## The Project Gutenberg eBook of Secrets of Crewe House

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Title: Secrets of Crewe House

The story of a famous campaign

Author: Campbell Stuart

Release date: January 28, 2026 [eBook #77798]

Language: English

Original publication: London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1921

Credits: deaurider and the Online Distributed Proofreading Team at https://www.pgdp.net (This file was produced from images generously made available by The Internet Archive)

*** START OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK SECRETS OF CREWE HOUSE ***
VISCOUNT NORTHCLIFFE.
DIRECTOR OF PROPAGANDA IN ENEMY COUNTRIES.
Photo: Hoppé.

[iii]

# SECRETS OF CREWE HOUSE

The Story of a Famous Campaign

BY

SIR CAMPBELL STUART, K.B.E.

HODDER AND STOUGHTON
LONDON NEW YORK TORONTO
MCMXXI

[iv]

First Edition printed September, 1920.
Second Edition printed October, 1920.
Third Edition printed November, 1920.
Fourth Edition printed March, 1921.

[v]

TO
VISCOUNT NORTHCLIFFE
IN
GRATEFUL AND AFFECTIONATE APPRECIATION

[vii]

## AUTHOR’S FOREWORD

Some courage is required to add to the already too swollen list of war books, of the making of which there seems to be no end. The justification for the present volume, which tells the remarkable story of British propaganda in enemy countries during 1918, lies in the fact that it records historic activities, some of which were of a pioneer character.

Necessarily its publication had to be postponed until the main principles of the Peace had been decided. The nature of the documents quoted precluded earlier publication, which might have embarrassed the Allied Governments. No such embarrassment will be caused at this late stage. The march of events has removed the need, which existed during the War and during the peace-making, for withholding from public knowledge particulars of the organisation and work directed with such effect from Crewe House.

Much that was interesting, and even[viii] dramatic, can never be divulged. Otherwise, many who did valuable and dangerous service might, by a breach of faith, be exposed to reprisals.

The activities of Crewe House will stand the test of judgment by results. German comments on Viscount Northcliffe’s department leave no room for doubt as to the verdict of enemy countries.

[ix]

## CONTENTS

CHAPTER I
PROPAGANDA: ITS USES AND ABUSES | 1
CHAPTER II
CREWE HOUSE: ITS ORGANISATION AND PERSONNEL | 8
CHAPTER III
OPERATIONS AGAINST AUSTRIA-HUNGARY: PROPAGANDA’S MOST STRIKING SUCCESS | 20
CHAPTER IV
OPERATIONS AGAINST GERMANY | 50
CHAPTER V
TRIBUTES FROM THE ENEMY | 105
CHAPTER VI
OPERATIONS AGAINST BULGARIA AND OTHER ACTIVITIES | 134[x]
CHAPTER VII
INTER-ALLIED CO-OPERATION | 146
CHAPTER VIII
FROM WAR PROPAGANDA TO PEACE PROPAGANDA | 201
CHAPTER IX
VALE! | 233
APPENDIX—Facsimile leaflets and translations | 237
INDEX | 253

[xi]

## LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS

Viscount Northcliffe | Frontispiece
| BETWEEN PAGES
Crewe House | 8 and 9
Rear-Admiral Sir Reginald Hall, K.C.M.G., C.B., M.P. | 8 and 9
Lieutenant-General Sir George Macdonogh, K.C.M.G., C.B. | 16 and 17
The Rt. Hon. Lord Beaverbrook | 16 and 17
Mr. H. Wickham Steed | 32 and 33
Dr. R. W. Seton-Watson | 32 and 33
News of Allied successes on Western Front for Jugo-Slav soldiers in the Austrian Armies | 48 and 49
A manifesto from Dr. Trumbitch distributed from aeroplanes among Jugo-Slav troops in the Austrian Army | 48 and 49
Mr. H. G. Wells | 64 and 65
Leaflet—probably the first—distributed by British aeroplanes among German troops in October, 1914. It announced a Russian victory in East Prussia | 64 and 65
Mr. Hamilton Fyfe | 64 and 65
Aeroplane distribution of copies of an early leaflet prepared for the German soldier | 64 and 65
Brigadier-General G. K. Cockerill, C.B. | 80 and 81
A typical news-sheet for German soldiers | 80 and 81
Captain Chalmers Mitchell | 96 and 97[xii]
“Reporting Progress”—Leaflet which gave particulars of Allied progress against the Germans | 96 and 97
Diagrammatic representation of the growth of the American Army in the Field | 96 and 97
Map-leaflet showing the breaking of the Hindenburg line | 112 and 113
News for German soldiers of the destruction of the Turkish Army in Palestine | 112 and 113
Some pointed quotations for German soldiers culled from German sources | 112 and 113
A medallion struck by the Germans in “dishonour” of Lord Northcliffe | 128 and 129
Leaflet with particulars of the fate of 150 German submarine commanders, which created great depression in German naval ports | 128 and 129
Leaflet warning the Germans that such places as Berlin and Hamburg had been brought within range of aerial attack and could be bombed if the war were prolonged | 128 and 129
A German dream and the result. A leaflet illustrating the collapse of the Mittel-Europa ambition of German militarism | 144 and 145
Front page of a “Trench Newspaper,” issued by Crewe House for German troops | 144 and 145
The late Sir Charles Nicholson, Bart., M.P. | 144 and 145
Sir Roderick Jones, K.B.E. | 160 and 161
Illustrated leaflet portraying contentment of German prisoners in British hands | 160 and 161
Colonel the Earl of Denbigh, C.V.O. | 160 and 161
Leaflet showing how the Allies had shattered the great Berlin-Bagdad plan | 160 and 161
Mr. Robert Donald | 176 and 177[xiii]
Manifesto to Magyar Troops | 176 and 177
“Drifting down in white showers”: Leaflets, from Italian aeroplane squadron, dropping on Vienna | 176 and 177
Manifesto, signed by Professor (now President) Masaryk, to Czecho-Slovak soldiers | 176 and 177
Sir Sidney Low | 192 and 193
Rapidly-distributed leaflets for German troops telling of Allied successes in the Balkans and in Syria | 192 and 193
Mr. James O’Grady, M.P. | 192 and 193
Inflating the balloons and attaching the truth-telling leaflets | 208 and 209
Registering the direction and velocity of the wind, in order to judge where the leaflets would fall | 208 and 209
How leaflets were attached to the balloons | 208 and 209
Dispatching the balloons | 208 and 209
Testing the lifting power of balloons used for propaganda purposes | 224 and 225
LIST OF MAPS.
Ethnographic map of Austria-Hungary | 32 and 38
The partition of Austria-Hungary: Showing the boundaries as defined in the Peace Treaties | 48 and 49
Germany’s new boundaries as fixed by the Treaty of Peace | 80 and 81
Bulgaria as delimited by the Peace treaty | 144 and 145

[1]

## CHAPTER I
PROPAGANDA: ITS USES AND ABUSES

Definition and Axioms: Why German Propaganda Failed: Ludendorff’s Lament and Tribute.

Propaganda in war is a comparatively modern activity. Certainly, in the stage of development to which it attained in the closing phases of the Great War, it is a new weapon of warfare and a powerful weapon. Therefore it requires skilful and careful handling. Otherwise it destroys rather than creates, and alienates whom it should conciliate.

What is propaganda? It is the presentation of a case in such a way that others may be influenced. In so far as its use against an enemy is concerned, the subject matter employed must not be self-evidently propagandist. Except in special circumstances, its origin should be completely concealed. As a general rule, too, it is desirable to hide the channels of communication.

[2]

Creation of a favourable “atmosphere” is the first object of propaganda. Until this psychological effect is produced (as the result of military events, of propagandist activity or of internal political disaffection) the mentality of enemy troops and civil population—and both are equally important in modern warfare—will be naturally unsympathetic and unresponsive to influence. In order to produce this “atmosphere” of receptivity and susceptibility, continuity of propaganda policy is indispensable. This presupposes definition of sound policy, based upon comprehensive knowledge of the facts and of the developments of the political, military, and economic situation, and also of the enemy psychology.

When a line of policy has been laid down, actual propaganda operations may be begun, but not before. First of all axioms of propaganda is that only truthful statements be made. Secondly, there must be no conflicting arguments, and this can only be ensured by close co-operation of all propagandists and by strict adherence to the policy defined. A false step may possibly be irretrievable.

Owing to inattention to these cardinal principles of propaganda against an enemy—inattention[3] due to lack of appreciation of their importance—the Germans’ very energetic propaganda effort miscarried. Wrongly assuming that the war would be of short duration, they made use of untruths and half-truths, mis-statements and over-statements. These produced a temporary effect, but the protraction of the war brought its own refutation of their misrepresentation, and, instead of operating to the good of the Central Empires, the campaign wrought harm to their cause.

Moreover, as they afterwards realised, the Germans did not agree among themselves in their misrepresentations. There was, as a well-known British authority on German propaganda has pointed out, a chaotic exuberance of different points of view. And they were incapable of understanding other nations. Dr. Karl Lamprecht, the distinguished German professor, deplored this in the course of a lecture at the end of 1914, when the Germans regarded their victory as assured. “When the war came,” he said, “everyone who could write obtained the largest possible goose quill and wrote to all his foreign friends, telling them that they did not realise what splendid fellows the Germans were, and not infrequently adding that in[4] many cases their conduct required some excuse. The effect was stupendous.” “I can speak with the most open heart on the subject,” he added, “for amongst the whole crowd it was the professors who were most erratic. The consequences were gruesome. Probably much more harm came to our cause in this way than from all the efforts of the enemy. None the less, it was done with the best intentions. The self-confidence was superb, but the knowledge was lacking. People thought that they could explain the German cause without preparation. What was wanted was organisation.”

Before coming to Allied methods and matter, it will be interesting to examine the scope of German propaganda. In the early stages of the war, Germany loudly proclaimed that she was winning. As the progress of events belied such words, she changed her theme. The Allies could not win, she averred, and the longer they took to realise this the greater would be their suffering and losses. She continually endeavoured to sow discord between the Allies. Great Britain was not taking her fair share of the Allied burden; Great Britain intended to retain Belgium and the northern part of France; Great Britain was using France and Russia for her[5] own selfish ends; the interests of the Balkan Powers could not be reconciled. These were some of the foolish falsehoods in which she indulged. They were ineffective, as were her many attempts to stir up disaffection within Allied countries. Ireland, South Africa, India, Egypt and Mohammedan countries were examples in the case of Great Britain, and Algeria in that of France. She spared no effort to encourage Pacifism among the Allied peoples.

Their lack of success became evident even to the Germans themselves. Government agencies and Press became more reticent as the war went on and the propaganda was found to be doing more harm than good. The military leaders became apprehensive of the effectiveness and superiority of British propaganda. Soldiers and writers made bitter complaints of the lack of any German organisation to maintain an adequate counter-campaign.

General Ludendorff (“My War Memories,” pp. 360 et seq.) is pathetic in his laments at the non-success of German efforts. “The German propaganda,” he writes, “was only kept going with difficulty. In spite of all our efforts, its achievements, in comparison to the magnitude of the task, were inadequate. We[6] produced no real effect on the enemy peoples.” He admits failure, too, in propaganda efforts on the fighting fronts. In the East, he says, the Russians were the authors of their own collapse. In the West, “the fronts of our enemies had not been made susceptible by the state of public opinion in their home countries, and the propaganda we gradually introduced had no success.” He records his efforts to induce the Imperial Chancellor to create a great organisation, as it had become “undeniably essential to establish an Imperial Ministry of Propaganda,” and he was convinced that no adequate counter-campaign to Allied propaganda could be organised except by an Imperial department possessing special powers. “At last a feeble step in this direction was taken in August, 1918. A totally inadequate organisation was set up; besides, it was then too late. In these circumstances it was quite impossible to achieve uniformity in propaganda work between Germany and Austria-Hungary, as was conspicuously the case with our enemies. The Army found no ally in a strong propaganda directed from home. While her Army was victorious on the field of battle, Germany failed in the fight against the moral of the enemy peoples.”

[7]

Ludendorff’s apologia shows that he understood the principles which should govern a propaganda campaign; but he did not understand that the German case was bad. He has the doubtful consolation of knowing he was right in his theories; for they coincided in large degree with the principles upon which Viscount Northcliffe based his famous intensive campaign from Crewe House. No other German has exhibited such a grasp of the fundamentals of propaganda as Ludendorff, and he had excellent opportunity of judging the efficacy of the action into which these theoretical principles were translated. His verdict is an unqualified tribute, as the extracts from his writings quoted in another chapter show.

How this success was attained it is the purpose of this book to reveal.

CREWE HOUSE.

[8]

## CHAPTER II
CREWE HOUSE: ITS ORGANISATION AND PERSONNEL

Viscount Northcliffe’s appointment: The Formation of an Advisory Committee: Other Government Departments’ Co-operation.

In February, 1918, Viscount Northcliffe accepted the Prime Minister’s invitation to become Director of Propaganda in Enemy Countries. Only a few weeks earlier, Lord Northcliffe had concluded his mission to the United States, where he had undertaken the co-ordination and supervision of the multiplex British missions engaged in purchasing food and munitions and in other vitally important operations. Upon his return to England, he had become Chairman of the London headquarters of the British War Mission to the United States of America, after having declined a seat in the Cabinet. Despite the importance of his new duties, he elected to retain his connection with the British War Mission to the United States.

[9]

Lord Northcliffe’s name bore in itself a propaganda value in enemy countries. None knew better than the Germans with what assiduity and tenacity he had striven to awaken the British nation to the extent and significance of the war preparations of German militarism. From the time of his entry into this office he and his work were the subjects of continual reference in the German Press. The vehemence of their attacks showed the depth of their apprehension.

The direction and organisation of propaganda abroad, and especially against enemy countries, required a personnel deeply versed in foreign politics, with an intimate understanding of enemy psychology, and with professional knowledge of the art of presenting facts plainly and forcefully. The work was of a highly specialised character, designed to reveal to the enemy the hopelessness of their cause and case and the inevitability of Allied victory. This called for continuity of policy and persevering effort. But the problems of the penetration of propaganda into enemy countries were as exacting as the definition of policy and the presentation of the facts of the situation.

In order to bring as wide a knowledge as[10] possible to bear upon the conduct of this campaign of education and enlightenment of enemy peoples, Lord Northcliffe invited and obtained the enthusiastic co-operation of a committee of well-known men of affairs and publicists. Each had won distinction in some sphere of public service which rendered his aid in this work valuable.

Lord Northcliffe appointed me as Deputy-Director of the department and Deputy-Chairman of the Committee.

The members of the Committee were:—

Colonel the Earl of Denbigh, C.V.O.

Mr. Robert Donald (then Editor of the Daily Chronicle).

Sir Roderick Jones, K.B.E. (Managing Director of Reuters Agency).

Sir Sidney Low.

Sir Charles Nicholson, Bt., M.P.

Mr. James O’Grady, M.P.

Mr. H. Wickham Steed (Foreign Editor and later Editor-in-Chief of The Times).

Mr. H. G. Wells.

Secretary, Mr. H. K. Hudson, C.B.E.

It was an advisory committee of wide knowledge and many talents, with a strong[11] representation of authors and journalists of distinction. Regular fortnightly meetings were held, at which each section of the department reported progress and submitted programmes of future activities for approval.

The headquarters of the department were established at Crewe House, the town mansion of the Marquis of Crewe, who had, with characteristic public spirit, placed it at the disposal of the Government for war purposes.

The department was divided into two main branches, the one for production, and the other for distribution, of propaganda material. In its turn the production branch was divided into German, Austro-Hungarian, and Bulgarian sections.

For reasons which will be given in the next chapter, the Austro-Hungarian section was the first to begin operations. Mr. Steed and Dr. R. W. Seton-Watson were co-directors of this section. They were an admirable choice. As Foreign Editor (as he then was) of The Times, author of “The Hapsburg Monarchy,” and with experience from 1902 to 1913 as correspondent of The Times at Vienna, Mr. Steed had intimate and authoritative knowledge of the peoples and conditions of the Dual Monarchy. Dr. Seton-Watson was also a distinguished[12] authority on Austro-Hungarian and Balkan history and politics, to which he had devoted many years of study.

After determination of the policy to be pursued against Austria-Hungary, Lord Northcliffe entrusted to them the important mission to Italy which initiated the campaign against the Dual Monarchy, resulting in such far-reaching and remarkable consequences. In the course of this mission they attended the historic Rome Congress of the Oppressed Hapsburg Nationalities and they took a prominent part in the establishment of the inter-Allied commission which waged propaganda warfare against Austria-Hungary. The subsequent conduct of this campaign necessitated keeping in close touch with the different national organisations of the oppressed Hapsburg races—Poles, Czecho-Slovaks, Southern Slavs, Rumanes—throughout 1918, and they were able to render signal services to these peoples as well as to the Allies.

When operations began against Germany, Mr. H. G. Wells accepted Lord Northcliffe’s invitation to take charge of the German Section. Mr. Wells made an exhaustive study of the conditions affecting Germany from a propaganda point of view, with the[13] co-operation of Dr. J. W. Headlam-Morley, and his memorandum (which is published in Chapter IV of this book) is a noteworthy document of exceptional interest. When, in July, 1918, he found himself unable to continue the direction of the German Section (although retaining membership of the Committee) he had collected a mass of valuable data for the use of his successor, Mr. Hamilton Fyfe, the well-known journalist. To Mr. Fyfe and his colleagues of the German Section fell the organisation of the “intensive” propaganda activities of the last three months of the war.

There thus remained the work against Turkey and Bulgaria. By arrangement between Lord Northcliffe and Lord Beaverbrook, propaganda against Turkey was ably conducted by the Near East section of the Ministry of Information, in charge of Mr. (now Sir Hugo) Cunliffe-Owen. This was obviously wise in the interests of economy and efficiency. Propaganda in Bulgaria, however, was directed from Crewe House.

The production of propaganda literature and its distribution were different functions and were performed by separate sections of the department, but, of course, in the closest co-operation. So far as enemy troops were[14] concerned, the distribution for Germans and Bulgarians was undertaken by the British military authorities. For Austro-Hungarian troops, the work was placed on an inter-Allied basis, distribution being organised by the Italian Army.

Distribution through civil channels, a difficult task, was in the hands of Mr. S. A. Guest, who, alone of British propagandists against the enemy, had been constantly engaged in that work since the early days of the war. He built up a series of organisations in different parts of Europe by which news and views could be introduced into all the enemy countries. Great ingenuity and perseverance were required, but no little measure of success crowned his efforts.

Co-ordination of these activities was a vital necessity, and this was effectively ensured by a daily meeting of those in charge of the different sections, the liaison officers between Crewe House and other departments, and the heads of the administrative branches of Crewe House. At this meeting, held usually under my chairmanship, the general details of policy and operations of all sections were systematically discussed. Each section knew what the other was doing, and uniformity of policy and action was[15] secured. In addition, the consideration of the problems which arose, whether in the general work of Crewe House or in the work of one particular section, benefited from the collective attention of a combination of enthusiastic minds. Mr. Hudson, the able secretary of the advisory committee, also acted as secretary of these daily meetings.

All at Crewe House were profoundly grateful for the cordiality with which the many other Government departments, with whom they were brought into contact, lent their co-operation. In this respect the Foreign Office, War Office, Admiralty, Treasury, Ministry of Information, and Stationery Office, all contributed materially to the success attained, although this list by no means exhausts the departments which willingly placed their resources at the disposal of Crewe House. It is pleasing to be able to record this as a recollection of and tribute to the service rendered by these departments in this phase of war activity.

The liaison officers’ duties were extremely important. Mr. C. J. Phillips, a distinguished Civil Servant, who had been transferred from the Board of Education for special work in the Foreign Office, was the connecting link[16] between the latter department and Crewe House. To him fell the task of keeping Crewe House informed of foreign developments which affected the work of propaganda in enemy countries and of keeping the Foreign Office au courant with Crewe House activities. His assistance and judgment were of immense value in dealing with the questions affecting foreign affairs which were constantly arising.

For a few months after Lord Northcliffe’s appointment, the Military Intelligence Directorate of the War Office continued the production of literature for propaganda work against the Germans, and during this period Major the Earl of Kerry, M.P., acted as liaison officer between the two departments. Each department was able to complement and supplement the other’s work with good effect, and the co-operation was carried out most harmoniously. When production was subsequently centralised at Crewe House, Captain Chalmers Mitchell became liaison officer with the War Office and with the Air Ministry. No greater tribute can be paid to his work than the record in the pages that follow.

Most cordial, too, were the relations maintained with the Admiralty, and especially[17] with Rear-Admiral Sir Reginald Hall (Director of Naval Intelligence), through Commander (now Sir Guy) Standing, R.N.V.R. Crewe House was rightly grateful for constant co-operation of a confidential character through the exercise on its behalf of naval resources.

Most valuable assistance was readily given to Crewe House by the Ministry of Information, so efficiently organised by Lord Beaverbrook. Close consultation was maintained between heads of sections of the two departments wherever co-operation could be advantageous. In certain European countries, for instance, the same agents acted for both departments—an arrangement which proved effective as well as economical. Invaluable service for Crewe House was performed by one agent of the Ministry in regard to Bulgarian affairs in which he displayed high competence and discretion. Crewe House was also indebted to the Ministry for the use of its wireless service in sending out matter for the enlightenment of the enemy by that means, and for many similar facilities, too numerous to mention, willingly offered and gladly accepted.

With the Treasury—bête noire to so many temporary war departments—Crewe House[18] had the smoothest working arrangements through Mr. C. S. Kent, who acted as Financial Controller and Accounting Officer in addition to other duties connected with the general administration of Crewe House. At no time was Treasury sanction withheld or delayed in regard to any expenditure proposed in connection with enemy propaganda.

The enemy leaders frequently alleged that Lord Northcliffe expended huge sums of money on his propaganda work. According to the report of the Comptroller and Auditor-General, the expenditure for the four months from September 1 to December 31, 1918—which was the period of the “intensive” campaign and consequently the most expensive—was £31,360 4s. 9d., which included expenses borne by the Office of Works, the Stationery Office, and the War Office on behalf of Crewe House. Only £7,946 2s. 7d. of this amount was incurred directly by Crewe House, one reason for the smallness of the amount being that many members of the department worked without remuneration for their services. The Auditor-General made a complimentary reference to the manner in which the accounts were rendered.

Last, but not least, the Stationery Office[19] which undertook all the printing arrangements for the millions of leaflets and other publications required in German, Croat, Bulgarian, and other languages, rendered great assistance by the promptness and efficiency with which they met Crewe House requirements which, from their very nature, generally necessitated working against time.

It is particularly pleasing to look back and remember all the help so willingly given by other Government departments and to record the unfailing courtesy with which it was proffered and the zeal displayed. Crewe House gladly recognised the value of such loyal co-operation, of which those who were concerned in its work still retain grateful memories.

REAR-ADMIRAL SIR REGINALD HALL, K.C.M.G., C.B., M.P.
[DIRECTOR OF NAVAL INTELLIGENCE, 1918.]
Photo: Russell, London.
LIEUTENANT-GENERAL SIR GEORGE MACDONOGH, K.C.M.G., C.B.
[DIRECTOR OF MILITARY INTELLIGENCE, 1918.]
Photo: Russell, London.
RT. HON. LORD BEAVERBROOK, MINISTER OF INFORMATION, 1918.
Photo: M. S. Kay, Bolton.

[20]

## CHAPTER III
OPERATIONS AGAINST AUSTRIA-HUNGARY: PROPAGANDA’S MOST STRIKING SUCCESS

Anti-German Hapsburg Races: The Secret Treaty of London: Problem of the Adriatic: Importance of the Rome Congress: Lord Northcliffe’s Policy against Austria-Hungary: Formation of an Inter-Allied Propaganda Commission and its Effective Operations: The Final Triumph.

Little time was spent in deciding that, of all enemy countries, Austria-Hungary would be most susceptible to propaganda. With the assistance of such authorities as Mr. Wickham Steed and Dr. Seton-Watson, Lord Northcliffe was soon able to propose a line of sound policy for the sanction of the Foreign Office.

It is strange that determined action on some such lines had not been initiated previously by the Allied Governments. They had failed to profit from the anti-Hapsburg and anti-German sentiment of the oppressed subject races of the Dual Monarchy. Three-fifths[21] of the Hapsburg peoples were actually or potentially well disposed to the Allies, and it was towards this majority that Lord Northcliffe decided that propaganda must be directed with two objectives, one constructive and one destructive:—

(1) The moral and active support of the national desires of these races for independence, with the ultimate aim of forming a strong non-German chain of Central European and Danubian States.

(2) The encouragement of their disinclination to fight on behalf of the Central Empires, thus greatly handicapping the Austro-Hungarian Armies as a fighting force, and seriously embarrassing the German military leaders.

It will be seen with what success each object was secured.

The nationalities chiefly affected were the Czechs and the Southern Slavs. There were also lesser numbers of Italians, Poles and Rumanes, whom it was intended to place under their own national Governments of Italy, the State of Poland (then projected and now established), and Rumania, which countries marched with the districts of[22] Austria-Hungary inhabited by their respective races.

Operations were comparatively straightforward in every case except that of the Southern Slavs, in which the secret Treaty of London of April, 1915, presented a serious obstacle. At the beginning of 1918 few people realised the difficulties thus created, but since the cessation of hostilities the “Adriatic question” has loomed largely in the public view of international relations and is rightly regarded as one of the most troublesome problems of world politics. Its bearing on propaganda lay in the fact that by this treaty Great Britain, France and Russia had promised to Italy certain Austrian territories inhabited by Southern Slavs. These territories, moreover, provided trading access to the sea and were of the highest economic value to any Southern Slav state which might be formed. So long as that treaty was regarded by the Southern Slavs as representing Allied policy, it was difficult to persuade them that Allied sympathies were with them or that the Allies would secure for them the economic interests necessary to the establishment of the united Southern Slav state peopled by the Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes.

With the object of creating a counterpoise[23] to the secret pact, representatives of the Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes, had assembled in Corfu, under the leadership of Dr. Trumbitch (president of the Southern Slav Committee) and M. Pashitch (Prime Minister of Serbia), and had issued the Southern Slav Unitary Declaration on June 20, 1917, proclaiming the union of the three peoples and claiming all territory compactly inhabited by them, which (said the Declaration) “cannot be mutilated without attaint to the vital interests of the community. Our nation demands nothing that belongs to others, but only what is its own.” On the one hand, this was an important counter-step to the partition of Dalmatia proposed in the Treaty of London; while on the other, it was a definite advance towards the solidification of the three peoples into nationhood. Consequently it was not without effect upon the German military leaders, who foresaw its influence upon the Southern Slav regiments of the Austro-Hungarian armies, and it undoubtedly hastened their decision to take direct control of the forces of the Dual Monarchy.

The next move was made after the Italian armies had recovered from the disaster of Caporetto and had re-established their line[24] on the Piave. On the initiative of Mr. Wickham Steed, Dr. Seton-Watson, and other members of the Serbian Society of Great Britain, conferences took place in London between leading Italians and Southern Slavs, with the aim of outlining a solution of the question which would be acceptable to the two nations. A memorandum of the discussions was given to the Prime Minister of Italy (Signor Orlando), who was then (January, 1918) in London. At Mr. Steed’s suggestion, Signor Orlando met Dr. Trumbitch and they discussed the question at great length, with the result that Dr. Trumbitch accepted an invitation from the Italian Premier to go to Rome.

Before that visit took place, Dr. Torre, a prominent member of the Italian Parliament, was sent to London, as representative of an influential joint committee of the two Italian Houses of Parliament, to endeavour to establish a definite basis of agreement. After much negotiation the representatives of the two nations engaged themselves to settle amicably the various territorial controversies in the interest of the future good and sincere relations between the two peoples, on the basis of the principles of nationality and of the right of peoples to decide their own[25] destiny. The linguistic and economic interests of such minorities as might have to be included in the national territory of either party were also guaranteed.

This agreement of principle, made under the stress of war, coincided approximately with Lord Northcliffe’s entry into office. One of his first official acts was to dispatch Mr. Steed and Dr. Seton-Watson as a special mission to Italy. While there, they represented his department at the Congress of the Oppressed Hapsburg Nationalities which met with the consent of the Italian Government at Rome on April 7, 8, and 9, 1918. The holding of this Congress was, in itself, an important act of propaganda. This unprecedented assembly, representing Italians, Poles, Czecho-Slovaks, Southern Slavs, and Rumanes, resolved upon common action in the proclamation of the right of national unity of these peoples and also confirmed, in striking fashion, the decisions arrived at between Italians and Southern Slavs in London. Signor Orlando, Signor Bissolati and other Italian Ministers expressed publicly their adhesion to the resolutions, which were as follows:—

“The representatives of the nationalities subjected in whole or in part to the[26] rule of Austria-Hungary—the Italians, Poles, Rumanes, Czechs, and Southern Slavs—join in affirming their principles of common action as follows:—

“(1) Each of these peoples proclaims its right to constitute its own nationality and State unity, or to complete it, and to attain full political and economic independence.

“(2) Each of these peoples recognises in the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy the instrument of German domination and the fundamental obstacle to the realisation of its aspirations and rights.

“(3) The assembly recognises the necessity of a common struggle against the common oppressors, in order that each people may attain complete liberation and national unity within a free State unit.

“The representatives of the Italian people and of the Jugo-Slav people in particular, agree as follows:—

“(1) In the relations of the Italian nation and the nation of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes—known also under the name of the Jugo-Slav nation—the representatives of the two peoples recognise that the unity and independence of the Jugo-Slav[27] nation is a vital interest of Italy, just as the completion of Italian national unity is a vital interest of the Jugo-Slav nation. And therefore the representatives of the two peoples pledge themselves to employ every effort in order that during the war and at the moment of peace, these ends of the two nations may be completely attained.

“(2) They declare that the liberation of the Adriatic Sea and its defence against every present and future enemy is a vital interest of the two peoples.

“(3) They pledge themselves also, in the interest of good and sincere relations between the two peoples in the future to solve amicably the various territorial controversies on the basis of the principles of nationality and of the right of peoples to decide their own fate, and in such a way as not to injure the vital interests of the two nations, as they shall be defined at the moment of peace.

“(4) To such racial groups (nuclei) of one people as it may be found necessary to include within the frontiers of the other, there shall be recognised and guaranteed the right of their language, culture, and moral and economic interests.”

[28]

Meanwhile, Lord Northcliffe and his experts had, in accordance with the principle consistently followed by Crewe House, determined the broad lines of policy upon which propaganda against Austria-Hungary was to be based. A memorandum on the subject was prepared and forwarded by Lord Northcliffe on February 24, 1918, to the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs for his consideration and approval. The following are the principal points of the memorandum:

“I have long been of opinion that it would be well to concentrate on Propaganda in Austria.

“I have made a point of seeing every available person who has come out of Austria, including many Americans who returned to the United States when I was there. All shared the same view—that the Dual Monarchy entered the greater war in a halfhearted spirit; is weary of the war; has endured hardships approaching starvation; and realises that there is no benefit for Austria arising out of the war.

“The control of the Presses of the various nationalities composing the Dual Monarchy is so absolute that the real facts of the war are unknown to the multitude. Germany is not idle in Austria or elsewhere.

[29]

“For example, the entrance of the United States into the war has been belittled, and described as mere American ‘bluff.’ Many subjects of Austrian nationalities had, before the war, considerable knowledge of the United States, owing to the great emigration to that country. They would realise the power of the United States if explained to them.

“It is submitted with respect, therefore, that one of the first steps to be taken is to spread, through all available channels, accurate facts about the American preparations.

“But, before making any beginning in that direction, or any others, I feel that I must be placed in possession of knowledge of the policy of the Allies as to the Dual Monarchy.

“I should be greatly obliged if you would give me your opinion on the following suggestions, which are made after consultation with those well acquainted with Austria. If they merit your approval, it is suggested that they be submitted to the United States, France, and Italy.

“It is suggested that there are two policies for the Department of Propaganda in Enemy Countries. In order that there may be no misunderstanding I have recapitulated elementary facts generally known.

[30]

“These two policies are as follows:

“(a) To work for a separate peace with the Emperor, the Court, and the aristocracy, on the principle of not interfering with the domestic affairs of the Hapsburg Monarchy, and of leaving its territory almost or quite intact; or

“(b) To try to break the power of Austria-Hungary, as the weakest link in the chain of enemy States, by supporting and encouraging all anti-German and pro-Ally peoples and tendencies.

“The (a) policy has been tried without success. The Hapsburgs are not free agents. They have not the power, even though they may wish, to break away from Germany, because—

“(1) They are controlled by the internal structure of their dominions (the Dual System), which gives Germany decisive leverage over them through the Germans of Austria and the Magyars of Hungary; and

“(2) Because the Allies cannot offer them acceptable terms without breaking with Italy.

“It remains to try the (b) policy.

“This policy is not primarily, or even, in the last resort, necessarily anti-Hapsburgian; it is not opposed to the interests of the[31] Roman Catholic religion; and it is in harmony with the declared aims of the Allies.

“The Empire of Austria contains some 31,000,000 inhabitants. Of these less than one-third, i.e., the 9,000,000 or 10,000,000 Germans of Austria, are pro-German. The other two-thirds (including the Poles, Czecho-Slovaks, Rumanes, Italians, and Southern Slavs) are actively or passively anti-German.

“The Kingdom of Hungary, including the ‘autonomous’ kingdom of Croatia-Slavonia has a population of approximately 21,000,000 of which one-half (Magyars, Jews, Saxons, and Swabians) may be considered pro-German, and the rest (Slovaks, Rumanes, and Southern Slavs) actively or passively anti-German.

“There are thus in Austria-Hungary, as a whole, some 31,000,000 anti-Germans, and some 21,000,000 pro-Germans. The pro-German minority rules the anti-German majority. Apart from questions of democratic principle, the policy of the Allies should evidently be to help and encourage the anti-Germans.

“The chief means of helping them may be specified thus:

“(1) The Allied Governments and the President of the United States should insist[32] upon their determination to secure democratic freedom for the races of Austria-Hungary on the principle of ‘government by consent of the governed.’ Expressions such as ‘self-government,’ or ‘autonomous development’ should be avoided, because they have a sinister meaning in Austria-Hungary and tend to discourage the friends of the Allies.

“(2) For the same reason, statements that the Allies do not wish to ‘dismember Austria’ should be avoided. The war cannot be won without so radical a transformation of Austria-Hungary as to remove its peoples from German control. The Hapsburgs may be driven to help in this transformation if Allied encouragement of the anti-German Hapsburg peoples is effective. By themselves the Hapsburgs cannot effect a transformation except in an increasingly pro-German sense.

“(3) For propaganda among the anti-German peoples the agencies already existing should be utilised. These agencies are chiefly the Bohemian (Czecho-Slovak) National Alliance, the Southern Slav Committee, and various Polish organisations.

[33]

“(4) The present tendency of the Italian Government to shelve the policy embodied in the London Convention of April 26, 1915, and to adopt a policy of agreement with the anti-German races of Austria-Hungary should be encouraged and stimulated.

“(5) The ultimate aim of Allied policy should be, not to form a number of small, disjointed States, but to create a non-German Confederation of Central European and Danubian States.

“(6) The Germans of Austria should be free to join the Confederated States of Germany. They would, in any case, tend to secede from a transformed Austria, in which they would no longer be able to rule over non-German peoples.

“In view of the great amount of cabling that will be necessary to achieve unity, may I ask you to let me have either your own suggestions, or your approval of those above mentioned, as speedily as possible?”

In his reply, Mr. Balfour wrote on February 26, 1918:—

“Your very lucid memorandum raises in one shape or another the fundamental problem of the Hapsburg Empire. A final and authoritative answer to the question you put to me can only be given (if given at all) by the Cabinet, speaking in the name of the Government. But I offer the following observations on the subject, in the hope that[34] they may help you in the immediate task for which you have been made responsible.

“If the two alternative policies of dealing with the Dual Monarchy set forth in your paper were mutually exclusive, and if they involved distinct and even opposite methods of propaganda, our position would be even more difficult than it is. For what we can do with the Austrian Empire does not wholly depend upon our wishes, but upon the success of our arms and the views of our Allies, and, as these elements in our calculations cannot be estimated with certainty, we should inevitably remain in doubt as to which of the two mutually exclusive methods of propaganda it would be judicious to adopt.

“Fortunately, however, our position is not quite so embarrassing. As you point out with unanswerable force, everything which encourages the anti-German elements in the Hapsburg dominions really helps to compel the Emperor and the Court to a separate peace, and also diminishes the efficiency of Austria-Hungary as a member of the Middle-Europe combination. The Emperor, by these means, might be induced, or compelled, fundamentally to modify the constitution of his own State. If he refused to lend himself to such a policy, the strengthening[35] of the non-German elements might bring about the same end even more effectually than if he lent his assistance to the process. But in either case the earlier stages of that process are the same, and a propaganda which aids the struggle of the nationalities now subject either to Austrian Germans or to Magyar Hungarians towards freedom and self-determination, must be right, whether the complete break-up of the Austrian Empire or its de-Germanisation under Hapsburg rule be the final goal of our efforts.”

When acknowledging this prompt reply, Lord Northcliffe pointed out that his anxiety to move as rapidly as possible was due to the belief of the Italians that a strong Austrian or Austro-German offensive against Italy would be launched within the next two months. “If our propaganda in Austria is to help to weaken this offensive, or to turn it into a defeat, it ought, in my judgment, to begin at once, and all the agencies we can command ought to be hard at work within a fortnight.

“The representative of the American Propaganda Department is in London. The Italian will be here next week, and we could no doubt have a French representative at the same time.

[36]

“As to the memorandum, I am very pleased that you are in substantial agreement with the policy outlined. The two policies may not be mutually exclusive in the last resort, but it is very important that one or the other of them should be given absolute precedence. It would place me in an awkward predicament if, after basing vigorous propaganda on the (b) policy, I were confronted with some manifestation of the (a) policy on the part of the British or other Allied Government. For this reason I hope that the War Cabinet will not delay its own decision, and that it will try to get a decision from France, Italy, and the United States as quickly as possible.

“It goes without saying that public declarations on behalf of the British, French, and Allied Governments, and, if possible, on the part of President Wilson, in the sense of the (b) policy would, if promptly made, greatly facilitate my efforts.”

Obviously the wise course was to place action in carrying out this policy on an Inter-Allied basis. Lord Northcliffe, therefore, convened meetings in London which were attended by Italian, French and American representatives. It was decided to organise a committee to arrange with France and[37] Italy for united operations on the Italian front against the Austro-Hungarian armies.

Accordingly, the special mission which Lord Northcliffe had sent to Italy, and of which Mr. Steed and Dr. Seton-Watson were the principal members, was entrusted with this task. With the willing support and co-operation of the Italian Prime Minister, the Italian Commander-in-Chief, and the British and French Commanders on the Italian Front, a permanent Inter-Allied Propaganda Commission was organised at the Italian General Headquarters. Italy provided the President (Colonel Siciliani) and one commissioner (Captain Ojetti) and Great Britain and France one commissioner each (Lieutenant-Colonel B. Granville Baker and Major Gruss respectively). To the Commission were attached, as a result of representations from Mr. Steed, representatives of committees of each of the oppressed nationalities. Mr. Steed, speaking on behalf of Lord Northcliffe, urged that only representatives of these races were fully qualified to speak to their co-nationals on the vital subjects which would form the theme of their propagandist productions.

The Commission began work on April 18, 1918. It acquired a polyglot printing press[38] at Reggio Emilia. A weekly journal was published containing news (collected by a special Italian office ably organised by Professor Borgese at Berne) quadruplicated in the Czech, Polish, Southern Slav, and Rumanian languages. The assistance of the national representatives was valuable to the point of indispensability in ensuring accuracy of translation and suitability of contents. These representatives also composed leaflet manifestoes. Coloured reproductions of pictures of a patriotic, or religious, nature which appealed to the nationalist aspirations and piety of the races, were made. All this literary matter was dispatched straight to the front-line armies from the printing press, and distributed by means of aeroplanes (one per army being detailed for this purpose), rockets, which were constructed to hold about 30 pamphlets, and grenades, and also by contact patrols. These patrols were originally formed by bodies of troops raised on the responsibility of the various Italian armies, and were composed of deserters of Czecho-Slovak, Southern Slav, Polish, or Rumanian nationalities who had volunteered for this service against their hereditary enemy. They were wonderfully successful. The total number of leaflets and other[39] productions thus distributed ran into many millions. But this by no means exhausted the channels of propagandist effort. Gramophone records of Czecho-Slovak and Southern Slav songs were secured by the British Commissioner and effectively used for the awakening of the nationalist sentiment among the troops of these races in the Austrian armies. The instruments were placed in “No Man’s Land,” and so close to each other were the front trenches of the opposing armies that the words and music could easily be heard.

The Austro-Hungarian section of Crewe House, of which section Mr. Steed and Dr. Seton-Watson were the directors, maintained the closest touch with the Commission. Specimens of literature were exchanged between the Commission and other sections of Crewe House, and it was not uncommon for one news leaflet to appear in eight or ten different languages, with a total circulation of several millions of copies. The Austro-Hungarian section also necessarily kept in the closest touch with the Czecho-Slovak, Southern Slav, Polish, and Rumanian leaders and organisations in Allied and neutral countries. It also co-operated with Mr. S. A. Guest in the organisation of civil and[40] secret channels in neutral countries by which propaganda literature could be introduced into Austria-Hungary.

The effect of the launching of the propaganda leaflet campaign was soon apparent. Unrest became manifest among the Austro-Hungarian forces. Deserters belonging to the subject races came over to the Allied lines. This was one of the chief causes contributory to the postponements of the Austrian offensive carefully planned for April. When this attack was eventually made—in June—the Italian commanders, and their Allied colleagues, had full information concerning enemy plans and positions.

But, unhappily, the propaganda, and, consequently, the military, campaigns were impaired by reactionary tendencies within the Italian Government. Had the Italian Government been prepared in May, 1918, to join with their Allies and Associates in making a joint public declaration in strong and unmistakable language in favour of the creation of a united and independent Southern Slav State and in recognising the Czecho-Slovaks as an Allied and belligerent nation, the result would undoubtedly have precipitated the collapse of Austria in the early part of the summer of 1918.

[41]

Instead of seizing the opportunity for this united and strong pronouncement which presented itself at a meeting of the Prime Ministers of Great Britain, France, and Italy, held at Versailles, on June 3, 1918, the following declarations were made:—

(1) The creation of a united and independent Polish State with free access to the sea constitutes one of the conditions of a solid and just peace and of the rule of right in Europe.

(2) The Allied Governments have noted with pleasure the declaration made by the Secretary of State of the United States Government (in referring to the resolutions of the Rome Congress of Austro-Hungarian nationalities), and desire to associate themselves in an expression of earnest sympathy for the nationalistic aspirations towards freedom of the Czecho-Slovak and Jugo (Southern)-Slav peoples.

The regrettable weakness of the second declaration, which followed very closely the wording of Mr. Lansing’s earlier announcement on behalf of the United States Government, was entirely due to the opposition of Baron Sonnino (Italian Foreign Minister),[42] who rejected the stronger declarations prepared by Mr. Balfour and the French Foreign Minister, M. Pichon. It was a retrogressive step by Italy from the position she had taken at the Rome Congress, at which her Prime Minister had expressly associated himself with the terms of the Italo-Southern Slav agreement that recognised the “unity and independence of the Jugo-Slav nation as a vital Italian interest.” In regard to the Czecho-Slovaks, the British, French, and Italian Governments had already recognised the Czecho-Slovak Army, under the Bohemian National Council, as an Allied force.

Towards the end of June, Mr. Lansing made considerable advance with a definite statement that the United States aimed at the complete liberation of all Slav peoples from Austro-German domination.

While Lord Northcliffe and his associates were striving hard in London to retrieve the opportunities thus wasted, the propaganda organisation in Italy was making remarkable progress despite the vacillations of the politicians. Undoubtedly the reactionary attitude of Baron Sonnino at Versailles influenced adversely the response of the Southern Slav troops in the Austrian ranks to the appeals made by the propaganda leaflets. Nevertheless,[43] there was a considerable amount of desertion from the Austro-Hungarian Army. Among the deserters were numbers of junior officers, not professional soldiers, but men who in private life were lawyers, merchants, and so on. These men were all led to come over by the prospect of liberation which the propaganda held out to them. Men of other ranks were induced to desert, either in order to join relatives among their co-nationals fighting in the Italian Army, of whom news had reached them through the propaganda agency, or else by the more elementary considerations of food, comfort, and safety. It was noticeable that nearly all the deserters brought with them copies of the leaflets distributed by the Allied Commission.

That the propaganda had seriously alarmed the Austro-Hungarian authorities was made evident by reference to it in Army Orders and in the Austrian and German Press, which even reproduced some of the literary efforts, and vilified Lord Northcliffe in their most fervent manner. It even affected the minor tactics of the Austro-Hungarian Army, for it necessitated the detachment of machine-gun sections to deal with attempts at desertion en masse during the Piave offensive, which was eventually launched by the Austrians[44] at the end of June. There was at least one authenticated account of a mutiny among Czech troops being suppressed by Germans and Magyars during that offensive. Desertions of single men or small parties were frequent before and during the action, and one case is known of a whole unit having come over. This was a company composed entirely of Jugo-Slavs. The Company Commander (Jugo-Slav and strongly Nationalist), on going his rounds a couple of hours before the attack began, gathered from his men’s conversation that they had no intention of fighting. He was able to bring his whole company over.

The delay of the offensive, mainly on account of Allied propaganda, proved to be very important, because, when it came the Piave rose behind the Austrian army and converted the attack into something like a disaster. There is reason to believe that many ammunition dumps behind the enemy lines were blown up by the Czechs. A rumour was spread in the Press that the Southern Slavs had been fighting desperately against Italy, but this was officially denied. The divisions in question were a mixture of Germans, Magyars, Poles, and Ruthenes. It appeared that the Southern Slav divisions[45] had been divided up and mixed with “reliable” troops, which showed that the Austrians were afraid of them. The prisoners taken, as a rule, expressed willingness to volunteer at once. Dalmatian prisoners showed great enthusiasm for Jugo-Slavia and the Allies.

After the Piave battle, members of the Inter-Allied Propaganda Commission were received and thanked by the Italian Commander-in-Chief. General Diaz said that the victory was due in considerable measure to their efforts.

In August the Inter-Allied Conference on Enemy Propaganda, convoked by Lord Northcliffe, met at Crewe House. In regard to propaganda against Austria-Hungary, the Committee formed to consider questions of policy found itself in complete agreement with the scheme of policy sanctioned by the British Government for purposes of Propaganda, and amplified by the decisions of the British, French, and Italian Governments at the time of, or in connection with, the Rome Congress of Oppressed Austro-Hungarian Nationalities. It recognised that such extensions of policy, while springing from considerations of Allied principles, had, in part, corresponded to the real demands of the[46] propaganda situation, which, in their turn, had sprung from the exigencies of the military situation and, in particular, from the necessity of utilising the established principles of the alliance for the purpose of impeding or hampering the Austro-Hungarian offensive against Italy. Subsequent acts and declarations on the part of Allied Governments and of the Government of the United States made it clear that the joint policy of the Allies was tending increasingly towards the constructive liberation of the subject Austro-Hungarian races. The main task of the Committee in relation to propaganda in Austria-Hungary seemed, therefore, to be one of unifying for propaganda purposes these various acts and declarations, and of preparing, if possible, the way for a joint Allied declaration that might complete and render more effective the work of Allied propaganda both in the interior of Austria-Hungary and among Austro-Hungarian troops at the front. The Committee resolved to suggest that the Italian Government take the initiative in promoting a joint and unanimous public declaration that all the Allies regard the establishment of a free and united Jugo-Slav State, embracing Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes, as one of the conditions of a just[47] and lasting peace, and of the rule of right in Europe. Such a declaration was actually made by the Italian Government, but so tardily that its propaganda effect was reduced to a minimum.

Reports from the British Commissioner at Padua chronicled the uninterrupted continuance of the preparation and distribution of leaflets. The work was so developed that a distributing capacity of almost a million leaflets a day was obtained. Proof of the value of the work was afforded by the arrival of deserters, belonging to the subject races, in the Italian lines bringing with them the manifestoes and saying, “I have come because you invited me.” A special leaflet was prepared in London, with the co-operation of a member of the Southern Slav Committee, for distribution by aeroplane at various points on the Dalmatian coast, where Southern Slav insurgents were ascertained to be gathered in considerable numbers. A detailed description, compiled from official sources, of the overwhelming character of American war preparations (which the enemy was constantly belittling) was telegraphed to Padua for translation into Austro-Hungarian languages, and for distribution in leaflet form among Austro-Hungarian troops.

[48]

Progress was even made among the Magyars who had fought with remarkable ferocity on the Montello. The agrarian question that had troubled Hungary for some time was used for propaganda purposes and many Magyar desertions ensued. The constant efforts exerted an ever-increasing and cumulative influence on the enemy. The collapse of Bulgaria opened a new front for operations against Austria-Hungary and a Propaganda Commission under Lieutenant-Colonel Granville Baker was quickly organised on the lines of the Padua Commission and dispatched to Salonika. Operations were promptly started, but it soon became evident that the end was near. As the Allied armies on the Western fronts advanced, news of their progress and of Bulgaria’s defection was continually and promptly sent over the Austrian lines. There is no doubt that this contributed to the increased amount of desertion and disorder among the Austrian forces, culminating in the débâcle produced by the final Allied attack in October, which brought down the military and political organisations of the Dual Monarchy.

[49] Crewe House had every reason to be proud of the success of its work against Austria-Hungary. The conception of the whole propaganda campaign—its policy, its scope, its application—was due to Lord Northcliffe and the co-directors of the Austrian Section of his department, Mr. Wickham Steed and Dr. Seton-Watson. The results fully vindicated every basic principle of their propaganda strategy. There were difficulties to be overcome at every turn, of which political and personal ambitions abroad were not the least. To keep the work on the straight metals of uninterrupted progress necessitated unremitting vigilance and ceaseless consultation with the numerous interests concerned. The result was the greatest victory achieved by war propaganda—the culmination of a constructive campaign, which, could it have been extended to its logical conclusions, would have achieved a just and lasting peace, liberating millions of our fellow-men from a tyrannous yoke to the enjoyment of that political freedom which is the inalienable right of civilised mankind.

MR. H. WICKHAM STEED.
MEMBER OF THE ENEMY PROPAGANDA COMMITTEE, AND ONE OF THE DIRECTORS OF THE AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN SECTION.
Photo: Russell, London.
DR. R. W. SETON-WATSON.
CO-DIRECTOR OF THE AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN SECTION OF CREWE HOUSE.
MR. H. G. WELLS.
MEMBER OF THE ENEMY PROPAGANDA COMMITTEE, AND FIRST DIRECTOR OF GERMAN SECTION.
“Daily Mirror” Photograph.

[50]

## CHAPTER IV
OPERATIONS AGAINST GERMANY

Early British neglect of propaganda—War Office establishes a department—Lord Northcliffe takes office—Mr. H. G. Wells’s and Mr. Hamilton Fyfe’s work—The final “intensive” campaign—Ways and means.

The successful launch of the “propaganda offensive” against Austria-Hungary raised high hopes for the success of the corresponding campaign against the Germans on the Western Front. These hopes were shared by the Prime Minister, who wrote to Lord Northcliffe on May 16, 1918:—“It seems to me that you have organised admirable work in your Austrian propaganda.... I trust that you will soon turn your attention towards German propaganda along the French and British Fronts. I feel sure that much can be done to disintegrate the moral of the German army along the same lines as we appear to have adopted with great success in the Austro-Hungarian army.”

For the first eighteen months of the war all[51] propaganda had been sadly neglected by the British Government. Few realised its value, and officially it was regarded as an unimportant “side-line.” That it might be a weapon of warfare, equal in effect to several army corps, would at that time have been ridiculed. Money for such purposes was grudgingly spent, while the whole-hearted endeavours of a few enthusiasts were disparaged as the exuberances of harmless “cranks.”

In October, 1914, Lieutenant-Colonel (now Major-General) Swinton, who was then acting as “Eye-Witness” with the British Army, prepared a propaganda leaflet, a reproduction of which appears in this book. To enable him to produce it, Lord Northcliffe lent the aid of his Paris organisation, and a large number of copies were printed and distributed by aeroplane among the German troops. But the Army chiefs at that time did not show any enthusiasm for the innovation, and Colonel Swinton was unable to proceed with the project.

Propaganda against the enemy was, during a long period, almost a single-handed campaign by Mr. S. A. Guest. He struggled on, despite official discouragement or lack of encouragement, undeterred by all the vicissitudes through which British propaganda[52] passed. Indeed, the early direction of British propaganda was like an epidemic; it occasionally took strange forms and occurred in unexpected places. Mr. Guest’s work was the institution and maintenance of those agencies by which propagandist literature was produced and smuggled into Germany and Austria-Hungary.

Within the War Office, there were some in favour of propagandist activity, but for a long time they were in a minority. Early in 1916, Major-General (now Lieutenant-General) Sir George Macdonogh, K.C.M.G., C.B., returned from France to become Director of Military Intelligence, and mainly owing to his efforts and those of Brigadier-General G. K. Cockerill, C.B. (then Director of Special Intelligence), a propaganda branch of the Military Intelligence Department of the War Office was established. From small beginnings, the activities of this branch grew.

It was in the spring of 1916 that a sub-section of this branch began the preparation of leaflets in German for distribution among enemy troops. One use of the leaflets was to disprove the false beliefs spread among German soldiers that the British and French treated their prisoners with great severity. To counteract this, reproductions of letters[53] actually written by German prisoners of war, photographs and descriptions of prisoners and their camps, and similar material, were prepared and distributed. As the political and social discontent in Germany increased it was thought useful that the German soldiers should be provided with more evidence of the internal conditions in their own country than their officers would allow them to have, and leaflets prepared from German sources, as, for instance, from suppressed editions of German pamphlets and newspapers, were scattered on the lines and rest billets.

It then undertook the publication of an excellent weekly news-sheet, entitled Le Courrier de l’Air, containing news in French for circulation among the French and Belgian inhabitants of occupied districts. This newspaper, save for one short break, was regularly distributed by air until November, 1918, and naturally was greatly valued by those who otherwise would only have received “news” from German sources.

During 1917 reports obtained by the examination of prisoners and information derived from more secret sources showed that the propaganda campaign was achieving useful results, and the Directorate of Military Intelligence, in co-operation with the G.H.Q.[54] in France, made arrangements for the work to be extended, until by the spring of 1918 about a million leaflets monthly were being issued.

The task of distribution of propaganda literature by air would have been simpler but for an extraordinary military decision. When this work was started by the military authorities the leaflets were dropped from aeroplanes. This method had the widest limits, and, at the same time, was the best means of carrying a large bulk and of distributing with accuracy. Perturbed by the success attained, the Germans threatened to inflict severe penalties upon airmen captured when performing such duties, and, on capturing two British airmen, followed their threats by action. Instead of instituting immediate reprisals, the British authorities tamely submitted and gave instructions for the discontinuance of the use of aeroplanes for the purpose.

In consequence of this weak action, experiments had to be undertaken to find a substitute for the aeroplane. There were a number of possible, although inferior, methods. Hand and rifle grenades were devised to burst and shower leaflets over a limited area among enemy troops. Trench mortars would serve a similar purpose. But[55] thanks to the progress of military meteorological science during the war and to several months’ patient experimenting with various devices, it was found possible to utilise specially adapted balloons. The Air Inventions Committee, the Munitions Inventions Department, the Inspectorate of H.M. Stores, Woolwich, Army Intelligence officers experienced in the use of silk balloons for other military purposes, and the manufacturers, all assisted the War Office in arriving at a result which proved to be effective and as nearly as possible “fool-proof.” Designs and apparatus were tested in the workshop and laboratory, at experimental stations near London, and on Salisbury Plain. They were taken out to France and tried under the actual conditions of war, and gradually each difficulty was overcome and each detail reduced to its simplest form.

In its standard form in which it was being manufactured at the rate of nearly 2,000 a week the propaganda balloon was made of paper, cut in 10 longitudinal panels, with a neck of oiled silk about 12 inches long. The circumference was about 20 feet and the height, when inflated, over eight feet. The absolute capacity was approximately 100 cubic feet, but the balloons were liberated[56] when not quite taut, containing 90 to 95 cubic feet of hydrogen. Hydrogen readily passes through paper, and the part of the experimental work that caused most trouble was the discovery of a suitable varnish, or “dope,” to make the paper gas-tight. After many disappointments, a formula was arrived at, the application of which prevented appreciable evaporation of the gas for two or three hours, and which left a balloon with some lifting capacity after thirty-six hours.

The lifting power of a balloon is the difference between the weight of the hydrogen and the weight of the same bulk of air, less the weight of the balloon itself. The weight of the paper balloon was just over one pound; the available lifting power varied with the degree of tautness to which the balloon was filled, the height of the barometer and the temperature, but on the average, at ground level, the balloon as inflated would just support five and a half pounds. After a good deal of experiment the load of propaganda and releasing apparatus was fixed at four pounds and a few ounces, this allowing from 500 to 1,000 leaflets, according to their size, to be carried by each balloon, the balance of lifting power being sufficient to take the balloon sharply into the air to a[57] height of five or six thousand feet. As a balloon rises the pressure of the air decreases and the contained hydrogen expands. In the earlier experiments the neck of the balloon was tied after inflation, and, to allow for expansion, the balloon was filled only to a little over two-thirds of its capacity. This was unsatisfactory; it reduced the load of propaganda and led to many failures from bursting and to great uncertainty as to where the load would fall. It was found more satisfactory to inflate the balloon nearly to its full capacity and to liberate it with the neck open, or with a large slit cut at the base of the neck, to allow the gas to escape as it expanded. At a height of, on the average, from 4,000 to 6,000 feet the escape of gas had reduced the free lift to a negative quantity, and the balloon would begin to drop slowly, but for the liberation of ballast.

After several ingenious mechanical devices had been tested, a method of releasing leaflets by the burning of a fuse was adopted. A suitable length of prepared cotton wick, similar to that used in flint pipe-lighters, and burning evenly at the rate of five minutes to the inch, was securely threaded to a wire by which it was attached to the neck of the[58] balloon. Several inches of the upper end were left free, and the load of leaflets was strung in small packets by cotton threads along the length of the fuse. As soon as a balloon was inflated and the loaded release attached, the free end of the fuse was cut to the required length, so as to burn for five, ten, or so many minutes, before the first packet was reached, the cut end was lighted, usually from the pipe or cigarette the soldier was smoking, and the balloon sent off on its journey. The release of each packet acted as a discharge of ballast, and the balloon, although continually losing gas, kept in the air until the end of its course. The arrangement used most frequently was designed for liberating the balloons a few miles behind the front lines and for distributing the leaflets from the enemy lines to a few miles behind them. The total length of fuse was twelve inches, giving an hour’s run. The first six inches were left free to be cut before lighting according to the position of the station and the strength of the wind; the load of propaganda was arranged over the second half-hour at intervals of two and a half minutes. Much longer fuses, with the load distributed at greater intervals, were used for longer runs. Experiment showed[59] that the lateral scattering of the leaflets, dropped from a height of 4,000 feet and upwards, was considerable. The length of the track varied with the strength of the wind.

The unit for distribution consisted of two motor lorries, which took the men, the cylinders of hydrogen, and the propaganda loaded on releases to a sheltered position selected in the morning by the officer in charge after consultation with the meteorological experts. The vans were drawn up end to end, separated by a distance of about ten feet, and a curtain of canvas was then stretched on the windward side between the vans, thus forming a three-sided chamber. The balloon was laid on the ground, rapidly filled, the release attached and lighted, and the balloon liberated, the whole operation taking only a few minutes.

The load of the balloons was chosen according to the direction of the wind. If it was blowing towards Belgium, copies of Le Courrier de l’Air were attached; if towards Germany, propaganda leaflets for enemy troops. The experimental improvement of the “dope” with which the paper was treated in order to prevent loss of gas by diffusion, and the manufacture of balloons of double the standard capacity, had placed runs of upwards[60] of 150 miles well within the capacity of the method before the Armistice suspended operations, but the bulk of the propaganda was distributed over an area of from 10 to 50 miles behind the enemy lines. Fortunately, during the late summer and autumn of 1918 the wind was blowing almost consistently favourable for their dispatch.

When Lord Northcliffe took office in February, 1918, Austria-Hungary was the most urgent field for his operations, as has been explained. While Crewe House was concentrating upon that work he desired the War Office to continue on his behalf the admirable and assiduous work carried on since 1916. Early in May, 1918, Mr. H. G. Wells accepted Lord Northcliffe’s invitation to direct the preparation of propaganda literature against Germany, with the co-operation of Dr. J. W. Headlam-Morley. The first need was felt to be the definition of a policy to be followed against Germany, in order to prevent dissipation of energy and diversity of treatment. It was obvious that this propaganda policy must be in accord with the general policy of the Allies. In some points it followed the declared aims of the Allies; in others, it preceded the general policy as a pathmaker and pacemaker.[61] Mr. Wells undertook to prepare a memorandum on the position of Germany at that time from the point of view of propaganda. This was submitted by Mr. Wells to the Enemy Propaganda Committee and fully discussed. A preface was prepared and upon the two statements was based a letter to the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, as in the case of the propaganda policy against Austria-Hungary, asking for the assent of the British Government to the policy therein contained.

Mr. Wells’s memorandum was of the highest interest as a contemporary study of Germany, by a master of psychology, at that juncture when Germany was making her great (and, fortunately, her final) bid for world-mastery. The document possesses no little historical value; much that was prophetic has been forged into history by the rapid march of events; and the non-fulfilment of much of what has not attained to its consummation is due to lack of political wisdom in the chancelleries. Following is the text of preface and memorandum:—

Preface.

“Propaganda in Germany, as in other enemy countries, must obviously be based[62] upon a clear Allied policy. Hitherto Allied policy and Allied war aims have been defined too loosely to be comprehensible to the Germans.

“The real war aim of the Allies is not only to beat the enemy, but to establish a world peace that shall preclude the resumption of war. Successful propaganda in Germany presupposes the clear definition of the kind of world-settlement which the Allies are determined to secure and the place of Germany in it.

“The points to be brought home to the Germans are:—

“1. The determination of the Allies to continue the war until Germany accepts the Allied peace settlement.

“2. The existing alliance as a Fighting League of Free Nations will be deepened and extended, and the military, naval, financial and economic resources of its members will be pooled until—

“(a) Its military purpose is achieved, and

“(b) Peace is established on lasting foundations.

“German minds are particularly susceptible to systematic statements. They are[63] accustomed to discuss and understand co-ordinate projects. The ideas represented by the phrase ‘Berlin-Baghdad’ and ‘Mittel-Europa’ have been fully explained to them and now form the bases of German political thought. Other projects, represented by ‘Berlin-Teheran’ and ‘Berlin-Tokyo’ are becoming familiar to them. Against these ideas the Allies have not yet set up any comprehensive and comprehensible scheme of world organisation. There is no Allied counterpart of Naumann’s ‘Mittel-Europa’ which the neutral and the German Press could discuss as a practical proposition. This counterpart should be created without delay by competent Allied writers. It would form an effective basis for propaganda, and would work automatically.

“It follows that one of the first requisites is to study and to lay down the lines of a practical League of Free Nations. The present alliance must be taken as the nucleus of any such League. Its control of raw materials, of shipping, and its power to exclude for an indefinite period enemy or even neutral peoples until they subscribe to and give pledges of their acceptance of its principles should be emphasised. It should be pointed out that nothing stands between[64] enemy peoples and a lasting peace except the predatory designs of their ruling dynasties and military and economic castes; that the design of the Allies is not to crush any people, but to assure the freedom of all on a basis of self-determination to be exercised under definite guarantees of justice and fair play; that, unless enemy peoples accept the Allied conception of a world peace settlement, it will be impossible for them to repair the havoc of the present war, to avert utter financial ruin, and to save themselves from prolonged misery; and that the longer the struggle lasts the deeper will become the hatred of everything German in the non-German world, and the heavier the social and economic handicap under which the enemy peoples will labour, even after their admission into a League of Nations.

“The primary war aim of the Allies thus becomes the changing of Germany, not only in the interest of the Allied League, but in that of the German people itself. Without the honest co-operation of Germany, disarmament on a large scale would be impossible, and, without disarmament, social and economic reconstruction would be impracticable. Germany has, therefore, to choose between her own permanent ruin by adhering to her present system of government and policy and the prospect of economic and political redemption by overthrowing her militarist system so as to be able to join honestly in the Allied scheme of world organisation.”

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Memorandum.

“It has become manifest that for the purposes of an efficient pro-Ally propaganda in neutral and enemy countries a clear and full statement of the war aims of the Allies is vitally necessary. What is wanted is something in the nature of an authoritative text to which propagandists may refer with confidence and which can be made the standard of their activities. It is not sufficient to recount the sins of Germany and to assert that the defeat of Germany is the Allied war aim. What all the world desires to know is what is to happen after the war. The real war aim of a belligerent, it is more and more understood, is not merely victory, but a peace of a certain character which that belligerent desires shall arise out of that victory. What, therefore, is the peace sought by the Allies?

“It would be superfluous even to summarise here the primary case of the Allies,[66] that the war is on their part a war to resist the military aggression of Germany, assisted by the landowning Magyars of Hungary, the Turks, and the King of Bulgaria, upon the rest of mankind. It is a war against belligerence, against aggressive war, and the preparation for aggressive war. Such it was in its beginning, and such it remains. But it would be idle to pretend that the ideas of the Governments and peoples allied against Germany have not developed very greatly during the years of the war. There has been a deepening realisation of the danger to mankind of existing political divisions and separations, a great experience in the suffering, destruction, and waste of war; a quickening of consciences against conquests, annexations, and subjugations; and a general clearing up of ideas that have hitherto stood in the way of an organised world peace. While German Imperialism, to judge by the utterances of its accredited heads, and by the behaviour of Germany in the temporarily disorganised States on her Eastern Front, is still as truculent, aggressive, and treacherous as ever, the mind of her antagonists has learnt and has matured. There has arisen in the great world outside the inner lives of the Central Powers a will that grows to[67] gigantic proportions, that altogether overshadows the boasted will to power of the German junker and exploiter, the will to a world peace. It is like the will of an experienced man set against the will of an obstinate and selfish youth. The war aims of the anti-German Allies take more and more definitely the form of a world of States leagued together to maintain a common law, to submit their mutual differences to a conclusive tribunal, to protect weak communities, to restrain and suppress war threats and war preparations throughout the earth.

“Steadfastly the great peoples of the world outside the shadow of German Imperial domination have been working their way to unanimity, while the ruling intelligences of Germany have been scheming for the base advantages of conquest; while they have been undermining, confusing, and demoralising the mentality of Russia, crushing down the subject peoples of the Austro-Hungarian Imperialism, and threatening and cajoling neutrals there has been a wide, free movement in the minds of their antagonists towards the restraint and wisdom of a greater and nobler phase in human affairs. The thought of the world crystallises now about a phrase, the phrase ‘The League of Free Nations.’ The[68] war aims of the Allies become more and more explicitly associated with the spirit and implications of that.

“Like all such phrases, ‘The League of Free Nations’ is subject to a great variety of detailed interpretation, but its broad intentions can now be stated without much risk of dissent. The ideal would, of course, include all the nations of the earth, including a Germany purged of her military aggressiveness; it involves some sort of International Congress that can revise, codify, amend and extend international law, a supreme Court of Law in which States may sue and be sued, and whose decision the League will be pledged to enforce, and the supervision, limitation, and use of armaments under the direction of the international congress. It is also felt very widely that such a congress must set a restraint upon competitive and unsanctioned ‘expansionist’ movements into unsettled and disordered regions, must act as the guardian of feeble races and communities, and must be empowered to make conclusive decisions upon questions of transport, tariffs, access to raw material, migration, and international intercourse generally. The constitution of this congress remains indefinite; it is the crucial[69] matter upon which the best thought of the world is working at the present time. But given the prospect of a suitable congress there can be little dispute that the great Imperial Powers among the Allies are now prepared for great and generous limitations of their sovereignty in the matter of armaments, of tropical possessions and of subject peoples, in the common interest of mankind. The spectacle of German Imperialism, boastful, selfish, narrow, and altogether hateful, in its terrible blood-dance through Europe, has been an object-lesson to humanity against excesses of national vanity and national egotism and against Imperial pride. Among the Allies, the two chief Imperial Powers, measured by the extent of territory they control, are Britain and France, and each of these is more completely prepared to-day than ever it has been before to consider its imperial possessions as a trust for their inhabitants and for mankind, and its position in the more fertile and less settled regions of the world as that of a mandatory and trustee. These admissions involve a plain prospect and promise of the ultimate release and liberation of all the peoples in these great and variegated Empires to complete world-citizenship.

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“But in using the phrase ‘The League of Nations,’ it may be well to dispel certain misconceptions that have arisen through the experimental preparation by more or less irresponsible persons and societies of elaborate schemes and constitutions of such a league. Proposals have been printed and published, for example, of a Court of World Conciliation, in which each sovereign State will be represented by one member—Montenegro, for example, by one, and the British Empire by one—and other proposals have been mooted of a Congress of the League of Nations, in which such States as Hayti, Abyssinia, and the like will be represented by one or two representatives, and France and Great Britain by five or six. All such projects should be put out of mind when the phrase ‘League of Free Nations’ is used by responsible speakers for the Allied Powers. Certain most obvious considerations have evidently been overlooked by the framers of such proposals. It will, for example, be a manifest disadvantage to the smaller Powers to be at all over-represented upon the Congress of any such League; it may even be desirable that certain of them should not have a voting representative at all, for this reason, that a great Power still cherishing[71] an aggressive spirit would certainly attempt, as the beginning of its aggression, to compel adjacent small Powers to send representatives practically chosen by itself. The coarse fact of the case in regard to an immediate world peace is this, that only five or six great Powers possess sufficient economic resources to make war under modern conditions at the present time, namely, the United States of America, Great Britain, France, Germany, Japan, and, doubtfully, Austria-Hungary. Italy suffers under the disadvantage that she has no coal supply. These five or six Powers we may say, therefore, permit war and can prevent it. They are at present necessarily the custodians of the peace of the world, and it is mere pedantry not to admit that this gives them a practical claim to preponderance in the opening Congress of the World League. It may be pointed out that a small State with a voice in the discussions, but no vote in the decisions of the League, would logically be excused from the liability to assist in enforcing those decisions.

“But this question of the constitution of a world Congress is not to be solved by making a coarse classification of States into large and war-capable Powers, and small and weak Powers. Take the case of Italy,[72] for example: though she is almost incapable of sustaining a war against the world by herself because of her weakness in the matter of coal, she can as an ally be at once of enormous importance. Take the case of Spain again, a very similar case. And whatever the war ability of Latin-America may be to-day, there can be no question that this great constellation of States must count very heavily in the framing of the world of to-morrow. Then, again, we have to consider the vast future possibilities of the Chinese Republic, with coal, steel, and a magnificent industrial population, and the probable reconstruction of Eastern Europe and a renascence of Russia which may give the world a loose-knit but collectively-important Slavonic confederation. While an isolated small Power within the orbit of attraction of a large Power, a State of 5,000,000 people or less, must always remain a difficult problem in the world representation, it is clear that something like an adequate representation of small and weak Powers becomes possible so soon as they develop a disposition towards aggregation, for the purposes of world politics, into associations with States racially, linguistically, and historically akin to them. The trend of Allied opinion is to place not Peru[73] or Ukrainia, nor Norway, nor Finland on a level with the United States of America or the British Empire at the League of Nations Congress, but to prepare the way for adequate representation through a preliminary Latin-American or a Slavonic or a Scandinavian Confederation, which could speak with a common idea at the World Congress.

“It should be manifest that there is one Power whose splendid achievement in this war, and whose particular needs, justify her over-representation (as measured by material wealth, and millions of population) upon the Congress of the League, and that is France. It is open to question whether Italy should not also be disproportionately over-represented, seeing that she will not have, as Spain will have, the moral reinforcement of kindred nations over seas. And with regard to the British Empire, seeing that there exists no real Imperial legislature, it is open to consideration whether Canada, South Africa, and Australasia should come into the Council as separate nationalities. The Asiatic and African possessions of Britain and France, Belgium and Italy, possessions, that is, which have no self-government, might possibly for a time be represented by members appointed by the governing power in each[74] case. These are merely suggestions here, indications of a disposition of mind, but they are suggestions upon which it is necessary for the Allied Powers to decide as speedily as possible. The effective working out of this problem of the League of Nations Congress by the Allies without undue delay is as vital a part of the Allied policy as the effective conduct of the war.

“It has to be recognised that the institution of a League of Nations precludes any annexations or any military interference with any peoples whatever, without a mandate from the Congress of the League. The League must directly or indirectly become the guardian of all unsettled regions and order must be kept and development promoted by it in such derelict regions as Mesopotamia and Armenia, for example, have now become. In these latter instances it is open to consideration whether the League should operate through some single power acting as a mandatory of the League, or else by international forces under the control of the League as a whole. Theoretically the latter course is to be preferred, but there are enormous practical advantages in many cases to be urged for the former. The Allies have indeed had a considerable experience[75] during the war of joint controls and joint expeditions; there has been a great education in internationalism since August, 1914; but nevertheless the end of the war is likely to come long before any real international forces have been evolved. It is, however, towards the ultimate use of international forces in such cases that the joint policy of the Allies is plainly and openly directed.

“The bringing of the League into practical politics profoundly affects the question of territorial adjustment after the war. The Allies are bound in honour to follow the will of France in the matter of Alsace-Lorraine, and the rectification of the Italian frontier and the bringing of the bulk of the Italian-speaking population, now under Austrian dominion, into one ring-fence with Italy, also seem a necessary part of a world pacification. It is, however, of far less importance in the war aims of the Allies that this and that particular scrap of territory should change hands from the control of one group of combatants to that of the other, than that the present practical ascendency of German Imperialism over the resources of the Polish, Russian, Ukrainian, Czech, Jugo-Slav, Finnish, and Roumanian peoples should cease. The war aim of the Allies in Eastern Europe[76] is to create in the place of the present Austro-Hungarian Empire a larger synthesis of associated States, something in the nature of an ‘East Central European League,’ within the League of Nations, a confederation that might possibly reach from Poland to the Black and Adriatic Seas, and have also access to, if not a port upon, the Baltic at Danzig. The Allies are necessarily obliged to wait upon the development of affairs in Russia, but the hopes and efforts of the Allies are towards a reconciliation of at least Great Russia, Siberia, and Ukrainia into a workable association within the League. It is premature to speculate upon the grouping of Finland at the present time. Relieved of the feverish and impossible ambitions the political weaknesses of these peoples have stimulated, a free and united Germany could then become one of the predominant partners in the World League of Free Nations. The Allies do not propose an unconditional return of the former African possessions of Germany, but they contemplate an over-ruling international régime in Africa between the Sahara and the Zambesi, restraining armament, reorganising native education, and giving absolute equality of trade to all the nations in the League. Such an international régime under the[77] League may not be incompatible with the retention of national flags in the former ‘possessions’ of the leagued Powers.

“Exact territorial definition does not appear to the Allies to be of nearly such importance as the establishment of a common system of disarmament and a common effort to restore the ravages of the war. The full effect of the war is still not realised by the mass of the belligerent peoples, more especially in America and Western Europe, where life is still fairly comfortable. There has already been a destruction not merely of the political, but of the social order over great areas of the world, especially in Eastern Europe, and it is doubtful whether any peace can restore these disorganised areas to anything like their former productivity for many years. A universal shortage not merely of man-power, but of transport and machinery available for the purposes of peace cannot be avoided. It is doubtful, moreover, if social discipline in the ports of the British Empire and America will be strong enough to restrain an organised resistance to the use of German shipping after the war for any purpose and to the use of Allied shipping for the transport of goods to and from Germany on the part of Allied and neutral seamen and transport[78] workers indignant at the U-boat campaign; moreover, there is a world-wide cry for a vindictive trade after the war against Germany, and for organised boycotts that may further restrict the process of economic world recovery. It is doubtful if the menace of these ‘revenge’ movements and the difficulty of controlling them in democratic States is properly appreciated in Germany. The militarist Government of Germany, fighting now for bare existence, is concealing from its people this world-wide disposition to boycott German trade and industry at any cost to the boycotting populations, and buoying them up with preposterous hopes of ‘business as usual’ as soon as peace is made. The fact has to be faced that while the present German Government remains no such economic resumption is possible. The ‘War after the War’ possibility has to be added to the economic destruction in Russia, Belgium, and elsewhere in any estimate of the situation after the war.

“The plain prospect of material disorganisation thus opened should alone suffice to establish the absolute necessity for peace now of such a nature as will permit a world-wide concentration upon reconstruction, in good faith and without any complications of[79] enmity and hostility. But in addition to the material destruction and dislocation, and to the ‘hatred’ disorganisation already noted, the financial transactions of the last few years have created a monetary inflation which, without the concerted action of all the Powers, may mean a collapse of world credit. Add now the plain necessity for continued armament if a real League of Nations is not attained. Without any exaggeration the prospect of the nations facing these economic difficulties in an atmosphere of continuing hostility, intrigue, and conflict, under a continuing weight of armaments, and with a continuing distrust, is a hopeless one. The consequences stare us in the face; Russia is only the first instance of what must happen generally. The alternative to a real League of Nations is the steady descent of our civilisation towards a condition of political and social fragmentation such as the world has not seen since the fall of the Roman Empire. The honest co-operation of Germany in the League of Nations, in disarmament, and in world reconstruction is, therefore, fundamentally necessary. There is now no other rational policy. And since it is impossible to hope for any such help or co-operation from the Germany of the Belgian[80] outrage, the Brest-Litovsk Treaty, the betrayal of Ukrainia, THE CHANGING OF GERMANY becomes a primary war aim, the primary war aim for the Allies. How Germany is to be changed is a complex question. The word Revolution is, perhaps, to be deprecated. We do not, for instance, desire a Bolshevik breakdown in Germany, which would make her economically useless to mankind. We look, therefore, not so much to the German peasant and labourer as to the ordinary, fairly well-educated mediocre German for co-operation in the reinstatement of civilisation. Change there must be in Germany; in the spirit in which the Government is conducted, in the persons who exercise the control, and in the relative influence of different classes in the country. The sharpest distinction, therefore, has to be drawn between Germany and its present Government in all our propaganda and public utterances; and a constant appeal has to be made by the statesmen of the Alliance, and by a frank and open propaganda through the Germans of the United States of America and of Switzerland, through neutral countries and by every possible means, from Germany Junker to Germany sober. We may be inclined to believe that every German is something of a Junker, we have to remember he is also potentially a reasonable man.

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“And meanwhile, the Allies must continue with haste and diligence to fight and defeat Junker Germany, which cannot possibly conquer but which may nevertheless succeed in ruining the world. They must fight the German armies upon the fronts, they must fight an unregenerate Germany economically and politically, and they must bring home to the German reason and conscience at home, by an intensive air war and by propaganda alike, the real impossibility of these conceptions of national pride and aggressiveness in which the German population has been bred.”

These documents were used as a basis for the policy of Crewe House, which was summarised into seven parts in Lord Northcliffe’s subsequent letter to Mr. Balfour, extracts from which follow:—

“I wish to submit to you the following general scheme of policy as a basis for British—and eventually Allied—propaganda in Germany. Propaganda, as an active form of policy, must be in harmony with the settled war aims of the Allies:—

“1. The object of all propaganda is to weaken the will of the enemy to war and[82] victory. For this purpose it is necessary to put in the forefront the ultimate object of the Allies, and the use which they would make of victory, for this is the matter with which the Germans are most concerned. We cannot, of course, expect that the war aims of the Allies should be determined solely by the effect which they may have upon the German people, but, on the other hand, it is clearly undesirable to put forward for propaganda purposes objects which it is not really intended to secure. It appears to me, however, that our war aims, as I understand them, are such as could, if presented in a suitable form, be made to do something to strengthen whatever ‘opposition’ exists in Germany.

“2. From such information as is available as to the internal condition of Germany two points emerge which are of the greatest importance for immediate purposes:—

“(a) There is much evidence that the German people as a whole desire above all a cessation of the war. They are suffering more than their opponents, and war weariness has advanced further with them than it has with us. They acquiesce in the continuance of the present offensive chiefly because they are assured[83] by their leaders that this is the only way in which a speedy peace can be achieved. It is, therefore, necessary to impress upon them that they are face to face with a determined and immutable will on the part of Allied nations to continue the war at whatever cost, notwithstanding German military successes, and that for this reason military success is not the way to bring about the peace they desire. It must be made plain that we are prepared to continue a ruthless policy of commercial blockade.

“(b) Side by side with this we have another motive of the highest importance. One of the chief instruments of the German Government is the belief which they foster that any peace that the Allies would, if they had their way, impose would mean the internal ruin of Germany, and this again would mean that each individual German family would find itself without work, without money, and without food. As against this it is necessary to impress on the German nation that these results might happen, but that they can be avoided. They will happen if the Government of Germany continues to carry out its openly avowed[84] design of subjecting the other free nations of Europe to its domination. They can be avoided if the German nation will resign these projects of domination and consent to accept the Allied scheme for a new organisation of the world.

“These two points (a) and (b) must be kept in close connection; the first provides the element of fear, the second provides the element of hope.

“3. The first point presents no difficulty to us; we can go ahead in full confidence that we are in harmony with both the nation and the Government. As to the second, on the other hand, I must ask for your guidance and support. Hitherto Allied policy and war aims have been defined too loosely to be comprehensible to the Germans, and there have been apparent inconsistencies, of which they have quickly taken advantage. Moreover, it has been possible for German writers to misrepresent our war aims as dictated by Imperialistic ambitions, similar in kind to those by which they are themselves actuated, and involving ‘annexations and indemnities,’ such as have in the past been too often the result of victory in war. I take it that the real object of the Allies is, after defeating Germany, to establish such a world peace[85] as shall, within the limits of human foresight, preclude another conflagration. It seems necessary, therefore, that the separate aims which would, of course, be maintained, such as the restoration of Belgium, the liberation of Alsace-Lorraine, the establishment of civilised government in Mesopotamia and Palestine, should be put forward in their proper places as individual but essential points in the general scheme for the settlement of world politics on a basis which would go far to remove the causes of future wars.

“4. Any such scheme would, in effect, amount to the constitution of a ‘League of Free Nations.’ It is, I presume, generally understood that eventually Germany would be invited to take her place in such a League on condition that she accepted the principles of its foundation. Her admission to the League would be in itself her guarantee against the establishment of, e.g., a hostile monopoly of raw materials. Our terms of peace, therefore, can be represented as the conditions on which Germany should be invited to take her part in such a League. In order to secure the economic benefits she would have to accept the political conditions. If this is so, the task of propaganda is greatly lightened, for it would be easier to[86] put our aims in such a form as to make them to some extent acceptable to the moderate elements in Germany than if they were put forward merely as terms to be imposed on a defeated enemy.

“5. It is, however, obvious that propaganda conducted on these lines will be of little use unless it is supported by public and authoritative statements from the Allied Governments. Otherwise, it would be represented that the real object is to beguile Germany into accepting a peace of renunciation, and that, as soon as this object has been achieved, these schemes will be repudiated, and a weakened Germany will find herself face to face with an Anglo-Saxon combination which aims at dominating the world, and keeping Germany permanently in a position of political inferiority.

“6. No such statement has yet been made, so far as I am aware, by the British Government or by the Allies. What, therefore, I should venture to ask is for such support from you as will enable us to carry on our work with the full consciousness that we have behind us the support of His Majesty’s Government. If it were known that the Government itself, in conjunction with the Allies, was investigating the problem with[87] a view to speedy action, this knowledge would give a great and needed incentive to the more popular work which we should be doing.

“7. I am well aware of the very great practical difficulties which are bound to arise so soon as an attempt is made to give formal expression to the general idea of a ‘League of Free Nations.’ But for the purposes of our work, it is of the most urgent importance that some statement of this kind should be put forward at the earliest possible date. Such a statement would in effect be an offer to the Germans of peace on stated conditions. If it were accepted, Germany would be able shortly after the conclusion of the war to come into the new society of nations; if it were refused, the war would have to continue. But it should also be made clear to the German people that the privilege of admission to this society would inevitably be postponed for a period proportional to the length of time that they continued the war.”

In answer to an inquiry, Lord Northcliffe wrote a supplementary letter, dealing with propaganda policy as to the German colonies. The following is an extract:—

“I have no settled views as to the future[88] of what were the German colonies, beyond a very strong conviction that they must never again be allowed to fall, for any military or naval purpose, under German control. But, broadly, my feeling is this: The whole situation of the Allies in regard to Germany is governed by the fact that Germany is responsible for the war. The Allies are, therefore, entitled to demand from her restitution, reparation, and guarantees as preliminary conditions of any peace settlement. The territories which the Allies have taken from Germany in the course of their legitimate self-defence do not come into the same category as the territories seized by Germany, and the allies of Germany, in the course of their predatory aggression. To contemplate barter or exchange between one set of territories and the other would be to assimilate, by implication, the moral situation of the Allies to that of Germany. Therefore, however closely we may study the question, or rather the questions—for there are several—of the German colonies, we ought to make it clear that the ultimate settlement of those questions will be reserved for treatment by the Allies as a fighting league of free nations, or by the general League of Nations should the behaviour of Germany entitle her to[89] admission to it in time to take part in any scheme of world reorganisation.”

The policy laid down in these letters was approved by the Government as a basis for propaganda, and Mr. Wells was able to develop his work in many directions.

He kept in close touch with the different organisations at home and abroad which were endeavouring to promote the League of Nations. In conjunction with Mr. Steed, Mr. Wells assisted in the drawing up of a restatement of the aims of the League of Nations Society in Great Britain and in the formation of a new association for the study of the problems arising out of the League proposal. This movement was always kept prominently before the German mind, for it was a threat of future isolation, with its resultant economic disabilities, and yet was an invitation to national repentance.

A second line of action was designed to appeal to the German workers. For this purpose Mr. Wells arranged, among other things, for the preparation and issue of a short and compact summary of the British Labour War Aims, which was subsequently used with much effectiveness not only in Germany but also in Austria.

Economic conditions, both during and[90] after the war, were made by Mr. Wells and his co-workers the subject of systematic and scientific study with the object of undertaking a propaganda of economic discouragement and persuasion in Germany. Signs were not lacking of the existence of misgivings among the commercial communities in that country at the prospect of loss of commerce, ships, and colonies in the case of defeat. Here was an opportunity to bring home to the Germans the conviction that the longer they persisted in continuing the war, so would their loss and sufferings increase.

Unfortunately, in July, Mr. Wells found himself unable to continue the direction of the German Section and, at his request, the Enemy Propaganda Committee accepted his resignation of that office, although he retained his membership of the Committee. Mr. Hamilton Fyfe was appointed to succeed him and continued in the important post until the end. Mr. Fyfe developed the work along the lines already laid down.

From the time of Mr. Wells’s appointment, Crewe House and the enemy propaganda section of the Military Intelligence Department maintained close touch with each other, but in July, 1918, Lord Northcliffe wrote to the Secretary of State for War expressing his[91] considered view that it would be advisable that British propaganda agencies against the enemy should, both for technical reasons and in order to preclude possible differences of statement in propaganda literature, as far as possible be closely co-ordinated. While gladly recognising the most friendly relations which had been cultivated between his department and the enemy propaganda branch of the War Office, through Major the Earl of Kerry, Lord Northcliffe thought that the time had come for the whole of the work of production to be centralised at Crewe House. This did not alter the arrangements for distribution through military channels which were always admirably organised and carried out by the military authorities. And, as a matter of fact, a large proportion of the literature, apart from the “priority” leaflets referred to hereinafter, was produced by the War Office on Lord Northcliffe’s behalf. Lord Northcliffe asked for urgent consideration of the matter, in view of the necessity for the intensification and extension of propaganda on the Western Front. On Lord Milner’s agreeing to this reorganisation, it was arranged that the services of Captain P. Chalmers Mitchell, who, well-known in civil life as a distinguished man of science, had been the officer immediately[92] in charge of this enemy propaganda branch, should be transferred to Crewe House. He was a valuable acquisition, and his experience, knowledge, and counsel were of great practical service. Captain Chalmers Mitchell also acted as liaison officer with the War Office (in succession to Lord Kerry) and with the Royal Air Force, and, in conjunction with Mr. Hamilton Fyfe, co-ordinated production and distribution.

This centralisation soon bore fruit. One of the earliest developments aimed at abolishing the delays which might have caused the contents of leaflets to become stale owing to the time which elapsed between their composition and their distribution. This defect was obviated by dividing the leaflets into two classes, namely, “priority” leaflets for those of a news character and “stock” leaflets with matter of a less urgent nature.

A time-table was prepared for the “priority” leaflets in which the time allotted for the different processes of composition, translation, printing, transport to France, and distribution, was cut down to an absolute minimum. With the willing aid of Messrs. Harrison and Son, the printers, and of Messrs. Gamage, who undertook the work of attaching the leaflets to the “releases,” it[93] was found possible to arrange for these news bulletins to be in the hands of the Germans within approximately forty-eight hours of their being written. Three times a week a consignment of not fewer than 100,000 leaflets of this character was rushed over to France for prompt dispatch to the Germans. This “speeding-up” became a factor of the highest importance when military events moved so rapidly in the closing months of the war.

In June and July the number of leaflets dropped over the German lines and behind them totalled 1,689,457 and 2,172,794 respectively. During August an average of over 100,000 a day was attained, the actual number of leaflets issued by the Enemy Propaganda Department in that month being 3,958,116, in September 3,715,000, and in October 5,360,000, while in the first ten days of November, before the Armistice put an end to such activities, 1,400,000 were sent out. The Germans were greatly disturbed. One of their writers described the flood of leaflets picturesquely as “English poison raining down from God’s clear sky.” Marshal von Hindenburg, in his autobiography, “Out of My Life” (Cassell & Co.), admits that this propaganda intensified the[94] process of German demoralisation. “This was a new weapon,” he continues, “or rather a weapon which had never been employed on such a scale and so ruthlessly in the past.”

The leaflets were written in simple language, and aimed at letting the Germans know the truth which was being concealed from them by their leaders. They gave information as to the progress of the war in all theatres, and showed at a glance, by means of shaded maps, the territory gained by the Associated Nations. Great stress was laid upon the large number of troops arriving daily from the United States. While, by the use of diagrams, the steadily progressive increase of the American forces was strikingly illustrated, German losses and the consequent futility of making further sacrifices in a losing cause were strongly emphasised. We have again the testimony of Hindenburg’s autobiography as to the effect on the German troops: “Ill-humour and disappointment that the war seemed to have no end, in spite of all our victories, had” (he writes) “ruined the character of many of our brave men. Dangers and hardships in the field, battle and turmoil, on top of which came the complaints from home about many real and some imaginary privations![95] All this gradually had a demoralising effect, especially as no end seemed to be in sight. In the shower of pamphlets which was scattered by enemy airmen our adversaries said and wrote that they did not think so badly of us; that we must only be reasonable and perhaps here and there renounce something we had conquered. Then everything would be soon right again and we could live together in peace, in perpetual international peace. As regards peace within our own borders, new men and new Governments would see to that. What a blessing peace would be after all the fighting! There was, therefore, no point in continuing the struggle. Such was the purport of what our men read and said. The soldier thought it could not be all enemy lies, allowed it to poison his mind, and proceeded to poison the minds of others.”

Despite such compliments as to the effectiveness of the distribution, this branch of the work provided the thorn in the Crewe House flesh. Distribution by aeroplane was the ideal method, and the decision to discontinue the use of aeroplanes for the purpose was a serious handicap to Lord Northcliffe’s work. Balloon distribution was dependent upon favourable winds, and could only be[96] performed in one direction, whereas aeroplanes could cover a much more extensive area at great speed. On several occasions Lord Northcliffe pressed for the resumption of their use. Lord Milner replied to the first request, early in May, to the effect that the British authorities were disputing the German contention that the distribution of literature from aeroplanes was contrary to the laws of war, and had given notice that they intended to institute prompt reprisals if they received information that any British airmen were undergoing punishment for similar action. Although distribution by aeroplane on the Western Front had been temporarily suspended, they held themselves free at any moment to resume it, and stated that meanwhile literature would be distributed by other and, as they thought, more effective means. Yet it was admitted that there had been no stoppage of the use of aeroplanes for the purpose on the Italian Front.

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A month later, Lord Northcliffe again wrote, asking if anything had been done to cancel the temporary suspension of the distribution of leaflets by aeroplane on the Western Front. He and his co-workers felt strongly that propaganda work against Germany was being severely handicapped by disuse of this method of distribution, especially as, according to his information, the Germans themselves continued to drop leaflets over the British lines from aeroplanes. He could not believe that distribution by balloon was as accurate or as effective. It was a curious commentary on the British attitude that the French continued to use aeroplanes for the purpose on the Western Front.

Many weeks passed before the War Cabinet agreed to the resumption of the use of aeroplanes, and even then the Air Ministry raised further objection. Finally, all obstacles were overcome, but not until the end of October. In one week 3,000,000 leaflets were prepared for the interior of Germany, and the distribution of these was begun just before the Armistice.

With the turn of the tide of military events in the summer of 1918, propaganda had assumed greater importance than ever. Military defeat rendered the German soldier more amenable to propagandist influences, to which in victory he could afford to turn a blind eye and deaf ear. Moreover, the Allied successes seriously disturbed the German nation, and as the news was disseminated by the various agencies carefully organised by Crewe House the spirit of the people[98] became generally depressed. The commercial classes exhibited great fear at the threatened economic war. Thus the soil became fertilised for the reception of propagandist views. One obvious but important way of spreading such views was by ensuring that important speeches of leading British statesmen should be adequately and promptly reported in enemy countries. Means were found of accomplishing this object. When occasion arose, publication in neutral newspapers of interviews with British public men on important subjects was arranged for, and these were widely quoted in the enemy Press.

The valuable material collected by Mr. Wells on British progress in those lines of industry in which Germany had excelled was used by Mr. Fyfe in many ways. Articles on the subject were sent to, and published by, German-Swiss papers, which were known to be much read in Germany. Pamphlets were written in German in tones of serious warning and distributed through channels prepared by the perseverance and ingenuity of Mr. S. A. Guest. By these means, also, a large number of descriptive catalogues of an exhibition in London of British scientific products were introduced into Germany and[99] were snapped up and read with avidity. Treatment of these issues was found to influence enlightened German opinion more than any other kind of propaganda.

From time to time special topics were selected. For instance, a series of “London Letters” was sent to Swiss and Scandinavian papers purporting to be written with a pro-German flavour, but containing, under this disguise, a true picture of food and other conditions in Great Britain. It was gratifying to find these reprinted in enemy papers, for the German reader was thus led to institute mental comparisons with the much worse conditions prevalent in Germany. Secret means, too, were found to circulate in German naval ports, as a deterrent to men picked for service in submarines, leaflets (of which a reproduction appears in this volume) containing a long list of U-boat commanders, dead or captured, with description of their rank. Particulars so easy of verification proved the mastery of the British Navy over the U-boat campaigners and created great depression in the German ports.

In addition to the “priority” leaflets containing news of Allied successes, illustrated with shaded maps and diagrams, a[100] “trench newspaper” was prepared in a style which exactly resembled a German publication. The propaganda pill was coated to make it attractive. The newspaper was homely in appearance—its title-decoration included a head of the Kaiser—and it provided excellent reading matter which would appeal to the German soldier, while revealing facts hitherto carefully hidden from him. As many as from 250,000 to 500,000 copies of each weekly issue were distributed. Some leaflets, on the other hand, were in religious vein, for there is a deep religious strain in the German character. These leaflets pointed out that their military defeats were a just retribution for the crimes of their Government. One was a little sermon on the text “Be sure your sin will find you out.”

With knowledge of the dwindling of their own reserves, the Germans became increasingly anxious about the supply of American troops, artillery, and munitions. No opportunity was lost by Crewe House of keeping the enemy armies and civil populations fully aware of the wonderful extent of the American effort. A series of leaflets was prepared which gave in succinct and vigorous form the latest details about that effort, both in the field[101] and at home in the factory, the shipyard and the farm.

British propagandist work against Germany was both positive and negative. Its aim was to give the German people something to hope for in an early peace and much to fear from the prolongation of the war—that is, to make it clear to them that the only way to escape complete ruin would be to break with the system that brought the war upon Europe, and to qualify for admission eventually into the League of Nations on the Allied terms. In addition to these very necessary educative efforts, the enemy armies were supplied with constant and invariably truthful information about the actual military position. Its veracity was a more essential factor to its success than its quantity. The news withheld by the German authorities was supplied by us. Hence the cries of alarm from Marshal von Hindenburg and General von Hutier, to which fuller reference is made in the next chapter.

In the “intensive propaganda” of the last few weeks of hostilities the Hohenzollern Government was denounced. It was pointed out that all Germany’s sufferings and tribulations were due to its “Old Gang,” of which a clean sweep would have to be made before[102] the world would make friends or do business with Germans again. Chapter and verse were given to prove that the German Government could not be trusted, and that it was a great obstacle to peace. Attention, too, was drawn to the changes then taking place in Germany, to the cries raised for the abdication of the Emperor, and to the growing demand for the punishment of all who had brought Germany to her disastrous situation. German soldiers were urged to consider whether it was worth while to risk being killed when they had nothing left to fight for, and it was suggested that their best course was to make off to their homes and ensure the safety of their families. The consequences to Germans of the continuation of the war were plainly indicated. Maps and diagrams showed at a glance how Allied air raids over Germany had increased in number, how larger and larger Allied air squadrons and more powerful bombs were being provided and how easily it would be possible to attack Berlin, Hamburg, Hanover, and other places which had previously escaped. A map was also prepared showing all the steamship routes by which food, munitions, and raw materials were being brought to Great Britain and France, and demonstrating the falsity[103] of the German leaders’ assurance that we could be starved into submission.

By the courtesy of the Admiralty and of the Ministry of Information, use was regularly made of wireless telegraphy as a means of disseminating information, combating false German statements, and influencing German opinion through neutral newspapers and public opinion.

Many other agencies for introducing propagandist material into enemy countries were organised by Mr. Guest, whose work demanded extraordinary patience and perseverance. He experimented with many methods, and, despite the vigilance of the Germans, the inflow into Germany increased. Some of the methods can never be revealed, but it is permissible to hint that, for instance, among foreign workmen of a certain nationality who went into Germany each morning and returned each evening there might be some to whom propagandist work was not uncongenial. And, of course, all secret agents were not necessarily Allies or neutrals. Somehow, huge masses of literature were posted in Germany to selected addresses from which the German postal revenues derived no benefit. Easiest of all were certain obvious channels left wholly or partially[104] open in most incredible fashion, as, for instance, the book trade, which was by no means as closely supervised as might have been expected. None were more amazed at the facility with which such valuable propaganda material as Prince Lichnowsky’s pamphlet achieved clandestine circulation in Germany and Austria than were British propagandists. Perhaps, as a gratuitous hint to the curious, it may be added that the outside covers with titles of works by revered German authors did not always correspond to the contents of the books, but, oft-times, as the poet said, “things are not what they seem.”

Personal propaganda among enemy subjects resident in neutral countries—and especially those unsympathetic to the perverted ideals of their respective nations—was tactfully pursued. Neutrals in prominent positions in any walk of life whose views were likely to react on enemy opinion were brought within the orbit of salutary personal intercourse. Enemy newspaper correspondents were carefully “nursed.” No avenue of approach into enemy countries was considered too insignificant, for each had its particular use.

MR. HAMILTON FYFE.
SUCCEEDED MR. H. G. WELLS AS DIRECTOR OF THE GERMAN SECTION.
Photo: Elliott & Fry, Ltd.
CAPTAIN CHALMERS MITCHELL.
BRIGADIER-GENERAL G. K. COCKERILL, C.B.
[DEPUTY-DIRECTOR OF MILITARY INTELLIGENCE, 1918.]
Photo: Russell, London.

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## CHAPTER V
TRIBUTES FROM THE ENEMY

Hindenburg’s outburst: German Press Comments: Ludendorff on the conduct and effect of British Propaganda against the Central Powers.

The Press of the enemy countries was closely watched for references to British propaganda in editorial articles or in the reports of utterances of political and military leaders. During August, 1918, the misgivings engendered by the trend of events, as revealed by our propaganda, found expression in print. Then, as if a pent-up stream had at last carried away the dam, came a flood of wails from many quarters, generals vying with editors in hurling imprecations at the British Enemy Propaganda Department, with blackest vilifications of Lord Northcliffe, and in beseeching German troops and people not to be affected by the leaflets which had by this time found their way into even the remotest corner of rural Germany.

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These outbursts were symptomatic of the fear of defeat which had laid hold of the Germans, and were correctly interpreted in England as foreshadowing the end which came so dramatically in November, 1918. It was obvious that even the German Government felt it unwise to restrain, by use of the censorship, the publication of such damaging admissions of the deadliness of British propaganda. It was impossible to stop the rising tide of truth which was covering Germany.

To attempt to quote even a small proportion of these unintentional tributes to the work of Sir George Macdonogh’s department of the War Office and of Crewe House would be wearisome. Perhaps the best specimen of all came in the form of a manifesto from no less a person than Field Marshal von Hindenburg, the war idol and personification of German militarism. This is the text of the remarkable document:

We are engaged in a hard struggle with our enemies. If numerical superiority alone guaranteed victory, Germany would long since have lain shattered on the ground. The enemy knows, however, that Germany and her Allies cannot be conquered by arms alone. The enemy[107] knows that the spirit which dwells within our troops and our people makes us unconquerable. Therefore, together with the struggle against the German arms, he has undertaken a struggle against the German spirit; he seeks to poison our spirit and believes that German arms will also become blunted if the German spirit is eaten away.

We should not take this plan of the enemy lightly. The enemy conducts his campaign against our spirit by various means. He bombards our Front, not only with a drumfire of artillery, but also with a drumfire of printed paper. Besides bombs which kill the body, his airmen throw down leaflets which are intended to kill the soul.

Of these enemy leaflets our field-grey men delivered up:

In May | 84,000
In June | 120,000
In July | 300,000

A gigantic increase! Ten thousand poisoned arrows daily in July; 10,000 times daily the attempt to deprive the individual and the whole body of belief in the justice of our cause and of the[108] strength and confidence for ultimate victory! We can reckon, in addition, that a great part of the enemy leaflets will not have been found by us.

Poisoning the Home Spirit.

But the enemy is not merely satisfied in attacking the spirit of our Front, he wishes above all also to poison the spirit of our home. He knows what sources of strength for the Front rest in the home. True, his aeroplanes and balloons do not carry these leaflets far into our homeland; they lie far from it in the lines in which the enemy vainly struggles for victory by arms. But the enemy hopes that many a field-grey soldier will send home the leaflet which has innocently fluttered down from the air. At home it will pass from hand to hand and be discussed at the beer-table, in families, in the sewing-room, in factories, and in the street. Unsuspectingly many thousands consume the poison. For thousands the burden the war in any case imposes upon them is increased, and the will and hope for a victorious issue of the war is taken from them. All these again write their doubts to the Front,[109] and Wilson, Lloyd George and Clemenceau rub their hands.

The enemy attacks the spirit of the home in another way besides. The silliest rumours, designed to break our inner power of resistance, are put into circulation. We find them simultaneously in Switzerland, in Holland, and in Denmark. Thence they spread like a wave over the whole of Germany. Or they emerge simultaneously, agreeing in silly details, in the remotest regions of our country—in Silesia, in East Prussia, in the Rhineland—and wend their way thence over the remainder of the home territory. This poison works on the men on leave and flows in letters to the Front. Again the enemy rubs his hands.

The enemy is ingenious. He knows how to mix the little powder for everyone. He decoys the fighters at the Front. One leaflet runs:

“German soldiers! It is a shameful lie that the French ill-treat German prisoners. We are not brutes; only come over to us without fear; here you will find a most considerate reception, good food, and a peaceful refuge.”

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Ask brave men who have succeeded with unspeakable difficulty in escaping from the enemy captivity about this. Plundered to the utmost in wire compounds, roofless, goaded by hunger and thirst into treasonable utterances, forced by blows and threats of death to betray their comrades, spat upon, pelted with filth by the French populace while being driven to hard labour, that is what the paradise that the enemy conjures up really looks like.

Reproductions of original letters written by prisoners are also thrown down, in which these men describe how well it goes with them. God be praised, there are still also decent and humane commandants of prisoners’ camps in England and France; but these are the exception, and the letters the enemy throws down are only of three or four different kinds. But he sends these multiplied by many thousands of copies. The enemy intimidates the faint-hearted by saying:

“Your struggle is hopeless; America will settle you; your submarines are no good; we are building more ships than they sink; after the war we shall[111] debar you from getting raw materials, then Germany’s industry must starve. You will never see your colonies again.”

That is the tone of the leaflets; now enticement, now threat.

German Facts and Fancies.

What is the real situation? We have enforced peace in the East and are strong enough to do it in the West, notwithstanding the Americans; but we must be strong and united; that is what the enemy is fighting against with these leaflets and rumours. He wishes to deprive us of faith and confidence, will and force.

Why is the enemy continually seeking new allies in the struggle against us? Why does he try to press nations still neutral into the struggle against us? Because in strength we are his equals.

Why does he incite black and other coloured men against German soldiers? Because his will is to destroy us.

Again, the enemy says another thing:

“You Germans, your form of government is wrong. Fight against the Hohenzollerns, against capitalism; help[112] us, the Entente, to give you a better form of State.”

The enemy knows perfectly what strength resides in our State and Empire; but that is precisely why he combats it. The enemy also seeks to tear open old wounds in the German body politic. With his leaflets and by rumours he attempts to sow division and distrust among the Federal States. At Lake Constance we confiscated many thousands of leaflets conveyed to Bavaria and intended to excite anger against the North Germans. They wish to destroy the German Empire, which for centuries was the dream of Germans and which our fathers won for us, and to condemn Germany to the impotence of the Thirty Years’ War.

The enemy also wishes to shake our loyalty to our allies. He does not know the German way and the word of a German man. He himself sacrifices his allies; he who is England’s ally dies of it.

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Traitors to the Fatherland.

And finally the enemy sends not the least dangerous of his poisoned arrows dipped in printers’ ink when he throws down the utterances of German men and German newspapers. The utterances of German newspapers are torn from their context. Regarding the utterances of Germans which are reproduced, remember that at every time there have been conscious and unconscious traitors to the Fatherland. Most of them reside abroad in neutral countries, in order not to be obliged to share our struggle and our privations, or to be condemned by our Judges as guilty of high treason. Nor have champions of extreme party tendencies any right to claim to speak for the generality of the German people.

It is our strength, but also our weakness that even in war we allow unrestricted utterance to every opinion. We still tolerate the reproduction in our newspapers of enemy Army reports and the speeches of enemy statesmen which are weapons of attack directed against the spirit of the German Army and people. This is a sign of strength, because it proves a consciousness of might. But it is a weakness because it allows the enemy’s poison to find an entrance among us.

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Therefore, German Army, German Homeland, if one of these thrown-out pieces of poison in the form of leaflet or rumour comes before your eyes and ears, remember that its originates with the enemy. Remember nothing comes from the enemy which is not harmful to Germany. Every one must be mindful of this, whatever his position or party. If you meet anyone whose name and origin indeed are German, but who by nature stands in the enemy’s camp, keep him at a distance, despise him, put him publicly in the pillory in order that every other true German may despise him.

Defend yourself, German Army, German Homeland!

Hindenburg’s fear that only a small part of the leaflets was given up was fully justified. The numbers which he quotes suggest that hundreds of thousands must have been carried to their homes by the “field-grey men.”

The whole manifesto is an interesting study in psychology. Hope had slipped away; dismay had ripened into despair and despair had sown wild anger and hatred. The dissemination of the unwelcome facts[115] of the position caused him to burst out in vituperation and so to give a valuable clue as to the effect which Allied propaganda was producing on the German troops and public.

After such a mighty oracle, it is not surprising that others took up the cry. Not long after, the following noteworthy message, signed by General von Hutier of the Sixth German Army, was captured:

The enemy begins to realise that we cannot be crushed by blockade, superiority of numbers, or force of arms. He is, therefore, trying a last resource. While engaging to the utmost of his military force he is racking his imagination for ruses, trickery, and other underhand methods of which he is a past master, to induce in the minds of the German people a doubt of their invincibility. He has founded for this purpose a special Ministry (“The Ministry for the Destruction of German Confidence”), at the head of which he has put the most thoroughgoing rascal of all the Entente—Lord Northcliffe, who has been given billions for use in influencing opinion in the interior of the country and at the Front by means of paid agents, the assassination of Ambassadors,[116] and all the other ways in favour with the Entente.

The method of Northcliffe at the Front is to distribute through airmen a constantly increasing number of leaflets and pamphlets; the letters of German prisoners are falsified in the most outrageous way; tracts and pamphlets are concocted, to which the names of German poets, writers, and statesmen are forged, or which present the appearance of having been printed in Germany, and bear, for example, the title of the Reclam series, when they really come from the Northcliffe Press, which is working day and night for this same purpose. His thought and aim are that these forgeries, however obvious they may appear to the man who thinks twice, may suggest a doubt, even for a moment, in the minds of those who do not think for themselves, and that their confidence in their leaders, in their own strength, and in the inexhaustible resources of Germany may be shattered.

Fortunately, Northcliffe, the Minister for the Destruction of German Confidence, forgets that German soldiers are neither Negroes nor Hindus, nor[117] illiterate French, English, and Americans, incapable of seeing through such machinations. Explain these infamous attempts to your young and inexperienced comrades, and tell them what our mortal enemy expects of them, and what is at stake. Pick up the leaflets and pamphlets and give them to our commanders for transmission to the High Command, which may be able to make valuable deductions from them as to the aims of our enemies. You will thus help the Command, and you will also help to hasten the hour of victory.

The allegation that huge sums of money were expended by Lord Northcliffe is comic. As will have been seen already, the total cost of the operations conducted by Lord Northcliffe during his tenure of office was considerably less than a one-hundredth part of Great Britain’s daily war bill.

German Army orders, which fell into Allied hands, showed plainly how widespread was the effect produced among the enemy troops by the leaflets. Officers and men were threatened with severe punishment if they neglected to hand the leaflets in immediately. On the other hand, bonuses for the delivery of unknown specimens of pamphlets,[118] books, leaflets, and pictures were offered as follows:—

3 marks (nominally 3s.) for the first copy.

30 pfgs. (nominally 4d.) for other copies.

5 marks (nominally 5s.) for a book.

An order issued by Ludendorff showed that the influence of the propaganda extended beyond the troops to the population of Germany. This read:

“There has been an increase in the number of complaints received from home that men on leave from the front create a very unfavourable impression by making statements actually bordering on high treason and incitement to disobedience. Instances such as these drag through the mud the honour and respect of the individual as well as of the whole Army, and have a disastrous effect upon the moral of the people at home.”

A “high officer at the front” describing, in the Kölnische Zeitung of October 31, 1918, the demoralisation of the German Army as a result of the retreat, wrote:

What damaged us most of all was the paper war carried on by the enemy,[119] who dropped daily among us 100,000 leaflets, which were extraordinarily well distributed and well edited.

This strikingly confirmed a report received by the Foreign Office the previous month which stated:

Leaflets thrown by Allied airmen have much more effect now. Instead of being thrown away or laughed at, as was often the case in the past, they are eagerly picked up and read. There is no doubt that recent events have seriously shaken the moral of the German people and Army. One of the returned officers mentioned above said that if the Entente knew what poison these leaflets, etc., were working in the minds of the German soldiers they would give up lead and bombard with paper only in future.

That neither threats nor bribes was inducing the surrender of the leaflets to German Headquarters was plainly shown by the statements of prisoners captured during the last four months of hostilities, and by the fact that most of them had British leaflets in their possession. Among the subjects which seemed to have attracted special attention[120] were the German responsibility for starting the war, for the adoption of poison gas attacks, and for the bombing of open towns; the ineffectiveness of Zeppelin attacks and of the U-boats preventing the transport of food and troops; the arrival of the American armies; the Allied war aims; comparison of food conditions in Germany with those in Great Britain; and the extracts from German Socialist newspapers. Inhabitants of the recaptured territory testified to the effect of the propaganda on the German troops, remarking on the lowering of moral and the increasing number of deserters which they attributed to it.

Politicians and newspapers were also greatly excited, and raised loud cries for the creation of an organisation for counter-propaganda. Herr F. Stossinger described British propaganda in the Frankfurter Zeitung as “the most complicated and dangerous of all,” and commented on its “countless” activities. The Minister of War, General von Stein was complimentary enough to say “In propaganda the enemy is undoubtedly our superior.” (Berlin Morgenpost, August 25, 1918.) Other tributes were:

Rheinische-Westfälische-Zeitung: “At any rate, the British Propaganda Department[121] has worked hard. Had we shown the same activity in our Propaganda perhaps many a thing would have been different now. But in this, we regret to say, we were absolutely unprepared, but we hope that by now we have learned differently.”

Deutsche Tageszeitung: “We Germans have a right to be proud of our General Staff. We have a feeling that our enemies’ General Staff cannot hold a candle to it, but we also have the feeling that our enemies have a brilliant Propaganda General Staff, whereas we have none.”

Violent and bitter attacks were repeatedly made. The revelations of the British propaganda created great nervousness, which in turn gave rise to all kinds of wild rumours, which spread all over Germany. These were attributed to Lord Northcliffe’s department. Speaking in the Bavarian Lower House of Parliament during August, 1918, General von Hellingrath, the Bavarian Minister of War, said:—

“These rumours are nothing but the result of the industrious and determined[122] agitation which our enemies carry on in the interior through their agents.”

Herr von Kupffer, the editor of the Berlin Lokal-Anzeiger, referred to them as “a carnival of soul-storms, idiotic terror, and criminal irresponsibility,” and he continued:

“The main thing is to remember the source of such rumours and to bear in mind what their object is. Their object is to demoralise us and, by so doing, turn into realities what otherwise would remain merely nightmares. One would have to be really blind not to see that these things radiate from that organisation in England formed to shatter the German nervous system by means of shameful and impudent lies. Is not the figure of Lord Northcliffe, the great Propaganda Chief of the English Home Army, pilloried in world-history for all time?

“Is anybody in doubt as to the purpose of this propaganda? Does not everybody know that the generalissimo of this campaign of mendacity has unlimited funds at his disposal in order to circulate streams of lies through neutral channels with devilish cunning[123] and almost impressive skill? Does not everybody realise that the Northcliffe Propaganda is too shrewd to work by means of mere newspaper tales that could easily be disproved, and therefore resorts to the much more subtle method of carrying unrest, disloyalty, and alarm into our country and into the lands of our allies by means of verbal communications of all sorts? Paid rascals are systematically employed for this purpose. It is this sort of person who propagates these wild stories in Germany and upsets our sense of proportion in connection with war events. These are the facts. Let people bear them in mind before they promote the Northcliffe Propaganda by repeating every bit of washerwoman’s gossip as gospel, even though it be without the slightest foundation in fact.”

In the Hamburg district matters were much the same, for the influential shipping journal Hansa printed the following on September 14:—

“God be thanked! At last we are just beginning to recognise what the hour of war demands; what is our duty as Germans and as citizens. Despondency,[124] discontent, depression, hanging heads, grumbling! We meet them at every step and turn, but we did not know their origin, these growths of evil fantasy. We did not understand what meant these secret whispers about alleged unfavourable news from the front, these exaggerated reports, fraught with misfortune, which passed so glibly from mouth to mouth. One had heard this, another that, but always it was something bad in regard to our military situation. Nothing definite was ever mentioned. There were only suggestions, which proved to be chimeras as soon as ever they could be run to earth. They were the birth of ignoble defeatism. Yet there they were, invisibly surrounding us, disturbing our spiritual balance, darkening our temper; like an epidemic, like poisonous bacilli, they flew hither and thither in all directions through our German air.

“Whence came they? Who brought them to us? To-day we know. To-day we can recognise the origin of this depression of German will-power. It was the long-advertised publicity offensive of the Entente directed against us[125] under England’s lead, and under the special direction of that unprincipled, unscrupulous rascal, Northcliffe.”

In the Kölnische Volkszeitung for September 11, a letter from the front said:

“Leaflets destined to cause low spirits and despair, or to send deserters to the enemy, are being showered down in thousands in certain places and their surroundings. It is this combat, waged openly or secretly, which, particularly at home, produces low spirits and despair. Here you find statements that Hindenburg was once regarded as a Divinity, but that his laurels are beginning to fade, which is quite evident from the way the enemy advance daily; that our troops have lost courage, whole companies are deserting to the enemy, and such like things.”

In another letter to the same newspaper, published on August 20, the writer said:

“Our enemies have recently been very busy distributing leaflets from the air. I have had two of these leaflets in my hands, and it is not to be doubted that our enemies are in that, also, our[126] masters, for the pamphlets are so well produced that anyone who is not on the lookout is very likely to fall a victim to them.”

That such Propaganda might have had an effect if it had been tried earlier was evident from the admissions of war correspondents as well as of generals. Herr W. Scheurmann wrote in the Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung (October 30):

“We Germans have learnt for the first time this autumn that the moral resistance of the fighter at the front is a power with which the Command must reckon, all the more cautiously inasmuch as it is difficult to estimate.”

All charges of the mendacity of British propaganda were unfounded, for the greatest care was unremittingly exercised to tell only the truth. One effect of this was to make the Germans distrust their official communiqués. “We have in our dear Fatherland to-day,” wrote the Kölnische Zeitung on September 11, “great numbers of innocent and ingenuous minds who doubt the plain statements of the German Army reports, but believe the false reports and[127] omissions of the enemy. To prove constantly the contrary to them is a rather thankless task, but of which one should never tire.”

It was, indeed, a thankless task to try to keep the truth from the whole German nation. “Warn your brothers, your sons, your husbands, not to believe the enemy’s leaflets,” was one of “Ten Commandments for German Women,” published by the Kölnische Volkszeitung on October 20, but it was then too late to maintain the lie-system by which the German resistance had been stimulated for so long.

Writing in July, 1919, Herr Arnold Rechberg said in the Tägliche Rundschau: “It cannot be doubted that Lord Northcliffe very substantially contributed to England’s victory in the world war. His conduct of English propaganda during the war will some day find its place in history as a performance hardly to be surpassed. The Northcliffe propaganda during the war correctly estimated ... the character and intellectual peculiarities of the Germans.”

Praise from an enemy, when there is no underlying motive, can usually be accepted as sincere. Most of the foregoing quotations were primarily warnings and exhortations to their own people issued during the war,[128] and compliments to Allied propaganda only indirectly.

When, however, hostilities had ceased disastrously for Germany and her allies, passions of hatred and pride began to give place to the cold logic of reason. Ludendorff, who, as First Quartermaster-General from 1916 to the end of the war, was regarded as one of the cleverest of Germany’s military leaders, sat down to write his “War Memories” (Hutchinson and Co., London). His reputation entitles him to respect, and he has much to say of value regarding propaganda.

He learned one important lesson. “Good propaganda,” he wrote, “must keep well ahead of actual political events. It must act as pacemaker to policy and mould public opinion without appearing to do so.” This was the great basic principle upon which was built the success of Lord Northcliffe’s department. To try to make propaganda shape policy is as fatal as endeavouring to conduct propaganda campaigns without policy or with conflicting policies. Illuminating volumes could be written on failures from all these causes. But whoever follows the history of the operations conducted from Crewe House will find that painstaking study was made of the factors governing the political, economic, and military position of each of the enemy countries concerned before action was taken. As The Times observed in a leading article (October 31, 1919) Lord Northcliffe’s work “differed from the praiseworthy and painstaking efforts that had preceded it mainly by adopting as its guiding principle the very maxim which Ludendorff lays down. The consideration that, without a definite policy in regard to each enemy country, propaganda must be at best a hand-to-mouth business was, from the first, regarded as self-evident by Lord Northcliffe and the handful of experts who advised him.”

[129]

Ludendorff compared the work of the British and German propaganda departments, to the great disparagement of the latter. Indeed he attributed the moral collapse of the German soldier—and consequently the military defeat—in part to British propaganda and in part to the demoralisation of the German home population, which, in turn, he ascribed to British propaganda and to the feebleness of the German Government in counteracting it. Of British propaganda he wrote:—

[130]

[1]Lloyd George knew what he was doing when, after the close of the war, he gave Lord Northcliffe the thanks of England for the propaganda he had carried out. Lord Northcliffe was a master of mass-suggestion. The enemy’s propaganda attacked us by transmitting reports and print from the neutral States on our frontier, especially Holland and Switzerland. It assailed us in the same way from Austria, and finally in our own country by using the air. It did this with such method and on such a scale that many people were no longer able to distinguish their own impressions from what the enemy propaganda had told them. This propaganda was all the more effective in our case as we had to rely, not on the numbers, but on the quality of our battalions in prosecuting the war. The importance of numbers in war is incontestable. Without soldiers there can be no war. But numbers count only according to the spirit which animates them. As it is in the life of peoples, so it is also on the battlefield. We had fought against the world, and could continue to do so with good conscience so long as we were spiritually ready to endure the burden[131] of war. So long as we were this, we had hope of victory and refused to bow to the enemy’s determination to annihilate us. But with the disappearance of our moral readiness to fight everything changed completely. We no longer battled to the last drop of our blood. Many Germans were no longer willing to die for their country.

The shattering of public confidence at home affected our moral readiness to fight. The attack on our home front and on the spirit of the Army was the chief weapon with which the Entente intended to conquer us, after it had lost all hope of a military victory.

[1] This passage is a translation from the German edition.

His references to German enemy propaganda are generally in terms of disgust. He considered it rendered Germany no service. “Our political aims and decisions, issued to the world as sudden surprises, often seemed to be merely brutal and violent. This could have been skilfully avoided by broad and far-sighted propaganda.... The German propaganda was only kept going with difficulty. In spite of all our efforts, its achievements, in comparison to the magnitude of the task, were inadequate. We produced no real effect on the enemy peoples.... We[132] also attempted to carry on propaganda on the enemy fronts. In the East, the Russians were the authors of their own collapse, and our work there was of secondary importance. In the West, the fronts of our enemies had not been made susceptible by the state of public opinion in their home countries, and the propaganda we gradually introduced had no success.... Germany failed in the fight against the moral of the enemy peoples.”

Again and again Ludendorff quotes instances of the effect of propaganda. For example, just before the last German offensive of July 15, 1918:

“The Army complained of the enemy propaganda. It was the more effective because the Army was rendered impressionable by the attitude at home.... The enemy propaganda had seized on Prince Lichnowsky’s pamphlet, which, in a way that I myself could not explain, placed on the German Government the responsibility for the outbreak of war. And this, though his Majesty and the Chancellor again and again asserted that the Entente was responsible....

“The Army was literally drenched with enemy propaganda publications. Their great danger to us was clearly recognised.[133] The Supreme Command offered rewards for such as were handed over to us, but we could not prevent them from poisoning the heart of our soldiers.”

No greater effect could have been desired by the British authorities than that described by Ludendorff, and such an acknowledgment of the results produced gave the highest satisfaction.

A MEDALLION STRUCK BY THE GERMANS IN “DISHONOUR” OF LORD NORTHCLIFFE.

[134]

## CHAPTER VI
OPERATIONS AGAINST BULGARIA AND OTHER ACTIVITIES

Peculiar difficulties of propaganda against Bulgaria—Educative work among prisoners of war.

Operations against Bulgaria—the other objective of Crewe House activities—were somewhat dissimilar to those against either Austria-Hungary or Germany. There were complications due to the general state of Balkan affairs and politics, and to the fact that technically the United States was not at war with Bulgaria. The definition of propaganda policy against Bulgaria called for most delicate expression, lest any offence should be given to Serbia, Roumania, or Greece.

Lord Northcliffe, in submitting to the Foreign Office a statement of policy proposed for use against Bulgaria, pointed out that he and his advisers felt that there was need for a definite Allied policy in regard to the Jugo-Slav and Roumanian questions.[135] These, in their turn, were dependent upon Allied policy in regard to Austria-Hungary. On May 25, 1918, Lord Northcliffe wrote to the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs:

“After careful consideration, and with the advice of our most competent authorities on Bulgarian and Balkan affairs, I beg to submit to you the following scheme of Allied policy in regard to Balkan countries as the framework within which any propaganda in Bulgaria should be carried out. I would especially direct your attention to the need for a Government decision in regard to the Southern Slav, Greek, and Roumanian questions before any definite proposals from Bulgaria are entertained:

“The adoption of a clear and comprehensive Balkan policy by the British and Allied Governments is an essential condition of any propaganda in Bulgaria.

“Without such a policy any propaganda in Bulgaria would resolve itself into competitive bargaining between the Allies on the one hand and the Austro-Germans on the other.

“This bargaining would tend to[136] estrange and to dishearten the Serbians and the Greeks. In attempting it the Allies would be, moreover, at a disadvantage, inasmuch as Bulgaria already occupies, as a member of the enemy Alliance, considerably more than all the territories that would be the subject of the bargaining.

“The aim of Allied policy in the Balkans should be a lasting territorial and political settlement, framed as nearly as possible on lines of ethnography, with the object of paving the way for a permanent League of the Balkan Nations.

“Bulgaria cannot possess all the territories ethnographically Bulgarian unless she retain at the peace districts held by Serbia, Greece, and Roumania before the war. Serbia, Greece, and Roumania, on the other hand, cannot fairly be asked or compelled to abandon those districts unless they, in their turn, be united with territories ethnographically Serbo-Croatian (Jugo-Slav), Greek, and Roumanian.

“Allied policy should therefore deliberately aim at the solution of the Southern Slav, Hellenic, and Roumanian[137] questions in the sense of the fullest possible racial unity and independence.

“The chief difficulty in defining the just claims of Bulgaria lies in the uncertainty as to the proper delimitation of Bulgarian Macedonia. A purely ethnographical delimitation might involve economic and strategical injustice to Serbia and Greece, unless it were accompanied by due provision, internationally guaranteed, for Serbian and Greek rights of way. Similarly, the retention of ports like Salonika and Kavalla by Greece would involve hardship to Bulgaria unless adequate provision, internationally guaranteed, were made for a Bulgarian right of way to those ports.

“Should it prove impossible to obtain, by persuasion or pressure, the assent of Serbia and Greece to the retention of ethnographical Macedonia by Bulgaria, an autonomous Macedonia might be set up, proper provision being made for the maintenance of order and for the repression of armed Serbian and Greek or Bulgarian ‘propaganda’ by an international force of[138] gendarmerie. One advantage of an autonomous Macedonia would be that it would meet the wishes of the Macedonian Bulgars themselves, who would prefer autonomy to annexation outright by Bulgaria.

“The Allied policy in the Balkans should be made known to the Bulgarians by the Allies and by the United States. The necessary ethnographical delimitation of Bulgarian, or of autonomous Macedonian territory should be undertaken by a competent Allied Commission, possibly under the presidency of the United States. The announcement of Allied policy should be accompanied by an intimation that only by accepting it can Bulgaria hope to escape economic and political ostracism for an indefinite period; but that acceptance of the Allied policy would, on the contrary, carry with it a claim to financial and economic support.

“Bulgaria should at the same time be told that the Allies would guarantee to her the Enos-Midia line as her minimum frontier on the east, provided that she refrained from further[139] active co-operation with the enemies of the Allies. Active co-operation on the side of the Allies should be rewarded by a frontier yet more favourable to her aspirations, e.g. by the line Midia-Rodosto. The inclusion of Silistria in the future Bulgarian territory should likewise be made contingent upon the behaviour of Bulgaria before the conclusion of peace.

“May I ask you to give me your views on this scheme of policy as early as possible?

“I wish to send to Salonika, without delay, a competent mission to begin propaganda on this, or some similar basis, but cannot authorise its departure unless the ideas it would propagate have the explicit approval of His Majesty’s Government.”

Mr. Balfour replied on June 6, 1918:

“I have carefully considered your letter of May 25, in which you were so kind as to furnish me with your ideas as to the lines on which we should conduct our propaganda in the Balkans.

“I fully agree with the general ideas underlying your policy.

[140]

“I feel, indeed, that it will be of value if our own efforts in this direction, which, for obvious reasons, can at present be only of the most tentative nature, are preceded by discreet and intelligent propaganda, such as will not only appeal to our enemies but enlighten our friends.”

It was well-known that influential Bulgarians realised the meaning of the trend of events in the main theatres of war and would have welcomed the opening of negotiations with the Allies. But it was obviously impossible to begin territorial bargaining with Bulgarian representatives of any party, because Bulgaria already possessed more territory than that to which she was ethnographically entitled. On the other hand, strictly to follow the ethnographic principle would raise difficulties to which Lord Northcliffe referred in the foregoing letter. As it would obviously require long and patient negotiations with our Allies to establish a just basis, it was deemed to be strongly advisable to restrict immediate propaganda to telling the Bulgarians the fate which must inevitably befall them and that unless they made a complete and effective reversal of their policy, the Allies would do nothing to save them from that fate or to alleviate their position.

[141]

Four preliminary conditions were laid down as essential to the establishment of relations with Bulgaria:

“(a) The expulsion of King Ferdinand and his family;

“(b) A complete rupture with Germany;

“(c) Establishment of a democratic Government;

“(d) The orientation of Bulgarian policy in the direction of a Balkan Confederation under the ægis of the Allied Powers and of the United States.”

These lines were suggested as the suitable basis for a reply to secret overtures which had been made by Bulgarian emissaries claiming to speak for the new Premier, M. Malinof.

In due course, Crewe House was authorised to convey an informal message to the effect “that until Bulgaria had given proof that a complete reversal of her policy had actually been brought about, we are not prepared to entertain any suggestions from her.” The Bulgarian agents were duly notified in this sense, and it is to be presumed that so firm a message was not without its effect upon the Malinof Government.

Meanwhile propaganda material in this[142] sense was prepared, reinforced by pamphlets, such as, for example, that by Lichnowsky, and another giving full particulars of American preparations. These were translated into Bulgarian, and this was a matter of some difficulty, as was the subsequent arrangement for printing. Distribution was principally arranged through naval and military channels and through secret agencies of the character operating against other enemy countries.

Most painstaking work was undertaken to prepare for the publication of a newspaper in Bulgarian to be smuggled into Bulgaria. When a series of perplexing difficulties had been surmounted and all arrangements were in train for an immediate start, the news came that Bulgaria had surrendered.

In this connection, too, Ludendorff pays tribute to the effect of propaganda. “A few days after the 15th (September, 1918), a secret report of the French General fell into my hands which made it evident that the French no longer expected any resistance from the Bulgarian army. Entente propaganda and money, and the United States representatives who had remained in Sofia, had done their work. In this instance again the Entente had made a thoroughly good job of it.” (“My War Memories.”)

[143]

Besides the work in enemy countries, Crewe House also undertook the enlightenment of prisoners of war in the camps of Great Britain. The first necessity was the eradication of innate ideas of militarism, if it had left them with any illusions which their own experience had failed to shatter. Then the advantages of democratic government would be inculcated. Rightly it was thought that if these men could be taught that government of a country must be by the free will and assent of the governed, a small step at least would have been taken in the right direction. Such beneficent influences as could be brought to bear upon them would affect their compatriots on their return home and might fructify in the expression of changed views in their letters to their friends. There were several Prisoners of War camps scattered about Great Britain, each of them being in charge of a Commandant responsible to the War Office. The late Sir Charles Nicholson, Bt., a valued member of the Enemy Propaganda Committee, took charge of this section of Crewe House work, his usual procedure being to have a personal interview with each of the Commandants, in order to ascertain from them what newspapers and books were allowed inside the camps, and[144] what were the English and German newspapers which were most read by the prisoners. He then submitted to the Commandant a list of books and newspapers which were approved for such purposes, and suggested to them that these should be circulated among the prisoners and added to the library which existed in each of the camps. Among the newspapers in German which were found to be useful for this purpose were the Arbeiterzeitung of Vienna, the Vorwärts, the Frankfurter Zeitung, the Berliner Tageszeitung, and the Volkstimme, and such pamphlets as Prince Lichnowsky’s “Meine Londoner Mission,” Hermann Fernau’s “Gerade weil ich Deutscher bin,” Dr. Karl Liebknecht’s “Brief an das Kommandanturgericht,” Dr. Muehlon’s “Die Schuld der Deutschen Regierung am Kriege” and “Die Verheerung Europas,” Dr. Anton Nystroem’s “Vor dem Tribunale,” and, in addition, German translations of Mr. H. G. Wells’s “Mr. Britling Sees it Through,” and copies of Mr. James W. Gerard’s “My Four Years in Germany.”

Letters which were sent out by the prisoners of war to their friends at home were, of course, examined by the postal censor. Sometimes this examination indicated that certain of the prisoners would prove susceptible to influence, and a point was made of seeing that[145] such prisoners were specially supplied with literature. The examination of prisoners of war was useful, too, in ascertaining what were the ideas prevalent in the minds of the Germans as to the cause of the war, the progress of events, and the prospect of ultimate success or failure.

THE LATE SIR CHARLES NICHOLSON, BART., M.P.
MEMBER OF ENEMY PROPAGANDA COMMITTEE, AND DIRECTOR OF PRISONERS OF WAR SECTION.
Photo: Russell & Sons.
SIR RODERICK JONES, K.B.E.
MEMBER OF THE ENEMY PROPAGANDA COMMITTEE.
Photo: Elliott & Fry, Ltd.
COLONEL THE EARL OF DENBIGH, C.V.O.
MEMBER OF THE ENEMY PROPAGANDA COMMITTEE.
Photo: Speight

[146]

## CHAPTER VII
INTER-ALLIED CO-OPERATION

An axiom for propaganda—Results of a successful conference—Policy, Means and Methods.

Experience gained at Crewe House proved that it is as necessary for Allies to co-ordinate propaganda against a common enemy as to unify military command. To conduct propaganda without a policy is bad enough; but to shut up sets of propagandists working independently of each other in a number of water-tight compartments, each set representative of a different nationality, is to court ridicule instead of attracting serious attention from an intelligent enemy, and to result in the production of contradictory thoughts and confusion in the minds of unintelligent adversaries.

An axiom for propaganda of allies in future wars is that a clear common policy must be defined, based upon such a foundation of fact and justice that it need not be altered in its essential principles, but can be, and must be,[147] rigidly adhered to. It will doubtless be necessary to lay down such a policy for each nation of an opposing alliance, in the event of the enemy not being a single nation.

Clearly, too, it should be recognised that propaganda policy, or policies, must accord with the policy of the diplomatic, military, and naval authorities. Possessing no administrative function, propaganda is dependent upon them to make policy operative. Here, again, lack of co-ordination would involve the risk of confusion, contradiction, and consequent inefficiency. Propaganda may well and rightly be in advance of these other departments as a forerunner (with what success other chapters of this book record) or it may follow, but it must be in agreement with them.

Lord Northcliffe had always conceived it to be a fundamental principle of propaganda against enemy countries that when a line of policy had been laid by him before the British Government and sanctioned as a basis for propaganda, the Allied Governments should be asked for their assent to it, so that their propaganda departments might act in conformity. In practice it was found that most rapid co-ordination could be attained by representatives of the Allied propaganda departments meeting together. One of Lord[148] Northcliffe’s earliest acts was to convene an inter-Allied gathering at Crewe House which was attended by Lord Beaverbrook (Minister of Information), M. Franklin-Bouillon (France), and Signor Gallenga-Stuart (Italy), as well as by a number of other British, French, Italian, and United States representatives.

To some extent this gathering paved the way for the close Allied co-operation in Italy. Lord Northcliffe would have desired the immediate establishment of an inter-Allied body for propaganda in enemy countries, but difficulties were encountered which postponed the formation of such a body until a later date. Meanwhile, as close touch as possible was kept with the French and Italian departments concerned. But the course of events in the summer made it obvious to Lord Northcliffe and his advisers that an inter-Allied conference on Enemy Propaganda was indispensable to success. With the assent of the British War Cabinet, therefore, he issued invitations to the French, Italian, and United States Governments to send delegates to an official conference in London. These invitations were cordially accepted and the Conference assembled at Crewe House on August 14, 1918.

[149]

In addition to representatives of Lord Northcliffe’s department, and of the Allied propaganda departments, there were also present representatives of the British Foreign Office, War Office, Admiralty, Air Ministry, and Ministry of Information.

The full list of delegates was:

Great Britain:
Viscount Northcliffe (Chairman). Lieutenant-Colonel Sir Campbell Stuart. Sir Charles Nicholson, Bart, M.P. Mr. Wickham Steed. |  | Department of Propaganda in Enemy Countries.
Rear-Admiral Sir Reginald Hall (Director of Naval Intelligence). Captain Guy Gaunt. Commander G. Standing. |  | Admiralty.
Brigadier-General G. K. Cockerill (Deputy-Director of Military Intelligence). Major The Earl of Kerry, M.P. Captain P. Chalmers Mitchell. |  | War Office.
Colonel E. H. Davidson. |  | Air Ministry.[150]
Mr. C. J. Phillips. |  | Foreign Office.
Sir Roderick Jones (representing the Minister of Information). Mr. Cunliffe-Owen (Controller of Propaganda against Turkey). |  | Ministry of Information.
France:
M. Klobukowski. M. Haguenin. M. Sabatier D’Espeyran. Major-General le Vicomte de la Panouse. M. le Capitaine Prince Pierre d’Arenberg. Lieutenant le Comte Stanislas de Montebello. M. Comert. Lieutenant P. Mantoux.
Italy:
Professor Borgese. Signor G. Emanuel. Captain Count Vicino-Pallavicino. Lieutenant R. Cajrati-Crivello.
United States of America:
Mr. James Keeley. Captain Walter Lippmann. Captain Heber Blankenhorn. Lieutenant Charles Merz. Lieutenant Ludlow Griscom. |  | Present as observers.

[151]

In the speech with which, as Chairman, Lord Northcliffe opened the Conference, he pointed out that the organisation of British Propaganda in Enemy Countries had reached a stage at which greater co-ordination of Allied purpose and effort was required if its objects were to be achieved in full measure. Propaganda in enemy countries presupposed:

a. The definition, for propaganda purposes at least, of Allied policy in regard to our enemies;

b. The public manifestation of this policy; and

c. The study of technical means of bringing its main features to the knowledge of the enemy.

He suggested that the Conference should resolve itself into a number of Committees to examine and to report upon these and other matters. Such Committees would be concerned with:

1. The great subject of the policy of propaganda;

2. The difficult question of means of distribution:

(a) Military.

(b) Civil.

[152]

3. Propaganda material;

4. Educative work among prisoners of war who might return to Germany to tell their compatriots the real facts.

Unless based on a definite policy, propaganda could only be fragmentary and superficial. On the basis of a clear policy it might become destructive of enemy moral, a valuable adjunct to military operations, and constructive of the necessary conditions of a lasting peace.

The three enemy countries with which his Department was mainly concerned were Austria-Hungary, Bulgaria, and Germany. He cited Austria-Hungary first, because, of all our enemies, the Hapsburg Monarchy was the field where positive results were most readily attainable.

In the early months of 1918, when he began that work, Germany was too flushed with her facile triumphs in Russia to be susceptible to propaganda, and the attitude of Bulgaria was too closely bound up with German fortunes to be at that moment easily affected by propaganda. Allied policy in regard to Bulgaria was, moreover, closely connected with the general Balkan policy of[153] the Allies, the formulation of which necessarily depended, in its turn, upon the adoption of a definite policy towards Austria-Hungary. All these considerations pointed to Austria-Hungary as the foremost object of attack, and therefore as the country in regard to which a clear propaganda policy was most urgently required.

Lord Northcliffe then outlined the steps taken in regard to Austria-Hungary, described fully in Chapter III. He went on to state that there was abundant evidence that the work thus begun had helped to prevent an Austrian offensive in April, and to check it when it was finally launched in June. There was also strong reason to believe that, had action on these lines been taken earlier, far greater results might have been obtained. This was an aspect of the vital connection between propaganda policy and military operations to which he earnestly directed attention. He trusted that the Policy Committee of the Conference might be able to make valuable recommendations in this respect.

One important aspect of propaganda against Austria-Hungary and, indeed, against all our enemies, was the dissemination of knowledge of the greatness of the war effort[154] of the American people. With that effort he had had personal acquaintance; and on that very day he had received a secret report that the Germans had little idea of the supreme effort which the Americans were making. To this aspect he attributed great and growing significance.

In regard to Bulgaria, he had also ventured to lay before the British Government an outline of propaganda policy, which had received general approval. Its main features were the necessity of a definite Allied decision in regard to the Jugo-Slav and Rumanian questions, before any direct attempt could be made to influence Bulgaria by propaganda. A definite Jugo-Slav and Rumanian policy presupposed, however, a definite Allied policy in regard to Austria-Hungary. Upon the details of this important subject the Policy Committee would be fully informed. Broadly speaking, he considered it at once inexpedient and dangerous to enter into any direct or indirect negotiations with Bulgaria or to make to her proposals even as propaganda until a complete change of attitude had actually taken place in Bulgaria itself. Until then, propaganda could consist only in conveying information to the Bulgarian troops and people as to the fate that inevitably[155] awaited them unless they reversed completely their attitude; and in preparing by agreement among the Allied Governments an outline of Balkan policy, aiming at a solution of the various Balkan questions as nearly as possible on ethnographical lines. In this way, Allied propaganda might eventually help to prepare the way for a League of Balkan States.

Though for many reasons it had not thereto been possible to develop British propaganda in Germany as fully or as efficiently as it had been developed in Austria-Hungary, Lord Northcliffe said his department had, in co-operation with the military authorities, and by the utilisation of secret channels, been able to introduce into Germany a certain amount of propaganda literature. The decision of the British military authorities not to allow the use of aeroplanes on the British Front in France for the distribution of propaganda had naturally retarded and hampered the necessary extension of his work. He trusted that this question of the use of aeroplanes for propaganda purposes would be most carefully considered by the committee on military distribution. In the meantime, balloons had been employed, though they were manifestly far inferior to[156] aeroplanes as instruments of distribution. The view seemed to prevail that propaganda was not worth casualties. Were this view well-founded it would be hard to understand why the Germans should have taken such drastic measures against British airmen accused of dropping propaganda leaflets. The Germans, who ought to be good judges, evidently feared our leaflets more than they feared our bombs. But the main issue was the determination of an Allied propaganda policy in regard to Germany—a matter of no little difficulty. As he had said in relation to Austria-Hungary, one of the chief features of Allied propaganda—apart from questions of policy—would be the constant dissemination of knowledge of the immensity and of the growing efficiency of American effort. This feature he had endeavoured to develop, and he intended to develop it increasingly. On the subject of policy, however, he had submitted to the British Government an outline comprising the following points, which it was necessary to bring home to the Germans.

1. The determination of the Allies to continue the war until Germany accepted the Allied peace terms.

2. The existing alliance as a fighting[157] league of free nations would be deepened and extended and the military, naval, financial, and economic resources of its members would be pooled until its military purpose was achieved and peace could be established on lasting foundations. He had suggested further that, as German minds were peculiarly susceptible to systematic statement, the Allies should prepare a comprehensive scheme of world organisation as a counterpart to the German schemes represented by the phrases “Berlin-Baghdad” and “Mittel-Europa.” As a preliminary to the drafting of such a scheme, he had urged that the lines of a practical League of Free Nations should be studied and laid down.

Pending the formulation of this scheme, he thought that Allied propaganda should insist upon Allied control of raw materials, of shipping, and on the Allies’ power to ostracise for an indefinite period enemy peoples, until the terms of the Allied peace settlement were fully accepted. At the same time it should be pointed out that nothing stood between enemy people and a lasting peace except the designs of their ruling dynasties and of their military and economic[158] castes. The primary war aim of the Allies was the changing of Germany, not only in their own interest, but also in that of the German people itself, since, without the honest co-operation of a reformed Germany, disarmament on a large scale might be impossible, and without disarmament social and economic reconstruction would be impracticable. He trusted that this question of Allied propaganda policy in regard to Germany would be carefully weighed by the Policy Committee.

There remained the extremely important question of the co-ordination of Allied propaganda effort. It was obvious, he said, that if each Ally carried on its propaganda in enemy countries without reference to what the other Allies were doing, there must result great dispersion of effort, overlapping, and, possibly, some conflict of statement if not of aims. In order to secure the greatest possible military efficiency, the Allied Governments had established the Versailles Council, and had agreed to the appointment of an Allied Commander-in-Chief. Up till then the only Inter-Allied propaganda institution set up was the Inter-Allied Propaganda Commission at Padua. The working of this Commission had revealed the great advantages of concerted[159] effort, but it had also revealed certain defects which only fuller Allied co-ordination in matters of propaganda seemed likely to overcome. He would therefore submit a proposal, definite in aim, though variable in detail, that there be created a central body for the conduct of propaganda in enemy countries. By such a step it seemed to him many delays might be avoided, great economy of energy and expense might be secured, and progress be made towards the unification of Allied propaganda policy and of the means for carrying it into effect.

In conclusion, he asked pardon for reverting once more to the great importance of a true conception of propaganda in enemy countries, not only as a means of winning the war, but also and especially as a means of winning the peace. It was a work that demanded all the intelligence of the best minds in Allied countries, and the sustained support of responsible Allied statesmen.

M. Klobukowski, the head of the French delegation, who followed Lord Northcliffe with an eloquent speech in French, which Lieutenant Mantoux interpreted, concurred in all that Lord Northcliffe had said. The French Government, he said, answered willingly to the invitation sent to them by the[160] British Government to send their representatives to the Inter-Allied Conference on Propaganda in Enemy Countries. It seemed to them necessary to call it to intensify by methodical co-operation and concerted direction the powerful means of action at the disposal of the Allies. To see exactly what could be done; to know exactly where they meant to go—that was the principal aim which must inspire their propaganda.

The campaign of systematic untruth which was being waged by the enemy need not for one moment divert the Allies from their line. Honesty had never seemed to the Allies to be an inferior policy. In the second place, French propaganda had taken care to put in a strong light the responsibility for the war. The war, on the part of our enemies, was a war of aggression and the service of a policy of conquest and the enslavement of nationalities. On the Allied side it was a purely defensive war, for the defence not only of territories, but also of the great cause of Right violated in Belgium, as in Alsace-Lorraine, in Poland, in the Ukraine, in Serbia, in Rumania, and in all the Balkan countries. “We try,” said M. Klobukowski, “to reach in enemy countries consciences which have hitherto shut out free examination and which cannot yet control themselves. We try to open eyes and ears now shut by the most extraordinary education of discipline which has at any time dominated men. And this with the help not only of arguments taken from facts which might be considered as arbitrary in practice and intention, but also with the help of what is admitted by our enemies themselves in declarations (the sincerity of which is incontestable for they come from their own agents) from those who dared write what they know, like Prince Lichnowsky and Dr. Muehlon.”

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Co-operation in the work of liberating the oppressed nationalities (continued M. Klobukowski) defined clearly one of the ends of our action against Austria-Hungary; but although we cannot speak of immediate results, Allied propaganda was not least indispensable in Germany. If Austria was guilty towards her peoples, Germany was guilty towards the whole of mankind. Since the war began, the French Government had been constantly preoccupied with the propaganda to be effected in Germany. Faced with the monstrous distortion of facts which the Imperial Government tried to force upon the world, the first French Yellow Book, in December, 1914, gave the full list of[162] responsibilities for the war, and showed, by going back to its origin, that Germany prepared and finally launched the war.

One of the essential objects of Allied propagandists, therefore, must be to come back frequently to the origin of the war, in the hope that such effort will not be in vain. The experience of the publication of the Lichnowsky memorandum was very encouraging from that point of view, but that was not enough, as the majority of the German nation had still confidence in the official versions of the causes of the world conflict such as had been given to them by the Imperial Government. The Germans must not be allowed to lower the Allies’ defensive war to the level of a war of conquest. The Allies must never be tired of insisting that they were victims of a deliberate aggression.

On the other hand, it was their interest to insist more and more upon the character of the struggle in which they were engaged. They were upon the defensive; they were defending themselves, they were defending right and humanity; that was their war aim, and all other war aims were only consequences of it. Deeply imbued as the German nation might be with doctrines of[163] historical realism, hostile as their Government might be to the notion of a policy founded upon the respect of right, the day nevertheless must come when their ideas would triumph over their resistance, when gradually on one hand the revelations (daily becoming more definite) would show the criminal complicities which were the cause of the war. On the other hand the gradual failure of that bid for domination would oblige the Germans themselves to look for the culprits. The anxiety about the injustice of their own cause would finally penetrate into the German nation.

It was also important clearly to show how useless was the effort made by the enemy to sever the link between the Powers of the Entente. The enemy Press was never tired of giving its readers the imaginary spectacle of divisions between their enemies. After their tales about France being conquered by the British Army, they proceeded to announce that the Americans were going to get hold of France.

Every peace offensive undertaken by the German Government in the hour of military difficulty gave evidence of the naïve confidence which the best-informed among them employed in such an attempt to divide us.[164] To show that the Allied front was indissolubly united, to show that the Alliance extends still further than the war, that it will extend from the military to the economic field—that would be the efficient answer of the Allies.

It must be said above all that the Allies would conquer and that they had the means to conquer. They must not let themselves be led towards discussions. There was always a danger of seeing the enemy get hold of Allied formulæ, after having emptied them of what they contained. The German mind, so complex and treacherous, had great ability in the art of turning to its own account the principles laid down by others. Germany might attempt once more to mislead the peoples by writing on her own flag their mottoes while they reserved to themselves the possibility of giving to those mottoes later on an interpretation diametrically opposed to the real one.

Nothing was more important than to defend Allied public opinions against such enterprises, which would certainly be undertaken by Germany. The liberation of the peoples, affirmation of the justice of the Allied cause, demonstration of the violation of right perpetrated by the Central Empires—such must be the basis of Allied propaganda.

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That was in full harmony with the general policy of principles and tended to assure to all the peoples the right freely to develop, as the constitutions of the Allied States had given the same right to every individual. So Allied victory would have that character of moral elevation which was the character of the great Allied nations during their history. But until they reached that victory of liberty and right, according to the strong words of M. Clemenceau, “let us make war!”

Signor Borgese, the representative of Italy, said that he agreed generally with all the ideas and proposals that had been made by Lord Northcliffe.

The Italians had of late been particularly active on the field of anti-enemy propaganda. For example, they had one office in Rome whose chief duty it was to spread news arriving from the enemy in order that his position in the world, and his internal resistance, might be weakened. They had also in Switzerland a large organisation, the principal aim of which was to secure daily knowledge of what was going on in enemy countries, and to utilise to the full every possible means of securing information about their internal condition.

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The first act of Allied joint propaganda against the enemy was the Rome Congress in April, which was due largely to the concord and the friendship of the most enlightened and intelligent elements of public opinion in England and in Italy. As a result of that Congress, great consequences had followed in Austria-Hungary, and generally in the world of the enemy; and the principal task was to pursue the way that had thus been opened by the Rome Congress. The peculiar position of Italy as the enemy of Austria naturally entered largely into the motives that inspired Italian action. The declarations of Lord Northcliffe—whose influence upon the question of enemy propaganda was immense—and the declaration of M. Klobukowski were entirely anti-Austrian in tendency.

As regards the Italians, they had been enemies of Austria not only because Austria was their enemy, but also because they felt that it was the most direct and sure way of being the enemies of Germany and of Germanism. Those Italians who had understood the true position since the beginning of the war had always been enemies of Austria in this sense, and had sought the best means of attacking and annihilating German militarism[167] through Austria. Although German militarism was not completely invulnerable, and although the vulnerability of Germany was not so certain as that of Austria, Austria was the Achilles’ heel of Germany. Two important conditions that had rendered possible such action against Austria, were that the necessity of disintegrating Austria had become generally realised throughout the world, and that Austria’s responsibility for the war had been generally acknowledged not only by the Allies, but also by the enemy. Lichnowsky and Muehlon had acknowledged that the chief and immediate responsibility for the war rested with Austria. The question of guilt was certainly one of the chief questions with which propaganda had to deal; and it would be examined by the committees, because he believed that it might be possible to accelerate movements of opinion in Germany and in Austria if a confession of guilt as to the origin of the war were made widely known.

As to what had been done by Italian propaganda during the last few months, he had mentioned the offices at Rome and at Berne, to which he would refer in more detail in the committees. As to the work of the Padua Inter-Allied Commission, it was[168] assuredly a very great work, if one were to judge of its activity not only by personal convictions but by the convictions of the foe, who had publicly acknowledged that the defeat on the Piave was partly caused by the efforts of the Padua Commission, and by information that had been brought to them by the Jugo-Slavs and Czecho-Slovaks. Allied propaganda must be a propaganda of truth. The chief difficulty lay in making a distinction between copying the enemy’s system of actual military operations and imitating his methods in the war of ideas. It was true that the military technique of war must be dependent upon that of the adversary, unless we were to be at a disadvantage; but there was a danger that we might imitate methods adopted by the enemy in the war of ideas—that is to say, that we might copy German methods of propaganda. Although there were people who thought that the Allies should copy lies and hypocritical statements of German propaganda, he was convinced that their real arm in the propaganda war was the truth. The Allies could tell the truth because they were persuaded that they were right. It was easy for them to have a system of ideas, because they believed in them as in a[169] kind of religion. Germany and Austria-Hungary would listen intently to the words that we should say—not necessarily in that Conference, but to the words of our Governments. Political action and propaganda would have very great importance at the end of this campaign, and therefore he hoped that Italians would be able to make their contribution to the shortening and to the victorious decision of the war.

One circumstance that gave them absolute certainty of victory, and was a certificate of the moral purity of the Allied cause, was the action of the United States, whom no one—not even the enemy—could accuse of any selfish motive or interest. While it was conceivable that the European Allies might be charged, however unjustly, with having some thought of their direct interests, the United States could not by any stretch of imagination be regarded as having intervened for any issue save that of high principle. Therefore, he agreed entirely with Lord Northcliffe and M. Klobukowski that the more the significance of the American effort, both in its material and its moral aspects, were brought to the knowledge of enemy peoples, the more rapid would be the decline of their moral, and the surer the attainment[170] of the just peace which was the great common aim of the Allies and the purpose of their action, both military and propagandist.

Mr. James Keeley, the representative of the United States, said that he received his appointment through the Committee on Public Information of the United States Government. Four U.S. military officers were present, from the Military Intelligence Branch of the General Staff, as observers. They all met the Conference as pupils, having a most earnest desire to learn so that they might do their part as whole-heartedly in this as in all other phases of Allied effort.

Learning from those who have had experience, they would be enabled to devote whatever resources they had to the common purpose. They would report to the American Government what men of experience in this work had to recommend, and on the basis of that report it was hoped that an American organisation could be created as quickly as possible, which should work in the fullest, frankest, and most effective co-operation with the corresponding organisations of the Allied nations. It would not be amiss, perhaps, to suggest that, in addition to material equipment, the United States could contribute one element that might possibly be of[171] peculiar importance in this work. Its population contained a large representation of all the peoples of Central Europe. These peoples were well organised in the United States, and, with a few exceptions perfectly well-known, were loyal to the Allied cause. Those peoples, of course, had intimate connections with the peoples of Central Europe, and it was more than possible that they might be, in various ways, of great use in carrying messages across the frontiers. On this point, particularly, they would be glad of the advice of the Conference.

After these speeches the four Committees referred to by Lord Northcliffe were appointed to deliberate on policy, distribution, material, and prisoners of war. The members of the Conference were suitably distributed among the different committees, which accomplished most invaluable work in a business-like manner, and presented their reports to the full Conference for consideration at its sitting on the third day.

The Policy Committee, presided over by M. Klobukowski, considered exhaustively the problems of propaganda policy in all its fields and phases of action. Its discussion crystallised into a series of resolutions and recommendations for sanction, modification[172] or rejection by the Allied Governments. It was, of course, fully understood that such resolutions could be only ad referendum and not binding on the respective Governments.

In regard to propaganda against Austria-Hungary, the Committee found itself in complete agreement with the scheme of policy sanctioned by the British Government for purposes of propaganda, and amplified by the decisions of the British, French and Italian Governments at the time of, or in connection with, the Rome Congress of Oppressed Austro-Hungarian Nationalities. It recognised that such extensions of policy, while springing from considerations of Allied principles, had, in part, corresponded to the real demands of the propaganda situation, which, in their turn, had sprung from the exigencies of the military situation and, in particular, from the necessity of utilising the established principles of the alliance for the purpose of impeding or hampering the Austro-Hungarian offensive against Italy. Subsequent acts and declarations on the part of Allied Governments and of the Government of the United States made it clear that the joint policy of the Allies was tending increasingly towards the constructive liberation of the subject Austro-Hungarian[173] races. The main task of the Committee in relation to propaganda in Austria-Hungary seemed, therefore, to be one of unifying for propaganda purposes these various acts and declarations, and of preparing, if possible, the way for a joint Allied declaration that might complete and render more effective the work of Allied propaganda both in the interior of Austria-Hungary and among Austro-Hungarian troops at the Front.

The discussion upon the expediency and the possibility of such a joint Allied declaration was exhaustive and illuminating. In view of the position already taken up by the Allied Governments and by the United States in regard to the Czecho-Slovaks, the Poles, and the Rumanians, it appeared that the main issue awaiting definition concerned the question of Jugo-Slav unity and independence, and of the attitude of Italy towards them. The Committee adopted the following recommendation:

“With reference to the best means of aiding Allied Propaganda in favour of the freedom of the Austro-Hungarian subject races, the Committee expresses a strong hope that all controversial discussions of the frontiers between Italy and the future Jugo-Slav State will be[174] avoided by the Jugo-Slav Press and the Jugo-Slav leaders both outside and, as far as the Jugo-Slav leaders may be able to exert their influence, also inside the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, just as they have been avoided of late by the most important organs of the Italian Press and in the public speeches of influential Italian leaders.”

During the debate upon this recommendation it became clearly apparent that the Committee regarded, and was confident that the Conference would regard, the Italian national claims to the union with Italy of the cities and regions of Trent, Trieste, and the other regions of Italian character as not only entirely justified, but also as an elementary dictate of the Allies’ respect for the principles of nationality and of ethnical justice. Precisely because the Committee supported the principles formulated in the Italo-Jugo-Slav Agreement of last March and saw in them the basis of fruitful co-ordination between Italy, Jugo-Slavia, and the other nationalities then oppressed of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, it held the Italian national rights above mentioned to be imprescriptible and not open to discussion.

The Committee also felt that both for[175] reason of propaganda and from the point of view of the future independence and moral and political security of the Italian nation a foremost part in the work of creating a free and united Jugo-Slav State naturally fell to Italy. Therefore, after the most careful consideration, it unanimously adopted—and recommended to the Conference—the following resolution:

“Considering the adhesion of the Italian Government, by the Prime Minister’s speech of April, 1918, to the resolutions of the Rome Congress of Austro-Hungarian subject races (which embodied the agreement between the Jugo-Slavs and the Italian Committee) and by his recent telegram to the Prime Minister of Serbia, M. Pashitch;

“Considering the exemplifications of Allied Policy towards Austria-Hungary in the French and Italian Convention with the Czecho-Slovak National Council, the British declaration recognising the Czecho-Slovaks as an Allied Nation, the Allied declaration at the Versailles Conference of June 3rd, 1918 in favour of the unity and independence of Poland and Mr. Lansing’s statement of the 28th June, that all branches of the Slav races[176] should be completely freed from German and Austrian rule;

“Considering further the extreme expediency, especially in view of possible military developments on the Italian front, that the Allied policy of liberating the oppressed Hapsburg peoples should be represented, in the first place, by Italy, on whose front Allied propaganda against Austria-Hungary is principally located;

“The Policy Committee of the Inter-Allied Propaganda Conference resolves to suggest that the Italian Government take the initiative in promoting a joint and unanimous public declaration that all the Allies regard the establishment of a free and united Jugo-Slav State, embracing Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes, as one of the conditions of a just and lasting peace, and of the rule of right in Europe.”

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Passing to the consideration of propaganda against Bulgaria, the Committee recognised the essential connection between Allied propaganda policy towards Austria-Hungary and Allied propaganda policy in the Balkans. Without the adoption by the Allied Governments of a definite policy in regard to Jugo-Slav and Rumanian unity and independence, it was impossible to formulate any effective propaganda policy in regard to Bulgaria. Upon the merits of propaganda in Bulgaria, the Committee unanimously adhered to the principles laid down in Lord Northcliffe’s opening statement, that is to say, that an essential preliminary to any conversations or negotiations with Bulgaria must be a complete and effective reversal of the policy hitherto pursued by Bulgaria as the enemy of the Allies; and until this reversal had taken place, the objects of the Allied propaganda should be to bring home to the Bulgarian people a sense of the dangers that threatened them unless they could convince the Allies by their conduct of their sincere repentance. The Committee was also of the opinion that pending this necessary change, their Serbian and Greek Allies should not be left in ignorance of the propaganda policy which the chief Allied Powers might adopt.

With reference to Poland, the Chairman of the Committee made a brief but pregnant statement, declaring the policy of propaganda in regard to the Poles to be identical with that laid down by President Wilson and President Poincaré and formulated by the Allied Prime Ministers on June 3 in the words: “The creation of a united and independent[178] Polish State, with free access to the sea, constitutes one of the conditions of a solid and just peace and of the rule of right in Europe.” He added that the growth of Prussian power for evil, and the present position of Prussia in the world, had their origin in the partition of Poland. Consequently he urged that the reunion of the various parts of Poland would be not only the reparation of an historical injustice, but would constitute a strong guarantee against any revival of the Prussian system. He claimed that the greater the strength of Poland, the firmer would be the security of Europe and the world against any renewal of aggressive Prussian militarism.

In the discussion which followed, general agreement was expressed with this view; but it was pointed out that a reunited Poland might be stronger in proportion as its territory was ethnographically compact and did not include other neighbouring racial elements with whom Poland would have every interest to live in concord, but which, were they included against their will within her frontiers, might become sources of disturbance and weakness. It was also considered desirable that the Polish National Committee, in order to become not less[179] valuable to the Allies as an adjunct and agency of propaganda in enemy countries than were the Czech and Jugo-Slav Committees, might extend the basis of its representation, so as to secure more unanimous support from the various sections of Polish opinion. The Committee adopted, and submitted to the approval of the Conference, the following resolution and recommendation. It proposed to communicate the recommendation to the Polish National Committee:

“The Conference records its conviction that the creation of a united and independent Polish State, with free access to the sea, is an essential requirement of lasting peace in Europe, and expresses the belief that the more closely the frontiers of this future Polish State follow ethnographical lines, the stronger will it be to play its part in safeguarding that peace, and the more harmonious will be its relations with neighbouring peoples which, like the Poles, are striving to secure a free existence.

“The Conference, anxious that Allied propaganda may truly express the desires of the Polish people, as a whole, and may tend to promote its[180] welfare, expresses the hope that the Polish National Council may extend the basis of its representation so as to be in a position to lend still further aid to Allied Propaganda in enemy countries.”

On the question of Alsace-Lorraine, the Committee found itself in entire agreement with its Chairman’s declaration that the return of the two provinces to France was an imperative demand of international justice and not a concession to be made by the Allies to French national feeling. The undoing of the flagrant wrong done by Germany in 1871 was so clearly a condition of any just peace that it required no further demonstration; quite apart from the historical justification of the French claim to the reincorporation of these provinces in France by their disannexation from Germany, the title of the people of Alsace-Lorraine to determine their own allegiance proceeded from their voluntary adhesion to France in 1790, no less than from the protests of their elected representatives against the Treaty of Frankfurt in the French National Assembly at Bordeaux in 1871, and in the German Reichstag in 1874. In regard to Alsace-Lorraine, the Committee was convinced that Allied Propaganda in Germany should make[181] known to the German people the determination of the Allies to insist in all circumstances upon this vindication of rights.

Consequently it adopted the following resolutions:

1. Propaganda on the subject of Alsace-Lorraine should be unified and conducted on general lines indicated by France.

2. The argument to which first place should always be given is that of outraged right and of the will of the inhabitants as expressed in their solemn and repeated protests.

3. The question of Alsace-Lorraine is a question of international right, the solution of which interests the whole world.

As to propaganda addressed to the German people themselves in regard to the future position of Germany, the Committee was in full agreement with the policy recommended by Lord Northcliffe with the approval of the British Government and summarised in his opening statements. It believed that Allied propaganda should make it clear that the chief object of the Allies was the changing of Germany, not the destruction of the German[182] people; and that the German people could hope for an adequate position in the world, and for admission into a future society of nations, when they had qualified themselves for partnership with civilised communities by making the necessary reparations and restorations (primarily in the case of Belgium) by overthrowing the system known as Prussian militarism, and when they had effectively abandoned all designs of mastery over Europe. At the same time, the Committee laid stress upon the importance of bringing home to the German people a sense of the economic pressure which the Allies, and above all the United States of America, were in a position to exercise, and would exercise, until the conditions of a just peace were accepted.

To this end the Committee strongly urged that, in the various Allied countries and in the United States, a comprehensive scheme of world organisation be studied and worked out, and that, in particular, the steps already taken to co-ordinate the economic policy of the Allies and of the United States be publicly explained and brought to the knowledge of the Germans. The Committee, therefore, adopted and recommended to the Conference the following resolution:

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“In consideration of the fact that the Allied Governments have in their own respective fields of action and by their joint action begun to give effect to economic co-operation, which is to-day a powerful instrument of war, and which may, after the war, serve as a basis for the systematic organisation of the resources of the world:

“The Conference expresses its satisfaction with the results already attained and believes that it would be expedient to make plain to enemy public opinion, by means of a service of information, which would set forth both the principles of Allied economic action and their results as worked out in daily practice, the gravity of the danger by which the enemy is threatened, and the advantages assured to those who are admitted to co-operation with the Allies.”

The Committee adopted the following resolution:

“That in view of the great importance of co-ordinating the Allies’ policies and organisations for the conduct of propaganda in enemy countries, a permanent body be constituted for this purpose;

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“That this body consist of four members, representing respectively the four propaganda departments which have taken part in this Conference; each member having the power to nominate an assistant or a substitute, or both, if necessary;

“That the provisional headquarters of the body shall be at Crewe House, London, until permanent headquarters be determined;

“That the establishment expenses be shared equally between the four Governments; and that a permanent secretariat be appointed thereto.”

In adhering to this resolution, and in deciding that it be recommended for adoption by the Allied Governments and by the United States, the Policy Committee had been influenced especially by the hope that the proposed arrangement might expedite the co-ordination of Allied propaganda policy, facilitate the preparation of concordant declarations by the Allied Governments at suitable moments, and assist in the proper organisation of congresses.

The discussions of the Distribution Committee were exceedingly interesting and fruitful. They ranged over the whole field[185] of propaganda effort, and the Committee’s report summarised the means of distribution of propaganda in use and assessed their respective values. So far as military means were concerned, it was found that the Italians employed aeroplanes, projectiles, and contact patrols; the French, aeroplanes, projectiles, and balloons; the British, only balloons on the Western Front, but aeroplanes in the East; and that seaplanes might be employed to reach special objectives in the Mediterranean. Each country gave favourable reports on the methods they employed, but all were agreed that a constant exchange of information as to results was required. In certain cases, such as the mountainous Italian Front, where very limited targets had to be reached, the dropping of propaganda in bulk was necessary; but in most cases methods that secured a wide scattering of the leaflets, so that those might be secured and hidden by individuals, were necessary. The French explained a device, in its experimental stage, to secure an automatic scattering from aeroplanes. The “releases” of English balloons were agreed to produce a most adequate scattering. Various devices employed in projectiles were successful in the case of[186] leaflets when the angle of projection was high and the wind was favourable, but hitherto had not been successful with pamphlets. It was recognised that aeroplanes were the best means of reaching distant targets with accuracy; that for shorter distances, from a few hundred yards up to ten miles, projectiles would secure great accuracy.

With regard to range, it was recognised that aeroplanes had the widest limits, and the scattering of literature in Berlin by the French and in Vienna by the Italians was considered an accomplishment of great brilliancy and promise of usefulness, and that the types of paper balloons in use were thoroughly effective for ranges up to twenty or thirty miles, and with less certainty of aim up to 100 or 150 miles; but that with larger balloons (such as the fabric balloons in the possession of the English, or the new larger “doped” paper balloons then being prepared in England, or the reinforced paper balloons being experimented with in France) the distances could be increased to several hundred miles.

As to the bulk that could be distributed, it was stated that each of the standard balloons, then used by the English and[187] French, carried 4 lb. 2 oz. of literature, and that projectiles could take from a few ounces up to 8 or 9 lb. The large fabric balloons then available at G.H.Q. could carry up to 15 lb.

It was recognised that there were no objections to the use of balloons, as the operations did not interfere with other work and did not excite retaliation from the enemy. The use of projectiles was apt to provoke retaliation unless it were carried out at night or to a limited extent. There was difference of experience and opinion with regard to the use of aeroplanes. The Italians and French stated that no action had been taken by the enemy in the case of their airmen who had been captured, and that they found no difficulty in imposing this duty on their airmen. The British, however, stated that the Germans had taken strong measures, and had threatened their continuance, against airmen captured after distributing leaflets. The representative of the British Air Ministry stated that, after giving full consideration to the matter, and notwithstanding their appreciation of the value of propaganda, they were opposed to the use of aeroplanes for this purpose, partly on the ground of the bad psychological[188] effect of such work on young pilots and aviators and partly because the supply of trained men and of machines was no more than sufficient for the direct purposes of this arm of the Forces. The representative of G.H.Q., France, said that the British Army had accepted this view. He added that balloons could be employed on the Western Front three days a week on the average, and that there was no mechanical reason why the method by balloons could not be increased to meet every reasonable requirement.

A French representative in the course of a discussion as to the utility of throwing some leaflets in bombing expeditions, reported the opinion of a well-known pro-ally German citizen that in the case of the Rhine towns and rich cities of Germany the propaganda of fear, that is to say, the actual dropping of bombs, was more useful than the dropping of literature.

It was agreed that the suggested use of aeroplanes to scatter leaflets at great heights parallel with the enemy lines encountered most of the objections to, and none of the dangers of, their direct use by crossing the lines. A device which had been worked out experimentally in England, but was not employed because of the danger it might[189] occasion to aeroplanes, was explained and the apparatus shown. It consisted in sending up leaflets to be liberated at the necessary height for wind driftage by means of a messenger travelling up and down the cable of a box kite. This means was recognised to be cheap and efficient for employment where it would not be dangerous to aeroplanes.

The Committee agreed that the regular exchange of information as to methods employed by the Allies, and as to the results actually obtained by these, would be of great value, and recommended that a permanent bureau should be established to collect and exchange such information and reports.

As regards civil means of distribution, the Committee recommended that increased attention be paid to the insertion of news and articles in neutral organs which were either read or quoted in the enemy countries. Special stress was laid on the importance of establishing effective relations with organs which had a reputation for strict neutrality or pro-enemy bias.

The Committee also recommended that each Power should seek through its agencies to establish channels through which enemy newspaper correspondents could be influenced[190] or provided with information. The task of approaching all sufficiently important correspondents with whom contact had not been established should be apportioned among the agencies of the Powers according to the opportunities of approach available. Channels created under a scheme of this kind should be made mutually available to the respective Allied agents in the localities concerned.

Having regard to the extent to which the ordinary book trade channels into Germany were still operating, the Committee recommended the publication in neutral countries of works which, though not directly bearing on the issues of the war, were expressly calculated to educate enemy opinion in a democratic sense. The Committee held that, in view of its great utility, clandestine circulation in the enemy countries of carefully-chosen literature, especially if actually written by enemy subjects of pro-Ally or revolutionary tendencies, should be secured through every available channel. In view of the precarious and delicate nature of this work, the Committee desired specially to emphasise the necessity of seeking out and developing new channels for distribution of this kind.

[191]

The main part of the time which the Committee on Material gave to the discussion of its subject was devoted to the question of the most effective forms of propaganda and to the special methods desirable for putting these forms into practice. There was general agreement that the best way to depress the moral of the German troops and the German population was to show them that it was against their interest to continue the war; that the longer they went on the worse they would fare both during the war and after; and that their only hope of regaining their place in the community of nations lay in throwing over the bad advisers who had led them into the war, and whose repeated promises of success had been one after the other falsified. Thereto the Germans had always had a hope before them. They were taught to hope for great advantage from the downfall of Russia, from the unrestricted U-boat warfare, from the last offensive on the Western Front. For the first time their leaders did not know what hope to dangle before them. Therefore, the moment was one peculiarly favourable for propaganda if undertaken upon the right lines.

It appeared to the Committee that the[192] best lines upon which to work would be to emphasise as much as possible the great American effort, both in the field and at home in the factory, the shipyard, and the farm. At the same time the dark commercial outlook for Germans, the dangers lying latent for them in the control of raw materials by the Allies, the discovery of so many of their trade secrets, and the building up in France, Italy, England, and the United States of industries in which they had almost a monopoly before the war ought also to be brought as vividly as possible before them. They should be told the truth about the food situation in France and England, which so far had been kept from them. They should be given news as quickly as possible of Allied successes. They should be depressed as much as possible, yet at the same time care should be taken not to let them think they were for ever excluded from relations of business and friendship with the peoples then fighting against them. If they were made to believe this, their backs would be stiffened to fight on desperately as long as possible. A sound line of propaganda, the Committee considered, would be to leave open a doorway through which if they got rid of Pan-Germanism and renounced its theories of world domination by blood and iron they would in time be admitted again to the same intercourse as before. It was agreed that for soldiers the most elementary propaganda was the best. More elaborate arguments and demonstrations should be kept for pamphlets to be smuggled into Germany and for articles in neutral papers. Use should be made wherever possible of diagrams appealing instantly to the eye.

[193]

A long discussion took place on the question of revolutionary propaganda. The opinion was expressed that it was better to denounce the Pan-German party generally and throw upon them the responsibility for the war and for all the misfortunes which Germany had suffered and would still further suffer from it, rather than to attack the Emperor. On the other hand, it was pointed out that attacks on an individual are always more effective than attacks on a party. Finally, it was agreed that anything said against the Hohenzollern dynasty should be taken, either in reality or in appearance, from German sources, so as to avoid the risk that attacks clearly emanating from Allied sources might strengthen rather than weaken the Emperor’s hold upon the people of Germany. While a good deal of material was available from[194] German anti-Imperial sources, it was suggested that the advantage of circulating, for example, speeches of Socialists, might be counterbalanced by the disadvantage that it would make such speakers less inclined to talk. Some Socialists had appealed to the French Government not to use their speeches for propaganda, because this weakened their efforts. It was agreed that incitements to German soldiers to desert were legitimate and might be useful. The sending into Germany of photographs of prisoners of war taken immediately after their capture, when they were usually in a deplorable condition, and after two months of captivity, when their physical condition was good, was recommended.

With regard to Austria-Hungary, the Committee discussed whether it was illegitimate to exploit the land hunger among the Magyar peasants and the discontent among the German proletariat. It was agreed that it would do no harm to support the agrarian agitators in Hungary, but, as regards Bolshevik propaganda among the Austro-German working classes, that the Allies ought only to circulate their own literature. It was suggested that the United States, in mobilising its Slav elements, might spare members[195] of each of the Slav nationalities for propaganda work in England and in France.

Propaganda in Bulgaria depended on the policy which the Entente Powers and the United States decided to follow with regard to that country. Until such a policy was settled little could be done in a large way. It was useful, however, to make the Bulgarians acquainted with a number of facts of which they were ignorant, as for example, the failure of U-boats to reduce England to the verge of starvation, the large number of American troops already in France, and so on. Leaflets on these and other topics were being dropped regularly by aeroplanes on the Salonica front in considerable quantities. A good deal, it was suggested, could be done through Bulgars in Switzerland. But so long as the Bulgarians believed that the United States was their friend and would see them through whatever happened, little impression could be made upon them.

With regard to co-operation between the various bodies engaged in propaganda, it was proposed that closer relations should be established between the local agents of the Allied Powers in neutral countries; that they should meet from time to time to exchange ideas and to give each other full[196] information as to their activities. Special stress was laid upon the necessity of these local agents working in union with the diplomatic and military representatives and with any other agencies engaged in the same kind of work. The Committee unanimously accepted this suggestion, with the proviso that the local agents should, if possible, be under the direction of the Central Committee, to which they could refer for instructions and advice. Pending the establishment of such a central body, arrangements were made for the various Propaganda Departments to begin at once to exchange information about all that they were doing and that each should send out copies of all the material produced by it to the other departments. It was, of course, agreed that such circulation of material produced would be one of the chief activities of the proposed central body, which would do it with greater rapidity and effect.

It was also agreed that such a central body could be most useful in employing methods for testing the effectiveness of propaganda. The means of doing this were generally admitted to be defective. Only by co-ordinating effort and by comparing information could they be improved. It was decided that the existing system of[197] examining prisoners of war for purposes of military information ought to be supplemented by a special further examination for the purposes of propaganda information, and it was suggested that special representatives of the Enemy Propaganda Departments should be allowed to conduct such examinations.

Some important points connected with propaganda brought to bear upon Germany through neutral countries were raised, and it was agreed that the work of controlling and distributing films for moving picture theatres, which was to be done by an Inter-Allied Commission in Switzerland, ought to be extended to other neutral countries, especially Sweden. Information before the Committee bore testimony that German-owned picture theatres had of late increased very much in number both in Switzerland and in Scandinavia, and that these relied for the lighter part of their entertainments upon films from Allied countries, Germany supplying special propaganda films. By controlling the supply of films from Allied countries, the activity of these theatres could be very much diminished and possibly brought to an end.

It was also agreed that it would be advisable[198] to invite a number of neutral editors and newspaper writers to pay a visit to the United States. It was considered that articles describing what they saw and what they were able to judge of the feeling of the American nation would have a very useful effect upon German opinion.

With a view to influencing German opinion, it was agreed that more news agencies, to all appearance independent and self-supporting, might well be established in other neutral countries; that more efforts should be made to get articles inserted in enemy newspapers, not controversial articles, but statements of what the Allies were doing, especially in the economic field, written as a German might write them who was anxious about the future of his country; and that dispatch of Allied newspapers to neutral countries should be improved and extended so that there might be more chance of their finding their way into Germany.

The discussions of the Prisoners of War Committee showed that agreement existed as to the soundness of the methods adopted by Crewe House for this particular work, and the report took the form of a recommendation that they should be generally adopted by the Allies.

[199]

At the final plenary session of the Conference, on August 17, 1918, it was unanimously resolved that the Committees’ reports should be accepted, and submitted by the heads of the four Missions to their respective Governments for their approval and adoption. The Conference resolved to constitute (as suggested by the Policy Committee) a permanent inter-Allied body for the conduct of propaganda in enemy countries and by so doing made a great advance. In order to maintain close touch with the French propaganda authorities, Lord Northcliffe appointed Colonel Lord Onslow as resident representative of Crewe House in Paris. By the time the Armistice was signed the different Governments had nominated their delegates to the permanent Inter-Allied body and all the necessary preliminary arrangements had been satisfactorily made. This organisation would have opened a new chapter in the history of war propaganda but for the conclusion of hostilities. As Lord Northcliffe said in his final speech to the Conference, the constitution of a permanent Inter-Allied body was a step towards that general co-ordination of Allied purpose and organisation which the experience of the war had proved to be a postulate of rapidity[200] and efficiency of action. The work of the Conference itself, however, was invaluable as it surveyed the policy and organisation of propaganda against the enemy in all its phases and from many points of view at a time when propaganda had just passed into the intensive stage. Its reports in themselves form a text-book in the science and art of propaganda.

“DRIFTING DOWN IN WHITE SHOWERS”: LEAFLETS (INSTEAD OF BOMBS), FROM ITALIAN AEROPLANE SQUADRON, DROPPING ON VIENNA—AN AIR PHOTOGRAPH.
Photograph supplied by the Photographic Studios of the Italian Air Service. By kind permission of the “Illustrated London News.”
MR. ROBERT DONALD.
MEMBER OF THE ENEMY PROPAGANDA COMMITTEE.
Photo: Elliott & Fry, Ltd.
SIR SIDNEY LOW.
MEMBER OF THE ENEMY PROPAGANDA COMMITTEE
Photo: Elliott & Fry. Ltd
MR. JAMES O’GRADY, M.P.
MEMBER OF THE ENEMY PROPAGANDA COMMITTEE.

[201]

## CHAPTER VIII
FROM WAR PROPAGANDA TO PEACE PROPAGANDA

The Co-ordination of British Policy—A representative committee—Lord Northcliffe’s Article: “From War to Peace.”

In addition to its success in its practical bearing and direct influence on the work of spreading the truth concerning the war in the enemy countries, the Inter-Allied Conference at Crewe House in August, 1918, was a distinctly useful act of propaganda in two other directions. First, it led to a mutual appreciation, among the influential representatives of the four countries, of the effort and determination of each nation and of their willingness to combine to achieve victory—in other words, to a better understanding of each other’s will to conquer and readiness to subordinate self-interest to the larger object of Allied accomplishment of purpose.

In the second place, the Conference was an object-lesson to the British Government Departments which participated in it as to the[202] value of concerted and co-ordinated action in propaganda matters. Shortly afterwards, a suggestion was made by an influential representative of one of these Departments that a committee should be formed to represent all British departments concerned in any way with propaganda. Moreover, it gradually became evident to all concerned that the collapse of Bulgaria was the beginning of the end, and that “war propaganda” must by a process of steady evolution become “peace-terms propaganda,” by which public opinion in enemy countries as well as at home, in the Dominions, and in Allied and neutral countries, might be made accustomed to the peace which the Allies intended to make. The maintenance of British prestige demanded that our position in regard to the peace should be explained and justified by the widespread dissemination of news and views, both before and during the Peace Conference.

Thus it was more than ever imperative that all British propagandists should speak with one voice. Here then was work ready to be done by the suggested inter-departmental committee, for the formation of which invitations had already been issued to the departments concerned to send as delegates[203] to this Committee responsible officials able to give decisions for their departments on such matters as would be discussed by such a committee. These invitations were accepted by:

The War Cabinet,
The Admiralty,
The War Office,
The Foreign Office,
The Treasury,
The Ministry of Information,
The Air Ministry,
The Colonial Office,
The India Office,
The War Aims Committee, and
The Official Press Bureau.

Representatives of these departments and of Lord Northcliffe’s department, which, for official purposes, had been renamed The British War Mission, thus formed what was known as the Policy Committee of the British War Mission.

While this Committee was in process of formation, Crewe House had been studying the problems of “peace-terms propaganda” and had, as a result of a series of conferences, prepared a memorandum outlining a basis upon which such propaganda could be developed.

[204]

The first meeting of the Policy Committee was held at Crewe House on October 4, 1918, and I presided in the absence, through indisposition, of Lord Northcliffe. After giving a summarised account of the work carried on from Crewe House, I said that whatever results it had been possible to achieve had proceeded mainly from the circumstance that it had in each case been based upon definite policies in regard to the countries concerned. These policies had all been submitted to, and had received the approval of, the British Government. The advantages of this procedure were obvious. It enabled propagandists to work on consistent lines without fear that the representations they made to the enemy would be contradicted by actual occurrences. In this way, propaganda representations had a cumulative effect. If, for instance, enemy troops were at first inclined to regard representations with scepticism, they were gradually convinced by the force of events that they had been told the truth from the outset, and that consequently subsequent representations deserved serious attention. Another advantage had proceeded from the obvious circumstance that as Allied policy must correspond to the aims which the Allies[205] were determined to secure at the peace, the representation of that policy to propaganda was in harmony with the war aims of the Allies, and was strengthened by every successive declaration by Allied statesmen of the objects for which they were fighting. A third advantage was that the propaganda of the enemy could not destroy the effects of our propaganda without having gained such military successes as to render the Allied war aims themselves unattainable. Consequently every Allied victory that brought the war aims nearer attainment enhanced also the efficacy of propaganda.

At the outset, the efforts made by Crewe House were naturally tentative and experimental. Their real value could only be proved by the test of experience. This test had been applied in Austria-Hungary, Bulgaria, and Germany. As against Austria-Hungary, Crewe House propaganda contributed to the defeat of the Austrians on the Piave in June, and had its efforts not been thwarted by political short-sightedness and some personal intrigue on the part of various Italian authorities, it was certain that much greater headway would have been made and that the Italian armies would have been in a much more favourable[206] position. As it was, the policy of liberating the Austro-Hungarian subject races, upon which propaganda had been based, had already had a marked effect in the interior of the Dual Monarchy, and had brought large sections of the inhabitants to the point of revolt. This would be clear when it was said that the Italo-Jugo-Slav Agreement of March, 1918, the Rome Congress of the Hapsburg Subject Races of April, with its sequel in the declarations by the Allies and the United States to the Poles, Czecho-Slovaks and Southern Slavs, as well as the actual recognition of the Czecho-Slovaks and the prospective recognition of the Jugo-Slavs as Allied and belligerent nations, had all been influenced, if not directly promoted, by the efforts of Crewe House.

As regards Bulgaria, Crewe House definitely rejected Bulgarian overtures until there should be a complete reversal of Bulgarian policy. That reversal had taken place, and had opened up further prospects of propaganda against Austria-Hungary of which speedy advantage was being taken.

The work in Germany had been positive and negative. Its aim had been to give the German people something to hope for and much to fear—in other words, to make it[207] clear to them that the only way to escape complete ruin would be to break with the system that brought the war upon Europe, and to qualify for admission into a League of Nations on the Allied terms. In addition to these educative efforts, we had supplied the enemy armies with constant and invariably truthful information about the actual military position. The news which the German military authorities were withholding from their troops had been supplied by us. Hence their cries of alarm. Nevertheless, much remained to be done in the co-ordination of the efforts of all Government Departments so as to make the general work of propaganda as rapid and as efficient as possible. Much use had unfortunately deprived the term “propaganda” of its real meaning. In its true sense it meant the education of the enemy to a knowledge of what kind of world the Allies meant to create, and of the place reserved in it for enemy peoples according as they assisted in, or continued to resist, its creation. It implied also the dissemination of this knowledge among the Allied peoples, so that there might be full popular support for Allied policy and no tendency at the critical moment of peace to sacrifice any essential feature of[208] the settlement because its importance might not have been explained or understood in time. Next to the actual work of fighting the enemy on land and sea, there was no more important work than this; and the joint intelligence and energy of all Departments of the Government were required to accomplish it successfully. For this reason the suggestion that this council of representatives of the Government Departments chiefly concerned should be formed had been warmly welcomed, in order that there might be less dispersion of effort, less overlapping, and greater mutual comprehension of the work which each Department was striving to do, and fuller co-ordination in the direction of all those efforts to one single end.

[209]

As the war approached its end, enemy propaganda must gradually pass into peace offensives and counter-offensives. The British War Mission therefore had already in existence an organisation to collect and collate various suggestions, territorial, political, economic, and so forth, that had been made by the different sections and parties in Allied, neutral, and enemy countries. A step in this direction was the report on the Propaganda Library, issued by the War Office early in 1917, by Captain Chalmers Mitchell, who had since become the liaison officer between the British War Mission and the War Office, and who had been asked to act as Secretary of the Policy Committee. Captain Chalmers Mitchell was in charge of the aforesaid organisation at Crewe House, and although its immediate function was to collect information useful for propaganda, it was clear that it would also obtain material useful to those who had to shape peace policy. For propaganda to the enemy was in a sense a forecast of policy; it must be inspired by policy, but at the same time its varying needs also suggested policy.

It was hoped, therefore, that this Policy Committee might assist in furnishing materials for the compilation of the various peace proposals, in revising the collation of them, in drawing inferences from them and in discussing the action and reaction of peace propaganda and peace policy that the inferences suggested.

The Committee decided to undertake the following immediate activities:

Study of Peace Terms.

Study of utterances by important enemy representatives to form decisions[210] as to what credence should be given them and what response should be made to them.

Suggestion of statements to be made by Allied representatives, and consideration of their phraseology and substance.

Special consideration of the reception to be given to German statements as to the course of democratisation in Germany.

At an emergency meeting of the Committee summoned a few days later to draft a statement of propaganda policy with reference to the German Peace Note, Lord Northcliffe said his department had prepared for submission to the Committee a draft statement, based on a consideration of President Wilson’s pronouncements. After various slight modifications had been made, the statement was adopted in principle.

In its final form it read:

“In order to stop further bloodshed, the German Government requests the immediate conclusion of an armistice on land and water and in the air.

“The Note accepts the programme set forth by the President of the United States in his message to Congress of January 8th, 1918, and in his later pronouncements,[211] especially his speech of September 27th, as a basis for peace negotiations.

“In point of fact, the pronouncements of President Wilson were a statement of attitude made before the Brest-Litovsk treaty, and enforcement of the peace of Bucharest on Rumania, and the German statement of their intentions at the outset of the Spring offensive. They cannot, therefore, be understood as a full recitation of the conditions of peace.

“The phrasing of the German acceptance of them as a ‘basis for peace negotiations’ covers every variety of interpretation from sincere acceptance to that mere desire for negotiations which is the inevitable consequence of the existing military situation. It is, therefore, impossible to grant any armistice to Germany which does not give the Entente full and acceptable guarantees that the terms arranged will be complied with. There must be a clear understanding that Germany accepts certain principles as indisputable, and reserves for negotiation only such details as, in the opinion of the Associated Powers, are negotiable.

“In the full conviction of the power and the will of the Associated Powers to enforce a peace that shall be just and lasting, we[212] shall thankfully accept conclusive evidence that the peoples of our present enemies are willing to co-operate in the establishment of such a peace. With the object of making the conditions of such co-operation clear, we take the opportunity, presented by the German peace note, of exploring more fully the ground covered by President Wilson’s pronouncements and of distinguishing explicitly between principles and conditions that must be accepted as indisputable, and terms and details that may be the subject of negotiation.

“The following conditions are indisputable:—

“In no sense whatever shall restoration or reparation in the case of Belgium be taken into consideration when adjusting any other claims arising from the war.

“1. The complete restoration, territorial and political, of Belgium. The assumption by Germany of the full financial burden involved in material restoration and reconstruction, including the replacement of machinery, the provision of war pensions and adequate compensation for all civilian losses and injuries, and the liquidation of all Belgian war debts. In view of the circumstances in which Germany invaded Belgium,[213] no allegations that Belgian civilians acted against military law or imposed authority shall be taken into consideration. The future international status of Belgium shall be settled in accordance with the wishes of the Belgian nation.

“2. The freeing of French territory, reconstruction of the invaded provinces, compensation for all civilian losses and injuries.

“3. The restoration to France of Alsace-Lorraine, not as a territorial acquisition or part of a war indemnity, but as reparation for the wrong done in 1871, when the inhabitants of the two Provinces, whose ancestors voluntarily chose French allegiance, were incorporated in Germany against their will.

“4. Readjustment of the Northern frontiers of Italy as nearly as possible along the lines of nationality.

“5. The assurance to all the peoples of Austria-Hungary of their place amongst the free nations of the world and of their right to enter into union with their kindred beyond the present boundaries of Austria-Hungary.

“6. The evacuation of all Territory formerly included in the boundaries of the Russian Empire, the annulment of all treaties,[214] contracts, or agreements made with subjects, agents, or representatives of Enemy Powers since the Revolution and affecting territory or interests formerly Russian, and co-operation of the Associated Powers in securing conditions under which the various nationalities of the former Empire of Russia shall determine their own form of Government.

“7. The formation of an independent Polish State with access to the Sea, which State shall include the territories inhabited by predominantly Polish populations, and the indemnification of Poland by the Powers responsible for the havoc wrought.

“8. The abrogation of the Treaty of Bucharest, the evacuation and restoration of Rumania, Serbia, and Montenegro, the Associated Powers to aid the Balkan States in settling finally the Balkan question on an equitable basis.

“9. The removal, so far as is practicable, of Turkish dominion over all non-Turkish peoples.

“10. The people of Schleswig shall be free to determine their own allegiance.

“11. As reparation for the illegal submarine warfare waged by Germany and Austria-Hungary, these Powers shall be held[215] liable to replace the merchant tonnage belonging to the Associated and Neutral nations illegally damaged or destroyed.

“12. The appointment of a tribunal before which there shall be brought for impartial justice individuals of any of the belligerents accused of offences against the laws of war or of humanity.

“13. The former Colonial possessions of Germany lost by her in consequence of her illegal aggression against Belgium shall in no case be returned to Germany.

“The following conditions of Peace are negotiable:

“1. The adjustment of claims for damage necessarily arising from the operations of war, and not included amongst the indisputable conditions.

“2. The establishment, constitution, and conditions of Membership of a League of Free Nations for the purpose of preventing future wars, and improving international relations.

“3. The League of Free Nations shall be inspired by the resolve of the Associated Powers to create a world in which, when the conditions of the Peace have been carried out, there shall be opportunity and security for the legitimate development of all the Peoples.”

[216]

This was approved by a representative of the Government, designated ad hoc, for unofficial use as propaganda policy. Each department adapted it to its own needs. So far as Crewe House was concerned, effective use was made of it on two occasions—the first being when Lord Northcliffe, at the suggestion of the Enemy Propaganda Committee, dealt with the subject of peace terms in an address to United States officers at the “Washington Inn,” London, on October 22, 1918.

At a meeting of the Policy Committee at Crewe House on October 28, the action of the various departments on the memorandum was stated and approved.

The Crewe House Committee reported first as to Lord Northcliffe’s address at the Washington Inn; next that the production department of the Enemy Propaganda Committee was engaged on a series of pamphlets and leaflets dealing with different points of the terms; third, that a reasoned statement covering the whole ground, and showing what Germany had to gain in the end, was being drafted for publication, the idea being that it should appear as an article or as a speech to which wide circulation would be given; and lastly that the secretary of the[217] permanent Inter-Allied Body for Propaganda in Enemy Countries had written to the French, Italian, and American members of that body enclosing a copy of the Peace Policy Memorandum and suggesting that they should take action similar to that of the British Policy Committee and bring the subject up for discussion at the next meeting of the Inter-Allied Body. (It may be mentioned here that the rapid course of events prevented the contemplated meeting of the Inter-Allied Body.)

That was the last meeting of the Policy Committee. There remains to be set forth the final result of its work. Crewe House, as explained above, had stated its intention of publishing an article covering the whole ground of the memorandum in such a way that the policy could be presented in the same terms to our own people, to our Allies, and to the enemy. It was found impracticable to get such an article published quickly enough in a high-class magazine, or to get an immediate occasion for making it the text of a speech. In these circumstances the Committee asked their chairman, Viscount Northcliffe, to give the Peace Policy the wide publicity possible by the use of his name and by the sources of distribution[218] which he was able to command. Lord Northcliffe agreed, and accordingly produced the article which follows and which was a full statement of the agreed policy. He arranged for its simultaneous publication in the London Press and, at his own expense, had it cabled to the remotest parts of the world. As stated in the House of Commons by the Financial Secretary to the Treasury, the document was unofficial. Its purpose was to form the basis of a policy of publicity and the fact that it was proposed to elaborate it for publication was announced beforehand, and approved by the Policy Committee. This is the text of the article from The Times of November 4, 1918:

FROM WAR TO PEACE
By Lord Northcliffe

This article is appearing to-day in the leading papers in Canada, Australia, New Zealand, South Africa, Newfoundland, India, the British Dependencies, United States, South America, France, Italy, Spain, Switzerland, Holland, Norway, Sweden, Denmark, Japan and elsewhere.

It will be circulated in Germany during the present week.

Now that peace is at last in sight, I hear the question being asked on all sides: “How are we to pass from war conditions to peace conditions?” This cannot be done by a sudden and dramatic declaration like[219] the declaration which in August, 1914, changed peace into war. It must be a slow and laborious process—a process with, as it seems to me, at least three distinct and successive stages. Out of these stages will be formed the organic whole which will constitute the machinery for replacing war conditions by peace conditions.

It is important to get these three stages clearly outlined in our imaginations, and it is important also to bear in mind that each stage will smooth the path for its successor precisely in proportion to the sincerity and thoroughness with which it has been completed. There is but one goal for those who are honest and far-seeing. That goal is to create a condition of the world in which there shall be opportunity and security for the legitimate development of all Peoples. The road is long and difficult, but I believe that its course is already clear enough to be described, in the same words, to those who are our friends and to those who are now our enemies.

I

The first stage is the cessation of hostilities. Here, whether they cease on account of an armistice or by reason of surrender, there can be no question as to the “Honour” of the German people, or as to any adjustment of the conditions to any supposed strategical or actual strength of the Central Powers.

If they feel humiliated, they must blame those who brought humiliation upon them; and as to military strength, the semi-official organ of the German Government, the Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung, has admitted that our reserves are such as Germany cannot compete with.

[220]

It is clear [said this newspaper on October 12] that if we systematically continued the war in this way, fighting might go on for a long time. The annihilation of the German Army is still a long way from attainment; we still have a quantity of unspent forces at our command in the recruit depôts behind the front, in the reserve battalions, and at home. But doubtless there are certain limits to all this on our side, whereas our enemies—chiefly America—are in a position to replace men and materials on an ever-increasing scale.

Another equally important admission I found in the Münchner Neueste Nachrichten, the leading South-German organ, on October 25.

A German retreat beyond the frontier [this journal said] and especially an advance by the enemy to the frontier, would render the German situation much worse, as it would expose Germany’s industrial territory to the Entente’s artillery fire, and particularly their air attacks, while the danger to the enemy’s industrial districts would be correspondingly removed. This condition alone would not only secure the enemy’s military preponderance, but would increase it.

Thus it is clear that Germany, deprived now of the help of her allies, recognises her hopeless situation. The conditions upon which hostilities can cease must be laid down by the military and naval leaders of the Associated Powers and accepted by the Central Powers in such form that no resumption of hostilities is possible.

And this I will say: The spirit in which Germany accepts these stern and necessary conditions will do much to determine the course of future events. If she haggles over the conditions, or is sullen and obstructive in her mode of carrying them out, then our profound distrust of her spirit and motives will[221] survive into the subsequent stages and still further delay that re-establishment of tolerable relations which must be our object. But if Germany by word and deed makes plain her abandonment of that belief in Might which her rulers, supported until recently by the majority of her people, have used as a menace to the power of Right, the greatest obstacle in the path of equal justice will have been removed.

By a stroke of the pen, in accepting the conditions of armistice, or by a mere gesture of unconditional surrender, Germany can cause fighting to cease. Naturally, the business of evacuation and of reoccupation will have to be conducted by concert between the military and naval leaders. The first governing condition in these operations and detailed arrangements will be the safety of the peace. The second condition will be the security of civilian life and property. The emotional background to all this will be a daily increasing desire on the part of all to get back to normal conditions of life. Co-operation and agreement will be required, not so much to secure that demobilisation and disarmament shall be forced sternly on those who have surrendered as to secure that each side takes its fair share in the burden of maintaining order and in facilitating the change from military to civilian organisation.

II

The second stage of the passage from war conditions to peace conditions will begin as soon as it is certain that security has been obtained for the permanence of the first stage. It will consist in the acceptance by Germany of certain principles as indisputable. The security provided in the first stage ought to be sufficient[222] to enable us to pass through the second stage quickly. With sufficient guarantees there need be no waiting to see whether the transformation of the German Government from irresponsible autocracy to responsible democracy is as genuine as it is represented to be, or whether the changed professions of those who speak for the People represent a change of heart.

The indisputable principles which Germany must accept in this second stage have been stated in different forms at different times, but the consensus of opinion amongst all classes of the Associated Powers seems to me to be so clear that it is not difficult to state them objectively in a form very close to that which they are likely to assume in their final enunciation.

The first is the complete restoration, territorial, economic, and political, of Belgium. In this there can be no reservation, no bargaining, no attempt to raise counter-claims or offsets of any kind. By her initial violation of International Law, and by her subsequent treatment of Belgium, Germany has forfeited all right to discussion. Reparation is impossible, but she must undertake restoration in such form and measure as shall be indicated to her.

2. The freeing of French territory, reconstruction of the invaded provinces, compensation for all civilian losses and injuries. Here again reparation in any full sense of the word is beyond human power, but Germany must accept the full burden of material reconstruction, replacement, and compensation, again in such form and measure as shall be laid down.

3. The restoration to France of Alsace-Lorraine, not as a territorial acquisition or part of a war indemnity, but as reparation for the wrong done in 1871, when the inhabitants of the two provinces,[223] whose ancestors voluntarily chose French allegiance, were incorporated in Germany against their will.

4. Readjustment of the Northern Frontiers of Italy as nearly as possible along the lines of nationality; the Eastern and Adriatic frontiers to be determined in accordance with the principles embodied in the Italo-Jugo-Slav Agreement and ratified by the Rome Congress of April, 1918.

5. The assurance to all the peoples of Austria-Hungary of their place amongst the free nations of the world and of their right to enter into union with their kindred beyond the present boundaries of Austria-Hungary. This involves the creation of independent Czecho-Slovak and Jugo-Slav States, the reduction of Hungary to the ethnographic limits of the Magyar race, and the union of all Rumanians with the present kingdom of Rumania. In the same way the Poles and Ukrainians of the Dual Monarchy must be free to unite with their co-nationals across existing frontiers, and it is obvious that the same right of self-determination cannot be denied to the German provinces of Austria, should they desire to enter Germany as a federal unit.

6. The evacuation of all territory formerly included in the boundaries of the Russian Empire; the annulment of all Russian treaties, contracts, or agreements made with subjects, agents, or representatives of Enemy Powers since the Revolution and affecting territory or interests formerly Russian; and the unimpeded co-operation of the Associated Powers in securing conditions under which the various nationalities of the former Empire of Russia shall determine their own forms of government.

When Russia offered a peace of reconciliation[224] without annexations or indemnities, the Central Powers, taking advantage of the military position, rejected all considerations of justice and imposed terms that were brutal and selfish. Thus they forfeited the right to aid Russia and the various nationalities of the former Empire of Russia in their efforts to establish self-determination and their own form of government.

The seventh indisputable principle concerns (a) the formation of an independent Polish State with access to the sea, which State shall include the territories inhabited by predominantly Polish populations; and (b) the indemnification of Poland by the Powers responsible for the havoc wrought.

This condition is indispensable for the reign of justice in Europe. Germany has ruthlessly oppressed the Poles within her Empire. Justice and stability demand the restoration of the predominantly Polish parts of the present German Empire to the new Polish State.

8. The abrogation of the Treaty of Bucharest; the evacuation and restoration of Rumania, Serbia, and Montenegro; the Associated Powers to aid the Balkan States in settling finally the Balkan question on an equitable basis.

The Balkan question must be settled, and it follows from that principle of self-determination to which the Associated Powers adhere that the Balkan States must be encouraged to agree among themselves and give what advice or assistance they may ask in coming to an agreement.

9. The removal, as far as is practicable, of Turkish dominion over all non-Turkish peoples.

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The complexity of the distribution of nationalities in the present Empire of Turkey makes the details of the problem difficult, but the failure of the Turks, in act and in intention, to rule justly has been so disastrous, and the acquiescence of the Central Powers in Turkish misdeeds so complete, that no departure from this principle can be considered.

10. The people of Schleswig to be free to determine their own allegiance.

The case of Schleswig is a fundamental instance of the fashion in which Prussia and Austria used their might to override the principle of self-determination. The wrong done must be redressed.

11. As reparation for the illegal submarine warfare waged by Germany and Austria-Hungary, these Powers shall be held liable to replace the merchant tonnage, belonging to the associated and neutral nations, illegally damaged or destroyed.

In spite of repeated warnings, and in defiance of the pledges which they had given to the Government of the United States, then a neutral Power, the Central Powers have persisted in operations which, by their nature and by the fashion in which they were conducted, outraged both International Law and common humanity. The question of punishment must be dealt with separately; that of restoring the ships or their equivalents, and of material compensation to the victims and their families, cannot be subject to discussion or negotiation.

12. The appointment of tribunals before which there shall be brought for impartial justice as soon as possible individuals of any of the belligerents accused of offences against the laws of war or of humanity.

While I regard this condition as an essential preliminary to peace, as a just concession to the outraged[226] conscience of humanity, I admit freely that its practical application is full of difficulty. I foresee the extraordinary difficulty of assigning responsibility; I recognise that during the actual conduct of war there are reasons why belligerents should hesitate to punish adequately those whom in normal times they would unhesitatingly condemn. I offer my own solution of the difficulty. It is that the appointed tribunals should act as Courts of First Instance. They would hear the evidence brought against the accused, and, if they found a prima facie case established against them, would refer them to their own countries for ultimate trial, judgment, and sentence. I believe that more stern justice will be done if nations which desire to purge themselves condemn their own criminals than if the punishment were left to other nations which might hesitate to be severe lest they should invest the individuals punished with the halo of martyrdom.

13. The former colonial possessions of Germany, lost by her in consequence of her illegal aggression against Belgium, shall in no case be returned to Germany.

Germany’s possession of her colonies would have been inviolate but for her illegal aggression against Belgium, which brought England into the war. She has proclaimed that the fate of her colonies would be decided on the Western front; it has been so decided. She has proclaimed the uses to which, if victorious, she would have put her colonies; such uses must be prevented for ever in the interest of the peace of the world. Furthermore, there is this consideration that, after what has happened, it would be as intolerable for Australasia to have New Guinea in German hands as it would be for the United States to have Germany in possession of Cuba. The colonies therefore cannot be[227] returned to Germany, but their assignment as possessions, or in trusteeship, together with the fashion in which they shall be administered in the interests of their inhabitants and of the world generally, are matters for future decisions.

These are the indisputable conditions of peace which must be accepted in the second stage of the negotiations.

I have dealt with the first two stages as logically separate and successive. In actual fact agreement on them might be coincident in time. In any event, acceptance of the indisputable conditions would be made before the guarantees required under the terms of surrender or of armistice had become accomplished facts.

The conclusion of the first two stages, whether concurrent or consecutive, will be the end of dictation. They form the preliminary to co-operation. They will be an earnest of a complete break with the past on the part of Germany. They will go far to satisfy the natural desire of those who demand that the guilty should be punished, and yet I believe that they contain nothing that is not imperative for a just and lasting peace. And I hope that their imposition and acceptance will, in the subsequent stages, make it possible to take advantage, for the benefit of the world, of those powers of discipline and organisation which Germany has perverted to the great harm of the world.

III

The third stage, should I consider, consist in the appointment of a large number of Commissions to study and work out the details of the principles which I have enumerated. These will report ultimately, some of[228] them quickly, some of them after months or years, to the Central Peace Conference. For my part I see no reason why the members of the Commissions, if the principles on which they shall act are settled beforehand, should not be selected chiefly from among those who have the greatest interest in the matters to be settled. I do not see, for instance, why a Commission consisting largely of Poles and Prussians should not be asked to work out the future frontier of Prussia and Poland. This may be thought the suggestion of an idealist. But I claim that in this instance the idealist is the realist. If our goal be lasting peace, then let us give every opportunity for arrangement and mutual accommodation before we resort to compulsion.

So far I have said nothing of the future government of Germany. The Germans assure us that the transformation of autocratic government to responsible government is taking place. I should like to believe them. I am certain that its accomplishment is necessary to Germany itself and to the final attainment of a just and lasting peace. I frankly admit that the perfect form of government does not exist, and that the genius of Germany may evolve some form as good as, or even better than, existing constitutions.

But Germany must understand that it will take time to convince the world, which has so much reason to distrust her, that this sudden change is to be a permanent reality. Fortunately the stages which I have described do not require for their accomplishment more than the hope that Germany has set out on the right path. Whilst the last stage is in progress there will be time, and more than time, to see whether Germany realises our hopes and what I believe to be now the wishes of the majority of her own people.

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For the last stage will mean nothing less than reconstructing the organisation of the world, and establishing a new policy in which a League of Free Nations shall replace the old system of the balance of rival Powers.

The accomplishment of a change so gigantic as the adjusting of national organisations to fit into new super-national machinery must be difficult and slow. Fortunately the very steps necessary to make it possible are steps that will slowly make it actual. Let me select a few simple examples. The cessation of hostilities will leave the world short of food, short of transport, short of raw materials. The machinery that has regulated these during war will have to be kept in action beyond the war. Food will have to be rationed, transport will have to be rationed, raw material will have to be rationed. It is a world problem that can be settled only on a world basis, and there will be every opportunity, in the years of transition, to transform those economic relations which are forced upon us by necessity into a system which will meet with free and general acceptance.

Intimately connected with these matters will be the problem of the returned soldier, whether wounded or otherwise, the problem of pensions, the problems of wages, housing, hours and conditions of work, regulation of child labour, female labour, and so forth. The equalisation of those in different countries will be necessary to fair rationing, and from this necessity will arise international conferences of workers which may be able to settle some of the most difficult questions of super-national organisation. When the question of disarmament arises, some will demand as a fundamental necessity that their nation must have a large army[230] or a large navy. Some will advocate, as an act of punishment or of justice, the disarmament of other nations. In the consequent negotiations it will soon be found that to insist on an unduly large army or navy is to saddle one’s country with a huge expense; to insist on the disarmament of another country may be to present that country with a huge annual income that can be used in commercial rivalry. And so we may come to a condition in which, if there be international security, there will be a contest, not as to which country shall maintain the largest navy and the largest army, but as to which country shall most completely disarm.

I foresee international Commissions at work for a long time, trying to establish frontiers, conditions of Parliamentary responsibility, canons of international law, rules of international commerce, laws even of religious freedom, and a thousand other conditions of national organisation. In the very act of seeking the foundation for a League of Free Nations, and in slowly building up the fabric, we shall get rid of the passions and fears of war. By the mere endeavour to find the way to a better condition of the world, we shall bring this better condition about.

This article created the desired interest and public discussion in the enemy countries. It was widely reproduced by German newspapers and it had the effect of producing a state of mind which culminated in the complete collapse of German resistance. It was a fitting wind-up to the work of propaganda in enemy countries. The article gave[231] rise to a great deal of comment at home and elsewhere abroad also, and did much to form a public opinion favourable to the conditions of peace which were in the minds of Allied statesmen but which they had themselves refrained from declaring in public.

Thus the Policy Committee, although it existed so short a time, had useful achievement to its credit. Had it been possible to constitute such a Committee early in the war the results might have been incalculable in the effect on British propaganda.

On November 15, 1918, Lord Northcliffe sent the following valedictory letter to each of the members of the Committee:—

“I am sending you herewith a copy of the minutes of the last meeting of the Policy Committee, and feel that it is unnecessary under the changed circumstances to call another meeting.

“May I remind you that this Committee was formed under my chairmanship by the British War Mission at a time when it seemed urgent to correlate propaganda addressed to the enemy, to Allies, and to Neutrals? In the opening remarks by the Chairman at the first meeting it was pointed out that as the[232] war approached its end, war propaganda would change into peace propaganda. This change took place with even greater rapidity than was at the moment anticipated, and the Committee had at once to undertake the task of devising a propaganda policy with regard to peace. You are acquainted with the steps that the Committee took and with the large measure of success that their efforts achieved. All questions of policy have now, however, passed from the hands of the Committee to those of the Council of the Nations, and there seems to me no immediate sphere for our action, especially as by arrangement with the Government the British War Mission is being wound up.

“May I take this opportunity of thanking you for your co-operation, and of stating my belief that, had the war continued, the Policy Committee would have developed into an organ of ever-increasing value?

Yours very truly,
(Signed) “Northcliffe.”

INFLATING THE BALLOONS AND ATTACHING THE TRUTH-TELLING LEAFLETS.
Official Photograph.
HOW LEAFLETS WERE ATTACHED TO THE BALLOONS.
Official Photograph.
REGISTERING THE DIRECTION AND VELOCITY OF THE WIND, IN ORDER TO JUDGE WHERE THE LEAFLETS WOULD FALL.
DISPATCHING THE BALLOONS.
TESTING THE LIFTING POWER OF BALLOONS USED FOR PROPAGANDA PURPOSES
“Daily Mirror” Photograph.

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## CHAPTER IX
VALE!

With the foundations well and truly laid and with increasing and widening avenues of approach into enemy countries, the work of the British War Mission was always expanding. Had the war continued, the gathering momentum of Crewe House activities would have dealt many other blows which, even in November, 1918, were in an advanced state of preparation. But, happily for the Allies, one enemy collapsed quickly after another. When the following letter was received from the War Office on November 9, and was followed by the signing of the Armistice with Germany—the last of our enemies—on November 11, the work of Crewe House as the headquarters of Propaganda in Enemy Countries was finished:—

“Sir,

“I am commanded by the Army Council to inform you that, in view of the armistices which have been concluded with Austria, Turkey, and Bulgaria,[234] the Council has decided that the distribution of propaganda in those countries by military means should cease during the period of the armistice.

“I am to say that, in the event of the conclusion of an armistice with Germany, distribution of propaganda by military means in that country will also cease during the existence of the armistice.

“I am further to inform you that the Commanders-in-Chief in the various theatres of war have been notified in the above sense.

“I am, Sir,
“Your obedient servant,
“B. B. Cubitt.

“The Secretary,
“The British War Mission,
“Crewe House.”

On the day following the signing of the Armistice with Germany Lord Northcliffe wrote to the Prime Minister:

“Dear Prime Minister,

“The signing of the last armistice with our enemies has necessarily brought the labours upon which I have been engaged for the past year to a close. The very nature of the armistices themselves[235] necessitates the termination of enemy propaganda, and I beg, therefore, to request you to accept my resignation of my post as Director of Propaganda in Enemy Countries.

“I wish to thank you for the confidence you have reposed in me in appointing me to this office. I have endeavoured, with the assistance of a most able Committee and of an untiring staff of experts, to render the very best possible services to the Government and to the country.

“Believe me, dear Prime Minister,
“Yours sincerely,
“Northcliffe.”

In reply, the Prime Minister wrote on the same day:

“My Dear Northcliffe,

“I have received your letter, and I agree with you that the office of Director of Propaganda in Enemy Countries is rendered unnecessary by recent events.

“In accepting your resignation, I wish to assure you how grateful I am for the great services you have rendered to the Allied Cause while holding this important post. I have had many[236] direct evidences of the success of your invaluable work and of the extent to which it has contributed to the dramatic collapse of the enemy strength in Austria and Germany.

“I shall be glad if Sir Campbell Stuart, the present Vice-Chairman of the Mission, will remain in office as Acting-Chairman of the Mission until December 31st, 1918, in order to wind up its activities.

“Ever sincerely,
“D. Lloyd George.”

When the year 1918 came to its close the affairs of the Mission had been wound up, and Crewe House as a propaganda force ceased to exist. The building was handed over to another Government department, but by those who had even a remote connection with the work carried on within its walls in 1918 Crewe House will always be remembered for its propaganda politics for which, as has been truly said, it became as well-known in the Chancelleries of Europe as it had been in Great Britain for so long as a social centre for national politics.

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## APPENDIX
Facsimile Leaflets and Translations.

Leaflet No. 1.
NEWS OF ALLIED SUCCESSES ON WESTERN FRONT FOR JUGO-SLAV SOLDIERS IN THE AUSTRIAN ARMIES.

Map representing the great offensive of the Allies, with the results achieved from August 9th to September 1st:—

[Map]

In the offensive from July 15th to August 31st the Allies captured 140,000 Germans (2,674 of whom were officers), 2,500 guns, 1,734 Flamethrowers, 13,783 machine guns, together with a huge amount of other war material.

The Jugoslav Committee.

Leaflet No. 2.
A MANIFESTO FROM DR. TRUMBITCH DISTRIBUTED FROM AEROPLANES AMONG JUGO-SLAV TROOPS IN THE AUSTRIAN ARMY.

SERBOCROATS AND SLOVENES.

The “Agenzia Stefani” announces officially:—

“By a decree of the Ministerial Council on September 8th the Home (Italian) Government has informed the Allied Governments that it regards the Jugoslav movement for obtaining independence and the formation of a free State as a principle for which the Allies are fighting, and as a condition of a just and lasting peace.”

The Governments of the Allied States have replied that they have received with satisfaction this declaration of the Italian Government.

Jugoslavs!

By this historic and fateful declaration Italy has set up the following war aim: The destruction of the Austro-Hungarian monarchy such as it is to-day, and upon its ruins the establishment of an independent State of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes.

This noble decree of hers is accepted by all our Allies.

Soldiers!

The part which Italy has been assigned by history has been manifested to-day more strongly than ever. She is the protector of the weak, the bearer of freedom and of the ideal for which the Allies have been fighting for four years. The aim of the[238] fighting is not the peace of Brest-Litovsk and Bucharest, but the freedom of the weak and oppressed.

Therefore open your eyes. Remember that by fighting against it you are fighting against yourselves, against our posterity, against our freedom and unity.

Long live Italy, long live the united and free Jugoslavia, long live our Allies!

Dr. Ante Trumbic,
Chairman of the Jugoslav Council.

Leaflet No. 3.
LEAFLET—PROBABLY THE FIRST—DISTRIBUTED BY BRITISH AEROPLANES AMONG GERMAN TROOPS IN OCTOBER 1914. IT ANNOUNCED A RUSSIAN VICTORY IN EAST PRUSSIA.

[Note.—This was distributed in October, 1914.]
NOTICE.
Explanation for German Soldiers.

It has become known that German soldiers have been told the British treat their captives inhumanly. That is a lie.

All German prisoners of war are well-treated and receive from the British the same food as their own soldiers.

The opportunity is now taken to enlighten the German soldier about some facts which hitherto have been kept secret from him.

The German Army never reached or occupied Paris and has been retiring since September 5.

The British Army has been neither made prisoner nor beaten. It increases in strength every day.

The French Army is not beaten. Quite on the contrary, for it inflicted a heavy defeat on the Germans at Montmirail.

Russia and Serbia have so decisively defeated Austria that she no longer plays any part in the war. With the exception of a few cruisers, German shipping, the merchant service as well as the fighting fleet, is no longer to be seen upon the seas.

The British and German Navies have both suffered casualties, but the German the heaviest.

Germany has already lost several colonies and will presently also lose what now remains to her. Japan has declared war on Germany. Kiauchau is now besieged by the British and the Japanese.

The report circulated in the Press that the British Colonies and India have rebelled against Great Britain is wholly untrue. Quite on the contrary, these Colonies have sent to France large masses of troops and many supplies to come to the help of the Fatherland.

Ireland is one with England, and from North and South is sending her soldiers who are fighting with enthusiasm alongside their English comrades.

The Kaiser and the Prussian War Party wanted this war against all interests of the Fatherland. In secret they prepared[239] for this war. Germany alone was prepared, which explains her temporary successes. Now we have succeeded in checking her victorious advance. Supported by the sympathies of the whole civilised world, which regards with horror an arbitrary war of conquest, Great Britain, France, Russia, Belgium, Serbia, Montenegro, and Japan will carry on the war to the end.

We bring these facts to general notice in order to throw light upon the truth which has been hidden from you. You are not fighting to defend your Fatherland, as no one ever thought of attacking Germany. You are fighting to satisfy the ambitious war-lust of the military party at the cost of the true interests of the Fatherland. The whole business is blackguardly.

At first sight these facts will seem improbable to you. But now it is for you to compare the events of the past weeks with the information manufactured by the military authorities.

ON OCTOBER 4 THE RUSSIANS GAINED A TREMENDOUS VICTORY OVER THE GERMAN ARMIES IN EAST PRUSSIA. GERMAN LOSSES 70,000.

Leaflet No. 4.
AEROPLANE DISTRIBUTION OF COPIES OF AN EARLY LEAFLET PREPARED BY THE FRENCH AUTHORITIES FOR THE GERMAN SOLDIER.

To the German Soldiers!

It is not true that we French shoot or ill-treat German prisoners.

On the contrary, our prisoners are well-treated and receive plenty to eat and drink.

All who are tired of this wretched life may report themselves unarmed, without fear, to the French outposts.

They will be well received there.

After the war everyone can go home again.

Leaflet No. 5.
A TYPICAL NEWS-SHEET FOR GERMAN SOLDIERS.

Information Leaflet for the Troops.
IS PEACE AT THE DOOR?

Our enemies reject negotiations until we have evacuated Belgium and France.

What must we do now?

Well, what does it all mean?

“A few weeks ago,” says the Frankfurter Zeitung, “it appeared as if our armies were very near their goal, the defeat of the enemy forces and peace. But what a change!”

In these few weeks the German armies have lost three-quarters of a million men. More than a quarter of a million have given themselves up and are now out of danger and have plenty to eat.

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In these few weeks Bulgaria has dropped out of the war and has been compelled to surrender unconditionally. The best Turkish armies have been destroyed and Turkey is about to follow Bulgaria’s example.

And what is the result of all these events in the last few weeks?

All hope of victory by the military Junker party in Germany abandoned: an armistice demanded: the admission of the new Imperial Chancellor, Prince Max von Baden, that Belgium was wrongfully attacked.

The following is the text of the Note addressed to President Wilson through the Swiss Government:—

“The German Government requests the President of the United States to bring about the restoration of peace, to inform all belligerent States of this request and to summon them to send plenipotentiaries to open negotiations. Germany takes as a basis for peace negotiations the programme set forth by the President of the United States in his Message to Congress of January 8th, 1918, and particularly in his speech of September 27th.

“With a view to preventing further bloodshed the German Government requests the immediate conclusion of an armistice on land, on water, and in the air.

(Signed) Max, Prince von Baden,
Imperial Chancellor.”

Why was this Note addressed to President Wilson?

Partly because he laid down certain conditions which he explained the German Government must accept before he would enter into any discussion whatever on peace terms.

But also partly because the German Government at length became aware of the United States’ military effort.

In this, as in every other important matter dealing with the war, our leaders deceived us in the most unheard-of way. They fed us with false hopes.

They have brought us to such a desperate pass that we are retiring on every front and are now compelled to sue for peace.

But will our enemies consent to discuss peace?

Not as long as we are still in Belgium, which, as our Government admits, was wrongfully attacked; not whilst we are still in Northern France.

Before our enemies will consent to negotiate with us we must retire to Germany. For, they say, they will gladly conclude a just and honourable peace with the German people if they can be sure that militarism and medieval methods of statesmanship are abolished for good.

What must we do to save ourselves? We must retire to our own country, then we may hope for an end of all the horror and hardships we have suffered for more than four years, only[241] because our Government let its policy be dictated by militarism and underestimated the forces which had to be arrayed against us owing to the attempt to realise the criminal ambition of the Pan-Germans.

We have been miserably deceived.

Leaflet No. 6.
“REPORTING PROGRESS”—LEAFLETS (SUCH AS THE ONE, BOTH SIDES OF WHICH ARE REPRODUCED, ABOVE) GAVE PARTICULARS OF ALLIED PROGRESS AGAINST THE GERMANS. CLEARLY-PRINTED MAPS DROVE THE TRUTH HOME. THE SHADED PORTION SHOWS TERRITORY WON BY THE ALLIES.

WHAT THE ALLIES HAVE WON.
Back on the Line of Last March.

[Map]

The whole ground has been twice won and twice lost by the German armies. How much blood has been spilled, and how much misery has been caused? For what object? Think it over!

On the other side of the leaflet was the following:

Further Successes of the Entente; the German Retreat continues.

During the last few weeks there has been fighting west of Cambrai and St. Quentin. The battle reached a degree of vehemence fully equal to any previously experienced in the course of the whole war.

The Germans and British attacked simultaneously; both sides fought with stubborn determination, but

the British gained the victory.

They beat off the German attack, made many prisoners, and killed an enormous number, thanks to the manner in which the German troops were driven forward under murderous machine-gun fire.

The British attack succeeded. The German front was pressed back closer to St. Quentin.

Ten thousand prisoners

were made and a number of guns were captured. The outer works of the Siegfried Line are in British possession in spite of the determined and plucky attempts of the German troops to hold them. The latter did not retreat “according to plan,” but because in open honourable fight

THEY GOT THE WORST OF IT.

The operations of the Entente forces have in no way reached an end, as reported in the German newspapers a week ago by military writers. The German forces were unable to stand[242] their ground. The French threaten Laon and the Chemin des Dames and in these regions are driving the Germans back.

On the Balkan Front

the Bulgarians are totally defeated

and are still retreating. The French and Serbian troops have advanced 20 kilometres. Many thousands of Bulgarians have surrendered. The prisoners ascribe the blame for Bulgaria’s disastrous situation to Germany.

The Austrian proposal that representatives of the belligerent nations should hold a secret conference in order to discuss

THE POSSIBILITIES OF PEACE

was described by the representatives of the Workmen’s and Socialist parties assembled at the London Conference as inspired more by the anxiety to strengthen the monarchy than by the desire to help effectively to put an end to the world war.

No voice was raised for the acceptance of the Austrian proposal.

Leaflet No. 7.
DIAGRAMMATIC REPRESENTATION OF THE GROWTH OF THE AMERICAN ARMY IN THE FIELD. THE IMMENSITY OF THE AMERICAN EFFORT WAS A STRONG POINT OF THE CREWE HOUSE PROPAGANDA CAMPAIGN.

TO-DAY WE ARE IN RETREAT.
Next Year we shall be destroyed.

America, which has now 1,750,000 men in France, had made arrangements to send 3,500,000 troops by next year.

But now, in view of the refusal of the German Government to make a genuine peace proposal, America has decided to increase the number.

By next year America will have 5,000,000 men on the Western Front.

What do our leaders say to this—our leaders who declared that America was not a danger to us because our U-boats would prevent them from sending troops to Europe?

What do we say to this, we who will be completely crushed by the huge superiority of numbers?

[Diagram]

The increase of the American Army on the Western Front.

1917. 100,000 | 1918. 1,750,000 | 1919. 5,000,000

[243]

Leaflet No. 8.
MAP-LEAFLET SHOWING THE BREAKING OF THE HINDENBURG LINE.

WHERE THE HINDENBURG LINE IS BROKEN
[Map]

This map shows exactly where the British troops have forced a way through an important part of the Hindenburg defence line. The dotted line from North to South indicates these defences. The black line shows the positions reached by the British. Their advance continues. In Flanders the German armies are in full retreat. Kemmel Hill has been given up. “Our troops left it with heavy heart,” writes Karl Rosner, war correspondent of the Lokalanzeiger.

Leaflet No. 9.
NEWS FOR GERMAN SOLDIERS OF THE DESTRUCTION OF THE TURKISH ARMY IN PALESTINE. TWO SIDES OF THE SAME LEAFLET.

TURKISH ARMY IN PALESTINE DESTROYED.
No further Resistance against the British Troops. Brilliant Encircling Manœuvre.
20,000 PRISONERS.
Turkey incensed against Germany for leading her to irretrievable disaster.

The Turkish Army in Palestine has ceased to exist. The British took them unawares, broke through the front, sent through large masses of cavalry, cut off all lines of retreat and completely surrounded the Turks.

Twenty thousand surrendered, a large number were killed, and only a few stragglers succeeded in escaping. The Holy Land has been liberated from the Mussulman suzerainty which the German Government did its best to uphold. Turkey could not have received a harder blow. Her best troops have been destroyed. The Turks’ feeling against Germany is extremely bitter. They openly threaten to turn against the German Government.

The Bulgarians are scarcely less embittered against Germany. They are still pursued in the Balkan mountains by the French and Serbian troops, who have driven them back 64 kilometres. Their defeat is a wholesale disaster.

On the Western Front the British and French troops are still gaining ground, slowly but steadily, a little every day.

Everywhere Germany and her allies are in retreat.

Read no leaflets which you may find accidentally, say Field Marshal Hindenburg and General von Hutier.

[244]

WHY?

Because they know that the leaflets contain the truth which they and the Government want to conceal.

They fear the truth. When the German people know it the Government and militarism will be wiped out.

Read overleaf of the successes of the Entente Powers and ask yourselves

How long can it go on like this?
Map illustrating the Turkish disasters.
[Map of Palestine]

The black lines and arrows show the position of the English forces. The Turks were between Samaria and Nablus. They were wiped out. Their army no longer exists.

Leaflet No. 10.
SOME POINTED QUOTATIONS FOR GERMAN SOLDIERS CULLED FROM GERMAN SOURCES.

The High Official.

“We have no cause for anxiety.”—Dr. Wekerle, Hungarian Premier.

The People.

“The men must thoroughly understand that they must stand fast.”—Order of the Day to 200th Infantry Division.

The General.

“We have no reason to be downhearted.”—General von Wrisberg, War Minister in the Reichstag.

The Soldier.

“The principle that troops must continue fighting all day long, to the last man, to the last cartridge, even when they are surrounded, appears to have sunk into oblivion.”—General Army Order, signed by General Ludendorff.

Preparations for Civil War.

Every precaution has been taken in Berlin and other places to suppress an eventual attempt at revolution.

Orders for the suppression of risings are issued under the heading “Measures for the Suppression of Strikes.” Proof of this is furnished by the order of German G.H.Q. to all Guards Infantry troops and to the 3rd, 4th, and 5th Corps.

On receipt of the telegraphic order “Prepare for the suppression of strikes,” all man-power must be mobilised. On receipt of the order “Suppress strikes,” the commandant of the transport troops must be immediately informed. The men must be equipped as for field service, only without masks. On receipt of the telegraphic order “Make preparations for[245] surrounding,” all detachments of troops will be marched to their allotted positions. Battalion commanders should place themselves at the head of their units and direct all further movements.

On receipt of the telegraphic order “Surround,” the troops selected for this duty, the 3rd, 4th, and 5th Corps, will march on Berlin to the Vorstadtbahn (Suburban Railway). The Guards will take the opposite direction from the centre of the city to the Vorstadtbahn, driving the populace before them. Headquarters will be Kaulsdorf. Then follow detailed instructions for the employment of machine guns. The order is strictly secret.

What shall we do with the Kaiser?

Stockholm, 10th September.—The German Minister in Stockholm has requested the Swedish Foreign Office to seize the copy of the “New York Herald Magazine of the War” of the 14th July because it publishes on the first page a photograph of the German Emperor underneath which are the words:—

“What shall we do with the Kaiser after the War?”

The Minister of Justice is said to have ordered the copies in question to be seized.

Arrest of Socialists.

According to the Neue Badische Landeszeitung, wild scenes took place last week at a meeting of Independent Socialists in Berlin. “In the course of the meeting the Reichstag member Hoffmann was arrested by two policemen because of provocative speeches. A scene of such excitement ensued that in the general disturbance Hoffmann escaped, while the hall rang with cries of ‘Down with the War!’ ‘Long live Liebknecht!’

“The following morning the officials arrived at Hoffmann’s house in order to arrest him again, but the deputy was not to be found. Many arrests were made among his adherents.”

Pork in Bottles.

“The smugglers are still devising new tricks so as to prevent their costly goods from falling into the clutches of the war contraband officials. At the Schlesicher Station a man was stopped as he was fetching away two carboys such as are used for the transport of dangerous acids. A closer inspection showed that the carboys were divided in two parts, a small receptacle at the top being filled with vinegar, while the lower and larger part contained 55 kilos. of freshly killed pork neatly packed. The expensive pork was seized.”—Berliner Tageblatt, Sept. 19, 1918.

The Veto on Dancing.

“In the Hanover Command dancing lessons are only allowed for men and women separately, and anyone who has already[246] taken a course of dancing is not allowed to learn again. A sensible regulation has been issued at Essen. Only dancing instructors belonging to the two German dancing instructors’ unions may hold dancing classes as in peace time.”—Berliner Tageblatt, Sept. 19, 1918.

Leaflet No. 11.
THIS LEAFLET WITH PARTICULARS OF THE FATE OF 150 GERMAN SUBMARINE COMMANDERS CREATED GREAT DEPRESSION IN GERMAN NAVAL PORTS.

THE 150 LOST GERMAN U-BOATS.

In the House of Commons the British Prime Minister, Mr. Lloyd George, said, “Our British vessels are serving as convoys, patrolling, laying mines, sweeping mines, protecting merchant ships and hunting U-boats over vast and uncharted distances. They have destroyed at least 150 of these ocean pests, the German U-boats—more than half that number in the course of last year.”

In reply to this, the following official Berlin telegram was sent out to the German papers and to neutral countries:

“We are in the position to state that the enemy’s war against the U-boats does not show anything like so great a success as that claimed by the British Prime Minister.”

The Chief of the Naval General Staff in London has in his possession a complete list of the names of the commanders of the 150 U-boats which Germany has lost through sinking, capture, or internment. The greater part of these officers are dead, a certain percentage are prisoners of war, a few are interned in neutral countries. The truth of the statement of the British Prime Minister is thus proved. It is also proved that the statement contained in the official Berlin telegram is untrue. Here is the list:

[List of U-boat commanders.]

Leaflet No. 12.
LEAFLET WARNING THE GERMANS THAT SUCH PLACES AS BERLIN AND HAMBURG HAD BEEN BROUGHT WITHIN RANGE OF AERIAL ATTACK AND COULD BE BOMBED IF THE WAR WERE PROLONGED.

A MAP WHICH EXPLAINS ITSELF.

In 1914 the English air squadrons which carried out reprisals for the attacks made on English towns were small and carried small bombs. In 1915 they grew larger and dropped larger bombs. In 1916 both had doubled in size. In 1917 there was a further increase in the size of the bombing squadrons and the bombs were 7½ times again as heavy. 1918 saw further increases and throughout the period under review the range of attacks steadily extended. In 1919 Berlin, Hamburg, Brunswick, and Hanover will be easily within range of attack—if we do not make peace in the meantime.

[247]

Leaflet No. 13.
A GERMAN DREAM AND THE RESULT. A LEAFLET ILLUSTRATING THE COLLAPSE OF THE MITTEL-EUROPA AMBITION OF GERMAN MILITARISM.

HOW THE THING WENT WRONG.

The upper map is entitled “Pan-German Dream,” the wording under it being as follows:

“Our rulers went to war because they hoped to found a gigantic empire for the Kaiser and the Junkers. All the territories shaded in on the above map were to be their realm. It would have meant the subjection of half the world under the German sword.”—Vorwärts, Oct. 11, 1918.

The lower map is entitled “The Awakening of the German People.” Under it is the following inscription:

This is how Germany looks to-day. Her allies can give no further aid. What the Kaiser calls “his heritage from God” will soon be smaller than it was at the beginning of the war. But the German people will be the better for it. They will have escaped from autocracy and militarism. Freedom at last!

Leaflet No. 14.
FRONT PAGE OF A “TRENCH NEWSPAPER” ISSUED BY CREWE HOUSE FOR GERMAN TROOPS.

WAR AND HOME.
The Summons to Unity.

The picture on the left is headed “The Ideal” and represents “The Assembly.” On its right is the following parody, entitled “Paradise Lost,” on Goethe’s “Faust”:

“PARADISE LOST.”

“Gretchen, how different thou wast!”—(Goethe—“Faust.”)
Germany, how different thou wast before the war
Brought about by thy lust of conquest.
With self-assurance thou wentst from triumph to triumph
And reached the summit of thy power
Untouched, with ample possessions
In earthly goods, in fame and world renown
Thou hadst all mankind can crave,
In high respect regarded, if not beloved.
But now what disgust, what horror
The mere name of Germany excites!
There is deep mourning for thy vanished happiness,
Thy honour lost, thy peace of mind destroyed!
Thou liest parted by the iron wall
Which thy crime has built between us
Fast fettered to thy false ideal
And all thy former glory gone!

[248]

The lower picture is called “The Reality,” the quotation from Moltke underneath being “March separately, strike together.” On its left:

The War was decided at Potsdam.

During a debate on the origin of the war in the Hungarian Parliament, Count Tisza claimed that the ultimatum to Serbia was drawn up at a conference at which no German representative was present.

A Deputy: Not in Vienna but in Potsdam.

Count Tisza: Neither in Potsdam nor anywhere else.

The Deputy: The ultimatum was not drawn up at Potsdam, but the outbreak of war was decided there.

A Prophecy.

The Dutch newspaper, the Handelsblad, reports that a person who has just returned from Germany saw this rhyme written up in gigantic letters at an important factory:

“If the war lasts another year,
William’s fate will be the Tsar’s!”

Leaflet No. 15.
ILLUSTRATED LEAFLET PORTRAYING CONTENTMENT OF GERMAN PRISONERS IN BRITISH HANDS. THIS WAS ISSUED TO COUNTERACT ENEMY ASSERTIONS OF SEVERE TREATMENT.

German prisoners of war arriving behind the British lines are greeted by their comrades, who assure them of good treatment.

Leaflet No. 16.
THIS LEAFLET SHOWED HOW THE ALLIES HAD SHATTERED THE GREAT BERLIN-BAGDAD PLAN.

WHY THE GOVERNMENT IS SUING FOR PEACE.

The reason is clear.

The Government undertook the war in the hope of realising the Pan-German dream of a Middle Europe.

This was the real cause of the war.

If there remained any doubt on the subject it is clearly proved by the fact that the moment the realisation of the Pan-German dream became impossible the Government sues for peace.

This was the plan of the Pan-Germans who led us into the war.

The whole of the territory coloured black was to become German.

Bulgaria and Turkey would become vassal States.

The Kaiser and the Prussian Junker aristocracy, the bureaucrats and the rich who exploit the rest of the people, should become the most powerful class in the world.

[249]

THIS IS WHAT HAS BECOME OF THE PAN-GERMAN PLAN.

Bulgaria refuses to be a vassal State.

Turkey is becoming anxious.

The plan for the realisation of which the Pan-Germans persuaded Germany to go to war and which has cost so many millions of lives and caused such universal misery is completely frustrated.

What reason remains why we should fight?

The Government has no further reason for continuing the struggle and is therefore suing our enemies for peace.

Therefore all the talk about a defensive war proves to have been absolutely untruthfully and dishonestly

STARTED TO DECEIVE US.

Leaflet No. 17.
MANIFESTO TO MAGYAR TROOPS.

HUNGARIAN SOLDIERS!

What are you fighting for?

For the Emperor of Austria and the King of Hungary!

Or is it for the German Emperor?

You are only fighting for the German Emperor. The Austrian Emperor has given over to him the army and the State revenues for twenty-five years by a formal treaty the contents of which are kept from you.

But your newspapers also announce a “Waffenbund” which was entered upon on May 12th, 1918, between your old and your new masters.

But you Magyars, whose ancestors shed so much blood for freedom, you are ignorant of the truth.

For behold according to the Germans you are idle and slow.

The Frankfurter Zeitung says on May 13th, “The new treaty should finally seal the disappearance of Austria as an independent State and the seizing of the Hapsburg Monarchy by Germany.”

The Deutsche Zeitung of the 19th May remarks, “What the Mittel-Europa Confederacy chiefly needs is strength, and never more so than at the time the war broke out. Austria-Hungary was not sufficiently prepared. According to the ‘Waffenbund’ Austria-Hungary must arm its inhabitants in exactly the same way as Germany. It is no longer possible that it should happen that the delegates should vote extraordinary credits for military purposes, and that afterwards they should waste a long time before they pass the amount because either the Hungarian or the Austrian Minister of Finance says there is no money; or[250] that the delegates vote the guns but that the Hungarian Parliament refuses the necessary calling up of the recruits, so that afterwards the guns are there but there are not soldiers to man them.”

Is this clear enough? The Germans struggle for a mad whim—they wish to rule the whole world. To fight for years, to pour out Hungarian blood for German glory for years and years.

Naturally the Neue Freie Presse should with triumph proclaim that the new treaty is specially a triumph for the “upholders of Germany in Austria.”

Leaflet No. 18.
MANIFESTO, SIGNED BY PROFESSOR (NOW PRESIDENT) MASARYK, TO CZECHO-SLOVAK SOLDIERS IN THE AUSTRIAN ARMIES.

MESSAGE OF PROFESSOR MASARYK TO THE CZECHO-SLOVAK ARMY IN ITALY.

Through the agency of the Italian Legation, Professor T. G. Masaryk has sent the following message from Washington to the autonomous Czecho-Slovak army in Italy:

“Brothers! Austria-Hungary, desiring to break the opposition at home, has asserted that our army is a rabble which has no political or military significance. She has even uttered the lie that our army is composed of Russians and other nationalities, and that a Czecho-Slovak army does not exist. Our nation does not believe this dishonesty and has remained obdurate and proud of its army. Then Austria-Hungary endeavoured to deal a decisive blow to our nation by destroying you, and with you its army. She desired to gain possession of our banners of resistance and independence, the symbol of trust and aspiration cherished by our people.

“Brothers! Your will, your far-reaching glance frustrated the enemy’s plans. Our flag is still flying proudly upon the position entrusted to you for defence. Our nation recognises your heroic deeds and all hearts are stirred by profound gratitude to you. They extol you and the proud memory of your fallen brothers.

“As your Commander-in-Chief I send you my heartiest thanks for the bravery by which you have contributed to the victory of our nation, of Italy, the Allies and all mankind.

“Greetings!

“T. G. Masaryk.”

We cannot help telling you how proud we are of the recognition by our beloved leader, who will guide us and our nation to the goal of victory.

We are convinced that you also, in concert with the whole[251] nation, see the salvation of our country and the realisation of our sacred rights only in the destruction of Austria.

When they drive you forward to protect the treacherous dynasty, to which the nation has no obligations, you will certainly find an opportunity of retaliating worthily for centuries of oppression and of saving yourselves for a better future.

Greetings!

Volunteers of the Czecho-Slovak Army in Italy.

October 2nd, 1918.

Leaflet No. 19.
RAPIDLY-DISTRIBUTED LEAFLETS FOR GERMAN TROOPS TELLING OF ALLIED SUCCESSES IN THE BALKANS AND IN SYRIA.

INFORMATION LEAFLET FOR THE TROOPS.
FLIGHT OF GERMAN GENERAL.
The Turks make Liman von Sanders responsible for their Misery.
TWO ARMIES DESTROYED.
Bulgarians pursued on an Extended Front in the Balkans.
Count Hertling’s Gloom.

The victory of the British troops in Palestine over the Turkish troops commanded by General Liman von Sanders has made further progress and assumed much greater dimensions than was indicated by the first reports.

Two Turkish armies, the 7th and 8th, have ceased to exist. The whole of their baggage train, all their guns, and their entire material of war have been captured.

30,000 MEN SURRENDERED

and the few who escaped death or captivity fled in small dispersed bodies across the Jordan and are now wandering about the country.

The British are now pursuing the 4th Turkish Army, which is also in danger of destruction. In any case the Turkish resistance in Palestine is definitely broken. General Liman von Sanders, the German Commander-in-Chief, who was so completely surprised and so much surpassed in leadership by the enemy headquarters,

is in flight before the British.

The Turks claim that they have been betrayed and led into misfortune by the German officers appointed to command their forces. Palestine is now lost to them for ever. The Holy Places have been liberated from the suzerainty of the Mussulman. The Entente has undertaken to restore Palestine to the Jewish people. The victory of the French and Serbian troops over the[252] Bulgarians in the Balkan mountains has strikingly developed. The Bulgarians are now

WITHDRAWING ON A FRONT OF 160 KILOMETRES.

They have made no strong opposition to the advance of the Entente troops. The German defeats on the Western front have merely depressed them and weakened their fighting ardour. We know it is useless to continue the struggle.

Count Hertling, the Imperial Chancellor, knows this too. He told the Chief Commission of the Reichstag that deep discontent had seized wide circles of the people. What does he recommend? That the German people shall maintain its old and sure confidence in Hindenburg and Ludendorff in the hope that they may improve the situation a little? But he knows, we know, and the whole world knows that they cannot improve it.

Only the German people itself

can bring about an improvement by putting an end to autocracy and militarism, pan-Germanism, and the out-of-date absurdities which other peoples have long since done away with.

On the other side of the leaflet:

The upper map shows the encircling movement of the British which annihilated the Turkish forces under General Liman von Sanders.

Notes in the body of the map:

British cavalry.
Here 25,000 Turks surrendered.
Site of break-through on the Turkish front.

The lower map shows the ground gained in the Balkans by the French and Serbian troops which have inflicted on the Bulgarians the heaviest defeat they have suffered in the war.

ETHNOGRAPHIC MAP OF AUSTRIA-HUNGARY.
OF AUSTRIA-HUNGARY’S PRE-WAR POPULATION OF 52,000,000, ONLY ABOUT 21,000,000 WERE GERMANS OR MAGYARS. THE REMAINING 31,000,000, COMPRISING POLES, CZECHS, SLOVAKS, SOUTHERN SLAVS, RUMANES, ITALIANS, ETC., WERE ACTIVELY OR PASSIVELY ANTI-GERMAN. THE ABOVE MAP SHOWS HOW THESE OPPRESSED RACES WERE DISTRIBUTED OVER THE DUAL MONARCHY.

THE PARTITION OF AUSTRIA-HUNGARY: SHOWING THE BOUNDARIES AS DEFINED IN THE PEACE TREATIES. IT IS INTERESTING TO COMPARE THIS WITH THE ETHNOGRAPHIC MAP BETWEEN PAGES 32 AND 33.

GERMANY’S NEW BOUNDARIES AS FIXED BY THE TREATY OF PEACE. THE DARK PORTIONS SHOW THE TERRITORY LOST TO GERMANY; THE SHADED PORTIONS INDICATE TERRITORY WITHIN WHICH THE INHABITANTS WERE TO CHOOSE BY PLEBISCITE UNDER WHOSE FLAG THEY WOULD LIVE. THE FREE TERRITORY OF DANZIG IS ALSO MARKED.

BULGARIA, AS DELIMITED BY THE PEACE TREATY.

[253]

## INDEX

- A
- Alsace-Lorraine, Propaganda policy, 180-1
- Austria-Hungary—propaganda against, 20 et seqq.;
- Congress of the Oppressed Hapsburg Nationalities: resolutions, 25-7;
- propaganda policy: memorandum to Foreign Office, 28;
- policies outlined, 30-3;
- Inter-Allied Propaganda Commission organised at Italian G.H.Q., 37;
- publishes weekly journal, 38;
- effect of leaflet campaign, 40;
- work impaired by reactionary tendencies within Italian Government, 40, 205;
- weakness of declaration made at Versailles meeting of June 3, 1918, 41;
- effect of propaganda, desertions, 43-4;
- recommendations of Inter-Allied Policy Committee, 173-6
- B
- Baker, Lieut.-Col. B. Granville, 37, 48
- Balfour, Mr. A. J., reply to Lord Northcliffe’s memorandum on policy to be adopted against Austria, 33;
- against Bulgaria, 139
- Beaverbrook, Lord, 17, 148
- Bissolati, Signor, 25
- Borgese, Professor, 38, 150;
- on inter-Allied co-operation, 165
- Bulgaria, propaganda against:
- policy submitted to Foreign Office, 134-9;
- Mr. Balfour’s reply, 139;
- Ludendorff on effect of, 142
- C
- Cinematograph films, use for propaganda purposes, 197
- Cockerill, Brig.-Gen. G. K., 52, 149
- Comert, M., 150
- Congress of the Oppressed Hapsburg Nationalities at Rome: resolutions, 25-6
- Cunliffe-Owen, Sir H., in charge of propaganda against Turkey, 13, 150
- D
- Denbigh, Col. the Earl of, 10
- Department of Propaganda in Enemy Countries (Crewe House):
- Lord Northcliffe appointed Director, 8;
- personnel of advisory committee, 10;
- two main branches, 11;
- co-operation of other Government Departments, 15, 19;
- expenditure during “intensive” campaign (Sept.-Dec. 1918), 18;
- production work centralised at Crewe House, 91-2;
- good effect of, 93;
- inter-Allied Conference: list of delegates, 149;
- [Pg 254]propaganda to cease during period of Armistice, 234
- Austro-Hungarian Section, 11, 12
- German Section, 12, 13
- Peace terms propaganda, 202 et seqq.;
- Lord Northcliffe’s article published in The Times and circulated throughout the World, 218-230.
- Work against Turkey, 13
- Deutsche Tageszeitung, tribute to propaganda staff, 121
- Diaz, General, on effect of propaganda work on Italian front, 45
- Donald, Mr. Robert, 10
- F
- Franklin-Bouillon, M., 148
- Fyfe, Mr. H., succeeds Mr. H. G. Wells as head of German Section, 13, 90
- G
- Gallenga-Stuart, Signor, 148.
- Germany:—
- Allied propaganda against, early neglect of, 50-2;
- use of leaflets, 52;
- effect, 53;
- suspension of distribution by aeroplane: reasons, 54: use of balloons, 55-7;
- Mr. H. G. Wells’s memorandum on policy, 61 et seqq.;
- Lord Northcliffe’s letter to Mr. Balfour, 81;
- summary of British Labour War Aims distributed: effect, 89;
- use of aeroplanes resumed, 97;
- leaflets circulated among submarine crews: effect, 99;
- use of “trench newspaper,” 100;
- German press comments, 105 et seqq.;
- rewards offered for leaflets, 117-8;
- admission of Allied superiority, 120;
- basis for peace negotiations, 212 et seqq.;
- Lord Northcliffe’s article, 218 et seqq.
- German propaganda, methods, 3 et seqq.;
- reasons for failure, 4;
- organisation set up, 6
- Gramophone records of Czech and Slav songs used on Italian front, 39
- Gruss, Major, 37
- Guest, Mr. S. A., propaganda campaign, 14, 39, 51, 98;
- methods, 103
- H
- Hall, Rear-Adm. Sir R., 17, 149
- Hansa, article quoted, 123.
- Headlam-Morley, Dr. J. W., 13, 60
- Hellingrath, General von, 121
- Hindenburg, Marshal von, on effect of propaganda on German troops, 93-4;
- manifesto on, 106-15
- Hudson, Mr. H. K., 10, 15
- Hutier, General von, manifesto; attack on Lord Northcliffe, 115-7
- J
- Jones, Sir Roderick, 10, 150
- K
- Keeley, Mr. James, 150;
- on need for inter-Allied co-operation, 170
- Kent, Mr. C. S., financial controller of Crewe House, 18
- Kerry, Major, the Earl of, 16, 91, 149
- Klobukowski, M., 150, 160, 171
- Kölnische Zeitung, letter describing effect of leaflets, 119;
- [Pg 255]“Ten Commandments for German Women,” 127
- Kölnische Volkszeitung, letters quoted, 125
- Kupffer, Herr von, article quoted, 122
- L
- Lamprecht, Dr. Karl, 3
- Lansing, Mr., 41, 42
- League of Nations, 67, et seqq.
- Le Courrier de l’Air, 53, 59
- Lichnowsky, Prince, his pamphlet used by Allies for propaganda, 104, 132, 142
- Lloyd George, Mr. D., on success of propaganda against Austria, 50;
- appreciation of Lord Northcliffe’s work, 235
- Low, Sir Sidney, 10
- Ludendorff, Gen., on failure of German propaganda, 5;
- efforts to create organisation, 6;
- order showing influence of propaganda on German population, 118;
- value of good propaganda, 128;
- comparison between British and German departments, 129-31;
- on effect of propaganda on Bulgarian defeat, 142
- M
- Macdonogh, Lieut.-Gen. Sir George, 52, 106
- Malinof, M., 141
- Ministry of Information, 17
- Mitchell, Capt. P. Chalmers, 16, 91, 92, 149, 209
- N
- Nicholson, Sir Charles, 10, 143, 149
- Northcliffe, Lord, Mission to United States; Chairman of London H.Q. of British War Mission; declines seat in Cabinet; appointed Director of Propaganda in Enemy Countries, 8;
- anxiety to commence work against Austria, 35;
- letter of appreciation from Mr. Lloyd George, 50;
- on need for greater co-ordination, 151;
- outline of policy, 156
- Bulgaria, outlines policy against, 135-139
- Enemy attacks on, 43, 105, 115-7, 125
- Germany, outlines policy against, 81
- Ludendorff, tribute, 130
- Peace terms, article published in The Times and circulated throughout the world, 218-230
- Rechberg, Herr A., tribute, 127
- Resignation, letter to Mr. Lloyd George, 234;
- Mr. Lloyd George’s reply, 235
- The Times, leading article on propaganda work quoted, 129
- O
- O’Grady, Mr. James, 10
- Ojetti, Capt., 37
- Onslow, Col. Lord, 199
- Orlando, Signor, meeting with Dr. Trumbitch, 24
- P
- Pashitch, M., 23
- Phillips, Mr. C. J., 15, 150
- Poland, propaganda policy in regard to, 178-180
- Prisoners of War, information for, 143
- Propaganda, objects, 2;
- axioms: truthful statements only to be made, 2;
- necessity of co-ordination, 146;
- [Pg 256]inter-Allied conference at Crewe House, list of delegates, 149;
- distribution devices, 54-59; 184-190
- R
- Rechberg, Herr A., tribute to Lord Northcliffe’s work, 127
- Rheinische-Westfälische-Zeitung, article quoted, 121
- Rome Congress, 25 et seqq.
- S
- Scheurmann, Herr W., letter quoted, 126
- Seton-Watson, Dr. R. W., 11, 12, 20, 24, 37, 49
- Siciliani, Col., 37
- Sonnino, Baron, 41, 42
- Standing, Sir Guy, 17, 149
- Steed, Mr. H. Wickham, 10, 20, 24, 39, 49, 149;
- Co-Director of Austro-Hungarian Section, 11;
- mission to Italy, 37
- Stein, Gen. von, admission of superiority of Allies’ propaganda, 120
- Stossinger, Herr F., 120
- Stuart, Lieut.-Col. Sir Campbell, 10, 149, 204, 236
- Swinton, Maj.-Gen., 51
- T
- The Times, leading article on Lord Northcliffe’s work quoted, 129
- Torre, Dr., 24
- Trumbitch, Dr., 23, 24
- W
- Wells, Mr. H. G., 10, 12, 60, 89, 90;
- memorandum on propaganda policy against Germany, 61 et seqq.
- Wireless Telegraphy, used as means of disseminating information, 17, 103

PRINTED IN GREAT BRITAIN BY THE CORNWALL PRESS, LTD.,
PARIS GARDEN, STAMFORD STREET, LONDON, S.E.1.

Transcriber’s notes:

Underlining in the translation of leaflet 17, where it is used for emphasis, has been marked as bold, but ignored elsewhere.

Evident typographical and punctuation errors have been corrected silently. Inconsistent spelling/hyphenation has been normalised.

The usage of both Roumania & Rumania is the author’s.

A half-title page has been discarded.

A single footnote has been relocated at the end of the quoted passage to which it refers.

To improve text flow, illustrations have been relocated as follows:

Photographs have been grouped between chapters.

Each “leaflet” has been moved to the appendix, to accompanying its translation.
Redundant cross-references and reiterations of the leaflet number have been discarded.
The explanatory text “Facsimile leaflets and translations” has been appended to the appendix and table of contents.

Maps follow immediately after the appendix.

Page numbers in the List of Illustrations are no longer relevant, but will link to the indicated image.

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