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.. meta::
   :PG.Id: 46210
   :PG.Title: The Retreat from Mons
   :PG.Released: 2014-07-07
   :PG.Rights: Public Domain
   :PG.Producer: Al Haines
   :DC.Creator: Anonymous
   :DC.Title: The Retreat from Mons
   :DC.Language: en
   :DC.Created: 1917
   :coverpage: images/img-cover.jpg

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THE RETREAT FROM MONS
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      *The Operations of the British
      Army in the Present War*

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      THE RETREAT
      FROM MONS

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      WITH A PREFACE BY
      FIELD MARSHAL LORD FRENCH

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      BOSTON AND NEW YORK
      HOUGHTON MIFFLIN COMPANY
      The Riverside Press Cambridge
      1917

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      COPYRIGHT, 1917, BY HOUGHTON MIFFLIN COMPANY
      ALL RIGHTS RESERVED

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      *Published July 1917*

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   PREFACE

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I am told that it has been thought
advisable to publish short accounts
in pamphlet form of prominent
and important operations which
have been carried on during the
course of the war which is still raging.

Such war stories may undoubtedly
be beneficial, and in the
belief that such "propaganda" is
productive of more good than
harm I have consented to indite
this very brief preface to *The
Retreat from Mons*.

Any hesitation I may have felt
arises from my profound conviction
that no history of a war or any
part of a war can be worth
anything until some period after peace
has been made and the full facts
are known and understood.

This pamphlet however, is not
so much a "history" as an
interesting summary or a chronology
of leading events, and the writer
carefully avoids according praise
or blame in connection with any
event or group of events which can
ever become the subject of controversy.

In a Preface to so brief and so
unpretentious a military work as
this, it is impossible to put before
the reader more than a glimpse of
the situation in regard to which
plans had to be conceived and put
into execution as suddenly and
speedily as the demand for them
was unexpected.

That it is the "unexpected"
which generally happens in war,
and that it is the "unexpected" for
which we must be ever ready, has
of late years been deeply instilled
in the mind of the British officer.
A cardinal axiom in his military
creed is that he must never be
taken by surprise.

When, therefore, the Germans,
on the same principle as they
subsequently used poison-gas, sank
hospital ships, and disregarded
every known rule of civilized war,
suddenly and quite unexpectedly
overran a neutral country in such
a drastic manner as to nullify all
preconceived plans and possibilities,
and the British Army found
itself on the outer flank of the
threatened line exposed to the full
weight of the German menace, it
was this previous careful training
which formed the sure foundation
upon which to plan and conduct
the inevitable retreat and carry it
to a successful conclusion.

When men are told to retire
without fighting, when they see no
reason for it, when they remain
full of ardour and longing to get
at the enemy, and are not allowed
to, demoralization is very apt to
be the result.  Why was such a
feature of the Retreat conspicuous
by its complete non-existence?
Because of another result of British
military training, namely, the
absolute confidence of the men in
their leaders and officers and the
wonderful mutual understanding
which existed between them.

The magnificent spirit which
animated the British Expeditionary
Force was seen at every phase
of these operations; in the skilful
handling and moral superiority of
the cavalry which covered the
Retreat; in the able conduct by the
respective leaders of the several
battles and encounters which local
circumstances rendered necessary;
and lastly, in the extraordinary
marching powers and capability
of endurance which animated all ranks.

Controversies loud and bitter
will certainly rage in regard to all
the dispositions and plans under
which this war has been conducted;
as to the operations of the first
three weeks, perhaps, more than
as to those of any other period.
But I venture to hope and believe
that no sane person can dispute in
the smallest particular the claims
which I make in this very short
Preface on behalf of the forces
which it is the great pride and glory
of my life to have commanded.

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FRENCH
   *\F.\M.*

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WHITEHALL
   *April* 23, 1917.





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   The Operations of the British
   Army in the Present War

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   INTRODUCTORY

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The first quality of British
military operations in the present
war--and so it will strike the future
historian--is their astonishing
variety and range.  Beginning on
the ancient battlefields of France
and Flanders, they have spread,
in a series of expanding and
apparently inevitable waves, over a
good part of three continents, so
that, wherever the enemy was to be
found,--whether in Europe, or
Asia, or Africa, or in the islands
of the high seas,--there also,
sooner or later, were the British
arms.  There was a time when one
or two campaigns were thought
amply sufficient for the military
energies of the most warlike nation.
We have never pretended to be
warlike, meeting our emergencies
always, with a certain reluctance,
as they arose; but in the present
war we have seldom had fewer than
six considerable campaigns on our
hands at one time, and these in
areas separated often by thousands
of miles from one another and from
us.  It is one of the obligations of a
great empire at war that it should
be so; it is one of the privileges of
a great maritime empire that it
should be possible.  It is undoubtedly
the grand characteristic of the
operations of the British Army in
this war, and gives the only true
perspective of our military effort
in the field.  To our share in the
Allied front must always be added
the fighting frontiers of the Empire.

The British Army, now grown
out of all recognition, was small,
and known to be small, when the
war began.  It was a voluntary
army, numbering approximately
700,000 men, of whom about
450,000 (including reservists) were
trained soldiers, liable for service
abroad, and the remainder, a
half-trained Territorial Force, enrolled
for service at home.  Besides being
small, it was, from the nature of
its duties, widely scattered.  Over
100,000 of our best troops were
serving at the time in India or on
foreign stations.  For all purposes,
therefore, when war broke out, we
had in this country a mobilizable
army of something under 600,000
trained and half-trained men,
250,000 of whom were liable only for
service at home.  The striking or
Expeditionary Force of this army
was a fully equipped and highly
professional body of six infantry
divisions and one division of
cavalry, and with this force we entered
the war.  Intended primarily, as its
name implied, for protective or
punitive operations within the
Empire, it was on a scale proportionate
to its purpose and to the size of our
army.  Our army, judged by a
European standard, being small,
our Expeditionary Force, judged
by that standard, was diminutive;
and the chief problem which
confronted the Government, when it
was decided to send this force to
France, was how to support and
supplement it.  The story of how
this problem was faced and
overcome, of how "Home Service"
men became "Foreign Service"
in a day, and our little army of
700,000, by a gigantic effort of
British determination and Imperial
good-will, was expanded into an
army of millions--all this is a
separate narrative, to be related
elsewhere; but we cannot afford to
overlook it as we follow the
fortunes of the Expeditionary Force
in France and Flanders.  It is the
military background of all their
triumphs and vicissitudes, and had
an effect upon the tone of the war
almost from the first.  Even to our
Expeditionary Force itself, with
all its cheerful self-confidence and
efficiency, it meant something to
know that the country was in
earnest; that as early as August 23,
while they were still fighting among
the coal-pits of Mons, the first
100,000 volunteers had been
enrolled, and were already deep in
the mysteries of forming fours.





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   THE RETREAT FROM MONS

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When a country goes to war the
first test of its military efficiency is
the mobilization of its army.  This
is a stage in the history of wars
which the public is apt to overlook,
because the arrangements are
necessarily secret and complex, and
are carried out in that first hush
which precedes *communiqués* and
great conflicts in the field.  It is
nevertheless true that every war
starts in the Department of the
Quartermaster General, and that by
the nature of this start the issue of
a war may be decided.  We started
well.  From August 5, when
mobilization began,--in spite of bank
holidays and Territorials *en route*
for summer camps,--the whole
scheme of concentration and
despatch was carried out almost
exactly to schedule, and without a
hitch.  It is calculated that,
during the busiest period, the railway
companies, now under
Government control and brilliantly
directed by an executive committee
of general managers, were able to
run as many as eighteen hundred
special trains in five days, an
average of three hundred and sixty
trains a day, and all up to time.
The concentration of the Home
Forces and of the Expeditionary
Force proceeded concurrently.  On
August 9 the first elements of the
Force embarked, and nine days
later the greater part of it had
been landed in France, and was
moving by way of Amiens to its
unknown fortunes.  The smoothness,
rapidity, above all the
secrecy with which the transportation
was carried out, made a great
impression at the time, and will
always be admired.  The question
of how it was done excited,
characteristically enough, less interest.
We are a people accustomed to
happy improvisations, and it was
generally assumed that this national
talent had once more come to our
rescue; the truth being that in
these matters improvisation can
seldom be happy, and that for
instant and complete success the
only method is long and careful
preparation in time of peace.  For
several years the military, naval,
and civilian authorities concerned
had been engaged upon such a
scheme of preparation, and had,
indeed, concluded their labours
not many months before war broke
out.  When the day came all
railway and naval transport officers
were at their posts, and the
Railway Executive Committee, in its
offices in Parliament Street, was
calmly carrying out a time-table
with every detail of which it had
long been familiar.  Such perfect
preparedness is rare in our history,
and worthy of note.  Amidst the
vast unreadiness of the nation for
war the despatch of the Expeditionary
Force, and the magnificent
readiness of the fleet which made it
possible, stand out in grand relief,
not to be lost sight of or forgotten.

The Expeditionary Force was
commanded by Field Marshal Sir
John French, and consisted, up to
August 23, of four complete divisions
of infantry (the First, Second,
Third, and Fifth) and five brigades
of cavalry; that is to say, about
80,000 men.  On August 24 it was
joined by the Nineteenth Infantry
Brigade, which added 4000 more;
and on August 25 by the Fourth
Division, which added another
17,000.  Our total strength,
therefore, during the fighting at Mons
and in the Retreat, varied from
80,000 to a little over 100,000 men.
It was a small force, but of a
quality rarely seen.  No finer
fighting unit ever entered the field.  In
physique and equipment, in
professional training and experience
of war, in that quality of skilful
and cheerful tenacity against odds
which distinguishes the veteran, it
was probably unrivalled by any
body of troops of its time.  The
French, who gave our men a warm
welcome, dwell always on their
youth and good spirits, their
wonderful cleanness and healthiness,
the excellence of their equipment,
and their universal courtesy.

"À Argenteuil-Triage," writes a
French infantryman who fought
in the Retreat and on the Marne,
"nous croisons un train de
fantassins anglais; figures rasées,
ouvertes, enfantines, riant de toutes
leurs dents.  Ils sont reluisants de
propreté.  Nous nous acclamons
réciproquement."  (Sept. 2/14:
Garnet de Route; Roujons.)

At Bucy-le-long the French
relieve the English.  It is a matter of
outposts.  "De deux cents mètres
en deux cents mètres, un groupe de
six Anglais est couché à plat ventre
dans les betteraves, en bordure
d'un chemin.  Ils se dressent et
nous allons prendre leurs places
en admirant ces beaux soldats,
bien équipés, silencieux, et qui
ont des couvertures."  (*Ibid.*, Oct. 6/14.)

Such opinions were worth much.
For though it is a great thing to
be welcomed, as our men were
welcomed, by a whole people, to have
the hearty professional approval
of its soldiers is a greater thing still.

The Expeditionary Force, thus
landed in France, was organized
in two army corps--the First,
consisting of the First and Second
Divisions, under Lieutenant-General
Sir Douglas Haig; the second,
consisting of the Third and Fifth
Divisions, under Lieutenant-General
Sir James Grierson, who was
succeeded, on his sudden and much
lamented death, by General Sir
Horace Smith-Dorrien.  General
Allenby commanded the cavalry
division, consisting of the First,
Second, Third, and Fourth Cavalry
Brigades, and the Fifth Cavalry
Brigade was commanded
independently by Brigadier-General
Sir Philip Chetwode.  By the
evening of Friday, August 21, the
concentration was practically
complete, and during Saturday the 22d
the Force moved up to its position
on the left or western extremity of
the French line.  (Plan 1.)

The general situation in this
region, as it was known at the
moment to the leaders of the Allies,
may be briefly stated.  It was at
last plain, after much uncertainty,
that the first great shock and
collision of forces was destined to take
place in this northern area.  It was
plain, also, that Belgium, for some
time to come, was out of the
scheme.  Liège had fallen, and with
it how many hopes and predictions
of the engineer!  Brussels was
occupied; and the Belgian field army
was retiring to shelter under the
ramparts of Antwerp.  Except for
Namur, there was nothing in
Belgium north of the Allied line to
stop the German advance.  Von
Kluck and Von Buelow, with the
First and Second German Armies,
were marching without opposition
towards the French frontier--Von
Kluck towards the south-west
and Von Buelow towards the
crossings of the Sambre.  By the
evening of the 20th, Von Buelow's
guns were bombarding Namur.  So
much was known to the leaders
of the Allies: of the strength of the
advancing armies they knew little.

To oppose these two armies--for
of the seven German armies
already in position we shall
consider only these two--the Allies
were disposed as follows: Directly
in the route of Von Buelow's army,
should he pass Namur, lay the
Fifth French Army, under General
Lanrezac, with its left resting on
the river Sambre at Charleroi, and
its right in the fork of the Meuse
and the Sambre.  This army, it
should be noted, made a junction
in the river fork with another
French Army, the Fourth, under
General Ruffey, which lay off to
the south along the Middle Meuse,
watching the Ardennes.  On the
left of the Fifth French Army,
along a line presently to be
defined, lay the British Expeditionary
Force, facing, as it seemed, with
equal directness, the line of
advance of the army of Von Kluck.
Subsidiary to the Fifth French
Army and the British Force were
two formations, available for
support: a cavalry corps of three
divisions under General Sordet,
stationed to the south of Maubeuge,
and, out to the west, with its base
at Arras, a corps of two reserve
divisions under General D'Amade.
Both these formations will be
heard of during the subsequent
operations, and it is important to
remark that General D'Amade's two
divisions were at this time, and
throughout the first days of the
fighting, the only considerable
body of Allied troops in the eighty
miles of territory between the
British and the sea.

The line occupied by the British
ran due east from the neighbourhood
of Condé along the straight
of the Condé-Mons Canal, round
the loop which the canal makes
north of Mons, and then, with a
break, patrolled by cavalry, turned
back at almost a right angle
towards the southeast of the direction
of the Mons-Beaumont road.  The
whole of the canal line, including
the loop round Mons,--a front of
nearly twenty miles,--was held
by the Second Army Corps, and
the First Army Corps lay off to
its right, holding the southeastern
line to a point about nine miles
from Mons.  There being no
infantry reserves available in this
small force, General Allenby's
cavalry division was employed to
act on the flank or in support of
any threatened part of the line.
The forward reconnaissance was
entrusted to the Fifth Cavalry
Brigade, assisted by some
squadrons from General Allenby's
division, and some of its detachments
penetrated as far north as Soignies,
nine miles on the way to Brussels.
In the occasional encounters which
took place with the enemy's Uhlans,
to the north and east, our cavalry
had always the best of it; then, as
always in this war, when the
opportunity has occurred, mounted
or dismounted, they have proved
themselves the better arm.  Their
reconnaissance was more than
supplemented by four squadrons of the
Royal Flying Corps under the
direction of Major-General Sir David
Henderson.

Throughout the Saturday our
men entrenched themselves, the
North-Countrymen among them
finding in the chimney-stacks and
slag-heaps of this mining district
much to remind them of home.  The
line they held was clearly not an
easy line to defend.  No salient
ever is, and a glance at the map
will show that this was no common
salient.  To the sharp apex of Mons
was added, as an aggravation, the
loop of the canal.  It was
nevertheless the best line available, and,
once adopted, had been occupied
with that double view both to
defence and to attack which a good
commander has always before him.
The first object, when an enemy of
unknown strength attacks, is to
hold him and gain time; the line of
the canal supplies just the obstacle
required; it was therefore held, in
spite of the salient, and
arrangements made for a withdrawal of
the Second Corps should the salient
become untenable.  If, on the other
hand, the enemy should be beaten
back, the Second Corps, pivoting
northeast on Mons, could cross
the canal and move forward in line
with the First Corps, already in
position for such an advance.  If,
finally,--for a commander, like
a good parent, must provide for
everything,--a general retirement
should become necessary, the
British Commander-in-Chief had
decided to rest his right flank
on Maubeuge, twelve miles south
of Mons: and here was his First
Corps ready for it, clustered about
the roads that lead towards
Maubeuge, and able, from this
advantage, to cover the retirement of the
Second Corps, which had fewer
facilities in this way, and would
have farther to travel.  Tactically
the arrangements were as good as
could be made.

When we come to the strength
and direction of the enemy's
attack, we are on more doubtful
ground.  His strength on the
British front was estimated at the time,
according to all the available
information, both French and
English, to be at most two army corps,
with perhaps one cavalry division,
which would have made an equal
battle; and it was not unnaturally
supposed that he would attack in
the general direction of his advance;
that is, from the northeast.  From
an attack in this strength and from
this direction we had nothing to
fear.  As it turned out, however,
both the estimate of strength and
the supposition of direction were
inaccurate.  The enemy, making
full use of the wooded country in
these parts, which gave excellent
concealment, and strong enough to
throw his forces wide, was, as we
shall see, engaged on something
much more ambitious; a
movement which, had it succeeded (as
against any other troops it might
well have succeeded), would have
brought disaster on the whole Allied army.

At what hour precisely the
Germans began their attack on the
Mons position is uncertain.  Some
say at dawn, others just after noon.
What is certain is that between 12
and 1 P.M. on Sunday the 23d,
some of the men of the Royal West
Kents, in support on the outskirts
of Mons, were having a sing-song
and watching the people home
from church, and, feeling quite at
their ease, had sent their shirts and
socks out to wash, for all the world
as if on manoeuvres.  It is an
interesting little scene, and one which
would have seemed incomprehensible
to the Germans, who by this
time pictured our little army
cowering in its positions.  The
abruptness with which the scene changed
is no less characteristic.  When it
was reported that the enemy had
turned up "at last" and that "A"
company was hard-pressed at the
canal, there was no more thought
of sing-songs nor even of the dinner
"which the orderlies had just gone
to fetch"; socks and shirts
appeared as if by miracle; and when
the "fall-in" went, every man was
there, equipped and ready for
anything.  It is an ordinary incident,
and for that reason important; in
any institution, whether it be an
army or a household, it is the
ordinary incidents that count.  It is
typical of the spirit of an army
which has puzzled many even of
its admirers by its strange
combination of qualities: boyish ease and
hilarity coupled with manly
fortitude and discipline, and a most
perfect and unassailable confidence
in its weapons, its leaders, and itself.

The attack had most certainly
begun; and it began, as was
expected, at the weakest and most
critical point of the line, the canal
loop, which was held by the Third
Division.  This division had the
heaviest share of the fighting
throughout the day, maintaining,
longer than seemed humanly
possible, a hopeless position against
hopeless odds, the Second Royal
Irish and Fourth Middlesex of the
Eighth Brigade, and the Fourth
Royal Fusiliers of the Ninth
Brigade, particularly distinguishing
themselves.  The bridges over the
canal, which our men held, after
some preliminary shelling, were
attacked by infantry debouching
from the low woods which at this
point came down to within three
hundred or four hundred yards of
the canal.  These woods were of
great assistance to the enemy,
both here and at other points of
the canal, in providing cover for
their infantry and machine-guns.
The odds were very heavy.  One
company of the Royal Fusiliers,
holding the Nimy Bridge, was
attacked at one time by as many
as four battalions.  The enemy at
first came on in masses, and
suffered severely in consequence.  It
was their first experience of the
British "fifteen rounds a minute,"
and it told.  They went down in
bundles--our men delighting in a
form of musketry never
contemplated in the Regulations.  To
men accustomed to hitting
bobbing heads at eight hundred yards
there was something monstrous
and incredible in the German
advance.  They could scarcely
believe their eyes; such targets had
never appeared to them even in
their dreams.  Nor were our
machine-guns idle.  In this, as in
many other actions that day and in
the days that followed, our
machine-guns were handled with a
skill and devotion which no one
appreciated more than the enemy.
Two of the first Victoria Crosses
of the war were won by machine-gunners
in this action of the
bridges: Lieutenant Dease, of the
Royal Fusiliers, who, though five
times wounded,--and, as it turned
out, mortally wounded,--continued
to work his gun on the Nimy
Bridge until the order came for
retirement, and he was carried off;
and Private Godley, of the Royal
Scots Fusiliers, who, lower down
the loop, at the Ghlin Bridge, in
the face of repeated assaults, kept
his gun in action throughout.

The attack had now spread along
the whole line of the canal; but
except at the loop the enemy could
make no impression.  There,
however, numbers told at last, and
about the middle of the afternoon
the Third Division was ordered to
retire from the salient, and the
Fifth Division on its left directed
to conform.  Bridges were blown
up--the Royal Engineers vying
with the other services in the
race for glory: and by the night of
the 23d, after various vicissitudes,
the Second Army Corps had fallen
back as far as the line
Montreuil-Wasmes-Paturages-Frameries.
That the retirement, though
successful, was expensive, is not to be
wondered at, when it is
remembered that throughout this action,
as we now know, the Second Army
Corps was outnumbered by three
to one.  All ranks, however, were
in excellent spirits.  Allowing for
handicaps, they felt that they had
proved themselves the better men.

It was a feeling which was to be
severely tried in the next few days.
At 5 P.M. on Sunday the 23d, as
the Second Corps was withdrawing
from the canal, the British
Commander-in-Chief received a most
unexpected telegraph from General
Joffre, the Generalissimo of the
Allied armies, to the effect that at
least three German army corps were
moving against the British front,
and that a fourth corps was
endeavouring to outflank him from
the west.  He was also informed
that the Germans had on the
previous day captured the crossings of
the Sambre between Charleroi and
Namur, and that the French on his
right were retiring.  In other words,
Namur, the defensive pivot of the
Anglo-French line, on the
resistance of which--if only for a few
days--the Allied strategy had
depended, had fallen almost at a
blow.  By Saturday the Germans
had left Namur behind, and in
numbers far exceeding French
predictions had seized the crossings
of the Sambre and Middle Meuse
and were hammering at the
junction of the Fifth and Fourth
French Armies in the river-fork.
The junction was pierced, and the
French, unexpectedly and
overwhelmingly assaulted both in front
and flank, could do nothing but
retire.  By 5 P.M. on the Sunday,
when the message was received at
British Headquarters, the French
had been retiring for anywhere
from ten to twelve hours.  The
British Army was for the moment
isolated.  Standing forward a day's
march from the French on its
right, faced and engaged by three
German corps in front, and already
threatened by a fourth corps on its
left, it seemed a force marked out
for destruction.

In the British Higher Command,
however, there was no flurry.  There
is a thing called British phlegm.

The facts of the case, though
unwelcome, were laconically
accepted.  Over General Headquarters
brooded a clubroom calm.  Airmen
were sent up to confirm the
French report, in the usual manner,
and arrangements were quietly and
methodically made for a retirement
towards the prearranged
Maubeuge-Valenciennes line.  The
hard-pressed Second Corps, which had
farther to march, was the first to
move.  Early on the 24th it was
marching south towards Dour and
Quarouble, covered by the First
Corps, which had been much less
taxed, and was favourably placed
to threaten the German left.  This
covering demonstration was well
carried out by the Second Division,
supported by the massed artillery
of the corps.  The retirement of the
Second Corps, however, even with
this assistance, was not made
without much difficulty.  By the night
of the 23d the enemy were already
crossing the canal, and pouring
down on the villages to the south.
Several rear-guard actions were
fought here on the morning of the
24th, in which infantry and
artillery equally distinguished
themselves at Wasmes with notable
success and much loss to the enemy;
but, as every hour passed, the
intention of the enemy to outflank from
the northwest became more
evident.  Desperate fighting took place,
the First Norfolks, First Cheshires,
and One Hundred and Nineteenth
Battery, R.F.A., detached as a
flank guard under Colonel Ballard,
of the Norfolks, holding the ridge
from Audregnies to Flouges for
several hours in the teeth of
overwhelming opposition.  To this little
band, which cheerfully sacrificed
itself, belongs the principal credit
for holding up the turning
movement of the enemy during the
retirement of the 24th.  They made
a splendid stand, and six hundred
of the Cheshires never got away.
Our cavalry, fortunately, were
able to help also, and at once; for
by an act of great foresight, long
before the news arrived of a
turning movement, Sir John French
had transferred his cavalry division
from the right flank to the left.
They were in position there by the
Sunday morning, and in the
subsequent retirement did everything
that men and horses could do to
relieve the pressure.  The dramatic
action of General de Lisle's cavalry
brigade at Audregnies, where the
Fifth Division was hard-pressed,
is one of the best-known incidents
of this day's fighting, not only
because it succeeded, though at a
heavy cost, in delaying the enemy,
but because it gave occasion to one
of the most heroic performances of
the Retreat.

When the action was drawing to
a close, and men, horses, and
batteries were being withdrawn,
Captain Francis Grenfell, of the Ninth
Lancers, observed that the One
Hundred and Nineteenth Battery,
R.F.A., was in difficulties.  All the
horses of the battery had been
killed, most of its personnel had
been killed or wounded, and it
looked as if the guns would have
to be left.  Captain Grenfell, though
himself wounded, determined to
help, and rode out to look for a
way of retreat for the guns.
Having found it, to show how little a
cavalryman need care for death, he
rode his horse back, under a
tempest of fire, at a walk, and called
for volunteers from the Lancers,
reminding them that "the Ninth
had never failed the gunners."  After
such an example the
response could be nothing but brisk.
He returned with his volunteers
("eleven officers and some forty
men"), and under a fierce and
incessant fire the guns were
manhandled into safety.  For this fine
action Captain Grenfell and the
battery commander--Major
Alexander--were each awarded the
Victoria Cross.  It is one of many
illustrations furnished by the
Retreat of the *camaraderie* of the
various arms.

After a short halt and partial
entrenchment on the line
Dour-Quarouble, to enable the First
Corps to break off its demonstrations,
the retreat of the Second
Corps was resumed; and by the
evening of the 24th the whole
army had reached the prearranged
line Jenlain-Bavai-Maubeuge--the
Second Corps to the west of
Bavai, and the First Corps to the
right.  The right was protected by
the fortress of Maubeuge, the left
by the cavalry, operating outwards,
and by the Nineteenth Infantry
Brigade, which had been brought
up in the nick of time from the
lines of communication, and had
acted throughout the day in support
of the exposed flank of the Second
Corps.

It had been intended by the
British Commander-in-Chief to
make a stand on the Maubeuge
line, and if the first calculations of
the enemy's strength and intentions
had proved correct, it is
possible that a great battle might
have been fought here, and
continued by the French armies along
the whole fortress line of northern
France.  Even as it was, the
temptation to linger at Maubeuge must
have been strong; it offered such
an inviting buttress to our right
flank, and filled so comfortably
that dangerous gap between our
line and the French.  The
temptation, to which a weaker commander
might have succumbed, was
resisted.  "The French were still
retiring," says the despatch, "and I
had no support except such as was
afforded by the fortress of
Maubeuge; and the determined
attempts of the enemy to get round
my left flank assured me that it
was his intention to hem me against
that place and surround me.  I felt
that not a moment must be lost in
retiring to another position."

Early on the 25th, accordingly,
the whole British Army set out
on the next stage of its retreat.
Its function in the general Allied
strategy was now becoming clear.
It was not merely fighting its own
battles.  Situated as it was on the
left flank of the retiring French
Armies, it had become in effect the
left flank-guard of the Allied line,
committed to its retirement, and to
the protection of that retirement,
to the end.  The turning movement
from the west, at first local and
partial, had suddenly acquired a
strategic significance.  It
threatened not merely the British Army,
but the whole Allied strategy of
the Retreat.  Could the British
resist it?  Could they, at the least,
delay it?  These were the questions
which the French leaders asked
themselves, with some anxiety, as
they retired with their armies from
day to day, and waited for the
counter-turn which was to come.
For, as we now know, behind the
retiring and still intact French
Armies, to the south and east of
Paris, movements were shaping,
forces were forming, which were to
change the face of things in this
western corner.  Could the British
hold out till these movements were
ripe?  It was a momentous
question.  No more momentous
question has been asked for a hundred
years.  The answer, so far, had
been affirmative.

On this day, the 25th, from very
early in the morning, the two corps
marched south on each side of the
great Forest of Mormal, the First
Corps to the right and the Second
to the left, as one faces the enemy.
The position chosen for the next
stand was in the neighbourhood of
Le Cateau, on the line
Cambrai-Le Cateau-Landrecies, and while the
army was marching towards it,
civilian labour was employed to
prepare and entrench the ground.
On this morning, also, the infantry
of the Fourth Division, which had
arrived at Le Cateau on the 23d
and 24th, became available for
service, bringing a welcome
addition to our strength of eleven
battalions.  They were immediately
sent forward, and, facing
north-west between Solesmes and the
Cambrai-Le Cateau road, materially
assisted the retirement of the
Second Corps.  For both corps it
was a day of terrible marching,
along roads crowded with
transport and--particularly on the
eastern route--packed with
refugees.  For marching in a retreat
has this fundamental disadvantage,
that the men move behind their
transport, and (in friendly country)
with all the civilians of the countryside
about their feet.  In such
conditions a steady pace is the last
thing to be hoped for.  Checking--the
curse of tired men--from
being the exception becomes the
rule; while the hours crawl on, and
the boots tell, and the packs tell,
and the eye grows glazed with
staring at the men in front, and
even the rifle, that "best friend,"
seems duller and heavier than a
friend should be--the heaviest
nine pounds in the world.  It is
calculated that on the 25th the
various units of the Second Corps
marched, under these most trying
conditions, anything from twenty
to thirty-five miles.  By this time,
also, the continual retirement was
having its effect on the men's
spirits.  To the rank and file, who
necessarily know nothing of high
strategy, and see only what is
before their eyes, the Retreat carried
little of that high significance which
we attach to it, but much of
weariness and distaste.  Some
glimmering of an idea that we were
"leading the Germans into a trap"
cheered men up here and there;
some rumours of Russian victories
raised the old jokes about "Berlin";
but for the most part they marched
and fought uncomprehending,
welcoming their turn of rear guard
as a relief, because it gave some
chance of fighting and turned their
faces to the north.

The Second Corps reached their
appointed line on the Cambrai-Le
Cateau road as night was falling,
and, under a cold, steady rain,
which had succeeded the blazing
heat of the day, proceeded to
improve the trenches which they
found there.  They had had an
exhausting march, but little fighting
or interruption.  The First Corps
was delayed and did not reach the
allotted position; but was
scattered by the evening over an area
at some points as many as thirty
miles from the Second Corps, and
nowhere nearer than Landrecies,
eight miles from Le Cateau.  The
difficulty of movement had been
increased by the convergence of
French troops retiring from the
Sambre, who cut across our line of
march.  The enemy pressure was
continued by fresh troops well into
the night.  The engagement of the
Second Division south and east of
Maroilles, and the fight of the
Fourth (Guards') Brigade at
Landrecies, are the two main
incidents in this difficult night's work.
About the fighting near Maroilles
we have little information except
that it seemed serious enough to
justify the British Commander-in-Chief
in asking for help from the
French.  In response to his urgent
request two French reserve
divisions attached to the Fifth French
Army on our right eventually
came up, and by diverting the
attention of the enemy enabled Sir
Douglas Haig to effect a skilful
extrication from an awkward
position made still more awkward by
the darkness of night.  One
incident of the fighting near Maroilles
has, indeed, slipped into the light
of day with regard to a unit of the
Second Division: a little
rearguard action of the First Berks,
near a bridge over the Petit Helpe
which it was important to hold.
They were on their way back to
it, stumbling in the dark along a
greasy, narrow causeway, with a
deep ditch on each side, which led
to the bridge.  "The Germans, as
it turned out, had already forced
the bridge and were in the act of
advancing along the causeway;
and in the pitch darkness of the
night the two forces suddenly
bumped one into the other.  Neither
side had fixed bayonets, for fear of
accidents in the dark, and in the
scrimmage which followed it was
chiefly a case of rifle-butts and
fists.  At this game the Germans
proved no match for our men, and
were gradually forced back to the
bridgehead, where they were held
for the remainder of the night."
Early in the morning the Germans
withdrew, and the First Berks fell
back on the rest of the Second
Division, along the road to Guise.  It
was a very complete and satisfactory
little affair.

The fight at Landrecies by the
Fourth (Guards') Brigade is better
known.  They had arrived there,
very weary, and had got into
billets; so weary, indeed, that the
Commander-in-Chief could not
order them farther west, to fill up
the gap between Le Gateau and
Landrecies.  "The men were
exhausted, and could not get farther
in without rest."  The enemy,
however, would not allow them this
rest.  At 8.30 in the evening came
news that Germans in motor-lorries
were coming through the
Forest of Mormal in great numbers,
and bearing down upon the town.
The town, fortunately, had already
been put into a hasty state of
defence: houses loopholed, machine-guns
installed, barricades erected,
and a company detailed to each of
the many exits.  It is said that the
Germans advanced singing French
songs, and that the leading ranks
wore French uniforms, for a
moment deceiving the defenders.
This would explain the suddenness
of the collision, for the
Germans and British were fighting
hand to hand almost at once.  It
was a fierce fight while it lasted,
and, with short respites, went on
till the early hours of the morning;
but eventually the enemy were
beaten off with great loss.  It is
estimated that they lost in this
action from 700 to 1000 men.  It
must be allowed, nevertheless, in
the light of later knowledge that
the tactics of the Germans at
Maroilles and Landrecies were
good.  A few battalions--for it
is unlikely that they amounted to
more--attacking at various points
under cover of darkness with a
great show of vigour, though beaten
off, succeeded in conveying the
impression to the British
commanders in this part of the field
that they were engaged with a
considerable force.  This
impression once conveyed, the main
object of the manoeuvre had been
attained, for the First Corps was
kept on the alert all night, and
effectually prevented either from
obtaining rest or from reaching its
appointed destination in the
British line.  If our assumption of the
enemy numbers is correct, it was
a clever piece of work, well
conceived and well executed.

The crisis of the Retreat was
now approaching.  There is a limit
to what men can do, and it seemed
for a moment as if this limit might
be reached too soon.  The
Commander-in-Chief, seriously
considering the accumulating strength of
the enemy, the continued
retirement of the French, his exposed
left flank, the tendency of the
enemy's western corps to envelop
him, and above all, the exhausted
and dispersed condition of his
troops, decided to abandon the Le
Gateau position, and to press on
the Retreat till he could put some
substantial obstacle, such as the
Somme or the Oise, between his
men and the enemy, behind which
they might reorganize and rest.
He therefore ordered his corps
commanders to break off whatever
action they might have in hand,
and continue their retreat as soon
as possible towards the new St. Quentin line.

The First Corps was by this
time terribly exhausted, but, on
receiving the order, set out from its
scattered halting-places in the early
hours of the 26th.

By dawn on that day the whole
corps, including the Fourth Brigade
at Landrecies, was moving south
towards St. Quentin.

The order to retire at daybreak,
on which the First Corps was now
acting, had been duly received by
the Second Corps.  The commander
had been informed that the
retirement of the First Corps was to
continue simultaneously and that three
divisions of French cavalry under
General Sordet were moving
towards his left flank, in pursuance
of an agreement arrived at in
a personal interview between the
French cavalry commander and
the British Commander-in-Chief.

Sir H. Smith-Dorrien was also
informed that two French
Territorial Divisions under General
D'Amade were moving up to
support Sordet.

There was no reason to suppose
that the Second Corps, which had
not been so much harassed by the
enemy on its march south as the
First Corps, was not equally well
able to obey the order to retreat.

The corps commander, however,
judged that his men were too tired
and the enemy too strong to effect
such a retirement as he was directed
to carry out.

The General's reply was duly
received at Headquarters.  The
Commander-in-Chief was deeply
engaged in concerting plans with
the French Commander-in-Chief,
his Chief of the Staff, and General
Lanzerac (the commander of the
Fifth French Army).  Orders were
immediately sent to the Second
Corps, informing the General that
any delay in retiring would
seriously compromise the plan of the
Allied operations, and, in view of
the general situation, might entail
fatal results.  He was directed to
resume his retirement forthwith,
and, to assist him, the cavalry and
Fourth Division were placed under
his orders.

At the conclusion of the
conference, no positive information
having been received of the
commencement of the retirement, the
Commander-in-Chief himself set out
for Le Cateau; but the congestion
of the roads with Belgian refugees,
etc., made progress so slow that he
had not accomplished half the
distance before he found that his
orders had been carried out and
the retirement was in progress.

During the early part of the day,
however, Sir H. Smith-Dorrien
had, for the reason given above,
waited at the Le Gateau position
to engage the pursuing Germans.
Of the three divisions of infantry
thus engaged, the Fifth lay on the
right, the Third in the centre, and
the Fourth faced outwards on the
left: the whole occupying the ridge
south of the Cambrai-Le Cateau
road, on the line
Haucourt-Caudry-Beaumont-Le Cateau.  The
Nineteenth Infantry Brigade was in
reserve and the cavalry operated
on the flanks.  With both flanks
exposed, with three divisions of
infantry to the enemy's seven, and
faced by the massed artillery of
four army corps,--an odds of four
or five to one,--the Second Corps
and Fourth Division prepared to
make a stand.  A few hours' sleep,
and at dawn, with a roar of guns,
the battle opened.

That the day was critical, that
it was all or nothing, was realized
by all ranks.  Everything was
thrown into the scale; nothing was
held back.  Regiments and batteries,
with complete self-abandonment,
faced hopeless duels at impossible
ranges; brigades of cavalry
on the flanks boldly threatened
divisions; and in the half-shelter
of their trenches the infantry,
withering but never budging,
grimly dwindled before the
German guns.  It was our first
experience on a large scale of modern
artillery in mass.  For the first six
hours the guns never stopped.  To
our infantry it was a time of
stubborn and almost stupefied
endurance, broken by lucid intervals of
that deadly musketry which had
played such havoc with the
Germans at Mons.  To our artillery it
was a duel, and perhaps of all the
displays of constancy and devotion
in a battle where every man in
every arm of the service did his
best, the display of the gunners
was the finest.  For they accepted
the duel quite cheerfully, and made
such sport with the enemy's
infantry that even their masses
shivered and recoiled.  By midday,
however, many of our batteries
were out of action, and the enemy
infantry had advanced almost to
the main Cambrai-Le Gateau road,
behind which our men, in their
pathetic civilian trenches, were
quietly waiting.

The enemy attacked on the right
of the Fifth Division, and were in
the act of turning it when the order
came to retire.  This necessary
order, for a gradual retirement
from the right, was issued a little
before 3 P.M., and was with great
difficulty conveyed to all parts
of the line.  In the Fifth Division
several companies, in covering the
retirement, were practically wiped
out.  The story of "B" Company
of the Second K.O.Y.L.I. charging
the enemy with its nineteen
remaining men, headed by its
commander, is typical of the spirit
which inspired the British regiments.

The Third Division had suffered
comparatively little when the order
reached them, and were justly
priding themselves on having
successfully repulsed a determined
attack on Caudry, the apex of the
position.

On the left of the line was posted
the Fourth Division which had
come in by train the previous day,
and was personally placed by the
Commander-in-Chief in the
position he thought best to cover the
retirement of the Second Corps.

Owing to the unexpected turn of
events at Mons, and the unfortunate
delay in the despatch of this
division from England, the troops
had to be pushed into action
without a moment's delay, and before
the detrainment of their artillery
and other services was practically
complete.

On the morning of the 26th they
found themselves on the extreme
western flank of the Allied forces,
and splendidly did General Snow
and his gallant men carry out the
difficult and dangerous task assigned them.

The conduct of their retirement
was no less efficient than their
gallant fighting.  Parts of this division,
however, shared the fate of other
units in the line engaged in
covering the retirement, and, holding
on into the night, either retired in
the darkness (some to the British
lines, others through the German
lines to the sea) or, less fortunate,
were cut off, captured, or destroyed.
Many adventures befell them, and
some tragedies, but none to equal
the tragedy of the First Gordons,
who marched in the darkness into
a German division in bivouac some
miles south of the battle-ground,
and were shot or taken prisoners
almost to a man.

The infantry retirement, though
thus partial and irregular, was
progressively carried out according to
orders, and by four o'clock in the
afternoon most of the line had been
cleared.  The retirement was
covered by the artillery, still in action
with the same unruffled courage
and devotion which they had shown
throughout the day, and there is no
doubt that the reluctance of the
enemy to engage in an energetic
pursuit was partly due to this
splendid opposition of our gunners,
as well as to the undoubtedly
heavy losses which they had
suffered from our rifle and shell fire
earlier in the day.  At any rate, the
pursuit was not pressed, and by
nightfall, after another long and
weary march,--how weary, after
such a day, can scarcely be
expressed,--the remains of the
Second Corps and the Fourth
Division halted and bivouacked.  It was
pouring with rain, but many slept
where they halted, by the roadside,
too utterly worn to think of shelter.

There is a pendant to this great
action of the 26th which until
recently has been missing from its
place; and it has been a matter of
much wonder, in consequence, how
it was that things fell out as they
did after the battle of Le Gateau,
the weary British retiring before
a numerous and victorious enemy
which did not pursue.  It was
pointed out, indeed, that the
enemy had suffered heavy losses; that
they were tired and shaken by the
unexpected violence of the British
defence; but when every allowance
had been made for the effect of
weariness and loss, it was plain
that some other reason must still
be found to account for a decision
so repugnant to the German temper
and the German plans.  Reference
has already been made to the
promise made by Generals Sordet
and D'Amade to the British
Commander-in-Chief.  If history has
been slow to record it, let the delay
be put down to the exigencies of
war.  The enemy were not only
tired and shaken.  They were also
threatened, and threatened, as
they very quickly discovered, in
the most sensitive tentacles of their
advance.  It was about 4.30 on the
afternoon of the 26th (so the story
runs), when the British retirement
had been in progress about an
hour, that a furious cannonading
was heard out towards the west.
This was Sordet's cavalry, tired
horses and all, arrived and
engaging the German right.  The
explanation was confirmed by
airmen later in the day, who reported
having seen large bodies of French
cavalry, with horse artillery and
some battalions of infantry,
driving back the Germans out
towards Cambrai.  General Sordet
and his cavalry, aided by General
D'Amade's battalions, which had
moved out from their station at
Arras, were able to inflict upon the
outflanking German right a blow
which recoiled upon the whole of
the First German Army, and by its
threatened significance more than
by its actual strength dominated
the policy of that army for
several days to come.  The German
advance wavered and paused, and
for nearly twenty-four hours the
British continued their retirement
almost unmolested.

Whether on the early morning of
the 26th the left of the British line
could have followed the example of
the First Corps and continued its
retreat, is a question which cannot
be satisfactorily settled until the
whole history of the war is laid
bare.  But there can be no doubt
that both troops and commander
richly deserved the high tribute
paid them in the despatch of the
British Commander-in-Chief, who,
after praising the behaviour of
various arms, says:--

"I cannot close this brief
account of the glorious stand of the
British troops without putting on
record my deep appreciation of the
valuable services rendered by Sir
H. Smith-Dorrien.

"I say without hesitation that
the saving of the left wing of the
army under my command on the
morning of the 26th August could
never have been accomplished
unless a commander of rare and
unusual coolness, intrepidity, and
determination had been present to
personally conduct the operations."

It is impossible to close the story
of this, the most critical time of
the great Retreat, without making
mention of the inestimable services
performed by the British cavalry
under General Allenby.  The moral
superiority which they had so
effectually established over the
hostile horsemen during the enemy's
first advance on Mons, was
maintained and increased by every one
of the many trials of strength
which occurred all along the line
between smaller and greater units
of the two opposing cavalries.
Invariably in all these encounters
the German cavalry were driven
behind the protection of their
infantry and, thus hampering the
latter's advance, assisted our troops
to make good their retreat.  The
quality of the horses and equipment
of the British, their unrivalled
efficiency in dismounted fighting
and in knowledge of ground,
coupled with their intrepidity and
dash whenever the smallest
opportunity for mounted attack
presented itself, enabled them
effectually to prevent that which is most
dreaded by a retreating army--the
enterprises of hostile horsemen.

No praise can be too great for
the British cavalry throughout
this drastic initiation into the
splendid work which they have
invariably performed throughout the
campaign.

It was in the early hours of
the morning of the 27th that the
commander of the Second Corps
personally reported himself at
Headquarters.  He informed the
Commander-in-Chief that the
Second Corps and Fourth Division
had suffered heavily and were very
tired, but were now rapidly
regaining order and cohesion.  By dawn
every available staff officer was *en
route* for St. Quentin, and hour
after hour, at their posts on the
line of the Retreat, shepherded
the troops towards their units, and
the longed-for luxuries of food and
drink and news.  All through the
morning detachments of every size
and every conceivable composition
kept filing past--some with
officers, most with none--some
hobbling and silent, others whistling
and in step--but all with one
accord most thoroughly persuaded
(such are the fallacies of a retreat)
that they were the last and only
survivors of their respective
commands.  Many, after a brief halt,
had marched all night, and up to
one o'clock in the afternoon they
were still coming in.  A brief rest,
some bread and coffee, and they
were off once more, their troubles
almost forgotten in the pleasure of
rejoining their regiments and
recovering their friends.

The general Retreat, which the
battle of Le Cateau had so
dangerously interrupted, resumed once
more its normal tenor.  Of the
behaviour of the men during this
trying period it is difficult to speak
with moderation.  They had passed
through an ordeal, both physical
and mental, such as few troops
have ever had to face in their first
week of war; and had displayed
throughout a nobility of bearing
and demeanour of which none who
observed them can speak even now
without emotion.  Such courage
and patience, such humorous
resignation and cheerfulness in
adversity, are to be paralleled only in
the finest armies of history.

The resumption of the general
Retreat and the restoration of
march routine among the forces of
the British left had one immediate
and important consequence.  It
became possible to deal with the
chief remaining weakness caused
by the inability of the First Corps,
as already pointed out, to reach
its allotted position on the
evening of the 25th.  The First Corps
had not been idle while the Second
Corps fought; though never heavily
engaged, it had been perpetually
harassed, and was still, on August
27, suffering from the wide
dispersion of its forces on the 25th.  It
was now moving south as best
it could--keeping direction, but
otherwise marching and bivouacking
by brigades.  On both flanks,
indeed, throughout these early days
of the Retreat, such was the
imminence of the enemy, and such
the variety of fortunes of the
different brigades--and even battalions
and companies--of the same
division during any one day, that no
strict uniformity of march or of
line could be looked for.  It speaks
well for the commanders of brigade
and regimental units that so
unusually high a discretionary power
was exercised so well, and with so
little miscarriage either of
individual units or of the general
scheme.  Some mishaps, of course,
there were, of companies and
battalions overtaken, cut off, or
surprised.  The capture of the greater
part of the Second Munster
Fusiliers at Bergues on the 26th is one
of these incidents, to be set beside
the destruction of the First
Gordons, as part of the tragic waste
inevitable in any continuous
retreat before superior numbers.  It
is memorable, not only because,
like the First Gordons, the
regiment involved carried a famous
name, but because it gave occasion
to our cavalry to show once more
in their Retreat their devotion to
duty.  It was entirely due to the
skilful and audacious dismounted
action of two troops of the
Fifteenth Hussars that the battered
remnant of the Munsters--about
one hundred and fifty men--was
saved from annihilation or surrender.

The Second Corps was still, on
August 27, in advance of the First;
but in both corps the Retreat
continued incessantly.  Sleep was cut
down to a minimum; men fed,
drank, and slept as they could, and
always, when they rose from the
roadside and stretched themselves
to a new dawn, the word was
"March."  Their chief enemy now
was not the Germans, but the road,
the blazing sun, and the limits
of their own flesh and blood.  The
worst, however, was over.  By
August 27/28 movement by
divisions began to be possible; and by
August 28 movement by corps.
By August 28/29 the whole Army
was in touch once more on the line
Noyon-La Fère, and on Sunday the
29th, for the first time for eight
days, the Army actually rested.
It is a day they are never likely to
forget.  While the men rested, their
commanders took stock; and before
the march was resumed, brigades
and divisions had been reorganized,
stragglers restored, and
deficiencies of men and material
ascertained and noted.  The
reorganization was completed by the arrival
of Major-General Pulteney, and
the constitution of the Fourth
Division and Nineteenth Infantry
Brigade as a Third Army Corps
under his command.

The reorganization of the British
Force coincided with a gratifying
change in the Allied dispositions.
The British Army was not only in
touch within itself, but in touch,
also, on both its flanks, with the
French; on the right, with the
Fifth French Army, now, after
many vicissitudes and much hard
fighting, lying behind the Oise
from La Fère to Guise; and on the
left with a new French Army, still
in process of formation, of which
the nucleus was those same two
divisions of infantry and three
divisions of cavalry which General
D'Amade and General Sordet had
handled so much to our advantage
on the afternoon of the 26th, and
throughout the subsequent
retirement.  This Army (to be called
henceforth, the Sixth) conscious of
some mission above the ordinary,
and daily increasing in strength,
lay off, on the 29th, to the
north-west of the British line, facing
northeast with its right on Roye.
It was a welcome change, removing
none too soon that fear of isolation
which had haunted all our
movements.  The situation of the British,
scars and bruises notwithstanding,
seemed suddenly almost promising,
and with their flanks secured, for
the first time since the Retreat
began, they enjoyed a genuine feeling
of relaxation.  It was a feeling,
happily, which the enemy at the
moment was unable to disturb.
His strength was diverted to the
two French Armies, and except for
some cavalry actions, in which our
troops as usual were completely
successful, there was little activity
on the British front.  On the
morning of the 29th, while our men were
resting behind the Oise, the main
body of the pursuit was still
engaged in crossing the Somme.

It was amazing to see how
quickly the Army recovered during
these days from the first strain
of the Retreat.  Even on the 28th
the improvement was notable.
A general cheerfulness pervaded
the ranks, whence derived no one
seemed to care, but splendid and
infectious.  Men toughened and
hardened; the limpers grew fewer,
and already battalions were to be
met marching with the old swing to
the old song.  By the 29th--for
always we come back to this
crucial date--the first hard
apprenticeship was over; and when the
Army rose from its sleep to take
the road once more, it looked and
felt an army of veterans.  Officers
smiled as they watched their men,
and speculated happily on the day
to come.

The chief difficulty now was to
replace wastage in equipment, etc.,
which had been enormous.  For in
the strain and confusion of the
Retreat everything detachable had
been lost or thrown away, and
whole companies were found,
perfectly fitted out eight days before,
which had now scarcely a single
greatcoat, waterproof sheet, or
change of clothing left.  The
deficiency of entrenching tools--to
take only one article of equipment,
though that, perhaps, the most
easily lost--amounted, in the
troops which had fought at Le
Cateau, to over eighty per cent.  It
was much easier, unfortunately, to
tabulate these deficiencies than to
supply them.  The stores existed,
indeed, but they were not to be had.
They were lying for the fetching
on the quays and in the dépôts
of Havre and Rouen and Boulogne,
but every day's march took us
farther away from them and
increased their exposure to the
German advance.  With Amiens
already in the enemy's hands, and
the Channel ports uncovered, we
were, for a moment, that portent
of the textbooks, an army without
a base.  It was a case for prompt
measures, and prompt measures
were taken.  On August 29, while
the Army was recounting deficiencies
on the Oise, the Inspector
General of the lines of communication,
by order of the Commander-in-Chief,
was arranging a grand
removal to the mouth of the Loire,
and on August 30, the new British
base was temporarily established
at St. Nazaire and Nantes, with
Le Mans as advanced base in
place of Amiens.  It was a great
achievement, but an unwelcome
change, for both by sea and by
land the distances were greater,
and it had the inevitable
consequence of delaying the arrival of
everything on which the Army
depended for replenishment.  The
infantry went without their
greatcoats and entrenching tools; and
though reinforcements of men
continued to arrive at stated
intervals,--the first reinforcement on
September 5, and the second on
September 7 and 8,--the guns which
should have come on August 29
were not actually received till
September 19.  It was not until
October 11, when the British Army
was setting out for Flanders, that
St. Nazaire was at last definitely
closed down, and Havre and
Boulogne reopened in its place.  It was
a difficult period for the
administrative departments of the Army,
and had its own triumphs.

The lull in operations on the
British front during the 29th, and
the restoration of contact with the
French, were turned to good
account by the Allied leaders, whose
opportunities for meeting and
exchanging views had hitherto been
rare.  A conference was held in
the early afternoon at British
Headquarters in Compiègne, which
was attended not only by General
Joffre and Sir John French, but
by the three British corps
commanders and General Allenby.  The
conference was presided over by
the French Commander-in-Chief,
who showed himself, then as
always, where the British were
concerned, "most kind, cordial, and
sympathetic."  "He told me," says
Sir John French, "that he had
directed the Fifth French Army on
the Oise to move forward and
attack the Germans on the Somme,
with a view to checking pursuit.
He also told me of the formation
of the Sixth French Army on my
left flank, composed of the Seventh
Army Corps, four reserve divisions,
and Sordet's corps of cavalry."  In
conclusion, having dealt with the
immediate necessities of the British,
he outlined once more his strategic
conception, to draw on the enemy
at all points until a favourable
situation should be created for the
desired offensive, and in conformity
with that conception directed the
Retreat to proceed.  The bridges
over the Oise were promptly
destroyed, and at various hours
between mid-afternoon of the 29th
and early morning of the 30th the
British forces set out on a
twenty-mile march to the Aisne, through
beautiful country which they were
no longer too tired to enjoy.  By
the afternoon of August 30, the
whole Army was in position a few
miles north of the line
Compiègne-Soissons, and at the same time the
Germans occupied La Fère.  On
the morning of August 31 the
Retreat was resumed, and from this
date until September 4 continued
practically from day to day in
conformity with the movements of
the French, our men becoming
daily fitter and more war-hardened.
Rumours, however, of successful
French actions on our flanks, and,
amidst much that was vague and
wearisome, a growing sense of
combination and ulterior purpose in
their movements, encouraged all
ranks.

The country now was much
more difficult, for after the Forest
of Compiègne is passed the land
plunges into deep wooded ravines
and break-neck roads, very trying
for guns and transport, and for all
manner of manoeuvres.  The heat
was intense, and, to make matters
worse, the enemy pursuit, which
had unaccountably languished, was
becoming closer and more insistent.
The British, bivouacked that
night between Crépy-en-Valois and
Villers-Cotteret, found themselves
committed, on the morning of
September 1, to two of the hottest
skirmishes of the Retreat; one at
Villers-Cotteret, where the Fourth
(Guards') Brigade was covering
the retirement of the Second
Division, the other on the left at Néry,
in the area of the Third Corps.

The action at Villers-Cotteret
began about nine o'clock, in very
difficult forest country, and
continued until after midday, the
Guards' Brigade maintaining its
ground, despite heavy losses, with
a steadiness and determination
worthy of the heroes of
Landrecies.  It was an action easily
described.  The attack had been
expected, and was repulsed.  In this
action the Irish Guards, who had
only been under distant shell fire
at Mons and had had little to do
at Landrecies, received their full
baptism of fire.  It was their first
real fight, and their commanding
officer headed the casualty list.
The action at Néry was quite
unlike the action at Villers-Cotteret,
for it came as a surprise, and at one
time looked like becoming a
tragedy.  The first indication of danger
had reached the Headquarters of
the Second Corps at three o'clock
in the morning, when a Frenchman
reported having seen "forty
German guns and a large force of
Uhlans" moving in the direction
of the Third Corps, and more
particularly in the direction of Néry,
where the First Cavalry Brigade
with L Battery, R.H.A., was
billeted, on the left front of the
British line.  Except as regards the
number of the guns the report
proved to be true.  The Germans,
concealed from the British by a
thick mist,--six regiments of
cavalry with two batteries of six guns
each,--were in position by
daybreak on the steep ridge which
overlooks the village, when an
officer's patrol of the Eleventh
Hussars bumped suddenly into
them out of the mist.  It is
possible that they were as much
surprised as the British, for a mist
works both ways; but they had
the advantage in numbers,
armament, and position.  The alarm
was scarcely given when their guns
opened on the village, and by five
o'clock, when the sun rose, the
fight was in full swing.

It was a singular action, for
though our cavalry, dismounted
and hastily disposed, soon
recovered from their surprise, nothing
could alter the situation of L
Battery.  Thanks to the mist, it had
been caught in a position as
unsuitable for action as could well be
conceived.  Unlimbered in an
orchard only four hundred yards off,
and perfectly commanded by the
German guns, it was throughout
the fight a mere target for the
enemy.  A tornado of shell,
machine-gun, and rifle fire was
directed upon it, the battery
meanwhile boldly replying, though its
case was hopeless, and known to be
hopeless, from the first.  Soon only
one of its guns was left in action,
and on the serving of this one gun
the attention of every surviving
officer and man was concentrated,
one after another falling killed or
wounded under the fire of the now
exasperated enemy.  Captain Bradbury,
loading, lost a leg; continued
to direct, and lost the other, and
was carried away to die so that, as
he said, his men should not see his
agony and be discouraged.  When
all the officers had fallen,
Sergeant-Major Dorrell took command, and
aided by the machine-guns of the
Eleventh Hussars, was still
maintaining the hopeless duel when
about eight o'clock the Fourth
Cavalry Brigade arrived, and not
long after the First Middlesex
leading the Nineteenth Infantry
Brigade.  The balance was reversed,
and the enemy, with, it is said, the
one gun of L Battery still firing at
them, retired in disorder towards
Verrines, leaving eight of their
twelve guns on the field.  Whatever
their mission, it remained
unfulfilled.  In this action, in which a
serious disaster was so successfully
averted, the heroic performance of
L Battery will always be
memorable.  It had lost, during the
engagement, all its officers and eighty
per cent of its gun detachments
killed or wounded, without
betraying by so much as a sign either
discouragement or defeat.
Distinctions were showered upon it,
and Captain Bradbury, Sergeant-Major
Dorrell, and Sergeant Nelson
were awarded the Victoria
Cross.

There is a sequel to this fight too
exhilarating to be omitted.  As the
First and Fourth Cavalry Brigades
were moving south next morning
through the rides of the Forest of
Ermenonville, they came on the
tracks of horses and sent a troop to
follow them up.  "They found the
ride strewn with German kit of all
kinds, lame horses, etc., showing a
hurried retreat.  They had gone by
five hours before, and turned out
to be our Néry friends, the cavalry
division, who had bumped into one
of our columns and retreated
rapidly, leaving their four remaining
guns."  It was a very satisfactory
finish, and had a fine effect on the
whole Army.  The story of the
capture of the twelve guns ran like
wildfire through the ranks, and
was recorded with pleasure by the
French in their *communiqué*.

On September 2, very early in
the morning, the Army was once
more on the move.  September 1
had been a hard day, and at one
time something like a general
engagement was threatened on the
left and left centre of the British
line, the Fifth and Fourth Divisions
fighting model rear-guard actions
which had much to do with the
inactivity of the enemy on the
following day.  For on September 2
the pursuit once more relaxed, and
by the evening the British had
reached the north bank of the
Marne, and were already arranging
for the crossing on the following
day.  Both the march and the
crossing had been contemplated
with considerable misgiving by the
Commander-in-Chief, for on
September 2 the Army was no longer
retiring, as it had hitherto retired,
in the direction of Paris, but, owing
to the position of the bridges, had
swung southeast and was now
executing what was in effect almost
a flank march in the face of the
enemy.  The crossing of the Marne
was an even more delicate
operation, for it involved, in
circumstances of comparative immobility,
the same dangerous exposure to the
enemy.  The enemy, however, did
nothing to interrupt our
operations, and was, indeed, reported by
our airmen to have swung
south-east also, and to be moving in the
direction of Château-Thierry,
towards the front of the Fifth French
Army.  By the night of September
3 the whole of the British troops
were safely across the river and all
the bridges blown up.  The left of
the British Army was now actually
in sight of the outlying forts of
Paris, and there was much
excitement among all ranks as to our
ultimate destination.  Should we,
after all, enter Paris, and sleep in
the beds of *la ville lumière*?  It was
not to be.  A position was occupied
between Lagny and Signy-Signets,
and on the following day, while the
enemy was bridging the Marne, the
British Army made the last stage
of the Retreat, finishing up, in the
cool of the evening, on the line
Lagny-Courtagon.  This was their
"farthest south," and on
September 5, while they rested, the great
news spread through the Army
that the Retreat was over, and that
next day the Advance would begin.
It would be difficult to exaggerate
the effect of the news.  For though
the Army had grown outwardly
fitter and more cheerful during the
last seven days, the profound
distaste which was felt by all ranks
for the perpetual retirement
poisoned every activity.  Was it never
to end, this Retreat?  Were we
retiring, then, to the Pyrenees?
With such bitter questions and
mock-humorous answers, they
beguiled the march.  When the news
came it was as if a great sickness
had been lifted from their minds,
and for the first time, perhaps,
they realized fully, as men do when
they rise from sickness, how
infinitely tired and weary they had
been.  They could scarcely believe
the news; but it came from
quarters not to be denied.  The
"favourable situation" for which
General Joffre had been waiting so
patiently had come at last.

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