire, those who are familiar with the history of the period, and the
light naval literature that has grown up around it, know how constant
is the mention of convoys stealing from point to point along the
French coast, although the sea swarmed with English cruisers and there
were good inland roads.

Under modern conditions, however, home trade is but a part of the
business of a country bordering on the sea. Foreign necessaries or
luxuries must be brought to its ports, either in its own or in foreign
ships, which will return, bearing in exchange the products of the
country, whether they be the fruits of the earth or the works of men's
hands; and it is the wish of every nation that this shipping business
should be done by its own vessels. The ships that thus sail to and fro
must have secure ports to which to return, and must, as far as
possible, be followed by the protection of their country throughout
the voyage.

This protection in time of war must be extended by armed shipping. The
necessity of a navy, in the restricted sense of the word, springs,
therefore, from the existence of a peaceful shipping, and disappears
with it, except in the case of a nation which has aggressive
tendencies, and keeps up a navy merely as a branch of the military
establishment. As the United States has at present no aggressive
purposes, and as its merchant service has disappeared, the dwindling
of the armed fleet and general lack of interest in it are strictly
logical consequences. When for any reason sea trade is again found to
pay, a large enough shipping interest will reappear to compel the
revival of the war fleet. It is possible that when a canal route
through the Central-American Isthmus is seen to be a near certainty,
the aggressive impulse may be strong enough to lead to the same
result. This is doubtful, however, because a peaceful, gain-loving
nation is not far-sighted, and far-sightedness is needed for adequate
military preparation, especially in these days.

As a nation, with its unarmed and armed shipping, launches forth from
its own shores, the need is soon felt of points upon which the ships
can rely for peaceful trading, for refuge and supplies. In the present
day friendly, though foreign, ports are to be found all over the
world; and their shelter is enough while peace prevails. It was not
always so, nor does peace always endure, though the United States have
been favored by so long a continuance of it. In earlier times the
merchant seaman, seeking for trade in new and unexplored regions, made
his gains at risk of life and liberty from suspicious or hostile
nations, and was under great delays in collecting a full and
profitable freight. He therefore intuitively sought at the far end of
his trade route one or more stations, to be given to him by force or
favor, where he could fix himself or his agents in reasonable
security, where his ships could lie in safety, and where the
merchantable products of the land could be continually collecting,
awaiting the arrival of the home fleet, which should carry them to the
mother-country. As there was immense gain, as well as much risk, in
these early voyages, such establishments naturally multiplied and grew
until they became colonies; whose ultimate development and success
depended upon the genius and policy of the nation from which they
sprang, and form a very great part of the history, and particularly of
the sea history, of the world. All colonies had not the simple and
natural birth and growth above described. Many were more formal, and
purely political, in their conception and founding, the act of the
rulers of the people rather than of private individuals; but the
trading-station with its after expansion, the work simply of the
adventurer seeking gain, was in its reasons and essence the same as
the elaborately organized and chartered colony. In both cases the
mother-country had won a foothold in a foreign land, seeking a new
outlet for what it had to sell, a new sphere for its shipping, more
employment for its people, more comfort and wealth for itself.

The needs of commerce, however, were not all provided for when safety
had been secured at the far end of the road. The voyages were long
and dangerous, the seas often beset with enemies. In the most active
days of colonizing there prevailed on the sea a lawlessness the very
memory of which is now almost lost, and the days of settled peace
between maritime nations were few and far between. Thus arose the
demand for stations along the road, like the Cape of Good Hope, St.
Helena, and Mauritius, not primarily for trade, but for defence and
war; the demand for the possession of posts like Gibraltar, Malta,
Louisburg, at the entrance of the Gulf of St. Lawrence,--posts whose
value was chiefly strategic, though not necessarily wholly so.
Colonies and colonial posts were sometimes commercial, sometimes
military in their character; and it was exceptional that the same
position was equally important in both points of view, as New York
was.

In these three things--production, with the necessity of exchanging
products, shipping, whereby the exchange is carried on, and colonies,
which facilitate and enlarge the operations of shipping and tend to
protect it by multiplying points of safety--is to be found the key to
much of the history, as well as of the policy, of nations bordering
upon the sea. The policy has varied both with the spirit of the age
and with the character and clear-sightedness of the rulers; but the
history of the seaboard nations has been less determined by the
shrewdness and foresight of governments than by conditions of
position, extent, configuration, number and character of their
people,--by what are called, in a word, natural conditions. It must
however be admitted, and will be seen, that the wise or unwise action
of individual men has at certain periods had a great modifying
influence upon the growth of sea power in the broad sense, which
includes not only the military strength afloat, that rules the sea or
any part of it by force of arms, but also the peaceful commerce and
shipping from which alone a military fleet naturally and healthfully
springs, and on which it securely rests.

The principal conditions affecting the sea power of nations may be
enumerated as follows: I. Geographical Position. II. Physical
Conformation, including, as connected therewith, natural productions
and climate. III. Extent of Territory. IV. Number of Population. V.
Character of the People. VI. Character of the Government, including
therein the national institutions.


I. _Geographical Position._--It may be pointed out, in the first
place, that if a nation be so situated that it is neither forced to
defend itself by land nor induced to seek extension of its territory
by way of the land, it has, by the very unity of its aim directed upon
the sea, an advantage as compared with a people one of whose
boundaries is continental. This has been a great advantage to England
over both France and Holland as a sea power. The strength of the
latter was early exhausted by the necessity of keeping up a large army
and carrying on expensive wars to preserve her independence; while the
policy of France was constantly diverted, sometimes wisely and
sometimes most foolishly, from the sea to projects of continental
extension. These military efforts expended wealth; whereas a wiser and
consistent use of her geographical position would have added to it.

The geographical position may be such as of itself to promote a
concentration, or to necessitate a dispersion, of the naval forces.
Here again the British Islands have an advantage over France. The
position of the latter, touching the Mediterranean as well as the
ocean, while it has its advantages, is on the whole a source of
military weakness at sea. The eastern and western French fleets have
only been able to unite after passing through the Straits of
Gibraltar, in attempting which they have often risked and sometimes
suffered loss. The position of the United States upon the two oceans
would be either a source of great weakness or a cause of enormous
expense, had it a large sea commerce on both coasts.

England, by her immense colonial empire, has sacrificed much of this
advantage of concentration of force around her own shores; but the
sacrifice was wisely made, for the gain was greater than the loss, as
the event proved. With the growth of her colonial system her war
fleets also grew, but her merchant shipping and wealth grew yet
faster. Still, in the wars of the American Revolution, and of the
French Republic and Empire, to use the strong expression of a French
author, "England, despite the immense development of her navy, seemed
ever, in the midst of riches, to feel all the embarrassment of
poverty." The might of England was sufficient to keep alive the heart
and the members; whereas the equally extensive colonial empire of
Spain, through her maritime weakness, but offered so many points for
insult and injury.

The geographical position of a country may not only favor the
concentration of its forces, but give the further strategic advantage
of a central position and a good base for hostile operations against
its probable enemies. This again is the case with England; on the one
hand she faces Holland and the northern powers, on the other France
and the Atlantic. When threatened with a coalition between France and
the naval powers of the North Sea and the Baltic, as she at times was,
her fleets in the Downs and in the Channel, and even that off Brest,
occupied interior positions, and thus were readily able to interpose
their united force against either one of the enemies which should seek
to pass through the Channel to effect a junction with its ally. On
either side, also, Nature gave her better ports and a safer coast to
approach. Formerly this was a very serious element in the passage
through the Channel; but of late, steam and the improvement of her
harbors have lessened the disadvantage under which France once
labored. In the days of sailing-ships, the English fleet operated
against Brest making its base at Torbay and Plymouth. The plan was
simply this: in easterly or moderate weather the blockading fleet kept
its position without difficulty; but in westerly gales, when too
severe, they bore up for English ports, knowing that the French fleet
could not get out till the wind shifted, which equally served to bring
them back to their station.

The advantage of geographical nearness to an enemy, or to the object
of attack, is nowhere more apparent than in that form of warfare
which has lately received the name of commerce-destroying, which the
French call _guerre de course_. This operation of war, being directed
against peaceful merchant vessels which are usually defenceless, calls
for ships of small military force. Such ships, having little power to
defend themselves, need a refuge or point of support near at hand;
which will be found either in certain parts of the sea controlled by
the fighting ships of their country, or in friendly harbors. The
latter give the strongest support, because they are always in the same
place, and the approaches to them are more familiar to the
commerce-destroyer than to his enemy. The nearness of France to
England has thus greatly facilitated her _guerre de course_ directed
against the latter. Having ports on the North Sea, on the Channel, and
on the Atlantic, her cruisers started from points near the focus of
English trade, both coming and going. The distance of these ports from
each other, disadvantageous for regular military combinations, is an
advantage for this irregular secondary operation; for the essence of
the one is concentration of effort, whereas for commerce-destroying
diffusion of effort is the rule. Commerce-destroyers scatter, that
they may see and seize more prey. These truths receive illustration
from the history of the great French privateers, whose bases and
scenes of action were largely on the Channel and North Sea, or else
were found in distant colonial regions, where islands like Guadaloupe
and Martinique afforded similar near refuge. The necessity of renewing
coal makes the cruiser of the present day even more dependent than of
old on his port. Public opinion in the United States has great faith
in war directed against an enemy's commerce; but it must be remembered
that the Republic has no ports very near the great centres of trade
abroad. Her geographical position is therefore singularly
disadvantageous for carrying on successful commerce-destroying, unless
she find bases in the ports of an ally.

If, in addition to facility for offence, Nature has so placed a
country that it has easy access to the high sea itself, while at the
same time it controls one of the great thoroughfares of the world's
traffic, it is evident that the strategic value of its position is
very high. Such again is, and to a greater degree was, the position of
England. The trade of Holland, Sweden, Russia, Denmark, and that which
went up the great rivers to the interior of Germany, had to pass
through the Channel close by her doors; for sailing-ships hugged the
English coast. This northern trade had, moreover, a peculiar bearing
upon sea power; for naval stores, as they are commonly called, were
mainly drawn from the Baltic countries.

But for the loss of Gibraltar, the position of Spain would have been
closely analogous to that of England. Looking at once upon the
Atlantic and the Mediterranean, with Cadiz on the one side and
Cartagena on the other, the trade to the Levant must have passed under
her hands, and that round the Cape of Good Hope not far from her
doors. But Gibraltar not only deprived her of the control of the
Straits, it also imposed an obstacle to the easy junction of the two
divisions of her fleet.

At the present day, looking only at the geographical position of
Italy, and not at the other conditions affecting her sea power, it
would seem that with her extensive sea-coast and good ports she is
very well placed for exerting a decisive influence on the trade route
to the Levant and by the Isthmus of Suez. This is true in a degree,
and would be much more so did Italy now hold all the islands naturally
Italian; but with Malta in the hands of England, and Corsica in those
of France, the advantages of her geographical position are largely
neutralized. From race affinities and situation those two islands are
as legitimately objects of desire to Italy as Gibraltar is to Spain.
If the Adriatic were a great highway of commerce, Italy's position
would be still more influential. These defects in her geographical
completeness, combined with other causes injurious to a full and
secure development of sea power, make it more than doubtful whether
Italy can for some time be in the front rank among the sea nations.

As the aim here is not an exhaustive discussion, but merely an
attempt to show, by illustration, how vitally the situation of a
country may affect its career upon the sea, this division of the
subject may be dismissed for the present; the more so as instances
which will further bring out its importance will continually recur in
the historical treatment. Two remarks, however, are here appropriate.

Circumstances have caused the Mediterranean Sea to play a greater part
in the history of the world, both in a commercial and a military point
of view, than any other sheet of water of the same size. Nation after
nation has striven to control it, and the strife still goes on.
Therefore a study of the conditions upon which preponderance in its
waters has rested, and now rests, and of the relative military values
of different points upon its coasts, will be more instructive than the
same amount of effort expended in another field. Furthermore, it has
at the present time a very marked analogy in many respects to the
Caribbean Sea,--an analogy which will be still closer if a Panama
canal-route ever be completed. A study of the strategic conditions of
the Mediterranean, which have received ample illustration, will be an
excellent prelude to a similar study of the Caribbean, which has
comparatively little history.

The second remark bears upon the geographical position of the United
States relatively to a Central-American canal. If one be made, and
fulfil the hopes of its builders, the Caribbean will be changed from a
terminus, and place of local traffic, or at best a broken and
imperfect line of travel, as it now is, into one of the great highways
of the world. Along this path a great commerce will travel, bringing
the interests of the other great nations, the European nations, close
along our shores, as they have never been before. With this it will
not be so easy as heretofore to stand aloof from international
complications. The position of the United States with reference to
this route will resemble that of England to the Channel, and of the
Mediterranean countries to the Suez route. As regards influence and
control over it, depending upon geographical position, it is of course
plain that the centre of the national power, the permanent base,[7]
is much nearer than that of other great nations. The positions now or
hereafter occupied by them on island or mainland, however strong, will
be but outposts of their power; while in all the raw materials of
military strength no nation is superior to the United States. She is,
however, weak in a confessed unpreparedness for war; and her
geographical nearness to the point of contention loses some of its
value by the character of the Gulf coast, which is deficient in ports
combining security from an enemy with facility for repairing war-ships
of the first class, without which ships no country can pretend to
control any part of the sea. In case of a contest for supremacy in the
Caribbean, it seems evident from the depth of the South Pass of the
Mississippi, the nearness of New Orleans, and the advantages of the
Mississippi Valley for water transit, that the main effort of the
country must pour down that valley, and its permanent base of
operations be found there. The defence of the entrance to the
Mississippi, however, presents peculiar difficulties; while the only
two rival ports, Key West and Pensacola, have too little depth of
water, and are much less advantageously placed with reference to the
resources of the country. To get the full benefit of superior
geographical position, these defects must be overcome. Furthermore, as
her distance from the Isthmus, though relatively less, is still
considerable, the United States will have to obtain in the Caribbean
stations fit for contingent, or secondary, bases of operations; which
by their natural advantages, susceptibility of defence, and nearness
to the central strategic issue, will enable her fleets to remain as
near the scene as any opponent. With ingress and egress from the
Mississippi sufficiently protected, with such outposts in her hands,
and with the communications between them and the home base secured, in
short, with proper military preparation, for which she has all
necessary means, the preponderance of the United States on this field
follows, from her geographical position and her power, with
mathematical certainty.


II. _Physical Conformation._--The peculiar features of the Gulf coast,
just alluded to, come properly under the head of Physical Conformation
of a country, which is placed second for discussion among the
conditions which affect the development of sea power.

The seaboard of a country is one of its frontiers; and the easier the
access offered by the frontier to the region beyond, in this case the
sea, the greater will be the tendency of a people toward intercourse
with the rest of the world by it. If a country be imagined having a
long seaboard, but entirely without a harbor, such a country can have
no sea trade of its own, no shipping, no navy. This was practically
the case with Belgium when it was a Spanish and an Austrian province.
The Dutch, in 1648, as a condition of peace after a successful war,
exacted that the Scheldt should be closed to sea commerce. This closed
the harbor of Antwerp and transferred the sea trade of Belgium to
Holland. The Spanish Netherlands ceased to be a sea power.

Numerous and deep harbors are a source of strength and wealth, and
doubly so if they are the outlets of navigable streams, which
facilitate the concentration in them of a country's internal trade;
but by their very accessibility they become a source of weakness in
war, if not properly defended. The Dutch in 1667 found little
difficulty in ascending the Thames and burning a large fraction of the
English navy within sight of London; whereas a few years later the
combined fleets of England and France, when attempting a landing in
Holland, were foiled by the difficulties of the coast as much as by
the valor of the Dutch fleet. In 1778 the harbor of New York, and with
it undisputed control of the Hudson River, would have been lost to the
English, who were caught at disadvantage, but for the hesitancy of the
French admiral. With that control, New England would have been
restored to close and safe communication with New York, New Jersey,
and Pennsylvania; and this blow, following so closely on Burgoyne's
disaster of the year before, would probably have led the English to
make an earlier peace. The Mississippi is a mighty source of wealth
and strength to the United States; but the feeble defences of its
mouth and the number of its subsidiary streams penetrating the country
made it a weakness and source of disaster to the Southern Confederacy.
And lastly, in 1814, the occupation of the Chesapeake and the
destruction of Washington gave a sharp lesson of the dangers incurred
through the noblest water-ways, if their approaches be undefended; a
lesson recent enough to be easily recalled, but which, from the
present appearance of the coast defences, seems to be yet more easily
forgotten. Nor should it be thought that conditions have changed;
circumstances and details of offence and defence have been modified,
in these days as before, but the great conditions remain the same.

Before and during the great Napoleonic wars, France had no port for
ships-of-the-line east of Brest. How great the advantage to England,
which in the same stretch has two great arsenals, at Plymouth and at
Portsmouth, besides other harbors of refuge and supply. This defect of
conformation has since been remedied by the works at Cherbourg.

Besides the contour of the coast, involving easy access to the sea,
there are other physical conditions which lead people to the sea or
turn them from it. Although France was deficient in military ports on
the Channel, she had both there and on the ocean, as well as in the
Mediterranean, excellent harbors, favorably situated for trade abroad,
and at the outlet of large rivers, which would foster internal
traffic. But when Richelieu had put an end to civil war, Frenchmen did
not take to the sea with the eagerness and success of the English and
Dutch. A principal reason for this has been plausibly found in the
physical conditions which have made France a pleasant land, with a
delightful climate, producing within itself more than its people
needed. England, on the other hand, received from Nature but little,
and, until her manufactures were developed, had little to export.
Their many wants, combined with their restless activity and other
conditions that favored maritime enterprise, led her people abroad;
and they there found lands more pleasant and richer than their own.
Their needs and genius made them merchants and colonists, then
manufacturers and producers; and between products and colonies
shipping is the inevitable link. So their sea power grew. But if
England was drawn to the sea, Holland was driven to it; without the
sea England languished, but Holland died. In the height of her
greatness, when she was one of the chief factors in European politics,
a competent native authority estimated that the soil of Holland could
not support more than one eighth of her inhabitants. The manufactures
of the country were then numerous and important, but they had been
much later in their growth than the shipping interest. The poverty of
the soil and the exposed nature of the coast drove the Dutch first to
fishing. Then the discovery of the process of curing the fish gave
them material for export as well as home consumption, and so laid the
corner-stone of their wealth. Thus they had become traders at the time
that the Italian republics, under the pressure of Turkish power and
the discovery of the passage round the Cape of Good Hope, were
beginning to decline, and they fell heirs to the great Italian trade
of the Levant. Further favored by their geographical position,
intermediate between the Baltic, France, and the Mediterranean, and at
the mouth of the German rivers, they quickly absorbed nearly all the
carrying-trade of Europe. The wheat and naval stores of the Baltic,
the trade of Spain with her colonies in the New World, the wines of
France, and the French coasting-trade were, little more than two
hundred years ago, transported in Dutch shipping. Much of the
carrying-trade of England, even, was then done in Dutch bottoms. It
will not be pretended that all this prosperity proceeded only from the
poverty of Holland's natural resources. Something does not grow from
nothing. What is true, is, that by the necessitous condition of her
people they were driven to the sea, and were, from their mastery of
the shipping business and the size of their fleets, in a position to
profit by the sudden expansion of commerce and the spirit of
exploration which followed on the discovery of America and of the
passage round the Cape. Other causes concurred, but their whole
prosperity stood on the sea power to which their poverty gave birth.
Their food, their clothing, the raw material for their manufactures,
the very timber and hemp with which they built and rigged their ships
(and they built nearly as many as all Europe besides), were imported;
and when a disastrous war with England in 1653 and 1654 had lasted
eighteen months, and their shipping business was stopped, it is said
"the sources of revenue which had always maintained the riches of the
State, such as fisheries and commerce, were almost dry. Workshops were
closed, work was suspended. The Zuyder Zee became a forest of masts;
the country was full of beggars; grass grew in the streets, and in
Amsterdam fifteen hundred houses were untenanted." A humiliating peace
alone saved them from ruin.

This sorrowful result shows the weakness of a country depending wholly
upon sources external to itself for the part it is playing in the
world. With large deductions, owing to differences of conditions which
need not here be spoken of, the case of Holland then has strong points
of resemblance to that of Great Britain now; and they are true
prophets, though they seem to be having small honor in their own
country, who warn her that the continuance of her prosperity at home
depends primarily upon maintaining her power abroad. Men may be
discontented at the lack of political privilege; they will be yet more
uneasy if they come to lack bread. It is of more interest to Americans
to note that the result to France, regarded as a power of the sea,
caused by the extent, delightfulness, and richness of the land, has
been reproduced in the United States. In the beginning, their
forefathers held a narrow strip of land upon the sea, fertile in parts
though little developed, abounding in harbors and near rich
fishing-grounds. These physical conditions combined with an inborn
love of the sea, the pulse of that English blood which still beat in
their veins, to keep alive all those tendencies and pursuits upon
which a healthy sea power depends. Almost every one of the original
colonies was on the sea or on one of its great tributaries. All export
and import tended toward one coast. Interest in the sea and an
intelligent appreciation of the part it played in the public welfare
were easily and widely spread; and a motive more influential than care
for the public interest was also active, for the abundance of
ship-building materials and a relative fewness of other investments
made shipping a profitable private interest. How changed the present
condition is, all know. The centre of power is no longer on the
seaboard. Books and newspapers vie with one another in describing the
wonderful growth, and the still undeveloped riches, of the interior.
Capital there finds its best investments, labor its largest
opportunities. The frontiers are neglected and politically weak; the
Gulf and Pacific coasts actually so, the Atlantic coast relatively to
the central Mississippi Valley. When the day comes that shipping again
pays, when the three sea frontiers find that they are not only
militarily weak, but poorer for lack of national shipping, their
united efforts may avail to lay again the foundations of our sea
power. Till then, those who follow the limitations which lack of sea
power placed upon the career of France may mourn that their own
country is being led, by a like redundancy of home wealth, into the
same neglect of that great instrument.

Among modifying physical conditions may be noted a form like that of
Italy,--a long peninsula, with a central range of mountains dividing
it into two narrow strips, along which the roads connecting the
different ports necessarily run. Only an absolute control of the sea
can wholly secure such communications, since it is impossible to know
at what point an enemy coming from beyond the visible horizon may
strike; but still, with an adequate naval force centrally posted,
there will be good hope of attacking his fleet, which is at once his
base and line of communications, before serious damage has been done.
The long, narrow peninsula of Florida, with Key West at its
extremity, though flat and thinly populated, presents at first sight
conditions like those of Italy. The resemblance may be only
superficial, but it seems probable that if the chief scene of a naval
war were the Gulf of Mexico, the communications by land to the end of
the peninsula might be a matter of consequence, and open to attack.

When the sea not only borders, or surrounds, but also separates a
country into two or more parts, the control of it becomes not only
desirable, but vitally necessary. Such a physical condition either
gives birth and strength to sea power, or makes the country powerless.
Such is the condition of the present kingdom of Italy, with its
islands of Sardinia and Sicily; and hence in its youth and still
existing financial weakness it is seen to put forth such vigorous and
intelligent efforts to create a military navy. It has even been argued
that, with a navy decidedly superior to her enemy's, Italy could
better base her power upon her islands than upon her mainland; for the
insecurity of the lines of communication in the peninsula, already
pointed out, would most seriously embarrass an invading army
surrounded by a hostile people and threatened from the sea.

The Irish Sea, separating the British Islands, rather resembles an
estuary than an actual division; but history has shown the danger
from it to the United Kingdom. In the days of Louis XIV., when the
French navy nearly equalled the combined English and Dutch, the
gravest complications existed in Ireland, which passed almost wholly
under the control of the natives and the French. Nevertheless, the
Irish Sea was rather a danger to the English--a weak point in their
communications--than an advantage to the French. The latter did not
venture their ships-of-the-line in its narrow waters, and expeditions
intending to land were directed upon the ocean ports in the south and
west. At the supreme moment the great French fleet was sent upon the
south coast of England, where it decisively defeated the allies, and
at the same time twenty-five frigates were sent to St. George's
Channel, against the English communications. In the midst of a
hostile people, the English army in Ireland was seriously imperilled,
but was saved by the battle of the Boyne and the flight of James II.
This movement against the enemy's communications was strictly
strategic, and would be just as dangerous to England now as in 1690.

Spain, in the same century, afforded an impressive lesson of the
weakness caused by such separation when the parts are not knit
together by a strong sea power. She then still retained, as remnants
of her past greatness, the Netherlands (now Belgium), Sicily, and
other Italian possessions, not to speak of her vast colonies in the
New World. Yet so low had the Spanish sea power fallen, that a
well-informed and sober-minded Hollander of the day could claim that
"in Spain all the coast is navigated by a few Dutch ships; and since
the peace of 1648 their ships and seamen are so few that they have
publicly begun to hire our ships to sail to the Indies, whereas they
were formerly careful to exclude all foreigners from there.... It is
manifest," he goes on, "that the West Indies, being as the stomach to
Spain (for from it nearly all the revenue is drawn), must be joined to
the Spanish head by a sea force; and that Naples and the Netherlands,
being like two arms, they cannot lay out their strength for Spain, nor
receive anything thence but by shipping,--all which may easily be done
by our shipping in peace, and by it obstructed in war." Half a century
before, Sully, the great minister of Henry IV., had characterized
Spain "as one of those States whose legs and arms are strong and
powerful, but the heart infinitely weak and feeble." Since his day the
Spanish navy had suffered not only disaster, but annihilation; not
only humiliation, but degradation. The consequences briefly were that
shipping was destroyed; manufactures perished with it. The government
depended for its support, not upon a wide-spread healthy commerce and
industry that could survive many a staggering blow, but upon a narrow
stream of silver trickling through a few treasure-ships from America,
easily and frequently intercepted by an enemy's cruisers. The loss of
half a dozen galleons more than once paralyzed its movements for a
year. While the war in the Netherlands lasted, the Dutch control of
the sea forced Spain to send her troops by a long and costly journey
overland instead of by sea; and the same cause reduced her to such
straits for necessaries that, by a mutual arrangement which seems very
odd to modern ideas, her wants were supplied by Dutch ships, which
thus maintained the enemies of their country, but received in return
specie which was welcome in the Amsterdam exchange. In America, the
Spanish protected themselves as best they might behind masonry,
unaided from home; while in the Mediterranean they escaped insult and
injury mainly through the indifference of the Dutch, for the French
and English had not yet begun to contend for mastery there. In the
course of history the Netherlands, Naples, Sicily, Minorca, Havana,
Manila, and Jamaica were wrenched away, at one time or another, from
this empire without a shipping. In short, while Spain's maritime
impotence may have been primarily a symptom of her general decay, it
became a marked factor in precipitating her into the abyss from which
she has not yet wholly emerged.

Except Alaska, the United States has no outlying possession,--no foot
of ground inaccessible by land. Its contour is such as to present few
points specially weak from their saliency, and all important parts of
the frontiers can be readily attained,--cheaply by water, rapidly by
rail. The weakest frontier, the Pacific, is far removed from the most
dangerous of possible enemies. The internal resources are boundless as
compared with present needs; we can live off ourselves indefinitely in
"our little corner," to use the expression of a French officer to the
author. Yet should that little corner be invaded by a new commercial
route through the Isthmus, the United States in her turn may have the
rude awakening of those who have abandoned their share in the common
birthright of all people, the sea.


III. _Extent of Territory._--The last of the conditions affecting the
development of a nation as a sea power, and touching the country
itself as distinguished from the people who dwell there, is Extent of
Territory. This may be dismissed with comparatively few words.

As regards the development of sea power, it is not the total number of
square miles which a country contains, but the length of its
coast-line and the character of its harbors that are to be considered.
As to these it is to be said that, the geographical and physical
conditions being the same, extent of sea-coast is a source of strength
or weakness according as the population is large or small. A country
is in this like a fortress; the garrison must be proportioned to the
_enceinte_. A recent familiar instance is found in the American War of
Secession. Had the South had a people as numerous as it was warlike,
and a navy commensurate to its other resources as a sea power, the
great extent of its sea-coast and its numerous inlets would have been
elements of great strength. The people of the United States and the
Government of that day justly prided themselves on the effectiveness
of the blockade of the whole Southern coast. It was a great feat, a
very great feat; but it would have been an impossible feat had the
Southerners been more numerous, and a nation of seamen. What was there
shown was not, as has been said, how such a blockade can be
maintained, but that such a blockade is possible in the face of a
population not only unused to the sea, but also scanty in numbers.
Those who recall how the blockade was maintained, and the class of
ships that blockaded during great part of the war, know that the plan,
correct under the circumstances, could not have been carried out in
the face of a real navy. Scattered unsupported along the coast, the
United States ships kept their places, singly or in small detachments,
in face of an extensive network of inland water communications which
favored secret concentration of the enemy. Behind the first line of
water communications were long estuaries, and here and there strong
fortresses, upon either of which the enemy's ships could always fall
back to elude pursuit or to receive protection. Had there been a
Southern navy to profit by such advantages, or by the scattered
condition of the United States ships, the latter could not have been
distributed as they were; and being forced to concentrate for mutual
support, many small but useful approaches would have been left open to
commerce. But as the Southern coast, from its extent and many inlets,
might have been a source of strength, so, from those very
characteristics, it became a fruitful source of injury. The great
story of the opening of the Mississippi is but the most striking
illustration of an action that was going on incessantly all over the
South. At every breach of the sea frontier, war-ships were entering.
The streams that had carried the wealth and supported the trade of the
seceding States turned against them, and admitted their enemies to
their hearts. Dismay, insecurity, paralysis, prevailed in regions that
might, under happier auspices, have kept a nation alive through the
most exhausting war. Never did sea power play a greater or a more
decisive part than in the contest which determined that the course of
the world's history would be modified by the existence of one great
nation, instead of several rival States, in the North American
continent. But while just pride is felt in the well-earned glory of
those days, and the greatness of the results due to naval
preponderance is admitted, Americans who understand the facts should
never fail to remind the over-confidence of their countrymen that the
South not only had no navy, not only was not a seafaring people, but
that also its population was not proportioned to the extent of the
sea-coast which it had to defend.


IV. _Number of Population._--After the consideration of the natural
conditions of a country should follow an examination of the
characteristics of its population as affecting the development of sea
power; and first among these will be taken, because of its relations
to the extent of the territory, which has just been discussed, the
number of the people who live in it. It has been said that in respect
of dimensions it is not merely the number of square miles, but the
extent and character of the sea-coast that is to be considered with
reference to sea power; and so, in point of population, it is not only
the grand total, but the number following the sea, or at least readily
available for employment on ship-board and for the creation of naval
material, that must be counted.

For example, formerly and up to the end of the great wars following
the French Revolution, the population of France was much greater than
that of England; but in respect of sea power in general, peaceful
commerce as well as military efficiency, France was much inferior to
England. In the matter of military efficiency this fact is the more
remarkable because at times, in point of military preparation at the
outbreak of war, France had the advantage; but she was not able to
keep it. Thus in 1778, when war broke out, France, through her
maritime inscription, was able to man at once fifty ships-of-the-line.
England, on the contrary, by reason of the dispersal over the globe of
that very shipping on which her naval strength so securely rested, had
much trouble in manning forty at home; but in 1782 she had one hundred
and twenty in commission or ready for commission, while France had
never been able to exceed seventy-one. Again, as late as 1840, when
the two nations were on the verge of war in the Levant, a most
accomplished French officer of the day, while extolling the high state
of efficiency of the French fleet and the eminent qualities of its
admiral, and expressing confidence in the results of an encounter with
an equal enemy, goes on to say: "Behind the squadron of twenty-one
ships-of-the-line which we could then assemble, there was no reserve;
not another ship could have been commissioned within six months." And
this was due not only to lack of ships and of proper equipments,
though both were wanting. "Our maritime inscription," he continues,
"was so exhausted by what we had done [in manning twenty-one ships],
that the permanent levy established in all quarters did not supply
reliefs for the men, who were already more than three years on
cruise."

A contrast such as this shows a difference in what is called staying
power, or reserve force, which is even greater than appears on the
surface; for a great shipping afloat necessarily employs, besides the
crews, a large number of people engaged in the various handicrafts
which facilitate the making and repairing of naval material, or
following other callings more or less closely connected with the water
and with craft of all kinds. Such kindred callings give an undoubted
aptitude for the sea from the outset. There is an anecdote showing
curious insight into this matter on the part of one of England's
distinguished seamen, Sir Edward Pellew. When the war broke out in
1793, the usual scarceness of seamen was met. Eager to get to sea and
unable to fill his complement otherwise than with landsmen, he
instructed his officers to seek for Cornish miners; reasoning from the
conditions and dangers of their calling, of which he had personal
knowledge, that they would quickly fit into the demands of sea life.
The result showed his sagacity, for, thus escaping an otherwise
unavoidable delay, he was fortunate enough to capture the first
frigate taken in the war in single combat; and what is especially
instructive is, that although but a few weeks in commission, while his
opponent had been over a year, the losses, heavy on both sides, were
nearly equal.

It may be urged that such reserve strength has now nearly lost the
importance it once had, because modern ships and weapons take so long
to make, and because modern States aim at developing the whole power
of their armed force, on the outbreak of war, with such rapidity as to
strike a disabling blow before the enemy can organize an equal effort.
To use a familiar phrase, there will not be time for the whole
resistance of the national fabric to come into play; the blow will
fall on the organized military fleet, and if that yield, the solidity
of the rest of the structure will avail nothing. To a certain extent
this is true; but then it has always been true, though to a less
extent formerly than now. Granted the meeting of two fleets which
represent practically the whole present strength of their two nations,
if one of them be destroyed, while the other remains fit for action,
there will be much less hope now than formerly that the vanquished
can restore his navy for that war; and the result will be disastrous
just in proportion to the dependence of the nation upon her sea power.
A Trafalgar would have been a much more fatal blow to England than it
was to France, had the English fleet then represented, as the allied
fleet did, the bulk of the nation's power. Trafalgar in such a case
would have been to England what Austerlitz was to Austria, and Jena to
Prussia; an empire would have been laid prostrate by the destruction
or disorganization of its military forces, which, it is said, were the
favorite objective of Napoleon.

But does the consideration of such exceptional disasters in the past
justify the putting a low value upon that reserve strength, based upon
the number of inhabitants fitted for a certain kind of military life,
which is here being considered? The blows just mentioned were dealt by
men of exceptional genius, at the head of armed bodies of exceptional
training, _esprit-de-corps_, and prestige, and were, besides,
inflicted upon opponents more or less demoralized by conscious
inferiority and previous defeat. Austerlitz had been closely preceded
by Ulm, where thirty thousand Austrians laid down their arms without a
battle; and the history of the previous years had been one long record
of Austrian reverse and French success. Trafalgar followed closely
upon a cruise, justly called a campaign, of almost constant failure;
and farther back, but still recent, were the memories of St. Vincent
for the Spaniards, and of the Nile for the French, in the allied
fleet. Except the case of Jena, these crushing overthrows were not
single disasters, but final blows; and in the Jena campaign there was
a disparity in numbers, equipment, and general preparation for war,
which makes it less applicable in considering what may result from a
single victory.

England is at the present time the greatest maritime nation in the
world; in steam and iron she has kept the superiority she had in the
days of sail and wood. France and England are the two powers that have
the largest military navies; and it is so far an open question which
of the two is the more powerful, that they may be regarded as
practically of equal strength in material for a sea war. In the case
of a collision can there be assumed such a difference of _personnel_,
or of preparation, as to make it probable that a decisive inequality
will result from one battle or one campaign? If not, the reserve
strength will begin to tell; organized reserve first, then reserve of
seafaring population, reserve of mechanical skill, reserve of wealth.
It seems to have been somewhat forgotten that England's leadership in
mechanical arts gives her a reserve of mechanics, who can easily
familiarize themselves with the appliances of modern iron-clads; and
as her commerce and industries feel the burden of the war, the surplus
of seamen and mechanics will go to the armed shipping.

The whole question of the value of a reserve, developed or
undeveloped, amounts now to this: Have modern conditions of warfare
made it probable that, of two nearly equal adversaries, one will be so
prostrated in a single campaign that a decisive result will be reached
in that time? Sea warfare has given no answer. The crushing successes
of Prussia against Austria, and of Germany against France, appear to
have been those of a stronger over a much weaker nation, whether the
weakness were due to natural causes, or to official incompetency. How
would a delay like that of Plevna have affected the fortune of war,
had Turkey had any reserve of national power upon which to call?

If time be, as is everywhere admitted, a supreme factor in war, it
behooves countries whose genius is essentially not military, whose
people, like all free people, object to pay for large military
establishments, to see to it that they are at least strong enough to
gain the time necessary to turn the spirit and capacity of their
subjects into the new activities which war calls for. If the existing
force by land or sea is strong enough so to hold out, even though at a
disadvantage, the country may rely upon its natural resources and
strength coming into play for whatever they are worth,--its numbers,
its wealth, its capacities of every kind. If, on the other hand, what
force it has can be overthrown and crushed quickly, the most
magnificent possibilities of natural power will not save it from
humiliating conditions, nor, if its foe be wise, from guarantees which
will postpone revenge to a distant future. The story is constantly
repeated on the smaller fields of war: "If so-and-so can hold out a
little longer, this can be saved or that can be done;" as in sickness
it is often said: "If the patient can only hold out so long, the
strength of his constitution may pull him through."

England to some extent is now such a country. Holland was such a
country; she would not pay, and if she escaped, it was but by the skin
of her teeth. "Never in time of peace and from fear of a rupture,"
wrote their great statesman, De Witt, "will they take resolutions
strong enough to lead them to pecuniary sacrifices beforehand. The
character of the Dutch is such that, unless danger stares them in the
face, they are indisposed to lay out money for their own defence. I
have to do with a people who, liberal to profusion where they ought to
economize, are often sparing to avarice where they ought to spend."

That our own country is open to the same reproach, is patent to all
the world. The United States has not that shield of defensive power
behind which time can be gained to develop its reserve of strength. As
for a seafaring population adequate to her possible needs, where is
it? Such a resource, proportionate to her coast-line and population,
is to be found only in a national merchant shipping and its related
industries, which at present scarcely exist. It will matter little
whether the crews of such ships are native or foreign born, provided
they are attached to the flag, and her power at sea is sufficient to
enable the most of them to get back in case of war. When foreigners by
thousands are admitted to the ballot, it is of little moment that they
are given fighting-room on board ship.

Though the treatment of the subject has been somewhat discursive, it
may be admitted that a great population following callings related to
the sea is, now as formerly, a great element of sea power; that the
United States is deficient in that element; and that its foundations
can be laid only in a large commerce under her own flag.


V. _National Character._--The effect of national character and
aptitudes upon the development of sea power will next be considered.

If sea power be really based upon a peaceful and extensive commerce,
aptitude for commercial pursuits must be a distinguishing feature of
the nations that have at one time or another been great upon the sea.
History almost without exception affirms that this is true. Save the
Romans, there is no marked instance to the contrary.

All men seek gain and, more or less, love money; but the way in which
gain is sought will have a marked effect upon the commercial fortunes
and the history of the people inhabiting a country.

If history may be believed, the way in which the Spaniards and their
kindred nation, the Portuguese, sought wealth, not only brought a blot
upon the national character, but was also fatal to the growth of a
healthy commerce; and so to the industries upon which commerce lives,
and ultimately to that national wealth which was sought by mistaken
paths. The desire for gain rose in them to fierce avarice; so they
sought in the new-found worlds which gave such an impetus to the
commercial and maritime development of the countries of Europe, not
new fields of industry, not even the healthy excitement of exploration
and adventure, but gold and silver. They had many great qualities;
they were bold, enterprising, temperate, patient of suffering,
enthusiastic, and gifted with intense national feeling. When to these
qualities are added the advantages of Spain's position and
well-situated ports, the fact that she was first to occupy large and
rich portions of the new worlds and long remained without a
competitor, and that for a hundred years after the discovery of
America she was the leading State in Europe, she might have been
expected to take the foremost place among the sea powers. Exactly the
contrary was the result, as all know. Since the battle of Lepanto in
1571, though engaged in many wars, no sea victory of any consequence
shines on the pages of Spanish history; and the decay of her commerce
sufficiently accounts for the painful and sometimes ludicrous
inaptness shown on the decks of her ships of war. Doubtless such a
result is not to be attributed to one cause only. Doubtless the
government of Spain was in many ways such as to cramp and blight a
free and healthy development of private enterprise; but the character
of a great people breaks through or shapes the character of its
government, and it can hardly be doubted that had the bent of the
people been toward trade, the action of government would have been
drawn into the same current. The great field of the colonies, also,
was remote from the centre of that despotism which blighted the growth
of old Spain. As it was, thousands of Spaniards, of the working as
well as the upper classes, left Spain; and the occupations in which
they engaged abroad sent home little but specie, or merchandise of
small bulk, requiring but small tonnage. The mother-country herself
produced little but wool, fruit, and iron; her manufactures were
naught; her industries suffered; her population steadily decreased.
Both she and her colonies depended upon the Dutch for so many of the
necessaries of life, that the products of their scanty industries
could not suffice to pay for them. "So that Holland merchants," writes
a contemporary, "who carry money to most parts of the world to buy
commodities, must out of this single country of Europe carry home
money, which they receive in payment of their goods." Thus their
eagerly sought emblem of wealth passed quickly from their hands. It
has already been pointed out how weak, from a military point of view,
Spain was from this decay of her shipping. Her wealth being in small
bulk on a few ships, following more or less regular routes, was easily
seized by an enemy, and the sinews of war paralyzed; whereas the
wealth of England and Holland, scattered over thousands of ships in
all parts of the world, received many bitter blows in many exhausting
wars, without checking a growth which, though painful, was steady. The
fortunes of Portugal, united to Spain during a most critical period of
her history, followed the same downward path: although foremost in
the beginning of the race for development by sea, she fell utterly
behind. "The mines of Brazil were the ruin of Portugal, as those of
Mexico and Peru had been of Spain; all manufactures fell into insane
contempt; ere long the English supplied the Portuguese not only with
clothes, but with all merchandise, all commodities, even to salt-fish
and grain. After their gold, the Portuguese abandoned their very soil;
the vineyards of Oporto were finally bought by the English with
Brazilian gold, which had only passed through Portugal to be spread
throughout England." We are assured that in fifty years, five hundred
millions of dollars were extracted from "the mines of Brazil, and that
at the end of the time Portugal had but twenty-five millions in
specie,"--a striking example of the difference between real and
fictitious wealth.

The English and Dutch were no less desirous of gain than the southern
nations. Each in turn has been called "a nation of shopkeepers;" but
the jeer, in so far as it is just, is to the credit of their wisdom
and uprightness. They were no less bold, no less enterprising, no less
patient. Indeed, they were more patient, in that they sought riches
not by the sword but by labor, which is the reproach meant to be
implied by the epithet; for thus they took the longest, instead of
what seemed the shortest, road to wealth. But these two peoples,
radically of the same race, had other qualities, no less important
than those just named, which combined with their surroundings to favor
their development by sea. They were by nature business-men, traders,
producers, negotiators. Therefore both in their native country and
abroad, whether settled in the ports of civilized nations, or of
barbarous eastern rulers, or in colonies of their own foundation, they
everywhere strove to draw out all the resources of the land, to
develop and increase them. The quick instinct of the born trader,
shopkeeper if you will, sought continually new articles to exchange;
and this search, combined with the industrious character evolved
through generations of labor, made them necessarily producers. At home
they became great as manufacturers; abroad, where they controlled, the
land grew richer continually, products multiplied, and the necessary
exchange between home and the settlements called for more ships. Their
shipping therefore increased with these demands of trade, and nations
with less aptitude for maritime enterprise, even France herself, great
as she has been, called for their products and for the service of
their ships. Thus in many ways they advanced to power at sea. This
natural tendency and growth were indeed modified and seriously checked
at times by the interference of other governments, jealous of a
prosperity which their own people could invade only by the aid of
artificial support,--a support which will be considered under the head
of governmental action as affecting sea power.

The tendency to trade, involving of necessity the production of
something to trade with, is the national characteristic most important
to the development of sea power. Granting it and a good seaboard, it
is not likely that the dangers of the sea, or any aversion to it, will
deter a people from seeking wealth by the paths of ocean commerce.
Where wealth is sought by other means, it may be found; but it will
not necessarily lead to sea power. Take France. France has a fine
country, an industrious people, an admirable position. The French navy
has known periods of great glory, and in its lowest estate has never
dishonored the military reputation so dear to the nation. Yet as a
maritime State, securely resting upon a broad basis of sea commerce,
France, as compared with other historical sea-peoples, has never held
more than a respectable position. The chief reason for this, so far as
national character goes, is the way in which wealth is sought. As
Spain and Portugal sought it by digging gold out of the ground, the
temper of the French people leads them to seek it by thrift, economy,
hoarding. It is said to be harder to keep than to make a fortune.
Possibly; but the adventurous temper, which risks what it has to gain
more, has much in common with the adventurous spirit that conquers
worlds for commerce. The tendency to save and put aside, to venture
timidly and on a small scale, may lead to a general diffusion of
wealth on a like small scale, but not to the risks and development of
external trade and shipping interests. To illustrate,--and the
incident is given only for what it is worth,--a French officer,
speaking to the author about the Panama Canal, said: "I have two
shares in it. In France we don't do as you, where a few people take a
great many shares each. With us a large number of people take one
share or a very few. When these were in the market my wife said to me,
'You take two shares, one for you and one for me.'" As regards the
stability of a man's personal fortunes this kind of prudence is
doubtless wise; but when excessive prudence or financial timidity
becomes a national trait, it must tend to hamper the expansion of
commerce and of the nation's shipping. The same caution in money
matters, appearing in another relation of life, has checked the
production of children, and keeps the population of France nearly
stationary.

The noble classes of Europe inherited from the Middle Ages a
supercilious contempt for peaceful trade, which has exercised a
modifying influence upon its growth, according to the national
character of different countries. The pride of the Spaniards fell
easily in with this spirit of contempt, and co-operated with that
disastrous unwillingness to work and wait for wealth which turned them
away from commerce. In France, the vanity which is conceded even by
Frenchmen to be a national trait led in the same direction. The
numbers and brilliancy of the nobility, and the consideration enjoyed
by them, set a seal of inferiority upon an occupation which they
despised. Rich merchants and manufacturers sighed for the honors of
nobility, and upon obtaining them, abandoned their lucrative
professions. Therefore, while the industry of the people and the
fruitfulness of the soil saved commerce from total decay, it was
pursued under a sense of humiliation which caused its best
representatives to escape from it as soon as they could. Louis XIV.,
under the influence of Colbert, put forth an ordinance "authorizing
all noblemen to take an interest in merchant ships, goods and
merchandise, without being considered as having derogated from
nobility, provided they did not sell at retail;" and the reason given
for this action was, "that it imports the good of our subjects and our
own satisfaction, to efface the relic of a public opinion, universally
prevalent, that maritime commerce is incompatible with nobility." But
a prejudice involving conscious and open superiority is not readily
effaced by ordinances, especially when vanity is a conspicuous trait
in national character; and many years later Montesquieu taught that it
is contrary to the spirit of monarchy that the nobility should engage
in trade.

In Holland there was a nobility; but the State was republican in name,
allowed large scope to personal freedom and enterprise, and the
centres of power were in the great cities. The foundation of the
national greatness was money--or rather wealth. Wealth, as a source of
civic distinction, carried with it also power in the State; and with
power there went social position and consideration. In England the
same result obtained. The nobility were proud; but in a representative
government the power of wealth could be neither put down nor
overshadowed. It was patent to the eyes of all; it was honored by all;
and in England, as well as Holland, the occupations which were the
source of wealth shared in the honor given to wealth itself. Thus, in
all the countries named, social sentiment, the outcome of national
characteristics, had a marked influence upon the national attitude
toward trade.

In yet another way does the national genius affect the growth of sea
power in its broadest sense; and that is in so far as it possesses the
capacity for planting healthy colonies. Of colonization, as of all
other growths, it is true that it is most healthy when it is most
natural. Therefore colonies that spring from the felt wants and
natural impulses of a whole people will have the most solid
foundations; and their subsequent growth will be surest when they are
least trammelled from home, if the people have the genius for
independent action. Men of the past three centuries have keenly felt
the value to the mother-country of colonies as outlets for the home
products and as a nursery for commerce and shipping; but efforts at
colonization have not had the same general origin, nor have different
systems all had the same success. The efforts of statesmen, however
far-seeing and careful, have not been able to supply the lack of
strong natural impulse; nor can the most minute regulation from home
produce as good results as a happier neglect, when the germ of
self-development is found in the national character. There has been no
greater display of wisdom in the national administration of successful
colonies than in that of unsuccessful. Perhaps there has been even
less. If elaborate system and supervision, careful adaptation of means
to ends, diligent nursing, could avail for colonial growth, the genius
of England has less of this systematizing faculty than the genius of
France; but England, not France, has been the great colonizer of the
world. Successful colonization, with its consequent effect upon
commerce and sea power, depends essentially upon national character;
because colonies grow best when they grow of themselves, naturally.
The character of the colonist, not the care of the home government, is
the principle of the colony's growth.

This truth stands out the clearer because the general attitude of all
the home governments toward their colonies was entirely selfish.
However founded, as soon as it was recognized to be of consequence,
the colony became to the home country a cow to be milked; to be cared
for, of course, but chiefly as a piece of property valued for the
returns it gave. Legislation was directed toward a monopoly of its
external trade; the places in its government afforded posts of value
for occupants from the mother-country; and the colony was looked upon,
as the sea still so often is, as a fit place for those who were
ungovernable or useless at home. The military administration, however,
so long as it remains a colony, is the proper and necessary attribute
of the home government.

The fact of England's unique and wonderful success as a great
colonizing nation is too evident to be dwelt upon; and the reason for
it appears to lie chiefly in two traits of the national character.
The English colonist naturally and readily settles down in his new
country, identifies his interest with it, and though keeping an
affectionate remembrance of the home from which he came, has no
restless eagerness to return. In the second place, the Englishman at
once and instinctively seeks to develop the resources of the new
country in the broadest sense. In the former particular he differs
from the French, who were ever longingly looking back to the delights
of their pleasant land; in the latter, from the Spaniards, whose range
of interest and ambition was too narrow for the full evolution of the
possibilities of a new country.

The character and the necessities of the Dutch led them naturally to
plant colonies; and by the year 1650 they had in the East Indies, in
Africa, and in America a large number, only to name which would be
tedious. They were then far ahead of England in this matter. But
though the origin of these colonies, purely commercial in its
character, was natural, there seems to have been lacking to them a
principle of growth. "In planting them they never sought an extension
of empire, but merely an acquisition of trade and commerce. They
attempted conquest only when forced by the pressure of circumstances.
Generally they were content to trade under the protection of the
sovereign of the country." This placid satisfaction with gain alone,
unaccompanied by political ambition, tended, like the despotism of
France and Spain, to keep the colonies mere commercial dependencies
upon the mother-country, and so killed the natural principle of
growth.

Before quitting this head of the inquiry, it is well to ask how far
the national character of Americans is fitted to develop a great sea
power, should other circumstances become favorable.

It seems scarcely necessary, however, to do more than appeal to a not
very distant past to prove that, if legislative hindrances be removed,
and more remunerative fields of enterprise filled up, the sea power
will not long delay its appearance. The instinct for commerce, bold
enterprise in the pursuit of gain, and a keen scent for the trails
that lead to it, all exist; and if there be in the future any fields
calling for colonization, it cannot be doubted that Americans will
carry to them all their inherited aptitude for self-government and
independent growth.


VI. _Character of the Government._--In discussing the effects upon the
development of a nation's sea power exerted by its government and
institutions, it will be necessary to avoid a tendency to
over-philosophizing, to confine attention to obvious and immediate
causes and their plain results, without prying too far beneath the
surface for remote and ultimate influences.

Nevertheless, it must be noted that particular forms of government
with their accompanying institutions, and the character of rulers at
one time or another, have exercised a very marked influence upon the
development of sea power. The various traits of a country and its
people which have so far been considered constitute the natural
characteristics with which a nation, like a man, begins its career;
the conduct of the government in turn corresponds to the exercise of
the intelligent will-power, which, according as it is wise, energetic
and persevering, or the reverse, causes success or failure in a man's
life or a nation's history.

It would seem probable that a government in full accord with the
natural bias of its people would most successfully advance its growth
in every respect; and, in the matter of sea power, the most brilliant
successes have followed where there has been intelligent direction by
a government fully imbued with the spirit of the people and conscious
of its true general bent. Such a government is most certainly secured
when the will of the people, or of their best natural exponents, has
some large share in making it; but such free governments have
sometimes fallen short, while on the other hand despotic power,
wielded with judgment and consistency, has created at times a great
sea commerce and a brilliant navy with greater directness than can be
reached by the slower processes of a free people. The difficulty in
the latter case is to insure perseverance after the death of a
particular despot.

England having undoubtedly reached the greatest height of sea power of
any modern nation, the action of her government first claims
attention. In general direction this action has been consistent,
though often far from praiseworthy. It has aimed steadily at the
control of the sea. One of its most arrogant expressions dates back as
far as the reign of James I., when she had scarce any possessions
outside her own islands; before Virginia or Massachusetts was settled.
Here is Richelieu's account of it:--

    "The Duke of Sully, minister of Henry IV. [one of the most
    chivalrous princes that ever lived], having embarked at Calais
    in a French ship wearing the French flag at the main, was no
    sooner in the Channel than, meeting an English despatch-boat
    which was there to receive him, the commander of the latter
    ordered the French ship to lower her flag. The Duke, considering
    that his quality freed him from such an affront, boldly refused;
    but this refusal was followed by three cannon-shot, which,
    piercing his ship, pierced the heart likewise of all good
    Frenchmen. Might forced him to yield what right forbade, and for
    all the complaints he made he could get no better reply from the
    English captain than this: 'That just as his duty obliged him to
    honor the ambassador's rank, it also obliged him to exact the
    honor due to the flag of his master as sovereign of the sea.' If
    the words of King James himself were more polite, they
    nevertheless had no other effect than to compel the Duke to take
    counsel of his prudence, feigning to be satisfied, while his
    wound was all the time smarting and incurable. Henry the Great
    had to practise moderation on this occasion; but with the
    resolve another time to sustain the rights of his crown by the
    force that, with the aid of time, he should be able to put upon
    the sea."

This act of unpardonable insolence, according to modern ideas, was not
so much out of accord with the spirit of nations in that day. It is
chiefly noteworthy as the most striking, as well as one of the
earliest indications of the purpose of England to assert herself at
all risks upon the sea; and the insult was offered under one of her
most timid kings to an ambassador immediately representing the
bravest and ablest of French sovereigns. This empty honor of the flag,
a claim insignificant except as the outward manifestation of the
purpose of a government, was as rigidly exacted under Cromwell as
under the kings. It was one of the conditions of peace yielded by the
Dutch after their disastrous war of 1654. Cromwell, a despot in
everything but name, was keenly alive to all that concerned England's
honor and strength, and did not stop at barren salutes to promote
them. Hardly yet possessed of power, the English navy sprang rapidly
into a new life and vigor under his stern rule. England's rights, or
reparation for her wrongs, were demanded by her fleets throughout the
world,--in the Baltic, in the Mediterranean, against the Barbary
States, in the West Indies; and under him the conquest of Jamaica
began that extension of her empire, by force of arms, which has gone
on to our own days. Nor were equally strong peaceful measures for the
growth of English trade and shipping forgotten. Cromwell's celebrated
Navigation Act declared that all imports into England or her colonies
must be conveyed exclusively in vessels belonging to England herself,
or to the country in which the products carried were grown or
manufactured. This decree, aimed specially at the Dutch, the common
carriers of Europe, was resented throughout the commercial world; but
the benefit to England, in those days of national strife and
animosity, was so apparent that it lasted long under the monarchy. A
century and a quarter later we find Nelson, before his famous career
had begun, showing his zeal for the welfare of England's shipping by
enforcing this same act in the West Indies against American
merchant-ships. When Cromwell was dead, and Charles II. sat on the
throne of his father, this king, false to the English people, was yet
true to England's greatness and to the traditional policy of her
government on the sea. In his treacherous intrigues with Louis XIV.,
by which he aimed to make himself independent of Parliament and
people, he wrote to Louis: "There are two impediments to a perfect
union. The first is the great care France is now taking to create a
commerce and to be an imposing maritime power. This is so great a
cause of suspicion with us, who can possess importance only by our
commerce and our naval force, that every step which France takes in
this direction will perpetuate the jealousy between the two nations."
In the midst of the negotiations which preceded the detestable attack
of the two kings upon the Dutch republic, a warm dispute arose as to
who should command the united fleets of France and England. Charles
was inflexible on this point. "It is the custom of the English," said
he, "to command at sea;" and he told the French ambassador plainly
that, were he to yield, his subjects would not obey him. In the
projected partition of the United Provinces he reserved for England
the maritime plunder in positions that controlled the mouths of the
rivers Scheldt and Meuse. The navy under Charles preserved for some
time the spirit and discipline impressed on it by Cromwell's iron
rule; though later it shared in the general decay of _morale_ which
marked this evil reign. Monk, having by a great strategic blunder sent
off a fourth of his fleet, found himself in 1666 in presence of a
greatly superior Dutch force. Disregarding the odds, he attacked
without hesitation, and for three days maintained the fight with
honor, though with loss. Such conduct is not war; but in the single
eye that looked to England's naval prestige and dictated his action,
common as it was to England's people as well as to her government, has
lain the secret of final success following many blunders through the
centuries. Charles's successor, James II., was himself a seaman, and
had commanded in two great sea-fights. When William III. came to the
throne, the governments of England and Holland were under one hand,
and continued united in one purpose against Louis XIV. until the Peace
of Utrecht in 1713; that is, for a quarter of a century. The English
government more and more steadily, and with conscious purpose, pushed
on the extension of her sea dominion and fostered the growth of her
sea power. While as an open enemy she struck at France upon the sea,
so as an artful friend, many at least believed, she sapped the power
of Holland afloat. The treaty between the two countries provided that
of the sea forces Holland should furnish three eighths, England five
eighths, or nearly double. Such a provision, coupled with a further
one which made Holland keep up an army of 102,000 against England's
40,000, virtually threw the land war on one and the sea war on the
other. The tendency, whether designed or not, is evident; and at the
peace, while Holland received compensation by land, England obtained,
besides commercial privileges in France, Spain, and the Spanish West
Indies, the important maritime concessions of Gibraltar and Port Mahon
in the Mediterranean; of Newfoundland, Nova Scotia, and Hudson's Bay
in North America. The naval power of France and Spain had disappeared;
that of Holland thenceforth steadily declined. Posted thus in America,
the West Indies, and the Mediterranean, the English government
thenceforth moved firmly forward on the path which made of the English
kingdom the British Empire. For the twenty-five years following the
Peace of Utrecht, peace was the chief aim of the ministers who
directed the policy of the two great seaboard nations, France and
England; but amid all the fluctuations of continental politics in a
most unsettled period, abounding in petty wars and shifty treaties,
the eye of England was steadily fixed on the maintenance of her sea
power. In the Baltic, her fleets checked the attempts of Peter the
Great upon Sweden, and so maintained a balance of power in that sea,
from which she drew not only a great trade but the chief part of her
naval stores, and which the Czar aimed to make a Russian lake. Denmark
endeavored to establish an East India company aided by foreign
capital; England and Holland not only forbade their subjects to join
it, but threatened Denmark, and thus stopped an enterprise they
thought adverse to their sea interests. In the Netherlands, which by
the Utrecht Treaty had passed to Austria, a similar East India
company, having Ostend for its port, was formed, with the emperor's
sanction. This step, meant to restore to the Low Countries the trade
lost to them through their natural outlet of the Scheldt, was opposed
by the sea powers England and Holland; and their greediness for the
monopoly of trade, helped in this instance by France, stifled this
company also after a few years of struggling life. In the
Mediterranean, the Utrecht settlement was disturbed by the emperor of
Austria, England's natural ally in the then existing state of European
politics. Backed by England, he, having already Naples, claimed also
Sicily in exchange for Sardinia. Spain resisted; and her navy, just
beginning to revive under a vigorous minister, Alberoni, was crushed
and annihilated by the English fleet off Cape Passaro in 1718; while
the following year a French army, at the bidding of England, crossed
the Pyrenees and completed the work by destroying the Spanish
dock-yards. Thus England, in addition to Gibraltar and Mahon in her
own hands, saw Naples and Sicily in those of a friend, while an enemy
was struck down. In Spanish America, the limited privileges to English
trade, wrung from the necessities of Spain, were abused by an
extensive and scarcely disguised smuggling system; and when the
exasperated Spanish government gave way to excesses in the mode of
suppression, both the minister who counselled peace and the opposition
which urged war defended their opinions by alleging the effects of
either upon England's sea power and honor. While England's policy thus
steadily aimed at widening and strengthening the bases of her sway
upon the ocean, the other governments of Europe seemed blind to the
dangers to be feared from her sea growth. The miseries resulting from
the overweening power of Spain in days long gone by seemed to be
forgotten; forgotten also the more recent lesson of the bloody and
costly wars provoked by the ambition and exaggerated power of Louis
XIV. Under the eyes of the statesmen of Europe there was steadily and
visibly being built up a third overwhelming power, destined to be used
as selfishly, as aggressively, though not as cruelly, and much more
successfully than any that had preceded it. This was the power of the
sea, whose workings, because more silent than the clash of arms, are
less often noted, though lying clearly enough on the surface. It can
scarcely be denied that England's uncontrolled dominion of the seas,
during almost the whole period chosen for our subject, was by long
odds the chief among the military factors that determined the final
issue.[8] So far, however, was this influence from being foreseen
after Utrecht, that France for twelve years, moved by personal
exigencies of her rulers, sided with England against Spain; and when
Fleuri came into power in 1726, though this policy was reversed, the
navy of France received no attention, and the only blow at England was
the establishment of a Bourbon prince, a natural enemy to her, upon
the throne of the two Sicilies in 1736. When war broke out with Spain
in 1739, the navy of England was in numbers more than equal to the
combined navies of Spain and France; and during the quarter of a
century of nearly uninterrupted war that followed, this numerical
disproportion increased. In these wars England, at first
instinctively, afterward with conscious purpose under a government
that recognized her opportunity and the possibilities of her great sea
power, rapidly built up that mighty colonial empire whose foundations
were already securely laid in the characteristics of her colonists and
the strength of her fleets. In strictly European affairs her wealth,
the outcome of her sea power, made her play a conspicuous part during
the same period. The system of subsidies, which began half a century
before in the wars of Marlborough and received its most extensive
development half a century later in the Napoleonic wars, maintained
the efforts of her allies, which would have been crippled, if not
paralyzed, without them. Who can deny that the government which with
one hand strengthened its fainting allies on the continent with the
life-blood of money, and with the other drove its own enemies off the
sea and out of their chief possessions, Canada, Martinique,
Guadeloupe, Havana, Manila, gave to its country the foremost rôle in
European politics; and who can fail to see that the power which dwelt
in that government, with a land narrow in extent and poor in
resources, sprang directly from the sea? The policy in which the
English government carried on the war is shown by a speech of Pitt,
the master-spirit during its course, though he lost office before
bringing it to an end. Condemning the Peace of 1763, made by his
political opponent, he said: "France is chiefly, if not exclusively,
formidable to us as a maritime and commercial power. What we gain in
this respect is valuable to us, above all, through the injury to her
which results from it. You have left to France the possibility of
reviving her navy." Yet England's gains were enormous; her rule in
India was assured, and all North America east of the Mississippi in
her hands. By this time the onward path of her government was clearly
marked out, had assumed the force of a tradition, and was consistently
followed. The war of the American Revolution was, it is true, a great
mistake, looked at from the point of view of sea power; but the
government was led into it insensibly by a series of natural blunders.
Putting aside political and constitutional considerations, and looking
at the question as purely military or naval, the case was this: The
American colonies were large and growing communities at a great
distance from England. So long as they remained attached to the
mother-country, as they then were enthusiastically, they formed a
solid base for her sea power in that part of the world; but their
extent and population were too great, when coupled with the distance
from England, to afford any hope of holding them by force, _if_ any
powerful nations were willing to help them. This "if," however,
involved a notorious probability; the humiliation of France and Spain
was so bitter and so recent that they were sure to seek revenge, and
it was well known that France in particular had been carefully and
rapidly building up her navy. Had the colonies been thirteen islands,
the sea power of England would quickly have settled the question; but
instead of such a physical barrier they were separated only by local
jealousies which a common danger sufficiently overcame. To enter
deliberately on such a contest, to try to hold by force so extensive a
territory, with a large hostile population, so far from home, was to
renew the Seven Years' War with France and Spain, and with the
Americans, against, instead of for, England. The Seven Years' War had
been so heavy a burden that a wise government would have known that
the added weight could not be borne, and have seen it was necessary to
conciliate the colonists. The government of the day was not wise, and
a large element of England's sea power was sacrificed; but by mistake,
not wilfully; through arrogance, not through weakness.

This steady keeping to a general line of policy was doubtless made
specially easy for successive English governments by the clear
indications of the country's conditions. Singleness of purpose was to
some extent imposed. The firm maintenance of her sea power, the
haughty determination to make it felt, the wise state of preparation
in which its military element was kept, were yet more due to that
feature of her political institutions which practically gave the
government, during the period in question, into the hands of a
class,--a landed aristocracy. Such a class, whatever its defects
otherwise, readily takes up and carries on a sound political
tradition, is naturally proud of its country's glory, and
comparatively insensible to the sufferings of the community by which
that glory is maintained. It readily lays on the pecuniary burden
necessary for preparation and for endurance of war. Being as a body
rich, it feels those burdens less. Not being commercial, the sources
of its own wealth are not so immediately endangered, and it does not
share that political timidity which characterizes those whose property
is exposed and business threatened,--the proverbial timidity of
capital. Yet in England this class was not insensible to anything that
touched her trade for good or ill. Both houses of Parliament vied in
careful watchfulness over its extension and protection, and to the
frequency of their inquiries a naval historian attributes the
increased efficiency of the executive power in its management of the
navy. Such a class also naturally imbibes and keeps up a spirit of
military honor, which is of the first importance in ages when military
institutions have not yet provided the sufficient substitute in what
is called _esprit-de-corps_. But although full of class feeling and
class prejudice, which made themselves felt in the navy as well as
elsewhere, their practical sense left open the way of promotion to its
highest honors to the more humbly born; and every age saw admirals who
had sprung from the lowest of the people. In this the temper of the
English upper class differed markedly from that of the French. As late
as 1789, at the outbreak of the Revolution, the French Navy List still
bore the name of an official whose duty was to verify the proofs of
noble birth on the part of those intending to enter the naval school.

Since 1815, and especially in our own day, the government of England
has passed very much more into the hands of the people at large.
Whether her sea power will suffer therefrom remains to be seen. Its
broad basis still remains in a great trade, large mechanical
industries, and an extensive colonial system. Whether a democratic
government will have the foresight, the keen sensitiveness to national
position and credit, the willingness to insure its prosperity by
adequate outpouring of money in times of peace, all which are
necessary for military preparation, is yet an open question. Popular
governments are not generally favorable to military expenditure,
however necessary, and there are signs that England tends to drop
behind.

It has already been seen that the Dutch Republic, even more than the
English nation, drew its prosperity and its very life from the sea.
The character and policy of its government were far less favorable to
a consistent support of sea power. Composed of seven provinces, with
the political name of the United Provinces, the actual distribution of
power may be roughly described to Americans as an exaggerated example
of States Rights. Each of the maritime provinces had its own fleet and
its own admiralty, with consequent jealousies. This disorganizing
tendency was partly counteracted by the great preponderance of the
Province of Holland, which alone contributed five sixths of the fleet
and fifty-eight per cent of the taxes, and consequently had a
proportionate share in directing the national policy. Although
intensely patriotic, and capable of making the last sacrifices for
freedom, the commercial spirit of the people penetrated the
government, which indeed might be called a commercial aristocracy, and
made it averse to war, and to the expenditures which are necessary in
preparing for war. As has before been said, it was not until danger
stared them in the face that the burgomasters were willing to pay for
their defences. While the republican government lasted, however, this
economy was practised least of all upon the fleet; and until the death
of John De Witt, in 1672, and the peace with England in 1674, the
Dutch navy was in point of numbers and equipment able to make a fair
show against the combined navies of England and France. Its efficiency
at this time undoubtedly saved the country from the destruction
planned by the two kings. With De Witt's death the republic passed
away, and was followed by the practically monarchical government of
William of Orange. The life-long policy of this prince, then only
eighteen, was resistance to Louis XIV. and to the extension of French
power. This resistance took shape upon the land rather than the
sea,--a tendency promoted by England's withdrawal from the war. As
early as 1676, Admiral De Ruyter found the force given him unequal to
cope with the French alone. With the eyes of the government fixed on
the land frontier, the navy rapidly declined. In 1688, when William of
Orange needed a fleet to convoy him to England, the burgomasters of
Amsterdam objected that the navy was incalculably decreased in
strength, as well as deprived of its ablest commanders. When king of
England, William still kept his position as stadtholder, and with it
his general European policy. He found in England the sea power he
needed, and used the resources of Holland for the land war. This Dutch
prince consented that in the allied fleets, in councils of war, the
Dutch admirals should sit below the junior English captain; and Dutch
interests at sea were sacrificed as readily as Dutch pride to the
demands of England. When William died, his policy was still followed
by the government which succeeded him. Its aims were wholly centred
upon the land, and at the Peace of Utrecht, which closed a series of
wars extending over forty years, Holland, having established no sea
claim, gained nothing in the way of sea resources, of colonial
extension, or of commerce.

Of the last of these wars an English historian says: "The economy of
the Dutch greatly hurt their reputation and their trade. Their
men-of-war in the Mediterranean were always victualled short, and
their convoys were so weak and ill-provided that for one ship that we
lost, they lost five, which begat a general notion that we were the
safer carriers, which certainly had a good effect. Hence it was that
our trade rather increased than diminished in this war."

From that time Holland ceased to have a great sea power, and rapidly
lost the leading position among the nations which that power had built
up. It is only just to say that no policy could have saved from
decline this small, though determined, nation, in face of the
persistent enmity of Louis XIV. The friendship of France, insuring
peace on her landward frontier, would have enabled her, at least for a
longer time, to dispute with England the dominion of the seas; and as
allies the navies of the two continental States might have checked the
growth of the enormous sea power which has just been considered. Sea
peace between England and Holland was only possible by the virtual
subjection of one or the other, for both aimed at the same object.
Between France and Holland it was otherwise; and the fall of Holland
proceeded, not necessarily from her inferior size and numbers, but
from faulty policy on the part of the two governments. It does not
concern us to decide which was the more to blame.

France, admirably situated for the possession of sea power, received a
definite policy for the guidance of her government from two great
rulers, Henry IV. and Richelieu. With certain well-defined projects of
extension eastward upon the land were combined a steady resistance to
the House of Austria, which then ruled in both Austria and Spain, and
an equal purpose of resistance to England upon the sea. To further
this latter end, as well as for other reasons, Holland was to be
courted as an ally. Commerce and fisheries as the basis of sea power
were to be encouraged, and a military navy was to be built up.
Richelieu left what he called his political will, in which he pointed
out the opportunities of France for achieving sea power, based upon
her position and resources; and French writers consider him the
virtual founder of the navy, not merely because he equipped ships, but
from the breadth of his views and his measures to insure sound
institutions and steady growth. After his death, Mazarin inherited his
views and general policy, but not his lofty and martial spirit, and
during his rule the newly formed navy disappeared. When Louis XIV.
took the government into his own hands, in 1661, there were but thirty
ships of war, of which only three had as many as sixty guns. Then
began a most astonishing manifestation of the work which can be done
by absolute government ably and systematically wielded. That part of
the administration which dealt with trade, manufactures, shipping, and
colonies, was given to a man of great practical genius, Colbert, who
had served with Richelieu and had drunk in fully his ideas and policy.
He pursued his aims in a spirit thoroughly French. Everything was to
be organized, the spring of everything was in the minister's cabinet.
"To organize producers and merchants as a powerful army, subjected to
an active and intelligent guidance, so as to secure an industrial
victory for France by order and unity of efforts, and to obtain the
best products by imposing on all workmen the processes recognized as
best by competent men.... To organize seamen and distant commerce in
large bodies like the manufactures and internal commerce, and to give
as a support to the commercial power of France a navy established on a
firm basis and of dimensions hitherto unknown,"--such, we are told,
were the aims of Colbert as regards two of the three links in the
chain of sea power. For the third, the colonies at the far end of the
line, the same governmental direction and organization were evidently
purposed; for the government began by buying back Canada,
Newfoundland, Nova Scotia, and the French West India Islands from the
parties who then owned them. Here, then, is seen pure, absolute,
uncontrolled power gathering up into its hands all the reins for the
guidance of a nation's course, and proposing so to direct it as to
make, among other things, a great sea power.

To enter into the details of Colbert's action is beyond our purpose.
It is enough to note the chief part played by the government in
building up the sea power of the State, and that this very great man
looked not to any one of the bases on which it rests to the exclusion
of the others, but embraced them all in his wise and provident
administration. Agriculture, which increases the products of the
earth, and manufactures, which multiply the products of man's
industry; internal trade routes and regulations, by which the exchange
of products from the interior to the exterior is made easier; shipping
and customs regulations tending to throw the carrying-trade into
French hands, and so to encourage the building of French shipping, by
which the home and colonial products should be carried back and forth;
colonial administration and development, by which a far-off market
might be continually growing up to be monopolized by the home trade;
treaties with foreign States favoring French trade, and imposts on
foreign ships and products tending to break down that of rival
nations,--all these means, embracing countless details, were employed
to build up for France (1) Production; (2) Shipping; (3) Colonies and
Markets,--in a word, sea power. The study of such a work is simpler
and easier when thus done by one man, sketched out by a kind of
logical process, than when slowly wrought by conflicting interests in
a more complex government. In the few years of Colbert's
administration is seen the whole theory of sea power put into practice
in the systematic, centralizing French way; while the illustration of
the same theory in English and Dutch history is spread over
generations. Such growth, however, was forced, and depended upon the
endurance of the absolute power which watched over it; and as Colbert
was not king, his control lasted only till he lost the king's favor.
It is, however, most interesting to note the results of his labors in
the proper field for governmental action--in the navy. It has been
said that in 1661, when he took office, there were but thirty armed
ships, of which three only had over sixty guns. In 1666 there were
seventy, of which fifty were ships of the line and twenty were
fire-ships; in 1671, from seventy the number had increased to one
hundred and ninety-six. In 1683 there were one hundred and seven ships
of from twenty-four to one hundred and twenty guns, twelve of which
carried over seventy-six guns, besides many smaller vessels. The order
and system introduced into the dock-yards made them vastly more
efficient than the English. An English captain, a prisoner in France
while the effect of Colbert's work still lasted in the hands of his
son, writes:--

    "When I was first brought prisoner thither, I lay four months in
    a hospital at Brest for care of my wounds. While there I was
    astonished at the expedition used in manning and fitting out
    their ships, which till then I thought could be done nowhere
    sooner than in England, where we have ten times the shipping,
    and consequently ten times the seamen, they have in France; but
    there I saw twenty sail of ships, of about sixty guns each, got
    ready in twenty days' time; they were brought in and the men
    were discharged; and upon an order from Paris they were
    careened, keeled up, rigged, victualled, manned, and out again
    in the said time with the greatest ease imaginable. I likewise
    saw a ship of one hundred guns that had all her guns taken out
    in four or five hours' time; which I never saw done in England
    in twenty-four hours, and this with the greatest ease and less
    hazard than at home. This I saw under my hospital window."

A French naval historian cites certain performances which are simply
incredible, such as that the keel of a galley was laid at four
o'clock, and that at nine she left port, fully armed. These traditions
may be accepted as pointing, with the more serious statements of the
English officer, to a remarkable degree of system and order, and
abundant facilities for work.

Yet all this wonderful growth, forced by the action of the government,
withered away like Jonah's gourd when the government's favor was
withdrawn. Time was not allowed for its roots to strike down deep into
the life of the nation. Colbert's work was in the direct line of
Richelieu's policy, and for a time it seemed there would continue the
course of action which would make France great upon the sea as well as
predominant upon the land. For reasons which it is not yet necessary
to give, Louis came to have feelings of bitter enmity against Holland;
and as these feelings were shared by Charles II., the two kings
determined on the destruction of the United Provinces. This war, which
broke out in 1672, though more contrary to natural feeling on the part
of England, was less of a political mistake for her than for France,
and especially as regards sea power. France was helping to destroy a
probable, and certainly an indispensable, ally; England was assisting
in the ruin of her greatest rival on the sea, at this time, indeed,
still her commercial superior. France, staggering under debt and utter
confusion in her finances when Louis mounted the throne, was just
seeing her way clear in 1672, under Colbert's reforms and their happy
results. The war, lasting six years, undid the greater part of his
work. The agricultural classes, manufactures, commerce, and the
colonies, all were smitten by it; the establishments of Colbert
languished, and the order he had established in the finances was
overthrown. Thus the action of Louis--and he alone was the directing
government of France--struck at the roots of her sea power, and
alienated her best sea ally. The territory and the military power of
France were increased, but the springs of commerce and of a peaceful
shipping had been exhausted in the process; and although the military
navy was for some years kept up with splendor and efficiency, it soon
began to dwindle, and by the end of the reign had practically
disappeared. The same false policy, as regards the sea, marked the
rest of this reign of fifty-four years. Louis steadily turned his back
upon the sea interests of France, except the fighting-ships, and
either could not or would not see that the latter were of little use
and uncertain life, if the peaceful shipping and the industries, by
which they were supported, perished. His policy, aiming at supreme
power in Europe by military strength and territorial extension, forced
England and Holland into an alliance, which, as has before been said,
directly drove France off the sea, and indirectly swamped Holland's
power thereon. Colbert's navy perished, and for the last ten years of
Louis' life no great French fleet put to sea, though there was
constant war. The simplicity of form in an absolute monarchy thus
brought out strongly how great the influence of government can be upon
both the growth and the decay of sea power.

The latter part of Louis' life thus witnessed that power failing by
the weakening of its foundations, of commerce, and of the wealth that
commerce brings. The government that followed, likewise absolute, of
set purpose and at the demand of England, gave up all pretence of
maintaining an effective navy. The reason for this was that the new
king was a minor; and the regent, being bitterly at enmity with the
king of Spain, to injure him and preserve his own power, entered into
alliance with England. He aided her to establish Austria, the
hereditary enemy of France, in Naples and Sicily to the detriment of
Spain, and in union with her destroyed the Spanish navy and
dock-yards. Here again is found a personal ruler disregarding the sea
interests of France, ruining a natural ally, and directly aiding, as
Louis XIV. indirectly and unintentionally aided, the growth of a
mistress of the seas. This transient phase of policy passed away with
the death of the regent in 1726; but from that time until 1760 the
government of France continued to disregard her maritime interests. It
is said, indeed, that owing to some wise modifications of her fiscal
regulations, mainly in the direction of free trade (and due to Law, a
minister of Scotch birth), commerce with the East and West Indies
wonderfully increased, and that the islands of Guadeloupe and
Martinique became very rich and thriving; but both commerce and
colonies lay at the mercy of England when war came, for the navy fell
into decay. In 1756, when things were no longer at their worst, France
had but forty-five ships-of-the-line, England nearly one hundred and
thirty; and when the forty-five were to be armed and equipped, there
was found to be neither material nor rigging nor supplies; not even
enough artillery. Nor was this all.

    "Lack of system in the government," says a French writer,
    "brought about indifference, and opened the door to disorder and
    lack of discipline. Never had unjust promotions been so
    frequent; so also never had more universal discontent been seen.
    Money and intrigue took the place of all else, and brought in
    their train commands and power. Nobles and upstarts, with
    influence at the capital and self-sufficiency in the seaports,
    thought themselves dispensed with merit. Waste of the revenues
    of the State and of the dock-yards knew no bounds. Honor and
    modesty were turned into ridicule. As if the evils were not thus
    great enough, the ministry took pains to efface the heroic
    traditions of the past which had escaped the general wreck. To
    the energetic fights of the great reign succeeded, by order of
    the court, 'affairs of circumspection.' To preserve to the
    wasted material a few armed ships, increased opportunity was
    given to the enemy. From this unhappy principle we were bound to
    a defensive as advantageous to the enemy as it was foreign to
    the genius of our people. This circumspection before the enemy,
    laid down for us by orders, betrayed in the long run the
    national temper; and the abuse of the system led to acts of
    indiscipline and defection under fire, of which a single
    instance would vainly be sought in the previous century."

A false policy of continental extension swallowed up the resources of
the country, and was doubly injurious because, by leaving defenceless
its colonies and commerce, it exposed the greatest source of wealth to
be cut off, as in fact happened. The small squadrons that got to sea
were destroyed by vastly superior force; the merchant shipping was
swept away, and the colonies, Canada, Martinique, Guadeloupe, India,
fell into England's hands. If it did not take too much space,
interesting extracts might be made, showing the woful misery of
France, the country that had abandoned the sea, and the growing wealth
of England amid all her sacrifices and exertions. A contemporary
writer has thus expressed his view of the policy of France at this
period:--

    "France, by engaging so heartily as she has done in the German
    war, has drawn away so much of her attention and her revenue
    from her navy that it enabled us to give such a blow to her
    maritime strength as possibly she may never be able to recover.
    Her engagement in the German war has likewise drawn her from the
    defence of her colonies, by which means we have conquered some
    of the most considerable she possessed. It has withdrawn her
    from the protection of her trade, by which it is entirely
    destroyed, while that of England has never, in the profoundest
    peace, been in so flourishing a condition. So that, by embarking
    in this German war, France has suffered herself to be undone, so
    far as regards her particular and immediate quarrel with
    England."

In the Seven Years' War France lost thirty-seven ships-of-the-line and
fifty-six frigates,--a force three times as numerous as the whole navy
of the United States at any time in the days of sailing-ships. "For
the first time since the Middle Ages," says a French historian,
speaking of the same war, "England had conquered France single-handed,
almost without allies, France having powerful auxiliaries. She had
conquered solely by the superiority of her government." Yes; but it
was by the superiority of her government using the tremendous weapon
of her sea power,--the reward of a consistent policy perseveringly
directed to one aim.

The profound humiliation of France, which reached its depths between
1760 and 1763, at which latter date she made peace, has an instructive
lesson for the United States in this our period of commercial and
naval decadence. We have been spared her humiliation; let us hope to
profit by her subsequent example. Between the same years (1760 and
1763) the French people rose, as afterward in 1793, and declared they
would have a navy. "Popular feeling, skilfully directed by the
government, took up the cry from one end of France to the other, 'The
navy must be restored.' Gifts of ships were made by cities, by
corporations, and by private subscriptions. A prodigious activity
sprang up in the lately silent ports; everywhere ships were building
or repairing." This activity was sustained; the arsenals were
replenished, the material of every kind was put on a satisfactory
footing, the artillery reorganized, and ten thousand trained gunners
drilled and maintained.

The tone and action of the naval officers of the day instantly felt
the popular impulse, for which indeed some loftier spirits among them
had been not only waiting but working. At no time was greater mental
and professional activity found among French naval officers than just
then, when their ships had been suffered to rot away by governmental
inaction. Thus a prominent French officer of our own day writes:--

    "The sad condition of the navy in the reign of Louis XV., by
    closing to officers the brilliant career of bold enterprises and
    successful battles, forced them to fall back upon themselves.
    They drew from study the knowledge they were to put to the proof
    some years later, thus putting into practice that fine saying of
    Montesquieu, 'Adversity is our mother, Prosperity our
    step-mother.'... By the year 1769 was seen in all its splendor
    that brilliant galaxy of officers whose activity stretched to
    the ends of the earth, and who embraced in their works and in
    their investigations all the branches of human knowledge. The
    Académie de Marine, founded in 1752, was reorganized."[9]

The Académie's first director, a post-captain named Bigot de Morogues,
wrote an elaborate treatise on naval tactics, the first original work
on the subject since Paul Hoste's, which it was designed to supersede.
Morogues must have been studying and formulating his problems in
tactics in days when France had no fleet, and was unable so much as to
raise her head at sea under the blows of her enemy. At the same time
England had no similar book; and an English lieutenant, in 1762, was
just translating a part of Hoste's great work, omitting by far the
larger part. It was not until nearly twenty years later that Clerk, a
Scotch private gentleman, published an ingenious study of naval
tactics, in which he pointed out to English admirals the system by
which the French had thwarted their thoughtless and ill-combined
attacks.[10] "The researches of the Académie de Marine, and the
energetic impulse which it gave to the labors of officers, were not,
as we hope to show later, without influence upon the relatively
prosperous condition in which the navy was at the beginning of the
American war."

It has already been pointed out that the American War of Independence
involved a departure from England's traditional and true policy, by
committing her to a distant land war, while powerful enemies were
waiting for an opportunity to attack her at sea. Like France in the
then recent German wars, like Napoleon later in the Spanish war,
England, through undue self-confidence, was about to turn a friend
into an enemy, and so expose the real basis of her power to a rude
proof. The French government, on the other hand, avoided the snare
into which it had so often fallen. Turning her back on the European
continent, having the probability of neutrality there, and the
certainty of alliance with Spain by her side, France advanced to the
contest with a fine navy and a brilliant, though perhaps relatively
inexperienced, body of officers. On the other side of the Atlantic she
had the support of a friendly people, and of her own or allied ports,
both in the West Indies and on the continent. The wisdom of this
policy, the happy influence of this action of the government upon her
sea power, is evident; but the details of the war do not belong to
this part of the subject. To Americans, the chief interest of that war
is found upon the land; but to naval officers upon the sea, for it was
essentially a sea war. The intelligent and systematic efforts of
twenty years bore their due fruit; for though the warfare afloat ended
with a great disaster, the combined efforts of the French and Spanish
fleets undoubtedly bore down England's strength and robbed her of her
colonies. In the various naval undertakings and battles the honor of
France was upon the whole maintained; though it is difficult, upon
consideration of the general subject, to avoid the conclusion that
the inexperience of French seamen as compared with English, the narrow
spirit of jealousy shown by the noble corps of officers toward those
of different antecedents, and above all, the miserable traditions of
three quarters of a century already alluded to, the miserable policy
of a government which taught them first to save their ships, to
economize the material, prevented French admirals from reaping, not
the mere glory, but the positive advantages that more than once were
within their grasp. When Monk said the nation that would rule upon the
sea must always attack, he set the key-note to England's naval policy;
and had the instructions of the French government consistently
breathed the same spirit, the war of 1778 might have ended sooner and
better than it did. It seems ungracious to criticise the conduct of a
service to which, under God, our nation owes that its birth was not a
miscarriage; but writers of its own country abundantly reflect the
spirit of the remark. A French officer who served afloat during this
war, in a work of calm and judicial tone, says:--

    "What must the young officers have thought who were at Sandy
    Hook with D'Estaing, at St. Christopher with De Grasse, even
    those who arrived at Rhode Island with De Ternay, when they saw
    that these officers were not tried at their return?"[11]

Again, another French officer, of much later date, justifies the
opinion expressed, when speaking of the war of the American Revolution
in the following terms:--

    "It was necessary to get rid of the unhappy prejudices of the
    days of the regency and of Louis XV.; but the mishaps of which
    they were full were too recent to be forgotten by our ministers.
    Thanks to a wretched hesitation, fleets, which had rightly
    alarmed England, became reduced to ordinary proportions.
    Intrenching themselves in a false economy, the ministry claimed
    that, by reason of the excessive expenses necessary to maintain
    the fleet, the admirals must be ordered to maintain the
    '_greatest circumspection_,' as though in war half measures have
    not always led to disasters. So, too, the orders given to our
    squadron chiefs were to keep the sea as long as possible,
    without engaging in actions which might cause the loss of
    vessels difficult to replace; so that more than once complete
    victories, which would have crowned the skill of our admirals
    and the courage of our captains, were changed into successes of
    little importance. A system which laid down as a principle that
    an admiral should not use the force in his hands, which sent him
    against the enemy with the foreordained purpose of receiving
    rather than making the attack, a system which sapped moral power
    to save material resources, must have unhappy results.... It is
    certain that this deplorable system was one of the causes of the
    lack of discipline and startling defections which marked the
    periods of Louis XVI., of the [first] Republic, and of the
    [first] Empire."[12]

Within ten years of the peace of 1783 came the French Revolution; but
that great upheaval which shook the foundations of States, loosed the
ties of social order, and drove out of the navy nearly all the trained
officers of the monarchy who were attached to the old state of things,
did not free the French navy from a false system. It was easier to
overturn the form of government than to uproot a deep-seated
tradition. Hear again a third French officer, of the highest rank and
literary accomplishments, speaking of the inaction of Villeneuve, the
admiral who commanded the French rear at the battle of the Nile, and
who did not leave his anchors while the head of the column was being
destroyed:--

    "A day was to come [Trafalgar] in which Villeneuve in his turn,
    like De Grasse before him, and like Duchayla, would complain of
    being abandoned by part of his fleet. We have come to suspect
    some secret reason for this fatal coincidence. It is not natural
    that among so many honorable men there should so often be found
    admirals and captains incurring such a reproach. If the name of
    some of them is to this very day sadly associated with the
    memory of our disasters, we may be sure the fault is not wholly
    their own. We must rather blame the nature of the operations in
    which they were engaged, and that system of defensive war
    prescribed by the French government, which Pitt, in the English
    Parliament, proclaimed to be the forerunner of certain ruin.
    That system, when we wished to renounce it, had already
    penetrated our habits; it had, so to say, weakened our arms and
    paralyzed our self-reliance. Too often did our squadrons leave
    port with a special mission to fulfil, and with the intention of
    avoiding the enemy; to fall in with him was at once a piece of
    bad luck. It was thus that our ships went into action; they
    submitted to it instead of forcing it.... Fortune would have
    hesitated longer between the two fleets, and not have borne in
    the end so heavily against ours, if Brueys, meeting Nelson half
    way, could have gone out to fight him. This fettered and timid
    war, which Villaret and Martin had carried on, had lasted long,
    thanks to the circumspection of some English admirals and the
    traditions of the old tactics. It was with these traditions that
    the battle of the Nile had broken; the hour for decisive action
    had come."[13]

Some years later came Trafalgar, and again the government of France
took up a new policy with the navy. The author last quoted speaks
again:--

    "The emperor, whose eagle glance traced plans of campaign for
    his fleets as for his armies, was wearied by these unexpected
    reverses. He turned his eyes from the one field of battle in
    which fortune was faithless to him, and decided to pursue
    England elsewhere than upon the seas; he undertook to rebuild
    his navy, but without giving it any part in the struggle which
    became more furious than ever.... Nevertheless, far from
    slackening, the activity of our dock-yards redoubled. Every year
    ships-of-the-line were either laid down or added to the fleet.
    Venice and Genoa, under his control, saw their old splendors
    rise again, and from the shores of the Elbe to the head of the
    Adriatic all the ports of the continent emulously seconded the
    creative thought of the emperor. Numerous squadrons were
    assembled in the Scheldt, in Brest Roads, and in Toulon.... But
    to the end the emperor refused to give this navy, full of ardor
    and self-reliance, an opportunity to measure its strength with
    the enemy.... Cast down by constant reverses, he had kept up our
    armed ships only to oblige our enemies to blockades whose
    enormous cost must end by exhausting their finances."

When the empire fell, France had one hundred and three
ships-of-the-line and fifty-five frigates.

To turn now from the particular lessons drawn from the history of the
past to the general question of the influence of government upon the
sea career of its people, it is seen that that influence can work in
two distinct but closely related ways.

First, in peace: The government by its policy can favor the natural
growth of a people's industries and its tendencies to seek adventure
and gain by way of the sea; or it can try to develop such industries
and such sea-going bent, when they do not naturally exist; or, on the
other hand, the government may by mistaken action check and fetter the
progress which the people left to themselves would make. In any one of
these ways the influence of the government will be felt, making or
marring the sea power of the country in the matter of peaceful
commerce; upon which alone, it cannot be too often insisted, a
thoroughly strong navy can be based.

Secondly, for war: The influence of the government will be felt in its
most legitimate manner in maintaining an armed navy, of a size
commensurate with the growth of its shipping and the importance of the
interests connected with it. More important even than the size of the
navy is the question of its institutions, favoring a healthful spirit
and activity, and providing for rapid development in time of war by an
adequate reserve of men and of ships and by measures for drawing out
that general reserve power which has before been pointed to, when
considering the character and pursuits of the people. Undoubtedly
under this second head of warlike preparation must come the
maintenance of suitable naval stations, in those distant parts of the
world to which the armed shipping must follow the peaceful vessels of
commerce. The protection of such stations must depend either upon
direct military force, as do Gibraltar and Malta, or upon a
surrounding friendly population, such as the American colonists once
were to England, and, it may be presumed, the Australian colonists now
are. Such friendly surroundings and backing, joined to a reasonable
military provision, are the best of defences, and when combined with
decided preponderance at sea, make a scattered and extensive empire,
like that of England, secure; for while it is true that an unexpected
attack may cause disaster in some one quarter, the actual superiority
of naval power prevents such disaster from being general or
irremediable. History has sufficiently proved this. England's naval
bases have been in all parts of the world; and her fleets have at once
protected them, kept open the communications between them, and relied
upon them for shelter.

Colonies attached to the mother-country afford, therefore, the surest
means of supporting abroad the sea power of a country. In peace, the
influence of the government should be felt in promoting by all means a
warmth of attachment and a unity of interest which will make the
welfare of one the welfare of all, and the quarrel of one the quarrel
of all; and in war, or rather for war, by inducing such measures of
organization and defence as shall be felt by all to be a fair
distribution of a burden of which each reaps the benefit.

Such colonies the United States has not and is not likely to have. As
regards purely military naval stations, the feeling of her people was
probably accurately expressed by an historian of the English navy a
hundred years ago, speaking then of Gibraltar and Port Mahon.
"Military governments," said he, "agree so little with the industry of
a trading people, and are in themselves so repugnant to the genius of
the British people, that I do not wonder that men of good sense and of
all parties have inclined to give up these, as Tangiers was given up."
Having therefore no foreign establishments, either colonial or
military, the ships of war of the United States, in war, will be like
land birds, unable to fly far from their own shores. To provide
resting-places for them, where they can coal and repair, would be one
of the first duties of a government proposing to itself the
development of the power of the nation at sea.

As the practical object of this inquiry is to draw from the lessons of
history inferences applicable to one's own country and service, it is
proper now to ask how far the conditions of the United States involve
serious danger, and call for action on the part of the government, in
order to build again her sea power. It will not be too much to say
that the action of the government since the Civil War, and up to this
day, has been effectively directed solely to what has been called the
first link in the chain which makes sea power. Internal development,
great production, with the accompanying aim and boast of
self-sufficingness, such has been the object, such to some extent the
result. In this the government has faithfully reflected the bent of
the controlling elements of the country, though it is not always easy
to feel that such controlling elements are truly representative, even
in a free country. However that may be, there is no doubt that,
besides having no colonies, the intermediate link of a peaceful
shipping, and the interests involved in it, are now likewise lacking.
In short, the United States has only one link of the three.

The circumstances of naval war have changed so much within the last
hundred years, that it may be doubted whether such disastrous effects
on the one hand, or such brilliant prosperity on the other, as were
seen in the wars between England and France, could now recur. In her
secure and haughty sway of the seas England imposed a yoke on neutrals
which will never again be borne; and the principle that the flag
covers the goods is forever secured. The commerce of a belligerent can
therefore now be safely carried on in neutral ships, except when
contraband of war or to blockaded ports; and as regards the latter, it
is also certain that there will be no more paper blockades. Putting
aside therefore the question of defending her seaports from capture or
contribution, as to which there is practical unanimity in theory and
entire indifference in practice, what need has the United States of
sea power? Her commerce is even now carried on by others; why should
her people desire that which, if possessed, must be defended at great
cost? So far as this question is economical, it is outside the scope
of this work; but conditions which may entail suffering and loss on
the country by war are directly pertinent to it. Granting therefore
that the foreign trade of the United States, going and coming, is on
board ships which an enemy cannot touch except when bound to a
blockaded port, what will constitute an efficient blockade? The
present definition is, that it is such as to constitute a manifest
danger to a vessel seeking to enter or leave the port. This is
evidently very elastic. Many can remember that during the Civil War,
after a night attack on the United States fleet off Charleston, the
Confederates next morning sent out a steamer with some foreign consuls
on board, who so far satisfied themselves that no blockading vessel
was in sight that they issued a declaration to that effect. On the
strength of this declaration some Southern authorities claimed that
the blockade was technically broken, and could not be technically
re-established without a new notification. Is it necessary, to
constitute a real danger to blockade-runners, that the blockading
fleet should be in sight? Half a dozen fast steamers, cruising twenty
miles off-shore between the New Jersey and Long Island coast, would be
a very real danger to ships seeking to go in or out by the principal
entrance to New York; and similar positions might effectively blockade
Boston, the Delaware, and the Chesapeake. The main body of the
blockading fleet, prepared not only to capture merchant-ships but to
resist military attempts to break the blockade, need not be within
sight, nor in a position known to the shore. The bulk of Nelson's
fleet was fifty miles from Cadiz two days before Trafalgar, with a
small detachment watching close to the harbor. The allied fleet began
to get under way at 7 A.M., and Nelson, even under the conditions of
those days, knew it by 9.30. The English fleet at that distance was a
very real danger to its enemy. It seems possible, in these days of
submarine telegraphs, that the blockading forces in-shore and
off-shore, and from one port to another, might be in telegraphic
communication with one another along the whole coast of the United
States, readily giving mutual support; and if, by some fortunate
military combination, one detachment were attacked in force, it could
warn the others and retreat upon them. Granting that such a blockade
off one port were broken on one day, by fairly driving away the ships
maintaining it, the notification of its being re-established could be
cabled all over the world the next. To avoid such blockades there must
be a military force afloat that will at all times so endanger a
blockading fleet that it can by no means keep its place. Then neutral
ships, except those laden with contraband of war, can come and go
freely, and maintain the commercial relations of the country with the
world outside.

It may be urged that, with the extensive sea-coast of the United
States, a blockade of the whole line cannot be effectively kept up. No
one will more readily concede this than officers who remember how the
blockade of the Southern coast alone was maintained. But in the
present condition of the navy, and, it may be added, with any
additions not exceeding those so far proposed by the government,[14]
the attempt to blockade Boston, New York, the Delaware, the
Chesapeake, and the Mississippi, in other words, the great centres of
export and import, would not entail upon one of the large maritime
nations efforts greater than have been made before. England has at the
same time blockaded Brest, the Biscay coast, Toulon, and Cadiz, when
there were powerful squadrons lying within the harbors. It is true
that commerce in neutral ships can then enter other ports of the
United States than those named; but what a dislocation of the carrying
traffic of the country, what failure of supplies at times, what
inadequate means of transport by rail or water, of dockage, of
lighterage, of warehousing, will be involved in such an enforced
change of the ports of entry! Will there be no money loss, no
suffering, consequent upon this? And when with much pain and expense
these evils have been partially remedied, the enemy may be led to stop
the new inlets as he did the old. The people of the United States will
certainly not starve, but they may suffer grievously. As for supplies
which are contraband of war, is there not reason to fear that the
United States is not now able to go alone if an emergency should
arise?

The question is eminently one in which the influence of the government
should make itself felt, to build up for the nation a navy which, if
not capable of reaching distant countries, shall at least be able to
keep clear the chief approaches to its own. The eyes of the country
have for a quarter of a century been turned from the sea; the results
of such a policy and of its opposite will be shown in the instance of
France and of England. Without asserting a narrow parallelism between
the case of the United States and either of these, it may safely be
said that it is essential to the welfare of the whole country that the
conditions of trade and commerce should remain, as far as possible,
unaffected by an external war. In order to do this, the enemy must be
kept not only out of our ports, but far away from our coasts.[15]

Can this navy be had without restoring the merchant shipping? It is
doubtful. History has proved that such a purely military sea power can
be built up by a despot, as was done by Louis XIV.; but though so fair
seeming, experience showed that his navy was like a growth which
having no root soon withers away. But in a representative government
any military expenditure must have a strongly represented interest
behind it, convinced of its necessity. Such an interest in sea power
does not exist, cannot exist here without action by the government.
How such a merchant shipping should be built up, whether by subsidies
or by free trade, by constant administration of tonics or by free
movement in the open air, is not a military but an economical
question. Even had the United States a great national shipping, it may
be doubted whether a sufficient navy would follow; the distance which
separates her from other great powers, in one way a protection, is
also a snare. The motive, if any there be, which will give the United
States a navy, is probably now quickening in the Central American
Isthmus. Let us hope it will not come to the birth too late.

Here concludes the general discussion of the principal elements which
affect, favorably or unfavorably, the growth of sea power in nations.
The aim has been, first to consider those elements in their natural
tendency for or against, and then to illustrate by particular examples
and by the experience of the past. Such discussions, while undoubtedly
embracing a wider field, yet fall mainly within the province of
strategy, as distinguished from tactics. The considerations and
principles which enter into them belong to the unchangeable, or
unchanging, order of things, remaining the same, in cause and effect,
from age to age. They belong, as it were, to the Order of Nature, of
whose stability so much is heard in our day; whereas tactics, using as
its instruments the weapons made by man, shares in the change and
progress of the race from generation to generation. From time to time
the superstructure of tactics has to be altered or wholly torn down;
but the old foundations of strategy so far remain, as though laid upon
a rock. There will next be examined the general history of Europe and
America, with particular reference to the effect exercised upon that
history, and upon the welfare of the people, by sea power in its broad
sense. From time to time, as occasion offers, the aim will be to
recall and reinforce the general teaching, already elicited, by
particular illustrations. The general tenor of the study will
therefore be strategical, in that broad definition of naval strategy
which has before been quoted and accepted: "Naval strategy has for its
end to found, support, and increase, as well in peace as in war, the
sea power of a country." In the matter of particular battles, while
freely admitting that the change of details has made obsolete much of
their teaching, the attempt will be made to point out where the
application or neglect of true general principles has produced
decisive effects; and, other things being equal, those actions will be
preferred which, from their association with the names of the most
distinguished officers, may be presumed to show how far just tactical
ideas obtained in a particular age or a particular service. It will
also be desirable, where analogies between ancient and modern weapons
appear on the surface, to derive such probable lessons as they offer,
without laying undue stress upon the points of resemblance. Finally,
it must be remembered that, among all changes, the nature of man
remains much the same; the personal equation, though uncertain in
quantity and quality in the particular instance, is sure always to be
found.

FOOTNOTES:

[7] By a base of permanent operations "is understood a country whence
come all the resources, where are united the great lines of
communication by land and water, where are the arsenals and armed
posts."

[8] An interesting proof of the weight attributed to the naval power
of Great Britain by a great military authority will be found in the
opening chapter of Jomini's "History of the Wars of the French
Revolution." He lays down, as a fundamental principle of European
policy, that an unlimited expansion of naval force should not be
permitted to any nation which cannot be approached by land,--a
description which can apply only to Great Britain.

[9] Gougeard: La Marine de Guerre; Richelieu et Colbert.

[10] Whatever may be thought of Clerk's claim to originality in
constructing a system of naval tactics, and it has been seriously
impugned, there can be no doubt that his criticisms on the past were
sound. So far as the author knows, he in this respect deserves credit
for an originality remarkable in one who had the training neither of a
seaman nor of a military man.

[11] La Serre: Essais Hist. et Crit. sur la Marine Française.

[12] Lapeyrouse-Bonfils: Hist. de la Marine Française.

[13] Jurien de la Gravière: Guerres Maritimes.

[14] Since the above was written, the secretary of the navy, in his
report for 1889, has recommended a fleet which would make such a
blockade as here suggested very hazardous.

[15] The word "defence" in war involves two ideas, which for the sake
of precision in thought should be kept separated in the mind. There is
defence pure and simple, which strengthens itself and awaits attack.
This may be called passive defence. On the other hand, there is a view
of defence which asserts that safety for one's self, the real object
of defensive preparation, is best secured by attacking the enemy. In
the matter of sea-coast defence, the former method is exemplified by
stationary fortifications, submarine mines, and generally all immobile
works destined simply to stop an enemy if he tries to enter. The
second method comprises all those means and weapons which do not wait
for attack, but go to meet the enemy's fleet, whether it be but for a
few miles, or whether to his own shores. Such a defence may seem to be
really offensive war, but it is not; it becomes offensive only when
its object of attack is changed from the enemy's fleet to the enemy's
country. England defended her own coasts and colonies by stationing
her fleets off the French ports, to fight the French fleet if it came
out. The United States in the Civil War stationed her fleets off the
Southern ports, not because she feared for her own, but to break down
the Confederacy by isolation from the rest of the world, and
ultimately by attacking the ports. The methods were the same; but the
purpose in one case was defensive, in the other offensive.

The confusion of the two ideas leads to much unnecessary wrangling as
to the proper sphere of army and navy in coast-defence. Passive
defences belong to the army; everything that moves in the water to the
navy, which has the prerogative of the offensive defence. If seamen
are used to garrison forts, they become part of the land forces, as
surely as troops, when embarked as part of the complement, become part
of the sea forces.




CHAPTER II.

    STATE OF EUROPE IN 1660.--SECOND ANGLO-DUTCH WAR, 1665-1667. SEA
    BATTLES OF LOWESTOFT AND OF THE FOUR DAYS.


The period at which our historical survey is to begin has been loosely
stated as the middle of the seventeenth century. The year 1660 will
now be taken as the definite date at which to open. In May of that
year Charles II. was restored to the English throne amid the general
rejoicing of the people. In March of the following year, upon the
death of Cardinal Mazarin, Louis XIV. assembled his ministers and said
to them: "I have summoned you to tell you that it has pleased me
hitherto to permit my affairs to be governed by the late cardinal; I
shall in future be my own prime minister. I direct that no decree be
sealed except by my orders, and I order the secretaries of State and
the superintendent of the finances to sign nothing without my
command." The personal government thus assumed was maintained, in fact
as well as in name, for over half a century.

Within one twelvemonth then are seen, setting forward upon a new stage
of national life, after a period of confusion more or less prolonged,
the two States which, amid whatever inequalities, have had the first
places in the sea history of modern Europe and America, indeed, of the
world at large. Sea history, however, is but one factor in that
general advance and decay of nations which is called their history;
and if sight be lost of the other factors to which it is so closely
related, a distorted view, either exaggerated or the reverse, of its
importance will be formed. It is with the belief that that importance
is vastly underrated, if not practically lost sight of, by people
unconnected with the sea, and particularly by the people of the United
States in our own day, that this study has been undertaken.

The date taken, 1660, followed closely another which marked a great
settlement of European affairs, setting the seal of treaty upon the
results of a general war, known to history as the Thirty Years' War.
This other date was that of the Treaty of Westphalia, or Munster, in
1648. In this the independence of the Dutch United Provinces, long
before practically assured, was formally acknowledged by Spain; and it
being followed in 1659 by the Treaty of the Pyrenees between France
and Spain, the two gave to Europe a state of general external peace,
destined soon to be followed by a series of almost universal wars,
which lasted as long as Louis XIV. lived,--wars which were to induce
profound changes in the map of Europe; during which new States were to
arise, others to decay, and all to undergo large modifications, either
in extent of dominion or in political power. In these results maritime
power, directly or indirectly, had a great share.

We must first look at the general condition of European States at the
time from which the narrative starts. In the struggles, extending over
nearly a century, whose end is marked by the Peace of Westphalia, the
royal family known as the House of Austria had been the great
overwhelming power which all others feared. During the long reign of
the Emperor Charles V., who abdicated a century before, the head of
that house had united in his own person the two crowns of Austria and
Spain, which carried with them, among other possessions, the countries
we now know as Holland and Belgium, together with a preponderating
influence in Italy. After his abdication the two great monarchies of
Austria and Spain were separated; but though ruled by different
persons, they were still in the same family, and tended toward that
unity of aim and sympathy which marked dynastic connections in that
and the following century. To this bond of union was added that of a
common religion. During the century before the Peace of Westphalia,
the extension of family power, and the extension of the religion
professed, were the two strongest motives of political action. This
was the period of the great religious wars which arrayed nation
against nation, principality against principality, and often, in the
same nation, faction against faction. Religious persecution caused the
revolt of the Protestant Dutch Provinces against Spain, which issued,
after eighty years of more or less constant war, in the recognition of
their independence. Religious discord, amounting to civil war at
times, distracted France during the greater part of the same period,
profoundly affecting not only her internal but her external policy.
These were the days of St. Bartholomew, of the religious murder of
Henry IV., of the siege of La Rochelle, of constant intriguing between
Roman Catholic Spain and Roman Catholic Frenchmen. As the religious
motive, acting in a sphere to which it did not naturally belong, and
in which it had no rightful place, died away, the political
necessities and interests of States began to have juster weight; not
that they had been wholly lost sight of in the mean time, but the
religious animosities had either blinded the eyes, or fettered the
action, of statesmen. It was natural that in France, one of the
greatest sufferers from religious passions, owing to the number and
character of the Protestant minority, this reaction should first and
most markedly be seen. Placed between Spain and the German States,
among which Austria stood foremost without a rival, internal union and
checks upon the power of the House of Austria were necessities of
political existence. Happily, Providence raised up to her in close
succession two great rulers, Henry IV. and Richelieu,--men in whom
religion fell short of bigotry, and who, when forced to recognize it
in the sphere of politics, did so as masters and not as slaves. Under
them French statesmanship received a guidance, which Richelieu
formulated as a tradition, and which moved on the following general
lines,--(1) Internal union of the kingdom, appeasing or putting down
religious strife and centralizing authority in the king; (2)
Resistance to the power of the House of Austria, which actually and
necessarily carried with it alliance with Protestant German States and
with Holland; (3) Extension of the boundaries of France to the
eastward, at the expense mainly of Spain, which then possessed not
only the present Belgium, but other provinces long since incorporated
with France; and (4) The creation and development of a great sea
power, adding to the wealth of the kingdom, and intended specially to
make head against France's hereditary enemy, England; for which end
again the alliance with Holland was to be kept in view. Such were the
broad outlines of policy laid down by statesmen in the front rank of
genius for the guidance of that country whose people have, not without
cause, claimed to be the most complete exponent of European
civilization, foremost in the march of progress, combining political
advance with individual development. This tradition, carried on by
Mazarin, was received from him by Louis XIV.; it will be seen how far
he was faithful to it, and what were the results to France of his
action. Meanwhile it may be noted that of these four elements
necessary to the greatness of France, sea power was one; and as the
second and third were practically one in the means employed, it may be
said that sea power was one of the two great means by which France's
_external_ greatness was to be maintained. England on the sea, Austria
on the land, indicated the direction that French effort was to take.

As regards the condition of France in 1660, and her readiness to move
onward in the road marked by Richelieu, it may be said that internal
peace was secured, the power of the nobles wholly broken, religious
discords at rest; the tolerant edict of Nantes was still in force,
while the remaining Protestant discontent had been put down by the
armed hand. All power was absolutely centred in the throne. In other
respects, though the kingdom was at peace, the condition was less
satisfactory. There was practically no navy; commerce, internal and
external, was not prosperous; the finances were in disorder; the army
small.

Spain, the nation before which all others had trembled less than a
century before, was now long in decay and scarcely formidable; the
central weakness had spread to all parts of the administration. In
extent of territory, however, she was still great. The Spanish
Netherlands still belonged to her; she held Naples, Sicily, and
Sardinia; Gibraltar had not yet fallen into English hands; her vast
possessions in America--with the exception of Jamaica, conquered by
England a few years before--were still untouched. The condition of her
sea power, both for peace and war, has been already alluded to. Many
years before, Richelieu had contracted a temporary alliance with
Spain, by virtue of which she placed forty ships at his disposal; but
the bad condition of the vessels, for the most part ill armed and ill
commanded, compelled their withdrawal. The navy of Spain was then in
full decay, and its weakness did not escape the piercing eye of the
cardinal. An encounter which took place between the Spanish and Dutch
fleets in 1639 shows most plainly the state of degradation into which
this once proud navy had fallen.

    "Her navy at this time," says the narrative quoted, "met one of
    those shocks, a succession of which during this war degraded her
    from her high station of mistress of the seas in both
    hemispheres, to a contemptible rank among maritime powers. The
    king was fitting out a powerful fleet to carry the war to the
    coasts of Sweden, and for its equipment had commanded a
    reinforcement of men and provisions to be sent from Dunkirk. A
    fleet accordingly set sail, but were attacked by Von Tromp, some
    captured, the remainder forced to retire within the harbor
    again. Soon after, Tromp seized three English [neutral] ships
    carrying 1070 Spanish soldiers from Cadiz to Dunkirk; he took
    the troops out, but let the ships go free. Leaving seventeen
    vessels to blockade Dunkirk, Tromp with the remaining twelve
    advanced to meet the enemy's fleet on its arrival. It was soon
    seen entering the Straits of Dover to the number of sixty-seven
    sail, and having two thousand troops. Being joined by De Witt
    with four more ships, Tromp with his small force made a resolute
    attack upon the enemy. The fight lasted till four P.M., when the
    Spanish admiral took refuge in the Downs. Tromp determined to
    engage if they should come out; but Oquendo with his powerful
    fleet, many of which carried from sixty to a hundred guns,
    suffered himself to be blockaded; and the English admiral told
    Tromp he was ordered to join the Spaniards if hostilities began.
    Tromp sent home for instructions, and the action of England only
    served to call out the vast maritime powers of the Dutch. Tromp
    was rapidly reinforced to ninety-six sail and twelve fire-ships,
    and ordered to attack. Leaving a detached squadron to observe
    the English, and to attack them if they helped the Spaniards, he
    began the fight embarrassed by a thick fog, under cover of which
    the Spaniards cut their cables to escape. Many running too close
    to shore went aground, and most of the remainder attempting to
    retreat were sunk, captured, or driven on the French coast.
    Never was victory more complete."[16]

When a navy submits to such a line of action, all tone and pride must
have departed; but the navy only shared in the general decline which
made Spain henceforward have an ever lessening weight in the policy of
Europe.

    "In the midst of the splendors of her court and language," says
    Guizot, "the Spanish government felt itself weak, and sought to
    hide its weakness under its immobility. Philip IV. and his
    minister, weary of striving only to be conquered, looked but for
    the security of peace, and only sought to put aside all
    questions which would call for efforts of which they felt
    themselves incapable. Divided and enervated, the house of
    Austria had even less ambition than power, and except when
    absolutely forced, a pompous inertia became the policy of the
    successors of Charles V."[17]

Such was the Spain of that day. That part of the Spanish dominions
which was then known as the Low Countries, or the Roman Catholic
Netherlands (our modern Belgium), was about to be a fruitful source of
variance between France and her natural ally, the Dutch Republic. This
State, whose political name was the United Provinces, had now reached
the summit of its influence and power,--a power based, as has already
been explained, wholly upon the sea, and upon the use of that element
made by the great maritime and commercial genius of the Dutch people.
A recent French author thus describes the commercial and colonial
conditions, at the accession of Louis XIV., of this people, which
beyond any other in modern times, save only England, has shown how the
harvest of the sea can lift up to wealth and power a country
intrinsically weak and without resources:--

    "Holland had become the Phoenicia of modern times. Mistresses of
    the Scheldt, the United Provinces closed the outlets of Antwerp
    to the sea, and inherited the commercial power of that rich
    city, which an ambassador of Venice in the fifteenth century had
    compared to Venice herself. They received besides in their
    principal cities the workingmen of the Low Countries who fled
    from Spanish tyranny of conscience. The manufactures of clothes,
    linen stuffs, etc., which employed six hundred thousand souls,
    opened new sources of gain to a people previously content with
    the trade in cheese and fish. Fisheries alone had already
    enriched them. The herring fishery supported nearly one fifth of
    the population of Holland, producing three hundred thousand tons
    of salt-fish, and bringing in more than eight million francs
    annually.

    "The naval and commercial power of the republic developed
    rapidly. The merchant fleet of Holland alone numbered 10,000
    sail, 168,000 seamen, and supported 260,000 inhabitants. She had
    taken possession of the greater part of the European
    carrying-trade, and had added thereto, since the peace, all the
    carriage of merchandise between America and Spain, did the same
    service for the French ports, and maintained an importation
    traffic of thirty-six million francs. The north countries,
    Brandenburg, Denmark, Sweden, Muscovy, Poland, access to which
    was opened by the Baltic to the Provinces, were for them an
    inexhaustible market of exchange. They fed it by the produce
    they sold there, and by purchase of the products of the
    North,--wheat, timber, copper, hemp, and furs. The total value
    of merchandise yearly shipped in Dutch bottoms, in all seas,
    exceeded a thousand million francs. The Dutch had made
    themselves, to use a contemporary phrase, the wagoners of all
    seas."[18]

It was through its colonies that the republic had been able thus to
develop its sea trade. It had the monopoly of all the products of the
East. Produce and spices from Asia were by her brought to Europe of a
yearly value of sixteen million francs. The powerful East India
Company, founded in 1602, had built up in Asia an empire, with
possessions taken from the Portuguese. Mistress in 1650 of the Cape of
Good Hope, which guaranteed it a stopping-place for its ships, it
reigned as a sovereign in Ceylon, and upon the coasts of Malabar and
Coromandel. It had made Batavia its seat of government, and extended
its traffic to China and Japan. Meanwhile the West India Company, of
more rapid rise, but less durable, had manned eight hundred ships of
war and trade. It had used them to seize the remnants of Portuguese
power upon the shores of Guinea, as well as in Brazil.

The United Provinces had thus become the warehouse wherein were
collected the products of all nations.

The colonies of the Dutch at this time were scattered throughout the
eastern seas, in India, in Malacca, in Java, the Moluccas, and various
parts of the vast archipelago lying to the northward of Australia.
They had possessions on the west coast of Africa, and as yet the
colony of New Amsterdam remained in their hands. In South America the
Dutch West India Company had owned nearly three hundred leagues of
coast from Bahia in Brazil northward; but much had recently escaped
from their hands.

The United Provinces owed their consideration and power to their
wealth and their fleets. The sea, which beats like an inveterate enemy
against their shores, had been subdued and made a useful servant; the
land was to prove their destruction. A long and fierce strife had been
maintained with an enemy more cruel than the sea,--the Spanish
kingdom; the successful ending, with its delusive promise of rest and
peace, but sounded the knell of the Dutch Republic. So long as the
power of Spain remained unimpaired, or at least great enough to keep
up the terror that she had long inspired, it was to the interest of
England and of France, both sufferers from Spanish menace and
intrigue, that the United Provinces should be strong and independent.
When Spain fell,--and repeated humiliations showed that her weakness
was real and not seeming,--other motives took the place of fear.
England coveted Holland's trade and sea dominion; France desired the
Spanish Netherlands. The United Provinces had reason to oppose the
latter as well as the former.

Under the combined assaults of the two rival nations, the intrinsic
weakness of the United Provinces was soon to be felt and seen. Open to
attack by the land, few in numbers, and with a government ill adapted
to put forth the united strength of a people, above all unfitted to
keep up adequate preparation for war, the decline of the republic and
the nation was to be more striking and rapid than the rise. As yet,
however, in 1660, no indications of the coming fall were remarked. The
republic was still in the front rank of the great powers of Europe.
If, in 1654, the war with England had shown a state of unreadiness
wonderful in a navy that had so long humbled the pride of Spain on the
seas, on the other hand the Provinces, in 1657, had effectually put a
stop to the insults of France directed against her commerce; and a
year later, "by their interference in the Baltic between Denmark and
Sweden, they had hindered Sweden from establishing in the North a
preponderance disastrous to them. They forced her to leave open the
entrance to the Baltic, of which they remained masters, no other navy
being able to dispute its control with them. The superiority of their
fleet, the valor of their troops, the skill and firmness of their
diplomacy, had caused the prestige of their government to be
recognized. Weakened and humiliated by the last English war, they had
replaced themselves in the rank of great powers. At this moment
Charles II. was restored."

The general character of the government has been before mentioned, and
need here only be recalled. It was a loosely knit confederacy,
administered by what may not inaccurately be called a commercial
aristocracy, with all the political timidity of that class, which has
so much to risk in war. The effect of these two factors, sectional
jealousy and commercial spirit, upon the military navy was disastrous.
It was not kept up properly in peace, there were necessarily rivalries
in a fleet which was rather a maritime coalition than a united navy,
and there was too little of a true military spirit among the officers.
A more heroic people than the Dutch never existed; the annals of Dutch
sea-fights give instances of desperate enterprise and endurance
certainly not excelled, perhaps never equalled, elsewhere; but they
also exhibit instances of defection and misconduct which show a lack
of military spirit, due evidently to lack of professional pride and
training. This professional training scarcely existed in any navy of
that day, but its place was largely supplied in monarchical countries
by the feeling of a military caste. It remains to be noted that the
government, weak enough from the causes named, was yet weaker from the
division of the people into two great factions bitterly hating each
other. The one, which was the party of the merchants (burgomasters),
and now in power, favored the confederate republic as described; the
other desired a monarchical government under the House of Orange. The
Republican party wished for a French alliance, if possible, and a
strong navy; the Orange party favored England, to whose royal house
the Prince of Orange was closely related, and a powerful army. Under
these conditions of government, and weak in numbers, the United
Provinces in 1660, with their vast wealth and external activities,
resembled a man kept up by stimulants. Factitious strength cannot
endure indefinitely; but it is wonderful to see this small State,
weaker by far in numbers than either England or France, endure the
onslaught of either singly, and for two years of both in alliance, not
only without being destroyed, but without losing her place in Europe.
She owed this astonishing result partly to the skill of one or two
men, but mainly to her sea power.

The conditions of England, with reference to her fitness to enter upon
the impending strife, differed from those of both Holland and France.
Although monarchical in government, and with much real power in the
king's hands, the latter was not able to direct the policy of the
kingdom wholly at his will. He had to reckon, as Louis had not, with
the temper and wishes of his people. What Louis gained for France, he
gained for himself; the glory of France was his glory. Charles aimed
first at his own advantage, then at that of England; but, with the
memory of the past ever before him, he was determined above all not to
incur his father's fate nor a repetition of his own exile. Therefore,
when danger became imminent, he gave way before the feeling of the
English nation. Charles himself hated Holland; he hated it as a
republic; he hated the existing government because opposed in internal
affairs to his connections, the House of Orange; and he hated it yet
more because in the days of his exile, the republic, as one of the
conditions of peace with Cromwell, had driven him from her borders. He
was drawn to France by the political sympathy of a would-be absolute
ruler, possibly by his Roman Catholic bias, and very largely by the
money paid him by Louis, which partially freed him from the control of
Parliament. In following these tendencies of his own, Charles had to
take account of certain decided wishes of his people. The English, of
the same race as the Dutch, and with similar conditions of situation,
were declared rivals for the control of the sea and of commerce; and
as the Dutch were now leading in the race, the English were the more
eager and bitter. A special cause of grievance was found in the action
of the Dutch East India Company, "which claimed the monopoly of trade
in the East, and had obliged distant princes with whom it treated to
close their States to foreign nations, who were thus excluded, not
only from the Dutch colonies, but from all the territory of the
Indies." Conscious of greater strength, the English also wished to
control the action of Dutch politics, and in the days of the English
Republic had even sought to impose a union of the two governments. At
the first, therefore, popular rivalry and enmity seconded the king's
wishes; the more so as France had not for some years been formidable
on the continent. As soon, however, as the aggressive policy of Louis
XIV. was generally recognized, the English people, both nobles and
commons, felt the great danger to be there, as a century before it had
been in Spain. The transfer of the Spanish Netherlands (Belgium) to
France would tend toward the subjection of Europe, and especially
would be a blow to the sea power both of the Dutch and English; for it
was not to be supposed that Louis would allow the Scheldt and port of
Antwerp to remain closed, as they then were, under a treaty wrung by
the Dutch from the weakness of Spain. The reopening to commerce of
that great city would be a blow alike to Amsterdam and to London. With
the revival of inherited opposition to France the ties of kindred
began to tell; the memory of past alliance against the tyranny of
Spain was recalled; and similarity of religious faith, still a
powerful motive, drew the two together. At the same time the great and
systematic efforts of Colbert to build up the commerce and the navy of
France excited the jealousy of both the sea powers; rivals themselves,
they instinctively turned against a third party intruding upon their
domain. Charles was unable to resist the pressure of his people under
all these motives; wars between England and Holland ceased, and were
followed, after Charles's death, by close alliance.

Although her commerce was less extensive, the navy of England in 1660
was superior to that of Holland, particularly in organization and
efficiency. The stern, enthusiastic religious government of Cromwell,
grounded on military strength, had made its mark both on the fleet and
army. The names of several of the superior officers under the
Protector, among which that of Monk stands foremost, appear in the
narrative of the first of the Dutch wars under Charles. This
superiority in tone and discipline gradually disappeared under the
corrupting influence of court favor in a licentious government; and
Holland, which upon the whole was worsted by England alone upon the
sea in 1665, successfully resisted the combined navies of England and
France in 1672. As regards the material of the three fleets, we are
told that the French ships had greater displacement than the English
relatively to the weight of artillery and stores; hence they could
keep, when fully loaded, a greater height of battery. Their hulls also
had better lines. These advantages would naturally follow from the
thoughtful and systematic way in which the French navy at that time
was restored from a state of decay, and has a lesson of hope for us in
the present analogous condition of our own navy. The Dutch ships, from
the character of their coast, were flatter-bottomed and of less
draught, and thus were able, when pressed, to find a refuge among the
shoals; but they were in consequence less weatherly and generally of
lighter scantling than those of either of the other nations.

Thus as briefly as possible have been sketched the conditions, degree
of power, and aims which shaped and controlled the policy of the four
principal seaboard States of the day,--Spain, France, England, and
Holland. From the point of view of this history, these will come most
prominently and most often into notice; but as other States exercised
a powerful influence upon the course of events, and our aim is not
merely naval history but an appreciation of the effect of naval and
commercial power upon the course of general history, it is necessary
to state shortly the condition of the rest of Europe. America had not
yet begun to play a prominent part in the pages of history or in the
policies of cabinets.

Germany was then divided into many small governments, with the one
great empire of Austria. The policy of the smaller States shifted, and
it was the aim of France to combine as many of them as possible under
her influence, in pursuance of her traditional opposition to Austria.
With France thus working against her on the one side, Austria was in
imminent peril on the other from the constant assaults of the Turkish
Empire, still vigorous though decaying. The policy of France had long
inclined to friendly relations with Turkey, not only as a check upon
Austria, but also from her wish to engross the trade with the Levant.
Colbert, in his extreme eagerness for the sea power of France, favored
this alliance. It will be remembered that Greece and Egypt were then
parts of the Turkish Empire.

Prussia as now known did not exist. The foundations of the future
kingdom were then being prepared by the Elector of Brandenburg, a
powerful minor State, which was not yet able to stand quite alone, but
carefully avoided a formally dependent position. The kingdom of Poland
still existed, a most disturbing and important factor in European
politics, because of its weak and unsettled government, which kept
every other State anxious lest some unforeseen turn of events there
should tend to the advantage of a rival. It was the traditional policy
of France to keep Poland upright and strong. Russia was still below
the horizon; coming, but not yet come, within the circle of European
States and their living interests. She and the other powers bordering
upon the Baltic were naturally rivals for preponderance in that sea,
in which the other States, and above all the maritime States, had a
particular interest as the source from which naval stores of every
kind were chiefly drawn. Sweden and Denmark were at this time in a
state of constant enmity, and were to be found on opposite sides in
the quarrels that prevailed. For many years past, and during the early
wars of Louis XIV., Sweden was for the most part in alliance with
France; her bias was that way.

The general state of Europe being as described, the spring that was to
set the various wheels in motion was in the hands of Louis XIV. The
weakness of his immediate neighbors, the great resources of his
kingdom, only waiting for development, the unity of direction
resulting from his absolute power, his own practical talent and
untiring industry, aided during the first half of his reign by a
combination of ministers of singular ability, all united to make every
government in Europe hang more or less upon his action, and be
determined by, if not follow, his lead. The greatness of France was
his object, and he had the choice of advancing it by either of two
roads,--by the land or by the sea; not that the one wholly forbade the
other, but that France, overwhelmingly strong as she then was, had not
power to move with equal steps on both paths.

Louis chose extension by land. He had married the eldest daughter of
Philip IV., the then reigning king of Spain; and though by the treaty
of marriage she had renounced all claim to her father's inheritance,
it was not difficult to find reasons for disregarding this
stipulation. Technical grounds were found for setting it aside as
regarded certain portions of the Netherlands and Franche Comté, and
negotiations were entered into with the court of Spain to annul it
altogether. The matter was the more important because the male heir to
the throne was so feeble that it was evident that the Austrian line of
Spanish kings would end in him. The desire to put a French prince on
the Spanish throne--either himself, thus uniting the two crowns, or
else one of his family, thus putting the House of Bourbon in authority
on both sides of the Pyrenees--was the false light which led Louis
astray during the rest of his reign, to the final destruction of the
sea power of France and the impoverishment and misery of his people.
Louis failed to understand that he had to reckon with all Europe. The
direct project on the Spanish throne had to wait for a vacancy; but he
got ready at once to move upon the Spanish possessions to the east of
France.

In order to do this more effectually, he cut off from Spain every
possible ally by skilful diplomatic intrigues, the study of which
would give a useful illustration of strategy in the realm of politics,
but he made two serious mistakes to the injury of the sea power of
France. Portugal had until twenty years before been united to the
crown of Spain, and the claim to it had not been surrendered. Louis
considered that were Spain to regain that kingdom she would be too
strong for him easily to carry out his aims. Among other means of
prevention he promoted a marriage between Charles II. and the Infanta
of Portugal, in consequence of which Portugal ceded to England, Bombay
in India, and Tangiers in the Straits of Gibraltar, which was reputed
an excellent port. We see here a French king, in his eagerness for
extension by land, inviting England to the Mediterranean, and
forwarding her alliance with Portugal. The latter was the more
curious, as Louis already foresaw the failure of the Spanish royal
house, and should rather have wished the union of the peninsular
kingdoms. As a matter of fact, Portugal became a dependent and outpost
of England, by which she readily landed in the Peninsula down to the
days of Napoleon. Indeed, if independent of Spain, she is too weak not
to be under the control of the power that rules the sea and so has
readiest access to her. Louis continued to support her against Spain,
and secured her independence. He also interfered with the Dutch, and
compelled them to restore Brazil, which they had taken from the
Portuguese.

On the other hand, Louis obtained from Charles II. the cession of
Dunkirk on the Channel, which had been seized and used by Cromwell.
This surrender was made for money, and was inexcusable from the
maritime point of view. Dunkirk was for the English a bridge-head into
France. To France it became a haven for privateers, the bane of
England's commerce in the Channel and the North Sea. As the French sea
power waned, England in treaty after treaty exacted the dismantling of
the works of Dunkirk, which it may be said in passing was the home
port of the celebrated Jean Bart and other great French privateersmen.

Meanwhile the greatest and wisest of Louis' ministers, Colbert, was
diligently building up that system of administration, which, by
increasing and solidly basing the wealth of the State, should bring a
surer greatness and prosperity than the king's more showy enterprises.
With those details that concern the internal development of the
kingdom this history has no concern, beyond the incidental mention
that production, both agricultural and manufacturing, received his
careful attention; but upon the sea a policy of skilful aggression
upon the shipping and commerce of the Dutch and English quickly began,
and was instantly resented. Great trading companies were formed,
directing French enterprise to the Baltic, to the Levant, to the East
and West Indies; customs regulations were amended to encourage French
manufactures, and to allow goods to be stored in bond in the great
ports, by which means it was hoped to make France take Holland's place
as the great warehouse for Europe, a function for which her
geographical position eminently fitted her; while tonnage duties on
foreign shipping, direct premiums on home-built ships, and careful,
rigorous colonial decrees giving French vessels the monopoly of trade
to and from the colonies, combined to encourage the growth of her
mercantile marine. England retaliated at once; the Dutch, more
seriously threatened because their carrying-trade was greater and
their home resources smaller, only remonstrated for a time; but after
three years they also made reprisals. Colbert, relying on the great
superiority of France as an actual, and still more as a possible
producer, feared not to move steadily on the grasping path marked out;
which, in building up a great merchant shipping, would lay the broad
base for the military shipping, which was being yet more rapidly
forced on by the measures of the State. Prosperity grew apace. At the
end of twelve years everything was flourishing, everything rich in the
State, which was in utter confusion when he took charge of the
finances and marine.

    "Under him," says a French historian, "France grew by peace as
    she had grown by war.... The warfare of tariffs and premiums
    skilfully conducted by him tended to reduce within just limits
    the exorbitant growth of commercial and maritime power which
    Holland had arrogated at the expense of other nations; and to
    restrain England, which was burning to wrest this supremacy from
    Holland in order to use it in a manner much more dangerous to
    Europe. The interest of France seemed to be peace in Europe and
    America; a mysterious voice, at once the voice of the past and
    of the future, called for her warlike activity on other
    shores."[19]

This voice found expression through the mouth of Leibnitz, one of the
world's great men, who pointed out to Louis that to turn the arms of
France against Egypt would give her, in the dominion of the
Mediterranean and the control of Eastern trade, a victory over Holland
greater than the most successful campaign on land; and while insuring
a much needed peace within his kingdom, would build up a power on the
sea that would insure preponderance in Europe. This memorial called
Louis from the pursuit of glory on the land to seek the durable
grandeur of France in the possession of a great sea power, the
elements of which, thanks to the genius of Colbert, he had in his
hands. A century later a greater man than Louis sought to exalt
himself and France by the path pointed out by Leibnitz; but Napoleon
did not have, as Louis had, a navy equal to the task proposed. This
project of Leibnitz will be more fully referred to when the narrative
reaches the momentous date at which it was broached; when Louis, with
his kingdom and navy in the highest pitch of efficiency, stood at the
point where the roads parted, and then took the one which settled that
France should not be the power of the sea. This decision, which killed
Colbert and ruined the prosperity of France, was felt in its
consequences from generation to generation afterward, as the great
navy of England, in war after war, swept the seas, insured the growing
wealth of the island kingdom through exhausting strifes, while drying
up the external resources of French trade and inflicting consequent
misery. The false line of policy that began with Louis XIV. also
turned France away from a promising career in India, in the days of
his successor.

   [Illustration: ENGLISH CHANNEL AND NORTH SEA.]

Meanwhile the two maritime States, England and Holland, though eying
France distrustfully, had greater and growing grudges against each
other, which under the fostering care of Charles II. led to war. The
true cause was doubtless commercial jealousy, and the conflict sprang
immediately from collisions between the trading companies. Hostilities
began on the west coast of Africa; and an English squadron, in 1664,
after subduing several Dutch stations there, sailed to New Amsterdam
(now New York), and seized it. All these affairs took place before the
formal declaration of war in February, 1665. This war was undoubtedly
popular in England; the instinct of the people found an expression by
the lips of Monk, who is reported to have said, "What matters this or
that reason? What we want is more of the trade which the Dutch now
have." There is also little room to doubt that, despite the
pretensions of the trading companies, the government of the United
Provinces would gladly have avoided the war; the able man who was at
their head saw too clearly the delicate position in which they stood
between England and France. They claimed, however, the support of the
latter in virtue of a defensive treaty made in 1662. Louis allowed the
claim, but unwillingly; and the still young navy of France gave
practically no help.

The war between the two sea States was wholly maritime, and had the
general characteristics of all such wars. Three great battles were
fought,--the first off Lowestoft, on the Norfolk coast, June 13, 1665;
the second, known as the Four Days' Battle in the Straits of Dover,
often spoken of by French writers as that of the Pas de Calais,
lasting from the 11th to the 14th of June, 1666; and the third, off
the North Foreland, August 4 of the same year. In the first and last
of these the English had a decided success; in the second the
advantage remained with the Dutch. This one only will be described at
length, because of it alone has been found such a full, coherent
account as will allow a clear and accurate tactical narrative to be
given. There are in these fights points of interest more generally
applicable to the present day than are the details of somewhat
obsolete tactical movements.

In the first battle off Lowestoft, it appears that the Dutch
commander, Opdam, who was not a seaman but a cavalry officer, had
very positive orders to fight; the discretion proper to a
commander-in-chief on the spot was not intrusted to him. To interfere
thus with the commander in the field or afloat is one of the most
common temptations to the government in the cabinet, and is generally
disastrous. Tourville, the greatest of Louis XIV.'s admirals, was
forced thus to risk the whole French navy against his own judgment;
and a century later a great French fleet escaped from the English
admiral Keith, through his obedience to imperative orders from his
immediate superior, who was sick in port.

In the Lowestoft fight the Dutch van gave way; and a little later one
of the junior admirals of the centre, Opdam's own squadron, being
killed, the crew was seized with a panic, took the command of the
ship from her officers, and carried her out of action. This movement
was followed by twelve or thirteen other ships, leaving a great gap in
the Dutch line. The occurrence shows, what has before been pointed
out, that the discipline of the Dutch fleet and the tone of the
officers were not high, despite the fine fighting qualities of the
nation, and although it is probably true that there were more good
seamen among the Dutch than among the English captains. The natural
steadfastness and heroism of the Hollanders could not wholly supply
that professional pride and sense of military honor which it is the
object of sound military institutions to encourage. Popular feeling in
the United States is pretty much at sea in this matter; there is with
it no intermediate step between personal courage with a gun in its
hand and entire military efficiency.

Opdam, seeing the battle going against him, seems to have yielded to a
feeling approaching despair. He sought to grapple the English
commander-in-chief, who on this day was the Duke of York, the king's
brother. He failed in this, and in the desperate struggle which
followed, his ship blew up. Shortly after, three, or as one account
says four, Dutch ships ran foul of one another, and this group was
burned by one fire-ship; three or four others singly met the same fate
a little later. The Dutch fleet was now in disorder, and retreated
under cover of the squadron of Van Tromp, son of the famous old
admiral who in the days of the Commonwealth sailed through the Channel
with a broom at his masthead.

Fire-ships are seen here to have played a very conspicuous part, more
so certainly than in the war of 1653, though at both periods they
formed an appendage to the fleet. There is on the surface an evident
resemblance between the rôle of the fire-ship and the part assigned in
modern warfare to the torpedo-cruiser. The terrible character of the
attack, the comparative smallness of the vessel making it, and the
large demands upon the nerve of the assailant, are the chief points of
resemblance; the great points of difference are the comparative
certainty with which the modern vessel can be handled, which is
partly met by the same advantage in the iron-clad over the old
ship-of-the-line, and the instantaneousness of the injury by torpedo,
whose attack fails or succeeds at once, whereas that of the fire-ship
required time for effecting the object, which in both cases is total
destruction of the hostile ship, instead of crippling or otherwise
reducing it. An appreciation of the character of fire-ships, of the
circumstances under which they attained their greatest usefulness, and
of the causes which led to their disappearance, may perhaps help in
the decision to which nations must come as to whether the
torpedo-cruiser, pure and simple, is a type of weapon destined to
survive in fleets.

A French officer, who has been examining the records of the French
navy, states that the fire-ship first appears, incorporated as an arm
of the fleet, in 1636.

    "Whether specially built for the purpose, or whether altered
    from other purposes to be fitted for their particular end, they
    received a special equipment. The command was given to officers
    not noble, with the grade of captain of fire-ship. Five
    subordinate officers and twenty-five seamen made up the crew.
    Easily known by grappling-irons which were always fitted to
    their yards, the fire-ship saw its rôle growing less in the
    early years of the eighteenth century. It was finally to
    disappear from the fleets _whose speed it delayed and whose
    evolutions were by it complicated_. As the ships-of-war grew
    larger, their action in concert with fire-ships became daily
    more difficult. On the other hand, there had already been
    abandoned the idea of combining them with the fighting-ships to
    form a few _groups_, _each_ provided with all the means of
    attack and defence. The formation of the close-hauled
    line-of-battle, by assigning the fire-ships a place in a second
    line placed half a league on the side farthest from the enemy,
    made them more and more unfitted to fulfil their office. The
    official plan of the battle of Malaga (1704), drawn up
    immediately after the battle, shows the fire-ship in this
    position as laid down by Paul Hoste. Finally the use of shells,
    enabling ships to be set on fire more surely and quickly, and
    introduced on board at the period of which we are now treating,
    though the general use did not obtain until much later, was the
    last blow to the fire-ship."[20]

Those who are familiar with the theories and discussions of our own
day on the subject of fleet tactics and weapons, will recognize in
this short notice of a long obsolete type certain ideas which are not
obsolete. The fire-ship disappeared from fleets "whose speed it
delayed." In heavy weather small bulk must always mean comparatively
small speed. In a moderate sea, we are now told, the speed of the
torpedo-boat falls from twenty knots to fifteen or less, and the
seventeen to nineteen knot cruiser can either run away from the
pursuing boats, or else hold them at a distance under fire of machine
and heavy guns. These boats are sea-going, "and it is thought can keep
the sea in all weathers; but to be on board a 110-foot torpedo-boat,
when the sea is lively, is said to be far from agreeable. The heat,
noise, and rapid vibrations of the engines are intense. Cooking seems
to be out of the question, and it is said that if food were well
cooked few would be able to appreciate it. To obtain necessary rest
under these conditions, added to the rapid motions of the boat, is
most difficult." Larger boats are to be built; but the factor of loss
of speed in rough weather will remain, unless the size of the
torpedo-cruiser is increased to a point that will certainly lead to
fitting them with something more than torpedoes. Like fire-ships,
_small_ torpedo-cruisers will delay the speed and complicate the
evolutions of the fleet with which they are associated.[21] The
disappearance of the fire-ship was also hastened, we are told, by the
introduction of shell firing, or incendiary projectiles; and it is not
improbable that for deep-sea fighting the transfer of the torpedo to a
class of larger ships will put an end to the mere torpedo-cruiser. The
fire-ship continued to be used against fleets at anchor down to the
days of the American Civil War; and the torpedo-boat will always be
useful within an easy distance of its port.

A third phase of naval practice two hundred years ago, mentioned in
the extract quoted, involves an idea very familiar to modern
discussions; namely, the group formation. "The idea of combining
fire-ships with the fighting-ships to form a few groups, each provided
with all the means of attack and defence," was for a time embraced;
for we are told that it was later on abandoned. The combining of the
ships of a fleet into groups of two, three, or four meant to act
specially together is now largely favored in England; less so in
France, where it meets strong opposition. No question of this sort,
ably advocated on either side, is to be settled by one man's judgment,
nor until time and experience have applied their infallible tests. It
may be remarked, however, that in a well-organized fleet there are two
degrees of command which are in themselves both natural and necessary,
that can be neither done away nor ignored; these are the command of
the whole fleet as one unit, and the command of each ship as a unit in
itself. When a fleet becomes too large to be handled by one man, it
must be subdivided, and in the heat of action become practically two
fleets acting to one common end; as Nelson, in his noble order at
Trafalgar, said, "The second in command will, _after_ my intentions
are made known to him" (mark the force of the "after," which so well
protects the functions both of the commander-in-chief and the second),
"have the entire direction of his line, to make the attack upon the
enemy, and to follow up the blow until they are captured or
destroyed."

The size and cost of the individual iron-clad of the present day makes
it unlikely that fleets will be so numerous as to require subdivision;
but whether they are or not does not affect the decision of the group
question. Looking simply to the principle underlying the theory, and
disregarding the seeming tactical clumsiness of the special groups
proposed, the question is: Shall there be introduced between the
natural commands of the admiral and of the captains of individual
ships a third artificial contrivance, which on the one hand will in
effect partly supersede the supreme authority, and on the other will
partly fetter the discretion of commanders of ships? A further
difficulty springing from the narrow principle of support specially
due to particular ships, on which the group system rests, is this:
that when signals can no longer be seen, the duty of the captain to
his own ship and to the fleet at large will be complicated by his duty
to observe certain relations to particular ships; which particular
ships must in time come to have undue prominence in his views. The
group formation had its day of trial in old times, and disappeared
before the test of experience; whether in its restored form it will
survive, time will show. It may be said, before quitting the subject,
that as an order of sailing, corresponding to the route-step of an
army in march, a loose group formation has some advantages;
maintaining some order without requiring that rigid exactness of
position, to observe which by day and night must be a severe strain on
captain and deck-officers. Such a route-order should not, however, be
permitted until a fleet has reached high tactical precision.

To return to the question of fire-ships and torpedo-boats, the rôle of
the latter, it is often said, is to be found in that _mêlée_ which is
always to succeed a couple of headlong passes between the opposing
fleets. In the smoke and confusion of that hour is the opportunity of
the torpedo-boat. This certainly sounds plausible, and the torpedo
vessel certainly has a power of movement not possessed by the
fire-ship. A _mêlée_ of the two fleets, however, was not the condition
most favorable for the fire-ship. I shall quote here from another
French officer, whose discussion of these Anglo-Dutch sea-fights, in a
late periodical, is singularly clear and suggestive. He says:

    "Far from impeding the direct action of the fire-ship, which was
    naught or nearly so during the confused battles of the war of
    1652, the regularity and _ensemble_ newly attained in the
    movements of squadrons seem rather to favor it. The fire-ships
    played a very important part at the battles of Lowestoft, Pas de
    Calais, and the North Foreland. Thanks to the good order
    preserved by the ships-of-the-line, these incendiary ships can
    indeed be better protected by the artillery; much more
    efficiently directed than before toward a distinct and
    determined end."[22]

In the midst of the confused _mêlées_ of 1652 the fire-ship "acted, so
to speak, alone, seeking by chance an enemy to grapple, running the
risk of a mistake, without protection against the guns of the enemy,
nearly sure to be sunk by him or else burned uselessly. All now, in
1665, has become different. Its prey is clearly pointed out; it knows
it, follows it easily into the relatively fixed position had by it in
the enemy's line. On the other hand, the ships of his own division do
not lose sight of the fire-ship. They accompany it as far as possible,
cover it with their artillery to the end of its course, and disengage
it before burning, if the fruitlessness of the attempt is seen soon
enough. Evidently under such conditions its action, always uncertain
(it cannot be otherwise), nevertheless acquires greater chances of
success." These instructive comments need perhaps the qualifying, or
additional, remark that confusion in the enemy's order at the time
that your own remains good gives the best opening for a desperate
attack. The writer goes on to trace the disappearance of the
fire-ship:--

    "Here then we see the fire-ship at the point of its highest
    importance. That importance will decrease, the fire-ship itself
    will end by disappearing from engagements in _the open sea_,
    when naval artillery becoming more perfect shall have greater
    range, be more accurate and more rapid;[23] when ships receiving
    better forms, greater steering power, more extensive and better
    balanced sail power, shall be able, thanks to quicker speed and
    handling, to avoid almost certainly the fire-ships sent against
    them; when, finally, fleets led on principles of tactics as
    skilful as they were timid, a tactics which will predominate a
    century later during the whole war of American Independence,
    when these fleets, in order not to jeopardize the perfect
    regularity of their order of battle, will avoid coming to close
    quarters, and will leave to the cannon alone to decide the fate
    of an action."

In this discussion the writer has in view the leading feature which,
while aiding the action of the fire-ship, also gives this war of 1665
its peculiar interest in the history of naval tactics. In it is found
for the first time the close-hauled line-of-battle undeniably adopted
as the fighting order of the fleets. It is plain enough that when
those fleets numbered, as they often did, from eighty to a hundred
ships, such lines would be very imperfectly formed in every essential,
both of line and interval; but the general aim is evident, amid
whatever imperfections of execution. The credit for this development
is generally given to the Duke of York, afterward James II.; but the
question to whom the improvement is due is of little importance to
sea-officers of the present day when compared with the instructive
fact that so long a time elapsed between the appearance of the large
sailing-ship, with its broadside battery, and the systematic adoption
of the order which was best adapted to develop the full power of the
fleet for mutual support. To us, having the elements of the problem in
our hands, together with the result finally reached, that result seems
simple enough, almost self-evident. Why did it take so long for the
capable men of that day to reach it? The reason--and herein lies the
lesson for the officer of to-day--was doubtless the same that leaves
the order of battle so uncertain now; namely, that the necessity of
war did not force men to make up their minds, until the Dutch at last
met in the English their equals on the sea. The sequence of ideas
which resulted in the line-of-battle is clear and logical. Though
familiar enough to seamen, it will be here stated in the words of the
writer last quoted, because they have a neatness and precision
entirely French:--

    "With the increase of power of the ship-of-war, and with the
    perfecting of its sea and warlike qualities, there has come an
    equal progress in the art of utilizing them.... As naval
    evolutions become more skilful, their importance grows from day
    to day. To these evolutions there is needed a base, a point from
    which they depart and to which they return. A fleet of war-ships
    must be always ready to meet an enemy; logically, therefore,
    this point of departure for naval evolutions must be the order
    of battle. Now, since the disappearance of galleys, almost all
    the artillery is found upon the sides of a ship of war. Hence
    it is the beam that must necessarily and always be turned toward
    the enemy. On the other hand, it is necessary that the sight of
    the latter must never be interrupted by a friendly ship. Only
    one formation allows the ships of the same fleet to satisfy
    fully these conditions. That formation is the line ahead
    [column]. This line, therefore, is imposed as the only order of
    battle, and consequently as the basis of all fleet tactics. In
    order that this order of battle, this long thin line of guns,
    may not be injured or broken at some point weaker than the rest,
    there is at the same time felt the necessity of putting in it
    only ships which, if not of equal force, have at least equally
    strong sides. Logically it follows, at the same moment in which
    the line ahead became definitively the order for battle, there
    was established the distinction between the ships 'of the line,'
    alone destined for a place therein, and the lighter ships meant
    for other uses."

If to these we add the considerations which led to making the
line-of-battle a close-hauled line, we have the problem fully worked
out. But the chain of reasoning was as clear two hundred and fifty
years ago as it is now; why then was it so long in being worked out?
Partly, no doubt, because old traditions--in those days traditions of
galley-fighting--had hold of and confused men's minds; chiefly because
men are too indolent to seek out the foundation truths of the
situation in their day, and develop the true theory of action from its
base up. As a rare instance of clear-sightedness, recognizing such a
fundamental change in conditions and predicting results, words of
Admiral Labrousse of the French navy, written in 1840, are most
instructive. "Thanks to steam," he wrote, "ships will be able to move
in any direction with such speed that the effects of collision may,
and indeed must, as they formerly did, take the place of projectile
weapons and annul the calculations of the skilful manoeuvrer. The ram
will be favorable to speed, without destroying the nautical qualities
of a ship. As soon as one power shall have adopted this terrible
weapon, all others must accept it, under pain of evident inferiority,
and thus combats will become combats of ram against ram." While
forbearing the unconditional adhesion to the ram as the controlling
weapon of the day, which the French navy has yielded, the above brief
argument may well be taken as an instance of the way in which
researches into the order of battle of the future should be worked
out. A French writer, commenting on Labrousse's paper, says:--

    "Twenty-seven years were scarce enough for our fathers, counting
    from 1638, the date of building the 'Couronne,' to 1665, to pass
    from the tactical order of the line abreast, the order for
    galleys, to that of the line ahead. We ourselves needed
    twenty-nine years from 1830, when the first steamship was
    brought into our fleet, to 1859, when the application of the
    principle of ram-fighting was affirmed by laying down the
    'Solferino' and the 'Magenta' to work a revolution in the
    contrary direction; so true it is that truth is always slow in
    getting to the light.... This transformation was not sudden, not
    only because the new material required time to be built and
    armed, but above all, it is sad to say, because the necessary
    consequences of the new motive power escaped most minds."[24]

We come now to the justly celebrated Four Days' Battle of June, 1666,
which claims special notice, not only on account of the great number
of ships engaged on either side, nor yet only for the extraordinary
physical endurance of the men who kept up a hot naval action for so
many successive days, but also because the commanders-in-chief on
either side, Monk and De Ruyter, were the most distinguished seamen,
or rather sea-commanders, brought forth by their respective countries
in the seventeenth century. Monk was possibly inferior to Blake in the
annals of the English navy; but there is a general agreement that De
Ruyter is the foremost figure, not only in the Dutch service, but
among all the naval officers of that age. The account about to be
given is mainly taken from a recent number of the "Revue Maritime et
Coloniale,"[25] and is there published as a letter, recently
discovered, from a Dutch gentleman serving as volunteer on board De
Ruyter's ship, to a friend in France. The narrative is delightfully
clear and probable,--qualities not generally found in the description
of those long-ago fights; and the satisfaction it gave was increased
by finding in the Memoirs of the Count de Guiche, who also served as
volunteer in the fleet, and was taken to De Ruyter after his own
vessel had been destroyed by a fire-ship, an account confirming the
former in its principal details.[26] This additional pleasure was
unhappily marred by recognizing certain phrases as common to both
stories; and a comparison showed that the two could not be accepted as
independent narratives. There are, however, points of internal
difference which make it possible that the two accounts are by
different eye-witnesses, who compared and corrected their versions
before sending them out to their friends or writing them in their
journals.

The numbers of the two fleets were: English about eighty ships, the
Dutch about one hundred; but the inequality in numbers was largely
compensated by the greater size of many of the English. A great
strategic blunder by the government in London immediately preceded the
fight. The king was informed that a French squadron was on its way
from the Atlantic to join the Dutch. He at once divided his fleet,
sending twenty ships under Prince Rupert to the westward to meet the
French, while the remainder under Monk were to go east and oppose the
Dutch.

A position like that of the English fleet, threatened with an attack
from two quarters, presents one of the subtlest temptations to a
commander. The impulse is very strong to meet both by dividing his own
numbers as Charles did; but unless in possession of overwhelming force
it is an error, exposing both divisions to be beaten separately,
which, as we are about to see, actually happened in this case. The
result of the first two days was disastrous to the larger English
division under Monk, which was then obliged to retreat toward Rupert;
and probably the opportune return of the latter alone saved the
English fleet from a very serious loss, or at the least from being
shut up in their own ports. A hundred and forty years later, in the
exciting game of strategy that was played in the Bay of Biscay before
Trafalgar, the English admiral Cornwallis made precisely the same
blunder, dividing his fleet into two equal parts out of supporting
distance, which Napoleon at the time characterized as a glaring piece
of stupidity. The lesson is the same in all ages.

   [Illustration: Pl. I.]

The Dutch had sailed for the English coast with a fair easterly wind,
but it changed later to southwest with thick weather, and freshened,
so that De Ruyter, to avoid being driven too far, came to anchor
between Dunkirk and the Downs.[27] The fleet then rode with its head
to the south-southwest and the van on the right; while Tromp, who
commanded the rear division in the natural order, was on the left. For
some cause this left was most to windward, the centre squadron under
Ruyter being to leeward, and the right, or van, to leeward again of
the centre.[28] This was the position of the Dutch fleet at daylight
of June 11, 1666; and although not expressly so stated, it is likely,
from the whole tenor of the narratives, that it was not in good order.

The same morning Monk, who was also at anchor, made out the Dutch
fleet to leeward, and although so inferior in numbers determined to
attack at once, hoping that by keeping the advantage of the wind he
would be able to commit himself only so far as might seem best. He
therefore stood along the Dutch line on the starboard tack, leaving
the right and centre out of cannon-shot, until he came abreast of the
left, Tromp's squadron. Monk then had thirty-five ships well in hand;
but the rear had opened and was straggling, as is apt to be the case
with long columns. With the thirty-five he then put his helm up and
ran down for Tromp, whose squadron cut their cables and made sail on
the same tack (V'); the two engaged lines thus standing over toward
the French coast, and the breeze heeling the ships so that the English
could not use their lower-deck guns (Fig. 2, V''). The Dutch centre
and rear also cut (Fig. 1, C'), and followed the movement, but being
so far to leeward, could not for some time come into action. It was
during this time that a large Dutch ship, becoming separated from her
own fleet, was set on fire and burned, doubtless the ship in which was
Count de Guiche.

As they drew near Dunkirk the English went about, probably all
together; for in the return to the northward and westward the proper
English van fell in with and was roughly handled by the Dutch centre
under Ruyter himself (Fig. 2, C''). This fate would be more likely to
befall the rear, and indicates that a simultaneous movement had
reversed the order. The engaged ships had naturally lost to leeward,
thus enabling Ruyter to fetch up with them. Two English flag-ships
were here disabled and cut off; one, the "Swiftsure," hauled down her
colors after the admiral, a young man of only twenty-seven, was
killed. "Highly to be admired," says a contemporary writer, "was the
resolution of Vice-Admiral Berkeley, who, though cut off from the
line, surrounded by enemies, great numbers of his men killed, his ship
disabled and boarded on all sides, yet continued fighting almost
alone, killed several with his own hand, and would accept no quarter;
till at length, being shot in the throat with a musket-ball, he
retired into the captain's cabin, where he was found dead, extended at
his full length upon a table, and almost covered with his own blood."
Quite as heroic, but more fortunate in its issue, was the conduct of
the other English admiral thus cut off; and the incidents of his
struggle, though not specially instructive otherwise, are worth
quoting, as giving a lively picture of the scenes which passed in the
heat of the contests of those days, and afford coloring to otherwise
dry details.

    "Being in a short time completely disabled, one of the enemy's
    fire-ships grappled him on the starboard quarter; he was,
    however, freed by the almost incredible exertions of his
    lieutenant, who, having in the midst of the flames loosed the
    grappling-irons, swung back on board his own ship unhurt. The
    Dutch, bent on the destruction of this unfortunate ship, sent a
    second which grappled her on the larboard side, and with greater
    success than the former; for the sails instantly taking fire,
    the crew were so terrified that nearly fifty of them jumped
    overboard. The admiral, Sir John Harman, seeing this confusion,
    ran with his sword drawn among those who remained, and
    threatened with instant death the first man who should attempt
    to quit the ship, or should not exert himself to quench the
    flames. The crew then returned to their duty and got the fire
    under; but the rigging being a good deal burned, one of the
    topsail yards fell and broke Sir John's leg. In the midst of
    this accumulated distress, a third fire-ship prepared to grapple
    him, but was sunk by the guns before she could effect her
    purpose. The Dutch vice-admiral, Evertzen, now bore down to him
    and offered quarter; but Sir John replied, 'No, no, it is not
    come to that yet,' and giving him a broadside, killed the Dutch
    commander; after which the other enemies sheered off."[29]

It is therefore not surprising that the account we have been following
reported two English flag-ships lost, one by a fire-ship. "The English
chief still continued on the port tack, and," says the writer, "as
night fell we could see him proudly leading his line past the squadron
of North Holland and Zealand [the actual rear, but proper van], which
from noon up to that time had not been able to reach the enemy [Fig.
2, R''] from their leewardly position." The merit of Monk's attack as
a piece of grand tactics is evident, and bears a strong resemblance to
that of Nelson at the Nile. Discerning quickly the weakness of the
Dutch order, he had attacked a vastly superior force in such a way
that only part of it could come into action; and though the English
actually lost more heavily, they carried off a brilliant prestige and
must have left considerable depression and heart-burning among the
Dutch. The eye-witness goes on: "The affair continued until ten P.M.,
friends and foes mixed together and as likely to receive injury from
one as from the other. It will be remarked that the success of the day
and the misfortunes of the English came from their being too much
scattered, too extended in their line; but for which we could never
have cut off a corner of them, as we did. The mistake of Monk was in
not keeping his ships better together;" that is, closed up. The remark
is just, the criticism scarcely so; the opening out of the line was
almost unavoidable in so long a column of sailing-ships, and was one
of the chances taken by Monk when he offered battle.

The English stood off on the port tack to the west or west-northwest,
and next day returned to the fight. The Dutch were now on the port
tack in natural order, the right leading, and were to windward; but
the enemy, being more weatherly and better disciplined, soon gained
the advantage of the wind. The English this day had forty-four ships
in action, the Dutch about eighty; many of the English, as before
said, larger. The two fleets passed on opposite tacks, the English to
windward;[30] but Tromp, in the rear, seeing that the Dutch order of
battle was badly formed, the ships in two or three lines, overlapping
and so masking each other's fire, went about and gained to windward of
the enemy's van (R'); which he was able to do from the length of the
line, and because the English, running parallel to the Dutch order,
were off the wind. "At this moment two flag-officers of the Dutch van
kept broad off, presenting their sterns to the English (V'). Ruyter,
greatly astonished, tried to stop them, but in vain, and therefore
felt obliged to imitate the manoeuvre in order to keep his squadron
together; but he did so with some order, keeping some ships around
him, and was joined by one of the van ships, disgusted with the
conduct of his immediate superior. Tromp was now in great danger,
separated [by his own act first and then by the conduct of the van]
from his own fleet by the English, and would have been destroyed but
for Ruyter, who, seeing the urgency of the case, hauled up for him,"
the van and centre thus standing back for the rear on the opposite
tack to that on which they entered action. This prevented the English
from keeping up the attack on Tromp, lest Ruyter should gain the wind
of them, which they could not afford to yield because of their very
inferior numbers. Both the action of Tromp and that of the junior
flag-officers in the van, though showing very different degrees of
warlike ardor, bring out strongly the lack of subordination and of
military feeling which has been charged against the Dutch officers as
a body; no signs of which appear among the English at this time.

How keenly Ruyter felt the conduct of his lieutenants was manifested
when "Tromp, immediately after this partial action, went on board his
flagship. The seamen cheered him; but Ruyter said, 'This is no time
for rejoicing, but rather for tears.' Indeed, our position was bad,
each squadron acting differently, in no line, and all the ships
huddled together like a flock of sheep, so packed that the English
might have surrounded all of them with their forty ships [June 12,
Fig. 2]. The English were in admirable order, but did not push their
advantage as they should, whatever the reason." The reason no doubt
was the same that often prevented sailing-ships from pressing an
advantage,--disability from crippled spars and rigging, added to the
inexpediency of such inferior numbers risking a decisive action.

Ruyter was thus able to draw his fleet out into line again, although
much maltreated by the English, and the two fleets passed again on
opposite tacks, the Dutch to leeward, and Ruyter's ship the last in
his column. As he passed the English rear, he lost his maintopmast and
mainyard. After another partial rencounter the English drew away to
the northwest toward their own shores, the Dutch following them; the
wind being still from southwest, but light. The English were now
fairly in retreat, and the pursuit continued all night, Ruyter's own
ship dropping out of sight in the rear from her crippled state.

The third day Monk continued retreating to the westward. He burned, by
the English accounts, three disabled ships, sent ahead those that were
most crippled, and himself brought up the rear with those that were in
fighting condition, which are variously stated, again by the English,
at twenty-eight and sixteen in number (Plate II., June 13). One of the
largest and finest of the English fleet, the "Royal Prince," of ninety
guns, ran aground on the Galloper Shoal and was taken by Tromp (Plate
II. a); but Monk's retreat was so steady and orderly that he was
otherwise unmolested. This shows that the Dutch had suffered very
severely. Toward evening Rupert's squadron was seen; and all the ships
of the English fleet, except those crippled in action, were at last
united.

The next day the wind came out again very fresh from the southwest,
giving the Dutch the weather-gage. The English, instead of attempting
to pass upon opposite tacks, came up from astern relying upon the
speed and handiness of their ships. So doing, the battle engaged all
along the line on the port tack, the English to leeward.[31] The Dutch
fire-ships were badly handled and did no harm, whereas the English
burned two of their enemies. The two fleets ran on thus, exchanging
broadsides for two hours, at the end of which time the bulk of the
English fleet had passed through the Dutch line.[32] All regularity of
order was henceforward lost. "At this moment," says the eye-witness,
"the lookout was extraordinary, for all were separated, the English as
well as we. But luck would have it that the largest of our fractions
surrounding the admiral remained to windward, and the largest fraction
of the English, also with their admiral, remained to leeward [Figs. 1
and 2, C and C']. This was the cause of our victory and their ruin.
Our admiral had with him thirty-five or forty ships of his own and of
other squadrons, for the squadrons were scattered and order much lost.
The rest of the Dutch ships had left him. The leader of the van, Van
Ness, had gone off with fourteen ships in chase of three or four
English ships, which under a press of sail had gained to windward of
the Dutch van [Fig. 1, V]. Van Tromp with the rear squadron had
fallen to leeward, and so had to keep on [to leeward of Ruyter and the
English main body, Fig. 1, R] after Van Ness, in order to rejoin the
admiral by passing round the English centre." De Ruyter and the
English main body kept up a sharp action, beating to windward all the
time. Tromp, having carried sail, overtook Van Ness, and returned
bringing the van back with him (V', R'); but owing to the constant
plying to windward of the English main body he came up to leeward of
it and could not rejoin Ruyter, who was to windward (Fig. 3, V'',
R''). Ruyter, seeing this, made signal to the ships around him, and
the main body of the Dutch kept away before the wind (Fig 3, C''),
which was then very strong. "Thus in less than no time we found
ourselves in the midst of the English; who, being attacked on both
sides, were thrown into confusion and saw their whole order destroyed,
as well by dint of the action, as by the strong wind that was then
blowing. This was the hottest of the fight [Fig. 3]. We saw the high
admiral of England separated from his fleet, followed only by one
fire-ship. With that he gained to windward, and passing through the
North Holland squadron, placed himself again at the head of fifteen or
twenty ships that rallied to him."

   [Illustration: Pl. II.]

Thus ended this great sea-fight, the most remarkable, in some of its
aspects, that has ever been fought upon the ocean. Amid conflicting
reports it is not possible to do more than estimate the results. A
fairly impartial account says: "The States lost in these actions three
vice-admirals, two thousand men, and four ships. The loss of the
English was five thousand killed and three thousand prisoners; and
they lost besides seventeen ships, of which nine remained in the hands
of the victors."[33] There is no doubt that the English had much the
worst of it, and that this was owing wholly to the original blunder of
weakening the fleet by a great detachment sent in another direction.
Great detachments are sometimes necessary evils, but in this case no
necessity existed. Granting the approach of the French, the proper
course for the English was to fall with their whole fleet upon the
Dutch before their allies could come up. This lesson is as applicable
to-day as it ever was. A second lesson, likewise of present
application, is the necessity of sound military institutions for
implanting correct military feeling, pride, and discipline. Great as
was the first blunder of the English, and serious as was the disaster,
there can be no doubt that the consequences would have been much worse
but for the high spirit and skill with which the plans of Monk were
carried out by his subordinates, and the lack of similar support to
Ruyter on the part of the Dutch subalterns. In the movements of the
English, we hear nothing of two juniors turning tail at a critical
moment, nor of a third, with misdirected ardor, getting on the wrong
side of the enemy's fleet. Their drill also, their tactical precision,
was remarked even then. The Frenchman De Guiche, after witnessing this
Four Days' Fight, wrote:--

    "Nothing equals the beautiful order of the English at sea. Never
    was a line drawn straighter than that formed by their ships;
    thus they bring all their fire to bear upon those who draw near
    them.... They fight like a line of cavalry which is handled
    according to rule, and applies itself solely to force back those
    who oppose; whereas the Dutch advance like cavalry whose
    squadrons leave their ranks and come separately to the
    charge."[34]

The Dutch government, averse to expense, unmilitary in its tone, and
incautious from long and easy victory over the degenerate navy of
Spain, had allowed its fleet to sink into a mere assembly of armed
merchantmen. Things were at their worst in the days of Cromwell.
Taught by the severe lessons of that war, the United Provinces, under
an able ruler, had done much to mend matters, but full efficiency had
not yet been gained.

    "In 1666 as in 1653," says a French naval writer, "the fortune
    of war seemed to lean to the side of the English. Of the three
    great battles fought two were decided victories; and the third,
    though adverse, had but increased the glory of her seamen. This
    was due to the intelligent boldness of Monk and Rupert, the
    talents of part of the admirals and captains, and the skill of
    the seamen and soldiers under them. The wise and vigorous
    efforts made by the government of the United Provinces, and the
    undeniable superiority of Ruyter in experience and genius over
    any one of his opponents, could not compensate for the weakness
    or incapacity of part of the Dutch officers, and the manifest
    inferiority of the men under their orders."[35]

England, as has been said before, still felt the impress of Cromwell's
iron hand upon her military institutions; but that impress was growing
weaker. Before the next Dutch war Monk was dead, and was poorly
replaced by the cavalier Rupert. Court extravagance cut down the
equipment of the navy as did the burgomaster's parsimony, and court
corruption undermined discipline as surely as commercial indifference.
The effect was evident when the fleets of the two countries met again,
six years later.

There was one well-known feature of all the military navies of that
day which calls for a passing comment; for its correct bearing and
value is not always, perhaps not generally, seen. The command of
fleets and of single vessels was often given to soldiers, to military
men unaccustomed to the sea, and ignorant how to handle the ship, that
duty being intrusted to another class of officer. Looking closely into
the facts, it is seen that this made a clean division between the
direction of the fighting and of the motive power of the ship. This is
the essence of the matter; and the principle is the same whatever the
motive power may be. The inconvenience and inefficiency of such a
system was obvious then as it is now, and the logic of facts gradually
threw the two functions into the hands of one corps of officers, the
result being the modern naval officer, as that term is generally
understood.[36] Unfortunately, in this process of blending, the less
important function was allowed to get the upper hand; the naval
officer came to feel more proud of his dexterity in managing the
motive power of his ship than of his skill in developing her military
efficiency. The bad effects of this lack of interest in military
science became most evident when the point of handling fleets was
reached, because for that military skill told most, and previous study
was most necessary; but it was felt in the single ship as well. Hence
it came to pass, and especially in the English navy, that the pride of
the seaman took the place of the pride of the military man. The
English naval officer thought more of that which likened him to the
merchant captain than of that which made him akin to the soldier. In
the French navy this result was less general, owing probably to the
more military spirit of the government, and especially of the
nobility, to whom the rank of officer was reserved. It was not
possible that men whose whole association was military, all of whose
friends looked upon arms as the one career for a gentleman, could
think more of the sails and rigging than of the guns or the fleet. The
English corps of officers was of different origin. There was more than
the writer thought in Macaulay's well-known saying: "There were seamen
and there were gentlemen in the navy of Charles II.; but the seamen
were not gentlemen, and the gentlemen were not seamen." The trouble
was not in the absence or presence of gentlemen as such, but in the
fact that under the conditions of that day the gentleman was
pre-eminently the military element of society; and that the seaman,
after the Dutch wars, gradually edged the gentleman, and with him the
military tone and spirit as distinguished from simple courage, out of
the service. Even "such men of family as Herbert and Russell, William
III.'s admirals," says the biographer of Lord Hawke, "were sailors
indeed, but only able to hold their own by adopting the boisterous
manners of the hardy tarpaulin." The same national traits which made
the French inferior as seamen made them superior as military men; not
in courage, but in skill. To this day the same tendency obtains; the
direction of the motive power has no such consideration as the
military functions in the navies of the Latin nations. The studious
and systematic side of the French character also inclined the French
officer, when not a trifler, to consider and develop tactical
questions in a logical manner; to prepare himself to handle fleets,
not merely as a seaman but as a military man. The result showed, in
the American Revolutionary War, that despite a mournful history of
governmental neglect, men who were first of all military men, inferior
though they were in opportunities as seamen to their enemies, could
meet them on more than equal terms as to tactical skill, and were
practically their superiors in handling fleets. The false theory has
already been pointed out, which directed the action of the French
fleet not to crushing its enemy, but to some ulterior aim; but this
does not affect the fact that in tactical skill the military men were
superior to the mere seamen, though their tactical skill was applied
to mistaken strategic ends. The source whence the Dutch mainly drew
their officers does not certainly appear; for while the English naval
historian in 1666 says that most of the captains of their fleet were
sons of rich burgomasters, placed there for political reasons by the
Grand Pensionary, and without experience, Duquesne, the ablest French
admiral of the day, comments in 1676 on the precision and skill of the
Dutch captains in terms very disparaging to his own. It is likely,
from many indications, that they were generally merchant seamen, with
little original military feeling; but the severity with which the
delinquents were punished both by the State and by popular frenzy,
seems to have driven these officers, who were far from lacking the
highest personal courage, into a sense of what military loyalty and
subordination required. They made a very different record in 1672 from
that of 1666.

Before finally leaving the Four Days' Fight, the conclusions of
another writer may well be quoted:--

    "Such was that bloody Battle of the Four Days, or Straits of
    Calais, the most memorable sea-fight of modern days; not,
    indeed, by its results, but by the aspect of its different
    phases; by the fury of the combatants; by the boldness and skill
    of the leaders; and by the new character which it gave to sea
    warfare. More than any other this fight marks clearly the
    passage from former methods to the tactics of the end of the
    seventeenth century. For the first time we can follow, as though
    traced upon a plan, the principal movements of the contending
    fleets. It seems quite clear that to the Dutch as well as to the
    British have been given a tactical book and a code of signals;
    or, at the least, written instructions, extensive and precise,
    to serve instead of such a code. We feel that each admiral now
    has his squadron in hand, and that even the commander-in-chief
    disposes at his will, during the fight, of the various
    subdivisions of his fleet. Compare this action with those of
    1652, and one plain fact stares you in the face,--that between
    the two dates naval tactics have undergone a revolution.

    "Such were the changes that distinguish the war of 1665 from
    that of 1652. As in the latter epoch, the admiral still thinks
    the weather-gage an advantage for his fleet; but it is no
    longer, from the tactical point of view, the principal, we might
    almost say the sole, preoccupation. Now he wishes above all to
    keep his fleet in good order and compact as long as possible, so
    as to keep the power of _combining_, during the action, the
    movements of the different squadrons. Look at Ruyter, at the end
    of the Four Days' Fight; with great difficulty he has kept to
    windward of the English fleet, yet he does not hesitate to
    sacrifice this advantage in order to unite the two parts of his
    fleet, which are separated by the enemy. If at the later fight
    off the North Foreland great intervals exist between the Dutch
    squadrons, if the rear afterward continues to withdraw from the
    centre, Ruyter deplores such a fault as the chief cause of his
    defeat. He so deplores it in his official report; he even
    accuses Tromp [who was his personal enemy] of treason or
    cowardice,--an unjust accusation, but which none the less shows
    the enormous importance thenceforth attached, during action, to
    the reunion of the fleet into a whole strictly and regularly
    maintained."[37]

This commentary is justified in so far as it points out general aims
and tendencies; but the results were not as complete as might be
inferred from it.

The English, notwithstanding their heavy loss in the Four Days'
Battle, were at sea again within two months, much to the surprise of
the Dutch; and on the 4th of August another severe fight was fought
off the North Foreland, ending in the complete defeat of the latter,
who retired to their own coasts. The English followed, and effected an
entrance into one of the Dutch harbors, where they destroyed a large
fleet of merchantmen as well as a town of some importance. Toward the
end of 1666 both sides were tired of the war, which was doing great
harm to trade, and weakening both navies to the advantage of the
growing sea power of France. Negotiations looking toward peace were
opened; but Charles II., ill disposed to the United Provinces,
confident that the growing pretensions of Louis XIV. to the Spanish
Netherlands would break up the existing alliance between Holland and
France, and relying also upon the severe reverses suffered at sea by
the Dutch, was exacting and haughty in his demands. To justify and
maintain this line of conduct he should have kept up his fleet, the
prestige of which had been so advanced by its victories. Instead of
that, poverty, the result of extravagance and of his home policy, led
him to permit it to decline; ships in large numbers were laid up; and
he readily adopted an opinion which chimed in with his penury, and
which, as it has had advocates at all periods of sea history, should
be noted and condemned here. This opinion, warmly opposed by Monk,
was:--

    "That as the Dutch were chiefly supported by trade, as the
    supply of their navy depended upon trade, and, as experience
    showed, nothing provoked the people so much as injuring their
    trade, his Majesty should therefore apply himself to this, which
    would effectually humble them, at the same time that it would
    less exhaust the English than fitting out such mighty fleets as
    had hitherto kept the sea every summer.... Upon these motives
    the king took a fatal resolution of laying up his great ships
    and keeping only a few frigates on the cruise."[38]

In consequence of this economical theory of carrying on a war, the
Grand Pensionary of Holland, De Witt, who had the year before caused
soundings of the Thames to be made, sent into the river, under De
Ruyter, a force of sixty or seventy ships-of-the-line, which on the
14th of June, 1667, went up as high as Gravesend, destroying ships at
Chatham and in the Medway, and taking possession of Sheerness. The
light of the fires could be seen from London, and the Dutch fleet
remained in possession of the mouth of the river until the end of the
month. Under this blow, following as it did upon the great plague and
the great fire of London, Charles consented to peace, which was signed
July 31, 1667, and is known as the Peace of Breda. The most lasting
result of the war was the transfer of New York and New Jersey to
England, thus joining her northern and southern colonies in North
America.

Before going on again with the general course of the history of the
times, it will be well to consider for a moment the theory which
worked so disastrously for England in 1667; that, namely, of
maintaining a sea-war mainly by preying upon the enemy's commerce.
This plan, which involves only the maintenance of a few swift cruisers
and can be backed by the spirit of greed in a nation, fitting out
privateers without direct expense to the State, possesses the specious
attractions which economy always presents. The great injury done to
the wealth and prosperity of the enemy is also undeniable; and
although to some extent his merchant-ships can shelter themselves
ignobly under a foreign flag while the war lasts, this _guerre de
course_, as the French call it, this commerce-destroying, to use our
own phrase, must, if in itself successful, greatly embarrass the
foreign government and distress its people. Such a war, however,
cannot stand alone; it must be _supported_, to use the military
phrase; unsubstantial and evanescent in itself, it cannot reach far
from its base. That base must be either home ports, or else some solid
outpost of the national power, on the shore or the sea; a distant
dependency or a powerful fleet. Failing such support, the cruiser can
only dash out hurriedly a short distance from home, and its blows,
though painful, cannot be fatal. It was not the policy of 1667, but
Cromwell's powerful fleets of ships-of-the-line in 1652, that shut
the Dutch merchantmen in their ports and caused the grass to grow in
the streets of Amsterdam. When, instructed by the suffering of that
time, the Dutch kept large fleets afloat through two exhausting wars,
though their commerce suffered greatly, they bore up the burden of the
strife against England and France united. Forty years later, Louis
XIV. was driven, by exhaustion, to the policy adopted by Charles II.
through parsimony. Then were the days of the great French privateers,
Jean Bart, Forbin, Duguay-Trouin, Du Casse, and others. The regular
fleets of the French navy were practically withdrawn from the ocean
during the great War of the Spanish Succession (1702-1712). The French
naval historian says:--

    "Unable to renew the naval armaments, Louis XIV. increased the
    number of cruisers upon the more frequented seas, especially the
    Channel and the German Ocean [not far from home, it will be
    noticed]. In these different spots the cruisers were always in a
    position to intercept or hinder the movements of transports
    laden with troops, and of the numerous convoys carrying supplies
    of all kinds. In these seas, in the centre of the commercial and
    political world, there is always work for cruisers.
    Notwithstanding the difficulties they met, owing to the absence
    of large friendly fleets, they served advantageously the cause
    of the two peoples [French and Spanish]. These cruisers, in the
    face of the Anglo-Dutch power, needed good luck, boldness, and
    skill. These three conditions were not lacking to our seamen;
    but then, what chiefs and what captains they had!"[39]

The English historian, on the other hand, while admitting how severely
the people and commerce of England suffered from the cruisers,
bitterly reflecting at times upon the administration, yet refers over
and over again to the increasing prosperity of the whole country, and
especially of its commercial part. In the preceding war, on the
contrary, from 1689 to 1697, when France sent great fleets to sea and
disputed the supremacy of the ocean, how different the result! The
same English writer says of that time:--

    "With respect to our trade it is certain that we suffered
    infinitely more, not merely than the French, for that was to be
    expected from the greater number of our merchant-ships, but than
    we ever did in any former war.... This proceeded in great
    measure from the vigilance of the French, who carried on the war
    in a piratical way. It is out of all doubt that, taking all
    together, our traffic suffered excessively; our merchants were
    many of them ruined."[40]

Macaulay says of this period: "During many months of 1693 the English
trade with the Mediterranean had been interrupted almost entirely.
There was no chance that a merchantman from London or Amsterdam would,
if unprotected, reach the Pillars of Hercules without being boarded by
a French privateer; and the protection of armed vessels was not easily
obtained." Why? Because the vessels of England's navy were occupied
watching the French navy, and this diversion of them from the cruisers
and privateers constituted the support which a commerce-destroying war
must have. A French historian, speaking of the same period in England
(1696), says: "The state of the finances was deplorable; money was
scarce, maritime insurance thirty per cent, the Navigation Act was
virtually suspended, and the English shipping reduced to the necessity
of sailing under the Swedish and Danish flags."[41] Half a century
later the French government was again reduced, by long neglect of the
navy, to a cruising warfare. With what results? First, the French
historian says: "From June, 1756, to June, 1760, French privateers
captured from the English more than twenty-five hundred merchantmen.
In 1761, though France had not, so to speak, a single ship-of-the-line
at sea, and though the English had taken two hundred and forty of our
privateers, their comrades still took eight hundred and twelve
vessels. But," he goes on to say, "the prodigious growth of the
English shipping explains the number of these prizes."[42] In other
words, the suffering involved to England in such numerous captures,
which must have caused great individual injury and discontent, did not
really prevent the growing prosperity of the State and of the
community at large. The English naval historian, speaking of the same
period, says: "While the commerce of France was nearly destroyed, the
trading-fleet of England covered the seas. Every year her commerce was
increasing; the money which the war carried out was returned by the
produce of her industry. Eight thousand merchant vessels were employed
by the English merchants." And again, summing up the results of the
war, after stating the immense amount of specie brought into the
kingdom by foreign conquests, he says: "The trade of England increased
gradually every year, and such a scene of national prosperity, while
waging a long, bloody, and costly war, was never before shown by any
people in the world." On the other hand, the historian of the French
navy, speaking of an earlier phase of the same wars, says: "The
English fleets, having nothing to resist them, swept the seas. Our
privateers and single cruisers, having no fleet to keep down the
abundance of their enemies, ran short careers. Twenty thousand French
seamen lay in English prisons."[43] When, on the other hand, in the
War of the American Revolution France resumed the policy of Colbert
and of the early reign of Louis XIV., and kept large battle-fleets
afloat, the same result again followed as in the days of Tourville.
"For the first time," says the Annual Register, forgetting or ignorant
of the experience of 1693, and remembering only the glories of the
later wars, "English merchant-ships were driven to take refuge under
foreign flags."[44] Finally, in quitting this part of the subject, it
may be remarked that in the island of Martinique the French had a
powerful distant dependency upon which to base a cruising warfare; and
during the Seven Years' War, as afterward during the First Empire, it,
with Guadeloupe, was the refuge of numerous privateers. "The records
of the English admiralty raise the losses of the English in the West
Indies during the first years of the Seven Years' War to fourteen
hundred merchantmen taken or destroyed." The English fleet was
therefore directed against the islands, both of which fell, involving
a loss to the trade of France greater than all the depredations of her
cruisers on the English commerce, besides breaking up the system; but
in the war of 1778 the great fleets protected the islands, which were
not even threatened at any time.

So far we have been viewing the effect of a purely cruising warfare,
not based upon powerful squadrons, only upon that particular part of
the enemy's strength against which it is theoretically directed,--upon
his commerce and general wealth; upon the sinews of war. The evidence
seems to show that even for its own special ends such a mode of war is
inconclusive, worrying but not deadly; it might almost be said that it
causes needless suffering. What, however, is the effect of this policy
upon the general ends of the war, to which it is one of the means, and
to which it is subsidiary? How, again, does it react upon the people
that practise it? As the historical evidences will come up in detail
from time to time, it need here only be summarized. The result to
England in the days of Charles II. has been seen,--her coast insulted,
her shipping burned almost within sight of her capital. In the War of
the Spanish Succession, when the control of Spain was the military
object, while the French depended upon a cruising war against
commerce, the navies of England and Holland, unopposed, guarded the
coasts of the peninsula, blocked the port of Toulon, forced the French
succors to cross the Pyrenees, and by keeping open the sea highway,
neutralized the geographical nearness of France to the seat of war.
Their fleets seized Gibraltar, Barcelona, and Minorca, and
co-operating with the Austrian army failed by little of reducing
Toulon. In the Seven Years' War the English fleets seized, or aided in
seizing, all the most valuable colonies of France and Spain, and made
frequent descents on the French coast. The War of the American
Revolution affords no lesson, the fleets being nearly equal. The next
most striking instance to Americans is the War of 1812. Everybody
knows how our privateers swarmed over the seas, and that from the
smallness of our navy the war was essentially, indeed solely, a
cruising war. Except upon the lakes, it is doubtful if more than two
of our ships at any time acted together. The injury done to English
commerce, thus unexpectedly attacked by a distant foe which had been
undervalued, may be fully conceded; but on the one hand, the American
cruisers were powerfully supported by the French fleet, which being
assembled in larger or smaller bodies in the many ports under the
emperor's control from Antwerp to Venice, tied the fleets of England
to blockade duty; and on the other hand, when the fall of the emperor
released them, our coasts were insulted in every direction, the
Chesapeake entered and controlled, its shores wasted, the Potomac
ascended, and Washington burned. The Northern frontier was kept in a
state of alarm, though there squadrons, absolutely weak but relatively
strong, sustained the general defence; while in the South the
Mississippi was entered unopposed, and New Orleans barely saved. When
negotiations for peace were opened, the bearing of the English toward
the American envoys was not that of men who felt their country to be
threatened with an unbearable evil. The late Civil War, with the
cruises of the "Alabama" and "Sumter" and their consorts, revived the
tradition of commerce-destroying. In so far as this is one means to a
general end, and is based upon a navy otherwise powerful, it is well;
but we need not expect to see the feats of those ships repeated in the
face of a great sea power. In the first place, those cruises were
powerfully supported by the determination of the United States to
blockade, not only the chief centres of Southern trade, but every
inlet of the coast, thus leaving few ships available for pursuit; in
the second place, had there been ten of those cruisers where there was
one, they would not have stopped the incursion in Southern waters of
the Union fleet, which penetrated to every point accessible from the
sea; and in the third place, the undeniable injury, direct and
indirect, inflicted upon individuals and upon one branch of the
nation's industry (and how high that shipping industry stands in the
writer's estimation need not be repeated), did not in the least
influence or retard the event of the war. Such injuries, unaccompanied
by others, are more irritating than weakening. On the other hand, will
any refuse to admit that the work of the great Union fleets powerfully
modified and hastened an end which was probably inevitable in any
case? As a sea power the South then occupied the place of France in
the wars we have been considering, while the situation of the North
resembled that of England; and, as in France, the sufferers in the
Confederacy were not a class, but the government and the nation at
large. It is not the taking of individual ships or convoys, be they
few or many, that strikes down the money power of a nation; it is the
possession of that overbearing power on the sea which drives the
enemy's flag from it, or allows it to appear only as a fugitive; and
which, by controlling the great common, closes the highways by which
commerce moves to and from the enemy's shores. This overbearing power
can only be exercised by great navies, and by them (on the broad sea)
less efficiently now than in the days when the neutral flag had not
its present immunity. It is not unlikely that, in the event of a war
between maritime nations, an attempt may be made by the one having a
great sea power and wishing to break down its enemy's commerce, to
interpret the phrase "effective blockade" in the manner that best
suits its interests at the time; to assert that the speed and disposal
of its ships make the blockade effective at much greater distances and
with fewer ships than formerly. The determination of such a question
will depend, not upon the weaker belligerent, but upon neutral powers;
it will raise the issue between belligerent and neutral rights; and if
the belligerent have a vastly overpowering navy he may carry his
point, just as England, when possessing the mastery of the seas, long
refused to admit the doctrine of the neutral flag covering the goods.

FOOTNOTES:

[16] Davies: History of Holland.

[17] République d'Angleterre.

[18] Lefèvre-Pontalis: Jean de Witt.

[19] Martin: History of France.

[20] Gougeard: Marine de Guerre.

[21] Since the above was written, the experience of the English autumn
manoeuvres of 1888 has verified this statement; not indeed that any
such experiment was needed to establish a self-evident fact.

[22] Chabaud-Arnault: Revue Mar. et Col. 1885.

[23] The recent development of rapid-firing and machine guns, with the
great increase of their calibre and consequent range and penetration,
reproduces this same step in the cycle of progress.

[24] Gougeard: Marine de Guerre.

[25] Vol. lxxxii. p. 137.

[26] Mémoires du Cte. de Guiche. À Londres, chez P. Changuion. 1743
pp. 234-264.

[27] See Map of English Channel and North Sea, page 107.

[28] Plate I., June 11, 1666, Fig. 1. V, van; C, centre; R, rear: in
this part of the action the Dutch order was inverted, so that the
actual van was the proper rear. The great number of ships engaged in
the fleet actions of these Anglo-Dutch wars make it impossible to
represent each ship and at the same time preserve clearness in the
plans. Each figure of a ship therefore represents a group more or less
numerous.

[29] Campbell: Lives of the Admirals.

[30] Plate I., June 12, Fig. 1, V, C, R.

[31] Plate II., June 14, Fig. 1, E, D.

[32] Fig. 1, V, C, R. This result was probably due simply to the
greater weatherliness of the English ships. It would perhaps be more
accurate to say that the Dutch had sagged to leeward so that they
drifted through the English line.

[33] Lefèvre-Pontalis. Jean de Witt.

[34] Mémoires, pp. 249, 251, 266, 267.

[35] Chabaud-Arnault: Revue Mar. et Col. 1885.

[36] The true significance of this change has often been
misunderstood, and hence erroneous inferences as to the future have
been drawn. It was not a case of the new displacing the old, but of
the military element in a military organization asserting its
necessary and inevitable control over all other functions.

[37] Chabaud-Arnault: Revue Mar. et Col. 1885.

[38] Campbell: Lives of the Admirals.

[39] Lapeyrouse-Bonfils: Hist. de la Marine Française.

[40] Campbell: Lives of the Admirals.

[41] Martin: History of France.

[42] Martin: History of France.

[43] Lapeyrouse-Bonfils.

[44] Annual Reg., vol. xxvii. p. 10.




CHAPTER III.

    WAR OF ENGLAND AND FRANCE IN ALLIANCE AGAINST THE UNITED
    PROVINCES, 1672-1674.--FINALLY, OF FRANCE AGAINST COMBINED
    EUROPE, 1674-1678.--SEA BATTLES OF SOLEBAY, THE TEXEL, AND
    STROMBOLI.


Shortly before the conclusion of the Peace of Breda, Louis XIV. made
his first step toward seizing parts of the Spanish Netherlands and
Franche Comté. At the same time that his armies moved forward, he sent
out a State paper setting forth his claims upon the territories in
question. This paper showed unmistakably the ambitious character of
the young king, roused the anxiety of Europe, and doubtless increased
the strength of the peace party in England. Under the leadership of
Holland, but with the hearty co-operation of the English minister, an
alliance was formed between the two countries and Sweden, hitherto the
friend of France, to check Louis' advance before his power became too
great. The attack first on the Netherlands in 1667, and then on
Franche Comté in 1668, showed the hopeless weakness of Spain to defend
her possessions; they fell almost without a blow.

The policy of the United Provinces, relative to the claims of Louis at
this time, was summed up in the phrase that "France was good as a
friend, but not as a neighbor." They were unwilling to break their
traditional alliance, but still more unwilling to have her on their
border. The policy of the English people, though not of their king,
turned toward the Dutch. In the increased greatness of Louis they saw
danger to all Europe; to themselves more especially if, by a settled
preponderance on the continent, his hands were free to develop his sea
power. "Flanders once in the power of Louis XIV.," wrote the English
ambassador Temple, "the Dutch feel that their country will be only a
maritime province of France;" and sharing that opinion, "he advocated
the policy of resistance to the latter country, whose domination in
the Low Countries he considered as a threatened subjection of all
Europe. He never ceased to represent to his government how dangerous
to England would be the conquest of the sea provinces by France, and
he urgently pointed out the need of a prompt understanding with the
Dutch. 'This would be the best revenge,' said he, 'for the trick
France has played us in involving us in the last war with the United
Provinces.'" These considerations brought the two countries together
in that Triple Alliance with Sweden which has been mentioned, and
which for a time checked the onward movement of Louis. But the wars
between the two sea nations were too recent, the humiliation of
England in the Thames too bitter, and the rivalries that still existed
too real, too deeply seated in the nature of things, to make that
alliance durable. It needed the dangerous power of Louis, and his
persistence in a course threatening to both, to weld the union of
these natural antagonists. This was not to be done without another
bloody encounter.

Louis was deeply angered at the Triple Alliance, and his wrath was
turned mainly upon Holland, in which from the necessities of her
position he recognized his most steadfast opponent. For the time,
however, he seemed to yield; the more readily because of the probable
approaching failure of the Spanish royal line, and the ambition he had
of getting more than merely the territory lying to the east of France,
when the throne became vacant. But, though he dissembled and yielded,
from that time he set his mind upon the destruction of the republic.
This policy was directly contrary to that laid down by Richelieu, and
to the true welfare of France. It was to England's interest, at least
just then, that the United Provinces should not be trodden down by
France; but it was much more to the interest of France that they
should not be subjected to England. England, free from the continent,
might stand alone upon the seas contending with France; but France,
hampered by her continental politics, could not hope to wrest the
control of the seas from England without an ally. This ally Louis
proposed to destroy, and he asked England to help him. The final
result is already known, but the outlines of the contest must now be
followed.

Before the royal purpose had passed into action, and while there was
still time to turn the energies of France into another channel, a
different course was proposed to the king. This was the project of
Leibnitz, before spoken of, which has special interest for our subject
because, in proposing to reverse the lines which Louis then laid down,
to make continental expansion secondary and growth beyond the sea the
primary object of France, the tendency avowedly and necessarily was to
base the greatness of the country upon the control of the sea and of
commerce. The immediate object offered to the France of that day, with
the attainment of which, however, she could not have stopped short,
was the conquest of Egypt; that country which, facing both the
Mediterranean and Eastern seas, gave control of the great commercial
route which in our own day has been completed by the Suez Canal. That
route had lost much of its value by the discovery of the way round the
Cape of Good Hope, and yet more by the unsettled and piratical
conditions of the seas through which it lay; but with a really strong
naval power occupying the key of the position it might have been
largely restored. Such a power posted in Egypt would, in the already
decaying condition of the Ottoman Empire, have controlled the trade
not only of India and the far East, but also of the Levant; but the
enterprise could not have stopped there. The necessity of mastering
the Mediterranean and opening the Red Sea, closed to Christian vessels
by Mohammedan bigotry, would have compelled the occupation of stations
on either side of Egypt; and France would have been led step by step,
as England has been led by the possession of India, to the seizure of
points like Malta, Cyprus, Aden, in short, to a great sea power. That
is clear now; but it will be interesting to hear the arguments by
which Leibnitz sought to convince the French king two hundred years
ago.

After pointing out the weakness of the Turkish Empire, and the
readiness with which it might be further embarrassed by stirring up
Austria and Poland, the latter the traditional ally of France; after
showing that France had no armed enemy in the Mediterranean, and that
on the other side of Egypt she would meet the Portuguese colonies,
longing to obtain protection against the Dutch in India, the memorial
proceeds:--

    "The conquest of Egypt, that Holland of the East, is infinitely
    easier than that of the United Provinces. France needs peace in
    the west, war at a distance. War with Holland will probably ruin
    the new Indian companies as well as the colonies and commerce
    lately revived by France, and will increase the burdens of the
    people while diminishing their resources. The Dutch will retire
    into their maritime towns, stand there on the defensive in
    perfect safety, and assume the offensive on the sea with great
    chance of success. If France does not obtain a complete victory
    over them, she loses all her influence in Europe, and by victory
    she endangers that influence. In Egypt, on the contrary, a
    repulse, almost impossible, will be of no great consequence, and
    victory will give the dominion of the seas, the commerce of the
    East and of India, the preponderance in Christendom, and even
    the empire of the East on the ruins of the Ottoman power. The
    possession of Egypt opens the way to conquests worthy of
    Alexander; the extreme weakness of the Orientals is no longer a
    secret. Whoever has Egypt will have all the coasts and islands
    of the Indian Ocean. It is in Egypt that Holland will be
    conquered; it is there she will be despoiled of what alone
    renders her prosperous, the treasures of the East. She will be
    struck without being able to ward off the blow. Should she wish
    to oppose the designs of France upon Egypt, she would be
    overwhelmed with the universal hatred of Christians; attacked at
    home, on the contrary, not only could she ward off the
    aggression, but she could avenge herself sustained by universal
    public opinion, which suspects the views of France of
    ambition."[45]

The memorial had no effect. "All that the efforts of ambition and
human prudence could do to lay the foundations for the destruction of
a nation, Louis XIV. now did. Diplomatic strategy on a vast scale was
displayed in order to isolate and hem in Holland. Louis, who had been
unable to make Europe accept the conquest of Belgium by France, now
hoped to induce it to see without trembling the fall of Holland." His
efforts were in the main successful. The Triple Alliance was broken;
the King of England, though contrary to the wishes of his people, made
an offensive alliance with Louis; and Holland, when the war began,
found herself without an ally in Europe, except the worn-out kingdom
of Spain and the Elector of Brandenburg, then by no means a
first-class State. But in order to obtain the help of Charles II.,
Louis not only engaged to pay him large sums of money, but also to
give to England, from the spoils of Holland and Belgium, Walcheren,
Sluys, and Cadsand, and even the islands of Goree and Voorn; the
control, that is, of the mouths of the great commercial rivers the
Scheldt and the Meuse. With regard to the united fleets of the two
nations, it was agreed that the officer bearing the admiral's flag of
England should command in chief. The question of naval precedence was
reserved, by not sending the admiral of France afloat; but it was
practically yielded. It is evident that in his eagerness for the ruin
of Holland and his own continental aggrandizement Louis was playing
directly into England's hand, as to power on the sea. A French
historian is justified in saying: "These negotiations have been
wrongly judged. It has been often repeated that Charles sold England
to Louis XIV. This is true only of internal policy. Charles indeed
plotted the political and religious subjugation of England with the
help of a foreign power; but as to external interests, he did not sell
them, for the greater share in the profit from the ruin of the Dutch
was to go to England."[46]

During the years preceding the war the Dutch made every diplomatic
effort to avert it, but the hatred of Charles and Louis prevented any
concession being accepted as final. An English royal yacht was ordered
to pass through the Dutch ships-of-war in the Channel, and to fire on
them if they did not strike their flags. In January, 1672, England
sent an ultimatum, summoning Holland to acknowledge the right of the
English crown to the sovereignty of the British seas, and to order its
fleets to lower their flags to the smallest English man-of-war; and
demands such as these received the support of a French king. The Dutch
continued to yield, but seeing at length that all concessions were
useless, they in February ordered into commission seventy-five
ships-of-the-line, besides smaller vessels. On the 23d of March the
English, without declaration of war, attacked a fleet of Dutch
merchantmen; and on the 29th the king declared war. This was followed,
April 6th, by the declaration of Louis XIV.; and on the 28th of the
same month he set out to take command in person of his army.

The war which now began, including the third and last of the great
contests between the English and Dutch upon the ocean, was not, like
those before it, purely a sea war; and it will be necessary to mention
its leading outlines on the land also, not only in order to clearness
of impression, but also to bring out the desperate straits to which
the republic was reduced, and the final deliverance through its sea
power in the hands of the great seaman De Ruyter.

The naval war differs from those that preceded it in more than one
respect; but its most distinctive feature is that the Dutch, except on
one occasion at the very beginning, did not send out their fleet to
meet the enemy, but made what may properly be called a strategic use
of their dangerous coast and shoals, upon which were based their sea
operations. To this course they were forced by the desperate odds
under which they were fighting; but they did not use their shoals as a
mere shelter,--the warfare they waged was the defensive-offensive.
When the wind was fair for the allies to attack, Ruyter kept under
cover of his islands, or at least on ground where the enemy dared not
follow; but when the wind served so that he might attack in his own
way, he turned and fell upon them. There are also apparent indications
of tactical combinations, on his part, of a higher order than have
yet been met; though it is possible that the particular acts referred
to, consisting in partial attacks amounting to little more than
demonstrations against the French contingent, may have sprung from
political motives. This solution for the undoubted fact that the Dutch
attacked the French lightly has not been met with elsewhere by the
writer; but it seems possible that the rulers of the United Provinces
may have wished not to increase the exasperation of their most
dangerous enemy by humiliating his fleet, and so making it less easy
to his pride to accept their offers. There is, however, an equally
satisfactory military explanation in the supposition that, the French
being yet inexperienced, Ruyter thought it only necessary to contain
them while falling in force upon the English. The latter fought
throughout with their old gallantry, but less than their old
discipline; whereas the attacks of the Dutch were made with a
sustained and unanimous vigor that showed a great military advance.
The action of the French was at times suspicious; it has been alleged
that Louis ordered his admiral to economize his fleet, and there is
good reason to believe that toward the end of the two years that
England remained in his alliance he did do so.

The authorities of the United Provinces, knowing that the French fleet
at Brest was to join the English in the Thames, made great exertions
to fit out their squadron so as to attack the latter before the
junction was made; but the wretched lack of centralization in their
naval administration caused this project to fail. The province of
Zealand was so backward that its contingent, a large fraction of the
whole, was not ready in time; and it has been charged that the delay
was due, not merely to mismanagement, but to disaffection to the party
in control of the government. A blow at the English fleet in its own
waters, by a superior force, before its ally arrived, was a correct
military conception; judging from the after-history of this war, it
might well have produced a profound effect upon the whole course of
the struggle. Ruyter finally got to sea and fell in with the allied
fleets, but though fully intending to fight, fell back before them to
his own coast. The allies did not follow him there, but retired,
apparently in full security, to Southwold Bay, on the east coast of
England, some ninety miles north of the mouth of the Thames. There
they anchored in three divisions,--two English, the rear and centre of
the allied line, to the northward, and the van, composed of French
ships, to the southward. Ruyter followed them, and on the early
morning of June 7, 1672, the Dutch fleet was signalled by a French
lookout frigate in the northward and eastward; standing down before a
northeast wind for the allied fleet, from which a large number of
boats and men were ashore in watering parties. The Dutch order of
battle was in two lines, the advanced one containing eighteen ships
with fire-ships (Plate III., A). Their total force was ninety-one
ships-of-the-line; that of the allies one hundred and one.

The wind was blowing toward the coast, which here trends nearly north
and south, and the allies were in an awkward position. They had first
to get under way, and they could not fall back to gain time or room to
establish their order. Most of the ships cut their cables, and the
English made sail on the starboard tack, heading about north-northwest,
a course which forced them soon to go about; whereas the French took
the other tack (Plate III., B). The battle began therefore by the
separation of the allied fleet. Ruyter sent one division to attack the
French, or rather to contain them; for these opponents exchanged only a
distant cannonade, although the Dutch, being to windward, had the
choice of closer action if they wished it. As their commander, Bankert,
was not censured, it may be supposed he acted under orders; and he was
certainly in command a year later, and acting with great judgment and
gallantry at the battle of the Texel. Meanwhile Ruyter fell furiously
upon the two English divisions, and apparently with superior forces;
for the English naval historians claim that the Dutch were in the
proportion of three to two.[47] If this can be accepted, it gives a
marked evidence of Ruyter's high qualities as a general officer, in
advance of any other who appears in this century.

   [Illustration: Pl. III.]

The results of the battle, considered simply as an engagement, were
indecisive; both sides lost heavily, but the honors and the substantial
advantages all belonged to the Dutch, or rather to De Ruyter. He had
outgeneralled the allies by his apparent retreat, and then returning
had surprised them wholly unprepared. The false move by which the
English, two thirds of the whole, stood to the northward and westward,
while the other third, the French, went off to the east and south,
separated the allied fleet; Ruyter threw his whole force into the gap,
showing front to the French with a division probably smaller in
numbers, but which, from its position to windward, had the choice of
coming to close action or not, while with the remainder he fell in much
superior strength upon the English (Plate III., B). Paul Hoste says[48]
that Vice-Admiral d'Estrées, commanding the French, had taken measures
for tacking and breaking through the Dutch division opposed to him so
as to rejoin the Duke of York, the allied commander-in-chief. It may be
so, for D'Estrées was a very brave man, and not enough of a seaman to
appreciate the dangers of the attempt; but no such move was begun, and
both the English and Ruyter thought that the French rather avoided than
sought close action. Had D'Estrées, however, gone about, and attempted
to break through the line of experienced Dutchmen to windward of him
with the still raw seamen of France, the result would have been as
disastrous as that which overtook the Spanish admiral at the battle of
St. Vincent a hundred and twenty-five years later, when he tried to
reunite his broken fleet by breaking through the close order of Jervis
and Nelson. (See Plate III., a.) The truth, which gradually dawns
through a mass of conflicting statements, is, that the Duke of York,
though a fair seaman and a brave man, was not an able one; that his
fleet was not in good order and was thus surprised; that his orders
beforehand were not so precise as to make the French admiral
technically disobedient in taking the opposite tack from the
commander-in-chief, and so separating the squadrons; and that Ruyter
profited most ably by the surprise which he had himself prepared, and
by the further opportunity given him by the ineptness of his enemies.
Unless for circumstances that are not stated, the French admiral took
the right tack, with a northeast wind, for it led out to sea and would
give room for manoeuvring; had the Duke of York chosen the same, the
allied fleet would have gone out together, with only the disadvantage
of the wind and bad order. In that case, however, Ruyter could, and
probably would, have done just what he did at the Texel a year
later,--check the van, the French, with a small containing force, and
fall with the mass of his fleet upon the centre and rear. It is the
similarity of his action in both cases, under very different
conditions, that proves he intended at Southwold Bay merely to keep the
French in check while he destroyed the English.

In this battle, called indifferently Southwold Bay and Solebay, Ruyter
showed a degree of skill combined with vigor which did not appear upon
the sea, after his death, until the days of Suffren and Nelson. His
battles of the war of 1672 were no "affairs of circumspection," though
they were fought circumspectly; his aim was no less than the enemy's
total overthrow, by joining good combinations to fury of attack. At
Solebay he was somewhat, though not greatly, inferior to his enemies;
afterward much more so.

The substantial results of Solebay fight were wholly favorable to the
Dutch. The allied fleets were to have assisted the operations of the
French army by making a descent upon the coast of Zealand. Ruyter's
attack had inflicted an amount of damage, and caused an expenditure of
ammunition, which postponed the sailing of the fleet for a month; it
was a diversion, not only important, but vital in the nearly desperate
condition to which the United Provinces were reduced ashore. It may be
added, as an instructive comment on the theory of commerce-destroying,
that after this staggering check to the enemy's superior forces,
Ruyter met and convoyed safely to port a fleet of Dutch merchantmen.

The progress of the land campaign must now be briefly described.[49]
Early in May the French army in several corps moved forward, passing
through the outskirts of the Spanish Netherlands, and directing their
attack upon Holland from the south and east. The republican party
which was in power in Holland had neglected the army, and now made the
mistake of scattering the force they had among many fortified towns,
trusting that each would do something toward delaying the French.
Louis, however, under the advice of Turenne, simply observed the more
important places, while the second-rate towns surrendered nearly as
fast as they were summoned; the army of the Provinces, as well as
their territory, thus passing rapidly, by fractions, into the power of
the enemy. Within a month the French were in the heart of the country,
having carried all before them, and with no organized force remaining
in their front sufficient of itself to stop them. In the fortnight
following the battle of Solebay, terror and disorganization spread
throughout the republic. On the 15th of June the Grand Pensionary
obtained permission of the States-General to send a deputation to
Louis XIV., begging him to name the terms on which he would grant them
peace; any humiliation to the foreigner was better in the eyes of the
politician than to see the opposite party, the House of Orange, come
into power on his downfall. While negotiations were pending, the Dutch
towns continued to surrender; and on the 20th of June a few French
soldiers entered Muyden, the key to Amsterdam. They were only
stragglers, though the large body to which they belonged was near at
hand; and the burghers, who had admitted them under the influence of
the panic prevailing throughout the land, seeing that they were alone,
soon made them drunk and put them out. The nobler feeling that
animated Amsterdam now made itself felt in Muyden; a body of troops
hurried up from the capital, and the smaller city was saved.
"Situated on the Zuyder Zee, two hours distant from Amsterdam, at the
junction of a number of rivers and canals, Muyden not only held the
key of the principal dykes by which Amsterdam could surround herself
with a protecting inundation, it also held the key of the harbor of
this great city, all the ships which went from the North Sea to
Amsterdam by the Zuyder Zee being obliged to pass under its guns.
Muyden saved and its dykes open, Amsterdam had time to breathe, and
remained free to break off her communications by land and to maintain
them by sea."[50] It was the turning-point of the invasion; but what
would have been the effect upon the spirit of the Dutch, oppressed by
defeat and distracted in council, if in that fateful fortnight which
went before, the allied fleet had attacked their coasts? From this
they were saved by the battle of Solebay.

Negotiations continued. The burgomasters--the party representing
wealth and commerce--favored submission; they shrank from the
destruction of their property and trade. New advances were made; but
while the envoys were still in the camp of Louis, the populace and the
Orange party rose, and with them the spirit of resistance. On the 25th
of June Amsterdam opened the dykes, and her example was followed by
the other cities of Holland; immense loss was entailed, but the
flooded country and the cities contained therein, standing like
islands amid the waters, were safe from attack by land forces until
freezing weather. The revolution continued. William of Orange,
afterward William III. of England, was on the 8th of July made
stadtholder, and head of the army and navy; and the two De Witts, the
heads of the republican party, were murdered by a mob a few weeks
later.

The resistance born of popular enthusiasm and pride of country was
strengthened by the excessive demands of Louis XIV. It was plain that
the Provinces must conquer or be destroyed. Meanwhile the other States
of Europe were waking up to the danger, and the Emperor of Germany,
the Elector of Brandenburg, and the King of Spain declared for
Holland; while Sweden, though nominally in alliance with France, was
unwilling to see the destruction of the Provinces, because that would
be to the advantage of England's sea power. Nevertheless the next
year, 1673, opened with promise for France, and the English king was
prepared to fulfil his part of the compact on the seas; but the Dutch,
under the firm leadership of William of Orange, and with their hold on
the sea unshaken, now refused to accept conditions of peace which had
been offered by themselves the year before.

Three naval battles were fought in 1673, all near the coast of the
United Provinces; the first two, June 7 and June 14, off Schoneveldt,
from which place they have taken their name; the third, known as the
battle of the Texel, August 21. In all three Ruyter attacked, choosing
his own time, and retiring when it suited him to the protection of his
own shores. For the allies to carry out their objects and make any
diversion upon the seaboard, or on the other hand to cripple the sea
resources of the hard-pressed Provinces, it was necessary first to
deal successfully with Ruyter's fleet. The great admiral and his
government both felt this, and took the resolution that "the fleet
should be posted in the passage of Schoneveldt, or a little farther
south toward Ostend, to observe the enemy, and if attacked, or seeing
the enemy's fleet disposed to make a descent upon the shores of the
United Provinces, should resist vigorously, by opposing his designs
and destroying his ships."[51] From this position, with good lookouts,
any movement of the allies would be known.

The English and French put to sea about the 1st of June, under the
command of Prince Rupert, first cousin to the king, the Duke of York
having been obliged to resign his office on account of the passage of
the Test Act, directed against persons of the Roman Catholic faith
holding any public employment. The French were under Vice-Admiral
d'Estrées, the same who had commanded them at Solebay. A force of six
thousand English troops at Yarmouth was ready to embark if De Ruyter
was worsted. On the 7th of June the Dutch were made out, riding within
the sands at Schoneveldt. A detached squadron was sent to draw them
out, but Ruyter needed no invitation; the wind served, and he followed
the detached squadron with such impetuosity as to attack before the
allied line was fairly formed. On this occasion the French occupied
the centre. The affair was indecisive, if a battle can be called so in
which an inferior force attacks a superior, inflicts an equal loss,
and frustrates the main object of the enemy. A week later Ruyter again
attacked, with results which, though indecisive as before as to the
particular action, forced the allied fleet to return to the English
coast to refit, and for supplies. The Dutch in these encounters had
fifty-five ships-of-the-line; their enemies eighty-one, fifty-four of
which were English.

The allied fleets did not go to sea again until the latter part of
July, and this time they carried with them a body of troops meant for
a landing. On the 20th of August the Dutch fleet was seen under way
between the Texel and the Meuse. Rupert at once got ready to fight;
but as the wind was from the northward and westward, giving the allies
the weather-gage, and with it the choice of the method of attack,
Ruyter availed himself of his local knowledge, keeping so close to the
beach that the enemy dared not approach,--the more so as it was late
in the day. During the night the wind shifted to east-southeast off
the land, and at daybreak, to use the words of a French official
narrative, the Dutch "made all sail and stood down boldly into
action."

The allied fleet was to leeward on the port tack, heading about
south,--the French in the van, Rupert in the centre, and Sir Edward
Spragge commanding the rear. De Ruyter divided his fleet into three
squadrons, the leading one of which, of ten or twelve ships only, he
sent against the French; while with the rest of his force he attacked
the English in the centre and rear (Plate IV., A, A', A''). If we
accept the English estimate of the forces, which gives the English
sixty ships, the French thirty, and the Dutch seventy, Ruyter's plan
of attack, by simply holding the French in check as at Solebay,
allowed him to engage the English on equal terms. The battle took on
several distinct phases, which it is instructive to follow. M. de
Martel, commanding the van of the French, and consequently the leading
subdivision of the allied fleet, was ordered to stretch ahead, go
about and gain to windward of the Dutch van, so as to place it between
two fires. This he did (B); but as soon as Bankert--the same who had
manoeuvred so judiciously at Solebay the year before--saw the danger,
he put his helm up and ran through the remaining twenty ships of
D'Estrées' squadron with his own twelve (C),--a feat as creditable to
him as it was discreditable to the French; and then wearing round
stood down to De Ruyter, who was hotly engaged with Rupert (C'). He
was not followed by D'Estrées, who suffered him to carry this
important reinforcement to the Dutch main attack undisturbed. This
practically ended the French share in the fight.

   [Illustration: Pl. IV. TEXEL. Aug. 21, 1673.]

Rupert, during his action with De Ruyter, kept off continually, with
the object of drawing the Dutch farther away from their coast, so that
if the wind shifted they might not be able to regain its shelter. De
Ruyter followed him, and the consequent separation of the centre from
the van (B, B') was one of the reasons alleged by D'Estrées for his
delay. It does not, however, seem to have prevented Bankert from
joining his chief.

In the rear an extraordinary action on the part of Sir Edward Spragge
increased the confusion in the allied fleet. For some reason this
officer considered Tromp, who commanded the Dutch rear, as his
personal antagonist, and in order to facilitate the latter's getting
into action, he hove-to (stopped) the whole English rear to wait for
him. This ill-timed point of honor on Spragge's part seems to have
sprung from a promise he had made to the king that he would bring back
Tromp alive or dead, or else lose his own life. The stoppage, which
recalls the irresponsible and insubordinate action of the junior Dutch
flag-officers in the former war, of course separated the rear (A'',
B'', C''), which also drifted rapidly to leeward, Spragge and Tromp
carrying on a hot private action on their own account. These two
junior admirals sought each other personally, and the battle between
their flags was so severe that Spragge twice had to shift his own to
another ship; on the second occasion the boat in which he was embarked
was sunk by a shot, and he himself drowned.

Rupert, thus forsaken by his van and rear, found himself alone with
Ruyter (B'); who, reinforced by his van, had the address further to
cut off the rear subdivision of the allied centre, and to surround the
remaining twenty ships with probably thirty or forty of his own (C').
It is not creditable to the gunnery of the day that more substantial
results did not follow; but it is to be remembered that all Ruyter's
skill could secure, except for probably a very short time, was an
action on equal terms with the English; his total inferiority in
numbers could not be quite overcome. The damage to the English and
Dutch may therefore have been great, and was probably nearly equal.

Rupert finally disengaged himself, and seeing that the English rear
(C'') was not replying well to its immediate opponents, ran down
toward it, Ruyter following him; the two opposing centres steering
parallel courses, and within cannon-shot, but by mutual consent,
induced perhaps by ammunition running short, refraining from firing.
At four P.M. the centres and rears united, and toward five a fresh
engagement began, which continued till seven, when Ruyter withdrew,
probably because of the approach of the French, who, by their own
accounts, rejoined Rupert about that time. This ended the battle,
which, like all that preceded it in this war, may be called a drawn
fight, but as to which the verdict of the English naval historian is
doubtless correct: "The consequences which the Dutch, through the
prudence of their admiral, drew from this battle were exceedingly
great; for they opened their ports, which were entirely blocked up,
and put an end to all thoughts, by removing the possibility, of an
invasion."[52]

The military features of the action have sufficiently appeared in the
account that has been given,--the skill of De Ruyter; the firmness and
promptness of Bankert, first in checking and then in passing through
the French division; the apparent disloyalty or, at the best,
inefficiency of the latter; the insubordination and military
blundering of Spragge; the seeming lack of everything but hard
fighting on Rupert's part. The allies indulged in bitter mutual
recriminations. Rupert blamed both D'Estrées and Spragge; D'Estrées
found fault with Rupert for running to leeward; and D'Estrées' own
second, Martel, roundly called his chief a coward, in a letter which
earned him an imprisonment in the Bastille. The French king ordered an
inquiry by the intendant of the navy at Brest, who made a report[53]
upon which the account here given has mainly rested, and which leaves
little doubt of the dishonor of the French arms in this battle. "M.
d'Estrées gave it to be understood," says the French naval historian,
"that the king wished his fleet spared, and that the English should
not be trusted. Was he wrong in not relying upon the sincerity of the
English alliance, when he was receiving from all quarters warnings
that the people and the nobles were murmuring against it, and Charles
II. was perhaps alone in his kingdom in wishing it?"[54] Possibly not;
but he was surely wrong if he wished any military man, or body of men,
to play the equivocal part assigned to the French admiral on this day;
the loss of the fleet would have been a lighter disaster. So evident
to eye-witnesses was the bad faith or cowardice (and the latter
supposition is not admissible), that one of the Dutch seamen, as they
discussed among themselves why the French did not come down, said:
"You fools! they have hired the English to fight for them, and all
their business here is to see that they earn their wages." A more
sober-minded and significant utterance is that with which the
intendant at Brest ends the official report before mentioned: "It
would appear in all these sea-fights Ruyter has never cared to attack
the French squadron, and that in this last action he had detached ten
ships of the Zealand squadron to keep it in play."[55] No stronger
testimony is needed to Ruyter's opinion of the inefficiency or
faithlessness of that contingent to the allied forces.

Another chapter in the history of maritime coalitions was closed, on
the 21st of August, 1673, by the battle of the Texel. In it, as in
others, were amply justified the words with which a modern French
naval officer has stamped them: "United by momentary political
interests, but at bottom divided to the verge of hatred, never
following the same path in counsel or in action, they have never
produced good results, or at least results proportioned to the efforts
of the powers allied against a common enemy. The navies of France,
Spain, and Holland seem, at several distinct times, to have joined
only to make more complete the triumph of the British arms."[56] When
to this well-ascertained tendency of coalitions is added the equally
well known jealousy of every country over the increasing power of a
neighbor, and the consequent unwillingness to see such increase
obtained by crushing another member of the family of nations, an
approach is made to the measure of naval strength required by a State.
It is not necessary to be able to meet all others combined, as some
Englishmen have seemed to think; it is necessary only to be able to
meet the strongest on favorable terms, sure that the others will not
join in destroying a factor in the political equilibrium, even if they
hold aloof. England and Spain were allies in Toulon in 1793, when the
excesses of Revolutionary France seemed to threaten the social order
of Europe; but the Spanish admiral told the English flatly that the
ruin of the French navy, a large part of which was there in their
hands, could not fail to be injurious to the interests of Spain, and a
part of the French ships was saved by his conduct, which has been
justly characterized as not only full of firmness, but also as
dictated by the highest political reason.[57]

The battle of the Texel, closing the long series of wars in which the
Dutch and English contended on equal terms for the mastery of the
seas, saw the Dutch navy in its highest efficiency, and its greatest
ornament, De Ruyter, at the summit of his glory. Long since old in
years, for he was now sixty-six, he had lost none of his martial
vigor; his attack was as furious as eight years before, and his
judgment apparently had ripened rapidly through the experience of the
last war, for there is far more evidence of plan and military insight
than before. To him, under the government of the great Pensionary De
Witt, with whom he was in close sympathy, the increase of discipline
and sound military tone now apparent in the Dutch navy must have been
largely due. He went to this final strife of the two great sea-peoples
in the fulness of his own genius, with an admirably tempered
instrument in his hands, and with the glorious disadvantage of
numbers, to save his country. The mission was fulfilled not by courage
alone, but by courage, forethought, and skill. The attack at the Texel
was, in its general lines, the same as that at Trafalgar, the enemy's
van being neglected to fall on the centre and rear, and as at
Trafalgar the van, by failing to do its duty, more than justified the
conception; but as the odds against De Ruyter were greater than those
against Nelson, so was his success less. The part played by Bankert at
Solebay was essentially the same as that of Nelson at St. Vincent,
when he threw himself across the path of the Spanish division with his
single ship (see Plate III., c, c'); but Nelson took his course
without orders from Jervis, while Bankert was carrying out Ruyter's
plan. Once more, still himself in his bearing, but under sadly altered
surroundings, will this simple and heroic man come before us; and
here, in contrast with his glory, seems a proper place to insert a
little description by the Comte de Guiche[58] of his bearing in the
Four Days' Fight, which brings out at once the homely and the heroic
sides of his character.

    "I never saw him [during those last three days] other than
    even-tempered; and when victory was assured, saying always it
    was the good God that gives it to us. Amid the disorders of the
    fleet and the appearance of loss, he seemed to be moved only by
    the misfortune to his country, but always submissive to the will
    of God. Finally, it may be said that he has something of the
    frankness and lack of polish of our patriarchs; and, to conclude
    what I have to say of him, I will relate that the day after the
    victory I found him sweeping his own room and feeding his
    chickens."

Nine days after the battle of the Texel, on the 30th of August, 1673,
a formal alliance was made between Holland on the one hand, and Spain,
Lorraine, and the emperor of Germany on the other, and the French
ambassador was dismissed from Vienna. Louis almost immediately offered
Holland comparatively moderate terms; but the United Provinces, with
their new allies by their sides and with their backs borne firmly upon
the sea which had favored and supported them, set their face steadily
against him. In England the clamor of the people and Parliament became
louder; the Protestant feeling and the old enmity to France were daily
growing, as was the national distrust of the king. Charles, though he
had himself lost none of his hatred of the republic, had to give way.
Louis, seeing the gathering storm, made up his mind, by the counsel of
Turenne, to withdraw from his dangerously advanced position by
evacuating Holland, and to try to make peace with the Provinces
separately while continuing the war with the House of Austria in Spain
and Germany. Thus he returned to Richelieu's policy, and Holland was
saved. February 19, 1674, peace was signed between England and the
Provinces. The latter recognized the absolute supremacy of the English
flag from Cape Finisterre in Spain to Norway, and paid a war
indemnity.

The withdrawal of England, which remained neutral during the remaining
four years of the war, necessarily made it less maritime. The King of
France did not think his navy, either in numbers or efficiency, able
to contend alone with that of Holland; he therefore withdrew it from
the ocean and confined his sea enterprises to the Mediterranean, with
one or two half-privateering expeditions to the West Indies. The
United Provinces for their part, being freed from danger on the side
of the sea, and not having, except for a short time, any serious idea
of operating against the French coast, diminished their own fleets.
The war became more and more continental, and drew in more and more
the other powers of Europe. Gradually the German States cast their lot
with Austria, and on May 28, 1674, the Diet proclaimed war against
France. The great work of French policy in the last generations was
undone, Austria had resumed her supremacy in Germany, and Holland had
not been destroyed. On the Baltic, Denmark, seeing Sweden inclining
toward France, hastened to make common cause with the German Empire,
sending fifteen thousand troops. There remained in Germany only
Bavaria, Hanover, and Wurtemberg faithful still to their French
alliance. The land war had thus drawn in nearly all the powers of
Europe, and, from the nature of the case, the principal theatre of the
conflict was beyond the eastern boundary of France, toward the Rhine,
and in the Spanish Netherlands; but while this was raging, a maritime
episode was introduced by the fact of Denmark and Sweden being engaged
on opposite sides. Of this it will not be necessary to speak, beyond
mentioning that the Dutch sent a squadron under Tromp to join the
Danes, and that the united fleets won a great victory over the Swedes
in 1676, taking from them ten ships. It is therefore evident that the
sea superiority of Holland detracted greatly from Sweden's value as an
ally to Louis XIV.

Another maritime strife arose in the Mediterranean by the revolt of
the Sicilians against the Spanish rule.[59] The help they asked from
France was granted as a diversion against Spain, but the Sicilian
enterprise never became more than a side issue. Its naval interest
springs from bringing Ruyter once more on the scene, and that as the
antagonist of Duquesne, the equal, and by some thought even the
superior, of Tourville, whose name has always stood far above all
others in the French navy of that day.

Messina revolted in July, 1674, and the French king at once took it
under his protection. The Spanish navy throughout seems to have
behaved badly, certainly inefficiently; and early in 1675 the French
were safely established in the city. During the year their naval power
in the Mediterranean was much increased, and Spain, unable to defend
the island herself, applied to the United Provinces for a fleet, the
expenses of which she would bear. The Provinces, "fatigued by the war,
involved in debt, suffering cruelly in their commerce, exhausted by
the necessity of paying the emperor and all the German princes, could
no longer fit out the enormous fleets which they had once opposed to
France and England." They however hearkened to Spain and sent De
Ruyter, with a squadron of only eighteen ships and four fire-ships.
The admiral, who had noted the growth of the French navy, said the
force was too small, and departed oppressed in spirit, but with the
calm resignation which was habitual to him. He reached Cadiz in
September, and in the mean time the French had further strengthened
themselves by the capture of Agosta, a port commanding the southeast
of Sicily. De Ruyter was again delayed by the Spanish government, and
did not reach the north coast of the island until the end of December,
when head winds kept him from entering the Straits of Messina. He
cruised between Messina and the Lipari Islands in a position to
intercept the French fleet convoying troops and supplies, which was
expected under Duquesne.

On the 7th of January, 1676, the French came in sight, twenty
ships-of-the-line and six fire-ships; the Dutch had but nineteen
ships, one of which was a Spaniard, and four fire-ships; and it must
be remembered that, although there is no detailed account of the Dutch
ships in this action, they were as a rule inferior to those of
England, and yet more to those of France. The first day was spent in
manoeuvring, the Dutch having the weather-gage; but during that night,
which was squally and drove the Spanish galleys accompanying the Dutch
to take refuge under Lipari, the wind shifted, and coming out at
west-southwest, gave the French the weather-gage and the power to
attack. Duquesne resolved to use it, and sending the convoy ahead,
formed his line on the starboard tack standing south; the Dutch did
the same, and waited for him (Plate V., A, A, A).

   [Illustration: Pl. V. STROMBOLI JAN. 8, 1676. Pl. Va. POCOCK AND
   D'ACHÉ 1758.]

An emotion of surprise must be felt at seeing the great Dutch admiral
surrender the choice of attack on the 7th. At daybreak of that day he
saw the enemy and steered for him; at three P.M., a French account
says, he hauled his wind on the same tack as themselves, but out of
cannon-shot to windward. How account for the seeming reluctance of the
man who three years before had made the desperate attacks of Solebay
and the Texel? His reasons have not been handed down; it may be that
the defensive advantages of the lee-gage had been recognized by this
thoughtful seaman, especially when preparing to meet, with inferior
forces, an enemy of impetuous gallantry and imperfect seamanship. If
any such ideas did influence him they were justified by the result.
The battle of Stromboli presents a partial anticipation of the tactics
of the French and English a hundred years later; but in this case it
is the French who seek the weather-gage and attack with fury, while
the Dutch take the defensive. The results were very much such as Clerk
pointed out to the English in his celebrated work on naval tactics,
the accounts here followed being entirely French.[60]

The two fleets being drawn up in line-of-battle on the starboard tack,
heading south, as has been said, De Ruyter awaited the attack which he
had refused to make. Being between the French and their port, he felt
they must fight. At nine A.M. the French line kept away all together
and ran down obliquely upon the Dutch, a manoeuvre difficult to be
performed with accuracy, and during which the assailant receives his
enemy's fire at disadvantage (A', A'', A'''). In doing this, two ships
in the French van were seriously disabled. "M. de la Fayette, in the
'Prudente,' began the action; but having rashly thrown himself into
the midst of the enemy's van, he was dismantled and forced to haul
off" (a). Confusion ensued in the French line, from the difficult
character of the manoeuvre. "Vice-Admiral de Preuilli, commanding the
van, in keeping away took too little room, so that in coming to the
wind again, the ships, in too close order, lapped and interfered with
one another's fire [A']. The absence of M. de la Fayette from the line
threw the 'Parfait' into peril. Attacked by two ships, she lost her
maintopmast and had also to haul off for repairs." Again, the French
came into action in succession instead of all together, a usual and
almost inevitable result of the manoeuvre in question. "In the _midst_
of a terrible cannonade," that is, after part of his ships were
engaged, "Duquesne, commanding the centre, took post on the beam of
Ruyter's division." The French rear came into action still later,
after the centre (A'', A'''). "Langeron and Bethune, commanding
leading ships of the French centre, are crushed by superior forces."
How can this be, seeing the French had the more ships? It was because,
as the narrative tells us, "the French had not yet repaired the
disorder of the first movement." However, all at last got into action
(B, B, B), and Duquesne gradually restored order. The Dutch, engaged
all along the line, resisted everywhere, and there was not one of
their ships which was not closely engaged; more cannot be said for the
admiral and captains of the inferior fleet. The remaining part of the
fight is not very clearly related. Ruyter is said to have given way
continually with his two leading divisions; but whether this was a
confession of weakness or a tactical move does not appear. The rear
was separated (C'), in permitting which either Ruyter or the immediate
commander was at fault; but the attempts made by the French to
surround and isolate it failed, probably because of damaged spars, for
one French ship did pass entirely around the separated division. The
action ended at 4.30 P.M., except in the rear, and the Spanish galleys
shortly after came up and towed the disabled Dutch ships away. Their
escape shows how injured the French must have been. The positions, C,
C', are intended to show the Dutch rear far separated, and the
disorder in which a fleet action under sail necessarily ended from
loss of spars.

Those who are familiar with Clerk's work on naval tactics, published
about 1780, will recognize in this account of the battle of Stromboli
all the features to which he called the attention of English seamen in
his thesis on the methods of action employed by them and their
adversaries in and before his time. Clerk's thesis started from the
postulate that English seamen and officers were superior in skill or
spirit, or both, to the French, and their ships on the whole as fast;
that they were conscious of this superiority and therefore eager to
attack, while the French, equally conscious of inferiority, or for
other reasons, were averse to decisive engagements. With these
dispositions the latter, feeling they could rely on a blindly furious
attack by the English, had evolved a crafty plan by which, while
seeming to fight, they really avoided doing so, and at the same time
did the enemy much harm. This plan was to take the lee-gage, the
characteristic of which, as has before been pointed out, is that it is
a defensive position, and to await attack. The English error,
according to Clerk, upon which the French had learned by experience
that they could always count, was in drawing up their line parallel to
the enemy, or nearly so, and then keeping away all together to attack,
ship for ship, each its opposite in the hostile line. By standing down
in this manner the assailant lost the use of most of his artillery,
while exposed to the full fire of his opponent, and invariably came up
in confusion, because the order of attack was one difficult to
maintain at any time, and much more so in the smoke under fire, with
torn sails and falling masts. This was precisely the attack made by
Duquesne at Stromboli, and it there had precisely the consequences
Clerk points out,--confusion in the line, the van arriving first and
getting the brunt of the fire of the defence, disabled ships in the
van causing confusion in the rear, etc. Clerk further asserts, and he
seems to be right, that as the action grew warm, the French, by
running off to leeward, in their turn, led the English to repeat the
same mode of attack;[61] and so we find, at Stromboli, Ruyter giving
ground in the same way, though his motive does not appear. Clerk also
points out that a necessary corollary of the lee-gage, assumed for
tactical reasons, is to aim at the assailant's spars, his motive
power, so that his attack cannot be pushed farther than the defendant
chooses, and at Stromboli the crippled condition of the French is
evident; for after Ruyter had fallen to leeward, and could no longer
help his separated rear, it was practically unmolested by the French,
although none of these had been sunk. While therefore there cannot
with certainty be attributed to Ruyter the deliberate choice of the
lee-gage, for which there was as yet no precedent, it is evident that
he reaped all its benefits, and that the character of the French
officers of his day, inexperienced as seamen and of impetuous valor,
offered just the conditions that gave most advantage to an inferior
force standing on the defensive. The qualities and characteristics of
the enemy are among the principal factors which a man of genius
considers, and it was to this as much as to any other one trait that
Nelson owed his dazzling successes. On the other hand, the French
admiral attacked in a wholly unscientific manner, ship against ship,
without an attempt to concentrate on a part of the enemy, or even
trying to keep him in play until the French squadron of eight
ships-of-the-line in Messina, near by, could join. Such tactics cannot
be named beside that of Solebay or the Texel; but as Duquesne was the
best French officer of the century, with the possible exception of
Tourville, this battle has a value of its own in the history of
tactics, and may by no means be omitted. The standing of the
commander-in-chief is the warrant that it marks the highest point to
which French naval tactics has as yet attained. Before quitting this
discussion, it may be noted that the remedy Clerk proposed was to
attack the rear ships of the enemy's line, and preferably to leeward;
the remainder of the fleet must then either abandon them or stand down
for a general action, which according to his postulate was all that
the English seamen desired.

After the fight De Ruyter sailed to Palermo, one of his ships sinking
on the way. Duquesne was joined outside Messina by the French division
that had been lying there. The remaining incidents of the Sicilian war
are unimportant to the general subject. On the 22d of April, De Ruyter
and Duquesne met again off Agosta. Duquesne had twenty-nine ships, the
allied Spaniards and Dutch twenty-seven, of which ten were Spanish.
Unfortunately the Spaniard commanded in chief, and took the centre of
the line with the ships of his country, contrary to the advice of
Ruyter, who, knowing how inefficient his allies were, wished to
scatter them through the line and so support them better. Ruyter
himself took the van, and the allies, having the wind, attacked; but
the Spanish centre kept at long cannon range, leaving the brunt of the
battle to fall on the Dutch van. The rear, following the
commander-in-chief's motions, was also but slightly engaged. In this
sorrowful yet still glorious fulfilment of hopeless duty, De Ruyter,
who never before in his long career had been struck by an enemy's
shot, received a mortal wound. He died a week later at Syracuse, and
with him passed away the last hope of resistance on the sea. A month
later the Spanish and Dutch fleets were attacked at anchor at Palermo,
and many of them destroyed; while a division sent from Holland to
reinforce the Mediterranean fleet was met by a French squadron in the
Straits of Gibraltar and forced to take refuge in Cadiz.

The Sicilian enterprise continued to be only a diversion, and the
slight importance attached to it shows clearly how entirely Louis XIV.
was bent on the continental war. How differently would the value of
Sicily have impressed him, had his eyes been fixed on Egypt and
extension by sea. As the years passed, the temper of the English
people became more and more excited against France; the trade
rivalries with Holland seemed to fall into the shade, and it became
likely that England, which had entered the war as the ally of Louis,
would, before it closed, take up arms against him. In addition to
other causes of jealousy she saw the French navy increased to a number
superior to her own. Charles for a while resisted the pressure of
Parliament, but in January, 1678, a treaty of alliance, offensive and
defensive, was made between the two sea countries; the king recalled
the English troops which until now had been serving as part of the
French army, and when Parliament opened again in February, asked for
money to equip ninety ships and thirty thousand soldiers. Louis, who
was expecting this result, at once ordered the evacuation of Sicily.
He did not fear England by land, but on the sea he could not yet hold
his own against the union of the two sea powers. At the same time he
redoubled his attacks on the Spanish Netherlands. As long as there was
a hope of keeping the ships of England out of the fight, he had
avoided touching the susceptibilities of the English people on the
subject of the Belgian sea-coast; but now that they could no longer be
conciliated, he thought best to terrify Holland by the sharpness of
his attack in the quarter where she dreaded him most.

The United Provinces were in truth the mainspring of the coalition.
Though among the smallest in extent of the countries arrayed against
Louis, they were strongest in the character and purpose of their
ruler, the Prince of Orange, and in the wealth which, while supporting
the armies of the confederates, also kept the poor and greedy German
princes faithful to their alliance. Almost alone, by dint of mighty
sea power, by commercial and maritime ability, they bore the burden of
the war; and though they staggered and complained, they still bore it.
As in later centuries England, so at the time we are now speaking of
Holland, the great sea power, supported the war against the ambition
of France; but her sufferings were great. Her commerce, preyed upon by
French privateers, lost heavily; and there was added an immense
indirect loss in the transfer of the carrying-trade between foreign
countries, which had contributed so much to the prosperity of the
Dutch. When the flag of England became neutral, this rich business
went to her ships, which crossed the seas the more securely because of
the eager desire of Louis to conciliate the English nation. This
desire led him also to make very large concessions to English
exigencies in the matter of commercial treaties, undoing much of the
work of protection upon which Colbert sought to nourish the yet feeble
growth of French sea power. These sops, however, only stayed for a
moment the passions which were driving England; it was not
self-interest, but stronger motives, which impelled her to a break
with France.

Still less was it to the interest of Holland to prolong the war, after
Louis showed a wish for peace. A continental war could at best be but
a necessary evil, and source of weakness to her. The money she spent
on her own and the allied armies was lost to her navy, and the sources
of her prosperity on the sea were being exhausted. How far the Prince
of Orange was justified, by the aims of Louis XIV., in that unyielding
attitude of opposition toward him which he always maintained, may be
uncertain, and there is here no need to decide the question; but there
can be no doubt that the strife sacrificed the sea power of Holland
through sheer exhaustion, and with it destroyed her position among
the nations of the world. "Situated between France and England," says
a historian of Holland, "by one or other of them were the United
Provinces, after they had achieved their independence of Spain,
constantly engaged in wars, which exhausted their finances,
annihilated their navy, and caused the rapid decline of their trade,
manufactures, and commerce; and thus a peace-loving nation found
herself crushed by the weight of unprovoked and long-continued
hostilities. Often, too, the friendship of England was scarcely less
harmful to Holland than her enmity. As one increased and the other
lessened, it became the alliance of the giant and the dwarf."[62]
Hitherto we have seen Holland the open enemy or hearty rival of
England; henceforward she appears as an ally,--in both cases a
sufferer from her smaller size, weaker numbers, and less favored
situation.

The exhaustion of the United Provinces and the clamor of their
merchants and peace party on the one hand, aided on the other by the
sufferings of France, the embarrassment of her finances, and the
threatened addition of England's navy to her already numerous enemies,
inclined to peace the two principal parties to this long war. Louis
had long been willing to make peace with Holland alone; but the States
had been withheld, at first by fidelity to those who had joined them
in their hour of trouble, and latterly by the firm purpose of William
of Orange. Difficulties were gradually smoothed away, and the Peace of
Nimeguen between the United Provinces and France was signed August 11,
1678. The other powers shortly afterward acceded to it. The principal
sufferer, as was natural, was the overgrown but feeble monarchy whose
centre was Spain, which gave up to France Franche Comté and a number
of fortified towns in the Spanish Netherlands, thus extending the
boundaries of France to the east and northeast. Holland, for whose
destruction Louis began the war, lost not a foot of ground in Europe;
and beyond the seas only her colonies on the west coast of Africa and
in Guiana. She owed her safety at first, and the final successful
issue, to her sea power. That delivered her in the hour of extreme
danger, and enabled her afterward to keep alive the general war. It
may be said to have been one of the chief factors, and inferior to no
other one singly, in determining the event of the great war which was
formally closed at Nimeguen.

The effort none the less sapped her strength, and being followed by
many years of similar strain broke her down. But what was the effect
upon the vastly greater state, the extreme ambition of whose king was
the principal cause of the exhausting wars of this time? Among the
many activities which illustrated the brilliant opening of the reign
of the then youthful king of France, none was so important, none so
intelligently directed, as those of Colbert, who aimed first at
restoring the finances from the confusion into which they had fallen,
and then at establishing them upon a firm foundation of national
wealth. This wealth, at that time utterly beneath the possibilities of
France, was to be developed on the lines of production encouraged,
trade stimulated to healthful activity, a large merchant shipping, a
great navy, and colonial extension. Some of these are sources, others
the actual constituents, of sea power; which indeed may be said in a
seaboard nation to be the invariable accompaniment, if it be not the
chief source, of its strength. For nearly twelve years all went well;
the development of the greatness of France in all these directions
went forward rapidly, if not in all with equal strides, and the king's
revenues increased by bounds. Then came the hour in which he had to
decide whether the exertions which his ambition naturally, perhaps
properly, prompted should take the direction which, while imposing
great efforts, did nothing to sustain but rather hindered the natural
activities of his people, and broke down commerce by making control of
the sea uncertain; or whether he should launch out in pursuits which,
while involving expense, would keep peace on his borders, lead to the
control of the sea, and by the impulse given to trade, and all upon
which trade depends, would bring in money nearly if not quite equal
to that which the State spent. This is not a fanciful picture; by his
attitude toward Holland, and its consequences, Louis gave the first
impulse to England upon the path which realized to her, within his own
day, the results which Colbert and Leibnitz had hoped for France. He
drove the Dutch carrying-trade into the ships of England; allowed her
to settle peacefully Pennsylvania and Carolina, and to seize New York
and New Jersey; and he sacrificed, to gain her neutrality, the growing
commerce of France. Not all at once, but very rapidly, England pressed
into the front place as a sea power; and however great her sufferings
and the sufferings of individual Englishmen, it remained true of her
that even in war her prosperity was great. Doubtless France could not
forget her continental position, nor wholly keep free from continental
wars; but it may be believed that if she had chosen the path of sea
power, she might both have escaped many conflicts and borne those that
were unavoidable with greater ease. At the Peace of Nimeguen the
injuries were not irreparable, but "the agricultural classes,
commerce, manufactures, and the colonies had alike been smitten by the
war; and the conditions of peace, so advantageous to the territorial
and military power of France, were much less so to manufactures, the
protective tariffs having been lowered in favor of England and
Holland,"[63] the two sea powers. The merchant shipping was stricken,
and the splendid growth of the royal navy, that excited the jealousy
of England, was like a tree without roots; it soon withered away under
the blast of war.

Before finally quitting this war with Holland, a short notice of the
Comte d'Estrées, to whom Louis committed the charge of the French
contingent of the allied fleet, and who commanded it at Solebay and
the Texel, will throw some light upon the qualifications of the French
naval officers of the day before experience had made seamen of many of
them. D'Estrées went to sea for the first time in 1667, being then a
man of mature years; but in 1672 we find him in the chief command of
an important squadron, having under him Duquesne, who was a seaman,
and had been so for nearly forty years. In 1677, D'Estrées obtained
from the king a body of eight ships which he undertook to maintain at
his own expense, upon the condition of receiving half the prizes made.
With this squadron he made an attack upon the then Dutch island of
Tobago, with a recklessness which showed that no lack of courage
prompted his equivocal conduct at the Texel. The next year he went out
again and contrived to run the whole squadron ashore on the Aves
Islands. The account given by the flag-captain of this transaction is
amusing as well as instructive. In his report he says:--

    "The day that the squadron was lost, the sun having been taken
    by the pilots, the vice-admiral as usual had them put down the
    position in his cabin. As I was entering to learn what was going
    on, I met the third pilot, Bourdaloue, who was going out crying.
    I asked him what the matter was, and he answered: 'Because I
    find more drift than the other pilots, the admiral is
    threatening me and abusing me, as usual; yet I am only a poor
    lad who does the best he can.' When I had entered the cabin, the
    admiral, who was very angry, said to me, 'That scoundrel of a
    Bourdaloue is always coming to me with some nonsense or other; I
    will drive him out of the ship. He makes us to be running a
    course, the devil knows where, I don't.' As I did not know which
    was right," says the captain of the ship, rather naïvely, "I did
    not dare to say anything for fear of bringing down a like storm
    on my own head."[64]

Some hours after this scene, which, as the French officer from whom
the extract is taken says, "appears now almost grotesque, but which is
only an exact portrayal of the sea manners of the day, the whole
squadron was lost on a group of rocks known as the Aves Islands. Such
were the officers." The flag-captain, in another part of his report,
says: "The shipwreck resulted from the general line of conduct held by
Vice-Admiral d'Estrées. It was always the opinion of his servants, or
others than the proper officers of the ship, which prevailed. This
manner of acting may be understood in the Comte d'Estrées, who,
without the necessary knowledge of a profession he had embraced so
late, always had with him obscure counsellors, in order to appropriate
the opinions they gave him so as to blind the ship's company as to his
capacity."[65] D'Estrées had been made vice-admiral two years after he
first went aboard ship.

FOOTNOTES:

[45] Martin: History of France.

[46] Martin: History of France.

[47] Ledyard, vol ii. p. 599; Campbell: Lives of the Admirals. See
also letter of Sir Richard Haddock, Naval Chronicle, vol. xvii. p.
121.

[48] Hoste: Naval Tactics.

[49] See Map, p. 107.

[50] Martin: History of France.

[51] Brandt: Life of De Ruyter.

[52] Campbell: Lives of the Admirals.

[53] Troude: Batailles Navales de la France, year 1673.

[54] Ibid.

[55] Troude: Batailles Navales de la France, year 1673.

[56] Chabaud-Arnault: Revue Mar. et Col. July, 1885.

[57] Jurien de la Gravière: Guerres Maritimes.

[58] Mémoires.

[59] See Map of Mediterranean, p. 15.

[60] Lapeyrouse-Bonfils: Hist. de la Marine Française.

[61] This movement, according to Clerk, was not made by the whole of a
French line together, but in a way much more scientific and military.
A group of two or three ships withdrew at a time, being covered by the
smoke and the continued fire of the rest of their line. In time a
second line was partly formed, which in its turn protected the ships
which had remained on the first, as they executed the somewhat exposed
movement of falling back. In Plan V., Dutch ships at b, b, b, are
represented as thus withdrawing. English official reports of the
eighteenth century often speak of French ships acting thus; the
English officers attributing to their superior valor a movement which
Clerk more plausibly considers a skilful military manoeuvre, well
calculated to give the defence several opportunities of disabling the
assailants as they bore down on a course which impeded the use of
their artillery. In 1812 the frigate "United States," commanded by
Decatur, employed the same tactics in her fight with the "Macedonian;"
and the Confederate gunboats at Mobile by the same means inflicted on
Farragut's flag-ship the greater part of the heavy loss which she
sustained. In its essential features the same line of action can now
be followed by a defendant, having greater speed, when the ardor of
the attack, or the necessities of the case, force the assailant to a
direct approach. An indirect cause of a lee line falling farther to
leeward has never been noticed. When a ship in that line (as at c)
found itself without an opponent abeam, and its next ahead perhaps
heavily engaged, the natural impulse would be to put up the helm so as
to bring the broadside to bear. This advantage would be gained by a
loss of ground to leeward and consequent disorder in the line; which,
if the act were repeated by several ships, could only be restored by
the whole line keeping away.

[62] Davies: History of Holland.

[63] Martin: History of France.

[64] Gougeard: Marine de Guerre.

[65] Troude: Batailles Navales.




CHAPTER IV.

    ENGLISH REVOLUTION.--WAR OF THE LEAGUE OF AUGSBURG,
    1688-1697.--SEA BATTLES OF BEACHY HEAD AND LA HOUGUE.


The Peace of Nimeguen was followed by a period of ten years in which
no extensive war broke out. They were, however, far from being years
of political quiet. Louis XIV. was as intent upon pushing on his
frontiers to the eastward in peace as in war, and grasped in quick
succession fragments of territory which had not been given him by the
peace. Claiming this and that in virtue of ancient feudal ties; this
and that other as implicitly surrendered by the treaty, because
dependent upon something else that had been explicitly surrendered;
purchasing at one time, using bare force in other cases, and backing
up all the so-called peaceful methods of obtaining his asserted rights
by the presence of armed power, he carried on this process of
extension between 1679 and 1682. The aggression most startling to
Europe, and above all to the German Empire, was the seizure of the
then imperial city of Strasburg on the 30th of September, 1681; and on
the same day Casale, in Italy, was sold to him by the Duke of Mantua,
showing that his ambitions were directed that way as well as to the
north and east. Both of these were positions of great strategic
importance, threatening, the one Germany, the other Italy, in case of
war.

The excitement throughout Europe was very great; in every direction
Louis, serenely trusting to his power, was making new enemies and
alienating former friends. The king of Sweden, directly insulted, and
injured in his duchy of Deux-Ponts, turned against him, as did the
Italian States; and the Pope himself sided with the enemies of a king
who was already showing his zeal for the conversion of the
Protestants, and was preparing for the revocation of the Edict of
Nantes. But the discontent, though deep and general, had to be
organized and directed; the spirit necessary to give it form and final
effective expression was found again in Holland, in William of Orange.
Time, however, was needed to mature the work. "No one yet armed
himself; but every one talked, wrote, agitated, from Stockholm to
Madrid.... The war of the pen preceded by many years the war of the
sword; incessant appeals were made to European opinion by
indefatigable publicists; under all forms was diffused the terror of
the New Universal Monarchy," which was seeking to take the place once
filled by the House of Austria. It was known that Louis sought to make
himself or his son emperor of Germany. But complications of different
kinds, private interests, lack of money, all combined to delay action.
The United Provinces, despite William's wishes, were yet unwilling to
act again as banker for a coalition, and the emperor was so threatened
on his eastern frontier by the rebel Hungarians and the Turks that he
dared not risk a western war.

Meanwhile the armed navy of France was daily growing in strength and
efficiency under Colbert's care, and acquiring the habit of war by
attacks upon the Barbary pirates and their ports. During the same
years the navies both of England and of Holland were declining in
numbers and efficiency. It has already been said that in 1688, when
William needed Dutch ships for his expedition to England, it was
objected that the navy was in a far different condition from 1672,
"being incalculably decreased in strength and deprived of its most
able commanders." In England, the decline of discipline had been
followed by an economical policy as to material, gradually lessening
the numbers and injuring the condition of the fleet; and after the
little flare-up and expected war with France in 1678, the king gave
the care of the navy to a new body of men, concerning whom an English
naval historian says: "This new administration lasted five years, and
if it had continued five years longer would in all probability have
remedied even the numerous and mighty evils it had introduced, by
wearing out the whole royal navy, and so leaving no room for future
mistakes. However, a just sense of this induced the king, in 1684, to
resume the management of the fleet into his own hands, restoring most
of the old officers; but before any great progress in the work of
restoration could be made, his Majesty died,"[66]--in 1685. The change
of sovereigns was of vast importance, not merely to the English navy,
but from the ultimate effect it was to have upon the designs of Louis
XIV. and the fortune of the general war which his aggressions were
preparing. James II. was peculiarly interested in the navy, being
himself a seaman, and having commanded in chief at Lowestoft and
Southwold Bay. He knew its actual depressed condition; and the
measures he at once took to restore it, both in numbers and
efficiency, were thoughtful and thorough. In the three years of his
reign very much indeed was done to prepare a weapon which was first
proved against himself and his best friend.

The accession of James II., which promised fairly for Louis,
precipitated the action of Europe against him. The House of Stuart,
closely allied to the King of France, and sympathizing with his
absolutist rule, had used the still great power of the sovereign to
check the political and religious enmity of the English nation to
France. James II. added to the same political sympathies a strength of
Roman Catholic fervor which led him into acts peculiarly fitted to
revolt the feeling of the English people, with the final result of
driving him from the throne, and calling to it, by the voice of
Parliament, his daughter Mary, whose husband was William of Orange.

In the same year that James became king, a vast diplomatic combination
against France began. This movement had two sides, religious and
political. The Protestant States were enraged at the increasing
persecutions of the French Protestants, and their feelings became
stronger as the policy of James of England showed itself more and more
bent toward Rome. The Protestant northern States, Holland, Sweden, and
Brandenburg, drew together in alliances; and they counted for support
upon the Emperor of Austria and Germany, upon Spain and other Roman
Catholic States whose motives were political apprehension and anger.
The emperor had latterly been successful against the Turks, thus
freeing his hands for a move against France. July 9, 1686, there was
signed at Augsburg a secret agreement between the emperor, the kings
of Spain and Sweden, and a number of German princes. Its object was at
first defensive only against France, but it could readily be turned
into an offensive alliance. This compact took the name of the League
of Augsburg, and from it the general war which followed two years
later was called the War of the League of Augsburg.

The next year, 1687, saw yet greater successes of the Empire over the
Turks and Hungarians. It was evident that France could expect no more
from diversions in that quarter. At the same time the discontent of
the English and the ambitions of the Prince of Orange, who hoped from
his accession to the throne of England no ordinary personal
aggrandizement, but the fulfilment of his strongest political wish and
conviction, in curbing forever the power of Louis XIV., became more
and more plain. But for his expedition into England, William needed
ships, money, and men from the United Provinces; and they hung back,
knowing that the result would be war with the French king, who
proclaimed James his ally. Their action was at last decided by the
course of Louis, who chose this moment to revoke concessions made at
Nimeguen to Dutch trade. The serious injury thus done to Holland's
material interests turned the wavering scale. "This violation of the
conventions of Nimeguen," says a French historian,[67] "by giving a
severe blow to Dutch commerce, reducing her European trade more than
one fourth, removed the obstacle that religious passions still
encountered in material interests, and put all Holland at the
disposition of William, none having reason longer to conciliate
France." This was in November, 1687. In the summer of the following
year the birth of an heir to the English throne brought things to an
issue. English loyalty might have put up with the reign of the father,
now advanced in years, but could not endure the prospect of a
continued Roman Catholic royalty.

Matters had at last reached the crisis to which they had been tending
for years. Louis and William of Orange, long-standing enemies, and at
the moment the two chief figures in European politics, alike from
their own strong personalities and the cause which either represented,
stood on the brink of great actions, whose effects were to be felt
through many generations. William, despotic in temper himself, stood
on the shores of Holland looking hopefully toward free England, from
which he was separated by the narrow belt of water that was the
defence of the island kingdom, and might yet be an impassable barrier
to his own high aims; for the French king at that moment could control
the sea if he would. Louis, holding all the power of France in his
single grasp, facing eastward as before, saw the continent gathering
against him; while on his flank was England heartily hostile, longing
to enter on the strife against him, but as yet without a leader. It
still remained with him to decide whether he would leave the road open
for the head to join the waiting body, and to bring Holland and
England, the two sea powers, under one rule. If he attacked Holland by
land, and sent his superior navy into the Channel, he might well keep
William in his own country; the more so as the English navy, beloved
and petted by the king, was likely to have more than the usual loyalty
of seamen to their chief. Faithful to the bias of his life, perhaps
unable to free himself from it, he turned toward the continent, and
September 24, 1688, declared war against Germany and moved his armies
toward the Rhine. William, overjoyed, saw removed the last obstacle to
his ambition. Delayed for some weeks by contrary winds, he finally
set sail from Holland on the 30th of October. More than five hundred
transports, with fifteen thousand troops, escorted by fifty
men-of-war, formed the expedition; and it is typical of its mingled
political and religious character, that the larger part of the army
officers were French Protestants who had been driven from France since
the last war, the commander-in-chief under William being the Huguenot
Schomberg, late a marshal of France. The first start was foiled by a
violent storm; but sailing again on the 10th of November, a fresh,
fair breeze carried the ships through the Straits and the Channel, and
William landed on the 15th at Torbay. Before the end of the year,
James had fled from his kingdom. On the 21st of the following April,
William and Mary were proclaimed sovereigns of Great Britain, and
England and Holland were united for the war, which Louis had declared
against the United Provinces as soon as he heard of William's
invasion. During all the weeks that the expedition was preparing and
delayed, the French ambassador at the Hague and the minister of the
navy were praying the king to stop it with his great sea power,--a
power so great that the French fleet in the first years of the war
outnumbered those of England and Holland combined; but Louis would
not. Blindness seems to have struck the kings of England and France
alike; for James, amid all his apprehensions, steadily refused any
assistance from the French fleet, trusting to the fidelity of the
English seamen to his person, although his attempts to have Mass
celebrated on board the ships had occasioned an uproar and mutiny
which nearly ended in the crews throwing the priests overboard.

France thus entered the War of the League of Augsburg without a single
ally. "What her policy had most feared, what she had long averted, was
come to pass. England and Holland were not only allied, but united
under the same chief; and England entered the coalition with all the
eagerness of passions long restrained by the Stuart policy." As
regards the sea war, the different battles have much less tactical
value than those of De Ruyter. The chief points of strategic interest
are the failure of Louis, having a decided superiority at sea,
properly to support James II. in Ireland, which remained faithful to
him, and the gradual disappearance from the ocean of the great French
fleets, which Louis XIV. could no longer maintain, owing to the
expense of that continental policy which he had chosen for himself. A
third point of rather minor interest is the peculiar character and
large proportions taken on by the commerce-destroying and privateering
warfare of the French, as their large fleets were disappearing. This,
and the great effect produced by it, will appear at first to
contradict what has been said as to the general inadequacy of such a
warfare when not supported by fleets; but an examination of the
conditions, which will be made later on, will show that the
contradiction is rather apparent than real.

Taught by the experience of the last conflict, the chief effort of the
French king, in the general war he had brought upon himself, should
have been directed against the sea powers,--against William of Orange
and the Anglo-Dutch alliance. The weakest point in William's position
was Ireland; though in England itself not only were there many
partisans of the exiled king, but even those who had called in William
fenced his kingship about with jealous restrictions. His power was not
secure so long as Ireland was not subdued. James, having fled from
England in January, 1689, landed in Ireland in the following March,
accompanied by French troops and a French squadron, and was
enthusiastically welcomed everywhere but in the Protestant North. He
made Dublin his capital, and remained in the country until July of the
next year. During these fifteen months the French were much superior
at sea; they landed troops in Ireland on more than one occasion; and
the English, attempting to prevent this, were defeated in the naval
battle of Bantry Bay.[68] But although James was so well established,
and it was of the utmost importance to sustain him; although it was
equally important to keep William from getting a foothold till James
was further strengthened and Londonderry, then passing through its
famous siege, reduced; and although the French were superior to the
united English and Dutch on the seas in 1689 and 1690; nevertheless,
the English admiral Rooke was able, unmolested, to throw succors and
troops into Londonderry, and afterward landed Marshal Schomberg, with
a small army, near Carrickfergus. Rooke stopped intercourse between
Ireland and Scotland, where were many Stuart partisans, and then with
his small squadron passed along the east coast of Ireland, attempted
to burn the shipping in Dublin harbor, failing only through lack of
wind, and finally came off Cork, then occupied by James, took
possession of an island in the harbor, and returned in safety to the
Downs in October. These services, which raised the siege of
Londonderry and kept open the communications between England and
Ireland, extended throughout the summer months; nor was any attempt
made by the French to stop them. There can be little doubt that an
effective co-operation of the French fleet in the summer of 1689 would
have broken down all opposition to James in Ireland, by isolating that
country from England, with corresponding injury to William's power.

The following year the same strategic and political mistake was made.
It is the nature of an enterprise such as James's, dependent upon a
weaker people and foreign help, to lose strength if it does not
progress; but the chances were still in his favor, provided France
co-operated heartily, and above all, with her fleet. It is equally the
nature of a merely military navy like that of France to be strongest
at the beginning of hostilities; whereas that of the allied sea powers
grew daily stronger, drawing upon the vast resources of their merchant
shipping and their wealth. The disparity of force was still in favor
of France in 1690, but it was not as great as the year before. The
all-important question was where to direct it. There were two
principal courses, involving two views of naval strategy. The one was
to act against the allied fleet, whose defeat, if sufficiently severe,
might involve the fall of William's throne in England; the other was
to make the fleet subsidiary to the Irish campaign. The French king
decided upon the former, which was undoubtedly the proper course; but
there was no reason for neglecting, as he did, the important duty of
cutting off the communications between the two islands. As early as
March he had sent a large fleet with six thousand troops and supplies
of war, which were landed without any trouble in the southern ports of
Ireland; but after performing that service, the ships employed
returned to Brest, and there remained inactive during May and June
while the grand fleet under the Comte de Tourville was assembling.
During those two months the English were gathering an army on their
west coast, and on the 21st of June, William embarked his forces at
Chester on board two hundred and eighty-eight transports, escorted by
only six men-of-war. On the 24th he landed in Carrickfergus, and the
ships-of-war were dismissed to join the English grand fleet, which,
however, they were not able to do; Tourville's ships having in the
mean time got to sea and occupied the channel to the eastward. There
is nothing more striking than the carelessness shown by both the
contending parties, during the time that Ireland was in dispute, as to
the communications of their opponents with the island; but this was
especially strange in the French, as they had the larger forces, and
must have received pretty accurate information of what was going on
from disaffected persons in England. It appears that a squadron of
twenty-five frigates, to be supported by ships-of-the-line, were told
off for duty in St. George's Channel; but they never reached their
station, and only ten of the frigates had got as far as Kinsale by the
time James had lost all at the battle of the Boyne. The English
communications were not even threatened for an hour.

Tourville's fleet, complete in numbers, having seventy-eight ships, of
which seventy were in the line-of-battle, with twenty-two fire-ships,
got to sea June 22, the day after William embarked. On the 30th the
French were off the Lizard, to the dismay of the English admiral, who
was lying off the Isle of Wight in such an unprepared attitude that
he had not even lookout ships to the westward. He got under way,
standing off-shore to the southeast, and was joined from time to time,
during the next ten days, by other English and Dutch ships. The two
fleets continued moving to the eastward, sighting each other from time
to time.

The political situation in England was critical. The Jacobites were
growing more and more open in their demonstrations, Ireland had been
in successful revolt for over a year, and William was now there,
leaving only the queen in London. The urgency of the case was such
that the council decided the French fleet must be fought, and orders
to that effect were sent to the English admiral, Herbert. In obedience
to his instructions he went out, and on the 10th of July, being to
windward, with the wind at northeast, formed his line-of-battle, and
then stood down to attack the French, who waited for him, with their
foretopsails aback[69] on the starboard tack, heading to the northward
and westward.

The fight that followed is known as the battle of Beachy Head. The
ships engaged were, French seventy, English and Dutch according to
their own account fifty-six, according to the French sixty. In the
allied line of battle the Dutch were in the van; the English,
commanded in person by Herbert, in the centre; and the rear was made
up partly of English and partly of Dutch ships. The stages of the
battle were as follows:--

1. The allies, being to windward, bore down together in line abreast.
As usual, this manoeuvre was ill performed, and as also generally
happens, the van came under fire before the centre and rear, and bore
the brunt of the injury.

2. Admiral Herbert, though commander-in-chief, failed to attack
vigorously with the centre, keeping it at long range. The allied van
and rear came to close action (Plate VI., A). Paul Hoste's[70] account
of this manoeuvre of the allies is that the admiral intended to fall
mainly on the French rear. To that end he closed the centre to the
rear and kept it to windward at long cannon-shot (refused it), so as
to prevent the French from tacking and doubling on the rear. If that
were his purpose, his plan, though tolerably conceived in the main,
was faulty in detail, for this manoeuvre of the centre left a great
gap between it and the van. He should rather have attacked, as Ruyter
did at the Texel, as many of the rear ships as he thought he could
deal with, and refused his van, assigning to it the part of checking
the French van. It may be conceded that an admiral who, from inferior
numbers, cannot spread as long and close a line as his enemy, should
not let the latter overlap the extremities of his fleet; but he should
attain his end not, as Herbert did, by leaving a great opening in the
centre, but by increasing each interval between the ships refused. The
allied fleet was thus exposed to be doubled on at two points, both van
and centre; and both points were attacked.

3. The commander of the French van, seeing the Dutch close to his line
and more disabled than himself, pressed six of his leading ships
ahead, where they went about, and so put the Dutch between two fires
(Plate VI. B).

   [Illustration: Pl. VI. LA HOUGUE MAY 29, 1692. Pl. VIa. BEACHY
   HEAD JULY 10, 1690.]

At the same time Tourville, finding himself without adversaries in the
centre, having beaten off the leading division of the enemy's centre,
pushed forward his own leading ships, which Herbert's dispositions had
left without opponents; and these fresh ships strengthened the attack
upon the Dutch in the van (B).

This brought about a _mêlée_ at the head of the lines, in which the
Dutch, being inferior, suffered heavily. Luckily for the allies the
wind fell calm; and while Tourville himself and other French ships got
out their boats to tow into action again, the allies were shrewd
enough to drop anchor with all sail set, and before Tourville took in
the situation the ebb-tide, setting southwest, had carried his fleet
out of action. He finally anchored a league from his enemy.

At nine P.M., when the tide changed, the allies weighed and stood to
the eastward. So badly had many of them been mauled, that, by English
accounts, it was decided rather to destroy the disabled ships than to
risk a general engagement to preserve them.

Tourville pursued; but instead of ordering a general chase, he kept
the line-of-battle, reducing the speed of the fleet to that of the
slower ships. The occasion was precisely one of those in which a
_mêlée_ is permissible, indeed, obligatory. An enemy beaten and in
flight should be pursued with ardor, and with only so much regard to
order as will prevent the chasing vessels from losing mutual
support,--a condition which by no means implies such relative bearings
and distances as are required in the beginning or middle of a
well-contested action. The failure to order such general pursuit
indicates the side on which Tourville's military character lacked
completeness; and the failure showed itself, as is apt to be the case,
at the supreme moment of his career. He never had such another
opportunity as in this, the first great general action in which he
commanded in chief, and which Hoste, who was on board the flag-ship,
calls the most complete naval victory ever gained. It was so indeed at
that time,--the most complete, but not the most decisive, as it
perhaps might have been. The French, according to Hoste, lost not even
a boat, much less a ship, which, if true, makes yet more culpable the
sluggishness of the pursuit; while the allies fled, casting sixteen of
their ships ashore and burning them in sight of the enemy, who pursued
as far as the Downs. The English indeed give the allied loss as only
eight ships,--an estimate probably full as much out one way as the
French the other. Herbert took his fleet to the Thames, and baffled
the enemy's further pursuit by removing the buoys.[71]

Tourville's is the only great historical name among the seamen of this
war, if we except the renowned privateersmen at whose head was Jean
Bart. Among the English, extraordinary merit cannot be claimed for any
one of the gallant and enterprising men who commanded squadrons.
Tourville, who by this time had served afloat for nearly thirty
years, was at once a seaman and a military man. With superb courage,
of which he had given dazzling examples in his youth, he had seen
service wherever the French fleets had fought,--in the Anglo-Dutch
war, in the Mediterranean, and against the Barbary pirates. Reaching
the rank of admiral, he commanded in person all the largest fleets
sent out during the earlier years of this war, and he brought to the
command a scientific knowledge of tactics, based upon both theory and
experience, joined to that practical acquaintance with the seaman's
business which is necessary in order to apply tactical principles upon
the ocean to the best advantage. But with all these high qualities he
seems to have failed, where so many warriors fail, in the ability to
assume a great responsibility.[72] The caution in his pursuit of the
allies after Beachy Head, though so different in appearance, came from
the same trait which impelled him two years later to lead his fleet
into almost certain destruction at La Hougue, because he had the
king's order in his pocket. He was brave enough to do anything, but
not strong enough to bear the heaviest burdens. Tourville was in fact
the forerunner of the careful and skilful tacticians of the coming
era, but with the savor still of the impetuous hard-fighting which
characterized the sea commanders of the seventeenth century. He
doubtless felt, after Beachy Head, that he had done very well and
could be satisfied; but he could not have acted as he did had he felt,
to use Nelson's words, that "if we had taken ten ships out of the
enemy's eleven, and let the eleventh escape, being able to take her, I
could never call such a good day."

The day after the sea fight off Beachy Head, with its great but still
partial results, the cause of James II. was lost ashore in Ireland.
The army which William had been allowed to transport there unmolested
was superior in number and quality to that of James, as William
himself was superior as a leader to the ex-king. The counsel of Louis
XIV. was that James should avoid decisive action, retiring if
necessary to the Shannon, in the midst of a country wholly devoted to
him. It was, however, a good deal to ask, this abandonment of the
capital after more than a year's occupancy, with all the consequent
moral effect; it would have been much more to the purpose to stop
William's landing. James undertook to cover Dublin, taking up the line
of the river Boyne, and there on the 11th of July the two armies met,
with the result that James was wholly defeated. The king himself fled
to Kinsale, where he found ten of those frigates that had been meant
to control St. George's Channel. He embarked, and again took refuge in
France, begging Louis to improve the victory at Beachy Head by landing
him with another French army in England itself. Louis angrily refused,
and directed that the troops still remaining in Ireland should be at
once withdrawn.

The chances of a rising in favor of James, at least upon the shores of
the Channel, if they existed at all, were greatly exaggerated by his
own imagination. After the safe retreat of the allied fleet to the
Thames, Tourville, in accordance with his instructions, made several
demonstrations in the south of England; but they were wholly fruitless
in drawing out any show of attachment to the Stuart cause.

In Ireland it was different. The Irish army with its French contingent
fell back, after the battle of the Boyne, to the Shannon, and there
again made a stand; while Louis, receding from his first angry
impulse, continued to send reinforcements and supplies. But the
increasing urgency of the continental war kept him from affording
enough support, and the war in Ireland came to a close a little over a
year later, by the defeat at Aghrim and capitulation of Limerick. The
battle of the Boyne, which from its peculiar religious coloring has
obtained a somewhat factitious celebrity, may be taken as the date at
which the English crown was firmly fixed on William's head. Yet it
would be more accurate to say that the success of William, and with it
the success of Europe against Louis XIV. in the War of the League of
Augsburg, was due to the mistakes and failure of the French naval
campaign in 1690; though in that campaign was won the most conspicuous
single success the French have ever gained at sea over the English. As
regards the more striking military operations, it is curious to remark
that Tourville sailed the day after William left Chester, and won
Beachy Head the day before the battle of the Boyne; but the real
failure lay in permitting William to transport that solid body of men
without hindrance. It might have been favorable to French policy to
let him get into Ireland, but not with such a force at his back. The
result of the Irish campaign was to settle William safely on the
English throne and establish the Anglo-Dutch alliance; and the union
of the two sea peoples under one crown was the pledge, through their
commercial and maritime ability, and the wealth they drew from the
sea, of the successful prosecution of the war by their allies on the
continent.

The year 1691 was distinguished by only one great maritime event. This
was ever afterward known in France as Tourville's "deep-sea" or
"off-shore" cruise; and the memory of it as a brilliant strategic and
tactical display remains to this day in the French navy. That staying
power, which has already been spoken of as distinctive of nations
whose sea power is not a mere military institution, but based upon the
character and pursuits of the people, had now come into play with the
allies. Notwithstanding the defeat and loss of Beachy Head, the united
fleets took the sea in 1691 with one hundred ships-of-the-line under
the command of Admiral Russell. Tourville could only gather
seventy-two, the same number as the year before. "With these he left
Brest June 25. As the enemy had not yet appeared upon the coasts of
the Channel, he took up his cruising ground at the entrance, sending
lookout ships in all directions. Informed that the allies had
stationed themselves near the Scilly Islands to cover the passage of a
convoy expected from the Levant, Tourville did not hesitate to steer
for the English coasts, where the approaching arrival of another
merchant fleet from Jamaica was equally expected. Deceiving the
English cruisers by false courses, he reached the latter fleet, took
from it several ships, and dispersed it before Russell could come up
to fight him. When at last Tourville was in presence of the allied
fleet, he manoeuvred so skilfully, always keeping the weather-gage,
that the enemy, drawn far out into the ocean, lost fifty days without
finding an opportunity to engage. During this time French privateers,
scattered throughout the Channel, harassed the enemy's commerce and
protected convoys sent into Ireland. Worn out by fruitless efforts,
Russell steered for the Irish coast. Tourville, after having protected
the return of the French convoys, anchored again in Brest Roads."

The actual captures made by Tourville's own fleet were insignificant,
but its service to the commerce-destroying warfare of the French, by
occupying the allies, is obvious; nevertheless, the loss of English
commerce was not as great this year as the next. The chief losses of
the allies seem to have been in the Dutch North Sea trade.

The two wars, continental and maritime, that were being waged, though
simultaneous, were as yet independent of each other. It is unnecessary
in connection with our subject to mention the operations of the
former. In 1692 there occurred the great disaster to the French fleet
which is known as the battle of La Hougue. In itself, considered
tactically, it possesses little importance, and the actual results
have been much exaggerated; but popular report has made it one of the
famous sea battles of the world, and therefore it cannot be wholly
passed by.

Misled by reports from England, and still more by the representations
of James, who fondly nursed his belief that the attachment of many
English naval officers to his person was greater than their love of
country or faithfulness to their trust, Louis XIV. determined to
attempt an invasion of the south coast of England, led by James in
person. As a first step thereto, Tourville, at the head of between
fifty and sixty ships-of-the-line, thirteen of which were to come
from Toulon, was to engage the English fleet; from which so many
desertions were expected as would, with the consequent demoralization,
yield the French an easy and total victory. The first hitch was in the
failure of the Toulon fleet, delayed by contrary winds, to join; and
Tourville went to sea with only forty-four ships, but with a
peremptory order from the king to fight when he fell in with the
enemy, were they few or many, and come what might.

On the 29th of May, Tourville saw the allies to the northward and
eastward; they numbered ninety-nine sail-of-the-line. The wind being
southwest, he had the choice of engaging, but first summoned all the
flag-officers on board his own ship, and put the question to them
whether he ought to fight. They all said not, and he then handed them
the order of the king.[73] No one dared dispute that; though, had they
known it, light vessels with contrary orders were even then searching
for the fleet. The other officers then returned to their ships, and
the whole fleet kept away together for the allies, who waited for
them, on the starboard tack, heading south-southeast, the Dutch
occupying the van, the English the centre and rear. When they were
within easy range, the French hauled their wind on the same tack,
keeping the weather-gage. Tourville, being so inferior in numbers,
could not wholly avoid the enemy's line extending to the rear of his
own, which was also necessarily weak from its extreme length; but he
avoided Herbert's error at Beachy Head, keeping his van refused with
long intervals between the ships, to check the enemy's van, and
engaging closely with his centre and rear (Plate VIa. A, A, A). It is
not necessary to follow the phases of this unequal fight; the
extraordinary result was that when the firing ceased at night, in
consequence of a thick fog and calm, not a single French ship had
struck her colors nor been sunk. No higher proof of military spirit
and efficiency could be given by any navy, and Tourville's seamanship
and tactical ability contributed largely to the result, which it must
also be confessed was not creditable to the allies. The two fleets
anchored at nightfall (B, B, B), a body of English ships (B')
remaining to the southward and westward of the French, Later on, these
cut their cables and allowed themselves to drift through the French
line in order to rejoin their main body; in doing which they were
roughly handled.

Having amply vindicated the honor of his fleet, and shown the
uselessness of further fighting, Tourville now thought of retreat,
which was begun at midnight with a light northeast wind and continued
all the next day. The allies pursued, the movements of the French
being much embarrassed by the crippled condition of the flag-ship
"Royal Sun," the finest ship in the French navy, which the admiral
could not make up his mind to destroy. The direction of the main
retreat was toward the Channel Islands, thirty-five ships being with
the admiral; of them twenty passed with the tidal current through the
dangerous passage known as the Race of Alderney, between the island of
that name and the mainland, and got safe to St. Malo. Before the
remaining fifteen could follow, the tide changed; and the anchors
which had been dropped dragging, these ships were carried to the
eastward and to leeward of the enemy. Three sought refuge in
Cherbourg, which had then neither breakwater nor port, the remaining
twelve at Cape La Hougue; and they were all burned either by their own
crews or by the allies. The French thus lost fifteen of the finest
ships in their navy, the least of which carried sixty guns; but this
was little more than the loss of the allies at Beachy Head. The
impression made upon the public mind, accustomed to the glories and
successes of Louis XIV., was out of all proportion to the results, and
blotted out the memory of the splendid self-devotion of Tourville and
his followers. La Hougue was also the last general action fought by
the French fleet, which did rapidly dwindle away in the following
years, so that this disaster seemed to be its death-blow. As a matter
of fact, however, Tourville went to sea the next year with seventy
ships, and the losses were at the time repaired. The decay of the
French navy was not due to any one defeat, but to the exhaustion of
France and the great cost of the continental war; and this war was
mainly sustained by the two sea peoples whose union was secured by the
success of William in the Irish campaign. Without asserting that the
result would have been different had the naval operations of France
been otherwise directed in 1690, it may safely be said that their
misdirection was the immediate cause of things turning out as they
did, and the first cause of the decay of the French navy.

The five remaining years of the War of the League of Augsburg, in
which all Europe was in arms against France, are marked by no great
sea battles, nor any single maritime event of the first importance. To
appreciate the effect of the sea power of the allies, it is necessary
to sum up and condense an account of the quiet, steady pressure which
it brought to bear and maintained in all quarters against France. It
is thus indeed that sea power usually acts, and just because so quiet
in its working, it is the more likely to be unnoticed and must be
somewhat carefully pointed out.

The head of the opposition to Louis XIV. was William III., and his
tastes being military rather than naval combined with the direction of
Louis' policy to make the active war continental rather than maritime;
while the gradual withdrawal of the great French fleets, by leaving
the allied navies without enemies on the sea, worked in the same way.
Furthermore, the efficiency of the English navy, which was double in
numbers that of the Dutch, was at this time at a low pitch; the
demoralizing effects of the reign of Charles II. could not be wholly
overcome during the three years of his brother's rule, and there was a
yet more serious cause of trouble growing out of the political state
of England. It has been said that James believed the naval officers
and seamen to be attached to his person; and, whether justly or
unjustly, this thought was also in the minds of the present rulers,
causing doubts of the loyalty and trustworthiness of many officers,
and tending to bring confusion into the naval administration. We are
told that "the complaints made by the merchants were extremely well
supported, and showed the folly of preferring unqualified men to that
board which directed the naval power of England; and yet the mischief
could not be amended, because the more experienced people who had been
long in the service were thought disaffected, and it appeared the
remedy might have proved worse than the disease."[74] Suspicion
reigned in the cabinet and the city, factions and irresolution among
the officers; and a man who was unfortunate or incapable in action
knew that the yet more serious charge of treason might follow his
misadventure.

After La Hougue, the direct military action of the allied navies was
exerted in three principal ways, the first being in attacks upon the
French ports, especially those in the Channel and near Brest. These
had rarely in view more than local injury and the destruction of
shipping, particularly in the ports whence the French privateers
issued; and although on some occasions the number of troops embarked
was large, William proposed to himself little more than the diversion
which such threats caused, by forcing Louis to take troops from the
field for coast defence. It may be said generally of all these
enterprises against the French coast, in this and later wars, that
they effected little, and even as a diversion did not weaken the
French armies to any great extent. If the French ports had been less
well defended, or French water-ways open into the heart of the
country, like our own Chesapeake and Delaware bays and the Southern
sounds, the result might have been different.

In the second place, the allied navies were of great direct military
value, though they fought no battles, when Louis XIV. decided in 1694
to make his war against Spain offensive. Spain, though so weak in
herself, was yet troublesome from her position in the rear of France;
and Louis finally concluded to force her to peace by carrying the war
into Catalonia, on the northeast coast. The movement of his armies was
seconded by his fleet under Tourville; and the reduction of that
difficult province went on rapidly until the approach of the allied
navies in largely superior force caused Tourville to retire to Toulon.
This saved Barcelona; and from that time until the two sea nations had
determined to make peace, they kept their fleets on the Spanish coast
and arrested the French advance. When, in 1697, William had become
disposed to peace and Spain refused it, Louis again invaded, the
allied fleet did not appear, and Barcelona fell. At the same time a
French naval expedition was successfully directed against Cartagena in
South America, and under the two blows, both of which depended upon
the control of the sea, Spain yielded.

The third military function of the allied navies was the protection of
their sea commerce; and herein, if history may be trusted, they
greatly failed. At no time has war against commerce been conducted on
a larger scale and with greater results than during this period; and
its operations were widest and most devastating at the very time that
the great French fleets were disappearing, in the years immediately
after La Hougue, apparently contradicting the assertion that such a
warfare must be based on powerful fleets or neighboring seaports. A
somewhat full discussion is due, inasmuch as the distress to commerce
wrought by the privateers was a large factor in bringing the sea
nations to wish for peace; just as the subsidies, which their
commerce enabled them to pay the continental armies, besides keeping
up their own, were the chief means by which the war was prolonged and
France brought to terms. The attack and defence of commerce is still a
living question.

In the first place it is to be observed that the decay of the French
fleet was gradual, and that the moral effect of its appearance in the
Channel, its victory at Beachy Head, and gallant conduct at La Hougue
remained for some time impressed on the minds of the allies. This
impression caused their ships to be kept together in fleets, instead
of scattering in pursuit of the enemy's cruisers, and so brought to
the latter a support almost equal to an active warfare on the seas.
Again, the efficiency of the English navy, as has been said, was low,
and its administration perhaps worse; while treason in England gave
the French the advantage of better information. Thus in the year
following La Hougue, the French, having received accurate information
of a great convoy sailing for Smyrna, sent out Tourville in May,
getting him to sea before the allies were ready to blockade him in
Brest, as they had intended. This delay was due to bad administration,
as was also the further misfortune that the English government did not
learn of Tourville's departure until after its own fleet had sailed
with the trade. Tourville surprised the convoy near the Straits,
destroyed or captured one hundred out of four hundred ships, and
scattered the rest. This is not a case of simple cruising warfare, for
Tourville's fleet was of seventy-one ships; but it shows the
incompetency of the English administration. In truth, it was
immediately after La Hougue that the depredations of cruisers became
most ruinous; and the reason was twofold: first, the allied fleet was
kept together at Spithead for two months and more, gathering troops
for a landing on the continent, thus leaving the cruisers unmolested;
and in the second place, the French, not being able to send their
fleet out again that summer, permitted the seamen to take service in
private ships, thus largely increasing the numbers of the latter. The
two causes working together gave an impunity and extension to
commerce-destroying which caused a tremendous outcry in England. "It
must be confessed," says the English naval chronicler, "that our
commerce suffered far less the year before, when the French were
masters at sea, than in this, when their grand fleet was blocked up in
port." But the reason was that the French having little commerce and a
comparatively large number of seamen, mainly employed in the fleet,
were able, when this lay by, to release them to cruisers. As the
pressure of the war became greater, and Louis continued to reduce the
number of his ships in commission, another increase was given to the
commerce-destroyers. "The ships and officers of the royal navy were
loaned, under certain conditions, to private firms, or to companies
who wished to undertake privateering enterprises, in which even the
cabinet ministers did not disdain to take shares;" indeed, they were
urged to do so to please the king. The conditions generally provided
that a certain proportion of the profits should go to the king, in
return for the use of the ships. Such employment would be demoralizing
to any military service, but not necessarily all at once; and the
conditions imparted for the time a tone and energy to privateering
that it cannot always have. In truth, the public treasury, not being
able to maintain the navy, associated with itself private capital,
risking only material otherwise useless, and looking for returns to
robbing the enemy. The commerce-destroying of this war, also, was no
mere business of single cruisers; squadrons of three or four up to
half a dozen ships acted together under one man, and it is only just
to say that under seamen like Jean Bart, Forbin, and Duguay-Trouin,
they were even more ready to fight than to pillage. The largest of
these private expeditions, and the only one that went far from the
French shores, was directed in 1697 against Cartagena, on the Spanish
Main. It numbered seven ships-of-the-line and six frigates, besides
smaller vessels, and carried twenty-eight hundred troops. The chief
object was to lay a contribution on the city of Cartagena; but its
effect on the policy of Spain was marked, and led to peace. Such a
temper and concert of action went far to supply the place of
supporting fleets, but could not wholly do so; and although the allies
continued to keep their large fleets together, still, as the war went
on and efficiency of administration improved, commerce-destroying was
brought within bounds. At the same time, as an evidence of how much
the unsupported cruisers suffered, even under these favorable
conditions, it may be mentioned that the English report fifty-nine
ships-of-war captured against eighteen admitted by the French during
the war,--a difference which a French naval historian attributes, with
much probability, to the English failing to distinguish between
ships-of-war properly so called, and those loaned to private firms.
Captures of actual privateers do not appear in the list quoted from.
"The commerce-destroying of this war, therefore, was marked by the
particular characteristics of cruisers acting together in squadron,
not far from their base, while the enemy thought best to keep his
fleet concentrated elsewhere; notwithstanding which, and the bad
administration of the English navy, the cruisers were more and more
controlled as the great French fleets disappeared." The results of the
war of 1689-1697 do not therefore vitiate the general conclusion that
"a cruising, commerce-destroying warfare, to be destructive, must be
seconded by a squadron warfare, and by divisions of ships-of-the-line;
which, forcing the enemy to unite his forces, permit the cruisers to
make fortunate attempts upon his trade. Without such backing the
result will be simply the capture of the cruisers." Toward the end of
this war the real tendency was becoming manifest, and was still more
plainly seen in the next, when the French navy had sunk to a yet lower
state of weakness.

Notwithstanding their losses, the sea nations made good their cause.
The war, which began with the French taking the offensive, ended by
reducing them everywhere to the defensive, and forced Louis to do
violence at once to his strongest prejudices and his most reasonable
political wishes, by recognizing as king of England him whom he looked
upon as a usurper as well as his own inveterate enemy. On its
surface, and taken as a whole, this war will appear almost wholly a
land struggle, extending from the Spanish Netherlands down the line of
the Rhine, to Savoy in Italy and Catalonia in Spain. The sea fights in
the Channel, the Irish struggle receding in the distance, look like
mere episodes; while the underlying action of trade and commerce is
wholly disregarded, or noticed only as their outcries tell of their
sufferings. Yet trade and shipping not only bore the burden of
suffering, but in the main paid the armies that were fighting the
French; and this turning of the stream of wealth from both sea nations
into the coffers of their allies was perhaps determined, certainly
hastened, by the misdirection of that naval supremacy with which
France began the war. It was then possible, as it will usually be
possible, for a really fine military navy of superior force to strike
an overwhelming blow at a less ready rival; but the opportunity was
allowed to slip, and the essentially stronger, better founded sea
power of the allies had time to assert itself.

The peace signed at Ryswick in 1697 was most disadvantageous to
France; she lost all that had been gained since the Peace of Nimeguen,
nineteen years before, with the single important exception of
Strasburg. All that Louis XIV. had gained by trick or force during the
years of peace was given up. Immense restitutions were made to Germany
and to Spain. In so far as the latter were made in the Netherlands,
they were to the immediate advantage of the United Provinces, and
indeed of all Europe as well as of Spain. To the two sea nations the
terms of the treaty gave commercial benefits, which tended to the
increase of their own sea power and to the consequent injury of that
of France.

France had made a gigantic struggle; to stand alone as she did then,
and as she has since done more than once, against all Europe is a
great feat. Yet it may be said that as the United Provinces taught the
lesson that a nation, however active and enterprising, cannot rest
upon external resources alone, if intrinsically weak in numbers and
territory, so France in its measure shows that a nation cannot
subsist indefinitely off itself, however powerful in numbers and
strong in internal resources.

It is said that a friend once found Colbert looking dreamily from his
windows, and on questioning him as to the subject of his meditations,
received this reply: "In contemplating the fertile fields before my
eyes, I recall those which I have seen elsewhere; what a rich country
is France!" This conviction supported him amid the many
discouragements of his official life, when struggling to meet the
financial difficulties arising from the extravagance and wars of the
king; and it has been justified by the whole course of the nation's
history since his days. France is rich in natural resources as well as
in the industry and thrift of her people. But neither individual
nations nor men can thrive when severed from natural intercourse with
their kind; whatever the native vigor of constitution, it requires
healthful surroundings, and freedom to draw to itself from near and
from far all that is conducive to its growth and strength and general
welfare. Not only must the internal organism work satisfactorily, the
processes of decay and renewal, of movement and circulation, go on
easily, but, from sources external to themselves, both mind and body
must receive healthful and varied nourishment. With all her natural
gifts France wasted away because of the want of that lively
intercourse between the different parts of her own body and constant
exchange with other people, which is known as commerce, internal or
external. To say that war was the cause of these defects is to state
at least a partial truth; but it does not exhaust the matter. War,
with its many acknowledged sufferings, is above all harmful when it
cuts a nation off from others and throws it back upon itself. There
may indeed be periods when such rude shocks have a bracing effect, but
they are exceptional, and of short duration, and they do not
invalidate the general statement. Such isolation was the lot of France
during the later wars of Louis XIV., and it well-nigh destroyed her;
whereas to save her from the possibility of such stagnation was the
great aim of Colbert's life.

War alone could not entail it, if only war could be postponed until
the processes of circulation within and without the kingdom were
established and in vigorous operation. They did not exist when he took
office; they had to be both created and firmly rooted in order to
withstand the blast of war. Time was not given to accomplish this
great work, nor did Louis XIV. support the schemes of his minister by
turning the budding energies of his docile and devoted subjects into
paths favorable to it. So when the great strain came upon the powers
of the nation, instead of drawing strength from every quarter and
through many channels, and laying the whole outside world under
contribution by the energy of its merchants and seamen, as England has
done in like straits, it was thrown back upon itself, cut off from the
world by the navies of England and Holland, and the girdle of enemies
which surrounded it upon the continent. The only escape from this
process of gradual starvation was by an effectual control of the sea;
the creation of a strong sea power which should insure free play for
the wealth of the land and the industry of the people. For this, too,
France had great natural advantages in her three seaboards, on the
Channel, the Atlantic, and the Mediterranean; and politically she had
had the fair opportunity of joining to her own maritime power that of
the Dutch in friendly alliance, hostile or at least wary toward
England. In the pride of his strength, conscious of absolute control
in his kingdom, Louis cast away this strong reinforcement to his
power, and proceeded to rouse Europe against him by repeated
aggressions. In the period which we have just considered, France
justified his confidence by a magnificent, and upon the whole
successful, maintenance of his attitude against all Europe; she did
not advance, but neither did she greatly recede. But this display of
power was exhausting; it ate away the life of the nation, because it
drew wholly upon itself and not upon the outside world, with which it
could have been kept in contact by the sea. In the war that next
followed, the same energy is seen, but not the same vitality; and
France was everywhere beaten back and brought to the verge of ruin.
The lesson of both is the same; nations, like men, however strong,
decay when cut off from the external activities and resources which at
once draw out and support their internal powers. A nation, as we have
already shown, cannot live indefinitely off itself, and the easiest
way by which it can communicate with other peoples and renew its own
strength is the sea.

FOOTNOTES:

[66] Campbell: Lives of the Admirals.

[67] Martin: History of France.

[68] See Map of English Channel, etc., p. 107.

[69] That is, nearly motionless.

[70] Hoste: Naval Tactics.

[71] Ledyard says the order to remove the buoys was not carried out
(Naval History, vol. ii. p. 636).

[72] Seignelay, the French minister of marine of the day, called him
"poltron de tête, mais pas de coeur."

[73] The author has followed in the text the traditional and generally
accepted account of Tourville's orders and the motives of his action.
A French writer, M. de Crisenoy, in a very interesting paper upon the
secret history preceding and accompanying the event, traverses many of
these traditional statements. According to him, Louis XIV. was not
under any illusion as to the loyalty of the English officers to their
flag; and the instructions given to Tourville, while peremptory under
certain conditions, did not compel him to fight in the situation of
the French fleet on the day of the battle. The tone of the
instructions, however, implied dissatisfaction with the admiral's
action in previous cruises, probably in the pursuit after Beachy Head,
and a consequent doubt of his vigor in the campaign then beginning.
Mortification therefore impelled him to the desperate attack on the
allied fleet; and, according to M. de Crisenoy, the council of war in
the admiral's cabin, and the dramatic production of the king's orders,
had no existence in fact.

[74] Campbell: Lives of the Admirals.




CHAPTER V.

    WAR OF THE SPANISH SUCCESSION, 1702-1713.--SEA BATTLE OF MALAGA.


During the last thirty years of the seventeenth century, amid all the
strifes of arms and diplomacy, there had been clearly foreseen the
coming of an event which would raise new and great issues. This was
the failure of the direct royal line in that branch of the House of
Austria which was then on the Spanish throne; and the issues to be
determined when the present king, infirm both in body and mind, should
die, were whether the new monarch was to be taken from the House of
Bourbon or from the Austrian family in Germany; and whether, in either
event, the sovereign thus raised to the throne should succeed to the
entire inheritance, the Empire of Spain, or some partition of that
vast inheritance be made in the interests of the balance of European
power. But this balance of power was no longer understood in the
narrow sense of continental possessions; the effect of the new
arrangements upon commerce, shipping, and the control both of the
ocean and the Mediterranean, was closely looked to. The influence of
the two sea powers and the nature of their interests were becoming
more evident.

It is necessary to recall the various countries that were ruled by
Spain at that time in order to understand the strategic questions, as
they may fairly be called, now to be settled. These were, in Europe,
the Netherlands (now Belgium); Naples and the south of Italy; Milan
and other provinces in the north; and, in the Mediterranean, Sicily,
Sardinia, and the Balearic Isles. Corsica at that time belonged to
Genoa. In the western hemisphere, besides Cuba and Porto Rico, Spain
then held all that part of the continent now divided among the
Spanish American States, a region whose vast commercial possibilities
were coming to be understood; and in the Asian archipelago there were
large possessions that entered less into the present dispute. The
excessive weakness of this empire, owing to the decay of the central
kingdom, had hitherto caused other nations, occupied as they were with
more immediate interests, to regard with indifference its enormous
extent. This indifference could not last when there was a prospect of
a stronger administration, backed possibly by alliances with one of
the great powers of Europe.

It would be foreign to our subject to enter into the details of
diplomatic arrangement, which, by shifting about peoples and
territories from one ruler to another, sought to reach a political
balance peacefully. The cardinal points of each nation's policy may be
shortly stated. The Spanish cabinet and people objected to any
solution which dismembered the empire. The English and the Dutch
objected to any extension of France in the Spanish Netherlands, and to
the monopoly by the French of the trade with Spanish America, both
which they feared as the results of placing a Bourbon on the Spanish
throne. Louis XIV. wanted Naples and Sicily for one of his sons, in
case of any partition; thus giving France a strong Mediterranean
position, but one which would be at the mercy of the sea powers,--a
fact which induced William III. to acquiesce in this demand. The
Emperor of Austria particularly objected to these Mediterranean
positions going away from his family, and refused to come into any of
the partition treaties. Before any arrangement was perfected, the
actual king of Spain died, but before his death was induced by his
ministers to sign a will, bequeathing all his States to the grandson
of Louis XIV., then Duke of Anjou, known afterward as Philip V. of
Spain. By this step it was hoped to preserve the whole, by enlisting
in its defence the nearest and one of the most powerful States in
Europe,--nearest, if are excepted the powers ruling the sea, which are
always near any country whose ports are open to their ships.

Louis XIV. accepted the bequest, and in so doing felt bound in honor
to resist all attempts at partition. The union of the two kingdoms
under one family promised important advantages to France, henceforth
delivered from that old enemy in the rear, which had balked so many of
her efforts to extend her frontiers eastward. As a matter of fact,
from that time, with rare breaks, there existed between the two
kingdoms an alliance, the result of family ties, which only the
weakness of Spain kept from being dangerous to the rest of Europe. The
other countries at once realized the situation, and nothing could have
saved war but some backward step on the part of the French king. The
statesmen of England and Holland, the two powers on whose wealth the
threatened war must depend, proposed that the Italian States should be
given to the son of the Austrian emperor, Belgium be occupied by
themselves, and that the new king of Spain should grant no commercial
privileges in the Indies to France above other nations. To the credit
of their wisdom it must be said that this compromise was the one which
after ten years of war was found, on the whole, best; and in it is
seen the growing sense of the value of extension by sea. Louis,
however, would not yield; on the contrary, he occupied, by connivance
of the Spanish governors, towns in the Netherlands which had been held
by Dutch troops under treaties with Spain. Soon after, in February,
1701, the English Parliament met, and denounced any treaty which
promised France the dominion of the Mediterranean. Holland began to
arm, and the Emperor of Austria pushed his troops into northern Italy,
where a campaign followed, greatly to the disadvantage of Louis.

In September of the same year, 1701, the two sea powers and the
Emperor of Austria signed a secret treaty, which laid down the chief
lines of the coming war, with the exception of that waged in the
Spanish peninsula itself. By it the allies undertook to conquer the
Spanish Netherlands in order to place a barrier between France and the
United Provinces; to conquer Milan as a security for the emperor's
other provinces; and to conquer Naples and Sicily for the same
security, and also for the security of the navigation and commerce of
the subjects of his Britannic Majesty and of the United Provinces. The
sea powers should have the right to conquer, for the utility of the
said navigation and commerce, the countries and towns of the Spanish
Indies; and all that they should be able to take there should be for
them and remain theirs. The war begun, none of the allies could treat
without the others, nor without having taken just measures--first, to
prevent the kingdoms of France and Spain from ever being united under
the same king; second, to prevent the French from ever making
themselves masters of the Spanish Indies, or from sending ships
thither to engage, directly or indirectly, in commerce; third, to
secure to the subjects of his Britannic Majesty and of the United
Provinces the commercial privileges which they enjoyed in all the
Spanish States under the late king.

It will be noticed that in these conditions there is no suggestion of
any intention to resist the accession of the Bourbon king, who was
called to the throne by the Spanish government and at first
acknowledged by England and Holland; but, on the other hand, the
Emperor of Austria does not withdraw the Austrian claim, which centred
in his own person. The voice of the sea powers was paramount in the
coalition, as the terms of the treaty safeguarding their commercial
interests show, though, as they were about to use German armies for
the land war, German claims also had to be considered. As a French
historian points out:--

    "This was really a new treaty of partition.... William III., who
    had conducted all, had taken care not to exhaust England and
    Holland, in order to restore the Spanish monarchy, intact, to
    the emperor; his final condition was to reduce the new king,
    Philip V., to Spain proper, and to secure to England and Holland
    at once the commercial use of all the regions that had been
    under the Spanish monarchy, together with important military and
    maritime positions against France."[75]

But though war was imminent, the countries about to engage hesitated.
Holland would not move without England, and despite the strong
feeling of the latter country against France, the manufacturers and
merchants still remembered the terrible sufferings of the last war.
Just then, as the scales were wavering, James II. died. Louis,
yielding to a sentiment of sympathy and urged by his nearest
intimates, formally recognized the son of James as king of England;
and the English people, enraged at what they looked on as a threat and
an insult, threw aside all merely prudential considerations. The House
of Lords declared that "there could be no security till the usurper of
the Spanish monarchy was brought to reason;" and the House of Commons
voted fifty thousand soldiers and thirty-five thousand seamen, besides
subsidies for German and Danish auxiliaries. William III. died soon
after, in March, 1702; but Queen Anne took up his policy, which had
become that of the English and Dutch peoples.

Louis XIV. tried to break part of the on-coming storm by forming a
league of neutrals among the other German States; but the emperor
adroitly made use of the German feeling, and won to his side the
Elector of Brandenburg by acknowledging him as king of Prussia, thus
creating a North-German Protestant royal house, around which the other
Protestant States naturally gathered, and which was in the future to
prove a formidable rival to Austria. The immediate result was that
France and Spain, whose cause was thenceforth known as that of the two
crowns, went into the war without any ally save Bavaria. War was
declared in May by Holland against the kings of France and Spain; by
England against France and Spain, Anne refusing to recognize Philip V.
even in declaring war, because he had recognized James III. as king of
England; while the emperor was still more outspoken, declaring against
the King of France and the Duke of Anjou. Thus began the great War of
the Spanish Succession.

It is far from easy, in dealing with a war of such proportions,
lasting for more than ten years, to disentangle from the general
narrative that part which particularly touches our subject, without at
the same time losing sight of the relation of the one part to the
whole. Such a loss, however, is fatal to the end in view, which is
not a mere chronicle of naval events, nor even a tactical or strategic
discussion of certain naval problems divorced from their surroundings
of cause and effect in general history, but an appreciation of the
effect of sea power upon the general result of the war and upon the
prosperity of nations. It will conduce to clearness, however, to point
out again that the aim of William III. was not to dispute the claim of
Philip V. to the throne,--a matter of comparative indifference to the
sea powers,--but to seize, to the benefit of their commerce and
colonial empire, such portions of the Spanish American possessions as
he could, and at the same time to impose such conditions upon the new
monarchy as would at least prevent any loss, to English and Dutch
commerce, of the privileges they had had under the Austrian line. Such
a policy would not direct the main effort of the sea nations upon the
Spanish peninsula, but upon America; and the allied fleets might not
have entered the Straits. Sicily and Naples were to go, not to
England, but to Austria. Subsequent causes led to an entire change in
this general plan. A new candidate, a son of the Emperor of Germany,
was set up in 1703 by the coalition under the name of Carlos III., and
the peninsula became the scene of a doubtful and bloody war, keeping
the Anglo-Dutch fleets hovering round the coasts; with the result, as
regards the sea powers, that nothing of decisive importance was done
in Spanish America, but that England issued from the strife with
Gibraltar and Port Mahon in her hands, to be thenceforth a
Mediterranean power. At the same time that Carlos III. was proclaimed,
a treaty was negotiated with Portugal, known as the Methuen Treaty,
which gave England the practical monopoly of Portuguese trade, and
sent the gold of Brazil by way of Lisbon to London,--an advantage so
great that it aided materially in keeping up the war on the continent
as well as in maintaining the navy. At the same time the efficiency of
the latter so increased that the losses by French cruisers, though
still heavy, were at no time unendurable.

When the war broke out, in pursuance of the original policy, Sir
George Rooke, with a fleet of fifty ships-of-the-line and transports
carrying fourteen thousand troops, was sent against Cadiz, which was
the great European centre of the Spanish-American trade; there came
the specie and products of the West, and thence they were dispersed
through Europe. It had been the purpose of William III. also to seize
Cartagena, one of the principal centres of the same trade in the other
hemisphere; and to that end, six months before his death, in
September, 1701, he had despatched there a squadron under that
traditional seaman of the olden time, Benbow. Benbow fell in with a
French squadron sent to supply and strengthen the place, and brought
it to action north of Cartagena; but though superior in force, the
treason of several of his captains, who kept out of action, defeated
his purpose, and after fighting till his ship was helpless and he
himself had received a mortal wound, the French escaped and Cartagena
was saved. Before his death Benbow received a letter from the French
commodore to this effect: "Yesterday morning I had no hope but I
should have supped in your cabin. As for those cowardly captains of
yours, hang them up, for, by God! they deserve it." And hanged two of
them were. Rooke's expedition against Cadiz also failed, as it was
nearly certain to do; for his instructions were so to act as to
conciliate the Spanish people and disincline them to the Bourbon king.
Such doubtful orders tied his hands; but after failing there, he
learned that the galleons from the West Indies, loaded with silver and
merchandise, had put into Vigo Bay under escort of French
ships-of-war. He went there at once, and found the enemy in a harbor
whose entrance was but three quarters of a mile wide, defended by
fortifications and a heavy boom; but a passage was forced through the
boom under a hot fire, the place seized, and all the shipping, with
much of the specie, either taken or sunk. This affair, which is known
in history as that of the Vigo galleons, was a brilliant and
interesting feat of arms, but has no military features calling for
mention, except the blow it gave to the finances and prestige of the
two crowns.

The affair at Vigo had, however, important political results, and
helped to that change in the general plan of the sea powers which has
been mentioned. The King of Portugal, moved by fear of the French, had
acknowledged Philip V.; but his heart was against him, for he dreaded
French influence and power brought so near his little and isolated
kingdom. It had been a part of Rooke's mission to detach him from the
alliance of the two crowns; and the affair of Vigo, happening so near
his own frontiers, impressed him with a sense of the power of the
allied navies. In truth, Portugal is nearer to the sea than to Spain,
and must fall naturally under the influence of the power controlling
the sea. Inducements were offered,--by the Emperor of Austria a
cession of Spanish territory, by the sea powers a subsidy; but the
king was not willing to declare himself until the Austrian claimant
should have landed at Lisbon, fairly committing the coalition to a
peninsular as well as a continental war. The emperor transferred his
claims to his second son, Charles; and the latter, after being
proclaimed in Vienna and acknowledged by England and Holland, was
taken by the allied fleets to Lisbon, where he landed in March, 1704.
This necessitated the important change in the plans of the sea powers.
Pledged to the support of Carlos, their fleets were thenceforth tied
to the shores of the peninsula and the protection of commerce; while
the war in the West Indies, becoming a side issue on a small scale,
led to no results. From this time on, Portugal was the faithful ally
of England, whose sea power during this war gained its vast
preponderance over all rivals. Her ports were the refuge and support
of English fleets, and on Portugal was based in later days the
Peninsular war with Napoleon. In and through all, Portugal, for a
hundred years, had more to gain and more to fear from England than
from any other power.

Great as were the effects of the maritime supremacy of the two sea
powers upon the general result of the war, and especially upon that
undisputed empire of the seas which England held for a century after,
the contest is marked by no one naval action of military interest.
Once only did great fleets meet, and then with results that were
indecisive; after which the French gave up the struggle at sea,
confining themselves wholly to a commerce-destroying warfare. This
feature of the War of the Spanish Succession characterizes nearly the
whole of the eighteenth century, with the exception of the American
Revolutionary struggle. The noiseless, steady, exhausting pressure
with which sea power acts, cutting off the resources of the enemy
while maintaining its own, supporting war in scenes where it does not
appear itself, or appears only in the background, and striking open
blows at rare intervals, though lost to most, is emphasized to the
careful reader by the events of this war and of the half-century that
followed. The overwhelming sea power of England was the determining
factor in European history during the period mentioned, maintaining
war abroad while keeping its own people in prosperity at home, and
building up the great empire which is now seen; but from its very
greatness its action, by escaping opposition, escapes attention. On
the few occasions in which it is called to fight, its superiority is
so marked that the affairs can scarcely be called battles; with the
possible exceptions of Byng's action at Minorca and Hawke's at
Quiberon, the latter one of the most brilliant pages in naval history,
no decisive encounter between equal forces, possessing military
interest, occurs between 1700 and 1778.

Owing to this characteristic, the War of the Spanish Succession, from
the point of view of our subject, has to be blocked out in general
outline, avoiding narrative and indicating general bearings,
especially of the actions of the fleets. With the war in Flanders, in
Germany, and in Italy the navies had naturally no concern; when they
had so protected the commerce of the allies that there was no serious
check to that flow of subsidies upon which the land war depended,
their part toward it was done. In the Spanish peninsula it was
different. Immediately after landing Carlos III. at Lisbon, Sir George
Rooke sailed for Barcelona, which it was understood would be handed
over when the fleets appeared; but the governor was faithful to his
king and kept down the Austrian party. Rooke then sailed for Toulon,
where a French fleet was at anchor. On his way he sighted another
French fleet coming from Brest, which he chased but was unable to
overtake; so that both the enemy's squadrons were united in the port.
It is worth while to note here that the English navy did not as yet
attempt to blockade the French ports in winter, as they did at a later
date. At this period fleets, like armies, went into winter quarters.
Another English admiral, Sir Cloudesley Shovel, had been sent in the
spring to blockade Brest; but arriving too late, he found his bird
flown, and at once kept on to the Mediterranean. Rooke, not thinking
himself strong enough to resist the combined French squadrons, fell
back toward the Straits; for at this time England had no ports, no
base, in the Mediterranean, no useful ally; Lisbon was the nearest
refuge. Rooke and Shovel met off Lagos, and there held a council of
war, in which the former, who was senior, declared that his
instructions forbade his undertaking anything without the consent of
the kings of Spain and Portugal. This was indeed tying the hands of
the sea powers; but Rooke at last, chafing at the humiliating
inaction, and ashamed to go home without doing something, decided to
attack Gibraltar for three reasons: because he heard it was
insufficiently garrisoned, because it was of infinite importance as a
port for the present war, and because its capture would reflect credit
on the queen's arms. The place was attacked, bombarded, and then
carried by an assault in boats. The English possession of Gibraltar
dates from August 4, 1704, and the deed rightly keeps alive the name
of Rooke, to whose judgment and fearlessness of responsibility England
owes the key of the Mediterranean.

The Bourbon king of Spain at once undertook to retake the place, and
called upon the French fleet in Toulon to support his attack.
Tourville had died in 1701, and the fleet was commanded by the Count
of Toulouse,--a natural son of Louis XIV., only twenty-six years old.
Rooke also sailed eastward, and the two fleets met on the 24th of
August off Velez Malaga. The allies were to windward with a northeast
wind, both fleets on the port tack heading to the southward and
eastward. There is some uncertainty as to the numbers; the French had
fifty-two ships-of-the-line, their enemy probably half a dozen more.
The allies kept away together, each ship for its opposite; there was
apparently no attempt on Rooke's part at any tactical combination. The
battle of Malaga possesses indeed no military interest, except that it
is the first in which we find fully developed that wholly unscientific
method of attack by the English which Clerk criticised, and which
prevailed throughout the century. It is instructive to notice that the
result in it was the same as in all others fought on the same
principle. The van opened out from the centre, leaving quite an
interval; and the attempt made to penetrate this gap and isolate the
van was the only tactical move of the French. We find in them at
Malaga no trace of the cautious, skilful tactics which Clerk rightly
thought to recognize at a later day. The degeneracy from the able
combinations of Monk, Ruyter, and Tourville to the epoch of mere
seamanship is clearly marked by the battle of Malaga, and gives it its
only historical importance. In it was realized that primitive mode of
fighting which Macaulay has sung, and which remained for many years
the ideal of the English navy:--

    "Then on both sides the leaders
      Gave signal for the charge;
    And on both sides the footmen
      Strode forth with lance and targe;
    And on both sides the horsemen
      Struck their spurs deep in gore,
    And _front to front_ the armies
      Met with a mighty roar."

Human movement is not always advance; and there are traces of a
somewhat similar ideal in the naval periodical literature of our own
day. The fight was severe, lasting from ten in the morning till five
in the afternoon, but was entirely indecisive. The next day the wind
shifted, giving the weather-gage to the French, but they did not use
the opportunity to attack; for which they were much to blame, if their
claim of the advantage the day before is well founded. Rooke could not
have fought; nearly half his fleet, twenty-five ships, it is said, had
used up all their ammunition. Even during the battle itself several of
the allied ships were towed out of line, because they had not powder
and ball for a single broadside. This was doubtless due to the attack
upon Gibraltar, in which fifteen thousand shot were expended, and to
the lack of any port serving as a base of supplies,--a deficiency
which the new possession would hereafter remove. Rooke, in seizing
Gibraltar, had the same object in view that prompted the United States
to seize Port Royal at the beginning of the Civil War, and which made
the Duke of Parma urge upon his king, before sending the Spanish Great
Armada, to seize Flushing on the coast of Holland,--advice which, had
it been followed, would have made unnecessary that dreary and
disastrous voyage to the north of England. The same reasons would
doubtless lead any nation intending serious operations against our
seaboard, to seize points remote from the great centres and
susceptible of defence, like Gardiner's Bay or Port Royal, which in an
inefficient condition of our navy they might hold with and for their
fleets.

Rooke retired in peace to Lisbon, bestowing by the way on Gibraltar
all the victuals and ammunition that could be spared from the fleet.
Toulouse, instead of following up his victory, if it was one, went
back to Toulon, sending only ten ships-of-the-line to support the
attack on Gibraltar. All the attempts of the French against the place
were carried on in a futile manner; the investing squadron was finally
destroyed and the land attack converted into a blockade. "With this
reverse," says a French naval officer, "began in the French people a
regrettable reaction against the navy. The wonders to which it had
given birth, its immense services, were forgotten. Its value was no
longer believed. The army, more directly in contact with the nation,
had all its favor, all its sympathy. The prevailing error, that the
greatness or decay of France depended upon some Rhenish positions,
could not but favor these ideas adverse to the sea service, which have
made England's strength and our weakness."[76]

During this year, 1704, the battle of Blenheim was fought, in which
the French and Bavarian troops were wholly overthrown by the English
and German under Marlborough and Prince Eugene. The result of this
battle was that Bavaria forsook the French alliance, and Germany
became a secondary theatre of the general war, which was waged
thereafter mainly in the Netherlands, Italy, and the Peninsula.

The following year, 1705, the allies moved against Philip V. by two
roads,--from Lisbon upon Madrid, and by way of Barcelona. The former
attack, though based upon the sea, was mainly by land, and resultless;
the Spanish people in that quarter showed unmistakably that they would
not welcome the king set up by foreign powers. It was different in
Catalonia. Carlos III. went there in person with the allied fleet. The
French navy, inferior in numbers, kept in port. The French army also
did not appear. The allied troops invested the town, aided by three
thousand seamen and supported by supplies landed from the fleet, which
was to them both base of supplies and line of communications.
Barcelona surrendered on the 9th of October; all Catalonia welcomed
Carlos, and the movement spread to Aragon and Valencia, the capital of
the latter province declaring for Carlos.

The following year, 1706, the French took the offensive in Spain on
the borders of Catalonia, while defending the passes of the mountains
toward Portugal. In the absence of the allied fleet, and of the
succors which it brought and maintained, the resistance was weak, and
Barcelona was again besieged, this time by the French party supported
by a French fleet of thirty sail-of-the-line and numerous transports
with supplies from the neighboring port of Toulon. The siege, begun
April 5, was going on hopefully; the Austrian claimant himself was
within the walls, the prize of success; but on the 10th of May the
allied fleet appeared, the French ships retired, and the siege was
raised in disorder. The Bourbon claimant dared not retreat into
Aragon, and so passed by Roussillon into France, leaving his rival in
possession. At the same time there moved forward from Portugal--that
other base which the sea power of the English and Dutch at once
controlled and utilized--another army maintained by the subsidies
earned from the ocean. This time the western attack was more
successful; many cities in Estremadura and Leon fell, and as soon as
the allied generals learned the raising of the siege of Barcelona,
they pressed on by way of Salamanca to Madrid. Philip V., after
escaping into France, had returned to Spain by the western Pyrenees;
but on the approach of the allies he had again to fly, leaving to them
his capital. The Portuguese and allied troops entered Madrid, June 26,
1706. The allied fleet, after the fall of Barcelona, seized Alicante
and Cartagena.

So far success had gone; but the inclinations of the Spanish people
had been mistaken, and the strength of their purpose and pride,
supported by the natural features of their country, was not yet
understood. The national hatred to the Portuguese was aroused, as well
as the religious dislike to heretics, the English general himself
being a Huguenot refugee. Madrid and the surrounding country were
disaffected, and the south sent the Bourbon king assurance of its
fidelity. The allies were not able to remain in the hostile capital,
particularly as the region around was empty of supplies and full of
guerillas. They retired to the eastward, drawing toward the Austrian
claimant in Aragon. Reverse followed reverse, and on the 25th of
April, 1707, the allied army was disastrously overthrown at Almansa,
losing fifteen thousand men. All Spain fell back again into the power
of Philip V., except the province of Catalonia, part of which also was
subdued. The next year, 1708, the French made some progress in the
same quarter, but were not able to attack Barcelona; Valencia and
Alicante, however, were reduced.

The year 1707 was not marked by any naval event of importance. During
the summer the allied fleets in the Mediterranean were diverted from
the coast of Spain to support an attack upon Toulon made by the
Austrians and Piedmontese. The latter moved from Italy along the coast
of the Mediterranean, the fleet supporting the flank on the sea, and
contributing supplies. The siege, however, failed, and the campaign
was inconclusive. Returning home, the admiral, Sir Cloudesley Shovel,
with several ships-of-the-line, was lost on the Scilly Islands, in one
of those shipwrecks which have become historical.

In 1708 the allied fleets seized Sardinia, which from its fruitfulness
and nearness to Barcelona became a rich storehouse to the Austrian
claimant, so long as by the allied help he controlled the sea. The
same year Minorca, with its valuable harbor, Port Mahon, was also
taken, and from that time for fifty years remained in English hands.
Blocking Cadiz and Cartagena by the possession of Gibraltar, and
facing Toulon with Port Mahon, Great Britain was now as strongly based
in the Mediterranean as either France or Spain; while, with Portugal
as an ally, she controlled the two stations of Lisbon and Gibraltar,
watching the trade routes both of the ocean and of the inland sea. By
the end of 1708 the disasters of France by land and sea, the frightful
sufferings of the kingdom, and the almost hopelessness of carrying on
a strife which was destroying France, and easily borne by England, led
Louis XIV. to offer most humiliating concessions to obtain peace. He
undertook to surrender the whole Spanish monarchy, reserving only
Naples for the Bourbon king. The allies refused; they demanded the
abandonment of the whole Spanish Empire without exception by the Duke
of Anjou, refusing to call him king, and added thereto ruinous
conditions for France herself. Louis would not yield these, and the
war went on.

During the remaining years the strenuous action of the sea power of
the allies, which had by this time come to be that of Great Britain
alone, with little help from Holland, was less than ever obtrusive,
but the reality of its effect remained. The Austrian claimant,
confined to Catalonia for the most part, was kept in communication
with Sardinia and the Italian provinces of Germany by the English
fleet; but the entire disappearance of the French navy and the evident
intention on the part of Louis to keep no squadrons at sea, allowed
some diminution of the Mediterranean fleet, with the result of greater
protection to trade. In the years 1710 and 1711 expeditions were also
made against the French colonies in North America. Nova Scotia was
taken, but an attempt on Quebec failed.

During the winter of 1709 and 1710 Louis withdrew all the French
troops from Spain, thus abandoning the cause of his grandson. But when
the cause of France was at the very lowest, and it seemed as though
she might be driven to concessions which would reduce her to a
second-class power, the existence of the coalition was threatened by
the disgrace of Marlborough, who represented England in it. His loss
of favor with the queen was followed by the accession to power of the
party opposed to the war, or rather to its further continuance. This
change took place in the summer of 1710, and the inclination toward
peace was strengthened both by the favorable position in which England
then stood for treating, and by the heavy burden she was bearing;
which it became evident could bring in no further advantages
commensurate to its weight. The weaker ally, Holland, had gradually
ceased to contribute her stipulated share to the sea forces; and
although far-sighted Englishmen might see with complacency the
disappearance of a rival sea power, the immediate increase of expense
was more looked to and felt by the men of the day. The cost both of
the continental and Spanish wars was also largely defrayed by
England's subsidies; and while that on the continent could bring her
no further gain, it was seen that the sympathies of the Spanish people
could not be overborne in favor of Carlos III. without paying more
than the game was worth. Secret negotiations between England and
France soon began, and received an additional impulse by the
unexpected death of the Emperor of Germany, the brother of the
Austrian claimant of the Spanish throne. There being no other male
heir, Carlos became at once emperor of Austria, and was soon after
elected emperor of Germany. England had no more wish to see two crowns
on an Austrian head than on that of a Bourbon.

The demands made by England, as conditions of peace in 1711, showed
her to have become a sea power in the purest sense of the word, not
only in fact, but also in her own consciousness. She required that the
same person should never be king both of France and Spain; that a
barrier of fortified towns should be granted her allies, Holland and
Germany, as a defensive line against France; that French conquests
from her allies should be restored; and for herself she demanded the
formal cession of Gibraltar and Port Mahon, whose strategic and
maritime value has been pointed out, the destruction of the port of
Dunkirk, the home nest of the privateers that preyed on English
commerce, the cession of the French colonies of Newfoundland, Hudson's
Bay, and Nova Scotia, the last of which she held at that time, and
finally, treaties of commerce with France and Spain, and the
concession of the monopoly of the slave trade with Spanish America,
known as the Asiento, which Spain had given to France in 1701.

Negotiations continued, though hostilities did not cease; and in June,
1712, a four months' truce between Great Britain and France removed
the English troops from the allied armies on the continent, their
great leader Marlborough having been taken from their head the year
before. The campaign of 1712 was favorable to France; but in almost
any event the withdrawal of Great Britain made the end of the war a
question of but a short time. The remonstrances of Holland were met by
the reply that since 1707 the Dutch had not furnished more than one
third their quota of ships, and taking the war through, not over one
half. The House of Commons in an address to the throne in 1712
complained that--

    "The service at sea hath been carried on through the whole
    course of the war in a manner highly disadvantageous to your
    Majesty's kingdom, for the necessity requiring that great fleets
    should be fitted out every year for maintaining a superiority
    in the Mediterranean and for opposing any force which the enemy
    might prepare either at Dunkirk or in the ports of west France;
    your Majesty's readiness, in fitting out your proportion of
    ships for all parts of that service, hath not prevailed with
    Holland, which has been greatly deficient every year in
    proportion to what your Majesty hath furnished.... Hence your
    Majesty hath been obliged to supply those deficiencies with
    additional reinforcements of your own ships, and your Majesty's
    ships have been forced in greater numbers to continue in remote
    seas, and at unseasonable times of the year, to the great damage
    of the navy. This also hath straitened the convoys for trade;
    the coasts have been exposed for want of cruisers; and you have
    been disabled from annoying the enemy in their most beneficial
    commerce with the West Indies, whence they received those vast
    supplies of treasure, without which they could not have
    supported the expenses of the war."

In fact, between 1701 and 1716 the commerce of Spanish America had
brought into France forty million dollars in specie. To these
complaints the Dutch envoy to England could only reply that Holland
was not in a condition to fulfil her compacts. The reverses of 1712,
added to Great Britain's fixed purpose to have peace, decided the
Dutch to the same; and the English still kept, amid their
dissatisfaction with their allies, so much of their old feeling
against France as to support all the reasonable claims of Holland.
April 11, 1713, an almost general peace, known as the Peace of
Utrecht, one of the landmarks of history, was signed between France on
the one hand, and England, Holland, Prussia, Portugal, and Savoy on
the other. The emperor still held out, but the loss of British
subsidies fettered the movements of his armies, and with the
withdrawal of the sea powers the continental war might have fallen of
itself; but France with her hands freed carried on during 1713 a
brilliant and successful campaign in Germany. On the 7th of March,
1714, peace was signed between France and Austria. Some embers of the
war continued to burn in Catalonia and the Balearic Islands, which
persisted in their rebellion against Philip V.; but the revolt was
stifled as soon as the arms of France were turned against them.
Barcelona was taken by storm in September, 1714; the islands submitted
in the following summer.

The changes effected by this long war and sanctioned by the peace,
neglecting details of lesser or passing importance, may be stated as
follows: 1. The House of Bourbon was settled on the Spanish throne,
and the Spanish empire retained its West Indian and American
possessions; the purpose of William III. against her dominion there
was frustrated when England undertook to support the Austrian prince,
and so fastened the greater part of her naval force to the
Mediterranean. 2. The Spanish empire lost its possessions in the
Netherlands, Gelderland going to the new kingdom of Prussia and
Belgium to the emperor; the Spanish Netherlands thus became the
Austrian Netherlands. 3. Spain lost also the principal islands of the
Mediterranean; Sardinia being given to Austria, Minorca with its fine
harbor to Great Britain, and Sicily to the Duke of Savoy. 4. Spain
lost also her Italian possessions, Milan and Naples going to the
emperor. Such, in the main, were the results to Spain of the fight
over the succession to her throne.

France, the backer of the successful claimant, came out of the strife
worn out, and with considerable loss of territory. She had succeeded
in placing a king of her own royal house on a neighboring throne, but
her sea strength was exhausted, her population diminished, her
financial condition ruined. The European territory surrendered was on
her northern and eastern boundaries; and she abandoned the use of the
port of Dunkirk, the centre of that privateering warfare so dreaded by
English merchants. In America, the cession of Nova Scotia and
Newfoundland was the first step toward that entire loss of Canada
which befell half a century later; but for the present she retained
Cape Breton Island, with its port Louisburg, the key to the Gulf and
River St. Lawrence.

The gains of England, by the treaty and the war, corresponded very
nearly to the losses of France and Spain, and were all in the
direction of extending and strengthening her sea power. Gibraltar and
Port Mahon in the Mediterranean, and the colonies already mentioned in
North America, afforded new bases to that power, extending and
protecting her trade. Second only to the expansion of her own was the
injury to the sea power of France and Holland, by the decay of their
navies in consequence of the immense drain of the land warfare;
further indications of that decay will be given later. The very
neglect of Holland to fill up her quota of ships, and the bad
condition of those sent, while imposing extra burdens upon England,
may be considered a benefit, forcing the British navy to greater
development and effort. The disproportion in military power on the sea
was further increased by the destruction of the works at Dunkirk; for
though not in itself a first-class port, nor of much depth of water,
it had great artificial military strength, and its position was
peculiarly adapted to annoy English trade. It was but forty miles from
the South Foreland and the Downs, and the Channel abreast it is but
twenty miles wide. Dunkirk was one of Louis' earliest acquisitions,
and in its development was as his own child; the dismantling of the
works and filling-in of the port show the depth of his humiliation at
this time. But it was the wisdom of England not to base her sea power
solely on military positions nor even on fighting-ships, and the
commercial advantages she had now gained by the war and the peace were
very great. The grant of the slave trade with Spanish America, in
itself lucrative, became yet more so as the basis for an immense
smuggling intercourse with those countries, which gave the English a
partial recompense for their failure to obtain actual possession;
while the cessions made to Portugal by France in South America were
mainly to the advantage of England, which had obtained the control of
Portuguese trade by the treaty of 1703. The North American colonies
ceded were valuable, not merely nor chiefly as military stations, but
commercially; and treaties of commerce on favorable terms were made
both with France and Spain. A minister of the day, defending the
treaty in Parliament, said: "The advantages from this peace appear in
the addition made to our wealth; in the great quantities of bullion
lately coined in our mint; by the vast increase in our shipping
employed since the peace, in the fisheries, and in merchandise; and by
the remarkable growth of the customs upon imports, and of our
manufactures, and the growth of our country upon export;" in a word,
by the impetus to trade in all its branches.

While England thus came out from the war in good running condition,
and fairly placed in that position of maritime supremacy which she has
so long maintained, her old rival in trade and fighting was left
hopelessly behind. As the result of the war Holland obtained nothing
at sea,--no colony, no station. The commercial treaty with France
placed her on the same terms as England, but she received no
concessions giving her a footing in Spanish America like that obtained
by her ally. Indeed, some years before the peace, while the coalition
was still maintaining Carlos, a treaty was made with the latter by the
British minister, unknown to the Dutch, practically giving the British
monopoly of Spanish trade in America; sharing it only with Spaniards,
which was pretty much the same as not sharing it at all. This treaty
accidentally became known, and made a great impression on the Dutch;
but England was then so necessary to the coalition that she ran no
risk of being left out by its other members. The gain which Holland
made by land was that of military occupation only, of certain
fortified places in the Austrian Netherlands, known to history as the
"barrier towns;" nothing was added by them to her revenue, population,
or resources; nothing to that national strength which must underlie
military institutions. Holland had forsaken, perhaps unavoidably, the
path by which she had advanced to wealth and to leadership among
nations. The exigencies of her continental position had led to the
neglect of her navy, which in those days of war and privateering
involved a loss of carrying-trade and commerce: and although she held
her head high through the war, the symptoms of weakness were apparent
in her failing armaments. Therefore, though the United Provinces
attained the great object for which they began the war, and saved the
Spanish Netherlands from the hands of France, the success was not
worth the cost. Thenceforth they withdrew for a long period from the
wars and diplomacy of Europe; partly, perhaps, because they saw how
little they had gained, but yet more from actual weakness and
inability. After the strenuous exertions of the war came a reaction,
which showed painfully the inherent weakness of a State narrow in
territory and small in the number of its people. The visible decline
of the Provinces dates from the Peace of Utrecht; the real decline
began earlier. Holland ceased to be numbered among the great powers of
Europe, her navy was no longer a military factor in diplomacy, and her
commerce also shared in the general decline of the State.

It remains only to notice briefly the results to Austria, and to
Germany generally. France yielded the barrier of the Rhine, with
fortified places on the east bank of the river. Austria received, as
has been mentioned, Belgium, Sardinia, Naples, and the Spanish
possessions in northern Italy; dissatisfied in other respects, Austria
was especially discontented at her failure to obtain Sicily, and did
not cease negotiating afterward, until she had secured that island. A
circumstance more important to Germany and to all Europe than this
transitory acquisition of distant and alien countries by Austria was
the rise of Prussia, which dates from this war as a Protestant and
military kingdom destined to weigh in the balance against Austria.

Such were the leading results of the War of the Spanish Succession,
"the vastest yet witnessed by Europe since the Crusades." It was a war
whose chief military interest was on the land,--a war in which fought
two of the greatest generals of all times, Marlborough and Prince
Eugene, the names of whose battles, Blenheim, Ramillies, Malplaquet,
Turin, are familiar to the most casual reader of history; while a
multitude of able men distinguished themselves on the other theatres
of the strife, in Flanders, in Germany, in Italy, in Spain. On the
sea only one great battle, and that scarcely worthy of the name, took
place. Yet looking only, for the moment, to immediate and evident
results, who reaped the benefit? Was it France, whose only gain was to
seat a Bourbon on the Spanish throne? Was it Spain, whose only gain
was to have a Bourbon king instead of an Austrian, and thus a closer
alliance with France? Was it Holland, with its barrier of fortified
towns, its ruined navy, and its exhausted people? Was it, lastly,
Austria, even though she had fought with the money of the sea powers,
and gained such maritime States as the Netherlands and Naples? Was it
with these, who had waged war more and more exclusively by land, and
set their eyes more and more on gains on the land, or was it not
rather with England, who had indeed paid for that continental war and
even backed it with her troops, but who meanwhile was building up her
navy, strengthening, extending, and protecting her commerce, seizing
maritime positions,--in a word, founding and rearing her sea power
upon the ruins of that of her rivals, friend and foe alike? It is not
to depreciate the gains of others that the eye fixes on England's
naval growth; their gains but bring out more clearly the immenseness
of hers. It was a gain to France to have a friend rather than an enemy
in her rear, though her navy and shipping were ruined. It was a gain
to Spain to be brought in close intercourse with a living country like
France after a century of political death, and she had saved the
greater part of her threatened possessions. It was a gain to Holland
to be definitively freed from French aggression, with Belgium in the
hands of a strong instead of a weak State. And it doubtless was a gain
to Austria not only to have checked, chiefly at the expense of others,
the progress of her hereditary enemy, but also to have received
provinces like Sicily and Naples, which, under wise government, might
become the foundation of a respectable sea power. But not one of these
gains, nor all together, compared in greatness, and much less in
solidity, with the gain to England of that unequalled sea power which
started ahead during the War of the League of Augsburg, and received
its completeness and seal during that of the Spanish Succession. By it
she controlled the great commerce of the open sea with a military
shipping that had no rival, and in the exhausted condition of the
other nations could have none; and that shipping was now securely
based on strong positions in all the disputed quarters of the world.
Although her Indian empire was not yet begun, the vast superiority of
her navy would enable her to control the communications of other
nations with those rich and distant regions, and to assert her will in
any disputes arising among the trading-stations of the different
nationalities. The commerce which had sustained her in prosperity, and
her allies in military efficiency, during the war, though checked and
harassed by the enemy's cruisers (to which she could pay only partial
attention amid the many claims upon her), started with a bound into
new life when the war was over. All over the world, exhausted by their
share of the common suffering, people were longing for the return of
prosperity and peaceful commerce; and there was no country ready as
England was in wealth, capital, and shipping to forward and reap the
advantages of every enterprise by which the interchange of commodities
was promoted, either by lawful or unlawful means. In the War of the
Spanish Succession, by her own wise management and through the
exhaustion of other nations, not only her navy but her trade was
steadily built up; and indeed, in that dangerous condition of the
seas, traversed by some of the most reckless and restless cruisers
France ever sent out, the efficiency of the navy meant safer voyages,
and so more employment for the merchant-ships. The British
merchant-ships, being better protected than those of the Dutch, gained
the reputation of being far safer carriers, and the carrying-trade
naturally passed more and more into their hands; while the habit of
employing them in preference, once established, was likely to
continue.

    "Taking all things together," says an historian of the British
    navy, "I doubt whether the credit of the English nation ever
    stood higher than at this period, or the spirit of the people
    higher. The success of our arms at sea, the necessity of
    protecting our trade, and the popularity of every step taken to
    increase our maritime power, occasioned such measures to be
    pursued as annually added to our force. Hence arose that mighty
    difference which at the close of the year 1706 appeared in the
    Royal Navy; this, not only in the number but in the quality of
    the ships, was much superior to what it had been at the time of
    the Revolution or even before. Hence it was that our trade
    rather increased than diminished during the last war, and that
    we gained so signally by our strict intercourse with
    Portugal."[77]

The sea power of England therefore was not merely in the great navy,
with which we too commonly and exclusively associate it; France had
had such a navy in 1688, and it shrivelled away like a leaf in the
fire. Neither was it in a prosperous commerce alone; a few years after
the date at which we have arrived, the commerce of France took on fair
proportions, but the first blast of war swept it off the seas as the
navy of Cromwell had once swept that of Holland. It was in the union
of the two, carefully fostered, that England made the gain of sea
power over and beyond all other States; and this gain is distinctly
associated with and dates from the War of the Spanish Succession.
Before that war England was one of the sea powers; after it she was
_the_ sea power, without any second. This power also she held alone,
unshared by friend and unchecked by foe. She alone was rich, and in
her control of the sea and her extensive shipping had the sources of
wealth so much in her hands that there was no present danger of a
rival on the ocean. Thus her gain of sea power and wealth was not only
great but solid, being wholly in her own hands; while the gains of the
other States were not merely inferior in degree, but weaker in kind,
in that they depended more or less upon the good will of other
peoples.

Is it meant, it may be asked, to attribute to sea power alone the
greatness or wealth of any State? Certainly not. The due use and
control of the sea is but one link in the chain of exchange by which
wealth accumulates; but it is the central link, which lays under
contribution other nations for the benefit of the one holding it, and
which, history seems to assert, most surely of all gathers to itself
riches. In England, this control and use of the sea seems to arise
naturally, from the concurrence of many circumstances; the years
immediately preceding the War of the Spanish Succession had, moreover,
furthered the advance of her prosperity by a series of fiscal
measures, which Macaulay speaks of as "the deep and solid foundation
on which was to rise the most gigantic fabric of commercial prosperity
which the world had ever seen." It may be questioned, however, whether
the genius of the people, inclined to and developed by trade, did not
make easier the taking of such measures; whether their adoption did
not at least partially spring from, as well as add to, the sea power
of the nation. However that may be, there is seen, on the opposite
side of the Channel, a nation which started ahead of England in the
race,--a nation peculiarly well fitted, by situation and resources,
for the control of the sea both by war and commerce. The position of
France is in this peculiar, that of all the great powers she alone had
a free choice; the others were more or less constrained to the land
chiefly, or to the sea chiefly, for any movement outside their own
borders; but she to her long continental frontier added a seaboard on
three seas. In 1672 she definitely chose expansion by land. At that
time Colbert had administered her finances for twelve years, and from
a state of terrible confusion had so restored them that the revenue of
the King of France was more than double that of the King of England.
In those days France paid the subsidies of Europe; but Colbert's plans
and hopes for France rested upon making her powerful on the sea. The
war with Holland arrested these plans, the onward movement of
prosperity ceased, the nation was thrown back upon itself, shut off
from the outside world. Many causes doubtless worked together to the
disastrous result which marked the end of the reign of Louis XIV.:
constant wars, bad administration in the latter half of the period,
extravagance throughout; but France was practically never invaded, the
war was kept at or beyond her own frontiers with slight exceptions,
her home industries could suffer little from direct hostilities. In
these respects she was nearly equal to England, and under better
conditions than her other enemies. What made the difference in the
results? Why was France miserable and exhausted, while England was
smiling and prosperous? Why did England dictate, and France accept,
terms of peace? The reason apparently was the difference in wealth and
credit. France stood alone against many enemies; but those enemies
were raised and kept moving by English subsidies. The Lord Treasurer
of England, writing in 1706 to Marlborough, says:--

    "Though the land and trade of both England and Holland have
    excessive burthens upon them, yet the credit continues good both
    of them and us; whereas the finances of France are so much more
    exhausted that they are forced to give twenty and twenty-five
    per cent for every penny they send out of the kingdom, unless
    they send it in specie."

In 1712 the expenditure of France was 240,000,000 francs, while the
taxes brought in only 113,000,000 gross, of which, after deducting
losses and necessary expenses, only 37,000,000 remained in the
treasury; the deficit was sought to be met by anticipating parts of
the revenue for years ahead, and by a series of extraordinary
transactions tedious to name or to understand.

    "In the summer of 1715 [two years after the peace] it seemed as
    if the situation could not grow worse,--no more public nor
    private credit; no more clear revenue for the State; the
    portions of the revenue not pledged, anticipated on the
    following years. Neither labor nor consumption could be resumed
    for want of circulation; usury reigned on the ruins of society.
    The alternations of high prices and the depreciation of
    commodities finally crushed the people. Provision riots broke
    out among them, and even in the army. Manufactures were
    languishing or suspended; forced mendicity was preying upon the
    cities. The fields were deserted, the lands fallow for lack of
    instruments, for lack of manure, for lack of cattle; the houses
    were falling to ruin. Monarchical France seemed ready to expire
    with its aged king."[78]

Thus it was in France, with a population of nineteen millions at that
time to the eight millions of all the British Islands; with a land
vastly more fertile and productive; before the great days, too, of
coal and iron. "In England, on the contrary, the immense grants of
Parliament in 1710 struck the French prodigiously; for while their
credit was low, or in a manner quite gone, ours was at its zenith."
During that same war "there appeared that mighty spirit among our
merchants which enabled them to carry on all their schemes with a
vigor that kept a constant circulation of money throughout the
kingdom, and afforded such mighty encouragement to all manufactures as
has made the remembrance of those times grateful in worse."

    "By the treaty with Portugal we were prodigious gainers.... The
    Portuguese began to feel the comfortable effects of their Brazil
    gold mines, and the prodigious commerce that followed with us
    made their good fortune in great measure ours; and so it has
    been ever since; otherwise I know not how the expenses of the
    war had been borne.... The running cash in the kingdom increased
    very considerably, which must be attributed in great measure to
    our Portuguese trade; and this, as I have made manifest, we owed
    wholly to our power at sea [which took Portugal from the
    alliance of the two crowns, and threw her upon the protection of
    the maritime powers]. Our trade with the Spanish West Indies by
    way of Cadiz was certainly much interrupted at the beginning of
    this war; but afterward it was in great measure restored, as
    well by direct communication with several provinces when under
    the Archduke, as through Portugal, by which a very great though
    contraband trade was carried on. We were at the same time very
    great gainers by our commerce with the Spaniards in the West
    Indies [also contraband].... Our colonies, though complaining of
    neglect, grew richer, more populous, and carried their trade
    farther than in former times.... Our national end with respect
    to England was in this war particularly in great measure
    answered,--I mean the destruction of the French power at sea,
    for, after the battle of Malaga, we hear no more of their great
    fleets; and though by this the number of their privateers was
    very much increased, yet the losses of our merchants were far
    less in the latter than in the former reign.... It is certainly
    a matter of great satisfaction that ... setting out at first
    with the sight of so great a naval power as the French king had
    assembled in 1688, while we struggled under such difficulties,
    and when we got out of that troublesome war, in 1697, found
    ourselves loaded with a debt too heavy to be shaken off in the
    short interval of peace, yet by 1706, instead of seeing the navy
    of France riding upon our coast, we sent every year a powerful
    fleet to insult theirs, superior to them not only in the ocean,
    but in the Mediterranean, forcing them entirely out of that sea
    by the mere sight of our flag.... By this we not only secured
    our trade with the Levant, and strengthened our interests with
    all the Italian princes, but struck the States of Barbary with
    terror, and awed the Sultan from listening to any proposals from
    France. Such were the fruits of the increase of our naval power,
    and of the manner in which it was employed.... Such fleets were
    necessary; they at once protected our flag and our allies, and
    attached them to our interest; and, what is of greater
    importance than all the rest, they established our reputation
    for maritime force so effectually that we feel even to this day
    [1740] the happy effects of the fame thus acquired."[79]

It is needless to add more. Thus stood the Power of the Seas during
the years in which the French historians tell us that their cruisers
were battening on her commerce. The English writer admits heavy
losses. In 1707, that is, in the space of five years, the returns,
according to the report of a committee of the House of Lords, "show
that since the beginning of the war England had lost 30 ships-of-war
and 1146 merchant-ships, of which 300 were retaken; whereas we had
taken from them, or destroyed, 80 ships-of-war, and 1346 merchantmen;
175 privateers also were taken." The greater number of the
ships-of-war were probably on private venture, as has been explained.
But, be the relative numbers what they may, no argument is needed
beyond the statements just given, to show the inability of a mere
cruising warfare, not based upon large fleets, to break down a great
sea power. Jean Bart died in 1702; but in Forbin, Du Casse, and
others, and above all in Duguay-Trouin, he left worthy successors, the
equals of any commerce-destroyers the world has ever seen.

The name of Duguay-Trouin suggests the mention, before finally leaving
the War of the Spanish Succession, of his greatest privateering
expedition, carried to a distance from home rarely reached by the
seamen of his occupation, and which illustrates curiously the spirit of
such enterprises in that day, and the shifts to which the French
government was reduced. A small French squadron had attacked Rio
Janeiro in 1710, but being repulsed, had lost some prisoners, who were
said to have been put to death. Duguay-Trouin sought permission to
avenge the insult to France. The king, consenting, advanced the ships
and furnished the crews; and a regular contract was drawn up between
the king on the one hand and the company employing Duguay-Trouin on the
other, stipulating the expenses to be borne and supplies furnished on
either hand; among which we find the odd, business-like provision that
for every one of the troops embarked who shall die, be killed, or
desert during the cruise, the company should pay a forfeit of thirty
francs. The king was to receive one fifth of the net profits, and was
to bear the loss of any one of the vessels that should be wrecked, or
destroyed in action. Under these provisions, enumerated in full in a
long contract, Duguay-Trouin received a force of six ships-of-the-line,
seven frigates, and over two thousand troops, with which he sailed to
Rio Janeiro in 1711; captured the place after a series of operations,
and allowed it to be ransomed at the price of something under four
hundred thousand dollars, probably nearly equal to a million in the
present day, besides five hundred cases of sugar. The privateering
company cleared about ninety-two per cent on their venture. As two of
the ships-of-the-line were never heard from after sailing on the
return voyage, the king's profits were probably small.

While the War of the Spanish Succession was engaging all western
Europe, a strife which might have had a profound influence upon its
issue was going on in the east. Sweden and Russia were at war, the
Hungarians had revolted against Austria, and Turkey was finally drawn
in, though not till the end of the year 1710. Had Turkey helped the
Hungarians, she would have made a powerful diversion, not for the
first time in history, in favor of France. The English historian
suggests that she was deterred by fear of the English fleet; at all
events she did not move, and Hungary was reduced to obedience. The war
between Sweden and Russia was to result in the preponderance of the
latter upon the Baltic, the subsidence of Sweden, the old ally of
France, into a second-rate State, and the entrance of Russia
definitively into European politics.

FOOTNOTES:

[75] Martin: History of France.

[76] Lapeyrouse-Bonfils: Hist. de la Marine Française.

[77] Campbell: Lives of the Admirals.

[78] Martin: History of France.

[79] Campbell: Lives of the Admirals.




CHAPTER VI.

    THE REGENCY IN FRANCE.--ALBERONI IN SPAIN.--POLICIES OF WALPOLE
    AND FLEURI.--WAR OF THE POLISH SUCCESSION.--ENGLISH CONTRABAND
    TRADE IN SPANISH AMERICA.--GREAT BRITAIN DECLARES WAR AGAINST
    SPAIN.--1715-1739.


The Peace of Utrecht was soon followed by the deaths of the rulers of
the two countries which had played the foremost part in the War of the
Spanish Succession. Queen Anne died August 1, 1714; Louis XIV. on the
1st of September, 1715.

The successor to the English throne, the German George I., though
undoubtedly the choice of the English people, was far from being their
favorite, and was rather endured as a necessary evil, giving them a
Protestant instead of a Roman Catholic king. Along with the coldness
and dislike of his own partisans, he found a very considerable body of
disaffected men, who wished to see the son of James II. on the throne.
There was therefore a lack of solidity, more apparent than real, but
still real, in his position. In France, on the contrary, the
succession to the throne was undisputed; but the heir was a child of
five years, and there was much jealousy as to the possession of the
regency, a power more absolute than that of the King of England. The
regency was obtained and exercised by the next in succession to the
throne, Philip, Duke of Orleans; but he had to apprehend, not only
attempts on the part of rivals in France to shake his hold, but also
the active enmity of the Bourbon king of Spain, Philip V.,--an enmity
which seems to have dated from an intrigue of Orleans, during the late
war, to supplant Philip on the Spanish throne. There was therefore a
feeling of instability, of apprehension, in the governments of England
and France, which influenced the policy of both. As regards the
relations of France and Spain, the mutual hatred of the actual rulers
stood for a while in the way of the friendly accord Louis XIV. had
hoped from family ties, and was injurious to the true interests of
both nations.

The Regent Orleans, under the advice of the most able and celebrated
French statesman of that day, the Abbé Dubois, made overtures of
alliance to the King of Great Britain. He began first by commercial
concessions of the kind generally acceptable to the English,
forbidding French shipping to trade to the South Seas under penalty of
death, and lowering the duties on the importation of English coal.
England at first received these advances warily; but the regent would
not be discouraged, and offered, further, to compel the Pretender,
James III., to withdraw beyond the Alps. He also undertook to fill up
the port at Mardyck, a new excavation by which the French government
was trying to indemnify itself for the loss of Dunkirk. These
concessions, all of which but one, it will be noted, were at the
expense of the sea power or commercial interests of France, induced
England to sign a treaty by which the two countries mutually
guaranteed the execution of the treaties of Utrecht as far as their
respective interests were concerned; especially the clause by which
the House of Orleans was to succeed to the French throne, if Louis XV.
died childless. The Protestant succession in England was likewise
guaranteed. Holland, exhausted by the war, was unwilling to enter upon
new engagements, but was at last brought over to this by the remission
of certain dues on her merchandise entering France. The treaty, signed
in January, 1717, was known as the Triple Alliance, and bound France
to England for some years to come.

While France was thus making overtures to England, Spain, under the
guidance of another able churchman, was seeking the same alliance and
at the same time developing her national strength with the hope of
recovering her lost Italian States. The new minister, Cardinal
Alberoni, promised Philip V. to put him in a position to reconquer
Sicily and Naples, if granted five years of peace. He worked hard to
bring up the revenues, rebuild the navy, and re-establish the army,
while at the same time promoting manufactures, commerce, and shipping,
and the advance made in all these was remarkable; but the more
legitimate ambition of Spain to recover her lost possessions, and with
them to establish her power in the Mediterranean, so grievously
wounded by the loss of Gibraltar, was hampered by the ill-timed
purpose of Philip to overthrow the regency of Orleans in France.
Alberoni was compelled to alienate France, whose sea power, as well as
that of Spain, was concerned in seeing Sicily in friendly hands, and,
instead of that natural ally, had to conciliate the maritime powers,
England and Holland. This he also sought to do by commercial
concessions; promising promptly to put the English in possession of
the privileges granted at Utrecht, concerning which Spain had so far
delayed. In return, he asked favorable action from them in Italy.
George I., who was at heart German, received coldly advances which
were unfriendly to the German emperor in his Italian dominions; and
Alberoni, offended, withdrew them. The Triple Alliance, by
guaranteeing the existing arrangement of succession to the French
throne, gave further offence to Philip V., who dreamed of asserting
his own claim. The result of all these negotiations was to bind
England and France together against Spain,--a blind policy for the two
Bourbon kingdoms.

The gist of the situation created by these different aims and
feelings, was that the Emperor of Austria and the King of Spain both
wanted Sicily, which at Utrecht had been given to the Duke of Savoy;
and that France and England both wished for peace in western Europe,
because war would give an opportunity to the malcontents in either
kingdom. The position of George, however, being more secure than that
of Orleans, the policy of the latter tended to yield to that of the
former, and this tendency was increased by the active ill-will of the
King of Spain. George, as a German, wished the emperor's success; and
the English statesmen naturally preferred to see Sicily in the hands
of their late ally and well-assured friend rather than in Spain's.
France, contrary to her true policy, but under the urgency of the
regent's position, entertained the same views, and it was proposed to
modify the Treaty of Utrecht by transferring Sicily from Savoy to
Austria, giving the former Sardinia instead. It was necessary,
however, to consider Spain, which under Alberoni had already gained a
degree of military power astounding to those who had known her
weakness during the last war. She was not yet ready to fight, for only
half of the five years asked by the cardinal had passed; but still
less was she ready to forego her ambitions. A trifling incident
precipitated an outbreak. A high Spanish official, travelling from
Rome to Spain by land, and so passing through the Italian States of
the emperor, was arrested as a rebellious subject by order of the
latter, who still styled himself King of Spain. At this insult,
Alberoni could not hold Philip back. An expedition of twelve ships of
war and eighty-six hundred soldiers was sent against Sardinia, the
transfer to Savoy not having yet taken effect, and reduced the island
in a few months. This happened in 1717.

Doubtless the Spaniards would at once have moved on against Sicily;
but France and England now intervened more actively to prevent the
general war that seemed threatening. England sent a fleet to the
Mediterranean, and negotiations began at Paris, Vienna, and Madrid.
The outcome of these conferences was an agreement between England and
France to effect the exchange of Sardinia and Sicily just mentioned,
recompensing Spain by giving her Parma and Tuscany in northern Italy,
and stipulating that the emperor should renounce forever his absurd
but irritating claim to the Spanish crown. This arrangement was to be
enforced by arms, if necessary. The emperor at first refused consent;
but the increasing greatness of Alberoni's preparations at last
decided him to accept so advantageous an offer, and the accession of
Holland to the compact gave it the historical title of the Quadruple
Alliance. Spain was obstinate; and it is significant of Alberoni's
achievements in developing her power, and the eagerness, not to say
anxiety, of George I., that the offer was made to purchase her consent
by ceding Gibraltar. If the Regent Orleans knew this, it would partly
justify his forwarding the negotiations.

Alberoni tried to back up his military power by diplomatic efforts
extending all over Europe. Russia and Sweden were brought together in
a project for invading England in the interest of the Stuarts; the
signing of the Quadruple Alliance in Holland was delayed by his
agents; a conspiracy was started in France against the regent; the
Turks were stirred up against the emperor; discontent was fomented
throughout Great Britain; and an attempt was made to gain over the
Duke of Savoy, outraged by being deprived of Sicily. On the 1st of
July, 1718, a Spanish army of thirty thousand troops, escorted by
twenty-two ships-of-the-line, appeared at Palermo. The troops of Savoy
evacuated the city and pretty nearly the whole island, resistance
being concentrated in the citadel of Messina. Anxiety was felt in
Naples itself, until the English admiral, Byng,[80] anchored there the
day after the investment of Messina. The King of Sicily having now
consented to the terms of the Quadruple Alliance, Byng received on
board two thousand Austrian troops to be landed at Messina. When he
appeared before the place, finding it besieged, he wrote to the
Spanish general suggesting a suspension of arms for two months. This
was of course refused; so the Austrians were landed again at Reggio,
in Italy, and Byng passed through the Straits of Messina to seek the
Spanish fleet, which had gone to the southward.

The engagement which ensued can scarcely be called a battle, and, as
is apt to happen in such affairs, when the parties are on the verge of
war but war has not actually been declared, there is some doubt as to
how far the attack was morally justifiable on the part of the English.
It seems pretty sure that Byng was determined beforehand to seize or
destroy the Spanish fleet, and that as a military man he was justified
by his orders. The Spanish naval officers had not made up their minds
to any line of conduct; they were much inferior in numbers, and, as
must always be the case, Alberoni's hastily revived navy had not
within the same period reached nearly the efficiency of his army. The
English approached threateningly near, one or more Spanish ships
opened fire, whereupon the English, being to windward, stood down and
made an end of them; a few only escaped into Valetta harbor. The
Spanish navy was practically annihilated. It is difficult to
understand the importance attached by some writers to Byng's action at
this time in attacking without regard to the line-of-battle. He had
before him a disorderly force, much inferior both in numbers and
discipline. His merit seems rather to lie in the readiness to assume a
responsibility from which a more scrupulous man might have shrunk; but
in this and throughout the campaign he rendered good service to
England, whose sea power was again strengthened by the destruction not
of an actual but a possible rival, and his services were rewarded by a
peerage. In connection with this day's work was written a despatch
which has great favor with English historians. One of the senior
captains was detached with a division against some escaping ships of
the enemy. His report to the admiral ran thus: "SIR,--We have taken or
destroyed all the Spanish ships upon this coast, the number as per
margin. Respectfully, etc., G. Walton." One English writer makes, and
another indorses, the uncalled-for but characteristic fling at the
French, that the ships thus thrust into the margin would have filled
some pages of a French narration.[81] It may be granted that the
so-called "battle" of Cape Passaro did not merit a long description,
and Captain Walton possibly felt so; but if all reports of naval
transactions were modelled upon his, the writing of naval history
would not depend on official papers.

Thus the Spanish navy was struck down on the 11th of August, 1718,
off Cape Passaro. This settled the fate of Sicily, if it had been
doubtful before. The English fleet cruised round the island,
supporting the Austrians and isolating the Spaniards, none of whom
were permitted to withdraw before peace was made. Alberoni's
diplomatic projects failed one after the other, with a strange
fatality. In the following year the French, in pursuance of the terms
of the alliance, invaded the north of Spain and destroyed the
dock-yards; burning nine large ships on the stocks, besides the
materials for seven more, at the instigation of an English _attaché_
accompanying the French headquarters. Thus was completed the
destruction of the Spanish navy, which, says an English historian, was
ascribed to the maritime jealousy of England. "This was done," wrote
the French commander, the Duke of Berwick, a bastard of the house of
Stuart, "in order that the English government may be able to show the
next Parliament that nothing has been neglected to diminish the navy
of Spain." The acts of Sir George Byng, as given by the English naval
historian, make yet more manifest the purpose of England at this time.
While the city and citadel of Messina were being besieged by the
Austrians, English, and Sardinians, a dispute arose as to the
possession of the Spanish men-of-war within the mole. Byng,
"reflecting within himself that possibly the garrison might capitulate
for the safe return of those ships into Spain, which he was determined
not to suffer; that on the other hand the right of possession might
breed an inconvenient dispute at a critical juncture among the princes
concerned, and if it should at length be determined that they did not
belong to England it were better they belonged to no one else,
proposed to Count de Merci, the Austrian general, to erect a battery
and destroy them as they lay."[82] After some demur on the part of the
other leaders, this was done. If constant care and watchfulness
deserve success, England certainly deserved her sea power; but what
shall be said of the folly of France at this time and in this
connection?

The steady stream of reverses, and the hopelessness of contending for
distant maritime possessions when without a navy, broke down the
resistance of Spain. England and France insisted upon the dismissal of
Alberoni, and Philip yielded to the terms of the Quadruple Alliance.
The Austrian power, necessarily friendly to England, was thus firmly
settled in the central Mediterranean, in Naples and Sicily, as England
herself was in Gibraltar and Port Mahon. Sir Robert Walpole, the
minister now coming into power in England, failed at a later day to
support this favorable conjunction, and so far betrayed the
traditional policy of his country. The dominion of the House of Savoy
in Sardinia, which then began, has lasted; it is only within our own
day that the title King of Sardinia has merged in the broader one of
King of Italy.

Contemporaneously with and for some time after the short episode of
Alberoni's ministry and Spain's ambition, a struggle was going on
around the shores of the Baltic which must be mentioned, because it
gave rise to another effectual illustration of the sea power of
England, manifested alike in the north and south with a slightness of
exertion which calls to mind the stories of the tap of a tiger's paw.
The long contest between Sweden and Russia was for a moment
interrupted in 1718, by negotiations looking to peace and to an
alliance between the two for the settlement of the succession in
Poland and the restoration of the Stuarts in England. This project, on
which had rested many of Alberoni's hopes, was finally stopped by the
death in battle of the Swedish king. The war went on; and the czar,
seeing the exhaustion of Sweden, purposed its entire subjugation. This
destruction of the balance of power in the Baltic, making it a Russian
lake, suited neither England nor France; especially the former, whose
sea power both for peace and war depended upon the naval stores
chiefly drawn from those regions. The two western kingdoms interfered,
both by diplomacy, while England besides sent her fleet. Denmark,
which was also at war with her traditional enemy Sweden, readily
yielded; but Peter the Great chafed heavily under the implied
coercion, until at last orders were sent to the English admiral to
join his fleet to that of the Swedes and repeat in the Baltic the
history of Cape Passaro. The czar in alarm withdrew his fleet. This
happened in 1719; but Peter, though baffled, was not yet subdued. The
following year the interposition of England was repeated with greater
effect, although not in time to save the Swedish coasts from serious
injury; but the czar, recognizing the fixed purpose with which he had
to deal, and knowing from personal observation and practical
experience the efficiency of England's sea power, consented finally to
peace. The French claim much for their own diplomacy in this happy
result, and say that England supported Sweden feebly; being willing
that she should lose her provinces on the eastern shore of the Baltic
because Russia, thus brought down to the sea-shore, could more easily
open to English trade the vast resources of her interior. This may
very possibly be true, and certainty can be felt that British
interests, especially as to commerce and sea power, were looked after;
but the character of Peter the Great is the guarantee that the
argument which weighed most heavily with him was the military
efficiency of the British fleet and its ability to move up to his very
doors. By this Peace of Nystadt, August 30, 1721, Sweden abandoned
Livonia, Esthonia, and other provinces on the east side of the Baltic.
This result was inevitable; it was yearly becoming less possible for
small States to hold their own.

It can readily be understood that Spain was utterly discontented with
the terms wrung from her by the Quadruple Alliance. The twelve years
which followed are called years of peace, but the peace was very
uncertain, and fraught with elements of future wars. The three great
grievances rankling with Spain were--Sicily and Naples in the
possession of Austria, Gibraltar and Mahon in the hands of England,
and lastly, the vast contraband trade carried on by English merchants
and ships in Spanish America. It will be seen that England was the
active supporter of all these injuries; England therefore was the
special enemy of Spain, but Spain was not the only enemy of England.

The quiet, such as it was, that succeeded the fall of Alberoni was due
mainly to the character and policy of the two ministers of France and
England, who agreed in wishing a general peace. The policy and reasons
of the French regent are already known. Moved by the same reasons, and
to remove an accidental offence taken by England, Dubois obtained for
her the further concession from Spain, additional to the commercial
advantages granted at Utrecht, of sending a ship every year to trade
in the West Indies. It is said that this ship, after being anchored,
was kept continually supplied by others, so that fresh cargo came in
over one side as fast as the old was sent ashore from the other.
Dubois and the regent both died in the latter half of 1723, after an
administration of eight years, in which they had reversed the policy
of Richelieu by alliance with England and Austria and sacrificing to
them the interests of France.

The regency and the nominal government of France passed to another
member of the royal family; but the real ruler was Cardinal Fleuri,
the preceptor of the young king, who was now thirteen years of age.
Efforts to displace the preceptor resulted only in giving him the
title, as well as the power, of minister in 1726. At this time Sir
Robert Walpole had become prime minister of England, with an influence
and power which gave him practically the entire guidance of the policy
of the State. The chief wish of both Walpole and Fleuri was peace,
above all in western Europe. France and England therefore continued to
act together for that purpose, and though they could not entirely
stifle every murmur, they were for several years successful in
preventing outbreaks. But while the aims of the two ministers were
thus agreed, the motives which inspired them were different. Walpole
desired peace because of the still unsettled condition of the English
succession; for the peaceful growth of English commerce, which he had
ever before his eyes; and probably also because his spirit, impatient
of equals in the government, shrank from war which would raise up
stronger men around him. Fleuri, reasonably secure as to the throne
and his own power, wished like Walpole the peaceful development of his
country, and shrank from war with the love of repose natural to old
age; for he was seventy-three when he took office, and ninety when he
laid it down in death. Under his mild administration the prosperity of
France revived; the passing traveller could note the change in the
face of the country and of the people; yet it may be doubted whether
this change was due to the government of the quiet old man, or merely
to the natural elasticity of the people, no longer drained by war nor
isolated from the rest of the world. French authorities say that
agriculture did not revive throughout the country. It is certain,
however, that the maritime prosperity of France advanced wonderfully,
owing mainly to the removal of commercial restrictions in the years
immediately following the death of Louis XIV. The West India islands
in particular throve greatly, and their welfare was naturally shared
by the home ports that traded with them. The tropical climate of
Martinique, Guadeloupe, and Louisiana, and cultivation by slaves, lent
themselves readily to the paternal, semi-military government which
marks all French colonies, but which produced less happy results in
the bitter weather of Canada. In the West Indies, France at this time
obtained a decided preponderance over England; the value of the French
half of Hayti was alone equal to that of all the English West Indies,
and French coffee and sugar were driving those of England out of
European markets. A like advantage over England in the Mediterranean
and Levant trade is asserted by French historians. At the same time
the East India Company was revived, and its French depot, whose name
tells its association with the East, the Breton town of L'Orient,
quickly became a splendid city. Pondicherry on the Coromandel coast,
and Chandernagore on the Ganges, the chief seats of French power and
commerce in India, grew rapidly; the Isle of Bourbon and the Isle of
France, now the Mauritius, whose position is so well suited for the
control of the Indian Ocean, became, the one a rich agricultural
colony, the other a powerful naval station. The monopoly of the great
company was confined to the trade between home and the chief Indian
stations; the traffic throughout the Indian seas was open to private
enterprise and grew more rapidly. This great movement, wholly
spontaneous, and even looked on with distrust by the government, was
personified in two men, Dupleix and La Bourdonnais; who, the former at
Chandernagore and the latter at the Isle of France, pointed out and
led the way in all these undertakings, which were building up the
power and renown of the French in the Eastern seas. The movement was
begun which, after making France the rival of England in the Hindustan
peninsula, and giving her for a moment the promise of that great
empire which has bestowed a new title on the Queen of Great Britain,
was destined finally to falter and perish before the sea power of
England. The extent of this expansion of French trade, consequent upon
peace and the removal of restrictions, and not due in any sense to
government protection, is evidenced by the growth of French merchant
shipping from only three hundred vessels at the death of Louis XIV.,
to eighteen hundred, twenty years later. This, a French historian
claims, refutes "the deplorable prejudices, born of our misfortunes,
that France is not fitted for sea commerce, the only commerce that
indefinitely extends the power of a nation with its sphere of
activity."[83]

This free and happy movement of the people was far from acceptable to
Fleuri, who seems to have seen it with the distrust of a hen that has
hatched ducklings. Walpole and himself were agreed to love peace; but
Walpole was obliged to reckon with the English people, and these were
prompt to resent rivalry upon the sea and in trade, however obtained.
Moreover, Fleuri had inherited the unfortunate policy of Louis XIV.;
his eyes were fixed on the continent. He did not indeed wish to follow
the course of the regency in quarrelling with Spain, but rather to
draw near to her; and although he was not able for a time to do so
without sacrificing his peace policy, because of Spain's restless
enmity to England, yet his mind was chiefly bent upon strengthening
the position of France on the land, by establishing Bourbon princes
where he could, and drawing them together by family alliances. The
navy was allowed to decay more and more. "The French government
abandoned the sea at the very moment that the nation, through the
activity of private individuals, was making an effort to regain it."
The material force fell to fifty-four ships-of-the-line and frigates,
mostly in bad condition; and even when war with England had been
imminent for five years, France had but forty-five ships-of-the-line
to England's ninety. This difference foreshadowed the results which
followed a quarter of a century of war.

During the same period Walpole, relying upon Fleuri's co-operation,
resolutely set his face against open war between England and Spain.
The difficulties caused by the threatening and exasperating action of
the latter country, and of such allies as she from time to time could
raise, were met, and for a while successfully met, by naval
demonstrations,--reminders of that sea power which one nation after
another had felt and yielded to. In 1725, the Spanish king and the
emperor agreed to sink their long-standing feud, and signed a treaty
at Vienna, in which there was a secret clause providing that the
emperor would support the claim of Spain to Gibraltar and Port Mahon,
by arms if necessary. Russia also showed a disposition to join this
confederacy. A counter-alliance was formed between England, France,
and Prussia; and English fleets were sent, one to the Baltic to awe
the czarina, another to the coast of Spain to check that government
and protect Gibraltar, and a third to Porto Bello, on the Spanish
Main, to blockade the fleet of galleons there assembled, and by
cutting off the supplies remind the Spanish king at once of his
dependence upon the specie of America, and of England's control of the
highway by which it reached him. Walpole's aversion to war was marked
by giving the admiral at Porto Bello the strictest orders not to
fight, only to blockade; the consequence of which, through the long
delay of the squadron upon the sickly coast, was a mortality among
the crews that shocked the nation, and led, among other causes, to the
minister's overthrow many years later. Between three and four thousand
officers and men, including Admiral Hosier himself, died there.
Walpole's aim, however, was reached; though Spain made a foolish
attack by land upon Gibraltar, the presence of the English fleet
assured its supplies and provisions and averted the formal outbreak of
war. The emperor withdrew from the alliance, and under English
pressure also revoked the charter of an East India company which he
had authorized in the Austrian Netherlands, and which took its name
from the port of Ostend. English merchants demanded the removal of
this competitor, and also of a similar rival established in Denmark;
both which concessions the English ministry, backed by Holland,
obtained. So long as commerce was not seriously disturbed, Walpole's
peace policy, accompanied as it naturally was by years of plenty and
general content, was easily maintained, even though Spain continued
threatening and arrogant in her demands for Gibraltar; but
unfortunately she now entered more deeply upon a course of annoyance
to English trade. The concessions of the Asiento, or slave-trade, and
of the annual ship to South America have been mentioned; but these
privileges were but a part of the English commerce in those regions.
The system of Spain with regard to the trade of her colonies was of
the narrowest and most exclusive character; but, while attempting to
shut them out from foreign traffic, she neglected to provide for their
wants herself. The consequence was that a great smuggling or
contraband trade arose throughout her American possessions, carried on
mainly by the English, who made their lawful traffic by the Asiento
and the yearly ship subserve also the unlawful, or at least
unauthorized, trade. This system was doubtless advantageous to the
great body of the Spanish colonists, and was encouraged by them, while
colonial governors connived at it, sometimes for money, sometimes
swayed by local public opinion and their own knowledge of the
hardships of the case; but there were Spanish subjects who saw their
own business injured by the use and abuse of English privileges, and
the national government suffered both in pocket and in pride by these
evasions of the revenue. It now began to pull the strings tighter.
Obsolete regulations were revived and enforced. Words in which the
action of Spain in this old controversy have been described are
curiously applicable to certain recent disputes to which the United
States has been a party. "The letter of the treaty was now followed,
though the spirit which dictated it was abandoned. Although English
ships still enjoyed the liberty of putting into Spanish harbors for
the purpose of refitting and provisioning, yet they were far from
enjoying the same advantages of carrying on a friendly and commercial
intercourse. They were now watched with a scrupulous jealousy,
strictly visited by guarda-costas, and every efficient means adopted
to prevent any commerce with the colonies, except what was allowed by
the annual ship." If Spain could have confined herself to closer
watchfulness and to enforcing in her own waters vexatious customs
regulations, not essentially different from those sanctioned by the
general commercial ideas of that day, perhaps no further harm would
have resulted; but the condition of things and the temper of her
government would not let her stop there. It was not possible to guard
and effectually seal a sea-coast extending over hundreds of miles,
with innumerable inlets; nor would traders and seamen, in pursuit of
gain which they had come to consider their right, be deterred by fears
of penalties nor consideration for Spanish susceptibilities. The power
of Spain was not great enough to enforce on the English ministry any
regulation of their shipping, or stoppage of the abuse of the treaty
privileges, in face of the feelings of the merchants; and so the
weaker State, wronged and harassed, was goaded into the use of wholly
unlawful means. Ships-of-war and guarda-costas were instructed, or at
least permitted, to stop and search English ships on the high seas,
outside of Spanish jurisdiction; and the arrogant Spanish temper,
unrestrained by the weak central government, made many of these
visits, both the lawful and the unlawful, scenes of insult and even
violence. Somewhat similar results, springing from causes not entirely
different, have occurred in the relations of Spanish officials to the
United States and American merchant-ships in our own day. The stories
of these acts of violence coming back to England, coupled with cases
of loss by confiscation and by the embarrassment of trade, of course
stirred up the people. In 1737 the West India merchants petitioned the
House of Commons, saying,--

    "For many years past their ships have not only frequently been
    stopped and searched, but also forcibly and arbitrarily seized
    upon the high seas, by Spanish ships fitted out to cruise, under
    the plausible pretext of guarding their own coasts; that the
    commanders thereof, with their crews, have been inhumanly
    treated, and their ships carried into some of the Spanish ports
    and there condemned with their cargoes, in manifest violation of
    the treaties subsisting between the two crowns; that the
    remonstrances of his Majesty's ministers at Madrid receive no
    attention, and that insults and plunder must soon destroy their
    trade."

Walpole struggled hard, during the ten years following 1729, to keep
off war. In that year a treaty signed at Seville professed to regulate
matters, restoring the conditions of trade to what they had been four
years before, and providing that six thousand Spanish troops should at
once occupy the territory of Tuscany and Parma. Walpole argued with
his own people that war would lose them the commercial privileges they
already enjoyed in Spanish dominions; while with Spain he carried on
constant negotiations, seeking concessions and indemnities that might
silence the home clamor. In the midst of this period a war broke out
concerning the succession to the Polish throne. The father-in-law of
the French king was one claimant; Austria supported his opponent. A
common hostility to Austria once more drew France and Spain together,
and they were joined by the King of Sardinia, who hoped through this
alliance to wrest Milan from Austria and add it to his own territory
of Piedmont. The neutrality of England and Holland was secured by a
promise not to attack the Austrian Netherlands, the possession of any
part of which by France was considered to be dangerous to England's
sea power. The allied States declared war against Austria in October,
1733, and their armies entered Italy together; but the Spaniards,
intent on their long-cherished projects against Naples and Sicily,
left the others and turned southward. The two kingdoms were easily and
quickly conquered, the invaders having command of the sea and the
favor of the population. The second son of the King of Spain was
proclaimed king under the title of Carlos III., and the Bourbon
Kingdom of the Two Sicilies thus came into existence. Walpole's
aversion to war, leading him to abandon a long-standing ally, thus
resulted in the transfer of the central Mediterranean to a control
necessarily unfriendly to Great Britain.

But while Walpole thus forsook the emperor, he was himself betrayed by
his friend Fleuri. While making the open alliance with Spain against
Austria, the French government agreed to a secret clause directed
against England. This engagement ran as follows: "Whenever it seems
good to both nations alike, the abuses which have crept into commerce,
especially through the English, shall be abolished; and if the English
make objection, France will ward off their hostility with all its
strength by land and sea." "And this compact was made," as the
biographer of Lord Hawke points out, "during a period of intimate and
ostentatious alliance with England itself."[84] "Thus the policy
against which William III. had called on England and Europe to arm, at
last came into existence." Had Walpole known of this secret agreement,
it might have seemed to him an additional argument in favor of peace;
for, his keen political sagacity warning him of the existence of a
danger which he yet could not see, he told the House of Commons that
"if the Spaniards had not private encouragement from powers more
considerable than themselves, they would never have ventured on the
insults and injuries which have been proved at your bar;" and he
expressed the opinion that "England was not a match for the French and
Spaniards too."

Fleuri had indeed given his old friend and fellow-statesman an ugly
fall. The particular question which excited the two years' War of the
Polish Succession, the choice of a ruler for a distracted kingdom
fated soon to disappear from the list of European States, seems a
small matter; but the turn imparted to European politics by the action
of the powers engaged gives it a very different importance. France and
Austria came to an arrangement in October, 1735, upon terms to which
Sardinia and Spain afterward acceded, the principal points of which
were as follows: The French claimant to the Polish throne gave up his
claim to it, and received instead the duchies of Bar and Lorraine on
the east of France, with the provision that upon his death they were
to go to his son-in-law, the King of France, in full sovereignty; the
two kingdoms of Sicily and Naples were confirmed to the Spanish
Bourbon prince, Don Carlos; and Austria received back Parma. The
Sardinian monarchy also got an increase to its Italian territory.
France thus, under the peace-loving Fleuri, obtained in Bar and
Lorraine an accession of strength which more warlike rulers had
coveted in vain; and at the same time her external position was
fortified at the expense of England, by the transfer of controlling
positions in the central Mediterranean to an ally. Yet the heart of
Fleuri might well have failed him as he remembered the secret
agreement to check the commerce of England, and thought of her mighty
sea power alongside of the decayed navy of France. That compact
between France and Spain, to which the Two Sicilies acceded later,
bore within it, in the then strained relations between England and
Spain, the germ of the great wars between England and the House of
Bourbon which issued in the creation of the British Empire and the
independence of the United States.

The clamor in England over Spanish outrages continued, and was
carefully nursed by the opposition to Walpole. The minister was now
over sixty years of age, and scarcely able to change the settled
convictions and policy of his prime. He was face to face with one of
those irrepressible conflicts between nations and races toward which a
policy of repression and compromise can be employed but for a short
time. The English were bent upon opening the West Indies and Spanish
America, the Spanish government equally bent upon obstructing them.
Unfortunately for their policy of obstruction, they strengthened
Walpole's enemies by unlawful search of English ships on the open sea,
and possibly also by outrages to English seamen. Some of the latter
were brought before the bar of the House of Commons, and testified
that they had been not merely plundered, but tortured, shut up in
prison, and compelled to live and work under loathsome conditions. The
most celebrated case was that of a certain Jenkins, the master of a
merchant-brig, who told that a Spanish officer had torn off one of his
ears, bidding him carry it to the king his master, and say that if he
had been there he would have been served likewise. Being asked what
were his feelings at such a moment of danger and suffering, he was
said to have replied, "I commended my soul to God and my cause to my
country." This well-turned dramatic utterance from the mouth of a man
of his class throws a suspicion of high coloring over the whole story;
but it can be readily imagined what a capital campaign-cry it would be
in the heat of a popular movement. The tide of feeling swept away
Walpole's patchwork of compromise, and war was declared against Spain
by Great Britain on the 19th of October, 1739. The English ultimatum
insisted upon a formal renunciation of the right of search as claimed
and exercised by the Spaniards, and upon an express acknowledgment of
the British claims in North America. Among these claims was one
relating to the limits of Georgia, then a recently established colony,
touching the Spanish territory of Florida.

How far the war thus urged on and begun by England, against the
judgment of her able minister, was morally justifiable has been warmly
argued on either side by English writers. The laws of Spain with
regard to the trade of her colonies did not differ in spirit from
those of England herself as shown by her Navigation Act, and Spanish
naval officers found themselves in a position nearly identical with
that of Nelson when captain of a frigate in the West Indies half a
century later. American ships and merchants then, after the separation
from the mother-country, continued the trade which they had enjoyed as
colonists; Nelson, zealous for the commercial advantage of England as
then understood, undertook to enforce the act, and in so doing found
against him the feeling of the West Indians and of the colonial
authorities. It does not seem that he or those supporting him searched
unlawfully, for the power of England was great enough to protect her
shipping interests without using irregular means; whereas Spain
between 1730 and 1740, being weak, was tempted, as she has since been,
to seize those whom she knew to have injured her wherever she could
find them, even outside her lawful jurisdiction.

After reading the entirely sympathetic presentation of the case of
Walpole's opponents, urging war, which is given by Professor Burrows
in his Life of Lord Hawke, a foreigner can scarcely fail to conclude
that the Spaniards were grievously wronged, according to the rights of
the mother-country over colonies as commonly admitted in that day;
though no nation could tolerate the right of search as claimed by
them. It chiefly concerns our subject to notice that the dispute was
radically a maritime question, that it grew out of the uncontrollable
impulse of the English people to extend their trade and colonial
interests. It is possible that France was acting under a similar
impulse, as English writers have asserted; but the character and
general policy of Fleuri, as well as the genius of the French people,
make this unlikely. There was no Parliament and no opposition to make
known popular opinion in the France of that day, and very different
estimates of Fleuri's character and administration have found voice
since then. The English look rather at the ability which obtained
Lorraine for France and the Sicilies for the House of Bourbon, and
blame Walpole for being overreached. The French say of Fleuri that "he
lived from day to day seeking only to have quiet in his old age. He
had stupefied France with opiates, instead of laboring to cure her. He
could not even prolong this silent sleep until his own death."[85]
When the war broke out between England and Spain, "the latter claimed
the advantage of her defensive alliance with France. Fleuri,
grievously against his will, was forced to fit out a squadron; he did
so in niggardly fashion." This squadron, of twenty-two ships, convoyed
to America the Spanish fleet assembled at Ferrol, and the
reinforcement prevented the English from attacking.[86] "Still, Fleuri
made explanations to Walpole and hoped for compromise,--an ill-founded
hope, which had disastrous results for our sea interests, and
prevented measures which would have given France, from the beginning
of the war, the superiority in eastern seas." But "upon Walpole's
overthrow," says another Frenchman, "Fleuri perceived his mistake in
letting the navy decay. Its importance had lately struck him. He knew
that the kings of Naples and Sardinia forsook the French alliance
merely because an English squadron threatened to bombard Naples and
Genoa and to bring an army into Italy. For lack of this element of
greatness, France silently swallowed the greatest humiliations, and
could only complain of the violence of English cruisers, which
pillaged our commerce, in violation of the law of nations,"[87] during
the years of nominal peace that elapsed between the time when the
French fleet was confined to protecting the Spanish against the
English and the outbreak of formal war. The explanation of these
differing views seems not very hard. The two ministers had tacitly
agreed to follow lines which apparently could not cross. France was
left free to expand by land, provided she did not excite the jealousy
of the English people, and Walpole's own sense of English interests,
by rivalry at sea. This course suited Fleuri's views and wishes. The
one sought power by sea, the other by land. Which had been wiser, war
was to show; for, with Spain as an ally to one party, war had to come,
and that on the sea. Neither minister lived to see the result of his
policy. Walpole was driven from power in 1742, and died in March,
1745. Fleuri died in office, January 29, 1743.

FOOTNOTES:

[80] Afterward Lord Torrington; father of Admiral John Byng, shot in
1757.

[81] Campbell: Lives of the Admirals; quoted by Lord Mahon in his
History of England.

[82] Lives of the Admirals

[83] Martin: History of France.

[84] Burrows: Life of Lord Hawke.

[85] Martin: History of France.

[86] The peculiar political relation which France bore toward England
between 1739 and 1744, while the latter country was at war with Spain,
needs to be explained, as it depended upon views of international
duties which are practically obsolete. By her defensive alliance with
Spain, France had bound herself to furnish a contingent of specified
force to the Spanish fleet when that country was involved in war of a
certain kind. She claimed, however, that her sending these succors was
not such an act of hostility to England as involved a breach of the
peace existing between the two nations. The French ships-of-war, while
thus serving with the Spanish fleet under the terms of the treaty,
were enemies; but the French nation and all other armed forces of
France, on sea and land, were neutrals, with all the privileges of
neutrality. Of course England was not bound to accept this view of the
matter, and could make the action of France a _casus belli_; but
France claimed it was not justly so, and England practically conceded
the claim, though the relation was likely to lead to formal war, as it
did in 1744. A few years later the Dutch will be found claiming the
same privilege of neutrality toward France while furnishing a large
contingent to the Austrian army acting against her.

[87] Lapeyrouse-Bonfils: Hist. de la Marine Française.




CHAPTER VII.

    WAR BETWEEN GREAT BRITAIN AND SPAIN, 1739.--WAR OF THE AUSTRIAN
    SUCCESSION, 1740.--FRANCE JOINS SPAIN AGAINST GREAT BRITAIN,
    1744.--SEA BATTLES OF MATTHEWS, ANSON, AND HAWKE.--PEACE OF
    AIX-LA-CHAPELLE, 1748.


We have now reached the opening of a series of great wars, destined to
last with short intervals of peace for nearly half a century, and
having, amid many misleading details, one broad characteristic
distinguishing them from previous, and from many subsequent, wars.
This strife embraced the four quarters of the world, and that not only
as side issues here and there, the main struggle being in Europe; for
the great questions to be determined by it, concerning the world's
history, were the dominion of the sea and the control of distant
countries, the possession of colonies, and, dependent upon these, the
increase of wealth. Singularly enough it is not till nearly the end of
the long contest that great fleets are found engaging, and the
struggle transferred to its proper field, the sea. The action of sea
power is evident enough, the issue plainly indicated from the
beginning; but for a long time there is no naval warfare of any
consequence, because the truth is not recognized by the French
government. The movement toward colonial extension by France is wholly
popular, though illustrated by a few great names; the attitude of the
rulers is cold and mistrustful: hence came neglect of the navy, a
foregone conclusion of defeat on the main question, and destruction
for the time of her sea power.

Such being the character of the coming wars, it is important to
realize the relative positions of the three great powers in those
quarters of the world, outside of Europe, where the strife was to
engage.

In North America, England now held the thirteen colonies, the original
United States, from Maine to Georgia. In these colonies was to be
found the highest development of that form of colonization peculiar to
England, bodies of free men essentially self-governing and
self-dependent, still enthusiastically loyal, and by occupation at
once agricultural, commercial, and sea-faring. In the character of
their country and its productions, in its long sea-coast and sheltered
harbors, and in their own selves, they had all the elements of sea
power, which had already received large development. On such a country
and such a people the royal navy and army were securely based in the
western hemisphere. The English colonists were intensely jealous of
the French and Canadians.

France held Canada and Louisiana, a name much more extensive in its
application then than now, and claimed the entire valley of the Ohio
and Mississippi, by right of prior discovery, and as a necessary link
between the St. Lawrence and the Gulf of Mexico. There was as yet no
adequate occupation of this intermediate country, nor was the claim
admitted by England, whose colonists asserted the right to extend
indefinitely westward. The strength of the French position was in
Canada; the St. Lawrence gave them access to the heart of the country,
and though Newfoundland and Nova Scotia had been lost, in Cape Breton
Island they still held the key of the gulf and river. Canada had the
characteristics of the French colonial system planted in a climate
least suited to it. A government paternal, military, and monkish
discouraged the development of individual enterprise and of free
association for common ends. The colonists abandoned commerce and
agriculture, raising only food enough for immediate consumption, and
were given to arms and hunting. Their chief traffic was in furs. There
was so little mechanical art among them that they bought of the
English colonies part of the vessels for their interior navigation.
The chief element of strength was the military, arms-bearing character
of the population; each man was a soldier.

Besides the hostility inherited from the mother-countries, there was a
necessary antagonism between two social and political systems, so
directly opposed, and lying one alongside the other. The remoteness of
Canada from the West Indies, and the inhospitable winter climate, made
it, from the naval point of view, of much less value to France than
the English colonies to England; besides which the resources and
population were greatly inferior. In 1750 the population of Canada was
eighty thousand, that of the English colonies twelve hundred thousand.
With such disparity of strength and resources, the only chance for
Canada lay in the support of the sea power of France, either by direct
control of the neighboring seas, or by such powerful diversion
elsewhere as would relieve the pressure upon her.

On the continent of North America, in addition to Mexico and the
countries south of it, Spain held Florida; under which name were
embraced extensive regions beyond the peninsula, not accurately
defined, and having little importance at any period of these long
wars.

In the West Indies and South America, Spain held mainly what are still
known as Spanish American countries, besides Cuba, Porto Rico, and
part of Hayti; France had Guadeloupe, Martinique, and the western half
of Hayti; England, Jamaica, Barbadoes, and some of the smaller
islands. The fertile character of the soil, the commercial
productions, and the less rigorous climate would seem to make these
islands objects of particular ambition in a colonial war; but as a
matter of fact no attempt was made, nor, except as to Jamaica, which
Spain wished to recover, was any intention entertained of conquering
any of the larger islands. The reason probably was that England, whose
sea power made her the principal aggressor, was influenced in the
direction of her efforts by the wishes of the great body of Englishmen
on the North American continent. The smaller West India islands are
singly too small to be strongly held except by a power controlling the
sea. They had a twofold value in war: one as offering military
positions for such a power: the other a commercial value, either as
adding to one's own resources or diminishing those of the enemy. War
directed against them may be considered as a war upon commerce, and
the islands themselves as ships or convoys loaded with enemy's wealth.
They will be found therefore changing hands like counters, and usually
restored when peace comes; though the final result was to leave most
of them in the hands of England. Nevertheless, the fact of each of the
great powers having a share in this focus of commerce drew thither
both large fleets and small squadrons, a tendency aided by the
unfavorable seasons for military operations on the continent; and in
the West Indies took place the greater number of the fleet-actions
that illustrated this long series of wars.

   [Illustration: PENINSULA OF INDIA AND CEYLON.]

In yet another remote region was the strife between England and France
to be waged, and there, as in North America, finally decided by these
wars. In India, the rival nations were represented by their East India
companies, who directly administered both government and commerce.
Back of them, of course, were the mother-countries; but in immediate
contact with the native rulers were the presidents and officers
appointed by the companies. At this time the principal settlements of
the English were,--on the west coast, Bombay; on the east, Calcutta
upon the Ganges, at some distance from the sea, and Madras; while a
little south of Madras another town and station, known generally to
the English as Fort St. David, though sometimes called Cuddalore, had
been established later. The three presidencies of Bombay, Calcutta,
and Madras were at this time mutually independent, and responsible
only to the Court of Directors in England.

France was established at Chandernagore, on the Ganges, above
Calcutta; at Pondicherry, on the east coast, eighty miles south of
Madras; and on the west coast, far to the south of Bombay, she had a
third station of inferior importance, called Mahé. The French,
however, had a great advantage in the possession of the intermediate
station already pointed out in the Indian Ocean, the neighboring
islands of France and Bourbon. They were yet more fortunate in the
personal character of the two men who were at this time at the head
of their affairs in the Indian peninsula and the islands, Dupleix and
La Bourdonnais,--men to whom no rivals in ability or force of
character had as yet appeared among the English Indian officials. Yet
in these two men, whose cordial fellow-working might have ruined the
English settlement in India, there appeared again that singular
conflict of ideas, that hesitation between the land and the sea as the
stay of power, a prophecy of which seems to be contained in the
geographical position of France itself. The mind of Dupleix, though
not inattentive to commercial interests, was fixed on building up a
great empire in which France should rule over a multitude of vassal
native princes. In the pursuit of this end he displayed great tact and
untiring activity, perhaps also a somewhat soaring and fantastic
imagination; but when he met La Bourdonnais, whose simpler and sounder
views aimed at sea supremacy, at a dominion based upon free and
certain communication with the home country instead of the shifting
sands of Eastern intrigues and alliances, discord at once arose.
"Naval inferiority," says a French historian who considers Dupleix to
have had the higher aims, "was the principal cause that arrested his
progress;"[88] but naval superiority was precisely the point at which
La Bourdonnais, himself a seaman and the governor of an island, aimed.
It may be that with the weakness of Canada, compared to the English
colonies, sea power could not there have changed the actual issue; but
in the condition of the rival nations in India everything depended
upon controlling the sea.

Such were the relative situations of the three countries in the
principal foreign theatres of war. No mention has been made of the
colonies on the west coast of Africa, because they were mere trading
stations having no military importance. The Cape of Good Hope was in
possession of the Dutch, who took no active part in the earlier wars,
but long maintained toward England a benevolent neutrality, surviving
from the alliance in the former wars of the century. It is necessary
to mention briefly the condition of the military navies, which were
to have an importance as yet unrealized. Neither precise numbers nor
an exact account of condition of the ships can be given; but the
relative efficiency can be fairly estimated. Campbell, the English
contemporary naval historian, says that in 1727 the English navy had
eighty-four ships-of-the-line, from sixty guns up; forty 50-gun ships,
and fifty-four frigates and smaller vessels. In 1734 this number had
fallen to seventy ships-of-the-line and nineteen 50-gun ships. In
1744, after four years of war with Spain alone, the number was ninety
ships-of-the-line and eighty-four frigates. The French navy at the
same time he estimates at forty-five ships-of-the-line and sixty-seven
frigates. In 1747, near the end of the first war, he says that the
royal navy of Spain was reduced to twenty-two ships-of-the-line, that
of France to thirty-one, while the English had risen to one hundred
and twenty-six. The French writers consulted are less precise in their
figures, but agree in representing not only that the navy was reduced
to a pitiful number of ships, but that these were in bad condition and
the dock-yards destitute of materials. This neglect of the navy lasted
more or less throughout these wars, until 1760, when the sense of the
nation was aroused to the importance of restoring it; too late,
however, to prevent the most serious of the French losses. In England
as well as in France discipline and administration had been sapped by
the long peace; the inefficiency of the armaments sent out was
notorious, and recalls the scandals that marked the outbreak of the
Crimean War; while the very disappearance of the French ships led, by
the necessity of replacing them, to putting afloat vessels superior
singly, because more modern and scientific, to the older ships of the
same class in England. Care must be had, however, in accepting too
easily the complaints of individual writers; French authors will be
found asserting that English ships are faster, while at the same
period Englishmen complain that they are slower. It may be accepted as
generally true that the French ships built between 1740 and 1800 were
better designed and larger, class for class, than the English. The
latter had the undoubted superiority both in the number and quality
of the seamen and officers. Keeping some fleets always afloat, whether
better or worse, the officers could not quite lose touch of their
profession; whereas in France it is said that not one fifth of the
officers were, in 1744, employed. This superiority was kept and
increased by the practice, which henceforth obtained, of blockading
the French military ports with superior force; the enemy's squadrons
when they put to sea found themselves at once at a disadvantage in
point of practical skill. On the other hand, large as was the number
of English seamen, the demands of commerce were so great that war
found them scattered all over the world, and part of the fleet was
always paralyzed for lack of crews. This constant employment assured
good seamanship, but the absence of so many men had to be supplied by
an indiscriminate press, which dragged in a class of miserable and
sickly men, sadly diluting the quality of the whole. To realize the
condition of ships' companies of that day, it will be necessary only
to read the accounts of those sent to Anson starting for a cruise
round the world, or to Hawke when fitting out for war service; the
statements are now almost incredible, and the results most deplorable.
It was not a question of sanitation only; the material sent was
entirely unfit to meet the conditions of sea life under the most
favorable circumstances. In both the French and English service a
great deal of weeding among the officers was necessary. Those were the
palmy days of court and political influence; and, moreover, it is not
possible, after a long peace, at once to pick out from among the
fairest-seeming the men who will best stand the tests of time and
exposure to the responsibilities of war. There was in both nations a
tendency to depend upon officers who had been in their prime a
generation before, and the results were not fortunate.

War having been declared against Spain by England in October, 1739,
the first attempts of the latter power were naturally directed against
the Spanish-American colonies, the cause of the dispute, in which it
was expected to find an easy and rich prey. The first expedition
sailed under Admiral Vernon in November of the same year, and took
Porto Bello by a sudden and audacious stroke, but found only the
insignificant sum of ten thousand dollars in the port whence the
galleons sailed. Returning to Jamaica, Vernon received large
reinforcements of ships, and was joined by a land force of twelve
thousand troops. With this increased force, attempts were made upon
both Cartagena and Santiago de Cuba, in the years 1741 and 1742, but
in both wretched failures resulted; the admiral and the general
quarrelled, as was not uncommon in days when neither had an
intelligent comprehension of the other's business. Marryatt, when
characterizing such misunderstandings by a humorous exaggeration,
seems to have had in view this attempt on Cartagena: "The army thought
that the navy might have beaten down stone ramparts ten feet thick;
and the navy wondered why the army had not walked up the same
ramparts, which were thirty feet perpendicular."

Another expedition, justly celebrated for the endurance and
perseverance shown by its leader, and famous both for the hardships
borne and singular final success, was sent out in 1740 under Anson.
Its mission was to pass round Cape Horn and attack the Spanish
colonies on the west coast of South America. After many delays, due
apparently to bad administration, the squadron finally got away toward
the end of 1740. Passing the Cape at the worst season of the year, the
ships met a series of tempests of the most violent kind; the squadron
was scattered, never all to meet again, and Anson, after infinite
peril, succeeded in rallying a part of it at Juan Fernandez. Two ships
had put back to England, a third was lost to the southward of Chiloe.
With the three left to him he cruised along the South American coast,
taking some prizes and pillaging the town of Payta, intending to touch
near Panama and join hands with Vernon for the capture of that place
and the possession of the isthmus, if possible. Learning of the
disaster at Cartagena, he then determined to cross the Pacific and
waylay the two galleons that sailed yearly from Acapulco to Manila.
In the passage across, one of the two ships now left to him was found
in such bad condition that she had to be destroyed. With the other he
succeeded in his last undertaking, capturing the great galleon with a
million and a half dollars in specie. The expedition, from its many
misfortunes, had no military result beyond the terror and consequent
embarrassment caused to the Spanish settlements; but its very
misfortunes, and the calm persistency which worked out a great success
from them all, have given it a well-deserved renown.

During the year 1740 happened two events which led to a general
European war breaking in upon that in which Spain and England were
already engaged. In May of that year Frederick the Great became king
of Prussia, and in October the emperor Charles VI., formerly the
Austrian claimant of the Spanish throne, died. He had no son, and left
by will the sovereignty of his estates to his eldest daughter, the
celebrated Maria Theresa, to secure whose succession the efforts of
his diplomacy had been directed for many years. This succession had
been guaranteed by the European powers; but the apparent weakness of
her position excited the ambitions of other sovereigns. The Elector of
Bavaria laid claim to the whole inheritance, in which he was supported
by France; while the Prussian king claimed and seized the province of
Silesia. Other powers, large and small, threw in their lot with one or
the other; while the position of England was complicated by her king
being also elector of Hanover, and in that capacity hurriedly
contracting an obligation of neutrality for the electorate, although
English feeling was strongly in favor of Austria. Meanwhile the
failure of the Spanish-American expeditions and the severe losses of
English commerce increased the general outcry against Walpole, who
resigned early in 1742. England under the new ministry became the open
ally of Austria; and Parliament voted not only a subsidy to the
empress-queen, but also a body of troops to be sent as auxiliaries to
the Austrian Netherlands. At the same time Holland, under English
influence, and bound like England by previous treaties to support the
succession of Maria Theresa, also voted a subsidy. Here occurs again
that curious view of international relations before mentioned. Both of
these powers thus entered the war against France, but only as
auxiliaries to the empress, not as principals; as nations, except the
troops actually in the field, they were considered to be still at
peace. Such an equivocal situation could in the end have only one
result. On the sea France had already assumed the same position of
auxiliary to Spain, in virtue of the defensive alliance between the
two kingdoms, while affecting still to be at peace with England; and
it is curious to see the gravity with which French writers complain of
assaults upon French by English ships, upon the plea that there was no
open war between the two States. It has already been mentioned that in
1740 a French squadron supported a division of Spanish ships on their
way to America. In 1741, Spain, having now entered the continental war
as an enemy of Austria, sent a body of fifteen thousand troops from
Barcelona to attack the Austrian possessions in Italy. The English
admiral Haddock, in the Mediterranean, sought and found the Spanish
fleet; but with it was a division of twelve French sail-of-the-line,
whose commander informed Haddock that he was engaged in the same
expedition and had orders to fight, if the Spaniards, though formally
at war with England, were attacked. As the allies were nearly double
his force, the English admiral was obliged to go back to Port Mahon.
He was soon after relieved; and the new admiral, Matthews, held at
once the two positions of commander-in-chief in the Mediterranean and
English minister at Turin, the capital of the King of Sardinia. In the
course of the year 1742 an English captain in his fleet, chasing some
Spanish galleys, drove them into the French port of St. Tropez, and
following them into the harbor burned them, in spite of the so-called
neutrality of France. In the same year Matthews sent a division of
ships under Commodore Martin to Naples, to compel the Bourbon king to
withdraw his contingent of twenty thousand troops serving with the
Spanish army in northern Italy against the Austrians. To the attempts
to negotiate, Martin replied only by pulling out his watch and giving
the government an hour to come to terms. There was nothing for it but
submission; and the English fleet left the harbor after a stay of
twenty-four hours, having relieved the empress of a dangerous enemy.
Henceforward it was evident that the Spanish war in Italy could only
be maintained by sending troops through France; England controlled the
sea and the action of Naples. These two last incidents, at St. Tropez
and Naples, deeply impressed the aged Fleuri, who recognized too late
the scope and importance of a well-founded sea power. Causes of
complaint were multiplying on both sides, and the moment was fast
approaching when both France and England must quit the pretence of
being only auxiliaries in the war. Before it came to that, however,
the controlling sea power and wealth of England again made itself felt
by attaching the King of Sardinia to the Austrian cause. Between the
dangers and advantages of the French or English alliance the king's
action was determined by a subsidy and the promise of a strong English
fleet in the Mediterranean; in return he engaged to enter the war with
an army of forty-five thousand men. This compact was signed in
September, 1743. In October, Fleuri being now dead, Louis XV. made
with Spain a treaty, by which he engaged to declare war against
England and Sardinia, and to support the Spanish claims in Italy, as
also to Gibraltar, Mahon, and Georgia. Open war was thus near at hand,
but the declaration was still deferred. The greatest sea fight that
took place occurred while nominal peace yet existed.

   [Illustration: Pl. VII. MATTHEWS. FEB., 1744., Pl. VIIa. BYNG.
   MAY, 1756.]

In the latter part of 1743 the Infante Philip of Spain had sought to
land on the coast of the Genoese Republic, which was unfriendly to the
Austrians; but the attempt had been frustrated by the English fleet,
and the Spanish ships forced to retreat into Toulon. They lay there
for four months, unable to go out on account of the English
superiority. In this dilemma the court of Spain applied to Louis XV.
and obtained an order for the French fleet, under the command of
Admiral de Court,--an old man of eighty years, a veteran of the days
of Louis XIV.,--to escort the Spaniards either to the Gulf of Genoa or
to their own ports, it does not clearly appear which. The French
admiral was ordered not to fire unless he was attacked. In order to
secure the best co-operation of the Spaniards, whose efficiency he
probably distrusted, De Court proposed, as Ruyter had done in days
long gone by, to scatter their ships among his own; but as the Spanish
admiral, Navarro, refused, the line-of-battle was formed with nine
French ships in the van, in the centre six French and three Spaniards,
in the rear nine Spanish ships; in all, twenty-seven. In this order
the combined fleets sailed from Toulon February 19, 1744. The English
fleet, which had been cruising off Hyères in observation, chased, and
on the 22d its van and centre came up with the allies; but the rear
division was then several miles to windward and astern, quite out of
supporting distance (Plate VII., r). The wind was easterly, both
fleets heading to the southward, and the English had the weather-gage.
The numbers were nearly equal, the English having twenty-nine to the
allied twenty-seven; but this advantage was reversed by the failure of
the English rear to join. The course of the rear-admiral has been
generally attributed to ill-will toward Matthews; for although he
proved that in his separated position he made all sail to join, he did
not attack later on when he could, on the plea that the signal for the
line-of-battle was flying at the same time as the signal to engage;
meaning that he could not leave the line to fight without disobeying
the order to form line. This technical excuse was, however, accepted
by the subsequent court-martial. Under the actual conditions Matthews,
mortified and harassed by the inaction of his lieutenant, and fearing
that the enemy would escape if he delayed longer, made the signal to
engage when his own van was abreast the enemy's centre, and at once
bore down himself out of the line and attacked with his flag-ship of
ninety guns the largest ship in the enemy's line, the "Royal Philip,"
of one hundred and ten guns, carrying the flag of the Spanish admiral
(a). In doing this he was bravely supported by his next ahead and
astern. The moment of attack seems to have been judiciously chosen;
five Spanish ships had straggled far to the rear, leaving their
admiral with the support only of his next ahead and astern, while
three other Spaniards continued on with the French. The English van
stood on, engaging the allied centre, while the allied van was without
antagonists. Being thus disengaged, the latter was desirous of tacking
to windward of the head of the English line, thus putting it between
two fires, but was checked by the intelligent action of the three
leading English captains, who, disregarding the signal to bear down,
kept their commanding position and stopped the enemy's attempts to
double. For this they were cashiered by the court-martial, but
afterward restored. This circumspect but justifiable disregard of
signals was imitated without any justification by all the English
captains of the centre, save the admiral's seconds already mentioned,
as well as by some of those in the van, who kept up a cannonade at
long range while their commander-in-chief was closely and even
furiously engaged. The one marked exception was Captain Hawke,
afterward the distinguished admiral, who imitated the example of his
chief, and after driving his first antagonist out of action, quitted
his place in the van (b), brought to close quarters (b') a fine
Spanish ship that had kept at bay five other English ships, and took
her,--the only prize made that day. The commander of the English van,
with his seconds, also behaved with spirit and came to close action.
It is unnecessary to describe the battle further; as a military affair
it deserves no attention, and its most important result was to bring
out the merit of Hawke, whom the king and the government always
remembered for his share in it. The general inefficiency and
wide-spread misbehavior of the English captains, after five years of
declared war, will partly explain the failure of England to obtain
from her undoubted naval superiority the results she might have
expected in this war--the first act in a forty years' drama--and they
give military officers a lesson on the necessity of having their
minds prepared and stocked, by study of the conditions of war in their
own day, if they would not be found unready and perhaps disgraced in
the hour of battle.[89] It is not to be supposed that so many English
seamen misbehaved through so vulgar and rare a defect as mere
cowardice; it was unpreparedness of mind and lack of military
efficiency in the captains, combined with bad leadership on the part
of the admiral, with a possible taint of ill will toward him as a rude
and domineering superior, that caused this fiasco. Attention may here
fitly be drawn to the effect of a certain cordiality and good-will on
the part of superiors toward their subordinates. It is not perhaps
essential to military success, but it undoubtedly contributes to the
other elements of that success a spirit, a breath of life, which makes
possible what would otherwise be impossible; which reaches heights of
devotion and achievement that the strictest discipline, not so
enkindled, cannot attain. Doubtless it is a natural gift. The highest
example of it possibly ever known among seamen was Nelson. When he
joined the fleet just before Trafalgar, the captains who gathered on
board the flag-ship seemed to forget the rank of their admiral in
their desire to testify their joy at meeting him. "This Nelson," wrote
Captain Duff, who fell in the battle, "is so lovable and excellent a
man, so kindly a leader, that we all wish to exceed his desires and
anticipate his orders." He himself was conscious of this fascination
and its value, when writing of the battle of the Nile to Lord Howe, he
said, "I had the happiness to command a band of brothers."

The celebrity attained by Matthews's action off Toulon, certainly not
due to the skill with which it was managed, nor to its results, sprang
from the clamor at home, and chiefly from the number and findings of
the courts-martial that followed. Both the admiral and his second, and
also eleven captains out of the twenty-nine, had charges preferred
against them. The admiral was cashiered because he had broken the
line; that is, because his captains did not follow him when he left it
to get at the enemy,--a decision that smacks more of the Irish bull
than of the Irish love of fighting. The second was acquitted on the
technical grounds already given; he avoided the fault of breaking the
line by keeping far enough away. Of the eleven captains one died, one
deserted, seven were dismissed or suspended, two only were acquitted.
Nor were the French and Spaniards better pleased; mutual
recriminations passed. Admiral de Court was relieved from his command,
while the Spanish admiral was decorated by his government with the
title of Marquis de la Victoria, a most extraordinary reward for what
was at best a drawn fight. The French, on the other hand, assert that
he left the deck on the plea of a very slight wound, and that the ship
was really fought by a French captain who happened to be on board.

To use a common expression, this battle, the first general action
since that off Malaga forty years before, "woke up" the English people
and brought about a healthful reaction. The sifting process begun by
the battle itself was continued, but the result was reached too late
to have its proper effect on the current war. It is rather by its
deficient action, than by such conspicuous successes as were attained
in earlier and later times, that the general value of England's sea
power is now shown; like some precious faculty, scarcely valued when
possessed, but keenly missed when withdrawn. Mistress now of the seas
rather by the weakness of her enemies than by her own disciplined
strength, she drew from that mastery no adequate results; the most
solid success, the capture of Cape Breton Island, in 1745, was
achieved by the colonial forces of New England, to which indeed the
royal navy lent valuable aid, for to troops so situated the fleet is
the one line of communication. The misconduct off Toulon was repeated
by officers high in command in the West and East Indies, resulting in
the latter case in the loss of Madras. Other causes concurred with the
effete condition of the naval officers to hamper the action of that
sea power which launches out far from home. The condition of England
itself was insecure; the cause of the Stuarts was still alive, and
though a formidable invasion by fifteen thousand troops under Marshal
Saxe, in 1744, was foiled, partly by the English Channel fleet, and
partly by a storm which wrecked several of the transports assembled
off Dunkirk, with the loss of many lives, yet the reality of the
danger was shown in the following year, when the Pretender landed in
Scotland with only a few men at his back and the northern kingdom rose
with him. His successful invasion was carried well down into England
itself; and sober historians have thought that at one time the chances
of ultimate success were rather with than against him. Another serious
fetter upon the full use of England's power was the direction given to
the French operations on land and the mistaken means used to oppose
them. Neglecting Germany, France turned upon the Austrian Netherlands,
a country which England, out of regard to her sea interests, was not
willing to see conquered. Her commercial preponderance would be
directly threatened by the passing of Antwerp, Ostend, and the Scheldt
into the hands of her great rival; and though her best check against
this would have been to seize valuable French possessions elsewhere
and hold them as a pledge, the weakness of her government and the
present inefficiency of the navy prevented her doing so. The position
of Hanover, again, controlled the action of England; for though united
only by the tie of a common sovereign, the love of that sovereign for
his continental dominion, his native country, made itself strongly
felt in the councils of a weak and time-serving ministry. It was the
disregard of Hanover by the first William Pitt, consequent upon his
strong English feeling, that incensed the king and led him so long to
resist the demands of the nation that he should be put at the head of
affairs. These different causes--dissension at home, interest in the
Netherlands, regard for Hanover--combined to prevent a subservient and
second-rate ministry, divided also among themselves, from giving a
proper direction and infusing a proper spirit into the naval war; but
a better condition of the navy itself, more satisfactory results from
it, might have modified even their action. As it was, the outcome of
the war was almost nothing as regards the disputes between England and
her special enemies. On the continent, the questions after 1745
reduced themselves to two,--what part of the Austrian possessions
should be given to Prussia, Spain, and Sardinia, and how peace was to
be wrenched by France from England and Holland. The sea countries
still, as of old, bore the expenses of the war, which however now fell
chiefly upon England. Marshal Saxe, who commanded the French in
Flanders throughout this war, summed up the situation in half a dozen
words to his king. "Sire," said he, "peace is within the walls of
Maestricht." This strong city opened the course of the Meuse and the
way for the French army into the United Provinces from the rear; for
the English fleet, in conjunction with that of Holland, prevented an
attack from the sea. By the end of 1746, despite the efforts of the
allies, nearly all Belgium was in the hands of the French; but up to
this time, although Dutch subsidies were supporting the Austrian
government, and Dutch troops in the Netherlands were fighting for it,
there was nominal peace between the United Provinces and France. In
April, 1747, "the King of France invaded Dutch Flanders, announcing
that he was obliged to send his army into the territory of the
republic, to arrest the protection granted by the States-General to
the Austrian and English troops; but that he had no intention of
breaking with it, and that the places and provinces occupied would be
restored to the United Provinces as soon as they gave proof that they
had ceased to succor the enemies of France." This was actual, but not
formal, war. Numerous places fell during the year, and the successes
of the French inclined both Holland and England to come to terms.
Negotiations went on during the winter; but in April, 1748, Saxe
invested Maestricht. This forced a peace.

Meanwhile, though languishing, the sea war was not wholly uneventful.
Two encounters between English and French squadrons happened during the
year 1747, completing the destruction of the French fighting navy. In
both cases the English were decidedly superior; and though there was
given opportunity for some brilliant fighting by particular captains,
and for the display of heroic endurance on the part of the French,
greatly outnumbered but resisting to the last, only one tactical lesson
is afforded. This lesson is, that when an enemy, either as the result
of battle or from original inequality, is greatly inferior in force,
obliged to fly without standing on the order of his flying, the regard
otherwise due to order must be in a measure at least dismissed, and a
general chase ordered. The mistake of Tourville in this respect after
Beachy Head has already been noted. In the first of the cases now under
discussion, the English Admiral Anson had fourteen ships against eight
French, weaker individually as well as in total number; in the second,
Sir Edward Hawke had fourteen against nine, the latter being somewhat
larger, ship for ship, than the English. In both cases the signal was
made for a general chase, and the action which resulted was a _mêlée_.
There was no opportunity for anything else; the one thing necessary was
to overtake the running enemy, and that can only certainly be done by
letting the fleetest or best situated ships get ahead, sure that the
speed of the fastest pursuers is better than that of the slowest of
the pursued, and that therefore either the latter must be abandoned or
the whole force brought to bay. In the second case the French
commander, Commodore l'Étenduère, did not have to be followed far. He
had with him a convoy of two hundred and fifty merchant-ships;
detaching one ship-of-the-line to continue the voyage with the convoy,
he placed himself with the other eight between it and the enemy,
awaiting the attack under his topsails. As the English came up one
after another they divided on either side of the French column, which
was thus engaged on both sides. After an obstinate resistance, six of
the French ships were taken, but the convoy was saved. The English had
been so roughly handled that the two remaining French men-of-war got
back safely to France. If, therefore, Sir Edward Hawke showed in his
attack the judgment and dash which always distinguished that remarkable
officer, it may be claimed for Commodore l'Étenduère that fortune, in
assigning him the glorious disadvantage of numbers, gave him also the
leading part in the drama, and that he filled it nobly. A French
officer justly remarks that "he defended his convoy as on shore a
position is defended, when the aim is to save an army corps or to
assure an evolution; he gave himself to be crushed. After an action
that lasted from mid-day till eight P.M. the convoy was saved, thanks
to the obstinacy of the defence; two hundred and fifty ships were saved
to their owners by the devotion of L'Étenduère and of the captains
under his orders. This devotion cannot be questioned, for eight ships
had but few chances of surviving an action with fourteen; and not only
did the commander of the eight accept an action which he might possibly
have avoided, but he knew how to inspire his lieutenants with trust in
him; for all supported the strife with honor, and yielded at last,
showing the most indisputable proofs of their fine and energetic
defence. Four ships were entirely dismasted, two had only the foremast
standing."[90] The whole affair, as conducted on both sides, affords an
admirable study of how to follow up an advantage, original or
acquired, and of the results that may be obtained by a gallant, even
hopeless defence, for the furtherance of a particular object. It may be
added that Hawke, disabled from further pursuit himself, sent a sloop
of war express to the West Indies, with information of the approach of
the convoy,--a step which led to the capture of part of it, and gives a
touch of completeness to the entire transaction, which cannot fail to
be gratifying to a military student interested in seeing the actors in
history fully alive to and discharging to the utmost their important
tasks.

Before bringing to a close the story of this war and mentioning the
peace settlement, an account must be given of the transactions in
India, where France and England were then on equal terms. It has been
said that affairs there were controlled by the East India companies of
either nation; and that the French were represented in the peninsula
by Dupleix, in the islands by La Bourdonnais. The latter was appointed
to his post in 1735, and his untiring genius had been felt in all the
details of administration, but especially in converting the Isle of
France into a great naval station,--a work which had to be built up
from the foundations. Everything was wanting; everything was by him in
greater or less measure supplied,--storehouses, dock-yards,
fortifications, seamen. In 1740, when war between France and England
became probable, he obtained from the East India Company a squadron,
though smaller than he asked, with which he proposed to ruin the
English commerce and shipping; but when war actually began in 1744, he
received orders not to attack the English, the French company hoping
that neutrality might exist between the companies in that distant
region, though the nations were at war. The proposition does not seem
absurd in view of the curious relations of Holland to France,
nominally at peace while sending troops to the Austrian army; but it
was much to the advantage of the English, who were inferior in the
Indian seas. Their company accepted the proffer, while saying that it
of course could bind neither the home government nor the royal navy.
The advantage won by the forethought of La Bourdonnais was thus lost;
though first, and long alone, on the field, his hand was stayed.
Meanwhile the English admiralty sent out a squadron and began to seize
French ships between India and China; not till then did the company
awake from its illusion. Having done this part of its work, the
English squadron sailed to the coast of India, and in July, 1745,
appeared off Pondicherry, the political capital of French India,
prepared to sustain an attack which the governor of Madras was about
to make by land. La Bourdonnais' time was now come.

Meanwhile, on the mainland of the Indian peninsula, Dupleix had been
forming wide views and laying broad foundations for the establishment
of French preponderance. Having entered the service of their company
at first in a subordinate clerical position, his ability had raised
him by rapid steps to be head of the commercial establishments at
Chandernagore, to which he gave a very great enlargement, seriously
affecting, it is said even destroying, parts of the English trade. In
1742 he was made governor-general, and as such removed to Pondicherry.
Here he began to develop his policy, which aimed at bringing India
under the power of France. He saw that through the progress and
extension of the European races over the seas of the whole world the
time had come when the Eastern peoples must be brought into
ever-increasing contact with them; and he judged that India, so often
conquered before, was now about to be conquered by Europeans. He meant
that France should win the prize, and saw in England the only rival.
His plan was to meddle in Indian politics: first, as head of a foreign
and independent colony, which he already was; and second, as a vassal
of the Great Mogul, which he intended to become. To divide and
conquer, to advance the French lines and influence by judicious
alliances, to turn wavering scales by throwing in on one side or the
other the weight of French courage and skill,--such were his aims.
Pondicherry, though a poor harbor, was well adapted for his political
plans; being far distant from Delhi, the capital of the Mogul,
aggressive extension might go on unmarked, until strong enough to
bear the light. Dupleix's present aim, therefore, was to build up a
great French principality in southeast India, around Pondicherry,
while maintaining the present positions in Bengal.

Let it be noted, however,--and the remark is necessary in order to
justify the narration of these plans in connection with our subject, a
connection perhaps not at first evident,--that the kernel of the
question now before Dupleix was not how to build up an empire out of
the Indian provinces and races, but how to get rid of the English, and
that finally. The wildest dreams of sovereignty he may have
entertained could not have surpassed the actual performance of England
a few years later. European qualities were bound to tell, if not
offset by the opposition of other Europeans; and such opposition on
the one side or the other depended upon the control of the sea. In a
climate so deadly to the white races the small numbers whose heroism
bore up the war against fearful odds on many a field must be
continually renewed. As everywhere and always, the action of sea power
was here quiet and unperceived; but it will not be necessary to
belittle in the least the qualities and career of Clive the English
hero of this time and the founder of their empire, in order to prove
the decisive influence which it exerted, despite the inefficiency of
the English naval officers first engaged, and the lack of conclusive
results in such naval battles as were fought.[91] If during the twenty
years following 1743, French fleets instead of English had controlled
the coasts of the peninsula and the seas between it and Europe, can it
be believed that the schemes of Dupleix would have utterly failed?
"Naval inferiority," justly says a French historian, "was the
principal cause that arrested the progress of Dupleix. The French
royal navy did not make its appearance in the East Indies" in his day.
It remains to tell the story briefly.

The English, in 1745, made preparations to besiege Pondicherry, in
which the royal navy was to support the land forces; but the effects
of Dupleix's political schemes were at once seen. The Nabob of the
Carnatic threatened to attack Madras, and the English desisted. The
following year La Bourdonnais appeared on the scene, and an action
took place between his squadron and that under Commodore Peyton; after
which, although it had been a drawn fight, the English officer
deserted the coast, taking refuge in Ceylon, and leaving the control
at sea with the French. La Bourdonnais anchored at Pondicherry, where
quarrels between him and Dupleix soon arose, and were aggravated by
the conflicting tone of their instructions from home. In September he
went to Madras, attacked by land and sea, and took the place, but made
with the governor the stipulation that it might be ransomed; and a
ransom of two million dollars was accordingly paid. When Dupleix heard
of this he was very angry, and claimed to annul the terms of
capitulation on the ground that, once taken, the place was within his
jurisdiction. La Bourdonnais resented this attempt as dishonorable to
him after the promise given. While the quarrel was going on, a violent
cyclone wrecked two of his ships and dismasted the rest. He soon after
returned to France, where his activity and zeal were repaid by three
years' imprisonment under charges, from the effects of which treatment
he died. After his departure Dupleix broke the capitulation, seized
and kept Madras, drove out the English settlers, and went on to
strengthen the fortifications. From Madras he turned against Fort St.
David, but the approach of an English squadron compelled him to raise
the siege in March, 1747.

During this year the disasters to the French navy in the Atlantic,
already related, left the English undisturbed masters of the sea. In
the following winter they sent to India the greatest European fleet
yet seen in the East, with a large land force, the whole under the
command of Admiral Boscawen, who bore a general's commission in
addition to his naval rank. The fleet appeared off the Coromandel
coast in August, 1748. Pondicherry was attacked by land and sea, but
Dupleix made a successful resistance. The English fleet in its turn
suffered from a hurricane, and the siege was raised in October.
Shortly after came the news of the Peace of Aix-la-Chapelle, which
ended the European war. Dupleix, with his home communications
restored, could now resume his subtle and persevering efforts to
secure a territorial base which should, as far as possible, shelter
him from the chances of sea war. Pity that so much genius and patience
should have been spent in an effort wholly vain; nothing could protect
against that sea attack but a naval aid, which the home government
could not give. One of the conditions of the peace was that Madras
should be restored to the English in exchange for Louisburg, the prize
won by the North American colonists and released by them as
reluctantly as Madras was by Dupleix. This was indeed illustrating
Napoleon's boast that he would reconquer Pondicherry on the bank of
the Vistula; yet, although the maritime supremacy of England made
Louisburg in her hands much stronger than Madras, or any other
position in India, when held by the French, the gain by the exchange
was decidedly on the side of Great Britain. The English colonists were
not men to be contented with this action; but they knew the naval
power of England, and that they could do again what they had done
once, at a point not far distant from their own shores. They
understood the state of the case. Not so with Madras. How profound
must have been the surprise of the native princes at this surrender,
how injurious to the personality of Dupleix and the influence he had
gained among them, to see him, in the very hour of victory, forced, by
a power they could not understand, to relinquish his spoil! They were
quite right; the mysterious power which they recognized by its
working, though they saw it not, was not in this or that man, king or
statesman, but in that control of the sea which the French government
knew forbade the hope of maintaining that distant dependency against
the fleets of England. Dupleix himself saw it not; for some years more
he continued building, on the sand of Oriental intrigues and lies, a
house which he vainly hoped would stand against the storms that must
descend upon it.

The Treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle, ending this general war, was signed
April 30, 1748, by England, France, and Holland, and finally by all
the powers in October of the same year. With the exception of certain
portions shorn off the Austrian Empire,--Silesia for Prussia, Parma
for the Infante Philip of Spain, and some Italian territory to the
east of Piedmont for the King of Sardinia,--the general tenor of the
terms was a return to the status before the war. "Never, perhaps, did
any war, after so many great events, and so large a loss of blood and
treasure, end in replacing the nations engaged in it so nearly in the
same situation as they held at first." In truth, as regarded France,
England, and Spain, the affair of the Austrian succession, supervening
so soon upon the outbreak of war between the two latter, had wholly
turned hostilities aside from their true direction and postponed for
fifteen years the settlement of disputes which concerned them much
more nearly than the accession of Maria Theresa. In the distress of
her old enemy, the House of Austria, France was easily led to renew
her attacks upon it, and England as easily drawn to oppose the
attempts of the French to influence or dictate in German affairs,--a
course the more readily followed from the German interests of the
king. It may be questioned whether the true policy for France was to
direct the war upon the heart of the Austrian Empire, by way of the
Rhine and Germany, or, as she finally did, upon the remote possessions
of the Netherlands. In the former case she rested on friendly
territory in Bavaria, and gave a hand to Prussia, whose military
power was now first felt. Such was the first theatre of the war. On
the other hand, in the Netherlands, whither the chief scene of
hostilities shifted later, France struck not only at Austria, but also
at the sea powers, always jealous of her intrusion there. They were
the soul of the war against her, by their subsidies to her other
enemies and by the losses inflicted on her commerce and that of Spain.
The misery of France was alleged to the King of Spain by Louis XV., as
forcing him to conclude peace; and it is evident that the suffering
must have been great to induce him to yield such easy terms as he did,
when he already held the Netherlands and parts of Holland itself by
force of arms. But while so successful on the continent, his navy was
annihilated and communication with the colonies thus cut off; and
though it may be doubted whether the French government of that day
cherished the colonial ambitions ascribed to it by some, it is certain
French commerce was suffering enormously.

While this was the condition of France, impelling her to peace,
England in 1747 found that, from disputes about trade in Spanish
America and through the inefficient action of her navy, she had been
led away into a continental war, in which she had met with disaster,
incurred nearly £80,000,000 of debt, and now saw her ally Holland
threatened with invasion. The peace itself was signed under a threat
by the French envoy that the slightest delay would be the signal for
the French to destroy the fortifications of the captured towns and at
once begin the invasion. At the same time her own resources were
drained, and Holland, exhausted, was seeking to borrow from her.
"Money," we are told, "was never so scarce in the city, and cannot be
had at twelve per cent." Had France, therefore, at this time had a
navy able to make head against that of England, even though somewhat
inferior in strength, she might, with her grip on the Netherlands and
Maestricht, have exacted her own conditions. England, on the other
hand, though driven to the wall on the continent, was nevertheless
able to obtain peace on equal terms, through the control of the sea by
her navy.

The commerce of all three nations had suffered enormously, but the
balance of prizes in favor of Great Britain was estimated at
£2,000,000. Stated in another way, it is said that the combined losses
of French and Spanish commerce amounted during the war to 3,434 ships,
the English to 3,238; but in considering such figures, the relation
they bear to the total merchant shipping of either nation must not be
forgotten. A thousand vessels were a very much larger fraction of
French shipping than of English, and meant more grievous loss.

    "After the disaster to the squadron of L'Étenduère," says a
    French writer, "the French flag did not appear at sea.
    Twenty-two ships-of-the-line composed the navy of France, which
    sixty years before had one hundred and twenty. Privateers made
    few prizes; followed everywhere, unprotected, they almost always
    fell a prey to the English. The British naval forces, without
    any rivals, passed unmolested over the seas. In one year they
    are said to have taken from French commerce £7,000,000 sterling.
    Yet this sea power, which might have seized French and Spanish
    colonies, made few conquests from want of unity and persistence
    in the direction given them."[92]

To sum up, France was forced to give up her conquests for want of a
navy, and England saved her position by her sea power, though she had
failed to use it to the best advantage.

FOOTNOTES:

[88] Martin: History of France

[89] There is not in modern naval history a more striking warning to
the officers of every era, than this battle of Toulon. Coming as it
did after a generation of comparative naval inactivity, it tried men's
reputation as by fire. The lesson, in the judgment of the author, is
the danger of disgraceful failure to men who have neglected to keep
themselves prepared, not only in knowledge of their profession, but in
the sentiment of what war requires. The average man is not a coward;
but neither is he endowed by nature only with the rare faculty of
seizing intuitively the proper course at a critical moment. He gains
it, some more, some less, by experience or by reflection. If both have
been lacking to him, indecision will follow; either from not knowing
what to do, or from failure to realize that utter self-devotion of
himself and his command are required. Of one of the captains cashiered
it is said: "No man had ever lived with a fairer or more honorable
character previous to the unfortunate event which did such irreparable
injury to his reputation. Many of his contemporaries, men in the
highest popular estimation, who knew him well, could scarcely credit
what were indisputably established as facts, and declared, with the
utmost astonishment, 'they believed it next to impossible for Captain
Burrish to behave otherwise than as a man of gallantry and
intrepidity.'" He had been twenty-five years in service, and eleven
afloat as a captain (Charnock's Biographia Navalis). Others of the
condemned men bore fair characters; and even Richard Norris, who
absconded to avoid trial, had been of respectable repute.

[90] Troude: Batailles Navales de la France

[91] "Notwithstanding the extraordinary effort made by the French in
sending out M. Lally with a considerable force last year, I am
confident before the end of this [1759] they will be near their last
gasp in the Carnatic unless some very unforeseen event interpose in
their favor. The _superiority of our squadron_ and the plenty of money
and supplies of all kinds which our friends on that coast will be
furnished with from this province [Bengal], while the enemy are in
total want of everything, without any visible means of redress, are
such advantages as, if properly attended to, cannot fail of wholly
effecting their ruin in that as well as in every other part of India"
(Letter of Clive to Pitt, Calcutta, January 7, 1759; Gleig's Life of
Lord Clive). It will be remembered that the control and use of Bengal,
upon which Clive here counts, had only lately been acquired by the
English; in the days of Dupleix they did not possess them. As will be
seen later, Clive's predictions in this letter were wholly fulfilled.

[92] Lapeyrouse-Bonfils: Hist. de la Marine Française.




CHAPTER VIII.

    SEVEN YEARS' WAR, 1756-1763.--ENGLAND'S OVERWHELMING POWER AND
    CONQUESTS ON THE SEAS, IN NORTH AMERICA, EUROPE, AND EAST AND
    WEST INDIES.--SEA BATTLES: BYNG OFF MINORCA; HAWKE AND CONFLANS;
    POCOCK AND D'ACHÉ IN EAST INDIES.


The urgency with which peace was desired by the principal parties to
the War of the Austrian Succession may perhaps be inferred from the
neglect to settle definitely and conclusively many of the questions
outstanding between them, and notably the very disputes about which
the war between England and Spain began. It seems as though the powers
feared to treat thoroughly matters that contained the germs of future
quarrels, lest the discussion should prolong the war that then
existed. England made peace because the fall of Holland was otherwise
inevitable, not because she had enforced, or surrendered, her claims
of 1739 against Spain. The right of uninterrupted navigation in West
Indian seas, free from any search, was left undetermined, as were
other kindred matters. Not only so, but the boundaries between the
English and French colonies in the valley of the Ohio, toward Canada,
and on the land side of the Nova Scotian peninsula, remained as vague
as they had before been. It was plain that peace could not last; and
by it, if she had saved Holland, England surrendered the control of
the sea which she had won. The true character of the strife, shrouded
for a moment by the continental war, was revealed by the so-called
peace; though formally allayed, the contention continued in every part
of the world.

In India, Dupleix, no longer able to attack the English openly, sought
to undermine their power by the line of policy already described.
Mingling adroitly in the quarrels of surrounding princes, and
advancing his own power while so doing, he attained by rapid steps to
the political control, in 1751, of the southern extremity of India,--a
country nearly as large as France. Given the title of Nabob, he now
had a place among the princes of the land. "A merely commercial policy
was in his eyes a delusion; there could be no middle course between
conquest and abandonment." In the course of the same year further
grants extended the French power through extensive regions to the
north and east, embracing all the coast of Orissa, and made Dupleix
ruler of a third of India. To celebrate his triumphs, perhaps also in
accordance with his policy of impressing the native mind, he now
founded a town and put up a pillar setting forth his successes. But
his doings caused the directors of the company only disquietude;
instead of the reinforcements he asked for they sent him exhortations
to peace; and at about this time Robert Clive, then but twenty-six
years old, began to show his genius. The success of Dupleix and his
allies became checkered with reverses; the English under Clive's
leadership supported the native opponents of the French. The company
at home was but little interested in his political schemes, and was
annoyed at the failure of dividends. Negotiations were opened at
London for a settlement of difficulties, and Dupleix was summoned
home; the English government, it is said, making his recall an
absolute condition of continued peace. Two days after his departure,
in 1754, his successor signed a treaty with the English governor,
wholly abandoning his policy, stipulating that neither company should
interfere in the internal politics of India, and that all possessions
acquired during the war in the Carnatic should be given back to the
Mogul. What France thus surrendered was in extent and population an
empire, and the mortification of French historians has branded the
concession as ignominious; but how could the country have been held,
with the English navy cutting off the eagerly desired reinforcements?

In North America, the declaration of peace was followed by renewed
agitation, which sprang from and betokened the deep feeling and keen
sense of the situation had by the colonists and local authorities on
either side. The Americans held to their points with the stubbornness
of their race. "There is no repose for our thirteen colonies," wrote
Franklin, "so long as the French are masters of Canada." The rival
claims to the central unsettled region, which may accurately enough be
called the valley of the Ohio, involved, if the English were
successful, the military separation of Canada from Louisiana; while on
the other hand, occupation by the French, linking the two extremes of
their acknowledged possessions, would shut up the English colonists
between the Alleghany Mountains and the sea. The issues were apparent
enough to leading Americans of that day, though they were more
far-reaching than the wisest of them could have foreseen; there is
room for curious speculation as to the effect, not only upon America,
but upon the whole world, if the French government had had the will,
and the French people the genius, effectively to settle and hold the
northern and western regions which they then claimed. But while
Frenchmen upon the spot saw clearly enough the coming contest and the
terrible disadvantage of unequal numbers and inferior navy under which
Canada must labor, the home government was blind alike to the value of
the colony and to the fact that it must be fought for; while the
character and habits of the French settlers, lacking in political
activity and unused to begin and carry through measures for the
protection of their own interests, did not remedy the neglect of the
mother-country. The paternal centralizing system of French rule had
taught the colonists to look to the mother-country, and then failed to
take care of them. The governors of Canada of that day acted as
careful and able military men, doing what they could to supply defects
and weaknesses; it is possible that their action was more consistent
and well-planned than that of the English governors; but with the
carelessness of both home governments, nothing in the end could take
the place of the capacity of the English colonists to look out for
themselves. It is odd and amusing to read the conflicting statements
of English and French historians as to the purposes and aims of the
opposing statesmen in these years when the first murmurings of the
storm were heard; the simple truth seems to be that one of those
conflicts familiarly known to us as irrepressible was at hand, and
that both governments would gladly have avoided it. The boundaries
might be undetermined; the English colonists were not.

The French governors established posts where they could on the
debatable ground, and it was in the course of a dispute over one of
these, in 1754, that the name of Washington first appears in history.
Other troubles occurred in Nova Scotia, and both home governments then
began to awake. In 1755 Braddock's disastrous expedition was directed
against Fort Duquesne, now Pittsburg, where Washington had surrendered
the year before. Later in the year another collision between the
English and French colonists happened near Lake George. Although
Braddock's expedition had been first to start, the French government
was also moving. In May of the same year a large squadron of
ships-of-war, mostly armed _en flûte_[93], sailed from Brest with
three thousand troops, and a new governor, De Vaudreuil, for Canada.
Admiral Boscawen had already preceded this fleet, and lay in wait for
it off the mouth of the St. Lawrence. There was as yet no open war,
and the French were certainly within their rights in sending a
garrison to their own colonies; but Boscawen's orders were to stop
them. A fog which scattered the French squadron also covered its
passage; but two of the ships were seen by the English fleet and
captured, June 8, 1755. As soon as this news reached Europe, the
French ambassador to London was recalled, but still no declaration of
war followed. In July, Sir Edward Hawke was sent to sea with orders to
cruise between Ushant and Cape Finisterre, and to seize any French
ships-of-the-line he might see; to which were added in August further
orders to take all French ships of every kind, men-of-war, privateers,
and merchantmen, and to send them into English ports. Before the end
of the year, three hundred trading vessels, valued at six million
dollars, had been captured, and six thousand French seamen were
imprisoned in England,--enough to man nearly ten ships-of-the-line.
All this was done while nominal peace still existed. War was not
declared until six months later.

France still seemed to submit, but she was biding her time, and
preparing warily a severe stroke for which she had now ample
provocation. Small squadrons, or detachments of ships, continued to be
sent to the West Indies and to Canada, while noisy preparations were
made in the dock-yard of Brest, and troops assembled upon the shores
of the Channel. England saw herself threatened with invasion,--a
menace to which her people have been peculiarly susceptible. The
government of the day, weak at best, was singularly unfit for waging
war, and easily misled as to the real danger. Besides, England was
embarrassed, as always at the beginning of a war, not only by the
numerous points she had to protect in addition to her commerce, but
also by the absence of a large number of her seamen in trading-vessels
all over the world. The Mediterranean was therefore neglected; and the
French, while making loud demonstrations on the Channel, quietly
equipped at Toulon twelve ships-of-the-line, which sailed on the 10th
of April, 1756, under Admiral la Galissonière, convoying one hundred
and fifty transports with fifteen thousand troops, commanded by the
Duke of Richelieu. A week later the army was safely landed in Minorca,
and Port Mahon invested, while the fleet established itself in
blockade before the harbor.

Practically this was a complete surprise; for though the suspicions of
the English government had been at last aroused, its action came too
late. The garrison had not been reinforced, and numbered a scant three
thousand men, from which thirty-five officers were absent on leave,
among them the governor and the colonels of all the regiments.
Admiral Byng sailed from Portsmouth with ten ships-of-the-line only
three days before the French left Toulon. Six weeks later, when he
reached the neighborhood of Port Mahon, his fleet had been increased
to thirteen ships-of-the-line, and he had with him four thousand
troops. It was already late; a practicable breach had been made in the
fortress a week before. When the English fleet came in sight, La
Galissonière stood out to meet it and bar the entrance to the harbor.

The battle that followed owes its historical celebrity wholly to the
singular and tragic event which arose from it. Unlike Matthews's
battle off Toulon, it does afford some tactical instruction, though
mainly applicable to the obsolete conditions of warfare under sail;
but it is especially linked to the earlier action through the effect
produced upon the mind of the unfortunate Byng by the sentence of the
court-martial upon Matthews. During the course of the engagement he
repeatedly alluded to the censure upon that admiral for leaving the
line, and seems to have accepted the judgment as justifying, if not
determining, his own course. Briefly, it may be said that the two
fleets, having sighted each other on the morning of the 20th of May,
were found after a series of manoeuvres both on the port tack, with an
easterly wind, heading southerly, the French to leeward, between the
English and the harbor. Byng ran down in line ahead off the wind, the
French remaining by it, so that when the former made the signal to
engage, the fleets were not parallel, but formed an angle of from
thirty to forty degrees (Plate VIIa. A, A). The attack which Byng by
his own account meant to make, each ship against its opposite in the
enemy's line, difficult to carry out under any circumstances, was here
further impeded by the distance between the two rears being much
greater than that between the vans; so that his whole line could not
come into action at the same moment. When the signal was made, the van
ships kept away in obedience to it, and ran down for the French so
nearly head-on (B, B) as to sacrifice their artillery fire in great
measure; they received three raking broadsides, and were seriously
dismantled aloft. The sixth English ship, counting from the van, had
her foretopmast shot away, flew up into the wind, and came aback,
stopping and doubling up the rear of the line. Then undoubtedly was
the time for Byng, having committed himself to the fight, to have set
the example and borne down, just as Farragut did at Mobile when his
line was confused by the stopping of the next ahead; but according to
the testimony of the flag-captain, Matthews's sentence deterred him.
"You see, Captain Gardiner, that the signal for the line is out, and
that I am ahead of the ships 'Louisa' and 'Trident' [which in the
order should have been ahead of him]. You would not have me, as the
admiral of the fleet, run down as if I were going to engage a single
ship. It was Mr. Matthews's misfortune to be prejudiced by not
carrying down his force together, which I shall endeavor to avoid."
The affair thus became entirely indecisive; the English van was
separated from the rear and got the brunt of the fight (C). One French
authority blames Galissonière for not tacking to windward of the
enemy's van and crushing it. Another says he ordered the movement, but
that it could not be made from the damage to the rigging; but this
seems improbable, as the only injury the French squadron underwent
aloft was the loss of one topsail yard, whereas the English suffered
very badly. The true reason is probably that given and approved by one
of the French authorities on naval warfare. Galissonière considered
the support of the land attack on Mahon paramount to any destruction
of the English fleet, if he thereby exposed his own. "The French navy
has always preferred the glory of assuring or preserving a conquest to
that more brilliant perhaps, but actually less real, of taking some
ships, and therein has approached more nearly the true end that has
been proposed in war."[94] The justice of this conclusion depends upon
the view that is taken of the true end of naval war. If it is merely
to assure one or more positions ashore, the navy becomes simply a
branch of the army for a particular occasion, and subordinates its
action accordingly; but if the true end is to preponderate over the
enemy's navy and so control the sea, then the enemy's ships and fleets
are the true objects to be assailed on all occasions. A glimmer of
this view seems to have been present to Morogues when he wrote that at
sea there is no field of battle to be held, nor places to be won. If
naval warfare is a war of posts, then the action of the fleets must be
subordinate to the attack and defence of the posts; if its object is
to break up the enemy's power on the sea, cutting off his
communications with the rest of his possessions, drying up the sources
of his wealth in his commerce, and making possible a closure of his
ports, then the object of attack must be his organized military forces
afloat; in short, his navy. It is to the latter course, for whatever
reason adopted, that England owed a control of the sea that forced the
restitution of Minorca at the end of this war. It is to the former
that France owed the lack of prestige in her navy. Take this very case
of Minorca; had Galissonière been beaten, Richelieu and his fifteen
thousand troops must have been lost to France, cooped up in Minorca,
as the Spaniards, in 1718, were confined to Sicily. The French navy
therefore assured the capture of the island; but so slight was the
impression on the ministry and the public, that a French naval officer
tells us: "Incredible as it may seem, the minister of marine, after
the glorious affair off Mahon, instead of yielding to the zeal of an
enlightened patriotism and profiting by the impulse which this victory
gave to France to build up the navy, saw fit to sell the ships and
rigging which we still had in our ports. We shall soon see the
deplorable consequences of this cowardly conduct on the part of our
statesmen."[95] Neither the glory nor the victory is very apparent;
but it is quite conceivable that had the French admiral thought less
of Mahon and used the great advantage luck had given him to take, or
sink, four or five of the enemy, the French people would have
anticipated the outbreak of naval enthusiasm which appeared too late,
in 1760. During the remainder of this war the French fleets, except
in the East Indies, appear only as the pursued in a general chase.

The action imposed upon the French fleets was, however, consistent
with the general policy of the French government; and John Clerk was
probably right in saying that there is apparent in this action off
Minorca a tactics too well defined to be merely accidental,--a tactics
essentially defensive in its scope and aim.[96] In assuming the
lee-gage the French admiral not only covered Mahon, but took a good
defensive position, imposing upon his enemy the necessity of attacking
with all the consequent risks. Clerk seems to bring evidence enough to
prove that the leading French ships did, after roughly handling their
assailants, astutely withdraw (C) thus forcing the latter to attack
again with like results. The same policy was repeatedly followed
during the American war twenty years later, and with pretty uniform
success; so much so that, although formal avowal of the policy is
wanting, it may be concluded that circumspection, economy, defensive
war, remained the fixed purpose of the French authorities, based
doubtless upon the reasons given by Admiral Grivel, of that navy:--

    "If two maritime powers are at strife, the one that has the
    fewest ships must always avoid doubtful engagements; it must run
    only those risks necessary for carrying out its missions, avoid
    action by manoeuvring, or at worst, if forced to engage, assure
    itself of favorable conditions. The attitude to be taken should
    depend radically upon the power of your opponent. Let us not
    tire of repeating, according as she has to do with an inferior
    or superior power, France has before her two distinct
    strategies, radically opposite both in means and ends,--Grand
    War and Cruising War."

Such a formal utterance by an officer of rank must be received with
respect, and the more so when it expresses a consistent policy
followed by a great and warlike nation; yet it may be questioned
whether a sea power worthy of the name can thus be secured. Logically,
it follows from the position assumed, that combats between equal
forces are to be discouraged, because the loss to you is greater than
the loss to your opponent. "In fact," says Ramatuelle, upholding the
French policy, "of what consequence to the English would be the loss
of a few ships?" But the next inevitable step in the argument is that
it is better not to meet the enemy. As another Frenchman,[97]
previously quoted, says, it was considered a mishap to their ships to
fall in with a hostile force, and, if one was met, their duty was to
avoid action if possible to do so honorably. They had ulterior objects
of more importance than fighting the enemy's navy. Such a course
cannot be consistently followed for years without affecting the spirit
and tone of the officers charged with it; and it led directly to as
brave a man as ever commanded a fleet, the Comte de Grasse, failing to
crush the English under Rodney when he had the chance, in 1782. On the
9th of April of that year, being chased by the English among the
Windward Islands, it happened to him to have sixteen of their fleet
under his lee while the main body was becalmed under Dominica. Though
greatly superior to the separated ships, during the three hours that
this state of things lasted, De Grasse left them undisturbed, except
by a distant cannonade by his own van; and his action was justified by
the court which tried him, in which were many officers of high rank
and doubtless of distinction, as being "an act of prudence on the part
of the admiral, dictated to him by the ulterior projects of the
cruise." Three days later he was signally beaten by the fleet he had
failed to attack at disadvantage, and all the ulterior projects of the
cruise went down with him.

To return to Minorca; after the action of the 20th, Byng called a
council of war, which decided that nothing more could be done, and
that the English fleet should go to Gibraltar and cover that place
from an attack. At Gibraltar, Byng was relieved by Hawke and sent home
to be tried. The court-martial, while expressly clearing him of
cowardice or disaffection, found him guilty of not doing his utmost
either to defeat the French fleet or to relieve the garrison at
Mahon; and, as the article of war prescribed death with no
alternative punishment for this offence, it felt compelled to sentence
him to death. The king refused to pardon, and Byng was accordingly
shot.

The expedition against Minorca was begun while nominal peace still
lasted. On the 17th of May, three days before Byng's battle, England
declared war, and France replied on the 20th of June. On the 28th,
Port Mahon surrendered, and Minorca passed into the hands of France.

The nature of the troubles between the two nations, and the scenes
where they occurred, pointed out clearly enough the proper theatre of
the strife, and we should by rights now be at the opening of a sea
war, illustrated by great naval actions and attended with great
modifications in the colonial and foreign possessions of the two
powers. Of the two, England alone recognized the truth; France was
again turned aside from the sea by causes which will shortly be given.
Her fleets scarcely appeared; and losing the control of the sea, she
surrendered one by one her colonies and all her hopes in India. Later
in the struggle she drew in Spain as her ally, but it was only to
involve that country in her own external ruin. England, on the other
hand, defended and nourished by the sea, rode it everywhere in
triumph. Secure and prosperous at home, she supported with her money
the enemies of France. At the end of seven years the kingdom of Great
Britain had become the British Empire.

It is far from certain that France could have successfully contended
with England on the sea, without an ally. In 1756 the French navy had
sixty-three ships-of-the-line, of which forty-five were in fair
condition; but equipments and artillery were deficient. Spain had
forty-six ships-of-the-line; but from the previous and subsequent
performances of the Spanish navy, it may well be doubted if its worth
were equal to its numbers. England at this time had one hundred and
thirty ships-of-the-line; four years later she had one hundred and
twenty actually in commission. Of course when a nation allows its
inferiority, whether on land or sea, to become as great as that of
France now was, it cannot hope for success.

Nevertheless, she obtained advantages at first. The conquest of
Minorca was followed in November of the same year by the acquisition
of Corsica. The republic of Genoa surrendered to France all the
fortified harbors of the island. With Toulon, Corsica, and Port Mahon,
she now had a strong grip on the Mediterranean. In Canada, the
operations of 1756, under Montcalm, were successful despite the
inferiority of numbers. At the same time an attack by a native prince
in India took from the English Calcutta, and gave an opportunity to
the French.

Yet another incident offered a handle for French statesmanship to
strengthen her position on the ocean. The Dutch had promised France
not to renew their alliance with England, but to remain neutral.
England retaliated by declaring "all the ports of France in a state of
blockade, and all vessels bound to those ports liable to seizure as
lawful prize." Such a violation of the rights of neutrals can only be
undertaken by a nation that feels it has nothing to fear from their
rising against it. The aggressiveness, born of the sense of power,
which characterized England might have been used by France to draw
Spain and possibly other States into alliance against her.

Instead of concentrating against England, France began another
continental war, this time with a new and extraordinary alliance. The
Empress of Austria, working on the religious superstitions of the king
and upon the anger of the king's mistress, who was piqued at sarcasms
uttered against her by Frederick the Great, drew France into an
alliance with Austria against Prussia. This alliance was further
joined by Russia, Sweden and Poland. The empress urged that the two
Roman Catholic powers should unite to take Silesia away from a
Protestant king, and expressed her willingness to give to France a
part of her possessions in the Netherlands, which France had always
desired.

Frederick the Great, learning the combination against him, instead of
waiting for it to develop, put his armies in motion and invaded
Saxony, whose ruler was also King of Poland. This movement, in
October, 1756, began the Seven Years' War; which, like the War of the
Austrian Succession, but not to the same extent, drew some of the
contestants off from the original cause of difference. But while
France, having already on hand one large quarrel with her neighbor
across the Channel, was thus needlessly entering upon another
struggle, with the avowed end of building up that Austrian empire
which a wiser policy had long striven to humble, England this time saw
clearly where her true interests lay. Making the continental war
wholly subsidiary, she turned her efforts upon the sea and the
colonies; at the same time supporting Frederick both with money and
cordial sympathy in the war for the defence of his kingdom, which so
seriously diverted and divided the efforts of France. England thus had
really but one war on hand. In the same year the direction of the
struggle was taken from the hands of a weak ministry and given into
those of the bold and ardent William Pitt, who retained his office
till 1761, by which time the ends of the war had practically been
secured.

In the attack upon Canada there were two principal lines to be
chosen,--that by the way of Lake Champlain, and that by the way of the
St. Lawrence. The former was entirely inland, and as such does not
concern our subject, beyond noting that not till after the fall of
Quebec, in 1759, was it fairly opened to the English. In 1757 the
attempt against Louisburg failed; the English admiral being unwilling
to engage sixteen ships-of-the-line he found there, with the fifteen
under his own command, which were also, he said, of inferior metal.
Whether he was right in his decision or not, the indignation felt in
England clearly shows the difference of policy underlying the action
of the French and English governments. The following year an admiral
of a higher spirit, Boscawen, was sent out accompanied with twelve
thousand troops, and, it must in fairness be said, found only five
ships in the port. The troops were landed, while the fleet covered
the siege from the only molestation it could fear, and cut off from
the besieged the only line by which they could look for supplies. The
island fell in 1758, opening the way by the St. Lawrence to the heart
of Canada, and giving the English a new base both for the fleet and
army.

The next year the expedition under Wolfe was sent against Quebec. All
his operations were based upon the fleet, which not only carried his
army to the spot, but moved up and down the river as the various
feints required. The landing which led to the decisive action was made
directly from the ships. Montcalm, whose skill and determination had
blocked the attacks by way of Lake Champlain the two previous years,
had written urgently for reinforcements; but they were refused by the
minister of war, who replied that in addition to other reasons it was
too probable that the English would intercept them on the way, and
that the more France sent, the more England would be moved to send. In
a word, the possession of Canada depended upon sea power.

Montcalm, therefore, in view of the certain attack upon Quebec by the
river, was compelled to weaken his resistance on the Champlain route;
nevertheless, the English did not get farther than the foot of the
lake that year, and their operations, though creditable, had no effect
upon the result at Quebec.

In 1760, the English, holding the course of the St. Lawrence, with
Louisburg at one end and Quebec at the other, seemed firmly seated.
Nevertheless, the French governor, De Vaudreuil, still held out at
Montreal, and the colonists still hoped for help from France. The
English garrison at Quebec, though inferior in numbers to the forces
of the Canadians, was imprudent enough to leave the city and meet them
in the open field. Defeated there, and pursued by the enemy, the
latter nearly entered Quebec pell-mell with the English troops, and
trenches were opened against the city. A few days later an English
squadron came in sight, and the place was relieved. "Thus," says the
old English chronicler of the navy, "the enemy saw what it was to be
inferior at sea; for, had a French squadron got the start of the
English in sailing up the river, Quebec must have fallen." Wholly cut
off now, the little body of Frenchmen that remained in Montreal was
surrounded by three English armies, which had come, one by way of Lake
Champlain, the others from Oswego and from Quebec. The surrender of
the city on the 8th of September, 1760, put an end forever to the
French possession of Canada.

In all other quarters of the world, after the accession of Pitt to
power, the same good fortune followed the English arms, checkered only
at the first by some slight reverses. It was not so on the continent,
where the heroism and skill of Frederick the Great maintained with
difficulty his brilliant struggle against France, Austria, and Russia.
The study of the difficulties of his position, of the military and
political combinations attending it, do not belong to our subject. Sea
power does not appear directly in its effects upon the struggle, but
indirectly it was felt in two ways,--first, by the subsidies which the
abundant wealth and credit of England enabled her to give Frederick,
in whose thrifty and able hands they went far; and second, in the
embarrassment caused to France by the attacks of England upon her
colonies and her own sea-coast, in the destruction of her commerce,
and in the money--all too little, it is true, and grudgingly
given--which France was forced to bestow on her navy. Stung by the
constant lashing of the Power of the sea, France, despite the
blindness and unwillingness of the rulers, was driven to undertake
something against it. With a navy much inferior, unable to cope in all
quarters of the world, it was rightly decided to concentrate upon one
object; and the object chosen was Great Britain itself, whose shores
were to be invaded. This decision, soon apprehended by the fears of
the English nation, caused the great naval operations to centre for
some years around the coast of France and in the Channel. Before
describing them, it will be well to sum up the general plan by which
England was guided in the use of her overwhelming sea power.

Besides the operations on the North American continent already
described, this plan was fourfold:--

1. The French Atlantic ports were watched in force, especially Brest,
so as to keep the great fleets or small squadrons from getting out
without fighting.

2. Attacks were made upon the Atlantic and Channel coasts with flying
squadrons, followed at times by the descent of small bodies of troops.
These attacks, the direction of which could not be foreseen by the
enemy, were chiefly intended to compel him to keep on hand forces at
many points, and so to diminish the army acting against the King of
Prussia. While the tendency would certainly be that way, it may be
doubted whether the actual diversion in favor of Frederick was of much
consequence. No particular mention will be made of these operations,
which had but little visible effect upon the general course of the
war.

3. A fleet was kept in the Mediterranean and near Gibraltar to prevent
the French Toulon fleet from getting round to the Atlantic. It does
not appear that any attempt was seriously made to stop communications
between France and Minorca. The action of the Mediterranean fleet,
though an independent command, was subsidiary to that in the Atlantic.

4. Distant foreign expeditions were sent against the French colonies
in the West India Islands and on the coast of Africa, and a squadron
was maintained in the East Indies to secure the control of those seas,
thereby supporting the English in the Peninsula, and cutting off the
communications of the French. These operations in distant waters,
never intermitted, assumed greater activity and larger proportions
after the destruction of the French navy had relieved England from the
fear of invasion, and when the ill-advised entrance of Spain into the
war, in 1762, offered yet richer prizes to her enterprise.

The close blockade of the enemy's fleet in Brest, which was first
systematically carried out during this war, may be considered rather a
defensive than an offensive operation; for though the intention
certainly was to fight if opportunity offered, the chief object was to
neutralize an offensive weapon in the enemy's hands; the destruction
of the weapon was secondary. The truth of this remark is shown by the
outburst of fear and anger which swept over England when an
unavoidable absence of the blockading fleet in 1759 allowed the French
to escape. The effect of the blockade in this and after wars was to
keep the French in a state of constant inferiority in the practical
handling of their ships, however fair-showing their outward appearance
or equal their numerical force. The position of the port of Brest was
such that a blockaded fleet could not get out during the heavy
westerly gales that endangered the blockaders; the latter, therefore,
had the habit of running away from them to Torbay or Plymouth, sure,
with care, of getting back to their station with an east wind before a
large and ill-handled fleet could get much start of them.

In the latter part of 1758, France, depressed by the sense of failure
upon the continent, mortified and harassed by English descents upon
her coasts, which had been particularly annoying that year, and seeing
that it was not possible to carry on both the continental and sea wars
with her money resources, determined to strike directly at England.
Her commerce was annihilated while the enemy's throve. It was the
boast of London merchants that under Pitt commerce was united with and
made to flourish by war;[98] and this thriving commerce was the soul
also of the land struggle, by the money it lavished on the enemy of
France.

At this time a new and active-minded minister, Choiseul, was called
into power by Louis XV. From the beginning of 1759, preparations were
made in the ocean and Channel ports. Flat-boats to transport troops
were built at Havre, Dunkirk, Brest, and Rochefort. It was intended to
embark as many as fifty thousand men for the invasion of England,
while twelve thousand were to be directed upon Scotland. Two squadrons
were fitted out, each of respectable strength, one at Toulon, the
other at Brest. The junction of these two squadrons at Brest was the
first step in the great enterprise.

It was just here that it broke down, through the possession of
Gibraltar by the English, and their naval superiority. It seems
incredible that even the stern and confident William Pitt should, as
late as 1757, have offered to surrender to Spain the watch-tower from
which England overlooks the road between the Mediterranean and the
Atlantic, as the price of her help to recover Minorca. Happily for
England, Spain refused. In 1759, Admiral Boscawen commanded the
English Mediterranean fleet. In making an attack upon French frigates
in Toulon roads, some of his ships were so damaged that he sailed with
his whole squadron to Gibraltar to refit; taking the precaution,
however, to station lookout frigates at intervals, and to arrange
signals by guns to notify him betimes of the enemy's approach. Taking
advantage of his absence, and in obedience to orders, the French
commodore, De la Clue, left Toulon with twelve ships-of-the-line on
the 5th of August, and on the 17th found himself at the Straits of
Gibraltar, with a brisk east wind carrying him out into the Atlantic.
Everything seemed propitious, a thick haze and falling night
concealing the French ships from the land, while not preventing their
sight of each other, when an English frigate loomed up in the near
distance. As soon as she saw the fleet, knowing they must be enemies,
she hauled in for the land and began firing signal-guns. Pursuit was
useless; flight alone remained. Hoping to elude the chase he knew must
follow, the French commodore steered west-northwest for the open sea,
putting out all lights; but either from carelessness or
disaffection,--for the latter is hinted by one French naval
officer,--five out of the twelve ships headed to the northward and put
into Cadiz when on the following morning they could not see the
commodore. The latter was dismayed when at daylight he saw his forces
thus diminished. At eight o'clock some sails made their appearance,
and for a few minutes he hoped they were the missing ships. Instead
of that, they were the lookouts of Boscawen's fleet, which, numbering
fourteen ships-of-the-line, was in full pursuit. The French formed
their order on one of the close-hauled lines, and fled; but of course
their fleet-speed was less than that of the fastest English ships. The
general rule for all chases where the pursuer is decidedly superior,
namely, that order must be observed only so far as to keep the leading
ships within reasonable supporting distance of the slower ones, so
that they may not be singly overpowered before the latter can come up,
was by this time well understood in the English navy, and that is
certainly the fitting time for a _mélêe_. Boscawen acted accordingly.
The rear ship of the French, on the other hand, nobly emulated the
example of L'Étenduère when he saved his convoy. Overtaken at two
o'clock by the leading English ship, and soon after surrounded by four
others, her captain made for five hours a desperate resistance, from
which he could hope, not to save himself, but to delay the enemies
long enough for the better sailers to escape. He so far succeeded
that--thanks to the injury done by him and their better speed--they
did that day escape action at close quarters, which could only have
ended in their capture. When he hauled down his flag, his three
topmasts were gone, the mizzen-mast fell immediately after, and the
hull was so full of water that the ship was with difficulty kept
afloat. M. de Sabran--his name is worthy to be remembered--had
received eleven wounds in this gallant resistance, by which he
illustrated so signally the duty and service of a rearguard in
retarding pursuit. That night two of the French ships hauled off to
the westward, and so escaped. The other four continued their flight as
before; but the next morning the commodore, despairing of escape,
headed for the Portuguese coast, and ran them all ashore between Lagos
and Cape St. Vincent. The English admiral followed and attacked them,
taking two and burning the others, without regard to the neutrality of
Portugal. For this insult no amend was made beyond a formal apology;
Portugal was too dependent upon England to be seriously considered.
Pitt, writing to the English minister to Portugal about the affair,
told him that while soothing the susceptibilities of the Portuguese
government he must not allow it to suppose that either the ships would
be given up or the distinguished admiral censured.[99]

The destruction or dispersal of the Toulon fleet stopped the invasion
of England, though the five ships that got into Cadiz remained a
matter of anxiety to Sir Edward Hawke, who cruised before Brest.
Choiseul, balked of his main object, still clung to the invasion of
Scotland. The French fleet at Brest, under Marshal de Conflans, a sea
officer despite his title, numbered twenty sail-of-the-line, besides
frigates. The troops to be embarked are variously stated at fifteen to
twenty thousand. The original purpose was to escort the transports
with only five ships-of-the-line, besides smaller vessels. Conflans
insisted that the whole fleet ought to go. The minister of the navy
thought that the admiral was not a sufficiently skilful tactician to
be able to check the advance of an enemy, and so insure the safe
arrival of the convoy at its destination near the Clyde without
risking a decisive encounter. Believing therefore that there would be
a general action, he considered that it would be better to fight it
before the troops sailed; for if disastrous, the convoy would not be
sacrificed, and if decisively victorious, the road would then be
clear. The transports were assembled, not at Brest, but in the ports
to the southward as far as the mouth of the Loire. The French fleet
therefore put to sea with the expectation and purpose of fighting the
enemy; but it is not easy to reconcile its subsequent course with that
purpose, nor with the elaborate fighting instructions[100] issued by
the admiral before sailing.

About the 5th or 6th of November there came on a tremendous westerly
gale. After buffeting it for three days, Hawke bore up and ran into
Torbay, where he waited for the wind to shift, keeping his fleet in
readiness to sail at once. The same gale, while keeping back the
French already in Brest, gave the chance to a small squadron under M.
Bompart, which was expected from the West Indies, to slip in during
Hawke's absence. Conflans made his preparations with activity,
distributed Bompart's crews among his own ships, which were not very
well manned, and got to sea with an easterly wind on the 14th. He
stood at once to the southward, flattering himself that he had escaped
Hawke. The latter, however, had sailed from Torbay on the 12th; and
though again driven back, sailed a second time on the 14th, the same
day that Conflans left Brest. He soon readied his station, learned
that the enemy had been seen to the southward steering east, and
easily concluding that they were bound to Quiberon Bay, shaped his own
course for the same place under a press of sail. At eleven P.M. of the
19th the French admiral estimated his position to be seventy miles
southwest by west from Belle Isle;[101] and the wind springing up
fresh from the westward, he stood for it under short sail, the wind
continuing to increase and hauling to west-northwest. At daybreak
several ships were seen ahead, which proved to be the English squadron
of Commodore Duff, blockading Quiberon. The signal was made to chase;
and the English, taking flight, separated into two divisions,--one
going off before the wind, the other hauling up to the southward. The
greater part of the French fleet continued its course after the former
division, that is, toward the coast; but one ship hauled up for the
second. Immediately after, the rear French ships made signal of sails
to windward, which were also visible from aloft on board the
flag-ship. It must have been about the same moment that the lookout
frigate in advance of the English fleet informed her admiral of sails
to leeward. Hawke's diligence had brought him up with Conflans, who,
in his official reports, says he had considered it impossible that the
enemy could have in that neighborhood forces superior or even equal to
his own. Conflans now ordered his rear division to haul its wind in
support of the ship chasing to the southward and eastward. In a few
moments more it was discovered that the fleet to windward numbered
twenty-three ships-of-the-line to the French twenty-one, and among
them some three-deckers. Conflans then called in the chasing ships and
got ready for action. It remained to settle his course under
circumstances which he had not foreseen. It was now blowing hard from
the west-northwest, with every appearance of heavy weather, the fleet
not far from a lee shore, with an enemy considerably superior in
numbers; for besides Hawke's twenty-three of the line, Duff had four
fifty-gun ships. Conflans therefore determined to run for it and lead
his squadron into Quiberon Bay, trusting and believing that Hawke
would not dare to follow, under the conditions of the weather, into a
bay which French authorities describe as containing banks and shoals,
and lined with reefs which the navigator rarely sees without fright
and never passes without emotion. It was in the midst of these ghastly
dangers that forty-four large ships were about to engage pell-mell;
for the space was too contracted for fleet manoeuvres. Conflans
flattered himself that he would get in first and be able to haul up
close under the western shore of the bay, forcing the enemy, if he
followed, to take position between him and the beach, six miles to
leeward. None of his expectations were fulfilled. In the retreat he
took the head of his fleet; a step not unjustifiable, since only by
leading in person could he have shown just what he wanted to do, but
unfortunate for his reputation with the public, as it placed the
admiral foremost in the flight. Hawke was not in the least, nor for
one moment, deterred by the dangers before him, whose full extent he,
as a skilful seaman, entirely realized; but his was a calm and
steadfast as well as a gallant temper, that weighed risks justly,
neither dissembling nor exaggerating. He has not left us his
reasoning, but he doubtless felt that the French, leading, would serve
partially as pilots, and must take the ground before him; he believed
the temper and experience of his officers, tried by the severe school
of the blockade, to be superior to those of the French; and he knew
that both the government and the country demanded that the enemy's
fleet should not reach another friendly port in safety. On the very
day that he was thus following the French, amid dangers and under
conditions that have made this one of the most dramatic of sea fights,
he was being burnt in effigy in England for allowing them to escape.
As Conflans, leading his fleet, was rounding the Cardinals,--as the
southernmost rocks at the entrance of Quiberon Bay are called,--the
leading English ships brought the French rear to action. It was
another case of a general chase ending in a _mêlée_, but under
conditions of exceptional interest and grandeur from the surrounding
circumstances of the gale of wind, the heavy sea, the lee shore, the
headlong speed, shortened canvas, and the great number of ships
engaged. One French seventy-four, closely pressed and outnumbered,
ventured to open her lower-deck ports; the sea sweeping in carried her
down with all on board but twenty men. Another was sunk by the fire of
Hawke's flag-ship. Two others, one of which carried a commodore's
pennant, struck their colors. The remainder were dispersed. Seven fled
to the northward and eastward, and anchored off the mouth of the
little river Vilaine, into which they succeeded in entering at the top
of high water in two tides,--a feat never before performed. Seven
others took refuge to the southward and eastward in Rochefort. One,
after being very badly injured, ran ashore and was lost near the mouth
of the Loire. The flag-ship bearing the same name as that of Tourville
burned at La Hougue, the "Royal Sun," anchored at nightfall off
Croisic, a little to the northward of the Loire, where she rode in
safety during the night. The next morning the admiral found himself
alone, and, somewhat precipitately it would seem, ran the ship ashore
to keep her out of English hands. This step has been blamed by the
French, but needlessly, as Hawke would never have let her get away.
The great French fleet was annihilated; for the fourteen ships not
taken or destroyed were divided into two parts, and those in the
Vilaine only succeeded in escaping, two at a time, between fifteen
months and two years later. The English lost two ships which ran upon
a shoal (a), and were hopelessly wrecked; their losses in action were
slight. At nightfall Hawke anchored his fleet and prizes in the
position shown in the plate (b).

   [Illustration: Pl. VIII.]

All possibility of an invasion of England passed away with the
destruction of the Brest fleet. The battle of November 20, 1759, was
the Trafalgar of this war; and though a blockade was maintained over
the fractions that were laid up in the Vilaine and at Rochefort, the
English fleets were now free to act against the colonies of France,
and later of Spain, on a grander scale than ever before. The same year
that saw this great sea fight and the fall of Quebec witnessed also
the capture of Guadeloupe in the West Indies, of Goree on the west
coast of Africa, and the abandonment of the East Indian seas by the
French flag after three indecisive actions between their commodore,
D'Aché, and Admiral Pocock,--an abandonment which necessarily led to
the fall of the French power in India, never again to rise. In this
year also the King of Spain died, and his brother succeeded, under the
title of Charles III. This Charles had been King of Naples at the time
when an English commodore had allowed one hour for the court to
determine to withdraw the Neapolitan troops from the Spanish army. He
had never forgotten this humiliation, and brought to his new throne a
heart unfriendly to England. With such feelings on his part, France
and Spain drew more readily together. Charles's first step was to
propose mediation, but Pitt was averse to it. Looking upon France as
the chief enemy of England, and upon the sea and the colonies as the
chief source of power and wealth, he wished, now that he had her down,
to weaken her thoroughly for the future as well as the present, and to
establish England's greatness more firmly upon the wreck. Later on he
offered certain conditions; but the influence of Louis's mistress,
attached to the Empress of Austria, prevailed to except Prussia from
the negotiations, and England would not allow the exception. Pitt,
indeed, was not yet ready for peace. A year later, October 25, 1760,
George II. died, and Pitt's influence then began to wane, the new
king being less bent on war. During these years, 1759 and 1760,
Frederick the Great still continued the deadly and exhausting strife
of his small kingdom against the great States joined against him. At
one moment his case seemed so hopeless that he got ready to kill
himself; but the continuance of the war diverted the efforts of France
from England and the sea.

The hour was fast approaching for the great colonial expeditions,
which made the last year of the war illustrious by the triumph of the
sea power of England over France and Spain united. It is first
necessary to tell the entirely kindred story of the effect of that sea
power in the East Indian peninsula.

The recall of Dupleix and the entire abandonment of his policy, which
resulted in placing the two East India companies on equal terms, have
already been told. The treaty stipulations of 1754 had not, however,
been fully carried out. The Marquis de Bussy, a brave and capable
soldier who had been a second to Dupleix, and was wholly in accord
with his policy and ambitions, remained in the Deccan,--a large region
in the southern central part of the peninsula, over which Dupleix had
once ruled. In 1756, troubles arose between the English and the native
prince in Bengal. The nabob of that province had died, and his
successor, a young man of nineteen, attacked Calcutta. The place fell,
after a weak resistance, in June, and the surrender was followed by
the famous tragedy known as that of the Black Hole of Calcutta. The
news reached Madras in August, and Clive, whose name has already been
mentioned, sailed with the fleet of Admiral Watson, after a long and
vexatious delay. The fleet entered the river in December and appeared
before Calcutta in January, when the place fell into English hands
again as easily as it had been lost.

The nabob was very angry, and marched against the English; sending
meanwhile an invitation to the French at Chandernagore to join him.
Although it was now known that England and France were at war, the
French company, despite the experience of 1744, weakly hoped that
peace might be kept between it and the English. The native invitation
was therefore refused, and offers of neutrality made to the other
company. Clive marched out, met the Indian forces and defeated them,
and the nabob at once asked for peace, and sought the English
alliance, yielding all the claims on the strength of which he had
first attacked Calcutta. After some demur his offers were accepted.
Clive and Watson then turned upon Chandernagore and compelled the
surrender of the French settlement.

The nabob, who had not meant to allow this, took umbrage, and entered
into correspondence with Bussy in the Deccan. Clive had full knowledge
of his various intrigues, which were carried on with the vacillation
of a character as weak as it was treacherous; and seeing no hope of
settled peace or trade under the rule of this man, entered into an
extensive conspiracy for his dethronement, the details of which need
not be given. The result was that war broke out again, and that Clive
with three thousand men, one third of whom were English, met the nabob
at the head of fifteen thousand horse and thirty-five thousand foot.
The disproportion in artillery was nearly as great. Against these odds
was fought and won the battle of Plassey, on the 23d of June,
1757,--the date from which, by common consent, the British empire in
India is said to begin. The overthrow of the nabob was followed by
placing in power one of the conspirators against him, a creature of
the English, and dependent upon them for support. Bengal thus passed
under their control, the first-fruits of India. "Clive," says a French
historian, "had understood and applied the system of Dupleix."

This was true; yet even so it may be said that the foundation thus
laid could never have been kept nor built upon, had the English nation
not controlled the sea. The conditions of India were such that a few
Europeans, headed by men of nerve and shrewdness, dividing that they
might conquer, and advancing their fortunes by judicious alliances,
were able to hold their own, and more too, amidst overwhelming
numerical odds; but it was necessary that they should not be opposed
by men of their own kind, a few of whom could turn the wavering
balance the other way. At the very time that Clive was acting in
Bengal, Bussy invaded Orissa, seized the English factories, and made
himself master of much of the coast regions between Madras and
Calcutta; while a French squadron of nine ships, most of which,
however, belonged to the East India Company and were not first-rate
men-of-war, was on its way to Pondicherry with twelve hundred regular
troops,--an enormous European army for Indian operations of that day.
The English naval force on the coast, though fewer in numbers, may be
considered about equal to the approaching French squadron. It is
scarcely too much to say that the future of India was still uncertain,
and the first operations showed it.

The French division appeared off the Coromandel coast to the southward
of Pondicherry on the 26th of April, 1758, and anchored on the 28th
before the English station called Fort St. David. Two ships kept on to
Pondicherry, having on board the new governor, Comte de Lally, who
wished to go at once to his seat of government. Meanwhile, the English
admiral, Pocock, having news of the enemy's coming, and fearing
specially for this post, was on his way to it, and appeared on the
29th of April, before the two ships with the governor were out of
sight. The French at once got under way and stood out to sea on the
starboard tack (Plate Va.), heading to the northward and eastward, the
wind being southeast, and signals were made to recall the ship and
frigate (a) escorting Lally; but they were disregarded by the latter's
order, an act which must have increased, if it did not originate, the
ill-will between him and Commodore d'Aché, through which the French
campaign in India miscarried. The English, having formed to windward
on the same tack as the French, made their attack in the then usual
way, and with the usual results. The seven English ships were ordered
to keep away together for the French eight, and the four leading
ships, including the admiral's, came into action handsomely; the last
three, whether by their own fault or not, were late in doing so, but
it will be remembered that this was almost always the case in such
attacks. The French commodore, seeing this interval between the van
and the rear, formed the plan of separating them, and made signal to
wear together, but in his impatience did not wait for an answer.
Putting his own helm up, he wore round, and was followed in succession
by the rear ships, while the van stood on. The English admiral, who
had good reason to know, gives D'Aché more credit than the French
writers, for he describes this movement thus:--

    "At half-past four P.M. the rear of the French line had drawn
    pretty close up to their flag-ship. Our three rear ships were
    signalled to engage closer. Soon after, M. d'Aché broke the
    line, and put before the wind; his second astern, who had kept
    on the 'Yarmouth's' [English flag-ship] quarter most part of the
    action, then came up alongside, gave his fire, and then bore
    away; and a few minutes after, the enemy's van bore away also."

By this account, which is by no means irreconcilable with the French,
the latter effected upon the principal English ship a movement of
concentration by defiling past her. The French now stood down to their
two separated ships, while the English vessels that had been engaged
were too much crippled to follow. This battle prevented the English
fleet from relieving Fort St. David, which surrendered on the 2d of
June.

After the fall of this place, the two opposing squadrons having
refitted at their respective ports and resumed their station, a second
action was fought in August, under nearly the same conditions and in
much the same fashion. The French flag-ship met with a series of
untoward accidents, which determined the commodore to withdraw from
action; but the statement of his further reasons is most suggestive of
the necessary final overthrow of the French cause. "Prudence," a
writer of his own country says, "commanded him not to prolong a
contest from which his ships could not but come out with injuries very
difficult to repair in a region where it was impossible to supply the
almost entire lack of spare stores." This want of so absolute a
requisite for naval efficiency shows in a strong light the fatal
tendency of that economy which always characterized French operations
at sea, and was at once significant and ominous.

Returning to Pondicherry, D'Aché found that, though the injuries to
the masts and rigging could for this time be repaired, there was lack
of provisions, and that the ships needed calking. Although his orders
were to remain on the coast until October 15, he backed himself with
the opinion of a council of war which decided that the ships could not
remain there longer, because, in case of a third battle, there was
neither rigging nor supplies remaining in Pondicherry; and
disregarding the protests of the governor, Lally, he sailed on the 2d
of September for the Isle of France. The underlying motive of D'Aché,
it is known, was hostility to the governor, with whom he quarrelled
continually. Lally, deprived of the help of the squadron, turned his
arms inland instead of against Madras.

Upon arriving at the islands, D'Aché found a state of things which
again singularly illustrates the impotence and short-sightedness
characteristic of the general naval policy of the French at this time.
His arrival there was as unwelcome as his departure from India had
been to Lally. The islands were then in a state of the most complete
destitution. The naval division, increased by the arrival of three
ships-of-the-line from home, so exhausted them that its immediate
departure was requested of the commodore. Repairs were pushed ahead
rapidly, and in November several of the ships sailed to the Cape of
Good Hope, then a Dutch colony, to seek provisions; but these were
consumed soon after being received, and the pressure for the departure
of the squadron was renewed. The situation of the ships was no less
precarious than that of the colony; and accordingly the commodore
replied by urging his entire lack of food and supplies. The condition
was such that, a little later, it was necessary to make running
rigging out of the cables, and to put some of the ships on the bottom,
so as to give their materials to others. Before returning to India,
D'Aché wrote to the minister of the navy that he "was about to leave,
only to save the crews from dying of hunger, and that nothing need be
expected from the squadron if supplies were not sent, for both men and
things were in a deplorable state."

Under these circumstances D'Aché sailed from the islands in July,
1759, and arrived off the Coromandel coast in September. During his
year of absence Lally had besieged Madras for two months, during the
northeast monsoon. Both squadrons were absent, that season being unfit
for naval operations on this coast; but the English returned first,
and are said by the French to have caused, by the English to have
hastened, the raising of the siege. D'Aché, upon his return, was much
superior in both number and size of ships; but when the fleets met,
Pocock did not hesitate to attack with nine against eleven. This
action, fought September 10, 1759, was as indecisive as the two
former; but D'Aché retreated, after a very bloody contest. Upon it
Campbell, in his "Lives of the Admirals," makes a droll, but seemingly
serious, comment: "Pocock had reduced the French ships to a very
shattered condition, and killed a great many of their men; but what
shows the singular talents of both admirals, they had fought three
pitched battles in eighteen months without the loss of a ship on
either side." The fruits of victory, however, were with the weaker
fleet; for D'Aché returned to Pondicherry and thence sailed on the 1st
of the next month for the islands, leaving India to its fate. From
that time the result was certain. The English continued to receive
reinforcements from home, while the French did not; the men opposed to
Lally were superior in ability; place after place fell, and in
January, 1761, Pondicherry itself surrendered, surrounded by land and
cut off from the sea. This was the end of the French power in India;
for though Pondicherry and other possessions were restored at the
peace, the English tenure there was never again shaken, even under the
attacks of the skilful and bold Suffren, who twenty years later met
difficulties as great as D'Aché's with a vigor and conduct which the
latter at a more hopeful moment failed to show.

France having thus lost both Canada and India by the evident failure
of her power to act at a distance by sea, it would seem scarcely
possible that Spain, with her own weak navy and widely scattered
possessions, would choose this moment for entering the war. Yet so it
was. The maritime exhaustion of France was plain to all, and is
abundantly testified to by her naval historians. "The resources of
France were exhausted," says one; "the year 1761 saw only a few single
ships leave her ports, and all of them were captured. The alliance
with Spain came too late. The occasional ships that went to sea in
1762 were taken, and the colonies still remaining to France could not
be saved."[102] Even as early as 1758, another Frenchman writes, "want
of money, the depression of commerce given over to English cruisers,
the lack of good ships, the lack of supplies, etc., compelled the
French ministry, unable to raise large forces, to resort to
stratagems, to replace the only rational system of war, Grand War, by
the smallest of petty wars,--by a sort of game in which the great aim
is not to be caught. Even then, the arrival of four ships-of-the-line
at Louisburg, by avoiding the enemy, was looked on as a very fortunate
event.... In 1759 the lucky arrival of the West India convoy caused as
much surprise as joy to the merchants. We see how rare had become such
a chance in seas ploughed by the squadrons of England."[103] This was
before the disasters of La Clue and Conflans. The destruction of
French commerce, beginning by the capture of its merchant-ships, was
consummated by the reduction of the colonies. It can hardly,
therefore, be conceded that the Family Compact now made between the
two courts, containing, as it did, not only an agreement to support
each other in any future war, but also a secret clause binding Spain
to declare war against England within a year, if peace were not made,
"was honorable to the wisdom of the two governments." It is hard to
pardon, not only the Spanish government, but even France for alluring
a kindred people into such a bad bargain. It was hoped, however, to
revive the French navy and to promote an alliance of neutral powers;
many of which, besides Spain, had causes of complaint against England.
"During the war with France," confesses an English historian, "the
Spanish flag had not always been respected by British cruisers."[104]
"During 1758," says another, "not less than one hundred and
seventy-six neutral vessels, laden with the rich produce of the French
colonies or with military or naval stores, fell into the hands of the
English."[105] The causes were already at work which twenty years
later gave rise to the "armed neutrality" of the Baltic powers,
directed against the claims of England on the sea. The possession of
unlimited power, as the sea power of England then really was, is
seldom accompanied by a profound respect for the rights of others.
Without a rival upon the ocean, it suited England to maintain that
enemy's property was liable to capture on board neutral ships, thus
subjecting these nations not only to vexatious detentions, but to loss
of valuable trade; just as it had suited her earlier in the war to
establish a paper blockade of French ports. Neutrals of course chafed
under these exactions; but the year 1761 was ill-chosen for an armed
protest, and of all powers Spain risked most by a war. England had
then one hundred and twenty ships-of-the-line in commission, besides
those in reserve, manned by seventy thousand seamen trained and
hardened by five years of constant warfare afloat, and flushed with
victory. The navy of France, which numbered seventy-seven
ships-of-the-line in 1758, lost as prizes to the English in 1759
twenty-seven, besides eight destroyed and many frigates lost; indeed,
as has been seen, their own writers confess that the navy was ruined,
root and branch. The Spanish navy contained about fifty ships; but the
personnel, unless very different from the days before and after, must
have been very inferior. The weakness of her empire, in the absence of
an efficient navy, has before been pointed out. Neutrality, too,
though at times outraged, had been of great advantage to her,
permitting her to restore her finances and trade and to re-establish
her internal resources; but she needed a still longer period of it.
Nevertheless, the king, influenced by family feeling and resentment
against England, allowed himself to be drawn on by the astute
Choiseul, and the Family Compact between the two crowns was signed on
the 15th of August, 1761. This compact, into which the King of Naples
was also to enter, guaranteed their mutual possessions by the whole
power of both kingdoms. This in itself was a weighty undertaking; but
the secret clause further stipulated that Spain should declare war
against England on the 1st of May, 1762, if peace with France had not
then been made. Negotiations of this character could not be kept
wholly secret, and Pitt learned enough to convince him that Spain was
becoming hostile in intention. With his usual haughty resolve, he
determined to forestall her by declaring war; but the influence
against him in the councils of the new king was too strong. Failing to
carry the ministry with him, he resigned on the 5th of October, 1761.
His prevision was quickly justified; Spain had been eager in
professing good-will until the treasure-ships from America should
arrive laden with the specie so needed for carrying on war. On the
21st of September the Flota of galleons anchored safely in Cadiz; and
on the 2d of November the British ambassador announced to his
government that "two ships had safely arrived with very extraordinary
rich cargoes from the West Indies, so that all the wealth that was
expected from Spanish America is now safe in old Spain," and in the
same despatch reports a surprising change in the words of the Spanish
minister, and the haughty language now used.[106] The grievences and
claims of Spain were urged peremptorily, and the quarrel grew so fast
that even the new English ministry, though ardently desiring peace,
recalled their ambassador before the end of the year, and declared war
on the 4th of January, 1762; thus adopting Pitt's policy, but too late
to reap the advantages at which he had aimed.

However, no such delay on the part of England could alter the
essential inequality, in strength and preparation, between the two
nations. The plans formed by Pitt were in the main adopted by his
successor, and carried out with a speed which the readiness of the
English navy permitted. On the 5th of March, Pocock, who had returned
from the East Indies, sailed from Portsmouth, convoying a fleet of
transports to act against Havana; in the West Indies he was reinforced
from the forces in that quarter, so that his command contained
nineteen ships-of-the-line besides smaller vessels, and ten thousand
soldiers.

In the previous January, the West India fleet, under the well-known
Rodney, had acted with the land forces in the reduction of Martinique,
the gem and tower of the French islands and the harbor of an extensive
privateering system. It is said that fourteen hundred English
merchantmen were taken during this war in the West Indian seas by
cruisers whose principal port was Fort Royal in Martinique. With this
necessary base fell also the privateering system resting upon it.
Martinique was surrendered February 12, and the loss of this chief
commercial and military centre was immediately followed by that of the
smaller islands, Grenada, Sta. Lucia, St. Vincent. By these
acquisitions the English colonies at Antigua, St. Kitts, and Nevis, as
well as the ships trading to those islands, were secured against the
enemy, the commerce of England received large additions, and all the
Lesser Antilles, or Windward Islands, became British possessions.

Admiral Pocock was joined off Cape St. Nicholas by the West Indian
reinforcement on the 27th of May, and as the season was so far
advanced, he took his great fleet through the old Bahama channel
instead of the usual route around the south side of Cuba. This was
justly considered a great feat in those days of poor surveys, and was
accomplished without an accident. Lookout and sounding vessels went
first, frigates followed, and boats or sloops were anchored on shoals
with carefully arranged signals for day or night. Having good weather,
the fleet got through in a week and appeared before Havana. The
operations will not be given in detail. After a forty days' siege the
Moro Castle was taken on the 30th of July, and the city surrendered on
the 10th of August. The Spaniards lost not only the city and port, but
twelve ships-of-the-line, besides £3,000,000 in money and merchandise
belonging to the Spanish king. The importance of Havana was not to be
measured only by its own size, or its position as centre of a large
and richly cultivated district; it was also the port commanding the
only passage by which the treasure and other ships could sail from the
Gulf of Mexico to Europe in those days. With Havana in an enemy's
hands it would be necessary to assemble them at Cartagena and from
there beat up against the trade-winds,--an operation always difficult,
and which would keep ships long in waters where they were exposed to
capture by English cruisers. Not even an attack upon the isthmus would
have been so serious a blow to Spain. This important result could only
be achieved by a nation confident of controlling the communications by
its sea power, to which the happy issue must wholly be ascribed, and
which had another signal illustration in the timely conveying of four
thousand American troops to reinforce the English ranks, terribly
wasted by battle and fever. It is said that only twenty-five hundred
serviceable fighting men remained on foot when the city fell.

While the long reach and vigor of England's sea power was thus felt in
the West Indies, it was receiving further illustration in Portugal and
in the far East. The allied crowns in the beginning had invited
Portugal to join their alliance against those whom they had taken to
calling the "tyrants of the seas," reminding her how the English
monopoly of her trade was draining the country of gold, and recalling
the deliberate violation of her neutrality by the fleet under
Boscawen. The Portuguese minister of the day well knew all this, and
keenly felt it; but though the invitation was accompanied by the plain
statement that Portugal would not be allowed to continue a neutrality
she could not enforce, he judged rightly that the country had more to
fear from England and her fleet than from the Spanish army. The allies
declared war and invaded Portugal. They were for a time successful;
but the "tyrants of the seas" answered Portugal's call, sent a fleet
and landed at Lisbon eight thousand soldiers, who drove the Spaniards
over the frontiers, and even carried the war into Spain itself.

Simultaneous with these significant events, Manila was attacked. With
so much already on hand, it was found impossible to spare troops or
ships from England. The successes in India and the absolute security
of the establishments there, with the control of the sea, allowed the
Indian officials themselves to undertake this colonial expedition. It
sailed in August, 1762, and reaching Malacca on the 19th, was supplied
at that neutral port with all that was needed for the siege about to
be undertaken; the Dutch, though jealous of the English advance, not
venturing to refuse their demands. The expedition, which depended
entirely upon the fleet, resulted in the whole group of Philippine
Islands surrendering in October and paying a ransom of four million
dollars. At about the same time the fleet captured the Acapulco
galleon having three million dollars on board, and an English squadron
in the Atlantic took a treasure-ship from Lima with four million
dollars in silver for the Spanish government.

    "Never had the colonial empire of Spain received such blows.
    Spain, whose opportune intervention might have modified the fate
    of the war, entered it too late to help France, but in time to
    share her misfortunes. There was reason to fear yet more. Panama
    and San Domingo were threatened, and the Anglo-Americans were
    preparing for the invasion of Florida and Louisiana.... The
    conquest of Havana had in great measure interrupted the
    communications between the wealthy American colonies of Spain
    and Europe. The reduction of the Philippine Islands now excluded
    her from Asia. The two together severed all the avenues of
    Spanish trade and cut off all intercourse between the parts of
    their vast but disconnected empire."[107]

The selection of the points of attack, due to the ministry of Pitt,
was strategically good, cutting effectually the sinews of the enemy's
strength; and if his plans had been fully carried out and Panama also
seized, the success would have been yet more decisive. England had
lost also the advantage of the surprise he would have effected by
anticipating Spain's declaration of war; but her arms were triumphant
during this short contest, through the rapidity with which her
projects were carried into execution, due to the state of efficiency
to which her naval forces and administration had been brought.

With the conquest of Manila ended the military operations of the war.
Nine months, counting from the formal declaration by England in
January, had been sufficient to shatter the last hope of France, and
to bring Spain to a peace in which was conceded every point on which
she had based her hostile attitude and demands. It seems scarcely
necessary, after even the brief summary of events that has been given,
to point out that the speed and thoroughness with which England's work
was done was due wholly to her sea power, which allowed her forces to
act on distant points, widely apart as Cuba, Portugal, India, and the
Philippines, without a fear of serious break in their communications.

Before giving the terms of peace which ought to summarize the results
of the war, but do so imperfectly, owing to the weak eagerness of the
English ministry to conclude it, it is necessary to trace in outline
the effect of the war upon commerce, upon the foundations of sea power
and national prosperity.

One prominent feature of this war may be more strongly impressed upon
the mind by a startling, because paradoxical, statement that the
prosperity of the English is shown by the magnitude of their losses.

    "From 1756 to 1760," states a French historian, "French
    privateers captured from the English more than twenty-five
    hundred merchantmen. In 1761, though France had not, so to
    speak, a single ship-of-the-line at sea, and though the English
    had taken two hundred and forty of our privateers, their
    comrades still took eight hundred and twelve English vessels.
    The explanation of the number of these prizes lies in the
    prodigious growth of the English shipping. In 1760 it is claimed
    that the English had at sea eight thousand sail; of these the
    French captured nearly one tenth, despite escorts and cruisers.
    In the four years from 1756 to 1760 the French lost only nine
    hundred and fifty vessels."[108]

But this discrepancy is justly attributed by an English writer "to the
diminution of the French commerce and the dread of falling into the
hands of the English, which kept many of their trading-vessels from
going to sea;" and he goes on to point out that the capture of vessels
was not the principal benefit resulting from the efficiency of
England's fleets. "Captures like Duquesne, Louisburg, Prince Edward's
Island, the reduction of Senegal, and later on of Guadeloupe and
Martinique, were events no less destructive to French commerce and
colonies than advantageous to those of England."[109] The
multiplication of French privateers was indeed a sad token to an
instructed eye, showing behind them merchant shipping in enforced
idleness, whose crews and whose owners were driven to speculative
pillage in order to live. Nor was this risk wholly in vain. The same
Englishman confesses that in 1759 the losses of merchantmen showed a
worse balance than the ships-of-war. While the French were striving in
vain to regain equality upon the sea and repair their losses, but to
no purpose, for "in building and arming vessels they labored only for
the English fleet," yet, "notwithstanding the courage and vigilance of
English cruisers, French privateers so swarmed that in this year they
took two hundred and forty British vessels, chiefly coasters and small
craft." In 1760 the same authority gives the British loss in
trading-vessels at over three hundred, and in 1761 at over eight
hundred, three times that of the French; but he adds: "It would not
have been wonderful had they taken more and richer ships. While their
commerce was nearly destroyed, and they had few merchant-ships at
sea, the trading-fleets of England covered the seas. Every year her
commerce was increasing; the money which the war carried out was
returned by the produce of her industry. Eight thousand vessels were
employed by the traders of Great Britain." The extent of her losses is
attributed to three causes, of which the first only was preventable:
(1) The inattention of merchant-ships to the orders of the convoying
vessels; (2) The immense number of English ships in all seas; (3) The
enemy's venturing the whole remains of his strength in privateering.
During the same year, 1761, the navy lost one ship-of-the-line, which
was retaken, and one cutter. At the same time, notwithstanding the
various exchanges, the English still held twenty-five thousand French
prisoners, while the English prisoners in France were but twelve
hundred. These were the results of the sea war.

Finally, in summing up the commercial condition of the kingdom at the
end of the war, after mentioning the enormous sums of specie taken
from Spain, the writer says:--

    "These strengthened trade and fostered industry. The remittances
    for foreign subsidies were in great part paid by bills on
    merchants settled abroad, who had the value of the drafts in
    British manufactures. The trade of England increased gradually
    every year, and such a scene of national prosperity while waging
    a long, costly, and bloody war, was never before shown by any
    people in the world."

No wonder, with such results to her commerce and such unvarying
success attending her arms, and seeing the practical annihilation of
the French navy, that the union of France and Spain, which was then
lowering on her future and had once excited the fears of all Europe,
was now beheld by Great Britain alone without the smallest fear or
despondency. Spain was by her constitution and the distribution of her
empire peculiarly open to the attack of a great sea people; and
whatever the views of the government of the day, Pitt and the nation
saw that the hour had come, which had been hoped for in vain in 1739,
because then years of peace and the obstinate bias of a great
minister had relaxed the muscles of her fleet. Now she but reached
forth her hand and seized what she wished; nor could there have been
any limit to her prey, had not the ministry again been untrue to the
interests of the country.

The position of Portugal with reference to Great Britain has been
alluded to, but merits some special attention as instancing an element
of sea power obtained not by colonies, but by alliance, whether
necessary or prudential. The commercial connection before spoken of
"was strengthened by the strongest political ties. The two kingdoms
were so situated as to have little to fear from each other, while they
might impart many mutual advantages. The harbors of Portugal gave
shelter as well as supplies to the English fleet, while the latter
defended the rich trade of Portugal with Brazil. The antipathy between
Portugal and Spain made it necessary for the former to have an ally,
strong yet distant. None is so advantageous in that way as England,
which in her turn might, and always has, derived great advantages from
Portugal in a war with any of the southern powers of Europe."

This is an English view of a matter which to others looks somewhat
like an alliance between a lion and a lamb. To call a country with a
fleet like England's "distant" from a small maritime nation like
Portugal is an absurdity. England is, and yet more in those days was,
wherever her fleet could go. The opposite view of the matter, showing
equally the value of the alliance, was well set forth in the memorial
by which, under the civil name of an invitation, the crowns of France
and Spain ordered Portugal to declare against England.

The grounds of that memorial--namely, the unequal benefit to Portugal
from the connection and the disregard of Portuguese neutrality--have
already been given. The King of Portugal refused to abandon the
alliance, for the professed reason that it was ancient and wholly
defensive. To this the two crowns replied:--

    "The defensive alliance is actually an offensive one by the
    situation of the Portuguese dominions and the nature of the
    English power. The English squadrons cannot in all seasons keep
    the sea, nor cruise on the principal coasts of France and Spain
    for cutting off the navigation of the two countries, without the
    ports and assistance of Portugal; and these islanders could not
    insult all maritime Europe, if the whole riches of Portugal did
    not pass through their hands, which furnishes them with the
    means to make war and renders the alliance truly and properly
    offensive."

Between the two arguments the logic of situation and power prevailed.
Portugal found England nearer and more dangerous than Spain, and
remained for generations of trial true to the alliance. This
relationship was as useful to England as any of her colonial
possessions, depending of course upon the scene of the principal
operations at any particular time.

The preliminaries of peace were signed at Fontainebleau, November 3,
1762; the definitive treaty on the 10th of the following February, at
Paris, whence the peace takes its name.

By its terms France renounced all claims to Canada, Nova Scotia, and
all the islands of the St. Lawrence; along with Canada she ceded the
valley of the Ohio and all her territory on the east side of the
Mississippi, except the city of New Orleans. At the same time Spain,
as an equivalent for Havana, which England restored, yielded Florida,
under which name were comprised all her continental possessions east
of the Mississippi. Thus England obtained a colonial empire embracing
Canada, from Hudson's Bay, and all of the present United States east
of the Mississippi. The possibilities of this vast region were then
only partially foreseen, and as yet there was no foreshadowing of the
revolt of the thirteen colonies.

In the West Indies, England gave back to France the important islands
of Guadeloupe and Martinique. The four so-called neutral islands of
the Lesser Antilles were divided between the two powers; Sta. Lucia
going to France, St. Vincent, Tobago, and Dominica to England, which
also retained Grenada.

Minorca was given back to England; and as the restoration of the
island to Spain had been one of the conditions of the alliance with
the latter, France, unable to fulfil her stipulation, ceded to Spain
Louisiana west of the Mississippi.

In India, France recovered the possessions she had held before Dupleix
began his schemes of aggrandizement; but she gave up the right of
erecting fortifications or keeping troops in Bengal, and so left the
station at Chandernagore defenceless. In a word, France resumed her
facilities for trading, but practically abandoned her pretensions to
political influence. It was tacitly understood that the English
company would keep all its conquests.

The right of fishing upon the coasts of Newfoundland and in parts of
the Gulf of St. Lawrence, which France had previously enjoyed, was
conceded to her by this treaty; but it was denied to Spain, who had
claimed it for her fishermen. This concession was among those most
attacked by the English opposition.

The nation at large and Pitt, the favorite of the nation, were
bitterly opposed to the terms of the treaty. "France," said Pitt, "is
chiefly formidable to us as a maritime and commercial power. What we
gain in this respect is valuable to us above all through the injury to
her which results from it. You leave to France the possibility of
reviving her navy." In truth, from the point of view of sea power and
of the national jealousies which the spirit of that age sanctioned,
these words, though illiberal, were strictly justifiable. The
restoration to France of her colonies in the West Indies and her
stations in India, together with the valuable right of fishery in her
former American possessions, put before her the possibility and the
inducement to restore her shipping, her commerce, and her navy, and
thus tended to recall her from the path of continental ambition which
had been so fatal to her interests, and in the same proportion
favorable to the unprecedented growth of England's power upon the
ocean. The opposition, and indeed some of the ministry, also thought
that so commanding and important a position as Havana was poorly paid
for by the cession of the yet desolate and unproductive region called
Florida. Porto Rico was suggested, Florida accepted. There were other
minor points of difference, into which it is unnecessary to enter. It
could scarcely be denied that with the commanding military control of
the sea held by England, grasping as she now did so many important
positions, with her navy overwhelmingly superior in numbers, and her
commerce and internal condition very thriving, more rigorous terms
might easily have been exacted and would have been prudent. The
ministry defended their eagerness and spirit of concession on the
ground of the enormous growth of the debt, which then amounted to
£122,000,000, a sum in every point of view much greater then than now;
but while this draft upon the future was fully justified by the
success of the war, it also imperatively demanded that the utmost
advantages which the military situation made attainable should be
exacted. This the ministry failed to do. As regards the debt, it is
well observed by a French writer that "in this war, and for years
afterward, England had in view nothing less than the conquest of
America and the progress of her East India Company. By these two
countries her manufactures and commerce acquired more than sufficient
outlets, and repaid her for the numerous sacrifices she had made.
Seeing the maritime decay of Europe,--its commerce annihilated, its
manufactures so little advanced,--how could the English nation feel
afraid of a future which offered so vast a perspective?" Unfortunately
the nation needed an exponent in the government; and its chosen
mouthpiece, the only man, perhaps, able to rise to the level of the
great opportunity, was out of favor at court.

Nevertheless, the gains of England were very great, not only in
territorial increase, nor yet in maritime preponderance, but in the
prestige and position achieved in the eyes of the nations, now fully
opened to her great resources and mighty power. To these results, won
by the sea, the issue of the continental war offered a singular and
suggestive contrast. France had already withdrawn, along with
England, from all share in that strife, and peace between the other
parties to it was signed five days after the Peace of Paris. The terms
of the peace were simply the _status quo ante bellum_. By the estimate
of the King of Prussia, one hundred and eighty thousand of his
soldiers had fallen or died in this war, out of a kingdom of five
million souls; while the losses of Russia, Austria, and France
aggregated four hundred and sixty thousand men. The result was simply
that things remained as they were.[110] To attribute this only to a
difference between the possibilities of land and sea war is of course
absurd. The genius of Frederick, backed by the money of England, had
proved an equal match for the mismanaged and not always hearty efforts
of a coalition numerically overwhelming. What does seem a fair
conclusion is, that States having a good seaboard, or even ready
access to the ocean by one or two outlets, will find it to their
advantage to seek prosperity and extension by the way of the sea and
of commerce, rather than in attempts to unsettle and modify existing
political arrangements in countries where a more or less long
possession of power has conferred acknowledged rights, and created
national allegiance or political ties. Since the Treaty of Paris in
1763, the waste places of the world have been rapidly filled; witness
our own continent, Australia, and even South America. A nominal and
more or less clearly defined political possession now generally exists
in the most forsaken regions, though to this statement there are some
marked exceptions; but in many places this political possession is
little more than nominal, and in others of a character so feeble that
it cannot rely upon itself alone for support or protection. The
familiar and notorious example of the Turkish Empire, kept erect only
by the forces pressing upon it from opposing sides, by the mutual
jealousies of powers that have no sympathy with it, is an instance of
such weak political tenure; and though the question is wholly
European, all know enough of it to be aware that the interest and
control of the sea powers is among the chief, if not the first, of the
elements that now fix the situation; and that they, if intelligently
used, will direct the future inevitable changes. Upon the western
continents the political condition of the Central American and
tropical South American States is so unstable as to cause constant
anxiety about the maintenance of internal order, and seriously to
interfere with commerce and with the peaceful development of their
resources. So long as--to use a familiar expression--they hurt no one
but themselves, this may go on; but for a long time the citizens of
more stable governments have been seeking to exploit their resources,
and have borne the losses arising from their distracted condition.
North America and Australia still offer large openings to immigration
and enterprise; but they are filling up rapidly, and as the
opportunities there diminish, the demand must arise for a more settled
government in those disordered States, for security to life and for
reasonable stability of institutions enabling merchants and others to
count upon the future. There is certainly no present hope that such a
demand can be fulfilled from the existing native materials; if the
same be true when the demand arises, no theoretical positions, like
the Monroe doctrine, will prevent interested nations from attempting
to remedy the evil by some measure, which, whatever it may be called,
will be a political interference. Such interferences must produce
collisions, which may be at times settled by arbitration, but can
scarcely fail at other times to cause war. Even for a peaceful
solution, that nation will have the strongest arguments which has the
strongest organized force. It need scarcely be said that the
successful piercing of the Central American Isthmus at any point may
precipitate the moment that is sure to come sooner or later. The
profound modification of commercial routes expected from this
enterprise, the political importance to the United States of such a
channel of communication between her Atlantic and Pacific seaboards,
are not, however, the whole nor even the principal part of the
question. As far as can be seen, the time will come when stable
governments for the American tropical States must be assured by the
now existing powerful and stable States of America or Europe. The
geographical position of those States, the climatic conditions, make
it plain at once that sea power will there, even more than in the case
of Turkey, determine what foreign State shall predominate,--if not by
actual possession, by its influence over the native governments. The
geographical position of the United States and her intrinsic power
give her an undeniable advantage; but that advantage will not avail if
there is a great inferiority of organized brute-force, which still
remains the last argument of republics as of kings. Herein lies to us
the great and still living interest of the Seven Years' War. In it we
have seen and followed England, with an army small as compared with
other States, as is still her case to-day, first successfully
defending her own shores, then carrying her arms in every direction,
spreading her rule and influence over remote regions, and not only
binding them to her obedience, but making them tributary to her
wealth, her strength, and her reputation. As she loosens the grasp and
neutralizes the influence of France and Spain in regions beyond the
sea, there is perhaps seen the prophecy of some other great nation in
days yet to come, that will incline the balance of power in some
future sea war, whose scope will be recognized afterward, if not by
contemporaries, to have been the political future and the economical
development of regions before lost to civilization; but that nation
will not be the United States if the moment find her indifferent, as
now, to the empire of the seas.

The direction then given to England's efforts, by the instinct of the
nation and the fiery genius of Pitt, continued after the war, and has
profoundly influenced her subsequent policy. Mistress now of North
America, lording it in India, through the company whose territorial
conquests had been ratified by native princes, over twenty millions of
inhabitants,--a population larger than that of Great Britain and
having a revenue respectable alongside of that of the home
government,--England, with yet other rich possessions scattered far
and wide over the globe, had ever before her eyes, as a salutary
lesson, the severe chastisement which the weakness of Spain had
allowed her to inflict upon that huge disjointed empire. The words of
the English naval historian of that war, speaking about Spain, apply
with slight modifications to England in our own day.

    "Spain is precisely that power against which England can always
    contend with the fairest prospect of advantage and honor. That
    extensive monarchy is exhausted at heart, her resources lie at a
    great distance, and whatever power commands the sea, may command
    the wealth and commerce of Spain. The dominions from which she
    draws her resources, lying at an immense distance from the
    capital and from one another, make it more necessary for her
    than for any other State to temporize, until she can inspire
    with activity all parts of her enormous but disjointed
    empire."[111]

It would be untrue to say that England is exhausted at heart; but her
dependence upon the outside world is such as to give a certain
suggestiveness to the phrase.

This analogy of positions was not overlooked by England. From that
time forward up to our own day, the possessions won for her by her sea
power have combined with that sea power itself to control her policy.
The road to India--in the days of Clive a distant and perilous voyage
on which she had not a stopping-place of her own--was reinforced as
opportunity offered by the acquisition of St. Helena, of the Cape of
Good Hope, of the Mauritius. When steam made the Red Sea and
Mediterranean route practicable, she acquired Aden, and yet later has
established herself at Socotra. Malta had already fallen into her
hands during the wars of the French Revolution, and her commanding
position, as the corner-stone upon which the coalitions against
Napoleon rested, enabled her to claim it at the Peace of 1815. Being
but a short thousand miles from Gibraltar, the circles of military
command exercised by these two places intersect. The present day has
seen the stretch from Malta to the Isthmus of Suez, formerly without a
station, guarded by the cession to her of Cyprus. Egypt, despite the
jealousy of France, has passed under English control. The importance
of that position to India, understood by Napoleon and Nelson, led the
latter at once to send an officer overland to Bombay with the news of
the battle of the Nile and the downfall of Bonaparte's hopes. Even
now, the jealousy with which England views the advance of Russia in
Central Asia is the result of those days in which her sea power and
resources triumphed over the weakness of D'Aché and the genius of
Suffren, and wrenched the peninsula of India from the ambition of the
French.

    "For the first time since the Middle Ages," says M. Martin,
    speaking of the Seven Years' War, "England had conquered France
    single-handed almost without allies, France having powerful
    auxiliaries. She had conquered solely by the superiority of her
    government."

Yes! but by the superiority of her government using the tremendous
weapon of her sea power. This made her rich, and in turn protected the
trade by which she had her wealth. With her money she upheld her few
auxiliaries, mainly Prussia and Hanover, in their desperate strife.
Her power was everywhere that her ships could reach, and there was
none to dispute the sea to her. Where she would she went, and with her
went her guns and her troops. By this mobility her forces were
multiplied, those of her enemies distracted. Ruler of the seas, she
everywhere obstructed its highways. The enemies' fleets could not
join; no great fleet could get out, or if it did, it was only to meet
at once, with uninured officers and crews, those who were veterans in
gales and warfare. Save in the case of Minorca, she carefully held her
own sea-bases and eagerly seized those of the enemy. What a lion in
the path was Gibraltar to the French squadrons of Toulon and Brest!
What hope for French succor to Canada, when the English fleet had
Louisburg under its lee?

The one nation that gained in this war was that which used the sea in
peace to earn its wealth, and ruled it in war by the extent of its
navy, by the number of its subjects who lived on the sea or by the
sea, and by its numerous bases of operations scattered over the globe.
Yet it must be observed that these bases themselves would have lost
their value if their communications remained obstructed. Therefore the
French lost Louisburg, Martinique, Pondicherry; so England herself
lost Minorca. The service between the bases and the mobile force
between the ports and the fleets is mutual.[112] In this respect the
navy is essentially a light corps; it keeps open the communications
between its own ports, it obstructs those of the enemy; but it sweeps
the sea for the service of the land, it controls the desert that man
may live and thrive on the habitable globe.

FOOTNOTES:

[93] That is, with the guns on board, but for the most part not
mounted on their carriages, in order to give increased accommodation
for troops. When the troops were landed, the guns were mounted.

[94] Ramatuelle: Tactique Navale.

[95] Lapeyrouse-Bonfils: Hist. de la Marine.

[96] Clerk: Naval Tactics.

[97] Jurien de la Gravière: Guerres Maritimes.

[98] Mahon: History of England.

[99] Mahon: History of England.

[100] For these, see Troude: Batailles Navales.

[101] See Plate VIII.

[102] Troude: Batailles Navales de la France.

[103] Lapeyrouse-Bonfils.

[104] Mahon: History of England.

[105] Campbell: Lives of the Admirals.

[106] Mahon: History of England.

[107] Martin: History of France.

[108] Martin: History of France.

[109] Campbell: Lives of the Admirals.

[110] See Annual Register, 1762, p. 63

[111] Campbell: Lives of the Admirals.

[112] These remarks, always true, are doubly so now since the
introduction of steam. The renewal of coal is a want more frequent,
more urgent, more peremptory, than any known to the sailing-ship. It
is vain to look for energetic naval operations distant from coal
stations. It is equally vain to acquire distant coaling stations
without maintaining a powerful navy; they will but fall into the hands
of the enemy. But the vainest of all delusions is the expectation of
bringing down an enemy by commerce-destroying alone, with no coaling
stations outside the national boundaries.




CHAPTER IX.

    COURSE OF EVENTS FROM THE PEACE OF PARIS TO 1778.--MARITIME WAR
    CONSEQUENT UPON THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION.--SEA BATTLE OFF USHANT.


If England had reason to complain that she had not reaped from the
Treaty of Paris all the advantages that her military achievements and
position entitled her to expect, France had every cause for discontent
at the position in which the war left her. The gain of England was
nearly measured by her losses; even the cession of Florida, made to
the conqueror by Spain, had been bought by France at the price of
Louisiana. Naturally the thoughts of her statesmen and of her people,
as they bent under the present necessity to bear the burden of the
vanquished, turned to the future with its possibilities of revenge and
compensation. The Duc de Choiseul, able though imperious, remained for
many years more at the head of affairs, and worked persistently to
restore the power of France from the effects of the treaty. The
Austrian alliance had been none of his seeking; it was already made
and working when he came to office in 1758; but he had even at the
first recognized that the chief enemy was England, and tried as far as
could be to direct the forces of the nation against her. The defeat of
Conflans having thwarted his projects of invasion, he next sought, in
entire consistency with his main purpose, to stir up Spain and gain
her alliance. The united efforts of the two kingdoms with their fine
seaboards could, under good administration and with time for
preparation, put afloat a navy that would be a fair counterpoise to
that of England. It was also doubtless true that weaker maritime
States, if they saw such a combination successfully made and working
efficiently, would pluck up heart to declare against a government
whose greatness excited envy and fear, and which acted with the
disregard to the rights and welfare of others common to all
uncontrolled power. Unhappily for both France and Spain, the alliance
came too late. The virtual annihilation of the French fleet in 1759
was indeed followed by an outburst of national enthusiasm for the
navy, skilfully fostered and guided by Choiseul. "Popular feeling took
up the cry, from one end of France to the other, 'The navy must be
restored.' Gifts of cities, corporations, and private individuals
raised funds. A prodigious activity sprang up in the lately silent
ports; everywhere ships were building and repairing." The minister
also recognized the need of restoring the discipline and tone, as well
as the material of the navy. The hour, however, was too late; the
middle of a great and unsuccessful war is no time to begin
preparations. "Better late than never" is not so safe a proverb as "In
time of peace prepare for war." The condition of Spain was better.
When war broke out, the English naval historian estimates that she had
one hundred ships of all sizes; of these, probably sixty were of the
line. Nevertheless, although the addition of Spain to her numerous
enemies might make the position of England seem critical, the
combination in her favor of numbers, skill, experience, and prestige,
was irresistible. With seventy thousand veteran seamen, she had only
to maintain a position already won. The results we know.

After the peace, Choiseul wisely remained faithful to his own first
ideas. The restoration of the navy continued, and was accompanied and
furthered by a spirit of professional ambition and of desire to excel,
among the officers of the navy, which has been before mentioned, and
which, in the peculiar condition of the United States navy at the
present day, may be commended as a model. The building of ships-of-war
continued with great activity and on a large scale. At the end of the
war, thanks to the movement begun in 1761, there were forty
ships-of-the-line in good condition. In 1770, when Choiseul was
dismissed, the royal navy numbered sixty-four of the line and fifty
frigates afloat. The arsenals and storehouses were filled, and a stock
of ship-timber laid up. At the same time the minister tried to improve
the efficiency of the officers by repressing the arrogant spirit of
those of noble birth, which showed itself both toward superiors and
toward another order of officers, not of the nobility, whose abilities
made them desired on board the fleet. This class-feeling carried with
it a curious sentiment of equality among officers of very different
grades, which injuriously affected the spirit of subordination.
Members, all, of a privileged social order, their equality as such was
more clearly recognized than their inequality as junior and senior.
The droll story told by Marryatt of the midshipman, who represented to
his captain that a certain statement had been made in confidence,
seems to have had a realization on the French quarter-deck of that
day. "Confidence!" cried the captain; "who ever heard of confidence
between a post-captain and a midshipman!" "No sir," replied the
youngster, "not between a captain and a midshipman, but between two
gentlemen." Disputes, arguments, suggestions, between two gentlemen,
forgetful of their relative rank, would break out at critical moments,
and the feeling of equality, which wild democratic notions spread
throughout the fleets of the republic, was curiously forestalled by
that existing among the members of a most haughty aristocracy. "I saw
by his face," says one of Marryatt's heroes, "that the first
lieutenant did not agree with the captain; but he was too good an
officer to say so at such a moment." The phrase expresses one of the
deepest-rooted merits of the English system, the want of which is
owned by French writers:--

    "Under Louis XVI. the intimacy and fellowship existing between
    the chief and the subordinate led the latter to discuss the
    orders which were given him.... The relaxation of discipline and
    the spirit of independence were due also to another cause than
    that pointed out; they can be partly attributed to the
    regulation of the officers' messes. Admiral, captain, officers,
    midshipmen, ate together; everything was in common. They
    thee-and-thou'd each other like chums. In handling the ship, the
    inferior gave his opinion, argued, and the chief, irritated,
    often preferred to yield rather than make enemies. Facts of this
    kind are asserted by witnesses whose truthfulness is above
    suspicion."[113]

Insubordination of this character, to which weaker men gave way,
dashed in vain against the resolute and fiery temper of Suffren; but
the spirit of discontent rose almost to the height of mutiny, causing
him to say in his despatches to the minister of the navy, after his
fourth battle: "My heart is pierced by the most general defection. It
is frightful to think that I might four times have destroyed the
English fleet, and that it still exists." Choiseul's reforms broke
against this rock, which only the uprising of the whole nation finally
removed; but in the personnel of the crews a great improvement was
made. In 1767 he reorganized the artillery of the fleet, forming a
body of ten thousand gunners, who were systematically drilled once a
week during the ten years still to intervene before the next war with
England.

Losing sight of no part of his plans, Choiseul, while promoting the
naval and military power of France, paid special attention to the
alliance with Spain and judiciously encouraged and furthered the
efforts of that country in the path of progress under Charles III.,
the best of her kings of the Bourbon line. The Austrian alliance still
existing was maintained, but his hopes were chiefly fixed upon Spain.
The wisdom and insight which had at once fastened upon England as the
centre of enmity to France had been justified and further enlightened
by the whole course of the Seven Years' War. In Spain was the surest,
and, with good administration, the most powerful ally. The close
proximity of the two countries, the relative positions of their ports,
made the naval situation particularly strong; and the alliance which
was dictated by sound policy, by family ties, and by just fear of
England's sea power, was further assured to France by recent and still
existing injuries that must continue to rankle with Spain. Gibraltar,
Minorca, and Florida were still in the hands of England; no Spaniard
could be easy till this reproach was wiped out.

It may be readily believed, as is asserted by French historians, that
England viewed with disquietude the growth of the French navy, and
would gladly have nipped it betimes; but it is more doubtful whether
she would have been willing to force a war for that purpose. During
the years succeeding the Peace of Paris a succession of short
ministries, turning mainly upon questions of internal policy or
unimportant party arrangement, caused her foreign policy to present a
marked contrast to the vigorous, overbearing, but straightforward path
followed by Pitt. Internal commotions, such as are apt to follow great
wars, and above all the controversy with the North American colonies,
which began as early as 1765 with the well-known Stamp Act, conspired
with other causes to stay the hand of England. Twice at least during
the years of Choiseul's ministry there occurred opportunities which a
resolute, ready, and not too scrupulous government might easily have
converted into a cause of war; the more so as they involved that sea
power which is to England above all other nations the object of just
and jealous concern. In 1764 the Genoese, weary of their unsuccessful
attempts to control Corsica, again asked France to renew the
occupation of the ports which had been garrisoned by her in 1756. The
Corsicans also sent an ambassador to France in order to solicit
recognition of the independence of the island, in consideration of a
tribute equivalent to that which they had formerly paid to Genoa. The
latter, feeling its inability to reconquer the island, at length
decided practically to cede it. The transaction took the shape of a
formal permission for the King of France to exercise all the rights of
sovereignty over all the places and harbors of Corsica, as security
for debts owing to him by the republic. This cession, disguised under
the form of a security in order to palliate the aggrandizement of
France in the eyes of Austria and England, recalls the conditional and
thinly veiled surrender of Cyprus to England nine years ago,--a
transfer likely to be as final and far-reaching as that of Corsica.
England then remonstrated and talked angrily; but though Burke said,
"Corsica as a province of France is terrible to me," only one member
of the House of Commons, the veteran admiral Sir Charles Saunders, was
found to say "that it would be better to go to war with France than
consent to her taking possession of Corsica."[114] Having in view the
then well-recognized interests of England in the Mediterranean, it is
evident that an island so well situated as Corsica for influencing the
shores of Italy and checking the naval station at Minorca, would not
have been allowed to go into the hands of a strong master, if the
nation had felt ready and willing for war.

Again, in 1770, a dispute arose between England and Spain relative to
the possession of the Falkland Islands. It is not material to state
the nature of either claim to what was then but a collection of barren
islands, destitute of military as well as of natural advantages. Both
England and Spain had had a settlement, on which the national colors
were flying; and at the English station a captain in the navy
commanded. Before this settlement, called Port Egmont, there suddenly
appeared, in June, 1770, a Spanish expedition, fitted out in Buenos
Ayres, of five frigates and sixteen hundred soldiers. To such a force
the handful of Englishmen could make no serious resistance; so after a
few shots, exchanged for the honor of the flag, they capitulated.

The news of this transaction, which reached England in the following
October, showed by its reception how much more serious is an insult
than an injury, and how much more bitterly resented. The transfer of
Corsica had scarcely occasioned a stir outside the offices of
statesmen; the attack on Port Egmont roused the people and Parliament.
The minister to Madrid was ordered to demand the immediate restoration
of the islands, with a disavowal of the action of the officer who had
ordered the attack. Without waiting for a reply, ships were ordered
into commission, press-gangs swept the streets, and in a short time a
powerful fleet was ready at Spithead to revenge the insult. Spain,
relying upon the Bourbon family compact and the support of France, was
disposed to stand firm; but the old king, Louis XV., was averse to
war, and Choiseul, among whose enemies at court was the last mistress,
was dismissed. With his fall disappeared the hopes of Spain, which at
once complied with the demands of England, reserving, however, the
question as to the rights of sovereignty. This conclusion shows
clearly that England, though still wielding an effective sea power
able to control Spain, was not eager for a war merely in order to
break down the rival navies.

It is not wholly alien to the question of sea power to note, without
dwelling upon it, a great event which now happened, seemingly utterly
removed from all relation to the sea. The first partition of Poland
between Prussia, Russia, and Austria, carried out in 1772, was made
easier by the preoccupation of Choiseul with his naval policy and the
Spanish alliance. The friendship and support of Poland and Turkey, as
checks upon the House of Austria, were part of the tradition received
from Henry IV. and Richelieu; the destruction of the former was a
direct blow to the pride and interest of France. What Choiseul would
have done had he been in office, cannot be known; but if the result of
the Seven Years' War had been different, France might have interfered
to some purpose.

On the 10th of May, 1774, Louis XV. died, at the time when the
troubles in the North American colonies were fast coming to a head.
Under his youthful successor, Louis XVI., the policy of peace on the
continent, of friendly alliance with Spain, and of building up the
navy in numbers and efficiency, was continued. This was the foreign
policy of Choiseul, directed against the sea power of England as the
chief enemy, and toward the sea power of France as the chief support,
of the nation. The instructions which, according to a French naval
author, the new king gave to his ministers show the spirit with which
his reign up to the Revolution was inspired, whether or not they
originated with the king himself:--

    "To watch all indications of approaching danger; to observe by
    cruisers the approaches to our islands and the entrance to the
    Gulf of Mexico; to keep track of what was passing on the banks
    of Newfoundland, and to follow the tendencies of English
    commerce; to observe in England the state of the troops and
    armaments, the public credit and the ministry; to meddle
    adroitly in the affairs of the British colonies; to give the
    insurgent colonists the means of obtaining supplies of war,
    while maintaining the strictest neutrality; to develop actively,
    but noiselessly, the navy; to repair our ships of war; to fill
    our storehouses and to keep on hand the means for rapidly
    equipping a fleet at Brest and at Toulon, while Spain should be
    fitting one at Ferrol; finally, at the first serious fear of
    rupture, to assemble numerous troops upon the shores of Brittany
    and Normandy, and get everything ready for an invasion of
    England, so as to force her to concentrate her forces, and thus
    restrict her means of resistance at the extremities of the
    empire."[115]

Such instructions, whether given all at once as a symmetrical,
well-thought-out plan, or from time to time, as occasion arose, showed
that an accurate forecast of the situation had been made, and breathed
a conviction which, if earlier felt, would have greatly modified the
history of the two countries. The execution was less thorough than the
conception.

In the matter of developing the navy, however, fifteen years of peace
and steady work showed good results. When war openly broke out in
1778, France had eighty ships-of-the-line in good condition, and
sixty-seven thousand seamen were borne on the rolls of the maritime
conscription. Spain, when she entered the war in 1779 as the ally of
France, had in her ports nearly sixty ships-of-the-line. To this
combination England opposed a total number of two hundred and
twenty-eight ships of all classes, of which about one hundred and
fifty were of the line. The apparent equality in material which would
result from these numbers was affected, to the disadvantage of
England, by the superior size and artillery of the French and
Spaniards; but on the other hand her strength was increased by the
unity of aim imparted by belonging to one nation. The allies were
destined to feel the proverbial weakness of naval coalitions, as well
as the degenerate administration of Spain, and the lack of habit--may
it not even be said without injustice, of aptitude for the sea--of
both nations. The naval policy with which Louis XVI. began his reign
was kept up to the end; in 1791, two years after the assembly of the
States-General, the French navy numbered eighty-six ships-of-the-line,
generally superior, both in dimensions and model, to English ships of
the same class.

We have come, therefore, to the beginning of a truly maritime war;
which, as will be granted by those who have followed this narrative,
had not been seen since the days of De Ruyter and Tourville. The
magnificence of sea power and its value had perhaps been more clearly
shown by the uncontrolled sway, and consequent exaltation, of one
belligerent; but the lesson thus given, if more striking, is less
vividly interesting than the spectacle of that sea power meeting a foe
worthy of its steel, and excited to exertion by a strife which
endangered, not only its most valuable colonies, but even its own
shores. Waged, from the extended character of the British Empire, in
all quarters of the world at once, the attention of the student is
called now to the East Indies and now to the West; now to the shores
of the United States and thence to those of England; from New York and
Chesapeake Bay to Gibraltar and Minorca, to the Cape Verde Islands,
the Cape of Good Hope, and Ceylon. Fleets now meet fleets of equal
size, and the general chase and the _mêlée_, which marked the actions
of Hawke, Boscawen, and Anson, though they still occur at times, are
for the most part succeeded by wary and complicated manoeuvres, too
often barren of decisive results as naval battles, which are the
prevailing characteristic of this coming war. The superior tactical
science of the French succeeded in imparting to this conflict that
peculiar feature of their naval policy, which subordinated the control
of the sea by the destruction of the enemy's fleets, of his organized
naval forces, to the success of particular operations, the retention
of particular points, the carrying out of particular ulterior
strategic ends. It is not necessary to endeavor to force upon others
the conviction of the present writer that such a policy, however
applicable as an exception, is faulty as a rule; but it is most
desirable that all persons responsible for the conduct of naval
affairs should recognize that the two lines of policy, in direct
contradiction to each other, do exist. In the one there is a strict
analogy to a war of posts; while in the other the objective is that
force whose destruction leaves the posts unsupported and therefore
sure to fall in due time. These opposing policies being recognized,
consideration should also be had of the results of the two as
exemplified in the history of England and France.

It was not, however, with such cautious views that the new king at
first sought to impress his admirals. In the instructions addressed to
the Count d'Orvilliers, commanding the first fleet sent out from
Brest, the minister, speaking in the name of the king, says:--

    "Your duty now is to restore to the French flag the lustre with
    which it once shone; past misfortunes and faults must be buried
    out of sight; only by the most illustrious actions can the navy
    hope to succeed in doing this. His Majesty has the right to
    expect the greatest efforts from his officers.... Under whatever
    circumstances the king's fleet may be placed, his Majesty's
    orders, which he expressly charges me to impress upon you, as
    well as upon all officers in command, are that his ships attack
    with the greatest vigor, and defend themselves, on all
    occasions, to the last extremity."

More follows to the same effect; upon which a French officer, who has
not before been quoted in connection with this phase of French naval
policy, says:--

    "How different this language from that held to our admirals
    during the last war; for it would be an error to believe that
    they followed by choice and temper the timid and defensive
    system which predominated in the tactics of the navy. The
    government, always finding the expenses exacted by the
    employment of the navy excessive, too often prescribed to its
    admirals to keep the sea as long as possible without coming to
    pitched battles, or even to brushes, generally very expensive,
    and from which might follow the loss of ships difficult to
    replace. Often they were enjoined, if driven to accept action,
    carefully to avoid compromising the fate of their squadron by
    too decisive encounters. They thought themselves, therefore,
    obliged to retreat as soon as an engagement took too serious a
    turn. Thus they acquired the unhappy habit of voluntarily
    yielding the field of battle as soon as an enemy, even inferior,
    boldly disputed it with them. Thus to send a fleet to meet the
    enemy, only to retire shamefully from his presence; to receive
    action instead of offering it; to begin battles only to end them
    with the semblance of defeat; to ruin moral force in order to
    save physical force,--that was the spirit which, as has been
    very judiciously said by M. Charles Dupin, guided the French
    ministry of that epoch. The results are known."[116]

The brave words of Louis XVI. were followed almost immediately by
others, of different and qualifying tenor, to Admiral d'Orvilliers
before he sailed. He was informed that the king, having learned the
strength of the English fleet, relied upon his prudence as to the
conduct to be followed at a moment when he had under his orders all
the naval force of which France could dispose. As a matter of fact the
two fleets were nearly equal; it would be impossible to decide which
was the stronger, without detailed information as to the armament of
every ship. D'Orvilliers found himself, as many a responsible man has
before, with two sets of orders, on one or the other of which he was
sure to be impaled, if unlucky; while the government, in the same
event, was sure of a scape-goat.

The consideration of the relative force of the two navies, material
and moral, has necessarily carried us beyond the date of the opening
of the American Revolutionary War. Before beginning with that
struggle, it may be well to supplement the rough estimate of England's
total naval force, given, in lack of more precise information, by the
statement of the First Lord of the Admiralty made in the House of
Lords in November, 1777, a very few months before the war with France
began. Replying to a complaint of the opposition as to the smallness
of the Channel fleet, he said:--

    "We have now forty-two ships-of-the-line in commission in Great
    Britain (without counting those on foreign service), thirty-five
    of which are completely manned, and ready for sea at a moment's
    warning.... I do not believe that either France or Spain
    entertains any hostile disposition toward us; but from what I
    have now submitted to you, I am authorized to affirm that our
    navy is more than a match for that of the whole House of
    Bourbon."[117]

It must, however, be said that this pleasing prospect was not realized
by Admiral Keppel when appointed to command in the following March,
and looking at his fleet with (to use his own apt expression) "a
seaman's eye;"[118] and in June he went to sea with only twenty ships.

It is plainly undesirable to insert in a narrative of this character
any account of the political questions which led to the separation of
the United States from the British Empire. It has already been
remarked that the separation followed upon a succession of blunders by
the English ministry,--not unnatural in view of the ideas generally
prevalent at that day as to the relations of colonies to the
mother-country. It needed a man of commanding genius to recognize, not
only the substantial justice of the American claims,--many did
that,--but also the military strength of their situation, as before
indicated. This lay in the distance of the colonies from home, their
nearness to each other independently of the command of the sea, the
character of the colonists,--mainly of English and Dutch stock,--and
the probable hostility of France and Spain. Unfortunately for England,
the men most able to cope with the situation were in the minority and
out of office.

It has been said before that, had the thirteen colonies been islands,
the sea power of Great Britain would have so completely isolated them
that their fall, one after the other, must have ensued. To this it may
be added that the narrowness of the strip then occupied by civilized
man, and the manner in which it was intersected by estuaries of the
sea and navigable rivers, practically reduced to the condition of
islands, so far as mutual support went, great sections of the
insurgent country, which were not large enough to stand alone, yet too
large for their fall not to have been a fatal blow to the common
cause. The most familiar case is that of the line of the Hudson, where
the Bay of New York was held from the first by the British, who also
took the city in September, 1776, two months after the Declaration of
Independence. The difficulties in the way of moving up and down such a
stream were doubtless much greater to sailing vessels than they now
are to steamers; yet it seems impossible to doubt that active and
capable men wielding the great sea power of England could so have held
that river and Lake Champlain with ships-of-war at intervals and
accompanying galleys as to have supported a sufficient army moving
between the head-waters of the Hudson and the lake, while themselves
preventing any intercourse by water between New England and the States
west of the river. This operation would have closely resembled that by
which in the Civil War the United States fleets and armies gradually
cut in twain the Southern Confederacy by mastering the course of the
Mississippi, and the political results would have been even more
important than the military; for at that early stage of the war the
spirit of independence was far more general and bitter in the section
that would have been cut off,--in New England,--than in New York and
New Jersey, perhaps than anywhere except in South Carolina.[119]

In 1777 the British attempted to accomplish this object by sending
General Burgoyne from Canada to force his way by Lake Champlain to the
Hudson. At the same time Sir Henry Clinton moved north from New York
with three thousand men, and reached West Point, whence he sent by
shipping a part of his force up the river to within forty miles of
Albany. Here the officer in command learned of the surrender of
Burgoyne at Saratoga, and returned; but what he did at the head of a
detachment from a main body of only three thousand, shows what might
have been done under a better system. While this was happening on the
Hudson, the English commander-in-chief of the troops acting in America
had curiously enough made use of the sea power of his nation to
transport the bulk of his army--fourteen thousand men--from New York
to the head of Chesapeake Bay, so as to take Philadelphia in the rear.
This eccentric movement was successful as regarded its objective,
Philadelphia; but it was determined by political considerations,
because Philadelphia was the seat of Congress, and was contrary to
sound military policy. The conquest therefore was early lost; but it
was yet more dearly won, for by this diversion of the British forces
the different corps were placed out of mutual support, and the control
of the water-line of the Hudson was abandoned. While Burgoyne, with
seven thousand regular troops, besides auxiliaries, was moving down to
seize the head-waters of the river, fourteen thousand men were removed
from its mouth to the Chesapeake. The eight thousand left in or near
New York were consequently tied to the city by the presence of the
American army in New Jersey. This disastrous step was taken in August;
in October Burgoyne, isolated and hemmed in, surrendered. In the
following May the English evacuated Philadelphia, and after a painful
and perilous march through New Jersey, with Washington's army in close
pursuit, regained New York.

This taking of the British fleet to the head of the Chesapeake,
coupled with the ascent of the Potomac in 1814 by English
sailing-frigates, shows another weak line in the chain of the American
colonies; but it was not, like that of the Hudson and Champlain, a
line both ends of which rested in the enemy's power,--in Canada on the
one hand, on the sea on the other.

As to the sea warfare in general, it is needless to enlarge upon the
fact that the colonists could make no head against the fleets of Great
Britain, and were consequently forced to abandon the sea to them,
resorting only to a cruising warfare, mainly by privateers, for which
their seamanship and enterprise well fitted them, and by which they
did much injury to English commerce. By the end of 1778 the English
naval historian estimates that American privateers had taken nearly a
thousand merchant-ships, valued at nearly £2,000,000; he claims,
however, that the losses of the Americans were heavier. They should
have been; for the English cruisers were both better supported and
individually more powerful, while the extension of American commerce
had come to be the wonder of the statesmen of the mother-country. When
the war broke out, it was as great as that of England herself at the
beginning of the century.

An interesting indication of the number of the seafaring population of
North America at that time is given by the statement in Parliament by
the First Lord of the Admiralty, "that the navy had lost eighteen
thousand of the seamen employed in the last war by not having
America,"[120]--no inconsiderable loss to a sea power, particularly if
carried over to the ranks of the enemy.

The course of warfare on the sea gave rise, as always, to grievances
of neutrals against the English for the seizures of their ships in the
American trade. Such provocation, however, was not necessary to
excite the enmity and the hopes of France in the harassed state of the
British government. The hour of reckoning, of vengeance, at which the
policy of Choiseul had aimed, seemed now at hand. The question was
early entertained at Paris what attitude should be assumed, what
advantage drawn from the revolt of the colonies. It was decided that
the latter should receive all possible support short of an actual
break with England; and to this end a Frenchman named Beaumarchais was
furnished with money to establish a business house which should supply
the colonists with warlike stores. France gave a million francs, to
which Spain added an equal sum, and Beaumarchais was allowed to buy
from government arsenals. Meanwhile agents were received from the
United States, and French officers passed into its service with little
real hindrance from their government. Beaumarchais' house was started
in 1776; in December of that year Benjamin Franklin landed in France,
and in May, 1777, Lafayette came to America. Meanwhile the
preparations for war, especially for a sea war, were pushed on; the
navy was steadily increased, and arrangements were made for
threatening an invasion from the Channel, while the real scene of the
war was to be in the colonies. There France was in the position of a
man who has little to lose. Already despoiled of Canada, she had every
reason to believe that a renewal of war, with Europe neutral and the
Americans friends instead of enemies, would not rob her of her
islands. Recognizing that the Americans, who less than twenty years
before had insisted upon the conquest of Canada, would not consent to
her regaining it, she expressly stipulated that she would have no such
hopes, but exacted that in the coming war she should retain any
English West Indian possessions which she could seize. Spain was
differently situated. Hating England, wanting to regain Gibraltar,
Minorca, and Jamaica,--no mere jewels in her crown, but
foundation-stones of her sea power,--she nevertheless saw that the
successful rebellion of the English colonists against the hitherto
unrivalled sea power of the mother-country would be a dangerous
example to her own enormous colonial system, from which she yearly
drew so great subsidies. If England with her navy should fail, what
could Spain achieve? In the introductory chapter it was pointed out
that the income of the Spanish government was drawn, not as a light
tax upon a wealthy sea power, built upon the industry and commerce of
the kingdom, but from a narrow stream of gold and silver trickling
through a few treasure-ships loaded with the spoils of colonies
administered upon the narrowest system. Spain had much to lose, as
well as to gain. It was true still, as in 1760, that she was the power
with which England could war to the greatest advantage. Nevertheless,
existing injuries and dynastic sympathy carried the day. Spain entered
upon the secretly hostile course pursued by France.

To this explosive condition of things the news of Burgoyne's surrender
acted as a spark. The experience of former wars had taught France the
worth of the Americans as enemies, and she was expecting to find in
them valuable helpers in her schemes of revenge; now it seemed that
even alone they might be able to take care of themselves, and reject
any alliance. The tidings reached Europe on the 2d of December, 1777;
on the 16th the French foreign minister informed the commissioners of
Congress that the king was ready to recognize the independence of the
United States, and to make with them a commercial treaty and
contingent defensive alliance. The speed with which the business was
done shows that France had made up her mind; and the treaty, so
momentous in its necessary consequences, was signed on the 6th of
February, 1778.

It is not necessary to give the detailed terms of the treaty; but it
is important to observe, first, that the express renunciation of
Canada and Nova Scotia by France foreshadowed that political theory
which is now known as the Monroe doctrine, the claims of which can
scarcely be made good without an adequate sea-force; and next, that
the alliance with France, and subsequently with Spain, brought to the
Americans that which they above all needed,--a sea power to
counterbalance that of England. Will it be too much for American
pride to admit that, had France refused to contest the control of the
sea with England, the latter would have been able to reduce the
Atlantic seaboard? Let us not kick down the ladder by which we
mounted, nor refuse to acknowledge what our fathers felt in their hour
of trial.

Before going on with the story of this maritime war, the military
situation as it existed in the different parts of the world should be
stated.

The three features which cause it to differ markedly from that at the
opening of the Seven Years' War, in 1756, are--(1) the hostile
relation of America to England; (2) the early appearance of Spain as
the ally of France; and (3) the neutrality of the other continental
States, which left France without preoccupation on the land side.

On the North American continent the Americans had held Boston for two
years. Narragansett Bay and Rhode Island were occupied by the English,
who also held New York and Philadelphia. Chesapeake Bay and its
entrance, being without strong posts, were in the power of any fleet
that appeared against them. In the South, since the unsuccessful
attack upon Charlestown in 1776, no movement of importance had been
made by the English; up to the declaration of war by France the chief
events of the war had been north of the Chesapeake (of Baltimore). In
Canada, on the other hand, the Americans had failed, and it remained
to the end a firm base to the English power.

In Europe the most significant element to be noted is the state of
preparedness of the French navy, and to some extent of the Spanish, as
compared with previous wars. England stood wholly on the defensive,
and without allies; while the Bourbon kings aimed at the conquest of
Gibraltar and Port Mahon, and the invasion of England. The first two,
however, were the dear objects of Spain, the last of France; and this
divergence of aims was fatal to the success of this maritime
coalition. In the introductory chapter allusion was made to the
strategic question raised by these two policies.

In the West Indies the grip of the two combatants on the land was in
fact about equal, though it should not have been so. Both France and
England were strongly posted in the Windward Islands,--the one at
Martinique, the other at Barbadoes. It must be noted that the position
of the latter, to windward of all others of the group, was a decided
strategic advantage in the days of sail. As it happened, the fighting
was pretty nearly confined to the neighborhood of the Lesser Antilles.
Here, at the opening of the struggle, the English island of Dominica
lay between the French Martinique and Guadeloupe; it was therefore
coveted and seized. Next south of Martinique lay Sta. Lucia, a French
colony. Its strong harbor on the lee side, known as Gros Ilot Bay, was
a capital place from which to watch the proceedings of the French navy
in Fort Royal, Martinique. The English captured the island, and from
that safe anchorage Rodney watched and pursued the French fleet before
his famous action in 1782. The islands to the southward were of
inferior military consequence. In the greater islands, Spain should
have outweighed England, holding as she did Cuba, Porto Rico, and,
with France, Hayti, as against Jamaica alone. Spain, however, counted
here for nothing but a dead-weight; and England had elsewhere too much
on her hands to attack her. The only point in America where the
Spanish arms made themselves felt was in the great region east of the
Mississippi, then known as Florida, which, though at that time an
English possession, did not join the revolt of the colonies.

In the East Indies it will be remembered that France had received back
her stations at the peace of 1763; but the political predominance of
the English in Bengal was not offset by similar control of the French
in any part of the peninsula. During the ensuing years the English had
extended and strengthened their power, favored in so doing by the
character of their chief representatives, Clive and Warren Hastings.
Powerful native enemies had, however, risen against them in the south
of the peninsula, both on the east and west, affording an excellent
opportunity for France to regain her influence when the war broke out;
but her government and people remained blind to the possibilities of
that vast region. Not so England. The very day the news of the
outbreak of war reached Calcutta, July 7, 1778, Hastings sent orders
to the governor of Madras to attack Pondicherry, and set the example
by seizing Chandernagore. The naval force of each nation was
insignificant; but the French commodore, after a brief action, forsook
Pondicherry, which surrendered after a siege by land and sea of
seventy days. The following March, 1779, Mahé, the last French
settlement, fell, and the French flag again disappeared; while at the
same time there arrived a strong English squadron of six
ships-of-the-line under Admiral Hughes. The absence of any similar
French force gave the entire control of the sea to the English until
the arrival of Suffren, nearly three years later. In the mean while
Holland had been drawn into the war, and her stations, Negapatam on
the Coromandel coast, and the very important harbor of Trincomalee in
Ceylon, were both captured, the latter in January, 1782, by the joint
forces of the army and navy. The successful accomplishment of these
two enterprises completed the military situation in Hindostan at the
time when the arrival of Suffren, just one month later, turned the
nominal war into a desperate and bloody contest. Suffren found himself
with a decidedly stronger squadron, but without a port, either French
or allied, on which to base his operations against the English.

Of these four chief theatres of the war, two, North America and the
West Indies, as might be expected from their nearness, blend and
directly affect each other. This is not so obviously the case with the
struggles in Europe and India. The narrative therefore naturally falls
into three principal divisions, which may to some extent be treated
separately. After such separate consideration their mutual influence
will be pointed out, together with any useful lessons to be gathered
from the goodness or badness, the success or failure, of the grand
combinations, and from the part played by sea power.

On the 13th of March, 1778, the French ambassador at London notified
the English government that France had acknowledged the independence
of the United States, and made with them a treaty of commerce and
defensive alliance. England at once recalled her ambassador; but
though war was imminent and England at disadvantage, the Spanish king
offered mediation, and France wrongly delayed to strike. In June,
Admiral Keppel sailed from Portsmouth, with twenty ships, on a cruise.
Falling in with two French frigates, his guns, to bring them to,
opened the war. Finding from their papers that thirty-two French ships
lay in Brest, he at once returned for reinforcements. Sailing again
with thirty ships, he fell in with the French fleet under D'Orvilliers
to the westward of Ushant, and to windward, with a westerly wind. On
the 27th of July was fought the first fleet action of the war,
generally known as the battle of Ushant.

This battle, in which thirty ships-of-the-line fought on either side,
was wholly indecisive in its results. No ship was taken or sunk; both
fleets, after separating, returned to their respective ports. The
action nevertheless obtained great celebrity in England from the
public indignation at its lack of result, and from the storm of naval
and political controversy which followed. The admiral and the officer
third in command belonged to different political parties; they made
charges, one against the other, and in the following courts-martial
all England divided, chiefly on party lines. Public and naval
sentiment generally favored the commander-in-chief, Keppel.

   [Illustration: Pl. IX. KEPPEL OFF USHANT JULY 27, 1778.]

Tactically, the battle presents some interesting features, and
involves one issue which is still living to-day. Keppel was to leeward
and wished to force an action; in order to do this he signalled a
general chase to windward, so that his fastest ships might overtake
the slower ones of the enemy. Granting equal original fleet-speed,
this was quite correct. D'Orvilliers, to windward, had no intention of
fighting except on his own terms. As will generally be the case, the
fleet acting on the offensive obtained its wish. At daybreak of the
27th both fleets were on the port tack, heading west-northwest, with
a steady breeze at southwest (Plate IX., A, A, A).[121] The English
rear (R) had fallen to leeward,[122] and Keppel consequently made
signal to six of its ships to chase to windward, so as to place them
in a better position to support the main body if it could get into
action. D'Orvilliers observed this movement, and construed it to show
an intention to attack his rear with a superior force. The two fleets
being then from six to eight miles apart, he wore his fleet in
succession (French A to B), by which he lost ground to leeward, but
approached the enemy, and was able to see them better (Positions B, B,
B). At the completion of this evolution the wind hauled to the
southward, favoring the English; so Keppel, instead of going about,
stood on for half an hour more (English B to C), and then tacked
together in wake of the French. This confirmed D'Orvilliers'
suspicions, and as the wind, which certainly favored the English that
morning, now hauled back again to the westward, permitting them to lay
up for the French rear, he wore his fleet together (B to C), thus
bringing the rest to aid the rear, now become the van, and preventing
Keppel from concentrating on or penetrating it. The two fleets thus
passed on opposite tacks (C),[123] exchanging ineffective broadsides,
the French running free to windward and having the power to attack,
but not using it. D'Orvilliers then made the signal for his van,
formerly the rear, to wear to leeward of the English rear, which was
to leeward of its own main body, intending himself to remain to
windward and so attack it on both sides; but the commander of that
division, a prince of the blood royal, did not obey, and the possible
advantage was lost. On the English side the same manoeuvre was
attempted. The admiral of the van and some of his ships tacked, as
soon as out of fire (D),[124] and stood after the French rear; but for
the most part the damage to rigging prevented tacking, and wearing was
impossible on account of the ships coming up behind. The French now
stood to leeward and formed line again, but the English were not in
condition to attack. This was the end of the battle.

It has been said that there are some interesting points about this
resultless engagement. One is, that Keppel's conduct was approved
throughout, on oath before the court-martial, by one of the most
distinguished admirals England has brought forth, Sir John Jervis, who
commanded a ship in the fleet. It does not indeed appear what he could
have done more; but his lack of tactical understanding is shown by a
curious remark in his defence. "If the French admiral really meant to
come to action," says he, "I apprehend he would never have put his
fleet on the contrary tack to that on which the British fleet was
approaching." This remark can only proceed from ignorance or
thoughtlessness of the danger to which the rear of the French fleet
would have been exposed, and is the more curious as he himself had
said the English were lying up for it. Keppel's idea seems to have
been that the French should have waited for him to come up abreast,
and then go at it, ship for ship, in what was to him the good old
style; D'Orvilliers was too highly trained to be capable of such
action.

The failure of the Duc de Chartres,[125] commanding the French van
during the firing, to wear in obedience to orders, whether due to
misunderstanding or misconduct, raises the question, which is still
debated, as to the proper position for a naval commander-in-chief in
action. Had D'Orvilliers been in the van, he could have insured the
evolution he wished. From the centre the admiral has the extremities
of his fleet equally visible, or invisible, as it may be. At the head
he enforces his orders by his example. The French toward the end of
this war solved the question by taking him out of the line altogether
and putting him on board a frigate, for the avowed reasons that he
could thus better see the movements of his fleet and of the enemy
without being blinded by smoke or distracted by the occurrences on
board his own ship, and that his signals could be better seen.[126]
This position, resembling somewhat that of a general on shore, being
remote from personal risk, was also assumed by Lord Howe in 1778; but
both that officer and the French abandoned the practice later. Nelson
at Trafalgar, the end of his career, led his column; but it may be
doubted whether he had any other motive than his ardor for battle. The
two other great attacks in which he commanded in chief were directed
against ships at anchor, and in neither did he take the head of the
column; for the good reason that, his knowledge of the ground being
imperfect, the leading ship was in most danger of grounding. The
common practice in the days of broadside sailing-ships, except when a
general chase was ordered, was for the admiral to be in the line, and
in the centre of it. The departure from this custom on the part of
both Nelson and Collingwood, each of whom led his own columns at
Trafalgar, may have had some reason, and an ordinary man rather
shrinks from criticising the action of officers of their eminence. The
danger to which were exposed the two senior officers of the fleet,
upon whom so much depended, is obvious; and had any serious injury
befallen their persons, or the head of their columns, the lack of
their influence would have been seriously felt. As it was, they were
speedily obliterated, as admirals, in the smoke of the battle, leaving
to those who came after them no guidance or control except the
brilliancy of their courage and example. A French admiral has pointed
out that the practical effect of the mode of attack at Trafalgar, two
columns bearing down upon a line at right angles to them, was to
sacrifice the head of the columns in making two breaches in the
enemy's line. So far, very well; the sacrifice was well worth while;
and into these breaches came up the rear ships of each column, nearly
fresh, forming in fact a _reserve_ which fell upon the shattered ships
of the enemy on either side of the breaks. Now this idea of a reserve
prompts a thought as to the commander-in-chief. The size of his ship
was such as precluded its being out of the order; but would it not
have been well had the admiral of each column been with this reserve,
keeping in his hands the power of directing it according to the
chances of the action, making him a reality as well as a name for some
time longer, and to a very useful purpose? The difficulty of arranging
any system of signals or light despatch-boats which could take the
place of the aids or messengers of a general, coupled with the fact
that ships cannot stand still, as divisions of men do, waiting orders,
but that they must have steerage-way, precludes the idea of putting an
admiral of a fleet under way in a light vessel. By so doing he becomes
simply a spectator; whereas by being in the most powerful ship of the
fleet he retains the utmost weight possible after action is once
engaged, and, if this ship be in the reserve, the admiral keeps to the
latest possible moment the power of commander-in-chief in his own
hands. "Half a loaf is better than no bread;" if the admiral cannot,
from the conditions of sea warfare, occupy the calmly watchful
position of his brother on shore, let there be secured for him as much
as may be. The practice of Farragut after New Orleans and Vicksburg,
that is to say, in the latter part of his career, when it may be
believed experience had determined his views, was to lead in person.
It is known that he very reluctantly, at the solicitation of various
officers, yielded his convictions in this matter at Mobile so far as
to take the second place, and afterward freely expressed his regrets
for having done so. It may, however, be argued that the character of
all the actions in which Farragut commanded had a peculiarity,
differentiating them from battles in the strict sense of the word. At
New Orleans, at Vicksburg, at Port Hudson, and at Mobile, the task was
not to engage, but to pass fortifications which the fleet confessedly
could not stand up to; and the passage was to be made under conditions
mainly of pilotage upon ground as to which, unlike Nelson, he had good
knowledge. There was thus imposed upon the commander-in-chief the duty
of leadership in the literal, as well as the military, sense of the
term. So leading, he not only pointed out to the fleet the safe road,
but, drawing continually ahead of the smoke, was better able to see
and judge the path ahead, and to assume the responsibility of a course
which he may have prescribed and intended throughout, but from which a
subordinate might shrink. It has not perhaps been commonly noted, that
at Mobile the leaders, not only of one but of both columns, at the
critical point of the road hesitated and doubted as to the admiral's
purpose; not that they had not received it clearly, but because
circumstances seemed to them to be different from what he had
supposed. Not only Alden in the "Brooklyn," but Craven also in the
"Tecumseh," departed from the admiral's orders and left the course
dictated to them, with disastrous results. There is no necessity to
condemn either captain; but the irresistible inference is that
Farragut was unqualifiedly right in his opinion that the man who alone
has the highest responsibility should, under the conditions of his
battles, be in the front. And here it must be remarked that at such
critical moments of doubt any but the highest order of mind tends to
throw off the responsibility of decision upon the superior, though
from the instancy of the case hesitation or delay may be fatal. A man
who as the commissioned chief would act intelligently, as the mere
subordinate will balk. Nelson's action at St. Vincent will rarely be
emulated, a truth which is strongly shown by the fact that
Collingwood was immediately in his rear that day, and did not imitate
his action till signalled by the commander-in-chief; yet after
receiving the authority of the signal, he particularly distinguished
himself by his judgment and daring.[127] It will be recalled, also, in
connection with this question of pilot-ground battles, that a central
position nearly lost the flag-ship at New Orleans, owing to the
darkness and to the smoke from the preceding ships; the United States
fleet came near finding itself without its leader after the passage of
the forts. Now as the mention of a reserve prompted one set of
considerations, so the name of pilotage suggests certain ideas,
broader than itself, which modify what has been said of keeping the
admiral with the reserve. The ease and quickness with which a steam
fleet can change its formation make it very probable that a fleet
bearing down to attack may find itself, almost at the very moment of
collision, threatened with some unlooked-for combination; then where
would be the happiest position for an admiral? Doubtless in that part
of his own order where he could most readily pilot his ships into the
new disposition, or direction, by which he would meet the changed
conditions; that is, in the position of leading. It would seem that
there are always two moments of greatest importance in a sea-fight;
one which determines the method of the main attack, the other the
bringing up and directing the effort of the reserve. If the first is
more important, the second perhaps requires the higher order of
ability; for the former may and should proceed on a before-determined
plan, while the latter may, and often must, be shaped to meet
unforeseen exigencies. The conditions of sea-battles of the future
contain one element that land battles cannot have,--the extreme
rapidity with which encounters and changes of order can take place.
However troops may be moved by steam to the field of battle, they will
there fight on foot or on horseback, and with a gradual development of
their plan, which will allow the commander-in-chief time to make his
wishes known (as a rule, of course), in case of a change in the
enemy's attack. On the other hand, a fleet, comparatively small in
numbers and with its component units clearly defined, may be
meditating an important change of which no sign can appear until it
begins, and which will occupy but a few minutes. So far as these
remarks are sound, they show the need of a second in command
thoroughly conversant with not only the plans, but with the leading
principles of action of his chief,--a need plain enough from the fact
that the two extremities of the order-of-battle may be necessarily
remote, and that you want the spirit of the leader at both
extremities. As he cannot be there in person, the best thing is to
have an efficient second at one end. As regards Nelson's position at
Trafalgar, mentioned at the beginning of this discussion, it is to be
noted that the "Victory" did nothing that another ship could not have
done as well, and that the lightness of the wind forbade the
expectation of any sudden change in the enemy's order. The enormous
risk run by the person of the admiral, on whose ship was concentrated
the fire of the enemy's line, and which led several captains to
implore a change, was condemned long before by Nelson himself in one
of his letters after the battle of the Nile:--

    "I think, if it had pleased God I had not been wounded, not a
    boat would have escaped to have told the tale; but do not
    believe that any individual in the fleet is to blame.... I only
    mean to say that if my experience could in person have directed
    those individuals, there was every appearance that Almighty God
    would have continued to bless my endeavors," etc.[128]

Yet, notwithstanding such an expression of opinion based upon
experience, he took the most exposed position at Trafalgar, and upon
the loss of the leader there followed a curious exemplification of its
effects. Collingwood at once, rightly or wrongly, avoidably or
unavoidably, reversed Nelson's plans, urged with his last breath.
"Anchor! Hardy, do you anchor!" said the dying chief. "Anchor!" said
Collingwood. "It is the last thing I should have thought of."

FOOTNOTES:

[113] Troude: Batailles Navales.

[114] Mahon: History of England.

[115] Lapeyrouse-Bonfils, vol. iii. p. 5.

[116] Troude, vol. ii. pp. 3-5. For other quotations from French
authors to the same effect, see _ante_, pages 77, 80, 81.

[117] Mahon: History of England; Gentleman's Magazine, 1777, p. 553.

[118] Keppel's Defence.

[119] "A candid view of our affairs, which I am going to exhibit, will
make you a judge of the difficulties under which we labor. Almost all
our supplies of flour and no inconsiderable part of our meat are drawn
from the States westward of Hudson's River. This renders a secure
communication across that river indispensably necessary, both to the
support of your squadron and the army. The enemy, being masters of
that navigation, would interrupt this essential intercourse between
the States. They have been sensible of these advantages.... If they
could by any demonstration in another part draw our attention and
strength from this important point, and by anticipating our return
possess themselves of it, the consequences would be fatal. Our
dispositions must therefore have equal regard to co-operating with you
[at Boston] in a defensive plan, and securing the North River, which
the remoteness of the two objects from each other renders peculiarly
difficult."--WASHINGTON to D'ESTAING, Sept. 11, 1778.

[120] Annual Register, 1778, p. 201.

[121] In this plate the plan followed in every other instance, of
showing only the characteristic phases of a battle, in succession, but
disconnected, has been abandoned, and the attempt is to indicate
_continuously_ the series of manoeuvres and the tracks by which the
fleets at last came into contact (from A to C). As the _battle_
consisted merely in the passage by each other of two fleets, moving in
opposite parallel directions, an encounter always indecisive and
futile, the previous manoeuvres constitute the chief interest in an
affair whose historical importance is due to other than tactical
reasons.

[122] The line drawn through the centre of the English fleet at A
shows the close-hauled line (south-southeast) on which, by strict
tactical requirement, the English ships should have borne from each
other.

[123] The leading ships of the two fleets diverged from each other
(C), which is, by the French, attributed to the English van keeping
away; by the English it is said that the French van luffed. The latter
account is followed in the diagrams.

[124] The position D, separated from the rest of the plan, shows the
end of the passage by, which began at C. It could not be shown in
connection with the other tracks without producing confusion.

[125] Afterward Duc d'Orleans; the Philippe Égalité of the French
Revolution, and father of Louis Philippe.

[126] The capture of the French commander-in-chief on board his
flag-ship, in the battle of April 12, 1782, was also a motive for this
new order.

[127] The following incident, occurring during Rodney's chase of De
Grasse, in April, 1782, shows how far subordination may be carried.
Hood was one of the finest of the British officers; nor does the
author undertake to criticise his action. He was some miles from
Rodney at the time. "The separated French ship in the N.W., having got
the breeze at the same time as our van division, boldly stood for and
endeavored to weather the British advanced ships; that being the only
way to regain her own fleet, then to windward. To such a length did
she carry her audacity that she compelled the Alfred, the headmost
ship of Sir Samuel Hood's division, to bear up in order to allow her
to pass. Every eye was fixed upon the bold Frenchman, excepting those
who were anxiously looking out on the commander-in-chief to make the
signal to engage, but who, most likely from not supposing it could be
an enemy, did not throw out the ardently looked-for signal, and
therefore not a gun was fired. This is mentioned to show the state of
discipline on board the ships composing Sir Samuel Hood's division,
and that he, though second in command, would not fire a single shot
until directed to do so by his commander-in-chief. 'It is more than
probable that Sir S. Hood's reason for having waited for the signal to
engage from his commander-in-chief, ere he would fire, arose from the
supposition that had he been the occasion of prematurely bringing on
an action under the above circumstances, he would have been
responsible for the results.'" (White's Naval Researches, p. 97.)

Hood may have been influenced by Rodney's bearing toward inferiors
whose initiative displeased him. The relations of the two seem to have
been strained.

[128] Sir N.H. Nicholas: Despatches and Letters of Lord Nelson.




CHAPTER X.

    MARITIME WAR IN NORTH AMERICA AND WEST INDIES, 1778-1781.--ITS
    INFLUENCE UPON THE COURSE OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION.--FLEET
    ACTIONS OFF GRENADA, DOMINICA, AND CHESAPEAKE BAY.


On the 15th of April, 1778, Admiral Comte d'Estaing sailed from Toulon
for the American continent, having under his command twelve
ships-of-the-line and five frigates. With him went as a passenger a
minister accredited to Congress, who was instructed to decline all
requests for subsidies, and to avoid explicit engagements relative to
the conquest of Canada and other British possessions. "The Cabinet of
Versailles," says a French historian, "was not sorry for the United
States to have near them a cause of anxiety, which would make them
feel the value of the French alliance."[129] While acknowledging the
generous sympathy of many Frenchmen for their struggle, Americans need
not blind themselves to the self-interestedness of the French
government. Neither should they find fault; for its duty was to
consider French interests first.

D'Estaing's progress was very slow. It is said that he wasted much
time in drills, and even uselessly. However that may be, he did not
reach his destination, the Capes of the Delaware, until the 8th of
July,--making a passage of twelve weeks, four of which were spent in
reaching the Atlantic. The English government had news of his intended
sailing; and in fact, as soon as they recalled their ambassador at
Paris, orders were sent to America to evacuate Philadelphia, and
concentrate upon New York. Fortunately for them, Lord Howe's
movements were marked by a vigor and system other than D'Estaing's.
First assembling his fleet and transports in Delaware Bay, and then
hastening the embarkation of stores and supplies, he left Philadelphia
as soon as the army had marched from there for New York. Ten days were
taken up in reaching the mouth of the bay;[130] but he sailed from it
the 28th of June, ten days before D'Estaing arrived, though more than
ten weeks after he had sailed. Once outside, a favoring wind took the
whole fleet to Sandy Hook in two days. War is unforgiving; the prey
that D'Estaing had missed by delays foiled him in his attempts upon
both New York and Rhode Island.

The day after Howe's arrival at Sandy Hook the English army reached
the heights of Navesink, after an harassing march through New Jersey,
with Washington's troops hanging upon its rear. By the active
co-operation of the navy it was carried up to New York by the 5th of
July; and Howe then went back to bar the entrance to the port against
the French fleet. As no battle followed, the details of his
arrangements will not be given; but a very full and interesting
account by an officer of the fleet can be found in Ekins's "Naval
Battles." Attention, however, may well be called to the combination of
energy, thought, skill, and determination shown by the admiral. The
problem before him was to defend a practicable pass with six
sixty-four-gun ships and three of fifty, against eight of seventy-four
guns or over, three sixty-fours, and one fifty,--it may be said
against nearly double his own force.

D'Estaing anchored outside, south of the Hook, on the 11th of July,
and there remained until the 22d, engaged in sounding the bar, and
with every apparent determination to enter. On the 22d a high
northeast wind, coinciding with a spring tide, raised the water on the
bar to thirty feet. The French fleet got under way, and worked up to
windward to a point fair for crossing the bar. Then D'Estaing's heart
failed him under the discouragement of the pilots; he gave up the
attack and stood away to the southward.

Naval officers cannot but sympathize with the hesitation of a seaman
to disregard the advice of pilots, especially on a coast foreign to
him; but such sympathy should not close their eyes to the highest type
of character. Let any one compare the action of D'Estaing at New York
with that of Nelson at Copenhagen and the Nile, or that of Farragut at
Mobile and Port Hudson, and the inferiority of the Frenchman as a
military leader, guided only by military considerations, is painfully
apparent. New York was the very centre of the British power; its fall
could not but have shortened the war. In fairness to D'Estaing,
however, it must be remembered that other than military considerations
had to weigh with him. The French admiral doubtless had instructions
similar to those of the French minister, and he probably reasoned that
France had nothing to gain by the fall of New York, which might have
led to peace between America and England, and left the latter free to
turn all her power against his own country. Less than that would have
been enough to decide his wavering mind as to risking his fleet over
the bar.

Howe was more fortunate than D'Estaing, in having no divided purposes.
Having escaped from Philadelphia and saved New York by his diligence,
he had in store the further honor of saving Rhode Island by the like
rapid movements. Scattered ships-of-war from a fleet despatched from
England now began to arrive. On the 28th of July Howe was informed
that the French fleet, which had disappeared to the southward, had
been seen heading for Rhode Island. In four days his fleet was ready
for sea, but owing to contrary winds did not reach Point Judith till
the 9th of August. There he anchored, and learned that D'Estaing had
run the batteries the day before and anchored between Gould and
Canonicut Islands;[131] the Seakonnet and Western passages had also
been occupied by French ships, and the fleet was prepared to sustain
the American army in an attack upon the British works.

The arrival of Howe, although his reinforcements did not raise the
English fleet to over two thirds the strength of the French, upset
D'Estaing's plans. With the prevailing summer southwest breezes
blowing straight into the bay, he was exposed to any attempts his
adversary might make. That same night the wind shifted unexpectedly to
the northward, and D'Estaing at once got under way and stood out to
sea. Howe, though surprised by this unlooked-for act,--for he had not
felt himself strong enough to attack,--also made sail to keep the
weather-gage. The next twenty-four hours passed in manoeuvring for the
advantage; but on the night of the 11th of August a violent gale of
wind dispersed the fleets. Great injury was done to the vessels of
both, and among others the French flag-ship "Languedoc," of ninety
guns, lost all her masts and her rudder. Immediately after the gale
two different English fifty-gun ships, in fighting order, fell in, the
one with the "Languedoc," the other with the "Tonnant," of eighty
guns, having only one mast standing. Under such conditions both
English ships attacked; but night coming on, they ceased action,
intending to begin again in the morning. When morning came, other
French ships also came, and the opportunity was lost. It is suggestive
to note that one of the captains was Hotham, who as admiral of the
Mediterranean fleet, seventeen years later, so annoyed Nelson by his
cool satisfaction in having taken only two ships: "We must be
contented; we have done very well." This was the immediate occasion of
Nelson's characteristic saying, "Had we taken ten sail, and allowed
the eleventh to escape, being able to get at her, I could never have
called it well done."

The English fell back on New York. The French rallied again off the
entrance of Narragansett Bay; but D'Estaing decided that he could not
remain on account of the damage to the squadron, and accordingly
sailed for Boston on the 21st of August. Rhode Island was thus left to
the English, who retained it for a year longer, evacuating then for
strategic reasons. Howe on his part diligently repaired his ships, and
sailed again for Rhode Island when he heard of the French being there;
but meeting on the way a vessel with word of their going to Boston, he
followed them to that harbor, in which they were too strongly placed
to be attacked. Taking into consideration his enforced return to New
York, the necessary repairs, and the fact that he was only four days
behind the French at Boston, it may be believed that Howe showed to
the end the activity which characterized the beginning of his
operations.

Scarcely a shot had been exchanged between the two fleets, yet the
weaker had thoroughly outgeneralled the stronger. With the exception of
the manoeuvres for the weather-gage after D'Estaing left Newport, which
have not been preserved, and of Howe's dispositions to receive the
expected attack in New York Bay, the lessons are not tactical, but
strategic, and of present application. Chief among them undoubtedly
stands the value of celerity and watchfulness, combined with knowledge
of one's profession. Howe learned of his danger by advices from home
three weeks after D'Estaing sailed from Toulon. He had to gather in his
cruisers from the Chesapeake and outside, get his ships-of-the-line
from New York and Rhode Island, embark the supplies of an army of ten
thousand men, move down the Delaware,--which unavoidably took ten
days,--and round to New York again. D'Estaing was ten days behind him
at the Delaware, twelve days at Sandy Hook, and only one day ahead of
him in entering Newport, outside which harbor he had lain ten days
before sailing in. An English narrator in the fleet, speaking of the
untiring labor between June 30, when the English army reached Navesink,
and the arrival of the French fleet on the 11th of July, says: "Lord
Howe attended in person as usual, and by his presence animated the zeal
and quickened the industry of officers and men." In this quality he was
a marked contrast to his amiable but indolent brother, General Howe.

The same industry and watchfulness marked his remaining operations. As
soon as the French ships hauled off to the southward, lookout vessels
followed them, and preparations continued (notably of fireships) for
pursuit. The last ship that joined from England crossed the bar at New
York on the 30th of July. On the 1st of August the fleet was ready for
sea, with four fire-ships. The accident of the wind delayed his next
movements; but, as has been seen, he came up only one day after the
entrance of the enemy into Newport, which his inferior force could not
have prevented. But the object of the enemy, which he could not
oppose, was frustrated by his presence. D'Estaing was no sooner in
Newport than he wished himself out. Howe's position was strategically
excellent. With his weatherly position in reference to the prevailing
winds, the difficulty of beating a fleet out through the narrow
entrance to the harbor would expose the French ships trying it to be
attacked in detail; while if the wind unluckily came fair, the admiral
relied upon his own skill to save his squadron.

Cooper, in one of his novels, "The Two Admirals," makes his hero say
to a cavilling friend that if he had not been in the way of good luck,
he could not have profited by it. The sortie of the French, the
subsequent gale, and the resulting damage were all what is commonly
called luck; but if it had not been for Howe's presence off Point
Judith threatening them, they would have ridden out the gale at their
anchors inside. Howe's energy and his confidence in himself as a
seaman had put him in the way of good luck, and it is not fair to deny
his active share in bringing it about. But for him the gale would not
have saved the British force in Newport.[132]

D'Estaing, having repaired his ships, sailed with his whole force for
Martinique on the 4th of November; on the same day Commodore Hotham
left New York for Barbadoes, with five sixty-four and fifty-gun ships
and a convoy of five thousand troops, destined for the conquest of
Sta. Lucia Island. On the way a heavy gale of wind injured the French
fleet more than the English, the French flag-ship losing her main and
mizzen topmasts. The loss of these spars, and the fact that twelve
unencumbered ships-of-war reached Martinique only one day before the
convoy of fifty-nine English transports reached Barbadoes, a hundred
miles farther on, tells badly for the professional skill which then
and now is a determining feature in naval war.

Admiral Barrington, commanding at Barbadoes, showed the same energy as
Howe. The transports arrived on the 10th; the troops were kept on
board; sailed on the morning of the 12th for Sta. Lucia, and anchored
there at three P.M. the 13th. The same afternoon half the troops were
landed, and the rest the next morning. They seized at once a better
port, to which the admiral was about to move the transports when the
appearance of D'Estaing prevented him. All that night the transports
were being warped inside the ships-of-war, and the latter anchored
across the entrance to the bay, especial care being taken to
strengthen the two extremities of the line, and to prevent the enemy
from passing inside the weather end, as the English ships in after
years did at the battle of the Nile. The French was much more than
double the English fleet; and if the latter were destroyed, the
transports and troops would be trapped.

D'Estaing stood down along the English order twice from north to
south, cannonading at long range, but did not anchor. Abandoning then
his intentions against the fleet, he moved to another bay, landed some
French soldiers, and assaulted the position of the English troops.
Failing here also, he retired to Martinique; and the French garrison,
which had been driven into the interior of the island, surrendered.

It seems scarcely necessary to point out the admirable diligence of
Admiral Barrington, to which and to the skill of his dispositions he
owed this valuable strategic success; for such it was. Sta. Lucia was
the island next south of Martinique, and the harbor of Gros Ilot at
its northern end was especially adapted to the work of watching the
French depot at Fort Royal, their principal station in the West
Indies. Thence Rodney pursued them before his great action in 1782.

The absence of precise information causes hesitation in condemning
D'Estaing for this mortifying failure. His responsibility depends upon
the wind, which may have been light under the land, and upon his power
to anchor. The fact, however, remains that he passed twice along the
enemy's line within cannon-shot, yet did not force a decisive action.
His course was unfavorably criticised by the great Suffren, then one
of his captains.[133]

The English had thus retrieved the capture of Dominica, which had been
taken on the 8th of September by the French governor of the West India
Islands. There being no English squadron there, no difficulty had been
met. The value of Dominica to the French has been pointed out; and it
is necessary here to use the example of both Dominica and Sta. Lucia
to enforce what has before been said, that the possession of these
smaller islands depended solely upon the naval preponderance. Upon the
grasp of this principle held by any one will depend his criticism upon
the next action of D'Estaing, to be immediately related.

Six months of almost entire quiet followed the affair of Sta. Lucia.
The English were reinforced by the fleet of Byron, who took chief
command; but the French, being joined by ten more ships-of-the-line,
remained superior in numbers. About the middle of June, Byron sailed
with his fleet to protect a large convoy of merchant-ships, bound for
England, till they were clear of the islands. D'Estaing then sent a
very small expedition which seized St. Vincent, June 16, 1779, without
difficulty; and on the 30th of June he sailed with his whole fleet to
attack Grenada. Anchoring off Georgetown on the 2d of July, he landed
his soldiers, and on the 4th the garrison of seven hundred men
surrendered the island. Meanwhile Byron, hearing of the loss of St.
Vincent and probable attack on Grenada, sailed with a large convoy of
vessels carrying troops, and with twenty-one ships-of-the-line, to
regain the one and relieve the other. Receiving on the way definite
information that the French were before Grenada, he kept on for it,
rounding the northwest point of the island at daybreak of July 6. His
approach had been reported the day before to D'Estaing, who remained
at anchor,[134] fearing lest with the currents and light winds he
might drop too far to leeward if he let go the bottom. When the
English came in sight, the French got under way; but the confused
massing of their ships prevented Byron from recognizing at once the
disparity of numbers, they having twenty-five ships-of-the-line. He
made signal for a general chase, and as the disorder of the French
fleet forced it to form on the leewardmost ships, the English easily
retained the advantage of the wind with which they approached. As the
action began, therefore, the French were to the westward with a partly
formed line, on the starboard tack, heading north, the rear in
disorder, and to windward of the van and centre (Plate X., A.). The
English stood down with a fair wind, steering south by west on the
port tack (A), between the island and the enemy, their leading ships
approaching at a slight angle, but heading more directly for his yet
unformed rear; while the English convoy was between its own fleet and
the island, under special charge of three ships (A, a), which were now
called in. As the signal so far commanded a general chase, the three
fastest of the English, among which was the flag of the second in
command, Admiral Barrington, came under fire of the French centre and
rear, apparently unsupported (b), and suffered much from the
consequent concentration of fire upon them. When they reached the
sternmost ships they wore upon the same tack with them and stood
north, after and to windward of them; and at about the same time
Byron, who had not before known of the surrender, saw the French flag
flying over the forts. Signals followed to wear in succession, and for
the advanced ships to form line for mutual support, ceasing the
general chase under which the engagement had hitherto been fought.
While the main body was still standing south on the port tack, three
ships,--"Cornwall," "Grafton," and "Lion" (c),--obeying literally the
signal for close action, had passed much to leeward of the others,
drawing upon themselves most of the fire of the enemy's line. They
thus suffered very severely in men and spars; and though finally
relieved by the advanced ships, as these approached from the southward
on the opposite tack, they were unable, after wearing (B, c', c''), to
keep up with the fleet, and so dropped astern and toward the French.
The bulk of the injury sustained by the English fell upon these three,
upon the three advanced ships under Barrington, and upon two others in
the rear (A, a), which, seeing the van so heavily engaged, did not
follow the successive movement, but bore down straight out of the
order, and took their places at the head of the column (B, a, a'),--an
act strongly resembling that which won Nelson such high renown at Cape
St. Vincent, but involving less responsibility.[135]

   [Illustration: Pl. X. D'ESTAING AND BYRON JULY 6, 1779]

So far Byron had conducted his attack, using the initiative permitted
him by the advantage of the wind and the disorder of the French rear.
It will be observed that, though it was desirable to lose no time in
assailing the latter while in confusion, it is questionable whether
Barrington's three ships should have been allowed to separate as far
as they seem to have done from the rest of the fleet. A general chase
is permissible and proper when, from superiority of numbers, original
or acquired, or from the general situation, the ships first in action
will not be greatly outnumbered, or subjected to overpowering
concentration before support comes up, or when there is probability
that the enemy may escape unless promptly struck. This was not so
here. Nor should the "Cornwall," "Grafton," and "Lion" have been
permitted to take a course which allowed, almost compelled, the enemy
to concentrate rather than diffuse his fire. The details of the affair
are not precise enough to warrant more comment than naming these
mistakes, without necessarily attributing them to fault on the part of
the admiral.

The French had up to this time remained strictly on the defensive, in
accordance with their usual policy. There was now offered an
opportunity for offensive action which tested D'Estaing's professional
qualities, and to appreciate which the situation at the moment must be
understood. Both fleets were by this on the starboard tack, heading
north (B, B, B), the French to leeward. The latter had received little
injury in their motive power, though their line was not in perfect
order; but the English, owing to the faulty attack, had seven ships
seriously crippled, four of which--the "Monmouth" (a'), "Grafton,"
"Cornwall" (c'), and "Lion" (c'')--were disabled. The last three, by
three P.M., were a league astern and much to leeward of their line,
being in fact nearer the French than the English; while the speed of
the English fleet was necessarily reduced to that of the crippled
ships remaining in line. These conditions bring out strongly the
embarrassments of a fleet whose injuries are concentrated upon a few
ships, instead of being distributed among all; the ten or twelve which
were practically untouched had to conform to the capabilities of the
others. D'Estaing, with twenty-five ships, now had Byron to windward
of him with seventeen or eighteen capable of holding together, but
slower and less handy than their enemies, and saw him tactically
embarrassed by the care of a convoy to windward and three disabled
ships to leeward. Under these circumstances three courses were open to
the French admiral: (1) He might stretch ahead, and, tacking in
succession, place himself between Byron and the convoy, throwing his
frigates among the latter; (2) He might tack his fleet together and
stand up to the English line to bring on a general action; or (3) he
could, after going about, cut off the three disabled ships, which
might bring on a general action with less exposure.

None of these did he do. As regards the first, he, knowing the
criticisms of the fleet, wrote home that his line was too much
disordered to allow it. Whatever the technical irregularity, it is
difficult to believe that, with the relative power of motion in the
two fleets, the attempt was hopeless. The third alternative probably
presented the greatest advantage, for it insured the separation
between the enemy's main body and the crippled ships, and might very
probably exasperate the British admiral into an attack under most
hazardous conditions. It is stated by English authorities that Byron
said he would have borne down again, had any attack been made on them.
At three P.M. D'Estaing tacked all together, forming line on the lee
ship,[136] and stood to the southward again. The English imitated
this movement, except the van ship "Monmouth" (a'), which being too
badly hurt to manoeuvre kept on to the northward, and the three
separated ships. Two of these (c') kept on north and passed once more
under the French broadsides; but the "Lion" (c''), unable to keep to
the wind, kept broad off before it across the bows of the enemy, for
Jamaica, a thousand miles away. She was not pursued; a single
transport was the sole maritime trophy of the French. "Had the
admiral's seamanship equalled his courage," wrote the celebrated
Suffren, who commanded the French van ship, "we would not have
suffered four dismasted vessels to escape." "D'Estaing, at the age of
thirty, had been transferred from the army to the navy with the
premature rank of rear-admiral. The navy did not credit him with
nautical ability when the war broke out, and it is safe to say that
its opinion was justified by his conduct during it."[137] "Brave as
his sword, D'Estaing was always the idol of the soldier, the idol of
the seaman; but moral authority over his officers failed him on
several occasions, notwithstanding the marked protection extended to
him by the king."[138]

Another cause than incapacity as a seaman has usually been assigned by
French historians for the impotent action of D'Estaing on this
occasion. He looked upon Grenada, they say, as the real objective of
his efforts, and considered the English fleet a very secondary
concern. Ramatuelle, a naval tactician who served actively in this war
and wrote under the Empire, cites this case, which he couples with
that of Yorktown and others, as exemplifying the true policy of naval
war. His words, which probably reflect the current opinion of his
service in that day, as they certainly do the policy of French
governments, call for more than passing mention, as they involve
principles worthy of most serious discussion:--

    "The French navy has always preferred the glory of assuring or
    preserving a conquest to that, more brilliant perhaps, but
    actually less real, of taking a few ships; and in that it has
    approached more nearly the true end to be proposed in war. What
    in fact would the loss of a few ships matter to the English? The
    essential point is to attack them in their possessions, the
    immediate source of their commercial wealth and of their
    maritime power. The war of 1778 furnishes examples which prove
    the devotion of the French admirals to the true interests of the
    country. The preservation of the island of Grenada, the
    reduction of Yorktown where the English army surrendered, the
    conquest of the island of St. Christopher, were the result of
    great battles in which the enemy was allowed to retreat
    undisturbed, rather than risk giving him a chance to succor the
    points attacked."

The issue could not be more squarely raised than in the case of
Grenada. No one will deny that there are moments when a probable
military success is to be foregone, or postponed, in favor of one
greater or more decisive. The position of De Grasse at the Chesapeake,
in 1781, with the fate of Yorktown hanging in the balance, is in
point; and it is here coupled with that of D'Estaing at Grenada, as
though both stood on the same grounds. Both are justified alike; not
on their respective merits as fitting the particular cases, but upon a
general principle. Is that principle sound? The bias of the writer
quoted betrays itself unconsciously, in saying "a few ships." A whole
navy is not usually to be crushed at a blow; a few ships mean an
ordinary naval victory. In Rodney's famous battle only five ships were
taken, though Jamaica was saved thereby.

In order to determine the soundness of the principle, which is claimed
as being illustrated by these two cases (St. Christopher will be
discussed later on), it is necessary to examine what was the advantage
sought, and what the determining factor of success in either case. At
Yorktown the advantage sought was the capture of Cornwallis's army;
the objective was the destruction of the enemy's organized military
force on shore. At Grenada the chosen objective was the possession of
a piece of territory of no great military value; for it must be
remarked that all these smaller Antilles, if held in force at all,
multiplied large detachments, whose mutual support depended wholly
upon the navy. These large detachments were liable to be crushed
separately, if not supported by the navy; and if naval superiority is
to be maintained, the enemy's navy must be crushed. Grenada, near and
to leeward of Barbadoes and Sta. Lucia, both held strongly by the
English, was peculiarly weak to the French; but sound military policy
for all these islands demanded one or two strongly fortified and
garrisoned naval bases, and dependence for the rest upon the fleet.
Beyond this, security against attacks by single cruisers and
privateers alone was needed.

Such were the objectives in dispute. What was the determining factor
in this strife? Surely the navy, the organized military force afloat.
Cornwallis's fate depended absolutely upon the sea. It is useless to
speculate upon the result, had the odds on the 5th of September, 1781,
in favor of De Grasse, been reversed; if the French, instead of five
ships more, had had five ships less than the English. As it was, De
Grasse, when that fight began, had a superiority over the English
equal to the result of a hard-won fight. The question then was, should
he risk the almost certain decisive victory over the organized enemy's
force ashore, for the sake of a much more doubtful advantage over the
organized force afloat? This was not a question of Yorktown, but of
Cornwallis and his army; there is a great deal in the way things are
put.

So stated,--and the statement needs no modifications,--there can be
but one answer. Let it be remarked clearly, however, that _both_ De
Grasse's alternatives brought before him the organized forces as the
objective.

Not so with D'Estaing at Grenada. His superiority in numbers over the
English was nearly as great as that of De Grasse; his alternative
objectives were the organized force afloat and a small island,
fertile, but militarily unimportant. Grenada is said to have been a
strong position for defence; but intrinsic strength does not give
importance, if the position has not strategic value. To save the
island, he refused to use an enormous advantage fortune had given him
over the fleet. Yet upon the strife between the two navies depended
the tenure of the islands. Seriously to hold the West India Islands
required, first, a powerful seaport, which the French had; second, the
control of the sea. For the latter it was necessary, not to multiply
detachments in the islands, but to destroy the enemy's navy, which may
be accurately called the army in the field. The islands were but rich
towns; and not more than one or two fortified towns, or posts, were
needed.

It may safely be said that the principle which led to D'Estaing's
action was not, to say the least, unqualifiedly correct; for it led
him wrong. In the case of Yorktown, the principle as stated by
Ramatuelle is not the _justifying_ reason of De Grasse's conduct,
though it likely enough was the _real_ reason. What justified De
Grasse was that, the event depending upon the unshaken control of the
sea, for a short time only, he already had it by his greater numbers.
Had the numbers been equal, loyalty to the military duty of the hour
must have forced him to fight, to stop the attempt which the English
admiral would certainly have made. The destruction of a few ships, as
Ramatuelle slightingly puts it, gives just that superiority to which
the happy result at Yorktown was due. As a general principle, this is
undoubtedly a better objective than that pursued by the French. Of
course, exceptions will be found; but those exceptions will probably
be where, as at Yorktown, the military force is struck at directly
elsewhere, or, as at Port Mahon, a desirable and powerful base of that
force is at stake; though even at Mahon it is doubtful whether the
prudence was not misplaced. Had Hawke or Boscawen met with Byng's
disaster, they would not have gone to Gibraltar to repair it, unless
the French admiral had followed up his first blow with others,
increasing their disability.

Grenada was no doubt very dear in the eyes of D'Estaing, because it
was his only success. After making the failures at the Delaware, at
New York, and at Rhode Island, with the mortifying affair at Sta.
Lucia, it is difficult to understand the confidence in him expressed
by some French writers. Gifted with a brilliant and contagious
personal daring, he distinguished himself most highly, when an
admiral, by leading in person assaults upon intrenchments at Sta.
Lucia and Grenada, and a few months later in the unsuccessful attack
upon Savannah.

During the absence of the French navy in the winter of 1778-79, the
English, controlling now the sea with a few of their ships that had
not gone to the West Indies, determined to shift the scene of the
continental war to the Southern States, where there was believed to be
a large number of loyalists. The expedition was directed upon Georgia,
and was so far successful that Savannah fell into their hands in the
last days of 1778. The whole State speedily submitted. Operations were
thence extended into South Carolina, but failed to bring about the
capture of Charleston.

Word of these events was sent to D'Estaing in the West Indies,
accompanied by urgent representations of the danger to the Carolinas,
and the murmurings of the people against the French, who were accused
of forsaking their allies, having rendered them no service, but on the
contrary having profited by the cordial help of the Bostonians to
refit their crippled fleet. There was a sting of truth in the alleged
failure to help, which impelled D'Estaing to disregard the orders
actually in his hands to return at once to Europe with certain ships.
Instead of obeying them he sailed for the American coast with
twenty-two ships-of-the-line, having in view two objects,--the relief
of the Southern States and an attack upon New York in conjunction with
Washington's army.

Arriving off the coast of Georgia on the 1st of September, D'Estaing
took the English wholly at unawares; but the fatal lack of promptness,
which had previously marked the command of this very daring man, again
betrayed his good fortune. Dallying at first before Savannah, the
fleeting of precious days again brought on a change of conditions, and
the approach of the bad-weather season impelled him, too slow at
first, into a premature assault. In it he displayed his accustomed
gallantry, fighting at the head of his column, as did the American
general; but the result was a bloody repulse. The siege was raised,
and D'Estaing sailed at once for France, not only giving up his
project upon New York, but abandoning the Southern States to the
enemy. The value of this help from the great sea power of France, thus
cruelly dangled before the eyes of the Americans only to be withdrawn,
was shown by the action of the English, who abandoned Newport in the
utmost haste when they learned the presence of the French fleet.
Withdrawal had been before decided upon, but D'Estaing's coming
converted it into flight.

After the departure of D'Estaing, which involved that of the whole
French fleet,--for the ships which did not go back to France returned
to the West Indies,--the English resumed the attack upon the Southern
States, which had for a moment been suspended. The fleet and army left
New York for Georgia in the last weeks of 1779, and after assembling
at Tybee, moved upon Charleston by way of Edisto. The powerlessness of
the Americans upon the sea left this movement unembarrassed save by
single cruisers, which picked up some stragglers,--affording another
lesson of the petty results of a merely cruising warfare. The siege of
Charleston began at the end of March,--the English ships soon after
passing the bar and Fort Moultrie without serious damage, and
anchoring within gunshot of the place. Fort Moultrie was soon and
easily reduced by land approaches, and the city itself was surrendered
on the 12th of May, after a siege of forty days. The whole State was
then quickly overrun and brought into military subjection.

The fragments of D'Estaing's late fleet were joined by a reinforcement
from France under the Comte de Guichen, who assumed chief command in
the West Indian seas March 22, 1780. The next day he sailed for Sta.
Lucia, which he hoped to find unprepared; but a crusty, hard-fighting
old admiral of the traditional English type, Sir Hyde Parker, had so
settled himself at the anchorage, with sixteen ships, that Guichen
with his twenty-two would not attack. The opportunity, if it were one,
did not recur. De Guichen, returning to Martinique, anchored there on
the 27th; and the same day Parker at Sta. Lucia was joined by the new
English commander-in-chief, Rodney.

This since celebrated, but then only distinguished, admiral was
sixty-two years old at the time of assuming a command where he was to
win an undying fame. Of distinguished courage and professional skill,
but with extravagant if not irregular habits, money embarrassments had
detained him in exile in France at the time the war began. A boast of
his ability to deal with the French fleet, if circumstances enabled
him to go back to England, led a French nobleman who heard it to
assume his debts, moved by feelings in which chivalry and national
pique probably bore equal shares. Upon his return he was given a
command, and sailed, in January, 1780, with a fleet of twenty
ships-of-the-line, to relieve Gibraltar, then closely invested. Off
Cadiz, with a good luck for which he was proverbial, he fell in with a
Spanish fleet of eleven ships-of-the-line, which awkwardly held their
ground until too late to fly.[139] Throwing out the signal for a
general chase, and cutting in to leeward of the enemy, between them
and their port, Rodney, despite a dark and stormy night, succeeded in
blowing up one ship and taking six. Hastening on, he relieved
Gibraltar, placing it out of all danger from want; and then, leaving
the prizes and the bulk of his fleet, sailed with the rest for his
station.

Despite his brilliant personal courage and professional skill, which
in the matter of tactics was far in advance of his contemporaries in
England, Rodney, as a commander-in-chief, belongs rather to the wary,
cautious school of the French tacticians than to the impetuous,
unbounded eagerness of Nelson. As in Tourville we have seen the
desperate fighting of the seventeenth century, unwilling to leave its
enemy, merging into the formal, artificial--we may almost say
trifling--parade tactics of the eighteenth, so in Rodney we shall see
the transition from those ceremonious duels to an action which, while
skilful in conception, aimed at serious results. For it would be
unjust to Rodney to press the comparison to the French admirals of his
day. With a skill that De Guichen recognized as soon as they crossed
swords, Rodney meant mischief, not idle flourishes. Whatever
incidental favors fortune might bestow by the way, the objective from
which his eye never wandered was the French fleet,--the organized
military force of the enemy on the sea. And on the day when Fortune
forsook the opponent who had neglected her offers, when the conqueror
of Cornwallis failed to strike while he had Rodney at a disadvantage,
the latter won a victory which redeemed England from the depths of
anxiety, and restored to her by one blow all those islands which the
cautious tactics of the allies had for a moment gained, save only
Tobago.

De Guichen and Rodney met for the first time on the 17th of April,
1780, three weeks after the arrival of the latter. The French fleet
was beating to windward in the Channel between Martinique and
Dominica, when the enemy was made in the southeast. A day was spent in
manoeuvring for the weather-gage, which Rodney got. The two fleets
being now well to leeward of the islands[140] (Plate XI.), both on the
starboard tack heading to the northward and the French on the lee bow
of the English, Rodney, who was carrying a press of sail, signalled to
his fleet that he meant to attack the enemy's rear and centre with his
whole force; and when he had reached the position he thought suitable,
ordered them to keep away eight points (90°) together (A, A, A). De
Guichen, seeing the danger of the rear, wore his fleet all together
and stood down to succor it. Rodney, finding himself foiled, hauled up
again on the same tack as the enemy, both fleets now heading to the
southward and eastward.[141] Later, he again made signal for battle,
followed an hour after, just at noon, by the order (quoting his own
despatch), "for every ship to bear down and steer for her opposite in
the enemy's line." This, which sounds like the old story of ship to
ship, Rodney explains to have meant her opposite at the moment, not
her opposite in numerical order. His own words are: "In a slanting
position, that my leading ships might attack the van ships of the
enemy's centre division, and the whole British fleet be opposed to
only two thirds of the enemy" (B, B). The difficulty and
misunderstanding which followed seem to have sprung mainly from the
defective character of the signal book. Instead of doing as the
admiral wished, the leading ships (a) carried sail so as to reach
their supposed station abreast their numerical opposite in the order.
Rodney stated afterward that when he bore down the second time, the
French fleet was in a very extended line of battle; and that, had his
orders been obeyed, the centre and rear must have been disabled before
the van could have joined.

   [Illustration: Pl. XI. RODNEY & GUICHEN APRIL 17, 1780.]

There seems every reason to believe that Rodney's intentions
throughout were to double on the French, as asserted. The failure
sprang from the signal-book and tactical inefficiency of the fleet;
for which he, having lately joined, was not answerable. But the
ugliness of his fence was so apparent to De Guichen, that he
exclaimed, when the English fleet kept away the first time, that six
or seven of his ships were gone; and sent word to Rodney that if his
signals had been obeyed he would have had him for his prisoner.[142] A
more convincing proof that he recognized the dangerousness of his
enemy is to be found in the fact that he took care not to have the
lee-gage in their subsequent encounters. Rodney's careful plans being
upset, he showed that with them he carried all the stubborn courage of
the most downright fighter; taking his own ship close to the enemy and
ceasing only when the latter hauled off, her foremast and mainyard
gone, and her hull so damaged that she could hardly be kept afloat.

An incident of this battle mentioned by French writers and by
Botta,[143] who probably drew upon French authorities, but not found
in the English accounts, shows the critical nature of the attack in
the apprehension of the French. According to them, Rodney, marking a
gap in their order due to a ship in rear of the French admiral being
out of station, tried to break through (b); but the captain of the
"Destin," seventy-four, pressed up under more sail and threw himself
across the path of the English ninety-gun ship.

    "The action of the 'Destin' was justly praised," says
    Lapeyrouse-Bonfils. "The fleet ran the danger of almost certain
    defeat, but for the bravery of M. de Goimpy. Such, after the
    affair, was the opinion of the whole French squadron. Yet,
    admitting that our line was broken, what disasters then would
    necessarily threaten the fleet? Would it not always have been
    easy for our rear to remedy the accident by promptly standing on
    to fill the place of the vessels cut off? That movement would
    necessarily have brought about a _mêlée_, which would have
    turned to the advantage of the fleet having the bravest and most
    devoted captains. But then, as under the empire, it was an
    acknowledged principle that ships cut off were ships taken, and
    the belief wrought its own fulfilment."

The effect of breaking an enemy's line, or order-of-battle, depends
upon several conditions. The essential idea is to divide the opposing
force by penetrating through an interval found, or made, in it, and
then to concentrate upon that one of the fractions which can be least
easily helped by the other. In a column of ships this will usually be
the rear. The compactness of the order attacked, the number of the
ships cut off, the length of time during which they can be isolated
and outnumbered, will all affect the results. A very great factor in
the issue will be the moral effect, the confusion introduced into a
line thus broken. Ships coming up toward the break are stopped, the
rear doubles up, while the ships ahead continue their course. Such a
moment is critical, and calls for instant action; but the men are rare
who in an unforeseen emergency can see, and at once take the right
course, especially if, being subordinates, they incur responsibility.
In such a scene of confusion the English, without presumption, hoped
to profit by their better seamanship; for it is not only "courage and
devotion," but skill, which then tells. All these effects of "breaking
the line" received illustration in Rodney's great battle in 1782.

De Guichen and Rodney met twice again in the following month, but on
neither occasion did the French admiral take the favorite lee-gage of
his nation. Meanwhile a Spanish fleet of twelve ships-of-the-line was
on its way to join the French. Rodney cruised to windward of
Martinique to intercept them; but the Spanish admiral kept a northerly
course, sighted Guadeloupe, and thence sent a despatch to De Guichen,
who joined his allies and escorted them into port. The great
preponderance of the coalition, in numbers, raised the fears of the
English islands; but lack of harmony led to delays and hesitations, a
terrible epidemic raged in the Spanish squadron, and the intended
operations came to nothing. In August De Guichen sailed for France
with fifteen ships. Rodney, ignorant of his destination, and anxious
about both North America and Jamaica, divided his fleet, leaving one
half in the islands, and with the remainder sailing for New York,
where he arrived on the 12th of September. The risk thus run was very
great, and scarcely justifiable; but no ill effect followed the
dispersal of forces.[144] Had De Guichen intended to turn upon
Jamaica, or, as was expected by Washington, upon New York, neither
part of Rodney's fleet could well have withstood him. Two chances of
disaster, instead of one, were run, by being in small force on two
fields instead of in full force on one.

Rodney's anxiety about North America was well grounded. On the 12th of
July of this year the long expected French succor arrived,--five
thousand French troops under Rochambeau and seven ships-of-the-line
under De Ternay. Hence the English, though still superior at sea, felt
forced to concentrate at New York, and were unable to strengthen their
operations in Carolina. The difficulty and distance of movements by
land gave such an advantage to sea power that Lafayette urged the
French government further to increase the fleet; but it was still
naturally and properly attentive to its own immediate interests in the
Antilles. It was not yet time to deliver America.

Rodney, having escaped the great hurricane of October, 1780, by his
absence, returned to the West Indies later in the year, and soon after
heard of the war between England and Holland; which, proceeding from
causes which will be mentioned later, was declared December 20, 1780.
The admiral at once seized the Dutch islands of St. Eustatius and St.
Martin, besides numerous merchant-ships, with property amounting in
all to fifteen million dollars. These islands, while still neutral,
had played a rôle similar to that of Nassau during the American Civil
War, and had become a great depot of contraband goods, immense
quantities of which now fell into the English hands.

The year 1780 had been gloomy for the cause of the United States. The
battle of Camden had seemed to settle the English yoke on South
Carolina, and the enemy formed high hopes of controlling both North
Carolina and Virginia. The treason of Arnold following had increased
the depression, which was but partially relieved by the victory at
King's Mountain. The substantial aid of French troops was the most
cheerful spot in the situation. Yet even that had a checkered light,
the second division of the intended help being blocked in Brest by the
English fleet; while the final failure of De Guichen to appear, and
Rodney coming in his stead, made the hopes of the campaign fruitless.

A period of vehement and decisive action was, however, at hand. At the
end of March, 1781, the Comte de Grasse sailed from Brest with
twenty-six ships-of-the-line and a large convoy. When off the Azores,
five ships parted company for the East Indies, under Suffren, of whom
more will be heard later on. De Grasse came in sight of Martinique on
the 28th of April. Admiral Hood (Rodney having remained behind at St.
Eustatius) was blockading before Fort Royal, the French port and
arsenal on the lee side of the island, in which were four
ships-of-the-line, when his lookouts reported the enemy's fleet. Hood
had two objects before him,--one to prevent the junction of the four
blockaded ships with the approaching fleet, the other to keep the
latter from getting between him and Gros Ilot Bay in Sta. Lucia.
Instead of effecting this in the next twenty-four hours, by beating to
windward of the Diamond Rock, his fleet got so far to leeward that De
Grasse, passing through the channel on the 29th, headed up for Fort
Royal, keeping his convoy between the fleet and the island. For this
false position Hood was severely blamed by Rodney, but it may have
been due to light winds and the lee current. However that be, the four
ships in Fort Royal got under way and joined the main body. The
English had now only eighteen ships to the French twenty-four, and the
latter were to windward; but though thus in the proportion of four to
three, and having the power to attack, De Grasse would not do it. The
fear of exposing his convoy prevented him from running the chance of a
serious engagement. Great must have been his distrust of his forces,
one would say. When is a navy to fight, if this was not a time? He
carried on a distant cannonade, with results so far against the
English as to make his backwardness yet more extraordinary. Can a
policy or a tradition which justifies such a line of conduct be good?

The following day, April 30, De Grasse, having thrown away his chance,
attempted to follow Hood; but the latter had no longer any reason for
fighting, and his original inferiority was increased by the severe
injuries of some ships on the 29th. De Grasse could not overtake him,
owing to the inferior speed of his fleet, many of the ships not being
coppered,--a fact worthy of note, as French vessels by model and size
were generally faster than English; but this superiority was
sacrificed through the delay of the government in adopting the new
improvement.

Hood rejoined Rodney at Antigua; and De Grasse, after remaining a
short time at Fort Royal, made an attempt upon Gros Ilot Bay, the
possession of which by the English kept all the movements of his fleet
under surveillance. Foiled here, he moved against Tobago, which
surrendered June 2, 1781. Sailing thence, after some minor operations,
he anchored on the 26th of July at Cap Français (now Cape Haytien), in
the island of Hayti. Here he found awaiting him a French frigate from
the United States, bearing despatches from Washington and Rochambeau,
upon which he was to take the most momentous action that fell to any
French admiral during the war.

The invasion of the Southern States by the English, beginning in
Georgia and followed by the taking of Charleston and the military
control of the two extreme States, had been pressed on to the
northward by way of Camden into North Carolina. On the 16th of August,
1780, General Gates was totally defeated at Camden; and during the
following nine months the English under Cornwallis persisted in their
attempts to overrun North Carolina. These operations, the narration of
which is foreign to our immediate subject, had ended by forcing
Cornwallis, despite many successes in actual encounter, to fall back
exhausted toward the seaboard, and finally upon Wilmington, in which
place depots for such a contingency had been established. His
opponent, General Greene, then turned the American troops toward South
Carolina. Cornwallis, too weak to dream of controlling, or even
penetrating, into the interior of an unfriendly country, had now to
choose between returning to Charleston, to assure there and in South
Carolina the shaken British power, and moving northward again into
Virginia, there to join hands with a small expeditionary force
operating on the James River under Generals Phillips and Arnold. To
fall back would be a confession that the weary marching and fighting
of months past had been without results, and the general readily
convinced himself that the Chesapeake was the proper seat of war, even
if New York itself had to be abandoned. The commander-in-chief, Sir
Henry Clinton, by no means shared this opinion, upon which was
justified a step taken without asking him. "Operations in the
Chesapeake," he wrote, "are attended with great risk unless we are
sure of a permanent superiority at sea. I tremble for the fatal
consequences that may ensue." For Cornwallis, taking the matter into
his own hands, had marched from Wilmington on the 25th of April, 1781,
joining the British already at Petersburg on the 20th of May. The
forces thus united numbered seven thousand men. Driven back from the
open country of South Carolina into Charleston, there now remained two
centres of British power,--at New York and in the Chesapeake. With New
Jersey and Pennsylvania in the hands of the Americans, communication
between the two depended wholly upon the sea.

Despite his unfavorable criticism of Cornwallis's action, Clinton had
himself already risked a large detachment in the Chesapeake. A body of
sixteen hundred men under Benedict Arnold had ravaged the country of
the James and burned Richmond in January of this same year. In the
hopes of capturing Arnold, Lafayette had been sent to Virginia with a
nucleus of twelve hundred troops, and on the evening of the 8th of
March the French squadron at Newport sailed, in concerted movement, to
control the waters of the bay. Admiral Arbuthnot, commanding the
English fleet lying in Gardiner's Bay,[145] learned the departure by
his lookouts, and started in pursuit on the morning of the 10th,
thirty-six hours later. Favored either by diligence or luck, he made
such good time that when the two fleets came in sight of each other, a
little outside of the capes of the Chesapeake, the English were
leading[146] (Plate XII., A, A). They at once went about to meet their
enemy, who, on his part, formed a line-of-battle. The wind at this
time was west, so that neither could head directly into the bay.

The two fleets were nearly equal in strength, there being eight ships
on each side; but the English had one ninety-gun ship, while of the
French one was only a heavy frigate, which was put into the line.
Nevertheless, the case was eminently one for the general French policy
to have determined the action of a vigorous chief, and the failure to
see the matter through must fall upon the good-will of Commodore
Destouches, or upon some other cause than that preference for the
ulterior objects of the operations, of which the reader of French
naval history hears so much. The weather was boisterous and
threatening, and the wind, after hauling once or twice, settled down
to northeast, with a big sea, but was then fair for entering the bay.
The two fleets were by this time both on the port tack standing out to
sea, the French leading, and about a point on the weather bow of the
English (B, B). From this position they wore in succession (c) ahead
of the latter, taking the lee-gage, and thus gaining the use of their
lower batteries, which the heavy sea forbade to the weather-gage. The
English stood on till abreast the enemy's line (a, b), when they wore
together, and soon after attacked in the usual manner, and with the
usual results (C). The three van ships were very badly injured aloft,
but in their turn, throwing their force mainly on the two leaders of
the enemy, crippled them seriously in hulls and rigging. The French
van then kept away, and Arbuthnot, in perplexity, ordered his van to
haul the wind again. M. Destouches now executed a very neat movement
by defiling. Signalling his van to haul up on the other tack (e), he
led the rest of his squadron by the disabled English ships, and after
giving them the successive broadsides of his comparatively fresh
ships, wore (d), and out to sea (D). This was the end of the battle,
in which the English certainly got the worst; but with their usual
tenacity of purpose, being unable to pursue their enemy afloat, they
steered for the bay (D), made the junction with Arnold, and thus broke
up the plans of the French and Americans, from which so much had been
hoped by Washington. There can be no doubt, after careful reading of
the accounts, that after the fighting the French were in better force
than the English, and they in fact claimed the victory; yet the
ulterior objects of the expedition did not tempt them again to try the
issue with a fleet of about their own size.[147]

   [Illustration: Pl. XII. ARBUTHNOT & DESTOUCHES. MARCH 16, 1781.]

The way of the sea being thus open and held in force, two thousand
more English troops sailing from New York reached Virginia on the 26th
of March, and the subsequent arrival of Cornwallis in May raised the
number to seven thousand. The operations of the contending forces
during the spring and summer months, in which Lafayette commanded the
Americans, do not concern our subject. Early in August, Cornwallis,
acting under orders from Clinton, withdrew his troops into the
peninsula between the York and James rivers, and occupied Yorktown.

Washington and Rochambeau had met on the 21st of May, and decided that
the situation demanded that the effort of the French West Indian
fleet, when it came, should be directed against either New York or the
Chesapeake. This was the tenor of the despatch found by De Grasse at
Cap Français, and meantime the allied generals drew their troops
toward New York, where they would be on hand for the furtherance of
one object, and nearer the second if they had to make for it.

In either case the result, in the opinion both of Washington and of
the French government, depended upon superior sea power; but
Rochambeau had privately notified the admiral that his own preference
was for the Chesapeake as the scene of the intended operations, and
moreover the French government had declined to furnish the means for a
formal siege of New York.[148] The enterprise therefore assumed the
form of an extensive military combination, dependent upon ease and
rapidity of movement, and upon blinding the eyes of the enemy to the
real objective,--purposes to which the peculiar qualities of a navy
admirably lent themselves. The shorter distance to be traversed, the
greater depth of water and easier pilotage of the Chesapeake, were
further reasons which would commend the scheme to the judgment of a
seaman; and De Grasse readily accepted it, without making difficulties
or demanding modifications which would have involved discussion and
delay.

Having made his decision, the French admiral acted with great good
judgment, promptitude, and vigor. The same frigate that brought
despatches from Washington was sent back, so that by August 15th the
allied generals knew of the intended coming of the fleet. Thirty-five
hundred soldiers were spared by the governor of Cap Français, upon the
condition of a Spanish squadron anchoring at the place, which De
Grasse procured. He also raised from the governor of Havana the money
urgently needed by the Americans; and finally, instead of weakening
his force by sending convoys to France, as the court had wished, he
took every available ship to the Chesapeake. To conceal his coming as
long as possible, he passed through the Bahama Channel, as a less
frequented route, and on the 30th of August anchored in Lynnhaven Bay,
just within the capes of the Chesapeake, with twenty-eight
ships-of-the-line. Three days before, August 27, the French squadron
at Newport, eight ships-of-the-line with four frigates and eighteen
transports under M. de Barras, sailed for the rendezvous; making,
however, a wide circuit out to sea to avoid the English. This course
was the more necessary as the French siege-artillery was with it. The
troops under Washington and Rochambeau had crossed the Hudson on the
24th of August, moving toward the head of Chesapeake Bay. Thus the
different armed forces, both land and sea, were converging toward
their objective, Cornwallis.

The English were unfortunate in all directions. Rodney, learning of De
Grasse's departure, sent fourteen ships-of-the-line under Admiral Hood
to North America, and himself sailed for England in August, on account
of ill health. Hood, going by the direct route, reached the Chesapeake
three days before De Grasse, looked into the bay, and finding it empty
went on to New York. There he met five ships-of-the-line under Admiral
Graves, who, being senior officer, took command of the whole force and
sailed on the 31st of August for the Chesapeake, hoping to intercept
De Barras before he could join De Grasse. It was not till two days
later that Sir Henry Clinton was persuaded that the allied armies had
gone against Cornwallis, and had too far the start to be overtaken.

Admiral Graves was painfully surprised, on making the Chesapeake, to
find anchored there a fleet which from its numbers could only be an
enemy's. Nevertheless, he stood in to meet it, and as De Grasse got
under way, allowing his ships to be counted, the sense of numerical
inferiority--nineteen to twenty-four--did not deter the English
admiral from attacking. The clumsiness of his method, however,
betrayed his gallantry; many of his ships were roughly handled,
without any advantage being gained. De Grasse, expecting De Barras,
remained outside five days, keeping the English fleet in play without
coming to action; then returning to port he found De Barras safely at
anchor. Graves went back to New York, and with him disappeared the
last hope of succor that was to gladden Cornwallis's eyes. The siege
was steadily endured, but the control of the sea made only one issue
possible, and the English forces were surrendered October 19, 1781.
With this disaster the hope of subduing the colonies died in England.
The conflict flickered through a year longer, but no serious
operations were undertaken.

In the conduct of the English operations, which ended thus
unfortunately, there was both bad management and ill fortune. Hood's
detachment might have been strengthened by several ships from Jamaica,
had Rodney's orders been carried out.[149] The despatch-ship, also,
sent by him to Admiral Graves commanding in New York, found that
officer absent on a cruise to the eastward, with a view to intercept
certain very important supplies which had been forwarded by the
American agent in France. The English Court had laid great stress upon
cutting off this convoy; but, with the knowledge that he had of the
force accompanying it, the admiral was probably ill-advised in leaving
his headquarters himself, with all his fleet, at the time when the
approach of the hurricane season in the West Indies directed the
active operations of the navies toward the continent. In consequence
of his absence, although Rodney's despatches were at once sent on by
the senior officer in New York, the vessel carrying them being driven
ashore by enemy's cruisers, Graves did not learn their contents until
his return to port, August 16. The information sent by Hood of his
coming was also intercepted. After Hood's arrival, it does not appear
that there was avoidable delay in going to sea; but there does seem to
have been misjudgment in the direction given to the fleet. It was
known that De Barras had sailed from Newport with eight ships, bound
probably for the Chesapeake, certainly to effect a junction with De
Grasse; and it has been judiciously pointed out that if Graves had
taken up his cruising-ground near the Capes, but out of sight of land,
he could hardly have failed to fall in with him in overwhelming force.
Knowing what is now known, this would undoubtedly have been the proper
thing to do; but the English admiral had imperfect information. It
was nowhere expected that the French would bring nearly the force they
did; and Graves lost information, which he ought to have received, as
to their numbers, by the carelessness of his cruisers stationed off
the Chesapeake. These had been ordered to keep under way, but were
both at anchor under Cape Henry when De Grasse's appearance cut off
their escape. One was captured, the other driven up York River. No
single circumstance contributed more to the general result than the
neglect of these two subordinate officers, by which Graves lost that
all-important information. It can readily be conceived how his
movements might have been affected, had he known two days earlier that
De Grasse had brought twenty-seven or twenty-eight sail of the line;
how natural would have been the conclusion, first, to waylay De
Barras, with whom his own nineteen could more than cope. "Had Admiral
Graves succeeded in capturing that squadron, it would have greatly
paralyzed the besieging army [it had the siege train on board], if it
would not have prevented its operations altogether; it would have put
the two fleets nearly on an equality in point of numbers, would have
arrested the progress of the French arms for the ensuing year in the
West Indies, and might possibly have created such a spirit of discord
between the French and Americans[150] as would have sunk the latter
into the lowest depths of despair, from which they were only
extricated by the arrival of the forces under De Grasse."[151] These
are true and sober comments upon the naval strategy.

In regard to the admiral's tactics, it will be enough to say that the
fleet was taken into battle nearly as Byng took his; that very similar
mishaps resulted; and that, when attacking twenty-four ships with
nineteen, seven, under that capable officer Hood, were not able to get
into action, owing to the dispositions made.

On the French side De Grasse must be credited with a degree of energy,
foresight, and determination surprising in view of his failures at
other times. The decision to take every ship with him, which made him
independent of any failure on the part of De Barras; the passage
through the Bahama Channel to conceal his movements; the address with
which he obtained the money and troops required, from the Spanish and
the French military authorities; the prevision which led him, as early
as March 29, shortly after leaving Brest, to write to Rochambeau that
American coast pilots should be sent to Cap Français; the coolness
with which he kept Graves amused until De Barras's squadron had
slipped in, are all points worthy of admiration. The French were also
helped by the admiral's power to detain the two hundred
merchant-ships, the "West India trade," awaiting convoy at Cap
Français, where they remained from July till November, when the close
of operations left him at liberty to convoy them with ships-of-war.
The incident illustrates one weakness of a mercantile country with
representative government, compared with a purely military nation. "If
the British government," wrote an officer of that day, "had
sanctioned, or a British admiral had adopted, such a measure, the one
would have been turned out and the other hanged."[152] Rodney at the
same time had felt it necessary to detach five ships-of-the-line with
convoys, while half a dozen more went home with the trade from
Jamaica.

It is easier to criticise the division of the English fleet between
the West Indies and North America in the successive years 1780 and
1781, than to realize the embarrassment of the situation. This
embarrassment was but the reflection of the military difficulty of
England's position, all over the world, in this great and unequal war.
England was everywhere outmatched and embarrassed, as she has always
been as an empire, by the number of her exposed points. In Europe the
Channel fleet was more than once driven into its ports by overwhelming
forces. Gibraltar, closely blockaded by land and sea, was only kept
alive in its desperate resistance by the skill of English seamen
triumphing over the inaptness and discords of their combined enemies.
In the East Indies, Sir Edward Hughes met in Suffren an opponent as
superior to him in numbers as was De Grasse to Hood, and of far
greater ability. Minorca, abandoned by the home government, fell
before superior strength, as has been seen to fall, one by one, the
less important of the English Antilles. The position of England from
the time that France and Spain opened their maritime war was
everywhere defensive, except in North America; and was therefore, from
the military point of view, essentially false. She everywhere awaited
attacks which the enemies, superior in every case, could make at their
own choice and their own time. North America was really no exception
to this rule, despite some offensive operations which in no way
injured her real, that is her naval, foes.

Thus situated, and putting aside questions of national pride or
sensitiveness, what did military wisdom prescribe to England? The
question would afford an admirable study to a military inquirer, and
is not to be answered off-hand, but certain evident truths may be
pointed out. In the first place, it should have been determined what
part of the assailed empire was most necessary to be preserved. After
the British islands themselves, the North American colonies were the
most valuable possessions in the eyes of the England of that day. Next
should have been decided what others by their natural importance were
best worth preserving, and by their own inherent strength, or that of
the empire, which was mainly naval strength, could most surely be
held. In the Mediterranean, for instance, Gibraltar and Mahon were
both very valuable positions. Could both be held? Which was more
easily to be reached and supported by the fleet? If both could not
probably be held, one should have been frankly abandoned, and the
force and efforts necessary to its defence carried elsewhere. So in
the West Indies the evident strategic advantages of Barbadoes and Sta.
Lucia prescribed the abandonment of the other small islands by
garrisons as soon as the fleet was fairly outnumbered, if not before.
The case of so large an island as Jamaica must be studied separately,
as well as with reference to the general question. Such an island may
be so far self-supporting as to defy any attack but one in great force
and numbers, and that would rightly draw to it the whole English force
from the windward stations at Barbadoes and Sta. Lucia.

With the defence thus concentrated, England's great weapon, the navy,
should have been vigorously used on the offensive. Experience has
taught that free nations, popular governments, will seldom dare wholly
to remove the force that lies between an invader and its shores or
capital. Whatever the military wisdom, therefore, of sending the
Channel fleet to seek the enemy before it united, the step may not
have been possible. But at points less vital the attack of the English
should have anticipated that of the allies. This was most especially
true of that theatre of the war which has so far been considered. If
North America was the first object, Jamaica and the other islands
should have been boldly risked. It is due to Rodney to say that he
claims that his orders to the admirals at Jamaica and New York were
disobeyed in 1781, and that to this was owing the inferiority in
number of Graves's fleet.

But why, in 1780, when the departure of De Guichen for Europe left
Rodney markedly superior in numbers during his short visit to North
America, from September 14 to November 14, should no attempt have been
made to destroy the French detachment of seven ships-of-the-line in
Newport? These ships had arrived there in July; but although they had
at once strengthened their position by earthworks, great alarm was
excited by the news of Rodney's appearance off the coast. A fortnight
passed by Rodney in New York and by the French in busy work, placed
the latter, in their own opinion, in a position to brave all the naval
force of England. "We twice feared, and above all at the time of
Rodney's arrival," wrote the chief of staff of the French squadron,
"that the English might attack us in the road itself; and there was a
space of time during which such an undertaking would not have been an
act of rashness. Now [October 20], the anchorage is fortified so that
we can there brave all the naval force of England."[153]

The position thus taken by the French was undoubtedly very
strong.[154] It formed a re-entrant angle of a little over ninety
degrees, contained by lines drawn from Goat Island to what was then
called Brenton's Point, the site of the present Fort Adams on the one
side, and to Rose Island on the other. On the right flank of the
position Rose Island received a battery of thirty-six 24-pounders;
while twelve guns of the same size were placed on the left flank at
Brenton's Point. Between Rose and Goat islands four ships, drawn up on
a west-northwest line, bore upon the entrance and raked an approaching
fleet; while three others, between Goat Island and Brenton's Point,
crossed their fire at right angles with the former four.

On the other hand, the summer winds blow directly up the entrance,
often with great force. There could be no question even of a
considerably crippled attacking ship reaching her destined position,
and when once confused with the enemy's line, the shore batteries
would be neutralized. The work on Rose Island certainly, that on
Brenton's Point probably, had less height than the two upper batteries
of a ship-of-the-line, and could be vastly outnumbered. They could not
have been casemated, and might indisputably have been silenced by the
grapeshot of the ships that could have been brought against them. Rose
Island could be approached on the front and on the west flank within
two hundred yards, and on the north within half a mile. There was
nothing to prevent this right flank of the French, including the line
of ships, being enfiladed and crushed by the English ships taking
position west of Rose Island. The essential points of close range and
superior height were thus possible to the English fleet, which
numbered twenty to the enemy's seven. If successful in destroying the
shipping and reducing Rose Island, it could find anchorage farther up
the bay and await a favorable wind to retire. In the opinion of a
distinguished English naval officer of the day,[155] closely familiar
with the ground, there was no doubt of the success of an attack; and
he urged it frequently upon Rodney, offering himself to pilot the
leading ship. The security felt by the French in this position, and
the acquiescence of the English in that security, mark clearly the
difference in spirit between this war and the wars of Nelson and
Napoleon.

It is not, however, merely as an isolated operation, but in relation
to the universal war, that such an attempt is here considered. England
stood everywhere on the defensive, with inferior numbers. From such a
position there is no salvation except by action vigorous almost to
desperation. "It is impossible for us," wrote with great truth the
First Lord of the Admiralty to Rodney, "to have a superior fleet in
every part; and unless our commanders-in-chief will take the great
line, as you do, and consider the king's whole dominions under their
care, our enemies must find us unprepared somewhere, and carry their
point against us."[156] Attacks which considered in themselves alone
might be thought unjustifiable, were imposed upon English commanders.
The allied navy was the key of the situation, and its large
detachments, as at Newport, should have been crushed at any risk. The
effect of such a line of action upon the policy of the French
government is a matter of speculation, as to which the present writer
has no doubts; but no English officer in chief command rose to the
level of the situation, with the exception of Hood, and possibly of
Howe. Rodney was now old, infirm, and though of great ability, a
careful tactician rather than a great admiral.

The defeat of Graves and subsequent surrender of Cornwallis did not
end the naval operations in the western hemisphere. On the contrary,
one of the most interesting tactical feats and the most brilliant
victory of the whole war were yet to grace the English flag in the
West Indies; but with the events at Yorktown the patriotic interest
for Americans closes. Before quitting that struggle for independence,
it must again be affirmed that its successful ending, at least at so
early a date, was due to the control of the sea,--to sea power in the
hands of the French, and its improper distribution by the English
authorities. This assertion may be safely rested on the authority of
the one man who, above all others, thoroughly knew the resources of
the country, the temper of the people, the difficulties of the
struggle, and whose name is still the highest warrant for sound,
quiet, unfluttered good-sense and patriotism.

The keynote to all Washington's utterances is set in the "Memorandum
for concerting a plan of operations with the French army," dated July
15, 1780, and sent by the hands of Lafayette:--

    "The Marquis de Lafayette will be pleased to communicate the
    following general ideas to Count de Rochambeau and the Chevalier
    de Ternay, as the sentiments of the underwritten:

    "I. _In any operation, and under all circumstances, a decisive
    naval superiority is to be considered as a fundamental
    principle, and the basis upon which every hope of success must
    ultimately depend._"

This, however, though the most formal and decisive expression of
Washington's views, is but one among many others equally distinct.
Thus, writing to Franklin, December 20, 1780, he says:--

    "Disappointed of the second division of French troops [blockaded
    in Brest], but more especially in the expected naval
    superiority, which was the pivot upon which everything turned,
    we have been compelled to spend an inactive campaign after a
    flattering prospect at the opening of it.... Latterly we have
    been obliged to become spectators of a succession of detachments
    from the army at New York in aid of Lord Cornwallis; while our
    naval weakness, and the political dissolution of a large part of
    our army, put it out of our power to counteract them at the
    southward, or to take advantage of them here."

A month later, January 15, 1781, in a memorandum letter to Colonel
Laurens, sent on a special mission to France, he says:--

    "Next to a loan of money, a constant naval superiority upon
    these coasts is the object most interesting. This would
    instantly reduce the enemy to a difficult defensive.... Indeed,
    it is not to be conceived how they could subsist a large force
    in this country, if we had the command of the seas to interrupt
    the regular transmission of supplies from Europe. This
    superiority, with an aid in money, would enable us to convert
    the war into a vigorous offensive. With respect to us it seems
    to be one of two deciding points."

In another letter to the same person, then in Paris, dated April 9, he
writes:--

    "If France delays a timely and powerful aid in the critical
    posture of our affairs, it will avail us nothing, should she
    attempt it hereafter.... Why need I run into detail, when it may
    be declared in a word that we are at the end of our tether, and
    that now or never our deliverance must come? How easy would it
    be to retort the enemy's own game upon them, if it could be made
    to comport with the general plan of the war to keep a superior
    fleet always in these seas, and France would put us in condition
    to be active by advancing us money."

Ships and money are the burden of his cry. May 23, 1781, he writes to
the Chevalier de la Luzerne: "I do not see how it is possible to give
effectual support to the Southern States, and avert the evils which
threaten, while we are inferior in naval force in these seas." As the
season for active operations advances, his utterances are more
frequent and urgent. To Major General Greene, struggling with his
difficulties in South Carolina, he writes, June 1, 1781: "Our affairs
have been attentively considered in every point of view, and it was
finally determined to make an attempt upon New York, in preference to
a Southern operation, as we had not decided command of the water." To
Jefferson, June 8: "Should I be supported in the manner I expect, by
the neighboring States, the enemy will, I hope, be reduced to the
necessity of recalling part of their force from the southward to
support New York, or they will run the most imminent risk of being
expelled from that post, which is to them invaluable; and should we,
by a lucky coincidence of circumstances, gain a naval superiority,
their ruin would be inevitable.... While we remain inferior at sea ...
policy dictates that relief should be attempted by diversion rather
than by sending reinforcements immediately to the point in distress,"
that is, to the South. To Rochambeau, June 13: "Your Excellency will
recollect that New York was looked upon by us as the only practicable
object under present circumstances; but should we be able to secure a
naval superiority, we may perhaps find others more practicable and
equally advisable." By the 15th of August the letters of De Grasse
announcing his sailing for the Chesapeake were received, and the
correspondence of Washington is thenceforth filled with busy
preparations for the campaign in Virginia, based upon the long-delayed
fleet. The discouragement of De Grasse, and his purpose to go to sea,
upon learning that the English fleet in New York had been reinforced,
drew forth an appealing letter dated September 25, which is too long
for quotation; but the danger passed, Washington's confidence returns.
The day after the capitulation he writes to De Grasse: "The surrender
of York ... _the honor of which belongs to your Excellency_, has
greatly anticipated [in time] our most sanguine anticipations." He
then goes on to urge further operations in the South, seeing so much
of the good season was still left: "The general naval superiority of
the British, previous to your arrival, gave them decisive advantages
in the South, in the rapid transport of their troops and supplies;
while the immense land marches of our succors, too tardy and expensive
in every point of view, subjected us to be beaten in detail. It will
depend upon your Excellency, therefore, to terminate the war." De
Grasse refusing this request, but intimating an intention to
co-operate in the next year's campaign, Washington instantly accepts:
"With your Excellency I need not insist upon the indispensable
necessity of a maritime force capable of giving you an absolute
ascendency in these seas.... You will have observed that, whatever
efforts are made by the land armies, the navy must have the casting
vote in the present contest." A fortnight later, November 15, he
writes to Lafayette, who is on the point of sailing for France:--

    "As you expressed a desire to know my sentiments respecting the
    operations of the next campaign, I will, without a tedious
    display of reasoning, declare in one word that it must depend
    absolutely upon the naval force which is employed in these seas,
    and the time of its appearance next year. No land force can act
    decisively unless accompanied by a maritime superiority.... A
    doubt did not exist, nor does it at this moment, in any man's
    mind, of the total extirpation of the British force in the
    Carolinas and Georgia, if Count de Grasse could have extended
    his co-operation two months longer."

Such, in the opinion of the revered commander-in-chief of the American
armies, was the influence of sea power upon the contest which he
directed with so much skill and such infinite patience, and which,
amidst countless trials and discouragements, he brought to a glorious
close.

It will be observed that the American cause was reduced to these
straits, notwithstanding the great and admitted losses of British
commerce by the cruisers of the allies and by American privateers.
This fact, and the small results from the general war, dominated as it
was by the idea of commerce-destroying, show strongly the secondary
and indecisive effect of such a policy upon the great issues of war.

FOOTNOTES:

[129] Martin: History of France.

[130] This delay was due to calms. Howe's Despatch, Gentleman's
Magazine, 1778.

[131] Most accounts say between Goat Island and Canonicut; but the
position given seems more probable. The names "Goat" and "Gould"
(often written "Gold") are easily confused. Since writing the above,
the author has been favored with the sight of a contemporary
manuscript map obtained in Paris, which shows the anchorage as near
Canonicut and abreast Coaster's Harbor Island; the latter being marked
"L'Isle d'Or ou Golde Isle." The sketch, while accurate in its main
details, seems the more authentic from its mistakes being such as a
foreigner, during a hurried and exciting stay of twenty-four hours,
might readily make.

[132] "The arrival of the French fleet upon the coast of America is a
great and striking event; but the operations of it have been injured by
a number of unforeseen and unfavorable circumstances, which, though
they ought not to detract from the merit and good intention of our
great ally, have nevertheless lessened the importance of its services
in a great degree. The length of the passage, in the first instance,
was a capital misfortune; for had even one of common length taken
place, Lord Howe, with the British ships-of-war and all the transports
in the river Delaware, must inevitably have fallen; and Sir Henry
Clinton must have had better luck than is commonly dispensed to men of
his profession under such circumstances, if he and his troops had not
shared at least the fate of Burgoyne. The long passage of Count
d'Estaing was succeeded by an unfavorable discovery at the Hook, which
hurt us in two respects,--first, in a defeat of the enterprise upon New
York and the shipping and troops at that place, and next in the delay
occasioned in ascertaining the depth of water over the bar which was
essential to their entrance into the harbor of New York. And, moreover,
after the enterprise upon Rhode Island had been planned and was in the
moment of execution, that Lord Howe with the British ships should
interpose merely to create a diversion and draw the French fleet from
the island was again unlucky, as the Count had not returned on the 17th
to the island, though drawn off from it on the 10th; by which means the
land operations were retarded, and the whole subjected to a miscarriage
in case of the arrival of Byron's squadron."--WASHINGTON'S Letter, Aug.
20, 1778.

[133] See page 426.

[134] D'Estaing's position at anchor is marked by the anchor in Plate
X.

[135] Of one of these, the "Monmouth," sixty-four (a'), it is said
that the officers of the French flag-ship drank to the health of the
captain of the "little black ship." Ships' names, like those of
families, often have a marked career. A former "Monmouth," twenty
years before, had attacked and taken, practically single-handed, the
"Foudroyant," eighty-four, one of the finest ships in the French navy.
She was then commanded by a Captain Gardiner, who, having commanded
Byng's ship in the battle which led to his execution, was moved by his
mortification at the result of that affair to dare such desperate
odds, and thereby lost his life. The same ship, here punished so
severely off Grenada, will be found in like sturdy fight, under
another captain, three years later in India.

[136] The line BC shows the final direction of the French
line-of-battle; the lee ship (o) having tacked and standing to o',
while the other ships took position in her wake. Though not expressly
stated, Byron doubtless formed in the same way on a parallel line.
Into this new line the disabled ships (c'), which could scarcely have
made good the course they were heading, would be easily received.

[137] Chevalier: Hist. de la Marine Française.

[138] Guérin: Hist. Maritime.

[139] Drinkwater, in his history of the siege of Gibraltar, explains
that the Spanish admiral believed that Rodney would not accompany the
convoy to the Straits, but had separated from it. He did not detect
his mistake until too late.

[140] The place where the battle was fought is shown by the crossed
flags.

[141] The black ships, in position A, represent the English ships
bearing down upon the French centre and rear. The line v r is the
line-of-battle from van to rear before bearing down. The positions v',
r', are those of the van and rear ships after hauling up on the port
tack, when the French wore.

[142] In a severe reprimand addressed to Captain Carkett, commanding
the leading ship of the English line, by Rodney, he says: "Your leading
in the manner you did, induced others to follow so bad an example; and
thereby, forgetting that the signal for the line was at only two
cables' length distance from each other, the van division was led by
you to _more than two leagues distance_ from the centre division, which
was thereby exposed to the greatest strength of the enemy and not
properly supported" (Life, vol. i. p. 351). By all rules of tactical
common-sense it would seem that the other ships should have taken their
distance from their next astern, that is, should have closed toward the
centre. In conversation with Sir Gilbert Blane, who was not in this
action, Rodney stated that the French line extended four leagues in
length, "as if De Guichen thought we meant to run away from him" (Naval
Chronicle, vol. xxv. p. 402).

[143] History of the American Revolution.

[144] For Rodney's reasons, see his Life, vol. i. pp. 365-376.

[145] At the eastern end of Long Island.

[146] The French ascribe this disadvantage to the fact that some of
their ships were not coppered.

[147] That the French government was not satisfied with M.
Destouches's action can be safely inferred from its delay to reward
the officers of the squadron, which called forth much feeling and very
lively remonstrances. The French asserted that Arbuthnot was hooted in
the streets of New York and recalled by his government. The latter is
a mistake, as he went home by his own request; but the former is
likely enough. Both commanders reversed in this case the usual naval
policy of their nations.

[148] Bancroft: History of the United States.

[149] Life of Rodney, vol. ii. p. 152; Clerk: Naval Tactics, p. 84.

[150] De Barras had been unwilling to go to the Chesapeake, fearing to
be intercepted by a superior force, and had only yielded to the
solicitation of Washington and Rochambeau.

[151] Naval Researches: Capt. Thomas White, R.N.

[152] White: Naval Researches.

[153] Bouclon: La Marine de Louis XVI., p. 281. Under a rather
misleading title this work is really a lengthy biography of Liberge de
Granchain, chief of staff to the French squadron under Ternay.

[154] Diary of a French officer, 1781; Magazine of American History
for March, 1880. The works at the time of Rodney's visit to New York
were doubtless less complete than in 1781. This authority, a year
later, gives the work on Rose Island twenty 36-pounders.

[155] Sir Thomas Graves, afterward second in command to Nelson in the
attack at Copenhagen in 1801,--an enterprise fully as desperate and
encompassed with greater difficulties of pilotage than the one here
advocated. See biographical memoir, Naval Chronicle, vol. viii.

[156] Rodney's Life, vol. i. p. 402.




CHAPTER XI.

    MARITIME WAR IN EUROPE, 1779-1782.


The last chapter closed with the opinions of Washington, expressed in
many ways and at many times, as to the effect of sea power upon the
struggle for American independence. If space allowed, these opinions
could be amply strengthened by similar statements of Sir Henry
Clinton, the English commander-in-chief.[157] In Europe the results
turned yet more entirely upon the same factor. There the allies had
three several objectives, at each of which England stood strictly upon
the defensive. The first of these was England herself, involving, as a
preliminary to an invasion, the destruction of the Channel fleet,--a
project which, if seriously entertained, can scarcely be said to have
been seriously attempted; the second was the reduction of Gibraltar;
the third, the capture of Minorca. The last alone met with success.
Thrice was England threatened by a largely superior fleet, thrice the
threat fell harmless. Thrice was Gibraltar reduced to straits; thrice
was it relieved by the address and fortune of English seamen, despite
overpowering odds.

After Keppel's action off Ushant, no general encounter took place
between fleets in European seas during the year 1778 and the first
half of 1779. Meantime Spain was drawing toward a rupture with England
and an active alliance with France. War was declared by her on the
16th of June, 1779; but as early as April 12, a treaty between the two
Bourbon kingdoms, involving active war upon England, had been signed.
By its terms the invasion of Great Britain or Ireland was to be
undertaken, every effort made to recover for Spain, Minorca,
Pensacola, and Mobile, and the two courts bound themselves to grant
neither peace, nor truce, nor suspension of hostilities, until
Gibraltar should be restored.[158]

The declaration of war was withheld until ready to strike; but the
English government, doubtless, should have been upon its guard in the
strained relations of the two countries, and prepared to prevent a
junction of the two fleets. As it was, no efficient blockade of Brest
was established, and twenty-eight French sail-of-the-line went out
unopposed[159] June 3, 1779, under D'Orvilliers, Keppel's opponent of
the year before. The fleet steered for the coasts of Spain, where it
was to find the Spanish ships; but it was not till the 22d of July
that the full contingent joined. Seven precious summer weeks thus
slipped by unimproved, but that was not all the loss; the French had
been provisioned for only thirteen weeks, and this truly great armada
of sixty-six ships-of-the-line and fourteen frigates had not more than
forty working-days before it. Sickness, moreover, ravaged the fleet;
and although it was fortunate enough to enter the Channel while the
English were at sea, the latter, numbering little more than half their
enemies, succeeded in passing within them. The flabbiness of
coalitions increased the weakness due to inefficient preparation; a
great and not unnatural panic on the English Channel coast, and the
capture of one ship-of-the-line, were the sole results of a cruise
extending, for the French, over fifteen weeks.[160] The
disappointment, due to bad preparation, mainly on the part of Spain,
though the French ministry utterly failed to meet the pressing wants
of its fleet, fell, of course, upon the innocent Admiral d'Orvilliers.
That brave and accomplished but unfortunate officer, whose only son, a
lieutenant, had died of the pestilence which scourged the allies,
could not support the odium. Being of a deeply religious character,
the refuge which Villeneuve after Trafalgar found in suicide was
denied him; but he threw up his command and retired into a religious
house.

The scanty maritime interest of the year 1780, in Europe, centres
round Cadiz and Gibraltar. This fortress was invested by Spain
immediately upon the outbreak of war, and, while successfully
resisting direct attack, the supply of provisions and ammunition was a
matter of serious concern to England, and involved both difficulty and
danger. For this purpose, Rodney sailed on the 29th of December, 1779,
having under his command twenty ships-of-the-line with a large convoy
and reinforcements for Gibraltar and Minorca, as well as the West
India trade. The latter parted company on the 7th of January, under
the care of four frigates, and the following morning the fleet fell in
with and captured a Spanish squadron of seven ships-of-war and sixteen
supply-ships. Twelve of the latter being laden with provisions were
carried on to Gibraltar. A week later, at one P.M. of the 16th, a
Spanish fleet of eleven sail-of-the-line was seen in the southeast.
They held their ground, supposing the approaching vessels to be only
supply-ships for Gibraltar, without a strong force of men-of-war,--an
unfortunate error from which they did not awake until too late to
escape, owing to the yet more unfortunate oversight of having no
lookout frigates thrown out. When the Spanish admiral, Don Juan de
Langara, recognized his mistake, he attempted to escape; but the
English ships were copper-bottomed, and Rodney making the signal for a
general chase overtook the enemy, cut in between him and his port,
regardless of a blowy night, lee shore, and dangerous shoals, and
succeeded in capturing the commander-in-chief with six ships-of-the-line.
A seventh was blown up. The weather continuing very tempestuous, one of
the prizes was wrecked, and one forced into Cadiz; several of the
English ships were also in great danger, but happily escaped, and
within a few days the entire force entered Gibraltar Bay. The convoy
for Minorca was at once despatched, and immediately after the return of
the ships-of-war guarding it, on the 13th of February, Rodney sailed
for the West Indies with four ships-of-the-line, sending the rest of
his force, with the prizes, to England under Admiral Digby.

The state of politics and parties in England at this time was such
that, combined with the unavoidable inferiority of the Channel fleet,
it was difficult to find an admiral willing to accept the chief
command. An admirable officer, Barrington, the captor of Sta. Lucia,
refused the first place, though willing to serve as second, even to a
junior.[161] The allied fleet, to the number of thirty-six
sail-of-the-line, assembled at Cadiz. Their cruises, however, were
confined to the Portuguese coast; and their only service, a most
important one, was the capture of an entire convoy, largely laden with
military stores, for the East and West Indies. The entrance of sixty
English prizes, with nearly three thousand prisoners, into Cadiz, was
a source of great rejoicing to Spain. On the 24th of October, De
Guichen, returning from his contest with Rodney, came into the same
port with his West Indian squadron, of nineteen ships-of-the-line; but
the immense armament thus assembled did nothing. The French ships
returned to Brest in January, 1781.

While thus unproductive of military results in Europe, the war in 1780
gave rise to an event which cannot wholly be passed over by any
history of sea power. This was the Armed Neutrality, at the head of
which stood Russia, joined by Sweden and Denmark. The claim of England
to seize enemy's goods in neutral ships bore hard upon neutral powers,
and especially upon those of the Baltic and upon Holland, into whose
hands, and those of the Austrian Netherlands, the war had thrown much
of the European carrying-trade; while the products of the Baltic,
naval stores and grain, were those which England was particularly
interested in forbidding to her enemies. The declarations finally put
forth by Russia, and signed by Sweden and Denmark, were four in
number:

1. That neutral vessels had a right, not only to sail to unblockaded
ports, but also from port to port of a belligerent nation; in other
words, to maintain the coasting trade of a belligerent.

2. That property belonging to the subjects of a power at war should be
safe on board neutral vessels. This was the principle involved in the
now familiar maxim, "Free ships make free goods."

3. That no articles are contraband, except arms, equipments, and
munitions of war. This ruled out naval stores and provisions unless
belonging to the government of a belligerent.

4. That blockades, to be binding, must have an adequate naval force
stationed in close proximity to the blockaded port.

The contracting parties being neutral in the present war, but binding
themselves to support these principles by a combined armed fleet of a
fixed minimum number, the agreement received the name of the Armed
Neutrality. The discussion of the propriety of the various
declarations belongs to International law; but it is evident that no
great maritime State, situated as England then was, would submit to
the first and third as a matter of right. Policy only could induce her
to do so. Without meeting the declarations by a direct contradiction,
the ministry and the king determined to disregard them,--a course
which was sustained in principle even by prominent members of the
bitter opposition of that day. The undecided attitude of the United
Provinces, divided as in the days of Louis XIV. between the partisans
of England and France, despite a century of alliance with the former,
drew the especial attention of Great Britain. They had been asked to
join the Armed Neutrality; they hesitated, but the majority of the
provinces favored it. A British officer had already gone so far as to
fire upon a Dutch man-of-war which had resisted the search of
merchant-ships under its convoy; an act which, whether right or wrong,
tended to incense the Dutch generally against England. It was
determined by the latter that if the United Provinces acceded to the
coalition of neutrals, war should be declared. On the 16th of
December, 1780, the English ministry was informed that the
States-General had resolved to sign the declarations of the Armed
Neutrality without delay. Orders were at once sent out to Rodney to
seize the Dutch West India and South American possessions; similar
orders to the East Indies; and the ambassador at the Hague was
recalled. England declared war four days later. The principal effect,
therefore, of the Armed Neutrality upon the war was to add the
colonies and commerce of Holland to the prey of English cruisers. The
additional enemy was of small account to Great Britain, whose
geographical position effectually blocked the junction of the Dutch
fleet with those of her other enemies. The possessions of Holland fell
everywhere, except when saved by the French; while a bloody but wholly
uninstructive battle between English and Dutch squadrons in the North
Sea, in August, 1781, was the only feat of arms illustrative of the
old Dutch courage and obstinacy.

The year 1781, decisive of the question of the independence of the
United States, was marked in the European seas by imposing movements
of great fleets followed by puny results. At the end of March De
Grasse sailed from Brest with twenty-six ships-of-the-line. On the
29th he detached five under Suffren to the East Indies, and himself
continued on to meet success at Yorktown and disaster in the West
Indies. On the 23d of June De Guichen sailed from Brest with eighteen
ships-of-the-line for Cadiz, where he joined thirty Spanish ships.
This immense armament sailed on the 22d of July for the Mediterranean,
landed fourteen thousand troops at Minorca, and then moved upon the
English Channel.

The English had this year first to provide against the danger to
Gibraltar. That beset fortress had had no supplies since Rodney's
visit, in January of the year before, and was now in sore want, the
provisions being scanty and bad, the biscuits weevilly, and the meat
tainted. Amid the horrors and uproar of one of the longest and most
exciting sieges of history, the sufferings of the combatants were
intensified by the presence of many peaceful inhabitants, including
the wives and families of soldiers as well as of officers. A great
fleet of twenty-eight ships-of-the-line sailed from Portsmouth on the
13th of March, convoying three hundred merchant-ships for the East and
West Indies, besides ninety-seven transports and supply-ships for the
Rock. A delay on the Irish coast prevented its falling in with De
Grasse, who had sailed nine days after it. Arriving off Cape St.
Vincent, it met no enemy, and looking into Cadiz saw the great Spanish
fleet at anchor. The latter made no move, and the English admiral,
Derby, threw his supplies into Gibraltar on the 12th of April,
undisturbed. At the same time he, like De Grasse, detached to the East
Indies a small squadron, which was destined before long to fall in
with Suffren. The inaction of the Spanish fleet, considering the
eagerness of its government about Gibraltar and its equal if not
superior numbers, shows scanty reliance of the Spanish admiral upon
himself or his command. Derby, having relieved Gibraltar and Minorca,
returned to the Channel in May.

Upon the approach of the combined fleet of nearly fifty sail in August
following, Derby fell back upon Torbay and there anchored his fleet,
numbering thirty ships. De Guichen, who held chief command, and whose
caution when engaged with Rodney has been before remarked, was in
favor of fighting; but the almost unanimous opposition of the
Spaniards, backed by some of his own officers, overruled him in a
council of war,[162] and again the great Bourbon coalition fell back,
foiled by their own discord and the unity of their enemy. Gibraltar
relieved, England untouched, were the results of these gigantic
gatherings; they can scarcely be called efforts. A mortifying disaster
closed the year for the allies. De Guichen sailed from Brest with
seventeen sail, protecting a large convoy of merchantmen and ships
with military supplies. The fleet was pursued by twelve English ships
under Admiral Kempenfeldt, an officer whose high professional
abilities have not earned the immortality with which poetry has graced
his tragical death. Falling in with the French one hundred and fifty
miles west of Ushant, he cut off a part of the convoy, despite his
inferior numbers.[163] A few days later a tempest dispersed the
French fleet. Only two ships-of-the-line and five merchantmen out of
one hundred and fifty reached the West Indies.

The year 1782 opened with the loss to the English of Port Mahon, which
surrendered on the 5th of February, after a siege of six months.--a
surrender induced by the ravages of scurvy, consequent upon the lack
of vegetables, and confinement in the foul air of bombproofs and
casemates, under the heavy fire of an enemy. On the last night of the
defence the call for necessary guards was four hundred and fifteen,
while only six hundred and sixty men were fit for duty, thus leaving
no reliefs.

The allied fleets assembled this year in Cadiz, to the number of forty
ships-of-the-line. It was expected that this force would be increased
by Dutch ships, but a squadron under Lord Howe drove the latter back
to their ports. It does not certainly appear that any active
enterprise was intended against the English coast; but the allies
cruised off the mouth of the Channel and in the Bay of Biscay during
the summer months. Their presence insured the safe arrival and
departure of the homeward and outward bound merchantmen, and likewise
threatened English commerce; notwithstanding which, Howe, with
twenty-two ships, not only kept the sea and avoided an engagement, but
also succeeded in bringing the Jamaica fleet safe into port. The
injury to trade and to military transportation by sea may be said to
have been about equal on either side; and the credit for successful
use of sea power for these most important ends must therefore be given
to the weaker party.

Having carried out their orders for the summer cruise, the combined
fleets returned to Cadiz. On the 10th of September they sailed thence
for Algesiras, on the opposite side of the bay from Gibraltar, to
support a grand combined attack by land and sea, which, it was hoped,
would reduce to submission the key to the Mediterranean. With the
ships already there, the total rose to nearly fifty ships-of-the-line.
The details of the mighty onslaught scarcely belong to our subject,
yet cannot be wholly passed by, without at least such mention as may
recognize and draw attention to their interest.

The three years' siege which was now drawing to its end had been
productive of many brilliant feats of arms, as well as of less
striking but more trying proofs of steadfast endurance, on the part of
the garrison. How long the latter might have held out cannot be said,
seeing the success with which the English sea power defied the efforts
of the allies to cut off the communications of the fortress; but it
was seemingly certain that the place must be subdued by main force or
not at all, while the growing exhaustion of the belligerents foretold
the near end of the war. Accordingly Spain multiplied her efforts of
preparation and military ingenuity; while the report of them and of
the approaching decisive contest drew to the scene volunteers and men
of eminence from other countries of Europe. Two French Bourbon princes
added, by their coming, to the theatrical interest with which the
approaching drama was invested. The presence of royalty was needed
adequately to grace the sublime catastrophe; for the sanguine
confidence of the besiegers had determined a satisfactory _dénouement_
with all the security of a playwright.

Besides the works on the isthmus which joins the Rock to the mainland,
where three hundred pieces of artillery were now mounted, the chief
reliance of the assailants was upon ten floating batteries elaborately
contrived to be shot and fire proof, and carrying one hundred and
fifty-four heavy guns. These were to anchor in a close north-and-south
line along the west face of the works, at about nine hundred yards
distance. They were to be supported by forty gunboats and as many bomb
vessels, besides the efforts of the ships-of-the-line to cover the
attack and distract the garrison. Twelve thousand French troops were
brought to reinforce the Spaniards in the grand assault, which was to
be made when the bombardment had sufficiently injured and demoralized
the defenders. At this time the latter numbered seven thousand, their
land opponents thirty-three thousand men.

The final act was opened by the English. At seven o'clock on the
morning of September 8, 1782, the commanding general, Elliott, began a
severe and most injurious fire upon the works on the isthmus. Having
effected his purpose, he stopped; but the enemy took up the glove the
next morning, and for four days successively poured in a fire from the
isthmus alone of six thousand five hundred cannon-balls and one
thousand one hundred bombs every twenty-four hours. So approached the
great closing scene of September 13. At seven A.M. of that day the ten
battering-ships unmoored from the head of the bay and stood down to
their station. Between nine and ten they anchored, and the general
fire at once began. The besieged replied with equal fury. The
battering-ships seem in the main, and for some hours, to have
justified the hopes formed of them; cold shot glanced or failed to get
through their sides, while the self-acting apparatus for extinguishing
fires balked the hot shot.

About two o'clock, however, smoke was seen to issue from the ship of
the commander-in-chief, and though controlled for some time, the fire
continued to gain. The same misfortune befell others; by evening, the
fire of the besieged gained a marked superiority, and by one o'clock
in the morning the greater part of the battering-ships were in flames.
Their distress was increased by the action of the naval officer
commanding the English gunboats, who now took post upon the flank of
the line and raked it effectually,--a service which the Spanish
gunboats should have prevented. In the end, nine of the ten blew up at
their anchors, with a loss estimated at fifteen hundred men, four
hundred being saved from the midst of the fire by the English seamen.
The tenth ship was boarded and burned by the English boats. The hopes
of the assailants perished with the failure of the battering-ships.

There remained only the hope of starving out the garrison. To this end
the allied fleets now gave themselves. It was known that Lord Howe was
on his way out with a great fleet, numbering thirty-four
ships-of-the-line, besides supply vessels. On the 10th of October a
violent westerly gale injured the combined ships, driving one ashore
under the batteries of Gibraltar, where she was surrendered. The next
day Howe's force came in sight, and the transports had a fine chance
to make the anchorage, which, through carelessness, was missed by all
but four. The rest, with the men-of-war, drove eastward into the
Mediterranean. The allies followed on the 13th; but though thus placed
between the port and the relieving force, and not encumbered, like the
latter, with supply-ships, they yet contrived to let the transports,
with scarcely an exception, slip in and anchor safely. Not only
provisions and ammunition, but also bodies of troops carried by the
ships-of-war, were landed without molestation. On the 19th the English
fleet repassed the straits with an easterly wind, having within a
week's time fulfilled its mission, and made Gibraltar safe for another
year. The allied fleet followed, and on the 20th an action took place
at long range, the allies to windward, but not pressing their attack
close. The number of ships engaged in this magnificent spectacle, the
closing scene of the great drama in Europe, the after-piece to the
successful defence of Gibraltar, was eighty-three of the
line,--forty-nine allies and thirty-four English. Of the former,
thirty-three only got into action; but as the duller sailers would
have come up to a general engagement, Lord Howe was probably right in
declining, so far as in him lay, a trial which the allies did not too
eagerly court.

Such were the results of this great contest in the European seas,
marked on the part of the allies by efforts gigantic in size, but
loose-jointed and flabby in execution. By England, so heavily
overmatched in mere numbers, were shown firmness of purpose, high
courage, and seamanship; but it can scarcely be said that the military
conceptions of her councils, or the cabinet management of her sea
forces, were worthy of the skill and devotion of her seamen. The odds
against her were not so great--not nearly so great--as the formidable
lists of guns and ships seemed to show; and while allowance must
justly be made for early hesitations, the passing years of indecision
and inefficiency on the part of the allies should have betrayed to her
their weakness. The reluctance of the French to risk their ships, so
plainly shown by D'Estaing, De Grasse, and De Guichen, the
sluggishness and inefficiency of the Spaniards, should have encouraged
England to pursue her old policy, to strike at the organized forces of
the enemy afloat. As a matter of fact, and probably from the
necessities of the case, the opening of every campaign found the
enemies separated,--the Spaniards in Cadiz, the French in Brest.[164]
To blockade the latter in full force before they could get out,
England should have strained every effort; thus she would have stopped
at its head the main stream of the allied strength, and, by knowing
exactly where this great body was, would have removed that uncertainty
as to its action which fettered her own movements as soon as it had
gained the freedom of the open sea. Before Brest she was interposed
between the allies; by her lookouts she would have known the approach
of the Spaniards long before the French could know it; she would have
kept in her hands the power of bringing against each, singly, ships
more numerous and individually more effective. A wind that was fair to
bring on the Spaniards would have locked their allies in the port. The
most glaring instances of failure on the part of England to do this
were when De Grasse was permitted to get out unopposed in March, 1781;
for an English fleet of superior force had sailed from Portsmouth nine
days before him, but was delayed by the admiralty on the Irish
coast;[165] and again at the end of that year, when Kempenfeldt was
sent to intercept De Guichen with an inferior force, while ships
enough to change the odds were kept at home. Several of the ships
which were to accompany Rodney to the West Indies were ready when
Kempenfeldt sailed, yet they were not associated with an enterprise so
nearly affecting the objects of Rodney's campaign. The two forces
united would have made an end of De Guichen's seventeen ships and his
invaluable convoy.

Gibraltar was indeed a heavy weight upon the English operations, but
the national instinct which clung to it was correct. The fault of the
English policy was in attempting to hold so many other points of land,
while neglecting, by rapidity of concentration, to fall upon any of
the detachments of the allied fleets. The key of the situation was
upon the ocean; a great victory there would have solved all the other
points in dispute. But it was not possible to win a great victory
while trying to maintain a show of force everywhere.[166]

North America was a yet heavier clog, and there undoubtedly the
feeling of the nation was mistaken; pride, not wisdom, maintained that
struggle. Whatever the sympathies of individuals and classes in the
allied nations, by their governments American rebellion was valued
only as a weakening of England's arm. The operations there depended,
as has been shown, upon the control of the sea; and to maintain that,
large detachments of English ships were absorbed from the contest with
France and Spain. Could a successful war have made America again what
it once was, a warmly attached dependency of Great Britain, a firm
base for her sea power, it would have been worth much greater
sacrifices; but that had become impossible. But although she had lost,
by her own mistakes, the affection of the colonists, which would have
supported and secured her hold upon their ports and sea-coast, there
nevertheless remained to the mother-country, in Halifax, Bermuda, and
the West Indies, enough strong military stations, inferior, as naval
bases, only to those strong ports which are surrounded by a friendly
country, great in its resources and population. The abandonment of the
contest in North America would have strengthened England very much
more than the allies. As it was, her large naval detachments there
were always liable to be overpowered by a sudden move of the enemy
from the sea, as happened in 1778 and 1781.

To the abandonment of America as hopelessly lost, because no military
subjection could have brought back the old loyalty, should have been
added the giving up, for the time, all military occupancy which
fettered concentration, while not adding to military strength. Most of
the Antilles fell under this head, and the ultimate possession of them
would depend upon the naval campaign. Garrisons could have been spared
for Barbadoes and Sta. Lucia, for Gibraltar and perhaps for Mahon,
that could have effectually maintained them until the empire of the
seas was decided; and to them could have been added one or two vital
positions in America, like New York and Charleston, to be held only
till guarantees were given for such treatment of the loyalists among
the inhabitants as good faith required England to exact.

Having thus stripped herself of every weight, rapid concentration with
offensive purpose should have followed. Sixty ships-of-the-line on the
coast of Europe, half before Cadiz and half before Brest, with a
reserve at home to replace injured ships, would not have exhausted by
a great deal the roll of the English navy; and that such fleets would
not have had to fight, may not only be said by us, who have the whole
history before us, but might have been inferred by those who had
watched the tactics of D'Estaing and De Guichen, and later on of De
Grasse. Or, had even so much dispersal been thought unadvisable, forty
ships before Brest would have left the sea open to the Spanish fleet
to try conclusions with the rest of the English navy when the question
of controlling Gibraltar and Mahon came up for decision. Knowing what
we do of the efficiency of the two services, there can be little
question of the result; and Gibraltar, instead of a weight, would, as
often before and since those days, have been an element of strength to
Great Britain.

The conclusion continually recurs. Whatever may be the determining
factors in strifes between neighboring continental States, when a
question arises of control over distant regions, politically
weak,--whether they be crumbling empires, anarchical republics,
colonies, isolated military posts, or islands below a certain
size,--it must ultimately be decided by naval power, by the organized
military force afloat, which represents the communications that form
so prominent a feature in all strategy. The magnificent defence of
Gibraltar hinged upon this; upon this depended the military results of
the war in America; upon this the final fate of the West India
Islands; upon this certainly the possession of India. Upon this will
depend the control of the Central American Isthmus, if that question
take a military coloring; and though modified by the continental
position and surroundings of Turkey, the same sea power must be a
weighty factor in shaping the outcome of the Eastern Question in
Europe.

If this be true, military wisdom and economy, both of time and money,
dictate bringing matters to an issue as soon as possible upon the
broad sea, with the certainty that the power which achieves military
preponderance there will win in the end. In the war of the American
Revolution the numerical preponderance was very great against England;
the actual odds were less, though still against her. Military
considerations would have ordered the abandonment of the colonies; but
if the national pride could not stoop to this, the right course was to
blockade the hostile arsenals. If not strong enough to be in superior
force before both, that of the more powerful nation should have been
closed. Here was the first fault of the English admiralty; the
statement of the First Lord as to the available force at the outbreak
of the war was not borne out by facts. The first fleet, under Keppel,
barely equalled the French; and at the same time Howe's force in
America was inferior to the fleet under D'Estaing. In 1779 and 1781,
on the contrary, the English fleet was superior to that of the French
alone; yet the allies joined unopposed, while in the latter year De
Grasse got away to the West Indies, and Suffren to the East. In
Kempenfeldt's affair with De Guichen, the admiralty knew that the
French convoy was of the utmost importance to the campaign in the West
Indies, yet they sent out their admiral with only twelve ships; while
at that time, besides the reinforcement destined for the West Indies,
a number of others were stationed in the Downs, for what Fox justly
called "the paltry purpose" of distressing the Dutch trade. The
various charges made by Fox in the speech quoted from, and which, as
regarded the Franco-Spanish War, were founded mainly on the expediency
of attacking the allies before they got away into the ocean
wilderness, were supported by the high professional opinion of Lord
Howe, who of the Kempenfeldt affair said: "Not only the fate of the
West India Islands, but perhaps the whole future fortune of the war,
might have been decided, almost without a risk, in the Bay of
Biscay."[167] Not without a risk, but with strong probabilities of
success, the whole fortune of the war should at the first have been
staked on a concentration of the English fleet between Brest and
Cadiz. No relief for Gibraltar would have been more efficacious; no
diversion surer for the West India Islands; and the Americans would
have appealed in vain for the help, scantily given as it was, of the
French fleet. For the great results that flowed from the coming of De
Grasse must not obscure the fact that he came on the 31st of August,
and announced from the beginning that he must be in the West Indies
again by the middle of October. Only a providential combination of
circumstances prevented a repetition to Washington, in 1781, of the
painful disappointments by D'Estaing and De Guichen in 1778 and 1780.

FOOTNOTES:

[157] The curious reader can consult Clinton's letters and notes, in
the "Clinton Cornwallis Controversy," by B.F. Stevens. London, 1888.

[158] Bancroft: History of the United States, vol. x. p. 191.

[159] Although the English thus culpably failed to use their
superiority to the French alone, the Channel fleet numbering over
forty of the line, the fear that it might prevent the junction caused
the Brest fleet to sail in haste and undermanned,--a fact which had an
important effect upon the issue of the cruise. (Chevalier, p. 159.)

[160] The details of the mismanagement of this huge mob of ships are
so numerous as to confuse a narrative, and are therefore thrown into a
foot-note. The French fleet was hurried to sea four thousand men
short. The Spaniards were seven weeks in joining. When they met, no
common system of signals had been arranged; five fair summer days were
spent in remedying this defect. Not till a week after the junction
could the fleet sail for England. No steps were taken to supply the
provisions consumed by the French during the seven weeks. The original
orders to D'Orvilliers contemplated a landing at Portsmouth, or the
seizure of the Isle of Wight, for which a large army was assembled on
the coast of Normandy. Upon reaching the Channel, these orders were
suddenly changed, and Falmouth indicated as the point of landing. By
this time, August 16, summer was nearly over; and Falmouth, if taken,
would offer no shelter to a great fleet. Then an easterly gale drove
the fleet out of the Channel. By this time the sickness which raged
had so reduced the crews that many ships could be neither handled nor
fought. Ships companies of eight hundred or a thousand men could
muster only from three to five hundred. Thus bad administration
crippled the fighting powers of the fleet; while the unaccountable
military blunder of changing the objective from a safe and accessible
roadstead to a fourth-rate and exposed harbor completed the disaster
by taking away the only hope of a secure base of operations during the
fall and winter months. France then had no first-class port on the
Channel; hence the violent westerly gales which prevail in the autumn
and winter would have driven the allies into the North Sea.

[161] Life of Admiral Keppel, vol. ii pp. 72, 346, 403. See also
Barrow: Life of Lord Howe, pp. 123-126.

[162] Beatson gives quite at length (vol. v. p. 395) the debate in the
allied council of war. The customary hesitation of such councils, in
face of the difficulties of the situation, was increased by an appeal
to the delusion of commerce-destroying as a decisive mode of warfare.
M. de Beausset urged that "the allied fleets should direct their whole
attention to that great and attainable object, the intercepting of the
British homeward-bound West India fleets. This was a measure which, as
they were now masters of the sea, could scarcely fail of success; and
it would prove a blow so fatal to that nation, that she could not
recover it during the whole course of the war." The French account of
Lapeyrouse-Bonfils is essentially the same. Chevalier, who is silent
as to details, justly remarks: "The cruise just made by the allied
fleet was such as to injure the reputation of France and Spain. These
two powers had made a great display of force which had produced no
result." The English trade also received little injury. Guichen wrote
home: "I have returned from a cruise fatiguing but not glorious."

[163] This mishap of the French was largely due to mismanagement by De
Guichen, a skilful and usually a careful admiral. When Kempenfeldt
fell in with him, all the French ships-of-war were to leeward of their
convoy, while the English were to windward of it. The former,
therefore, were unable to interpose in time; and the alternative
remedy, of the convoy running down to leeward of their escort, could
not be applied by all the merchant-ships in so large a body.

[164] "In the spring of 1780 the British admiralty had assembled in
the Channel ports forty-five ships-of-the-line. The squadron at Brest
was reduced to twelve or fifteen.... To please Spain, twenty French
ships-of-the-line had joined the flag of Admiral Cordova in Cadiz. In
consequence of these dispositions, the English with their Channel
fleet held in check the forces which we had in Brest and in Cadiz.
Enemy's cruisers traversed freely the space between the Lizard and the
Straits of Gibraltar." (Chevalier, p. 202.)

In 1781 "the Cabinet of Versailles called the attention of Holland and
Spain to the necessity of assembling at Brest a fleet strong enough to
impose upon the ships which Great Britain kept in the Channel. The
Dutch remained in the Texel, and the Spaniards did not leave Cadiz.
From this state of things it resulted that the English, with forty
ships-of-the-line, blocked seventy belonging to the allied powers."
(p. 265.)

[165] "A question was very much agitated both in and out of
Parliament; namely, Whether the intercepting of the French fleet under
the Count de Grasse should not have been the first object of the
British fleet under Vice-Admiral Darby, instead of losing time in
going to Ireland, by which that opportunity was missed. The defeat of
the French fleet would certainly totally have disconcerted the great
plans which the enemies had formed in the East and West Indies. It
would have insured the safety of the British West India islands; the
Cape of Good Hope must have fallen into the hands of Britain; and the
campaign in North America might have had a very different
termination." (Beatson's Memoirs, vol. v. p. 341, where the contrary
arguments are also stated.)

[166] This is one of the most common and flagrant violations of the
principles of war,--stretching a thin line, everywhere inadequate,
over an immense frontier. The clamors of trade and local interests
make popular governments especially liable to it.

[167] Annual Register, 1782.




CHAPTER XII.

    EVENTS IN THE EAST INDIES, 1778-1781.--SUFFREN SAILS FROM BREST,
    1781.--HIS BRILLIANT NAVAL CAMPAIGN IN THE INDIAN SEAS, 1782,
    1783.


The very interesting and instructive campaign of Suffren in the East
Indies, although in itself by far the most noteworthy and meritorious
naval performance of the war of 1778, failed, through no fault of his,
to affect the general issue. It was not till 1781 that the French
Court felt able to direct upon the East naval forces adequate to the
importance of the issue. Yet the conditions of the peninsula at that
time were such as to give an unusual opportunity for shaking the
English power. Hyder Ali, the most skilful and daring of all the
enemies against whom the English had yet fought in India, was then
ruling over the kingdom of Mysore, which, from its position in the
southern part of the peninsula, threatened both the Carnatic and the
Malabar coast. Hyder, ten years before, had maintained alone a most
successful war against the intruding foreigners, concluding with a
peace upon the terms of a mutual restoration of conquests; and he was
now angered by the capture of Mahé. On the other hand, a number of
warlike tribes, known by the name of the Mahrattas, of the same race
and loosely knit together in a kind of feudal system, had become
involved in war with the English. The territory occupied by these
tribes, whose chief capital was at Poonah, near Bombay, extended
northward from Mysore to the Ganges. With boundaries thus
conterminous, and placed centrally with reference to the three English
presidencies of Bombay, Calcutta, and Madras, Hyder and the Mahrattas
were in a position of advantage for mutual support and for offensive
operations against the common enemy. At the beginning of the war
between England and France, a French agent appeared at Poonah. It was
reported to Warren Hastings, the Governor-General, that the tribes had
agreed to terms and ceded to the French a seaport on the Malabar
coast. With his usual promptness, Hastings at once determined on war,
and sent a division of the Bengal army across the Jumna and into
Berar. Another body of four thousand English troops also marched from
Bombay; but being badly led, was surrounded and forced to surrender in
January, 1779. This unusual reverse quickened the hopes and increased
the strength of the enemies of the English; and although the material
injury was soon remedied by substantial successes under able leaders,
the loss of prestige remained. The anger of Hyder Ali, roused by the
capture of Mahé, was increased by imprudent thwarting on the part of
the governor of Madras. Seeing the English entangled with the
Mahrattas, and hearing that a French armament was expected on the
Coromandel coast, he quietly prepared for war. In the summer of 1780
swarms of his horsemen descended without warning from the hills, and
appeared near the gates of Madras. In September one body of English
troops, three thousand strong, was cut to pieces, and another of five
thousand was only saved by a rapid retreat upon Madras, losing its
artillery and trains. Unable to attack Madras, Hyder turned upon the
scattered posts separated from each other and the capital by the open
country, which was now wholly in his control.

Such was the state of affairs when, in January, 1781, a French
squadron of six ships-of-the-line and three frigates appeared on the
coast. The English fleet under Sir Edward Hughes had gone to Bombay.
To the French commodore, Count d'Orves, Hyder appealed for aid in an
attack upon Cuddalore. Deprived of support by sea, and surrounded by
the myriads of natives, the place must have fallen. D'Orves, however,
refused, and returned to the Isle of France. At the same time one of
the most skilful of the English Indian soldiers, Sir Eyre Coote, took
the field against Hyder. The latter at once raised the siege of the
beleaguered posts, and after a series of operations extending through
the spring months, was brought to battle on the 1st of July, 1781. His
total defeat restored to the English the open country, saved the
Carnatic, and put an end to the hopes of the partisans of the French
in their late possession of Pondicherry. A great opportunity had been
lost.

Meanwhile a French officer of very different temper from his
predecessors was on his way to the East Indies. It will be remembered
that when De Grasse sailed from Brest, March 22, 1781, for the West
Indies, there went with his fleet a division of five ships-of-the-line
under Suffren. The latter separated from the main body on the 29th of
the month, taking with him a few transports destined for the Cape of
Good Hope, then a Dutch colony. The French government had learned that
an expedition from England was destined to seize this important
halting-place on the road to India, and Suffren's first mission was to
secure it. In fact, the squadron under Commodore Johnstone[168] had
got away first, and had anchored at Porto Praya, in the Cape Verde
Islands, a Portuguese colony, on the 11th of April. It numbered two
ships-of-the-line, and three of fifty guns, with frigates and smaller
vessels, besides thirty-five transports, mostly armed. Without
apprehension of attack, not because he trusted to the neutrality of
the port but because he thought his destination secret, the English
commodore had not anchored with a view to battle.

It so happened that at the moment of sailing from Brest one of the
ships intended for the West Indies was transferred to Suffren's
squadron. She consequently had not water enough for the longer voyage,
and this with other reasons determined Suffren also to anchor at
Porto Praya. On the 16th of April, five days after Johnstone, he made
the island early in the morning and stood for the anchorage, sending a
coppered ship ahead to reconnoitre. Approaching from the eastward, the
land for some time hid the English squadron; but at quarter before
nine the advance ship, the "Artésien," signalled that enemy's ships
were anchored in the bay. The latter is open to the southward, and
extends from east to west about a mile and a half; the conditions are
such that ships usually lie in the northeast part, near the shore
(Plate XIII).[169] The English were there, stretching irregularly in a
west-northwest line. Both Suffren and Johnstone were surprised, but
the latter more so; and the initiative remained with the French
officer. Few men were fitter, by natural temper and the teaching of
experience, for the prompt decision required. Of ardent disposition
and inborn military genius, Suffren had learned, in the conduct of
Boscawen toward the squadron of De la Clue,[170] in which he had
served, not to lay weight upon the power of Portugal to enforce
respect for her neutrality. He knew that this must be the squadron
meant for the Cape of Good Hope. The only question for him was whether
to press on to the Cape with the chance of getting there first, or to
attack the English at their anchors, in the hope of so crippling them
as to prevent their further progress. He decided for the latter; and
although the ships of his squadron, not sailing equally well, were
scattered, he also determined to stand in at once, rather than lose
the advantage of a surprise. Making signal to prepare for action at
anchor, he took the lead in his flag-ship, the "Héros," of
seventy-four guns, hauled close round the southeast point of the bay,
and stood for the English flag-ship (f). He was closely followed by
the "Hannibal," seventy-four (line a b); the advance ship "Artésien"
(c), a sixty-four, also stood on with him; but the two rear ships were
still far astern.

   [Illustration: Pl. XIII. PORTO PRAYA. APRIL 16, 1781.]

The English commodore got ready for battle as soon as he made out the
enemy, but had no time to rectify his order. Suffren anchored five
hundred feet from the flag-ship's starboard beam (by a singular
coincidence the English flag-ship was also called "Hero"), thus having
enemy's ships on both sides, and opened fire. The "Hannibal" anchored
ahead of her commodore (b), and so close that the latter had to veer
cable and drop astern (a); but her captain, ignorant of Suffren's
intention to disregard the neutrality of the port, had not obeyed the
order to clear for action, and was wholly unprepared,--his decks
lumbered with water-casks which had been got up to expedite watering,
and the guns not cast loose. He did not add to this fault by any
hesitation, but followed the flag-ship boldly, receiving passively the
fire, to which for a time he was unable to reply. Luffing to the wind,
he passed to windward of his chief, chose his position with skill, and
atoned by his death for his first fault. These two ships were so
placed as to use both broadsides. The "Artésien," in the smoke,
mistook an East India ship for a man-of-war. Running alongside (c'),
her captain was struck dead at the moment he was about to anchor, and
the critical moment being lost by the absence of a head, the ship
drifted out of close action, carrying the East-Indiaman along with her
(c''). The remaining two vessels, coming up late, failed to keep close
enough to the wind, and they too were thrown out of action (d, e).
Then Suffren, finding himself with only two ships to bear the brunt of
the fight, cut his cable and made sail. The "Hannibal" followed his
movement; but so much injured was she that her fore and main masts
went over the side,--fortunately not till she was pointed out from the
bay, which she left shorn to a hulk.

Putting entirely aside questions of international law, the wisdom and
conduct of Suffren's attack, from the military point of view, invite
attention. To judge them properly, we must consider what was the
object of the mission with which he was charged, and what were the
chief factors in thwarting or forwarding it. His first object was to
protect the Cape of Good Hope against an English expedition; the
chief reliance for effecting his purpose was to get there first; the
obstacle to his success was the English fleet. To anticipate the
arrival of the latter, two courses were open to him,--to run for it in
the hope of winning the race, or to beat the enemy and so put him out
of the running altogether. So long as his whereabouts was unknown, a
search, unless with very probable information, would be a waste of
time; but when fortune had thrown his enemy across his path, the
genius of Suffren at once jumped to the conclusion that the control of
the sea in southern waters would determine the question, and should be
settled at once. To use his own strong expression, "The destruction of
the English squadron would _cut off the root_ of all the plans and
projects of that expedition, gain us for a long time the superiority
in India, a superiority whence might result a glorious peace, and
hinder the English from reaching the Cape before me,--an object which
has been fulfilled and was the principal aim of my mission." He was
ill-informed as to the English force, believing it greater than it
was; but he had it at disadvantage and surprised. The prompt decision
to fight, therefore, was right, and it is the most pronounced merit of
Suffren in this affair, that he postponed for the moment--dismissed,
so to speak, from his mind--the ulterior projects of the cruise; but
in so doing he departed from the traditions of the French navy and the
usual policy of his government. It cannot be imputed to him as a fault
that he did not receive from his captains the support he was fairly
entitled to expect. The accidents and negligence which led to their
failure have been mentioned; but having his three best ships in hand,
there can be little doubt he was right in profiting by the surprise,
and trusting that the two in reserve would come up in time.

The position taken by his own ship and by the "Hannibal," enabling
them to use both broadsides,--in other words, to develop their utmost
force,--was excellently judged. He thus availed himself to the full of
the advantage given by the surprise and by the lack of order in the
enemy's squadron. This lack of order, according to English accounts,
threw out of action two of their fifty-gun ships,--a circumstance
which, while discreditable to Johnstone, confirmed Suffren's judgment
in precipitating his attack. Had he received the aid upon which, after
all deductions, he was justified in counting, he would have destroyed
the English squadron; as it was, he saved the Cape Colony at Porto
Praya. It is not surprising, therefore, that the French Court,
notwithstanding its traditional sea policy and the diplomatic
embarrassment caused by the violation of Portuguese neutrality, should
have heartily and generously acknowledged a vigor of action to which
it was unused in its admirals.

It has been said that Suffren, who had watched the cautious movements
of D'Estaing in America, and had served in the Seven Years' War,
attributed in part the reverses suffered by the French at sea to the
introduction of Tactics, which he stigmatized as the veil of timidity;
but that the results of the fight at Porto Praya, necessarily engaged
without previous arrangement, convinced him that system and method had
their use.[171] Certainly his tactical combinations afterward were of
a high order, especially in his earlier actions in the East (for he
seems again to have abandoned them in the later fights under the
disappointment caused by his captains' disaffection or blundering).
But his great and transcendent merit lay in the clearness with which
he recognized in the English fleets, the exponent of the British sea
power, the proper enemy of the French fleet, to be attacked first and
always when with any show of equality. Far from blind to the
importance of those ulterior objects to which the action of the French
navy was so constantly subordinated, he yet saw plainly that the way
to assure those objects was not by economizing his own ships, but by
destroying those of the enemy. Attack, not defence, was the road to
sea power in his eyes; and sea power meant control of the issues upon
the land, at least in regions distant from Europe. This view out of
the English policy he had the courage to take, after forty years of
service in a navy sacrificed to the opposite system; but he brought to
its practical application a method not to be found in any English
admiral of the day, except perhaps Rodney, and a fire superior to the
latter. Yet the course thus followed was no mere inspiration of the
moment; it was the result of clear views previously held and
expressed. However informed by natural ardor, it had the tenacity of
an intellectual conviction. Thus he wrote to D'Estaing, after the
failure to destroy Barrington's squadron at Sta. Lucia, remonstrating
upon the half-manned condition of his own and other ships, from which
men had been landed to attack the English troops:--

    "Notwithstanding the small results of the two cannonades of the
    15th of December [directed against Barrington's squadron], and
    the unhappy check our land forces have undergone, we may yet
    hope for success. But the only means to have it is to attack
    vigorously the squadron, which, with our superiority, cannot
    resist, notwithstanding its land batteries, whose effects will
    be neutralized if we run them aboard, or anchor upon their
    buoys. If we delay, they may escape.... Besides, our fleet being
    unmanned, it is in condition neither to sail nor to fight. What
    would happen if Admiral Byron's fleet should arrive? What would
    become of ships having neither crews nor admiral? Their defeat
    would cause the loss of the army and the colony. Let us destroy
    that squadron; their army, lacking everything and in a bad
    country, would soon be obliged to surrender. Then let Byron
    come, we shall be pleased to see him. I think it is not
    necessary to point out that for this attack we need men and
    plans well concerted with those who are to execute them."

Equally did he condemn the failure of D'Estaing to capture the four
crippled ships of Byron's squadron, after the action off Grenada.

Owing to a combination of misfortunes, the attack at Porto Praya had
not the decisive result it deserved. Commodore Johnstone got under way
and followed Suffren; but he thought his force was not adequate to
attack in face of the resolute bearing of the French, and feared the
loss of time consequent upon chasing to leeward of his port. He
succeeded, however, in retaking the East India ship which the
"Artésien" had carried out. Suffren continued his course and anchored
at the Cape, in Simon's Bay, on the 21st of June. Johnstone followed
him a fortnight later; but learning by an advance ship that the French
troops had been landed, he gave up the enterprise against the colony,
made a successful commerce-destroying attack upon five Dutch India
ships in Saldanha Bay, which poorly repaid the failure of the military
undertaking, and then went back himself to England, after sending the
ships-of-the-line on to join Sir Edward Hughes in the East Indies.

Having seen the Cape secured, Suffren sailed for the Isle of France,
arriving there on the 25th of October, 1781. Count d'Orves, being
senior, took command of the united squadron. The necessary repairs
were made, and the fleet sailed for India, December 17. On the 22d of
January, 1782, an English fifty-gun ship, the "Hannibal," was taken.
On the 9th of February Count d'Orves died, and Suffren became
commander-in-chief, with the rank of commodore. A few days later the
land was seen to the northward of Madras; but owing to head-winds the
city was not sighted until February 15. Nine large ships-of-war were
found anchored in order under the guns of the forts. They were the
fleet of Sir Edward Hughes, not in confusion like that of
Johnstone.[172]

Here, at the meeting point between these two redoubtable champions,
each curiously representative of the characteristics of his own
race,--the one of the stubborn tenacity and seamanship of the English,
the other of the ardor and tactical science of the French, too long
checked and betrayed by a false system,--is the place to give an
accurate statement of the material forces. The French fleet had three
seventy-fours, seven sixty-fours, and two fifty-gun ships, one of
which was the lately captured English "Hannibal." To these Sir Edward
Hughes opposed two seventy-fours, one seventy, one sixty-eight, four
sixty-fours, and one fifty-gun ship. The odds, therefore, twelve to
nine, were decidedly against the English; and it is likely that the
advantage in single-ship power, class for class, was also against
them.

It must be recalled that at the time of his arrival Suffren found no
friendly port or roadstead, no base of supplies or repair. The French
posts had all fallen by 1779; and his rapid movement, which saved the
Cape, did not bring him up in time to prevent the capture of the Dutch
Indian possessions. The invaluable harbor of Trincomalee, in Ceylon,
was taken just one month before Suffren saw the English fleet at
Madras. But if he thus had everything to gain, Hughes had as much to
lose. To Suffren, at the moment of first meeting, belonged superiority
of numbers and the power of taking the offensive, with all its
advantages in choice of initiative. Upon Hughes fell the anxiety of
the defensive, with inferior numbers, many assailable points, and
uncertainty as to the place where the blow would fall.

It was still true, though not so absolutely as thirty years before,
that control in India depended upon control of the sea. The passing
years had greatly strengthened the grip of England, and
proportionately loosened that of France. Relatively, therefore, the
need of Suffren to destroy his enemy was greater than that of his
predecessors, D'Aché and others; whereas Hughes could count upon a
greater strength in the English possessions, and so bore a somewhat
less responsibility than the admirals who went before him.

Nevertheless, the sea was still by far the most important factor in
the coming strife, and for its proper control it was necessary to
disable more or less completely the enemy's fleet, and to have some
reasonably secure base. For the latter purpose, Trincomalee, though
unhealthy, was by far the best harbor on the east coast; but it had
not been long enough in the hands of England to be well supplied.
Hughes, therefore, inevitably fell back on Madras for repairs after an
action, and was forced to leave Trincomalee to its own resources until
ready to take the sea again. Suffren, on the other hand, found all
ports alike destitute of naval supplies, while the natural advantages
of Trincomalee made its possession an evident object of importance to
him; and Hughes so understood it.

Independently, therefore, of the tradition of the English navy
impelling Hughes to attack, the influence of which appears plainly
between the lines of his letters, Suffren had, in moving toward
Trincomalee, a threat which was bound to draw his adversary out of his
port. Nor did Trincomalee stand alone; the existing war between Hyder
Ali and the English made it imperative for Suffren to seize a port
upon the mainland, at which to land the three thousand troops carried
by the squadron to co-operate on shore against the common enemy, and
from which supplies, at least of food, might be had. Everything,
therefore, concurred to draw Hughes out, and make him seek to cripple
or hinder the French fleet.

The method of his action would depend upon his own and his adversary's
skill, and upon the uncertain element of the weather. It was plainly
desirable for him not to be brought to battle except on his own terms;
in other words, without some advantage of situation to make up for his
weaker force. As a fleet upon the open sea cannot secure any
advantages of ground, the position favoring the weaker was that to
windward, giving choice of time and some choice as to method of
attack, the offensive position used defensively, with the intention to
make an offensive movement if circumstances warrant. The leeward
position left the weaker no choice but to run, or to accept action on
its adversary's terms.

Whatever may be thought of Hughes's skill, it must be conceded that
his task was difficult. Still, it can be clearly thought down to two
requisites. The first was to get in a blow at the French fleet, so as
to reduce the present inequality; the second, to keep Suffren from
getting Trincomalee, which depended wholly on the fleet.[173]
Suffren, on the other hand, if he could do Hughes, in an action, more
injury than he himself received, would be free to turn in any
direction he chose.

Suffren having sighted Hughes's fleet at Madras, February 15, anchored
his own four miles to the northward. Considering the enemy's line,
supported by the batteries, to be too strong for attack, he again got
under way at four P.M., and stood south. Hughes also weighed, standing
to the southward all that night under easy sail, and at daylight found
that the enemy's squadron had separated from the convoy, the ships of
war being about twelve miles east, while the transports were nine
miles southwest, from him (Plate XIV. A, A). This dispersal is said to
have been due to the carelessness of the French frigates, which did
not keep touch of the English. Hughes at once profited by it, chasing
the convoy (c), knowing that the line-of-battle ships must follow. His
copper-bottomed ships came up with and captured six of the enemy, five
of which were English prizes. The sixth carried three hundred troops
with military stores. Hughes had scored a point.

Suffren of course followed in a general chase, and by three P.M. four
of his best sailers were two or three miles from the sternmost English
ships. Hughes's ships were now much scattered, but not injudiciously
so, for they joined by signal at seven P.M. Both squadrons stood to
the southeast during the night, under easy sail.

At daylight of the 17th--the date of the first of four actions fought
between these two chiefs within seven months--the fleets were six or
eight miles apart, the French bearing north-northeast from the
English (B, B). The latter formed line-ahead on the port tack (a),
with difficulty, owing to the light winds and frequent calms. Admiral
Hughes explains that he hoped to weather the enemy by this course so
as to engage closely, counting probably on finding himself to windward
when the sea-breeze made. The wind continuing light, but with frequent
squalls, from north-northeast, the French, running before it, kept the
puffs longer and neared the English rapidly, Suffren's intention to
attack the rear being aided by Hughes's course. The latter finding his
rear straggling, bore up to line abreast (b), retreating to gain time
for the ships to close on the centre. These movements in line abreast
continued till twenty minutes before four P.M., when, finding he could
not escape attack on the enemy's terms, Hughes hauled his wind on the
port tack and awaited it (C). Whether by his own fault or not, he was
now in the worst possible position, waiting for an attack by a
superior force at its pleasure. The rear ship of his line, the
"Exeter," was not closed up; and there appears no reason why she
should not have been made the van, by forming on the starboard tack,
and thus bringing the other ships up to her.

   [Illustration: Pl. XIV. SUFFREN & HUGHES. FEB. 17. 1782.]

The method of Suffren's attack (C) is differently stated by him and by
Hughes, but the difference is in detail only; the main facts are
certain. Hughes says the enemy "steered down on the rear of our line
in an irregular double line-abreast," in which formation they
continued till the moment of collision, when "three of the enemy's
ships in the first line bore right down upon the 'Exeter,' while four
more of their second line, headed by the 'Héros,' in which M. de
Suffren had his flag, hauled _along the outside of the first line_
toward our centre. At five minutes past four the enemy's three ships
began their fire upon the 'Exeter,' which was returned by her and her
second ahead; the action became general from our rear to our centre,
the commanding ship of the enemy, with three others of their second
line, leading down on our centre, yet never advancing farther than
opposite to the 'Superbe,' our centre ship, with little or no wind and
some heavy rain during the engagement. Under these circumstances, the
enemy brought eight of their best ships to the attack of five of ours,
as the van of our line, consisting of the 'Monmouth,' 'Eagle,'
'Burford,' and 'Worcester,' could not be brought into action without
tacking on the enemy," for which there was not enough wind.

Here we will leave them, and give Suffren's account of how he took up
his position. In his report to the Minister of Marine he says:--

    "I should have destroyed the English squadron, less by superior
    numbers than by the advantageous disposition in which I attacked
    it. I attacked the rear ship and stood along the English line as
    far as the sixth. I thus made three of them useless, so that we
    were twelve against six. I began the fight at half-past three in
    the afternoon, taking the lead and making signal to form line as
    best could be done; without that I would not have engaged. At
    four I made signal to three ships to double on the enemy's rear,
    and to the squadron to approach within pistol-shot. This signal,
    though repeated, was not executed. I did not _myself_ give the
    example, in order that I might hold in check the three van
    ships, which by tacking would have doubled on me. However,
    except the 'Brilliant,' which doubled on the rear, no ship was
    as close as mine, nor received as many shots."

The principal point of difference in the two accounts is, that Suffren
asserts that his flag-ship passed along the whole English line, from
the rear to the sixth ship; while Hughes says the French divided into
two lines, which, upon coming near, steered, one on the rear, the
other on the centre, of his squadron. The latter would be the better
manoeuvre; for if the leading ship of the attack passed, as Suffren
asserts, along the enemy's line from the rear to the sixth, she should
receive in succession the first fire of six ships, which ought to
cripple her and confuse her line. Suffren also notes the intention to
double on the rear by placing three ships to leeward of it. Two of the
French did take this position. Suffren further gives his reason for
not closing with his own ship, which led; but as those which followed
him went no nearer, Hughes's attention was not drawn to his action.

The French commodore was seriously, and it would seem justly, angered
by the inaction of several of his captains. Of the second in command
he complained to the minister: "Being at the head, I could not well
see what was going on in the rear. I had directed M. de Tromelin to
make signals to ships which might be near him; he only repeated my own
without having them carried out." This complaint was wholly justified.
On the 6th of February, ten days before the fight, he had written to
his second as follows:--

    "If we are so fortunate as to be to windward, as the English are
    not more than eight, or at most nine, my intention is to double
    on their rear. Supposing your division to be in the rear, you
    will see by your position what number of ships will overlap the
    enemy's line, and you will make signal to them to double[174]
    [that is, to engage on the lee side].... In any case, I beg you
    to order to your division the manoeuvres which you shall think
    best fitted to assure the success of the action. The capture of
    Trincomalee and that of Negapatam, and perhaps of all Ceylon,
    should make us wish for a general action."

The last two sentences reveal Suffren's own appreciation of the
military situation in the Indian seas, which demanded, first, the
disabling of the hostile fleet, next, the capture of certain strategic
ports. That this diagnosis was correct is as certain as that it
reversed the common French maxims, which would have put the port first
and the fleet second as objectives. A general action was the first
desideratum of Suffren, and it is therefore safe to say that to avoid
such action should have been the first object of Hughes. The attempt
of the latter to gain the windward position was consequently correct;
and as in the month of February the sea-breeze at Madras sets in from
the eastward and southward about eleven A.M., he probably did well to
steer in that general direction, though the result disappointed him.
De Guichen in one of his engagements with Rodney shaped the course of
his fleet with reference to being to windward when the afternoon
breeze made, and was successful. What use Hughes would have made of
the advantage of the wind can only be inferred from his own
words,--that he sought it in order to engage more closely. There is
not in this the certain promise of any skilful use of a tactical
advantage.

Suffren also illustrates, in his words to Tromelin, his conception of
the duties of a second in command, which may fairly be paralleled with
that of Nelson in his celebrated order before Trafalgar. In this first
action he led the main attack himself, leaving the direction of what
may be called the reserve--at any rate, of the second half of the
assault--to his lieutenant, who, unluckily for him, was not a
Collingwood, and utterly failed to support him. It is probable that
Suffren's leading was due not to any particular theory, but to the
fact that his ship was the best sailer in the fleet, and that the
lateness of the hour and lightness of the wind made it necessary to
bring the enemy to action speedily. But here appears a fault on the
part of Suffren. Leading as he did involves, not necessarily but very
naturally, the idea of example; and holding his own ship outside of
close range, for excellent tactical reasons, led the captains in his
wake naturally, almost excusably, to keep at the same distance,
notwithstanding his signals. The conflict between orders and example,
which cropped out so singularly at Vicksburg in our civil war, causing
the misunderstanding and estrangement of two gallant officers, should
not be permitted to occur. It is the business of a chief to provide
against such misapprehensions by most careful previous explanation of
both the letter and spirit of his plans. Especially is this so at sea,
where smoke, slack wind, and intervening rigging make signals hard to
read, though they are almost the only means of communication. This was
Nelson's practice; nor was Suffren a stranger to the idea.
"Dispositions well concerted with those who are to carry them out are
needed," he wrote to D'Estaing, three years before. The excuse which
may be pleaded for those who followed him, and engaged, cannot avail
for the rear ships, and especially not for the second in command, who
knew Suffren's plans. He should have compelled the rear ships to take
position to leeward, leading himself, if necessary. There was wind
enough; for two captains actually engaged to leeward, one of them
without orders, acting, through the impulse of his own good will and
courage, on Nelson's saying, "No captain can do very wrong who places
his ship alongside that of an enemy." He received the special
commendation of Suffren, in itself an honor and a reward. Whether the
failure of so many of his fellows was due to inefficiency, or to a
spirit of faction and disloyalty, is unimportant to the general
military writer, however interesting to French officers jealous for
the honor of their service. Suffren's complaints, after several
disappointments, became vehement.

    "My heart," wrote he, "is wrung by the most general defection. I
    have just lost the opportunity of destroying the English
    squadron.... All--yes, all--might have got near, since we were
    to windward and ahead, and none did so. Several among them had
    behaved bravely in other combats. I can only attribute this
    horror to the wish to bring the cruise to an end, to ill-will,
    and to ignorance; for I dare not suspect anything worse. The
    result has been terrible. I must tell you, Monseigneur, that
    officers who have been long at the Isle of France are neither
    seamen nor military men. Not seamen, for they have not been at
    sea; and the trading temper, independent and insubordinate, is
    absolutely opposed to the military spirit."

This letter, written after his fourth battle with Hughes, must be
taken with allowance. Not only does it appear that Suffren himself,
hurried away on this last occasion by his eagerness, was partly
responsible for the disorder of his fleet, but there were other
circumstances, and above all the character of some of the officers
blamed, which made the charge of a general disaffection excessive. On
the other hand, it remains true that after four general actions, with
superior numbers on the part of the French, under a chief of the skill
and ardor of Suffren, the English squadron, to use his own plaintive
expression, "still existed;" not only so, but had not lost a single
ship. The only conclusion that can be drawn is that of a French naval
writer: "Quantity disappeared before quality."[175] It is immaterial
whether the defect was due to inefficiency or disaffection.

The inefficiency which showed itself on the field of battle
disappeared in the general conduct of the campaign where the qualities
of the chief alone told. The battle of February 17th ended with a
shift of wind to the southeast at six P.M., after two hours action.
The English were thus brought to windward, and their van ships enabled
to share in the fight. Night falling, Suffren, at half-past six,
hauled his squadron by the wind on the starboard tack, heading
northeast, while Hughes steered south under easy sail. It is said by
Captain Chevalier, of the French navy, that Suffren intended to renew
the fight next day. In that case he should have taken measures to keep
within reach. It was too plainly Hughes's policy not to fight without
some advantage,--to allow the supposition that with one ship, the
"Exeter," lost to him through the concentration of so many enemies
upon her, he would quietly await an attack. This is so plain as to
make it probable that Suffren saw sufficient reason, in the results to
his fleet and the misconduct of his officers, not to wish to renew
action at once. The next morning the two fleets were out of sight of
each other. The continuance of the north wind, and the crippled state
of two of his ships, forced Hughes to go to Trincomalee, where the
sheltered harbor allowed them to repair. Suffren, anxious about his
transports, went to Pondicherry, where he anchored in their company.
It was his wish then to proceed against Negapatam; but the commander
of the troops chose to act against Cuddalore. After negotiations and
arrangements with Hyder Ali the army landed south of Porto Novo, and
marched against Cuddalore, which surrendered on the 4th of April.

Meanwhile Suffren, anxious to act against his principal objective, had
sailed again on the 23d of March. It was his hope to cut off two
ships-of-the-line which were expected from England. For this he was
too late; the two seventy-fours joined the main body at Madras, March
30th. Hughes had refitted at Trincomalee in a fortnight, and reached
Madras again on the 12th of March. Soon after the reinforcement had
joined him, he sailed again for Trincomalee with troops and military
stores for the garrison. On the 8th of April Suffren's squadron was
seen to the northeast, also standing to the southward. Hughes kept on,
through that and the two following days, with light northerly winds.
On the 11th he made the coast of Ceylon, fifty miles north of
Trincomalee, and bore away for the port. On the morning of the 12th
the French squadron in the northeast was seen crowding sail in
pursuit. It was the day on which Rodney and De Grasse met in the West
Indies, but the parts were reversed; here the French, not the English,
sought action.

The speed of the ships in both squadrons was very unequal; each had
some coppered ships and some not coppered. Hughes found that his slow
sailers could not escape the fastest of his enemy,--a condition which
will always compel a retreating force to hazard an action, unless it
can resolve to give up the rear ships, and which makes it imperative
for the safety, as well as the efficiency, of a squadron that vessels
of the same class should all have a certain minimum speed. The same
cause--the danger of a separated ship--led the unwilling De Grasse,
the same day, in another scene, to a risky manoeuvre and a great
mishap. Hughes, with better reason, resolved to fight; and at nine
A.M. formed his line on the starboard tack, standing in-shore (Plate
XV., A), the squadron in good order, with intervals of two cables
between the ships.[176] His account, which again varies from that of
Suffren, giving a radically different idea of the tactics used by the
French commodore, and more to the credit of the latter's skill, will
first be followed. He says:--

    "The enemy, bearing north by east, distant six miles, with wind
    at north by east, continued manoeuvring their ships and
    changing their positions in line, till fifteen minutes past
    noon, when they bore away (a) to engage us, five sail of their
    van stretching along (b) to engage the ships of our van, and the
    other seven sail (b') steering directly on our three centre
    ships, the 'Superbe,' the 'Monmouth,' her second ahead, and the
    'Monarca,' her second astern. At half-past one the engagement
    began in the van of both squadrons; three minutes after, I made
    the signal for battle. The French admiral in the 'Héros' and his
    second astern in 'L'Orient' (both seventy-fours) bore down on
    the 'Superbe'[177] within pistol-shot. The 'Héros' continued in
    her position, giving and receiving a severe fire for nine
    minutes, and then stood on, greatly damaged, to attack the
    'Monmouth,' at that time engaged with another of the enemy's
    ships, making room for the ships in his rear to come up to the
    attack of our centre, where the engagement was hottest. At three
    the 'Monmouth' had her mizzen-mast shot away, and in a few
    minutes her mainmast, and bore out of the line to leeward (C,
    c); and at forty minutes past three the wind unexpectedly
    continuing far northerly without any sea-breeze, and being
    careful not to entangle our ships with the land, I made signal
    to wear and haul by the wind in a line-of-battle on the larboard
    tack, still engaging the enemy."

Now here, practically, was concentration with a vengeance. In this,
the hardest fight between these two hard fighters, the English loss
was 137 killed and 430 wounded in eleven ships. Of this total, the two
centre ships, the flag-ship and her next ahead, lost 104 killed and
198 wounded,--fifty-three per cent of the entire loss of the squadron,
of which they formed eighteen per cent. The casualties were very much
heavier, in proportion to the size of the ships, than those of the
leaders of the two columns at Trafalgar.[178] The material injury to
hulls, spars, etc., was yet more serious. The English squadron, by
this concentration of the enemy upon a small fraction of it, was
entirely crippled. Inferior when the action began, its inferiority
was yet more decisive by the subtraction of two ships, and Suffren's
freedom to move was increased.

   [Illustration: Pl. XV. SUFFREN & HUGHES. APRIL 12, 1782.]

But how far was this concentration intended by Suffren? For this we
must go to the pages of two French writers,[179] who base their
narratives upon his own despatches on record in the French Marine
Office. The practical advantage gained by the French must also be
tested by comparing the lists of casualties, and the injuries received
by their individual ships; for it is evident that if both the
squadrons received the same total amount of injury, but that with the
English it fell on two ships, so that they could not be ready for
action for a month or more, while with the French the damage was
divided among the twelve, allowing them to be ready again in a few
days, the victory tactically and strategically would rest with the
latter.[180]

As regards Suffren's purpose, there is nothing to indicate that he
meant to make such an attack as Hughes describes. Having twelve ships
to the English eleven, his intention seems to have been to pursue the
usual English practice,--form line parallel to the enemy, bear down
together, and engage ship to ship. To this he added one simple
combination; the twelfth French ship, being unprovided with an
opponent, was to engage the rear English ship on her lee side, placing
her thus between two fires. In truth, a concentration upon the van and
centre, such as Hughes describes, is tactically inferior to a like
effort upon the centre and rear of a column. This is true of steamers
even, which, though less liable to loss of motive power, must still
turn round to get from van to rear, losing many valuable seconds; but
it is specially true of sailing vessels, and above all in the light,
baffling airs which are apt to mark the change of monsoon at the
season when this fight was fought. Nelson emphasized his contempt of
the Russians of his day by saying he would not hesitate to attack
their van, counting upon throwing the whole line in confusion from
their want of seamanship; but though entertaining a not much better
opinion of the Spaniards, he threw the weight of attack on the rear of
the allied fleets at Trafalgar. In dealing with such seamen as the
captains of Hughes's fleet, it would have been an error to assail the
van instead of the rear. Only a dead calm could have kept the latter
out of action.

Suffren's attack is thus described by Captain Chevalier. After
mentioning Hughes's forming line on the starboard tack, he says:--

    "This manoeuvre was imitated by the French, and the two
    squadrons ran on parallel lines, heading about west-northwest
    (A, A). At eleven, our line being well formed, Suffren made
    signal to keep away to west-southwest, by a movement all
    together. Our ships did not keep their bearing upon the
    prescribed line, and the van, composed of the best sailers, came
    first within range of the enemy.[181] At one, the leading ships
    of the English fleet opened fire upon the 'Vengeur' and
    'Artésien' [French van]. These two ships, having luffed[182] to
    return the fire, were at once ordered to keep away again.
    Suffren, who wished for a decisive action, kept his course,
    receiving without reply the shots directed upon his ship by the
    enemy. When at pistol-range of the 'Superbe,' he hauled to the
    wind (B), and the signal to open fire appeared at his mainmast
    head. Admiral Hughes having only eleven ships, the 'Bizarre,'
    according to the dispositions taken by the commander-in-chief,
    was to attack on the quarter the rear ship of the English fleet
    and double on it to leeward. At the moment when the first
    cannon-shots were heard, our worst sailers were not up with
    their stations. Breathing the letter, and not the spirit, of the
    commodore's orders, the captains of these ships luffed at the
    same time as those which preceded them. Hence it resulted that
    the French line formed a curve (B), whose extremities were
    represented in the van by the 'Artésien' and 'Vengeur,' and in
    the rear by the 'Bizarre,' 'Ajax,' and 'Sévère.' In consequence,
    these ships were very far from those which corresponded to them
    in the enemy's line."

It is evident from all this, written by a warm admirer of Suffren, who
has had full access to the official papers, that the French chief
intended an attack elementary in conception and difficult of
execution. To keep a fleet on a line of bearing, sailing free,
requires much drill, especially when the ships have different rates of
speed, as had Suffren's. The extreme injury suffered by the "Superbe"
and "Monmouth," undeniably due to a concentration, cannot be
attributed to Suffren's dispositions. "The injuries which the 'Héros'
received at the beginning of the action did not allow her to remain by
the 'Superbe.' Not being able to back her topsails in time, the braces
having been cut, she passed ahead, and was only stopped on the beam of
the 'Monmouth.'"[183] This accounts for the suffering of the latter
ship, already injured, and now contending with a much larger opponent.
The "Superbe" was freed from Suffren only to be engaged by the next
Frenchman, an equally heavy ship; and when the "Monmouth" drifted or
bore up, to leeward, the French flag-ship also drifted so that for a
few moments she fired her stern guns into the "Superbe's" bow (C, d).
The latter at the same time was engaged on the beam and quarter by two
French ships, who, either with or without signal, came up to shield
their commodore.

An examination of the list of casualties shows that the loss of the
French was much more distributed among their ships than was the case
with the English. No less than three of the latter escaped without a
man killed, while of the French only one. The kernel of the action
seems to have been in the somewhat fortuitous concentration of two
French seventy-fours and one sixty-four on an English seventy-four and
sixty-four. Assuming the ships to have been actually of the same force
as their rates, the French brought, counting broadside only, one
hundred and six guns against sixty-nine.

Some unfavorable criticism was excited by the management of Admiral
Hughes during the three days preceding the fight, because he refrained
from attacking the French, although they were for much of the time to
leeward with only one ship more than the English, and much separated
at that. It was thought that he had the opportunity of beating them in
detail.[184] The accounts accessible are too meagre to permit an
accurate judgment upon this opinion, which probably reflected the
mess-table and quarter-deck talk of the subordinate officers of the
fleet. Hughes's own report of the position of the two fleets is vague,
and in one important particular directly contradictory to the French.
If the alleged opportunity offered, the English admiral in declining
to use it adhered to the resolve, with which he sailed, neither to
seek nor shun the enemy, but to go directly to Trincomalee and land
the troops and supplies he had on board. In other words, he was
governed in his action by the French rather than the English naval
policy, of subordinating the attack of the enemy's fleet to the
particular mission in hand. If for this reason he did allow a
favorable chance of fighting to slip, he certainly had reason bitterly
to regret his neglect, in the results of the battle which followed;
but in the lack of precise information the most interesting point to
be noted is the impression made upon public and professional opinion,
indicating how strongly the English held that the attack of the
enemy's fleet was the first duty of an English admiral. It may also be
said that he could hardly have fared worse by attacking than he did by
allowing the enemy to become the assailant; and certainly not worse
than he would have fared had Suffren's captains been as good as his
own.

After the action, towards sunset, both squadrons anchored in fifteen
fathoms of water, irregular soundings, three of the French ships
taking the bottom on coral patches. Here they lay for a week two miles
apart, refitting. Hughes, from the ruined condition of the "Monmouth,"
expected an attack; but when Suffren had finished his repairs on the
19th, he got under way and remained outside for twenty-four hours,
inviting a battle which he would not begin. He realized the condition
of the enemy so keenly as to feel the necessity of justifying his
action to the Minister of Marine, which he did for eight reasons
unnecessary to particularize here. The last was the lack of efficiency
and hearty support on the part of his captains.

It is not likely that Suffren erred on the side of excessive caution.
On the contrary, his most marked defect as a commander-in-chief was an
ardor which, when in sight of the enemy, became impatience, and
carried him at times into action hastily and in disorder. But if, in
the details and execution of his battles, in his tactical
combinations, Suffren was at times foiled by his own impetuosity and
the short-comings of most of his captains, in the general conduct of
the campaign, in strategy, where the personal qualities of the
commander-in-chief mainly told, his superiority was manifest, and
achieved brilliant success. Then ardor showed itself in energy,
untiring and infectious. The eagerness of his hot Provençal blood
overrode difficulty, created resources out of destitution, and made
itself felt through every vessel under his orders. No military lesson
is more instructive nor of more enduring value than the rapidity and
ingenuity with which he, without a port or supplies, continually
refitted his fleet and took the field, while his slower enemy was
dawdling over his repairs.

The battle forced the English to remain inactive for six weeks, till
the "Monmouth" was repaired. Unfortunately, Suffren's situation did
not allow him to assume the offensive at once. He was short of men,
provisions, and especially of spare spars and rigging. In an official
letter after the action he wrote: "I have no spare stores to repair
rigging; the squadron lacks at least twelve spare topmasts." A convoy
of supply-ships was expected at Point de Galles, which, with the rest
of Ceylon, except Trincomalee, was still Dutch. He therefore anchored
at Batacalo, south of Trincomalee, a position in which he was between
Hughes and outward-bound English ships, and was favorably placed to
protect his own convoys, which joined him there. On the 3d of June he
sailed for Tranquebar, a Danish possession, where he remained two or
three weeks, harassing the English communications between Madras and
the fleet at Trincomalee. Leaving there, he sailed for Cuddalore, to
communicate with the commander of the land forces and Hyder Ali. The
latter was found to be much discontented with the scanty co-operation
of the French general. Suffren, however, had won his favor, and he
expressed a wish to see him on his return from the expedition then in
contemplation; for, true to his accurate instinct, the commodore was
bent upon again seeking out the English fleet, _after_ beating which
he intended to attack Negapatam. There was not in him any narrowness
of professional prejudice; he kept always in view the necessity, both
political and strategic, of nursing the alliance with the Sultan and
establishing control upon the seaboard and in the interior; but he
clearly recognized that the first step thereto was the control of the
sea, by disabling the English fleet. The tenacity and vigor with which
he followed this aim, amid great obstacles, joined to the
clear-sightedness with which he saw it, are the distinguishing merits
of Suffren amid the crowd of French fleet-commanders,--his equals in
courage, but trammelled by the bonds of a false tradition and the
perception of a false objective.

Hughes meantime, having rigged jury-masts to the "Monmouth," had gone
to Trincomalee, where his squadron refitted and the sick were landed
for treatment; but it is evident, as has before been mentioned, that
the English had not held the port long enough to make an arsenal or
supply port, for he says, "I will be able to remast the 'Monmouth'
from the spare stores on board the several ships." His resources were
nevertheless superior to those of his adversary. During the time that
Suffren was at Tranquebar, worrying the English communications between
Madras and Trincomalee, Hughes still stayed quietly in the latter
port, sailing for Negapatam on the 23d of June, the day after Suffren
reached Cuddalore. The two squadrons had thus again approached each
other, and Suffren hastened his preparations for attack as soon as he
heard that his enemy was where he could get at him. Hughes awaited his
movement.

Before sailing, however, Suffren took occasion to say in writing home:
"Since my arrival in Ceylon, partly by the help of the Dutch, partly
through the prizes we have taken, the squadron has been equipped for
six months' service, and I have rations of wheat and rice assured for
more than a year." This achievement was indeed a just source of pride
and self-congratulation. Without a port, and destitute of resources,
the French commodore had lived off the enemy; the store ships and
commerce of the latter had supplied his wants. To his fertility of
resource and the activity of his cruisers, inspired by himself, this
result was due. Yet he had but two frigates, the class of vessel upon
which an admiral must mainly depend for this predatory warfare. On the
23d of March, both provisions and stores had been nearly exhausted.
Six thousand dollars in money, and the provisions in the convoy, were
then his sole resources. Since then he had fought a severe action,
most expensive in rigging and men, as well as in ammunition. After
that fight of April 12 he had left only powder and shot enough for one
other battle of equal severity. Three months later he was able to
report as above, that he could keep the sea on his station for six
months without further supplies. This result was due wholly to
himself,--to his self-reliance, and what may without exaggeration be
called his greatness of soul. It was not expected at Paris; on the
contrary, it was expected there that the squadron would return to the
Isle of France to refit. It was not thought possible that it could
remain on a hostile coast, so far from its nearest base, and be kept
in efficient condition. Suffren thought otherwise; he considered, with
true military insight and a proper sense of the value of his own
profession, that the success of the operations in India depended upon
the control of the sea, and therefore upon the uninterrupted presence
of his squadron. He did not shrink from attempting that which had
always been thought impossible. This firmness of spirit, bearing the
stamp of genius, must, to be justly appreciated, be considered with
reference to the circumstances of his own time, and of the preceding
generations in which he grew up.

Suffren was born July 17, 1729, and served during the wars of 1739 and
1756. He was first under fire at Matthews's action off Toulon,
February 22, 1744. He was the contemporary of D'Estaing, De Guichen,
and De Grasse, before the days of the French Revolution, when the
uprising of a people had taught men how often impossibilities are not
impossible; before Napoleon and Nelson had made a mock of the word.
His attitude and action had therefore at the time the additional merit
of originality, but his lofty temper was capable of yet higher proof.
Convinced of the necessity of keeping the squadron on its station, he
ventured to disregard not only the murmurs of his officers but the
express orders of the Court. When he reached Batacalo, he found
despatches directing him to return to the Isle of France. Instead of
taking them as a release from the great burden of responsibility, he
disobeyed, giving his reasons, and asserting that he on the spot could
judge better than a minister in Europe what the circumstances
demanded. Such a leader deserved better subordinates, and a better
colleague than he had in the commander of the forces on shore. Whether
or no the conditions of the general maritime struggle would have
permitted the overthrow of the English East Indian power may be
doubtful; but it is certain that among all the admirals of the three
nations there was none so fitted to accomplish that result as Suffren.
We shall find him enduring severer tests, and always equal to them.

In the afternoon of the 5th of July Suffren's squadron came in sight
of the English, anchored off Cuddalore. An hour later, a sudden squall
carried away the main and mizzen topmasts of one of the French ships.
Admiral Hughes got under way, and the two fleets manoeuvred during the
night. The following day the wind favored the English, and the
opponents found themselves in line of battle on the starboard tack,
heading south-southeast, with the wind at southwest. The disabled
French ship having by unpardonable inactivity failed to repair her
injuries, the numbers about to engage were equal,--eleven on each
side. At eleven A.M. the English bore down together and engaged ship
against ship; but as was usual under those conditions, the rear ships
did not come to as close action as those ahead of them (Plate XVI.,
Position I.). Captain Chevalier carefully points out that their
failure was a fair offset to the failure of the French rear on the
12th of April,[185] but fails to note in this connection that the
French van, both on that occasion and again on the 3d of September,
bungled as well as the rear. There can remain little doubt, in the
mind of the careful reader, that most of the French captains were
inferior, as seamen, to their opponents. During this part of the
engagement the fourth ship in the French order, the "Brilliant" (a),
lost her mainmast, bore up out of the line (a'), and dropped gradually
astern and to leeward (a'')

   [Illustration: Pl. XVI. SUFFREN & HUGHES. JULY 6, 1782.]

At one P.M., when the action was hottest, the wind suddenly shifted to
south-southeast, taking the ships on the port bow (Position II.). Four
English ships, the "Burford," "Sultan" (s), "Worcester," and "Eagle,"
seeing the breeze coming, kept off to port, toward the French line;
the others were taken aback and paid off to starboard. The French
ships, on the other hand, with two exceptions, the "Brilliant" (a) and
"Sévère" (b), paid off from the English. The effect of the change of
wind was therefore to separate the main parts of the two squadrons,
but to bring together between the lines four English and two French
ships. Technical order was destroyed. The "Brilliant," having dropped
far astern of her position, came under the fire of two of the English
rear, the "Worcester" and the "Eagle," who had kept off in time and so
neared the French. Suffren in person came to her assistance (Position
III., a) and drove off the English, who were also threatened by the
approach of two other French ships that had worn to the westward in
obedience to signal. While this partial action was taking place, the
other endangered French ship, the "Sévère" (b), was engaged by the
English "Sultan" (s), and, if the French captain M. de Cillart can be
believed, by two other English ships. It is probable, from her place
in the line, that the "Burford" also assailed her. However this may
be, the "Sévère" hauled down her flag; but while the "Sultan" was
wearing away from her, she resumed her fire, raking the English ship.
The order to surrender, given by the French captain and carried into
execution by the formal well-established token of submission, was
disregarded by his subordinates, who fired upon their enemy while the
flag was down. In effect, the action of the French ship amounted to
using an infamous _ruse de guerre_; but it would be unjust to say that
this was intended. The positions of the different vessels were such
that the "Sultan" could not have secured her prize; other French ships
were approaching and must have retaken it. The indignation of the
French juniors at the weakness of their captain was therefore
justified; their refusal to be bound by it may be excused to men face
to face with an unexpected question of propriety, in the heat of
battle and under the sting of shame. Nevertheless, scrupulous good
faith would seem to demand that their deliverance should be awaited
from other hands, not bound by the action of their commander; or at
least that the forbearing assailant should not have suffered from
them. The captain, suspended and sent home by Suffren, and cashiered
by the king, utterly condemned himself by his attempted defence: "When
Captain de Cillart saw the French squadron drawing off,--for all the
ships except the 'Brilliant' had fallen off on the other tack,--he
thought it useless to prolong his defence, and had the flag hauled
down. _The ships engaged with him immediately ceased their fire_, and
the one on the starboard side moved away. At this moment the 'Sévère'
fell off to starboard and her sails filled; Captain de Cillart then
ordered the fire to be resumed by his lower-deck guns, the only ones
still manned, and he rejoined his squadron."[186]

This action was the only one of the five fought by Suffren on the
coast of India, in which the English admiral was the assailant. There
can be found in it no indication of military conceptions, of tactical
combinations; but on the other hand Hughes is continually showing the
aptitudes, habits of thought, and foresight of the skilful seaman, as
well as a courage beyond all proof. He was in truth an admirable
representative of the average English naval officer of the middle of
the eighteenth century; and while it is impossible not to condemn the
general ignorance of the most important part of the profession, it is
yet useful to remark how far thorough mastery of its other details,
and dogged determination not to yield, made up for so signal a defect.
As the Roman legions often redeemed the blunders of their generals, so
did English captains and seamen often save that which had been lost by
the errors of their admirals,--errors which neither captain nor seamen
recognized, nor would probably have admitted. Nowhere were these solid
qualities so clearly shown as in Suffren's battles, because nowhere
else were such demands made upon them. No more magnificent instances
of desperate yet useful resistance to overwhelming odds are to be
found in naval annals, than that of the "Monmouth" on April 12, and of
the "Exeter" on February 17. An incident told of the latter ship is
worth quoting. "At the heel of the action, when the 'Exeter' was
already in the state of a wreck, the master came to Commodore King to
ask him what he should do with the ship, as two of the enemy were
again bearing down upon her. He laconically answered, 'there is
nothing to be done but to fight her till she sinks.'"[187] She was
saved.

Suffren, on the contrary, was by this time incensed beyond endurance
by the misbehavior of his captains. Cillart was sent home; but besides
him two others, both of them men of influential connections, and one a
relative of Suffren himself, were dispossessed of their commands.
However necessary and proper this step, few but Suffren would have had
the resolution to take it; for, so far as he then knew, he was only a
captain in rank, and it was not permitted even to admirals to deal
thus with their juniors. "You may perhaps be angry, Monseigneur," he
wrote, "that I have not used rigor sooner; but I beg you to remember
that the regulations do not give this power even to a general officer,
which I am not."

It is immediately after the action of the 6th of July that Suffren's
superior energy and military capacity begin markedly to influence the
issue between himself and Hughes. The tussle had been severe; but
military qualities began to tell, as they surely must. The losses of
the two squadrons in men, in the last action, had been as one to three
in favor of the English; on the other hand, the latter had apparently
suffered more in sails and spars,--in motive power. Both fleets
anchored in the evening, the English off Negapatam, the French to
leeward, off Cuddalore. On the 18th of July Suffren was again ready for
sea; whereas on the same day Hughes had but just decided to go to
Madras to finish his repairs. Suffren was further delayed by the
political necessity of an official visit to Hyder Ali, after which he
sailed to Batacalo, arriving there on the 9th of August, to await
reinforcements and supplies from France. On the 21st, these joined him;
and two days later he sailed, now with fourteen ships-of-the-line, for
Trincomalee, anchoring off the town on the 25th. The following night
the troops were landed, batteries thrown up, and the attack pressed
with vigor. On the 30th and 31st the two forts which made the defensive
strength of the place surrendered, and this all-important port passed
into the hands of the French. Convinced that Hughes would soon appear,
Suffren granted readily all the honors of war demanded by the governor
of the place, contenting himself with the substantial gain. Two days
later, on the evening of September 2d, the English fleet was sighted by
the French lookout frigates.

During the six weeks in which Suffren had been so actively and
profitably employed, the English admiral had remained quietly at
anchor, repairing and refitting. No precise information is available
for deciding how far this delay was unavoidable; but having in view
the well-known aptitude of English seamen of that age, it can scarcely
be doubted that, had Hughes possessed the untiring energy of his great
rival, he could have gained the few days which decided the fate of
Trincomalee, and fought a battle to save the place. In fact, this
conclusion is supported by his own reports, which state that on the
12th of August the ships were nearly fitted; and yet, though
apprehending an attack on Trincomalee, he did not sail until the 20th.
The loss of this harbor forced him to abandon the east coast, which
was made unsafe by the approach of the northeast monsoon, and
conferred an important strategic advantage upon Suffren, not to speak
of the political effect upon the native rulers in India.

To appreciate thoroughly this contrast between the two admirals, it is
necessary also to note how differently they were situated with regard
to material for repairs. After the action of the 6th, Hughes found at
Madras spars, cordage, stores, provisions, and material. Suffren at
Cuddalore found nothing. To put his squadron in good fighting
condition, nineteen new topmasts were needed, besides lower masts,
yards, rigging, sails, and so on. To take the sea at all, the masts
were removed from the frigates and smaller vessels, and given to the
ships-of-the-line while English prizes were stripped to equip the
frigates. Ships were sent off to the Straits of Malacca to procure
other spars and timber. Houses were torn down on shore to find lumber
for repairing the hulls. The difficulties were increased by the
character of the anchorage, an open roadstead with frequent heavy sea,
and by the near presence of the English fleet; but the work was driven
on under the eyes of the commander-in-chief, who, like Lord Howe at New
York, inspired the working parties by his constant appearance among
them. "Notwithstanding his prodigious obesity, Suffren displayed the
fiery ardor of youth; he was everywhere where work was going on. Under
his powerful impulse, the most difficult tasks were done with
incredible rapidity. Nevertheless, his officers represented to
him the bad state of the fleet, and the need of a port for the
ships-of-the-line. 'Until we have taken Trincomalee,' he replied, 'the
open roadsteads of the Coromandel coast will answer.'"[188] It was
indeed to this activity on the Coromandel coast that the success at
Trincomalee was due. The weapons with which Suffren fought are
obsolete; but the results wrought by his tenacity and fertility in
resources are among the undying lessons of history.

While the characters of the two chiefs were thus telling upon the
strife in India, other no less lasting lessons were being afforded by
the respective governments at home, who did much to restore the
balance between them. While the English ministry, after the news of
the battle of Porto Praya, fitted out in November, 1781, a large and
compact expedition, convoyed by a powerful squadron of six
ships-of-the-line, under the command of an active officer, to
reinforce Hughes, the French despatched comparatively scanty succors
in small detached bodies, relying apparently upon secrecy rather than
upon force to assure their safety. Thus Suffren, while struggling with
his innumerable embarrassments, had the mortification of learning that
now one and now another of the small detachments sent to his relief
were captured, or driven back to France, before they were clear of
European waters. There was in truth little safety for small divisions
north of the Straits of Gibraltar. Thus the advantages gained by his
activity were in the end sacrificed. Up to the fall of Trincomalee the
French were superior at sea; but in the six months which followed, the
balance turned the other way, by the arrival of the English
reinforcements under Sir Richard Bickerton.

With his usual promptness the French commodore had prepared for
further immediate action as soon as Trincomalee surrendered. The
cannon and men landed from the ships were at once re-embarked, and the
port secured by a garrison strong enough to relieve him of any
anxiety about holding it. This great seaman, who had done as much in
proportion to the means intrusted to him as any known to history, and
had so signally illustrated the sphere and influence of naval power,
had no intention of fettering the movements of his fleet, or risking
his important conquest, by needlessly taking upon the shoulders of the
ships the burden of defending a seaport. When Hughes appeared, it was
past the power of the English fleet by a single battle to reduce the
now properly garrisoned post. Doubtless a successful campaign, by
destroying or driving away the French sea power, would achieve this
result; but Suffren might well believe that, whatever mishaps might
arise on a single day, he could in the long run more than hold his own
with his opponent.

Seaports should defend themselves; the sphere of the fleet is on the
open sea, its object offence rather than defence, its objective the
enemy's shipping wherever it can be found. Suffren now saw again
before him the squadron on which depended the English control of the
sea; he knew that powerful reinforcements to it must arrive before the
next season, and he hastened to attack. Hughes, mortified by his
failure to arrive in time,--for a drawn battle beforehand would have
saved what a successful battle afterward could not regain,--was in no
humor to balk him. Still, with sound judgment, he retreated to the
southeast, flying in good order, to use Suffren's expression;
regulating speed by the slowest ships, and steering many different
courses, so that the chase which began at daybreak overtook the enemy
only at two in the afternoon. The object of the English was to draw
Suffren so far to leeward of the port that, if his ships were
disabled, he could not easily regain it.

The French numbered fourteen ships-of-the-line to twelve English. This
superiority, together with his sound appreciation of the military
situation in India, increased Suffren's natural eagerness for action;
but his ships sailed badly, and were poorly handled by indifferent and
dissatisfied men. These circumstances, during the long and vexatious
pursuit, chafed and fretted the hot temper of the commodore, which
still felt the spur of urgency that for two months had quickened the
operations of the squadron. Signal followed signal, manoeuvre
succeeded manoeuvre, to bring his disordered vessels into position.
"Sometimes they edged down, sometimes they brought to," says the
English admiral, who was carefully watching their approach, "in no
regular order, as if undetermined what to do." Still, Suffren
continued on, and at two P.M., having been carried twenty-five miles
away from his port, his line being then partly formed and within
striking distance of the enemy, the signal was made to come to the
wind to correct the order before finally bearing down. A number of
blunders in executing this made matters worse rather than better; and
the commodore, at last losing patience, made signal thirty minutes
later to attack (Plate XVII., A), following it with another for close
action at pistol range. This being slowly and clumsily obeyed, he
ordered a gun fired, as is customary at sea to emphasize a signal;
unluckily this was understood by his own crew to be the opening of the
action, and the flag-ship discharged all her battery. This example was
followed by the other ships, though yet at the distance of half
cannon-shot, which, under the gunnery conditions of that day, meant
indecisive action. Thus at the end and as the result of a mortifying
series of blunders and bad seamanship, the battle began greatly to the
disadvantage of the French, despite their superior numbers. The
English, who had been retreating under short and handy sail, were in
good order and quietly ready; whereas their enemies were in no order
(B). Seven ships had forereached in rounding to,[189] and now formed
an irregular group ahead of the English van, as well as far from it,
where they were of little service; while in the centre a second
confused group was formed, the ships overlapping and masking each
other's fire. Under the circumstances the entire brunt of the action
fell upon Suffren's flag-ship (a) and two others which supported him;
while at the extreme rear a small ship-of-the-line, backed by a large
frigate, alone engaged the English rear; but these, being wholly
overmatched, were soon forced to retire.

   [Illustration: Pl. XVII. SUFFREN AND HUGHES SEPT. 3, 1782.]

A military operation could scarcely be worse carried out. The French
ships in the battle did not support each other; they were so grouped
as to hamper their own fire and needlessly increase the target offered
to the enemy; so far from concentrating their own effort, three ships
were left, almost unsupported, to a concentrated fire from the English
line.[190] "Time passed on, and our three ships [B, a], engaged on the
beam by the centre of the English fleet and raked [enfiladed] by van
and rear, suffered greatly. After two hours the 'Héros'' sails were in
rags, all her running rigging cut, and she could no longer steer. The
'Illustre' had lost her mizzen-mast and maintopmast." In this disorder
such gaps existed as to offer a great opportunity to a more active
opponent. "Had the enemy tacked now," wrote the chief-of-staff in his
journal, "we would have been cut off and probably destroyed." The
faults of an action in which every proper distribution was wanting are
summed up in the results. The French had fourteen ships engaged. They
lost eighty-two killed and two hundred and fifty-five wounded. Of this
total, sixty-four killed and one hundred and seventy-eight wounded, or
three fourths, fell to three ships. Two of these three lost their main
and mizzen masts and foretopmast; in other words, were helpless.

This was a repetition on a larger scale of the disaster to two of
Hughes's ships on the 12th of April; but on that day the English
admiral, being to leeward and in smaller force had to accept action on
the adversary's terms, while here the loss fell on the assailant, who,
to the advantage of the wind and choice of his mode of attack, added
superiority in numbers. Full credit must in this action be allowed to
Hughes, who, though lacking in enterprise and giving no token of
tactical skill or _coup d'oeil_, showed both judgment and good
management in the direction of his retreat and in keeping his ships so
well in hand. It is not easy to apportion the blame which rests upon
his enemies. Suffren laid it freely upon his captains.[191] It has
been rightly pointed out, however, that many of the officers thus
condemned in mass had conducted themselves well before, both under
Suffren and other admirals; that the order of pursuit was irregular,
and Suffren's signals followed each other with confusing rapidity; and
finally that chance, for which something must always be allowed, was
against the French, as was also the inexperience of several captains.
It is pretty certain that some of the mishap must be laid to the fiery
and inconsiderate haste of Suffren, who had the defects of his great
qualities, upon which his coy and wary antagonist unwittingly played.

It is noteworthy that no complaints of his captains are to be found in
Hughes's reports. Six fell in action, and of each he speaks in terms
of simple but evidently sincere appreciation, while on the survivors
he often bestows particular as well as general commendation. The
marked contrast between the two leaders, and between the individual
ship-commanders, on either side, makes this singularly instructive
among naval campaigns; and the ultimate lesson taught is in entire
accordance with the experience of all military history from the
beginning. Suffren had genius, energy, great tenacity, sound military
ideas, and was also an accomplished seaman. Hughes had apparently all
the technical acquirements of the latter profession, would probably
have commanded a ship equally well with any of his captains, but shows
no trace of the qualities needed by a general officer. On the other
hand, without insisting again upon the skill and fidelity of the
English subordinates, it is evident that, to whatever it be
attributed, the French single ships were as a rule incomparably
worse-handled than those of their opponents. Four times, Suffren
claims, certainly thrice, the English squadron was saved from
overwhelming disaster by the difference in quality of the under
officers. Good troops have often made amends for bad generalship; but
in the end the better leader will prevail. This was conspicuously the
case in the Indian seas in 1782 and 1783. War cut short the strife,
but not before the issue was clearly indicated.

The action of September 3, like that of July 6, was brought to a close
by a shift of wind to the southeast. When it came, the English line
wore, and formed again on the other tack. The French also wore; and
their van ships, being now to windward, stood down between their
crippled ships and the enemy's line (C). Toward sundown Hughes hauled
off to the northward, abandoning the hope of regaining Trincomalee,
but with the satisfaction of having inflicted this severe retaliation
upon his successful opponent.

That firmness of mind which was not the least of Suffren's qualities
was severely tried soon after the action off Trincomalee. In returning
to port, a seventy-four, the "Orient," was run ashore and lost by
mismanagement, the only consolation being that her spars were saved
for the two dismasted ships. Other crippled masts were replaced as
before by robbing the frigates, whose crews also were needed to
replace the losses in battle. Repairs were pushed on with the usual
energy, the defence of the port was fully provided for, and on the
30th of September the squadron sailed for the Coromandel coast, where
the state of French interests urgently called for it. Cuddalore was
reached in four days; and here another incapable officer wrecked the
"Bizarre," of sixty-four guns, in picking up his anchorage. In
consequence of the loss of these two ships, Suffren, when he next met
the enemy, could oppose only fifteen to eighteen ships-of-the-line; so
much do general results depend upon individual ability and care.
Hughes was at Madras, ninety miles north, whither he had gone at once
after the late action. He reports his ships badly damaged; but the
loss was so evenly distributed among them that it is difficult to
justify his failure to follow up the injuries done to the French.

At this season the monsoon wind, which has come for four or five
months from southwest, changes to northeast, blowing upon the east
coast of the peninsula, where are no good harbors. The consequent
swell made the shore often unapproachable, and so forbade support from
fleet to army. The change of the monsoon is also frequently marked by
violent hurricanes. The two commanders, therefore, had to quit a
region where their stay might be dangerous as well as useless. Had
Trincomalee not been lost, Hughes, in the condition of his squadron,
might have awaited there the reinforcements and supplies expected soon
from England; for although the port is not healthy, it is secure and
well situated. Bickerton had already reached Bombay, and was on his
way now to Madras with five ships-of-the-line. As things were, Hughes
thought necessary to go to Bombay for the season, sailing or rather
being driven to sea by a hurricane, on the 17th of October. Four days
later Bickerton reached Madras, not having fallen in with the admiral.
With an activity which characterized him he sailed at once, and was
again in Bombay on the 28th of November. Hughes's ships, scattered and
crippled by tempest, dropped in one by one, a few days later.

Suffren held Trincomalee, yet his decision was not easy. The port was
safe, he had not to fear an attack by the English fleet; and on the
other hand, besides being sickly during the approaching monsoon, it
was doubtful whether the provisions needed for the health of the crews
could be had there. In short, though of strategic value from its
strength and position, the port was deficient in resources. Opposed to
Trincomalee there was an alternative in Achem, a harbor on the other
side of the Bay of Bengal, at the west end of the island of Sumatra.
This was healthy, could supply provisions, and, from its position with
reference to the northeast monsoon, would permit ships to regain the
Coromandel coast sooner than those in Bombay, when the milder ending
of the season made landing more practicable.

These simple considerations were not, however, the only elements in
the really difficult problem before Suffren. The small results that
followed this campaign must not hide the fact that great issues were
possible, and that much might depend upon his decision. Owing to the
French policy of sending out reinforcements in several small bodies,
not only was there much loss, but great uncertainty prevailed among
the scattered commands as to conditions elsewhere. This uncertainty,
loss, and delay profoundly affected the political situation in India.
When Suffren first reached the coast, the English had on their hands
not only Hyder Ali, but the Mahrattas as well. Peace with the latter
was signed on the 17th of May, 1782; but, owing probably to an
opposition party among them, the ratifications were not exchanged
until December. Both there and in the court of Hyder Ali there was
division of interest; and representations were made from both to the
French, who, though suspicious, could obtain no certain information of
the treaty, that everything depended upon the relative military
strength of themselves and the English. The presence and the actions
of Suffren were all that France had to show,--the prestige of his
genius, the capture of Trincomalee, his success in battle. The French
army, cooped up in Cuddalore, was dependent upon the sultan for money,
for food, and for reinforcements; even the fleet called on him for
money, for masts, for ammunition, for grain. The English, on the other
hand, maintained their ground; though on the whole worsted, they lost
no ships; and Bickerton's powerful squadron was known to have reached
Bombay. Above all, while the French asked for money, the English
lavished it.

It was impossible for the French to make head against their enemy
without native allies; it was essential to keep Hyder from also making
peace. Here the inadequate support and faulty dispositions of the home
government made themselves felt. The command in India, both by land
and sea, was intrusted to General de Bussy, once the brilliant
fellow-worker with Dupleix, now a gouty invalid of sixty-four. With a
view to secrecy, Bussy sailed from Cadiz in November, 1781, with two
ships-of-the-line, for Teneriffe, where he was to be joined by a
convoy leaving Brest in December. This convoy was captured by the
English, only two of the vessels escaping to Bussy. The latter pursued
his journey, and learning at the Cape of Good Hope that Bickerton's
strong force was on the way, felt compelled to land there a great part
of his troops. He reached the Isle of France on the 31st of May. The
next convoy of eighteen transports, sailing in April for India, was
also intercepted. Two of the four ships-of-war were taken, as also ten
of the transports; the remainder returned to Brest. A third detachment
was more fortunate, reaching the Cape in May; but it was delayed there
two months by the wretched condition of the ships and crews. These
disappointments decided Bussy to remain at the Island until joined by
the expected ships from the Cape, and Suffren at this critical moment
did not know what the state of things there was. The general had only
written him that, as he could not reach the coast before the bad
season, he should rendezvous at Achem. These uncertainties made a
painful impression upon Hyder Ali, who had been led to expect Bussy in
September, and had instead received news of Bickerton's arrival and
the defection of his old allies, the Mahrattas. Suffren was forced to
pretend a confidence which he did not feel, but which, with the
influence of his own character and achievements, determined the sultan
to continue the war. This settled, the squadron sailed for Achem on
the 15th of October, anchoring there the 2d of November.

Three weeks afterward a vessel arrived from Bussy, with word that his
departure was indefinitely delayed by an epidemic raging among the
troops. Suffren therefore determined to hasten his own return to the
coast, and sailed on the 20th of December. January 8, 1783, he
anchored off Ganjam, five hundred miles northeast of Cuddalore, whence
he would have a fair wind to proceed when he wished. It was his
purpose to attack not only the coasting vessels but the English
factories on shore as well, the surf being now often moderate; but
learning on the 12th, from an English prize, the important and
discouraging news of Hyder Ali's death, he gave up all minor
operations, and sailed at once for Cuddalore, hoping to secure by his
presence the continuance of the alliance as well as the safety of the
garrison. He reached the place on the 6th of February.

During his four months absence the failure of Bussy to appear with his
troops, and the arrival of Bickerton, who had shown himself on both
coasts, had seriously injured the French cause. The treaty of peace
between the English and the Mahrattas had been ratified; and the
former, released from this war and reinforced, had attacked the sultan
on the west, or Malabar, coast. The effect of this diversion was of
course felt on the east coast, despite the efforts of the French to
keep the new sultan there. The sickness among the troops at the Isle
of France had, however, ceased early in November; and had Bussy then
started without delay, he and Suffren would now have met in the
Carnatic, with full command of the sea and large odds in their favor
ashore. Hughes did not arrive till two months later.

Being thus alone, Suffren, after communicating with Tippoo-Saib, the
new sultan of Mysore, went to Trincomalee; and there he was at last
joined, on the 10th of March, by Bussy, accompanied by three
ships-of-the-line and numerous transports. Eager to bring the troops
into the field, Suffren sailed on the 15th with his fastest ships, and
landed them the next day at Porto Novo. He returned to Trincomalee on
the 11th of April, and fell in with Hughes's fleet of seventeen
ships-of-the-line off the harbor's mouth. Having only part of his
force with him, no fight ensued, and the English went on to Madras.
The southwest monsoon was now blowing.

It is not necessary to follow the trivial operations of the next two
months. Tippoo being engaged on the other side of the peninsula and
Bussy displaying little vigor, while Hughes was in superior force off
the coast, the affairs of the French on shore went from bad to worse.
Suffren, having but fifteen ships to eighteen English, was unwilling
to go to leeward of Trincomalee, lest it should fall before he could
return to it. Under these conditions the English troops advanced from
Madras, passing near but around Cuddalore, and encamped to the
southward of it, by the sea. The supply-ships and light cruisers were
stationed off the shore near the army; while Admiral Hughes, with the
heavy ships, anchored some twenty miles south, where, being to
windward, he covered the others.

In order to assure to Suffren the full credit of his subsequent
course, it is necessary to emphasize the fact that Bussy, though
commander-in-chief both by land and sea, did not venture to order him
to leave Trincomalee and come to his support. Allowing him to feel the
extremity of the danger, he told him not to leave port unless he heard
that the army was shut up in Cuddalore, and blockaded by the English
squadron. This letter was received on the 10th of June. Suffren waited
for no more. The next day he sailed, and forty-eight hours later his
frigates saw the English fleet. The same day, the 13th, after a sharp
action, the French army was shut up in the town, behind very weak
walls. Everything now depended on the action of the fleets.

Upon Suffren's appearance, Hughes moved away and anchored four or five
miles from the town. Baffling winds prevailed for three days; but the
monsoon resuming on the 16th, Suffren approached. The English admiral
not liking to accept action at anchor, and to leeward, in which he was
right, got under way; but attaching more importance to the
weather-gage than to preventing a junction between the enemy's land
and sea forces, he stood out into the offing with a southerly, or
south-southeast wind, notwithstanding his superior numbers. Suffren
formed on the same tack, and some manoeuvring ensued during that
night and the next day. At eight P.M. of the 17th the French squadron,
which had refused to be drawn to sea, anchored off Cuddalore and
communicated with the commander-in-chief. Twelve hundred of the
garrison were hastily embarked to fill the numerous vacancies at the
guns of the fleet.

Until the 20th the wind, holding unexpectedly at west, denied Hughes
the advantage which he sought; and finally on that day he decided to
accept action and await the attack. It was made by Suffren with
fifteen ships to eighteen, the fire opening at quarter-past four P.M.
and lasting until half-past six. The loss on both sides was nearly
equal; but the English ships, abandoning both the field of battle and
their army, returned to Madras. Suffren anchored before Cuddalore.

The embarrassment of the British army was now very great. The
supply-ships on which it had depended fled before the action of the
20th, and the result of course made it impossible for them to return.
The sultan's light cavalry harassed their communications by land. On
the 25th, the general commanding wrote that his "mind was on the rack
without a moment's rest since the departure of the fleet, considering
the character of M. de Suffren, and the infinite superiority on the
part of the French now that we are left to ourselves." From this
anxiety he was relieved by the news of the conclusion of peace, which
reached Cuddalore on the 29th by flag-of-truce from Madras.

If any doubt had remained as to the relative merits of the two
sea-commanders, the last few days of their campaign would have removed
them. Hughes alleges the number of his sick and shortness of water as
his reasons for abandoning the contest. Suffren's difficulties,
however, were as great as his own;[192] and if he had an advantage at
Trincomalee, that only shifts the dispute a step back, for he owed its
possession to superior generalship and activity. The simple facts that
with fifteen ships he forced eighteen to abandon a blockade, relieved
the invested army, strengthened his own crews, and fought a decisive
action, make an impression which does not need to be diminished in
the interests of truth.[193] It is probable that Hughes's
self-reliance had been badly shaken by his various meetings with
Suffren.

Although the tidings of peace sent by Hughes to Bussy rested only upon
unofficial letters, they were too positive to justify a continuance of
bloodshed. An arrangement was entered into by the authorities of the
two nations in India, and hostilities ceased on the 8th of July. Two
months later, at Pondicherry, the official despatches reached Suffren.
His own words upon them are worth quoting, for they show the
depressing convictions under which he had acted so noble a part: "God
be praised for the peace! for it was clear that in India, though we
had the means to impose the law, all would have been lost. I await
your orders with impatience, and heartily pray they may permit me to
leave. War alone can make bearable the weariness of certain things."

On the 6th of October, 1783, Suffren finally sailed from Trincomalee
for France, stopping at the Isle of France and the Cape of Good Hope.
The homeward voyage was a continued and spontaneous ovation. In each
port visited the most flattering attentions were paid by men of every
degree and of every nation. What especially gratified him was the
homage of the English captains. It might well be so; none had so
clearly established a right to his esteem as a warrior. On no occasion
when Hughes and Suffren met, save the last, did the English number
over twelve ships; but six English captains had laid down their lives,
obstinately opposing his efforts. While he was at the Cape, a division
of nine of Hughes's ships, returning from the war, anchored in the
harbor. Their captains called eagerly upon the admiral, the stout
Commodore King of the "Exeter" at their head. "The good Dutchmen have
received me as their savior," wrote Suffren; "but among the tributes
which have most flattered me, none has given me more pleasure than the
esteem and consideration testified by the English who are here." On
reaching home, rewards were heaped upon him. Having left France as a
captain, he came back a rear-admiral; and immediately after his return
the king created a fourth vice-admiralship, a special post to be
filled by Suffren, and to lapse at his death. These honors were won by
himself alone; they were the tribute paid to his unyielding energy and
genius, shown not only in actual fight but in the steadfastness which
held to his station through every discouragement, and rose equal to
every demand made by recurring want and misfortune.

Alike in the general conduct of his operations and on the battlefield
under the fire of the enemy, this lofty resolve was the distinguishing
merit of Suffren; and when there is coupled with it the clear and
absolute conviction which he held of the necessity to seek and crush
the enemy's fleet, we have probably the leading traits of his military
character. The latter was the light that led him, the former the
spirit that sustained him. As a tactician, in the sense of a driller
of ships, imparting to them uniformity of action and manoeuvring, he
seems to have been deficient, and would probably himself have
admitted, with some contempt, the justice of the criticism made upon
him in these respects. Whether or no he ever actually characterized
tactics--meaning thereby elementary or evolutionary tactics--as the
veil of timidity, there was that in his actions which makes the _mot_
probable. Such a contempt, however, is unsafe even in the case of
genius. The faculty of moving together with uniformity and precision
is too necessary to the development of the full power of a body of
ships to be lightly esteemed; it is essential to that concentration of
effort at which Suffren rightly aimed, but which he was not always
careful to secure by previous dispositions. Paradoxical though it
sounds, it is true that only fleets which are able to perform regular
movements can afford at times to cast them aside; only captains whom
the habit of the drill-ground has familiarized with the shifting
phases it presents, can be expected to seize readily the opportunities
for independent action presented by the field of battle. Howe and
Jervis must make ready the way for the successes of Nelson. Suffren
expected too much of his captains. He had the right to expect more
than he got, but not that ready perception of the situation and that
firmness of nerve which, except to a few favorites of Nature, are the
result only of practice and experience.

Still, he was a very great man. When every deduction has been made,
there must still remain his heroic constancy, his fearlessness of
responsibility as of danger, the rapidity of his action, and the
genius whose unerring intuition led him to break through the
traditions of his service and assert for the navy that principal part
which befits it, that offensive action which secures the control of
the sea by the destruction of the enemy's fleet. Had he met in his
lieutenants such ready instruments as Nelson found prepared for him,
there can be little doubt that Hughes's squadron would have been
destroyed while inferior to Suffren's, before reinforcements could
have arrived; and with the English fleet it could scarcely have failed
that the Coromandel coast also would have fallen. What effect this
would have had upon the fate of the peninsula, or upon the terms of
the peace, can only be surmised. His own hope was that, by acquiring
the superiority in India, a glorious peace might result.

No further opportunities of distinction in war were given to Suffren.
The remaining years of his life were spent in honored positions
ashore. In 1788, upon an appearance of trouble with England, he was
appointed to the command of a great fleet arming at Brest; but before
he could leave Paris he died suddenly on the 8th of December, in the
sixtieth year of his age. There seems to have been no suspicion at
the time of other than natural causes of death, he being exceedingly
stout and of apoplectic temperament; but many years after a story,
apparently well-founded, became current that he was killed in a duel
arising out of his official action in India. His old antagonist on the
battlefield, Sir Edward Hughes, died at a great age in 1794.

FOOTNOTES:

[168] This Commodore Johnstone, more commonly known as Governor
Johnstone, was one of the three commissioners sent by Lord North in
1778 to promote a reconciliation with America. Owing to certain
suspicious proceedings on his part, Congress declared it was
incompatible with their honor to hold any manner of correspondence or
intercourse with him. His title of Governor arose from his being at
one time governor of Pensacola. He had a most unenviable reputation in
the English navy. (See Charnock's Biog. Navalis.)

[169] This plate is taken almost wholly from Cunat's "Vie de Suffren."

[170] Page 299.

[171] La Serre: Essais Hist. et Critiques sur la Marine Française.

[172] The question of attacking the English squadron at its anchors
was debated in a council of war. Its opinion confirmed Suffren's
decision not to do so. In contrasting this with the failure of the
English to attack the French detachment in Newport (p. 394), it must
be borne in mind that in the latter case there was no means of forcing
the ships to leave their strong position; whereas by threatening
Trincomalee, or other less important points, Suffren could rely upon
drawing Hughes out. He was therefore right in not attacking, while the
English before Newport were probably wrong.

[173] The dependence of Trincomalee upon the English fleet in this
campaign affords an excellent illustration of the embarrassment and
false position in which a navy finds itself when the defence of its
seaports rests upon it. This bears upon a much debated point of the
present day, and is worthy the study of those who maintain, too
unqualifiedly, that the best coast defence is a navy. In one sense
this is doubtless true,--to attack the enemy abroad is the best of
defences; but in the narrow sense of the word "defence" it is not
true. Trincomalee unfortified was simply a centre round which Hughes
had to revolve like a tethered animal; and the same will always happen
under like conditions.

[174] Plate XIV., Fig. D, shows the order of battle Suffren intended
in this action. The five rear ships of the enemy would each have two
opponents close aboard. The leading French ship on the weather side
was to be kept farther off, so that while attacking the sixth
Englishman she could "contain" the van ships if they attempted to
reinforce the rear by tacking.

[175] Troude: Batailles Navales.

[176] Between four and five hundred yards.

[177] The English and French flag-ships are denoted in the plan by
their exceptional size.

[178] The "Victory," Nelson's ship at Trafalgar, a 100-gun ship, lost
57 killed and 102 wounded; Hughes's ship, a 74, lost 59 killed and 96
wounded. Collingwood's ship, the "Royal Sovereign," also of 100 guns,
lost 47 killed and 94 wounded; the "Monmouth," a 64, in Hughes's
action lost 45 killed and 102 wounded.

[179] Troude: Batailles Navales; Chevalier: Hist. de la Marine
Française.

[180] This remark seems too self-evident to need emphasis; yet it may
be questioned whether naval men generally carry it in their stock of
axioms.

[181] As always.

[182] That is turned their side to the enemy instead of approaching
him.

[183] Chevalier.

[184] Annual Register, 1782.

[185] The British account differs materially as to the cause of the
distance separating the two rears. "In this action it did not fall to
the 'Monmouth's' lot to sustain a very considerable share, the enemy's
rear being so far to leeward that the ships of the British rear could
not, even whilst the wind was favorable, close with them without
considerably breaking the order of their own line" (Memoir of Captain
Alms, Naval Chronicle, vol. ii). Such contradictions are common, and,
except for a particular purpose, need not to be reconciled. Alms seems
to have been not only a first-rate seaman, but an officer capable of
resolute and independent action; his account is probably correct.

[186] Troude: Batailles Navales. It was seen from Suffren's ship that
the "Sévère's" flag was down; but it was supposed that the ensign
halliards had been shot away. The next day Hughes sent the captain of
the "Sultan" to demand the delivery to him of the ship which had
struck. The demand, of course, could not be complied with. "The
'Sultan,'" Troude says, "which had hove-to to take possession of the
'Sévère,' was the victim of this action; she received during some
time, without replying, the whole fire of the French ship."

[187] Annual Register, 1782.

[188] Cunat: Vie de Suffren.

[189] The curves in (B) represent the movements of the ships _after_
the shift of wind, which practically ended the battle. The ships
themselves show the order in fighting.

[190] The enemy formed a semicircle around us and raked us ahead and
astern, as the ship came up and fell off, with the helm to
leeward.--_Journal de Bord du Bailli de Suffren._

[191] See page 435. He added: "It is frightful to have had four times
in our power to destroy the English squadron, and that it still
exists."

[192] There was not a single ship of Suffren's which had more than
three-fourths of her regular complement of men. It must be added that
soldiers and sepoys made up half of these reduced crews.--_Chevalier_,
p. 463.

[193] You will have learned my promotion to commodore and
rear-admiral. Now, I tell you in the sincerity of my heart and for
your own ear alone, that what I have done since then is worth
infinitely more than what I had done before. You know the capture and
battle of Trincomalee; but the end of the campaign, and that which
took place between the month of March and the end of June, is far
above anything that has been done in the navy since I entered it. The
result has been very advantageous to the State, for the squadron was
endangered and the army lost.--_Private Letter of Suffren, Sept. 13,
1783; quoted in the "Journal de Bord du Bailli de Suffren."_




CHAPTER XIII.

    EVENTS IN THE WEST INDIES AFTER THE SURRENDER OF
    YORKTOWN--ENCOUNTERS OF DE GRASSE WITH HOOD.--THE SEA BATTLE OF
    THE SAINTS.--1781, 1782.


The surrender of Cornwallis marked the end of the active war upon the
American continent. The issue of the struggle was indeed assured upon
the day when France devoted her sea power to the support of the
colonists; but, as not uncommonly happens, the determining
characteristics of a period were summed up in one striking event. From
the beginning, the military question, owing to the physical
characteristics of the country, a long seaboard with estuaries
penetrating deep into the interior, and the consequent greater ease of
movement by water than by land, had hinged upon the control of the sea
and the use made of that control. Its misdirection by Sir William Howe
in 1777, when he moved his army to the Chesapeake instead of
supporting Burgoyne's advance, opened the way to the startling success
at Saratoga, when amazed Europe saw six thousand regular troops
surrendering to a body of provincials. During the four years that
followed, until the surrender of Yorktown, the scales rose and fell
according as the one navy or the other appeared on the scene, or as
English commanders kept touch with the sea or pushed their operations
far from its support. Finally, at the great crisis, all is found
depending upon the question whether the French or the English fleet
should first appear, and upon their relative force.

The maritime struggle was at once transferred to the West Indies. The
events which followed there were antecedent in time both to Suffren's
battles and to the final relief of Gibraltar; but they stand so much
by themselves as to call for separate treatment, and have such close
relation to the conclusion of the war and the conditions of peace, as
to form the dramatic finale of the one and the stepping-stone of
transition to the other. It is fitting indeed that a brilliant though
indecisive naval victory should close the story of an essentially
naval war.

The capitulation of Yorktown was completed on the 19th of October,
1781, and on the 5th of November, De Grasse, resisting the suggestions
of Lafayette and Washington that the fleet should aid in carrying the
war farther south, sailed from the Chesapeake. He reached Martinique
on the 26th, the day after the Marquis de Bouillé, commanding the
French troops in the West Indies, had regained by a bold surprise the
Dutch island of St. Eustatius. The two commanders now concerted a
joint expedition against Barbadoes, which was frustrated by the
violence of the trade winds.

Foiled here, the French proceeded against the island of St.
Christopher, or St. Kitt's (Plate XVIII.). On the 11th of January,
1782, the fleet, carrying six thousand troops, anchored on the west
coast off Basse Terre, the chief town. No opposition was met, the
small garrison of six hundred men retiring to a fortified post ten
miles to the northwest, on Brimstone Hill, a solitary precipitous
height overlooking the lee shore of the island. The French troops
landed and pursued, but the position being found too strong for
assault, siege operations were begun.

The French fleet remained at anchor in Basse Terre road. Meanwhile,
news of the attack was carried to Sir Samuel Hood, who had followed De
Grasse from the continent, and, in the continued absence of Rodney,
was naval commander-in-chief on the station. He sailed from Barbadoes
on the 14th, anchored at Antigua on the 21st, and there embarked all
the troops that could be spared,--about seven hundred men. On the
afternoon of the 23d the fleet started for St. Kitt's, carrying such
sail as would bring it within striking distance of the enemy at
daylight next morning.

The English having but twenty-two ships to the French twenty-nine,
and the latter being generally superior in force, class for class, it
is necessary to mark closely the lay of the land in order to
understand Hood's original plans and their subsequent modifications;
for, resultless as his attempt proved, his conduct during the next
three weeks forms the most brilliant military effort of the whole
war. The islands of St. Kitt's and Nevis (Plates XVIII. and XIX.)
being separated only by a narrow channel, impracticable for
ships-of-the-line, are in effect one, and their common axis lying
northwest and southeast, it is necessary for sailing-ships, with the
trade wind, to round the southern extremity of Nevis, from which
position the wind is fair to reach all anchorages on the lee side of
the islands. Basse Terre is about twelve miles distant from the
western point of Nevis (Fort Charles), and its roadstead lies east
and west. The French fleet were anchored there in disorder (Plate
XVIII., A), three or four deep, not expecting attack, and the ships
at the west end of the road could not reach those at the east without
beating to windward,--a tedious, and under fire a perilous process. A
further most important point to note is that all the eastern ships
were so placed that vessels approaching from the southward could
reach them with the usual wind.

Hood, therefore, we are told, intended to appear at early daylight, in
order of and ready for battle, and fall upon the eastern ships, filing
by them with his whole fleet (a, a'), thus concentrating the fire of
all upon a few of the enemy; then turning away, so as to escape the
guns of the others, he proposed, first wearing and then tacking, to
keep his fleet circling in long procession (a', a'') past that part of
the enemy's ships chosen for attack. The plan was audacious, but
undeniably sound in principle; some good could hardly fail to follow,
and unless De Grasse showed more readiness than he had hitherto done,
even decisive results might be hoped for.[194]

   [Illustration: Pl. XVIII. HOOD & DE GRASSE. JAN. 25 & 26, 1782.]

The best-laid plans, however, may fail, and Hood's was balked by the
awkwardness of a lieutenant of the watch, who hove-to (stopped) a
frigate at night ahead of the fleet, and was consequently run down by
a ship-of-the-line. The latter also received such injury as delayed
the movement, several hours being lost in repairing damages. The
French were thus warned of the enemy's approach, and although not
suspecting his intention to attack, De Grasse feared that Hood would
pass down to leeward of him and disturb the siege of Brimstone
Hill,--an undertaking so rash for an inferior force that it is as
difficult to conceive how he could have supposed it, as to account for
his overlooking the weakness of his own position at anchor.

At one P.M. of the 24th the English fleet was seen rounding the south
end of Nevis; at three De Grasse got under way and stood to the
southward. Toward sundown Hood also went about and stood south, as
though retreating; but he was well to windward of his opponent, and
maintained this advantage through the night. At daybreak both fleets
were to leeward of Nevis,--the English near the island, the French
about nine miles distant (Plate XIX.). Some time was spent in
manoeuvring, with the object on Hood's part of getting the French
admiral yet more to leeward; for, having failed in his first attempt,
he had formed the yet bolder intention of seizing the anchorage his
unskilful opponent had left, and establishing himself there in an
impregnable manner. In this he succeeded, as will be shown; but to
understand the justification for a movement confessedly hazardous, it
must be pointed out that he thus would place himself between the
besiegers of Brimstone Hill and their fleet; or if the latter anchored
near the hill, the English fleet would be between it and its base in
Martinique, ready to intercept supplies or detachments approaching
from the southward. In short, the position in which Hood hoped to
establish himself was on the flank of the enemy's communications, a
position the more advantageous because the island alone could not long
support the large body of troops so suddenly thrown upon it.
Moreover, both fleets were expecting reinforcements; Rodney was on his
way and might arrive first, which he did, and in time to save St.
Kitt's, which he did not. It was also but four months since Yorktown;
the affairs of England were going badly; something must be done,
something left to chance, and Hood knew himself and his officers. It
may be added that he knew his opponent.

At noon, when the hillsides of Nevis were covered with expectant and
interested sightseers, the English fleet rapidly formed its line on
the starboard tack and headed north for Basse Terre (Plate XIX., A,
A'). The French, at the moment, were in column steering south, but
went about at once and stood for the enemy in a bow-and-quarter
line[195] (A, A). At two the British had got far enough for Hood to
make signal to anchor. At twenty minutes past two the van of the
French came within gunshot of the English centre (B, B, B), and
shortly afterward the firing began, the assailants very properly
directing their main effort upon the English rear ships, which, as
happens with most long columns, had opened out, a tendency increased
in this case by the slowness of the fourth ship from the rear, the
"Prudent." The French flag-ship, "Ville de Paris," of one hundred and
twenty guns, bearing De Grasse's flag, pushed for the gap thus made,
but was foiled by the "Canada," seventy-four, whose captain,
Cornwallis, the brother of Lord Cornwallis, threw all his sails aback,
and dropped down in front of the huge enemy to the support of the
rear,--an example nobly followed by the "Resolution" and the "Bedford"
immediately ahead of him (a). The scene was now varied and animated in
the extreme. The English van, which had escaped attack, was rapidly
anchoring (b) in its appointed position. The commander-in-chief in the
centre, proudly reliant upon the skill and conduct of his captains,
made signal for the ships ahead to carry a press of sail, and gain
their positions regardless of the danger to the threatened rear. The
latter, closely pressed and outnumbered, stood on unswervingly,
shortened sail, and came to anchor, one by one, in a line ahead (B,
B'), under the roar of the guns of their baffled enemies. The latter
filed by, delivered their fire, and bore off again to the southward,
leaving their former berths to their weaker but clever antagonists.

   [Illustration: Pl. XIX. HOOD & DE GRASSE. JAN. 25, 1782.]

The anchorage thus brilliantly taken by Hood was not exactly the same
as that held by De Grasse the day before; but as it covered and
controlled it, his claim that he took up the place the other had left
is substantially correct. The following night and morning were spent
in changing and strengthening the order, which was finally established
as follows (Plate XVIII., B, B'). The van ship was anchored about four
miles southeast from Basse Terre, so close to the shore that a ship
could not pass inside her, nor, with the prevailing wind, even reach
her, because of a point and shoal just outside, covering her position.
From this point the line extended in a west-northwest direction to the
twelfth or thirteenth ship (from a mile and a quarter to a mile and a
half), where it turned gradually but rapidly to north, the last six
ships being on a north and south line. Hood's flag-ship, the
"Barfleur," of ninety guns, was at the apex of the salient angle thus
formed.

It would not have been impossible for the French fleet to take the
anchorage they formerly held; but it and all others to leeward were
forbidden by the considerations already stated, so long as Hood
remained where he was. It became necessary therefore to dislodge him,
but this was rendered exceedingly difficult by the careful tactical
dispositions that have been described. His left flank was covered by
the shore. Any attempt to enfilade his front by passing along the
other flank was met by the broadsides of the six or eight ships drawn
up _en potence_ to the rear. The front commanded the approaches to
Basse Terre. To attack him in the rear, from the northwest, was
forbidden by the trade-wind. To these difficulties was to be added
that the attack must be made under sail against ships at anchor, to
whom loss of spars would be of no immediate concern; and which, having
springs[196] out, could train their broadsides over a large area with
great ease.

Nevertheless, both sound policy and mortification impelled De Grasse
to fight, which he did the next day, January 26. The method of attack,
in single column of twenty-nine ships against a line so carefully
arranged, was faulty in the extreme; but it may be doubted whether any
commander of that day would have broken through the traditional
fighting order.[197] Hood had intended the same, but he hoped a
surprise on an ill-ordered enemy, and at the original French anchorage
it was possible to reach their eastern ships, with but slight exposure
to concentrated fire. Not so now. The French formed to the southward
and steered for the eastern flank of Hood's line. As their van ship
drew up with the point already mentioned, the wind headed her, so that
she could only reach the third in the English order, the first four
ships of which, using their springs, concentrated their guns upon her.
This vessel was supposed by the English to be the "Pluton," and if so,
her captain was D'Albert de Rions, in Suffren's opinion the foremost
officer of the French navy. "The crash occasioned by their destructive
broadsides," wrote an English officer who was present, "was so
tremendous that whole pieces of plank were seen flying from her off
side ere she could escape the cool, concentrated fire of her
determined adversaries. As she proceeded along the British line, she
received the first fire of every ship in passing. She was indeed in
so shattered a state as to be compelled to bear away for St.
Eustatius." And so ship after ship passed by, running the length of
the line (Plate XVIII., B, B), distributing their successive fires in
gallant but dreary, ineffectual monotony over the whole extent. A
second time that day De Grasse attacked in the same order, but
neglecting the English van, directed his effort upon the rear and
centre. This was equally fruitless, and seems to have been done with
little spirit.

From that time until the 14th of February, Hood maintained his
position in sight of the French fleet, which remained cruising in the
offing and to the southward. On the 1st a despatch vessel arrived from
Kempenfeldt, informing him of the dispersal of the French
reinforcements for the West Indies, which must have renewed his hopes
that his bold attempt would be successful through Rodney's arrival. It
was not, however, to be so. Brimstone Hill surrendered on the 12th,
after a creditable defence. On the 13th De Grasse took his fleet, now
amounting to thirty-three ships-of-the-line, to Nevis, and anchored
there. On the night of the 14th Hood summoned all his captains on
board, had them set their watches by his, and at eleven P.M., one
after another, without noise or signal, cut their cables and made sail
to the northward, passing round that end of the island unnoticed, or
at least unmolested, by the French.

Both strategically and tactically Hood's conceptions and dispositions
were excellent, and their execution was most honorable to the skill
and steadiness of himself and his captains. Regarded as a single
military operation, this was brilliant throughout; but when considered
with reference to the general situation of England at the time, a much
higher estimate must be formed of the admiral's qualities.[198] St.
Kitt's in itself might not be worth a great risk; but it was of the
first importance that energy and audacity should be carried into the
conduct of England's naval war, that some great success should light
upon her flag. Material success was not obtained. The chances, though
fair enough, turned against Hood; but every man in that fleet must
have felt the glow of daring achievement, the assured confidence which
follows a great deed nobly done. Had this man been in chief command
when greater issues were at stake, had he been first instead of second
at the Chesapeake, Cornwallis might have been saved. The
operation--seizing an anchorage left by the enemy--would have been
nearly the same; and both situations may be instructively compared
with Suffren's relief of Cuddalore.

The action of De Grasse, also, should be considered not only with
reference to the particular occasion, but to the general condition of
the war as well, and when thus weighed, and further compared with
other very similar opportunities neglected by this general officer, a
fair estimate of his military capacity can be reached. This
comparison, however, is better deferred to the now not very distant
close of the campaign. The most useful comment to be made here is,
that his action in failing to crush Hood at his anchors, with a force
at least fifty per cent greater, was in strict accordance with the
general French principle of subordinating the action of the fleet to
so-called particular operations; for nothing is more instructive than
to note how an unsound principle results in disastrous action. Hood's
inferiority was such as to weaken, for offensive purposes, his
commanding position. So long as De Grasse kept to windward, he
maintained his communications with Martinique, and he was strong
enough, too, to force communication when necessary with the troops
before Brimstone Hill. It was probable, as the event showed, that the
particular operation, the reduction of St. Kitt's, would succeed
despite the presence of the English fleet; and "the French navy has
always preferred the glory of assuring a conquest to that, more
brilliant perhaps but less real, of taking a few ships."

So far De Grasse may be acquitted of any error beyond that of not
rising above the traditions of his service. Some days, however, before
the surrender of the island and the departure of the English fleet, he
was joined by two ships-of-the-line which brought him word of the
dispersal of the expected convoy and reinforcements from Europe.[199]
He then knew that he himself could not be strengthened before Rodney's
arrival, and that by that event the English would be superior to him.
He had actually thirty-three ships-of-the-line in hand, and a few
miles off lay twenty-two English in a position where he knew they
would await his attack; yet he let them escape. His own explanation
implies clearly that he had no intention of attacking them at
anchor:--

    "The day after the capitulation of Brimstone Hill was the moment
    to watch Hood closely, and to fight him _as soon as he got under
    way_ from the conquered island. But our provisions were
    exhausted; We had only enough for thirty-six hours. Some
    supply-ships had arrived at Nevis, and you will admit one must
    live before fighting. I went to Nevis, always to windward and in
    sight of the enemy, a league and a half from him, in order to
    take on board the necessary supplies as rapidly as possible.
    Hood decamped at night without signals, and the next morning I
    found only the sick whom he left behind."[200]

In other words, Hood having held his ground with consummate audacity
and skill, when he had some chance of successful resistance, declined
to await his adversary's attack under conditions overwhelmingly
unfavorable. What shall be said of this talk about provisions? Did not
the Comte de Grasse know a month before how long, to a day, the
supplies on board would last? Did he not know, four days before Hood
sailed, that he had with him every ship he could probably count on for
the approaching campaign, while the English would surely be
reinforced? And if the English position was as strong as good
judgment, professional skill, and bold hearts could make it, had it
not weak points? Were not the lee ships to leeward? If they did
attempt to beat to windward, had he not ships to "contain" them? If
the van ship could not be reached, had he not force enough to double
and treble on the third and following ships, as far down the line as
he chose? A letter of Suffren's, referring to a similar condition of
things at Santa Lucia,[201] but written three years before these
events, seems almost a prophetic description of them:--

    "Notwithstanding the slight results of the two cannonades of
    December 15 [1778], we can yet expect success; but the only way
    to attain it is to attack vigorously the squadron, which in
    consequence of our superiority cannot hold out, despite their
    land works, which will become of no effect _if we lay them on
    board, or anchor upon their buoys_. If we delay, a thousand
    circumstances may save them. _They may profit by the night to
    depart._"

There can be no doubt that the English would have sold their defeat
dearly; but results in war must be paid for, and the best are in the
long run the cheapest. A tight grip of a few simple principles--that
the enemy's fleet was the controlling factor in the coming campaign,
that it was therefore his true objective, that one fraction of it must
be crushed without delay when caught thus separated--would have saved
De Grasse a great blunder; but it is only fair to note that it would
have made him an exception to the practice of the French navy.

The hour was now close at hand when the French admiral should feel,
even if he did not admit, the consequences of this mistake, by which he
had won a paltry island and lost an English fleet. Rodney had sailed
from Europe on the 15th of January, with twelve ships-of-the-line. On
the 19th of February he anchored at Barbadoes, and the same day Hood
reached Antigua from St. Kitt's. On the 25th the squadrons of Rodney
and Hood met to windward of Antigua, forming a united fleet of
thirty-four ships-of-the-line. The next day De Grasse anchored in Fort
Royal, thus escaping the pursuit which Rodney at once began. The
English admiral then returned to Sta. Lucia, where he was joined by
three more ships-of-the-line from England, raising his force to
thirty-seven. Knowing that a large convoy was expected from France,
before the arrival of which nothing could be attempted, Rodney sent a
part of his fleet to cruise to windward and as far north as Guadeloupe;
but the officer in charge of the French convoy, suspecting this action,
kept well north of that island, and reached Fort Royal, Martinique, on
the 20th of March. The ships-of-war with him raised De Grasse's fleet
to thirty-three effective sail-of-the-line and two fifty-gun ships.

The object of the united efforts of France and Spain this year was the
conquest of Jamaica. It was expected to unite at Cap Français (now Cap
Haïtien), in Hayti, fifty ships-of-the-line and twenty thousand
troops. Part of the latter were already at the rendezvous; and De
Grasse, appointed to command the combined fleets, was to collect in
Martinique all the available troops and supplies in the French
islands, and convoy them to the rendezvous. It was this junction that
Rodney was charged to prevent.

The region within which occurred the important operations of the next
few days covers a distance of one hundred and fifty miles, from south
to north, including the islands of Sta. Lucia, Martinique, Dominica,
and Guadeloupe, in the order named. (See Plate XI. p. 378.) At this
time the first was in English, the others in French, hands. The final,
and for the moment decisive, encounter took place between, and a
little to westward of, Dominica and Guadeloupe. These are
twenty-three miles apart; but the channel is narrowed to thirteen by
three islets called the Saints, lying ten miles south of Guadeloupe.
It is said to have been De Grasse's intention, instead of sailing
direct for Cap Français,[202] to take a circuitous course near the
islands, which, being friendly or neutral, would give refuge to the
convoy if pressed. The close pursuit of the English, who came up with
him off Dominica, led him to forsake this plan, sending the convoy
into Basse Terre at the south end of Guadeloupe, while with the fleet
he tried to beat through the channel and pass east of the island, thus
drawing the English away from the transports and ridding himself of
the tactical embarrassment due to the latter's presence. Accidents to
various ships thwarted this attempt, and brought about a battle
disastrous to him and fatal to the joint enterprise.

The anchorages of the two fleets, in Martinique and Sta. Lucia, were
thirty miles apart. The prevailing east wind is generally fair to pass
from one to the other; but a strong westerly current, and the
frequency of calms and light airs, tend to throw to leeward
sailing-ships leaving Sta. Lucia for the northern island. A chain of
frigates connected the English lookout ships off Martinique, by
signal, with Rodney's flag-ship in Gros Ilot Bay. Everything was astir
at the two stations, the French busy with the multitudinous
arrangements necessitated by a great military undertaking, the English
with less to do, yet maintaining themselves in a state of expectancy
and preparation for instant action, that entails constant alertness
and mental activity.

On the 5th of April Rodney was informed that the soldiers were being
embarked, and on the 8th, soon after daylight, the lookout frigates
were seen making signal that the enemy was leaving port. The English
fleet at once began to get under way, and by noon was clear of the
harbor to the number of thirty-six of the line. At half-past two P.M.
the advanced frigates were in sight of the French fleet, which was
seen from the mastheads of the main body just before sundown. The
English stood to the northward all night, and at daybreak of the 9th
were abreast Dominica, but for the most part becalmed. In-shore of
them, to the northward and eastward, were seen the French fleet and
convoy: the men-of-war numbering thirty-three of the line, besides
smaller vessels; the convoy a hundred and fifty sail, under special
charge of the two fifty-gun ships. The irregular and uncertain winds,
common to the night and early hours of the day near the land, had
scattered these unwieldy numbers. Fifteen sail-of-the-line were in the
channel between Dominica and the Saints, with a fresh trade-wind,
apparently beating to windward; the remainder of the ships-of-war and
most of the convoy were still becalmed close under Dominica (Plate
XX., Position I, b). Gradually, however, one by one, the French ships
were catching light airs off the land; and by favor of these, which
did not reach so far as the English in the offing, drew out from the
island and entered the more steady breeze of the channel, reinforcing
the group which was thus possessed of that prime element of naval
power, mobility. At the same time light airs from the southeast crept
out to the English van under Hood, fanning it gently north from the
main body of the fleet toward two isolated French ships (i), which,
having fallen to leeward during the night, had shared the calms that
left the English motionless, with their heads all round the compass.
They had come nearly within gunshot, when a light puff from the
northwest enabled the Frenchmen to draw away and approach their own
ships in the channel.

The farther the English van advanced, the fresher grew their wind,
until they fairly opened the channel of the Saints and felt the
trade-wind. De Grasse signalled to the convoy to put into Guadeloupe,
which order was so well carried out that they were all out of sight to
the northward by two in the afternoon, and will appear no more in the
sequel. The two French ships, already spoken of as fallen to leeward,
not being yet out of danger from the English van, which had now a
commanding breeze, and the latter being much separated from their rear
and centre, De Grasse ordered his van to bear down and engage. This
was obeyed by the ships signalled and by three others, in all by
fourteen or fifteen, the action beginning at half-past nine A.M., and
lasting with intermissions until quarter-past one P.M. Hood was soon
forced to heave-to, in order not to increase too much his separation
from the main fleet; the French kept under way, approaching from the
rear and passing in succession at half cannon-shot to windward (Plate
XX., Position I.). As each ship drew ahead of the English division,
she tacked, standing back to the southward until in position to resume
her place in the order of attack, thus describing a continuous
irregular curve of elliptical form, to windward of their opponents.
The brunt of the attack fell upon eight or nine of the English, this
number being successively increased as one ship after another, as the
baffling airs served, drew out from the calm space under Dominica; but
the French received similar accessions. While this engagement was
going on, part of the English centre, eight ships with Rodney's flag
among them (Position I., a), by carefully watching the puffs and
cat's-paws, had worked in with the land and caught the sea breeze,
which was felt there sooner than in the offing. As soon as they had
it, about eleven A.M., they stood to the north, being now on the
weather quarter[203] both of the English van and its assailants
(Position II., a). The latter, seeing this, tacked, and abandoning the
contest for the moment, steered south to join their centre, lest
Rodney's eight ships should get between them. At half-past eleven the
French again formed line on the starboard tack, most of their ships
being now clear of the land, while the English rear was still
becalmed. The greater numbers of the French enabled them to extend
from north to south along the length of the English line, whereas the
latter was still broken by a great gap between the van and centre
(Position II.). The attack upon Hood was therefore hotly renewed;
but the French centre and rear (b), having the wind, kept their
distance, and held Rodney's division at long range. At quarter-past
one the French, finding that the whole British line was coming up with
the wind, ceased firing, and at two Rodney hauled down the signal for
battle, the enemy having withdrawn.

   [Illustration: Pl. XX. RODNEY & DE GRASSE. APRIL 9, 1782.]

This action of the 9th of April amounted actually to no more than an
artillery duel. One French ship, the "Caton," a sixty-four (d),
received injuries which sent her into Guadeloupe; two English were
disabled, but repaired their injuries without leaving the fleet. The
material advantage, therefore, lay with the latter. Opinions differ as
to the generalship of the Comte de Grasse on this day, but they divide
on the same basis of principle as to whether ulterior operations, or
the chances of beating the enemy's fleet, are to determine an
admiral's action. The facts of the case are these: Sixteen of the
English fleet, all the rear and four of the centre (Position II., c),
were not able at any time to fire a shot. Apparently every French
ship, first and last, might have been brought into action. At the
beginning, eight or nine English were opposed to fifteen French. At
the end there were twenty English to thirty-three French, and these
general proportions doubtless obtained throughout the four hours. De
Grasse therefore found himself in the presence of a fleet superior to
his own, in numbers at least, and by the favor of Providence that
fleet so divided that nearly half of it was powerless to act. He had
the wind, he had a fine body of captains; what was to prevent him from
attacking Hood's nine ships with fifteen, putting one on each side of
the six in the rear. Had those nine been thoroughly beaten, Rodney's
further movements must have been hopelessly crippled. The French lost
only five in their defeat three days later. The subsequent
court-martial, however, laid down the French doctrine thus: "The
decision to persist in engaging with only a part of our fleet may be
considered as an act of prudence on the part of the admiral, which
might be dictated by the ulterior projects of the campaign." On this a
French professional writer naturally remarks, that if an attack were
made at all, it would be more prudent to make it in force; less injury
would fall on individual ships, while in the end the whole fleet would
inevitably be drawn in to support any which, by losing spars, could
not return to windward.

Three times in one year had Fortune thrown before De Grasse the
opportunity of attacking English fleets with decisive odds on his
side.[204] Her favors were now exhausted. Three days more were to show
how decidedly the ulterior projects of a campaign may be affected by a
battle and the loss of a few ships. From the 9th to the morning of the
12th the French fleet continued beating to windward between Dominica
and the Saints, in no regular order. On the night of the 9th the
English hove-to to repair damages. The next day the chase to windward
was resumed, but the French gained very decidedly upon their pursuers.
On the night of the 10th two ships, the "Jason" and "Zélé," collided.
The "Zélé" was the bane of the French fleet during these days. She was
one of those that were nearly caught by the enemy on the 9th, and was
also the cause of the final disaster. The injuries to the "Jason"
forced her to put into Guadeloupe. On the 11th the main body was to
windward of the Saints, but the "Zélé" and another had fallen so far
to leeward that De Grasse bore down to cover them, thus losing much of
the ground gained. On the night following, the "Zélé" was again in
collision, this time with De Grasse's flag-ship; the latter lost some
sails, but the other, which had not the right of way and was wholly at
fault, carried away both foremast and bowsprit. The admiral sent word
to the frigate "Astrée" to take the "Zélé" in tow; and here flits
across the page of our story a celebrated and tragical figure, for the
captain of the "Astrée" was the ill-fated explorer Lapeyrouse, the
mystery of whose disappearance with two ships and their entire crews
remained so long unsolved. Two hours were consumed in getting the ship
under way in tow of the frigate,--not very smart work under the
conditions of weather and urgency; but by five A.M. the two were
standing away for Basse Terre, where the "Caton" and "Jason," as well
as the convoy, had already arrived. The French fleet had thus lost
three from its line-of-battle since leaving Martinique.

The disabled ship had not long been headed for Basse Terre, when the
faint streaks of dawn announced the approach of the 12th of April, a
day doubly celebrated in naval annals. The sun had not quite set upon
the exhausted squadrons of Suffren and Hughes, anchoring after their
fiercest battle off Ceylon, when his early rays shone upon the opening
strife between Rodney and De Grasse.[205] The latter was at the time
the greatest naval battle in its results that had been fought in a
century; its influence on the course of events was very great, though
far from as decisive as it might have been; it was attended with
circumstances of unusual though somewhat factitious brilliancy, and
particularly was marked by a manoeuvre that was then looked upon as
exceptionally daring and decisive,--"breaking the line." It must be
added that it has given rise to a storm of controversy; and the mass
of details, as given by witnesses who should be reliable, are so
confused and contradictory, owing mainly to the uncertainties of the
wind, that it is impossible now to do more than attempt to reconcile
them in a full account. Nevertheless, the leading features can be
presented with sufficient accuracy, and this will first be done
briefly and barely; the outline thus presented can afterward be
clothed with the details which give color, life, and interest to the
great scene.

At daylight[206] (about half-past five) the English fleet, which had
gone about at two A.M., was standing on the starboard tack, with the
wind at southeast,[207] an unusual amount of southing for that hour
(Plate XXI., A). It was then about fifteen miles from the Saints,
which bore north-northeast, and ten from the French fleet, which bore
northeast. The latter, owing to the events of the night, was greatly
scattered, as much as eight or ten miles separating the weather, or
easternmost, ships from the lee,[208] the flag-ship "Ville de Paris"
being among the latter. Anxiety for the "Zélé" kept the French
admiral, with the ships in his company, under short canvas, standing
to the southward on the port tack (A). The English on the starboard
tack, with the wind as they had it,[3] headed east-northeast, and
thus, as soon as there was light to see, found the French "broad on
the lee bow, and one of M. de Grasse's ships (the "Zélé") towed by a
frigate, square under our lee (a), with his bowsprit and foremast
prostrate across his forecastle."[209] To draw the French farther to
leeward, Rodney detached four ships (b) to chase the "Zélé." As soon
as De Grasse saw this he signalled his fleet to keep away (c), as
Rodney wished, and at the same time to form the line-of-battle, thus
calling down to him the ships to windward. The English line was also
formed rapidly, and the chasing ships recalled at seven A.M. De
Grasse, seeing that if he stood on he would lose the weather-gage
altogether, hauled up again on the port tack (c'); and the breeze
changing to east-southeast and east in his favor and knocking the
English off, the race of the two fleets on opposite tacks, for the
advantage of the wind, became nearly equal. The French, however, won,
thanks to a superiority in sailing which had enabled them to draw so
far to windward of the English on the previous days, and, but for the
awkwardness of the "Zélé," might have cleared them altogether (Plate
XXI., B). Their leading ships first reached and passed the point where
the rapidly converging tracks intersected, while the English leader,
the "Marlborough," struck the French line between the sixth and
tenth ships (variously stated). The battle, of course, had by this
time begun, the ninth ship in the French line, the "Brave," opening
fire at twenty minutes before eight A.M. upon the "Marlborough." As
there was no previous intention of breaking the line, the English
leader kept away, in obedience to a signal from Rodney, and ran close
along under the enemy's lee, followed in succession by all the ships
as they reached her wake. The battle thus assumed the common and
indecisive phase of two fleets passing on opposite tacks, the wind
very light, however, and so allowing a more heavy engagement than
common under these circumstances, the ships "sliding by" at the rate
of three to four knots. Since the hostile lines diverged again south
of their point of meeting, De Grasse made signal to keep away four
points to south-southwest, thus bringing his van (B, a) to action with
the English rear, and not permitting the latter to reach his rear
unscathed. There were, however, two dangers threatening the French if
they continued their course. Its direction, south or south-southwest,
carried them into the calms that hung round the north end of Dominica;
and the uncertainty of the wind made it possible that by its hauling
to the southward the enemy could pass through their line and gain the
wind, and with it the possibility of forcing the decisive battle which
the French policy had shunned; and this was in fact what happened. De
Grasse therefore made signal at half-past eight to wear _together_ and
take the same tack as the English. This, however, was impossible; the
two fleets were too close together to admit the evolution. He then
signalled to haul close to the wind and wear _in succession_, which
also failed to be done, and at five minutes past nine the dreaded
contingency arose; the wind hauled to the southward, knocking off all
the French ships that had not yet kept away; that is, all who had
English ships close under their lee (Plate XXI. C). Rodney, in the
"Formidable," was at this time just drawing up with the fourth ship
astern of De Grasse's flag. Luffing to the new wind, he passed through
the French line, followed by the five ships next astern of him (C,
a), while nearly at the same moment, and from the same causes, his
sixth astern (C, b) led through the interval abreast him, followed by
the whole English rear. The French line-of-battle was thus broken in
two places by columns of enemies' ships in such close order as to
force its vessels aside, even if the wind had not conspired to
embarrass their action. Every principle upon which a line-of-battle
was constituted, for mutual support and for the clear field of fire of
each ship, was thus overthrown for the French, and preserved for the
English divisions which filed through; and the French were forced off
to leeward by the interposition of the enemy's columns, besides being
broken up. Compelled thus to forsake the line upon which they had been
ranged, it was necessary to re-form upon another, and unite the three
groups into which they were divided,--a difficult piece of tactics
under any circumstances, but doubly so under the moral impression of
disaster, and in presence of a superior enemy, who, though himself
disordered, was in better shape, and already felt the glow of victory.

   [Illustration: Pl. XXI. RODNEY & DE GRASSE. APRIL 12, 1782.]

It does not appear that any substantial attempt to re-form was made by
the French. To reunite, yes; but only as a flying, disordered mass.
The various shifts of wind and movements of the divisions left their
fleet, at midday (Plate XXI. D), with the centre (c) two miles
northwest of and to leeward of the van (v), the rear (r) yet farther
from the centre and to leeward of it. Calms and short puffs of wind
prevailed now through both fleets. At half-past one P.M. a light
breeze from the east sprang up, and De Grasse made signal to form the
line again on the port tack; between three and four, not having
succeeded in this, he made signal to form on the starboard tack. The
two signals and the general tenor of the accounts show that at no time
were the French re-formed after their line was broken; and all the
manoeuvres tended toward, even if they did not necessitate, taking the
whole fleet as far down as the most leewardly of its parts (D). In
such a movement, it followed of course that the most crippled ships
were left behind, and these were picked up, one by one, by the
English, who pursued without any regular order, for which there was
no need, as mutual support was assured without it. Shortly after six
P.M. De Grasse's flag-ship, the "Ville de Paris," struck her colors to
the "Barfleur," carrying the flag of Sir Samuel Hood. The French
accounts state that nine of the enemy's ships then surrounded her, and
there is no doubt that she had been fought to the bitter end. Her
name, commemorating the great city whose gift she had been to the
king, her unusual size, and the fact that no French naval
commander-in-chief had before been taken prisoner in battle, conspired
to bestow a peculiar brilliancy upon Rodney's victory. Four other
ships-of-the-line were taken,[210] and, singularly enough, upon these
particular ships was found the whole train of artillery intended for
the reduction of Jamaica.

Such were the leading features of the Battle of the Saints, or, as it
is sometimes styled, of the 12th of April, known to the French as the
Battle of Dominica. Certain points which have so far been omitted for
the sake of clearness, but which affect the issue, must now be given.
When the day opened, the French fleet was greatly scattered and
without order.[211] De Grasse, under the influence of his fears for
the "Zélé," so precipitated his movements that his line was not
properly formed at the moment of engaging. The van ships had not yet
come into position (B, a), and the remainder were so far from having
reached their places that De Vaudreuil, commanding the rear division
and last engaged, states that the line was formed under the fire of
musketry. The English, on the contrary, were in good order, the only
change made being to shorten the interval between ships from two to
one cable's length (seven hundred feet). The celebrated stroke of
breaking through the French line was due, not to previous intention,
but to a shift of wind throwing their ships out of order and so
increasing the spaces between them; while the gap through which
Rodney's group penetrated was widened by the "Diadème" on its north
side being taken aback and paying round on the other tack (C, c.) Sir
Charles Douglas says the immediate effect, where the flag-ship broke
through, was "the bringing together, almost if not quite in contact
with each other, the four ships of the enemy which were nearest," on
the north, "to the point alluded to (c), and coming up in succession.
This unfortunate group, composing now only one large single object at
which to fire, was attacked by the "Duke," "Namur," and "Formidable"
(ninety-gun ships) all at once, receiving several broadsides from
each, not a single shot missing; and great must have been the
slaughter." The "Duke" (C, d), being next ahead of the flag-ship, had
followed her leader under the French lee; but as soon as her captain
saw that the "Formidable" had traversed the enemy's order, he did the
same, passing north of this confused group and so bringing it under a
fire from both sides. The log of the "Magnanime," one of the group,
mentions passing under the fire of two three-deckers, one on either
side.

As soon as the order was thus broken, Rodney hauled down the signal
for the line, keeping flying that for close action, and at the same
time ordered his van, which had now passed beyond and north of the
enemy's rear, to go about and rejoin the English centre. This was
greatly delayed through the injuries to spars and sails received in
passing under the enemy's fire. His own flag-ship and the ships with
her went about. The rear, under Hood, instead of keeping north again
to join the centre, stood to windward for a time, and were then
becalmed at a considerable distance from the rest of the fleet.

Much discussion took place at a later day as to the wisdom of Rodney's
action in breaking through his enemy's order, and to whom the credit,
if any, should be ascribed. The latter point is of little concern; but
it may be said that the son of Sir Charles Douglas, Rodney's
chief-of-staff, brought forward an amount of positive evidence, the
only kind that could be accepted to diminish the credit of the person
wholly responsible for the results, which proves that the suggestion
came from Douglas, and Rodney's consent was with difficulty obtained.
The value of the manoeuvre itself is of more consequence than any
question of personal reputation. It has been argued by some that, so
far from being a meritorious act, it was unfortunate, and for Rodney's
credit should rather be attributed to the force of circumstances than
to choice. It had been better, these say, to have continued along
under the lee of the French rear, thus inflicting upon it the fire of
the whole English line, and that the latter should have tacked and
doubled on the French rear. This argument conveniently forgets that
tacking, or turning round in any way, after a brush of this kind, was
possible to only a part of the ships engaged; and that these would
have much difficulty in overtaking the enemies who had passed on,
unless the latter were very seriously crippled. Therefore this
suggested attack, the precise reproduction of the battle of Ushant,
really reduces itself to the fleets passing on opposite tacks, each
distributing its fire over the whole of the enemy's line without
attempting any concentration on a part of it. It may, and must, be
conceded at once, that Rodney's change of course permitted the eleven
rear ships of the French (D, r) to run off to leeward, having received
the fire of only part of their enemy, while the English van had
undergone that of nearly the whole French fleet. These ships, however,
were thus thrown entirely out of action for a measurable and important
time by being driven to leeward, and would have been still more out of
position to help any of their fleet, had not De Grasse himself been
sent to leeward by Hood's division cutting the line three ships ahead
of him. The thirteen leading French ships, obeying the last signal
they had seen, were hugging the wind; the group of six with De Grasse
(C, e) would have done the same had they not been headed off by Hood's
division. The result of Rodney's own action alone, therefore, would
have been to divide the French fleet into two parts, separated by a
space of six miles, and one of them hopelessly to leeward. The
English, having gained the wind, would have been in position easily to
"contain" the eleven lee ships, and to surround the nineteen weather
ones in overwhelming force. The actual condition, owing to the _two_
breaches in the line, was slightly different; the group of six with De
Grasse being placed between his weather and lee divisions, two miles
from the former, four from the latter (D). It seems scarcely necessary
to insist upon the tactical advantages of such a situation for the
English, even disregarding the moral effect of the confusion through
which the French had passed. In addition to this, a very striking
lesson is deducible from the immediate effects of the English guns in
passing through. Of the five ships taken, three were those under whose
sterns the English divisions pierced.[212] Instead of giving and
taking, as the parallel lines ran by, on equal terms, each ship having
the support of those ahead and astern, the French ships near which the
penetrating columns passed received each the successive fire of all
the enemy's division. Thus Hood's thirteen ships filed by the two rear
ones of the French van, the "César" and "Hector," fairly crushing them
under this concentration of fire; while in like manner, and with like
results, Rodney's six passed by the "Glorieux." This "concentration by
defiling" past the extremity of a column corresponds quite accurately
to the concentration upon the flank of a line, and has a special
interest, because if successfully carried out it would be as powerful
an attack now as it ever has been. If quick to seize their advantage,
the English might have fired upon the ships on both sides of the gaps
through which they passed, as the "Formidable" actually did; but they
were using the starboard broadsides, and many doubtless did not
realize their opportunity until too late. The natural results of
Rodney's act, therefore, were: (1) The gain of the wind, with the
power of offensive action; (2) Concentration of fire upon a part of
the enemy's order; and (3) The introduction into the latter of
confusion and division, which might, and did, become very great,
offering the opportunity of further tactical advantage. It is not a
valid reply to say that, had the French been more apt, they could have
united sooner. A manoeuvre that presents a good chance of advantage
does not lose its merit because it can be met by a prompt movement of
the enemy, any more than a particular lunge of the sword becomes
worthless because it has its appropriate parry. The chances were that
by heading off the rear ships, while the van stood on, the French
fleet would be badly divided; and the move was none the less sagacious
because the two fragments could have united sooner than they did, had
they been well handled. With the alternative action suggested, of
tacking after passing the enemy's rear, the pursuit became a stern
chase, in which both parties having been equally engaged would
presumably be equally crippled. Signals of disability, in fact, were
numerous in both fleets.

Independently of the tactical handling of the two fleets, there were
certain differences of equipment which conferred tactical advantage,
and are therefore worth noting. The French appear to have had finer
ships, and, class for class, heavier armaments. Sir Charles Douglas,
an eminent officer of active and ingenious turn of mind, who paid
particular attention to gunnery details, estimated that in weight of
battery the thirty-three French were superior to the thirty-six
English by the force of four 84-gun ships; and that after the loss of
the "Zélé," "Jason," and "Caton" there still remained an advantage
equal to two seventy-fours. The French admiral La Gravière admits the
generally heavier calibre of French cannon at this era. The better
construction of the French ships and their greater draught caused them
to sail and beat better, and accounts in part for the success of De
Grasse in gaining to windward; for in the afternoon of the 11th only
three or four of the body of his fleet were visible _from the
mast-head_ of the English flag-ship, which had been within gunshot of
them on the 9th. It was the awkwardness of the unlucky "Zélé" and of
the "Magnanime," which drew down De Grasse from his position of
vantage, and justified Rodney's perseverance in relying upon the
chapter of accidents to effect his purpose. The greater speed of the
French as a body is somewhat hard to account for, because, though
undoubtedly with far better lines, the practice of coppering the
bottom had not become so general in France as in England, and among
the French there were several uncoppered and worm-eaten ships.[213]
The better sailing of the French was, however, remarked by the English
officers, though the great gain mentioned must have been in part owing
to Rodney's lying-by, after the action of the 9th, to refit, due
probably to the greater injury received by the small body of his
vessels, which had been warmly engaged, with greatly superior numbers.
It was stated, in narrating that action, that the French kept at half
cannon-range; this was to neutralize a tactical advantage the English
had in the large number of carronades and other guns of light weight
but large calibre, which in close action told heavily, but were
useless at greater distances. The second in command, De Vaudreuil, to
whom was intrusted the conduct of that attack, expressly states that
if he had come within reach of the carronades his ships would have
been quickly unrigged. Whatever judgment is passed upon the military
policy of refusing to crush an enemy situated as the English division
was, there can be no question that, if the object was to prevent
pursuit, the tactics of De Vaudreuil on the 9th was in all respects
excellent. He inflicted the utmost injury with the least exposure of
his own force. On the 12th, De Grasse, by allowing himself to be lured
within reach of carronades, yielded this advantage, besides
sacrificing to an impulse his whole previous strategic policy. Rapidly
handled from their lightness, firing grape and shot of large
diameter, these guns were peculiarly harmful in close action and
useless at long range. In a later despatch De Vaudreuil says: "The
effect of these new arms is most deadly within musket range; it is
they which so badly crippled us on the 12th of April." There were
other gunnery innovations, in some at least of the English ships,
which by increasing the accuracy, the rapidity, and the field of fire,
greatly augmented the power of their batteries. These were the
introduction of locks, by which the man who aimed also fired; and the
fitting to the gun-carriages of breast-pieces and sweeps, so that the
guns could be pointed farther ahead or astern,--that is, over a larger
field than had been usual. In fights between single ships, not
controlled in their movements by their relations to a fleet, this
improvement would at times allow the possessor to take a position
whence he could train upon his enemy without the latter being able to
reply, and some striking instances of such tactical advantage are
given. In a fleet fight, such as is now being considered, the gain was
that the guns could be brought to bear farther forward, and could
follow the opponent longer as he passed astern, thus doubling, or
more, the number of shots he might receive, and lessening for him the
interval of immunity enjoyed between two successive antagonists.[214]
These matters of antiquated and now obsolete detail carry with them
lessons that are never obsolete; they differ in no respect from the
more modern experiences with the needle-gun and the torpedo.

And indeed this whole action of April 12, 1782, is fraught with sound
military teaching. Perseverance in pursuit, gaining advantage of
position, concentration of one's own effort, dispersal of the enemy's
force, the efficient tactical bearing of small but important
improvements in the material of war, have been dwelt on. To insist
further upon the necessity of not letting slip a chance to beat the
enemy in detail, would be thrown away on any one not already convinced
by the bearing of April 9 on April 12. The abandonment of the attack
upon Jamaica, after the defeat of the French fleet, shows
conclusively that the true way to secure ulterior objects is to defeat
the force which threatens them. There remains at least one criticism,
delicate in its character, but essential to draw out the full
teachings of these events; that is, upon the manner in which the
victory was followed up, and the consequent effects upon the war in
general.

The liability of sailing-ships to injury in spars and sails, in other
words, in that mobility which is the prime characteristic of naval
strength, makes it difficult to say, after a lapse of time, what might
or might not have been done. It is not only a question of actual
damage received, which log-books may record, but also of the means for
repair, the energy and aptitude of the officers and seamen, which
differ from ship to ship. As to the ability of the English fleet,
however, to follow up its advantages by a more vigorous pursuit on the
12th of April, we have the authority of two most distinguished
officers,--Sir Samuel Hood, the second in command, and Sir Charles
Douglas, the captain of the fleet, or chief-of-staff to the admiral.
The former expressed the opinion that twenty ships might have been
taken, and said so to Rodney the next day; while the chief-of-staff
was so much mortified by the failure, and by the manner in which the
admiral received his suggestions, as seriously to contemplate
resigning his position.[215]

Advice and criticism are easy, nor can the full weight of a
responsibility be felt, except by the man on whom it is laid; but
great results cannot often be reached in war without risk and effort.
The accuracy of the judgment of these two officers, however, is
confirmed by inference from the French reports. Rodney justifies his
failure to pursue by alleging the crippled condition of many ships,
and other matters incident to the conclusion of a hard-fought battle,
and then goes on to suggest what might have been done that night, had
he pursued, by the French fleet, which "went off in a body of
twenty-six ships-of-the-line."[216] These possibilities are rather
creditable to his imagination, considering what the French fleet had
done by day; but as regards the body of twenty-six[217] ships, De
Vaudreuil, who, after De Grasse's surrender, made the signal for the
ships to rally round his flag, found only ten with him next morning,
and was not joined by any more before the 14th. During the following
days five more joined him at intervals.[218] With these he went to the
rendezvous at Cap Français, where he found others, bringing the whole
number who repaired thither to twenty. The five remaining, of those
that had been in the action, fled to Curaçoa, six hundred miles
distant, and did not rejoin until May. The "body of twenty-six ships,"
therefore, had no existence in fact; on the contrary, the French fleet
was very badly broken up, and several of its ships isolated. As
regards the crippled condition, there seems no reason to think the
English had suffered more, but rather less, than their enemy; and a
curious statement, bearing upon this, appears in a letter from Sir
Gilbert Blane:--

    "It was with difficulty we could make the French officers
    believe that the returns of killed and wounded, made by our
    ships to the admiral, were true; and one of them flatly
    contradicted me, saying we always gave the world a false account
    of our loss. I then walked with him over the decks of the
    'Formidable,' and bid him remark what number of shot-holes there
    were, and _also how little her rigging had suffered_, and asked
    if that degree of damage was likely to be connected with the
    loss of more than fourteen men, which was our number killed, and
    _the greatest of any in the fleet_, except the 'Royal Oak' and
    'Monarch.' He ... owned our fire must have been much better kept
    up and directed than theirs."[219]

There can remain little doubt, therefore, that the advantage was not
followed up with all possible vigor. Not till five days after the
battle was Hood's division sent toward San Domingo, where they picked
up in the Mona Passage the "Jason" and the "Caton," which had
separated before the battle and were on their way to Cap Français.
These, and two small vessels with them, were the sole after-fruits of
the victory. Under the conditions of England's war this cautious
failure is a serious blot on Rodney's military reputation, and goes
far to fix his place among successful admirals. He had saved Jamaica
for the time; but he had not, having the opportunity, crushed the
French fleet. He too, like De Grasse, had allowed the immediate
objective to blind him to the general military situation, and to the
factor which controlled it.

To appreciate the consequences of this neglect, and the real
indecisiveness of this celebrated battle, we must go forward a year
and listen to the debates in Parliament on the conditions of peace, in
February, 1783. The approval or censure of the terms negotiated by the
existing ministry involved the discussion of many considerations; but
the gist of the dispute was, whether the conditions were such as the
comparative financial and military situations of the belligerents
justified, or whether it would have been better for England to
continue the war rather than submit to the sacrifices she had made. As
regards the financial condition, despite the gloomy picture drawn by
the advocates of the peace, there was probably no more doubt then than
there is now about the comparative resources of the different
countries. The question of military strength was really that of naval
power. The ministry argued that the whole British force hardly
numbered one hundred sail-of-the-line, while the navies of France and
Spain amounted to one hundred and forty, not to speak of that of
Holland.

    "With so glaring an inferiority, what hopes of success could we
    derive, either from the experience of the last campaign, or from
    any new distribution of our force in that which would have
    followed? In the West Indies we could not have had more than
    forty-six sail to oppose to forty, which on the day that peace
    was signed lay in Cadiz Bay, with sixteen thousand troops on
    board, ready to sail for that quarter of the world, where they
    would have been joined by twelve of the line from Havana and
    ten from San Domingo.... Might we not too reasonably apprehend
    that the campaign in the West Indies would have closed with the
    loss of Jamaica itself, the avowed object of this immense
    armament?"[220]

These are certainly the reasonings of an avowed partisan, for which
large allowances must be made. The accuracy of the statement of
comparative numbers was denied by Lord Keppel, a member of the same
party, and but lately at the head of the admiralty, a post which he
had resigned because he disapproved the treaty.[221] English
statesmen, too, as well as English seamen, must by this time have
learned to discount largely the apparent, when estimating the real,
power of the other navies. Nevertheless, how different would have been
the appreciation of the situation, both moral and material, had Rodney
reaped the full fruits of the victory which he owed rather to chance
than to his own merit, great as that undeniably was.

A letter published in 1809, anonymous, but bearing strong internal
evidence of being written by Sir Gilbert Blane, the physician of the
fleet and long on intimate terms with Rodney, who was a constant
sufferer during his last cruise, states that the admiral "thought
little of his victory on the 12th of April, 1782." He would have
preferred to rest his reputation upon his combinations against De
Guichen, April 17, 1780, and "looked upon that opportunity of beating,
with an inferior fleet, such an officer, whom he considered the best
in the French service, as one by which, but for the disobedience of
his captains, he might have gained immortal renown."[222] Few students
will be inclined to question this estimate of Rodney's merit on the
two occasions. Fortune, however, decreed that his glory should depend
upon a battle, brilliant in itself, to which his own qualities least
contributed, and denied him success when he most deserved it. The
chief action of his life in which merit and success met, the
destruction of Langara's fleet off Cape St. Vincent, has almost
passed into oblivion; yet it called for the highest qualities of a
seaman, and is not unworthy of comparison with Hawke's pursuit of
Conflans.[223]

Within the two years and a half which had elapsed since Rodney was
appointed to his command he had gained several important successes,
and, as was remarked, had taken a French, a Spanish, and a Dutch
admiral. "In that time he had added twelve line-of-battle ships, all
taken from the enemy, to the British navy, and destroyed five more;
and to render the whole still more singularly remarkable, the 'Ville
de Paris' was said to be the only first-rate man-of-war that ever was
taken and carried into port by any commander of any nation."
Notwithstanding his services, the party spirit that was then so strong
in England, penetrating even the army and navy, obtained his
recall[224] upon the fall of Lord North's ministry, and his successor,
a man unknown to fame, had already sailed when news arrived of the
victory. In the fallen and discouraging state of English affairs at
the time, it excited the utmost exultation, and silenced the
strictures which certain parts of the admiral's previous conduct had
drawn forth. The people were not in a humor to be critical, and amid
the exaggerated notions that prevailed of the results achieved, no one
thought of the failure to obtain greater. This impression long
prevailed. As late as 1830, when Rodney's Life was first published, it
was asserted "that the French navy had been so effectually crippled
and reduced by the decisive victory of the 12th of April, as to be no
longer in a condition to contest with Great Britain the empire of the
seas." This is nonsense, excusable in 1782, but not to the calm
thought of after days. The favorable terms obtained were due to the
financial embarrassment of France, not to her naval humiliation; and
if there was exaggeration in the contention of the advocates of peace
that England could not save Jamaica, it is probable that she could not
have recovered by arms the other islands restored to her by the
treaty.

The memory of De Grasse will always be associated with great services
done to America. His name, rather than that of Rochambeau, represents
the material succor which France gave to the struggling life of the
young Republic, as Lafayette's recalls the moral sympathy so
opportunely extended. The incidents of his life, subsequent to the
great disaster which closed his active career, cannot be without
interest to American readers.

After the surrender of the "Ville de Paris," De Grasse accompanied the
English fleet and its prizes to Jamaica, whither Rodney repaired to
refit his ships, thus appearing as a captive upon the scene of his
intended conquest. On the 19th of May he left the island, still a
prisoner, for England. Both by naval officers and by the English
people he was treated with that flattering and benevolent attention
which comes easily from the victor to the vanquished, and of which his
personal valor at least was not unworthy. It is said that he did not
refuse to show himself on several occasions upon the balcony of his
rooms in London, to the populace shouting for the valiant Frenchman.
This undignified failure to appreciate his true position naturally
excited the indignation of his countrymen; the more so as he had been
unsparing and excessive in denouncing the conduct of his subordinates
on the unlucky 12th of April.

    "He bears his misfortune," wrote Sir Gilbert Blane, "with
    equanimity; conscious, as he says, that he has done his duty....
    He attributes his misfortune, not to the inferiority of his
    force, but to the base desertion of his officers in the other
    ships, to whom he made the signal to rally, and even hailed them
    to abide by him, but was abandoned."[225]

This was the key-note to all his utterances. Writing from the English
flag-ship, the day after the battle, he "threw upon the greater part
of his captains the misfortunes of the day. Some had disobeyed his
signals; others, and notably the captains of the 'Languedoc' and
'Couronne,' that is to say his next ahead and astern, had abandoned
him."[226] He did not, however, confine himself to official reports,
but while a prisoner in London published several pamphlets to the same
effect, which he sent broadcast over Europe. The government, naturally
thinking that an officer could not thus sully the honor of his corps
without good reason, resolved to search out and relentlessly punish
all the guilty. The captains of the "Languedoc" and "Couronne" were
imprisoned as soon as they reached France, and all papers, logs, etc.,
bearing upon the case were gathered together. Under all the
circumstances it is not to be wondered at that on his return to
France, De Grasse, to use his own words, "found no one to hold out a
hand to him."[227] It was not till the beginning of 1784 that all the
accused and witnesses were ready to appear before the court-martial;
but the result of the trial was to clear entirely and in the most
ample manner almost every one whom he had attacked, while the faults
found were considered of a character entitled to indulgence, and were
awarded but slight punishment. "Nevertheless," cautiously observes a
French writer, "one cannot but say, with the Court, that the capture
of an admiral commanding thirty ships-of-the-line is an historical
incident which causes the regret of the whole nation."[228] As to the
conduct of the battle by the admiral, the Court found that the danger
of the "Zélé" on the morning of the 12th was not such as to justify
bearing down for so long a time as was done; that the crippled ship
had a breeze which was not then shared by the English, five miles away
to the southward, and which carried her into Basse Terre at ten A.M.;
that the engagement should not have been begun before all the ships
had come into line; and finally, that the fleet should have been
formed on the same tack as the English, because, by continuing to
stand south, it entered the zone of calms and light airs at the north
end of Dominica.[229]

De Grasse was much dissatisfied with the finding of the Court, and was
indiscreet enough to write to the minister of marine, protesting
against it and demanding a new trial. The minister, acknowledging his
protest, replied in the name of the king. After commenting upon the
pamphlets that had been so widely issued, and the entire contradiction
of their statements by the testimony before the Court, he concluded
with these weighty words:--

    "The loss of the battle cannot be attributed to the fault of
    private officers.[230] It results, from the findings, that you
    have allowed yourself to injure, by ill-founded accusations, the
    reputation of several officers, in order to clear yourself in
    public opinion of an unhappy result, the excuse for which you
    might perhaps have found in the inferiority of your force, in
    the uncertain fortune of war, and in circumstances over which
    you had no control. His Majesty is willing to believe that you
    did what you could to prevent the misfortunes of the day; but he
    cannot be equally indulgent to your unjust imputations upon
    those officers of his navy who have been cleared of the charges
    against them. His Majesty, dissatisfied with your conduct in
    this respect, forbids you to present yourself before him. I
    transmit his orders with regret, and add my own advice to
    retire, under the circumstances, to your province."

De Grasse died in January, 1788. His fortunate opponent, rewarded with
peerage and pension, lived until 1792. Hood was also created a peer,
and commanded with distinction in the early part of the wars of the
French Revolution, winning the enthusiastic admiration of Nelson, who
served under him; but a sharp difference with the admiralty caused him
to be retired before achieving any brilliant addition to his
reputation. He died in 1816, at the great age of ninety-two.

FOOTNOTES:

[194] The curve, a, a', a'', represents the line which Hood proposed
to follow with his fleet, the wind being supposed east-southeast. The
positions B, B, B, refer to the proceedings of a subsequent day and
have nothing to do with the diagram at A.

[195] When a fleet is in line ahead, close to the wind, on one tack,
and the ships go about together, they will, on the other tack, be on
the same line, but not one ahead of the other. This formation was
called bow-and-quarter line.

[196] A spring is a rope taken from the stern or quarter of a ship at
anchor, to an anchor properly placed, by which means the ship can be
turned in a desired direction.

[197] In the council of war of the allied fleets on the expediency of
attacking the English squadron anchored at Torbay (p. 408) an opponent
of the measure urged "that the whole of the combined fleets could not
bear down upon the English in a line-of-battle abreast, that of course
they must form the line-of-battle ahead, and go down upon the enemy
singly, by which they would run the greatest risk of being shattered
and torn to pieces," etc. (Beatson, vol. v. p. 396).

[198] In war, as in cards, the state of the score must at times
dictate the play; and the chief who never takes into consideration the
effect which his particular action will have on the general result,
nor what is demanded of him by the condition of things elsewhere, both
political and military, lacks an essential quality of a great general.
"The audacious manner in which Wellington stormed the redoubt of
Francisco [at Ciudad Rodrigo], and broke ground on the first night of
the investment, the more audacious manner in which he assaulted the
place before the fire of the defence had in any way lessened, and
before the counterscarp had been blown in, were the true causes of the
sudden fall of the place. _Both the military and political state of
affairs warranted this neglect of rules._ When the general terminated
his order for the assault with this sentence, 'Ciudad Rodrigo _must_
be stormed this evening,' he knew well that it would be nobly
understood" (Napier's Peninsular War). "Judging that the honour of his
Majesty's arms, _and the circumstances of the war in these seas_,
required a considerable degree of enterprise, I felt myself justified
in departing from the regular system" (Sir John Jervis's Report of the
Battle of Cape St. Vincent).

[199] By Kempenfeldt's attack upon De Guichen's convoy, and the
following gale in December, 1781. See p. 408.

[200] Kerguelen: Guerre Maritime de 1778. Letter of De Grasse to
Kerguelen, dated Paris. January 8, 1783. p. 263.

[201] See pp. 366, 426.

[202] See Map IV. of the Atlantic Ocean, p. 532.

[203] Weather quarter is behind, but on the windward side.

[204] April 29, 1781, off Martinique, twenty-four ships to eighteen;
January, 1782, thirty to twenty-two; April 9, 1782, thirty to twenty.

[205] The difference of time from Trincomalee to the Saints is nine
hours and a half.

[206] The account of the transactions from April 9 to April 12 is
based mainly upon the contemporary plates and descriptions of
Lieutenant Matthews, R.N., and the much later "Naval Researches" of
Capt. Thomas White, also of the British Navy, who were eye-witnesses,
both being checked by French and other English narratives. Matthews
and White are at variance with Rodney's official report as to the tack
on which the English were at daybreak; but the latter is explicitly
confirmed by private letters of Sir Charles Douglas, sent immediately
after the battle to prominent persons, and is followed in the text.

[207] Letter of Sir Charles Douglas, Rodney's chief-of-staff: "United
Service Journal," 1833, Part I. p. 515.

[208] De Grasse calls this distance three leagues, while some of his
captains estimated it to be as great as five.

[209] The French, in mid-channel, had the wind more to the eastward.

[210] The positions of the French ships captured are shown by a cross
in each of the three successive stages of the battle, B, C, D.

[211] The distance of the weathermost French ships from the "Ville de
Paris," when the signal to form line-of-battle was made, is variously
stated at from six to nine miles.

[212] The other two French ships taken were the "Ville de Paris,"
which, in her isolated condition, and bearing the flag of the
commander-in-chief, became the quarry around which the enemy's ships
naturally gathered, and the "Ardent," of sixty-four guns, which
appears to have been intercepted in a gallant attempt to pass from the
van to the side of her admiral in his extremity. The latter was the
solitary prize taken by the allied Great Armada in the English
Channel, in 1779.

[213] Official letter of the Marquis de Vaudreuil. Guérin: Histoire de
la Marine Française, vol. v. p. 513.

[214] See United Service Journal, 1834, Part II. pp. 109 and
following.

[215] See letter of Sir Howard Douglas in United Service Journal,
1834, Part II. p. 97; also "Naval Evolutions," by same author. The
letters of Sir Samuel Hood have not come under the author's eye.

[216] Rodney's Life, vol. ii. p. 248.

[217] There were only twenty-five in all.

[218] Guérin, vol. v. p. 511.

[219] Rodney's Life, vol. ii. p. 246.

[220] Annual Register, 1783, p. 151.

[221] Annual Register, 1783, p. 157; Life of Admiral Keppel, vol. ii.
p. 403.

[222] Naval Chronicle, vol. xxv. p. 404.

[223] Page 404. Yet here also the gossip of the day, as reflected in
the Naval Atalantis, imputed the chief credit to Young, the captain of
the flag-ship. Sir Gilbert Blane stated, many years later, "When it
was close upon sunset, it became a question whether the chase should
be continued. After some discussion between the admiral and captain,
at which I was present, the admiral being confined with the gout, it
was decided to persist in the same course with the signal to engage to
leeward." (United Service Journal, 1830, Part II. p. 479.)

[224] Rodney was a strong Tory. Almost all the other distinguished
admirals of the day, notably Keppel, Howe, and Barrington, were
Whigs,--a fact unfortunate for the naval power of England.

[225] Rodney's Life, vol. ii. p. 242.

[226] Chevalier, p. 311.

[227] Kerguelen: Guerre Maritime de 1778. Letter of De Grasse to
Kerguelen, p. 263.

[228] Troude: Batailles Navales. It is interesting to note in this
connection that one of the ships near the French admiral, when he
surrendered, was the "Pluton," which, though the extreme rear ship,
had nevertheless thus reached a position worthy of the high reputation
of her captain, D'Albert de Rions.

[229] Troude, vol. ii. p. 147

[230] That is, commanders of single ships.




CHAPTER XIV.

    CRITICAL DISCUSSION OF THE MARITIME WAR OF 1778.


The war of 1778, between Great Britain and the House of Bourbon, which
is so inextricably associated with the American Revolution, stands by
itself in one respect. It was purely a maritime war. Not only did the
allied kingdoms carefully refrain from continental entanglements,
which England in accordance with her former policy strove to excite,
but there was between the two contestants an approach to equality on
the sea which had not been realized since the days of Tourville. The
points in dispute, the objects for which the war was undertaken or at
which it aimed, were for the most part remote from Europe; and none of
them was on the continent with the single exception of Gibraltar, the
strife over which, being at the extreme point of a rugged and
difficult salient, and separated from neutral nations by the whole of
France and Spain, never threatened to drag in other parties than those
immediately interested.

No such conditions existed in any war between the accession of Louis
XIV. and the downfall of Napoleon. There was a period during the reign
of the former in which the French navy was superior in number and
equipment to the English and Dutch; but the policy and ambition of the
sovereign was always directed to continental extension, and his naval
power, resting on inadequate foundations, was ephemeral. During the
first three-quarters of the eighteenth century there was practically
no check to the sea power of England; great as were its effects upon
the issues of the day, the absence of a capable rival made its
operations barren of military lessons. In the later wars of the French
Republic and Empire, the apparent equality in numbers of ships and
weight of batteries was illusive, owing to the demoralization of the
French officers and seamen by causes upon which it is not necessary
here to enlarge. After some years of courageous but impotent effort,
the tremendous disaster of Trafalgar proclaimed to the world the
professional inefficiency of the French and Spanish navies, already
detected by the keen eyes of Nelson and his brother officers, and upon
which rested the contemptuous confidence that characterized his
attitude, and to some extent his tactics, toward them. Thenceforward
the emperor "turned his eyes from the only field of battle where
fortune had been unfaithful to him, and deciding to pursue England
elsewhere than upon the seas, undertook to restore his navy, but
without reserving to it any share in a strife become more than ever
furious.... Up to the last day of the Empire he refused to offer to
this restored navy, full of ardor and confidence, the opportunity to
measure itself with the enemy."[231] Great Britain resumed her old
position as unquestioned mistress of the seas.

The student of naval war will therefore expect to find a particular
interest in the plans and methods of the parties to this great
contest, and especially where they concern the general conduct of the
whole war, or of certain large and clearly defined portions of it; in
the strategic purpose which gave, or should have given, continuity to
their actions from first to last, and in the strategic movements which
affected for good or ill the fortunes of the more limited periods,
which may be called naval campaigns. For while it cannot be conceded
that the particular battles are, even at this day, wholly devoid of
tactical instruction, which it has been one of the aims of the
preceding pages to elicit, it is undoubtedly true that, like all the
tactical systems of history, they have had their day, and their
present usefulness to the student is rather in the mental training, in
the forming of correct tactical habits of thought, than in supplying
models for close imitation. On the other hand, the movements which
precede and prepare for great battles, or which, by their skilful and
energetic combinations, attain great ends without the actual contact
of arms, depend upon factors more permanent than the weapons of the
age, and therefore furnish principles of more enduring value.

In a war undertaken for any object, even if that object be the
possession of a particular territory or position, an attack directly
upon the place coveted may not be, from the military point of view,
the best means of obtaining it. The end upon which the military
operations are directed may therefore be other than the object which
the belligerent government wishes to obtain, and it has received a
name of its own,--the objective. In the critical consideration of any
war it is necessary, first, to put clearly before the student's eye
the objects desired by each belligerent; then, to consider whether the
objective chosen is the most likely, in case of success, to compass
those objects; and finally, to study the merits or faults of the
various movements by which the objective is approached. The minuteness
with which such an examination is conducted will depend upon the
extent of the work which the inquirer proposes to himself; but it will
generally conduce to clearness if an outline, giving only the main
features unencumbered by detail, should precede a more exhaustive
discussion. When such principal lines are thoroughly grasped, details
are easily referred to them, and fall into place. The effort here will
be confined to presenting such an outline, as being alone fitted to
the scope of this work.

The principal parties to the War of 1778 were, on the one hand, Great
Britain; on the other, the House of Bourbon, controlling the two great
kingdoms of France and Spain. The American colonies, being already
engaged in an unequal struggle with the mother-country, gladly
welcomed an event so important to them; while in 1780 Holland was
deliberately forced by England into a war from which she had nothing
to gain and all to lose. The object of the Americans was perfectly
simple,--to rid their country out of the hands of the English. Their
poverty and their lack of military sea power, with the exception of a
few cruisers that preyed upon the enemy's commerce, necessarily
confined their efforts to land warfare, which constituted indeed a
powerful diversion in favor of the allies and an exhausting drain upon
the resources of Great Britain, but which it was in the power of the
latter to stop at once by abandoning the contest. Holland, on the
other hand, being safe from invasion by land, showed little desire for
anything more than to escape with as little external loss as possible,
through the assistance of the allied navies. The object of these two
minor parties may therefore be said to have been the cessation of the
war; whereas the principals hoped from its continuance certain changed
conditions, which constituted their objects.

With Great Britain also the object of the war was very simple. Having
been led into a lamentable altercation with her most promising
colonies, the quarrel had gone on step by step till she was threatened
with their loss. To maintain forcible control when willing adhesion
had departed, she had taken up arms against them, and her object in so
doing was to prevent a break in those foreign possessions with which,
in the eyes of that generation, her greatness was indissolubly
connected. The appearance of France and Spain as active supporters of
the colonists' cause made no change in England's objects, whatever
change of objective her military plans may, or should, have undergone.
The danger of losing the continental colonies was vastly increased by
these accessions to the ranks of her enemies, which brought with them
also a threat of loss, soon to be realized in part, of other valuable
foreign possessions. England, in short, as regards the objects of the
war, was strictly on the defensive; she feared losing much, and at
best only hoped to keep what she had. By forcing Holland into war,
however, she obtained a military advantage; for, without increasing
the strength of her opponents, several important but ill-defended
military and commercial positions were thereby laid open to her arms.

The views and objects of France and Spain were more complex. The moral
incentives of hereditary enmity and desire of revenge for the recent
past doubtless weighed strongly, as in France did also the sympathy
of the _salons_ and philosophers with the colonists' struggle for
freedom; but powerfully as sentimental considerations affect the
action of nations, only the tangible means by which it is expected to
gratify them admit of statement and measurement. France might wish to
regain her North American possessions; but the then living generation
of colonists had too keen personal recollection of the old contests to
acquiesce in any such wishes as to Canada. The strong inherited
distrust of the French, which characterized the Americans of the
revolutionary era, has been too much overlooked in the glow of
gratitude which followed the effectual sympathy and assistance then
given; but it was understood at the time, and France felt, that to
renew those pretensions might promote, between people of the same race
only recently alienated, a reconciliation by just concessions, which a
strong and high-minded party of Englishmen had never ceased to
advocate. She therefore did not avow, perhaps did not entertain, this
object. On the contrary, she formally renounced all claim to any part
of the continent which was then, or had recently been, under the power
of the British crown, but stipulated for freedom of action in
conquering and retaining any of the West India Islands, while all the
other colonies of Great Britain were, of course, open to her attack.
The principal objects at which France aimed were therefore the English
West Indies and that control of India which had passed into English
hands, and also to secure in due time the independence of the United
States, after they had wrought a sufficient diversion in her favor.
With the policy of exclusive trade which characterized that
generation, the loss of these important possessions was expected to
lessen that commercial greatness upon which the prosperity of England
depended,--to weaken her and to strengthen France. In fact, the strife
which should be greater may be said to have been the animating motive
of France; all objects were summed up in the one supreme end to which
they contributed,--maritime and political superiority over England.

Preponderance over England, in combination with France, was also the
aim of the equally humbled but less vigorous kingdom of Spain; but
there was a definiteness in the injuries suffered and the objects
specially sought by her which is less easily found in the broader
views of her ally. Although no Spaniard then living could remember the
Spanish flag flying over Minorca, Gibraltar, or Jamaica, the lapse of
time had not reconciled the proud and tenacious nation to their loss;
nor was there on the part of the Americans the same traditional
objection to the renewal of Spanish sovereignty over the two Floridas
that was felt with reference to Canada.

Such, then, were the objects sought by the two nations, whose
interposition changed the whole character of the American
Revolutionary War. It is needless to say that they did not all appear
among the causes, or pretexts, avowed for engaging in hostility; but
sagacious English opinion of the day rightly noted, as embodying in a
few words the real ground of action of the united Bourbon Courts, the
following phrase in the French manifesto: "To avenge their respective
injuries, and to put an end to that tyrannical empire which England
has usurped, and claims to maintain upon the ocean." In short, as
regards the _objects_ of the war the allies were on the offensive, as
England was thrown upon the defensive.

The tyrannical empire which England was thus accused, and not
unjustly, of exercising over the seas, rested upon her great sea
power, actual or latent; upon her commerce and armed shipping, her
commercial establishments, colonies, and naval stations in all parts
of the world. Up to this time her scattered colonies had been bound to
her by ties of affectionate sentiment, and by the still stronger
motive of self-interest through the close commercial connection with
the mother-country and the protection afforded by the constant
presence of her superior navy. Now a break was made in the girdle of
strong ports upon which her naval power was based, by the revolt of
the continental colonies; while the numerous trade interests between
them and the West Indies, which were injured by the consequent
hostilities, tended to divide the sympathies of the islands also. The
struggle was not only for political possession and commercial use. It
involved a military question of the first importance,--whether a chain
of naval stations covering one of the shores of the Atlantic, linking
Canada and Halifax with the West Indies, and backed by a thriving
seafaring population, should remain in the hands of a nation which had
so far used its unprecedented sea power with consistent, resolute
aggressiveness, and with almost unbroken success.

While Great Britain was thus embarrassed by the difficulty of
maintaining her hold upon her naval bases, which were the defensive
element of her naval strength, her offensive naval power, her fleet,
was threatened by the growth of the armed shipping of France and
Spain, which now confronted her upon the field which she had claimed
as her own, with an organized military force of equal or superior
material strength. The moment was therefore favorable for attacking
the great Power whose wealth, reaped from the sea, had been a decisive
factor in the European wars of the past century. The next question was
the selection of the points of attack--of the principal _objectives_
upon which the main effort of the assailants should be steadily
directed, and of the secondary objectives by which the defence should
be distracted and its strength dissipated.

One of the wisest French statesmen of that day, Turgot, held that it
was to the interest of France that the colonies should not achieve
their independence. If subdued by exhaustion, their strength was lost
to England; if reduced by a military tenure of controlling points, but
not exhausted, the necessity of constant repression would be a
continual weakness to the mother-country. Though this opinion did not
prevail in the councils of the French government, which wished the
ultimate independence of America, it contained elements of truth which
effectually moulded the policy of the war. If benefit to the United
States, by effecting their deliverance, were the principal object, the
continent became the natural scene, and its decisive military points
the chief objectives, of operations; but as the first object of France
was not to benefit America, but to injure England, sound military
judgment dictated that the continental strife, so far from being
helped to a conclusion, should be kept in vigorous life. It was a
diversion ready made to the hand of France and exhausting to Great
Britain, requiring only so much support as would sustain a resistance
to which the insurgents were bound by the most desperate alternatives.
The territory of the thirteen colonies therefore should not be the
principal objective of France; much less that of Spain.

The commercial value of the English West Indies made them tempting
objects to the French, who adapted themselves with peculiar readiness
to the social conditions of that region, in which their colonial
possessions were already extensive. Besides the two finest of the
Lesser Antilles, Guadeloupe and Martinique, which she still retains,
France then held Sta. Lucia and the western half of Hayti. She might
well hope by successful war to add most of the English Antilles, and
thus to round off a truly imperial tropical dependency; while, though
debarred from Jamaica by the susceptibilities of Spain, it might be
possible to win back that magnificent island for an allied and weaker
nation. But however desirable as possessions, and therefore as
objects, the smaller Antilles might be, their military tenure depended
too entirely upon control of the sea for them to be in themselves
proper objectives. The French government, therefore, forbade its naval
commanders to occupy such as they might seize. They were to make the
garrisons prisoners, destroy the defences, and so retire. In the
excellent military port of Fort Royal, Martinique, in Cap Français,
and in the strong allied harbor of Havana, a fleet of adequate size
found good, secure, and well-distributed bases; while the early and
serious loss of Sta. Lucia must be attributed to the mismanagement of
the French fleet and the professional ability of the English admiral.
On shore, in the West Indies, the rival powers therefore found
themselves about equally provided with the necessary points of
support; mere occupation of others could not add to their military
strength, thenceforth dependent upon the numbers and quality of the
fleets. To extend occupation further with safety, the first need was
to obtain maritime supremacy, not only locally, but over the general
field of war. Otherwise occupation was precarious, unless enforced by
a body of troops so large as to entail expense beyond the worth of the
object. The key of the situation in the West Indies being thus in the
fleets, these became the true objectives of the military effort; and
all the more so because the real _military_ usefulness of the West
Indian ports in this war was as an intermediate base, between Europe
and the American continent, to which the fleets retired when the
armies went into winter quarters. No sound strategic operation on
shore was undertaken in the West Indies except the seizure of Sta.
Lucia by the English, and the abortive plan against Jamaica in 1782;
nor was any serious attempt against a military port, as Barbadoes or
Fort Royal, possible, until naval preponderance was assured either by
battle or by happy concentration of force. The key of the situation,
it must be repeated, was in the fleet.

The influence of naval power, of an armed fleet, upon the war on the
American continent has also been indicated in the opinions of
Washington and Sir Henry Clinton; while the situation in the East
Indies, regarded as a field by itself, has been so largely discussed
under the head of Suffren's campaign, that it needs here only to
repeat that everything there depended upon control of the sea by a
superior naval force. The capture of Trincomalee, essential as it was
to the French squadron which had no other base, was, like that of Sta.
Lucia, a surprise, and could only have been effected by the defeat,
or, as happened, by the absence of the enemy's fleet. In North America
and India sound military policy pointed out, as the true objective,
the enemy's fleet, upon which also depended the communications with
the mother-countries. There remains Europe, which it is scarcely
profitable to examine at length as a separate field of action, because
its relations to the universal war are so much more important. It may
simply be pointed out that the only two points in Europe whose
political transfer was an object of the war were Gibraltar and
Minorca; the former of which was throughout, by the urgency of Spain,
made a principal objective of the allies. The tenure of both these
depended, obviously, upon control of the sea.

In a sea war, as in all others, two things are from the first
essential,--a suitable base upon the frontier, in this case the
seaboard, from which the operations start, and an organized military
force, in this case a fleet, of size and quality adequate to the
proposed operations. If the war, as in the present instance, extends
to distant parts of the globe, there will be needed in each of those
distant regions secure ports for the shipping, to serve as secondary,
or contingent, bases of the local war. Between these secondary and the
principal, or home, bases there must be reasonably secure
communication, which will depend upon military control of the
intervening sea. This control must be exercised by the navy, which
will enforce it either by clearing the sea in all directions of
hostile cruisers, thus allowing the ships of its own nation to pass
with reasonable security, or by accompanying in force (convoying) each
train of supply-ships necessary for the support of the distant
operations. The former method aims at a widely diffused effort of the
national power, the other at a concentration of it upon that part of
the sea where the convoy is at a given moment. Whichever be adopted,
the communications will doubtless be strengthened by the military
holding of good harbors, properly spaced yet not too numerous, along
the routes,--as, for instance, the Cape of Good Hope and the
Mauritius. Stations of this kind have always been necessary, but are
doubly so now, as fuel needs renewing more frequently than did the
provisions and supplies in former days. These combinations of strong
points at home and abroad, and the condition of the communications
between them, may be called the strategic features of the general
military situation, by which, and by the relative strength of the
opposing fleets, the nature of the operations must be determined. In
each of the three divisions of the field, Europe, America, and India,
under which for sake of clearness the narrative has been given, the
control of the sea has been insisted upon as the determining factor,
and the hostile fleet therefore indicated as the true objective. Let
the foregoing considerations now be applied to the whole field of
war, and see how far the same conclusion holds good of it, and if so,
what should have been the nature of the operations on either
side.[232]

In Europe the home base of Great Britain was on the English Channel,
with the two principal arsenals of Plymouth and Portsmouth. The base
of the allied powers was on the Atlantic, the principal military ports
being Brest, Ferrol, and Cadiz. Behind these, within the
Mediterranean, were the dock-yards of Toulon and Cartagena, over
against which stood the English station Port Mahon, in Minorca. The
latter, however, may be left wholly out of account, being confined to
a defensive part during the war, as the British fleet was not able to
spare any squadron to the Mediterranean. Gibraltar, on the contrary,
by its position, effectually watched over detachments or
reinforcements from within the Straits, provided it were utilized as
the station of a body of ships adequate to the duty. This was not
done; the British European fleet being kept tied to the Channel, that
is, to home defence, and making infrequent visits to the Rock to
convoy supplies essential to the endurance of the garrison. There was,
however, a difference in the parts played by Port Mahon and Gibraltar.
The former, being at the time wholly unimportant, received no
attention from the allies until late in the war, when it fell after a
six months' siege; whereas the latter, being considered of the first
importance, absorbed from the beginning a very large part of the
allied attack, and so made a valuable diversion in favor of Great
Britain. To this view of the principal features of the natural
strategic situation in Europe may properly be added the remark, that
such aid as Holland might be inclined to send to the allied fleets had
a very insecure line of communication, being forced to pass along the
English base on the Channel. Such aid in fact was never given.

In North America the local bases of the war at its outbreak were New
York, Narragansett Bay, and Boston. The two former were then held by
the English, and were the most important stations on the continent,
from their position, susceptibility of defence, and resources. Boston
had passed into the hands of the Americans, and was therefore at the
service of the allies. From the direction actually given to the war,
by diverting the active English operations to the Southern States in
1779, Boston was thrown outside the principal theatre of operations,
and became from its position militarily unimportant; but had the plan
been adopted of isolating New England by holding the line of the
Hudson and Lake Champlain, and concentrating military effort to the
eastward, it will be seen that these three ports would all have been
of decisive importance to the issue. South of New York, the Delaware
and Chesapeake Bays undoubtedly offered tempting fields for maritime
enterprise; but the width of the entrances, the want of suitable and
easily defended points for naval stations near the sea, the wide
dispersal of the land forces entailed by an attempt to hold so many
points, and the sickliness of the locality during a great part of the
year, should have excepted them from a principal part in the plan of
the first campaigns. It is not necessary to include them among the
local bases of the war. To the extreme south the English were drawn by
the _ignis fatuus_ of expected support among the people. They failed
to consider that even if a majority there preferred quiet to freedom,
that very quality would prevent them from rising against the
revolutionary government by which, on the English theory, they were
oppressed; yet upon such a rising the whole success of this distant
and in its end most unfortunate enterprise was staked. The local base
of this war apart was Charleston, which passed into the hands of the
British in May, 1780, eighteen months after the first expedition had
landed in Georgia.

The principal local bases of the war in the West Indies are already
known through the previous narrative. They were for the English,
Barbadoes, Sta. Lucia, and to a less degree Antigua. A thousand miles
to leeward was the large island of Jamaica, with a dock-yard of great
natural capabilities at Kingston. The allies held, in the first order
of importance, Fort Royal in Martinique, and Havana; in the second
order, Guadeloupe and Cap Français. A controlling feature of the
strategic situation in that day, and one which will not be wholly
without weight in our own, was the trade-wind, with its accompanying
current. A passage to windward against these obstacles was a long and
serious undertaking even for single ships, much more for larger
bodies. It followed that fleets would go to the western islands only
reluctantly, or when assured that the enemy had taken the same
direction, as Rodney went to Jamaica after the Battle of the Saints,
knowing the French fleet to have gone to Cap Français. This condition
of the wind made the windward, or eastern, islands points on the
natural lines of communication between Europe and America, as well as
local bases of the naval war, and tied the fleets to them. Hence also
it followed that between the two scenes of operations, between the
continent and the Lesser Antilles, was interposed a wide central
region into which the larger operations of war could not safely be
carried except by a belligerent possessed of great naval superiority,
or unless a decisive advantage had been gained upon one flank. In
1762, when England held all the Windward Islands, with undisputed
superiority at sea, she safely attacked and subdued Havana; but in the
years 1779-1782 the French sea power in America and the French tenure
of the Windward Islands practically balanced her own, leaving the
Spaniards at Havana free to prosecute their designs against Pensacola
and the Bahamas, in the central region mentioned.[233]

Posts like Martinique and Sta. Lucia had therefore for the present war
great strategic advantage over Jamaica, Havana, or others to leeward.
They commanded the latter in virtue of their position, by which the
passage westward could be made so much more quickly than the return;
while the decisive points of the continental struggle were practically
little farther from the one than from the other. This advantage was
shared equally by most of those known as the Lesser Antilles; but the
small island of Barbadoes, being well to windward of all, possessed
peculiar advantages, not only for offensive action, but because it was
defended by the difficulty with which a large fleet could approach it,
even from so near a port as Fort Royal. It will be remembered that the
expedition which finally sat down before St. Kitt's had been intended
for Barbadoes, but could not reach it through the violence of the
trade-wind. Thus Barbadoes, under the conditions of the time, was
peculiarly fitted to be the local base and depot of the English war,
as well as a wayside port of refuge on the line of communications to
Jamaica, Florida, and even to North America; while Sta. Lucia, a
hundred miles to leeward, was held in force as an advanced post for
the fleet, watching closely the enemy at Fort Royal.

In India the political conditions of the peninsula necessarily
indicated the eastern, or Coromandel, coast as the scene of
operations. Trincomalee, in the adjacent island of Ceylon, though
unhealthy, offered an excellent and defensible harbor, and thus
acquired first-rate strategic importance, all the other anchorages on
the coast being mere open roadsteads. From this circumstance the
trade-winds, or monsoons, in this region also had strategic bearing.
From the autumnal to the spring equinox the wind blows regularly from
the northeast, at times with much violence, throwing a heavy surf upon
the beach and making landing difficult; but during the summer months
the prevailing wind is southwest, giving comparatively smooth seas and
good weather. The "change of the monsoon," in September and October,
is often marked by violent hurricanes. Active operations, or even
remaining on the coast, were therefore unadvisable from this time
until the close of the northeast monsoon. The question of a port to
which to retire during this season was pressing. Trincomalee was the
only one, and its unique strategic value was heightened by being to
windward, during the fine season, of the principal scene of war. The
English harbor of Bombay on the west coast was too distant to be
considered a local base, and rather falls, like the French islands
Mauritius and Bourbon, under the head of stations on the line of
communications with the mother-country.

Such were the principal points of support, or bases, of the
belligerent nations, at home and abroad. Of those abroad it must be
said, speaking generally, that they were deficient in resources,--an
important element of strategic value. Naval and military stores and
equipments, and to a great extent provisions for sea use, had to be
sent them from the mother-countries. Boston, surrounded by a thriving,
friendly population, was perhaps an exception to this statement, as
was also Havana, at that time an important naval arsenal, where much
ship-building was done; but these were distant from the principal
theatres of war. Upon New York and Narragansett Bay the Americans
pressed too closely for the resources of the neighboring country to be
largely available, while the distant ports of the East and West Indies
depended wholly upon home. Hence the strategic question of
communications assumed additional importance. To intercept a large
convoy of supply-ships was an operation only secondary to the
destruction of a body of ships-of-war; while to protect such by main
strength, or by evading the enemy's search, taxed the skill of the
governments and naval commanders in distributing the ships-of-war and
squadrons at their disposal, among the many objects which demanded
attention. The address of Kempenfeldt and the bad management of
Guichen in the North Atlantic, seconded by a heavy gale of wind,
seriously embarrassed De Grasse in the West Indies. Similar injury, by
cutting off small convoys in the Atlantic, was done to Suffren in the
Indian seas: while the latter at once made good part of these losses,
and worried his opponents by the success of his cruisers preying on
the English supply-ships.

Thus the navies, by which alone these vital streams could be secured
or endangered, bore the same relation to the maintenance of the
general war that has already been observed of the separate parts. They
were the links that bound the whole together, and were therefore
indicated as the proper objective of both belligerents.

The distance from Europe to America was not such as to make
intermediate ports of supply absolutely necessary; while if difficulty
did arise from an unforeseen cause, it was always possible, barring
meeting an enemy, either to return to Europe or to make a friendly
port in the West Indies. The case was different with the long voyage
to India by the Cape of Good Hope. Bickerton, leaving England with a
convoy in February, was thought to have done well in reaching Bombay
the following September; while the ardent Suffren, sailing in March,
took an equal time to reach Mauritius, whence the passage to Madras
consumed two months more. A voyage of such duration could rarely be
made without a stop for water, for fresh provision, often for such
refitting as called for the quiet of a harbor, even when the stores on
board furnished the necessary material. A perfect line of
communications required, as has been said, several such harbors,
properly spaced, adequately defended, and with abundant supplies, such
as England in the present day holds on some of her main commercial
routes, acquisitions of her past wars. In the war of 1778 none of the
belligerents had such ports on this route, until by the accession of
Holland, the Cape of Good Hope was put at the disposal of the French
and suitably strengthened by Suffren. With this and the Mauritius on
the way, and Trincomalee at the far end of the road, the
communications of the allies with France were reasonably guarded.
England, though then holding St. Helena, depended, for the refreshment
and refitting of her India-bound squadrons and convoys in the
Atlantic, upon the benevolent neutrality of Portugal, extended in the
islands of Madeira and Cape Verde and in the Brazilian ports. This
neutrality was indeed a frail reliance for defence, as was shown by
the encounter between Johnstone and Suffren at the Cape Verde; but
there being several possible stopping-places, and the enemy unable to
know which, if any, would be used, this ignorance itself conferred no
small security, if the naval commander did not trust it to the neglect
of proper disposition of his own force, as did Johnstone at Porto
Praya. Indeed, with the delay and uncertainty which then characterized
the transmission of intelligence from one point to another, doubt
where to find the enemy was a greater bar to offensive enterprises
than the often slight defences of a colonial port.

This combination of useful harbors and the conditions of the
communications between them constitute, as has been said, the main
strategic outlines of the situation. The navy, as the organized force
linking the whole together, has been indicated as the principal
objective of military effort. The method employed to reach the
objective, the conduct of the war, is still to be considered.[234]

Before doing this a condition peculiar to the sea, and affecting the
following discussion, must be briefly mentioned; that is, the
difficulty of obtaining information. Armies pass through countries
more or less inhabited by a stationary population, and they leave
behind them traces of their march. Fleets move through a desert over
which wanderers flit, but where they do not remain; and as the waters
close behind them, an occasional waif from the decks may indicate
their passage, but tells nothing of their course. The sail spoken by
the pursuer may know nothing of the pursued, which yet passed the
point of parley but a few days or hours before. Of late, careful study
of the winds and currents of the ocean has laid down certain
advantageous routes, which will be habitually followed by a careful
seaman, and afford some presumption as to his movements; but in 1778
the data for such precision were not collected, and even had they
been, the quickest route must often have been abandoned for one of the
many possible ones, in order to elude pursuit or lying-in-wait. In
such a game of hide-and-seek the advantage is with the sought, and the
great importance of watching the outlets of an enemy's country, of
stopping the chase before it has got away into the silent desert, is
at once evident. If for any reason such a watch there is impossible,
the next best thing is, not attempting to watch routes which may not
be taken, to get first to the enemy's destination and await him there;
but this implies a knowledge of his intentions which may not always be
obtainable. The action of Suffren, when pitted against Johnstone, was
throughout strategically sound, both in his attack at Porto Praya and
in the haste with which he made for their common destination; while
the two failures of Rodney to intercept the convoys to Martinique in
1780 and 1782, though informed that they were coming, show the
difficulty which attended lying-in-wait even when the point of arrival
was known.

Of any maritime expedition two points only are fixed,--the point of
departure and that of arrival. The latter may be unknown to the enemy;
but up to the time of sailing, the presence of a certain force in a
port, and the indications of a purpose soon to move, may be assumed to
be known. It may be of moment to either belligerent to intercept such
a movement; but it is more especially and universally necessary to the
defence, because, of the many points at which he is open to attack, it
may be impossible for him to know which is threatened; whereas the
offence proceeds with full knowledge direct to his aim, if he can
deceive his opponent. The importance of blocking such an expedition
becomes yet more evident should it at any time be divided between two
or more ports,--a condition which may easily arise when the facilities
of a single dock-yard are insufficient to fit out so many ships in
the time allowed, or when, as in the present war, allied powers
furnish separate contingents. To prevent the junction of these
contingents is a matter of prime necessity, and nowhere can this be
done so certainly as off the ports whence one or both is to sail. The
defence, from its very name, is presumably the less strong, and is
therefore the more bound to take advantage of such a source of
weakness as the division of the enemy's force. Rodney in 1782 at Sta.
Lucia, watching the French contingent at Martinique to prevent its
union with the Spaniards at Cap Français, is an instance of correct
strategic position; and had the islands been so placed as to put him
between the French and their destination, instead of in their rear,
nothing better could have been devised. As it was, he did the best
thing possible under the circumstances.

The defence, being the weaker, cannot attempt to block _all_ the ports
where divisions of the enemy lie, without defeating his aim by being
in inferior force before each. This would be to neglect the
fundamental principles of war. If he correctly decide not to do this,
but to collect a superior force before one or two points, it becomes
necessary to decide which shall be thus guarded and which
neglected,--a question involving the whole policy of the war after a
full understanding of the main conditions, military, moral, and
economic, in every quarter.

The defensive was necessarily accepted by England in 1778. It had been
a maxim with the best English naval authorities of the preceding era,
with Hawke and his contemporaries, that the British navy should be
kept equal in numbers to the combined fleets of the Bourbon
kingdoms,--a condition which, with the better quality of the
_personnel_ and the larger maritime population upon which it could
draw, would have given a real superiority of force. This precaution,
however, had not been observed during recent years. It is of no
consequence to this discussion whether the failure was due to the
inefficiency of the ministry, as was charged by their opponents, or to
the misplaced economy often practised by representative governments
in time of peace. The fact remains that, notwithstanding the notorious
probability of France and Spain joining in the war, the English navy
was inferior in number to that of the allies. In what have been called
the strategic features of the situation, the home bases, and the
secondary bases abroad, the advantage upon the whole lay with her. Her
positions, if not stronger in themselves, were at least better
situated, geographically, for strategic effect; but in the second
essential for war, the organized military force, or fleet, adequate to
offensive operations, she had been allowed to become inferior. It only
remained, therefore, to use this inferior force with such science and
vigor as would frustrate the designs of the enemy, by getting first to
sea, taking positions skilfully, anticipating their combinations by
greater quickness of movement, harassing their communications with
their objectives, and meeting the principal divisions of the enemy
with superior forces.

It is sufficiently clear that the maintenance of this war, everywhere
except on the American continent, depended upon the mother-countries
in Europe and upon open communication with them. The ultimate crushing
of the Americans, too, not by direct military effort but by
exhaustion, was probable, if England were left unmolested to strangle
their commerce and industries with her overwhelming naval strength.
This strength she could put forth against them, if relieved from the
pressure of the allied navies; and relief would be obtained if she
could gain over them a decided preponderance, not merely material but
moral, such as she had twenty years later. In that case the allied
courts, whose financial weakness was well known, must retire from a
contest in which their main purpose of reducing England to an inferior
position was already defeated. Such preponderance, however, could only
be had by fighting; by showing that, despite inferiority in numbers,
the skill of her seamen and the resources of her wealth enabled her
government, by a wise use of these powers, to be actually superior at
the decisive points of the war. It could never be had by distributing
the ships-of-the-line all over the world, exposing them to be beaten
in detail while endeavoring to protect all the exposed points of the
scattered empire.

The key of the situation was in Europe, and in Europe in the hostile
dock-yards. If England were unable, as she proved to be, to raise up a
continental war against France, then her one hope was to find and
strike down the enemy's navy. Nowhere was it so certainly to be found
as in its home ports; nowhere so easily met as immediately after
leaving them. This dictated her policy in the Napoleonic wars, when
the moral superiority of her navy was so established that she dared to
oppose inferior forces to the combined dangers of the sea and of the
more numerous and well-equipped ships lying quietly at anchor inside.
By facing this double risk she obtained the double advantage of
keeping the enemy under her eyes, and of sapping his efficiency by the
easy life of port, while her own officers and seamen were hardened by
the rigorous cruising into a perfect readiness for every call upon
their energies. "We have no reason," proclaimed Admiral Villeneuve in
1805, echoing the words of the emperor, "to fear the sight of an
English squadron. Their seventy-fours have not five hundred men on
board; they are worn out by a two years' cruise."[235] A month later
he wrote: "The Toulon squadron appeared very fine in the harbor, the
crews well clothed and drilling well; but as soon as a storm came, all
was changed. They were not drilled in storms."[236] "The emperor,"
said Nelson, "now finds, if emperors hear truth, that his fleet
suffers more in a night than ours in one year.... These gentlemen are
not used to the hurricanes, which we have braved for twenty-one months
without losing mast or yard."[237] It must be admitted, however, that
the strain was tremendous both on men and ships, and that many English
officers found in the wear and tear an argument against keeping their
fleets at sea off the enemy's coast. "Every one of the blasts we
endure," wrote Collingwood, "lessens the security of the country. The
last cruise disabled five large ships and two more lately; several of
them must be docked." "I have hardly known what a night of rest is
these two months," wrote he again; "this incessant cruising seems to
me beyond the powers of human nature. Calder is worn to a shadow,
quite broken down, and I am told Graves is not much better."[1] The
high professional opinion of Lord Howe was also adverse to the
practice.

Besides the exhaustion of men and ships, it must also be admitted that
no blockade could be relied on certainly to check the exit of an
enemy's fleet. Villeneuve escaped from Toulon, Missiessy from
Rochefort. "I am here watching the French squadron in Rochefort,"
wrote Collingwood, "but feel that it is not practicable to prevent
their sailing; and yet, if they should get by me, I should be
exceedingly mortified.... The only thing that can prevent their
sailing is the apprehension that they may get among us, as they cannot
know exactly where we are."[238]

Nevertheless, the strain then was endured. The English fleets girdled
the shores of France and Spain; losses were made good; ships were
repaired; as one officer fell, or was worn out at his post, another
took his place. The strict guard over Brest broke up the emperor's
combinations; the watchfulness of Nelson, despite an unusual
concurrence of difficulties, followed the Toulon fleet, from the
moment of its starting, across the Atlantic and back to the shores of
Europe. It was long before they came to blows, before strategy stepped
aside and tactics completed the work at Trafalgar; but step by step
and point by point the rugged but disciplined seamen, the rusty and
battered but well-handled ships, blocked each move of their
unpractised opponents. Disposed in force before each arsenal of the
enemy, and linked together by chains of smaller vessels, they might
fail now and again to check a raid, but they effectually stopped all
grand combinations of the enemy's squadrons.

The ships of 1805 were essentially the same as those of 1780. There
had doubtless been progress and improvement; but the changes were in
degree, not in kind. Not only so, but the fleets of twenty years
earlier, under Hawke and his fellows, had dared the winters of the Bay
of Biscay. "There is not in Hawke's correspondence," says his
biographer, "the slightest indication that he himself doubted for a
moment that it was not only possible, but his duty, to keep the sea,
even through the storms of winter, and that he should soon be able to
'make downright work of it.'"[239] If it be urged that the condition
of the French navy was better, the character and training of its
officers higher, than in the days of Hawke and Nelson, the fact must
be admitted; nevertheless, the admiralty could not long have been
ignorant that the number of such officers was still so deficient as
seriously to affect the quality of the deck service, and the lack of
seamen so great as to necessitate filling up the complements with
soldiers. As for the _personnel_ of the Spanish navy, there is no
reason to believe it better than fifteen years later, when Nelson,
speaking of Spain giving certain ships to France, said, "I take it for
granted not manned [by Spaniards], as that would be the readiest way
to lose them again."

In truth, however, it is too evident to need much arguing, that the
surest way for the weaker party to neutralize the enemy's ships was to
watch them in their harbors and fight them if they started. The only
serious objection to doing this, in Europe, was the violence of the
weather off the coasts of France and Spain, especially during the long
nights of winter. This brought with it not only risk of immediate
disaster, which strong, well-managed ships would rarely undergo, but a
continual strain which no skill could prevent, and which therefore
called for a large reserve of ships to relieve those sent in for
repairs, or to refresh the crews.

The problem would be greatly simplified if the blockading fleet could
find a convenient anchorage on the flank of the route the enemy must
take, as Nelson in 1804 and 1805 used Maddalena Bay in Sardinia when
watching the Toulon fleet,--a step to which he was further forced by
the exceptionally bad condition of many of his ships. So Sir James
Saumarez in 1800 even used Douarnenez Bay, on the French coast, only
five miles from Brest, to anchor the in-shore squadron of the
blockading force in heavy weather. The positions at Plymouth and
Torbay cannot be considered perfectly satisfactory from this point of
view; not being, like Maddalena Bay, on the flank of the enemy's
route, but like Sta. Lucia, rather to its rear. Nevertheless, Hawke
proved that diligence and well-managed ships could overcome this
disadvantage, as Rodney also afterward showed on his less tempestuous
station.

In the use of the ships at its disposal, taking the war of 1778 as a
whole, the English ministry kept their foreign detachments in America,
and in the West and East Indies, equal to those of the enemy. At
particular times, indeed, this was not so; but speaking generally of
the assignment of ships, the statement is correct. In Europe, on the
contrary, and in necessary consequence of the policy mentioned, the
British fleet was habitually much inferior to that in the French and
Spanish ports. It therefore could be used offensively only by great
care, and through good fortune in meeting the enemy in detail; and
even so an expensive victory, unless very decisive, entailed
considerable risk from the consequent temporary disability of the
ships engaged. It followed that the English home (or Channel) fleet,
upon which depended also the communications with Gibraltar and the
Mediterranean, was used very economically both as to battle and
weather, and was confined to the defence of the home coast, or to
operations against the enemy's communications.

India was so far distant that no exception can be taken to the policy
there. Ships sent there went to stay, and could be neither reinforced
nor recalled with a view to sudden emergencies. The field stood by
itself. But Europe, North America, and the West Indies should have
been looked upon as one large theatre of war, throughout which events
were mutually dependent, and whose different parts stood in close
relations of greater or less importance, to which due attention should
have been paid.

Assuming that the navies, as the guardians of the communications, were
the controlling factors in the war, and that the source, both of the
navies and of those streams of supplies which are called
communications, was in the mother-countries, and there centralized in
the chief arsenals, two things follow: First, the main effort of the
Power standing on the defensive, of Great Britain, should have been
concentrated before those arsenals; and secondly, in order to such
concentration, the lines of communication abroad should not have been
needlessly extended, so as to increase beyond the strictest necessity
the detachments to guard them. Closely connected with the last
consideration is the duty of strengthening, by fortification and
otherwise, the vital points to which the communications led, so that
these points should not depend in any way upon the fleet for
protection, but only for supplies and reinforcements, and those at
reasonable intervals. Gibraltar, for instance, quite fulfilled these
conditions, being practically impregnable, and storing supplies that
lasted very long.

If this reasoning be correct, the English dispositions on the American
continent were very faulty. Holding Canada, with Halifax, New York,
and Narragansett Bay, and with the line of the Hudson within their
grip, it was in their power to isolate a large, perhaps decisive, part
of the insurgent territory. New York and Narragansett Bay could have
been made unassailable by a French fleet of that day, thus assuring
the safety of the garrisons against attacks from the sea and
minimizing the task of the navy; while the latter would find in them a
secure refuge, in case an enemy's force eluded the watch of the
English fleet before a European arsenal and appeared on the coast.
Instead of this, these two ports were left weak, and would have fallen
before a Nelson or a Farragut, while the army in New York was twice
divided, first to the Chesapeake and afterward to Georgia, neither
part of the separated forces being strong enough for the work before
it. The control of the sea was thus used in both cases to put the
enemy between the divided portions of the English army, when the
latter, undivided, had not been able to force its way over the ground
thus interposed. As the communication between the two parts of the
army depended wholly upon the sea, the duty of the navy was increased
with the increased length of the lines of communication. The necessity
of protecting the seaports and the lengthened lines of communication
thus combined to augment the naval detachments in America, and to
weaken proportionately the naval force at the decisive points in
Europe. Thus also a direct consequence of the southern expedition was
the hasty abandonment of Narragansett Bay, when D'Estaing appeared on
the coast in 1779, because Clinton had not force enough to defend both
it and New York.[240]

In the West Indies the problem before the English government was not
to subdue revolted territory, but to preserve the use of a number of
small, fruitful islands; to keep possession of them itself, and to
maintain their trade as free as possible from the depredations of the
enemy. It need not be repeated that this demanded predominance at sea
over both the enemy's fleets and single cruisers,--"commerce-destroyers,"
as the latter are now styled. As no vigilance can confine all these to
their ports, the West Indian waters must be patrolled by British
frigates and lighter vessels; but it would surely be better, if
possible, to keep the French fleet away altogether than to hold it in
check by a British fleet on the spot, of only equal force at any time,
and liable to fall, as it often did, below equality. England, being
confined to the defensive, was always liable to loss when thus
inferior. She actually did lose one by one, by sudden attack, most of
her islands, and at different times had her fleet shut up under the
batteries of a port; whereas the enemy, when he found himself
inferior, was able to wait for reinforcements, knowing that he had
nothing to fear while so waiting.[241]

Nor was this embarrassment confined to the West Indies. The nearness
of the islands to the American continent made it always possible for
the offence to combine his fleets in the two quarters before the
defence could be sure of his purpose; and although such combinations
were controlled in some measure by well-understood conditions of
weather and the seasons, the events of 1780 and 1781 show the
perplexity felt from this cause by the ablest English admiral, whose
dispositions, though faulty, but reflected the uncertainties of his
mind. When to this embarrassment, which is common to the defensive in
all cases, is added the care of the great British trade upon which the
prosperity of the empire mainly depended, it must be conceded that the
task of the British admiral in the West Indies was neither light nor
simple.

In Europe, the safety of England herself and of Gibraltar was gravely
imperilled by the absence of these large detachments in the Western
Hemisphere, to which may also be attributed the loss of Minorca. When
sixty-six allied ships-of-the-line confronted the thirty-five which
alone England could collect, and drove them into their harbors, there
was realized that mastery of the Channel which Napoleon claimed would
make him beyond all doubt master of England. For thirty days, the
thirty ships which formed the French contingent had cruised in the Bay
of Biscay, awaiting the arrival of the tardy Spaniards; but they were
not disturbed by the English fleet. Gibraltar was more than once
brought within sight of starvation, through the failure of
communications with England; and its deliverance was due, not to the
power of the English navy suitably disposed by its government, but to
the skill of British officers and the inefficiency of the Spaniards.
In the great final relief, Lord Howe's fleet numbered only thirty-four
to the allied forty-nine.

Which, then, in the difficulties under which England labored, was the
better course,--to allow the enemy free exit from his ports and
endeavor to meet him by maintaining a sufficient naval force on each
of the exposed stations, or to attempt to watch his arsenals at home,
under all the difficulties of the situation, not with the vain hope of
preventing every raid, or intercepting every convoy, but with the
expectation of frustrating the greater combinations, and of following
close at the heels of any large fleet that escaped? Such a watch must
not be confounded with a blockade, a term frequently, but not quite
accurately, applied to it. "I beg to inform your Lordship," wrote
Nelson, "that the port of Toulon has never been blockaded by me; quite
the reverse. Every opportunity has been offered the enemy to put to
sea, for it is there we hope to realize the hopes and expectations of
our country." "Nothing," he says again, "ever kept the French fleet in
Toulon or Brest when they had a mind to come out;" and although the
statement is somewhat exaggerated, it is true that the attempt to shut
them up in port would have been hopeless. What Nelson expected by
keeping near their ports, with enough lookout ships properly
distributed, was to know when they sailed and what direction they
took, intending, to use his own expression, to "follow them to the
antipodes." "I am led to believe," he writes at another time, "that
the Ferrol squadron of French ships will push for the Mediterranean.
If it join that in Toulon, it will much outnumber us; but I shall
never lose sight of them, and Pellew (commanding the English squadron
off Ferrol) will soon be after them." So it happened often enough
during that prolonged war that divisions of French ships escaped,
through stress of weather, temporary absence of a blockading fleet, or
misjudgment on the part of its commander; but the alarm was quickly
given, some of the many frigates caught sight of them, followed to
detect their probable destination, passed the word from point to point
and from fleet to fleet, and soon a division of equal force was after
them, "to the antipodes" if need were. As, according to the
traditional use of the French navy by French governments, their
expeditions went not to fight the hostile fleet, but with "ulterior
objects," the angry buzz and hot pursuit that immediately followed was
far from conducive to an undisturbed and methodical execution of the
programme laid down, even by a single division; while to great
combinations, dependent upon uniting the divisions from different
ports, they were absolutely fatal. The adventurous cruise of Bruix,
leaving Brest with twenty-five ships-of-the-line in 1799, the rapidity
with which the news spread, the stirring action and individual
mistakes of the English, the frustration of the French projects[242]
and the closeness of the pursuit,[243] the escape of Missiessy from
Rochefort in 1805, of the divisions of Willaumez and Leissegues from
Brest in 1806,--all these may be named, along with the great Trafalgar
campaign, as affording interesting studies of a naval strategy
following the lines here suggested; while the campaign of 1798,
despite its brilliant ending at the Nile, may be cited as a case where
failure nearly ensued, owing to the English having no force before
Toulon when the expedition sailed, and to Nelson being insufficiently
provided with frigates. The nine weeks' cruise of Ganteaume in the
Mediterranean, in 1808, also illustrates the difficulty of controlling
a fleet which has been permitted to get out, unwatched by a strong
force, even in such narrow waters.

   [Illustration: NORTH ATLANTIC OCEAN.]

No parallel instances can be cited from the war of 1778, although the
old monarchy did not cover the movements of its fleets with the
secrecy enforced by the stern military despotism of the Empire. In
both epochs England stood on the defensive; but in the earlier war she
gave up the first line of the defence, off the hostile ports, and
tried to protect all parts of her scattered empire by dividing the
fleet among them. It has been attempted to show the weakness of the
one policy, while admitting the difficulties and dangers of the other.
The latter aims at shortening and deciding the war by either shutting
up or forcing battle upon the hostile navy, recognizing that this is
the key of the situation, when the sea at once unites and separates
the different parts of the theatre of war. It requires a navy equal in
number and superior in efficiency, to which it assigns a limited field
of action, narrowed to the conditions which admit of mutual support
among the squadrons occupying it. Thus distributed, it relies upon
skill and watchfulness to intercept or overtake any division of the
enemy which gets to sea. It defends remote possessions and trade by
offensive action against the fleet, in which it sees their real enemy
and its own principal objective. Being near the home ports, the relief
and renewal of ships needing repairs are accomplished with the least
loss of time, while the demands upon the scantier resources of the
bases abroad are lessened. The other policy, to be effective, calls
for superior numbers, because the different divisions are too far
apart for mutual support. Each must therefore be equal to any probable
combination against it, which implies superiority everywhere to the
force of the enemy actually opposed, as the latter may be unexpectedly
reinforced. How impossible and dangerous such a defensive strategy is,
when not superior in force, is shown by the frequent inferiority of
the English abroad, as well as in Europe, despite the effort to be
everywhere equal. Howe at New York in 1778, Byron at Grenada in 1779,
Graves off the Chesapeake in 1781, Hood at Martinique in 1781 and at
St. Kitt's in 1782, all were inferior, at the same time that the
allied fleet in Europe overwhelmingly outnumbered the English. In
consequence, unseaworthy ships were retained, to the danger of their
crews and their own increasing injury, rather than diminish the force
by sending them home; for the deficiencies of the colonial dock-yards
did not allow extensive repairs without crossing the Atlantic. As
regards the comparative expense of the two strategies, the question is
not only which would cost the more in the same time, but which would
most tend to shorten the war by the effectiveness of its action.

The military policy of the allies is open to severer condemnation than
that of England, by so much as the party assuming the offensive has by
that very fact an advantage over the defensive. When the initial
difficulty of combining their forces was overcome,--and it has been
seen that at no time did Great Britain seriously embarrass their
junction,--the allies had the choice open to them where, when, and how
to strike with their superior numbers. How did they avail themselves
of this recognized enormous advantage? By nibbling at the outskirts of
the British Empire, and knocking their heads against the Rock of
Gibraltar. The most serious military effort made by France, in sending
to the United States a squadron and division of troops intended to be
double the number of those which actually reached their destination,
resulted, in little over a year, in opening the eyes of England to the
hopelessness of the contest with the colonies and thus put an end to a
diversion of her strength which had been most beneficial to her
opponents. In the West Indies one petty island after another was
reduced, generally in the absence of the English fleet, with an ease
which showed how completely the whole question would have been solved
by a decisive victory over that fleet; but the French, though favored
with many opportunities, never sought to slip the knot by the simple
method of attacking the force upon which all depended. Spain went her
own way in the Floridas, and with an overwhelming force obtained
successes of no military value. In Europe the plan adopted by the
English government left its naval force hopelessly inferior in numbers
year after year; yet the operations planned by the allies seem in no
case seriously to have contemplated the destruction of that force. In
the crucial instance, when Derby's squadron of thirty sail-of-the-line
was hemmed in the open roadstead of Torbay by the allied forty-nine,
the conclusion of the council of war not to fight only epitomized the
character of the action of the combined navies. To further embarrass
their exertions in Europe, Spain, during long periods, obstinately
persisted in tying down her fleet to the neighborhood of Gibraltar;
but there was at no time practical recognition of the fact that a
severe blow to the English navy in the Straits, or in the English
Channel, or on the open sea, was the surest road to reduce the
fortress, brought more than once within measurable distance of
starvation.

In the conduct of their offensive war the allied courts suffered from
the divergent counsels and jealousies which have hampered the
movements of most naval coalitions. The conduct of Spain appears to
have been selfish almost to disloyalty, that of France more faithful,
and therefore also militarily sounder; for hearty co-operation and
concerted action against a common objective, wisely chosen, would have
better forwarded the objects of both. It must be admitted, too, that
the indications point to inefficient administration and preparation on
the part of the allies, of Spain especially; and that the quality of
the _personnel_[244] was inferior to that of England. Questions of
preparation and administration, however, though of deep military
interest and importance, are very different from the strategic plan or
method adopted by the allied courts in selecting and attacking their
objectives, and so compassing the objects of the war; and their
examination would not only extend this discussion unreasonably, but
would also obscure the strategic question by heaping up unnecessary
details foreign to its subject.

As regards the strategic question, it may be said pithily that the
phrase "ulterior objects" embodies the cardinal fault of the naval
policy. Ulterior objects brought to nought the hopes of the allies,
because, by fastening their eyes upon them, they thoughtlessly passed
the road which led to them. Desire eagerly directed upon the ends in
view--or rather upon the partial, though great, advantages which they
constituted their ends--blinded them to the means by which alone they
could be surely attained; hence, as the result of the war, everywhere
failure to attain them. To quote again the summary before given, their
object was "to avenge their respective injuries, and to put an end to
that tyrannical empire which England claims to maintain upon the
ocean." The revenge they had obtained was barren of benefit to
themselves. They had, so that generation thought, injured England by
liberating America; but they had not righted their wrongs in Gibraltar
and Jamaica, the English fleet had not received any such treatment as
would lessen its haughty self-reliance, the armed neutrality of the
northern powers had been allowed to pass fruitlessly away, and the
English empire over the seas soon became as tyrannical and more
absolute than before.

Barring questions of preparation and administration, of the fighting
quality of the allied fleets as compared with the English, and looking
only to the indisputable fact of largely superior numbers, it must be
noted as the supreme factor in the military conduct of the war, that,
while the allied powers were on the offensive and England on the
defensive, the attitude of the allied fleets in presence of the
English navy was habitually defensive. Neither in the greater
strategic combinations, nor upon the battlefield, does there appear
any serious purpose of using superior numbers to crush fractions of
the enemy's fleet, to make the disparity of numbers yet greater, to
put an end to the empire of the seas by the destruction of the
organized force which sustained it. With the single brilliant
exception of Suffren, the allied navies avoided or accepted action;
they never imposed it. Yet so long as the English navy was permitted
thus with impunity to range the seas, not only was there no security
that it would not frustrate the ulterior objects of the campaign, as
it did again and again, but there was always the possibility that by
some happy chance it would, by winning an important victory, restore
the balance of strength. That it did not do so is to be imputed as a
fault to the English ministry; but if England was wrong in permitting
her European fleet to fall so far below that of the allies, the latter
were yet more to blame for their failure to profit by the mistake. The
stronger party, assuming the offensive, cannot plead the perplexities
which account for, though they do not justify, the undue dispersal of
forces by the defence anxious about many points.

The national bias of the French, which found expression in the line of
action here again and for the last time criticised, appears to have
been shared by both the government and the naval officers of the day.
It is the key to the course of the French navy, and, in the opinion of
the author, to its failure to achieve more substantial results to
France from this war. It is instructive, as showing how strong a hold
tradition has over the minds of men, that a body of highly
accomplished and gallant seamen should have accepted, apparently
without a murmur, so inferior a rôle for their noble profession. It
carries also a warning, if these criticisms are correct, that current
opinions and plausible impressions should always be thoroughly
tested; for if erroneous they work sure failure, and perhaps disaster.

There was such an impression largely held by French officers of that
day, and yet more widely spread in the United States now, of the
efficacy of commerce-destroying as a main reliance in war, especially
when directed against a commercial country like Great Britain. "The
surest means in my opinion," wrote a distinguished officer,
Lamotte-Picquet, "to conquer the English is to attack them in their
commerce." The harassment and distress caused to a country by serious
interference with its commerce will be conceded by all. It is
doubtless a most important secondary operation of naval war, and is
not likely to be abandoned till war itself shall cease; but regarded
as a primary and fundamental measure, sufficient in itself to crush an
enemy, it is probably a delusion, and a most dangerous delusion, when
presented in the fascinating garb of cheapness to the representatives
of a people. Especially is it misleading when the nation against whom
it is to be directed possesses, as Great Britain did and does, the two
requisites of a strong sea power,--a wide-spread healthy commerce and
a powerful navy. Where the revenues and industries of a country can be
concentrated into a few treasure-ships, like the flota of Spanish
galleons, the sinew of war may perhaps be cut by a stroke; but when
its wealth is scattered in thousands of going and coming ships, when
the roots of the system spread wide and far, and strike deep, it can
stand many a cruel shock and lose many a goodly bough without the life
being touched. Only by military command of the sea by prolonged
control of the strategic centres of commerce, can such an attack be
fatal;[245] and such control can be wrung from a powerful navy only
by fighting and overcoming it. For two hundred years England has been
the great commercial nation of the world. More than any other her
wealth has been intrusted to the sea in war as in peace; yet of all
nations she has ever been most reluctant to concede the immunities of
commerce and the rights of neutrals. Regarded not as a matter of
right, but of policy, history has justified the refusal; and if she
maintain her navy in full strength, the future will doubtless repeat
the lesson of the past.

       *       *       *       *       *

The preliminaries of the peace between Great Britain and the allied
courts, which brought to an end this great war, were signed at
Versailles, January 20, 1783, an arrangement having been concluded
between Great Britain and the American Commissioners two months
before, by which the independence of the United States was conceded.
This was the great outcome of the war. As between the European
belligerents, Great Britain received back from France all the West
India Islands she had lost, except Tobago, and gave up Sta. Lucia. The
French stations in India were restored; and Trincomalee being in the
possession of the enemy, England could not dispute its return to
Holland, but she refused to cede Negapatam. To Spain, England
surrendered the two Floridas and Minorca, the latter a serious loss
had the naval power of Spain been sufficient to maintain possession of
it; as it was, it again fell into the hands of Great Britain in the
next war. Some unimportant redistribution of trading-posts on the west
coast of Africa was also made.

Trivial in themselves, there is but one comment that need be made upon
these arrangements. In any coming war their permanency would depend
wholly upon the balance of sea power, upon that empire of the seas
concerning which nothing conclusive had been established by the war.

The definitive treaties of peace were signed at Versailles, September
3, 1783.

FOOTNOTES:

[231] Jurien de la Gravière: Guerres Maritimes, vol. ii. p. 255.

[232] See map of the Atlantic Ocean, p. 532.

[233] It may be said here in passing, that the key to the English
possessions in what was then called West Florida was at Pensacola and
Mobile, which depended upon Jamaica for support; the conditions of the
country, of navigation, and of the general continental war forbidding
assistance from the Atlantic. The English force, military and naval,
at Jamaica was only adequate to the defence of the island and of
trade, and could not afford sufficient relief to Florida. The capture
of the latter and of the Bahamas was effected with little difficulty
by overwhelming Spanish forces, as many as fifteen ships-of-the-line
and seven thousand troops having been employed against Pensacola.
These events will receive no other mention. Their only bearing upon
the general war was the diversion of this imposing force from joint
operations with the French, Spain here, as at Gibraltar, pursuing her
own aims instead of concentrating upon the common enemy,--a policy as
shortsighted as it was selfish.

[234] In other words, having considered the objects for which the
belligerents were at war and the proper objectives upon which their
military efforts should have been directed to compass the objects, the
discussion now considers how the military forces should have been
handled; by what means and at what point the objective, being mobile,
should have been assailed.

[235] Orders of Admiral Villeneuve to the captains of his fleet, Dec.
20, 1804.

[236] Letter of Villeneuve, January, 1805.

[237] Letters and Despatches of Lord Nelson.

[238] Life and Letters of Lord Collingwood.

[239] Burrows: Life of Lord Hawke.

[240] Of this Rodney said: "The evacuating Rhode Island was the most
fatal measure that could possibly be adopted. It gave up the best and
noblest harbor in America, from whence squadrons, in forty-eight
hours, could blockade the three capital cities of America, namely,
Boston, New York, and Philadelphia." The whole letter, private to the
First Lord of the Admiralty, is worth reading. (Life of Rodney, vol.
ii. p. 429.)

[241] The loss of Sta. Lucia does not militate against this statement,
being due to happy audacity and skill on the part of the English
admiral, and the professional incapacity of the commander of the
greatly superior French fleet.

[242] The plan of campaign traced by the Directory for Bruix became
impossible of execution; the delay in the junction of the French and
Spanish squadrons having permitted England to concentrate sixty ships
in the Mediterranean.--_Troude_, vol. iii. p. 158.

[243] The combined squadrons of France and Spain, under Bruix, reached
Brest on their return only twenty-four hours before Lord Keith, who
had followed them from the Mediterranean. (James: Naval History of
Great Britain.)

[244] The high professional attainments of many of the French officers
is not overlooked in this statement. The quality of the _personnel_
was diluted by an inferior element, owing to the insufficient number
of good men. "The _personnel_ of our crews had been seriously affected
by the events of the campaign of 1779. At the beginning of 1780 it was
necessary either to disarm some ships, or to increase the proportion
of soldiers entering into the composition of the crews. The minister
adopted the latter alternative. New regiments, drawn from the land
army, were put at the disposal of the navy. The corps of officers, far
from numerous at the beginning of hostilities, had become completely
inadequate. Rear-Admiral de Guichen met the greatest difficulty in
forming the complements, both officers and crews, for his squadron. He
took the sea, February 3, with ships 'badly manned,' as he wrote to
the minister." (Chevalier: Hist. de la Marine Française, p. 184.)
"During the last war [of 1778] we had met the greatest difficulty in
supplying officers to our ships. If it had been easy to name admirals,
commodores, and captains, it had been impossible to fill the vacancies
caused by death, sickness, or promotion among officers of the rank of
lieutenant and ensign." (Chevalier: Marine Française sous la
République, p. 20.)

[245] The vital centre of English commerce is in the waters surrounding
the British Islands; and as the United Kingdom now depends largely upon
external sources of food-supply, it follows that France is the nation
most favourably situated to harass it by commerce-destroying, on
account of her nearness and her possession of ports both on the
Atlantic and the North Sea. From these issued the privateers which in
the past preyed upon English shipping. The position is stronger now
than formerly, Cherbourg presenting a good Channel port which France
lacked in the old wars. On the other hand steam and railroads have made
the ports on the northern coasts of the United Kingdom more available,
and British shipping need not, as formerly, focus about the Channel.

Much importance has been attached to the captures made during the late
summer manoeuvres (1888) by cruisers in and near the English Channel.
The United States must remember that such cruisers were near their
home ports. Their line of coal-supply may have been two hundred miles;
it would be a very different thing to maintain them in activity three
thousand miles from home. The furnishing of coal, or of such
facilities as cleaning the bottom or necessary repairs, in such a
case, would be so unfriendly to Great Britain, that it may well be
doubted if any neighboring neutral nation would allow them.

Commerce-destroying by independent cruisers depends upon wide
dissemination of force. Commerce-destroying through control of a
strategic centre by a great fleet depends upon concentration of force.
Regarded as a primary, not as a secondary, operation, the former is
condemned, the latter justified, by the experience of centuries.




INDEX.


_Alberoni_, Cardinal, minister to Philip V. of Spain, 233;
  naval and general policy of, 234-236;
  failure of his schemes, 238;
  dismissed, 239.

_Anson_, British Admiral, expedition to the Pacific, 261;
  captures a French squadron, 271.

_Arbuthnot_, British Admiral, engagement with French fleet off the
  Chesapeake, 385-387.

_Armed Neutrality_, the, of the Baltic powers, 405.

_Arnold_, Benedict, treason of, 382;
  expedition to James River, 385.


_Barbadoes_, strategic value of, 348, 393, 518;
  ineffectual attempt of the French against, 469.

_Barrington_, British Admiral, energy of, 365;
  takes Sta. Lucia and resists an attack by superior French fleet, 366;
  second in command at battle of Grenada, 368;
  refuses the command of the Channel fleet, 404;
  a whig in politics, 500.

_Battles_, Land, Austerlitz, 24, 47;
  Blenheim, 213;
  Boyne, 41, 185-187;
  Camden, 382, 384;
  Ciudad Rodrigo, storming of, 475 (note);
  Jena, 47;
  Metaurus, 19, 20;
  Plassey, 306;
  Savannah, assault on, 376;
  Yorktown, capitulation of, 390.

_Battles_, Naval (_the list of the principal naval battles,
 with plans, will be found on pp. xxiii, xxiv_),
  Actium, 13;
  Agosta, 165;
  Boscawen and De la Clue, 299;
  Byng off Minorca, 286,
    _plan_ 265;
  Cape Passaro, 63, 237;
  Chesapeake. 372-374, 389, 391;
  Copenhagen, 361;
  La Hougue, 189-191,
    _plan_ 183;
  Lepanto, 13, 50;
  Lowestoft, 108;
  Malaga, 110, 211, 229;
  Mobile, 287, 354, 355, 361;
  Navarino, 13 (note);
  New Orleans, 354-356;
  Nile, 10, 11, 80, 81, 358, 361, 366, 533;
  Pocock and D'Aché, 307-310,
    _plan_ 162;
  Port Hudson, 355, 361;
  Rio de Janeiro, expedition against, 230;
  Rodney and Langara, 404, 500 (and note);
  Schoneveldt 152;
  Sta. Lucia, 366, 425, 478;
  St Vincent, 11, 356, 358, 476 (note),
    _plan_ 146;
  Suffren and Hughes, fifth action, 463;
  Trafalgar, 9, 11, 12, 23 (note), 24, 47, 85, 353, 354, 357, 438;
  Vigo galleons, 207.

_Benbow_, British Admiral,
  sent to West Indies, 207;
  treason of his captains, 207;
  killed in battle. 207.

_Bickerton_, British Admiral,
  conducts a powerful convoy to the East Indies, 452;
  arrived in India, 458;
  activity of, 458, 520;
  effects of arrival of, 459, 461.

_Blane_, Sir Gilbert, physician to British fleet, letters of, 497, 499,
 500(note), 501.

_Blockade_,
  of French ports by English fleets, 23 (note), 30, 210, 296, 297, 383,
   387, 402 (and note), 413, 525-527, 532, 533;
  of Southern coast of United States, 43, 44, 87 (note);
  Napoleon forces England to, 81;
  with consequent effect on American privateering, 137;
  definition of efficient, 85;
  dangers to United States from, 86, 87;
  offensive and defensive use of, 87 (note);
  declaration of the Armed Neutrality concerning, 405;
  position taken off an enemy's port not necessarily a blockade in
   strict sense of the word, 532.

_Boscawen_, British Admiral,
  expedition to India, failure of, 277;
  intercepts French ships off the St. Lawrence, 284;
  takes Louisburg, 294;
  disperses or destroys French fleet from Toulon, 298.

_Burgoyne_, British General,
  expedition from Canada, 343;
  effect of his surrender, 346.

_Bussy_, French General,
  second to Dupleix in India, 305;
  intrigues with nabob of Bengal, 306;
  invades Orissa, 307;
  again sent to India during American Revolution, 459;
  delayed _en route_, 460;
  reaches India, 461;
  besieged in Cuddalore by the English, 462;
  relieved by Suffren, 463.

_Byng_, Sir George, British Admiral,
  sent to Mediterranean, 236;
  destroys Spanish fleet at Cape Passaro, 237;
  policy at Messina, 238.

_Byng_, John, British Admiral,
  sails to relieve Port Mahon, 286;
  action with the French fleet, 286-288;
  returns to Gibraltar, is relieved, tried, 290,
  and shot, 291.

_Byron_, British Admiral,
  commander-in-chief at Battle of Grenada, 367-371.


_Cape of Good Hope_,
  a half-way naval station, 28, 514;
  discovery of passage round, 37, 38, 141;
  acquired by Holland, 97;
  acquired by England during the Napoleonic wars, 327;
  English expedition against, 421;
  saved by Suffren, 422-425, 427;
  utility to France, 460, 520;
  Suffren's reception at, 464, 465.

_Carlos_ III.,
  King of the Two Sicilies, 248, 249;
  enters into Bourbon Family Compact, 249;
  forced to withdraw his troops by a British commodore, 252, 264, 304;
  succeeds to the Spanish throne, 304;
  enters into secret alliance with France, 312, 313;
  losses in Seven Years' War, 315, 317;
  again enters alliance with France against England, 401, 402.

_Charles_, Archduke,
  claimant to Spanish throne as Carlos III., 206;
  lands at Lisbon, 208;
  lands in Catalonia and takes Barcelona, 213;
  takes and loses Madrid, 214;
  antipathy of Spaniards to, 214, 216;
  inherits empire of Austria and elected Emperor Charles VI. of
   Germany, 217;
  makes, as king of Spain, secret commercial treaty with England, 221;
  discontented with Treaty of Utrecht, 222, 234;
  renounces claim to Spanish throne, 235;
  joins Quadruple Alliance, 236;
  obtains Naples and Sicily, 239;
  loses Naples and Sicily, 248;
  dies, leaving no son, 262;
  succeeded by Maria Theresa, 262.

_Charles_ II., naval policy of, 60, 61;
  restoration of, 90;
  political motives, 100;
  cedes Dunkirk, 105;
  policy of commerce-destroying, 131;
  bargains with Louis XIV., 143;
  declares war against Holland, 144;
  makes peace with Holland, 158;
  forms alliance with Holland, 166;
  dies, 175.

_Choiseul_, minister to Louis XV., 297;
  plans for invading England and Scotland, 297, 300;
  makes close alliance with Spain, 311-313;
  policy after Seven Years' War, 330-336;
  naval reforms, 331-333;
  supports Spain in dispute with England over the Falkland Islands, 336;
  dismissed, 336.

_Clerk_, John,
  work on Naval Tactics, 77 (and note), 163-165, 289.

_Clinton_, Sir Henry, British General,
  expedition up the Hudson, 343;
  commander-in-chief in America, 360, 365, 401;
  opinions as to influence of sea power, 385, 401;
  sends detachments to the Chesapeake, 385, 387;
  directs Cornwallis to occupy Yorktown, 387;
  outwitted by Washington and Rochambeau, 387.

_Clive_, Robert, afterward Lord,
  letter of. 275 (note);
  Indian career begins, 282;
  retakes Calcutta, 305;
  defeats nabob of Bengal, takes Chandernagore, and wins battle of
   Plassey, 306;
  reduces Bengal, 306.

_Colbert_
  becomes minister under Louis XIV., 70;
  commercial and naval policy, 70-74, 105, 106, 169, 174;
  thwarted by the king, 170;
  his trust in the resources of France, 198.

_Collingwood_, British Admiral,
  leads a column at Trafalgar, 353;
  his conduct at battle of Cape St. Vincent, 355, 356;
  reverses Nelson's orders after his death, 358;
  loss in his ship at Trafalgar, 438 (note);
  blockading duty off French coast (letters), 526.

_Colonies_:
  origin of, 27;
  character of, 28;
  effect on England of, 29, 82, 83, 255, 326-328, 392-394, 396, 414;
  weakness of Spain through, 30, 41, 42, 202, 261, 312, 327, 345, 346;
  effect of national character on, 55-58, 255, 256;
  growth of English colonial system, 60, 62, 64, 217, 220, 228, 251,
   291, 305-307, 310, 321, 327;
  Colbert's policy, 70, 71, 106;
  navy essential to security of, 41, 42, 74, 75, 82, 329, 367, 373,
   401, 416, 424, 434, 511, 529, 541;
  support to sea power by, 83, 212, 329, 415, 510, 511, 514, 520, 521;
  Dutch, 96, 97, 258;
  New York and New Jersey seized by English, 107, 132;
  loss of French colonies, 219, 291, 294, 295, 304, 314, 321, 322;
  loss of Spanish colonies, 219, 315-317, 321;
  French colonial policy, 242, 254, 255, 257, 258, 273-278, 282, 283, 306;
  Spanish colonial policy, 245-247, 250;
  colonial expansion the characteristic motive of the wars from 1739
   to 1783, 254, 281-284, 291, 508-510;
  value of smaller West India islands, 256, 374, 512, 513;
  the English in India, 257, 282, 305, 307, 348, 349, 419, 420, 459;
  Vernon's and Anson's expedition against Spanish, 261;
  Florida and the Bahamas recovered by Spain, 517 (note).
  British North American, character of, 255, 283;
  extension over all the continent east of the Mississippi, 65, 321;
  quarrel with mother-country, 334, 341;
  military situation of, 341-344;
  alliance with France, 350;
  effect of sea power upon their struggle, 397, 524;
  object of, 507, 508;
  policy of France in their struggle, 359, 511, 512;
  distribution of colonial possessions at peace of 1783, 540.

_Commander-in-chief_,
  position of a naval, in battle, 353-358;
  question raised by action of the Due de Chartres, 352;
  illustrated by practice of Howe, Nelson, Farragut, 353-358;
  orders of French government, 353.

_Commerce_,
  attempts to control by force, 1, 62, 63, 100, 101, 107, 245, 247;
  trade routes, 25, 32, 33, 37, 38, 141, 142;
  water carriage easier and cheaper than land, 25;
  advantages of rivers and inlets to, 25, 35, 36;
  secure seaports and a navy necessary to security of, 26-28, 74-76,
   82, 83, 134, 135;
  the basis of a healthy navy, 28, 45, 46, 82;
  war upon (see commerce-destroying);
  influence of Baltic trade upon sea power, 32, 62, 239, 240, 405;
  effect of Central American Canal on, 33, 325;
  effect of physical conditions on, 36-39;
  decay of Spanish, 41, 50-52;
  effect of national character on, 50-55;
  solicitude of English government concerning, 60, 62, 63, 65, 66,
   143, 206, 218, 220, 240, 241, 247, 269, 270;
  the Navigation Act, 60;
  influence of the wealth of England on history, 64, 187, 197, 216,
   218, 227, 279, 295;
  commercial spirit of the Dutch, 49, 52, 55, 57, 68, 69, 98;
  Colbert's policy for developing, 70, 71, 101, 102, 105, 106, 169;
  decay of French, under Louis XIV., 73, 107, 167, 169, 170, 198, 199,
   219, 226-228;
  improvement of French, under Louis XV., 74, 242, 243;
  government influence on, 70, 71, 82, 101, 105, 106;
  dangers to United States, by blockades, 84-87;
  commercial policy of United States, 84, 88;
  French, in 1660, 93;
  Dutch, in 1660, 95-97, 131;
  rivalry of English and Dutch, 100, 107;
  Leibnitz's proposition to Louis XIV. to seize Egypt, 141, 142;
  influence of Dutch wealth, 167, 176, 187, 197, 270, 279;
  sufferings of Dutch, 38, 160, 167, 168;
  gains to English, by policy of Louis XIV. 167, 170;
  effect of injury to, in hastening war, 176, 177;
  bearing of, upon War of Spanish Succession, 201-204, 207, 209;
  Methuen Treaty of, with Portugal, 206, 228;
  concession to England of the Asiento, or slave trade, 217, 220, 245;
  growth of English, during eighteenth century, 220, 223-226, 228,
   229, 233, 241, 245, 319, 323, 328;
  secret treaty of, made with England by claimant to Spanish throne, 221;
  decay of Dutch, in early part of eighteenth century, 69, 220-222, 224;
  English, contraband with Spanish America, 240, 241, 245-247;
  sufferings of, 1740-1748, 279, 280;
  sufferings of, 1756-1763, 311, 312, 317-319;
  prosperity of English commerce, 1756-1763, 297, 318, 319, 323;
  effect of commercial interests on the results at Yorktown, 392;
  great centre of English, 539 (note);
  policy of Great Britain as to neutral, 540.

_Commerce-Destroying_ (Cruising Warfare),
  a strategic question, 8;
  dependence on geographical position, 31;
  diffusion of effort, 31;
  disadvantageous position of United States, 31, 540 (note);
  Spanish treasure-ships, 41, 51, 207, 262, 313, 316;
  English and Dutch commerce defy, 51, 133, 134, 135, 206, 229, 297,
   317, 318, 319, 539, 540;
  Charles II. resorts to it as a substitute for great fleets, 131;
  disastrous results, 132;
  discussion of, as a principal mode of warfare, 132-136;
  dependent upon a near base or upon powerful fleets, 132, 196, 230, 314;
  illustrations, 1652-1783, 133-136;
  injurious reaction on the nation relying upon it, 136;
  illustrations, 136-138;
  mistaken conclusions drawn from American privateering in 1812, and
   from the Confederate cruisers, 137, 138;
  effect of great navies, 138;
  illustrations, after battle of Solebay, 148;
  after battle of Texel, 154;
  decline of Dutch navy, 160,
  and consequent increase of commerce-destroying by French privateers, 167;
  in the war of 1689-1697, discussion, 193-196;
  in the war of 1702-1713, 228-230;
  in war of 1739-1748, 280;
  in Seven Years' War, 295, 297, 311, 314, 316, 317-319 (discussion),
   329 (note);
  in American Revolution, 344, 382, 392, 400, 404, 408 (and note),
   409, 443, 445, 452, 460, 530, 539, 540 (and note);
  French privateering, 133, 135, 167, 195, 196, 229, 280, 314, 317-319;
  peculiar character of French privateering, 1689-1713, 194-196, 229, 230.

_Conflans_, French Admiral,
  commands fleet intended for invasion of England, 300;
  sails from Brest, 301;
  encounters Hawke and is defeated by him, 302-304.

_Cornwallis_, British General,
  wins battle of Camden, 382;
  overruns Southern States, 384;
  marches into Virginia, 385;
  takes position at Yorktown, 387;
  surrounded by enemies, 389,
  capitulates, 390.

_Cornwallis_, Captain British navy,
  gallant conduct in Hood's action at St. Christopher, 472.

_Corsica_,
  island of, naturally Italian, 32;
  a dependency of Genoa, 201;
  Genoa cedes fortified harbors to France, 292;
  whole island ceded to France, 334;
  strategic value, 335.

_Cromwell_, Oliver,
  naval policy of, 60;
  issues Navigation Act, 60;
  condition of navy under, 60, 61, 101, 127;
  takes Jamaica, 60;
  takes Dunkirk, 105.


_D'Aché_, French Commodore,
  reaches India, 307;
  first and second battles with Pocock, 308;
  ill-will to the French governor, Lally, 307, 309;
  goes to the Isle of France, 309;
  return to the peninsula, and third battle with Pocock, 310;
  abandons the peninsula, 310.

_De Barras_, French Commodore,
  commands French squadron at Newport, and takes part in operations
   against Cornwallis, 389-392.

_De la Clue_, French Commodore,
  sails from Toulon to join Brest fleet, 298;
  encounters and beaten by Boscawen, 299.

_D'Estaing_, French Admiral,
  transferred from the army to the navy, 371;
  long passage from Toulon to the Delaware, 359;
  fails to attack the British fleet in New York, 361;
  runs British batteries at Newport, 361;
  sails in pursuit of Howe's fleet, and receives injuries in a gale, 362;
  goes to Boston, 363;
  foiled by Howe on all points, 363, 364;
  goes to West Indies, 365;
  failure at Sta. Lucia, 366;
  capture of St. Vincent and Grenada, 367;
  action with Byron's fleet, 367-371;
  professional character, 371, 375;
  ineffectual assault on Savannah, 376;
  return to France, 376.

_D'Estrées_, French Admiral,
  commands French contingent to the allied fleet at Solebay, 147;
  at Schoneveldt, 151;
  at the Texel, 152;
  equivocal action at the battle of the Texel, 153, 155;
  notice of, 170.

_De Grasse_, French Admiral,
  sails from Brest for West Indies, 383;
  partial action with Hood off Martinique, 383, 384;
  takes Tobago, and goes thence to San Domingo, 384;
  determines to go to Chesapeake Bay, 388;
  thoroughness of his action, 388, 392;
  anchors in Lynnhaven Bay, 388;
  skilful management when opposed by Graves, 389;
  share in results at Yorktown, 399;
  declines to remain longer in the United States, 400, 418, 469;
  return to West Indies, and expedition against St. Kitt's Island, 469;
  outgeneralled by Hood, 470-476;
  criticisms upon his actions, 392, 476-478, 483, 489, 494;
  return to Martinique, 479;
  in command of combined fleet in expedition against Jamaica, 479;
  sails from Martinique, 480;
  partial action of April 9, 1782, 481-483;
  battle of the Saints, 486-490;
  surrenders with his flag-ship, 489;
  later career and death, 501-503;
  findings of the court-martial on, 503.

_De Guichen_, French Admiral,
  wary tactics of, 7, 413, 433;
  takes command in West Indies, 376;
  actions with Rodney, 378-381;
  returns to France, 381, 405;
  chief command of allied fleets in Europe, 407, 408;
  abortive action at Torbay, 408 (and note);
  injuries to convoy under his care, 408;
  Rodney's opinion of, 499;
  difficulty in manning his fleet, 536 (note).

_D'Orvilliers_, French Admiral,
  instructions to, 339, 340;
  appointed to command Brest fleet, 339;
  commander-in-chief at battle of Ushant, 350-352;
  commands allied fleets in English Channel, 1779, 402 (and note);
  retires from the navy, 403.

_De Rions_, d'Albert, Captain in French navy,
  leads in the attack on Hood's position at St. Kitt's, 474;
  Suffren's opinion of, 474;
  gallantry at time of De Grasse's defeat, 502 (note).

_De Ternay_, French Commodore,
  commands fleet which convoys Rochambeau to America, 382;
  position occupied in Newport, 394-396;
  Washington's memorandum to, 397.

_De Vaudreuil_, French Commodore,
  second in command to De Grasse, 494;
  conducts partial attack of April 9, 1782, 482, 494;
  assumes command after De Grasse's capture, 497.

_Derby_, British Admiral,
  relieves Gibraltar, 407, 414 (note);
  retreats before superior allied fleet, 408.

_Destouches_, French Commodore,
  engagement with English fleet off the Chesapeake, 385-387.

_Douglas_, Sir Charles, Captain British navy,
  chief of staff to Rodney, 485 (note);
  letters of, 486 (and note), 490, 493;
  credit of breaking French line claimed for, 490;
  opinion as to Rodney's failure to pursue his success, 496.

_Dubois_, Cardinal,
  minister of Philippe d'Orleans, 233;
  his policy, 233, 235, 237, 239, 241;
  death, 241.

_Duguay-Trouin_, French privateer,
  expedition against Rio de Janeiro, 230.

_Dupleix_,
  advances the power of France in India, 243;
  his ambition and policy, 258, 274, 282;
  problem before him in India, 275;
  foiled by lack of sea power, 276, 278;
  quarrel with La Bourdonnais, 276;
  seizes Madras, 276;
  successful defence of Pondicherry, 277;
  extends his power in the peninsula, 282;
  is recalled to France, 282.

_Duquesne_, French Admiral,
  compares French and Dutch officers, 129;
  commands at battle of Stromboli, 160-162;
  tactics of, 163-165;
  commands at battle of Agosta, 165.


_Egypt_,
  Napoleon's expedition to, 10, 11;
  Leibnitz proposes to Louis XIV. to seize, 141;
  commanding commercial and strategic position of, 141, 142;
  occupation of, by England, 22, 328;
  importance of, to India, 328.

_Elliott_, British General,
  commands at Gibraltar during the great siege, 411.

_England_, See under Colonies, Commerce, Commerce-Destroying,
 Geographical Position, Government, Inhabitants, character and number
 of, Naval Policy, Naval Tactics, Sea Power, Strategy.

_Extent of Territory_,
  its effect upon the sea power of a country, 42-44.


_Falkland Islands_,
  dispute concerning, 335.

_Farragut_, American Admiral,
  at Mobile, 164, 287, 361;
  at Port Hudson, 361;
  at New Orleans, 354, 356;
  practice of, as to his position in order of battle, 354-356.

_Fleuri_, Cardinal,
  minister of Louis XV., 241;
  peace policy, 241, 243, 253;
  commercial expansion of France under, 242, 248;
  accord with Walpole, 241, 244, 252;
  policy, continental rather than maritime, 243, 244, 251, 253;
  supports claimant to Polish throne, 247;
  arranges Bourbon Family Compact with Spain, 244, 248;
  acquires Bar and Lorraine for France, 249;
  allows the navy to decay, 244, 249, 252, 253;
  death, 253.

_France._
  See under Colonies, Commerce, Commerce-Destroying, Geographical
  Position, Government, Inhabitants, character and number of Naval
  Policy, Naval Tactics, Sea-Power, Strategy.

_Frederick_, King of Prussia,
  seizes Silesia, 262;
  Silesia ceded to, 278;
  opens Seven Years' War, 292;
  desperate struggle of, 295, 305;
  losses in the war, 324;
  results of the war to, 324;
  partition of Poland, 336.


_Gardiner's Bay_, Long Island,
  useful as a base of operations to an enemy of the United States, 212,
  station of English fleet, 386.

_Geographical Position_,
  its effect upon the sea power of countries, 29-35.

_Gibraltar_,
  strategic question, 12;
  taken by Rooke, 210;
  strategic value, 212;
  value to England, 29, 32, 220, 298, 328, 414;
  offers to restore to Spain, 236, 298;
  attacks on, 212, 245, 411;
  siege of, 403-412.

_Government_,
  character and policy of, effect upon the sea power of countries, 58-88;
  English, 59-67;
  Dutch, 67-69;
  French, 69-82;
  United States, 83-88.

_Graves_, British Admiral,
  commanding in New York, sails to relieve Cornwallis, 389;
  out-manoeuvred by De Grasse, 391;
  criticisms on, 390, 391.

_Graves_, British Captain, afterward admiral,
  urges Rodney to attack French squadron anchored in Newport, 396;
  second to Nelson at Copenhagen, 396 (note);
  blockading on French coast, 526.

_Great Britain._ See England.


_Hannibal._ See Second Punic War, 13-21.

_Havana_,
  strategic value of, 315, 517, 519;
  taken by the English, 315;
  restored at Peace of Paris, 321, 322.

_Hawke_, Sir Edward, afterward Lord, British Admiral,
  distinguishes himself at the battle of Toulon, 266;
  captures a French squadron, 271-273;
  seizes French shipping in the Atlantic, 285;
  relieves Byng in the Mediterranean, 290;
  blockade of Brest, 300, 527;
  brilliant action in Quiberon Bay, 300-304;
  maxim as to strength of English fleet, 523.

_Henry IV._, of France,
  policy of, 59, 69, 92, 93.

_Herbert_, British Admiral,
  commands allied English and Dutch fleets at battle of Beachy Head, 182.

_Holland._ See under Colonies, Commerce, Commerce-Destroying,
  Geographical Position, Government, Inhabitants, character and number
  of, Naval Policy, Naval Tactics (Ruyter's), Sea Power, Strategy.

_Hood_, Sir Samuel, afterward Lord, British Admiral,
  trait of subordination in, 356 (note);
  action with De Grasse off Martinique, 383;
  sent by Rodney to America with fourteen ships, 389, 390;
  second in command in action off Chesapeake, 391;
  temporary chief command in West Indies, 469;
  brilliant action at St. Christopher's Island, 470-476;
  junction with Rodney, 479;
  partial action of April 9, 1782, 481-483;
  at battle of the Saints, 486-490, 491-493;
  De Grasse's flag-ship strikes to his, 489;
  opinion as to Rodney's failure to pursue his advantage, 496;
  captures four French ships, 498;
  later career and death, 504.

_Hoste_, Paul,
  work on naval tactics, 77, 147, 182, 184.

_Howe_, Lord, British Admiral,
  naval policy of, 9;
  at Philadelphia, 360;
  at New York, 360;
  at Newport, 361;
  energy and skill of, 363, 364;
  commands Channel fleet, 408;
  relieves Gibraltar, 412;
  a whig in politics, 500;
  opinion as to blockades, 526.

_Howe_, Sir William, British General,
  commander-in-chief in America, 343;
  expedition to the Chesapeake, 343, 468, 529, 530;
  indolence of, 364.

_Hughes_, Sir Edward, British Admiral,
  arrives in India, 349;
  takes Negapatam and Trincomalee, 349;
  first meeting with Suffren, 427;
  task in India, 428;
  first battle with Suffren's squadron, 430-434;
  second battle with Suffren, 437-441;
  contemporary criticisms on, 442;
  third battle with Suffren, 446-448;
  tactics of, 431, 449, 453, 456, 462:
  slowness of, loses Trincomalee, 450, 451;
  fourth battle with Suffren, 453-455;
  praise bestowed by, upon his captains, 456;
  goes to Bombay from Coromandel coast, 458;
  returns to Madras, 461;
  supports English siege of Cuddalore, 462;
  fifth battle with Suffren, 463;
  abandons the field, 463;
  death, 467.

_Hyder Ali_, Sultan of Mysore, 419;
  war upon the English, 420;
  denied the aid of the French squadron, 421;
  Suffren communicates with, 443;
  visited by Suffren, 450;
  negotiations of Suffren with, 459, 460;
  death of, 461.


_Inhabitants_, character of,
  effect upon the sea power of a country, 50-58.

_Inhabitants_, number of,
  effect upon the sea power of a country, reserve strength, 44-49.

_Italy_,
  geographical position of, 32;
  physical conformation of, 39, 40;
  necessity for a navy, 40;
  Sicilian revolt against Spain, 1674, 159;
  Spanish possessions in, 1700, 201;
  Sardinia taken by allied fleets, 215;
  disposition of Spanish provinces in, at peace of 1713, 219;
  Sicily transferred to Austria, and Sardinia to House of Savoy, 1719, 239;
  Spanish expedition into, 248;
  foundation of Bourbon Kingdom of the Two Sicilies, 248;
  Spanish operations against Austria, 1741, 263, 264;
  King of Naples forced to withdraw troops from Spanish army by English
   fleet, 263;
  disposition of provinces of, at peace of 1748, 278;
  transfer of Corsica to France by Genoa, 292, 334;
  acquisition of Malta by England, 327.


_Jamaica_,
  taken by English, under Cromwell, 60;
  wish of Spain to recover, 345, 510, 512;
  strategic value of, 394, 517, 518;
  combined expedition against, 479;
  frustrated by Rodney's victory over De Grasse, 496;
  Rodney repairs to, after his victory, 501, 517.

_James II._,
  a seaman by profession, 61, 115;
  commands at battle of Lowestoft, as Duke of York, 109;
  commands at the battle of Solebay, 147;
  deprived of the command, 151;
  succeeds to the throne, 175;
  interest in the navy, 175, 177, 178;
  flight from England, 178;
  lands in Ireland, 179;
  defeated at the Boyne, 186;
  at Cape La Hougue, 188;
  death, 205.

_Jenkins_,
  captain of a merchant brig, the story of his ears, 250.

_Jervis_, Sir John, afterward Earl St. Vincent, British Admiral,
  naval policy of, 9;
  tactics at Cape St. Vincent, 11, 147, 167, 476 (note);
  testimony at Keppel's court-martial, 352.

_Johnstone_, British Commodore,
  sails for Cape of Good Hope, 421;
  commissioner to American Congress, 421 (note);
  attacked by Suffren at the Cape Verde Islands, 421-425;
  anticipated by Suffren at the Cape, 427;
  returns unsuccessful to England, 427.


_Kempenfeldt_, British Admiral,
  cuts off part of De Guichen's convoy, 408, 414, 417, 475.

_Keppel_, Lord, British Admiral,
  appointed to command Channel fleet, 341;
  battle of Ushant, 350-352;
  head of admiralty and disapproves treaty of peace, 499;
  a whig in politics, 500.

_King_, British Commodore,
  stubborn defence of the "Exeter," 449;
  visits Suffren at the Cape of Good Hope, 465.


_La Bourdonnais_,
  governor of the Isle of France, 243, 273;
  his active administration, 273;
  prepares to attack English commerce in the East Indies, 273;
  takes and ransoms Madras, quarrels with Dupleix, squadron wrecked,
   returns to France, and dies, 276.

_L'Étenduère_, French commodore,
  brilliant defence of, 272.

_Lafayette_, Marquis de,
  arrival in America, 345;
  operations in Virginia, 385;
  expressions of Washington to, as to necessity of naval help, 397, 400;
  associations of his name to Americans, 501.

_La Galissonière_, French Admiral,
  commands the fleet in the expedition to Minorca, 285;
  defeats Byng's attempt to relieve Port Mahon, 286-288.

_Lally_, French governor of India,
  reaches India, 307;
  quarrels with Commodore D'Aché, 307;
  takes Fort St. David, 308;
  besieges Madras, but fails, 310;
  fall of French power under, 310.

_Langara_, Spanish Admiral,
  defeated and captured by Rodney, 403, 404, 499;
  action at Toulon in 1793, 156.

_Leibnitz_,
  proposes to Louis XIV. the occupation of Egypt, 106, 107, 141, 142.

_Louis XIV._,
  growth of French navy under, 72;
  enmity to Holland, 73;
  policy of, 73, 103-105, 140, 143, 205;
  naval policy of, 72, 74, 107, 133, 141-143, 155, 159, 166, 174,
   178-181, 194-196;
  assumes personal government, 90;
  initiates general wars, 91;
  condition of France at accession of, 93;
  commercial policy of, 54, 105, 167, 169, 170, 176;
  aggressions of, 139, 173;
  declares war against Holland, 144;
  campaign in Holland, 149-151;
  evacuates Holland, 158;
  Sicilian episode, 159-166;
  peace with Holland, 168;
  declares war against Germany, 177;
  against Holland, 178;
  supports invasion of Ireland, 179-186;
  plans invasion of England, 188-191;
  concessions by, at peace of Ryswick, 197;
  effect of policy of, on sea-power, 198-200;
  accepts bequest of Spanish throne to his grandson, 203;
  reduced to extremities in War of Spanish Succession, 215, 216;
  humiliating concessions at peace of Utrecht, 219-221;
  exhaustion of France under, 227;
  privateering under, 133, 134, 195, 230;
  death of, 232.

_Louis XV._,
  ascends throne, 232;
  condition of French commerce under, 74, 242-244, 279, 280, 311, 318;
  condition of French navy, 74-77, 244, 252-254, 259, 276, 279, 280,
   288, 291, 311;
  restoration of the navy, 76, 331-333;
  defensive alliance with Spain, 248, 263-268;
  offensive alliance with Spain, 313, 333;
  death, 336.

_Louis XVI._,
  begins to reign, 336;
  naval policy of, 78-80, 337-340, 402, 403, 452;
  general policy of, 336, 337, 345, 359, 382, 419, 509-512, 535-540;
  treaty with the United States, 346;
  breach with England, 350.

_Louisburg_, Cape Breton Island,
  strategic importance of, 28, 294, 328;
  retained by France at Peace of Utrecht, 219;
  taken by New England colonists, 269;
  restored to France at peace of Aix-la-Chapelle, 277;
  taken by Boscawen, 294.


_Madras_,
  capital of a British presidency in India, 257;
  taken by French, 276;
  exchanged for Louisburg at peace of 1748, 277;
  besieged by French in 1759, 310;
  danger from Hyder Ali in 1780, 420;
  principal British naval station during the struggle, 1781-1783, 429,
   437, 444, 450, 451;
  danger of roadstead, in northeast monsoon. 458, 518, 519.

_Mahrattas_, the,
  position in India of, and war with English, 419, 420;
  peace with the English, 459, 461.

_Maria Theresa_,
  ascends Austrian throne, 262;
  war with Prussia, France, and Spain, 262, 263;
  war with Prussia, in alliance with France and Russia, 292.

_Martinique_, French West India Island,
  base for commerce-destroying, 31, 135, 314;
  taken by the English, 135, 314;
  effects of this conquest, 318;
  restored to France at peace of Paris, 321;
  principal base of French navy in West Indies. 348, 366, 469, 479;
  actions near, 378, 383;
  strategic position of, 480, 517, 518, 523.

_Matthews_, British Admiral,
  commander-in-chief in the Mediterranean and minister to Sardinia, 263;
  action with combined French and Spanish fleets, 265-267;
  court-martialled and cashiered, 268.

_Mazarin_, Cardinal,
  policy of, 70, 93;
  death, 90.

_Mediterranean Sea_,
  control of, influence on Second Punic war, 14-21;
  strategic points in, 13, 20, 22, 23, 32, 62, 63, 82, 141, 142, 202,
   203, 215, 220, 285, 298, 327, 328, 335, 393, 515;
  advantage of strategic study of, 33;
  analogy to Caribbean Sea, 33;
  increase of English power in, 206, 210, 212, 215, 219, 220, 229,
   235, 239, 263, 322, 327, 328;
  Austria established in, 239;
  Sardinia given to House of Savoy, 239;
  foundation of Bourbon Kingdom of Two Sicilies, 248,
  strengthens France in, 249;
  English navy in, 193, 206, 208, 210-216, 263-268, 286-291, 296, 298,
   412, 515, 532, 533;
  France acquires Corsica, 334, 335;
  England loses Minorca in American Revolution, 409, 540.

_Monk_, British General and Admiral,
  saying about Dutch trade, 107;
  commands English fleet in the Four Days' Battle, 117-126;
  tactics of, 121, 124;
  merits of, 126;
  opposition to laying up the heavy ships, 131;
  death, 127.

_Morogues_, Bigot de,
  work on Naval Tactics, 10, 77, 288.


_Napoleon I._,
  recommends study of military history, 2;
  Egyptian expedition, 10, 107;
  Trafalgar campaign, 11, 12, 23, 24 (note), 119, 532, 533;
  favorite objective, 47;
  naval policy, 81, 506;
  influence of French navy on American privateering in 1812, 137.

_Naval Policy_,
  value of reserve force, 48;
  colonial, 56,
  in peace, 82;
  in war, 82;
  soldiers commanding ships, 127;
  commerce-destroying and privateering (see Commerce-destroying)
   Bourbon Family compact, 248, 313;
  significance of the wars from 1739 to 1783, 254;
  Dutch, 67-69, 95-99, 108, 109, 126, 174, 201-204, 217, 218, 222, 406;
  English, 59-67, 78, 100, 101, 105, 107, 131, 140, 143, 174, 175,
   192-196, 201-204, 206, 224, 225, 229, 238-241, 244, 245, 264, 293,
   326-328, 406, 417, 442, 451, 452, 505, 540;
  French, 29, 54, 69-81, 93, 104, 105-107, 166, 167-170, 177, 187,
   197, 199, 212, 226, 238, 242-244, 252, 282, 287-290, 291, 309, 311,
   322, 331-334, 337, 340, 359, 382, 408 (and note), 451, 452, 459,
   460, 506, 510, 511;
  maritime inscription, 45;
  Leibnitz's proposition to Louis XIV., 141, 142;
  Italian, 39, 40;
  Spanish, 41, 51, 94, 156, 246, 312, 333, 348, 401, 407, 510, 517
   (note), 535, 536;
  United States, 26, 33, 34, 38, 39, 42, 49, 83-88, 325, 326, 539, 540
   (note).


_Naval Tactics_,
  unsettled condition of modern, 2;
  qualities of galleys, steamers, and sailing-ships, 3-5;
  windward and leeward positions, 6,
  change of, from age to age, 9, 10, 22, 130, 506;
  fireships, 109, 110, 113, 114;
  torpedo-cruisers, 111;
  group formation, 112;
  close-hauled line-of-battle, 115;
  breaking the line, 124, 147, 265, 268, 286, 380, 381, 488, 491;
  refusing the van, 148, 152, 157, 183, 190, 266, 432, 434;
  concentration by defiling, 308, 387, 470, 492;
  concentration by doubling, 125, 147, 183, 272, 378, 379, 432, 433,
   438-441;
  general chase with _mêlée_, 3, 4, 184, 237, 271, 299, 302, 303,
   367-369, 404, 481, 482, 486;
  French, in eighteenth century, 79, 80, 114, 163, 164, 287-290, 338,
   340, 351, 372, 383, 425, 426, 431, 474 (and note), 476, 478, 482,
   483, 486-488, 494, 538;
  English, in eighteenth century, 127-129, 163, 211, 237, 265, 268,
   271, 286, 287, 299, 303, 307, 350, 352, 369, 377-381, 386, 389,
   391, 404, 412, 442, 447, 449, 453-455, 462, 463, 470-473, 476 (and
   note), 486-490;
  Monk's, 121;
  Ruyter's, 145, 147, 148, 152, 154, 157, 161;
  Duquesne's, 161-163, 165;
  Herbert's, 182;
  Tourville's, 182, 184, 185, 187, 189;
  Rooke's, 211;
  Byng's, 286;
  Hawke's, 271, 272, 303;
  Keppel's and D'Orvilliers, 351;
  Barrington's, 366;
  Byron's, 367-369;
  D'Estaing's, 369, 370;
  Rodney's, 377-379, 404, 488, 491;
  De Grasse's, 383, 389, 471-474, 481-483, 485-489;
  Arbuthnot and Destouches's, 386;
  Graves's, 389, 391;
  Suffren's, 425, 426, 432, 433, 439, 455, 465;
  Hood's, 472, 473;
  Clerk's work on, 77, 163, 211;
  Hoste's work on, 77;
  Morogues' work on, 77;
  position of commander-in-chief in battle, 353-358;
  effect on, of changes in naval material, 2-5, 9, 10, 22, 109, 116,
   384 (note), 386 (note), 493-495.

_Navies_, condition of:
  _British_, under Cromwell, 62;
    under Charles II., 61, 101;
    character of vessels, 1660, 101;
    qualities of officers, 1660, 126-129;
    decline of, under Charles II., 174;
    improvement of, by James II., 175;
    numbers in 1691, 187;
    deterioration under William III., 192;
    improvement under Anne, 209, 220, 224, 225, 229;
    numbers and condition of, in 1727, 1734, and 1744, 259, 260;
    inefficiency of officers, 1744, 265-269;
    numbers of, 1756-1763, 291;
    numbers of, in 1778, 337, 341;
    professional skill of officers in American Revolution, 379 (and
     note), 401, 412, 449, 456, 497;
    administration of, 417, 452, 523, 527.

  _Dutch_, prior to 1660, 68, 98, 99;
    character of ships, 102;
    professional qualities of officers, 109, 126, 127, 129, 157;
    Duquesne's estimate of Dutch officers, 129;
    decline of, after 1675, 160, 174;
    decline of, during War of Spanish Succession, 221, 222;
    practical disappearance of, after 1713, 222.

  _French_, 53;
    numbers in 1661, 70;
    numbers in 1666, 72;
    numbers, 1683-1690, 72, 178, 179, 180;
    administration of, 1660-1695, 72;
    condition of, at end of Louis XIV.'s reign, 74, 191;
    character of vessels in 1660, 101,
    professional qualities of officers in seventeenth and eighteenth
     centuries, 129, 161, 170-172, 185;
    decay in number and condition, 1713-1760, 74-76, 209, 216, 244,
     252, 259, 260, 279, 280, 288, 291, 311, 312;
    revival of, 1760, 76-78, 331;
    numbers of, in 1761 and 1770, 331;
    discipline during war of 1778, 332, 333;
    numbers in 1778, 45, 337;
    superior to British in size and batteries of ships, 338, 493, 494;
    professional skill of officers, 365, 412, 435, 436, 447, 457, 484,
     497, 527, 536 (note);
    administration of, 402 (and note), 403, 452, 536, 537;
    numbers of, in 1791, 338;
    numbers of, in 1814, 81.

  _Spanish_, condition of, anterior to 1660, 41, 50, 94, 95;
    in 1675, 160, 165;
    restoration by Alberoni, 234;
    destruction of ships at Cape Passaro and of dock-yards, 237, 238;
    numbers of, 1747, 259;
    numbers of, 1756, 291;
    numbers of, in 1761, 331;
    numbers of, in 1779, 337;
    superior to British in size and batteries of ships, 338;
    administration of, 402 (and note), 403, 536;
    character of the personnel, 527.

_Nelson_, Horatio, afterward Lord, British Admiral,
  tactics at the battle of the Nile, 10;
  Trafalgar campaign, 11, 23 (note), 527, 532, 533;
  tactics at Trafalgar, 12, 354, 459;
  enforces Navigation Act, 60, 251;
  orders at Trafalgar, 112, 434;
  at battle of Cape St. Vincent, 157, 355, 368;
  celebrated sayings of, 185, 362, 435, 525, 527, 532;
  attachment of subordinates to, 267;
  position assumed by him in battle, 353-358.

_Nile_, Battle of the,
  tactical principles, 10;
  strategic effect, 11;
  French rear at, 80;
  Nelson at, 358.


_Opdam_, Dutch Admiral,
  commands at battle of Lowestoft and is killed, 108, 109.

_Orleans_, Philippe d',
  Regent of France during minority of Louis XV., 74, 232;
  insecurity of position, 232;
  concessions to England, 233;
  policy of, 235;
  alliance with England against Spain, 235-238;
  death, 241.


_Peace_:
  _Aix-la-Chapelle_, 1748, 277.
  _Breda_, 1667, 132.
  _Nimeguen_, 1678, 168.
  _Nystadt_, 1721, 240.
  _Paris_, 1763, 321.
  _Ryswick_, 1697, 197.
  _Utrecht_, 1713, 219.
  _Versailles_, 1783, 541.

_Philip_, Duke of Anjou, afterward Philip V. of Spain,
  Spanish throne bequeathed to, 202;
  war declared against, by England, Holland, and Germany, 205;
  loses Gibraltar, 210;
  besieges Gibraltar, 212;
  loses Barcelona and Catalonia, 213;
  driven from Madrid, 214;
  recovers all Spain, except Catalonia, 214;
  acknowledged King of Spain by Treaty of Utrecht, 219;
  deprived of Netherlands and Italian dependencies, 219;
  enmity to the regent Orleans, 232;
  seizes Sardinia, 235;
  attacks Sicily, 236;
  brought to terms by France and the Sea Powers, 239;
  makes alliance with the Emperor Charles VI., 244;
  attacks Gibraltar, 245.

_Physical Conformation_,
  its effect upon the sea power of countries, 35-42.

_Pitt_, William,
  dislike of George II. to, 270;
  becomes prime minister, 293;
  policy of, 295, 296;
  prosperity of commerce under, 297;
  offers to restore Gibraltar to Spain, 298;
  respect for Portuguese neutrality, 299, 300;
  declines mediation of Spain, 304;
  waning of his influence, 305;
  purposes war against Spain, 313;
  resigns his office, 313;
  his plans adopted by successors, 314, 317;
  opposes the peace of Paris, 322;
  effect of his policy on the history of England, 326.

_Pocock_, British Admiral,
  commands British fleet in India and fights three battles with French
   fleet, 307-310;
  commands fleet in combined expedition against Havana, 314, 315.

_Port Mahon_ and Minorca,
  lost to Spain frequently through maritime weakness, 42, 215, 541;
  ceded to England in 1713, 62, 219;
  strategic importance of, 62, 220, 393, 515;
  French expedition against, 285;
  Byng defeated in his attempt to relieve, 286-288;
  surrender of, to France, 291;
  Pitt's offer to exchange Gibraltar for, 298;
  restored to England at peace of 1763, 322;
  taken from England in 1782, 407, 409;
  ceded to Spain in 1783, 540;
  again taken by England, 541.

_Portugal_,
  decay in sea power and wealth, 52;
  cedes Bombay and Tangiers to England, 104;
  dependence on England, 105, 208, 315, 320, 321;
  Methuen treaty, 206;
  alliance with England and Holland, 1704, 208;
  advantage of, to England, 208, 213-215, 220, 228;
  French and Spaniards invade, 315, 316, 321;
  England repels the invasion, 316;
  benevolent neutrality of colonial ports to England, 520, 521.


_Ramatuelle_,
  work on Naval Tactics, 287, 290, 371-374.

_Rhode Island_,
  occupied by the English in the American Revolution, 346;
  attack upon by French and Americans, 361-364;
  English evacuate, 376, 530;
  French occupy, 382, 394;
  French position in, 394;
  strategic value of, 519, 529, 530 (note).

_Richelieu_, Cardinal,
  policy of, 59, 70, 92, 93;
  alliance with Spain, 94.

_Rochambeau_, French General,
  arrival in America, 382;
  despatches to De Grasse, 384, 388;
  consultation with Washington, 387, 399;
  marches against Cornwallis, 389.

_Rodney_, Sir George B., afterward Lord, British Admiral,
  commands squadron in reduction of Martinique, 314;
  commander-in-chief in West Indies, 377;
  takes or disperses a Spanish squadron, 377, 404, 500 (and note);
  personal and military character, 377, 378, 380, 397, 498-500;
  actions with De Guichen, 378-381;
  divides his fleet and goes to New York, 382;
  seizes Dutch West India islands, 382;
  sends Hood with fourteen ships to New York, and returns to England, 389;
  returns to West Indies, 479;
  sails in chase of De Grasse, 480;
  action of April 9, 1782, 481-483;
  battle of April 12, 1782, 485-490;
  criticism upon his tactics, 490-493;
  criticism upon his failure to pursue the beaten enemy, 496, 497;
  his successes, 500;
  rewards and death, 503;
  opinion as to evacuation of Rhode Island, 530 (note).

_Rooke_, Sir George, British Admiral,
  relieves Londonderry, 180;
  burns French ships at Cape La Hougue, 190;
  unsuccessful expedition against Cadiz, 207;
  destroys the galleons at Vigo Bay, 207;
  takes Gibraltar, 210;
  commands at the battle of Malaga, 211.

_Rupert_, Prince,
  at Four Days' Battle, 124, 125;
  commands English fleet at battles of Schoneveldt and of the Texel,
   151, 152.

_Russell_, British Admiral,
  commands allied English and Dutch fleets in 1691, 187;
  at battle of La Hougue, 189.

_Ruyter_, Dutch Admiral,
  greatest naval officer of seventeenth century, 117;
  commands at battle of the Four Days, 117-126;
  badly supported by his officers, 122, 126, 127;
  tactics of, 130, 144-148, 152, 157, 161, 164;
  destroys English shipping in the Thames, 132;
  strategy of, 144, 151, 152;
  commands at the battles of Solebay, 146,
    Schoneveldt, 152,
    Texel, 152-154;
  military character, 157;
  sent to Mediterranean with inadequate force, 160;
  commands at battle of Stromboli, 160-162;
  killed at battle of Agosta, 166.


_Sea Power_,
  a history of conflicts, 1;
  elements of, 25.
  Affected by geographical position of countries, 29-35;
  by physical conformation, 35-42;
  by extent of territory, 42-44;
  by number of population, 44-50;
  by national character, 50-58;
  by policy of government, 58.
  Policy of England as to, 58-67;
  policy of Holland, 67-69;
  of France, 69-81.
  Influence of colonies on, 82 (see also Colonies);
  weakness of the United States in, 83;
  dependent upon commerce, 87, 225 (see also Commerce);
  strategic bearing, 88 (see also Strategy);
  policy of Richelieu, 93;
  Spanish, in 1660, 94;
  Dutch, in 1660, 95;
  English, in 1860, 101;
  mistakes of Louis XIV., 104;
  Colbert's measures, 70, 105;
  effects of commerce-destroying on, 132, 179, 193, 229, 317, 344, 400,
   408 (note), 539.
    (See also Commerce-destroying.)
  Influence of, upon Napoleon's expedition to Egypt, 10;
  upon Second Punic War, 14;
  upon Third Anglo-Dutch War, 148, 154;
  upon English Revolution, 177, 178, 180, 181, 191, 197;
  upon France, 198, 199;
  upon War of Spanish Succession, 203, 206, 209, 213, 214, 223-229;
  upon Alberoni's ambitions, 237, 239;
  upon Peter the Great, 239;
  in India, 243, 258, 273-278, 306, 309, 310, 316, 328, 349, 424, 428,
   445, 452, 459-464, 466, 513, 520, 521;
  upon War of Austrian Succession, 263, 264, 279, 280;
  upon Seven Years' War, 291, 293-295, 304, 311, 314-317;
  upon Portugal, 320, 321;
  at Peace of Paris, 321;
  in remote and disordered countries, 324-326;
  upon British policy since 1763, 326-328.
  Washington's opinions as to, 397-400;
  American Revolution, 347, 468;
  influence of, upon conditions of peace, 1783, 498.

_Spain_,
  geographical position, 32;
  results of maritime weakness of, 41, 42, 193, 313-317, 327, 345,
   346, 541;
  dependence of finances upon treasure-ships, 41, 244, 313, 346, 539;
  effect of national character upon sea power, 50-52, 54;
  unity of aim with Austria, 91, 92;
  policy of Richelieu toward, 93;
  condition of, in 1660, 94, 95;
  condition of navy, in 1660, 94;
  aggressions of Louis XIV. on, 104, 139;
  failure of the Austrian line of kings, 140, 201, 202;
  alliance with Holland and Germany against France, 158;
  revolt of Sicily against, 159;
  territory lost at Peace of Nimeguen, 168;
  joins League of Augsburg, 176;
  dependence upon Dutch and English fleets, 193;
  possessions in year 1700, 201;
  throne of, bequeathed to Philip, Duke of Anjou, 202;
  war of the succession, 201-231;
  Bourbon line of kings established, 219;
  losses of territory at peace of 1713, 219;
  Alberoni's ministry in, 233-239;
  grievances against England, 1720-1739, 240, 241, 244-251;
  conquers the Two Sicilies in War of Polish Succession, 248;
  Family Compact with France, 248, 311, 313;
  war with England, 250;
  possessions in 1739, 256;
  Peace of Aix-la-Chapelle, 278;
  lack of results from war with England, 278;
  enters Seven Years' War as the ally of France against England, 313;
  loss of colonies and treasures, 314-317;
  loss of possessions by Peace of Paris, 1763, 321, 322;
  political relations with France, 333;
  dispute with England over Falkland Islands, 335;
  objects in the war of 1779-1782, 347, 348, 509, 510, 513;
  rupture with England and alliance with France, 401;
  inefficiency of navy, 402 (and note), 407-409, 411, 412, 506, 527;
  policy in war of 1779, 517 (note), 535-538;
  territorial gains by peace of 1783.
  (See also Colonies, Commerce, Naval Policy.)

_Sta. Lucia_, West India Island,
  taken by English, 314;
  ceded to France at Peace of Paris, 321;
  strong harbor and strategic position, 348, 366, 377, 393, 415, 513,
   516, 518, 523;
  taken by Admiral Barrington, 348, 365, 366, 512, 531 (note);
  Rodney watches De Grasse from, 479, 480;
  an advanced strategic position, 518, 528;
  restored to France at peace of 1783, 540.

_Strategy_,
  permanence of its principles, 7-9, 88, 89;
  illustrations, 10-22;
  definition of naval, 22;
  Trafalgar campaign, 23 (note);
  bearing of geographical position on, 29-33;
  Mediterranean and Caribbean Seas, 33-35;
  bearing of physical conformation of coast on, 35-42;
  blockade of coast of Confederate States, 43, 44;
  value of commerce-destroying (see Commerce-destroying);
  word "defence" two distinct ideas, 87 (note);
  naval, of the British, 6, 9, 22, 24, 30, 118, 125, 136, 143, 182,
   206, 208, 210, 212, 224, 229, 239, 260, 269, 284, 285, 296,
   314-317, 320, 326-328, 339, 342, 343, 363, 375, 376, 385, 390-397,
   412-417, 428-430, 468, 523-535;
  naval, of the Dutch, 144, 145, 151, 154;
  naval, of the French, 6, 12, 23 (note), 179-181, 191, 347, 371-374,
   383, 388, 392, 401, 433, 459, 460, 476, 483, 535-539;
  features of War of Spanish Succession, 201-206;
  silent action of sea power, 209;
  general military situation, in 1740, 255;
  England in Seven Years' War, 296;
  mutual dependence of seaports and fleets, 31, 83, 132, 212, 329,
   430, 453, 529;
  value of colonies, 27, 28, 65, 83, 135, 136, 510, 511;
  importance of coal, 31, 329 (note), 540 (note);
  military situation in America in 1777, 341-343;
  general strategic situation in 1778, 347-349;
  British difficulties in American Revolution, 392-397, 412-419, 522-533;
  Suffren's naval, 424, 425, 433, 450, 465;
  situation in India, 349, 428-430;
  Hood's naval, 476;
  Rodney's naval, 381, 392, 496-498, 523;
  influence of trade-winds and monsoons, 315, 458, 517, 518;
  elements essential to all naval wars, 514;
  difficulty of procuring information at sea, 521;
  general discussion of war of 1778, 505-540.
  (See also Naval Policy and Sea Power.)

_Suffren_, French Admiral,
  criticism on D'Estaing's conduct at Sta. Lucia, 366, 426, 478;
  commands leading French ship in D'Estaing's battle off Grenada, 371;
  criticism on D'Estaing's conduct in the battle, 371;
  sails from Brest in company with De Grasse's fleet, 383, 421;
  parts company, off the Azores, for India, 383, 407, 421;
  orders to secure Cape of Good Hope, 421;
  action, with British squadron at the Cape Verde Islands, 422, 423;
  military discussion of his conduct, 423-425;
  arrival in India, 427;
  lack of seaports on which to base operations, 349, 429;
  first battle with squadron of Sir Edward Hughes, 430-432;
  tactics in the action, 432-435;
  estimate of the strategic situation in India, 424, 433, 444, 445,
   464, 466;
  second battle with Hughes, 437-439;
  tactics in it, 439-441;
  strategic action, 443, 445, 446, 450-453, 458-460, 462-464, 466, 522;
  military character, 445, 446, 450, 456, 465, 466;
  third battle with Hughes, 446-448;
  takes Trincomalee, 450;
  activity of, 450, 451, 456, 462, 466;
  fourth battle with Hughes, 453-456;
  wreck of two of squadron, 457;
  goes to Sumatra, 460;
  returns to Trincomalee, 461;
  relieves Cuddalore besieged by the English, 462;
  fifth battle with Hughes, 463;
  conclusion of peace, 464;
  return to France, 465;
  rewards, 465;
  later career and death, 466.


_Tourville_, French Admiral,
  commands at the battle of Beachy Head, 181;
  sluggish pursuit of the enemy, 184;
  military character, 185;
  celebrated cruise in 1691, 187;
  commands at battle of La Hougue, 189;
  tactics and brilliant defence at La Hougue, 190;
  destruction of French ships, 190;
  supports the army in Catalonia, 193;
  destroys or disperses a great English convoy, 194;
  death, 210.

_Trafalgar_, Battle of,
  final act of a strategic combination, 11, 23 (note);
  tactics at, 12, 354, 459;
  effects of, 47;
  Nelson's position at, 353, 357;
  Collingwood's action after Nelson's death, 358.

_Trincomalee_,
  in Ceylon, Dutch influence in, 97;
  passes into the hands of the English, 349, 428;
  effect upon the contest in India, 349, 427 (note), 429, 430 (note),
   433, 437, 442, 451, 453, 458, 462;
  strategic value of, 428, 429, 436, 444, 451, 458, 518, 519, 520;
  taken by Suffren, 450;
  restored to Holland at peace of 1783, 540.

_Two Sicilies_, the,
  acquired by Austria, 239;
  foundation of Bourbon Kingdom of, 248;
  forced by British fleet to withdraw troops from Spanish army, 264, 304.


_United Provinces._ See Holland.


_Vernon_, British Admiral,
  takes Porto Bello, is repulsed from Cartagena and Santiago de Cuba, 261.

_Villeneuve_, French Admiral, Trafalgar,
  campaign, 23, 24 (note), 525;
  at the battle of the Nile, 80;
  suicide, 403.


_Walpole_, Sir Robert,
  prime minister of England, 239, 241;
  peace policy of, 241, 243, 244;
  naval demonstrations, 244;
  struggle with the war party in England, 247, 249, 250;
  neutrality causes Austria to lose the two Sicilies, 248;
  forced into war with Spain, 250;
  accord with Fleuri, 241, 243, 244;
  confidence betrayed by Fleuri, 248;
  driven from office, 253, 262;
  death, 253.

_War_, Second Punic,
  influence of sea power upon, 13-21.

_Wars_,
  American Revolution, 341--397;
  Anglo-Dutch, second, 107-132;
  Anglo-Dutch, third, England in alliance with France, 144-158;
  Austrian Succession, 262-277;
  France against Holland, Germany, and Spain, 1674-1678, 158-168;
  Great Britain against Spain, 250-277;
  League of Augsburg, 176-197;
  Maritime war of 1778, 350-540;
  Polish Succession, 247;
  Russia and Sweden, 231;
  Seven Years', 291-321;
  Spanish Succession, 1702-1713, 205-218.

_Washington_, George,
  at Pittsburg and in Braddock's expedition, 284;
  opinion as to the line of the Hudson, 342 (note);
  comments on D'Estaing's cruise, 364 (note);
  despatches to De Grasse, 384;
  meeting with Rochambeau, 387;
  result of their deliberations, 388;
  marches from New York to Virginia, 389;
  opinions as to the influence of sea power on the American Revolution,
   397-400.

_William III._,
  naval policy of, 68, 192;
  becomes ruler of Holland, 150;
  general policy, 68, 167, 168, 174, 176, 177, 191, 202-204, 207;
  expedition to England, 178;
  becomes King of England, 61, 178;
  difficulties of his position, 179;
  goes to Ireland, 181;
  wins the battle of the Boyne, 188;
  dies, 205.





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