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Title: From Isolation to Leadership, Revised
       A Review of American Foreign Policy

Author: John Holladay Latane

Release Date: June 11, 2006 [EBook #18553]

Language: English

Character set encoding: ISO-8859-1

*** START OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK ISOLATION TO LEADERSHIP ***




Produced by Al Haines










FROM ISOLATION TO LEADERSHIP

REVISED


A Review of American Foreign Policy


BY

JOHN HOLLADAY LATANE, PH.D., LL.D.

 PROFESSOR OF AMERICAN HISTORY AND DEAN OF THE
 COLLEGE FACULTY IN THE JOHNS HOPKINS UNIVERSITY



 Author of
 "The United States and Latin America"
 "America as a World Power"
 Etc.



GARDEN CITY ------ NEW YORK

DOUBLEDAY, PAGE & COMPANY

1922




COPYRIGHT, 1918, 1922, BY

DOUBLEDAY, PAGE & COMPANY


ALL RIGHTS RESERVED, INCLUDING THAT OF

TRANSLATION INTO FOREIGN LANGUAGES,

INCLUDING THE SCANDINAVIAN




PREFACE

The first edition of this book appeared in October, 1918, a few weeks
before the signing of the Armistice, when the United States was at the
high tide of its power and influence.  In view of the subsequent course
of events, some of my readers may question the propriety of the
original title.  In fact, one of my friends has suggested that a more
appropriate title for the new edition would be "From Isolation to
Leadership, and Back."  But I do not regard the verdict of 1920 as an
expression of the final judgment of the American people.  The world
still waits on America, and sooner or later we must recognize and
assume the responsibilities of our position as a great world power.

The first nine chapters are reprinted with only a few verbal changes.
Chapter X has been rewritten, and chapters XI and XII have been added.

JOHN H. LATANÉ.

Baltimore, June 10, 1922.




CONTENTS


CHAPTER

    I. ORIGIN OF THE POLICY OF ISOLATION
   II. FORMULATION OF THE MONROE DOCTRINE
  III. THE MONROE DOCTRINE AND THE EUROPEAN BALANCE OF POWER
   IV. INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION WITHOUT THE SANCTION OF FORCE
    V. THE OPEN-DOOR POLICY
   VI. ANGLO-AMERICAN RELATIONS
  VII. IMPERIALISTIC TENDENCIES OF THE MONROE DOCTRINE
 VIII. THE NEW PAN-AMERICANISM
   IX. THE FAILURE OF NEUTRALITY AND ISOLATION
    X. THE WAR AIMS OF THE UNITED STATES
   XI. THE TREATY OF VERSAILLES
  XII. THE WASHINGTON CONFERENCE
       INDEX




From Isolation to Leadership

I

ORIGIN OF THE POLICY OF ISOLATION

The Monroe Doctrine and the policy of political isolation are two
phases of American diplomacy so closely related that very few writers
appear to draw any distinction between them.  The Monroe Doctrine was
in its origin nothing more than the assertion, with special application
to the American continents, of the right of independent states to
pursue their own careers without fear or threat of intervention,
domination, or subjugation by other states.  President Monroe announced
to the world that this principle would be upheld by the United States
in this hemisphere.  The policy of isolation was the outgrowth of
Washington's warning against _permanent_ alliances and Jefferson's
warning against _entangling_ alliances.  Both Washington and Jefferson
had in mind apparently the form of European alliance common in their
day, which bound one nation to support another both diplomatically and
by force in any dispute that might arise no matter whether it concerned
the interests of the first state or not.  Such alliances were usually
of the nature of family compacts between different dynasties, or
between different branches of the same dynasty, rather than treaties
between nations.  In fact, dynastic aims and ambitions were frequently,
if not usually, at variance with the real interests of the peoples
affected.  It will be shown later that neither Washington nor Jefferson
intended that the United States should refrain permanently from the
exercise of its due influence in matters which properly concern the
peace and welfare of the community of nations.  Washington did not
object to temporary alliances for special emergencies nor did Jefferson
object to special alliances for the accomplishment of definite objects.
Their advice has, however, been generally interpreted as meaning that
the United States must hold aloof from world politics and attend
strictly to its own business.

The Monroe Doctrine was a perfectly sound principle and it has been
fully justified by nearly a century of experience.  It has saved South
America from the kind of exploitation to which the continents of Africa
and Asia have, during the past generation, fallen a prey.  The policy
of isolation, on the other hand, still cherished by so many Americans
as a sacred tradition of the fathers, is in principle quite distinct
from the Monroe Doctrine and is in fact utterly inconsistent with the
position and importance of the United States as a world power.  The
difference in principle between the two policies can perhaps best be
illustrated by the following supposition.  If the United States were to
sign a permanent treaty with England placing our navy at her disposal
in the event of attack from Germany or some other power, on condition
that England would unite with us in opposing the intervention of any
European power in Latin America, such a treaty would not be a violation
of the Monroe Doctrine, but a distinct recognition of that principle.
Such a treaty would, however, be a departure from our traditional
policy of isolation.  Of the two policies, that of avoiding political
alliances is the older.  It was announced by Washington under
circumstances that will be considered in a moment.

In the struggle for independence the colonies deliberately sought
foreign alliances.  In fact, the first treaty ever signed by the United
States was the treaty of alliance with France, negotiated and ratified
in 1778.  The aid which France extended under this treaty to our
revolutionary ancestors in men, money, and ships enabled them to
establish the independence of our country.  A few years later came the
French Revolution, the establishment of the French Republic followed by
the execution of Louis XVI, and in 1793 the war between England and
France.  With the arrival in this country of Genet, the minister of the
newly established French Republic, there began a heated debate in the
newspapers throughout the country as to our obligations under the
treaty of alliance and the commercial treaty of 1778.  President
Washington requested the opinions in writing of the members of his
cabinet as to whether Genet should be received and the new government
which had been set up in France recognized, as to whether the treaties
were still binding, and as to whether a proclamation of neutrality
should be issued.  Hamilton and Jefferson replied at great length,
taking as usual opposite sides, particularly on the question as to the
binding force of the treaties.  Hamilton took the view that as the
government of Louis XVI, with which the treaties had been negotiated,
had been overthrown, we were under no obligations to fulfill their
stipulations and had a perfect right to renounce them.  Jefferson took
the correct view that the treaties were with the French nation and that
they were binding under whatever government the French people chose to
set up.  This principle, which is now one of the fundamental doctrines
of international law, was so ably expounded by Jefferson that his words
are well worth quoting.

"I consider the people who constitute a society or nation as the source
of all authority in that nation, as free to transact their common
concerns by any agents they think proper, to change these agents
individually, or the organization of them in form or function whenever
they please: that all the acts done by those agents under the authority
of the nation, are the acts of the nation, are obligatory on them, and
enure to their use, and can in no wise be annulled or affected by any
change in the form of the government, or of the persons administering
it.  Consequently the Treaties between the United States and France
were not treaties between the United States and Louis Capet, but
between the two nations of America and France, and the nations
remaining in existence, tho' both of them have since changed their
forms of government, the treaties are not annulled by these changes."

The argument was so heated that Washington was reluctant to press
matters to a definite conclusion.  From his subsequent action it
appears that he agreed with Jefferson that the treaties were binding,
but he held that the treaty of alliance was purely defensive and that
we were under no obligation to aid France in an offensive war such as
she was then waging.  He accordingly issued his now famous proclamation
of neutrality, April, 1793.  Of this proclamation W. E. Hall, a leading
English authority on international law, writing one hundred years
later, said: "The policy of the United States in 1793 constitutes an
epoch in the development of the usages of neutrality.  There can be no
doubt that it was intended and believed to give effect to the
obligations then incumbent upon neutrals.  But it represented by far
the most advanced existing opinions as to what those obligations were;
and in some points it even went farther than authoritative
international custom has up to the present time advanced.  In the main,
however, it is identical with the standard of conduct which is now
adopted by the community of nations."  Washington's proclamation laid
the real foundations of the American policy of isolation.

The very novelty of the rigid neutrality proclaimed by Washington made
the policy a difficult one to pursue.  In the Revolutionary and
Napoleonic wars, which lasted for nearly a quarter of a century, the
United States was the principal neutral.  The problems to which this
situation gave rise were so similar to the problems raised during the
early years of the World War that many of the diplomatic notes prepared
by Jefferson and Madison might, with a few changes of names and dates,
be passed off as the correspondence of Wilson and Lansing.
Washington's administration closed with the clouds of the European war
still hanging heavy on the horizon.  Under these circumstances he
delivered his famous Farewell Address in which he said:

"The great rule of conduct for us in regard to foreign nations is, in
extending our commercial relations to have with them as little
_political_ connection as possible.  So far as we have already formed
engagements let them be fulfilled with perfect good faith.  Here let us
stop.

"Europe has a set of primary interests which to us have none or a very
remote relation.  Hence she must be engaged in frequent controversies,
the causes of which are essentially foreign to our concerns.  Hence,
therefore, it must be unwise in us to implicate ourselves by artificial
ties in the ordinary vicissitudes of her politics or the ordinary
combinations and collisions of her friendships or enmities.

"Our detached and distant situation invites and enables us to pursue a
different course.  If we remain one people, under an efficient
government, the period is not far off when we may defy material injury
from external annoyance; when we may take such an attitude as will
cause the neutrality we may at any time resolve upon to be scrupulously
respected; when belligerent nations, under the impossibility of making
acquisitions upon us, will not lightly hazard the giving us
provocation; when we may choose peace or war, as our interest, guided
by justice, shall counsel.

"Why forego the advantages of so peculiar a situation?  Why quit our
own to stand upon foreign ground?  Why, by interweaving our destiny
with that of any part of Europe, entangle our peace and prosperity in
the toils of European ambitions, rivalship, interest, humor, or caprice?

"It is our true policy to steer clear of permanent alliances with any
portion of the foreign world, so far, I mean, as we are now at liberty
to do it; for let me not be understood as capable of patronizing
infidelity to existing engagements.  I hold the maxim no less
applicable to public than to private affairs that honesty is always the
best policy.  I repeat, therefore, let those engagements be observed in
their genuine sense.  But in my opinion it is unnecessary and would be
unwise to extend them.

"Taking care always to keep ourselves by suitable establishments on a
respectable defensive posture, we may safely trust to temporary
alliances for extraordinary emergencies."

It will be observed that Washington warned his countrymen against
_permanent_ alliances.  He expressly said that we might "safely trust
to _temporary_ alliances for extraordinary emergencies."  Further than
this many of those who are continually quoting Washington's warning
against alliances not only fail to note the limitations under which the
advice was given, but they also overlook the reasons assigned.  In a
succeeding paragraph of the Farewell Address he said:

"With me a predominant motive has been to endeavor to gain time to our
country to settle and mature its yet recent institutions, and to
progress without interruption to that degree of strength and
consistency which is necessary to give it, humanly speaking, the
command of its own fortunes."

The expression "entangling alliances" does not occur in the Farewell
Address, but was given currency by Jefferson.  In his first inaugural
address he summed up the principles by which he proposed to regulate
his foreign policy in the following terms: "Peace, commerce, and honest
friendship with all nations, entangling alliances with none."

During the brief interval of peace following the treaty of Amiens in
1801, Napoleon undertook the reëstablishment of French power in Santo
Domingo as the first step in the development of a colonial empire which
he determined upon when he forced Spain to retrocede Louisiana to
France by the secret treaty of San Ildefonso in 1800.  Fortunately for
us the ill-fated expedition to Santo Domingo encountered the opposition
of half a million negroes and ultimately fell a prey to the ravages of
yellow fever.  As soon as Jefferson heard of the cession of Louisiana
to France, he instructed Livingston, his representative at Paris, to
open negotiations for the purchase of New Orleans and West Florida,
stating that the acquisition of New Orleans by a powerful nation like
France would inevitably lead to friction and conflict.  "The day that
France takes possession of New Orleans fixes the sentence which is to
restrain her forever within her low water mark.  It seals the union of
two nations who in conjunction can maintain exclusive possession of the
ocean.  From that moment we must marry ourselves to the British fleet
and nation.  We must turn all our attentions to a maritime force, for
which our resources place us on very high grounds: and having formed
and cemented together a power which may render reinforcement of her
settlements here impossible to France, make the first cannon, which
shall be fired in Europe the signal for tearing up any settlement she
may have made, and for holding the two continents of America in
sequestration for the common purposes of the united British and
American nations.  This is not a state of things we seek or desire.  It
is one which this measure, if adopted by France, forces on us, as
necessarily as any other cause, by the laws of nature, brings on its
necessary effect."

Monroe was later sent to Paris to support Livingston and he was
instructed, in case there was no prospect of a favorable termination of
the negotiations, to avoid a rupture until the spring and "in the
meantime enter into conferences with the British Government, through
their ambassador at Paris, to fix principles of alliance, and leave us
in peace until Congress meets."  Jefferson had already informed the
British minister at Washington that if France should, by closing the
mouth of the Mississippi, force the United States to war, "they would
throw away the scabbard."  Monroe and Livingston were now instructed,
in case they should become convinced that France meditated hostilities
against the United States, to negotiate an alliance with England and to
stipulate that neither party should make peace or truce without the
consent of the other.  Thus notwithstanding his French proclivities and
his warning against "entangling alliances," the author of the immortal
Declaration of Independence was ready and willing in this emergency to
form an alliance with England.  The unexpected cession of the entire
province of Louisiana to the United States made the contemplated
alliance with England unnecessary.

The United States was no more successful in its effort to remain
neutral during the Napoleonic wars than it was during the late war,
though the slow means of communication a hundred years ago caused the
struggle for neutral rights to be drawn out for a much longer period of
time.  Neither England nor France regarded us as having any rights
which they were bound to respect, and American commerce was fairly
bombarded by French decrees and British orders in council.  There was
really not much more reason why we should have fought England than
France, but as England's naval supremacy enabled her to interfere more
effectually with our commerce on the sea and as this interference was
accompanied by the practice of impressing American sailors into the
British service, we finally declared war against her.  No effort was
made, however, to form an alliance or even to coöperate with Napoleon.
The United States fought the War of 1812 without allies, and while we
gained a number of single-ship actions and notable victories on Lake
Erie and Lake Champlain, we failed utterly in two campaigns to occupy
Canada, and the final result of the conflict was that our national
capitol was burned and our commerce absolutely swept from the seas.
Jackson's victory at New Orleans, while gratifying to our pride, took
place two weeks after the treaty of Ghent had been signed and had,
consequently, no effect on the outcome of the war.




II

FORMULATION OF THE MONROE DOCTRINE

The international situation which gave rise to the Monroe Doctrine was
the most unusual in some respects that modern history records.  The
European alliance which had been organized in 1813 for the purpose of
bringing about the overthrow of Napoleon continued to dominate the
affairs of Europe until 1823.  This alliance, which met at the Congress
of Vienna in 1815 and held later meetings at Aix-la-Chapelle in 1818,
at Troppau in 1820, at Laybach in 1821, and at Verona in 1822,
undertook to legislate for all Europe and was the nearest approach to a
world government that had ever been tried.  While this alliance
publicly proclaimed that it had no other object than the maintenance of
peace and that the repose of the world was its motive and its end, its
real object was to uphold absolute monarchy and to suppress every
attempt at the establishment of representative government.  As long as
England remained in the alliance her statesmen exercised a restraining
influence, for England was the only one of the allies which professed
to have a representative system of government.  As Castlereagh was
setting out for the meeting at Aix-la-Chapelle Lord Liverpool, who was
then prime minister, warned him that, "The Russian must be made to feel
that we have a parliament and a public, to which we are responsible,
and that we cannot permit ourselves to be drawn into views of policy
which are wholly incompatible with the spirit of our government."

The reactionary spirit of the continental members of the alliance was
soon thoroughly aroused by the series of revolutions that followed one
another in 1820.  In March the Spanish army turned against the
government of Ferdinand VII and demanded the restoration of the
constitution of 1812.  The action of the army was everywhere approved
and sustained by the people and the king was forced to proclaim the
constitution and to promise to uphold it.  The Spanish revolution was
followed in July by a constitutional movement in Naples, and in August
by a similar movement in Portugal; while the next year witnessed the
outbreak of the Greek struggle for independence.  Thus in all three of
the peninsulas of Southern Europe the people were struggling for the
right of self-government.  The great powers at once took alarm at the
rapid spread of revolutionary ideas and proceeded to adopt measures for
the suppression of the movements to which these ideas gave rise.  At
Troppau and Laybach measures were taken for the suppression of the
revolutionary movements in Italy.  An Austrian army entered Naples in
March, 1821, overthrew the constitutional government that had been
inaugurated, and restored Ferdinand II to absolute power.  The
revolution which had broken out in Piedmont was also suppressed by a
detachment of the Austrian army.  England held aloof from all
participation in the conferences at Troppau and Laybach, though her
ambassador to Austria was present to watch the proceedings.

The next meeting of the allied powers was arranged for October, 1822,
at Verona.  Here the affairs of Greece, Italy, and in particular Spain
came up for consideration.  At this congress all five powers of the
alliance were represented.  France was especially concerned about the
condition of affairs in Spain, and England sent Wellington out of
self-defense.  The Congress of Verona was devoted largely to a
discussion of Spanish affairs.  Wellington had been instructed to use
all his influence against the adoption of measures of intervention in
Spain.  When he found that the other powers were bent upon this step
and that his protest would be unheeded, he withdrew from the congress.
The four remaining powers signed the secret treaty of Verona, November
22, 1822, as a revision, so they declared in the preamble, of the
Treaty of the Holy Alliance, which had been signed at Paris in 1815 by
Austria, Russia, and Prussia.  This last mentioned treaty sprang from
the erratic brain of the Czar Alexander under the influence of Baroness
Krüdener, and is one of the most remarkable political documents extant.
No one had taken it seriously except the Czar himself and it had been
without influence upon the politics of Europe.  The text of the treaty
of Verona was never officially published, but the following articles
soon appeared in the press of Europe and America:

"Article I.--The high contracting powers being convinced that the
system of representative government is equally as incompatible with the
monarchical principles as the maxim of the sovereignty of the people
with the divine right, engage mutually, in the most solemn manner, to
use all their efforts to put an end to the system of representative
governments, in whatever country it may exist in Europe, and to prevent
its being introduced in those countries where it is not yet known.

"Article II.--As it cannot be doubted that the liberty of the press is
the most powerful means used by the pretended supporters of the rights
of nations, to the detriment of those of Princes, the high contracting
parties promise reciprocally to adopt all proper measures to suppress
it, not only in their own states, but, also, in the rest of Europe.

"Article III.--Convinced that the principles of religion contribute
most powerfully to keep nations in the state of passive obedience which
they owe to their Princes, the high contracting parties declare it to
be their intention to sustain, in their respective states, those
measures which the clergy may adopt, with the aim of ameliorating their
own interests, so intimately connected with the preservation of the
authority of Princes; and the contracting powers join in offering their
thanks to the Pope, for what he has already done for them, and solicit
his constant coöperation in their views of submitting the nations.

"Article IV.--The situation of Spain and Portugal unite unhappily all
the circumstances to which this treaty has particular reference.  The
high contracting parties, in confiding to France the care of putting an
end to them, engage to assist her in the manner which may the least
compromise them with their own people and the people of France, by
means of a subsidy on the part of the two empires, of twenty millions
of francs every year, from the date of the signature of this treaty to
the end of the war."

Such was the code of despotism which the continental powers adopted for
Europe and which they later proposed to extend to America.  It was an
attempt to make the world safe for autocracy.  Wellington's protest at
Verona marked the final withdrawal of England from the alliance which
had overthrown Napoleon and naturally inclined her toward a
rapprochement with the United States.  The aim of the Holy Allies, as
the remaining members of the alliance now called themselves, was to
undo the work of the Revolution and of Napoleon and to restore all the
peoples of Europe to the absolute sway of their legitimate sovereigns.
After the overthrow of the constitutional movements in Piedmont,
Naples, and Spain, absolutism reigned supreme once more in western
Europe, but the Holy Allies felt that their task was not completed so
long as Spain's revolted colonies in America remained unsubjugated.
These colonies had drifted into practical independence while Napoleon's
brother Joseph was on the throne of Spain.  Nelson's great victory at
Trafalgar had left England supreme on the seas and neither Napoleon nor
Joseph had been able to establish any control over Spain's American
colonies.  When Ferdinand was restored to his throne in 1814, he
unwisely undertook to refasten on his colonies the yoke of the old
colonial system and to break up the commerce which had grown up with
England and with the United States.  The different colonies soon
proclaimed their independence and the wars of liberation ensued.  By
1822 it was evident that Spain unassisted could never resubjugate them,
and the United States after mature deliberation recognized the new
republics and established diplomatic intercourse with them.  England,
although enjoying the full benefits of trade with the late colonies of
Spain, still hesitated out of regard for the mother country to take the
final step of recognition.

In the late summer of 1823 circular letters were issued inviting the
powers to a conference at Paris to consider the Spanish-American
question.  George Canning, the British foreign secretary, at once
called into conference Richard Rush, the American minister, and
proposed joint action against the schemes of the Holy Alliance.  Rush
replied that he was not authorized to enter into such an agreement, but
that he would communicate the proposal at once to his government.  As
soon as Rush's dispatch was received President Monroe realized fully
the magnitude of the issue presented by the proposal of an
Anglo-American alliance.  Before submitting the matter to his cabinet
he transmitted copies of Rush's dispatch to ex-Presidents Jefferson and
Madison and the following interesting correspondence took place.  In
his letter to Jefferson of October 17th, the President said:

"I transmit to you two despatches, which were receiv'd from Mr. Rush,
while I was lately in Washington, which involve interests of the
highest importance.  They contain two letters from Mr. Canning,
suggesting designs of the holy alliance, against the Independence of
So. America, & proposing a co-operation, between G. Britain & the U
States, in support of it, against the members of that alliance.  The
project aims, in the first instance, at a mere expression of opinion,
somewhat in the abstract, but which, it is expected by Mr. Canning,
will have a great political effect, by defeating the combination.  By
Mr. Rush's answers, which are also enclosed, you will see the light in
which he views the subject, & the extent to which he may have gone.
Many important considerations are involved in this proposition.  1st
Shall we entangle ourselves, at all, in European politicks, & wars, on
the side of any power, against others, presuming that a concert, by
agreement, of the kind proposed, may lead to that result?  2d If a case
can exist in which a sound maxim may, & ought to be departed from, is
not the present instance, precisely that case?  3d Has not the epoch
arriv'd when G. Britain must take her stand, either on the side of the
monarchs of Europe, or of the U States, & in consequence, either in
favor of Despotism or of liberty & may it not be presum'd that, aware
of that necessity, her government has seiz'd on the present occurrence,
as that, which it deems, the most suitable, to announce & mark the
commenc'ment of that career?

"My own impression is that we ought to meet the proposal of the British
govt. & to make it known, that we would view an interference on the
part of the European powers, and especially an attack on the Colonies,
by them, as an attack on ourselves, presuming that, if they succeeded
with them, they would extend it to us.  I am sensible however of the
extent & difficulty of the question, & shall be happy to have yours, &
Mr. Madison's opinions on it."

Jefferson's reply dated Monticello, October 24th, displays not only a
profound insight into the international situation, but a wide vision of
the possibilities involved.  He said:

"The question presented by the letters you have sent me, is the most
momentous which has ever been offered to my contemplation since that of
Independence.  That made us a nation, this sets our compass and points
the course which we are to steer through the ocean of time opening on
us.  And never could we embark on it under circumstances more
auspicious.  Our first and fundamental maxim should be, never to
entangle ourselves in the broils of Europe.  Our second, never to
suffer Europe to intermeddle with cis-Atlantic affairs.  America, North
and South, has a set of interests distinct from those of Europe, and
peculiarly her own.  She should therefore have a system of her own,
separate and apart from that of Europe.  While the last is laboring to
become the domicil of despotism, our endeavor should surely be, to make
our hemisphere that of freedom.  One nation, most of all, could disturb
us in this pursuit; she now offers to lead, aid, and accompany us in
it.  By acceding to her proposition, we detach her from the bands,
bring her mighty weight into the scale of free government, and
emancipate a continent at one stroke, which might otherwise linger long
in doubt and difficulty.  Great Britain is the nation which can do us
the most harm of any one, or all on earth; and with her on our side we
need not fear the whole world.  With her then, we should most
sedulously cherish a cordial friendship; and nothing would tend more to
knit our affections than to be fighting once more, side by side, in the
same cause.  Not that I would purchase even her amity at the price of
taking part in her wars.  But the war in which the present proposition
might engage us, should that be its consequence, is not her war, but
ours.  Its object is to introduce and establish the American system, of
keeping out of our land all foreign powers, of never permitting those
of Europe to intermeddle with the affairs of our nations.  It is to
maintain our own principle, not to depart from it.  And if, to
facilitate this, we can effect a division in the body of the European
powers, and draw over to our side its most powerful member, surely we
should do it.  But I am clearly of Mr. Canning's opinion, that it will
prevent instead of provoking war.  With Great Britain withdrawn from
their scale and shifted into that of our two continents, all Europe
combined would not undertake such a war.  For how would they propose to
get at either enemy without superior fleets?  Nor is the occasion to be
slighted which this proposition offers, of declaring our protest
against the atrocious violations of the rights of nations, by the
interference of any one in the internal affairs of another, so
flagitiously begun by Bonaparte, and now continued by the equally
lawless Alliance, calling itself Holy."

Madison not only agreed with Jefferson as to the wisdom of accepting
the British proposal of some form of joint action, but he went even
further and suggested that the declaration should not be limited to the
American republics, but that it should express disapproval of the late
invasion of Spain and of any interference with the Greeks who were then
struggling for independence from Turkey.  Monroe, it appears, was
strongly inclined to act on Madison's suggestion, but his cabinet took
a different view of the situation.  From the diary of John Quincy
Adams, Monroe's secretary of state, it appears that almost the whole of
November was taken up by cabinet discussions on Canning's proposals and
on Russia's aggressions in the northwest.  Adams stoutly opposed any
alliance or joint declaration with Great Britain.  The composition of
the President's message remained in doubt until the 27th, when the more
conservative views of Adams were, according to his own statement of the
case, adopted.  He advocated an independent course of action on the
part of the United States, without direct reference to Canning's
proposals, though substantially in accord with them.  Adams defined his
position as follows: "The ground that I wish to take is that of earnest
remonstrance against the interference of the European powers by force
with South America, but to disclaim all interference on our part with
Europe; to make an American cause and adhere inflexibly to that."
Adams's dissent from Monroe's position was, it is claimed, due partly
to the influence of Clay who advocated a Pan-American system, partly to
the fact that the proposed coöperation with Great Britain would bind
the United States not to acquire some of the coveted parts of the
Spanish possessions, and partly to the fear that the United States as
the ally of Great Britain would be compelled to play a secondary part.
He probably carried his point by showing that the same ends could be
accomplished by an independent declaration, since it was evident that
the sea power of Great Britain would be used to prevent the reconquest
of South America by the European powers.  Monroe, as we have seen,
thought that the exigencies of the situation justified a departure from
the sound maxim of political isolation, and in this opinion he was
supported by his two predecessors in the presidency.

The opinions of Monroe, Jefferson, and Madison in favor of an alliance
with Great Britain and a broad declaration against the intervention of
the great powers in the affairs of weaker states in any part of the
world, have been severely criticised by some historians and ridiculed
by others, but time and circumstances often bring about a complete
change in our point of view.  After the beginning of the great world
conflict, especially after our entrance into it, several writers raised
the question as to whether, after all, the three elder statesmen were
not right and Adams and Clay wrong.  If the United States and England
had come out in favor of a general declaration against intervention in
the concerns of small states and established it as a world-wide
principle, the course of human history during the next century might
have been very different, but Adams's diary does not tell the whole
story.  On his own statement of the case he might be justly censured by
posterity for persuading the president to take a narrow American view
of a question which was world-wide in its bearing.  An important
element in the situation, however, was Canning's change of attitude
between the time of his conference with Rush in August and the
formulation of the president's message.  Two days after the delivery of
his now famous message Monroe wrote to Jefferson in explanation of the
form the declaration had taken: "Mr. Canning's zeal has much abated of
late."  It appears from Rush's correspondence that the only thing which
stood in the way of joint action by the two powers was Canning's
unwillingness to extend immediate recognition to the South American
republics.  On August 27th, Rush stated to Canning that it would
greatly facilitate joint action if England would acknowledge at once
the full independence of the South American colonies.  In communicating
the account of this interview to his government Mr. Rush concluded:
"Should I be asked by Mr. Canning, whether, in case the recognition be
made by Great Britain without more delay, I am on my part prepared to
make a declaration, in the name of my government, that it will not
remain inactive under an attack upon the independence of those states
by the Holy Alliance, the present determination of my judgment is that
I will make such a declaration explicitly, and avow it before the
world."  About three weeks later Canning, who was growing restless at
the delay in hearing from Washington, again urged Rush to act without
waiting for specific instructions from his government.  He tried to
show that the proposed joint declaration would not conflict with the
American policy of avoiding entangling alliances, for the question at
issue was American as much as European, if not more.  Rush then
indicated his willingness to act provided England would "immediately
and unequivocally acknowledge the independence of the new states."
Canning did not care to extend full recognition to the South American
states until he could do so without giving unnecessary offense to Spain
and the allies, and he asked if Mr. Rush could not give his assent to
the proposal on a promise of future recognition.  Mr. Rush refused to
accede to anything but immediate acknowledgment of independence and so
the matter ended.

As Canning could not come to a formal understanding with the United
States, he determined to make a frank avowal of the views of the
British cabinet to France and to this end he had an interview with
Prince Polignac, the French ambassador at London, October 9, 1823, in
which he declared that Great Britain had no desire to hasten
recognition, but that any foreign interference, by force, or by menace,
would be a motive for immediate recognition; that England "could not go
into a joint deliberation upon the subject of Spanish America upon an
equal footing with other powers, whose opinions were less formed upon
that question."  This declaration drew from Polignac the admission that
he considered the reduction of the colonies by Spain as hopeless and
that France "abjured in any case, any design of acting against the
colonies by force of arms."  This admission was a distinct victory for
Canning, in that it prepared the way for ultimate recognition by
England, and an account of the interview was communicated without delay
to the allied courts.  The interview was not communicated to Rush until
the latter part of November, and therefore had no influence upon the
formation of Monroe's message.

The Monroe Doctrine is comprised in two widely separated paragraphs
that occur in the message of December 2, 1823.  The first, relating to
Russia's encroachments on the northwest coast, and occurring near the
beginning of the message, was an assertion to the effect that the
American continents had assumed an independent condition and were no
longer open to European colonization.  This may be regarded as a
statement of fact.  No part of the continent at that time remained
unclaimed.  The second paragraph, relating to Spanish America and
occurring near the close of the message, was a declaration against the
extension to the American continents of the system of intervention
adopted by the Holy Alliance for the suppression of popular government
in Europe.

The language used by President Monroe is as follows:

1. "At the proposal of the Russian Imperial Government, made through
the minister of the Emperor residing here, a full power and
instructions have been transmitted to the minister of the United States
at St. Petersburg to arrange by amicable negotiation the respective
rights and interests of the two nations on the north-west coast of this
continent.  A similar proposal had been made by His Imperial Majesty to
the Government of Great Britain, which has likewise been acceded to.
The Government of the United States has been desirous by this friendly
proceeding of manifesting the great value which they have invariably
attached to the friendship of the Emperor and their solicitude to
cultivate the best understanding with his Government.  In the
discussions to which this interest has given rise and in the
arrangements by which they may terminate the occasion has been judged
proper for asserting, as a principle in which the rights and interests
of the United States are involved, that the American continents, by the
free and independent condition which they have assumed and maintain,
are henceforth not to be considered as subjects for future colonization
by any European powers."

2. "In the wars of the European powers in matters relating to
themselves we have never taken any part, nor does it comport with our
policy so to do.  It is only when our rights are invaded or seriously
menaced that we resent injuries or make preparation for our defense.
With the movements in this hemisphere we are of necessity more
immediately connected, and by causes which must be obvious to all
enlightened and impartial observers.  The political system of the
allied powers is essentially different in this respect from that of
America.  This difference proceeds from that which exists in their
respective Governments; and to the defense of our own, which has been
achieved by the loss of so much blood and treasure, and matured by the
wisdom of their most enlightened citizens, and under which we have
enjoyed unexampled felicity, this whole nation is devoted.  We owe it,
therefore, to candor and to the amicable relations existing between the
United States and those powers to declare that we should consider any
attempt on their part to extend their system to any portion of this
hemisphere as dangerous to our peace and safety.  With the existing
colonies or dependencies of any European power we have not interfered
and shall not interfere.  But with the Governments who have declared
their independence and maintained it, and whose independence we have,
on great consideration and on just principles, acknowledged, we could
not view any interposition for the purpose of oppressing them, or
controlling in any other manner their destiny, by any European power in
any other light than as the manifestation of an unfriendly disposition
toward the United States."

The message made a profound impression on the world, all the more
profound for the fact that Canning's interview with Polignac was known
only to the chancelleries of Europe.  To the public at large it
appeared that the United States was blazing the way for democracy and
liberty and that Canning was holding back through fear of giving
offense to the allies.  The governments of Europe realized only too
well that Monroe's declaration would be backed by the British navy, and
all thought of intervention in Latin America was therefore abandoned.
A few months later England formally recognized the independence of the
Spanish-American republics, and Canning made his famous boast on the
floor of the House of Commons.  In a speech delivered December 12,
1826, in defense of his position in not having arrested the French
invasion of Spain, he said: "I looked another way--I sought for
compensation in another hemisphere.  Contemplating Spain, such as our
ancestors had known her, I resolved that, if France had Spain, it
should not be Spain _with the Indies_.  I called the New World into
existence to redress the balance of the Old."




III

THE MONROE DOCTRINE AND THE EUROPEAN BALANCE OF POWER

President Monroe said in effect that the western hemisphere must be
made safe for democracy.  It was reserved for our own generation and
for President Wilson to extend the declaration and to say that the
world must be made safe for democracy.  President Monroe announced that
we would uphold international law and republican government in this
hemisphere, and as _quid pro quo_ he announced that it was the settled
policy of the United States to refrain from all interference in the
internal affairs of European states.  He based his declaration,
therefore, not mainly on right and justice, but on the doctrine of the
separation of the European and American spheres of politics.  The
Monroe Doctrine and the policy of isolation thus became linked together
in the public mind as compensating policies, neither one of which could
stand without the other.  Even Secretary Olney as late as 1895 declared
that "American non-intervention in Europe implied European
non-intervention in America."  It is not strange, therefore, that the
public at large should regard the policy of isolation as the sole
justification for the Monroe Doctrine.  There is, however, neither
logic nor justice in basing our right to uphold law and freedom in this
hemisphere on our promise not to interfere with the violation of law
and humanity in Europe.  The real difficulty is that the Monroe
Doctrine as interpreted in recent years has developed certain
imperialistic tendencies and that the imperialistic implications of the
policy resemble too closely the imperialistic aims of the European
powers.

For three quarters of a century after Monroe's declaration the policy
of isolation was more rigidly adhered to than ever, the principal
departure from it being the signature and ratification of the
Clayton-Bulwer Treaty in 1850.  By the terms of this treaty we
recognized a joint British interest in any canal that might be built
through the isthmus connecting North and South America, undertook to
establish the general neutralization of such canal, and agreed to
invite other powers, European and American, to unite in protecting the
same.  Owing to differences that soon arose between the United States
and England as to the interpretation of the treaty, the clause
providing for the adherence of other powers was never carried out.

For nearly a hundred years we have successfully upheld the Monroe
Doctrine without a resort to force.  The policy has never been
favorably regarded by the powers of continental Europe.  Bismarck
described it as "an international impertinence."  In recent years it
has stirred up rather intense opposition in certain parts of Latin
America.  Until recently no American writers appear to have considered
the real nature of the sanction on which the doctrine rested.  How is
it that without an army and until recent years without a navy of any
size we have been able to uphold a policy which has been described as
an impertinence to Latin America and a standing defiance to Europe?
Americans generally seem to think that the Monroe Doctrine has in it an
inherent sanctity which prevents other nations from violating it.  In
view of the general disregard of sanctities, inherent or acquired,
during the early stages of the late war, this explanation will not hold
good and some other must be sought.  Americans have been so little
concerned with international affairs that they have failed to see any
connection between the Monroe Doctrine and the balance of power in
Europe.  The existence of a European balance of power is the only
explanation of our having been able to uphold the Monroe Doctrine for
so long a time without a resort to force.  Some one or more of the
European powers would long ago have stepped in and called our bluff,
that is, forced us to repudiate the Monroe Doctrine or fight for it,
had it not been for the well-grounded fear that as soon as they became
engaged with us some other European power would attack them in the
rear.  A few illustrations will be sufficient to establish this thesis.

The most serious strain to which the Monroe Doctrine was ever subjected
was the attempt of Louis Napoleon during the American Civil War to
establish the empire of Maximilian in Mexico under French auspices.  He
was clever enough to induce England and Spain to go in with him in 1861
for the avowed purpose of collecting the claims of their subjects
against the government of Mexico.  Before the joint intervention had
gone very far, however, these two powers became convinced that Napoleon
had ulterior designs and withdrew their forces.  Napoleon's Mexican
venture was deliberately calculated on the success of the Southern
Confederacy.  Hence, his friendly relations with the Confederate
commissioners and the talk of an alliance between the Confederacy and
Maximilian backed by the power of France.  Against each successive step
taken by France in Mexico Mr. Seward, Lincoln's Secretary of State,
protested.  As the Civil War drew to a successful conclusion his
protests became more and more emphatic.  Finally, in the spring of
1866, the United States Government began massing troops on the Mexican
border and Mr. Seward sent what was practically an ultimatum to the
French Emperor; he requested to know when the long-promised withdrawal
of the French troops would take place.  Napoleon replied, fixing the
dates for their withdrawal in three separate detachments.

American historians have usually attributed Napoleon's backdown to
Seward's diplomacy supported by the military power of the United
States, which was, of course, greater then than at any previous time in
our history.  All this undoubtedly had its effect on Napoleon's mind,
but it appears that conditions in Europe just at that particular moment
had an even greater influence in causing him to abandon his Mexican
scheme.  Within a few days of the receipt of Seward's ultimatum
Napoleon was informed of Bismarck's determination to force a war with
Austria over the Schleswig-Holstein controversy.  Napoleon realized
that the territorial aggrandizement of Prussia, without any
corresponding gains by France, would be a serious blow to his prestige
and in fact endanger his throne.  He at once entered upon a long and
hazardous diplomatic game in which Bismarck outplayed him and
eventually forced him into war.  In order to have a free hand to meet
the European situation he decided to yield to the American demands.  As
the European situation developed he hastened the final withdrawal of
his troops and left Maximilian to his fate.  Thus the Monroe Doctrine
was vindicated!

Let us take next President Cleveland's intervention in the Venezuelan
boundary dispute.  Here surely was a clear and spectacular vindication
of the Monroe Doctrine which no one can discount.  Let us briefly
examine the facts.  Some 30,000 square miles of territory on the border
of Venezuela and British Guiana were in dispute.  Venezuela, a weak and
helpless state, had offered to submit the question to arbitration.
Great Britain, powerful and overbearing, refused.  After Secretary
Olney, in a long correspondence ably conducted, had failed to move the
British Government, President Cleveland decided to intervene.  In a
message to Congress in December, 1895, he reviewed the controversy at
length, declared that the acquisition of territory in America by a
European power through the arbitrary advance of a boundary line was a
clear violation of the Monroe Doctrine, and asked Congress for an
appropriation to pay the expenses of a commission which he proposed to
appoint for the purpose of determining the true boundary, which he said
it would then be our duty to uphold.  Lest there should be any
misunderstanding as to his intentions he solemnly added: "In making
these recommendations I am fully alive to the responsibility incurred
and keenly realize all the consequences that may follow."  Congress
promptly voted the appropriation.

Here was a bold and unqualified defiance of England.  No one before had
ever trod so roughly on the British lion's tail with impunity.  The
English-speaking public on both sides of the Atlantic was stunned and
amazed.  Outside of diplomatic circles few persons were aware that any
subject of controversy between the two countries existed, and no one
had any idea that it was of a serious nature.  Suddenly the two nations
found themselves on the point of war.  After the first outburst of
indignation the storm passed; and before the American boundary
commission completed its investigation England signed an arbitration
agreement with Venezuela.  Some persons, after looking in vain for an
explanation, have concluded that Lord Salisbury's failure to deal more
seriously with Mr. Cleveland's affront to the British Government was
due to his sense of humor.

But here again the true explanation is to be found in events that were
happening in another quarter of the globe.  Cleveland's Venezuelan
message was sent to Congress on December 17th.  At the end of the year
came Dr. Jameson's raid into the Transvaal and on the third of January
the German Kaiser sent his famous telegram of congratulation to Paul
Kruger.  The wrath of England was suddenly diverted from America to
Germany, and Lord Salisbury avoided a rupture with the United States
over a matter which after all was not of such serious moment to England
in order to be free to deal with a question involving much greater
interests in South Africa.  The Monroe Doctrine was none the less
effectively vindicated.

In 1902 Germany made a carefully planned and determined effort to test
out the Monroe Doctrine and see whether we would fight for it.  In that
year Germany, England, and Italy made a naval demonstration against
Venezuela for the purpose of forcing her to recognize as valid certain
claims of their subjects.  How England was led into the trap is still a
mystery, but the Kaiser thought that he had her thoroughly committed,
that if England once started in with him she could not turn against
him.  But he had evidently not profited by the experience of Napoleon
III in Mexico.  Through the mediation of Herbert Bowen, the American
minister, Venezuela agreed to recognize in principle the claims of the
foreign powers and to arbitrate the amount.  England and Italy accepted
this offer and withdrew their squadrons.  Germany, however, remained
for a time obdurate.  This much was known at the time.

A rather sensational account of what followed next has recently been
made public in Thayer's "Life and Letters of John Hay."  Into the
merits of the controversy that arose over Thayer's version of the
Roosevelt-Holleben interview it is not necessary to enter.  The
significant fact, that Germany withdrew from Venezuela under pressure,
is, however, amply established.  Admiral Dewey stated publicly that the
entire American fleet was assembled at the time under his command in
Porto Rican waters ready to move at a moment's notice.  Why did Germany
back down from her position?  Her navy was supposed to be at least as
powerful as ours.  The reason why the Kaiser concluded not to measure
strength with the United States was that England had accepted
arbitration and withdrawn her support and he did not dare attack the
United States with the British navy in his rear.  Again the nicely
adjusted European balance prevented the Monroe Doctrine from being put
to the test of actual war.

While England has from time to time objected to some of the corollaries
deduced from the Monroe Doctrine, she has on the whole been not
unfavorably disposed toward the essential features of that policy.  The
reason for this is that the Monroe Doctrine has been an open-door
policy, and has thus been in general accord with the British policy of
free trade.  The United States has not used the Monroe Doctrine for the
establishment of exclusive trade relations with our southern neighbors.
In fact, we have largely neglected the South American countries as a
field for the development of American commerce.  The failure to
cultivate this field has not been due wholly to neglect, however, but
to the fact that we have had employment for all our capital at home and
consequently have not been in a position to aid in the industrial
development of the Latin-American states, and to the further fact that
our exports have been so largely the same and hence the trade of both
North and South America has been mainly with Europe.  There has,
therefore, been little rivalry between the United States and the powers
of Europe in the field of South American commerce.  Our interest has
been political rather than commercial.  We have prevented the
establishment of spheres of influence and preserved the open door.
This situation has been in full accord with British policy.  Had Great
Britain adopted a high tariff policy and been compelled to demand
commercial concessions from Latin America by force, the Monroe Doctrine
would long since have gone by the board and been forgotten.  Americans
should not forget the fact, moreover, that at any time during the past
twenty years Great Britain could have settled all her outstanding
difficulties with Germany by agreeing to sacrifice the Monroe Doctrine
and give her rival a free hand in South America.  In the face of such a
combination our navy would have been of little avail.




IV

INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION WITHOUT THE SANCTION OF FORCE

President Monroe's declaration had a negative as well as a positive
side.  It was in effect an announcement to the world that we would not
use force in support of law and justice anywhere except in the Western
Hemisphere, that we intended to stay at home and mind our own business.
Washington and Jefferson had recommended a policy of isolation on
grounds of expediency.  Washington, as we have seen, regarded this
policy as a temporary expedient, while Jefferson upon two separate
occasions was ready to form an alliance with England.  Probably neither
one of them contemplated the possibility of the United States shirking
its responsibilities as a member of the family of nations.  Monroe's
message contained the implied promise that if Europe would refrain from
interfering in the political concerns of this hemisphere, we would
abstain from all intervention in Europe.  From that day until our
entrance into the World War it was generally understood, and on
numerous occasions officially proclaimed, that the United States would
not resort to force on any question arising outside of America except
where its material interests were directly involved.  We have not
refrained from diplomatic action in matters not strictly American, but
it has always been understood that such action would not be backed by
force.  In the existing state of world politics this limitation has
been a serious handicap to American diplomacy.  To take what we could
get and to give nothing in return has been a hard rule for our
diplomats, and has greatly circumscribed their activities.  Diplomatic
action without the use or threat of force has, however, accomplished
something in the world at large, so that American influence has by no
means been limited to the western hemisphere.

During the first half of the nineteenth century the subject of slavery
absorbed a large part of the attention of American statesmen.  The fact
that they were not concerned with foreign problems outside of the
American hemisphere probably caused them to devote more time and
attention to this subject than they would otherwise have done.  Slavery
and isolation had a very narrowing effect on men in public life,
especially during the period from 1830 to 1860.  As the movement
against slavery in the early thirties became world-wide, the retention
of the "peculiar institution" in this country had the effect of
increasing our isolation.  The effort of the American Colonization
Society to solve or mitigate the problem of slavery came very near
giving us a colony in Africa.  In fact, Liberia, the negro republic
founded on the west coast of Africa by the Colonization Society, was in
all essentials an American protectorate, though the United States
carefully refrained in its communications with other powers from doing
more than expressing its good will for the little republic.  As Liberia
was founded years before Africa became a field for European
exploitation, it was suffered to pursue its course without outside
interference, and the United States was never called upon to decide
whether its diplomatic protection would be backed up by force.

The slave trade was a subject of frequent discussion between the United
States and England during the first half of the nineteenth century, and
an arrangement for its suppression was finally embodied in Article VIII
of the Webster-Ashburton Treaty of 1842.  The only reason why the two
countries had never been able to act in accord on this question before
was that Great Britain persistently refused to renounce the right of
impressment which she had exercised in the years preceding the War of
1812.  The United States therefore refused to sign any agreement which
would permit British naval officers to search American vessels in time
of peace.  In 1820 the United States declared the slave trade to be a
form of piracy, and Great Britain advanced the view that as there was
no doubt of the right of a naval officer to visit and search a ship
suspected of piracy, her officers should be permitted to visit and
search ships found off the west coast of Africa under the American flag
which were suspected of being engaged in the slave trade.  The United
States stoutly refused to acquiesce in this view.  In the
Webster-Ashburton Treaty of 1842 it was finally agreed that each of the
two powers should maintain on the coast of Africa a sufficient squadron
"to enforce, separately and respectively, the laws, rights, and
obligations of each of the two countries for the suppression of the
slave trade."  It was further agreed that the officers should act in
concert and coöperation, but the agreement was so worded as to avoid
all possibility of our being drawn into an entangling alliance.

The United States has upon various occasions expressed a humanitarian
interest in the natives of Africa.  In 1884 two delegates were sent to
the Berlin conference which adopted a general act giving a recognized
status to the Kongo Free State.  The American delegates signed the
treaty in common with the delegates of the European powers, but it was
not submitted to the Senate for ratification for reasons stated as
follows by President Cleveland in his annual message of December 8,
1885:

"A conference of delegates of the principal commercial nations was held
at Berlin last winter to discuss methods whereby the Kongo basin might
be kept open to the world's trade.  Delegates attended on behalf of the
United States on the understanding that their part should be merely
deliberative, without imparting to the results any binding character so
far as the United States were concerned.  This reserve was due to the
indisposition of this Government to share in any disposal by an
international congress of jurisdictional questions in remote foreign
territories.  The results of the conference were embodied in a formal
act of the nature of an international convention, which laid down
certain obligations purporting to be binding on the signatories,
subject to ratification within one year.  Notwithstanding the
reservation under which the delegates of the United States attended,
their signatures were attached to the general act in the same manner as
those of the plenipotentiaries of other governments, thus making the
United States appear, without reserve or qualification, as signatories
to a joint international engagement imposing on the signers the
conservation of the territorial integrity of distant regions where we
have no established interests or control.

"This Government does not, however, regard its reservation of liberty
of action in the premises as at all impaired; and holding that an
engagement to share in the obligation of enforcing neutrality in the
remote valley of the Kongo would be an alliance whose responsibilities
we are not in a position to assume, I abstain from asking the sanction
of the Senate to that general act."

The United States also sent delegates to the international conference
held at Brussels in 1890 for the purpose of dealing with the slave
trade in certain unappropriated regions of Central Africa.  The
American delegates insisted that prohibitive duties should be imposed
on the importation of spirituous liquors into the Kongo.  The European
representatives, being unwilling to incorporate the American proposals,
framed a separate tariff convention for the Kongo, which the American
delegates refused to sign.  The latter did, however, affix their
signatures to the general treaty which provided for the suppression of
the African slave trade and the restriction of the sale of firearms,
ammunition, and spirituous liquors in certain parts of the African
continent.  In ratifying the treaty the Senate reaffirmed the American
policy of isolation in the following resolution:

"That the United States of America, having neither possessions nor
protectorates in Africa, hereby disclaims any intention, in ratifying
this treaty, to indicate any interest whatsoever in the possessions or
protectorates established or claimed on that Continent by the other
powers, or any approval of the wisdom, expediency or lawfulness
thereof, and does not join in any expressions in the said General Act
which might be construed as such a declaration or acknowledgement; and,
for this reason, that it is desirable that a copy of this resolution be
inserted in the protocol to be drawn up at the time of the exchange of
the ratifications of this treaty on the part of the United States."

The United States has always stood for legality in international
relations and has always endeavored to promote the arbitration of
international disputes.  Along these lines we have achieved notable
success.  It is, of course, sometimes difficult to separate questions
of international law from questions of international politics.  We have
been so scrupulous in our efforts to keep out of political
entanglements that we have sometimes failed to uphold principles of law
in the validity of which we were as much concerned as any other nation.
We have always recognized international law as a part of the law of the
land, and we have always acknowledged the moral responsibilities that
rested on us as a member of the society of nations.  In fact, the
Constitution of the United States expressly recognizes the binding
force of the law of nations and of treaties.  As international law is
the only law that governs the relations between states, we are, of
course, directly concerned in the enforcement of existing law and in
the development of new law.  When the Declaration of Paris was drawn up
by the European powers at the close of the Crimean War in 1856, the
United States was invited to give its adherence.  The four rules
embodied in the declaration, which have since formed the basis of
maritime law, are as follows: First, privateering is, and remains,
abolished.  Second, the neutral flag covers enemy's goods, with the
exception of contraband of war.  Third, neutral goods, with the
exception of contraband of war, are not liable to capture under the
enemy's flag.  Fourth, blockades, in order to be binding, must be
effective.  The United States Government was in thorough accord with
the second, third, and fourth rules but was unwilling, as matters then
stood, to commit itself to the first rule.  It had never been our
policy to maintain a large standing navy.  In the War of 1812, as in
the Revolution, we depended upon privateers to attack the commerce of
the enemy.  In reply to the invitation to give our adherence to the
declaration, Secretary Marcy made a counter proposition, namely, that
the powers of Europe should agree to exempt all private property,
except of course contraband of war, from capture on the high seas in
time of war.  He said that if they would agree to this, the United
States would agree to abolish privateering.  The powers of Europe
refused to accept this amendment.  We refrained from signing the
Declaration of Paris, therefore, not because it went too far, but
because it did not go far enough.

During the Civil War the United States Government used its diplomatic
efforts to prevent the recognition of the independence of the
Confederacy and the formation of hostile alliances.  It made no effort
to form any alliance itself and insisted that the struggle be regarded
as an American question.  The dispute with England over the _Alabama_
Claims came near precipitating war, but the matter was finally adjusted
by the Treaty of Washington.  The most significant feature of this
treaty, as far as the present discussion is concerned, was the formal
adoption of three rules which were not only to govern the decision of
the "Alabama Claims," but which were to be binding upon England and the
United States for the future.  It was further agreed that these rules
should be brought to the knowledge of other maritime powers who should
be invited to accede to them.  The rules forbade the fitting out,
arming, or equipping within neutral jurisdiction of vessels intended to
cruise or carry on war against a power with which the neutral is at
peace; they forbade the use of neutral ports or waters as a base of
naval operations; and they imposed upon neutrals the exercise of due
diligence to prevent these things from being done.  While these rules
have never been formally adopted by the remaining powers, they are
generally recognized as embodying obligations which are now incumbent
upon all neutrals.

When the United States decided to accept the invitation of the Czar of
Russia to attend the first peace conference at The Hague in 1899, grave
misgivings were expressed by many of the more conservative men in
public life.  The participation of the United States with the powers of
Europe in this conference was taken by many Americans to mark the end
of the old order and the beginning of a new era in American diplomacy.
The conference, however, was concerned with questions of general
international interest, and had no bearing upon the internal affairs of
any state, European or American.  Lest there should be any
misapprehension as to the historic policy of the United States, the
final treaty was signed by the American delegation under the express
reservation of a declaration previously read in open session.  This
declaration was as follows:

"Nothing contained in this convention shall be so construed as to
require the United States of America to depart from its traditional
policy of not intruding upon, interfering with, or entangling itself in
the political questions or policy or internal administration of any
foreign state; nor shall anything contained in the said convention be
construed to imply a relinquishment by the United States of America of
its traditional attitude toward purely American questions."  The
establishment of the Permanent Court of Arbitration at The Hague which
resulted from the first conference was a notable achievement, although
the Court has accomplished less than its advocates hoped.  This was the
most important occasion on which American delegates had sat together
with European diplomats in a general conference.  Our delegation was
the object of considerable interest and was not without influence in
shaping the provisions of the final treaty.  It was through the
personal influence of Andrew D. White that the Emperor of Germany was
persuaded to permit his delegation to take part in the proceedings
establishing the Court of Arbitration.

The second Hague Conference revised the Convention for the Pacific
Settlement of International Disputes, drew up a plan for an
International Prize Court, and attempted a codification of the rules of
international law on a number of subjects relating to the conduct of
war and the rights of neutrals.  The American delegates, headed by Mr.
Choate, not only took a prominent part in these proceedings, but,
acting under instructions from Secretary Root, they proposed to the
Conference the creation of a permanent international court of justice.
The creation of an international court of justice whose decisions would
have the force of law, as distinguished from an international court of
arbitration whose decisions are usually arrived at by a compromise of
conflicting legal or political points of view, had long been advocated
by advanced thinkers, but the proposition had always been held by
practical statesmen to be purely academic.  The serious advocacy of the
proposition at this time by a great nation like the United States and
the able arguments advanced by Mr. Choate marked an important step
forward and made a profound impression.  There were two difficulties in
the way of establishing such a court at the second Hague Conference.
In the first place, the delegation of the United States was the only
one which had instructions on this subject, and in the second place it
was found to be impossible to agree upon a method of selecting the
judges.  The great world powers, with the exception of the United
States, demanded permanent representation on the court.  The smaller
nations, relying on the doctrine of the equality of states, demanded
likewise to be represented.  If each nation could have been given the
right to appoint a judge, the court could have been organized, but
there would have been forty-four judges instead of fifteen, the number
suggested in the American plan.  The Draft Convention for the
Establishment of the Court of Arbitral Justice, as it was agreed the
new court should be designated, was submitted to the Conference and its
adoption recommended to the signatory powers.  This Draft contained
thirty-five articles and covered everything except the method of
appointing judges.  This question was to be settled by diplomatic
negotiation, and it was agreed that the court should be established as
soon as a satisfactory agreement with regard to the choice of judges
could be reached.  After the adjournment of the Conference the United
States continued its advocacy of the international court of justice
through the ordinary diplomatic channels.  The proposal was made that
the method of selecting judges for the Prize Court be adopted for the
court of justice, that is, that each power should appoint a judge, that
the judges of the larger powers should always sit on the court while
the judges of the other powers should sit by a system of rotation for
limited periods.  It was found, however, that many of the smaller
states were unwilling to accept this suggestion, and as difficulties
which we will mention presently prevented the establishment of the
Prize Court, the whole question of the court of justice was postponed.

Most of the conventions adopted by the second Hague Conference were
ratified by the United States without reservation.  The fact, however,
that certain of these conventions were not ratified by all the powers
represented at the Conference, and that others were ratified with
important reservations, left the status of most of the conventions in
doubt, so that at the beginning of the World War there was great
confusion as to what rules were binding and what were not binding.  The
Conference found it impossible to arrive at an agreement on many of the
most vital questions of maritime law.  Under these circumstances the
powers were not willing to have the proposed International Prize Court
established without the previous codification of the body of law which
was to govern its decisions.

In order to supply this need the London Naval Conference was convened
in December, 1908, and issued a few months later the Declaration of
London.  The London Naval Conference was attended by representatives of
the principal maritime powers including the United States, and the
Declaration which it issued was avowedly a codification of the existing
rules of international law.  This was not true, however, of all the
provisions of the Declaration.  On several of the most vital questions
of maritime law, such as blockade, the doctrine of continuous voyage,
the destruction of neutral prizes, and the inclusion of food stuffs in
the list of conditional contraband, the Declaration was a compromise
and therefore unsatisfactory.  It encountered from the start the most
violent opposition in England.  In Parliament the Naval Prize Bill,
which was to give the Declaration effect, was discussed at considerable
length.  It passed the House of Commons by a small vote, but was
defeated in the House of Lords.  It was denounced by the press, and a
petition to the king, drawn up by the Imperial Maritime League
protesting against it, was signed by a long list of commercial
associations, mayors, members of the House of Lords, general officers,
and other public officials.  One hundred and thirty-eight naval
officers of flag rank addressed to the prime minister a public protest
against the Declaration.  In the debate in the House of Lords the main
objections to the Declaration were (1) that it made food stuffs
conditional contraband instead of placing them on the free list, (2)
that the clause permitting the seizure of conditional contraband bound
for a fortified place or "other place serving as a base for the armed
forces of the enemy" would render all English ports liable to be
treated as bases by an enemy, and (3) that it permitted the destruction
of neutral prizes.

The refusal of England to ratify the Declaration of London sealed its
fate.  The United States Senate formally ratified it, but this
ratification was, of course, conditional on the ratification of other
powers.  At the beginning of the Great War the United States made a
formal proposal to the belligerent powers that they should agree to
adopt the Declaration for the period of the war in order that there
might be a definite body of law for all parties concerned.  This
proposal was accepted by Germany and Austria, but England, France, and
Russia were not willing to accept the Declaration of London without
modifications.  The United States, therefore, promptly withdrew its
proposal and stated that where its rights as a neutral were concerned
it would expect the belligerent powers to observe the recognized rules
of international law and existing treaties.

The Hague Conferences were concerned with questions of general
international interest, and had no bearing upon the internal affairs of
states.  Such, however, was not the character of the conference which
convened at Algeciras, Spain, in December, 1905, for the purpose of
adjusting the very serious dispute that had arisen between France and
Germany over the status of Morocco.  France had been engaged for some
years in the peaceful penetration of Morocco.  By the terms of the
Entente of 1904 England recognized Morocco as being within the French
sphere of influence and France agreed to recognize England's position
in Egypt.  The German Kaiser had no idea of permitting any part of the
world to be divided up without his consent.  In March, 1905, while on a
cruise in the Mediterranean, he disembarked at Tangier and paid a visit
to the Sultan "in his character of independent sovereign."  As the
Russian armies had just suffered disastrous defeats at the hands of the
Japanese, France could not count on aid from her ally and the Kaiser
did not believe that the recently formed Entente was strong enough to
enable her to count on English support.  His object in landing at
Tangier was, therefore, to check and humiliate France while she was
isolated and to break up the Entente before it should develop into an
alliance.  Delcassé, the French foreign minister, wanted to stand firm,
but Germany demanded his retirement and the prime minister accepted his
resignation.  In recognition of this triumph, the German chancellor
Count von Bülow was given the title of Prince.  Not satisfied with this
achievement, the Kaiser demanded a general European conference on the
Moroccan question, and, in order to avoid war, President Roosevelt
persuaded France to submit the whole dispute to the powers interested.
The Algeciras conference turned out to be a bitter disappointment to
Germany.  Not only did France receive the loyal support of England, but
she was also backed by the United States and even by Italy--a warning
to Germany that the Triple Alliance was in danger.  As the conference
was called nominally for the purpose of instituting certain
administrative reforms in Morocco, President Roosevelt decided, in view
of our rights under a commercial treaty of 1880, to take part in the
proceedings.  The American delegates were Henry White, at that time
ambassador to Italy, and Samuel R. Gummeré, minister to Morocco.  As
the United States professed to have no political interests at stake,
its delegates were instrumental in composing many of the difficulties
that arose during the conference and their influence was exerted to
preserve the European balance of power.  The facts in regard to
America's part in this conference were carefully concealed from the
public.  There was nothing in any published American document to
indicate that the participation of our representatives was anything
more than casual.  André Tardieu, the well-known French publicist, who
reported the conference and later published his impressions in book
form, first indicated that President Roosevelt was a positive factor in
the proceedings.  But it was not until the publication of Bishop's
"Theodore Roosevelt and His Time" that the full extent of Roosevelt's
activities in this connection became known.

There can be no doubt that our participation in the Moroccan conference
was the most radical departure ever made from our traditional policy of
isolation.  Roosevelt's influence was exerted for preserving the
balance of power in Europe.  As we look back upon the events of that
year we feel, in view of what has since happened, that he was fully
justified in the course he pursued.  Had his motives for participating
in the conference been known at the time, they would not have been
upheld either by the Senate or by public opinion.  There are many
serious objections to secret diplomacy, but it cannot be entirely done
away with even under a republican form of government until the people
are educated to a fuller understanding of international politics.  The
German Kaiser was relentless in his attempt to score a diplomatic
triumph while France was isolated.  He was thwarted, however, by the
moral support which England, Italy, and the United States gave to
France.

During the proceedings of the conference the American delegates
declared in open session that the United States had no political
interest in Morocco and that they would sign the treaty only with the
understanding that the United States would thereby assume no
"obligation or responsibility for the enforcement thereof."  This
declaration did not satisfy the United States Senate, which no doubt
suspected the part that was actually played by America in the
conference.  At any rate, when the treaty was finally ratified the
Senate attached to its resolution of ratification the following
declaration:

"Resolved further.  That the Senate, as a part of this act of
ratification, understands that the participation of the United States
in the Algeciras conference and in the formation and adoption of the
general act and protocol which resulted therefrom, was with the sole
purpose of preserving and increasing its commerce in Morocco, the
protection as to life, liberty, and property of its citizens residing
or traveling therein, and of aiding by its friendly offices and
efforts, in removing friction and controversy which seemed to menace
the peace between powers signatory with the United States to the treaty
of 1880, all of which are on terms of amity with this Government; and
without purpose to depart from the traditional American foreign policy
which forbids participation by the United States in the settlement of
political questions which are entirely European in their scope."

The determination of the United States not to interfere in the internal
politics of European States has not prevented occasional protests in
the name of humanity against the harsh treatment accorded the Jews in
certain European countries.  On July 17, 1902, Secretary Hay protested
in a note to the Rumanian government against a policy which was forcing
thousands of Jews to emigrate from that country.  The United States, he
claimed, had more than a philanthropic interest in this matter, for the
enforced emigration of the Jews from Rumania in a condition of utter
destitution was "the mere transplantation of an artificially produced
diseased growth to a new place"; and, as the United States was
practically their only place of refuge, we had a clearly established
right of remonstrance.  In the case of Russia information has
repeatedly been sought through diplomatic channels as to the extent of
destitution among the Jewish population, and permission has been
requested for the distribution of relief funds raised in the United
States.  Such inquiries have been so framed as to amount to diplomatic
protests.  In his annual message of 1904 President Roosevelt went
further and openly expressed the horror of the nation at the massacre
of the Jews at Kishenef.  These protests, however, were purely
diplomatic in character.  There was not the slightest hint at
intervention.  During the early stages of the Great War in Europe the
Government of the United States endeavored to adhere strictly to its
historic policy.  The German invasion of Belgium with its attendant
horrors made a deep impression upon the American people and aroused
their fighting spirit even more perhaps than the German policy of
submarine warfare, but it was on the latter issue, in which the
interests and rights of the United States were directly involved, that
we finally entered the war.




V

THE OPEN-DOOR POLICY

In the Orient American diplomacy has had a somewhat freer hand than in
Europe.  Commodore Perry's expedition to Japan in 1852-1854 was quite a
radical departure from the general policy of attending strictly to our
own business.  It would hardly have been undertaken against a country
lying within the European sphere of influence.  There were, it is true,
certain definite grievances to redress, but the main reason for the
expedition was that Japan refused to recognize her obligations as a
member of the family of nations and closed her ports to all intercourse
with the outside world.  American sailors who had been shipwrecked on
the coast of Japan had failed to receive the treatment usually accorded
by civilized nations.  Finally the United States decided to send a
naval force to Japan and to force that country to abandon her policy of
exclusion and to open her ports to intercourse with other countries.
Japan yielded only under the threat of superior force.  The conduct of
the expedition, as well as our subsequent diplomatic negotiations with
Japan, was highly creditable to the United States, and the Japanese
people later erected a monument to the memory of Perry on the spot
where he first landed.

The acquisition of the Philippine Islands tended to bring us more fully
into the current of world politics, but it did not necessarily disturb
the balancing of European and American spheres as set up by President
Monroe.  Various explanations have been given of President McKinley's
decision to retain the Philippine group, but the whole truth has in all
probability not yet been fully revealed.  The partition of China
through the establishment of European spheres of influence was well
under way when the Philippine Islands came within our grasp.  American
commerce with China was at this time second to that of England alone,
and the concessions which were being wrung from China by the European
powers in such rapid succession presented a bad outlook for us.  The
United States could not follow the example of the powers of Europe, for
the seizure of a sphere of influence in China would not have been
supported by the Senate or upheld by public opinion.  It is probable
that President McKinley thought that the Philippine Islands would not
only provide a market for American goods, which owing to the Dingley
tariff were beginning to face retaliatory legislation abroad, but that
they would provide a naval base which would be of great assistance in
upholding our interests in China.

Talcott Williams made public some years later another explanation of
President McKinley's decision which is interesting and appears to be
well vouched for.  He was informed by a member of McKinley's cabinet
that while the President's mind was not yet made up on the question, a
personal communication was received from Lord Salisbury who warned the
President that Germany was preparing to take over the Philippine
Islands in case the United States should withdraw; that such a step
would probably precipitate a world war and that in the interests of
peace and harmony it would be best for the United States to retain the
entire group.

The famous open-door policy was outlined by Secretary Hay in notes
dated September 6, 1899, addressed to Great Britain, Germany, and
Russia.  Each of these powers was requested to give assurance and to
make a declaration to the following effect: (1) that it would not
interfere with any treaty port or vested interests in its so-called
sphere of influence; (2) that it would permit the Chinese tariff to
continue in force in such sphere and to be collected by Chinese
officials; (3) that it would not discriminate against other foreigners
in the matter of port dues or railroad rates.  Similar notes were later
addressed to France, Italy, and Japan.  England alone expressed her
willingness to sign such a declaration.  The other powers, while
professing thorough accord with the principles set forth by Mr. Hay,
avoided committing themselves to a formal declaration and no such
declaration was ever made.  Mr. Hay made a skillful move, however, to
clinch matters by informing each of the powers to whom the note had
been addressed that in view of the favorable replies from the other
powers, its acceptance of the proposals of the United States was
considered "as final and definitive."

Americans generally are under the impression that John Hay originated
the open-door policy and that it was successfully upheld by the United
States.  Neither of these impressions is correct.  A few months before
John Hay formulated his famous note Lord Charles Beresford came through
America on his return from China and addressed the leading chambers of
commerce from San Francisco to New York, telling Americans what was
actually taking place in China and urging this country to unite with
England and Japan in an effort to maintain the open door.  Like the
Monroe Doctrine, the open-door policy was thus Anglo-American in
origin.  There is little doubt that England and Japan were willing to
form an alliance with the United States for the purpose of maintaining
the open door in China, but our traditional policy of isolation
prevented our committing ourselves to the employment of force.
President McKinley, following the example of President Monroe,
preferred announcing our policy independently and requesting the other
powers to consent to it.  Had John Hay been able to carry out the plan
which he favored of an alliance with England and Japan, the mere
announcement of the fact would have been sufficient to check the
aggressions of the powers in China.  Instead of such an alliance,
however, we let it be known that while we favored the open door we
would not fight for it under any conditions.

The utter worthlessness of the replies that were made in response to
Hay's note of September 6, 1899, became fully apparent in the
discussions that soon arose as to the status of consuls in the various
spheres of influence.  Japan claimed that sovereignty did not pass with
a lease and that even if China should surrender jurisdiction over her
own people, the lessee governments could not acquire jurisdiction over
foreigners in leased territory.  This position was undoubtedly correct
if the territorial integrity of China was really to be preserved, but
after negotiations with Russia and the other powers concerned Mr. Hay
wrote to Minister Conger on February 3, 1900, that "The United States
consuls in districts adjacent to the foreign leased territories are to
be instructed that they have no authority to exercise extra-territorial
consular jurisdiction or to perform ordinary non-judicial consular acts
within the leased territory under their present Chinese exequaturs."
Application was then made to the European powers for the admission of
American consuls in the leased territories for the performance of the
ordinary consular functions, but in no case were they to exercise
extra-territorial jurisdiction within a leased territory.

The exploitation of China which continued at a rapid rate naturally
aroused an intense anti-foreign sentiment and led to the Boxer
uprising.  Events moved with startling rapidity and United States
troops took a prominent part with those of England, France, Russia, and
Japan in the march to Peking for the relief of the legations.  In a
note to the powers July 3, 1900, Secretary Hay, in defining the
attitude of the United States on the Chinese question, said: "The
policy of the government of the United States is to seek a solution
which may bring about permanent safety and peace to China, preserve
Chinese territorial and administrative entity, protect all rights
guaranteed to friendly powers by treaty and international law, and
safeguard for the world the principle of equal and impartial trade with
all parts of the Chinese empire."  Mr. Hay's notes were skillfully
worded and had some influence in helping to formulate public opinion on
the Chinese question both in this country and abroad, but we know now
from his private letters which have recently been made public that he
realized only too fully the utter futility of his efforts to stay the
course of events.  During the exciting days of June, 1900, when the
foreign legations at Peking were in a state of siege, Mr. Hay wrote to
John W. Foster as follows:

"What can be done in the present diseased state of the public mind?
There is such a mad-dog hatred of England prevalent among newspapers
and politicians that anything we should now do in China to take care of
our imperiled interests would be set down to 'subservience to Great
Britain'. . . .  Every Senator I see says, 'For God's sake, don't let
it appear we have any understanding with England.'  How can I make
bricks without straw?  That we should be compelled to refuse the
assistance of the greatest power in the world, in carrying out our own
policy, because all Irishmen are Democrats and some Germans are
fools--is enough to drive a man mad.  Yet we shall do what we can."

A little later (September 20, 1900) in confidential letters to Henry
Adams, he exclaimed:

"About China, it is the devil's own mess.  We cannot possibly publish
all the facts without breaking off relations with several Powers.  We
shall have to do the best we can, and take the consequences, which will
be pretty serious, I do not doubt.  'Give and take'--the axiom of
diplomacy to the rest of the world--is positively forbidden to us, by
both the Senate and public opinion.  We must take what we can and give
nothing--which greatly narrows our possibilities.

"I take it, you agree with us that we are to limit as far as possible
our military operations in China, to withdraw our troops at the
earliest day consistent with our obligations, and in the final
adjustment to do everything we can for the integrity and reform of
China, and to hold on like grim death to the Open Door. . . ."

Again, November 21, 1900:

"What a business this has been in China!  So far we have got on by
being honest and naïf. . . .  At least we are spared the infamy of an
alliance with Germany.  I would rather, I think, be the dupe of China,
than the chum of the Kaiser.  Have you noticed how the world will take
anything nowadays from a German?  Bülow said yesterday in
substance--'We have demanded of China everything we can think of.  If
we think of anything else we will demand that, and be d--d to you'--and
not a man in the world kicks."

During the long negotiations that followed the occupation of Peking by
the powers, the United States threw the weight of its influence on the
side of moderation, urging the powers not to impose too many burdens on
China and declaring that the only hope for the future lay in a strong,
independent, responsible Chinese government.  Contrary to the terms of
the final protocol, however, Russia retained in Manchuria the troops
concentrated there during the Boxer movement with a view to exacting
further concessions from China.  The open-door policy was again
ignored.  The seriousness of the situation led England and Japan to
sign a defensive agreement January 30, 1902, recognizing England's
interest in China and Japan's interest in Korea, and providing that if
either party should be attacked in defense of its interest, the other
party would remain neutral, unless a third power joined in, in which
event the second party would come to the assistance of the first.  A
formal protest made by the United States, February 1, against some of
the demands Russia was making on China led Russia to conclude that the
American government had an understanding with England and Japan, but
Mr. Hay gave the assurance that he had known nothing about the
Anglo-Japanese agreement until it was made public.  He succeeded in
securing from Russia, however, a definite promise to evacuate
Manchuria, but as the time for the withdrawal of her troops drew near,
Russia again imposed new conditions on China, and deliberately
misrepresented to the United States the character of the new proposals.

After the suppression of the Boxer uprising, China had agreed to extend
the scope of her commercial treaties with the powers.  When the
negotiation of a new treaty with the United States was begun, our
representative demanded that at least two new ports in Manchuria be
opened to foreign trade and residence.  The Chinese commissioners
declined to discuss the subject on the alleged ground that they had no
instructions to do so.  It was evident that there was secret opposition
somewhere, and after considerable difficulty Mr. Hay finally secured
evidence that it came from Russia.  When confronted with the evidence
the Russian Government finally admitted the facts.  We were told that
we could not be admitted to one of the ports that we had designated
because it was situated within the Russian railway zone, and therefore
not under the complete jurisdiction of China, but that another port
would be substituted for it.  Secretary Hay and President Roosevelt
were helpless.  They accepted what they could get and kept quiet.  "The
administrative entity" of China was again utterly ignored.  The
difficulty was that we did not have a strong enough navy in the Pacific
to fight Russia alone, and President Roosevelt and Secretary Hay
realized that neither the Senate nor public opinion would consent to an
alliance with England and Japan.  Had these three powers made a joint
declaration in support of the open-door policy, the exploitation of
China would have ceased, there would have been no Russo-Japanese war,
and the course of world history during the period that has since
intervened might have been very different.

When we backed down and abandoned Manchuria to Russian exploitation
Japan stepped into the breach.  After long negotiations the Japanese
Government finally delivered an ultimatum to Russia which resulted in
the rupture of diplomatic relations and war.  After a series of notable
victories on land and sea Japan was fast approaching the end of her
resources, and it is now an open secret that the Emperor wrote a
personal letter to President Roosevelt requesting him to intervene
diplomatically and pave the way for peace.  The President was quick to
act on the suggestion and the commissioners of Russia and Japan met at
Portsmouth, New Hampshire.  Here President Roosevelt's intervention
should have ceased.  The terms of the Treaty of Portsmouth were a
bitter disappointment to the Japanese people and the Japanese
commissioners undertook to shift the burden from their shoulders by
stating that President Roosevelt had urged them to surrender their
claim to the Island of Saghalien and to give up all idea of an
indemnity.  Japanese military triumph had again, as at the close of the
Chino-Japanese War, been followed by diplomatic defeat, and for this
defeat Japanese public opinion held President Roosevelt responsible.
From the days of Commodore Perry and Townsend Harris to the Treaty of
Portsmouth, relations between the United States and Japan had been
almost ideal.  Since the negotiations at Portsmouth there has been a
considerable amount of bad feeling, and at times diplomatic relations
have been subjected to a severe strain.

Having fought a costly war in order to check the Russian advance in
Manchuria, the Japanese naturally felt that they had a paramount
interest in China.  They consequently sharply resented the attempts
which the United States subsequently made, particularly Secretary
Knox's proposal for the neutralization of the railways of Manchuria, to
formulate policies for China.  They took the position that we had had
our day and that we must henceforth remain hands off so far as China
was concerned.  This attitude of mind was not unnatural and during the
World War the United States, in order to bind the Japanese government
more closely to the Allied Cause, agreed to recognize, in the
Lansing-Ishii agreement, the "special interests" of Japan in China.




VI

ANGLO-AMERICAN RELATIONS

A few years ago George L. Beer, one of our leading students of British
colonial policy, said "It is easily conceivable, and not at all
improbable, that the political evolution of the next centuries may take
such a course that the American Revolution will lose the great
significance that is now attached to it, and will appear merely as the
temporary separation of two kindred peoples whose inherent similarity
was obscured by superficial differences resulting from dissimilar
economic and social conditions."  This statement does not appear as
extravagant to-day as it did ten years ago.  As early as 1894, Captain
Mahan, the great authority on naval history, published an essay
entitled "Possibilities of an Anglo-American Reunion," in which he
pointed out that these two countries were the only great powers which
were by geographical position exempt from the burden of large armies
and dependent upon the sea for intercourse with the other great nations.

In a volume dealing with questions of American foreign policy,
published in 1907, the present writer concluded the last paragraph with
this statement: "By no means the least significant of recent changes is
the development of cordial relations with England; and it seems now
that the course of world politics is destined to lead to the further
reknitting together of the two great branches of the Anglo-Saxon race
in bonds of peace and international sympathy, in a union not cemented
by any formal alliance, but based on community of interests and of
aims, a union that will constitute the highest guarantee of the
political stability and moral progress of the world."

The United States has very naturally had closer contact with England
than with any other European power.  This has been due to the fact that
England was the mother country, that after independence was established
a large part of our trade continued to be with the British Isles, that
our northern boundary touches British territory for nearly four
thousand miles, and that the British navy and mercantile marine have
dominated the Atlantic Ocean which has been our chief highway of
intercourse with other nations.  Having had more points of contact we
have had more disputes with England than with any other nation.  Some
writers have half jocularly attributed this latter fact to our common
language.  The Englishman reads our books, papers, and magazines, and
knows what we think of him, while we read what he writes about us, and
in neither case is the resulting impression flattering to the national
pride.

Any one who takes the trouble to read what was written in England about
America and the Americans between 1820 and 1850 will wonder how war was
avoided.  A large number of English travellers came to the United
States during this period and published books about us when they got
home.  The books were bad enough in themselves, but the great English
periodicals, the _Edinburgh Review_, _Blackwood's_, the _British
Review_, and the _Quarterly_, quoted at length the most objectionable
passages from these writers and made malicious attacks on Americans and
American institutions.  American men were described as "turbulent
citizens, abandoned Christians, inconstant husbands, unnatural fathers,
and treacherous friends."  Our soldiers and sailors were charged with
cowardice in the War of 1812.  It was stated that "in the southern
parts of the Union the rites of our holy faith are almost never
practised. . . .  Three and a half millions enjoy no means of religious
instruction.  The religious principle is gaining ground in the northern
parts of the Union; it is becoming fashionable among the better orders
of society to go to church . . .  The greater number of states declare
it to be unconstitutional to refer to the providence of God in any of
their public acts."  The _Quarterly Review_ informed its readers that
"the supreme felicity of a true-born American is inaction of body and
inanity of mind."  Dickens's _American Notes_ was an ungrateful return
for the kindness and enthusiasm with which he had been received in this
country.  De Tocqueville's _Democracy in America_ was widely read in
England and doubtless had its influence in revising opinion concerning
America.  Richard Cobden was, however, the first Englishman to
interpret correctly the significance of America as an economic force.
His essay on America, published in 1835, pointed out that British
policy should be more concerned with economic relations with America
than with European politics.  As Professor Dunning says, "Cobden made
the United States the text of his earliest sermon against militarism
and protectionism."

Notwithstanding innumerable disputes over boundaries, fisheries, and
fur seals, trade with the British West Indies and Canada, and questions
of neutral rights and obligations, we have had unbroken peace for more
than a hundred years.  Upon several occasions, notably during the
Canadian insurrection of 1837 and during our own Civil War,
disturbances along the Canadian border created strained relations, but
absence of frontier guards and forts has prevented hasty action on the
part of either government.  The agreement of 1817, effecting
disarmament on the Great Lakes, has not only saved both countries the
enormous cost of maintaining navies on these inland waters, but it has
prevented hostile demonstrations in times of crisis.

During the Canadian rebellion of 1837 Americans along the border
expressed openly their sympathy for the insurgents who secured arms and
munitions from the American side.  In December a British force crossed
the Niagara River, boarded and took possession of the _Caroline_, a
vessel which had been hired by the insurgents to convey their cannon
and other supplies.  The ship was fired and sent over the Falls.  When
the _Caroline_ was boarded one American, Amos Durfee, was killed and
several others wounded.  The United States at once demanded redress,
but the British Government took the position that the seizure of the
_Caroline_ was a justifiable act of self-defense against people whom
their own government either could not or would not control.

The demands of the United States were still unredressed when in 1840 a
Canadian named Alexander McLeod made the boast in a tavern on the
American side that he had slain Durfee.  He was taken at his word,
examined before a magistrate, and committed to jail in Lockport.
McLeod's arrest created great excitement on both sides of the border.
The British minister at Washington called upon the Government of the
United States "to take prompt and effectual steps for the liberation of
Mr. McLeod."  Secretary of State Forsyth replied that the offense with
which McLeod was charged had been committed within the State of New
York; that the jurisdiction of each State of the United States was,
within its proper sphere, perfectly independent of the Federal
Government; that the latter could not interfere.  The date set for the
trial of McLeod was the fourth Monday in March, 1841.  Van Buren's term
ended and Harrison's began on the 4th of March, and Webster became
Secretary of State.  The British minister was given instructions by his
government to demand the immediate release of McLeod.  This demand was
made, he said, because the attack on the _Caroline_ was an act of a
public character; because it was a justifiable use of force for the
defense of British territory against unprovoked attack by "British
rebels and American pirates"; because it was contrary to the principles
of civilized nations to hold individuals responsible for acts done by
order of the constituted authorities of the State; and because Her
Majesty's government could not admit the doctrine that the Federal
Government had no power to interfere and that the decision must rest
with the State of New York.  The relations of foreign powers were with
the Federal Government.  To admit that the Federal Government had no
control over a State would lead to the dissolution of the Union so far
as foreign powers were concerned, and to the accrediting of foreign
diplomatic agents, not to the Federal Government, but to each separate
State.  Webster received the note quietly and sent the attorney-general
to Lockport to see that McLeod had competent counsel.  After
considerable delay, during which Webster replied to the main arguments
of the British note, McLeod was acquitted and released.

In the midst of the dispute over the case of the _Caroline_ serious
trouble arose between the authorities of Maine and New Brunswick over
the undetermined boundary between the St. Croix River and the
Highlands, and there ensued the so-called "Aroostook War."  During the
summer of 1838 British and American lumbermen began operating along the
Aroostook River in large numbers.  The governor of Maine sent a body of
militia to enforce the authority of that State, and the New Brunswick
authorities procured a detachment of British regulars to back up their
position.  Bloodshed was averted by the arrival of General Winfield
Scott, who managed to restrain the Maine authorities.  The
administration found it necessary to take up seriously the settlement
of the boundary question, and for the next three years the matter was
under consideration, while each side had surveyors employed in a vain
attempt to locate a line which would correspond to the line of the
treaty.  As soon as the McLeod affair was settled, Webster devoted
himself earnestly to the boundary question.  He decided to drop the
mass of data accumulated by the surveyors and historians, and to reach
an agreement by direct negotiation.

In April, 1842, Alexander Baring, Lord Ashburton, arrived in Washington
and the following August the Webster-Ashburton treaty was signed.  The
boundary fixed by the treaty gave Maine a little more than half the
area which she claimed and the United States appropriated $150,000 to
compensate Maine for the territory which she had lost.

The settlement of these matters did not, however, insure peace with
England.  Settlers were crowding into Oregon and it was evident that
the joint occupation, established by the convention of 1818, would soon
have to be terminated and a divisional line agreed upon.  Great Britain
insisted that her southern boundary should extend at least as far as
the Columbia River, while Americans finally claimed the whole of the
disputed area, and one of the slogans of the presidential campaign of
1844 was "Fifty-Four-Forty or Fight."  At the same time Great Britain
actively opposed the annexation of Texas by the United States.  Her
main reason for this course was that she wished to encourage the
development of Texas as a cotton-growing country from which she could
draw a large enough supply to make her independent of the United
States.  If Texas should thus devote herself to the production of
cotton as her chief export crop, she would, of course, adopt a
free-trade policy and thus create a considerable market for British
goods.

As soon as it became evident that Tyler contemplated taking definite
steps toward annexation, Lord Aberdeen secured the coöperation of the
government of Louis Philippe in opposing the absorption of Texas by the
American republic.  While the treaty for the annexation of Texas was
before the Senate, Lord Aberdeen came forward with a proposition that
England and France should unite with Texas and Mexico in a diplomatic
act or perpetual treaty, securing to Texas recognition as an
independent republic, but preventing her from ever acquiring territory
beyond the Rio Grande or joining the American union.  While the United
States would be invited to join in this act, it was not expected that
the government of that country would agree to it.  Mexico obstinately
refused to recognize the independence of Texas.  Lord Aberdeen was so
anxious to prevent the annexation of Texas that he was ready, if
supported by France, to coerce Mexico and fight the United States, but
the French Government was not willing to go this far, so the scheme was
abandoned.

The two foremost issues in the campaign of 1844 were the annexation of
Texas and the occupation of Oregon.  Texas was annexed by joint
resolution a few days before the inauguration of Polk.  This act, it
was foreseen, would probably provoke a war with Mexico, so Polk's first
task was to adjust the Oregon dispute in order to avoid complications
with England.  The fate of California was also involved.  That province
was not likely to remain long in the hands of a weak power like Mexico.
In fact, British consular agents and naval officers had for several
years been urging upon their government the great value of Upper
California.  Aberdeen refused to countenance any insurrectionary
movement in California, but he directed his agents to keep vigilant
watch on the proceedings of citizens of the United States in that
province.  Had England and Mexico arrived at an understanding and
joined in a war against the United States, the probabilities are that
England would have acquired not only the whole of Oregon, but
California besides.  In fact, in May, 1846, just as we were on the
point of going to war with Mexico, the president of Mexico officially
proposed to transfer California to England as security for a loan.
Fortunately, the Oregon question had been adjusted and England had no
reason for wishing to go to war with the United States.  Mexico's offer
was therefore rejected.  Polk managed the diplomatic situation with
admirable promptness and firmness.  Notwithstanding the fact that the
democratic platform had demanded "Fifty-Four-Forty or Fight," as soon
as Polk became President he offered to compromise with England on the
49th parallel.  When this offer was declined he asked permission of
Congress to give England the necessary notice for the termination of
the joint occupation agreement, to provide for the military defense of
the territory in dispute, and to extend over it the laws of the United
States.  A few months later notice was given to England, but at the
same time the hope was expressed that the matter might be adjusted
diplomatically.  As soon as it was evident that the United States was
in earnest, England gracefully yielded and accepted the terms which had
been first proposed.

As war with Mexico was imminent the public generally approved of the
Oregon compromise, though the criticism was made by some in the North
that the South, having secured in Texas a large addition to slave
territory, was indifferent about the expansion of free territory.  In
fact, Henry Cabot Lodge, in his recent little book, "One Hundred Years
of Peace," says: "The loss of the region between the forty-ninth
parallel and the line of 54-40 was one of the most severe which ever
befell the United States.  Whether it could have been obtained without
a war is probably doubtful, but it never ought to have been said,
officially or otherwise, that we would fight for 54-40 unless we were
fully prepared to do so.  If we had stood firm for the line of 54-40
without threats, it is quite possible that we might have succeeded in
the end; but the hypotheses of history are of little practical value,
and the fact remains that by the treaty of 1846 we lost a complete
control of the Pacific coast."

That the United States lived through what Professor Dunning calls "the
roaring forties" without a war with England seems now little less than
a miracle.  During the next fifteen years relations were much more
amicable, though by no means free from disputes.  The most important
diplomatic act was the signature in 1850 of the Clayton-Bulwer treaty
which conceded to England a joint interest in any canal that might be
built through the isthmus connecting North and South America.  One of
the interesting episodes of this period was the dismissal of Crampton,
the British minister, who insisted on enlisting men in the United
States for service in the Crimean War, an act which pales into
insignificance in comparison with some of the things which Bernstorff
did during the early stages of the Great War.

Relations between the United States and England during the American
Civil War involved so many highly technical questions that it is
impossible to do more than touch upon them in the present connection.
Diplomatic discussions centred about such questions as the validity of
the blockade established by President Lincoln, the recognition by
England of Confederate belligerency, the _Trent_ affair, and the
responsibility of England for the depredations committed by the
_Alabama_ and other Confederate cruisers.  When the United States first
demanded reparation for the damage inflicted on American commerce by
the Confederate cruisers, the British Government disclaimed all
liability on the ground that the fitting out of the cruisers had not
been completed within British jurisdiction.  Even after the close of
the war the British Government continued to reject all proposals for a
settlement.  The American nation, flushed with victory, was bent on
redress, and so deep-seated was the resentment against England, that
the Fenian movement, which had for its object the establishment of an
independent republic in Ireland, met with open encouragement in this
country.  The House of Representatives went so far as to repeal the law
forbidding Americans to fit out ships for belligerents, but the Senate
failed to concur.  The successful war waged by Prussia against Austria
in 1866 disturbed the European balance, and rumblings of the
approaching Franco-Prussian war caused uneasiness in British cabinet
circles.  Fearing that if Great Britain were drawn into the conflict
the American people might take a sweet revenge by fitting out
"Alabamas" for her enemies, the British Government assumed a more
conciliatory attitude, and in January, 1869, Lord Clarendon signed with
Reverdy Johnson a convention providing for the submission to a mixed
commission of all claims which had arisen since 1853.  Though the
convention included, it did not specifically mention, the _Alabama_
Claims, and it failed to contain any expression of regret for the
course pursued by the British Government during the war.  The Senate,
therefore, refused by an almost unanimous vote to ratify the
arrangement.

When Grant became President, Hamilton Fish renewed the negotiations
through Motley, the American minister at London, but the latter was
unduly influenced by the extreme views of Sumner, chairman of the
Senate committee on foreign relations, to whose influence he owed his
appointment, and got things in a bad tangle.  Fish then transferred the
negotiations to Washington, where a joint high commission, appointed to
settle the various disputes with Canada, convened in 1871.  A few
months later the treaty of Washington was signed.  Among other things
it provided for submitting the _Alabama_ Claims to an arbitration
tribunal composed of five members, one appointed by England, one by the
United States, and the other three by the rulers of Italy, Switzerland,
and Brazil.  When this tribunal met at Geneva, the following year, the
United States, greatly to the surprise of everybody, presented not only
the direct claims for the damage inflicted by the Confederate cruisers,
but also indirect claims for the loss sustained through the transfer of
American shipping to foreign flags, for the prolongation of the war,
and for increased rates of insurance.  Great Britain threatened to
withdraw from the arbitration, but Charles Francis Adams, the American
member of the tribunal, rose nobly to the occasion and decided against
the contention of his own government.  The indirect claims were
rejected by a unanimous vote and on the direct claims the United States
was awarded the sum of $15,500,000.  Although the British member of the
tribunal dissented from the decision his government promptly paid the
award.  This was the most important case that had ever been submitted
to arbitration and its successful adjustment encouraged the hope that
the two great branches of the English-speaking peoples would never
again have to resort to war.

Between the settlement of the _Alabama_ Claims and the controversy over
the Venezuelan boundary, diplomatic intercourse between the two
countries was enlivened by the efforts of Blaine and Frelinghuysen to
convince the British Government that the Clayton-Bulwer treaty was out
of date and therefore no longer binding, by the assertion of American
ownership in the seal herds of Bering Sea and the attempt to prevent
Canadians from taking these animals in the open sea, and by the summary
dismissal of Lord Sackville-West, the third British minister to receive
his passports from the United States without request.

President Cleveland's bold assertion of the Monroe Doctrine in the
Venezuelan boundary dispute, while the subject of much criticism at the
time both at home and abroad, turned out to be a most opportune
assertion of the intention of the United States to protect the American
continents from the sort of exploitation to which Africa and Asia have
fallen a prey, and, strange to say, it had a clarifying effect on our
relations with England, whose attitude has since been uniformly
friendly.

The Venezuelan affair was followed by the proposal of Lord Salisbury to
renew the negotiations for a permanent treaty of arbitration which had
been first entered into by Secretary Gresham and Sir Julian Pauncefote.
In the spring of 1890 the Congress of the United States had adopted a
resolution in favor of the negotiation of arbitration treaties with
friendly nations, and the British House of Commons had in July, 1893,
expressed its hearty approval of a general arbitration treaty between
the United States and England.  The matter was then taken up
diplomatically, as stated above, but was dropped when the Venezuelan
boundary dispute became acute.  Lord Salisbury's proposal was favorably
received by President Cleveland, and after mature deliberation the
draft of a treaty was finally drawn up and signed by Secretary Olney
and Sir Julian Pauncefote.  This treaty provided for the submission of
pecuniary claims to the familiar mixed commission with an umpire or
referee to decide disputed points.  Controversies involving the
determination of territorial claims were to be submitted to a tribunal
composed of six members, three justices of the Supreme Court of the
United States or judges of the Circuit Court to be nominated by the
president of the United States, and three judges of the British Supreme
Court of Judicature or members of the Judicial Committee of the Privy
Council to be nominated by the British sovereign, and an award made by
a majority of not less than five to one was to be final.  In case of an
award made by less than the prescribed majority, the award was also to
be final unless either power should within three months protest against
it, in which case the award was to be of no validity.  This treaty was
concluded in January, 1897, and promptly submitted to the Senate.  When
President Cleveland's term expired in March no action had been taken.
President McKinley endorsed the treaty in his inaugural address and
urged the Senate to take prompt action, but when the vote was taken,
May 5th, it stood forty-three for, and twenty-six against, the treaty.
It thus lacked three votes of the two thirds required for ratification.
The failure of this treaty was a great disappointment to the friends of
international arbitration.  The opposition within his own party to
President Cleveland, under whose direction the treaty had been
negotiated, and the change of administration, probably had a good deal
to do with its defeat.  Public opinion, especially in the Northern
States of the Union, was still hostile to England.  Irish agitators
could always get a sympathetic hearing in America, and politicians
could not resist the temptation to play on anti-British prejudices in
order to bring out the Irish vote.

The Spanish War was the turning point in our relations with England as
in many other things.  The question as to who were our friends in 1898
was much discussed at the time, and when revived by the press upon the
occasion of the visit of Prince Henry of Prussia to the United States
in February, 1902, even the cabinets of Europe could not refrain from
taking part in the controversy.  In order to diminish the enthusiasm
over the Prince's visit the British press circulated the story that
Lord Pauncefote had checked a movement of the European powers to
prevent any intervention of the United States in Cuba; while the German
papers asserted that Lord Pauncefote had taken the initiative in
opposing American intervention.  It is certain that the attitude of the
British Government, as well as of the British people, from the outbreak
of hostilities to the close of the war, was friendly.  As for Germany,
while the conduct of the government was officially correct, public
sentiment expressed itself with great violence against the United
States.  The conduct of the German admiral, Diederichs, in Manila Bay
has never been satisfactorily explained.  Shortly after Dewey's victory
a German squadron, superior to the American in strength, steamed into
the Bay and displayed, according to Dewey, an "extraordinary disregard
of the usual courtesies of naval intercourse."  Dewey finally sent his
flag-lieutenant, Brumby, to inform the German admiral that "if he wants
a fight he can have it right now."  The German admiral at once
apologized.  It is well known now that the commander of the British
squadron, which was in a position to bring its guns to bear on the
Germans, gave Dewey to understand that he could rely on more than moral
support from him in case of trouble.  In fact, John Hay wrote from
London at the beginning of the war that the British navy was at our
disposal for the asking.

Great Britain's change of attitude toward the United States was so
marked that some writers have naïvely concluded that a secret treaty of
alliance between the two countries was made in 1897.  The absurdity of
such a statement was pointed out by Senator Lodge several years ago.
England's change of attitude is not difficult to understand.  For a
hundred years after the battle of Trafalgar, England had pursued the
policy of maintaining a navy large enough to meet all comers.  With the
rapid growth of other navies during the closing years of the nineteenth
century, England realized that she