Produced by John Bickers





HELLENICA

By Xenophon


Translation by H. G. Dakyns





          Xenophon the Athenian was born 431 B.C. He was a
          pupil of Socrates. He marched with the Spartans,
          and was exiled from Athens. Sparta gave him land
          and property in Scillus, where he lived for many
          years before having to move once more, to settle
          in Corinth. He died in 354 B.C.


          The Hellenica is his chronicle of the history of
          the Hellenes from 411 to 359 B.C., starting as a
          continuation of Thucydides, and becoming his own
          brand of work from Book III onwards.



PREPARER'S NOTE

This was typed from Dakyns' series, "The Works of Xenophon," a
four-volume set. The complete list of Xenophon's works (though there is
doubt about some of these) is:

     Work                                   Number of books

     The Anabasis                                         7
     The Hellenica                                        7
     The Cyropaedia                                       8
     The Memorabilia                                      4
     The Symposium                                        1
     The Economist                                        1
     On Horsemanship                                      1
     The Sportsman                                        1
     The Cavalry General                                  1
     The Apology                                          1
     On Revenues                                          1
     The Hiero                                            1
     The Agesilaus                                        1
     The Polity of the Athenians and the Lacedaemonians   2

Text in brackets "{}" is my transliteration of Greek text into English
using an Oxford English Dictionary alphabet table. The diacritical marks
have been lost.





HELLENICA




BOOK I


I

B.C. 411. To follow the order of events (1). A few days later
Thymochares arrived from Athens with a few ships, when another sea fight
between the Lacedaemonians and Athenians at once took place, in which
the former, under the command of Agesandridas, gained the victory.

 (1) Lit. "after these events"; but is hard to conjecture to what
    events the author refers. For the order of events and the
    connection between the closing chapter of Thuc. viii. 109, and the
    opening words of the "Hellenica," see introductory remarks above.
    The scene of this sea-fight is, I think, the Hellespont.

Another short interval brings us to a morning in early winter, when
Dorieus, the son of Diagoras, was entering the Hellespont with fourteen
ships from Rhodes at break of day. The Athenian day-watch descrying him,
signalled to the generals, and they, with twenty sail, put out to sea to
attack him. Dorieus made good his escape, and, as he shook himself free
of the narrows, (2) ran his triremes aground off Rhoeteum. When the
Athenians had come to close quarters, the fighting commenced, and was
sustained at once from ships and shore, until at length the Athenians
retired to their main camp at Madytus, having achieved nothing.

 (2) Lit. "as he opened" {os enoige}. This is still a mariner's phrase
    in modern Greek, if I am rightly informed.

Meanwhile Mindarus, while sacrificing to Athena at Ilium, had observed
the battle. He at once hastened to the sea, and getting his own triremes
afloat, sailed out to pick up the ships with Dorieus. The Athenians on
their side put out to meet him, and engaged him off Abydos. From early
morning till the afternoon the fight was kept up close to the shore.
(3) Victory and defeat hung still in even balance, when Alcibiades
came sailing up with eighteen ships. Thereupon the Peloponnesians
fled towards Abydos, where, however, Pharnabazus brought them timely
assistance. (4) Mounted on horseback, he pushed forward into the sea as
far as his horse would let him, doing battle himself, and encouraging
his troopers and the infantry alike to play their parts. Then the
Peloponnesians, ranging their ships in close-packed order, and drawing
up their battle line in proximity to the land, kept up the fight. At
length the Athenians, having captured thirty of the enemy's vessels
without their crews, and having recovered those of their own which
they had previously lost, set sail for Sestos. Here the fleet, with the
exception of forty vessels, dispersed in different directions outside
the Hellespont, to collect money; while Thrasylus, one of the generals,
sailed to Athens to report what had happened, and to beg for a
reinforcement of troops and ships. After the above incidents,
Tissaphernes arrived in the Hellespont, and received a visit from
Alcibiades, who presented him with a single ship, bringing with him
tokens of friendship and gifts, whereupon Tissaphernes seized him and
shut him up in Sardis, giving out that the king's orders were to go to
war with the Athenians. Thirty days later Alcibiades, accompanied by
Mantitheus, who had been captured in Caria, managed to procure horses
and escaped by night to Clazomenae.

 (3) The original has a somewhat more poetical ring. The author uses
    the old Attic or Ionic word {eona}. This is a mark of style, of
    which we shall have many instances. One might perhaps produce
    something of the effect here by translating: "the battle hugged
    the strand."

 (4) Or, "came to their aid along the shore."

B.C. 410. And now the Athenians at Sestos, hearing that Mindarus was
meditating an attack upon them with a squadron of sixty sail, gave
him the slip, and under cover of night escaped to Cardia. Hither also
Alcibiades repaired from Clazomenae, having with him five triremes and
a light skiff; but on learning that the Peloponnesian fleet had left
Abydos and was in full sail for Cyzicus, he set off himself by land to
Sestos, giving orders to the fleet to sail round and join him there.
Presently the vessels arrived, and he was on the point of putting out to
sea with everything ready for action, when Theramenes, with a fleet of
twenty ships from Macedonia, entered the port, and at the same instant
Thrasybulus, with a second fleet of twenty sail from Thasos, both
squadrons having been engaged in collecting money. Bidding these
officers also follow him with all speed, as soon as they had taken out
their large sails and cleared for action, Alcibiades set sail himself
for Parium. During the following night the united squadron, consisting
now of eighty-six vessels, stood out to sea from Parium, and reached
Proconnesus next morning, about the hour of breakfast. Here they learnt
that Mindarus was in Cyzicus, and that Pharnabazus, with a body of
infantry, was with him. Accordingly they waited the whole of this day at
Proconnesus. On the following day Alcibiades summoned an assembly,
and addressing the men in terms of encouragement, warned them that a
threefold service was expected of them; that they must be ready for a
sea fight, a land fight, and a wall fight all at once, "for look you,"
said he, "we have no money, but the enemy has unlimited supplies from
the king."

Now, on the previous day, as soon as they were come to moorings, he had
collected all the sea-going craft of the island, big and little alike,
under his own control, that no one might report the number of his
squadron to the enemy, and he had further caused a proclamation to be
made, that any one caught sailing across to the opposite coast would be
punished with death. When the meeting was over, he got his ships ready
for action, and stood out to sea towards Cyzicus in torrents of rain.
Off Cyzicus the sky cleared, and the sun shone out and revealed to him
the spectacle of Mindarus's vessels, sixty in number, exercising at some
distance from the harbour, and, in fact, intercepted by himself. The
Peloponnesians, perceiving at a glance the greatly increased number of
the Athenian galleys, and noting their proximity to the port, made haste
to reach the land, where they brought their vessels to anchor in a
body, and prepared to engage the enemy as he sailed to the attack. But
Alcibiades, sailing round with twenty of his vessels, came to land and
disembarked. Seeing this, Mindarus also landed, and in the engagement
which ensued he fell fighting, whilst those who were with him took to
flight. As for the enemy's ships, the Athenians succeeded in capturing
the whole of them (with the exception of the Syracusan vessels,
which were burnt by their crews), and made off with their prizes to
Proconnesus. From thence on the following day they sailed to attack
Cyzicus. The men of that place, seeing that the Peloponnesians and
Pharnabazus had evacuated the town, admitted the Athenians. Here
Alcibiades remained twenty days, obtaining large sums of money from
the Cyzicenes, but otherwise inflicting no sort of mischief on the
community. He then sailed back to Proconnesus, and from there to
Perinthus and Selybria. The inhabitants of the former place welcomed his
troops into their city, but the Selybrians preferred to give money,
and so escape the admission of the troops. Continuing the voyage the
squadron reached Chrysopolis in Chalcedonia, (5) where they built a
fort, and established a custom-house to collect the tithe dues which
they levied on all merchantmen passing through the Straits from the
Black Sea. Besides this, a detachment of thirty ships was left there
under the two generals, Theramenes and Eubulus, with instructions not
only to keep a look-out on the port itself and on all traders passing
through the channel, but generally to injure the enemy in any way which
might present itself. This done, the rest of the generals hastened back
to the Hellespont.

 (5) This is the common spelling, but the coins of Calchedon have the
    letters {KALKH}, and so the name is written in the best MSS. of
    Herodotus, Xenophon, and other writers, by whom the place is
    named. See "Dict. of Greek and Roman Geog." "Chalcedon."

Now a despatch from Hippocrates, Mindarus's vice-admiral, (6) had been
intercepted on its way to Lacedaemon, and taken to Athens. It ran
as follows (in broad Doric): (7) "Ships gone; Mindarus dead; the men
starving; at our wits' end what to do."

 (6) "Epistoleus," i.e. secretary or despatch writer, is the Spartan
    title of the officer second in command to the admiral.

 (7) Reading {'Errei ta kala} (Bergk's conjecture for {kala}) =
    "timbers," i.e. "ships" (a Doric word). Cf. Aristoph., "Lys."
    1253, {potta kala}. The despatch continues: {Mindaros apessoua}
    (al. {apessua}), which is much more racy than the simple word
    "dead." "M. is gone off." I cannot find the right English or
    "broad Scotch" equivalent. See Thirlwall, "Hist. Gr." IV. xxix. 88
    note.

Pharnabazus, however, was ready to meet with encouragement the
despondency which afflicted the whole Peloponnesian army and their
allies. "As long as their own bodies were safe and sound, why need
they take to heart the loss of a few wooden hulls? Was there not timber
enough and to spare in the king's territory?" And so he presented each
man with a cloak and maintenance for a couple of months, after which he
armed the sailors and formed them into a coastguard for the security of
his own seaboard.

He next called a meeting of the generals and trierarchs of the different
States, and instructed them to build just as many new ships in the
dockyards of Antandrus as they had respectively lost. He himself was to
furnish the funds, and he gave them to understand that they might
bring down timber from Mount Ida. While the ships were building, the
Syracusans helped the men of Antandrus to finish a section of their
walls, and were particularly pleasant on garrison duty; and that is why
the Syracusans to this day enjoy the privilege of citizenship, with the
title of "benefactors," at Antandrus. Having so arranged these matters,
Pharnabazus proceeded at once to the rescue of Chalcedon.

It was at this date that the Syracusan generals received news from home
of their banishment by the democratic party. Accordingly they called a
meeting of their separate divisions, and putting forward Hermocrates
(8) as their spokesman, proceeded to deplore their misfortune, insisting
upon the injustice and the illegality of their banishment. "And now let
us admonish you," they added, "to be eager and willing in the future,
even as in the past: whatever the word of command may be, show
yourselves good men and true: let not the memory of those glorious sea
fights fade. Think of those victories you have won, those ships you
have captured by your own unaided efforts; forget not that long list of
achievements shared by yourselves with others, in all which you
proved yourselves invincible under our generalship. It was to a happy
combination of our merit and your enthusiasm, displayed alike on land
and sea, that you owe the strength and perfection of your discipline."

 (8) Hermocrates, the son of Hermon. We first hear of him in Thuc. iv.
    58 foll. as the chief agent in bringing the Sicilian States
    together in conference at Gela B.C. 424, with a view to healing
    their differences and combining to frustrate the dangerous designs
    of Athens. In 415 B.C., when the attack came, he was again the
    master spirit in rendering it abortive (Thuc. vi. 72 foll.) In 412
    B.C. it was he who urged the Sicilians to assist in completing the
    overthrow of Athens, by sending a squadron to co-operate with the
    Peloponnesian navy--for the relief of Miletus, etc. (Thuc. viii.
    26, 27 foll.) At a later date, in 411 B.C., when the Peloponnesian
    sailors were ready to mutiny, and "laid all their grievances to
    the charge of Astyochus (the Spartan admiral), who humoured
    Tissaphernes for his own gain" (Thuc. viii. 83), Hermocrates took
    the men's part, and so incurred the hatred of Tissaphernes.

With these words they called upon the men to choose other commanders,
who should undertake the duties of their office, until the arrival of
their successors. Thereupon the whole assembly, and more particularly
the captains and masters of vessels and marines, insisted with loud
cries on their continuance in command. The generals replied, "It was
not for them to indulge in faction against the State, but rather it was
their duty, in case any charges were forthcoming against themselves,
at once to render an account." When, however, no one had any kind of
accusation to prefer, they yielded to the general demand, and were
content to await the arrival of their successors. The names of these
were--Demarchus, the son of Epidocus; Myscon, the son of Mencrates; and
Potamis, the son of Gnosis.

The captains, for their part, swore to restore the exiled generals as
soon as they themselves should return to Syracuse. At present with
a general vote of thanks they despatched them to their several
destinations. It particular those who had enjoyed the society of
Hermocrates recalled his virtues with regret, his thoroughness and
enthusiasm, his frankness and affability, the care with which every
morning and evening he was wont to gather in his quarters a group of
naval captains and mariners whose ability he recognised. These were his
confidants, to whom he communicated what he intended to say or do: they
were his pupils, to whom he gave lessons in oratory, now calling upon
them to speak extempore, and now again after deliberation. By these
means Hermocrates had gained a wide reputation at the council board,
where his mastery of language was no less felt than the wisdom of his
advice. Appearing at Lacedaemon as the accuser of Tissaphernes, (9) he
had carried his case, not only by the testimony of Astyochus, but by
the obvious sincerity of his statements, and on the strength of this
reputation he now betook himself to Pharnabazus. The latter did not wait
to be asked, but at once gave him money, which enabled him to collect
friends and triremes, with a view to his ultimate recall to Syracuse.
Meanwhile the successors of the Syracusans had arrived at Miletus, where
they took charge of the ships and the army.

 (9) The matter referred to is fully explained Thuc. viii. 85.

It was at this same season that a revolution occurred in Thasos,
involving the expulsion of the philo-Laconian party, with the Laconian
governor Eteonicus. The Laconian Pasippidas was charged with having
brought the business about in conjunction with Tissaphernes, and was
banished from Sparta in consequence. The naval force which he had been
collecting from the allies was handed over to Cratesippidas, who was
sent out to take his place in Chios.

About the same period, while Thrasylus was still in Athens, Agis
(10) made a foraging expedition up to the very walls of the city. But
Thrasylus led out the Athenians with the rest of the inhabitants of the
city, and drew them up by the side of the Lyceum Gymnasium, ready to
engage the enemy if they approached; seeing which, Agis beat a hasty
retreat, not however without the loss of some of his supports, a few of
whom were cut down by the Athenian light troops. This success disposed
the citizens to take a still more favourable view of the objects for
which Thrasylus had come; and they passed a decree empowering him to
call out a thousand hoplites, one hundred cavalry, and fifty triremes.

 (10) The reader will recollect that we are giving in "the Deceleian"
    period of the war, 413-404 B.C. The Spartan king was in command of
    the fortress of Deceleia, only fourteen miles distant from Athens,
    and erected on a spot within sight of the city. See Thuc. vii. 19,
    27, 28.

Meanwhile Agis, as he looked out from Deceleia, and saw vessel after
vessel laden with corn running down to Piraeus, declared that it was
useless for his troops to go on week after week excluding the Athenians
from their own land, while no one stopped the source of their corn
supply by sea: the best plan would be to send Clearchus, (11) the son
of Rhamphius, who was proxenos (12) of the Byzantines, to Chalcedon and
Byzantium. The suggestion was approved, and with fifteen vessels duly
manned from Megara, or furnished by other allies, Clearchus set out.
These were troop-ships rather than swift-sailing men-of-war. Three of
them, on reaching the Hellespont, were destroyed by the Athenian ships
employed to keep a sharp look-out on all merchant craft in those waters.
The other twelve escaped to Sestos, and thence finally reached Byzantium
in safety.

 (11) Of Clearchus we shall hear more in the sequel, and in the
    "Anabasis."

 (12) The Proxenus answered pretty nearly to our "Consul," "Agent,"
    "Resident"; but he differed in this respect, that he was always a
    member of the foreign State. An Athenian represented Sparta at
    Athens; a Laconian represented Athens at Sparta, and so forth. See
    Liddell and Scott.

So closed the year--a year notable also for the expedition against
Sicily of the Carthaginians under Hannibal with one hundred thousand
men, and the capture, within three months, of the two Hellenic cities of
Selinus and Himera.



II

B.C. 409. Next year (1)... the Athenians fortified Thoricus; and
Thrasylus, taking the vessels lately voted him and five thousand of
his seamen armed to serve as peltasts, (2) set sail for Samos at the
beginning of summer. At Samos he stayed three days, and then continued
his voyage to Pygela, where he proceeded to ravage the territory and
attack the fortress. Presently a detachment from Miletus came to the
rescue of the men of Pygela, and attacking the scattered bands of the
Athenian light troops, put them to flight. But to the aid of the light
troops came the naval brigade of peltasts, with two companies of heavy
infantry, and all but annihilated the whole detachment from Miletus.
They captured about two hundred shields, and set up a trophy. Next day
they sailed to Notium, and from Notium, after due preparation, marched
upon Colophon. The Colophonians capitulated without a blow. The
following night they made an incursion into Lydia, where the corn crops
were ripe, and burnt several villages, and captured money, slaves, and
other booty in large quantity. But Stages, the Persian, who was employed
in this neighbourhood, fell in with a reinforcement of cavalry sent to
protect the scattered pillaging parties from the Athenian camp, whilst
occupied with their individual plunder, and took one trooper prisoner,
killing seven others. After this Thrasylus led his troops back to the
sea, intending to sail to Ephesus. Meanwhile Tissaphernes, who had wind
of this intention, began collecting a large army and despatching cavalry
with a summons to the inhabitants one and all to rally to the defence of
the goddess Artemis at Ephesus.

 (1) The MSS. here give a suspected passage, which may be rendered
    thus: "The first of Olympiad 93, celebrated as the year in which
    the newly-added two-horse race was won by Evagorias the Eleian,
    and the stadion (200 yards foot-race) by the Cyrenaean Eubotas,
    when Evarchippus was ephor at Sparta and Euctemon archon at
    Athens." But Ol. 93, to which these officers,and the addition of
    the new race at Olympia belong, is the year 408. We must therefore
    suppose either that this passage has been accidentally inserted in
    the wrong place by some editor or copyist, or that the author was
    confused in his dates. The "stadium" is the famous foot-race at
    Olympia, 606 3/4 English feet in length, run on a course also
    called the "Stadion," which was exactly a stade long.

 (2) Peltasts, i.e. light infantry armed with the "pelta" or light
    shield, instead of the heavy {aspis} of the hoplite or heavy
    infantry soldiers.

On the seventeenth day after the incursion above mentioned Thrasylus
sailed to Ephesus. He disembarked his troops in two divisions, his heavy
infantry in the neighbourhood of Mount Coressus; his cavalry, peltasts,
and marines, with the remainder of his force, near the marsh on the
other side of the city. At daybreak he pushed forward both divisions.
The citizens of Ephesus, on their side, were not slow to protect
themselves. They had to aid them the troops brought up by Tissaphernes,
as well as two detachments of Syracusans, consisting of the crews of
their former twenty vessels and those of five new vessels which had
opportunely arrived quite recently under Eucles, the son of Hippon,
and Heracleides, the son of Aristogenes, together with two Selinuntian
vessels. All these several forces first attacked the heavy infantry
near Coressus; these they routed, killing about one hundred of them, and
driving the remainder down into the sea. They then turned to deal with
the second division on the marsh. Here, too, the Athenians were put to
flight, and as many as three hundred of them perished. On this spot the
Ephesians erected a trophy, and another at Coressus. The valour of the
Syracusans and Selinuntians had been so conspicuous that the citizens
presented many of them, both publicly and privately, with prizes for
distinction in the field, besides offering the right of residence in
their city with certain immunities to all who at any time might wish to
live there. To the Selinuntians, indeed, as their own city had lately
been destroyed, they offered full citizenship.

The Athenians, after picking up their dead under a truce, set sail
for Notium, and having there buried the slain, continued their voyage
towards Lesbos and the Hellespont. Whilst lying at anchor in the harbour
of Methymna, in that island, they caught sight of the Syracusan vessels,
five-and-twenty in number, coasting along from Ephesus. They put out to
sea to attack them, and captured four ships with their crews, and chased
the remainder back to Ephesus. The prisoners were sent by Thrasylus to
Athens, with one exception. This was an Athenian, Alcibiades, who was a
cousin and fellow-exile of Alcibiades. Him Thrasylus released. (3) From
Methymna Thrasylus set sail to Sestos to join the main body of the army,
after which the united forces crossed to Lampsacus. And now winter was
approaching. It was the winter in which the Syracusan prisoners who had
been immured in the stone quarries of Piraeus dug through the rock and
escaped one night, some to Decelia and others to Megara. At Lampsacus
Alcibiades was anxious to marshal the whole military force there
collected in one body, but the old troops refused to be incorporated
with those of Thrasylus. "They, who had never yet been beaten, with
these newcomers who had just suffered a defeat." So they devoted the
winter to fortifying Lampsacus. They also made an expedition against
Abydos, where Pharnabazus, coming to the rescue of the place,
encountered them with numerous cavalry, but was defeated and forced
to flee, Alcibiades pursuing hard with his cavalry and one hundred and
twenty infantry under the command of Menander, till darkness intervened.
After this battle the soldiers came together of their own accord, and
freely fraternised with the troops of Thrasylus. This expedition was
followed by other incursions during the winter into the interior, where
they found plenty to do ravaging the king's territory.

 (3) Reading {apelusen}. Wolf's conjecture for the MSS. {katelousen} =
    stoned. See Thirlwall, "Hist. Gr." IV. xxix. 93 note.

It was at this period also that the Lacedaemonians allowed their
revolted helots from Malea, who had found an asylum at Coryphasium, to
depart under a flag of truce. It was also about the same period that the
Achaeans betrayed the colonists of Heracleia Trachinia, when they were
all drawn up in battle to meet the hostile Oetaeans, whereby as many
as seven hundred of them were lost, together with the governor (4) from
Lacedaemon, Labotas. Thus the year came to its close--a year marked
further by a revolt of the Medes from Darius, the king of Persia,
followed by renewed submission to his authority.

 (4) Technically {armostes} (harmost), i.e. administrator.



III

B.C. 408. The year following is the year in which the temple of Athena,
in Phocaea, was struck by lightning and set on fire. (1) With the
cessation of winter, in early spring, the Athenians set sail with the
whole of their force to Proconnesus, and thence advanced upon Chalcedon
and Byzantium, encamping near the former town. The men of Chalcedon,
aware of their approach, had taken the precaution to deposit all their
pillageable property with their neighbours, the Bithynian Thracians;
whereupon Alcibiades put himself at the head of a small body of heavy
infantry with the cavalry, and giving orders to the fleet to follow
along the coast, marched against the Bithynians and demanded back the
property of the Chalcedonians, threatening them with war in case of
refusal. The Bithynians delivered up the property. Returning to camp,
not only thus enriched, but with the further satisfaction of having
secured pledges of good behaviour from the Bithynians, Alcibiades set to
work with the whole of his troops to draw lines of circumvallation round
Chalcedon from sea to sea, so as to include as much of the river as
possible within his wall, which was made of timber. Thereupon the
Lacedaemonian governor, Hippocrates, let his troops out of the city and
offered battle, and the Athenians, on their side, drew up their forces
opposite to receive him; while Pharnabazus, from without the lines of
circumvallation, was still advancing with his army and large bodies of
horse. Hippocrates and Thrasylus engaged each other with their heavy
infantry for a long while, until Alcibiades, with a detachment of
infantry and the cavalry, intervened. Presently Hippocrates fell,
and the troops under him fled into the city; at the same instant
Pharnabazus, unable to effect a junction with the Lacedaemonian leader,
owing to the circumscribed nature of the ground and the close proximity
of the river to the enemy's lines, retired to the Heracleium, (2)
belonging to the Chalcedonians, where his camp lay. After this success
Alcibiades set off to the Hellespont and the Chersonese to raise money,
and the remaining generals came to terms with Pharnabazus in respect
of Chalcedon; according to these, the Persian satrap agreed to pay the
Athenians twenty talents (3) in behalf of the town, and to grant their
ambassadors a safe conduct up country to the king. It was further
stipulated by mutual consent and under oaths provided, that the
Chalcedonians should continue the payment of their customary tribute
to Athens, being also bound to discharge all outstanding debts. The
Athenians, on their side, were bound to desist from all hostilities
until the return of their ambassadors from the king. These oaths
were not witnessed by Alcibiades, who was now in the neighbourhood of
Selybria. Having taken that place, he presently appeared before the
walls of Byzantium at the head of the men of Chersonese, who came out
with their whole force; he was aided further by troops from Thrace and
more than three hundred horse. Accordingly Pharnabazus, insisting that
he too must take the oath, decided to remain in Chalcedon, and to await
his arrival from Byzantium. Alcibiades came, but was not prepared to
bind himself by any oaths, unless Pharnabazus would, on his side, take
oaths to himself. After this, oaths were exchanged between them by
proxy. Alcibiades took them at Chrysopolis in the presence of two
representatives sent by Pharnabazus--namely, Mitrobates and Arnapes.
Pharnabazus took them at Chalcedon in the presence of Euryptolemus and
Diotimus, who represented Alcibiades. Both parties bound themselves not
only by the general oath, but also interchanged personal pledges of good
faith.

 (1) The MSS. here give the words, "in the ephorate of Pantacles and
    the archonship of Antigenes, two-and-twenty years from the
    beginning of the war," but the twenty-second year of the war =
    B.C. 410; Antigenes archon, B.C. 407 = Ol. 93, 2; the passage must
    be regarded as a note mis-inserted by some editor or copyist (vide
    supra, I. 11.)

 (2) I.e. sacred place or temple of Heracles.

 (3) Twenty talents = 4800 pounds; or, more exactly, 4875 pounds.

This done, Pharnabazus left Chalcedon at once, with injunctions that
those who were going up to the king as ambassadors should meet him
at Cyzicus. The representatives of Athens were Dorotheus, Philodices,
Theogenes, Euryptolemus, and Mantitheus; with them were two Argives,
Cleostratus and Pyrrholochus. An embassy of the Lacedaemonians was also
about to make the journey. This consisted of Pasippidas and his fellows,
with whom were Hermocrates, now an exile from Syracuse, and his brother
Proxenus. So Pharnabazus put himself at their head. Meanwhile the
Athenians prosecuted the siege of Byzantium; lines of circumvallation
were drawn; and they diversified the blockade by sharpshooting at
long range and occasional assaults upon the walls. Inside the city lay
Clearchus, the Lacedaemonian governor, and a body of Perioci with a
small detachment of Neodamodes. (4) There was also a body of Megarians
under their general Helixus, a Megarian, and another body of Boeotians,
with their general Coeratadas. The Athenians, finding presently that
they could effect nothing by force, worked upon some of the inhabitants
to betray the place. Clearchus, meanwhile, never dreaming that any one
would be capable of such an act, had crossed over to the opposite
coast to visit Pharnabazus; he had left everything in perfect order,
entrusting the government of the city to Coeratadas and Helixus. His
mission was to obtain pay for the soldiers from the Persian satrap,
and to collect vessels from various quarters. Some were already in the
Hellespont, where they had been left as guardships by Pasippidas, or
else at Antandrus. Others formed the fleet which Agesandridas, who had
formerly served as a marine (5) under Mindarus, now commanded on the
Thracian coast. Others Clearchus purposed to have built, and with the
whole united squadron to so injure the allies of the Athenians as to
draw off the besieging army from Byzantium. But no sooner was he fairly
gone than those who were minded to betray the city set to work. Their
names were Cydon, Ariston, Anaxicrates, Lycurgus, and Anaxilaus. The
last-named was afterwards impeached for treachery in Lacedaemon on the
capital charge, and acquitted on the plea that, to begin with, he was
not a Lacedaemonian, but a Byzantine, and, so far from having betrayed
the city, he had saved it, when he saw women and children perishing of
starvation; for Clearchus had given away all the corn in the city to the
Lacedaemonian soldiers. It was for these reasons, as Anaxilaus himself
admitted, he had introduced the enemy, and not for the sake of money,
nor out of hatred to Lacedaemon.

 (4) According to the constitution of Lacedaemon the whole government
    was in Dorian hands. The subject population was divided into (1)
    Helots, who were State serfs. The children of Helots were at times
    brought up by Spartans and called "Mothakes"; Helots who had
    received their liberty were called "Neodamodes" ({neodamodeis}).
    After the conquest of Messenia this class was very numerous. (2)
    Perioeci. These were the ancient Achaean inhabitants, living in
    towns and villages, and managing their own affairs, paying
    tribute, and serving in the army as heavy-armed soldiers. In 458
    B.C. they were said to number thirty thousand. The Spartans
    themselves were divided, like all Dorians, into three tribes,
    Hylleis, Dymanes, and Pamphyli, each of which tribes was divided
    into ten "obes," which were again divided into {oikoi} or families
    possessed of landed properties. In 458 B.C. there were said to be
    nine thousand such families; but in course of time, through
    alienation of lands, deaths in war, and other causes, their
    numbers were much diminished; and in many cases there was a loss
    of status, so that in the time of Agis III., B.C. 244, we hear of
    two orders of Spartans, the {omoioi} and the {upomeiones}
    (inferiors); seven hundred Spartans (families) proper and one
    hundred landed proprietors. See Mullers "Dorians," vol. ii. bk.
    iii. ch. x. S. 3 (Eng. trans.); Arist. "Pol." ii. 9, 15; Plut.
    ("Agis").

 (5) The greek word is {epibates}, which some think was the title of an
    inferior naval officer in the Spartan service, but there is no
    proof of this. Cf. Thuc. viii. 61, and Prof. Jowett's note; also
    Grote, "Hist. of Greece," viii. 27 (2d ed.)

As soon as everything was ready, these people opened the gates leading
to the Thracian Square, as it is called, and admitted the Athenian
troops with Alcibiades at their head. Helixus and Coeratadas, in
complete ignorance of the plot, hastened to the Agora with the whole
of the garrison, ready to confront the danger; but finding the enemy in
occupation, they had nothing for it but to give themselves up. They were
sent off as prisoners to Athens, where Coeratadas, in the midst of the
crowd and confusion of debarkation at Piraeus, gave his guards the slip,
and made his way in safety to Decelia.



IV

B.C. 407. Pharnabazus and the ambassadors were passing the winter at
Gordium in Phrygia, when they heard of the occurrences at Byzantium.
Continuing their journey to the king's court in the commencement of
spring, they were met by a former embassy, which was now on its return
journey. These were the Lacedaemonian ambassadors, Boeotius and his
party, with the other envoys; who told them that the Lacedaemonians had
obtained from the king all they wanted. One of the company was Cyrus,
the new governor of all the seaboard districts, who was prepared to
co-operate with the Lacedaemonians in war. He was the bearer, moreover,
of a letter with the royal seal attached. It was addressed to all the
populations of Lower Asia, and contained the following words: "I send
down Cyrus as 'Karanos'" (1)--that is to say, supreme lord--"over all
those who muster at Castolus." The ambassadors of the Athenians, even
while listening to this announcement, and indeed after they had seen
Cyrus, were still desirous, if possible, to continue their journey to
the king, or, failing that, to return home. Cyrus, however, urged upon
Pharnabazus either to deliver them up to himself, or to defer sending
them home at present; his object being to prevent the Athenians learning
what was going on. Pharnabazus, wishing to escape all blame, for the
time being detained them, telling them, at one time, that he would
presently escort them up country to the king, and at another time that
he would send them safe home. But when three years had elapsed, he
prayed Cyrus to let them go, declaring that he had taken an oath to
bring them back to the sea, in default of escorting them up to the king.
Then at last they received safe conduct to Ariobarzanes, with orders for
their further transportation. The latter conducted them a stage further,
to Cius in Mysia; and from Cius they set sail to join their main
armament.

 (1) {Karanos.} Is this a Greek word, a Doric form, {karanos}, akin to
    {kara} (cf. {karenon}) = chief? or is it not more likely a Persian
    or native word, Karanos? and might not the title be akin
    conceivably to the word {korano}, which occurs on many Indo-
    Bactrian coins (see A. von Sallet, "Die Nachfolger Alexanders des
    Grossen," p. 57, etc.)? or is {koiranos} the connecting link? The
    words translated "that is to say, supreme lord," {to de karanon
    esti kurion}, look very like a commentator's gloss.

Alcibiades, whose chief desire was to return home to Athens with the
troops, immediately set sail for Samos; and from that island, taking
twenty of the ships, he sailed to the Ceramic Gulf of Caria, where he
collected a hundred talents, and so returned to Samos.

Thrasybulus had gone Thrace-wards with thirty ships. In this quarter he
reduced various places which had revolted to Lacedaemon, including
the island of Thasos, which was in a bad plight, the result of wars,
revolutions, and famine.

Thrasylus, with the rest of the army, sailed back straight to Athens.
On his arrival he found that the Athenians had already chosen as their
general Alcibiades, who was still in exile, and Thrasybulus, who was
also absent, and as a third, from among those at home, Conon.

Meanwhile Alcibiades, with the moneys lately collected and his fleet of
twenty ships, left Samos and visited Paros. From Paros he stood out to
sea across to Gytheum, (2) to keep an eye on the thirty ships of war
which, as he was informed, the Lacedaemonians were equipping in that
arsenal. Gytheum would also be a favourable point of observation
from which to gauge the disposition of his fellow-countrymen and the
prospects of his recall. When at length their good disposition seemed
to him established, not only by his election as general, but by the
messages of invitation which he received in private from his friends, he
sailed home, and entered Piraeus on the very day of the festival of the
Plunteria, (3) when the statue of Athena is veiled and screened from
public gaze. This was a coincidence, as some thought, of evil omen,
and unpropitious alike to himself and the State, for no Athenian would
transact serious business on such a day.

 (2) Gytheum, the port and arsenal of Sparta, situated near the head of
    the Laconian Gulf (now Marathonisi).

 (3) {ta Plunteria}, or feast of washings, held on the 25th of the
    month Thargelion, when the image of the goddess Athena was
    stripped in order that her clothes might be washed by the
    Praxiergidae; neither assembly nor court was held on that day, and
    the Temple was closed.

As he sailed into the harbour, two great crowds--one from the Piraeus,
the other from the city (4)--flocked to meet the vessels. Wonderment,
mixed with a desire to see Alcibiades, was the prevailing sentiment of
the multitude. Of him they spoke: some asserting that he was the best
of citizens, and that in his sole instance banishment had been
ill-deserved. He had been the victim of plots, hatched in the brains
of people less able than himself, however much they might excel in
pestilent speech; men whose one principle of statecraft was to look to
their private gains; whereas this man's policy had ever been to uphold
the common weal, as much by his private means as by all the power of the
State. His own choice, eight years ago, when the charge of impiety in
the matter of the mysteries was still fresh, would have been to submit
to trial at once. It was his personal foes, who had succeeded in
postponing that undeniably just procedure; who waited till his back was
turned, and then robbed him of his fatherland. Then it was that, being
made the very slave of circumstance, he was driven to court the men he
hated most; and at a time when his own life was in daily peril, he must
see his dearest friends and fellow-citizens, nay, the very State itself,
bent on a suicidal course, and yet, in the exclusion of exile, be unable
to lend a helping hand. "It is not men of this stamp," they averred,
"who desire changes in affairs and revolution: had he not already
guaranteed to him by the Democracy a position higher than that of his
equals in age, and scarcely if at all inferior to his seniors? How
different was the position of his enemies. It had been the fortune of
these, though they were known to be the same men they had always been,
to use their lately acquired power for the destruction in the first
instance of the better classes; and then, being alone left surviving, to
be accepted by their fellow-citizens in the absence of better men."

 (4) Or, "collected to meet the vessels from curiosity and a desire to
    see Alcibiades."

Others, however, insisted that for all their past miseries and
misfortunes Alcibiades alone was responsible: "If more trials were still
in store for the State, here was the master mischief-maker ready at his
post to precipitate them."

When the vessels came to their moorings, close to the land, Alcibiades,
from fear of his enemies, was unwilling to disembark at once. Mounting
on the quarterdeck, he scanned the multitude, (5) anxious to make
certain of the presence of his friends. Presently his eyes lit upon
Euryptolemus, the son of Peisianax, who was his cousin, and then on the
rest of his relations and other friends. Upon this he landed, and so,
in the midst of an escort ready to put down any attempt upon his person,
made his way to the city.

 (5) Or, "he looked to see if his friends were there."

In the Senate and Public Assembly (6) he made speeches, defending
himself against the charge of impiety, and asserting that he had been
the victim of injustice, with other like topics, which in the present
temper of the assembly no one ventured to gainsay.

 (6) Technically the "Boule" ({Boule}) or Senate, and "Ecclesia" or
    Popular Assembly.

He was then formally declared leader and chief of the State, with
irresponsible powers, as being the sole individual capable of recovering
the ancient power and prestige of Athens. Armed with this authority, his
first act was to institute anew the processional march to Eleusis;
for of late years, owing to the war, the Athenians had been forced to
conduct the mysteries by sea. Now, at the head of the troops, he caused
them to be conducted once again by land. This done, his next step was
to muster an armament of one thousand five hundred heavy infantry, one
hundred and fifty cavalry, and one hundred ships; and lastly, within
three months of his return, he set sail for Andros, which had revolted
from Athens.

The generals chosen to co-operate with him on land were Aristocrates and
Adeimantus, the son of Leucophilides. He disembarked his troops on the
island of Andros at Gaurium, and routed the Andrian citizens who sallied
out from the town to resist the invader; forcing them to return and keep
close within their walls, though the number who fell was not large.
This defeat was shared by some Lacedaemonians who were in the place.
Alcibiades erected a trophy, and after a few days set sail himself for
Samos, which became his base of operations in the future conduct of the
war.



V

At a date not much earlier than that of the incidents just described,
the Lacedaemonians had sent out Lysander as their admiral, in the place
of Cratesippidas, whose period of office had expired. The new admiral
first visited Rhodes, where he got some ships, and sailed to Cos and
Miletus, and from the latter place to Ephesus. At Ephesus he waited with
seventy sail, expecting the advent of Cyrus in Sardis, when he at once
went up to pay the prince a visit with the ambassadors from Lacedaemon.
And now an opportunity was given to denounce the proceedings of
Tissaphernes, and at the same time to beg Cyrus himself to show as much
zeal as possible in the prosecution of the war. Cyrus replied that not
only had he received express injunction from his father to the same
effect, but that his own views coincided with their wishes, which he was
determined to carry out to the letter. He had, he informed them, brought
with him five hundred talents; (1) and if that sum failed, he had still
the private revenue, which his father allowed him, to fall back upon,
and when this resource was in its turn exhausted, he would coin the gold
and silver throne on which he sat, into money for their benefit. (2)

 (1) About 120,000 pounds. One Euboic or Attic talent = sixty minae =
    six thousand drachmae = 243 pounds 15 shillings of our money.

 (2) Cf. the language of Tissaphernes, Thuc. viii. 81.

His audience thanked him for what he said, and further begged him to
fix the rate of payment for the seamen at one Attic drachma per man, (3)
explaining that should this rate of payment be adopted, the sailors of
the Athenians would desert, and in the end there would be a saving
of expenditure. Cyrus complimented them on the soundness of their
arguments, but said that it was not in his power to exceed the
injunctions of the king. The terms of agreement were precise, thirty
minae (4) a month per vessel to be given, whatever number of vessels the
Lacedaemonians might choose to maintain.

 (3) About 9 3/4 pence; a drachma (= six obols) would be very high pay
    for a sailor--indeed, just double the usual amount. See Thuc. vi.
    8 and viii. 29, and Prof. Jowett ad loc. Tissaphernes had, in the
    winter of 412 B.C., distributed one month's pay among the
    Peloponnesian ships at this high rate of a drachma a day, "as his
    envoy had promised at Lacedaemon;" but this he proposed to reduce
    to half a drachma, "until he had asked the king's leave, promising
    that if he obtained it, he would pay the entire drachma. On the
    remonstrance, however, of Hermocrates, the Syracusan general, he
    promised to each man a payment of somewhat more than three obols."

 (4) Nearly 122 pounds; and thirty minae a month to each ship (the crew
    of each ship being taken at two hundred) = three obols a day to
    each man. The terms of agreement to which Cyrus refers may have
    been specified in the convention mentioned above in chap. iv,
    which Boeotius and the rest were so proud to have obtained. But
    see Grote, "Hist. of Greece," vol. viii. p. 192 note (2d ed.)

To this rejoinder Lysander at the moment said nothing. But after dinner,
when Cyrus drank to his health, asking him "What he could do to gratify
him most?" Lysander replied, "Add an obol (5) to the sailors' pay."
After this the pay was raised to four instead of three obols, as it
hitherto had been. Nor did the liberality of Cyrus end here; he not only
paid up all arrears, but further gave a month's pay in advance, so that,
if the enthusiasm of the army had been great before, it was greater than
ever now. The Athenians when they heard the news were proportionately
depressed, and by help of Tissaphernes despatched ambassadors to Cyrus.
That prince, however, refused to receive them, nor were the prayers of
Tissaphernes of any avail, however much he insisted that Cyrus should
adopt the policy which he himself, on the advice of Alcibiades, had
persistently acted on. This was simply not to suffer any single Hellenic
state to grow strong at the expense of the rest, but to keep them all
weak alike, distracted by internecine strife.

 (5) An obol = one-sixth of a drachma; the Attic obol = rather more
    than 1 1/2 pence.

Lysander, now that the organisation of his navy was arranged to his
satisfaction, beached his squadron of ninety vessels at Ephesus, and
sat with hands folded, whilst the vessels dried and underwent repairs.
Alcibiades, being informed that Thrasybulus had come south of the
Hellespont and was fortifying Phocaea, sailed across to join him,
leaving his own pilot Antiochus in command of the fleet, with orders
not to attack Lysander's fleet. Antiochus, however, was tempted to leave
Notium and sail into the harbour of Ephesus with a couple of ships, his
own and another, past the prows of Lysander's squadron. The Spartan at
first contented himself with launching a few of his ships, and started
in pursuit of the intruder; but when the Athenians came out with other
vessels to assist Antiochus, he formed his whole squadron into line of
battle, and bore down upon them, whereupon the Athenians followed suit,
and getting their remaining triremes under weigh at Notium, stood out to
sea as fast as each vessel could clear the point. (6) Thus it befell in
the engagement which ensued, that while the enemy was in due order, the
Athenians came up in scattered detachments and without concert, and in
the end were put to flight with the loss of fifteen ships of war. Of the
crews, indeed, the majority escaped, though a certain number fell into
the hands of the enemy. Then Lysander collected his vessels, and having
erected a trophy on Cape Notium, sailed across to Ephesus, whilst the
Athenians retired to Samos.

 (6) {os ekastos enoixen}, for this nautical term see above.

On his return to Samos a little later, Alcibiades put out to sea with
the whole squadron in the direction of the harbour of Ephesus. At the
mouth of the harbour he marshalled his fleet in battle order, and tried
to tempt the enemy to an engagement; but as Lysander, conscious of his
inferiority in numbers, refused to accept the challenge, he sailed
back again to Samos. Shortly after this the Lacedaemonians captured
Delphinium and Eion. (7)

 (7) This should probably be Teos, in Ionia, in spite of the MSS.
    {'Eiona}. The place referred to cannot at any rate be the well-
    known Eion at the mouth of the Strymon in Thrace.

But now the news of the late disaster at Notium had reached the
Athenians at home, and in their indignation they turned upon Alcibiades,
to whose negligence and lack of self-command they attributed
the destruction of the ships. Accordingly they chose ten new
generals--namely Conon, Diomedon, Leon, Pericles, Erasinides,
Aristocrates, Archestratus, Protomachus, Thrasylus, and Aristogenes.
Alcibiades, who was moreover in bad odour in the camp, sailed away with
a single trireme to his private fortress in the Chersonese.

After this Conon, in obedience to a decree of the Athenian people,
set sail from Andros with the twenty vessels under his command in that
island to Samos, and took command of the whole squadron. To fill the
place thus vacated by Conon, Phanosthenes was sent to Andros with four
ships. That captain was fortunate enough to intercept and capture
two Thurian ships of war, crews and all, and these captives were all
imprisoned by the Athenians, with the exception of their leader Dorieus.
He was the Rhodian, who some while back had been banished from Athens
and from his native city by the Athenians, when sentence of death was
passed upon him and his family. This man, who had once enjoyed the
right of citizenship among them, they now took pity on and released him
without ransom.

When Conon had reached Samos he found the armament in a state of great
despondency. Accordingly his first measure was to man seventy ships with
their full complement, instead of the former hundred and odd vessels.
With this squadron he put to sea accompanied by the other generals,
and confined himself to making descents first at one point and then at
another of the enemy's territory, and to collecting plunder.

And so the year drew to its close: a year signalled further by an
invasion of Sicily by the Carthaginians, with one hundred and twenty
ships of war and a land force of one hundred and twenty thousand men,
which resulted in the capture of Agrigentum. The town was finally
reduced to famine after a siege of seven months, the invaders having
previously been worsted in battle and forced to sit down before its
walls for so long a time.



VI

B.C. 406. In the following year--the year of the evening eclipse of the
moon, and the burning of the old temple of Athena (1) at Athens (2)--the
Lacedaemonians sent out Callicratidas to replace Lysander, whose period
of office had now expired. (3) Lysander, when surrendering the squadron
to his successor, spoke of himself as the winner of a sea fight, which
had left him in undisputed mastery of the sea, and with this boast
he handed over the ships to Callicratidas, who retorted, "If you will
convey the fleet from Ephesus, keeping Samos (4) on your right" (that
is, past where the Athenian navy lay), "and hand it over to me at
Miletus, I will admit that you are master of the sea." But Lysander
had no mind to interfere in the province of another officer. Thus
Callicratidas assumed responsibility. He first manned, in addition
to the squadron which he received from Lysander, fifty new vessels
furnished by the allies from Chios and Rhodes and elsewhere. When all
these contingents were assembled, they formed a total of one hundred and
forty sail, and with these he began making preparations for engagement
with the enemy. But it was impossible for him not to note the strong
current of opposition which he encountered from the friends of Lysander.
Not only was there lack of zeal in their service, but they openly
disseminated an opinion in the States, that it was the greatest possible
blunder on the part of the Lacedaemonians so to change their admirals.
Of course, they must from time to time get officers altogether unfit for
the post--men whose nautical knowledge dated from yesterday, and who,
moreover, had no notion of dealing with human beings. It would be very
odd if this practice of sending out people ignorant of the sea and
unknown to the folk of the country did not lead to some catastrophe.
Callicratidas at once summoned the Lacedaemonians there present, and
addressed them in the following terms:--

 (1) I.e. as some think, the Erechtheion, which was built partly on the
    site of the old temple of Athena Polias, destroyed by the
    Persians. According to Dr. Dorpfeld, a quite separate building of
    the Doric order, the site of which (S. of the Erechtheion) has
    lately been discovered.

 (2) The MSS. here add "in the ephorate of Pityas and the archonship of
    Callias at Athens;" but though the date is probably correct (cf.
    Leake, "Topography of Athens," vol. i. p. 576 foll.), the words
    are almost certainly a gloss.

 (3) Here the MSS. add "with the twenty-fourth year of the war,"
    probably an annotator's gloss; the correct date should be twenty-
    fifth. Pel. war 26 = B.C. 406. Pel. war 25 ended B.C. 407.

 (4) Lit. on the left (or east) of Samos, looking south from Ephesus.

"For my part," he said, "I am content to stay at home: and if Lysander
or any one else claim greater experience in nautical affairs than I
possess, I have no desire to block his path. Only, being sent out by the
State to take command of this fleet, I do not know what is left to
me, save to carry out my instructions to the best of my ability. For
yourselves, all I beg of you, in reference to my personal ambitions and
the kind of charges brought against our common city, and of which you
are as well aware as I am, is to state what you consider to be the best
course: am I to stay where I am, or shall I sail back home, and explain
the position of affairs out here?"

No one ventured to suggest any other course than that he should obey the
authorities, and do what he was sent to do. Callicratidas then went up
to the court of Cyrus to ask for further pay for the sailors, but
the answer he got from Cyrus was that he should wait for two days.
Callicratidas was annoyed at the rebuff: to dance attendance at the
palace gates was little to his taste. In a fit of anger he cried out
at the sorry condition of the Hellenes, thus forced to flatter the
barbarian for the sake of money. "If ever I get back home," he added,
"I will do what in me lies to reconcile the Athenians and the
Lacedaemonians." And so he turned and sailed back to Miletus. From
Miletus he sent some triremes to Lacedaemon to get money, and convoking
the public assembly of the Milesians, addressed them thus:--

"Men of Miletus, necessity is laid upon me to obey the rulers at home;
but for yourselves, whose neighbourhood to the barbarians has exposed
you to many evils at their hands, I only ask you to let your zeal in the
war bear some proportion to your former sufferings. You should set
an example to the rest of the allies, and show us how to inflict the
sharpest and swiftest injury on our enemy, whilst we await the return
from Lacedaemon of my envoys with the necessary funds. Since one of the
last acts of Lysander, before he left us, was to hand back to Cyrus the
funds already on the spot, as though we could well dispense with them. I
was thus forced to turn to Cyrus, but all I got from him was a series of
rebuffs; he refused me an audience, and, for my part, I could not induce
myself to hang about his gates like a mendicant. But I give you my word,
men of Miletus, that in return for any assistance which you can render
us while waiting for these aids, I will requite you richly. Only by
God's help let us show these barbarians that we do not need to worship
them, in order to punish our foes."

The speech was effective; many members of the assembly arose, and not
the least eagerly those who were accused of opposing him. These, in some
terror, proposed a vote of money, backed by offers of further private
contributions. Furnished with these sums, and having procured from Chios
a further remittance of five drachmas (5) a piece as outfit for each
seaman, he set sail to Methyma in Lesbos, which was in the hands of the
enemy. But as the Methymnaeans were not disposed to come over to him
(since there was an Athenian garrison in the place, and the men at the
head of affairs were partisans of Athens), he assaulted and took the
place by storm. All the property within accordingly became the spoil of
the soldiers. The prisoners were collected for sale by Callicratidas
in the market-place, where, in answer to the demand of the allies, who
called upon him to sell the Methymnaeans also, he made answer, that as
long as he was in command, not a single Hellene should be enslaved if
he could help it. The next day he set at liberty the free-born captives;
the Athenian garrison with the captured slaves he sold. (6) To Conon
he sent word:--He would put a stop to his strumpeting the sea. (7) And
catching sight of him, as he put out to sea, at break of day, he gave
chase, hoping to cut him off from his passage to Samos, and prevent his
taking refuge there.

 (5) About 4d.

 (6) Grote, "Hist. of Greece," vol. viii. p. 224 (2d ed.), thinks that
    Callicratidas did not even sell the Athenian garrison, as if the
    sense of the passage were: "The next day he set at liberty the
    free-born captives with the Athenian garrison, contenting himself
    with selling the captive slaves." But I am afraid that no
    ingenuity of stopping will extract that meaning from the Greek
    words, which are, {te d' usteraia tous men eleutherous apheke tous
    de ton 'Athenaion phrourous kai ta andrapoda ta doula panta
    apedoto}. To spare the Athenian garrison would have been too
    extraordinary a proceeding even for Callicratidas. The idea
    probably never entered his head. It was sufficiently noble for him
    to refuse to sell the Methymnaeans. See the remarks of Mr. W. L.
    Newman, "The Pol. of Aristotle," vol. i. p. 142.

 (7) I.e. the sea was Sparta's bride.

But Conon, aided by the sailing qualities of his fleet, the rowers of
which were the pick of several ships' companies, concentrated in a few
vessels, made good his escape, seeking shelter within the harbour of
Mitylene in Lesbos, and with him two of the ten generals, Leon and
Erasinides. Callicratidas, pursuing him with one hundred and seventy
sail, entered the harbour simultaneously; and Conon thus hindered from
further or final escape by the too rapid movements of the enemy, was
forced to engage inside the harbour, and lost thirty of his ships,
though the crews escaped to land. The remaining, forty in number, he
hauled up under the walls of the town. Callicratidas, on his side, came
to moorings in the harbour; and, having command of the exit, blocked the
Athenian within. His next step was to send for the Methymnaeans in force
by land, and to transport his army across from Chios. Money also came to
him from Cyrus.

Conon, finding himself besieged by land and sea, without means of
providing himself with corn from any quarter, the city crowded with
inhabitants, and aid from Athens, whither no news of the late events
could be conveyed, impossible, launched two of the fastest sailing
vessels of his squadron. These he manned, before daybreak, with the best
rowers whom he could pick out of the fleet, stowing away the marines at
the same time in the hold of the ships and closing the port shutters.
Every day for four days they held out in this fashion, but at evening as
soon as it was dark he disembarked his men, so that the enemy might not
suspect what they were after. On the fifth day, having got in a small
stock of provisions, when it was already mid-day and the blockaders were
paying little or no attention, and some of them even were taking their
siesta, the two ships sailed out of the harbour: the one directing her
course towards the Hellespont, whilst her companion made for the open
sea. Then, on the part of the blockaders, there was a rush to the scene
of action, as fast as the several crews could get clear of land, in
bustle and confusion, cutting away the anchors, and rousing themselves
from sleep, for, as chance would have it, they had been breakfasting on
shore. Once on board, however, they were soon in hot pursuit of the
ship which had started for the open sea, and ere the sun dipped they
overhauled her, and after a successful engagement attached her by cables
and towed her back into harbour, crew and all. Her comrade, making for
the Hellespont, escaped, and eventually reached Athens with news of
the blockade. The first relief was brought to the blockaded fleet by
Diomedon, who anchored with twelve vessels in the Mitylenaean Narrows.
(8) But a sudden attack of Callicratidas, who bore down upon him without
warning, cost him ten of his vessels, Diomedon himself escaping with his
own ship and one other.

 (8) Or, "Euripus."

Now that the position of affairs, including the blockade, was fully
known at Athens, a vote was passed to send out a reinforcement of one
hundred and ten ships. Every man of ripe age, (9) whether slave or free,
was impressed for this service, so that within thirty days the whole one
hundred and ten vessels were fully manned and weighed anchor. Amongst
those who served in this fleet were also many of the knights. (10)
The fleet at once stood out across to Samos, and picked up the Samian
vessels in that island. The muster-roll was swelled by the addition of
more than thirty others from the rest of the allies, to whom the same
principle of conscription applied, as also it did to the ships already
engaged on foreign service. The actual total, therefore, when all the
contingents were collected, was over one hundred and fifty vessels.

 (9) I.e. from eighteen to sixty years.

 (10) See Boeckh. "P. E. A." Bk. II. chap. xxi. p. 263 (Eng. trans.)

Callicratidas, hearing that the relief squadron had already reached
Samos, left fifty ships, under command of Eteonicus, in the harbour of
Mitylene, and setting sail with the other one hundred and twenty, hove
to for the evening meal off Cape Malea in Lesbos, opposite Mitylene. It
so happened that the Athenians on this day were supping on the islands
of Arginusae, which lie opposite Lesbos. In the night the Spartan not
only saw their watch-fires, but received positive information that
"these were the Athenians;" and about midnight he got under weigh,
intending to fall upon them suddenly. But a violent downpour of rain
with thunder and lightning prevented him putting out to sea. By daybreak
it had cleared, and he sailed towards Arginusae. On their side, the
Athenian squadron stood out to meet him, with their left wing
facing towards the open sea, and drawn up in the following
order:--Aristocrates, in command of the left wing, with fifteen ships,
led the van; next came Diomedon with fifteen others, and immediately in
rear of Aristocrates and Diomedon respectively, as their supports, came
Pericles and Erasinides. Parallel with Diomedon were the Samians, with
their ten ships drawn up in single line, under the command of a Samian
officer named Hippeus. Next to these came the ten vessels of the
taxiarchs, also in single line, and supporting them, the three ships of
the navarchs, with any other allied vessels in the squadron. The right
wing was entrusted to Protomachus with fifteen ships, and next to him
(on the extreme right) was Thrasylus with another division of fifteen.
Protomachus was supported by Lysias with an equal number of ships, and
Thrasylus by Aristogenes. The object of this formation was to prevent
the enemy from manouvring so as to break their line by striking them
amidships, (11) since they were inferior in sailing power.

 (11) Lit. "by the diekplous." Cf. Thuc. i. 49, and Arnold's note, who
    says: "The 'diecplus' was a breaking through the enemy's line in
    order by a rapid turning of the vessel to strike the enemy's ship
    on the side or stern, where it was most defenceless, and so to
    sink it." So, it seems, "the superiority of nautical skill has
    passed," as Grote (viii. p. 234) says, "to the Peloponnesians and
    their allies." Well may the historian add, "How astonished would
    the Athenian Admiral Phormion have been, if he could have
    witnessed the fleets and the order of battle at Arginusae!" See
    Thuc. iv. 11.

The Lacedaemonians, on the contrary, trusting to their superior
seamanship, were formed opposite with their ships all in single line,
with the special object of manouvring so as either to break the enemy's
line or to wheel round them. Callicratidas commanded the right wing
in person. Before the battle the officer who acted as his pilot, the
Megarian Hermon, suggested that it might be well to withdraw the fleet
as the Athenian ships were far more numerous. But Callicratidas replied
that Sparta would be no worse off even if he personally should perish,
but to flee would be disgraceful. (12) And now the fleets approached,
and for a long space the battle endured. At first the vessels were
engaged in crowded masses, and later on in scattered groups. At length
Callicratidas, as his vessel dashed her beak into her antagonist,
was hurled off into the sea and disappeared. At the same instant
Protomachus, with his division on the right, had defeated the enemy's
left, and then the flight of the Peloponnesians began towards Chios,
though a very considerable body of them made for Phocaea, whilst the
Athenians sailed back again to Arginusae. The losses on the side of the
Athenians were twenty-five ships, crews and all, with the exception of
the few who contrived to reach dry land. On the Peloponnesian side, nine
out of the ten Lacedaemonian ships, and more than sixty belonging to the
rest of the allied squadron, were lost.

 (12) For the common reading, {oikeitai}, which is ungrammatical,
    various conjectures have been made, e.g.

      {oikieitai} = "would be none the worse off for citizens,"
      {oikesetai} = "would be just as well administered without him,"

    but as the readings and their renderings are alike doubtful, I
    have preferred to leave the matter vague. Cf. Cicero, "De Offic."
    i. 24; Plutarch, "Lac. Apophth." p. 832.

After consultation the Athenian generals agreed that two captains
of triremes, Theramenes and Thrasybulus, accompanied by some of the
taxiarchs, should take forty-seven ships and sail to the assistance
of the disabled fleet and of the men on board, whilst the rest of the
squadron proceeded to attack the enemy's blockading squadron under
Eteonicus at Mitylene. In spite of their desire to carry out this
resolution, the wind and a violent storm which arose prevented them. So
they set up a trophy, and took up their quarters for the night. As to
Etenoicus, the details of the engagement were faithfully reported to
him by the express despatch-boat in attendance. On receipt of the news,
however, he sent the despatch-boat out again the way she came, with
an injunction to those on board of her to sail off quickly without
exchanging a word with any one. Then on a sudden they were to return
garlanded with wreaths of victory and shouting "Callicratidas has won
a great sea fight, and the whole Athenian squadron is destroyed." This
they did, and Eteonicus, on his side, as soon as the despatch-boat came
sailing in, proceeded to offer sacrifice of thanksgiving in honour of
the good news. Meanwhile he gave orders that the troops were to take
their evening meal, and that the masters of the trading ships were
silently to stow away their goods on board the merchant ships and make
sail as fast as the favourable breeze could speed them to Chios. The
ships of war were to follow suit with what speed they might. This done,
he set fire to his camp, and led off the land forces to Methymna. Conon,
finding the enemy had made off, and the wind had grown comparatively
mild, (13) got his ships afloat, and so fell in with the Athenian
squadron, which had by this time set out from Arginusae. To these he
explained the proceedings of Eteonicus. The squadron put into Mitylene,
and from Mitylene stood across to Chios, and thence, without effecting
anything further, sailed back to Samos.

 (13) Or, "had changed to a finer quarter."



VII

All the above-named generals, with the exception of Conon, were
presently deposed by the home authorities. In addition to Conon two new
generals were chosen, Adeimantus and Philocles. Of those concerned in
the late victory two never returned to Athens: these were Protomachus
and Aristogenes. The other six sailed home. Their names were Pericles,
Diomedon, Lysias, Aristocrates, Thrasylus, and Erasinides. On their
arrival Archidemus, the leader of the democracy at that date, who had
charge of the two obol fund, (1) inflicted a fine on Erasinides, and
accused him before the Dicastery (2) of having appropriated money
derived from the Hellespont, which belonged to the people. He brought
a further charge against him of misconduct while acting as general, and
the court sentenced him to imprisonment.

 (1) Reading {tes diobelais}, a happy conjecture for the MSS. {tes
    diokelias}, which is inexplicable. See Grote, "Hist. of Greece,"
    vol. viii. p. 244 note (2d ed.)

 (2) I.e. a legal tribunal or court of law. At Athens the free citizens
    constitutionally sworn and impannelled sat as "dicasts"
    ("jurymen," or rather as a bench of judges) to hear cases
    ({dikai}). Any particular board of dicasts formed a "dicastery."

These proceedings in the law court were followed by the statement of
the generals before the senate (3) touching the late victory and the
magnitude of the storm. Timocrates then proposed that the other
five generals should be put in custody and handed over to the public
assembly. (4) Whereupon the senate committed them all to prison. Then
came the meeting of the public assembly, in which others, and more
particularly Theramenes, formally accused the generals. He insisted
that they ought to show cause why they had not picked up the shipwrecked
crews. To prove that there had been no attempt on their part to attach
blame to others, he might point, as conclusive testimony, to the
despatch sent by the generals themselves to the senate and the people,
in which they attributed the whole disaster to the storm, and nothing
else. After this the generals each in turn made a defence, which was
necessarily limited to a few words, since no right of addressing
the assembly at length was allowed by law. Their explanation of the
occurrences was that, in order to be free to sail against the enemy
themselves, they had devolved the duty of picking up the shipwrecked
crews upon certain competent captains of men-of-war, who had themselves
been generals in their time, to wit Theramenes and Tharysbulus, and
others of like stamp. If blame could attach to any one at all with
regard to the duty in question, those to whom their orders had been
given were the sole persons they could hold responsible. "But," they
went on to say, "we will not, because these very persons have denounced
us, invent a lie, and say that Theramenes and Thrasybulus are to blame,
when the truth of the matter is that the magnitude of the storm alone
prevented the burial of the dead and the rescue of the living." In
proof of their contention, they produced the pilots and numerous other
witnesses from among those present at the engagement. By these arguments
they were in a fair way to persuade the people of their innocence.
Indeed many private citizens rose wishing to become bail for the
accused, but it was resolved to defer decision till another meeting
of the assembly. It was indeed already so late that it would have been
impossible to see to count the show of hands. It was further resolved
that the senate meanwhile should prepare a measure, to be introduced at
the next assembly, as to the mode in which the accused should take their
trial.

 (3) This is the Senate or Council of Five Hundred. One of its chief
    duties was to prepare measures for discussion in the assembly. It
    had also a certain amount of judicial power, hearing complaints
    and inflicting fines up to fifty drachmas. It sat daily, a
    "prytany" of fifty members of each of the ten tribes in rotation
    holding office for a month in turn.

 (4) This is the great Public Assembly (the Ecclesia), consisting of
    all genuine Athenian citizens of more than twenty years of age.

Then came the festival of the Aparturia, (5) with its family gatherings
of fathers and kinsfolk. Accordingly the party of Theramenes procured
numbers of people clad in black apparel, and close-shaven, (6) who were
to go in and present themselves before the public assembly in the middle
of the festival, as relatives, presumably, of the men who had perished;
and they persuaded Callixenus to accuse the generals in the senate. The
next step was to convoke the assembly, when the senate laid before it
the proposal just passed by their body, at the instance of Callixenus,
which ran as follows: "Seeing that both the parties to this case, to
wit, the prosecutors of the generals on the one hand, and the accused
themselves in their defence on the other, have been heard in the late
meeting of the assembly; we propose that the people of Athens now record
their votes, one and all, by their tribes; that a couple of voting urns
be placed for the convenience of each several tribe; and the public
crier in the hearing of each several tribe proclaim the mode of voting
as follows: 'Let every one who finds the generals guilty of not rescuing
the heroes of the late sea fight deposit his vote in urn No. 1. Let him
who is of the contrary opinion deposit his vote in urn No. 2. Further,
in the event of the aforesaid generals being found guilty, let death be
the penalty. Let the guilty persons be delivered over to the eleven. Let
their property be confiscated to the State, with the exception of one
tithe, which falls to the goddess.'"

 (5) An important festival held in October at Athens, and in nearly all
    Ionic cities. Its objects were (1) the recognition of a common
    descent from Ion, the son of Apollo Patrous; and (2) the
    maintenance of the ties of clanship. See Grote, "Hist. of Greece,"
    vol. viii. p. 260 foll. (2d ed.); Jebb, "Theophr." xviii. 5.

 (6) I.e. in sign of mourning.

Now there came forward in the assembly a man, who said that he had
escaped drowning by clinging to a meal tub. The poor fellows perishing
around him had commissioned him, if he succeeded in saving himself,
to tell the people of Athens how bravely they had fought for their
fatherland, and how the generals had left them there to drown.

Presently Euryptolemus, the son of Peisianax, and others served a
notice of indictment on Callixenus, insisting that his proposal was
unconstitutional, and this view of the case was applauded by some
members of the assembly. But the majority kept crying out that it was
monstrous if the people were to be hindered by any stray individual from
doing what seemed to them right. And when Lysicus, embodying the spirit
of those cries, formally proposed that if these persons would not
abandon their action, they should be tried by the same vote along with
the generals: a proposition to which the mob gave vociferous assent; and
so these were compelled to abandon their summonses. Again, when some of
the Prytanes (7) objected to put a resolution to the vote which was in
itself unconstitutional, Callixenus again got up and accused them in the
same terms, and the shouting began again. "Yes, summons all who refuse,"
until the Prytanes, in alarm, all agreed with one exception to permit
the voting. This obstinate dissentient was Socrates, the son of
Sophroniscus, who insisted that he would do nothing except in accordance
with the law. (8) After this Euryptolemus rose and spoke in behalf of
the generals. He said:--

 (7) Prytanes--the technical term for the senators of the presiding
    tribe, who acted as presidents of the assembly. Their chairman for
    the day was called Epistates.

 (8) For the part played by Socrates see further Xenophon's
    "Memorabilia," I. i. 18; IV. iv. 2.

"I stand here, men of Athens, partly to accuse Pericles, though he is a
close and intimate connection of my own, and Diomedon, who is my friend,
and partly to urge certain considerations on their behalf, but chiefly
to press upon you what seems to me the best course for the State
collectively. I hold them to blame in that they dissuaded their
colleagues from their intention to send a despatch to the senate and
this assembly, which should have informed you of the orders given to
Theramenes and Thrasybulus to take forty-seven ships of war and pick up
the shipwrecked crews, and of the neglect of the two officers to carry
out those orders. And it follows that though the offence was committed
by one or two, the responsibility must be shared by all; and in return
for kindness in the past, they are in danger at present of sacrificing
their lives to the machinations of these very men, and others whom I
could mention. In danger, do I say, of losing their lives? No, not so,
if you will suffer me to persuade you to do what is just and right; if
you will only adopt such a course as shall enable you best to discover
the truth and shall save you from too late repentance, when you find you
have transgressed irremediably against heaven and your own selves. In
what I urge there is no trap nor plot whereby you can be deceived by me
or any other man; it is a straightforward course which will enable
you to discover and punish the offender by whatever process you like,
collectively or individually. Let them have, if not more, at any rate
one whole day to make what defence they can for themselves; and trust to
your own unbiased judgment to guide you to the right conclusion.

"You know, men of Athens, the exceeding stringency of the decree of
Cannonus, (9) which orders that man, whosoever he be, who is guilty of
treason against the people of Athens, to be put in irons, and so to meet
the charge against him before the people. If he be convicted, he is to
be thrown into the Barathron and perish, and the property of such an one
is to be confiscated, with the exception of the tithe which falls to the
goddess. I call upon you to try these generals in accordance with this
decree. Yes, and so help me God--if it please you, begin with my own
kinsman Pericles for base would it be on my part to make him of more
account than the whole of the State. Or, if you prefer, try them by that
other law, which is directed against robbers of temples and betrayers
of their country, which says: if a man betray his city or rob a sacred
temple of the gods, he shall be tried before a law court, and if he be
convicted, his body shall not be buried in Attica, and his goods shall
be confiscated to the State. Take your choice as between these two laws,
men of Athens, and let the prisoners be tried by one or other. Let three
portions of a day be assigned to each respectively, one portion wherein
they shall listen to their accusation, a second wherein they shall make
their defence, and a third wherein you shall meet and give your votes in
due order on the question of their guilt or innocence. By this procedure
the malefactors will receive the desert of their misdeeds in full, and
those who are innocent will owe you, men of Athens, the recovery of
their liberty, in place of unmerited destruction. (10)

 (9) "There was a rule in Attic judicial procedure, called the psephism
    of Kannonus (originally adopted, we do not know when, on the
    proposition of a citizen of that name, as a psephism or decree for
    some particular case, but since generalised into common practice,
    and grown into great prescriptive reverence), which peremptorily
    forbade any such collective trial or sentence, and directed that a
    separate judicial vote should in all cases be taken for or against
    each accused party." Grote, "Hist. of Greece," vol. viii. p. 266
    (2d ed.)

 (10) Reading {adikos apolountai}.

"On your side, in trying the accused by recognised legal procedure, you
will show that you obey the dictates of pious feeling, and can regard
the sanctity of an oath, instead of joining hands with our enemies the
Lacedaemonians and fighting their battles. For is it not to fight their
battles, if you take their conquerors, the men who deprived them of
seventy vessels, and at the moment of victory sent them to perdition
untried and in the teeth of the law? What are you afraid of, that you
press forward with such hot haste? Do you imagine that you may be
robbed of the power of life and death over whom you please, should you
condescend to a legal trial? but that you are safe if you take shelter
behind an illegality, like the illegality of Callixenus, when he worked
upon the senate to propose to this assembly to deal with the accused by
a single vote? But consider, you may actually put to death an innocent
man, and then repentance will one day visit you too late. Bethink you
how painful and unavailing remorse will then be, and more particularly
if your error has cost a fellow-creature his life. What a travesty of
justice it would be if in the case of a man like Aristarchus, (11) who
first tried to destroy the democracy and then betrayed Oenoe to our
enemy the Thebans, you granted him a day for his defence, consulting his
wishes, and conceded to him all the other benefits of the law; whereas
now you are proposing to deprive of these same privileges your own
generals, who in every way conformed to your views and defeated your
enemies. Do not you, of all men, I implore you, men of Athens, act thus.
Why, these laws are your own, to them, beyond all else you owe your
greatness. Guard them jealously; in nothing, I implore you, act without
their sanction.

 (11) See below, II. iii; also cf. Thuc. viii. 90, 98.

"But now, turn for a moment and consider with me the actual occurrences
which have created the suspicion of misconduct on the part of our late
generals. The sea-fight had been fought and won, and the ships had
returned to land, when Diomedon urged that the whole squadron should
sail out in line and pick up the wrecks and floating crews. Erasinides
was in favour of all the vessels sailing as fast as possible to deal
with the enemy's forces at Mitylene. And Thrasylus represented that both
objects could be effected, by leaving one division of the fleet there,
and with the rest sailing against the enemy; and if this resolution were
agreed to, he advised that each of the eight generals should leave three
ships of his own division with the ten vessels of the taxiarchs, the
ten Samian vessels, and the three belonging to the navarchs. These added
together make forty-seven, four for each of the lost vessels, twelve
in number. Among the taxiarchs left behind, two were Thrasybulus and
Theramenes, the men who in the late meeting of this assembly undertook
to accuse the generals. With the remainder of the fleet they were to
sail to attack the enemy's fleet. Everything, you must admit, was duly
and admirably planned. It was only common justice, therefore, that those
whose duty it was to attack the enemy should render an account for
all miscarriages of operations against the enemy; while those who were
commissioned to pick up the dead and dying should, if they failed to
carry out the instructions of the generals, be put on trial to explain
the reasons of the failure. This indeed I may say in behalf of both
parites. It was really the storm which, in spite of what the generals
had planned, prevented anything being done. There are witnesses ready to
attest the truth of this: the men who escaped as by a miracle, and among
these one of these very generals, who was on a sinking ship and was
saved. And this man, who needed picking up as much as anybody at that
moment, is, they insist, to be tried by one and the same vote as those
who neglected to perform their orders! Once more, I beg you, men
of Athens, to accept your victory and your good fortune, instead of
behaving like the desperate victims of misfortune and defeat.
Recognise the finger of divine necessity; do not incur the reproach
of stony-heartedness by discovering treason where there was merely
powerlessness, and condemning as guilty those who were prevented by the
storm from carrying out their instructions. Nay! you will better satisfy
the demands of justice by crowning these conquerors with wreaths of
victory than by punishing them with death at the instigation of wicked
men."

At the conclusion of his speech Euryptolemus proposed, as an amendment,
that the prisoners should, in accordance with the decree of Cannonus, be
tried each separately, as against the proposal of the senate to try them
all by a single vote.

At the show of hands the tellers gave the majority in favour of
Euryptolemus's amendment, but upon the application of Menecles, who
took formal exception (12) to this decision, the show of hands was gone
through again, and now the verdict was in favour of the resolution of
the senate. At a later date the balloting was made, and by the votes
recorded the eight generals were condemned, and the six who were in
Athens were put to death.

 (12) For this matter cf. Schomann, "De Comitiis Athen." p. 161 foll.;
    also Grote, "Hist. of Grece," vol. viii. p. 276 note (2d ed.)

Not long after, repentance seized the Athenians, and they passed a
decree authorising the public prosecution of those who had deceived the
people, and the appointment of proper securities for their persons until
the trial was over. Callixenus was one of those committed for trail.
There were, besides Callixenus, four others against whom true bills were
declared, and they were all five imprisoned by their sureties. But all
subsequently effected their escape before the trial, at the time of the
sedition in which Cleophon (13) was killed. Callixenus eventually came
back when the party in Piraeus returned to the city, at the date of
the amnesty, (14) but only to die of hunger, an object of universal
detestation.

 (13) Cleophon, the well-known demagogue. For the occasion of his death
    see Grote, "Hist. of Greece," vol. viii. pp. 166, 310 (2d ed.);
    Prof. Jebb, "Attic Orators," i. 266, ii. 288. For his character,
    as popularly conceived, cf. Aristoph. "Frogs," 677.

 (14) B.C. 403.




BOOK II


I

To return to Eteonicus and his troops in Chios. During summer they
were well able to support themselves on the fruits of the season, or
by labouring for hire in different parts of the island, but with the
approach of winter these means of subsistence began to fail. Ill-clad at
the same time, and ill-shod, they fell to caballing and arranging plans
to attack the city of Chios. It was agreed amongst them, that in order
to gauge their numbers, every member of the conspiracy should carry a
reed. Eteonicus got wind of the design, but was at a loss how to deal
with it, considering the number of these reed-bearers. To make an open
attack upon them seemed dangerous. It would probably lead to a rush
to arms, in which the conspirators would seize the city and commence
hostilities, and, in the event of their success, everything hitherto
achieved would be lost. Or again, the destruction on his part of many
fellow-creatures and allies was a terrible alternative, which would
place the Spartans in an unenviable light with regard to the rest of
Hellas, and render the soldiers ill-disposed to the cause in hand.
Accordingly he took with him fifteen men, armed with daggers, and
marched through the city. Falling in with one of the reed-bearers, a man
suffering from ophthalmia, who was returning from the surgeon's house,
he put him to death. This led to some uproar, and people asked why the
man was thus slain. By Eteonicus's orders the answer was set afloat,
"because he carried a reed." As the explanation circulated, one
reed-bearer after another threw away the symbol, each one saying to
himself, as he heard the reason given, "I have better not be seen with
this." After a while Eteonicus called a meeting of the Chians, and
imposed upon them a contribution of money, on the ground that with pay
in their pockets the sailors would have no temptation to revolutionary
projects. The Chians acquiesced. Whereupon Eteonicus promptly ordered
his crews to get on board their vessels. He then rowed alongside
each ship in turn, and addressed the men at some length in terms of
encouragement and cheery admonition, just as though he knew nothing of
what had taken place, and so distributed a month's pay to every man on
board.

After this the Chians and the other allies held a meeting in Ephesus,
and, considering the present posture of affairs, determined to send
ambassadors to Lacedaemon with a statement of the facts, and a request
that Lysander might be sent out to take command of the fleet. Lysander's
high reputation among the allies dated back to his former period of
office, when as admiral he had won the naval victory of Notium. The
ambassadors accordingly were despatched, accompanied by envoys also from
Cyrus, charged with the same message. The Lacedaemonians responded by
sending them Lysander as second in command, (1) with Aracus as admiral,
since it was contrary to their custom that the same man should be
admiral twice. At the same time the fleet was entrusted to Lysander. (2)

 (1) Epistoleus. See above.

 (2) "At this date the war had lasted five-and-twenty years." So the
    MSS. read. The words are probably an interpolation.

It was in this year (3) that Cyrus put Autoboesaces and Mitraeus to
death. These were sons of the sister of Dariaeus (4) (the daughter of
Xerxes, the father of Darius). (5) He put them to death for neglecting,
when they met him, to thrust their hands into the sleeve (or "kore")
which is a tribute of respect paid to the king alone. This "kore" is
longer than the ordinary sleeve, so long in fact that a man with his
hand inside is rendered helpless. In consequence of this act on the part
of Cyrus, Hieramenes (6) and his wife urged upon Dariaeus the danger of
overlooking such excessive insolence on the part of the young prince,
and Dariaeus, on the plea of sickness, sent a special embassy to summon
Cyrus to his bedside.

 (3) B.C. 406.

 (4) Dariaeus, i.e. Darius, but the spelling of the name is correct,
    and occurs in Ctesias, though in the "Anabasis" we have the
    spelling Darius.

 (5) These words look like the note of a foolish and ignorant scribe.
    He ought to have written, "The daughter of Artaxerxes and own
    sister of Darius, commonly so called."

 (6) For Hieramenes cf. Thuc. viii. 95, and Prof. Jowett ad loc.

B.C. 405. In the following year (7) Lysander arrived at Ephesus, and
sent for Eteonicus with his ships from Chios, and collected all other
vessels elsewhere to be found. His time was now devoted to refitting the
old ships and having new ones built in Antandrus. He also made a journey
to the court of Cyrus with a request for money. All Cyrus could say
was, that not only the money sent by the king was spent, but much more
besides; and he pointed out the various sums which each of the admirals
had received, but at the same time he gave him what he asked for.
Furnished with this money, Lysander appointed captains to the different
men-of-war, and remitted to the sailors their arrears of pay. Meanwhile
the Athenian generals, on their side, were devoting their energies to
the improvements of their navy at Samos.

 (7) The MSS. add "during the ephorate of Archytas and the archonship
    at Athens of Alexias," which, though correct enough, is probably
    an interpolation.

It was now Cyrus's turn to send for Lysander. It was the moment at which
the envoy from his father had arrived with the message: "Your father is
on his sick-bed and desires your presence." The king lay at Thamneria,
in Media, near the territory of the Cadusians, against whom he had
marched to put down a revolt. When Lysander presented himself, Cyrus was
urgent with him not to engage the Athenians at sea unless he had many
more ships than they. "The king," he added, "and I have plenty of
wealth, so that, as far as money goes, you can man plenty of vessels."
He then consigned to him all the tributes from the several cities which
belonged to him personally, and gave him the ready money which he had
as a gift; and finally, reminding him of the sincere friendship he
entertained towards the state of Lacedaemon, as well as to himself
personally, he set out up country to visit his father. Lysander, finding
himself thus left with the complete control of the property of Cyrus
(during the absence of that prince, so summoned to the bedside of his
father), was able to distribute pay to his troops, after which he set
sail for the Ceramic Gulf of Caria. Here he stormed a city in alliance
with the Athenians named Cedreae, and on the following day's assault
took it, and reduced the inhabitants to slavery. These were of a mixed
Hellene and barbaric stock. From Cedreae he continued his voyage
to Rhodes. The Athenians meanwhile, using Samos as their base of
operations, were employed in devastating the king's territory, or in
swooping down upon Chios and Ephesus, and in general were preparing for
a naval battle, having but lately chosen three new generals in addition
to those already in office, whose names were Menander, Tydeus, and
Cephisodotus. Now Lysander, leaving Rhodes, and coasting along Ionia,
made his way to the Hellespont, having an eye to the passage of vessels
through the Straits, and, in a more hostile sense, on the cities which
had revolted from Sparta. The Athenians also set sail from Chios, but
stood out to open sea, since the seaboard of Asia was hostile to them.

Lysander was again on the move; leaving Abydos, he passed up channel to
Lampsacus, which town was allied with Athens; the men of Abydos and
the rest of the troops advancing by land, under the command of the
Lacedaemonian Thorax. They then attacked and took by storm the town,
which was wealthy, and with its stores of wine and wheat and other
commodities was pillaged by the soldiery. All free-born persons,
however, were without exception released by Lysander. And now the
Athenian fleet, following close on his heels, came to moorings at
Elaeus, in the Chersonesus, one hundred and eighty sail in all. It was
not until they had reached this place, and were getting their early
meal, that the news of what had happened at Lampsacus reached them. Then
they instantly set sail again to Sestos, and, having halted long enough
merely to take in stores, sailed on further to Aegospotami, a point
facing Lampsacus, where the Hellespont is not quite two miles (8) broad.
Here they took their evening meal.

 (8) Lit. fifteen stades.

The night following, or rather early next morning, with the first streak
of dawn, Lysander gave the signal for the men to take their breakfasts
and get on board their vessels; and so, having got all ready for a naval
engagement, with his ports closed and movable bulwarks attached, he
issued the order that no one was to stir from his post or put out to
sea. As the sun rose the Athenians drew up their vessels facing the
harbour, in line of battle ready for action; but Lysander declining
to come out to meet them, as the day advanced they retired again to
Aegospotami. Then Lysander ordered the swiftest of his ships to follow
the Athenians, and as soon as the crews had disembarked, to watch what
they did, sail back, and report to him. Until these look-outs returned
he would permit no disembarkation from his ships. This performance he
repeated for four successive days, and each day the Athenians put out to
sea and challenged an engagement.

But now Alcibiades, from one of his fortresses, could espy the position
of his fellow-countrymen, moored on an open beach beyond reach of any
city, and forced to send for supplies to Sestos, which was nearly two
miles distant, while their enemies were safely lodged in a harbour, with
a city adjoining, and everything within reach. The situation did not
please him, and he advised them to shift their anchorage to Sestos,
where they would have the advantage of a harbour and a city. "Once
there," he concluded, "you can engage the enemy whenever it suits you."
But the generals, and more particularly Tydeus and Menander, bade him go
about his business. "We are generals now--not you," they said; and so he
went away. And now for five days in succession the Athenians had sailed
out to offer battle, and for the fifth time retired, followed by the
same swift sailors of the enemy. But this time Lysander's orders to the
vessels so sent in pursuit were, that as soon as they saw the
enemy's crew fairly disembarked and dispersed along the shores of the
Chersonesus (a practice, it should be mentioned, which had grown upon
them from day to day owing to the distance at which eatables had to be
purchased, and out of sheer contempt, no doubt, of Lysander, who refused
to accept battle), they were to begin their return voyage, and when in
mid-channel to hoist a shield. The orders were punctually carried out,
and Lysander at once signalled to his whole squadron to put across with
all speed, while Thorax, with the land forces, was to march parallel
with the fleet along the coast. Aware of the enemy's fleet, which he
could see bearing down upon him, Conon had only time to signal to the
crews to join their ships and rally to the rescue with all their might.
But the men were scattered far and wide, and some of the vessels had
only two out of their three banks of rowers, some only a single one,
while others again were completely empty. Conon's own ship, with seven
others in attendance on him and the "Paralus," (9) put out to sea, a
little cluster of nine vessels, with their full complement of men; but
every one of the remaining one hundred and seventy-one vessels were
captured by Lysander on the beach. As to the men themselves, the
large majority of them were easily made prisoners on shore, a few only
escaping to the small fortresses of the neighbourhood. Meanwhile Conon
and his nine vessels made good their escape. For himself, knowing that
the fortune of Athens was ruined, he put into Abarnis, the promontory of
Lampsacus, and there picked up the great sails of Lysander's ships, and
then with eight ships set sail himself to seek refuge with Evagoras in
Cyprus, while the "Paralus" started for Athens with tidings of what had
taken place.

 (9) The "Paralus"--the Athenian sacred vessel; cf. Thuc. iii. 33 et
    passim.

Lysander, on his side, conveyed the ships and prisoners and all other
spoil back to Lampsacus, having on board some of the Athenian generals,
notably Philocles and Adeimantus. On the very day of these achievements
he despatched Theopompus, a Milesian privateersman, to Lacedaemon to
report what had taken place. This envoy arrived within three days and
delivered his message. Lysander's next step was to convene the allies
and bid them deliberate as to the treatment of the prisoners. Many were
the accusations here levied against the Athenians. There was talk of
crimes committed against the law of Hellas, and of cruelties sanctioned
by popular decrees; which, had they conquered in the late sea-fight,
would have been carried out; such as the proposal to cut off the right
hand of every prisoner taken alive, and lastly the ill-treatment of two
captured men-of-war, a Corinthian and an Andrian vessel, when every man
on board had been hurled headlong down the cliff. Philocles was the very
general of the Athenians who had so ruthlessly destroyed those men. Many
other tales were told; and at length a resolution was passed to put all
the Athenian prisoners, with the exception of Adeimantus, to death. He
alone, it was pleaded, had taken exception to the proposal to cut off
the prisoners' hands. On the other hand, he was himself accused by some
people of having betrayed the fleet. As to Philocles, Lysander put to
him one question, as the officer who had thrown (10) the Corinthians and
Andrians down the cliff: What fate did the man deserve to suffer who
had embarked on so cruel a course of illegality against Hellenes? and so
delivered him to the executioner.

 (10) Reading {os... katekremnise}.



II

When he had set the affairs of Lampsacus in order, Lysander sailed to
Byzantium and Chalcedon, where the inhabitants, having first dismissed
the Athenian garrison under a flag of truce, admitted him within their
walls. Those citizens of Byzantium, who had betrayed Byzantium into
the hands of Alcibiades, fled as exiles into Pontus, but subsequently
betaking themselves to Athens, became Athenian citizens. In dealing with
the Athenian garrisons, and indeed with all Athenians wheresoever found,
Lysander made it a rule to give them safe conduct to Athens, and to
Athens only, in the certainty that the larger the number collected
within the city and Piraeus, the more quickly the want of necessaries of
life would make itself felt. And now, leaving Sthenelaus, a Laconian, as
governor-general of Byzantium and Chalcedon, he sailed back himself to
Lampsacus and devoted himself to refitting his ships.

It was night when the "Paralus" reached Athens with her evil tidings,
on receipt of which a bitter wail of woe broke forth. From Piraeus,
following the line of the long walls up to the heart of the city, it
swept and swelled, as each man to his neighbour passed on the news. On
that night no man slept. There was mourning and sorrow for those that
were lost, but the lamentation for the dead was merged in even deeper
sorrow for themselves, as they pictured the evils they were about to
suffer, the like of which they themselves had inflicted upon the men of
Melos, who were colonists of the Lacedaemonians, when they mastered
them by siege. Or on the men of Histiaea; on Scione and Torone; on the
Aeginetans, and many another Hellene city. (1) On the following day the
public assembly met, and, after debate, it was resolved to block up all
the harbours save one, to put the walls in a state of defence, to post
guards at various points, and to make all other necessary preparations
for a siege. Such were the concerns of the men of Athens.

 (1) With regard to these painful recollections, see (1) for the siege
    and surrender of Melos (in B.C. 416), Thuc. v. 114, 116; and cf.
    Aristoph. "Birds," 186; Plut. ("Lysander," 14); (2) for the
    ejection of the Histiaeans, an incident of the recovery of Euboea
    in 445 B.C., see Thuc. i. 14; Plut. ("Pericles," 23); (3) for the
    matter of Scione, which revolted in 423 B.C., and was for a long
    time a source of disagreement between the Athenians and
    Lacedaemonians, until finally captured by the former in 421 B.C.,
    when the citizens were slain and the city given to the Plataeans,
    see Thuc. iv. 120-122, 129-133; v. 18, 32; (4) for Torone see
    Thuc. ib., and also v. 3; (5) for the expulsion of the Aeginetans
    in 431 B.C. see Thuc. ii. 27.

Lysander presently left the Hellespont with two hundred sail and arrived
at Lesbos, where he established a new order of things in Mitylene and
the other cities of the island. Meanwhile he despatched Eteonicus with
a squadron of ten ships to the northern coasts, (2) where that officer
brought about a revolution of affairs which placed the whole region
in the hands of Lacedaemon. Indeed, in a moment of time, after the
sea-fight, the whole of Hellas had revolted from Athens, with the
solitary exception of the men of Samos. These, having massacred the
notables, (3) held the state under their control. After a while Lysander
sent messages to Agis at Deceleia, and to Lacedaemon, announcing his
approach with a squadron of two hundred sail.

 (2) Lit. "the Thraceward districts." See above, p. 16.

 (3) Or, "since they had slain their notables, held the state under
    popular control." See Grote, "Hist. of Greece," vol. viii. p. 303
    note 3 (2d ed.), who thinks that the incident referred to is the
    violent democratic revolution in Samos described in Thuc. viii.
    21, B.C. 412.

In obedience to a general order of Pausanias, the other king of
Lacedaemon, a levy in force of the Lacedaemonians and all the rest of
Peloponnesus, except the Argives, was set in motion for a campaign. As
soon as the several contingents had arrived, the king put himself at
their head and marched against Athens, encamping in the gymnasium of the
Academy, (4) as it is called. Lysander had now reached Aegina, where,
having got together as many of the former inhabitants as possible, he
formally reinstated them in their city; and what he did in behalf of the
Aeginetans, he did also in behalf of the Melians, and of the rest who
had been deprived of their countries. He then pillaged the island of
Salamis, and finally came to moorings off Piraeus with one hundred and
fifty ships of the line, and established a strict blockade against all
merchant ships entering that harbour.

 (4) For this most illustrious of Athenian gymnasia, which still
    retains its name, see Leake, "Topography of Athens," i. 195 foll.

The Athenians, finding themselves besieged by land and sea, were in
sore perplexity what to do. Without ships, without allies, without
provisions, the belief gained hold upon them that there was no way of
escape. They must now, in their turn, suffer what they had themselves
inflincted upon others; not in retaliation, indeed, for ills received,
but out of sheer insolence, overriding the citizens of petty states, and
for no better reason than that these were allies of the very men now at
their gates. In this frame of mind they enfranchised those who at any
time had lost their civil rights, and schooled themselves to endurance;
and, albeit many succumbed to starvation, no thought of truce or
reconciliation with their foes was breathed. (5) But when the stock
of corn was absolutely insufficient, they sent an embassage to Agis,
proposing to become allies of the Lacedaemonians on the sole condition
of keeping their fortification walls and Piraeus; and to draw up
articles of treaty on these terms. Agis bade them betake themselves to
Lacedaemon, seeing that he had no authority to act himself. With this
answer the ambassadors returned to Athens, and were forthwith sent on to
Lacedaemon. On reaching Sellasia, (6) a town in (7) Laconian territory,
they waited till they got their answer from the ephors, who, having
learnt their terms (which were identical to those already proposed
to Agis), bade them instantly to be gone, and, if they really desired
peace, to come with other proposals, the fruit of happier reflection.
Thus the ambassadors returned home, and reported the result of their
embassage, whereupon despondency fell upon all. It was a painful
reflection that in the end they would be sold into slavery; and
meanwhile, pending the return of a second embassy, many must needs fall
victims to starvation. The razing of their fortifications was not a
solution which any one cared to recommend. A senator, Archestratus, had
indeed put the question in the senate, whether it were not best to make
peace with the Lacedaemonians on such terms as they were willing to
propose; but he was thrown into prison. The Laconian proposals referred
to involved the destruction of both long walls for a space of more than
a mile. And a decree had been passed, making it illegal to submit any
such proposition about the walls. Things having reached this pass,
Theramenes made a proposal in the public assembly as follows: If they
chose to send him as an ambassador to Lysander, he would go and find out
why the Lacedaemonians were so unyielding about the walls; whether it
was they really intended to enslave the city, or merely that they wanted
a guarantee of good faith. Despatched accordingly, he lingered on with
Lysander for three whole months and more, watching for the time when the
Athenians, at the last pinch of starvation, would be willing to accede
to any terms that might be offered. At last, in the fourth month, he
returned and reported to the public assembly that Lysander had detained
him all this while, and had ended by bidding him betake himself to
Lacedaemon, since he had no authority himself to answer his questions,
which must be addressed directly to the ephors. After this Theramenes
was chosen with nine others to go to Lacedaemon as ambassadors with
full powers. Meanwhile Lysander had sent an Athenian exile, named
Aristoteles, in company of certain Lacedaemonians, to Sparta to report
to the board of ephors how he had answered Theramenes, that they, and
they alone, had supreme authority in matters of peace and war.

 (5) Or, "they refused to treat for peace."

 (6) Sellasia, the bulwark of Sparta in the valley of the Oenus.

 (7) The MSS. have "in the neighbourhood of," which words are
    inappropriate at this date, though they may well have been added
    by some annotator after the Cleomenic war and the battle of
    Sellasia, B.C. 222, when Antigonus of Macedon destroyed the place
    in the interests of the Achaean League.

Theramenes and his companions presently reached Sellasia, and being
there questioned as to the reason of their visit, replied that they had
full powers to treat of peace. After which the ephors ordered them to
be summoned to their presence. On their arrival a general assembly was
convened, in which the Corinthians and Thebans more particularly, though
their views were shared by many other Hellenes also, urged the meeting
not to come to terms with the Athenians, but to destroy them. The
Lacedaemonians replied that they would never reduce to slavery a city
which was itself an integral portion of Hellas, and had performed a
great and noble service to Hellas in the most perilous of emergencies.
On the contrary, they were willing to offer peace on the terms now
specified--namely, "That the long walls and the fortifications of
Piraeus should be destroyed; that the Athenian fleet, with the exception
of twelve vessels, should be surrendered; that the exiles should be
restored; and lastly, that the Athenians should acknowledge the headship
of Sparta in peace and war, leaving to her the choice of friends and
foes, and following her lead by land and sea." Such were the terms which
Theramenes and the rest who acted with him were able to report on their
return to Athens. As they entered the city, a vast crowd met them,
trembling lest their mission have proved fruitless. For indeed delay
was no longer possible, so long already was the list of victims daily
perishing from starvation. On the day following, the ambassadors
delivered their report, stating the terms upon which the Lacedaemonians
were willing to make peace. Theramenes acted as spokesman, insisting
that they ought to obey the Lacedaemonians and pull down the walls. A
small minority raised their voice in opposition, but the majority were
strongly in favour of the proposition, and the resolution was passed to
accept the peace. After that, Lysander sailed into the Piraeus, and the
exiles were readmitted. And so they fell to levelling the fortifications
and walls with much enthusiasm, to the accompaniment of female
flute-players, deeming that day the beginning of liberty to Greece.

Thus the year drew to its close (8)--during its middle months took place
the accession of Dionysius, the son of Hermocrates the Syracusan, to
the tyranny of Syracuse; an incident itself preceded by a victory gained
over the Carthaginians by the Syracusans; the reduction of Agrigentum
through famine by the Carthaginians themselves; and the exodus of the
Sicilian Greeks from that city.

 (8) For the puzzling chronology of this paragraph see Grote, "Hist. of
    Greece," vol. x. p 619 (2d ed.) If genuine, the words may perhaps
    have slipt out of their natural place in chapter i. above, in
    front of the words "in the following year Lysander arrived," etc.
    L. Dindorf brackets them as spurious. Xen., "Hist. Gr." ed.
    tertia, Lipsiae, MDCCCLXXII. For the incidents referred to see
    above; Grote, "Hist. of Greece," vol. x. pp. 582, 598 (2d ed.)



III

B.C. 404. In the following year (1) the people passed a resolution
to choose thirty men who were to draft a constitution based on the
ancestral laws of the State. The following were chosen to act on this
committee:--Polychares, Critias, Melobius, Hippolochus, Eucleides,
Hiero, Mnesilochus, Chremo, Theramenes, Aresias, Diocles, Phaedrias,
Chaereleos, Anaetius, Piso, Sophocles, Erastosthenes, Charicles,
Onomacles, Theognis, Aeschines, Theogones, Cleomedes, Erasistratus,
Pheido, Dracontides, Eumathes, Aristoteles, Hippomachus, Mnesitheides.
After these transactions, Lysander set sail for Samos; and Agis withdrew
the land force from Deceleia and disbanded the troops, dismissing the
contingents to their several cities.

 (1) The MSS. here add "it was that year of the Olympiad cycle in which
    Crocinas, a Thessalian, won the Stadium; when Endius was ephor at
    Sparta, and Pythodorus archon at Athens, though the Athenians
    indeed do not call the year by that archon's name, since he was
    elected during the oligarchy, but prefer to speak of the year of
    'anarchy'; the aforesaid oligarchy originated thus,"--which,
    though correct, probably was not written by Xenophon. The year of
    anarchy might perhaps be better rendered "the year without
    archons."

In was at this date, about the time of the solar eclipse, (2) that
Lycophron of Pherae, who was ambitious of ruling over the whole of
Thessaly, defeated those sections of the Thessalians who opposed him,
such as the men of Larissa and others, and slew many of them. It
was also about this date that Dionysius, now tyrant of Syracuse, was
defeated by the Carthaginians and lost Gela and Camarina. And again, a
little later, the men of Leontini, who previously had been amalgamated
with the Syracusans, separated themselves from Syracuse and Dionysius,
and asserted their independence, and returned to their native city.
Another incident of this period was the sudden despatch and introduction
of Syracusan horse into Catana by Dionysius.

 (2) This took place on 2d September B.C. 404.

Now the Samians, though besieged by Lysander on all sides, were at first
unwilling to come to terms. But at the last moment, when Lysander was on
the point of assaulting the town, they accepted the terms, which allowed
every free man to leave the island, but not to carry away any part of
his property, except the clothes on his back. On these conditions they
marched out. The city and all it contained was then delivered over to
its ancient citizens by Lysander, who finally appointed ten governors
to garrison the island. (3) After which, he disbanded the allied fleet,
dismissing them to their respective cities, while he himself, with the
Lacedaemonian squadron, set sail for Laconia, bringing with him the
prows of the conquered vessels and the whole navy of Piraeus, with
the exception of twelve ships. He also brought the crowns which he had
received from the cities as private gifts, and a sum of four hundred and
seventy talents (4) in silver (the surplus of the tribute money which
Cyrus had assigned to him for the prosecution of the war), besides other
property, the fruit of his military exploits. All these things Lysander
delivered to the Lacedaemonians in the latter end of summer. (5)

 (3) A council of ten, or "decarchy." See Grote, "H. G." viii. 323 (1st
    ed.)

 (4) About 112,800 pounds.

 (5) The MSS. add "a summer, the close of which coincided with the
    termination of a war which had lasted twenty-eight and a half
    years, as the list of annual ephors, appended in order, serves to
    show. Aenesias is the first name. The war began during his
    ephorate, in the fifteenth year of the thirty years' truce after
    the capture of Euboea. His successors were Brasidas, Isanor,
    Sostratidas, Exarchus, Agesistratus, Angenidas, Onomacles,
    Zeuxippus, Pityas, Pleistolas, Cleinomachus, Harchus, Leon,
    Chaerilas, Patesiadas, Cleosthenes, Lycarius, Eperatus,
    Onomantius, Alexippidas, Misgolaidas, Isias, Aracus, Euarchippus,
    Pantacles, Pityas, Archytas, and lastly, Endius, during whose year
    of office Lysander sailed home in triumph, after performing the
    exploits above recorded,"--the interpolation, probably, of some
    editor or copyist, the words "twenty-eight and a half" being
    probably a mistake on his part for "twenty-seven and a half." Cf.
    Thuc. v. 26; also Buchsenschutz, Einleitung, p. 8 of his school
    edition of the "Hellenica."

The Thirty had been chosen almost immediately after the long walls and
the fortifications round Piraeus had been razed. They were chosen
for the express purpose of compiling a code of laws for the future
constitution of the State. The laws were always on the point of being
published, yet they were never forthcoming; and the thirty compilers
contented themselves meanwhile with appointing a senate and the other
magistracies as suited their fancy best. That done, they turned their
attention, in the first instance, to such persons as were well known to
have made their living as informers (6) under the democracy, and to be
thorns in the side of all respectable people. These they laid hold on
and prosecuted on the capital charge. The new senate gladly recorded its
vote of condemnation against them; and the rest of the world, conscious
of bearing no resemblance to them, seemed scarcely vexed. But the Thirty
did not stop there. Presently they began to deliberate by what means
they could get the city under their absolute control, in order that they
might work their will upon it. Here again they proceeded tentatively;
in the first instance, they sent (two of their number), Aeschines and
Aristoteles, to Lacedaemon, and persuaded Lysander to support them in
getting a Lacedaemonian garrison despatched to Athens. They only
needed it until they had got the "malignants" out of the way, and had
established the constitution; and they would undertake to maintain these
troops at their own cost. Lysander was not deaf to their persuasions,
and by his co-operation their request was granted. A bodyguard, with
Callibius as governor, was sent.

 (6) Lit. "by sycophancy," i.e. calumnious accusation--the sycophant's
    trade. For a description of this pest of Athenian life cf. "Dem."
    in Arist. 1, S. 52; quoted in Jebb, "Attic Orators," chap. xxix.
    14; cf. Aristoph. "Ach." 904; Xen. "Mem." II. ix. 1.

And now that they had got the garrison, they fell to flattering
Callibius with all servile flattery, in order that he might give
countenance to their doings. Thus they prevailed on him to allow some of
the guards, whom they selected, to accompany them, while they proceeded
to lay hands on whom they would; no longer confining themselves to base
folk and people of no account, but boldly laying hands on those who they
felt sure would least easily brook being thrust aside, or, if a
spirit of opposition seized them, could command the largest number of
partisans.

These were early days; as yet Critias was of one mind with Theramenes,
and the two were friends. But the time came when, in proportion as
Critias was ready to rush headlong into wholesale carnage, like one
who thirsted for the blood of the democracy, which had banished him,
Theramenes balked and thwarted him. It was barely reasonable, he argued,
to put people to death, who had never done a thing wrong to respectable
people in their lives, simply because they had enjoyed influence and
honour under the democracy. "Why, you and I, Critias," he would add,
"have said and done many things ere now for the sake of popularity."
To which the other (for the terms of friendly intimacy still subsisted)
would retort, "There is no choice left to us, since we intend to take
the lion's share, but to get rid of those who are best able to hinder
us. If you imagine, because we are thirty instead of one, our government
requires one whit the less careful guarding than an actual tyranny, you
must be very innocent."

So things went on. Day after day the list of persons put to death for no
just reason grew longer. Day after day the signs of resentment were more
significant in the groups of citizens banding together and forecasting
the character of this future constitution; till at length Theramenes
spoke again, protesting:--There was no help for it but to associate with
themselves a sufficient number of persons in the conduct of affairs, or
the oligarchy would certainly come to an end. Critias and the rest
of the Thirty, whose fears had already converted Theramenes into a
dangerous popular idol, proceeded at once to draw up a list of three
thousand citizens; fit and proper persons to have a share in the conduct
of affairs. But Theramenes was not wholly satisfied, "indeed he must
say, for himself, he regarded it as ridiculous, that in their effort to
associate the better classes with themselves in power, they should fix
on just that particular number, three thousand, as if that figure had
some necessary connection with the exact number of gentlemen in the
State, making it impossible to discover any respectability outside
or rascality within the magic number. And in the second place," he
continued, "I see we are trying to do two things, diametrically opposed;
we are manufacturing a government, which is based on force, and at the
same time inferior in strength to those whom we propose to govern."
That was what he said, but what his colleagues did, was to institute a
military inspection or review. The Three Thousand were drawn up in the
Agora, and the rest of the citizens, who were not included in the list,
elsewhere in various quarters of the city. The order to take arms was
given; (7) but while the men's backs were turned, at the bidding of the
Thirty, the Laconian guards, with those of the citizens who shared their
views, appeared on the scene and took away the arms of all except the
Three Thousand, carried them up to the Acropolis, and safely deposited
them in the temple.

 (7) Or, "a summons to the 'place d'armes' was given; but." Or, "the
    order to seize the arms was given, and." It is clear from
    Aristoph. "Acharn." 1050, that the citizens kept their weapons at
    home. On the other hand, it was a custom not to come to any
    meeting in arms. See Thuc. vi. 58. It seems probable that while
    the men were being reviewed in the market-place and elsewhere, the
    ruling party gave orders to seize their weapons (which they had
    left at home), and this was done except in the case of the Three
    Thousand. Cf. Arnold, "Thuc." II. 2. 5; and IV. 91.

The ground being thus cleared, as it were, and feeling that they had
it in their power to do what they pleased, they embarked on a course of
wholesale butchery, to which many were sacrificed to the merest hatred,
many to the accident of possessing riches. Presently the question
rose, How they were to get money to pay their guards? and to meet this
difficulty a resolution was passed empowering each of the committee to
seize on one of the resident aliens apiece, to put his victim to death,
and to confiscate his property. Theramenes was invited, or rather told
to seize some one or other. "Choose whom you will, only let it be done."
To which he made answer, it hardly seemed to him a noble or worthy
course on the part of those who claimed to be the elite of society to go
beyond the informers (8) in injustice. "Yesterday they, to-day we; with
this difference, the victim of the informer must live as a source of
income; our innocents must die that we may get their wealth. Surely
their method was innocent in comparison with ours."

 (8) See above.

The rest of the Thirty, who had come to regard Theramenes as an obstacle
to any course they might wish to adopt, proceeded to plot against him.
They addressed themselves to the members of the senate in private,
here a man and there a man, and denounced him as the marplot of the
constitution. Then they issued an order to the young men, picking out
the most audacious characters they could find, to be present, each with
a dagger hidden in the hollow of the armpit; and so called a meeting
of the senate. When Theramenes had taken his place, Critias got up and
addressed the meeting:

"If," said he, "any member of this council, here seated, imagines that
an undue amount of blood has been shed, let me remind him that with
changes of constitution such things can not be avoided. It is the rule
everywhere, but more particularly at Athens it was inevitable there
should be found a specially large number of persons sworn foes to any
constitutional change in the direction of oligarchy, and this for two
reasons. First, because the population of this city, compared with other
Hellenic cities, is enormously large; and again, owing to the length of
time during which the people has battened upon liberty. Now, as to two
points we are clear. The first is that democracy is a form of government
detestable to persons like ourselves--to us and to you; the next is that
the people of Athens could never be got to be friendly to our friends
and saviours, the Lacedaemonians. But on the loyalty of the better
classes the Lacedaemonians can count. And that is our reason for
establishing an oligarchical constitution with their concurrence. That
is why we do our best to rid us of every one whom we perceive to be
opposed to the oligarchy; and, in our opinion, if one of ourselves
should elect to undermine this constitution of ours, he would deserve
punishment. Do you not agree? And the case," he continued, "is no
imaginary one. The offender is here present--Theramenes. And what we say
of him is, that he is bent upon destroying yourselves and us by every
means in his power. These are not baseless charges; but if you will
consider it, you will find them amply established in this unmeasured
censure of the present posture of affairs, and his persistent opposition
to us, his colleagues, if ever we seek to get rid of any of these
demagogues. Had this been his guiding principle of action from the
beginning, in spite of hostility, at least he would have escaped all
imputation of villainy. Why, this is the very man who originated our
friendly and confidential relations with Lacedaemon. This is the very
man who authorised the abolition of the democracy, who urged us on to
inflict punishment on the earliest batch of prisoners brought before
us. But to-day all is changed; now you and we are out of odour with
the people, and he accordingly has ceased to be pleased with our
proceedings. The explanation is obvious. In case of a catastrophe, how
much pleasanter for him once again to light upon his legs, and leave us
to render account for our past performances.

"I contend that this man is fairly entitled to render his account also,
not only as an ordinary enemy, but as a traitor to yourselves and us.
And let us add, not only is treason more formidable than open war, in
proportion as it is harder to guard against a hidden assassin than
an open foe, but it bears the impress of a more enduring hostility,
inasmuch as men fight their enemies and come to terms with them again
and are fast friends; but whoever heard of reconciliation with a
traitor? There he stands unmasked; he has forfeited our confidence for
evermore. But to show you that these are no new tactics of his, to prove
to you that he is a traitor in grain, I will recall to your memories
some points in his past history.

"He began by being held in high honour by the democracy; but taking a
leaf out of his father's, Hagnon's, book, he next showed a most headlong
anxiety to transform the democracy into the Four Hundred, and, in fact,
for a time held the first place in that body. But presently, detecting
the formation of rival power to the oligarchs, round he shifted; and we
find him next a ringleader of the popular party in assailing them. It
must be admitted, he has well earned his nickname 'Buskin.' (9) Yes,
Theramenes! clever you may be, but the man who deserves to live should
not show his cleverness in leading on his associates into trouble, and
when some obstacle presents itself, at once veer round; but like a pilot
on shipboard, he ought then to redouble his efforts, until the wind is
fair. Else, how in the name of wonderment are those mariners to reach
the haven where they would be, if at the first contrary wind or
tide they turn about and sail in the opposite direction? Death and
destruction are concomitants of constitutional changes and revolution,
no doubt; but you are such an impersonation of change, that, as you
twist and turn and double, you deal destruction on all sides. At one
swoop you are the ruin of a thousand oligarchs at the hands of the
people, and at another of a thousand democrats at the hands of the
better classes. Why, sirs, this is the man to whom the orders were given
by the generals, in the sea-fight off Lesbos, to pick up the crews of
the disabled vessels; and who, neglecting to obey orders, turned round
and accused the generals; and to save himself murdered them! What, I ask
you, of a man who so openly studied the art of self-seeking, deaf
alike to the pleas of honour and to the claims of friendship? Would not
leniency towards such a creature be misplaced? Can it be our duty at
all to spare him? Ought we not rather, when we know the doublings of his
nature, to guard against them, lest we enable him presently to practise
on ourselves? The case is clear. We therefore hereby cite this man
before you, as a conspirator and traitor against yourselves and us. The
reasonableness of our conduct, one further reflection may make clear.
No one, I take it, will dispute the splendour, the perfection of the
Laconian constitution. Imagine one of the ephors there in Sparta, in
lieu of devoted obedience to the majority, taking on himself to find
fault with the government and to oppose all measures. Do you not think
that the ephors themselves, and the whole commonwealth besides, would
hold this renegade worthy of condign punishment? So, too, by the same
token, if you are wise, do you spare yourselves, not him. For what does
the alternative mean? I will tell you. His preservation will cause
the courage of many who hold opposite views to your own to rise; his
destruction will cut off the last hopes of all your enemies, whether
within or without the city."

 (9) An annotator seems to have added here the words, occurring in the
    MSS., "the buskin which seems to fit both legs equally, but is
    constant to neither," unless, indeed, they are an original
    "marginal note" of the author. For the character of Theramenes, as
    popularly conceived, cf. Aristoph. "Frogs," 538, 968 foll., and
    Thuc. viii. 92; and Prof. Jowett, "Thuc." vol. ii. pp. 523, 524.

With these words he sat down, but Theramenes rose and said: "Sirs, with
your permission I will first touch upon the charge against me which
Critias has mentioned last. The assertion is that as the accuser of the
generals I was their murderer. Now I presume it was not I who began
the attack upon them, but it was they who asserted that in spite of
the orders given me I had neglected to pick up the unfortunates in the
sea-fight off Lesbos. All I did was to defend myself. My defence was
that the storm was too violent to permit any vessel to ride at sea, much
more therefore to pick up the men, and this defence was accepted by my
fellow-citizens as highly reasonable, while the generals seemed to be
condemned out of their own mouths. For while they kept on asserting
that it was possible to save the men, the fact still remained that they
abandoned them to their fate, set sail, and were gone.

"However, I am not surprised, I confess, at this grave misconception
(10) on the part of Critias, for at the date of these occurrences he
was not in Athens. He was away in Thessaly, laying the foundations of
a democracy with Prometheus, and arming the Penestae (11) against their
masters. Heaven forbid that any of his transactions there should be
re-enacted here. However, I must say, I do heartily concur with him on
one point. Whoever desires to exclude you from the government, or to
strength the hands of your secret foes, deserves and ought to meet with
condign punishment; but who is most capable of so doing? That you will
best discover, I think, by looking a little more closely into the past
and the present conduct of each of us. Well, then! up to the moment at
which you were formed into a senatorial body, when the magistracies were
appointed, and certain notorious 'informers' were brought to trial, we
all held the same views. But later on, when our friends yonder began
to hale respectable honest folk to prison and to death, I, on my side,
began to differ from them. From the moment when Leon of Salamis, (12)
a man of high and well-deserved reputation, was put to death, though he
had not committed the shadow of a crime, I knew that all his equals must
tremble for themselves, and, so trembling, be driven into opposition to
the new constitution. In the same way, when Niceratus, (13) the son of
Nicias, was arrested; a wealthy man, who, no more than his father, had
never done anything that could be called popular or democratic in his
life; it did not require much insight to discover that his compeers
would be converted into our foes. But to go a step further: when it
came to Antiphon (14) falling at our hands--Antiphon, who during the war
contributed two fast-sailing men-of-war out of his own resources, it was
then plain to me, that all who had ever been zealous and patriotic
must eye us with suspicion. Once more I could not help speaking out in
opposition to my colleagues when they suggested that each of us ought to
seize some one resident alien. (15) For what could be more certain
than that their death-warrant would turn the whole resident foreign
population into enemies of the constitution. I spoke out again when they
insisted on depriving the populace of their arms; it being no part of my
creed that we ought to take the strength out of the city; nor, indeed,
so far as I could see, had the Lacedaemonians stept between us and
destruction merely that we might become a handful of people, powerless
to aid them in the day of need. Had that been their object, they might
have swept us away to the last man. A few more weeks, or even days,
would have sufficed to extinguish us quietly by famine. Nor, again, can
I say that the importation of mercenary foreign guards was altogether to
my taste, when it would have been so easy for us to add to our own
body a sufficient number of fellow-citizens to ensure our supremacy as
governors over those we essayed to govern. But when I saw what an army
of malcontents this government had raised up within the city walls,
besides another daily increasing host of exiles without, I could not
but regard the banishment of people like Thrasybulus and Anytus and
Alcibiades (16) as impolitic. Had our object been to strengthen the
rival power, we could hardly have set about it better than by providing
the populace with the competent leaders whom they needed, and the
would-be leaders themselves with an army of willing adherents.

 (10) Reading with Cobet {paranenomikenai}.

 (11) I.e. serfs--Penestae being the local name in Thessaly for the
    villein class. Like the {Eilotes} in Laconia, they were originally
    a conquered tribe, afterwards increased by prisoners of war, and
    formed a link between the freemen and born slaves.

 (12) Cf. "Mem." IV. iv. 3; Plat. "Apol." 8. 32.

 (13) Cf. Lysias, "Or." 18. 6.

 (14) Probably the son of Lysidonides. See Thirlwall, "Hist. of
    Greece," vol. iv. p. 179 (ed. 1847); also Lysias, "Or." 12. contra
    Eratosth. According to Lysias, Theramenes, when a member of the
    first Oligarchy, betrayed his own closest friends, Antiphon and
    Archeptolemus. See Prof. Jebb, "Attic Orators," I. x. p. 266.

 (15) The resident aliens, or {metoikoi}, "metics," so technically
    called.

 (16) Isocr. "De Bigis," 355; and Prof. Jebb's "Attic Orators," ii.
    230. In the defence of his father's career, which the younger
    Alcibiades, the defendant in this case (B.C. 397 probably) has
    occasion to make, he reminds the court, that under the Thirty,
    others were banished from Athens, but his father was driven out of
    the civilised world of Hellas itself, and finally murdered. See
    Plutarch, "Alcibiades," ad fin.

"I ask then is the man who tenders such advice in the full light of
day justly to be regarded as a traitor, and not as a benefactor? Surely
Critias, the peacemaker, the man who hinders the creation of many
enemies, whose counsels tend to the acquistion of yet more friends, (17)
cannot be accused of strengthening the hands of the enemy. Much more
truly may the imputation be retorted on those who wrongfully appropriate
their neighbours' goods and put to death those who have done no wrong.
These are they who cause our adversaries to grow and multiply, and
who in very truth are traitors, not to their friends only, but to
themselves, spurred on by sordid love of gain.

 (17) Or, "the peacemaker, the healer of differences, the cementer of
    new alliances, cannot," etc.

"I might prove the truth of what I say in many ways, but I beg you to
look at the matter thus. With which condition of affairs here in Athens
do you think will Thrasybulus and Anytus and the other exiles be the
better pleased? That which I have pictured as desirable, or that which
my colleagues yonder are producing? For my part I cannot doubt but that,
as things now are, they are saying to themselves, 'Our allies muster
thick and fast.' But were the real strength, the pith and fibre of this
city, kindly disposed to us, they would find it an uphill task even to
get a foothold anywhere in the country.

"Then, with regard to what he said of me and my propensity to be for
ever changing sides, let me draw your attention to the following facts.
Was it not the people itself, the democracy, who voted the constitution
of the Four Hundred? This they did, because they had learned to think
that the Lacedaemonians would trust any other form of government rather
than a democracy. But when the efforts of Lacedaemon were not a whit
relaxed, when Aristoteles, Melanthius, and Aristarchus, (18) and the
rest of them acting as generals, were plainly minded to construct an
intrenched fortress on the mole for the purpose of admitting the
enemy, and so getting the city under the power of themselves and their
associates; (19) because I got wind of these schemes, and nipped them in
the bud, is that to be a traitor to one's friends?

 (18) Cf. Thuc. viii. 90-92, for the behaviour of the Lacedaemonian
    party at Athens and the fortification of Eetioneia in B.C. 411.

 (19) I.e. of the political clubs.

"Then he threw in my teeth the nickname 'Buskin,' as descriptive of
an endeavour on my part to fit both parties. But what of the man
who pleases neither? What in heaven's name are we to call him? Yes!
you--Critias? Under the democracy you were looked upon as the most
arrant hater of the people, and under the aristocracy you have proved
yourself the bitterest foe of everything respectable. Yes! Critias, I
am, and ever have been, a foe of those who think that a democracy cannot
reach perfection until slaves and those who, from poverty, would sell
the city for a drachma, can get their drachma a day. (20) But not less
am I, and ever have been, a pronounced opponent of those who do not
think there can possibly exist a perfect oligarchy until the State is
subjected to the despotism of a few. On the contrary, my own ambition
has been to combine with those who are rich enough to possess a horse
and shield, and to use them for the benefit of the State. (21) That was
my ideal in the old days, and I hold to it without a shadow of turning
still. If you can imagine when and where, in conjunction with despots or
demagogues, I have set to my hand to deprive honest gentlefolk of
their citizenship, pray speak. If you can convict me of such crimes at
present, or can prove my perpetration of them in the past, I admit that
I deserve to die, and by the worst of deaths."

 (20) I.e. may enjoy the senatorial stipend of a drachma a day = 9 3/4
    pence.

 (21) See Thuc. viii. 97, for a momentary realisation of that "duly
    attempered compound of Oligarchy and Democracy" which Thucydides
    praises, and which Theramenes here refers to. It threw the power
    into the hands of the wealthier upper classes to the exclusion of
    the {nautikos okhlos}. See Prof. Jowett, vol. ii. note, ad loc.
    cit.

With these words he ceased, and the loud murmur of the applause which
followed marked the favourable impression produced upon the senate.
It was plain to Critias, that if he allowed his adversary's fate to be
decided by formal voting, Theramenes would escape, and life to himself
would become intolerable. Accordingly he stepped forward and spoke a
word or two in the ears of the Thirty. This done, he went out and gave
an order to the attendants with the daggers to stand close to the bar
in full view of the senators. Again he entered and addressed the senate
thus: "I hold it to be the duty of a good president, when he sees the
friends about him being made the dupes of some delusion, to intervene.
That at any rate is what I propose to do. Indeed our friends here
standing by the bar say that if we propose to acquit a man so openly
bent upon the ruin of the oligarchy, they do not mean to let us do
so. Now there is a clause in the new code forbidding any of the Three
Thousand to be put to death without your vote; but the Thirty have
power of life and death over all outside that list. Accordingly," he
proceeded, "I herewith strike this man, Theramenes, off the list; and
this with the concurrence of my colleagues. And now," he continued, "we
condemn him to death."

Hearing these words Theramenes sprang upon the altar of Hestia,
exclaiming: "And I, sirs, supplicate you for the barest forms of law and
justice. Let it not be in the power of Critias to strike off either
me, or any one of you whom he will. But in my case, in what may be your
case, if we are tried, let our trial be in accordance with the law they
have made concerning those on the list. I know," he added, "but too
well, that this altar will not protect me; but I will make it plain that
these men are as impious towards the gods as they are nefarious towards
men. Yet I do marvel, good sirs and honest gentlemen, for so you are,
that you will not help yourselves, and that too when you must see that
the name of every one of you is as easily erased as mine."

But when he had got so far, the voice of the herald was heard giving the
order to the Eleven to seize Theramenes. They at that instant entered
with their satellites--at their head Satyrus, the boldest and most
shameless of the body--and Critias exclaimed, addressing the Eleven, "We
deliver over to you Theramenes yonder, who has been condemned according
to the law. Do you take him and lead him away to the proper place, and
do there with him what remains to do." As Critias uttered the words,
Satyrus laid hold upon Theramenes to drag him from the altar, and the
attendants lent their aid. But he, as was natural, called upon gods and
men to witness what was happening. The senators the while kept silence,
seeing the companions of Satyrus at the bar, and the whole front of the
senate house crowded with the foreign guards, nor did they need to be
told that there were daggers in reserve among those present.

And so Theramenes was dragged through the Agora, in vehement and loud
tones proclaiming the wrongs that he was suffering. One word, which is
said to have fallen from his lips, I cite. It is this: Satyrus, bade him
"Be silent, or he would rue the day;" to which he made answer, "And if I
be silent, shall I not rue it?" Also, when they brought him the hemlock,
and the time was come to drink the fatal draught, they tell how he
playfully jerked out the dregs from the bottom of the cup, like one who
plays "Cottabos," (22) with the words, "This to the lovely Critias."
These are but "apophthegms" (23) too trivial, it may be thought, to find
a place in history. Yet I must deem it an admirable trait in this man's
character, if at such a moment, when death confronted him, neither his
wits forsook him, nor could the childlike sportiveness vanish from his
soul.

 (22) "A Sicilian game much in vogue at the drinking parties of young
    men at Athens. The simplest mode was when each threw the wine left
    in his cup so as to strike smartly in a metal basin, at the same
    time invoking his mistress's name; if all fell into the basin and
    the sound was clear, it was a sign he stood well with her."--
    Liddell and Scott, sub. v. For the origin of the game compare
    curiously enough the first line of the first Elegy of Critias
    himself, who was a poet and political philosopher, as well as a
    politician:--

"{Kottabos ek Sikeles esti khthonos, euprepes ergon on skopon es latagon
toxa kathistametha.}" Bergk. "Poetae Lyr. Graec." Pars II. xxx.


 (23) Or, "these are sayings too slight, perhaps, to deserve record;
    yet," etc. By an "apophthegm" was meant originally a terse
    (sententious) remark, but the word has somewhat altered in
    meaning.



IV

So Theramenes met his death; and, now that this obstacle was removed,
the Thirty, feeling that they had it in their power to play the tyrant
without fear, issued an order forbidding all, whose names were not
on the list, to set foot within the city. Retirement in the country
districts was no protection, thither the prosecutor followed them, and
thence dragged them, that their farms and properties might fall to the
possession of the Thirty and their friends. Even Piraeus was not safe;
of those who sought refuge there, many were driven forth in similar
fashion, until Megara and Thebes overflowed with the crowd of refugees.

Presently Thrasybulus, with about seventy followers, sallied out from
Thebes, and made himself master of the fortress of Phyle. (1) The
weather was brilliant, and the Thirty marched out of the city to repel
the invader; with them were the Three Thousand and the Knights. When
they reached the place, some of the young men, in the foolhardiness of
youth, made a dash at the fortress, but without effect; all they got was
wounds, and so retired. The intention of the Thirty now was to blockade
the place; by shutting off all the avenues of supplies, they thought to
force the garrison to capitulate. But this project was interrupted by
a steady downfall of snow that night and the following day. Baffled
by this all-pervading enemy they beat a retreat to the city, but not
without the sacrifice of many of their camp-followers, who fell a prey
to the men in Phyle. The next anxiety of the government in Athens was to
secure the farms and country houses against the plunderings and forays
to which they would be exposed, if there were no armed force to
protect them. With this object a protecting force was despatched to
the "boundary estates," (2) about two miles south of Phyle. This corps
consisted of the Lacedaemonian guards, or nearly all of them, and two
divisions of horse. (3) They encamped in a wild and broken district, and
the round of their duties commenced.

 (1) "A strong fortress (the remains of which still exist) commanding
    the narrow pass across Mount Parnes, through which runs the direct
    road from Thebes to Athens, past Acharnae. The precipitous rock on
    which it stands can only be approached by a ridge on the eastern
    side. The height commands a magnificent view of the whole Athenian
    plain, of the city itself, of Mount Hymettus, and the Saronic
    Gulf,"--"Dict. of Geog., The demi of the Diacria and Mount
    Parnes."

 (2) Cf. Boeckh, "P. E. A." p. 63, Eng. ed.

 (3) Lit. tribes, each of the ten tribes furnishing about one hundred
    horse.

But by this time the small garrison above them had increased tenfold,
until there were now something like seven hundred men collected in
Phyle; and with these Thrasybulus one night descended. When he was not
quite half a mile from the enemy's encampment he grounded arms, and a
deep silence was maintained until it drew towards day. In a little while
the men opposite, one by one, were getting to their legs or leaving the
camp for necessary purposes, while a suppressed din and murmur arose,
caused by the grooms currying and combing their horses. This was the
moment for Thrasybulus and his men to snatch up their arms and make a
dash at the enemy's position. Some they felled on the spot; and routing
the whole body, pursued them six or seven furlongs, killing one
hundred and twenty hoplites and more. Of the cavalry, Nicostratus, "the
beautiful," as men called him, and two others besides were slain; they
were caught while still in their beds. Returning from the pursuit,
the victors set up a trophy, got together all the arms they had taken,
besides baggage, and retired again to Phyle. A reinforcement of horse
sent from the city could not discover the vestige of a foe; but waited
on the scene of battle until the bodies of the slain had been picked up
by their relatives, when they withdrew again to the city.

After this the Thirty, who had begun to realise the insecurity of their
position, were anxious to appropriate Eleusis, so that an asylum might
be ready for them against the day of need. With this view an order was
issued to the Knights; and Critias, with the rest of the Thirty, visited
Eleusis. There they held a review of the Eleusians in the presence of
the Knights; (4) and, on the pretext of wishing to discover how many
they were, and how large a garrison they would further require, they
ordered the townsfolk to enter their names. As each man did so he had to
retire by a postern leading to the sea. But on the sea-beach this
side there were lines of cavalry drawn up in waiting, and as each man
appeared he was handcuffed by the satellites of the Thirty. When all
had so been seized and secured, they gave orders to Lysimachus, the
commander of the cavalry, to take them off to the city and deliver them
over to the Eleven. Next day they summoned the heavy armed who were on
the list, and the rest of the Knights (5) to the Odeum, and Critias rose
and addressed them. He said: "Sirs, the constitution, the lines of which
we are laying down, is a work undertaken in your interests no less than
ours; it is incumbent on you therefore to participate in its dangers,
even as you will partake of its honours. We expect you therefore, in
reference to these Eleusians here, who have been seized and secured, to
vote their condemnation, so that our hopes and fears may be identical."
Then, pointing to a particular spot, he said peremptorily, "You will
please deposit your votes there within sight of all." It must be
understood that the Laconian guards were present at the time, and armed
to the teeth, and filling one-half of the Odeum. As to the proceedings
themselves, they found acceptance with those members of the State,
besides the Thirty, who could be satisfied with a simple policy of
self-aggrandisement.

 (4) Or, "in the cavalry quarters," cf. {en tois ikhthusin} = in the
    fish market. Or, "at the review of the horse."

 (5) For the various Odeums at Athens vide Prof. Jebb, "Theophr."
    xviii. 235, 236. The one here named was near the fountain
    Callirhoe by the Ilissus.

But now Thrasybulus at the head of his followers, by this time about one
thousand strong, descended from Phyle and reached Piraeus in the night.
The Thirty, on their side, informed of this new move, were not slow to
rally to the rescue, with the Laconian guards, supported by their own
cavalry and hoplites. And so they advanced, marching down along the
broad carriage road which leads into Piraeus. The men from Phyle seemed
at first inclined to dispute their passage, but as the wide circuit
of the walls needed a defence beyond the reach of their still scanty
numbers, they fell back in a compact body upon Munychia. (6) Then the
troops from the city poured into the Agora of Hippodmus. (7) Here they
formed in line, stretching along and filling the street which leads to
the temple of Artemis and the Bendideum. (8) This line must have been
at least fifty shields deep; and in this formation they at once began
to march up. As to the men of Phyle, they too blocked the street at the
opposite end, and facing the foe. They presented only a thin line, not
more than ten deep, though behind these, certainly, were ranged a body
of targeteers and light-armed javelin men, who were again supported by
an artillery of stone-throwers--a tolerably numerous division drawn from
the population of the port and district itself. While his antagonists
were still advancing, Thrasybulus gave the order to ground their heavy
shields, and having done so himself, whilst retaining the rest of
his arms, he stood in the midst, and thus addressed them: "Men and
fellow-citizens, I wish to inform some, and to remind others of you,
that of the men you see advancing beneath us there, the right division
are the very men we routed and pursued only five days ago; while on the
extreme left there you see the Thirty. These are the men who have not
spared to rob us of our city, though we did no wrong; who have hounded
us from our homes; who have set the seal of proscription on our dearest
friends. But to-day the wheel of fortune has revolved; that has come
about which least of all they looked for, which most of all we prayed
for. Here we stand with our good swords in our hands, face to face
with our foes; and the gods themselves are with us, seeing that we were
arrested in the midst of our peaceful pursuits; at any moment, whilst
we supped, or slept, or marketed, sentence of banishment was passed upon
us: we had done no wrong--nay, many of us were not even resident in the
country. To-day, therefore, I repeat, the gods do visibly fight upon our
side; the great gods, who raise a tempest even in the midst of calm for
our benefit, and when we lay to our hand to fight, enable our little
company to set up the trophy of victory over the multitude of our foes.
On this day they have brought us hither to a place where the steep
ascent must needs hinder our foes from reaching with lance or arrow
further than our foremost ranks; but we with our volley of spears and
arrows and stones cannot fail to reach them with terrible effect. Had we
been forced to meet them vanguard to vanguard, on an equal footing, who
could have been surprised? But as it is, all I say to you is, let fly
your missiles with a will in right brave style. No one can miss his mark
when the road is full of them. To avoid our darts they must be for ever
ducking and skulking beneath their shields; but we will rain blows upon
them in their blindness; we will leap upon them and lay them low. But,
O sirs! let me call upon you so to bear yourselves that each shall
be conscious to himself that victory was won by him and him alone.
Victory--which, God willing, shall this day restore to us the land of
our fathers, our homes, our freedom, and the rewards of civic life, our
children, if children we have, our darlings, and our wives! Thrice happy
those among us who as conquerors shall look upon this gladdest of all
days. Nor less fortunate the man who falls to-day. Not all the wealth
in the world shall purchase him a monument so glorious. At the right
instant I will strike the keynote of the paean; then, with an invocation
to the God of battle, (9) and in return for the wanton insults they put
upon us, let us with one accord wreak vengeance on yonder men."

 (6) The citadel quarter of Piraeus.

 (7) Named after the famous architect Hippodamus, who built the town.
    It was situated near where the two long walls joined the wall of
    Piraeus; a broad street led from it up to the citadel of Munychia.

 (8) I.e. the temple of Bendis (the Thracian Artemis). Cf. Plat. "Rep."
    327, 354; and Prof. Jowett, "Plato," vol. iii. pp. 193, 226.

 (9) Lit. "Enyalius," in Homer an epithet of Ares; at another date (cf.
    Aristoph. "Peace," 456) looked upon as a distinct divinity.

Having so spoken, he turned round, facing the foemen, and kept quiet,
for the order passed by the soothsayer enjoined on them, not to
charge before one of their side was slain or wounded. "As soon as that
happens," said the seer, "we will lead you onwards, and the victory
shall be yours; but for myself, if I err not, death is waiting." And
herein he spoke truly, for they had barely resumed their arms when he
himself as though he were driven by some fatal hand, leapt out in front
of the ranks, and so springing into the midst of the foe, was slain,
and lies now buried at the passage of the Cephisus. But the rest were
victorious, and pursued the routed enemy down to the level ground.
There fell in this engagement, out of the number of the Thirty, Critias
himself and Hippomachus, and with them Charmides, (10) the son of
Glaucon, one of the ten archons in Piraeus, and of the rest about
seventy men. The arms of the slain were taken; but, as fellow-citizens,
the conquerors forebore to despoil them of their coats. This being done,
they proceeded to give back the dead under cover of a truce, when the
men, on either side, in numbers stept forward and conversed with one
another. Then Cleocritus (he was the Herald of the Initiated, (11) a
truly "sweet-voiced herald," if ever there was), caused a deep
silence to reign, and addressed their late combatants as follows:
"Fellow-citizens--Why do you drive us forth? why would you slay us?
what evil have we wrought you at any time? or is it a crime that we
have shared with you in the most solemn rites and sacrifices, and in
festivals of the fairest: we have been companions in the chorus, the
school, the army. We have braved a thousand dangers with you by land and
sea in behalf of our common safety, our common liberty. By the gods
of our fathers, by the gods of our mothers, by the hallowed names of
kinship, intermarriage, comradeship, those three bonds which knit the
hearts of so many of us, bow in reverence before God and man, and
cease to sin against the land of our fathers: cease to obey these most
unhallowed Thirty, who for the sake of private gain have in eight months
slain almost more men than the Peloponnesians together in ten years of
warfare. See, we have it in our power to live as citizens in peace; it
is only these men, who lay upon us this most foul burthen, this hideous
horror of fratricidal war, loathed of God and man. Ah! be well assured,
for these men slain by our hands this day, ye are not the sole mourners.
There are among them some whose deaths have wrung from us also many a
bitter tear."

 (10) He was cousin to Critias, and uncle by the mother's side to
    Plato, who introduces him in the dialogue, which bears his name
    (and treats of Temperance), as a very young man at the beginning
    of the Peloponnesian War. We hear more of him also from Xenophon
    himself in the "Memorabilia," iii. 6. 7; and as one of the
    interlocutors in the "Symposium."

 (11) I.e. of the Eleusinian mysteries. He had not only a loud voice,
    but a big body. Cf. Aristoph. "Frogs," 1237.

So he spoke, but the officers and leaders of the defeated army who were
left, unwilling that their troops should listen to such topics at that
moment, led them back to the city. But the next day the Thirty, in deep
down-heartedness and desolation, sat in the council chamber. The Three
Thousand, wherever their several divisions were posted, were everywhere
a prey to discord. Those who were implicated in deeds of violence, and
whose fears could not sleep, protested hotly that to yield to the party
in Piraeus were preposterous. Those on the other hand who had faith in
their own innocence, argued in their own minds, and tried to convince
their neighbours that they could well dispense with most of their
present evils. "Why yield obedience to these Thirty?" they asked, "Why
assign to them the privilege of destroying the State?" In the end they
voted a resolution to depose the government, and to elect another. This
was a board of ten, elected one from each tribe.

B.C. 403. As to the Thirty, they retired to Eleusis; but the Ten,
assisted by the cavalry officers, had enough to do to keep watch over
the men in the city, whose anarchy and mutual distrust were rampant. The
Knights did not return to quarters at night, but slept out in the Odeum,
keeping their horses and shields close beside them; indeed the distrust
was so great that from evening onwards they patrolled the walls on foot
with their shields, and at break of day mounted their horses, at every
moment fearing some sudden attack upon them by the men in Piraeus. These
latter were now so numerous, and of so mixed a company, that it was
difficult to find arms for all. Some had to be content with shields of
wood, others of wicker-work, which they spent their time in coating with
whitening. Before ten days had elapsed guarantees were given, securing
full citizenship, with equality of taxation and tribute to all,
even foreigners, who would take part in the fighting. Thus they were
presently able to take the field, with large detachments both of heavy
infantry and light-armed troops, besides a division of cavalry, about
seventy in number. Their system was to push forward foraging parties in
quest of wood and fruits, returning at nightfall to Piraeus. Of the city
party no one ventured to take the field under arms; only, from time to
time, the cavalry would capture stray pillagers from Piraeus or inflict
some damage on the main body of their opponents. Once they fell in with
a party belonging to the deme Aexone, (12) marching to their own farms
in search of provisions. These, in spite of many prayers for mercy
and the strong disapprobation of many of the knights, were ruthlessly
slaughtered by Lysimachus, the general of cavalry. The men of Piraeus
retaliated by putting to death a horseman, named Callistratus, of the
tribe Leontis, whom they captured in the country. Indeed their courage
ran so high at present that they even meditated an assault upon the city
walls. And here perhaps the reader will pardon the record of a somewhat
ingenious device on the part of the city engineer, who, aware of the
enemy's intention to advance his batteries along the racecourse, which
slopes from the Lyceum, had all the carts and waggons which were to be
found laden with blocks of stone, each one a cartload in itself, and
so sent them to deposit their freights "pele-mele" on the course in
question. The annoyance created by these separate blocks of stone
was enormous, and quite out of proportion to the simplicity of the
contrivance.

 (12) On the coast south of Phalerum, celebrated for its fisheries. Cf.
    "Athen." vii. 325.

But it was to Lacedaemon that men's eyes now turned. The Thirty
despatched one set of ambassadors from Eleusis, while another set
representing the government of the city, that is to say the men on the
list, was despatched to summon the Lacedaemonians to their aid, on the
plea that the people had revolted from Sparta. At Sparta, Lysander,
taking into account the possibility of speedily reducing the party in
Piraeus by blockading them by land and sea, and so cutting them off from
all supplies, supported the application, and negotiated the loan of
one hundred talents (13) to his clients, backed by the appointment of
himself as harmost on land, and of his brother, Libys, as admiral of
the fleet. And so proceeding to the scene of action at Eleusis, he got
together a large body of Peloponnesian hoplites, whilst his brother,
the admiral, kept watch and ward by sea to prevent the importation of
supplies into Piraeus by water. Thus the men in Piraeus were soon again
reduced to their former helplessness, while the ardour of the city folk
rose to a proportionally high pitch under the auspices of Lysander.

 (13) 24,375 pounds, reckoning one tal. = 243 pounds 15 shillings.

Things were progressing after this sort when King Pausanias intervened.
Touched by a certain envy of Lysander--(who seemed, by a final stroke of
achievement, about to reach the pinnacle of popularity, with Athens laid
like a pocket dependency at his feet)--the king persuaded three of
the ephors to support him, and forthwith called out the ban. With him
marched contingents of all the allied States, except the Boeotians and
Corinthians. These maintained, that to undertake such an expedition
against the Athenians, in whose conduct they saw nothing contrary to the
treaty, was inconsistent with their oaths. But if that was the language
held by them, the secret of their behaviour lay deeper; they seemed to
be aware of a desire on the part of the Lacedaemonians to annex the
soil of the Athenians and to reduce the state to vassalage. Pausanias
encamped on the Halipedon, (14) as the sandy flat is called, with his
right wing resting on Piraeus, and Lysander and his mercenaries forming
the left. His first act was to send an embassage to the party in
Piraeus, calling upon them to retire peacably to their homes; when they
refused to obey, he made, as far as mere noise went, the semblance of an
attack, with sufficient show of fight to prevent his kindly disposition
being too apparent. But gaining nothing by the feint, he was forced to
retire. Next day he took two Laconian regiments, with three tribes of
Athenian horse, and crossed over to the Mute (15) Harbour, examining the
lie of the ground to discover how and where it would be easiest to draw
lines of circumvallation round Piraeus. As he turned his back to retire,
a party of the enemy sallied out and caused him annoyance. Nettled at
the liberty, he ordered the cavalry to charge at the gallop, supported
by the ten-year-service (16) infantry, whilst he himself, with the rest
of the troops, followed close, holding quietly back in reserve. They cut
down about thirty of the enemy's light troops and pursued the rest hotly
to the theatre in Piraeus. Here, as chance would have it, the whole
light and heavy infantry of the Piraeus men were getting under arms;
and in an instant their light troops rushed out and dashed at the
assailants; thick and fast flew missiles of all sorts--javelins, arrows
and sling stones. The Lacedaemonians finding the number of their wounded
increasing every minute, and sorely called, slowly fell back step by
step, eyeing their opponents. These meanwhile resolutely pressed on.
Here fell Chaeron and Thibrachus, both polemarchs, here also Lacrates,
an Olympic victor, and other Lacedaemonians, all of whom now lie
entombed before the city gates in the Ceramicus. (17)

 (14) The Halipedon is the long stretch of flat sandy land between
    Piraeus Phalerum and the city.

 (15) Perhaps the landlocked creek just round the promontory of
    Eetioneia, as Leake conjectures, "Topog. of Athens," p. 389. See
    also Prof. Jowett's note, "Thuc." v. 2; vol. ii. p. 286.

 (16) I.e. who had already seen ten years of service, i.e. over twenty-
    eight, as the Spartan was eligible to serve at eighteen. Cf. Xen.
    "Hell." III. iv. 23; VI. iv. 176.

 (17) The outer Ceramicus, "the most beautiful spot outside the walls."
    Cf. Thuc. ii. 34; through it passes the street of the tombs on the
    sacred road; and here was the place of burial for all persons
    honoured with a public funeral. Cf. Arist. "Birds," 395.

Watching how matters went, Thrasybulus began his advance with the whole
of his heavy infantry to support his light troops and quickly fell
into line eight deep, acting as a screen to the rest of his troops.
Pausanias, on his side, had retired, sorely pressed, about half a
mile towards a bit of rising ground, where he sent orders to the
Lacedaemonians and the other allied troops to bring up reinforcements.
Here, on this slope, he reformed his troops, giving his phalanx the
full depth, and advanced against the Athenians, who did not hesitate
to receive him at close quarters, but presently had to give way; one
portion being forced into the mud and clay at Halae, (18) while the
others wavered and broke their line; one hundred and fifty of them were
left dead on the field, whereupon Pausanias set up a trophy and retired.
Not even so, were his feelings embittered against his adversary. On the
contrary he sent secretly and instructed the men of Piraeus, what sort
of terms they should propose to himself and the ephors in attendance.
To this advice they listened. He also fostered a division in the party
within the city. A deputation, acting on his orders, sought an audience
of him and the ephors. It had all the appearance of a mass meeting. In
approaching the Spartan authorities, they had no desire or occasion,
they stated, to look upon the men of Piraeus as enemies, they would
prefer a general reconciliation and the friendship of both sides with
Lacedaemon. The propositions were favourably received, and by no less a
person than Nauclidas. He was present as ephor, in accordance with the
custom which obliges two members of that board to serve on all military
expeditions with the king, and with his colleague shared the political
views represented by Pausanias, rather than those of Lysander and his
party. Thus the authorities were quite ready to despatch to Lacedaemon
the representatives of Piraeus, carrying their terms of truce with the
Lacedaemonians, as also two private individuals belonging to the city
party, whose names were Cephisophon and Meletus. This double deputation,
however, had no sooner set out to Lacedaemon than the "de facto"
government of the city followed suit, by sending a third set of
representatives to state on their behalf: that they were prepared to
deliver up themselves and the fortifications in their possession to
the Lacedaemonians, to do with them what they liked. "Are the men of
Piraeus," they asked, "prepared to surrender Piraeus and Munychia in
the same way? If they are sincere in their profession of friendship to
Lacedaemon, they ought to do so." The ephors and the members of assembly
at Sparta (19) gave audience to these several parties, and sent
out fifteen commissioners to Athens empowered, in conjunction with
Pausanias, to discover the best settlement possible. The terms (20)
arrived at were that a general peace between the rival parties should be
established, liberty to return to their own homes being granted to all,
with the exception of the Thirty, the Eleven, and the Ten who had been
governors in Piraeus; but a proviso was added, enabling any of the city
party who feared to remain at Athens to find a home in Eleusis.

 (18) Halae, the salt marshy ground immediately behind the great
    harbour of Piraeus, but outside the fortification lines.

 (19) Cf. "Hell." VI. iii. 3, {oi ekkletoi}.

 (20) Cf. Prof. Jebb, "Orators," i. 262, note 2.

And now that everything was happily concluded, Pausanias disbanded his
army, and the men from Piraeus marched up under arms into the acropolis
and offered sacrifice to Athena. When they were come down, the generals
called a meeting of the Ecclesia, (21) and Thrasybulus made a speech in
which, addressing the city party, he said: "Men of the city! I have one
piece of advice I would tender to you; it is that you should learn to
know yourselves, and towards the attainment of that self-knowledge I
would have you make a careful computation of your good qualities and
satisfy yourselves on the strength of which of these it is that you
claim to rule over us. Is it that you are more just than ourselves? Yet
the people, who are poorer--have never wronged you for the purposes of
plunder; but you, whose wealth would outweight the whole of ours, have
wrought many a shameful deed for the sake of gain. If, then, you have
no monopoly of justice, can it be on the score of courage that you are
warranted to hold your heads so high? If so, what fairer test of courage
will you propose than the arbitrament of war--the war just ended? Or do
you claim superiority of intelligence?--you, who with all your wealth of
arms and walls, money and Peloponnesian allies, have been paralysed by
men who had none of these things to aid them! Or is it on these Laconian
friends of yours that you pride yourselves? What! when these same
friends have dealt by you as men deal by vicious dogs. You know how that
is. They put a heavy collar round the neck of the brutes and hand them
over muzzled to their masters. So too have the Lacedaemonians handed you
over to the people, this very people whom you have injured; and now they
have turned their backs and are gone. But" (turning to the mass) "do
not misconceive me. It is not for me, sirs, coldly to beg of you, in no
respect to violate your solemn undertakings. I go further; I beg you,
to crown your list of exploits by one final display of virtue. Show
the world that you can be faithful to your oaths, and flawless in your
conduct." By these and other kindred arguments he impressed upon them
that there was no need for anarchy or disorder, seeing that there were
the ancient laws ready for use. And so he broke up (22) the assembly.

 (21) I.e. the Public Assembly, see above; and reading with Sauppe
    after Cobet {ekklesian epoiesan}, which words are supposed to have
    dropt out of the MSS. Or, keeping to the MSS., translate "When the
    generals were come down, Thrasybulus," etc. See next note.

 (22) The Greek words are {antestese ten ekklesian} (an odd phrase for
    the more technical {eluse} or {dieluse ten ekklesian}). Or,
    accepting the MSS. reading above (see last note), translate "he
    set up (i.e. restored) the Assembly." So Mr. J. G. Philpotts, Mr.
    Herbert Hailstone, and others.

At this auspicious moment, then, they reappointed the several
magistrates; the constitution began to work afresh, and civic life was
recommenced. At a subsequent period, on receiving information that the
party at Eleusis were collecting a body of mercenaries, they marched out
with their whole force against them, and put to death their generals,
who came out to parley. These removed, they introduced to the others
their friends and connections, and so persuaded them to come to terms
and be reconciled. The oath they bound themselves by consisted of a
simple asseveration: "We will remember past offences no more;" and to
this day (23) the two parties live amicably together as good citizens,
and the democracy is steadfast to its oaths.

 (23) It would be interesting to know the date at which the author
    penned these words. Was this portion of the "Hellenica" written
    before the expedition of Cyrus? i.e. in the interval between the
    formal restoration of the Democracy, September B.C. 403, and March
    B.C. 401. The remaining books of the "Hellenica" were clearly
    written after that expedition, since reference is made to it quite
    early in Bk. III. i. 2. Practically, then, the first volume of
    Xenophon's "History of Hellenic Affairs" ends here. This history
    is resumed in Bk. III. i. 3. after the Cyreian expedition  (of
    which episode we have a detailed account in the "Anabasis" from
    March B.C. 401 down to March B.C. 399, when the remnant of the Ten
    Thousand was handed over to the Spartan general Thibron in Asia).
    Some incidents belonging to B.C. 402 are referred to in the
    opening paragraphs of "Hellenica," III. i. 1, 2, but only as an
    introduction to the new matter; and with regard to the historian
    himself, it is clear that "a change has come o'er the spirit of
    his dream." This change of view is marked by a change of style in
    writing. I have thought it legitimate, under the circumstances, to
    follow the chronological order of events, and instead of
    continuing the "Hellenica," at this point to insert the
    "Anabasis." My next volume will contain the remaining books of the
    "Hellenica" and the rest of Xenophon's "historical" writings.




BOOK III



I

B.C. 403-402. Thus the civil strife at Athens had an end. At a
subsequent date Cyrus sent messengers to Lacedaemon, claiming requital
in kind for the service which he had lately rendered in the war with
Athens. (1) The demand seemed to the ephorate just and reasonable.
Accordingly they ordered Samius, (2) who was admiral at the time, to
put himself at the disposition of Cyrus for any service which he might
require. Samius himself needed no persuasion to carry out the wishes of
Cyrus. With his own fleet, accompanied by that of Cyrus, he sailed round
to Cilicia, and so made it impossible for Syennesis, the ruler of that
province, to oppose Cyrus by land in his advance against the king his
brother.

 (1) Lit. "what Cyrus himself had been to the Lacedaemonians let the
    Lacedaemonians in their turn be to Cyrus."

 (2) Samius (Diod. Sic. xiv. 19). But see "Anab." I. iv. 2, where
    Pythagoras is named as admiral. Possibly the one officer succeeded
    the other.

B.C. 401. The particulars of the expedition are to be found in the pages
of the Syracusan Themistogenes, (3) who describes the mustering of the
armament, and the advance of Cyrus at the head of his troops; and then
the battle, and death of Cyrus himself, and the consequent retreat of
the Hellenes while effecting their escape to the sea. (4)

 (3) Lit. "as to how then Cyrus collected an army and with it went up
    against his brother, and how the battle was fought and how he
    died, and how in the sequel the Hellenes escaped to the sea (all
    this), is written by (or 'for,' or 'in honour of') Themistogenes
    the Syracusan." My impression is that Xenophon's "Anabasis," or a
    portion of the work so named, was edited originally by
    Themistogenes. See "Philol. Museum," vol. i. p. 489; L. Dindorf,
    {Xen. Ell.}, Ox. MDCCCLIII., node ad loc. {Themistogenei}. Cf.
    Diod. Sic. xiv. 19-31, 37, after Ephorus and Theopompus probably.

 (4) At Trapezus, March 10, B.C. 400.

B.C. 400. It was in recognition of the service which he had rendered in
this affair, that Tissaphernes was despatched to Lower Asia by the king
his master. He came as satrap, not only of his own provinces, but of
those which had belonged to Cyrus; and he at once demanded the absolute
submission of the Ionic cities, without exception, to his authority.
These communities, partly from a desire to maintain their freedom, and
partly from fear of Tissaphernes himself, whom they had rejected in
favour of Cyrus during the lifetime of that prince, were loth to admit
the satrap within their gates. They thought it better to send an embassy
to the Lacedaemonians, calling upon them as representatives and leaders
(5) of the Hellenic world to look to the interests of their petitioners,
who were Hellenes also, albeit they lived in Asia, and not to suffer
their country to be ravaged and themselves enslaved.

 (5) {Prostatai}, "patrons and protectors."

In answer to this appeal, the Lacedaemonians sent out Thibron (6)
as governor, providing him with a body of troops, consisting of one
thousand neodamodes (7) (i.e. enfranchised helots) and four thousand
Peloponnesians. In addition to these, Thibron himself applied to
the Athenians for a detachment of three hundred horse, for whose
service-money he would hold himself responsible. The Athenians in
answer sent him some of the knights who had served under the Thirty,
(8) thinking that the people of Athens would be well rid of them if they
went abroad and perished there.

 (6) "As harmost." See "Anab." ad fin.

 (7) See "Hell." I. iii. 15; Thuc. vii. 58.

 (8) See "Hell." II. iv. 2.

B.C. 400-399. On their arrival in Asia, Thibron further collected
contingents from the Hellenic cities on the continent; for at this time
the word of a Lacedaemonian was law. He had only to command, and every
city must needs obey. (9) But although he had this armament, Thibron,
when he saw the cavalry, had no mind to descend into the plain. If he
succeeded in protecting from pillage the particular district in which
he chanced to be, he was quite content. It was only when the troops (10)
who had taken part in the expedition of Cyrus had joined him on their
safe return, that he assumed a bolder attitude. He was now ready to
confront Tissaphernes, army against army, on the level ground, and won
over a number of cities. Pergamum came in of her own accord. So did
Teuthrania and Halisarna. These were under the government of Eurysthenes
and Procles, (11) the descendants of Demaratus the Lacedaemonian, who
in days of old had received this territory as a gift from the Persian
monarch in return for his share in the campaign against Hellas. Gorgion
and Gongylus, two brothers, also gave in their adhesion; they were
lords, the one of Gambreum and Palae-Gambreum, the other of Myrina and
Gryneum, four cities which, like those above named, had originally
been gifts from the king to an earlier Gongylus--the sole Eretrian who
"joined the Mede," and in consequence was banished. Other cities which
were too weak to resist, Thibron took by force of arms. In the case of
one he was not so successful. This was the Egyptian (12) Larisa, as it
is called, which refused to capitulate, and was forthwith invested and
subjected to a regular siege. When all other attempts to take it failed,
he set about digging a tank or reservoir, and in connection with the
tank an underground channel, by means of which he proposed to draw off
the water supply of the inhabitants. In this he was baffled by frequent
sallies of the besieged, and a continual discharge of timber and stones
into the cutting. He retaliated by the construction of a wooden tortoise
which he erected over the tank; but once more the tortoise was burnt to
a cinder in a successful night attack on the part of the men of Larisa.
These ineffectual efforts induced the ephors to send a despatch bidding
Thibron give up Larisa and march upon Caria.

 (9) See "Anab." VI. vi. 12.

 (10) March B.C. 399. See the final sentence of the "Anabasis."

 (11) See "Anab." VII. viii. 8-16.

 (12) Seventy stades S.E. of Cyme in the Aeolid. See Strabo, xiii. 621.
    For the origin of the name cf. "Cyrop." VII. i. 45.

He had already reached Ephesus, and was on the point of marching into
Caria, when Dercylidas arrived to take command of his army. The new
general was a man whose genius for invention had won him the nickname of
Sisyphus. Thus it was that Thibron returned home, where on his arrival
he was fined and banished, the allies accusing him of allowing his
troops to plunder their friends.

Dercylidas was not slow to perceive and turn to account the jealousy
which subsisted between Tissaphernes and Pharnabazus. Coming to
terms with the former, he marched into the territory of the latter,
preferring, as he said, to be at war with one of the pair at a time,
rather than the two together. His hostility, indeed, to Pharnabazus was
an old story, dating back to a period during the naval command (13)
of Lysander, when he was himself governor in Abydos; where, thanks to
Pharnabazus, he had got into trouble with his superior officer, and had
been made to stand "with his shield on his arm"--a stigma on his honour
which no true Lacedaemonian would forgive, since this is the punishment
of insubordination. (14) For this reason, doubtless, Dercylidas had the
greater satisfaction in marching against Pharnabazus. From the moment he
assumed command there was a marked difference for the better between his
methods and those of his predecessor. Thus he contrived to conduct his
troops into that portion of the Aeolid which belonged to Pharnabazus,
through the heart of friendly territory without injury to the allies.

 (13) Technically "navarchy," in B.C. 408-407. "Hell." I. v. 1.

 (14) See Plut. "Aristid." 23 (Clough, ii. p. 309).

This district of Aeolis belonged to Pharnabazus, (15) but had been held
as a satrapy under him by a Dardanian named Zenis whilst he was alive;
but when Zenis fell sick and died, Pharnabazus made preparation to give
the satrapy to another. Then Mania the wife of Zenis, herself also a
Dardanian, fitted out an expedition, and taking with her gifts wherewith
to make a present to Pharnabazus himself, and to gratify his concubines
and those whose power was greatest with Pharnabazus, set forth on her
journey. When she had obtained audience with him she spoke as follows:
"O Pharnabazus, thou knowest that thy servant my husband was in all
respects friendly to thee; moreover, he paid my lord the tributes which
were thy due, so that thou didst praise and honour him. Now therefore,
if I do thee service as faithfully as my husband, why needest thou to
appoint another satrap?--nay but, if in any matter I please thee not, is
it not in thy power to take from me the government on that day, and to
give it to another?" When he had heard her words, Pharnabazus decided
that the woman ought to be satrap. She, as soon as she was mistress of
the territory, never ceased to render the tribute in due season, even
as her husband before her had done. Moreover, whenever she came to the
court of Pharnabazus she brought him gifts continually, and whenever
Pharnabazus went down to visit her provinces she welcomed him with all
fair and courteous entertainment beyond what his other viceroys were
wont to do. The cities also which had been left to her by her husband,
she guarded safely for him; while of those cities that owed her no
allegiance, she acquired, on the seaboard, Larisa and Hamaxitus and
Colonae--attacking their walls by aid of Hellenic mercenaries, whilst
she herself sat in her carriage and watched the spectacle. Nor was
she sparing of her gifts to those who won her admiration; and thus she
furnished herself with a mercenary force of exceptional splendour. She
also went with Pharnabazus on his campaigns, even when, on pretext of
some injury done to the king's territory, Mysians or Pisidians were the
object of attack. In requital, Pharnabazus paid her magnificent honour,
and at times invited her to assist him with her counsel. (16)

 (15) I.e. as suzerain.

 (16) Grote, "H. G." ix. 292; cf. Herod. viii. 69.

Now when Mania was more than forty years old, the husband of her own
daughter, Meidias--flustered by the suggestions of certain people who
said that it was monstrous a woman should rule and he remain a private
person (17)--found his way into her presence, as the story goes, and
strangled her. For Mania, albeit she carefully guarded herself against
all ordinary comers, as behoved her in the exercise of her "tyranny,"
trusted in Meidias, and, as a woman might her own son-in-law, was ready
to greet him at all times with open arms. He also murdered her son, a
youth of marvellous beauty, who was about seventeen years of age. He
next seized upon the strong cities of Scepsis and Gergithes, in which
lay for the most part the property and wealth of Mania. As for the
other cities of the satrapy, they would not receive the usurper, their
garrisons keeping them safely for Pharnabazus. Thereupon Meidias sent
gifts to Pharnabazus, and claimed to hold the district even as Mania
had held it; to whom the other answered, "Keep your gifts and guard them
safely until that day when I shall come in person and take both you
and them together"; adding, "What care I to live longer if I avenge not
myself for the murder of Mania!"

 (17) Or, "his brains whimsied with insinuations."

Just at the critical moment Dercylidas arrived, and in a single day
received the adhesion of the three seaboard cities Larisa, Hamaxitus,
and Colonae--which threw open their gates to him. Then he sent
messengers to the cities of the Aeolid also, offering them freedom if
they would receive him within their walls and become allies. Accordingly
the men of Neandria and Ilium and Cocylium lent willing ears; for since
the death of Mania their Hellenic garrisons had been treated but ill.
But the commander of the garrison in Cebrene, a place of some strength,
bethinking him that if he should succeed in guarding that city for
Pharnabazus, he would receive honour at his hands, refused to admit
Dercylidas. Whereupon the latter, in a rage, prepared to take the place
by force; but when he came to sacrifice, on the first day the victims
would not yield good omens; on the second, and again upon the third day,
it was the same story. Thus for as many as four days he persevered in
sacrificing, cherishing wrath the while--for he was in haste to become
master of the whole Aeolid before Pharnabazus came to the succour of the
district.

Meanwhile a certain Sicyonian captain, Athenadas by name, said to
himself: "Dercylidas does but trifle to waste his time here, whilst
I with my own hand can draw off their water from the men of Cybrene";
wherewith he ran forward with his division and essayed to choke up the
spring which supplied the city. But the garrison sallied out and covered
the Sicyonian himself with wounds, besides killing two of his men.
Indeed, they plied their swords and missiles with such good effect that
the whole company was forced to beat a retreat. Dercylidas was not a
little annoyed, thinking that now the spirit of the besiegers would
certainly die away; but whilst he was in this mood, behold! there
arrived from the beleaguered fortress emissaries of the Hellenes, who
stated that the action taken by the commandant was not to their taste;
for themselves, they would far rather be joined in bonds of fellowship
with Hellenes than with barbarians. While the matter was still under
discussion there came a messenger also from the commandant, to say that
whatever the former deputation had proposed he, on his side, was ready
to endorse. Accordingly Dercylidas, who, it so happened, had at length
obtained favourable omens on that day, marched his force without more
ado up to the gates of the city, which were flung open by those
within; and so he entered. (18) Here, then, he was content to appoint a
garrison, and without further stay advanced upon Scepsis and Gergithes.

 (18) Grote ("H. G." ix. 294) says: "The reader will remark how
    Xenophon shapes the narrative in such a manner as to inculcate the
    pious duty in a general of obeying the warnings furnished by the
    sacrifice--either for action or for inaction.... Such an
    inference is never (I believe) to be found suggested in
    Thucydides." See Brietenbach, "Xen. Hell." I et II, praef. in
    alteram ed. p. xvii.

And now Meidias, partly expecting the hostile advance of Pharnabazus,
and partly mistrusting the citizens--for to such a pass things had
come--sent to Dercylidas, proposing to meet him in conference provided
he might take security of hostages. In answer to this suggestion the
other sent him one man from each of the cities of the allies, and bade
him take his pick of these, whichsoever and how many soever he chose, as
hostages for his own security. Meidias selected ten, and so went out. In
conversation with Dercylidas, he asked him on what terms he would accept
his alliance. The other answered: "The terms are that you grant the
citizens freedom and self-government." The words were scarcely out of
his mouth before he began marching upon Scepsis. Whereupon Meidias,
perceiving it was vain to hinder him in the teeth of the citizens,
suffered him to enter. That done, Dercylidas offered sacrifice to Athena
in the citadel of the Scepsians, turned out the bodyguards of Meidias,
and handed over the city to the citizens. And so, having admonished them
to regulate their civic life as Hellenes and free men ought, he left the
place and continued his advance against Gergithes. On this last march
he was escorted by many of the Scepsians themselves; such was the honour
they paid him and so great their satisfaction at his exploits. Meidias
also followed close at his side, petitioning that he would hand over the
city of Gergithians to himself. To whom Dercylidas only made reply,
that he should not fail to obtain any of his just rights. And whilst the
words were yet upon his lips, he was drawing close to the gates, with
Meidias at his side. Behind him followed the troops, marching two
and two in peaceful fashion. The defenders of Gergithes from their
towers--which were extraordinarily high--espied Meidias in company of
the Spartan, and abstained from shooting. And Dercylidas said: "Bid them
open the gates, Meidias, when you shall lead the way, and I will enter
the temple along with you and do sacrifice to Athena." And Meidias,
though he shrank from opening the gates, yet in terror of finding
himself on a sudden seized, reluctantly gave the order to open the
gates. As soon as he was entered in, the Spartan, still taking Meidias
with him, marched up to the citadel and there ordered the main body of
his soldiers to take up their position round the walls, whilst he with
those about him did sacrifice to Athena. When the sacrifice was ended he
ordered Meidias's bodyguard to pile arms (19) in the van of his troops.
Here for the future they would serve as mercenaries, since Meidias their
former master stood no longer in need of their protection. The latter,
being at his wits' end what to do, exclaimed: "Look you, I will now
leave you; I go to make preparation for my guest." But the other
replied: "Heaven forbid! Ill were it that I who have offered sacrifice
should be treated as a guest by you. I rather should be the entertainer
and you the guest. Pray stay with us, and while the supper is preparing,
you and I can consider our obligations, and perform them."

 (19) I.e. take up a position, or "to order arms," whilst he addressed
    them; not probably "to ground arms," as if likely to be mutinous.

When they were seated Dercylidas put certain questions: "Tell me,
Meidias, did your father leave you heir to his estates?" "Certainly he
did," answered the other. "And how many dwelling-houses have you? what
landed estates? how much pasturage?" The other began running off
an inventory, whilst some of the Scepsians who were present kept
interposing, "He is lying to you, Dercylidas." "Nay, you take too minute
a view of matters," replied the Spartan. When the inventory of the
paternal property was completed, he proceeded: "Tell me, Meidias, to
whom did Mania belong?" A chorus of voices rejoined, "To Pharnabazus."
"Then must her property have belonged to Pharnabazus too." "Certainly,"
they answered. "Then it must now be ours," he remarked, "by right of
conquest, since Pharnabazus is at war with us. Will some one of you
escort me to the place where the property of Mania and Pharnabazus
lies?" So the rest led the way to the dwelling-place of Mania which
Meidias had taken from her, and Meidias followed too. When he was
entered, Dercylidas summoned the stewards, and bidding his attendants
seize them, gave them to understand that, if detected stealing anything
which belonged to Mania, they would lose their heads on the spot. The
stewards proceeded to point out the treasures, and he, when he had
looked through the whole store, bolted and barred the doors, affixing
his seal, and setting a watch. As he went out he found at the doors
certain of the generals (20) and captains, and said to them: "Here,
sirs, we have pay ready made for the army--a year's pay nearly for eight
thousand men--and if we can win anything besides, there will be so much
the more." This he said, knowing that those who heard it would be all
the more amenable to discipline, and would yield him a more flattering
obedience. Then Meidias asked, "And where am I to live, Dercylidas?"
"Where you have the very best right to live," replied the other, "in
your native town of Scepsis, and in your father's house."

 (20) Lit. "of the taxiarchs and lochagoi."



II

Such were the exploits of Dercylidas: nine cities taken in eight days.
Two considerations now began to occupy his mind: how was he to avoid
falling into the fatal error of Thibron and becoming a burthen to his
allies, whilst wintering in a friendly country? how, again, was he to
prevent Pharnabazus from overriding the Hellenic states in pure contempt
with his cavalry? Accordingly he sent to Pharnabazus and put it to him
point-blank: Which will you have, peace or war? Whereupon Pharnabazus,
who could not but perceive that the whole Aeolid had now been converted
practically into a fortified base of operations, which threatened his
own homestead of Phrygia, chose peace.

B.C. 399-398. This being so, Dercylidas advanced into Bithynian Thrace,
and there spent the winter; nor did Pharnabazus exhibit a shadow of
annoyance, since the Bithynians were perpetually at war with himself.
For the most part, Dercylidas continued to harry (1) Bithynia in perfect
security, and found provisions without stint. Presently he was joined
from the other side of the straits by some Odrysian allies sent by
Seuthes; (2) they numbered two hundred horse and three hundred peltasts.
These fellows pitched upon a site a little more than a couple of miles
(3) from the Hellenic force, where they entrenched themselves; then
having got from Dercylidas some heavy infantry soldiers to act as
guards of their encampment, they devoted themselves to plundering,
and succeeded in capturing an ample store of slaves and other wealth.
Presently their camp was full of prisoners, when one morning the
Bithynians, having ascertained the actual numbers of the marauding
parties as well as of the Hellenes left as guards behind, collected in
large masses of light troops and cavalry, and attacked the garrison,
who were not more than two hundred strong. As soon as they came close
enough, they began discharging spears and other missiles on the little
body, who on their side continued to be wounded and shot down, but were
quite unable to retaliate, cooped up as they were within a palisading
barely six feet high, until in desperation they tore down their defences
with their own hands, and dashed at the enemy. These had nothing to do
but to draw back from the point of egress, and being light troops easily
escaped beyond the grasp of heavy-armed men, while ever and again, from
one point of vantage or another, they poured their shower of javelins,
and at every sally laid many a brave man low, till at length, like
sheep penned in a fold, the defenders were shot down almost to a man. A
remnant, it is true, did escape, consisting of some fifteen who, seeing
the turn affairs were taking, had already made off in the middle of the
fighting. Slipping through their assailants' fingers, (4) to the small
concern of the Bithynians, they reached the main Hellenic camp in
safety. The Bithynians, satisfied with their achievement, part of which
consisted in cutting down the tent guards of the Odrysian Thracians and
recovering all their prisoners, made off without delay; so that by the
time the Hellenes got wind of the affair and rallied to the rescue, they
found nothing left in the camp save only the stripped corpses of the
slain. When the Odrysians themselves returned, they fell to burying
their own dead, quaffing copious draughts of wine in their honour and
holding horse-races; but for the future they deemed it advisable to
camp along with the Hellenes. Thus they harried and burned Bithynia the
winter through.

 (1) {Pheson kai agon}, i.e. "there was plenty of live stock to lift
    and chattels to make away with."

 (2) For Seuthes see "Anab." VII. i. 5; and below, IV. viii. 26.

 (3) Lit. "twenty stades."

 (4) Or, "slipping through the enemy's fingers, who took no heed of
    them, they," etc.

B.C. 398. With the commencement of spring Dercylidas turned his back
upon the Bithynians and came to Lampsacus. Whilst at this place envoys
reached him from the home authorities. These were Aracus, Naubates, and
Antisthenes. They were sent to inquire generally into the condition of
affairs in Asia, and to inform Dercylidas of the extension of his office
for another year. They had been further commissioned by the ephors to
summon a meeting of the soldiers and inform them that the ephors
held them to blame for their former doings, though for their present
avoidance of evil conduct they must needs praise them; and for the
future they must understand that while no repetition of misdoing would
be tolerated, all just and upright dealing by the allies would receive
its meed of praise. The soldiers were therefore summoned, and the envoys
delivered their message, to which the leader of the Cyreians answered:
"Nay, men of Lacedaemon, listen; we are the same to-day as we were last
year; only our general of to-day is different from our general in the
past. If to-day we have avoided our offence of yesterday, the cause is
not far to seek; you may discover it for yourselves."

Aracus and the other envoys shared the hospitality of Dercylidas's tent,
and one of the party chanced to mention how they had left an embassy
from the men of Chersonese in Lacedaemon. According to their statement,
he added, it was impossible for them to till their land nowadays, so
perpetually were they robbed and plundered by the Thracians; whereas
the peninsula needed only to be walled across from sea to sea, and there
would be abundance of good land to cultivate--enough for themselves and
as many others from Lacedaemon as cared to come. "So that it would not
surprise us," continued the envoys, "if a Lacedaemonian were actually
sent out from Sparta with a force to carry out the project." Dercylidas
kept his ears open but his counsel close, and so sent forward the
commissioners to Ephesus. (5) It pleased him to picture their progress
through the Hellenic cities, and the spectacle of peace and prosperity
which would everywhere greet their eyes. When he knew that his stay was
to be prolonged, he sent again to Pharnabazus and offered him once more
as an alternative either the prolongation of the winter truce or war.
And once again Pharnabazus chose truce. It was thus that Dercylidas was
able to leave the cities in the neighbourhood of the satrap (6) in peace
and friendship. Crossing the Hellespont himself he brought his army
into Europe, and marching through Thrace, which was also friendly, was
entertained by Seuthes, (7) and so reached the Chersonese.

 (5) See Grote, "H. G." ix. 301.

 (6) Or, reading after Cobet, {tas peri ekeina poleis}--"the cities of
    that neighbourhood."

 (7) See "Anab." VII. vii. 51.

This district, he soon discovered, not only contained something like a
dozen cities, (8) but was singularly fertile. The soil was of the best,
but ruined by the ravages of the Thracians, precisely as he had been
told. Accordingly, having measured and found the breadth of the isthmus
barely four miles, (9) he no longer hesitated. Having offered sacrifice,
he commenced his line of wall, distributing the area to the soldiers in
detachments, and promising to award them prizes for their industry--a
first prize for the section first completed, and the rest as each
detachment of workers might deserve. By this means the whole wall begun
in spring was finished before autumn. Within these lines he established
eleven cities, with numerous harbours, abundance of good arable land,
and plenty of land under plantation, besides magnificent grazing grounds
for sheep and cattle of every kind.

 (8) Lit. "eleven or twelve cities." For the natural productivity, see
    "Anab." V. vi. 25.

 (9) Lit. "thirty-seven stades." Mod. Gallipoli. See Herod. vi. 36;
    Plut. "Pericl." xix.

Having finished the work, he crossed back again into Asia, and on a
tour of inspection, found the cities for the most part in a thriving
condition; but when he came to Atarneus he discovered that certain
exiles from Chios had got possession of the stronghold, which served
them as a convenient base for pillaging and plundering Ionia; and this,
in fact, was their means of livelihood. Being further informed of the
large supplies of grain which they had inside, he proceeded to draw
entrenchments around the place with a view to a regular investment, and
by this means he reduced it in eight months. Then having appointed Draco
of Pellene (10) commandant, he stocked the fortress with an abundance of
provisions of all sorts, to serve him as a halting-place when he chanced
to pass that way, and so withdrew to Ephesus, which is three days'
journey from Sardis.

 (10) Cf. Isocr. "Panegyr." 70; Jebb. "Att. Or." ii. p. 161. Of Pellene
    (or Pellana) in Laconia, not Pellene in Achaia? though that is the
    opinion of Grote and Thirlwall.

B.C. 397. Up to this date peace had been maintained between Tissaphernes
and Dercylidas, as also between the Hellenes and the barbarians in those
parts. But the time came when an embassy arrived at Lacedaemon from the
Ionic cities, protesting that Tissaphernes might, if he chose, leave the
Hellenic cities independent. "Our idea," they added, "is, that if Caria,
the home of Tissaphernes, felt the pinch of war, the satrap would very
soon agree to grant us independence." The ephors, on hearing this, sent
a despatch to Dercylidas, and bade him cross the frontier with his army
into Caria, whilst Pharax the admiral coasted round with the fleet.
These orders were carried out. Meanwhile a visitor had reached
Tissaphernes. This was not less a person than Pharnabazus. His coming
was partly owing to the fact that Tissaphernes had been appointed
general-in-chief, and party in order to testify his readiness to make
common cause with his brother satrap in fighting and expelling the
Hellenes from the king's territory; for if his heart was stirred by
jealousy on account of the generalship bestowed upon his rival, he
was not the less aggrieved at finding himself robbed of the Aeolid.
Tissaphernes, lending willing ears to the proposal, had answered: "First
cross over with me in Caria, and then we will take counsel on these
matters." But being arrived in Caria, they determined to establish
garrisons of some strength in the various fortresses, and so crossed
back again into Ionia.

Hearing that the satraps had recrossed the Maeander, Dercylidas
grew apprehensive for the district which lay there unprotected. "If
Tissaphernes and Pharnabazus," he said to Pharax, "chose to make a
descent, they could harry the country right and left." In this mind he
followed suit, and recrossed the frontier too. And now as they marched
on, preserving no sort of battle order--on the supposition that the
enemy had got far ahead of them into the district of Ephesus--suddenly
they caught sight of his scouts perched on some monumental structures
facing them. To send up scouts into similar edifices and towers on their
own side was the work of a few moments, and before them lay revealed the
long lines of troops drawn up just where their road lay. These were the
Carians, with their white shields, and the whole Persian troops there
present, with all the Hellenic contingents belonging to either satrap.
Besides these there was a great cloud of cavalry: on the right wing the
squadrons of Tissaphernes, and on the left those of Pharnabazus.

Seeing how matters lay, Dercylidas ordered the generals of brigade and
captains to form into line as quickly as possible, eight deep, placing
the light infantry on the fringe of battle, with the cavalry--such
cavalry, that is, and of such numerical strength, as he chanced to have.
Meanwhile, as general, he sacrificed. (11) During this interval the
troops from Peloponnese kept quiet in preparation as for battle. Not
so the troops from Priene and Achilleum, from the islands and the Ionic
cities, some of whom left their arms in the corn, which stood thick and
deep in the plain of the Maeander, and took to their heels; while those
who remained at their posts gave evident signs that their steadiness
would not last. Pharnabazus, it was reported, had given orders to
engage; but Tissaphernes, who recalled his experience of his own
exploits with the Cyreian army, and assumed that all other Hellenes
were of similar mettle, had no desire to engage, but sent to Dercylidas
saying, he should be glad to meet him in conference. So Dercylidas,
attended by the pick of his troops, horse and foot, in personal
attendance on himself, (12) went forward to meet the envoys. He told
them that for his own part he had made his preparations to engage, as
they themselves might see, but still, if the satraps were minded to meet
in conference, he had nothing to say against it--"Only, in that case,
there must be mutual exchange of hostages and other pledges."

 (11) I.e. according to custom on the eve of battle. See "Pol. Lac."
    xiii. 8.

 (12) Lit. "they were splendid fellows to look at." See "Anab." II.
    iii. 3.

When this proposal had been agreed to and carried out, the two armies
retired for the night--the Asiatics to Tralles in Caria, the Hellenes to
Leucophrys, where was a temple (13) of Artemis of great sanctity, and
a sandy-bottomed lake more than a furlong in extent, fed by a spring of
ever-flowing water fit for drinking and warm. For the moment so much was
effected. On the next day they met at the place appointed, and it was
agreed that they should mutually ascertain the terms on which either
party was willing to make peace. On his side, Dercylidas insisted
that the king should grant independence to the Hellenic cities; while
Tissaphernes and Pharnabazus demanded the evacuation of the country by
the Hellenic army, and the withdrawal of the Lacedaemonian governors
from the cities. After this interchange of ideas a truce was entered
into, so as to allow time for the reports of the proceedings to be sent
by Dercylidas to Lacedaemon, and by Tissaphernes to the king.

 (13) Lately unearthed. See "Class. Rev." v. 8, p. 391.

B.C. 401 (?). Whilst such was the conduct of affairs in Asia under the
guidance of Dercylidas, the Lacedaemonians at home were at the same
time no less busily employed with other matters. They cherished a
long-standing embitterment against the Eleians, the grounds of which
were that the Eleians had once (14) contracted an alliance with the
Athenians, Argives, and Mantineans; moreover, on pretence of a sentence
registered against the Lacedaemonians, they had excluded them from
the horse-race and gymnastic contests. Nor was that the sum of their
offending. They had taken and scourged Lichas, (15) under the following
circumstances:--Being a Spartan, he had formally consigned his chariot
to the Thebans, and when the Thebans were proclaimed victors he stepped
forward to crown his charioteer; whereupon, in spite of his grey hairs,
the Eleians put those indignities upon him and expelled him from the
festival. Again, at a date subsequent to that occurrence, Agis being
sent to offer sacrifice to Olympian Zeus in accordance with the bidding
of an oracle, the Eleians would not suffer him to offer prayer for
victory in war, asserting that the ancient law and custom (16) forbade
Hellenes to consult the god for war with Hellenes; and Agis was forced
to go away without offering the sacrifice.

 (14) In 421 B.C. (see Thuc. v. 31); for the second charge, see Thuc.
    v. 49 foll.

 (15) See "Mem." I. ii. 61; Thuc. v. 50; and Jowett, note ad loc. vol.
    ii. p. 314.

 (16) See Grote, "H. G." ix. 311 note.

In consequence of all these annoyances the ephors and the Assembly
determined "to bring the men of Elis to their senses." Thereupon they
sent an embassy to that state, announcing that the authorities of
Lacedaemon deemed it just and right that they should leave the country
(17) townships in the territory of Elis free and independent. This the
Eleians flatly refused to do. The cities in question were theirs by
right of war. Thereupon the ephors called out the ban. The leader of the
expedition was Agis. He invaded Elis through Achaia (18) by the Larisus;
but the army had hardly set foot on the enemy's soil and the work of
devastation begun, when an earthquake took place, and Agis, taking
this as a sign from Heaven, marched back again out of the country and
disbanded his army. Thereat the men of Elis were much more emboldened,
and sent embassies to various cities which they knew to be hostile to
the Lacedaemonians.

 (17) Lit. "perioecid."

 (18) From the north. The Larisus is the frontier stream between Achaia
    and Elis. See Strabo, viii. 387.

The year had not completed its revolution (19) ere the ephors again
called out the ban against Elis, and the invading host of Agis was this
time swelled by the rest of the allies, including the Athenians; the
Boeotians and Corinthians alone excepted. The Spartan king now entered
through Aulon, (20) and the men of Lepreum (21) at once revolted
from the Eleians and gave in their adhesion to the Spartan, and
simultaneously with these the Macistians and their next-door neighbours
the Epitalians. As he crossed the river further adhesions followed, on
the part of the Letrinians, the Amphidolians, and the Marganians.

 (19) Al. "on the coming round of the next year." See Jowett (note to
    Thuc. i. 31), vol. ii. p. 33.

 (20) On the south. For the history, see Busolt, "Die Laked." pp.
    146-200. "The river" is the Alpheus.

 (21) See below, VI. v. 11; Paus. IV. xv. 8.

B.C. 400 (?). Upon this he pushed on into Olympian territory and did
sacrifice to Olympian Zeus. There was no attempt to stay his proceedings
now. After sacrifice he marched against the capital, (22) devastating
and burning the country as he went. Multitudes of cattle, multitudes
of slaves, were the fruits of conquest yielded, insomuch that the fame
thereof spread, and many more Arcadians and Achaeans flocked to join
the standard of the invader and to share in the plunder. In fact, the
expedition became one enormous foray. Here was the chance to fill all
the granaries of Peloponnese with corn. When he had reached the capital,
the beautiful suburbs and gymnasia became a spoil to the troops; but the
city itself, though it lay open before him a defenceless and unwalled
town, he kept aloof from. He would not, rather than could not, take
it. Such was the explanation given. Thus the country was a prey to
devastation, and the invaders massed round Cyllene.

 (22) I.e. Elis, of which Cyllene is the port town. For the wealth of
    the district, see Polyb. iv. 73; and below, VII. iv. 33.

Then the friends of a certain Xenias--a man of whom it was said that
he might measure the silver coin, inherited from his father, by the
bushel--wishing to be the leading instrument in bringing over the state
to Lacedaemon, rushed out of the house, sword in hand, and began a
work of butchery. Amongst other victims they killed a man who strongly
resembled the leader of the democratic party, Thrasydaeus. (23) Everyone
believed it was really Thrasydaeus who was slain. The popular party were
panic-stricken, and stirred neither hand nor foot. On their side,
the cut-throats poured their armed bands into the market-place. But
Thrasydaeus was laid asleep the while where the fumes of wine had
overpowered him. When the people came to discover that their hero was
not dead, they crowded round his house this side and that, (24) like a
swarm of bees clinging to their leader; and as soon as Thrasydaeus
had put himself in the van, with the people at his back, a battle was
fought, and the people won. And those who had laid their hands to deeds
of butchery went as exiles to the Lacedaemonians.

 (23) See Paus. III. viii. 4. He was a friend of Lysias ("Vit. X. Orat.
    835").

 (24) The house was filled to overflowing by the clustering close-
    packed crowd.

After a while Agis himself retired, recrossing the Alpheus; but he was
careful to leave a garrison in Epitalium near that river, with Lysippus
as governor, and the exiles from Elis along with him. Having done so, he
disbanded his army and returned home himself.

B.C. 400-399 (?). (25) During the rest of the summer and the ensuing
winter the territory of the Eleians was ravaged and ransacked by
Lysippus and his troops, until Thrasydaeus, the following summer, sent
to Lacedaemon and agreed to dismantle the walls of Phea and Cyllene, and
to grant autonomy to the Triphylian townships (26)--together with Phrixa
and Epitalium, the Letrinians, Amphidolians, and Marganians; and besides
these to the Acroreians and to Lasion, a place claimed by the Arcadians.
With regard to Epeium, a town midway between Heraea and Macistus,
the Eleians claimed the right to keep it, on the plea that they had
purchased the whole district from its then owners, for thirty talents,
(27) which sum they had actually paid. But the Lacedaemonians, acting on
the principle "that a purchase which forcibly deprives the weaker party
of his possession is no more justifiable than a seizure by violence,"
compelled them to emancipate Epeium also. From the presidency of the
temple of Olympian Zeus, however, they did not oust them; not that it
belonged to Elis of ancient right, but because the rival claimants,
(28) it was felt, were "villagers," hardly equal to the exercise of
the presidency. After these concessions, peace and alliance between the
Eleians and the Lacedaemonians were established, and the war between
Elis and Sparta ceased.

 (25) Grote ("H. G." ix. 316) discusses the date of this war between
    Elis and Sparta, which he thinks, reaches over three different
    years, 402-400 B.C. But Curtius (vol. iv. Eng. tr. p. 196)
    disagrees: "The Eleian war must have occurred in 401-400 B.C., and
    Grote rightly conjectures that the Eleians were anxious to bring
    it to a close before the celebration of the festival. But he errs
    in extending its duration over three years." See Diod. xiv. 17.
    24; Paus. III. viii. 2 foll.

 (26) Grote remarks: "There is something perplexing in Xenophon's
    description of the Triphylian townships which the Eleians
    surrendered" ("H. G." ix. 315). I adopt Grote's emend. {kai
    Phrixan}. See Busolt, op. cit. p. 176.

 (27) = 7,312 pounds: 10 shillings.

 (28) I.e. the men of the Pisatid. See below, VII. iv. 28; Busolt, op.
    cit. p 156.



III

After this Agis came to Delphi and offered as a sacrifice a tenth of the
spoil. On his return journey he fell ill at Heraea--being by this time
an old man--and was carried back to Lacedaemon. He survived the journey,
but being there arrived, death speedily overtook him. He was buried with
a sepulchre transcending in solemnity the lot of ordinary mortality. (1)

 (1) See "Ages." xi. 16; "Pol. Lac." xv. 9.

When the holy days of mourning were accomplished, and it was necessary
to choose another king, there were rival claimants to the throne.
Leotychides claimed it as the son, Agesilaus as the brother, of Agis.
Then Leotychides protested: "Yet consider, Agesilaus, the law bids not
'the king's brother,' but 'the king's son' to be king; only if there
chance to be no son, in that case shall the brother of the king be
king." Agesilaus: "Then must I needs be king." Leotychides: "How so,
seeing that I am not dead?" Agesilaus: "Because he whom you call
your father denied you, saying, 'Leotychides is no son of mine.'"
Leotychides: "Nay, but my mother, who would know far better than
he, said, and still to-day says, I am." Agesilaus: "Nay, but the god
himself, Poteidan, laid his finger on thy falsity when by his earthquake
he drove forth thy father from the bridal chamber into the light of day;
and time, 'that tells no lies,' as the proverb has it, bare witness to
the witness of the god; for just ten months from the moment at which he
fled and was no more seen within that chamber, you were born." (2) So
they reasoned together.

 (2) I have followed Sauppe as usual, but see Hartman ("Anal. Xen." p.
    327) for a discussion of the whole passage. He thinks Xenophon
    wrote {ex ou gar toi ephugen} ({o sos pater}, i.e. adulterer) {ek
    to thalamo dekato meni tu ephus}. The Doric {ek to thalamo} was
    corrupted into {en to thalamo} and {kai ephane} inserted. This
    corrupt reading Plutarch had before him, and hence his distorted
    version of the story.

Diopethes, (3) a great authority upon oracles, supported Leotychides.
There was an oracle of Apollo, he urged, which said "Beware of the lame
reign." But Diopethes was met by Lysander, who in behalf of Agesilaus
demurred to this interpretation put upon the language of the god. If
they were to beware of a lame reign, it meant not, beware lest a man
stumble and halt, but rather, beware of him in whose veins flows not the
blood of Heracles; most assuredly the kingdom would halt, and that would
be a lame reign in very deed, whensoever the descendants of Heracles
should cease to lead the state. Such were the arguments on either side,
after hearing which the city chose Agesilaus to be king.

 (3) See Plut. "Ages." ii. 4; "Lys." xxii. (Clough, iv. 3; iii. 129);
    Paus. III. viii. 5.

Now Agesilaus had not been seated on the throne one year when, as he
sacrificed one of the appointed sacrifices in behalf of the city, (4)
the soothsayer warned him, saying: "The gods reveal a conspiracy of the
most fearful character"; and when the king sacrificed a second time,
he said: "The aspect of the victims is now even yet more terrible"; but
when he had sacrificed for the third time, the soothsayer exclaimed: "O
Agesilaus, the sign is given to me, even as though we were in the very
midst of the enemy." Thereupon they sacrificed to the deities who avert
evil and work salvation, and so barely obtained good omens and ceased
sacrificing. Nor had five days elapsed after the sacrifices were ended,
ere one came bringing information to the ephors of a conspiracy, and
named Cinadon as the ringleader; a young man robust of body as of soul,
but not one of the peers. (5) Accordingly the ephors questioned their
informant: "How say you the occurrence is to take place?" and he who
gave the information answered: "Cinadon took me to the limit of the
market-place, and bade me count how many Spartans there were in
the market-place; and I counted--'king, ephors, and elders, and
others--maybe forty. But tell me, Cinadon,' I said to him, 'why have you
bidden me count them?' and he answered me: 'Those men, I would have
you know, are your sworn foes; and all those others, more than four
thousand, congregated there are your natural allies.' Then he took and
showed me in the streets, here one and there two of 'our enemies,' as we
chanced to come across them, and all the rest 'our natural allies'; and
so again running through the list of Spartans to be found in the country
districts, he still kept harping on that string: 'Look you, on each
estate one foeman--the master--and all the rest allies.'" The ephors
asked: "How many do you reckon are in the secret of this matter?" The
informant answered: "On that point also he gave me to understand that
there were by no means many in their secret who were prime movers of the
affair, but those few to be depended on; 'and to make up,' said he,
'we ourselves are in their secret, all the rest of them--helots,
enfranchised, inferiors, provincials, one and all. (6) Note their
demeanour when Spartans chance to be the topic of their talk. Not one of
them can conceal the delight it would give him if he might eat up every
Spartan raw.'" (7) Then, as the inquiry went on, the question came: "And
where did they propose to find arms?" The answer followed: "He explained
that those of us, of course, who are enrolled in regiments have arms of
our own already, and as for the mass--he led the way to the war
foundry, and showed me scores and scores of knives, of swords, of spits,
hatchets, and axes, and reaping-hooks. 'Anything or everything,' he told
me, 'which men use to delve in earth, cut timber, or quarry stone, would
serve our purpose; nay, the instruments used for other arts would in
nine cases out of ten furnish weapons enough and to spare, especially
when dealing with unarmed antagonists.'" Once more being asked what time
the affair was to come off, he replied his orders were "not to leave the
city."

 (4) "Pol. Lac." xv. 2.

 (5) For the {omoioi}, see Muller, "Dorians," iii. 5, 7 (vol. ii. p.
    84); Grote, "H. G." ix. 345, note 2.

 (6) For the neodamodes, hypomeiones, perioeci, see Arnold, "Thuc." v.
    34; Muller, "Dorians," ii. 43, 84, 18; Busolt, op. cit. p 16.

 (7) See "Anab." IV. viii. 14; and Hom. "Il." iv. 34.

As the result of their inquiry the ephors were persuaded that the man's
statements were based upon things he had really seen, (8) and they were
so alarmed that they did not even venture to summon the Little Assembly,
(9) as it was named; but holding informal meetings among themselves--a
few senators here and a few there--they determined to send Cinadon and
others of the young men to Aulon, with instructions to apprehend certain
of the inhabitants and helots, whose names were written on the scytale
(or scroll). (10) He had further instructions to capture another
resident in Aulon; this was a woman, the fashionable beauty of the
place--supposed to be the arch-corruptress of all Lacedaemonians, young
and old, who visited Aulon. It was not the first mission of the sort
on which Cinadon had been employed by the ephors. It was natural,
therefore, that the ephors should entrust him with the scytale on which
the names of the suspects were inscribed; and in answer to his inquiry
which of the young men he was to take with him, they said: "Go and order
the eldest of the Hippagretae (11) (or commanders of horse) to let you
have six or seven who chance to be there." But they had taken care to
let the commander know whom he was to send, and that those sent should
also know that their business was to capture Cinadon. Further, the
authorities instructed Cinadon that they would send three waggons
to save bringing back his captives on foot--concealing as deeply as
possible the fact that he, and he alone, was the object of the mission.
Their reason for not securing him in the city was that they did not
really know the extent of the mischief; and they wished, in the first
instance, to learn from Cinadon who his accomplices were before these
latter could discover they were informed against and effect their
escape. His captors were to secure him first, and having learnt from
him the names of his confederates, to write them down and send them
as quickly as possible to the ephors. The ephors, indeed, were so much
concerned about the whole occurrence that they further sent a company of
horse to assist their agents at Aulon. (12) As soon as the capture was
effected, and one of the horsemen was back with the list of names taken
down on the information of Cinadon, they lost no time in apprehending
the soothsayer Tisamenus and the rest who were the principals in
the conspiracy. When Cinadon (13) himself was brought back and
cross-examined, and had made a full confession of the whole plot, his
plans, and his accomplices, they put to him one final question: "What
was your object in undertaking this business?" He answered: "I wished to
be inferior to no man in Lacedaemon." Let that be as it might, his fate
was to be taken out forthwith in irons, just as he was, and to be placed
with his two hands and his neck in the collar, and so under scourge and
goad to be driven, himself and his accomplices, round the city. Thus
upon the heads of those was visited the penalty of their offences.

 (8) "And pointed to a well-concerted plan."

 (9) See Grote, "H. G." ix. 348.

 (10) See Thuc. i. 131; Plut. "Lys." 19 (Clough, iii. p. 125).

 (11) "The Hippagretes (or commander of the three hundred guards called
    horsemen, though they were not really mounted)." Grote, "H. G."
    vol. ix. p. 349; see "Pol. Lac." iv. 3.

 (12) Or, "to those on the way to Aulon."

 (13) See for Cinadon's case, Arist. "Pol." v. 7, 3.



IV

B.C. 397. (1) It was after the incidents just recorded that a Syracusan
named Herodas brought news to Lacedaemon. He had chanced to be in
Phoenicia with a certain shipowner, and was struck by the number of
Phoenician triremes which he observed, some coming into harbour from
other ports, others already there with their ships' companies complete,
while others again were still completing their equipments. Nor was it
only what he saw, but he had heard say further that there were to be
three hundred of these vessels all told; whereupon he had taken passage
on the first sailing ship bound for Hellas. He was in haste to lay this
information before the Lacedaemonians, feeling sure that the king and
Tissaphernes were concerned in these preparations--though where the
fleet was to act, or against whom, he would not venture to predict.

 (1) See Grote, "H. G." ix. 353, for chronology, etc.

These reports threw the Lacedaemonians into a flutter of expectation and
anxiety. They summoned a meeting of the allies, and began to deliberate
as to what ought to be done. Lysander, convinced of the enormous
superiority of the Hellenic navy, and with regard to land forces drawing
an obvious inference from the exploits and final deliverance of the
troops with Cyrus, persuaded Agesilaus, to undertake a campaign into
Asia, provided the authorities would furnish him with thirty Spartans,
two thousand of the enfranchised, (2) and contingents of the allies
amounting to six thousand men. Apart from these calculations, Lysander
had a personal object: he wished to accompany the king himself, and by
his aid to re-establish the decarchies originally set up by himself in
the different cities, but at a later date expelled through the action
of the ephors, who had issued a fiat re-establishing the old order of
constitution.

 (2) Technically, "neodamodes."

B.C. 396. To this offer on the part of Agesilaus to undertake such an
expedition the Lacedaemonians responded by presenting him with all
he asked for, and six months' provisions besides. When the hour of
departure came he offered all such sacrifices as are necessary, and
lastly those "before crossing the border," (3) and so set out. This
done, he despatched to the several states (4) messengers with directions
as to the numbers to be sent from each, and the points of rendezvous;
but for himself he was minded to go and do sacrifice at Aulis, even as
Agamemnon had offered sacrifice in that place ere he set sail for
Troy. But when he had reached the place and had begun to sacrifice, the
Boeotarchs (5) being apprised of his design, sent a body of cavalry and
bade him desist from further sacrificing; (6) and lighting upon victims
already offered, they hurled them from off the altars, scattering the
fragments. Then Agesilaus, calling the gods to witness, got on board his
trireme in bitter indignation, and sailed away. Arrived at Geraestus, he
there collected as large a portion of his troops as possible, and with
the armada made sail for Ephesus.

 (3) "Pol. Lac." xiii. 2 foll.

 (4) Or, "To the several cities he had already despatched messengers
    with directions," etc.; see Paus. III. ix. 1-3.

 (5) See Freeman, "Hist. of Federal Government," ch. iv. "Constitution
    of the Boeotian League," pp. 162, 163. The Boeotarchs, as
    representatives of the several Boeotian cities, were the supreme
    military commanders of the League, and, as it would appear, the
    general administrators of Federal affairs. "The Boeotarchs of
    course command at Delion, but they also act as administrative
    magistrates of the League by hindering Agesilaus from sacrificing
    at Aulis."

 (6) Plut. "Ages." vi.; "Pelop." xxi. See Breitenb. op. cit. Praef. p.
    xvi.; and below, III. v. 5; VI. iv. 23.

When he had reached that city the first move was made by Tissaphernes,
who sent asking, "With what purpose he was come thither?" And the
Spartan king made answer: "With the intention that the cities in Asia
shall be independent even as are the cities in our quarter of Hellas."
In answer to this Tissaphernes said: "If you on your part choose to
make a truce whilst I send ambassadors to the king, I think you may well
arrange the matter, and sail back home again, if so you will." "Willing
enough should I be," replied Agesilaus, "were I not persuaded that you
are cheating me." "Nay, but it is open to you," replied the satrap, "to
exact a surety for the execution of the terms... 'Provided always that
you, Tissaphernes, carry out what you say without deceit, we on our side
will abstain from injuring your dominion in any respect whatever
during the truce.'" (7) Accordingly in the presence of three
commissioners--Herippidas, Dercylidas, and Megillus--Tissaphernes took
an oath in the words prescribed: "Verily and indeed, I will effect peace
honestly and without guile." To which the commissioners, on behalf
of Agesilaus, swore a counter-oath: "Verily and indeed, provided
Tissaphernes so acts, we on our side will observe the truce."

 (7) For this corrupt passage, see Hartman, "Anal. Xen." p. 332; also
    Otto Keller's critical edition of the "Hellenica" (Lips,
    MDCCCLXXX.)

Tissaphernes at once gave the lie to what he had sworn. Instead of
adhering to peace he sent up to demand a large army from the king, in
addition to what he already had. But Agesilaus, though he was fully
alive to these proceedings, adhered as rigidly as ever to the truce.

To keep quiet and enjoy leisure was his duty, in the exercise of which
he wore away the time at Ephesus. But in reference to the organisation
of the several states it was a season of vehement constitutional
disturbance in the several cities; that is to say, there were neither
democracies as in the old days of the Athenians, nor yet were there
decarchies as in the days of Lysander. But here was Lysander back again.
Every one recognised him, and flocked to him with petitions for one
favour or another, which he was to obtain for them from Agesilaus.
A crowd of suitors danced attendance on his heels, and formed so
conspicuous a retinue that Agesilaus, any one would have supposed, was
the private person and Lysander the king. All this was maddening
to Agesilaus, as was presently plain. As to the rest of the Thirty,
jealousy did not suffer them to keep silence, and they put it plainly to
Agesilaus that the super-regal splendour in which Lysander lived was
a violation of the constitution. So when Lysander took upon himself to
introduce some of his petitioners to Agesilaus, the latter turned them
a deaf ear. Their being aided and abetted by Lysander was sufficient; he
sent them away discomfited. At length, as time after time things turned
out contrary to his wishes, Lysander himself perceived the position of
affairs. He now no longer suffered that crowd to follow him, and gave
those who asked him help in anything plainly to understand that they
would gain nothing, but rather be losers, by his intervention. But being
bitterly annoyed at the degradation put upon him, he came to the king
and said to him: "Ah, Agesilaus, how well you know the art of humbling
your friends!" "Ay, indeed," the king replied; "those of them whose one
idea it is to appear greater than myself; if I did not know how also to
requite with honour those who work for my good, I should be ashamed."
And Lysander said: "maybe there is more reason in your doings than ever
guided my conduct;" adding, "Grant me for the rest one favour, so shall
I cease to blush at the loss of my influence with you, and you will
cease to be embarrassed by my presence. Send me off on a mission
somewhere; wherever I am I will strive to be of service to you." Such
was the proposal of Lysander. Agesilaus resolved to act upon it, and
despatched Lysander to the Hellespont. And this is what befell.
(8) Lysander, being made aware of a slight which had been put upon
Spithridates the Persian by Pharnabazus, got into conversation with the
injured man, and so worked upon him that he was persuaded to bring
his children and his personal belongings, and with a couple of hundred
troops to revolt. The next step was to deposit all the goods safely in
Cyzicus, and the last to get on shipboard with Spithridates and his
son, and so to present himself with his Persian friends to Agesilaus.
Agesilaus, on his side, was delighted at the transaction, and set
himself at once to get information about Pharnabazus, his territory and
his government.

 (8) See "Ages." iii. 3; "Anab." VI. v. 7.

Meanwhile Tissaphernes had waxed bolder. A large body of troops had been
sent down by the king. On the strength of that he declared war against
Agesilaus, if he did not instantly withdraw his troops from Asia. The
Lacedaemonians there (9) present, no less than the allies, received the
news with profound vexation, persuaded as they were that Agesilaus had
no force capable of competing with the king's grand armament. But a
smile lit up the face of Agesilaus as he bade the ambassadors return to
Tissaphernes and tell him that he was much in his debt for the perjury
by which he had won the enmity of Heaven and made the very gods
themselves allies of Hellas. He at once issued a general order to the
troops to equip themselves for a forward movement. He warned the cities
through which he must pass in an advance upon Caria, to have markets in
readiness, and lastly, he despatched a message to the Ionian, Aeolian,
and Hellespontine communities to send their contingents to join him at
Ephesus.

 (9) I.e. at Ephesus.

Tissaphernes, putting together the facts that Agesilaus had no cavalry
and that Caria was a region unadapted to that arm, and persuaded in
his own mind also that the Spartan could not but cherish wrath against
himself personally for his chicanery, felt convinced that he was really
intending to invade Caria, and that the satrap's palace was his final
goal. Accordingly he transferred the whole of his infantry to that
province, and proceeded to lead his cavalry round into the plain of the
Maeander. Here he conceived himself capable of trampling the Hellenes
under foot with his horsemen before they could reach the craggy
districts where no cavalry could operate.

But, instead of marching straight into Caria, Agesilaus turned sharp
off in the opposite direction towards Phrygia. Picking up various
detachments of troops which met him on his march, he steadily advanced,
laying cities prostrate before him, and by the unexpectedness of his
attack reaping a golden harvest of spoil. As a rule the march was
prosecuted safely; but not far from Dascylium his advanced guard of
cavalry were pushing on towards a knoll to take a survey of the state
of things in front, when, as chance would have it, a detachment of
cavalry sent forward by Pharnabazus--the corps, in fact, of Rhathines
and his natural brother Bagaeus--just about equal to the Hellenes in
number, also came galloping up to the very knoll in question. The two
bodies found themselves face to face not one hundred and fifty yards
(10) apart, and for the first moment or two stood stock still. The
Hellenic horse were drawn up like an ordinary phalanx four deep, the
barbarians presenting a narrow front of twelve or thereabouts, and a
very disproportionate depth. There was a moment's pause, and then the
barbarians, taking the initiative, charged. There was a hand-to-hand
tussle, in which any Hellene who succeeded in striking his man shivered
his lance with the blow, while the Persian troopers, armed with
cornel-wood javelins, speedily despatched a dozen men and a couple of
horses. (11) At this point the Hellenic cavalry turned and fled. But as
Agesilaus came up to the rescue with his heavy infantry, the Asiatics
were forced in their turn to withdraw, with the loss of one man slain.
This cavalry engagement gave them pause. Agesilaus on the day following
it offered sacrifice. "Was he to continue his advance?" But the victims
proved hopeless. (12) There was nothing for it after this manifestation
but to turn and march towards the sea. It was clear enough to his mind
that without a proper cavalry force it would be impossible to conduct
a campaign in the flat country. Cavalry, therefore, he must get, or be
driven to mere guerilla warfare. With this view he drew up a list of
all the wealthiest inhabitants belonging to the several cities of
those parts. Their duty would be to support a body of cavalry, with the
proviso, however, that any one contributing a horse, arms, and rider, up
to the standard, would be exempted from personal service. The effect
was instantaneous. The zeal with which the recipients of these orders
responded could hardly have been greater if they had been seeking
substitutes to die for them.

 (10) Lit. "four plethra."

 (11) See Xenophon's treatise "On Horsemanship," xii. 12.

 (12) Lit. "lobeless," i.e. with a lobe of the liver wanting--a bad
    sign.

B.C. 395. After this, at the first indication of spring, he collected
the whole of his army at Ephesus. But the army needed training. With
that object he proposed a series of prizes--prizes to the heavy infantry
regiments, to be won by those who presented their men in the best
condition; prizes for the cavalry regiments which could ride best;
prizes for those divisions of peltasts and archers which proved most
efficient in their respective duties. And now the gymnasiums were
a sight to see, thronged as they were, one and all, with warriors
stripping for exercise; or again, the hippodrome crowded with horses and
riders performing their evolutions; or the javelin men and archers
going through their peculiar drill. In fact, the whole city where he
lay presented under his hands a spectacle not to be forgotten. The
market-place literally teemed with horses, arms, and accoutrements of
all sorts for sale. The bronze-worker, the carpenter, the smith, the
leather-cutter, the painter and embosser, were all busily engaged in
fabricating the implements of war; so that the city of Ephesus itself
was fairly converted into a military workshop. (13) It would have done
a man's heart good to see those long lines of soldiers with Agesilaus
at their head, as they stepped gaily be-garlanded from the gymnasiums to
dedicate their wreaths to the goddess Artemis. Nor can I well conceive
of elements more fraught with hope than were here combined. Here were
reverence and piety towards Heaven; here practice in war and military
training; here discipline with habitual obedience to authority. But
contempt for one's enemy will infuse a kind of strength in battle. So
the Spartan leader argued; and with a view to its production he ordered
the quartermasters to put up the prisoners who had been captured by
his foraging bands for auction, stripped naked; so that his Hellenic
soldiery, as they looked at the white skins which had never been bared
to sun and wind, the soft limbs unused to toil through constant riding
in carriages, came to the conclusion that war with such adversaries
would differ little from a fight with women.

 (13) See Plut. "Marc." (Clough, ii. 262); Polyb. "Hist." x. 20.

By this date a full year had elapsed since the embarkation of Agesilaus,
and the time had come for the Thirty with Lysander to sail back home,
and for their successors, with Herippidas, to arrive. Among these
Agesilaus appointed Xenocles and another to the command of the cavalry,
Scythes to that of the heavy infantry of the enfranchised, (14)
Herippidas to that of the Cyreians, and Migdon to that of the
contingents from the states. Agesilaus gave them to understand that he
intended to lead them forthwith by the most expeditious route against
the stronghold of the country, (15) so that without further ceremony
they might prepare their minds and bodies for the tug of battle.
Tissaphernes, however, was firmly persuaded that this was only talk
intended to deceive him; Agesilaus would this time certainly invade
Caria. Accordingly he repeated his former tactics, transporting his
infantry bodily into Caria and posting his cavalry in the valley of the
Maeander. But Agesilaus was as good as his word, and at once invaded the
district of Sardis. A three days' march through a region denuded of the
enemy threw large supplies into his hands. On the fourth day the cavalry
of the enemy approached. Their general ordered the officer in charge of
his baggage-train to cross the Pactolus and encamp, while his troopers,
catching sight of stragglers from the Hellenic force scattered in
pursuit of booty, put several of them to the sword. Perceiving which,
Agesilaus ordered his cavalry to the rescue; and the Persians on their
side, seeing their advance, collected together in battle order to
receive them, with dense squadrons of horse, troop upon troop. The
Spartan, reflecting that the enemy had as yet no infantry to support
him, whilst he had all branches of the service to depend upon, concluded
that the critical moment had arrived at which to risk an engagement.
In this mood he sacrificed, and began advancing his main line of battle
against the serried lines of cavalry in front of him, at the same time
ordering the flower of his heavy infantry--the ten-years-service men
(16)--to close with them at a run, and the peltasts to bring up their
supports at the double. The order passed to his cavalry was to charge
in confidence that he and the whole body of his troops were close behind
them. The cavalry charge was received by the Persians without flinching,
but presently finding themselves environed by the full tide of war they
swerved. Some found a speedy grave within the river, but the mass of
them gradually made good their escape. The Hellenes followed close on
the heels of the flying foe and captured his camp. here the peltasts not
unnaturally fell to pillaging; whereupon Agesilaus planted his troops
so as to form a cordon enclosing the property of friends and foes alike.
The spoil taken was considerable; it fetched more than seventy talents,
(17) not to mention the famous camels, subsequently brought over by
Agesilaus into Hellas, which were captured here. At the moment of the
battle Tissaphernes lay in Sardis. Hence the Persians argued that they
had been betrayed by the satrap. And the king of Persia, coming to a
like conclusion himself that Tissaphernes was to blame for the evil turn
of his affairs, sent down Tithraustes and beheaded him. (18)

 (14) The neodamodes.

 (15) I.e. Lydia. See Plut. "Ages." x. (Clough, iv. 11).

 (16) See note to "Hell." II. iv. 32.

 (17) = 17,062 pounds: 10 shillings.

 (18) See Diod. xiv. 80.

This done, Tithraustes sent an embassy to Agesilaus with a message as
follows: "The author of all our trouble, yours and ours, Agesilaus, has
paid the penalty of his misdoings; the king therefore asks of you first
that you should sail back home in peace; secondly, that the cities in
Asia secured in their autonomy should continue to render him the ancient
tribute." To this proposition Agesilaus made answer that "without the
authorities at home he could do nothing in the matter." "Then do you,
at least," replied Tithraustes, "while awaiting advice from Lacedaemon,
withdraw into the territory of Pharnabazus. Have I not avenged you of
your enemy?" "While, then, I am on my way thither," rejoined Agesilaus,
"will you support my army with provisions?" On this wise Tithraustes
handed him thirty talents, (19) which the other took, and forthwith
began his march into Phrygia (the Phrygia of Pharnabazus). He lay in the
plain district above Cyme, (20) when a message reached him from the home
authorities, giving him absolute disposal of the naval forces, (21)
with the right to appoint the admiral of his choice. This course the
Lacedaemonians were led to adopt by the following considerations: If,
they argued, the same man were in command of both services, the land
force would be greatly strengthened through the concentration of the
double force at any point necessary; and the navy likewise would be far
more useful through the immediate presence and co-operation of the land
force where needed. Apprised of these measures, Agesilaus in the first
instance sent an order to the cities on the islands and the seaboard to
fit out as many ships of war as they severally might deem desirable.
The result was a new navy, consisting of the vessels thus voluntarily
furnished by the states, with others presented by private persons out
of courtesy to their commander, and amounting in all to a fleet of one
hundred and twenty sail. The admiral whom he selected was Peisander, his
wife's brother, a man of genuine ambition and of a vigorous spirit, but
not sufficiently expert in the details of equipment to achieve a great
naval success. Thus while Peisander set off to attend to naval matters,
Agesilaus continued his march whither he was bound to Phrygia.

 (19) = 7,312 pounds: 10 shillings.

 (20) See "Cyrop." VII. i. 45.

 (21) See Grote, "H. G." ix. 327, note 3; Arist. "Pol." ii. 9, 33.



V

But now Tithraustes seemed to have discovered in Agesilaus a disposition
to despise the fortunes of the Persian monarch--he evidently had no
intention to withdraw from Asia; on the contrary, he was cherishing
hopes vast enough to include the capture of the king himself. Being at
his wits' end how to manage matters, he resolved to send Timocrates the
Rhodian to Hellas with a gift of gold worthy fifty silver talents, (1)
and enjoined upon him to endeavour to exchange solemn pledges with
the leading men in the several states, binding them to undertake a
war against Lacedaemon. Timocrates arrived and began to dole out
his presents. In Thebes he gave gifts to Androcleidas, Ismenias, and
Galaxidorus; in Corinth to Timolaus and Polyanthes; in Argos to Cylon
and his party. The Athenians, (2) though they took no share of the gold,
were none the less eager for the war, being of opinion that empire
was theirs by right. (3) The recipients of the moneys forthwith began
covertly to attack the Lacedaemonians in their respective states, and,
when they had brought these to a sufficient pitch of hatred, bound
together the most important of them in a confederacy.

 (1) = 12,187 pounds: 10 shillings.

 (2) See Paus. III. ix. 8; Plut. "Ages." xv.

 (3) Reading {nomizontes auton to arkhein} with Sauppe; or if, as
    Breitinbach suggests, {enomizon de oukh outon to arkhesthai},
    translate "but thought it was not for them to take the
    initiative."

But it was clear to the leaders in Thebes that, unless some one struck
the first blow, the Lacedaemonians would never be brought to break the
truce with their allies. They therefore persuaded the Opuntian Locrians
(4) to levy moneys on a debatable district, (5) jointly claimed by the
Phocians and themselves, when the Phocians would be sure to retaliate
by an attack on Locris. These expectations were fulfilled. The Phocians
immediately invaded Locris and seized moneys on their side with ample
interest. Then Androcleidas and his friends lost no time in persuading
the Thebans to assist the Locrians, on the ground that it was no
debatable district which had been entered by the Phocians, but
the admittedly friendly and allied territory of Locris itself. The
counter-invasion of Phocis and pillage of their country by the Thebans
promptly induced the Phocians to send an embassy to Lacedaemon. In
claiming assistance they explained that the war was not of their own
seeking, but that they had attacked the Locrians in self-defence. On
their side the Lacedaemonians were glad enough to seize a pretext for
marching upon the Thebans, against whom they cherished a long-standing
bitterness. They had not forgotten the claim which the Thebans had
set up to a tithe for Apollo in Deceleia, (6) nor yet their refusal to
support Lacedaemon in the attack on Piraeus; (7) and they accused them
further of having persuaded the Corinthians not to join that expedition.
Nor did they fail to call to mind some later proceedings of the
Thebans--their refusal to allow Agesilaus to sacrifice in Aulis; (8)
their snatching the victims already offered and hurling them from the
altars; their refusal to join the same general in a campaign directed
even against Asia. (9) The Lacedaemonians further reasoned that now,
if ever, was the favourable moment to conduct an expedition against
the Thebans, and once for all to put a stop to their insolent behaviour
towards them. Affairs in Asia were prospering under the strong arm of
Agesilaus, and in Hellas they had no other war on hand to trammel their
movements. Such, therefore, being the general view of the situation
adopted at Lacedaemon, the ephors proceeded to call out the ban.
Meanwhile they despatched Lysander to Phocis with orders to put himself
at the head of the Phocians along with the Oetaeans, Heracleotes,
Melians, and Aenianians, and to march upon Haliartus; before the
walls of which place Pausanias, the destined leader of the expedition,
undertook to present himself at the head of the Lacedaemonians and other
Peloponnesian forces by a specified date. Lysander not only carried
out his instructions to the letter, but going a little beyond them,
succeeded in detaching Orchomenus from Thebes. (10) Pausanias, on
the other hand, after finding the sacrifice for crossing the frontier
favourable, sat down at Tegea and set about despatching to and fro the
commandants of allied troops whilst contentedly awaiting the soldiers
from the provincial (11) districts of Laconia.

 (4) For an alliance between Athens and the Locrians, B.C. 395, see
    Hicks, 67; and below, IV. ii. 17.

 (5) Lit. "the." See Paus. III. ix. 9.

 (6) See Grote, "H. G." ix. 309, 403; viii. 355.

 (7) "Hell." II. iv. 30, B.C. 403.

 (8) See above, III. iv. 3; and below, VII. i. 34.

 (9) See Paus. III. ix. 1-3.

 (10) See Freeman, op. cit. p. 167, "Ill feeling between Thebes and
    other towns."--"Against Thebes, backed by Sparta, resistance was
    hopeless. It was not till long after that, at last  (in 395 B.C.),
    on a favourable opportunity during the Corinthian war, Orchomenos
    openly seceded." And for the prior "state of disaffection towards
    Thebes on the part of the smaller cities," see "Mem." III. v. 2,
    in reference to B.C. 407.

 (11) Lit. "perioecid."

And now that it was fully plain to the Thebans that the Lacedaemonians
would invade their territory, they sent ambassadors to Athens, who spoke
as follows:--

"Men of Athens, it is a mistake on your part to blame us for certain
harsh resolutions concerning Athens at the conclusion of the war.
(12) That vote was not authorised by the state of Thebes. It was the
utterance merely of one man, (13) who was at that time seated in
the congress of the allies. A more important fact is that when the
Lacedaemonians summoned us to attack Piraeus (14) the collective state
of Thebes passed a resolution refusing to join in the campaign. As
then you are to a large extent the cause of the resentment which the
Lacedaemonians feel towards us, we consider it only fair that you in
your turn should render us assistance. Still more do we demand of you,
sirs, who were of the city party at that date, to enter heart and soul
into war with the Lacedaemonians. For what were their services to you?
They first deliberately converted you into an oligarchy and placed you
in hostility to the democracy, and then they came with a great force
under guise of being your allies, and delivered you over to the
majority, so that, for any service they rendered you, you were all dead
men; and you owe your lives to our friends here, the people of Athens.
(15)

 (12) See "Hell." II. ii. 19; and below, VI. v. 35.

 (13) Plut. "Lys." xv. "Erianthus the Theban gave his vote to pull down
    the city, and turn the country into sheep-pasture."--Clough, iii.
    121.

 (14) See "Hell." II. iv. 30.

 (15) See "Hell." II. iv. 38, 40, 41.

"But to pass on--we all know, men of Athens, that you would like to
recover the empire which you formerly possessed; and how can you compass
your object better than by coming to the aid yourselves of the victims
of Lacedaemonian injustice? Is it their wide empire of which you are
afraid? Let not that make cowards of you--much rather let it embolden
you as you lay to heart and ponder your own case. When your empire was
widest then the crop of your enemies was thickest. Only so long as they
found no opportunity to revolt did they keep their hatred of you dark;
but no sooner had they found a champion in Lacedaemon than they at once
showed what they really felt towards you. So too to-day. Let us show
plainly that we mean to stand shoulder to shoulder (16) embattled
against the Lacedaemonians; and haters enough of them--whole
armies--never fear, will be forthcoming. To prove the truth of this
assertion you need only to count upon your fingers. How many friends
have they left to them to-day? The Argives have been, are, and ever will
be, hostile to them. Of course. But the Eleians? Why, the Eleians have
quite lately (17) been robbed of so much territory and so many cities
that their friendship is converted into hatred. And what shall we say
of the Corinthians? the Arcadians? the Achaeans? In the war which Sparta
waged against you, there was no toil, no danger, no expense, which those
peoples did not share, in obedience to the dulcet coaxings (18) and
persuasions of that power. The Lacedaemonians gained what they wanted,
and then not one fractional portion of empire, honour, or wealth did
these faithful followers come in for. That is not all. They have no
scruple in appointing their helots (19) as governors, and on the free
necks of their alies, in the day of their good fortune, they have
planted the tyrant's heel.

 (16) Lit. "shield to shield."

 (17) Lit. "to-day," "nowadays."

 (18) {mala liparoumenoi}. See Thuc. i. 66 foll.; vi. 88.

 (19) See "Pol. Lac." xiv.

"Then again take the case of those whom they have detached from
yourselves. In the most patent way they have cajoled and cheated them;
in place of freedom they have presented them with a twofold slavery. The
allies are tyrannised over by the governor and tyrannised over by the
ten commissioners set up by Lysander over every city. (20) And to come
lastly to the great king. In spite of all the enormous contributions
with which he aided them to gain a mastery over you, is the lord of Asia
one whit better off to-day than if he had taken exactly the opposite
course and joined you in reducing them?

 (20) Grote ("H. G." ix. 323), referring to this passage, and to
    "Hell." VI. iii. 8-11, notes the change in Spartan habits between
    405 and 394 B.C. (i.e. between the victory of Aegospotami and the
    defeat of Cnidos), when Sparta possessed a large public revenue
    derived from the tribute of the dependent cities. For her earlier
    condition, 432 B.C., cf. Thuc. i. 80. For her subsequent
    condition, 334 B.C., cf. Arist. "Pol." ii. 6, 23.

"Is it not clear that you have only to step forward once again as the
champions of this crowd of sufferers from injustice, and you will attain
to a pinnacle of power quite unprecedented? In the days of your old
empire you were leaders of the maritime powers merely--that is clear;
but your new empire to-day will be universal. You will have at
your backs not only your former subjects, but ourselves, and the
Peloponnesians, and the king himself, with all that mighty power
which is his. We do not deny that we were serviceable allies enough to
Lacedaemon, as you will bear us witness; but this we say:--If we helped
the Lacedaemonians vigorously in the past, everything tends to show that
we shall help you still more vigorously to-day; for our swords will be
unsheathed, not in behalf of islanders, or Syracusans, or men of alien
stock, as happened in the late war, but of ourselves, suffering under a
sense of wrong. And there is another important fact which you ought to
realise: this selfish system of organised greed which is Sparta's will
fall more readily to pieces than your own late empire. Yours was the
proud assertion of naval empire over subjects powerless by sea. Theirs
is the selfish sway of a minority asserting dominion over states equally
well armed with themselves, and many times more numerous. Here our
remarks end. Do not forget, however, men of Athens, that as far as we
can understand the matter, the field to which we invite you is destined
to prove far richer in blessings to your own state of Athens than to
ours, Thebes."

With these words the speaker ended. Among the Athenians, speaker after
speaker spoke in favour of the proposition, (21) and finally a unanimous
resolution was passed voting assistance to the Thebans. Thrasybulus, in
an answer communicating the resolution, pointed out with pride that in
spite of the unfortified condition of Piraeus, Athens would not shrink
from repaying her former debt of gratitude to Thebes with interest.
"You," he added, "refused to join in a campaign against us; we are
prepared to fight your battles with you against the enemy, if he attacks
you." Thus the Thebans returned home and made preparations to defend
themselves, whilst the Athenians made ready to assist them.

 (21) For the alliance between Boeotia and Athens, B.C. 395, see
    Kohler, "C. I. A." ii. 6; Hicks, op. cit. 65; Lys. "pro Man." S.
    13; Jebb, "Att. Or." i. p. 247; and the two speeches of the same
    orator Lysias against Alcibiades (son of the famous Alcibiades),
    on a Charge of Desertion ("Or." xiv.), and on a Charge of Failure
    to Serve ("Or." xv.)--Jebb, op. cit. i. p. 256 foll.

And now the Lacedaemonians no longer hesitated. Pausanias the
king advanced into Boeotia with the home army and the whole of the
Peloponnesian contingents, saving only the Corinthians, who declined
to serve. Lysander, at the head of the army supplied by Phocis and
Orchomenus and the other strong places in those parts, had already
reached Haliartus, in front of Pausanias. Being arrived, he refused to
sit down quietly and await the arrival of the army from Lacedaemon, but
at once marched with what troops he had against the walls of Haliartus;
and in the first instance he tried to persuade the citizens to detach
themselves from Thebes and to assume autonomy, but the intention was
cut short by certain Thebans within the fortress. Whereupon Lysander
attacked the place. The Thebans were made aware, (22) and hurried to the
rescue with heavy infantry and cavalry. Then, whether it was that the
army of relief fell upon Lysander unawares, or that with clear knowledge
of his approach he preferred to await the enemy, with intent to crush
him, is uncertain. This only is clear: a battle was fought beside the
walls, and a trophy still exists to mark the victory of the townsfolk
before the gates of Haliartus. Lysander was slain, and the rest fled to
the mountains, the Thebans hotly pursuing. But when the pursuit had led
them to some considerable height, and they were fairly environed and
hemmed in by difficult ground and narrow space, then the heavy infantry
turned to bay, and greeted them with a shower of darts and missiles.
First two or three men dropped who had been foremost of the pursuers,
and then upon the rest they poured volleys of stones down the
precipitous incline, and pressed on their late pursuers with much zeal,
until the Thebans turned tail and quitted the deadly slope, leaving
behind them more than a couple of hundred corpses.

 (22) See Plut. "Lys." xxviii. (Clough, iii. 137).

On this day, thereafter, the hearts of the Thebans failed them as they
counted their losses and found them equal to their gains; but the next
day they discovered that during the night the Phocians and the rest of
them had made off to their several homes, whereupon they fell to pluming
themselves highly on their achievement. But presently Pausanias appeared
at the head of the Lacedaemonian army, and once more their dangers
seemed to thicken round them. Deep, we are told, was the silence and
abasement which reigned in their host. It was not until the third day,
when the Athenians arrived (23) and were duely drawn up beside them,
whilst Pausanias neither attacked nor offered battle, that at length the
confidence of the Thebans took a larger range. Pausanias, on his side,
having summoned his generals and commanders of fifties, (24) deliberated
whether to give battle or to content himself with picking up the bodies
of Lysander and those who fell with him, under cover of a truce.

 (23) See Dem. "On the Crown," 258.

 (24) Lit. "polemarchs and penteconters"--"colonels and lieutenants."
    See "Pol. Lac." xi.

The considerations which weighed upon the minds of Pausanias and
the other high officers of the Lacedaemonians seem to have been that
Lysander was dead and his defeated army in retreat; while, as far as
they themselves were concerned, the Corinthian contingent was absolutely
wanting, and the zeal of the troops there present at the lowest ebb.
They further reasoned that the enemy's cavalry was numerous and theirs
the reverse; whilst, weightiest of all, there lay the dead right under
the walls, so that if they had been ever so much stronger it would have
been no easy task to pick up the bodies within range of the towers of
Haliartus. On all these grounds they determined to ask for a flag of
truce, in order to pick up the bodies of the slain. These, however, the
Thebans were not disposed to give back unless they agreed to retire from
their territory. The terms were gladly accepted by the Lacedaemonians,
who at once picked up the corpses of the slain, and prepared to quit the
territory of Boeotia. The preliminaries were transacted, and the retreat
commenced. Despondent indeed was the demeanour of the Lacedaemonians,
in contrast with the insolent bearing of the Thebans, who visited the
slightest attempt to trespass on their private estates with blows and
chased the offenders back on to the high roads unflinchingly. Such was
the conclusion of the campaign of the Lacedaemonians.

As for Pausanias, on his arrival at home he was tried on the capital
charge. The heads of indictment set forth that he had failed to reach
Haliartus as soon as Lysander, in spite of his undertaking to be there
on the same day: that, instead of using any endeavour to pick up the
bodies of the slain by force of arms, he had asked for a flag of truce:
that at an earlier date, when he had got the popular government of
Athens fairly in his grip at Piraeus, he had suffered it to slip through
his fingers and escape. Besides this, (25) he failed to present himself
at the trial, and a sentence of death was passed upon him. He escaped
to Tegea and there died of an illness whilst still in exile. Thus closes
the chapter of events enacted on the soil of Hellas. To return to Asia
and Agesilaus.

 (25) Or, add, "as a further gravamen."




BOOK IV



I

B.C. 395. With the fall of the year Agesilaus reached Phrygia--the
Phrygia of Pharnabazus--and proceeded to burn and harry the district.
City after city was taken, some by force and some by voluntary
surrender. To a proposal of Spithridates to lead him into Paphlagonia,
(1) where he would introduce the king of the country to him in
conference and obtain his alliance, he readily acceded. It was a
long-cherished ambition of Agesilaus to alienate some one of the subject
nations from the Persian monarch, and he pushed forward eagerly.

 (1) See Hartman ("An. Xen." p. 339), who suggests {Otun auto} for {sun
    auto}.

On his arrival in Paphlagonia, King Otys (2) came, and an alliance was
made. (The fact was, he had been summoned by the king to Susa and had
not gone up.) More than that, through the persuasion of Spithridates he
left behind as a parting gift to Agesilaus one thousand cavalry and a
couple of thousand peltasts. Agesilaus was anxious in some way to
show his gratitude to Spithridates for such help, and spoke as
follows:--"Tell me," he said to Spithridates, "would you not like to
give your daughter to King Otys?" "Much more would I like to give her,"
he answered, "than he to take her--I an outcast wanderer, and he lord
of a vast territory and forces." Nothing more was said at the time about
the marriage; but when Otys was on the point of departure and came to
bid farewell, Agesilaus, having taken care that Spithridates should be
out of the way, in the presence of the Thirty broached the subject: (3)
"Can you tell me, Otys, to what sort of family Spithridates belongs?"
"To one of the noblest in Persia," replied the king. Agesilaus: "Have
you observed how beautiful his son is?" Otys: "To be sure; last evening
I was supping with him." Agesilaus: "And they tell me his daughter
is yet more beautiful." Otys: "That may well be; beautiful she is."
Agesilaus: "For my part, as you have proved so good a friend to us, I
should like to advise you to take this girl to wife. Not only is she
very beautiful--and what more should a husband ask for?--but her
father is of noble family, and has a force at his back large enough to
retaliate on Pharnabazus for an injury. He has made the satrap, as you
see, a fugitive and a vagabond in his own vast territory. I need not
tell you," he added, "that a man who can so chastise an enemy is well
able to benefit a friend; and of this be assured: by such an alliance
you will gain not the connection of Spithridates alone, but of myself
and the Lacedaemonians, and, as we are the leaders of Hellas, of
the rest of Hellas also. And what a wedding yours will be! Were ever
nuptials celebrated on so grand a scale before? Was ever bride led home
by such an escort of cavalry and light-armed troops and heavy infantry,
as shall escort your wife home to your palace?" Otys asked: "Is
Spithridates of one mind with you in this proposal?" and Agesilaus
answered: "In good sooth he did not bid me make it for him. And for
my own part in the matter, though it is, I admit, a rare pleasure to
requite an enemy, yet I had far rather at any time discover some good
fortune for my friends." Otys: "Why not ask if your project pleases
Spithridates too?" Then Agesilaus, turning to Herippidas and the rest
of the Thirty, bade them go to Spithridates; "and give him such good
instruction," he added, "that he shall wish what we wish." The Thirty
rose and retired to administer their lesson. But they seemed to tarry
a long time, and Agesilaus asked: "What say you, King Otys--shall we
summon him hither ourselves? You, I feel certain, are better able to
persuade him than the whole Thirty put together." Thereupon Agesilaus
summoned Spithridates and the others. As they came forward, Herippidas
promptly delivered himself thus: "I spare you the details, Agesilaus.
To make a long story short, Spithridates says, 'He will be glad to do
whatever pleases you.'" Then Agesilaus, turning first to one and then
to the other: "What pleases me," said he, "is that you should wed a
daughter--and you a wife--so happily. (4) But," he added, "I do not see
how we can well bring home the bride by land till spring." "No, not by
land," the suitor answered, "but you might, if you chose, conduct her
home at once by sea." Thereupon they exchanged pledges to ratify the
compact; and so sent Otys rejoicing on his way.

 (2) See "Ages." iii. 4, where he is called Cotys.

 (3) I.e. "Spartan counsellors."

 (4) Or, "and may the wedding be blest!"

Agesilaus, who had not failed to note the king's impatience, at once
fitted out a ship of war and gave orders to Callias, a Lacedaemonian,
to escort the maiden to her new home; after which he himself began his
march on Dascylium. Here was the palace of Pharnabazus. It lay in the
midst of abundant supplies. Here, too, were most fair hunting grounds,
offering the hunter choice between enclosed parks (5) and a wide expanse
of field and fell; and all around there flowed a river full of fish
of every sort; and for the sportsman versed in fowling, winged game in
abundance.

 (5) Lit. "paradises." See "Anab." I. ii. 7; "Cyrop." I. iv. 11.

In these quarters the Spartan king passed the winter, collecting
supplies for the army either on the spot or by a system of forage. On
one of these occasions the troops, who had grown reckless and scornful
of the enemy through long immunity from attack, whilst engaged
in collecting supplies were scattered over the flat country, when
Pharnabazus fell upon them with two scythe-chariots and about four
hundred horse. Seeing him thus advancing, the Hellenes ran together,
mustering possibly seven hundred men. The Persian did not hesitate, but
placing his chariots in front, supported by himself and the cavalry, he
gave the command to charge. The scythe-chariots charged and scattered
the compact mass, and speedily the cavalry had laid low in the dust
about a hundred men, while the rest retreated hastily, under cover of
Agesilaus and his hoplites, who were fortunately near.

It was the third or fourth day after this that Spithridates made a
discovery: Pharnabazus lay encamped in Caue, a large village not more
than eighteen miles (6) away. This news he lost no time in reporting
to Herippidas. The latter, who was longing for some brilliant exploit,
begged Agesilaus to furnish him with two thousand hoplites, an equal
number of peltasts, and some cavalry--the latter to consist of the
horsemen of Spithridates, the Paphlagonians, and as many Hellene
troopers as he might perchance persuade to follow him. Having got the
promise of them from Agesilaus, he proceeded to take the auspices.
Towards late afternoon he obtained favourable omens and broke off the
sacrifice. Thereupon he ordered the troops to get their evening meal,
after which they were to present themselves in front of the camp. But by
the time darkness had closed in, not one half of them had come out. To
abandon the project was to call down the ridicule of the rest of the
Thirty. So he set out with the force to hand, and about daylight,
falling on the camp of Pharnabazus, put many of his advanced guard
of Mysians to the sword. The men themselves made good their escape in
different directions, but the camp was taken, and with it divers goblets
and other gear such as a man like Pharnabazus would have, not to speak
of much baggage and many baggage animals. It was the dread of being
surrounded and besieged, if he should establish himself for long at any
one spot, which induced Pharnabazus to flee in gipsy fashion from point
to point over the country, carefully obliterating his encampments.
Now as the Paphlagonians and Spithridates brought back the captured
property, they were met by Herippidas with his brigadiers and captains,
who stopped them and (7) relieved them of all they had; the object being
to have as large a list as possible of captures to deliver over to the
officers who superintended the sale of booty. (8) This treatment the
Asiatics found intolerable. They deemed themselves at once injured
and insulted, got their kit together in the night, and made off in the
direction of Sardis to join Ariaeus without mistrust, seeing that he
too had revolted and gone to war with the king. On Agesilaus himself
no heavier blow fell during the whole campaign than the desertion of
Spithridates and Megabates and the Paphlagonians.

 (6) Lit. "one hundred and sixty stades."

 (7) Or, "captains posted to intercept them, who relieved..." See
    "Anab." IV. i. 14.

 (8) See "Pol. Lac." xiii. 11, for these officers.

Now there was a certain man of Cyzicus, Apollophanes by name; he was an
old friend of Pharnabazus, and at this time had become a friend also
of Agesilaus. (9) This man informed Agesilaus that he thought he could
bring about a meeting between him and Pharnabazus, which might tend to
friendship; and having so got ear of him, he obtained pledges of good
faith between his two friends, and presented himself with Pharnabazus at
the trysting-place, where Agesilaus with the Thirty around him awaited
their coming, reclined upon a grassy sward. Pharnabazus presently
arrived clad in costliest apparel; but just as his attendants were about
to spread at his feet the carpets on which the Persians delicately seat
themselves, he was touched with a sense of shame at his own luxury
in sight of the simplicity of Agesilaus, and he also without further
ceremony seated himself on the bare ground. And first the two bade one
another hail, and then Pharnabazus stretched out his right hand and
Agesilaus his to meet him, and the conversation began. Pharnabazus, as
the elder of the two, spoke first. "Agesilaus," he said, "and all you
Lacedaemonians here present, while you were at war with the Athenians
I was your friend and ally; it was I who furnished the wealth that made
your navy strong on sea; on land I fought on horseback by your side,
and pursued your enemies into the sea. (10) As to duplicity like that of
Tissaphernes, I challenge you to accuse me of having played you false by
word or deed. Such have I ever been; and in return how am I treated
by yourselves to-day?--in such sort that I cannot even sup in my own
country unless, like the wild animals, I pick up the scraps you chance
to leave. The beautiful palaces which my father left me as an heirloom,
the parks (11) full of trees and beasts of the chase in which my heart
rejoiced, lie before my eyes hacked to pieces, burnt to ashes. Maybe I
do not comprehend the first principles of justice and holiness; do you
then explain to me how all this resembles the conduct of men who know
how to repay a simple debt of gratitude." He ceased, and the Thirty were
ashamed before him and kept silence. (12)

 (9) "Ages." v. 4; Plut. "Ages." xi. (Clough, iv. p. 14).

 (10) See "Hell." I. i. 6.

 (11) Lit. "paradises."

 (12) Theopompus of Chios, the historian (b. B.C. 378, fl. B.C. 333),
    "in the eleventh book  (of his {Suntazis Ellenikon}) borrowed
    Xenophon's lively account of the interview between Agesilaus and
    Pharnabazus (Apollonius apud Euseb. B, "Praep. Evang." p. 465)."
    See "Hist. Lit. of Anc. Gr.," Muller and Donaldson, ii. p. 380.

At length, after some pause, Agesilaus spoke. "I think you are aware,"
he said, "Pharnabazus, that within the states of Hellas the folk of
one community contract relations of friendship and hospitality with one
another; (13) but if these states should go to war, then each man will
side with his fatherland, and friend will find himself pitted against
friend in the field of battle, and, if it so betide, the one may even
deal the other his death-blow. So too we to-day, being at war with your
sovereign lord the king, must needs regard as our enemy all that he
calls his; not but that with yourself personally we should esteem it
our high fortune to be friends. If indeed it were merely an exchange of
service--were you asked to give up your lord the king and to take us as
your masters in his stead, I could not so advise you; but the fact is,
by joining with us it is in your power to-day to bow your head to no
man, to call no man master, to reap the produce of your own domain in
freedom--freedom, which to my mind is more precious than all riches. Not
that we bid you to become a beggar for the sake of freedom, but rather
to use our friendship to increase not the king's authority, but your
own, by subduing those who are your fellow-slaves to-day, and who
to-morrow shall be your willing subjects. Well, then, freedom given and
wealth added--what more would you desire to fill the cup of happiness to
overflowing?" Pharnabazus replied: "Shall I tell you plainly what I will
do?" "That were but kind and courteous on your part," he answered. "Thus
it stands with me, then," said Pharnabazus. "If the king should send
another general, and if he should wish to rank me under this new
man's orders, I, for my part, am willing to accept your friendship and
alliance; but if he offers me the supreme command--why, then, I plainly
tell you, there is a certain something in the very name ambition which
whispers me that I shall war against you to the best of my ability."
(14) When he heard that, Agesilaus seized the satrap's hand, exclaiming:
"Ah, best of mortals, may the day arrive which sends us such a friend!
Of one thing rest assured. This instant I leave your territory with what
haste I may, and for the future--even in case of war--as long as we can
find foes elsewhere our hands shall hold aloof from you and yours."

 (13) Or, add, "we call them guest friends."

 (14) Or, "so subtle a force, it seems, is the love of honour that."
    Grote, "H. G." ix. 386; cf. Herod. iii. 57 for "ambition,"
    {philotimia}.

And with these words he broke up the meeting. Pharnabazus mounted his
horse and rode away, but his son by Parapita, who was still in the bloom
of youth, lingered behind; then, running up to Agesilaus, he exclaimed:
"See, I choose you as my friend." "And I accept you," replied the king.
"Remember, then," the lad answered, and with the word presented the
beautiful javelin in his hand to Agesilaus, who received it, and
unclasping a splendid trapping (15) which his secretary, Idaeus, had
round the neck of his charger, he gave it in return to the youth;
whereupon the boy leapt on his horse's back and galloped after his
father. (16) At a later date, during the absence of Pharnabazus abroad,
this same youth, the son of Parapita, was deprived of the government by
his brother and driven into exile. Then Agesilaus took great interest
in him, and as he had a strong attachment to the son of Eualces, an
Athenian, Agesilaus did all he could to have this friend of his, who
was the tallest of the boys, admitted to the two hundred yards race at
Olympia.

 (15) {phalara}, bosses of gold, silver, or other metals, cast or
    chased, with some appropriate device in relief, which were worn as
    an ornamental trapping for horses, affixed to the head-stall or to
    a throat-collar, or to a martingale over the chest.--Rich's
    "Companion to Lat. Dict. and Greek Lex.," s.v.

 (16) See Grote, ix. 387; Plut. "Ages." xiv. (Clough, iv. 15); "Ages."
    iii. 5. The incident is idealised in the "Cyrop." I. iv. 26 foll.
    See "Lyra Heroica": CXXV. A Ballad of East and West--the incident
    of the "turquoise-studded rein."

B.C. 394. But to return to the actual moment. Agesilaus was as good as
his word, and at once marched out of the territory of Pharnabazus. The
season verged on spring. Reaching the plain of Thebe, (17) he encamped
in the neighbourhood of the temple of Artemis of Astyra, (18) and there
employed himself in collecting troops from every side, in addition to
those which he already had, so as to form a complete armament. These
preparations were pressed forward with a view to penetrating as far as
possible into the interior. He was persuaded that every tribe or nation
placed in his rear might be considered as alienated from the king.

 (17) "Anab." VII. viii. 7.

 (18) Vide Strab. xiii. 606, 613. Seventy stades from Thebe.



II

Such were the concerns and projects of Agesilaus. Meanwhile the
Lacedaemonians at home were quite alive to the fact that moneys had been
sent into Hellas, and that the bigger states were leagued together
to declare war against them. It was hard to avoid the conclusion that
Sparta herself was in actual danger, and that a campaign was inevitable.
While busy, therefore, with preparations themselves, they lost no time
in despatching Epicydidas to fetch Agesilaus. That officer, on his
arrival, explained the position of affairs, and concluded by delivering
a peremptory summons of the state recalling him to the assistance of
the fatherland without delay. The announcement could not but come as a
grievous blow to Agesilaus, as he reflected on the vanished hopes, and
the honours plucked from his grasp. Still, he summoned the allies and
announced to them the contents of the despatch from home. "To aid our
fatherland," he added, "is an imperative duty. If, however, matters turn
out well on the other side, rely upon it, friends and allies, I will
not forget you, but I shall be back anon to carry out your wishes." When
they heard the announcement many wept, and they passed a resolution, one
and all, to assist Agesilaus in assisting Lacedaemon; if matters turned
out well there, they undertook to take him as their leader and come back
again to Asia; and so they fell to making preparations to follow him.

Agesilaus, on his side, determined to leave behind him in Asia Euxenus
as governor, and with him a garrison numbering no less than four
thousand troops, which would enable him to protect the states in Asia.
But for himself, as on the one hand he could see that the majority of
the soldiers would far rather stay behind than undertake service against
fellow-Hellenes, and on the other hand he wished to take as fine and
large an army with him as he could, he offered prizes first to that
state or city which should continue the best corps of troops, and
secondly to that captain of mercenaries who should join the expedition
with the best equipped battalion of heavy infantry, archers, and light
infantry. On the same principle he informed the chief cavalry officers
that the general who succeeded in presenting the best accoutred and best
mounted regiment would receive from himself some victorious distinction.
"The final adjudication," he said, "would not be made until they had
crossed from Asia into Europe and had reached the Chersonese; and this
with a view to impress upon them that the prizes were not for show but
for real campaigners." (1) These consisted for the most part of infantry
or cavalry arms and accoutrements tastefully furnished, besides which
there were chaplets of gold. The whole, useful and ornamental alike,
must have cost nearly a thousand pounds, (2) but as the result of this
outlay, no doubt, arms of great value were procured for the expedition.
(3) When the Hellespont was crossed the judges were appointed. The
Lacedaemonians were represented by Menascus, Herippidas, and
Orsippus, and the allies by one member from each state. As soon as the
adjudication was complete, the army commenced its march with Agesilaus
at its head, following the very route taken by the great king when he
invaded Hellas.

 (1) Or, "that the perfection of equipment was regarded as anticipative
    of actual service in the field." Cobet suggests for {eukrinein}
    {dieukrinein}; cf. "Oecon." viii. 6.

 (2) Lit. "at least four talents" = 975 pounds.

 (3) Or, "beyond which, the arms and material to equip the expedition
    were no doubt highly costly."

Meanwhile the ephors had called out the ban, and as Agesipolis was still
a boy, the state called upon Aristodemus, who was of the royal family
and guardian of the young king, to lead the expedition; and now that
the Lacedaemonians were ready to take the field and the forces of their
opponents were duly mustered, the latter met (4) to consider the most
advantageous method of doing battle.

 (4) At Corinth. See above, III. iv. 11; below, V. iv. 61, where the
    victory of Nixos is described but not localised.

Timolaus of Corinth spoke: "Soldiers of the allied forces," he said,
"the growth of Lacedaemon seems to me just like that of some mighty
river--at its sources small and easily crossed, but as it farther and
farther advances, other rivers discharge themselves into its channel, and
its stream grows ever more formidable. So is it with the Lacedaemonians.
Take them at the starting-point and they are but a single community, but
as they advance and attach city after city they grow more numerous
and more resistless. I observe that when people wish to take wasps'
nests--if they try to capture the creatures on the wing, they are liable
to be attacked by half the hive; whereas, if they apply fire to them ere
they leave their homes, they will master them without scathe themselves.
On this principle I think it best to bring about the battle within the
hive itself, or, short of that, as close to Lacedaemon as possible." (5)

 (5) Or, "if not actually at Lacedaemon, then at least as near as
    possible to the hornet's nest."

The arguments of the speaker were deemed sound, and a resolution was
passed in that sense; but before it could be carried out there were
various arrangements to be made. There was the question of headship.
Then, again, what was the proper depth of line to be given to the
different army corps? for if any particular state or states gave too
great a depth to their battle line they would enable the enemy to turn
their flank. Whilst they were debating these points, the Lacedaemonians
had incorporated the men of Tegea and the men of Mantinea, and were
ready to debouch into the bimarine region. (6) And as the two armies
advanced almost at the same time, the Corinthians and the rest reached
the Nemea, (7) and the Lacedaemonians and their allies occupied Sicyon.
The Lacedaemonians entered by Epieiceia, and at first were severely
handled by the light-armed troops of the enemy, who discharged stones
and arrows from the vantage-ground on their right; but as they dropped
down upon the Gulf of Corinth they advanced steadily onwards through the
flat country, felling timber and burning the fair land. Their rivals, on
their side, after a certain forward movement, (8) paused and encamped,
placing the ravine in front of them; but still the Lacedaemonians
advanced, and it was only when they were within ten furlongs (9) of the
hostile position that they followed suit and encamped, and then they
remained quiet.

 (6) I.e. "the shores of the Corinthian Gulf." Or, "upon the strand or
    coast road or coast land of Achaia"  (aliter {ten aigialon}(?) the
    Strand of the Corinthian Gulf, the old name of this part of
    Achaia).

 (7) Or, "the district of Nemea."

 (8) {epelthontes}, but see Grote ("H. G." ix. 425 note), who prefers
    {apelthontes} = retreated and encamped.

 (9) Lit. "ten stades." For the numbers below, see Grote, "H. G." ix.
    422, note 1.

And here I may state the numbers on either side. The Lacedaemonian
heavy-armed infantry levies amounted to six thousand men. Of Eleians,
Triphylians, Acroreians, and Lasionians, there must have been nearly
three thousand, with fifteen hundred Sicyonians, while Epidaurus,
Troezen, Hermione, and Halieis (10) contributed at least another three
thousand. To these heavy infantry troops must be added six hundred
Lacedaemonian cavalry, a body of Cretan archers about three hundred
strong, besides another force of slingers, at least four hundred in
all, consisting of Marganians, Letrinians, and Amphidolians. The men
of Phlius were not represented. Their plea was they were keeping "holy
truce." That was the total of the forces on the Lacedaemonian side.
There was collected on the enemy's side six thousand Athenian heavy
infantry, with about, as was stated, seven thousand Argives, and in the
absence of the men of Orchomenus something like five thousand Boeotians.
There were besides three thousand Corinthians, and again from the whole
of Euboea at least three thousand. These formed the heavy infantry.
Of cavalry the Boeotians, again in the absence of the Orchomenians,
furnished eight hundred, the Athenians (11) six hundred, the Chalcidians
of Euboea one hundred, the Opuntian Locrians (12) fifty. Their light
troops, including those of the Corinthians, were more numerous, as the
Ozolian Locrians, the Melians, and Arcarnanians (13) helped to swell
their numbers.

 (10) Halieis, a seafaring people (Strabo, viii. 373) and town on the
    coast of Hermionis; Herod. vii. 137; Thuc. i. 105, ii. 56, iv. 45;
    Diod. xi. 78; "Hell." VI. ii. 3.

 (11) For a treaty between Athens and Eretria, B.C. 395, see Hicks, 66;
    and below, "Hell." IV. iii. 15; Hicks, 68, 69; Diod. xiv. 82.

 (12) See above, "Hell." III. v. 3.

 (13) See below, "Hell." IV. vi. 1; ib. vii. 1; VI. v. 23.

Such was the strength of the two armies. The Boeotians, as long as they
occupied the left wing, showed no anxiety to join battle, but after a
rearrangement which gave them the right, placing the Athenians opposite
the Lacedaemonians, and themselves opposite the Achaeans, at once, we
are told, (14) the victims proved favourable, and the order was passed
along the lines to prepare for immediate action. The Boeotians, in the
first place, abandoning the rule of sixteen deep, chose to give their
division the fullest possible depth, and, moreover, kept veering
more and more to their right, with the intention of overlapping their
opponent's flank. The consequence was that the Athenians, to avoid being
absolutely severed, were forced to follow suit, and edged towards the
right, though they recognised the risk they ran of having their flank
turned. For a while the Lacedaemonians had no idea of the advance of the
enemy, owing to the rough nature of the ground, (15) but the notes of
the paean at length announced to them the fact, and without an instant's
delay the answering order "prepare for battle" ran along the different
sections of their army. As soon as their troops were drawn up, according
to the tactical disposition of the various generals of foreign brigades,
the order was passed to "follow the lead," and then the Lacedaemonians
on their side also began edging to their right, and eventually stretched
out their wing so far that only six out of the ten regimental divisions
of the Athenians confronted the Lacedaemonians, the other four finding
themselves face to face with the men of Tegea. And now when they
were less than a furlong (16) apart, the Lacedaemonians sacrificed in
customary fashion a kid to the huntress goddess, (17) and advanced upon
their opponents, wheeling round their overlapping columns to outflank
his left. As the two armies closed, the allies of Lacedaemon were as
a rule fairly borne down by their opponents. The men of Pellene alone,
steadily confronting the Thespiaeans, held their ground, and the dead
of either side strewed the position. (18) As to the Lacedaemonians
themselves: crushing that portion of the Athenian troops which lay
immediately in front of them, and at the same time encircling them
with their overlapping right, they slew man after man of them; and,
absolutely unscathed themselves, their unbroken columns continued their
march, and so passed behind the four remaining divisions (19) of the
Athenians before these latter had returned from their own victorious
pursuit. Whereby the four divisions in question also emerged from battle
intact, except for the casualties inflicted by the Tegeans in the
first clash of the engagement. The troops next encountered by the
Lacedaemonians were the Argives retiring. These they fell foul of, and
the senior polemarch was just on the point of closing with them "breast
to breast" when some one, it is said, shouted, "Let their front ranks
pass." This was done, and as the Argives raced past, their enemies
thrust at their unprotected (20) sides and killed many of them. The
Corinthians were caught in the same way as they retired, and when their
turn had passed, once more the Lacedaemonians lit upon a portion of the
Theban division retiring from the pursuit, and strewed the field with
their dead. The end of it all was that the defeated troops in the first
instance made for safety to the walls of their city, but the Corinthians
within closed the gates, whereupon the troops took up quarters once
again in their old encampment. The Lacedaemonians on their side withdrew
to the point at which they first closed with the enemy, and there set up
a trophy of victory. So the battle ended.

 (14) Or, "then they lost no time in discovering that the victims
    proved favourable."

 (15) See Grote, "H. G." ix. 428; cf. Lys. "pro Mant." 20.

 (16) Lit. "a stade."

 (17) Lit. "our Lady of the Chase." See "Pol. Lac." xiii. 8.

 (18) Lit. "men on either side kept dropping at their post."

 (19) Lit. "tribes."

 (20) I.e. "right."



III

Meanwhile Agesilaus was rapidly hastening with his reinforcements from
Asia. He had reached Amphipolis when Dercylidas brought the news of this
fresh victory of the Lacedaemonians; their own loss had been eight men,
that of the enemy considerable. It was his business at the same time to
explain that not a few of the allies had fallen also. Agesilaus
asked, "Would it not be opportune, Dercylidas, if the cities that have
furnished us with contingents could hear of this victory as soon as
possible?" And Dercylidas replied: "The news at any rate is likely
to put them in better heart." Then said the king: "As you were an
eye-witness there could hardly be a better bearer of the news than
yourself." To this proposal Dercylidas lent a willing ear--to travel
abroad (1) was his special delight--and he replied, "Yes, under your
orders." "Then you have my orders," the king said. "And you may further
inform the states from myself that we have not forgotten our promise;
if all goes well over here we shall be with them again ere long."
So Dercylidas set off on his travels, in the first instance to the
Hellespont; (2) while Agesilaus crossed Macedonia, and arrived in
Thessaly. And now the men of Larissa, Crannon, Scotussa, and Pharsalus,
who were allies of the Boeotians--and in fact all the Thessalians except
the exiles for the time being--hung on his heels (3) and did him damage.

 (1) See "Pol. Lac." xiv. 4.

 (2) See below, "Hell." IV. viii. 3.

 (3) See "Ages." ii. 2; Grote, "H. G." ix. 420, note 2.

For some while he marched his troops in a hollow square, (4) posting
half his cavalry in front and half on his rear; but finding that the
Thessalians checked his passage by repeated charges from behind, he
strengthened his rearguard by sending round the cavalry from his van,
with the exception of his own personal escort. (5) The two armies stood
confronted in battle order; but the Thessalians, not liking the notion
of a cavalry engagement with heavy infantry, turned, and step by step
retreated, while the others followed them with considerable caution.
Agesilaus, perceiving the error under which both alike laboured, now
sent his own personal guard of stalwart troopers with orders that both
they and the rest of the horsemen should charge at full gallop, (6)
and not give the enemy the chance to recoil. The Thessalians were taken
aback by this unexpected onslaught, and half of them never thought of
wheeling about, whilst those who did essay to do so presented the
flanks of their horses to the charge, (7) and were made prisoners.
Still Polymarchus of Pharsalus, the general in command of their cavalry,
rallied his men for an instant, and fell, sword in hand, with his
immediate followers. This was the signal for a flight so precipitate on
the part of the Thessalians, that their dead and dying lined the road,
and prisoners were taken; nor was any halt made until they reached Mount
Narthacius. Here, then, midway between Pras and Narthacius, Agesilaus
set up a trophy, halting for the moment, in unfeigned satisfaction at
the exploit. It was from antagonists who prided themselves on their
cavalry beyond everything that he had wrested victory, with a body
of cavalry of his own mustering. Next day he crossed the mountains
of Achaea Phthiotis, and for the future continued his march through
friendly territory until he reached the confines of Boeotia.

 (4) See Rustow and Kochly, S. 187 foll.

 (5) See Thuc. v. 72; Herod. vi. 56, viii. 124.

 (6) Lit. "and bids them pass the order to the others and themselves to
    charge," etc.

 (7) See "Horsemanship," vii. 16; Polyb. iv. 8.

Here, at the entrance of that territory, the sun (in partial eclipse)
(8) seemed to appear in a crescent shape, and the news reached him of
the defeat of the Lacedaemonians in a naval engagement, and the death
of the admiral Peisander. Details of the disaster were not wanting. The
engagement of the hostile fleets took place off Cnidus. Pharnabazus, the
Persian admiral, was present with the Phoenician fleet, and in front
of him were ranged the ships of the Hellenic squadron under Conon.
Peisander had ventured to draw out his squadron to meet the combined
fleets, though the numerical inferiority of his fleet to that of the
Hellenic navy under Conon was conspicuous, and he had the mortification
of seeing the allies who formed his left wing take to flight
immediately. He himself came to close quarters with the enemy, and was
driven on shore, on board his trireme, under pressure of the hostile
rams. The rest, as many as were driven to shore, deserted their ships
and sought safety as best they could in the territory of Cnidus. The
admiral alone stuck to his ship, and fell sword in hand.

 (8) B.C. 394, August 14.

It was impossible for Agesilaus not to feel depressed by those tidings
at first; on further reflection, however, it seemed to him that the
moral quality of more than half his troops well entitled them to share
in the sunshine of success, but in the day of trouble, when things
looked black, he was not bound to take them into his confidence.
Accordingly he turned round and gave out that he had received news that
Peisander was dead, but that he had fallen in the arms of victory in
a sea-fight; and suiting his action to the word, he proceeded to offer
sacrifice in return for good tidings, (9) distributing portions of the
victims to a large number of recipients. So it befell that in the first
skirmish with the enemy the troops of Agesilaus gained the upper hand,
in consequence of the report that the Lacedaemonians had won a victory
by sea.

 (9) "Splendide mendax." For the ethics of the matter, see "Mem." IV.
    ii. 17; "Cyrop." I. vi. 31.

To confront Agesilaus stood an army composed of the Boeotians,
Athenians, Argives, Corinthians, Aenianians, Euboeans, and both
divisions of the Locrians. Agesilaus on his side had with him a division
(10) of Lacedaemonians, which had crossed from Corinth, also half the
division from Orchomenus; besides which there were the neodamodes (11)
from Lacedaemon, on service with him already; and in addition to these
the foreign contingent under Herippidas; (12) and again the quota
furnished by the Hellenic cities in Asia, with others from the cities in
Europe which he had brought over during his progress; and lastly, there
were additional levies from the spot--Orchomenian and Phocian heavy
infantry. In light-armed troops, it must be admitted, the numbers told
heavily in favour of Agesilaus, but the cavalry (13) on both sides were
fairly balanced.

 (10) Lit. "a mora"; for the numbers, see "Ages." ii. 6; Plut. "Ages."
    17; Grote, "H. G." ix. 433.

 (11) I.e. "enfranchised helots."

 (12) See "Ages." ii. 10, 11; and above, "Hell." III. iv. 20.

 (13) See Hicks, op. cit. 68.

Such were the forces of either party. I will describe the battle itself,
if only on account of certain features which distinguish it from the
battles of our time. The two armies met on the plain of Coronea--the
troops of Agesilaus advancing from the Cephisus, the Thebans and their
allies from the slopes of Helicon. Agesilaus commanded his own right
in person, with the men of Orchomenus on his extreme left. The Thebans
formed their own right, while the Argives held their left. As they drew
together, for a while deep silence reigned on either side; but when they
were not more than a furlong (14) apart, with the loud hurrah (15) the
Thebans, quickening to a run, rushed furiously (16) to close quarters;
and now there was barely a hundred yards (17) breadth between the two
armies, when Herippidas with his foreign brigade, and with them the
Ionians, Aeolians, and Hellespontines, darted out from the Spartans'
battle-lines to greet their onset. One and all of the above played their
part in the first rush forward; in another instant they were (18) within
spear-thrust of the enemy, and had routed the section immediately before
them. As to the Argives, they actually declined to receive the attack
of Agesilaus, and betook themselves in flight to Helicon. At this
moment some of the foreign division were already in the act of crowning
Agesilaus with the wreath of victory, when some one brought him word
that the Thebans had cut through the Orchomenians and were in among the
baggage train. At this the Spartan general immediately turned his army
right about and advanced against them. The Thebans, on their side,
catching sight of their allies withdrawn in flight to the base of the
Helicon, and anxious to get across to their own friends, formed in close
order and tramped forward stoutly.

 (14) Lit. "a stade."

 (15) Lit. "Alalah."

 (16) Like a tornado.

 (17) Lit. "about three plethra."

 (18) Or, "All these made up the attacking columns... and coming
    within... routed..."

At this point no one will dispute the valour of Agesilaus, but he
certainly did not choose the safest course. It was open to him to make
way for the enemy to pass, which done, he might have hung upon his heels
and mastered his rear. This, however, he refused to do, preferring to
crash full front against the Thebans. Thereupon, with close interlock
of shield wedged in with shield, they shoved, they fought, they dealt
death, (19) they breathed out life, till at last a portion of the
Thebans broke their way through towards Helicon, but paid for that
departure by the loss of many lives. And now the victory of Agesilaus
was fairly won, and he himself, wounded, had been carried back to the
main line, when a party of horse came galloping up to tell him that
something like eighty of the enemy, under arms, were sheltering under
the temple, and they asked what they ought to do. Agesilaus, though he
was covered with wounds, did not, for all that, forget his duty to God.
He gave orders to let them retire unscathed, and would not suffer any
injury to be done to them. And now, seeing it was already late, they
took their suppers and retired to rest.

 (19) Or, "they slew, they were slain." In illustration of this famous
    passage, twice again worked up in "Ages." ii. 12, and "Cyrop."
    VII. i. 38, commented on by Longinus, {peri upsous}, 19, and
    copied by Dio Cassius, 47, 45, I venture to quote a passage from
    Mr. Rudyard Kipling, "With the Main Guard," p. 57, Mulvaney
    loquitur: "The Tyrone was pushin' an' pushin' in, an' our men was
    sweerin' at thim, an' Crook was workin' away in front av us all,
    his sword-arm swingin' like a pump-handle an' his revolver
    spittin' like a cat. But the strange thing av ut was the quiet
    that lay upon. 'Twas like a fight in a dhrame--excipt for thim
    that wus dead."

But with the morning Gylis the polemarch received orders to draw up the
troops in battle order, and to set up a trophy, every man crowned with a
wreath in honour of the god, and all the pipers piping. Thus they busied
themselves in the Spartan camp. On their side the Thebans sent heralds
asking to bury their dead, under a truce; and in this wise a truce was
made. Agesilaus withdrew to Delphi, where on arrival he offered to
the god a tithe of the produce of his spoils--no less than a hundred
talents. (20) Gylis the polemarch meanwhile withdrew into Phocis at the
head of his troops, and from that district made a hostile advance into
Locris. Here nearly a whole day was spent by the men in freely helping
themselves to goods and chattels out of the villages and pillaging the
corn; (21) but as it drew towards evening the troops began to retire,
with the Lacedaemonians in the rear. The Locrians hung upon their heels
with a heavy pelt of stones and javelins. Thereupon the Lacedaemonians
turned short round and gave chase, laying some of their assailants low.
Then the Locrians ceased clinging to their rear, but continued their
volleys from the vantage-ground above. The Lacedaemonians again made
efforts to pursue their persistent foes even up the slope. At last
darkness descended on them, and as they retired man after man dropped,
succumbing to the sheer difficulty of the ground; some in their
inability to see what lay in front, or else shot down by the enemy's
missiles. It was then that Gylis the polemarch met his end, as also
Pelles, who was on his personal staff, and the whole of the Spartans
present without exception--eighteen or thereabouts--perished, either
crushed by stones or succumbing to other wounds. Indeed, except for
timely aid brought from the camp where the men were supping, the chances
are that not a man would have escaped to tell the tale.

 (20) = 25,000 pounds nearly.

 (21) Or, "not to speak of provisions."



IV

This incident ended the campaign. The army as a whole was disbanded, the
contingents retiring to their several cities, and Agesilaus home across
the Gulf by sea.

B.C. 393. Subsequently (1) the war between the two parties recommenced.
The Athenians, Boeotians, Argives, and the other allies made Corinth
the base of their operations; the Lacedaemonians and their allies held
Sicyon as theirs. As to the Corinthians, they had to face the fact that,
owing to their proximity to the seat of war, it was their territory
which was ravaged and their people who perished, while the rest of
the allies abode in peace and reaped the fruits of their lands in due
season. Hence the majority of them, including the better class, desired
peace, and gathering into knots they indoctrinated one another with
these views.

 (1) B.C. 393. See Grote, ix. p. 455, note 2 foll.; "Hell." IV. viii.
    7.

B.C. 392. (2) On the other hand, it could hardly escape the notice of
the allied powers, the Argives, Athenians, and Boeotians, as also those
of the Corinthians themselves who had received a share of the king's
moneys, or for whatever reason were most directly interested in the war,
that if they did not promptly put the peace party out of the way, ten
chances to one the old laconising policy would again hold the field. It
seemed there was nothing for it but the remedy of the knife. There was a
refinement of wickedness in the plan adopted. With most people the life
even of a legally condemned criminal is held sacred during a solemn
season, but these men deliberately selected the last day of the Eucleia,
(3) when they might reckon on capturing more victims in the crowded
market-place, for their murderous purposes. Their agents were supplied
with the names of those to be gotten rid of, the signal was given, and
then, drawing their daggers, they fell to work. Here a man was struck
down standing in the centre of a group of talkers, and there another
seated; a third while peacably enjoying himself at the play; a fourth
actually whilst officiating as a judge at some dramatic contest. (4)
When what was taking place became known, there was a general flight on
the part of the better classes. Some fled to the images of the gods
in the market-place, others to the altars; and here these unhallowed
miscreants, ringleaders and followers alike, utterly regardless of
duty and law, fell to butchering their victims even within the sacred
precincts of the gods; so that even some of those against whom no hand
was lifted--honest, law-abiding folk--were filled with sore amazement
at sight of such impiety. In this way many of the elder citizens, as
mustering more thickly in the market-place, were done to death. The
younger men, acting on a suspicion conceived by one of their number,
Pasimelus, as to what was going to take place, kept quiet in the
Kraneion; (5) but hearing screams and shouting and being joined anon by
some who had escaped from the affair, they took the hint, and, running
up along the slope of the Acrocorinthus, succeeded in repelling an
attack of the Argives and the rest. While they were still deliberating
what they ought to do, down fell a capital from its column--without
assignable cause, whether of earthquake or wind. Also, when they
sacrificed, the aspect of the victims was such that the soothsayers said
it was better to descend from that position.

 (2) Others assign the incidents of this whole chapter iv. to B.C. 393.

 (3) The festival of Artemis Eucleia.

 (4) See Diod. xiv. 86.

 (5) See Paus. II. ii. 4.

So they retired, in the first instance prepared to go into exile beyond
the territory of Corinth. It was only upon the persuasion of their
friends and the earnest entreaties of their mothers and sisters who
came out to them, supported by the solemn assurance of the men in power
themselves, who swore to guarantee them against evil consequences, that
some of them finally consented to return home. Presented to their eyes
was the spectacle of a tyranny in full exercise, and to their minds the
consciousness of the obliteration of their city, seeing that boundaries
were plucked up and the land of their fathers had come to be re-entitled
by the name of Argos instead of Corinth; and furthermore, compulsion was
put upon them to share in the constitution in vogue at Argos, for which
they had little appetite, while in their own city they wielded less
power than the resident aliens. So that a party sprang up among them
whose creed was, that life was not worth living on such terms: their
endeavour must be to make their fatherland once more the Corinth of old
days--to restore freedom to their city, purified from the murderer and
his pollution and fairly rooted in good order and legality. (6) It was
a design worth the venture: if they succeeded they would become the
saviours of their country; if not--why, in the effort to grasp the
fairest flower of happiness, they would but overreach, and find instead
a glorious termination to existence.

 (6) {eunomia}. See "Pol. Ath." i. 8; Arist. "Pol." iv. 8, 6; iii. 9,
    8; v. 7, 4.

It was in furtherance of this design that two men--Pasimelus and
Alcimenes--undertook to creep through a watercourse and effect a meeting
with Praxitas the polemarch of the Lacedaemonians, who was on garrison
duty with his own division in Sicyon. They told him they could give
him ingress at a point in the long walls leading to Lechaeum. Praxitas,
knowing from previous experience that the two men might be relied upon,
believed their statement; and having arranged for the further detention
in Sicyon of the division which was on the point of departure, he busied
himself with plans for the enterprise. When the two men, partly by
chance and partly by contrivance, came to be on guard at the gate where
the tophy now stands, without further ado Praxitas presented himself
with his division, taking with him also the men of Sicyon and the whole
of the Corinthian exiles. (7) Having reached the gate, he had a qualm of
misgiving, and hesitated to step inside until he had first sent in a
man on whom he could rely to take a look at things within. The two
Corinthians introduced him, and made so simple and straightforward
a representation (8) that the visitor was convinced, and reported
everything as free of pitfalls as the two had asserted. Then the
polemarch entered, but owing to the wide space between the double
walls, as soon as they came to form in line within, the intruders were
impressed by the paucity of their numbers. They therefore erected a
stockade, and dug as good a trench as they could in front of them,
pending the arrival of reinforcements from the allies. In their rear,
moreover, lay the guard of the Boeotians in the harbour. Thus they
passed the whole day which followed the night of ingress without
striking a blow.

 (8) Or, "showed him the place in so straightforward a manner."

On the next day, however, the Argive troops arrived in all haste,
hurrying to the rescue, and found the enemy duly drawn up. The
Lacedaemonians were on their own right, the men of Sicyon next, and
leaning against the eastern wall the Corinthian exiles, one hundred and
fifty strong. (9) Their opponents marshalled their lines face to face in
correspondence: Iphicrates with his mercenaries abutting on the eastern
wall; next to them the Argives, whilst the Corinthians of the city held
their left. In the pride inspired by numbers they began advancing at
once. They overpowered the Sicyonians, and tearing asunder the stockade,
pursued them to the sea and here slew numbers of them. At that instant
Pasimachus, the cavalry general, at the head of a handful of troopers,
seeing the Sicyonians sore presed, made fast the horses of his troops to
the trees, and relieving the Sicyonians of their heavy infantry shields,
advanced with his volunteers against the Argives. The latter, seeing the
Sigmas on the shields and taking them to be "Sicyonians," had not the
slightest fear. Whereupon, as the story goes, Pasimachus, exclaiming
in his broad Doric, "By the twin gods! these Sigmas will cheat you,
you Argives," came to close quarters, and in that battle of a handful
against a host, was slain himself with all his followers. In another
quarter of the field, however, the Corinthian exiles had got the better
of their opponents and worked their way up, so that they were now
touching the city circumvallation walls.

 (9) See Grote, ix. p. 333 foll.

The Lacedaemonians, on their side, perceiving the discomfiture of the
Sicyonians, sprang out with timely aid, keeping the palisade-work on
their left. But the Argives, discovering that the Lacedaemonians were
behind them, wheeled round and came racing back, pouring out of the
palisade at full speed. Their extreme right, with unprotected flanks
exposed, fell victims to the Lacedaemonians; the rest, hugging the wall,
made good their retreat in dense masses towards the city. Here they
encountered the Corinthian exiles, and discovering that they had fallen
upon foes, swerved aside in the reverse direction. In this predicament
some mounted by the ladders of the city wall, and, leaping down from
its summit, were destroyed; (10) others yielded up their lives, thrust
through, as they jostled at the foot of the steps; others again were
literally trampled under one another's feet and suffocated.

 (10) Or, "plunged from its summit into perdition." See Thuc. ii. 4.

The Lacedaemonians had no difficulty in the choice of victims; for at
that instant a work was assigned to them to do, (11) such as they could
hardly have hoped or prayed for. To find delivered into their hands
a mob of helpless enemies, in an ecstasy of terror, presenting their
unarmed sides in such sort that none turned to defend himself, but
each victim rather seemed to contribute what he could towards his own
destruction--if that was not divine interposition, I know now what to
call it. Miracle or not, in that little space so many fell, and the
corpses lay piled so thick, that eyes familiar with the stacking of corn
or wood or piles of stones were called upon to gaze at layers of human
bodies. Nor did the guard of the Boeotians in the port itself (12)
escape death; some were slain upon the ramparts, others on the roofs of
the dock-houses, which they had scaled for refuge. Nothing remained but
for the Corinthians and Argives to carry away their dead under cover of
a truce; whilst the allies of Lacedaemon poured in their reinforcements.
When these were collected, Praxitas decided in the first place to raze
enough of the walls to allow a free broadway for an army on march. This
done, he put himself at the head of his troops and advanced on the road
to Megara, taking by assault, first Sidus and next Crommyon. Leaving
garrisons in these two fortresses, he retraced his steps, and finally
fortifying Epieiceia as a garrison outpost to protect the territory
of the allies, he at once disbanded his troops and himself withdrew to
Lacedaemon.

 (11) Or, "Heaven assigned to them a work..." Lit. "The God..."

 (12) I.e. "of Lechaeum."

B.C. 392-391. (13) After this the great armaments of both belligerents
had ceased to exist. The states merely furnished garrisons--the one
set at Corinth, the other set at Sicyon--and were content to guard the
walls. Though even so, a vigorous war was carried on by dint of the
mercenary troops with which both sides were furnished.

 (13) So Grote and Curtius; al. B.C. 393.

A signal incident in the period was the invasion of Phlius by
Iphicrates. He laid an ambuscade, and with a small body of troops
adopting a system of guerilla war, took occasion of an unguarded sally
of the citizens of Phlius to inflict such losses on them, that though
they had never previously received the Lacedaemonians within their
walls, they received them now. They had hitherto feared to do so lest
it might lead to the restoration of the banished members of
their community, who gave out that they owed their exile to their
Lacedaemonian sympathies; (14) but they were now in such abject fear
of the Corinthian party that they sent to fetch the Lacedaemonians,
and delivered the city and citadel to their safe keeping. These latter,
however, well disposed to the exiles of Phlius, did not, at the time
they held the city, so much as breathe the thought of bringing back the
exiles; on the contrary, as soon as the city seemed to have recovered
its confidence, they took their departure, leaving city and laws
precisely as they had found them on their entry.

 (14) Lit. "laconism."

To return to Iphicrates and his men: they frequently extended their
incursions even into Arcadia in many directions, (15) following their
usual guerilla tactics, but also making assaults on fortified posts. The
heavy infantry of the Arcadians positively refused to face them in the
field, so profound was the terror in which they held these light troops.
In compensation, the light troops themselves entertained a wholesome
dread of the Lacedaemonians, and did not venture to approach even within
javelin-range of their heavy infantry. They had been taught a lesson
when, within that distance, some of the younger hoplites had made a dash
at them, catching and putting some of them to the sword. But however
profound the contempt of the Lacedaemonians for these light troops,
their contempt for their own allies was deeper. (On one occasion (16) a
reinforcement of Mantineans had sallied from the walls between Corinth
and Lechaeum to engage the peltasts, and had no sooner come under attack
than they swerved, losing some of their men as they made good their
retreat. The Lacedaemonians were unkind enough to poke fun at these
unfortunates. "Our allies," they said, "stand in as much awe of these
peltasts as children of the bogies and hobgoblins of their nurses." For
themselves, starting from Lechaeum, they found no difficulty in marching
right round the city of Corinth with a single Lacedaemonian division and
the Corinthian exiles.) (17)

 (15) See Thuc. ii. 4.

 (16) See Grote, ix. 472 note. Lechaeum was not taken by the
    Lacedaemonians until the Corinthian long walls had been rebuilt by
    the Athenians. Possibly the incidents in this section (S. 17)
    occurred after the capture of Lechaeum. The historian introduces
    them parenthetically, as it were, in illustration of his main
    topic--the success of the peltasts.

 (17) Or, adopting Schneider's conjecture, {estratopedeuonto}, add "and
    encamping."

The Athenians, on their side, who felt the power of the Lacedaemonians
to be dangerously close, now that the walls of Corinth had been laid
open, and even apprehended a direct attack upon themselves, determined
to rebuild the portion of the wall severed by Praxitas. Accordingly
they set out with their whole force, including a suite of stonelayers,
masons, and carpenters, and within a few days erected a quite splendid
wall on the side facing Sicyon towards the west, (18) and then proceeded
with more leisure to the completion of the eastern portion.

 (18) See Thuc. vi. 98.

To turn once more to the other side: the Lacedaemonians, indignant at
the notion that the Argives should be gathering the produce of their
lands in peace at home, as if war were a pastime, marched against them.
Agesilaus commanded the expedition, and after ravaging their territory
from one end to the other, crossed their frontier at Tenea (19) and
swooped down upon Corinth, taking the walls which had been lately
rebuilt by the Athenians. He was supported on the sea side by his
brother Teleutias (20) with a naval force of about twelve triremes, and
the mother of both was able to congratulate herself on the joint success
of both her sons; one having captured the enemy's walls by land and
the other his ships and naval arsenal by sea, on the same day. These
achievements sufficed Agesilaus for the present; he disbanded the army
of the allies and led the state troops home.

 (19) Reading {Tenean}, Koppen's emendation for {tegean}. In the
    parallel passage ("Ages." ii. 17) the text has {kata ta stena}.
    See Grote, "H. G." ix. 471.

 (20) See below, IV. viii. 11.



V

B.C. 390. (1) Subsequently the Lacedaemonians made a second expedition
against Corinth. They heard from the exiles that the citizens contrived
to preserve all their cattle in Peiraeum; indeed, large numbers derived
their subsistence from the place. Agesilaus was again in command of the
expedition. In the first instance he advanced upon the Isthmus. It
was the month of the Isthmian games, (2) and here he found the Argives
engaged in conducting the sacrifice to Poseidon, as if Corinth were
Argos. So when they perceived the approach of Agesilaus, the Argives and
their friends left the offerings as they lay, including the preparations
for the breakfast, and retired with undisguised alarm into the city
by the Cenchrean road. (3) Agesilaus, though he observed the movement,
refrained from giving chase, but taking up his quarters in the temple,
there proceeded to offer victims to the god himself, and waited until
the Corinthian exiles had celebrated the sacrifice to Poseidon, along
with the games. But no sooner had Agesilaus turned his back and retired,
than the Argives returned and celebrated the Isthmian games afresh;
so that in this particular year there were cases in which the same
competitors were twice defeated in this or that contest, or conversely,
the same man was proclaimed victor twice over.

 (1) Al. B.C. 392. The historian omits the overtures for peace, B.C.
    391 (or 391-390) referred to in Andoc. "De Pace." See Jebb, "Att.
    Or." i. 83, 108; Grote, "H. G." ix. 474; Curtius, "H. G." Eng. tr.
    iv. 261.

 (2) Grote and Curtius believe these to be the Isthmian games of 390
    B.C., not of 392 B.C., as Sauppe and others suppose. See Peter,
    "Chron. Table," p. 89, note 183; Jowett, "Thuc." ii. 468, note on
    VIII. 9, 1.

 (3) Lit. "road to Cenchreae."

On the fourth day Agesilaus led his troops against Peiraeum, but finding
it strongly defended, he made a sudden retrograde march after the
morning meal in the direction of the capital, as though he calculated on
the betrayal of the city. The Corinthians, in apprehension of some such
possible catastrophe, sent to summon Iphicrates with the larger
portion of his light infantry. These passed by duly in the night, not
unobserved, however, by Agesilaus, who at once turned round at break of
day and advanced on Piraeum. He himself kept to the low ground by the
hot springs, (4) sending a division to scale the top of the pass. That
night he encamped at the hot springs, while the division bivouacked
in the open, in possession of the pass. Here Agesilaus distinguished
himself by an invention as seasonable as it was simple. Among those
who carried provisions for the division not one had thought of bringing
fire. The altitude was considerable; there had been a fall of rain and
hail towards evening and the temperature was low; besides which, the
scaling party were clad in thin garments suited to the summer season.
There they sat shivering in the dark, with scarcely heart to attack
their suppers, when Agesilaus sent up to them as many as ten porters
carrying fire in earthen pots. One found his way up one way, one
another, and presently there were many bonfires blazing--magnificently
enough, since there was plenty of wood to hand; so that all fell to
oiling themselves and many supped over again. The same night the sky was
lit up by the blaze of the temple of Poseidon--set on fire no one knows
how.

 (4) Near mod. Lutraki.

When the men in Piraeum perceived that the pass was occupied, they at
once abandoned all thought of self-defence and fled for refuge to the
Heraion (5)--men and women, slaves and free-born, with the greater part
of their flocks and herds. Agesilaus, with the main body, meanwhile
pursued his march by the sea-shore, and the division, simultaneously
descending from the heights, captured the fortified position of Oenoe,
appropriating its contents. Indeed, all the troops on that day reaped
a rich harvest in the supplies they brought in from various farmsteads.
Presently those who had escaped into the Heraion came out, offering to
leave it to Agesilaus to decide what he would do with them. He decided
to deliver up to the exiles all those concerned with the late butchery,
and that all else should be sold. And so from the Heraion streamed out
a long line of prisoners, whilst from other sides embassies arrived in
numbers; and amongst these a deputation from the Boeotians, anxious to
learn what they should do to obtain peace. These latter Agesilaus,
with a certain loftiness of manner, affected not even to see, although
Pharax, (6) their proxenus, stood by their side to introduce them.
Seated in a circular edifice on the margin of the lake, (7) he surveyed
the host of captives and valuables as they were brought out. Beside the
prisoners, to guard them, stepped the Lacedaemonian warriors from the
camp, carrying their spears--and themselves plucked all gaze their way,
so readily will success and the transient fortune of the moment rivet
attention. But even while Agesilaus was still thus seated, wearing a
look betokening satisfaction at some great achievement, a horseman came
galloping up; the flanks of his charger streamed with sweat. To the many
inquiries what news he brought, the rider responded never a word; but
being now close beside Agesilaus, he leaped from his horse, and running
up to him with lowering visage narrated the disaster of the Spartan
division (8) at Lechaeum. At these tidings the king sprang instantly
from his seat, clutching his spear, and bade his herald summon to a
meeting the generals, captains of fifties, and commanders of foreign
brigades. (9) When these had rapidly assembled he bade them, seeing that
the morning meal had not yet been tasted, to swallow hastily what they
could, and with all possible speed to overtake him. But for himself,
he, with the officers of the royal staff, (10) set off at once without
breakfast. His bodyguard, with their heavy arms, accompanied him with
all speed--himself in advance, the officers following behind. In this
fashion he had already passed beyond the warm springs, and was well
within the plateau of Lechaeum, when three horsemen rode up with further
news: the dead bodies had been picked up. On receipt of these tidings
he commanded the troops to order arms, and having rested them a little
space, led them back again to the Heraion. The next day he spent in
disposing of the captured property. (11)

 (5) Or, "Heraeum," i.e. sanctuary of Hera, on a promontory so called.
    See Leake, "Morea," iii. 317.

 (6) See "Hell." III. ii. 12, if the same.

 (7) Or, "on the round pavilion by the lake" (mod. Vuliasmeni).

 (8) Technically "mora."

 (9) Lit. the polemarchs, penteconters, and xenagoi.

 (10) See "Pol. Lac." xiii. 1.

 (11) See Grote, "H. G." ix. 480, in reference to "Ages." vii. 6.

The ambassadors of the Boeotians were then summoned, and, being asked to
explain the object of their coming, made no further mention of the
word "peace," but replied that, if there was nothing to hinder it, they
wished to have a pass to their own soldiers within the capital. The king
answered with a smile: "I know your desire is not so much to see your
soldiers as to feast your eyes on the good fortune of your friends, and
to measure its magnitude. Wait then, I will conduct you myself; with
me you will be better able to discover the true value of what has taken
place." And he was as good as his word. Next day he sacrificed, and led
his army up to the gates of Corinth. The trophy he respected, but not
one tree did he leave standing--chopping and burning, as proof positive
that no one dared to face him in the field. And having so done, he
encamped about Lechaeum; and as to the Theban ambassadors, in lieu
of letting them pass into the city, he sent them off by sea across to
Creusis.

But in proportion to the unwontedness of such a calamity befalling
Lacedaemonians, a widespread mourning fell upon the whole Laconian army,
those alone excepted whose sons or fathers or brothers had died at their
post. The bearing of these resembled that of conquerors, (12) as with
bright faces they moved freely to and fro, glorying in their domestic
sorrow. Now the tragic fate which befell the division was on this wise:
It was the unvaried custom of the men of Amyclae to return home at
the Hyacinthia, (13) to join in the sacred paean, a custom not to be
interrupted by active service or absence from home or for any other
reason. So, too, on this occasion, Agesilaus had left behind all the
Amyclaeans serving in any part of his army at Lechaeum. At the right
moment the general in command of the garrison at that place had posted
the garrison troops of the allies to guard the walls during his absence,
and put himself at the head of his division of heavy infantry with that
of the cavalry, (14) and led the Amyclaeans past the walls of Corinth.
Arrived at a point within three miles or so (15) of Sicyon, the
polemarch turned back himself in the direction of Lechaeum with his
heavy infantry regiment, six hundred strong, giving orders to the
cavalry commandant to escort the Amyclaeans with his division as far as
they required, and then to turn and overtake him. It cannot be said that
the Lacedaemonians were ignorant of the large number of light troops and
heavy infantry inside Corinth, but owing to their former successes they
arrogantly presumed that no one would attack them. Within the capital
of the Corinthians, however, their scant numbers--a thin line of heavy
infantry unsupported by light infantry or cavalry--had been noted; and
Callias, the son of Hipponicus, (16) who was in command of the Athenian
hoplites, and Iphicrates at the head of his peltasts, saw no risk in
attacking with the light brigade. Since if the enemy continued his
march by the high road, he would be cut up by showers of javelins on his
exposed right flank; or if he were tempted to take the offensive, they
with their peltasts, the nimblest of all light troops, would easily slip
out of the grasp of his hoplites.

 (12) See Grote, "H. G." ix. 488.

 (13) Observed on three days of the month Hecatombaeus (= July). See
    Muller's "Dorians," ii. 360. For Amyclae, see Leake, "Morea," i.
    ch. iv. p. 145 foll.; Baedeker's "Greece," p. 279.

 (14) See below, "Hell." VI. iv. 12; and "Pol. Lac." xi. 4, xiii. 4.

 (15) Lit. "twenty or thirty stades."

 (16) See Cobet, "Prosop. Xen." p. 67 foll.

With this clearly-conceived idea they led out their troops; and while
Callias drew up his heavy infantry in line at no great distance from the
city, Iphicrates and his peltasts made a dash at the returning division.

The Lacedaemonians were presently within range of the javelins. (17)
Here a man was wounded, and there another dropped, not to rise again.
Each time orders were given to the attendant shield-bearers (18) to pick
up the men and bear them into Lechaeum; and these indeed were the
only members of the mora who were, strictly speaking, saved. Then the
polemarch ordered the ten-years-service men (19) to charge and drive off
their assailants. Charge, however, as they might, they took nothing by
their pains--not a man could they come at within javelin range. Being
heavy infantry opposed to light troops, before they could get to close
quarters the enemy's word of command sounded "Retire!" whilst as soon
as their own ranks fell back, scattered as they were in consequence of
a charge where each man's individual speed had told, Iphicrates and his
men turned right about and renewed the javelin attack, while others,
running alongside, harassed their exposed flank. At the very first
charge the assailants had shot down nine or ten, and, encouraged by
this success, pressed on with increasing audacity. These attacks told so
severely that the polemarch a second time gave the order (and this time
for the fifteen-years-service men) to charge. The order was promptly
obeyed, but on retiring they lost more men than on the first occasion,
and it was not until the pick and flower of the division had succumbed
that they were joined by their returning cavalry, in whose company they
once again attempted a charge. The light infantry gave way, but the
attack of the cavalry was feebly enforced. Instead of pressing home the
charge until at least they had sabred some of the enemy, they kept their
horses abreast of their infantry skirmishers, (20) charging and wheeling
side by side.

 (17) See Grote, "H. G." ix. 467, note on the improvements of
    Iphicrates.

 (18) Grote, "H. G." ix. 484; cf. "Hell." IV. viii. 39; "Anab." IV. ii.
    20; Herod. ix. 10-29.

 (19) Youngest rank and file, between eighteen and twenty-eight years
    of age, who formed the first line. The Spartan was liable to
    service at the age of eighteen. From twenty-eight to thirty-three
    he would belong to the fifteen-years-service division (the second
    line); and so on. See below, IV. vi. 10.

 (20) See Thuc. iv. 125.

Again and again the monotonous tale of doing and suffering repeated
itself, except that as their own ranks grew thinner and their courage
ebbed, the courage of their assailants grew bolder and their numbers
increased. In desperation they massed compactly upon the narrow slope of
a hillock, distant a couple of furlongs (21) or so from the sea, and a
couple of miles (22) perhaps from Lechaeum. Their friends in Lechaeum,
perceiving them, embarked in boats and sailed round until they were
immediately under the hillock. And now, in the very slough of despair,
being so sorely troubled as man after man dropped dead, and unable
to strike a blow, to crown their distress they saw the enemy's heavy
infantry advancing. Then they took to flight; some of them threw
themselves into the sea; others--a mere handful--escaped with the
cavalry into Lechaeum. The death-roll, including those who fell in the
second fight and the final flight, must have numbered two hundred and
fifty slain, or thereabouts. (23) Such is the tale of the destruction of
the Lacedaemonian mora.

 (21) Lit. "two stades."

 (22) Lit. "sixteen or seventeen stades."

 (23) See Grote, "H. G." ix. 486.

Subsequently, with the mutilated fragment of the division, Agesilaus
turned his back upon Lechaeum, leaving another division behind to
garrison that port. On his passage homewards, as he wound his way
through the various cities, he made a point of arriving at each as late
in the day as possible, renewing his march as early as possible next
morning. Leaving Orchomenus at the first streak of dawn, he passed
Mantinea still under cover of darkness. The spectacle of the Mantineans
rejoicing at their misfortune would have been too severe an ordeal for
his soldiers.

But Iphicrates had not yet reached the summit of his good fortune.
Success followed upon success. Lacedaemonian garrisons had been placed
in Sidus and Crommyon by Praxitas when he took these fortresses, and
again in Oenoe, when Peiraeum was taken quite lately by Agesilaus. One
and all of these now fell into the hands of Iphicrates. Lechaeum still
held out, garrisoned as it was by the Lacedaemonians and their allies;
while the Corinthian exiles, unable since (24) the disaster of the mora
any longer to pass freely by land from Sicyon, had the sea passage still
open to them, and using Lechaeum as their base, (25) kept up a game of
mutual annoyance with the party in the capital.

 (24) Lit. "owing to."

 (25) The illustrative incidents narrated in chapter iv. 17 may belong
    to this period.



VI

B.C. 390-389. (1) At a later date the Achaeans, being in possession of
Calydon, a town from old times belonging to Aetolia, and having further
incorporated the Calydonians as citizens, (2) were under the necessity
of garrisoning their new possession. The reason was, that the
Arcarnanians were threatening the place with an army, and were aided
by contingents from Athens and Boeotia, who were anxious to help their
allies. (3) Under the strain of this combined attack the Achaeans
despatched ambassadors to Lacedaemon, who on arrival complained of the
unfair conduct of Lacedaemon towards themselves. "We, sirs," they said,
"are ever ready to serve in your armies, in obedience to whatever orders
you choose to issue; we follow you whithersoever you think fit to lead;
but when it comes to our being beleaguered by the Acarnanians, with
their allies the Athenians and Boeotians, you show not the slightest
concern. Understand, then, that if things go on thus we cannot hold out;
but either we must give up all part in the war in Peloponnesus and cross
over in full force to engage the Arcarnanians, or we must make peace
with them on whatever terms we can." This language was a tacit threat
that if they failed to obtain the assistance they felt entitled to from
Lacedaemon they would quit the alliance.

 (1) According to others (who suppose that the Isthmia and the events
    recorded in chapter v. 1-19 above belong to B.C. 392), we have now
    reached B.C. 391.

 (2) Or, "having conferred a city organisation on the Calydonians."

 (3) See Thuc. ii. 68.

The ephors and the assembly concluded that there was no alternative
but to assist the Achaeans in their campaign against the Acarnanians.
Accordingly they sent out Agesilaus with two divisions and the proper
complement of allies. The Achaeans none the less marched out in full
force themselves. No sooner had Agesilaus crossed the gulf than there
was a general flight of the population from the country districts into
the towns, whilst the flocks and herds were driven into remote districts
that they might not be captured by the troops. Being now arrived on
the frontier of the enemy's territory, Agesilaus sent to the general
assembly of the Acarnanians at Stratus, (4) warning them that unless
they chose to give up their alliance with the Boeotians and Athenians,
and to take instead themselves and their allies, he would ravage their
territory through its length and breadth, and not spare a single thing.
When they turned a deaf ear to this summons, the other proceeded to do
what he threatened, systematically laying the district waste, felling
the timber and cutting down the fruit-trees, while slowly moving on at
the rate of ten or twelve furlongs a day. The Acarnanians, owing to the
snail-like progress of the enemy, were lulled into a sense of security.
They even began bringing down their cattle from their alps, and devoted
themselves to the tillage of far the greater portion of their fields.
But Agesilaus only waited till their rash confidence reached its climax;
then on the fifteenth or sixteenth day after he had first entered the
country he sacrificed at early dawn, and before evening had traversed
eighteen miles (5) or so of country to the lake (6) round which were
collected nearly all the flocks and herds of the Acarnanians, and so
captured a vast quantity of cattle, horses, and grazing stock of all
kinds, besides numerous slaves.

 (4) "The Akarnanians had, in early times, occupied the hill of Olpai
    as a place for judicial proceedings common to the whole nation"
    (see Thuc. iii. 105). "But in Thucydides' own time Stratos had
    attained its position as the greatest city of Akarnania, and
    probably the Federal Assemblies were already held there" (Thuc.
    ii. 80). "In the days of Agesilaos we find Stratos still more
    distinctly marked as the place of Federal meeting."--Freeman,
    "Hist. Fed. Gov." ch. iv. p. 148 foll., "On the constitution of
    the League."

 (5) Lit. "one hundred and sixty stades."

 (6) See Thuc. ii. 80; vi. 106.

Having secured this prize, he stayed on the spot the whole of the
following day, and devoted himself to disposing of the captured property
by public sale. While he was thus engaged, a large body of Arcarnanian
light infantry appeared, and availing themselves of the position in
which Agesilaus was encamped against the mountain side, assailed him
with volleys of sling-stones and rocks from the razor-edge of the
mountain, without suffering any scathe themselves. By this means they
succeeded in dislodging and forcing his troops down into the level
plain, and that too at an hour when the whole camp was engaged in
preparations for the evening meal. As night drew on, the Acarnanians
retired; sentinels were posted, and the troops slept in peace.

Next day Agesilaus led off his army. The exit from the plain and
meadow-land round the lake was a narrow aperture through a close
encircling range of hills. In occupation of this mountain barrier the
Acarnanians, from the vantage-ground above, poured down a continuous
pelt of stones and other missiles, or, creeping down to the fringes,
dogged and annoyed them so much that the army was no longer able to
proceed. If the heavy infantry or cavalry made sallies from the main
line they did no harm to their assailants, for the Acarnanians had only
to retire and they had quickly gained their strongholds. It was too
severe a task, Agesilaus thought, to force his way through the narrow
pass so sorely beset. He made up his mind, therefore, to charge that
portion of the enemy who dogged his left, though these were pretty
numerous. The range of hills on this side was more accessible to heavy
infantry and horse alike. During the interval needed for the inspection
of victims, the Acarnanians kept plying them with javelins and bullets,
and, coming into close proximity, wounded man after man. But presently
came the word of command, "Advance!" and the fifteen-years-service men
of the heavy infantry (7) ran forward, accompanied by the cavalry, at a
round pace, the general himself steadily following with the rest of the
column. Those of the Acarnanians who had crept down the mountain side at
that instant in the midst of their sharpshooting turned and fled, and as
they climbed the steep, man after man was slain. When, however, the top
of the pass was reached, there stood the hoplites of the Acarnanians
drawn up in battle line, and supported by the mass of their light
infantry. There they steadily waited, keeping up a continuous discharge
of missiles the while, or launching their long spears; whereby they
dealt wounds to the cavalry troopers and death in some cases to the
horses. But when they were all but within the clutches of the advancing
heavy infantry (8) of the Lacedaemonians their firmness forsook them;
they swerved and fled, and there died of them on that day about three
hundred. So ended the affair.

 (7) I.e. "the first two ranks." See above, IV. v. 14.

 (8) See "Ages." ii. 20, for an extraordinary discrepancy.

Agesilaus set up a trophy of victory, and afterwards making a tour of
the country, he visited it with fire and sword. (9) Occasionally, in
obedience to pressure put upon him by the Achaeans, he would assault
some city, but did not capture a single one. And now, as the season of
autumn rapidly approached, he prepared to leave the country; whereupon
the Achaeans, who looked upon his exploits as abortive, seeing that not
a single city, willingly or unwillingly, had as yet been detached from
their opponents, begged him, as the smallest service he could render
them, at any rate to stay long enough in the country to prevent the
Acarnanians from sowing their corn. He answered that the course they
suggested ran counter to expediency. "You forget," he said, "that I mean
to invade your enemies again next summer; and therefore the larger their
sowing now, the stronger will be their appetite for peace hereafter."
With this retort he withdrew overland through Aetolia, and by roads,
moreover, which no army, small or great, could possibly have traversed
without the consent of the inhabitants. The Aetolians, however, were
only too glad to yield the Spartan king a free passage, cherishing hopes
as they did that he would aid them to recover Naupactus. On reaching
Rhium (10) he crossed the gulf at that point and returned homewards,
the more direct passage from Calydon to Peloponnesus being effectually
barred by an Athenian squadron stationed at Oeniadae.

 (9) Or lit. "burning and felling."

 (10) Or Antirrhium (as more commonly called).



VII

B.C. 389-388. (1) On the expiration of winter, and in fulfilment of his
promise to the Achaeans, Agesilaus called out the ban once more with
early spring to invade the Acarnanians. The latter were apprised of his
intention, and, being persuaded that owing to the midland situation of
their cities they would just as truly be blockaded by an enemy who chose
to destroy their corn as they would be if besieged with entrenchments in
regular form, they sent ambassadors to Lacedaemon, and made peace with
the Achaeans and alliance with the Lacedaemonians. Thus closes this page
of history concerning the affairs of Arcarnania.

 (1) According to others, B.C. 390.

To turn to the next. There was a feeling on the part of the
Lacedaemonians (2) that no expedition against Athens or Boeotia would be
safe so long as a state so important and so close to their own frontier
as Argos remained in open hostility behind them. Accordingly they called
out the ban against Argos. Now when Agesipolis learnt that the duty of
leadership devolved on him, and, moreover, that the sacrifices before
crossing the frontier were favourable, he went to Olympia and consulted
the will of the god. "Would it be lawful to him," he inquired, "not to
accept the holy truce, on the ground that the Argives made the season
for it (3) depend not on a fixed date, but on the prospect of a
Lacedaemonian invasion?" The god indicated to the inquirer that he might
lawfully repudiate any holy truce which was fraudulently antedated. (4)
Not content with this, the young king, on leaving Olympia, went at once
to Delphi, and at that shrine put the same question to Apollo: "Were his
views in accordance with his Father's as touching the holy truce?"--to
which the son of Zeus made answer: "Yea, altogether in accordance." (5)

 (2) Or, "It was agreed by the Lacedaemonians."

 (3) I.e. "the season of the Carneia."

 (4) Or, "wrongfully put forward." See below, V. i. 29; iii. 28; Paus.
    III. v. 8; Jebb. "Att. Or." i. p. 131; Grote, "H. G." ix. 494
    foll.; Jowett, "Thuc." ii. 315; note to Thuc. V. liv. 3.

 (5) Grote; cf. Aristot. "Rhet." ii. 33.

Then without further hesitation, picking up his army at Phlius
(where, during his absence to visit the temples, the troops had been
collecting), he advanced by Nemea into the enemy's territory. The
Argives, on their side, perceiving that they would be unable to hinder
his advance, in accordance with their custom sent a couple of heralds,
garlanded, and presented their usual plea of a holy truce. Agesipolis
answered them curtly that the gods were not satisfied with the justice
of their plea, and, refusing to accept the truce, pushed forward,
causing thereby great perplexity and consternation throughout the rural
districts and the capital itself.

But while he was getting his evening meal that first evening in the
Argive territory--just at the moment when the after-dinner libation had
been poured out--the god sent an earthquake; and with one consent the
Lacedaemonians, beginning with the officers of the royal quarters,
sang the sacred hymn of Poseidon. The soldiers, in general, expected to
retreat, arguing that, on the occurrence of an earthquake once before,
Agis had retired from Elis. But Agesipolis held another view: if the god
had sent his earthquake at the moment when he was meditating invasion,
he should have understood that the god forbade his entrance; but now,
when the invasion was a thing effected, he must needs take it as a
signal of his approval. (6) Accordingly next morning he sacrificed to
Poseidon, and advanced a short distance further into the country.

 (6) Or, "interpret the signal as a summons to advance."

The late expedition of Agesilaus into Argos (7) was still fresh in men's
minds, and Agesipolis was eager to ascertain from the soldiers how close
his predecessor had advanced to the fortification walls; or again, how
far he had gone in ravaging the open country--not unlike a competitor
in the pentathlon, (8) eager to cap the performance of his rival in each
event. On one occasion it was only the discharge of missiles from the
towers which forced him to recross the trenches round the walls; on
another, profiting by the absence of the majority of the Argives in
Laconian territory, he came so close to the gates that their officers
actually shut out their own Boeotian cavalry on the point of entering,
in terror lest the Lacedaemonians might pour into the town in company,
and these Boeotian troopers were forced to cling, like bats to a wall,
under each coign of vantage beneath the battlements. Had it not been for
the accidental absence of the Cretans, (9) who had gone off on a raid to
Nauplia, without a doubt numbers of men and horses would have been
shot down. At a later date, while encamping in the neighbourhood of the
Enclosures, (10) a thunder-bolt fell into his camp. One or two men were
struck, while others died from the effect of the concussion on their
brains. At a still later period he was anxious to fortify some sort of
garrison outpost in the pass of Celusa, (11) but upon offering sacrifice
the victims proved lobeless, (12) and he was constrained to lead back
and disband his army--not without serious injury inflicted on the
Argives, as the result of an invasion which had taken them wholly by
surprise.

 (7) See above, "Hell." IV. iv. 19.

 (8) The pentathlon of Olympia and the other great games consisted of
    five contests, in the following order--(1) leaping, (2) discus-
    throwing, (3) javelin-throwing, (4) running, (5) wrestling. Cf.
    Simonides, {alma podokeien diskon akonta palen}, where, "metri
    gratia," the order is inverted. The competitors were drawn in
    pairs. The odd man who drew a bye in any particular round or heat
    was called the "ephedros." The successful athletes of the pairs,
    that is, those who had won any three events out of five, would
    then again be drawn against each other, and so on until only two
    were left, between whom the final heat took place. See, for an
    exhaustive discussion of the subject, Prof. Percy Gardner, "The
    Pentathlon of the Greeks" ("Journal of Hellenic Studies," vol. i.
    9, p. 210 foll. pl. viii.), from whom this note is taken.

 (9) See Thuc. vii. 57.

 (10) {peri tas eirktas}--what these were no one knows, possibly a
    stone quarry used as a prison. Cf. "Cyrop." III. i. 19; "Mem." II.
    i. 5; see Grote, "H. G." ix. 497; Paus. III. v.. 8.

 (11) Or Celossa. See Strabo, viii. 382.

 (12) I.e. "hopeless." See above, III. iv. 15.



VIII

394 B.C. Such were the land operations in the war. Meanwhile another
series of events was being enacted on the sea and within the seaboard
cities; and these I will now narrate in detail. But I shall confine my
pen to the more memorable incidents, and others of less account I shall
pass over.

In the first place, then, Pharnabazus and Conon, after defeating the
Lacedaemonians in the naval engagement of Cnidus, commenced a tour of
inspection round the islands and the maritime states, expelling from
them, as they visited them, one after another the Spartan governors. (1)
Everywhere they gave consolatory assurances to the citizens that they
had no intention of establishing fortress citadels within their walls,
or in any way interfering with their self-government. (2) Such words
fell soothingly upon the ears of those to whom they were addressed;
the proposals were courteously accepted; all were eager to present
Pharnabazus with gifts of friendship and hospitality. The satrap,
indeed, was only applying the instructions of his master Conon on these
matters--who had taught him that if he acted thus all the states would
be friendly to him, whereas, if he showed any intention to enslave them,
the smallest of them would, as Conon insisted, be capable of causing
a world of trouble, and the chances were, if apprehensions were once
excited, he would find himself face to face with a coalition of united
Hellas. To these admonitions Pharnabazus lent a willing ear.

 (1) Lit. "the Laconian harmosts."

 (2) See Hicks, 70, "Honours to Konon," Inscript. found at Erythrae in
    Ionia. Cf. Diod. xiv. 84.

Accordingly, when disembarking at Ephesus, he presented Conon with a
fleet of forty sail, (3) and having further instructed him to meet him
at Sestos, (4) set off himself by land along the coast to visit his own
provinces. For here it should be mentioned that his old enemy Dercylidas
happened to be in Abydos at the time of the sea-fight; (5) nor had he at
a later date suffered eclipse with the other governors, (6) but on
the contrary, had kept tight hold of Abydos and still preserved it in
attachment to Lacedaemon. The course he had adopted was to summon a
meeting of the Abydenians, when he made them a speech as follows: "Sirs,
to-day it is possible for you, who have before been friends to my city,
to appear as benefactors of the Lacedaemonians. For a man to prove
faithful to his friends in the heyday of their good fortune is no great
marvel; but to prove steadfast when his friends are in misfortune--that
is a service monumental for all time. But do not mistake me. It does not
follow that, because we have been defeated in a great sea-fight, we are
therefore annihilated. (7) Certainly not. Even in old days, you will
admit, when Athens was mistress of the sea, our state was not powerless
to benefit friends or chastise enemies. Moreover, in proportion as the
rest of the cities have joined hands with fortune to turn their backs
upon us, so much the more certainly will the grandeur of your fidelity
shine forth. Or, is any one haunted by the fear that we may find
ourselves blockaded by land and sea?--let him consider that at present
there is no Hellenic navy whatever on the seas, and if the barbarian
attempts to clutch the empire of the sea, Hellas will not sit by and
suffer it; so that, if only in self-defence, she must inevitably take
your side."

 (3) See Diod. xiv. 83.

 (4) See above, "Hell." II. i. 27 foll.

 (5) See above, "Hell." IV. iii. 3.

 (6) Lit. "harmosts."

 (7) Or, "we are beaten, ergo, it is all over with us."

To this the Abydenians lent no deaf ears, but rather responded with
willingness approaching enthusiasm--extending the hand of fellowship
to the ex-governors, some of whom were already flocking to Abydos as a
harbour of refuge, whilst others they sent to summon from a distance.

So when a number of efficient and serviceable men had been collected,
Dercylidas ventured to cross over to Sestos--lying, as it does, not more
than a mile (8) distant, directly facing Abydos. There he not only
set about collecting those who held lands in the Chersonese through
Lacedaemonian influence, but extended his welcome also to the governors
(9) who had been driven out of European states. (10) He insisted
that, if they came to think of it, not even was their case desperate,
reminding them that even in Asia, which originally belonged to the
Persian monarch, places were to be found--such as the little state of
Temnos, or Aegae, and others, capable of administering their affairs,
unsubjected to the king of Persia. "But," he added, "if you want a
strong impregnable position, I cannot conceive what better you can find
than Sestos. Why, it would need a combined naval and military force to
invest that port." By these and such like arguments he rescued them from
the lethargy of despair.

 (8) Lit. "eight stades."

 (9) Lit. "harmosts."

 (10) See Demos. "de Cor." 96.

Now when Pharnabazus found Abydos and Sestos so conditioned, he gave
them to understand that unless they chose to eject the Lacedaemonians,
he would bring war to bear upon them; and when they refused to obey,
having first assigned to Conon as his business to keep the sea closed
against them, he proceeded in person to ravage the territory of the men
of Abydos. Presently, finding himself no nearer the fulfilment of his
object--which was their reduction--he set off home himself and left it
to Conon the while so to conciliate the Hellespontine states that as
large a naval power as possible might be mustered against the coming
spring. In his wrath against the Lacedaemonians, in return for the
treatment he had received from them, his paramount object was to invade
their territory and exact what vengeance he could.

B.C. 393. The winter was thus fully taken up with preparations; but with
the approach of spring, Pharnabazus and Conon, with a large fleet fully
manned, and a foreign mercenary brigade to boot, threaded their way
through the islands to Melos. (11) This island was to serve as a base of
operations against Lacedaemon. And in the first instance he sailed down
to Pherae (12) and ravaged that district, after which he made successive
descents at various other points on the seaboard, and did what injury
he could. But in apprehension of the harbourless character of the coast,
coupled with the enemy's facility of reinforcement and his own scarcity
of supplies, he very soon turned back and sailed away, until finally he
came to moorings in the harbour of Phoenicus in Cythera. The occupants
of the city of the Cytherians, in terror of being taken by storm,
evacuated the walls. To dismiss these under a flag of truce across to
Laconia was his first step; his second was to repair the fortress
in question and to leave a garrison in the island under an Athenian
governor--Nicophemus. After this he set sail to the Isthmus of Corinth,
where he delivered an exhortation to the allies begging them to
prosecute the war vigorously, and to show themselves faithful to the
Great King; and so, having left them all the moneys he had with him, set
off on his voyage home.

 (11) See Lys. xix. "de bon. Arist." 19 foll.; and Hicks, 71, "Honours
    to Dionysios I. and his court"; Grote, "H. G." ix. 453.

 (12) Mod. Kalamata.

But Conon had a proposal to make:--If Pharnabazus would allow him to
keep the fleet, he would undertake, in the first place, to support it
free of expense from the islands; besides which, he would sail to his
own country and help his fellow-citizens the Athenians to rebuild their
long walls and the fortifications round Piraeus. No heavier blow, he
insisted, could well be inflicted on Lacedaemon. "In this way, I can
assure you," he added, "you will win the eternal gratitude of the
Athenians and wreak consummate vengeance on the Lacedaemonians, since
at one stroke you will render null and void that on which they have
bestowed their utmost labour." These arguments so far weighed with
Pharnabazus that he despatched Conon to Athens with alacrity, and
further supplied him with funds for the restoration of the walls. Thus
it was that Conon, on his arrival at Athens, was able to rebuild a large
portion of the walls--partly by lending his own crews, and partly by
giving pay to carpenters and stone-masons, and meeting all the necessary
expenses. There were other portions of the walls which the Athenians and
Boeotians and other states raised as a joint voluntary undertaking.

Nor must it be forgotten that the Corinthians, with the funds left them
by Pharnabazus, manned a fleet--the command of which they entrusted
to their admiral Agathinus--and so were undisputed masters of the sea
within the gulf round Achaia and Lechaeum.

B.C. 393-391. The Lacedaemonians, in opposition, fitted out a fleet
under the command of Podanemus. That officer, in an attack of no great
moment, lost his life, and Pollis, (13) his second in command, was
presently in his turn obliged to retire, being wounded, whereupon
Herippidas took command of the vessels. On the other hand, Proaenus
the Corinthian, who had relieved Agathinus, evacuated Rhium, and the
Lacedaemonians recovered that post. Subsequently Teleutias succeeded to
Herippidas's fleet, and it was then the turn of that admiral to dominate
the gulf. (14)

 (13) See "Hell." I. i. 23.

 (14) According to Grote ("H. G." ix. 471, note 2), this section
    summarises the Lacedaemonian maritime operations in the Corinthian
    Gulf from the late autumn of 393 B.C. till the appointment of
    Teleutias in the spring or early summer of 391 B.C., the year of
    the expedition of Agesilaus recounted above, "Hell." IV. iv. 19.

B.C. 392. The Lacedaemonians were well informed of the proceedings of
Conon. They knew that he was not only restoring the fortifications
of Athens by help of the king's gold, but maintaining a fleet at his
expense besides, and conciliating the islands and seaboard cities
towards Athens. If, therefore, they could indoctrinate Tiribazus--who
was a general of the king--with their sentiments, they believed they
could not fail either to draw him aside to their own interests, or, at
any rate, to put a stop to his feeding Conon's navy. With this intention
they sent Antalcidas to Tiribazus: (15) his orders were to carry out
this policy and, if possible, to arrange a peace between Lacedaemon and
the king. The Athenians, getting wind of this, sent a counter-embassy,
consisting of Hermogenes, Dion, Callisthenes, and Callimedon, with Conon
himself. They at the same time invited the attendance of ambassadors
from the allies, and there were also present representatives of the
Boeotians, of Corinth, and of Argos. When they had arrived at their
destination, Antalcidas explained to Tiribazus the object of his
visit: he wished, if possible, to cement a peace between the state
he represented and the king--a peace, moreover, exactly suited to the
aspirations of the king himself; in other words, the Lacedaemonians gave
up all claim to the Hellenic cities in Asia as against the king, while
for their own part they were content that all the islands and other
cities should be independent. "Such being our unbiased wishes," he
continued, "for what earthly reason should (the Hellenes or) the king
go to war with us? or why should he expend his money? The king is
guaranteed against attack on the part of Hellas, since the Athenians are
powerless apart from our hegemony, and we are powerless so long as the
separate states are independent." The proposals of Antalcidas sounded
very pleasantly in the ears of Tiribazus, but to the opponents of
Sparta they were the merest talk. The Athenians were apprehensive of
an agreement which provided for the independence of the cities in the
islands, whereby they might be deprived of Lemnos, Imbros, and Scyros.
The Thebans, again, were afraid of being compelled to let the Boeotian
states go free. The Argives did not see how such treaty contracts
and covenants were compatible with the realisation of their own great
object--the absorption of Corinth by Argos. And so it came to pass that
this peace (16) proved abortive, and the representatives departed each
to his own home.

 (15) See Plut. "Ages." xxiii. (Clough, iv. p. 27); and for the date
    B.C. 392 (al. B.C. 393) see Grote, "H. G." ix. 498.

 (16) See Andoc. "de Pace"; Jebb, "Attic Or." i. 83, 128 foll. Prof.
    Jebb assigns this speech to B.C. 390 rather than B.C. 391. See
    also Grote, "H. G." ix. 499; Diod. xiv. 110.

Tiribazus, on his side, thought it hardly consistent with his own safety
to adopt the cause of the Lacedaemonians without the concurrence of
the king--a scruple which did not prevent him from privately presenting
Antalcidas with a sum of money, in hopes that when the Athenians and
their allies discovered that the Lacedaemonians had the wherewithal to
furnish a fleet, they might perhaps be more disposed to desire peace.
Further, accepting the statements of the Lacedaemonians as true, he
took on himself to secure the person of Conon, as guilty of wrongdoing
towards the king, and shut him up. (17) That done, he set off up
country to the king to recount the proposals of Lacedaemon, with his own
subsequent capture of Conon as a mischievous man, and to ask for further
guidance on all these matters.

 (17) See Diod. xiv. 85; and Corn. Nep. 5.

On the arrival of Tiribazus at the palace, the king sent down Struthas
to take charge of the seaboard district. The latter, however, was a
strong partisan of Athens and her allies, since he found it impossible
to forget the long list of evils which the king's country had suffered
at the hands of Agesilaus; so that the Lacedaemonians, contrasting
the hostile disposition of the new satrap towards themselves with his
friendliness to the Athenians, sent Thibron to deal with him by force of
arms.

B.C. 391. (18) That general crossed over and established his base
of operations in Ephesus and the towns in the plain of the
Maeander--Priene, Leucophrys, and Achilleum--and proceeded to harry the
king's territory, sparing neither live nor dead chattels. But as time
went on, Struthas, who could not but note the disorderly, and indeed
recklessly scornful manner in which the Lacedaemonian brought up his
supports on each occasion, despatched a body of cavalry into the plain.
Their orders were to gallop down and scour the plain, making a clean
sweep (19) of all they could lay their hands on. Thibron, as it
befell, had just finished breakfast, and was returning to the mess
with Thersander the flute-player. The latter was not only a good
flute-player, but, as affecting Lacedaemonian manners, laid claim to
personal prowess. Struthas, then, seeing the disorderly advance of the
supports and the paucity of the vanguard, appeared suddenly at the head
of a large body of cavalry, all in orderly array. Thibron and Thersander
were the first to be cut down, and when these had fallen the rest of the
troops were easily turned. A mere chase ensued, in which man after
man was felled to earth, though a remnant contrived to escape into the
friendly cities; still larger numbers owed their safety to their late
discovery of the business on hand. Nor, indeed, was this the first time
the Spartan commander had rushed to the field, without even issuing a
general order. So ends the history of these events.

 (18) Al. B.C. 392, al. B.C. 390.

 (19) See "Hell." VII. i. 40; "Cyrop." I. iv. 17; III. iii. 23; "Anab."
    VI. iii. 3.

B.C. 390. (20) We pass on to the arrival at Lacedaemon of a party of
Rhodian exiles expelled by the popular party. They insisted that it was
not equitable to allow the Athenians to subjugate Rhodes and thus build
up so vast a power. The Lacedaemonians were alive to the fact that the
fate of Rhodes depended on which party in the state prevailed: if the
democracy were to dominate, the whole island must fall into the hands of
Athens; if the wealthier classes, (21) into their own. Accordingly they
fitted out for them a fleet of eight vessels, and put Ecdicus in command
of it as admiral.

 (20) Grote, "H. G." ix. 504; al. B.C. 391.

 (21) Or, "the Lacedaemonians were not slow to perceive that the whole
    island of Rhodes was destined to fall either into the hands of
    Athens or of themselves, according as the democracy or the
    wealthier classes respectively dominated."

At the same time they despatched another officer on board these vessels
named Diphridas, on a separate mission. His orders were to cross over
into Asia and to secure the states which had received Thibron. He was
also to pick up the survivors of Thibron's army, and with these troops,
aided by a second army which he would collect from any other quarter
open to him, he was to prosecute the war against Struthas. Diphridas
followed out his instructions, and amongst other achievements was
fortunate enough to capture Tigranes, (22) the son-in-law of Struthas,
with his wife, on their road to Sardis. The sum paid for their ransom
was so large that he at once had the wherewithal to pay his mercenaries.
Diphridas was no less attractive than his predecessor Thibron; but
he was of a more orderly temperament, steadier, and incomparably more
enterprising as a general; the secret of this superiority being that
he was a man over whom the pleasures of the body exercised no sway. He
became readily absorbed in the business before him--whatever he had to
do he did it with a will.

 (22) See "Anab." VII. viii. 9 for a similar exploit.

Ecdicus having reached Cnidus, there learned that the democracy in
Rhones were entirely masters of the situation. They were dominant by
land and sea; indeed they possessed a fleet twice the size of his
own. He was therefore content to keep quiet in Cnidus until the
Lacedaemonians, perceiving that his force was too small to allow him to
benefit their friends, determined to relieve him. With this view they
ordered Teleutias to take the twelve ships which formed his squadron (at
present in the gulf adjoining Achaia and Lechaeum), (23) and to feel his
way round to Ecdicus: that officer he was to send home. For himself, he
was to undertake personally to protect the interests of all who cared to
be their friends, whilst injuring the enemy by every possible means.

 (23) See above, IV. viii. 11.

So then Teleutias, having reached Samos, where he added some vessels to
his fleet, set sail to Cnidus. At this point Ecdicus returned home, and
Teleutias, continuing his voyage, reached Rhodes, at the head now of
seven-and-twenty vessels. It was during this portion of the voyage that
he fell in with Philocrates, the son of Ephialtes, who was sailing from
Athens to Cyprus with ten triremes, in aid of their ally Evagoras. (24)
The whole flotilla fell into the Spartan's hands--a curious instance, it
may be added, of cross purposes on the part of both belligerents. Here
were the Athenians, supposed to be on friendly terms with the king,
engaged in sending an allied force to support Evagoras, who was at open
war with him; and here again was Teleutias, the representative of a
people at war with Persia, engaged in crippling a fleet which had been
despatched on a mission hostile to their adversary. Teleutias put
back into Cnidus to dispose of his captives, and so eventually reached
Rhodes, where his arrival brought timely aid to the party in favour of
Lacedaemon.

 (24) See Diod. xiv. 98; Hicks, 72; Kohler, "C. I. A." ii. p. 397;
    Isoc. "Evag." 54-57; Paus. I. iii. 1; Lys. "de bon. Ar." 20; Dem.
    p. 161.

B.C. 389. (25) And now the Athenians, fully impressed with the belief
that their rivals were laying the basis of a new naval supremacy,
despatched Thrasybulus the Steirian to check them, with a fleet of forty
sail. That officer set sail, but abstained from bringing aid to Rhodes,
and for good reasons. In Rhodes the Lacedaemonian party had hold of
the fortress, and would be out of reach of his attack, especially as
Teleutias was close at hand to aid them with his fleet. On the other
hand, his own friends ran no danger of succumbing to the enemy, as
they held the cities and were numerically much stronger, and they had
established their superiority in the field. Consequently he made for
the Hellespont, where, in the absence of any rival power, he hoped to
achieve some stroke of good fortune for his city. Thus, in the first
place, having detected the rivalries existing between Medocus, (26)
the king of the Odrysians, and Seuthes, (27) the rival ruler of the
seaboard, he reconciled them to each other, and made them friends and
allies of Athens; in the belief that if he secured their friendship the
Hellenic cities on the Thracian coast would show greater proclivity to
Athens. Such being the happy state of affairs not only in Europe but as
regards the states in Asia also, thanks to the friendly attitude of
the king to his fellow-citizens, he sailed into Byzantium and sold the
tithe-duty levied on vessels arriving from the Euxine. By another stroke
he converted the oligarchy of Byzantium into a democracy. The result of
this was that the Byzantine demos (28) were no longer sorry to see as
vast a concourse of Athenians in their city as possible. Having so done,
and having further won the friendship of the men of Calchedon, he set
sail south of the Hellespont. Arrived at Lesbos, he found all the cities
devoted to Lacedaemon with the exception of Mytilene. He was therefore
loth to attack any of the former until he had organised a force within
the latter. This force consisted of four hundred hoplites, furnished
from his own vessels, and a corps of exiles from the different
cities who had sought shelter in Mytilene; to which he added a stout
contingent, the pick of the Mytileneian citizens themselves. He stirred
the ardour of the several contingents by suitable appeals: representing
to the men of Mytilene that by their capture of the cities they would at
once become the chiefs and patrons of Lesbos; to the exiles he made it
appear that if they would but unite to attack each several city in turn,
they might all reckon on their particular restoration; while he needed
only to remind his own warriors that the acquisition of Lesbos meant not
only the attachment of a friendly city, but the discovery of a mine
of wealth. The exhortations ended and the contingents organised, he
advanced against Methymna.

 (25) Grote, "H. G." ix. 507.

 (26) Al. Amedocus.

 (27) For Seuthes, see above, "Hell." III. ii. 2, if the same.

 (28) For the varying fortunes of the democrats at Byzantium in 408
    B.C. and 405 B.C., see above, ("Hell." I. iii. 18; II. ii. 2); for
    the present moment, 390-389 B.C., see Demosth. "c. Lept." 475; for
    the admission of Byzantium into the new naval confederacy in 378
    B.C., see Hicks, 68; Kohler, "C. I. A." ii. 19; and for B.C. 363,
    Isocr. "Phil." 53; Diod. xv. 79; and for its commercial
    prosperity, Polyb. iv. 38-47.

Therimachus, who chanced to be the Lacedaemonian governor at the time,
on hearing of the meditated attack of Thrasybulus, had taken a body
of marines from his vessels, and, aided by the citizens of Methymna
themselves, along with all the Mytileneian exiles to be found in that
place, advanced to meet the enemy on their borders. A battle was fought
and Therimachus was slain, a fate shared by several of the exiles of his
party.

As a result (29) of his victory the Athenian general succeeded in
winning the adhesion of some of the states; or, where adhesion
was refused, he could at least raise supplies for his soldiers by
freebooting expeditions, and so hastened to reach his goal, which was
the island of Rhodes. His chief concern was to support as powerful an
army as possible in those parts, and with this object he proceeded
to levy money aids, visiting various cities, until he finally reached
Aspendus, and came to moorings in the river Eurymedon. The money was
safely collected from the Aspendians, and the work completed, when,
taking occasion of some depredations (30) of the soldiers on the
farmsteads, the people of the place in a fit of irritation burst into
the general's quarters at night and butchered him in his tent.

 (29) According to some critics, B.C. 389 is only now reached.

 (30) See Diod. xiv. 94.

So perished Thrasybulus, (31) a good and great man by all admission. In
room of him the Athenians chose Agyrrhius, (32) who was despatched to
take command of the fleet. And now the Lacedaemonians--alive to the fact
that the sale of the Euxine tithe-dues had been negotiated in Byzantium
by Athens; aware also that as long as the Athenians kept hold on
Calchedon the loyalty of the other Hellespontine cities was secured to
them (at any rate while Pharnabazus remained their friend)--felt that
the state of affairs demanded their serious attention. They attached no
blame indeed to Dercylidas. Anaxibius, however, through the friendship
of the ephors, contrived to get himself appointed as governor, on a
mission to Abydos. With the requisite funds and ships, he promised to
exert such hostile pressure upon Athens that at least her prospects
in the Hellespont would cease to be so sunny. His friends the ephors
granted him in return for these promises three ships of war and funds
to support a thousand mercenaries, and so they despatched him on his
mission. Reaching Abydos, he set about improving his naval and military
position. First he collected a foreign brigade, by help of which he drew
off some of the Aeolid cities from Pharnabazus. Next he set on foot
a series of retaliatory expeditions against the states which attacked
Abydos, marching upon them and ravaging their territories; and lastly,
manning three vessels besides those which he already held in the harbour
of Abydos, he intercepted and brought into port all the merchant ships
of Athens or of her allies which he could lay hands on.

 (31) "Thus perished the citizen to whom, more than any one else,
    Athens owed not only her renovated democracy, but its wise,
    generous, and harmonious working, after renovation."--Grote, "H.
    G." ix. 509.

 (32) For this statesman, see Demosth. "c. Timocr." 742; Andoc. "de
    Myst." 133; Aristot. "Ath. Pol." 41, and Mr. Kenyon's notes ad
    loc.; Aristoph. "Eccles." 102, and the Schol. ad loc.; Diod. xiv.
    99; Curtius, "H. G." Eng tr. iv. 280.

Getting wind of these proceedings, the Athenians, fearing lest the fair
foundation laid for them by Thrasybulus in the Hellespont should be
ruined, sent out Iphicrates with eight vessels and twelve hundred
peltasts. The majority of them (33) consisted of troops which he had
commanded at Corinth. In explanation it may be stated that the Argives,
when once they had appropriated Corinth and incorporated it with Argos,
gave out they had no further need of Iphicrates and his troops; the real
fact being that he had put to death some of the partisans of Argos. (34)
And so it was he turned his back on Corinth and found himself at home in
Athens at the present crisis.

 (33) Or, "The mass of them."

 (34) See Grote, "H. G." ix. p. 491 note. The "Argolising" or philo-
    Argeian party, as opposed to the philo-Laconian party. See above,
    "Hell." IV. iv. 6.

B.C. 389-388. When Iphicrates first reached the Chersonese he and
Anaxibius carried on war against each other by the despatch of guerilla
or piratic bands across the straits. But as time wore on, information
reached him of the departure of Anaxibius to Antandrus, accompanied
by his mercenaries and his own bodyguard of Laconians and two hundred
Abydenian hoplites. Hearing further that Anaxibius had won the friendly
adhesion of Antandrus, Iphicrates conjectured that after establishing a
garrison in that place he would make the best of his way back, if only
to bring the Abydenians home again. He therefore crossed in the night,
selecting a desert point on the Abydene coast, from which he scaled
the hills above the town and planted himself in ambuscade within their
folds. The triremes which brought him across had orders at break of day
to coast up northwards along the Chersonese, which would suggest the
notion that he was only out on one of his customary voyages to collect
money. The sequel more than fulfilled his expectations. Anaxibius began
his return march, and if report speaks truly, he did so notwithstanding
that the victims were against his marching that day; contemptuously
disregarding the warning, and satisfied that his march lay all along
through a friendly country and was directed to a friendly city. Besides
which, those whom he met assured him that Iphicrates was off on a voyage
to Proconnesus: hence the unusual absence of precaution on the march.
On his side Iphicrates saw the chance, but, so long as the troops of
Anaxibius lingered on the level bottoms, refused to spring from his
lair, waiting for the moment when the Abydenian division in the van
was safely landed in the plain of Cremaste, at the point where the
gold mines stand; the main column following on the downward slope, and
Anaxibius with his Laconians just beginning the descent. At that instant
Iphicrates set his ambuscade in motion, and dashed against the Spartan
at full speed. The latter quickly discerned that there was no hope of
escape as he scanned the long straggling line of his attenuated column.
The troops in advance, he was persuaded, would never be able to come
back to his aid up the face of that acclivity; besides which, he
observed the utter bewilderment of the whole body at sight of the
ambuscade. He therefore turned to those next him, and spoke as follows:
"Sirs, it is good for me to die on this spot, where honour bids me; but
for you, sirs, yonder your path lies, haste and save yourselves (35)
before the enemy can close with us." As the words died on his lips he
took from the hands of his attendant shield-bearer his heavy shield, and
there, at his post, unflinchingly fought and fell; not quite alone,
for by his side faithfully lingered a favourite youth, and of the
Lacedaemonian governors who had rallied to Abydos from their several
cities yet other twelve fought and fell beside the pair. The rest fled,
dropping down one by one as the army pursued them to the walls of the
city. The death-roll amounted to something like fifty hoplites of the
Abydenians, and of the rest two hundred. After this exploit Iphicrates
returned to the Chersonese. (36)

 (35) Or, "sauve qui peut."

 (36) See Hicks, 76; and below, "Hell." V. i. 31.




BOOK V



I

B.C. 388. Such was the state of affairs in the Hellespont, so far at
least as Athens and Sparta are concerned. Eteonicus was once more in
Aegina; and notwithstanding that the Aeginetans and Athenians had up to
this time held commercial intercourse, yet now that the war was plainly
to be fought out on the sea, that officer, with the concurrence of the
ephorate, gave permission to any one who liked to plunder Attica. (1)
The Athenians retaliated by despatching a body of hoplites under their
general Pamphilus, who constructed a fort against the Aeginetans,
(2) and proceeded to blockade them by land and sea with ten warships.
Teleutias, however, while threading his way among the islands in
question of contributions, had chanced to reach a point where he
received information of the turn in affairs with regard to the
construction of the fortress, whereupon he came to the rescue of the
beleaguered Aeginetans, and so far succeeded that he drove off the
enemy's blockading squadron. But Pamphilus kept a firm hold on the
offensive fortress, and was not to be dislodged.

 (1) Or, "determined to let slip the hounds of war;" or, more
    prosaically, "issued letters of marque." See Grote, "H. G." ix.
    517.

 (2) I.e. in Aegina as an {epiteikhisma}.

After this the new admiral Hierax arrived from Lacedaemon. The naval
force was transferred into his successor's hands, and under the happiest
auspices Teleutias set sail for home. As he descended to the seashore
to start on his homeward voyage there was not one among his soldiers
who had not a warm shake of the hand for their old admiral. Here one
presented him with a crown, and there another with a victor's wreath;
and those who arrived too late, still, as the ship weighed anchor, threw
garlands into the sea and wafted him many a blessing with prayerful
lips. I am well aware that in the above incident I have no memorable
story of munificence, peril, or invention to narrate, but in all
sincerity I protest that a man may find food for reflection in the
inquiry what Teleutias had done to create such a disposition in his
subordinates. Here we are brought face to face with a true man's work
more worthy of account than multitudes of riches or adventure. (3)

 (3) See Grote, "H. G." ix. 518: "The ideal of government as it
    presented itself to Xenophon was the paternal despotism or
    something like it," {to ethelonton arkhein}. Cf. "Cyrop." passim,
    "Heiro," and his various other compositions.

The new admiral Hierax, taking with him the larger portion of the fleet,
set sail once more for Rhodes. He left behind him twelve vessels
in Aegina under his vice-admiral Gorgopas, who was now installed as
governor of that island. In consequence of this chance the Athenian
troops inside the fortres were more blockaded than the Aeginetans
themselves, so much so that a vote was passed by the Athenian assembly,
in obedience to which a large fleet was manned, and the garrison, after
four months' sojourn in Aegina, were brought back. But this was
no sooner done than they began to be harassed by Gorgopas and the
privateers again. To operate against these they fitted out thirteen
vessels, choosing Eunomus as admiral in command. Hierax was still in
Rhodes when the Lacedaemonians sent out a new admiral, Antalcidas; they
believed that they could not find a better mode of gratifying Tiribazus.
Accordingly Antalcidas, after visiting Aegina in order to pick up the
vessels under Gorgopas, set sail for Ephesus. At this point he sent back
Gorgopas with his twelve ships to Aegina, and appointed his vice-admiral
Nicolochus to command the remainder of the fleet.

Nicolochus was to relieve Abydos, and thither set sail; but in the
course of the voyage turned aside to Tenedos, where he ravaged the
territory, and, with the money so secured, sailed on to Abydos. The
Athenian generals (4) on their side, collecting from Samothrace, Thasos,
and the fortresses in that quarter, hastened to the relief of Tenedos;
but, finding that Nicolochus had continued his voyage to Abydos, they
selected the Chersonese as their base, and proceeded to blockade him
and his fleet of five-and-twenty vessels with the two-and-thirty vessels
under their joint command.

 (4) And among the rest Iphicrates and Diotimus. See below, S. 25;
    above, IV. viii. 39.

Meanwhile Gorgopas, returning from Ephesus, fell in with the Athenian
admiral Eunomus, and, shunning an encounter at the moment, sought
shelter in Aegina, which he reached a little before sunset; and at
once disembarking his men, set them down to their evening meal; whilst
Eunomus on his side, after hanging back for a little while, sailed away.
Night fell, and the Athenian, showing the customary signal light to
prevent his squadron straggling, led the way in the darkness. Gorgopas
instantly got his men on board again, and, taking the lantern for his
guide, followed the Athenians, craftily lagging behind a little space,
so as not to show himself or raise any suspicion of his presence. In
place of the usual cry the boatswains timed the rowers by a clink of
stones, and silently the oars slid, feathering through the waves (5);
and just when the squadron of Eunomus was touching the coast, off Cape
Zoster (6) in Attica, the Spartan sounded the bugle-note for the charge.
Some of Eunomus's vessels were in the act of discharging their crews,
others were still getting to their moorings, whilst others were as yet
only bearing down to land. The engagement was fought by the light of the
moon, and Gorgopas captured four triremes, which he tied astern, and so
set sail with his prizes in tow towards Aegina. The rest of the Athenian
squadron made their escape into the harbour of Piraeus.

 (5) Lit. "the boatswains employing a clink of stones and a sliding
    motion of the oars."

 (6) I.e. "Cape Girdle," mod. Cape Karvura. See Tozer, "Geog. of
    Greece," pp. 78, 372.

It was after these events that Chabrias (7) commenced his voyage to
Cyprus, bringing relief to Evagoras. His force consisted at first of
eight hundred light troops and ten triremes, but was further increased
by other vessels from Athens and a body of heavy infantry. Thus
reinforced, the admiral chose a night and landed in Aegina; and secreted
himself in ambuscade with his light troops in hollow ground some way
beyond the temple of Heracles. At break of day, as prearranged, the
Athenian hoplites made their appearance under command of Demaenetus, and
began mounting up between two and three miles (8) beyond the Kerakleion
at Tripurgia, as it is called. The news soon reached Gorgopas, who
sallied out to the rescue with the Aeginetans and the marines of his
vessels, being further accompanied by eight Spartans who happened to be
with him. Not content with these he issued orders inviting any of the
ships' crews, who were free men, to join the relief party. A large
number of these sailors responded. They armed themselves as best they
could, and the advance commenced. When the vanguard were well past the
ambuscade, Chabrias and his men sprang up from their hiding-place,
and poured a volley of javelins and stones upon the enemy. At the same
moment the hoplites, who had disembarked, (9) were advancing, so that
the Spartan vanguard, in the absence of anything like collective
action, were speedily cut down, and among them fell Gorgopas with the
Lacedaemonians. At their fall the rest of course turned and fled. One
hundred and fifty Aeginetans were numbered among the slain, while the
loss incurred by the foreigners, metics, and sailors who had joined the
relief party, reached a total of two hundred. After this the Athenians
sailed the sea as freely as in the times of actual peace. Nor would
anything induce the sailors to row a single stroke for Eteonicus--even
under pressure--since he had no pay to give.

 (7) According to Diod. xiv. 92, Chabrias had been for some time in
    Corinth. See also above, IV. viii. 24.

 (8) Lit. "about sixteen stades."

 (9) Or, reading {oi anabebekotes}, "who had scaled the height." See
    Hartman, "Anal. Xen." p. 364.

Subsequently the Lacedaemonians despatched Teleutias once again to take
command of the squadron, and when the sailors saw it was he who had
come, they were overjoyed. He summoned a meeting and addressed them
thus: "Soldiers, I am back again, but I bring with me no money. Yet if
God be willing, and your zeal flag not, I will endeavour to supply
you with provisions without stint. Be well assured, as often as I find
myself in command of you, I have but one prayer--that your lives may
be spared no less than mine; and as for the necessaries of existence,
perhaps it would astonish you if I said I would rather you should
have them than I. Yet by the gods I swear I would welcome two days'
starvation in order to spare you one. Was not my door open in old days
to every comer? Open again it shall stand now; and so it shall be; where
your own board overflows, you shall look in and mark the luxury of your
general; but if at other times you see him bearing up against cold and
heat and sleepless nights, you must apply the lesson to yourselves
and study to endure those evils. I do not bid you do aught of this for
self-mortification's sake, but that you may derive some after-blessing
from it. Soldiers, let Lacedaemon, our own mother-city, be to you an
example. Her good fortune is reputed to stand high. That you know; and
you know too, that she purchased her glory and her greatness not by
faint-heartedness, but by choosing to suffer pain and incur dangers in
the day of need. 'Like city,' I say, 'like citizens.' You, too, as I
can bear you witness, have been in times past brave; but to-day must we
strive to be better than ourselves. So shall we share our pains without
repining, and when fortune smiles, mingle our joys; for indeed the
sweetest thing of all surely is to flatter no man, Hellene or Barbarian,
for the sake of hire; we will suffice to ourselves, and from a source
to which honour pre-eminently invites us; since, I need not remind you,
abundance won from the enemy in war furnishes forth not bodily nutrition
only, but a feast of glory the wide world over."

So he spoke, and with one voice they all shouted to him to issue what
orders he thought fit; they would not fail him in willing service. The
general's sacrifice was just concluded, and he answered: "Good, then, my
men; go now, as doubtless you were minded, and take your evening meal,
and next provide yourselves, please, with one day's food. After that
repair to your ships without delay, for we have a voyage on hand,
whither God wills, and must arrive in time." So then, when the men
returned, he embarked them on their ships, and sailed under cover of
night for the great harbour of Piraeus: at one time he gave the rowers
rest, passing the order to take a snatch of sleep; at another he pushed
forward towards his goal with rise and fall of oars. If any one supposes
that there was a touch of madness in such an expedition--with but
twelve triremes to attack an enemy possessed of a large fleet--he should
consider the calculations of Teleutias. He was under the firm persuasion
that the Athenians were more careless than ever about their navy in the
harbour since the death of Gorgopas; and in case of finding warships
riding at anchor--even so, there was less danger, he conjectured, in
attacking twenty ships in the port of Athens than ten elsewhere; for,
whereas, anywhere outside the harbour the sailors would certainly be
quartered on board, at Athens it was easy to divine that the captains
and officers would be sleeping at their homes, and the crews located
here and there in different quarters.

This minded he set sail, and when he was five or six furlongs (10)
distant from the harbour he lay on his oars and rested. But with the
first streak of dawn he led the way, the rest following. The admiral's
orders to the crews were explicit. They were on no account to sink any
merchant vessel; they were equally to avoid damaging (11) their own
vessels, but if at any point they espied a warship at her moorings they
must try and cripple her. The trading vessels, provided they had got
their cargoes on board, they must seize and tow out of the harbour;
those of larger tonnage they were to board wherever they could and
capture the crews. Some of his men actually jumped on to the Deigma
quay, (12) where they seized hold of various traders and pilots and
deposited them bodily on board ship. So the Spartan admiral carried out
his programme.

 (10) Lit. "five or six stades."

 (11) See Hartman, "Anal. Xen." pp. 365, 366.

 (12) See Grote ("H. G." ix. 523): cf. Thuc. ii. 94, the attempt of
    Brasidas on the port of Megara. For the wealth of Piraeus, Grote
    "H. G." ix. 351. See below, "Pol. Ath." i. 17; "Rev." iii. 13.

As to the Athenians, meanwhile, some of them who got wind of what was
happening rushed from indoors outside to see what the commotion meant,
others from the streets home to get their arms, and others again were
off to the city with the news. The whole of Athens rallied to the rescue
at that instant, heavy infantry and cavalry alike, the apprehension
being that Piraeus was taken. But the Spartan sent off the captured
vessels to Aegina, telling off three or four of his triremes to convoy
them thither; with the rest he followed along the coast of Attica, and
emerging in seemingly innocent fashion from the harbour, captured
a number of fishing smacks, and passage boats laden with passengers
crossing to Piraeus from the islands; and finally, on reaching Sunium
he captured some merchantmen laden with corn or other merchandise. After
these performances he sailed back to Aegina, where he sold his prizes,
and with the proceeds was able to provide his troops with a month's
pay, and for the future was free to cruise about and make what reprisals
chance cast in his way. By such a procedure he was able to support a
full quota of mariners on board his squadron, and procured to himself
the prompt and enthusiastic service of his troops.

B.C. 388-387. Antalcidas had now returned from the Persian court with
Tiribazus. The negotiations had been successful. He had secured the
alliance of the Persian king and his military co-operation in case the
Athenians and their allies refused to abide by the peace which the king
dictated. But learning that his second in command, Nicolochus, was being
blockaded with his fleet by Iphicrates and Diotimus (13) in Abydos, he
set off at once by land for that city. Being come thither he took the
fleet one night and put out to sea, having first spread a story that he
had invitations from a party in Calchedon; but as a matter of fact
he came to anchorage in Percote and there kept quiet. Meanwhile the
Athenian forces under Demaenetus and Dionysius and Leontichus and
Phanias had got wind of his movement, and were in hot pursuit towards
Proconnesus. As soon as they were well past, the Spartan veered round
and returned to Abydos, trusting to information brought him of the
approach of Polyxenus with the Syracusan (14) and Italian squadron of
twenty ships, which he wished to pick up and incorporate with his own.

 (13) See above; Lysias, "de bon. Arist." (Jebb, "Att. Or." i. p. 327).

 (14) See below, VI. ii. 4 foll; Hicks, 71, 84, 88.

A little later the Athenian Thrasybulus (15) (of Collytus) was making
his way up with eight ships from Thrace, his object being to effect
a junction with the main Athenian squadron. The scouts signalled the
approach of eight triremes, whereupon Antalcidas, embarking his marines
on board twelve of the fastest sailers of his fleet, ordered them to
make up their full complements, where defective, from the remaining
vessels; and so lay to, skulking in his lair with all possible secrecy.
As soon as the enemy's vessels came sailing past he gave chase; and
they catching sight of him took to flight. With his swiftest sailors
he speedily overhauled their laggards, and ordering his vanguard to let
these alone, he followed hard on those ahead. But when the foremost
had fallen into his clutches, the enemy's hinder vessels, seeing their
leaders taken one by one, out of sheer despondency fell an easy prey
to the slower sailers of the foe, so that not one of the eight vessels
escaped.

 (15) His name occurs on the famous stele of the new Athenian
    confederacy, B.C. 378. See Hicks, 81; Kohler, "C. I. A." ii. 17;
    Demos. "de. Cor." p. 301; Arist. "Rhet." ii. 23; Demos. "c.
    Timocr." 742.

Presently the Syracusan squadron of twenty vessels joined him, and again
another squadron from Ionia, or rather so much of that district as lay
under the control of Tiribazus. The full quota of the contingent
was further made up from the territory of Ariobarzanes (which whom
Antalcidas kept up a friendship of long standing), in the absence of
Pharnabazus, who by this date had already been summoned up country on
the occasion of his marriage with the king's daughter. With this fleet,
which, from whatever sources derived, amounted to more than eighty sail,
Antalcidas ruled the seas, and was in a position not only to cut off the
passage of vessels bound to Athens from the Euxine, but to convoy them
into the harbours of Sparta's allies.

The Athenians could not but watch with alarm the growth of the enemy's
fleet, and began to fear a repetition of their former discomfiture.
To be trampled under foot by the hostile power seemed indeed no remote
possibility, now that the Lacedaemonians had procured an ally in the
person of the Persian monarch, and they were in little less than a state
of siege themselves, pestered as they were by privateers from Aegina. On
all these grounds the Athenians became passionately desirous of peace.
(16) The Lacedaemonians were equally out of humour with the war for
various reasons--what with their garrison duties, one mora at Lechaeum
and another at Orchomenus, and the necessity of keeping watch and ward
on the states, if loyal not to lose them, if disaffected to prevent
their revolt; not to mention that reciprocity of annoyance (17) of which
Corinth was the centre. So again the Argives had a strong appetite for
peace; they knew that the ban had been called out against them, and,
it was plain, that no fictitious alteration of the calendar would any
longer stand them in good stead. Hence, when Tiribazus issued a summons
calling on all who were willing to listen to the terms of peace sent
down by the king (18) to present themselves, the invitation was promptly
accepted. At the opening of the conclave (19) Tiribazus pointed to
the king's seal attached to the document, and proceeded to read the
contents, which ran as follows:

 (16) See, at this point, Grote on the financial condition of Athens
    and the "Theorikon," "H. G." ix. 525.

 (17) Or, "that give-and-take of hard knocks."

 (18) See Hicks, 76.

 (19) At Sardis, doubtless.

"The king, Artaxerxes, deems it just that the cities in Asia, with the
islands of Clazomenae and Cyprus, should belong to himself; the rest of
the Hellenic cities he thinks it just to leave independent, both small
and great, with the exception of Lemnos, Imbros, and Scyros, which three
are to belong to Athens as of yore. Should any of the parties concerned
not accept this peace, I, Artaxerxes, will war against him or them with
those who share my views. This will I do by land and by sea, with ships
and with money."

After listening to the above declaration the ambassadors from the
several states proceeded to report the same to their respective
governments. One and all of these took the oaths (20) to ratify and
confirm the terms unreservedly, with the exception of the Thebans,
who claimed to take the oaths in behalf of all Boeotians. This claim
Agesilaus repudiated: unless they chose to take the oaths in precise
conformity with the words of the king's edict, which insisted on "the
future autonomy of each state, small or great," he would not admit them.
To this the Theban ambassadors made no other reply, except that
the instructions they had received were different. "Pray go, then,"
Agesilaus retorted, "and ask the question; and you may inform your
countrymen that if they will not comply, they will be excluded from the
treaty." The Theban ambassadors departed, but Agesilaus, out of hatred
to the Thebans, took active measures at once. Having got the consent of
the ephors he forthwith offered sacrifice. The offerings for crossing
the frontier were propitious, and he pushed on to Tegea. From Tegea he
despatched some of the knights right and left to visit the perioeci
and hasten their mobilisation, and at the same time sent commanders of
foreign brigades to the allied cities on a similar errand. But before
he had started from Tegea the answer from Thebes arrived; the point was
yielded, they would suffer the states to be independent. Under these
circumstances the Lacedaemonians returned home, and the Thebans were
forced to accept the truce unconditionally, and to recognise the
autonomy of the Boeotian cities. (21) But now the Corinthians were by
no means disposed to part with the garrison of the Argives. Accordingly
Agesilaus had a word of warning for both. To the former he said, "if
they did not forthwith dismiss the Argives," and to the latter, "if
they did not instantly quit Corinth," he would march an army into their
territories. The terror of both was so great that the Argives marched
out of Corinth, and Corinth was once again left to herself; (22)
whereupon the "butchers" (23) and their accomplices in the deed of blood
determined to retire from Corinth, and the rest of the citizens welcomed
back their late exiles voluntarily.

 (20) At Sparta, doubtless.

 (21) See Freeman, op. cit. pp. 168, 169.

 (22) See "Ages." ii. 21; Grote, "H. G." ix. 537.

 (23) {oi sphageis}, a party catchword (in reference to the incidents
    narrated above, "Hell." IV. iv. 2). See below, {ton bareon
    demagogon}, "Hell." V. ii. 7; {oi kedomenoi tes Peloponnesou},
    "Hell." VII. v. 1; above, {oi sphageis}, "Hell." III. ii. 27, of
    the philo-Laconian oligarchs in Elis. See Dem. "c. Lept." 473.

Now that the transactions were complete, and the states were bound by
their oaths to abide by the peace sent down to them by the king, the
immediate result was a general disarmament, military and naval forces
being alike disbanded; and so it was that the Lacedaemonians and
Athenians, with their allies, found themselves in the enjoyment of peace
for the first time since the period of hostilities subsequent to the
demolition of the walls of Athens. From a condition which, during
the war, can only be described as a sort of even balance with their
antagonists, the Lacedaemonians now emerged; and reached a pinnacle
of glory consequent upon the Peace of Antalcidas, (24) so called.
As guarantors of the peace presented by Hellas to the king, and as
administrators personally of the autonomy of the states, they had added
Corinth to their alliance; they had obtained the independence of
the states of Boeotia at the expense of Thebes, (25) which meant the
gratification of an old ambition; and lastly, by calling out the ban in
case the Argives refused to evacuate Corinth, they had put a stop to the
appropriation of that city by the Argives.

 (24) Or, more correctly, the peace "under," or "at the date of," {ep
    'Antalkidou}. See Grote, "H. G." x. 1, note 1.

 (25) Or, "they had made the states of Boeotia independent of Thebes."
    See Grote, "H. G." x. 44.



II

B.C. 386. Indeed the late events had so entirely shaped themselves in
conformity with the wishes of the Lacedaemonians, that they determined
to go a step farther and chastise those of their allies who either had
borne hard on them during the war, or otherwise had shown themselves
less favourable to Lacedaemon than to her enemies. (1) Chastisement was
not all; they must lay down such secure foundations for the future as
should render the like disloyalty impossible again. (2) As the first
step towards this policy they sent a dictatorial message to the
Mantinaeans, and bade them raze their fortifications, on the sole ground
that they could not otherwise trust them not to side with their enemies.
Many things in their conduct, they alleged, from time to time, had not
escaped their notice: their frequent despatches of corn to the Argives
while at war with Lacedaemon; at other times their refusal to furnish
contingents during a campaign, on the pretext of some holy truce or
other; (3) or if they did reluctantly take the field--the miserable
inefficiency of their service. "But, more than that," they added, "we
note the jealousy with which you eye any good fortune which may betide
our state; the extravagant pleasure (4) you exhibit at the sudden
descent of some disaster."

 (1) See Hartman, "An. Xen." p. 367 foll.; Busolt, "Die Lak." p. 129
    foll.

 (2) Or, "they determined to chastise... and reduce to such order
    that disloyalty should be impossible."

 (3) See above, "Hell." IV. ii. 16.

 (4) Ib. IV. v. 18.

This very year, moreover, it was commonly said, (5) saw the expiration,
as far as the Mantineans were concerned, of the thirty years' truce,
consequent upon the battle of Mantinea. On their refusal, therefore,
to raze their fortification walls the ban was called out against them.
Agesilaus begged the state to absolve him from the conduct of this war
on the plea that the city of Mantinea had done frequent service to
his father (6) in his Messenian wars. Accordingly Agesipolis led the
expedition--in spite of the cordial relations of his father Pausanias
(7) with the leaders of the popular party in Mantinea.

 (5) As to this point, see Curtius, "H. G." V. v. (iv. 305 note, Eng.
    trans.) There appears to be some confusion. According to Thuc. v.
    81, "When the Argives deserted the alliance  (with Mantinea,
    Athens, and Elis, making a new treaty of alliance with Lacedaemon
    for fifty years) the Mantineans held out for a time, but without
    the Argives they were helpless, and so they came to terms with the
    Lacedaemonians, and gave up their claims to supremacy over the
    cities in Arcadia, which had been subject to them.... These
    changes were effected at the close of winter  (418 B.C.) towards
    the approach of spring  (417 B.C.), and so ended the fourteenth
    year of the war." Jowett. According to Diod. xv. 5, the
    Lacedaemonians attacked Mantinea within two years after the Peace
    of Antalcidas, apparently in 386 B.C. According to Thuc. v. 82,
    and "C. I. A. 50, in B.C. 417 Argos had reverted to her alliance
    with Athens, and an attempt to connect the city with the sea by
    long walls was made, certain other states in Peloponnese being
    privy to the project" (Thuc. v. 83)--an attempt frustrated by
    Lacedaemon early in B.C. 416. Is it possible that a treaty of
    alliance between Mantinea and Lacedaemon for thirty years was
    formally signed in B.C. 416?

 (6) I.e. Archidamus.

 (7) See above, "Hell." III. v. 25.

B.C. 385. The first move of the invader was to subject the enemy's
territory to devastation; but failing by such means to induce them to
raze their walls, he proceeded to draw lines of circumvallation round
the city, keeping half his troops under arms to screen the entrenching
parties whilst the other half pushed on the work with the spade. As soon
as the trench was completed, he experienced no further difficulty in
building a wall round the city. Aware, however, of the existence of a
huge supply of corn inside the town, the result of the bountiful harvest
of the preceding year, and averse to the notion of wearing out the city
of Lacedaemon and her allies by tedious campaigning, he hit upon the
expedient of damming up the river which flowed through the town.

It was a stream of no inconsiderable size. (8) By erecting a barrier at
its exit from the town he caused the water to rise above the basements
of the private dwellings and the foundations of the fortification walls.
Then, as the lower layers of bricks became saturated and refused their
support to the rows above, the wall began to crack and soon to totter
to its fall. The citizens for some time tried to prop it with pieces
of timber, and used other devices to avert the imminent ruin of their
tower; but finding themselves overmatched by the water, and in dread
lest the fall at some point or other of the circular wall (9) might
deliver them captive to the spear of the enemy, they signified their
consent to raze their walls. But the Lacedaemonians now steadily refused
any form of truce, except on the further condition that the Mantineans
would suffer themselves to be broken up and distributed into villages.
They, looking the necessity in the face, consented to do even that. The
sympathisers with Argos among them, and the leaders of their democracy,
thought their fate was sealed. Then the father treated with the son,
Pausanias with Agesipolis, on their behalf, and obtained immunity for
them--sixty in number--on condition that they should quit the city. The
Lacedaemonian troops stood lining the road on both sides, beginning
from the gates, and watched the outgoers; and with their spears in
their hands, in spite of bitter hatred, kept aloof from them with less
difficulty than the Mantineans of the better classes themselves--a
weighty testimony to the power of Spartan discipline, be it said. In
conclusion, the wall was razed, and Mantinea split up into four parts,
(10) assuming once again its primitive condition as regards inhabitants.
The first feeling was one of annoyance at the necessity of pulling down
their present houses and erecting others, yet when the owners (11)
found themselves located so much nearer their estates round about the
villages, in the full enjoyment of aristocracy, and rid for ever of
"those troublesome demagogues," they were delighted with the turn which
affairs had taken. It became the custom for Sparta to send them, not one
commander of contingents, (12) but four, one for each village; and the
zeal displayed, now that the quotas for military service were furnished
from the several village centres, was far greater than it had been under
the democratic system. So the transactions in connection with Mantinea
were brought to a conclusion, and thereby one lesson of wisdom was
taught mankind--not to conduct a river through a fortress town.

 (8) I.e. the Ophis. See Leake, "Morea," III. xxiv. p. 71; Pausan.
    "Arcad." 8; Grote, "H. G." x. 48, note 2.

 (9) Or, "in the circuit of the wall."

 (10) See Diod. xv. 5; Strab. viii. 337; Ephor. fr. 138, ed. Did.; and
    Grote, "H. G." x. 51.

 (11) Or, "holders of properties." The historian is referring not to
    the population at large, I think, but to the rich landowners, i.e.
    the {Beltistoi}, and is not so partial as Grote supposes ("H. G."
    x. 51 foll.)

 (12) Technically {zenagoi}, Lacedaemonian officers who commanded the
    contingents of the several allies. See above, "Hell." III. v. 7;
    Thuc. ii. 76; and Arnold's note ad loc.; also C. R. Kennedy, "ap.
    Dict. of Greek and Roman Antiquities," s.v.; Muller, "Dorians,"
    ii. 250, Eng. tr.; Busolt, "Die Lak." p. 125.

B.C. 384-383. To pass on. The party in exile from Phlius, seeing the
severe scrutiny to which the behaviour of the allies of Lacedaemon
during the late war was being subjected, felt that their opportunity had
come. They repaired to Lacedaemon, and laid great emphasis on the fact
that, so long as they had been in power themselves at home, "their
city used to welcome Lacedaemonians within her walls, and her citizens
flocked to the campaign under their leadership; but no sooner had they
been driven into exile than a change had come. The men of Phlius now
flatly refused to follow Lacedaemon anywhere; the Lacedaemonians, alone
of all men living, must not be admitted within their gates." After
listening to their story, the ephors agreed that the matter demanded
attention. Then they sent to the state of Phlius a message to this
effect; the Phliasian exiles were friends of Lacedaemon; nor did
it appear that they owed their exile to any misdoing. Under the
circumstances, Lacedaemon claimed their recall from banishment, not by
force, but as a concession voluntarily granted. When the matter was thus
stated, the Phliasians were not without alarm that an army might march
upon Phlius, and a party inside the town might admit the enemy within
the walls; for within the walls of Phlius were to be found many who,
either as blood relations or for other reasons, were partisans of the
exiles, and as so often happens, at any rate in the majority of states,
there was a revolutionary party who, in their ardour to reform, would
welcome gladly their restoration. Owing to fears of this character, a
formal decree was passed: to welcome home the exiles, and to restore
to them all undisputed property, the purchasers of the same being
indemnified from the treasury of the state; and in the event of any
ambiguity or question arising between the parties, the same to be
determined before a court of justice. Such was the position of affairs
in connection with the Phliasian exiles at the date in question.

B.C. 383. (13) And now from yet another quarter ambassadors arrived at
Lacedaemon: that is to say, from Acanthus and Apollonia, the two largest
and most important states of the Olynthian confederacy. The ephorate,
after learning from them the object of their visit, presented them to
the assembly and the allies, in presence of whom Cleigenes of Acanthus
made a speech to this effect:

 (13) Al. B.C. 382.

"Men of Lacedaemon and of the allied states," he said, "are you aware of
a silent but portentous growth within the bosom of Hellas? (14) Few here
need to be told that for size and importance Olynthus now stands at
the head of the Thracian cities. But are you aware that the citizens of
Olynthus had already brought over several states by the bribe of joint
citizenship and common laws; that they have forcibly annexed some of the
larger states; and that, so encouraged, they have taken in hand
further to free the cities of Macedonia from Amyntas the king of the
Macedonians; that, as soon as their immediate neighbours had shown
compliance, they at once proceeded to attack larger and more distant
communities; so much so, that when we started to come hither, we left
them masters not only of many other places, but of Pella itself, the
capital of Macedonia. Amyntas, (15) we saw plainly, must ere long
withdraw from his cities, and was in fact already all but in name an
outcast from Macedonia.

 (14) Or, "are you aware of a new power growing up in Hellas?"

 (15) For Amyntas's reign, see Diod. xiv. 89, 92; xv. 19; Isocr.
    "Panegyr." 126, "Archid." 46.

"The Olynthians have actually sent to ourselves and to the men of
Apollonia a joint embassy, warning us of their intention to attack us if
we refuse to present ourselves at Olynthus with a military contingent.
Now, for our parts, men of Lacedaemon, we desire nothing better than to
abide by our ancestral laws and institutions, to be free and independent
citizens; but if aid from without is going to fail us, we too must
follow the rest and coalesce with the Olynthians. Why, even now they
muster no less than eight hundred (16) heavy infantry and a considerably
larger body of light infantry, while their cavalry, when we have joined
them, will exceed one thousand men. At the date of our departure we left
embassies from Athens and Boeotia in Olynthus, and we were told that
the Olynthians themselves had passed a formal resolution to return the
compliment. They were to send an embassy on their side to the aforesaid
states to treat of an alliance. And yet, if the power of the Athenians
and the Thebans is to be further increased by such an accession of
strength, look to it," the speaker added, "whether hereafter you will
find things so easy to manage in that quarter.

 (16) See Grote, "H. G." x. 72; Thirlwall, "H. G." v. 12 (ch. xxxvii).

"They hold Potidaea, the key to the isthmus of Pallene, and therefore,
you can well believe, they can command the states within that peninsula.
If you want any further proof of the abject terror of those states, you
have it in the fact that notwithstanding the bitter hatred which they
bear to Olynthus, not one of them has dared to send ambassadors along
with us to apprise you of these matters.

"Reflect, how you can reconcile your anxiety to prevent the unification
of Boeotia with your neglect to hinder the solidifying of a far larger
power--a power destined, moreover, to become formidable not on land
only, but by sea? For what is to stop it, when the soil itself supplies
timber for shipbuilding, (17) and there are rich revenues derived
from numerous harbours and commercial centres?--it cannot but be that
abundance of food and abundance of population will go hand in hand. Nor
have we yet reached the limits of Olynthian expansion; there are their
neighbours to be thought of--the kingless or independent Thracians.
These are already to-day the devoted servants of Olynthus, and when it
comes to their being actually under her, that means at once another vast
accession of strength to her. With the Thracians in her train, the gold
mines of Pangaeus would stretch out to her the hand of welcome.

 (17) See Hicks, 74, for a treaty between Amyntas and the Chalcidians,
    B.C. 390-389: "The article of the treaty between Amyntas III.,
    father of Philip, and the Chalcidians, about timber, etc., reminds
    us that South Macedonia, the Chalcidic peninsula, and Amphipolis
    were the chief sources whence Athens derived timber for her
    dockyards." Thuc. iv. 108; Diod. xx. 46; Boeckh, "P. E. A." p.
    250; and for a treaty between Athens and Amyntas, B.C. 382, see
    Hicks, 77; Kohler, "C. I. A." ii. 397, 423.

"In making these assertions, we are but uttering remarks ten thousand
times repeated in the democracy of Olynthus. And as to their confident
spirit, who shall attempt to describe it? It is God, for aught I know,
who, with the growth of a new capacity, gives increase also to the proud
thoughts and vast designs of humanity. For ourselves, men of Lacedaemon
and of the allied states, our task is completed. We have played our
parts in announcing to you how things stand there. To you it is left to
determine whether what we have described is worthy of your concern. One
only thing further you ought to recognise: the power we have spoken
of as great is not as yet invincible, for those states which are
involuntary participants in the citizenship of Olynthus will, in
prospect of any rival power appearing in the field, speedily fall away.
On the contrary, let them be once closely knit and welded together
by the privileges of intermarriage and reciprocal rights of holding
property in land--which have already become enactments; let them
discover that it is a gain to them to follow in the wake of conquerors
(just as the Arcadians, (18) for instance, find it profitable to march
in your ranks, whereby they save their own property and pillage their
neighbours'); let these things come to pass, and perhaps you may find
the knot no longer so easy to unloose."

 (18) For the point of the comparison, see Freeman, "Hist. Fed. Gov."
    ch. iv. "Real nature of the Olynthian scheme," pp. 190 foll., and
    note 2, p. 197; also Grote, "H. G." x. 67 foll., 278 foll.

At the conclusion of this address, the Lacedaemonians requested the
allies to speak, bidding them give their joint advice as to the best
course to be pursued in the interests of Peloponnese and the allies.
Thereupon many members, and especially those who wished to gratify
the Lacedaemonians, agreed in counselling active measures; and it was
resolved that the states should severally send contingents to form a
total of ten thousand men. Proposals were also made to allow any state,
so wishing, to give money instead of men, at the rate of three Aeginetan
obols (19) a day per man; or where the contingent consisted of cavalry,
the pay given for one horseman was to be the equivalent to that of
four hoplites; while, in the event of any defaulting in service, the
Lacedaemonians should be allowed to mulct the said state of a stater
per man per diem. These resolutions were passed, and the deputies
from Acanthus rose again. They argued that, though excellent, these
resolutions were not of a nature to be rapidly carried into effect.
Would it not be better, they asked, pending the mobilisation of the
troops, to despatch an officer at once in command of a force from
Lacedaemon and the other states, not too large to start immediately. The
effect would be instantaneous, for the states which had not yet given in
their adhesion to Olynthus would be brought to a standstill, and those
already forcibly enrolled would be shaken in their alliance. These
further resolutions being also passed, the Lacedaemonians despatched
Eudamidas, accompanied by a body of neodamodes, with perioeci and
Sciritae, (20) to the number of two thousand odd. Eudamidas lost no time
in setting out, having obtained leave from the ephors for his brother
Phoebidas to follow later with the remainder of the troops assigned
to him. Pushing on himself to the Thracian territory, he set about
despatching garrisons to various cities at their request. He also
secured the voluntary adhesion of Potidaea, although already a member
of the Olynthian alliance; and this town now served as his base of
operations for carrying on war on a scale adapted to his somewhat
limited armament.

 (19) I.e. "rather more than sixpence a day for a hoplite, and two
    shillings for a horseman." "The Aeginetan stater weighed about 196
    grains, rather more than two of our shillings, and was divided
    into two drachms of 98 grains, each of which contained six obols
    of about 16 grains each." See Percy Gardner, "Types of Greek
    Coins," "Hist. Int." p. 8; Jowett, note to Thuc. III. lxx. 4, vol.
    i. pp. 201, 202.

 (20) Or, "new citizens, provincials, and Sciritae."

Phoebidas, when the remaining portion of his brother's forces was duly
mustered, put himself at their head and commenced his march. On reaching
Thebes the troops encamped outside the city, round the gymnasium.
Faction was rife within the city. The two polemarchs in office, Ismenias
and Leontiades, were diametrically opposed, (21) being the respective
heads of antagonistic political clubs. Hence it was that, while
Ismenias, ever inspired by hatred to the Lacedaemonians, would not come
anywhere near the Spartan general, Leontiades, on the other hand,
was assiduous in courting him; and when a sufficient intimacy was
established between them, he made a proposal as follows: "You have it
in your power," he said, addressing Phoebidas, "this very day to confer
supreme benefit on your country. Follow me with your hoplites, and I
will introduce you into the citadel. That done, you may rest assured
Thebes will be completely under the thumb of Lacedaemon and of us, your
friends. At present, as you see, there is a proclamation forbidding any
Theban to take service with you against Olynthus, but we will change all
that. You have only to act with us as we suggest, and we shall at once
be able to furnish you with large supplies of infantry and cavalry, so
that you will join your brother with a magnificent reinforcement, and
pending his proposed reduction of Olynthus, you will have accomplished
the reduction of a far larger state than that--to wit, this city of
Thebes."

 (21) See Grote, "H. G." vol. x. p. 80: "We have little or no
    information respecting the government of Thebes," etc. The "locus
    classicus" seems to be Plut. "de Genio Socratis." See Freeman, op.
    cit. ch. iv. S. 2, "Of the Boeotian League," pp. 154-184; and, in
    reference to the seizure of the Kadmeia, p. 170.

The imagination of Phoebidas was kindled as he listened to the tempting
proposal. To do a brilliant deed was far dearer to him than life; (22)
on the other hand, he had no reasoning capacity, and would seem to have
been deficient altogether in sound sense. The consent of the Spartan
secured, Leontiades bade him set his troops in motion, as if everything
were ready for his departure. "And anon, when the hour is come," added
the Theban, "I will be with you, and show you the way myself."

 (22) Or, "Renown was his mistress." See Grote, "H. G." x. 84.

The senate was seated in the arcade or stoa in the market-place, since
the Cadmeia was in possession of the women who were celebrating the
Thesmophoria. (23) It was noon of a hot summer's day; scarcely a soul
was stirring in the streets. This was the moment for Leontiades. He
mounted on horseback and galloped off to overtake Phoebidas. He turned
him back, and led him without further delay into the acropolis. Having
posted Phoebidas and his soldiers inside, he handed him the key of the
gates, and warning him not to suffer any one to enter into the citadel
without a pass from himself, he straightway betook himself to
the senate. Arrived there, he delivered himself thus: "Sirs, the
Lacedaemonians are in possession of the citadel; but that is no
cause for despondency, since, as they assure us, they have no hostile
intention, except, indeed, towards any one who has an appetite for
war. For myself, and acting in obedience to the law, which empowers the
polemarch to apprehend all persons suspected of capital crimes, I hereby
seize the person of Ismenias as an arch-fomenter of war. I call upon
you, sirs, who are captains of companies, and you who are ranked with
them, to do your duty. Arise and secure the prisoner, and lead him away
to the place appointed."

 (23) An ancient festival held by women in honour of Demeter and
    Persephone ({to Thesmophoro}), who gave the first impulse to civil
    society, lawful marriage, etc. See Herod. ii. 171; Diod. v. 5.

Those who were privy to the affair, it will be understood, presented
themselves, and the orders were promptly carried out. Of those not in
the secret, but opposed to the party of Leontiades, some sought refuge
at once outside the city in terror for their lives; whilst the rest,
albeit they retired to their houses at first, yet when they found
that Ismenias was imprisoned in the Cadmeia, and further delay seemed
dangerous, retreated to Athens. These were the men who shared the views
of Androcleidas and Ismenias, and they must have numbered about three
hundred.

Now that the transactions were concluded, another polemarch was chosen
in place of Ismenias, and Leontiades at once set out to Lacedaemon.
There he found the ephors and the mass of the community highly incensed
against Phoebidas, "who had failed to execute the orders assigned to
him by the state." Against this general indignation, however, Agesilaus
protested. (24) If mischief had been wrought to Lacedaemon by this deed,
it was just that the doer of it should be punished; but, if good, it was
a time-honoured custom to allow full scope for impromptu acts of this
character. "The sole point you have to look to," he urged, "is whether
what has been done is good or evil." After this, however, Leontiades
presented himself to the assembly (25) and addressed the members as
follows: "Sirs, Lacedaemonians, the hostile attitude of Thebes towards
you, before the occurrence of late events, was a topic constantly on
your lips, since time upon time your eyes were called upon to witness
her friendly bearing to your foes in contrast with her hatred of your
friends. Can it be denied that Thebes refused to take part with you in
the campaign against your direst enemy, the democracy in Piraeus; and
balanced that lukewarmness by on onslaught on the Phocians, whose
sole crime was cordiality to yourselves? (26) Nor is that all. In full
knowledge that you were likely to be engaged in war with Olynthus, she
proceeded at once to make an alliance with that city. So that up to the
last moment you were in constant expectation of hearing that the whole
of Boeotia was laid at the feet of Thebes. With the late incidents all
is changed. You need fear Thebes no longer. One brief despatch (27) in
cipher will suffice to procure a dutiful subservience to your every wish
in that quarter, provided only you will take as kindly an interest in us
as we in you."

 (24) See "Ages." vii.

 (25) "Select Committee." See "Hell." II. iv. 38; and below, VI. iii.
    3.

 (26) See above, "Hell." III. v. 4.

 (27) Lit. "scytale."

This appeal told upon the meeting, and the Lacedaemonians (28) resolved
formally, now that the citadel had been taken, to keep it, and to put
Ismenias on his trial. In consequence of this resolution a body of
commissioners (29) was despatched, three Lacedaemonians and one for each
of the allied states, great and small alike. The court of inquiry thus
constituted, the sittings commenced, and an indictment was preferred
against Ismenias. He was accused of playing into the hands of the
barbarian; of seeking amity with the Persians to the detriment of
Hellas; of accepting sums of money as bribes from the king; and,
finally, of being, along with Androcleidas, the prime cause of the whole
intestine trouble to which Hellas was a prey. Each of these charges was
met by the defendant, but to no purpose, since he failed to disabuse
the court of their conviction that the grandeur of his designs was only
equalled by their wickedness. (30) The verdict was given against him,
and he was put to death. The party of Leontiades thus possessed
the city; and went beyond the injunctions given them in the eager
performance of their services.

 (28) See Grote, "H. G." vol. x. p. 85; Diod. xv. 20; Plut. "Pelop."
    vi.; ib. "de Genio Socratis," V. vii. 6 A; Cor. Nep. "Pelop." 1.

 (29) Lit. "Dicasts."

 (30) Or, "that he was a magnificent malefactor." See Grote, "H. G."
    vol. ix. p. 420, "the great wicked man" (Clarendon's epithets for
    Cromwell); Plato, "Meno." 90 B; "Republic," 336 A, "a rich and
    mighty man." See also Plut. "Ages." xxxii. 2, Agesilaus's
    exclamation at sight of Epaminondas, {o tou megalopragmonos
    anthropou}.

B.C. 382. As a result of these transactions the Lacedaemonians pressed
on the combined campaign against Olynthus with still greater enthusiasm.
They not only set out Teleutias as governor, but by their united efforts
furnished him with an aggregate army of ten thousand men. (31) They
also sent despatches to the allied states, calling upon them to support
Teleutias in accordance with the resolution of the allies. All the
states were ready to display devotion to Teleutias, and to do him
service, since he was a man who never forgot a service rendered him.
Nor was Thebes an exception; for was not the governor a brother
of Agesilaus? Thebes, therefore, was enthusiastic in sending her
contribution of heavy infantry and cavalry. The Spartan conducted his
march slowly and surely, taking the utmost pains to avoid injuring his
friends, and to collect as large a force as possible. He also sent a
message in advance to Amyntas, begging him, if he were truly desirous of
recovering his empire, to raise a body of mercenaries, and to distribute
sums of money among the neighbouring kings with a view to their
alliance. Nor was that all. He sent also to Derdas, the ruler of Elimia,
pointing out to him that the Olynthians, having laid at their feet the
great power of Macedonia, would certainly not suffer his lesser power
to escape unless they were stayed up by force in arms in their career of
insolence. Proceeding thus, by the time he had reached the territory
of the allied powers he was at the head of a very considerable army. At
Potidaea he halted to make the necessary disposition of his troops, and
thence advanced into the territory of the enemy. As he approached
the hostile city, he abstained from felling and firing alike, being
persuaded that to do so was only to create difficulties in his own
path, whether advancing or retreating; it would be time enough, when he
retired from Olynthus, to fell the trees and lay them as a barrier in
the path of any assailant in the rear.

 (31) Lit. "sent out along with him the combined force of ten thousand
    men," in ref to S. 20 above.

Being now within a mile or so (32) of the city he came to a halt. The
left division was under his personal command, for it suited him to
advance in a line opposite the gate from which the enemy sallied; the
other division of the allies stretched away to the right. The cavalry
were thus distributed: the Laconians, Thebans, and all the Macedonians
present were posted on the right. With his own division he kept Derdas
and his troopers, four hundred strong. This he did partly out of genuine
admiration for this body of horse, and partly as a mark of courtesy to
Derdas, which should make him not regret his coming.

 (32) Lit. "ten stades."

Presently the enemy issued forth and formed in line opposite, under
cover of their walls. Then their cavalry formed in close order and
commenced the attack. Dashing down upon the Laconians and Boeotians they
dismounted Polycharmus, the Lacedaemonian cavalry general, inflicting a
hundred wounds on him as he lay on the ground, and cut down others, and
finally put to flight the cavalry on the right wing. The flight of these
troopers infected the infantry in close proximity to them, who in turn
swerved; and it looked as if the whole army was about to be worsted,
when Derdas at the head of his cavalry dashed straight at the gates of
Olynthus, Teleutias supporting him with the troops of his division.
The Olynthian cavalry, seeing how matters were going, and in dread
of finding the gates closed upon them, wheeled round and retired with
alacrity. Thus it was that Derdas had his chance to cut down man after
man as their cavalry ran the gauntlet past him. In the same way, too,
the infantry of the Olynthians retreated within their city, though,
owing to the closeness of the walls in their case, their loss was
trifling. Teleutias claimed the victory, and a trophy was duly erected,
after which he turned his back on Olynthus and devoted himself to
felling the fruit-trees. This was the campaign of the summer. He
now dismissed both the Macedonians and the cavalry force of Derdas.
Incursions, however, on the part of the Olynthians themselves against
the states allied to Lacedaemon were frequent; lands were pillaged, and
people put to the sword.



III

B.C. 381. With the first symptoms of approaching spring the Olynthian
cavalry, six hundred strong, had swooped into the territory of
Apollonia--about the middle of the day--and dispersing over the
district, were employed in pillaging; but as luck would have it,
Derdas had arrived that day with his troopers, and was breakfasting in
Apollonia. He noted the enemy's incursion, but kept quiet, biding his
time; his horses were ready saddled, and his troopers armed cap-a-pied.
As the Olynthians came galloping up contemptuously, not only into the
suburbs, but to the very gates of the city, he seized his opportunity,
and with his compact and well-ordered squadron dashed out; whereupon the
invaders took to flight. Having once turned them, Derdas gave them no
respite, pursuing and slaughtering them for ten miles or more, (1) until
he had driven them for shelter within the very ramparts of Olynthus.
Report said that Derdas slew something like eighty men in this affair.
After this the Olynthians were more disposed to keep to their walls,
contenting themselves with tilling the merest corner of their territory.

 (1) Lit. "ninety stades."

Time advanced, and Teleutias was in conduct of another expedition
against the city of Olynthus. His object was to destroy any timber
(2) still left standing, or fields still cultivated in the hostile
territory. This brought out the Olynthian cavalry, who, stealthily
advancing, crossed the river which washes the walls of the town, and
again continued their silent march right up to the adversary's camp.
At sight of an audacity which nettled him, Teleutias at once ordered
Tlemonidas, the officer commanding his light infantry division, to
charge the assailants at the run. On their side the men of Olynthus,
seeing the rapid approach of the light infantry, wheeled and quietly
retired until they had recrossed the river, drawing the enemy on,
who followed with conspicuous hardihood. Arrogating to themselves the
position of pursuers towards fugitives, they did not hesitate to cross
the river which stood between them and their prey. Then the Olynthian
cavalry, choosing a favourable moment, when those who had crossed seemed
easy to deal with, wheeled and attacked them, putting Tlemonidas himself
to the sword with more than a hundred others of his company. Teleutias,
when he saw what was happening, snatched up his arms in a fit of anger
and began leading his hoplites swiftly forward, ordering at the same
time his peltasts and cavalry to give chase and not to slacken. Their
fate was the fate of many before and since, who, in the ardour of
pursuit, have come too close to the enemy's walls and found it hard to
get back again. Under a hail of missiles from the walls they were forced
to retire in disorder and with the necessity of guarding themselves
against the missiles. At this juncture the Olynthians sent out their
cavalry at full gallop, backed by supports of light infantry; and
finally their heavy infantry reserves poured out and fell upon the
enemy's lines, now in thorough confusion. Here Teleutias fell fighting,
and when that happened, without further pause the troops immediately
about him swerved. Not one soul longer cared to make a stand, but the
flight became general, some fleeing towards Spartolus, others in the
direction of Acanthus, a third set seeking refuge within the walls of
Apollonia, and the majority within those of Potidaea. As the tide of
fugitives broke into several streams, so also the pursuers divided
the work between them; this way and that they poured, dealing death
wholesale. So perished the pith and kernel of the armament.

 (2) I.e. fruit-trees.

Such calamities are not indeed without a moral. The lesson they are
meant to teach mankind, I think, is plain. If in a general sense one
ought not to punish any one, even one's own slave, in anger--since
the master in his wrath may easily incur worse evil himself than he
inflicts--so, in the case of antagonists in war, to attack an enemy
under the influence of passion rather than of judgment is an absolute
error. For wrath is but a blind impulse devoid of foresight, whereas to
the penetrating eye of reason a blow parried may be better than a wound
inflicted. (3)

 (3) See, for the same sentiment, "Horsemanship," vi. 13. See also
    Plut. "Pel." and "Marc." (Clough, ii. p. 278).

When the news of what had happened reached Lacedaemon it was agreed,
after due deliberation, that a force should be sent, and of no trifling
description, if only to quench the victors' pride, and to prevent their
own achievements from becoming null and void. In this determination they
sent out King Agesipolis, as general, attended, like Agesilaus (4) on
his Asiatic campaign, by thirty Spartans. (5) Volunteers flocked to his
standard. They were partly the pick and flower of the provincials, (6)
partly foreigners of the class called Trophimoi, (7) or lastly, bastard
sons of Spartans, comely and beautiful of limb, and well versed in the
lore of Spartan chivalry. The ranks of this invading force were further
swelled by volunteers from the allied states, the Thessalians notably
contributing a corps of cavalry. All were animated by the desire of
becoming known to Agesipolis, so that even Amyntas and Derdas in zeal
of service outdid themselves. With this promise of success Agesipolis
marched forward against Olynthus.

 (4) See above, "Hell." III. iv. 2.

 (5) Lit. "Spartiates." The new army was sent out B.C. 380, according
    to Grote.

 (6) Lit. "beautiful and brave of the Perioeci."

 (7) Xenophon's own sons educated at Sparta would belong to this class.
    See Grote, "H. G." x. 91.

Meanwhile the state of Phlius, complimented by Agesipolis on the amount
of the funds contributed by them to his expedition and the celerity with
which the money had been raised, and in full belief that while one king
was in the field they were secure against the hostile attack of the
other (since it was hardly to be expected that both kings should be
absent from Sparta at one moment), boldly desisted from doing justice
by her lately reinstated citizens. On the one hand, these exiles claimed
that points in dispute should be determined before an impartial court
of justice; the citizens, on the other, insisted on the claimants
submitting the cases for trial in the city itself. And when the latter
demurred to that solution, asking "What sort of trial that would be
where the offenders were also the judges?" they appealed to deaf
ears. Consequently the restored party appealed at Sparta, to prefer a
complaint against their city. They were accompanied by other members of
the community, who stated that many of the Phliasians themselves besides
the appellants recognised the injustice of their treatment. The state of
Phlius was indignant at this manouvre, and retaliated by imposing a fine
on all who had betaken themselves to Lacedaemon without a mandate from
the state. Those who incurred the fine hesitated to return home; they
preferred to stay where they were and enforce their views: "It is quite
plain now who were the perpetrators of all the violence--the very
people who originally drove us into exile, and shut their gates upon
Lacedaemon; the confiscators of our property one day, the ruthless
opponents of its restoration the next. Who else but they have now
brought it about that we should be fined for appearing at Lacedaemon?
and for what purpose but to deter any one else for the future from
venturing to expose the proceedings at Phlius?" Thus far the appellants.
And in good sooth the conduct of the men of Phlius did seem to savour of
insolence; so much so that the ephors called out the ban against them.

B.C. 380. Nor was Agesilaus otherwise than well satisfied with
this decision, not only on the ground of old relations of friendly
hospitality between his father Archidamus and the party of Podanemus,
who were numbered among the restored exiles at this time, but because
personally he was bound by similar ties himself towards the adherents
of Procles, son of Hipponicus. The border sacrifices proving favourable,
the march commenced at once. As he advanced, embassy after embassy met
him, and would fain by presents of money avert invasion. But the king
answered that the purpose of his march was not to commit wrongdoing, but
to protect the victims of injustice. Then the petitioners offered to do
anything, only they begged him to forgo invasion. Again he replied--How
could he trust to their words when they had lied to him already? He
must have the warrant of acts, not promises. And being asked, "What act
(would satisfy him)?" he answered once more, saying, "The same which
you performed aforetime, and suffered no wrong at our hands"--in other
words, the surrender of the acropolis. (8) But to this they could not
bring themselves. Whereupon he invaded the territory of Phlius, and
promptly drawing lines of circumvallation, commenced the siege. Many of
the Lacedaemonians objected, for the sake of a mere handful of wretched
people, so to embroil themselves with a state of over five thousand men.
(9) For, indeed, to leave no doubt on this score, the men of Phlius met
regularly in assembly in full view of those outside. But Agesilaus was
not to be beaten by this move. Whenever any of the townsmen came out,
drawn by friendship or kinship with the exiles, in every case the king's
instructions were to place the public messes (10) at the service of
the visitors, and, if they were willing to go through the course of
gymnastic training, to give them enough to procure necessaries. All
members of these classes were, by the general's strict injunctions,
further to be provided with arms, and loans were to be raised for the
purpose without delay. Presently the superintendents of this branch of
the service were able to turn out a detachment of over a thousand men,
in the prime of bodily perfection, well disciplined and splendidly
armed, so that in the end the Lacedaemonians affirmed: "Fellow-soldiers
of this stamp are too good to lose." Such were the concerns of
Agesilaus.

 (8) See above, IV. iv. 15.

 (9) See Grote, "H. G." x. 45, note 4; and below, V. iv. 13.

 (10) See "Pol. Lac." v.

Meanwhile Agesipolis on leaving Macedonia advanced straight upon
Olynthus and took up a strategical position in front of the town.
Finding that no one came out to oppose him, he occupied himself for the
present with pillaging any remnant of the district still intact, and with
marching into the territory allied with the enemy, where he destroyed
the corn. The town of Torone he attacked and took by storm. But while he
was so engaged, in the height of mid-summer he was attacked by a burning
fever. In this condition his mind reverted to a scene once visited, the
temple of Dionysus at Aphytis, and a longing for its cool and sparkling
waters and embowered shades (11) seized him. To this spot accordingly
he was carried, still living, but only to breathe his last outside the
sacred shrine, within a week of the day on which he sickened. His body
was laid in honey and conveyed home to Sparta, where he obtained royal
sepulchre.

 (11) Lit. "shady tabernacles."

When the news reached Agesilaus he displayed none of the satisfaction
which might possibly have been expected at the removal of an antagonist.
On the contrary, he wept and pined for the companionship so severed, it
being the fashion at Sparta for the kings when at home to mess together
and to share the same quarters. Moreover, Agesipolis was admirably
suited to Agesilaus, sharing with the merriment of youth in tales of the
chase and horsemanship and boyish loves; (12) while, to crown all, the
touch of reverence due from younger to elder was not wanting in their
common life. In place of Agesipolis, the Lacedaemonians despatched
Polybiades as governor to Olynthus.

 (12) See "Ages." viii. 2.

B.C. 379. Agesilaus had already exceeded the time during which the
supplies of food in Phlius were expected to last. The difference, in
fact, between self-command and mere appetite is so great that the men of
Phlius had only to pass a resolution to cut down the food expenditure by
one half, and by doing so were able to prolong the siege for twice
the calculated period. But if the contrast between self-restraint and
appetite is so great, no less startling is that between boldness and
faint-heartedness. A Phliasian named Delphion, a real hero, it would
seem, took to himself three hundred Phliasians, and not only succeeded
in preventing the peace-party from carrying out their wishes, but was
equal to the task of incarcerating and keeping safely under lock and key
those whom he mistrusted. Nor did his ability end there. He succeeded
in forcing the mob of citizens to perform garrison duty, and by
vigorous patrolling kept them constant to the work. Over and over again,
accompanied by his personal attendants, he would dash out of the walls
and drive in the enemy's outposts, first at one point and then at
another of the beleaguering circle. But the time eventually came when,
search as they might by every means, these picked defenders (13) could
find no further store of food within the walls, and they were forced to
send to Agesilaus, requesting a truce for an embassy to visit Sparta,
adding that they were resolved to leave it to the discretion of the
authorities at Lacedaemon to do with their city what they liked.
Agesilaus granted a pass to the embassy, but, at the same time, he was
so angry at their setting his personal authority aside, that he sent to
his friends at home and arranged that the fate of Phlius should be
left to his discretion. Meanwhile he proceeded to tighten the cordon of
investment, so as to render it impossible that a single soul inside
the city should escape. In spite of this, however, Delphion, with
one comrade, a branded dare-devil, who had shown great dexterity
in relieving the besieging parties of their arms, escaped by night.
Presently the deputation returned with the answer from Lacedaemon that
the state simply left it entirely to the discretion of Agesilaus
to decide the fate of Phlius as seemed to him best. Then Agesilaus
announced his verdict. A board of one hundred--fifty taken from the
restored exiles, fifty from those within the city--were in the first
place to make inquisition as to who deserved to live and who to
die, after which they were to lay down laws as the basis of a new
constitution. Pending the carrying out of these transactions, he left a
detachment of troops to garrison the place for six months, with pay
for that period. After this he dismissed the allied forces, and led the
state (14) division home. Thus the transactions concerning Phlius were
brought to a conclusion, having occupied altogether one year and eight
months.

 (13) See below, "Hell." VII. i. 19.

 (14) {to politokon}, the citizen army. See above, IV. iv. 19; "Pol.
    Lac." xi.

Meanwhile Polybiades had reduced the citizens of Olynthus to the last
stage of misery through famine. Unable to supply themselves with corn
from their own land, or to import it by sea, they were forced to send an
embassy to Lacedaemon to sue for peace. The plenipotentiaries on their
arrival accepted articles of agreement by which they bound themselves
to have the same friends and the same foes as Lacedaemon, to follow her
lead, and to be enrolled among her allies; and so, having taken an oath
to abide by these terms, they returned home.

On every side the affairs of Lacedaemon had signally prospered: Thebes
and the rest of the Boeotian states lay absolutely at her feet; Corinth
had become her most faithful ally; Argos, unable longer to avail herself
of the subterfuge of a movable calendar, was humbled to the dust; Athens
was isolated; and, lastly, those of her own allies who displayed a
hostile feeling towards her had been punished; so that, to all outward
appearance, the foundations of her empire were at length absolutely well
and firmly laid.



IV

Abundant examples might be found, alike in Hellenic and in foreign
history, to prove that the Divine powers mark what is done amiss,
winking neither at impiety nor at the commission of unhallowed acts;
but at present I confine myself to the facts before me. (1) The
Lacedaemonians, who had pledged themselves by oath to leave the states
independent, had laid violent hands on the acropolis of Thebes, and were
eventually punished by the victims of that iniquity single-handed--the
Lacedaemonians, be it noted, who had never before been mastered by
living man; and not they alone, but those citizens of Thebes who
introduced them to their acropolis, and who wished to enslave their city
to Lacedaemon, that they might play the tyrant themselves--how fared
it with them? A bare score of the fugitives were sufficient to destroy
their government. How this happened I will now narrate in detail.

 (1) Or, "it is of my own subject that I must now speak." For the
    "peripety," or sudden reversal of circumstances, on which the plot
    of the "Hellenica" hinges, see Grote, "H. G." x. 100-108. Cf.
    Soph. "Oed. Tyr." 450; "Antig." 1066; Thuc. v. 116; "Hellenica
    Essays," "Xenophon," p. 382 foll. This passage is perhaps the key
    to the historian's position.

There was a man named Phyllidas--he was secretary to Archias, that is,
to the polemarchs. (2) Beyond his official duties, he had rendered his
chief other services, and all apparently in an exemplary fashion. A
visit to Athens in pursuance of some business brought this man into
contact with a former acquaintance of his, Melon, one of the exiles
who had fled for safety to Athens. Melon had various questions to ask
touching the sort of tyranny practised by Archias in the exercise of the
polemarchy, and by Philip. He soon discovered that affairs at home were
still more detestable to Phyllidas than to himself. It only remained
to exchange pledges, and to arrange the details of what was to be done.
After a certain interval Melon, accompanied by six of the trustiest
comrades he could find among his fellow-exiles, set off for Thebes. They
were armed with nothing but daggers, and first of all crept into the
neighbourhood under cover of night. The whole of the next day they lay
concealed in a desert place, and drew near to the city gates in the
guise of labourers returning home with the latest comers from the
fields. Having got safely within the city, they spent the whole of that
night at the house of a man named Charon, and again the next day in the
same fashion. Phyllidas meanwhile was busily taken up with the concerns
of the polemarchs, who were to celebrate a feast of Aphrodite on going
out of office. Amongst other things, the secretary was to take this
opportunity of fulfilling an old undertaking, which was the introduction
of certain women to the polemarchs. They were to be the most majestic
and the most beautiful to be found in Thebes. The polemarchs, on their
side (and the character of the men is sufficiently marked), were looking
forward to the pleasures of the night with joyful anticipation. Supper
was over, and thanks to the zeal with which the master of the ceremonies
responded to their mood, they were speedily intoxicated. To their
oft-repeated orders to introduce their mistresses, he went out and
fetched Melon and the rest, three of them dressed up as ladies and the
rest as their attendant maidens. Having brought them into the treasury
of the polemarchs' residence, (3) he returned himself and announced to
Archias and his friends that the women would not present themselves
as long as any of the attendants remained in the room; whereupon they
promptly bade all withdraw, and Phyllidas, furnishing the servants with
a stoup of wine, sent them off to the house of one of them. And now at
last he introduced the mistresses, and led them to their seats beside
their respective lords. It was preconcerted that as soon as they were
seated they were to throw aside their veils and strike home. That is one
version of the death of the polemarchs. (4) According to another, Melon
and his friends came in as revellers, and so despatched their victims.

 (2) Lit. "to Archias and his (polemarchs)"; but the Greek phrase does
    not, as the English would, imply that there were actually more
    than two polemarchs, viz. Archias and Philippus. Hypates and
    Leontiades belonged to the faction, but were neither of them
    polemarchs.

 (3) Lit. "Polemarcheion."

 (4) Or, "and so, according to the prevalent version of the matter, the
    polemarchs were slain. But some say that..."

That over, Phyllidas, with three of the band, set off to the house of
Leontiades. Arrived there, he knocked on the door, and sent in word that
he had a message from the polemarchs. Leontiades, as chance befell, was
still reclining in privacy after dinner, and his wife was seated beside
him working wools. The fidelity of Phyllidas was well known to him, and
he gave orders to admit him at once. They entered, slew Leontiades, and
with threats silenced his wife. As they went out they ordered the door
to be shut, threatening that if they found it open they would kill every
one in the house. And now that this deed was done, Phyllidas, with two
of the band, presented himself at the prison, telling the gaoler he had
brought a man from the polemarchs to be locked up. The gaoler opened the
door, and was at once despatched, and the prisoners were released. These
they speedily supplied with arms taken from the armoury in the stoa,
and then led them to the Ampheion, (5) and bade them take up a position
there, after which they at once made a proclamation calling on all
Thebans to come out, horse and foot, seeing that the tyrants were dead.
The citizens, indeed, as long as it was night, not knowing whom or
what to trust, kept quiet, but when day dawned and revealed what had
occurred, the summons was responded to with alacrity, heavy infantry and
cavalry under arms alike sallying forth. Horsemen were also despatched
by the now restored exiles to the two Athenian generals on the frontier;
and they, being aware of the object of the message (promptly responded).
(6)

 (5) See plan of Thebes, "Dict. Geog."; Arrian, "Anab." i. 8; Aesch.
    "Sept. c. Theb." 528.

 (6) Supply {epeboethoun}. There is a lacuna in the MSS. at this point.

On the other hand, the Lacedaemonian governor in the citadel, as soon
as that night's proclamation reached his ears, was not slow to send
to Plataeae (7) and Thespiae for reinforcements. The approach of the
Plataeans was perceived by the Theban cavalry, who met them and killed a
score of them and more, and after that achievement returned to the
city, to find the Athenians from the frontier already arrived. Then they
assaulted the acropolis. The troops within recognised the paucity of
their own numbers, whilst the zeal of their opponents (one and all
advancing to the attack) was plainly visible, and loud were the
proclamations, promising rewards to those who should be first to scale
the walls. All this so worked upon their fears that they agreed to
evacuate the place if the citizens would allow them a safe-conduct to
retire with their arms. To this request the others gladly yielded, and
they made a truce. Oaths were taken on the terms aforesaid, and the
citizens dismissed their adversaries. For all that, as the garrison
retired, those of them who were recognised as personal foes were seized
and put to death. Some were rescued through the good offices of the
Athenian reinforcements from the frontier, who smuggled them across and
saved them. The Thebans were not content with putting the men to
death; if any of them had children, these also were sacrificed to their
vengeance.

 (7) This city had been refounded in B.C. 386 (Isocr. "Plat." 20, 21).
    See Freeman, op. cit. ch. iv. p. 170: "Its restoration implied not
    only a loss of Theban supremacy, but the actual loss of that
    portion of the existing Theban territory which had formerly formed
    the Plataian district."

B.C. 378. When the news of these proceedings reached Sparta the first
thing the Lacedaemonians did was to put to death the governor, who had
abandoned the Cadmeia instead of awaiting reinforcements, and the next
was to call out the ban against Thebes. Agesilaus had little taste to
head the expedition; he pointed out that he had seen more than forty
years' service, (8) and that the exemption from foreign duty applicable
to others at that age was applicable on the same principle to the king.
Such were the ostensible grounds on which he excused himself from the
present expedition, but his real objections lay deeper. He felt certain
that if he led the expedition his fellow-citizens would say: "Agesilaus
caused all this trouble to the state in order to aid and abet tyrants."
Therefore he preferred to leave his countrymen to settle the matter
themselves as they liked. Accordingly the ephors, instructed by
the Theban exiles who had escaped the late massacres, despatched
Cleombrotus. He had not commanded before, and it was the depth of
winter.

 (8) And was therefore more than fifty-eight years old at this date.
    See "Ages." i. 6.

Now while Chabrias, with a body of Athenian peltasts, kept watch and
ward over the road through Eleutherae, Cleombrotus made his way up by
the direct route to Plataeae. His column of light infantry, pushing
forward in advance, fell upon the men who had been released from the
Theban prison, guarding the summit, to the number of about one hundred
and fifty. These, with the exception of one or two who escaped, were cut
down by the peltasts, and Cleombrotus descended in person upon Plataeae,
which was still friendly to Sparta. Presently he reached Thespiae, and
that was the base for an advance upon Cynoscephalae, where he encamped
on Theban territory. Here he halted sixteen days, and then again fell
back upon Thespiae. At this latter place he now left Sphodrias as
governor, with a third portion of each of the contingents of the allies,
handing over to him all the moneys he had brought with him from
home, with directions to supplement his force with a contingent of
mercenaries.

While Sphodrias was so employed, Cleombrotus himself commenced his
homeward march, following the road through Creusis at the head of his
own moiety of the troops, who indeed were in considerable perplexity to
discover whether they were at war with the Thebans or at peace, seeing
that the general had led his army into Theban territory, had inflicted
the minimum of mischief, and again retired. No sooner, however, was his
back turned than a violent wind storm assailed him in his rear, which
some construed as an omen clearly significant of what was about to take
place. Many a blow this assailant dealt them, and as the general and his
army, crossing from Creusis, scaled that face of the mountain (9) which
stretches seaward, the blast hurled headlong from the precipices a
string of asses, baggage and all: countless arms were wrested from the
bearers' grasp and whirled into the sea; finally, numbers of the men,
unable to march with their arms, deposited them at different points of
the pass, first filling the hollow of their shields with stones. For the
moment, then, they halted at Aegosthena, on Megarian soil, and supped as
best they could. Next day they returned and recovered their arms.
After this adventure the contingents lost no time in returning to their
several homes, as Cleombrotus disbanded them.

 (9) I.e. "Cithaeron."

Meanwhile at Athens and Thebes alike fear reigned. To the Athenians the
strength of the Lacedaemonians was unmistakable: the war was plainly
no longer confined to Corinth; on the contrary, the Lacedaemonians had
ventured to skirt Athenian territory and to invade Thebes. They were so
worked upon by their alarm that the two generals who had been privy
to the insurrection of Melon against Leontiades and his party had to
suffer: the one was formally tried and put to death; the other, refusing
to abide his trial, was banished.

The apprehensions of the Thebans were of a different sort: their fear
was rather lest they should find themselves in single-handed war with
Lacedaemon. To prevent this they hit upon the following expedient. They
worked upon Sphodrias, (10) the Spartan governor left in Thespiae, by
offering him, as at least was suspected, a substantial sum, in return
for which he was to make an incursion into Attica; their great object
being to involve Athens and Lacedaemon in hostilities. Sphodrias lent a
willing ear, and, pretending that he could easily capture Piraeus in its
present gateless condition, gave his troops an early evening meal and
marched out of Thespiae, saying that he would reach Piraeus before
daybreak. As a matter of fact day overtook him at Thria, nor did he
take any pains even to draw a veil over his intentions; on the contrary,
being forced to turn aside, he amused himself by recklessly lifting
cattle and sacking houses. Meanwhile some who chanced upon him in the
night had fled to the city and brought news to the men of Athens that a
large body of troops was approaching. It needs no saying with what speed
the cavalry and heavy infantry armed themselves and stood on guard
to protect the city. As chance befell, there were some Lacedaemonian
ambassadors in Athens at the moment, at the house of Callias their
proxenos; their names were Etymocles, Aristolochus, and Ocyllus.
Immediately on receipt of the news the Athenians seized these three and
imprisoned them, as not improbably concerned in the plot. Utterly taken
aback by the affair themselves, the ambassadors pleaded that, had they
been aware of an attempt to seize Piraeus, they would hardly have been
so foolish as to put themselves into the power of the Athenians, or have
selected the house of their proxenos for protection, where they were so
easily to be found. It would, they further urged, soon be plain to the
Athenians themselves that the state of Lacedaemon was quite as
little cognisant of these proceedings as they. "You will hear before
long"--such was their confident prediction--"that Sphodrias has paid for
his behaviour by his life." On this wise the ambassadors were acquitted
of all concern in the matter and dismissed. Sphodrias himself was
recalled and indicted by the ephors on the capital charge, and, in spite
of his refusal to face the trial, he was acquitted. This miscarriage
of justice, as it seemed to many, who described it as unprecedented in
Lacedaemon, has an explanation.

 (10) See Plut. "Pel." xiv. (Clough, ii. p. 214).

Sphodrias had a son named Cleonymus. He was just at the age when
youth emerges from boyhood, very handsome and of high repute among
his fellows. To this youth Archidamus, the son of Agesilaus, was
passionately attached. Now the friends of Cleombrotus, as comrades of
Sphodrias, were disposed to acquit him; but they feared Agesilaus and
his friends, not to mention the intermediate party, for the enormity of
his proceeding was clear. So when Sphodrias addressed his son Cleonymus:
"You have it in your power, my son, to save your father, if you will, by
begging Archidamus to dispose Agesilaus favourably to me at my trial."
Thus instructed, the youth did not shrink from visiting Archidamus, and
implored him for his sake to save his father. Now when Archidamus saw
how Cleonymus wept, he too was melted to tears as he stood beside him,
but to his petition he made answer thus: "Nay, Cleonymus, it is the bare
truth I tell you, I cannot so much as look my father in the face;
(11) if I wished anything transacted for me in the city I would beg
assistance from the whole world sooner than from my father. Still, since
it is you who bid me, rest assured I will do my best to bring this about
for you as you desire." He then left the common hall (12) and retired
home to rest, but with dawn he arose and kept watch that his father
might not go out without his knowledge. Presently, when he saw him
ready to go forth, first some citizen was present, and then another and
another; and in each case he stepped aside, while they held his father
in conversation. By and by a stranger would come, and then another; and
so it went on until he even found himself making way for a string of
petitioning attendants. At last, when his father had turned his back on
the Eurotas, and was entering his house again, he was fain to turn his
back also and be gone without so much as accosting him. The next day
he fared no better: all happened as on the previous day. Now Agesilaus,
although he had his suspicions why his son went to and fro in this way,
asked no questions, but left him to take his own course. Archidamus, on
his side, was longing, as was natural, to see his friend Cleonymus; but
how he was to visit him, without having held the desired conversation
with his father, he knew not. The friends of Sphodrias, observing that
he who was once so frequent a visitor had ceased coming, were in agony;
he must surely have been deterred by the reproaches of his father. At
last, however, Archidamus dared to go to his father, and said, "Father,
Cleonymus bids me ask you to save his father; grant me this boon, if
possible, I beg you." He answered: "For yourself, my son, I can make
excuse, but how shall my city make excuse for me if I fail to condemn
that man who, for his own base purpose, traffics to the injury of the
state?" For the moment the other made no reply, but retired crestfallen
before the verdict of justice. Afterwards, whether the thought was his
own or that he was prompted by some other, he came and said, "Father,
if Sphodrias had done no wrong you would have released him, that I know;
but now, if he has done something wrong, may he not be excused by you
for our sakes?" And the father answered: "If it can be done without loss
of honour on our parts, so shall it be." At that word the young man, in
deep despondency, turned and went. Now one of the friends of Sphodrias,
conversing with Etymocles, remarked to him: "You are all bent on putting
Sphodrias to death, I take it, you friends of Agesilaus?" And Etymocles
replied: "If that be so, we all are bent on one thing, and Agesilaus on
another, since in all his conversations he still harps upon one string:
that Sphodrias has done a wrong there is no denying, yet Sphodrias is
a man who, from boyhood to ripe manhood, (13) was ever constant to the
call of honour. To put such a man as that to death is hard; nay, Sparta
needs such soldiers." The other accordingly went off and reported what
he had just heard to Cleonymus; and he in the joy of his heart went
straightway to Archidamus and said: "Now we know that you care for us;
rest assured, Archidamus, that we in turn will take great pains that you
shall never have cause to blush for our friendship." Nor did his acts
belie his words; but so long as he lived he was ever faithful to the
code of Spartan chivalry; and at Leuctra, fighting in front of the king
side by side with Deinon the polemarch, thrice fell or ever he yielded
up his breath--foremost of the citizens amidst the foe. And so, albeit
he caused his friend the bitterest sorrow, yet to that which he had
promised he was faithful, seeing he wrought Archidamus no shame, but
contrariwise shed lustre on him. (14) In this way Sphodrias obtained his
acquittal.

 (11) See "Cyrop." I. iv. 12.

 (12) Lit. "the Philition." See "Pol. Lac." iii. 6.

 (13) Lit. "who, whether as child, boy, or young man"; and for the
    three stages of growth, see "Pol. Lac." ii. iii. iv.

 (14) I.e. both in life and in death.

At Athens the friends of Boeotia were not slow to instruct the people
that his countrymen, so far from punishing Sphodrias, had even applauded
him for his designs on Athens; and in consequence of this the Athenians
not only furnished Piraeus with gates, but set to work to build a fleet,
and displayed great zeal in sending aid to the Boeotians. (15) The
Lacedaemonians, on their side, called out the ban against the Thebans;
and being persuaded that in Agesilaus they would find a more prudent
general than Cleombrotus had proved, they begged the former to undertake
the expedition. (16) He, replying that the wish of the state was for him
law, began making preparations to take the field.

 (15) For the new Athenian confederacy of Delos of this year, B.C. 378,
    see "Pol. Lac." xiv. 6; "Rev." v. 6; Diod. xv. 28-30; Plut.
    "Pelop." xv.; Hicks, 78, 81; and for an alliance between Athens
    and Chalcis in Euboea, see Hicks, 79; and for a treaty with Chios,
    Hicks, 80.

 (16) See "Ages." ii. 22.

Now he had come to the conclusion that without the occupation of Mount
Cithaeron any attack on Thebes would be difficult. Learning then that
the men of Cleitor were just now at war with the men of Orchomenus, (17)
and were maintaining a foreign brigade, he came to an understanding with
the Cleitorians that in the event of his needing it, this force would be
at his service; and as soon as the sacrifices for crossing the
frontier proved favourable, he sent to the commander of the Cleitorian
mercenaries, and handing him a month's pay, ordered him to occupy
Cithaeron with his men. This was before he himself reached Tegea.
Meanwhile he sent a message to the men of Orchomenus that so long as
the campaign lasted they must cease from war. If any city during his
campaign abroad took on itself to march against another city, his first
duty, he declared, would be to march against such offending city in
accordance with a decree of the allies.

 (17) In Arcadia. See Busolt, "Die Lak." 120 foll.

Thus crossing Cithaeron he reached Thespiae, (18) and from that base
made the territory of Thebes his objective. Finding the great plain
fenced round with ditch and palisade, as also the most valuable portions
of the country, he adopted the plan of shifting his encampment from one
place to another. Regularly each day, after the morning meal, he marched
out his troops and ravaged the territory, confining himself to his own
side of the palisadings and trench. The appearance of Agesilaus at any
point whatever was a signal to the enemy, who within the circuit of his
entrenchment kept moving in parallel line to the invader, and was ever
ready to defend the threatened point. On one occasion, the Spartan
king having retired and being well on the road back to camp, the Theban
cavalry, hitherto invisible, suddenly dashed out, following one of the
regularly constructed roads out of the entrenchment. Taking advantage of
the enemy's position--his light troops breaking off to supper or busily
preparing the meal, and the cavalry, some of them on their legs just
(19) dismounted, and others in the act of mounting--on they rode,
pressing the charge home. Man after man of the light troops was cut
down; and three cavalry troopers besides--two Spartans, Cleas and
Epicydidas by name, and the third a provincial (20) named Eudicus, who
had not had time to mount their horses, and whose fate was shared by
some Theban (21) exiles. But presently Agesilaus wheeled about and
advanced with his heavy infantry to the succour; his cavalry dashed
at the enemy's cavalry, and the flower of the heavy infantry, the
ten-years-service men, charged by their side. The Theban cavalry at that
instant looked like men who had been imbibing too freely in the noontide
heat--that is to say, they awaited the charge long enough to hurl their
spears; but the volley sped without effect, and wheeling about within
that distance they left twelve of their number dead upon the field.

 (18) By Cynoscephalae. See "Ages." ii. 22.

 (19) Read, after Courier, {arti} for the vulg. {eti}; or, better
    still, adopt Hartman's emendation (op. cit. p. 379), {ton men ede
    katabebekoton ton de katabainonton}, and translate "some--already
    dismounted, and others dismounting."

 (20) Lit. "one of the perioeci."

 (21) Reading {Thebaion} after Dind. for {'Athenaion}.

Agesilaus had not failed to note with what regularity the enemy
presented himself after the morning meal. Turning the observation to
account, he offered sacrifice with day's dawn, and marched with all
possible speed, and so crossed within the palisadings, through what
might have been a desert, as far as defence or sign of living being
went. Once well inside, he proceeded to cut down and set on fire
everything up to the city gates. After this exploit he beat a retreat,
retiring into Thespiae, where he fortified their citadel for them. Here
he left Phoebidas as governor, while he himself crossed the passes back
into Megara. Arrived here he disbanded the allies, and led the city
troops homewards.

After the departure of Agesilaus, Phoebidas devoted himself to harrying
the Thebans by sending out robber bands, and laid waste their land by
a system of regular incursions. The Thebans, on their side, desiring
to retaliate, marched out with their whole force into the territory
of Thespiae. But once well inside the district they found themselves
closely beset by Phoebidas and his light troops, who would not give
them the slightest chance to scatter from their main body, so that
the Thebans, heartily vexed at the turn their foray had taken, beat a
retreat quicker than they had come. The muleteers threw away with their
own hands the fruits they had captured, in their anxiety to get home as
quickly as possible; so dire a dread had fallen upon the invading army.
This was the chance for the Spartan to press home his attack boldly,
keeping his light division in close attendance on himself, and leaving
the heavy infantry under orders to follow him in battle order. He was
in hopes even that he might put the enemy to complete rout, so valiantly
did he lead the advance, encouraging the light troops to "come to a
close grip with the invadors," or summoning the heavy infantry of the
Thespiaeans to "bring up their supports." Presently the Theban cavalry
as they retired found themselves face to face with an impassable glen
or ravine, where in the first instance they collected in a mob, and next
wheeled right-about-face in sheer resourcelessness where to cross. The
handful of light troops who formed the Spartan vanguard took fright
at the Thebans and fled, and the Theban horsemen seeing this put in
practice the lesson of attack which the fugitives taught them. As for
Phoebidas himself, he and two or three with him fell sword in hand,
whereupon his mercenary troops all took to their heels.

When the stream of fugitives reached the Thespiaean heavy infantry
reserves, they too, in spite of much boasting beforehand that they would
never yield to Thebans, took to flight, though there was now absolutely
no pursuit whatever, for it was now late. The number slain was not
large, but, for all that, the men of Thespiae did not come to a
standstill until they found themselves safe inside their walls. As a
sequel, the hopes and spirits of the Thebans were again kindled into new
life, and they made campaigns against Thespiae and the other provincial
cities of Boeotia. (22) It must be admitted that in each case the
democratical party retired from these cities to Thebes; since absolute
governments had been established in all of them on the pattern
previously adopted at Thebes; and the result was that the friends of
Lacedaemon in these cities also needed her assistance. (23) After the
death of Phoebidas the Lacedaemonians despatched a polemarch with a
division by sea to form the garrison of Thespiae.

 (22) Lit. "their other perioecid cities." For the significance of this
    title as applied by the Thebans (and perhaps commonly) to the
    other cities of Boeotia, see Freeman, op. cit. ch. iv. pp. 157,
    173 foll.

 (23) See Grote, "H. G." x. 174; Freeman, op. cit. iv. 171, 172.

B.C. 377. With the advent of spring (24) the ephors again called out the
ban against Thebes, and requested Agesilaus to lead the expedition, as
on the former campaign. He, holding to his former theory with regard to
the invasion, even before sacrificing the customary frontier sacrifice,
sent a despatch to the polemarch at Thespiae, with orders to seize the
pass which commands the road over Cithaeron, and to guard it against his
arrival. Then, having once more crossed the pass and reached Plataeae,
he again made a feint of marching first into Thespiae, and so sent a
despatch ordering supplies to be in readiness, and all embassies to
be waiting his arrival there; so that the Thebans concentrated their
attention on the approaches from Thespiae, which they strongly guarded.
Next morning, however, Agesilaus sacrificed at daybreak and set out on
the road to Erythrae, (25) and completing in one day what was a good two
days' march for an army, gave the Thebans the slip, and crossed
their palisade-work at Scolus before the enemy had arrived from the
closely-guarded point at which he had effected his entrance formerly.
This done he proceeded to ravage the eastward-facing districts of the
city of Thebes as far as the territory of Tanagra, for at that date
Tanagra was still in the hands of Hypatodorus and his party, who were
friends of the Lacedaemonians. After that he turned to retire, keeping
the walls of Thebes on his left. But the Thebans, who had stolen, as
it were, upon the scene, drew up at the spot called "The Old Wife's
Breast," (26) keeping the trench and palisading in their rear: they were
persuaded that here, if anywhere, lay their chance to risk a decisive
engagement, the ground at this point being somewhat narrow and difficult
to traverse. Agesilaus, however, in view of the situation, refused to
accept the challenge. Instead of marching upon them he turned sharp off
in the direction of the city; and the Thebans, in alarm for the city in
its undefended state, abandoned the favourable ground on which they
were drawn up in battle line, and retired at the double towards the city
along the road to Potniae, which seemed the safer route. This last
move of Agesilaus may be described as a stroke of genius: (27) while it
allowed him to retire to a distance, it forced the enemy themselves
to retreat at the double. In spite of this, however, one or two of the
polemarchs, with their divisions, charged the foe as he raced past.
But again the Thebans, from the vantage-ground of their heights, sent
volleys of spears upon the assailants, which cost one of the polemarchs,
Alypetus, his life. He fell pierced by a spear. But again from this
particular crest the Thebans on their side were forced to turn in
flight; so much so that the Sciritae, with some of the cavalry, scaled
up and speedily cut down the rearmost ranks of the Thebans as they
galloped past into the city. When, however, they were close under
cover of their walls the Thebans turned, and the Sciritae seeing them
retreated at more than a steady walking pace. No one, it is true, was
slain; but the Thebans all the same set up a trophy in record of
the incident at the point where the scaling party had been forced to
retreat.

 (24) See for affairs of Delos, never actually named by Xenophon,
    between B.C. 377 and 374, the Sandwich Marble in Trinity College,
    Cambridge; Boeckh, "C. I. G" 158, and "P. E. A." ii. p. 78 foll.;
    Hicks, 82.

 (25) Erythrae (Redlands) stands between Hysiae and Scolus, east of
    Katzula.--Leake, "N. Gr." ii. 329. See Herod. ix. 15, 25; Thuc.
    iii. 24; Paus. IX. ii. 1; Strab. IX. ii.

 (26) Lit. "Graos Stethos."

 (27) Or, "and this move of Agesilaus was regarded as a very pretty
    one."

And now, since the hour was come, Agesilaus fell back and encamped on
the very site on which he had seen the enemy drawn up in battle array.
Next day he retired by the road to Thespiae. The light troops, who
formed a free corps in the pay of the Thebans, hung audaciously at his
heels. Their shouts could be heard calling out to Chabrias (28) for not
bringing up his supports; when the cavalry of the Olynthians (who now
contributed a contingent in accordance with their oaths) (29) wheeled
round on them, caught the pursuers in the heat of their pursuit, and
drove them uphill, putting large numbers of them to the sword--so
quickly are infantry overhauled by cavalry on steep ground which can be
ridden over. Being arrived within the walls of Thespiae, Agesilaus
found the citizens in a state of party feud, the men of Lacedaemonian
proclivities desiring to put their political opponents, one of whom was
Menon, to death (30)--a proceeding which Agesilaus would not sanction.
After having healed their differences and bound them over by solemn oath
to keep the peace with one another, he at once retired, taking his
old route across Cithaeron to Megara. Here once more he disbanded the
allies, and at the head of the city troops himself marched back to
Sparta.

 (28) For the exploits of Chabrias, who commanded a division of mixed
    Athenians and mercenaries (see above, S. 14), see Dem. "c. Lept."
    479; Polyaen. ii. 1, 2; Diod. xv. 32, 33, who gives interesting
    details; Grote, "H. G." x. 172 foll.

 (29) See above, "Hell." V. iii. 26.

 (30) Or, "under the pretext of furthering Laconian interests there was
    a desire to put political opponents to death." For "Menon," Diod.
    conj. "Melon."

The Thebans had not gathered in the fruits of their soil for two years
now, and began to be sorely pinched for want of corn; they therefore
sent a body of men on board a couple of triremes to Pagasae, with
ten talents (31) in hand for the purchase of corn. But while these
commissioners were engaged in effecting their purchases, Alcetas, the
Lacedaemonian who was garrisoning Oreus, (32) fitted out three triremes,
taking precautions that no rumour of his proceedings should leak out.
As soon as the corn was shipped and the vessels under weigh, he captured
not only the corn but the triremes, escort and all, numbering no less
than three hundred men. This done he locked up his prisoners in the
citadel, where he himself was also quartered. Now there was a youth, the
son of a native of Oreus, fair of mien and of gentle breeding, (33) who
danced attendance on the commandant: and the latter must needs leave the
citadel and go down to busy himself with this youth. This was a piece of
carelessness which the prisoners did not fail to observe, and turned to
good account by seizing the citadel, whereupon the town revolted,
and the Thebans experienced no further difficulty in obtaining corn
supplies.

 (31) = 2,437 pounds: 10 shillings.

 (32) Oreus, formerly called Histiaea, in the north of Euboea. See
    Thuc. vii. 57, viii. 95; Diod. xv. 30; Grote, "H. G." ix. 263. For
    Pagasae at the north extremity of the Pagasaean Gulf, "the cradle
    of Greek navigation," see Tozer, "Geog. Gr." vi. p. 124; Strab.
    IX. v. 15.

 (33) Or, "beautiful and brave if ever youth was."

B.C. 376. At the return of spring Agesilaus lay sick--a bedridden
invalid. The history of the case is this: During the withdrawal of his
army from Thebes the year before, when at Megara, while mounting from
the Aphrodision (34) to the Government house he ruptured a vein or other
vessel of the body. This was followed by a rush of blood to his sound
leg. The knee was much swelled, and the pain intolerable, until a
Syracusan surgeon made an incision in the vein near the ankle. The blood
thus let flowed night and day; do what they could to stop the discharge,
all failed, till the patient fainted away; then it ceased. In this
plight Agesilaus was conveyed home on a litter to Lacedaemon, and
remained an invalid the rest of that summer and throughout the winter.

 (34) Pausanius (I. xi. 6) mentions a temple of Aphrodite
    {'Epistrophoa} (Verticordia), on the way up to the Carian
    Acropolis of Megara.

But to resume: at the first burst of spring the Lacedaemonians
again called out the ban, and gave orders to Cleombrotus to lead the
expedition. The king found himself presently with his troops at the foot
of Cithaeron, and his light infantry advanced to occupy the pass which
commands the road. But here they found a detachment of Thebans and
Athenians already in occupation of the desired height, who for a while
suffered them to approach; but when they were close upon them, sprang
from their position and charged, putting about forty to the sword. This
incident was sufficient to convince Cleombrotus that to invade Thebes by
this mountain passage was out of the question, and in this faith he led
back and disbanded his troops.

The allies met in Lacedaemon, and arguments were adduced on the part of
the allies to show that faintheartedness would very soon lead to their
being absolutely worn out by the war. They had got it in their power,
it was urged, to fit out a fleet far outnumbering that of Athens, and
to reduce that city by starvation; it was open to them, in the self-same
ships, to carry an army across into Theban territory, and they had
a choice of routes--the road into Phocis, or, if they preferred, by
Creusis. After thus carefully considering the matter they manned a fleet
of sixty triremes, and Pollis was appointed admiral in command. Nor
indeed were their expectations altogether belied. The Athenians were
soon so closely blockaded that their corn vessels could get no farther
than Geraestus; (35) there was no inducing them to coast down father
south, with a Lacedaemonian navy hovering about Aegina and Ceos and
Andros. The Athenians, making a virtue of necessity, manned their ships
in person, gave battle to Pollis under the leadership of Chabrias, and
came out of the sea-fight (36) victorious.

 (35) The promontory at the southern extremity of Euboea.

 (36) Battle of Naxos, B.C. 376. For interesting details, see Diod. xv.
    35, 35.

B.C. 375. Then the corn supplies flowed freely into Athens. The
Lacedaemonians, on their side, were preparing to transport an army
across the water into Boeotia, when the Thebans sent a request to the
Athenians urging them to despatch an armament round Peloponnesus, under
the persuasion that if this were done the Lacedaemonians would find it
impossible at once to guard their own or the allied territory in that
part of the world, and at the same time to convery an army of any size
to operate against Thebes. The proposals fell in with the present temper
of the Athenians, irritated with Lacedaemon on account of the exploit
of Sphodrias. Accordingly they eagerly manned a fleet of sixty vessels,
appointing Timotheus as admiral in command, and despatched it on a
cruise round Peloponnesus.

The Thebans, seeing that there had been no hostile invasion of their
territory for so long (neither during the campaign of Cleombrotus
nor now, (37) whilst Timotheus prosecuted his coasting voyage), felt
emboldened to carry out a campaign on their own account against the
provincial cities; (38) and one by one they again recovered them.

 (37) Lit. "nor at the date of Timotherus's periplus." To the historian
    writing of the events of this period several years later, the
    coasting voyage of Timotheus is a single incident ({periepleuse}),
    and as Grote ("H. G." x. 185, note 3) observes, the words may
    "include not simply the time which Timotheus took in actually
    circumnavigating Peloponnesos, but the year which he spent
    afterwards in the Ionian sea, and the time which he occupied in
    performing his exploits near Korkyra, Leukas, and the
    neighbourhood generally." For the character and exploits of
    Timotheus, son of Conon, see Isocr. "Or." xv. "On the Antidosis,"
    SS. 101-139; Jebb, "Att. Or." ii. p. 140 foll.; Rehdantz, "Vit.
    Iphicr. Chabr. Timoth. Atheniensium."

 (38) Or, "the cities round about their territory," lit. "the perioecid
    cities." For the import of the epithet, see V. iv. 46; Freeman,
    op. cit. iv. 173, note 1, in reference to Grote, "H. G." x. 183,
    note 4. For the battle of Tegyra see Grote, ib. 182; Plut.
    "Pelop." 17; Diod. xv. 57 ("evidently this battle," Grote);
    Callisthenes, fr. 3, ed. Did. Cf. Steph. Byz., {Tegura}.

Timotheus in his cruise reached Corcyra, and reduced it at a blow. That
done, he neither enslaved the inhabitants nor drove them into exile,
nor changed their laws. And of this conduct he reaped the benefit of
the increased cordiality (39) of all the cities of those parts. The
Lacedaemonians thereupon fitted out and despatched a counter fleet, with
Nicolochus in command, an officer of consummate boldness. This admiral
no sooner caught sight of Timotheus's fleet than without hesitation, and
in spite of the absence of six Ambraciot vessels which formed part
of his squadron, he gave battle, with fifty-five ships to the enemy's
sixty. The result was a defeat at the moment, and Timotheus set up a
trophy at Alyzia. But as soon as the six missing Ambraciot vessels
had reinforced him--the ships of Timotheus meanwhile being docked and
undergoing repairs--he bore down upon Alyzia in search of the Athenian,
and as Timotheus refused to put out to meet him, the Lacedaemonian in
turn set up a trophy on the nearest group of islands.

 (39) The Corcyraeans, Acarnanians, and Cephallenians join the alliance
    B.C. 375; see Hicks, 83. "This decree dates from the autumn of
    B.C. 375, immediately after Timotheos's visit to Korkyra (Xen.
    'Hell.' V. iv. 64). The result was that the names of Korkyra,
    Kephallenia, and Akarnania were inscribed upon the list (No. 81),
    and an alliance was made with them." (See "C. I. A." ii. p. 399
    foll.; Hicks, loc. cit.; "Hell." VI. v. 23); "C. I. A." ii. 14.
    The tablet is in the Asclepeian collection at the entrance of the
    Acropolis at Athens. See Milchofer, "Die Museum Athens," 1881, p.
    45.

B.C. 374. Timotheus, after repairing his original squadron and manning
more vessels from Corcyra, found himself at the head of more than
seventy ships. His naval superiority was undisputed, but he was forced
to send to Athens for moneys, seeing his fleet was large and his wants
not trifling.




BOOK VI



I

B.C. 374. The Athenians and Lacedaemonians were thus engaged. But to
return to the Thebans. After the subjugation of the cities in Boeotia,
they extended the area of aggression and marched into Phocis. The
Phocians, on their side, sent an embassy to Lacedaemon, and pleaded that
without assistance from that power they must inevitably yield to Thebes.
The Lacedaemonians in response conveyed by sea into the territory of
Phocis their king Cleombrotus, at the head of four regiments and the
contingents of the allies.

About the same time Polydamus of Pharsalus arrived from Thessaly to
address the general assembly (1) of Lacedaemon. He was a man of high
repute throughout the whole of Thessaly, while in his native city he was
regarded as so true a gentleman that the faction-ridden Pharsalians
were content to entrust the citadel to his keeping, and to allow their
revenues to pass through his hands. It was his privilege to disburse the
money needed for sacred rites or other expenditure, within the limits
of their written law and constitution. Out of these moneys this faithful
steward of the state was able to garrison and guard in safety for
the citizens their capital. Every year he rendered an account of his
administration in general. If there was a deficit he made it up out of
his own pocket, and when the revenues expanded he paid himself back. For
the rest, his hospitality to foreigners and his magnificence were on a
true Thessalian scale. Such was the style and character of the man who
now arrived in Lacedaemon and spoke as follows:

 (1) {pros to koinon}, "h.e. vel ad ad senatum vel ad ephoros vel ad
    concionem."--Sturz, "Lex. Xen." s.v.

"Men of Lacedaemon, it is in my capacity as 'proxenos' and 'benefactor'
(titles borne by my ancestry from time immemorial) that I claim, or
rather am bound, in case of any difficulty to come to you, and, in case
of any complication dangerous to your interests in Thessaly, to give you
warning. The name of Jason, I feel sure, is not unknown to Lacedaemonian
ears. His power as a prince is sufficiently large, and his fame
widespread. It is of Jason I have to speak. Under cover of a treaty of
peace he has lately conferred with me, and this is the substance of what
he urged: 'Polydamas,' he said, 'if I chose I could lay your city at my
feet, even against its will, as the following considerations will prove
to you. See,' he went on, 'the majority and the most important of the
states of Thessaly are my allies. I subdued them in campaigns in which
you took their side in opposition to myself. Again, you do not need
to be told that I have six thousand mercenaries who are a match in
themselves, I take it, for any single state. It is not the mere numbers
on which I insist. No doubt as large an army could be raised in other
quarters; but these citizen armies have this defect--they include men
who are already advanced in years, with others whose beards are scarcely
grown. Again, it is only a fraction of the citizens who attend to bodily
training in a state, whereas with me no one takes mercenary service who
is not as capable of endurance as myself.'

"And here, Lacedaemonians, I must tell you what is the bare truth. This
Jason is a man stout of limb and robust of body, with an insatiable
appetite for toil. Equally true is it that he tests the mettle of those
with him day by day. He is always at their head, whether on a field-day
under arms, or in the gymnasium, or on some military expedition. The
weak members of the corps he weeds out, but those whom he sees bear
themselves stout-heartedly in the face of war, like true lovers of
danger and of toil, he honours with double, treble, and quadruple
pay, or with other gifts. On the bed of sickness they will not lack
attendance, nor honour in their graves. Thus every foreigner in his
service knows that his valour in war may obtain for him a livelihood--a
life replete at once with honour and abundance. (2)

 (2) Or, "a life satisfying at once to soul and body."

"Then with some parade he pointed out to me what I knew before, that
the Maracians, and the Dolopians, and Alcetas the hyparch (3) in
Epirus, were already subject to his sway; 'so that I may fairly ask you,
Polydamas,' he proceeded, 'what I have to apprehend that I should not
look on your future subjugation as mere child's play. Perhaps some one
who did not know me, and what manner of man I am, might put it to me:
"Well! Jason, if all you say be true, why do you hesitate? why do you
not march at once against Pharsalia?" For the good reason, I reply, that
it suits me better to win you voluntarily than to annex you against your
wills. Since, if you are forced, you will always be planning all the
mischief you can against me, and I on my side shall be striving
to diminish your power; whereas if you throw in your lot with mine
trustfully and willingly, it is certain we shall do what we can to help
each other. I see and know, Polydamas, that your country fixes her eyes
on one man only, and that is yourself: what I guarantee you, therefore,
is that, if you will dispose her lovingly to myself, I on my side will
raise you up to be the greatest man in Hellas next to me. Listen, while
I tell you what it is in which I offer you the second prize. Listen,
and accept nothing which does not approve itself as true to your own
reasoning. First, is it not plain to us both, that with the adhesion
of Pharsalus and the swarm of pettier states dependent on yourselves,
I shall with infinite ease become Tagos (4) of all the Thessalians; and
then the corollary--Thessaly so united--sixteen thousand cavalry and
more than ten thousand heavy infantry leap into life. Indeed, when I
contemplate the physique and proud carriage of these men, I cannot but
persuade myself that, with proper handling, there is not a nation or
tribe of men to which Thessalians would deign to yield submission. Look
at the broad expanse of Thessaly and consider: when once a Tagos is
established here, all the tribes in a circle round will lie stilled in
subjection; and almost every member of each of these tribes is an archer
born, so that in the light infantry division of the service our power
must needs excel. Furthermore, the Boeotians and all the rest of the
world in arms against Lacedaemon are my allies; they clamour to follow
my banner, if only I will free them from Sparta's yoke. So again the
Athenians, I make sure, will do all they can to gain our alliance; but
with them I do not think we will make friends, for my persuasion is that
empire by sea will be even easier to acquire than empire by land; and
to show you the justice of this reasoning I would have you weigh the
following considerations. With Macedonia, which is the timber-yard (5)
of the Athenian navy, in our hands we shall be able to construct a far
larger fleet than theirs. That stands to reason. And as to men, which
will be the better able to man vessels, think you--Athens, or ourselves
with our stalwart and numerous Penestae? (6) Which will better support
mariners--a nation which, like our own, out of her abundance exports her
corn to foreign parts, or Athens, which, but for foreign purchases, has
not enough to support herself? And so as to wealth in general it is
only natural, is it not, that we, who do not look to a string of little
islands for supplies, but gather the fruits of continental peoples,
should find our resources more copious? As soon as the scattered powers
of Thessaly are gathered into a principality, all the tribes around, I
repeat, will become our tributaries. I need not tell you that the king
of Persia reaps the fruits, not of islands, but of a continent, and he
is the wealthiest of men! But the reduction of Persia will be still more
practicable, I imagine, than that of Hellas, for there the men, save
one, are better versed in slavery than in prowess. Nor have I forgotten,
during the advance of Cyrus, and afterwards under Agesilaus, how scant
the force was before which the Persian quailed.'

 (3) Or, "his underlord in Epirus." By hyparch, I suppose, is implied
    that Alcetas regarded Jason as his suzerain. Diodorus (xv. 13, 36)
    speaks of him as "king" of the Molossians.

 (4) Or, "Prince," and below, "Thessaly so converted into a
    Principality." "The Tagos of Thessaly was not a King, because his
    office was not hereditary or even permanent; neither was he
    exactly a Tyrant, because his office had some sort of legal
    sanction. But he came much nearer to the character either of a
    King or of a Tyrant than to that of a Federal President like the
    General of the Achaians.... Jason of Pherai acts throughout
    like a King, and his will seems at least as uncontrolled as that
    of his brother sovereign beyond the Kambunian hills. Even Jason
    seems to have been looked upon as a Tyrant (see below, 'Hell.' VI.
    iv. 32); possibly, like the Athenian Demos, he himself did not
    refuse the name" (cf. Arist. "Pol." iii. 4, 9).--Freeman, "Hist.
    Fed. Gov." "No True Federation in Thessaly," iv. pp. 152 foll.

 (5) See above, and Hicks, 74.

 (6) Or, "peasantry."

"Such, Lacedaemonians, were the glowing arguments of Jason. In answer
I told him that what he urged was well worth weighing, but that we, the
friends of Lacedaemon, should so, without a quarrel, desert her and rush
into the arms of her opponents, seemed to me sheer madness. Whereat he
praised me, and said that now must he needs cling all the closer to me
if that were my disposition, and so charged me to come to you and
tell you the plain truth, which is, that he is minded to march against
Pharsalus if we will not hearken to him. Accordingly he bade me demand
assistance from you; 'and if they suffer you,' (7) he added, 'so to work
upon them that they will send you a force sufficient to do battle with
me, it is well: we will abide by war's arbitrament, nor quarrel with
the consequence; but if in your eyes that aid is insufficient, look to
yourself. How shall you longer be held blameless before that fatherland
which honours you and in which you fare so well?' (8)

 (7) Or, reading {theoi}, after Cobet; translate "if providentially
    they should send you."

 (8) Reading {kai e su pratteis}, after Cobet. The chief MSS. give {ouk
    ede anegkletos an dikaios eies en te patridi e se tima kai su
    prattois ta kratista}, which might be rendered either, "and how be
    doing best for yourself?"  (lit. "and you would not be doing best
    for yourself," {ouk an} carried on from previous clause), or
    (taking {prattois} as pure optative), "may you be guided to adopt
    the course best for yourself!" "may the best fortune attend you!
    Farewell." See Otto Keller, op. cit. ad loc. for various
    emendations.

"These are the matters," Polydamas continued, "which have brought me to
Lacedaemon. I have told you the whole story; it is based partly on what
I see to be the case, and partly on what I have heard from yonder man.
My firm belief is, men of Lacedaemon, that if you are likely to despatch
a force sufficient, not in my eyes only, but in the eyes of all the rest
of Thessaly, to cope with Jason in war, the states will revolt from
him, for they are all in alarm as to the future development of the man's
power; but if you think a company of newly-enfranchised slaves and any
amateur general will suffice, I advise you to rest in peace. You may
take my word for it, you will have a great power to contend against, and
a man who is so prudent a general that, in all he essays to do, be it an
affair of secrecy, or speed, or force, he is wont to hit the mark of his
endeavours: one who is skilled, should occasion serve, to make the night
of equal service to him with the day; (9) or, if speed be needful,
will labour on while breakfasting or taking an evening meal. And as for
repose, he thinks that the time for it has come when the goal is reached
or the business on hand accomplished. And to this same practice he
has habituated those about him. Right well he knows how to reward the
expectations of his soldiers, when by the extra toil which makes the
difference they have achieved success; so that in his school all have
laid to heart that maxim, 'Pain first and pleasure after.' (10) And
in regard to pleasure of the senses, of all men I know, he is the most
continent; so that these also are powerless to make him idle at the
expense of duty. You must consider the matter then and tell me, as
befits you, what you can and will do."

 (9) See "Cyrop." III. i. 19.

 (10) For this sentiment, see "Mem." II. i. 20 et passim.

Such were the representations of Polydamas. The Lacedaemonians, for the
time being, deferred their answer; but after calculating the next
day and the day following how many divisions (11) they had on foreign
service, and how many ships on the coast of Laconia to deal with the
foreign squadron of the Athenians, and taking also into account the war
with their neighbours, they gave their answer to Polydamas: "For the
present they would not be able to send him sufficient aid: under the
circumstances they advised him to go back and make the best settlement
he could of his own affairs and those of his city." He, thanking the
Lacedaemonians for their straightforwardness, withdrew.

 (11) Lit. "morai."

The citadel of Pharsalus he begged Jason not to force him to give up:
his desire was to preserve it for those who had entrusted it to his safe
keeping; his own sons Jason was free to take as hostages, and he would
do his best to procure for him the voluntary adhesion of his city by
persuasion, and in every way to further his appointment as Tagos of
Thessaly. Accordingly, after interchange of solemn assurances between
the pair, the Pharsalians were let alone and in peace, and ere long
Jason was, by general consent, appointed Tagos of all the Thessalians.
Once fairly vested with that authority, he drew up a list of the cavalry
and heavy infantry which the several states were capable of furnishing
as their quota, with the result that his cavalry, inclusive of allies,
numbered more than eight thousand, while his infantry force was computed
at not less than twenty thousand; and his light troops would have been a
match for those of the whole world--the mere enumeration of their cities
would be a labour in itself. (12) His next act was a summons to all the
dwellers round (13) to pay tribute exactly the amount imposed in the
days of Scopas. (14) And here in this state of accomplishment we may
leave these matters. I return to the point reached when this digression
into the affairs of Jason began.

 (12) See "Cyrop." I. i. 5.

 (13) Lit. perioeci.

 (14) It is conjectured that the Scopadae ruled at Pherae and Cranusa
    in the earlier half of the fifth century B.C.; see, for the change
    of dynasty, what is said of Lycophron of Pherae in "Hell." II.
    iii. 4. There was a famous Scopas, son of Creon, to whom Simonides
    addressed his poem--

{Andr' agathon men alatheos genesthai khalepon khersin te kai posi kai
noo tetragonon, aneu psogou tetugmenon.}

a sentiment criticised by Plato, "Protag." 359 A. "Now Simonides says to
Scopas, the son of Creon, the Thessalian:

'Hardly on the one hand can a man become truly good; built four-square
in hands and feet and mind, a work without a flaw.'

Do you know the poem?"--Jowett, "Plat." i. 153. But whether this Scopas
is the Scopas of our text and a hero of Jason's is not clear.



II

B.C. 374. The Lacedaemonians and their allies were collecting in
Phocia, and the Thebans, after retreating into their own territory,
were guarding the approaches. At this juncture the Athenians, seeing the
Thebans growing strong at their expense without contributing a single
penny to the maintenance of the fleet, while they themselves, what
with money contributions, and piratical attacks from Aegina, and the
garrisoning of their territory, were being pared to the bone, conceived
a desire to cease from war. In this mood they sent an embassy to
Lacedaemon and concluded peace. (1)

 (1) See Curtius, "H. G." vol. iv. p. 376 (Eng. trans.)

B.C. 374-373. This done, two of the ambassadors, in obedience to a
decree of the state, set sail at once from Laconian territory, bearing
orders to Timotheus to sail home, since peace was established. That
officer, while obeying his orders, availed himself of the homeward
voyage to land certain Zacynthian exiles (2) on their native soil,
whereupon the Zacynthian city party sent to Lacedaemon and complained of
the treatment they had received from Timotheus; and the Lacedaemonians,
without further consideration, decided that the Athenians were in the
wrong, and proceeded to equip another navy, and at length collected from
Laconia itself, from Corinth, Leucas, (3) Ambracia, Elis, Zacynthus,
Achaia, Epidaurus, Troezen, Hermione, and Halieis, a force amounting
to sixty sail. In command of this squadron they appointed Mnasippus
admiral, with orders to attack Corcyra, and in general to look after
their interests in those seas. They, moreover, sent an embassy to
Dionysius, instructing him that his interests would be advanced by the
withdrawal of Corcyra from Athenian hands.

 (2) See Hicks, 81, p. 142.

 (3) Ibid. 81, 86.

B.C. 373. Accordingly Mnasippus set sail, as soon as his squadron was
ready, direct to Corcyra; he took with him, besides his troops from
Lacedaemon, a body of mercenaries, making a total in all of no less
than fifteen hundred men. His disembarked, and soon became master of the
island, the country district falling a prey to the spoiler. It was in
a high state of cultivation, and rich with fruit-trees, not to speak of
magnificent dwelling-houses and wine-cellars fitted up on the farms: so
that, it was said, the soldiers reached such a pitch of luxury that they
refused to drink wine which had not a fine bouquet. A crowd of slaves,
too, and fat beasts were captured on the estates.

The general's next move was to encamp with his land forces about
three-quarters of a mile (4) from the city district, so that any
Corcyraean who attempted to leave the city to go into the country would
certainly be cut off on that side. The fleet he stationed on the other
side of the city, at a point where he calculated on detecting and
preventing the approach of convoys. Besides which he established a
blockade in front of the harbour when the weather permitted. In this way
the city was completely invested.

 (4) Lit. "five stades."

The Corcyraeans, on their side, were in the sorest straits. They could
get nothing from their soil owing to the vice in which they were gripped
by land, whilst owing to the predominance of the enemy at sea nothing
could be imported. Accordingly they sent to the Athenians and begged for
their assistance. They urged upon them that it would be a great mistake
if they suffered themselves to be robbed of Corcyra. If they did so,
they would not only throw away a great advantage to themselves, but add
a considerable strength to their enemy; since, with the exception of
Athens, no state was capable of furnishing a larger fleet or revenue.
Moreover, Corcyra lay favourably (5) for commanding the Corinthian gulf
and the cities which line its shores; it was splendidly situated for
injuring the rural districts of Laconia, and still more splendidly in
relation to the opposite shores of the continent of Epirus, and the
passage between Peloponnesus and Sicily.

 (5) See Thuc. i. 36.

This appeal did not fall on deaf ears. The Athenians were persuaded
that the matter demanded their most serious attention, and they at once
despatched Stesicles as general, (6) with about six hundred peltasts.
They also requested Alcetas to help them in getting their troops across.
Thus under cover of night the whole body were conveyed across to a point
in the open country, and found their way into the city. Nor was that
all. The Athenians passed a decree to man sixty ships of war, and
elected (7) Timotheus admiral. The latter, being unable to man the fleet
on the spot, set sail on a cruise to the islands and tried to make up
the complements of his crews from those quarters. He evidently looked
upon it as no light matter to sail round Peloponnesus as if on a voyage
of pleasure, and to attack a fleet in the perfection of training. (8) To
the Athenians, however, it seemed that he was wasting the precious time
seasonable for the coastal voyage, and they were not disposed to condone
such an error, but deposed him, appointing Iphicrates in his stead.
The new general was no sooner appointed than he set about getting
his vessels manned with the utmost activity, putting pressure on the
trierarchs. He further procured from the Athenians for his use not
only any vessels cruising on the coast of Attica, but the Paralus and
Salaminia (9) also, remarking that, if things turned out well yonder,
he would soon send them back plenty of ships. Thus his numbers grew to
something like seventy sail.

 (6) The name of the general was Ctesicles, according to Diod. xv. 47.
    Read {strategon} for {tagon}, with Breitenbach, Cobet, etc. For
    Alcetas, see above, "Hell." VI. i. 7.

 (7) I.e. by show of hands, {ekheirotonoun}.

 (8) See Jowett, note to Thuc. VIII. xcv. 2, ii. p. 525.

 (9) The two sacred galleys. See Thuc. iii. 33; Aristoph. "Birds," 147
    foll.

Meanwhile the Corcyraeans were sore beset with famine: desertion became
every day more frequent, so much so that Mnasippus caused proclamation
to be made by herald that all deserters would be sold there and then;
(10) and when that had no effect in lessening the stream of runaways,
he ended by driving them back with the lash. Those within the walls,
however, were not disposed to receive these miserable slaves within
the lines, and numbers died outside. Mnasippus, not blind to what was
happening, soon persuaded himself that he had as good as got the city
into his possession: and he began to try experiments on his mercenaries.
Some of them he had already paid off; (11) others still in his service
had as much as two months' pay owing to them by the general, who, if
report spoke true, had no lack of money, since the majority of the
states, not caring for a campaign across the seas, sent him hard cash
instead of men. But now the beleaguered citizens, who could espy
from their towers that the outposts were less carefully guarded than
formerly, and the men scattered about the rural districts, made a
sortie, capturing some and cutting down others. Mnasippus, perceiving
the attack, donned his armour, and, with all the heavy troops he had,
rushed to the rescue, giving orders to the captains and brigadiers (12)
to lead out the mercenaries. Some of the captains answered that it
was not so easy to command obedience when the necessaries of life were
lacking; whereat the Spartan struck one man with his staff, and another
with the butt of his spear. Without spirit and full of resentment
against their general, the men mustered--a condition very unfavourable
to success in battle. Having drawn up the troops, the general in person
repulsed the division of the enemy which was opposite the gates, and
pursued them closely; but these, rallying close under their walls,
turned right about, and from under cover of the tombs kept up a
continuous discharge of darts and other missiles; other detachments,
dashing out at other gates, meanwhile fell heavily on the flanks of the
enemy. The Lacedaemonians, being drawn up eight deep, and thinking that
the wing of their phalanx was of inadequate strength, essayed to wheel
around; but as soon as they began the movement the Corcyraeans attacked
them as if they were fleeing, and they were then unable to recover
themselves, (13) while the troops next in position abandoned themselves
to flight. Mnasippus, unable to succour those who were being pressed
owing to the attack of the enemy immediately in front, found himself
left from moment to moment with decreasing numbers. At last the
Corcyraeans collected, and with one united effort made a final rush upon
Mnasippus and his men, whose numbers were now considerably reduced.
At the same instant the townsmen, (14) eagerly noticing the posture of
affairs, rushed out to play their part. First Mnasippus was slain, and
then the pursuit became general; nor could the pursuers well have failed
to capture the camp, barricade and all, had they not caught sight of
the mob of traffickers with a long array of attendants and slaves, and
thinking that here was a prize indeed, desisted from further chase.

 (10) Or, "he would knock them all down to the hammer."

 (11) Or, "cut off from their pay."

 (12) Lit. "lochagoi and taxiarchs."

 (13) Or, "to retaliate"; or, "to complete the movement."

 (14) Reading, after Dindorf, {oi politai}, or, if with the MSS., {oi
    oplitai}; translate "the heavy-armed among the assailants saw
    their advantage and pressed on."

The Corcyraeans were well content for the moment to set up a trophy
and to give back the enemy's dead under a flag of truce; but the
after-consequences were even more important to them in the revival of
strength and spirits which were sunk in despondency. The rumour spread
that Iphicrates would soon be there--he was even at the doors; and in
fact the Corcyraeans themselves were manning a fleet. So Hypermenes,
who was second in command to Mnasippus and the bearer of his despatches,
manned every vessel of the fleet as full as it would hold, and then
sailing round to the entrenched camp, filled all the transports with
prisoners and valuables and other stock, and sent them off. He himself,
with his marines and the survivors of his troops, kept watch over the
entrenchments; but at last even this remnant in the excess of panic and
confusion got on board the men-of-war and sailed off, leaving behind
them vast quantities of corn and wine, with numerous prisoners and
invalided soldiers. The fact was, they were sorely afraid of being
caught by the Athenians in the island, and so they made safely off to
Leucas.

Meanwhile Iphicrates had commenced his voyage of circumnavigation,
partly voyaging and partly making every preparation for an engagement.
He at once left his large sails behind him, as the voyage was only to
be the prelude of a battle; his flying jibs, even if there was a good
breeze, were but little used, since by making his progress depend on
sheer rowing, he hoped at once to improve the physique of his men and
the speed of his attack. Often when the squadron was about to put into
shore for the purpose of breakfast or supper, he would seize the moment,
and draw back the leading wing of the column from the land off the point
in question; and then facing round again with the triremes posted well
in line, prow for prow, at a given signal let loose the whole fleet in a
stoutly contested race for the shore. Great was the triumph in being the
first to take in water or whatever else they might need, or the first to
breakfast; just as it was a heavy penalty on the late-comers, not only
to come short in all these objects of desire, but to have to put out
to sea with the rest as soon as the signal was given; since the
first-comers had altogether a quiet time of it, whilst the hindmost must
get through the whole business in hot haste. So again, in the matter
of outposts, if he chanced to be getting the morning meal on hostile
territory, pickets would be posted, as was right and proper, on the
land; but, apart from these, he would raise his masts and keep look-out
men on the maintops. These commanded of course a far wider prospect from
their lofty perches than the outposts on the level ground. So too, when
he dined or slept he had no fires burning in the camp at night, but
only a beacon kindled in front of the encampment to prevent any unseen
approach; and frequently in fine weather he put out to sea immediately
after the evening meal, when, if the breeze favoured, they ran along and
took their rest simultaneously, or if they depended on oars he gave his
mariners repose by turns. During the voyage in daytime he would at
one time signal to "sail in column," and at another signal "abreast in
line." So that whilst they prosecuted the voyage they at the same time
became (both as to theory and practice) well versed in all the details
of an engagement before they reached the open sea--a sea, as they
imagined, occupied by their foes. For the most part they breakfasted
and dined on hostile territory; but as he confined himself to bare
necessaries he was always too quick for the enemy. Before the hostile
reinforcement would come up he had finished his business and was out to
sea again.

At the date of Mnasippus's death he chanced to be off Sphagiae in
Laconian territory. Reaching Elis, and coasting past the mouth of the
Alpheus, he came to moorings under Cape Ichthus, (15) as it is called.
The next day he put out from that port for Cephallenia, so drawing up
his line and conducting the voyage that he might be prepared in every
detail to engage if necessary. The tale about Mnasippus and his demise
had reached him, but he had not heard it from an eye-witness, and
suspected that it might have been invented to deceive him and throw him
off his guard. He was therefore on the look-out. It was, in fact, only
on arrival in Cephallenia that he learned the news in an explicit form,
and gave his troops rest.

 (15) Cape Fish, mod. Cape Katakolon, protecting harbour of Pyrgos in
    Elis.

I am well aware that all these details of practice and manouvring are
customary in anticipation of a sea-fight, but what I single out for
praise in the case before us is the skill with which the Athenian
admiral attained a twofold object. Bearing in mind that it was his duty
to reach a certain point at which he expected to fight a naval battle
without delay, it was a happy discovery on his part not to allow
tactical skill, on the one hand, to be sacrificed to the pace of
sailing, (16) nor, on the other, the need of training to interfere with
the date of arrival.

 (16) Lit. "the voyage."

After reducing the towns of Cephallenia, Iphicrates sailed to Corcyra.
There the first news he heard was that the triremes sent by Dionysius
were expected to relieve the Lacedaemonians. On receipt of this
information he set off in person and surveyed the country, in order
to find a spot from which it would be possible to see the vessels
approaching and to signal to the city. Here he stationed his look-out
men. A code of signals was agreed upon to signify "vessels in sight,"
"mooring," etc.; which done he gave his orders to twenty of his captains
of men-of-war who were to follow him at a given word of command. Any one
who failed to follow him must not grumble at the penalty; that he warned
them. Presently the vessels were signalled approaching; the word of
command was given, and then the enthusiasm was a sight to see--every
man of the crews told off for the expedition racing to join his ship and
embark. Sailing to the point where the enemy's vessels lay, he had no
difficulty in capturing the crews, who had disembarked from all the
ships with one exception. The exception was that of Melanippus the
Rhodian, who had advised the other captains not to stop at this point,
and had then manned his own vessel and sailed off. Thus he encountered
the ships of Iphicrates, but contrived to slip through his fingers,
while the whole of the Syracusan vessels were captured, crews and all.

Having cut the beaks off the prows, Iphicrates bore down into the
harbour of Corcyra with the captured triremes in tow. With the captive
crews themselves he came to an agreement that each should pay a fixed
sum as ransom, with one exception, that of Crinippus, their commander.
Him he kept under guard, with the intention apparently of exacting a
handsome sum in his case or else of selling him. The prisoner, however,
from vexation of spirit, put an end to his own life. The rest were sent
about their business by Iphicrates, who accepted the Corcyraeans as
sureties for the money. His own sailors he supported for the most part
as labourers on the lands of the Corcyraeans, while at the head of his
light infantry and the hoplites of the contingent he crossed over into
Acarnania, and there lent his aid to any friendly state that needed his
services; besides which he went to war with the Thyrians, (17) a sturdy
race of warriors in possession of a strong fortress.

 (17) Thyreum (or Thyrium), in Acarnania, a chief city at the time of
    the Roman wars in Greece; and according to Polybius (xxxviii. 5),
    a meeting-place of the League on one occasion. See "Dict. Anct.
    Geog." s.v.; Freeman, op. cit. iv. 148; cf. Paus. IV. xxvi. 3, in
    reference to the Messenians and Naupactus; Grote, "H. G." x. 212.

B.C. 372. Having attached to his squadron the navy also of Corcyra,
with a fleet numbering now about ninety ships he set sail, in the first
instance to Cephallenia, where he exacted money--which was in some cases
voluntarily paid, in others forcibly extorted. In the next place
he began making preparations partly to harass the territory of the
Lacedaemonians, and partly to win over voluntarily the other states in
that quarter which were hostile to Athens; or in case of refusal to go
to war with them.

The whole conduct of the campaign reflects, I think, the highest credit
on Iphicrates. If his strategy was admirable, so too was the instinct
which led him to advise the association with himself of two such
colleagues as Callistratus and Chabrias--the former a popular orator
but no great friend of himself politically, (18) the other a man of
high military reputation. Either he looked upon them as men of unusual
sagacity, and wished to profit by their advice, in which case I
commend the good sense of the arrangement, or they were, in his belief,
antagonists, in which case the determination to approve himself a
consummate general, neither indolent nor incautious, was bold, I admit,
but indicative of a laudable self-confidence. Here, however, we must
part with Iphicrates and his achievements to return to Athens.

 (18) Reading with the MSS. {ou mala epitedeion onta}. See Grote, "H.
    G." x. 206. Boeckh ("P. E. A.," trans. Cornewall Lewis, p. 419)
    wished to read {eu mala} for {ou mala k.t.l.}, in which case
    translate "the former a popular orator, and a man of singular
    capacity"; and for {epitedeion} in that sense, see "Hipparch." i.
    8; for {eu mala}, see "Hipparch." i. 25. For details concerning
    Callistratus, see Dindorf, op. cit. note ad. loc.; Curtius, "H.
    G." iv. 367, 381 foll., v. 90. For Chabrias, Rehdantz, op. cit. In
    the next sentence I have again adhered to the reading of the MSS.,
    but the passage is commonly regarded as corrupt; see Otto Keller,
    op. cit. p. 215 for various emendations.



III

The Athenians, forced to witness the expatriation from Boeotia of their
friends the Plataeans (who had sought an asylum with themselves), forced
also to listen to the supplications of the Thespiaeans (who begged them
not to suffer them to be robbed of their city), could no longer
regard the Thebans with favour; (1) though, when it came to a direct
declaration of war, they were checked in part by a feeling of shame, and
partly by considerations of expediency. Still, to go hand in hand with
them, to be a party to their proceedings, this they absolutely refused,
now that they saw them marching against time-honoured friends of the
city like the Phocians, and blotting out states whose loyalty in the
great Persian war was conspicuous no less than their friendship to
Athens. Accordingly the People passed a decree to make peace; but in the
first instance they sent an embassy to Thebes, inviting that state to
join them if it pleased them on an embassy which they proposed to send
to Lacedaemon to treat of peace. In the next place they despatched such
an embassy on their own account. Among the commissioners appointed
were Callias the son of Hipponicus, Autocles the son of Strombichides,
Demostratus the son of Aristophon, Aristocles, Cephisodotus, (2)
Melanopus, and Lycaethus.

 (1) Plataea destroyed in B.C. 373. See Jowett, "Thuc." ii. 397.

 (2) See below, "Hell." VII. i. 12; Hicks, 87.

B.C. 371. (These were formally introduced to the Deputies of the
Lacedaemonians and the allies. (3)) Nor ought the name of Callistratus
to be omitted. That statesman and orator was present. He had obtained
furlough from Iphicrates on an undertaking either to send money for
the fleet or to arrange a peace. Hence his arrival in Athens and
transactions in behalf of peace. After being introduced to the assembly
(4) of the Lacedaemonians and to the allies, Callias, (5) who was the
dadouchos (or torch-holder) in the mysteries, made the first speech.
He was a man just as well pleased to praise himself as to hear himself
praised by others. He opened the proceedings as follows:

 (3) The bracketed words read like an annotator's comment, or possibly
    they are a note by the author.

 (4) See above, "Hell." II. iv. 38.

 (5) See above, "Hell." IV. v. 13; Cobet, "Prosop. Xen." p. 67 foll.;
    Xen. "Symp."; Plat. "Protag."; Andoc. "de Myst." If this is one
    and the same person he must have been an elderly man at this date,
    371 B.C.

"Lacedaemonians, the duty of representing you as proxenos at Athens is
a privilege which I am not the first member of my family to enjoy; my
father's father held it as an heirloom of our family and handed it down
as a heritage to his descendants. If you will permit me, I should like
to show you the disposition of my fatherland towards yourselves. If in
times of war she chooses us as her generals, so when her heart is set
upon quiet she sends us out as her messengers of peace. I myself have
twice already (6) stood here to treat for conclusion of war, and on both
embassies succeeded in arranging a mutually agreeable peace. Now for
the third time I am come, and I flatter myself that to-day again I shall
obtain a reconciliation, and on grounds exceptionally just. My eyes bear
witness that our hearts are in accord; you and we alike are pained at
the effacement of Plataeae and Thespiae. Is it not then reasonable that
out of agreement should spring concord rather than discord? It is never
the part, I take it, of wise men to raise the standard of war for the
sake of petty differences; but where there is nothing but unanimity they
must be marvellous folk who refuse the bond of peace. But I go further.
It were just and right on our parts even to refuse to bear arms against
each other; since, as the story runs, the first strangers to whom our
forefather Triptolemus showed the unspeakable mystic rites of Demeter
and Core, the mother and the maiden, were your ancestors;--I speak of
Heracles, the first founder of your state, and of your two citizens, the
great twin sons of Zeus--and to Peloponnesus first he gave as a gift the
seed of Demeter's corn-fruits. How, then, can it be just or right either
that you should come and ravage the corn crops of those from whom you
got the sacred seed of corn, or that we should not desire that they to
whom the gift was given should share abundantly of this boon? But if, as
it would seem, it is a fixed decree of heaven that war shall never cease
among men, yet ought we--your people and our people--to be as slow as
possible to begin it, and being in it, as swift as possible to bring it
to an end."

 (6) B.C. 387 and 374; see Curtius, "H. G." vol. iv. p. 376 (Eng. ed.)

After him Autocles (7) spoke: he was of repute as a versatile lawyer and
orator, and addressed the meeting as follows: "Lacedaemonians, I do not
conceal from myself that what I am about to say is not calculated to
please you, but it seems to me that, if you wish the friendship which
we are cementing to last as long as possible, we are wise to show each
other the underlying causes of our wars. Now, you are perpetually saying
that the states ought to be independent; but it is you yourselves
who most of all stand in the way of independence--your first and last
stipulation with the allied states being that they should follow you
whithersoever you choose to lead; and yet what has this principle of
follow-my-leader got to do with independent action? (8) Again, you pick
quarrels without consulting your allies, and lead them against those
whom you account enemies; so that in many cases, with all their vaunted
independence, they are forced to march against their greatest friends;
and, what is still more opposed to independence than all else, you
are for ever setting up here your decarchies and there your thirty
commissioners, and your chief aim in appointing these officers and
governors seems to be, not that they should fulfil their office and
govern legally, but that they should be able to keep the cities under
their heels by sheer force. So that it looks as if you delighted in
despotisms rather than free constitutions. Let us go back to the date
(9) at which the Persian king enjoined the independence of the states.
At that time you made no secret of your conviction that the Thebans, if
they did not suffer each state to govern itself and to use the laws
of its own choice, would be failing to act in the spirit of the king's
rescript. But no sooner had you got hold of Cadmeia than you would not
suffer the Thebans themselves to be independent. Now, if the maintenance
of friendship be an object, it is no use for people to claim justice
from others while they themselves are doing all they can to prove the
selfishness of their aims."

 (7) For the political views of Autocles, see Curtius, "H. G." iv. 387,
    v. 94 (Eng. tr.); see also Grote, "H. G." x. 225.

 (8) Or, "what consistency is there between these precepts of yours and
    political independence?"

 (9) Sixteen years before--B.C. 387. See "Pol. Lac." xiv. 5.

These remarks were received in absolute silence, yet in the hearts of
those who were annoyed with Lacedaemon they stirred pleasure. After
Autocles spoke Callistratus: "Trespasses, men of Lacedaemon, have been
committed on both sides, yours and ours, I am free to confess; but still
it is not my view that because a man has done wrong we can never again
have dealings with him. Experience tells me that no man can go very far
without a slip, and it seems to me that sometimes the transgressor by
reason of his transgression becomes more tractable, especially if he be
chastened through the error he has committed, as has been the case with
us. And so on your own case I see that ungenerous acts have sometimes
reaped their own proper reward: blow has been met by counter-blow; and
as a specimen I take the seizure of the Cadmeia in Thebes. To-day, at
any rate, the very cities whose independence you strove for have, since
your unrighteous treatment of Thebes, fallen one and all of them again
into her power. (10) We are schooled now, both of us, to know that
grasping brings not gain. We are prepared, I hope, to be once more
moderate under the influence of a mutual friendship. Some, I know, in
their desire to render our peace (11) abortive accuse us falsely, as
though we were come hither, not seeking friendship, but because we
dread the arrival of some (12) Antalcidas with moneys from the king. But
consider, what arrant nonsense they talk! Was it not, pray, the great
king who demanded that all the states in Hellas should be independent?
and what have we Athenians, who are in full agreement with the king,
both in word and deed, to fear from him? Or is it conceivable that he
prefers spending money in making others great to finding his favourite
projects realised without expense?

 (10) Reading, with Breitenbach and Hartman, {as} instead of {os
    espoudasate k.t.l.}

 (11) Or, more lit. "to avert the peace" as an ill-omened thing.

 (12) Without inserting {tis}, as Hartman proposes ("An. Xen." p. 387),
    that, I think, is the sense. Antalcidas is the arch-diplomat--a
    name to conjure with, like that of Bismarck in modern European
    politics. But see Grote, "H. G." x. 213, note 2.

"Well! what is it really that has brought us here? No especial need
or difficulty in our affairs. That you may discover by a glance at our
maritime condition, or, if you prefer, at the present posture of our
affairs on land. Well, then, how does the matter stand? It is obvious
that some of our allies please us no better than they please you; (13)
and, possibly, in return for your former preservation of us, we may be
credited with a desire to point out to you the soundness of our policy.

 (13) See, for this corrupt passage, Otto Keller, op. cit. p. 219;
    Hartman, op. cit. p. 387; and Breitenbach, n. ad loc. In the next
    sentence I should like to adopt Hartman's emendation (ib.) {on
    orthos egnote} for the MSS. {a orthos egnomen}, and translate "we
    may like to prove to you the soundness of your policy at the
    time." For the "preservation" referred to, see below, VI. v. 35,
    and above, II. ii. 20.

"But, to revert once more to the topic of expediency and common
interests. It is admitted, I presume, that, looking at the states
collectively, half support your views, half ours; and in every single
state one party is for Sparta and another for Athens. Suppose, then,
we were to shake hands, from what quarter can we reasonably anticipate
danger and trouble? To put the case in so many words, so long as you
are our friends no one can vex us by land; no one, whilst we are your
supports, can injure you by sea. Wars like tempests gather and grow to a
head from time to time, and again they are dispelled. That we all know.
Some future day, if not to-day, we shall crave, both of us, for peace.
Why, then, need we wait for that moment, holding on until we expire
under the multitude of our ills, rather than take time by the forelock
and, before some irremediable mischief betide, make peace? I cannot
admire the man who, because he has entered the lists and has scored many
a victory and obtained to himself renown, is so eaten up with the spirit
of rivalry that he must needs go on until he is beaten and all his
training is made futile. Nor again do I praise the gambler who, if he
makes one good stroke of luck, insists on doubling the stakes. Such
conduct in the majority of cases must end in absolute collapse. Let us
lay the lesson of these to heart, and forbear to enter into any such
lists as theirs for life or death; but, while we are yet in the heyday
of our strength and fortune, shake hands in mutual amity. So assuredly
shall we through you and you through us attain to an unprecedented
pinnacle of glory throughout Hellas."

The arguments of the speakers were approved, and the Lacedaemonians
passed a resolution to accept peace on a threefold basis: the withdrawal
of the governors from the cities, (14) the disbanding of armaments naval
and military, and the guarantee of independence to the states. "If any
state transgressed these stipulations, it lay at the option of any power
whatsoever to aid the states so injured, while, conversely, to bring
such aid was not compulsory on any power against its will." On these
terms the oaths were administered and accepted by the Lacedaemonians on
behalf of themselves and their allies, and by the Athenians and
their allies separately state by state. The Thebans had entered their
individual name among the states which accepted the oaths, but their
ambassadors came the next day with instructions to alter the name of
the signatories, substituting for Thebans Boeotians. (15) But Agesilaus
answered to this demand that he would alter nothing of what they had in
the first instance sworn to and subscribed. If they did not wish to
be included in the treaty, he was willing to erase their name at their
bidding. So it came to pass that the rest of the world made peace, the
sole point of dispute being confined to the Thebans; and the Athenians
came to the conclusion that there was a fair prospect of the Thebans
being now literally decimated. (16) As to the Thebans themselves, they
retired from Sparta in utter despondency.

 (14) Grote ("H. G." x. 236) thinks that Diod. xv. 38 ({exagogeis})
    belongs to this time, not to the peace between Athens and Sparta
    in 374 B.C.

 (15) See, for a clear explanation of the matter, Freeman, "Hist. Red.
    Gov." iv. p. 175, note 3, in reference to Grote, ib. x. 231 note,
    and Paus. IX. xiii. 2; Plut. "Ages." 28; Thirlwall, "H. G." v. p
    69 note.

 (16) Or, "as the saying is, taken and tithed." See below, VI. v. 35,
    and for the origin of the saying, Herod. vii. 132.



IV

In consequence of the peace the Athenians proceeded to withdraw their
garrisons from the different sates, and sent to recall Iphicrates with
his fleet; besides which they forced him to restore everything captured
subsequently to the late solemn undertaking at Lacedaemon. The
Lacedaemonians acted differently. Although they withdrew their governors
and garrisons from the other states, in Phocis they did not do so. Here
Cleombrotus was quartered with his army, and had sent to ask directions
from the home authorities. A speaker, Prothous, maintained that their
business was to disband the army in accordance with their oaths, and
then to send round invitations to the states to contribute what each
felt individually disposed, and lay such sum in the temple of Apollo;
after which, if any attempt to hinder the independence of the states on
any side were manifested, it would be time enough then again to invite
all who cared to protect the principle of autonomy to march against its
opponents. "In this way," he added, "I think the goodwill of heaven
will be secured, and the states will suffer least annoyance." But the
Assembly, on hearing these views, agreed that this man was talking
nonsense. Puppets in the hands of fate! (1) An unseen power, it would
seem, was already driving them onwards; so they sent instructions to
Cleombrotus not to disband the army, but to march straight against
the Thebans if they refused to recognise the autonomy of the states.
(Cleombrotus, it is understood, had, on hearing the news of the
establishment of peace, sent to the ephorate to ask for guidance;
and then they sent him the above instructions, bidding him under the
circumstances named to march upon Thebes. (2))

 (1) See Grote, "H. G." x. 237: "The miso-Theban impulse now drove them
    on with a fury which overcame all other thoughts... a
    misguiding inspiration sent by the gods--like that of the Homeric
    Ate."

 (2) This passage reads like an earlier version for which the above was
    substituted by the author.

The Spartan king soon perceived that, so far from leaving the Boeotian
states their autonomy, the Thebans were not even preparing to disband
their army, clearly in view of a general engagement; he therefore felt
justified in marching his troops into Boeotia. The point of ingress
which he adopted was not that which the Thebans anticipated from Phocis,
and where they were keeping guard at a defile; but, marching through
Thisbae by a mountainous and unsuspected route, he arrived before
Creusis, taking that fortress and capturing twelve Theban war-vessels
besides. After this achievement he advanced from the seaboard and
encamped in Leuctra on Thespian territory. The Thebans encamped in
a rising ground immediately opposite at no great distance, and were
supported by no allies except the Boeotians.

At this juncture the friends of Cleombrotus came to him and urged upon
him strong reasons for delivering battle. "If you let the Thebans escape
without a battle," they said, "you will run great risks of suffering
the extreme penalty at the hands of the state. People will call to mind
against you the time when you reached Cynoscephelae and did not ravage a
square foot of Theban territory; and again, a subsequent expedition when
you were driven back foiled in your attempt to make an entry into the
enemy's country--while Agesilaus on each occasion found his entry
by Mount Cithaeron. If then you have any care for yourself, or any
attachment to your fatherland, march you against the enemy." That was
what his friends urged. As to his opponents, what they said was, "Now
our fine friend will show whether he really is so concerned on behalf of
the Thebans as he is said to be."

Cleombrotus, with these words ringing in his ears, felt driven (3) to
join battle. On their side the leaders of Thebes calculated that, if
they did not fight, their provincial cities (4) would hold aloof from
them and Thebes itself would be besieged; while, if the commonalty of
Thebes failed to get supplies, there was every prospect that the city
itself would turn against them; and, seeing that many of them had
already tasted the bitterness of exile, they came to the conclusion that
it was better for them to die on the field of battle than to renew that
experience. Besides this they were somewhat encouraged by the recital of
an oracle which predicted that the Lacedaemonians would be defeated
on the spot where the monument of the maidens stood, who, as the story
goes, being violated by certain Lacedaemonians, had slain themselves.
(5) This sepulchral monument the Thebans decked with ornaments before
the battle. Furthermore, tidings were brought them from the city that
all the temples had opened of their own accord; and the priestesses
asserted that the gods revealed victory. Again, from the Heracleion
men said that the arms had disappeared, as though Heracles himself had
sallied forth to battle. It is true that another interpretation (6)
of these marvels made them out to be one and all the artifices of the
leaders of Thebes. However this may be, everything in the battle turned
out adverse to the Lacedaemonians; while fortune herself lent aid to
the Thebans and crowned their efforts with success. Cleombrotus held his
last council "whether to fight or not," after the morning meal. In the
heat of noon a little goes a long way; and the people said that it took
a somewhat provocative effect on their spirits. (7)

 (3) Or, "was provoked."

 (4) Lit. "perioecid." See Thuc. iv. 76, Arnold's note, and "Hell." V.
    iv. 46, 63.

 (5) See Diod. xv. 54; Paus. IX. xiii. 3; Plut. "Pelop." xx.

 (6) Or, "it is true that some people made out these marvels."

 (7) Or, "they were somewhat excited by it."

Both sides were now arming, and there was the unmistakeable signs of
approaching battle, when, as the first incident, there issued from the
Boeotian lines a long train bent on departure--these were the furnishers
of the market, a detachment of baggage bearers, and in general such
people as had no inclination to join in the fight. These were met on
their retreat and attacked by the mercenary troops under Hiero, who got
round them by a circular movement. (8) The mercenaries were supported by
the Phocian light infantry and some squadrons of Heracleot and Phliasian
cavalry, who fell upon the retiring train and turned them back, pursuing
them and driving them into the camp of the Boeotians. The immediate
effect was to make the Boeotian portion of the army more numerous and
closer packed than before. The next feature of the combat was that in
consequence of the flat space of plain (9) between the opposing armies,
the Lacedaemonians posted their cavalry in front of their squares
of infantry, and the Thebans followed suit. Only there was this
difference--the Theban cavalry was in a high state of training and
efficiency, owing to their war with the Orchomenians and again their war
with Thespiae, whilst the cavalry of the Lacedaemonians was at its worst
at this period. (10) The horses were reared and kept by the wealthiest
members of the state; but whenever the ban was called out, an appointed
trooper appeared who took the horse with any sort of arms which might
be presented to him, and set off on the expedition at a moment's notice.
Moreover, these troopers were the least able-bodied of the men: raw
recruits set simply astride their horses, and devoid of soldierly
ambition. Such was the cavalry of either antagonist.

 (8) Or, "surrounded them."

 (9) See Rustow and Kochly, op. cit. p. 173.

 (10) See "Hipparch." ix. 4; also "Cyrop." VIII. viii.

The heavy infantry of the Lacedaemonians, it is said, advanced by
sections three files abreast, (11) allowing a total depth to the whole
line of not more than twelve. The Thebans were formed in close order of
not less than fifty shields deep, calculating that victory gained over
the king's division of the army implied the easy conquest of the rest.

 (11) It would appear that the "enomoty" (section) numbered thirty-six
    files. See "Pol. Lac." xi. 4; xiii. 4. For further details as to
    the tactical order of the Thebans, see Diod. xv. 55; Plut.
    "Pelop." xxiii.

Cleombrotus had hardly begun to lead his division against the foe
when, before in fact the troops with him were aware of his advance, the
cavalry had already come into collision, and that of the Lacedaemonians
was speedily worsted. In their flight they became involved with their
own heavy infantry; and to make matters worse, the Theban regiments were
already attacking vigorously. Still strong evidence exists for
supposing that Cleombrotus and his division were, in the first instance,
victorious in the battle, if we consider the fact that they could never
have picked him up and brought him back alive unless his vanguard had
been masters of the situation for the moment.

When, however, Deinon the polemarch and Sphodrias, a member of the
king's council, with his son Cleonymus, (12) had fallen, then it was
that the cavalry and the polemarch's adjutants, (13) as they are
called, with the rest, under pressure of the mass against them, began
retreating; and the left wing of the Lacedaemonians, seeing the right
borne down in this way, also swerved. Still, in spite of the numbers
slain, and broken as they were, as soon as they had crossed the trench
which protected their camp in front, they grounded arms on the spot (14)
whence they had rushed to battle. This camp, it must be borne in mind,
did not lie at all on the level, but was pitched on a somewhat steep
incline. At this juncture there were some of the Lacedaemonians who,
looking upon such a disaster as intolerable, maintained that they ought
to prevent the enemy from erecting a trophy, and try to recover the
dead not under a flag of truce but by another battle. The polemarchs,
however, seeing that nearly a thousand men of the total Lacedaemonian
troops were slain; seeing also that of the seven hundred Spartans
themselves who were on the field something like four hundred lay dead;
(15) aware, further, of the despondency which reigned among the allies,
and the general disinclination on their parts to fight longer (a frame
of mind not far removed in some instances from positive satisfaction at
what had taken place)--under the circumstances, I say, the polemarchs
called a council of the ablest representatives of the shattered army
(16) and deliberated as to what should be done. Finally the unanimous
opinion was to pick up the dead under a flag of truce, and they sent a
herald to treat for terms. The Thebans after that set up a trophy and
gave back the bodies under a truce.

 (12) See above, V. iv. 33.

 (13) {sumphoreis}. For the readings of this corrupt passage see Otto
    Keller.

 (14) Or, "in orderly way." See Curt. "H. G." iv. 400.

 (15) See "Ages." ii. 24.

 (16) {tous epikairiotatous}. See above, III. iii. 10; "Cyrop." VII.
    iv. 4; VIII. iv. 32, vi. 2.

After these events, a messenger was despatched to Lacedaemon with news
of the calamity. He reached his destination on the last day of the
gymnopaediae, (17) just when the chorus of grown men had entered the
theatre. The ephors heard the mournful tidings not without grief and
pain, as needs they must, I take it; but for all that they did not
dismiss the chorus, but allowed the contest to run out its natural
course. What they did was to deliver the names of those who had fallen
to their friends and families, with a word of warning to the women not
to make any loud lamentations but to bear their sorrow in silence; and
the next day it was a striking spectacle to see those who had relations
among the slain moving to and fro in public with bright and radiant
looks, whilst of those whose friends were reported to be living barely a
man was to be seen, and these flitted by with lowered heads and scowling
brows, as if in humiliation.

 (17) The festival was celebrated annually about midsummer. See Herod.
    vi. 67; Thuc. v. 82, and Arnold's note; Pollux. iv. 105; Athen.
    xiv. 30, xv. 22; Muller, "Dorians," ii. 389.

After this the ephors proceeded to call out the ban, including the
forty-years-service men of the two remaining regiments; (18) and they
proceeded further to despatch the reserves of the same age belonging
to the six regiments already on foreign service. Hitherto the Phocian
campaign had only drawn upon the thirty-five-years-service list. Besides
these they now ordered out on active service the troops retained at
the beginning of the campaign in attendance on the magistrates at the
government offices. Agesilaus being still disabled by his infirmity,
the city imposed the duty of command upon his son Archidamus. The new
general found eager co-operators in the men of Tegea. The friends of
Stasippus at this date were still living, (19) and they were stanch
in their Lacedaemonian proclivities, and wielded considerable power in
their state. Not less stoutly did the Mantineans from their villages
under their aristocratic form of government flock to the Spartan
standard. Besides Tegea and Mantinea, the Corinthians and Sicyonians,
the Phliasians and Achaeans were equally enthusiastic to joining the
campaign, whilst other states sent out soldiers. Then came the fitting
out and manning of ships of war on the part of the Lacedaemonians
themselves and of the Corinthians, whilst the Sicyonians were requested
to furnish a supply of vessels on board of which it was proposed to
transport the army across the gulf. And so, finally, Archidamus was able
to offer the sacrifices usual at the moment of crossing the frontier.
But to return to Thebes.

 (18) I.e. every one up to fifty-eight years of age.

 (19) See below, VI. v. 9.

Immediately after the battle the Thebans sent a messenger to Athens
wearing a chaplet. Whilst insisting on the magnitude of the victory they
at the same time called upon the Athenians to send them aid, for now the
opportunity had come to wreak vengeance on the Lacedaemonians for all
the evil they had done to Athens. As it chanced, the senate of the
Athenians was holding a session on the Acropolis. As soon as the
news was reported, the annoyance caused by its announcement was
unmistakeable. They neither invited the herald to accept of hospitality
nor sent back one word in reply to the request for assistance. And so
the herald turned his back on Athens and departed.

But there was Jason still to look to, and he was their ally. To him then
the Thebans sent, and earnestly besought his aid, their thoughts running
on the possible turn which events might take. Jason on his side at
once proceeded to man a fleet, with the apparent intention of sending
assistance by sea, besides which he got together his foreign brigade
and his own cavalry; and although the Phocians and he were implacable
enemies, (20) he marched through their territory to Boeotia. Appearing
like a vision to many of the states before his approach was even
announced--at any rate before levies could be mustered from a dozen
different points--he had stolen a march upon them and was a long way
ahead, giving proof that expedition is sometimes a better tool to work
with than sheer force.

 (20) Or, "though the Phocians maintained a war 'a outrance' with him."

When he arrived in Boeotia the Thebans urged upon him that now was the
right moment to attack the Lacedaemonians: he with his foreign brigade
from the upper ground, they face to face in front; but Jason dissuaded
them from their intention. He reminded them that after a noble
achievement won it was not worth their while to play for so high a
stake, involving a still greater achievement or else the loss of victory
already gained. "Do you not see," he urged, "that your success followed
close on the heels of necessity? You ought then to reflect that the
Lacedaemonians in their distress, with a choice between life and death,
will fight it out with reckless desperation. Providence, as it seems,
ofttimes delights to make the little ones great and the great ones
small." (21)

 (21) Cf. "Anab." III. ii. 10.

By such arguments he diverted the Thebans from the desperate adventure.
But for the Lacedaemonians also he had words of advice, insisting on the
difference between an army defeated and an army flushed with victory.
"If you are minded," he said, "to forget this disaster, my advice to you
is to take time to recover breath and recruit your energies. When you
have grown stronger then give battle to these unconquered veterans. (22)
At present," he continued, "you know without my telling you that among
your own allies there are some who are already discussing terms of
friendship with your foes. My advice is this: by all means endeavour
to obtain a truce. This," he added, "is my own ambition: I want to save
you, on the ground of my father's friendship with yourselves, and
as being myself your representative." (23) Such was the tenor of his
speech, but the secret of action was perhaps to be found in a desire
to make these mutual antagonists put their dependence on himself
alone. Whatever his motive, the Lacedaemonians took his advice, and
commissioned him to procure a truce.

 (22) Or, "the invincibles."

 (23) Lit. "your proxenos."

As soon as the news arrived that the terms were arranged, the polemarchs
passed an order round: the troops were to take their evening meal, get
their kit together, and be ready to set off that night, so as to scale
the passes of Cithaeron by next morning. After supper, before the hour
of sleep, the order to march was given, and with the generals at their
head the troops advanced as the shades of evening fell, along the road
to Creusis, trusting rather to the chance of their escaping notice, than
to the truce itself. It was weary marching in the dead of night, making
their retreat in fear, and along a difficult road, until they fell in
with Archidamus's army of relief. At this point, then, Archidamus waited
till all the allies had arrived, and so led the whole of the united
armies back to Corinth, from which point he dismissed the allies and led
his fellow-citizens home.

Jason took his departure from Boeotia through Phocis, where he captured
the suburbs of Hyampolis (24) and ravaged the country districts, putting
many to the sword. Content with this, he traversed the rest of Phocis
without meddling or making. Arrived at Heraclea, (25) he knocked down
the fortress of the Heracleots, showing that he was not troubled by any
apprehension lest when the pass was thrown open somebody or other might
march against his own power at some future date. Rather was he haunted
by the notion that some one or other might one day seize Heraclea, which
commanded the pass, and bar his passage into Hellas--should Hellas ever
be his goal. (26) At the moment of his return to Thessaly he had reached
the zenith of his greatness. He was the lawfully constituted Prince (27)
of Thessaly, and he had under him a large mercenary force of infantry
and cavalry, and all in the highest perfection of training. For this
twofold reason he might claim the title great. But he was still greater
as the head of a vast alliance. Those who were prepared to fight his
battles were numerous, and he might still count upon the help of many
more eager to do so; but I call Jason greatest among his contemporaries,
because not one among them could afford to look down upon him. (28)

 (24) An ancient town in Phocis (see Hom. "Il." ii. 521) on the road
    leading from Orchomenus to Opus, and commanding a pass from Locris
    into Phocis and Boeotia. See Herod. viii. 28; Paus. ix. 35, S. 5;
    Strab. ix. 424; "Dict. of Geog." s.v.

 (25) Or, "Heracleia Trachinia," a fortress city founded (as a colony)
    by the Lacedaemonians in B.C. 426, to command the approach to
    Thermopylae from Thessaly, and to protect the Trachinians and the
    neighbouring Dorians from the Oetean mountaineers. See "Dict. of
    Geog." "Trachis"; Thuc. iii. 92, 93, v. 51, 52; Diod. xii. 59.

 (26) B.C. 370. The following sections 28-37 form an episode concerning
    Thessalian affairs between B.C. 370 and B.C. 359.

 (27) Lit. "Tagos."

 (28) For a similar verbal climax see below, VI. v. 47.

B.C. 370. The Pythian games were now approaching, and an order went
round the cities from Jason to make preparation for the solemn sacrifice
of oxen, sheep and goats, and swine. It was reported that although the
requisitions upon the several cities were moderate, the number of beeves
did not fall short of a thousand, while the rest of the sacrificial
beasts exceeded ten times that number. He issued a proclamation also
to this effect: a golden wreath of victory should be given to whichever
city could produce the best-bred bull to head the procession in honour
of the god. And lastly there was an order issued to all the Thessalians
to be ready for a campaign at the date of the Pythian games. His
intention, as people said, was to act as manager of the solemn assembly
and games in person. What the thought was that passed through his mind
with reference to the sacred money, remains to this day uncertain;
only, a tale is rife to the effect that in answer to the inquiry of the
Delphians, "What ought we to do, if he takes any of the treasures of the
god?" the god made answer, "He would see to that himself." This great
man, his brain teeming with vast designs of this high sort, came now
to his end. He had ordered a military inspection. The cavalry of
the Pheraeans were to pass muster before him. He was already seated,
delivering answers to all petitioners, when seven striplings approached,
quarrelling, as it seemed, about some matter. Suddenly by these seven
the Prince was despatched; his throat gashed, his body gored with
wounds. Stoutly his guard rushed to the rescue with their long spears,
and one of the seven, while still in the act of aiming a blow at Jason,
was thrust through with a lance and died; a second, in the act of
mounting his horse, was caught, and dropped dead, the recipient of many
wounds. The rest leaped on the horses which they had ready waiting
and escaped. To whatever city of Hellas they came honours were almost
universally accorded them. The whole incident proves clearly that the
Hellenes stood in much alarm of Jason. They looked upon him as a tyrant
in embryo.

So Jason was dead; and his brothers Polydorus and Polyphron were
appointed princes (29) in his place. But of these twain, as they
journeyed together to Larissa, Polydorus was slain in the night, as
he slept, by his brother Polyphron, it was thought; since a death so
sudden, without obvious cause, could hardly be otherwise accounted for.

 (29) Lit. "Tagoi."

Polyphron governed for a year, and by the year's end he had refashioned
his princedom into the likeness of a tyranny. In Pharsalus he put to
death Polydamas (30) and eight other of the best citizens; and from
Larissa he drove many into exile. But while he was thus employed, he,
in his turn, was done to death by Alexander, who slew him to avenge
Polydorus and to destroy the tyranny. This man now assumed the reins of
office, and had no sooner done so than he showed himself a harsh prince
to the Thessalians: harsh too and hostile to the Thebans and Athenians,
(31) and an unprincipled freebooter everywhere by land and by sea. But
if that was his character, he too was doomed to perish shortly. The
perpetrators of the deed were his wife's brothers. (32) The counsellor
of it and the inspiring soul was the wife herself. She it was who
reported to them that Alexander had designs against them; who hid them
within the house a whole day; who welcomed home her husband deep in his
cups and laid him to rest, and then while the lamp still burned brought
out the prince's sword. It was she also who, perceiving her brothers
shrank bank, fearing to go in and attack Alexander, said to them, "If
you do not be quick and do the deed, I will wake him up!" After they had
gone in, she, too, it was who caught and pulled to the door, clinging
fast to the knocker till the breath was out of her husband's body. (33)
Her fierce hatred against the man is variously explained. By some it
was said to date from the day when Alexander, having imprisoned his own
favourite--who was a fair young stripling--when his wife supplicated
him to release the boy, brought him forth and stabbed him in the throat.
Others say it originated through his sending to Thebes and seeking the
hand of the wife of Jason in marriage, because his own wife bore him no
children. These are the various causes assigned to explain the treason
of his wife against him. Of the brothers who executed it, the eldest,
Tisiphonus, in virtue of his seniority accepted, and up to the date of
this history (34) succeeded in holding, the government.

 (30) See above, VI. i. 2 foll.

 (31) See Dem. "c. Aristocr." 120; Diod. xv. 60 foll.

 (32) B.C. 359 or 358.

 (33) The woman's name was Thebe. See Diod. xvi. 14; Cicero, "de
    Inven." II. xlix. 144; "de Div." I. xxv. 52; "de Off." II. vii.
    25; Ovid, "Ibis," iii. 21 foll.

 (34) Or, "portion of my work;" lit. "argument," {logos}. See
    {Kuprianos, Peri ton 'Ell}: p. 111.



V

The above is a sketch of Thessalian affairs, including the incidents
connected with Jason, and those subsequent to his death, down to
the government of Tisiphonus. I now return to the point at which we
digressed.

B.C. 371. Archidamus, after the relief of the army defeated at Leuctra,
had led back the united forces. When he was gone, the Athenians,
impressed by the fact that the Peloponessians still felt under an
obligation to follow the Lacedaemonians to the field, whilst Sparta
herself was by no means as yet reduced to a condition resembling that
to which she had reduced Athens, sent invitations to those states which
cared to participate in the peace authorised by the great king. (1) A
congress met, and they passed a resolution in conjunction with those
who wished to make common cause with them to bind themselves by oath
as follows: "I will abide by the treaty terms as conveyed in the king's
rescript, as also by the decrees of the Athenians and the allies. If any
one marches against any city among those which have accepted this oath,
I will render assistance to that city with all my strength." The oath
gave general satisfaction, the Eleians alone gainsaying its terms and
protesting that it was not right to make either the Marganians or the
Scilluntians or the Triphylians independent, since these cities belonged
to them, and were a part of Elis. (2) The Athenians, however, and the
others passed the decree in the precise language of the king's rescript:
that all states--great and small alike--were to be independent; and
they sent out administrators of the oath, and enjoined upon them to
administer it to the highest authorities in each state. This oath they
all, with the exception of the Eleians, swore to.

 (1) I.e. in B.C. 387, the peace "of" Antalcidas. See Grote, "H. G." x.
    274.

 (2) See Busolt, op. cit. p. 186.

B.C. 371-370. As an immediate consequence of this agreement, the
Mantineans, on the assumption that they were now absolutely independent,
met in a body and passed a decree to make Mantinea into a single state
and to fortify the town. (3) The proceeding was not overlooked by the
Lacedaemonians, who thought it would be hard if this were done without
their consent. Accordingly they despatched Agesilaus as ambassador to
the Mantineans, choosing him as the recognised ancestral friend of that
people. When the ambassador arrived, however, the chief magistrates had
no inclination to summon a meeting of the commons to listen to him, but
urged him to make a statement of his wishes to themselves. He, on his
side, was ready to undertake for himself and in their interests that,
if they would at present desist from their fortification work, he
would bring it about that the defensive walls should be built with the
sanction of Lacedaemon and without cost. Their answer was, that it was
impossible to hold back, since a decree had been passed by the whole
state of Mantinea to build at once. Whereupon Agesilaus went off in high
dudgeon; though as to sending troops to stop them, (4) the idea seemed
impracticable, as the peace was based upon the principle of autonomy.
Meanwhile the Mantineans received help from several of the Arcadian
states in the building of their walls; and the Eleians contributed
actually three talents (5) of silver to cover the expense of their
construction. And here leaving the Mantineans thus engaged, we will turn
to the men of Tegea.

 (3) For the restoration of Mantinea, see Freeman, "Fed. Gov." iv. p.
    198; Grote, "H. G." x. 283 foll.

 (4) See above, V. ii. 1, sub anno B.C. 386.

 (5) = 731 pounds: 5 shillings. See Busolt, op. cit. p. 199.

There were in Tegea two political parties. The one was the party of
Callibius and Proxenus, who were for drawing together the whole Arcadian
population in a confederacy, (6) in which all measures carried in
the common assembly should be held valid for the individual component
states. The programme of the other (Stasippus's) party was to leave
Tegea undisturbed and in the enjoyment of the old national laws.
Perpetually defeated in the Sacred College, (7) the party of Callibius
and Proxenus were persuaded that if only the commons met they would gain
an easy victory by an appeal to the multitude; and in this faith they
proceeded to march out the citizen soldiers. (8) At sight of this
Stasippus and his friends on their side armed in opposition, and proved
not inferior in numbers. The result was a collision and battle, in which
Proxenus and some few others with him were slain and the rest put to
flight; though the conquerors did not pursue, for Stasippus was a
man who did not care to stain his hands with the blood of his
fellow-citizens. (9)

 (6) Although the historian does not recount the foundation of
    Megalopolis (see Pausanias and Diodorus), the mention of the
    common assembly of the League {en to koino} in this passage and,
    still more, of the Ten Thousand (below, "Hell." VII. i. 38),
    implies it. See Freeman, op. cit. iv. 197 foll.; Grote, "H. G." x.
    306 foll., ii. 599; "Dict. of Geog." "Megalopolis." As to the date
    of its foundation Pausanias (VIII. xxvii. 8) says "a few months
    after the battle of Leuctra," before midsummer B.C. 370; Diodorus
    (xv. 72) says B.C. 368. The great city was not built in a day.
    Messene, according to Paus. IV. xxvii. 5, was founded between the
    midsummers of B.C. 370 and B.C. 369.

 (7) Lit. "in the Thearoi." For the Theari, see Thuc. v. 47, Arnold's
    note; and "C. I. G." 1756 foll.; and for the revolution at Tegea
    here recounted, see Grote, "H. G." x. 285 foll.

 (8) Or, "they mustered under arms."

 (9) Or, "opposed to a wholesale slaughter of the citizens."

Callibius and his friends had retired under the fortification walls and
gates facing Mantinea; but, as their opponents made no further attempts
against them, they here collected together and remained quiet. Some
while ago they had sent messages to the Mantineans demanding assistance,
but now they were ready to discuss terms of reconciliation with the
party of Stasippus. Presently they saw the Mantineans advancing;
whereupon some of them sprang to the walls, and began calling to them to
bring succour with all speed. With shouts they urged upon them to make
haste, whilst others threw open wide the gates to them. Stasippus
and his party, perceiving what was happening, poured out by the gates
leading to Pallantium, (10) and, outspeeding their pursuers, succeeded
in reaching the temple of Artemis, where they found shelter, and,
shutting to the doors, kept quiet. Following close upon their heels,
however, their foes scaled the temple, tore off the roof, and began
striking them down with the tiles. They, recognising that there was no
choice, called upon their assailants to desist, and undertook to come
forth. Then their opponents, capturing them like birds in a fowler's
hand, bound them with chains, threw them on to the prisoner's van, (11)
and led them off to Tegea. Here with the Mantineans they sentenced and
put them to death.

 (10) Pallantium, one of the most ancient towns of Arcadia, in the
    Maenalia (Paus. VIII. xliv. 5; Livy, i. 5), situated somewhat
    south of the modern Tripolitza (see "Dict. of Anc. Geog."); like
    Asea and Eutaea it helped to found Megalopolis (Paus. VIII. xxvii.
    3, where for {'Iasaia} read {'Asea}); below, VII. v. 5; Busolt,
    op. cit. p. 125.

 (11) For the sequel of the matter, see above, "Hell." VI. iv. 18;
    Busolt, op. cit. p. 134.

The outcome of these proceedings was the banishment to Lacedaemon of the
Tegeans who formed the party of Stasippus, numbering eight hundred; but
as a sequel to what had taken place, the Lacedaemonians determined that
they were bound by their oaths to aid the banished Tegeans and to avenge
the slain. With this purpose they marched against the Mantineans, on the
ground that they had violated their oaths in marching against Tegea with
an armed force. The ephors called out the ban and the state commanded
Agesilaus to head the expedition.

Meanwhile most of the Arcadian contingents were mustering at Asea. (12)
The Orchomenians not only refused to take part in the Arcadian league,
on account of their personal hatred to Mantinea, but had actually
welcomed within their city a mercenary force under Polytropus, which had
been collected at Corinth. The Mantineans themselves were forced to
stay at home to keep an eye on these. The men of Heraea and Lepreum made
common cause with the Lacedaemonians in a campaign against Mantinea.

 (12) Asea is placed by Leake ("Travels in Morea," i. 84; iii. 34) near
    Frangovrysi, a little south of Pallantium.

    Heraea, the most important town of Arcadia in the Cynuria, near
    Elis, on the high road to Olympia, and commanding other main
    roads. See Leake, "Peloponnesiaca," p. 1 foll.; "Morea," ii. 91.

    Lepreum, chief town of the Triphylia (Herod. iv. 148, ix. 28;
    Thuc. v. 31; above, III. ii. 25; Paus. V. v. 3; Polyb. iv. 77
    foll.; Strab. viii. 345), near modern Strovitzi; Leake, "Morea,"
    i. 56; Dodwell, "Tour," ii. 347.

    Eutaea is placed by Leake between Asea and Pallantium at Barbitza
    ("Morea," iii. 31); but see Grote, "H. G." x. 288.

Finding the frontier sacrifices favourable, Agesilaus began his march
at once upon Arcadia. He began by occupying the border city of Eutaea,
where he found the old men, women, and children dwelling in their
houses, while the rest of the population of a military age were off
to join the Arcadian league. In spite of this he did not stir a finger
unjustly against the city, but suffered the inhabitants to continue in
their homes undisturbed. The troops took all they needed, and paid for
it in return; if any pillage had occurred on his first entrance into
the town, the property was hunted up and restored by the Spartan king.
Whilst awaiting the arrival of Polytropus's mercenaries, he amused
himself by repairing such portions of their walls as necessity demanded.

Meanwhile the Mantineans had taken the field against Orchomenus;
but from the walls of that city the invaders had some difficulty in
retiring, and lost some of their men. On their retreat they found
themselves in Elymia; (13) here the heavy infantry of the Orchomenians
ceased to follow them; but Polytropus and his troops continued to assail
their rear with much audacity. At this conjuncture, seeing at a glance
that either they must beat back the foe or suffer their own men to be
shot down, the Mantineans turned right about and met the assailant in
a hand-to-hand encounter. Polytropus fell fighting on that battlefield;
and of the rest who took to flight, many would have shared his fate, but
for the opportune arrival of the Phliasian cavalry, who swooped round to
the conqueror's rear and checked him in his pursuit. (14)

 (13) Elymia, mentioned only by Xenophon, must have been on the
    confines of the Mantinice and Orchomenus, probably at Levidhi.--
    Leake, "Morea," iii. 75; "Peloponn." p. 229.

 (14) See "Cyrop." VII. i. 36.

Content with this achievement, the Mantineans retired homewards; while
Agesilaus, to whom the news was brought, no longer expecting that the
Orchomenian mercenaries could effect a junction with himself, determined
to advance without further delay. (15) On the first day he encamped for
the evening meal in the open country of Tegea, and the day following
crossed into Mantinean territory. Here he encamped under the
westward-facing (16) mountains of Mantinea, and employed himself in
ravaging the country district and sacking the farmsteads; while the
troops of the Arcadians who were mustered in Asea stole by night into
Tegea. The next day Agesilaus shifted his position, encamping about
two miles' (17) distance from Mantinea; and the Arcadians, issuing from
Tegea and clinging to the mountains between Mantinea and that city,
appeared with large bodies of heavy infantry, wishing to effect a
junction with the Mantineans. The Argives, it is true, supported them,
but they were not in full force. And here counsellors were to be found
who urged on Agesilaus to attack these troops separately; but fearing
lest, in proportion as he pressed on to engage them, the Mantineans
might issue from the city behind and attack him on flank and rear, he
decided it was best to let the two bodies coalesce, and then, if they
would accept battle, to engage them on an open and fair field.

 (15) See "Ages." ii. 23.

 (16) See Leake, "Morea," iii. 73.

 (17) Lit. "twenty stades."

And so ere long the Arcadians had effected their object and were united
with the Mantineans. The next incident was the sudden apparition at
break of day, as Agesilaus was sacrificing in front of the camp, of a
body of troops. These proved to be the light infantry from Orchomenus,
who in company with the Phliasian cavalry had during the night made
their way across past the town of Mantinea; and so caused the mass of
the army to rush to their ranks, and Agesilaus himself to retire within
the lines. Presently, however, the newcomers were recognised as friends;
and as the sacrifices were favourable, Agesilaus led his army forward
a stage farther after breakfast. As the shades of evening descended he
encamped unobserved within the fold of the hills behind the Mantinean
territory, with mountains in close proximity all round. (18)

 (18) Lit. "within the hindmost bosom of the Mantinice." In reference
    to the position, Leake ("Morea," iii. 75) says: "The northern bay
     (of the Mantinic plain between Mantinea and the Argon) corresponds
    better by its proximity to Mantinea; by Mount Alesium it was
    equally hidden from the city, while its small dimensions, and the
    nearness of the incumbent mountains, rendered it a more hazardous
    position to an army under the circumstances of that of Agesilaus"
     (than had he encamped in the Argon itself). For the Argon (or
    Inert Plain), see Leake, ib. 54 foll.

On the next morning, as day broke, he sacrificed in front of the army;
and observing a mustering of men from the city of Mantinea on the hills
which overhung the rear of his army, he decided that he must lead his
troops out of the hollow by the quickest route. But he feared lest, if
he himself led off, the enemy might fall upon his rear. In this dilemma
he kept quiet; presenting a hostile front to the enemy, he sent orders
to his rear to face about to the right, (19) and so getting into line
behind his main body, to move forward upon him; and in this way he
at once extricated his troops from their cramped position and kept
continually adding to the weight and solidity of his line. As soon as
the phalanx was doubled in depth he emerged upon the level ground, with
his heavy infantry battalions in this order, and then again extended his
line until his troops were once more nine or ten shields deep. But the
Mantineans were no longer so ready to come out. The arguments of the
Eleians who had lent them their co-operation had prevailed: that it was
better not to engage until the arrival of the Thebans. The Thebans,
it was certain, would soon be with them; for had they not borrowed ten
talents (20) from Elis in order to be able to send aid? The Arcadians
with this information before them kept quiet inside Mantinea. On
his side Agesilaus was anxious to lead off his troops, seeing it was
midwinter; but, to avoid seeming to hurry his departure out of fear,
he preferred to remain three days longer and no great distance from
Mantinea. On the fourth day, after an early morning meal, the retreat
commenced. His intention was to encamp on the same ground which he had
made his starting-point on leaving Eutaea. But as none of the Arcadians
appeared, he marched with all speed and reached Eutaea itself, although
very late, that day; being anxious to lead off his troops without
catching a glimpse of the enemy's watch-fires, so as to silence the
tongues of any one pretending that he withdrew in flight. His main
object was in fact achieved. To some extent he had recovered the state
from its late despondency, since he had invaded Arcadia and ravaged the
country without any one caring to offer him battle. But, once arrived
on Laconian soil, he dismissed the Spartan troops to their homes and
disbanded the provincials (21) to their several cities.

 (19) See "Anab." IV. iii. 29; "Pol. Lac." xi. 10.

 (20) 2,437 pounds: 10 shillings. See Busult, op. cit. p. 199.

 (21) Lit. "perioeci"; and below, SS. 25, 32.

B.C. 370-369. The Arcadians, now that Agesilaus had retired, realising
that he had disbanded his troops, while they themselves were fully
mustered, marched upon Heraea, the citizens of which town had not only
refused to join the Arcadian league, but had joined the Lacedaemonians
in their invasion of Arcadia. For this reason they entered the country,
burning the homesteads and cutting down the fruit-trees.

Meanwhile news came of the arrival of the Theban reinforcements at
Mantinea, on the strength of which they left Heraea and hastened to
fraternise (22) with their Theban friends. When they were met together,
the Thebans, on their side, were well content with the posture of
affairs: they had duly brought their succour, and no enemy was any
longer to be discovered in the country; so they made preparations to
return home. But the Arcadians, Argives and Eleians were eager in
urging them to lead the united forces forthwith into Laconia: they dwelt
proudly on their own numbers, extolling above measure the armament of
Thebes. And, indeed, the Boeotians one and all were resolute in their
military manouvres and devotion to arms, (23) exulting in the victory of
Leuctra. In the wake of Thebes followed the Phocians, who were now their
subjects, Euboeans from all the townships of the island, both sections
of the Locrians, the Acarnanians, (24) and the men of Heraclea and of
Melis; while their force was further swelled by Thessalian cavalry and
light infantry. With the full consciousness of facts like these, and
further justifying their appeal by dwelling on the desolate condition of
Lacedaemon, deserted by her troops, they entreated them not to turn back
without invading the territory of Laconia. But the Thebans, albeit they
listened to their prayers, urged arguments on the other side. In the
first place, Laconia was by all accounts most difficult to invade;
and their belief was that garrisons were posted at all the points most
easily approached. (As a matter of fact, Ischolaus was posted at Oeum
in the Sciritid, with a garrison of neodamodes and about four hundred
of the youngest of the Tegean exiles; and there was a second outpost on
Leuctrum above the Maleatid. (25)) Again it occurred to the Thebans
that the Lacedaemonian forces, though disbanded, would not take long to
muster, and once collected they would fight nowhere better than on their
own native soil. Putting all these considerations together, they
were not by any means impatient to march upon Lacedaemon. A strong
counter-impulse, however, was presently given by the arrival of
messengers from Caryae, giving positive information as to the
defenceless condition of the country, and offering to act as guides
themselves; they were ready to lose their lives if they were convicted
of perfidy. A further impulse in the same direction was given by the
presence of some of the provincials, (26) with invitations and promises
of revolt, if only they would appear in the country. These people
further stated that even at the present moment, on a summons of the
Spartans proper, the provincials did not care to render them assistance.
With all these arguments and persuasions echoing from all sides, the
Thebans at last yielded, and invaded. They chose the Caryan route
themselves, while the Arcadians entered by Oeum in the Sciritid. (27)

 (22) Or, "effect a junction with."

 (23) Or, "in practising gymnastics about the place of arms." See "Pol.
    Lac." xii. 5.

 (24) See "Hell." IV. vii. 1; "Ages." ii. 20. For a sketch of the
    relations of Acarnania to Athens and Sparta, see Hicks, No. 83, p.
    150; and above, "Hell." V. iv. 64.

 (25) Leuctrum, a fortress of the district Aegytis on the confines of
    Arcadia and Laconia ("in the direction of Mount Lycaeum," Thuc. v.
    54). See Leake, "Morea," ii. 322; also "Peloponn." p. 248, in
    which place he corrects his former view as to the situation of
    Leuctrum and the Maleatid.

    Oeum or Ium, the chief town of the Sciritis, probably stood in the
    Klisura or series of narrow passes through the watershed of the
    mountains forming the natural boundary between Laconia and Arcadia
    (in the direct line north from Sparta to Tegea), "Dict. of Anc.
    Geog." s.v. Leake says ("Morea," iii. 19, 30 foll.) near the
    modern village of Kolina; Baedeker ("Greece," p. 269) says perhaps
    at Palaeogoulas.

    Caryae. This frontier town was apparently (near Arachova) on the
    road from Thyrea (in the direction of the Argolid) to Sparta
    (Thuc. v. 55; Paus. III. x. 7; Livy, xxxiv. 26, but see Leake,
    "Morea," iii. 30; "Peloponn." p. 342).

    Sellasia, probably rightly placed "half an hour above Vourlia"
    (Baedeker, "Greece," p. 269). The famous battle of Sellasia, in
    the spring of B.C. 221, in which the united Macedonians under
    Antigonus and the Achaeans finally broke the power of Sparta, was
    fought in the little valley where the stream Gorgylus joins the
    river Oenus and the Khan of Krevatas now stands. For a plan, see
    "Dict. of Anc. Geog." s.v.

 (26) "Perioeci."

 (27) Diodorus (xv. 64) gives more details; he makes the invaders
    converge upon Sellasia by four separate routes. See Leake,
    "Morea," iii. 29 foll.

By all accounts Ischolaus made a mistake in not advancing to meet them
on the difficult ground above Oeum. Had he done so, not a man, it is
believed, would have scaled the passes there. But for the present,
wishing to turn the help of the men of Oeum to good account, he waited
down in the village; and so the invading Arcadians scaled the heights
in a body. At this crisis Ischolaus and his men, as long as they fought
face to face with their foes, held the superiority; but, presently, when
the enemy, from rear and flank, and even from the dwelling-houses up
which they scaled, rained blows and missiles upon them, then and there
Ischolaus met his end, and every man besides, save only one or two who,
failing to be recognised, effected their escape.

After these achievements the Arcadians marched to join the Thebans
at Caryae, and the Thebans, hearing what wonders the Arcadians had
performed, commenced their descent with far greater confidence. Their
first exploit was to burn and ravage the district of Sellasia, but
finding themselves ere long in the flat land within the sacred enclosure
of Apollo, they encamped for the night, and the next day continued
their march along the Eurotas. When they came to the bridge they made
no attempt to cross it to attack the city, for they caught sight of
the heavy infantry in the temple of Alea (28) ready to meet them. So,
keeping the Eurotas on their right, they tramped along, burning and
pillaging homesteads stocked with numerous stores. The feelings of the
citizens may well be imagined. The women who had never set eyes upon a
foe (29) could scarcely contain themselves as they beheld the cloud of
smoke. The Spartan warriors, inhabiting a city without fortifications,
posted at intervals, here one and there another, were in truth what they
appeared to be--the veriest handful. And these kept watch and ward. The
authorities passed a resolution to announce to the helots that whosoever
among them chose to take arms and join a regiment should have his
freedom guaranteed to him by solemn pledges in return for assistance in
the common war. (30) More than six thousand helots, it is said, enrolled
themselves, so that a new terror was excited by the very incorporation
of these men, whose numbers seemed to be excessive. But when it was
found that the mercenaries from Orchomenus remained faithful, and
reinforcements came to Lacedaemon from Phlius, Corinth, Epidaurus,
and Pellene, and some other states, the dread of these new levies was
speedily diminished.

 (28) See Pausanias, III. xix. 7.

 (29) See Plutarch, "Ages." xxxi. 3 (Clough, vol. iv. p. 38); Aristot.
    "Pol." ii. 9-10.

 (30) See below, VII. ii. 2.

The enemy in his advance came to Amyclae. (31) Here he crossed the
Eurotas. The Thebans wherever they encamped at once formed a stockade
of the fruit-trees they had felled, as thickly piled as possible, and
so kept ever on their guard. The Arcadians did nothing of the sort.
They left their camping-ground and took themselves off to attack the
homesteads and loot. On the third or fourth day after their arrival the
cavalry advanced, squadron by squadron, as far as the racecourse, (32)
within the sacred enclosure of Gaiaochos. These consisted of the
entire Theban cavalry and the Eleians, with as many of the Phocian
or Thessalian or Locrian cavalry as were present. The cavalry of the
Lacedaemonians, looking a mere handful, were drawn up to meet them. They
had posted an ambuscade chosen from their heavy infantry, the younger
men, about three hundred in number, in the house of the Tyndarids (33);
and while the cavalry charged, out rushed the three hundred at the
same instant at full pace. The enemy did not wait to receive the double
charge, but swerved, and at sight of that many also of the infantry took
to headlong flight. But the pursuers presently paused; the Theban army
remained motionless; and both parties returned to their camps. And
now the hope, the confidence strengthened that an attack upon the city
itself would never come; nor did it. The invading army broke up from
their ground, and marched off on the road to Helos and Gytheum. (34)
The unwalled cities were consigned to the flames, but Gytheum, where
the Lacedaemonians had their naval arsenal, was subjected to assault for
three days. Certain of the provincials (35) also joined in this attack,
and shared the campaign with the Thebans and their friends.

 (31) For this ancient (Achaean) town, see Paus. III. ii. 6; Polyb. v.
    19. It lay only twenty stades (a little more than two miles) from
    the city of Sparta.

 (32) Or, "hippodrome." See Paus. III. ii. 6.

 (33) Paus. III. xvi. 2.

 (34) See Baedeker's "Greece," p. 279. Was Gytheum taken? See Grote,
    "H. G." x. 305; Curt. "H. G." Eng. trans. iv. 431.

 (35) "Perioeci." See above, III. iii. 6; VI. v. 25; below, VII. ii. 2;
    Grote, "H. G." x. 301. It is a pity that the historian should
    hurry us off to Athens just at this point. The style here is
    suggestive of notes ({upomnemata}) unexpanded.

The news of these proceedings set the Athenians deeply pondering
what they ought to do concerning the Lacedaemonians, and they held an
assembly in accordance with a resolution of the senate. It chanced that
the ambassadors of the Lacedaemonians and the allies still faithful
to Lacedaemon were present. The Lacedaemonian ambassadors were Aracus,
Ocyllus, Pharax, Etymocles, and Olontheus, and from the nature of the
case they all used, roughly speaking, similar arguments. They reminded
the Athenians how they had often in old days stood happily together,
shoulder to shoulder, in more than one great crisis. They (the
Lacedaemonians), on their side, had helped to expel the tyrant
from Athens, and the Athenians, when Lacedaemon was besieged by the
Messenians, had heartily leant her a helping hand. (36) Then they fell to
enumerating all the blessings that marked the season when the two states
shared a common policy, hinting how in common they had warred against
the barbarians, and more boldly recalling how the Athenians with the
full consent and advice of the Lacedaemonians were chosen by united
Hellas leaders of the common navy (37) and guardians of all the common
treasure, while they themselves were selected by all the Hellenes as
confessedly the rightful leaders on land; and this also not without the
full consent and concurrence of the Athenians.

 (36) In reference (1) to the expulsion of the Peisistratidae (Herod.
    v. 64); (2) the "third" Messenian war (Thuc. i. 102).

 (37) See "Revenues," v. 6.

One of the speakers ventured on a remark somewhat to this strain: "If
you and we, sirs, can only agree, there is hope to-day that the old
saying may be fulfilled, and Thebes be 'taken and tithed.'" (38) The
Athenians, however, were not in the humour to listen to that style of
argument. A sort of suppressed murmur ran through the assembly which
seemed to say, "That language may be well enough now; but when they
were well off they pressed hard enough on us." But of all the pleas put
forward by the Lacedaemonians, the weightiest appeared to be this: that
when they had reduced the Athenians by war, and the Thebans wished
to wipe Athens off the face of the earth, they (the Lacedaemonians)
themselves had opposed the measure. (39) If that was the argument of
most weight, the reasoning which was the most commonly urged was to the
effect that "the solemn oaths necessitated the aid demanded. Sparta had
done no wrong to justify this invasion on the part of the Arcadians and
their allies. All she had done was to assist the men of Tegea when
(40) the Mantineans had marched against that township contrary to
their solemn oaths." Again, for the second time, at these expressions
a confused din ran through the assembly, half the audience maintaining
that the Mantineans were justified in supporting Proxenus and his
friends, who were put to death by the party with Stasippus; the other
half that they were wrong in bringing an armed force against the men of
Tegea.

 (38) Or, "the Thebans be decimated"; for the phrase see above, "Hell."
    VI. iii. 20.

 (39) See "Hell." II. ii. 19; and "Hell." III. v. 8.

 (40) Lit. "because," {oti}.

Whilst these distinctions were being drawn by the assembly itself,
Cleiteles the Corinthian got up and spoke as follows: "I daresay, men
of Athens, there is a double answer to the question, Who began the
wrongdoing? But take the case of ourselves. Since peace began, no one
can accuse us either of wantonly attacking any city, or of seizing the
wealth of any, or of ravaging a foreign territory. In spite of which the
Thebans have come into our country and cut down our fruit-trees, burnt
to the ground our houses, filched and torn to pieces our cattle and our
goods. How then, I put it to you, will you not be acting contrary to
your solemn oaths if you refuse your aid to us, who are so manifestly
the victims of wrongdoings? Yes; and when I say solemn oaths, I speak
of oaths and undertakings which you yourselves took great pains to exact
from all of us." At that point a murmur of applause greeted Cleiteles,
the Athenians feeling the truth and justice of the speaker's language.

He sat down, and then Procles of Phlius got up and spoke as follows:
"What would happen, men of Athens, if the Lacedaemonians were well out
of the way? The answer to that question is obvious. You would be the
first object of Theban invasion. Clearly; for they must feel that you
and you alone stand in the path between them and empire over Hellas. If
this be so, I do not consider that you are more supporting Lacedaemon
by a campaign in her behalf than you are helping yourselves. For imagine
the Thebans, your own sworn foes and next-door neighbours, masters of
Hellas! You will find it a painful and onerous exchange indeed for the
distant antagonism of Sparta. As a mere matter of self-interest, now
is the time to help yourselves, while you may still reckon upon allies,
instead of waiting until they are lost, and you are forced to fight
a life-and-death battle with the Thebans single-handed. But the fear
suggests itself, that should the Lacedaemonians escape now, they will
live to cause you trouble at some future date. Lay this maxim to heart,
then, that it is not the potential greatness of those we benefit, but of
those we injure, which causes apprehension. And this other also, that
it behoves individuals and states alike so to better their position (41)
while yet in the zenith of their strength that, in the day of weakness,
when it comes, they may find some succour and support in what their
former labours have achieved. (42) To you now, at this time, a
heaven-sent opportunity is presented. In return for assistance to the
Lacedaemonians in their need, you may win their sincere, unhesitating
friendship for all time. Yes, I say it deliberately, for the acceptance
of these benefits at your hands will not be in the presence of one or
two chance witnesses. The all-seeing gods, in whose sight to-morrow is
even as to-day, will be cognisant of these things. The knowledge of them
will be jointly attested by allies and enemies; nay, by Hellenes and
barbarians alike, since to not one of them is what we are doing a
matter of unconcern. If, then, in the presence of these witnesses, the
Lacedaemonians should prove base towards you, no one will ever again
be eager in their cause. But our hope, our expectation should rather be
that they will prove themselves good men and not base; since they beyond
all others would seem persistently to have cherished a high endeavour,
reaching forth after true praise, and holding aloof from ugly deeds.

 (41) Lit. "to acquire some good."

 (42) Or, "for what," etc.

"But there are further considerations which it were well you should lay
to heart. If danger were ever again to visit Hellas from the barbarian
world outside, in whom would you place your confidence if not in the
Lacedaemonians? Whom would you choose to stand at your right hand in
battle if not these, whose soldiers at Thermopylae to a man preferred to
fall at their posts rather than save their lives by giving the barbarian
free passage into Hellas? Is it not right, then, considering for
what thing's sake they displayed that bravery in your companionship,
considering also the good hope there is that they will prove the like
again--is it not just that you and we should lend them all countenance
and goodwill? Nay, even for us their allies' sake, who are present, it
would be worth your while to manifest this goodwill. Need you be assured
that precisely those who continue faithful to them in their misfortunes
would in like manner be ashamed not to requite you with gratitude?
And if we seem to be but small states, who are willing to share their
dangers with them, lay to heart that there is a speedy cure for this
defect: with the accession of your city the reproach that, in spite of
all our assistance, we are but small cities, will cease to be.

"For my part, men of Athens, I have hitherto on hearsay admired and
envied this great state, whither, I was told, every one who was wronged
or stood in terror of aught needed only to betake himself and he would
obtain assistance. To-day I no longer hear, I am present myself and
see these famous citizens of Lacedaemon here, and by their side their
trustiest friends, who have come to you, and ask you in their day of
need to give them help. I see Thebans also, the same who in days bygone
failed to persuade the Lacedaemonians to reduce you to absolute slavery,
(43) to-day asking you to suffer those who saved you to be destroyed.

 (43) See "Hell." II. ii. 19; III. v. 8, in reference to B.C. 405.

"That was a great deed and of fair renown, attributed in old story to
your ancestors, that they did not suffer those Argives who died on the
Cadmeia (44) to lie unburied; but a fairer wreath of glory would
you weave for your own brows if you suffer not these still living
Lacedaemonians to be trampled under the heel of insolence and destroyed.
Fair, also, was that achievement when you stayed the insolence of
Eurystheus and saved the sons of Heracles; (45) but fairer still than
that will your deed be if you rescue from destruction, not the primal
authors (46) merely, but the whole city which they founded; fairest of
all, if because yesterday the Lacedaemonians won you your preservation
by a vote which cost them nothing, you to-day shall bring them help with
arms, and at the price of peril. It is a proud day for some of us to
stand here and give what aid we can in pleading for assistance to brave
men. What, then, must you feel, who in very deed are able to render
that assistance! How generous on your parts, who have been so often the
friends and foes of Lacedaemon, to forget the injury and remember only
the good they have done! How noble of you to repay, not for yourselves
only, but for the sake of Hellas, the debt due to those who proved
themselves good men and true in her behalf!"

 (44) In reference to the Seven against Thebes, see Herod. IX. xxvii.
    4; Isoc. "Paneg." 55.

 (45) Herod. IX. xxvii. 3; see Isoc. "Paneg." 56. "The greatness of
    Sparta was founded by the succour which Athens lent to the
    Heraklid invaders of the Peloponnese--a recollection which ought
    to restrain Sparta from injuring or claiming to rule Athens.
    Argos, Thebes, Sparta were in early times, as they are now, the
    foremost cities of Hellas; but Athens was the greatest of them all
    --the avenger of Argos, the chastiser of Thebes, the patron of
    those who founded Sparta."--Jebb, "Att. Or." ii. 154.

 (46) Plut. "Lyc." vi.

After these speeches the Athenians deliberated, and though there was
opposition, the arguments of gainsayers (47) fell upon deaf ears. The
assembly finally passed a decree to send assistance to Lacedaemon in
force, and they chose Iphicrates general. Then followed the preliminary
sacrifices, and then the general's order to his troops to take the
evening meal in the grove of the Academy. (48) But the general himself,
it is said, was in no hurry to leave the city; many were found at their
posts before him. Presently, however, he put himself at the head of his
troops, and the men followed cheerily, in firm persuasion that he was
about to lead them to some noble exploit. On arrival at Corinth
he frittered away some days, and there was a momentary outburst of
discontent at so much waste of precious time; but as soon as he led the
troops out of Corinth there was an obvious rebound. The men responded to
all orders with enthusiasm, heartily following their general's lead, and
attacking whatever fortified place he might confront them with.

 (47) As to the anti-Laconian or Boeotian party at Athens, see Curtius,
    "H. G." vol. v. ch. ii. (Eng. tr.)

 (48) See Baedeker, "Greece," p. 103.

And now reverting to the hostile forces on Laconian territory, we find
that the Arcadians, Argives, and Eleians had retired in large numbers.
They had every inducement so to do since their homes bordered on
Laconia; and off they went, driving or carrying whatever they had
looted. The Thebans and the rest were no less anxious to get out of the
country, though for other reasons, partly because the army was melting
away under their eyes day by day, partly because the necessities of life
were growing daily scantier, so much had been either fairly eaten up
and pillaged or else recklessly squandered and reduced to ashes. Besides
this, it was winter; so that on every ground there was a general desire
by this time to get away home.

As soon as the enemy began his retreat from Laconian soil, Iphicrates
imitated his movement, and began leading back his troops out of Arcadia
into Corinthia. Iphicrates exhibited much good generalship, no doubt,
with which I have no sort of fault to find. But it is not so with that
final feature of the campaign to which we are now come. Here I find his
strategy either meaningless in intent or inadequate in execution.
He made an attempt to keep guard at Oneion, in order to prevent the
Boeotians making their way out homewards; but left meanwhile far the
best passage through Cenchreae unguarded. Again, when he wished to
discover whether or not the Thebans had passed Oneion, he sent out on
a reconnaissance the whole of the Athenian and Corinthian cavalry;
whereas, for the object in view, the eyes of a small detachment would
have been as useful as a whole regiment; (49) and when it came to
falling back, clearly the smaller number had a better chance of hitting
on a traversable road, and so effecting the desired movement quietly.
But the height of folly seems to have been reached when he threw into
the path of the enemy a large body of troops which were still too weak
to cope with him. As a matter of fact, this body of cavalry, owing to
their very numbers, could not help covering a large space of ground;
and when it became necessary to retire, had to cling to a series of
difficult positions in succession, so that they lost not fewer than
twenty horsemen. (50) It was thus the Thebans effected their object and
retired from Peloponnese.

 (49) See "Hipparch." viii. 10 foll.

 (50) See Diod. xv. 63; Plut. "Pelop." 24.




BOOK VII



I

B.C. 369. In the following year (1) plenipotentiary ambassadors (2) from
the Lacedaemonians and their allies arrived at Athens to consider and
take counsel in what way the alliance between Athens and Lacedaemon
might be best cemented. It was urged by many speakers, foreigners and
Athenians also, that the alliance ought to be based on the principle of
absolute equality, (3) "share and share alike," when Procles of Phlius
put forward the following argument:

 (1) I.e. the official year from spring to spring. See Peter, "Chron.
    Table" 95, note 215; see Grote, "H. G." x. 346, note 1.

 (2) See Hicks, 89.

 (3) For the phrase {epi toi isois kai omoiois}, implying "share and
    share alike," see Thuc. i. 145, etc.

"Since you have already decided, men of Athens, that it is good to
secure the friendship of Lacedaemon, the point, as it appears to me,
which you ought now to consider is, by what means this friendship may be
made to last as long as possible. The probability is, that we shall hold
together best by making a treaty which shall suit the best interests of
both parties. On most points we have, I believe, a tolerable unanimity,
but there remains the question of leadership. The preliminary decree of
your senate anticipates a division of the hegemony, crediting you with
the chief maritime power, Lacedaemon with the chief power on land; and
to me, personally, I confess, that seems a division not more established
by human invention than preordained by some divine naturalness or happy
fortune. For, in the first place, you have a geographical position
pre-eminently adapted for naval supremacy; most of the states to whom
the sea is important are massed round your own, and all of these are
inferior to you in strength. Besides, you have harbours and roadsteads,
without which it is not possible to turn a naval power to account.
Again, you have many ships of war. To extend your naval empire is a
traditional policy; all the arts and sciences connected with these
matters you possess as home products, and, what is more, in skill and
experience of nautical affairs you are far ahead of the rest of the
world. The majority of you derive your livelihood from the sea, or
things connected with it; so that in the very act of minding your own
affairs you are training yourselves to enter the lists of naval combat.
(4) Again, no other power in the world can send out a larger collective
fleet, and that is no insignificant point in reference to the
question of leadership. The nucleus of strength first gained becomes
a rallying-point, round which the rest of the world will gladly
congregate. Furthermore, your good fortune in this department must
be looked upon as a definite gift of God: for, consider among the
numberless great sea-fights which you have fought how few you have
lost, how many you have won. It is only rational, then, that your allies
should much prefer to share this particular risk with you. Indeed,
to show you how natural and vital to you is this maritime study, the
following reflection may serve. For several years the Lacedaemonians,
when at war with you in old days, dominated your territory, but they
made no progress towards destroying you. At last God granted them one
day to push forward their dominion on the sea, and then in an instant
you completely succumbed to them. (5) Is it not self-evident that
your safety altogether depends upon the sea? The sea is your natural
element--your birthright; it would be base indeed to entrust the
hegemony of it to the Lacedaemonians, and the more so, since, as they
themselves admit, they are far less acquainted with this business than
yourselves; and, secondly, your risk in naval battles would not be for
equal stakes--theirs involving only the loss of the men on board their
ships, but yours, that of your children and your wives and the entire
state.

 (4) See "Pol. Ath." i. 19 foll.

 (5) See "Hell." II. i.

"And if this is a fair statement of your position, turn, now, and
consider that of the Lacedaemonians. The first point to notice is, that
they are an inland power; as long as they are dominant on land it does
not matter how much they are cut off from the sea--they can carry
on existence happily enough. This they so fully recognise, that from
boyhood they devote themselves to training for a soldier's life. The
keystone of this training is obedience to command, (6) and in this they
hold the same pre-eminence on land which you hold on the sea. Just as
you with your fleets, so they on land can, at a moment's notice, put
the largest army in the field; and with the like consequence, that their
allies, as is only rational, attach themselves to them with undying
courage. (7) Further, God has granted them to enjoy on land a like good
fortune to that vouchsafed to you on sea. Among all the many contests
they have entered into, it is surprising in how few they have failed, in
how many they have been successful. The same unflagging attention which
you pay to maritime affairs is required from them on land, and, as the
facts of history reveal, it is no less indispensable to them. Thus,
although you were at war with them for several years and gained many a
naval victory over them, you never advanced a step nearer to reducing
them. But once worsted on land, in an instant they were confronted with
a danger affecting the very lives of child and wife, and vital to the
interests of the entire state. We may very well understand, then, the
strangeness, not to say monstrosity, in their eyes, of surrendering to
others the military leadership on land, in matters which they have made
their special study for so long and with such eminent success. I end
where I began. I agree absolutely with the preliminary decrees of your
own senate, which I consider the solution most advantageous to both
parties. My prayer (8) is that you may be guided in your deliberations
to that conclusion which is best for each and all of us."

 (6) Or, "the spirit of discipline." See "Mem." III. v. 16; IV. iv. 15;
    Thuc. ii. 39; "Pol. Lac." viii.

 (7) Or, "with unlimited confidence."

 (8) See above, "Hell." VI. i. 13, {kai su prattois ta kratista}, "and
    so may the best fortune attend you!"--if that reading and
    rendering be adopted.

Such were the words of the orator, and the sentiments of his speech were
vehemently applauded by the Athenians no less than by the Lacedaemonians
who were present. Then Cephisodotus (9) stepped forward and addressed
the assembly. He said, "Men of Athens, do you not see how you are being
deluded? Lend me your ears, and I will prove it to you in a moment.
There is no doubt about your leadership by sea: it is already secured.
But suppose the Lacedaemonians in alliance with you: it is plain they
will send you admirals and captains, and possibly marines, of Laconian
breed; but who will the sailors be? Helots obviously, or mercenaries
of some sort. These are the folk over whom you will exercise your
leadership. Reverse the case. The Lacedaemonians have issued a general
order summoning you to join them in the field; it is plain again, you
will be sending your heavy infantry and your cavalry. You see what
follows. You have invented a pretty machine, by which they become leaders
of your very selves, and you become the leaders either of their slaves
or of the dregs of their state. I should like to put a question to the
Lacedaemonian Timocrates seated yonder. Did you not say just now, Sir,
that you came to make an alliance on terms of absolute equality, 'share
and share alike'? Answer me." "I did say so." "Well, then, here is a
plan by which you get the perfection of equality. I cannot conceive of
anything more fair and impartial than that 'turn and turn about' each
of us should command the navy, each the army; whereby whatever advantage
there may be in maritime or military command we may each of us share."

 (9) See above, "Hell." VI. iii. 2; Hicks, 87.

These arguments were successful. The Athenians were converted, and
passed a decree vesting the command in either state (10) for periods of
five days alternately.

 (10) See "Revenues," v. 7.

B.C. 369. (11) The campaign was commenced by both Athenians and
Lacedaemonians with their allies, marching upon Corinth, where it was
resolved to keep watch and ward over Oneion jointly. On the advance of
the Thebans and their allies the troops were drawn out to defend the
pass. They were posted in detachments at different points, the most
assailable of which was assigned to the Lacedaemonians and the men of
Pellene. (12)

 (11) See Grote, "H. G." x. 349 foll.; al. B.C. 368.

 (12) "During the wars of Epameinondas Pellene adhered firmly to her
    Spartan policy, at a time when other cities were, to say the
    least, less strenuous in the Spartan cause."--Freeman, "Hist. Fed.
    Gov." p. 241. Afterwards Pellene is found temporarily on the
    Theban side ("Hell." VII. ii. 11).

The Thebans and their allies, finding themselves within three or four
miles (13) of the troops guarding the pass, encamped in the flat ground
below; but presently, after a careful calculation of the time it would
take to start and reach the goal in the gloaming, they advanced against
the Lacedaemonian outposts. In spite of the difficulty they timed their
movements to a nicety, and fell upon the Lacedaemonians and Pellenians
just at the interval when the night pickets were turning in and the men
were leaving their shakedowns and retiring for necessary purposes. (14)
This was the instant for the Thebans to fling themselves upon them; they
plied their weapons with good effect, blow upon blow. Order was pitted
against disorder, preparation against disarray. When, however, those who
escaped from the thick of the business had retired to the nearest rising
ground, the Lacedaemonian polemarch, who might have taken as many heavy,
or light, infantry of the allies as he wanted, and thus have held the
position (no bad one, since it enabled him to get his supplies safely
enough from Cenchreae), failed to do so. On the contrary, and in spite
of the great perplexity of the Thebans as to how they were to get down
from the high level facing Sicyon or else retire the way they came,
the Spartan general made a truce, which in the opinion of the majority,
seemed more in favour of the Thebans than himself, and so he withdrew
his division and fell back.

 (13) Lit. "thirty stades."

 (14) Or, "intent on their personal concerns." See "Hell." II. iv. 6;
    "Hipparch." vii. 12.

The Thebans were now free to descend without hindrance, which they did;
and, effecting a junction with their allies the Arcadians, Argives,
and Eleians, at once attacked (15) Sicyon and Pellene, and, marching on
Epidaurus, laid waste the whole territory of that people. Returning from
that exploit with a consummate disdain for all their opponents, when
they found themselves near the city of Corinth they advanced at the
double against the gate facing towards Phlius; intending if they found
it open to rush in. However, a body of light troops sallied out of the
city to the rescue, and met the advance of the Theban picked corps (16)
not one hundred and fifty yards (17) from the walls. Mounting on the
monuments and commanding eminences, with volleys of sling stones and
arrows they laid low a pretty large number in the van of the attack,
and routing them, gave chase for three or four furlongs' (18) distance.
After this incident the Corinthians dragged the corpses of the slain
to the wall, and finally gave them up under a flag of truce, erecting a
trophy to record the victory. As a result of this occurrence the allies
of the Lacedaemonians took fresh heart.

 (15) And took (apparently); see below; Diod. xv. 69.

 (16) See "Anab." III. iv. 43; and above, "Hell." V. iii. 23.

 (17) Lit. "four plethra."

 (18) LIt. "three or four stades."

At the date of the above transactions the Lacedeamonians were cheered by
the arrival of a naval reinforcement from Dionysius, consisting of more
than twenty warships, which conveyed a body of Celts and Iberians and
about fifty cavalry. The day following, the Thebans and the rest of the
allies, posted, at intervals, in battle order, and completely filling
the flat land down to the sea on one side, and up to the knolls on
the other which form the buttresses of the city, proceeded to destroy
everything precious they could lay their hands on in the plain. The
Athenian and Corinthian cavalry, eyeing the strength, physical and
numerical, of their antagonists, kept at a safe distance from their
armament. But the little body of cavalry lately arrived from Dionysius
spread out in a long thin line, and one at one point and one at another
galloped along the front, discharging their missiles as they dashed
forward, and when the enemy rushed against them, retired, and again
wheeling about, showered another volley. Even while so engaged they
would dismount from their horses and take breath; and if their foemen
galloped up while they were so dismounted, in an instant they had leapt
on their horses' backs and were in full retreat. Or if, again, a party
pursued them some distance from the main body, as soon as they turned to
retire, they would press upon them, and discharging volleys of missiles,
made terrible work, forcing the whole army to advance and retire, merely
to keep pace with the movements of fifty horsemen.

B.C. 369-368. After this the Thebans remained only a few more days
and then turned back homewards; and the rest likewise to their several
homes. Thereupon the troops sent by Dionysius attacked Sicyon. Engaging
the Sicyonians in the flat country, they defeated them, killing about
seventy men and capturing by assault the fortres of Derae. (19) After
these achievements this first reinforcement from Dionysius re-embarked
and set sail for Syracuse.

 (19) "East of Sicyon was Epieiceia (see above, "Hell." IV. ii. 14, iv.
    13) on the river Nemea. In the same direction was the fortress
    Derae." ("Dict. Anct. Geog." "Topography of Sicyonia"), al. Gerae.
    So Leake ("Morea," iii. 376), who conjectures that this fortress
    was in the maritime plain.

Up to this time the Thebans and all the states which had revolted from
Lacedaemon had acted together in perfect harmony, and were content to
campaign under the leadership of Thebes; but now a certain Lycomedes,
(20) a Mantinean, broke the spell. Inferior in birth and position
to none, while in wealth superior, he was for the rest a man of high
ambition. This man was able to inspire the Arcadians with high thoughts
by reminding them that to Arcadians alone the Peloponnese was in
a literal sense a fatherland; since they and they alone were the
indigenous inhabitants of its sacred soil, and the Arcadian stock
the largest among the Hellenic tribes--a good stock, moreover, and of
incomparable physique. And then he set himself to panegyrise them as the
bravest of the brave, adducing as evidence, if evidence were needed,
the patent fact, that every one in need of help invariably turned to
the Arcadians. (21) Never in old days had the Lacedaemonians yet invaded
Athens without the Arcadians. "If then," he added, "you are wise, you
will be somewhat chary of following at the beck and call of anybody,
or it will be the old story again. As when you marched in the train
of Sparta you only enhanced her power, so to-day, if you follow Theban
guidance without thought or purpose instead of claiming a division of
the headship, you will speedily find, perhaps, in her only a second
edition of Lacedaemon." (22)

 (20) For the plan of an Arcadian Federation and the part played by
    Lycomedes, its true author, "who certainly merits thereby a high
    place among the statesmen of Greece," see Freeman, "Hist. Fed.
    Gov." ch. iv. p. 199 foll.

 (21) For this claim on the part of the Arcadians, see "Anab." VI. ii.
    10 foll.

 (22) Or, "Lacedaemonians under another name."

These words uttered in the ears of the Arcadians were sufficient to puff
them up with pride. They were lavish in their love of Lycomedes, and
thought there was no one his equal. He became their hero; he had only
to give his orders, and they appointed their magistrates (23) at his
bidding. But, indeed, a series of brilliant exploits entitled the
Arcadians to magnify themselves. The first of these arose out of an
invasion of Epidaurus by the Argives, which seemed likely to end in
their finding their escape barred by Chabrias and his foreign brigade
with the Athenians and Corinthians. Only, at the critical moment the
Arcadians came to the rescue and extricated the Argives, who were
closely besieged, and this in spite not only of the enemy, but of the
savage nature of the ground itself. Again they marched on Asine (24) in
Laconian territory, and defeated the Lacedaemonian garrison, putting
the polemarch Geranor, who was a Spartan, to the sword, and sacking the
suburbs of the town. Indeed, whenever or wherever they had a mind to
send an invading force, neither night nor wintry weather, nor length of
road nor mountain barrier could stay their march. So that at this date
they regarded their prowess as invincible. (25) The Thebans, it will be
understood, could not but feel a touch of jealousy at these pretensions,
and their former friendship to the Arcadians lost its ardour. With the
Eleians, indeed, matters were worse. The revelation came to them when
they demanded back from the Arcadians certain cities (26) of which the
Lacedaemonians had deprived them. They discovered that their views
were held of no account, but that the Triphylians and the rest who had
revolted from them were to be made much of, because they claimed to
be Arcadians. (27) Hence, as contrasted with the Thebans, the Eleians
cherished feelings towards their late friends which were positively
hostile.

 (23) {arkhontas}, see below, "Hell." VII. iv. 33. The formal title of
    these Federal magistrates may or may not have been {arkhontes};
    Freeman, "H. F. G." 203, note 6.

 (24) See Grote, "H. G." x. 356.

 (25) Or, "regarded themselves as the very perfection of soldiery."

 (26) In reference to "Hell." III. ii. 25 foll., see Freeman, op. cit.
    p. 201, and below, "Hell." VII. iv. 12 (B.C. 365); Busolt, op.
    cit. p. 186 foll., in reference to Lasion.

 (27) Busolt, p. 150.

B.C. 368. Self-esteem amounting to arrogance--such was the spirit which
animated each section of the allies, when a new phase was introduced by
the arrival of Philiscus (28) of Abydos on an embassy from Ariobarzanes
(29) with large sums of money. This agent's first step was to assemble
a congress of Thebans, allies, and Lacedaemonians at Delphi to treat
of peace. On their arrival, without attempting to communicate or take
counsel with the god as to how peace might be re-established, they fell
to deliberating unassisted; and when the Thebans refused to acquiesce
in the dependency of Messene (30) upon Lacedaemon, Philiscus set about
collecting a large foreign brigade to side with Lacedaemon and to
prosecute the war.

 (28) See Hicks, 84, p. 152; Kohler, "C. I. A." ii. 51; Grote, "H. G."
    x. 357; Curtius, "H. G." (Eng. tr.) iv. 458; Diod. xv. 90.

 (29) See above, V. i. 28; "Ages." ii. 26.

 (30) See Hicks, 86.

Whilst these matters were still pending, the second reinforcements from
Dionysius (31) arrived. There was a difference of opinion as to where
the troops should be employed, the Athenians insisting that they ought
to march into Thessaly to oppose the Thebans, the Lacedaemonians being
in favour of Laconia; and among the allies this latter opinion carried
the day. The reinforcement from Dionysius accordingly sailed round to
Laconia, where Archidamus incorporated them with the state troops and
opened the campaign. Caryae he took by storm, and put every one captured
to the sword, and from this point marching straight upon the Parrhasians
of Arcadia, he set about ravaging the country along with his Syracusan
supporters.

 (31) See above, SS. 20, 22, p. 191 foll. The date is B.C. 368
    according to Grote, "H. G." x. 362 foll.; al. B.C. 367.

Presently when the Arcadians and Argives arrived with succours, he
retreated and encamped on the knolls above Medea. (32) While he was
there, Cissidas, the officer in charge of the reinforcement from
Dionysius, made the announcement that the period for his stay abroad had
elapsed; and the words were no sooner out of his lips than off he set on
the road to Sparta. The march itself, however, was not effected without
delays, for he was met and cut off by a body of Messenians at a narrow
pass, and was forced in these straits to send to Archidamus and beg for
assistance, which the latter tendered. When they had got as far as the
bend (33) on the road to Eutresia, there were the Arcadians and Argives
advancing upon Laconia and apparently intending, like the Messenians, to
shut the Spartan off from the homeward road.

 (32) Or, "Melea," or "Malea." E. Curtius conjectures {Meleas} for
    {Medeas} of the MSS., and probably the place referred to is the
    township of Malea in the Aegytis (Pausan. VIII. xxvii. 4); see
    above, "Hell." VI. v. 24, "the Maleatid." See Dind. "Hist. Gr.,"
    Ox. MDCCCLIII., note ad loc.; Curtius, "H. G." iv. 459; Grote, "H.
    G." x. 362.

 (33) Or, "the resting-place"; cf. mod. "Khan." L. and S. cf. Arist.
    "Frogs," 113. "Medea," below, is probably "Malea," (see last
    note).

Archidamus, debouching upon a flat space of ground where the roads to
Eutresia and Medea converge, drew up his troops and offered battle. When
happened then is thus told:--He passed in front of the regiments and
addressed them in terms of encouragement thus: "Fellow-citizens, the day
has come which calls upon us to prove ourselves brave men and look the
world in the face with level eyes. (34) Now are we to deliver to those
who come after us our fatherland intact as we received it from our
fathers; now will we cease hanging our heads in shame before our
children and wives, our old men and our foreign friends, in sight
of whom in days of old we shone forth conspicuous beyond all other
Hellenes."

 (34) See Plut. "Ages." 53 (Clough, vol. iv. p. 41).

The words were scarcely uttered (so runs the tale), when out of
the clear sky came lightnings and thunderings, (35) with propitious
manifestation to him; and it so happened that on his right wing there
stood a sacred enclosure and a statue of Heracles, his great ancestor.
As the result of all these things, so deep a strength and courage came
into the hearts of his soldiers, as they tell, that the generals had
hard work to restrain their men as they pushed forward to the front.
Presently, when Archidamus led the advance, a few only of the enemy
cared to await them at the spear's point, and were slain; the mass of
them fled, and fleeing fell. Many were cut down by the cavalry, many
by the Celts. When the battle ceased and a trophy had been erected, the
Spartan at once despatched home Demoteles, the herald, with the news. He
had to announce not only the greatness of the victory, but the startling
fact that, while the enemy's dead were numerous, not one single
Lacedaemonian had been slain. (36) Those in Sparta to whom the news was
brought, as says the story, when they heard it, one and all, beginning
with Agesilaus, and, after him, the elders and the ephors, wept for
joy--so close akin are tears to joy and pain alike. There were others
hardly less pleased than the Lacedaemonians themselves at the
misfortune which had overtaken the Arcadians: these were the Thebans and
Eleians--so offensive to them had the boastful behaviour of these men
become.

 (35) See Xen. "Apolog." 12; Homer, "Il." ii. 353; "Od." xx. 113 foll.

 (36) According to Diod. xv. 72, ten thousand of the enemy fell.

The problem perpetually working in the minds of the Thebans was how they
were to compass the headship of Hellas; and they persuaded themselves
that, if they sent an embassy to the King of Persia, they could not but
gain some advantage by his help. Accordingly they did not delay, but
called together the allies, on the plea that Euthycles the Lacedaemonian
was already at the Persian court. The commissioners sent up were, on
the part of the Thebans, Pelopidas; (37) on the part of the Arcadians,
Antiochus, the pancratiast; and on that of the Eleians, Archidamus.
There was also an Argive in attendance. The Athenians on their side,
getting wind of the matter, sent up two commissioners, Timagoras and
Leon.

 (37) See Plut. "Pelop." 30 (Clough, vol. ii. p. 230). For the date see
    Grote, "H. G." x. 365, 379; Curtius, "H. G." iv. 460.

When they arrived at the Persian court the influence of Pelopidas was
preponderant with the Persian. He could point out that, besides the fact
that the Thebans alone among all the Hellenes had fought on the king's
side at Plataeae, (38) they had never subsequently engaged in military
service against the Persians; nay, the very ground of Lacedaemonian
hostility to them was that they had refused to march against the Persian
king with Agesilaus, (39) and would not even suffer him to sacrifice to
Artemis at Aulis (where Agamemnon sacrificed before he set sail for Asia
and captured Troy). In addition, there were two things which contributed
to raise the prestige of Thebes, and redounded to the honour of
Pelopidas. These were the victory of the Thebans at Leuctra, and the
indisputable fact that they had invaded and laid waste the territory of
Laconia. Pelopidas went on to point out that the Argives and Arcadians
had lately been defeated in battle by the Lacedaemonians, when his own
countrymen were not there to assist. The Athenian Timagoras supported
all these statements of the Theban by independent testimony, and stood
second in honour after Pelopidas.

 (38) See Thuc. iii. 58, 59, 60.

 (39) See above, "Hell." III. iv. 3; Lincke, "Zur. Xen. Krit." p. 315.

At this point of the proceedings Pelopidas was asked by the king, what
special clause he desired inserted in the royal rescript. He replied as
follows: "Messene to be independent of Lacedaemon, and the Athenians
to lay up their ships of war. Should either power refuse compliance in
these respects, such refusal to be a casus belli; and any state refusing
to take part in the military proceedings consequent, to be herself the
first object of attack." These clauses were drawn up and read to the
ambassadors, when Leon, in the hearing of the king, exclaimed: "Upon my
word! Athenians, it strikes me it is high time you looked for some other
friend than the great king." The secretary reported the comment of the
Athenian envoy, and produced presently an altered copy of the document,
with a clause inserted: "If the Athenians have any better and juster
views to propound, let them come to the Persian court and explain them."
(40)

 (40) See Grote, "H. G." x. 402; and "Ages." viii. 3.

Thus the ambassadors returned each to his own home and were variously
received. Timagoras, on the indictment of Leon, who proved that his
fellow-commissioner not only refused to lodge with him at the king's
court, but in every way played into the hands of Pelopidas, was put to
death. Of the other joint commissioners, the Eleian, Archidamus, was
loud in his praises of the king and his policy, because he had shown
a preference to Elis over the Arcadians; while for a converse reason,
because the Arcadian league was slighted, Antiochus not only refused to
accept any gift, but brought back as his report to the general assembly
of the Ten Thousand, (41) that the king appeared to have a large army of
confectioners and pastry-cooks, butlers and doorkeepers; but as for
men capable of doing battle with Hellenes, he had looked carefully, and
could not discover any. Besides all which, even the report of his wealth
seemed to him, he said, bombastic nonsense. "Why, the golden plane-tree
that is so belauded is not big enough to furnish shade to a single
grasshopper." (42)

 (41) See above, VI. v. 6; Freeman, "Hist. Fed. Gov." 202; Demosth. "F.
    L." 220, etc.

 (42) Or, "the golden plane-tree they romance about would not suffice
    to," etc.

At Thebes a conference of the states had been convened to listen to the
great king's letter. The Persian who bore the missive merely pointed
to the royal seal, and read the document; whereupon the Thebans invited
all, who wished to be their friends, to take an oath to what they had
just heard, as binding on the king and on themselves. To which the
ambassadors from the states replied that they had been sent to listen to
a report, not to take oaths; if oaths were wanted, they recommended
the Thebans to send ambassadors to the several states. The Arcadian
Lycomedes, moreover, added that the congress ought not to be held at
Thebes at all, but at the seat of war, wherever that might be. This
remark brought down the wrath of the Thebans on the speaker; they
exclaimed that he was bent on breaking up the alliance. Whereupon the
Arcadian refused to take a seat in the congress at all, and got up
and betook himself off there and then, accompanied by all the Arcadian
envoys. Since, therefore, the assembled representatives refused to take
the oaths at Thebes, the Thebans sent to the different states, one by
one in turn, urging each to undertake solemnly to act in accordance with
the great king's rescript. They were persuaded that no individual state
would venture to quarrel with themselves and the Persian monarch at
once. As a matter of fact, however, when they arrived at Corinth--which
was the first stated vist--the Corinthians stood out and gave as their
answer, that they had no desire for any common oath or undertaking with
the king. The rest of the states followed suit, giving answers of
a similar tenor, so that this striving after empire on the part of
Pelopidas and the Thebans melted like a cloud-castle into air.

B.C. 367. (43) But Epaminondas was bent on one more effort. With a view
to forcing the Arcadians and the rest of the allies to pay better heed
to Thebes, he desired first to secure the adhesion of the Achaeans,
and decided to march an army into Achaea. Accordingly, he persuaded the
Argive Peisias, who was at the head of military affairs in Argos, to
seize and occupy Oneion in advance. Persias, having ascertained that
only a sorry guard was maintained over Oneion by Naucles, the general
commanding the Lacedaemonian foreign brigade, and by Timomachus the
Athenian, under cover of night seized and occupied with two thousand
heavy infantry the rising ground above Cenchreae, taking with him
provisions for seven days. Within the interval the Thebans arrived
and surmounted the pass of Oneion; whereupon the allied troops with
Epaminondas at their head, advanced into Achaea. The result of the
campaign was that the better classes of Achaea gave in their adhesion
to him; and on his personal authority Epaminondas insisted that there
should be no driving of the aristocrats into exile, nor any modification
of the constitution. He was content to take a pledge of fealty from the
Achaeans to this effect: "Verily and indeed we will be your allies, and
follow whithersoever the Thebans lead." (44)

 (43) B.C. 367, according to Grote, "H. G." x. 365, note 1; al. B.C.
    366.

 (44) See Freeman, "Hist. Fed. Gov." p. 241: "We read of local
    oligarchies (in the several cities of Achaia) which Epameinondas
    found and left in possession, but which the home government of
    Thebes thought good to expel, and to substitute democracies under
    the protection of Theban harmosts. This policy did not answer, as
    the large bodies of exiles thus formed contrived to recover the
    cities, and to bring them to a far more decided Spartan
    partisanship than before."

So he departed home. The Arcadians, however, and the partisans of the
opposite faction in Thebes were ready with an indictment against him:
"Epaminondas," they said, "had merely swept and garnished Achaea for the
Lacedaemonians, and then gone off." The Thebans accordingly resolved
to send governors (45) into the states of Achaea; and those officers on
arrival joined with the commonalty and drove out the better folk,
and set up democracies throughout Achaea. On their side, these exiles
coalesced, and, marching upon each separate state in turn, for they
were pretty numerous, speedily won their restoration and dominated the
states. As the party thus reinstated no longer steered a middle course,
but went heart and soul into an alliance with Lacedaemon, the Arcadians
found themselves between the upper and the nether millstone--that is to
say, the Lacedaemonians and the Achaeans.

 (45) Lit. "harmosts."

At Sicyon, hitherto, (46) the constitution was based on the ancient
laws; but at this date Euphron (who during the Lacedaemonian days had
been the greatest man in Sicyon, and whose ambition it was to hold
a like pre-eminence under their opponents) addressed himself to the
Argives and Arcadians as follows: "If the wealthiest classes should ever
come into power in Sicyon, without a doubt the city would take the first
opportunity of readopting a Laconian policy; whereas, if a democracy be
set up," he added, "you may rest assured Sicyon will hold fast by you.
All I ask you is to stand by me; I will do the rest. It is I who will
call a meeting of the people; and by that selfsame act I shall give
you a pledge of my good faith and present you with a state firm in
its alliance. All this, be assured," he added, "I do because, like
yourselves, I have long ill brooked the pride of Lacedaemon, and shall
be glad to escape the yoke of bondage."

 (46) See Grote, "H. G." x. 379.

These proposals found favour with the Arcadians and the Argives,
who gladly gave the assistance demanded. Euphron straightway, in
the market-place, in the presence of the two powers concerned,
(47) proceeded to convene the Demos, as if there were to be a new
constitution, based on the principle of equality. (48) When the
convention met, he bade them appoint generals: they might choose
whom they liked. Whereupon they elected Euphron himself, Hippodamus,
Cleander, Acrisius, and Lysander. When these matters were arranged he
appointed Adeas, his own son, over the foreign brigade, in place of the
former commander, Lysimenes, whom he removed. His next step was promptly
to secure the fidelity of the foreign mercenaries by various acts of
kindness, and to attach others; and he spared neither the public nor the
sacred moneys for this object. He had, to aid him, further, the property
of all the citizens whom he exiled on the ground of Laconism, and
of this without scruple he in every case availed himself. As for his
colleagues in office, some he treacherously put to death, others he
exiled, by which means he got everything under his own power, and was
now a tyrant without disguise. The method by which he got the allies to
connive at his doings was twofold. Partly he worked on them by pecuniary
aid, partly by the readiness with which he lent the support of his
foreign troops on any campaign to which they might invite him.

 (47) Lit. "the Argives and the Arcadians."

 (48) Lit. "on fair and equal terms." See Thuc. v. 79.



II

B.C. 366. Matters had so far progressed that the Argives had already
fortified the Trikaranon above the Heraion as an outpost to threaten
Phlius, while the Sicyonians were engaged in fortifying Thyamia (1)
on their frontier; and between the two the Phliasians were severely
pinched. They began to suffer from dearth of necessaries; but, in
spite of all, remained unshaken in their alliance. It is the habit of
historians, I know, to record with admiration each noble achievement of
the larger powers, but to me it seems a still more worthy task to bring
to light the great exploits of even a little state found faithful in the
performance of fair deeds.

 (1) "Thyamia is placed by Ross on the lofty hill of Spiria, the
    northern prolongation of Tricaranum, between the villages Stimanga
    and Skrapani."--"Dict. Anct. Geog." "Phlius."

B.C. 370-369. Now these Phliasians were friends of Lacedaemon while at
the zenith of her power. After her disaster on the field of Leuctra,
when many of the Perioeci, and the helots to a man, revolted; when, more
than that, the allies, save only quite a few, forsook her; (2) and
when united Hellas, so to speak, was marching on her--these Phliasians
remained stanch in their allegiance; and, in spite of the hostility of
the most powerful states of the Peloponnese, to wit the Arcardians and
the Argives, they insisted on coming to her aid. It fell to their lot
to cross into Prasiae as the rearguard of the reinforcements, which
consisted of the men of Corinth, of Epidaurus and of Troezen, of
Hermione, Halieis, and Sicyon and Pellene, in the days before any of
these had revolted. (3) Not even when the commander of the foreign
brigade, picking up the divisions already across, left them behind and
was gone--not even so did they flinch or turn back, but hired a guide
from Prasiae, and though the enemy was massed round Amyclae, slipped
through his ranks, as best they could, and so reached Sparta. It was
then that the Lacedaemonians, besides other honours conferred upon them,
sent them an ox as a gift of hospitality.

 (2) See above, "VI." v. 29.

 (3) See "Hell." VII. i. 18.

B.C. 369. Later on, when the enemy had retired from Laconia, the
Argives, ill brooking so much zeal for Lacedaemon on the part of Phlius,
marched in full force against the little state, and fell to ravaging
their territory. Even then they remained undaunted; and when the enemy
turned to retire, destroying all that he could lay hands upon, out
dashed the cavalry of the Phliasians and dogged his retreat. And
notwithstanding that the Argive's rear consisted of the whole of his
cavalry, with some companies of infantry to support them, they attacked
him, sixty in number, and routed his whole rearguard. They slew, indeed,
but a few of them; but, having so slain that handful, they paused and
erected a trophy in full sight of the Argive army with as little concern
as if they had cut down their enemies to a man.

Once again the Lacedaemonians and their allies were guarding Oneion, (4)
and the Thebans were threatening to scale the pass. The Arcadians and
Eleians (5) were moving forwards through Nemea to effect a junction with
the Thebans, when a hint was conveyed to them by some Phliasian exiles,
"Only show yourselves before Phlius and the town is yours." An agreement
was made, and in the dead of night a party consisting of the exiles
themselves and others with them, about six hundred in number, planted
themselves close under the walls with scaling-ladders. Presently the
scouts from the Trikaranon signalled to the city that the enemy was
advancing. The citizens were all attention; their eyes fixed upon their
scouts. Meanwhile the traitors within were likewise signalling to those
seated under lee of the walls "to scale"; and these, scaling up, seized
the arms of the guards, which they found abandoned, and fell to pursuing
the day sentinels, ten in number (one out of each squad of five being
always left on day duty). (6) One of these was put to the sword as he
lay asleep, and a second as he was escaping to the Heraion; but the
other eight day-pickets leapt down the wall on the side towards the
city, one after another. The scaling party now found themselves in
undisputed possession of the citadel. But the shouting had reached the
city below: the citizens rallied to the rescue; and the enemy began by
sallying forth from the citadel, and did battle in the forefront of the
gate leading down to the city. By and by, being strongly beleaguered
by the ever-increasing reinforcements of the citizens, they retired,
falling back upon the citadel; and the citizens along with the enemy
forced their way in. The centre of the citadel was speedily deserted;
for the enemy scaled the walls and towers, and showered blows and
missiles upon the citizens below. These defended themselves from the
ground, or pressed the encounter home by climbing the ladders which led
to the walls. Once masters of certain towers on this side and the other
of the invaders, the citizens came to close quarters with them with
reckless desperation. The invaders, pushed and pommelled by dint of such
audacity and hard hitting, were cooped up like sheep into narrower
and narrower space. But at that critical moment the Arcadians and the
Argives were circling round the city, and had begun to dig through the
walls of the citadel from its upper side. (7) Of the citizens inside
some were beating down their assailants on the wall; (8) others,
those of them who were climbing up from outside and were still on the
scaling-ladders, whilst a third set were delivering battle against
those who had mounted the towers. These last had found fire in the
men's quarters, and were engaged in setting the towers and all ablaze,
bringing up sheaves of corn and grass--an ample harvesting, as luck
would have it, garnered off the citadel itself. Thereupon the occupants
of the towers, in terror of the flames, leapt down one by one, while
those on the walls, under the blows of the defenders, tumbled off with
similar expedition; and as soon as they had once begun to yield, the
whole citadel, in almost less time than it takes to tell, was cleared of
the enemy. In an instant out dashed the cavalry, and the enemy, seeing
them, beat a hasty retreat, leaving behind scaling-ladders and dead,
besides some comrades hopelessly maimed. In fact, the enemy, what
between those who were slain inside and those who leapt from the walls,
lost not less than eighty men. And now it was a goodly sight to see the
brave men grasp one another by the hand and pledge each other on their
preservation, whilst the women brought them drink and cried for joy. Not
one there present but in very sooth was overcome by laughter mixed with
tears. (9)

 (4) B.C. 369? al. B.C. 368. See above, "Hell." VII. i. 15; Grote, "H.
    G." x. 346.

 (5) See above, "Hell." VII. i. 18, and below, S. 8.

 (6) Or, "one member of both the squads of five was left behind"--i.e.
    two out of the ten could not keep up with the rest in their
    flight, and were taken and killed; one indeed had not started, but
    was killed in sleep.

 (7) Or, "downwards" (L. and S.); or, "in front," "von vorn" (Buchs).

 (8) Reading, {tous eti toi teikhous}. See Otto Keller for various
    emendations of the passage.

 (9) In true Homeric fashion, as Pollux (ii. 64) observes. See Homer,
    "Il." vi. 484. See above, VII. i. 32; "Cyrop." VII. v. 32;
    "Hiero," iii. 5; "Sym." ii. 24; "Antony and Cleopatra," III. ii.
    43.

Next year also (10) Phlius was invaded by the Argives and all the
Arcadians. The reason of this perpetually-renewed attack on Phlius is
not far to seek: partly it was the result of spleen, partly the little
township stood midway between them, and they cherished the hope that
through want of the necessaries of life they would bring it over.
During this invasion the cavalry and the picked troop of the Phliasians,
assisted by some Athenian knights, made another famous charge at the
crossing of the river. (11) They made it so hot for the enemy that for
the rest of that day he was forced to retire under the mountain ridges,
and to hold aloof as if afraid to trample down the corn-crops of a
friendly people on the flat below.

 (10) B.C. 368 (or 367).

 (11) The Asopus.

Again another time (12) the Theban commander in Sicyon marched out
against Phlius, taking with him the garrison under his personal command,
with the Sicyonians and Pellenians (for at the date of the incident
these states followed in the wake of Thebes). Euphron was there also
with his mercenaries, about two thousand in number, to share the
fortunes of the field. The mass of the troops began their descent on the
Heraion by the Trikaranon, intending to ravage the flat bottom below. At
the gate leading to Corinth the Theban general left his Sicyonians and
Pellenians on the height, to prevent the Phliasians getting behind him
at this point and so over the heads of his troops as they lay at the
Heraion beneath. (13) As soon as the citizens of Phlius found that
hostile troops were advancing on their corn-land, out dashed the cavalry
with the chosen band of the Phliasians and gave battle, not suffering
the enemy to penetrate into the plain. The best part of the day was
spent in taking long shots at one another on that field; Euphron pushing
his attack down to the point where cavalry could operate, the citizens
retaliating as far as the Heraion. Presently the time to withdraw
had come, and the enemy began to retire, following the circle of the
Trikaranon; the short cut to reach the Pellenians being barred by the
ravine which runs in front of the walls. The Phliasians escorted their
retreating foes a little way up the steep, and then turning off dashed
along the road beside the walls, making for the Pellenians and those
with them; whereupon the Theban, perceiving the haste of the Phliasians,
began racing with his infantry to outspeed them and bring succour to the
Pellenians. The cavalry, however, arrived first and fell to attacking
the Pellenians, who received and withstood the shock, and the cavalry
drew back. A second time they charged, and were supported by some
infantry detachments, which had now come up. It ended in a hand-to-hand
fight; and eventually the enemy gave way. On the field lay dead some
Sicyonians, and of the Pellenians many a good man. In record of the feat
the Phliasians began to raise a trophy, as well they might; and loud and
clear the paean rang. As to the Theban and Euphron, they and all their
men stood by and stared at the proceedings, like men who had raced to
see a sight. After all was over the one party retired to Sicyon and the
other withdrew into their city.

 (12) B.C. 367 (or 366).

 (13) Lit. "above the Heraion" (where his main body lay).

That too was another noble exploit of the Phliasians, when they took the
Pellenian Proxenus prisoner and, although suffering from scarcity at the
time, sent him back without a ransom. "As generous as brave," such is
their well-earned title who were capable of such performance.

The heroic resolution with which these men maintained their loyalty to
their friends is manifest. When excluded from the fruits of their own
soil, they contrived to live, partly by helping themselves from the
enemy's territory, partly by purchasing from Corinth, though to reach
that market they must run the gauntlet of a thousand risks; and having
reached it their troubles began afresh. There were difficulties
in providing the requisite sum, difficulties in arranging with the
purveyors, and it was barely possible to find sureties for the very
beasts which should carry home their marketing. They had reached the
depth of despair, and were absolutely at a loss what to do, when they
arranged with Chares to escort their convoy. Once safe inside Phlius,
they begged him to help them to convey their useless and sick folk to
Pellene. (14) These they left at that place; and after making purchases
and packing as many beasts of burthen as they could, they set off to
return in the night, not in ignorance that they would be laid in wait
for by the enemy, but persuaded that the want of provisions was a worse
evil than mere fighting.

 (14) What is the date of this incident? See above, "Hell." VII. ii. 3;
    below VII. iv. 17.

The men of Phlius pushed forward with Chares; presently they stumbled on
the enemy and at once grappled to their work. Pressing hard on the foe,
they called cheerily to one another, and shouted at the same time to
Chares to bring up his aid. In short, the victory was theirs; and the
enemy was driven off the road; and so they got themselves and their
supplies safely home. The long night-watching superinduced sleep which
lasted well into the next day. But Chares was no sooner out of bed then
he was accosted by the cavalry and the pick of the heavy infantry with
the following appeal: "Chares, to-day you have it in your power to
perform the noblest deed of arms. The Sicyonians are fortifying an
outpost on our borders, they have plenty of stone-masons but a mere
handful of hoplites. We the knights of Phlius and we the flower of our
infantry force will lead the way; and you shall follow after with your
mercenaries. Perhaps when you appear on the scene you will find the
whole thing finished, or perhaps your coming will send the enemy flying,
as happened at Pellene. If you do not like the sound of these proposals,
sacrifice and take counsel of the gods. Our belief is that the gods
will bid you yet more emphatically than we to take this step. Only this,
Chares, you must well consider, that if you do take it you will have
established an outpost on the enemy's frontier; you will have saved
from perdition a friendly city; you will win eternal glory in your own
fatherland; and among friends and foes alike no name will be heralded
with louder praise than that of Chares."

Chares was persuaded, and proceeded to offer sacrifice. Meanwhile the
Phliasian cavalry were donning their breastplates and bridling their
horses, and the heavy infantry made every preparation for the march.
Then they took their arms, fell into line, and tramped off to the place
of sacrifice. Chares with the soothsayer stepped forward to meet them,
announcing that the victims were favourable. "Only wait for us," they
exclaimed; "we will sally forth with you at once." The heralds' cry
"To arms!" was sounded, and with a zeal which was almost miraculous the
mercenaries themselves rushed out. As soon as Chares began the march,
the Phliasian cavalry and infantry got in front of him. At first they
led off at a smart pace; presently they began to bowl (15) along more
quickly, and finally the cavalry were tearing over the ground might and
main, whilst the infantry, at the greatest pace compatible with keeping
their ranks, tore after them; and behind them, again, came Chares
zealously following up in their rear. There only remained a brief
interval of daylight before the sun went down, and they came upon the
enemy in the fortress, some washing, some cooking a savoury meal, others
kneading their bread, others making their beds. These, when they saw
the vehemence of the attack, at once, in utter panic, took to flight,
leaving behind all their provisions for the brave fellows who took their
place. They, as their reward, made a fine supper off these stores and
others which had come from home, pouring out libations for their good
fortune and chanting the battle-hymn; after which they posted pickets
for the night and slumbered well. The messenger with the news of their
success at Thyamia arrived at Corinth in the night. The citizens of that
state with hearty friendship at once ordered out by herald all the
oxen and beasts of burthen, which they loaded with food and brought to
Phlius; and all the while the fortress was building day by day these
convoys of food were duly despatched.

 (15) See "Anab." VII. iii. 46.



III

But on this topic enough, perhaps, has been said to demonstrate the
loyalty of the men of Phlius to their friends, their bravery in war,
and, lastly, their steadfastness in maintaining their alliance in spite
of famine.

B.C. 367-366. It seems to have been somewhere about this date that
Aeneas the Stymphalian, (1) who had become general of the Arcadians,
finding that the state of affairs in Sicyon was intolerable, marched
up with his army into the acropolis. Here he summoned a meeting of the
Sicyonian aristocrats already within the walls, and sent to fetch
those others who had been banished without a decree of the people. (2)
Euphron, taking fright at these proceedings, fled for safety to the
harbour-town of Sicyon. Hither he summoned Pasimelus from Corinth, and
by his instrumentality handed over the harbour to the Lacedaemonians.
Once more reappearing in his old character, he began to pose as an ally
of Sparta. He asserted that his fidelity to Lacedaemon had never been
interrupted; for when the votes were given in the city whether Sicyon
should give up her allegiance to Lacedaemon, "I, with one or two
others," said he, "voted against the measure; but afterwards these
people betrayed me, and in my desire to avenge myself on them I set up
a democracy. At present all traitors to yourselves are banished--I have
seen to that. If only I could get the power into my own hands, I would
go over to you, city and all, at once. All that I can do at present,
I have done; I have surrendered to you this harbour." That was what
Euphron said to his audience there, but of the many who heard his words,
how many really believed his words is by no means evident. However,
since I have begun the story of Euphron, I desire to bring it to its
close.

 (1) Is this man the famous writer {o taktikos}, a portion of whose
    works, the "Treatise on Siege Operations," has been preserved
     (recently re-edited by Arnold Hug--"Commentarius Poliorceticus,"
    Lips. Trubner, 1884)? So Casaubon supposed. Cf. "Com. Pol." 27,
    where the writer mentions {paneia} as the Arcadian term for
    "panics." Readers of the "Anabasis" will recollect the tragic end
    of another Aeneas, also of Stymphalus, an Arcadian officer. On the
    official title {strategos} (general), Freeman ("Hist. Fed. Gov."
    204) notes that "at the head of the whole League there seems to
    have been, as in so many other cases, a single Federal general."
    Cf. Diod. xv. 62.

 (2) See above, VII. i. 46.

Faction and party strife ran high in Sicyon between the better classes
and the people, when Euphron, getting a body of foreign troops from
Athens, once more obtained his restoration. The city, with the help of
the commons, he was master of, but the Theban governor held the citadel.
Euphron, perceiving that he would never be able to dominate the state
whilst the Thebans held the acropolis, collected money and set off to
Thebes, intending to persuade the Thebans to expel the aristocrats and
once again to hand over the city to himself. But the former exiles,
having got wind of this journey of his, and of the whole intrigue, set
off themselves to Thebes in front of him. (3) When, however, they
saw the terms of intimacy on which he associated with the Theban
authorities, in terror of his succeeding in his mission some of them
staked their lives on the attempt and stabbed Euphron in the Cadmeia,
where the magistrates and senate were seated. The magistrates, indeed,
could not but indict the perpetrators of the deed before the senate, and
spoke as follows:

 (3) Or, "on an opposition journey."

"Fellow-citizens, it is our duty to arraign these murderers of Euphron,
the men before you, on the capital charge. Mankind may be said to
fall into two classes: there are the wise and temperate, (4) who are
incapable of any wrong and unhallowed deed; and there are the base, the
bad, who do indeed such things, but try to escape the notice of their
fellows. The men before you are exceptional. They have so far exceeded
all the rest of men in audacity and foul villainy that, in the very
presence of the magistrates and of yourselves, who alone have the power
of life and death, they have taken the law into their own hands, (5) and
have slain this man. But they stand now before the bar of justice, and
they must needs pay the extreme penalty; for, if you spare them, what
visitor will have courage to approach the city? Nay, what will become
of the city itself, if license is to be given to any one who chooses to
murder those who come here, before they have even explained the
object of their visit? It is our part, then, to prosecute these men as
arch-villains and miscreants, whose contempt for law and justice is only
matched by the supreme indifference with which they treat this city. It
is your part, now that you have heard the charges, to impose upon them
that penalty which seems to be the measure of their guilt."

 (4) Lit. "the sound of soul."

 (5) Or, "they have been judge and jury both, and executioners to
    boot."

Such were the words of the magistrates. Among the men thus accused, all
save one denied immediate participation in the act. It was not their
hands that had dealt the blow. This one not only confessed the deed, but
made a defence in words somewhat as follows:

"As to treating you with indifference, men of Thebes, that is not
possible for a man who knows that with you lies the power to deal with
him as you list. Ask rather on what I based my confidence when I slew
the man; and be well assured that, in the first place, I based it on the
conviction that I was doing right; next, that your verdict will also
be right and just. I knew assuredly how you dealt with Archias (6) and
Hypates and that company whom you detected in conduct similar to that
of Euphron: you did not stay for formal voting, but at the first
opportunity within your reach you guided the sword of vengeance,
believing that by the verdict of mankind a sentence of death had already
been passed against the conspicuously profane person, the manifest
traitor, and him who lays to his hand to become a tyrant. See, then,
what follows. Euphron was liable on each of these several counts: he was
a conspicuously profane person, who took into his keeping temples rich
in votive offerings of gold and silver, and swept them bare of their
sacred treasures; he was an arrant traitor--for what treason could
be more manifest than Euphron's? First he was the bosom friend of
Lacedaemon, but presently chose you in their stead; and, after exchange
of solemn pledges between yourselves and him, once more turned round and
played the traitor to you, and delivered up the harbour to your enemies.
Lastly, he was most undisguisedly a tyrant, who made not free men only,
but free fellow-citizens his slaves; who put to death, or drove into
exile, or robbed of their wealth and property, not malefactors, note
you, but the mere victims of his whim and fancy; and these were ever
the better folk. Once again restored by the help of your sworn foes
and antagonists, the Athenians, to his native town of Sicyon, the first
thing he did was to take up arms against the governor from Thebes; but,
finding himself powerless to drive him from the acropolis, he collected
money and betook himself hither. Now, if it were proved that he had
mustered armed bands to attack you, I venture to say, you would have
thanked me that I slew him. What then, when he came furnished with vile
moneys, to corrupt you therewith, to bribe you to make him once more
lord and master of the state? How shall I, who dealt justice upon him,
justly suffer death at your hands? For to be worsted in arms implies
injury certainly, but of the body only: the defeated man is not proved
to be dishonest by his loss of victory. But he who is corrupted by
filthy lucre, contrary to the standard of what is best, (7) is at once
injured and involved in shame.

 (6) See above, V. iv. 2.

 (7) Or, as we should say, "in violation of conscience."

"Now if he had been your friend, however much he was my national foe,
I do confess it had been scarce honourable of me to have stabbed him to
death in your presence: but why, I should like to ask, should the man
who betrayed you be less your enemy than mine? 'Ah, but,' I hear some
one retort, 'he came of his own accord.' I presume, sir, you mean that
had he chanced to be slain by somebody at a distance from your state,
that somebody would have won your praise; but now, on the ground that
he came back here to work mischief on the top of mischief, 'he had the
right to live'! (8) In what part of Hellas, tell me, sir, do Hellenes
keep a truce with traitors, double-dyed deserters, and tyrants?
Moreover, I must remind you that you passed a resolution--if I mistake
not, it stands recorded in your parliamentary minutes--that 'renegades
are liable to be apprehended (9) in any of the allied cities.' Now, here
is a renegade restoring himself without any common decree of the allied
states: will any one tell me on what ground this person did not deserve
to die? What I maintain, sirs, is that if you put me to death, by so
doing you will be aiding and abetting your bitterest foe; while, by
a verdict sanctioning the justice of my conduct, you will prove your
willingness to protect the interests not of yourselves only, but of the
whole body of your allies."

 (8) Or, "he was wrongfully slain."

 (9) For this right of extradition see Plut. "Lys." xxvii.

The Thebans on hearing these pleadings decided that Euphron had only
suffered the fate which he deserved. His own countrymen, however,
conveyed away the body with the honours due to a brave and good man, and
buried him in the market-place, where they still pay pious reverence to
his memory as "a founder of the state." So strictly, it would seem, do
the mass of mankind confine the term brave and good to those who are the
benefactors of themselves.



IV

B.C. 366. And so ends the history of Euphron. I return to the point
reached at the commencement of this digression. (1) The Phliasians were
still fortifying Thyamia, and Chares was still with them, when Oropus
(2) was seized by the banished citizens of that place. The Athenians
in consequence despatched an expedition in full force to the point of
danger, and recalled Chares from Thyamia; whereupon the Sicyonians and
the Arcadians seized the opportunity to recapture the harbour of Sicyon.
Meanwhile the Athenians, forced to act single-handed, with none of their
allies to assist them, retired from Oropus, leaving that town in the
hands of the Thebans as a deposit till the case at issue could be
formally adjudicated.

 (1) See above, VII. ii. 23; iii. 3; Diod. xv. 76.

 (2) See Thuc. viii. 60.

Now Lycomedes (3) had discovered that the Athenians were harbouring a
grievance against her allies, as follows:--They felt it hard that, while
Athens was put to vast trouble on their account, yet in her need not a
man among them stepped forward to render help. Accordingly he persuaded
the assembly of Ten Thousand to open negotiations with Athens for the
purpose of forming an alliance. (4) At first some of the Athenians were
vexed that they, being friends of Lacedaemon, should become allied to
her opponents; but on further reflection they discovered it was no less
desirable for the Lacedaemonians than for themselves that the Arcadians
should become independent of Thebes. That being so, they were quite
ready to accept an Arcadian alliance. Lycomedes himself was still
engaged on this transaction when, taking his departure from Athens, he
died, in a manner which looked like divine intervention.

 (3) See above, VII. i. 23.

 (4) This proves that "the Ten Thousand made war and peace in the name
    of all Arkadia"; cf. "Hell." VII. i. 38; Diod. xv. 59. "They
    received and listened to the ambassadors of other Greek states";
    Demosth. "F. L." 220. "They regulated and paid the standing army
    of the Federation"; "Hell." VII. iv. 22, 23; Diod. xv. 62. "They
    sat in judgment on political offenders against the collective
    majority of the Arkadian League"; "Hell." VII. iv. 33; Freeman,
    "Hist. Fed. Gov." 203, note 1.

Out of the many vessels at his service he had chosen the one he liked
best, and by the terms of contract was entitled to land at any point he
might desire; but for some reason, selected the exact spot where a body
of Mantinean exiles lay. Thus he died; but the alliance on which he had
set his heart was already consummated.

Now an argument was advanced by Demotion (5) in the Assembly of Athens,
approving highly of the friendship with the Arcadians, which to his
mind was an excellent thing, but arguing that the generals should be
instructed to see that Corinth was kept safe for the Athenian people.
The Corinthians, hearing this, lost no time in despatching garrisons of
their own large enough to take the place of the Athenian garrisons at
any point where they might have them, with orders to these latter to
retire: "We have no further need of foreign garrisons," they said. The
garrisons did as they were bid.

 (5) Of Demotion nothing more, I think, is known. Grote ("H. G." x.
    397) says: "The public debates of the Athenian assembly were not
    favourable to the success of a scheme like that proposed by
    Demotion, to which secrecy was indispensable. Compare another
    scheme" (the attempted surprise of Mitylene, B.C. 428), "divulged
    in like manner, in Thuc. iii. 3."

As soon as the Athenian garrison troops were met together in the city
of Corinth, the Corinthian authorities caused proclamation to be made
inviting all Athenians who felt themselves wronged to enter their names
and cases upon a list, and they would recover their dues. While things
were in this state, Chares arrived at Cenchreae with a fleet. Learning
what had been done, he told them that he had heard there were designs
against the state of Corinth, and had come to render assistance. The
authorities, while thanking him politely for his zeal, were not any
the more ready to admit the vessels into the harbour, but bade him sail
away; and after rendering justice to the infantry troops, they sent
them away likewise. Thus the Athenians were quit of Corinth. To the
Arcadians, to be sure, they were forced by the terms of their alliance
to send an auxiliary force of cavalry, "in case of any foreign attack
upon Arcadia." At the same time they were careful not to set foot on
Laconian soil for the purposes of war.

The Corinthians had begun to realise on how slender a thread their
political existence hung. They were overmastered by land still as ever,
with the further difficulty of Athenian hostility, or quasi-hostility,
now added. They resolved to collect bodies of mercenary troops, both
infantry and horse. At the head of these they were able at once to guard
their state and to inflict much injury on their neighbouring foes. To
Thebes, indeed, they sent ambassadors to ascertain whether they would
have any prospect of peace if they came to seek it. The Thebans bade
them come: "Peace they should have." Whereupon the Corinthians asked
that they might be allowed to visit their allies; in making peace they
would like to share it with those who cared for it, and would leave
those who preferred war to war. This course also the Thebans sanctioned;
and so the Corinthians came to Lacedaemon and said:

"Men of Lacedaemon, we, your friends, are here to present a petition,
and on this wise. If you can discover any safety for us whilst we
persist in warlike courses, we beg that you will show it us; but if
you recognise the hopelessness of our affairs, we would, in that case,
proffer this alternative: if peace is alike conducive to your interests,
we beg that you would join us in making peace, since there is no one
with whom we would more gladly share our safety than with you; if, on
the other hand, you are persuaded that war is more to your interest,
permit us at any rate to make peace for ourselves. So saved to-day,
perhaps we may live to help you in days to come; whereas, if to-day we
be destroyed, plainly we shall never at any time be serviceable again."

The Lacedaemonians, on hearing these proposals, counselled the
Corinthians to arrange a peace on their own account; and as for the rest
of their allies, they permitted any who did not care to continue the
war along with them to take a respite and recruit themselves. "As for
ourselves," they said, "we will go on fighting and accept whatever
Heaven has in store for us,"--adding, "never will we submit to be
deprived of our territory of Messene, which we received as an heirloom
from our fathers." (6)

 (6) See Isocr. "Or." vi. "Archidamos," S. 70; Jebb, "Att. Or." ii.
    193.

Satisfied with this answer, the Corinthians set off to Thebes in quest
of peace. The Thebans, indeed, asked them to agree on oath, not to peace
only but an alliance; to which they answered: "An alliance meant, not
peace, but merely an exchange of war. If they liked, they were ready
there and then," they repeated, "to establish a just and equitable
peace." And the Thebans, admiring the manner in which, albeit in danger,
they refused to undertake war against their benefactors, conceded to
them and the Phliasians and the rest who came with them to Thebes, peace
on the principle that each should hold their own territory. On these
terms the oaths were taken.

Thereupon the Phliasians, in obedience to the compact, at once retired
from Thyamia; but the Argives, who had taken the oath of peace on
precisely the same terms, finding that they were unable to procure the
continuance of the Phliasian exiles in the Trikaranon as a point held
within the limits of Argos, (7) took over and garrisoned the place,
asserting now that this land was theirs--land which only a little while
before they were ravaging as hostile territory. Further, they refused
to submit the case to arbitration in answer to the challenge of the
Phliasians.

 (7) Or, "as a post held by them within the territory of the state."
    The passage is perhaps corrupt.

It was nearly at the same date that the son of Dionysius (8) (his
father, Dionysius the first, being already dead) sent a reinforcement
to Lacedaemon of twelve triremes under Timocrates, who on his arrival
helped the Lacedaemonians to recover Sellasia, and after that exploit
sailed away home.

 (8) Concerning Dionysius the first, see above, VII. i. 20 foll. 28.

B.C. 366-365. Not long after this the Eleians seized Lasion, (9) a
place which in old days was theirs, but at present was attached to the
Arcadian league. The Arcadians did not make light of the matter,
but immediately summoned their troops and rallied to the rescue.
Counter-reliefs came also on the side of Elis--their Three Hundred, and
again their Four Hundred. (10) The Eleians lay encamped during the day
face to face with the invader, but on a somewhat more level position.
The Arcadians were thereby induced under cover of night to mount on to
the summit of the hill overhanging the Eleians, and at day-dawn they
began their descent upon the enemy. The Eleians soon caught sight of
the enemy advancing from the vantage ground above them, many times
their number; but a sense of shame forbade retreat at such a distance.
Presently they came to close quarters; there was a hand-to-hand
encounter; the Eleians turned and fled; and in retiring down the
difficult ground lost many men and many arms.

 (9) See above, VII. i. 26; Freeman, "Hist. Fed. Gov." p. 201.

 (10) From the sequel it would appear that the former were a picked
    corps of infantry and the latter of cavalry. See Thuc. ii. 25;
    Busolt, op. cit. p. 175 foll.

Flushed with this achievement the Arcadians began marching on the cities
of the Acroreia, (11) which, with the exception of Thraustus, they
captured, and so reached Olympia. There they made an entrenched camp on
the hill of Kronos, established a garrison, and held control over the
Olympian hill-country. Margana also, by help of a party inside who gave
it up, next fell into their hands.

 (11) The mountainous district of Elis on the borders of Arcadia,  in
    which the rivers Peneius and Ladon take their rise; see "Dict. of
    Anct. Geog." s.v.; above, III. ii. 30, IV. ii. 16. Thraustus was
    one of the four chief townships of the district. For Margana, see
    above, III. ii. 25, 30, IV. ii. 16, VI. v. 2.

These successive advantages gained by their opponents reacted on the
Eleians, and threw them altogether into despair. Meanwhile the Arcadians
were steadily advancing upon their capital. (12) At length they arrived,
and penetrated into the market-place. Here, however, the cavalry and the
rest of the Eleians made a stand, drove the enemy out with some loss,
and set up a trophy.

 (12) I.e. Elis.

It should be mentioned that the city of Elis had previously been in a
state of disruption. The party of Charopus, Thrasonidas and Argeius
were for converting the state into a democracy; the party of Eualcas,
Hippias, and Stratolas (13) were for oligarchy. When the Arcadians,
backed by a large force, appeared as allies of those who favoured a
democratic constitution, the party of Charopus were at once emboldened;
and, having obtained the promise of assistance from the Arcadians,
they seized the acropolis. The Knights and the Three Hundred did not
hesitate, but at once marched up and dislodged them; with the result
that about four hundred citizens, with Argeius and Charopus, were
banished. Not long afterwards these exiles, with the help of some
Arcadians, seized and occupied Pylus; (14) where many of the commons
withdrew from the capital to join them, attracted not only by the beauty
of the position, but by the great power of the Arcadians, in alliance
with them.

 (13) See below, VII. iv. 31; Busolt, op. cit. p. 175.

 (14) Pylus, a town in "hollow" Elis, upon the mountain road from Elis
    to Olympia, at the place where the Ladon flows into the Peneius
    (Paus. VI. xxii. 5), near the modern village of Agrapidokhori.--
    Baedeker, "Greece," p. 320. See Busolt, p. 179.

There was subsequently another invasion of the territory of the Eleians
on the part of the Arcadians, who were influenced by the representations
of the exiles that the city would come over to them. But the attempt
proved abortive. The Achaeans, who had now become friends with the
Eleians, kept firm guard on the capital, so that the Arcadians had
to retire without further exploit than that of ravaging the country.
Immediately, however, on marching out of Eleian territory they were
informed that the men of Pellene were in Elis; whereupon they executed
a marvellously long night march and seized the Pellenian township of
Olurus (15) (the Pellenians at the date in question having already
reverted to their old alliance with Lacedaemon). And now the men of
Pellene, in their turn getting wind of what had happened at Olurus,
made their way round as best they could, and got into their own city of
Pellene; after which there was nothing for it but to carry on war with
the Arcadians in Olurus and the whole body of their own commons; and in
spite of their small numbers they did not cease till they had reduced
Olurus by siege.

 (15) This fortress (placed by Leake at modern Xylokastro) lay at the
    entrance of the gorge of the Sys, leading from the Aigialos or
    coast-land into the territory of Pellene, which itself lay about
    sixty stades from the sea at modern Zougra. For the part played by
    Pellene as one of the twelve Achaean states at this period, see
    above.

B.C. 365. (16) The Arcadians were presently engaged on another campaign
against Elis. While they were encamped between Cyllene (17) and the
capital the Eleians attacked them, but the Arcadians made a stand
and won the battle. Andromachus, the Eleian cavalry general, who was
regarded as responsible for the engagement, made an end of himself;
and the rest withdrew into the city. This battle cost the life also
of another there present--the Spartan Socleides; since, it will be
understood, the Lacedaemonians had by this time become allies of the
Eleians. Consequently the Eleians, being sore pressed on their own
territory, sent an embassy and begged the Lacedaemonians to organise an
expedition against the Arcadians. They were persuaded that in this way
they would best arrest the progress of the Arcadians, who would thus
be placed between the two foes. In accordance with this suggestion
Archidamus marched out with a body of the city troops and seized
Cromnus. (18) Here he left a garrison--three out of the twelve regiments
(19)--and so withdrew homewards. The Arcadians had just ended their
Eleian campaign, and, without disbanding their levies, hastened to the
rescue, surrounded Cromnus with a double line of trenches, and having
so secured their position, proceeded to lay siege to those inside the
place. The city of Lacedaemon, annoyed at the siege of their citizens,
sent out an army, again under Archidamus, who, when he had come, set
about ravaging Arcadia to the best of his power, as also the Sciritid,
and did all he could to draw off, if possible, the besieging army. The
Arcadians, for all that, were not one whit the more to be stirred: they
seemed callous to all his proceedings.

 (16) See Grote, "H. G." x. 429 foll.; al. B.C. 364.

 (17) The port town of Elis.

 (18) Cromnus, a township near Megalopolis. See Callisthenes, ap.
    Athen. 10, p. 452 A. See Schneider's note ad loc.

 (19) Lit. "lochi." See Arnold's note to Thuc. v. 68; below, VII. v.
    10.

Presently espying a certain rising ground, across which the Arcadians
had drawn their outer line of circumvallation, Archidamus proposed
to himself to take it. If he were once in command of that knoll, the
besiegers at its foot would be forced to retire. Accordingly he set
about leading a body of troops round to the point in question, and
during this movement the light infantry in advance of Archidamus,
advancing at the double, caught sight of the Arcadian Eparitoi (20)
outside the stockade and attacked them, while the cavalry made an
attempt to enforce their attack simultaneously. The Arcadians did not
swerve: in compact order they waited impassively. The Lacedaemonians
charged a second time: a second time they swerved not, but on the
contrary began advancing. Then, as the hoarse roar and shouting
deepened, Archidamus himself advanced in support of his troops. To do
so he turned aside along the carriage-road leading to Cromnus, and moved
onward in column two abreast, (21) which was his natural order. When
they came into close proximity to one another--Archidamus's troops in
column, seeing they were marching along a road; the Arcadians in compact
order with shields interlinked--at this conjuncture the Lacedaemonians
were not able to hold out for any length of time against the numbers of
the Arcadians. Before long Archidamus had received a wound which pierced
through his thigh, whilst death was busy with those who fought in
front of him, Polyaenidas and Chilon, who was wedded to the sister of
Archidamus, included. The whole of these, numbering no less than thirty,
perished in this action. Presently, falling back along the road,
they emerged into the open ground, and now with a sense of relief the
Lacedaemonians got themselves into battle order, facing the foe. The
Arcadians, without altering their position, stood in compact line, and
though falling short in actual numbers, were in far better heart--the
moral result of an attack on a retreating enemy and the severe loss
inflicted on him. The Lacedaemonians, on the other hand, were sorely
down-hearted: Archidamus lay wounded before their eyes; in their ears
rang the names of those who had died, the fallen being not only brave
men, but, one may say, the flower of Spartan chivalry. The two armies
were now close together, when one of the older men lifted up his voice
and cried: "Why need we fight, sirs? Why not rather make truce and part
friends?" Joyously the words fell on the ears of either host, and they
made a truce. The Lacedaemonians picked up their dead and retired; the
Arcadians withdrew to the point where their advance originally began,
and set up a trophy of victory.

 (20) So the troops of the Arcadian Federation were named. Diodorus
    (xv. 62) calls them "the select troops," {tous kaloumenous
    epilektous}.

 (21) See above, III. i. 22.

Now, as the Arcadians lay at Cromnus, the Eleians from the capital,
advancing in the first instance upon Pylus, fell in with the men of that
place, who had been beaten back from Thalamae. (22) Galloping along the
road, the cavalry of the Eleians, when they caught sight of them, did
not hesitate, but dashed at them at once, and put some to the sword,
while others of them fled for safety to a rising knoll. Ere long the
Eleian infantry arrived, and succeeded in dislodging this remnant on the
hillock also; some they slew, and others, nearly two hundred in number,
they took alive, all of whom where either sold, if foreigners, or, if
Eleian exiles, put to death. After this the Eleians captured the men
of Pylus and the place itself, as no one came to their rescue, and
recovered the Marganians.

 (22) A strong fortress in an unfrequented situation, defended by
    narrow passes (Leake, "Morea," ii. 204); it lay probably in the
    rocky recesses of Mount Scollis (modern Santameri), on the
    frontier of Achaea, near the modern village of Santameri. See
    Polyb. iv. 75. See Busolt, op. cit. p. 179.

The Lacedaemonians presently made a second attempt on Cromnus by a night
attack, got possession of the part of the palisading facing the Argives,
and at once began summoning their besieged fellow-citizens to come out.
Out accordingly came all who happened to be within easy distance, and
who took time by the forelock. The rest were not quick enough; a strong
Arcadian reinforcement cut them off, and they remained shut up inside,
and were eventually taken prisoners and distributed. One portion of
them fell to the lot of the Argives, one to the Thebans, (23) one to the
Arcadians, and one to the Messenians. The whole number taken, whether
true-born Spartans or Perioeci, amounted to more than one hundred.

 (23) "The Thebans must have been soldiers in garrison at Tegea,
    Megalopolis, or Messene."--Grote, "H. G." x. 433.

B.C. 364. And now that the Arcadians had leisure on the side of Cromnus,
they were again able to occupy themselves with the Eleians, and to
keep Olympia still more strongly garrisoned. In anticipation of the
approaching Olympic year, (24) they began preparations to celebrate the
Olympian games in conjunction with the men of Pisa, who claim to be
the original presidents of the Temple. (25) Now, when the month of the
Olympic Festival--and not the month only, but the very days, during
which the solemn assembly is wont to meet, were come, the Eleians, in
pursuance of preparations and invitations to the Achaeans, of which they
made no secret, at length proceeded to march along the road to Olympia.
The Arcadians had never imagined that they would really attack them; and
they were themselves just now engaged with the men of Pisa in carrying
out the details of the solemn assembly. They had already completed the
chariot-race, and the foot-race of the pentathlon. (26) The competitors
entitled to enter for the wrestling match had left the racecourse, and
were getting through their bouts in the space between the racecourse and
the great altar.

 (24) I.e. "Ol. 104. 1" (July B.C. 364).

 (25) For this claim on the part of the Pisatans (as the old
    inhabitants), see above, III. ii. 31; Paus. VI. xxii. 2; Diod. xv.
    78; Busolt, op. cit. p. 154.

 (26) As to the pentathlon, see above, IV. vii. 5. Whether the
    preceding {ippodromia} was, at this date, a horse or chariot race,
    or both, I am unable to say.

It must be understood that the Eleians under arms were already close at
hand within the sacred enclosure. (27) The Arcadians, without advancing
farther to meet them, drew up their troops on the river Cladaus, which
flows past the Altis and discharges itself into the Alpheus. Their
allies, consisting of two hundred Argive hoplites and about four hundred
Athenian cavalry, were there to support them. Presently the Eleians
formed into line on the opposite side of the stream, and, having
sacrificed, at once began advancing. Though heretofore in matters of
war despised by Arcadians and Argives, by Achaeans and Athenians alike,
still on this day they led the van of the allied force like the bravest
of the brave. Coming into collision with the Arcadians first, they at
once put them to flight, and next receiving the attack of the Argive
supports, mastered these also. Then having pursued them into the space
between the senate-house, the temple of Hestia, and the theatre thereto
adjoining, they still kept up the fighting as fiercely as ever, pushing
the retreating foe towards the great altar. But now being exposed to
missiles from the porticoes and the senate-house and the great temple,
(28) while battling with their opponents on the level, some of the
Eleians were slain, and amongst others the commander of the Three
Hundred himself, Stratolas. At this state of the proceedings they
retired to their camp.

 (27) "The {temenos} must here be distinguished from the Altis, as
    meaning the entire breadth of consecrated ground at Olympia, of
    which the Altis formed a smaller interior portion enclosed with a
    wall. The Eleians entered into a {temenos} before they crossed the
    river Kladeus, which flowed through the {temenos}, but alongside
    the Altis. The tomb of Oenomaus, which was doubtless included in
    the {temenos}, was on the right bank of the Kladeus (Paus. VI.
    xxi. 3); while the Altis was on the left bank of the river."--
    Grote, "H. G." x. 438, note 1. For the position of the Altis
    (Paus. V. x. 1) and several of the buildings here mentioned, and
    the topography of Olympia in general, see Baedeker's "Greece," p.
    322 foll.; and Dorpfeld's Plan ("Olympia und Umgegend," Berlin,
    1882), there reproduced.

 (28) Or, "from the porticoes of the senate-house and the great
    temple."

The Arcadians and those with them were so terrified at the thought of
the coming day that they gave themselves neither respite nor repose
that night, but fell to chopping up the carefully-compacted booths and
constructing them into palisades; so that when the Eleians did again
advance the next day and saw the strength of the barriers and the number
mounted on the temples, they withdrew to their city. They had proved
themselves to be warriors of such mettle as a god indeed by the breath
of his spirit may raise up and bring to perfection in a single day, but
into which it were impossible for mortal men to convert a coward even in
a lifetime.

B.C. 363. The employment of the sacred treasures of the temple by the
Arcadian magistrates (29) as a means of maintaining the Eparitoi (30)
aroused protest. The Mantineans were the first to pass a resolution
forbidding such use of the sacred property. They set the example
themselves of providing the necessary quota for the Troop in question
from their state exchequer, and this sum they sent to the federal
government. The latter, affirming that the Mantineans were undermining
the Arcadian league, retaliated by citing their leading statesmen to
appear before the assembly of Ten Thousand; and on their refusal to
obey the summons, passed sentence upon them, and sent the Eparitoi to
apprehend them as convicted persons. The Mantineans, however, closed
their gates, and would not admit the Troop within their walls. Their
example was speedily followed: others among the Ten Thousand began to
protest against the enormity of so applying the sacred treasures; it
was doubly wrong to leave as a perpetual heirloom to their children the
imputation of a crime so heinous against the gods. But no sooner was a
resolution passed in the general assembly (31) forbidding the use of the
sacred moneys for profane purposes than those (members of the league)
who could not have afforded to serve as Eparitoi without pay began
speedily to melt away; while those of more independent means, with
mutual encouragement, began to enrol themselves in the ranks of the
Eparitoi--the feeling being that they ought not to be a mere tool in
the hands of the corps, but rather that the corps itself should be their
instrument. Those members of the government who had manipulated the
sacred money soon saw that when they came to render an account of
their stewardship, in all likelihood they would lose their heads. They
therefore sent an embassy to Thebes, with instructions to the Theban
authorities warning them that, if they did not open a campaign, the
Arcadians would in all probability again veer round to Lacedaemon.

 (29) See above, VII. i. 24. "Were these magistrates, or merely popular
    leaders?"--Freeman, "Hist. Fed. Gov." p. 203, note 3.

 (30) Or, "Select Troop." See above.

 (31) "The common formula for a Greek confederation, {to koinon ton
    'Arkadon}, is used as an equivalent of {oi mupioi}" (here and
    below, SS. 35, 38)--Freeman, op. cit. 202, note 4.

The Thebans, therefore, began making preparations for opening a
campaign, but the party who consulted the best interests of Peloponnese
(32) persuaded the general assembly of the Arcadians to send an embassy
and tell the Thebans not to advance with an army into Arcadia, unless
they sent for them; and whilst this was the language they addressed to
Thebes, they reasoned among themselves that they could dispense with war
altogether. The presidency over the temple of Zeus, they were persuaded,
they might easily dispense with; indeed, it would at once be a more
upright and a holier proceeding on their parts to give it back, and with
such conduct the god, they thought, might be better pleased. As these
were also the views and wishes of the Eleians, both parties agreed to
make peace, and a truce was established.

 (32) See below, VII. v. 1, {oi kedouenoi tes Peloponnesou}. I regard
    these phrases as self-laudatory political catchwords.

B.C. 362. The oaths were ratified; and amongst those who swore to them
were included not only the parties immediately concerned, but the men of
Tegea, and the Theban general himself, who was inside Tegea with three
hundred heavy infantry of the Boeotians. Under these circumstances the
Arcadians in Tegea remained behind feasting and keeping holy day,
with outpouring of libations and songs of victory, to celebrate the
establishment of peace. Here was an opportunity for the Theban and
those of the government who regarded the forthcoming inquiry with
apprehension. Aided by the Boeotians and those of the Eparitoi who
shared their sentiments, they first closed the gates of the fortress of
Tegea, and then set about sending to the various quarters to apprehend
those of the better class. But, inasmuch as there were Arcadians present
from all the cities, and there was a general desire for peace, those
apprehended must needs be many. So much so, that the prison-house was
eventually full to overflowing, and the town-hall was full also. Besides
the number lodged in prison, a number had escaped by leaping down the
walls, and there were others who were suffered to pass through the
gates (a laxity easily explained, since no one, excepting those who were
anticipating their own downfall, cherished any wrathful feeling against
anybody). But what was a source of still graver perplexity to the Theban
commander and those acting with him--of the Mantineans, the very people
whom they had set their hearts on catching, they had got but very few.
Nearly all of them, owing to the proximity of their city, had, in fact,
betaken themselves home. Now, when day came and the Mantineans learned
what had happened, they immediately sent and forewarned the other
Arcadian states to be ready in arms, and to guard the passes; and they
set the example themselves by so doing. They sent at the same time to
Tegea and demanded the release of all Mantineans there detained. With
regard to the rest of the Arcadians they further claimed that no one
should be imprisoned or put to death without trial. If any one had any
accusation to bring against any, than by the mouth of their messengers
there present they gave notice that the state of Mantinea was ready to
offer bail, "Verily and indeed to produce before the general assembly
of the Arcadians all who might be summoned into court." The Theban
accordingly, on hearing this, was at a loss what to make of the affair,
and released his prisoners. Next day, summoning a congress of all the
Arcadians who chose to come, he explained, with some show of apology,
that he had been altogether deceived; he had heard, he said, that "the
Lacedaemonians were under arms on the frontier, and that some of the
Arcadians were about to betray Tegea into their hands." His auditors
acquitted him for the moment, albeit they knew that as touching
themselves he was lying. They sent, however, an embassy to Thebes and
there accused him as deserving of death. Epaminondas (who was at that
time the general at the head of the war department) is reported to have
maintained that the Theban commander had acted far more rightly when he
seized than when he let go the prisoners. "Thanks to you," he argued,
"we have been brought into a state of war, and then you, without our
advice or opinion asked, make peace on your own account; would it not
be reasonable to retort upon you the charge of treason in such conduct?
Anyhow, be assured," he added, "we shall bring an army into Arcadia,
and along with those who share our views carry on the war which we have
undertaken."



V

B.C. 362. This answer was duly reported to the general assembly of the
Arcadians, and throughout the several states of the league. Consequently
the Mantineans, along with those of the Arcadians who had the interests
of Peloponnesus at heart, as also the Eleians and the Achaeans, came
to the conclusion that the policy of the Thebans was plain. They wished
Peloponnesus to be reduced to such an extremity of weakness that it
might fall an easy prey into their hands who were minded to enslave it.
"Why else," they asked, "should they wish us to fight, except that we
may tear each other to pieces, and both sides be driven to look to them
for support? or why, when we tell them that we have no need of them at
present, do they insist on preparing for a foreign campaign? Is it not
plain that these preparations are for an expedition which will do us
some mischief?"

In this mood they sent to Athens, (1) calling on the Athenians for
military aid. Ambassadors also went to Lacedaemon on behalf of the
Eparitoi, summoning the Lacedaemonians, if they wished to give a helping
hand, to put a stop to the proceedings of any power approaching
to enslave Peloponnesus. As regards the headship, they came to an
arrangement at once, on the principle that each of the allied states
should exercise the generalship within its own territory.

 (1) For a treaty of alliance between Athens, the Arkadians, Achaeans,
    Eleians, and Phliasians, immediately before Mantinea, B.C. 362,
    {epi Molonos arkhontos}, see Hicks, 94; Kohler, "C. I. A." ii. p.
    405. It is preserved on a stele ("broken at bottom; but the top is
    surmounted by a relief representing Zeus enthroned, with a
    thunderbolt; a female figure  (= the {Summakhia}?) approaches
    lifting her veil, while Athena stands by") now standing among the
    sculptures from the Asklepieion on the Acropolis at Athens. See
    Milchhofer, p. 47, no. 7, "Die Museum," Athens, 1881. For the
    date, see Demosth. "c. Polycl." 1207.

While these matters were in progress, Epaminondas was prosecuting his
march at the head of all the Boeotians, with the Euboeans, and a
large body of Thessalians, furnished both by Alexander (2) and by his
opponents. The Phocians were not represented. Their special agreement
only required them to render assistance in case of an attack on Thebes;
to assist in a hostile expedition against others was not in the bond.
Epaminondas, however, reflected that inside Peloponnesus itself they
might count upon the Argives and the Messenians, with that section of
the Arcadians which shared their views. These latter were the men of
Tegea and Megalopolis, of Asea and Pallantium, with any townships which
owing to their small size or their position in the midst of these larger
cities were forced to follow their lead.

 (2) For Alexander of Pherae, see above, VI. iv. 34. In B.C. 363 the
    Thebans had sent an army under Pelopidas into Thessaly to assist
    their allies among the Thessalians with the Phthiot Achaeans and
    the Magnetes against Alexander. At Kynos Kephelae Alexander was
    defeated, but Pelopidas was slain (see Grote, "H. G." x. 420
    foll.). "His death, as it brought grief, so likewise it produced
    advantage to the allies; for the Thebans, as soon as they heard of
    his fall, delayed not their revenge, but presently sent seven
    thousand foot and seven hundred horse, under the command of
    Malcitas and Diogiton. And they, finding Alexander weak and
    without forces, compelled him to restore the cities he had taken,
    to withdraw his garrisons from the Magnesians and Achaeans of
    Phthiotos and swear to assist the Thebans against whatsoever
    enemies they should require."--Plut. "Pelop." 35 (Clough, ii.
    236).

Epaminondas advanced with rapid strides; but on reaching Nemea he
slackened speed, hoping to catch the Athenians as they passed,
and reflecting on the magnitude of such an achievement, whether in
stimulating the courage of his own allies, or in plunging his foes into
despondency; since, to state the matter concisely, any blow to Athens
would be a gain to Thebes. But during his pause at Nemea those who
shared the opposite policy had time to converge on Mantinea. Presently
the news reached Epaminondas that the Athenians had abandoned the idea
of marching by land, and were preparing to bring their supports to
Arcadia by sea through Lacedaemon. This being so, he abandoned his base
of Nemea and pushed on to Tegea.

That the strategy of the Theban general was fortunate I will not pretend
to assert, but in the particular combination of prudence and daring
which stamps these exploits, I look upon him as consummate. In the first
place, I cannot but admire the sagacity which led him to form his camp
within the walls of Tegea, where he was in greater security that he
would have been if entrenched outside, and where his future movements
were more completely concealed from the enemy. Again, the means to
collect material and furnish himself with other necessaries were readier
to his hand inside the city; while, thirdly, he was able to keep an eye
on the movements of his opponents marching outside, and to watch their
successful dispositions as well as their mistakes. More than this: in
spite of his sense of superiority to his antagonists, over and over
again, when he saw them gaining some advantage in position, he refused
to be drawn out to attack them. It was only when he saw plainly that no
city was going to give him its adhesion, and that time was slipping by,
that he made up his mind that a blow must be struck, failing which, he
had nothing to expect save a vast ingloriousness, in place of his former
fame. (3) He had ascertained that his antagonists held a strong position
round Mantinea, and that they had sent to fetch Agesilaus and the whole
Lacedaemonian army. He was further aware that Agesilaus had commenced
his advance and was already at Pellene. (4) Accordingly he passed
the word of command (5) to his troops to take their evening meal, put
himself at their head and advanced straight upon Sparta. Had it not been
for the arrival (by some providential chance) of a Cretan, who brought
the news to Agesilaus of the enemy's advance, he would have captured
the city of Sparta like a nest of young birds absolutely bereft of its
natural defenders. As it was, Agesilaus, being forewarned, had time to
return to the city before the Thebans came, and here the Spartans made
distribution of their scanty force and maintained watch and ward, albeit
few enough in numbers, since the whole of their cavalry were away in
Arcadia, and so was their foreign brigade, and so were three out of
their twelve regiments. (6)

 (3) Or, "dull obscurity in place of renown."

 (4) Pellene (or Pellana), a town of Laconia on the Eurotas, and on the
    road from Sparta to Arcadia; in fact the frontier fortress on the
    Eurotas, as Sellasia on the Oenus; "Dict. of Anct. Geog." s.v.;
    see Paus. iii. 20, S. 2; Strab. viii. 386; Polyb. iv. 81, xvi. 37;
    Plut. "Agis," 8; Leake, "Morea," iii. 14 foll.

 (5) Cf. "Hipparch." iv. 9.

 (6) Lit. "lochi." See above, VII. iv. 20; "Pol. Lac." xi. 4.

Arrived within the city of Sparta, (7) Epaminondas abstained from
gaining an entry at a point where his troops would have to fight on
level ground and under attack from the houses above; where also their
large numbers would give them no superiority over the small numbers of
the foemen. But, singling out a position which he conceived would give
him the advantage, he occupied it and began his advance against the city
upon a downward instead of an upward incline.

 (7) Grote ("H. G." x. 455) says: "Though he crossed the Eurotas and
    actually entered into the city of Sparta," as the words {epei de
    egeneto en te polei ton Spartiaton} certainly seem to me to imply.
    Others interpret "in the close neighbourhood of."

With regard to what subsequently took place, two possible explanations
suggest themselves: either it was miraculous, or it may be maintained
that there is no resisting the fury of desperation. Archidamus,
advancing at the head of but a hundred men, and crossing the one thing
which might have been expected to form an obstacle to the enemy, (8)
began marching uphill against his antagonists. At this crisis these
fire-breathing warriors, these victorious heroes of Leuctra, (9) with
their superiority at every point, aided, moreover, by the advantage of
their position, did not withstand the attack of Archidamus and those
with him, but swerved in flight.

 (8) Or, "to serve as his defence"; or, "the one obstacle to his
    progress," i.e. Archidamus's. It was a miraculous thing that the
    Thebans did not stop him.

 (9) See Mahaffy, "Hist. Gk. Lit." vol. ii. p. 268, 1st ed. See above,
    "Hell." VI. iv. 24; Diod. xv. 39, 56.

The vanguard of Epaminondas's troops were cut down; when, however,
flushed with the glory of their victory, the citizens followed up their
pursuit beyond the right point, they in turn were cut down--so plainly
was the demarking line of victory drawn by the finger of God. So then
Archidamus set up a trophy to note the limit of his success, and gave
back those who had there fallen of the enemy under a truce. Epaminondas,
on his side, reflecting that the Arcadians must already be hastening
to the relief of Lacedaemon, and being unwilling to engage them in
conjunction with the whole of the Lacedaemonian force, especially now
that the star of Sparta's fortune shone, whilst theirs had suffered some
eclipse, turned and marched back the way he came with all speed possible
into Tegea. There he gave his heavy infantry pause and refreshment, but
his cavalry he sent on to Mantinea; he begged them to "have courage and
hold on," instructing them that in all likelihood they would find the
flocks and herds of the Mantineans and the entire population itself
outside their walls, especially as it was the moment for carrying the
corn. So they set off.

The Athenian cavalry, started from Eleusis, had made their evening
meal at the Isthmus, and passing through Cleonae, as chance befell, had
arrived at Mantinea and had encamped within the walls in the houses. As
soon as the enemy were seen galloping up with evidently hostile intent,
the Mantineans fell to praying the Athenian knights to lend them all the
succour they could, and they showed them all their cattle outside, and
all their labourers, and among them were many children and graybeards
who were free-born citizens. The Athenians were touched by this appeal,
and, though they had not yet broken fast, neither the men themselves
nor their horses, went out eagerly to the rescue. And here we must needs
pause to admire the valour of these men also. The enemy whom they had
to cope with far outnumbered them, as was plain to see, and the former
misadventure of the cavalry in Corinth was not forgotten. (10) But none
of these things entered into their calculations now--nor yet the fact
that they were on the point of engaging Thebans and Thessalians, the
finest cavalry in the world by all repute. The only thing they thought
of was the shame and the dishonour, if, being there, they did not lend a
helping hand to their allies. In this mood, so soon as they caught sight
of the enemy, they fell with a crash upon him in passionate longing to
recover the old ancestral glory. Nor did they fight in vain--the
blows they struck enabled the Mantineans to recover all their property
outside, but among those who dealt them died some brave heroes; (11)
brave heroes also, it is evident, were those whom they slew, since on
either side the weapons wielded were not so short but that they could
lunge at one another with effect. The dead bodies of their own men they
refused to abandon; and there were some of the enemy's slain whom they
restored to him under a flag of truce.

 (10) Or, "and in Corinth an untoward incident had been experienced by
    the cavalry." See Grote, "H. G." x. 458, note 2. Possibly in
    reference to "Hell." VI. v. 51, 52.

 (11) Probably Xenophon's own son Gryllus was among them.

The thoughts now working in the mind of Epaminondas were such as these:
that within a few days he would be forced to retire, as the period of
the campaign was drawing to a close; if it ended in his leaving in the
lurch those allies whom he came out to assist, they would be besieged
by their antagonists. What a blow would that be to his own fair fame,
already somewhat tarnished! Had he not been defeated in Lacedaemon, with
a large body of heavy infantry, by a handful of men? defeated again at
Mantinea, in the cavalry engagement, and himself the main cause
finally of a coalition between five great powers--that is to say,
the Lacedaemonians, the Arcadians, the Achaeans, the Eleians, and the
Athenians? On all grounds it seemed to him impossible to steal past
without a battle. And the more so as he computed the alternatives of
victory or death. If the former were his fortune, it would resolve all
his perplexities; if death, his end would be noble. How glorious a thing
to die in the endeavour to leave behind him, as his last legacy to his
fatherland, the empire of Peloponnesus! That such thoughts should pass
through his brain strikes me as by no means wonderful, as these are
thoughts distinctive to all men of high ambition. Far more wonderful to
my mind was the pitch of perfection to which he had brought his army.
There was no labour which his troops would shrink from, either by night
or by day; there was no danger they would flinch from; and, with the
scantiest provisions, their discipline never failed them.

And so, when he gave his last orders to them to prepare for impending
battle, they obeyed with alacrity. He gave the word; the cavalry fell
to whitening their helmets, the heavy infantry of the Arcadians began
inscribing their clubs as the crest on their shields, (12) as though
they were Thebans, and all were engaged in sharpening their lances and
swords and polishing their heavy shields. When the preparations were
complete and he had led them out, his next movement is worthy of
attention. First, as was natural, he paid heed to their formation, and
in so doing seemed to give clear evidence that he intended battle; but
no sooner was the army drawn up in the formation which he preferred,
than he advanced, not by the shortest route to meet the enemy, but
towards the westward-lying mountains which face Tegea, and by this
movement created in the enemy an expectation that he would not do battle
on that day. In keeping with this expectation, as soon as he arrived at
the mountain-region, he extended his phalanx in long line and piled arms
under the high cliffs; and to all appearance he was there encamping.
The effect of this manouvre on the enemy in general was to relax the
prepared bent of their souls for battle, and to weaken their tactical
arrangements. Presently, however, wheeling his regiments (which were
marching in column) to the front, with the effect of strengthening the
beak-like (13) attack which he proposed to lead himself, at the same
instant he gave the order, "Shoulder arms, forward," and led the way,
the troops following.

 (12) Grote ("H. G." x. 463) has another interpretation.

 (13) Or, "the wedge-like attack of his own division"; see Grote, "H.
    G." x. 469 foll. I do not, however, think that the attacking
    column was actually wedge-shaped like the "acies cuneata" of the
    Romans. It was the unusual depth of the column which gave it the
    force of an ironclad's ram. Cf. "Cyrop." II. iv. for {eis
    metopon}.

When the enemy saw them so unexpectedly approaching, not one of them
was able to maintain tranquility: some began running to their divisions,
some fell into line, some might be seen bitting and bridling their
horses, some donning their cuirasses, and one and all were like men
about to receive rather than to inflict a blow. He, the while, with
steady impetus pushed forward his armament, like a ship-of-war prow
forward. Wherever he brought his solid wedge to bear, he meant to cleave
through the opposing mass, and crumble his adversary's host to pieces.
With this design he prepared to throw the brunt of the fighting on the
strongest half of his army, while he kept the weaker portion of it in
the background, knowing certainly that if worsted it would only cause
discouragement to his own division and add force to the foe. The cavalry
on the side of his opponents were disposed like an ordinary phalanx
of heavy infantry, regular in depth and unsupported by foot-soldiers
interspersed among the horses. (14) Epaminondas again differed in
strengthening the attacking point of his cavalry, besides which he
interspersed footmen between their lines in the belief that, when he
had once cut through the cavalry, he would have wrested victory from the
antagonist along his whole line; so hard is it to find troops who will
care to keep their own ground when once they see any of their own side
flying. Lastly, to prevent any attempt on the part of the Athenians, who
were on the enemy's left wing, to bring up their reliefs in support of
the portion next them, he posted bodies of cavalry and heavy infantry on
certain hillocks in front of them, intending to create in their minds an
apprehension that, in case they offered such assistance, they would be
attacked on their own rear by these detachments. Such was the plan of
encounter which he formed and executed; nor was he cheated in his hopes.
He had so much the mastery at his point of attack that he caused the
whole of the enemy's troops to take flight.

 (14) See Rustow and Kochly, p. 176; and for the {amippoi}
    Harpocration, s.v.; Pollus, i. 131; "Hipparch." v. 13; Thuc. v.
    58; Herod. vii. 158; Caes. "B. G." i. 48; "B. Civ." iii. 84.

But after he himself had fallen, the rest of the Thebans were not able
any longer to turn their victory rightly to account. Though the
main battle line of their opponents had given way, not a single man
afterwards did the victorious hoplites slay, not an inch forward did
they advance from the ground on which the collision took place. Though
the cavalry had fled before them, there was no pursuit; not a man,
horseman or hoplite, did the conquering cavalry cut down; but, like men
who have suffered a defeat, as if panic-stricken (15) they slipped
back through the ranks of the fleeing foemen. Only the footmen fighting
amongst the cavalry and the light infantry, who had together shared in
the victory of the cavalry, found their way round to the left wing as
masters of the field, but it cost them dear; here they encountered the
Athenians, and most of them were cut down.

 (15) Or, "they timorously slipped back."

The effective result of these achievements was the very opposite of that
which the world at large anticipated. Here, where well-nigh the whole
of Hellas was met together in one field, and the combatants stood rank
against rank confronted, there was no one doubted that, in the event
of battle, the conquerors would this day rule; and that those who lost
would be their subjects. But God so ordered it that both belligerents
alike set up trophies as claiming victory, and neither interfered with
the other in the act. Both parties alike gave back their enemy's dead
under a truce, and in right of victory; both alike, in symbol of defeat,
under a truce took back their dead. And though both claimed to have won
the day, neither could show that he had thereby gained any accession of
territory, or state, or empire, or was better situated than before the
battle. Uncertainty and confusion, indeed, had gained ground, being
tenfold greater throughout the length and breadth of Hellas after the
battle than before.

At this point I lay aside my pen: the sequel of the story may haply
commend itself (16) to another.

 (16) Or, "win the attention of some other writer."