"Emphasis" _italics_ have a * mark.
[#] footnotes moved to EOParagraphs but not renumbered.
German spelling of words need to checked particularly!





Scanned by Charles Keller with OmniPage Professional OCR software





THE RIDDLE
OF THE RHINE
CHEMICAL STRATEGY IN PEACE AND WAR

_An account of the critical struggle for power
and for the decisive war initiative. The campaign
fostered by the great Rhine factories, and
the pressing problems which they represent.
A matter of pre-eminent public interest
concerning the sincerity of disarmament, the
future of warfare, and the stability of peace_.

BY

VICTOR LEFEBURE
Officer of the Order of the British Empire (Mil.)
Chevalier de la Legion d'Honneur, Officer of the Crown of Italy
Fellow of the Chemical Society, etc.


WITH A PREFACE BY
MARSHAL FOCH

AND AN INTRODUCTION BY
FIELD-MARSHAL SIR HENRY WILSON, BART.
Chief of the Imperial General Staff



THE CHEMICAL FOUNDATION, INC.
81 FULTON STREET
NEW YORK CITY



Published, 1923,
By THE CHEMICAL FOUNDATION, INC.
----
_All Rights Reserved_

_Printed in the United States of America_



PREFACE


My motives in writing this book are sufficiently explained in
the first chapter.  The silence surrounding the true facts of the
chemical campaign, the tardy realisation of the real forces behind it
in Germany, and our failure to grasp the significance of the matter
in the Treaty, all pointed to the need for an early statement.
More recently, this need has been emphasised by inaccurate
public utterances on the matter, and by its vital importance
for the full and fair treatment of certain legislative measures
before Allied countries.

A unique experience of chemical warfare in all its aspects, first with a
combatant gas unit on the British front in France, then as Liaison Officer
with France and other Allies on all Chemical Warfare and allied questions,
has afforded me an exceptionally complete survey of the subject.
Later post-armistice experience in Paris, and the occupied territories,
assisting Lord Moulton on various chemical questions in connection
with the Treaty, and surveying the great chemical munition factories
of the Rhine, has provided a central view of the whole matter which can
have been the privilege and opportunity of very few.

Further, my association with the dye industry, since commencing this book,
leaves me with a deep conviction of the critical importance for disarmament,
of a world redistribution of organic chemical production.  It is inevitable
that such a step should benefit the growing organic chemical industries
of countries other than Germany, but this issue need not be shirked.
The importance of the matter is so vital that it eclipses all reproach
that the disarmament argument for the maintenance of the dye industry
is used on selfish grounds.  Such reproach cannot, in fairness,
be heard unless it destroys the case which we have established.
We are faced with the following alternatives.  Safety demands strong
organic chemical industries or cumbersome and burdensome chemical
warfare establishments.  The stability of future peace depends upon
the former, and the extent to which we must establish, or can abandon,
the latter depends entirely on the activity and success of those whose
special duty it is to organise against war.

A recent visit to America revealed the considerable publicity and public
interest surrounding chemical warfare, strengthening my conviction that
the facts, now noised abroad, should be presented in their proper setting.
They are supremely significant at the present time and for the future,
hence the chapters which follow.
                         V. LEFEBURE.
     HAMPSTEAD, _October_ 12, 1920.



PREFACE BY FIELD MARSHAL FOCH


In 1918, chemical warfare had developed considerably in our army.
Before 1914 Germany possessed chemical factories which permitted
her to manufacture in great quantities chemicals used at the front,
and to develop on a large scale this new form of fighting.

The Allies, to retaliate, had to experiment and organise important
centres for production.  Only in this way, though starting late,
were they able to put themselves in a position to supply the growing
necessities of their armies.

To-day, the ability for aviation to carry increasing weight furnishes a new
method for abundantly spreading poison gases with the aid of stronger and
stronger bombs, and to reach armies, the centres of population in the rear,
or to render regions uninhabitable.

Chemical warfare is therefore in a condition to produce more formidable
results over more extended areas.

It is incontestable on the other hand that this growth will find an easy
realisation in one country, Germany, addicted in times of peace,
to wholesale manufacture of chemical products, which a simple modification
in reactions can transform into war products.

This country, deprived, partially at least, of its former methods of fighting,
and its numerous forces of specially trained soldiers, regularly organised
and strongly armed, will be more drawn toward the new systems of attack--
that of chemical warfare.

Chemical warfare must therefore enter into our future provisions
and preparations, if we do not wish to experience some terrible surprises.

The work of Major Lefebure gives an exact idea of the possibilities he finds
to-day in Germany, and through them the dangers with which she threatens us.
In this form it constitutes a warning; and information of the highest order,
for the minds who remain anxious for the fate of their country confronted
by the inefficience of the old fighting methods which the progress of industry
out of date renders daily.

By sounding the alarm in both our countries, I find myself in company
with my faithful friend Field Marshal Sir Henry Wilson.  This is an
old habit, contracted by both of us, many years ago, which we still
maintain at the present time to insure for ourselves once again,
peace in the future.

Together, we say, read this work of Major Lefebure.  F. FOCH.



CONTENTS PAGE CHAPTER I-EXPLANATORY The Riddle of the
Rhine-A Critical Point in Disarmament-Need for a Balanced View
of Chemical Warfare-Some Preliminary Explanation--"Poison Gas"
a Misleading Term-The French Physiological Classification-Asphyxiating
Substances-Toxic Substances-Lachrymators-Vesicant or
Blistering Compounds-Sneezing or Sternutatory Substances-The
Tactical Classification-Persistent Substances-Non-persistent
Substances-Penetrants-Special Gas Weapons and Appliances-Gas Shell.
17

CHAPTER II-THE GERMAN SURPRISE The First Cloud Gas Attack-The Element
of Surprise -Lord Kitchener's Protest-German Preparations--
Research-Production-Field Preparations-German Opinion of
Results-Germany Prompted by Production Monopoly-Standard Uses
for Gas-Gas Shell-Further German Cloud Attacks-Hill 60-Origin of
German Gas Shell-Early German Gas Shell-A Successful Experiment-Lachrymators
at Loos, 1915-The Flammenwerfer-German Phosgene Clouds-Gas and
the Eastern Theatre-Conclusion. 31

CHAPTER III-THE ALLIED REACTION The Need of Retaliation-First Signs-The
Loos Attack, September, 1915-The Somme Battle, 1916--Reasons for
British Cloud Gas Success-Our Casualties-Exhausting Preparations
for Cloud Attack-The Livens Projector-British Gas Shell-German Gas
Shell Development, 1916-Main Features of the Period.  48

CHAPTER IV-INTENSIVE CHEMICAL WARFARE The Mustard Gas Surprise-Blue
Cross-German Emphasis on Gas Shell-The German Projector-German Projector
Improvements-Dyes in Gas Shell--German Flame Projectors-Their Origin-Further
Flame Development-The 1918 Offensive-Ludendorff's Testimony-Preparations
for Assault-Gas Defensive Flank at Armentieres-Fixed Gas Barrage at
Kemmel-Percentage of Chemical Shell-Gas Re-Contents

PAGE treat Tactics-General Hartley's Analysis-Percentage of German Gas Shell
in Enemy Dumps-Forced Exhaustion of Stocks-Yperite, French Mustard Gas-Effect
on German Gas Discipline-Allied Gas Statistics-Critical Importance of
Rapid German Production.  66

CHAPTER V-CHEMICAL WARFARE ORGANISATIONS German
Research-Leverkusen-Hochst-Ludwigshaven-Early Formulation of Policy-Movements
of Personnel-German Simplicity of Organisation-German Organisation at the
Front-The Gas Regiment--Early German Gas School-New Gas Regiments-Gas Shell
Experts-Inspection of Protective Masks and Method-British Field Organisation--
"Breach" Organisations-Central Laboratory-New Type of Casualty~Directorate
of Gas Services-British Home Organisations-The Royal Society-Royal
Society Chemical Sub-Committee-The Trench Warfare Department-Scientific
Advisory Committee -Commercial Advisory Committee-Split Between Research
and Supply-Munitions Inventions Department-Imperial College of Science-The
Chemical Warfare Department-The Anti-Gas Department -Designs Committee
French Organisation-Italian Developments-Supply Organisations-British Supply
Organisation-Allied Handicaps-The German Solution--Departmental Difficulties--
Allied Success Against Odds-Allied Lack of Vision in Production-British Lag
in Organisation-French and American Characteristics-Inter-Allied
Chemical Warfare Liaison-Inter-Allied Supply-Nature of
Chemical Warfare Research-Discovery of New Substances-Technical Method of
Preparation-Filling Problem-Protection-Half Scale Investigation-Two Classes
of Research-Conclusion-The "Outer and Inner Lines."  85

CHAPTER VI-THE STRUGGLE FOR THE INITIATIVE Meaning of the
Chemical Initiative-Controlling Factors--Rapid Manufacture Rapid
Identification Essential-Propaganda and Morale-Peculiar Peace-time
Danger-War Fluctuations of Initiative-The Tense Protective
Struggle-The German Mask-Enforced German Modifications-Shortage
of Rubber-Gas Discipline-Summary-New German Attempts-Yellow and
Blue Cross-Yellow Cross-Blue Cross-"Particulate" Clouds-Potential Production
and Peace.  lit

Contents PAGE CHAPTER VII-REVIEW OF PRODUCTION Critical Importance
of Production-Significance of the German Dye Industry--The Interessen
Gemeinschaft-War Production by the I.G.-Allied Difficulties-Conclusion. 143

CHAPTER VIII-AMERICAN DEVELOPMENTS Special Attention justified-Special Value
of American Opinion-Early American Activities-Field Activities -Special
Difficulties-Edgewood Arsenal-Research--Production-Post-Armistice
Developments-Views of General Fries-The Gas Cloud Inescapable-Importance
of Smoke-Casualty Percent ages-Short Range Projectors-Vast Expansion
in Personnel.  173

CHAPTER IX-GERMAN CHEMICAL POLICY Origin of German Chemical Monopolies-German
Chemical Commercial Policy-Evidence of the U. S. A. Alien Property
Custodian-Pre-war American Situation--German Price Cutting--Salicylic Acid--
Full Line Forcing--Bribery and Corruption--German Patent Policy--Propaganda
and Information--Espionage-Activities of the Dye Agencies-Manoeuvring Raw
Materials-Chemical Exchange Association -Doctor Albert's Letter-Dye Agency
Information System-Dr. Albert on Chemical Warfare-The Moral Aspect-Report
of the New York World-German Policy Regarding Dye Supplies to the
U. S. A.--Professor Stieglitz's Evidence Ehrlich's Discovery--Drugs and
Medicinal Products-The German Monopoly-National Health Insurance
Commission-The Royal Society--Novocain--Beta-Eucaine--Photographic
Chemicals-War Activities of the I.G.-The Rhine Factories and
the Armistice-War Mentality of the I.G.-German Attitude towards
Inspection-The Rhine and Chaulny Contrast-German Revolution and
the Industrial Leaders-The German Peace Delegation -Recent Signs of
Government Interest-Nitrogen Fixation-The German Nitrogen Syndicate-Haber
Process Prominent-The New German Dye Combine -Aggressive Nationalist Policy.
186

CHAPTER X-LINES OF FUTURE DEVELOPMENT The Element of
Speculation-Chemical Tactics and Strategy-New War Chemicals--"Camouflage"
Chemicals-Functions Hitherto Immune-Chemical Constitution and
Physiological Action-Unsolved Prob-

Contents PAGE lems of Mustard Gas-A New Type of Obstacle--
The "Persistent Lethal" Substance-The Critical Range-The New
No-Man's-Land-The "Alert Gas Zone"--Gas and Aircraft-Protective
Development -Individual Protection-Collective Protection-Conclusion. 215

CHAPTER XI-HUMANE OR INHUMANE?  Nature of Gas Casualties-Sargent's
Picture-Need for Safeguards.  238

CHAPTER XII-CHEMICAL WARFARE AND DISARMAMENT The Treaty of
Versailles-German Information-Limitation of Armament-Report of the Hartley
Mission -New Conceptions in Chemical Disarmament-Limitation Mechanical and
Chemical-Tank Disarmament -Chemical Limitation-Research-Production-Mechanical
and Chemical Preparations for War-Recent Disarmament Proposals-The Covenant
of the League Need for Guarantees-Viscount Grey, "Germany must disarm first'~--
Suggested Methods--"Vested Interests"--"Handing Over" Inventions-Neglect of
Chemical Disarmament in the Treaty.  242

CONCLUSION-THE TREATY OF THE FUTURE.  264



ILLUSTRATIONS

THE LIVENS PROJECTOR-I. _Frontispiece_

A completed battery of projectors in the foreground, with a battery
on the left rear, half dug in.  Suitably camouflaged with brush,
the batteries are not observable by aircraft, and, being in
"No-Man's-Land," neither party can detect them by day.

                                                   FACING
                                                   PAGE
TYPICAL GAS SHELL BURSTING.  30

THE LIVENS PROJECTOR-II 61

A working party fitting electric leads and adjusting bombs prior
to discharge.  This work occurs at night.

THE LIVENS PROJECTOR-III. 133 Explosion of Livens bombs on the objective.

SMOKE BARRAGE.  181

Note the sharp curtain which is formed, behind which the infantry advance.



INTRODUCTION


No one who has the welfare of the country at heart can fail to share
Major Lefebure's anxiety that a clear, accurate, and unbiased
account of chemical warfare should be presented to the public,
so that the many erroneous ideas now prevalent in regard to poison
gas and its uses may be dispelled.

The whole subject of chemical warfare is at present _sub judice_,
and there is great danger that the future safety of this
country may be jeopardised by the almost universal ignorance
of the peculiarities and potentialities of this class of warfare.
Recent publications in the Press have shown a tendency to deal
with the subject on purely sentimental grounds, and attempts
have been made to declare this form of warfare illegitimate
without full and careful consideration of all the facts and their
significance for the future.

Major Lefebure has therefore attempted in his book to make it quite
clear that no convention, guarantee, or disarmament safeguard will
prevent an unscrupulous enemy from employing poison gas, especially if
that enemy has discovered some new powerful agent, or possesses,
as Germany does in her well-organised and strong chemical industry,
a ready means for producing such chemicals in bulk at practically
a moment's notice; further, that the safety of this country makes it
imperative that the study and investigation of the subject should be
continued and that our chemical and dye industry should be developed,
so that when an emergency arises we may have the necessary facilities
for supply ready to hand.

It is not for me to express any opinion here either as to the desirability
of using gas as a weapon or as to the possibility of preventing an enemy from
using it.  But I am convinced that a decision come to without full knowledge
of the facts may involve grave danger and heavy preventable loss of life.
I am further convinced that Major Lefebure, by his special knowledge
and long experience as chemical liaison officer during the war, is well
qualified to speak, and that his opinion is entitled to full consideration.
For these reasons I think that his book will do a much needed public service.
I wish it every success, and the greatest possible number of readers.
HENRY WILSON, F.M.



CHAPTER 1

EXPLANATORY


The Riddle of the Rhine.--The Great War challenged our very existence.
But with the tension released, and the Allies victorious,
the check to the German menace appears crushing and complete.
Few realise that one formidable challenge has not been answered.
Silently menacing, the chemical threat remains unrecognised.
How, asks the reader, can this be?  Are we not aware of the poison
gas campaign?  Indeed, we have not yet grasped the simple technical
facts of the case, and these are merely the outward signs of a
deep-rooted menace whose nature, activities, and potentialities
are doubly important because so utterly unsuspected by those whom
they most threaten.

How many of us, for example, realise that the Germans relied
mainly on gas for success in the great March assault of 1918,
which threatened to influence the destinies of the world.
Yet Ludendorff goes out of his way to tell us how much he counted upon it.
How many understand that the 1918 hostilities were no longer a war
of explosives.  German guns were firing more than fifty per cent.
of gas and war chemical.  But a deep study of such war facts reveals
a much more significant matter.

All are aware of the enormous national enterprises built to fulfil our
explosives programme.  With mushroom-like growth chemical establishments
of a magnitude hitherto unknown in England arose to meet our crying needs.
What was the German equivalent, and where were the huge reservoirs of gas
and war chemical which filled those countless shells?  Krupp, of Essen,
loomed large in the mind of every Allied citizen and soldier.
There lay the sinews of war in the making.  But the guns were useless
without their message.  Who provided it?  A satisfactory answer
to this question demands an examination of the great German I.G.,
the Interessen Gemeinschaft, the world power in organic chemical enterprise,
whose monopoly existence threatened to turn the tide of war against us.
This organisation emerges from the war with renewed and greater strength.
Our splendid but improvised factories drained the vital forces of
the nation, and now lie idle, while German war chemical production fed
new life blood and grafted new tissue to the great pre-war factories
of the I.G., which, if she will, she can use against us in the future.
I do not claim that this German combine has at present any direct economic
or military policy against world peace.  In any case, the facts must
speak for themselves.  But the following pages will prove that the mere
existence of the complete German monopoly, represented by the forces
of the I.G., however free from suspicion might be the mentality and morals
of those directing its activities, constitutes, in itself, a serious menace.
It is, if you will, a monster camouflaged floating mine in the troubled
sea of world peace, which the forces of reconstruction have left unswept.
The existence of this giant monopoly raises vital military and economic
questions, which are, indeed, "The Riddle of the Rhine."

Impersonal Examination of Fact.--In a sound examination
of the subject it becomes necessary to examine the activities
of our former enemies very closely.  Even adopting a mild
view of the case, their reputation has not been unattacked,
and is not left untarnished.  We, however, have no desire to renew
such attacks, but we wish our statement to be coldly reliable.
National and international issues are at stake which require
a background unprejudiced by war emotion.

Placed in a similar predicament, in reporting to his Government
of the methods of German economic aggression in the United States
of America, Mr. Mitchell Palmer, the Alien Property Custodian,
expressed himself as follows:

"I do not advocate any trade boycott out of spirit of revenge
or in retaliation for injuries done to the United States.  I do
not want to continue the war after the war.  I am for peace.
I believe that the great overshadowing result which has come from this
war is the assurance of peace almost everlasting amongst the peoples
of the earth.  I would help to make that an absolute certainty
by refusing to permit Germany to prosecute a war after the war.
The military arm of her war machine has been palsied by the tremendous
hammering of the allied powers.  But her territory was not invaded,
and if she can get out of the war with her home territory intact,
rebuild a stable government, and still have her foreign markets
subject to her exploitation, by means no less foul and unfair
than those which she has employed on the field of battle,
we shall not be safe from future onslaughts different in methods,
but with the same purpose that moved her on that fateful day in July
when she set out to conquer the world."

Ours is a fair standpoint.  Let us know the facts of the chemical
war into which Germany impelled us.  Let us examine its mainsprings,
in conception and action, see how far they can be explained
in terms of pre-war Germany, and how far they remain ready
to function in the much desired peace which they threaten.
If the result be unpleasant, let us not hide our heads in the sand,
but exercise a wise vigilance, choose what precautions are available
and consistent with our plans for world peace.

A Critical Point in Disarmament.--Probably never before in the history
of man has Disarmament figured as such a vitally urgent national
and international measure.  Discussions and official utterances reveal
a very disquieting tendency.

When compared with the methods, armament and materials of
the war in 1914, those of 1918 reveal basic changes which a
hundred years of former peace could not have brought about.
These developments are not merely of fact, but they represent
the opening of new fields, visions of possibilities previously
undreamed of by the practical soldier.  By the concentrated
application of electricity, chemistry, and other sciences to war
two dominating factors have emerged, whose importance to war,
and danger for world peace, can only gain momentum with time.
The scientific or technical initiative, the invention of a deadly
new chemical, wireless-directed aeroplane, or other war appliance
and their incidence on war through large scale production in
the convertible industries of peace constitute a challenge which,
if unanswered by practical schemes for world disarmament,
will render the latter worse than useless, by aggravating the danger
of sudden decisive attack in an otherwise disarmed world.

There is a tendency to ignore this aspect of disarmament.  We appear
to be thinking in terms of a world still organised for war on 1914 lines.
The disbanding of the German army and semi-military organisations,
and the reduction of her artillery and small arms seem to occupy
all our attention.  Such, it might be urged, is the immediate need;
we can leave the future to find answers to the other problems.
This answer is dangerous, for it ignores the disarmament aspect
of what is perhaps the most important development in the modern
offensive campaign.  We refer to poison gas or chemical warfare.
This, the crux of all disarmament, is dealt with at some length
in the chapters which follow.

A curiously illogical attitude of mind has arisen in certain quarters.
There is a tendency among strong adherents to the ideal
of world peace to regard themselves as its sole possessors.
Every thinking civilian and soldier must adhere to such an ideal;
the only point at issue is the method of approaching it.
The mere fact that a League of Nations is called into being
to attain world peace implies recognition of the fact
that a definite mechanism and definite measures are required
for the purpose; this is self-evident. There are those who,
having established their League of Nations, feel that they
can attain chemical peace by merely prohibiting chemical war,
in other words, they expect their mechanism to achieve its object
without functioning, to attain peace by its mere existence.
Just as special measures are required to control disarmament
in the older branches of warfare, in the same way special measures,
but not the same measures, are required to control the chemical peace.
Chemical peace guaranteed by a mere signature is no peace at all.

In a recent Press utterance we find an appeal to prohibit chemical
warfare and to "trust the general sentiment of the civilised
world to say that the lesson has been learnt in that sense."
"There is the League of Nations to furnish that sentiment
with a mouthpiece and a sanction."  We agree, but to stop there
is dangerous, the most important thing which it must furnish
is a mechanism of control, a check, or guarantee.  This question
is one of the most important which confronts us for world peace.
It merits the most careful consideration.

Even responsible and relevant officials who admit that their League must
do more than issue edicts, that their mechanism must function, are ignoring
the specific technical aspect of the war methods whose use we wish to limit.
This matter will receive later attention.

The following pages, therefore, are an attempt to represent the salient points
in the development of chemical warfare, its causes, results, and future.
Such an attempt cannot limit itself to merely British developments, and this
is not a final detailed memoir of British chemical warfare.  Further, in
considering the future, we examine another aspect of chemical warfare.
Facts lead us to believe that it was purely the most open and obvious
activity in a whole campaign of chemical aggression which had effective
unity of conception and direction long before the war started.

Need for a Balanced View of Chemical Warfare.--The facts of chemical
warfare have probably been less ventilated than those of any other
important war development.  Yet no subject has aroused more general and
intense feeling.  Tanks, aircraft, the different campaigns, enemy memoirs,
and a variety of war subjects, have received a considerable measure
of publicity, some more than full measure.  Grave questions are pending
in which the chemical aspect of national defence is a prominent factor.
However willing the individual concerned, he cannot make a sound judgment
on the brief technical or popular garbled versions which have appeared.
One searches in vain for balanced and detailed statements on the question.
This may be due in no way to lack of intention, but to lack of opportunity.
Therefore, no excuse is needed for this contribution, but rather
an apology for the obscurity which has so far surrounded the subject.
What is the cause of this emotional or almost hysterical background from
which a clear definition of the matter is only now beginning to emerge?
Circumstances are to blame; the first open act of chemical warfare
decided the matter.

This event, the first German cloud gas attack at Ypres, arriving at
the peak of allied indignation against a series of German abuses,
in particular with regard to the treatment of prisoners,
left the world aghast at the new atrocity.  Further, its use
against entirely unprotected troops was particularly revolting.
The fact that such a cloud of chlorine would have passed the 1918
armies untouched behind their modern respirators, could not be
known to, nor appreciated by the relatives of the 1915 casualties.
But the emotion and indignation called forth by the first use of gas
has survived a period of years, at the end of which the technical
facts would no longer, of themselves, justify such feeling.
We would hesitate to do anything which might dispel this emotional
momentum were we not convinced that, unaccompanied by knowledge,
it becomes a very grave danger.  If we felt that the announcement
of an edict was sufficient to suppress chemical warfare we would
gladly stimulate any public emotion to create such an edict.
But therein lies the danger.  Owing to certain technical peculiarities,
which can be clearly revealed by examination of the facts,
it is impossible to suppress chemical warfare in this way.
As well try to suppress disease by forbidding its recurrence.
But we can take precaution against disease, and the following
examination will show clearly that we can take similar precautions
against the otherwise permanent menace of chemical war.
Further, backed by such precautions, a powerful international
edict has value.

It is, therefore, our intention to present a reasoned account of the
development of poison gas, or chemical warfare, during the recent war.
But to leave the matter there would be misleading and culpable,
for, however interesting the simple facts of the chemical campaign,
they owed their being to a combination of forces, whose nature
and significance for the future are infinitely more important.
The chief cause of the chemical war was an unsound and dangerous
world distribution of industrial organic chemical forces.
Unless some readjustment occurs, this will remain the "point faible"
in world disarmament.  We, therefore, propose to examine the relationships
between chemical industry, war, and disarmament.

Some Preliminary Explanation.--The chemistry of war, developed under
the stress of the poison gas campaign, is of absorbing chemical
and technical interest, but it has none the less a general appeal.
When its apparently disconnected and formidable facts are revealed
as an essential part of a tense struggle in which move and counter-move
followed swiftly one upon the other, its appeal becomes much wider.
Therefore, in order not to confuse the main issue in the following
chapters by entering upon tiresome definitions, it is proposed to conclude
the present chapter by explaining, simply, a number of chemical warfare
conceptions with which the expert is probably well acquainted.

"Poison Gas" a Misleading Term--Poison gas is a misleading term, and.
our subject is much better described as "chemical, warfare."
Let us substantiate this by examining briefly the types of chemicals
which were used.  In the first place they were not all gases;
the tendency during the war was towards the use of liquids and solids.
Even the chemicals which appeared as gases on the field of battle
were transported and projected as liquids, produced by compression.
As the poison war developed, a large number of different
chemicals became available for use by the opposing armies.
These can he classified, either according to their tactical use,
or according to their physiological effects on man.

The British, French, American, and German armies all tended to the final
adoption of a tactical classification, but the French emphasised
the physiological side.  Let us use their classification as a basis
for a review of the chief chemicals concerned.

The French Physiological Classification;--Asphyxiating Substances;--
Toxic Substances;--Chemicals or poison gases were either asphyxiating,
toxic, lachrymatory, vesicant, or sternutatory.  It is perfectly true
that the asphyxiating and toxic substances, used during the war,
produced a higher percentage of deaths than the other three classes,
but the latter were responsible for many more casualties.
The so-called asphyxiating gases produced their effect by producing lesions
and congestion in the pulmonary system, causing death by suffocation.
The best known substances of this type was chlorine, employed in the liquid
state in cylinders on the occasion of the first German gas attack,
but the most formidable were phosgene (an important substance required
in the manufacture of dyes), diphosgene, chlor-picrin, made from bleaching
powder and picric acid, brom-acetone, which was also a powerful lachrymator,
and diphenylchlorarsine, known as sneezing gas, the first sternutatory
or sneezing compound to appear on the front in large quantities.
The toxic compounds were so called because of their specific effect upon
particular parts of the organism such as, for example, the nervous system.
The chief example, with regard to the military value of which there
has been much dispute, was prussic, or hydrocyanic, acid.  The French
had definite evidence of the mortal effect of this compound upon
German gunners, but it was doubted by other Allies whether French gas
shell produced a sufficient concentration of gas to be of military value.
It was a kill or cure compound, for recovery was rapid from any
concentration which did not produce death.

A prominent Cambridge physiologist, in the heat of the controversy
on this matter, made a very brave and self-sacrificing experiment.
He entered a chamber of prussic acid which was sufficiently
concentrated to cause the death of other animals which were present.
They were removed in time, and he escaped because the concentration
was not a mortal one for man.  This was, in a sense, an _experimentum
crucis_ and, although it did not disprove the extreme danger
of prussic acid, if employed in high concentrations, it showed,
on the other hand, that it was difficult to gauge the military
value by field experiments; battle results were necessary.
The Germans' disappointment with the use of arsenic compounds
confirms this need for battle evidence.

Lachrymators.--There is hardly need to dwell on the next class,
the lachrymator.  These compounds were employed on a large scale
to produce temporary blindness by lachrymation, or weeping.
We give later some interesting examples of their use on the front.
It is an arresting thought that even as early as 1887
Professor Baeyer, the renowned organic chemist of Munich,
in his lectures to advanced students, included a reference
to the military value of these compounds.

Vesicant or Blistering Compounds.--It was the introduction of
the fourth, the vesicant class, which revealed, more than any other
enemy move, the great possibilities inherent in chemical warfare.
These compounds, the chief of which was mustard gas, produced vesicant,
or skin burning, effects, which, although rarely mortal,
were sufficient to put a man out of action for a number of months.
Mustard gas resulted from pure scientific investigation as early as 1860.
Victor Meyer, the famous German chemist, described the substance in 1884,
indicating its skin-blistering effects.  There is evidence of further
investigation in German laboratories a year before the outbreak of war,
and whatever the motive for this work, we know that mustard gas
must have received the early attention of the German War Office,
for it was approved and in production early in 1917.
Although the Medecin aide-major Chevalier of the French services
drew attention to its importance in 1916, the French had no serious
thought of using mustard gas, and did not realise its possibilities
until the German battle experiment of July, 1917.  It is not
generally known, however, that other vesicant compounds were employed,
notably some of the arsenic compounds, and the Germans were researching
on substances of this nature which gave great promise of success.
Mustard gas provides a striking example of the organic way
in which chemical warfare is bound up with the dye industry.
The compounds required for its manufacture were those which had been
made on a large scale by the I.G. for the production of indigo.
World indigo monopoly meant possession of a potential mustard gas
surprise on the outbreak of war.

Sneezing or Sternutatory Substances.--The last class,
the sternutatory substances, produced the familiar sneezing
effect which was accompanied by intense pain and irritation
of the nose, throat, and respiratory channels.  They were mostly
arsenic compounds and were not only sternutatory but also toxic,
producing the after effects of arsenic poisoning.

The Tactical Classification.--From the point of view of our account
of chemical warfare, however, the physiological classification
of these substances is not so important as the tactical and,
indeed, once this grouping of the substances is understood,
a profound knowledge of their chemical nature is not necessary.

Persistent Substances.--Two main classes exist from the tactical
Point of view.  There are those "persistent" substances which
remain for a long time on the soil or on the object on which they
are sprayed by shell, while retaining their dangerous effect.
Mustard gas was the chief example, but some of the lachrymators
were just as persistent.  By their use it is possible to render
ground uninhabitable or ineffective for military movement.
The combination of the vesicant and persistent properties of mustard
gas rendered it a powerful military factor.

Non-Persistent Substances.--On the other hand, there are the relatively
volatile substances, such as phosgene, which can be used immediately
before an attack.  The chief sternutatory compound, diphenylchlorarsine,
although not volatile, could also be used in this way, for, being a solid
and in a very finely pulverised state, its presence on the ground was
not a distinct danger, and it invited chemical decomposition.

Penetrants.--The Germans introduced an additional tactical group.
This comprised pulverised substances able to penetrate the mask
on account of their existence as minute particles.  The Germans
expressed these tactical conceptions by their shell markings.
The familiar Green Cross represented the slightly persistent,
volatile, lethal compounds, such as phosgene and diphosgene.
The German gunner had no need to know the content of his gas
shell so long as he could identify the cross.  Yellow Cross,
representing mustard gas, was the most highly persistent type.
It is interesting to speculate whether a new persistent compound,
whose military value was due to some other property than the blistering,
would have been grouped under Yellow Cross.  Logically, this should
have been done.  Blue Cross covered the arsenic group of compounds,
which were non-persistent and were expected to penetrate the mask.
So strong was this tactical conception that the Allies were on
the verge of adopting a uniform shell marking based on this
principle throughout their armies.

Special Gas Weapons and Appliances.--It is a popular misconception
that gas was only discharged from cylinders in huge clouds,
or used as artillery shell.  A number of special weapons developed,
which were particularly adapted for gas.  Thus, the Livens projector,
which was a great Allied advance, produced a gas cloud a long distance
from the point of discharge, while the Stokes and other short range
guns were used for rapid fire of large numbers of gas shell.

The primary conceptions with regard to protection have been brought
home to so many, through the fact that the mask was a part of the
equipment of every soldier, that we need not dwell on them here.
It is not generally realised, however, that every modification
introduced by either side was a vital and direct counter to some enemy
move planned to render the protection of the opponent ineffective.

Gas Shell.--A word is necessary to define the use of gas shell.
The point which must be realised is that gas, and in
particular gas shell, fulfilled a special purpose in warfare,
from which it was much more suitable than explosives.
The use for neutralising batteries, cross roads, and rendering
whole areas uninhabitable, is developed fully in our reference
to the great German attacks in 1918.

With this brief sketch to clear the ground, we can embark more freely
upon the account of chemical warfare which follows.  CHAPTER II

THE GERMAN SURPRISE

Ypres, April, 1915, to the Somme, August, 1916.


The First Cloud Gas Attack.--The critical factor of surprise in war
was never nearer decisive success than on April 22nd, 1915.
Of this, the occasion of the first German gas attack
at Ypres, Field-Marshal Sir J. D. P. French Stated:


"Following a heavy bombardment, the enemy attacked the French Division
at about 5 p.m., using asphyxiating gases for the first time.
Aircraft reported that at about 5 p.m. thick yellow smoke had
been seen issuing from the German trenches between Langemarck
and Bixschoote.  What follows almost defies description.
The effect of these poisonous gases was so virulent as to render
the whole of the line held by the French Division mentioned above
practically incapable of any action at all.  It was at first
impossible for any one to realise what had actually happened.
The smoke and fumes hid everything from sight, and hundreds of men
were thrown into a comatose or dying condition, and within an hour
the whole position had to be abandoned, together with about fifty guns.
I wish particularly to repudiate any idea of attaching the least
blame to the French Division for this unfortunate incident."

The Element of Surprise.--The enemy just missed colossal success rendered
possible by the use of an entirely new war method; one contrary to engagements
entered into by them at the Hague Convention.

There were elements in this first gas attack which were absent
even from the situation created by our first use of tanks.
Unfamiliarity amongst the troops, or the staff, for that matter,
created an atmosphere of unparalleled confusion.
Men attempted to protect themselves by burying their mouths
and nostrils in the loose earth.  Those chemists, on the spot,
not immediately struck down, made frantic efforts to bring up
supplies of any suitable and available chemical or material
which might assist resistance and movement in the affected zone.
Paying every homage to the heroic sacrifices and brave actions
which characterised the Allied resistance, we cannot ignore
the fact that morale must have been very severely shaken locally,
and that a general disquiet and uneasiness must have permeated
the whole front until measures were known to be effectively
in progress, not only for protection, but for retaliation.
The enemy had but to exploit the attack fully to break through
to the channel ports, but failed to do so.  The master mind
behind this new and deadly attack was not, let us remember,
that of a soldier.  It was very strongly rumoured that this
monstrous conception and its execution were due to one or,
at the most, two renowned German Professors.  The first hammer
blow in the enemy chemical campaign was a two-party conspiracy,
led by world-famous scientists and the powerful I.G. with the German
army unconvinced but expectant, little more than a willing dupe.

Lord Kitchener's Protest.--In his spirited protest in the House
of Lords, Lord Kitchener stated:  "The Germans have, in the last week,
introduced a method of placing their opponents _hors de combat_
by the use of asphyxiating and deleterious gases, and they
employ these poisonous methods to prevail when their attack,
according to the rules of war, might have otherwise failed.
On this subject I would remind your Lordships that Germany was
a signatory to the following article in the Hague Convention:


" `The Contracting Powers agree to abstain from the use of projectiles
the object of which is the diffusion of asphyxiating or deleterious gases.'
"


This protest circulated amongst neutrals prompted numerous
attempts at vindication in the German Press.  In several cases we
find important newspapers arguing that the German attack was not
contrary to the Hague Convention, while others admitted the breach,
but claimed that the Germans merely followed Allied example.
The main technical excuse was that the effect of the German gas was
merely stupefying (_Colniche Zeitung_, June, 1915). It is incredible
that the German nation was, or could allow itself to be, so hoodwinked.
Scientific Germany was certainly aware of the true nature of the gases used.
Even scientific neutrals in Berlin at the outbreak of war, and during
the ensuing winter, were aware of the German poison gas work,
which commenced, in an organised way, almost as soon as war broke out.
The Germans have argued that they only entertained the idea of gas
after Allied use.  The facts revealed below are a sufficient answer.
Whatever legal arguments may be involved, there is no doubt as
to German intention.

We do not wish to enter into a comprehensive examination of the legal aspect
of the first use of cloud and shell gas by Germany.  Whatever complicated
arguments may turn upon the strict reading of a phrase in the records
of the Hague Convention, we have no doubt whatever as to the desires
and intentions of the Assembly, and we regard Germany (and the Allies)
as morally engaged not to venture upon the series of chemical
enterprises which she openly commenced with the Ypres cloud attack.
The Versailles Treaty also renders fruitless any such discussion.
Article 171, accepted by Germany, is deliberately based on her breach
of International Convention.

German Preparations.--A significant phrase occurs in the
Field-Marshal's despatch.  "The brain power and thought which has
evidently been at work before this unworthy method of making
war reached the pitch of efficiency which has been demonstrated
in its practice shows that the Germans must have harboured
these designs for a long time."  This is a most important point.
It was argued by many generous and fairminded people in April, 1915,
that the German use of gas was the result of a sudden decision,
only arrived at in a desperate effort to terminate the war.
This point of view would give us maximum hope for the future.
But the actual truth?  What do we know about German preparations,
and how far back do they date?  Any preparations which occurred
must have covered research on the compounds to be employed and on
the protection required for the German troops, their training
for the cloud attack, and the design and production of the special
appliances to be used.  Finally, the production of the chemicals
themselves had to be faced.

Research.--We have obtained an insight into the German research
preparations, which leaves no doubt as to their intention.
There is evidence that the Kaiser Wilhelm Institute and
the physico-chemical institute near by were employed for this
purpose as early as August, 1914.  Reliable authority exists
for the statement that soon after this date they were working
with cacodyl oxide and phosgene, both well known before the war
for their very poisonous nature, for use, it was believed,
in hand grenades.  Our quotations are from a statement
by a neutral then working at the Institute.  "We could hear
the tests that Professor Haber was carrying out at the back
of the Institute, with the military authorities, who in their
steel-grey cars came to Haber's Institute every morning."
"The work was pushed day and night, and many times I saw
activity in the building at eleven o'clock in the evening.
It was common knowledge that Haber was pushing these men
as hard as he could."  Sachur was Professor Haber's assistant.
"One morning there was a violent explosion in the room
in which most of this war work was carried out.  The room
was instantly filled with dense clouds of arsenic oxide."
"The janitors began to clear the room by a hose and discovered
Professor Sachur."  He was very badly hurt and died soon after.
"After that accident I believe the work on cacodyl oxide
and phosgene was suspended and I believe that work was carried
out on chlorine or chlorine compounds."  "There were seven
or eight men working in the Institute on these problems,
but we heard nothing more until Haber went to the Battle
of Ypres."  Rumours to this effect circulated in 1915.

Production.--Preparations, for production can easily be imagined.
The Germans first used chlorine for cloud gas, and certain
lachrymators for shell.  The chlorine was readily available.
At about this time British liquid chlorine capacity had a
maximum daily output of about one ton, while along the Rhine
alone the production was more than forty times greater.
The question of German chlorine production was, therefore,
already solved.  The lachrymators were mainly raw materials
and intermediates of the dye industry submitted to a process,
the technique of which the German dye factories readily mastered.
Here, again, production presented no real difficulties.
Cylinders were also probably available from the industry.

Field Preparations.--There remains the last question of gas attack
technique and personnel.  Those of us who remember the difficulties
involved in creating our own organisation in the summer of 1915
have no illusions on the question of German preparation.
Giving the Germans every credit for their technical and military
efficiency, some months must have been occupied in establishing
and training the special companies required, and in arriving
at a satisfactory design for the discharge appliances.
Schwarte's book, _Die Technik Im Weltkriege_,[1] tells us "specially
organised and trained troops" were required for the purpose.
Prisoners taken later revealed the German methods.  Gas officers
and N.C.O.'s, after making a careful survey of the front line trench,
organised the digging of deep narrow trenches at suitable places
below the surface of the main trench, just underneath the parapet.
The heavy gas cylinders, weighing as much as ninety pounds,
were carried to the front line by the unfortunate infantry.
The discharge valves were carefully protected by domes which screwed
on to the cylinder.  The latter were introduced into the holes,
tops flush with the trench bottom, and covered by a board
on which reposed the "Salzdecke," a kind of long bag stuffed
with some such material as peat moss and soaked in potash
solution to absorb any slight gas leakages.  Three layers of
sandbags were built above the salzdecke to protect the cylinder
from shell fragments and to form a firestep for the infantry.
This concealed the cylinders so efficiently that, in our own trenches,
I have often found the new occupants of a sector ignorant
of the presence of gas cylinders under their own firesteps.
On the favourable night the dome was removed and a lead pipe
was connected to the cylinder and directed over the parapet
into No Man's Land, with the nozzle weighed down by a sandbag.
The pioneers stood by the batteries of twenty cylinders each
and let off the gas a fixed few minutes after a rocket signal,
at which the infantry retired to leave the front line free
for the pioneers, who not only ran the risk of gassing from
defective appliances but were subjected to almost immediate
violent bombardment from the opposing artillery.  When surprise
was complete artillery retaliation was very late in developing.
This gives a faint idea of the elaborate preparations required.
They must have been doubly arduous and lengthy on the very first
occasion of cloud gas attack.


[1] _Die Technik Im Weltkriegre_.  Publisher:  Mittler, Berlin, 1920.


German Opinion of Results.--We can now regard the chlorine attack
of April 22, 1915, as the first and successful result of a huge
German experiment on a new method of war, the pioneer work
of which actually began at (if not before) the outbreak of war.
Quoting again from Schwarte:  "G.H.Q. considered the attack near
Ypres to he a successful experiment.  The impression created
was colossal and the result not inconsiderable, although it
was not fully utilised from the tactical point of view.
It was obvious that we had gained a great advantage;
the enemy was not sufficiently prepared with defensive measures
against gas."  Indeed, we were absolutely unprepared, so much so,
that after the German attack nearly every household in England
contributed to our first inefficient and improvised mask.
Is not this suggestion of our preparation a deliberate attempt
to deceive the German public?  They seem to have been as easily
hoodwinked on gas questions as on many others.

Germany Prompted by Production Monopoly.--An important point arises.
The Germans failed to exploit their initial success.
This is not very surprising.  Whatever the opinion of the chemists
behind the movement, the German General Staff must have retained
the elements of precaution in its opinion.  It could not have
taken for granted the formidable success which the chemists
proved justified in prophesying.  This being so, we can fairly
assume that had there been very serious difficulties in carrying
out this huge war experiment it might never have materialised.
Such difficulties might have been found in production.
But as we have seen, the question of production was the most
easily forged link in the chain of events which led to the use
of poison gas by Germany.  In other words, this monopoly in ease
of production was an inducement to the Germans to proceed
with their experiment.

The earliest German cloud gas attacks established beyond
a doubt the enormous value of gas against unprotected troops,
in other words, its value as a complete surprise.  These conditions
were again approached in the first German use of mustard gas.
The most telling examples will probably be found in the future,
unless the correct precautions are taken.  The whole history of
chemical warfare during the war was a struggle for this initiative,
a struggle between gas protection and aggression.

Standard Uses for Gas;--Gas Shell.--But gas found an important
use besides that of strategic surprise.  It became a standard
weapon for certain clear and definite tactical purposes.
(For some of these, indeed, the factor of local surprise
was important.) We refer to the specific use of gas shell
for the neutralisation of batteries, roads, and areas, and to
the use of cloud gas, prior to offensives for the production
of casualties, and wearing down of reserves.  The Ypres attack
had not by any means established the use of gas for such purposes.
There is no doubt that, from this point of view, the experimental
period carried on for many months.  Naturally, in some respects,
there was always an experimental element in the use of gas.

Further German Cloud Attacks.--Two days after the first cloud
gas attack the Germans launched a second against the Canadians,
with similar results.  Quoting from official despatches:
"On the early morning of the 24th a violent outburst of gas
against nearly the whole front was varied by heavy shell fire,
and a most determined attack was delivered against our position
east of Ypres.  The real attack commenced at 2.45 a.m. A
large proportion of the men were asleep, and the attack was
too sudden to give them time to put on their respirators."
These latter were hurriedly improvised after the first Ypres attack.

Hill 60.--Four more attacks occurred in May, notably in the region of
Hill 60.  "On May 1st another attempt to recapture Hill 60 was supported
by great volumes of asphyxiating gas which caused nearly all the men along
a front of about 400 yards to be immediately struck down by its fumes."
"A second and more severe gas attack under much more favourable weather
conditions enabled the enemy to recapture this position on May 5th.
The enemy owes his success in this last attack entirely to the use
of asphyxiating gas."  "It was only a few days later that the means which
have since proved so effective of counteracting these methods of making
war were put into practice."  (Official despatches, 1915.) The despatch
further described how violent bombardments, the confusion and demoralisation
from the first great gas surprise, and subsequent almost daily gas attacks,
prevented the proper reorganisation of the line in question.

Origin of German Gas Shell.--After May a long period elapsed
during which the Germans confined their war chemical activities
on the front to the use of gas shell.  Schwarte's book describes
their origin as follows:--"The main idea which influenced
the FIRST construction of a German projectile containing chemicals
(October, 1914) was that of adding to the charge an irritant substance,
which would be pulverised by the explosion of the projectile,
and would overwhelm the enemy with a cloud of dust.
This cloud would hover in the air and have such an effect
upon the mucous membranes that, for the time being,
the enemy would be unable to fight in such an atmosphere.
By altering the construction of the 10.5 c.m. universal
shell for light field howitzers, the `N.i' projectile
was created in the form of 10.5 c.m. shrapnel, the bullets
of which were embedded in a sternutatory powder (double salts
of dianisidine) well stamped down, instead of an explosive.
By means of the propelling charge and the grinding effect
of the bullets, this powder was pulverised on explosion.
The irritation caused was not very intense, lasted only a short,
time and affected only a limited area and therefore it was of no
importance in the field, but the initial step had been taken.
Liquid irritants soon came to the front--xylyl bromide
and xylylene dibromide--a mixture used later under the name
of T. stuff, bromo-acetone and brominated methyl ethyl ketone,
later introduced under the name of B. stuff and Bn.  stuff."

During experiments they gave such improved results in intensity,
in power of lasting and of affecting an increased area,
that practical results in the field were ensured.
The use of these liquids in projectiles, however, was contrary
to the accepted idea with regard to artillery, according to which
liquid materials should not be used for ballistic reasons.
Specially arranged shoots were required to prove that the projectiles
in use in the German Army could also be used from the ballistic
point of view when filled with liquids.

In this way the first effective German gas projectile, the T. shell
for heavy field howitzers, was evolved (January, 1915).

Early German Gas Shell.--The first important use of German gas
in shell was that of brominated and chlorinated organic compounds,
T. and K. stuffs.  Schwarte's book tells us "the use of these
projectiles was continually hampered by lack of understanding
on the part of the troops which it was difficult to overcome.
In the summer of 1915 it was practically in the Argonne alone that
any considerable results were attained by the new projectiles."
And he describes how the first elements of the new gas tactics
were developed there.

A Successful Experiment.--The development of the gas shell,
the use of which, generally speaking, is independent of,
but co-ordinated with, wind direction, may have received stimulus
from the fact that the prevailing wind, so important for cloud gas,
favoured the Allies.  It is clear that this period was an experimental one,
but we know that by August, 1915, German military opinion had
crystallised out to the extent of formulating certain rules, issued as
Falkenhayn's orders for the employment of gas shell.  These early orders
defined two types of shell, one persistent, for harassing purposes,
and the other non-persistent, to be used immediately before an attack.
They specified the number of shell to be used for a given task.
But in this they were unsound and it is clear that the Germans had
an exaggerated opinion of what could be achieved with a small number
of shell.  They adhered too closely to high explosive practice.
Various documents reveal the fact that the Germans were much more
satisfied with their gas tactics than they would have been had they
possessed information with regard to our losses from their shell.
They attached insufficient importance to the value of surprise
and highly concentrated shoots, and had a mistaken idea of the actual
specific aggressive value of their early types.

Lachrymators at Loos, 1915.--Germany commenced the manufacture
of lachrymators, crude brominated xylene or brominated ketones, early in,
or perhaps before 1915.  These substances caused great inconvenience
through temporary blindness by lachrymation, but were not highly toxic.
In June, 1915, however, they began to produce lethal gas for shell.
Falkenhayn's orders for the use of gas shell, mentioned above,
although they represent by no means the best final practice,
were definite evidence that gas had come to stay with the Germans.
The writer has vivid recollections of their use of lachrymators
in the Loos Battle.  Batteries in the open, under the crest near
the Lens road, were in position so that the wind direction practically
enfiladed them, sweeping along from the direction of Le Rutoire farm.
Gas from German shell, borne on the wind, was continually
enveloping the line of batteries, but they remained in action.
It was on this occasion while watching the bursting gas shells
from the outskirts of the mining village of Philosophe that
Major-General Wing was killed outright by a high explosive shell.
These gas shells certainly did not achieve the results which
the Germans expected, although they were not without effect.
Demolished villages, the only shelter for troops in a desolate area,
have been rendered uninhabitable for days by a concentrated
lachrymator enemy shoot of less than one hour.  Again, walking into
gas "pockets" up a trench one has been stopped as by a fierce blow
across the eyes, the lachrymatory effect was so piercing and sudden.
The great inconvenience which was occasioned to parties engaged
in the routine of trench warfare, on ration or engineering duties,
and the effect on movement in the rear after an assault,
taken cumulatively, represented a big military factor.

The Flammenwerfer.--There can be no doubt that this period marks increasing
German willingness to live up to their "blood and iron" theories of war,
and, in July, 1915, another device with a considerable surprise value
was used against us:  the flame projector, or the German flammenwerfer.
Field-Marshal Sir John French signalled the entry of this new weapon
as follows:  "Since my last despatch a new device has been adopted by
the enemy for driving burning liquid into our trenches with a strong jet.
Thus supported, an attack was made on the trenches of the Second Army
at Hooge, on the Menin Road, early on 30th July.  Most of the infantry
occupying these trenches were driven back, but their retirement was due
far more to the surprise and temporary confusion caused by the burning
liquid than to the actual damage inflicted.  Gallant endeavours were made
by repeated counter-attacks to recapture the lost section of trenches.
These, however, proving unsuccessful and costly, a new line of trenches
was consolidated a short distance farther back."

Although this weapon continued to be used right through the campaign,
it did not exert that influence which first acquaintance with it
might have led one to conclude.  At the same time, there exists
a mistaken notion that the flame projector was a negligible quantity.
This may be fairly true of the huge non-portable types,
but it is certainly not true of the very efficient portable flame
projector which was the form officially adopted by the German,
and later by the French, armies.  On a number of occasions Germany
gained local successes purely owing to the momentary surprise
effect of the flame projector, and the French made some use of it
for clearing out captured trench systems over which successful
waves of assault had passed.  Further, the idea of flame projection
is not without certain possibilities for war.

German Phosgene Clouds.--Germany had by no means abandoned
cloud gas, however.  She had merely been planning to regain what
the Ypres attacks had lost for her, the cloud gas initiative.
We have seen how phosgene had occupied the attention of the
German research organisation in the first months of the war.
Once alive to its great importance, they must have strained all
efforts to obtain an efficient method of using it at the front.
Phosgene was remarkable for its peculiar "delayed" effect.
Relatively small quantities, inhaled and followed by vigorous
or even normal exercise, led to sudden collapse and fatal
effects sometimes more than twenty-four hours after the attack.
The case of a German prisoner in a First Army raid after
a British gas attack was often quoted on the front.
He passed through the various Intelligence headquarters as far
as the Army, explaining the feeble effect of the British gas
and his own complete recovery.  But he died from delayed
action within twenty-four hours of his last interrogation.
This effect imposed strict conditions of discipline, and men
merely suspected of exposure to phosgene were compelled
to report as serious casualties and carried as such even from
the front line.

The successful development of the phosgene cloud probably
arrived too late for the Ypres attacks, and a variety of reasons
must have led to the postponement of its use until such time
as it might once again give Germany the real initiative.
Accordingly, on December 19, 1915, a formidable cloud gas attack
was made on the north-east of the Ypres salient, using a mixture
of phosgene and chlorine in a very high concentration.
Fortunately, by this time we had established an anti-gas
organisation, which had forestalled the production of cloud
phosgene by special modifications in the British respirator.
The conditions were similar to those of April 22nd, 1915.
Instead of the first use of cloud gas, we had the first
use of the new gas in highly concentrated cloud.
In both cases the Germans reckoned on our lack of protection,
correctly in the first case, but incorrectly in the second.
In both cases they were sure that great difficulties
in production would meet our attempts at retaliation.
In general this proved true, but in this case and increasingly
throughout the war, they reckoned without Allied adaptability.
The French development of phosgene manufacture was indeed remarkable.

Very interesting light is thrown on this attack by Major Barley,
D.S.O., Chemical Adviser to the British Second Army.  It appears that
in November, 1915, the French captured a prisoner who had attended a gas
school in one of the factories of the I.G. Here lecturers explained
that a new gas was to be used against the British forces, many thousands
of casualties were expected, and an attack would follow, which,
correcting the errors of the effort at Ypres, would lead to the capture
of the Channel ports.  Efforts were at once made to obtain information
on gas preparation by the Germans in front of the British sectors.
In this way a sergeant-major was captured on the morning of December 16th,
and he revealed the date and front on which the cylinders were installed.
About 35,000 British troops were found to be in the direct line of the gas,
but owing to the timely warning and to the protection which had recently
been adopted, we experienced very few casualties.  The Germans had prepared
a huge infantry attack, and used a new type of gas shell on this occasion.
German troops massing must have received huge casualties owing to our
preparation and the failure of their gas attack.

The last German cloud attack on the British front occurred on August 8, 1916.
There were later attacks against the French, but the Germans were replacing
the cloud method by other methods which they considered more suitable.
These will be discussed later on, when considering our own reaction against
the chemical offensive.

Gas and the Eastern Theatre.--The German surprise was not
limited to activities on the Western front.  In fact, apart from
the first Ypres attack, cloud gas probably reaped more casualties
in the East against Russia.  We learn from Schwarte's book:
"From reliable descriptions we know that our gas troops caused
an unusual amount of damage to the enemy--especially in the East--
with very little expenditure of effort.  The special battalion
formed by Austria-Hungary was, unfortunately, of no special
importance for various reasons."

Had the nature of the Russian campaign been different, with a
smaller front, and nearer critical objectives to the front of attack,
we have no doubt that gas would have assumed enormous importance
in the East.  Russia, even more feebly organised for production
than ourselves, would have been at a tremendous disadvantage,
both from the point of view of protection and of the retention
of satisfactory morale by retaliation.

Conclusion.--This, then, was the period of the German surprise,
during which the first big shock occurred, and which promised most
success for further attempts owing to the lack of comprehensive
protection by the Allies.  Looking at the matter in a very broad way,
ignoring the moral and legal aspects of the case, we can describe
this period as an example of brilliant chemical opportunism.
According to plan or otherwise, conditions for this experiment
were ripe in Germany as in no other country.  Overcoming whatever
prejudices may have existed, the German authorities realised this,
seized the opportunity, and very nearly succeeded.



CHAPTER III

THE ALLIED REACTION

Loos, September, 1915, to Ypres, July, 1917.


The Need of Retaliation.--The conclusive sign of the Allied
reaction to the German poison gas attack appeared at the battle
of Loos.  "Owing to the repeated use by the enemy of asphyxiating
gas in their attacks on our positions," says Field-Marshal French
in his despatch of October 15, 1915, "I have been compelled to resort
to similar methods, and a detachment was organised for this purpose,
which took part in the operations commencing on the 25th September
for the first time."  Five months thus elapsed before retaliation.
From a military point of view their can be no doubt as to
the wisdom, in fact the absolute necessity, of using gas
in order to reply to the many German attacks of this nature.
The question of morale was bound up in this retaliation.
Had the Germans continued their chemical attacks in variety
and extent as they did, and had it been realised that for some
reason or other we were not able to retaliate in kind, none but
the gravest consequences could have resulted with regard to morale.
It must be remembered that the earlier use of cloud and shell gas
by the Germans was of local incidence, when compared with its
tremendous use along the whole of the front in the later stages
of the war.

First Signs.--Our preparatory period was one of feverish, if somewhat
unco-ordinated, activity.  The production of a protective appliance,
the gas mask, was vital.  This development will be considered later.
Allied chemical warfare organisations arose, to become an important
factor in the later stages of the war.  The history of Allied gas
organisation is one of the gradual recognition that chemical warfare
represented a new weapon with new possibilities, new specific uses,
and new requirements from the rear.  Its beginnings are seen
in the English and French Scientific Advisory Committees
appointed to examine the new German method.  One could always
trace an element of reluctance, however, in Allied development,
signs that each move was forced upon us by some new German surprise.
We find the other extreme, the logical outcome of war experience,
in the completely independent Chemical Warfare Service now actually
adopted in the United States of America.  This is dealt with in
a separate chapter.

The decision to retaliate once made, our difficulties commenced.
We required gas, weapons, and methods for its use, trained personnel,
and the association of certain scientific with military standards
without losing the field efficiency of the latter.  The German
staff found this in their co-operation with eminent scientists,
notably Professor Haber.  Without drawing invidious distinctions
between pre-war military and public appreciation of chemical science
in England and Germany, it would be merely untrue to state that
the Germans were not in a position of advantage in this respect.
However, chemical mobilisation and co-operation proceeded sufficiently
rapidly to provide us with personnel and material for the Loos attack.

The assembly and organisation of personnel occurred in
three directions.  In the first place the Royal Society had already
begun to mobilise prominent scientists for other war purposes.
In the second place, different formations in the field,
realising the need for specialist treatment of the gas question,
after the first German attack, created staff appointments
for certain chemists chosen from infantry regiments and other
formations on the front.  Thirdly, men were collected at a depot
in France to form the nucleus of the offensive gas troops.
For this purpose chemists were specially enrolled and chosen
men from infantry and other front line units were added.
Early gas attacks and gas organisation did not appear to justify
the immobilisation of so much chemical talent in the offensive
gas troops, when chemists were needed all over England for
munition production so vital to war.  But later events justified
the mobilisation and military training of these specialists.
The expansion of the advisory and offensive organisations
at the front necessitated a large number of officers,
whose chemical training was of great value.  It is difficult
to see where they would have been found had they not been
mobilised with the Special Companies.  Moreover, their offensive
and battle experience gained with the latter was of great value.
Six or seven weeks' training witnessed the conversion of a few
hundred men of the above type into one or two so called
Special Companies.  The spirit and work of these men in the Loos
attack cannot be spoken of too highly.

The Loos Attack, September, 1915.--The Field-Marshal bears testimony
to its success as follows:  "Although the enemy was known to have been
prepared for such reprisals, our gas attack met with marked success,
and produced a demoralising effect in some of the opposing units,
of which ample evidence was forthcoming in the captured trenches.
The men who undertook this work carried out their unfamiliar duties
during a heavy bombardment with conspicuous gallantry and coolness;
and I feel confident in their ability to more than hold their own
should the enemy again resort to this method of warfare."

There is evidence, however, that this early attack, inefficient as it
appeared to be to participants, met with considerable success.
Schwarte's book tells us:  "The English succeeded in releasing gas
clouds on a large scale.  Their success on this occasion was due
to the fact that they took us by surprise.  Our troops refused
to believe in the danger and were not sufficiently adept in the use
of defensive measures as prescribed by G.H.Q."

On the occasion of a cloud attack a few weeks later, at the
storming of the Hohenzollern redoubt, Sergeant-Major Dawson,
in charge of a sector of gas emplacements in the front
line trench, won the Victoria Cross.  The German reply
to our bombardment was very severe and under stress of it
a battery of our cylinders, either through a direct hit or
faulty connections, began to pour gas into our own trenches.
In order to prevent panic and casualties among our own troops
at this critical time, a few minutes before zero, the moment
of assault, Sergeant-Major Dawson climbed on to the parapet under
a hail of shell, rifle, and machine-gun fire, and, hauling up
the cylinders in question, carried them to a safe distance
into the poisoned atmosphere of No Man's Land and ensured
their complete discharge by boring them with a rifle bullet.
In addition to the Hohenzollern attack cloud gas was used
in December, 1915, in the region of Givenchy.

The Somme Battle, 1916.--My impression as an eyewitness
and participator, however, was that the real British gas
offensive began after, and as a result of, the Loos experience.
Material, organisation, and numbers of personnel, both at
the front and at home, co-operation with staffs and tactical
conceptions all improved vastly in time to contribute largely
to the efficiency of preparations for the Somme offensive
in July, 1916.  During the early months of 1916, a Special Brigade
was created by expanding the four Special Companies,
and the 4-inch Stokes mortar was adopted, training being
vigorously pursued.  As many as 110 cloud gas discharges,
mainly of a phosgene mixture, occurred during the Somme battle,
and evidence of their success is seen in German reports.
These successes were due not only to the magnitude of our operations,
but to the carefully developed cloud attack tactics which
aimed at obtaining maximum results from the gas employed.
The factor of surprise governed all other considerations.
Attacks occurred at night and depended for success upon
the concentration of the maximum amount of gas in the given sector
for a short, sharp discharge under the best wind conditions.
There is abundant evidence of our success in these attacks.
Probably the most marked feature of the captured documents or
of prisoners' statements during the later stages of the Somme battle
was the continual reference to the deadly effect of British cloud gas.
The captured letter of a German soldier writing home stated:
"Since the beginning of July an unparalleled slaughter has
been going on.  Not a day passes but the English let off
their gas waves at one place or another.  I will give you
only one instance of this gas; men 7 and 8 kilometres behind
the front line became unconscious from the tail of the gas cloud,
and its effects are felt 12 kilometres behind the front.
It is deadly stuff."

The accuracy of this reference to the long range effect of our gas
clouds is borne out in a number of other statements.  For example,
we learnt from a prisoner examined by the French:  "The men were thrown
into disorder and raised their masks because they were suffocated.
Many fell in running to the rear; a number did not become ill until
the next day.  Vegetation was burnt up to a depth of 8 kilometres."
Again, prisoners taken at Maurepas stated that one of the English
gas attacks was effective 10 kilometres back.

There are also marked references to the surprise nature of our
gas attacks, which are an unconscious tribute to the successful
tactical developments which have already been referred to, and also
numerous other references to the "delayed" action of phosgene.
The prisoner mentioned above, taken at Maurepas, gave testimony
that some were only taken ill after several days, and one died
suddenly two days after, whilst writing a letter.  One prisoner,
pointing to Les Ayettes on the map, stated that about the beginning
of September when gas came over suddenly in the late evening,
they thought it was from artillery fire because it was so sudden.
No one was expecting gas and very few were carrying their masks.
Another one stated:  "The attack was a surprise and the cloud
came over and passed fairly quickly.  The whole thing did not
occupy more than ten minutes."  More than thirty per cent.
of the battalion was put out of action.

Finally, to show what a serious imposition this constant
cloud gas attack was upon the German Army, we will quote from
the Special Correspondent of the _Vossiches Zeitung_.  He said:
"I devote a special chapter to this plague of our Somme warriors.
It is not only when systematic gas attacks are made that they
have to struggle with this devilish and intangible foe."
He refers to the use of gas shell, and says:  "This invisible
and perilous spectre of the air threatens and lies in wait
on all roads leading to the front."

In a despatch dated December 23rd, 1916, from Field-Marshal
Sir Douglas Haig, G.C.B., the situation is ably summarised:
"The employment by the enemy of gas and of liquid flame
as weapons of offence compelled us not only to discover ways
to protect our troops from their effects but also to devise
means to make use of the same instruments of destruction.
Great fertility of invention has been shown, and very great credit
is due to the special personnel employed for the rapidity and success
with which these new arms have been developed and perfected,
and for the very great devotion to duty they have displayed
in a difficult and dangerous service.  The army owes its thanks
to the chemists, physiologists, and physicists of the highest
rank who devoted their energies to enable us to surpass the enemy
in the use of a means of warfare which took the civilised world
by surprise.  Our own experience of the numerous experiments
and trials necessary before gas and flame could be used,
of the preparations which had to be made for their manufacture,
and of the special training required for the personnel employed,
shows that the employment of such methods by the Germans
was not the result of a desperate decision, but had been
prepared for deliberately.

"Since we have been compelled, in self-defence, to use similar methods,
it is satisfactory to be able to record, on the evidence of prisoners,
of documents captured, and of our own observation, that the enemy
has suffered heavy casualties from our gas attacks, while the means
of protection adopted by us have proved thoroughly effective."

One of the causes which leads to a lack of understanding of the chemical
weapon is the fact that the results of chemical attack are not,
like those of a huge assault, obvious to the mere visual observer.
A period of months often elapsed during the war before the immediate
effect of a gas attack was known.  It was inspiring to witness
the assault of the 18th Division near Montauban on July 1st, 1916.
But few realised the part played by the preparatory gas
attacks in that and other sectors of the line, in weakening
the numerical strength and battle morale of effective reserves.
It is, therefore, of great interest to follow up a particular case
and to obtain a connected idea of the series of events associated
with some particular attack.

The early stages of the Somme battle were characterised by a
number of cloud gas attacks which served the double purpose
of a feint, and reducing the strength of available reserves.
These attacks occurred chiefly along the part of the line north
of the Somme battle zone, and they extended as far as the sea.
One of them occurred on the 30th August, 1916, at Monchy, between Arras
and Bapaume.  About one thousand cylinders were discharged during
the night.  The usual careful organisation preceded the attack and it
is quite likely that it shared the advantage of surprise common
to a large number of these attacks.  Three German regiments were
holding the line directly in front of the British sector concerned.
Before December, 1916, the following reliable information was collected
from prisoners and confirmed by cross-examination. One Company
of the 23rd regiment, was in training and had no gas masks with it.
The gas came along quickly and about half the Company were killed.
After that there were more stringent rules about carrying masks.
They had no recollection of a gas alarm being sounded.
Another man said that in his Company no special drill or training
was being done, and a large number of men were put out of action
through not being able to adjust their respirators in time.
There was no warning, although after this gas alarms were given
by ringing church bells.  Other prisoners, from the 63rd, regiment,
had such vivid recollections of the attack that they said:
"The effects of the English gas are said to be appalling."
Collecting information from prisoners belonging to this or that Company,
and carefully checking by cross-examination, it is clear that this
attack must have been responsible for many hundreds of casualties.

Reasons for British Cloud Gas Success.--The fact that the British persisted
with cloud gas attack and attained so much more success than the Germans,
after the first surprise, was due to a curious combination of causes,
quite apart from the prevailing favourable wind.

Our Casualties.--In the first place, we knew from bitter experience
the deadly effect of a successfully operated cloud gas attack.
We knew, for example, that in the first attack at Ypres there were
more than 5000 dead with many more times that number of casualties.
On the other hand, the Germans, left to speculate on our casualties,
retained the conviction, from apparent non-success, that cloud gas
was not a suitable form of preparation behind which to develop big
infantry attacks.  Quoting from Schwarte:  "Large gains of ground
could hardly be attained by means of an attack which followed the use
of gas clouds, therefore such clouds were soon merely employed as a
means of injuring the enemy, and were not followed up by an attack."
This represented German policy, and it lacked vision.  They did not
realise that their difficulty was the method of forming the cloud,
and that if a more mobile and long range method of cloud formation
materialised, with correspondingly less dependence on wind direction,
the object which they once sought and failed to attain would again
be within their reach.

Exhausting Preparations for Cloud Attack.--The second reason
accounting for the relatively early cessation of German cloud
attacks is one constantly referred to in the German war memoirs.
It was the enormous mechanical and muscular effort required in preparing
for such an attack.  Few people realise what hours of agonised
effort were involved in preparing and executing a cloud gas attack.
The cylinders had to be in position in specially chosen emplacements
in the front line within certain time limits.  The "carrying in"
could not be spread over an indefinite period and usually took
from two to six nights, according to the magnitude of the attack and
the local difficulties.  Naturally, all the work occurred in the dark.
Picture the amount of organisation and labour required to install
2000 cylinders on, say, a two mile front.  These cylinders would have
to be assembled at a number of points in the rear of the given line
where the roads met the communication trenches.  No horse or lorry
transport could assemble at such points before dark, nor be left
standing there after dawn.  To carry this number of cylinders more than
fifty lorries would be required or, say, perhaps, go G.S. wagons.
All the points of assembly would be under possible enemy shell fire.
These points would be normally in use for the unloading of rations
and trench engineering materials, etc., with which cylinder transport
would have to be co-ordinated. Once arrived at the unloading points,
parties had to be provided for unloading the lorries and for
conveying the cylinders up to the front line trench.  In a normally
difficult trench system, for a carry of a mile to a mile and a half
of communication trench, at least four men per cylinder are required
to give the necessary margin for casualties and reliefs, etc.
This implies the organisation of more than 8000 officers and men
for the installation, with a fundamental condition that only small
groups of these men be assembled at any one point at any given time.
The installation of gas for an attack on this scale would have been
a matter of vast and complicated organisation if there were no other
activities in the trench system, and no enemy to harass the work.
But to co-ordinate such an enterprise with the busy night life of
the trench system and to leave the enemy unaware of your activities
was a task which tried the patience, not only of the Special Companies,
who organised, guided, and controlled these operations, but much
more so of the Infantry Brigades and Divisions whose dispositions
were interfered with, and who had to provide the men for the work.

Add to this even more acute difficulties.  The front line
trench is nothing but a series of traverses, thus to avoid
the enfilade effect of shell and machine-gun fire.
A straight trench is a death-trap. But to carry hundreds of
pole-slung cylinders, already weighing as lead, round traverses
on a dark night, is a feat requiring superhuman endurance.
Therefore many "carries" finished with a hundred yards "over the top"
through the parados wire, to the near locality of the appropriate
emplacement in the front line.  This last carry was critical;
a false step, the clatter of falling metal, meant drawing
the fire of some curious and alert German machine gunner.
The sudden turning of darkness into day by enemy Very lights
imposed instantaneous immobility.  Yet all the time tired men
were straining at their heavy burden and any moment a cylinder
might be pierced by intentional or unaimed rifle fire.

But the spirit of the infantry in this work, as in all they undertook,
is to their everlasting credit.  These tasks were an enemy challenge
and they accepted it successfully, albeit with much cursing.
The work was indeed beyond description and the country, colonial,
and London troops expressed their opinion equally emphatically
in their own peculiar way.  Think again of the need of systematic
wind observation along the whole front of attack, the disorganisation
and "gas alert" conditions imposed on the favourable night,
the possibility of postponement, and we can only draw one conclusion.
There must have been some imperative need or justification of cloud gas
attack for the army to have encouraged or even tolerated its continuance.
There is no difficulty in understanding why gas attack was so
exceedingly unpopular among the staffs in the early stages of the war.
Later, however, when they realised the enemy casualties that were being
created by the gas, and what a large part it was taking in the war
of attrition, the opposition and lack of appreciation vanished.
Further, when the projector arrived to produce similar effects
with less demand upon infantry personnel, and less dependence
on the wind, the whole tone of the army towards gas was changed,
and it became almost popular.

The peculiarity of cloud gas attack was the concentration of all this
effort of preparation within a few days.  In terms of military efficiency,
the amount of energy expended was fully justified by the casualties produced.
We know that some of our cloud attacks were responsible on one night
for many thousands of casualties, and the amount of artillery effort
to give such a result would probably have been considerably larger.
But under normal conditions of warfare, such artillery effort would
have been expended over a much longer period of time.

The Livens Projector.--The Somme offensive witnessed the use
of a new British gas weapon which became of the utmost importance.
This was the mortar known as the Livens Projector.  Its origin
dates back many months, however, and is of considerable interest.
A British engineer, Lt.  Livens (afterwards Major, D.S.O., M.C.)
of the Signal Corps, was inspired to constructive and aggressive
thought on the gas question by a double motive.  He quickly
realised the tactical weakness of the German method at Ypres,
once shorn of its vast initial possibilities of surprise.
He saw the advantage of being able to command the point or
locality of incidence of the cloud, instead of being limited
to the actual trench front.  Prompted by a direct personal
interest in the huge loss sustained by the _Lusitania_ outrage,
he determined to find a practical outlet for his feelings by
developing his views on the future of gas clouds.  In a few months
the general principles of the projector were defined and a crude
specimen resulted.  Caught up, however, in the gas organisation,
preparations for the cloud attack at Loos absorbed all his
attention and energies and the consequent reorganisation found him
developing a flammenwerfer and training a company for its use.
It was really the Somme battle which gave him the first
opportunity to carry his idea into offensive practice.
This arose in front of High Wood, which was a veritable nest of German
machine gunners in such a critical tactical position as to hold
up our advance in that region.  The huge stationary flammenwerfer
had recently been used by Major Livens and his company against
a strong point in front of Carnoy in the assault of July 1st.
Here again the effect of flame was limited even more than
that of cloud gas by dependence on a fixed emplacement.
It was quickly grasped that the solution was to be found
in the application of the projector principle to the use of oil
for flame and a crude projector was devised for the emergency,
using oil cans as mortars, burying them in the earth for two-thirds
of their length and employing water cans as bombs.

As soon as the possibilities of the weapon were seen its
development was pressed.  The usual Livens Projector consisted
of a simple tube mortar or projector closed at one end,
and fitted with a charge box on which rested the projectile.
By an electrical arrangement and suitable communications,
large numbers, sometimes thousands, of these projectors could
be discharged at a given moment.  In this way quantities of gas,
comparable with the huge tonnages employed in the normal stationary
cloud attack, could be used to produce a cloud which would originate,
as cloud, as far as a mile away from the point of discharge.
In other words, the advantages of cloud attack could
be used with a much smaller dependence on wind direction,
and with a much greater factor of local surprise.
Thus when the partially perfected and efficient weapon was used
in large quantities during the British Arras offensive in April,
1917, the German Army was thrown into great consternation.
But for the fact that protection had developed so strongly
on both sides, the use of the Livens Projector would have gone
far towards a decision.

The simplest way to illustrate the peculiar value of the projector will
be to quote from one or two of the many Intelligence reports collected.
Thus from a captured document dated July, 1917, belonging to the 111th
German Division, signed Von Busse, we have:  "The enemy has combined
in this new process the advantages of gas clouds and gas shells.
The density is equal to that of gas clouds, and the surprise effect
of shell fire is also obtained.  For the bombardment the latter part
of the night is generally chosen, in a calm or light wind (the direction
of the latter is immaterial). The enemy aims essentially at surprise.
Our losses have been serious up to now, as he has succeeded, in the majority
of cases, in surprising us, and masks have often been put on too late. . . .
As soon as a loud report like a mine is heard 1000-1500 metres away,
give the gas alarm.  It does not matter if several false alarms are given.
Masks must not be taken off without orders from an officer.  Men affected,
even if apparently only slightly, must be treated as serious cases, laid flat,
kept still, and taken back as soon as possible for medical treatment.
Anti-gas officers and Company Commanders will go through a fresh course
of training on the above principles."  The influence of gas discipline
is borne out by another captured statement that they could only attempt
to "reduce their losses to a minimum by the strictest gas discipline."
Again, from a prisoner we learn that "every time a battalion goes into rest,
masks are inspected and a lecture is delivered by the gas officer
on British gas projectors, which are stated to be the most deadly form
of warfare."  So great was the impression formed by the introduction
of the projector that uneasiness at the front was reflected later on
in the Press.  Thus, quoting from reference to the military discussion
before the main committee of the Reichstag.  "Casualties from enemy poison
gas admit on the whole of a favourable judgment, as the harm involved
is only temporary, and in most cases no ill after-effects persist"
(_Tagliche Rundschau_, 24.4.18). "Cases of gas poisoning are not as a rule
accompanied by harmful consequences, even though the treatment extends
sometimes over a long period" (_Vorwarts_, 25.4.18), Based on the later
mustard gas casualties these statements would have been more truthful.
As it was, they afforded poor consolation to the German people.

British Gas Shell.--The British first used shell gas as lachrymators,
in trench mortar bombs, in small quantities, during the battle of the Somme,
but for the first time, during the battle of Arras, 1917, our supplies
of gas for shell were sufficient for extensive and effective use.
Our success can be measured by the report dated April 11th, 1917, from the
General Commanding the first German Army, on "Experiences in the Battle
of Arras," in which he says:  "The enemy made extensive use of gas
ammunition against our front positions as well as against batteries."
"The fighting resistance of the men suffered considerably from wearing
the mask for many hours."  Artillery activity seems to have been paralysed
by the effects of the gas.

In a general comparison of British and German methods of gas warfare,[1]
General Hartley tells us "our methods improved rapidly during 1917.
At first we neglected, almost entirely, the question of rate of firing,
but we soon arrived at the method of crashes of lethal shell.
These got the surprise concentrations of gas which proved
so effective, and we realised that the number of shells required
to produce an effect was much bigger than we thought originally.
At Messines gas was used in much the same way as at Arras."


[1] Journal of the Royal Artillery, February, 1920.


German Gas Shell Development, 1916.--The main evidence of Allied reaction
was to be found in the intensive development of cloud gas attacks,
but during the same period the Germans, who appeared to be abandoning
the use of cloud gas, were making steady efforts to regain their initiative
by the comprehensive development of shell gas.  Thus, to quote from
General Hartley's report to the British Association, "In the Summer
of 1916 chlor-methyl-chloroformate with toxic properties similar
to those of phosgene was used against us in large quantities
during the battle of the Somme.  Later this was replaced by
trichlor-methyl-chloro-formate, a similar liquid, which was used until
the end of the war as the well-known Green Cross shell filling.
The use of phosgene in trench mortar bombs also began in 1916."
Many of those on the front in 1916 will remember the surprise gas shell
attack of December of that year, on the Baudimont gate at Arras.  We were
fortunately let off lightly with little over 100 casualties,
but the effect was to tighten up gas discipline all along the line.
The appearance of the new substances represented definite German
progress and had definite military results, but they lost decisive
value owing to the relative inefficiency of German gas shell tactics.

Consideration of the Allied reaction must include some
reference to the appearance of the American Army in the field.
The Americans during their more or less educational period gave
serious attention to the gas question, and showed almost immediately,
by their preparations, that they attached enormous importance
to the new weapon.

Main Features of the Period.--It is difficult to generalise.  But the
following features appear to characterise the period under discussion.
In the first place we see German policy tending towards the use of gas
projectiles containing a variety of organic substances.  Secondly, we have
the British exploitation of cloud gas attack both in magnitude and method.
The Livens Projector provides the third important feature.  Fourthly, we note
the somewhat tardy development of the British use of gas shell.
A number of causes, no doubt, unite in responsibility for the above.
But whether due to definitely framed policy on our part, or merely to
the hard facts of the case, one important factor seems largely responsible.
It is the relative ease of production by Germany as compared with ourselves.
When German military opinion tended towards the development of gas shell,
a variety of substances came quickly to hand, not only from German
research sources, but in quantity from the dye factories.  No such quick
response could have met, or actually did meet, the demands of Allied
military policy.  Whatever ideas emanated from our research organisations,
there was no quick means of converting them into German casualties.
It is true that we could obtain chlorine and later phosgene in bulk and devote
them to the exploitation of the older gas appliances in cloud methods.
But British chemical supply was weak, owing to the absence of a strong
organic chemical industry.  In other words, German flexibility of supply
meant flexibility in meeting the requirements of military policy, and,
given sound military policy, this flexibility meant surprise, the essence
of successful war.



CHAPTER IV

INTENSIVE CHEMICAL WARFARE


The chemical struggle became very intense in the Summer and Autumn of 1917.
Projector attacks multiplied, the use of chemical shell increased
on both sides, allied and enemy gas discipline was tightened up,
officers and men acquired a kind of gas sense, a peculiar alertness
towards gas.  The home front was strengthened in England and France
by reinforced and sounder organisations, and by the vigorous steps taken
by America.  The Germans began to reap the benefit of their gas shell policy.
At the end of 1916, as a result of a review of the production situation,
they had arrived at the so-called Hindenburg Programme.  This included
a large output of gas for shell, and from its realisation the Germans
acquired a momentum which kept them ahead well into 1918.
It is a very clear indication of the progress made by Germany in research,
that the sudden expansion in manufacture required by the Hindenburg Programme
found a number of new efficient war chemicals ready for production.

The Mustard Gas Surprise.--The next big surprise came
from Germany.  Units in the line at Nieuport and Ypres
in July, 1917, were the first to experience it.  Some were
sprinkled and some deluged with a new type of German shell
chemical which, in many cases, evaded the British gas discipline,
and mustard gas, unrecognised, caused many serious casualties.
Even those who wore the mask were attacked by the vesicant
or blistering influence of the gas.  The matter is vividly
expressed in a letter, given below, which I received from
an officer wounded in the Nieuport attack:

"I was gassed by dichlor-diethyl sulphide, commonly known as mustard stuff,
on July 22nd.  I was digging in (Livens Projectors), to fire
on Lambartzyde.  Going up we met a terrible strafe of H.E. and gas
shells in Nieuport.  When things quietened a little I went up with
the three G.S. wagons, all that were left, and the carrying parties.
I must say that the gas was clearly visible and had exactly the same smell
as horseradish.  It had no immediate effect on the eyes or throat.
I suspected a delayed action and my party all put their masks on.

"On arriving at the emplacement we met a very thick cloud
of the same stuff drifting from the front line system.
As it seemed to have no effect on the eyes I gave orders for all
to put on their mouthpieces and noseclips so as to breathe none
of the stuff, and we carried on.

"Coming back we met another terrific gas shell attack
on Nieuport.  Next morning, myself, and all the eighty men
we had up there were absolutely blind.  The horrid stuff
had a delayed action on the eyes, causing temporary blindness
about seven hours afterwards.  About 3000 were affected.
One or two of our party never recovered their sight and died.
The casualty clearing stations were crowded.  On August 3rd,
with my eyes still very bloodshot and weak and wearing blue glasses,
I came home, and went into Millbank Hospital on August 15th."

These early mustard gas attacks caused serious gaps amongst
the troops assembling for the Northern offensives.  The gas was
distinctly a new departure.  Effective in low concentrations,
with very little odour, and no immediate sign of discomfort
or danger, very persistent, remaining on the ground for days,
it caused huge casualties.  Fortunately, its most fatal effects
could be prevented by wearing a respirator, and only a very small
proportion of mustard gas casualties were fatal.

The insidious nature of the gas and the way in which it evaded the gas
discipline is shown in the following example from an official report:
"A battery was bombarded by the new gas shell from 10 p.m. to 12
midnight and from 1.30 to 3.30 on the night of 23rd-24th July.
The shelling then ceased and at 6 a.m., when the battery had
to carry out a shoot, the Battery Commander considered the air
free from gas, and Box Respirators were accordingly removed.
Shortly afterwards several men went sick from gas poisoning,
including the Battery Commander.  On previous nights they
had been fired at with gas shell in the same way, but found
it safe to remove Box Respirators after a couple of hours.
On the occasion in question the air was very still and damp."
In another case an officer in the Boesinghe sector,
during the gas bombardment on the night of the 22-23 July,
adjusted the mouthpiece and nose-clip, but left the eyes uncovered.
His eyes were seriously affected, but he had no lung symptoms
on the morning of the 24th.

Mustard gas (or Yellow Cross, as it was called officially by the Germans)
was the war gas _par excellence_ for the purpose of causing casualties.
Indeed, it produced nearly eight times more Allied casualties than all
the various other kinds of German gas.  It was used for preparation
a considerable time before the attack, or during the attack, on localities
and objects with which the attackers would have no contact.

Blue Cross.--Another new type, the German Blue Cross, was introduced
about the same time.  This represented at different times
diphenylchlorarsine, diphenylcyanarsine and other arsenic compounds.
The Blue Cross compound was contained in a shell with high explosive.
The enemy expected that the shell burst would create such a fine diffusion
of the compound that it would penetrate our respirator mechanically,
and then exercise its effects.  These, violent irritation of the nose
and throat, nausea and intense pain, would cause the removal
of the respirator and allow other lethal gases to have full play.
Fortunately, the German hopes of penetration were not realised,
but they were, no doubt, continuing to develop the vast possibilities
of the new method.

German Emphasis on Gas Shell.--The Green Cross or lethal filling
was another type of German gas shell.  Green Cross covered
such compounds as phosgene and chlor-methyl chloroformate.
Although these caused fewer casualties than mustard gas,
they were relatively more fatal.  Schwarte's book tells us that,
"After the introduction of the Green Cross shell in the summer
of 1916, at Verdun over 100,000 gas shell were used to
a single bombardment."

From the time of the first use of mustard gas until the terrific
gas shell attack of March, 1918, the Germans persistently
used their new types against us with considerable effect.
Even when the period of surprise effect with mustard gas was over,
the number of casualties caused by it was considerably
greater than during the months when the Germans were firing
only non-persistent lethal shell of the Green Cross type.
The Germans regarded these shell gas developments as largely
responsible for our failure to break through in the Autumn of 1917.

The German Projector.--During this period they also developed a projector.
Their first use of it was again co-ordinated with an attempt at surprise.
Fortunately, protection and gas discipline had reached such an efficient
state that normal "alert" conditions of the front line system were largely
able to counter the use of this new device by Germany.  The first attack
was against the French at Rechicourt on the night of December 5th-6th.

On the night of December 10th-11th, 1917, they fired several hundred
projectiles on the Cambrai and Givenchy sectors of the British line.
In both cases the gas bombs were fired almost simultaneously
into a small area including our front and support lines.
The bombs appeared to have been fired from the enemy support line,
as observers state that they saw a sheet of flame run along this line,
followed by a loud explosion.  The bombs, which emitted a trail of sparks,
were seen in the air in large numbers and made a loud whirring noise.
They burst with a large detonation, producing a thick, white cloud.
The discharge was followed immediately by a bombardment with H.E. shrapnel
and gas shell, and a raid was attempted south of Givenchy.  We learn
that so strong was the gas discipline that in many cases respirators were
adjusted before the arrival of the bombs, the resemblance to our projector
attacks having been established at once.  When this was done practically
no casualties occurred.  Again, to show the efficiency of British
protection against projector gas, we learn from official reports that,
"At one point five bombs burst in a trench without harming the occupants.
It should be remembered that the British box respirator protects against
very high concentrations of gas which pass at once through the German mask."
Similar discharges were made against the French on two occasions in December,
and against the Lens sector on December 30th.  The compounds used
in the bombs were phosgene and a mixture of phosgene and chlorpicrin.
These attacks increased in number during the ensuing months.

German Projector Improvements.--The Germans developed a longer
range modification and would undoubtedly have exploited this
weapon very considerably but for the trend of the campaign.
The Allied advance in 1918 uncovered a number of enemy dumps.
Amongst the most interesting was one which contained a number
of a new type of projector.

A prisoner of the 37th pioneer gas battalion, captured on
August 26th, had said that they were to practise with a new
type of projector with a range of 3 kilometres, the increased
range being obtained by rifling the bore of the projector.
He stated that the intention was to use the longer range
weapons in conjunction with the old short range projector,
using the new type to deal with the reserve positions.
The capture of the dumps referred to above revealed the truth
of his statement.  Two kinds of bombs were used, one containing H.E.
and the other small pumice granules impregnated with phosgene.
This was an ingenious attempt to produce a persistent but highly
lethal gas by physical means, for hitherto the highly lethal
gases had only been slightly persistent.  The new projector
had a calibre of 158 mm.  and was termed the "Gaswerfer, 1918."
The importance of this new projector cannot be overestimated.
Its large scale use would, undoubtedly, have resulted in
imposing stringent gas alert conditions at greater distances
from the front line.

Dyes in Gas Shell.--Another interesting German development of this
period was the use of certain dyes or stains in gas shell.
After gas bombardments in the winter of 1916-17, the snow
was seen to be covered with coloured patches.  These coincided
with the bursts of the shell.  Analysis of the earth showed
that the colour was due to the presence of an actual dyestuff.
A number of explanations were advanced to account for the use
of the colour, of which the most probable claimed its employment
for the identification of affected localities several hours
or even days after the bombardment.  This was especially the case
with persistent types.  As the explosive charge of chemical shell
was feeble, some such means of identification was necessary.
It may be that the Germans expected that troops advancing after
such bombardments would be helped by the splashes of colour,
and that these earlier attempts were purely experimental.

German Flame Projectors.--We have already referred to the use of flame
projectors by the enemy, and a picturesque account of their development
and use in the later stages of the campaign is found in an extract
from the _Hamburger Nachrichten_ of the 9th of June, 1918:

Their Origin.--"Our Flammenwerfer troops owe their origin to a mere incident.
Their present commander, Major R., when an officer of the Reserve, received
the order, during peace manoeuvres, to hold a certain fort at all costs.
During the sham fight, having employed all means at his disposal,
he finally alarmed the fire brigade unit, which was under his orders as
commander of the fort, and directed the water jets on the attacking force.
Afterwards, during the criticism of operations in the presence of the Kaiser,
he claimed that he had subjected the attackers to streams of burning oil.
The Kaiser thereupon inquired whether such a thing would be possible,
and he received an answer in the affirmative.

"Long series of experiments were necessary before Engineer L. succeeded
in producing a combination of various oils, which mixture is projected
as a flame on the enemy by means of present day Flammenwerfer.

"Major R. occupied himself in peace time with fighting fire
as commander of the Munich Fire Brigade.  The `Prince of Hades,'
as he is called by his `fire spouters,' enjoys great popularity among his
men as well as among the troops to whose assistance he may be called.
He can look back on an important development of his units.
Whereas in January, 1915, Flammenwerfer troops consisted of a group
of 36 men, to-day they constitute a formation with special assault
and bombing detachments, and are furnished with all requisites
for independent action.  In reading Army Communiques, we often
find mention of these troops.  If difficulty is experienced
in clearing up an English or French Infantry nest, the `Prince
of Hades' appears with his hosts and smokes the enemy out.
That conditions of membership of this unit hardly constitute
a life insurance policy is obvious; nor is every man suitable.
Special men who are physically adapted and who have given proof
of keenness in assault are necessary for such work."

Further Flame Development.--Specimens of a very neat portable
German Flammenwerfer were captured in August, 1917.  It contained
three essential parts:  a ring-shaped oil container surrounding
a spherical vessel containing compressed nitrogen, which was used
to expel the oil, and a flexible tube of rubber and canvas carrying
the jet.  The whole was arranged to be carried on the back.
At about this time prisoners stated that men were transferred
to the Flammenwerfer companies as a form of punishment.

The Germans were fond of using the Flammenwerfer during counter-attacks
and raids in which the morale factor is so important.  Thus in September,
1915, in a raid against the British during our great offensive,
the German raiding party was heralded by a shower of stick bombs and
the Flammenwerfer men followed.  The bombing party advanced under cover
of these men, the smoke from the flame throwers acting as a screen.
British experience was that the calm use of machine-gun fire soon put
German flame throwers out of action, and it is clear that the Germans
themselves realised this weakness of isolated flame attacks for, in one
of their documents issued by German G.H.Q. in April, 1918, they said:
"Flammenwerfer have been usefully employed in combats against villages.
They must be engaged in great numbers and must fight in close liaison
with the infantry, which helps them with the fire of its machine-guns
and its grenades."

The 1918 Offensive.--Some idea of the importance of these developments
and of the scale on which they were exploited in the later campaigns
of the war can be obtained by briefly examining the German plans
for the use of gas in their 1918 offensive, and their execution:
_Die Technik im Weltkriege_ tells us:  "During the big German attacks
in 1918, gas was used against artillery and infantry in quantities
which had never been seen before, and even in open warfare the troops
were soon asking for gas."

The Yellow and Blue Cross shells first introduced into operation in July,
1917, were not incorporated into comprehensive offensives until March, 1918.
Owing to the exigencies of the campaign, the initial surprise value of these
gases was subordinated to the later large scale use in the great offensive.
In December, 1917, the German Army was instructed anew regarding
the use of the new gas shell types for different military purposes,
laying great stress on the use of non-persistent gas for the attack.
Fortunately for us, the gas shells destined for this purpose were not
relatively so efficient as the German persistent types, which were devoted
to the more remote preparation for attack and to defensive purposes.
Their penetrating Blue Cross types were a comparative failure.
Although plans emphasised the importance of this gas for the attack,
facts later gave greater prominence to the use of the persistent Yellow Cross
shell for defensive purposes in the great German retreat.

Ludendorffs Testimony.--Ludendorff, himself, emphasised the great
importance which was attached to gas in this offensive.
He says[1]: "And yet our artillery relied on gas for its effect,
and that was dependent on the direction and strength of the wind.
I had to rely on the forecast submitted to me at 11 a.m, by
my meteorologist, Lieutenant Dr. Schmaus.  Up till the morning
of the 20th strength and direction were by no means very favourable;
indeed, it seemed almost necessary to put off the attack.
It would have been very hard to do.  So I was very anxious to see
what sort of report I should get.  It was not strikingly favourable,
but it did indicate that the attack was possible.  At 12 noon
the Army Groups were told that the programme would be carried out.
Now it could no longer be stopped.  Everything must run its course.
G.H.Q. higher commanders and troops had all done their duty.
The rest was in the hands of fate, unfavourable wind diminished
the effectiveness of the gas, fog retarded our movements
and prevented our superior training and leadership from reaping
its full reward."


[1] _My War Memories_.  Hutchinson & Co., 1919.


Preparations for Assault;--Gas Defensive at Armentieres.--For twelve
days prior to their March assault the Germans used mustard gas over,
certain areas, and the non-persistent types for other localities.
As an example of the first method, we can state that nearly
200,000 rounds of Yellow Cross shell were used on the 9th March,
and caused us heavy casualties.  The actual attack at once
confirmed our suspicions of enemy intention to break through on
the territories which were not infected by the persistent mustard gas.
In the second case, of the non-persistent types of Blue and Green Cross,
bombardments of tremendous intensity occurred for several hours
before the assault, on all defensive positions and organisations
for several miles behind the front line.  Millions of rounds must
have been used.  Although not without serious effect on the campaign,
this furious gas attack did not fully justify expectations.
The failure of mask penetration by the Blue Cross shell prevented
the full possibilities of Green Cross coming into play.
To illustrate the specific use of gas in this great offensive,
and the organic way in which it was co-ordinated in the plan of attack,
we quote from a recent statement by General Hartley.[1] Referring
to the gas shelling immediately before the extension of the attack
to the north of Lens on 9th April, he explains, "Between the 7th April
and 9th April there was no gas shelling between the La Bassee Canal
and Armentieres, while there was heavy Yellow Cross shelling
immediately south of the Canal, and Armentieres had such a heavy
bombardment that the gutters were running with mustard gas.
This indicated the probability of an attack on the front held
by the Portuguese, which occurred on 9th April, Blue and Green Cross
being used in the preliminary bombardment."  The Portuguese front
lay between the two Yellow Cross regions.


[1] _Journal of the Royal Artillery_, February, 1920.


Fixed Gas Barrage at Kemmel.--Another most interesting example
is also quoted, dealing with the shelling preceding the attack
on Kemmel on 25th April.  "This is an interesting case,
as non-persistent Blue Cross shell were used within the objective
and Yellow Cross just behind it, indicating that on 25th April
the enemy did not intend to go beyond the line they gained."

Percentage of Chemical Shell.--Some idea of the importance
which the Germans attached to their chemical ammunition,
as distinct from explosives, can be gathered from the following
extract from a captured order of the Seventh German Army,
dated May 8th, 1918, giving the proportion of chemical shell
to be used in the artillery preparation for the attack on
the Aisne on 27th May, 1918.

     "(_a_) Counter-battery and long range bombardments.
          For 7.7 c/m field guns, 10.5 c/m and 15 c/m,
          howitzers and 10 c/m guns; Blue Cross 70%,
          Green Cross, 10%; H.E. 20%, long 15
          c/m guns fire only H.E.
     (_b_) Bombardment of infantry positions.
          (i) Creeping Barrage.
          For 7.7 c/m field guns, 10.5 c/m and 15
          c/m howitzers; Blue Cross 30%, Green
          Cross 10%, H.E. 60%, 21 c/m howitzers
          fire only H.E.
          (ii) Box Barrage.
          For 7.7 c/m field guns, 10.5 c/m howitzers
          and 10 c/m guns; Blue Cross 60%, Green
          Cross 10%, H.E. 30%."

What more striking demonstration is needed than these
extraordinarily high percentages?

Gas Retreat Tactics;--General Hartley's Analysis.--No Yellow Cross
shell were to be used in the bombardment, but, as mentioned above,
there was a complete change of tactics in their retreat, during which they
attempted to create a series of barriers by literally flooding areas
with mustard gas.  This defensive use of mustard gas was most important.
Again, quoting General Hartley, "Yellow Cross shell were used much
farther forward than previously, bombardments of the front line
system and of forward posts were frequent, and possible assembly
positions were also shelled with this gas.  On more than one occasion
when an attack was expected the enemy attempted to create an impassable
zone in front of our forward positions by means of mustard gas.
Their gas bombardments usually occurred on fronts where they had reason
to fear an attack, with the idea of inflicting casualties in areas
where troops might be massing.  It was instructive to note how supplies
of Yellow Cross shell were switched from the Third to the First Army
front late in August when they became nervous about the latter sector.
In Yellow Cross they had an extremely fine defensive weapon, which they
did not use to the best advantage, for instance, they neglected its use
on roads and did not hamper our communications nearly as much as they
might have done.  As our offensive progressed their gas shelling
became less organised, and one saw very clearly the superior value
of a big gas bombardment as compared with a number of small ones.
In the latter case it was usually possible to evacuate the contaminated
ground and take up alternative positions, while in the case of a bombardment
of a large area such as the Cambrai salient, the difficulty of doing
so was greatly increased, and consequently casualties were higher.
During our offensive it was not possible to exercise the same precautions
against gas as during stationary warfare, and the casualties were
increased on this account."

Percentage of German Gas Shell in Enemy Dumps.--A test of the
importance attached by any army to the different types of ammunition
which it uses can be made by examining the percentage of such
types of shell in a number of ammunition dumps assembled behind
the front line for some specific operation, or part of a campaign.
An examination of German production from this point of view
is very interesting, and also brings out a significant point.
The normal establishment of a German divisional ammunition dump
in July, 1918, contained about 50 per cent.  of gas shell.
The dumps captured later in the year contained from 30 per cent.
to 40 per cent.  These figures are significant, for they show
how much importance the German Army attached to gas shell.
When we think of the millions of shell and of the huge quantities
of explosives turned out by our own factories to fill them,
and when we realise that for a large number of gun calibres
the Germans used as many shell filled with gas as with explosive,
some idea of the importance of gas in the recent war and of its
future possibilities can be obtained.  Further, when we realise
that the production of explosives can be controlled and inspected
during peace, but that no such control can exist for chemical
warfare products, the significance for the future stands revealed.

Forced Exhaustion of Stocks.--It might be thought that the lower percentages
found later on in the year were an indication of the decreasing importance
of chemical shell.  Examining the case less superficially, however, we soon
see that this lower percentage has an entirely different meaning.
In the first place, we know that the German factories were still pressing
on to their maximum output at the time of the Armistice.  New units were
being brought into operation.  Secondly, we have seen how huge quantities
of mustard gas were diverted to those particular German armies which were
most threatened by the final Allied offensive, indicating that certain
portions of the German front were being starved for chemical shell.
The truth of the matter is that the Germans had accumulated enormous
stocks for their great offensive and that they had expended these
stocks at a greater rate than their factories could replace them.
We learn from Schwarte's book that, "Although the production of Yellow Cross
almost reached 1000 tons a month, yet finally the possibilities of use
and the amount required were so great that only a much increased monthly
output would have been sufficient."

Yperite, French Mustard Gas.--During this period the volume
of allied gas activities also increased considerably.
But until June, 1918, our success was due to the development
of more successful tactical methods rather than to any
specific chemical surprise.

Very great credit is due to the French for having produced large quantities
of mustard gas by the above date.

Judging from the German Intelligence Reports the surprise effect of the French
production was almost as great as that obtained by the earlier German use.
It again evaded the gas discipline of the troops, and we find the German staff
laying enormous emphasis on this question, which was already very prominent
in their general and operation orders.  The occasion provided a very striking
example of German belief in their absolute predominance in production.
They were largely justified in this belief, but it carried them too far.
They explained the use of mustard gas by the French as due to the use
of German mustard gas obtained from "blind" German shell!

Effect on German Gas Discipline.--British mustard gas was not in use
in the field until September, 1918, but the French was a great success,
and probably contributed to no small extent to the final allied
success in the 1918 campaign.  The French termed mustard gas
"Yperite" after Ypres, the place where it was first used.
As far as such terms can be applied to any weapon, Yperite arrived
to spread panic, and terror amongst the German formations.
A document captured by the Sixth French Army shows that Yperite used
on the 13th June against the 11th Bavarian Division was the chief cause
of the precipitate retreat of this Division.  The Seventh German Army
refers to another bombardment on the 9th of June, in which the casualties
exceeded five hundred.

It is curious to note that although the Germans had so preached
the superiority of their gases and gas methods, serious blows
by the Allies found the German gas discipline unequal to them.
It is no exaggeration to say that the use of mustard gas by the French,
and later by the British, and the British projector, produced,
on each occasion, in the German ranks feelings allied to panic.
This is reflected in the many orders which have been captured from
army and other headquarters enforcing and even appealing for gas
discipline amongst the troops.  Thus, almost immediately after
the first French use, Ludendorff, chief of the German General Staff,
issued a special detailed order on the subject, and the German
document captured by the French can be taken as representative.
"Our Yellow Cross has caused much damage to the enemy, formerly less
protected than now.  But as a natural sequence he had developed
through it a gas discipline which can certainly be taken as model.
On this account enemy troops have been able to cross, at once
and without loss, areas which their artillery had just bombarded
with gas.  We also must train our troops to an excellent
standard of gas discipline if we expect to avoid the grave
dangers which threaten the fighting forces of our army."
By the time of the Armistice France had produced nearly 2000 tons
of mustard gas, British and American production was rapidly increasing,
so that the output was attaining stupendous proportions.
Some idea of the importance of chemical warfare in the campaigns
of 1917-1918 can be obtained from the following figures:

Allied Gas Statistics.--Between November, 1917, and November, 1918,
France produced more than five millions of her latest type of respirator.
The British figure was probably higher.  From April to November, 1918,
the French filled nearly two and a half million shell with mustard gas.
From the 1st of July, 1915, to the latter date more than seventeen million
gas shell were completed by the French.  In addition to these huge gas
shell figures we must remember the chemical operations from projectors
and as cloud gas.  During the period the British averaged fifty
large scale operations of this type per month, sometimes discharging
monthly three hundred tons of gas.  The total French production of
chlorine and poison gas for chemical warfare approached 50,000 tons,
a large proportion of which production occurred during 1917 and 1918.
The British was of the same order, but German production was at least
more than twice as high, showing what great use they made of gas shell.
The huge American programme might have reduced the margin, but no limits
can be placed on German possibilities and elasticity in production.

Critical Importance of Rapid German Production.--These figures are
misleading inasmuch as they give no indication whatever of the relative
difficulties and corresponding rapidity of action on both sides.
As a general rule, where the German lag between the approval
of a substance and its use in the field covered weeks, our lag
covered months.  Owing to efficient production, chemical warfare
was an infinitely more flexible weapon in German hands than in ours.
This will be readily understood when we analyse, later,
the methods of production of some of the chief German war gases.
In general, German development of these complicated substances
provided a series of examples of the ease and rapidity of production
of organic substances by the dye industry.  On the other hand,
except in very few exceptional cases, British and French production,
although we cast no reflection on the energy or skill of any concerned,
was exceedingly slow and costly by comparison.  The Germans used
mustard gas in July, 1917.  We identified it a few days afterwards.
But the first fruits of allied production were not in the field for
eleven months.  British material was not used until a month or two before
the Armistice.  Further, in this case, we were convinced of the value
of the substance almost from the first day of its use by the enemy.
We will endeavour to throw light upon this in our review of production.

The period of intensive chemical warfare may be regarded as the proof
of the German experiment of 1915-1916. Shed of their trial nature,
the chemical weapons played a logical and increasingly dominating part
in the campaign.  They were surely destined to play a much more prominent
part had the period of stabilised warfare continued.  Projector cloud
gas would have assumed greater importance as a casualty producer.
But we will leave such considerations for a future chapter.



CHAPTER V

CHEMICAL WARFARE ORGANISATIONS


We have no desire nor intention to give a detailed historical
account of the above.  The ramifications, of Allied organisations
were so numerous, the number of persons concerned so great,
the sacrifices made so heavy, that only an exceedingly
lengthy account could hope to do justice to individuals.
In addition, such an account would not serve our purpose.
We wish to show, as briefly as possible, how the different Allied
organisations were bound up in an organic way with the campaign,
how they compared with those of the enemy, and what lesson
the comparison may contain for the future.

Two facts stand out in such a comparison.  We are struck with
the extreme simplicity of the German organisations, as we know them,
and the great complexity and multiplicity of the Allied departments
as we saw them.  We must admit from the beginning that we know
least of the German home organisations for research and production,
but our knowledge is sufficient to reveal their simplicity.
The Inter-Allied Commission of Control may, and certainly should,
obtain full information, but at present the matter stands as follows.

German Research.--The Germans relied upon two main and very strong
centres for research.  They have already been indicated as the
Kaiser Wilhelm Institute, under the direction of Professor Haber,
and the enormous research organisations of the I.G. There are various
references to internal gas organisation in captured documents.
It appears that they received their final form late in 1917.
A great gas school (Heeres-Gaschule) was instituted in Berlin where
there were also central depots for anti-gas inspection and material.
Rather earlier than this the Kaiser Wilhelm Institute was definitely
appointed as the official research centre.  The War Ministry had
a chemical section named A.10, which dealt with gas questions.
It is rumoured, and there is strong reason to believe, that the I.G.
was largely staffed by officers of the Reserve before the war.
Whatever their pre-war associations, if any, with the War Ministry,
hostilities must have found them keenly alive to the possibilities
of their unique research and organic chemical producing facilities.
It is inconceivable that this military personnel should not have
greatly assisted the I.G. in its operations, inventions and general
assistance for the army.

It appears that the subdivision of work left the, direction of
chemical research in Berlin, possibly at the above Institute,
while the bulk of the work of preparing the new compounds,
and developing manufacturing processes for approved substances,
occurred in the laboratories of the I.G.

Leverkusen.--We know, for example, that a very large number
of substances was produced at Leverkusen and samples forwarded
to Berlin, of which only a few were finally approved for production.
The physiological work and field tests were certainly associated
with the Berlin organisation, but it is not clear how much
of this work occurred within the I.G. An Allied mission
to Leverkusen reported as follows:--"It was emphatically
stated that no means of testing the products were resorted
to beyond inhala-tion and testing the effect of the substances
on the staff, but this statement must be accepted with reserve."
This is particularly so as we know that large numbers of
respirator-drums had been made in this factory, and that a gas
school existed at Leverkusen in 1915.

A member of another Allied mission was informed by one of the staff
at Leverkusen that the authorities there were well aware
of the difficulties in chemical warfare, apart from production,
for they had some experience in the designing and testing of
chemical shell.  It maybe that the German Government relied upon
the I.G. for such work in the early stages of the chemical war,
pending the development of official organisation.
When we remember, however, that at Leverkusen alone there
was a staff of 1500 technical and commercial specialists,
apart from thousands of workpeople, before the war,
and that the latter were increased by 1500 during the war,
we find it difficult to place a limit on the services which
might have been rendered by this research centre alone.
The opinion of the members of the Hartley Commission[1] was,
that much thought and attention had been given to chemical
warfare by the chemists of the Company.


[1] A post-armistice inter-allied mission of experts, to the Rhine
chemical factories, March, 1919.


Hochst.--A great volume of chemical warfare research occurred
also at Hochst.  "The admission was made that the research
department of the factory was continuously employed during the war
on the preparation of substances suitable for chemical warfare,
many hundreds being prepared and sent to Berlin for examination.
The firm employed 300 academically trained chemists in peace time,
but during the war many more were engaged, partly for research
and partly because all shell filling was carried out under
the supervision of trained chemists."

Ludwigshafen.--The most influential branch of the I.G. was,
undoubtedly, the Badische Anilin und Soda Fabrik.  It might
have been expected, as they shared largely in production,
that a considerable amount of chemical warfare research would occur
at these works, but this was emphatically denied to Allied missions.
It may be, however, that as the nitrogen fixation enterprise
was developed there, requiring a large amount of technical
development and control, this was considered a sufficient
contribution to the general cause.

Early Formulation of Policy.--In examining what signs we have
of the organisation and policy underlying chemical warfare
research and production in Germany, we are struck by the fact
that all the substances used with such dire effect against us
during the war must have been approved for production by the
Government at a relatively early date.  The following table,
assembled from information supplied by the German factories,
brings this point out very clearly.

                                                       First Use
 War Chemical.      Factory.       Production Began.        in the Field,
 Diphosgene              Hochst      Sept., 1916              Summer, 1915
 (Green Cross)      Leverkusen          June, 1915
 Mustard Gas        Leverkusen          Spring, 1917        July, 1917
 (Yellow Cross)
 Diphenyl-               Hochst      May, 1917           July, 1917
     chlorarsine
 (Blue Cross)
 Diphenyl-               A.G.F.A. ?          Feb., 1918               June, 1911
     cyanarsine
 (Blue Cross)
 Ethyl-dichlor-          Hochst      Aug., 1917               March, 1918
     arsine
 (Blue Cross)

We have chosen the later products to establish the point, for it
is self-evident for the earlier products, some of which were made
before the war.

Movements of Personnel.--The movements of German chemical personnel give
us a clue as to the main tendencies in their chemical warfare policy.
The factories were called upon to produce, as we have already shown,
towards the end of 1914, but this production largely involved
the use of substances already manufactured on a certain scale.
Large scale production of the more advanced types of war chemical
seems to have been directly stimulated by the Hindenburg programme,
in connection with which the Companies withdrew large numbers of their
skilled workers from the front.

German Simplicity of Organisation.--We can safely conclude
from the above that Germany required no cumbersome government
mechanism for the preparation of new war chemicals,
for the semi-industrial work in developing processes for
approved substances, nor for their production.  By relying on
the I.G., the Kaiser Wilhelm Institute, and probably some other
organisation for field and physiological tests, Germany escaped
the necessity for comprehensive government organisation,
the development of which was such a handicap to Allied countries.
It is certainly very suggestive that we only met,
in the field, substances approved before the summer of 1917.
It is with great interest and a certain amount of apprehension
that we speculate upon the research developments after that period
with which the war did not make us immediately acquainted.
If this early period produced such effective results as mustard gas,
Blue Cross compounds, and the different cloud substances,
what hidden surprises were matured in the later period?
This feature of simplicity, of linking up a new war with an old peace,
activity was paralleled somewhat in the field organisation.
We have seen how Germany created special formations for
cloud attacks, but for a time practically abandoned them,
throwing most of her chemical warfare production into shell.
In other words, she substituted a normal weapon, the artillery.
We, on the other hand, largely impelled by the enforced
simplicity of our production, tended more towards the development
of special formations and special weapons for cloud production,
but with such success that the German Pioneer formations,
after being practically dropped, found a use in developing
and using our new weapon, the Livens Projector.

German Organisation at the Front;--The Gas Regiment.--It is probable
that the earliest form of German organisation at the front consisted
in the liaison between Professor Haber and the German G.H.Q. It
will be remembered that Ludendorff, discussing cloud and shell gas,
refers to this co-operation, stating:[1] "Geheimrat Haber proved
of valuable service in this connection with the use of gas."
It was also rumoured soon after the first German attack that the
organisation and preparation of the latter were under the scientific
guidance of this renowned Professor.  The attack was carried out by
the 35th and 36th Pioneer Regiments, each furnished with chemically
trained officers who were specially detailed for gas warfare.

The importance of protection was realised very early, and a gas
school for officers of all armies was organised at Leverkusen
for training in protection.  We cannot but regard it as significant
that Leverkusen is also the site of the enormous Bayer[2] organic
chemical works which played such a large part in poison gas production.
The school dealt mainly with protection.


[1] _My War Memories_, page 338.

[2] A branch of the great German dye combine, the Interessen Gemeinschaft,
known as the I.G.


Early German Gas School.--Apparently, at the end of November, 1916,
special gas staffs were created and attached provisionally to the
headquarters of formations entrusted with large scale gas operations.
In addition, these staffs had the normal routine function of
supervising inspection and instruction in gas warfare at the front.
At about this time each regiment or larger unit was given a gas officer
(gasschutzoffizier) with similar duties to those outlined above.
In other words, the arrangement was generalised throughout the army.
This officer was assisted by non-commissioned officers and men
specially chosen for the purpose in the smaller units.  The great need
for these staffs is brought out in German official documents.

New Gas Regiments;--Gas Shell Experts.--In 1917 two new
Pioneer battalions, the 37th and 38th respectively, were created
for the express purpose of carrying out projector attacks.
These developments in organisation, both advisory and combatant,
led, at about this time, to the centralisation of the gas services
at the front under a Kommandeur der Gastruppen at G.H.Q. It
would thus appear that the Germans achieved the centralisation
of their gas services some months later than ourselves.
Further developments in organisation, of which we are aware,
were connected with two main tendencies in German gas warfare.
In the first place, the vast employment of gas shell led the Germans
to create special gas experts on the Divisional artillery staffs.
We have this on the authority of an order by Ludendorff dated
June 16th, 1918.  This gas shell expert was not necessarily an
imported specialist, but was usually a specially trained officer
chosen from the staff in question.  This was a very important move,
for it gave the artillery a paternal interest in gas shell.
This artillery specialist maintained a very close liaison
with the Divisional Gas Officer.

Inspection of Protective Masks and Method.--The second tendency
was towards stricter protective standards and inspection.
The gas inspection centre at Berlin was given more responsibilities
in the field and the protection of horses, dogs and carrier
pigeons received great emphasis.

British Field Organisation;--"Breach" Organisations.--Our own
field development followed very similar lines.  The immediate
need in April, 1915, was for organisations on the front
to advise formations on temporary methods of protection,
to ascertain quickly the nature of any new German chemical attack,
and to provide special means of examining the treatment of
the new kind of casualty.  These were "breach organisations,"
so to speak, countering the immediate effects of enemy attacks
while more comprehensive and permanent cadres were created
to absorb them.  The personnel of these breach organisations
was largely composed of chemists already at the front who
had in some cases taken part in the first German attacks.
Efforts were soon on foot to mobilise British chemists for
offensive purposes.  So remote from the old army standards
and training were the conceptions of the new scientific warfare,
that there was no scientific cadre or outstanding scientific
soldier to take over the direction and organisation of these
matters at the front or at home.  Accordingly, in June,
1915, Brigadier-General C. H. Foulkes, C.M.G., D.S.O.
(then Major, R.E.) was given the difficult task of assembling
and training an offensive gas formation, and acting as
Gas Adviser to G.H.Q. The Special Companies thus created
have already been referred to in quotations from despatches.
In addition to this combatant personnel a number of
specialists and advisory organisations came into being.
Additional gas officers were appointed by various divisions,
and chemical advisers by higher formations.

Central Laboratory.--A central laboratory was instituted at G.H.Q. under
the late Colonel W. Watson, C.M.G., F.R.S., which did particularly valuable
work in connection with the rapid identification of new enemy chemicals.
With the development of gas shell, the chemical advisers included this
subject in their province.  Reference must also be made to the medical
and physiological side.

New Type of Casualty.--After the introduction of gas warfare
the army was always faced with the possibility that some
entirely new chemical would produce a new type of casualty
which would require special and sometimes unusual treatment.
A new element was thus introduced into army medical work.
The effects of a new gas used in large quantities on the front
was often just as serious a threat to organisation as the sudden
development of a strange epidemic.  Reaction to meet these new
conditions took the form of the development of medical research
organisations at home, and of the appointment of a special medical
and physiological advisory staff incorporated later in the Directorate
of Gas Services.  It was thus possible, after any enemy gas attack,
and with little delay, to institute inquiries with regard
to treatment of casualties, stimulate special investigations,
and prepare for any reorganisation in personnel and equipment, and,
in general, introduce satisfactory alert conditions throughout
the medical organisation along the whole of the Allied front.
In this connection the effective liaison between the medical
specialists of the British and French armies must be mentioned.

Directorate of Gas Services.--These various services were centralised
in the Directorate of Gas Services, in the Spring of 1916,
under Major-General H. F. Thuillier, C.B., C.M.G., R.E. It is
interesting to note that although in their rear organisations
for research and supply the French preceded us in the adoption
of a logical symmetrical arrangement, yet in the field we were
the first to produce the centralised chemical warfare service
which was so essential.

British Home Organisations;--The Royal Society.--After the battle
of the Marne, Germany rapidly realised the need for scientific
and industrial mobilisation for the new stage into which the war
had passed.  Many signs and definite statements by Falkenhayn
and others in authority have shown us how this realisation
found outlet in various schemes for research and production.
The need for scientific attention to various war problems
was also realised in England, and found expression in the
mobilisation of prominent scientists by the Royal Society,
which constituted a number of committees to deal with specific
activities and to assist various Ministries or administrative
government departments in connection with scientific matters.

Royal Society Chemical Sub-Committee.--The Chemical Sub-Committee
included such prominent names as Lord Rayleigh, Sir William Ramsay and
Sir Oliver Lodge.  Retaliation, decided on early in May, 1915, was reflected
in organisation.  Lord Kitchener entrusted Colonel Jackson, C.M.G., R.E.
(later Major-General Sir Louis Jackson, K.B.E., C.B., C.M.G., R.E.),
then in charge of a fortification section of the War Office,
with the task of examining and taking action on the possibilities
of retaliation, and a liaison with the above chemical committee
of the Royal Society was soon established.  Protection became a part
of the duties of the Medical Services and was placed under the direct
control of Colonel, afterwards Sir William Horrocks, who became chairman
of the specially appointed Anti-Gas Committee.  Further, a little later,
the Chemical Sub-Committee above referred to became an advisory body to
Colonel Jackson.  This was the origin of the Chemical Warfare Department,
but it was destined to pass through many difficult and hampering
transformations before reaching its final, more or less efficient
and symmetrical form.

The Trench Warfare Department.--With the formation of the Ministry of
Munitions late in May, 1915, Colonel Jackson's section was transferred to it.
At this stage there was definite recognition of the absolute need of keeping
chemical warfare research, design, and supply under one head.  Probably this
was the chief reason which prompted Lord Kitchener, then Secretary of State
for War, to agree to the transference of this section to another Ministry,
and consent to the birth of the Trench Warfare Department.

Scientific Advisory Committee;--Commercial Advisory Committee.--Even at
this stage activities were growing and government organisation was found
necessary to cover such functions as in Germany were rendered unnecessary
by the existence of the I.G. It became clear that the new department
would require strong permanent scientific advice, and this was found
in the formation of the Scientific Advisory Committee.  This included
the most active members of the former relevant Royal Society Committee,
amongst whom were Professor A. W. Crossley, the Secretary,
and Professors H. B. Baker, J. F. Thorpe, and Sir George Beilby,
all of whom rendered great services in the later development of this
new branch of warfare.  A parallel Commercial Advisory Committee
was appointed, composed of representatives of some of the leading
manufacturers of the country.

Split Between Research and Supply.--We cannot follow in detail the many
fluctuations experienced in the organisation of the department.
They represent a constant struggle between a definitely expressed
policy of centralisation and symmetry for supply and research,
and circumstances imposed upon the department by the reorganisation
and fusion of Ministries and departments.  There were brief periods,
notably at the commencement and in the final stages, when the desired
centralised organisation was approached, but there were also periods
when there was a complete split between research and supply with feeble
and unsatisfactory liaison between the two.  Speaking generally,
the break between research and supply occurred in December, 1915,
when the Trench Warfare Department was split up into two parts.
These were the Trench Warfare Research Department, in which was
included the Scientific Advisory Committee, and, shortly afterwards,
changed its name to that of the Chemical Advisory Committee,
and the Trench Warfare Supply Department.  The relationships
between those two departments remained practically unchanged until
the formation of the Chemical Warfare Department in October, 1917.
This statement must be qualified, however, by a reference to the
services rendered by Professor, later Sir John Cadman, K.C.M.G., in
bringing about this liaison, not only with supply in England,
but also with that in France.

During the early period the Royal Society Committee of Physiology
became active and was later very closely co-ordinated with the
Chemical Warfare Department, as the Chemical Warfare Medical Committee.

Munitions Inventions Department.--Another feature which is worthy of notice
because it was common to Allied organisations other than the British,
and because it formed part of the slow realisation of the essential
unity of chemical warfare activities, was the duplication of effort
by the Munitions Inventions Department.  Suggestions which could only
have value when considered as part of the definitely directed chemical
warfare policy were constantly raised with the Inventions Department,
but this difficulty was overcome later by the growing importance
of chemical warfare and the effecting of a liaison between the two
departments by Colonel Crossley.

Imperial College of Science.--During the early period the Imperial College
of Science rendered great services by assisting in research.
It continued to do so during the rest of the war, but was later
associated with a large number of British university chemical
and scientific departments in pursuing a huge programme of chemical
warfare research.  We can only make passing reference to the development
of the training and experimental grounds which formed such an
important part in assisting decisions on chemical warfare policy.
The Porton ground, however, was a model of its kind, a pioneer
amongst Allied experimental grounds, and a tribute to the creative
and administrative efforts of Lt.-Colonel Crossley, C.M.G., C.B.E.,
who was its commandant from its inception to the end of the war.

The Chemical Warfare Department.--The growing importance of
chemical warfare, the vigorous chemical initiative assumed by Germany
in the summer of 1917, and various other reasons led to reorganisation
of the Chemical Warfare services in this country in October, 1917,
and the Chemical Warfare Department, under Major-General Thullier,
formerly Director of Gas Services, B.E.F., was constituted.
This reorganisation witnessed a great increase in research
and other activities of the department and a still greater
mobilisation of the chemists of the country.  Although this
change witnessed further centralisation by the incorporation
of the Anti-Gas Department, thereby settling once and for all
the inherent association between offensive and defensive research,
a fact which had been apparent to many long before, yet it still ignored
the fundamental connection between offensive research and supply.
This had been recognised in French organisation as early as 1915,
yet we did not reach the ideal solution even at the end of the war.

The Anti-Gas Department.--We have mentioned the origin of the
Anti-Gas Department.  Although separate in organisation from chemical
warfare research, yet the remarkable work and personality of the late
Lt.-Colonel E. F. Harrison, C.M.G., overcame the disadvantages by
energetic liaison and a great capacity for the internal organisation.
General Hartley has paid a tribute which we cannot refrain from repeating:
"Colonel Harrison was one of the great discoveries of the war.
It is often stated that he was the inventor of the box respirator,
but this he would have been the first to deny.  His great merit
was as an organiser.  He gathered round him an enthusiastic group
of young chemists and physicists, and the box respirator represents
the joint result of their researches, carried out under his
inspiration and controlled by his admirable practicable judgment.
He organised the manufacture of the respirator on a large scale,
and it is a great testimony to his foresight and energy that in spite
of all the difficulties of production, the supplies promised to France
never failed.  Fifty million respirators were produced by the department,
and of these nineteen million were box respirators."

Anti-gas research was at first centred in the R.A.M. College, Millbank,
and from the beginning of 1917 in the Physiological Institute,
University College, London.  The work done in research and production
not only protected the whole of the British Army, but formed the backbone
of American and a large part of Italian protection.  Further, the sacrifices
made in connection with this work are not sufficiently known.
Numbers of young scientists sacrificed their health and sometimes life,
in carrying out the critical tests upon which the safety of millions
of Englishmen and Allies depended.

Designs Committee.--We cannot leave this branch of the subject without
referring to the Chemical Warfare Designs Committee.  An important trend
in chemical warfare was its growing independence of the normal weapons of war,
and its special requirements when adapted for use with both the normal
and newer types.  This tendency found expression in the above Committee
under the direction of Professor Jocelyn Field Thorpe.  The development
of satisfactory chemical shell was an enormous problem, and the importance
of entirely new forms of the chemical weapon will be brought out in dealing
with the limitation of armaments.

French Organisation.--French development followed very similar lines.

From April 28th, 1915, a Commission of military representatives and
scientists was organised under General Curmer.  This gave place in June
to a Chemical Warfare Research Committee under M. Weiss, Directeur des
Mines au Ministere des Traveaux Publics.  In August, 1915, three special
Committees were formed; one under M. Kling for problems from the front,
whose organisation was responsible for a volume of exceedingly reliable
identifications of enemy chemicals of great use to the Allies;
another under M. Moureu for offensive research, whose brilliant organic
investigation characterised later French developments, and the other
under M. Vincent, for research on protection.  But, in the meantime,
the importance of gas shell was impressed upon the French and,
on the 1st July, 1915, this organisation passed into M. Albert Thomas's
new Ministere de L'Artillerie et des Munitions.  Manufacture passed into
the hands of the Directeur du Materiel Chimique de Guerre.  In September,
1915, these sections were centralised under General Ozil, attached to
the same Ministry.  General Ozil's service was strongly supported
by a number of eminent French scientists, and achieved unusual success
in the face of great practical difficulties.

A very close liaison was maintained with the army, and the initiative,
energy, and devotion of all concerned cannot be too highly praised.
In production alone the difficulties were enormous.  There was no
highly organised dye industry available.  The prewar German monopoly
had seen to that.  Elaborate organisations and continuous research
work under difficult conditions were necessary to replace the smooth,
running normal activities of the great German dye combine.
The salient points in French production are dealt with more fully
in another chapter.

In research and protection French activities were no less handicapped
and just as creditable.  The protection of the French armies was largely
achieved through the genius and tireless industry of Professor Paul Lebeau.

Quick to realise the need of retaliation against the new German weapon,
the French developed their chemical offensive and defensive
with characteristic elan and intuition.  Contributing largely
to Allied research, they took the lead in Inter-Allied co-operation
and liaison, and their activities in this field were due to much
worthier causes than mere geographical position.

Italian Development.--The Italians were alive to the importance of
chemical warfare.  World famous names such as those of Senator Paterno
and Professor Villavecchia were associated with their organisation.
Once again, however, although not lacking in invention and initiative,
they were continually hampered by production, which imposed such
grave disadvantages upon them as to endanger seriously the success
of their campaign.  The success of the great German offensive against
Italy in the autumn of 1917 was largely ascribed to the German use
of gas of such types and in such amounts that the Italian protective
appliances were outmanoeuvred.  Further, in spite of the offensive
qualities of the Italian gas organisation under Col. Penna,
lack of supplies prevented large scale gas retaliation, so essential
in maintaining gas morale.

Towards the end of the war, when the French and British production improved,
and with the entry of America and the promise of supplies therefrom,
it was possible to assist the Italians from Allied sources,
and arrangements were made to supply them with the British Respirator,
to assist them in the development of the Livens Projector, to supply large
quantities of mustard and other gases, and to assist them in production.
The use of the British box respirator was undoubtedly a great factor
in repelling the Austrian offensive of June, 1918.  Their experimental
fields and research organisations were particularly well staffed, and,
backed by production, Italian chemical genius would have been capable
of producing very serious results.

Supply Organisations.--What a marked contrast between the organisation
required for German and Allied chemical warfare production!
Such organisation implies cadres and arrangements for co-operation
with research organisations, for semi-scale work, commercial functions,
priority, raw material supply, transport, and all their concomitants.
In Germany, the self-contained dye industry simplified all these functions.
The Government addressed itself to one producing organisation which
was responsible for most of the relevant research.  Whole Government
departments were rendered unnecessary by this centralised production.

British Supply Organisation.--In England the situation was
entirely different.  Even before the advent of mustard gas the Government
was compelled to apply to at least twenty contractors.  The products
required were foreign to the normal activities of many of these.
They required assistance in raw materials, transport, technical methods,
either the result of the work of other factories or of research.
The latter again involved complex official organisation, cumbrous even
if efficiently carried out.  This at once introduced difficulties.
The centre of gravity of supply was in government offices instead
of in the centres of production.  Much depended upon the co-ordination
of the official departments.  Quite apart from the Government plants
finally engaged in chemical warfare production, more than fifty plants
were used in private organisations, of which a very high percentage
were entirely new.

Allied Handicaps.--The functions of the allied Government supply
departments were or should have been much more than those of an
individual negotiating a contract.  Owing to the fact that these were
new plants, and that the products were foreign to the production
of many of the firms concerned, two alternatives had to be faced.
Either the technical and service departments of each firm had
to be considerably strengthened, or else a special organisation
had to cover these functions by employing a considerable government
technical and liaison personnel.  For reasons of secrecy and general
efficiency the latter procedure evolved, but neither represented
the ideal solution.

The German Solution.--This was the German arrangement in which these
functions were all embodied in the centralised producing organisation,
the I.G. The German Government took the role of a pure contractor,
the only additional function being the choice of product and method,
a question of policy.  This implied the existence of a Government
experimental organisation, but purely for this purpose.

Departmental Difficulties.--The Allied task would have been
much simpler if the only war weapon had been a chemical one,
in which case an efficient organisation could have been decided
upon at first, and need have suffered no very radical changes.
As it was, however, the British supply organisation had to
administer some seventy plants, which were really in private hands,
and found its chief difficulties quite apart from the external
perplexities of the problem.  They arose in its relationships
with other Government departments.

Allied Success Against Odds.--Taking a broad view of the case,
although nobody who knew the facts could regard our poison gas
production with anything but dismay, except in a few cases,
yet the main feeling was one of amazement that we succeeded
as well as we did with these entirely new substances.
The whole story of chemical warfare supply amongst the Allies is
one of devoted effort by all concerned, against overwhelming odds,
and although the level of results was poor compared with Germany,
yet we find here and there brilliant examples of Allied
adaptability and tenacity amongst which the French development
of mustard gas stands pre-eminent.

What we have already said about supply organisation may be summed up
in one sentence.  The Germans were already organised to produce.
We had to create Government departments to administer a large
number of plants in private hands, and they had to cope not only
with the external difficulties of the situation but with the almost
overwhelming difficulties of internal organisation.  The checquered
career of the British supply department provides a good example.
The French and Americans suffered less than ourselves from
these troubles, the latter having the benefit of the combined
experience of the other Allies.

Allied Lack of Vision in Production.--A survey of the earliest supply
organisation of this country reveals another difficulty which later events
have obscured.  Few people realised the developments which chemical warfare
would produce.  The early production of chemicals for gas warfare was
grouped under some such designation as trench warfare stores, and graded
in order of importance, from the point of view of supply organisation
with catapults and spring guns, flame projectors and body shields!
It is no unfair criticism to state that hard facts rather than vision forced
the importance of chemical warfare upon those responsible for munition
production in the early stages of the war.  Chemical warfare production
remained under the Trench Warfare Supply Department for many months,
where it was one of ten Trench Warfare sections.  The vicissitudes of trench
warfare supply are too numerous and complicated to be dealt with here,
but chemical warfare supply has suffered accordingly.

British Lag in Organisation.--Examining Allied organisations,
we find that the French and Americans approached this ideal
solution more rapidly than ourselves, and we can trace in our
own development a number of unsuccessful attempts to reach this
centralised control, although the last configuration, under the direction
of Major-General H. F. Thuillier, was the nearest approach.
French organisation for supply provides another example of their
national characteristic of logical thinking and love of symmetry.
As early as September, 1915, the French centralised their research
organisation, the Inspection des Etudes et Experience Chimiques,
and their supply organisation, the Direction du Materiel Chimique
de Guerre, in their Service Chimique de Guerre under General Ozil.

French and American Characteristics.--Their early concentration on
gas shell shows that this symmetrical organisation was due not only
to the above characteristic but also to vision in war development.
American supply organisation again provides evidence of the
national characteristic.  They had no I.G. but they had plenty of money
and material, and the total of Allied experience in production.
They therefore proceeded at once to build an enormous producing
centre known as Edgewood Arsenal.  We refer to this later.
The tremendous potentialities of this Arsenal will readily he seen,
although they did not become effective during the war.

It would be poor testimony to the tremendous efforts and sacrifices
made by the various firms and officials connected with chemical
warfare to leave the matter at this stage, or to make a minute
analysis of the different internal causes for lack of success.
We may say that although the efforts of all concerned were
beyond praise, yet they were so initially handicapped that it was
practically impossible even to approach the German efficiency.
In France and England we were suffering from the faults of past years,
our lack of attention to the application of science to industry.
The Americans would also have suffered, for they were in the same plight,
but they adopted the drastic solution of Edgewood Arsenal.  As we
show later, however, this solution was really only a very necessary
and valuable attempt to treat the symptom rather than the disease.
We cannot regard the problem as settled for any of these countries.
If it is, then the outlook is very poor.

Inter-Allied Chemical Warfare Liaison.--Chemical warfare offered,
in theory, a splendid opportunity for co-ordination amongst
the Allies, The new methods, unhampered by tradition, seemed,
at first sight, admirably suited for exploitation against the enemy
by an allied Generalissimo and staff.  Co-ordination never reached
this stage, although strong liaison organisations were developed.
Inter-allied research conferences occurred periodically in Paris,
where decisions for co-operation were taken after full discussion
of allied work.  The continuity of these relationships was maintained
by an active secretariat on which each ally was represented.
The contact, so close between actual allied scientific workers
in this field, became less evident in the application of their
results to field warfare, for several reasons.  In the first place,
close scientific contact in research was replaced by the actual field
relationships of the armies, and, as is well known, the central
inter-allied command did not materialise until the spring of 1918,
and even then it was only possible to apply the new principle
to the actual battlefield.  The traditional differences between.
the methods of the different services of each ally still existed
to a large extent, and they found expression in type of armament,
equipment, and military standards, such as, for example, gun calibres
and shell design, to which chemical warfare had to conform.
No inter-allied gas mask materialised, although this would have been
of inestimable advantage.  Probably the example of most complete
co-ordination occurred on the supply side, where absence of the above
traditional difficulties and the crying need to make the most
of available raw materials compelled a very close co-ordination.

Inter-Allied Supply.--The writer was responsible for initiating,
in 1917, an Inter-Allied Chemical Supply Committee, whose function
was to pool effectively the allied raw materials, and to arrange
their distribution in accordance with allied programmes,
the exchange of which implied a considerable step.
Later this Committee became one of a number, similarly constituted,
forming part of the Inter-Allied Munitions Council.

Thinking over the difficulties of the inter-allied supply, now that the
emergenices of the situation have passed, an important contrast emerges.
After three years of war, and although protected by the powerful arm
of the blockade, we were, still resorting, for chemical warfare supply,
to measures which, compared with the German methods, were complicated,
clumsy, and inefficient.  This was, in a sense, forced upon us by
the number of the allies, and the fact that they held the outer lines.
But it is easily forgotten that Germany also had a number of allies,
and that Germany supply organisation was sufficient to feed them all.

Nature of Chemical Warfare Research.--So, much has been vaguely said,
and is vaguely known, about research in chemical warfare that a brief
analysis will be of value.

Discovery of New Substances.--Research for this purpose has
a number of very distinct functions, The most obvious is the
discovery of new substances.  But there are others in connection
with which research work represents a much greater volume.
Very few new substances which found valuable application
during the war were revealed by chemical warfare research.
The bulk of the important substances were already known as such,
although their importance for war was probably not realised.
It is most important to emphasise the fact that even in
the future, should there be no direct attempts to reveal
new chemical warfare substances, they will undoubtedly arise
as a normal outcome of research, even if, without exception,
every chemist in the world became a most pronounced pacifist.
A valuable substance once discovered or decided upon, however,
whole series of research investigations become necessary.

Technical Method of Preparation;--Filling Problem;--Protection;--
Half-Scale Investigation.--The substance must be prepared in the most
efficient manner for manufacture, which may not be the mode of its discovery.
It must be used in shells, cylinders, or some other war chemical device.
Each device represents a different filling problem, different difficulties
with regard to contact of the war chemical and the envelope of the container.
If a projectile is in question the ballistics become of importance.
More important than any of these, except production, is the question
of protection.  It is axiomatic that an army proposing to use a new offensive
chemical must be protected against it.  It may, therefore, be necessary
to modify the existing mask or protective appliance, or to create an
entirely new one.  If research reveals the necessity for the latter course
of action it may provide sufficient reason for abandoning the substance.
In addition, according to productive difficulties, it may be necessary
to undertake comprehensive and very expensive research on half-scale
methods for production.  It is impossible in many cases to proceed directly
from the laboratory process to large scale manufacture without serious
risk of failure.

Two Classes of Research.--Broadly, these research functions form two classes,
those concerned with policy and approval of a substance and those
concerned with work which follows automatically upon such approval.
There must be, of course, a certain amount of overlapping and liaison
between the two classes.

Herein lay one of the great advantages enjoyed by the Germans.  Their great
producing organisation, the I.G., was able to take over automatically
certain of these research functions, in particular all those with
regard to preparation and production, even of protective appliances.
The Government reserved what we have called the policy functions,
and was responsible, we assume, for the mass, of physiological and design
research which must always precede approval or a decision on policy.

Signs were not lacking, further, that the I.G. was even employed on certain
occasions for this latter type of research.

Conclusion.--From the facts at our disposal there can be no
doubt that the total material facilities at the disposal of
the Allies for chemical warfare investigation were considerably
more extensive and expensive than those of Germany with the one
notable exception of trained technical organic chemists.
It is very doubtful whether the German field experiments were
as largely provided for as those of the Allies.  When we think
of the French grounds at Versailles and Entressin, the British
at Porton, the American grounds in France and in America,
and the Italian organisations, there can hardly be any doubt that
the total German facilities were much smaller.  Under the actual
circumstances of the war, however, it was difficult to develop
more co-operation than was possible by a very close liaison.
The fact that all the experimental developments from these
grounds required special modification to meet the peculiar needs
of artillery and other equipment for each ally, prevented the
adoption of uniform types of projectile or other appliances.
Even uniform shell marking was found impracticable.

The "Outer and Inner Lines."--The Allied situation compelled the
multiplication of cumbersome organisations in the different countries.
Lack of a strong organic chemical industry placed each ally at a
considerable disadvantage, compared with Germany, in the development
of such organisations.  Using a strategic comparison, we can say
that Germany not only possessed the "inner lines" in the chemical war,
but an exceptionally efficient system to exploit them, in the shape
of the great I.G.



CHAPTER VI

THE STRUGGLE FOR THE INITIATIVE


Meaning of the Chemical Initiative.--The German invasion of Belgium
in 1914 was a direct appeal to the critical factor of surprise in war.
By disregarding their pledge, a "scrap of paper," they automatically
introduced into this attack the elements of military surprise.
We, the enemy, were unprepared, and a complete rearrangement
of dispositions became necessary.

A recent writer has admirably summarised the facts.[1]


[1] A. F. Pollard.  _A Short History of the Great War_.  Methuen, 1920.


"Germany began the war on the Western front before it was declared,
and on 1-2 August, German cavalry crossed the French frontier
between Luxembourg and Switzerland at three points in the direction
of Longwy, Luneville, and Belfort.  But these were only feints
designed to prolong the delusion that Germany would attack
on the only front legitimately open to warfare and to delay
the reconstruction of the French defence required to meet
the real offensive.  The reasons for German strategy were
conclusive to the General Staff, and they were frankly explained
by Bethmann-Hollweg to the British Ambassador.  There was no
time to lose if France was to be defeated before an effective
Russian move, and time would be lost by a frontal attack.
The best railways and roads from Berlin to Paris ran through Belgium;
the Vosges protected more than half of the French frontier
south of Luxembourg, Belfort defended the narrow gap between
them and Switzerland, and even the wider thirty miles'
gap between the northern slopes of the Vosges and Luxembourg
was too narrow for the deployment of Germany's strength;
the way was also barred by the elaborate fortifications
of Verdun, Toul, and Nancy.  Strategy pointed conclusively to
the Belgium route, and its advantages were clinched by the fact
that France was relying on the illusory scrap of paper."

The first German cloud gas attack was the second attempt to gain
the decisive initiative, by the unauthorised use of a surprise
of an entirely different nature.

Modern writers are at great pains to establish how the world war,
although leaving the final function of the infantry unchanged,
rendered them and their staff subservient to mass munition production.
Mr. H. G. Wells explains this to the Kaiser in a delightful imaginary
interview between that august person and an hypothetical manufacturer.[1]
Professor Pollard tells us how, when the first German surprise had failed,
the war became "a test of endurance rather than generalship."
We will leave a clear field for any military challenge to such
a point of view.  Our objection is that it is not fully developed.
The war was still a test of generalship, that of directed production.
This war has shown, and future wars may unfortunately confirm,
that the type and secrecy of production is as important as its volume.
There will still be the purely military surprise and manoeuvre,
but superimposed, co-ordinated, and sometimes predominant will appear
the technical surprise, the result of the generalship of production.


[1] _War and the Future_.  Cassel, 1917.


Such a surprise is achieved by the sudden introduction on a large
scale of some entirely new war weapon, capable of achieving
a strategic or tactical objective in an unsuspected manner.

Although the general idea of this second type of surprise existed
before the war, particularly in naval warfare, it required
the coincidence of the Great European War and modern scientific
development to demonstrate its great importance on land.

Thus the first German gas attack found the opposing troops
entirely unprotected, not merely through the absence of a mask,
but in training and technical discipline.  The case is quoted of an
indignant gassed soldier who, in an early gas attack, when reproached
for not protecting himself, thereupon opened his tunic and revealed
a mask firmly tied round his chest!  It is a far cry from such a case
to the inculcation of strict gas discipline into an army of millions.
The attack reaped the corresponding results in casualties and morale.
It found the opposing medical services unequipped, not only to treat
the new type of casualty, but even to determine its nature rapidly
and efficiently.  In short, it found the enemy utterly unprepared,
either in theory or practice, to counter its effect.  The importance
of this second type of surprise lies in its peculiar potentialities.
It may affect a given military result with an extraordinarily
small expenditure of material, energy, and eventually human life,
when compared with the older military weapons.  Chemical warfare is
a weapon, par excellence, to achieve this second type of surprise.
Therein lies its chief importance.

As a result, the history of chemical warfare becomes one of
continual attempts, on both sides, to achieve surprise and to
counter it by some accurate forecast in protective methods.
It is a struggle for the initiative.

More than this, as the use of chemical warfare becomes an organic
part of operations, as it did during the war, these operations
become correspondingly dependent upon conditions imposed
by the chemical campaign.  One can imagine the case of an army
unprotected against a new gas, aware that the enemy is ready to
employ the latter, compelled to postpone some huge offensive until
its protective methods were equal to countering the new chemical.
General Fries, the American authority, states, in reference
to mustard gas, and the Northern offensives in 1917:
"It is no disparagement of the British, nor of any one else,
to say that they held up the date of their attack for two weeks
pending further investigations into the effects of this new gas."
Ludendorff, referring to the German offensive in March, 1918,
tells us, "Our artillery relied on gas for its effect.
Up till the morning of the 20th strength and direction
(of the wind) were by no means favourable, and it seemed
almost necessary to put off the attack."  Such a point becomes
of greater importance as the influence of other arms decreases.
If we assume international arrangements for the limitation
of other types of armament in the future, chemical warfare
at once stands out as decisive.

Controlling Factors;--Rapid Manufacture.--Certain well-defined
factors hold a controlling position in the chemical initiative.
Before any chemical discovery can be used for surprise on the front
a second step must occur; this is large scale manufacture.
This period is vital to surprise.  Success in chemical
warfare is largely dependent on secrecy, which means
achieving production in the shortest possible time, and this
is particularly important at the commencement of hostilities.
Throughout the war the Germans possessed this advantage and,
in the future, unless certain steps are taken, it will be
theirs again.  A very simple example will suffice to show
the importance of the combination of these two factors.
Let us assume the not remote possibility that Germany had
refrained from using poison gas until she had reached the stage
of development which existed at the time of her 1918 offensive.
There is little room for doubt that the big scale use of cloud
attacks which would then have been available, and of shell gas,
in particular mustard gas, would have achieved decisive success.
The Allies would have been totally unprotected, the moral effect
would have been enormous, and, even if we ignore the latter,
the number of casualties would have produced a gap the size
of which was only dependent on German wishes.

Rapid Identification Essential.--It is important to remember,
however, that once a chemical campaign has commenced,
certain factors may militate against any lengthy retention
of the initiative by either party.  Organisations develop whose
function is to ascertain the nature of new enemy chemical devices
so that protective research and production can commence with
the minimum delay.  This assumes the existence of a protective
appliance and organisation.  The very efficient collaboration
of the British Central Laboratory in France for the examination
of new gas shell with the French organisation centred in Paris
provides numerous examples of the functioning of this safeguard.
No time was lost in identifying the nature of the various
chemicals employed by Germany in her shell fillings.
Speed was vital.  The use of a new type of chemical in shell,
bomb, or other contrivance, in any sector of the front,
on whatever scale, however small, was reported without delay.
Then followed instantaneous collection and examination,
after which all front line formations, other formations,
allies, and rear organisations were expeditiously warned.
The harmless trial flight of the few shell of a new type might
be followed by the use of hundreds of thousands in a deadly
attack one hundred miles away or on another allied front.
Not only were captured offensive contrivances of value for
this purpose, but the rapid examination of new enemy masks was
of prime importance, for it could be assumed that the enemy would
be protected against his own surprises in store for others.

Attempts to ascertain the enemy's gas activities were not
confined to examining captured material after their first use.
Raids and artillery fire were both used to obtain intelligence
regarding preparations, or to break up the gas emplacements.
The Germans have provided us with a particularly gallant
and interesting attempt.

Near Nieuport the front penetrated a region inundated by
the Belgians during the desperate German offensives of 1914.
The trench system, winding through a mile or so of sand dunes,
passed in a southeasterly direction through the marshy sector known
as Lombartzyde.  Here the bogged front lines were intersected by
the Yser canal, the German front trench being some 80 yards away.
Allied gas was installed in the Lombartzyde and neighbouring
sectors ready for discharge on the first favourable opportunity.
For some reason or other the Germans suspected this,
and at night a raiding party swam down the ice cold Yser, and,
negotiating the submerged wire, landed in the Allied support line.
Stunning the sentry with a bomb which, fortunately, refused to explode,
they proceeded to the front line to seek gas emplacements.
Either through unexpected disturbance, or for some other reason,
they were compelled to leave before completing their inspection,
and successfully swam the Yser canal back to their own trenches.
This hazardous enterprise represents but one of many raids whose
function it was to ascertain the presence of enemy gas.

Propaganda and Morale.--Another factor intended to facilitate the
attainment of the chemical initiative was the German use of propaganda.
Rumours, reflected in the Press, were often current at the Front,
at home, and in neutral countries, that some particularly fiendish
chemical contrivance was about to be launched against the Allies
by Germany.  Thus, in January and February of 1916, vigorous propaganda
activity of this kind in Switzerland preceded the great German
offensive at Verdun.  The new gas was heralded by fantastic stories.
Certain death was threatened for all within one hundred yards of the
shell burst.  The origin of the report was traced to various sources.
In one case rumours concerned a conscientious worker in a German factory,
desirous of warning the French through Swiss friends, in other cases
German scientists were reported to be influencing Francophile
neutrals in order that they might warn the French.  But an analysis
of the propaganda reveals something more than its sensational nature.
The information arrived at well-defined periods, which usually preceded
the actual use of a new gas or chemical device by Germany.  But when
the actual effort is compared with the prophecy we find that in no case
was there any real clue as to the nature of the gas.  Thus, before the use
of phosgene by the Germans at the end of 1915, definite reports reached
the Allies regarding the projected use of at least ten new gases
by Germany, which were described not only chemically, but as being
colourless, odourless, powerful, blinding, and instantaneously deadly!
No such volume of propaganda was experienced before the first German
cloud attack at Ypres.  Indeed, one would not have expected it,
for the mere fact of the use of cloud gas was then new to war,
and of military value.

This propaganda was not without its effect, and, but for the excellent
Allied gas discipline, would have been an effective precursor
to the gas itself.  Cases were not absent, at the Battle of Loos,
for example, in which the German use of lachrymators found
British soldiers so mentally unprepared, or rather let us say
"prepared" by propaganda, as to spread ridiculous rumours on
the battlefield as to the all-powerful nature of the new German
gas shell.  These were, in fact, bursting a few yards away,
with no more serious results than lachrymation and vomiting.
The extended use of shell gas by the Germans in the summer
of 1916 was again preceded by intensive propaganda during
the early months of that year, in which the promise of prussic
acid was prominent.  The influence of a name is very curious.
Prussic acid probably accounted for fewer casualties than any
other gas.  This fact became apparent with the increasing
use of the French Vincennite, which contained prussic acid.
Yet German propaganda redoubled its efforts as time went on to inspire
fear in the Allied soldiers by the threat to use prussic acid.
It is clear that armies cannot abandon gas discipline, and that
an important factor in strengthening this discipline is a wise
distribution of gas knowledge.  The use of mustard gas and newer
shell gases in 1917 was again preceded by a burst of propaganda.
In this period we find the first reference to long-range gas
shell and aircraft gas bomb, and, curiously enough, a certain
amount of propaganda with regard to a blinding chemical,
which partially described mustard gas.

As further confirmation of the General Staff origin of this propaganda
we find that the 1918 outburst occurred two or three months earlier in
the year than in 1917.  This was accounted for, no doubt, by its intended
influence upon Allied morale in the great German offensive of early 1918.
This last wave of propaganda includes one very interesting example.
It is better known than other cases through its association with the
International Red Cross at Geneva.  This body represented in February,
1918, that Germany was about to use a really terrible gas which would
have such disastrous effects that it was absolutely essential to make
a last attempt to get both sides to abandon gas warfare.  The official wire
reads as follows:--"Protest of International Red Cross against the use
of Poison Gas.  I have received private letter from Monsieur X., President
of International Red Cross, which I think that I ought to lay before you.
He says that Red Cross were induced to make protest by what they had
heard of new gas Germans are preparing although Red Cross understands
that the Allies are aware of the gas and are taking their precautions.
As they did not wish to draw an indictment of Germany they appealed to
both groups of belligerents to pledge themselves not to use this weapon.
Red Cross asks whether the Entente leaders through Inter-Allied Council at
Versailles could not make a loud declaration which would reach the peoples
of the Central Empires as well as their rulers, pledging themselves not to use
such gas on condition that the two Emperors similarly bind themselves not
to employ it.  If the latter refuse, all the guilt will rest with them."
Although there can be no doubt that the International Red Cross and the Swiss
involved in this move were absolutely bona fide, yet whoever was responsible
for initiating the move on the German side played his hand very well.
If, as actually occurred, the protest did not result in the cessation
of gas hostilities, it still served its purpose as propaganda aimed
at Allied morale.  Knowing his dispositions for gas defence, and our
own offensive preparations, it is probable that the enemy was willing
to withdraw before being overwhelmed by Allied and American production.
After three years of costly improvised production by the Allies, Germany could
no longer securely enjoy the fruits of the initiative provided by the plants
and factories of the I.G.

Peculiar Peace-Time Danger.--There can be no doubt therefore that the mere
contact of two armies during war acts as a check against the decisive
use of chemical warfare, except in the very early stages.  During peace
this contact will be practically non-existent, and it would be possible
for any country so to diverge in its lines of research and discovery that,
given rapid means of production, it could repeat the German surprise of 1915,
this time with decisive results.  Should such a nation possess a monopoly
in the means of rapid production, the world is practically at her mercy.
Should she be prepared to break her word, the usual means of controlling
disarmament are impotent against these developments.

War Fluctuations of Initiative.--In the light of the above remarks the
fluctuations in the initiative during the recent war are very significant.
The first marked feature was the development of British and Allied
protection to counter the enemy attacks which would presumably follow
the first German use of cloud gas.  Immediately after the German
chemical surprise, and while the Allies were still undecided whether
to retaliate, work proceeded feverishly on the development of some
form of protection for the hitherto unprotected soldier.  In response
to Lord Kitchener's dramatic appeal to the women of England and France,
masks were sent to France in sufficient quantity within a few days.
They were of a very primitive type, and consisted of a pad of cotton
wool impregnated with certain chemicals, to be held in place over
the mouth, which was superseded, in May, by a very similar contrivance,
slightly more efficient with regard to the length of time of protection.
Dr. Haldane and certain other prominent chemists and physiologists worked
on the different improvised types.  With this feeble protection, or,
in the first case, with none at all, our armies had to face the first
German cloud gas attacks.

The idea of the gas helmet which covered the whole head was brought
to England by Captain Macpherson of the Newfoundland Corps,
early in May.  Suitably impregnated, it made satisfactory tests.
The helmet type of respirator made of flannel was first tested in
the Anti-Gas laboratories on May 10th, 1915, and was a great success
compared with previously suggested types.  Arrangements for its
manufacture were accordingly made, and this began in June, 1915.
This protective device consisted of a flannel helmet with a celluloid
film eyepiece, and was called the hypo helmet.  The fabric was impregnated
with the same solution as the cotton waste pads described above,
the dipping being carried out largely at Oxford Works, but partly in
the Royal Army Clothing Department, Pimlico.  Its manufacture was continued
until September, 1915, about two and a half millions being made in all.
From June, 1915, we never really lost the initiative in the matter
of defence, although, at different times, the struggle was very intense.
It was this helmet, with the modified phenate impregnation, which, known as
the P. helmet, formed the first line of defence against the probable
employment of phosgene by Germany.  It became known as the "Tube Helmet"
when fitted with a mouthpiece for exhaled air, and, in this form,
countered the formidable enemy phosgene attack in December, 1915.
The later addition of hexamine, suggested from Russia, greatly improved
the efficiency against phosgene and led to the P.H. helmet, which was
issued from January, 1916.  It was not withdrawn until February,
1918, but in the later stages was used as a second line of defence.
The magnitude of this manoeuvring for protection can be judged from
the facts that two and a half millions of hypo helmets, nine millions
of P. helmets, and fourteen millions of P.H. helmets were issued
during the campaign.

There is no doubt that this early period, however, was a very costly
experiment on the use of the different masks, the success of which
involved the loss of numbers of men who were compelled, through reasons
of supply or uncertain design, to use the less efficient types.
In one case, for example, the trial of mica eyepieces rendered otherwise
efficient masks absolutely useless by breaking, and caused losses.
We cannot afford to repeat such experiments in future.  Failure to
develop protective appliances fatally implies large-scale experiments
in future wars in which unnecessary loss of life is bound to occur.
If steady research in peace can diminish this possible loss,
shall it be stopped?

The urgency of these developments can be understood from
a case quoted by General Hartley:[1] "A certain modification
of the respirator was considered necessary in France,
and officers were sent home to explain what was needed.
Within forty-eight hours of their arrival arrangements
were made to modify the respirators, and within a few weeks
the fighting troops had been re-equipped with the new pattern.
Less than three months after the change had been recommended
three attacks were made by the Germans which would certainly
have had very serious consequences if our troops had not been
in possession of the improved respirator, as the older pattern
would not have withstood the concentration of gas employed.
This was only one of many changes that were made in the respirator
to meet new developments."


[1] Report before the British Association, 1919.


How urgent was the need for these developments?  It was vital.
Here is a case showing frightful losses sustained by partially
or inefficiently protected troops.  Between May and July of 1915
the Germans made at least three cloud gas attacks upon the Russians,
immediately west of Warsaw.  In all these attacks, taken together,
gas was discharged for a total time of not more than one hour, and they
were all practically from the same position, on a front of about six miles.
The affair seems relatively small, yet what was the result?
The Russians lost not less than 5000 dead on the field, and their
total casualties were of the order of 25,000 officers and men.
A Siberian regiment had, before the last attack, a ration strength
of about forty officers and 4000 men.  This was reduced by a twenty
minutes gas discharge to four officers and four hundred men.
No other weapon could have reproduced, under the most favourable
conditions for its use, in as many days, what gas was able to do
in as many minutes.

Although our protection had countered the later German attacks
with cloud gas, yet it threatened to fail to meet the situation
created by the use of a variety of organic chemicals in shell.
In order to counter the use of lachrymatory compounds by the enemy,
compounds which penetrated the helmet insufficiently to cause serious
casualties but sufficiently to hamper the individual by lachrymation,
goggles were introduced in which the eyes were protected by rims
of rubber sponge.  This remedied the weakness of the P.H. helmet
and produced the P.H.G. helmet, of which more than one and a half
millions were issued during 1916-1917.

Towards the end of 1915 the standard protection was the P. and P.H. helmet,
but the use of lachrymators compelled us to use the P.H.G. Even
this helmet was not satisfactory against the high concentrations
of phosgene or lachrymators, and after much research the opinion
gained ground that further development must be on other lines.
In addition, the need for a more general form of protection was
emphasised by the German adoption of a mask of cartridge design.
In other words, the fabric of the helmet, or facial portion of the mask,
was made impermeable, and the filtration of the poisoned air occurred
through a cartridge, or filtering box, attached to the fabric
in the form of a snout.  The cartridge provided a much greater
protective range and capacity.  It was clear that such German
protection was evidence of their plans for the further use of gas.
The new German cartridge mask appeared in the autumn of 1915.
Doctor H. Pick, reviewing German protective measures in Schwarte's book,
enumerates the various desiderata of the ideal mask and explains,
"It was only our early recognition of these requirements
which gave us an advantage over the enemy from the first in
the sphere of defensive measures against gas, and which spared
us from having to undertake radical alterations in the apparatus
as the English, French, and Russians had to do more than once."
This early adoption of a comprehensive view on protection
by Germany is a testimony to both German thoroughness and their
definite intention to proceed with a vigorous chemical war.
The latter is not mere inference, for it is borne out by the dates
at which they commenced production in their dye factories.
Further, even if the German cartridge mask was only decided upon
after Loos, which is not probable, our feeble reply in that battle
would hardly have justified such a radical advance in protection.

It was thus forecasted that not only would new ranges of compounds
be employed which it would be most difficult to counter individually,
but aggressive methods would arise, either entirely new or modifications
of the cloud method, which would enable much higher concentrations to be
obtained than those in evidence hitherto.  Accordingly the first type
of the well-known British Box Respirator was designed, giving a big
capacity of highly efficient filtering material, or granule, contained in
a canister, with an improved face-piece and breathing arrangements.
Without going into details, it may be said that Colonel Harrison
and Major Lambert were associated with a number of other enthusiastic
workers in developing the Box Respirator.

Here again the question of chemical supply threatened to
influence our retention of the initiative.  Without going into
the development of the granule in the respirator, the supply
of potassium permanganate was of prime importance, and the country
was woefully deficient in the production of this substance.
The determined efforts of British manufacturers overcame this difficulty.
It was now possible to work on general lines for the improvement
of this canister to increase its protective range, and to modify
the canister specifically in accordance with intelligence as to
what the enemy had recently done or was about to do.  In this way,
and successively, the army was successfully protected against the higher
concentrations employed and the newer substances introduced.
The issue of the large Box Respirator commenced in February, 1916.
It was replaced by the small Box Respirator which came out
in August, 1916, and of which over sixteen millions had been
issued before the signing of the Armistice.  At one time over a
quarter of a million small Box Respirators were produced weekly.
The chief modifications were the use of a smaller box or canister,
the margin of protection being unnecessarily large in the former type.

It became necessary in the spring of 1917 to provide more efficient
protection against irritating smokes which tended to penetrate
the respirator as minute particles, and the first form consisted
in the use of two layers of cotton wadding in the canister of the small
Box Respirator.  The use of Blue Cross compounds by Germany in the summer
of 1917 rendered this matter more urgent, and a special filter jacket
was designed which fitted round the Small Box Respirator.  A million
were made and sent to France.  Developments proceeded on these lines.
Altogether, more than fifty million masks and respirators of different
kinds were manufactured by the British Anti-Gas Department for our own
and Allied armies.

We thus have some idea of the importance of protection
in chemical warfare and of the absolutely imperative need
of deciding whether or no work on protection must go on.
There can be no doubt as to the answer to this question.
It is not only in the interest of the army, whether a League of Nations
or a national army, but also in those of the civil population.

The Tense Protective Struggle.--Few people realise how the development
of Allied and enemy gas masks and protective measures was forced
upon each side in a number of critical steps.  At each of these,
had research and production been unequal to the task, the armies would
have found themselves more uncovered and exposed than if the whole
trench and dug-out system had been suddenly rendered unusable in some
peculiar way, thus removing cover from high explosive and shrapnel,
rifle, and machine-gun fire.  The army has an apt expression.
An officer or man parading incompletely equipped is dubbed "half naked."
To be within reach of enemy gas without a mask was true nakedness.
A modern army without a gas mask is much more helpless and beaten
than one without boots.  More than this, it must be clearly
understood that a gas mask of efficient design and production
will remain of very little use unless, supported by comprehensive
research which, itself, gains enormously in efficiency if related
to enemy offensive activities.

The German Mask.--Consider the German mask for a moment.
We have seen how Germany adopted the canister drum or cartridge
form before any of the other belligerents, and in good time
to protect her own men against their own use of phosgene,
at the end of 1915.  Indeed, Germany probably held up the use
of phosgene until her own protection against it was developed,
although Schwarte's book claims that the German mask issue in 1915
was mainly a protection against chlorine.  The filling consisted
of some such material as powdered pumice-stone saturated with a
solution of potash, and powdered over with fine absorbent charcoal
in order to protect against organic irritants and phosgene.
These were the familiar one-layer drums.  Then came the British
concentrated cloud gas offensive in the summer of 1916,
which undoubtedly found the German mask unequal to some of the higher
concentrations which were obtained under most favourable conditions.
The Gas Officer of the Sixth German Army stated in a document
issued in November, 1916:  "Considerable losses were caused
by the gas attacks which have taken place latterly.
The casualties were mainly due to the men being surprised in dugouts,
to the neglect of gas discipline, masks not being at hand,
to faulty masks, and to the use of old pattern drums _*which could
not afford protection against the type of gas employed by the enemy_.
(The italics are our own.--V.L.)

Evidence is found in the introduction of the German three-layer drum
in the autumn of 1916.  An army does not undertake the manufacture
of millions of new appliances without very good reason.
This new drum was specially aimed at phosgene protection.
The middle layer consisted of granulated absorbent charcoal,
which had the property of absorbing large quantities of organic
irritants and phosgene.  In the three-layer drum the latter
gas was adequately guarded against for most field purposes,
although we have reason to believe that the German staff was
always apprehensive, and German soldiers suspicious of the actual
penetration of their mask obtained in the immediate locality
of projector discharges.

Dr. Pick explains in Schwarte's book what is already well known,
that the charcoal layer has a wide, "non-specific effect, and it retains
almost all materials of which the molecular weight is not too small,
even if very strongly neutral in character (as, for example, chlorpicrin)."
He goes on to say "the progressive development of gas warfare
led to the use of these very materials, whilst substances with
acid properties, such as chlorine, fell more and more into disuse.
The three-layer drum went through all sorts of changes in consequence.
When the use of chlorpicrin mixtures gained in importance in 1917,
the layer of charcoal was increased at the expense of the other two layers.
This stage of development ended in 1918, when the other layers were
done away with altogether, and the entire three sets were filled
with `A' charcoal."  " `A' charcoal was a particularly efficient form.
We learn from the same source that the increased protection against
phosgene was very welcome to the Germans in view of the danger arising
from gas projector attacks.  Further, the capacity for absorption of
the German charcoal was never equalled by any of foreign production."
This was certainly true for the greater part of the war.
But Dr. Pick continues, in a sentence which is full of significance:
"In consequence of the high quality of the drum's absorption, we were able to
carry on to the end of the war with a drum of relatively small proportions."
This point is so important as to demand further explanation.

Enforced German Modifications.--The most important
disadvantage of a gas mask is its resistance to breathing.
Men undertaking arduous and dangerous duties in the presence of gas
must wear a mask, but they cannot undertake these duties if their
breathing is seriously interfered with.  This is particularly
so in trench engineering and in the heavy work of the artillery.
Now the resistance depends, for a given type of filling,
upon the area of the cross-section of the drum.  Breathing will be
easier through a very large area than through a very small one.
The British appliance was a frank admission that, with its filling,
a large drum was necessary, so large that the weight of it could
not be borne by the mask itself, but by attachment to the chest,
the actual mask being connected with the drum or box by a flexible
rubber tube.  But the Germans adopted from the beginning
a form of protective appliance in which the drum or cartridge
was attached to and supported by the mask.  In other words,
their development was limited by the weight of their drum,
unless they completely changed their type on British lines.
It is quite clear that they realised this, for Doctor Pick
tells us, referring to the large size of the British box:
"For this reason the weight of the box is so great that it
is no longer possible to attach it directly to the mask.
It is, therefore, carried on the chest and joined to the mouthpiece
of the mask by a flexible tube."

The development of British cloud gas compelled the Germans so to modify
their filling that the resistance to breathing increased considerably.
They countered this, however, by introducing an exceedingly active charcoal,
realising that the weight of their drum had already reached the limit
possible with that type of apparatus, and that they could not,
therefore, get better breathing capacity by increasing its size.
When, however, the Blue Cross compounds were introduced, it was necessary
for both armies to take special precautions.  These precautions involved
introducing a layer of filtering material into the canister or drum.
Dr. Pick tells us:  "When the material of the Blue Cross type became
of greater importance, a supplementary apparatus had to be issued.
A thin disc filter prepared by a special method from threads of cotton
was fastened to the tube of the drum by means of a spring lid.
This arrangement provided adequate protection against materials of the
Blue Cross type used by the enemy, as, for instance, stannic chloride,
whilst the German Blue Cross gas, which was more penetrating, was only
retained to a moderate degree."  This is a direct admission that,
in order to counter the Allied use of Blue Cross gas, further filtering
arrangements would have been necessary.  But the resistance to
breathing of the German apparatus was already strained to the utmost.
It is exceedingly improbable that the Germans, having already reached
the limit of size of the canister or drum, and being unable to obtain
better breathing by increase in size, could have introduced any such
device without carrying their resistance beyond the possible limit.
In other words, the use of Blue Cross by the Allies would have compelled
them to adopt the British type of apparatus, that is, a bigger box supported
by the chest and connected to the mask by a flexible rubber tube.
This would have led them into an _impasse_.

Shortage of Rubber.--We know how, in the beginning of 1917, they were
compelled to substitute leather in the substance of the mask.
Dr. Pick admits that this was due to lack of raw material, rubber,
and there are many other signs that this was so.  Although leather was
not altogether a bad substitute for this purpose, rubber would have been
essential for the flexible tube, and the millions required to refit
the army would have completely broken the German rubber resources.
Many facts, including their feverish development of synthetic rubber,
small quantities of which they obtained at enormous cost, go to prove
this conclusion.  The submarine, _Deutschland_, returning to Germany
in 1916, from its historic trip to America, carried shipments of the most
sorely needed commodities, including large quantities of raw rubber.
Stringent measures were adopted later to collect waste rubber and prevent
its use for such purposes as billiard tables and tyres for private vehicles.
The first naval expedition to Baltic ports after the Armistice
found the hospitals in a pitiable plight for lack of rubber.
The Germans were being driven into an impossible position.
In other words, the Allies, by a proper use of Blue Cross compounds,
could have regained the gas initiative.  There is no doubt that they
were within a few months of doing so.  Once again we see the importance
of production.  Lack of raw materials for protective purposes was
endangering the German position, but delay in offensive production
by the Allies removed that danger.  Although their pressing need
was obvious, the Blue Cross arsenic compounds were not available.
The chemical war involves manoeuvring for position just as definitely
as the older forms, but in it production, formerly a routine activity,
assumes critical strategic importance.

Gas Discipline.--This constant vigilance against enemy surprise
imposed more conditions upon the troops than the permanent adoption
of a protective appliance which, in itself, was a very big thing.
Given the mask, the army had to be taught how and when to use it.
A gas sense had to be developed which ensured rapid use of the mask
at the right time with the least hampering of operations.
Gas discipline thus became one of the most important features of
general training, a feature which can never be abandoned by the armies
of civilised nations in the future without disastrous results.
This discipline, like all other protective work, was dependent
in its nature and intensity upon the struggle for the initiative.
One example out of many is found in the numerous German Army Orders
which followed our introduction of the Livens projector.
This weapon gave the possibility of much higher concentrations
at much greater ranges from the front line than were formerly
possible and for a time German gas discipline was severely shaken,
and the staffs had to react violently to meet the situation.
The introduction of this weapon, in fact, was the first clear case
of the gaining of the chemical initiative by the Allies.  A telegram
from German General Headquarters stated:  "The English have
achieved considerable success by firing gas mines simultaneously
from a considerable number of projectors on to one point.
Casualties occurred because the gas was fired without warning,
and because its concentration was so great that a single breath
would incapacitate a man."

This is a further example of the fact that the decisive initiative
was very difficult to obtain after two years of war, whereas by
the same means it would have been ensured at the commencement.
The general development of German protection was a partial safeguard,
but the value of the weapon could be seen from the fact that an
order was issued for all German working parties to wear gas masks
when within 1000 yards of the front line on nights not obviously
unsuitable for Allied gas discharges.  It is difficult to exaggerate
the military importance of such an imposition.

Summary.--We have thus covered a period, the main features
of which were attempts at the cloud initiative by Germany
and our rapid and successful protective reaction.
The conditions surrounding the first attack were entirely peculiar.
The complete surprise attending it could only be repeated
at the commencement of another war.  It failed for entirely
different reasons from those which prevented the decisive
use of phosgene by the Germans.  But our reaction carried
us further, and we developed the final form of cloud gas attack,
the Livens projector, which, in its turn, taxed the German
protection to the utmost, and threatened to overcome it.
History repeated itself with a vengeance in this protective struggle.

Two attempts at the cloud initiative, the German phosgene attempt
and the Livens projector, were both partially successful.
Had either of those attempts shared the surprise of April 22nd,
1915, their success would have been many times greater.
It was contact on the battle front that developed a protective
appliance and organisation, by giving us an insight
into enemy appliances and projects.  We cannot emphasise
too strongly the significance of this for the future.
Apart from remote exceptions, contact will be entirely absent.
We can have no guarantee whatever that new devices will
be revealed, either between nations or to a central body.
Suppose the Germans had been more fully aware of the possibilities
of cloud gas, and, realising the dependence of their one method
upon wind direction and caprice, had developed our method of
producing cloud at a distance.  The combinations of the two methods
at Ypres could hardly have left a margin of chance for failure.
This is a feeble example of what may occur.

New German Attempts.--By this time it was not easy
to see how either side could obtain a decisive surprise
by the use of chemicals aimed at the respiratory system.
It appeared very difficult to penetrate the different forms
of respirators by conditions obtainable in the field.

Professor F. P. Kirschbaum, writing on gas warfare,
in Schwarte's book, reveals how Germany counted on obtaining
the gas initiative against the French at Verdun.  He explains
how the decision to use Green Cross on a large scale coincided
with certain modifications in the design of the German gas shell,
which made its large-scale manufacture much simpler and more rapid.
"The manufacture of Green Cross," he also tells us, "was assured
in the special progress in technical chemistry, and the output
was adequate," and goes on to explain, "The first use of per
stuff[1] found the enemy unprepared with any suitable protection.
The French had equipped their troops with protection against chlorine,
but had provided no protection against phosgene,"--"the results
of Green Cross ammunition were recognised by the troops.
During the big operations before Verdun, however, the enemy
did their very utmost to substitute the gas mask M2 for
the respirator XTX.  Gas mask M2 was a protection against
Green Cross.  For this reason Green Cross ammunition alone could
not be expected to have an effect, as soon as the enemy carried out
defensive measures by means of gas mask M2 or some better apparatus.
This reverse spurred on the Germans to renewed efforts."
The writer proceeds to explain how in 1916 these efforts resulted
in finding two important substitutes, mustard gas or Yellow Cross
and the arsenic compounds of the Blue Cross type.


[1] Diphosgene or Green Cross constituents.


Yellow and Blue Cross.--The Germans had, somewhat hastily,
laid aside their cloud activities.  But they were very keenly
pursuing another line, the development of shell gas.  Thus, in July,
1917, they made two distinct attempts to regain their initiative
by the use of shell gas, and were very largely successful in one case.
We refer to the Yellow and Blue Cross shell, containing mustard
gas and diphenyl-chlorarsine respectively.

Captain Geyer, writing in Schwarte's book, relates:  "Gas was used
to a much greater extent, over 100,000 shells to a bombardment
after the introduction of the Green Cross shell in the summer of 1916
at Verdun.  From that time the use of gas became much more varied
as the number of types of guns firing gas projectiles was increased,
field guns having also been provided with gas projectiles.
The most tremendous advance in the use of gas by the artillery,
and indeed in the use of gas in general, came in the summer of 1917
with the introduction of the three elements, Green, Yellow, and Blue,
one after another.  This introduced the most varied possibilities
of employing gas, which were utilised to the full in many places
on the front during the successful defensive operations of 1917,
above all in Flanders and at Verdun.  The hardly perceptible poisoning
of an area by means of Yellow Cross shell and the surprise gas
attack became two of the new regulation methods of using gas."

Yellow Cross.--The respirator afforded complete protection
against the attacks of mustard gas on the respiratory system,
but this gas evaded protection in other ways.  In the first place,
its early unfamiliarity evaded the gas discipline of the Allies,
and it was not realised in many cases that the respirator was necessary.
This was speedily corrected, but its second line of attack was not easily,
and never finally countered.  We refer to its vesicant action.
Mustard gas could produce severe blistering and skin wounds
in such slight concentrations, even through clothing, that it
was a tremendous casualty producer, putting men out of action
for several weeks or months, with a very low rate of mortality.
Used in large quantities against an entirely unprotected army,
its results might well have been decisive.

This was the first example of chemical attack upon a new function.
We had too readily assumed that gas, or chemical attack,
would be restricted to the respiratory system, or to the eyes.
We had assumed that if our mask protection was ahead
of enemy respiratory attacks our situation was safe.
Mustard gas was a rude awakening.  It was impossible to protect
fully against mustard gas, unless we protected the whole body,
and it was never possible to do this during the war without
too seriously influencing the movements of the soldier.

Blue Cross.--The Blue Cross Shell was a deliberate attempt
to pierce the respirator.  It represented to the German mind
such an advance of aggression over protection that the effect
on the enemy would be almost as if he were entirely unprotected.
Some idea of the German estimate of its importance can be found
in the following quotation from Captain Geyer:  "The search
for new irritants in the sphere of arsenic combinations
led to the discovery of a series of effective substances.
In view of the obvious importance of highly irritant compounds
capable of existing in a very finely divided, pulverised,
or particulate form, research was made in the domain of little
volatile substances with boiling points up to 400'0. This led
to the astonishing discovery that _diphenylarsenious chloride_
when scattered would penetrate all gas masks then in use,
even the German, practically unweakened, and would have serious
irritant effects on the wearers.  This discovery could only be
explained by the supposition that the irritant works in the form
of particles which it is difficult to keep back by means
of a respirator, even a completely protecting respirator,
such as the German and English gas masks were at that time.
Further analysis showed that the mixture of air and gas examined
revealed a concentration of gas greatly in excess of the point
of saturation for the vapour given off by this stuff.  Finally, ultra
microscopic examination showed the existence of smoke particles.
A new type of fighting material had been discovered."

He also tells us how, following this discovery, production rose
to 600 tons monthly, and used up all the arsenic obtainable
in Germany.  The Allies were fully alive to the importance
of this matter, and we have already explained that, had they
been in possession of large quantities of Blue Cross compounds,
they might have forced German protection into an impossible position.
No better example could be found of the immense superiority enjoyed
by Germany owing to her flexible and efficient producing organisation.
Captain Geyer goes on to explain how the military value of these
projectiles was considerable, and, therefore, the monthly production
reached a figure of over one million shell.  We have already emphasised
the question of design in chemical warfare, and its importance is
borne out by the comparative failure of these German projectiles.
Geyer explains how only minute particles less than 1/10,000
of a millimetre in diameter are of any use to penetrate a mask,
and he develops the difficulties experienced by Germany in obtaining
such fine pulverisation without decomposing the substance.
He explains the difficulties which they had in arriving at
a suitable shell, and their unsuccessful struggle to overcome
the necessity of a glass container, which, he says, demanded "a
considerable advance in the technical work of shell production."

This attempt at the chemical initiative by the use of Blue Cross
illustrates another method of attack.  Geyer says, "Blue and Green Cross
ammunition were used simultaneously in the field--called coloured cross
(Buntkreuz) in order, by the use of Blue Cross, to force the enemy
to remove gas masks, whereby they exposed themselves to the poisonous
effects of Green Cross.  Matters seldom reached that point, however,
for as soon as the enemy realised the effect of `coloured cross'
ammunition, they withdrew troops which were being bombarded with it
from their positions to a zone beyond the range of artillery fire.
The English in particular had tried to protect the troops against the
effects of diphenylarsenious chloride, and of diphenylarsenious cyanide
(which followed it and was even more effective) by the use of filters
made of woollen material and wadding.  They were to a great extent
technically successful, but the most effective defensive apparatus,
the `jacket' to the box, was unsatisfactory from the military point
of view, as the troops could only make a limited use of it owing
to the difficulty of breathing or suffocation which it occasioned."

The reference to the withdrawal of troops is a picturesque misrepresentation.
The relative inefficiency of the German shell rendered this unnecessary.
In addition, as Captain Geyer explains, our troops were specially protected
in anticipation of the use of particulate clouds.  An examination of our
protective device by the Germans obviously led them to believe that resistance
to breathing was too great for the protective appliance to be practicable.
But here the exceptional gas discipline of the British troops
became effective.  There is no doubt that the new mask was worn just
as constantly and satisfactorily as the old.  Captain Geyer's remarks are
also interesting from a point of view to which we have already referred:
they show how much this question of resistance to breathing was exercising
the minds of those responsible for German protection.

"Particulate" Clouds.--The principle of particulate clouds was not
entirely new, both sides having used smoke combined with lethal
gases with the object of forcing the removal of the respirator.
It was thought that the particulate form of the smoke
would penetrate a respirator designed purely to hold up
vapours and gases.  The reasoning was perfectly sound.
It was only a question of using the right smoke in the right way.
There were good grounds to believe that such substances would
penetrate the respirator, and either produce a casualty or compel
the removal of the respirator by the paroxysms produced, to allow
some lethal gas to complete the work on the unprotected soldier.
Fortunately for us, these objectives were not attained, but this
was rather due to some hitch or miscalculation in the German
preparations than to any inherent impossibility.

After this period, although chemical warfare became increasingly
an organic part of German (and Allied) operations, yet there is no
serious field evidence of a deliberate attempt at the gas initiative.
It must be remembered, however, that gas figured very largely indeed
in the March, 1918, attempt, by Germany, to regain the general initiative.
It is stated authoritatively, for example, that in July, 1918,
the German Divisional Ammunition Dump contained normally 50 per cent.
of gas shell and, in the preparation, in May, 1918, for German attacks
on the Aisne, artillery programmes included as much as 80 per cent.
gas shell for certain objectives.

Potential Production and Peace.--Enough has been said to show
the general nature of the chemical warfare struggle.
The question of the chemical initiative is vital at the commencement
of hostilities.  Unless, then, we completely rule out any possibility
whatever of a future war, it is vital for that occasion.
We have indicated sufficiently clearly the factors upon
which such initiative depends, to show the critical importance
of manufacturing capacity, and protective preparedness.

A further quotation from Schwarte's book is very much to the point.
It tells us:


"Whilst on our side only a few gases were introduced, but with successful
results, the use of gas by the enemy presents quite another picture.
We know of no less than twenty-five gases used by the enemy, and of fifteen
types of gas projectile used by the French alone, and we know, from `blind'
(dud) shells which have been found, what they contain.  The only
effective gases amongst them were phosgene and dichlorodiethyl sulphide.
The other substances are harmless preparations, used most probably
for purposes of camouflage, a method highly esteemed by the enemy,
but which did not enter into the question with us, owing to the capacity
of our chemical industry for the production of effective materials."


This is true to a considerable extent.  Our dependence on improvised
and relatively inefficient production imposed conditions upon
Allied policy, whereas, in Germany, they had but to command
a flexible and highly efficient producing machine.

The world movement towards disarmament will hardly countenance
the maintenance of permanent chemical arsenals.  In the face of war
experience and further research developments the laborious war improvisation
of these arsenals will not save us as it did in the last struggle.
Any nation devoid of the means of production invites enemy chemical
aggression and is helpless against it.  This, and the need to keep
abreast of chemical warfare development--particularly in protection--
are the chief lessons of the struggle for the chemical initiative.



CHAPTER VII

REVIEW OF PRODUCTION


Critical Importance of Production.--Our analysis of the struggle
for the initiative reveals the critical importance of production.
In the chemical more than in any other form of warfare,
production has a tactical and strategic importance and functions
as an organic part of the offensive scheme.  A tendency in modern
war is to displace the incidence of initiative towards the rear.
Staffs cannot leave the discoveries of the technical
workshop or scientific laboratory out of their calculations,
for their sudden introduction into a campaign may have
more influence on its result than the massing of a million
men with their arms and equipment for a surprise assault.
The use of a new war device may shake the opposing formations
more than the most cunningly devised attack of this sort.

When, after the first brilliant assault on the Somme on July 1st, we began to
lose men, material, and the initiative, in an endless series of local attacks,
we were even then regaining it by the home development of the tank.
Even before the colossal German effort was frustrated by the first Marne
battle and the development of trench warfare, the German laboratories
were within an ace of regaining the initiative by their work on cloud gas.
After the lull in their gas attacks, when the Germans sought to gain
the initiative and a decision by the use of phosgene, the quiet work
of our defensive organisations at home had completely countered
the move weeks before.

But in all these cases the counter idea could not become effective
without large-scale production.  This was absolutely fundamental.
Had we taken six years to produce the first type of tank, had the Germans
failed to manufacture mustard gas within a period of years instead of
succeeding in weeks, and had the box respirator taken longer to produce,
all the brilliant thinking and research underlying these developments
would have had practically no influence on the campaign, for they would
have had no incidence upon it.  We could go on multiplying examples.
But what is the conclusion?

From this rapid development of methods a new principle emerges.
The initiative no longer remains the sole property of the staffs,
unless we enlarge the staff conception.  Vital moves can be
engineered from a point very remote in organisation and distance
from the G.H.Q. of armies in the field.  But there is a critical
step between the invention and its effect on military initiative.
This is production, which for these newer methods becomes an organic
part of the campaign.

But the future is our chief preoccupation.  What would be
the supreme characteristics of the early stages of a future war?
It would be distinguished by attempts of belligerents to win immediate
and decisive success by large scale use of various types of surprise.
Three factors would be pre-eminent, the nature of the idea or invention,
the magnitude on which it is employed, and its actual time of incidence,
that is, the delay between the actual declaration of war and its use.
Now the invention is of no use whatever without the last two factors,
which are entirely dependent on production.  When, in 1917,
the Allied staffs pressed repeatedly for gases with which to
reply to German Yellow Cross, their urgent representations met
with no satisfactory response until nearly a year had elapsed.
This was not due to lack of invention, for we had simply to copy
the German discovery.  Failure to meet the crying demands of the Front
was due to delay in production.

Any eventual chemical surprise will, under genuine conditions
of disarmament, depend on peace industry, for no such conditions
will tolerate the existence of huge military arensals.
We have already indicated the type of peace-time industry
_par excellence_, which can rapidly and silently mobilise for war.
It is the organic chemical industry.  Therefore, whatever the war may
have taught us as to the value of chemical industry, its importance
from the point of view of a future war is magnified many times.
The surprise factor is responsible.  The next war will only
commence once, however long it may drag on, and it is to the start
that all efforts of a nation planning war will be directed.
It is, therefore, of importance to examine in detail the development
of chemical production during the recent war.

A close examination is of more than historical significance, and should
provide answers to certain vital questions.  German chemical industry was the
critical factor in this new method of war which almost led to our downfall.
How did the activities of this industry compare with our own production?
To this an answer is attempted below, but graver questions follow.
Was our inferior position due to more than a combination of normal
economic conditions, and were we the victims of a considered policy?
If so, who directed it, and when did it first give evidence of activity?
An answer to these questions will be attempted in a later chapter.

Significance of the German Dye Industry.--At the end of 1914 the nation began
to realise what it meant to be at the mercy of the German dye monopoly.
Apart from the immediate economic war disadvantages, the variety and sinister
peace ramifications of this monopoly had not been clearly revealed.
Mr. Runciman, then President of the Board of Trade, stated with regard
to the dye industry:  "The inquiries of the Government have led them
to the conclusion that the excessive dependence of this country on a single
foreign country for materials of such vital importance to the industry
in which millions of our workpeople were employed, constitutes a permanent
danger which can only be remedied by a combined national effort on a scale
which requires and justifies an exceptional measure of State encouragement."
Measures were defined later.

In the debate in the House of Commons in February, 1915, on the
aniline dye industry, a member prominent in the discussion,
referring to "taking sides on the question of Free Trade," stated that,
"It was a great pity that this should occur when the attention of
the House is occupied with regard to MATTERS CONNECTED WITH THE WAR,"
and proceeded to draw a comparison between the national
importance of the manufacture of dyes and that of lead pencils.
Fortunately he prefaced his remarks by explaining his ignorance
of the "technical matters involved in this aniline dye industry."
These are two out of many references to the pressure due to
the absence of German dyes, which illustrate the purely economic
grounds on which the issue was being discussed, on the one hand,
and reveal the prevailing ignorance of its importance on the other.

Exactly one month later came the first German gas shock.
Such statements as the above tempt us to ask who, at this time,
realised the common source of the direct military
and indirect economic attack.  It can hardly be doubted
that the existence of the German dye factories was largely
responsible for the first German use of gas on the front.
We have already seen how, from the first month of the war,
the chemical weapon was the subject of definite research.
Falkenhayn leaves us in no doubt as to the chief factor
which finally determined its use.  Referring to difficulties
of production, he says, "Only those who held responsible posts
in the German G.H.Q. in the winter of 1914-15 . . . can form any
estimate of the difficulty which had to be overcome at that time.
The adjustment of science and engineering . . . took place
almost noiselessly, so that they were accomplished before
the enemy quite knew what was happening.  Particular stress
was laid upon the promotion of the production of munitions . . .
as well as the development of gas as a means of warfare."
Referring to protective methods of trench warfare, he continues,
"Where one party had gained time . . . the ordinary methods of attack
often failed completely.  A weapon had, therefore, to be found
which was superior to them but which would not excessively tax
the limited capacity of German war industry in its production.
Such a weapon existed in gas."

The Germans had themselves shown us where this production occurred,
and Ludendorff supplements our information by telling us how he discussed
the supply of war material with Herr Duisburg and Herr Krupp von Bohlen
in Halbach, "whom I had asked to join the train" in the autumn of 1916.
The former was the Chairman of the I.G., the great dye combine.

Those producing a new weapon of war must always consider the
possibilities possessed by their opponents to exploit the same weapon
after the first shock.  For the Germans the answer was obvious.
The Allies would be held at a material disadvantage for months,
if not years.  Without the means of production available in Germany,
we are not at all, convinced that the gas experiment would have been made,
and had it not been made, and its formidable success revealed,
Germany's hesitation to use this new weapon would probably have
carried the day.  This, at least, is the most generous point of view.
In other words, the German poison gas experiment owed a large part
of its initial momentum to ease of production by a monopoly.
The combination of this factor with the willingness to use gas led
to the great experiment.  The future may again provide this combination,
unless the monopoly is removed.

Following up this line of thought, we can see how tempting was the German
course of action.  Falkenhayn has told us what a violent strain was imposed
upon Germany by the stabilisation of the Western Front early in 1915.
The tension between the Great General Headquarters and the Home Government
was already in evidence, and would have caused difficulty in attaining
suitable home and liaison organisations, in particular with regard
to supply.  We can well understand this when we remember the drastic
changes which occurred in our own ministries and departments.
But what organisation was required for chemical warfare supply?
Very little!  Quoting from the report of the Hartley Mission to the chemical
factories in the occupied zone, we know that when the Government wished
to produce a new gas "a conference with the various firms was held
at Berlin to determine how manufacture should be subdivided in order
to use the existing plant to the best advantage."  The firms referred
to were the constituent members of the highly organised I.G. There
was no need to create a clumsy and complicated organisation with an
efficient one existing in the I.G. ready to meet the Government demands.
The path could not have been smoother.  Ludendorff states in his memoirs
that the Hindenburg programme made a special feature of gas production.
Increased supply of explosives was also provided for.  He says:
"We aimed at approximately doubling the previous production."  And again:
"Gas production, too, had to keep pace with the increased output
of ammunition.  The discharge of gas from cylinders was used less and less.
The use of gas shells increased correspondingly."  This programme represented
a determined effort to speed up munitions production in the autumn of 1916.
It included not only gas but explosives, both of which could be supplied
by the I.G. Explosives demanded oleum, nitric acid, and nitrating plants,
which already existed, standardised, in the factories of the dye combine.
The unusual speed with which standard dye-producing plant was converted
for the production of explosives is instanced in the operation
of a T.N.T. plant at Leverkusen, producing 250 tons per month.
The conversion only took six weeks.  The factories of the I.G. supplied
a considerable proportion of the high explosives used by Germany.

In the field of chemical warfare the relationship between war and peace
production was even more intimate.  Chemical warfare products are
closely allied and in some cases almost identical with the finished
organic chemicals and intermediates produced by the dye industry.
Therefore, in most cases, even when the suggestion of the new chemical
may come from a research organisation entirely apart from the dye
research laboratories, the products fall automatically into the class
handled by the dye industry.

Is there any doubt that the I.G. was a terribly effective arsenal for the mass
production of the older war chemicals, explosives, and the newer types,
poison gases?  Is there even a shadow of exaggeration in our claims?
There may be those who would see a speedy resumption of friendship with
Germany at all costs, regardless of the honourable settling of her debts,
regardless of her disarmament and due reparation for wrongs committed.
Can even such concoct material to whitewash the military front of the I.G.? If
they would, they must explain away these facts.

The plants of the I.G. produced more than two thousand tons
of explosives per week, at their average pre-war rate.
This is an enormous quantity.  How can we best visualise it?
In view of the chapters on Disarmament which follow,
we will use the following comparison.  The Treaty of Versailles
allows Germany to hold a stock of about half a million shell
of different stated calibres.  How much explosive will these
shell require?  They could be filled by less than two days'
explosives production of the I.G. at its average war rate.
Between two and three million shell could be filled by
the result of a week's production in this organisation.
Further, the average rate of poison gas production within
the I.G. was at least three thousand tons per month,
sufficient to fill more than two million shell of Treaty calibres.
Unless drastic action has been taken, the bulk of this
capacity will remain, and Germany will be able to produce
enough poison gas in a week to fill the Treaty stock of shell;
this in a country where the manufacture and use of such substances
are specially prohibited.

It is appropriate at this stage to describe as briefly as possible
the origin and composition of this great German combination,
the Interessen Gemeinschaft, known as the I.G. There is no need
to go into the gradual self-neglect, and the eventual rooting
out by Germany, of the dye-producing industry in other countries,
notably England, France, and America.

The Interessen Gemeinschaft.--By the end of the nineteenth century
the manufacture of dyes on a large scale was concentrated almost
exclusively in six great firms.  These were the Badische Anilin
und Soda Fabrik, Ludwigshafen on the Rhine, known as the Badische;
the Farbenfabriken vorm.  Friedr.  Bayer, & Co., in Leverkusen,
known as Bayer; Aktien-Gesellschaft fur Anilin-Fabrikation
in Berlin; Farbwerke vorm.  Meister Lucius & Bruning in Hochst am Main,
referred to as Hochst; Leopold Cassella G.m.b.H. in Frankfort;
and Kalle & Co., Aktien-Gesellschaft in Biebrich.

Each of these six great companies had attained enormous
proportions long before the war.  Only two other concerns
had carried on manufacture on a comparable scale.  These were
the Chemische Fabrik Greisheim-Elektron of Frankfort A.M.,
a company which has absorbed a number of smaller manufacturers,
and the Chemische Fabriken vormals Weiler-ter Meer, Uerdingen.

The position of all these establishments, with one single exception,
along the Rhine and its tributaries is well known.
Their growth has been illustrated in their own prospectuses.
Hochst was organised in 1863 and started with five workmen.
In 1912 it employed 7680 workmen, 374 foremen, 307 academically
trained chemists, and 74 highly qualified engineers.
The works of the Badische, which was organised in 1865, covered,
in 1914, 500 acres, with a water front of a mile and half on
the Rhine.  There were 100 acres of buildings, 11,000 workmen,
and the company was capitalised at fifty-four million marks.
The establishment of Bayer was on a scale entirely comparable.
Quoting from an official American report,[1] "Griesheim Elektron,
prior to the war, had enormous works chiefly devoted to the
manufacture of electrolytic chemicals and became an important
factor in the dyestuff business only within recent years, when by
absorption of the Oehler Works and the Chemikalien Werke Griesheim,
its colour production reached a scale approaching that of the
larger houses."  This move on the part of the Griesheim Elektron
is interesting as an example of the general tendency which has
characterised the development of the German dye industry.
This firm, producing inorganic materials and intermediates,
absorbed the Oehler Works in order to find an independent outlet
for its intermediate products, thus becoming directly interested
in dyestuffs production.  This move towards independence in
the whole range of products involved is referred to elsewhere,
owing to the manner in which it simplified German production
for chemical warfare.

Combination, however, did not cease in the creation
of these enormous establishments.  The cartel fever raged
here as in other German industries.  By 1904 two immense
combinations had been formed in the dyestuff industry.
One of these comprised Bayer, Badische, and Berlin;
the other Hochst, Cassella, and Kalle.  "By pooling profits,
by so arranging capitalisation that each company held stock in
the other companies of its own cartel, and by other familiar means,
the risks incident to the enormous expansion of the business
and the immense increases of export trade were minimised.
The centripetal tendency, however, did not stop here.
In 1916, the two pre-existing cartels were combined with
Griesheim Elektron, Weilerter Meer, and various smaller
companies in one gigantic cartel, representing a nationalisation
of the entire German dye and pharmaceutical industry."
The combination was extremely close.  Profits of the companies
were pooled, and after being ascertained each year on common
principles were divided according to agreed percentages.
Each factory maintained an independent administration, but they
kept each other informed as to processes and experiences.
"There was also an agreement that in order to circumvent tariff
obstacles in other countries materials were to he produced
outside of Germany by common action and at common expense
whenever and wherever desirable.


[1] Alien Property Custodian's Report, 1919.


"At the time of the formation of this enormous organisation
the capitalisation of each of the principal component
companies was largely increased.  Hochst, Badische, and Bayer
each increased their capitalisation by 36,000,000 marks,
bringing the capital of each up to 90,000,000 marks."
"Berlin increased its capital from 19,800,000 to 33,000,000 marks.
Other increases brought the total nominal capital of the group
to over 383,000,000 marks.  For many years a large part of
the enormous profits of these concerns has been put back into
the works with the result indicated by the stock quotations.
The real capitalisation is thus much greater than this nominal figure.
In fact, it is estimated that the actual investment in the works
comprising the cartel is not less than $400,000,000. It cannot
be doubted that this enormous engine of commercial warfare has
been created expressly for the expected war after the war,
and that it is intended to undertake still more efficiently
and on a larger scale the various methods by which German
attacks upon all competition were carried on."

Two additional features must be indicated.  A policy to
which we have referred was most actively followed, aiming at
complete independence and self-sufficiency in all matters
relevant to production, especially regarding raw materials.
We mention later how the war has strengthened the strong prewar
position of the I.G. in heavy chemicals needed as raw materials
for the intermediates and finished dyes.

Recent information reveals a further widening of their basis of operation,
including a strong hold on the electro-chemical industry and on the new
synthetic processes from carbide, for acetic acid and the other products
normally obtained by wood distillation.  Again, the policy of the I.G.
appears to have moved towards more complete unity since the war.
Exchanges of directing personnel and of capital amongst the branches have
been recorded for which the term "cartel" is no longer a fair description.
In addition, considerable increases in capital have occurred which not only
reveal the vision and activity of the I.G. but which indicate its close
contact with the German Government.  With such an organisation in existence
and with the complete liaison which had developed between the directors
and the German Government for other purposes than chemical warfare,
and in agreement with the paternal policy adopted by the latter towards
this chemical industry, production became simplicity itself.

War Production by the I.G.--Let us, therefore, examine in some detail
the actual production of war gases and chemicals by the I.G. In order
to obtain an idea regarding case of production, we will later make
a comparison with the magnitude and rapidity of that of the Allies.

From the point of view of this statement, there are two main classes
of production, that in which the majority of the steps involved
were actual processes employed for the manufacture of some dye,
pharmaceutical or other chemical product, and, in the second place,
that in which no such coincidence occurred, but in which the general
technique developed, and the varieties of existing plant covered
the needs of the case.  Without stretching the point, every war
chemical employed came easily under one of these two categories.
In order to assist the less technical reader, we will consider
the production of the chief war chemicals in the order in which they
appeared against us on the front.

_Chlorine_.--This important raw material, used in a variety
of operations, notably for the production of indigo and sulphur black,
two highly important dyes, was produced along the Rhine
before the war to the extent of nearly forty tons a day.
The only serious expansion required for war was an increase of already
existing plant at the large factory of Ludwigshaven.  The following
table of production illustrates the point:

CHLORINE (METRIC TONS PER DAY)
                    1914 1918
     Leverkusen          20   20
     Hochst           4    8
     Ludwigshafen   13   35
                    ---- ----
          Total     37   63

Chlorine was important, nor only as a raw material for most of the known
chemical warfare products, but also, in the liquid form, for cloud attack.
Owing to the development of protection, the use of liquid chlorine
for the latter purpose became obsolete.

_Phosgene_.--This was produced in considerable quantity
before the war at Leverkusen and Ludwigshafen, leading to many
exceedingly important dyes, amongst the most commonly used at
present being the brilliant acid fast cotton scarlets so largely
used in England.  More expansion of plant was necessitated.
At Leverkusen the existing plant can produce at least thirty tons
a month, and we learn "the plant remains intact ready for use."
At Ludwigshafen the capacity was considerably higher, amounting to
600 tons per month.  As production was commenced before the war,
there were no difficulties in developing the process,
expansion alone being necessary.

_Xylyl Bromide_.--This was one of the early lachrymators, and was produced
at Leverkusen in a plant with a maximum monthly output of sixty tons.
Production began, according to a statement on the works, in March, 1915.
Its case can be judged from the fact that this compound was used almost
as soon as the first chlorine cloud attack at Ypres.

The Germans undoubtedly attached considerable importance to their
brominated lachrymators.  In this connection their persistent
efforts to retain the bromine monopoly with their Stassfurt product
and to crush the American industry before the war are significant.
The success of these efforts certainly placed us in a difficult
situation during the war, both with regard to production of
drugs and lachrymators.

German bromine was associated with potash in the Stassfurt mineral deposits,
whereas the American product was produced from numerous salt springs
and rock salt mines.  Although Germany had not succeeded in crushing
the American industry, yet the outbreak of war found her in a
predominant position, for her two chief opponents, France and England,
were cut off from their supplies, which were German; and American production
was of little use, owing to the great excess of demand over supply,
and the manipulation of output by German agents in America.  A possible
source of bromine existed in the French Tunisian salt lagoons,
whose pre-war exploitation had been considered by an Austrian combination.
The French wisely developed a Tunisian bromine industry sufficient for their
own needs, and, on different occasions, supplied us with small quantities.
But the development of such an enterprise in time of war was
a severe handicap.

_Diphosgene or Trichlormethyl Chloroformate_.--This substance was toxic,
a lachrymator, and slightly persistent.  It attained a maximum
monthly Output Of 300 tons at Leverkusen, and about 250 tons
at Hochst.  This was not a simple compound to make, and had no direct
relationship with the stable product of the peace-time industry.
At the same time, it provides an example of the way in which general technique
developed by the industry was rapidly used to master the new process.
In particular their method of lining reaction vessels was of value here.
The reaction occurs in two stages by the production of methyl formate
and its subsequent chlorination.  The methyl-formate plant was part
of an existing installation, but the chlorination and distillation
plant were specially installed.

_Chlorpicrin_.--This was mixed with diphosgene and used
in the familiar Green Cross shell.  The production was very
readily mastered and attained the rate of 200 tons per month.
Picric acid, chlorine, and lime were required, all three
being normal raw materials or products of the industry.
At Hochst no new plant was installed, the manufacture being
carried out in the synthetic indigo plant.

_Phenylcarbylamine Chloride_.--This was used in German chemical shell,
and was not particularly effective against us, although produced in large
quantities by the Germans, in vessels used in peace time for a very
common intermediate, monochlorbenzene.  The ease of production of this
substance may account for its use in large quantities by the Germans,
in order to increase their gas shell programme.

_Mustard Gas or Dichlordiethyl Sulphide_.--This was prepared
in four stages:


(1) Preparation of Ethylene--by heating alcohol with an aluminium
oxide catalyst at 400'0 C.

(2) Preparation of Ethylene-chlor-hydrin, by passing ethylene
and carbon dioxide into a 10 per cent.  solution of bleaching
powder at a temperature below zero centigrade, and subsequent
concentration of the product to a 20 per cent.  solution.

(3) Conversion of the chlor-hydrin into thiodiglycol by treatment
with sodium sulphide.

(4) Conversion of the thiodiglycol into mustard gas
(dichlordiethyl-sulphide), using gaseous hydrochloric acid.


The thiodiglycol was produced at Ludwigshafen and provides one
of the best examples of the adaptation of the German dye works
for the purpose of producing war chemical.  Technically, ethylene is
a fairly difficult gas to produce in large quantities, but, for the
Ludwigshafen works, these difficulties were a thing of the past.
There were twelve big units before the war, and, by the time
of the Armistice, these had been increased to seventy-two
in connection with mustard gas manufacture.  In a similar way,
the number of the units for chlorhydrin, the next step, was increased
from three to eighteen.  These two processes had all been worked
out very thoroughly in connection with the production of indigo.
These new plants were identical with the peace-time units.
The expansion was a mere question of repetition requiring no
new designs or experiments and risking no failure or delay.
Success was assured.  The last step, the production of thiodiglycol,
occurred in the causticising house, to which no substantial
alterations or additions appear to have been made for the purpose.
As sodium sulphide is used in large quantities as a raw material
in the dye industry, and was already produced within the I.G.,
no difficulty was presented in connection with its supply.

The thiodiglycol was forwarded to two other factories, one of which
was Leverkusen, where 300 tons of mustard gas were produced monthly.
The reaction between thiodiglycol and hydrochloric acid was one which
required very considerable care.  At one stage of the war the Allies viewed
with much misgiving the possibility of having to adopt this method.
But the technique of the German dye industry solved this as satisfactorily
and as steadily as other chemical warfare problems, bringing its technical
experience to bear on the different difficulties involved.

_Diphenychlorarsine_.--This was the earliest and main constituent
of the familiar Blue Cross shell.  It was prepared in four stages:


(1) The preparation of phenyl arsinic acid.

(2) The conversion of the above to phenyl arsenious oxide.

(3) The conversion of the latter into diphenyl arsinic acid.

(4) The conversion of the latter into diphenyl-chlor-arsine.



This is another example of a highly complicated product
which might have presented great difficulties of production,
but the problem of whose manufacture was solved, almost automatically,
by the German organisation.

The first step, that of the manufacture of phenyl arsinic acid,
was carried out at Ludwigshafen in one of the existing azo dye
sheds without any alteration of plant, just as a new azo dye
might have been produced in the same shed.  It is believed
that another dye factory also produced this substance.
At Ludwigshafen the conversion to diphenyl arsinic acid occurred.
This was again carried out in the azo colour shed, with no
more modification than that involved in passing, from one azo
dye to another.

This chemical mobilisation of a huge dye unit was, and could still be,
practically invisible in operation.  Not only was the process practically
the same as azo dye production, but, as the compounds were not particularly
poisonous in the intermediate stages, there was no risk to the workers,
and no need to violate secrecy by indicating special precautions.

The final stage, the preparation of diphenylchlorarsine,
the actual Blue Cross shell constituent, occurred at Hochst,
which also carried out the first three stages, already outlined
as occurring at Ludwigshafen and Leverkusen.  The last stage
was a simple one and was carried out in plant and buildings
previously used for peace purposes.

The other substances employed provide further examples of this ease
of production.  Ethyl-dichlor-arsine was produced in homogeneously
lead-lined vessels, identical with those used for diphosgene.
Dichlor-methyl-ether presented difficulties which were solved
by applying the German method of using tiled vessels.

The part played by the I.G. in the German chemical warfare organisation
has already been outlined, and we have seen how the German Government was
content simply to place its demands before the directors of the dye combine.
The latter were left to choose the process and exploit it by making the best
use of their organisation, which was done after reviewing the plant at their
disposal in the different branches.  An interesting feature of the production
of war chemicals by the I.G. is thus revealed by examining the actual locality
of the separate operations leading to any one of the individual poison gases.
The attached table shows us how the production of any particular war chemical
involved a number of stages, each of which occurred in a different factory.
The directors of the I.G. simply chose a particular plant in a particular
factory which was most suited for the operation concerned.  They

{The table (spread over pages 162-163) are "raw OCR" feed!  NEEDS FIXED!!!}

                                        FIRST STAGE
                    RAW
WAR CHEMICAL MATERIALS FROM THE I.G. PROCESS FACTORY

Phenyl Carbylamine 1.  Aniline Condensation of aniline Kalle Chloride 2.
Chlorine with carbon bisul 3.  Caustic phide to phenyldithio soda carbamic
acid Mustard Gas 1.  Carbon Preparation of Ethyl-Ludwigs dioxide lene
from Alcohol hafen 2.  Bleaching

powder 3.  Sodium

sulphide 4.  Hydro chloric

acid Diphenylchlorarsine I. Aniline Conversion of Diazo- Ludwigs 2.
Sodium benzene to Phenylar- hafen

nitrite sinic acid Kalle 3.  Sodium Hochst

bisulphite 4.  Sodium

hydrate 5.  Sulphur

dioxide 6.  Hydro chloric acid Ethyl -dichl or a rsine 1.
Ethyl Production of Ethylar-Ludwigs chloride sinic acid from
Ethyl hafen 2.  Caustic chloride

soda 3.  Sulphur

dioxide 4.  Hydro chloric

acid gas 5.  Iodine Sym-dichlor-methyl- I. Chlorsul- Production
of Formal- Mainz

ether phonic dehyde from Methyl116chst

acid alcohol

Z. Sulphuric

acid 162

Review of Production

SECOND STAGE THIRD STAGE FOURTH STAGE

PROCESS FACTORI PROCESS FACTORi PROCESS FACTORY

Conversion of Kalle Chlorination of Hochst

Phenyidithio- Phenyl Mus carbamic acid tard Oil giving

to Phenyl Mus- Phenyl Carby tard Oil by lamine Chlo zinc chloride ride
Conversion of Lud- Conversion of Lud- Conversion of Lever Ethylene
into wigs- Chlorhydrin wigs- Thiodiglycol kusen

Ethylene hafen to Thio-di- hafen to Mustard

Chlorhydrin glycol Gas

Reduction of Lever- Conversion to Lever- Reduction of A.G.F.A. Phenyl arjinic
kusen Diphenylar- kusen Diphenylar- Hochst acid to Phenyl and sinic acid
by and sinic acid to arsenious oxide Hochst treatment Hijchst Diphenyl:

with Diazo chlor-arsine

benzene by Sulphur

dioxide in

HCl solution

Reduction of Lud- Conversion of W)chst

Ethyl arsinic wigs- Ethyl arseni acid to Ethyl hafen ous Oxide to

arsenious oxide Ethyl dichlor by sulphur arsine by

dioxide HCl and iodine Conversion of H8chst

paraformalde hyde to sym

dichlor methyl

ether by means

of chlorsul phonic acid {END OF TABLE NEEDING FIXED!} aimed at
the minimum conversion, and in a number of cases none was required.
The above analysis can leave us with no doubt in our minds that
the organic chemical industry is the logical place for efficient
chemical warfare production.  It cannot leave us unconvinced as to
the vital importance of the dye industry in national defence.

Allied Difficulties.--Our own production was nothing but a
series of slow and relatively inefficient improvisations.
We have already referred to the fluctuations in chemical
warfare organisation for research and supply during the war.
These added to the difficulties of the supply department,
just as they did to its complement, the research department.
Only great patriotic endeavour could have made possible
the relative success achieved, not only by the departments,
but in particular by the firms with whom they were called
upon to co-ordinate.

We wanted mustard gas, and realised its need in July, 1917.
Research work began almost from that date, yet successful large scale
production did not materialise in England until more than a year later.
We must admit, however, that the French were in a position to use
their product on the front in July, 1918.  Let us examine some
of our difficulties.

The first efforts were directed towards the process by which,
as we eventually ascertained, the Germans produced the whole
of their mustard gas.  The actual chemical laboratory details
of the process presented no serious obstacle, but difficulties
multiplied as soon as we attempted large scale work.
We wanted ethylene-monochlor-hydrin. Some work had been done on this
during the war for the National Health Insurance Commissioners
in connection with the production of novocain.  Half scale
work had occurred at the works of a Midland chemical firm,
and experience so gained was freely offered and used
in a scheme for the large scale production of mustard gas
by the co-operation of a number of big chemical manufacturers.
Pressing requests for the material were continually coming from
G.H.Q., the programmes outlined being more and more ambitious.
We had to reproduce the result of years of German effort spent
in developing their monochlor-hydrin process for indigo.
As a consequence, large sums of money were expended on the process,
although it never eventually operated.  Its difficulties,
and other reasons, led us to research on other and more
direct methods which the French were also investigating.
The successful outcome of this early research was due, in particular,
to Sir William Pope and those associated with him in the work.
The process was so promising that the long and cumbersome chlor-hydrin
method was abandoned.  As a result our five or six months'
work on the German method meant so much time lost.
The new direct, sulphur monochloride method was taken up
actively and several private firms attempted to develop
the small scale manufacture.  The work was dangerous.
Lack of that highly developed organic chemical technique,
which was practically a German monopoly, rendered the task much
more dangerous than it would have been if undertaken by one
of the I.G. factories.

The French, realising the importance of the new methods,
spared nothing in their attempts to develop them.
Their casualties multiplied at the works, but the only reply was
to put the factories concerned under the same regime as the front,
and the staffs were strengthened by well-chosen military personnel.
The French realised the nature of their task, and organised
for it.  When the difficulties of production were pointed
out in August, 1917, in the British Ministry of Munitions,
reports were instanced that the Germans had used forced labour.
The French in their production at Rousillon, on the Rhone,
employed volunteer German prisoners.  It was a curious
contrast to see mingling together amongst the producing plants
representatives of the American, Italian, and British Missions,
with French officers, French technical men, and German prisoners.
The latter appeared to be perfectly satisfied in their work.
They were used for certain limited purposes, such as handling
raw materials, and were not, as a rule, exposed to the dangerous
operations against which the French struggled so heroically
and successfully.  It was as though a small section of the front
had been transferred to the heart of France.  We saw the minister
visiting a factory and pinning the Legion of Honour on to
the breast of a worker blinded by yperite.  We saw messages
of congratulation from the front to the factories themselves.
The morale was wonderful.  As a result, the French mastered
the technical difficulties of mustard gas production and shell
filling by June, 1918.  They shared information with us, but the race
had started neck and neck, and it was impossible to discard
completely the large plants to which we were already committed.
Without disparaging our own efforts, we must pay a tribute to the
achievement of the French yperite producing and filling factories.
It is impossible to give personal credit in this matter without
going beyond our scope, and we can only draw general comparisons.
But we must draw attention to the following.  The German factories
passed with ease to mustard gas production by a process which,
compared with the final Allied method, was clumsy and complicated,
but which suited their pre-war plant.  Their policy was,
therefore, sound from the point of view of the campaign.
The Allies experienced great difficulty and danger in attaining
large scale manufacture with a simpler process.

The same self-sacrificing zeal and patriotic endeavour was
shown in this country, but we were handicapped in mustard gas
production by the energetic way in which we had pressed forward
the industrial realisation of the monochlor-hydrin method.
The French, less committed in terms of plant and finance, could more
readily adjust their energy, materials, and money to the new method.
It must not be forgotten, also, that, at this period,
chemical warfare supply organisation was experiencing certain
critical changes which could not but reflect upon our efficiency.
Here again the earlier centralisation of research and production
by France was a great factor in her favour.

Our difficulties with phosgene, and in particular with the arsenic compounds
described above, were of the same nature, involving us in casualties,
great expenditure, and little success, when compared with German production.
The great need for these arsenic compounds was realised as early as February,
1918, and investigations began even at that date, but they had not appeared
in the field by the time of the Armistice.  Whatever mistakes we may have made
locally during the war, they are small compared with the big mistake which
was responsible for our comparative failure in chemical warfare production.
We were almost completely lacking in organic chemical industrial experience.

It is interesting to note that the activities of those elements
of organic chemical industry which did exist in France and England
fully justified the conclusions we have drawn.  Thus, although
entering late into the field of chemical warfare production,
Doctor Herbert Levinstein, Professor A. G. Green, and their
collaborators of the firm of Levinstein Limited were able to develop
rapidly a successful industrial mustard gas process which was
of considerable assistance to England and America.  This work,
both in research and production, deserves the greatest credit.
Again, the dye factories were called upon much earlier to assist
in French production and were of considerable assistance.

It would be well at this juncture to review very briefly the other
war activities of our own dye industries.  The outbreak of war found
them by no means inactive.  In this country, for example, our own dye
factories were able to keep pace with the increasing demand for dyes
created by the rapid mobilisation of military and naval equipment.
In particular the rapid large-scale production of indigo by the
Levinstein firm, at Ellesmere Port, was a considerable achievement.
In addition, the new State-aided enterprise at Huddersfield was largely
diverted to explosives production, and rendered very valuable services
in the supply of Tetryl, T.N.T., synthetic phenol, picric acid, and oleum.
For such reasons, the need for essential dyes, and the use of dye capacity
for explosives, the important part which the rapidly expanding industry
could have played in chemical warfare production was not recognised
quickly enough by the relevant authorities.  This is not surprising,
for the war significance of the German dye industry was not fully
realised until the Armistice.  It required the Hartley Mission
to drive this fact home.  When, however, the brilliant researches,
referred to above, on the mustard gas method had decided our policy,
the dye factory of Levinstein Limited vigorously converted the process
into a technical success, and what was still a laboratory reaction
in the spring of 1917 became a successful manufacturing process in July
of that year.

Released from its war responsibilities at the time of the Armistice,
the British industry developed so rapidly that Lord Moulton, in a speech
to the Colour Users Association on November 28th, 1919, stated:
"A few months before the war broke out England produced only one-tenth
of the dyes she needed, but the amount which I am informed we shall
be able to turn out at the end of this year would, in weight,
be within one-fifth of the amount which England used before the war."

But the Allies were not only in difficulties with regard to the lack
of suitable peace-time plant, and industrial organic chemical experience--
they were hindered at almost every turn by difficulties with regard to raw
materials and intermediates, the products of other chemical manufacture.
They had to create a liquid chlorine industry.  In April, 1915, the only
liquid chlorine plant in England was in the hands of the firm of
Castner Kellner, whose maximum output was not more than a few tons per day.
Increase in capacity was rendered necessary by chemical warfare developments.
Chlorine was a raw material for mustard gas and--practically every important
substance employed in chemical warfare including bleaching powder.
Tremendous tonnages of bleach were involved in the manufacture of
chlorpicrin and for use as an antidote against mustard gas on the front.
We refer elsewhere to the developing use of bleach in order to create
lanes for troops and transport through areas infected by mustard gas.
A very simple calculation will show what quantities would be required
for such an operation.  It is true that, as regards chlorine, we were
more favourably situated than France, and forwarded her considerable
supplies in exchange for phosgene.  This chlorine was essential for
phosgene production.  New plants were brought into being at different places,
largely through the energy and experience of the above-mentioned firm,
but so great was the demand that it finally became necessary, in order
to protect the trade users and war interests at the same time, to institute
a control of chlorine.  More than 20,000 tons of liquid chlorine were
produced under the administration of the supply department concerned.
When we consider the effort which such an increase in production must
have involved, and the fact that expansions occurring did not do so under
the steady and well-regulated influence of a simple demand, but were
continually being modified to meet expansions or diminutions of programme,
we can realise what a great advantage was possessed by the Germans owing
to their large initial experience and production.

We have no hesitation in stating that great credit is due to the old
Trench Warfare Supply Department and the firms with which it was in contact,
notably the one referred to above, in connection with the Loos attack.
But for them, we would not have been in a position to retaliate,
even at that date.

The Allied lachrymator campaign was terribly handicapped by lack of bromine.
The French performed the phenomenal task of creating a bromine
industry in Tunis, the development of which reads like a romance.
Apparently this industry is dying out, and German predominance in bromine
is again asserted.

French mustard gas production, for which they made such huge sacrifices,
was threatened by the lack of carbon-tetra-chloride, and examples
can be multiplied.  The Germans were in a very different position.
The development of their dye industry had followed the policy
of absolute independence of external chemical industry.
This independence was acquired either by the absorption of other
enterprises or by the definite development of processes and plant
for raw materials and intermediates.  In every case the war has
strengthened these factories for the manufacture of these products.
In 1918 they produced nearly thirty times as much ammonia
as in 1914, three times as much nitric acid, fifty per cent.
as much again of sulphuric acid, and twice as much
liquid chlorine.  This was not purely a commercial question.
Our lack of such products was due to the fact that the Allies,
in pre-war times, possessed few or feeble industries whose
consumption would stimulate the production of these raw materials.
They lacked these industries because of a blameworthy disregard
for the fundamental importance of science, and particularly
chemical science, in industry.

Conclusion.--We have shown how, during the war, chemical warfare proved its
surprise value and how manufacture figured repeatedly as a critical factor.
We have also shown how the importance of production is magnified from
the point of view of the future.  The only logical conclusion is that
the country which does not possess a strong dye industry, or enormously
comprehensive and expensive chemical arsenals, cannot hope to escape
serious military results, possibly defeat, from enemy chemical surprises.
The situation is aggravated by the fact that this critical producing capacity
exists as a monopoly in the hands of Germany.  No patriotic and thinking
person can, therefore, conclude otherwise than to encourage the creation
of dye industries in countries other than Germany, particularly in our own.
It is true, however, that patriotic sentiment and political views do
not always lead to the same solution.  But we must insist that there
can be no two opinions on the national defence aspect of this question,
and any political forces opposing the logical outcome of patriotic sentiment
in this case are incurring an exceedingly grave responsibility.

Further, there is a definite tendency to obscure the whole issue
by inaccurate thinking.  When we find a Member of Parliament seriously
discussing disarmament, endeavouring to deal with the matter
in detail, and yet classing gas as one of those methods of warfare
in connection with which production can he easily prevented,[1]
we can only stand in amazement before our traditional fault,
deliberate sidetracking of expert guidance.  When we realise that it
was not until after the Armistice that the Hartley Commission
opened our eyes to the war importance of the German dye industry,
we see how blind a nation may be in matters vital to its defence.


[1] _The Flaw in the Covenant and the Remedy_, Major David Davies, M.P.


From the point of view of results on the front, for which all were working,
the German dye factories, when considered as a war weapon, were as much
in advance of Allied improvised plants as a military quick-firing gun
is ahead of the old muzzle-loader.

Further, for progressive and flexible organic chemical production,
some such difference will always exist between the modern dye
industry and factories or arsenals improvised or maintained
to meet specific emergencies.



CHAPTER VIII

AMERICAN DEVELOPMENTS


Special Attention Justified;--Special Value of American Opinion.--Various
reasons prompt us to pay special attention to the development of
chemical warfare by the United States of America.  In the preceding
chapters we have attempted a more or less connected account of its
development during the campaign.  Such an account must necessarily
make constant reference to French and British developments.
But American preparations, although on a colossal scale,
were not in time to influence the campaign seriously and directly.
Therefore, purely for the symmetry of our account, special reference
should be made to America.  But a more serious reason is to be found
in the great importance attached by America to this branch of warfare.
As everybody knows, the arrival of the American troops in large numbers
was preceded by an educational period, during which American staffs,
officers, and men became acquainted with Allied staffs, operations,
and methods on the Western Front.  They were less biased by military
tradition, and not under the same necessity as the European Allies
to organise in an improvised way for different violent emergencies.
Their opinions of war methods on the Western Front are, therefore,
of great interest.

Chemical warfare at once assumed a place of prime importance in
their schemes, receiving a stimulus and a momentum which, rather than
losing force during peace, appears to have gathered intensity.
There was at first no particular background of emotion,
or desire for specific retaliation in this American development.
It was purely a question of deciding on technical grounds
the relative importance of different methods of warfare.
Solid facts determined the matter later.  We have it on the best
authority that 75,000 out of the total 275,000 American casualties
were due to gas.

Early American Activities.--The earliest American activities,
consisted in attaching various officers to the British formations
in France and to the French research and producing organisations
centred in Paris.  A period ensued of remarkably rapid and efficient
assimilation of the best developments in allied chemical warfare.
Two American gas companies were attached to ours for instruction
in the first month of 1918, and they assisted in several gas attacks
on the British front.

Field Activities.--In a sense the development of chemical warfare
organisations by the Americans was deprived of its promised success.
The Allies regained the general and final offensive before American
plans matured.  But if the latter were prevented from participating
in various types of cloud and stationary attack along the front,
yet the coincidence of their organisation with the development of more
open warfare gave them an opportunity, which they readily seized,
to demonstrate the possibilities of mobile chemical attack.
Two gas companies, known as the 30th Engineers, were assembled,
partially trained, and embarked for France at the end of 1917.
They entered upon a course of training with the British Special Brigade R.E.
while further units were being organised in America.  The projector
at-tracted the Americans, and they were ready, as General Fries
informs us, to launch a big projector gas attack, when Marshal Foch's
counter attack disorganised the front concerned.  They then turned
their attention to the use of the four-inch Stokes mortar in an attempt
to neutralise the German machine-gun nests, using phosphorus for smoke
and thermit shell, and continued to assist the infantry either by taking
part in the preparations for attack or in subsequent operations.

Special Difficulties.--The great length of the American
lines of communication led them to develop certain research
and experimental organisations near to the front.
These had to deal with the "short range" problems, those of
immediate importance, without referring them back
to America.  The 3000 miles of ocean represented a necessary loss
of contact which prevented the home workers, however willing,
from fully realising the needs of the problems concerned.
Accordingly a strong experimental station, Hanlon Field,
was developed near Chaumont, and a well-equipped laboratory
was established at Puteaux, near Paris.

Edgewood Arsenal.--The organisations developed in America were
of very great interest.  The American officers in the field,
through their contact with the British and French, realised early
that we were extended to the utmost in the matter of production,
that our demands and programmes were far ahead of our output,
and that they could not reasonably expect serious help from us,
either with regard to the results or the material means of production.
They, therefore, made surveys of our methods and wisely determined
to concentrate on production in America.  As a result, they developed
the phenomenal chemical warfare arsenal of Edgewood.  Had the war
lasted longer, there can be no doubt that this centre of production
would have represented one of the most important contributions
by America to the world war.  Probably had production been conceived
on a smaller scale, however, its results would have materialised
sooner and produced greater actual influence.

A few facts with regard to Edgewood suffice to confirm its potentialities.
We learn[1] that the arsenal organisation comprised a huge chlorine plant,
probably the largest in the world, various chemical plants for the manufacture
of the chief chemical warfare substances adopted by the European belligerents,
and shell-filling plant capable of filling a total of more than 200,000 shell
and bomb daily.


[1] _Journal of Industrial and Engineering Chemistry_, January, 1919.


Research.--Supporting this production, and in connection with
the other branches of chemical warfare, a tremendous research
organisation developed which, with the exception of the combined
research facilities of the I.G.[2] was probably the largest
research organisation ever assembled for one specific object.
It grew until it contained 1200 technical men and 700
service assistants, and we are told that its work covered
exhaustive research on more than 4000 different materials.
Nor were the Americans less ambitious on protection.
Wisely adopting the British Box Respirator during the
early stages, they made vigorous attempts at the same time,
with considerable success, to develop a form of their own.


[2] The great German organic chemical combine.


Production.--An American opinion on the importance of Edgewood Arsenal
at the time of the Armistice is worth quoting.[3] "Here is a
mammoth plant, constructed in record time, efficiently manned,
capable of an enormous output of toxic material, and just reaching
its full possibilities of death-dealing at the moment when news
is hourly expected of the signing of the Armistice.  What a pity
we did not possess this great engine of war from the day American
troops first sailed for France, for, had we been so prepared,
how many of our boys who `have gone West' could have returned
for the welcome home!  Shall we forget this lesson of preparedness?
Is this great plant to be scrapped?  Possibly wise heads may find
a solution of the problem which will add this great resource
to American chemical industry, at the same time preserving its
value to the nation as a greater asset, in case of future war,
than a standing army."


[3] _Journal of Industrial and Engineering Chemistry_, January, 1919.


Although mainly dependent on Edgewood Arsenal for their war schemes,
it is perfectly clear that the Americans realised that theirs
was not the ideal way, in fact was a very wasteful and inefficient
way to produce poison gases or chemical warfare substances.
Indeed, even during the war, in spite of their huge arsenal they
established contact with various American chemical producers.
At the present time, except in connection with its use for emergencies
during the next few years, this huge source of production
at Edgewood must be regarded as an unnecessary burden upon
the State.  To be of any use, it requires costly maintenance.
It is only capable of producing a limited number of organic substances.
Some of these are likely to become obsolete as time goes on.
This reliance upon a huge fixed arsenal is not only out of accord with any
international scheme for disarmament, but it is altogether too ponderous,
and not sufficiently flexible for reliance in future emergencies.
This is fully realised in America.  General Fries, addressing the
American Chemical Society, said:  "The magnificent plant at Edgewood
may soon be a thing of the past.  We do not believe the Government
should attempt to manufacture poisonous gases on a huge scale."
He explains how, by reliance upon normal chemical industry,
"We believe we can build up more quickly and to a greater extent
than by any other method the necessary large output of poisonous
gases required in a war with a first-class Power."  Referring to
the mobilisation of industry for this purpose, he says:
"We believe that if this is done satisfactorily it will be one
of the greatest possible guarantees of future peace."

Post-Armistice Developments.--But perhaps the most interesting
and significant aspect of American chemical warfare development
concerns what has occurred since the Armistice.  Valuable and
successful attempts have been made to educate not only
the public but also political leaders to its real meaning.
No one examining the American daily and scientific press,
or reading the records of the various Government Committees
on the proposed bills of chemical, or chemical warfare,
interest can doubt that the Americans are probably as a whole much
more alive to the importance of this matter than any other ally.
Discussions on the Longworth Bill and on the new chemical warfare
service have provided full ventilation for the facts of the case,
in their proper setting.

It was a striking contrast to land in America early in 1920
and find New York plastered with recruiting posters setting
forth the various reasons why Americans should join their
Chemical Warfare Service.  It was not only a sign of American
methods but also one of their appreciation of the importance
of the matter.  This is amply borne out by their final
step in reconstruction during the last few months.
A separate Chemical Warfare Service has been reorgan-ised in
America in such a way as to give it a position of independence
equivalent to that of the older branches of the service.
The specific possibilities in the development of this form of
warfare are acknowledged by the action of the American Congress,
and this result is very largely due to the creation of
an intelligently informed political and public opinion.
Large grants of money have been placed at the disposal of
the new Chemical Warfare Service, and its research facilities
promise to equal the war establishments of the older services
of other Allied countries.

Views of General Fries.--In view of the creation of this independent
Chemical Warfare Service in America and of its importance
when measured in terms of financial and material facilities,
it is of interest to summarise some of the views already
expressed by General Fries,[1] the head of the new service.
With regard to the general function of chemical warfare, he tells us:
"In the first place, chemical warfare is a complete science in itself.
No other invention since that of gunpowder has made so profound
a change in warfare as gas is making, or will make, in the future.


[1] _Journal of Industrial and Engineering Chemistry_, 1920.


"To-day there are only four really distinct arms of the Service,
viz.: the Infantry, the Artillery, Aviation, and Chemical Warfare.  All other
forms of warfare are a combination, more or less complete, of these.
The gases, smoke, and incendiary materials that make up chemical warfare
are used to a greater or lesser extent by other arms, but wherever gas
is used it compels precautionary measures that are found in no other branch
of the Service.

"Considering its power, it has no equal.  Physical vigour is one of
the greatest assets in any army.  Gas, used properly and in quantities
that will be easily obtainable in future wars, will make the wearing
of the mask a continuous affair for all troops within two to five
miles of the front line, and in certain places for many miles beyond.
If it never killed a man, the reduction in physical vigour, and, therefore,
in efficiency of an army forced at all times to wear masks, would amount
to at least 25 per cent., equivalent to disabling a quarter of a million
men out of an army of a million."

The Gas Cloud Inescapable.--He goes on to explain some of the more
specific military needs which can be met by chemical means,
and refers independently to a point which the Germans have
mentioned repeatedly in their memoirs.  "One great reason why
chemical warfare will continue is that it fills a long-felt
want on the part of the soldier, that of shooting successfully
around a stump or rock.  The gas cloud is inescapable.
It sweeps over and into everything in its path.  No trench
is too deep for it, no dug-out, unless hermetically sealed,
is safe from it.  Night and darkness only heighten its effect.
It is the only weapon that is as effective in a fog or in the inky
blackness of a moonless night as in the most brilliant sunshine.
Only the mask and the training that go with it protect.
Terror, confusion, lack of discipline and control are fatal."

Importance of Smoke.--General Fries is insistent on the future importance
of smoke in warfare:

"Chemical warfare includes gas, smoke, and incendiary materials,
and they can't well be subdivided.  As before stated,
all the early gas attacks were in the form of clouds.
The value of that cloud, not only for carrying gas but for
screening purposes, began to be realised in the fall of 1917.
Clouds of smoke may or may not be poisonous, and they will or will
not be poisonous, at the will of the one producing the smoke.
For that reason every cloud of smoke in the future must be
looked upon as possibly containing some deadly form of gas.
When you consider this for a moment, you can realise
the tremendous possibilities for ingenuity that gas and smoke
afford the attacker.

"The American, trained for 300 years in meeting nature on her great
plains and in her vast forests, was early appealed to by this side
of chemical warfare.  As early as November 3, 1917, the United States
was urged, in a cablegram from the Chemical Warfare Service in France,
to push the development of a large phosphorous supply for use in smokes.
Not only were the early intuitions of the value of gas borne out by
later events, but to-day the future of smoke appears greater still.
The battle-field of the future will be covered with smoke--
not the all-pervading black smoke of the battles of the Civil War
and of earlier wars before smokeless powder came into use,
but a field covered with dots and patches of smoke, big and little,
here and there and everywhere.

"Every man who has hunted ducks and been caught in a dense fog
with ducks quacking all round, and who has tried to get ducks
by firing at the quack in the fog, can realise the difficulty
of hitting a man on the battlefield when you cannot see him,
and have only a quack, or less, by which to locate him.
The smoke will be generated in candles of two or three-pound
cans that can be thrown out in front of trenches; by knapsacks
that can be carried and which will give off dense white smoke
in large volume for many minutes; by grenades which, while they
may be thrown by hand, will generally be fired from rifles;
by artillery shells reaching ten, fifteen, twenty miles back
of the main battle line; and finally, from aeroplane bombs whose
radius of action is limited only by the size of the earth.
And thus smoke becomes one of the great elements of war in the future.
It is more or less wholly protective in its nature, but as it
costs more and takes longer to train a man in the various problems
involved in modern war than ever before in this history of the world,
it is worth while taking every precaution to protect him,
once you have him trained."

Casualty Percentages.--He also brings out very dearly the unique
possibility possessed by gas warfare of increasing its military efficiency,
while decreasing its relative atrocity:

"The death rate in the first gas attack was probably
in the neighbourhood of 35 per cent.  of all casualties--
and everybody in front of the wave was a casualty.
With the development of masks and training in the use of the mask
and in taking advantage of the ground, the death rate fell.
At the same time the total number of casualties fell, but not
at all in the same ratio as the decrease in the death rate.
From a probable death rate of 35 per cent.  in the first attack
it fell to 24 per cent., then to 18 per cent., and, as gas
attacks by artillery became general, to 6 per cent., and finally,
with the extended use of mustard gas, the rate fell to 2.5
per cent.  or less."

Again referring to casualties, he gives us the startling fact that 75,000
out of the 275,000 American casualties were caused by gas, "And yet,"
he says "the Germans used it in a halting, comparatively feeble manner."

Short Range Projectors.--Very much alive to the future of the
short-range projectors developed in connection with gas warfare,
he tells us, "The Gas Regiment in the St. Mihiel battle fired
on the Cote des Esparges one hundred of these high explosive
bombs at the zero hour on the morning of the attack.  That hill,
famous for its strength through four years of struggle between the
French and Germans, dis-appeared completely as an enemy standpoint.
Nothing remained but torn and broken barbed wire, bits of concrete
pill-boxes, and trenches filled with debris, and a few scattered
fragments of clothing.

"The gas troops will, in the future, handle all short-range
methods of firing gas, smoke, or high explosive.
They will deliver the greatest quantities of material possible
up to ranges of a mile and a half or a mile and three-quarters.
So effective and so efficient are these short-range methods
of projection that the No-Man's-Land of the future will
be the width covered by these projectors and mortars.
They can't, and never will, compete with the artillery,
where range and great accuracy are the most important factors.
The efficiency of artillery gas shell or artillery smoke or high
explosive shell is only one-fifth that of the projector.
Hence, for economy and efficiency, the artillery will be used
to fire gas, smoke, high explosive, and incendiary materials
only at ranges beyond those reached by the gas troops."

Again, showing how the American authorities were seized with the importance
of the matter, we read:

Vast Expansion in Personnel.--"So greatly were these possibilities
appreciated in the summer of 1918 that the number of gas troops
authorised for use against the Germans was increased from six companies
to fifty-four. Back of all this, however, was the productive capacity
of the United States, which ensured that those troops would be able
to fight day and night, summer, winter, and fall, until the war was over.
No wonder the German quit--it was time, and he knew it."

And in conclusion General Fries tells us:

"The universal adoption of gas warfare on sea and land and in the air,
combined with its persistent quality, will make that nation able
to produce and use gas in the largest quantity superior in war
to any other nation on the globe.  The United States can reach
that position and maintain it, and I believe that we are going to get
such encouragement from the War Department that we can do it.
I feel sure that the army appreciates the value of chemical warfare,
and that it appreciates also the value of the chemists to chemical warfare.

"So long as there is any danger of other nations continuing these methods
of warfare, research and experiment in chemical warfare must be pursued.
Research must not only be directed towards the gases and apparatus,
likely to be employed in the future, but also towards protection
against all possible gases.  Training in the use of gas will be confined
to appropriate branches, but training in defensive measures will include
the whole army.

"We must continue our studies of what is known as chemical warfare.
No nation has renounced the use of poison gases as the result of the
Peace Conference.  There are nations whose word we could not respect
if they did renounce it.  It is essential to study the offensive
side of chemical warfare if we are to be prepared for defence.
The great importance of adequate defensive appliances arises
from the fact that preparations for the offensive use of gas can
be made in peace-time with great secrecy, and may have far-reaching
and even fatal results in the early stages of a war.

" . . . For these reasons it is necessary to make adequate provision
for research, experiment, and design in connection with war material.
It is equally necessary to avoid overlap, duplication of effort,
and the setting up of military institutions for scientific research
which can better be done by existing civil institutions."

He also quotes from a statement from General Debeney, Director of
the French College of Warfare:

"Should war begin now, aviation, and especially gas, would play one
of the most important parts.  The progress of aviation would make
the rear of each front, and very far in rear, extremely dangerous,
and the progress of chemistry would permit the use of gas on zones
of such an extent as cannot be imagined.

"Making gas is naturally rapidly done, because all the manufacturers
of chemical product--still so numerous in Germany--can be requisitioned,
but to make airplanes is much slower.

"The defence against gas seems to be more difficult than against airplanes.
I believe that against airplanes, the anti-aircraft artillery is susceptible
of making rapid progress, and perhaps in that very instance gas will be one
of the best ways, if with appropriate shells _*the air can be poisoned all
around the attacking airplanes_.

"It would be much more effective to create, for example, a sphere
of poisoned air a mile round the airplane, instead of trying to hit
the machine directly with bits of the shell."

British, French, and even German opinion, while not
underestimating the importance of the matter, may not agree
in an unqualified way with all the above statements.
But we claim that they show vision in a branch of war which,
on account of its scientific basis, may, more than any other,
speedily prove the visionary a true prophet.



CHAPTER IX

GERMAN CHEMICAL POLICY


The preceding account of chemical warfare leaves the impression of a
successful Allied struggle against persistently unfavourable circumstances.
We were constantly compelled to accelerate to attain the pace set by
the enemy.  There were exceptions, undoubtedly, but in the main Germany
kept ahead in the chemical struggle.

So far, in examining the root of our troubles, we have been content
to refer to the existence of the I.G., to describe its chemical
warfare activities, and to indicate, briefly, its unique power to
produce large quantities of organic chemical products at short notice.
The close connection between the German dye industry and chemical
warfare is now well recognised in official circles, and, to some extent,
by the general public.  Its belated exposure was almost entirely
due to the facts revealed by the Inter-Allied Mission to the German
chemical factories some months after the Armistice.

But the situation thus revealed was not created in a day, nor by chance.
Indeed, one of the military features of industrial chemical development
in the I.G. has already been traced to pre-war activities.
I refer to the Haber process for the production of synthetic ammonia.
It would be short-sighted policy to accept the set of conditions against
which we struggled, and to explain them in terms of the I.G., without
looking more closely into the pre-war activities of this organisation.
Such an examination may reveal the basic forces which determined
our inferior position in chemical warfare at the outbreak of war.
It is true that we can explain away our inferiority by referring
to the German breach of faith, which automatically created conditions
for which we were unprepared.  This is a comfortable solution.
But had chemical warfare been a strongly developed and accepted method of war
before the outbreak of hostilities, would we then have been prepared?
The records of the past, before April, 1915, must be consulted to answer
this question.  We may find that our position is due to more than a mere
negative attitude, to more than our simple neglect of the organic
chemical industry.  It maybe that there were forces which definitely
exploited this national characteristic to our disadvantage.
The pre-war policy and activities of the I.G. must be examined from
this point of view.  In no country has such an investigation been
more complete than in America, and official statements have been issued
by the American Alien Property Custodian[1] which throw a flood of light
on the pre-war activities of the constituent branches of the I.G. They
conclusively reveal the existence of a carefully directed German chemical
policy making for world domination in the organic chemical industry,
which greatly hampered the military effectiveness of other countries,
and directly strengthened the military resources of Germany.  On broad lines,
the pre-war and war activities of the I.G. produced the same result
as an attempt to strangle the economic life of possible opponents,
enfeebling their resistance to the subsequent delivery of a hammer blow
designed to take maximum advantage of the situation thus created.
Twenty years or more under the regime of a forceful economic policy,
not without its sinister aspects, prepared the ground by weakening us
in the concentrated chemical warfare which, ensued.  The success of this
policy manoeuvred us into such a position that we barely escaped defeat
under the hammer blows of German chemical aggression.  This, in fact,
appears to have been the German conception of modern war in its relation
to industry, and American reports have shown that it was carried through
with typical thoroughness by familiar German methods.


[1] _Alien Property Custodian Report_, Washington.
Government Printing Office, 1919.


Origin of German Chemical Monopolies.--The completeness of our organic
chemical deficiencies, and the thorough way in which we had failed
to develop organic chemical industries, creates such a sharp impression,
when thrown into relief by the outbreak of war, that we are led to
inquire into the methods by which these monopolies were established.
Let us admit, without any further delay, that Germany owed the origin
and assertion of these monopolies in part to her scientific development,
fostered by a vigorous policy of applying scientific research
to industrial enterprise.  So far as her success depended upon
such factors, it merits our unqualified admiration and envy.
But stimulating these developments was a very definite general
and commercial policy which requires close examination.

German Chemical Commercial Policy;--Evidence of the
U.S.A. Alien Property Custodian.--Giving every credit to German
initiative and thoroughness in the application of science to industry,
we are still prompted to inquire how this monopoly came to be so complete.
We can rely on more than mere rumour, when examining the commercial methods
of the great I.G. The American Alien Property Custodian, Mr. Mitchell Palmer,
and, later, Mr. Francis P. Garvan, had occasion and opportunity to make
minute examination of the German dye agencies in America in connection
with general investigations on the reorganisation of alien property.
Their revelations truly merit the term, showing remarkably clearly
the unity of conception, determination of purpose, and co-operation
with the German Government which characterised the policy of the I.G.

Pre-war American Situation.--Let us briefly consider the relevant
aspects of the pre-war American situation.  According to fairly
well-known facts, confirmed by the reports of the two American officials
mentioned above, the American pre-war organic chemical industry
consisted of little more than a series of small assembling plants.
Although enormous supplies of coal-tar products were available,
yet the dye intermediates derived from them were not made in America,
but imported from Germany.  After various attempts to establish
the dye industry, it seemed, at one time, about 1880,
to have definitely taken root, but, within the space of five years,
there were only four dye producing establishments remaining.

German Price-cutting;--Salicylic Acid.--In every instance the manufacture
was almost immediately brought to an end by German price-cutting.
The same source reveals the direct and indirect methods used by
Germany to prevent, at all costs, the development of an independent
organic chemical industry.  There are many pointed examples of
the direct method, and we will glance at the case of salicylic acid.
This is a very important chemical, used not only for certain important
drugs but also as in intermediate for dyes and photographic chemicals.
In 1903 the United States possessed five manufacturers of this product.
In ten years' time three of these had failed, and one of the survivors
was a mere branch of a German house.  During this fatal ten years,
the product was being sold in that country at a price twenty-five per cent.
lower than in Germany.  The manipulation of the prices of the other products
of the German monopoly enabled them, by such methods, to maintain it.
Many other examples, including such important products as bromine,
oxalic acid, and aniline, could be quoted to show the results of the German
price-cutting policy.  The direct significance of bromine for chemical
warfare must be borne in mind.

Full Line Forcing.--Besides directly attacking the production
of raw materials and intermediates, the Germans used an indirect
method which has been described as "full line forcing."
They were the sole producers of certain specialities, such as
alizarine colours, anthracene colours, and synthetic indigo.
These were indispensable to the textile manufacturers,
and by refusing to supply them, except to houses which
would buy their other supplies from German manufacturers,
the latter could squeeze out home producers of simple dyes,
however efficient their production.

Bribery and Corruption;--German Patent Policy.--The dyeing
industry was peculiarly susceptible to corruption.
It was so simple for the head dyer of a mill to show
a partiality for dyes from any particular source of supply.
The American Alien Property Custodian very frankly tells us[1]: "The
methods of the great German houses in carrying on their business
in this country were from the first honeycombed with corruption.
Bribery of dyers was carried on almost universally on a large
scale. . . . So extensive was this corruption that I came across
only one American consumer that had escaped its ill effects."
Such were hardly the methods of decent commercial competition,
although it appears that the strong patriotic sense of the German
was able to justify, in his own eyes, what might be regarded
as reprehensible methods.  This is not a question of bringing
up old reproaches, but merely of coldly examining facts.
We have already referred to their patent policy, whereby thousands
of patents were taken out, the only value of many of them,
being to cramp the productive initiative of possible rivals.
Professor Stieglitz explains how the German patents were useless
in developing large scale manufacture.  "The patent protects
the product, but does not reveal the method."  Sir William Pope
has also brought out this point, showing how the Germans use
thousands of bogus patents to protect their chemical industry.
He tells us,[1b] "In fact, some German patents are drawn
up for the purpose of discouraging investigation by more
practical methods; thus, any one who attempted to repeat
the method for manufacturing a dyestuff protected by Salzman &
Kruger in the German patent No. 12,096 would be pretty certain
to kill himself during the operation."


[1] _Alien Property Custodian Report_, 1919, p.  34.

[1b] _Science and the Nation_.  A. C. Seward, F.R.S. Cambridge
University Press, 1917.


Propaganda and Information;--Espionage; Activities of
the Dye Agencies.--But another method which was used in this
commercial offensive, to which we must draw further attention,
dealt with propaganda and information.  In his comprehensive report,
the American Men Property Custodian examines a number of large
industries and reveals how the German interest in these industries
through their American ramifications were active, "sowing the seeds
of German propaganda," and collecting information, both commercial
and military, for the use of the German Government and its agents.
Quoting again from this report, "In many of the large German-owned
companies taken over by the Alien Property Custodian, after investigation
it was found that espionage was one of the chief functions.
Every scrap of information of commercial or military value
to Germany was carefully gathered by the representatives of these
concerns in this country and quickly forwarded to the home office
in Germany.  The German agents were particularly keen on gathering
information that would be helpful to Germany's commercial warfare.
Once in Germany, this information was carefully card-indexed
for the use of the manufacturers.  Bulletins of commercial
information were also prepared and placed at their disposal.
In Germany, the collection of all commercial information is under
a bureau which is controlled and financed by the great German banks,
such as the Dresdner, Disconto, and Reichs Bank."  This statement
is not mere generalisation, but is backed by innumerable examples.
Thus we find a light railway equipment manufacturer, a projectile company,
a wireless company, various magneto companies, insurance companies,
and German shipping companies, all engaged in spreading propaganda,
acquiring information, and influencing public opinion in favour
of Germany.  But, undoubtedly more important than any of these,
and taking a leading part in the general scheme, was the German
dye organisation.  The American publications make this quite clear.
Mr. Garvan goes so far as to say:  "As long as you were supplied
by the big six (_i.e_. the I.G.), your business had no secret unknown
to Berlin.  In Berlin you will find the card index system which
recites every fact connected with each and every one of your sources
which can be of any possible value to your rivals over there."
Referring to assistance rendered by various American and Allied
departments, including Military, Naval, and War Trade Intelligence,
we learn from the same sources:  "All these bodies worked in close
co-operation and their mutual assistance was of inestimable value.
Information derived from these sources demonstrated that the chemical
industry was a natural centre for espionage and that this had been
true long before we entered the war--indeed, before the war began.
The relation between the German Government and the great German
chemical houses was so close that representatives of the industry
were naturally almost direct representatives of the Government,
and their work in this country gave them unequalled opportunities
for examining our industries from within."

With the outbreak of war, this organisation became more clearly defined.
It was, perhaps, difficult before the war to know where to draw the line
between purely commercial and actual governmental German activities.
The outbreak of war left no room for doubt.  The German dye agencies became,
at once, the active agents of their Government in various schemes,
the nature of which we shall outline, and their "information" functions
became very definitely describable as espionage.

Manoeuvring Raw Materials.--In the first place, the Alien Property Custodian
found unexampled, evidence of a definite German scheme to corner and divert
certain important war materials destined for the Allies.

Chemical Exchange Association;--Doctor Albert's Letter.--Many such plots
could be quoted, but we will limit ourselves to one,[1] chosen because on its
stage move the chief figures of this espionage system.  This case has been
described under the name of the "Chemical Exchange Association," and is much
more fitted for the pen of a Conan Doyle.  The move appears to have been
initiated by Dr. Albert, the financial adviser of the German Government
in America, in collaboration with von Bernstorff.  Its purpose was to
corner the immediate supplies of American phenol in order to prevent its
manufacture into high explosives, including the well-known picric acid.
The outbreak of war instantly stopped the entry of phenol into the country.
Further, this product was not manufactured there to any extent before.
Large supplies were required for the production of synthetic resins,
for the gramophone industry, This led to the development of a phenol industry
by the Edison works, and there appeared, automatically, a phenol surplus.
Dr. Albert, aware of the probable fate of this surplus as raw material
for allied munitions, determined to seize it for the German Government,
and he did this through Dr. Hugo Schweitzer, one of the most prominent
members of the American agency of the great Bayer works.  In June, 1915,
Dr. Schweitzer contracted with the selling agents of the Edison Co.
for the entire surplus of phenol available for sale, offering a large cash
security which was furnished by Dr. Albert.  A lapse of a week witnessed
another contract with the Heyden Chemical Works, a branch of the German house,
by which this phenol was purchased for conversion into salicylic acid and
other products.  To avoid exposing the nature of the deal, Dr. Schweitzer
registered as the "Chemical Exchange Association."  The profits amounted to
nearly a million dollars, half of which belonged to Dr. Schweitzer.  This, we
are told, went immediately to the German Government.  As a suitable
climax to such a venture, a dinner was given at the Hotel Astor by
Dr. Schweitzer in honour of Dr. Albert, and is described as a typical
gathering of the most active German propagandists in the country.
It was as a result of this deal that Dr. Albert sent Dr. Schweitzer
a memorable letter in which he praises his "breadth of highmindedness,"
and compares his work with "a military coup accomplished by an army
leader in destroying three railroad trains of forty cars containing four
and a half million pounds of explosives."


[1] _Alien Property Custodian Report_, 1919, p.  43.


Dye Agency Information System;--Dr. Albert on Chemical Warfare.--
Although a great deal has been said in America with regard to
the activities of Dr. Schweitzer and his followers, very little
has been heard on this side.  Explaining the complete information
system possessed by the Germans, Mr. F. P. Garvan informs us
that the head of the system in America for years before the war
was Dr. Hugo Schweitzer, President of the Bayer Company there,
and he even quotes his secret service number given him by
the Imperial Minister of War, stating that he came to America,
became a citizen on the instruction of the German Government,
and led the espionage and propagandist movements down to the day
of his sudden death in November, 1917.  The relationships between
Dr. Albert and Dr. Schweitzer, when the former was leaving for Germany
in 1917, are very illuminating.  We learn from the same source
how Dr. Schweitzer received from the former nearly one and a half
million dollars, all to be spent in espionage and propaganda.
Dr. Albert, leaving Dr. Schweitzer a letter of appreciation,
to which we have referred in connection with the Chemical Exchange,
makes a very significant reference to chemical warfare.
"Of still greater and more beneficial effect is the support which you
have afforded to the purchase of bromine.  We have a well-founded
hope that, with the exclusion of perhaps small quantities, we shall
be in a position to buy up the total production of the country.
Bromine, together with chloral, is used in making nitric gases,
which are of such great importance in trench warfare.
Without bromine these nitric gases are of slight effect:  in connection
with bromine they are of terrible effect.  Bromine is produced only
in the United States and Germany.  While, therefore, the material
is on hand in satisfactory quantities for the Germans, the Allies
are entirely dependent upon importation from America."  Making due
allowance for the fact that Dr. Albert was not a technical man,
this information possesses an element of truth, indeed France
was driven to the extreme of establishing a bromine industry
in the wilds of Tunis in order to counter the German attack.

The Moral Aspect.--Such facts tempt us to think hardly of these
representatives of German culture.  But they were, no doubt,
fiercely patriotic Germans, and it is not difficult for us
to understand their activities after the outbreak of war.
An American, however, can hardly adopt such a lenient view, if, as has
been claimed, many of these agents were naturalised Americans,
for they were abusing the privileges and the confidence of their
adopted country.  We have no wish, however, to dwell on this aspect
of the matter, and have no doubt whatever that many good Germans
could justify all these activities according to their own codes.
It would have been better not to have given this information
the light of day, were it not of some value for the future.

Report of the New York World;--German Policy Regarding Dye Supplies
to the U.S.A.--How far can the parent organisation of these
dye agencies be regarded as aware of their activities?
They were largely responsible for their inspiration.
Mr. Garvan says, "Practically all the dye salesmen were only
nominally in the employ of the branches here; all had secret
and personal contracts with the Home Office."  From these facts
alone there can hardly be any doubt as to the connivance of the
home organisation.  Again, on April 28, 1915, the _New York World_
printed an editorial explaining that "two large German chemical
and aniline dye concerns are reported to be establishing factories
in New Jersey, to supply American demands hither to supplied
from Germany."  This statement apparently alarmed Captain Boy-Ed,
the German Naval Attache, and he communicated with Dr. Albert,
the financial representative in New York, for the establishment
of these factories would have countered the German policy
of bringing political pressure by refusing dye shipments.
Dr. Albert's reply to Boy-Ed contains the following phrase:
"With regard to the dyes, I got into touch with local experts
in order to determine what truth there is in the news.
According to my knowledge of things, the matter is a fake,
inasmuch as _*our factories have bound themselves orally
and by word of honour to do nothing in the present situation
which might help the United States_."  As further evidence of this
definite policy, witness a letter from Consul-General Hossenfelder
to the Imperial German Chancellor, Dr. von Bethmann-Hollweg. This
letter is dated New York, March 3, 1916, and, after a detailed
examination of the economic relationships between Germany
and America, states:  "Further, we should, according to my conviction,
hold ourselves absolutely passive in relation to the proposals
for the exportation of potash, chemicals, and dyestuffs,
and if the opportunity arises, make the sanction for them,
not dependent upon the consent for an exchange of articles,
but upon the abolition _en bloc_ of all hindrances to intercourse
contrary to international laws which have been instituted
by England."  Further, Dr. Albert, cabling to the German Government
in April, 1916, on the export of dyestuffs, tells us:
"The hope was entertained of bringing American industries
which were solely dependent upon German deliveries of dyestuffs
into a position that they would have to insist on the importation
of dyestuffs under the conditions demanded by Germany."  There can
then be no doubt that the parent organisation of the I.G. was
in close touch with the activities of its agencies.

This, then, is a brief account of the methods by which Germany created
the monopoly whose existence threatened our success in the world war.
Before leaving the question of the monopoly, let us inquire a little
more closely into its exact nature and range.  Various American official
reports have revealed the desperate measures necessitated in that country
in order to meet deficiencies in vital products when the German source
of supply was removed.

Professor Stieglitz's Evidence.--Professor Stieglitz, of the University
of Chicago, giving evidence before the United States Senate, stated:[1]


[1] Hearings before the Committee on Finance, U. S. Senate, 1920.


"I have come to the conclusion that we would have saved a great deal of
suffering and a great many lives in this country, if we had had an organic
chemical industry, as they have in Germany, before we started the war."
Characterising the dye industry as the source of war chemicals,
including explosives and poison gas, he emphasises the drug question
and shows how their development depends absolutely upon the existence
of certain raw materials, and facilities for comprehensive organic
chemical research, which only find a _raison d'etre_ in the existence
of a flourishing dye industry,

Ehrlich's Discovery.--Pointing out the difficulties in developing
the manufacture of salvarsan, he explains how the process was
originally discovered by an organic chemist, Dr. Paul Ehrlich,
co-operating with a German dye company, the crude material coming
from the dye plants, the product itself strongly resembling dyes,
"containing arsenic instead of part of their nitrogen."
The great importance of this drug is brought out by another witness
before the same committee, Mr. Francis P. Garvan, who explains how,
by refusing or neglecting to ship salvarsan, Germany wanted the
United States "to starve to death" for lack of it, and he continues:
"Think what an extension of disease and that an intensification
of suffering and distress Germany was willing to impose upon
her best market in order to obtain her imperial will."

Germany had monopolised the production of the important
synthetic drugs, including the derivatives of salicylic acid,
of which aspirin had developed wide use in Allied countries.
After every household had learnt the value of German
produced aspirin, its supply was cut off at the outbreak of war.
The same disadvantages applied in the field of anaesthetics.
For a long period America had no local anaesthetics for hospital
surgical work, being compelled to use what were termed
"Bulgarian Operations," that is, operations without anaesthetics.
Professor Stieglitz claims that the lack of drugs and
anaesthetics threw back American surgery some fifty to seventy
years in civilisation.

But what of this country?  We have already outlined how the outbreak
of war found us with, at the most, two or three relatively small
producing centres, which did valiant service during the war
and amply proved the importance of the dye industry by revealing
what could have been done had we been many times stronger.
Was the same German chemical policy responsible for our
pre-war position?  As far as we know official investigations
have not been pursued to the same length as in America, but it
is beyond doubt that the German dye companies took every possible
step to stifle the development of our organic chemical production.
When the war broke out, our comfortable commercial contact
with the I.G. became a strangle-hold. It could not be otherwise.
Whatever the German attitude, and we could hardly expect it to
be friendly, the strangle-hold at the outbreak of war was inevitable.
But this dye menace facing our textile industries, and weakening
our power of retaliation in the chemical war, was not the only
danger from the I.G. We were in a critical position through failure
to produce other commodities than dyes.

Drugs and Medicinal Products;--The German Monopoly;--National Health
Insurance Commission.--The question of drugs assumed critical
importance at the outbreak of war.  Germany had been asserting
her monopoly for years in the field of medicinal chemicals.
Cessation of supplies at the outbreak of war caused grave
apprehension of a serious shortage in these products,
so important for the adequate treatment of disease.
In some cases we possessed neither the raw materials nor
the technical knowledge to undertake rapid home production.
But in the important group of the synthetic drugs derived from
coal-tar products, the raw materials were produced in quantity in
the United, Kingdom, only to be exported to Germany, thus contributing
to her monopoly.  British manufacturers, on the other hand,
held their own in the production of certain kinds of drugs,
such as the alkaloids, gaseous anaesthetics, and some inorganic
salts of bismuth and mercury.  In a summary of certain war
activities of the National Health Insurance Commission, we read:
"It was chiefly in the making of the coal-tar synthetic remedies
that Germany was pre-eminent, and that position was due not to any
lack of skill or invention on the part of the British chemists,
but to the high degree of organisation attained by the German
chemical industry, which made it possible to convert the by-products
of the aniline factories into medicaments of high therapeutic
and commercial value."

The Royal Society;--Novocain.--So serious was the situation
that for some time we existed on feeble stocks.  But during this
period the utmost efforts were made to develop our own production.
The Royal Society promptly came forward with a scheme to link
up would-be producers with appropriate centres of research.
The latter not only assisted production but actually produced sufficient
quantities of important drugs to tide us over the difficult period.
Thus, for example, for the production of novocain the assistance
of about forty university laboratories throughout the country
was invoked, and they proceeded to produce the intermediates,
diethylamine and ethylene-monochlor-hydrin. These substances
were converted into diethyl-amino-ethanol, and the final step,
the production of novocain, was undertaken by manufacturers,
including a prominent dye firm.  We have referred to one of these
substances in connection with the German production of mustard gas,
and need only say that in England, in a time of national emergency,
the Government had to depend on the improvised assistance
of forty teaching and research institutions for the production
of small quantities of drug intermediates.  Further, this work,
although to the permanent credit of those who undertook it,
did not enable us later to produce rapidly war quantities of
mustard gas, itself dependent on the same important intermediate,
ethylene-monochlor-hydrin. Germany settled the drug and mustard
gas question by a simple demand to the I.G., because the latter,
holding the indigo monopoly, possessed actual large-scale
ethylene-chlor-hydrin production.

Other cases, although equally creditable to those actually engaged
in the work, also reflect our national unpreparedness and neglect
of chemical industry.

Beta-Eucaine.--Beta-eucaine is a very important local anaesthetic.
Before the war we obtained it almost exclusively from Germany.  When urgently
needed in 1915 for the War Office and Admiralty, the Government discovered
that it could not obtain this substance from commercial sources.
Seventeen laboratories co-operated to produce two hundred and sixteen
pounds of the material.  Such examples would be ludicrous did they
not possess such a serious national aspect.  Our position was almost
as desperate regarding chloral-hydrate, the important hypnotic,
and the rare carbo-hydrates required for bacteriological purposes.
Sir William Pope's comprehensive statement[1] supplies further examples.


[1] _Science and the Nation_, A. C, Seward.  F.R.S. Cambridge
University Press, 1917.


Photographic Chemicals.--Our dependence upon German monopoly,
so drastically revealed at the outbreak of war, was not limited
to dyes and drugs, Photographic chemicals were of special importance
for war purposes, yet, when the development of aviation increased our
demands for photographic chemicals, we had no normal sufficient source
to which to turn.  We needed not only the essential bulk chemicals,
such as amidol, metol, para-amidophenol, and glycine, but also
certain rarer substances, such as the photographic sensitisers,
which were so essential for the Air Force.  By calling upon chemical
industry and research institutions both needs were satisfactorily met,
but the contrast with Germany leads perforce to the same conclusion,
their case and speed of production as compared with ours.

This examination shows the fine texture of the tenacious web by which Germany
had entangled and stifled the organic chemical industries of other countries.
Although at the outbreak of war the Allies were slow to realise the war
significance of the dye industry, yet they were quick to determine that
the resumption of peace would not find them in such an ignominious position.
Steps were taken to establish dye industries in England, France,
and America.  Not only did plants spring up to meet the immediate
needs of the textile industries of the world outside Germany,
but the question received considerable Government attention.
Promises were made and steps taken to encourage the growing industries.
But these cannot be examined in detail here, and the main facts are
common knowledge.  Two points emerge, however, which are of prime
importance from the point of view of our discussion.  In the first place,
the acute needs of the armies prevented the maximum use of the war
opportunity for developing Allied dye industries on a sound basis.
No sooner was producing capacity installed, than it was taken over for
the production of urgently needed organic chemicals for explosives.
Dye enthusiasts would have regarded the war as a supreme opportunity
for a period of concentrated organic chemical research to make up
the leeway which existed, owing to forty years of German development.
But the research energies of the country were occupied on more
pressing problems.  In Germany, the war chemical activities of the dye
factories all contributed to their future post-war strength.
In England and France it was otherwise.  Our equivalent energies were
concentrated on developing improvised processes and plant, absolutely
necessary to counter the German attacks, but almost without exception
of no direct ultimate value to our peace organic chemical industries.
This is a point which merits careful consideration.  These industries
voluntarily threw aside what was, logically, a great opportunity for them
to push their research investigations so necessary for eventual success.
The state-aided Huddersfield factory represented national vision, whose fruits
were stolen by our ceaseless need to improvise counters to German aggression.
But we owe to our dye industry the national recognition of these facts.
Stress of war gave us true vision, but prevented its logical outcome.
War needs are now removed, and everything should be done to place at
the disposal of the dye industries those facilities which they necessarily,
but gladly, sacrificed in time of emergency.

The brief survey of the preceding pages reveals the existence of a German
chemical policy pursued vigorously for many years before the war.
It also shows how this policy developed in America, the chief neutral country,
during the war period, for two years before her entry.

The Americans have also established beyond doubt the active
co-operation between the German Government and the I.G. But,
if the policy of the German Government and of the organic
chemical industry had many points in common before the war,
they became one before hostilities were many months old.
The part played by the I.G. in munitions production, in which it
was virtually a tool of the Government, has already been seen.
It must be remembered that, after the first Battle of the Marne,
the German Government turned to the I.G. for a large part of
its explosives and practically all its poison gas, and, as has
been stated on many occasions, and with reason, Germany would
not have been able to continue the war after the summer of 1915
but for the commercial development of the Haber process
by the I.G. The story is too well known to repeat at length.
The basic element of explosives is nitrogen, which is introduced
by nitric acid.  This was produced from imported Chili saltpetre,
but the blockade cut short these imports, and but for the Haber
method, the vital step in producing nitric acid from the air,
Germany would have been compelled to abandon the struggle.

There is striking coincidence between the commencement of
the Great War and the successful completion of certain vital
German chemical developments.  As late as 1912 Germany still
depended on other countries, chiefly England, for her phenol,
the basic raw material for picric acid as well as a dye necessity.
Soon after that date the development of the Bayer plant made
her independent in that product, and gave her, in fact,
an exportable surplus.

War Activities of the I.G.--Reviewing all these activities and realising
how they all emanate from this one organisation, we are overwhelmed by its
formidable nature as an offensive and defensive weapon in time of war.
Here we have an organisation, the I.G., whose sinister pre-war
ramifications dominated the world by their hold on the supply of organic
chemicals vital for peace and war.  This organisation functioned,
in a sense, as the life blood of German offensive warfare.
German sources tell us very little of the war activities and future
significance of the I.G. A veil of secrecy seems to be cast
over the whole matter, but behind this veil must exist an acute
realisation of the value of the I.G. as a trump card for the future.
Krupp is uncovered, the whole world was alarmed at its meaning for war,
but heard with a comfortable sense of security how Krupp was
exchanging the sword for the plough.  But the gigantic I.G. controls
in its great hand a sword or plough for war or peace at will.
This is no far-fetched metaphor.

The Rhine Factories and the Armistice,--It therefore becomes important
to inquire into the attitude and activities of the I.G. since
the Armistice, and to examine its position in world reconstruction.
For one brief period, the few weeks following the Armistice, the German dye
industries appear to have been without policy, its leaders in confusion.
But with the confidence inspired by the Allied Rhineland occupation,
with the assistance provided by the Allied controlling organisations,
with regard to labour, fuel, and commercial transactions, the industrial
morale speedily recovered.

The tide of revolution which accompanied the German debacle in
the autumn of 1918 swept over the Rhineland chemical factories.
Colonel Norris, writing on his visit in February, 1919, tells us
that after peace was restored by the Allied forces:[1]--
"the managers of several factories agreed that the occupation
of the territory was the best thing that could have happened.
On the other side of the Rhine, labour refused to work,
and demanded unheard-of pay--everything was topsy-turvy. In fact,
before the Allied armies arrived, revolutionary notions were
growing rapidly along the Rhine.  One director of a well-known
chemical plant is said to have escaped by night with his life
by way of the river, when his employees were especially menacing.
When the British Army came he returned, and is now at his old post."
Thus, although the I.G. was model in its institutions for
the welfare of employees, at least one of its most prominent
directors was compelled to take refuge from infuriated labour.
What with danger from the latter, and the uncertainty of action
by the oncoming Allied troops, the future of the factories
appeared very gloomy.  In fact, there are fairly credible
rumours that the German directors were willing to dispose
of their assets to the Allies while they remained intact.
But the same Allied troops, whose advent was feared, rolled back
the tide of revolution from the banks of the Rhine, and restored
industrial security.  It is doubtful whether the investing
armies realised the full war significance of these factories,
except the French.  The latter instituted a fairly thorough
control almost at once.  But, judging from reports of
different missions to these factories, we were even backward
in organising inspection of the purely munitions plants.
Thus the Hartley Mission did not materialise until three
months had elapsed.


[1] _Journal of Industrial and Engineering Chemistry_, Vol.  XI., 1919,
Page 817.


War Mentality of the I.G.--We watch a vivid impression of the war
mentality of the I.G. in a few phrases from Colonel Norris's account:
"Around the walls of the director's room was a beautifully painted
and artistic frieze which pictured the various plants of the
Bayer Company and their activities.  Dr. Duisberg, the director,
pointed out proudly to the Americans the view of the company's plant
on the Hudson River.  We were not surprised to see it, although pre-war
advertisements had assured us at home that Bayer aspirin had been made
on the Hudson for years by an American company.  During the war an
ante-room had been decorated in a similar way, with pictures illustrating
the activity of the plant in the preparation of war-gas materials.
One saw how gas was made, shells were filled, and gas masks assembled.
The work was done by an artist, and has a permanent value.
The fact that the thing was conceived and executed during the stress
of war throws an interesting sidelight on German character."
Incidentally, it also throws a further sidelight upon the part played
by Leverkusen in the chemical warfare campaign.

German Attitude towards Inspection.--As was quite to be expected,
the German factories did not receive our missions with open arms,
and they were particularly jealous of any inspection at Oppau,
the site of the wonderful Haber synthetic ammonia plant.
Lieut. McConnel, of the U.S. Navy, tells us:[1] "Upon arrival
at the plant the Germans displayed a polite but sullen attitude.
They seemed willing to afford the opportunity of a cursory
inspection, but strongly objected to a detailed examination.
On the third day of the visit the writer was informed that his
presence had become a source of serious objection and that if his
examination were prolonged a formal complaint would be submitted
to the Peace Conference."  The Allies had only themselves to blame.
Their facile yielding to the argument that this great arsenal
was principally of peace significance, owing to the fertilisers
which it would eventually make, and the feeble backing provided
for inspecting missions, were reflected in the semi-resistant
attitude of the I.G. personnel.


[1] _Journal of Industrial and Engineering Chemistry_, Vol.  XI., 1919,
page 837.


The Rhine and Chaulny Contrast.--It was a curious contrast, however,
to pass through Chaulny on the way to the Rhine.  At Chaulny,
the oldest chemical works in France, quoting again from
Colonel Norris, "where Gay-Lussac did his famous work on the
manufacture of sulphuric acid, where Courtois discovered iodine,
and where plate glass was first made, had grown with the times,
and was amongst the largest factories in France.  Around it
was a thriving town of about 13,000 inhabitants, with some
excellent public modern buildings.  When the Germans in their
first retreat were forced to leave the place, they dismantled
the factory and carried away everything that was portable.
The fortunes of war brought them back, and before they left
a second time a regiment of soldiers was put to work to destroy
systematically the factory and the entire town.  For, a month
they kept at work, and when they withdrew but a few bricks were
left standing.  Every boiler had been blown up with dynamite,
and every tank too heavy to be carted away rendered useless.
About half an acre was covered with chemical stoneware of
all kinds; each piece had been broken with a sledgehammer.
Nothing was too small or too large to escape destruction.
And to make sure of a good job, everything that would burn was
set on fire."  Yet within twenty-four hours one met Germans,
in-directly or directly responsible for this policy of destruction,
resenting peaceful Allied inquiries on the munition activities
of their own plants.  We hardly know whether to attribute such
effects of Allied policy to our own integrity in respecting
the peace activities of these arsenals or to official ignorance
of their war-like nature.

German Revolution and the Industrial Leaders.--It is curious how
the leadership of the captains of German industry was left untouched
by the revolutionary disturbances of the post-Armistice period.
Evidence is to be found in the composition of the main German delegation
to Paris for the settlement of the Versailles Treaty.  Many of the
members were big industrial magnates, several had direct connection
with chemical industry, and at least one was a prominent director
of the I.G.

The German Peace Delegation.--Commenting on the composition of the main
German delegation in the spring of 1919, we find the German press
deploring the omission of any "visible representative" of Army
or Navy.  Does this imply the presence of invisible representation?
Whether intended or not, there is truth in the implication.
The list contains the name of one of the leading representatives of
the big dye combine.  Others of the delegates have chemical interests.
This is significant.  It more than implies the German official
acknowledgment of the importance of the dye industry in general
for the future of Germany, and of its prime importance for war.

Recent Signs of Government Interest.--Recent developments
have merely strengthened the dye combine and provided
further evidence of Government interest in its welfare.
The chief signs of reviving.  German Government interest in the I.G.
are to be found in the loan for the nitrogen enterprise and in
the privileges which it enjoys with regard to Government taxes.
An American source,[1] a witness before a Senate Committee,
reveals that the dye plants "have to pay no direct Government taxes.
According to an understanding with the present Government,
all organic chemical productions, the companies themselves,
as well as all dependencies, without exception,
for the next ten years, are freed from all direct State tax.
In so far as community taxes come into consideration,
I believe we will obtain a remission for our profession."
The latest sign of Government support is to be found in
the preferential treatment obtained by the German dye industry
in coal deliveries.  Coal is a critical factor in the German
attempt to regain their monopoly.

Nitrogen Fixation.--The industrial fixation of nitrogen by Germany to form
ammonia has great importance from the point of view of our discussion.
Statements by various prominent Germans, such as Dr. Max Sering,
of the University of Berlin, and Dr. Hugo Schweitzer, already referred to,
leave no doubt.  The former, writing in 1915, tells us:
"The complete cutting off of the supply of Chili saltpetre during
the war has been made good by our now taking nitrogen directly
out of the air in large factories built during and before the war.
With extraordinary rapidity the question has been solved how the
enormous quantities of the needed ammunition were to be produced,
a question which in England still meets with difficulties, in spite
of the help from America."


[1] Hearings before Committee on Finance, U. S. Senate, 1920, page 195.


The German Nitrogen Syndicate.--The two great Haber plants at Oppau
and Merseburg are both constituent parts of the I.G., and they
introduce a new element of Government interest into the I.G. policy.
Giving evidence before the Committee on Agriculture and Forestry
of the United States Senate, Colonel Joyce develops this question
of Government interest in detail.  He tells us how war nitrogen supply
was energetically and specifically fostered by the German Government
through an Imperial Commissioner under the War Department.  One of
the three advisers of this campaign was Doctor Bueb,
representing the Badische Anilin- und Soda-Fabrik. Colonel Joyce tells us:
"That was a strictly war control organisation, but even before
the war closed, Germany, with her usual foresight, was giving
consideration to the future commercial aspects of her nitrogen works,
and in August, 1919, there was definitely formed an association
of the producers which was called the Stickstoff Syndikat G.m.b.H.
or Nitrogen Syndicate.  This designation is a commercial one,
and the organisation is along commercial lines, but it is,
reliably stated that the establishment of this syndicate was
largely due to governmental influence.  This will be more easily
understood if it be realised that the German Government had given
financial assistance to many of the new plants and plant increases
which the war had necessitated."

Haber Process Prominent.--The Badische Co.  holds a large part of the capital
stock of this syndicate, whose Board contains a Government nominee.
in addition the Board of Managers will have a Government chairman.
Through such arrangements, Government interest in the I.G. nitrogen
enterprise is clearly revealed.  In conclusion, Colonel Joyce informs us,
"This information, which comes from most reliable sources and is
not to be disputed, shows that, beyond question, any one outside
of Germany producing or desiring to purchase nitrogenous fertilisers
or similar compounds, will have to deal with a single organisation,
essentially a branch of the German Government, which will have
an absolute monopolistic control of all such products produced in
Germany or whatever surplus there may be for export (Hearing before
the Committee on Agriculture and Forestry, U.S. Senate, S. 3390,
Mar. 22nd, 1920, p.  52)." It is reported that the preliminary allotment
of production to the Badische Co.  in the Syndicate is three hundred thousand
tons per annum, which should leave a considerable exportable surplus.
This would constitute a formidable weapon in any price-cutting campaigns
entered upon by the I.G. in order to preserve her various monopolies.
We learn from the _Colour Trade Journal_ of August, 1920, that the
German Government has advanced something over ten million pounds
for the construction and operation of the Haber plant.

The New German Dye Combine.--Internal changes have accompanied
the development of these external relationships.  The interchange
of capital and directors between the different branches,
the use of all assets for a common purpose, and the pooling of
all profits effected in 1919, has brought about a closer union.
From the relatively loose pre-war combination held together by common
price interests, the organisation has passed through the cartel
to what is now practically a form of trust.  The German dye industry
is now a closely woven, almost homogeneous institution.  It has added
economic cohesion to technical efficiency, and is to-day the largest
technically efficient potential instrument of war in the world.
We have thus revealed the existence, and indicated the nature,
of the resultant activities of the chemical policy guiding
the pre-war German combination of organic chemical or dye producers.
Further, it is seen how the war stimulated and sealed closer relationships
between the constituent firms, and between the resultant organisation,
the I.G., and the German Government.  Continuing, we find the above
tendencies intensified since the Armistice, from unmistakable signs
briefly referred to above.

Aggressive Nationalistic Policy.--Both in peace and war,
the combination of interests, known as the I.G., has successfully
pursued an intensely nationalistic and aggressive chemical policy.
We might ignore what some have regarded as the sinister side
of the I.G. activities, considering the whole as a wonderful
monument to German science, thoroughness and patriotism,
which it undoubtedly is in many respects.  But the significance
to the Allies and associated countries remains the same.
Even without any thought or intention on the part of present day
Germany to use this thing for war, it remains a serious menace.
But the direct evidence which we possess does not actually
support such a peaceful view.  Her press confidently prophesies
the resumption of the pre-war German monopoly, reassuring its
readers by careful analysis of the causes of the eventful failure
to establish organic chemical industries in Allied countries.

Are we to yield in this field of economic war?  If so, then one
of the chief lessons of the Great War will remain unheeded,
and the future cannot fall to prove this to the hilt,
to our cost.



CHAPTER X

LINES OF FUTURE DEVELOPMENT


The Element of Speculation.--It is of considerable interest to Introduce
an element of speculation into our discussion of chemical warfare.
In glancing at future possibilities, we can adopt one of two courses,
follow up the clearly marked lines of recent development, or give
the imagination play within the whole field of scientific possibility.
The former course lies more within the scope of this book.

Chemical Tactics and Strategy.--Two basic military conceptions come
to our assistance in attempting to characterise types of chemical
warfare development.  With a little explanation it is possible
to place this or that method in the tactical or strategic class.
Any new chemical warfare development capable, under a given
system of individual protection, of successfully attacking
the hitherto protected individual, may be termed strategic.
The method may be aimed at a protected or hitherto immune human function,
but if it overcomes protection it is then capable of effecting
strategic results by its use on a sufficiently large scale.
Thus we regard the first introduction of cloud gas by Germany,
or their use of mustard gas, as examples of strategic chemical
warfare moves.  Any fundamental discovery of this sort,
applicable to chemical warfare, is capable of strategic effects.
Used only on a small scale, however, these possibilities may be
lost and tactical advantages may alone accrue.

The tactical type of chemical warfare method involves the use
of some new or old war chemical device in achieving a tactical
objective which may, itself, form part of a larger scheme with
strategic significance.  Examples were plentiful during the recent war.
We may refer to the use of smoke, of gas shell for neutralisation,
or of cloud gas as preparation for a local infantry advance.

The same classification can be applied to the protective
as to the offensive side of chemical warfare.  The equipment
of an army of millions with a gas mask has a strategic value,
if it counters the large-scale use of gas by the enemy.
The mere fact of this protection may serve the same purpose
as a violent resistance to a huge enemy attack.  It may render
the attack, and, therefore, the resistance, out of the question.
By permitting the individual soldier to retain the efficient use
of his weapons in gas, the mask, or other form of individual
protection, may render a costly counter-attack unnecessary.
In this way protective methods in chemical warfare may be the
determining factor in some strategic campaign or tactical activity.
The distinction between tactics and strategy in chemical
warfare cannot be made by grouping substances, or their methods
of application to war, any more than one can say that certain
infantry or artillery formations or weapons have a purely
strategic or tactical function.  The distinction lies rather
in the magnitude and incidence of use of the chemical appliance
on the battle-field, while depending on its novel nature.
A new substance, possessing potential strategic value,
may be wasted, and its surprise effect lost, in some local affair.
This applies to the use of mustard gas by the Germans and to our
own use of the Livens projector.  Our armies were surprised
and our plans modified by the German use of mustard gas at
Ypres and Nieuport.  We were not clear where this new thing
was tending.  Think of its strategic and psychological value
had it been used on a scale and front twenty times larger.
Leaving the chemical field, we can say that the first British
use of the tank provided another example.

New War Chemicals.--The question of entirely new war
chemicals is of general interest.  The first main group
of substances with which we were faced during the war
contained such types as chlorine and phosgene, whose chief
line of attack was directed towards the respiratory system.
Specific protection rapidly developed and, once obtained,
led to violent attempts to penetrate it or "break it down."
In other words, the attempts to penetrate the mask by using higher
concentrations of phosgene were analogous, from our point of view,
to similar attempts by the use of an entirely new substance aimed
again at the respiratory system.  The introduction of mustard
gas confirmed, what the use of lachrymators had suggested,
that the most fruitful line would be found by attacking human
functions hitherto immune.  First the lungs, then the eyes,
then the skin of the human being came under fire, so to speak.
What further developments appear possible on these lines?
Assuming that means are found to protect satisfactorily
the respiratory system, and the eyes, what other vulnerable
points can the war chemical find in the human organism?
Some more specific vesicant, some modification of mustard gas,
might arise, limited in attack to certain portions of the human being.
The Germans were already at work on these lines.

"Camouflage" Chemicals.--It is by no means visionary to picture
the loss of the sense of taste and smell by the use of some chemical.
Partially successful efforts were made by both sides during
the war to mask the odour of the harmful constituent of a shell
filling by introducing an appropriate "camouflage" compound.
Whole series of chemicals were examined from this point of view
by the American field laboratory at Puteaux near Paris.  The step
from specific camouflage compounds to a single general type
is by no means unbridgeable in theory.

An insight into work of this kind has been given by Colonel R. F. Bacon
of the American Chemical Warfare Service.  He says:
"The gas-camouflage is of particular interest.  It has been found
that malodorous compounds (butyl mercaptan, dimethyl tricarbonate,
etc.), are useful to mask the presence of other `gases' or to force
the enemy to wear respirators when no other `gases' are present.
As in the case of lachrymators, such `stink gases' must frequently
be accompanied by other `gases,' in order that the enemy may never
know when toxic gases are actually absent.  Camouflage gases are also
useful in that they save `mustard gas' and the highly lethal gases.
Their value has been demonstrated in trials at Hanlon Field and also
at the front."  The use of such compounds has an obvious value.
By removing the possibility of detecting the dangerous chemical,
they enforce the permanent use of the protective appliance or encourage
a fatal carelessness in the individual soldier.

Functions Hitherto Immune.--In this field of chemical attack upon
hitherto immune human functions, it is particularly easy to class
suggestions as visionary and to be wise only after the event.
But it must be borne in mind that any nation in a position
to effect such a surprise would be in a commanding position.
It is believed, for example, that the human being maintains his
equilibrium through the proper functioning of the semi-circular canals,
organs situated behind the inner ear.  It does not appear possible
to attain them chemically directly, but they might be reached
by the absorption of some suitable chemical into the system in
the very small concentrations now possible on the field of battle.
We doubt whether any physiologist would go further than to say
that such a mode of attack is improbable in the near future.
No qualified person would class it as impossible.
It has been advanced that the control of equilibrium occurs
through the movement of certain hairs through a liquid
within these canals.  If this be so, then one would simply
require to solidify or change the viscosity of this liquid.
Would this be difficult?  Probably not, for most of the body
fluids are of that colloidal nature in which coagulation
occurs in the presence of small quantities of special agents.
Such a result might cause the individual to lose his equilibrium.
This would prohibit all organised movement.  An army thus
attained would be less mobile than a colony of cripples.

Picture for a moment such a battle as the great German attack of March,
1918--millions of men urged forward from fixed positions under highly
centralised control--they advance, say, two or three miles beyond this
control and are largely dependent on local initiative for the attack.
They then enter clouds of shell chemical and in less than fifteen minutes
a fair percentage becomes incapable of advancing in a fixed direction,
of obeying local orders, or of anything more than a sort of drunken movement.
By this time their supporting artillery would have been identified
and attained, and the whole attack reduced to almost farcical conditions.
Such a compound may never develop, but who will class it as beyond
the realm of eventual possibility?

Every one is acquainted with the peculiar effects produced by
various anaesthetics.  The emergency uses to which they are put and
our personal acquaintance with them may have dulled the imagination.
Think for a moment of the possibilities which they unfold.
Gaseous anaesthetics, in certain concentrations, produce
temporary unconsciousness, other anaesthetics, so called local,
produce absolute immobility without loss of consciousness.
Chloroform and ether are common forms of the first type, but they
are required in such concentrations as to render their battle
use impracticable.  But the second type, of which stovaine,
the new synthetic drug, is a good example, produces its effects
in very small concentration.  A few drops injected into the spinal
column are sufficient to prevent all movement for a number of hours.
We cannot expect to obtain the conditions of the operating table
on the battle-field, but chemicals which are effective in very
small quantities or concentrations may find another channel into
the human system.  For this reason the development of the mask,
the protection of the respiratory channels, is of great importance,
for it blocks the way to substances which by mere absorption
might produce valuable military results.

Chemical Constitution and Physiological Action.--It is impossible
to adopt a more than speculative outlook in this field.
So little is known regarding the relationships between chemical
constitution and physiological action and very few sound generalisations
have been made.  A considerable amount of scientific work occurred
on these lines in various countries before the war on the connection
between the chemical nature of compounds and their taste and smell,
but the relationships are still obscure.

Unsolved Problems of Mustard Gas.--The use of a chemical
which attacks some unexpected human function introduces many
disturbing and disorganising factors.  Thus the introduction
of mustard gas has left us with a number of unsolved problems.
By employing this substance Germany departed from her usual caution
and violated one of the first principles of chemical warfare.
It is unsound for any nation to introduce a new weapon,
unless that nation is, itself, furnished with the means
of protection against its eventual employment by the enemy.
The Germans have, themselves, explained this breach of
the principles of war.  They were convinced that we could not
retaliate with mustard gas, because we could not produce it.
It was a miscalculation but based on grounds of which they
were sure, having been largely instrumental in determining them
through their aggressive chemical policy.

Mustard gas attacks the respiratory system and the outer skin of man.
The armies were efficiently protected against the first line of attack,
but they never developed efficient protection against the second.
Protection of the skin of the individual soldier against
mustard gas was theoretically possible in three ways.
In the first place a number of chemical solutions were devised which,
applied to the affected skin, would destroy the poisonous chemical.
This was a bad method, and was never efficiently employed.
German army orders after the French introduction of mustard gas were
bristling with references to chloride of lime or bleaching powder.
It was to be kept in every conceivable place where the gas was
likely to penetrate.  Soldiers were provided with boxes of bleach
called "Gelbolin."  Permanganate of potash was carried as an alternative
for a brief period.  A wire from the Third German Army to the
War Ministry, Berlin, dated 17th July, 1918, stated:  "Chloride of lime
has all been issued in boxes to the troops.  Reserves exhausted."
One had the impression of a drowning man catching at a straw.
Supply on a sufficient scale to cover most cases was practically impossible.
Each soldier would have to carry the protective chemical as part
of his equipment, and its proper use depended on training.
There was no time to identify and assemble the thousands of affected cases
for central treatment.  Mustard gas penetrated thick clothing, even boots.
and was often only identified hours after the damage was done.
The second method which was attempted on a large scale was the protection
of each soldier by special mustard-gas-proof clothing, but a man,
fighting for his life on the battle-field, will not tolerate such
a handicap to movement, and, although hundreds of thousands of oiled
suits were prepared and were of definite use in certain special cases,
for example in certain artillery formations, yet the method
must be rejected as unsuitable from a military point of view.
The third solution, which was tried experimentally on a large scale,
was to cover soldiers going into action with a cream or paste of
protective chemical.  This, again, could only be applied in special cases,
prior to an assault, for example, and could not be regarded as a
permanent form of protection.

As we have seen, mustard gas infected whole areas for many days, owing to its
great persistency.  It was often necessary to cross such zones for attack
or counter-attack. How was this to be effected without huge losses?
It was found possible, literally by creating roads of bleach, that is,
by sprinkling bleaching powder on chosen lanes through the infected area,
to pass columns of troops through such areas, but this cannot be viewed
as a practicable solution.  Carried to its logical conclusion, it would
have taxed the possibilities of supply beyond their utmost capacity.
Here, then, we have a case in which it is not possible to protect a soldier
by some specific appliance, and the war found us embarking on schemes
of protection by the use of chemicals in quantities which threatened
to carry us out of the range of possible manufacture.

A New Type of Obstacle.--Chemical warfare has introduced a new type
of strategic and tactical obstacle.  Mediaeval methods of war relied
largely on natural and man-built barriers.  Rivers, moats, forts were,
and still are, to a certain extent, critical factors in war.
The conceptions of a Vauban could determine the issue of a campaign.
Such obstacles were only effective, however, when properly manned and armed.
The Hindenburg Line and the Canal du Nord were tremendous obstacles when
backed by German artillery, rifles, and machine-guns, but, without the latter,
they would have been mere inconveniences for the passage of an army.
The massing of a multitude of guns, used for the first time during
the recent war, produced another form of temporary obstacle, but troops
could be trained to, and actually did, advance through the barrage.
Further, the ultimate limits of supply and the use of counter artillery
introduces time and quantitative limitations to the use of the really
intensive barrage.  Chemical warfare, however, has introduced a method
of blocking out chosen areas of the battle-field in such a way as to
prevent their effective use for military defence, communications,
or other purposes.  It is now possible, by chemical means, to give
a normal piece of country the same value as a natural obstacle,
or one organised for defence by formidable engineering construction,
and manned by rifles and machine-guns. This can be achieved by the use
of a highly persistent dangerous gas or war chemical of which, so far,
mustard gas is the most effective example.  We have seen how the Germans
formed defensive flanks during their March, 1918, offensive, by spraying
certain areas between their fronts of attack with mustard gas.
It is true that, in the quantities in which it has, so far, been used,
mustard gas has not converted open areas into absolute obstacles against
the movement of a determined individual, platoon, or even larger unit.
But even in the quantities which have already appeared on the battle-field,
it has rendered whole zones practically unusable for huge masses of men,
owing to the certainty of a very high percentage of casualties.
Up to the present its value has been rather as a serious factor in Staff
consideration of losses than as an actual physical barrier.  Many of
the casualties are only incurred a few hours after contact with the gas.
This may not deter a man from crossing an affected zone, but it may deter
the Staffs from using that zone, when they realise that this would imply
the certainty of many thousands of casualties amongst the troops.
The choice is between two evils, tactical acquiescence to the enemy's plan,
blocking out a certain area, or the certainty of huge casualties.
A very interesting case occurred in the German attack near Mt.  Kemmel in
the spring of 1918, where large quantities of German mustard gas were
used some distance in front of the original line of German attack.
In this case, not only was it clear that the Germans would not attempt
to advance beyond a limited objective (and they did not), but the development
of their attack left them organising their defences behind their own
mustard gas barrage.

The "Persistent Lethal" Substance.--The importance of these
considerations can hardly be exaggerated when we realise that,
at any time, a substance possessing the same strategic value as mustard
gas, but much more violent casualty effects, may be discovered.
The Germans were certainly aware of these possibilities.
According to the statement of an apparently reliable prisoner
of the 30th R.I.R., July, 1918, the Regimental Gas Officer
stated in a lecture that, as the Allies had used a new gas,
the Germans were going to employ a "White Cross" gas shell.
This gas was "stronger" than any of the gases at present
in use; it possessed a persistence up to eight days,
and could, therefore, not be used on the front for an assault.
Its persistence was favoured by damp or misty weather
and by the nature of the ground.  Neither the German drum
nor the masks of the Allies afforded protection against it.
The last important German development consisted in the use
of pumice impregnated with phosgene in their Livens bombs.
It was clear that the Germans were attempting to produce
a gas which was not only highly lethal but persistent.
Following up this idea, we can forecast the use of a chemical
which will not only permit the formation of defensive flanks,
or pockets, in the enemy front, or in our own defensive positions,
through their influence on Staff considerations with regard
to casualties, but, by replacing the relatively mild casualty effect
of mustard gas by a highly and rapidly lethal effect, will render
these areas not only strategically, but physically, impassable.
One of the most significant possibilities in chemical warfare
development is the arrival of this type of the compound,
the highly lethal, highly persistent chemical.

The Critical Range.--These considerations are very interesting
from the military point of view.  Consider the phenomenal
amount of muscular energy required to organise any captured
stretch of territory against counter-attack. The type
of compound we have outlined is likely to change completely
the aspect of attack and counter-attack. The Somme battlefield,
for example, gave the impression of a series of defensive
positions organised by the one side or the other after attack
or counter-attack, in order to hold small gains of ground,
which were never intended to represent the final advance.
Successful progress from one trench system meant building another,
under the pounding of the enemy's artillery, and the deadly
fire of machine-guns, exposing, in this improvised system,
large numbers of troops, among which casualties constituted
a continuous drain upon eventual reserves.  The arrival
of the highly persistent lethal compound should provide
an effective substitute for this laborious constructional
protection in the shape of the persistent lethal barrage.
This will render immediate counter-attack and near machine-gun
fire very difficult.  Automatically, fewer men will be
needed to hold the advanced positions.  It is true that,
with the next attack, "kicking off" and assembly positions will
be required, for these can be much more efficiently developed
behind a deep chemical barrage and will demand the exposure
of fewer men where more time is available for preparation.
Such conditions, however, can only occur if one, side possesses
some distinct advantage with regard to surprise by,
or efficient protection against, the persistent lethal compound.
When both sides are equally matched in this respect, a duel
will arise in which the winner will be the one who can throw
the critical concentrations of chemical into a given area at
the greatest range.  This might be called the "critical range."
Herein lies the importance of the development of such weapons
as the Livens projector, and the Germans had certainly grasped
an important principle, when they used our own modified
weapon against us with a much greater range than our own.
If we admit the possibility of a persistent lethal compound,
this question of critical range assumes outstanding importance.

The New No-Man's-Land.--The recent war witnessed a rather sudden
adoption of trench warfare, during a period in which the artillery
strengths of both sides were relatively feeble, when compared with
the later stages of the war.  Accordingly, there arose very definite
lines of field fortifications, and strongly held trench systems,
separated from each other by a comparatively narrow No-Man's-Land, With
the development of the formidable artillery strengths of belligerents,
there was a tendency to form a much wider No-Man's-Land, and the front
line systems were lightly held, approximating, in many cases,
to an outpost line.

The discovery and mass production of a persistent lethal substance is
likely to convert No-Man's-Land into a permanently infected gas zone,
manned by special outposts of permanently protected troops.
Combined with the development of smoke, this may render unnecessary
the highly organised trench assembly systems of the recent war,
used before the assault, and, with the development of the tank
as a fast fighting machine, and for the transport of troops, one can
obtain a glimpse of the nature of the new attack and counter-attack.
A recent writer[1] has shown us the future tank carrying war into
the enemy's country and destroying his nerve centres by actually
reaching and paralysing the G.H.Q.s. of armies and smaller formations.
Such operations will have to occur through a wide zone of the new gas
and will necessitate the anti-gas tank.  Indeed, one of the most
important functions of the tank will be to carry the advance guard
of an army beyond the infected No-Man's-Land, and such an advance will
occur behind a series of smoke barrages created, in the first place,
by the artillery, and, later, by the advance of tanks themselves.


[1] _Tanks in the Great War_, Col. J. F. C. Fuller., D.S.O.


The "Alert Gas Zone."--The development of the "gas alert"
idea has definite interest for the future of chemical warfare.
It is well known how the development of gas shell and surprise gas shoots
by the Germans led to the necessity for "gas alert" conditions between
certain times and within certain distances of the front line.
The mask had to be worn in the so-called ready position, in order
that swift adjustment might be possible in case of surprise attack.
The summer of 1917 witnessed a great increase in gas shell activity.
This was reflected in important changes in the "gas alert" regulations.
In the autumn of that year all periods of readiness were abolished
and replaced by a constant state of readiness.  In the forward area
absolute readiness was required within two miles of the front line,
and special precautions were taken as far back as twelve miles.
That the Germans suffered under the same restraints is witnessed
by many captured documents.  In particular, a divisional order
taken in December, 1917, gave the gas danger zone as within
fifteen kilometres of the front line, and within this region
every one must carry a mask.  The alert position of the mask
was insisted upon within two kilometres of the front line.
By July the alert zone had increased in depth in both armies.
This tendency must have increased, had the war continued, for both
sides were employing gas in guns of larger calibres, and weapons
were being devised, such as the improved German Livens projector,
which gave high concentrations at much greater distances from
the front line, _i.e_. with greater critical ranges.

We have seen how the possible development of a persistent lethal compound
may produce an infected and wide No-Man's-Land. Imposed on this,
there will, no doubt, be "gas alert" conditions of great depths.
How do these conceptions work out for the war of movement?
It would appear that the possession of such a compound and the means of
producing and using it on a very large scale could determine the stationary
or open nature of warfare, if other forces were not too unequal.
A new military factor emerges, the artificial, permanent, unmanned obstacle,
which can be laid down at will on areas whose magnitude depends finally
on manufacturing capacity.  The germ of the idea appeared during
the war at Kemmel and in the various mustard gas barrages formed by
artillery or delayed mines used by the Germans in their great retreat.
The sudden development of such barriers will be equivalent in effect
to the creation of strong trench systems, but these could never result,
under war conditions, in time to approach the strategic flexibility
and importance of the persistent lethal infected barrier.

Gas and Aircraft.--The combination of gas and aircraft presents
the possibility of attaining strategic effects by chemical means.
Many rumours were afloat, towards the end of the war, regarding the use
of gas by enemy aircraft, and there was apprehension amongst
the civil populations, which has been reflected in numerous
public utterances.  Evidence on the matter is very scanty.
In July, 1917, the use of gas in aeroplane bombs by the Germans
was reported, but not confirmed.  Further reports in August
indicated the use of Blue Cross, owing to the sneezing effects
which were produced on those within reach of the air bomb.
In October, the evidence was more conclusive.  But the German
aeroplanes left no blind or dud shell, and, beyond the violent nasal
and sneezing effects of Blue Cross, evidence was again absent.
This report was very persistent, for, in July, 1918, there were
again rumours that Blue Cross bombs had been dropped on the British
near Ficheux.  The Air Forces of the different armies were,
perhaps, the last to feel the effects of the gas campaign,
but the pilots of low-flying aeroplanes in the 1918 offensive
were constantly crossing pockets of gas, and this, added to
the fact that the pilots were often compelled to land in gas,
led to their equipment with gas masks.  A respirator of special type
was taken from a German aviator in April, 1918, after the fighting
at Passchendaele.  But the war gave us no direct evidence
of the successful use of gas and war chemicals from aircraft.
This, however, is no criterion as to its eventual importance.
The Allies definitely refrained from employing the combination
until Germany should give them the start in what was regarded
as a new atrocity.  The main reason for their lack of development
on these lines was probably the fact that the most suitable
type of gas only developed during the later stages of the war,
when it was required exceedingly urgently on the front.
No really harmful persistent compound appeared before the advent
of mustard gas, and the dangerous non-persistent types,
such as phosgene, could not have been used with great success,
owing to the fact that very considerable quantities
would have been required to produce any serious effect.
Mustard gas, however, which could have haunted a city for days,
would not have been required in such large quantities.
But its more urgent need on the front, and the fact that soon
after it arrived the Germans were sending out feelers to see whether
the Allies would consider the cessation of chemical warfare,
were probably sufficient reasons to explain their failure to use
it from aeroplanes.

Another point must be raised in connection with the use of gas
from aircraft which has not yet received much attention.
We must remember that the use of projectiles from aircraft
over a city was a very different proposition from their use
over a battle-field. One of the advantages of gas over explosives
on the field of battle was its greater range of action.
It produced effects at longer distances from the point of impact,
but no such incentive existed for the use of gas from aeroplanes
over large cities.  Explosives, which might miss their
objective on the field of battle, could not do so in a city.
They were bound to hit something.  The load of the aeroplane
is always important, and the essential is to carry, weight
for weight, the material which will produce the most effect.
There is no doubt what this will he when the persistent lethal
compound arrives, and mustard gas would probably have been superior
to explosives for use by German aircraft on British cities.

Protective Development;--Individual Protection.--The question of protection
against chemical attack presents some knotty problems for the future.  Let us
glance at the broad lines of war development in this field and forecast their
future in a speculative way.  Protection developed along two main lines.
Individual protection covered the mask and any other protective appliance
used by the individual soldier, while the term collective protection was
applied to any method or appliance which afforded simultaneous protection
for a number of individuals.

In general, the former represented an attempt to purify the poisoned
air actually inspired by the soldier, whereas the latter was an
attempt to purify the atmosphere of a locality or to prevent its
initial poisoning.  How far can the individual form of protection
develop to meet the possibilities of the chemical attack?
It certainly seems to have countered satisfactorily all the war
attacks upon the respiratory system, although, as we have pointed out,
the Germans might have failed, had we been sufficiently prompt
in introducing our arsenic compounds.  But we have forecasted the use
of chemicals which may attack human functions hitherto immune.
For the sake of our argument, we can divide these into two classes,
those attained through the respiratory and digestive systems and
those attained through contact with some other part of the body.
The former can probably be satisfactorily met by developments
in the mask.  Even that does not appear certain, when we
remember the emphasis laid by Germany upon the possibility
of penetrating the mask by using a particulate cloud.
The last word has certainly not been spoken in the struggle
between the mask and the chemical attempting to penetrate it.
But both the introduction of mustard gas and general speculative
grounds justify us in concluding that attacks may materialise upon
other parts of the human organism, We cannot foresee the actual
point of attack and can, therefore, only view with assurance
some form of protection which covers the whole body.

Collective Protection.--All parties dabbled in such a form of protection,
but the French were the only ones to make a large-scale experiment
on the front.  It was not very successful, for the burden of these
oilskin suits was intolerable.  It may be that some successful form
of protection for the whole body will materialise, but on general
grounds we can assume that development will follow other lines.
What are the possibilities?  They all lie in the direction of
collective protection.  The individual cannot be satisfactorily
protected from the new gas and remain an efficient soldier.
We must, therefore, see whether it is not possible to protect numbers
of men by removing them from contact with the poisoned atmosphere.
A stationary form of such protection was used by all the armies,
but emphasised by the French, by the creation of a large number of enormous
underground chambers, some capable of holding more than a thousand men,
the entries to which were carefully protected by special filtering
devices to prevent the entry of the poisoned external atmosphere.
On the British front these enormous dug-outs, although not absent,
were largely replaced by the efficient gas-proof organisation
of the smaller dugouts.  The use of impregnated blankets for this
purpose must be well known to any who visited the front or took part
in hostilities.  But you cannot imprison a whole army in this way.
The value of these collective protective chambers depended on the fact
that a certain number of men were always on the alert in the defensive
systems outside and around the chambers, exposed to those gases
against which the latter chambers were devised.

In my opinion, the further intensive development of gas warfare,
such as would have accompanied, say, the doubling or quadrupling
of the German factory output, would have forced us into realising
the limit of this collective protection.  It would have compelled
us to immobilise, in these shelters, more men than was consistent
with the safety of the zone in question.  Undoubtedly, the future
of collective protection lies in some form which will leave
the soldier his combatant powers, in other words some mobile form.
This has already been forecasted by Colonel Fuller in his book on
_Tanks in the Great War_.  But he passes lightly over the protection
of the tank against gas.  With the increase in depth of infected zones,
through the increasingly lethal nature of the persistent compound,
the tank will he compelled to rely on filtration methods of protection,
instead of the use of compressed oxygen in a gas-tight compartment.
Once committed to the use of oxygen, the only safe procedure will
be to close up the tank and employ the oxygen while there is any
suspicion of the presence of gas, and, under these conditions,
oxygen transport would become a factor militating against
the prime purpose of the tank, the transport of troops and arms.
It is safe to forecast a tense struggle between chemical weapons
and protective tank devices in the event of future wars.

Conclusion.--The facts which we have surveyed in early chapters,
and the development foreshadowed above, form part of a much
wider subject, for they are but one aspect of scientific warfare.
In what main directions has science modified or revolutionised
modern war?  Its influence has touched practically every weapon
in manufacture or design, introducing profound modifications in
many cases.  The sum total of such changes may be claimed to have
revolutionised warfare, but the term revolution should be reserved,
for some more specific scientific innovation, which threatens to change
the nature of war rather than merely improve existing weapons.
Modern wars have all echoed the popular cry for some new scientific
principle or device to settle hostilities with one sharp stroke.
This conception has been the sport of writers of fiction
and others for many years.  The "electric" death-dealing ray,
the all-powerful gas, the deadly bacteria, and the "explosion"
wave have all shared in buoying up the hopes or quickening
the fears of warring peoples.  Contrary to popular supposition,
a decisive scientific military surprise of this nature is not likely
to follow close on the heels of the discovery of a new phenomenon.
It is more than eighty years since the mind of a Faraday delved
so fruitfully into electrical science, yet the oft prophesied
large scale direct use of high voltage electricity, or some
other form in war has not materialised.  Organic chemistry was
a well-founded branch of science early in the nineteenth century,
and flourishing industries, fostered by it, were in existence
thirty years ago, yet it was not until the early twentieth century,
and the recent war, that we witnessed the rapid growth of organic
chemical warfare, which, I claim, was as revolutionary as any
other war development.  The physical sciences, have left their
mark on every weapon and mechanical appliance, and the cumulative
effect of these changes is indeed large, but the most revolutionary
upheaval in warfare, with permanent results, came from chemistry.
The flexible nature of organic chemistry must not be lost sight of.
In the physical sciences, electricity, for example, years of
co-ordinated world progress are required to produce an epoch-making
discovery which might have critical and direct war significance.
Radioactivity has shown us what undreamt-of energy is bound up
in the atom, and many are the prophesies regarding the harnessing
of these forces for constructive activities.  At least one prominent
novelist has pictured their destructive use in the radioactive bomb.
But the use of this wonderful store of energy for peace and war
can only result from years of costly and voluminous research,
and we have no idea of the difficulties involved in production,
without which any invention, however telling and revolutionary,
has no incidence on war.  But in organic chemistry a single worker,
following up some rare family of compounds, may stumble
upon a substance pot far removed chemically from related
compounds yet infinitely more potent for war.  Mustard gas,
or B:B dichlordiethylsulphide, is a member of a group of compounds
differing only slightly in chemical structure the one from the other.
Yet its nearest chemical relative is comparatively harmless.
The persistent lethal compound which will vastly change the nature
of warfare will probably be but a slight chemical modification
of some harmless substance, Thus, by comparison with other
branches of science as the handmaids of war, organic chemistry
is sympathetic, flexible, and theoretically capable of yielding
revolutionary discoveries in a relatively short time.
We can only base such speculations on general grounds.
Circumstances may disprove our contention over a short historical period,
but it will be borne out in the long run.  This is not the only reason,
however, for the unique war importance of organic chemicals.
It so happens that many of them are essential to our daily life,
as dyes, drugs, photographic and other synthetic products.
Industries, therefore, have arisen for their manufacture.
And this is not all.  Organic chemical factories have proved to be
not only arsenals in disguise but endowed with the flexibility
of their parent, the science itself.  The factories and plants
ignore the war significance of the problems put to them.
They can develop the production of practically any chemical
which research can produce.  The will of man can thus silently
and swiftly convert the dye factory into an arsenal.

These inherent possibilities of organic chemistry, flexibility in research
and production, make chemical warfare the most important war problem
in the future reconstruction of the world.



CHAPTER XI

HUMANE OR INHUMANE?


A good deal of abuse has been showered on chemical warfare
methods by those who understand very little about them.
It has been claimed by such that gas is particularly atrocious.
Feeling on the matter has been so strong in certain
quarters that the fact that all war is particularly vile
and atrocious seems to have been completely lost sight of.
Let us take up this matter in a rational way.  In the first place,
what do we mean by the atrocity or inhumanity of a weapon?
We can either appeal to the imagination or the reason, in the
first case, by visualising the battlefields, or, in the second,
by making a cold analysis of the casualties caused by gas.

Nature of Gas Casualties.--Every normal person who experienced
and survived the throes of the different stages of the war,
and of the different gas surprises, mainly German, which were
sprung upon us, finds it difficult to think out, or express,
a cool and balanced view on the question of poison gas.
But such a balanced view is most important for the future.
It must be remembered that the official protests in 1915 arose
on the grounds, to use Lord Kitchener's words, that "they
employed these poisonous methods to prevail when their attack,
according to the rules of war, might have otherwise failed."
Had the rules of war permitted their use, we should, no doubt,
have been protected.  But these protests, submerged in popular
sentiment, became an outcry against the atrocity of the new weapon.
This, a just criticism at the time, became inaccurate
when the Allies reacted, methods of protection developed,
and the specific tactical uses of gas were realised.
The view of the peculiar atrocity of gas has outlived the truth
of war experience with regard to it.  We agree that chemical
warfare is atrocious.  But it is no exception, for thus are all
the aggressive methods of warfare.  Indeed, when we attempt
to interpret atrocity in terms of available casualty statistics,
we find that gas is slightly less atrocious than the other weapons.
We must either incline to this view or dispute the figures,
which are authoritative.  Consider the American figures.
These will he more truly representative than our own,
because their troops were only exposed during the later
and more developed phases of the war.  Of the total strength
of the A.E.F., the number gassed was about six per cent., wounded
by rifle and machine-gun fire about one per cent., wounded
by high explosive one and a half per cent., shrapnel wounds
three percent., and bayonet wounds less than one half per cent.
But although enemy gas caused more than 70,000 casualties, yet of
these only one and a half per cent.  were fatal, while the total
number of deaths for all types of casualties was thirty per cent.
Thus against the American army, measured by casualties produced,
gas was by far the most effective, and yet by far the least
deadly weapon.  What can be more atrocious than the actual cone
of tens or even hundreds of dead and wounded invariably left
before an untouched machine-gun emplacement in an assault?
What is more horrible than the captured first line trench after
its treatment by the preparatory bombardment, or the mutilation
of men peacefully sleeping in billets behind the battle front
and thrown, broken and bloody, through their billet walls
under the wheels of passing transport, as one has seen them?

The whole experience of real war is beyond adjectives.
But, leaving impressions, let us turn to facts.
With regard to the future and from the point of view of atrocity,
gas has a hopeful outlook as compared with other weapons.
This may seem a curious statement to make, but consider the following.
We cannot envisage advances in the use of explosives in shell or bomb
to render them more humane.  Explosives, if their development be pressed,
can only become more violent, with a wider range of action.
Chemical warfare may follow the same lines, but it has
the unique possibility of developing on more humane lines.
The vesicant action of mustard gas produced huge casualties with
relatively little permanent harm.  Chemicals may be found which
temporarily influence human functions, enabling military objectives
to be attained with a remarkably small amount of pain and death.
In a fair review of the whole situation, this possibility cannot
be overlooked.  It is more than possible that a League of Nations,
compelled to employ an element of force in its eventual control
of peace, may find its most effective and humane weapon in some
chemical development.  However visionary these views may appear,
they are not unjustified as scientific possibilities.
Analysis of war gas casualties reveal two main trends.
As the struggle became more intense the number of casualties multiplied.
They were considerable during the first period of cylinder attack,
and the rate remained steady until the beginning of the mustard
gas period.  From the summer of 1917 to November, 1918,
there were more than ten times as many gas casualties as for
the preceding three years of war.  But the percentage mortality,
the number of deaths amongst each hundred men attained,
decreased considerably.  As high as twenty-five per cent.
during the early cylinder attacks, it decreased to two and a
half per cent.  for the huge number of mustard gas cases.
Yet mustard gas was an exceedingly important military factor.
It illustrates the possibility of development on these lines,
but we must by no means disregard the atrocity of chemical warfare,
and safeguards are required for the future.

We cannot do better than conclude by quoting from General Hartley's
report to the British Association.  He says:


"The general impression that gas is an inhumane weapon is derived partly
from the German breach of faith in using it contrary to the Hague Convention,
and partly from the nature and number of casualties in the earliest cloud
attacks which were made against unprotected troops.  Under the stress of a
long war the individual is apt to forget the physical and mental sufferings
it involves, unless he is daily in contact with them, but a dramatic
occurrence such as that of the first gas attack forces on the imagination
the brutal significance of war--the struggle for victory by killing--and the
new weapon is judged as inhumane, like gunpowder in the fifteenth century.
If we accept war as a possibility, the most humane weapon is that which leads
to a decision with the smallest amount of human suffering and death.
Judged from this standpoint, gas compares favourably with other weapons during
the period when both sides were fully equipped for offence and defence.
The death-rate among gas casualties was much lower than that among casualties
from other causes, and not only was the death-rate lower, but a much
smaller proportion of the injured suffered any permanent disability.
There is no comparison between the permanent damage caused by gas,
and the suffering caused to those who were maimed and blinded by shell
and rifle fire.  It is now generally admitted that in the later stages
of the war many military objects could be attained with less suffering
by using gas than by any other means.

Sargent's Picture.--"The judgment of future generations on the use
of gas may well be influenced by the pathetic appeal of Sargent's
picture of the first `Mustard Gas' casualties at Ypres, but it must
not be forgotten in looking at that picture that 75 per cent.
of the blinded men he drew were fit for duty within three months,
and that had their limbs and nerves been shattered by the effects
of high explosive, their fate would have been infinitely worse."


Need for Safeguards.--We have continually referred to the need
for safeguards instead of mere reliance on prohibition.
Such views and facts as the above should be more generally
known in order that very worthy sentiments may not impel us
to adopt an unsound solution for future peace.  However alarmed
and revolted we may have been in 1915 and later during the war,
it is essential to take a balanced view in the present critical
period of reconstruction.



CHAPTER XII

CHEMICAL WARFARE AND DISARMAMENT


Preceding chapters have shown how chemical warfare has now
become a normal, technical, and increasingly important part
of the science of war.  Further, it has opened vast possibilities,
the limits of which it is very difficult to fix.

The Treaty of Versailles.--Chemical warfare received definite attention
in the formulation of the Treaty of Versailles.  Lord Moulton,
one of the few Allied representatives who realised the full importance of
the matter, has drawn attention to its Treaty aspect in a recent speech.
He lays emphasis on the fact that the full significance of the German
dye industry was not realised during the war.  Referring to its
chameleon-like nature in peace and war, Lord Moulton says:
"All this was imperfectly present to my mind throughout the war,
and I was aware of the gravity of the matter, but until I learnt
what had passed in Germany I could not appreciate it fully.
I have spoken to you of the extent to which the Germans turned
their chemical works into general works for supplying explosives.
I have not touched the part in which they played the most deadly
game against us, and that was where they used their chemical works
to produce those toxic gases."

The same statement tells us, "The knowledge that I have gleaned
as to what was going on in Germany during the war makes me
feel that all my anticipa-tions of the importance of chemical
industries in time of war, all the views that I expressed
of that importance, did not nearly approach what has been
proved to have gone on in the enemy's country during the war."
He then proceeds to explain how a clause was inserted in the
treaty--"whereby the Germans have to tell us all the secrets of their
manufacture of explosives, all their methods of making toxic gases--
in fact, all the military secrets that made them so terrible.
This clause was a very just one.  It is not fair that when we
have gone through this agonising struggle, and when we are still
suffering from the consequences of all the wealth of knowledge
and ingenuity which they employed for their infamous purposes--
it is not fair, I say, to allow them to keep these secrets
to themselves, and I think you will agree with me it was in the highest
degree consonant with justice that we should make them reveal
them all to us."  Small wonder that we missed this vital point,
that we failed to fathom the force behind the German chemical war,
if such an eminent authority was left groping for the truth.
There was no time for mature reflection with the problems
of war supply pressing forward in an endless stream.
Lord Moulton was himself responsible for the brilliant solution
of the most important, the problem of explosives supply.

The realisation of the facts in question led to the direct
admission of their importance in the Treaty.  Article 172,
the one in question, states:  "Within a period of three
months from the coming into force of the present Treaty,
the German Government will disclose . . . the nature and mode
of manufacture of all explosives, toxic substances or other
like chemical preparations used by them in the war, or prepared
by them for the purpose of being so used."

German Information.--This clause should be fulfilled in detail.
In any given period of the stage of intensive chemical warfare and at the end,
the Germans, in addition to those devices in operation, must have had
a large number of more telling and more novel ones in preparation.
It is important to get as much information as possible on this development.

A striking fact emerges.  The years 1915, 1916, and the early part
of 1917 witnessed the actual manufacture of the war chemicals which were
used by Germany on the front.  All the research and other work which
precedes chemical manufacture must have been completed much earlier.
What surprises, then, had the German laboratories in store for us after 1917?
Have these been revealed under authority of the Treaty?

Probably the most important point in the clause is its interpretation
with regard to the Haber process.  Its critical importance in
the manufacture of explosives is so great that our neglect to use
the Treaty to remove the monopoly is a direct menace to peace.
This process undoubtedly saved Germany in 1915 and is largely
responsible for the three years of war agony which followed.
It can only have missed specific reference in the Treaty on account of its
claim to represent the fertiliser rather than the explosives industry.
To yield to such views, however ideal the motives, is to threaten
the greater ideal of world peace.

Limitation of Armament.--This clause, covering only war development,
cannot be regarded as a serious safeguard for the future.
It is rather the fruits of victory, the logical outcome
of Allied success and the German breach of faith.
But the Treaty of Versailles contains an admission of the importance
of chemical warfare for the future.  Article 171 states:
"The use of asphyxiating, poisonous, or other gases and of
analogous liquids, materials, or devices being prohibited,
their manufacture and importation are strictly forbidden
in Germany.  The same applies to materials specially intended
for the manufacture, storage, and the use of the same products
or devices."  What kind of guarantee is this?  How far is it
supported by other disarmament?  It is very important to answer
these questions.  In a sense the full execution of the other
relevant Treaty clauses would provide a partial answer.
We deal with these in the next chapter.

Report of the Hartley Mission.--Chemical warfare is the _point
faible_ in world disarmament.  Judging from the above clause
of the Treaty, it is clear that this is not fully recognised.
Once again our trust is invited in mere prohibition.  The lesson
of the war is not learnt.  The chemical menace is not countered.
Why should this be?  There are two main reasons.  In the first place,
very few had any conception of the tremendous growth in this branch
of warfare, for facts had rarely been disclosed, and those with no
direct contact with chemical warfare were relying on impressions.
The vivid recollection of the first German cloud attack, and of
the introduction of mustard gas, have, for most people, obscured the
solid facts of the case.  The great importance of the projector,
the high percentage of chemical shell used by the enemy artillery,
and the tremendous undertaking involved in protecting an army
of millions with a modern gas mask, have not been grasped.
The Hartley report clearly revealed the importance of the German dye
factories for chemical warfare production.  But we have a shrewd
idea that it left many of its official readers much better informed
on production than on the use of the materials concerned, that is,
on the military value of chemical warfare.

New Conceptions in Chemical Disarmament.--The second
difficulty preventing a full understanding of the case lies
in the fact that chemical disarmament involves certain
conceptions which are remote from the normal military outlook.
Let us examine the matter as simply as possible.

During the many discussions on disarmament in Paris, various principles
were suggested as a basis.  One which received recognition
in the Treaty was the limitation of the number of projectors
or guns, using the term "projector" in a general way to cover
all projectile-throwing weapons.  Thus, in the sense implied,
rifles, machine-guns, field and heavy guns are projectors.
Recent writers have termed gas a projectile, one which,
on account of its fluid nature, ignores the limitations of explosive
shell and multiplies their radius of action indefinitely.
This is true--with one most important qualification.
Gas has never entirely depended upon the usual form of projector,
the gun, and with the limitation of the latter its dependence
will decrease.  New forms of chemical weapon will evolve.
Now it is true that almost every form of warfare which one
can conceive depends for success on some sort of projector,
and it is also true that the manufacture of these projectors
can be controlled, because it is usually so complicated.
These remarks apply, for example, to the manufacture of a
field or heavy gun.  But there is one serious exception
to the covering power of this method of limitation.
You cannot carry on tank warfare without ordinary projectors,
but you can run a chemical campaign without them.

Facing the difficulties which are before any League of Nations
or international body planning world disarmament, let us assume
armament reduced to a police basis.  In other words, the use
of force is not entirely ruled out, but is limited to the minimum
required for reducing local disorder, maintaining the peace,
and contributing to any general scheme for preventing war.
The nations, then, agree to limit their personnel and material
within certain prescribed bounds.  The work of the League
of Nations, or central organisation, does not finish here.
We cannot assume that permanent purity of national intentions,
in other words, some check or guarantee must be instituted.  This may
take the simple form of systematic reporting by nations and their
inspection by the League.  Here we meet with considerable difficulty.
Unless some simple covering principle for inspection can
be determined upon, we shall end up with one-half the world
inspecting the administration and organisation of the other.
The matter becomes an absurdity.

Limitation, Mechanical and Chemical.--Considering the present
trend of war development, we can divide the factors requiring
limitation into three classes--the combatants, and weapons
of a mechanical and chemical nature.

Tank Disarmament.--A little thought will show that the limitation
of the number of projectile-throwing weapons covers the first two types,
and is a matter which is not theoretically beyond the possibility
of inspection.  Periodic inspection could reasonably be regarded as a check
against very big scale production beyond the normal scope of industry,
for such weapons as rifles, machine-guns, field and heavy guns.
If we consider the most important new mechanical war appliance, the tank,
we find it no exception to the above remarks.  Without projectors, that is,
machine-guns, rifles, etc., it merely becomes a means of conveying troops
and material from one place to another.

Two possibilities then arise.  The number of tanks required
might be so small that they could be suitably armed with light
projectors without entering upon large-scale production.
Secondly, the tank might become an offensive weapon
without projectors, by the use of some chemical contrivance.
This merely goes to prove that steps must be taken to limit
the output of the tank itself.  Are such steps possible?
We assume that the modern tank is, and will increasingly become,
a weapon practically as specific as a big gun, requiring a number
of special parts which normal industry does not provide,
and that the production concerned can be controlled by inspection
with the same order of difficulty as that of the bigger projectors.
We now come to the third type requiring limitation under
a disarmament scheme.

Chemical Limitation.--Can we limit chemical armament?
Our review of production has shown the impossibility of doing so,
unless we completely wipe out the organic chemical industry
which is essential for world progress by its contribution
of dyes, drugs, and other synthetic commodities.  The factories
of the organic chemical industries are more silently converted
into arsenals than any other type.  It is true that, under normal
conditions of warfare, the decisive success of a chemical campaign
might be restricted by the use of other weapons, such as artillery.
But, under conditions where the latter are seriously limited,
the chemical weapon becomes, relatively, of much greater importance.
One of the main trends in chemical warfare was the development
of devices which would give long-range chemical effects without
a complicated form of projector, or with none at all.  Having thus
shown the independence of the chemical weapon, under conditions
of limitation of armament, we are faced with an important question.
What can be the guarantees for the limitation of chemical warfare?

Research.--In the first place, can any research results accrue under
Treaty or League conditions?  The chief poison gases used during
the war owed their discovery, as individuals, to pre-war research
which was not stimulated by the need for an offensive chemical.
Phosgene was discovered in 1811 by J. Davy, while experimenting on
the action of sunlight on a mixture of carbon monoxide and chlorine.
Guthrie, in 1860, trying to throw light on some theoretical aspects
of organic chemistry, examining the nature of certain so-called
radicles or groups of atoms, came across a family of compounds
of which mustard gas, or B:B dichlordiethylsulphide, was a member.
This he found to be a dangerous substance, but the nearest members
of the series were harmless.

These substances will arise as a result of normal chemical research.
We admit they may multiply much more quickly if work is specially
directed towards their discovery, but it is practically
impossible to control such work.  The research worker's nearest
confidante and laboratory companion might be unaware that he was
developing some new vitally important chemical for warfare.
No serious person can claim the possibility of a check upon
such research.  If, then, the Government of any country desires
to provide its chemical factories with suitable subjects for
chemical warfare production, these can be produced under ANY
international arrangements, however prohibitive.

Production.--But what of production?  Here, again, we have an entirely
different problem compared with that of limiting the output of a gun.
Let us assume that the production of some vitally important new
organic compound involves four different steps, and that the last
step produces the toxic substance.  This is a fair assumption.
Let us further assume the most favourable condition for detection,
_i.e_. {t}he final product is a liquid or gas with obviously
toxic properties.  Given a big organic chemical industry,
there is no possibility of detection by open methods of control.
With regard to the first three steps, in practically every case they
will be related to some new or existing dye, drug, photographic, or other
commercial organic product.  The products of these first reactions can
either be stored, ready for the rapid realisation of the last reaction,
in which case there is no possibility of detection, or the reaction
can be completed and the materials passed without exposure through
a standard type of plant to an easily concealed container.
The only type of inspection which could possibly cope with such a
problem would require to probe deeply into the technical and commercial
secrets of the factories and plants, and could even then be misled
owing to the constantly developing nature of the compounds produced.
The inspectors would require to be numerous and as closely in touch
with the plants and processes as the actual factory staffs.

Consider the Leverkusen works for a moment.  They cover a very wide
range of products, are admirably planned on a well thought out and
rational scheme, and there is a reason for the position of every unit.
Their methodical arrangement would be of more assistance
to inspection in this than in any other large organic chemical
works with which we are acquainted.  Even under such favourable
conditions satisfactory inspection would be most difficult.
Each one of the twenty huge blocks contains many units of plant,
and is devoted to the production of primary, intermediate or
finished materials.  For the inspection of suspected poison
gas production, an examination of the first two would be of
no assistance, for the war and peace materials would be identical.
Differentiation would occur in the dye and finished product blocks.
Each one of these blocks may be producing as many as one hundred
different compounds at the same time, and each one of these
compounds may, itself, involve two, three, or four different stages.
The members of one official mission, when asking to be shown
the plant for the manufacture of _p_-amidophenol, an important
dye and photographic chemical, were taken to a large building
filled with assorted plant, and were told by the guides,
"We have no special plant for the product you mention;
we make it in this building with a great many other products,
for it is our principle not to have plant which makes one
product only, but is readily adaptable for making a variety."
In many of the processes the materials do not appear to the naked
eye after their introduction into the first plant unit, being fed
by gravity or pressure from one enclosed apparatus to another.
It would be absolutely essential for any inspection to conduct
chemical tests at the different stages.  The difficulty of inspection
is incontestable.  It could be done with a large staff, but we
must remember that the Rhine plants are, themselves, but a small
corner of the whole world of industry requiring inspection.
Even under the most favourable conditions for detection,
the chances are exceedingly small.  But, in most cases, an enemy
with a strong organic chemical industry need not undertake
manufacture during peace.  He could rely on the potentialities
of his chemical industry, which would enable him to commence
production in his existing plant immediately on the outbreak of war.
The question of the use of the chemical then arises.
If of an exceedingly novel and decisive nature, it could take
its share of use in the limited number of guns available;
on the other hand, it might be capable of use in one of the very
simple weapons already devised for chemicals, or to be devised
in the future.

Consider the Livens projector, by no means a favourable case.
The latest German designs have a range well over a mile.
This range maybe increased.  Yet the Livens projector can
be made without serious or obvious war modification of plant,
in a tube works, where the bomb can also be produced.
The very nature of chemical warfare is such that great accuracy
is not required, and simplification of production of the gas
projector follows naturally.  We conclude from the above that
whatever treaty or international arrangements exist for prohibiting
chemical warfare, we can find no safeguard in practicable methods
of control, and must find safety in some other measure.

Mechanical and Chemical Preparations for War.--There is a fundamental
difference in preparation for the mechanical and chemical methods of war.
This difference necessitates special consideration for the chemical method
from the point of view of disarmament.  All the modern mechanical types
of war appliances are characterised by their great structural intricacy,
witness the Lewis gun with its innumerable complicated parts,
the heavy and field guns with their wonderful mechanism, and the future
tank with its anti-gas, anti-water, and general anti devices.
This characteristic of great structural development has certain
concomitants which are of considerable military importance.
It imposes certain conditions on production, involving special factories
for special parts and other factories for the assembly of those parts.
It implies large scale experimentation for the improvement of the appliance.
All this brings control and inspection within the region of the
theoretically possible, and militates against sudden surprise.
The structural characteristic also imposes certain important conditions
in military training.  It takes a definite period of time to create
a machine-gunner who will humour the wonderful mechanism which he serves.
He must know the different jambs, and simple repairs.  He must be trained.
The same remarks apply to any other structurally intricate appliance,
such as the tank.  In other words, this characteristic is a distinct check
on any nation aiming at a sudden expansion from limited to war armament.

But consider the chemical method.  The specific property
of the chemical which gives it its military value is ultimately
its influence on the human organism, which causes casualties
or imposes heavy military handicaps on protected troops.
There is, again, a question of structure, the chemical
structure of the substance in question.  This, however,
does not involve the same aids to armament limitation as for
the mechanical type, unless it be in a very restricted sense.
In research, the discovery of the most effective chemical
the world will ever see can occur by the use of a few beakers,
pots and pans, and common chemicals, directed by a trained mind.
Being atomic or molecular, the structure imposes no large scale
conditions on the research.  Nor is it fair to say that from
the point of view of production there is a parallel between
the complexity of the molecule and the plant required to make it.
The chemically complicated Blue Cross arsenic compounds were
produced by Germany in a plant which was simplicity itself
when compared with the marvellous installation developed
to produce oleum, a concentrated form of the relatively simple
sulphuric acid, a fundamental substance in explosives production.
Instead of manipulating a huge lathe, or forge, or exceedingly
complicated multiple mechanical device, you manipulate
temperatures and pressures and vary the reaction medium.
Naturally, chemical engineering is very important,
but its magnitude and complexity is in no sense parallel
with the intricacy of the chemical molecule, whereas a
distinct parallel exists for the mechanical war appliance.
More than this, we believe that developments in both fields
will exaggerate rather than diminish the difference.
We see thus how, on general grounds, the chemical weapon tends
to evade any normal condition of limitation which might be
perfectly adequate for the mechanical type.

Recent Disarmament Proposals.--A superficial examination of recent
disarmament speeches by prominent League of Nations advocates leaves
one with the glow of inspiration produced by homage to a great ideal.
But later reflection, in the cold light of reason, produces a critical,
but not cynical, frame of mind.  Disarmament depends for success on
the way in which we tackle certain critical cases, The carrying out
of the more commonly considered forms of disarmament will give immensely
added importance to other forms of warfare which have already challenged
supremacy in the keen competitive atmosphere of the great world war.
The outstanding example is the chemical arm, whose peculiar requirements
in any scheme of disarmament have been but vaguely understood.

The great case and rapidity with which the German dye
factories mobilised for poison gas production on a
super-industrial scale has already been demonstrated.
It took forty years and more to develop those factories.
Yet forty days saw many of their plants producing huge tonnages
of poison gas, and as many hours were sufficient for others.
In some cases, indeed, they were already producing eventual
munitions long before the outbreak of war.  We must not remain
insensible to the double-edged nature of this industrial weapon.
When with one hand Germany withdrew life-giving drugs from America,
with the other she poured upon us an endless stream of deadly poison
made in the same factories.  Even when our textile industries
were threatened through lack of indigo, from the very plants on
which we had depended there issued a steady stream of mustard gas,
each ounce of which threatened Allied limb and life.
But how does this touch disarmament?  Very simply.
A few quotations from some recently published disarmament utterances
will show that we are not pressing the point without need.
But let us follow the matter through in a logical way.

The Covenant of the League;--Need for Guarantees.--We start from
the sure ground of the Covenant of the League of Nations.  Article 8,
recognising the reduction of armaments to the lowest point
consistent with national safety, refers to the formulation
and revision of plans for such reduction and states:
"The members of the League undertake to interchange full
and frank information as to the scale of their armaments,
their military and naval programmes, and the conditions of such
of their industries as are adaptable to warlike purposes."
Here is the frank admission of the importance of such industries.
But later exponents of the League express dissatisfaction
with Article 8, claiming the wording to be vague.  Thus, from
Major David Davies, M.P.,[1] "The whole wording of Article 8 is vague.
These proposals would not eradicate the old atmosphere of suspicion
which has brought about so many wars.  Nations who put their
trust in the League are entitled to an assurance that the League
will be able to enforce its decisions with promptitude.
The proposals concerning armaments in Article 8 and elsewhere
do not give this assurance.  Something more definite is required,"
and he proceeds to lay down three aims which must be covered
by an efficient disarmament scheme.

[1] _The Flaw in the Covenant and the Remedy_.  Major David Davies, M.P.


"(_a_) Allow each nation an army sufficient to maintain internal
order within its own boundaries, and sufficient also to furnish
its quota for the League of Nations when required.

"(_b_) Ensure that the quota of any nation shall not be rendered useless
by the employment of a new weapon of war by another nation.

"(_c_) Provide the League of Nations with an adequate force
for immediate use.


"All the above essentials are incorporated in a scheme for an
International Police Force.  This scheme, which is given in
the merest outline, is based on the assumption that our national
security must always be absolutely safeguarded, and that before
we decide on any relaxation of our armament policy we must
be certain that the alternative offers complete protection."
Other exponents emphasise this last essential.  This reference
to an International Police Force raises an important issue.
Such a force must draw its personnel from the different nations.
Without any doubt, one of the most important contributions from
the nations is the fostering of organic chemical research and
technical cadres which can only be maintained under true disarmament
conditions by the redistributed organic chemical industries.

Viscount Grey--"Germany Must Disarm First."--Viscount Grey,
at the public meeting in support of the League of Free Nations
on October 10th, 1918, stated:  "Germany must disarm first.
She led the way up the hill in increasing expenditure on armaments.
She must lead the way down the hill.  That as a first condition,
from our point of view, goes without saying.  There can be no talk
of disarmament until Germany, as the greater armer, is disarmed."
One can only heartily agree with such expressions, but the
_denouement_ brings a sense of disappointment.  There is a feeling
that those who should be nearest are but groping for a solution.
The peculiar significance of chemical warfare for the future is freely
admitted in these utterances.  Thus Major David Davies states:
"If they had kept their intentions secret until they could utilise
a thoroughly deadly gas in the general attack, it was more than
possible that they would have completely broken the Allied line,"
and Lord Grey, "You cannot limit the amount of merchant
ships or commercial aeroplanes, and the fewer the armaments,
fighting aeroplanes, and ships of war, the more potential as weapons
of war become the things which you use in commerce-ships, aeroplanes,
chemicals of all kinds."

Left in this state the case is true but not complete.
The essential point is that the new and telling types
of armament will develop from these very peace industries.
We are not merely concerned with their relative magnitude
in a state of disarmament, but with the critical types which may
develop from them.

So far, so good, but what steps are proposed to counter the menace?
In reviewing what has been suggested by different responsible individuals,
we find that the methods intended to cover armament limitation for the newer
weapons fall into two classes.

Suggested Methods.--In the first place, it is suggested "that war's
newest weapons--poison gas, aeroplanes, submarines, heavy artillery,
and tanks, should be ceded to the League to form the _Headquarter's Force_,
and that no state should be allowed to own them or to make use of any
new invention for warlike purposes.

"There should be no delay in handing over the new arms before they can
claim long traditions.  Vested interests have not yet been created on
a permanent footing.  Great disturbance would not be caused at present
by the suggestion of denationalisation."

This really claims the advisability of verbal prohibition, which is
absolutely useless, unless supported by the second class of safeguard,
periodic "inspection."  Major Davies suggests "all arsenals and
munition factories would be open to inspection by the General Staff,
who would use them, when necessary, for arming the quota of a
nation other than that in whose territory they were situated."
We know of no practical method by which inspection could be relied upon
to give satisfactory warning of the conversion of the plants of the I.G.
for war purposes.  A distinction must be made between those weapons whose
production can and cannot be practically controlled by inspection.
In attempting such a classification, Major Davies claims, "It is
difficult to prevent the secret manufacture of rifles, but it is easy
to prevent the manufacture of tanks, aeroplanes, gas, or submarines."
No one having witnessed the large scale operations of assembling tanks
and heavy guns, and aware, at the same time, of the German methods
of producing mustard gas or Blue Cross compounds, could make such an
elementary mistake in classification, and any international disarmament
arrangements based on such an error can only produce a false security.
_*Gas is the outstanding case of a weapon whose manufacture it is
difficult to prevent_.

"Vested Interests."--With regard to the vested interests
in the new method of warfare, the most striking example
is again the I.G. We find Ludendorff consulting Krupp and
the I.G. representative when formulating his plans for a vast
munition programme.  Few people have realised the existence
of another Krupp in the I.G. It would, indeed, be a revelation
to find Germany sharing in these schemes of disarmament
to the extent of voluntarily abandoning her dye monopoly.
For such a situation is the only one consistent with safety.
While the sole big source of production of these substances
exists in Germany or in any one country for that matter,
no scheme of disarmament is on sure ground.

"Handing Over" Inventions.--Certain disarmament advocates have ingenuous
ideas with regard to new war inventions, and their "handing over"
to the League.  How can an invention be handed over?  If every country
informed the League of its new scientific war developments, those countries
would still be aware of them.  It is possible, commercially, to hand over any
invention by assigning a patent, but this is of no use for war purposes.
What country would regard patent law as a barrier to the use of a
valuable war invention?  Secondly, the cession of an invention to
the League depends entirely on the goodwill of the nation concerned.
No country can be sufficiently inspected to root out its new inventions.
Suppose a gas ten times more useful, from a military point of view,
than mustard gas were discovered in the laboratories of the I.G. An inspector,
or "Secret Service" agent, at the next bench in the laboratory might never
know that the research was not aimed at the discovery of a new dye.
World equilibrium may at this moment be threatened by the discoveries
of some absorbed scientist working, say, in a greenhouse in St. John's Wood.

We come back to the same point, that the crux of the situation lies in the
possession of the means of production. There is hope of controlling this
for a weapon like a tank, but it cannot be controlled for chemical warfare.
If the League requires these weapons it cannot rely on obtaining them from
a monopoly source so complete as the I.G. Further, with or without a League
the mere existence of this monopoly is a permanent menace to peace.

Neglect of Chemical Disarmament in the Treaty.--Let us face the facts.
Our treatment of chemical industry during the Treaty negotiations
and in the Treaty itself persistently ignored its chameleon nature.
We knew that the nitrogen plants at Oppau and Merseburg were the most
menacing munition plants in existence.  We knew the grave dangers of
leaving Germany, a guilty country, in possession of the poison gas monopoly.
Yet, deaf to such arguments, the Treaty opportunity was ignored.
Even now the lesson is only half learnt by those whom it vitally concerns.

Here is a new weapon whose exploitation demands research and large
scale production.  The former cannot be checked, and the latter
cannot be destroyed or suitably controlled to prevent conversion
for war purposes.  Yet three distinct features of this weapon make
the disarmament need imperative.

In the first place, everything points to "chemical disarmament"
as a key measure to control the large scale use of all other weapons.
The aggressive agent in war is the chemical.  All weapons,
except the bayonet, depend upon it.

In the second place, chemical warfare is itself so overwhelmingly important
that it is farcical to con-template any disarmament scheme which does not,
first and foremost, tackle this question.

Thirdly, no nation ever held a more complete monopoly for any weapon
than did Germany for chemical warfare.  Yet the levelling up process
which occurred during the war, tending towards armament equilibrium,
towards removal of enormous disparity, failed to touch the chemical arm.
Germany through her guilty exercise of the new weapon, has still further
increased her enormous manufacturing superiority for war.

This age has witnessed the growth of an industry critical for war
and disarmament.  Others will follow as science progresses.
Without them, the possibility of sudden decisions,
and therefore war incentive will be removed.  Sir Oliver Lodge
prophesies the war use of the newly controlled atomic energy.
The fulfilment depends on the growth of another critical war
industry whose nature it would be difficult to foretell.
It is these critical industries which rational disarmament must harness.
At present the chemical industry holds the field.

Surely the first and crying need is to effect a redistribution
of these organic chemical forces.  This, indeed, is the one solid
chemical disarmament measure which can and must he brought about.

The certain establishment of these industries in the chief
countries outside Germany must be fixed far beyond the hazard
of local politics and the reach of organised German attack.
True, it is essential that no such support should in any way
drug the will, weaken the initiative and impoverish the service
of the fostered industries.  This must depend upon wise
organisation and control in the country concerned.

I claim, however, that it is one of the main duties of any League
of Nations or other organisation dealing with disarmament to proceed
two steps beyond the paragraph in Article 8 of the Covenant.  This runs
as follows:  "The members of the League undertake to interchange
full and frank information as to the scale of their armaments,
their military, naval, and air programmes, and the conditions
of such of their industries as are adaptable to warlike purposes."
Such an exchange of information must be used, first, to isolate that
industry which is of a vital or key nature to the armament of the period,
either on account of its value as a universal check, or because it
fosters some particularly deadly new type of weapon or aggressive agent.
The chemical industry at present fulfils both conditions, for without it,
all weapons except the bayonet become silent, and it includes the organic
chemical industry which fosters the deadly weapon of the period.

Secondly, rational disarmament must prevent the existence
of monopoly in this critical industry.  It may be objected
that we are interfering with the play of ordinary economic laws.
But we must face the possibility that the war of the future
can never be averted without such interference.  Indeed, if we
accept the reports of the American Alien Property Custodian,
this very monopoly which now threatens us was established
by methods open to the same objections.  It is indeed an
interesting question whether the German dye monopoly resulted
from forces which directly opposed the play of economic law.
Further, the question is not so simple as it appears, for, in the
industries which disarmament most concerns, governing technical
changes are constantly occurring, and the normal home for
the production of a whole range of chemical products may be
shifted by a change of process which demands new raw materials
or new types of energy and power.  We must be ready, in certain
critical cases, to regard disarmament as the paramount need.
International agreement, through the League or otherwise,
must find a suitable method to control the critical industry
and prevent its use against world peace.

To be the ardent possessor of an ideal, to be its official guardian,
does not allow us to ignore the technical aspect of an international
and national issue.  After our gigantic praiseworthy, but wasteful,
attempts at chemical armament, let us at least disarm on rational lines.



CONCLUSION

THE TREATY AND THE FUTURE


I have endeavoured to present the facts of chemical warfare
as briefly yet as truly as possible, giving a glimpse of the war
possibilities inherent in this branch of applied chemical science.
Nor have I ignored the hidden forces which inspired, stimulated,
and supported the huge war chemical experiment.  The great Rhine
factories of the I.G. still cast their shadow on the outer world,
obscuring the issues of reconstruction.  This looming menace,
its share in the past and future of chemical warfare, and the fatal
growth of the latter present questions demanding an imperative answer.
It is the weak point of world disarmament.

The Treaty of Versailles answers the riddle in principle,
but have the actual clauses been unfulfilled?

Article 168 demands the limitation of munitions production to factories
or works approved by the Allied and Associated Governments.  "All other
establishments for the manufacture of any war material whatever shall
be closed down."

True, the plants of the I.G., like most other munition plants,
have a dual function for peace and war.  But their recent vital
use for the latter brings them without doubt within the scope
of the above clause.  Are they still equipped for war purposes?
Very drastic action will have been necessary by the
Inter-Allied Commission of Control to justify a negative answer.
Has that action been taken?  If not, the I.G., a second Krupp,
remains in splendid isolation, secure behind our mediaeval
but generous conception of munitions, for fifty per cent.
of the German shell fillings, the message of their guns, were eventually
provided by the I.G. It is true that they were manufactured in
synthetic dye and fertiliser plants, but the explosives were none
the less violent and the poison gases none the less poisonous.
Do we understand that the Allied and Associated Governments
voluntarily leave Germany in unquestioned possession of this vast
source of munitions in the face of the Treaty Article 168?

Article 169 wisely requires that any special plant intended for
the manufacture of military material, except such as may be recognised
as necessary for equipping the authorised strength of the German Army,
must be "surrendered to be destroyed or rendered useless."
The most formidable examples of such excess production were,
and remain, the nitrogen fixation and the nitric acid plants
of the I.G. The factories of the latter represent explosives
and poison gas capacity far in excess of the authorised needs
of the German Army.  Why, then, should they be left.  intact?

What is the authorised equipment of the German Army?  In the first
place the manufacture and use of poison gas is specifically forbidden
by the Treaty.  The plants in question are therefore all in excess
of authorised production, and should be destroyed or rendered useless.
At present, to the best of our belief, they stand ready to produce at
short notice at the rate of more than 3000 tons of Poison gas per month.
Does this mean that we admit them as authorised equipment?
If so, we are ourselves contravening another clause of the Treaty.

The Treaty tabulates the authorised equipment in stock of shell.
Based on the figures, we find that the actual war explosives production
of the I.G., which, we believe, still largely remains available,
could meet the total stock allowed to Germany by the current production
of little more than one day!

Even if the Treaty provided authority, could these plants evade
their just penalties on the ground of commercial world need?

Consider the question of German poison gas, all produced within
the I.G., and its use and manufacture in Germany forbidden by
the Treaty.  It was made in converted or multiplied dye plants,
or in special plants of the same type.  Germany's great
advantage was due, unquestionably, to her pre-war dye monopoly.
The 1913 figures for production and home consumption are
given below, under (A) and (B) :

                              A         B              C
     Country.            Dye Production,     Home Dye       Dye Production,
                         1913.               Consumption.   1918,
                         Tons           Tons           Tons
     Germany             135,000        20,000         135,000
                                                       (probably
                                                       more)
     Switzerland         10,000         3,000               12,000
     France              7,500               9,430               18,000
     U.K .               4,500               31,730         25,000
     U.S.A               3,000               26,020         27,000
     Other Countries          3,000               72,820         4,000
                         ----           ----           ----
     Total               163,000        163,000        221,000


The completeness of the German monopoly stands clearly revealed.
If, therefore, any plants capable of making dyes were built for
poison gas or explosives during war, they could find no post-war
_raison d'etre_ unless the feeble production of other countries
had even further diminished.

Do the above figures (C) justify such an assumption?  There is an
increase of production outside Germany of nearly 60,000 tons per annum.
Almost all of this, representing development under definitely expressed
national policy, must be maintained unless we wish to revert to the
exceedingly dangerous situation of a German dye and poison gas monopoly.
Much of this 60,000 tons per annum German excess could be covered
by plants used or built specially for poison gas or explosives.

There is every reason, for world peace, to eliminate such excess plants.
There is no important reason, for commerce, to maintain them.
In addition, many of them represent excess capacity which should be destroyed
because they originated solely for the exploitation of a forbidden weapon.
Even if a generous ruling, superimposed on the Treaty, offered these guilty
plants a new lease of life because of their urgent peace-time use,
the claim could not be supported before neutral experts.  The Treaty
provides authority for the disarming of certain chemical munition plants.
Nothing but the most drastic economic need can justify departure from this
critical disarmament measure.  The need may justify Treaty exemption
for other types of munition production in which the disarmament aspect
is not so overwhelmingly important.  The matter demands examination.
We can hardly conceive that this has not been done.  Are our missions
equipped to meet the best German commercial minds on such a matter?
In any case, Allied Governments have already wisely adopted a dye industry
policy inconsistent with the special Treaty immunity of the excess I.G.
munition plants.  Our figures remove any ground for the economic argument.

The nitrogen fixation plants of the I.G. undoubtedly demand
the same critical examination.  These plants were built almost
entirely for war purposes, for the production of ammonia to be
oxidised to nitric acid.  Ammonium nitrate also resulted.
These substances are the mainstay of explosives warfare, and, as a
matter of fact, their production in these very plants was the chief
factor which enabled Germany to continue the war beyond 1915.

Under the simple reading of the Treaty clauses, the plants
should "be destroyed or rendered useless."  Here, possibly,
strong arguments will be advanced by Germany for the retention
of the plants for the purpose of fertilising her own soil.
The argument is strong, for the impoverishment of German soil
has been such as to demand, theoretically, enormous tonnages
of ammonium sulphate.  But it is vital, for the stability
of peace, that this unique capacity for producing explosives
must not remain the monopoly of any one country.
It is the expressed intention of certain governments outside
Germany to foster the nitrogen fixation enterprise.  If, then,
we admit the immunity of these German plants from the Treaty,
for strong agricultural reasons, we must not allow Germany
to use this privilege as a military advantage.

In other words, if we yield to such arguments it must be on two conditions.
In the first place, the plants to evade the Treaty clauses must
be proved necessary for German agriculture.  Secondly, the products
of the untouched plants must be used for this purpose and no other.
As far as we know, no attempt has been made to apply the Treaty
to the nitrogen fixation plants, and their products, instead of being
mainly used for agriculture on German soil, have served as a deliberate
weapon against the growing chemical industries of other countries.

Indeed, the figures at our disposal would indicate that even if the full
demands of German agriculture were met, the plants built and projected
leave a big margin which can only find outlet by export or military use.
According to the _Frankfurter Zeitung_ of November 23rd, 1919, the total
consumption of nitrogenous material by Germany was, in 1913, as follows:

                                        Tons
     Source and Nature        Tons      Calculated as
                                   Nitrogen
     Chili Saltpetre          750,000   116,000
     Ammonium Sulphate   460,000,  92,000
     Norwegian Nitrate   35,000    4,500
     Calcium Cyanamide   30,000    6,000
     Haber Ammonium Sulphate
          (by Fixation)  20,000    4,000
                                   -------
          Total                         222,500


The same journal, October 18, 1919, states the capacity of the finished
Haber plants to be equivalent to 300,000 tons of nitrogen per annum,
and the total consumption of the old German Empire was thus less than
the amount available from one source alone, _i.e_. nitrogen fixation
by the Haber process.  But other pre-war German sources of nitrogen,
expanded by the war, will easily contribute their pre-war quota.
We can therefore very safely assume German capacity of above 400,000 tons
of nitrogen per annum, approximately twice the pre-war consumption.
It is exceedingly unlikely that Germany will actually consume such
a quantity.  In any case, a large excess is now deliberately used
to recapture world chemical markets, and this, as explained above,
should be dealt with under the Treaty even if special immunity be afforded
the capacity required for home purposes.  We are indeed entitled to ask,
what is being done on this vital matter?

Article 170 prohibits the importation of munitions of every kind
into Germany.  Considered from the point of view of chemical munitions,
this clause shows a complete failure to understand the situation.
Far from importing, possession of the I.G. leaves Germany the greatest
potential exporter of chemical munitions in the whole world.
Further, it is not improbable that countries outside Germany
may encourage her in munitions production for export.
Lord Moulton stated in a speech at Manchester in December, 1914:
"Supposing our War Minister had been in the last few years
buying in the cheapest market for the sake of cheapness,
and that he had had the munitions of war manufactured by Krupp's
of Essen.  Gentlemen, I think he would have been lynched about
three months ago."

We have fallen far from the inspired resolution of those days!
Knowing the true war significance of the I.G. as a second Krupp,
if we fail to establish our own organic chemical industries,
that warning may become a prophecy.

Article 171 forbids the manufacture of asphyxiating gases and analogous
materials in Germany.

Has this clause any value unsupported by definite measures of control?
With such an enormous capacity of rapidly convertible production,
need Germany consider the production of these chemicals during peace?
Once engaged in war, what is the value of the prohibition?
True, failure would imply penalties for the specific breach of
the Treaty.  But a similar breach of International Convention is
already involved, and admitted in the first phrase of Article 171:
"The use of poison gases being prohibited, etc."

It is difficult to see, therefore, unless penalties be actually
incurred for the existing breach, why Article IV would be a serious
deterrent for the future.

A trenchant comparison is afforded by the motive for this Treaty Article,
and the actual operation of other Articles which should support it.

The Treaty makers thought it necessary to give direct reference
to chemical warfare.  They issued a special edict against its use.
This alone should have guided those responsible for the execution of
the Disarmament Clauses of the Treaty, measures of general application
to the means of production of the different types of weapon.
Have the special plants erected for poison gas received drastic
action under the Treaty?  It is to be feared that they and other war
chemical plants of the I.G. have received undeserved immunity.

Where lies our help apart from the Treaty?  World peace
depends upon disarmament.  True peace must come from a
radical change in the outlook and sentiment of individuals.
The forces working through these channels are the real peacemakers.
But a League of Nations can forward the cause by wise measures
of disarmament, and this implies limiting war producing capacity.
The weak point in such a scheme is the organic chemical industry.
There must be a redistribution of capacity, for while Germany retains
a vast world monopoly of potential organic chemical munitions,
which fed the armaments of the past with explosives and poison gas,
and to which the weapons of the future are looking for inspiration
and sustenance, disarmament will be a hollow farce.

The League of Nations may succeed in rooting out the means of production
of certain munitions.  But organic chemical factories must survive
for the sake of their material contribution to the welfare of humanity.
They cannot be inspected and controlled, as we have shown,
and there is only one sound solution.  The obstacle to peace must
be removed by decentralising the organic chemical factories.
We cannot leave this monopoly in the hands of any country.
It now lies a weapon ready to the hands of those who created
and wielded it with such success.  Redistributed, this dangerous
productive grouping will create a source of stability and strength
to a League of Nations, and will invite a national sense of security,
so essential to peace and disarmament under the present regime.
This has only one meaning, the establishment of dye industries
in Allied countries.  This may clash with certain political schools
of thought developed before the war without a due realisation of
the organic way in which production links up with national defence.
But let there be no misunderstanding.  The refusal to support this
critical industry is a definite sacrifice of vital national issues.
Political principles responsible for such opposition no longer
merit the name; they have become a fetish.

Our armies repelled the German chemical attack.
They stood and fell unprotected before the early German clouds
and unprotected again before the vile contact of mustard gas.
The awful price they paid for our safety demands that we do more
than rest contented with the sacrifice.  It is an imperative
and patriotic duty to the fallen, to the future of the race,
and to the Empire, that, faced once again with modern war,
we should be able to say, "every possible precaution was taken."
But the chief precaution will have been neglected unless organic
chemical industries are fostered on Imperial soil.

But what of chemical warfare itself?  It is a growth,
malignant or otherwise, according to our creeds, which will continue
until very definite steps be taken to suppress it, with all war.
Therefore, urgent guarantees for national safety are absolutely
essential until the web of peace is strongly organised, which cannot
be until the immediate menace of the monopoly in production is removed.
But even then, until the general peace is fairly implanted,
we must be ready for any surprise from an unscrupulous enemy.
Research and training in chemical protection must be continued, and this
can only be ensured by keeping abreast with offensive chemical warfare.
"The Struggle for the Initiative" has at least established this.

Each nation and any League of Nations must seriously face the question of
the establishment of elaborate and complex chemical warfare organisations.
It seems to me that the logical course of thought and action is as follows.
If guarantees are forthcoming, internationally, removing this grave German
chemical warfare threat through her manufacturing monopoly, then the need for
a definite chemical striking force and organisation will be greatly reduced.
National safety is itself a corollary of world disarmament.
But if satisfactory guarantees were forthcoming it would be consistent
with national safety to limit the chemical warfare equipment of each
nation to what would actually represent a scientific military brain.
So long as national ministries for war or defence exist, they must possess
even under the most stringent disarmament conditions, fully accredited
within their regular staffs, an individual or individuals with scientific
and military training, who represent knowledge, vision, and the power
to expand in chemical warfare.  What would be said of a great nation
not equipped to think for the future on naval or artillery questions?
Technical naval and military minds have evolved for these purposes.
We are not slow to judge and act on the value of a new ship, tank,
or machine-gun. The chemical arm is even more specialised and demands
the same combination of scientific and military thinking and training.
Whatever international disarmament decisions may be forthcoming,
unless they seriously dismember the Defence Ministries, we should ensure
that the pre-war position is corrected and that our staff conception
and organisation covers the chemical weapon.

One alone of the Allied and Associated Powers was able to see
the chemical menace with clear and unprejudiced vision.
This was America, for she not only entered the war less hampered
by traditions than the rest, but at a period when the chemical
war was in full blast.  More than a quarter of all her casualties
were due to "gas," and no other arm produced as many in her ranks.
As a result, we see America establishing an independent peace
Chemical Warfare Service, as sister service to the Infantry
and Artillery.  This can only be interpreted as a frank realisation
of the place of chemical warfare and of the need for serious
international guarantees in the present situation.

Let us take a balanced view of the facts, realise the unique significance
of chemical warfare and chemical industry, for war and disarmament,
and act accordingly.



INDEX {Raw OCR, needs fixed or stripped out...}

A. charcoal, 129.  Aircraft, gas and, 181, 185, 229, 230, 231.
Aisne, German attacks on, 77, 141.  Aktien Gesellschaft
fur Anilin Fabrikation, 151.  Alert Gas Zone, 229.
Alien Property Custodian, report of, Y9, 152, 187, 189) 190, 191,
194~ 262.  Allied Gas Statistics, 82.  -Missions, 86,
87-Reaction, 48.  American activities, 64, 1731 174.
-chemical warfare development, 105, 173P 174, 178, 273f 274.
chemical warfare service, 49, 178P 3179) 274.  Amidol, 203.
Ammonia, synthetic, see Nitrogen Fixation.  Anaesthetics, 201, 220.
-local, 199, 202, 220.  Anti-Gas Committee, British, 95.
-Department, British, 98, 127.  Armendires, bombardment of, 77.
Arras, Battle of, 63-, British 1917 offensive, 61.
Arsenic Compounds, 26, 28, 69, 136, 137) 139, x6o, x63- See also
Blue Cross.  Artillery Gas experts, 91.  Asphyxiating Compounds, 25.
Aspirin, 199, 208.

Austria-Hungary, gas battalion of, 47.  Azo Dyes, 16o.

Badische Anilin und Soda Fabrik, 88, 1151P 207P 212.
Bleaching Powder, x6g, 221, 222.  Blue Cross, 29, 69, 74-771 89,
126, 131P 132, 136p 137, z6o, 229, 253, 258.  Bn.  Stuff, 42.
Box Respirator, British, 69, 99,

1101P 125, x26t 176.  Bribery and Corruption, x9o.
British Association, General Hartley's report, 64, 123, 240.--
Central Laboratory, 93,1115. -Dyes Limited, 116g, x6g.  Brominated m
ethyl -ethylketone, 42.  Bromine, American Industry, 157) 190, 191.
-French, 1157, 171P z96.  -Monopoly, German, 157.  Bromoacetone, 26, 41.
B. Stuff, 4r.  Buntkreuz, ii3q.

Cacodyl oxide, 35.  Cambrai sector, attack Or', 70, 79.
Camouflage chemicals, 141, 217, 218.  Canadians, gas attack on, 19.
Captured Documents, 52, 53t 74, 82, 128, 133, 221, 222, 229.
Carnoy, attack at, 61.  27S Index

Cartridge Mask, German, 124, 3128.  Castner Kellner, 169.
Casualties, gas, 56, 93, X74, 182, 237-241, 274.  Chaulny, 209.
Chemical Advisory Committee, 96.  -Exchange Association,
x94, z96.  -Initiative, see Initiative, struggle for.
-Policy, German, z86-i8S, 200, 205.  -Warfare Department, British,
96-98.--Designs Committee, 99.--Medical Committee, 97.
-Organisations, 85, 215, 217, 228, 239, 264.  ngliSh, 92, 9'~,--' E

103~ 105, 165.--, French, 94, 99, 100, 105.--, German,
85, 89, 102, 103, 149.  Italian, iox.  Policy, 88, 249p 250.
Production, see Production.  Research, see Research.--Service, American,
see American Chemical Warfare Service.  Chemische Fabrik
Griesheim Elektron, iSi, 152.--Fabriken Yorm.  Weilerter-Meer, x5x.
Chloral Hydrate, 196, 202.  Chlorine, 23, Z5, 35, 36, x55, 156, 169,
171p 217.  276

ChlormethylchIoroform ate, 64,6 9.  Chloroform, z20.  Chlorpicrin, 25, 158,
169.  Cloud Gas attacks, 23, 46~ Szy 56, 57, 65, 215.  Coloured Cross, x39.
Colour Users Association, Y69.  Commercial Advisory Committee, British, 96.
Critical Industries, 261-z63, 272.  -Range, 226, 229.

Defence, national, see Dye Industry and National Defence.
Dianisidine, double salts Of, 41.  Dichlor-diethyl-sulphide, see
Mustard Gas.  Dichlor-methylether, x63.  Diethfiamine, 201.
Diphenylchlorarsine, see Arsenic compounds.  Diphenylcyanarsine, see
Arsenic compounds.  Diphosgene, 25, 29, 157, 163.  Directeur du
Mat6riel Chimique de Guerre, ioo.  Director of Gas Services,
94, 98.  Disarmament, 20, 2,~, 142, 145, 150, 172t 177,
242, 245, 246, 252, 254-262, 267, 271-274. See also Limitation
of Armaments.  Drugs, igg-2or. Dumps, enemy, 79# 141.
Dye Agency, German information system, r92, x93, 1957 197.
-Industry and National Defence, 163, 171t 172t 198, 203, 204, 272.
-Industry, British, 146, 168, 203~ 204-

Index

Dye Industry, German, 146, 147, 153$ x86, 242, 25 -Monopoly, German, see
Monopoly, German Dye.  supplies to America, 197.  Dyes, use in Gas Shell, 72.
Edgewood Arsenal, xo5, xo6, 175-178Entressin experimental grounds,

110.  Espionage, 192, 193Ether, 220.  Fthyldichlorarsine, x63.
Ethylenemonochlorhydrin, x64, 202.  P-Eucaine, 202.
Exhaustion of Stocks, forced, go.  Explosives, English Production, x6g.
German Production, i4q, 1150) 1151.  Farben fabriken vorm.  Fr.  Bayer

and CO., 90, 15T, 194, 208.  Farbwerke vorm.  Meister Lucius and Briining,
87, 151Field Organisation, British, go.--German, go.  -Tests, 86, xio.
Flame Projector, see Flammenwerfer.  Flammenwerfer, 43, 631, 72)
73Flexibility of Supply, German, 65, 138.  French College of Warfare, 185.
Full Line Forcing, x9o.  Future of Chemical Warfare, 14-4, 183.

Gas and Aircraft, see Aircraft.  -Casualties, see Casualties, gas.
-Discipline, 62, 81-82, 132P 133, 140-

Gas Experts on Artillery staffs, see Artillery Gas Experts.  -Mask, see
Mask, gas, and Helmet, gas.--Personnel, 89.--Regiment~ go,
gi.--School, German, 86, go, gi.  -Shell, see Shell, gas.
-Specific uses Of, 39Gaswerfer, 1918, 71Gelbolin, 221.
German Dye Industry, see Dye Industry, German.  Patent Policy,
see Patent Policy, German.  Press, 33, 54.  -Production, see
Production, German.  Givenchy, attack near, 51, 70Green Cross,
29, 69P 77, 135, ,36, i5g.

Haber Process, see Nitrogen.  Fixation.  Hague Convention, 32, 33,
240Hanlon Field, experimental sta tion, 175, 2318Hartley Mission,
87, 14 149,

172, 207, 245.  Heeres-Gasschule, see Gas

School, German.  Helmet, Gas, X21, 122, 124- See also Mask.  Hexamine, x22.
Hill 6o, attack on, 40.  Hindenburg Programme, 66, 89, 149.
116chst, Y7, 151, 152, 156, 157, 158, x6x.  Hohenzollern Redoubt,
storming Of, 51.  Hooge, attack on 2nd Army, 44.  277 I ndex

Hydrocyanic acid, see Prussic acid,

I.G., see Interessen Gemeinschaft.  Immune Functions, 217, 2x8, 232.
Imperial College of Science, 97Indigo, 28, 155t 158,
159, 165, x68, 202, 255.  Initiative, Struggle for, 111, 121,
1347 273Interessen Gemeinschaft, 18, 32, 86, 89, 109P 148,
149-151, z54, 163, x86, 187, 192, 198, 200, 202, 205, 214, 258-26o,
264-267, 27P.  Inter-Allied Chemical Supply Committee, 107-Commission
of Control, $5, 264.--Liaison, xo6.--Munitions Council, 107.
Intensive Chemical Warfare, 66.  International Police Force, 256.

Kaiser Wilhelm Institute, 35, 85, $9. Kalle and Co., 151, Kernmel, attack on,
77, 224, 229.  K. Stuff, 41KornmandeurderGastruppen,gi, Krupp's Works, 206.

La Bassie Canal, 76.  LachrymatorS, 26, 42, x18, 124, 156, 170,
2171 218.  League of Nations, 2r, 127, 259, 246, 247, 255,
256, 258, 26o, 261, 262, 2631 271-273Lens, attack at, 77, 76.
Le Rutoire Farm, 43, Leopold Cassella, G.m.b.H., 3151.
Leverkusen, 86, go, z4g, r5lt 156-158, L59, z61, 208, 250.
Levinstein Limited, x68, 16q.  278

Lewis Gun, 252.  Limitation of Armament, 114, 244-248, 254,
264, 265, 267See also Disarmament.  Livens Projector,
29, 6o, 41, 65, 90) IOT, 133, 175, 2x6, 227) 228, 245, 252.
Longworth Bill, 178.  Loos, Battle Of, 43, 50, ix8f 170Ludwigshafen,
88, 151, i56p 159# r6o, x61.

M2, French Mask, 135.  March, 19x8, German Offensive,
17, 69, 76, 219, 224Marne, Battle of, 94, 143, 205Mask, first
improvised gas, 121.  See also Helmet, gas.--German cartridge,
see Cartridge Mask, German.--M2 French, see M2, French Mask.
resistance of, to breathing, 130, 1311 140MetOl, 203.  Minist6re de
I'Artillerie et des Munitions, 200.  Monchy, attack at, 55.
Monopoly, Germany Dye, z8, 38, 148, i8g, 198, 214, 266.
Montauban attack, 55.  Munitions Inventions Department, 97.
Mustard Gas, 27-29, 28, 67, 68, 74, 75, 77, 78, 8r, 89, xig,
136t 1137, 141, 158, 170, 216, 217, 221, 224, 230, 236, 240,
2491 255, 258, 272.--Allied Production, 8o, 81, zo,4, 164Y 165,
x68, 171-casualties, 69', 224#

Index

Mustard Gas, defensive use of, 229.--- first use of, 66~ 67, 215.
German production, 158, 202.  protection a g a i n I t, 137, 221, 222.
Surprise, 66, 67, 69.

National Health Insurance Commission, 164, 201.  Neglect of Chemical Industry,

171, 187New War Chemicals, see War Chemicals.  Nieuport, 66, 67,
217Nitric Acid, 171.  Nitrogen Fixation, 88, 171s z86, 205, 208,
211-213, 244, 26o, 265, 2671 268, 269.  No-Man's-Land, fvture,
227, 229Non-persistent substances, 28, 29.  Novocain, 201.

Obstacle, new type Of, 223, 229.  Organic Chemical Industry, 145,

235, 2S6, 250, 251, 271Oxalic Acid, igo.

Particulate Clouds, 140, 232.  Patent Policy, German, x91.  Penetrants, 29.
Persistent lethal substance, 225227, 229, 231.  -substances, 29, 29.
Phenol, German cornering of, 194.  Phenylca rbyl amine chloride, 158.
Phosgene, 25, 29, 64, 69, 124,141, 156, z67, 217, 230, 249.
4,delayed action," 45, 53French development of, T 70 German cloud,
44-46. Phosphorus, r75, 181-

Photographic chemicals, 189, 203.  Physiological classification, 25.
Poison gas, 25, 1507 151.  Porton, experimental station, 97,

110`. Portuguese front, attack on, 77.  Potassium permanganate, 126, 2M Price
cutting policy, German, 189, 213.  Production, 83, 149, 162, 163, 249, 250.
critical importance of, 143Y 144, 171, 26o.  statistics, 82, 83, 88.
Projector, German development Of, 70) 711.  -Livens, see Livens Projector.
-short range, 182.  Propaganda by German dye agents, igr.
-,German use of, 113.  Protection, 38, 90, 92, 95, 99, loop 109, 113p 114)
121, 124~ 125, 127~ 128, 176, 216, 217, 220, 221.  -collective, 231, 233.
-future deinclopmentS, 231.  -Individual, 231, 232.  -of animals, 92.
Prussic acid, 26, ixS.  Puteaux, American laboratory, 175, 21S.

Rechicourt, attack on French, 7(RedCross appeal toendwar, i ig.
Research, 35,85, 108Y176,184,249. Respirator, Box, see Box Respirator.
-drurns, 97.--XTXY 13 5.  Rhincland occupation, Allied, 206.  279 Index

Royal Society, 50, 94-97. Rubber, German shortage of, x32.
Russia, gas attacks against, 47, 123p 124.

St. Mihiel Battle, z82.  Salicylic acid, igg, x94, igg.
Salvarsan, igg.  Scientific Advisory Committee, 499 95, 96.
Serni-Circular Canals, 2x5.  Sensitisers, photographic, 203.
Service Chemique de Guerre, ioS.  Shell, Gas, 30, 40, 41, 64., 136,

A3, 216.

-Falkenhayn's orders,+3.--percentage Of, 77, 79, 80, 141, 245.
Smoke, future importance of, ISO, 181, 2A.  -use with lethal gases,
i40, 180.  Somme offensive, 52,55, 6r, 64,143. Speculative element,
2115, 220.  Special Brigade R.E., 52, x74.  -Companies, 50, 93.
Sternutatory compounds, a6, 28, 41.  Stokes Mortar,
29, 52, 175.  Stovaine, 220.  Strategy, chemical, see Tactics
and Strategy.  Sulphur Black, 155.  Sulphuric acid, 171, 253.
Supply Department, British, iox, 105.  -Organisations, ioz.
Surprise, critical factor of, 31, 32, 53, 111.  113, 114, 144.

Tactics and Strategy, 215, 216, 225.  Tactical classification, 25, 28.  280

Tanks, 143, 217, 227) 253P 254, 247, 248.  Technik im Weltkriege, Die,
36 371 40) 417 47, 51, 57, 69, 74:  80,125,128,129,135, 136,141.
Thermite shell, 175.  Thiodiglycol, 159.  Toxic compounds, 26.
Treaty Stocks, 150.  Trench Warfare Department, British, 95, 96.
Re~earch Department, 96.  Supply Department, 96, io5,
170Tri-chlor-methyl-chloro-formate, 64, 157.  T. Stuffy 41.
Verdun, gas attack at, 69.  Versailles, TreatY'Of, 34,150,210,
242-244, 264-267, 270, 271.  Vesicant Compounds, 27, 137)
217, 239Vested Interests, 258, 259.  Vincennite, zi8.
War chemicals, new, 217, 225.--Physiological classification,
see Physiological classification.--Tactical classification,
see Tactical Classification.  Warsaw, cloud attacks, 123.  White Cross
shell, 225.  Xylyl bromide, 41, 156.  Xylylene dibromide, 41.
Yellow Cross, see Mustard Gas.  Yperite, 8o, z66.  Ypres, first
German gas attack, 23~ 31, 32, 38-first Mustard gas, 66, 217.
Yser, raid by Germans, 117.

NAME INDEX

Albert, Dr., x94-x96, 197t 198-

Bacon, Colonel R. F., 218.  Baeyer, Professor, 27Baker, Professor H. B.,
95Barley, Major, D.S.O., 46.  Beilby, Sir George, 96.  Bernstorff, von, 194.
Bethmann-Hollweg, Dr. von, 111, 197.  Boy-Ed, Captain, 197.  Bueb, Dr., 212.

Cadman, Sir John, 96.  Chevalier, Medecin aide-major,

27Crossley, Professor A. W., 95,

97Curmer, General, 99.

Davies, Major David, M.P., 1172, 255, 257, 258.  Davy, J., 249.
Dawson, Sergeant-Major, 5z.  Debeney, General, 185.  Duisberg, Herr, 1+7, 208-

Ehrlich, Dr. Paul, x9g.

Falkenhayn, General, 94, 147) 148.  Foch, Marshal, 175.
Foulkes, Brig.--General C. H., 92.

French, Field-Marshal Sir 31t 43, 48Fries, Brig.--General A. A., 114,
17S9 177t 1791 1809 183Fuller, Colonel J. F. C., 227, 233-

Garvan, Francis P., i8q, 195, 197, 199Geyer, Captain, 136-140.
Green, Prof. A. G., 168.  Grey, Viscount, 256, 257.  Guthrie, 249.

Haber, Professor, 35, 49, 85, 90Haig, Field-Marshal Sir Douglas, 54.
Haldane, Dr., 121.  Harrison, Lieut.--Colonel E. F., 98, x26.
Hartley, Brig.--General H., 63, 76, 98, 123, 240.
Horrocks, Sir William, 95Hossenf elder, Consul-General,

197-

Jackson, Colonel L., 942 95Joyce, Colonel, 212.

Kirschbaum, Prof. F. P., 1135.  Kitchener, Lord, 33, 94~ 95)
121) 237.  Kling, M., i0o.  Krupp, von Bohlen, Herr, 147,

259 281 Name Index

Lambert, Major, 126.  Lebeau, Professor P., iot.  Levinstein, Dr. H., 168.
Livens, Major, 6o.  Lodge, Sir Oliver, 94, Ludendorff, General, 70,
82P 90, 91) 114) 147, 149, 259.

Meyer, Victor, 27 Macpherson, Captain, z2i.  McConnel, Lieut., 208.
Moulton of Bank, Rt.  Hon.

Lord, 5, 16q, 242) 243, 270.  Moureu, M. Charles, 200.

Norris, Colonel, 206, 208, 209.

Ozil, General, 200, 105.

Palmer, Mitchell, ig, z8g.  Paterno, Senator, zoi.  Penna, Colonel, zoi.
Pick, Dr. H., iz5, i2q, 130, 131.  Pollard, Professor A. F., zz2.
Pope, Sir William, z65, 191, 202.

Ramsay, Sir William, 9+. Rayleigh, Lord, 94.  Runciman, W., 146-

Sachur, Professor, 35.  Schmaus, Lieut. Dr., 75, Schwarte, see Technik
im Weltkriege (Subject Index). Schweitzer, Dr. Hugo, 194, 195,

211.  Sering, Dr. Max, zii.  Stieglitz, Professor Julius, x9r,

198, 200.

Thomasl Albert, 200.  Thorpe, Prof. J. F., 96, 99.
Thuillier, Major-General H. F.,

94, 98P 105-

Villavecehia, Prof. zot.  Vincent, Monsieur, 200.

Watson, Colonel, 95.  Weiss, M., 200.  Wells, H. G., izz.
Wing, Major-General, 43.

282