Title: Senator Fulbright's secret memorandum
Author: James D. Bales
Release date: June 22, 2026 [eBook #78918]
Language: English
Original publication: Searcy, AR: Bales Bookstore, 1962
Other information and formats: www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/78918
Credits: Bob Taylor, Tim Lindell and the Online Distributed Proofreading Team at https://www.pgdp.net (This book was produced from images made available by the HathiTrust Digital Library.)
JAMES D. BALES
Concerning the cold war, a well known
liberal, William E. Bohn, said: “Many of
us on the democratic side are poorly prepared
for this historic conflict. There are
editors, clergymen, educators, and politicians
in this country who hardly know what Communism
is.” (The New Leader, January
22, 1962, p. 15)
BALES BOOKSTORE
Searcy, Arkansas
Copyright 1962 By
JAMES D. BALES
[Pg iii]
Senator J. W. Fulbright’s memorandum concerning the military and the cold war was likely the most controversial paper which appeared in Washington in 1961. It is probable that the memorandum has been discussed by a lot of people who have not read it, much less studied it. Because it is an important document it ought to be studied by the public as a whole, and not just by men in the armed forces or by those in the political arena.
The importance of the memorandum is underscored not only by what it says but also by the wide and varied reaction to it. As to be expected, it has not been favorably received by those individuals and organizations which it attacks as extremely radical rightwingers. In addition, many individuals from various parts of the United States and from both political parties have been critical of the memorandum.
On the other hand, support for the memorandum has come from many and different sources. President Kennedy stated that Senator Fulbright rendered a service by sending the memorandum to the White House. In the Senator’s own state, the Arkansas Gazette has more than once indicated its editorial backing of the memorandum.
The leftists as a whole have backed the memorandum. This backing has included that of the socialists and of the communists. Kingsley Martin, a British socialist said: “The dangerous change came with the Korean war, when America discovered that GIs, having no notion why they were fighting, were easily influenced by Communist propaganda. As a result, the Pentagon has poured out hundreds of booklets instructing officers how to indoctrinate the army with hatred of Communism. Quotations from these documents, presented at the initial hearing of the Walker case, were, one would have thought sufficient evidence of the virulent anti-Communist propaganda to which the troops are subjected. But the Fulbright memorandum (which should be widely published and not hidden in the Congressional Record) proved that [Pg iv]politically-minded generals had used the permitted task of indoctrination as a means of denigrating such distinguished American personalities as Truman, Mrs. Roosevelt and Dean Acheson. These were in effect treated as near-Communists, if not traitors.”[1] So far as the present author understands the matter, the memorandum does not mention but one General even remotely in such a way. And even in his case it states that he said that some prominent Americans were “tainted with Communist ideology.” This is not the same as calling them near-Communists or traitors.
Kingsley Martin further praised Senator Fulbright as an internationalist, and as one who “was making a reasoned attempt to bring Arkansas into the world community.”[2] What kind of “world community” did the socialist Martin have in mind?
Senator Fulbright and his position were backed in the Paris weekly, L’EXPRESS on October 12, 1961. This paper is connected with Pierre Mendes-France, a leader of the leftwing of the Socialist Party in France.[3]
The Socialist Party-Social Democratic Federation has backed it consistently. Norman Thomas said: “Our immediate purpose in preparing this factual pamphlet was to present it to the administration in order to back up Senator Fulbright’s excellent memorandum and continue the work that the Defense Department has begun.”[4]
Irwin Suall, a prominent socialist, has written: “Flushing out and exposing the activities of the ultras is a major current function of the Socialist Party. From that standpoint, Thomas called the results of his press conference ‘highly gratifying’.”[5]
[Pg v]
The Communist Party in the United States thought so highly of the memorandum that they reprinted without comment several columns of the memorandum in The Worker for August 27, 1961.
No attempt is made to identify Senator Fulbright with each of these groups just because they back him in this matter. This would be neither sensible nor fair. However, such questions as the following are raised: Why are they backing him in this matter? How do they believe that this would contribute to their long-range or short-range purposes? Would it make a contribution to any of their purposes? We do know that the socialists and the communists are backing the memorandum. This reveals their evaluation of it and indicates whose causes they think that the memorandum serves.
The extent to which the censorship, which is recommended in memorandum of Senator Fulbright, is being carried out already is indicated in a directive issued to Reserve Officers in at least one area of the United States. It reads: “Although Reserve personnel are not subject to Army Regulations except when on active duty, such regulations are distributed to Reserve units with the intention of providing guidance where appropriate. Members of the Reserve are encouraged to conform whenever possible to the spirit and intent of regulations even though they are not bound by them. It is pointed out that information they convey to the public becomes at least quasi-official when linked with their Reserve Status.”
Since within a few months an attempt was being made to carry over the censorship into the private lives of Reservists, in the above manner, what will happen within a few years unless the trend is changed? Will the Reserves be prohibited from the freedom of speech which is the birthright of American citizens?
The memorandum is thus seen to raise questions which are tremendous in their import.
Our examination of the memorandum does not imply that there are no extremists. Obviously there are extremists of all varieties in America, and it would be unreasonable to conclude that there were no extremists in the military or amongst the anti-Communists. However, in the author’s judgment it is highly doubtful that the number of extremists in the military is anywhere near as high as the percentage of soldiers in Korean prisoner of war camps who in one way or another collaborated with [Pg vi]the enemy, or defected, or failed to manifest the proper discipline or failed to cooperate with their fellow soldiers.
Our defense of some of the individuals and positions which are attacked in the memorandum does not imply an endorsement of every individual and organization mentioned in the memorandum; nor does it imply an endorsement of everything which may have been said at one time or another by the individuals and organizations in whose defense we have spoken.
In our discussion of the memorandum we have sometimes quoted Senator Fulbright against Senator Fulbright. We have also quoted some liberals against Senator Fulbright. This illustrates that one is not necessarily a so-called ultra rightist just because he opposes certain positions taken by the Senator.
There are some who have implied that Senator Fulbright is not responsible for what is in the memorandum since he did not personally write it. Of such we would ask: Is there anything in the memorandum’s charges and recommendations with which the Senator disagrees? If so, why has he not said so? As far as our knowledge goes, the Senator himself has never suggested that he disagrees with any of its charges and recommendations.
Although the Senator did not personally write the memorandum, he is responsible for it; and as far as we know he has never suggested otherwise. He submitted it “to the Secretary of Defense.”[6] He said: “The memorandum was based on my strong belief in the principle of military subordination to civilian control.”[7] “The memorandum was a personal one.... It was transmitted to the Secretary of Defense as a personal correspondence.” It was a part of his “private papers.”[8]
According to the President, Senator Fulbright’s memorandum presented the Senator’s views. “Senator Fulbright sent a memorandum to the Secretary of Defense at the request of the Secretary of Defense, and expressed his views about a matter which is, of course, of concern to the Department of Defense.”
“So, in my judgment, Senator Fulbright performed a service in sending his viewpoint to the Department of Defense....”[9]
In order to assist the public in their evaluation of the memorandum, [Pg vii]the following discussion of the memorandum is placed before the public.
This discussion does not endeavor to present and to examine the basic philosophy, strategy and tactics of the enemy—communism. This the author has endeavored to do in two other books, Communism: Its Faith and Fallacies and Understanding Communism.
Appreciation is expressed to those who gave permission to quote from copyrighted material.
[1] New Statesman, November 17, 1961, p. 732, col. 2,t. The difficulty of speaking on some phases of the present world situation without crossing Mrs. Eleanor Roosevelt is illustrated by following remarks which she made in a recent interview. First, the President has urged the people to build shelters. Mrs. Roosevelt said: “I don’t believe in private shelters, or school shelters.” It must be done, she said, through “a comprehensive government program” if it is to be done at all. Second, the President indicates that we shall fight if necessary. Military men teach the same thing. She said: “War is inadmissible anymore.... Today willingness to go to war means willingness to face the loss of civilization.” (Hal Boyle, “Eleanor Roosevelt Recalls Pearl Harbor,” Arkansas Democrat, Dec. 7, 1961, p. 19.)
[2] New Statesman, p. 732, col. 1,m.
[3] “Politically, it speaks for the non-Communist left and is close to ex-Premier Pierre Mendes-France.” Newsweek, Feb. 12, 1962, p. 82, col. 3,b.
[4] New America, December 8, 1961, p. 2.
[5] Ibid., p. 6, col. 5,t. Maclean’s magazine (September 9, 1961) defended Senator Fulbright and implied that “fanatics, numbskulls and mediocrities” were the core of the opposition to him in his home state (p. 81. From an article by Ian Schlanders.)
[6] Congressional Record, August 2, 1961, p. 13436, col. 2,m.
[7] Ibid., p. 13436, col. 2,m.
[8] Ibid., p. 13436, col. 3,t.
[9] Press conference of August 10. Congressional Record, August 11, 1961, p. 14449, col. 1,t,m. See also p. 14559.
[Pg ix]
| CHAPTERS | Page | |
| Preface | ||
| I | The Background | 1 |
| II | The Secret Memorandum Made Public | 5 |
| III | The Effect of the Memorandum | 6 |
| IV | Who Is Attacked in the Memorandum | 9 |
| V | The Protracted Conflict Concept Criticized | 29 |
| VI | The American People the Principle Problem? | 50 |
| VII | Who Is the Defeatest? | 70 |
| VIII | Senator Fulbright and World Opinion | 70 |
| IX | Is Communism A Matter of Politics? | 80 |
| X | The Memorandum and the Community Party Line | 80 |
| XI | Conclusions | 101 |
[Pg 1]
Too many Americans have understood neither the American system of freedom, and how it works, nor the communist challenge to our freedom, and how it operates. The well known liberal, William E. Bohn, wrote: “Many of us on the democratic side are poorly prepared for this historic conflict. There are editors, clergymen, educators and politicians in this country who hardly know what Communism is.”[10] This lack of understanding was illustrated in the case of those prisoners of war in Korea who were brainwashed.[11]
Out of this lack of understanding of the nature of our country, and of the nature of the enemy who has challenged us, has come an apathy which threatens our very survival. Senator Fulbright himself has spoken of our having become “snug and complacent.”[12] He lamented: “... If only we would stop snoring with our eyes open.”[13] His fear was that even if we are aroused out of our sleep we “again subside into dreamland.” In fact, he said: “Mr. President, I have no idea what must be done to awaken Americans to the unpleasant facts of life. As unwilling [Pg 2]as I am to face it, perhaps the answer is that we simply do not wish to be disturbed.”[14]
In December, 1960, the Senator said: “The greatest crisis confronting the West is not Berlin. It is the apathy of the free world and its incomprehensible unwillingness to look facts in the face. Evolution and the survival of the fittest are concepts we understand when applied to plants and animals—but we seem not to realize that these concepts apply to us.”[15]
The people, said the Senator, must be informed. “The American people ought to be told the bleak truth about their world, the character of the forces arrayed against them, and what they must do, at whatever cost, to survive or even to bring about a state of high security. They must be told that, however humane their society, whatever its ideals, this alone will not save them from destruction by a society armed with the prodigious mechanisms of our times and an implacable determination to dominate all men.”[16]
Spurred on by the studies of the Korean prisoners of war, and deeply concerned with the apathy and ignorance in America, efforts were made to do a better job of equipping the American soldier for the war in which we have become involved. On August 17, 1955, President Eisenhower made an official proclamation that soldiers were expected to live up to the newly formulated “Code of Conduct for Members of the Armed Forces of the United States.” Since the ignorance in the Armed Forces was but a reflection of the ignorance of the general population, President Eisenhower and the National Security Council issued in 1958 a directive which more fully put the military in the cold war.
The National Security Council is our top policy and planning agency. It is composed of the Cabinet members who have responsibilities in the field of national security, and included in it by law are the President, Vice President, the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of State, the National Security Resources Board’s Chairman; and, as statutory advisers, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the CIA. It was this group which issued the directive of 1958 which placed upon the military the [Pg 3]duty of helping not only the military but also the civilian population to gain an understanding of the issues involved in the cold war. By name, its statutory members in 1958 were President Eisenhower, Vice President Nixon, John Foster Dulles, Neil H. McElroy, and Gordon Grey, the Director of the Office of Defense Mobilization.
As a result of this directive of the National Security Council, national strategy seminars were conducted throughout the country. Originating in the War College, these seminars were making a valuable contribution to the waging of the cold war, as Roscoe Drummond has pointed out.[17] Civilian organizations who wanted speakers on the subject of Communism and the cold war could contact the military and secure the services of military officials who were versed in some phase of the cold war. In some cases facilities on military bases were made available.
During 1961, however, there was an increase in censorship of the speeches of military men. In July, 1961, the Defense Department issued a directive placing certain restraints on military speakers, and this action, according to Cabell Phillips in the New York Times of July 21, was the result of a memorandum of Senator J. W. Fulbright.[18] Supposedly directed only toward the curbing of political utterances by rightwing military speakers, the impact of the directive and the controversy which has arisen have been much broader. As a result, as Roscoe Drummond pointed out, the country is being deprived “of the useful and needed service which the military can properly perform.”
“We have just about thrown away the public national-strategy seminars which were doing so much to alert people” concerning communism and its strategy in the cold war.[19]
As far as we know the Defense Department has now limited [Pg 4]the military to military subjects, which include the military threat of Russia; but anything dealing with the specific aims and political tactics of the communists must be cleared by the Pentagon.[20]
Fulbright’s memorandum, which has had an influence on the stand taken by the Department of Defense, is thus seen to be an important one.
[10] The New Leader, Jan. 22, 1962, p. 15.
[11] William E. Mayer, “Communist Indoctrination—Its Significance to Americans,” Searcy, Arkansas: National Education Program, 1957, pp. 14-15, Congressional Record, Jan. 21, 1960, p. 877, col. 1,m. Senator Dodd has endeavored to give the percentage of collaborators in The Congressional Record, July 23, 1962, p. 13569. On the same page he said: “The overwhelming majority of these POW’s succumbed to Communist pressures and became collaborators in one degree or another. So general was the phenomena of defeatism and ‘give-up-itis,’ that we cannot write them off to individual weakness. The fault lay not with the individual, but with our society.” See also the statements of Admiral Arleigh A. Burke in the Special Preparedness Subcommittee of the Committee on Armed Services, Military Cold War Education and Speech Review Policies, Washington: Government Printing Office, 1962, Part 1, p.19. Also Secretary McNamara, Hearings Before the Committee on Armed Services, Defense Secretary McNamara on S. Res. 191, Washington: Government Printing Office, 1961, p. 4.
[12] Congressional Record, May 11, 1959, p. A3890, col. 2,b.
[13] Ibid., p. A3890, col. 1,m.
[14] Congressional Record, Jan. 23, 1959, p. 1007, col. 1,b.
[15] Congressional Record, Feb. 16, 1961, p. A925, col. 2,b.
[16] Congressional Record, March 28, 1960, p. A2709, col. 2,t.
[17] “When the Generals Should Be Allowed To Speak,” Arkansas Democrat, October 26, 1961. General Lyman L. Lemnitzer, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, thought that qualified military personnel should participate in such seminars. Special Preparedness Subcommittee of the Committee on Armed Services, Military Cold War Education and Speech Review Policies, Part 1, page 103.
[18] See the directive and Phillips’ articles reprinted by Senator Strom Thurmond in the Congressional Record, July 26, 1961, pp. 12620-12621. Compare U.S. News and World Report, August 7, 1961, p. 9. See also pp. 12-15 of a reprint entitled “Excerpts From Speeches by Senator Strom Thurmond on Efforts to Gag Military Anti-Communist Speeches and Seminars.”
[19] “When the Generals Should Be Allowed To Speak,” Arkansas Democrat, October 26, 1961.
[20] According to U.S. News and World Report, September 18, 1961, p. 8. Reporting on the September 6 testimony of Defense Secretary McNamara.
[Pg 5]
The Fulbright memorandum was sent to the Secretary of Defense and to the President. It was so secret that other members of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, of which Senator Fulbright is the chairman, did not know of its existence.[21] Someone, however, made it available to the United Press International.[22] Senator Thurmond learned of its existence and tried, without success at first, to secure a copy. He, Senator Mundt, and Senator Styles Bridges were concerned that such an influential memorandum was kept secret.[23] As Senator Fulbright himself had said, more than a year before, when something has been leaked to the press it should be more or less officially released. When it is not released, people wonder whether some things which they should know have been withheld from them.[24] But Senator Fulbright was willing to let the people wonder in this case!
Due to circumstances beyond the control of Senator Fulbright, Senator Thurmond secured a copy of the memorandum and inserted it into the Congressional Record.[25] Later the same day Senator Fulbright placed it in the Record.[26]
What was the effect of the secret memorandum which, without Senator Fulbright’s aid, has been made public?
[21] President Kennedy in a press conference on August 10, 1961, Congressional Record, August 11, 1961, p. 14449, col. 1,t. See Senator Fulbright’s letter to Senator Thurmond in the Congressional Record, August 4, 1961, p. 13687, col. 2,t. Arkansas Gazette, July 21, 1961, p. 1. Congressional Record, July 31, 1961, p. 13174. August 4, 1961, p. 13687, col. 2,t. Congressional Record, July 29, 1961, p. 13005; Compare August 4, 1961, p. 13687. See also Marquis Childs, Congressional Record, July 26, 1961, p. 12618.
[22] Arkansas Gazette, July 21, 1961, p. 1. See also Marquis Childs, “Birchites Finding Allies in Military,” Congressional Record, July 14, 1961, pp. 11659-11660.
[23] Congressional Record, July 26, 1961, p. 12621. col. 3,t.; July 29, 1961, p. 13005, col. 1,m.; p. 13005, col. 3,m.
[24] Congressional Record, March 28, 1960, p. 6207, col. 2,m.
[25] Congressional Record, August 2, 1961, p. 13398.
[26] Congressional Record, p. 13436.
[Pg 6]
Senator Fulbright, when he inserted the memorandum into the Congressional Record, said it was based on the principle of military subordination to civilian control, and that it was not the function of the military to educate the public on political issues.[27] The Senator further said: “The memorandum was directed solely at the impropriety of officers of the armed services lending their prestige and official status to meetings which tend to undermine policies of the civil government of the United [Pg 7]States, as set forth by the President and the Congress.”[28]
“The sole objective of my recommendation was to insure that high military personnel adhere to the obligation, which is inherent in their duty as officers to refrain from public expressions of opposition to the policies of the Government and of their Commander-in-Chief.”[29]
We are not impugning the motives of Senator Fulbright when we say that a study of the memorandum reveals that its effect was to challenge the National Security Council directive of 1958. This directive did not deny the principle of civilian control; in fact, because of its subordination to President Eisenhower the military obeyed the directive. Furthermore, the directive did not call for the military to educate the public on political issues in the sense of partisan politics. In the memorandum Senator Fulbright himself said: “Under a National Security Council directive in 1958, it remains the policy of the U. S. Government to make use of military personnel and facilities to arouse the public to the menace of the cold war.”[30]
“The purpose of this memorandum is to give some indication of the dangers involved in education and propaganda activities by the military, directed at the public, and to suggest steps for dealing with the underlying problem.”[31]
“There is little in the education, training or experience of most military officers to equip them with the balance of judgment necessary to put their own ultimate solutions—those with which their education, training and experience are concerned—into proper perspective in the President’s total ‘strategy for the nuclear age’.”[32]
Under “Recommendations” we find:
“1. With reference to the National Security Council directive of 1958, suggested revision is based upon its description in attachment 3 (New York Times article of June 18, 1961), from which the following is excerpted: ‘President Eisenhower and his top policy leaders decreed that the cold war could not be fought as a series of separate and often unrelated actions, as with foreign [Pg 8]aid and propaganda’. Rather, it must be fought with a concentration of all the resources of the Government and with the full understanding and support of the civilian population. It was decided, in particular, that the military should be used to reinforce the cold-war effort.”
“This policy should be reconsidered from the standpoint of a basic error, that military personnel have the necessarily broad background which would enable them to relate the various aspects of the cold-war effort, one to the other.”[33]
The memorandum indicates that it is convinced that the National Security Council directive, and its implementation, could be attacked from several grounds, including an assumed violation of the “basic traditional and constitutional question of military efforts to propagandize the public....” As it went on to say: “the violation of these concepts alone should be sufficient basis for challenging the National Security Council policy, and its implementation.”[34]
This also helps make it certain that the memorandum was not directed simply against certain mistakes in the implementation of the policy, but against the policy itself. In addition to saying that the military is not qualified to engage in the cold war, the Senator claims that it is forbidden on constitutional grounds.
[27] Congressional Record, August 2, 1961, p. 13436, col. 2,m. Civilian control is not controversial. In his May 12, 1962 speech to the West Point Cadets, General Douglas MacArthur emphasized that political problems were “not for your professional participation or military solution.” Congressional Record, May 31, 1962, p. A4009, col. 1,t.
Admiral Arleigh A. Burke testified: “No mature U.S. military officer I know of has ever questioned it. Indeed, it is a sacred part of our military tradition itself. If a military man cannot reconcile his convictions with his civilian superior’s orders, he has only the recourse of leaving the service.”
“But the principle of civilian control can be perverted. Civilian control of the military is properly exerted by the President, the Secretary of Defense, and the secretaries of the individual military departments over the military services, within the guidelines laid down by Congress. The senior civilians in the Government have the final decision on all problems affecting the military posture of the United States. This is proper and correct.”
“In my opinion, it is improper that civilian control should be exercised in any other echelon but at the top. It should not be extended to every subordinate military echelon. To be specific, orders and directives to the military should come from the top civilian elements to the senior military people. They should not come from junior civilian elements to junior military people.” (Military Cold War Education and Speech Review Policies, Part 1, pp. 21-22).
General MacArthur further said: “While for the purpose of administration and command the Armed forces are within the executive branch of the Government, they are accountable as well to the Congress, charged with the policymaking responsibility, and to the people, ultimate repository of all national power. Yet so inordinate has been the application of the Executive power that members of the armed services have been subjected to the most arbitrary and ruthless treatment for daring to speak the truth in accordance with conviction and conscience.” (as quoted by General Edward M. Almond, Ibid., Part 2, p. 714.)
[28] “Statement of Senator J. W. Fulbright Relating to a Memorandum Submitted by Him to the Department of Defense,” p. 3.
[29] Ibid., page 4.
[30] Congressional Record, August 2, 1961, p. 13436, col. 3,b.
[31] Ibid., p. 13437, col. 1,t.
[32] Ibid., p. 13437, col. 1,b.
[33] Ibid., p. 13437, col. 3,t.
[34] Ibid., p. 13437, col. 2,b.
[Pg 9]
Senator Fulbright’s memorandum attacked a wide variety of Americans, as well as the American people as a whole.
In challenging the directive of the National Security Council, Senator Fulbright was saying that in spite of his military background President Eisenhower did not know enough to realize that the military was not qualified to engage in the cold war. Senator Fulbright, however, was qualified—he thought—to judge that the military was not qualified. Furthermore, when Senator Fulbright said that such participation was contrary to certain constitutional values, he was saying that either President Eisenhower did not understand these values or that he chose to disregard them.
Senator Fulbright’s memorandum was an attack on the competency of the military to engage in the cold war. Concerning the policy of the National Security Council, which put the military into the cold war, the memorandum said: “This policy should be reconsidered from the standpoint of a basic error, that military personnel have the necessarily broad background which would enable them to relate the various aspects of the cold-war effort, one to the other.”[35]
It was also stated: “There is little in the education, training or experience of most military officers to equip them with the balance of judgment necessary to put their own ultimate solutions—those with which their education, training and experience [Pg 10]are concerned—into proper perspective in the President’s total ‘strategy for the nuclear age’.”[36]
Furthermore, the Senator said: “There are no reasons to believe that military personnel generally can contribute to this need, beyond their specific, technical competence to explain their own role. On the contrary, there are many reasons, and some evidence, for believing that an effort by the military, beyond this limitation, involves considerable danger.”[37]
Whence did the Senator get his competency in the field of the cold war? Whence his qualifications as a cold war strategist so that he knows that we have much to lose and nothing to gain by having the military in the cold war? How did he become qualified to advise in effect the neutralization, in so far as the public is involved, of the military in the cold war?
Are there any military officials more competent than the Senator is in any phase of the cold war? If so, why not let military experts on Communism be used to help us win the victory in the cold war?
Senator Fulbright’s position, that military officials are not sufficiently educated to engage in the cold war, is an indictment [Pg 11]of the armed services colleges where these officers have been trained.
Many of the officers have one or more degrees. Many of them have travelled extensively and some of them are proficient in more than one language.
Senator Styles Bridges expressed his shock at Senator Fulbright’s evaluation of the military. “I assume, and it is an assumption which I believe to be valid, that our senior military officers, particularly those of flag and general officer rank, are persons of judgment and responsibility. Most of these officers are graduates of our Military Academies, and all of them have many years of experience in leadership, many of them are held directly responsible for the welfare and lives of large segments of our military forces, and many of them are held directly chargeable with the care, custody and protection of millions of dollars worth of property belonging to the U. S. Government. The appointment of each of them to a position of high rank was made as an expression of trust and confidence by the President and with the concurrence of the U. S. Senate.”[38] After discussing the education of most of the Army officers, Major John A. Burns wrote: “It is doubtful if any professional group is so rigorously trained and educated as the American officer.”[39]
The Senator recognizes, as do the rest of us, that the United States is confronted by a situation which it has never before faced. The memorandum indicates that it is not in the American [Pg 12]tradition to be involved in the “long twilight struggle” which we are now involved in; but we are so involved.[40]
That we are in an unprecedented situation in the history of America, is underscored by the fact that on December 16, 1950, President Truman declared, in Proclamation 2914, that we are in a state of national emergency because of Communist imperialism. Events since that time have only further emphasized that we are in a state of national emergency.[41]
It is not contrary to our tradition for the military to go into action when war comes. War has come.
W. D. Workman wrote: “If warfare today were confined to the battlefield, and if the battlefield alone were the concern of the military, there might be some justification for buttoning the lips of our senior officers. But warfare now is fourth dimensional, encompassing politics, culture, economics and all other institutions which lend themselves to internal subversion as well as external manipulation.”[42]
Military men have taken an oath to defend the United States against enemies both domestic and foreign. This oath calls on them to defend the country against domestic enemies as well as foreign enemies. Why, then, does Senator Fulbright take a position which in effect keeps the military men from carrying out their oath against such a domestic enemy as the Communist conspiracy in America?
It is in the light of their oath, and of the threat of internal and external communism, that we can fully understand Resolution 99 of the American Legion convention in Denver. It states: “Whereas the morale and fighting spirit of our Armed Forces is directly related to their knowledge and their belief in the fundamental principles upon which the Government of their homeland is founded and to their knowledge and understanding of the aims and purposes of the enemy; and
“Whereas the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation and author of ‘Masters of Deceit’, a most knowledgeable work [Pg 13]on communism, has stated and warned, ‘We cannot hope to successfully meet the Communist menace unless there is a wide knowledge and understanding of its aims and designs’, and
“Whereas, Lenin, the real architect of communism, proclaimed, ‘It is inconceivable that communism and democracy can exist side by side in this world.’ Lenin said inevitably we must perish; and
“Whereas this doctrine has been iterated and reiterated many times by his successors, and their actions have consistently been in conformity therewith; and
“Whereas the military officers of the U. S. Armed Forces are charged under oath with the duty to defend our country from all enemies foreign and domestic and that to accomplish fealty to this oath, the military leaders must know the enemy—his aims and purposes in order to instruct the men under their command, fortify their morale, and so defend our homeland against the enemy; and
“Whereas this right and duty of the military officers of the U. S. Armed Forces has recently been challenged publicly by certain officials in high places in Government: Now, therefore, be it
“Resolved, That the American Legion in convention assembled in Denver, Colo., September 9 through 14, 1961, urge the officers of the U. S. Armed Forces to continue to perform their duty to defend the Constitution of the United States, that they better inform themselves regarding the fundamental principles of our form of government exemplified by our Declaration of Independence and Constitution, that they transmit and impart this knowledge to the Armed Forces under their command and to the general public, that the officers of our Armed Forces familiarize themselves with the aims and purposes of the known enemy, that they earnestly and patriotically strive at all times to impart this knowledge to the men under their command and to the general public to the end that the morale and fighting spirit of our Armed Forces be kept at all times at the highest possible level. We further urge that the challenge of certain Government officials in high places to the established rights and duties of the officers of our Armed Forces be removed and [Pg 14]that they be left unshackled and unhampered in the discharge of their duties to the above end.”[43]
Does the Senator think that the only way that the military can live up to its oath is by bullets in a hot war, and not also by words in a cold war? The oath does not say that the defense of the United States is limited to defense by bullets. To uphold the United States includes upholding it by word also. Or does the Senator, with his attitude toward at least some aspects of our constitutional system, think that if one upholds the Constitution by the teaching method that he is engaging in partisan politics?
If it is not a violation of their oath to defend the Constitution by words against the domestic enemy communism, if they can in harmony with their oath expose and oppose the domestic enemy communism, then why not let them participate in the cold war?
Is not the memorandum, in effect, a demand that the military not carry out their oath in so far as domestic Communists are concerned, which domestic Communists are a part of the international communist threat?
The Senator in effect wants the military eliminated from the cold war. As Senator Curtis, from Nebraska, said: “If this paper were devoted to errors of judgment or fact—which are going to creep into any program—everybody should consider those errors so that they might not be repeated or that they might be corrected. But the purport of this memorandum is plain—it is a pronouncement that the military should not alert the citizens of the internal Communist threat. I am afraid it serves interests that were never intended to be served by whoever had the responsibility of putting the memorandum together.”[44]
We would add the observation that there is no indication that Senator Fulbright in the memorandum proposed that the military officials should alert even their own troops to the menace and nature of the cold war except possibly later when some of them have been educated by civilians. And even then he says it should be done under civilian direction as far as possible.
The Senator does not seem to want the military to have the [Pg 15]right to speak out against internal communism, or to inform the public of the dangers which threaten us or to show how the Communists operate.
We are confident that, regardless of the Senator’s motives, Khrushchev must be pleased with the idea of the military being so neutralized in the cold war. Since the cold war is the major war which Khrushchev and world communism are now waging against us, Khrushchev must consider it to be a real victory for his side to have the military forces knocked out of the cold war to the extent that the memorandum knocked the military out of the cold war.
We would have little or no hope for the survival of our country if the military did not have greater confidence in America than the Senator seems to have in the military. Indeed, the Senator himself once said: “If we lose faith in the integrity of our military men, in addition to the criticism which has been heaped upon the leadership in the political field, we certainly are in a sad state.”[45]
We are afraid that under the influence of Senator Fulbright’s memorandum concerning the military, and the increased power which the Secretary of Defense is wielding over the statements of the military, that a situation is developing which a few years ago the Senator himself thought would be a serious condition indeed. Senator Taft had criticized the Chiefs of Staff because he thought that they were but rubber stamps for the administration. Taft said: “I accepted them as experts; but I have come to the point where I do not accept them as experts, particularly when General Bradley makes a foreign policy speech. I suggest to the Senator that the Joint Chiefs of Staff are absolutely under the control of the administration, and that their recommendations are what the administration demands that they make.
“Mr. Fulbright. Mr. President, I think that is a very serious charge which is made by the Senator from Ohio. I can think of nothing which is more likely to cause consternation in this country, to develop a fear which I believe the facts do not warrant, and generally to disrupt our effort in this great struggle with the Russians and with communism, than to state here that in effect he has no confidence in the integrity of the leading [Pg 16]military figures in our Government. I think it is a very sad state in which we find ourselves if we are led to such extreme views.”[46] Yet in 1960, Senator Fulbright praised an article which said, among other things, that in President Eisenhower’s administration “uniformity of viewpoint is virtually enforced.”[47]
If the military is not permitted to speak out on the issues of the cold war, if they must silently wait until the time comes for them to rubber stamp whatever program the President finally comes up with, one would have the situation which Taft had in mind, i.e. they would recommend whatever the administration demanded. And this they would do without having had the opportunity to have participated in public discussions before the program was arrived at.
The Senator smeared one of the greatest generals in the history of America, and included him as a sample of the attitude of rightwing extremism. Of MacArthur, who was born in Arkansas, the Senator said: “Pride in victory, and frustration in restraint, during the Korean war, led to MacArthur’s revolt and McCarthyism.”[48]
Surely the Senator must have at least hesitated before impugning the motives of General MacArthur. Although it would be a good thing for us to win the victory over communism, pride in victory is not the motive. The important things are for what one is fighting and against what one is fighting. The desire to win victory over communism is highly commendable. Was the General motivated by pride in victory or by love of country, love of freedom and by opposition to this tremendous evil which would enslave mankind? In our opinion, the Senator’s evaluation of the General is a reflection on the Senator instead of on the General. We do not believe that the General’s long life of service to his country gives us any reason for believing that “pride in victory” is a correct analysis. The Senator was judging motives.
In another place, the Senator has said: “This technique of questioning the motives of the opposition instead of arguing [Pg 17]about the wisdom of their views is one of the oldest and most effective tools of tyrants or demagogues.” He went on to say that one could question his judgment and intellect, but “I do object to their questioning my motives or purposes or loyalty.”[49] And yet, the Senator questioned the motives of the General and said that the General acted out of “pride in victory.”
As for the General being frustrated under restraint, it likely would have been frustrating to any soldier to have been ordered into a war in which the main enemy—the Chinese Communists—was permitted a privileged sanctuary beyond the Yalu River. Furthermore, it was a war which the General was not permitted to try to win. Would the Senator be frustrated if he was ordered into a political campaign which he would not be permitted—by those who ordered him into it—to win? How much more so when one wanted to win against communism and for the cause of freedom.
The term “McCarthyism” is used as a smear word, and by thus equating “MacArthur’s revolt” and “McCarthyism” was the Senator unconscious of the fact that in the minds of some a bit, at least, of the smear would rub off on the General?
We contrast the Senator’s views of MacArthur with that of General Carlos P. Romulo, the Ambassador to the United States from the Philippines.
“Gen. Douglas MacArthur’s sentimental journey to the Philippines has a fourfold significance:
“1. At a time when Soviet propaganda is sparing no effort to distort America’s image in the eyes of the peoples of Asia, General MacArthur’s personality emerges as a living refutation of Communist misrepresentations. Received by an Asian people with open arms and given a reception that in warmth and magnitude is unprecedented in that section of the globe, the American people should be proud that they have one of their own who can draw to his person and to his country such universal popular acclaim and admiration.”[50]
MacArthur’s wisdom concerning China, in contract with the [Pg 18]illusions of the civilian authorities who then formed policy, is illustrated in his cable to the House Foreign Affairs Committee around the early part of 1948.
“The international aspect of the Chinese problem, unfortunately, has become somewhat beclouded by demands for internal reform. Desirable as such reform may be, its importance is but secondary to the issue of civil strife now engulfing the land, and these two issues are as impossible of synchronization as it would be to alter the structural design of a house while the same was being consumed by flame. The maintenance of China’s integrity against destructive forces which threaten her engulfment is of infinitely more concern. For with the firm maintenance of such integrity, reform will gradually take place in the evolutionary processes of China’s future.
“The Chinese problem is part of a global situation which should be considered in its entirely. Fragmentary decisions in disconnected sectors of the world will not bring an integrated solution. It would be utterly fallacious to underrate either China’s needs or her importance. For if we embark upon a general policy to bulwark the frontiers of freedom against the assaults of political despotism, one major frontier is no less important than another, and a decisive breach of any will inevitably engulf all.”[51]
When he was a Congressman, President Kennedy also spoke of some of the illusions of civilian authorities concerning China. “Mr. Speaker, over this week end we have learned the extent of the disaster that has befallen China and the United States. The responsibility for the failure of our foreign policy in the Far East rests squarely with the White House and the Department of State.
“The continued insistence that aid would not be forthcoming, unless a coalition government with the Communists was formed, was a crippling blow to the National Government.
“So concerned were our diplomats and their advisers, the Lattimores and the Fairbanks, with the imperfection of the domestic system in China after 20 years of war and the tales of corruption in high places that they lost sight of our tremendous stake in a non-Communist China.
[Pg 19]
“Our policy in the words of the Premier of the National Government, Sun Fo, of vacillation, uncertainty, and confusion has reaped the whirlwind.
“This House must now assume the responsibility of preventing the onrushing tide of communism from engulfing all of Asia.”[52]
We wonder whether or not Senator Fulbright would have lectured this Congressman on the need to support the President’s total program, that criticism of this nature divides the country, that this is extremely radical rightwingism, etc.!!
We are glad that President Kennedy’s visits with General MacArthur indicate that he has a higher regard for the General than does Senator Fulbright. The Senator’s opinion of General MacArthur is also in contrast with that of the House of Representatives in their resolution in which the Senate also concurred. “Resolved by the House of Representatives (the Senate concurring), That the thanks and appreciation of the Congress and the American people are hereby tendered to General of the Army Douglas MacArthur in recognition of his outstanding devotion to the American people, his brilliant leadership during and following World War II, and the unsurpassed affection held for him by the people of the Republic of the Philippines which has done so much to strengthen the ties of friendship between the people of that nation and the people of the United States.”[53]
Senator Fulbright not only indicted General MacArthur, but also the American people. Thus we read: “The American people have never really been tested in such a struggle. In the long run, it is quite possible that the principle problem of leadership will be, if it is not already, to restrain the desire of the people to hit the Communists with everything we’ve got, particularly if there are more Cubas and Laos. Pride in victory, and frustration [Pg 20]in restraint, during the Korean war, led to MacArthur’s revolt and McCarthyism.”[54]
Is the Senator saying that the American people may revolt if they are restrained so much that they are not permitted, as MacArthur was not permitted, to win the struggle in which the Communists have engaged us?
This, incidentally, is the first time that we have known that the Senator had such a charitable interpretation of McCarthyism. In effect the memorandum is saying that the American people want to win the victory over communism in the struggle which is now going on in the world; and that when they are restrained and kept from this victory, McCarthyism is the result. McCarthyism, according to this, is the desire to break down the restraints which keep us from winning, and the desire to go on to win the victory over the evil forces of communism. This, in effect, is what the Senator said.
The American people will doubtless weigh well the Senator’s implication that they possess the two essential ingredients which, according to the Senator lead to McCarthyism. These two are: Pride in victory and frustration in restraint. In other words, the Senator believes that we are all potential or incipient McCarthyites. There is no reason to assume that the Senator meant this in any complimentary way.
Senator Fulbright included Dr. George S. Benson, Arkansan of the Year for 1953-1954, President of Harding College and President of the National Education Program, as one of the extremely radical rightwing speakers. Dr. Benson believes in and advocates the religious and moral principles on which this country was founded; constitutional and thus limited government; citizenship responsibility; free enterprise and freedom. He is against both the internal and external threat of communism, [Pg 21]which are two aspects of the same threat—international communism.
Does adherence to the traditional values on which America has been built, and which has made America great, make one an extremely radical rightwinger? If it does, what does Senator Fulbright’s classification of Dr. Benson reveal about Senator Fulbright’s stand? Is the Senator so far away from the positions that Dr. Benson advocates that the Senator thinks that Dr. Benson is an extremely radical rightwinger?
It would be educational for all concerned if Senator Fulbright would make an attempt to sustain his charge against Dr. Benson by listing, with documentation from Dr. Benson’s writings and speeches, those positions which the Senator believes prove that Dr. Benson is an extremely radical rightwing speaker. Assertions are not sufficient. The Senator’s charges, where the Senator has much influence, are damaging to Dr. Benson’s work for free enterprise and against communism. They should either be sustained or the Senator should withdraw them publicly.
In his secret memorandum Senator Fulbright passed on, without checking with Dr. Ganus, a misrepresentation of Dr. Ganus. Senator Fulbright’s memorandum said: “An Arkansas citizen wrote of the Fort Smith meeting: ‘Dr. Clifton L. Ganus, Jr., vice president and dean of the School of American Studies at Harding College, made the statement “your Representative (James W. Trimble) in this area has voted 89 percent of the time to aid and abet the Communist Party”’.”[56]
Dr. Ganus did not make this statement.[57] If he had made such a startling statement, surely it would have been picked up by the newspapers at that time and reported. However, as far as we know even the Arkansas Gazette did not refer to it until months later. This was after it had been published in the Reporter magazine—which magazine presented this false accusation without any effort to check it with Dr. Ganus. As far as I know, the first time this false accusation appeared in print [Pg 22]was in the July 20, 1961 issue of the Reporter, which was published at least a week earlier than July 20.[58]
It is also instructive that Perry Mason of Harding Academy spoke in Fort Smith several times, and to some of the same people, a few days after Dr. Ganus spoke. Although he received some questions concerning some points made in Dr. Ganus’ speech, no one either publicly or privately said anything about the statement later attributed to Dr. Ganus.
If Dr. Ganus had made such a preposterous statement, surely someone would have defended their Congressman right then and there.
Furthermore, several people have made out affidavits, and have testified that they were there and that Dr. Ganus did not make the statement attributed to him.[59]
Because it has won for ten straight years the highest award of Freedoms Foundation At Valley Forge, Harding College, a fully accredited educational institution, has been known as the nation’s most honored college. Freedoms Foundation has honored Harding College as the nation’s No. 1 school in promoting the American way of life. On February 9, 1962, the All-American Conference to Combat Communism, made up of organizations whose combined membership is well over 50,000,000, gave Harding College a citation.
The socialists have felt the impact of the College in its stand for the traditional free enterprise system in America. This helps explain the attack of Norman Thomas, the leading socialist in America, on the College early in 1961.
The Communists have recognized that the College is a bulwark against their designs on America, and thus they have attacked Harding College and have falsely accused it of being “one of the biggest political machines of the ultra-Right.”[60] This attack by the Communists is in reality a tribute to Harding College. The Communists know who is hurting them.
However, it must come as something of a shock that Senator [Pg 23]Fulbright from the State of Arkansas, should also attack Harding College as a source of extremely radical rightwing teaching. And yet, this is the label under which he secretly represented Harding College to the President of the United States and to the Secretary of Defense.[61] Harding College, located in the Senator’s home state, was the only college attacked in the memorandum.
Senator Fulbright’s memorandum regarded the Strategy for Survival Conferences as dominated by the extremely rightwing speakers.[62] The Chamber of Commerce had sponsored this Conference. Thus the Chamber of Commerce was involved in extreme rightwingism! It is of interest that the Chamber of Commerce had tried to get Senator Fulbright, but he was out of the country; and then Senator McClellan, and he was also unavailable. It was then that they got Dr. Ganus.[63]
The memorandum also stated that General William C. Bullock had personally persuaded the Chamber of Commerce to sponsor the Conference in Little Rock. Peyton Rice, who is chairman of the Chamber’s Armed Services Committee, said that General Bullock had not presented the proposal to the Chamber.[64]
The House Committee on Un-American Activities has not been perfect, but neither has any other Committee. However, on the whole it has done splendid work investigating and exposing the Communist conspiracy. If Senator Fulbright had listened to the evidence presented in just the 1938 hearings of the Committee, he would have learned much truth about communism. He would not have said in 1945 that “our fear of Russia and communism” is a “powerful prejudice” which we must give up in order to have peace. He would not have misread history and concluded that Lenin’s revolution was in any sense [Pg 24]a following of our example in the revolution which we fought for our independence. The Senator also said: “As I read history, the Russian experiment in socialism is scarcely more radical, under modern conditions, than the Declaration of Independence was in the days of George III.”[65] This sounds somewhat like the statement of Earl Browder when he was head of the Communist Party in America. “The Declaration of Independence was for that time what The Communist Manifesto is for ours.”[66] Lenin in his resolution was basically following the Communist Manifesto.
As a Rhodes scholar, Senator Fulbright should have been able to read history, instead of accepting such an obviously false view of history. Senator Fulbright seems to have known either little or nothing about Lenin’s revolution, or little or nothing about our revolution. The kindest thing we can say about the Senator is that he was seemingly ignorant of some very fundamental matters.
What are some of the differences between Lenin’s revolution and ours? (1) Our revolution had as its objective the establishment of a reign of law, but Lenin’s revolution was designed to establish the rule of the head of the Communist Party who would rule according to his own will. (2) Our revolution established a Republic, while Lenin’s established a dictatorship. (3) Our revolution did not result in a reign of terror of Americans over Americans, but Lenin’s revolution did establish a reign of terror. (4) Our revolution did not have as its aim the establishment of a world wide conspiracy which would endeavor to overthrow all other governments—democratic governments as well as dictatorships. (5) Our revolution was not a counter-revolution against self-government. Lenin did not overthrow the Czar, he overthrew the Kerensky Government which was endeavoring to establish a form of democracy. Lenin was not even in Russia at the time the Czar abdicated. (6) Our revolution was over in a very few years, in so far as establishing our form of government is concerned. How long does it take to overthrow the previous regime? As Kravchenko said “The French Terror [Pg 25]was over in five years.”[67] By 1945, when Senator Fulbright made his statement concerning Lenin’s revolution, the Soviet terror had been going on for almost thirty years. (7) The Communist revolution was not just a revolution in government. It was a revolt against God, religion, morals and humanity. Its aim has been, and is, to create a godless society and the new Soviet man.
All of these things could have been known by Senator Fulbright in 1945 and long before. Communist books and actions had made abundantly clear the nature of their revolution. Only a “powerful prejudice” could keep a reader of their history from knowing the nature of Lenin’s revolution.
Also in 1945 the Senator was seemingly so misinformed about Communism that he said: “I do not believe the Soviets desire to dominate the world as the Germans did.”[68] Before Hitler came to power the Soviets made clear their desire to rule the world. And their actions showed that they meant it. The House Committee had pointed this out. So had many individuals.
Senator Fulbright’s “powerful prejudice,” or whatever it was, against the House Committee, however, is such that he objected because in one of the meetings mentioned in the memorandum, someone defended the House Committee.[69] Such a defense could hardly be called a matter of partisan politics, since the House has supported the Committee for years, and in 1961 the vote to give the Committee its full appropriation was passed 412 to 6.[70]
The memorandum classified “Operation Abolition” as objectionable material. Did the Senator want to censor this film? Is he a “film burner”? Does he think that J. Edgar Hoover and the House Committee were wrong in saying that the San Francisco [Pg 26]riots were Communist inspired, and that most of the young people were duped?[71]
Herbert A. Philbrick, of “I Led Three Lives” fame, was smeared by Senator Fulbright as being an extremely radical rightwing speaker.[72] Philbrick spent nine years as a counterspy for the FBI and for America. He was commended by J. Edgar Hoover.[73] Philbrick has continued to fight Communism. He has sacrificed much to do so. The Communists have smeared him. And Senator Fulbright, without giving one shred of documentation, smeared Philbrick. The Senator must be very, very far to the left of Mr. Philbrick if from where the Senator is standing, Philbrick looks to him like an extremely radical rightwinger.
Billy Graham found good reason to commend the anti-communist work of Dr. Fred Schwarz,[74] and Life Magazine in an unprecedented action on Oct. 17, 1961, apologized to Dr. Schwarz for their misinterpretation of him and his work.[75] But Senator Fulbright has never apologized for accusing, without giving one bit of proof, Dr. Schwarz of being an extremely radical rightwinger. The Senator made this charge in his secret memorandum, [Pg 27]and without giving Dr. Schwarz an opportunity to answer the accusation. Did the Senator wish to remain a “faceless” accuser?
Dr. Frank Barnett, who was criticized more than once in the memorandum,[76] has been commended by Secretary of Defense McNamara in September, 1961 for an “excellent speech”[77] which contained some of the ideas which Fulbright’s memorandum condemns.[78]
As late as April 10, 1961, a National Military-Industrial Conference sponsored by the Institute was commended by President Kennedy.[79] These Conferences were criticized in the memorandum.[80]
The Institute for American Strategy sponsored a book which was prepared by the Foreign Policy Research Institute of the University of Pennsylvania. This book is called American Strategy for the Nuclear Age. The memorandum criticized this book and said that “its total effect can be said to be contrary to the President’s program.”[81] The book, among other things, brings out that the communists are at war with us on many different levels, and that we ought to fight back and win. Is this against the President’s program?
Among the contributors to the book are: J. Edgar Hoover, Hanson W. Baldwin, Henry A. Kissinger, Lieut. General Arthur G. Trudeau, Walt W. Rostow, Dean Acheson and David Sarnoff.
[Pg 28]
One Captain was mentioned in the memorandum as having given 233 talks to civilians on the “dangers of internal communism.” As I do not know what the Captain said, I do not know to what extent I would agree or disagree with him. But the fact that he gave 233 talks is not within itself a criticism. In fact, it shows that he was very zealous in carrying out his oath to defend America against domestic enemies.
The Senator made at least seventy-five talks in Arkansas in the fall of 1961, in the interest of his re-election to office.[82] Doubtless he will make other such talks. A man who is that zealous in behalf of his own re-election to office ought not to be critical of a Captain for making so many speeches for America and against the internal enemy—who is also an external enemy—communism.
[35] Congressional Record, August 2, 1961, p. 13437, col. 3,t.
[36] Ibid., p. 13437, col. 1,b. President Eisenhower said: “Accordingly, should departmental instructions be so phrased as unduly to prohibit desirable military participation in these educational efforts respecting the Communist menace, I suggest that your committee recommend their restudy with view to appropriate revision. The Reds are well aware of the integrity, patriotic motives, and high qualifications of our military. I suspect they would be delighted if we should prevent such people from spreading the truth about Communist imperialism.
“Pertaining at least indirectly to this subject, I have heard of accusations alleging that military education is so narrow as to make service personnel incapable of grasping the whole complex of dangers confronting our country. It is hinted that the entire officer corps has become politically infected, and prone to be disloyal to the Commander in Chief. I, for one, want to be on record as expressing my indestructible faith and pride in our armed services—even though their loyalty, patriotism, and breadth of understanding needs no defense from me or anyone else” (Military Cold War Education and Speech Review Policies, Part 1, p. 7.)
“I believe, therefore, that your committee will render valuable service by rejecting the recent spate of attacks upon the competence and loyalty of the military and by disapproving any effort to thrust them, so to speak, behind an American iron curtain, ordered to stand mutely by as hostile forces tirelessly strive to undermine every aspect of American life.” (ibid., p. 7).
Admiral Arthur W. Radford also thought that the military ought to be used in the cold war. He further emphasized that attacks on the military could hurt morale and that it was the duty of civilian authorities to defend the military against “unwarranted and unjust civilian attacks” (ibid., part 2, pp. 707-708).
[37] Congressional Record, August 2, 1961, p. 13437, col. 3,t.
[38] Congressional Record, August 3, 1961, p. 13517, col. 2,m.
[39] Quoted in Human Events, 1961, p. 867. Lt. Gen. Edward M. Almond wrote: “Fulbright’s thesis ignores the fact that last year there were 1,521 officers of the armed services engaged in studies at civilian institutions of higher learning which dealt with educational, scientific, economic, and political subjects; these all have a relation to national strategy. In addition to this number there are some 2,918 other officers engaged in special studies in languages, medical sciences, engineering sciences and management courses. This thesis in the Fulbright memorandum further ignores the fact that each year some 500 officers of senior grade attend the service war colleges and universities where they study the very topic that the nuclear age demands solution of. This topic is studied intensively. Furthermore, the Fulbright thesis ignores the fact that nowhere is there such an intensive study made to prepare any politician (before or after his election to office) for the task ‘to put their own ultimate solutions into proper perspective in the President’s total strategy for the nuclear age.’” (Military Cold War Education and Speech Review Policies, Part 2, p. 714.)
[40] Congressional Record, August 2, 1961, p. 13437, col. 2,b.
[41] Quoted in the Congressional Record, June 12, 1961, p. 9404, col. 2,m.
[42] Reprinted from the July 24, 1961 issue of the News and Courier, Charleston, S. C., Congressional Record, July 31, 1961, p. 13177, col. 3,b.
[43] Congressional Record, September 15, 1961, p. 18455, col. 2,b.-3,t.
[44] Congressional Record, August 2, 1961, p. 13402, col. 1,b.-2,t.
[45] Congressional Record, April 26, 1951, p. 4402, col. 2,m.
[46] Ibid., p. 4402, col. 2,t.
[47] Ibid., February 8, 1960, p. 1978, col. 3,b.
[48] Congressional Record, August 2, 1961, p. 13437, col. 2,t.
[49] Speech before the Arkansas Chamber of Commerce, Little Rock, Nov. 8, 1961. Arkansas Gazette, Nov. 9, 1961, p. 2A.
[50] Congressional Record, July 27, 1961, p. A5795, col. 1-2. Japan’s view of MacArthur is illustrated in the fact that Japan gave him their “highest decoration for foreigners,” Congressional Record, June 25, 1960, p. A5518, col. 2,b.
[51] Quoted in the Congressional Record, August 19, 1949, p. A5439.
[52] Congressional Record, January 25, 1949, pp. 532-533.
[53] As quoted in the Congressional Record, August 8, 1962, p. A6084, col. 1,t. See Speaker McCormack’s tribute in the Congressional Record, August 16, 1962, p. A6243. Even the Arkansas Gazette paid tribute to him. Editorial, August 19, 1962.
[54] Congressional Record, August 2, 1961, p. 13437, col. 2,t.
[55] The Fulbright memorandum quoted a statement of Dr. Benson concerning the John Birch Society. It is important, however, to realize that this statement was made at a time when Dr. Benson was not aware of the radical positions which Mr. Robert Welch had taken on some matters. These radical positions Dr. Benson repudiates. Furthermore, his commendation was of their stated long-range purpose “to work for less government, more responsibility and a better world,” and their purpose to inform citizens concerning communism. Is Senator Fulbright against these aims?
[56] Congressional Record, August 2, 1961, p. 13438, col. 1,b.
[57] See his open letter of July 25, 1961 to Congressman Trimble.
[58] The Reporter article has been reprinted in the Senate Internal Security Subcommittee, The New Drive Against the Anti-Communist Program, pp. 57-63.
[59] Arkansas Gazette, December 28, 1961, p. 3A.
[60] Mike Newberry, The Worker, August 13, 1961, p. 5, col. 1,m.
[61] Congressional Record, August 2, 1961, pp. 13438-13439.
[62] Ibid., p. 13438, col. 1,t.
[63] Arkansas Gazette, August 6, 1961.
[64] Arkansas Gazette, August 6, 1961.
[65] James William Fulbright, “The Price of Peace Is The Loss of Prejudices”, Vogue, July, 1945. Reprinted in Louise E. Rorabacher, Assignments in Exposition. New York: Harper and Brothers, 1946, pp. 197-198.
[66] What Is Communism? pp. 19-20.
[67] I Chose Justice, New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1950, p. 137.
[68] As reprinted in Louise E. Rorabacher, Assignments in Exposition, p. 198.
[69] Congressional Record, August 2, 1961, pp. 13438-13439. William F. Buckley, Jr., has announced the publication of a study of The Committee and Its Critics. “National Review”, 150 E. 35th St., New York 16, N.Y.
[70] Ibid, June 22, 1961, p. A4722.
[71] See J. Edgar Hoover, Communist Target—Youth. Washington: Government Printing Office, 1960. House Committee on Un-American Activities. The Truth About the Film “Operation Abolition.” Washington: Government Printing Office, 961, parts 1,2.
[72] Congressional Record, August 2, 1961, p. 13439, col. 1,t.
We wish that the Senator had been well read enough to have known that a decade ago Mr. Philbrick warned Americans against becoming extremely radical rightwingers! “The most important single thing is to avoid behaving the way a Communist says the individual must behave in a capitalist society. If the Communist had his way, he would force all non-Communists to the extreme right, toward fascism and state control.” (I Led Three Lives, New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., Inc., 1952, p. 300). “If we adhere to our traditional American dream of a society of freedom, of personal rather than state responsibility, of individual as well as collective intelligence, and of civil rights rather than rigid civil controls, then we will have disproved the Communist theory of the inevitability of capitalist deterioration.” (ibid., p. 301).
[73] On the back of the jacket of Mr. Philbrick’s book.
[74] See jacket of Dr. Schwarz’s book You Can Trust the Communists, Englewood, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1960.
[75] Arkansas Gazette, October 18, 1961, p. 5A.
[76] Congressional Record, August 2, 1961, p. 13439, col. 2,t. Ibid. pp. 13436, col. 3,b., 13439-13440.
[77] Committee on Armed Services, Defense Secretary McNamara on S. Res. 191, Washington, D.C., Government Printing Office, p. 152.
[78] See the entire speech reprinted in Defense Secretary McNamara on S. Res. 191. pp. 154-162.
[79] Quoted in Congressional Record, August 10, 1961, p. 14405, col. 3,t. A copy of the program of that Conference is reprinted beginning on p. 14405, col. 3,b.
[80] Congressional Record, August 2, 1961, pp. 13439-13441.
[81] Ibid., p. 13436, col. 3,b.
[82] Arkansas Gazette, July 11, 1962.
[Pg 29]
One of the main ideas attacked in the memorandum was the concept of protracted conflict.[83] This concept, with other materials, was presented in the handbook entitled American Strategy for the Nuclear Age. The memorandum stated that this handbook contained basic material for implementing the 1958 directive of the National Security Council. “Although scholarly, and worth attention as elements of strategy, its total effect can be said to be contrary to the President’s program.”[84] What is the concept of protracted conflict?
“The West can hope to defeat the Communists only by giving battle on its own chosen terrain. It must carry the battle to the vital sectors of Communist defense. To do that it must learn to counter the strategy of protracted conflict—to manage conflict in space and in time.
“The development of proper Western attitudes toward protracted conflict will be immensely difficult. The Communists possess a mentality that is much better suited to protracted and controlled conflict than that of the Western peoples. The West has neither a doctrine of protracted conflict nor an international conspiratorial apparatus for executing it. What is more, we do not want such a doctrine or such a political apparatus, for it would be a tragic piece of irony if the men of the Free World, in trying to combat the Communists, should become like them. Some of our ‘weaknesses’ vis-a-vis the Communists are irremediable: we cannot turn ourselves into a conflict society, nor can we assign to the government and, in the last resort, to the police the discipline of our conscience. It is within these limitations—which [Pg 30]are the ramparts of civilized self-restraint—that we are forced to cope with Communist perversity.
“Pericles long ago was confronted with a similar problem. As the leader of the open society of Athens, locked in an irreconcilable conflict with the garrison state of Sparta, he recognized a relatively simple fact which many of the theorists of war in the nuclear age have overlooked, namely, that there are subtle alternatives to the risky and blunt strategy of engaging the enemy in direct and decisive military action. In the protracted conflict known as the Peloponnesian War, Pericles chose to pursue an extended strategy which was designed to avoid a showdown battle while wearing down, by a campaign of economic, political, and psychological attrition, the enemy’s will to resist. Lidell Hart pointed out that the Periclean plan was simply a war policy aimed at ‘draining the enemy’s endurance in order to convince him that he could not gain a decision’. In today’s protracted conflict the United States must maintain and use its power for the same ultimate purposes: to turn the tide of battle against the Communists, to induce them to overextend themselves, to exploit the weakness of their system, to paralyze their will, and to bring about their final collapse. Within the framework of mutual deterrence, both sides can employ the strategy of protracted conflict, and we can do so quite effectively without the dispensation of a jealous and demanding dogma of conflict for conflict’s sake.
“A psychopolitical offensive, directed against the Communist citadel itself, offers the West its best chance for winning the battle for its own survival and for spoiling the Communist strategy for the subversion of the uncommitted world. Although the currents within the uncommitted world are running against the West, the West need not despair of holding its remaining positions once it has forced the Communists on the psychopolitical defensive by engaging them on the most favorable terrain, namely, the Communists’ own ‘peace zone’.
“It is rather in the psychological arena than in its technological workshop that the West has displayed its most alarming shortcomings. Objectively, Western strategy has been far more effective than the sensational charges of its critics will have it. It is improbable that either side from now on will be able to achieve decisive technological superiority for more than a [Pg 31]temporary, even brief, period. No doubt, our military posture is susceptible to a great deal of improvement. But an exaggerated zeal for improvement, especially when it is triggered by pained surprise at the latest ploy of communist psychological warfare or considerations of domestic advantage, might prove to be ‘counterproductive’ in developing our real range of power. Do not let us pour the baby out with the bath water. What we need now more than anything else is an understanding of the comprehensive, complex, subtle, and consistent strategy of our opponent—and the calm resolution to draw the practical consequences.”[85]
Now let the reader raise this question. If one is opposed to this concept of protracted conflict is he not in reality opposed to firm, unyielding opposition to communism?
Secretary of Defense McNamara realizes that if we lose the war with communism it will be total defeat. He also recognized that the Communists are out to conquer the world and that there is no indication that they will change.
This necessitates educating our troops in the nature of Communism as well as the nature of the freedom which we enjoy. As the Secretary himself put it: “There is no true historical parallel to the drive of Soviet Communist imperialism to colonize the world. This is not the first time that ambitious dictators have sought to dominate the globe. But none has ever been so well organized, has possessed so many instruments of destruction, or has been so adept at disguising ignoble motives and objectives with noble phrases and noble words.
“Furthermore, there is a totality in Soviet aggression which can be matched only by turning to ancient history when warring tribes sought not merely conquest but the total obliteration of the enemy.
“Soviet communism does not seek the physical obliteration of a conquered people, although it would not hesitate to do so, in my opinion, if this would serve its ends. But it does seek [Pg 32]the total obliteration of their customs, their social structure, their political structure, their religion and their freedoms. Everything and everybody must be remolded according to a blueprint laid down by Lenin and altered only for the purposes of ruthless efficiency by Stalin and the present-day leaders.
“There is nothing too sacred—friendship, integrity, church or family—that it escapes the attention of the Soviet Commissar or the Communist bureaucrat.
“Soviet communism seeks to wipe out the cherished traditions and institutions of the free world with the same fanaticism that once impelled winning armies to burn villages and sow the fields with salt so they would not again become productive.
“To this primitive concept of total obliteration, the Communists have brought the resources of modern technology and science. The combination is formidable. Twentieth century knowledge, when robbed of any moral restraints, is the most dangerous force ever let loose in the world. And the entire literature of Soviet communism can be searched without turning up the faintest trace of moral restraint.
“If the free world should lose to communism, the loss would be total, final, and irrevocable. The citadel of freedom must be preserved because there is no road back, no road back to freedom for anyone if the citadel is lost.
“These are not new convictions with me. I have held them for many years. I was deeply impressed and horrified by the human misery and destruction that Hitler was able to create. Hitler’s philosophy was based on the concept of total obliteration and Hitler lost. But the years since the end of World War II have demonstrated that Soviet communism is operating from a far stronger position than Hitler ever held.
“In 1949, 12 years ago, I read an article in Foreign Affairs magazine which analyzed the writings of Stalin and quoted him at length. It was clear from these quotes that the Communist world had no intention of living forever in peace with the world of freedom. One of Stalin’s favorite quotations from Lenin states this point and, as translated and published in Foreign Affairs, this is what he said:
‘We live * * * not only in a state but in a system of states, and the existence of the Soviet Republic side by side with the imperialist states for a long time is unthinkable. In the [Pg 33]end either one or the other will conquer. And until that end comes, a series of the most terrible collisions between the Soviet Republic and the bourgeois states is inevitable.’
“It is obvious that the aggressive goals of Soviet communism have not changed, for Stalin’s successor, Nikita Khrushchev, has said that our grandchildren will live under communism.
“I cite this material because I want you to know the spirit in which I believe the education program of our Defense Establishment should be conducted. The threat is clear and it is immediate. Our fighting men should know the positive values of the freedoms which the Nation is calling them to defend, and they should know the nature of Soviet communism which seeks to take them away.
“One of my most vivid recollections is that of a colleague in the Ford Motor Co. calling me out of my office a few years ago. He asked that I drop the work in which I was engaged to hear an analysis of the behavior of U. S. soldiers of war in North Korea, and I heard with amazement the story of prisoners who had cracked and become informers; men who had written articles for Communist newspapers; men who had cooperated with their captors.
“These American soldiers did not understand the Communist threat. They had not been taught to value the freedom of individual choice, which is at the basis of our form of society. They had not been taught what happens when the spirit of individual freedom and free inquiry is lost.”
“I believe we suffered during the Korean war because we did not stress with sufficient force and vigor the realities of freedom and the threat of communism.
“As Secretary of Defense, it is my policy that the members of the Military Establishment be educated in the role that they are playing in the battle against communism, through knowledge of the strength of our democracy, as well as the nature of the threat we face. We are prosecuting a vigorous program and we intend to step it up.”[86]
Is not this analysis, in brief, but a presentation of the concept of protracted conflict which is advanced by Dr. Barnett, [Pg 34]and the Institute for American Strategy, and which is condemned in the memorandum?
Since there is a total threat certainly we should meet it on every level on which it faces us. And yet, according to the article from the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, which was the longest reprint in the memorandum, if we act in the light of the realization of the nature, tactics and threat of Communism which is outlined by the Secretary, we shall split the world and be in more serious trouble! In other words, we must be careful lest we do something to make the Communists mad! As a matter of fact, their philosophy and ambitions have made them mad. They are angry unto death with us because we exist as a free people.
How does the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists view the possibility of our waging protracted conflict? The Bulletin and the memorandum are resolutely opposed to our so doing. The memorandum said that the handbook—which advances the concept—undermines the President’s program.[87] The Bulletin said: “The significance of ‘American Strategy for the Nuclear Age’ lies in its analysis of the international situation and its appeal for direct action. To a very large extent, the theme depends on the particular estimate of Soviet intentions that is presented and the particular prophecy of the Communist future that is forecast. Several contributions stress the persistency, strength, and versatility of ideology in the evolution of Soviet communism but nowhere is there adequate treatment of the forces that limit Soviet policy, and thus limit the projection of its ideological motivation. There is ample evidence, for example, of instability in the Soviet leadership and of ideological differences between the Russians and their Chinese [Pg 35]colleagues. The diverse effect of these forces is highly problematical, but they do suggest that Communist policy is far less monolithic than the concept of protracted conflict presumes. Indeed, like other major powers, the Soviet Union is also limited by external forces. Within the framework set by the editors of ‘American Strategy,’ however, any attempt to take advantage of these forces in order to insulate an area from big power confrontation, or to seek a resolution of differences on an ad hoc basis of mutual interest, would be tantamount to appeasement.
“The nonmilitary techniques advocated by Barnett and several other contributors (such as Strausz-Hupe and William Kintner) clearly recognize a grave deficiency in American Strategy, but they hardly cover the full spectrum of alternatives open to the United States. None of these suggestions includes the full use of either traditional diplomacy or innovating methods of settling disputes. At the same time, they contain an element of militancy that raises serious problems, geared as they are to setting up a savage dichotomy between the Communist and the Western World, and of making almost every issue a matter of irreconcilable competition.
“It is difficult to see how these tactics can do anything but intensify international tensions and, short of a complete collapse of the Soviet bloc (which the editors would surely discount), increase the likelihood that force will be used. Indeed, the more intense the conditions of rivalry become, the greater the inclination will be to reassess the major premises of our strategic doctrine, including our renunciation of preventative war, and to begin to incorporate provisions for offensive military action in the calculus of our planning. The editors fail to consider whether the provocative nature of the policies they openly advocate can be restricted to the nonmilitary spheres for very long. Indeed, they seem to assume that the Communists will back down under pressure—a highly dangerous assumption.
“Perhaps the most fundamental criticism that can be made of the book is that it fails to analyze the impact of a policy of protracted conflict on our domestic institutions. Barnett’s program of action, for example, would require large sums of public funds used with little public accountability, a wide network of secrecy and security in government operations, a [Pg 36]cold war orientation in our schools and universities—in short, a stunting of pluralism, a curtailment of individual liberties, and a weakening of politically responsible government. The editors of ‘American Strategy’ seem to see no alternative to confronting the Soviets with strong opposition at every turn. Indeed, they appear more concerned with virility than freedom, as if strength and courage were goals in themselves. This, together with the somewhat static nature of their view of history and the militant nature of their recommendations, justifies further inquiry about the men and the organizations who advocate a strategy based on these premises.”[88]
What shall we say to these things? First, it must be recognized that we are at war, and that the concept of protracted conflict is based on this obvious fact of present-day life. In other words, this concept takes seriously the words and deeds of the Communists which say that they are fighting to conquer and to rule the world, and that we must act accordingly. The memorandum shrinks from accepting this fact and its implications. Ivo Duchacek, a member of the Czech Parliament until the Communists took over, said: “Nobody likes to accept the idea that we cannot get along with our fellow men if we try hard enough.... When I look back at my own practical experience in Czechoslovakia where cooperation with the Communists was tried on both national and international levels, I realize that the basic mistake was our wishful thinking that communism had fundamentally changed under the influence of its 25-year experience and under the impact of World War II.”[89] According to James Reston, who has been close to the President, President Kennedy came to office with the idea that he could work out reasonable arrangements with the Communists and put an end to the angry dialogue which has been going on.[90]
It is not of our choosing, it is not to our taste, but the fact is that the Communists are at war with us. It does not take two to start a war, and the Communists have started a war whether we like it or not. As Edgar Ansel Mowrer, one of the nation’s outstanding students of world affairs, put it: “Communists play to win.... The West, including the United States, want only [Pg 37]to call the game off. It fails to admit that this is a real war which it can win only if it gives it No. 1 priority and stops considering it just another problem like smog or juvenile delinquency,”[91] Roscoe Drummond said: “It is my conviction that we will continue to lose this war called peace as long as we try to conduct it on a basis of business as usual, politics as usual and defence as usual.”[92]
Congressman Hosmer observed that “we can freeze to death in cold war as easily as we can burn to death in hot war.”[93]
Roscoe Drummond has underscored the fact that although we are at war, we are not acting in the light of that unpleasant reality. “It is my conviction that the time for words has passed, that the moment is at hand when it is not enough to say what needs to be done—but to do what needs to be done before it is too late.
“It is my conviction that the time has come when the American Government and the American people must act on the reality that we are not at peace, but at war, though a different and more difficult kind of war than we have ever faced; that, as the Overstreets have put it, we are in a war called peace and that there is nothing peaceful about it.
“At this stage we are losing, not winning—and we are not yet strong enough to win.”
“In New York last week, President Kennedy declared that ‘every new piece of information, every fresh event, have deepened my conviction that the survival of our civilization is at stake—and the hour is late’.”[94]
Second, the intensification of international tensions is going on today because the Communists are pushing even harder for the conquest of the world. Any so-called easing of international tension would be equivalent to a boxer relaxing in the middle of the fight. For tension to be relaxed in reality would necessitate the cessation of the communist drive for world conquest. In other words, it would mean that the Communists had ceased to be Communists.
[Pg 38]
That communism, and not the waging of protracted conflict by the non-communist world, is the cause of the existing tension is recognized by President Kennedy. Thus he told editor Adzhubei, of Izvestia, that the root of the conflict is the Soviet’s efforts “to communize, in a sense, the entire world.”[95]
As the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, of the British Government, said to the United Nations General Assembly on September 27, 1961, “the world is divided by an ideological chasm.... And when one side advertises its intention to destroy the way of life of the other, then you cannot have true collective security.”[96]
George E. Kennan, now Ambassador to Yugoslavia, and at one time Ambassador to the U.S.S.R., has summarized in his book Russia and the West what the communists are saying to us through their words and their deeds. Roscoe Drummond presented it in his column as follows: “We despise you. We consider that you should be swept from the earth as governments and physically destroyed as individuals. We reserve the right in our private if not in our official capacities to do what we can to bring this about: to revile you publicly, to do everything within our power to detach your own people from their loyalty to you and their confidence in you, to subvert your armed forces, and to work for your downfall in favor of a Communist dictatorship. But since we are not strong enough to destroy you today ... we want you during this interval to trade with us; we want you to finance us; we want you to give us the advantages of full-fledged diplomatic recognition, just as you accord these advantages to one another.
“An outrageous demand? Perhaps. But you will accept it nevertheless. Driven by this competition, which you cannot escape, you will do what we want you to do until such time as we are ready to make an end of you.* * *”[97]
Mr. Kennan also quoted a resolution of the Communist International which said: “The Comintern will not let its freedom be hampered by any obligation whatever. We are deadly enemies [Pg 39]of bourgeois society to the last breath, in word and in deed and if necessary with arms in hand. It is the historical mission of the Communist International to be the gravedigger of the bourgeois society.”[98]
Roscoe Drummond commented as follows on this resolution. “Mr. Kennan is here describing Communist policy and purpose toward all non-Communist governments formulated in the 1930’s, which hasn’t changed in the least.
“It is the same today—in Korea, in Laos, in Viet-Nam, in the Congo, at the conference table in Geneva. To the Communists, U. S. aid to the legitimate government of South Vietnam is ‘aggressive’ because the Communists recognize no non-Communist government as ever legitimate.
“We are not at peace with the Communists. We are engaged in a war called peace by the Communists. We can’t afford to think or act otherwise for 1 second.”[99]
The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists does not realize that our resistance to Communism does not set up a “savage dichotomy between the Communist and the Western World”. This dichotomy or division exists but it has been set up by the ideology and actions of the Communists. We wish that it were not so, we wish that they would change, but wishing does not make it so. It is a fact of life which we should realize, and which we fail to realize only at our peril. The Communists in the Communist Manifesto, which they consider to be an up-to-date document, and many times since have stated that they are irreconcilably at war with us.
Lenin, who is stressed today, said: “We are living not merely in a state, but in a system of states, and the existence of the Soviet Republic side by side with imperialist states for a long time is unthinkable. One or the other must triumph in the end. And before that end supervenes, a series of frightful collisions between the Soviet Republic and the bourgeois states will be inevitable. That means that if the ruling class, the proletariat, wants to hold sway, it must prove its capacity to do so by its military organizations.”
“As long as capitalism and socialism exists, we cannot live in peace; in the end, one or the other will triumph—a funeral [Pg 40]dirge will be sung over the Soviet Republic or over world capitalism.”[100]
Mao Tse-tung speaks in no uncertain terms about their revolutionary triumph. “In human history, antagonism between the classes exists as a particular manifestation of the struggle within the contradiction. The contradiction between the exploiting class and the exploited class: the two mutually contradictory classes coexist for a long time in one society, be it a slave society, or a feudal or a capitalist society, and struggle with each other; but it is not until the contradiction between the two classes has developed to a certain stage that the two sides adopt the form of open antagonism which develops into a revolution. In a class society, the transformation of peace into war is also like that.
“The time when a bomb has not yet exploded is the time when contradictory things, because of certain conditions, coexist in an entity. It is not until a new condition (ignition) is present that the explosion takes place. An analogous situation exists in all natural phenomena when they finally assume the form of open antagonism to solve old contradictions and to produce new things.
“It is very important to know this situation. It enables us to understand that in a class society revolutions and revolutionary wars are inevitable, that apart from them the leap in social development cannot be made, and the reactionary ruling classes cannot be overthrown so that the people will win political power. Communists must expose the deceitful propaganda of the reactionaries that social revolution is unnecessary and impossible, and so on, and firmly uphold the Marxist-Leninist theory of social revolution so as to help the people to understand that social revolution is not only entirely necessary but also entirely possible and that the whole history of mankind and the triumph of the Soviet Union all confirm this scientific truth.”[101]
The cold war and the danger of hot war come, according to the Communists, only because we resist their so-called inevitable conquest of the world. As Hugo Pauk, a Communist in the Ruhr, [Pg 41]told Dr. John R. Van de Water, “You must also understand that unless you accept our Communist way of life, war is inevitable.”[102]
If we did not resist communism there would be no cold war—only enslavement and death. For the cold war is their term for our resistance to communism. In one of the leading communist journals, International Affairs, we read that: “The aggressive imperialist forces have let loose upon the world their horrible offspring—the cold war. Its purpose was to keep the people in a state of constant fear, to persuade them that war is inevitable, and to compel them to spill more and more money into the bottomless pit of the arms race. The cold war was to help the doomed forces of the old world to retain their positions and hold back the surging advance of social and national-liberation movements, to prepare war against the Socialist camp, that untiring champion of world peace.”[103]
“The Socialist countries have set themselves the task of eliminating war from the lives of nations for all time—a goal for which the best minds in the world have striven for centuries. Proceeding from the analysis of the real balance of power on Earth, the 21st Congress of the C.P.S.U. stressed that this problem could be solved even before the complete victory of Socialism, with capitalism still extant in a part of the world.”[104]
“To establish durable peace on Earth is no easy task, of course. There are influential forces outside the bounds of the Socialist world whose riches and privileges depend on the arms race, on the preparation and unleashing of wars. These forces will not give in without desperate resistance and will do everything to prevent a relaxation of international tension. It will take the utmost effort of all the peace-loving forces in the world to turn into reality the existing possibility of achieving an international detente and putting an end to the cold war.
“N. S. Khrushchev’s visit to the United States is another brilliant proof of the fact that the Soviet Government and Communist Party are doing everything to terminate the cold war.”[105]
These quotations show that, as a matter of fact, with the [Pg 42]Communists every issue is a matter of irreconcilable competition in the sense that they are not out to make reasonable agreements which they will keep with integrity, but that every discussion is another front on which they are fighting us. Any agreement is made only because they have to make it or because in some way it contributes to their total program of victory.
The quotations which we took from the memorandum are saying that if we firmly resist Communism we are apt to have trouble! The Senator should raise the question: What trouble will there be if we do not firmly resist Communism and win this war for freedom?
International tension exists because of Communist aggression. Of course, if we ceased resisting they would enslave us, and kill millions, but this hardly seems like a desirable way to lessen tensions.
The fact that the Communists are waging protracted conflict on us is the provocative factor in the world situation. Why is it that the memorandum speaks of “the provocative nature of the policies” of those who call on us to awaken to the fact that the Communists have declared protracted war on us, and that we should wage protracted conflict for victory and freedom—yes, and for survival.
Concerning those who advocate that we wage this protracted conflict the Bulletin says: “Indeed, they seem to assume that the Communists will back down under pressure—a highly dangerous assumption.” Does the Bulletin and the Senator think that the Communists will back down if we retreat? Or if we are not firm? Does he think that the Communists have not been encouraged by the success which they have had hithertofore on their road to world conquest? Does he suggest that we relieve pressure by backing down? Does he think that the road of retreat is the road to survival? If we are not to put on increased pressure, what are we to do? Does he think that the Communists respect anything other than firm pressure?
Does the Senator believe, or does he not, that the Communists are intent on world conquest? If the Senator believes that the Communists are waging protracted conflict to conquer the world, why did he include the article from the Bulletin? If he does not believe that they are waging protracted conflict to conquer the world, we ask: Can America afford public servants, [Pg 43]men who help shape national policy, who think that the Communists are not trying to conquer the world? On the other hand, can America afford public servants who, if they believe that the Communists are out to conquer the world, criticize those who agree with them, and who also say that we ought to act accordingly and wage protracted conflict to defeat Communism?
Does the Senator believe that we should refuse to act in the light of the realization that the Communists are out to conquer the world? In other words, since the Communists are waging war on us on various fronts and in various ways, should we not engage them in combat on these various levels? Or should we leave the victory to them by default? The Communists have declared war on us, they are at war with us. They are engaging in protracted conflict against us. What should we do? Fail to respond? Respond weakly? Fearfully?
Since the Bulletin does not expect the Soviet bloc to collapse, since it does not think we should meet its aggression in protracted conflict; just what does it and what does Senator Fulbright propose? Do they suggest that Communism will back down from world conquest if we refuse to engage them in protracted conflict? If Communists will not back down under pressure, will they back down if we yield or refuse to apply pressure? As a matter of fact, every retreat on our part and every advance on their part, is viewed by them as proof that their theory of history is right.[106] Even if we surrendered, they would consider this as further proof that they have a mandate from history to overthrow all existing social conditions and to remake man.
In reply to the Bulletin’s repudiation of protracted conflict, we would say, in the third place, that it should be clearly understood that there is no evidence that the Communists will change their goal of world conquest. G. F. Hudson, Director of the Center for Far Eastern Studies at St. Anthony’s College, Oxford University, has said: “Ever since the early days of the Bolshevik regime, there has been the expectation abroad that it was just about to settle down, discard its fantastic ideas of world revolution, and revert to the normal habits and usages of a national sovereign state in its international relations.”
“Yet, every time the world has become convinced that the [Pg 44]original creed of Lenin no longer governed Soviet actions and that the policies of the Soviet Union could be interpreted simply in terms of national interest and security, like the policies of non-Communist states, events have provided fresh evidence that the ultimate aim of the rulers of Russia continued to be the destruction of all ‘bourgeois’ governments.”[107]
In the fourth place, the concept of protracted conflict does not rule out the use of traditional diplomacy or innovating methods of settling disputes. But it does ask that we recognize that all of these must be used as weapons in our war with communism. For it is obvious to every student that the Communists use traditional diplomacy and innovating methods as but phases of their warfare against civilization.
It is clear that traditional diplomacy has been tried again and again. We have even had innovating methods, such as helping enemy countries with financial aid. We have tried to work through the U.N. Traditional methods are still being tried. We should continue to use them to the best of our ability.
Furthermore, the concept of protracted conflict does not rule out the resolution of some particular differences “on an ad hoc basis of mutual interest....”
Our fifth observation on the Bulletin’s charges, is that the cold war is bound to have some effect on our democratic institutions. However, it will not involve near the dangers that would be created by putting greater power in the hands of the President—whoever the President may be at a given time—as Senator Fulbright wants to do. The Bulletin spoke of funds being spent secretly but it made no comments on the danger of secret executive agreements.
But there is no reason for protracted conflict to destroy democratic institutions. We can erect the proper safeguards. Furthermore, the failure to wage protracted conflict and to win the war we are in will lead to the destruction of our democratic institutions by the Communists.
Whether we wage protracted conflict or not, we are engaged in a war. Even Senator Fulbright speaks of the long twilight struggle and the influence it may have on the people. But certainly it is better to risk the possibility of some dangers to our [Pg 45]democratic institutions than to accept the certainty of their destruction if the Communists win.
The Communists leave us no range of pleasant choices. We either win in the struggle with them or we lose all.
Our sixth observation is that to win this war we must wage it on every necessary level. We must put the Communists on the defensive instead of simply reacting to their aggressive moves. As Charles Malik said: “It is most important that the Communists be put on the defensive. It is most important that the total arsenal of political, moral, and spiritual values be bought to bear upon this struggle.”[108] Even Senator Fulbright has said that we ought to take the initiative and that a truly tough “approach to Communism is one that meets it with ‘every instrumentality of foreign and domestic policy’....”[109] This is exactly what the concept of protracted conflict calls for, including the use of the military in the cold war!
This does not mean that a nuclear war will take place if we wage protracted conflict; although we might keep in mind that a failure to wage protracted conflict will result in our defeat, for they will nibble us to death, or slice us to pieces with the salami tactic. Edgar Ansel Mowrer has well said: “And whatever one thinks of the cold war, one fact stands out: The Soviets have made of it a third way, neither peace nor hot war. And the conclusions seem obvious: If such a third way exists for communism, does it not also exist for the West?
“It certainly does. Its name is waging freedom. Waging freedom means that, instead of continuing the military and diplomatic defensive, the West publicly sets as its goal an extension or recovery of the area of national determination—the rollback of communism. It means the cool, calculated, and determined acceptance of the Soviet challenge in the intermediate field. Above all, it means a complete repudiation of the thesis that the West has no choice save humbly seeking peace or accepting nuclear annihilation.
“Most of all, waging peace would mean an end to the present make-believe in regard to Soviet intentions that dominates too much thinking. Many, too many, believe, or are trying to believe, [Pg 46]that by some means—a mixture of defensive firmness, magical formula, and turning the other cheek—the Kremlin can be induced to call the cold war off.
“For this, with apologies to Prime Minister Macmillan, there is no shred of concrete evidence. All known facts point the other way—to the conclusion that the U.S.S.R. is gradually forcing the West back without fighting by playing upon its nuclear fears, its reluctance to believe the unpleasant, and its even greater reluctance to overtrump Soviet military expenditures.
“Yet curiously enough, even in such an intermediate struggle, the stronger cards are on the side of the West. The Kremlin can play upon the reluctance of a free people to accept a long and costly diplomatic and arms-building struggle. But the West can count upon much more—the fact that so far as is known, communism is popular in no country where it has firmly fixed its claws—not even in the U.S.S.R. as hundreds of thousands of defections from the Soviet Army during World War II demonstrated.
“To be brief: The West has it in its hands to adopt a third policy, a policy of waging freedom short of major war—and outlasting the Kremlin at its own chosen game. For the West has several times the economic resources and in addition the overwhelming moral resource of the appeal against Communist tyranny. It can, if it chooses, chivvy and harry Moscow to the point of exhaustion and despair. It can win without fighting provided it has the courage and the stamina.”[110]
As James Reston put it: “The choice before the President and the other leaders of the Western world today is not between the certainty of destruction and the certainty of Communist expansion, but between the possibility of destruction if we risk war, and the certainty of Communist expansion if we don’t.”[111]
Both from Communist theory and from their past actions we know that they will start some local conflicts, when and if they think they can get away with it. They will do this regardless of whether or not we use protracted conflict. As Dr. Ralph K. [Pg 47]White, of the U.S.I.A. said: “But for a well indoctrinated Communist the rational, prudent aggressive use of force in the cause of Communism is not only legitimate; it is obligatory. It is an accepted, integral part of his self-image. He believes with Karl Marx that ‘force is the midwife of every old society that is pregnant with the new.’”[112]
The memorandum includes an article which is critical of the call for total victory. “At a 2-day strategy seminar held in Chicago last September, Adm. Arthur W. Radford, former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, called for ‘total victory over the Communist system—not stalemate,’ and warned that ‘the minute we become satisfied with the status quo, we have started down the road to defeat.’ This theme has, in fact, dominated a series of strategy seminars that have been held throughout the country during the past 2 years—in New York, Cleveland, New Orleans, and Wilmington; in California, Massachusetts, Texas, and Washington, D. C. The chief force behind these meetings of businessmen, teachers, servicemen, and church leaders has been an organization called the Institute for American Strategy.”[113]
The Communist is working toward total victory over the non-Communist world. In dealing with an enemy who seeks total victory over us, and in the conflict with whom final defeat would be total defeat, can one win if he does not seek total victory? Well did Jay Lovestone say: “The war is total. If we don’t fight them down the line, we lose down the line.”[114]
Total victory does not mean that there will be no more evil in the world once Communism has been defeated. It simply means, in my view of it, that we should take the initiative and endeavor to meet and to defeat them on every necessary level. [Pg 48]We all wish that by so doing on some levels that they will be halted in their onward march and ultimately cease to be Communists. However, in our battle plans we should not relax and expect the Communists to cease being Communists. It would have been a real blessing if Hitler had ceased to be Hitler and if World War II had not been started. But he wasn’t converted from the errors of his way, and World War II did take place.
Khrushchev closed the 22nd Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union in the Fall of 1961 by saying: “Our aims are clear, the tasks have been set. To work, comrades! For new victories of communism.”
What is wrong with seeking total victory over Communism? This would include victory over its ideology, its subversive activities and its other forms of aggression.
Is the call for victory contrary to the President’s program for survival in this nuclear age? Doesn’t his program for survival include a program for victory? If such a total victory is not in the President’s program then the people need to know it. If it is in the President’s program, what is wrong with backing it and struggling for it? Senator Fulbright said that the military and the civilian population should back the President’s program.
Elsewhere Senator Fulbright himself recognized that the challenge is total, and that the Communists are waging protracted conflict. “We endure in an era of total crisis.”[115] After speaking of the armies and navy of the U.S.S.R., Fulbright said: “In addition the Soviet Union is mounting a world wide trade offensive aimed primarily at us. Hence the challenge to us is total. It involves the military, the political, the intellectual, and the industrial. The measures of our antagonist cannot be countered by half measures or by half-hearted competition.”[116]
“Since we are now in deadly conflict with a prodigious [Pg 49]antagonist, we can neglect nothing that might assure our security.”[117]
Why, then, take the military out of the cold war? Why, then, did the Senator criticize in the memorandum the concept of protracted conflict?[118]
[83] Congressional Record, August 2, 1961, pp. 13439, col. 2,m.-p. 13441, col. 1.
[84] Ibid., p. 13436, col. 3,b. point 2.
[85] Walter F. Hahn and John C. Neff, American Strategy for the Nuclear Age, Garden City, New York: Doubleday & Co., Inc., 1960, pp. 30-31. I agree with Gerhart Niemeyer that the ideological dimension of the cold war must be emphasized. Problems of Communism, Nov.-Dec. 1961, p. 59.
[86] Hearings before the Committee on Armed Services, Defense Secretary McNamara on S. Res. 191, Washington: Government Printing Office, 1961, pp. 3-4.
[87] Congressional Record, August 2, 1961, p. 13436, col. 3,b. A government official in a position to know the viewpoint of current policy-makers, told Edith Kermit Roosevelt that: “The purpose of American policy is to work for a merger of East and West. It is believed accommodation can be reached as the two systems become more alike politically and economically: As the United States adopts a more collectivist pattern of federal control, while at the same time a consolidation of Soviet rule makes genocide purges, and other less-pleasant attributes of the police state unnecessary.” (“Policy of ‘No Win’ Now Official”, Dallas Morning News, May 27, 1962.)
[88] Ibid., p. 13440, col. 1,t.
[89] Ibid., August 2, 1949, pp. A4995-A4996.
[90] Quoted in the Congressional Record, October 3, 1961, p. A7922, col. 3,t.
[91] “Ten Reasons Why Communism is Winning”, Congressional Record, April 25, 1961, p. A2788, col. 2,m.
[92] “War Called Peace: Time for Words Has Passed.” Congressional Record, May 3, 1961, p. A3045, col. 3,m.
[93] Congressional Record, August 7, 1961, p. 13759, col. 3,m.
[94] Congressional Record, May 3, 1961, p. A3045, col. 3.
[95] Arkansas Democrat, November 28, 1961, p. 1, Arkansas Gazette, November 29, 1961, p. 1.
[96] “Speech Delivered by the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to the United Nations General Assembly on Wednesday, September 27, 1961,” mimeographed copy of the speech, p. 2.
[97] Congressional Record, June 19, 1961, p. A4545, col. 3,m.
[98] Ibid., p. A4546, col. 1,t.
[99] Ibid., p. A4546, col. 1,t.
[100] Quoted in Department of State, Soviet World Outlook, July 1959, p. 96.
[101] Mao Tse-tung, On Contradiction, Foreign Language Press, Peking, 1952, pp. 66-67.
[102] John R. Van de Water, Ideologies in Conflict. Address on June 8, 1951, p. 7.
[103] International Affairs, Moscow, November 1959, pp. 3-4.
[104] Ibid., p. 5.
[105] Ibid., p. 6.
[106] Mao Tse-tung On Contradiction, p. 61.
[107] G. F. Hudson, Problems of Communism, July-Aug. 1961, p. 31.
[108] Congressional Record, Oct. 3, 1961, p. A7894, col. 3,m. See Frank J. Johnson, No Substitute For Victory, Chicago: Regnery, 1962.
[109] Arkansas Democrat, November 8, 1961, p. 1.
[110] Congressional Record, March 26, 1959, p. A2762, col. 2,m-3,t.
[111] Ibid., September 26, 1961, p. A7750, col. 3,t.
[112] Ralph K. White’s speech before the American Psychological Association, Duplicated copy, p. 4.
[113] Congressional Record, August 2, 1961, p. 13439, col. 2,b.
[114] Taken from my notes of Mr. Lovestone’s speech, Washington, D. C., November 4, 1961. Congressman Judd said: “Mr. Chairman, nobody has ever yet won a struggle military or otherwise, by being only on the defensive and announcing ahead of time that he is not trying to win.” Freedom Commission and Freedom Academy. Washington: Government Printing Office, 1959, p. 123.
[115] Senator Fulbright, Congressional Record, March 28, 1960, p. A2707, col. 2,b.
[116] Ibid., p. A2708, col. 2,t.
[117] Ibid., p. A2709, col. 1,m. Congressman McCormack of Massachusetts said: “As long as the Communists adhere to dialectic communism and their ultimate intent for world revolution and world domination, as long as the dominating influence of communism is its dialectic aspect, the dominating and controlling power or influence of international communism, they have got to keep on going, and going, and going until their (sic) either conquer the world or blow up. International communism as presently constituted cannot permanently survive in any part of the world there are free men and women.” (Congressional Record, January 22, 1959, p. 951, col. 2,t.)
[118] In the author’s judgment, there are some who want the military out of the cold war, because they fear that the military is for the hard line against communism, i.e. for victory over communism. This, they fear, will start a war. Several years ago Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr. wrote an article on the future of democratic socialism in the United States. In it he advocated some ideas which, he said, the State Department had been somewhat following for some time. Among these ideas were: (a) The U.S.S.R. will get over its “messianic intoxication.” (b) We must contain her so that she will not run the risk of the aggression that might prove a general war. (c) We must not engage in an anti-Soviet crusade. (d) We must not “permit reactionaries in the buffer states to precipitate conflicts in defense of their own obsolete prerogatives.” (e) We must demonstrate to the U.S.S.R. that we have no aggressive intentions toward the U.S.S.R. (f) We must back the non-Communist left, since—the implication is—such governments will not be apt to engage in an anti-Soviet crusade. In this way, perhaps we can stave off general war and give the U.S.S.R. time to undergo a change of heart. See the Congressional Record, Feb. 6, 1962, pp. A881-A884. A reprint.
This approach would not only mean that we should encourage neutralism in at least some nations, but it would also mean that an anti-communist crusade in America should be defeated.
It would mean that we should not seek victory over communism.
It would encourage the salami tactics of the Communists who will try to see to it that each slice they cut off from the non-Communist world is not large enough to precipitate a general war.
[Pg 50]
Senator Fulbright takes a dim view of the American people. He indicates that the curbing of the people, or the manipulation of the masses, may be the primary problem of the President. The masses are all potential McCarthyites who are easily infected with the virus of extremely radical rightwingism. “In the long run, it is quite possible that the principal problem of leadership will be, if it is not already, to restrain the desire of the people to hit the Communists with everything we’ve got, particularly if there are more Cubas and Laos. Pride in victory, and frustration in restraint, during the Korean war, led to MacArthur’s revolt and McCarthyism.”[119] This is the most charitable interpretation of McCarthyism which the Senator has ever made. For in effect he is saying that McCarthyism is the result of the desire for victory over Communism, and the frustration which comes when the leaders try to restrain people from winning this victory.
We think that the principal problem is Communism and not the American people.
The memorandum went on to say that the people cannot be trusted on foreign policy. They tend to “obey the impulse of passion” and “to abandon a mature design for the gratification of a momentary caprice.” Thus the Senator thought that if foreign aid was “laid before the people in a referendum, it would be defeated.” The Senator obviously does not want what he thinks is the people’s will to be carried out. The people want simple solutions, they want to scourge devils or lash out at the enemy.[120]
The Senator, it is plain to see, does not have a very high opinion of the American people and their ability to govern [Pg 51]themselves. Is not this a lack of confidence in our republican form of government?
Senator Fulbright says that he has a “strong belief in the principle of military subordination to civilian control.”[121] So does this reviewer. Furthermore, civilian control ultimately means the sovereignty of the people. Thus it ultimately means the civilian control of the President and of all other politicians and statesmen.
Does the Senator believe as strongly in the civilian control of politicians as well as of the military? It does not seem that the Senator is too well pleased with this bedrock principle of our constitutional system. In a TV interview July 30, 1961, he said, concerning the question of Red China and the U. N. and the recognition of Communist Outer Mongolia, that: “The sentiments of this country have been developed to such a pitch our President has no freedom of action in this field.”[122] Again: “... we will not recognize Red China, because of the price of dissension within our own ranks at home; it is too great to pay ... I think we have no freedom of action in this field because of domestic politics.”[123]
If he thought that he could get by with it would the Senator thwart the will of the people concerning Red China and Outer Mongolia? Would he like to have the freedom to act in these matters contrary to what he knows to be the will of the people?
As a matter of fact, the Senator wants us to recognize Outer Mongolia. He thinks that it might help us learn more about the relationship between the U.S.S.R. and Red China. Obviously he would urge the President to recognize Outer Mongolia if he thought that the people would stand for it.
The American people, in my judgment, have good reason to be against the recognition of Outer Mongolia. First, around five thousand of her troops fought Americans and the U.N. forces in Korea.[124] Second, it is one of the oldest of the satellites of the [Pg 52]U.S.S.R. Third, it is recognized as a loyal Communist country by Red China. For example, a Communist paper recently carried an article entitled: “China Salutes Fraternal Mongolia.”[125] In trade talks around the first of March, 1961, it was emphasized by Peking that the cooperation between Mongolia and China was “on the basis of the principles of proletarian Internationalism.” Marshall Malinevsky, who is chief of the Russian Army, “described the bond between Mongolian, Chinese and Russian Armies as ‘cemented in blood’.” Fourth, the Premier of Outer Mongolia in a broadcast on April 24, 1961, emphasized their loyalty to Lenin. Furthermore, he said: “In their struggle for building a new life, our people always leaned and continue to lean upon the disinterested all-around aid of the Soviet Union, the first country of triumphant Socialism.” Fifth, if we recognize Outer Mongolia, Japan will likely do likewise. This will help increase the sentiment of neutralism in Japan.[126] Sixth, it would have a bad psychological effect in Asia. The Foreign Secretary of the Philippines, Felix Berto Serrano, said that it would be “an example of the softening of the U.S. attitude toward Communism in this part of the world.” The Foreign Minister of Thailand, Phanat Khoman, said that it would have an adverse affect on free world morale.[127]
The Senator thinks that if the people were given a choice in the matter, they would defeat foreign aid. He may or may not be right. But is he not saying that what he thinks is the will of the people should not rule in this matter?
The Senator attacks those individuals who, he says, run down America. “Implicit in much of the propaganda of the radical right is the assumption that our free society is permeated with corruption and decay.”[128]
There is much that is right in America. We believe that it [Pg 53]is the greatest country in the world. The principles on which it is founded are the principles which when followed produce progress and prosperity.
On the other hand, there is enough crime, corruption and decay to cause all thoughtful Americans real concern. For example, J. Edgar Hoover has called our attention to these matters countless times.
We shall not enter into a discussion of this except to point out that the Senator himself has some hard things to say about America.
In the speech at Stanford University he said: “In the last few years American statesmen and scholars have been turning their thoughts toward an effort to re-define the national ‘purpose,’ to interpret our national life and politics in terms of goals. The genesis of this quest for a clear national objective was a feeling that somehow the American people had strayed from their historic course into a blind alley of aimlessness and frustration. In an era of unexampled affluence, the American people, by and large, are not happy. In the years since World War II, we have attained our private purposes almost too well at home, but beyond our personal material needs we have not yet recognized an objective or purpose which inspires our real interest. At home we have become immersed in the crass delight of extravagant consumption, puerile faddism, and callow amusements.”
“The quest for a definition of the national purpose has been generated by this sense of malaise. If our people were engaged in vigorous and meaningful activity, it is quite possible that we would not now be troubling ourselves with a quest for abstract definition and articulation.”[129]
Rightwing extremism, he says, has great appeal to the American public, and in times of crisis it has “great mass appeal”. The people are the ones who need to be restrained in our conflict with communism. The people do not have enough understanding to back an adequate foreign policy.[130] The people are misled by simple solutions and need some devils to scourge. [Pg 54]“The radicalism of the right can be expected to have great mass appeal during such periods. It offers the simple solution, easily understood: Scourging of the devils within the body politic, or, in the extreme, lashing out at the enemy.”[131]
On September 1, 1960, Senator Fulbright said: “I believe that such a study would conclude that America’s trouble is basically one of aimlessness at home and frustration abroad.”[132]
In the light of these contentions of the Senator, he is hardly the one to defend America against the charge, which he says is made by the “radical right,” that our “free society is permeated with corruption and decay.” Has the “radical right” said anything harder about America than has the Senator? If not, why should they be classified as radical, and the Senator not also be grouped with them in this matter.
Not only does the Senator think that the problem is to restrain the people, but that the people should be “directed” into backing whatever the President’s program happens to be. He does not trust the people; his statements make this clear. They must be “directed”. “Fundamentally, it is believed that the American people have little, if any, need to be alerted to the menace of the cold war. Rather, the need is for understanding of the true nature of that menace, and the direction of the public’s present and foreseeable awareness of the fact of the menace toward support of the President’s own total program for survival in a nuclear age. There are no reasons to believe that military personnel generally can contribute to this need, beyond their specific, technical competence to explain their own role. On the contrary, there are many reasons, and some evidence, for believing that an effort by the military, beyond this limitation, involves considerable danger.”[133]
Frankly at times we are not sure what is the President’s own [Pg 55]total program. It has vacillated, for example, concerning Laos and Cuba. Are we to be “directed” into it, as the President unfolds it, or shapes it, from time to time?
Senator Fulbright has attacked the competency of the people. He laid down in his secret memorandum, in our judgement, the ideological basis for a program of Pavlovian conditioning of the American people to accept whatever is decided on in the White House, the State Department and by a small group of advisors.[134]
The Senator thinks that the people are susceptible to radicalism. He says that extremely radical rightwingism “already has great appeal to the public. In the future it may well have much greater appeal.”[135] So the problem is to “direct” them into the President’s own total program. This program, the Senator implies, is quite different from the general program for victory and survival which is discussed in the memorandum and repudiated as being rightwing. For he thinks that the rightwingers are raising an obstacle to the “public acceptance of the President’s program.”[136]
Carried out to its logical conclusion, we believe that the memorandum, and the way in which it was formed and implemented, introduces a new concept into our government, a concept which would replace the Constitution and the sovereignty of the people. The President, the State Department and a few advisors are the ones who through their own will and wisdom formulate the policies which shall be followed. This they are to do independently of the people, for the people are too deficient in understanding; they are so immature that they follow the momentary caprice; they tend to obey the impulse of passion and thus the “Radicalism of the right can be expected to have great mass appeal during such periods” as the “long twilight struggle”. Furthermore, our age is complex, therefore, the public must either be ignored or conditioned so that they will follow the leader. In directing the people into the President’s program, the military should engage in the cold war only to the extent that it can help do this in explaining their own strictly military [Pg 56]role. After speaking of the need for the direction of the people’s awareness, that there is a danger, into support for the President’s program, he said: “There are no reasons to believe that military personnel generally can contribute to this need, beyond their specific technical competence to explain their own role. On the contrary, there are many reasons and some evidence, for believing that an effort by the military, beyond this limitation, involves considerable danger.”[137] Does this mean that when the military cannot be used as a rubber stamp it must not be used in waging the cold war?
It should be remembered that this basically anti-constitutional concept—against the Constitution in that it distrusts and wants to “direct” the people, rather than accept the sovereignty of the people—was set forth in a secret memorandum. The other members of the Foreign Relations Committee did not see it. It was sent directly to the President and the Secretary of Defense, and has had an influence on a very important policy.
Walter Lippmann, who is highly regarded by Senator Fulbright, said that there was a tendency of Government “insiders” to view the criticism of the “outsiders” as that of ignoramuses who were not enlightened by secret files and conferences. He said: “I tell the critic, you be careful. You will be denouncing the principle of democracy itself, which asserts that the outsiders shall be sovereign over the insiders. For you will be showing that the people themselves, since they are ignoramuses because they are outsiders, are therefore incapable of governing themselves.
“Furthermore, Lippmann declared that as far as the affairs of the world are concerned, those who regard themselves as insiders are actually outsiders since none of them read all of the U.S. papers and they have no access to the records of foreign governments that are equally important and if one is to have the total wisdom the insiders indicate they have.”[138]
[Pg 57]
Senator Fulbright seems to want to change our system of government so that it will be run by one man, the President. He has unlimited confidence in the President as a man who is above partisan politics and who is of high moral calibre by virtue of the fact that he is President. He views our constitutional system as out of date. Thus in his Stanford speech, July 28, 1961, he said:
“The President is hobbled in his task of leading the American people to consensus and concerted action by the restrictions of power imposed on him by a constitutional system designed for an eighteenth century agrarian society far removed from the centers of world power. It is imperative that we break out of the intelligent confines of cherished and traditional beliefs and open our minds to the possibility that basic changes in our system may be essential to meet the requirements of the twentieth century.
“The ability of this nation to preserve the value system which constitutes the core of our national interest has come to depend principally on our ability to cope with world wide revolutionary forces. If we are to deal with these forces successfully, we must be able to act quickly and decisively on the one hand and persistently and patiently on the other. ‘Our American task,’ wrote Walter Lippmann in a recent article, ‘is to generate superior national strength. For this we must have a powerful and purposeful National Government.... There is no getting away from the fact that, as Lord Acton said, power corrupts. But also, there is no getting away from the fact that powerlessness invites confusion, demoralization, and defeat.’
“The fact that is needed is Presidential power. He alone, among elected officials, can rise above parochialism and private pressures. He alone, in his role as teacher and moral leader, can hope to overcome the excesses and inadequacies of a public opinion that is all too often ignorant of the needs, the dangers, and the opportunities in our foreign relations.
“Public Opinion, wrote Lippmann in The Public Philosophy, consistently lags a generation behind in its attitudes and assessments of international relations. The tyranny of public opinion, he says, imposes upon our policy-makers a ‘compulsion to make [Pg 58]mistakes.’ The poet Yeats was not wholly wrong when he laid down this harsh pronouncement on public opinion: ‘The best lack all conviction—the worst are filled with passionate intensity.’
“These views may be extreme but they are not wholly without merit, and I point to them in order to stress the point that public opinion must be educated and led if it is to bolster wise and effective national policies. Only the President can provide the guidance that is necessary, while legislators display a distressing tendency to adhere slavishly to the dictates of public opinion, or at least to its vocal and highly organized minority segments.”[139]
Lippmann’s statement concerning the “insiders” and “outsiders” ought to be recalled in this connection. We should also remember his criticism that President Eisenhower was a defeatist who lacked faith in our people and in our system.[140] Why, then, should he contend that what is needed is more Presidential power? Why should Senator Fulbright maintain the same thing?
In a news conference in Washington, President Eisenhower said on May 10, 1962, that: “I believe that the problem of the Presidency is rarely an inadequacy of power. Ordinarily, the problem is to use the already enormous power of the Presidency [Pg 59]judiciously, temperately and wisely.”[141]
With all due respect to the President of the United States, whoever he may be at any given time in our history, we do not believe that any President is wise enough, knows enough or is good enough to occupy the position to which Senator Fulbright would elevate him. Of course, with the attitude which Fulbright has toward the masses, it is logical that he should accept the Fuhrer (Fuhrer means “leader”) principle. The masses must look to the leader. He must be their teacher and their moral leader.
“We got rid of kings back there in 1776, Senator.”[142] The Senator talks like a reactionary who wants to go back to kings and their “divine right” to rule.
Senator Fulbright thinks that legislators are slaves of public opinion, but the President is exempt from such. We ask: In our Republic shouldn’t the legislators and the President be subject to public opinion under law? If they are not to be responsive to the will of the people within the framework of our constitutional government, to whom and to what are they to be responsive?
Has the Senator from Arkansas forgotten that less than two years ago President Kennedy was a Senator, and thus a legislator; and legislators, according to Fulbright, display a “distressing tendency to adhere slavishly to the dictates of public opinion, or at least to its vocal and highly organized minority segments.” Just because this particular Senator was elected President did he therefore become so transformed that he rose above “parochialism and private pressures”? Did he become overnight the “teacher and moral leader”, the “only” one who can “provide the guidance that is necessary”? Does the Senator think, if Nixon had been elected President, that automatically on his shoulders would have descended the wisdom, the knowledge and the unlimited goodness which would be necessary in one who is to be our Leader in morality, our Teacher and our Guide? As a matter of fact, we know that the Senator does not believe that Mr. Nixon, if he had been elected, would have metamorphized into the Leader which Senator Fulbright claims [Pg 60]that the President by the very nature of the case becomes. On February 1, 1960, Senator Fulbright reprinted in the Congressional Record an article by James Reston which was critical of Mr. Nixon. Senator Fulbright said of the article that “it is seldom in this stolid and humorless era that an observer of our political scene sees through the absurd double talk of so much of the political speeches with which we are entertained.” Reston, however, had done so concerning Mr. Nixon.[143] And yet, Senator Fulbright’s concept of the Presidency is such that he must believe, if he follows his position to its logical conclusion, that Mr. Nixon would have ceased all double talk, and have become the teacher and the moral leader of the nation if he had been elected!
Did Senator Fulbright think that President Truman was the moral and educational leader of the people just because he was President? Of Truman he said in 1951: “For a long time we have been walking on opposite sides of the street, neither of us nodding to the other. He has often thought me wrong and unspeakable, while I have sometimes thought him wrong and incomprehensible.”
“I have spoken with him on official business only once in several years.”[144]
Senator Fulbright did not think that because President Eisenhower was in the office of President that he was therefore qualified as the leader and teacher of the people. He thought that Eisenhower was confused and engaged in the lucrative business of making and selling tranquilizer pills.[145] He spoke of the absence of leadership on the part of the President.[146] A veto message was described as “unworthy of his great office and beneath the dignity of the Congress to which it was sent. It is not factual. It is intemperate. It was obviously designed to catch newspaper headlines and radio and television news blurbs.”[147] The President himself; the Senator said, was unaware of the vastness of the Soviet challenge. “In defense, in our domestic economy, and [Pg 61]in our foreign relations, the administration seems to be unaware of the depth and scope of the Soviet challenge. There is no evidence that the administration is now or ever will be willing to urge the American people to take in one notch on our belt to deal with a Soviet challenge which confronts us in missiles, arms, and just downright capacity to produce.”[148] “I believe that the people of America will rise to the needs of our situation if they are clearly told what is at stake. They certainly would be willing to be taxed if it is necessary to survival. But I am not sure the administration agrees with even that simple proposition.”[149]
With high commendation, Senator Fulbright inserted an article by Joseph Alsop into the Congressional Record which indicated that he thought that President Eisenhower did not have, to say the least, the balanced judgment necessary for guiding aright the ship of state. Of a reason advanced by the President concerning test bans, Alsop said: “Surely this singular choice of reasons for a high policy decision of truly immeasurable import, reveals a mind gripped by one idea to the point of total obsession. Surely it shows a man driven by a single purpose almost to the point of mania.”[150]
Senator Fulbright further charged that President Eisenhower did not have the proper attitude toward Congress and that he did not take them into his confidence. Perhaps the Senator thought that there were too many secret memorandums floating around! At any rate he said: “I believe that a great deal of this stems from the President’s attitude toward Congress, particularly toward the Democratic Members of Congress. He has shown very little disposition to take them into his confidence, now or at any other time.
“I believe that legitimately leaves many people with the feeling that we do not know all that we ought to know. I asked Mr. Kohler about the letter which Khrushchev had written, and Mr. Kohler said flatly that he could not discuss it. I said that it had appeared at least in part in the Herald Tribune, and that it was strange indeed that it could be revealed to Miss Higgins of the New York Herald Tribune, but not to a committee of [Pg 62]the Senate. He said that he could not discuss it. Apparently he was under orders not to discuss it in any respect with the committee. That did not leave a very good taste in my mouth. It is a mystery to me why a letter, unless it was specifically agreed that Mr. Khrushchev considered it a personal and confidential letter, should not be released. Having been released, or leaked, as the new term is, to the Herald Tribune, I do not know of any reason why it should not be made available to the committee, and to the public, for that matter, in a more official manner than the way in which it was.
“With reference to the statement of the Senator regarding what Mr. Tsarapkin said, I have only seen a summary of it which Mr. Farley brought to me and said:
“‘This is all that can be released now.’
“I do not quite understand why that should be true. Maybe the Senator’s explanation would be a violation of an understanding. That is possible. However, I must agree with the Senator that a little more frank discussion, and taking the public into their confidence, certainly the Senate of the United States, particularly the Committee on Foreign Relations, would be a very healthy step.”[151]
Senator Fulbright also thought that President Eisenhower was forcing uniformity of viewpoint in his administration. Men under him were either muzzled or suffered the consequences. Or at least the Senator indicated this in an insertion, with high praise, of an article by Joseph Alsop which said: “In this administration, uniformity of viewpoint is virtually enforced. Independent-minded persons who do not take their viewpoint, readymade, from the White House have always been condemned as non-team players. Soon or late, they have always met the fate of General Gavin, General Ridgway, and Gen. Maxwell D. Taylor.”[152]
As late as March 22, 1960, Senator Fulbright, in a speech before the Annual Dinner of the Harvard Club of Washington, D. C., commended a high military official for disagreeing with the President. And, furthermore, Senator Fulbright seems to cast scorn on the idea that it was not for Generals to reason why! As the Senator put it: “Gen. Bernard Schriever has also [Pg 63]said that there is ‘very much evidence’ that Russia has greatly strengthened its bomber defenses. But the aircraft that might not be able to get through may not even be able to demonstrate their impotence. ‘For,’ states Gen. Thomas Power, Chief of the Strategic Air Command, ‘our bomber bases are vulnerable to surprise attack.’
“Generals are not to reason why. Their Commander in Chief complains that, ‘too many generals have all sorts of ideas.’
“Yet mankind moves on ideas. Men with ideas are the makers and shakers of the world. The larger their number serving the country the more fruitful and vigorous the country. But few men of ideas come to Washington. They are not likely to seek service in a government which is scornful of their kind.”[153]
The Senator seemed to agree with the idea that “President Eisenhower leads a dangerously sheltered life as Chief Executive of the Nation.”[154]
Lyndon B. Johnson also commended, on February 16, 1960, the idea that public debate by military officials was good. He reprinted a letter from a Harvard professor, Henry A. Kissinger, that: “The President says he deplores public argument by military experts regarding our defense policy. Prior to this, he had called his critics parochial and had invoked his superior expertise in the subject. It is impossible, of course, for laymen to pass judgment on a debate of such technical complexity. They have a right to insist, however, that the categories of the debate be properly put.”[155]
In the light of these considerations, it is a serious question as to what has happened to Senator Fulbright within the last year or so that has led him to think now that President Kennedy is in office, that the office of the Presidency has automatically raised the President above the temptations and mistakes that not only beset legislators—and Kennedy was a Senator less than two years ago—but also above those which beset Eisenhower. What makes the Senator, in the light of his previous criticisms of Eisenhower, think what is needed in this country is more power for the President? After all, the Senator might reflect, President Kennedy will not be President forever, and what if after we have [Pg 64]conferred far greater powers on the President, while Kennedy was in office, someone like Eisenhower or Truman, of whom the Senator was so critical, became President!!
In denouncing those whom he labeled as “fanatics” and “extremists” of the right, in a speech in Los Angeles on November 18, President Kennedy said: “They call for a ‘man on horseback’ because they do not trust the people.”[156] And yet, Senator Fulbright calls for more power for the President, because the people are so ignorant that they need the Leader. Wouldn’t this position make the Senator, in this matter, akin to the rightwing “fanatics”? As Joseph Alsop said, in regards to a position President Eisenhower had taken, “perhaps it would have been better to assert, at the outset, that it is always wrong for any nation to trust any leader, instead of trusting the hard facts.”[157]
Former President Herbert Hoover has indicated that more than one loss to communism has taken place because the man in the position of the Presidency, along with his selected advisors, entered into agreements without an opportunity being given to the Congress or to the people to know of, to discuss or to pass on these matters. “Executive agreements, Mr. Hoover said, had spread communism over the earth, turned over the Baltic States to Soviet Russia, partitioned Poland at the Teheran Conference, surrendered 10 nations to slavery at Yalta and set in motion the communization of Mongolia, North Korea, and all China. One result of these ‘unrestrained Presidential actions’ is a worldwide shrinking of human freedoms. Another has been a steady encroachment on powers of the legislative branch by the executive.”[158]
Senator Fulbright would lead us away from our constitutional system to a system wherein the power would be concentrated in the hands of the President. “The power that is needed is Presidential power.” “Only the President can provide the guidance that is necessary....” But this is not to lead us to a newer and higher form of government, than that of our so-called out-moded “eighteenth century agrarian society” constitutional [Pg 65]system. It is to lead us back to the concept of dictatorship, of the Fuhrer.
The leader, of course, would have his small, select group of advisors. In such a set-up, government by secret memorandums would likely be the order of the day.
We trust that Senator Fulbright, who is influential in the present administration, will not influence President Kennedy to accept this concept of our constitutional system, nor this idea of the role of the President.
The Senator knows that power tends to corrupt and that absolute power corrupts absolutely, for he himself once said: “Wherever there is power there is the possibility that it will be used and the danger that it will be misused. This assumption, expressed in Lord Acton’s maxim that ‘power corrupts, and absolute power corrupts absolutely,’ is common to all effective democracies. This principle is one of instinctive distrust of power itself wherever it exists. It has nothing to do with the motives of any group or individual who may wield it. It has been directed against big business, big labor, and big government, and now, inevitably, it is directed against our big Military Establishment.”[159]
Why, then, does the Senator want to give to the President far more power than the Constitution now allows and the President now has? For what does the President need more power?
The Senator said that the need is for the public to be directed into the support of the President’s own total program.[160] Does this apply to the Senator?
As a candidate, President Kennedy said he would do something about Cuba. He was going to do something, i.e. back an invasion. But Senator Fulbright’s opposition to our backing an invasion had an influence, according to some, on the President which helped induce him to modify his plans. Thus the invasion was doomed to failure.
President Kennedy emphasized that we would stand firm in [Pg 66]Berlin.[161] On a TV program on July 30, 1961, the following exchange took place:
“Mr. Scali. In any negotiations over Berlin, Senator, would you be willing to accept any concessions on the part of the West which closed West Berlin as an escape hatch for refugees in any way?
“Senator Fulbright. Well, I think that that might certainly be a negotiable point. The truth of the matter is I think the Russians have the power to close it in any case. I mean we are not giving up very much because I believe next week if they chose to close their borders, they could, without violating any treaty right I know of. We have no right to insist that they be allowed to come out. As I said I don’t understand why the East Germans don’t close the border because I think they have a right to close it. So why is this a great concession? You don’t have that right now.”[162]
The question dealt specifically with the West making some concessions which would close the escape hatch. The Senator thought “that might certainly be a negotiable point.” He made it clear that we could not negotiate with them as to whether they had the power to close it, so he was not implying we should negotiate concerning their power; nor, as he also put it, their right to close the escape hatch. The only thing left to negotiate was, as the question specifically said, whether the West should make any concessions “which closed West Berlin as an escape hatch for refugees in any way.” In other words, the Senator indicates that we should negotiate as to whether or not the West should help—by making concessions on our part, since obviously we could not make concessions for the Russians—close the escape hatch and thus in effect whether the West should help the Communists guard the prison house in which the Communists have their slaves.
The East German Communists made use of the Senator’s statements, and commended him. On August 3, 1961, in East Berlin Neues Deutschland had the following heading for an article: “U. S. Senator Against Trade in Human Beings.” He was quoted as saying that: “the East Germans have the right [Pg 67]to close their borders.” The paper stressed that the Bonn government was very much upset with Senator Fulbright’s proposal, as they put it, to hold “serious negotiations on Berlin with the USSR.” On August 4 the same paper said: “But the man seems to be a realistic politician.” “Apparently Fulbright is aware of the fact that the man-trap of West Berlin is an untenable situation, that it must and will be closed.”
We wonder whether the President felt that the Senator’s speech upheld the President’s position on Berlin.
The Senator later explained that this was not what he meant. It was, however, what he said. We quote the entire explanation which was made in the Senate on August 4, 1961.
“Last Sunday, I appeared on the ABC network television and radio program, ‘Issues and Answers.’ In the course of that program one of the exchanges led to an unfortunate and erroneous impression of my views. When asked if I thought the West should make any concessions on the question of the flight of East German refugees to West Berlin, I responded that this, too, is something that could be discussed, because—and this is the point—the East Germans have the ability to control travel within East Germany.
“The imposition of tighter travel restrictions by the East Germans on travel of East German citizens within East Germany could restrict access of East German citizens to all of Berlin, thus depriving a large number of potential refugees from East Germany (as distinguished from East Berlin) of this convenient means of escape.
“As I pointed out in the TV and radio interview, I know of no agreements to which the Western Powers are party which prohibit the East Germans from restricting the travel of East German citizens within East Germany (outside of Berlin). It is to that point of reference that my response was intended in the interview.
“I certainly did not intend to imply that the West should execute any agreement whereby the West would assist in enforcing any restriction imposed by East Germany on travel within East Germany nor that the West should consider changing existing agreements and consent to closing West Berlin to refugees wishing to enter.
“The right of persons to move freely within all sectors of [Pg 68]Berlin is entirely another matter and is guaranteed by post-war agreements signed by the United States, Britain, France and the Soviet Union. I do not consider such right to be negotiable.”[163]
According to Constantine Brown, Germans and other Europeans have raised the question: “How can we reconcile what your President tells us with what his own important party leaders and especially the chairman of the most important Foreign Relations Committee, Mr. Fulbright, says in public, on the floor of the Senate and in radio and television interviews?”
“The suspicions of what may be termed a schizophrenic foreign policy started some time ago when Senator Mansfield, the majority leader, and later Senator Fulbright urged negotiations on Berlin after Mr. Kennedy had taken a formally strong stand on that very matter.”[164]
We wonder if the Senator has set the public a good example of clearly and wholeheartedly backing the President’s program in such matters as we have mentioned?
In a review of some of our history Senator Fulbright took the position that it was important for the people themselves to bring to bear pressure on the President, instead of always following the leader. “Moreover, throughout the whole of this process, while much was done by the action of individual Presidents, a great deal was done as a direct result of congressional action or by the direct play of public pressures, rising from a people whose life was being progressively democratized.
“The key point is that the conduct of foreign affairs did not appear to be an elite function, limited to specialists in and around the Executive. Neither the electorate nor the Congress was ever overawed by the Executive claim to exclusive knowledge, or its claim that it would be against the national interest to disclose the facts relevant to a foreign policy decision. Foreign policy was debated in remote frontier outposts as well as in seaboard cities, with a shrewdness and a knowledge of great power rivalries that astonishes any modern reader who browses [Pg 69]through the records of these debates preserved in our National Archives.”[165]
Now that the Senator’s secret memorandum has been made public, the people can study it, debate it and continue to exercise their sovereignty. It is through knowledge and action based thereon that the civilian control can be maintained over the government and thus over the military. Those who do not believe that our constitutional system is out of date will surely want to examine closely the Senator’s position.[166] In fact, the Senator himself once emphasized the necessity of debating issues. “Too many people are given a practical veto over policy. There is an inhibition of the kind of free debate out of which a fundamental national agreement emerges.” “Nonpartisanship does not mean the absence of debate on foreign policy.” “I do not think it is possible for a democratic country to have a viable, effective policy unless it is founded on the widest possible public discussion. Debate is a necessary ingredient of policymaking.”[167]
[119] Congressional Record, August 2, 1961, p. 13437, col. 2,t.
[120] Ibid., p. 13437.
[121] Congressional Record, August 2, 1961, p. 13436, col. 2,b.
[122] Ibid., August 1, 1961, p. 13219, col. 2,t.
[123] Ibid., p. 13219, col. 2,m.
[124] Commercial Appeal, August 1, 1961. Report of speech of Congressman Frank J. Becker. This same news item said that Senator Fulbright was for the recognition of Outer Mongolia.
[125] Peking Review, July 14, 1961, p. 7.
[126] See the American-Asian Educational Exchange’s recent report on Communist China and Asia, July, 1961. See also The Worker, October 1, 1961, p. 6. World Marxist Review, July 1961, p. 3.
[127] Chinese News Service, August 1, 1961, pp. 3-4. For some additional comments see Thomas J. Dodd’s speech in the Congressional Record, August 2, 1961.
[128] Congressional Record, August 21, 1961, p. 15357, col. 3,m.
[129] Speech of Senator Fulbright before the 1961 Summer Cubberly Conference of Stanford University, Stanford, California, July 28, 1961. Mimeographed copy, pp. 1-2.
[130] Congressional Record, August 2, 1961, p. 13437, col. 2,m.
[131] Ibid., p. 13437, col. 2,m.
[132] Ibid., September 2, 1960, p. A6708, col. 2,b.
[133] Ibid., August 2, 1961, p. 13437, col. 2,b. Dr. Robert T. Oliver, of Pennsylvania State University, expressed his opinion on October 24, 1961, that: “Democratic and totalitarian governments are becoming more and more alike in their methods of governing—through the manipulation of public opinion by control of secrecy and publicity.” (Congressional Record, Jan. 15, 1962, p. A141, col. 2,t.)
[134] See Edward Hunter, speech on the Manion Forum. 1961. Reprinted in the Congressional Record, Feb. 6, 1962, pp. A906-907.
[135] Congressional Record, August 2, 1961, p. 13437, col. 1,b.-2,t.
[136] Ibid., p. 13437, col. 1,b. See also p. 13436, col. 3,b.
[137] Ibid., p. 13437, col. 3,t.
[138] Ibid., January 18, 1960, p. 578, col. 3,m. Dr. Robert T. Oliver, who served over twelve years in the inner councils of the government of Korea, dealing with matters of foreign policy, said: “On the whole, however, the significant facts concerning all the major international issues are completely available to anyone who takes the trouble to keep up with the news.” (Ibid., Jan. 5, 1962, p. A140, col. 3,b.)
[139] Speech of Senator Fulbright before the 1961 Summer Cubberly Conference at Stanford University, Stanford, California, July 28, 1961, pp. 7-8. When he was a Senator, Kennedy made it clear that the Presidency conferred no wisdom in his criticism of Eisenhower. (Congressional Record, June 14, 1960, p. 11630, col. 3,t.) The question is raised in my mind as to whether or not Senator Kennedy, who spoke of the “missile gap” and other “gaps” in our defenses during the campaign for President, was really that ignorant of our defense posture? Yet, within a few months after he became president—and certainly before anything that his administration did could have changed the picture basically—we “learned” that there was no “missile gap” and that our defense posture was strong. (See the article by David Lawrence in the Congressional Record, Jan. 16, 1962, p. A241, cols. 2 and 3.)
Senator Fulbright himself said “In a democratic system, such as ours, the people do have much to say about policy, and they decide who shall govern them. How, may I ask, can our people be expected to discharge their duty as citizens of a self-governing republic, if they are not told the truth about their affairs? It would be easier, more pleasant, and I am sure more popular, to join those who pretend that all is well, that the summit meeting was a triumph for the West and that the Japanese fiasco only demonstrates once again the viciousness of the Communists.” (Ibid., June 28, 1960, p. 13672, col. 2,m.)
[140] Column of February 11, 1960. Congressional Record, February 19, 1960, p. 2761, col. 3,t.
[141] U.S. News and World Report, May 21, 1962, p. 15.
[142] Evening Tribune, San Diego, California, Editorial, August 14, 1961.
[143] Congressional Record, February 1, 1960, p. 1519, col. 2,m, Senator Fulbright once accused Nixon of “deceiving the American people”. Quoted in The Arkansas Historical Quarterly, Winter, 1961, p. 328.
[144] Congressional Record, April 26, 1951, p. 4409, col. 3,m.
[145] Ibid, September 9, 1959, p. 17250, col. 3,m.
[146] Ibid., April 24, 1959, p. 5932, col. 3,b.
[147] Ibid., August 12, 1959, p. 14272, col. 1,m.
[148] Ibid., March 18, 1959, p. 3948, col. 1,m.
[149] Ibid., p. 3948, col 1,b.
[150] Ibid., February 8, 1960, p. 1978, col 3,m.
[151] Ibid., March 28, 1960, p. 6207, col. 2,m.
[152] Ibid., February 8, 1960, p. 1978, col. 3,b.-p. 1979, col. 1,t.
[153] Ibid., March 28, 1960, p. A2708, col. 2,m.
[154] Ibid., March 28, 1960, p. A2708, col. 2,b.
[155] Ibid., February 16, 1960, pp. A1250, col. 3,b. A1251, col. 1,t.
[156] As quoted in the U.S. News and World Report, December 4, 1961, p. 4, col. 1,b.
[157] Congressional Record, February 19, 1961, p. 2769.
[158] Congressional Record, August 16, 1954, p. A6075, col. 3,m. See the entire speech in Herbert Hoover, Addresses Upon the American Road, August 10, 1954, pp. 74-84.
[159] Ibid., August 21, 1961, p. 15357, col. 1,t. Speech before the National War College, August 21, 1961.
[160] Ibid., August 2, 1961, p. 13437, col. 3,t.
[161] Compare Constantine Brown, Congressional Record, September 5, 1961, p. A6963.
[162] Ibid., August 1, 1961, p. 13218, col. 2,t.
[163] Statement by Senator Fulbright before the United States Senate, August 4, 1961. It is regrettable that the right to move freely within all sectors of Berlin has been abrogated by the Communists without any negotiations. J.D.B.
[164] Congressional Record, September 5, 1961, p. A6963, col. 2,m.
[165] Speech by Senator Fulbright at the 10th anniversary banquet of the Reporter magazine. April 16, 1959. Congressional Record, April 17, 1959, p. 5543, col. 2,m.
[166] Compare Constantine Brown, “Remaking the Constitution?” Ibid., September 12, 1961, p. A7150, col. 2.
[167] Senator Fulbright, Congressional Record, April 17, 1959, p. 5542, col. 3.
[Pg 70]
One reason that was given for the banning of “Communism
on the Map” from military installations was that it was defeatist.
If a diagnosis of the dangerous situation we are in is defeatism
a doctor should not diagnose a serious disease. It is not a
defeatist film, although it does show that we are in real danger.
Senator Fulbright himself said: “We are confronted by the most
formidable and resourceful adversary ever to have challenged
us...”[168] President Kennedy on October 12, 1961, stated that
mankind is in the most dangerous situation the human race has
ever been in.
An examination of some of Senator Fulbright’s positions shows
that he is a defeatist in that he indicates that we should not
try to win victory over communism. The Senator does not think
in terms of victory over the communist enemy; although he
seemed to think in terms of victory, and that immediately, over
the military in his effort to knock them out of the cold war!
The Senator does not seem to understand the principle set
forth by Anthony Harrigan, director of the Foreign Policy Research
Institute, that: “As important to a navy as new ships
and late-model weapons is a victory psychology. In the last
analysis, it is the will to win that turns the tide of battle. The
great conflicts of former centuries are replete with illustrations
of the truth that the nation that is emotionally dedicated to
victory is the nation that triumphs, even though its weapons may
not be a match for the enemy’s weapons. To cite only one example,
the outnumbered airmen of the Royal Air Force defeated
the Luftwaffe in the Battle of Britain because they had the will
to win.”[169]
[Pg 71]
Senator Fulbright said that both “World Wars ended in total victory, but the world is far less safe for democracy today than it was in 1914, when the current era of upheavals began. One of the principle lessons of two World Wars is that wars, and total victories, generate more problems than they solve.”[170] What if we had lost these wars? The trouble was not that we won the wars but that we failed to keep the peace after the wars were won.
Senator Fulbright, to be consistent, should take the position that we should not fight communism even if war is forced on us, since he says that war and victory create more problems than they solve. The Senator says that he is not for total victory, and by that he means such a victory as we won in World War I and World War II, and that even if we won we would have the additional problem of what to do with victory![171]
What is it but defeatism for one to say that we should not seek victory over communism, and that if we did win it would create more problems than it would solve?
In the campaign for the Presidency, John F. Kennedy said that he would do something about Cuba. The Monroe Doctrine calls on us to do something about Cuba. The influence of Senator Fulbright, according to Charles J. V. Murphy, helped bring about a change in plans which contributed to the “fatal dismemberment of the whole plan.”[172] The Senator thought that the invasion was a bad thing to do even if we succeeded. World opinion would label us as an aggressor, and we would have to [Pg 72]support Cuba after we had thrown out Castro, and this would be a drain on our Treasury![173] It is strange that the Senator did not think of such arguments when U.N. troops, with United States support, waged war on Katanga. Furthermore, the Senator approved the State Department’s action in the show of force of American troops, ships and planes off the coast of the Dominican Republic in the fall of 1961.[174]
Fulbright is such a defeatist that he thinks that we cannot do much about Cuba, and that communist-controlled Cuba seems to be here to stay[175].
The rejection of the idea of victory over communism may be the reason that Edgar Ansel Mowrer, on returning to the United States after being in Europe, wrote: “In short, I find the Washington official attitude one of basic defeatism hidden behind a hot air screen of talk about the historical trend being on our side.”[176]
[168] Stanford Speech, p. 11.
[169] “The Will to Win”, Congressional Record, August 29, 1961, p. A6794.
[170] Congressional Record, July 24, 1961, pp. 12280-12281, col. 3,b. The Senator thought that possible action on our part might provoke the Soviets to an unrestricted nuclear arms race. At the very moment he was saying this, the Communists were finishing their preparations for renewed atmospheric testing, although we had not prepared for such and had not “provoked” them into doing this! When will some people learn that the driving power of communist activity is not reaction to our moves, but a positive program of world conquest based on their world view.
[171] Same as 3.
[172] Congressional Record, September 7, 1961, p. A7040. Senator Fulbright thought that it violated the OAS Charter. This statement in the quotation concerning Kennedy’s change of plans, does not imply that Senator Fulbright had anything to do with planning or executing the project.
[173] Arkansas Gazette, July 30, 1961, p. 5E. This quotation from the Gazette is based on the Senator’s speech of July 24. Congressional Record, July 24, 1961, p. 12281.
[174] Arkansas Democrat, December 4, 1961.
[175] Congressional Record, June 29, 1961, p. 10874. The Senator once said that he did not know whether Castro was a Communist or not, but the main thing was that we must be patient and understanding and drive him toward the Communists. We must not confuse communism with nationalism, he said. He reprinted an article by Walter Lippmann which attacked the Senate Internal Security Subcommittee for indicating that Castro and his revolutionists were pro-communist. Congressional Record, August 11, 1959, p. 14100, New York Times, August 12, 1959.
[176] Edgar Ansel Mowrer, “Washington Attitude is one of Defeatism,” Congressional Record, July 23, 1962, p. A5660.
[Pg 73]
From some of the Senator’s remarks one can draw the conclusion that we are in a “popularity contest” in the court of world opinion. This implies that if we are more popular with world opinion than are the Communists we shall win.
For the United States to liberate Cuba from the control of the communists would, the Senator thinks, result in “the alienation of most of Latin America, Asia and Africa.”[177]
Robert Murphy has written: “I was in Brazil at the time of the unhappy Cuban operation. Apart from the apathy of the mass I was a bit startled to be told that the reason the United States failed to intervene openly in Cuba was because our government feared it would provoke war between the U.S.S.R. and the United States. I found little or no recognition of the consistent effort our government has loyally made through the years to adhere to a policy of non-intervention. We have done this on moral grounds and by observing the rule of law in an effort to work in harmony with and as a good neighbor of the members of the Organization of American States. When I urged these reasons I was met by polite incredulity. I found that our government was actually blamed in the last analysis for permitting the Cuban attempt to fail but given little or no credit for restraint and non-intervention. President Kennedy’s statement warning that our patience is not inexhaustible and that the government of the United States will not hesitate to meet its primary obligations was like a timely ray of brilliant sunshine in the gloomy atmosphere. I gained the distinct impression that those Latin Americans with whom I talked, who are not unfriendly to the United States, would have welcomed successful intervention in Cuba because they fear the expansion of Castroism in South America and doubt it will be stopped without intervention. [Pg 74]The test in their minds seemed to be that it succeed. There was evidence of understanding on their part that both under a reasonable interpretation of the Monroe Doctrine as well as because of the severe provocation by Castro that some form of intervention would be justifiable.”[178]
James A. Farley has spoken thus concerning Cuba, invasion and world opinion. “In the last year, I have spoken personally and privately to most of the heads of government in the Far East and in South America. It is my opinion that as spokesmen for the free world they are far more in favor of a firm and final position than a policy of appeasement masquerading as the easing of a series of crises, crises which the Communists themselves manufacture. These foreign statesmen are much more aware than some of our own statesmen, of the fact that by practicing unceasing brinksmanship, Khrushchev is pushing us back into the abyss of dishonor and disaster.
“It follows that the President has gained free world approval in drawing the line. He has placed the responsibility where it belongs—on the Communist aggressor.
“Since President Kennedy has said that we do not intend to abandon Cuba to Communism, and since the Communists are accelerating their rate of acquisition there, it may be that the force of the United States may be necessary to expel them. That decision can be made under American law and oath of God by one man alone.
“But it is my conviction that should President Kennedy elect to order the Armed Forces of the United States into action against Communist Castro his action would be hailed by the free governments and the free peoples of the world. In these times of agonizing decision, their prayers are already with him. Furthermore, even more important than the preservation of the Western Hemisphere, the avoidance of global War may well depend upon giving unmistakable evidence to the Kremlin that to the extent that it believes itself on the way to world conquest it is in fact on the road to global war.
“It is a fact that we may have to accept such war in defense of our liberty. We must not conceal this from ourselves and, [Pg 75]still less, should we conceal it from our enemy. The peace of the world may well depend on the reeducation of Mr. Khrushchev, because if war he seeks he has found the way in which to make it inevitable. The fact is, freedom will not be edged off this earth by Mr. Khrushchev’s brinksmanship.”[179]
On the news broadcast on Sept. 22, 1961, David Brinkley implied that the foreign policy advisors who were so concerned about world opinion were not very wise. He spoke of the “vague and formless thing called world opinion—whatever that is.”
There is no such thing today as “world opinion.” There are many different views, aims and ambitions. Whose “world opinion” shall we court? Africa? Which tribe in Africa? Which Nation? Nkrumah? Or the freedom lovers he has jailed? The neutrals, are they the ones we should court? The Soviet manner of “courting” seems to be more successful with many of them than ours!
Arthur Krock of the New York Times has pointed out that the concept of “world opinion” ignores the fact that hundreds of millions have no knowledge whatever of exterior events.[180] And yet, as he pointed out, in some matters affecting our national security we have paid more attention to “world opinion” than to the warnings of experts. He has special reference to the three year test ban, without inspection, which we gave to the U.S.S.R.
Yet Senator Fulbright says: “World opinion is a civilizing force in the world, helping to restrain the great powers from the [Pg 76]worst possible consequences of their mutual hostility.”[181] This hostility is mutual only in the sense that after our countless words and deeds of good will, the Communists still hate us. They are inherently hostile to all that stands in their way of world conquest. They have said that they are our irreconcilable enemy, and then they have proceeded to treat us in this light. The hostility is mutual only in the sense that we have been waking up to the fact that this is an enemy bent on our destruction.
How has the U.S.S.R. been responding to world opinion? How has world opinion helped civilize the Communists in Russia or in China, or in the United States?
What is world opinion doing to civilize Castro? Did world opinion keep the U.S.S.R. from renewing the bomb tests?
As Senator Prouty said: “Twenty-four so-called neutral nations were sitting in the jury box at Belgrade when the Soviet Union announced its intention—since carried out—to resume nuclear explosions.
“And what was the verdict of this jury we have been so assiduously courting? ‘Not quite guilty’.
“Nehru said: I am not in a position and I suppose no one else here is in a position to know all the facts underlying the decision—military, political or nonpolitical, whatever they may be.
‘But I know this decision makes the situation much more dangerous. This is obvious to me. Therefore, I regret it deeply.’
“President Tito of Yugoslavia said he understood why Moscow had decided to resume nuclear testing; Nasser was simply shocked. The rest were eloquently silent.
“The shrieking shame on you, Russia, hoped for by the White House, turned out to be a whispered version of ‘Miss Otis regrets she is unable to lunch today.’
“About the only character missing from the very tragic comedy in Belgrade was the fictional creation of Lewis Carroll who said: ‘I am very brave generally only today I happen to have a headache.’
“Joseph Alsop nailed to the wall for all time the naive code of leading U.S. policy-makers—the code that lets a synthetic [Pg 77]world opinion—not enlightened self-interest—shape the policies of this Nation. Alsop said:
‘If you listen to persons of this school of thought you might suppose that foreign policy could be conducted on the principle of Sir Galahad—“my strength is as the strength of 10, because my heart is pure.”
‘The truth is, alas, that naked power counts far more in this sad world than virtuous intentions.’
“Mr. Khrushchev did not give a hoot about world opinion. He was brutally frank about his reason for resuming nuclear weapons tests at this time. According to the New York Times, Khrushchev told some leftwing British visitors, he is doing it to terrorize the Western Powers into negotiations on Berlin, Germany, and disarmament—on his own terms.”[182]
Eric Sevareid, who as far as I know has never been accused by Senator Fulbright of being a rightwing radical, had this to say of the Communists as they read about the concern of some Americans for “world opinion”. “Surely they adore reading the worrying, hair-shirt arguments that the United States must not do this or that because it will offend ‘world opinion’, knowing as they do that there is no such thing in the moralistic sense—the proof of which is that after all their crimes, including Hungary, they enjoy more influence and respect in the world than ever. They must love the British-American notion that the bosses of the new ‘neutral’ nations are somehow more high-minded and spiritual than those of the committed nations.”[183]
“The gamesmen in the Kremlin must smile in their sleep as they realize how deeply ingrained is the American illusion that a ton of wheat can offset a ton of Communist artillery shells, that a squad of Peace Corpsmen is a match for a squad of guerrilla fighters.
“But I hope they frowned a bit when they read the angry retort of Defense Secretary McNamara when he heard for the umpteenth time the pious theory that the Communists were gaining in Laos and South Vietnam because the regimes there are ‘unresponsive to the people’s needs.’ A burning sense of reality on a short fuse can make a quiet man shout (as I’m afraid [Pg 78]it makes me shout these days), and McNamara shouted that the Communists are gaining in those countries for very simple reasons known as guns, bombs, fighters and threats.
“Frightened people in a score of desperate countries want to be on the winning but not necessarily the moral side; and we have to start winning soon. We are going to lose in several more places before we do. We may as well face the fact that we will also lose in places we cannot afford to lose, until and unless we are willing to fight, no matter the reproving editorials in the Manchester Guardian, no matter what the temporary backlash of world opinion may be.
“The relations between nations are not the same as those between individuals. We can afford to lose everything—except respect for our strength and determination. Lose that, and Khrushchev won’t bother to sit down and talk again even to say no.”[184]
The Senator who is so impressed with “world” opinion does not think that the President should be too impressed with opinion in the United States. Instead of being influenced by public opinion, Senator Fulbright thinks that the main problem of the President may be to restrain the American people from too vigorous a response to Communist aggression and gains and the resulting losses for the non-communist world.
Winning the victory over those who would enslave the world is far more important than what Nehru, or Latin America thinks.[185] Goa shows that Nehru thumbs his nose at “world opinion.” Nehru, of course, is one of the “neutrals” whose “world opinion” some in America have courted.
Edgar Ansel Mowrer said that aside from a major war, “the next strongest weapon in the cold war is prestige.” He said that this was largely “a matter of military power—and the readiness to use it.” The crushing of the Hungarian revolt hurt the popularity of the U.S.S.R. but increased its prestige.[186]
James A. Farley on July 8, 1960 said: “Any American administration which refuses to protect American citizens and American property in any quarter of the globe, on the ground [Pg 79]that its action will be called Yankee imperialism, has in effect struck the flag. Let us not perform the disgraceful act of offering the American people a spurious dove of peace, when every page of recent history identifies it as the white flag of cowardly surrender.”[187] Just before this he stated: “I have traveled as much abroad as almost any man in this party. I, too, value the opinion of the world. But I am sure that sound policy cannot be based on loss of self-respect.”
[177] Congressional Record, June 29, 1961, pp. 10874-10875.
[178] Address of Robert Murphy, Commencement Exercises, Boston College, June 12, 1961, pp. 8-9. Also reprinted in the Congressional Record, June 13, 1961, p. A4314, col. 2,t.
[179] Congressional Record, June 12, 1961, p. A4237, col. 2,b.-3,t. General Carlos P. Romulo said: “But what is significant to the peoples outside this country is that in these 16 years you have not succeeded to make Soviet Russia recede or retreat one inch from any of her ill-gotten gains.” (Congressional Record, Feb. 15, 1962, p. A1134, col. 3,t.) The Republic of China Chapter of the Asian Peoples’ Anti-Communist League has spoken of the weakening of confidence in the United States on the part of Southeast Asian countries as a result of our actions in Laos (Free China and Asia, March, 1962, p 2. See also the Congressional Record, March 7, 1962, p. A1714).
Burmese Army leaders think that the Chinese Communists will take Southeast Asia in a few years; therefore, they lean toward them (Newsweek, May 21, 1962, p. 17.)
George E. Sokolsky has pointed out that not only Cuba, but aiding our enemies and alienating our allies in certain instances has damaged our prestige (“The National Image,” Searcy Daily Citizen, May 3, 1962, p. 4.)
[180] Arkansas Gazette, September 5, 1961.
[181] Congressional Record, July 24, 1961, p. 12281, col. 2,b.
[182] Congressional Record, September 19, 1961, p. 19015, col. 2,t.-3,m.
[183] Congressional Record, June 29, 1961, p. 10891, col. 1,b.
[184] Ibid., p. 10891, col. 2,m.
[185] Compare Marguerite Higgins, “Power and Popularity,” Congressional Record, September 5, 1961, p. A6963.
[186] Congressional Record, June 25, 1960, p. A5506, col. 3,t.
[187] Ibid., August 22, 1960, p. A6153, col. 3,m.
[Pg 80]
The 1958 directive of the National Security Council ordered the military into the cold war. In their participation in the cold war they had to deal with the history, the philosophy, the strategy and the tactics of communism. Since communism had endeavored to extend its influence throughout the world in a thousand and one ways, their tactics also involve the use of individuals, who are not Communists, to extend their influence whenever possible. An analysis of their tactics certainly involves analyzing how they have worked through the united fronts, the communist fronts, through infiltration and in other ways. Since communism does not work in a vacuum void of people, some people who were not Communists were unwittingly involved in certain aspects of the manifold operations of the Communists.
Would it be political to take an actual case history and to show how the Communists have operated? Of course, such an analysis would take on a different hue if the analyzer impugned the motives of the individuals who were involved. But the point here is that it is impossible to show fully how the Communists work without giving some concrete cases. When it is shown that even patriotic Americans have been duped—and surely the Senator would not say that none of them have been duped—it emphasizes the care which all need to exercise lest we in turn be duped.
We are not contending that the military become a spokesman for varying points of view in American politics. The 1958 directive did not authorize “political propaganda”. As Senator Thurmond said: “I think our people in uniform generally should not speak promiscuously on all subjects, but they are entitled to tell their own military personnel and entitled to tell the civilian population the aims, the methods of operations, and [Pg 81]the dangers of the enemy. The enemy today is communism.”[188]
And yet some have raised a false issue, whether they are conscious of it or not, and have said that Senator Thurmond is in favor of the military educating America on politics. The Arkansas Gazette said in an editorial on August 4, 1961, that: “Mr. Thurmond, we are compelled to observe, has not examined the implications of his doctrine that the military should assume responsibility for the political education of the American people—nor have Senator Goldwater and Karl Mundt.”
“Senator Fulbright just about said it all when he remarked to Senator Thurmond recently in a Senate debate:
‘The Senator from South Carolina, who opposed federal aid to education because he feared federal control of education, apparently wants the military to educate the people.’
“There you have it. The right wing evangelists—the Thurmonds, the Goldwaters, the Mundts, and the Alfords, who daily preach the dangers of central control—are prepared to concede the point which has in so many places resulted in dictatorial government: That the military is and ought to be a means of political control and influence.”[189]
Is not the Arkansas Gazette implying that communism is just a matter of politics, and that Senator Thurmond is wanting the military to educate the public in politics just because Senator Thurmond wants the military to help educate the public with regard to the dangers, aims and tactics of the enemy, communism?
Senator Fulbright has stated that his memorandum was directed against the involvement of the military in partisan political propaganda. “For all these reasons I strongly oppose political propaganda activities by military personnel directed at the public. If we are to maintain our political freedom and the Constitutional system which distinguishes us from totalitarian dictatorships, we must retain civil control over the military. This principle lies at the very core of our heritage of freedom and Constitutional government.”[190]
[Pg 82]
If engaging in the cold war, in obedience to the directive of the National Security Council, is engaging in political propaganda, the military not only has no right to educate the public, but it also has no right to educate the troops in any subject pertaining to the cold war.
No one who knows the nature of the Communist menace can say that instruction in this area is dabbling in partisan politics. Furthermore, Senator Fulbright himself in his vote for the Peace Corps Act voted for an amendment made by the Senate. “The Senate amendment, section 8(c), included a provision that ‘training hereinabove provided for shall include instruction in the philosophy, strategy, tactics, and menace of communism.’
“The House bill did not contain a similar provision.
“The managers on the part of the House accepted the Senate language. The Peace Corps officials have given assurance that such training is already required in every Peace Corps training curriculum. There appears to be every reason to give statutory recognition to this requirement.”[191] The Peace Corps, the Senator says, is “part of the cold war.”[192]
If the military in teaching the public concerning these matters is engaging in partisan politics, then the Peace Corps is giving partisan political indoctrination to members of the Corps. Unless Senator Fulbright is willing to say that the Peace Corps should become a center of partisan politics, he must say that such instruction is not political. If this is partisan politics, towards what party would the head of the Peace Corps, the President’s brother-in-law, be expected to slant this “partisan political” indoctrination? But if it is not political when done by the Peace Corps, why is it political when done by the military?
We wonder why the Senator is involved in this basic contradiction? He voted for training the Peace Corps in the above matters, will he vote for the military to do the same? No, he will not, for his memorandum, in effect denies them this right. If he says that it is right for the troops to be taught the above, but not for the military to teach the public—because they should not engage in political propaganda—then why teach political propaganda to the troops? Yet his memorandum, which he says [Pg 83]was against political propaganda by the military, was against the 1958 directive of the National Security Council. But the National Security Council basically did not authorize instruction in any fields other than those covered in the above instructions to the Peace Corps.
Although the Senator may not be aware of it, it is a part of the Communist Party line to view anti-communism education conducted by the military as partisan politics. It so happens that the Communists are wrong about this. Communism, in both its internal and external aspects, is not a matter of party politics.
We remind the reader that the Senator does not object to radical statements only, but the entire concept of the military’s participation in the cold war. He objected to the directive of the National Security Council which put the military into the cold war.
The policy of the President is against the recognition of Red China. Does the Senator think that it would be dabbling in politics for a military spokesman to oppose the recognition of Red China and to give reasons for his opposition?[193]
The author is against the military educating the public or the troops in partisan politics. When a military official oversteps the proper bounds, his mistake can be dealt with without abolishing, in effect, the 1958 directive of the National Security Council. In curing a cold the doctor does not decide that one must kill the patient. That would, of course, get rid of the cold, but we can’t say that it helps the patient. One can throw out dirty bathwater without throwing out the baby with it.
[188] Congressional Record, August 17, 1961, p. 15030, col. 2,m. Also in “Excerpts from Speeches by Senator Strom Thurmond on Efforts to Gag Military Anti-Communist Speeches and Seminars,” p. 35, col. 1,t.
[189] Arkansas Gazette, August 4, 1961, p. 4A.
[190] “Statement of Senator J. W. Fulbright Relating to a memorandum submitted by him to the Department of Defense,” p. 6.
[191] House of Representatives, 87th Congress, 1st Session, Report No. 1239, Peace Corps Act, September 19, 1961, p. 21.
[192] Arkansas Democrat, November 28, 1961.
[193] Both the Senate and the House have more than once gone on record as being opposed to the recognition of Red China. For example see 87th Congress, 1st Session, S. Con. Res. 34, July 28, 1961.
[Pg 84]
The Communists thought so highly of Senator Fulbright’s memorandum that they reprinted several columns of it in The Worker for August 27, 1961. It is not often that a Senator of the United States receives this type of “recognition”. Dr. Benson, Dr. Barnett and Herbert A. Philbrick, for example, have never received such an “honor”, and it is unlikely that they shall receive such an “honor” in the future.
The Religious Freedom Committee, Inc., which is well known for its defense of pro-communist causes and persons, calls on people to rally behind the Senator from Arkansas. As it views the struggle: “On the one side are the liberal elements in church and state; on the other, an alliance of fundamentalist religious groups, the military, and reactionary elements in the Congress and in the financial and business community.”[194] If the Religious Freedom Committee, Inc. thought that the Senator’s memorandum was damaging to internal communism, it is my judgment, based on their record, that they would not defend it.
We are not suggesting that the Senator wants this type of support, but he is espousing a cause which Communists and pro-Communists consider worthy of support. He ought to make a serious investigation of this question: Why do pro-Communists and Communists support the memorandum?
There are those who are not pro-Communists who support the memorandum, this we realize; but the Senator ought to find out why pro-Communists support it.
Gus Hall, the General Secretary of the Communist Party in the United States, makes it clear that one of the main objectives of the Communist Party is to defeat what he calls the “ultra-Right”. [Pg 85]Certainly anything on the center, or to the right of center, would be “ultra-Right” to Gus Hall. He includes Dr. Benson and many others. He indicates that Communists have hopes of defeating the “ultra-Right”. “If the tactical problem is solved correctly, it will be possible to slam shut the door on the ultra-Right, defeat it, and force a shift in policy upon the Administration itself in the direction of peace and democracy.”[195]
Of course, we realize with J. Edgar Hoover that there may be times when the Communist Party line coincides with some objective sought by a non-Communist or anti-Communist group. “Because communism thrives on turmoil, the party is continuously attempting to exploit all grievances—real or imagined—for its own tactical purposes. It is, therefore, almost inevitable that, on many issues, the party line will coincide with the position of many non-Communists. The danger of indiscriminately alleging that someone is a Communist merely because his views on a particular issue happen to parallel the official party position is obvious. The confusion which is thereby created helps the Communists by diffusing the forces of their opponents.”[196]
A person, however, who finds some of his views parallel those of the Party needs, of course, to examine his views to see whether or not they are non-Communist views which the party has taken merely to gain favor with the masses, or for some other reason, or whether or not they are views which can only help communism instead of freedom. One should also ask: How does the Communist try to use this for his own ends? Then one can try to work for the legitimate goals in such a way that no comfort is given to the Communists.
When one points out that a position parallels the party line, and when one shows in what way or ways the position advances [Pg 86]communism, one does not need to go into the motives of the non-Communist who advances this position. It is unnecessary, in order to deal with any concrete issue, to know why the person takes a particular position. Regardless of motives, one can be convinced that certain things do advance communism. This can be pointed out without entering into the question of motives. We, therefore, are not attacking Senator Fulbright’s motives, but his judgment.
The Senator, we regret to say, has accused some people of misquoting the memorandum in order to get headlines. “I regret the continued misquote of this memorandum by extremist groups and conservatives seeking headlines.”[197] We cannot sanction any misquotations, but neither do we endorse this judging of motives.
There are many things, however, in the Communist line which can hardly be said to fall into the category of legitimate objectives. The careful reader will ask: Does this or that item fall into this category? Even, however, when it does not, we need not deal with the motives of non-Communists who follow this or that aspect of the line. We can oppose their judgment in the matter. We emphasize that if they blunder us into slavery it will be slavery just as certain as if they had taken us into slavery with their eyes open.
There are several points in the memorandum which are included in the current Communist line.
The Fulbright memorandum implies that the military is engaging in politics if it follows the 1958 directive of the National Security Council, and participates in the cold war by instructing the people concerning the history, philosophy, strategy and tactics of communism, including the internal menace. It assumes that this is partisan politics. If this is not the assumption of the memorandum, why does the Senator say that the purpose of the memorandum is to uphold the principle of the military’s subordination to civilian control, and that there “has been a strong tradition in this country that it is not the function of the military to educate the public on political issues.”[198] [Pg 87]His memorandum is a challenge of the National Security Council directive of 1958 which put the military into the cold war to alert the people on the menace and nature of the enemy—communism.
If, on the other hand, the memorandum is not against the military alerting the civilian population concerning communism—in both its external and internal threat—then why doesn’t the memorandum protest against just the abuses of the directive instead of seeking the elimination of the directive?
Gus Hall, General Secretary of the Communist Party, agrees with the position that for military officials to expose the workings of communism in America and elsewhere is to engage in political discussion. For Gus Hall maintains that the Communist Party is simply a political party. “A very important lesson is to learned from this. No matter what one’s attitude may be towards the Communist Party, it must be recognized that the fight for its rights as a political party is a matter of defending the Bill of Rights and all democratic rights, and is the concern of all, especially of all left, democratic, and peace forces, and not of the Communists alone. This is an old lesson, but sometimes it has to be learned anew.”[199]
Senator Fulbright thinks that in “the long run, it is quite possible that the principal problem of leadership will be, if it is not already, to restrain the desire of the people to hit the Communists with everything we’ve got, particularly if there are more Cubas and Laos.”[200] This is because the people are infected with the “virus of rightwing radicalism”, and also since “radicalism of the right can be expected to have great mass appeal during such periods” of crisis.[201] When one takes this to its logical conclusion it means that the Senator must think that the main problem is to fight the so-called “rightwing radicals”.
That the “ultra-right” is at least one of the main problems is also the judgment of Gus Hall, General Secretary of the [Pg 88]Communist Party. “However, the situation requires that the main direction of the attack should be at the war-mongering and fascist forces, who are pressuring the Kennedy Administration further to the Right. At the same time, every policy or action of Kennedy that plays into the hands of the Right should be sharply opposed and criticized, building up the pressures upon the Administration for a change of policy in the direction of peaceful coexistence and defense of democracy.”[202]
Senator Fulbright thinks that in the “long twilight struggle” ahead that the people may become frustrated and that under such circumstances “radical rightism” will appeal to them even more strongly than at the present.[203]
Gus Hall, General Secretary of the Communist Party, has more or less the same fear. “We need to be aware that when people in large numbers become disillusioned or panicky there is always the danger that they may be entrapped by the demagogy of the ultra-Right, especially when their leaders become the instruments or allies of monopoly. For example, the recent statement of the AFL-CIO executive council, drawn up by professional anti-Communists, supports the most aggressive warlike incitement in the so-called Berlin crisis, and even urges the resumption of nuclear testing.”[204]
The memorandum takes the position that the concept of protracted conflict will lead to war, that it is an element of radical rightwingism, and that we must seek some sort of accommodation with communism instead of engaging in protracted conflict to defeat it.[205]
The Communists have made it one of their objectives to utilize their influence, in any way that they can, toward getting the Kennedy administration to seek an accommodation with communism, i.e., to refuse to try to roll back the tide of Communist [Pg 89]advance. Thus Gus Hall write: “It is of course true that these maneuvers, pretenses, and concessions are forced upon him by the strength of the world peace forces, by the deterioration of imperialism, by the declining world prestige and position of U. S. imperialism in particular, and by the deep-rooted peace and democratic sentiment of the American people.
“But the fact remains that the Kennedy administration has not closed the door to accommodation to these world realities, as the ultra-Right wishes it to do, and this involves a certain recognition of the new necessities of the present-day world at home and abroad. This is an important difference, which the forces for peace and democracy must recognize and exploit in order to bring about the required change in national policy.”[206]
That the Communists want the administration to take the position that communism is a world trend which cannot be resisted is made clear from another statement. “Continuing rebuffs and defeats for the cold war and interventionist policy (most recently in Cuba and Laos) confront the dominant monopoly power with a choice, essentially between two alternatives. One is to end the cold war and to seek some form of accommodation to the socialist and national revolutionary world, which would mean a turn to a policy of peaceful coexistence and peaceful competition. Such a shift of policy would meet the most urgent national needs of the country in the present period of world history.
“The other course is to seek to contain and reverse world trends by all means, including so-called limited war and the ultimate nuclear war. It is necessary to recognize that the present cold-war policies of the Administration lead in this direction. However, we must also recognize that the most aggressive and extreme expression of this suicidal policy comes from the ultra-Right.”[207]
Thus they are out to influence those whom they consider to be the liberal forces in the Kennedy administration. “It would be wishful thinking to assume that all liberal or forward-looking forces in the Kennedy camp, who must in their way participate in turning the tide, are equally aware of the double role played by Kennedy. These elements can become an effective positive [Pg 90]force once they realize it is necessary to fight Kennedy’s cold war and anti-democratic policies in order to defend democracy and to close the door to the extreme Right and defeat the threat from that direction.”[208]
The Senator, as we have seen, was extremely disturbed by the Cuban invasion, and he opposes any direct efforts on our part to overthrow Castro. Gus Hall is also disturbed about the matter, although at least some of his reasons are different. Hall did think that it was immoral for he said that the decision to invade Cuba was “criminal and reprehensible”. “It is also of significance that Kennedy decided not to back up the emigre invasion of Cuba with direct and open U. S. military support, as criminal and reprehensible as was his decision to go through with the military adventure, and as serious as still is the danger of U. S. imperialist intervention. It is also noteworthy that Kennedy must still seek to maintain democratic and anti-colonial pretenses in his dealings with the national liberation movements, although his objective remains to contain and reverse them. This creates certain embarrassments for him in world affairs, in view of anti-democratic measures at home.”[209]
In the discussion and rejection of the concept of protracted conflict, the memorandum indicates that to engage in protracted conflict, to meet with strength the Communists at every turn, will undermine democracy. Thus it said: “Perhaps the most fundamental criticism that can be made of the book is that it fails to analyze the impact of a policy of protracted conflict on our democratic institutions. Barnett’s program of action, for example, would require large sums of public funds used with little public accountability, a wide network of secrecy and security in government operations, a cold war orientation in our schools and universities—in short, a stunting of pluralism, a curtailment of individual liberties, and a weakening of politically responsible government. The editors of ‘American Strategy’ [Pg 91]seem to see no alternative to confronting the Soviets with strong opposition at every turn. Indeed, they appear more concerned with virility than freedom, as if strength and courage were goals in themselves. This, together with the somewhat static nature of their view of history and the militant nature of their recommendations, justifies further inquiry about the men and the organizations who advocate a strategy based on those premises.”[210]
Gus Hall is also convinced that the ultra-Right is trying to build “a garrison state that will seek to drive the country to war and self-destruction.”[211]
Senator Fulbright says: “Perhaps it is far-fetched to call forth the revolt of the French generals as an example of the ultimate danger. Nevertheless, military officers, French or American, have some common characteristics arising from their profession and there are numerous military ‘fingers on the trigger’ throughout the world. While this danger may appear very remote, contrary to American tradition, and even American military tradition, so also is the ‘long twilight struggle’, and so also is the very existence of an American military program for educating the public.”[212]
Gus Hall, in his discussion of the directive of the National Security Council is more emphatic than Senator Fulbright. “The entire line of policy, coupled with CIA and similar training in [Pg 92]subversive and putschist activities, cannot help but create our own ‘French Generals,’ who feel at home in fascist circles, and are ready to lend themselves to their objectives.”[213]
Gus Hall attacks the 1958 directive of the National Security Council.[214]
The Senator’s memorandum was aimed directly at the directive.[215]
Senator Fulbright considers General Walker’s case as but an illustration of the deeper problem of the military’s involvement in the “rightwing” activities. Thus he wrote: “With respect to the problem illustrated by the case of General Walker....”[216]
This is also the way that Gus Hall feels about it. “The case of General Walker was only a symptom of a much deeper affliction.”[217]
Senator Fulbright thinks that the military has a good deal of “rightwingism” in it. “Whether these instances are representative of programs implementing the National Security Council directive is not known, but the pattern they form, makes it strongly suspect that they are. There are many indications that the philosophy of the programs is representative of a substantial element of military thought, and has great appeal to the military mind. A strong case can be made, logically, that this type of activity is the inevitable consequence of such a directive. There is little in the education, training or experience of most military officers to equip them with the balance of judgment necessary to put their own ultimate solutions—those with which their education, training and experiences are concerned—into proper [Pg 93]perspective in the President’s total ‘strategy for the nuclear age.’”[218]
Gus Hall says: “Another pronounced characteristic of this growing fascist movement is its spreading influence among the higher military personnel.”[219] The Draft Program of the Communist Party in the U.S.S.R. in 1961 also said that the military was involved in the “fascist” anti-Communist drive.[220]
The Communists have at least two objectives in their attack on the military. First, the military contains some experts in the field of the cold war, and it is organized so that it can effectively reach all parts of America. Neutralizing the military in the cold war means that the Communists have far fewer foes to fight in the cold war. Second, the attack on the military can be used to try to undermine the morale of the military.
The memorandum classifies “Communism on the Map” and “Operation Abolition” as part of the extremely radical rightwing material being used in seminars.[221]
“Communism on the Map” is also noted in an unfavorable way by Gus Hall.[222]
Gus Hall also notices in an unfavorable context “Operation Abolition.”[223] These two films are “obnoxious films.”[224]
Gus Hall evidently is against “Operation Abolition” because it is an indictment of the Communists and an exposure of how they work and how they manipulate others.
In a speech in Arkadelphia on October 11 Senator Fulbright’s opposition to the film is based on the following, according to the Arkansas Gazette.
“One widely distributed film, Fulbright said, tries to show that the student body of the University of California is ‘ready to desert the American system’. He referred to ‘Operation [Pg 94]Abolition’, which purports to show that student protests at a House Un-American Activities Committee hearing last year at San Francisco were Communist inspired.”[225]
The film tries to show no such desertion by the student body. It does show that some students from the University were duped. It is doubtful that many of them really knew that the Communists were using them. Or does the Senator think that the students knew what they were doing?
The Senator views as “fascist” those whom he labels as radical rightwingers.[226]
Gus Hall also characterizes the “ultra-right” as fascist.[227] And by the “ultra-right” he is including at least some of the groups classified by Senator Fulbright as radical rightwingers. For example, Dr. Benson, Harding College and the National Education Program.
Senator Fulbright thinks that frustration in restraint is one of the reasons that the American people need to be curbed, and that this need will grow if there are any more Cubas and Laoses.[228]
Gus Hall explains the reaction of what he calls the extreme right on the grounds that the extreme right wants to turn back the tide of history (i.e. they want to win the victory over Communism), but that they are frustrated at seeing the advances of communism. “In the opinion of the Communist Party, there can be no question but that the threat from the extreme Right is serious. It arises from a situation which is new for the United States. This, the most powerful capitalist country, cannot have its way in a world in which the forces of socialism, national liberation, and peace are playing a decisive role. Continuing rebuffs and defeats for the cold war and interventionist policy [Pg 95](most recently in Cuba and Laos) confront the dominant monopoly power with a choice, essentially between two alternatives. One is to end the cold war and to seek some form of accommodation to the socialist and national revolutionary world, which would mean a turn to a policy of peaceful coexistence and peaceful competition. Such a shift of policy would meet the most urgent national needs of the country in the present period of world history.
“The other course is to seek to contain and reverse world trends by all means, including so-called limited war and the ultimate nuclear war. It is necessary to recognize that the present cold-war policies of the Administration lead in this direction. However, we must also recognize that the most aggressive and extreme expression of this suicidal policy comes from the ultra-Right.”[229]
We agree with the Senator that Americans will find it very frustrating if there are any more Cubas and Laoses. And, if the tide of communism continues to advance, they will undoubtedly come to the place where they will demand that we hit the Communists with everything we have if such is necessary to stop communism.
We do not agree with Gus Hall that the advance of Communism is inevitable.
In the author’s judgment Senator Fulbright and Gus Hall are right in saying that there are Americans who are frustrated because of continued losses to communism. There are people, of course, whose frustrations are not due to communism itself. However, there are many Americans who are not extremists but who are frustrated in various degrees because we have not stopped, not to speak of the fact that we are not winning the cold war, the advances of communism.
Roscoe Drummond has well pointed out that there is a mounting sense of frustration because we are always on the defensive in the cold war. He suggests that the way to overcome this, and to keep extremists from having any appeal to the masses, is for the President either to take the diplomatic initiative in the cold war or to show the people that it is not possible to do so. We have been on the diplomatic defensive since World War II [Pg 96]ended, he affirmed, and unless the President is able to find the will and the way to take the initiative that the President “will be leaving the field open to the extremists”.[230]
A study of the quotation, in the above section, from Gus Hall indicates that he is saying that we must accommodate ourselves to communism and its advances, or we shall have limited wars and then a nuclear war. This is curiously like the line in the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists that if we meet Communist aggression with a determined effort to win the cold war we shall likely end up in war.[231]
The Communist journal, World Marxist Review, has said that those who seek for victory over communism are eager for war. Dr. Robert Strausz-Hupe is quoted as follows: “Our lot is conflict. History brings us ‘not peace but a sword’.... The ultimate strategy for freedom, therefore, must be the devolution of Communist totalitarian governments.... The United States cannot renounce the first use of atomic weapons.” The World Marxist Review says that: “This incendiary strategy is elaborated in detail from Herman Kahns On Thermonuclear War.”[232]
Then the World Marxist Review comments: “These are not only the personal views of Mr. Strausz-Hupe or Mr. Kahn. They are the credo of the American military, many of whom make no secret of their eagerness to unleash the dogs of war. Moreover, as the foregoing shows, neither the ideas nor the ‘total’ war preparations of the U. S. government can be traced to the so-called ‘Berlin crisis’.”[233]
Of course, the memorandum and the World Marxist Review differ in that the World Marxist Review says that the military is eager to start war. The memorandum simply takes the position that the position of protracted conflict will likely lead to world war.
The effect of each—the memorandum and the World Marxist Review—in this matter is the same. Both of them try to discourage [Pg 97]us from waging protracted conflict and winning the victory over communism.
It is a major Communist objective to convince the non-Communist world that if they wage cold war that they will end up in a nuclear war. To strive for victory in the cold war must involve finally nuclear war. This, we are convinced, is not the case. Continual losses in the cold war are much more apt to bring us to nuclear war, since Communist victories in the cold war emboldens them, weakens us and brings more “neutrals” on to their bandwagon. When the Communists think that they have the United States sufficiently isolated and undermined it is quite likely that the Communists will confront us with the demand to surrender or to be involved in nuclear war.
If we endeavor to win the cold war, and it is my conviction that we can do so, as our victories in the cold war increase the Communists will realize that regardless of what a nuclear war will do to us it will destroy Communism. A nuclear war would immediately destroy the Communist chain of command. A dictatorship cannot go on with its chain of command shattered. Revolts will take place in the satellites. The masses of China would revolt if a nuclear war shattered the Red’s chain of control in China.
It is the judgment of the author, based not only on the above, but also on the fact that the Russian Communists have backed down when the United States government has met them firmly, that the Communists do not want a nuclear war. In the author’s judgment, short of an all-out attack we could not force them into a nuclear war, unless they were ready for one and wanted one. They hope to achieve their objectives without a nuclear war. But they will resort to such a war if they are convinced it is absolutely necessary and that war would enable them to win over us. In which case nothing we could do would stop the Communists from starting a war unless we surrendered. Furthermore, if we surrendered this would not guarantee that no nuclear war would take place. Who knows but what after world victory Communists would fall out among themselves and one group use the bomb on another group.
In the author’s judgment there is no way to guarantee that there will not be a nuclear war. But for us to let our policy be [Pg 98]determined by an overwhelming fear of nuclear war will lead us to defeat.
When we think of the millions which the Communists kill after they take over a country, there is no certainty that more will not be killed if we surrendered than if we waged nuclear war, if such were forced on us.
Although there are Americans who do not want us to publicly proclaim that our goal is to win the victory over the aggressive forces of communism, the Communists have made clear that they expect to win. Khrushchev said that Marxism-Leninism when assimilated by the people leads them to “take power into their hands and build their state.
“This is a mighty force which nothing can resist. And let Mssrs. Imperialists, Monopolists and various Colonialists—for it is the same thing——know that no prayers, no incantations can reverse the march of history to make it move backward. Victory will be ours, comrades!”[234]
The Communists, we see, are not letting the idea that the waging of protracted conflict, and the aim of victory, will lead to war restrain them from fighting to win.
It is well for us to realize that Communists have been ordered to intensify their efforts to discredit, to discourage and to destroy anti-communism. As Edward Hunter pointed out, they know where they are hurting, and if anti-communism were not hurting them they would not make anti-anti-communism a prime objective.
The Moscow Manifesto issued by 81 Communist Parties in November-December, 1960, and which is accepted as providing guidance for the Communist Party in America,[235] calls for an intensification of the attack on anti-communists.
“Anti-communism, which is indicative of a deep ideological crisis in, and extreme decline of bourgeois ideology, resorts to monstrous distortions of Marxist doctrine and crude slander [Pg 99]against the Socialist social system, presents Communist policies and objectives in a false light and carries on a witch hunt against the democratic peaceful forces and organizations.”
“To effectively defend the interests of the working people, maintain peace and realize the Socialist ideals of the working class, it is indispensable to wage a resolute struggle against anti-communism—that poisoned weapon which the bourgeoisie uses to fence off the masses from socialism.”[236]
The 1961 Congress of the Communist Party in the U.S.S.R. called for warfare against anti-communism. “The chief ideological and political weapon of imperialism is anti-communism, which consists mainly in slandering the Socialist system and distorting the policy and objectives of the Communist Parties and Marxist-Leninist theory.
“Under cover of anti-communism, imperialist reaction persecutes and hounds all that is progressive and revolutionary; it seeks to split the ranks of the working people and to paralyze the proletarians’ will to fight. Rallied to this black banner today are all the enemies of social progress: the finance oligarchy and the military, the Fascists and reactionary clericals, the colonialists and landlords and all the ideological and political vehicles of imperialist reaction. Anti-communism is a reflection of the extreme decadence of bourgeois ideology.”[237] The World Marxist Review for October 1961 carried an article on “Anti-Communism—a Crime Against the People.”
We have neither stated nor implied that every criticism against every anti-Communist is an implementation of this directive from the Kremlin. In the anti-Communist movements in the United States you can find extremists, some uninformed people, crackpots and a few totalitarians. However, the anti-Communist movements have no monopoly on such persons. Thus there may be ample grounds to criticize some individuals, some organizations, and some positions which are taken. There are criticisms which are justified and which need to be made.
However, criticism of the crackpots, the mistaken and the [Pg 100]totalitarians is not the only kind of criticism going on today. Different groups, even widely different groups, are lumped together by some critics. They are all classified as “extremely radical rightwing” people and positions. They are all classified as the “ultra-right”.
We are not suggesting that all the extremists who lump together different anti-Communist groups as “the ultra-right” and “extremely radical rightwingers”, are responding to the Moscow directive. We are confident that some are misinformed and misguided; that some see an opportunity to make political hay; that some have a vested interest in discrediting those who have compiled and publicized their public record; that there are others who hate capitalism and oppose those who defend it; these or other reasons explain the attack of some. Since, however, the Communists have been working for decades to infiltrate various phases of American life we can be certain that there are some hidden Communists who are vigorously engaged in anti-anti-communism. Who are they? I don’t know who the hidden Communists, or hidden sympathizers and fellow travelers, are. I doubt that even the FBI could possibly know about all of them.
It is fortunate, however, that one does not need to know why people do something in order to evaluate the actions of these people. Thus although it is certainly not without significance that, so soon after the Moscow directive, there should be several storms of criticism of and attacks on various anti-Communists, it would be inaccurate and unfair to say that they are all implementations of the Moscow directive. The fact that the Communists are now trying to destroy the vigorous anti-Communist organizations and individuals, does suggest to us that we should all endeavor to be fair and precise in our criticisms, and that we should exercise great care lest we promote the cause of anti-anti-communism.
[194] “Religious Freedom News,” October 1961, p. 2.
[195] Gus Hall, General Secretary of the Communist Party, U.S.A., Worker, July 16, 1961. The entire article is reprinted in the Senate Internal Security Subcommittee, The New Drive Against the Anti-Communist Program. Washington: Government Printing Office, 1961. This quotation is from page 47. We shall quote from the article as reprinted in this Senate publication. Edward Hunter’s testimony is contained in the above Senate publication. The Worker boasts that it was among the first to attack the “ultra-right,” Jan. 14, 1962, p. 5.
[196] J. Edgar Hoover, The Communist Party Line, Washington, D. C.: Government Printing Office, 1961, p. 6.
[197] Arkansas Democrat, December 4, 1961.
[198] Congressional Record, August 2, 1961, p. 13436, col. 2,b.
[199] Senate Internal Security Subcommittee, The New Drive Against the Anti-Communist Program, July 11, 1961, p. 50. Most of this publication was reprinted in the Congressional Record, August 28, 1961, pp. 16094-16116. An entire article by Gus Hall is in this Senate report...
[200] Congressional Record, August 2, 1961, p. 13437, col. 2,t.
[201] Ibid., p. 13437, col. 2,b.
[202] The New Drive Against the Anti-Communist Program, p. 49.
[203] Congressional Record, August 2, 1961, p. 13437, col. 2,t.
[204] The New Drive Against the Anti-Communist Program, p. 48.
[205] Congressional Record, August 2, 1961, pp. 13439-13440.
[206] The New Drive Against the Anti-Communist Program, p. 48.
[207] Ibid., p. 46.
[208] Ibid., p. 48.
[209] Ibid., pp. 47-48.
[210] Congressional Record, August 2, 1961, p. 13440, col. 1,b-2,t. “There have been dire predictions since the end of World War II that an attempt to defend ourselves would turn America into a garrison state. But, our defense budget has varied from 40 percent to 5 percent to 15 percent and down again to 9 percent of our gross national product, and our experience offers little confirmation for such fears.” Albert Wohlstetter, an official in the Rand Corporation. Congressional Record, June 16, 1960, p. 11911, col. 3,m. “From the radical left, and sometimes from the radical pacifists, we hear other voices of doom. We have great armed forces, they say, therefore our freedom is doomed by a garrison state. Or we have big businesses, therefore democracy is being strangled by greedy monopolies. We have ‘internal contradictions,’ as the ideologists love to say—labor versus capital, farms versus cities, importers versus exporters—and therefore democracy will soon tear itself to pieces.” (Press Release No. 3910, January 14, 1962. Address by Ambassador Adlai E. Stevenson, U.S. Representative to the U.N., before Anti-Defamation League of B’nai B’rith on the occasion of his receipt of the America’s Democratic Legacy Award, Hotel Plaza, New York, N.Y.)
[211] The New Drive Against the Anti-Communist Program, p. 47.
[212] Congressional Record, August 2, 1961, p. 13437, col. 2,b.
[213] The New Drive Against the Anti-Communist Program, p. 46.
[214] Ibid., p. 46.
[215] Congressional Record, August 2, 1961, p. 13436, col. 3,b., pp. 13436-13437, col. 3,b-1,t., p. 13437 col. 3,t.
[216] Ibid., p. 13438, col. 1,t.
[217] The New Drive Against the Anti-Communist Program, p. 46.
[218] Congressional Record, August 2, 1961, p. 13437, col. 1,b.
[219] The New Drive Against the Anti-Communist Program, p. 46.
[220] The Worker, August 20, 1961, p. S7, col. 2,b. Program of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (Draft), New York: Crosscurrents Press, Inc., 1961, p. 50.
[221] Congressional Record, August 2, 1961, p. 13439, col. 1,t. p. 13438, col. 1,m. col. 2,m.
[222] The New Drive Against the Anti-Communist Program, p. 46.
[223] Ibid., p. 46.
[224] Ibid., p. 46.
[225] Arkansas Gazette, October 12, 1961, p. 1B.
[226] Congressional Record, August 21, 1961, pp. 15357-15358.
[227] The New Drive Against the Anti-Communist Program, p. 46. See also The Worker, November 12, 1961, p. 1. Mike Newberry, The Fascist Revival, New York: New Century Publishers, 1961. This is a Communist publication.
[228] Congressional Record, August 2, 1961, p. 13437, col. 2,t.
[229] The New Drive Against the Anti-Communist Program, pp. 45-46.
[230] “Extremism Comes From a Sense of Frustration,” Arkansas Democrat, November 28, 1961.
[231] Congressional Record, August 2, 1961, pp. 13439-13440.
[232] World Marxist Review, December, 1961, p. 25, col. 1,t.
[233] Ibid., p. 25, col. 1,b.
[234] Speech at the Fifth World Congress of Trade Unions, December 9, 1961. This is No. 227 press release from EMBASSY OF THE U.S.S.R., Dec. 11, 1961, p. 2.
[235] James E. Jackson, “The General Crisis of Capitalism Deepens,” World Marxist Review, January 1961, p. 38.
[236] Senate Internal Security Subcommittee, Communist and Workers’ Parties’ Manifesto Adopted November-December, 1960. Interpretation and Analysis. Washington: Government Printing Office, 1961, p. 72. The entire Manifesto is reprinted in this government document, along with some statements by Communists in America.
[237] Program of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (Draft), p. 50.
[Pg 101]
The Communist Manifesto in its closing words declared war on all non-Communists. The Communists have continued this warfare even until now. It will culminate, they are confident, in the complete victory of communism. Although they want to avoid World War III, if they can attain their aims without it, they are now waging cold war, as well as hot war, against us in order to ultimately make possible world conquest.
The present period of peaceful coexistence is but another phase of their war on non-Communist societies. In the Statement by 81 Communist Parties in Moscow, November, 1960, this was clearly set forth.
“The policy of peaceful coexistence meets the basic interests of all peoples, of all who want no new cruel wars and seek durable peace. This policy strengthens the positions of socialism, enhances the prestige and international influence of the socialist countries and promotes the prestige and influence of the socialist countries and promotes the prestige and influence of the Communist Parties in the capitalist countries. Peace is a loyal ally of socialism, for time is working for socialism against capitalism.
“The policy of peaceful coexistence is a policy of mobilizing the masses and launching vigorous action against the enemies of peace. Peaceful coexistence of states does not imply renunciation of the class struggle as the revisionists claim. The coexistence of states with differing social systems is a form of class struggle between socialism and capitalism. In conditions of peaceful coexistence favorable opportunities are provided for the development of the class struggle in the capitalist countries and the national-liberation movement of the peoples of the colonial and dependent countries. In their turn, the successes of the revolutionary class and the national liberation struggle promote peaceful coexistence. The Communists consider it their [Pg 102]duty to fortify the faith of the people in the possibility of furthering peaceful coexistence, their determination to prevent world war. They will do their utmost for the people to weaken imperialism and limit its sphere of action by an active struggle for peace, democracy and national liberation.
“Peaceful coexistence of countries with differing social systems does not mean conciliation of the socialist and bourgeois ideologies. On the contrary, it implies intensification of the struggle of the working class, of all the Communist Parties, for the triumph of socialist ideas. But ideological and political disputes between states must not be settled through war.”[238]
Communist doctrine, action and aggression, however, has called forth anti-communism. Those who are for liberty and righteousness are aroused when they realize the inroads which communism is making throughout the world. If men are for the traditional values of Western civilization, for example, they must be against communism which endeavors to destroy those values.
It is very unfortunate that Senator Fulbright should brand so many informed anti-Communists as belonging (as Gus Hall puts it) to the ultra-right,[239] or extreme radical rightwing (as Senator Fulbright puts it). It is tragic that the Senator has helped knock the military out of the cold war (one of the prime objectives of the Communists in America). It also is harmful to the cause of anti-communism and freedom that he has identified this so-called radical rightwing with fascism. It does not help military morale to raise the idea of “French Generals” in America in the future threatening civilian authority.
We hope that the Senator will reconsider and that he will use his tremendous influence to get the Secretary of Defense and the White House to disregard his very influential secret memorandum. We are not asking that mistakes of anti-communists not be pointed out, but we are asking him not to lump together so many different groups of anti-communists and label them as “radical rightwingers”. We are not asking that the military engage in partisan politics, but in view of the great danger we stand in we are asking that at least some of the individuals in the military, who are equipped to wage the cold war, be allowed [Pg 103]to help inform and alert the public, as well as the military, concerning the history, philosophy, strategy and tactics of communism. The need to meet the enemy in the cold war, and to win over the very present danger of communism, is a pressing reality; and in dealing with it we should use all necessary forces without being held back by the fear that in some distant future some military leaders might get out of hand. It is not realism to refuse to do what we can, including the use of the military in the cold war, to meet a very real present danger because of a fear of a danger which the Senator admits does not now exist.
The great problems which face us today center in communism and the war which it is now waging on civilization. We hope that the influence of Senator Fulbright, and those of like mind, on the President will not keep him from implementing one of his own statements wherein he said: “So, therefore, the problem always is, how can the military remain removed from political life, how can civilian control of the military remain removed from political life, how can civilian control of the military be effectively maintained, and at the same time the military have the right and the necessity to express their educated views on some of the great problems that face us around the world?”[240] This, however, it will be impossible for them to do if the Fulbright memorandum continues to have an influence on the Government.
Let us not lose sight of the basic issues which are involved. First, we have been forced into the cold war by the aggressive acts and designs of the Communists. Second, there is no reason to believe that the Communists will change their minds and abandon their efforts to conquer the world and to remake man into the image demanded by their godless philosophy of life. Third, the cold war is a real war. Fourth, the cold war is the major war which the Communists are now waging against us. Fifth, the military has within its ranks experts on the history, the philosophy, the strategy and the tactics of communism. Sixth, international communism not only operates outside of the borders of our country, but also inside the borders through its various agents, including the Communist Party. Seventh, the oath taken by the military binds the military to defend the [Pg 104]country against enemies both domestic and foreign. Communism today is the foreign and domestic enemy. Eighth, informing the troops and the public concerning communism is not the same as participating in partisan politics. Ninth, there is a need for both the troops and the public to know more about the enemy who faces us. Tenth, civilian control of the military is not really being threatened. Eleventh, it is possible to deal with a military official who oversteps his bounds without nullifying the directive issued in 1958 by the National Security Council. Twelfth, the Fulbright memorandum was aimed at the nullification of this directive and was designed, therefore, to take the military out of the cold war in the very sense in which the directive was designed to put the military into the cold war. Thirteen, the memorandum and the Stanford speech introduce a new concept of government. Fourteen, the memorandum is a serious matter whose implementation hinders, not helps, the United States in the cold war. Thus the author believes that the memorandum is against the real interests of Senator Fulbright and all other Americans.
Furthermore, let it be observed, in conclusion, that Senator Fulbright has recognized elsewhere that the people need to be both alerted and informed, although at times the Senator seems confused on these matters. Thus in the memorandum Senator Fulbright said: “Fundamentally, it is believed that the American people have little, if any, need to be alerted to the menace of the cold war. Rather, the need is for understanding of the true nature of that menace, and the direction of the public’s present and foreseeable awareness of the fact of the menace toward the support of the President’s own total program for survival in a nuclear age.”[241]
Does the Senator mean that the American people have already been sufficiently alerted? Only a year before he doubted that Americans had yet heeded the warning. He further thought that the President was failing to sound the warning sufficiently. “We have been warned, but have we heard? If we should perish it will not be for lack of warning but for lack of the will to survive.”[242] “Mr. Sprague insisted that the United States be awakened [Pg 105]to the scope of the overall Russian threat to us. But who is to ring the alarm bell?
“‘There is only one man in the United States that can do this effectively, and that is the President,’ said Mr. Sprague. He continued: ‘I believe, and this is a personal belief, that the danger is more serious than the President has indicated to the American public.’”[243]
As late as December 1960 the Senator was saying: “The greatest crisis confronting the West is not Berlin. It is the apathy of the free world and its incomprehensible unwillingness to look facts in the face. Evolution and the survival of the fittest are concepts we understand when applied to plants and animals—but we seem not to realize that these concepts apply to us.”[244]
Toward the end of April 1961 President Kennedy said: “Our greatest adversary is not the Russians. It is our own unwillingness to do what must be done.”[245]
Senator Fulbright agrees that the people need to be informed. “The successful waging of peace requires a vigorous national administration, an informed people, and a mature people who know that you cannot be adult without being willing to pay for what you want.”[246] “The American people ought to be told the bleak truth about their world, the character of the forces arrayed against them, and what they must do, at whatever cost, to survive or even to bring about a state of high security. They must be told that, however humane their society, whatever its ideals, this alone will not save them from destruction by a society armed [Pg 106]with the prodigious mechanisms of our times and an implacable determination to dominate all men.”[247]
Since this is the case, there is no real reason why qualified men in the military should not be used in alerting and informing America.
[238] Statement of the Meeting of 81 Communist and Workers’ Parties, November 1960, Toronto 3, Canada: Progress Books. Published for the C.P. of Canada, pp. 16-17. Senate Internal Security Subcommittee, op. cit. p. 64.
[239] Gus Hall, the Communist, in the Worker, July 16, 1961.
[240] Excerpts from press conference of President Kennedy, Congressional Record, August 11, 1961, p. 14449, col. 1,m.
[241] Ibid., August 2, 1961, p. 13437, col 2,b.-3,t.
[242] Ibid., March 28, 1960, p. A2708, col. 1,t.
[243] Ibid., p. A2708, col. 3,m.
[244] Ibid., February 16, 1961, p. A925.
[245] As quoted in the Congressional Record, May 9, 1961, p. 7138, col. 3,b.
[246] Ibid., March 28, 1960, pp. A2708, col. 3,b.—A2709.
[247] Ibid., p. A2709, col. 2,t. Senator Fulbright also said: “As things now stand, however, the Soviets profit not only from their own energy, but also from our apathy.” (Congressional Record, Sept. 9, 1961, p. 17249. Col.3, m.) “Many among us expressed the fear that our inertia would be overcome—but momentarily, and that, like one who is awakened from a deep sleep by some minor disturbance, we would again subside into dreamland.” “Mr. President, I have no idea what must be done to awaken Americans to the unpleasant facts of life. As unwilling as I am to face it, perhaps the answer is that we simply do not wish to be disturbed.” (Congressional Record, January 23, 1959, p. 1007, col. 1,b.) “I believe that such a study would conclude that America’s trouble is basically one of aimlessness at home and frustration abroad.” (Speech before the American Bar Association, Sept. 1, 1960. Congressional Record, Sept 2, 1961, p. A6708, col. 2,b.) “... if only we would stop snoring with our eyes open.” (Congressional Record, May 11, 1959, p. A3890. col. 1,m.) “We might even look forward to the day when the Soviets become as snug and complacent as we have become.” (ibid., col. 2,b.) “Indeed, we are not even united on the nature and magnitude of that threat.” (ibid., p. A3891, col. 2,m.) Edgar Ansel Mowrer has written a book entitled, An End to Make-Believe. New York: Duell, Sloan and Pearce, 1961.
Mrs. F. D. Roosevelt, on October 17, 1957, said: “It’s not communism I am afraid of. What frightens me is the complacency of the American people and their lack of knowledge about communism and its objectives.” (New York Herald Tribune, October 18, 1957, p. 4) In the author’s judgment, many of the common people today are ahead of some of the “uncommon” people in their understanding of the nature of the threat.
| pg vii Changed: | the following discusison of the memorandum |
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| pg 6 Changed: | or military solution.” Congressonal Record |
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| pg 34 Changed: | It is believed accomodation can be |
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| pg 35 Changed: | of mutual interest, would be tantamont |
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