The Project Gutenberg eBook, New York Times Current History; The European War, Vol 2, No. 2, May, 1915, by Various This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere at no cost and with almost no restrictions whatsoever. You may copy it, give it away or re-use it under the terms of the Project Gutenberg License included with this eBook or online at www.gutenberg.net Title: New York Times Current History; The European War, Vol 2, No. 2, May, 1915 April-September, 1915 Author: Various Release Date: March 27, 2005 [eBook #15479] Language: English Character set encoding: ISO-646-US (US-ASCII) ***START OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK NEW YORK TIMES CURRENT HISTORY; THE EUROPEAN WAR, VOL 2, NO. 2, MAY, 1915*** E-text prepared by Juliet Sutherland, Linda Cantoni, Joshua Hutchinson, and the Project Gutenberg Online Distributed Proofreading Team Note: Project Gutenberg also has an HTML version of this file which includes the original illustrations. See 15479-h.htm or 15479-h.zip: (http://www.gutenberg.net/dirs/1/5/4/7/15479/15479-h/15479-h.htm) or (http://www.gutenberg.net/dirs/1/5/4/7/15479/15479-h.zip) The New York Times CURRENT HISTORY A Monthly Magazine THE EUROPEAN WAR, VOLUME II April, 1915-September, 1915 With Index Number II, May, 1915 [Illustration: (logo) THE N.Y. TIMES] New York The New York Times Company 1915 CONTENTS NUMBER II. MAY, 1915. Page GENERAL SIR JOHN FRENCH'S OWN STORY (With Map) 205 The Costly Victory of Neuve Chapelle ROBERTS OF KANDAHAR (Poem) 210 By Sidney Low THE SURRENDER OF PRZEMYSL (With Maps) 211 How Galicia's Strong Fortress Yielded to the Russian Siege THE JESTERS (Poem) 217 By Marion Couthouy Smith LORD KITCHENER ADVERTISES FOR RECRUITS 218 BATTLE OF THE DARDANELLES (With Map) 219 The Disaster that Befell the Allies' Fleet OFFICIAL STORY OF TWO SEA FIGHTS (With Maps) 223 BETWEEN MIDNIGHT AND MORNING (Poem) 231 By Sir Owen Seaman THE GREATEST OF CAMPAIGNS (With Map) 232 The French Official Account Concluded SONNET ON THE BELGIAN EXPATRIATION 250 By Thomas Hardy WAR CORRESPONDENCE (With Map) 251 THE SPIRIT OF MANKIND 258 By Woodrow Wilson "WHAT THE GERMANS SAY ABOUT THEIR OWN METHODS OF WARFARE" 259 (With Facsimile Letters) By Professor Bedier of the College de France THE RECRUIT (Poem) 274 By Hortense Flexner AMERICAN REPLY TO BRITAIN'S BLOCKADE ORDER 275 By William J. Bryan GERMANY'S CONDITIONS OF PEACE 279 By Dr. Bernhard Dernburg THE ALLIES' CONDITIONS OF PEACE 282 By Sir Edward Grey SOUTH AFRICA'S ROMANTIC BLUE PAPER (With Map) 284 THE BELLS OF BERLIN (Poem) 289 From _Punch_ of London WARFARE AND BRITISH LABOR 290 By Earl Kitchener SAVIORS OF EUROPE 292 By Rene Bazin BRITAIN'S PERIL OF STRIKES AND DRINK 293 By Lloyd George ITALY'S EVOLUTION AS REFLECTED BY HER PRESS 301 SOME RUSES DE GUERRE (Poem) 304 By A.M. Wakeman THE EUROPEAN WAR AS SEEN BY CARTOONISTS 305 FACSIMILE OF A BELGIAN BREAD-CHECK 329 TO A GERMAN APOLOGIST (Poem) 329 By Beatrice Barry AMERICA'S NEUTRALITY 330 By Count Albert Apponyi NEUTRAL SPIRIT OF THE SWISS 335 An Interview with President Motta TO KING AND PEOPLE (Poem) 336 By Walter Sichel A SWISS VIEW OF GERMANY 337 By Maurice Millioud THE LAND OF MAETERLINCK 344 By Alfred Sutro AMERICA AND PROHIBITION RUSSIA 345 By Isabel F. Hapgood THE MOTHER'S SONG (Poem) 350 By Cecilia Reynolds Robertson PAN-AMERICAN RELATIONS AS AFFECTED BY THE WAR 351 By Huntington Wilson AN EASTER MESSAGE (Poem) 357 By Beatrice Barry AN INTERVIEW ON THE WAR WITH HENRY JAMES 358 By Preston Lockwood A TALK WITH BELGIUM'S GOVERNOR 363 By Edward Lyall Fox A CHARGE IN THE DARK (Poem) 365 By O.C.A. Child A NEW POLAND 366 By Gustave Herve "WITH THE HONORS OF WAR" 368 By Wythe Williams GENERAL FOCH, THE MAN OF YPRES 373 THE UNREMEMBERED DEAD (Poem) 377 By Ella A. Fanning CANADA AND BRITAIN'S WAR UNION 378 By Edward W. Thomson ENGLAND (Poem) 384 By John E. Dolson AMERICAN AID OF FRANCE 385 By Eugene Brieux A FAREWELL (Poem) 387 By Edna Mead STORIES OF FRENCH COURAGE 388 By Edwin L. Shuman A TROOPER'S SOLILOQUY (Poem) 392 By O.C.A. Child AMERICAN UNFRIENDLINESS 393 By Maximilian Harden ENDOWED WITH A NOBLE FIRE OF BLOOD 395 By A. Kouprine CHRONOLOGY OF THE WAR 396 THE DAY (Poem) 408 By Henry Chappell [Illustration: COMMANDER THIERICHENS Commander of the German commerce-raider Prinz Eitel Friedrich, which sank the American sailing ship William P. Frye.] [Illustration: THE GRAND DUCHESS OF LUXEMBURG Whose little State was first occupied by the German forces. (Photo from George Grantham Bain.)] The New York Times CURRENT HISTORY A MONTHLY MAGAZINE THE EUROPEAN WAR MAY, 1915 General Sir John French's Own Story The Costly Victory of Neuve Chapelle _LONDON, April 14.--Field Marshal Sir John French, commander of the British expeditionary forces on the Continent, reports the British losses in the three days' fighting at Neuve Chapelle last month, as follows: Killed, 190 officers, 2,337 men; wounded, 359 officers, 8,174 other ranks; missing, 23 officers, 1,728 men; total casualties, 12,811. The report continues:_ The enemy left several thousand dead on the field, and we have positive information that upward of 12,000 wounded were removed by trains. Thirty officers and 1,657 of other ranks were captured. _The British commander's dispatch concerning the battle is long, and says, among other things:_ Considerable delay occurred after the capture of Neuve Chapelle, and the infantry was greatly disorganized. I am of the opinion that this delay would not have occurred had the clearly expressed order of the general officer commanding the First Army been more carefully observed. _Field Marshal Sir John French's report, which covers the battles of Neuve Chapelle and St. Eloi under date of April 5, was published in the official Gazette today. The Commander in Chief writes:_ The event of chief interest and importance which has taken place is the victory achieved over the enemy in the battle of Neuve Chapelle, which was fought on March 10, 11, and 12. The main attack was delivered by the troops of the First Army under command of General Sir Douglas Haig, supported by a large force of heavy artillery, a division of cavalry, and some infantry of the General Reserve. Secondary and holding attacks and demonstrations were made along the front of the Second Army, under direction of its commander, Sir Horace Smith-Dorrien. While the success attained was due to the magnificent bearing and indomitable courage displayed by the troops of the Fourth and Indian Corps, I consider that the able and skillful dispositions which were made by the general officer commanding the First Army contributed largely to the defeat of the enemy and to the capture of his position. The energy and vigor with which General Sir Douglas Haig handled his command show him to be a leader of great ability and power. Another action of considerable importance was brought about by a surprise attack made by the Germans on March 14 against the Twenty-seventh Division holding the trenches east of St. Eloi. A large force of artillery was concentrated in this area under the cover of a mist and a heavy volume of fire was suddenly brought to bear on the trenches. At 5 o'clock in the afternoon this artillery attack was accompanied by two mine explosions, and in the confusion caused by these and by the suddenness of the attack the position of St. Eloi was captured and held for some hours by the enemy. Well-directed and vigorous counter-attacks, in which the troops of the Fifth Army Corps showed great bravery and determination, restored the situation by the evening of the 15th. _The dispatch describes further operations, saying:_ On Feb. 6 a brilliant action by the troops of the First Corps materially improved our position in the area south of La Bassee Canal. During the previous night parties of the Irish Guards and the Third Battalion of the Coldstream Guards had succeeded in gaining ground from which a converging fire could be directed on the flanks and rear of certain brick stacks occupied by the Germans, which had been for some time a source of considerable annoyance. At 2 P.M. the affair commenced with a severe bombardment of the brick stacks and the enemy's trenches. A brisk attack by the Third Battalion of the Coldstream Guards and Irish Guards from our trenches west of the brick stacks followed and was supported by the fire from the flanking position which had been seized the previous night by the same regiments. The attack succeeded, the brick stacks were occupied without difficulty, and a line was established north and south through a point about forty yards east of the brick stacks. The casualties suffered by the Fifth Corps throughout the period under review, and particularly during the month of February, have been heavier than those on other parts of the line. I regret this, but do not think, taking all circumstances into consideration, that they were unduly numerous. The position then occupied by the Fifth Corps had always been a very vulnerable part of our line. The ground was marshy, and trenches were most difficult to construct and maintain. The Twenty-seventh and Twenty-eighth Divisions of the Fifth Corps had no previous experience in European warfare, and a number of the units composing the corps had only recently returned from service in tropical climates. In consequence, the hardships of a rigorous Winter campaign fell with greater weight upon these divisions than upon any other in the command. Chiefly owing to these causes the Fifth Corps, up to the beginning of March, was constantly engaged in counter-attacks to retake trenches and ground which had been lost. In their difficult and arduous task, however, the troops displayed the utmost gallantry and devotion, and it is most creditable to the skill and energy of their leaders that I am able to report how well they have surmounted all their difficulties and that the ground first taken over by them is still intact and held with little greater loss than is incurred by the troops in all other parts of the line. _Describing an attack on the German trenches near St. Eloi on Feb. 28 by Princess Patricia's Regiment, of the Canadian contingent, under command of Lieut. C.E. Crabbe, the Commander in Chief says:_ The services performed by this distinguished corps have continued to be very valuable since I had occasion to refer to them in my last dispatch. They have been most ably organized and trained and were commanded by Lieut. Colonel F.D. Farquhar, D.S.O., who I deeply regret to say was killed while superintending some trench work on March 20. His loss will be deeply felt. _Emphasizing the co-operation of the British and French forces and the new role in warfare assumed by the cavalry, the Commander in Chief writes:_ During the month of February I arranged with General Foch to render the Ninth French Corps, holding the trenches to my left, some much-needed rest by sending the three divisions of the British Cavalry Corps to hold a portion of the French trenches, each division for a period of ten days alternately. [Illustration: Map showing the field of the Battle of Neuve Chapelle and its position in the Allied line.] It was very gratifying to me to note once again in this campaign the eager readiness which the cavalry displayed to undertake a role which does not properly belong to them in order to support and assist their French comrades. In carrying out this work the leader, officers, and men displayed the same skill and energy which I have had reason to comment upon in former dispatches. _Referring to Neuve Chapelle and the considerations leading up to this, the Field Marshal says:_ About the end of February many vital considerations induced me to believe that a vigorous offensive movement by the troops under my command should be planned and carried out at the earliest possible moment. Among the more important reasons which convinced me of this necessity were the general aspect of the allied situation throughout Europe, and particularly the marked success of the Russian Army in repelling the violent onslaughts of Marshal von Hindenburg; the apparent weakening of the enemy on my front, and the necessity for assisting our Russian allies to the utmost by holding as many hostile troops as possible in the western theatre; the efforts to this end which were being made by the French forces at Arras and in Champagne, and--perhaps the most weighty consideration of all--the need of fostering the offensive spirit in the troops under my command after the trying and possibly enervating experiences which they had gone through of a severe Winter in the trenches. In a former dispatch I commented upon the difficulties and drawbacks which the Winter weather in this climate imposes upon a vigorous offensive. Early in March these difficulties became greatly lessened by the drying up of the country and by spells of brighter weather. I do not propose in this dispatch to enter at length into the considerations which actuated me in deciding upon the plan, time, and place of my attack. As mentioned above, the main attack was carried out by units of the First Army, supported by troops of the Second Army and the general reserve. The object of the main attack was to be the capture of the village of Neuve Chapelle and the enemy's position at that point, and the establishment of our line as far forward as possible to the east of that place. The object, nature, and scope of the attack and the instructions for the conduct of the operations were communicated by me to Sir Douglas Haig in a secret memorandum, dated Feb. 19. _After describing the main topographical features of the battlefield and showing how the Germans had established a strong post with numerous machine guns among the big houses, behind walls and in orchards which flanked the approaches to the village, Sir John proceeds:_ The battle opened at 7:30 o'clock the morning of the 10th of March by a powerful bombardment of the enemy's position in Neuve Chapelle. The artillery bombardment had been well prepared and was most effective, except on the extreme northern portion of the front of attack. At 8:05 o'clock the Twenty-third and Twenty-fifth Brigades of the Eighth Division assaulted the German trenches on the northwest of the village. At the same hour the Garhwal Brigade of the Meerut (British India) Division, which occupied a position to the south of Neuve Chapelle, assaulted the German trenches in its front. The Garhwal Brigade and the Twenty-fifth Brigade carried the enemy's lines of intrenchment, where the wire entanglements had been almost entirely swept away by our shrapnel fire. The Twenty-third Brigade, however, on the northeast, was held up by wire entanglements which were not sufficiently cut. At 8:05 o'clock the artillery was turned on Neuve Chapelle, and at 8:35 o'clock the advance of the infantry was continued. The Twenty-fifth and the Garhwal Brigades pushed on eastward and northeastward, respectively, and succeeded in getting a foothold in the village. The Twenty-third Brigade was still held up in front of the enemy's wire entanglements, and could not progress. Heavy losses were suffered, especially in the Middlesex Regiment and the Scottish Rifles. The progress, however, of the Twenty-fifth Brigade into Neuve Chapelle immediately to the south of the Twenty-third Brigade had the effect of turning the southern flank of the enemy's defenses in front of the Twenty-third Brigade. This fact, combined with powerful artillery support, enabled the Twenty-third Brigade to get forward between 10 and 11 A.M., and by 11 o'clock the whole of the village of Neuve Chapelle and the roads leading northward and southwestward from the eastern end of that village were in our hands. During this time our artillery completely cut off the village and surrounding country from any German reinforcements which could be thrown into the fight to restore the situation, by means of a curtain of shrapnel fire. Prisoners subsequently reported that all attempts at reinforcing the front line were checked. Steps were at once taken to consolidate the positions won. Considerable delay occurred after the capture of the Neuve Chapelle position. The infantry was greatly disorganized by the violent nature of the attack and by its passage through the enemy's trenches and the buildings of the village. It was necessary to get the units to some extent together before pushing on. The telephonic communication being cut by the enemy's fire rendered communication between the front and the rear most difficult. The fact of the left of the Twenty-third Brigade having been held up had kept back the Eighth Division and had involved a portion of the Twenty-fifth Brigade in fighting to the north, out of its proper direction of advance. All this required adjustment. An orchard held by the enemy north of Neuve Chapelle also threatened the flank of an advance toward the Aubers Bridge. I am of the opinion that this delay would not have occurred had the clearly expressed order of the general officer commanding the First Army been carefully observed. The difficulties above enumerated might have been overcome earlier in the day if the general officer commanding the Fourth Corps had been able to bring his reserve brigades more speedily into action. As it was, a further advance did not commence before 3:30 o'clock. The Twenty-first Brigade was able to form up in the open on the left without a shot being fired at it, thus showing that, at the time, the enemy's resistance had been paralyzed. The brigade pushed forward in the direction of Moulin-du-Pietre. At first it made good progress, but was subsequently held up by machine gun fire from houses and from a defended work in the line of the German intrenchments opposite the right of the Twenty-second Brigade. Further to the south the Twenty-fourth Brigade, which had been directed on Pietre, was similarly held up by machine guns in houses and trenches. At the road junction, 600 yards to the northwest of Pietre, the Twenty-fifth Brigade, on the right of the Twenty-fourth, was also held up by machine guns from a bridge held by the Germans over the River Les Layes, which is situated to the northwest of the Bois du Biez. While two brigades of the Meerut Division were establishing themselves on a new line the Dehra Dun Brigade, supported by the Jullunder Brigade of the Lahore Division, moved to the attack of the Bois du Biez, but were held up on the line of the River Les Layes by a German post at the bridge, which enfiladed them and brought them to a standstill. The defended bridge over the Les Layes and its neighborhood immediately assumed considerable importance. While the artillery fire was brought to bear, as far as circumstances would permit, on this point, General Sir Douglas Haig directed the First Corps to dispatch one or more battalions of the First Brigade in support of the troops attacking the bridge. Three battalions were thus sent to Richebourg St. Vaast. Darkness coming on and the enemy having brought up reinforcements, no further progress could be made, and the Indian Corps and the Fourth Corps proceeded to consolidate the position they had gained. While the operations, which I have thus briefly reported, were going on, the First Corps, in accordance with orders, delivered an attack in the morning from Givenchy simultaneously with that against Neuve Chapelle, but as the enemy's wire was insufficiently cut very little progress could be made, and the troops at this point did little more than hold fast to the Germans in front of them. On the following day, March 11, the attack was renewed by the Fourth and Indian Corps, but it was soon seen that further advance would be impossible until the artillery had dealt effectively with the various houses and defended localities which had held the troops up along the entire front. Efforts were made to direct the artillery fire accordingly, but, owing to the weather conditions, which did not permit of aerial observations, and the fact that nearly all the telephone communications between the artillery observers and their batteries had been cut, it was impossible to do so with sufficient accuracy. When our troops, who were pressing forward, occupied a house there, it was not possible to stop our artillery fire, and the infantry had to be withdrawn. As most of the objects for which the operations had been undertaken had been attained, and as there were reasons why I considered it inadvisable to continue the attack at that time, I directed General Sir Douglas Haig on the night of the 12th to hold and consolidate the ground which had been gained by the Fourth and Indian Corps, and suspend further offensive operations for the present. The losses during these three days' fighting were, I regret to say, very severe, numbering 190 officers and 2,337 of other ranks killed, 359 officers and 8,174 of other ranks wounded, and 23 officers and 1,720 of other ranks missing. But the results attained were, in my opinion, wide and far-reaching. _Referring to the severity of the casualties in action, the Commander in Chief writes:_ I can well understand how deeply these casualties are felt by the nation at large, but each daily report shows clearly that they are endured on at least an equal scale by all the combatants engaged throughout Europe, friends and foe alike. In war as it is today, between civilized nations armed to the teeth with the present deadly rifle and machine gun, heavy casualties are absolutely unavoidable. For the slightest undue exposure the heaviest toll is exacted. The power of defense conferred by modern weapons is the main cause for the long duration of the battles of the present day, and it is this fact which mainly accounts for such loss and waste of life. Both one and the other can, however, be shortened and lessened if attacks can be supported by a most efficient and powerful force of artillery available; but an almost unlimited supply of ammunition is necessary, and a most liberal discretionary power as to its use must be given to artillery commanders. I am confident that this is the only means by which great results can be obtained with a minimum of loss. ROBERTS OF KANDAHAR. SIDNEY LOW, in The London Times. Through the long years of peril and of strife, He faced Death oft, and Death forbore to slay, Reserving for its sacrificial Day, The garnered treasure of his full-crowned life; So saved him till the furrowed soil was rife, With the rich tillage of our noblest dead; Then reaped the offering of his honored head, In that red field of harvest, where he died, With the embattled legions at his side. The Surrender of Przemysl How Galicia's Strong Fortress Yielded to the Russian Siege The Austrian fortress of Przemysl fell on March 22, 1915, after an investment and siege which lasted, with one short interruption, for nearly four months. This important event was celebrated by a Te Deum of thanksgiving in the presence of the Czar and the General Staff. The importance to the Russians of the capitulation of Przemysl is suggested by the fact that about 120,000 prisoners were reported taken when the Austrians yielded. Until this was effected the Russians could not venture upon a serious invasion of Hungary, and the investing troops who were then freed were more numerous than the defenders. [By the Correspondent of The London Times.] PETROGRAD, March 22. The Minister of War has informed me that he has just received a telegram from the Grand Duke Nicholas announcing the fall of Przemysl. The fall of Przemysl marks the most important event of the Russian campaign this year. It finally and irrevocably consolidates the position of the Russians in Galicia. The Austro-German armies are deprived of the incentive hitherto held out to them of relieving the isolated remnant of their former dominion. The besieging army will be freed for other purposes. From information previously published the garrison aggregated about 25,000 men, hence the investing forces, which must always be at least four times as great as the garrison, represent not less than 100,000 men. From all the information lately received from both Russian and neutral sources, the position of the Austro-German armies in the Carpathians has become distinctly critical. The reinforcements for the gallant troops of General Brusiloff, General Radko Dmitrieff, and other commanders are bound to exercise an enormous influence on the future course of the campaign in the Carpathians. All honor and credit are given by the Russians to the garrison of Przemysl and General Kusmanek. Russian officers ever had the highest opinion of the personality of the commandant. I heard from those who fought under General Radko Dmitrieff in the early stages of the Galician campaign that when our troops, after sweeping away the resistance at Lwow and Jaroslau, loudly knocked at the doors of the fortress of Przemysl, they met with a stern rebuff. In reply to the summons of the Russians to surrender the keys the commandant wrote a curt and dignified note remarking that he considered it beyond his own dignity or the dignity of the Russian General to discuss the surrender of the fortress before it had exhausted all its powers of resistance. During the second invasion of Poland by the Austro-German armies the enemy's lines swept up to and just beyond Przemysl, interrupting the investment of the fortress. The wave of the Austrian invasion began to subside at the end of the first week in November. Only then could we begin the siege of the mighty fortress, which proved successful after the lapse of four months. The first Russian attempt to storm Przemysl without previous bombardment, which followed immediately upon the commandant's refusal to surrender, resulted in very great loss of life to no purpose. Thereafter it was decided to abstain from further attempts to take the fortress until our siege guns could be placed and a preliminary bombardment could sufficiently facilitate the task of the besiegers. Meanwhile, although the fortress and town were duly invested, our lines were somewhat remote from the outlying forts, and the peasants of adjacent villages were, it is said, able to pass freely to and from the town of Przemysl--a fact which would enable the inhabitants to obtain supplies. From all accounts neither the garrison nor the inhabitants were reduced to very great straits for food. The announcement made at the time of the first investment of the fortress that provisions and supplies would easily last till May was, however, obviously exaggerated. I understand that heavy siege guns were ready to be conveyed to Przemysl at the end of January, but that the Russian military authorities decided to postpone their departure in view of the determined attempts made by the Austro-German forces to pierce the Russian lines in the Carpathians in order to relieve the fortress, which, if successful, might have endangered the safety of the siege material. Owing to this fact the bombardment of Przemysl began only about a fortnight ago, when the Austro-German offensive had so far weakened as to satisfy the Russian authorities that there was no further danger from this quarter. The concluding stages of the siege have been related in the dispatches from the Field Headquarters during the past week. The capture of the dominating heights in the eastern sector followed close upon the first bombardment. The final desperate sortie led by General Kusmanek at the head of the Twenty-third Division of the Honved precipitated the end. The remnants of the garrison were unable to man the works extending to a thirty-mile periphery. The loss of the western approaches left General Kusmanek no alternative but to surrender. He had exhausted his ammunition and used up his effectives. His messages for help were either intercepted or unanswered. The assailants broke down the last resistance. The most important strategical point in the whole of Galicia is now in Russian hands. TE DEUM AT HEADQUARTERS. PETROGRAD, March 22. _The following official communique was issued from the Main Headquarters this morning:_ The fortress of Przemysl has surrendered to our troops. At the Headquarters of the Commander in Chief a Te Deum of thanksgiving was celebrated in the presence of the Czar, the Grand Duke Nicholas, Commander in Chief, and all the staff. _The following communique from the Great Headquarters is issued here today:_ Northern Front.--From the Niemen to the Vistula and on the left bank of the latter river there has been no important change. Our troops advancing from Tauroggen captured, after a struggle, Laugszargen, (near the frontier of East Prussia,) where they took prisoners and seized an ammunition depot and engineers' stores. The Carpathians.--There has been furious fighting on the roads to Bartfeld (in Hungary) in the valleys of the Ondawa and Laborcz. Near the Lupkow Pass and on the left bank of the Upper San our troops have advanced successfully, forcing the way with rifle fire and with the bayonet. In the course of the day we took 2,500 prisoners, including fifty officers and four machine guns. In the direction of Munkacz the Germans, in close formation, attacked our positions at Rossokhatch, Oravtchik, and Kosziowa, but were everywhere driven back by our fire and by our counter-attacks with severe losses. In Galicia there has been a snowstorm. Przemysl.--On the night of the 21st there was a fierce artillery fire round Przemysl. Portions of the garrison who once more tried to effect a sortie toward the northeast toward Oikowic were driven back within the circle of forts with heavy losses. _Note.--This portion of the communique was evidently drafted before the fall of Przemysl took place, and the communique proceeds:_ In recognition of the joyous event of the fall of Przemysl the Czar has conferred upon the Grand Duke Nicholas the Second Class of the Order of St. George and the Third Class of the same order on General Ivanoff, the commander of the besieging army. [Illustration: Map of the Siege of Przemysl. The small triangles indicate outlying fortified hills with their height in feet.] COLLECTING THE ARMS. _By Hamilton Fyfe, Correspondent of The London Daily Mail._ PETROGRAD, March 23. Advance detachments of Russian troops entered Przemysl last night. The business of collecting the arms is proceeding. I believe the officers will be allowed to keep their swords. Great surprise has been caused here by a statement that the number of troops captured exceeds three army corps. Possibly on account of the snowstorm no further telegram has been received from the Grand Duke Nicholas, and no details of the fall of the garrison have yet been officially announced. I have, however, received the definite assurance of a very high authority that the force which has surrendered includes nine Generals, over 2,000 officers, and 130,000 men. In spite of the authority of my informant, I am still inclined to await confirmation of these figures. The leading military organ, the Russki Invalid, says that the garrison was known to number 60,000 men and that it had been swelled to some extent by the additional forces drafted in before the investment began. The Retch estimates the total at 80,000, and a semi-official announcement also places the strength of the garrison at that figure, excluding artillery and also the men belonging to the auxiliary and technical services. There is an equal difference of opinion regarding the number of guns taken. The estimates vary from 1,000 to 2,000. What is known for certain is that the fortress contained 600 big guns of the newest type and a number of small, older pieces. The characteristic spirit in which Russia is waging war is shown by the service of thanksgiving to God which was held immediately the news of the fall of the fortress reached the Grand Duke's headquarters. The Czar was there to join with the staff in offering humble gratitude to the Almighty for the great victory accorded to the Russian arms. The first crowds which gathered here yesterday to rejoice over the great news moved with one consent to the Kazan Cathedral, where they sang the national hymn and crossed themselves reverently before the holy, wonder-working picture of Kazan, the Mother of God. In spite of the heaviest snowstorm of the Winter, which made the streets impassable and stopped the tramway cars, the Nevski Prospekt rang all the afternoon and evening with the sound of voices raised in patriotic song. Przemysl is admitted to be the first spectacular success of the war on the side of the Allies. It is not surprising that the nation is proud and delighted, yet so generous is the Russian mind that there mingle with its triumph admiration and sympathy for the garrison which was compelled to surrender after a long, brave resistance. Popular imagination has been thrilled by the story of the last desperate sortie, which will take a high place in the history of modern war. When toward the end of the week the hope of relief, which had so long buoyed up the defenders, was with heavy, resolved hearts abandoned, General Kousmanek resolved to try to save at all events some portion of his best troops by sending them to fight a way out. From the ranks, thinned terribly by casualties and also by typhus and other diseases caused through hunger and the unhealthy state of the town, he selected 20,000 men and served out to them five days' reduced rations, which were all he had left. He also supplied them with new boots in order to give them as good a chance as possible to join their comrades in the Carpathians, whose summits could be seen from Przemysl in the shining, warm Spring sunshine. It was a hopeless enterprise, pitifully futile. It is true that the Austrian armies sent to relieve the city were only a few days' march distant, but even if the 20,000 had cut a way through the investing force they would have found another Russian army between them and their fellow-countrymen. General Kousmanek, before they started, addressed them. In a rousing speech he said: Soldiers, for nearly half a year, in spite of cold and hunger, you have defended the fortress intrusted to you. The eyes of the world are fixed on you. Millions at home are waiting with painful eagerness to hear the news of your success. The honor of the army and our fatherland requires us to make a superhuman effort. Around us lies the iron ring of the enemy. Burst a way through it and join your comrades who have been fighting so bravely for you and are now so near. I have given you the last of our supplies of food. I charge you to go forward and sweep the foe aside. After our many gallant and glorious fights we must not fall into the hands of the Russians like sheep; we must and will break through. In case this appeal to the men's fighting spirit were ineffective threats were also used to the troops, who were warned by their officers that any who returned to the fortress would be treated as cowards and traitors. After the General's speech the men were told to rest for a few hours. At 4 in the morning they paraded and at 5 the battle began. For nine hours the Austrians hurled themselves against the iron ring, until early in the afternoon, when, broken and battered, the remains of the twenty thousand began to straggle back to the town. Exhausted and disheartened, the garrison was incapable of further effort. In order to prevent useless slaughter General Kousmanek sent officers with a flag of truce to inquire about the terms of surrender. These were arranged very quickly. In spite of the local value of the victory, and the vastness of the captures of material as well as of men, it must not be thought, as many are inclined to think here, that the Novoe Vremya exaggerates dangerously when it compares the effect likely to be produced with that of the fall of Metz and Port Arthur. It certainly brings the end of the Austrians' participation in the war more clearly in sight. But the Austrians will fight for some time yet. What it actually does is to free a large Russian force for the operations against Cracow or to assist in the invasion of Hungary. What is the strength of this force it would be imprudent to divulge, but I can say that it certainly amounts to not less than an "army," (anything from 80,000 to 200,000 men.) Those who are anxious to arrive at a closer figure can calculate by the fact that the Russians had a forty-mile front around Przemysl which was strong enough to repulse attacks at all points. Another very useful consequence is that all the Galician railway system is now in Russian hands. It makes the transport of troops much easier. One further reflection was suggested to me last night by a very distinguished and influential Russian soldier, holding office under the Government. "The method which prevailed at Przemysl was as follows: Instead of rushing against the place and losing heavily, we waited and husbanded our forces until the garrison was unable to hold out any longer. That is the method adopted by the Allies. It must in the course of time force Germany to surrender also. "Up to now we have held our own against her furious sorties. Soon we shall begin to draw more closely our investing lines. Only one end was possible to Przemysl. The fate of Germany is equally sure." Now all eyes are fixed on the Dardanelles. The phrase on every lip is: "When the fall of Constantinople follows, then Prussia must begin to see that the case is hopeless." But we must not deceive ourselves, for even when her allies are defeated Prussia will still be hard to beat. Przemysl must not cause us to slacken our effort in any direction or in the slightest degree. WHAT THE RUSSIANS FOUND Special Cable to THE NEW YORK TIMES. _LONDON, April 3.--The London Times under date Przemysl, March 30, publishes a dispatch from Stanley Washburn, its special correspondent with the Russian armies, who, by courtesy of the Russian high command, is the first foreigner to visit the great Galician fortress since its fall. He says:_ Przemysl is a story of an impregnable fortress two or three times over-garrisoned with patient, haggard soldiers starving in trenches, and sleek, faultlessly dressed officers living off the fat of the land in fashionable hotels and restaurants. The siege started with a total population within the lines of investment of approximately 200,000. Experts estimate that the fortress could have been held with 50,000 or 60,000 men against any forces the Russians could bring against it. It is probable that such supplies as there were were uneconomically expended, with the result that when the push came the situation was at once acute, and the suffering of all classes save the officers became general. First the cavalry and transport horses were consumed. Then everything available. Cats were sold at 8 shillings, and fair-sized dogs at a sovereign. While the garrison became thin and half starved, the mode of life of the officers in the town remained unchanged. The Cafe Sieber was constantly well filled with dilettante officers who gossipped and played cards and billiards and led the life to which they were accustomed in Vienna. Apparently very few shared any of the hardships of their men or made any effort to relieve their condition. At the Hotel Royal until the last, the officers had their three meals a day, with fresh meat, cigars, cigarettes, wines, and every luxury, while, as a witness has informed me, their own orderlies and servants begged for a slice of bread. There can be no question that ultimate surrender was due to the fact that the garrison was on the verge of starvation, while the officers' diet was merely threatened with curtailment. Witnesses state that private soldiers were seen actually to fall in the streets from lack of nourishment. The officers are reported to have retained their private thoroughbred riding horses until the day before the surrender, when 2,000 of them were killed to prevent them from falling into the hands of the Russians. A Russian officer of high rank informed me that when he entered the town hundreds of these bodies of beautiful thoroughbred horses were to be seen with half-crazed Austrian and Hungarian soldiers tearing into the bodies with their faces and hands smeared with red blood as they devoured the raw flesh. [Illustration: Map showing the scene of action between Przemysl and Cracow and the Carpathian Passes.] The Russians were utterly amazed at the casual reception which they received. The Austrian officers showed not the slightest sign of being disconcerted or humiliated at the collapse of their fortress. The first Russian effort was at once to relieve the condition of the garrison and civilians. Owing to the destruction of the bridge this was delayed, but soon with remarkable efficiency distribution depots were opened everywhere and the most pressing needs were somewhat relieved. The entire conduct of the siege on the part of the garrison seems wholly without explanation. The Austrians had throughout plenty of ammunition, and they certainly grossly outnumbered the Russians; yet they made but one recent effort to break out, which occurred three days before the surrender. Civilians inform me that they gladly welcome the Russians and that the first troops who entered were greeted with cheers, while the garrison was frankly pleased that the siege was over and their troubles at an end. As an example of overofficering it may be stated that General Kusmanek had seventy-five officers on his staff, while General Artamonov, the acting Russian Governor, had but four on his immediate staff. The removal of the prisoners is proceeding with great efficiency. They are going out at the rate of about 10,000 a day. The docility of the captives is indicated by the fact that the Russian guards attached to the prisoners' columns number about one for every hundred prisoners. They are all strung out for miles between the fortress and Lemberg. The prisoners are so eager to get out and to see the last of the war that they follow the instructions of their captors like children. All the civilians as well as prisoners I have talked with are unanimous in their praise of the Russian officers and soldiers, who have shown nothing but kindness and delicacy of feeling since their entrance into the fortress. This consideration strikes me as being utterly wasted on the captured officers, who treat the situation superciliously and are quite complacent in their relations with the Russians. THE JESTERS. By MARION COUTHOUY SMITH. Ev'n he, the master of the songs of life, May speak at times with less than certain sound-- "He jests at scars who never felt a wound." So runs his word! Yet on the verge of strife, They jest not who have never known the knife; They tremble who in the waiting ranks are found, While those scarred deep on many a battle-ground Sing to the throbbing of the drum and fife. They laugh who know the open, fearless breast, The thrust, the steel-point, and the spreading stain; Whose flesh is hardened to the searing test, Whose souls are tempered to a high disdain. Theirs is the lifted brow, the gallant jest, The long last breath, that holds a victor-strain. Lord Kitchener Advertises for Recruits [Illustration: _This map shows the comparative distances from London of Ostend and of some English towns. London is in the exact center of the map._ If the German Army were in Manchester. If the German Army were in Manchester, every fit man in the country would enlist without a moment's delay. Do you realise that the German Army is now at Ostend, only 125 miles away--or 40 miles nearer to London than is Manchester? How much nearer must the Germans come before _you_ do something to stop them? The German Army must be beaten in Belgium. The time to do it is _now_. Will you help? Yes? Then enlist _TODAY_. _God Save the King._ (Facsimile of an advertisement that appeared in The London Times, March 17, 1915.)] Battle of the Dardanelles The Disaster That Befell the Allies' Fleet AS THE TURKS SAW IT. _BERLIN, March 22, (via London, 11:33 A.M.)--The correspondent at Constantinople of the Wolff Bureau telegraphed today a description of the fighting at the Dardanelles on Thursday, March 18, in which the French battleship Bouvet and two British battleships were sent to the bottom. An abridgment of the correspondent's story follows:_ The efforts of the Allies to force the Strait of the Dardanelles reached their climax in an artillery duel on Thursday, March 18, which lasted seven hours. The entire atmosphere around the Turkish forts was darkened by clouds of smoke from exploding shells and quantities of earth thrown into the air by the projectiles of the French and British warships. The earth trembled for miles around. The Allies entered the strait at 11:30 in the morning, and shelled the town of Chank Kale. Four French and five British warships took part in the beginning. This engagement reached its climax at 1:30, when the fire of the Allies was concentrated upon Fort Hamidieh and the adjacent fortified positions. The attack of modern marine artillery upon strong land forts presented an interesting as well as a terrifying spectacle. At times the forts were completely enveloped in smoke. At 2 o'clock the Allies changed their tactics and concentrated their fire upon individual batteries, but it was evident that they found difficulty in getting the range. Many of the shells fell short, casting up pillars of water, or went over the forts to explode in the town. At 3:15, when the bombardment was at its hottest, the French battleship Bouvet was seen to be sinking at the stern. A moment later her bows swung clear of the water, and she was seen going down. Cheers from the Turkish garrisons and forts greeted this sight. Torpedo boats and other craft of the Allies hurried to the rescue, but they were successful in saving only a few men. Besides having been struck by a mine, the Bouvet was severely damaged above the water line by shell fire. One projectile struck her forward deck. A mast also was shot away and hung overboard. It could be seen that the Bouvet when she sank was endeavoring to gain the mouth of the strait. This, however, was difficult, owing, apparently, to the fact that her machinery had been damaged. Shortly after the sinking of the Bouvet a British ship was struck on the deck squarely amidship and compelled to withdraw from the fight. Then another British vessel was badly damaged, and at 3:45 was seen to retire under a terrific fire from the Turkish battery. This vessel ran in toward the shore. For a full hour the Allies tried to protect her with their guns, but it was apparent that she was destined for destruction. Eight effective hits showed the hopelessness of the situation for this vessel. She then withdrew toward the mouth of the Dardanelles, which she reached in a few minutes under a hail of shells. The forts continued firing until the Allies were out of range. This was the first day when the warships attacking the Dardanelles kept within range of the Turkish guns for any considerable length of time. The result for them was terrible, owing to the excellent marksmanship from the Turkish batteries. The Allies fired on this day 2,000 shells without silencing one shore battery. The result has inspired the Turks with confidence, and they are looking forward to further engagements with calm assurance. ELIMINATION OF MINES. _The London Times naval correspondent writes, in its issue of March 20:_ The further attack upon the inner forts at the Dardanelles, which was resumed by the allied squadrons on Thursday, has resulted, unfortunately, but not altogether unexpectedly, in some loss of ships and gallant lives. The clear and candid dispatch in which the operations are described attributes the loss of the ships to floating mines, which were probably released to drift down with the current in such large numbers that the usual method of evading these machines was unavailable. This danger, it is said, will require special treatment. Presumably the area having been swept clear of anchored mines, it was not considered necessary to take other precautions than such as were concerned with the movement of the battleships themselves. The satisfactory feature of the operations is that the ships maintained their superiority over the forts, and succeeded in silencing them after a few hours' bombardment. The sinking of the battleships occurred later in the afternoon, and it would seem at a time when a portion of the naval force was making a further advance to cover the mine-sweeping operations. There is nothing in the dispatch which indicates anything but the eventual success of the work, nor that the defenses have proved more formidable than was anticipated. The danger from floating mines may have been somewhat underestimated, but it is one that can be met and is most unlikely to form a decisive factor. Manifestly the Turks, with their German advisers, have done their utmost to repair, by means of howitzers and field guns, the destruction of the fixed defenses; but it is not likely that any temporary expedients will prove more than troublesome to the passage of the fleet. The determination of the Allies to make a satisfactory ending of the operations is shown by the immediate dispatch of reinforcing ships, and by the fact that ample naval and military forces are available on the spot. Every one will regret that illness has obliged Vice Admiral Carden to relinquish the chief command, but this is now in the very capable hands of Vice Admiral Robeck. BRITISH OFFICIAL REPORT. [From The London Times, March 20, 1915.] _After ten days of mine-sweeping inside the Dardanelles the British and French fleets made a general attack on the fortresses at the Narrows on Thursday. After about three hours' bombardment all the forts ceased firing._ _Three battleships were lost in these operations by striking mines--the French Bouvet, and the Irresistible and the Ocean. The British crews were practically all saved, but nearly the whole of the men on the Bouvet perished._ _The Secretary of the Admiralty issued the following statement last night:_ Mine-sweeping having been in progress during the last ten days inside the strait, a general attack was delivered by the British and French fleets yesterday morning upon the fortresses at the Narrows of the Dardanelles. At 10:45 A.M. Queen Elizabeth, Inflexible, Agamemnon, and Lord Nelson bombarded Forts J, L, T, U, and V; while Triumph and Prince George fired at Batteries F, E, and H. A heavy fire was opened on the ships from howitzers and field guns. At 12:22 the French squadron, consisting of the Suffren, Gaulois, Charlemagne, and Bouvet, advanced up the Dardanelles to engage the forts at closer range. Forts J, U, F, and E replied strongly. Their fire was silenced by the ten battleships inside the strait, all the ships being hit several times during this part of the action. By 1:25 P.M. all forts had ceased firing. Vengeance, Irresistible, Albion, Ocean, Swiftsure, and Majestic then advanced to relieve the six old battleships inside the strait. As the French squadron, which had engaged the forts in the most brilliant fashion was passing out, Bouvet was blown up by a drifting mine and sank in thirty-six fathoms north Erenkeui Village in less than three minutes. At 2:36 P.M., the relief battleships renewed the attack on the forts, which again opened fire. The attack on the forts was maintained while the operations of the mine-sweepers continued. At 4:09 Irresistible quitted the line, listing heavily; and at 5:50 she sank, having probably struck a drifting mine. At 6:05, Ocean, also having struck a mine, both vessels sank in deep water, practically the whole of the crews having been removed safely under a hot fire. [Illustration: QUEEN MARY Wife of George V., King of Great Britain and Ireland. _(Photo from Underwood & Underwood.)_] [Illustration: THE RIGHT HON. DAVID LLOYD GEORGE The radical Chancellor of the British Exchequer, upon whom has devolved the task of financing the great war. _(Photo by A. & R. Annan & Sons.)_] The Gaulois was damaged by gun fire. Inflexible had her forward control position hit by a heavy shell, and requires repair. The bombardment of the forts and the mine-sweeping operations terminated when darkness fell. The damage to the forts effected by the prolonged direct fire of the very powerful forces employed cannot yet be estimated, and a further report will follow. The losses of ships were caused by mines drifting with the current which were encountered in areas hitherto swept clear, and this danger will require special treatment. The British casualties in personnel are not heavy, considering the scale of the operations; but practically the whole of the crew of the Bouvet were lost with the ship, an internal explosion having apparently supervened on the explosion of the mine. The Queen and Implacable, which were dispatched from England to replace ships' casualties in anticipation of this operation, are due to arrive immediately, thus bringing the British fleet up to its original strength. The operations are continuing, ample naval and military forces being available on the spot. On the 16th inst., Vice Admiral Carden, who has been incapacitated by illness, was succeeded in the chief command by Rear Admiral John Michael de Robeck, with acting rank of Vice Admiral. THE SCENE IN THE STRAIT. _The London Times publishes this story of an eyewitness:_ TENEDOS, (Aegina,) March 18. This is not so much an account of the five hours' heavy engagement between the Turkish forts and the allied ships which has been fought actually within the Dardanelles today as an impression of the bombardment as seen at a distance of fifteen miles or so from the top of a high, steep hill called Mount St. Elias, at the northern end of Tenedos. Over the ridge of Kum Kale you plainly see, like a great blue lake, the first reach of the Dardanelles up to the narrow neck between Chanak and Kilid Bahr. It was up and down in this stretch of water that the largest vessels of the allied fleet steamed today for over four hours, hurling, with sheets of orange flame from their heavy guns, a constant succession of shells on the forts that guard the Narrows at Chanak, while the Turkish batteries, with a frequency that lessened as the day went on, flashed back at them in reply, with the difference that, while the effects of the Allies' shells were continually manifest in the columns of smoke and dust that were signs of the damage they had wrought, a great number of the enemy's shots fell in the sea hundreds of yards from the bombarding ships, sending torrents of water towering harmlessly into the air. Not that the successes of the day have been won without cost. I saw several ships, French and British, struck by shells that raised volumes of white smoke, and one of the French squadron is toiling slowly home at this moment down by the head and with a list to port, while, so far as one could make out with a glass, several boatloads of men were being taken off her. The ships left their stations between the Turkish and Asiatic coasts and Tenedos early this morning and by 11 they were steaming in line up the Dardanelles. It was 11:45 when the first notable hit was made by an English ship. I could see eight vessels, apparently all battleships, lying in line from the entrance up the strait. The ship furthest up appeared to be the Queen Elizabeth, and I think it was she that fired the shot which exploded the powder magazine at Chanak. A great balloon of white smoke sprang up in the midst of the magazine which leaped out from a fierce, red flame, and reached a great height. When the flame had disappeared the dense smoke continued to grow till it must have been a column hundreds of feet high. [Illustration: [map of the Dardanelles]] In the five minutes that followed this shot three more shells from the Queen Elizabeth fell practically on the same spot, and two minutes later yet another by the side of the smoking ruins. There were now eight battleships, all pre-dreadnoughts, left at Tenedos, and at noon six of them started off in line a-head toward the strait. The English ships already within were passing further up and went out of sight. The bombarding ships were steaming constantly up and down, turning at each end of the stretch, which is about a couple of miles long. A long thin veil of black smoke was drifting slowly westward from the fighting. At about 1:30 Erenkeui Village, standing high on the Asiatic side, received a couple of shells. At 1:45 a division of eight destroyers in line steamed into the entrance of the strait, and a little later the last two battleships from Tenedos joined, the Dublin patrolling outside. An hour later the most striking effect was produced by a shell falling on a fort at Kilid Bahr, which evidently exploded another magazine. A huge mass of heavy jet-black smoke gradually rose till it towered high above the cliffs on the European and Asiatic sides. It ballooned slowly out like a gigantic genie rising from a fisherman's bottle. By now the action was slackening, and at 3:45 five ships were slowly steaming homeward from the entrance. At 4:30 there were still eight vessels in the strait, but the forts had practically ceased to fire. The action was over for the day. The result had been the apparent silencing of several Turkish batteries, and those terrific explosions at the forts at Chanak and Kilid Bahr, the ultimate effect of which remains to be seen when the attack is renewed tonight. For Chanak is burning. Official Story of Two Sea Fights [From The London Times, March 3, 1915.] _Admiralty, March 3, 1915._ _The following dispatch has been received from Vice Admiral Sir David Beatty, K.C.B., M.V.O., D.S.O., commanding the First Battle Cruiser Squadron, reporting the action in the North Sea on Sunday, the 24th of January, 1915:_ H.M.S. Princess Royal, Feb. 2, 1915. Sir: I have the honor to report that at daybreak on Jan. 24, 1915, the following vessels were patrolling in company: The battle cruisers Lion, Capt. Alfred E.M. Chatfield, C.V.O., flying my flag; Princess Royal, Capt. Osmond de B. Brock, Aide de Camp; Tiger, Capt. Henry B. Pelly, M.V.O.; New Zealand, Capt. Lionel Halsey, C.M.G., Aide de Camp, flying the flag of Rear Admiral Sir Archibald Moore, K.C.B., C.V.O., and Indomitable, Capt. Francis W. Kennedy. The light cruisers Southampton, flying the broad pennant of Commodore William E. Goodenough, M.V.O.; Nottingham, Capt. Charles B. Miller; Birmingham, Capt. Arthur A.M. Duff, and Lowestoft, Capt. Theobald W.B. Kennedy, were disposed on my port beam. Commodore (T) Reginald Y. Tyrwhitt, C.B., in Arethusa, Aurora, Capt. Wilmot S. Nicholson; Undaunted, Capt. Francis G. St. John, M.V.O.; Arethusa and the destroyer flotillas were ahead. At 7:25 A.M. the flash of guns was observed south-southeast. Shortly afterward a report reached me from Aurora that she was engaged with enemy's ships. I immediately altered course to south-southeast, increased to 22 knots, and ordered the light cruisers and flotillas to chase south-southeast to get in touch and report movements of enemy. This order was acted upon with great promptitude, indeed my wishes had already been forestalled by the respective senior officers, and reports almost immediately followed from Southampton, Arethusa, and Aurora as to the position and composition of the enemy, which consisted of three battle cruisers and Bluecher, six light cruisers, and a number of destroyers, steering northwest. The enemy had altered course to southeast. From now onward the light cruisers maintained touch with the enemy, and kept me fully informed as to their movements. The battle cruisers worked up to full speed, steering to the southward. The wind at the time was northeast, light, with extreme visibility. At 7:30 A.M. the enemy were sighted on the port bow steaming fast, steering approximately southeast, distant 14 miles. Owing to the prompt reports received we had attained our position on the quarter of the enemy, and so altered course to southeast parallel to them, and settled down to a long stern chase, gradually increasing our speed until we reached 28.5 knots. Great credit is due to the engineer staffs of New Zealand and Indomitable--these ships greatly exceeded their normal speed. At 8:52 A.M., as we had closed to within 20,000 yards of the rear ship, the battle cruisers manoeuvred to keep on a line of bearing so that guns would bear, and Lion fired a single shot, which fell short. The enemy at this time were in single line ahead, with light cruisers ahead and a large number of destroyers on their starboard beam. Single shots were fired at intervals to test the range, and at 9:09 A.M. Lion made her first hit on the Bluecher, No. 4 in the line. The Tiger opened fire at 9:20 A.M. on the rear ship, the Lion shifted to No. 3 in the line, at 18,000 yards, this ship being hit by several salvos. The enemy returned our fire at 9:14 A.M. Princess Royal, on coming into range, opened fire on Bluecher, the range of the leading ship being 17,500 yards, at 9:35 A.M. New Zealand was within range of Bluecher, which had dropped somewhat astern, and opened fire on her. Princess Royal shifted to the third ship in the line, inflicting considerable damage on her. Our flotilla cruisers and destroyers had gradually dropped from a position broad on our beam to our port quarter, so as not to foul our range with their smoke; but the enemy's destroyers threatening attack, the Meteor and M Division passed ahead of us, Capt. the Hon. H. Meade, D.S.O., handling this division with conspicuous ability. About 9:45 A.M. the situation was as follows: Bluecher, the fourth in their line, already showed signs of having suffered severely from gun fire; their leading ship and No. 3 were also on fire, Lion was engaging No. 1, Princess Royal No. 3, New Zealand No. 4, while the Tiger, which was second in our line, fired first at their No. 1, and when interfered with by smoke, at their No. 4. The enemy's destroyers emitted vast columns of smoke to screen their battle cruisers, and under cover of this the latter now appeared to have altered course to the northward to increase their distance, and certainly the rear ships hauled out on the port quarter of their leader, thereby increasing their distance from our line. The battle cruisers, therefore, were ordered to form a line of bearing north-northwest, and proceed at their utmost speed. Their destroyers then showed evident signs of an attempt to attack. Lion and Tiger opened fire on them, and caused them to retire and resume their original course. The light cruisers maintained an excellent position on the port quarter of the enemy's line, enabling them to observe and keep touch, or attack any vessel that might fall out of the line. At 10:48 A.M. the Bluecher, which had dropped considerably astern of enemy's line, hauled out to port, steering north with a heavy list, on fire, and apparently in a defeated condition. I consequently ordered Indomitable to attack enemy breaking northward. At 10:54 A.M. submarines were reported on the starboard bow, and I personally observed the wash of a periscope two points on our starboard bow. I immediately turned to port. At 11:03 A.M. an injury to the Lion being reported as incapable of immediate repair, I directed Lion to shape course northwest. At 11:20 A.M. I called the Attack alongside, shifting my flag to her at about 11:35 A.M. I proceeded at utmost speed to rejoin the squadron, and met them at noon retiring north-northwest. I boarded and hoisted my flag on Princess Royal at about 12:20 P.M., when Capt. Brock acquainted me of what had occurred since the Lion fell out of the line, namely, that Bluecher had been sunk and that the enemy battle cruisers had continued their course to the eastward in a considerably damaged condition. He also informed me that a Zeppelin and a seaplane had endeavored to drop bombs on the vessels which went to the rescue of the survivors of Bluecher. The good seamanship of Lieut. Commander Cyril Callaghan, H.M.S. Attack, in placing his vessel alongside the Lion and subsequently the Princess Royal, enabled the transfer of flag to be made in the shortest possible time. At 2 P.M. I closed Lion and received a report that the starboard engine was giving trouble owing to priming, and at 3:38 P.M. I ordered Indomitable to take her in tow, which was accomplished by 5 P.M. The greatest credit is due to the Captains of Indomitable and Lion for the seaman-like manner in which the Lion was taken in tow under difficult circumstances. The excellent steaming of the ships engaged in the operation was a conspicuous feature. I attach an appendix giving the names of various officers and men who specially distinguished themselves. Where all did well it is difficult to single out officers and men for special mention, and as Lion and Tiger were the only ships hit by the enemy, the majority of these I mention belong to those ships. I have the honor to be, Sir, Your obedient servant, (Signed) DAVID BEATTY, Vice Admiral. OFFICERS. Commander Charles A. Fountaine, H.M.S. Lion. Lieut. Commander Evan C. Bunbury, H.M.S. Lion. Lieut. Frederick T. Peters, H.M.S. Meteor. Lieut. Charles M.R. Schwerdt, H.M.S. Lion. Engineer Commander Donald P. Green, H.M.S. Lion. Engineer Commander James L. Sands, H.M.S. Southampton. Engineer Commander Thomas H. Turner, H.M.S. New Zealand. Engineer Lieut. Commander George Preece, H.M.S. Lion. Engineer Lieut. Albert Knothe, H.M.S. Indomitable. Surgeon Probationer James A. Stirling, R.N.V.R., H.M.S. Meteor. Mr. Joseph H. Burton, Gunner (T), H.M.S. Lion. Chief Carpenter Frederick E. Dailey, H.M.S. Lion. PETTY OFFICERS AND MEN. Py. Or. J.W. Kemmett, O.N. 186,788, Lion. A.B.H. Davis, O.N. 184,526, Tiger. A.B.H.F. Griffin, O.N.J. 14,160, Princess Royal. A.B.P.S. Livingstone, O.N. 234,328, Lion. A.B.H. Robison, O.N. 209,112, Tiger. A.B.G.H. le Seilleur, O.N. 156,802, Lion. Boy, 1st CL., F.G.H. Bamford, O.N.J. 26,598, Tiger. Boy, 1st CL., J.F. Rogers, O.N.J. 28,329, Tiger. Ch. Ee. R. Artr., 1st CL., E.R. Hughes, O.N. 268,999, Indomitable. Ch. Ee. R. Artr., 2d CL, W.B. Dand, O.N. 270,648, New Zealand. Ch. Ee. A. Artr. W. Gillespie, O.N. 270,080, Meteor. Mechn. A.J. Cannon, O.N. 175,440, Lion. Mechn. E.C. Ephgrave, O.N. 288,231, Lion. Ch. Stkr. P. Callaghan, O.N. 278,953, Lion. Ch. Stkr. A.W. Ferris, O.N. 175,824, Lion. Ch. Stkr. J.E. James, O.N. 174,232, New Zealand. Ch. Stkr. W.E. James, O.N. 294,406, Indomitable. Ch. Stkr. J. Keating, R.F.R., O.N. 165,732, Meteor. Stkr. Py. Or. M. Flood, R.F.R., O.N. 153,418, Meteor. Stkr. Py. Or. T.W. Hardy, O.N. 292,542, Indomitable. Stkr. Py. Or. A.J. Sims, O.N. 276,502, New Zealand. Stkr. Py. Or. S. Westaway, R.F.R., O.N. 300,938, Meteor. Actg. Ldg. Skr. J. Blackburn, O.N.K. 4,844, Tiger. Stkr., 1st Cl., A.H. Bennet, O.N.K. 10,700, Tiger. Stkr., 2d Cl., H. Turner, O.N.K. 22,720, Tiger. Ldg. Carpenter's Crew, E.O. Bradley, O.N. 346,621, Lion. Ldg. Carpenter's Crew, E. Currie, O.N. 344,851, Lion. Sick Berth Attendant C.S. Hutchinson, O.N.M. 3,882, Tiger. Ch. Writer S.G. White, O.N. 340,597, Tiger. Third Writer H.C. Green, O.N.M. 8,266, Tiger. Officers' Steward, 3d Cl., F.W. Kearley, O.N.L. 2,716, Tiger. HONORS AWARDED. Lord Chamberlain's Office, St. James's Palace, March 3, 1915. The King has been graciously pleased to give orders for the following appointment to the Most Honorable Order of the Bath, in recognition of the services of the undermentioned officer mentioned in the foregoing dispatch: To be an Additional Member of the Military Division of the Third Class or Companion. Capt. Osmond de Beauvoir Brock, A.D.C., Royal Navy. Admiralty, S.W., March 3, 1915. The King has been graciously pleased to give orders for the following appointment to the Distinguished Service Order, and for the award of the Distinguished Service Cross, to the undermentioned officers in recognition of their services mentioned in the foregoing dispatch: To be Companion of the Distinguished Service Order. Lieut. Frederic Thornton Peters, Royal Navy. To receive the Distinguished Service Cross. Surg. Probationer James Alexander Stirling, R.N.V.R. Gunner (T) Joseph H. Burton. Chief Carpenter Frederick E. Dailey. The following promotion has been made: Commander Charles Andrew Fountaine to be a Captain in his Majesty's fleet, to date March 3, 1915. The following awards have also been made: To receive the Distinguished Service Medal. P.O. J.W. Kemmett, O.N. 186,788. A.B. H. Davis, O.N. 184,526. A.B. H.F. Griffin, O.N.J. 14,160. A.B. P.S. Livingstone, O.N. 234,328. A.B. H. Robison, O.N. 209,112. A.B. G.H. le Seilleur, O.N. 156,802. Boy, 1st Cl., F.G.H. Bamford, O.N.J. 26,598. Boy, 1st Cl., J.F. Rogers, O.N.J. 28,329. Ch. E.R. Art., 1st Cl., E.R. Hughes, O.N. 268,999. Ch. E.R. Art., 2d Cl., W.B. Dand, O.N. 270,648. Ch. E.R. Art., W. Gillespie, O.N. 270,080. Mechn. A.J. Cannon, O.N. 175,440. Mechn. E.C. Ephgrave, O.N. 288,231. Ch. Stkr. P. Callaghan, O.N. 278,953. Ch. Stkr. A.W. Ferris, O.N. 175,824. Ch. Stkr. J.E. James, O.N. 174,232. Ch. Stkr. W.E. James, O.N. 294,406. Ch. Stkr. J. Keating, R.F.R., O.N. 165,732. Stkr. P.O. M. Flood, R.F.R., O.N. 153,418. Stkr. P.O. T.W. Hardy, O.N. 292,542. Stkr. P.O. A.J. Sims, O.N. 276,502. Stkr. P.O. S. Westaway, R.F.R., O.N. 300,938. Actg. Ldg. Stkr. J. Blackburn, O.N.K. 4,844. Stkr., 1st Cl., A.H. Bennet, O.N.K. 10,700. Stkr., 2d Cl., H. Turner, O.N.K. 22,720. Ldg. Carpenter's Crew, E.O. Bradley, O.N. 346,621. Ldg. Carpenter's Crew, E. Currie, O.N. 344,851. Sick Berth Attendant C.S. Hutchinson, O.N.M. 3,882. Ch. Writer S.G. White, O.N. 340,597. Third Writer H.C. Green, O.N.M. 8,266. Officers' Steward, 3d Cl., F.W. Kearley, O.N.L. 2,716. BATTLE OF THE FALKLANDS _Admiralty, March 3, 1915._ _The following dispatch has been received from Vice Admiral Sir F.C. Doveton-Sturdee, K.C.B., C.V.O., C.M.G., reporting the action off the Falkland Islands on Tuesday, the 8th of December, 1914:_ INVINCIBLE, at Sea, Dec. 19, 1914. Sir: I have the honor to forward a report on the action which took place on Dec. 8, 1914, against a German squadron off the Falkland Islands. I have the honor to be, Sir, Your obedient servant, F.C.D. STURDEE, Vice Admiral, Commander in Chief. The Secretary, Admiralty. (A)--PRELIMINARY MOVEMENTS. The squadron, consisting of H.M. ships Invincible, flying my flag, Flag Capt. Percy T.M. Beamish; Inflexible, Capt. Richard F. Phillimore; Carnarvon, flying the flag of Rear Admiral Archibald P. Soddart, Flag Capt. Harry L.d'E. Skipwith; Cornwall, Capt. Walter M. Ellerton; Kent, Capt. John D. Allen; Glasgow, Capt. John Loce; Bristol, Capt. Basil H. Fanshawe, and Macedonia, Capt. Bertram S. Evans, arrived at Port Stanley, Falkland Islands, at 10:30 A.M. on Monday, Dec. 7, 1914. Coaling was commenced at once, in order that the ships should be ready to resume the search for the enemy's squadron the next evening, Dec. 8. At 8 A.M. on Tuesday, Dec. 8, a signal was received from the signal station on shore: "A four-funnel and two-funnel man-of-war in sight from Sapper Hill, steering northward." [Illustration: THE BATTLE OF THE FALKLAND ISLANDS FROM THE OFFICIAL REPORT OF ADMIRAL STURDEE. The numbers given on the plan show the corresponding positions of vessels at various times. All ships bearing the same number were simultaneously in the positions charted.] At this time the positions of the various ships of the squadron were as follows: Macedonia: At anchor as lookout ship. Kent (guard ship): At anchor in Port William. Invincible and Inflexible: In Port William. Carnarvon: In Port William. Cornwall: In Port William. Glasgow: In Port Stanley. Bristol: In Port Stanley. The Kent was at once ordered to weigh, and a general signal was made to raise steam for full speed. At 8:20 A.M. the signal station reported another column of smoke in sight to the southward, and at 8:45 A.M. the Kent passed down the harbor and took up a station at the entrance. The Canopus, Capt. Heathcoat S. Grant, reported at 8:47 A.M. that the first two ships were eight miles off, and that the smoke reported at 8:20 A.M. appeared to be the smoke of two ships about twenty miles off. At 8:50 A.M. the signal station reported a further column of smoke in sight to the southward. The Macedonia was ordered to weigh anchor on the inner side of the other ships, and await orders. At 9:20 A.M. the two leading ships of the enemy, (Gneisenau and Nuernberg,) with guns trained on the wireless station, came within range of the Canopus, which opened fire at them across the low land at a range of 11,000 yards. The enemy at once hoisted their colors and turned away. At this time the masts and smoke of the enemy were visible from the upper bridge of the Invincible at a range of approximately 17,000 yards across the low land to the south of Port William. A few minutes later the two cruisers altered course to port, as though to close the Kent at the entrance to the harbor, but about this time it seems that the Invincible and Inflexible were seen over the land, as the enemy at once altered course and increased speed to join their consorts. The Glasgow weighed and proceeded at 9:40 A.M. with orders to join the Kent and observe the enemy's movements. At 9:45 A.M. the squadron--less the Bristol--weighed, and proceeded out of harbor in the following order: Carnarvon, Inflexible, Invincible, and Cornwall. On passing Cape Pembroke Light the five ships of the enemy appeared clearly in sight to the southeast, hull down. The visibility was at its maximum, the sea was calm, with a bright sun, a clear sky, and a light breeze from the northwest. At 10:20 A.M. the signal for a general chase was made. The battle cruisers quickly passed ahead of the Carnarvon and overtook the Kent. The Glasgow was ordered to keep two miles from the Invincible, and the Inflexible was stationed on the starboard quarter of the flagship. Speed was eased to twenty knots at 11:15 A.M., to enable the other cruisers to get into station. At this time the enemy's funnels and bridges showed just above the horizon. Information was received from the Bristol at 11:27 A.M. that three enemy ships had appeared off Port Pleasant, probably colliers or transports. The Bristol was therefore directed to take the Macedonia under orders and destroy transports. The enemy were still maintaining their distance, and I decided, at 12:20 P.M., to attack with the two battle cruisers and the Glasgow. At 12:47 P.M. the signal to "Open fire and engage the enemy" was made. The Inflexible opened fire at 12:55 P.M. from her fore turret at the right-hand ship of the enemy, a light cruiser; a few minutes later the Invincible opened fire at the same ship. The deliberate fire from a range of 16,500 to 15,000 yards at the right-hand light cruiser, which was dropping astern, became too threatening, and when a shell fell close alongside her at 1:20 P.M. she (the Leipzig) turned away, with the Nuernberg and Dresden, to the southwest. These light cruisers were at once followed by the Kent, Glasgow, and Cornwall, in accordance with my instructions. The action finally developed into three separate encounters, besides the subsidiary one dealing with the threatened landing. (B.)--ACTION WITH THE ARMORED CRUISERS. The fire of the battle cruisers was directed on the Scharnhorst and Gneisenau. The effect of this was quickly seen when, at 1:25 P.M., with the Scharnhorst leading, they turned about seven points to port in succession into line ahead and opened fire at 1:30 P.M. Shortly afterward speed was eased to twenty-four knots and the battle cruisers were ordered to turn together, bringing them into line ahead, with the Invincible leading. The range was about 13,500 yards at the final turn, and increased until at 2 P.M. it had reached 16,450 yards. The enemy then (2:10 P.M.) turned away about ten points to starboard, and a second chase ensued until at 2:45 P.M. the battle cruisers again opened fire; this caused the enemy, at 2:53 P.M., to turn into line ahead to port and open fire at 2:55 P.M. The Scharnhorst caught fire forward, but not seriously, and her fire slackened perceptibly; the Gneisenau was badly hit by the Inflexible. At 3:30 P.M. the Scharnhorst led around about ten points to starboard; just previously her fire had slackened perceptibly, and one shell had shot away her third funnel; some guns were not firing, and it would appear that the turn was dictated by a desire to bring her starboard guns into action. The effect of the fire on the Scharnhorst became more and more apparent in consequence of smoke from fires, and also escaping steam. At times a shell would cause a large hole to appear in her side, through which could be seen a dull red glow of flame. At 4:04 P.M. the Scharnhorst, whose flag remained flying to the last, suddenly listed heavily to port, and within a minute it became clear that she was a doomed ship, for the list increased very rapidly until she lay on her beam ends, and at 4:17 P.M. she disappeared. The Gneisenau passed on the far side of her late flagship, and continued a determined but ineffectual effort to fight the two battle cruisers. At 5:08 P.M. the forward funnel was knocked over and remained resting against the second funnel. She was evidently in serious straits, and her fire slackened very much. At 5:15 P.M. one of the Gneisenau's shells struck the Invincible; this was her last effective effort. At 5:30 P.M. she turned toward the flagship with a heavy list to starboard, and appeared stopped, with steam pouring from her escape pipes and smoke from shell and fires rising everywhere. About this time I ordered the signal "Cease fire!" but before it was hoisted the Gneisenau opened fire again, and continued to fire from time to time with a single gun. At 5:40 P.M. the three ships closed in on the Gneisenau, and at this time the flag flying at her fore truck was apparently hauled down, but the flag at the peak continued flying. At 5:50 P.M. "Cease fire!" was made. At 6 P.M. the Gneisenau heeled over very suddenly, showing the men gathered on her decks and then walking on her side as she lay for a minute on her beam ends before sinking. The prisoners of war from the Gneisenau report that by the time the ammunition was expended some 600 men had been killed and wounded. The surviving officers and men were all ordered on deck and told to provide themselves with hammocks and any articles that could support them in the water. When the ship capsized and sank there were probably some 200 unwounded survivors in the water, but, owing to the shock of the cold water, many were drowned within sight of the boats and ship. Every effort was made to save life as quickly as possible, both by boats and from the ships; lifebuoys were thrown and ropes lowered, but only a portion could be rescued. The Invincible alone rescued 108 men, fourteen of whom were found to be dead after being brought on board. These men were buried at sea the following day with full military honors. (C)--ACTION WITH THE LIGHT CRUISERS. At about 1 P.M., when the Scharnhorst and Gneisenau turned to port to engage the Invincible and Inflexible, the enemy's light cruisers turned to starboard to escape; the Dresden was leading and the Nuernberg and Leipzig followed on each quarter. In accordance with my instructions, the Glasgow, Kent, and Cornwall at once went in chase of these ships; the Carnarvon, whose speed was insufficient to overtake them, closed the battle cruisers. The Glasgow drew well ahead of the Cornwall and Kent, and at 3 P.M. shots were exchanged with the Leipzig at 12,000 yards. The Glasgow's object was to endeavor to outrange the Leipzig with her 6-inch guns and thus cause her to alter course and give the Cornwall and Kent a chance of coming into action. At 4:17 P.M. the Cornwall opened fire, also on the Leipzig. At 7:17 P.M. the Leipzig was on fire fore and aft, and the Cornwall and Glasgow ceased fire. The Leipzig turned over on her port side and disappeared at 9 P.M. Seven officers and eleven men were saved. At 3:36 P.M. the Cornwall ordered the Kent to engage the Nuernberg, the nearest cruiser to her. Owing to the excellent and strenuous efforts of the engine room department, the Kent was able to get within range of the Nuernberg at 5 P.M. At 6:35 P.M. the Nuernberg was on fire forward and ceased firing. The Kent also ceased firing and closed to 3,300 yards; as the colors were still observed to be flying on the Nuernberg, the Kent opened fire again. Fire was finally stopped five minutes later on the colors being hauled down, and every preparation was made to save life. The Nuernberg sank at 7:27 P.M., and, as she sank, a group of men were waving a German ensign attached to a staff. Twelve men were rescued, but only seven survived. The Kent had four killed and twelve wounded, mostly caused by one shell. During the time the three cruisers were engaged with the Nuernberg and Leipzig, the Dresden, which was beyond her consorts, effected her escape owing to her superior speed. The Glasgow was the only cruiser with sufficient speed to have had any chance of success. However, she was fully employed in engaging the Leipzig for over an hour before either the Cornwall or Kent could come up and get within range. During this time the Dresden was able to increase her distance and get out of sight. The weather changed after 4 P.M., and the visibility was much reduced; further, the sky was overcast and cloudy, thus assisting the Dresden to get away unobserved. (D)--ACTION WITH THE ENEMY'S TRANSPORTS. A report was received at 11:27 A.M. from H.M.S. Bristol that three ships of the enemy, probably transports or colliers, had appeared off Port Pleasant. The Bristol was ordered to take the Macedonia under his orders and destroy the transports. H.M.S. Macedonia reports that only two ships, steamships Baden and Santa Isabel, were present; both ships were sunk after the removal of the crews. I have pleasure in reporting that the officers and men under my orders carried out their duties with admirable efficiency and coolness, and great credit is due to the engineer officers of all the ships, several of which exceeded their normal full speed. The names of the following are specially mentioned: OFFICERS. Commander Richard Herbert Denny Townsend, H.M.S. Invincible. Commander Arthur Edward Frederick Bedford, H.M.S. Kent. Lieut. Commander Wilfred Arthur Thompson, H.M.S. Glasgow. Lieut. Commander Hubert Edward Danreuther, First and Gunnery Lieutenant, H.M.S. Invincible. Engineer Commander George Edward Andrew, H.M.S. Kent. Engineer Commander Edward John Weeks, H.M.S. Invincible. Paymaster Cyril Sheldon Johnson, H.M.S. Invincible. Carpenter Thomas Andrew Walls, H.M.S. Invincible. Carpenter William Henry Venning, H.M.S. Kent. Carpenter George Henry Egford, H.M.S. Cornwall. PETTY OFFICERS AND MEN. Ch. P.O. D. Leighton, O.N. 124,288, Kent. P.O., 2d Cl., M.J. Walton, (R.F.R., A. 1,756,) O.N. 118,358, Kent. Ldg. Smn. F.S. Martin, O.N. 233,301, Invincible, Gnr's. Mate, Gunlayer, 1st Cl. Sigmn. F. Glover, O.N. 225,731, Cornwall. Ch. E.R. Art., 2d Cl., J.G. Hill, O.N. 269,646, Cornwall. Actg. Ch. E.R. Art., 2d Cl., R. Snowdon, O.N. 270,654, Inflexible. E.R. Art., 1st Cl., G.H.F. McCarten, O.N. 270,023, Invincible. Stkr. P.O. G.S. Brewer, O.N. 150,950, Kent. Stkr. P.O. W.A. Townsend, O.N. 301,650, Cornwall. Stkr., 1st Cl., J. Smith, O.N. SS 111,915, Cornwall. Shpwrt., 1st Cl., A.N.E. England, O.N. 341,971, Glasgow. Shpwrt., 2d Cl., A.C.H. Dymott, O.N.M. 8,047, Kent. Portsmouth R.F.R.B. 3,307 Sergt. Charles Mayes, H.M.S. Kent. F.C.D. STURDEE. BETWEEN MIDNIGHT AND MORNING. By SIR OWEN SEAMAN. [From King Albert's Book.] You that have faith to look with fearless eyes Beyond the tragedy of a world at strife, And trust that out of night and death shall rise The dawn of ampler life; Rejoice, whatever anguish rend your heart, That God has given you, for a priceless dower, To live in these great times and have your part In Freedom's crowning hour. That you may tell your sons who see the light High in the heavens, their heritage to take-- "I saw the powers of darkness put to flight! I saw the morning break!" The Greatest of Campaigns The French Official Account Concluded The second and succeeding installments--the first installment appeared in CURRENT HISTORY for April--of the official French historical review of the operations in the western theatre of war from the beginning until the end of January, 1915--the first six months--are described in the subjoined correspondence of The Associated Press. _LONDON, March 18, (Correspondence of The Associated Press.)--The Associated Press has received the second installment of the historical review emanating from French official sources of the operations in the Western theatre of war, from its beginning up to the end of January. It should be understood that the narrative is made purely from the French standpoint. The additional installment of the document dealing with the victory of the Marne, Sept. 6th to 15th, is as follows:_ If one examines on the map the respective positions of the German and French armies on Sept. 6 as previously described, it will be seen that by his inflection toward Meaux and Coulommiers General von Kluck was exposing his right to the offensive action of our left. This is the starting point of the victory of the Marne. On the evening of Sept. 5 our left army had reached the front Penchard-Saint-Souflet-Ver. On the 6th and 7th it continued its attacks vigorously with the Ourcq as objective. On the evening of the 7th it was some kilometers from the Ourcq, on the front Chambry-Marcilly-Lisieux-Acy-en-Multien. On the 8th, the Germans, who had in great haste reinforced their right by bringing their Second and Fourth Army Corps back to the north, obtained some successes by attacks of extreme violence. They occupied Betz, Thury-en-Valois, and Nanteuil-le-Haudouin. But in spite of this pressure our troops held their ground well. In a brilliant action they took three standards, and, being reinforced, prepared a new attack for the 10th. At the moment that this attack was about to begin the enemy was already in retreat toward the north. The attack became a pursuit, and on the 12th we established ourselves on the Aisne. LEFT OF KLUCK'S ARMY THREATENED. Why did the German forces which were confronting us and on the evening before attacking so furiously retreat on the morning of the 10th? Because in bringing back on the 6th several army corps from the south to the north to face our left the enemy had exposed his left to the attacks of the British Army, which had immediately faced around toward the north, and to those of our armies which were prolonging the English lines to the right. This is what the French command had sought to bring about. This is what happened on Sept. 8 and allowed the development and rehabilitation which it was to effect. On the 6th the British Army had set out from the line Rozcy-Lagny and had that evening reached the southward bank of the Grand Morin. On the 7th and 8th it continued its march, and on the 9th had debouched to the north of the Marne below Chateau-Thiery, taking in flank the German forces which on that day were opposing, on the Ourcq, our left army. Then it was that these forces began to retreat, while the British Army, going in pursuit and capturing seven guns and many prisoners, reached the Aisne between Soissons and Longueval. The role of the French Army, which was operating to the right of the British Army, was threefold. It had to support the British attacking on its left. It had on its right to support our centre, which from Sept. 7 had been subjected to a German attack of great violence. Finally, its mission was to throw back the three active army corps and the reserve corps which faced it. On the 7th it made a leap forward, and on the following days reached and crossed the Marne, seizing, after desperate fighting, guns, howitzers, mitrailleuses, and 1,300,000 cartridges. On the 12th it established itself on the north edge of the Montagne-de-Reime in contact with our centre, which for its part had just forced the enemy to retreat in haste. THE ACTION OF FERE-CHAMPENOISE. Our centre consisted of a new army created on Aug. 29 and of one of those which at the beginning of the campaign had been engaged in Belgian Luxemburg. The first had retreated on Aug. 29 to Sept. 5 from the Aisne to the north of the Marne and occupied the general front Sezanne-Mailly. The second, more to the east, had drawn back to the south of the line Humbauville-Chateau-Beauchamp-Bignicourt-Blesmes-Maurupt-le-Montoy. The enemy, in view of his right being arrested and the defeat of his enveloping movement, made a desperate effort from the 7th to the 10th to pierce our centre to the west and to the east of Fere-Champenoise. On the 8th he succeeded in forcing back the right of our new army, which retired as far as Gouragancon. On the 9th, at 6 o'clock in the morning, there was a further retreat to the south of that village, while on the left the other army corps also had to go back to the line Allemant-Connantre. Despite this retreat the General commanding the army ordered a general offensive for the same day. With the Morocco Division, whose behavior was heroic, he met a furious assault of the Germans on his left toward the marshes of Saint Gond. Then with the division which had just victoriously overcome the attacks of the enemy to the north of Sezanne, and with the whole of his left army corps, he made a flanking attack in the evening of the 9th upon the German forces, and notably the guard, which had thrown back his right army corps. The enemy, taken by surprise by this bold manoeuvre, did not resist, and beat a hasty retreat. On the 11th we crossed the Marne between Tours-sur-Marne and Sarry, driving the Germans in front of us in disorder. On the 12th we were in contact with the enemy to the north of the Camp de Chalons. Our other army of the centre, acting on the right of the one just referred to, had been intrusted with the mission during the 7th, 8th, and 9th of disengaging its neighbor, and it was only on the 10th that, being reinforced by an army corps from the east, it was able to make its action effectively felt. On the 11th the Germans retired. But, perceiving their danger, they fought desperately, with enormous expenditure of projectiles, behind strong intrenchments. On the 12th the result had none the less been attained, and our two centre armies were solidly established on the ground gained. THE OPERATIONS OF THE RIGHT. To the right of these two armies were three others. They had orders to cover themselves to the north and to debouch toward the west on the flank of the enemy, which was operating to the west of the Argonne. But a wide interval in which the Germans were in force separated them from our centre. The attack took place, nevertheless, with very brilliant success for our artillery, which destroyed eleven batteries of the Sixteenth German Army Corps. On the 10th inst. the Eighth and Fifteenth German Army Corps counter-attacked, but were repulsed. On the 11th our progress continued with new successes, and on the 12th we were able to face round toward the north in expectation of the near and inevitable retreat of the enemy, which, in fact, took place from the 13th. The withdrawal of the mass of the German force involved also that of the left. From the 12th onward the forces of the enemy operating between Nancy and the Vosges retreated in a hurry before our two armies of the East, which immediately occupied the positions that the enemy had evacuated. The offensive of our right had thus prepared and consolidated in the most useful way the result secured by our left and our centre. [Illustration: Map showing the successive stages of the Battle of the Marne.] Such was this seven days' battle, in which more than two millions of men were engaged. Each army gained ground step by step, opening the road to its neighbor, supported at once by it, taking in flank the adversary which the day before it had attacked in front, the efforts of one articulating closely with those of the other, a perfect unity of intention and method animating the supreme command. To give this victory all its meaning it is necessary to add that it was gained by troops which for two weeks had been retreating, and which, when the order for the offensive was given, were found to be as ardent as on the first day. It has also to be said that these troops had to meet the whole German army, and that from the time they marched forward they never again fell back. Under their pressure the German retreat at certain times had the appearance of a rout. In spite of the fatigue of our men, in spite of the power of the German heavy artillery, we took colors, guns, mitrailleuses, shells, more than a million cartridges, and thousands of prisoners. A German corps lost almost the whole of its artillery, which, from information brought by our airmen, was destroyed by our guns. "THE RUSH TO THE SEA." _LONDON, March 18.--The third installment of the historical review of the war, emanating from French official sources and purely from the French viewpoint, has been received by The Associated Press. The French narrative contains a long chapter on the siege war from the Oise to the Vosges, which lasted from Sept. 13 to Nov. 30. Most of the incidents in this prolonged and severe warfare have been recorded in the daily bulletins. The operations were of secondary importance, and were conducted on both sides with the same idea of wearing down the troops and the artillery of the opposing forces with the view of influencing the decisive result in the great theatre of war in the north. The next chapter deals with "the rush to the sea," Sept. 13 to Oct. 23, and is as follows:_ GENERAL CHARACTER OF THE ACTION. As early as Sept. 11 the Commander in Chief had directed our left army to have as important forces as possible on the right bank of the Oise. On Sept. 17 he made that instruction more precise by ordering "a mass to be constituted on the left wing of our disposition, capable of coping with the outflanking movement of the enemy." Everything led us to expect that flanking movement, for the Germans are lacking in invention. Indeed, their effort at that time tended to a renewal of their manoeuvre of August. In the parallel race the opponents were bound in the end to be stopped only by the sea; that is what happened about Oct. 20. The Germans had an advantage over us, which is obvious from a glance at the map--the concentric form of their front, which shortened the length of their transports. In spite of this initial inferiority we arrived in time. From the middle of September to the last week in October fighting went on continually to the north of the Oise, but all the time we were fighting we were slipping northward. On the German side this movement brought into line more than eighteen new army corps, (twelve active army corps, six reserve corps, four cavalry corps.) On our side it ended in the constitution of three fresh armies on our left and in the transport into the same district of the British Army and the Belgian Army from Antwerp. For the conception and realization of this fresh and extended disposition the French command, in the first place, had to reduce to a minimum the needs for effectives of our armies to the east of the Oise, and afterwards to utilize to the utmost our means of transport. It succeeded in this, and when, at the end of October, the battle of Flanders opened, when the Germans, having completed the concentration of their forces, attempted with fierce energy to turn or to pierce our left, they flung themselves upon a resistance which inflicted upon them a complete defeat. DEPLOYMENT OF A FIRST ARMY. The movement began on our side only with the resources of the army which had held the left of our front during the battle of the Marne, reinforced on Sept. 15 by one army corps. This reinforcement, not being sufficient to hold the enemy's offensive, (district of Vaudelincourt-Mouchy-Uaugy,) a fresh army was transported more to the left, with the task "of acting against the German right wing in order to disengage its neighbor, ... while preserving a flanking direction in its march in relation to the fresh units that the enemy might be able to put into line." To cover the detrainments of this fresh army in the district Clermont-Beauvais-Boix a cavalry corps and four territorial divisions were ordered to establish themselves on both banks of the Somme. In the wooded hills, however, which extend between the Oise and Lassigny the enemy displayed increasing activity. Nevertheless, the order still further to broaden the movement toward the left was maintained, while the territorial divisions were to move toward Bethune and Aubigny. The march to the sea went on. From the 21st to the 26th all our forces were engaged in the district Lassigny-Roye-Peronne, with alternations of reverse and success. It was the first act of the great struggle which was to spread as it went on. On the 26th the whole of the Sixth German Army was deployed against us. We retained all our positions, but we could do no more; consequently there was still the risk that the enemy, by means of a fresh afflux of forces, might succeed in turning us. Once more reinforcements, two army corps, were directed no longer on Beauvais, but toward Amiens. The front was then again to extend. A fresh army was constituted more to the north. DEPLOYMENT OF THE SECOND ARMY. From Sept. 30 onward we could not but observe that the enemy, already strongly posted on the plateau of Thiepval, was continually slipping his forces from south to north, and everywhere confronting us with remarkable energy. Accordingly, on Oct. 1 two cavalry corps were directed to make a leap forward and, operating on both banks of the Scarpe, to put themselves in touch with the garrison of Dunkirk, which, on its side, had pushed forward as far as Douai. But on Oct. 2 and 3 the bulk of our fresh army was very strongly attacked in the district of Arras and Lens. Confronting it were two corps of cavalry, the guards, four active army corps, and two reserve corps. A fresh French army corps was immediately transported and detrained in the Lille district. But once more the attacks became more pressing, and on Oct. 4 it was a question whether, in view of the enemy's activity both west of the Oise and south of the Somme, and also further to the north, a retreat would not have to be made. General Joffre resolutely put this hypothesis aside and ordered the offensive to be resumed with the reinforcements that had arrived. It was, however, clear that, despite the efforts of all, our front, extended to the sea as it was by a mere ribbon of troops, did not possess the solidity to enable it to resist with complete safety a German attack, the violence of which could well be foreseen. In the Arras district the position was fairly good. But between the Oise and Arras we were holding our own only with difficulty. Finally, to the north, on the Lille-Estaires-Merville-Hazebrouck-Cassel front, our cavalry and our territorials had their work cut out against eight divisions of German cavalry, with very strong infantry supports. It was at this moment that the transport of the British Army to the northern theatre of operations began. [Illustration: VICE ADMIRAL H.R.H. THE DUKE OF THE ABRUZZI Cousin of the King of Italy, Commander of the dreadnought squadron of the Italian Navy. _(Photo (c) by Pach Bros., N.Y.)_] [Illustration: H.M. FERDINAND I. Tsar of the Bulgars. _(Photo from P.S. Rogers.)_] THE TRANSPORT OF THE BRITISH ARMY. Field Marshal French had, as early as the end of September, expressed the wish to see his army resume its initial place on the left of the allied armies. He explained this wish on the ground of the greater facility of which his communications would have the advantage in this new position, and also of the impending arrival of two divisions of infantry from home and of two infantry divisions and a cavalry division from India, which would be able to deploy more easily on that terrain. In spite of the difficulties which such a removal involved, owing to the intensive use of the railways by our own units, General Joffre decided at the beginning of October to meet the Field Marshal's wishes and to have the British Army removed from the Aisne. It was clearly specified that on the northern terrain the British Army should co-operate to the same end as ourselves, the stopping of the German right. In other terms, the British Army was to prolong the front of the general disposition without a break, attacking as soon as possible, and at the same time seeking touch with the Belgian Army. But the detraining took longer than had been expected, and it was not possible to attack the Germans during the time when they had only cavalry in the Lille district and further to the north. THE ARRIVAL OF THE BELGIAN ARMY. There remained the Belgian Army. On leaving Antwerp on Oct. 9 the Belgian Army, which was covered by 8,000 British bluejackets and 6,000 French bluejackets, at first intended to retire as far as to the north of Calais, but afterwards determined to make a stand in Belgian territory. Unfortunately, the condition of the Belgian troops, exhausted by a struggle of more than three months, did not allow any immediate hopes to be based upon them. This situation weighed on our plans and delayed their execution. On the 16th we made progress to the east of Ypres. On the 18th our cavalry even reached Roulers and Cortemark. But it was now evident that, in view of the continual reinforcing of the German right, our left was not capable of maintaining the advantages obtained during the previous few days. To attain our end and make our front inviolable a fresh effort was necessary. That effort was immediately made by the dispatch to the north of the Lys of considerable French forces, which formed the French Army of Belgium. THE FRENCH ARMY OF BELGIUM. The French Army of Belgium consisted, to begin with, of two territorial divisions, four divisions of cavalry, and a naval brigade. Directly after its constitution it was strengthened by elements from other points on the front whose arrival extended from Oct. 27 to Nov. 11. These reinforcements were equivalent altogether in value to five army corps, a division of cavalry, a territorial division, and sixteen regiments of cavalry, plus sixty pieces of heavy artillery. Thus was completed the strategic manoeuvre defined by the instructions of the General in Chief on Sept. 11 and developed during the five following weeks with the ampleness we have just seen. The movements of troops carried out during this period were methodically combined with the pursuit of operations, both defensive and offensive, from the Oise to the North Sea. On Oct. 22 our left, bounded six weeks earlier by the Noyon district, rested on Nieuport, thanks to the successive deployment of five fresh armies--three French armies, the British Army, and the Belgian Army. Thus the co-ordination decided upon by the General in Chief attained its end. The barrier was established. It remained to maintain it against the enemy's offensive. That was the object and the result of the battle of Flanders, Oct. 22 to Nov. 15. OPERATIONS IN FLANDERS. _The fourth installment of the French review takes up the operations in Flanders, as follows:_ The German attack in Flanders was conducted strategically and tactically with remarkable energy. The complete and indisputable defeat in which it resulted is therefore significant. The forces of which the enemy disposed for this operation between the sea and the Lys comprised: (1) The entire Fourth Army commanded by the Duke of Wuerttemberg, consisting of one naval division, one division of Ersatz Reserve, (men who had received no training before the war,) which was liberated by the fall of Antwerp; the Twenty-second, Twenty-third, Twenty-sixth and Twenty-seventh Reserve Corps, and the Forty-eighth Division belonging to the Twenty-fourth Reserve Corps. (2) A portion of another army under General von Fabeck, consisting of the Fifteenth Corps, two Bavarian corps and three (unspecified) divisions. (3) Part of the Sixth Army under the command of the Crown Prince of Bavaria. This army, more than a third of which took part in the battle of Flanders, comprised the Nineteenth Army Corps, portions of the Thirteenth Corps and the Eighteenth Reserve Corps, the Seventh and Fourteenth Corps, the First Bavarian Reserve Corps, the Guards, and the Fourth Army Corps. (4) Four highly mobile cavalry corps prepared and supported the action of the troops enumerated above. Everything possible had been done to fortify the "morale" of the troops. At the beginning of October the Crown Prince of Bavaria in a proclamation had exhorted his soldiers "to make the decisive effort against the French left wing," and "to settle thus the fate of the great battle which has lasted for weeks." [Illustration: Map showing the swaying battle line from Belfort to the North Sea and the intrenched line on April 15, 1915.] On Oct. 28, Prince Rupprecht of Bavaria declared in an army order that his troops "had just been fighting under very difficult conditions," and he added: "It is our business now not to let the struggle with our most detested enemy drag on longer.... The decisive blow is still to be struck." On Oct. 30, General von Deimling, commanding the Fifteenth Army Corps (belonging to General von Fabeck's command,) issued an order declaring that "the thrust against Ypres will be of decisive importance." It should be noted also that the Emperor proceeded in person to Thielt and Courtrai to exalt by his presence the ardor of his troops. Finally, at the close of October, the entire German press incessantly proclaimed the importance of the "Battle of Calais." It is superfluous to add that events in Poland explain in a large measure the passionate resolve of the German General Staff to obtain a decision in the Western theatre of operations at all costs. This decision would be obtained if our left were pierced or driven in. To reach Calais, that is, to break our left; to carry Ypres, that is, to cut it in half; through both points to menace the communications and supplies of the British expeditionary corps, perhaps even to threaten Britain in her island--such was the German plan in the Battle of Flanders. It was a plan that could not be executed. CHECK OF GERMAN ATTACK. The enemy, who had at his disposal a considerable quantity of heavy artillery, directed his efforts at first upon the coast and the country to the north of Dixmude. His objective was manifestly the capture of Dunkirk, then of Calais and Boulogne, and this objective he pursued until Nov. 1. On Oct. 23 the Belgians along the railway line from Nieuport to Dixmude were strengthened by a French division. Dixmude was occupied by our marines (fusiliers marins). During the subsequent day our forces along the railway developed a significant resistance against an enemy superior in number and backed by heavy artillery. On the 29th the inundations effected between the canal and the railway line spread along our front. On the 30th we recaptured Ramscapelle, the only point on the railway which Belgians had lost. On the 1st and 2d of November the enemy bombarded Furnes, but began to show signs of weariness. On the 2d he evacuated the ground between the Yser and the railway, abandoning cannon, dead and wounded. On the 3d our troops were able to re-enter the Dixmude district. The success achieved by the enemy at Dixmude at this juncture was without fruit. They succeeded in taking the town. They could not debouch from it. The coastal attack had thus proved a total failure. Since then it has never been renewed. The Battle of Calais, so noisily announced by the German press, amounted to a decided reverse for the Germans. GERMAN DEFEAT AT YPRES. The enemy had now begun an attack more important than its predecessor, in view of the numbers engaged in it. This attack was intended as a renewal to the south of the effort which had just been shattered in the north. Instead of turning our flank on the coast, it was now sought to drive in the right of our northern army under the shock of powerful masses. This was the Battle of Ypres. In order to understand this long, desperate, and furious battle, we must hark back a few days in point of time. At the moment when our cavalry reached Roulers and Cortemark (Oct. 28) our territorial divisions from Dunkirk, under General Biden, had occupied and organized a defensive position at Ypres. It was a point d'appui, enabling us to prepare and maintain our connections with the Belgian Army. From Oct. 23 two British and French army corps were in occupation of this position, which was to be the base of their forward march in the direction of Roulers-Menin. The delays already explained and the strength of the forces brought up by the enemy soon brought to a standstill our progress along the line Poelcapelle, Paschendaele, Zandvorde, and Gheluvelt. But in spite of the stoppage here, Ypres was solidly covered, and the connections of all the allied forces were established. Against the line thus formed the German attack was hurled from Oct. 25 to Nov. 13, to the north, the east, and the south of Ypres. From Oct. 26 on the attacks were renewed daily with extraordinary violence, obliging us to employ our reinforcements at the most threatened points as soon as they came up. Thus, on Oct. 31, we were obliged to send supports to the British cavalry, then to the two British corps between which the cavalry formed the connecting link, and finally to intercalate between these two corps a force equivalent to two army corps. Between Oct. 30 and Nov. 6 Ypres was several times in danger. The British lost Zandvorde, Gheluvelt, Messines, and Wytschaete. The front of the Allies, thus contracted, was all the more difficult to defend; but defended it was without a recoil. REINFORCEMENTS ARRIVE. The arrival of three French divisions in our line enabled us to resume from the 4th to the 8th a vigorous offensive. On the 10th and 11th this offensive, brought up against fresh and sharper German attacks, was checked. Before it could be renewed the arrival of fresh reinforcements had to be awaited, which were dispatched to the north on Nov. 12. By the 14th our troops had again begun to progress, barring the road to Ypres against the German attacks, and inflicting on the enemy, who advanced in massed formation, losses which were especially terrible in consequence of the fact that the French and British artillery had crowded nearly 300 guns on to these few kilometers of front. Thus the main mass of the Germans sustained the same defeat as the detachments operating further to the north along the coast. The support which, according to the idea of the German General Staff, the attack on Ypres was to render to the coastal attack, was as futile as that attack itself had been. During the second half of November the enemy, exhausted and having lost in the Battle of Ypres alone more than 150,000 men, did not attempt to renew his effort, but confined himself to an intermittent cannonade. We, on the contrary, achieved appreciable progress to the north and south of Ypres, and insured definitely by a powerful defensive organization of the position the inviolability of our front. [The compiler of the report here adds a footnote saying that the bodies of more than 40,000 Germans were found on the battlefield during these three weeks of battle. The report next proceeds to summarize the character and results of the operations since the Battle of Flanders--that is, during the period Nov. 30-Feb. 1.] Since the former date the French supreme command had not thought it advisable to embark upon important offensive operations. It has confined itself to local attacks, the main object of which was to hold in front of us as large a number of German corps as possible, and thus to hinder the withdrawal of the troops which to our knowledge the German General Staff was anxious to dispatch to Russia. FEW SENT TO THE EAST. As a matter of fact, the numbers transported to the eastern front have been very moderate. Of the fifty-two army corps which faced us on the western front, Germany has only been able to take four and one-half corps for the eastern front. On the other hand, climatic conditions--the rain, mud, and mist--were such as to diminish the effectiveness of offensive operations and to add to the costliness of any undertaken, which was another reason for postponing them. Still another reason lies in the fact that from now on the allied forces can count upon a steadily expanding growth, equally in point of numbers and units as of material, while the German forces have attained the maximum of their power, and can only diminish now both in numbers and in value. These conditions explain the character of the siege warfare which the operations have assumed during the period under review. [Illustration: Map illustrating the Battle of Flanders, the Battle of Ypres, and the terrain of the frustrated German efforts to reach Dunkirk and Calais.] Meanwhile, it is by no means the case that the siege warfare has had the same results for the Germans as for us. From Nov. 15 to Feb. 1, our opponents, in spite of very numerous attacks, did not succeed in taking anything from us, except a few hundred metres of ground to the north of Soissons. We, on the contrary, have obtained numerous and appreciable results. [The French writer here proceeds to strike a balance of gains and losses between the allied and the German forces in France during the Winter campaign. The result he sums up as follows:] 1. A general progress of our troops; very marked at certain points. 2. A general falling back of the enemy, except to the northeast of Soissons. To complete the balance it must be added that: 1. The German offensive in Poland was checked a month ago. 2. The Russian offensive continues in Galicia and the Carpathians. 3. A large part of the Turkish Caucasian army has been annihilated. 4. Germany has exhausted her resources of officers, (there are now on an average twelve officers to a regiment,) and henceforth will only be able to develop her resources in men to the detriment of the existing units. 5. The allied armies, on the contrary, possess the power of reinforcing themselves in a very considerable degree. It may, therefore, be declared that in order to obtain complete success it is sufficient for France and her allies to know how to wait and to prepare victory with indefatigable patience. The German offensive is broken. The German defensive will be broken in its turn. [It is evident from the report that the numbered German army corps are Prussian corps unless otherwise specified.] THE FRENCH ARMY AS IT IS. _LONDON, March 18, (Correspondence of The Associated Press.)--All of Part II., of the historical review of the war, emanating from French official sources, and purely from the French viewpoint, has been received by The Associated Press. Part II, deals with the conditions in the French Army, furnishing a most interesting chapter on this subject under the title, "The French Army as it Is."_ _The compiler of the report, beginning this part of his review on Feb. 1, says that the condition of the French Army is excellent and appreciably superior to what it was at the beginning of the war from the three points of view of numbers, quality, and equipment. Continuing, he says:_ In the higher command important changes have been made. It has, in fact, been rejuvenated by the promotion of young commanders of proved quality to high rank. All the old Generals, who at the beginning of August were at the head of large commands, have been gradually eliminated, some as the result of the physical strain of war and others by appointment to territorial commands. This rejuvenation of the higher ranks of the army has been carried out in a far-reaching manner, and it may be said that it has embraced all the grades of the military hierarchy from commanders of brigades to commanders of armies. The result has been to lower the average age of general officers by ten years. Today more than three-fourths of the officers commanding armies and army corps are less than 60 years of age. Some are considerably younger. A number of the army corps commanders are from 46 to 54 years of age, and the brigade commanders are usually under 50. There are, in fact, at the front extremely few general officers over 60, and these are men who are in full possession of their physical and intellectual powers. MANY COLONELS PROMOTED. This rejuvenation of the high command was facilitated by a number of circumstances, notable among which were the strengthening of the higher regimental ranks carried out during the three years preceding the war, as a result of which at the outset of the campaign each infantry regiment had two Lieutenant Colonels, and each cavalry and artillery regiment a Colonel and Lieutenant Colonel, and also the system of promotion for the duration of the war. Many officers who began the war as Colonels now command brigades. Some are even at the head of divisions or army corps. Ability proved on the field of battle is now immediately recognized and utilized, and in this way it has been possible to provide in the most favorable manner for the vacancies created by the changes in command which were considered necessary in the first weeks of the war. The higher grades of the French Army are inspired by a remarkable unity in the matter of military theory, and by a solidarity of spirit which has found striking expression in the course of the numerous moves of army corps from one part of the theatre of operations to another, which have been carried out since the beginning of the war. The cavalry after six months of war still possesses an excess of officers. There are on an average thirty-six officers to a regiment instead of the thirty-one considered to be the necessary minimum. The artillery, which has suffered relatively little, has also an excess of officers, and is further able to count upon a large number of Captains and other officers, who before the war were employed in the arsenals or in technical research. Finally the reserve artillery officers have nearly all proved to be excellent battery commanders. The losses in the junior commissioned ranks have naturally been highest in the infantry. There is, however, nothing like a want of officers in this arm. Many Captains and Lieutenants who have been wounded by machine-gun fire (such wounds are usually slight and quickly healed,) have been able to return speedily to the front. The reserve officers have in general done remarkably well, and in many cases have shown quite exceptional aptitude for the rank of company commanders. The non-commissioned officers promoted to sub-Lieutenancies make excellent section leaders, and even show themselves very clever and energetic company commanders in the field. It must be remembered also that thanks to the intellectual and physical development of the generation now serving with the colors; and thanks, above all, to the warlike qualities of the race, and the democratic spirit of our army, we have been able to draw upon the lower grades and even upon the rank and file for officers. Many men who began the war on Aug. 2 as privates, now wear the officers' epaulettes. The elasticity of our regulations regarding promotion in war time, the absence of the spirit of caste, and the friendly welcome extended by all officers to those of their military inferiors who have shown under fire their fitness to command, have enabled us to meet all requirements. The state of our infantry on Jan. 15 was very satisfactory and much superior to that of the German infantry. On an average each of our regiments has forty-eight officers, including eighteen regular officers, fifteen reserve officers, and fifteen non-commissioned officers. In each regiment six of the twelve companies are commanded by Captains who are regular officers, three by Captains of the reserve and three by Lieutenants. Each company has at least three officers. The state of the army as regards the commissioned ranks from the highest to the lowest is declared to be exceptionally brilliant. The army is led by young, well-trained, and daring chiefs, and the lower commissioned ranks have acquired the art of war by experience. 2,500,000 FRENCH AT FRONT. Including all ranks, France now has more than 2,500,000 men at the front, and every unit is, or was on Jan. 15, at war strength. The infantry companies are at least 200 strong. In many regiments the companies have a strength of 250 or more. In other arms, which have suffered less than the infantry, the units are all up to, or above, regulation strength. This fact constitutes one of the most important advantages of the French Army over the Germans. While Germany has created a great number of new units, army corps or divisions, which absorbed at a blow all of her available resources in officers and men, the French supreme command has avoided the formation of new units, except in limited number, and has only admitted exceptions to this rule when it was able to count with certainty on being able to provide amply for both the present and future requirements of the new units, as regards all ranks, without encroaching upon the reserves needed for the existing units. At the same time, thanks to the depots in the interior of the country, the effectives at the front have been maintained at full strength. The sources of supply for this purpose were the remainder of the eleven classes of the reserves, the younger classes of the territorial army, and the new class of 1914. A large number of the men wounded in the earlier engagements of the war have been able to return to the front. They have been incorporated in the new drafts, providing these with a useful stiffening of war-tried men. With regard to the supplies of men upon which the army can draw to repair the wastage at the front, we learn that there are practically half as many men in the depots as at the front, in other words about 1,250,000. Further supplies of men are provided by the class of 1915 and the revision of the various categories of men of military age previously exempted on grounds of health or for other reasons from the duty of bearing arms. As a result of this measure nearly half a million men have been claimed for the army, almost all of whom, after rigorous physical tests, have been declared fit for military service. DRILLED BY CONVALESCENTS. In the depots in which the new soldiers are being trained the services of many officers and non-commissioned officers discharged as convalescents after being wounded are utilized in order to give a practical turn to the instruction. There are still many voluntary enlistments, and with all these resources of men the army can count upon reinforcements soon to be available which will considerably augment its offensive power. The quality of the troops has improved perceptibly since the beginning of the war. The men have become hardened and used to war, and their health--largely owing to the excellence of the commissariat--is extremely satisfactory. In spite of the severity of the Winter hardly any cases of disease of the respiratory organs have occurred, and the sanitary returns of the army show an appreciable improvement on those of the preceding Winter. With regard to the reserves, experience has verified the dictum of the Serbian and Bulgarian Generals in the war of 1913, namely, that "two months in the field are necessary in order to get at the full value of reserves." Our infantry is now accustomed to the rapid and thorough "organization" of the defensive. In August it neither liked nor had the habit of using the spade. Today those who see our trenches are astounded. They are veritable improvised fortresses, proof against the 77-millimeter gun and often against artillery of higher calibre. During the last five months not a single encounter can be cited in which our infantry did not have the advantage over the German infantry. All the enemy's attacks have been repulsed, except to the north of Soissons, where their success was due to the flooded state of the Aisne and the carrying away of our bridges. Our attacks, on the other hand, have yielded important results, and have been carried out with plenty of spirit, although without the imprudence which cost us such heavy losses in August. The cava