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Title: History of Holland

Author: George Edmundson

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  HISTORY OF HOLLAND




  BY GEORGE EDMUNDSON D.
  LITT., F.R.G.S., F.R.HIST.S.

  SOMETIME FELLOW OF BRASENOSE COLLEGE, OXFORD
  HON. MEMBER OF THE DUTCH HISTORICAL SOCIETY, UTRECHT
  FOREIGN MEMBER OF THE NETHERLAND SOCIETY OF LITERATURE, LEYDEN



  CAMBRIDGE
  AT THE UNIVERSITY PRESS
  1922






GENERAL PREFACE


_The aim of this series is to sketch the history of Modern Europe, with
that of its chief colonies and conquests, from about the end of the
fifteenth century down to the present time. In one or two cases the
story commences at an earlier date; in the case of the colonies it
generally begins later. The histories of the different countries are
described, as a rule, separately; for it is believed that, except in
epochs like that of the French Revolution and Napoleon I, the connection
of events will thus be better understood and the continuity of
historical development more clearly displayed.

The series is intended for the use of all persons anxious to understand
the nature of existing political conditions. 'The roots of the present
lie deep in the past'; and the real significance of contemporary events
cannot be grasped unless the historical causes which have led to them
are known. The plan adopted makes it possible to treat the history of
the last four centuries in considerable detail, and to embody the most
important results of modern research. It is hoped therefore that the
series will be useful not only to beginners but to students who have
already acquired some general knowledge of European History. For those
who wish to carry their studies further, the bibliography appended to
each volume will act as a guide to original sources of information and
works of a more special character.

Considerable attention is paid to political geography; and each volume
is furnished with such maps and plans as may be requisite for the
illustration of the text_.

G.W. PROTHERO.

       *       *       *       *       *




PROLOGUE


The title, "History of Holland," given to this volume is fully justified
by the predominant part which the great maritime province of Holland
took in the War of Independence and throughout the whole of the
subsequent history of the Dutch state and people. In every language the
country, comprising the provinces of Holland, Zeeland, Utrecht,
Friesland, Gelderland, Overyssel and Groningen, has, from the close of
the sixteenth century to our own day, been currently spoken of as
Holland, and the people (with the solitary exception of ourselves) as
'Hollanders[1].' It is only rarely that the terms the Republic of the
United Provinces, or of the United Netherlands, and in later times the
Kingdom of the Netherlands, are found outside official documents. Just
as the title "History of England" gradually includes the histories of
Wales, of Scotland, of Ireland, and finally of the widespread British
Empire, so is it in a smaller way with the history that is told in the
following pages. That history, to be really complete, should begin with
an account of mediaeval Holland in the feudal times which preceded the
Burgundian period; and such an account was indeed actually written, but
the plan of this work, which forms one of the volumes of a series,
precluded its publication.

The character, however, of the people of the province of Holland, and of
its sister and closely allied province of Zeeland, its qualities of
toughness, of endurance, of seamanship and maritime enterprise, spring
from the peculiar amphibious nature of the country, which differs from
that of any other country in the world. The age-long struggle against
the ocean and the river floods, which has converted the marshes, that
lay around the mouths of the Rhine, the Meuse and the Scheldt, by
toilsome labour and skill into fertile and productive soil, has left its
impress on the whole history of this people. Nor must it be forgotten
how largely this building up of the elaborate system of dykes, dams and
canals by which this water-logged land was transformed into the Holland
of the closing decades of the sixteenth century, enabled her people to
offer such obstinate and successful resistance to the mighty power of
Philip II.

The earliest dynasty of the Counts of Holland--Dirks, Floris, and
Williams--was a very remarkable one. Not only did it rule for an
unusually long period, 922 to 1299, but in this long period without
exception all the Counts of Holland were strong and capable rulers. The
fiefs of the first two Dirks lay in what is now known as North Holland,
in the district called Kennemerland. It was Dirk III who seized from the
bishops of Utrecht some swampy land amidst the channels forming the
mouth of the Meuse, which, from the bush which covered it, was named
Holt-land (Holland or Wood-land). Here he erected, in 1015, a stronghold
to collect tolls from passing ships. This stronghold was the beginning
of the town of Dordrecht, and from here a little later the name Holland
was gradually applied to the whole county. Of his successors the most
illustrious was William II (1234 to 1256) who was crowned King of the
Romans at Aachen, and would have received from Pope Innocent IV the
imperial crown at Rome, had he not been unfortunately drowned while
attempting to cross on horseback an ice-bound marsh.

In 1299 the male line of this dynasty became extinct; and John of
Avennes, Count of Hainault, nephew of William II, succeeded. His son,
William III, after a long struggle with the Counts of Flanders,
conquered Zeeland and became Count henceforth of Holland, Zeeland and
Hainault. His son, William IV, died childless; and the succession then
passed to his sister Margaret, the wife of the Emperor Lewis of Bavaria.
It was contested by her second son William, who, after a long drawn-out
strife with his mother, became, in 1354, Count of Holland and Zeeland
with the title William V, Margaret retaining the county of Hainault.
Becoming insane, his brother Albert in 1358 took over the reins of
government. In his time the two factions, known by the nicknames of "the
Hooks" and "the Cods," kept the land in a continual state of disorder
and practically of civil war. They had already been active for many
years. The Hooks were supported by the nobles, by the peasantry and by
that large part of the poorer townsfolk that was excluded from all share
in the municipal government. The Cods represented the interests of the
powerful burgher corporations. In later times these same principles and
interests divided the Orangist and the States parties, and were
inherited from the Hooks and Cods of mediaeval Holland. The marriages
of Albert's son, William, with Margaret the sister of John the Fearless,
Duke of Burgundy, and of John the Fearless with Albert's daughter,
Margaret, were to have momentous consequences. Albert died in 1404 and
was succeeded by William VI, who before his death in 1417 caused the
nobles and towns to take the oath of allegiance to his daughter and only
child, Jacoba or Jacqueline.[2]

Jacoba, brave, beautiful and gifted, for eleven years maintained her
rights against many adversaries, chief among them her powerful and
ambitious cousin, Philip the Good, Duke of Burgundy. Her courage and
many adventures transformed her into a veritable heroine of romance. By
her three marriages with John, Duke of Brabant, with Humphry, Duke of
Gloucester, and, finally, with Frans van Borselen, she had no children.
Her hopeless fight with Philip of Burgundy's superior resources ended at
last in the so-called "Reconciliation of Delft" in 1428, by which, while
retaining the title of countess, she handed over the government to
Philip and acknowledged his right of succession to the Countship upon
her death, which took place in 1436.

G.E.

_November_, 1921





  TABLE OF CONTENTS

                                                        PAGES


  GENERAL PREFACE                                       v

  PROLOGUE                                              vii-ix

  CHAP.


     I. The Burgundian Netherlands                      1-11

    II. Habsburg Rule in the Netherlands                12-26

   III. The Prelude to the Revolt                       27-46

   IV. The Revolt of the Netherlands                    47-68

    V. William the Silent                               69-81

   VI. The Beginnings of the Dutch Republic             82-109

  VII. The System of Government                         110-118

 VIII. The Twelve Years' Truce                          119-126

   IX. Maurice and Oldenbarneveldt                      127-138

    X. From the end of the Twelve Years' Truce
         to the Peace of Munster, 1621-1648.
         The Stadholderate
         of Frederick Henry of Orange                   139-158

    XI. The East and West India Companies.
          Commercial and Economic Expansion             159-185

   XII. Letters, Science and Art                        186-201

  XIII. The Stadholderate of William II.
        The Great Assembly                              202-211

   XIV. Rise of John de Witt.
       The First English War                            212-224

    XV. The Administration of John de Witt, 1654-1665,
        from the Peace of Westminster to
        the Out-break of the Second English War         225-235

  XVI.  The last years of De Witt's Administration,
        1665-1672. The Second English War.
        The Triple Alliance.
        The French Invasion                             236-250

 XVII.  War with France and England. William III,
        Stadholder. Murder of the brothers De
        Witt, 1672                                      251-257

XVIII.  The Stadholderate of William III,
        1672-1688                                       258-273

  XIX.    The King-Stadholder, 1688-1702                274-284

  XX.     The War of the Spanish Succession and the
        Treaties of Utrecht, 1702-1715                  285-297

  XXI.    The Stadholderless Republic, 1715-1740        298-305

  XXII.   The Austrian Succession War and William
          IV, 1740-1751                                 306-315

 XXIII. The Regency of Anne and of Brunswick,
          1751-1766                                     316-320

 XXIV.   William V. First Period, 1766-1780             321-326

  XXV.  Stadholderate of William V (_continued_),
        1780-1788. The English War.
        Patriot Movement. Civil War. Prussian
        Intervention                                    327-336

 XXVI. The Orange Restoration. Downfall of the
        Republic, 1788-1795                             337-343

XXVII.  The Batavian Republic, 1795-1806                344-356

XXVIII. The Kingdom of Holland and the French
        Annexation, 1806-1814                           357-366

XXIX.   The Formation of the Kingdom of the
        Netherlands, 1814-1815                          367-375

XXX.  The Kingdom of the Netherlands--Union
          of Holland and Belgium, 1815-1830             376-388

XXXI.  The Belgian Revolution. The Separation of
        Holland and Belgium, 1830-1842                  389-404

XXXII.  William I abdicates. Reign of William II.
          Revision of the Constitution, 1842-1849       405-410

XXXIII.  Reign of William III to the death of
           Thorbecke, 1849-1872                         411-418

XXXIV.  The later reign of William III, and the
        Regency of Queen Emma, 1872-1898                419-425

XXXV.  The Reign of Queen Wilhelmina, 1898-1917         426-428

  EPILOGUE                                              429-432

  BIBLIOGRAPHY                                          433-444

  INDEX                                                 445-464


  MAPS

  THE NETHERLANDS, _about_ 1550
  THE NETHERLANDS, _after_ 1648                AFTER p. 444





CHAPTER I

THE BURGUNDIAN NETHERLANDS


The last duke of the ancient Capetian house of Burgundy dying in 1361
without heirs male, the duchy fell into the possession of the French
crown, and was by King John II bestowed upon his youngest son, Philip
the Hardy, Duke of Touraine, as a reward, it is said, for the valour he
displayed in the battle of Poictiers. The county of Burgundy, generally
known as Franche-Comté, was not included in this donation, for it was an
imperial fief; and it fell by inheritance in the female line to
Margaret, dowager Countess of Flanders, widow of Count Louis II, who was
killed at Crécy. The duchy and the county were soon, however, to be
re-united, for Philip married Margaret, daughter and heiress of Louis de
Male, Count of Flanders, and granddaughter of the above-named Margaret.
In right of his wife he became, on the death of Louis de Male in 1384,
the ruler of Flanders, Mechlin, Artois, Nevers and Franche-Comté. Thus
the foundation was laid of a great territorial domain between France and
Germany, and Philip the Hardy seems from the first to have been
possessed by the ambitious design of working for the restoration of a
powerful middle kingdom, which should embrace the territories assigned
to Lothaire in the tripartite division of the Carolingian empire by the
treaty of Verdun (843). For this he worked ceaselessly during his long
reign of forty years, and with singular ability and courage. Before his
death he had by the splendour of his court, his wealth and his successes
in arms and diplomacy, come to be recognised as a sovereign of great
weight and influence, in all but name a king. The Burgundian policy and
tradition, which he established, found in his successors John the
Fearless (murdered in 1419) and John's son, Philip the Good, men of like
character and filled with the same ambitions as himself. The double
marriage of John with Margaret, the sister of William VI of Holland, and
of William VI with Margaret of Burgundy, largely helped forward their
projects of aggrandisement. Philip the Good was, however, a much abler
ruler than his father, a far-seeing statesman, who pursued his plans
with a patient and unscrupulous pertinacity, of which a conspicuous
example is to be found in his long protracted struggle with his cousin
Jacoba, the only child and heiress of William of Holland, whose
misfortunes and courage have made her one of the most romantic figures
of history. By a mixture of force and intrigue Philip, in 1433, at last
compelled Jacoba to abdicate, and he became Count of Holland, Zeeland
and Hainault. Nor was this by any means the end of his acquisitions.
Joanna, Duchess of Brabant (1355-1404) in her own right, was aunt on the
mother's side to Margaret of Flanders, wife of Philip the Hardy. Dying
without heirs, she bequeathed Brabant, Limburg and Antwerp to her
great-nephew, Anthony of Burgundy, younger brother of John the Fearless.
Anthony was killed at Agincourt and was succeeded first by his son John
IV, the husband of Jacoba of Holland, and on his death without an heir
in 1427, by his second son, Philip of St Pol, who also died childless in
1430. From him his cousin Philip the Good inherited the duchies of
Brabant and Limburg and the marquisate of Antwerp. Already he had
purchased in 1421 the territory of Namur from the last Count John III,
who had fallen into heavy debt; and in 1443 he likewise purchased the
duchy of Luxemburg from the Duchess Elizabeth of Görlitz, who had
married in second wedlock Anthony, Duke of Brabant, and afterwards John
of Bavaria, but who had no children by either of her marriages. Thus in
1443 Philip had become by one means or another sovereign under various
titles of the largest and most important part of the Netherlands, and he
increased his influence by securing in 1456 the election of his
illegitimate son David, as Bishop of Utrecht. Thus a great step forward
had been taken for the restoration of the middle kingdom, which had been
the dream of Philip the Hardy, and which now seemed to be well-nigh on
the point of accomplishment.

The year 1433, the date of the incorporation of Holland and Zeeland in
the Burgundian dominion, is therefore a convenient starting-point for a
consideration of the character of the Burgundian rule in the
Netherlands, and of the changes which the concentration of sovereign
power in the hands of a single ruler brought into the relations of the
various provinces with one another and into their internal
administration. The Netherlands become now for the first time something
more than a geographical expression for a number of petty feudal
states, practically independent and almost always at strife.
Henceforward there was peace; and throughout the whole of this northern
part of his domains it was the constant policy of Philip gradually to
abolish provincialism and to establish a centralised government. He was
far too wise a statesman to attempt to abolish suddenly or arbitrarily
the various rights and privileges, which the Flemings, Brabanters and
Hollanders had wrung from their sovereigns, and to which they were
deeply attached; but, while respecting these, he endeavoured to restrict
them as far as possible to local usage, and to centralise the general
administration of the whole of the "pays de par deçà" (as the Burgundian
dukes were accustomed to name their Netherland dominions) by the
summoning of representatives of the Provincial States to an assembly
styled the States-General, and by the creation of a common Court of
Appeal.

The first time the States-General were called together by Philip was in
1465 for the purpose of obtaining a loan for the war with France and the
recognition of his son Charles as his successor; and from this time
forward at irregular intervals, but with increasing frequency, the
practice of summoning this body went on. The States-General (in a sense)
represented the Netherlands as a whole; and it was a matter of great
convenience for the sovereign, especially when large levies of money had
to be raised, to be enabled thus to bring his proposals before a single
assembly, instead of before a number of separate and independent
provincial states. Nevertheless, it must be borne in mind that the
States-General had, as such, no authority to act on behalf of these
several provincial states. Each of these sent their deputies to the
General Assembly, but these deputies had to refer all matters to their
principals before they could give their assent, and each body of
deputies gave this assent separately, and without regard to the others.
It was thus but a first provisional step towards unity of
administration, but it did tend to promote a feeling of community of
interests between the provinces and to lead to the deputies having
intercourse with one another and interchanging their views upon the
various important subjects that were brought before their consideration.
The period of disturbance and the weakening of the authority of the
sovereign, which followed the death of Charles the Bold, led to the
States-General obtaining a position of increased importance; and they
may from that time be regarded as forming a regular and necessary part
of the machinery of government in the Burgundian Netherlands. The
States-General however, like the Provincial States, could only meet when
summoned by the sovereign or his stadholder; and the causes for which
they were summoned were such special occasions as the accession of a new
sovereign or the appointment of a new stadholder, or more usually for
sanctioning the requests for levies of money, which were required for
the maintenance of splendid courts and the cost of frequent wars. For
not only the Burgundian princes properly so-called, but even Charles V,
had mainly to depend upon the wealth of the Netherlands for their
financial needs. And here a distinction must be drawn. For solemn
occasions, such as the accession of a new sovereign, or the acceptance
of a newly appointed governor, representatives of all the provinces
(eventually seventeen) were summoned, but for ordinary meetings for the
purpose of money levies only those of the so-called patrimonial or old
Burgundian provinces came together. The demands for tribute on the
provinces acquired later, such as Gelderland, Groningen, Friesland and
Overyssel, were made to each of these provinces separately, and they
jealously claimed their right to be thus separately dealt with. In the
case of the other provinces the States-General, as has been already
stated, could only grant the money after obtaining from each province
represented, severally, its assent; and this was often not gained until
after considerable delay and much bargaining. Once granted, however, the
assessment regulating the quota, which the different provinces had to
contribute, was determined on the basis of the so-called _quotisatie_ or
_settinge_ drawn up in 1462 on the occasion of a tribute for 10 years,
which Charles the Bold, as his father's stadholder in the "pays de par
deçà," then demanded. The relative wealth of the provinces may be judged
from the fact that at this date Flanders and Brabant each paid a quarter
of the whole levy, Holland one sixth, Zeeland one quarter of Holland's
share.

As regards the provincial government the Burgundian princes left
undisturbed the local and historical customs and usages, and each
province had its individual characteristics. At the head of each
provincial government (with the exception of Brabant, at whose capital,
Brussels, the sovereign himself or his regent resided) was placed a
governor, with the title of Stadholder, who was the representative of
the sovereign and had large patronage. It was his duty to enforce
edicts, preserve order, and keep a watchful eye over the administration
of justice. He nominated to many municipal offices, but had little or no
control over finance. The raising of troops and their command in the
field was entrusted to a captain-general, who might not be the same
person as the stadholder, though the offices were sometimes united. In
the northern Netherlands there was but one stadholder for the three
provinces of Holland, Zeeland and Utrecht, and one (at a somewhat later
date) for Friesland, Groningen, Drente and Overyssel.

The desire of the Burgundian princes to consolidate their dominions into
a unified sovereignty found itself thwarted by many obstacles and
especially by the lack of any supreme tribunal of appeal. It was galling
to them that the _Parlement_ of Paris should still exercise appellate
jurisdiction in Crown-Flanders and Artois, and the Imperial Diet in some
of the other provinces. Already in 1428 Philip had erected the Court of
Holland at the Hague to exercise large powers of jurisdiction and
financial control in the provinces of Holland and Zeeland; and in 1473
Charles the Bold set up at Mechlin the body known as the Great Council,
to act as a court of appeal from the provincial courts. It was to be, in
the Netherlands, what the _Parlement_ of Paris was in France. The Great
Council, which had grown out of the Privy Council attached to the person
of the prince, and which under the direction of the Chancellor of
Burgundy administered the affairs of the government, more particularly
justice and finance, was in 1473, as stated above, re-constituted as a
Court of Appeal in legal matters, a new Chamber of Accounts being at the
same time created to deal with finance. These efforts at centralisation
of authority were undoubtedly for the good of the country as a whole,
but such was the intensity of provincial jealousy and particularism that
they were bitterly resented and opposed.

In order to strengthen the sovereign's influence in the towns, and to
lessen the power of the Gilds, Philip established in Holland, and so far
as he could elsewhere, what were called "vaste Colleges" or fixed
committees of notables, to which were entrusted the election of the town
officials and the municipal administration. These bodies were composed
of a number of the richest and most influential burghers, who were
styled the Twenty-four, the Forty, the Sixty or the Eighty, according
to the number fixed for any particular town. These men were appointed
for life and their successors were chosen by co-option, so that the town
corporations gradually became closed hereditary aristocracies, and the
mass of the citizens were deprived of all voice in their own affairs.
The _Schout_ or chief judge was chosen directly by the sovereign or his
stadholder, who also nominated the _Schepens_ or sheriffs from a list
containing a double number, which was submitted to him.

The reign of Philip the Good was marked by a great advance in the
material prosperity of the land. Bruges, Ghent, Ypres and Antwerp were
among the most flourishing commercial and industrial cities in the
world, and when, through the silting up of the waterway, Bruges ceased
to be a seaport, Antwerp rapidly rose to pre-eminence in her place, so
that a few decades later her wharves were crowded with shipping, and her
warehouses with goods from every part of Europe. In fact during the
whole of the Burgundian period the southern Netherlands were the richest
domain in Christendom, and continued to be so until the disastrous times
of Philip II of Spain. Meanwhile Holland and Zeeland, though unable to
compete with Brabant and Flanders in the populousness of their towns and
the extent of their trade, were provinces of growing importance. Their
strength lay in their sturdy and enterprising sea-faring population. The
Hollanders had for many years been the rivals of the Hanse Towns for the
Baltic trade. War broke out in 1438 and hostilities continued for three
years with the result that the Hanse League was beaten, and henceforth
the Hollanders were able without further let or hindrance more and more
to become the chief carriers of the "Eastland" traffic. Amsterdam was
already a flourishing port, though as yet it could make no pretension of
competing with Antwerp. The herring fisheries were, however, the staple
industry of Holland and Zeeland. The discovery of the art of curing
herrings by William Beukelsz of Biervliet (died 1447) had converted a
perishable article of food into a marketable commodity; and not only did
the fisheries give lucrative employment to many thousands of the
inhabitants of these maritime provinces, but they also became the
foundation on which was to be built their future commercial
supremacy.

The Burgundian dukes were among the most powerful rulers of their
time--the equals of kings in all but name--and they far surpassed all
contemporary sovereigns in their lavish display and the splendour of
their court. The festival at Bruges in 1430 in celebration of the
marriage of Philip the Good and Isabel of Portugal, at which the Order
of the Golden Fleece was instituted, excited universal wonder; while his
successor, Charles the Bold, contrived to surpass even his father in the
splendour of his espousals with Margaret of York in 1468, and at his
conference with the Emperor Frederick III at Trier in 1473. On this last
occasion he wore a mantle encrusted all over with diamonds.

The foundation of the Order of the Golden Fleece in 1430 was an event of
great importance, as marking a step forward on the part of Philip in its
assumption of quasi-regal attributes. The title was very appropriate,
for it pointed to the wool and cloth trade as being the source of the
wealth of Flanders. The Order comprised thirty-one knights, chosen from
the flower of the Burgundian nobles and the chief councillors of the
sovereign. The statutes of the Order set forth in detail the privileges
of the members, and their duties and obligations to their prince. They
had a prescriptive claim to be consulted on all matters of importance,
to be selected for the chief government posts, and to serve on military
councils. The knights were exempt from the jurisdiction of all courts,
save that of their own chapter.

Philip died in 1467 and was succeeded by his son, Charles, who had
already exercised for some years authority in the Netherlands as his
father's deputy. Charles, as his surname _le Téméraire_ witnesses, was
a man of impulsive and autocratic temperament, but at the same time a
hard worker, a great organiser, and a brilliant soldier. Consumed with
ambition to realise that restoration of a great middle Lotharingian
kingdom stretching from the North Sea to the Mediterranean, for which
his father had been working during his long and successful reign, he
threw himself with almost passionate energy into the accomplishment of
his task. With this object he was the first sovereign to depart from
feudal usages and to maintain a standing army. He appeared at one time
to be on the point of accomplishing his aim. Lorraine, which divided his
southern from his northern possessions, was for a short time in his
possession. Intervening in Gelderland between the Duke Arnold of
Egmont and his son Adolf, he took the latter prisoner and obtained the
duchy in pledge from the former. Uprisings in the Flemish towns against
heavy taxation and arbitrary rule were put down with a strong hand. In
September, 1474, the duke, accompanied by a splendid suite, met the
emperor Frederick III at Trier to receive the coveted crown from the
imperial hands. It was arranged that Charles' only daughter and heiress
should be betrothed to Maximilian of Austria, the emperor's eldest son,
and the very day and hour for the coronation were fixed. But the
Burgundian had an enemy in Louis XI of France, who was as prudent and
far-seeing as his rival was rash and impetuous, and who was far more
than his match in political craft and cunning. French secret agents
stirred up Frederick's suspicions against Charles' designs, and the
emperor suddenly left Trier, where he had felt humiliated by the
splendour of his powerful vassal.

The duke was furious at his disappointment, but was only the more
obstinately bent on carrying out his plans. But Louis had been meanwhile
forming a strong league (League of Constance, March 1474) of various
states threatened by Charles' ambitious projects. Duke Sigismund of
Austria, Baden, Basel, Elsass, and the Swiss Cantons united under the
leadership of France to resist them. Charles led an army of 60,000 men
to aid the Archbishop of Cologne against his subjects, but spent eleven
months in a fruitless attempt to take a small fortified town, Neuss, in
which a considerable portion of his army perished. He was compelled to
raise large sums of money from his unwilling subjects in the Netherlands
to repair his losses, and in 1475 he attacked Duke Réné of Lorraine,
captured Nancy and conquered the duchy, which had hitherto separated his
Netherland from his French possessions. It was the first step in the
accomplishment of his scheme for the restoration of the Lotharingian
kingdom. In Elsass, however, the populace had risen in insurrection
against the tyranny of the Burgundian governor, Peter van Hagenbach, and
had tried and executed him. Finding that the Swiss had aided the rebels,
Charles now, without waiting to consolidate his conquest of Lorraine,
determined to lead his army into Switzerland. At the head of a
splendidly equipped force he encountered the Confederates near Granson
(March 2, 1476) and was utterly routed, his own seal and order of the
Golden Fleece, with vast booty, falling into the hands of the victors.
A few months later, having recruited and reorganised his beaten army, he
again led them against the Swiss. The encounter took place (June 21,
1476) at Morat and once more the chivalry of Burgundy suffered complete
defeat. Charles fled from the field, half insane with rage and
disappointment, when the news that Duke Réné had reconquered Lorraine
roused him from his torpor. He hastily gathered together a fresh army
and laid siege to Nancy. But in siege operations he had no skill, and in
the depth of winter (January 5, 1477) he was attacked by the Swiss and
Lorrainers outside the walls of the town. A panic seized the
Burgundians; Charles in person in vain strove to stem their flight, and
he perished by an unknown hand. His body was found later, stripped
naked, lying frozen in a pool.

Charles left an only child, Mary, not yet twenty years of age. Mary
found herself in a most difficult and trying situation. Louis XI, the
hereditary enemy of her house, at once took possession of the duchy of
Burgundy, which by failure of heirs-male had reverted to its liege-lord.
The sovereignty of the county of Burgundy (Franche-Comté), being an
imperial fief descending in the female line, she retained; but, before
her authority had been established, Louis had succeeded in persuading
the states of the county to place themselves under a French
protectorate. French armies overran Artois, Hainault and Picardy, and
were threatening Flanders, where there was in every city a party of
French sympathisers. Gelderland welcomed the exiled duke, Adolf, as
their sovereign. Everywhere throughout the provinces the despotic rule
of Duke Charles and his heavy exactions had aroused seething discontent.
Mary was virtually a prisoner in the hands of her Flemish subjects; and,
before they consented to support her cause, there was a universal demand
for a redress of grievances. But Mary showed herself possessed of
courage and statesmanship beyond her years, and she had at this critical
moment in her step-mother, Margaret of York, an experienced and capable
adviser at her side. A meeting of the States-General was at once
summoned to Ghent. It met on February 3, 1477, Mary's 20th birthday.
Representatives came from Flanders, Brabant, Artois and Namur, in the
southern, and from Holland and Zeeland in the northern Netherlands. Mary
saw there was no course open to her but to accede to their demands. Only
eight days after the Assembly met, the charter of Netherland
liberties, called The Great Privilege, was agreed to and signed. By this
Act all previous ordinances conflicting with ancient privileges were
abolished. The newly-established Court of Appeal at Mechlin was replaced
by a Great Council of twenty-four members chosen by the sovereign from
the various states, which should advise and assist in the administration
of government. Mary undertook not to marry or to declare war without the
assent of the States-General. The States-General and the Provincial
States were to meet as often as they wished, without the summons of the
sovereign. All officials were to be native-born; no Netherlander was to
be tried by foreign judges; there were to be no forced loans, no
alterations in the coinage. All edicts or ordinances infringing
provincial rights were to be _ipso facto_ null and void. By placing her
seal to this document Mary virtually abdicated the absolute sovereign
power which had been exercised by her predecessors, and undid at a
stroke the results of their really statesmanlike efforts to create out
of a number of semi-autonomous provinces a unified State. Many of their
acts and methods had been harsh and autocratic, especially those of
Charles the Bold, but who can doubt that on the whole their policy was
wise and salutary? In Holland and Zeeland a Council was erected
consisting of a Stadholder and eight councillors (six Hollanders and two
Zeelanders) of whom two were to be nobles, the others jurists. Wolferd
van Borselen, lord of Veere, was appointed Stadholder.

The Great Privilege granted, the States willingly raised a force of
34,000 men to resist the French invasion, and adequate means for
carrying on the war. But the troubles of the youthful Mary were not yet
over. The hand of the heiress of so many rich domains was eagerly sought
for (1) by Louis of France for the dauphin, a youth of 17 years; (2) by
Maximilian of Austria to whom she had been promised in marriage; (3) by
Adolf, Duke of Gelderland, who was favoured by the States-General.
Adolf, however, was killed in battle. In Flanders there was a party who
favoured the French and actually engaged in intrigues with Louis, but
the mass of the people were intensely averse to French domination. To
such an extent was this the case that two influential officials, the
lords Hugonet and Humbercourt, on whom suspicion fell of treacherous
correspondence with the French king, were seized, tried by a special
tribunal, and, despite the tears and entreaties of the duchess, were
condemned and beheaded in the market-place of Ghent. Maximilian became
therefore the accepted suitor; and on August 19, 1477, his marriage with
Mary took place at Bruges. This marriage was to have momentous
consequences, not only for the Netherlands, but for Europe. The union
was a happy one, but, unfortunately, of brief duration. On March 29,
1482, Mary died from the effects of a fall from her horse, leaving two
children, Philip and Margaret.

       *       *       *       *       *




CHAPTER II

HABSBURG RULE IN THE NETHERLANDS


Maximilian, on the death of Mary, found himself in a very difficult
position. The archduke was a man of high-soaring ideas, chivalrous,
brave even to the point of audacity, full of expedients and never
daunted by failure, but he was deficient in stability of character, and
always hampered throughout his life by lack of funds. He had in 1477 set
himself to the task of defending Flanders and the southern provinces of
the Netherlands against French attack, and not without considerable
success. In 1482, as guardian of his four-year old son Philip, the heir
to the domains of the house of Burgundy, he became regent of the
Netherlands. His authority however was little recognised. Gelderland and
Utrecht fell away altogether. Liège acknowledged William de la Marck as
its ruler. Holland and Zeeland were torn by contending factions.
Flanders, the centre of the Burgundian power, was specially hostile to
its new governor. The burghers of Ghent refused to surrender to him his
children, Philip and Margaret, who were held as hostages to secure
themselves against any attempted infringement of their liberties. The
Flemings even entered into negotiations with Louis XI; and the archduke
found himself compelled to sign a treaty with France (December 23,
1482), one of the conditions being the betrothal of his infant daughter
to the dauphin. Maximilian, however, found that for a time he must leave
Flanders to put down the rising of the Hook faction in Holland, who,
led by Frans van Brederode, and in alliance with the anti-Burgundian
party in Utrecht, had made themselves masters of Leyden. Beaten in a
bloody fight by the regent, Brederode nevertheless managed to seize
Sluis and Rotterdam; and from these ports he and his daring
companion-in-arms, Jan van Naaldwijk, carried on a guerrilla warfare for
some years. Brederode was killed in a fight at Brouwershaven (1490), but
Sluis still held out and was not taken till two years later.

Meanwhile Maximilian had to undertake a campaign against the Flemings,
who were again in arms at the instigation of the turbulent burghers of
Ghent and Bruges. Entering the province at the head of a large force he
compelled the rebel towns to submit and obtained possession of the
person of his son Philip (July, 1485). Elected in the following year
King of the Romans, Maximilian left the Netherlands to be crowned at
Aachen (April, 1486). A war with France called him back, in the course
of which he suffered a severe defeat at Bethune. At the beginning of
1488 Ghent and Bruges once more rebelled; and the Roman king, enticed to
enter Bruges, was there seized and compelled to see his friends executed
in the market-place beneath his prison window. For seven months he was
held a prisoner; nor was he released until he had sworn to surrender his
powers, as regent, to a council of Flemings and to withdraw all his
foreign troops from the Netherlands. He was forced to give hostages as a
pledge of his good faith, among them his general, Philip of Cleef, who
presently joined his captors.

Maximilian, on arriving at the camp of the Emperor Frederick III, who
had gathered together an army to release his imprisoned son, was
persuaded to break an oath given under duress. He advanced therefore at
the head of his German mercenaries into Flanders, but was able to
achieve little success against the Flemings, who found in Philip of
Cleef an able commander. Despairing of success, he now determined to
retire into Germany, leaving Duke Albert of Saxe-Meissen, a capable and
tried soldier of fortune, as general-in-chief of his forces and
Stadholder of the Netherlands. With the coming of Duke Albert order was
at length to be restored, though not without a severe struggle.

Slowly but surely Duke Albert took town after town and reduced province
after province into submission. The Hook party in Holland and Zeeland,
and their anti-Burgundian allies in Utrecht, and Robert de la Marck in
Liège, in turn felt the force of his arm. An insurrection of the
peasants in West Friesland and Kennemerland--the "Bread and Cheese
Folk," as they were called--was easily put down. Philip of Cleef with
his Flemings was unable to make head against him; and, with the fall of
Ghent and Sluis in the summer of 1492, the duke was able to announce to
Maximilian that the Netherlands, except Gelderland, were pacified. The
treaty of Senlis in 1493 ended the war with France. In the following
year, after his accession to the imperial throne, Maximilian retired to
his ancestral dominions in Germany, and his son, Philip the Fair, took
in his hands the reins of government. The young sovereign, who was a
Netherlander by birth and had spent all his life in the country, was
more popular than his father; and his succession to the larger part of
the Burgundian inheritance was not disputed. He received the homage of
Zeeland at Roemerswaal, of Holland at Geertruidenburg, and seized the
occasion to announce the abrogation of the Great Privilege, and at the
same time restored the Grand Council at Mechlin.

In Utrecht the authority of Bishop David of Burgundy was now firmly
re-established; and on his death, Philip of Baden, an obsequious
adherent of the house of Austria, was elected. These results of the
pacification carried out so successfully by Duke Albert had, however,
left Maximilian and Philip deeply in debt to the Saxon; and there was no
money wherewith to meet the claim, which amounted to 300,000 guilders.
After many negotiations extending over several years, compensation was
found for Albert in Friesland. That unhappy province and the adjoining
territory of Groningen had for a long time been torn by internal
dissensions between the two parties, the _Schieringers_ and the
_Vetkoopers_, who were the counterparts of the Hooks and Cods of
Holland. The Schieringers called in the aid of the Saxon duke, who
brought the land into subjection. Maximilian now recognised Albert as
hereditary Podesta or governor of Friesland on condition that the House
of Austria reserved the right of redeeming the territory for 100,000
guilders; and Philip acquiesced in the bargain by which Frisian freedom
was sold in exchange for the cancelling of a debt. The struggle with
Charles of Egmont in Gelderland was not so easily terminated. Not till
1505 was Philip able to overcome this crafty and skilful adversary.
Charles was compelled to do homage and to accompany Philip to Brussels
(October, 1505). It was, however, but a brief submission. Charles made
his escape once more into Gelderland and renewed the war of
independence.

Before these events had taken place, the marriage of Philip with Juana,
the daughter of Ferdinand of Aragon and Isabel of Castile, had brought
about a complete change in his fortunes. Maximilian, always full of
ambitious projects for the aggrandisement of his House, had planned with
Ferdinand of Aragon a double marriage between their families, prompted
by a common hatred and fear of the growing power of France. The
Archduke Philip was to wed the Infanta Juana, the second daughter of
Ferdinand and Isabel; the Infante Juan, the heir to the thrones of
Aragon and Castile, Philip's sister, Margaret. Margaret had in 1483,
aged then three years, been betrothed to the Dauphin Charles, aged
twelve, and she was brought up at the French Court, and after the death
of Louis XI (August 30, 1483) had borne the title of Queen and had lived
at Amboise with other children of the French royal house, under the care
of the Regent, Anne de Beaujeu. The marriage, however, of Charles VIII
and Margaret was never to be consummated. In August, 1488, the male line
of the Dukes of Brittany became extinct; and the hand of the heiress,
Anne of Brittany, a girl of twelve, attracted many suitors. It was
clearly a matter of supreme importance to the King of France that this
important territory should not pass by marriage into the hands of an
enemy. The Bretons, on the other hand, clung to their independence and
dreaded absorption in the unifying French state. After many intrigues
her council advised the young duchess to accept Maximilian as her
husband, and she was married to him by proxy in March, 1490. Charles
VIII immediately entered Brittany at the head of a strong force and,
despite a fierce and prolonged resistance, conquered the country, and
gained possession of Anne's person (August, 1491). The temptation was
too strong to be resisted. Margaret, after residing in France as his
affianced wife for eight years, was repudiated and finally, two years
later, sent back to the Netherlands, while Anne was compelled to break
off her marriage with Margaret's father, and became Charles' queen. This
double slight was never forgiven either by Maximilian or by Margaret,
and was the direct cause of the negotiations for the double Spanish
marriage, which, though delayed by the suspicious caution of the two
chief negotiators, Ferdinand and Maximilian, was at length arranged. In
August, 1496, an imposing fleet conveyed the Infanta Juana to Antwerp
and she was married to Philip at Lille. In the following April Margaret
and Don Juan were wedded in the cathedral of Burgos. The union was
followed by a series of catastrophes in the Spanish royal family. While
on his way with his wife to attend the marriage of his older sister
Isabel with the King of Portugal, Juan caught a malignant fever and
expired at Salamanca in October, 1497.

The newly-married Queen of Portugal now became the heiress to the crowns
of Aragon and Castile, but she died a year later and shortly afterwards
her infant son. The succession therefore passed to the younger sister,
Juana; and Philip the Fair, the heir of the House of Austria and already
through his mother the ruler of the rich Burgundian domain, became
through his wife the prospective sovereign of the Spanish kingdoms of
Ferdinand and Isabel. Fortune seemed to have reserved all her smiles for
the young prince, when on February 24, 1500, a son was born to him at
Ghent, who received the name Charles. But dark days were soon to follow.
Philip was pleasure-loving and dissolute, and he showed little affection
for his wife, who had already begun to exhibit symptoms of that weakness
of mind which was before long to develop into insanity. However in 1501,
they journeyed together to Spain, in order to secure Juana's rights to
the Castilian succession and also to that of Aragon should King
Ferdinand die without an heir-male.

In November, 1504, Isabel the Catholic had died; and Philip and his
consort at once assumed the titles of King and Queen of Castile, in
spite of the opposition of Ferdinand, who claimed the right of regency
during his life-time. Both parties were anxious to obtain the support of
Henry VII. Already since the accession of Philip the commercial
relations between England and the Netherlands had been placed on what
proved to be a permanently friendly basis by the treaty known as the
_Magnus Intercursus_ of 1496. Flanders and Brabant were dependent upon
the supply of English wool for their staple industries, Holland and
Zeeland for that freedom of fishery on which a large part of their
population was employed and subsisted. In reprisals for the support
formerly given by the Burgundian government to the house of York, Henry
had forbidden the exportation of wool and of cloth to the Netherlands,
had removed the staple from Bruges to Calais, and had withdrawn the
fishing rights enjoyed by the Hollanders since the reign of Edward I.
But this state of commercial war was ruinous to both countries; and, on
condition that Philip henceforth undertook not to allow any enemies of
the English government to reside in his dominions, a good understanding
was reached, and the _Magnus Intercursus_, which re-established
something like freedom of trade between the countries, was duly signed
in February, 1496. The treaty was solemnly renewed in 1501, but shortly
afterwards fresh difficulties arose concerning Yorkist refugees, and a
stoppage of trade was once more threatened. At this juncture a storm
drove Philip and Juana, who had set sail in January, 1506, for Spain, to
take refuge in an English harbour. For three months they were hospitably
entertained by Henry, but he did not fail to take advantage of the
situation to negotiate three treaties with his unwilling guest: (1) a
treaty of alliance, (2) a treaty of marriage with Philip's sister, the
Archduchess Margaret, already at the age of 25 a widow for the second
time, (3) a revision of the treaty of commerce of 1496, named from its
unfavourable conditions, _Malus Intercursus_. The marriage treaty came
to nothing through the absolute refusal of Margaret to accept the hand
of the English king.

Philip and Juana left England for Spain, April 23, to assume the
government of the three kingdoms, Castile, Leon and Granada, which Juana
had inherited from her mother. Owing to his wife's mental incapacity
Philip in her name exercised all the powers of sovereignty, but his
reign was very short, for he was suddenly taken ill and died at Burgos,
September 25, 1506. His hapless wife, after the birth of a posthumous
child, sank into a state of hopeless insanity and passed the rest of her
long life in confinement. Charles, the heir to so vast an inheritance,
was but six years old. The representatives of the provinces, assembled
at Mechlin (October 18), offered the regency of the Burgundian dominions
to the Emperor Maximilian; he in his turn nominated his daughter,
Margaret, to be regent in his place and guardian of his grandson during
Charles' minority, and she with the assent of the States-General took
the oath on her installation as _Mambour_ or Governor-General of the
Netherlands, March, 1507. Margaret was but 27 years of age, and for
twenty-four years she continued to administer the affairs of the
Netherlands with singular discretion, firmness and Statesmanlike
ability. The superintendence and training of the young archduke could
have been placed in no better hands. Charles, who with his three sisters
lived with his aunt at Mechlin, was thus both by birth and education a
Netherlander.

One of the first acts of Margaret was a refusal to ratify the _Malus
Intercursus_ and the revival of the _Magnus Intercursus_ of 1496. This
important commercial treaty from that time forward continued in force
for more than a century. The great difficulty that Margaret encountered
in her government was the lack of adequate financial resources. The
extensive privileges accorded to the various provinces and their mutual
jealousies and diverse interests made the task of levying taxes arduous
and often fruitless. Margaret found that the granting of supplies, even
for so necessary a purpose as the raising of troops to resist the raids
of Charles of Gelderland, aided by the French king, into Utrecht and
Holland, was refused. She fortunately possessed in a high degree those
qualities of persuasive address and sound judgment, which gave to her a
foremost place among the diplomatists and rulers of her time. Such was
the confidence that her brilliant abilities inspired that she was
deputed both by the Emperor Maximilian and by Ferdinand of Aragon to be
their plenipotentiary at the Peace Congress that assembled at Cambray in
November, 1508. Chiefly through her exertions the negotiations had a
speedy and successful issue, and the famous treaty known as the League
of Cambray was signed on December 10. By this treaty many of the
disputes concerning the rights and prerogatives of the French crown in
the Burgundian Netherlands were amicably settled; and it was arranged
that Charles of Egmont should be provisionally recognised as Duke of
Gelderland on condition that he should give up the towns in Holland that
he had captured and withdraw his troops within his own borders.

The extant correspondence between Maximilian and Margaret, which is of
the most confidential character, on matters of high policy, is a proof
of the high opinion the emperor entertained of his daughter's
intelligence and capacity. In nothing was his confidence more justified
than in the assiduous care and interest that the regent took in the
education of the Archduke Charles and his three sisters, who had been
placed in her charge. In 1515 Charles, on entering his sixteenth year,
was declared by Maximilian to be of age; Margaret accordingly handed
over to him the reins of government and withdrew for the time into
private life. Her retirement was not, however, to be of long
continuance. On January 23, 1516, King Ferdinand of Aragon died, and
Charles, who now became King of Castile and of Aragon, was obliged to
leave the Netherlands to take possession of his Spanish dominions.
Before sailing he reinstated his aunt as governess, and appointed a
council to assist her. This post she continued to hold till the day of
her death, for Charles was never again able to take up his permanent
residence in the Netherlands. During the first years after his
accession to the thrones of Ferdinand and Isabel he was much occupied
with Spanish affairs; and the death of Maximilian, January 12, 1519,
opened out to him a still wider field of ambition and activity. On June
28 Charles was elected emperor, a result which he owed in no small
degree to the diplomatic skill and activity of Margaret. Just a year
later the emperor visited the Netherlands, where Charles of Gelderland
was again giving trouble, and his presence was required both for the
purpose of dealing with the affairs of the provinces and also for
securing a grant of supply, for he was sorely in need of funds. Margaret
had at his request summoned the States-General to meet at Brussels,
where Charles personally addressed them, and explained at some length
the reasons which led him to ask his loyal and devoted Netherland
subjects for their aid on his election to the imperial dignity. The
States-General on this, as on other occasions, showed no niggardliness
in responding to the request of a sovereign who, though almost always
absent, appealed to their patriotism as a born Netherlander, who had
been brought up in their midst and spoke their tongue. Charles was
crowned at Aachen, October 23, 1520, and some three months later
presided at the famous diet of Worms, where he met Martin Luther face to
face. Before starting on his momentous journey he again appointed
Margaret regent, and gave to her Council, which he nominated, large
powers; the Council of Mechlin, the Court of Holland and other
provincial tribunals being subjected to its superior authority and
jurisdiction. By this action the privileges of the provinces were
infringed, but Charles was resolute in carrying out the centralising
policy of his ancestors, the Dukes of Burgundy, and he had the power to
enforce his will in spite of the protests that were raised. And so
under the wise and conciliatory but firm administration of Margaret
during a decade of almost continuous religious and international
strife--a decade marked by such great events as the rapid growth of the
Reformation in Germany, the defeat and capture of Francis I at Pavia,
the sack of Rome by the troops of Bourbon and the victorious advance of
the Turks in Hungary and along the eastern frontier of the empire--the
Netherland provinces remained at peace, save for the restless intrigues
of Charles of Egmont in Gelderland, and prospered. Their wealth
furnished indeed no small portion of the funds which enabled Charles to
face successfully so many adversaries and to humble the power of
France. The last important act of Margaret, like her first, was
connected with the town of Cambray. In this town, as the representative
and plenipotentiary of her nephew the emperor, she met, July, 1529,
Louise of Savoy, who had been granted similar powers by her son Francis
I, to negotiate a treaty of peace. The two princesses proved worthy of
the trust that had been placed in them, and a general treaty of peace,
often spoken of as "the Ladies' Peace," was speedily drawn up and
ratified. The conditions were highly advantageous to the interests of
Spain and the Netherlands. On November 30 of the following year Margaret
died, as the result of a slight accident to her foot which the medical
science of the day did not know how to treat properly, in the 50th year
of her age and the 24th of her regency.

Charles, who had a few months previously reached the zenith of his power
by being crowned with the iron crown of Lombardy and with the imperial
crown at the hands of Pope Clement VII at Bologna (February 22 and 24,
1530), appointed as governess in Margaret's place his sister Mary, the
widowed queen of Louis, King of Hungary, who had been slain by the Turks
at the battle of Mohacs, August 29, 1526.

Mary, who had passed her early life in the Netherlands under the care of
her aunt Margaret, proved herself in every way her worthy successor. She
possessed, like Margaret, a strong character, statesmanlike qualities
and singular capacity in the administration of affairs. She filled the
difficult post of regent for the whole period of twenty-four years
between the death of Margaret and the abdication of Charles V in 1555.
It was fortunate indeed for that great sovereign that these two eminent
women of his house should, each in turn for one half of his long reign,
have so admirably conducted the government of this important portion of
his dominions, as to leave him free for the carrying out of his
far-reaching political projects and constant military campaigns in other
lands. Two years after Mary entered upon her regency Charles appointed
three advisory and administrative bodies--the Council of State, the
Council of Finance and the Privy Council--to assist her in the
government. The Council of State dealt with questions of external and
internal policy and with the appointment of officials; the Council of
Finance with the care of the revenue and private domains of the
sovereign; to the Privy Council were entrusted the publication of edicts
and "placards," and the care of justice and police.

When Charles succeeded Philip the Fair only a portion of the Netherlands
was subject to his sway. With steady persistence he set himself to the
task of bringing all the seventeen provinces under one sovereign. In
1515 George of Saxe-Meissen sold to him his rights over Friesland. Henry
of Bavaria, who in opposition to his wishes had been elected Bishop of
Utrecht, was compelled (1528) to cede to him the temporalities of the
see, retaining the spiritual office only. Charles thus added the Upper
and Lower _Sticht_--Utrecht and Overyssel--to his dominions. He made
himself (1536) master of Groningen and Drente after a long and obstinate
struggle with Charles of Gelderland, and seven years later he forced
Charles' successor, William of Jülich and Cleves, to renounce in his
favour his claims to Gelderland and Zutphen. During the reign of Charles
V the States-General were summoned many times, chiefly for the purpose
of voting subsidies, but it was only on special and solemn occasions,
that the representatives of all the seventeen provinces were present, as
for instance when Philip received their homage in 1549 and when Charles
V announced his abdication in 1555. The names of the seventeen provinces
summoned on these occasions were Brabant, Limburg, Luxemburg,
Gelderland, Flanders, Holland, Zeeland, Artois, Hainault, Namur, Lille
with Douay and Orchies, Tournay and district, Mechlin, Friesland,
Utrecht, Overyssel with Drente and Groningen. The bishopric of Liège,
though nominally independent, was under the strict control of the
government at Brussels. The relations of Charles' Burgundian domains
to the empire were a matter of no small moment, and he was able to
regulate them in a manner satisfactory to himself. Several times during
his reign tentative attempts were made to define those relations, which
were of a very loose kind. The fact that the head of the house of
Habsburg was himself emperor had not made him any less determined than
the Burgundian sovereigns, his ancestors, to assert for his Netherland
territories a virtual independence of imperial control or obligation.
The various states of which the Netherlands were composed were as much
opposed as the central government at Brussels to any recognition of the
claims of the empire; and both Margaret of Austria and Mary of Hungary
ventured to refuse to send representatives to the imperial diets, even
when requested to do so by the emperor. At last in 1548, when all the
Netherland provinces had been brought under the direct dominion or
control of one sovereign prince, a convention was drawn up at the diet
of Augsburg, chiefly by the exertions of the Regent Mary and her tried
councillors Viglius and Granvelle, by which the unity of the Netherland
territories was recognised and they were freed from imperial
jurisdiction. Nominally, they formed a circle of the empire,--the
Burgundian circle--and representatives of the circle were supposed to
appear at the diets and to bear a certain share of imperial taxation in
return for the right to the protection of the empire against attacks by
France. As a matter of fact, no representatives were ever sent and no
subsidy was paid, nor was the protection of the empire ever sought or
given.

This convention, which in reality severed the shadowy links which had
hitherto bound the Netherlands to the empire, received the sanction of
the States-General in October, 1548; and it was followed by the issuing,
with the consent of the Estates of the various provinces, of a
"Pragmatic Sanction" by which the inherited right of succession to the
sovereignty in each and every province was settled upon the male and
female line of Charles' descendants, notwithstanding the existence of
ancient provincial privileges to the contrary. In 1549 the emperor's
only son Philip was acknowledged by all the Estates as their future
sovereign, and made a journey through the land to receive homage.

The doctrines of the Reformation had early obtained a footing in
various parts of the Netherlands. At first it was the teaching of Luther
and of Zwingli which gained adherents. Somewhat later the Anabaptist
movement made great headway in Holland and Friesland, especially in
Amsterdam. The chief leaders of the Anabaptists were natives of Holland,
including the famous or infamous John of Leyden, who with some thousands
of these fanatical sectaries perished at Münster in 1535. Between 1537
and 1543 a more moderate form of Anabaptist teaching made rapid progress
through the preaching of a certain Menno Simonszoon. The followers of
this man were called Mennonites. Meanwhile Lutheranism and Zwinglianism
were in many parts of the country being supplanted by the sterner
doctrines of Calvin. All these movements were viewed by the emperor
with growing anxiety and detestation. Whatever compromises with the
Reformation he might be compelled to make in Germany, he was determined
to extirpate heresy from his hereditary dominions. He issued a strong
placard soon after the diet of Worms in 1521 condemning Luther and his
opinions and forbidding the printing or sale of any of the reformer's
writings; and between that date and 1555 a dozen other edicts and
placards were issued of increasing stringency. The most severe was the
so-called "blood-placard" of 1550. This enacted the sentence of death
against all convicted of heresy--the men to be executed with the sword
and the women buried alive; in cases of obstinacy both men and women
were to be burnt. Terribly harsh as were these edicts, it is doubtful
whether the number of those who Suffered the extreme penalty has not
been greatly exaggerated by partisan writers. Of the thousands who
perished, by far the greater part were Anabaptists; and these met their
fate rather as enemies of the state and of society, than as heretics.
They were political as well as religious anarchists.

In the time of Charles the trade and industries of the Netherlands were
in a highly prosperous state. The Burgundian provinces under the wise
administrations of Margaret and Mary, and protected by the strong arm of
the emperor from foreign attack, were at this period by far the richest
state in Europe and the financial mainstay of the Habsburg power.
Bruges, however, had now ceased to be the central market and exchange of
Europe, owing to the silting up of the river Zwijn. It was no longer a
port, and its place had been taken by Antwerp. At the close of the reign
of Charles, Antwerp, with its magnificent harbour on the Scheldt, had
become the "counting-house" of the nations, the greatest port and the
wealthiest and most luxurious city in the world. Agents of the principal
bankers and merchants of every country had their offices within its
walls. It has been estimated that, inclusive of the many foreigners who
made the town their temporary abode, the population of Antwerp in 1560
was about 150,000. Five hundred vessels sailed in and out of her harbour
daily, and five times that number were to be seen thronging her wharves
at the same time.

To the north of the Scheldt the condition of things was not less
satisfactory than in the south, particularly in Holland. The commercial
prosperity of Holland was in most respects different in kind from that
of Flanders and Brabant, and during the period with which we are dealing
had been making rapid advances, but on independent lines. A manufactory
of the coarser kinds of cloth, established at Leyden, had indeed for a
time met with a considerable measure of success, but had fallen into
decline in the time of Mary of Hungary. The nature of his country led
the Hollander to be either a sailor or a dairy-farmer, not an artisan or
operative. Akin though he was in race to the Fleming and the Brabanter,
his instincts led him by the force of circumstances to turn his energies
in other directions. Subsequent history has but emphasised the
fact--which from the fourteenth century onwards is clearly evident--that
the people who inhabited the low-lying sea-girt lands of dyke, canal and
polder in Holland and Zeeland were distinct in character and temper from
the citizens of Bruges, Ghent, Ypres, Brussels or Mechlin, who were
essentially landsmen and artisans. Ever since the discovery of the art
of curing herrings (ascribed to William Beukelsz), the herring fishery
had acquired a great importance to the Hollanders and Zeelanders, and
formed the chief livelihood of a large part of the entire population of
those provinces; and many thousands, who did not themselves sail in the
fishing fleets, found employment in the ship and boat-building wharves
and in the making of sails, cordage, nets and other tackle. It was in
this hazardous occupation that the hardy race of skilled and seasoned
seamen, who were destined to play so decisive a part in the coming wars
of independence, had their early training. The herring harvest, through
the careful and scientific methods that were employed in curing the
fish and packing them in barrels, became a durable and much sought for
article of commerce. A small portion of the catch served as a supply of
food for home consumption, the great bulk in its thousands of barrels
was a marketable commodity, and the distribution of the cured herring to
distant ports became a lucrative business. It had two important
consequences, the formation of a Dutch Mercantile Marine, and the growth
of Amsterdam, which from small beginnings had in the middle of the
sixteenth century become a town with 40,000 inhabitants and a port
second only in importance in the Netherlands to Antwerp. From its
harbour at the confluence of the estuary of the Y with the Zuyder Zee
ships owned and manned by Hollanders sailed along the coasts of France
and Spain to bring home the salt for curing purposes and with it wines
and other southern products, while year by year a still larger and
increasing number entered the Baltic. In those eastern waters they
competed with the German Hanseatic cities, with whom they had many
acrimonious disputes, and with such success that the Hollanders
gradually monopolised the traffic in grain, hemp and other "Eastland"
commodities and became practically the freight-carriers of the Baltic.
And be it remembered that they were able to achieve this because many of
the North-Netherland towns were themselves members of the Hanse League,
and possessed therefore the same rights and privileges commercially as
their rivals, Hamburg, Lübeck or Danzig. The great industrial cities of
Flanders and Brabant, on the other hand, not being members of the League
nor having any mercantile marine of their own, were content to transact
business with the foreign agents of the Hanse towns, who had their
counting-houses at Antwerp. It will thus be seen that in the middle of
the sixteenth century the trade of the northern provinces, though as yet
not to be compared in volume to that of the Flemings and Walloons, had
before it an opening field for enterprise and energy rich in
possibilities and promise for the future.

Such was the state of affairs political, religious and economical when
in the year 1555 the Emperor Charles V, prematurely aged by the heavy
burden of forty years of world-wide sovereignty, worn out by constant
campaigns and weary of the cares of state, announced his intention of
abdicating and retiring into a monastery. On October 25, 1555, the act
of abdication was solemnly and with impressive ceremonial carried out
in the presence of the representatives of the seventeen provinces of the
Netherlands specially summoned to meet their sovereign for the last time
in the Great Hall of the Palace at Brussels. Charles took an affecting
farewell of his Netherland subjects and concluded by asking them to
exhibit the same regard and loyalty to his son Philip as they had always
displayed to himself. Much feeling was shown, for Charles, despite the
many and varied calls and duties which had prevented him from residing
for any length of time in the Netherlands, had always been at pains to
manifest a special interest in the country of his birth. The Netherlands
were to him throughout life his homeland and its people looked upon him
as a fellow-countryman, and not even the constant demands that Charles
had made for financial aid nor the stern edicts against heresy had
estranged them from him. The abdication was the more regretted because
at the same time Mary of Hungary laid down her office as regent, the
arduous duties of which she had so long and so ably discharged. On the
following day, October 26, the Knights of the Golden Fleece, the members
of the Councils and the deputies of the provinces took the oath of
allegiance to Philip, the emperor's only son and heir; and Philip on his
side solemnly undertook to maintain unimpaired the ancient rights and
privileges of the several provinces.

       *       *       *       *       *




CHAPTER III

THE PRELUDE TO THE REVOLT


Philip at the time of his accession to the sovereignty of the
Netherlands was already King of Naples and Sicily, and Duke of Milan,
and, by his marriage in 1554 to Mary Tudor, King-consort of England, in
which country he was residing when summoned by his father to assist at
the abdication ceremony at Brussels. A few months later (January 16,
1556) by a further act of abdication on the part of Charles V he became
King of Castile and Aragon. It was a tremendous inheritance, and there
is no reason to doubt that Philip entered upon his task with a deep
sense that he had a mission to fulfil and with a self-sacrificing
determination to spare himself no personal labour in the discharge of
his duties. But though he bore to his father a certain physical
likeness, Philip in character and disposition was almost his antithesis.
Silent, reserved, inaccessible, Philip had none of the restless energy
or the geniality of Charles, and was as slow and undecided in action as
he was bigoted in his opinions and unscrupulous in his determination to
compass his ends. He found himself on his accession to power faced with
many difficulties, for the treasury was not merely empty, it was
burdened with debt. Through lack of means he was compelled to patch up
a temporary peace (February 5, 1556) with the French king at Vaucelles,
and to take steps to reorganise his finances.

One of Philip's first acts was the appointment of Emmanuel Philibert,
Duke of Savoy, to the post vacated by his aunt Mary; but it was a
position, as long as the king remained in the Netherlands, of small
responsibility. Early in 1556 he summoned the States-General to Brussels
and asked for a grant of 1,300,000 florins. The taxes proposed were
disapproved by the principal provinces and eventually refused. Philip
was very much annoyed, but was compelled to modify his proposals and
accept what was offered by the delegates. There was indeed from the very
outset no love lost between the new ruler and his Netherland subjects.
Philip had spent nearly all his life in Spain, where he had received
his education and early training, and he had grown up to manhood, in the
narrowest sense of the word, a Spaniard. He was as unfamiliar with the
laws, customs and privileges of the several provinces of his Netherland
dominions as he was with the language of their peoples. He spoke and
wrote only Castilian correctly, and during his four years' residence at
Brussels he remained coldly and haughtily aloof, a foreigner and alien
in a land where he never felt at home. Philip at the beginning of his
reign honestly endeavoured to follow in his father's steps and to carry
out his policy; but acts, which the great emperor with his conciliatory
address and Flemish sympathies could venture upon with impunity, became
suspect and questionable when attempted by the son. Philip made the
great mistake of taking into his private confidence only foreign
advisers, chief among whom was Anthony Perrenot de Granvelle, Bishop of
Arras, a Burgundian by birth, the son of Nicholas Perrenot, who for
thirty years had been the trusted counsellor of Charles V.

The opening of Philip's reign was marked by signal military successes.
War broke out afresh with France, after a brief truce, in 1557. The
French arms however sustained two crushing reverses at St Quentin,
August 10, 1557, and at Gravelines, July 13, 1558. Lamoral, Count of
Egmont, who commanded the cavalry, was the chief agent in winning these
victories. By the treaty of Cateau-Cambresis peace was concluded, in
which the French made many concessions, but were allowed to retain, at
the cost of Philip's ally, the town of Calais which had been captured
from the English by a surprise attack in 1558. By the death of Queen
Mary, which was said to have been hastened by the news of the loss of
Calais, Philip's relations with England were entirely changed, and one
of the reasons for a continuance of his residence in the Netherlands was
removed. Peace with France therefore was no sooner assured than Philip
determined to return to Spain, where his presence was required. He chose
his half-sister Margaret, Duchess of Parma, to be regent in place of the
Duke of Savoy. In July he summoned the Chapter of the Order of the
Golden Fleece--destined to be the last that was ever held--to Ghent in
order to announce his intended departure. A little later the
States-General were called together, also at Ghent, for a solemn
leave-taking. On August 26, Philip embarked at Flushing, and quitted the
Netherlands, never again to return.

Philip's choice of Margaret as governess-general was a happy one. She
was a natural daughter of Charles V. Her mother was a Fleming, and she
had been brought up under the care of her aunts, Margaret of Austria and
Mary of Hungary. She resembled those able rulers in being a woman of
strong character and statesmanlike qualities, and no doubt she would
have been as successful in her administration had she had the same
opportunities and the same freedom of action as her predecessors.
Philip, however, though henceforth he passed the whole of his life in
Spain, had no intention of loosening in any way his grasp of the reins
of power or of delegating any share of his sovereign authority. On his
return to Madrid he showed plainly that he meant to treat the Netherland
provinces as if they were dependencies of the Spanish crown, and he
required from Margaret and her advisers that all the details of policy,
legislation and administration should be submitted to him for
supervision and sanction. This necessitated the writing of voluminous
despatches and entailed with a man of his habits of indecision
interminable delays. Margaret moreover was instructed that in all
matters she must be guided by the advice of her three councils. By far
the most important of the three was the Council Of State, which at this
time consisted of five members--Anthony Granvelle, Bishop of Arras;
Baron de Barlaymont; Viglius van Zwychem van Aytta; Lamoral, Count of
Egmont; and William, Prince of Orange. Barlaymont was likewise
president of the Council of Finance and Viglius president of the Privy
Council. By far the most important member of the Council of State, as he
was much the ablest, was the Bishop of Arras; and he, with Barlaymont
and Viglius, formed an inner confidential council from whom alone the
regent asked advice. The members of this inner council, nicknamed the
_Consulta_, were all devoted to the interests of Philip. Egmont and
Orange, because of their great influence and popularity with the people,
were allowed to be nominally Councillors of State, but they were rarely
consulted and were practically shut out from confidential access to the
regent. It is no wonder that both were discontented with their position
and soon showed openly their dissatisfaction.

Egmont, a man of showy rather than of solid qualities, held in 1559 the
important posts of Stadholder of Flanders and Artois. The Prince of
Orange was the eldest of the five sons of William, Count of
Nassau-Dillenburg, head of the younger or German branch of the famous
house of Nassau. Members of the elder or Netherland branch had for
several generations rendered distinguished services to their Burgundian
and Habsburg sovereigns. This elder branch became extinct in the person
of Réné, the son of Henry of Nassau, one of Charles V's most trusted
friends and advisers, by Claude, sister of Philibert, Prince of
Orange-Châlons. Philibert being childless bequeathed his small
principality to Réné; and Réné in his turn, being killed at the siege of
St Dizier in 1544, left by will all his possessions to his cousin
William, who thus became Prince of Orange. His parents were Lutherans,
but Charles insisted that William, at that time eleven years of age,
should be brought up as a Catholic at the Court of Mary of Hungary. Here
he became a great favourite of the emperor, who in 1550 conferred on him
the hand of a great heiress, Anne of Egmont, only child of the Count of
Buren. Anne died in 1558, leaving two children, a son, Philip William,
and a daughter. At the ceremony of the abdication in 1555, Charles
entered the hall leaning on the shoulder of William, on whom, despite
his youth, he had already bestowed an important command. Philip likewise
specially recognised William's ability and gave evidence of his
confidence in him by appointing him one of the plenipotentiaries to
conclude with France the treaty of Cateau-Cambresis in 1559. He had also
made him a Knight of the Golden Fleece, a Councillor of State and
Stadholder of Holland, Zeeland, Utrecht and Burgundy (Franche-Comté).
Nevertheless there arose between Philip and Orange a growing feeling of
distrust and dislike, with the result that William speedily found
himself at the head of a patriotic opposition to any attempts of the
Spanish king to govern the Netherlands by Spanish methods. The presence
of a large body of Spanish troops in the country aroused the suspicion
that Philip intended to use them, if necessary, to support him in
overriding by force the liberties and privileges of the provinces. It
was largely owing to the influence of Orange that the States-General in
1559 refused to vote the grant of supplies for which Philip had asked,
unless he promised that all foreign troops should be withdrawn from the
Netherlands. The king was much incensed at such a humiliating rebuff and
is reported, when on the point of embarking at Flushing, to have charged
William with being the man who had instigated the States thus to thwart
him.

Thus, when Margaret of Parma entered upon her duties as regent, she
found that there was a feeling of deep dissatisfaction and general
irritation in the provinces; and this was accentuated as soon as it was
found that, though Philip had departed, his policy remained. The spirit
of the absent king from his distant cabinet in Madrid brooded, as it
were, over the land. It was soon seen that Margaret, whatever her
statesmanlike qualities or natural inclination might be, had no real
authority, nor was she permitted to take any steps or to initiate any
policy without the advice and approval of the three confidential
councillors placed at her side by Philip--Granvelle, Viglius and
Barlaymont. Of these Granvelle, both by reason of his conspicuous
abilities and of his being admitted more freely than anyone else into
the inner counsels of a sovereign, as secretive in his methods as he was
suspicious and distrustful of his agents, held the foremost position and
drew upon himself the odium of a policy with which, though it was
dictated from Spain, his name was identified.

Orange and Egmont, with whom were joined a number of other leading
nobles (among these Philip de Montmorency, Count of Hoorn, his brother
the lord of Montigny, the Counts of Meghem and Hoogstraeten and the
Marquis of Berghen), little by little adopted an attitude of increasing
hostility to this policy, which they regarded as anti-national and
tending to the establishment of a foreign despotism in the Netherlands.

The continued presence of the Spanish troops, the severe measures that
were being taken for the suppression of heresy, and a proposal for the
erection of a number of new bishoprics, aroused popular discontent and
suspicion. Orange and Egmont, finding that they were never consulted
except on matters of routine, wrote to Philip (July, 1561) stating that
they found that their attendance at the meetings of the Council of State
was useless and asked to be allowed to resign their posts. Meanwhile,
feeling that the presence of the Spanish troops was a source of weakness
rather than of strength, Margaret and Granvelle were urging upon the
king the necessity of their withdrawal. Neither the nobles nor the
regent succeeded in obtaining any satisfactory response. Orange and
Egmont accordingly absented themselves from the Council, and Margaret
ventured on her own authority to send away the Spanish regiments.

The question of the bishoprics was more serious. It was not a new
question. The episcopal organisation in the Netherlands was admittedly
inadequate. It had long been the intention of Charles V to create a
number of new sees, but in his crowded life he had never found the
opportunity of carrying out the proposed scheme, and it was one of the
legacies that at his abdication he handed on to his son. One of the
first steps taken by Philip was to obtain a Bull from Pope Paul IV for
the creation of the new bishoprics, and this Bull was renewed and
confirmed by Pius IV, January, 1560. Up to this time the entire area of
the seventeen provinces had been divided into three unwieldy
dioceses--Utrecht, Arras and Tournay. The See of Utrecht comprised
nearly the whole of the modern kingdom of the Netherlands. Nor was there
any archiepiscopal see. The metropolitical jurisdiction was exercised by
the three foreign Archbishops of Cologne, Rheims and Treves. Philip now
divided the land into fourteen dioceses (Charles had proposed six) with
three Metropolitans at Mechlin, Utrecht and 'sHertogenbosch[3].
Granvelle, who had obtained the Cardinal's hat, February, 1561, was
appointed Archbishop of Mechlin, and by virtue of this office Primate of
the Netherlands, December, 1561. This new organisation was not carried
out without arousing widespread opposition.

The existing bishops resented the diminution of their jurisdiction and
dignity, and still louder were the protests of the abbots, whose
endowments were appropriated to furnish the incomes of the new sees.
Still more formidable was the hostility of the people generally, a
hostility founded on fear, for the introduction of so many new bishops
nominated by the king was looked upon as being the first step to prepare
the way for the bringing in of the dreaded Spanish Inquisition. Already
the edicts against heretics, which Charles V had enacted and severely
enforced, were being carried out throughout the length and breadth of
the land with increasing and merciless barbarity. Both papal and
episcopal inquisitors were active in the work of persecution, and so
many were the sentences that in many places the civil authorities, and
even some of the stadholders, declined to carry out the executions.
Public opinion looked upon Granvelle as the author of the new bishoprics
scheme and the instigator of the increased activity of the persecutors.
He was accused of being eager to take any measures to repress the
ancient liberties of the Netherland provinces and to establish a
centralised system of absolute rule, in order to ingratiate himself with
the king and so to secure his own advancement. That the cardinal was
ambitious of power there can be no question. But to men of Granvelle's
great abilities, as administrator and statesman, ambition is not
necessarily a fault; and access to the secret records and correspondence
of the time has revealed that the part played by him was far from being
so sinister as was believed. The Bishop of Arras was not consulted about
the bishoprics proposal until after the Papal Bull had been secured, and
at first he was unfavourable to it and was not anxious to become
archbishop and primate. It was his advice which led Margaret to send
away the hated Spanish regiments from Netherland soil; and, far from
being naturally a relentless persecutor, there is proof that neither he
nor the president of the Privy Council, the jurist Viglius, believed in
the policy of harsh and brutal methods for stamping out heretical
opinions. They had in this as in other matters to obey their master, and
allow the odium to fall upon themselves.

To Orange and Egmont, the two leaders of the opposition to Granvelle, a
third name, that of Philip de Montmorency, Count of Hoorn and Admiral of
Flanders, has now to be added. These three worked together for the
overthrow of the Cardinal, but their opposition at this time was based
rather on political than on religious grounds. They all professed the
Catholic faith, but the marriage of Orange in August, 1561, with a
Lutheran, Anne daughter of Maurice of Saxony and granddaughter of
Philip of Hesse, was ominous of coming change in William's religious
opinions. In 1562 the discontent of the nobles led to the formation of a
league against the cardinal, of which, in addition to the three leaders,
the Counts of Brederode, Mansfeld and Hoogstraeten were the principal
members. This league, of which Orange was the brain and moving spirit,
had as its chief aim the removal of Granvelle from office, and then
redress of grievances. It found widespread support. The cardinal was
assailed by a torrent of lampoons and pasquinades of the bitterest
description. But, though Margaret began to see that the unpopularity of
the minister was undermining her position, and was rendering for her the
task of government more and more difficult, Philip was obdurate and
closed his ears. The long distance between Madrid and Brussels and the
procrastinating habits of the Spanish king added immensely to the
regent's perplexities. She could not act on her own initiative, and her
appeals to Philip were either disregarded or after long delay met by
evasive replies.

The discontented nobles in vain tried to obtain redress for their
grievances. In the autumn of 1562 Montigny was sent on a special mission
to Madrid, but returned without effecting anything. Orange, Egmont and
Hoorn thereupon drew up a joint letter containing a bold demand for the
dismissal of Granvelle, as the chief cause of all the troubles in the
land. The king replied by asking that one of them should go in person to
Spain to discuss the grievances with him, and suggesting that Egmont
should be sent. Egmont however was averse to the proposal, and another
and stronger letter signed by the three leaders was despatched to
Madrid. Finding that both Margaret and Granvelle himself were in
agreement with Orange, Egmont and Hoorn in their view of the situation,
Margaret advising, with the cardinal's acquiescence, the necessity of
the minister's removal from his post, Philip determined at last that
Granvelle should leave the Netherlands. But in accordance with the
counsel of Alva, who was opposed on principle to any concession, he
characteristically employed circuitous and clandestine means to conceal
from the world any appearance of yielding to the request of his
subjects. In January, 1564 he sent a letter to the Duchess of Parma
expressing his displeasure at the lords' letter, and saying that they
must substantiate their complaints. The same messenger (Armenteros, the
duchess' secretary) carried another letter for Granvelle headed
"secret," in which the cardinal was told that "owing to the strong
feeling that had been aroused against him, he was to ask permission from
the regent to go away for a short time to visit his mother." About a
week after these letters had reached their destination another courier
brought a reply to the three nobles, which, though written on the same
day as the others, bore a date three weeks later, in which they were
bidden to take their places again in the Council of State, and a promise
was given that the charges against Granvelle after substantiation should
be maturely considered. This letter was delivered on March 1, after
Granvelle had already, in obedience to the king's orders, asked for
leave of absence to visit his mother in Franche-Comté. The cardinal
actually left Brussels on March 13, to the great joy of every class of
the people, never to return.

With the departure of Granvelle, the nobles once more took their seats
on the Council of State. The _Consulta_ disappeared, and the regent
herself appeared to be relieved and to welcome the disappearance of the
man whose authority had overshadowed her own. But the change, though it
placed large powers of administration and of patronage in the hands of
Netherlanders instead of foreigners, did not by any means introduce
purer methods of government. Many of the nobles were heavily in debt;
most of them were self-seeking; offices and emoluments were eagerly
sought for, and were even put up for sale. Armenteros, Margaret's
private secretary (to whom the nickname of _Argenteros_ was given), was
the leading spirit in this disgraceful traffic, and enriched himself by
the acceptance of bribes for the nomination to preferments. It was an
unedifying state of things; and public opinion was not long in
expressing its discontent with such an exhibition of widespread venality
and greed. All this was duly reported to Philip by Granvelle, who
continued, in his retirement, to keep himself well informed of all that
was going on.

Meanwhile by the efforts of Orange, Egmont and Hoorn, chiefly of the
former, proposals of reform were being urged for the strengthening of
the powers of the Council of State, for the reorganisation of finance,
and for the more moderate execution of the placards against heresy.
While discussion concerning these matters was in progress, came an order
from Philip (August, 1564) for the enforcing of the decrees of the
recently concluded Council of Trent. This at once aroused protest and
opposition. It was denounced as an infringement of the fundamental
privileges of the provinces. Philip's instructions however were
peremptory. In these circumstances it was resolved by the Council of
State to despatch Egmont on a special mission to Madrid to explain to
the king in person the condition of affairs in the Netherlands. Egmont
having expressed his willingness to go, instructions were drawn up for
him by Viglius. When these were read at a meeting of the council
convened for the purpose, Orange in a long and eloquent speech boldly
expressed his dissent from much that Viglius had written, and wished
that Philip should be plainly told that it was impossible to enforce the
decrees and that the severity of religious persecution must be
moderated. The council determined to revise the instructions on the
lines suggested by Orange, whose words had such an effect upon the
aged Viglius, that he had that very night a stroke of apoplexy, which
proved fatal.

Egmont set out for Spain, January 15, 1565, and on his arrival was
received by Philip with extreme courtesy and graciousness. He was
entertained splendidly; presents were made to him, which, being
considerably in debt, he gladly accepted; but as regards his mission he
was put off with evasions and blandishments, and he returned home with a
reply from the king containing some vague promises of reform in
financial and other matters, but an absolute refusal to modify the
decrees against heresy. Rather would he sacrifice a hundred thousand
lives, if he had them, than concede liberty of worship in any form. For
some months however no attempt was made to carry out active
persecutions; and the regent meanwhile did her utmost to place before
the king urgent reasons for the modification of his policy, owing to the
angry spirit of unrest and suspicion which was arising in the provinces.
She begged Philip to visit the Netherlands and acquaint himself
personally with the difficulties of a situation which, unless her advice
were taken, would rapidly grow worse and pass beyond her control. Philip
however was deaf alike to remonstrance or entreaty. On November 5, 1565,
a royal despatch reached Brussels in which the strictest orders were
renewed for the promulgation throughout the provinces of the decrees of
the Council of Trent and for the execution of the placards against
heretics, while the proposals that had been made for an extension of the
powers of the Council of State and for the summoning of the
States-General were refused. As soon as these fateful decisions were
known, and the Inquisition began to set about its fell work in real
earnest, the popular indignation knew no bounds. A large number of the
magistrates refused to take any part in the cruel persecution that
arose, following the example of Orange, Egmont, Berghen and others of
the stadholders and leading nobles. A strong spirit of opposition to
arbitrary and foreign rule arose and found expression in the action
taken by a large number of the members of the so-called "lesser
nobility." Many of these had come to Brussels, and at a meeting at the
house of the Count of Culemburg the formation of a league to resist
arbitrary rule was proposed. The leaders were Lewis of Nassau, brother
of the Prince of Orange, Nicolas de Harnes, Philip de Marnix, lord of
Sainte Aldegonde, and Henry, Viscount of Brederode. Other meetings
were held, and a document embodying the principles and demands of the
Confederates was drawn up, known as _the Compromise_, which was widely
distributed among the nobles and quickly obtained large and constantly
increasing support. The signatories of the Compromise, while professing
themselves to be faithful and loyal subjects of the king, denounced the
Inquisition in its every form "as being unjust and contrary to all laws
human and divine"; and they pledged themselves to stand by one another
in resisting its introduction into the Netherlands and in preventing the
carrying-out of the placards against heresy, while at the same time
undertaking to maintain the royal authority and public peace in the
land.

At first the great nobles stood aloof, doubtful what course to pursue.
At the instigation of Orange conferences were held, at which, by his
advice, a petition or _Request_, setting forth the grievances and asking
for redress, should be made in writing for presentation to the regent.
The original draft of this document was the work of Lewis of Nassau.
These conferences, however, revealed that there was a considerable
divergence of views among the leading nobles. Egmont and Meghem were
indeed so alarmed at the character of the movement, which seemed to them
to savour of treason, that they separated themselves henceforth from
Orange and Hoorn and openly took the side of the government. The duchess
after some demur agreed to receive the petition. A body of confederates
under the leadership of Brederode and Lewis of Nassau marched to the
palace, where they were received by Margaret in person. The petitioners
asked the regent to send an envoy to Madrid to lay before the king the
state of feeling among his loyal subjects in the Netherlands, praying
him to withdraw the Inquisition and moderate the placards against
heresy, and meanwhile by her own authority to suspend them until the
king's answer had been received. The regent replied that she had no
power to suspend the Inquisition or the placards, but would undertake,
while awaiting the royal reply, to mitigate their operation.

On the last day of their stay at Brussels, April 8, the confederates
under the presidency of Brederode, to the number of about three hundred,
dined together at the Hotel Culemburg. In the course of the meal
Brederode drew the attention of the company now somewhat excited with
wine to a contemptuous phrase attributed by common report to Barlaymont.
Margaret was somewhat perturbed at the formidable numbers of the
deputation, as it entered the palace court, and it was said that
Barlaymont remarked that "these beggars" (_ces gueux_) need cause her no
fear. Brederode declared that he had no objection to the name and was
quite willing to be "a beggar" in the cause of his country and his king.
It was destined to be a name famous in history. Immediately loud cries
arose from the assembled guests, until the great hall echoed with the
shouts of _Vivent les Gueux_. From this date onwards the confederates
were known as "les gueux," and they adopted a coarse grey dress with the
symbols of beggarhood--the wallet and the bowl--worn as the _insignia_
of their league. It was the beginning of a popular movement, which made
rapid headway among all classes. A medal was likewise struck, which bore
on one side the head of the king, on the other two clasped hands with
the inscription--_Fidèles au roy jusques à la besace_.

Thus was the opposition to the tyrannical measures of the government
organising itself in the spring of 1566. It is a great mistake to
suppose that the majority of those who signed "the Compromise" or
presented "the Request" were disloyal to their sovereign or converts to
the reformed faith. Among those who denounced the methods of the
Inquisition and of the Blood Placards were a large number, who without
ceasing to be Catholics, had been disillusioned by the abuses which had
crept into the Roman Church, desired their removal only to a less degree
than the Protestants themselves, and had no sympathy with the terrible
and remorseless persecution on Spanish lines, which sought to crush out
all liberty of thought and all efforts of religious reform by the stake
and the sword of the executioner. Nevertheless this league of the nobles
gave encouragement to the sectaries and was the signal for a great
increase in the number and activity of the Calvinist and Zwinglian
preachers, who flocked into the land from the neighbouring countries.
Such was the boldness of these preachers that, instead of being
contented with secret meetings, they began to hold their conventicles in
the fields or in the outskirts of the towns. Crowds of people thronged
to hear them, and the authority of the magistrates was defied and
flouted. The regent was in despair. Shortly after the presentation of
the Request it was determined by the advice of the council to send
special envoys to lay before the king once more the serious state of
things. The Marquis of Berghen and Baron Montigny consented with some
demur to undertake the mission, but for various reasons they did not
reach Madrid till some two months later. They were received with
apparent courtesy, and after several conferences the king, on July 31,
despatched a letter to Margaret in which he undertook to do away with
the Papal Inquisition and offered to allow such moderation of the
Placards as did not imply any recognition of heretical opinions or any
injury to the Catholic faith. He refused to consent to the meeting of
the States, but he sent letters couched in most friendly terms to Orange
and Egmont appealing to their loyalty and asking them to support the
regent by their advice and influence. These demonstrations of a
conciliatory temper were however mere temporising. He was playing false.
A document is in existence, dated August 9, in which Philip states that
these concessions had been extorted from him against his will and that
he did not regard himself as bound by them, and he informed the Pope
that the abolition of the Papal Inquisition was a mere form of words.

Meanwhile events were moving fast in the Netherlands. The open-air
preachings were attended by thousands; and at Antwerp, which was one of
the chief centres of Calvinism, disorders broke out, and armed conflicts
were feared. Orange himself, as burgrave of Antwerp, at the request of
the duchess visited the town and with the aid of Brederode and Meghem
succeeded in effecting a compromise between the Catholic and Protestant
parties. The latter were allowed to hold their preachings undisturbed,
so long as they met outside and not within the city walls. The regent
in her alarm was even driven to make overtures to the confederates to
assist her in the maintenance of order. There was much parleying, in
which Orange and Egmont took part; and in July an assembly of the
signatories of the Compromise was called together at St Trond in the
district of Liège. Some two thousand were present, presided over by
Lewis of Nassau. It was resolved to send twelve delegates to Margaret to
lay before her the necessity of finding a remedy for the evils which
were afflicting and disturbing the land. They offered to consult with
Orange and Egmont as to the best means by which they could work together
for the country's good, but hinting that, if no redress was given, they
might be forced to look for foreign aid. Indeed this was no empty
threat, for Lewis had already been in communication with the Protestant
leaders both in France and in the Rhinelands, as to the terms on which
they would furnish armed assistance; and Orange was probably not
altogether in ignorance of the fact. The regent was angry at the tone of
the delegates, whom she received on July 26, but in her present
impotence thought it best to dissemble. She promised to give
consideration to the petition, and summoned a meeting of the Knights of
the Golden Fleece to meet at Brussels on August 18, when she would
decide upon her answer. But, when that date arrived, other and more
pressing reasons than the advice of counsellors compelled her to yield
to the confederates a large part of their demands. On August 23 she
agreed, in return for help in the restoration of order, to concede
liberty of preaching, so long as those who assembled did not bear arms
and did not interfere with the Catholic places of worship and religious
services. Further an indemnity was promised to all who had signed the
Compromise.

The reasons which influenced her were, first the receipt, on August 12,
of the conciliatory letter from the king, to which reference has already
been made, in which he consented to a certain measure of toleration; and
secondly a sudden outburst of iconoclastic fury on the part of the
Calvinistic sectaries, which had spread with great rapidity through many
parts of the land. On August 14, at St Omer, Ypres, Courtray,
Valenciennes and Tournay, fanatical mobs entered the churches destroying
and wrecking, desecrating the altars, images, vestments and works of
art, and carrying away the sacred vessels and all that was valuable. On
August 16 and 17 the cathedral of Antwerp was entered by infuriated and
sacrilegious bands armed with axes and hammers, who made havoc and ruin
of the interior of the beautiful church. In Holland and Zeeland similar
excesses were committed. Such conduct aroused a feeling of the deepest
indignation and reprobation in the minds of all right-thinking men, and
alienated utterly those more moderate Catholics who up till now had been
in favour of moderation. Of the great nobles, who had hitherto upheld
the cause of the national liberties and privileges against the
encroachments of a foreign despotism, many now fell away. Among these
were Aremberg, Meghem and Mansfeld. Egmont hesitated. As might have been
expected, the news of the outrages, when it reached Philip's ears,
filled him with rage and grief; and he is reported to have exclaimed,
"It shall cost them dear. I swear it by the soul of my father." From
this time forward he was determined to visit with exemplary punishment
not only the rioters and the Protestant sectaries, but more especially
the great nobles on whose shoulders he laid the whole blame for the
troubles that had arisen.

He was in no hurry to act, and announced that it was his intention to go
to the Netherlands in person and enquire into the alleged grievances. So
he told his councillors and wrote to Margaret. No one seems to have
suspected his deep-laid scheme for allaying the suspicions of his
intended victims until the right moment came for laying his hands upon
them and crushing all opposition by overwhelming force. Orange alone,
who had his paid spies at Madrid, had a presage of what was coming and
took measures of precaution betimes. An intercepted letter from the
Spanish ambassador at Paris to the Regent Margaret, specifically
mentioned Orange, Egmont and Hoorn as deserving of exemplary punishment;
and on October 3 the prince arranged a meeting at Dendermonde to
consider what should be their course of action. In addition to Egmont
and Hoorn, Hoogstraeten and Lewis of Nassau were present. William and
Lewis urged that steps should be taken for preparing armed resistance
should the necessity arise. But neither Egmont nor Hoorn would consent;
they would not be guilty of any act of disloyalty to their sovereign.
The result of the meeting was a great disappointment to Orange, and this
date marked a turning-point in his life. In concert with his brothers,
John and Lewis, he began to enter into negotiations with several of the
German Protestant princes for the formation of a league for the
protection of the adherents of the reformed faith in the Netherlands.
Now for the first time he severed his nominal allegiance to the Roman
Church, and in a letter to Philip of Hesse avowed himself a Lutheran.

During these same autumn months Philip furnished his sister with
considerable sums of money for the levying of a strong mercenary force,
German and Walloon. Possessed now of a body of troops that she could
trust, Margaret in the spring of 1567 took energetic steps to suppress
all insurrectionary movements and disorders, and did not scruple to
disregard the concessions which had been wrung from her on August 23.
The confederate nobles, satisfied with her promises, had somewhat
prematurely dissolved their league; but one of the most fiery and
zealous among them, John de Marnix, lord of Thoulouse, collected at
Antwerp a body of some 2000 Calvinists and attempted to make himself
master of that city. At Austruweel he was encountered (March 13) by a
Walloon force despatched by Margaret with orders to "exterminate the
heretics." Thoulouse and almost the whole of his following perished in
the fight. In the south at the same time the conventicles were
mercilessly suppressed and the preachers driven into exile.

Margaret now felt herself strong enough to demand that the stadholders
and leading nobles should, on pain of dismissal from their posts, take
an oath "to serve the king and to act for and against whomsoever His
Majesty might order." Egmont took the oath; Hoorn, Hoogstraeten and
Brederode declined to do so and resigned their offices. Orange offered
his resignation, but Margaret was unwilling to accept it and urged him
to discuss the matter first with Egmont and Meghem. The three nobles met
accordingly at Willebroek, April 2. William used his utmost powers of
persuasion in an attempt to convince Egmont that he was courting
destruction. But in vain. He himself was not to be moved from his
decision, and the two friends, who had worked together so long in the
patriot cause, parted, never to meet again. Orange saw that he was no
longer safe in the Netherlands and, on April 22, he set out from Breda
for the residence of his brother John at Dillenburg. Here in exile he
could watch in security the progress of events, and be near at hand
should circumstances again require his intervention in the affairs of
the Netherlands.

Orange did not take this extreme step without adequate cause. At the
very time that he left the Netherlands Philip was taking leave of the
Duke of Alva, whom he was despatching at the head of a veteran force to
carry out without pity or remorse the stern duty of expelling heresy
from the provinces and punishing all those, and especially the leaders,
who had ventured to oppose the arbitrary exercise of the royal
authority. He had for some time been preparing this expedition. He still
kept up the pretence that he was coming in person to enquire into the
alleged grievances, but he never had the slightest intention of quitting
Madrid. Alva sailed from Cartagena (April 27) for Genoa, and proceeded
at once to draw together from the various Spanish garrisons in Italy a
picked body of some 12,000 men. With these he set out in June for his
long march across the Alps and through Burgundy, Lorraine and Luxemburg.
His progress, jealously watched by the French and Swiss, met with no
opposition save for the difficulties of the route. He entered the
Netherlands on August 8, with his army intact. A number of notables,
amongst whom was Egmont, came to meet him on his way to Brussels. He
received them, more particularly Egmont, with every appearance of
graciousness. Alva as yet bore only the title of Captain-General, but
the king had bestowed on him full powers civil and military; and the
Duchess of Parma, though still nominally regent, found herself reduced
to a nonentity. Alva's first step was to place strong Spanish garrisons
in the principal cities, his next to get the leaders who had been marked
for destruction into his power. To effect this he succeeded by fair and
flattering words in securing the presence of both Egmont and Hoorn at
Brussels. Under the pretence of taking part in a consultation they were
(September 9) invited to the duke's residence and on their arrival
suddenly found themselves arrested. At the same time their secretaries
and papers were seized, and Antony van Stralen, the burgomaster of
Antwerp, was placed under arrest. These high-handed actions were the
prelude to a reign of terror; and Margaret, already humiliated by
finding herself superseded, requested her brother to accept her
resignation. On October 6 the office of Governor-General was conferred
upon Alva; and shortly afterwards the duchess left the Netherlands and
returned to Parma.

Alva had now the reins of power in his hand, and with a relentless zeal
and cold-blooded ferocity, which have made his name a by-word, he set
about the accomplishment of the fell task with which his master had
entrusted him. He had to enforce with drastic rigour all the penalties
decreed by the placards against heretics and preachers, and to deal
summarily with all who had taken any part in opposition to the
government. But to attempt to do this by means of the ordinary courts
and magistrates would consume time and lead to many acquittals. Alva
therefore had no sooner thrown off the mask by the sudden and skilfully
planned arrest of Egmont and Hoorn, than he proceeded to erect an
extraordinary tribunal, which had no legal standing except such as the
arbitrary will of the duke conferred upon it. This so-called Council of
Troubles, which speedily acquired in popular usage the name of the
Council of Blood, virtually consisted of Alva himself, who was president
and to whose final decision all cases were referred, and two Spanish
lawyers, his chosen tools and agents, Juan de Vargas and Louis del
Rio. The two royalist nobles, Noircarmes and Barlaymont, and five
Netherland jurists also had seats; but, as only the Spaniards voted, the
others before long ceased to attend the meetings. The proceedings indeed
were, from the legal point of view, a mere travesty of justice. A whole
army of commissioners was let loose upon the land, and informers were
encouraged and rewarded. Multitudes of accused were hauled before the
tribunal and were condemned by batches almost without the form of a
trial. For long hours day by day Vargas and del Rio revelled in their
work of butchery; and in all parts of the Netherlands the executioners
were busy. It was of no use for the accused to appeal to the charters
and privileges of their provinces. All alike were summoned to Brussels;
_non curamus privilegios vestros_ declared Vargas in his ungrammatical
Latin. Hand in hand with the wholesale sentences of death went the
confiscation of property. Vast sums went into the treasury. The whole
land for awhile was terror-stricken. All organised opposition was
crushed, and no one dared to raise his voice in protest.

The Prince of Orange was summoned to appear in person before the council
within six weeks, under pain of perpetual banishment and confiscation of
his estates. He refused to come, and energetically denied that the
council had any jurisdiction over him. The same sentence was passed upon
all the other leaders who had placed themselves out of reach of Alva's
arm--Sainte Aldegonde, Hoogstraeten, Culemburg, Montigny, Lewis of
Nassau and others. Unable to lay hands upon the prince himself, the
governor-general took dastardly advantage of William's indiscretion in
leaving his eldest son at Louvain to pursue his studies at the
university. At the beginning of 1568 Philip William, Count of Buren in
right of his mother, was seized and sent to Madrid to be brought up at
the court of Philip to hate the cause to which his father henceforth
devoted his life. Already indeed, before the abduction of his son,
Orange from his safe retreat at Dillenburg had been exerting himself to
raise troops for the invasion of the Netherlands. He still professed
loyalty to the king and declared that in the king's name he wished to
restore to the provinces those liberties and privileges which Philip
himself had sworn that he would maintain. The difficulty was to find the
large sum of money required for such an enterprise, and it was only by
extraordinary efforts that a sufficient amount was obtained. Part of
the money was collected in Antwerp and various towns of Holland and
Zeeland, the rest subscribed by individuals. John of Nassau pledged his
estates, Orange sold his plate and jewels, and finally a war-chest of
200,000 florins was gathered together. It was proposed to attack the
Netherlands from three directions. From the north Lewis of Nassau was to
lead an army from the Ems into Friesland; Hoogstraeten on the east to
effect an entrance by way of Maestricht; while another force of
Huguenots and refugees in the south was to march into Artois. It was an
almost desperate scheme in the face of veteran troops in a central
position under such a tried commander as Alva. The last-named French
force and that under Hoogstraeten were easily defeated and scattered by
Spanish detachments sent to meet them. Lewis of Nassau was at first more
successful. Entering Groningen at the head of eight or nine thousand
undisciplined troops he was attacked, May 23, in a strong position
behind a morass by a Spanish force under the Count of Aremberg,
Stadholder of Friesland, at Heiligerlee. He gained a complete victory.
Aremberg himself was slain, as was also the younger brother of Lewis,
Adolphus of Nassau. The triumph of the invaders was of short duration.
Alva himself took in hand the task of dealing with the rebels. At the
head of 15,000 troops he drove before him the levies of Nassau to
Jemmingen on the estuary of the Ems, and here with the loss of only
seven men he completely annihilated them. Lewis himself and a few others
alone escaped by throwing themselves into the water and swimming for
their lives.

The action at Heiligerlee, by compelling the governor-general to take
the field, had hastened the fate of Egmont and Hoorn. After their arrest
the two noblemen were kept in solitary confinement in the citadel of
Ghent for several months, while the long list of charges against them
was being examined by the Council of Troubles--in other words by Vargas
and del Rio. These charges they angrily denied; and great efforts were
made on their behalf by the wife of Egmont and the dowager Countess of
Hoorn. Appeals were made to the governor-general and to Philip himself,
either for pardon on the ground of services rendered to the State, or at
least for a trial, as Knights of the Golden Fleece, before the Court of
the Order. The Emperor Maximilian himself pleaded with Philip for
clemency, but without avail. Their doom had been settled in advance, and
the king was inflexible. Alva accordingly determined that they should
be executed before he left Brussels for his campaign in the north. On
June 2, the council, after refusing to hear any further evidence in the
prisoners' favour, pronounced them guilty of high treason; and Alva at
once signed the sentences of death. Egmont and Hoorn the next day were
brought by a strong detachment of troops from Ghent to Brussels and were
confined in a building opposite the town hall, known as the Broodhuis.
On June 5, their heads were struck off upon a scaffold erected in the
great square before their place of confinement. Both of them met their
death with the utmost calmness and courage. The effect of this momentous
stroke of vengeance upon these two patriot leaders, both of them good
Catholics, who had always professed loyalty to their sovereign, and one
of whom, Egmont, had performed distinguished services for his country
and king, was profound. A wave of mingled rage and sorrow swept over the
land. It was not only an act of cruel injustice, but even as an act of
policy a blunder of the first magnitude, which was sure to bring, as it
did bring, retribution in its train.

       *       *       *       *       *




CHAPTER IV

THE REVOLT OF THE NETHERLANDS


The complete failure of the expeditions of Hoogstraeten and of Lewis of
Nassau was a great discouragement to the Prince of Orange. Nevertheless
after receiving the news of Jemmingen he wrote to his brother, "With
God's help I am determined to go on." By great exertions he succeeded in
gathering together a heterogeneous force of German and Walloon
mercenaries numbering about 18,000 men, and with these in the beginning
of October he crossed the frontier. But to maintain such a force in the
field required far larger financial resources than William had at his
disposal. Alva was aware of this, and, as the prince made his way into
Brabant, he followed his steps with a small body of veteran troops,
cutting off supplies and stragglers, but declining battle. The
mercenaries, debarred from plunder and in arrears of pay, could not be
kept together more than a few weeks. In November Orange withdrew into
France and disbanded the remnants of his army. In disguise he managed to
escape with some difficulty through France to Dillenburg. His brothers,
Lewis and Henry, joined the Huguenot army under Coligny and took part in
the battles of Moncontour and Jarnac.

Alva was now apparently supreme in the Netherlands; and crowds of
refugees fled the country to escape the wholesale persecutions of the
Council of Blood. Alva however, like his predecessor and indeed like all
Spanish governors engaged in carrying out the policy of Philip II, was
always hampered by lack of funds. The Spanish treasury was empty. The
governor-general's troops no less than those of Orange clamoured for
their regular pay, and it was necessary to find means to satisfy them.
The taxes voted for nine years in 1559 had come to an end. New taxes
could only be imposed with the assent of the States-General. Alva,
however, after his victory at Jemmingen and the dispersion of the army
of Orange, felt himself strong enough to summon the States-General and
demand their assent to the scheme of taxation which he proposed. The
governor-general asked for (1) a tax of five per cent., the "twentieth
penny," on all transfers of real estate, (2) a tax of ten per cent., the
"tenth penny," on all sales of commodities. These taxes, which were an
attempt to introduce into the Netherlands the system known in Castile as
_alcabala_, were to be granted in perpetuity, thus, as the duke hoped,
obviating the necessity of having again to summon the States-General. In
addition to these annual taxes he proposed a payment once for all of one
per cent., "the hundredth penny," on all property, real or personal.
Such a demand was contrary to all precedent in the Netherlands and an
infringement of time-honoured charters and privileges; and even the
terror, which Alva's iron-handed tyranny had inspired, did not prevent
his meeting with strong opposition. The proposals had to be referred to
the provincial estates, and everywhere difficulties were raised. All
classes were united in resistance. Petitions came pouring in protesting
against impositions which threatened to ruin the trade and industries of
the country. Alva found it impossible to proceed.

The "hundredth penny" was voted, but instead of the other taxes, which
were to provide a steady annual income, he had to content himself with a
fixed payment of 2,000,000 guilders for two years only. The imposition
of these taxes on the model of the _alcabala_ had been part of a scheme
for sweeping away all the provincial jurisdictions and rights and
forming the whole of the Netherlands into a unified state, as
subservient to despotic rule as was Castile itself. A greater
centralisation of government had been the constant policy of the
Burgundian and Habsburg rulers since the time of Philip the Good, a
policy to be commended if carried out in a statesmanlike and moderate
spirit without any sudden or violent infringement of traditional
liberties. The aim of Philip of Spain as it was interpreted by his
chosen instrument, the Duke of Alva, was far more drastic. With Alva and
his master all restrictions upon the absolute authority of the sovereign
were obstacles to be swept remorselessly out of the way; civil and
religious liberty in their eyes deserved no better fate than to be
suppressed by force. Alva's experience was that of many would-be tyrants
before and since his day, that the successful application of force is
limited by the power of the purse. His exchequer was empty. Philip was
himself in financial difficulties and could spare him no money from
Spain. The refusal of the provincial estates of the Netherlands to
sanction his scheme of taxation deprived him of the means for imposing
his will upon them. His reign of terror had produced throughout the land
a superficial appearance of peace. There were at the beginning of 1570
no open disturbances or insurrectionary movements to be crushed, but the
people were seething with discontent, and the feeling of hatred aroused
by the presence of the Spanish Inquisition and the foreign soldiery and
by the proceedings of the Council of Blood was, day by day, becoming
deeper and more embittered.

This condition of affairs was duly reported to the king at Madrid; and
there was no lack of councillors at his side who were unfriendly to Alva
and eager to make the most of the complaints against him. Among these
enemies was Ruy Gomez, the king's private secretary, who recommended a
policy of leniency, as did Granvelle, who was now at Naples. Philip
never had any scruples about throwing over his agents, and he announced
his intention of proclaiming an amnesty on the occasion when Anne of
Austria, his intended bride and fourth wife, set sail from Antwerp for
Spain. The proclamation was actually made at Antwerp by the
governor-general in person, July 16, 1570. It was a limited declaration
of clemency, for six classes of offenders were excepted, and it only
extended to those who within two months made their peace with the
Catholic Church and abjured the Reformed doctrines.

During the years 1570-71 there were however few outward signs of the
gradual undermining of Alva's authority. There was sullen resentment and
discontent throughout the land, but no attempt at overt resistance. The
iron hand of the governor-general did not relax its firm grasp of the
reins of power, and the fear of his implacable vengeance filled men's
hearts. He ruled by force, not by love; and those who refused to submit
had either to fly the country or to perish by the hands of the
executioner. Nevertheless during these sad years the Prince of Orange
and Lewis of Nassau, in spite of the apparent hopelessness of the
situation, were unremitting in their efforts to raise fresh forces.
William at Dillenburg exerted himself to the uttermost to obtain
assistance from the Protestant princes of the Rhineland. With the
Calvinists he was, however, as yet strongly suspect. He himself was held
to be a lukewarm convert from Catholicism to the doctrines of Augsburg;
and his wife was the daughter and heiress of Maurice of Saxony, the
champion of Lutheranism. William's repudiation of Anne of Saxony for her
 repeated infidelities (March, 1571) severed this Lutheran alliance.
The unfortunate Anne, after six years' imprisonment, died insane in
1577. At the same time the closest relations of confidence and
friendship sprang up between Orange and the well-known Calvinist writer
and leader, Philip de Marnix, lord of Sainte Aldegonde. This connection
with Sainte Aldegonde ensured for William the support of the Calvinists;
and secret agents of the prince were soon busily at work in the
different parts of the provinces promising armed assistance and
collecting levies for the raising of an invading force. Foremost among
these active helpers were Jacob van Wesenbeke, Diedrich Sonoy and Paul
Buys; and the chief scene of their operations were the provinces of
Holland and Zeeland, already distinguished for their zeal in the cause
of freedom. The amount of cash that was raised was, however, for some
time very small. There was goodwill in plenty, but the utter failure of
the prince's earlier efforts had made people despair.

These earlier efforts had indeed, on land, been disastrous, but they
had not been confined entirely to land operations. Orange, in his
capacity as a sovereign prince, had given _letters of marque_ to a
number of vessels under the command of the lord of Dolhain. These
vessels were simply corsairs and they were manned by fierce fanatical
sectaries, desperadoes inflamed at once by bitter hatred of the papists
and by the hope of plunder. These "Beggars of the Sea" (_Gueux de mer_),
as they were called, rapidly increased in number and soon made
themselves a terror in the narrow seas by their deeds of reckless daring
and cruelty. William tried in vain to restrain excesses which brought
him little profit and no small discredit. It was to no purpose that he
associated the lord of Lumbres in the chief command with Dolhain. Their
subordinates, William de Blois, lord of Treslong, and William de la
Marck, lord of Lumey, were bold, unscrupulous adventurers who found it
to their interest to allow their unruly crews to burn and pillage, as
they lusted, not only their enemies' ships in the open sea, but churches
and monasteries along the coast and up the estuaries that they infested.
The difficulty was to find harbours in which they could take refuge and
dispose of their booty. For some time they were permitted to use the
English ports freely, and the Huguenot stronghold at La Rochelle was
also open to them as a market. Queen Elizabeth, as was her wont, had no
scruple in conniving at acts of piracy to the injury of the Spaniard;
but at last, at the beginning of 1572, in consequence of strong
representations from Madrid, she judged it politic to issue an order
forbidding the Sea-Beggars to enter any English harbours. The pirates,
thus deprived of the shelter which had made their depredations possible,
would have been speedily in very bad case, but for an unexpected and
surprising stroke of good fortune. It chanced that a large number of
vessels under Lumbres and Treslong were driven by stress of weather into
the estuary of the Maas; and finding that the Spanish garrison of Brill
had left the town upon a punitive expedition, the rovers landed and
effected an entry by burning one of the gates. The place was seized and
pillaged, and the marauders were on the point of returning with their
spoil to their ships, when at the suggestion of Treslong it was
determined to place a garrison in the town and hold it as a harbour of
refuge in the name of the Prince of Orange, as Stadholder of Holland. On
April 1, 1572, the prince's flag was hoisted over Brill, and the
foundation stone was laid of the future Dutch republic.

William himself at first did not realise the importance of this capture,
and did not take any steps to express his active approval; but it was
otherwise with his brother Lewis, who was at the time using his utmost
endeavours to secure if not the actual help, at least the connivance, of
Charles IX to his conducting an expedition from France into the
Netherlands. Lewis saw at once the great advantage to the cause of the
possession of a port like Brill, and he urged the Beggars to try and
gain possession of Flushing also, before Alva's orders for the
strengthening of the garrison and the defences had been carried out.
Flushing by its position commanded the approach by water to Antwerp.
When the ships of Lumbres and Treslong appeared before the town, the
inhabitants rose in revolt, over-powered the garrison, and opened the
gates. This striking success, following upon the taking of Brill,
aroused great enthusiasm. The rebels had now a firm foothold both in
Holland and Zeeland, and their numbers grew rapidly from day to day.
Soon the whole of the island of Walcheren, on which Flushing stands, was
in their hands with the exception of the capital Middelburg; and in
Holland several important towns hoisted the flag of revolt and
acknowledged the Prince of Orange as their lawful Stadholder. From
Holland the rebellion spread into Friesland. Finally on June 19 an
assembly of the Estates of Holland was, at the instance of Dordrecht,
convened to meet in that town. There was but one representative of the
nobility present at this meeting, whose legality was more than doubtful,
but it included deputies of no less than twelve out of the fourteen
towns which were members of the Estates. The prince sent Ste Aldegonde
as his plenipotentiary. The step taken was practically an act of
insurrection against the king. William had resigned his stadholdership
in 1568 and had afterwards been declared an outlaw. Bossu had been by
royal authority appointed to the vacant office. The Estates now formally
recognised the prince as Stadholder of the king in Holland, Zeeland,
West Friesland and Utrecht; and he was further invested with the supreme
command of the forces both by land and sea and was charged with the duty
of protecting the country against foreign oppression or invasion by
foreign troops. Ste Aldegonde in the name of the prince announced his
acceptance of the posts that had been conferred on him and declared that
he desired, as a condition of such acceptance, that the principle of
religious freedom and liberty of worship should be conceded to
Catholics and Protestants alike. To this the Estates assented. Orange
took an oath to maintain the towns in the rights and privileges of which
they had been deprived by Alva and not to enter into any negotiations or
conclude any treaty with Spain without their consent. The Court of
Holland for the administration of justice was reconstituted and a
Chamber of Finance erected. The question of finance was indeed crucial,
for the new stadholder asked for a subsidy of 100,000 crowns a month for
the support of the army he had raised for the invasion of Brabant; and
the Estates agreed to take measures for appropriating certain taxes for
the purpose, an undertaking which had, however, in this time of present
distress small likelihood of effectual result.

The course of events indeed in the months which followed this historic
gathering at Dordrecht was not encouraging to those who had thus dared
somewhat prematurely to brave the wrath of Philip and the vengeance of
Alva. Lewis of Nassau had for some time been engaged in raising a
Huguenot force for the invasion of the southern Netherlands. The news of
the capture of Brill and Flushing stirred him to sudden action. He had
collected only a small body of men, but, with characteristic impetuosity
he now led these across the frontier, and, before Alva was aware of his
presence in Hainault, had captured by surprise Valenciennes and Mons
(May 24). It was a rash move, for no sooner did the news reach the
governor-general than he sent his son, Don Frederick of Toledo, at the
head of a powerful force to expel the invader. Don Frederick quickly
made himself master of Valenciennes and then proceeded (June 3) to lay
siege to Mons, where Lewis, in hopes that relief would reach him,
prepared for an obstinate defence. These hopes were not without
foundation, for he knew that, beyond the Rhine, Orange with a
considerable army was on the point of entering the Netherlands from the
east, and that the Huguenot leader, Genlis, was leading another force
from France to his succour. William at the head of 20,000 German and
3000 Walloon mercenaries actually entered Gelderland (July 7), captured
Roeremonde and then marched into Brabant. Here (July 19) the news
reached him of the complete defeat and annihilation of the raw levies of
Genlis by Toledo's veteran troops. Hampered by lack of funds William
now, as throughout his life, showed himself to be lacking in the higher
qualities of military leadership. With an ill-paid mercenary force time
was a factor of primary importance, nevertheless the prince made no
effort to move from his encampment near Roeremonde for some five weeks.
Meanwhile his troops got out of hand and committed many excesses, and
when, on August 27, he set out once more to march westwards, he found to
his disappointment that there was no popular rising in his favour.
Louvain and Brussels shut their gates, and though Mechlin, Termonde and
a few other places surrendered, the prince saw only too plainly that his
advance into Flanders would not bring about the relief of Mons. All his
plans had gone awry. Alva could not be induced to withdraw any portion
of the army that was closely blockading Mons, but contented himself in
following Orange with a force under his own command while avoiding a
general action. And then like a thunderclap, September 5, the news of
the massacre of St Bartholomew was brought to the prince, and he knew
that the promise of Coligny to conduct 12,000 arquebusiers to the
succour of Lewis could not be redeemed. In this emergency William saw
that he must himself endeavour to raise the siege. He accordingly
marched from Flanders and, September 11, encamped at the village of
Harmignies, a short distance from Mons. In the night six hundred
Spaniards, each of whom to prevent mistakes wore a white shirt over his
armour, surprised the camp. The prince himself was awakened by a little
dog that slept in his tent and only narrowly escaped with his life,
several hundred of his troops being slain by the _Camisaders_. He was
now thoroughly discouraged and on the following day retreated first to
Mechlin, then to Roeremonde, where on September 30 the ill-fated
expedition was disbanded. The retirement from Harmignies decided the
fate of Mons. Favourable conditions were granted and Lewis of Nassau,
who was ill with fever, met with chivalrous treatment and was allowed to
return to Dillenburg.

William now found himself faced with something like financial ruin.
Mercenary armies are very costly, and by bitter experience he had learnt
the futility of opposing a half-hearted and badly disciplined force to
the veteran troops of Alva. He resolved therefore to go in person to
Holland to organise and direct the strong movement of revolt, which had
found expression in the meeting of the Estates at Dordrecht. His agents
had long been busy going about from town to town collecting funds in the
name of the prince and encouraging the people in their resistance to the
Inquisition and to foreign tyranny. William's declaration that
henceforth he intended to live and die in their midst and to devote
himself with all his powers to the defence of the rights and liberties
of the land met with willing and vigorous support throughout the greater
part of Holland, West Friesland and Zeeland; and contributions for the
supply of the necessary ways and means began to flow in. It was,
however, a desperate struggle to which he had pledged himself, and to
which he was to consecrate without flinching the rest of his life. If,
however, the prince's resolve was firm, no less so was that of Alva.

Alva had his enemies at the Spanish court, always ready to excite
distrust against the duke in the mind of the suspicious king. In July,
1572, the Duke of Medina-Coeli had been sent from Spain to enquire into
the state of affairs in the Netherlands; probably it was intended that
he should take over the administration and supersede the
governor-general. On his arrival, however, Medina-Coeli quickly saw that
the difficulties of the situation required a stronger hand than his, and
he did not attempt to interfere with Alva's continued exercise of
supreme authority. The governor-general, on his side, knew well what was
the meaning of this mission of Medina-Coeli, and no sooner was the army
of Orange dispersed than he determined, while the reins of power were
still in his hands, to visit the rebellious towns of the north with
condign vengeance.

At the head of a powerful force, Frederick of Toledo marched northwards.
Mechlin, which had received Orange, was given over for three days to
pillage and outrage. Then Zutphen was taken and sacked. Naarden, which
had, though without regular defences, dared to resist the Spaniards, was
utterly destroyed and the entire population massacred. Amsterdam, one of
the few towns of Holland which had remained loyal to the king, served as
a basis for further operations. Although it was already December and the
season was unfavourable, Toledo now determined to lay siege to the
important town of Haarlem. Haarlem was difficult of approach. It was
protected on two sides by broad sheets of shallow water, the Haarlem
lake and the estuary of the Y, divided from one another by a narrow neck
of land. On another side was a thick wood. It was garrisoned by 4000
men, stern Calvinists, under the resolute leadership of Ripperda and
Lancelot Brederode. An attempt to storm the place (December 21) was
beaten off with heavy loss to the assailants; so Toledo, despite the
inclemency of the weather, had to invest the city. Another desperate
assault, January 31, disastrously failed, and the siege was turned into
a blockade. The position, however, of the besiegers was in some respects
worse than that of the besieged; and Toledo would have abandoned his
task in despair had not his father ordered him at all costs to proceed.
William meanwhile made several efforts to relieve the town. Bodies of
skaters in the winter, and when the ice disappeared, numbers of boats
crossed over the Haarlem lake from Leyden and managed to carry supplies
of food into the town, and resistance might have been indefinitely
prolonged had not Bossu put a stop to all intercourse between Haarlem
and the outside world by convoying a flotilla of armed vessels from the
Y into the lake. Surrender was now only a question of time. On July
11,1573, after a relieving force of 4000 men, sent by Orange, had been
utterly defeated, and the inhabitants were perishing by famine, Toledo
gained possession of Haarlem. The survivors of the heroic garrison were
all butchered, and Ripperda and Brederode, their gallant leaders,
executed. A number of the leading citizens were likewise put to death,
but the town was spared from pillage on condition of paying a heavy
fine. The siege had lasted seven months, and the army of Toledo, which
had suffered terribly during the winter, is said to have lost twelve
thousand men.

Alva in his letters to the king laid great stress on the clemency with
which he had treated Haarlem. It had been spared the wholesale
destruction of Zutphen and Naarden, and the duke hoped that by this
exhibition of comparative leniency he might induce the other rebel towns
to open their gates without opposition. He was deceived. On July 18
Alkmaar was summoned to surrender, but refused. Alva's indignation knew
no bounds, and he vowed that every man, woman and child in the
contumacious town should be put to the sword. The threat, however, could
not at once be executed. Toledo's army, debarred from the sack of
Haarlem, became mutinous through lack of pay. Until they received the
arrears due to them, they refused to stir. Not till August 21 was Don
Frederick able to invest Alkmaar with a force of 16,000 men. The
garrison consisted of some 1300 burghers with 800 troops thrown into the
town by Sonoy, Orange's lieutenant in North Holland. Two desperate
assaults were repulsed with heavy loss, and then the Spaniards proceeded
to blockade the town. Sonoy now, by the orders of the prince, gained the
consent of the cultivators of the surrounding district to the cutting of
the dykes. The camps and trenches of the besiegers were flooded out; and
(October 8) the siege was raised and the army of Don Frederick retired,
leaving Alkmaar untaken. Within a week another disaster befell the
Spanish arms. Between Hoorn and Enkhuizen the fleet of Bossu on the
Zuyder Zee was attacked by the Sea-Beggars and was completely defeated.
Bossu himself was taken prisoner and was held as a hostage for the
safety of Ste Aldegonde, who fell into the hands of the Spaniards about
month later.

This naval victory, following upon the retreat from Alkmaar,
strengthened greatly the efforts of Orange and gave fresh life to the
patriot cause. It likewise marked the end of the six years of Alva's
blood-stained rule in the Netherlands. Weary and disappointed, always
hampered by lack of funds, angry at the loss of the king's confidence
and chafing at the evidence of it in the presence of Medina-Coeli at his
side, the governor-general begged that he might be relieved of his
functions. His request was granted, October 29. The chosen successor was
the Grand Commander, Don Luis de Requesens, governor of Milan. It was
only with much reluctance that Requesens, finding the king's command
insistent and peremptory, accepted the charge.

The Grand Commander was indeed far from being a suitable man for dealing
with the difficult situation in the Netherlands, for he was a Spanish
grandee pure and simple and did not even speak French. Even the
loyalists received him coolly. He knew nothing of the country, and
whatever his ability or disposition it was felt that he would not be
allowed a free hand in his policy or adequate means for carrying it out.
That his temper was conciliatory was quickly shown. An amnesty was
proclaimed for political offenders except three hundred persons (among
these Orange and his principal adherents), and pardon to all heretics
who abjured their errors. He went even further than this by entering
into a secret exchange of views with William himself through Ste
Aldegonde as an intermediary, in the hope of finding some common
meeting-ground for an understanding. But the prince was immovable.
Unless freedom of worship, the upholding of all ancient charters and
liberties and the removal of Spaniards and all foreigners from any share
in the government or administration of the land were granted, resistance
would be continued to the last. These were conditions Requesens had no
power even to consider.

Orange during this time was on his side using all his diplomatic ability
to gain help for the oppressed Netherlanders from France and England.
But Charles IX had his own difficulties and was in too feeble health (he
died May, 1574) to take any decided step, and Queen Elizabeth, though
she connived at assistance being given to the rebel cause on strictly
commercial terms, was not willing either to show open hostility to
Philip or to support subjects in revolt against their sovereign.
William's position appeared well-nigh desperate, for at the opening of
the year 1574 his authority was only recognised in a few of the towns of
Holland and in some of the Zeeland islands, and the Spaniards had sent a
large force to invest Leyden. He had, however, made up his mind to cast
in his lot with the brave Hollanders and Zeelanders in their gallant
struggle against overwhelming odds. To identify himself more completely
with his followers, the prince, October, 1573, openly announced his
adhesion to Calvinism. There are no grounds for doubting his sincerity
in taking this step; it was not an act of pure opportunism. His early
Catholicism had probably been little more than an outward profession,
and as soon as he began to think seriously about religious questions,
his natural bent had led him first to the Lutheran faith of his family,
and then to the sterner doctrines, which had gained so firm a foothold
in the towns of Holland and Zeeland. Nevertheless William, though
henceforth a consistent Calvinist, was remarkable among his
contemporaries for the principles of religious toleration he both
inculcated and practised. He was constitutionally averse to religious
persecution in any form, and by the zealots of his party he was
denounced as lukewarm; but throughout his life he upheld the right of
the individual, who was peaceful and law-abiding, to liberty of opinion
and freedom of worship.

The year 1574 opened favourably. By a remarkable feat of arms the
veteran Spanish commander Mondragon had, October, 1572, reconquered
several of the Zeeland islands. His men on one occasion at ebb-tide
marched across the channel which lies between South Beveland and the
mainland, the water reaching up to their necks. The patriot forces had
since then recovered much of the lost ground, but Middelburg was
strongly held, and so long as the Spaniards had command of the sea, was
the key to the possession of Zeeland. On January 29, 1574, the
Sea-Beggars under Boisot attacked the Spanish fleet near Roemerswaal and
after a bloody encounter gained a complete victory. The siege of
Middelburg was now pressed and Mondragon surrendered, February 18. The
prince at once set to work to create a patriot government in the
province. Four towns had representatives, Middelburg, Zierikzee, Veere
and Flushing. William himself acquired by purchase the marquisate of
Flushing and thus was able to exercise a preponderating influence in the
Provincial Estates, all of whose members were required to be Calvinists
and supporters of the rebel cause.

The investment of Leyden by the Spaniards threatened however, now
that Haarlem had fallen, to isolate South Holland and Zeeland; and
William did not feel himself strong enough to make any serious attempt
to raise the siege. Lewis of Nassau therefore, with the help of French
money, set himself to work with his usual enthusiastic energy to
collect a force in the Rhineland with which to invade the Netherlands
from the east and effect a diversion. At the head of 7000 foot and
3000 horse--half-disciplined troops, partly Huguenot volunteers,
partly German mercenaries--he tried to cross the Meuse above Maestricht
with the intention of effecting a junction with the Prince of Orange.
He was accompanied by John and Henry of Nassau, his brothers, and
Christopher, son of the Elector Palatine. He found his course blocked
by a Spanish force under the command of Sancho d'Avila and Mondragon.
The encounter took place on the heath of Mook (April 14) and ended in
the crushing defeat of the invaders. Lewis and his young brother,
Henry, and Duke Christopher perished, and their army was completely
scattered. The death of his brothers was a great grief to William.
Lewis had for years been his chief support, and the loss of this
dauntless champion was indeed a heavy blow to the cause for which he
had sacrificed his life. He was only thirty-six years of age, while
Henry, the youngest of the Nassaus, to whom the Prince was deeply
attached, was but a youth of twenty-four.

The invasion of Lewis had nevertheless the result of raising the siege
of Leyden; but only for a time. After the victory at Mook the Spanish
troops were free to continue the task of reconquering rebel Holland for
the king. On May 26 a strong force under Valdez advanced to Leyden and
completely isolated the town by surrounding it with a girdle of forts.
The attack came suddenly, and unfortunately the place had not been
adequately provisioned. So strong was the position of the Spaniards that
the stadholder did not feel that any relieving force that he could send
would have any chance of breaking through the investing lines and
revictualling the garrison. In these circumstances he summoned, June 1,
a meeting of the Estates of Holland at Rotterdam and proposed, as a
desperate resource, that the dykes should be cut and the land submerged,
and that the light vessels of the Sea-Beggars under Boisot should sail
over the waters, attack the Spanish forts and force an entrance into the
town. After considerable opposition the proposal was agreed to and the
waters were allowed to flow out upon the low-lying fields, villages and
farms, which lie between the sea, the Rhine, the Waal and the Maas.
Unfortunately the season was not favourable, and though the water
reached nearly to the higher land round Leyden on which the Spanish
redoubts were erected, and by alarming Valdez caused him to press the
blockade more closely, it was not deep enough even for the light-draught
vessels, which Boisot had gathered together, to make their way to the
town. So the month of August passed and September began. Meanwhile the
prince, who was the soul of the enterprise, was confined to his sick-bed
by a violent attack of fever, and the pangs of famine began to be
cruelly felt within the beleaguered town. A portion of the citizens were
half-hearted in the struggle, and began to agitate for surrender and
even sent out emissaries to try to make terms with the Spanish
commander. But there were within Leyden leaders of iron resolution, the
heroic Burgomaster Pieter Adriaanzoon van der Werf; the commandant of
the garrison, Jan van der Does; Dirk van Bronkhorst, Jan van Hout and
many others who remained staunch and true in face of the appalling agony
of a starving population; men who knew the fate in store for them if
they fell into the enemy's hands and were determined to resist as long
as they had strength to fight. At last in mid-September faint hopes
began to dawn. William recovered, and a fierce equinoctial gale driving
the flood-tide up the rivers gradually deepened the waters up to the
very dyke on which the entrenchments of the besiegers stood. Urged on by
Orange, Boisot now made a great effort. Anxiously from the towers was
the approach of the relieving fleet watched. The town was at the very
last extremity. The people were dying of hunger on every side. Some
fierce combats took place as soon as the Sea-Beggars, experts at this
amphibious warfare, arrived at the outlying Spanish forts, but not for
long. Alarmed at the rising of the waters and fearing that the fleet of
Boisot might cut off their escape, the Spaniards retreated in the night;
and on the morning of October 3 the vessels of the relieving force,
laden with provisions, entered the town. The long-drawn-out agony was
over and Leyden saved from the fate of Haarlem, just at the moment when
further resistance had become impossible. Had Leyden fallen the
probability is that the whole of South Holland would have been
conquered, and the revolt might have collapsed. In such a narrow escape
well might the people of the town see an intervention of Providence on
their behalf. The prince himself hastened to Leyden on the following
day, reorganised the government of the town and in commemoration of this
great deliverance founded the University, which was to become in the
17th century one of the most famous seats of learning in Europe.

The successful relief of Leyden was followed by a mutiny of the army of
Valdez. They were owed long arrears of pay, had endured great hardships,
and now that they saw themselves deprived of the hope of the pillage
of the town, they put their commander and his officers under arrest and
marched under a leader elected by themselves into Utrecht. Other
mutinies occurred in various parts of the southern provinces, for
Requesens had no funds, and it was useless to appeal to Philip, for the
Spanish treasury was empty. This state of things led to a practical
cessation of active hostilities for many months; and Requesens seized
the opportunity to open negotiations with Orange. These were, however,
doomed to be fruitless, for the king would not hear of any real
concessions being made to the Protestants. The position of William was
equally beset with difficulties, politically and financially. In the
month following the relief of Leyden he even threatened to withdraw from
the country unless his authority were more fully recognised and adequate
supplies were furnished for the conduct of the war. The Estates
accordingly, November 12, asked him to assume the title of Regent or
Governor, with "absolute might, authority and sovereign control" of the
affairs of the country. They also voted him an allowance of 49,000
guilders a month; but, while thus conferring on the man who still
claimed to be the "Stadholder of the king" practically supreme power,
the burgher-corporations of the towns were very jealous of surrendering
in the smallest degree that control over taxation which was one of their
most valued rights. The exercise of authority, however, by the prince
from this time forward was very great, for he had complete control in
military and naval matters, and in the general conduct of affairs he
held all the administrative threads in his own hands. He had become
indispensable, and in everything but name a sovereign in Holland and
Zeeland.

The first part of 1575 was marked by a lull in warlike operations, and
conferences were held at Breda between envoys of Orange and Requesens,
only to find that there was no common ground of agreement. The marriage
of the prince (June 24) with Charlotte de Bourbon, daughter of the Duke
of Montpensier, was a daring step which aroused much prejudice against
him. The bride, who was of the blood-royal of France, had been Abbess of
Jouarre, but had abjured her vows, run away and become a Calvinist. This
was bad enough, but the legality of the union was rendered the more
questionable by the fact that Anne of Saxony was still alive. On all
sides came protests--from Charlotte's father, from John of Nassau, and
from Anne's relations in Saxony and Hesse. But William's character was
such that opposition only made him more determined to carry out his
purpose. The wedding was celebrated at Brill with Calvinist rites. The
union, whether legitimate or not, was undoubtedly one of great
happiness.

Meanwhile the governor-general, unable to obtain any financial help from
Spain, had managed to persuade the provinces, always in dread of the
excesses of the mutinous soldiery, to raise a loan of 1,200,000 guilders
to meet their demands for arrears of pay. Requesens was thus enabled to
put in the late summer a considerable army into the field and among
other successes to gain possession of the Zeeland islands, Duiveland and
Schouwen. On September 27 a force under the command of the veteran
Mondragon waded across the shallow channels dividing the islands, which
fell into their hands. Zierikzee, the chief town of Schouwen, made a
stout resistance, but had at length to surrender (July, 1576). This
conquest separated South Holland from the rest of Zeeland; and, as
Haarlem and Amsterdam were in the hands of the Spaniards, the only
territory over which the authority of Orange extended was the low-lying
corner of land between the Rhine and the Maas, of which Delft was the
centre.

The situation again appeared well-nigh desperate, and the stadholder
began to look anxiously round in the hope of obtaining foreign
assistance. It was to the interest of both France and England to assist
a movement which distracted the attention and weakened the power of
Spain. But Henry III of France was too much occupied with civil and
religious disturbances in his own country, and Elizabeth of England,
while receiving with courtesy the envoys both of Orange and Requesens,
gave evasive replies to both. She was jealous of France, and pleased to
see the growing embarrassment of her enemy Philip, but the Tudor queen
had no love either for rebels or for Calvinists. While refusing
therefore openly to take the side of the Hollanders and Zeelanders, she
agreed to give them secret help; and no obstacle was placed in the way
of the English volunteers, who had already since 1572 been enlisting in
the Dutch service. It was at this time that those English and Scottish
Brigades were first formed which remained for nearly two centuries in
that service, and were always to be found in the very forefront of the
fighting throughout the great war of Liberation.

On March 4, 1576, Requesens died; and in the considerable interval
that elapsed before the arrival of his successor, the outlook for the
patriot cause became distinctly brighter. The Estates of Holland and
Zeeland met at Delft (April 25, 1576); and the assembly was noteworthy
for the passing of an Act of Federation. This Act, which was the work of
Orange, bound the two provinces together for common action in defence of
their rights and liberties and was the first step towards that larger
union, which three years later laid the foundations of the Dutch
Republic. By this Act sovereign powers were conferred upon William; he
was in the name of the king to exercise all the prerogatives of a ruler.
It required all his influence to secure the insertion of articles (1)
extending a certain measure of toleration to all forms of religious
worship that were not contrary to the Gospel, (2) giving authority to
the prince in case of need to offer the Protectorate of the federated
provinces to a foreign prince. Orange knew only too well that Holland
and Zeeland were not strong enough alone to resist the power of Spain.
His hopes of securing the support of the other provinces, in which
Catholics were in the majority, depended, he clearly saw, on the
numerous adherents to the ancient faith in Holland and Zeeland being
protected against the persecuting zeal of the dominant Calvinism of
those provinces. In any case--and this continued to be his settled
conviction to the end of his life--the actual independence of the whole
or any portion of the Netherlands did not seem to him to lie within the
bounds of practical politics. The object for which he strove was the
obtaining of substantial guarantees for the maintenance of the ancient
charters, which exempted the provinces from the presence of foreign
officials, foreign tribunals, foreign soldiery and arbitrary methods of
taxation. As Philip had deliberately infringed all those privileges
which he had sworn to maintain, it was the duty of all patriotic
Netherlanders to resist his authority, and, if resistance failed to
bring redress, to offer the sovereignty with the necessary restrictions
to some other prince willing to accept it on those conditions and
powerful enough to protect the provinces from Spanish attack. In order
to grasp the principles which guided William's policy during the next
few years it is essential to bear in mind (1) that he sought to bring
about a union of all the Netherland provinces on a basis of toleration,
(2) that he did not aim at the erection of the Netherlands into an
independent State.

On the death of Requesens the Council of State had assumed temporary
charge of the administration. There had for some time been growing
dissatisfaction even amongst the loyalist Catholics of the southern
provinces at the presence and over-bearing attitude of so many Spanish
officials and Spanish troops in the land and at the severity of the
religious persecution. Representations were made to the king by the
Council of State of the general discontent throughout the country, of
the deplorable results of the policy of force and repression, and urging
the withdrawal of the troops, the mitigation of the edicts, and the
appointment of a member of the royal house to the governorship. To these
representations and requests no answer was sent for months in accordance
with Philip's habitual dilatoriness in dealing with difficult affairs of
State. He did, however, actually nominate in April his bastard brother,
Don John of Austria, the famous victor of Lepanto, as Requesens'
successor. But Don John, who was then in Italy, had other ambitions, and
looked with suspicion upon Philip's motives in assigning him the
thankless task of dealing with the troubles in the Low Countries.
Instead of hurrying northwards, he first betook himself to Madrid where
he met with a cold reception. Delay, however, so far from troubling
Philip, was thoroughly in accordance with the whole bent of his
character and policy. For six months Don John remained in Spain, and it
was a half-year during which the situation in the Netherlands had been
to a very large extent transformed.

The position of Orange and his followers in Holland and Zeeland in the
spring of 1576 had again darkened. In June the surrender of Zierikzee to
Mondragon was a heavy blow to the patriot cause, for it gave the
Spaniards a firm footing in the very heart of the Zeeland archipelago
and drove a wedge between South Holland and the island of Walcheren.
This conquest was, however, destined to have important results of a very
different character from what might have been expected. The town had
surrendered on favourable terms and pillage was forbidden. Baulked of
their expected booty, the Spanish troops, to whom large arrears of pay
were due, mutinied. Under their own "eletto" they marched to Aalst,
where they were joined by other mutineers, and soon a large force was
collected together, who lived by plunder and were a terror to the
country. The Council declared them to be outlaws, but the revolted
soldiery defied its authority and scoffed at its threats. This was a
moment which, as Orange was quick to perceive, was extremely favourable
for a vigorous renewal of his efforts to draw together all the provinces
to take common action in their resistance to Spanish tyranny. His agents
and envoys in all parts of the Netherlands, but especially in Flanders
and Brabant, urged his views upon the more influential members of the
provincial estates and upon leading noblemen, like the Duke of Aerschot
and other hitherto loyal supporters of the government, who were now
suspected of wavering. His efforts met with a success which a few months
earlier would have been deemed impossible. The conduct of the Spanish
troops, and the lack of any central authority to protect the inhabitants
against their insolence and depredations, had effected a great change
in public opinion. In Brussels Baron de Héze (a god-child of the prince)
had been appointed to the command of the troops in the pay of the
Estates of Brabant. De Héze exerted himself to arouse popular opinion in
the capital in favour of Orange and against the Spaniards. To such an
extent was he successful that he ventured, Sept. 21, to arrest the whole
of the Council of State with the exception of the Spanish member Roda,
who fled to Antwerp. William now entered into direct negotiations with
Aerschot and other prominent nobles of Flanders and Brabant. He took a
further step by sending, at the request of the citizens of Ghent, a
strong armed force to protect the town against the Spanish garrison in
the citadel. In the absence of any lawful government, the States-General
were summoned to meet at Brussels on September 22. Deputies from
Brabant, Flanders and Hainault alone attended, but in the name of the
States-General they nominated Aerschot, Viglius and Sasbout as
Councillors of State, and appointed Aerschot to the command of the
forces, with the Count of Lalaing as his lieutenant. They then, Sept.
27, approached the prince with proposals for forming a union of all the
provinces. As a preliminary it was agreed that the conditions, which had
been put forward by William as indispensable--namely, exclusion of all
foreigners from administrative posts, dismissal of foreign troops, and
religious toleration--should be accepted. The proposals were gladly
received by William, and Ghent was chosen as the place where nine
delegates from Holland and Zeeland should confer with nine delegates
nominated by the States-General as representing the other provinces.
They met on October 19. Difficulties arose on two points--the
recognition to be accorded to Don John of Austria, and the principle of
non-interference with religious beliefs. Orange himself had always been
an advocate of toleration, but the representatives of Holland and
Zeeland showed an obstinate disinclination to allow liberty of Catholic
worship within their borders; and this attitude of theirs might, in
spite of the prince's efforts, have led to a breaking-off of the
negotiations, had not an event occurred which speedily led to a sinking
of differences on the only possible basis, that of mutual concession and
compromise.

The citadel of Antwerp was, during this month of October, garrisoned by
a body of mutinous Spanish troops under the command of Sancho d'Avila,
the victor of Mook. Champagney, the governor, had with him a body of
German mercenaries under a certain Count Oberstein; and at his request,
such was the threatening attitude of the Spaniards, the States-General
sent Havré with a reinforcement of Walloon troops. On Sunday, November
4, the garrison, which had been joined by other bands of mutineers,
turned the guns of the citadel upon the town and sallying forth attacked
the forces of Champagney. The Germans offered but a feeble resistance.
Oberstein perished; Champagney and Havré took refuge on vessels in the
river; and the Spaniards were masters of Antwerp. The scene of massacre,
lust and wholesale pillage, which followed, left a memory behind it
unique in its horror even among the excesses of this blood-stained time.
The "Spanish Fury," as it was called, spelt the ruin of what, but a
short time before, had been the wealthiest and most flourishing
commercial city in the world.

The news of this disaster reached the States-General, as they were in
the act of considering the draft proposals which had been submitted to
them by the Ghent conference. At the same time tidings came that Don
John, who had travelled through France in disguise, had arrived at
Luxemburg. They quickly therefore came to a decision to ratify the pact,
known as the _Pacification of Ghent,_ and on November 8 it was signed.
The _Pacification_ was really a treaty between the Prince of Orange and
the Estates of Holland and Zeeland on the one hand, and the
States-General representing the other provinces. It was agreed that the
Spanish troops should be compelled to leave the Netherlands and that the
States-General of the whole seventeen provinces, as they were convened
at the abdication of Charles V, should be called together to decide upon
the question of religious toleration and other matters of national
importance. Meanwhile the placards against heresy were suspended, and
all the illegal measures and sentences of Alva declared null and void.
His confiscated property was restored to Orange, and his position, as
stadholder in Holland and Zeeland, acknowledged. Don John was informed
that he would not be recognised as governor-general unless he would
consent to dismiss the Spanish troops, accept the Pacification of Ghent,
and swear to maintain the rights and privileges of the Provinces.
Negotiations ensued, but for a long time to little purpose; and Don
John, who was rather an impetuous knight-errant than a statesman and
diplomatist, remained during the winter months at Namur, angry at his
reception and chafing at the conditions imposed upon him, which he dared
not accept without permission from the king. In December the
States-General containing deputies from all the provinces met at
Brussels, and in January the Pacification of Ghent was confirmed, and a
new compact, to which the name of the Union of Brussels was given, was
drawn up by a number of influential Catholics. This document, to which
signatures were invited, was intended to give to the Pacification of
Ghent the sanction of popular support and to be at the same time a
guarantee for the maintenance of the royal authority and the Catholic
religion. The Union of Brussels was generally approved throughout the
southern provinces, and the signatories from every class were numbered
by thousands. Don John, who was at Huy, saw that it was necessary to
temporise. He was willing, he declared, to dismiss the foreign troops
and send them out of the country and to maintain the ancient charters
and liberties of the provinces, provided that nothing was done to
subvert the king's authority or the Catholic faith. Finally, on February
12, a treaty called "The Perpetual Edict," a most inappropriate name,
was signed, and the States-General acknowledged Don John as
governor-general. The agreement was principally the work of Aerschot and
the loyalist Catholic party, who followed his leadership, and was far
from being entirely acceptable to Orange. He had no trust in the good
faith of either Philip or his representative, and, though he recommended
Holland and Zeeland to acquiesce in the treaty and acknowledge Don John
as governor-general, it was with the secret resolve to keep a close
watch upon his every action, and not to brook any attempt to interfere
with religious liberty in the two provinces, in which he exercised
almost sovereign power and with whose struggles for freedom he had
identified himself.

The undertaking of Don John with regard to the Spanish troops was
punctually kept. Before the end of April they had all left the country;
and on May 1 the new governor-general made his state entry into
Brussels. It was to outward appearances very brilliant. But the hero of
Lepanto found himself at once distrusted by the Catholic nobles and
checkmated by the influence and diplomacy of the ever watchful William
of Orange. Chafing at his impotence, and ill-supported by the king, who
sent no reply to his appeals for financial help, Don John suddenly left
the capital and, placing himself at the head of a body of Walloon
troops, seized Namur. Feeling himself in this stronghold more secure, he
tried to bring pressure on the States-General to place in his hands
wider powers and to stand by him in his efforts to force Orange to
submit to the authority of the king. His efforts were in vain. William
had warned the States-General and the nobles of the anti-Spanish party
in Brabant and Flanders that Don John was not to be trusted, and he now
pointed to the present attitude of the governor-general, as a proof that
his suspicions were well-founded. Indeed the eyes of all true patriots
began to turn to the prince, who had been quietly strengthening his
position, not only in Holland and Zeeland, where he was supreme, but
also in Utrecht and Gelderland; and popular movements in Brussels and
elsewhere took place in his favour. So strongly marked was the Orange
feeling in the capital that the States-General acceded to the general
wish that the prince should be invited to come in person to Brussels.
Confidence was expressed by Catholics no less than by Protestants that
only under his leadership could the country be delivered from Spanish
tyranny. A deputation was sent, bearing the invitation; but for a while
William hesitated in giving an affirmative reply. On September 23,
however, he made his entry into Brussels amidst general demonstrations
of joy and was welcomed as "the Restorer and Defender of the
Father-land's liberty." Thus, ten years after he had been declared an
outlaw and banished, did the Prince of Orange return in triumph to the
town which had witnessed the execution of Egmont and Hoorn. It was the
proudest day of his life and the supreme point of his career.

       *       *       *       *       *




CHAPTER V

WILLIAM THE SILENT


The position of William at Brussels after his triumphant entry,
September 23, 1577, was by no means an easy one. His main support was
derived from a self-elected Council of Eighteen, containing
representatives of the gilds and of the citizens. This Council
controlled an armed municipal force and was really master in the city.
In these circumstances the States-General did not venture upon any
opposition to the popular wishes, in other words to William, whose
influence with the masses was unbounded. The States-General, therefore,
under pressure from the Eighteen, informed Don John, October 8, that
they no longer recognised him as governor-general; and the Estates of
Brabant appointed the prince to the office of _Ruward_ or governor of
the province. Meanwhile a fresh factor of disturbance had been
introduced into the troubled scene. Certain of the Catholic nobles
opposed to Spanish rule, but suspicious of Orange, had invited the
twenty year old Archduke Matthias, brother of the emperor, to accept the
sovereignty of the Netherlands. Matthias, who was of an adventurous
spirit, after some parleying agreed. He accordingly left Vienna
secretly, and at the end of October arrived in the Netherlands. Not
content with this counter-stroke, Aerschot went to Ghent to stir up
opposition to the appointment of William as Ruward of Brabant. The
populace however in Ghent was Orangist, and, rising in revolt, seized
Aerschot and a number of other Catholic leaders and threw them into
prison. They were speedily released, but the breach between the Catholic
nobles and the Calvinist stadholder of Holland was widened. William
himself saw in the coming of Matthias a favourable opportunity for
securing the erection of the Netherlands into a constitutional State
under the nominal rule of a Habsburg prince. By his influence,
therefore, the States-General entered into negotiations with the
Archduke; and Matthias finally was recognised (December 8) as governor
on condition that he accepted the Union of Brussels, He was also induced
to place the real power in the hands of Orange with the title of
Lieutenant-General. Matthias made his state entry into Brussels, January
18, 1578. His position appeared to be strengthened by a treaty concluded
with the English queen (January 7) by which Elizabeth promised to send
over a body of troops and to grant a subsidy to the States, for the
repayment of which the towns of Middelburg, Bruges and Gravelines were
to be pledges.

The news however of the step taken by Matthias had had more effect upon
Philip II than the despairing appeals of his half-brother. A powerful
army of tried Spanish and Italian troops under the command of Alexander
Farnese, Prince of Parma, son of the former regent Margaret, was sent to
Flanders. Farnese was Don John's nephew, and they had been brought up
together at Madrid, being almost of the same age. Already Philip had
determined to replace Don John, whose brilliance as a leader in the
field did not compensate for his lack of statesmanlike qualities. In
Farnese, whether by good fortune or deliberate choice, he had at length
found a consummate general who was to prove himself a match even for
William the Silent in all the arts of political combination and
intrigue. At Gembloux, January 31, Don John and Parma fell upon the
levies of the States and gained a complete and almost bloodless victory.
Had Philip supplied his governor-general with the money he asked for,
Don John might now have conquered the whole of the southern Netherlands,
but without funds he could achieve little.

Meanwhile all was confusion. The States-General withdrew from Brussels
to Antwerp; and William, finding that Matthias was useless, began
negotiations with France, England and Germany in the hope of finding in
this emergency some other foreign prince ready to brave the wrath of
Philip by accepting the suzerainty of the Netherlands. The Duke of
Anjou, brother of the French king, was the favoured candidate of the
Catholic party; and William, whose one aim was to secure the aid of a
powerful protector in the struggle against Spain, was ready to accept
him. Anjou at the head of an army of 15,000 men crossed the frontier at
Mons, July 12; and, on the following August 13, a treaty was agreed upon
between him and the States-General, by which the French duke, with the
title of _Defender of the Liberties of the Netherlands_, undertook to
help the States to expel the Spaniards from the Low Countries. But, to
add to the complications of the situation, a German force under the
command of John Casimir, brother of the Elector Palatine, and in the pay
of Queen Elizabeth, invaded the hapless provinces from the east. The
advent of John Casimir was greeted with enthusiasm by the Calvinist
party; and it required all the skill and sagacity of the Prince of
Orange to keep the peace and prevent the rival interests from breaking
out into open strife in the face of the common enemy. But Don John was
helpless, his repeated appeals for financial help remained unanswered,
and, sick at heart and weary of life, he contracted a fever and died in
his camp at Namur, October 1, 1578. His successor in the
governor-generalship was Alexander of Parma, who had now before him a
splendid field for the exercise of his great abilities.

The remainder of the year 1578 saw a violent recrudescence of religious
bitterness. In vain did Orange, who throughout his later life was a
genuine and earnest advocate of religious toleration, strive to the
utmost of his powers and with untiring patience to allay the suspicions
and fears of the zealots. John Casimir at Ghent, in the fervour of his
fanatical Calvinism, committed acts of violence and oppression, which
had the very worst effect in the Walloon provinces. In this part of the
Netherlands Catholicism was dominant; and there had always been in the
provinces of Hainault, Artois, and in the southern districts generally,
a feeling of distrust towards Orange. The upholding of the principle of
religious toleration by a man who had twice changed his faith was itself
suspect; and Farnese left no means untried for increasing this growing
anti-Orange feeling among the Catholic nobles. A party was formed, which
bore the name of "The Malcontents," whose leaders were Montigny, Lalaing
and La Motte. With these the governor-general entered into negotiations,
with the result that an alliance was made between Hainault, Artois,
Lille, Douay and Orchies (January 6, 1579), called the Union of Arras,
for the maintenance of the Catholic faith, by which these Walloon
provinces and towns expressed their readiness to submit to the king on
condition that he were willing to agree to uphold their rights and
privileges in accordance with the provisions of the Pacification of
Ghent. The Union of Arras did not as yet mean a complete reconciliation
with the Spanish sovereign, but it did mean the beginning of a breach
between the Calvinist north and the Catholic south, which the
statecraft of Parma gradually widened into an impossible chasm. Before
this took place, Anjou, Matthias and John Casimir had alike withdrawn
from the scene of anarchic confusion, in which for a brief time each had
been trying to compass his own ambitious ends in selfish indifference
to the welfare of the people they were proposing to deliver from the
Spanish yoke. The opening of the year 1579 saw Orange and Parma face to
face preparing to measure their strength in a grim struggle for the
mastery.

In the very same month as witnessed the signing of the Union of Arras, a
rival union had been formed in the northern Netherlands, which was
destined to be much more permanent. The real author however of the Union
of Utrecht was not Orange, but his brother, John of Nassau. In March,
1578, John had been elected Stadholder of Gelderland. He, like William,
had devoted himself heart and soul to the cause of Netherland freedom,
but his Calvinism was far more pronounced than his brother's. From the
moment of his acceptance of the stadholdership he set to work to effect
a close union between Holland, Zeeland and Utrecht with Gelderland and
the adjoining districts which lay around the Zuyder Zee. It was a
difficult task, since the eastern provinces were afraid (and not
unjustly) that its much greater wealth would give Holland predominance
in the proposed confederation. Nevertheless it was accomplished, and an
Act of Union was drawn up and signed at Utrecht, January 29, 1579, by
the representatives of Holland, Zeeland, the town and district
(_sticht_) of Utrecht, Gelderland and Zutphen, by which they agreed to
defend their rights and liberties and to resist all foreign intervention
in their affairs by common action as if they were one province, and to
establish and maintain freedom of conscience and of worship within their
boundaries. William does not seem at first to have been altogether
pleased with his brother's handiwork. He still hoped that a
confederation on a much wider scale might have been formed, comprising
the greater part of those who had appended their signatures to the
Pacification of Ghent. It was not until some months had passed and he
saw that his dreams of a larger union were not to be realised, that he
signed, on May 3, the Act of Union drawn up at Utrecht. By this time he
was well aware that Parma had succeeded in winning over the malcontent
nobles to accept his terms. On May 19 the Walloon provinces, whose
representatives had signed the Union of Arras, agreed to acknowledge,
with certain nominal reservations, the sovereignty of Philip and to
allow only Catholic worship. In fact the reconciliation was complete.

Thus, despite the efforts of Orange, the idea of the federation of all
the seventeen provinces on national lines became a thing of the past,
henceforth unattainable. The Netherlands were divided into two camps.
Gradually in the course of 1580 Overyssel, Drente and the greater part
of Friesland gave in their adherence to the Union of Utrecht, and
Groningen and the Ommelanden allied themselves with their neighbours. In
the rest of the Low Countries all fell away and submitted themselves to
the king's authority, except Antwerp and Breda in Brabant, and Ghent,
Bruges and Ypres in Flanders. William felt that Parma was constantly
gaining ground. Defection after defection took place, the most serious
being that of George Lalaing, Count of Renneberg, the Stadholder of
Groningen. Negotiations were indeed secretly opened with William
himself, and the most advantageous and flattering terms offered to him,
if he would desert the patriot cause. But with him opposition to Spain
and to Spanish methods of government was a matter of principle and
strong conviction. He was proof alike against bribery and cajolery, even
when he perceived, as the year 1580 succeeded 1579, that he had no
staunch friends on whom he could absolutely rely, save in the devoted
provinces of Holland and Zeeland.

For things had been going from bad to worse. The excesses and cruelties
committed by the Calvinists, wherever they found themselves in a
position to persecute a Catholic minority, and especially the outrages
perpetrated at Ghent under the leadership of two Calvinist fanatics, De
Ryhove and De Hembyze, although they were done in direct opposition to
the wishes and efforts of Orange, always and at all times the champion
of toleration, did much to discredit him in Flanders and Brabant and to
excite bitter indignation among the Catholics, who still formed the
great majority of the population of the Netherlands. William felt
himself to be month by month losing power. The action he was at last
compelled to take, in rescuing Ghent from the hands of the
ultra-democratic Calvinist party and in expelling De Ryhove and De
Hembyze, caused him to be denounced as "a papist at heart." Indeed the
bigots of both creeds in that age of intolerance and persecution were
utterly unable to understand his attitude, and could only attribute it
to a lack of any sincere religious belief at all. Farnese, meanwhile,
whose genius for Machiavellian statesmanship was as remarkable as those
gifts for leadership in war which entitled him to rank as the first
general of his time, was a man who never failed to take full advantage
of the mistakes and weaknesses of his opponents. At the head of a
veteran force he laid siege in the spring of 1579 to the important
frontier town of Maestricht. He encountered a desperate resistance,
worthy of the defence of Haarlem or of Leyden, and for four months the
garrison held out grimly in the hope of relief. But, despite all the
efforts of Orange to despatch an adequate force to raise the siege, at
last (June 29) the town was carried by assault and delivered up for
three days to the fury of a savage soldiery. By the possession of this
key to the Meuse, Parma was now able to cut off communications between
Brabant and Protestant Germany. Had he indeed been adequately supported
by Philip it is probable that at this time all the provinces up to the
borders of Holland might have been brought into subjection by the
Spanish forces.

The position of William was beset with perils on every side. One by one
his adherents were deserting him; even in the provinces of Holland and
Zeeland he was losing ground. He saw clearly that without foreign help
the national cause for which he had sacrificed everything was doomed. In
this emergency he reopened negotiations with Anjou, not because he had
any trust in the French prince's capacity or sincerity, but for the
simple reason that there was no one else to whom he could turn. As heir
to the throne of France and at this time the favoured suitor of Queen
Elizabeth, his acceptance of the sovereignty of the Netherlands would
secure, so Orange calculated, the support both of France and England. It
was his hope also that the limiting conditions attached to the offer of
sovereignty would enable him to exercise a strong personal control over
a man of weak character like Anjou. The Duke's vanity and ambition were
flattered by the proposal; and on September 19, 1580, a provisional
treaty was signed at Plessis-les-Tours by which Anjou accepted the offer
that was made to him, and showed himself quite ready to agree to any
limitations imposed upon his authority, since he had not any intention,
when once he held the reins of power, of observing them.

The first effect of William's negotiations with Anjou was to alienate
the Calvinists without gaining over the Catholics. Anjou was suspect
to both. The action of the Spanish government, however, at this critical
juncture did much to restore the credit of the prince with all to whom
the Spanish tyranny and the memory of Alva were abhorrent. Cardinal
Granvelle, after fifteen years of semi-exile in Italy, had lately been
summoned to Madrid to become chief adviser to the king. Granvelle
spared no pains to impress upon Philip the necessity of getting rid of
Orange as the chief obstacle to the pacification of the Netherlands, and
advised that a price should be placed upon his life. "The very fear of
it will paralyse or kill him" was the opinion of the cardinal, who ought
to have had a better understanding of the temper and character of his
old adversary. Accordingly at Maestricht, March 15, 1581, "a ban and
edict in form of proscription" was published against the prince, who was
denounced as "a traitor and miscreant, an enemy of ourselves and of our
country"; and all and everywhere empowered "to seize the person and
goods of this William of Nassau, as enemy of the human race." A solemn
promise was also made "to anyone who has the heart to free us of this
pest, and who will deliver him dead or alive, or take his life, the sum
of 25,000 crowns in gold or in estates for himself and his heirs; and we
will pardon him any crimes of which he has been guilty, and give him a
patent of nobility, if he be not noble." It is a document which, however
abhorrent or loathsome it may appear to us, was characteristic of the
age in which it was promulgated and in accordance with the ideas of that
cruel time. The ban was a declaration of war to the knife, and as such
it was received and answered.

In reply to the ban the prince at the close of the year (December 13)
published a very lengthy defence of his life and actions, the famous
_Apology_. To William himself is undoubtedly due the material which the
document embodies and the argument it contains, but it was almost
certainly not written by him, but by his chaplain, Pierre L'Oyseleur,
Seigneur de Villiers, to whom it owes its rather ponderous prolixity and
redundant verbiage. Historically it is of very considerable value,
though the facts are not always to be relied upon as strictly accurate.
The _Apology_ was translated into several languages and distributed to
the leading personages in every neighbouring country, and made a deep
impression on men's minds.

The combined effect of the _Ban_ and _the Apology_ was to strengthen
William's position in all the provinces where the patriot party still
held the upper hand; and he was not slow to take advantage of the strong
anti-Spanish feeling which was aroused. Its intensity was shown by the
solemn Act of Abjuration, July 26, 1581, by which the provinces of
Brabant, Flanders, Holland, Zeeland, Utrecht and Gelderland renounced
their allegiance to Philip II on the ground of his tyranny and misrule.
But after signing this Act it never seems to have occurred to the prince
or to the representatives of the provinces, that these now derelict
territories could remain without a personal sovereign. Orange used all
his influence and persuasiveness to induce them to accept Anjou. Anjou,
as we have seen, had already agreed to the conditions under which he
should, when invited, become "prince and lord" of the Netherlands. In
the autumn of 1581 the position was an ambiguous one. The States-General
claimed that, after the abjuration of Philip, the sovereignty of the
provinces had reverted to them, as the common representative of a group
of provinces that were now sovereign in their own right, and that the
conferring of that sovereignty on another overlord was their
prerogative. The position of Orange was peculiar, for _de facto_ under
one title or another he exercised the chief authority in each one of the
rebel provinces, but in the name of the States-General, instead of the
king. His influence indeed was so great as to over-shadow that of the
States-General, but great as it was, it had to be exerted to the utmost
before that body could be induced to accept a man of Anjou's despicable
and untrustworthy character as their new ruler. William however had
committed himself to the candidature of the duke, through lack of any
fitter choice; and at last both the States-General and the several
provincial Estates (Holland and Zeeland excepted) agreed to confer the
sovereignty upon the French prince subject to the conditions of the
treaty of Plessis-les-Tours.

William himself exercised the powers with which Holland and Zeeland had
invested him in the name of the king, whose stadholder he was, even when
waging war against him. After the Abjuration this pretence could no
longer be maintained. The Estates of Holland and Zeeland had indeed
petitioned Orange to become their count, but he refused the title,
fearing to give umbrage to Anjou. Finding, however, the two provinces
resolute in their opposition to the Valois prince, he consented, July
24, 1581, to exercise provisionally, as if he were count, the powers
of "high supremacy," which had already been conferred upon him.
Meanwhile Anjou was dallying in England, but on receiving through Ste
Aldegonde an intimation that the States could brook no further delay,
he set sail and landed at Flushing. Lord Leicester and a brilliant
English escort accompanied him; and Elizabeth asked the States to
receive her suitor as "her own self." At Antwerp, where he took up his
residence, Anjou was (February 19) solemnly invested with the duchy of
Brabant, and received the homage of his new subjects. He was far from
popular, and William remained at his side to give him support and
counsel. On March 18 (Anjou's birthday) an untoward event occurred,
which threatened to have most disastrous consequences. As Orange was
leaving the dinner-table, a young Biscayan, Juan Jaureguy by name,
attempted his assassination, by firing a pistol at him. The ball entered
the head by the right ear and passed through the palate. Jaureguy was
instantly killed and it was afterwards found that he had, for the sake
of the reward, been instigated to the deed by his master, a merchant
named Caspar Anastro. Anjou, who was at first suspected of being
accessory to the crime, was thus exculpated. It was a terrible wound and
William's life was for some time in great danger; but by the assiduous
care of his physicians and nurses he very slowly recovered, and was
strong enough, on May 2, to attend a solemn service of thanksgiving. The
shock of the event and the long weeks of anxiety were however too heavy
a strain upon his wife, Charlotte de Bourbon, who had recently given
birth to their sixth daughter. Her death, on May 5, was deeply grieved
by the prince, for Charlotte had been a most devoted helpmeet and
adviser to him throughout the anxious years of their married life.
During the whole of the summer and autumn William remained at Antwerp,
patiently trying to smooth away the difficulties caused by the dislike
and suspicion felt by the Netherlanders for the man whom they were asked
to recognise as their sovereign. It was an arduous task, but William, at
the cost of his own popularity, succeeded in getting the duke
acknowledged in July as Lord of Friesland and Duke of Gelderland, and in
August Anjou was solemnly installed at Bruges, as Count of Flanders.
Meanwhile he was planning, with the help of the large French force which
Anjou had undertaken to bring into the Netherlands, to take the
offensive against Parma. The truth is that he and Anjou were really
playing at cross-purposes. Orange wished Anjou to be the
_roi-fainéant_ of a United Netherland state of which he himself should
be the real ruler, but Anjou had no intention of being treated as a
second Matthias. He secretly determined to make himself master of
Antwerp by a sudden attack and, this achieved, to proceed to seize by
force of arms some of the other principal cities and to make himself
sovereign in reality as well as in name. He resented his dependence upon
Orange and was resolved to rid himself of it. With shameless treachery
in the early morning of January 17, 1583, he paid a visit to the prince
in Antwerp, and, with the object of gaining possession of his person,
tried to persuade him to attend a review of the French regiments who
were encamped outside the town. The suspicions of William had however
been aroused, and he pleaded some excuse for declining the invitation.
At midday some thousands of Anjou's troops rushed into the city at the
dinner-hour with loud cries of "Ville gagnée! Tue! Tue!" But the
citizens flew to arms; barricades were erected; and finally the French
were driven out with heavy loss, leaving some 1500 prisoners in the
hands of the town-guard. Many French nobles perished, and the "French
Fury," as it was called, was an ignominious and ghastly failure.
Indignation was wide and deep throughout the provinces; and William's
efforts to calm the excitement and patch up some fresh agreement with
the false Valois, though for the moment partially successful, only added
to his own growing unpopularity.

The prince in fact was so wedded to the idea that the only hope for the
provinces lay in securing French aid that he seemed unable to convince
himself that Anjou after this act of base treachery was impossible. His
continued support of the duke only served to alienate the people of
Brabant and Flanders. The Protestants hated the thought of having as
their sovereign a prince who was a Catholic and whose mother and
brothers were looked upon by them as the authors of the massacre of St
Bartholomew. The Catholics, cajoled by Parma's fair words, and alarmed
by the steady progress of his arms, were already inclining to return to
their old allegiance. The marriage of Orange, April 7, 1583, to Louise,
daughter of the famous Huguenot leader Admiral Coligny, and widow of the
Sieur de Téligny, added to the feelings of distrust and hostility he had
already aroused, for the bride was a Frenchwoman and both her father and
husband had perished on the fatal St Bartholomew's day.

Finding himself exposed to insult, and his life ever in danger,
William, at the end of July, left Antwerp and took up his residence
again at Delft in the midst of his faithful Hollanders. They, too,
disliked his French proclivities, but his alliance with Louise de
Téligny seemed to be an additional pledge to these strong Calvinists of
his religious sincerity.

Meanwhile Anjou had already returned to France; and Parma had now a
freer field for his advance northwards and, though sorely hampered by
lack of funds, was rapidly taking town after town. In the spring of 1584
he took Ypres and Bruges, and a strong party in Ghent was in traitorous
correspondence with him. Many nobles had fallen away from the patriot
cause, among them William's brother-in-law, Count van den Berg, who had
succeeded John of Nassau as Stadholder of Gelderland. The hold of Orange
upon Brabant and the Scheldt was, however, still ensured by the
possession of Antwerp, of which strongly fortified town the trusty Ste
Aldegonde was governor.

Meanwhile the prince, who was still striving hard to persuade the
provinces that were hostile to Spanish rule that their only hope lay in
obtaining aid from France through Anjou, was living at the old convent
of St Agatha, afterwards known as the Prinsenhof at Delft. His manner of
life was of the most modest and homely kind, just like that of an
ordinary Dutch burgher. He was in fact deeply in debt, terribly worried
with the outward aspect of things, and his position became one of
growing difficulty, for on June 10, 1584, the miserable Anjou died, and
the policy on which he had for so long expended his best efforts was
wrecked. Even his own recognition as Count of Holland and Zeeland had
led to endless negotiations between the Estates and the various town
councils which claimed to have a voice in the matter; and in July, 1584,
he had, though provisionally exercising sovereign authority, not yet
received formal homage. And all this time, in addition to the other
cares that weighed heavily upon him, there was the continual dread of
assassination. Ever since the failure of the attempt of Jaureguy, there
had been a constant succession of plots against the life of the rebel
leader and heretic at the instigation of the Spanish government, and
with the knowledge of Parma. Religious fanaticism, loyalty to the
legitimate sovereign, together with the more sordid motive of pecuniary
reward, made many eager to undertake the murderous commission. It was
made the easier from the fact that the prince always refused to
surround himself with guards or to take any special precautions, and was
always easy of access. Many schemes and proposed attempts came to
nothing either through the vigilance of William's spies or through the
lack of courage of the would-be assassins. A youth named Balthazar
Gérard had however become obsessed with the conviction that he had a
special mission to accomplish the deed in which Jaureguy had failed, and
he devoted himself to the task of ridding the world of one whom he
looked upon as the arch-enemy of God and the king. Under the false name
of Francis Guyon he made his way to Delft, pretended to be a zealous
Calvinist flying from persecution, and went about begging for alms. The
prince, even in his poverty always charitable, hearing of his needy
condition sent to the man a present of twelve crowns. With this gift
Gérard bought a pair of pistols and on July 10, 1584, having managed on
some pretext to gain admittance to the Prinsenhof, he concealed himself
in a dark corner by the stairs just opposite the door of the room where
William and his family were dining. As the prince, accompanied by his
wife, three of his daughters and one of his sisters, came out and was
approaching the staircase, the assassin darted forward and fired two
bullets into his breast. The wound was mortal; William fell to the
ground and speedily expired. Tradition says that, as he fell, he
exclaimed in French: "My God, have pity on my soul! My God, have pity on
this poor people!" But an examination of contemporary records of the
murder throws considerable doubt on the statement that such words were
uttered. The nature of the wound was such that the probability is that
intelligible speech was impossible.

Balthazar Gérard gloried in his deed, and bore the excruciating tortures
which were inflicted upon him with almost superhuman patience and
courage. He looked upon himself as a martyr in a holy cause, and as such
he was regarded by Catholic public opinion. His deed was praised both by
Granvelle and Parma, and Philip bestowed a patent of nobility on his
family, and exempted them from taxation.

In Holland there was deep and general grief at the tragic ending of the
great leader, who had for so many years been the fearless and
indefatigable champion of their resistance to civil and religious
tyranny. He was accorded a public funeral and buried with great pomp
in the Nieuwe Kerk at Delft, where a stately memorial, recording his
many high qualities and services, was erected to his memory.

William of Orange was but fifty-one years of age when his life was thus
prematurely ended, and though he had been much aged by the cares and
anxieties of a crushing responsibility, his physicians declared that at
the time of his death he was perfectly healthy and that he might have
been spared to carry on his work for many years, had he escaped the
bullets of the assassin. But it was not to be. It is possible that he
should be reckoned in the number of those whose manner of death sets the
seal to a life-work of continuous self-sacrifice. The title of "Father
of his Country," which was affectionately given to him by Hollanders of
every class, was never more deservedly bestowed, for it was in the
Holland that his exertions had freed and that he had made the
impregnable fortress of the resistance to Spain that he ever felt more
at home than anywhere else. It was in the midst of his own people that
he laid down the life that had been consecrated to their cause. As a
general he had never been successful. As a statesman he had failed to
accomplish that union of the Netherlands, north and south, which at one
triumphant moment had seemed to be well-nigh realised by the
Pacification of Ghent. But he had by the spirit that he had aroused in
Holland and its sister province of Zeeland created a barrier against
Spanish domination in the northern Netherlands which was not to be
broken down.

       *       *       *       *       *




CHAPTER VI

THE BEGINNINGS OF THE DUTCH REPUBLIC


At the moment of the assassination of William the Silent it might well
have seemed to an impartial observer that the restoration of the
authority of the Spanish king over the whole of the Netherlands was only
a question of time. The military skill and the statecraft of Alexander
Farnese were making slow but sure progress in the reconquest of Flanders
and Brabant. Despite the miserable inadequacy of the financial support
he received from Spain, the governor-general, at the head of a
numerically small but thoroughly efficient and well-disciplined army,
was capturing town after town. In 1583 Dunkirk, Nieuport, Lindhoven,
Steenbergen, Zutphen and Sas-van-Gent fell; in the spring of 1584 Ypres
and Bruges were already in Spanish hands, and on the very day of
William's death the fort of Liefkenshoek on the Scheldt, one of the
outlying defences of Antwerp, was taken by assault. In August
Dendermonde, in September Ghent, surrendered. All West Flanders, except
the sea-ports of Ostend and Sluis, had in the early autumn of 1584 been
reduced to the obedience of the king. The campaign of the following year
was to be even more successful. Brussels, the seat of government, was
compelled by starvation to capitulate, March 10; Mechlin was taken, July
19; and finally Antwerp, after a memorable siege, in which Parma
displayed masterly skill and resource, passed once more into the
possession of the Spaniards. The fall of this great town was a very
heavy blow to the patriot cause, and it was likewise the ruin of Antwerp
itself. A very large part of its most enterprising inhabitants left
their homes rather than abjure their religious faith and took refuge in
Holland and Zeeland, or fled across the Rhine into Germany. Access to
the sea down the Scheldt was closed by the fleets of the Sea Beggars,
and the commerce and industry of the first commercial port of western
Europe passed to Amsterdam and Middelburg. Meanwhile there had been no
signs of weakness or of yielding on the part of the sturdy burghers of
Holland and Zeeland. On the fatal July 10, 1584, the Estates of
Holland were in session at Delft. They at once took energetic action
under the able leadership of Paul Buys, Advocate of Holland, and John
van Oldenbarneveldt, Pensionary of Rotterdam. They passed a resolution
"to uphold the good cause with God's help without sparing gold or
blood." Despatches were at once sent to the Estates of the other
provinces, to the town councils and to the military and naval
commanders, affirming their own determined attitude and exhorting all
those who had accepted the leadership of the murdered Prince of Orange
"to bear themselves manfully and piously without abatement of zeal on
account of the aforesaid misfortune." Their calm courage at such a
moment of crisis reassured men's minds. There was no panic. Steps were
at once taken for carrying on the government in Holland, Zeeland and
Utrecht. Stimulated by the example of Holland, the States-General
likewise took prompt action. On August 18 a Council of State was
appointed to exercise provisionally the executive powers of sovereignty,
consisting of eighteen members, four from Holland, three each from
Zeeland and Friesland, two from Utrecht and six from Brabant and
Flanders. Of this body Maurice of Nassau, William's seventeen year-old
son, was nominated first Councillor, and a pension of 30,000 guilders
per annum was granted him. At the same time Louise de Coligny was
invited to take up her residence in Holland and suitable provision was
made for her. William Lewis, son of Count John of Nassau, was elected
Stadholder of Friesland. Count Nieuwenaar was Stadholder of Gelderland
and shortly afterwards also of Utrecht and Overyssel. Owing to the youth
of Maurice the question as to whether he should become Count of Holland
and Zeeland or be elected Stadholder was left in abeyance until it
should be settled to which of two foreign rulers the sovereignty of the
provinces, now that Anjou was dead, should be offered.

In the revolted provinces the responsible leaders were at this time
practically unanimous in their opinion that any attempt on their part to
carry on the struggle against the power of Spain without foreign
assistance was hopeless; and it was held that such assistance could only
be obtained by following in the footsteps of William and offering to
confer the overlordship of the provinces on another sovereign in the
place of Philip II. There were but two possible candidates, Henry III of
France and Elizabeth of England.

There were objections to both, but the rapid successes of Parma made it
necessary to take action. The partisans of a French alliance were in the
majority, despite the efforts of a strong opposition headed by Paul
Buys; and an embassy (January, 1585) was despatched to Paris to offer
conditionally to the French king the Protectorship of Holland and
Zeeland and sovereignty over the other provinces. The negotiations went
on for a couple of months, but Henry III finally declined the offer.
Another embassy was sent, July, 1585, to England, but Elizabeth refused
absolutely to accept the sovereignty. She however was not averse to the
proposal that she should despatch a body of troops to the armed
assistance of the provinces, provided that adequate guarantees were
given for the outlay. She was afraid of Philip II and, though she had no
love for men who were rebels to their lawful sovereign, was quite
willing to use them for her own ends. Her motives therefore were mixed
and purely self-interested; nevertheless it is doubtful if the
negotiations would have led to any definite result, had not the news of
the fall of Antwerp made both parties feel that this was no time for
haggling or procrastination. Elizabeth therefore promised to send at
once 6000 troops under the command of a "gentleman of quality," who
should bear the title of governor-general. He was to co-operate with the
Council of State (on which two Englishmen were to sit) in restoring
order and in maintaining and defending the ancient rights and privileges
of the provinces. The governor-general and all other officials were to
take an oath of fealty both to the States-General and to the queen. The
towns of Flushing and Brill with the fort of Rammekens were to be handed
over in pledge to Elizabeth for the repayment of expenses and received
English garrisons. They were known as "the cautionary towns."

At the end of October the States were informed that the choice of the
queen had fallen upon her favourite, Robert Dudley, Earl of Leicester,
and that he would shortly set out for the Netherlands. Holland and
Zeeland, ever jealous of foreign interference with their rights and
privileges, resolved now to forestall the arrival of the English
governor-general by appointing Maurice of Nassau, with the title of
"Excellency," to the offices of Stadholder and Admiral and
Captain-General of both provinces; and the Count of Hohenlo was
nominated (Maurice being still little more than a boy) to the actual
command of the State's forces. Leicester set sail from Harwich
accompanied by a fleet of fifty vessels and landed at Flushing on
December 19. He met everywhere with an enthusiastic reception. The
States-General were eager to confer large powers upon him. Practically
he was invested with the same authority as the former regent, Mary of
Hungary, with the reservation that the States-General and the Provincial
Estates should meet at their own instance, that the present stadholders
should continue in office, and that appointments to vacant offices
should be made from two or three persons nominated by the Provincial
Estates. A new Council of State was created which, as previously agreed,
included two Englishmen. On February 4, 1586, Leicester's government was
solemnly inaugurated in the presence of Maurice of Nassau and the
States-General, and he accepted the title of "Excellency." Elizabeth on
hearing this was very angry and even threatened to recall Leicester, and
she sent Lord Heneage to express both to the States-General and the
governor-general her grave displeasure at what had taken place. She bade
Leicester restrict himself to the functions that she had assigned to
him, and it was not until July that she was sufficiently appeased to
allow him to be addressed as "Excellency."

All this was galling to Leicester's pride and ambition, and did not tend
to improve his relations with the States. An English governor would in
any case have had a difficult task, and Leicester had neither tact nor
capacity as a statesman, and no pretensions as a military leader. He
possessed no knowledge of the institutions of the country or the
character of the people, and was ignorant of the Dutch language. The
measures he took and the arbitrary way in which he tried to enforce
them, soon brought him face to face with the stubborn resistance of the
Estates of Holland under the leadership of Oldenbarneveldt. In April,
1586, he issued a very stringent placard forbidding all traffic with the
enemy's lands and more especially the supplying of the enemy with grain.
He meant it well, for he had been informed that the cutting-off of this
commerce, which he regarded as illicit, would deprive the Spaniards of
the necessaries of life, and Parma's position would become desperate.
This carrying trade had, however, for long been a source of much profit
to the merchants and shipowners of Holland and Zeeland; indeed it
supplied no small part of the resources by which those two provinces
had equipped the fleets and troops by which they had defended themselves
against the efforts of the Spanish king. Two years before this the
States-General had tried to place an embargo on the traffic in grain,
but the powerful town-council of Amsterdam had refused obedience and the
Estates of Holland supported them in their action. The deputies of the
inland provinces, which had suffered most from the Spanish armies, were
jealous of the prosperity of the maritime States, and regarded this
trade with the Spaniard as being carried on to their injury. But Holland
and Zeeland supplied the funds without which resistance would long since
have been impossible, and they claimed moreover, as sovereign provinces,
the right to regulate their trade affairs. The edict remained a
dead-letter, for there was no power to enforce it.

The governor made a still greater mistake when, in his annoyance at the
opposition of the Hollanders, he courted the democratic anti-Holland
party in Utrecht, which had as its leader the ultra-Calvinist
stadholder, Nieuwenaar, and caused one of his confidants, a Brabanter,
Gerard Prounick, surnamed Deventer, to be elected burgomaster of
Utrecht, although as a foreigner he was disqualified from holding that
office. An even more arbitrary act was his creation of a Chamber of
Finance armed with inquisitorial powers, thus invading the rights of the
Provincial Estates and depriving the Council of State of one of its most
important functions. To make matters worse, he appointed Nieuwenaar to
preside over the new Chamber, with a Brabanter, Jacques Reingoud, as
treasurer-general, and a Fleming, Daniel de Burchgrave, as auditor. The
Estates of Holland, under the guidance of Oldenbarneveldt, prepared
themselves to resist stubbornly this attempt to thrust upon them a new
tyranny.

As a military leader Leicester was quite unfitted to oppose successfully
such a general as Parma. Both commanders were in truth much hampered by
the preparations that were being made by Philip for the invasion of
England. The king could spare Parma but little money for the pay of his
troops, and his orders were that the Spanish forces in the Netherlands
should be held in reserve and readiness for embarkation, as soon as the
Great Armada should hold command of the Channel. England was the first
objective. When its conquest was accomplished that of the rebel
provinces would speedily follow. On the other hand Elizabeth, always
niggardly, was little disposed in face of the threatened danger to
dissipate her resources by any needless expenditure. Leicester
therefore found himself at the head of far too small a force to deal any
effective blows at the enemy. He succeeded in capturing Doesburg, but
failed to take Zutphen. It was in a gallant effort to prevent a Spanish
convoy from entering that town that Sir Philip Sidney met his death at
the combat of Warnsfeld (Sept. 22, 1586). An important fort facing
Zutphen was however stormed, and here Leicester left Sir Robert Yorke
with a strong garrison, and at the same time sent Sir William Stanley
with 1200 men to be governor of Deventer. These appointments gave rise
to much criticism that proved later to be fully justified, for both
these officers were Catholics and had formerly been in the Spanish
service. Leicester had also taken other steps that were ill-judged. West
Friesland had for many years been united to Holland and was known as the
North-Quarter. The governor-general, however, appointed Sonoy Stadholder
of West Friesland, and was thus infringing the rights and jurisdiction
of Maurice of Nassau. Maurice also held the post of Admiral-General of
Holland and Zeeland, but Leicester took it upon himself to create three
distinct Admiralty Colleges, those of Holland, Zeeland, and the
North-Quarter, thus further dividing authority in a land where greater
unity was the chief thing to be aimed at. Leicester was equally unwise
in the part he took in regard to religious matters. Oldenbarneveldt,
Paul Buys and the great majority of burgher-regents in Holland belonged
to the moderate or, as it was called, the "libertine" party, to which
William the Silent had adhered and whose principles of toleration he had
strongly upheld. Leicester, largely influenced by spite against
Oldenbarneveldt and the Hollanders for their opposition to his edict
about trade with the enemy and to his appointment of Sonoy, threw
himself into the arms of the extreme Calvinists, who were at heart as
fanatical persecutors as the Spanish inquisitors themselves. These
"precisian" zealots held, by the governor-general's permission and under
his protection, a synod at Dort, June, 1586, and endeavoured to organise
the Reformed Church in accordance with their strict principles of
exclusiveness.

By this series of maladroit acts Leicester had made himself so unpopular
and distrusted in Holland that the Estates of that predominant province
lost no opportunity of inflicting rebuffs upon him. Stung by the
opposition he met and weary of a thankless task, the governor determined
at the end of November to pay a visit to England. The Council of State
was left in charge of the administration during his absence.

His departure had the very important effect of bringing the question of
State-rights acutely to the front. The dislike and distrust felt by the
Hollanders towards the English governor-general was greatly increased by
the treachery of Yorke and Stanley, who delivered the fort at Zutphen
and the town of Deventer, with the defence of which they had been
charged, into the hands of the Spaniards. The town of Gelder and the
fort at Wouw were likewise betrayed, and there can be small doubt that,
had Parma at this time been able to take advantage of the dissensions in
the ranks of his adversaries, he would have met with little effectual
resistance to his arms. His whole attention was, however, centred in
preparations for the proposed invasion of England. Leicester had no
sooner left the country than the Estates of Holland, under the strong
leadership of Oldenbarneveldt, took measures to assert their right to
regulate their own affairs, independently of the Council of State. A
levy of troops was made (in the pay of the province of Holland), who
were required to take an oath to the Provincial Estates and the
stadholder. To Maurice the title of "Prince" was given; and Sonoy in the
North-Quarter and all the commanders of fortified places were compelled
to place themselves under his orders. The States-General, in which the
influence of Holland and its chief representative, Oldenbarneveldt, was
overpoweringly great, upheld the Provincial Estates in the measures they
were taking. As a result of their action the trade restrictions were
practically repealed, the Council of State was reconstituted, and a
strong indictment of Leicester's conduct and administration was drawn up
in the name of the States-General and forwarded to the absent governor
in England.

Elizabeth was indignant at the language of this document, but at this
particular time the dangers which were threatening her throne and people
were too serious for her to take any steps to alienate the States. It
was her obvious policy to support them in their resistance, and to keep,
if possible, Parma's forces occupied in the Netherlands. Accordingly
Leicester returned to his post, July 1587, but in an altogether wrong
spirit. He knew that he had a strong body of partisans in Utrecht,
Friesland and elsewhere, for he had posed as the friend of the people's
rights against the nobles and those burgher-aristocracies in the cities
in whose hands all real power rested, and by his attitude in religious
matters he had won for himself the support of the Calvinist preachers.
His agents, Deventer in Utrecht, Aysma in Friesland and Sonoy in the
North-Quarter, were able men, who could count on the help of the
democracy, whom they flattered. So Leicester came back with the
determination to override the opposition of the Estates of Holland and
compel their submission to his will. But he found that he only succeeded
in making that opposition more resolute. His attempts to overthrow the
supremacy of the "regents" in Amsterdam, Leyden, Enkhuizen and other
towns were complete failures. Oldenbarneveldt and Maurice were supreme
in Holland and Zeeland; and the power of the purse gave to Holland a
controlling voice in the States-General. The position of Leicester was
shaken also by his inability to relieve Sluis, which important seaport
fell after a long siege into Parma's hands, August 5. Its capture was
attributed by rumour, which in this case had no foundation, to the
treachery of the English governor and garrison. Moreover it was
discovered that for some months secret peace negotiations had been
passing between the English government and Parma; and this aroused
violent suspicions that the Netherlands were merely being used as pawns
in English policy, and alienated from the governor-general the sympathy
of the preachers, who had been his strongest supporters. Humiliated and
broken in spirit, Leicester, after many bickerings and recriminations,
finally left the Netherlands (December 10), though his formal
resignation of his post did not reach the States-General until the
following April. Lord Willoughby was placed in command of the English
troops.

The year 1588 was the beginning of a decade full of fate for the Dutch
Republic. The departure of Leicester left the seven provinces of the
Union of Utrecht weak, divided, torn by factions, without allies, the
country to the east of the Yssel and to the south of the Scheldt and the
Waal already in the hands of the enemy. Moreover the armed forces of
that enemy were far stronger than their own and under the command of a
consummate general. But this was the year of the Spanish Armada, and
Parma's offensive operations were, by the strictest orders from Madrid,
otherwise directed. And Elizabeth on her side, though highly offended
at the treatment which her favourite, Leicester, had received from the
Hollanders, was too astute to quarrel at such a moment with a people
whose ships kept a strict blockade in the Scheldt and before the Flemish
harbours. Thus a respite was obtained for the States at this critical
time, which was turned to good account and was of vital import for their
constitutional development. The Leicestrian period, despite its record
of incompetence and failure, had however the distinction of being the
period which for good or for evil gave birth to the republic of the
United Netherlands, as we know it in history. The curious, amorphous,
hydra-headed system of government, which was to subsist for some two
centuries, was in its origin the direct result of the confused welter of
conflicting forces, which was the legacy of Leicester's rule. As a
preliminary to a right understanding of the political system, which was
now, more by accidental force of circumstances than by design,
developing into a permanent constitution, it will be necessary to trace
the events of the years which immediately followed the departure of
Leicester, and which under the influence and by the co-operation of
three striking personalities were to mould the future of the Dutch
republic.

Those three personalities were John van Oldenbarneveldt, Maurice of
Nassau and his cousin William Lewis of Nassau, the Stadholder of
Friesland. Born in 1547, Oldenbarneveldt, after studying Jurisprudence
at Louvain, Bourges and Heidelberg, became a devoted adherent of William
the Silent and took part in the defence of Haarlem and of Leyden. His
abilities, however, fitted him to take a prominent part as a politician
and administrator rather than as a soldier; and his career may be said
to have begun by his appointment to the post of Pensionary of Rotterdam
in 1576. In this capacity his industry and his talent speedily won for
him a commanding position in the Estates of Holland, and he became one
of the Prince of Orange's confidential friends and advisers. In 1586 he
was appointed Advocate of Holland in succession to Paul Buys. This
office included the duties of legal adviser, secretary and likewise in a
sense that of "Speaker" to the Provincial Estates. In addition to all
this he was the mouthpiece in the States-General of the deputation
representing the Provincial Estates, and exercised in that assembly all
the authority attaching to the man who spoke in the name of Holland. At
this time of transition, by his predominance alike in his own province
of Holland and in the States-General, he was able to secure for the
general policy of the Union, especially in the conduct of foreign
affairs, a continuity of aim and purpose that enabled the
loosely-cemented and mutually jealous confederacy of petty sovereign
states to tide-over successfully the critical years which followed the
departure of Leicester, and to acquire a sense of national unity.

The brain and the diplomatic skill of the great statesman would,
however, have been of little avail without the aid of the military
abilities of Maurice of Nassau. Maurice was twenty years of age when
Leicester left Holland. He was a man very different from his father in
opinions and in the character of his talents. Maurice had nothing of his
father's tolerance in religious matters or his subtle skill in
diplomacy. He was a born soldier, but no politician, and had no wish to
interfere in affairs of State. He had the highest respect for
Oldenbarneveldt and complete confidence in his capacity as a statesman,
and he was at all times ready to use the executive powers, which he
exercised by virtue of the numerous posts he was speedily called upon to
fill, for the carrying out of Oldenbarneveldt's policy; while the
Advocate on his side found in the strong arm of the successful general
the instrument that he needed for the maintenance of his supremacy in
the conduct of the civil government. Already in 1587 Maurice was
Stadholder of Holland and Zeeland. In 1588 he became Captain-General and
Admiral-General of the Union with the control and supervision of all the
armed forces of the Provinces by sea and by land. The death of
Nieuwenaar in the following year created a vacancy in the stadholderates
of Utrecht, Gelderland and Overyssel. Maurice was in each province
elected as Nieuwenaar's successor. The Advocate therefore and the
Prince, through the close accord which was for many years to subsist
between them, gathered thus into their hands (except in Friesland)
practically the entire administrative, executive and military powers of
the United Provinces and by their harmonious co-operation with William
Lewis, the wise and capable Stadholder of Friesland, were able to give
something of real unity to a group of states, each claiming to be a
sovereign entity, and to give them the outward semblance of a federal
republic. There was no "eminent head," but the sovereignty in reality,
if not in name, was vested during the period with which we have now to
deal in this triumvirate.

Circumstances provided a favourable field for the display of the
youthful Maurice's military abilities. In 1589 the assassination of
Henry III placed Henry of Navarre on the throne of France. The accession
of the brilliant Huguenot leader led to civil war; and the Catholic
opposition was encouraged and supported by Philip II, who regarded Henry
IV as a menace and danger to the Spanish power. Parma, therefore, whose
active prosecution of the war against the rebel provinces had been so
long hindered by having to hold his army in readiness for the projected
invasion of England, found himself, after the failure and destruction of
the Armada, in no better position for a campaign in the northern
Netherlands. Disappointment and false charges against him brought on a
serious illness, and on his recovery he received orders to conduct an
expedition into France. William Lewis of Nassau had for sometime been
urging upon the States-General that the time for remaining upon the
strict defensive was past, and that, when the enemy's efforts were
weakened and distracted, the best defence was a vigorous offensive. At
first he spoke to deaf ears, but he found now a powerful supporter in
Maurice, and the two stadholders prevailed. They had now by careful and
assiduous training created a strong and well-disciplined army for the
service of the States. This army was made up by contingents of various
nationalities, English, Scottish, French and German as well as
Netherlanders. But the material was on the whole excellent, and the
entire force was welded together by confidence in their leaders.

In 1590 the capture of Breda by a ruse (seventy men hidden beneath a
covering of peat making their entrance into the town and opening the
gates to their comrades outside) was a good omen for the campaign that
was planned for 1591. For the first time Maurice had an opportunity for
showing his genius for war and especially for siege warfare. By rapid
movements he took first Zutphen, then Deventer and Delfzijl, and
relieved the fort of Knodsenburg (near Nijmwegen). Thus successful on
the eastern frontier, the stadholder hurried to Zeeland and captured
Hulst, the key to the land of Waas. He then turned his steps again to
the east and appearing suddenly before Nijmwegen made himself master of
this important city. Such a succession of brilliant triumphs established
Maurice's fame, and to a lesser degree that of William Lewis, whose
co-operation and advice were of the greatest service to the younger man.
This was markedly the case in the following year (1592) when the two
stadholders set to work to expel the Spaniards from the two strongly
fortified towns of Steenwijk and Coevorden, whose possession enabled a
strong force under the veteran Verdugo to retain their hold upon
Friesland. The States army was not at its full strength, for the English
contingent under Sir Francis Vere had been sent to France; and Verdugo
was confident that any attempt to capture these well-garrisoned
fortresses was doomed to failure. He had to learn how great was the
scientific skill and resource of Maurice in the art of beleaguering.
Steenwijk after an obstinate defence capitulated on June 5. Coevorden
was then invested and in its turn had to surrender, on September 12.
During this time Parma had been campaigning with no great success in
northern France. In the autumn he returned to the Netherlands suffering
from the effects of a wound and broken in spirit. Never did any man fill
a difficult and trying post with more success and zeal than Alexander
Farnese during the sixteen years of his governor-generalship.
Nevertheless Philip was afraid of his nephew's talents and ambition, and
he despatched the Count of Fuentes with a letter of recall. It was never
delivered. Parma set out to meet him, but fell ill and died at Spa,
December 2, 1592. He appointed the Count of Mansfeld to take his place,
until the Archduke Ernest of Austria, who had been appointed to succeed
him, arrived in the Netherlands.

The campaign of 1593 was marked by the taking of Geertruidenberg, a
fortress which barred the free access of the Hollanders and Zeelanders
to the inland waters. The science which Maurice displayed in the siege
of this town greatly increased his renown. In the following year the
stadholders turned their attention to the north-east corner of the land,
which was still in the possession of the Spaniards. After a siege of two
months Groningen surrendered; and the city with the surrounding district
was by the terms of the capitulation--known as "The Treaty of
Reduction"--admitted as a province into the Union under the name of
_Stad en Landen._ William Lewis was appointed stadholder, and Drente was
placed under his jurisdiction. The northern Netherlands were now cleared
of the enemy, and Maurice at the conclusion of the campaign made a
triumphal entry into the Hague amidst general rejoicing. William Lewis
lost no time in taking steps to establish Calvinism as the only
recognised form of faith in his new government. His strong principles
did not allow him to be tolerant, and to Catholicism he was a
convinced foe. Everywhere throughout the United Provinces the reformed
religion was now dominant, and its adherents alone could legally take
part in public worship.

In January, 1595, Henry IV declared war against Spain and was anxious
for an alliance with the States against the common enemy. The Archduke
Ernest, on whose coming into the Netherlands great hopes had been
placed, found himself now in a difficult position with hostile armies
threatening from both sides and no hope of efficient financial or other
support from Spain. He was instructed therefore to enter into
negotiations at the Hague with a view to the conclusion of a peace,
based upon the terms of the Pacification of Ghent. But there was never
any prospect of an agreement being reached; and the sudden death of the
archduke (February 20,1595) brought the negotiations to an end. Archduke
Ernest was succeeded by the Count of Fuentes as governor _ad interim._
Fuentes proved himself to be a strong and capable commander; and the
summer was marked by a series of successes against the hostile forces
both of the French and the Netherlanders. There was no decisive
encounter, but the Spanish forces foiled the efforts of their
adversaries to effect an invasion or capture any towns.

The Cardinal Archduke Albert arrived at Brussels to replace Fuentes in
January, 1596. Albert was the favourite nephew of King Philip, and had
been brought up at Madrid. Although an ecclesiastic, he proved himself
to be a statesman and soldier of more than ordinary capacity. It was
intended that he should, as soon as the Pope's consent could be
obtained, divest himself of his orders and marry his cousin the Infanta
Isabel. The bankrupt condition of Spain prevented Philip from furnishing
the archduke with adequate financial help on entering upon his
governorship, but Albert was provided with some money, and he found in
the Netherlands the well-disciplined and war-tried force of which
Fuentes had made such good use in the previous campaign. He was anxious
to emulate that general's success, and as the veteran leaders, Mondragon
and Verdugo, had both died, he gave the command to the Seigneur de
Rosne, a French refugee. This man was a commander of skill and
enterprise, and special circumstances enabled him by two brilliant
offensive strokes to capture first Calais and afterwards Hulst. Hulst
was only taken after a severe struggle, in which De Rosne himself
fell.

The special circumstances which favoured these operations were brought
about by the conclusion of a treaty of alliance between France, England
and the States. This treaty was the result of prolonged negotiations; it
was of short duration and its conditions were far from favourable to the
United Provinces, but it was of great importance from the fact that for
the first time the new-fledged republic was recognised by the
neighbouring sovereigns of France and England as an independent state
and was admitted into alliance on terms of equality. It was, however,
only with difficulty and through the insistence of Henry IV that
Elizabeth was induced to acknowledge the independent status of the rebel
provinces. In return the republic was required to keep up a force of
8000 men for service in the Netherlands, and to despatch 4000 men to act
with the French army in northern France--this auxiliary force to include
the five English regiments in the States' service. Thus Maurice was
deprived of a considerable part of his army and obliged to act on the
defensive. Elizabeth also insisted upon the carrying out of Leicester's
placard forbidding trade with the enemy. This clause of the treaty was
very unpalatable to Amsterdam and the Hollanders generally, and only a
sullen acquiescence was given to it. From the first it was
systematically evaded. The English government on their part undertook to
support the French king with a force equal in strength to that furnished
by the Provinces, _i.e._ 4000 men, but at the same time a secret treaty
was drawn up by which Henry agreed to a reduction of the English troops
by one-half. This piece of underhand work was in due time discovered by
the States, who saw that their allies were not to be trusted and that
they must be on the watch lest their interests should be sacrificed to
the selfish policy of France. The issue showed that Henry IV was in fact
ready to make terms with Spain, as soon as it was to his advantage to do
so. Meanwhile in 1597 the French king, by advancing in force into
Picardy, drew upon this frontier the chief attention of the Spaniards;
and Maurice seized the opportunity that was offered to him to conduct an
offensive campaign with signal success.

He began the year brilliantly by surprising in January, while still in
its winter quarters, a Spanish force of 4500 near Turnhout. More than
half the force was destroyed. On the side of the Netherlands eight men
only fell. With the spring began a series of sieges; and, one after the
other, Rheinberg, Meurs, Groenloo, Breedevoort, Enschede, Ootmarsum,
Oldenzaal and Lingen were captured. Gelderland, Overyssel and Drente
were entirely freed from the presence of the enemy. With the opening of
1598 Henry IV and Philip II entered upon negotiations for a peace. The
French king felt the necessity of a respite from war in order to
reorganise the resources of his country, exhausted by a long continuance
of civil strife; and Philip was ill and already feeling his end
approaching. The States strove hard to prevent what they regarded as
desertion, and two embassies were despatched to France and to England to
urge the maintenance of the alliance. Oldenbarneveldt himself headed the
French mission, but he failed to turn Henry from his purpose. A treaty
of peace between France and Spain was signed at Vervins, May 2, 1598.
Oldenbarneveldt went from Paris to England and was more successful.
Elizabeth bargained however for the repayment of her loan by annual
installments, and for armed assistance both by land and sea should an
attack be made by the Spaniards on England. The queen, however, made two
concessions. Henceforth only one English representative was to have a
seat in the Council of State; and all the English troops in the
Netherlands, including the garrisons of the cautionary towns, were to
take an oath of allegiance to the States.

This year saw the accomplishment of a project on which the Spanish king
had for some time set his heart--the marriage of the Cardinal Archduke
Albert to his cousin the Infanta Isabel Clara Eugenia, and the erection
of the Netherlands into an independent sovereignty under their joint
rule. Philip hoped in this way to provide suitably for a well-beloved
daughter and at the same time, by the grant of apparent independence to
the Netherland provinces, to secure their allegiance to the new
sovereigns. The use of the word "apparent" is justified, for provision
was made in the deed of cession that the Netherlands should revert to
the Spanish crown in case the union should prove childless; and there
was a secret agreement that the chief fortresses should still be
garrisoned by Spanish troops and that the archdukes, as they were
officially styled, should recognise the suzerainty of the King of Spain.
 Philip did not actually live to carry his plan into execution. His
death took place on September 13, 1598. But all the necessary
arrangements for the marriage and the transfer of sovereignty had
already been made. Albert, having first divested himself of his
ecclesiastical dignities, was married by proxy to Isabel at Ferrara in
November. It was not until the end of the following year that the new
rulers made their _joyeuse entrée_ into Brussels, but their marriage
marks the beginning of a fresh stage in the history of the Netherlands.
Albert and Isabel were wise and capable, and they succeeded in gaining
the affection and willing allegiance of the southern provinces. The
States-General of the revolted provinces of the north had, however,
already enjoyed for some years a real independence won by suffering and
struggle and they showed no disposition to meet the overtures of the
archdukes. They were resolved to have no further connection with Spain
or with Spanish rulers, and from this time forward the cleavage in
character, sentiment, and above all in religion, between north and south
was to become, as time went on, more and more accentuated. The Dutch
republic and the Spanish Netherlands were henceforth destined to pursue
their separate course along widely divergent paths.

The ten years which had elapsed between the departure of Leicester and
the advent of Albert and Isabel had witnessed a truly marvellous
transformation in the condition of the rebel provinces, and especially
of Holland and Zeeland. Gradually they had been freed from the presence
of the Spaniard, while at the same time the Spanish yoke had been firmly
riveted upon Flanders and Brabant. These provinces were now devastated
and ruined. The quays of Antwerp were deserted, the industries of Ghent
and Bruges destroyed. The most enterprising and skilful of their
merchants and artisans had fled over the frontier into Holland or across
the sea into England. Holland and Zeeland were thronged with refugees,
Flemings and Brabanters, French Huguenots and numerous Spanish and
Portuguese Jews, driven out by the pitiless persecution of Philip II.
The Hollanders and Zeelanders had long been a seafaring people, who had
derived the chief part of their wealth from their fisheries and their
carrying trade; and this influx of new and vigorous blood, merchants,
traders, and textile workers, bringing with them their knowledge, skill
and energy, aroused such a phenomenal outburst of maritime and
commercial activity and adventure as the world had never seen before.
The fleets of the Hollanders and Zeelanders had during the whole of the
war of independence been the main defence of those provinces against
Spanish invasion; but, great as had been the services they had
rendered, it was the carrying-trade which had furnished the rebel states
with the sinews of war, and of this a large part had been derived from
that very trading with the enemy which Leicester had striven in vain to
prevent. The Spaniards and Portuguese were dependent upon the Dutch
traders for the supply of many necessaries of life; and thus Spanish
gold was made to pay for the support of the war which was waged against
the Spanish king. The dues in connection with this trade, known as
licences and convoys, alone furnished large sums to replenish the
war-chest; and it is said that from 25,000 to 30,000 seamen found
employment by it.

Amsterdam during this decade had been rapidly growing in importance and
it was soon to be the first seaport in the world. It had become the
_emporium_ of the Baltic trade. In 1601 it is stated that between 800
and 900 ships left its quays in three days, carrying commodities to the
Baltic ports. They came back laden with corn and other "east-sea" goods,
which they then distributed in French, Portuguese and Spanish havens,
and even as far as Italy and the Levant. Ship-building went on apace at
Enkhuizen, Hoorn and other towns on the Zuyder Zee; and Zaandam was soon
to become a centre of the timber trade. In Zeeland, Middelburg, through
the enterprise of an Antwerp refugee of French extraction, by name
Balthazar de Moucheron, was second only to Amsterdam as a sea-port,
while Dordrecht and Rotterdam were also busy with shipping.

The energies of the Dutch at this springtide of their national life were
far from being confined to European, waters. Dutch sailors already knew
the way to the East-Indies round the Cape of Good Hope through
employment on Portuguese vessels; and the trade-routes by which the
Spaniards brought the treasures of the New World across the Atlantic
were likewise familiar to them and for a similar reason. The East-Indies
had for the merchants of Holland and Zeeland, ever keenly on the
look-out for fresh markets, a peculiar attraction. At first the Cape
route was thought to be too dangerous, and several attempts were made to
discover a north-west passage along the coast of Siberia. Balthazar de
Moucheron was the pioneer in these northern latitudes. He established a
regular traffic with the Russians by way of the White Sea, and had a
factory (built in 1584) at Archangel. Through his instances, aided by
those of the famous geographer Petrus Plancius (likewise a refugee from
Antwerp), an expedition was fitted out and despatched in 1594 to try
to sail round northern Asia, but it was driven back after passing
through the Waigat by ice and storms. A like fate befell a second
expedition in the following year. Discouraged, but still not despairing,
a third fleet set out in 1596 under the command of Jacob van Heemskerk
with William Barendtsz as pilot. Forced to winter in Spitsbergen, after
terrible sufferings, Heemskerk returned home in the autumn of 1597 with
the remnant of his crews. Barendtsz was one of those who perished. This
was the last effort in this direction, for already a body of Amsterdam
merchants had formed a company for trafficking to India by the Cape; and
four ships had sailed, April 2, 1596, under the command of Cornelis
Houtman, a native of Gouda. A certain Jan Huyghen van Linschoten, who
had been in the Portuguese service, had published in 1595 a book
containing a description from personal knowledge of the route to the
East and the character of the Portuguese commerce. It was the
information contained in this work that led the Amsterdam merchants to
venture their money upon Houtman's expedition, which Linschoten himself
accompanied as guide. They reached Madagascar, Java and the Moluccas,
and, after much suffering and many losses by sickness, what was left of
the little fleet reached home in July, 1597. The rich cargo they brought
back, though not enough to defray expenses, proved an incentive to
further efforts. Three companies were formed at Amsterdam, two at
Rotterdam, one at Delft and two in Zeeland, for trading in the
East-Indies, all vying with one another in their eagerness to make large
profits from these regions of fabled wealth, hitherto monopolised by the
Portuguese. One expedition sent out by two Amsterdam companies under the
command of Jacob van Neck and Wybrand van Waerwyck was very successful
and came back in fifteen months richly laden with East-Indian products.
The year 1598 was one of great commercial activity. Two-and-twenty large
vessels voyaged to the East-Indies; others made their way to the coasts
of Guinea, Guiana and Brazil; and one daring captain, Olivier van Noort,
sailing through the Straits of Magellan, crossed the Pacific. It was in
this year that Philip II prohibited by decree all trading in Spain with
the Dutch, and all the Dutch ships in the harbours of the Peninsula were
confiscated. But the Spanish trade was no longer of consequence to the
Hollanders and Zeelanders. They had sought and found compensation
elsewhere.

The small companies formed to carry out these ventures in the
far-Eastern seas continued to grow in number, and by the very keenness
of their competition threatened each other's enterprises with ruin. In
these circumstances the States-General and the Estates of Holland
determined, under the leadership of Oldenbarneveldt, to take a step
which was to be fraught with very important consequences. The rival
companies were urged to form themselves into a single corporation to
which exclusive rights would be given for trading in the East-Indies.
Such a proposal was in direct contradiction to that principle of free
trade which had hitherto been dear to the Netherlanders, and there was
much opposition, and many obstacles had to be overcome owing to the
jealousies of the various provinces, towns and bodies of merchants who
were interested. But at length the patience and statesmanship of
Oldenbarneveldt overcame all difficulties, and on March 20,1601, a
charter was issued creating the United East-India Company and giving it
a monopoly of the East-India trade (for 21 years) with all lands east of
the Cape of Good Hope and west of the Straits of Magellan. The executive
control was vested in a College known as the Seventeen. Extensive
sovereign privileges were conferred upon the company and exercised by
the Seventeen in the name of the States-General. They might make
treaties with native rulers and potentates, erect forts for the
protection of their factories, appoint governors and officials with
administrative and judicial functions, and enlist troops, but these
officials and troops were required to take an oath of allegiance to the
States-General. The States-General themselves became "participants" by
investing the 25,000 pounds, which the company had paid them for the
grant of the charter. The capital speedily reached the amount of six and
a half million guilders.

The warlike operations of the year 1599 were uneventful and in the main
defensive, except on the eastern frontier where the Spanish forces under
the command of the Admiral of Aragon, Mendoza, captured Wesel and
Rheinberg. The new rulers of the Netherlands, Albert and Isabel, did
not make their entry into Brussels until the end of 1599; and almost
before they had had time to organise the new government and gain firm
possession of the reins of power in the Belgic provinces, they found
themselves confronted with a serious danger. The seaport of Dunkirk had
for many years been a nest of pirates, who preyed upon Dutch commerce
in the narrow seas. The States-General, urged on by Oldenbarneveldt,
resolved in the spring of 1606 to despatch an expedition to besiege and
capture Dunkirk. Both Maurice and William Lewis were opposed to the
project, which they regarded as rash and risky. The States-General,
however, hearing reports of the archduke's soldiery being mutinous for
lack of pay, persisted in their purpose, and Maurice, against his better
judgment, acquiesced. A body of picked troops, 12,000 foot and 3000
horse, was assembled on the island of Walcheren. A succession of
contrary winds delaying the sailing of the force, it was determined to
march straight through West Flanders to Nieuport and then along the
shore to Dunkirk. A deputation of the States-General, of which
Oldenbarneveldt was the leading member, went to Ostend to supervise,
much to Maurice's annoyance, the military operations. The stadholder,
however, reached Nieuport without serious opposition and proceeded to
invest it. Meanwhile the Archduke Albert had been acting with great
energy. By persuasive words and large promises he succeeded in winning
back the mutineers, and at the head of a veteran force of 10,000
infantry and 1500 cavalry he followed Maurice and, advancing along the
dunes, came on July 1 upon a body of 2000 men under the command of
Ernest Casimir of Nassau, sent by the stadholder to defend the bridge of
Leffingen. At the sight of the redoubtable Spanish infantry a panic
seized these troops and they were routed with heavy loss. The fight,
however, gave Maurice time to unite his forces and draw them up in
battle order in front of Nieuport. Battle was joined the following
afternoon, and slowly, foot by foot, after a desperate conflict the
archduke's Spanish and Italian veterans drove back along the dunes the
troops of the States. Every hillock and sandy hollow was fiercely
contested, the brunt of the conflict falling on the English and Frisians
under the command of Sir Francis Vere. Vere himself was severely
wounded, and the battle appeared to be lost. At this critical moment the
Spaniards began to show signs of exhaustion through their tremendous
exertions in two successive fights under a hot sun in the yielding
sand-hills; and the prince, at the critical moment, throwing himself
into the midst of his retreating troops, succeeded in rallying them. At
the same time he ordered some squadrons of cavalry which he had kept in
reserve to charge on the flank of the advancing foe. The effect was
instantaneous. The Spaniards were thrown into confusion, broke and
fled. The victory was complete. The archduke only just escaped capture,
and of his army 5000 perished and a large number were taken prisoners,
among these the Admiral of Aragon. Almost by a miracle was the States'
army thus rescued from a desperate position. Maurice's hard-won triumph
greatly enhanced his fame, for the battle of Nieuport destroyed the
legend of the invincibility of the Spanish infantry in the open field.
The victorious general, however, was not disposed to run any further
risks. He accordingly retreated to Ostend and there embarked his troops
for the ports from which they had started. The expedition had been very
costly and had been practically fruitless. Oldenbarneveldt and those who
had acted with him were deeply disappointed at the failure of their
plans for the capture of Dunkirk and were far from satisfied with
Maurice's obstinate refusal to carry out any further offensive
operations. From this time there arose a feeling of soreness between the
advocate and the stadholder, which further differences of opinion were
to accentuate in the coming years.

The vigour and powers of leadership displayed by their new sovereigns in
meeting the invasion of Flanders by the States' army, though a defeat in
the field had been suffered at Nieuport, had inspired their subjects in
the southern Netherlands with confidence and loyalty. Albert had proved
himself a brave commander, and his efforts had at least been successful
in compelling the enemy to withdraw within his own borders.

Ostend had long been a thorn in the side of the government at Brussels
and energetic steps were soon taken to besiege it. But the possession of
Ostend was important also to Elizabeth, and she promised active
assistance. The larger part of the garrison was, indeed, formed of
English troops, and Sir Francis Vere was governor of the town. The siege
which ensued was one of the memorable sieges of history, it lasted for
more than three years (July 15,1601, to September 20,1604) and was
productive of great feats of valour, skill and endurance on the part
alike of besiegers and besieged. The States' army under Maurice, though
it did not march to the relief of Ostend, endeavoured to divert the
attention of Albert from his objective by attacks directed elsewhere. In
1601 the fortresses of Rheinberg and Meurs on the Rhine were captured,
and an attack made upon Hertogenbosch. In 1602 the important town of
Grave on the Meuse was taken and a raid made into Brabant and
Luxemburg.

Meanwhile the defenders of Ostend had been making a desperate
resistance, and little progress was made by the besiegers, with the
result that a great drain was made upon the finances of the archdukes
and there were threatenings of mutiny among the troops. But the
situation was saved by the intervention of a wealthy Genoese banker,
Ambrosio de Spinola, who offered his services and his money to the
archdukes and promised that if he, though inexperienced in warfare, were
given the command, he would take Ostend. He fulfilled his promise.
Without regard to loss of life he pressed on the siege, and though as
fast as one line of defences was taken another arose behind it to bar
his progress, little by little he advanced and bit by bit the area held
by the garrison grew less. At last in the spring of 1604, under the
pressure of the States-General, Maurice led an army of 11,000 men into
Flanders in April, 1604, and laid siege to Sluis on May 19. Both Maurice
and William Lewis were still unwilling to run the risk of an attack on
Spinola's army in its lines, and so the two sieges went on side by side,
as it were independently. Sluis fell at the end of August, and Ostend
was then at its last gasp. Urged now by the deputies of the States to
make a direct effort to relieve the heroic garrison, Maurice and his
cousin, after wasting some precious time in protesting against the step,
began to march southward. It was too late. What was left of Ostend
surrendered on September 20, and Spinola became the master of a heap of
ruins. It is said that this three years' siege cost the Spaniards 80,000
lives, to say nothing of the outlay of vast expenditure. Whether Maurice
and William Lewis were right or wrong in their reluctance to assail
Spinola's entrenched camp, it is certain that they were better judges of
the military situation than the civilian deputies of the States. In any
case the capture of Sluis was an offset to the loss of Ostend; and its
importance was marked by the appointment of Frederick Henry, the young
brother of the stadholder, as governor of the seaport and the
surrounding district, which received the name of States-Flanders. The
tremendous exertions put forward for the defence of Ostend had been a
very serious drain upon the resources of the United Provinces,
especially upon those of Holland. Taxation was already So high that
Oldenbarneveldt and many other leading members of the States-General and
Provincial Estates began to feel despondent and to doubt whether it were
possible to continue the war. No longer could the States rely upon the
assistance of England. James I had concluded peace with Spain; and,
though he made professions of friendship and goodwill to the Dutch, wary
statesmen, like the Advocate, did not trust him, and were afraid lest he
should be tempted to deliver up the cautionary towns into the hands of
the enemy. Reverting to the policy of William the Silent,
Oldenbarneveldt even went so far as to make tentative approaches to
Henry IV of France touching the conditions on which he would accept the
sovereignty of the Provinces. Indeed it is said that such was the
despair felt by this great statesman, who knew better than any man the
economic difficulties of the situation, that he even contemplated the
possibility of submission to the archdukes. Had he suggested submission,
there would have been no question, however, that he could not have
retained office, for Maurice, William Lewis and the military leaders on
the one hand, and on the other the merchants and the adventurous seamen,
whom they employed in the profitable Indian traffic, would not have
listened for a moment to any thought of giving up a struggle which had
been so resolutely and successfully maintained for so many years. For
financially the archdukes were in even worse plight than the
Netherlanders, even though for a short time, with the help of Spinola,
appearances seemed to favour the Belgic attacks on the Dutch frontier
districts. In 1605 the Genoese general, at the head of a mixed but
well-disciplined force in his own pay, made a rapid advance towards
Friesland, and, after capturing Oldenzaal and Lingen and ravaging the
eastern provinces, concluded the campaign with a brilliant success
against a body of the States cavalry commanded by Frederick Henry, who
nearly lost his life. Maurice with inferior forces kept strictly on the
defensive, skilfully covering the heart of the land from attack, but
steadily refusing a pitched battle. In the following year Spinola with
two armies attempted to force the lines of the Waal and the Yssel, but,
though thwarted in this aim by the wariness of the stadholder and by a
very wet season, he succeeded in taking the important fortresses of
Groll and Rheinberg. Maurice made no serious effort to relieve them, and
his inactivity caused much discontent and adverse comment. His military
reputation suffered, while that of his opponent was enhanced. But
subsequent events showed that Maurice, though perhaps erring on the side
of caution, had acted rightly. The armies which had threatened the
safety of the Provinces had been raised at the charges of a private
individual, but the financial resources, even of a Spinola, were not
capable of a prolonged effort; there was no money in the State treasury;
and the soldiery, as soon as their pay was in arrears, began once more
to be mutinous. The bolt had been shot without effect, and the year 1607
found both sides, through sheer lack of funds, unable to enter upon a
fresh campaign on land with any hope of definite success. But though the
military campaigns had been so inconclusive, it had been far different
with the fortunes of maritime warfare in these opening years of the
seventeenth century. The sea-power of the Dutch republic was already a
formidable factor which had to be reckoned with and which was destined
to be decisive.

The East-India Company was no sooner founded than active steps were
taken to make full use of the privileges granted by the Charter. A fleet
of 17 vessels was despatched in 1602 under Wybrand van Waerwyck.
Waerwyck visited Ceylon and most of the islands of the Malay
Archipelago, established a factory at Bantam with a staff of officials
for developing trade relations with the natives, and even made his way
to Siam and China. He sent back from time to time some of his vessels
richly laden, and finally returned himself with the residue of his fleet
after an absence of five years in June, 1607. Another expedition of
thirteen ships sailed in 1604 under Steven van der Hagen, whose
operations were as widespread and as successful as those of Waerwyck.
Van der Hagen took possession of Molucca and built factories at Amboina,
Tidor and other places in the spice-bearing islands. On his way back in
1606 with his cargo of cloves, spices and other products of the far
Orient, he encountered at Mauritius another westward-bound fleet of
eleven ships under Cornelis Matelief. Matelief's first objective was the
town of Malacca, held by the Portuguese and commanding the straits to
which it gave its name. Alphonso de Castro, the Viceroy of India,
hastened however with a naval force far more powerful than the Dutch
squadron to the relief of this important fortress; and after a
hardly-fought but indecisive action Matelief raised the siege on August
17. Returning, however, about a month later, the Dutch admiral found
that De Castro had sailed away, leaving only a detachment of ten vessels
before Malacca. Matelief at once attacked this force, whose strength was
about equal to his own, and with such success that he sank or burnt
every single ship of the enemy with scarcely any loss, September 21,
1606.

These successful incursions into a region that the Spaniards and
Portuguese had jealously regarded as peculiarly their own aroused both
anger and alarm. All available forces in the East (the Portuguese from
the Mozambique and Goa, the Spaniards from the Philippines) were
equipped and sent to sea with the object of expelling the hated and
despised Netherlanders from East-Indian waters. Paulus van Caerden,
Matelief's successor in command, was defeated and himself taken
prisoner. Nor were the Spaniards content with attacking the Dutch fleets
in the far East. As the weather-worn and heavily-laden Company's vessels
returned along the west coast of Africa, they had to pass within
striking distance of the Spanish and Portuguese harbours and were in
constant danger of being suddenly assailed by a superior force and
captured. In 1607 rumours reached Holland of the gathering of a large
Spanish fleet at Gibraltar, whose destination was the East-Indies. The
directors of the Company were much alarmed, an alarm which was shared by
the States-General, many of whose deputies were cargo-shareholders.
Accordingly, in April, 1607, a fleet of twenty-six vessels set sail for
the purpose of seeking out and attacking the Spaniards whether in
harbour or on the open sea. The command was given to one of the most
daring and experienced of Dutch seamen, Jacob van Heemskerk. He found
twenty-one ships still at anchor in Gibraltar Bay, ten of them large
galleons, far superior in size and armament to his own largest vessels.
Heemskerk at once cleared for action. Both Heemskerk and the Spanish
commander, d'Avila, were killed early in the fight, the result of which
however was not long doubtful. The Spanish fleet was practically
destroyed. On the Dutch side no vessel was lost and the casualties were
small. Such a disaster was most humiliating to Castilian pride, and its
effect in hastening forward the peace negotiations, which were already
in progress, was considerable.

The initial steps had been taken by the archdukes. Through the secret
agency of Albert's Franciscan Confessor, Father John Neyen, both
Oldenbarneveldt and Maurice were approached in May, 1606, but without
any result. Early in 1607 however the efforts were renewed, and
negotiations were actively set on foot for the purpose of concluding a
peace or a truce for a term of twelve, fifteen or twenty years. There
were, however, almost insuperable difficulties in the way. In the first
place the stadholders, the military and naval leaders, the Calvinist
clergy, and the great majority of the traders honestly believed that a
peace would be detrimental to all the best interests of the States, and
were thoroughly distrustful of the motives which had prompted the
archdukes and the Spanish government to make these advances.
Oldenbarneveldt on the other hand thought that peace was necessary for
the land to recuperate after the exhausting struggle, which had already
lasted for forty years; and he found strong support among the
burgher-regents and that large part of the people who were over-burdened
and impoverished by the weight of taxation, and sick and weary of
perpetual warfare. There were, however, certain preliminary conditions,
which all were agreed must be assented to, and without which it would be
useless to continue the negotiations. The independence of the United
Provinces must be recognised, freedom of trade in the Indies conceded,
and the public exercise of Catholic worship prohibited. After some
parleying the archdukes agreed to treat with the United Provinces "in
the quality and as considering them free provinces and states," and an
armistice was concluded in April, 1607, for eight months, in order that
the matters in dispute might be referred to the King of Spain and his
views upon them ascertained. Not till October did the king's reply
arrive at Brussels. He consented to negotiate with the States "as free
and independent" parties, but he required that liberty of Catholic
worship should be permitted during the truce, and no mention was made of
the Indian trade. This was by no means satisfactory; nevertheless the
influence of Oldenbarneveldt prevailed and the negotiations were not
broken off. On February 1, 1608, the archdukes' envoys, the two leading
members being Ambrosio de Spinola and the president of the Privy
Council, Ricardot, arrived in Holland. They were met at Ryswyck by
Maurice and William Lewis in person, and with much ceremony and
splendour a solemn entry was made into the Hague, the procession with
the brilliant retinues forming a memorable spectacle, as it made its way
through the crowds which lined the roads. The negotiations were
conducted in the Binnenhof. The Special Commissioners to represent the
States-General were William Lewis of Nassau, Walraven, lord of
Brederode, and a deputy from each of the provinces under the leadership
of Oldenbarneveldt. Envoys from France, England, Denmark, the
Palatinate and Brandenburg were present, took part in the discussions,
and acted as friendly mediators.

The question of treating the United Provinces "as free States" was soon
settled. The archdukes, who were aiming at the conclusion of a truce in
which to recuperate and not of a definitive peace, showed an unexpected
complaisance in granting a concession which they regarded as only
temporary. Then came the really serious questions as to freedom of trade
in the Indies and the liberty of Catholic worship. Of these the first
was of most immediate interest, and showed irreconcilable differences
between the two parties. The Spaniards would never consent to any
trespassing in the closed area, which they regarded as their own
peculiar preserve. The Dutch traders and sailors were fired with the
spirit of adventure and of profit, and their successful expeditions had
aroused an enthusiasm for further effort in the distant seas, which had
hardened into a fixed resolve not to agree to any peace or truce
shutting them out from the Indian trade. For months the subject was
discussed and re-discussed without result. Some of the foreign delegates
left. The armistice was prolonged, in order that Father Neyen might go
to Madrid for further instructions. It was found, however, that the King
of Spain would yield nothing. The negotiations came to a standstill, and
both sides began to make preparations for a renewal of the war.
President Jeannin on behalf of the French king, by his skilful
mediation, in which he was supported by his English colleague, saved the
situation. He proposed as a compromise a twelve years' truce, pointing
out that whatever terms were arranged would only be binding for that
short period. He managed to bring about a personal interview between
Oldenbarneveldt and Maurice, who had respectively headed the peace and
war parties in the provinces; and henceforth both consented to work
together for this proposal of a limited truce, during which the trade to
the Indies should be open and the religious question be untouched. The
assent of the States-General and of the several Provincial Estates was
obtained. The two most interested, Holland and Zeeland, were won over,
Holland by the arguments and persuasions of the Advocate, Zeeland, which
was the last to agree, by the influence of Maurice. Jeannin was aware
that the finances of Spain were at their last gasp, and that both the
archdukes and Philip III were most anxious for a respite from the
ever-consuming expense of the war. At last the long and wearisome
negotiations came to an end, and the treaty concluding a truce for
twelve years was signed at the Hague on April 9,1609. The territorial
_status quo_ was recognised. The United Provinces were treated "as free
States over which the archdukes made no pretensions." Nothing was said
about the religious difficulty nor about trade in the Indies, but in a
secret treaty the King of Spain undertook not to interfere with Dutch
trade, wherever carried on. Thus access to the Indies was conceded,
though to save appearances the word was not mentioned. This result was
due solely to the diplomatic tact and resource of Jeannin, who was able
to announce to Henry IV that he had accomplished his task "to the
satisfaction of everyone, and even of Prince Maurice."

       *       *       *       *       *




CHAPTER VII

THE SYSTEM OF GOVERNMENT


One of the reasons which influenced the archdukes and the King of Spain
to make large concessions in order to secure the assent of the
States-General to the conclusion of a twelve years' truce was their firm
belief that the unstable political condition of the United Provinces
must lead to civil discord, as soon as the relaxing of the pressure of
war loosened the bonds which had, since Leicester's departure, held
together a number of separate authorities and discordant interests. They
were right in their supposition. In order, therefore, to understand the
course of events in the republic, which had been correctly recognised by
the treaty not as a single state, but as a group of "free and
independent States," it is necessary to give a brief account of one of
the most strangely complicated systems of government that the world has
ever seen--especially strange because no one could ever say positively
where or with whom the sovereignty really resided.

Let us take into separate consideration the powers and functions of (1)
the Council of State, (2) the States-General, (3) the Provincial
Estates, (4) the Stadholders, (5) the Advocate (later the
_Raad-Pensionarius_ or Council-Pensionary) of Holland, (6) the Admiralty
Colleges.

The Council of State was not a legislative, but an executive, body. In
the time of Leicester the Council was the executive arm of the
governor-general and had large powers. After his departure the presence
of the English ambassador, who by treaty had a seat in the Council,
caused the States-General gradually to absorb its powers, and to make
its functions subordinate to their own, until at last its authority was
confined to the administration of the affairs of war and of finance. The
right of the English representative to sit in the Council and take an
active part in its deliberations continued till 1626. The Stadholders
were also _ex officio_ members. The Provinces, since 1588, were
represented by twelve councillors. Holland had three; Gelderland,
Zeeland and Friesland two each; Utrecht, Overyssel and Groningen
(_Stad en Landeri_) one each. The treasurer-general and the clerk
(_Griffier_) of the States-General took part in the deliberations and
had great influence. The chief duty of the Council, during the period
with which we are dealing, was the raising of the "quotas" from the
various provinces for the military defence of the State. The General
Petition or War Budget was prepared by the Council and presented to the
States-General at the end of each year, providing for the military
expenses in the following twelve months. The "quotas" due towards these
expenses from the several provinces were set forth in smaller petitions
sent to the Provincial Estates, whose consent was necessary. The
so-called _repartitie_ fixing the amount of these quotas was likewise
drawn up by the Council of State, and was the subject at times of
considerable haggling and discontent. In 1612 it was settled that the
proportions to be borne by the provinces should be Holland 57.1 per
cent.; Friesland 11.4; Zeeland 11 (afterwards reduced to 9); Utrecht and
Groningen 5.5; Overyssel 3.5. It will thus be seen that the quota of
Holland was considerably more than half of the whole; and, as the naval
expenditure was to an even larger extent borne by Holland, the
preponderating influence of this province in the Union can be easily
understood. The forces of the republic that were distributed in the
several provinces received their pay from the provinces, but those
maintained by the Council, as troops of the State, were paid by monies
received from the Generality lands, _i.e._ lands such as the conquered
portions of Brabant and Flanders, governed by the States-General, but
without representation in that body. The Council of State, though its
political powers were curtailed and absorbed by the States-General,
continued to exercise, as a court of justice, appellate jurisdiction in
military and financial questions.

The States-General consisted of representatives of the Estates of the
seven sovereign provinces of Gelderland, Holland, Zeeland, Utrecht,
Friesland, Overyssel, and Groningen (_Stad en Landeri_) in the order of
precedence given above. Gelderland, having been a duchy, ranked before
those that had formerly been counties or lordships. The provinces sent
deputations varying in number; Holland and Gelderland generally six, the
others less. Each province had but a single vote. The president changed
week by week, being chosen in turn from each province according to their
order of precedence. Holland had nominally no more weight than the
others; its practical influence, however, was great in proportion to the
burden of taxation that it bore and was increased by the fact that the
sessions, which after 1593 were permanent, were held at the Hague in the
same building with the Estates of Holland, and that the
Council-Pensionary of Holland was the spokesman of the province in the
States-General. The States-General had control of the foreign affairs of
the Union. To them belonged the supreme control of military and naval
matters. The Captain-General and Admiral-General of the Union were
appointed by them; and a deputation of the States-General accompanied
the army into the field and the commanders were bound to consult it.
They exercised a strong supervision of finance, and sovereign authority
over the entire administration of the "Generality" lands. Ambassadors
were appointed by them, also the Treasurer-General of the Union, and
numerous other important officials. Yet with all these attributes and
powers the States-General possessed only a derived, not an inherent,
authority. To foreigners the sovereignty of the republic of the United
Netherlands appeared to be vested in their "High-Mightinesses." In
reality the States-General was, as already stated, a gathering of
deputations from the seven sovereign provinces. Each deputation voted as
a unit; and in all important affairs of peace and war, treaties and
finance, there must be no dissentient. A single province, however small,
could, by obstinate opposition, block the way to the acceptance of any
given proposal. Moreover the members, despite their lofty designation as
High-Mightinesses, did not vote according to their convictions or
persuasions, but according to the charge they had received from their
principals. The deputation of a province had no right to sanction any
disputable measure or proposal without referring it back to the Estates
of that province for approval or disapproval. Hence arose endless
opportunities and occasions for friction and dissension and manifold
delays in the transaction of the business of the republic, oftentimes
in a manner inimical to its vital interests.

The Provincial Estates in their turn were by no means homogeneous or
truly representative bodies. In Holland the nobles had one vote; and
eighteen towns, Dordrecht, Haarlem, Delft, Leyden, Amsterdam, Gouda,
Rotterdam, Gorkum, Schiedam, Schoonhoven, Brill, Alkmaar, Hoorn,
Enkhuizen, Edam, Monnikendam, Medemblik and Purmerend, had one each.
The nobles, though they had only one vote, were influential, as they
represented the rural districts and the small towns which had no
franchise, and they voted first. Here again, as in the States-General,
though each of the privileged towns counted equal in the voting, as a
matter of fact their weight and influence was very different. The
opposition of wealthy and populous Amsterdam was again and again
sufficient to override the decision of the majority, for there was no
power to enforce its submission, except the employment of armed force.
For at this point it may be as well to explain that each one of these
municipalities (_vroedschappen_) claimed to be a sovereign entity, and
yet, far from being bodies representing the citizens as a whole, they
were close corporations of the narrowest description. The ordinary
inhabitants of these towns had no voice whatever in the management of
their own affairs. The governing body or _vroedschap_ consisted of a
limited number of persons, sometimes not more than forty, belonging to
certain families, which filled up vacancies by co-option and chose the
burgomasters and sheriffs (_schepenen_). Thus it will be seen that
popular representation had no place in Holland. The regent-burghers were
a small patrician oligarchy, in whose hands the entire government and
administration of the towns rested, and from their number were chosen
the deputies, who represented the eighteen privileged cities in the
Provincial Estates.

The other provinces do not need such detailed notice. In Zeeland the
Estates consisted of seven members, the "first noble" (who presided) and
six towns. There was but one noble, the Marquis of Flushing and Veere.
William the Silent in 1581 obtained this marquisate by purchase; and his
heirs, through its possession, continued to exercise great influence in
the Provincial Estates. As Philip William, Prince of Orange, was in
Madrid, Maurice sat in the assembly as "first noble" in his place. In
Utrecht the three Estates were represented, _i.e._ the nobles, the towns
(four in number) and the clergy. The representatives of the clergy
were, however, chosen no longer from the Chapter but from the possessors
of what had been Church lands and property. They were elected by the
knights and the small towns out of a list drawn up by the corporation of
Utrecht. They necessarily belonged to the Reformed (Calvinist) faith.
Gelderland was divided into three (so-called) quarters, Nijmwegen,
Zutphen and Arnhem. Each of these quarters had its separate assembly;
and there was also a general diet. The nobles, who were numerous and had
large estates, were here very influential. Friesland was divided into
four quarters, three of which (Oostergoo, Westergoo and Zevenwolden)
were country districts, the fourth a gathering of the deputies of eleven
towns. The Diet of Friesland was not formed of Estates, the nobles and
the town representatives sitting together in the same assembly, which was
elected by a popular vote, all who had a small property-qualification
possessing the franchise, Roman Catholics excepted. The system of
administration and divided authority was in Friesland a very
complicated one, inherited from mediaeval times, but here again the
nobles, being large land-owners, had much influence. The stadholder
presided at the diet and had a casting vote. The Estates of Groningen
were divided into two parts--town and districts--each with one vote. The
districts were those of Hunsingoo, Fivelingoo and the West-Quarter. Here
also the stadholder had a casting vote. In Overyssel the Estates, like
those of Groningen, consisted of two members, the nobles from the
three quarters, Sallant, Twente and Vollenhove, and the deputies of
the three towns, Deventer, Kampen and Zwolle.

The ordinary executive and administrative work of Provincial
government was carried out in Holland by a body known as the
Commissioned-Councillors--_Gecommitteerde-Raden;_ in the other provinces
by Deputed-Estates--_Gedeputeerde-Staten._ The Commissioned-Councillors
were to the Estates of Holland what the Council of State was to the
States-General. They enjoyed considerable independence, for they were
not appointed by the Estates but directly by the nobles and cities
according to a fixed system of rotation, and they sat continuously,
whereas the Estates only met for short sessions. Their duty was to see
that all provincial edicts and ordinances decreed by the Estates were
published and enforced, to control the finances and to undertake the
provision and oversight of all military requirements; and to them it
belonged to summon the meetings of the Estates. The Deputed-Estates in
the other provinces had similar but generally less extensive and
authoritative functions.

Such a medley of diverse and often conflicting authorities within a
state of so small an area has no counterpart in history. It seemed
impossible that government could be carried on, or that there could be
any concerted action or national policy in a republic which was rather a
many-headed confederation than a federal state. That the United
Netherlands, in spite of all these disadvantages, rapidly rose in the
17th century to be a maritime and commercial power of the first rank was
largely due to the fact that the foreign policy of the republic and the
general control of its administration was directed by a succession of
very able men, the stadholders of the house of Orange-Nassau and the
council-pensionaries of Holland. For a right understanding of the period
of Dutch history with which we are about to deal, it is necessary to
define clearly what was the position of the stadholder and of the
council-pensionary in this cumbrous and creaking machinery of government
that has just been described, and the character of those offices, which
conferred upon their holders such wide-reaching influence and authority.

The Stadholder or governor was really, both in title and office, an
anomaly in a republic. Under the Burgundian and Habsburg rulers the
Stadholder exercised the local authority in civil and also in military
matters as representing the sovereign duke, count or lord in the
province to which he was appointed, and was by that fact clothed with
certain sovereign attributes during his tenure of office. William the
Silent was Stadholder of Holland and Zeeland at the outbreak of the
revolt, and, though deprived of his offices, he continued until the time
of the Union of Utrecht to exercise authority in those and other
provinces professedly in the name of the king. After his death one would
have expected that the office would have fallen into abeyance, but the
coming of Leicester into the Netherlands led to a revival of the
stadholderate. Holland and Zeeland, in their desire to exercise a check
upon the governor-general's arbitrary exercise of his powers, appointed
Maurice of Nassau to take his father's place; and at the same time
William Lewis of Nassau became Stadholder of Friesland, and stadholders
were also appointed in Utrecht, Gelderland and Overyssel. In 1609
Maurice was Stadholder in the five provinces of Holland, Zeeland,
Gelderland, Utrecht and Overyssel; his cousin William Lewis in Friesland
and Groningen with Drente. The powers of the stadholder were not the
same in the different provinces, but generally speaking he was the
executive officer of the Estates; and in Holland, where his authority
was the greatest, he had the supervision of the administration of
justice, the appointment of a large number of municipal magistrates,
and the prerogative of pardon, and he was charged with the military and
naval defence of the province. The stadholder received his commission
both from the Provincial Estates and from the States-General and took an
oath of allegiance to the latter. In so far, then, as he exercised
quasi-sovereign functions, he did it in the name of the States, whose
servant he nominally was. But when the stadholder, as was the case with
Maurice and the other Princes of Orange, was himself a sovereign-prince
and the heir of a great name, he was able to exercise an authority far
exceeding those of a mere official. The descendants of William the
Silent--Maurice, Frederick Henry, William II and William III--were,
moreover, all of them men of exceptional ability; and the stadholderate
became in their hands a position of almost semi-monarchical dignity and
influence, the stadholder being regarded both by foreign potentates and
by the people of the Netherlands generally as "the eminent head of the
State." Maurice, as stated above, was stadholder in five provinces;
Frederick Henry, William II and William III in six; the seventh
province, Friesland, remaining loyal, right through the 17th century, to
their cousins of the house of Nassau-Siegen, the ancestors of the
present Dutch royal family. That the authority of the States-General and
States-Provincial should from time to time come into conflict with that
of the stadholder was to be expected, for the relations between them
were anomalous in the extreme. The Stadholder of Holland for instance
appointed, directly or indirectly, the larger part of the municipal
magistrates; they in their turn the representatives who formed the
Estates of the Province. But, as the stadholder was the servant of the
Estates, he, in a sense, may be said to have had the power of appointing
his own masters. The stadholders of the house of Orange had also, in
addition to the prestige attaching to their name, the possession of
large property and considerable wealth, which with the emoluments they
received from the States-General, as Captain-General and
Admiral-General of the Union, and from the various provinces, where they
held the post of stadholder, enabled them in the days of Frederick Henry
and his successors to maintain the state and dignity of a court.

The office of Land's Advocate or Council-Pensionary was different
altogether in character from the stadholderate, but at times scarcely
less influential, when filled by a man of commanding talents. The
Advocate in the time of Oldenbarneveldt combined the duties of being
legal adviser to the Estates of Holland, and of presiding over and
conducting the business of the Estates at their meetings, and also those
of the Commissioned-Councillors. He was the leader and spokesman of the
Holland deputies in the States-General. He kept the minutes, introduced
the business and counted the votes at the provincial assemblies. It was
his duty to draw up and register the resolutions. What was perhaps
equally important, he carried on the correspondence with the ambassadors
of the republic at foreign courts, and received their despatches, and
conducted negotiations with the foreign ambassadors at the Hague. It is
easy to see how a man like Oldenbarneveldt, of great industry and
capacity for affairs, although nominally the paid servant of the
Estates, gradually acquired an almost complete control over every
department of administration and became, as it were, a Minister of State
of all affairs. In Oldenbarneveldt's time the post was held for life;
and, as Maurice did not for many years trouble himself about matters of
internal government and foreign diplomacy, the Advocate by the length of
his tenure of office had at the opening of the 17th century become the
virtual director and arbiter of the policy of the State. After his death
the title of advocate and the life-tenure ceased. His successors were
known as Council-Pensionaries, and they held office for five years only,
but with the possibility of re-election. The career of John de Witt
showed, however, that in the case of a supremely able man these
restrictions did not prevent a _Raad-Pensionarius_[4] from exercising
for eighteen years an authority and influence greater even than that of
Oldenbarneveldt.

An account of the multiplied subdivision of administrative control in
the United Provinces would not be complete without some mention of the
Admiralty Colleges in Holland. Holland with Zeeland furnished the fleets
on which the existence and well-being of the republic depended. Both
William the Silent and his son Maurice were, as stadholders, admirals of
Holland and of Zeeland, and both likewise were by the States-General
appointed Admirals-General of the Union. They thus wielded a double
authority over maritime affairs in the two provinces. In 1574 William
had at his side a Council of Admiralty erected by the Provincial
Estates, but Leicester in 1585 was annoyed by the immediate control of
naval matters being withdrawn from the governor-general and the
Council of State. He succeeded therefore in obtaining a division of the
Council of Admiralty into three Chambers, shortly afterwards increased
to five--Rotterdam, Hoorn with Enkhuizen, Veere, Amsterdam and Harlingen
with Dokkum. In 1597 it was determined that each Admiralty should
consist of seven members nominated by the States-General. The
Admiral-General presided over each College and over joint meetings of
the five Colleges. The Admiralties nominated the lieutenants of the
ships and proposed a list of captains to be finally chosen by the
States-General. The Lieutenant-Admiral and Vice-Admirals of Holland and
the Vice-Admiral of Zeeland were chosen by the Provincial Estates. The
States-General appointed the Commander-in-Chief. Such a system seemed to
be devised to prevent any prompt action or swift decision being taken at
times of emergency or sudden danger.

       *       *       *       *       *




CHAPTER VIII

THE TWELVE YEARS' TRUCE


The first years of the truce were for the United Provinces, now
recognised as "free and independent States," a period of remarkable
energy and enterprise. The young republic started on its new career with
the buoyant hopefulness that comes from the proud consciousness of
suffering and dangers bravely met and overcome, and, under the wise and
experienced guidance of Oldenbarneveldt, acquired speedily a position
and a weight in the Councils of Europe out of all proportion to its
geographical area or the numbers of its population. The far-seeing
statecraft and practised diplomatic skill of the Advocate never rendered
greater services to his country than during these last years of his long
tenure of power. A difficult question as to the succession to the
Jülich-Cleves duchies arose at the very time of the signing of the
truce, which called for delicate and wary treatment.

In March, 1609, the Duke of Jülich and Cleves died without leaving a
male heir, and the succession to these important border territories on
the Lower Rhine became speedily a burning question. The two principal
claimants through the female line were the Elector of Brandenburg and
William, Count-Palatine of Neuburg. The Emperor Rudolph II, however,
under the pretext of appointing imperial commissioners to adjudicate
upon the rival claims, aroused the suspicions of Brandenburg and
Neuburg; and these two came to an agreement to enter into joint
possession of the duchies, and were styled "the possessors." The
Protestant Union at Heidelberg recognised "the possessors," for it was
all-important for the balance of power in Germany that these lands
should not pass into the hands of a Catholic ruler of the House of
Austria. For the same reason Brandenburg and Neuburg were recognised by
the States-General, who did not wish to see a partisan of Spain
established on their borders. The emperor on his part not only refused
to acknowledge "the possessors," but he also sent his cousin Archduke
Leopold, Bishop of Passau, to intervene by armed force. Leopold seized
the fortress of Jülich and proceeded to establish himself.

It was an awkward situation, for neither the United Provinces nor the
archdukes nor the King of Spain had the smallest desire to make the
Jülich succession the cause of a renewal of hostilities, immediately
after the conclusion of the truce. The eagerness of the French king to
precipitate hostilities with the Habsburg powers however forced their
hands. Henry IV had for some time been making preparations for war, and
he was at the moment irritated by the protection given by the archdukes
to the runaway Princess of Condé, who had fled to Brussels. He had
succeeded in persuading the States to send an auxiliary force into
Germany to assist the French army of invasion in the spring of 1610,
when just as the king was on the point of leaving Paris to go to the
front he was assassinated on May 14. This event put an end to the
expedition, for the regent, Marie de' Medici, was friendly to Austria.
The States nevertheless did not feel disposed to leave Leopold in
possession of Jülich. Maurice led an army into the duchy and laid siege
to the town. It capitulated on September 1. As might have been
anticipated, however, the joint rule of the "possessors" did not turn
out a success. They quarrelled, and Neuburg asked for Catholic help.
Maurice and Spinola in 1614 found themselves again face to face at the
head of rival forces, but actual hostilities were avoided; and by the
treaty of Nanten (November 12, 1614) it was arranged that the disputed
territory should be divided, Brandenburg ruling at Cleves, Neuburg at
Jülich. Thus, in the settlement of this thorny question, the influence
of Oldenbarneveldt worked for a temporary solution satisfactory to the
interests of the United Provinces; nor was his successful intervention
in the Jülich-Cleves affair an isolated instance of his diplomatic
activity. On the contrary it was almost ubiquitous.

The growth of the Dutch trade in the Baltic had for some years been
advancing by leaps and bounds, and now far exceeded that of their old
rivals, the Hanseatic league. Christian IV, the ambitious and warlike
King of Denmark, had been seriously interfering with this trade by
imposing such heavy dues for the passage of the Sound as on the one hand
to furnish him with a large revenue, and on the other hand to support
his claim to sovereign rights over all traffic with the inland sea. The
Hanse towns protested strongly and sought the support of the
States-General in actively opposing the Danish king. It was granted. A
force of 7000 men under Frederick Henry was sent into Germany to the
relief of Brunswick, which was besieged by Christian IV. The siege was
raised; and an alliance was concluded between the republic and the Hanse
towns for common action in the protection of their commercial interests.
Nor was this all. Oldenbarneveldt entered into diplomatic relations with
Charles IX of Sweden and with Russia. Cornelis Haga was sent to
Stockholm; and from this time forward a close intimacy was established
between Sweden and the States. The seaport of Gotheborg, just outside
the entrance to the Sound, was founded by a body of Dutch colonists
under a certain Abraham Cabelliau, an Amsterdam merchant, and continued
to be for years practically a Dutch town.

Scarcely less important was the enterprise shown in the establishment of
friendly relations with distant Russia. Balthazar de Moucheron
established a Dutch factory at Archangel so early as 1584; and a growing
trade sprang up with Russia by way of the White Sea, at first in rivalry
with the English Muscovy Company. But a Dutch merchant, by name Isaac
Massa, having succeeded in gaining the ear and confidence of the Tsar,
Russian commerce gradually became a Dutch monopoly. In 1614 a Muscovite
embassy conducted by Massa came to the Hague, and access to the interior
of Russia was opened to the traders of Holland and to them only.

In the Mediterranean no less foresight and dexterity was shown in
forwarding the interests of the States. The Advocate's son-in-law, Van
der Myle, went in 1609 as ambassador to Venice; and the following year
the first Venetian envoy, Tommaso Contarini, arrived in Holland. In 1612
Cornelis Haga, who had been in Sweden, was sent to Constantinople to
treat with the Turks about commercial privileges in the Levant and for
the suppression of piracy, and he remained in the East in charge of the
republic's interests for many years.

More difficult was the maintenance of friendly relations with England.
In 1604 James I had made peace with Spain; and the growing rivalry upon
the seas between the Dutch and English tended to alienate his sympathies
from the rising maritime power of the republic. He outwardly maintained
friendly relations; his ambassador had a seat on the Council of State;
he retained his garrisons in the cautionary towns; and after the signing
of the truce he bestowed the Garter upon Prince Maurice. But at this
very time, May, 1609, James took a step which was most hurtful to that
industry which had laid the foundation of the commercial prosperity of
Holland--this was the issuing of an edict imposing a tax on all
foreigners fishing in English waters. Though general in its form, this
edict was really directed against the right heretofore enjoyed by the
Netherlanders to fish on the English coast, a right conferred by a
series of treaties and never challenged since its confirmation by the
_Magnus Intercursus_ of 1496. Dutch public opinion was strongly aroused
and a special embassy was sent to London, April, 1610, to protest
against the edict and endeavour to procure its withdrawal or its
modification. This was by no means an easy matter. The fisheries, on
which a large part of the population of Holland and Zeeland depended for
their livelihood, were of vital importance to the States. On the other
hand their virtual monopoly by the Dutch caused keen resentment in
England. In the latter part of the reign of Elizabeth that adventurous
sea-faring spirit, which was destined eventually to plant the flag of
England on the shores of every ocean, had come to the birth, and
everywhere it found, during this early part of the 17th century, Dutch
rivals already in possession and Dutch ships on every trading route. The
Dutch mercantile marine in fact far exceeded the English in numbers and
efficiency. The publication of Hugo Grotius' famous pamphlet, _Mare
Liberum_, in March, 1609, was probably the final cause which decided
James to issue his Fisheries' proclamation. The purpose of Grotius was
to claim for every nation, as against the Portuguese, freedom of trade
in the Indian Ocean, but the arguments he used appeared to King James
and his advisers to challenge the _dominium maris_, which English kings
had always claimed in the "narrow seas." The embassy of 1610,
therefore, had to deal not merely with the fisheries, but with the whole
subject of the maritime relations of the two countries; and a crowd of
published pamphlets proves the intense interest that was aroused. But
the emergence of the dispute as to the Jülich-Cleves succession, and the
change in the policy of the French government owing to the assassination
of Henry IV, led both sides to desire an accommodation; and James
consented, not indeed to withdraw the edict, but to postpone its
execution for two years. It remained a dead letter until 1616, although
all the time the wranglings over the legal aspects of the questions in
dispute continued. The Republic, however, as an independent State, was
very much hampered by the awkward fact of the cautionary towns remaining
in English hands. The occupation of Flushing and Brill, commanding the
entrances to important waterways, seemed to imply that the Dutch
republic was to a certain extent a vassal state under the protection of
England. Oldenbarneveldt resolved therefore to take advantage of King
James' notorious financial embarrassments by offering to redeem the
towns by a ready-money payment. The nominal indebtedness of the United
Provinces for loans advanced by Elizabeth was £600,000; the Advocate
offered in settlement £100,000 in cash and £150,000 more in half-yearly
payments. James accepted the offer, and the towns were handed over, the
garrisons being allowed to pass into the Dutch service, June 1616. Sir
Dudley Carleton, however, who about this time succeeded Sir Ralph
Winwood as English envoy at the Hague, continued to have a seat in the
Council of State.

Oldenbarneveldt thus, at a time when his dominant position in the State
was already being undermined and his career drawing to an end, performed
a great service to his country, the more so as King James, in his
eagerness to negotiate a marriage between the Prince of Wales and a
Spanish infanta, was beginning to allow his policy to be more and more
controlled by the Count of Gondomar, the Spanish ambassador at
Whitehall. James' leaning towards Spain naturally led him to regard with
stronger disfavour the increasing predominance of the Dutch flag upon
the seas, and it was not long before he was sorry that he had
surrendered the cautionary towns. For the fishery rights and the
principle of the _dominium maris_ in the narrow seas were no longer the
only questions in dispute between England and the States. English
seamen and traders had other grievances to allege against the Hollanders
in other parts of the world. The exclusive right to fish for whales in
the waters of Spitsbergen and Greenland was claimed by the English on
the ground of Hugh Willoughby's alleged discovery of Spitsbergen in
1553. The Dutch would not admit any such claim, and asserted that
Heemskerk was the first to visit the archipelago, and that he planted in
1596 the Dutch flag on the shores of the island, to which he gave the
name of Spitsbergen. In 1613 James conferred the monopoly upon the
English Muscovy Company, who sent out a fishing fleet with orders to
drive off any interlopers; and certain Dutch vessels were attacked and
plundered. The reply of the States-General was the granting of a
charter, January 27, 1614, to a company, known as the Northern or
Greenland Company, with the monopoly of fishing between Davis' Straits
and Nova Zembla; and a fishing fleet was sent out accompanied by
warships. The result was a temporary agreement between the English and
Dutch companies for using separate parts of Spitsbergen as their bases,
all others being excluded. Meanwhile the dispute was kept open; and
despite conferences and negotiations neither side showed any disposition
to yield. Matters reached an acute stage in 1618. English and Dutch
fishing fleets of exceptional strength sailed into the northern waters
in the early summer of that year, and a fierce fight took place, which,
as two Dutch war vessels were present, resulted in the scattering of the
English vessels and considerable loss of life and property.

The rivalry and opposition between the Dutch and English traders in the
East-Indies was on a larger scale, but here there was no question of the
Dutch superiority in force, and it was used remorselessly. The Dutch
East India Company had thriven apace. In 1606 a dividend of 50 per cent,
had been paid; in 1609 one of 325 per cent. The chief factory was at
Bantam, but there were many others on the mainland of India, and at
Amboina, Banda, Ternate and Matsjan in the Moluccas; and from these
centres trade was carried on with Ceylon, with Borneo and even with
distant China and Japan. But the position of the company was precarious,
until the secret article of the treaty of 1609 conceded liberty of trade
during the truce. The chief need was to create a centre of
administration, from which a general control could be exercised over all
the officials at the various trading factories throughout the
East-Indian archipelago. It was resolved, therefore, by the Council of
Seventeen to appoint a director-general, who should reside at Bantam,
armed with powers which made him, far removed as he was from
interference by the home authorities, almost a sovereign in the
extensive region which he administered. Jan Pieterszoon Koen, appointed
in 1614, was the first of a series of capable men by whose vigorous and
sometimes unscrupulous action the Dutch company became rapidly the
dominant power in the eastern seas, where their trade and influence
overshadowed those of their European competitors. The most enterprising
of those competitors were the English. Disputes quickly arose between
the rival companies as to trading rights in the Moluccas, the Banda
group and Amboina; and some islands, where the English had made treaties
with the natives, were occupied by the Dutch, and the English expelled.

Another grievance was the refusal of the States-General in 1616 to admit
English dyed cloths into the United Provinces. This had caused especial
irritation to King James. The manufacture of woollen cloth and the
exportation of wool had for long been the chief of English industries;
and the monopoly of the trade was, when James ascended the throne, in
the hands of the oldest of English chartered companies, the Fellowship
of Merchant Adventurers. The Adventurers held since 1598 their Court and
Staple at Middelburg in Zeeland. The English had not learnt the art of
finishing and dyeing the cloth that they wove; it was imported in its
unfinished state, and was then dyed and prepared for commerce by the
Dutch. Some thousands of skilled hands found employment in Holland in
this work. James, always impecunious, determined in 1608, on the
proposal of a certain Alderman Cockayne, to grant Cockayne a patent for
the creation of a home-dyeing industry, reserving to the crown a
monopoly for the sale of the goods. The Adventurers complained of this
as a breach of their charter; and, after much bickering, the king in
1615 settled the dispute by withdrawing the charter. Cockayne now hoped
that the company he had formed would be a profitable concern, but he and
the king were doomed to disappointment. The Estates of Holland refused
to admit the English dyed cloths, and their example was followed by the
other provinces and by the States-General. Cockayne became bankrupt, and
in 1617 the king had to renew the charter of the Adventurers. James was
naturally very sore at this rebuff, and he resolved upon reprisals by
enforcing the proclamation of 1609 and exacting a toll from all foreign
vessels fishing in British waters. Great was the indignation in Holland,
and the fishing fleet in 1617 set sail with an armed convoy. A Scottish
official named Browne, who came to collect the toll, was seized and
carried as a prisoner to Holland. James at once laid hands on two Dutch
skippers in the Thames, as hostages, and demanded satisfaction for the
outrage upon his officer. Neither side would at first give way, and it
was not until after some months that an accommodation was patched up.
The general question of the fishery privileges remained however just
as far from settlement as ever, for the States stood firm upon their
treaty rights. At length it was resolved by the States to send a special
mission to England to discuss with the king the four burning questions
embittering the relations between the two countries. The envoys arrived
in London, December, 1618. For seven months the parleyings went on
without any definite result being reached, and in August, 1619, the
embassy returned. Very important events had meanwhile been occurring
both in the United Provinces and in Germany, which made it necessary to
both parties that the decision on these trade questions, important as
they were, should be postponed for awhile, as they were overshadowed by
the serious political crises in Holland and in Bohemia, which were then
occupying all men's attention.

       *       *       *       *       *




CHAPTER IX

MAURICE AND OLDENBARNEVELDT


The conclusion of the truce did not bring, with material progress and
trade expansion, internal peace to the United Provinces. The relations
between the Prince-stadholder and the all-powerful Advocate had long
been strained. In the long-drawn-out negotiations Maurice had never
disguised his dislike to the project of a truce, and, though he finally
acquiesced, it was a sullen acquiescence. At first there was no overt
breach between the two men, but Maurice, though he did not refuse to
meet Oldenbarneveldt, was cold and unfriendly. He did not attempt to
interfere with the old statesman's control of the machinery of
administration or with his diplomatic activities, for he was naturally
indolent and took little interest in politics. Had he been ambitious, he
might many years before have obtained by general consent sovereign
power, but he did not seek it. His passion was the study of military
science. From his early youth he had spent his life in camps, and now he
found himself without occupation. The enemies of Oldenbarneveldt seized
the opportunity to arouse Maurice's suspicions of the Advocate's motives
in bringing about the truce, and even to hint that he had been bribed
with Spanish gold. Chief among these enemies was Francis van Aerssens,
for a number of years ambassador of the States at Paris. Aerssens owed
much to the Advocate, but he attributed his removal from his post at
the French court to the decision of Oldenbarneveldt to replace him by
his son-in-law, Van der Myle. He never forgave his recall, and alike by
subtle insinuation and unscrupulous accusation, strove to blacken the
character and reputation of his former benefactor.

By a curious fatality it was the outbreak of fierce sectarian strife and
dissension between the extreme and the moderate Calvinists which was
eventually to change the latent hostility of Maurice to Oldenbarneveldt
into open antagonism. Neither of the two men had strong religious
convictions, but circumstances brought it about that they were to range
themselves irrevocably on opposite sides in a quarrel between
fanatical theologians on the subject of predestination and grace.

From early times Calvinism in the northern Netherlands had been divided
into two schools. The strict Calvinists or "Reformed," known by their
opponents as "Precisians," and the liberal Calvinists, "the
Evangelicals," otherwise "the Libertines." To this Libertine party
belonged William the Silent, Oldenbarneveldt and the majority of the
burgher-regents of Holland. These men regarded the religious question
from the statesman's point of view. Having risen in rebellion against
the tyranny of the Spanish Inquisition, they were anxious to preserve
their countrymen (only a minority of whom were Protestants) from being
placed under the heel of a religious intolerance as narrow and bigoted
as that from which they had escaped. The "Reformed" congregations on the
other hand, led by the preachers, were anxious to summon a National
Synod for the purpose of creating a State Church to whose tenets,
rigidly defined by the Heidelberg catechism and the Netherland
confession, all would be required to conform on pain of being deprived
of their rights as citizens. The Libertines were opposed to such a
scheme, as an interference with the rights of each province to regulate
its own religious affairs, and as an attempt to assert the supremacy of
Church over State.

The struggle between the two parties, which had continued intermittently
for a number of years, suddenly became acute through the appointment by
Maurice of Jacob Harmensz, better known as Arminius, to the Chair of
Theology at Leyden, vacated by the death of Junius in 1602. The leader
of the strict Calvinist school, the learned Franciscus Gomarus, had at
the time of the appointment of Arminius already been a professor at
Leyden for eight years. Each teacher gathered round him a following of
devoted disciples, and a violent collision was inevitable. Prolonged and
heated controversy on the high doctrines of Predestination and Freewill
led to many appeals being made to the States-General and to the Estates
of Holland to convene a Synod to settle the disputed questions, but
neither of these bodies in the midst of the negotiations for the truce
was willing to complicate matters by taking a step that could not fail
to accentuate existing discords. Six months after the truce was signed
Arminius died. The quarrel, however, was only to grow more embittered.
Johannes Uyttenbogaert took the leadership of the Arminians, and
finally, after consultation with Oldenbarneveldt, he called together a
convention of Arminian preachers and laymen at Gouda (June, 1610). They
drew up for presentation to the Estates a petition, known as the
_Remonstratie,_ consisting of five articles, in which they defined the
points wherein they differed from the orthodox Calvinist doctrines on
the subjects of predestination, election and grace. The Gomarists on
their part drew up a _Contra-Remonstratie_ containing seven articles,
and they declined to submit to any decision on matters of doctrine, save
from a purely Church Synod. These two weighty declarations gained for
the two parties henceforth the names of Remonstrants and
Contra-Remonstrants. For the next three years a fierce controversy raged
in every province, pulpit replying to pulpit, and pamphlet to pamphlet.
The Contra-Remonstrants roundly accused their adversaries of holding
Pelagian and Socinian opinions and of being Papists in disguise. This
last accusation drew to their side the great majority of the Protestant
population, but the Remonstrants had many adherents among the
burgher-regents, and they could count upon a majority in the Estates of
Holland, Utrecht and Overyssel, and they had the powerful support of
Oldenbarneveldt.

The Advocate was no theologian, and on the doctrinal points in dispute
he probably held no very clear views. He inclined, however, to the
Arminians because of their greater tolerance, and above all for their
readiness to acknowledge the authority of the State as supreme, in
religious as well as in civil matters. He was anxious to bring about an
accommodation which should give satisfaction to both parties, but he was
dealing with fanatics, and the fires of religious bigotry when once
kindled are difficult to quench. And now was seen a curious object
lesson in the many-headed character of the government of the United
Netherlands. A majority of the provinces in the States-General favoured
the Contra-Remonstrants. The Estates of Holland, however, under the
influence of Oldenbarneveldt by a small majority refused the
Contra-Remonstrant demand and resolved to take drastic action against
the Gomarists. But a number of the representative towns in Holland, and
among them Amsterdam, declined to enforce the resolution. At Rotterdam,
on the other hand, and in the other town-councils, where the Arminians
had the majority, the Gomarist preachers were expelled from their
pulpits; and the Advocate was determined by coercion, if necessary, to
enforce the authority of the Estates throughout the province. But
coercion without the use of the military force was impossible in face of
the growing uprising of popular passion; and the military forces could
not be employed without the consent of the stadholder. Thus in 1617,
with the question of civil war in Holland trembling in the balance, the
ultimate decision lay with the stadholder; and Maurice after long
hesitation determined to throw the sword of the soldier into the scale
against the influence of the statesman.

Maurice had not as yet openly broken with his father's old friend, whose
immense services to the republic during the greater part of four decades
he fully recognised. As to the questions now in dispute the stadholder
was to an even less degree than the Advocate a zealous theologian. It is
reported that he declared that he did not know whether predestination
was blue or green. His court-chaplain, Uyttenbogaert, was a leading
Arminian; and both his step-mother, Louise (see p. 78), to whose
opinions he attached much weight, and his younger brother, Frederick
Henry, were by inclination "libertines." On the other hand William
Lewis, the Frisian Stadholder, was a zealous Calvinist, and he used all
his influence with his cousin to urge him to make a firm stand against
Oldenbarneveldt, and those who were trying to overthrow the Reformed
faith. Sir Dudley Carleton, the new English ambassador, ranged himself
also as a strong opponent of the Advocate. While Maurice, however, was
hesitating as to the action he should take, Oldenbarneveldt determined
upon a step which amounted to a declaration of war. In December, 1616,
he carried in the Estates of Holland a proposal that they should, in
the exercise of their sovereign rights, enlist a provincial force of
4000 militia (_waardgelders_) in their pay. Thus Holland, though a
strong minority in the Estates was in opposition, declared its intention
of upholding the principle of provincial sovereignty against the
authority of the States-General. The States-General at the instance of
the two stadholders, May, 1617, declared for the summoning of a National
Synod by a vote of four provinces against three. The Estates of Holland,
again with a sharp division of opinion but by a majority, declined to
obey the summons. An impasse was thus reached and Maurice at last openly
declared for the Contra-Remonstrant side.

On July 23 the Prince, accompanied by his suite, ostentatiously attended
divine service at the Cloister Church at the Hague, where the
Contra-Remonstrants had a fortnight before, in face of the prohibition
of the Estates, established themselves. This step was countered by
decisive action on the part of Oldenbarneveldt. A proposal was made in
the Estates of Holland, August 4, known as the "Sharp Resolution"--and
it well merited its name, for it was of the most drastic character. It
was a most unqualified declaration of provincial sovereignty, and yet it
was only passed in the teeth of a strong minority by the exertion of the
Advocate's personal influence. By this resolution Holland declined to
assent to the summoning of any Synod, National or Provincial, and
asserted the supremacy of the Estates in matters of religion. The
municipal authorities were ordered to raise levies of _Waardgelders_ to
keep the peace; and all officials, civil or military, were required to
take an oath of obedience to the Estates on pain of dismissal. A strong
protest was made by the representatives of the dissenting cities headed
by Reinier Pauw, burgomaster of Amsterdam.

On the plea of ill-health Oldenbarneveldt now left the Hague, and took
up his residence at Utrecht. His object was to keep this province firm
in its alliance with Holland. He did not return till November 6, but all
the time he was in active correspondence with his party in Holland, at
whose head were the three pensionaries of Rotterdam, Leyden and
Haarlem--De Groot, Hoogerbeets and De Haan. Under their leadership
levies of _Waardgelders_ were made in a number of towns; but other
towns, including Amsterdam, refused, and the total levy did not amount
to more than 1800 men. Meanwhile the majority of the States-General,
urged on by Maurice and William Lewis, were determined, despite the
resistance of Holland and Utrecht, to carry through the proposal for the
summoning of a National Synod. Overyssel had been overawed and persuaded
to assent, so that there were five votes against two in its favour. All
through the winter the wrangling went on, and estrangement between the
contending parties grew more bitter and acute. A perfect flood of
pamphlets, broadsheets and pasquinades issued from the press; and in
particular the most violent and envenomed attacks were made upon the
character and administration of the Advocate, in which he was accused of
having received bribes both from Spanish and French sources and to have
betrayed the interests of his country. The chief instigator of these
attacks was Oldenbarneveldt's personal enemy, Francis van Aerssens,
whose pen was never idle. The defenders of the Remonstrant cause and
of the principles of provincial sovereignty were not lacking in the
vigour and virulence of their replies; and the Advocate himself felt
that the accusations which were made against him demanded a formal and
serious rejoinder. He accordingly prepared a long and careful defence of
his whole career, in which he proved conclusively that the charges made
against him had no foundation. This _Remonstratie_ he addressed to the
Estates of Holland, and he also sent a copy to the Prince. If this
document did not at the time avail to silence the voices of prejudiced
adversaries whose minds were made up, it has at least had the effect of
convincing posterity that, however unwise may have been the course now
deliberately pursued by the Advocate, he never for the sake of personal
gain betrayed the interests of his country. Had he now seen that the
attempt of a majority in the Estates of Holland to resist the will of
the majority in the States-General could only lead to civil war, and had
he resigned his post, advising the Estates to disband the _Waardgelders_
and yield to superior force, a catastrophe might have been averted.
There is no reason to believe that in such circumstances Maurice would
have countenanced any extreme harshness in dealing with the Advocate.
But Oldenbarneveldt, long accustomed to the exercise of power, was
determined not to yield one jot of the claim of the sovereign province
of Holland to supremacy within its own borders in matters of religion.
The die was cast and the issue had to be decided by force of arms.

On June 28, 1618, a solemn protest was made by the Advocate in the
States-General against the summoning of a National Synod in opposition
to the expressed opinion of the Estates of Holland; and a threat was
made that Holland might withhold her contribution to the general fund.
The majority of the States-General (July 9) declared the raising of
local levies illegal, and (July 23) it was resolved that a commission be
sent to Utrecht with Maurice at its head to demand the disbanding of the
_Waardgelders_ in that town.

The Estates of Holland[5] impelled by Oldenbarneveldt now took a very
strong step, a step which could not be retrieved. They resolved also to
despatch commissioners to Utrecht to urge the town-council to stand
firm. De Groot, Hoogerbeets and two others were nominated, and they at
once set out for Utrecht. Maurice, with the deputation from the
States-General and a large suite, left the Hague only a little later
than De Groot and his companions, and reached Utrecht on the evening of
the 25th. This strange situation lasted for several days, and much
parleying and several angry discussions took place. Matters were further
complicated by the news that the dissentient towns of Holland were also
sending a deputation. This news had a considerable effect upon Colonel
Ogle, the commander of the _Waardgelders_ in Utrecht, and his officers.
They were already wavering; they now saw that resistance to the orders
of the States-General would be useless. The Prince, who had been
collecting a body of troops, now determined on action. His force entered
the city on the evening of the 31st, and on the following morning he
commanded the local levies to lay down their arms. They at once obeyed,
and Maurice took possession of the city. The Holland commissioners and
the members of the town-council fled. Maurice appointed a new
town-council entirely Contra-Remonstrant; and changes were made in both
branches of the Estates, so as to secure a Contra-Remonstrant majority
and with it the vote of the province in the States-General for the
National Synod. Holland now stood alone, and its opposition had to be
dealt with in a fashion even sterner than that of Utrecht.

The Remonstrant cities of Holland were still for resistance, and
attempts were made to influence the stadholder not to resort to extreme
measures. Maurice had, however, made up his mind. On August 18 the
States-General passed a resolution demanding the dismissal of the
_Waardgelders_ in Holland within twenty-four hours. The placard was
published on the 20th and was immediately obeyed. The Estates of
Holland had been summoned to meet on the 21st, and were at once called
upon to deal with the question of the National Synod. A few days later
(August 28) a secret resolution was adopted by the majority in the
States-General, without the knowledge of the Holland deputies, to arrest
Oldenbarneveldt, De Groot, Hoogerbeets and Ledenburg, the secretary of
the Estates of Utrecht, on the ground that their action in the troubles
at Utrecht had been dangerous to the State. On the following day the
Advocate, on his way to attend the meeting of the Estates, was arrested
and placed in confinement. De Groot, Hoogerbeets and Ledenburg met with
similar treatment. After protesting the Estates adjourned on the 30th
until September 12, the deputies alleging that it was necessary to
consult their principals in this emergency, but in reality because the
suddenness of the blow had stricken them with terror. It was a prudent
step, for Maurice was resolved to purge the Estates and the
town-councils of Holland, as he had already purged those of Utrecht.
Attended by a strong body-guard he went from town to town, changing the
magistracies, so as to place everywhere the Contra-Remonstrants in
power. As a consequence of this action the deputies sent by the towns
were likewise changed; and, when the Estates next met, the supporters of
Oldenbarneveldt and his policy had disappeared. A peaceful revolution
had been accomplished. All opposition to the summoning of the Synod was
crushed; and (November 9) the Estates passed a vote of thanks to the
stadholder for "the care and fidelity" with which he had discharged a
difficult and necessary duty.

Meanwhile Oldenbarneveldt and the other prisoners had been confined in
separate rooms in the Binnenhof and were treated with excessive
harshness and severity. They were permitted to have no communication
with the outside world, no books, paper or writing materials; and the
conditions of their imprisonment were such as to be injurious to health.
A commission was appointed by the States-General to examine the accused,
and it began its labours in November. The method of procedure was unjust
and unfair in the extreme, even had it been a case of dealing with vile
criminals. The treatment of Oldenbarneveldt in particular was almost
indecently harsh. The aged statesman had to appear sixty times before
the commission and was examined and cross-examined on every incident of
the forty years of his administration and on every detail of his
private life. He was allowed not only to have no legal adviser, but
also was forbidden access to any books of reference or to any papers or
to make any notes. It was thus hoped that, having to trust entirely to
his memory, the old man might be led into self-contradictions or to
making damaging admissions against himself. De Groot and Hoogerbeets had
to undergo a similar, though less protracted, inquisition. Such was its
effect upon Ledenburg that he committed suicide.

It was not until February 20, 1619, that the States-General appointed an
extraordinary court for the trial of the accused. It consisted of
twenty-four members, of whom twelve were Hollanders.

It is needless to say that such a court had no legal status; and the
fact that nearly all its members were the Advocate's personal or
political enemies is a proof that the proceedings were judicial only in
name. It was appointed not to try, but to condemn the prisoners.
Oldenbarneveldt protested in the strongest terms against the court's
competence. He had been the servant of the Estates of the sovereign
province of Holland, and to them alone was he responsible. He denied to
the States-General any sovereign rights; they were simply an assembly
representing a number of sovereign allies. These were bold statements,
and they were accompanied by an absolute denial of the charges brought
against him. It was quite useless. All the prisoners were condemned,
first De Groot, then Hoogerbeets, then Oldenbarneveldt. The trials were
concluded on May 1, but it was resolved to defer the sentences until
after the close of the National Synod, which had been meeting at
Dordrecht. This took place on May 9.

Meanwhile strong and influential efforts were made for leniency. The
French ambassador, Aubrey du Maurier, during the trial did his utmost to
secure fair treatment for the Advocate; and a special envoy, Châtillon,
was sent from Paris to express the French king's firm belief in the aged
statesman's integrity and patriotism based on an intimate knowledge of
all the diplomatic proceedings during and after the negotiations for the
Truce. But these representations had no effect and were indeed resented.
Equally unfruitful were the efforts made by Louise de Coligny to soften
the severity of her step-son's attitude. Even William Lewis wrote to
Maurice not to proceed too harshly in the matter. All was in vain. The
Prince's heart was steeled. He kept asking whether the Advocate or his
family had sued for pardon. But Oldenbarneveldt was far too proud to
take any step which implied an admission of guilt; and all the members
of his family were as firmly resolved as he was not to supplicate for
grace. Few, however, believed that capital punishment would be carried
out. On Sunday, May 12, however, sentence of death was solemnly
pronounced; and on the following morning the head of the great statesman
and patriot was stricken off on a scaffold erected in the Binnenhof
immediately in front of the windows of Maurice's residence. The
Advocate's last words were a protestation of his absolute innocence of
the charge of being a traitor to his country; and posterity has endorsed
the declaration.

That Oldenbarneveldt had in the last two years of his life acted
indiscreetly and arrogantly there can be no question. His long tenure of
power had made him impatient of contradiction; and, having once
committed himself to a certain course of action, he determined to carry
it through in the teeth of opposition, regardless of consequences and
with a narrow obstinacy of temper that aroused bitter resentment. His
whole correspondence and private papers were however seized and
carefully scrutinised by his personal enemies; and, had they found any
evidence to substantiate the charges brought against him, it would have
been published to the world. It is clear that not a shred of such
evidence was discovered, and that the Advocate was perfectly innocent of
the treasonable conduct for which a packed court condemned him to suffer
death. Such was the reward that Oldenbarneveldt received for life-long
services of priceless value to his country. He more than any other man
was the real founder of the Dutch Republic; and it will remain an
ineffaceable stain on Maurice's memory that he was consenting unto this
cruel and unjust sentence.

Sentences of imprisonment for life were passed upon De Groot and
Hoogerbeets. They were confined in the castle of Loevestein. The
conditions of captivity were so far relaxed that the famous jurist was
allowed to receive books for the continuance of his studies. Through the
ingenuity and daring of his wife De Groot contrived to escape in 1621 by
concealing himself in a trunk supposed to be filled with heavy tomes.
The trunk was conveyed by water to Rotterdam, from whence the prisoner
managed to make his way safely to France.

Concurrently with the political trials the National Synod had been
pursuing its labours at Dordrecht. On November 13 rather more than one
hundred delegates assembled under the presidency of Johannes Bogerman of
Leeuwarden. Fifty-eight of the delegates were preachers, professors and
elders elected by the provincial synods, fifteen were commissioners
appointed by the States-General, twenty-eight were members of foreign
Reformed churches. English and Scottish representatives took an active
part in the proceedings. The Synod decided to summon the Remonstrants to
send a deputation to make their defence. On December 6 accordingly, a
body of twelve leading Remonstrants with Simon Episcopius at their head
took their seats at a table facing the assembly. Episcopius made a
long harangue in Latin occupying nine sessions. His eloquence was,
however, wasted on a court that had already prejudged the cause for
which he pleaded. After much wrangling and many recriminations Bogerman
ordered the Remonstrants to withdraw. They did so only to meet in an
"anti-synod" at Rotterdam at which the authority of the Dordrecht
assembly to pronounce decisions on matters of faith was denied.
Meanwhile the Contra-Remonstrant divines at Dordrecht during many weary
sessions proceeded to draw up a series of canons defining the true
Reformed doctrine and condemning utterly, as false and heretical, the
five points set forth in the Remonstrance. On May 1 the Netherland
confession and the Heidelberg catechism were unanimously adopted, as
being in conformity with Holy Scripture, and as fixing the standard of
orthodox teaching. The Synod was dissolved eight days later. The final
session was the 154th; and this great assembly of delegates from many
lands, the nearest approach to a general council of the Protestant
churches that has ever been held, came to a close amidst much festivity
and no small congratulation. No time was lost in taking action by the
dominant party against their opponents. Two hundred Remonstrant
preachers were driven into exile; and the congregations were treated
with the same spirit of intolerance as had hitherto been the lot of the
Catholics, and were forbidden the exercise of public worship.

After the Advocate's death, except for the persecution directed against
the Remonstrant party, the course of public affairs went on smoothly.
Maurice, who by the death of his brother, Philip William, had in
February, 1618, become Prince of Orange, was virtually sovereign in the
United Provinces. His name appeared in treaties with eastern potentates
and in diplomatic despatches, just as if he were a reigning monarch; and
the people of the Netherlands were even at times spoken of as his
subjects. But Maurice never cared to trouble himself about the details
of politics, and he now left the management of affairs in the hands of a
few men that he could trust, notably in those of Francis van Aerssens
(henceforth generally known as lord of Sommelsdijk) and Reinier Pauw,
the influential burgomaster of Amsterdam. Aerssens had shown himself
spiteful and vindictive in his conduct towards his earlier patron,
Oldenbarneveldt, but being a clever diplomatist and gifted with
considerable powers of statesmanship, he became henceforth for many
years the trusted adviser and confidant not only of Maurice, but of his
successor Frederick Henry.

The year 1620 was marked by the sudden death in June of William Lewis,
the Stadholder of Friesland. His loss was much deplored by Maurice, who
had for years been accustomed to rely upon the tried experience and
sound judgment of his cousin both in peace and war. A few months earlier
(March) Louise de Coligny had died at Fontainebleau. She too had been
from his youth the wise adviser of her step-son, but she was deeply
grieved at the fate of Oldenbarneveldt, and after his execution left the
Netherlands to take up her residence in her native country. By the death
of William Lewis the two stadholderates of Groningen with Drente and of
Friesland became vacant. Maurice succeeded to that of Groningen, but the
Frieslanders remained faithful to the house of Nassau-Siegen and elected
Ernest Casimir, the younger brother of William Lewis, as their
stadholder.

       *       *       *       *       *




CHAPTER X

FROM THE END OF THE TWELVE YEARS' TRUCE TO THE PEACE OF MUENSTER
(1621-48). THE STADHOLDERATE OF FREDERICK HENRY OF ORANGE


Civil disturbances and religious persecutions were not the only causes
of anxiety to the political leaders in the United Provinces during the
crisis of 1618-19; foreign affairs were also assuming a menacing aspect.
The year 1618 saw the opening in Germany of the Thirty Years' War. The
acceptance of the Crown of Bohemia by Frederick, Elector Palatine, meant
that the long-delayed struggle for supremacy between Catholics and
Protestants was to be fought out; and it was a struggle which neither
Spain nor the Netherlands could watch with indifference. Maurice was
fully alive to the necessity of strengthening the defences of the
eastern frontier; and subsidies were granted by the States-General to
Frederick and also to some of the smaller German princes. This support
would have been larger, but the unexpected refusal of James I to give
aid to his son-in-law made the Dutch doubtful in their attitude. The
States, though friendly, were unwilling to commit themselves. In the
spring of 1620, however, by James' permission, the English regiments in
the Dutch service under the command of Sir Horace Vere were sent to
oppose Spinola's invasion of the Rhineland. Accompanied by a Dutch force
under Frederick Henry, they reached the Palatinate, but it was too late.
The fate of the King of Bohemia was soon to be decided elsewhere than in
his hereditary dominions. Completely defeated at the battle of Prague,
Frederick with his wife and family fled to Holland to seek the
protection of their cousin, the Prince of Orange. They met with the most
generous treatment at his hands, and they were for many years to make
the Hague the home of their exile.

As the date at which the Twelve Years' Truce came to an end drew near,
some efforts were made to avert war. There were advocates of peace in
the United Provinces, especially in Gelderland and Overyssel, the two
provinces most exposed to invasion.

The archdukes had no desire to re-open hostilities; and Pecquinius, the
Chancellor of Brabant, was sent to the Hague to confer with Maurice, and
was authorised to name certain conditions for the conclusion of a peace.
These conditions proved, however, to be wholly unacceptable, and the
early summer of 1621 saw Maurice and Spinola once more in the field at
the head of rival armies. The operations were, however, dilatory and
inconclusive. The stadholder now, and throughout his last campaigns, was
no longer physically the same man as in the days when his skilful
generalship had saved the Dutch republic from overthrow; he had lost the
brilliant energy of youth. The deaths in the course of this same year,
1621, of both the Archduke Albert and Philip III of Spain, were also
hindrances to the vigorous prosecution of the war. In 1622 there was
much marching and counter-marching, and Maurice was successful in
compelling Spinola to raise the siege of Bergen-op-Zoom, the last
success he was destined to achieve. In the course of this year the
prince's life was in serious danger. A plot was laid to assassinate him
on his way to Ryswyck, the leading conspirator being William van
Stoutenberg, the younger son of Oldenbarneveldt. Stoutenberg had, in
1619, been deprived of his posts and his property confiscated, and he
wished to avenge his father's death and his own injuries. The plot was
discovered, but Stoutenberg managed to escape and took service under the
Archduchess Isabel. Unfortunately he had implicated his elder brother,
Regnier, lord of Groeneveldt, in the scheme. Groeneveldt was seized and
brought to the scaffold.

From this time nothing but misfortune dogged the steps of Maurice, whose
health began to give way under the fatigues of campaigning. In 1623 a
carefully planned expedition against Antwerp, which he confidently
expected to succeed, was frustrated by a long continuance of stormy
weather. Spinola in the following year laid siege to Breda. This
strongly fortified town, an ancestral domain of the Princes of Orange,
had a garrison of 7000 men. The Spanish commander rapidly advancing
completely invested it. Maurice, who had been conducting operations on
the eastern frontier, now hastened to Breda, and did his utmost by
cutting off Spinola's own supplies to compel him to raise the blockade.
All his efforts however failed, and after holding out for many months
Breda surrendered. In the spring of 1625 the prince became so
seriously ill that he asked the States-General to appoint his brother
commander-in-chief in his stead. Feeling his end drawing near, Maurice's
chief wish was to see Frederick Henry married before his death.
Frederick Henry, like Maurice himself, had never shown any inclination
for wedlock and there was no heir to the family. He had, however, been
attracted by the Countess Amalia von Solms, a lady of the suite of
Elizabeth of Bohemia. Under pressure from the dying man the
preliminaries were speedily arranged, and the wedding was quietly
celebrated on April 4. Though thus hastily concluded, the marriage
proved to be in every way a thoroughly happy one. Amalia was throughout
his life to be the wise adviser of her husband and to exercise no small
influence in the conduct of public affairs. Maurice died on April 23, in
the fifty-eighth year of his age. His forty years of continuous and
strenuous service to the State had made him prematurely old; and there
can be but little doubt that the terrible anxieties of the crisis of
1618-19 told upon him. Above all a feeling of remorse for his share in
the tragedy of Oldenbarneveldt's death preyed upon his mind.

The new Prince of Orange succeeded to a difficult position, but he was
endowed with all the qualities of a real leader of men. Forty-one years
old and brought up from boyhood in camps under the eye of his brother,
Frederick Henry was now to show that he was one of the most accomplished
masters of the military art, and especially siege-craft, in an age of
famous generals, for Bernard of Saxe-Weimar, Torstenson, Turenne,
Charles Gustavus and the Great Elector were all trained in his school.
He was, however, much more than an experienced and resourceful commander
in the field. He inherited much of his father's wary and tactful
statesmanship and skill in diplomacy. He was, moreover, deservedly
popular. He was a Hollander born and bred, and his handsome face,
chivalrous bearing, and conciliatory genial temper, won for him an
influence, which for some years was to give him almost undisputed
predominance in the State. To quote the words of a contemporary, Van der
Capellen, "the prince in truth disposed of everything as he liked;
everything gave way to his word."

The offices and dignities held by Maurice were at once conferred on
Frederick Henry. He was elected Stadholder of Holland, Zeeland, Utrecht,
Gelderland and Overyssel, and was appointed Captain-General and
Admiral-General of the Union and head of the Council of State. During
practically the whole of his life the prince spent a considerable part
of the year in camp, but he was able all the time to keep in touch with
home affairs, and to exercise a constant supervision and control of the
foreign policy of the State by the help of his wife, and through the
services of Francis van Aerssens. The Court of the Princess of Orange,
graced as it was by the presence of the exiled King and Queen of
Bohemia, was brilliant and sumptuous, and gave to the reality of power
possessed by the stadholder more than a semblance of sovereign pomp.
During her husband's absence she spared no pains to keep him
well-acquainted with all the currents and under-currents of action and
opinion at the Hague, and was not only able to give sound advice, but
was quite ready, when necessity called, to meet intrigue with intrigue
and render abortive any movements or schemes adverse to the prince's
policy or authority. The obligations of Frederick Henry to Aerssens were
even greater. The stadholder was at first suspicious of the man, whom he
disliked for the leading part he had taken against Oldenbarneveldt. But
he did not allow personal prejudice to prevent him from employing a
diplomatist of Aerssens' experience and capacity, and, with
acquaintance, he learned to regard him, not merely as a clever and wise
councillor, but as a confidential friend.

The right conduct of foreign affairs was of peculiar importance at the
moment, when Frederick Henry became stadholder, for a change of
_régime_ took place almost simultaneously both in France and England. In
Paris Cardinal Richelieu had just laid firm hands upon the reins of
power, and the timorous and feeble James I died in the autumn of 1625.
Richelieu and Charles I were both hostile to Spain, and the republic had
reason to hope for something more than friendly neutrality in the coming
years of struggle with the united forces of the two Habsburg monarchies.

One of the chief difficulties which confronted the new stadholder was
the religious question. The prince himself, as was well known, was
inclined to Remonstrant opinions. He was, however, anxious not to stir
up the smouldering embers of sectarian strife, and he made no effort to
withdraw the placards against the Remonstrants, but confined himself to
moderate in practice their severity. He recalled from exile Van der
Myle, Oldenbarneveldt's son-in-law; made Nicholas van Reigersberg, De
Groot's brother-in-law, a member of the council; and released
Hoogerbeets from his captivity at Loevestein. When, however, De Groot
himself, presuming on the stadholder's goodwill, ventured to return to
Holland without permission, the prince refused to receive him and he was
ordered to leave the country once more.

The year 1626 was marked by no events of military importance; both sides
were in lack of funds and no offensive operations were undertaken. Much
rejoicing, however, attended the birth of a son and heir to the Prince
of Orange, May 27. The child received the name of William. Early in the
following year Sir Dudley Carleton, as envoy-extraordinary of King
Charles I, invested Frederick Henry at the Hague with the Order of the
Garter. This high distinction was not, however, a mark of really
friendlier relations between the two countries. The long-standing
disputes as to fishing rights in the narrow seas and at Spitsbergen, and
as to trading spheres in the East Indian Archipelago, remained
unsettled; and in the unfortunate and ill-considered war, which broke
out at this time between England and France, the sympathies of the
States were with the latter. Already those close relations between the
French and the Dutch, which for the next decade were to be one of the
dominating factors in determining the final issue of the Thirty Years'
War, were by the diplomatic efforts of Richelieu and of Aerssens being
firmly established. France advanced to the States a large subsidy by the
aid of which the stadholder was enabled to take the field at the head
of a really fine army and to give to the world a brilliant display of
his military abilities. Throughout his stadholderate the persistent aim
which Frederick Henry held before himself was never aggression with a
view to conquest, but the creation of a scientific frontier, covered by
strong fortresses, within which the flat lands behind the defensive
lines of the great rivers could feel reasonably secure against sudden
attack. It was with this object that in 1629 he determined to lay siege
to the town of Hertogenbosch. A force of 24,000 infantry and 4000
cavalry were gathered together for the enterprise. It was composed of
many nationalities, like all the armies commanded by Maurice and
Frederick Henry, but was admirably disciplined and devoted to its
commander. Four English, three Scottish and four French regiments, all
choice troops, raised by permission of their sovereigns for the service
of the States, formed the backbone of the force. On April 30 the town
was invested.

Hertogenbosch, or Bois-le-duc, was strongly fortified, and so surrounded
by marshy ground, intersected by a number of small streams, that the
only way of approach for a besieging force was a single causeway
defended by the forts of St Isabella and St Anthony. The garrison
consisted of 8000 men, and the governor, Grobendonc, was an experienced
and resolute soldier.

The stadholder began by surrounding the town with a double line of
circumvallation. The marshes were crossed by dykes, and two streams were
dammed so as to fill a broad deep moat round the lines and flood the
country outside. Other lines, three miles long, connected the investing
lines with the village of Crèvecceur on the Meuse, Frederick Henry's
base of supplies, which were brought by water from Holland. These works
completed, approaches were at once opened against the forts of St
Anthony and St Isabella, the task being entrusted to the English and
French troops. The court of Brussels now began to take serious measures
for relieving the town. At first regarding _Bolduc la pucelle_ as
impregnable, they had been pleased to hear that the prince had committed
himself to an enterprise certain to be a dismal failure. Then came the
news of the circumvallation, and with it alarm. The Count de Berg was
therefore ordered (June 17) at the head of an army of 30,000 foot and
7000 horse to advance into North Brabant and raise the siege. But the
stadholder was prepared and ceaselessly on his guard; and the Spanish
general, after several vain attempts, found the Dutch lines
unassailable. With the view of compelling Frederick Henry to follow him,
Berg now marched into the heart of the United Provinces, devastating as
he went with fire and sword, took Amersfoort and threatened Amsterdam.
But the prince confined himself to despatching a small detached force of
observation; and meanwhile a happy stroke, by which a certain Colonel
Dieden surprised and captured the important frontier fortress of Wesel,
forced the Spaniards to retreat, for Wesel was Berg's depot of supplies
and munitions.

While all this was going on the Prince of Orange had been pushing
forward the siege operations. On July 17 the forts of St Isabella and St
Anthony were stormed. The attack against the main defences, in which the
English regiments specially distinguished themselves, was now pressed
with redoubled vigour. The resistance at every step was desperate, but
at last the moat was crossed and a lodgment effected within the walls.
On September 14 Hertogenbosch surrendered; and the virgin fortress
henceforth became the bulwark of the United Provinces against Spanish
attack on this side. The consummate engineering skill, with which the
investment had been carried out, attracted the attention of all Europe
to this famous siege. It was a signal triumph and added greatly to the
stadholder's popularity and influence in the republic.

It was needed. The Estates of Holland were at this time once more
refractory. The interests of this great commercial and maritime province
differed from those of the other provinces of the Union; and it bore a
financial burden greater than that of all the others put together. The
Estates, then under the leadership of Adrian Pauw, the influential
pensionary of Amsterdam, declined to raise the quota of taxation
assigned to the province for military needs and proceeded to disband a
number of troops that were in their pay. Inconsistently with this action
they declined to consider certain proposals for peace put forward by the
Infanta Isabel, for they would yield nothing on the questions of liberty
of worship or of freedom to trade in the Indies. Their neglect to
furnish the requisite supplies for the war, however, prevented the
prince from undertaking any serious military operations in 1630.
Fortunately the other side were in no better case financially, while the
death of Spinola and the withdrawal of the Count de Berg from the
Spanish service deprived them of their only two competent generals. This
attitude of Holland, though it thwarted the stadholder's plans and was
maintained in opposition to his wishes, by no means however implied any
distrust of him or lack of confidence in his leadership. This was
conclusively proved by the passing, at the instigation of Holland, of
the _Acte de Survivance_ (April 19,1631). This Act declared all the
various offices held by the prince hereditary in the person of his
five-year-old son. He thus became, in all but name, a constitutional
sovereign.

An expedition planned for the capture of Dunkirk at this time, spring
1631, proved too hazardous and was abandoned, but later in the year the
Dutch sailors gave a signal proof of their superiority at sea.
Encouraged by the failure of the attempted attack on Dunkirk the
government at Brussels determined on a counter-stroke. A flotilla of 35
frigates, accompanied by a large number of smaller vessels to carry
supplies and munitions and having on board a body of 6000 soldiers,
set sail from Antwerp under the command of Count John of Nassau (a
cousin of the stadholder) and in the presence of Isabel herself to
effect the conquest of some of the Zeeland islands. As soon as the
news reached Frederick Henry, detachments of troops were at once
despatched to various points; and about a dozen vessels were rapidly
equipped and ordered to follow the enemy and if possible bring him to
action. A landing at Terscholen was foiled by Colonel Morgan, who, at
the head of 2000 English troops, waded across a shallow estuary in
time to prevent a descent. At last (September 12) the Dutch ships
managed to come up with their adversaries in the Slaak near the island
of Tholen. They at once attacked and though so inferior in numbers
gained a complete victory. Count John of Nassau just contrived to
escape, but his fleet was destroyed and 5000 prisoners were taken.

The year 1632 witnessed a renewal of military activity and was memorable
for the famous siege and capture of Maestricht. This fortress held the
same commanding position on the eastern frontier as Hertogenbosch on the
southern; and, though its natural position was not so strong as the
capital of North Brabant, Maestricht, lying as it did on both sides of
the broad Meuse, and being strongly fortified and garrisoned, was very
difficult to invest. The stadholder, at the head of a force of 17,000
infantry and 4000 horse, first made himself master of Venloo and
Roeremonde and then advanced upon Maestricht. Unfortunately before
Roeremonde, Ernest Casimir, the brave stadholder of Friesland and
Groningen, was killed. He was succeeded in his offices by his son, Henry
Casimir. Arriving (June 10) before Maestricht, Frederick Henry proceeded
to erect strongly entrenched lines of circumvallation round the town
connecting them above and below the town by bridges. Supplies reached
him plentifully by the river. To the English and French regiments were
once more assigned the place of honour in the attack. All went well
until July 2, when Don Gonzales de Cordova led a superior Spanish force
from Germany, consisting of 18,000 foot and 6000 horse, to raise the
siege, and encamped close to the Dutch lines on the south side of the
river. Finding however no vulnerable spot, he awaited the arrival at the
beginning of August of an Imperialist army of 12,000 foot and 4000
horse, under the renowned Pappenheim. This impetuous leader determined
upon an assault, and the Dutch entrenchments were attacked suddenly with
great vigour at a moment when the prince was laid up with the gout. He
rose, however, from his bed, personally visited all the points of
danger, and after desperate fighting the assailants were at last driven
off with heavy loss. The Spaniards and Imperialists, finding that the
stadholder's lines could not be forced, instituted a blockade, so that
the besiegers were themselves besieged. But Frederick Henry had laid up
such ample stores of munitions and provisions that he paid no heed to
the cutting of his communications, and pushed on his approaches with the
utmost rapidity. All difficulties were overcome by the engineering skill
of the scientific commander; and finally two tunnels sixty feet deep
were driven under the broad dry moat before the town walls. The English
regiments during these operations bore the brunt of the fighting and
lost heavily, Colonels Harwood and the Earl of Oxford being killed and
Colonel Morgan dangerously wounded. After exploding a mine, a forlorn
hope of fifty English troops rushed out from one of the tunnels and made
good their footing upon the ramparts. Others followed, and the garrison,
fearing that further resistance might entail the sacking of the town,
surrendered (August 23) with honours of war.

One result of the fall of Maestricht was a renewal on the part of the
Archduchess Isabel of negotiations for peace or a long truce. On the
authority of Frederick Henry's memoirs the terms first offered to him in
camp were favourable and might have been accepted. When, however, the
discussion was shifted to the Hague, the attitude of the Belgic
representatives had stiffened. The cause was not far to seek, for on
November 6, 1632 the ever-victorious Gustavus Adolphus had fallen in the
hour of triumph in the fatal battle of Lützen. The death of the Swedish
hero was a great blow to the Protestant cause and gave fresh heart to
the despondent Catholic alliance. The negotiations dragged however their
slow length along, the chief point of controversy being the old dispute
about freedom to trade in the Indies. On this point agreement was
impossible. Spain would yield nothing of her pretensions; and the
Hollanders would hear of no concessions that threatened the prosperity
of the East and West India Companies in which so many merchants and
investors were deeply interested. Any admission of a Spanish monopoly or
right of exclusion would have spelt ruin to thousands. The diplomatic
discussions, however, went on for many months in a desultory and
somewhat futile manner; and meanwhile though hostilities did not
actually cease, the campaign of 1633 was conducted in a half-hearted
fashion. The death of Isabel on November 29, 1633, shattered finally any
hopes that the peace party in the Provinces (for there was a strong
peace party) might have had of arriving at any satisfactory agreement.
By the decease of the arch-duchess, who had been a wise and beneficent
ruler and had commanded the respect and regard not only of her own
subjects but of many northerners also, the Belgic provinces reverted to
the crown of Spain and passed under the direct rule of Philip IV. The
Cardinal Infante Ferdinand, fresh from his crushing victory over the
Swedes at Nördlingen, came as governor to Brussels in 1634, at the head
of considerable Spanish forces, and an active renewal of the war in 1635
was clearly imminent.

In these circumstances Frederick Henry determined to enter into
negotiations with France for the conclusion of an offensive and
defensive alliance against Spain, the common enemy. He had many
difficulties to encounter. The Estates of Holland, though opposed to the
terms actually offered by the Brussels government, were also averse to
taking any step which shut the door upon hopes of peace. Richelieu on
his side, though ready, as before, to grant subsidies and to permit the
enrolment of French regiments for the Dutch service, shrank from
committing France to an open espousal of the Protestant side against the
Catholic powers. The stadholder, however, was not deterred by the
obstacles in his way; and the diplomatic skill and adroitness of
Aerssens, aided by his own tact and firmness of will, overcame the
scruples of Richelieu. The opposition of the Estates of Holland, without
whose consent no treaty could be ratified, was likewise surmounted.
Adrian Pauw, their leader, was despatched on a special embassy to Paris,
and in his absence his influence was undermined, and Jacob Cats was
appointed Council-Pensionary in his stead. In the spring of 1635 a firm
alliance was concluded between France and the United Provinces, by which
it was agreed that neither power should make peace without the consent
of the other, each meanwhile maintaining a field force of 25,000 foot
and 5000 horse and dividing conquests in the Southern Netherlands
between them. This treaty was made with the concurrence and strong
approval of the Swedish Chancellor, Oxenstierna, and was probably
decisive in its effect upon the final issue of the Thirty Years' War.

In the early spring of 1635, therefore, a French force entered the
Netherlands and, after defeating Prince Thomas of Savoy at Namur, joined
the Dutch army at Maestricht. Louis XIII had given instructions to the
French commanders, Châtillon and de Brézé, to place themselves under the
orders of the Prince of Orange; and Frederick Henry at the head of
32,000 foot and 9000 horse now entered the enemy's territory and
advanced to the neighbourhood of Louvain. Here however, owing to the
outbreak of disease among his troops, to lack of supplies and to
differences of opinion with his French colleagues, the prince determined
to retreat. His action was attended by serious results. His adversary,
the Cardinal Infante Ferdinand, was a wary and skilful general. He now
seized his opportunity, rapidly made himself master of Diest, Gennep,
Goch and Limburg, and took by surprise the important fort of Schenck at
the junction of the Waal and the Rhine. Vexed at the loss of a
stronghold which guarded two of the main waterways of the land, the
stadholder at once laid siege to Schenck. But the Spanish garrison held
out obstinately all through the winter and did not surrender until April
26,1636. The Dutch army had suffered much from exposure and sickness
during this long investment and was compelled to abstain for some months
from active operations. Ferdinand thereupon, as soon as he saw that
there was no immediate danger of an attack from the north, resolved to
avenge himself upon the French for the part they had taken in the
preceding year's campaign. Reinforced by a body of Imperialist troops
under Piccolomini he entered France and laid the country waste almost to
the gates of Paris. This bold stroke completely frustrated any plans
that the allies may have formed for combined action in the late summer.

The following year the States determined, somewhat against the wishes of
Frederick Henry, to send an expedition into Flanders for the capture of
Dunkirk. This was done at the instance of the French ambassador,
Charnacé, acting on the instructions of Richelieu, who promised the
assistance of 5000 French troops and undertook, should the town be
taken, to leave it in the possession of the Dutch. The stadholder
accordingly assembled (May 7) an army of 14,000 foot and a considerable
body of horse at Rammekens, where a fleet lay ready for their transport
to Flanders. Contrary winds, however, continued steadily to blow for
many weeks without affording any opportunity for putting to sea. At
last, wearied out with the long inaction and its attendant sickness
the prince (July 20) suddenly broke up his camp and marched upon Breda.
Spinola, after capturing Breda in 1625, had greatly strengthened its
defences; and now, with a garrison of 4000 men under a resolute
commander, it was held to be secure against any attack. The siege was a
repetition of those of Hertogenbosch and Maestricht. In vain did the
Cardinal Infante with a powerful force try to break through the lines of
circumvallation, which the prince had constructed with his usual skill.
Called away by a French invasion on the south, he had to leave Breda to
its fate. The town surrendered on October 10.

During the years 1637 and 1638 the ever-recurring dissensions between
the province of Holland and the Generality became acute once more. The
Provincial Estates insisted on their sovereign rights and refused to
acknowledge the authority of the States-General to impose taxes upon
them. This opposition of Holland was a great hindrance to the prince in
the conduct of the war, and caused him constant anxiety and worry. It
was impossible to plan or to carry out a campaign without adequate
provision being made for the payment and maintenance of the military and
naval forces, and this depended upon Holland's contribution. Amsterdam
was the chief offender. On one occasion a deputation sent to Amsterdam
from the States-General was simply flouted. The burgomaster refused to
summon the council together, and the members of the deputation had to
return without an audience. All the prince's efforts to induce the
contumacious city to consider his proposals in a reasonable and
patriotic spirit were of no avail; they were rejected insultingly. In
his indignation Frederick Henry is reported to have exclaimed, "I have
no greater enemy, but if only I could take Antwerp, it would bring them
to their senses."

The immense and growing prosperity of Amsterdam at this time was indeed
mainly due to the fall of Antwerp from its high estate. To reconquer
Antwerp had indeed long been a favourite project of Frederick Henry. In
1638 he made careful and ample preparations for its realisation. But it
was not to be. Misfortune this year was to dog his steps. The advance
was made in two bodies. The larger under the prince was to march
straight to Antwerp. The second, of 6000 men, commanded by Count William
of Nassau, was instructed to seize some outlying defences on the Scheldt
before joining the main force before the town. Count William began
well, but, hearing a false rumour that a fleet was sailing up the
Scheldt to intercept his communications, he hastily retreated. While his
ranks were in disorder he was surprised by a Spanish attack, and
practically his entire force was cut to pieces. On hearing of this
disaster the stadholder had no alternative but to abandon the siege.

Constant campaigning and exposure to the hardships of camp life year
after year began at this time seriously to affect the health of the
stadholder. He was much troubled by attacks of gout, which frequently
prevented him from taking his place in the field. In 1639 there were no
military events of importance; nevertheless this year was a memorable
one in the annals of the Dutch republic.

It was the year of the battle of the Downs. A great effort was made by
Spain to re-establish her naval supremacy in the narrow seas, and the
finest fleet that had left the harbours of the peninsula since 1588
arrived in the Channel in September, 1639. It consisted of seventy-seven
vessels carrying 24,000 men, sailors and soldiers, and was under the
command of an experienced and capable seaman, Admiral Oquendo. His
orders were to drive the Dutch fleet from the Channel and to land 10,000
men at Dunkirk as a reinforcement for the Cardinal Infante. Admiral
Tromp had been cruising up and down the Channel for some weeks on the
look-out for the Spaniards, and on September 16 he sighted the armada.
He had only thirteen vessels with him, the larger part of his fleet
having been detached to keep watch and ward over Dunkirk. With a
boldness, however, that might have been accounted temerity, Tromp at
once attacked the enemy and with such fury that the Spanish fleet sought
refuge under the lee of the Downs and anchored at the side of an English
squadron under Vice-Admiral Pennington. Rejoined by seventeen ships from
before Dunkirk, the Dutch admiral now contented himself with a vigilant
blockade, until further reinforcements could reach him. Such was the
respect with which he had inspired the Spaniards, that no attempt was
made to break the blockade; and in the meantime Tromp had sent urgent
messages to Holland asking the Prince of Orange and the admiralties to
strain every nerve to give him as many additional ships as possible. The
request met with a ready and enthusiastic response. In all the dockyards
work went on with relays of men night and day. In less than a month
Tromp found himself at the head of 105 sail with twelve fire-ships. They
were smaller ships than those of his adversary, but they were more
than enough to ensure victory. On October 21, after detaching
Vice-Admiral Witte de with 30 ships to watch Pennington's squadron,
Tromp bore down straight upon the Spanish fleet though they were lying
in English waters. Rarely has there been a naval triumph more complete.
Under cover of a fog Oquendo himself with seven vessels escaped to
Dunkirk; all the rest were sunk, burnt, or captured. It is said that
15,000 Spaniards perished. On the side of the Dutch only 100 men were
killed and wounded. The Spanish power at sea had suffered a blow from
which it never recovered.

Charles I was very angry on learning that English ships had been obliged
to watch the fleet of a friendly power destroyed in English waters
before their eyes. The king had inherited from his father a long series
of grievances against the Dutch; and, had he not been involved in
serious domestic difficulties, there would probably have been a
declaration of war. But Charles' finances did not permit him to take a
bold course, and he was also secretly irritated with the Spaniards for
having sought the hospitality of English waters (as written evidence
shows) without his knowledge and permission. Aerssens was sent to London
to smooth over the matter. He had no easy task, but by skill and
patience he contrived, in spite of many adverse influences at the
court, so to allay the bitter feelings that had been aroused by "the
scandal of the Downs" that Charles and his queen were willing, in the
early months of 1640, to discuss seriously the project of a marriage
between the stadholder's only son and one of the English princesses. In
January a special envoy, Jan van der Kerkoven, lord of Heenvlict, joined
Aerssens with a formal proposal for the hand of the princess royal; and
after somewhat difficult negotiations the marriage was at length
satisfactorily arranged. The ceremony took place in London, May 12,
1641. As William was but fifteen years of age and Mary, the princess
royal, only nine, the bridegroom returned to Holland alone, leaving the
child-bride for a time at Whitehall with her parents. The wedding took
place at an ominous time. Ten days after it was celebrated Strafford was
executed; and the dark shadow of the Great Rebellion was already hanging
over the ill-fated Charles. In the tragic story of the House of Stewart
that fills the next two decades there is perhaps no more pathetic figure
than that of Mary, the mother of William III. At the time this alliance
gave added lustre to the position of the Prince of Orange, both at
home and abroad, by uniting his family in close bonds of relationship
with the royal houses both of England and France.

In 1640, as the Spaniards remained on the defensive, the stadholder
entered Flanders and by a forced march attempted to seize Bruges. His
effort, however, was foiled, as was a later attempt to capture Hulst,
when Frederick Henry and the States sustained a great loss in the death
of the gallant Henry Casimir of Nassau, who was killed in a chance
skirmish at the age of 29 years. This regrettable event caused a vacancy
in the stadholderates of Friesland and Groningen with Drente. A number
of zealous adherents of the House of Orange were now anxious that
Frederick Henry should fill the vacant posts to the exclusion of his
cousin, William Frederick, younger brother of Henry Casimir. They urged
upon the prince, who was himself unwilling to supplant his relative,
that it was for the good of the State that there should be a unification
of authority in his person; and at last he expressed himself ready to
accept the offices, if elected. The result of the somewhat mean
intrigues that followed, in which Frederick Henry himself took no part,
gave a curious illustration of the extreme jealousy of the provinces
towards anything that they regarded as outside intrusion into their
affairs. The States-General ventured to recommend the Estates of
Friesland to appoint the Prince of Orange; the recommendation was
resented, and William Frederick became stadholder. The Frieslanders on
their part sent a deputation to Groningen in favour of William
Frederick, and Groningen-Drente elected the Prince of Orange. This
dispute caused an estrangement for a time between the two branches of
the House of Nassau, which was afterwards healed by the marriage of the
Friesland stadholder with Albertine Agnes, a daughter of Frederick
Henry. From this union the present royal family of Holland trace their
descent.

The military operations of the years 1641, 1642 and 1643 were dilatory
and featureless. Both sides were sick of the war and were content to
remain on the defensive. This was no doubt largely due to the fact that
in rapid succession death removed from the stage many of those who had
long played leading parts in the political history of the times.
Aerssens died shortly after his return from his successful mission to
England in the autumn of 1641; and almost at the same time the Cardinal
Infante Ferdinand, who during his tenure of the governor-generalship
had shown great capacity and prudence both as a statesman and as a
commander, expired. In 1642, after eighteen years of almost autocratic
rule, Richelieu passed away, his death (December 4, 1642) coming almost
half-way between those of his enemy, the intriguing Marie de' Medici
(July 3,1642), and that of her son, Louis XIII (May 18, 1643). Anne of
Austria, the sister of the King of Spain, became regent in France; but
this did not imply any change of policy with regard to the United
Provinces, for Cardinal Mazarin, who, through his influence over the
regent succeeded to the power of Richelieu, was a pupil in the school of
that great statesman and followed in his steps. Moreover, during this
same period the outbreak of civil war in England had for the time being
caused that country to be wholly absorbed in its own domestic concerns,
and it ceased to have any weight in the councils of western Europe. Thus
it came to pass that there was a kind of lull in the external affairs of
the United Provinces; and her statesmen were compelled to take fresh
stock of their position in the changed situation that had been created.

Not that this meant that these years were a time of less pressure and
anxiety to the Prince of Orange. His new relations with the English
royal family were a source of difficulty to him. Henrietta Maria (March,
1642) came to Holland, bringing with her the princess royal, and for a
whole year took up her residence at the Hague. She was received with
kindliness and courtesy not only by the stadholder and his family, but
by the people of Holland generally. Her presence, together with that of
the Queen of Bohemia, at the Princess of Orange's court gave to it quite
a regal dignity and splendour, which was particularly gratifying to
Amalia von Solms. But the English queen had other objects in view than
those of courtesy. She hoped not merely to enlist the sympathies of
Frederick Henry for the royal cause in the English civil war, but to
obtain through his help supplies of arms and munitions from Holland for
King Charles. But in this she did not succeed. The Parliament had sent
an envoy, William Strickland, to counteract the influence of Henrietta
Maria, and to represent to the States-General that it was fighting in
defence of the same principles which had led to the revolt against
Spain. The prince was far too prudent to allow his personal inclinations
to override his political judgment as a practical statesman. He knew
that public opinion in the United Provinces would never sanction in
any form active support of King Charles against his parliament, and he
did not attempt it. Intervention was confined to the despatch of an
embassy to England with instructions to mediate between the two
parties. When the unfortunate queen found that all her efforts on
behalf of King Charles were in vain, she determined to leave the safe
refuge where she had been so hospitably entertained and to return to
her husband's side. She sailed from Scheveningen on March 9, 1643, and
reached the royal camp at York in safety.

In the autumn of this year, 1643, two special envoys were sent by
Cardinal Mazarin to the Hague; and one of the results of their visit was
a renewal of the treaty of 1635 by which France and the United Provinces
had entered upon an offensive and defensive alliance and had agreed to
conclude no peace but by mutual consent. Nevertheless Frederick Henry,
whom long experience had made wary and far-sighted, had been growing for
some little time suspicious of the advantage to the republic of
furthering French aggrandisement in the southern Netherlands. He saw
that France was a waxing, Spain a waning power, and he had no desire to
see France in possession of territory bordering on the United Provinces.
This feeling on his part was possibly the cause of the somewhat
dilatory character of his military operations in 1641 and 1642. The
revolt of Portugal from Spain in December, 1640, had at first been
welcomed by the Dutch, but not for long. The great and successful
operations of the East and West India Companies had been chiefly carried
on at the expense of the Portuguese, not of the Spaniards. The great
obstacle to peace with Spain had been the concession of the right to
trade in the Indies. It was Portugal, rather than Spain, which now stood
in the way of the Dutch merchants obtaining that right, for the Spanish
government, in its eagerness to stamp out a rebellion which had spread
from the Peninsula to all the Portuguese colonies, was quite ready to
sacrifice these to secure Dutch neutrality in Europe. The dazzling
victory of the French under the young Duke of Enghien over a veteran
Spanish army at Rocroi (May, 1643) also had its effect upon the mind of
the prince. With prophetic foresight, he rightly dreaded a France too
decisively victorious. In the negotiations for a general peace between
all the contending powers in the Thirty Years' War, which dragged on
their slow length from 1643 to 1648, the stadholder became more and
more convinced that it was in the interest of the Dutch to maintain
Spain as a counterpoise to the growing power of France, and to secure
the favourable terms, which, in her extremity, Spain would be ready to
offer.

At first, however, there was no breach in the close relations with
France; and Frederick Henry, though hampered by ill-health, showed in
his last campaigns all his old skill in siege-craft. By the successive
captures of Hertogenbosch, Maestricht and Breda he had secured the
frontiers of the republic in the south and south-east. He now turned to
the north-west corner of Flanders. In 1644 he took the strongly
fortified post of Sas-van-Gent, situated on the Ley, the canalised river
connecting Ghent with the Scheldt. In 1645 he laid siege to and captured
the town of Hulst, and thus gained complete possession of the strip of
territory south of the Scheldt, known as the Land of Waes, which had
been protected by these two strongholds, and which has since been called
Dutch Flanders.

Very shortly after the capitulation of Hulst, the ambassadors
plenipotentiary of the United Provinces set out (November, 1645) to take
their places at the Congress of Münster on equal terms with the
representatives of the Emperor and of the Kings of France and Spain.
The position acquired by the Dutch republic among the powers of Europe
was thus officially recognised _de facto_ even before its independence
had been _de jure_ ratified by treaty. The parleyings at Münster made
slow headway, as so many thorny questions had to be settled. Meanwhile,
with the full approval of the prince, negotiations were being secretly
carried on between Madrid and the Hague with the view of arriving at a
separate understanding, in spite of the explicit terms of the treaty of
1635. As soon as the French became aware of what was going on, they
naturally protested and did their utmost to raise every difficulty to
prevent a treaty being concluded behind their backs. The old questions
which had proved such serious obstacles in the negotiations of 1607-9
were still sufficiently formidable. But the situation was very different
in 1646-7. The Spanish monarchy was actually _in extremis._ Portugal and
Catalonia were in revolt; a French army had crossed the Pyrenees; the
treasury was exhausted. Peace with the Dutch Republic was a necessity;
and, as has been already said, the vexed question about the Indies had
resolved itself rather into a Portuguese than a Spanish question. By a
recognition of the Dutch conquests in Brazil and in the Indian Ocean
they were acquiring an ally without losing anything that they had not
lost already by the Portuguese declaration of independence. But, as the
basis of an agreement was on the point of being reached, an event
happened which caused a delay in the proceedings.

The Prince of Orange, who had been long a martyr to the gout, became in
the autumn of 1646 hopelessly ill. He lingered on in continual suffering
for some months and died on March 14, 1647. Shortly before his death he
had the satisfaction of witnessing the marriage of his daughter Louise
Henrietta to Frederick William of Brandenburg, afterwards known as the
Great Elector. He was not, however, destined to see peace actually
concluded, though he ardently desired to do so. Frederick Henry could,
however, at any rate feel that his life-work had been thoroughly and
successfully accomplished. The services he rendered to his country
during his stadholderate of twenty-two years can scarcely be
over-estimated. It is a period of extraordinary prosperity and
distinction, which well deserves the title given to it by Dutch
historians--"the golden age of Frederick Henry." The body of the
stadholder was laid, amidst universal lamentation and with almost regal
pomp, besides those of his father and brother in the Nieuwe Kerk at
Delft.

The removal of a personality of such authority and influence at this
critical time was a dire misfortune, for there were many cross-currents
of policy in the different provinces and of divergence of interests
between the seafaring and merchant classes and other sections of the
population. Finally the skill and perseverance of the two leading Dutch
plenipotentiaries, Pauw and Van Knuyt, and of the Spanish envoys,
Peñaranda and Brun, brought the negotiations to a successful issue. The
assent of all the provinces was necessary, and for a time Utrecht and
Zeeland were obstinately refractory, but at length their opposition was
overcome; and on January 30,1648, the treaty of Münster was duly
signed. Great rejoicings throughout the land celebrated the end of the
War of Independence, which had lasted for eighty years. Thus, in spite
of the solemn engagement made with France, a separate peace was
concluded with Spain and in the interests of the United Provinces. Their
course of action was beyond doubt politically wise and defensible, but,
as might be expected, it left behind it a feeling of soreness, for the
French naturally regarded it as a breach of faith. The treaty of
Münster consisted of 79 articles, the most important of which were:
the King of Spain recognised the United Provinces as free and
independent lands; the States-General kept all their conquests in
Brabant, Limburg and Flanders, the so-called Generality lands; also
their conquests in Brazil and the East Indies made at the expense of
Portugal; freedom of trading both in the East and West Indies was
conceded; the Scheldt was declared closed, thus shutting out Antwerp
from access to the sea; to the House of Orange all its confiscated
property was restored; and lastly a treaty of trade and navigation with
Spain was negotiated. On all points the Dutch obtained all and more than
all they could have hoped for.

       *       *       *       *       *




CHAPTER XI

THE EAST AND WEST INDIA COMPANIES. COMMERCIAL AND ECONOMIC EXPANSION


An account of the foundation, constitution and early efforts of the
Dutch East India Company has been already given. The date of its charter
(March 20, 1602) was later than that of its English rival (Dec. 31,
1600), but in reality the Dutch were the first in the field, as there
were several small companies in existence and competing with one another
in the decade previous to the granting of the charter, which without
extinguishing these companies incorporated them by the name of chambers
under a common management, the Council of Seventeen. The four chambers
however--Amsterdam, Zeeland, the Maas (Rotterdam and Delft) and the
North Quarter (Enkhuizen and Hoorn)--though separately administered and
with different spheres, became gradually more and more unified by the
growing power of control exercised by the Seventeen. This was partly due
to the dominating position of the single Chamber of Amsterdam, which
held half the shares and appointed eight members of the council. The
erection of such a company, with its monopoly of trade and its great
privileges including the right of maintaining fleets and armed forces,
of concluding treaties and of erecting forts, was nothing less than the
creation of an _imperium in imperio_; and it may be said to have
furnished the model on which all the great chartered companies of later
times have been formed. The English East India Company was, by the side
of its Dutch contemporary, almost insignificant; with its invested
capital of £30,000 it was in no position to struggle successfully
against a competitor which started with subscribed funds amounting to
£540,000.

The conquest of Portugal by Spain had spelt ruin to that unhappy country
and to its widespread colonial empire and extensive commerce. Before
1581 Lisbon had been a great centre of the Dutch carrying-trade; and
many Netherlanders had taken service in Portuguese vessels and were
familiar with the routes both to the East Indies and to Brazil. It was
the closing of the port of Lisbon to Dutch vessels that led the
enterprising merchants of Amsterdam and Middelburg to look further
afield. In the early years of the seventeenth century a large number of
expeditions left the Dutch harbours for the Indian Ocean and made great
profits; and very large dividends were paid to the shareholders of the
company. How far these represented the actual gain it is difficult to
discover, for the accounts were kept in different sets of ledgers; and
it is strongly suspected that the size of the dividends may, at times
when enhanced credit was necessary for the raising of loans, have been
to some extent fictitious. For the enterprise, which began as a trading
concern, speedily developed into the creation of an empire overseas, and
this meant an immense expenditure.

The Malay Archipelago was the chief scene of early activity, and more
especially the Moluccas. Treaties were made with the native chiefs; and
factories defended by forts were established at Tidor, Ternate,
Amboina, Banda and other places. The victories of Cornelis Matelief
established that supremacy of the Dutch arms in these eastern waters
which they were to maintain for many years. With the conclusion of the
truce the necessity of placing the general control of so many scattered
forts and trading posts in the hands of one supreme official led, in
1609, to the appointment of a governor-general by the Seventeen with the
assent of the States-General. The governor-general held office for five
years, and he was assisted by a council, the first member of which,
under the title of director-general, was in reality minister of
commerce. Under him were at first seven (afterwards eight) local
governors. These functionaries, though exercising considerable powers in
their respective districts, were in all matters of high policy entirely
subordinate to the governor-general. The first holders of the office
were all men who had risen to that position by proving themselves to
possess energy and enterprise, and being compelled by the distance from
home to act promptly on their own initiative, were practically endowed
with autocratic authority. In consequence of this the Dutch empire in
the East became in their hands rapidly extended and consolidated, to the
exclusion of all competitors. This meant not only that the Portuguese
and Spaniards were ousted from their formerly dominant position in the
Orient, but that a collision with the English was inevitable.

The first governor-general, Pieter Both, had made Java the centre of
administration and had established factories and posts at Bantam,
Jacatra and Djapara, not without arousing considerable hostility among
the local rulers, jealous of the presence of the intruders. This
hostility was fostered and encouraged by the English, whose vessels had
also visited Java and had erected a trading-post close to that of the
Dutch at Jacatra. Already the spice islands had been the scene of
hostile encounters between the representatives of the two nations, and
had led to many altercations. This was the state of things when Jan
Pieterzoon Koen became governor-general in 1615. This determined man,
whose experience in the East Indies was of long date, and who had
already served as director-general, came into his new office with an
intense prejudice against the English, and with a firm resolve to put an
end to what he described as their treachery and intrigues. "Were they
masters," he wrote home, "the Dutch would quickly be out of the Indies,
but praise be to the Lord, who has provided otherwise. They are an
unendurable nation." With this object he strongly fortified the factory
near Jacatra, thereby arousing the hostility of the _Pangeran_, as the
native ruler was styled. The English in their neighbouring post also
began to erect defences and to encourage the _Pangeran_ in his hostile
attitude. Koen thereupon fell upon the English and destroyed and burnt
their factory, and finding that there was a strong English fleet under
Sir Thomas Dale in the neighbourhood, he sailed to the Moluccas in
search of reinforcements, leaving Pieter van der Broeck in command at
the factory. The _Pangeran_ now feigned friendship, and having enticed
Broeck to a conference, made him prisoner and attacked the Dutch
stronghold. The garrison however held out until the governor-general
returned with a strong force. With this he stormed and destroyed the
town of Jacatra and on its site erected a new town, as the seat of the
company's government, to which the name Batavia was given. From this
time the Dutch had no rivalry to fear in Java. The conquest of the whole
island was only a question of time, and the "pearl of the Malay
Archipelago" has from 1620 to the present been the richest and most
valuable of all the Dutch colonial possessions. Koen was planning to
follow up his success by driving the English likewise from the Moluccas,
when he heard that the home government had concluded a treaty which tied
his hands.

The position in the Moluccas had for some years been one of continual
bickering and strife; the chief scene being in the little group known as
the Banda islands. The lucrative spice-trade tempted both companies to
establish themselves by building forts; and the names of Amboina and
Pulo Rum were for many years to embitter the relations of the two
peoples. Meanwhile the whole subject of those relations had been in 1619
discussed at London by a special embassy sent nominally to thank King
James for the part he had taken in bringing the Synod of Dort to a
successful termination of its labours, but in reality to settle several
threatening trade disputes. Almost the only result of the prolonged
conferences was an agreement (June 2, 1619) by which the East India
Companies were for twenty years to be virtually amalgamated. The English
were to have half the pepper crop in Java and one-third of the spices in
the Moluccas, Amboina and the Banda islands. Forts and posts were to
remain in their present hands, but there was to be a joint council for
defence, four members from each company, the president to be appointed
alternately month by month. Such a scheme was a paper scheme, devised
by those who had no personal acquaintance with the actual situation.
There was no similarity between a great military and naval organisation
like the Dutch Company and a body of traders like the English, whose
capital was small, and who were entirely dependent on the political
vagaries of an impecunious sovereign, whose dearest wish at the time was
to cultivate close relations with the very power in defiance of whose
prohibition the East India Company's trade was carried on. The agreement
received indeed a fresh sanction at another conference held in London
(1622-23), but it never was a working arrangement. The bitter
ill-feeling that had arisen between the Dutch and English traders was
not to be allayed by the diplomatic subterfuge of crying peace when
there was no peace. Events were speedily to prove that this was so.

The trade in spices had proved the most lucrative of all, and measures
had been taken to prevent any undue lowering of the price by a glut in
the market. The quantity of spices grown was carefully regulated,
suitable spots being selected, and the trees elsewhere destroyed. Thus
cloves were specially cultivated at Amboina; nutmegs in the Banda
islands. Into this strictly guarded monopoly, from which the English had
been expelled by the energy of Koen, they were now by the new treaty to
be admitted to a share.

It was only with difficulty that the Dutch were induced to acquiesce
sullenly in the presence of the intruders. A fatal collision took place
almost immediately after the convention between the Companies, about the
trade in the spice islands, had been renewed in London, 1622-3.

In 1623 Koen was succeeded, as governor-general, by Pieter Carpentier,
whose name is still perpetuated by the Gulf of Carpentaria on the north
of Australia. At this time of transition the Governor of Amboina, Van
Speult, professed to have discovered a conspiracy of the English
settlers, headed by Gabriel Towerson, to make themselves masters of the
Dutch fort. Eighteen Englishmen were seized, and though there was no
evidence against them, except what was extorted by torture and
afterwards solemnly denied, twelve, including Towerson, were executed.
Carpentier admitted that the proceedings were irregular, and they were
in any case unnecessary, for a despatch recalling Towerson was on its
way to Amboina. It was a barbarous and cruel act; and when the news of
the "massacre of Amboina," as it was called, reached England, there was
loud indignation and demands for redress. But the quarrel with Spain
over the marriage of the Prince of Wales had driven James I at the very
end of his life, and Charles I on his accession, to seek the support of
the United Provinces. By the treaty of Southampton, September 17, 1625,
an offensive and defensive alliance was concluded with the
States-General; and Charles contented himself with a demand that the
States should within eighteen months bring to justice those who were
responsible "for the bloody butchery on our subjects." However, Carleton
again pressed for the punishment of the perpetrators of "the foule and
bloody act" of Amboina. The Dutch replied with evasive promises, which
they never attempted to carry out; and Charles' disastrous war with
France and his breach with his parliament effectually prevented him from
taking steps to exact reparation. But Amboina was not forgotten; the
sore rankled and was one of the causes that moved Cromwell to war in
1654.

The activity of the Dutch in eastern waters was, however, by no means
confined to Java, their seat of government, or to the Moluccas and Banda
islands with their precious spices. Many trading posts were erected on
the large islands of Sumatra and Borneo. Trading relations were opened
with Siam from 1613 onwards. In 1623 a force under Willem Bontekoe was
sent by Koen to Formosa. The island was conquered and a governor
appointed with his residence at Fort Zelandia. Already under the first
governor-general, Pieter Both, permission was obtained from the Shogun
for the Dutch, under close restrictions, to trade with Japan, a
permission which was still continued, after the expulsion of the
Portuguese and the bloody persecution of the Christian converts
(1637-42), though under somewhat humiliating conditions. But, with the
Dutch, trade was trade, and under the able conduct of Francis Caron it
became of thriving proportions. During the next century no other
Europeans had any access to the Japanese market except the agents of the
Dutch East India Company.

Among the governors-general of this early period the name of Antony van
Diemen (1636-45) deserves special recognition. If Koen laid the firm
foundations of Dutch rule in the East, Van Diemen built wisely and ably
on the work of Koen. Carpentier's rule had been noteworthy for several
voyages of discovery along the coasts of New Guinea and of the adjoining
shore of Australia, but the spirit of exploration reached its height in
the days of Van Diemen. The north and north-west of Australia being to
some extent already known, Abel Tasman was despatched by Van Diemen to
find out, if possible, how far southward the land extended. Sailing in
October, 1642, from Mauritius, he skirted portions of the coast of what
is now Victoria and New South Wales and discovered the island which he
named after his patron Van Diemen's land, but which is now very
appropriately known as Tasmania. Pressing on he reached New Zealand,
which still bears the name that he gave to it, and sailed through the
strait between the northern and southern islands, now Cook's strait. In
the course of this great voyage he next discovered the Friendly or Tonga
islands and the Fiji archipelago. He reached Batavia in June, 1643, and
in the following year he visited again the north of Australia and
voyaged right round the Gulf of Carpentaria. Even in a modern map of
Australia Dutch names will be found scattered round certain portions of
the coast of the island-continent, recording still, historically, the
names of the early Dutch explorers, their patrons, ships and homes.
Along the shores of the Gulf of Carpentaria may be seen Van Diemen
river, gulf and cape; Abel Tasman, Van Alphen, Nassau and Staten rivers;
capes Arnhem, Caron and Maria (after Francis Caron and Maria van
Diemen) and Groote Eylandt. In Tasmania, with many other names, may be
found Frederick Henry bay and cape, Tasman's peninsula and Tasman's head
and Maria island; while the wife of the governor-general is again
commemorated, the northernmost point of New Zealand bearing the name of
Maria van Diemen cape.

To Van Diemen belongs the credit of giving to the Dutch their first
footing (1638) in the rich island of Ceylon, by concluding a treaty with
the native prince of Kandy. The Portuguese still possessed forts at
Colombo, Galle, Negumbo and other places, but Galle and Negumbo were now
taken by the Dutch, and gradually the whole island passed into their
hands and became for a century and a half their richest possession in
the East, next to Java. On the Coromandel coast posts were also early
established, and trade relations opened up with the Persians and Arabs.
At the time when the Treaty of Münster gave to the United Provinces the
legal title to that independence for which they had so long fought, and
conceded to them the freedom to trade in the Indies, that trade was
already theirs, safe-guarded by the fleets, the forts and the armed
forces of the chartered company. The governor-general at Batavia had
become a powerful potentate in the Eastern seas; and a succession of
bold and able men, by a policy at once prudent and aggressive, had in
the course of a few decades organised a colonial empire. It was a
remarkable achievement for so small a country as the United Provinces,
and it was destined to have a prolonged life. The voyage round by the
cape was long and hazardous, so Van Diemen in 1638 caused the island of
Mauritius to be occupied as a refitting station; and in 1652 one of his
successors (Reinierz) sent a body of colonists under Jan van Riebeck to
form a settlement, which should be a harbour of refuge beneath the Table
mountain at the Cape itself. This was the beginning of the Cape colony.

Quite as interesting, and even more exciting, was the history of Dutch
enterprise in other seas during this eventful period. The granting of
the East India Company's charter led a certain Willem Usselincx to come
forward as an earnest and persistent advocate for the formation of a
West India Company on the same lines. But Oldenbarneveldt, anxious to
negotiate a peace or truce with Spain and to maintain good relations
with that power, refused to lend any countenance to his proposals,
either before or after the truce was concluded. He could not, however,
restrain the spirit of enterprise that with increasing prosperity was
abroad in Holland. The formation of the Northern or Greenland Company in
1613, specially created in order to contest the claims of the English
Muscovy Company to exclusive rights in the whale fishery off
Spitsbergen, led to those violent disputes between the fishermen of the
two countries, of which an account has been given. The granting of a
charter to the Company of New Netherland (1614) was a fresh departure.
The voyage of Henry Hudson in the Dutch service when, in 1610, he
explored the coast of North America and sailed up the river called by
his name, led certain Amsterdam and Hoorn merchants to plan a settlement
near this river; and they secured a charter giving them exclusive rights
from Chesapeake bay to Newfoundland. The result was the founding of the
colony of New Netherland, with New Amsterdam on Manhattan island as its
capital. This settlement was at first small and insignificant, but,
being placed midway between the English colonies on that same coast, it
added one more to the many questions of dispute between the two
sea-powers.

Willem Usselincx had all this time continued his agitation for the
erection of a West India Company; and at last, with the renewal of the
war with Spain in 1621, his efforts were rewarded. The charter granted
by the States-General (June 3, 1621) gave to the company for twenty-four
years the monopoly of navigation and trade to the coast-lands of America
and the West Indies from the south-end of Newfoundland to the Straits of
Magellan and to the coasts and lands of Africa from the tropic of Cancer
to the Cape of Good Hope. The governing body consisted of nineteen
representatives, the Nineteen. The States-General contributed to the
capital 1,000,000 fl., on half of which only they were to receive
dividends. They also undertook in time of war to furnish sixteen ships
and four yachts, the company being bound to supply a like number. The
West India Company from the first was intended to be an instrument of
war. Its aims were buccaneering rather than commerce. There was no
secret about its object; it was openly proclaimed. Its historian De Laet
(himself a director) wrote, "There is no surer means of bringing our
Enemy at last to reason, than to infest him with attacks everywhere in
America and to stop the fountain-head of his best finances." After some
tentative efforts, it was resolved to send out an expedition in great
force; but the question arose, where best to strike? By the advice of
Usselincx and others acquainted with the condition of the defences of
the towns upon the American coast, Bahia, the capital of the Portuguese
colony of Brazil, was selected, as specially vulnerable. Thus in the
West, as in the East, Portugal was to suffer for her unwilling
subjection to the crown of Castile.

The consent of the States-General and of the stadholder being obtained,
some months were spent in making preparations on an adequate scale. The
fleet, which consisted of twenty-three ships of war with four yachts,
armed with 500 pieces of ordnance, and carrying in addition to the crews
a force of 1700 troops, sailed in two contingents, December, 1623, and
January, 1624. Jacob Willekens was the admiral-in-chief, with Piet Hein
as his vice-admiral. Colonel Jan van Dorth, lord of Horst, was to
conduct the land operations and to be the governor of the town, when its
conquest was achieved. On May 9 the fleet sailed into the Bay of All
Saints (_Bahia de todos os Santos_) and proceeded to disembark the
troops on a sandy beach a little to the east of the city of San
Salvador, commonly known as Bahia. It was strongly situated on heights
rising sheer from the water; and, as news of the Dutch preparations had
reached Lisbon and Madrid, its fortifications had been repaired and its
garrison strengthened. In front of the lower town below the cliffs was a
rocky island, and on this and on the shore were forts well provided with
batteries, and under their lee were fifteen ships of war. On May 10 Piet
Hein was sent with five vessels to contain the enemy's fleet and cover
the landing of the military forces. But Hein, far from being content
with a passive role, attacked the Portuguese, burnt or captured all
their ships and then, embarking his men in launches, stormed the
defences of the island and spiked the guns. Meanwhile the troops had,
without opposition, occupied a Benedictine convent on the heights
opposite the town. But the daring of Piet Hein had caused a panic to
seize the garrison. Despite the efforts of the governor, Diogo de
Mendoça Furdado, there was a general exodus in the night, both of the
soldiery and the inhabitants. When morning came the Dutch marched into
the undefended town, the governor and his son, who had refused to desert
their posts, being taken prisoners. They, with much booty, were at once
sent to Holland as a proof of the completeness of the victory. Events,
however, were to prove that it is easier for an expeditionary force to
capture a town at such a distance from the home-base of supplies, than
to retain it.

Governor Van Dorth had scarcely entered upon his duties when he fell
into an ambush of native levies near San Salvador and was killed. His
successor, Willem Schouten, was incompetent and dissolute; and, when the
fleet set sail on its homeward voyage at the end of July, the garrison
soon found itself practically besieged by bodies of Portuguese troops
with Indian auxiliaries, who occupied the neighbouring woods and stopped
supplies. Meanwhile the news of the capture of San Salvador reached
Madrid and Lisbon; and Spaniards and Portuguese vied with one another in
their eagerness to equip a great expedition to expel the invaders. It
was truly a mighty armada which set sail, under the supreme command of
Don Fadrique de Toledo, from the Iberian ports at the beginning of 1625,
for it consisted of fifty ships with five caravels and four pinnaces,
carrying 12,566 men and 1185 guns. On Easter Eve (March 29) the fleet
entered All Saints' Bay in the form of a vast crescent measuring six
leagues from tip to tip. The Dutch garrison of 2300 men, being strongly
fortified, resisted for a month but, shut in by sea and by land and
badly led, they capitulated on April 28, on condition that they were
sent back to Holland.

That the brilliant success of 1624 was thus so soon turned into disaster
was in no way due to the supineness of the home authorities. The
Nineteen were in no way surprised to hear of great preparations being
made by the King of Spain to retake the town, and they on their part
were determined to maintain their conquest by meeting force with force.
Straining all their resources, three squadrons were equipped; the first
two, numbering thirty-two ships and nine yachts, were destined for
Brazil; the third, a small flying squadron of seven vessels, was
despatched early to watch the Spanish ports. The general-in-chief of the
Brazilian expedition was Boudewyn Hendrikszoon. Driven back by a
succession of storms, it was not until April 17, 1625, that the fleet
was able to leave the Channel and put out to sea. The voyage was a rapid
one and on May 23, Hendrikszoon sailed into the bay in battle order,
only to see the Spanish flag waving over San Salvador and the mighty
fleet of Admiral Toledo drawn up under the protection of its batteries.
Hendrikszoon sailed slowly past the Spaniards, who did not stir, and
perceiving that it would be madness to attack a superior force in such
a position he reluctantly gave orders to withdraw. On the homeward
journey by the West Indies a number of rich prizes were made, but
sickness made great ravages among the crews, and counted Hendrikszoon
himself among its victims.

The events of the following year seem to show that with audacity he
might have at least inflicted heavy losses on the enemy. For in 1626 the
directors, ignorant of his failure, sent out a reinforcement of nine
ships and five yachts under the command of the redoubtable Piet Hein.
Hein sailed on May 21 for the West Indies, where he learnt that
Hendrikszoon was dead and that the remnant of his expedition had
returned after a fruitless voyage of misadventure. Hein however was not
the man to turn back. He determined to try what he could effect at Bahia
by a surprise attack. He reached the entrance to the bay on March 1,
1627, but was unluckily becalmed; and the Portuguese were warned of his
presence. On arriving before San Salvador he found thirty ships drawn up
close to the land; sixteen of these were large and armed, and four were
galleons with a considerable number of troops on board. The Dutch
admiral with great daring determined to attack them by sailing between
them and the shore, making it difficult for the guns on shore to fire on
him without injury to their own ships. It was a hazardous stroke, for
the passage was narrow, but entirely successful. One of the four
galleons, carrying the admiral's flag, was sunk, the other three struck.
Taking to their launches, the Dutchmen now fiercely assailed the other
vessels, and in a very short time were masters of twenty-two prizes. It
was a difficult task to carry them off at the ebb-tide, and it was not
achieved without loss. Hein's own ship, the _Amsterdam,_ grounded and
had to be burnt, and another ship by some mischance blew up. The total
loss, except through the explosion, was exceedingly small. The captured
vessels contained 2700 chests of sugar, besides a quantity of cotton,
hides and tobacco. The booty was stored in the four largest ships and
sent to Holland; the rest were burnt.

Hein now made a raid down the coast as far as Rio de Janeiro and then
returned. The "Sea Terror of Delft" for some weeks after this remained
in unchallenged mastery of the bay, picking up prizes when the
opportunity offered. Then he sailed by the West Indies homewards and
reached Dutch waters on October 31, 1627, having during this expedition
captured no less than fifty-five enemy vessels. The value of the booty
was sufficient to repay the company for their great outlay, and it was
wisely used in the equipment of fresh fleets for the following year.

This next year, 1628, was indeed an _annus mirabilis_ in the records of
the Dutch West India Company. On January 24 two fleets put to sea, one
under Dirk Simonsz Uitgeest for the coast of Brazil; another under
Pieter Adriansz Ita for the West Indies. Both were successful and came
back laden with spoil. It was reserved, however, for the expedition
under Piet Hein to make all other successes seem small. This fleet,
consisting of thirty-one ships of war, left Holland at the end of May
for the West Indies with instructions to lie in wait for the Spanish
Treasure Fleet. Many attempts had been made in previous years to
intercept the galleons, which year by year carried the riches of Mexico
and Peru to Spain, but they had always failed. After some weeks of
weary cruising, Piet Hein, when off the coast of Cuba, was rewarded
(September 8) by the sight of the Spanish fleet approaching, and at once
bore down upon them. After a sharp conflict, the Spaniards took refuge
in the bay of Matanzas and, running the galleons into shoal-water, tried
to convey the rich cargoes on shore. It was in vain. The Dutch sailors,
taking to their boats, boarded the galleons and compelled them to
surrender. The spoil was of enormous value, comprising 177,537 lbs. of
silver, 135 lbs. of gold, 37,375 hides, 2270 chests of indigo, besides
cochineal, logwood, sugar, spices and precious stones. It brought
11,509,524 fl. into the coffers of the company, and a dividend of 50 per
cent, was paid to the shareholders. It was a wrong policy thus to deal
with the results of a stroke of good fortune not likely to be repeated.
This year was, however, to be a lucky year unto the end. A fourth
expedition under Adrian Jansz Pater which left on August 15 for the
Caribbean sea, sailed up the Orinoco and destroyed the town of San Thomé
de Guiana, the chief Spanish settlement in those parts. All this, it may
be said, partook of the character of buccaneering, nevertheless these
were shrewd blows struck at the very source from whence the Spanish
power obtained means for carrying on the war. The West India Company was
fulfilling triumphantly one of the chief purposes for which it was
created, and was threatening Philip IV with financial ruin.

The successes of 1628 had the effect of encouraging the directors to try
to retrieve the failure at Bahia by conquest elsewhere.


Olinda, on the coast of Pernambuco, was selected as the new objective.
An expeditionary force of exceptional strength was got ready; and, as
Piet Hein, at the very height of his fame, unfortunately lost his life
in the spring of 1629 in an encounter with the Dunkirk pirates, Hendrik
Cornelisz Lonck, who had served as vice-admiral under Hein at Matanzas
bay, was made admiral-in-chief, with Jonckheer Diederik van Waerdenburgh
in command of the military forces. A considerable delay was caused by
the critical position of the United Provinces when invaded by the
Spanish-Imperialist armies at the time of the siege of Hertogenbosch,
but the capture of that fortress enabled the last contingents to sail
towards the end of the year; and Lonck was able to collect his whole
force at St Vincent, one of the Canary islands, on Christmas Day to
start on their voyage across the Atlantic. That force consisted of
fifty-two ships and yachts and thirteen sloops, carrying 3780 sailors
and 3500 soldiers, and mounting 1170 guns. Adverse weather prevented the
arrival of the fleet in the offing of Olinda until February 13. Along
the coast of Pernambuco runs a continuous reef of rock with narrow
openings at irregular intervals, forming a barrier against attack from
the sea. Olinda, the capital of the provinces, was built on a hill a
short distance inland, having as its port a village known as Povo or the
Reciff, lying on a spit of sand between the mouths of the rivers
Biberibi and Capibaribi. There was a passage through the rocky reef
northwards about two leagues above Olinda and three others southwards
(only one of which, the _Barra_, was navigable for large ships) giving
access to a sheet of water of some 18 ft. in depth between the reef and
the spit of sand, and forming a commodious harbour, the Pozo.

The problem before the Dutch commander was a difficult one, for news of
the expedition had reached Madrid; and Matthias de Albuquerque, brother
of "the proprietor" of Pernambuco, Duarte de Albuquerque, a man of great
energy and powers of leadership, had arrived in October to put Olinda
and the Reciff into a state of defence. Two forts strongly garrisoned
and armed, San Francisco and San Jorge, defended the entrances through
the reef and the neck of the spit of sand; sixteen ships chained
together and filled with combustibles barred access to the harbour; and
the village of the Reciff was surrounded by entrenchments. Within the
fortifications of Olinda, Albuquerque held himself in readiness to
oppose any body of the enemy that should effect a landing above the
town. Lonck, after consultation with Waerdenburgh, determined to make
with the main body of the fleet under his own command an attempt to
force the entrances to the Pozo, while Waerdenburgh, with the bulk of
the military contingent on sixteen ships, sailed northwards to find some
spot suitable for disembarkation.

The naval attack was made on February 15, but was unavailing. All the
efforts of the Dutch to make their way through any of the entrances to
the Pozo, though renewed again and again with the utmost bravery, were
beaten off. In the evening Lonck withdrew his ships. He had learnt by an
experience, to which history scarcely offers an exception, that a naval
attack unsupported by military co-operation against land defences
cannot succeed. But Waerdenburgh had used the opportunity, while the
enemy's attention was directed to the repelling of the assault on the
Reciff, to land his army without opposition. At dawn the Dutch general
advanced and, after forcing the crossing of the river Doce in the teeth
of the resistance of a body of irregular troops led by Albuquerque in
person, marched straight on Olinda. There was no serious resistance. The
fortifications were carried by storm and the town fell into the hands of
Waerdenburgh. The garrison and almost all the inhabitants fled into the
neighbouring forest.

Aware of the fact that the occupation of Olinda was useless without a
harbour as a base of supplies, it was resolved at once with the aid of
the fleet to lay siege to the forts of San Francisco and San Jorge.
Despite obstinate resistance, first San Jorge, then San Francisco
surrendered; and on March 3 the fleet sailed through the Barra, and the
Reciff with the island of Antonio Vaz behind it was occupied by the
Dutch. No sooner was the conquest made than steps were taken for its
administration. A welcome reinforcement arrived from Holland on March
11, having on board three representatives sent by the Nineteen, who were
to form with Waerdenburgh, appointed governor, an administrative
council, or Court of Policy. The Reciff, rather than Olinda, was
selected as the seat of government, and forts were erected for its
defence. The position, however, was perilous in the extreme.
Albuquerque, who was well acquainted with the country and skilled in
guerrilla warfare, formed an entrenched camp to which he gave the name
of the _Arreyal de Bom Jesus_, a position defended by marshes and thick
woods. From this centre, by the aid of large numbers of friendly
Indians, he was able to cut off all supplies of fresh water, meat or
vegetables from reaching the Dutch garrison. They had to depend for the
necessaries of life upon stores sent to them in relief fleets from
Holland. It was a strange and grim struggle of endurance, in which both
Dutch and Portuguese suffered terribly, the one on the barren sea-shore,
the other in the pathless woods under the glare of a tropical sun, both
alike looking eagerly for succour from the Motherland. The Dutch
succours were the first to arrive. The first detachment under Marten
Thijssen reached the Reciff on December 18, 1630; the main fleet under
Adrian Jansz Pater on April 14, 1631. The whole fleet consisted of
sixteen ships and yachts manned by 1270 sailors and 860 soldiers. Their
arrival was the signal for offensive operations. An expedition under
Thijssen's command sailed on April 22 for the large island of Itamaraca
about fifteen miles to the north of the Reciff. It was successful.
Itamaraca was occupied and garrisoned, and thus a second and
advantageous post established on the Brazilian coast.

Meanwhile the Spanish government had not been idle. After many delays a
powerful fleet set sail from Lisbon on May 5 for Pernambuco, consisting
of fifteen Spanish and five Portuguese ships and carrying a large
military force, partly destined for Bahia, but principally as a
reinforcement for Matthias de Albuquerque. The expedition was commanded
by Admiral Antonio de Oquendo, and was accompanied by Duarte de
Albuquerque, the proprietor of Pernambuco. After landing troops and
munitions at Bahia, the Spaniards wasted several weeks before starting
again to accomplish the main object of blockading the Dutch in the
Reciff and compelling their surrender by famine. But Pater had learnt by
his scouts of the presence of Oquendo at Bahia, and though his force was
far inferior he determined to meet the hostile armada at sea. The
Spanish fleet was sighted at early dawn on September 12, and Pater at
once gave orders to attack. His fleet consisted of sixteen ships and
yachts, that of the enemy of twenty galleons and sixteen caravels. The
Dutch admiral had formed his fleet in two lines, himself in the _Prins
Willem_ and Vice-Admiral Thijssen in the _Vereenigte Provintien_ being
the leaders. On this occasion the sight of the great numbers and size of
the Spanish galleons caused a great part of the Dutch captains to lose
heart and hang back. Pater and Thijssen, followed by only two ships,
bore down however on the Spaniards. _The Prins Willem_ with the
_Walcheren_ in attendance laid herself alongside the _St Jago_, flying
the flag of Admiral Oquendo; the _Vereenigte Provintien_ with the
_Provintie van Utrecht_ in its wake drew up to the _St Antonio de
Padua_, the ship of Vice-Admiral Francisco de Vallecilla. For six hours
the duel between the _Prins Willem_ and the _St Jago_ went on with
fierce desperation, the captain of the _Walcheren_ gallantly holding at
bay the galleons who attempted to come to the rescue of Oquendo.
At 4 p.m. the _St Jago_ was a floating wreck with only a remnant of
her crew surviving, when suddenly a fire broke out in the _Prins
Willem_, which nothing could check. With difficulty the _St Jago_ drew
off and, finding that his vessel was lost, Pater, refusing to
surrender, wrapped the flag round his body and threw himself into the
sea. Meanwhile success had attended Thijssen. The lagging Dutch ships
coming up gradually threatened the convoy of Spanish transports and
drew off many of the galleons for their protection. The _Provintie van
Utrecht_ indeed, like the _Prins Willem_, caught fire and was burnt to
the water's edge; but the vice-admiral himself sank the _St Antonio de
Padua_ and another galleon that came to Vallecilla's help, and
captured a third. It was a bloody and apparently indecisive fight, but
the Dutch enjoyed the fruits of victory. Oquendo made no attempt to
capture the Reciff and Olinda, but, after landing the troops he
convoyed at a favourable spot, sailed northwards, followed by
Thijssen.

But though relieved the position was still very serious. Albuquerque,
now considerably reinforced from his impregnable post at the _Arreyal de
Bom Jesus_, cut off all intercourse inland. The Dutch even abandoned
Olinda and concentrated themselves at the Reciff, where they remained as
a besieged force entirely dependent upon supplies sent from Holland.
Several expeditions were despatched with the hope of seizing other
positions on the coast, but all of them proved failures; and, when
Waerdenburgh returned home in 1633, having reached the end of his three
years' service as governor, all that could be said was that the Dutch
had retained their foothold on the coast of Pernambuco, but at vast cost
to the company in men, vessels and treasure, and without any apparent
prospect for the future. But pertinacity was to be rewarded. For the
period of success that followed special histories must be consulted. In
the year following the return of Waerdenburgh the efforts of the Dutch
authorities to extend their possessions along the coast at the various
river mouths were steadily successful; and with the advent of Joan
Maurice of Nassau to the governorship, in 1637, the dream of a Dutch
empire in Brazil seemed to be on the point of realisation. This cousin
of the Prince of Orange was endowed with brilliant qualities, and during
the seven years of his governorship he extended the Dutch dominion from
the Rio Grande in the south to the island of Maranhão on the north and
to a considerable distance inland, indeed over the larger part of seven
out of the fourteen captaincies into which Portuguese Brazil was
divided. On his arrival, by a wise policy of statesmanlike conciliation,
he contrived to secure the goodwill of the Portuguese planters, who,
though not loving the Dutch heretics, hated them less than their Spanish
oppressors, and also of the Jews, who were numerous in the conquered
territory. Under his rule the Reciff as the seat of the Dutch government
was beautified and enlarged; many fine buildings and gardens adorned it,
and the harbour made commodious for commerce with rows of warehouses and
ample docks. To the new capital he gave the name of Mauritsstad.

During the earlier part of his governor-generalship Joan Maurice was
called upon to face a really great danger. The year 1639 was to witness
what was to be the last great effort (before the Portuguese revolt) of
the still undivided Spanish monarchy for supremacy at sea. Already it
has been told how a great fleet sent under Antonio de Oquendo to drive
the Dutch from the narrow seas was crushed by Admiral Tromp at the
battle of the Downs. In the same year the most formidable armada ever
sent from the Peninsula across the ocean set sail for Brazil. It
consisted of no less than eighty-six vessels manned by 12,000 sailors
and soldiers under the command of the Count de Torre. Unpropitious
weather conditions, as so often in the case of Spanish naval
undertakings, ruined the enterprise. Making for Bahia they were detained
for two months in the Bay of All Saints by strong northerly winds.
Meanwhile Joan Maurice, whose naval force at first was deplorably weak,
had managed by energetic efforts to gather together a respectable fleet
of forty vessels under Admiral Loos, which resembled the English fleet
of 1588 under Effingham and Drake, in that it made up for lack of
numbers and of size by superior seamanship and skill in manoeuvring. At
length, the wind having shifted, the Count de Torre put to sea; and on
January 12, 1640, the Dutch squadrons sighted the Spaniards, who were
being driven along by a southerly gale which had sprung up. Clinging to
their rear and keeping the weather-gauge, the Dutch kept up a running
fight, inflicting continual losses on their enemies, and, giving them no
opportunity to make for land and seek the shelter of a port, drove them
northwards in disorder never to return. By this signal deliverance the
hold of the Netherlanders upon their Brazilian conquests appeared to be
assured; and, as has been already stated, Joan Maurice took full
advantage of the opportunity that was offered to him to consolidate and
extend them. A sudden change of political circumstances was, however,
to bring to a rapid downfall a dominion which had never rested on a
sound basis.

The revolt of Portugal in 1641 was at first hailed in the United
Provinces as the entry of a new ally into the field against their
ancient enemy the Spaniard. But it was soon perceived that there could
be no friendship with independent Portugal, unless both the East and
West India Companies withdrew from the territories they had occupied
overseas entirely at the expense of the Portuguese. King João IV and his
advisers at Lisbon, face to face as they were with the menacing Spanish
power, showed willingness to make great concessions, but they could not
control the spirit which animated the settlers in the colonies
themselves. Everywhere the Spanish yoke was repudiated, and the Dutch
garrisons in Brazil suddenly found themselves confronted in 1645 with a
loyalist rising, with which they were not in a position to deal
successfully. The West India Company had not proved a commercial
success. The fitting out of great fleets and the maintenance of numerous
garrisons of mercenaries at an immense distance from the home country
had exhausted their resources and involved the company in debt. The
building of Mauritsstad and the carrying out of Joan Maurice's ambitious
schemes for the administration and organisation of a great Brazilian
dominion were grandiose, but very costly. The governor, moreover, who
could brook neither incompetence nor interference on the part of his
subordinates, had aroused the enmity of some of them, notably of a
certain Colonel Architofsky, who through spite plotted and intrigued
against him with the authorities at home. The result was that, the
directors having declined to sanction certain proposals made to them by
Joan Maurice, he sent in his resignation, which was accepted (1644).
It must be remembered that their position was a difficult one. The
charter of the company had been granted for a term of twenty-four years,
and it was doubtful whether the States-General, already beginning to
discuss secretly the question of a separate peace with Spain, would
consent to renew it. The relations with Portugal were very delicate; and
a formidable rebellion of the entire body of Portuguese settlers, aided
by the natives, was on the point of breaking out. Indeed the successors
of Joan Maurice, deprived of any adequate succour from home, were unable
to maintain themselves against the skill and courage of the insurgent
Portuguese leaders. The Dutch were defeated in the field, and one by
one their fortresses were taken. The Reciff itself held out for some
time, but it was surrendered at last in 1654; and with its fall the
Dutch were finally expelled from the territory for the acquisition of
which they had sacrificed so much blood and treasure.

The West India Company at the peace of Münster possessed, besides the
remnant of its Brazilian dominion, the colony of New Netherland in North
America, and two struggling settlements on the rivers Essequibo and
Berbice in Guiana. New Netherland comprised the country between the
English colonies of New England and Virginia; and the Dutch settlers had
at this time established farms near the coast and friendly relations
with the natives of the interior, with whom they trafficked for furs.
The appointment of Peter Stuyvesant as governor, in 1646, was a time of
real development in New Netherland. This colony was an appanage of the
Chamber of Amsterdam, after which New Amsterdam, the seat of government
on the island of Manhattan, was named. The official trading posts on the
Essequibo and the Berbice, though never abandoned, had for some years a
mere lingering existence, but are deserving of mention in that they were
destined to survive the vicissitudes of fortune and to become in the
18th century a valuable possession. Their importance also is to be
measured not by the meagre official reports and profit and loss accounts
that have survived in the West India Company's records, but by the much
fuller information to be derived from Spanish and Portuguese sources, as
to the remarkable daring and energy of Dutch trading agents in all that
portion of the South American continent lying between the rivers Amazon
and Orinoco. Expelled from the Amazon itself in 1627 by the Portuguese
from Para, the Dutch traders established themselves at different times
at the mouths of almost all the rivers along what was known as the Wild
Coast of Guiana, and penetrating inland through a good understanding
with the natives, especially with the ubiquitous Carib tribes, carried
on a barter traffic beyond the mountains into the northern watershed of
the Amazon, even as far as the Rio Negro itself. This trade with the
interior finds no place in the company's official minutes, for it was
strictly speaking an infringement of the charter, and therefore
illegitimate. But it was characteristically Dutch, and it was winked at,
for the chief offenders were themselves among the principal
shareholders of the company.

No account of Dutch commerce during the period of Frederick Henry would
be complete, however, which did not refer to the relations between
Holland and Sweden, and the part played by an Amsterdam merchant in
enabling the Swedish armies to secure the ultimate triumph of the
Protestant cause in the Thirty Years' War. Louis de Geer sprang from an
ancient noble family of Liège. His father fled to Dordrecht in 1595 to
escape from the Inquisition and became prosperous in business. Liège was
then, as now, a great centre of the iron industry; and after his
father's death Louis de Geer in 1615 removed to Amsterdam, where he
became a merchant in all kinds of iron and copper goods, more especially
of ordnance and fire-arms. In close alliance with him, though not in
partnership, was his brother-in-law, Elias Trip, the head of a firm
reputed to have the most extensive business in iron-ware and weapons in
the Netherlands. The commanding abilities of de Geer soon gave to the
two firms, which continued to work harmoniously together as a family
concern, a complete supremacy in the class of wares in which they dealt.
At this time the chief supply of iron and copper ore came from Sweden;
and in 1616 de Geer was sent on a mission by the States-General to that
country to negotiate for a supply of these raw materials for the forging
of ordnance. This mission had important results, for it was the first
step towards bringing about those close relations between Sweden and the
United Provinces which were to subsist throughout the whole of the
Thirty Years' War. In the following year, 1617, Gustavus Adolphus, then
about to conduct an expedition into Livonia, sent an envoy to Holland
for the purpose of securing the good offices of the States-General for
the raising of a loan upon the security of the Swedish copper mines. The
principal contributor was Louis de Geer. He had, during his visit to
Sweden, learnt how great was the wealth of that country in iron ore, and
at the same time that the mines were lying idle and undeveloped through
lack of capital and skilled workmen. He used his opportunity therefore
to obtain from Gustavus the lease of the rich mining domain of Finspong.
The lease was signed on October 12, 1619, and de Geer at once began
operations on the largest scale. He introduced from Liège a body of
expert Walloon iron-workers, built forges and factories, and was in a
few years able to supply the Swedish government with all the ordnance
and munitions of war that they required, and to export through the port
of Norrköping large supplies of goods to his warehouses at Amsterdam.
His relations with Gustavus Adolphus soon became intimate. The king
relied upon de Geer for the supply of all the necessaries for his armies
in the field, and even commissioned him to raise troops for the Swedish
service. In 1626 the Dutch merchant was appointed by the king
acting-manager of the copper mines, which were royal property; and, in
order to regularise his position and give him greater facilities for the
conduct of his enterprises, the rights of Swedish citizenship were
conferred by royal patent upon him. It was a curious position, for
though de Geer paid many visits to Sweden, once for three consecutive
years, 1626-29, he continued to make Amsterdam his home and principal
residence. He thus had a dual nationality. Year after year saw an
increasing number of mines and properties passing into the great
financier's hands, and in return for these concessions he made large
advances to the king for his triumphant expedition into Germany;
advancing him in 1628 50,000 rixdalers, and somewhat later a further sum
of 32,000 rixdalers. So confidential were the relations between them
that Gustavus sent for de Geer to his camp at Kitzingen for a personal
consultation on business matters in the spring of 1632. It was their
last interview, for before that year closed the Swedish hero was to
perish at Lützen.

The death of Gustavus made no difference to the position of Louis de
Geer in Sweden, for he found Axel Oxenstierna a warm friend and powerful
supporter. Among other fresh enterprises was the formation of a
Swedo-Dutch Company for trading on the West Coast of Africa. In this
company Oxenstierna himself invested money. In reward for his many
services the Swedish Council of Regency conferred upon de Geer and his
heirs a patent of nobility (August 4,1641); and as part repayment of the
large loans advanced by him to the Swedish treasury he obtained as his
own the districts containing his mines and factories in different parts
of Sweden, making him one of the largest landed proprietors in the
country. He on his part in return for this was able to show in a
remarkable way that he was not ungrateful for the favours that he had
received.

With Christian IV of Denmark for many years the Swedes and the Dutch had
had constant disputes and much friction. This able and ambitious king,
throughout a long and vigorous reign, which began in 1593, had watched
with ever-increasing jealousy the passing of the Baltic trade into Dutch
hands, and with something more than jealousy the rapid advance to power
of the sister Scandinavian kingdom under Gustavus Adolphus. Of the 1074
merchant ships that passed through the Sound between June 19 and
November 16, 1645, all but 49 came from Dutch ports, by far the largest
number from Amsterdam; and from these Christian IV drew a large revenue
by the exaction of harsh and arbitrary toll-dues. Again and again the
States-General had complained and protested; and diplomatic pressure had
been brought to bear upon the high-handed king, but without avail.
Between Sweden and Denmark there had been, since Gustavus Adolphus came
to the throne in 1613, no overt act of hostility; but smouldering
beneath the surface of an armed truce were embers of latent rivalries
and ambitions ready at any moment to burst into flame. Christian IV was
a Protestant, but his jealousy of Sweden led him in 1639 openly to take
sides with the Catholic powers, Austria and Spain. Fearing that he might
attempt to close the passage of the Sound, the States-General and the
Swedish Regency in 1640 concluded a treaty "for securing the freedom and
protection of shipping and commerce in the Baltic and North Seas"; and
one of the secret articles gave permission to Sweden to buy or hire
ships in the Netherlands and in case of necessity to enlist crews for
the same. Outward peace was precariously maintained between the
Scandinavian powers, when the seizure of a number of Swedish ships in
the Sound in 1643 made Oxenstierna resolve upon a bold stroke. Without
any declaration of war the Swedish general, Torstensson, was ordered to
lead his victorious army from North Germany into Denmark and to force
King Christian to cease intriguing with the enemy. Holstein, Schleswig
and Jutland were speedily in Torstensson's hands, but the Danish fleet
was superior to the Swedish, and he could make no further progress. Both
sides turned to the United Provinces. Christian promised that the
grievances in regard to the Sound dues should be removed if the
States-General would remain neutral. Oxenstierna addressed himself to
Louis de Geer. The merchant on behalf of the Swedish government was
instructed to approach the stadholder and the States-General, and to
seek for naval assistance under the terms of the treaty of 1640; and, if
he failed in obtaining their assent, then he--de Geer--should himself
(in conformance with the secret article of that treaty) raise on his
own account and equip a fleet of thirty ships for the Swedish service.

De Geer soon discovered that Frederick Henry, being intent on peace
negotiations, was averse to the proposal. The stadholder, and the
States-General acting under his influence, did not wish to create fresh
entanglements by embroiling the United Provinces in a war with Denmark.
De Geer therefore at once began on his own responsibility to equip ships
in the various seaports of Holland and Zeeland which had been the chief
sufferers by the vexatious Sound dues, and he succeeded in enlisting the
connivance of the Estates of Holland to his undertaking. Before the end
of April, 1644, a fleet of thirty-two vessels was collected under the
command of Marten Thijssen. Its first efforts were unsuccessful. The
Danish fleet effectually prevented the junction of Thijssen with the
Swedes, and for a time he found himself blockaded in a narrow passage
called the Listerdiep. Taking advantage of a storm which dispersed the
Danes, the Dutch admiral at last was able to put to sea again, and early
in July somewhat ignominiously returned to Amsterdam to refit. For the
moment King Christian was everywhere triumphant. On July 11 he gained a
signal victory over the Swedish fleet at Colberg Heath, and he had the
satisfaction of seeing Torstensson compelled by the Imperialists to
retreat from Jutland. But the energy and pertinacity of the Amsterdam
merchant saved the situation. Though the retreat of Thijssen meant for
him a heavy financial loss, de Geer never for a moment faltered in his
purpose. Within three weeks Thijssen again put to sea with twenty-two
ships, and by skilful manoeuvring he succeeded in making his way
through the Skagerak and the Sound, and finally brought his fleet to
anchor in the Swedish harbour of Calmar. From this harbour the united
Swedo-Dutch squadrons sailed out and on October 23, between Femern and
Laaland, met the Danish fleet, and after a desperate conflict completely
defeated and destroyed it. Thus were the wealth and resources of a
private citizen of Amsterdam able to intervene decisively at a critical
moment in the struggle for supremacy in the Baltic between the two
Scandinavian powers. But it is not in the victory won by Marten Thijssen
that de Geer rendered his greatest service to Sweden. As the Swedish
historian Fryxell truly says, "all that was won by the statesmanship of
Oxenstierna, by the sword of Baner, Torstensson and Wrangel, in a
desolated Germany streaming with blood, has been already lost again; but
the benefits which Louis de Geer brought to Sweden, by the path of
peaceful industry and virtue, these still exist, and bear wholesome
fruit to a late posterity."

This expedition under Marten Thijssen, who after his victory was created
a Swedish noble and definitely entered the Swedish naval service, though
connived at by Frederick Henry and the States-General, did not express
any desire on their part to aggrandise Sweden unduly at the expense of
Denmark. If some great merchants such as Louis de Geer and Elias Trip
were exploiting the resources of Sweden, others, notably a certain
Gabriel Marcelis, had invested their capital in developing the Danish
grazing lands; and politically and commercially the question of the
Sound dues, pre-eminently a Danish question, overshadowed all others in
importance. The Dutch had no desire to give Sweden a share in the
control of the Sound; they preferred in the interests of their vast
Baltic trade to have to deal with Christian IV alone. The Swedish threat
was useful in bringing diplomatic pressure to bear on the Danish king,
but ultimately they felt confident that, if he refused to make
concessions in the matter of the dues, they could compel him to do so.
As one of their diplomatists proudly declared, "the wooden keys of the
Sound were not in the hands of King Christian, but in the wharves of
Amsterdam." In June, 1645, his words were put to a practical test.
Admiral Witte de With at the head of a fleet of fifty war-ships was
ordered to convoy 300 merchantmen through the Sound, peacefully if
possible, if not, by force. Quietly the entire fleet of 350 vessels
sailed through the narrow waters. The Danish fleet and Danish forts
made no attempt at resistance. All the summer De With cruised to and fro
and the Dutch traders suffered no molestation. Christian's obstinacy at
last gave way before this display of superior might, and on August 23,
by the treaty of Christianopel he agreed to lower the tolls for forty
years and to make many other concessions that were required from him. At
the same time by Dutch mediation peace was concluded between Denmark and
Sweden, distinctly to the advantage of the former, by the treaty of
Brömsebro.

To pass to other regions. In the Levant, during the long residence of
Cornelis Haga at Constantinople, trade had been greatly extended.
Considerable privileges were conceded to the Dutch by the so-called
"capitulation" concluded by his agency with the Porte in 1612; and Dutch
consuls were placed in the chief ports of Turkey, Asia Minor, Syria,
Egypt, Tunis, Greece and Italy. The trading however with the
Mediterranean and the Levant was left to private enterprise, the
States-General which had given charters to the different Companies--East
India, West India and Northern--not being willing to create any further
monopolies.

The lack of coal and of metals has always seriously hindered industrial
development in the United Provinces. Nevertheless the advent into
Holland of so many refugees who were skilled artisans, from the southern
Netherlands, led to the establishment of various textile industries at
Leyden, Haarlem and other towns. One of the chief of these was the
dressing and dyeing of English cloth for exportation.

Amsterdam, it should be mentioned, had already at this time become the
home of the diamond industry. The art of cutting and polishing diamonds
was a secret process brought to the city on the Y by Portuguese Jews,
who were expelled by Philip II; and in Amsterdam their descendants still
retain a peculiar skill and craftmanship that is unrivalled. Jewish
settlers were indeed to be found in many of the Dutch towns; and it was
through them that Holland became famous in 17th century Europe for the
perfection of her goldsmiths' and silversmiths' art and for jewelry of
every kind. Another industry, which had its centre at Delft, was that of
the celebrated pottery and tiles known as "delfware." It will be evident
from what has been said above that vast wealth flowed into Holland at
this period of her history, but, as so often happens, this sudden
growth of riches had a tendency to accumulate in the hands of a minority
of the people, with the inevitable consequence, on the one hand, of the
widening of the gulf which divided poverty from opulence; on the other,
with the creation among rich and poor alike of a consuming eagerness and
passion for gain, if not by legitimate means, then by wild speculation
or corrupt venality. Bubble companies came into existence, only to bring
disaster on those who rashly invested their money in them. The fever of
speculation rose to its height in the mania for the growing of bulbs and
more especially of tulips, which more and more absorbed the attention of
the public in Holland in the years 1633-6. Perfectly inordinate sums
were offered in advance for growing crops or for particular bulbs; most
of the transactions being purely paper speculations, a gambling in
futures. Millions of guilders were risked, and hundreds of thousands
lost or won. In 1637 the crash came, and many thousands of people, in
Amsterdam, Haarlem, Leyden, Alkmaar and other towns in Holland, were
brought to ruin. The Estates of Holland and the various municipal
corporations, numbers of whose members were among the sufferers, were
compelled to take official action to extend the time for the liquidation
of debts, and thus to some extent limit the number of bankruptcies. The
tulip mania reduced, however, so many to beggary that it came as a stern
warning. It was unfortunately only too typical of the spirit of the
time.

Even worse in some ways was the venality and corruption which began to
pervade the public life of the country. The getting of wealth, no matter
how, was an epidemic, which infected not merely the business community,
but the official classes of the republic. There was malversation in the
admiralties and in the military administration. The government was in
the hands of narrow oligarchies, who took good care to oppose jealously
any extension of the privileges which placed so much valuable patronage
at their disposal. Even envoys to foreign courts were reputed not to be
inaccessible to the receipt of presents, which were in reality bribes;
and in the law-courts the wealthy suitor or offender could generally
count on a charitable construction being placed upon all points in his
favour. The severe placards, for instance, against the public
celebration of any form of worship but that of the Reformed religion,
according to the decrees of the Synod of Dort, were notoriously not
enforced. Those who were able and willing to pay for a dispensation
found a ready and judicious toleration.

This toleration was not entirely due to the venality of the officials,
but rather to the spirit of materialistic indifference that was abroad
among the orthodox Calvinists, who were alone eligible for public
office. Large numbers of those who professed the established faith were
in reality either nominal conformists too much immersed in affairs to
trouble about religious questions, or actually free-thinkers in
disguise. It must never be forgotten that in the United Provinces taken
as a whole, the Calvinists, whether orthodox or arminian, formed a
minority of the population. Even in Holland itself more than half the
inhabitants were Catholics, including many of the old families and
almost all the peasantry. Likewise in Utrecht, Gelderland and Overyssel
the Catholics were in the majority. The Generality lands, North Brabant
and Dutch Flanders, were entirely of the Roman faith. In Holland,
Zeeland and especially in Friesland and Groningen the Mennonite Baptists
and other sects had numerous adherents. Liberty of thought and to a
large extent of worship was in fact at this time the characteristic of
the Netherlands, and existed in spite of the unrepealed placards which
enforced under pain of heavy penalties a strict adherence to the
principles of Dort.

       *       *       *       *       *




CHAPTER XII

LETTERS, SCIENCE AND ART


The epithet "glorious"--_roemrijke_--has been frequently applied by
Dutch historians to the period of Frederick Henry--and deservedly. The
preceding chapter has told that it was a time of wonderful maritime and
colonial expansion, of commercial supremacy and material prosperity. But
the spirit of the Holland, which reached its culminating point of
national greatness in the middle of the 17th century, was far from being
wholly occupied with voyages of adventure and conquest on far distant
seas, or engrossed in sordid commercialism at home. The rapid
acquisition of wealth by successful trade is dangerous to the moral
health and stability alike of individuals and of societies; and the
vices which follow in its train had, as we have already pointed out,
infected to a certain extent the official and commercial classes in the
Dutch republic at this epoch. There is, however, another side of the
picture. The people of the United Provinces in their long struggle for
existence, as a free and independent state, had had all the dormant
energies and qualities of which their race was capable called into
intense and many-sided activity, with the result that the quickening
impulse, which had been sent thrilling through the veins, and which had
made the pulses to throb with the stress of effort and the eagerness of
hope, penetrated into every department of thought and life. When the
treaty of Münster was signed, Holland had taken her place in the very
front rank in the civilised world, as the home of letters, science and
art, and was undoubtedly the most learned state in Europe.

In an age when Latin was the universal language of learning, it was this
last fact which loomed largest in the eyes of contemporaries. The wars
and persecutions which followed the Reformation made Holland the place
of refuge of many of the most adventurous spirits, the choicest
intellects and the most independent thinkers of the time. Flemings and
Walloons, who fled from Alva and the Inquisition, Spanish and Portuguese
Jews driven out by the fanaticism of Philip II, French Huguenots and
German Calvinists, found within the borders of the United Provinces a
country of adoption, where freedom of the press and freedom of opinion
existed to a degree unknown elsewhere until quite modern times. The
social condition of the country, the disappearance of a feudal nobility,
and the growth of a large and well-to-do burgher aristocracy in whose
hands the government of the republic really lay, had led to a
widespread diffusion of education and culture. All travellers in 17th
century Holland were struck by the evidences which met their eyes, in
all places that they visited, of a general prosperity combined with
great simplicity of life and quiet domesticity. Homely comfort was to be
seen everywhere, but not even in the mansions of the merchant princes of
Amsterdam was there any ostentatious display of wealth and luxury.
Probably of no other people could it have been said that "amongst the
Dutch it was unfashionable not to be a man of business[6]." And yet, in
spite of this, there was none of that narrowness of outlook, which is
generally associated with burgher-society immersed in trade. These men,
be it remembered, were necessarily acquainted with many languages, for
they had commercial relations with all parts of the world. The number
too of those who had actually voyaged and travelled in far distant
oceans, in every variety of climate, amidst every diversity of race, was
very large; and their presence in their home circles and in social
gatherings and all they had to tell of their experiences opened men's
minds, stirred their imaginations, and aroused an interest and a
curiosity, which made even the stay-at-home Hollanders alert, receptive
and eager for knowledge.

The act of William the Silent in founding the University of Leyden, as a
memorial of the great deliverance of 1574, was prophetic of the future
that was about to dawn upon the land, which, at the moment of its lowest
fortunes, the successful defence of Leyden had done so much to save from
utter disaster. For the reasons which have been already stated, scholars
of renown driven by intolerance from their own countries found in the
newly-founded Academy in Holland a home where they could pursue their
literary work undisturbed, and gave to it a fame and celebrity which
speedily attracted thousands of students not only from the Netherlands,
but also from foreign lands. This was especially the case during the
terrible time when Germany was devastated by the Thirty Years' War.
Among the scholars and philologists, who held chairs at Leyden during
the first century of its existence, are included a long list of names of
European renown. Justus Lipsius and Josephus Justus Scaliger may be
justly reckoned among the founders of the science of critical
scholarship. These were of foreign extraction, as was Salmasius, one of
their successors, famous for his controversy with John Milton. But only
less illustrious in the domain of philology and classical learning were
the Netherlanders Gerardus Johannes Vossius (1577-1649) and his five
sons, one of whom Isaac (1618-89) may be even said to have surpassed his
father; Daniel Heinsius (1580-1665) and his son Nicolas (1620-1681), men
of immense erudition and critical insight; and the brilliant Latinist
Caspar Barlaeus (1584-1648). Of theologians and their bitter disputes
posterity retains a less grateful remembrance. Gomarus and Arminius by
their controversies were the authors of party strife and civil
dissensions which led to the death of Oldenbarneveldt on the scaffold;
and with them may be mentioned Episcopius, Voetius, Coecaeus, Bogerman
and Uyttenbogaert. Not all these men had a direct connection with
Leyden, for the success which attended the creation of the academy in
that town quickly led to the erection of similar institutions elsewhere.
Universities were founded at Franeker, 1584; Groningen, 1614; Amsterdam,
1632; Utrecht, 1636; and Harderwijk, 1646. These had not the same
attraction as Leyden for foreigners, but they quickly became, one and
all, centres for the diffusion of that high level of general culture
which was the distinguishing mark of the 17th century Netherlands.

All the writers, whose names have just been mentioned, used Latin almost
exclusively as their instrument of expression. But one name, the most
renowned of them all, has been omitted, because through political
circumstances he was compelled to spend the greater part of his life in
banishment from his native land. Hugo Grotius (Huig van Groot), after
his escape from the castle of Loevestein in 1621, though he remained
through life a true patriot, never could be induced to accept a pardon,
which implied an admission of guilt in himself or in Oldenbarneveldt. So
the man, who was known to have been the actual writer of the Advocate's
_Justification_, continued to live in straitened circumstances at Paris,
until Oxenstierna appointed him Swedish ambassador at the French
court. This post he held for eleven years. Of his extraordinary ability,
and of the variety and range of his knowledge, it is not possible to
speak without seeming exaggeration. Grotius was in his own time styled
"the wonder of the world"; he certainly stands intellectually as one of
the very foremost men the Dutch race has produced. Scholar, jurist,
theologian, philosopher, historian, poet, diplomatist, letter-writer, he
excelled in almost every branch of knowledge and made himself a master
of whatever subject he took in hand. For the student of International
Law the treatise of Grotius, _De Jure belli et pacis_, still remains the
text-book on which the later superstructure has been reared. His _Mare
liberum_, written expressly to controvert the Portuguese claim of an
exclusive right to trade and navigate in the Indian Ocean, excited much
attention in Europe, and was taken by James I to be an attack on the
oft-asserted _dominium maris_ of the English crown in the narrow seas.
It led the king to issue a proclamation forbidding foreigners to fish in
British waters (May, 1609). Selden's _Mare clausum_ was a reply, written
by the king's command, to the _Mare liberum_. Of his strictly historical
works the _Annales et Historiae de Rebus Belgicis_, for its impartiality
and general accuracy no less than for its finished and lucid style,
stands out as the best of all contemporary accounts from the Dutch side
of the Revolt of the Netherlands. As a theologian Grotius occupied a
high rank. His _De Veritate Religionis Christianae_ and his
_Annotationes in Vetus et in Novum Testamentum_ are now out of date; but
the _De Veritate_ was in its day a most valuable piece of Christian
apologetic and was quickly translated into many languages. The
_Annotationes_ have, ever since they were penned, been helpful to
commentators on the Scriptures for their brilliancy and suggestiveness
on many points of criticism and interpretation. His voluminous
correspondence, diplomatic, literary, confidential, is rich in
information bearing on the history and the life of his time. Several
thousands of these letters have been collected and published.

But if the smouldering embers of bitter sectarian and party strife
compelled the most brilliant of Holland's own sons to spend the last
twenty-three years of his life in a foreign capital and to enter the
service of a foreign state, Holland was at the same time, as we have
seen, gaining distinction by the presence within her hospitable
boundaries of men of foreign extraction famous for their learning.

It was thus that both the Cartesian and Spinozan systems of philosophy
had their birth-place on Dutch soil. Réné Descartes sought refuge from
France at Amsterdam in 1629, and he resided at different places in the
United Provinces, among them at the university towns of Utrecht,
Franeker and Leyden, for twenty years. During this time he published
most of his best known works, including the famous _Discours de la
méthode_. His influence was great. He made many disciples, who openly or
secretly became "Cartesians." Among his pupils was Baruch Spinoza
(1632-1677) the apostle of pantheism. A Portuguese Jew by descent,
Spinoza was born in Amsterdam and was a resident in his native city
throughout life.

The fame of Holland in 17th century Europe as the chosen home of
learning had thus been established by scholars and thinkers whose
literary language was ordinarily Latin. It is now time to speak of the
brilliant band of poets, dramatists and stylists, who cultivated the
resources of their native tongue with such success as to make this great
era truly the Golden Age of Dutch Literature properly so-called. The
growth of a genuine national literature in the Netherlands, which had
produced during the latter part of the 13th century a Maerlandt and a
Melis Stoke, was for some considerable time checked and retarded by the
influence of the Burgundian _régime_, where French, as the court
language, was generally adopted by the upper classes. The Netherland or
Low-German tongue thus became gradually debased and corrupted by the
introduction of bastard words and foreign modes of expression.
Nevertheless this period of linguistic degradation witnessed the uprise
of a most remarkable institution for popularising "the Art of Poesy." I
refer to the literary gilds, bearing the name of "Chambers of Rhetoric,"
which, though of French origin, became rapidly acclimatised in the
Netherlands. In well-nigh every town one or more of these "gilds" were
established, delighting the people with their quaint pageantry and
elaborate ritual, and forming centres of light and culture throughout
the land. Rhyming, versifying, acting, became through their means the
recreation of many thousands of shop-keepers, artisans and even
peasants. And with all their faults of style and taste, their endless
effusion of bad poetry, their feeble plays and rude farces, the mummery
and buffoonery which were mingled even with their gravest efforts, the
"Rhetoricians" effectually achieved the great and important work of
attracting an entire people in an age of ignorance and of darkness
towards a love of letters, and thereby broke the ground for the great
revival of the 17th century. Amsterdam at one time possessed several
of these Chambers of Rhetoric, but towards the end of the 16th century
they had all disappeared, with one brilliant exception, that of the
"Blossoming Eglantine," otherwise known as the "Old Chamber." Founded in
1518 under the special patronage of Charles V, the "Eglantine" weathered
safely the perils and troubles of the Revolt, and passed in 1581 under
the joint direction of a certain notable triumvirate, Coornheert,
Spiegel and Visscher. These men banded themselves together "to raise,
restore and enrich" their mother-tongue. But they were not merely
literary purists and reformers; the "Eglantine" became in their hands
and through their efforts the focus of new literary life and energy, and
Amsterdam replaced fallen Antwerp as the home of Netherland culture.

The senior member of the triumvirate, Dirk Volkertz Coornheert, led a
stormy and adventurous life. He was a devoted adherent of William the
Silent and for a series of years, through good and ill-fortune, devoted
himself with pen and person to the cause of his patron. As a poet he did
not attain any very high flight, but he was a great pamphleteer, and,
taking an active part in religious controversy, by his publications he
drew upon himself a storm of opposition and in the end of persecution.
He was, like his patron, a man of moderate and tolerant views, which in
an age of religious bigotry brought upon him the hatred of all parties
and the accusation of being a free-thinker. His stormy life ended in
1590. Hendrik Laurensz Spiegel (1549-1612) was a member of an old
Amsterdam family. In every way a contrast to Coornheert, Spiegel was a
Catholic. A prosperous citizen, simple, unostentatious and charitable,
he spent the whole of his life in his native town, and being
disqualified by his religion from holding public office he gave all his
leisure to the cultivation of his mind and to literary pursuits. The
work on which his fame chiefly rests was a didactic poem entitled the
_Hert-Spiegel_. In his pleasant country house upon the banks of the
Amstel, beneath a wide and spreading tree, which he was wont to call the
"Temple of the Muses" he loved to gather a circle of literary friends,
irrespective of differences of opinion or of faith, and with them to
spend the afternoon in bright congenial converse on books and men and
things. Roemer Visscher, the youngest member of the triumvirate, was
like Spiegel an Amsterdammer, a Catholic and a well-to-do merchant. His
poetical efforts did not attain a high standard, though his epigrams,
which were both witty and quaint, won for him from his contemporaries
the name of the "Second Martial." Roemer Visscher's fame does not,
however, rest chiefly upon his writings. A man of great affability,
learned, shrewd and humorous, he was exceedingly hospitable, and he was
fortunate in having a wife of like tastes and daughters more gifted than
himself. During the twenty years which preceded his death in 1620 his
home was the chosen rendezvous of the best intelligence of the day. To
the young he was ever ready to give encouragement and help; and
struggling talent always found in him a kindly critic and a sympathising
friend. He lived to see and to make the acquaintance of Brederôo,
Vondel, Cats and Huyghens, the men whose names were to make the period
of Frederick Henry the most illustrious in the annals of Dutch
literature.

Gerbrand Adriansz Brederôo, strictly speaking, did not belong to that
period. He died prematurely in 1618, a victim while still young to a
wayward life of dissipation and disappointment. His comedies, written in
the rude dialect of the fish-market and the street, are full of native
humour and originality and give genuine glimpses of low life in old
Amsterdam. His songs show that Brederôo had a real poetic gift. They
reveal, beneath the rough and at times coarse and licentious exterior, a
nature of fine susceptibilities and almost womanly tenderness. Joost van
den Vondel was born in the same year as Brederôo, 1587, but his career
was very different. Vondel survived till 1679, and during the whole of
his long life his pen was never idle. His dramas and poems (in the
edition of Van Lennep) fill twelve volumes. Such a vast production, as
is inevitable, contains material of very unequal merit; but it is not
too much to say that the highest flights of Vondel's lyric poetry, alike
in power of expression and imagery, in the variety of metre and the
harmonious cadence of the verse, deserve a far wider appreciation than
they have ever received, through the misfortune of having been written
in a language little known and read. Vondel was the son of an Antwerp
citizen compelled as a Protestant to fly from his native town after its
capture by Parma. He took refuge at Cologne, where the poet was born,
and afterwards settled at Amsterdam. In that town Vondel spent all his
life, first as a shopkeeper, then as a clerk in the City Savings' Bank.
He was always a poor man; he never sought for the patronage of the
great, but rather repelled it. His scathing attacks on those who had
compassed the death of Oldenbarneveldt, and his adhesion to the
Remonstrant cause brought him in early life into disfavour with the
party in power, while later his conversion to Catholicism--in 1641--and
his eager and zealous advocacy of its doctrines, were a perpetual bar to
that public recognition of his talents which was his due. Vondel never
at any time sacrificed his convictions to his interest, and he wrote
poetry not from the desire of wealth or fame, but because he was a born
poet and his mind found in verse the natural expression of its thought
and emotions.

But, though Vondel was a poor man, he was not unlearned. On the contrary
he was a diligent student of Greek and Latin literature, and translated
many of the poetical masterpieces in those languages into Dutch verse.
Indeed so close was his study that it marred much of his own work.
Vondel wrote a great number of dramas, but his close imitation of the
Greek model with its chorus, and his strict adherence to the unities,
render them artificial in form and lacking in movement and life. This is
emphasised by the fact that many of them are based on Scriptural themes,
and by the monotony of the Alexandrine metre in which all the dialogues
are written. It is in the choruses that the poetical genius of Vondel is
specially displayed. Lyrical gems in every variety of metre are to be
found in the Vondelian dramas, alike in his youthful efforts and in
those of extreme old age. Of the dramas, the finest and the most famous
is the _Lucifer_, 1654, which treats of the expulsion of Lucifer and his
rebel host of angels from Heaven. We are here in the presence of a
magnificent effort to deal grandiosely with a stupendous theme. The
conception of the personality of Lucifer is of heroic proportions; and a
comparison of dates renders it at least probable that this Dutch drama
passed into John Milton's hands, and that distinct traces of the
impression it made upon him are to be found in certain passages of the
_Paradise Lost_. Vondel also produced hundreds of occasional pieces,
besides several lengthy religious and didactic poems. He even essayed an
epic poem on Constantine the Great, but it was never completed. Of the
occasional poems the finest are perhaps the triumph songs over the
victories of Frederick Henry, and of the great admirals Tromp and De
Ruyter.

Jacob Cats (1577-1660) lived, like Vondel, to a great age, but in very
different circumstances. He was a native of Dordrecht and became
pensionary of that town, and, though not distinguished as a statesman or
politician, he was so much respected for his prudence and moderation
that for twenty-two years he filled the important office of
Council-Pensionary of Holland and was twice sent as an Envoy
Extraordinary to England. He was a prolific writer and was undoubtedly
the most popular and widely-read of the poets of his time. His works
were to be found in every Dutch homestead, and he was familiarly known
as "Father Cats." His gifts were, however, of a very different order
from those of Vondel. His long poems dealt chiefly with the events of
domestic, every-day existence; and the language, simple, unpretentious
and at times commonplace, was nevertheless not devoid of a certain
restful charm. There are no high flights of imagination or of passion,
but there are many passages as rich in quaint fancy as in wise maxims.
With Constantine Huyghens (1596-1687) the writing of verse was but one
of the many ways in which one of the most cultured, versatile, and busy
men of his time found pleasant recreation in his leisure hours. The
trusted secretary, friend and counsellor of three successive Princes of
Orange, Huyghens in these capacities was enabled for many years to
render great service to Frederick Henry, William II and William III,
more especially perhaps to the last-named during the difficult and
troubled period of his minority. Nevertheless all these cares and
labours of the diplomatist, administrator, courtier and man of the world
did not prevent him from following his natural bent for intellectual
pursuits. He was a man of brilliant parts and of refined and artistic
tastes. Acquainted with many languages and literatures, an accomplished
musician and musical composer, a generous patron of letters and of art,
his poetical efforts are eminently characteristic of the personality of
the man. His volumes of short poems--_Hofwijck, Cluijswerck, Voorhout_
and _Zeestraet_--contain exquisite and witty pictures of life at the
Hague--"the village of villages"--and are at once fastidious in form and
pithy in expression.

It remains to speak of the man who may truly be described as the central
figure among his literary contemporaries. Pieter Cornelisz Hooft
(1583-1647) was indisputably the first man of letters of his time. He
sprang from one of the first families of the burgher-aristocracy of
Amsterdam, in which city his father, Cornelis Pietersz Hooft, filled the
office of burgomaster no less than thirteen times. He began even as a
boy to write poetry, and his strong bent to literature was deepened by a
prolonged tour of more than three years in France, Germany and Italy,
almost two years of which were spent at Florence and Venice. After his
return he studied jurisprudence at Leyden, but when he was only
twenty-six years old he received an appointment which was to mould and
fix the whole of his future career. In 1609 Prince Maurice, in
recognition of his father's great services, nominated Hooft to the
coveted post of Drost, or Governor, of Muiden and bailiff of Gooiland.
This post involved magisterial and administrative duties of a
by-no-means onerous kind; and the official residence of the Drost, the
"High House of Muiden," an embattled feudal castle with pleasant
gardens, lying at the point where at no great distance from Amsterdam
the river Vecht sleepily empties itself into the Zuyder Zee, became
henceforth for thirty years a veritable home of letters.

Hooft's literary life may be divided into two portions. In the decade
after his settlement at Muiden, he was known as a dramatist and a writer
of pretty love songs. His dramas--_Geerard van Velzen, Warenar_ and
_Baeto_--caught the popular taste and were frequently acted, but are not
of high merit. His songs and sonnets are distinguished for their musical
rhythm and airy lightness of touch, but they were mostly penned, as he
himself tells us, for his own pleasure and that of his friends, not for
general publication. There are, nevertheless, charming pieces in the
collected edition of Hooft's poems, and he was certainly an adept in the
technicalities of metrical craft. But Hooft himself was ambitious of
being remembered by posterity as a national historian. He aimed at
giving such a narrative of the struggle against Spain as would entitle
him to the name of "the Tacitus of the Netherlands." He wished to
produce no mere chronicle like those of Bor or Van Meteren, but a
literary history in the Dutch tongue, whose style should be modelled on
that of the great Roman writer, whose works Hooft is said to have read
through fifty-two times. He first, to try his hand, wrote a life of
Henry IV of France, which attained great success. Louis XIII was so
pleased with it that he sent the author a gold chain and made him a
Knight of St Michael. Thus encouraged, on August 19, 1628, Hooft began
his _Netherland Histories_, and from this date until his death in 1647
he worked ceaselessly at the _magnum opus_, which, beginning with the
abdication of Charles V, he intended to carry on until the conclusion of
the Twelve Years' Truce. He did not live to bring the narrative further
than the end of the Leicester régime. In a small tower in the orchard at
Muiden he kept his papers; and here, undisturbed, he spent all his
leisure hours for nineteen years engaged on the great task, on which he
concentrated all his energies. He himself tells us of the enormous pains
that he took to get full and accurate information, collecting records,
consulting archives and submitting every portion as it was written to
the criticism of living authorities, more especially to Constantine
Huyghens and through him to the Prince of Orange himself. Above all
Hooft strove, to use his own words, "never to conceal the truth, even
were it to the injury of the fatherland"; and the carrying-out of this
principle has given to the great prose-epic that he wrote a permanent
value apart altogether from its merits as a remarkable literary
achievement. And yet perhaps the most valuable legacy that Hooft has
left to posterity is his collection of letters. Of these a recent
writer[7] has declared "that, though it could not be asserted that they
[Hooft's letters] threw into the shade the whole of the rest of
Netherland literature, still the assertion would not be far beyond the
mark." They deal with every variety of subject, grave and gay; and they
give us an insight into the literary, social and domestic life of the
Holland of his time, which is of more value than any history.

In these letters we find life-like portraits of the scholars, poets,
dramatists, musicians, singers, courtiers and travellers, who formed
that brilliant society which received from their contemporaries the name
of the "Muiden Circle"--_Muidener Kring_. The genial and hospitable
Drost loved to see around him those "five or six couple of friends,"
whom he delighted to invite to Muiden. Hooft was twice married; and both
his wives, Christina van Erp and Heleonore Hellemans, were charming and
accomplished women, endowed with those social qualities which gave an
added attractiveness to the Muiden gatherings. Brandt, Hooft's
biographer, describes Christina as "of surpassing capacity and
intelligence, as beautiful, pleasing, affable, discreet, gentle and
gracious, as such a man could desire to have"; while, of Heleonore,
Hooft himself writes: "Within this house one ever finds sunshine, even
when it rains without."

This reference to the two hostesses of Muiden calls attention to one of
the noteworthy features of social life in the Holland of this
period--namely, the high level of education among women belonging to
the upper burgher-class. Anna and Maria Tesselschade Visscher, and Anna
Maria Schuurman may be taken as examples. Anna, the elder of the two
daughters of Roemer Visscher (1584-1651), was brought up amidst cultured
surroundings. For some years after her mother's death she took her place
as mistress of the house which until 1620 had been the hospitable
rendezvous of the literary society of Amsterdam. She was herself a woman
of wide erudition, and her fame as a poet was such as to win for her,
according to the fashion of the day, the title of "the Dutch Sappho."
Tesselschade, ten years younger than her sister and educated under her
fostering care, was however destined to eclipse her, alike by her
personal charms and her varied accomplishments. If one could believe all
that is said in her praise by Hooft, Huyghens, Barlaeus, Brederôo,
Vondel and Cats, she must indeed have been a very marvel of perfect
womanhood. As a singer she was regarded as being without a rival; and
her skill in painting, carving, etching on glass and tapestry work was
much praised by her numerous admirers. Her poetical works, including her
translation into Dutch verse of Tasso's _Gerusalemme Liberata_, have
almost all unfortunately perished, but a single ode that survives--"the
Ode to a Nightingale"--is an effort not unworthy of Shelley and shows
her possession of a true lyrical gift. At Muiden the presence of the
"beautiful" Tesselschade was almost indispensable. "What feast would be
complete," wrote Hooft to her, "at which you were not present? Favour us
then with your company if it be possible"; and again: "that you will
come is my most earnest desire. If you will but be our guest, then, I
hope, you will cure all our ills." He speaks of her to Barlaeus as "the
priestess"; and it is clear that at her shrine all the frequenters of
Muiden were ready to burn the incense of adulation. Both Anna and
Tesselschade, like their father, were devout Catholics.

Anna Maria van Schuurman (1607-84) was a woman of a different type. She
does not seem to have loved or to have shone in society, but she was a
very phenomenon of learning. She is credited with proficiency in
painting, carving and other arts; but it is not on these, so to speak,
accessory accomplishments that her fame rests, but on the extraordinary
range and variety of her solid erudition. She was at once linguist,
scholar, theologian, philosopher, scientist and astronomer. She was a
remarkable linguist and had a thorough literary and scholarly knowledge
of French, English, German, Italian, Latin, Greek, Hebrew, Syriac,
Chaldee, Arabic and Ethiopic. Her reputation became widespread; and, in
the latter part of her long life, many strangers went to Utrecht, where
she resided, to try to get a glimpse of so great a celebrity, which was
not easy owing to her aversion to such visits.

Turning to the domain of mathematical and physical science and of
scientific research and discovery, we find that here also the 17th
century Netherlanders attained the highest distinction. As
mathematicians Simon Stevin, the friend and instructor of Maurice of
Orange, and Francis van Schooten, the Leyden Professor, who numbered
among his pupils Christian Huyghens and John de Witt, did much excellent
work in the earlier years of the century. The published writings of De
Witt on "the properties of curves" and on "the theory of probabilities"
show that the greatest of Dutch statesmen might have become famous as a
mathematician had the cares of administration permitted him to pursue
the abstract studies that he loved. Of the scientific achievements of
Christian Huyghens (1629-95), the brilliant son of a brilliant father,
it is difficult to speak in adequate terms. There is scarcely any name
in the annals of science that stands higher than his. His abilities, as
a pure mathematician, place him in the front rank among mathematicians
of all time; and yet the services that he rendered to mathematical
science were surpassed by his extraordinary capacity for the combination
of theory with practice. His powers of invention, of broad
generalisation, of originality of thought were almost unbounded. Among
the mathematical problems with which he dealt successfully were the
theory of numbers, the squaring of the circle and the calculation of
chances. To him we owe the conception of the law of the conservation of
energy, of the motion of the centre of gravity, and of the undulatory
theory of light. He expounded the laws of the motion of the pendulum,
increased the power of the telescope, invented the micrometer,
discovered the rings and satellites of Saturn, constructed the first
pendulum clock, and a machine, called the gunpowder machine, in
principle the precursor of the steam engine. For sheer brain power and
inventive genius Christian Huyghens was a giant. He spent the later
years of his life in Paris, where he was one of the founders and
original members of the _Académie des Sciences_. Two other names of
scientists, who gained a European reputation for original research and
permanent additions to knowledge, must be mentioned; those of Antoni van
Leeuwenhoek (1632-1723), and of Jan Swammerdam (1637-80). Leeuwenhoek
was a life-long observer of minute life. The microscope (the invention
of which was due to a Dutchman, Cornelius Drebbel) was the favourite
instrument of his patient investigations, and he was able greatly to
improve its mechanism and powers. Among the results of his labours was
the discovery of the infusoria, and the collection of a valuable mass of
information concerning the circulation of the blood and the structure of
the eye and brain. Swammerdam was a naturalist who devoted himself to
the study of the habits and the metamorphoses of insects, and he may be
regarded as the founder of this most important branch of scientific
enquiry. His work forms the basis on which all subsequent knowledge on
this subject has been built up.

To say that the school of Dutch painting attained its zenith in the
period of Frederick Henry and the decades which preceded and followed
it, is scarcely necessary. It was the age of Rembrandt. The works of
that great master and of his contemporaries, most of whom were
influenced and many dominated by his genius, are well known to every
lover of art, and are to be seen in every collection of pictures in
Europe. One has, however, to visit the Rijks Museum at Amsterdam and the
Mauritshuis at the Hague to appreciate what an extraordinary outburst of
artistic skill and talent had at this time its birth within the narrow
limits of the northern Netherlands. To the student of Dutch history
these two galleries are a revelation, for there we see 17th century
Holland portrayed before us in every phase of its busy and prosperous
public, social and domestic life. Particularly is this the case with the
portraits of individuals and of civic and gild groups by Rembrandt,
Frans Hals, Van der Helst and their followers, which form an inimitable
series that has rarely been equalled. To realise to what an extent in
the midst of war the fine arts flourished in Holland, a mere list of the
best-known painters of the period will suffice, it tells its own tale.
They are given in the order of their dates: Frans Hals (1584-1666),
Gerard Honthorst (1592-1662), Jan van Goyen (1596-1656), Jan Wyvants
(1600-87), Albert Cuyp (1606-72), Jan Lievens (1607-63), Rembrandt van
Rhyn (1608-69), Gerard Terburg (1608-81), Adrian Brouwer (1608-41),
Ferdinand Bol (1609-81), Salomon Koning (1609-74), Andreas Both
(1609-60), Jan Both (1610-62), Adrian van Ostade (1610-85), Bartolomaus
van der Helst (1613-70), Gerard Douw (1613-80), Gabriel Metzu (1615-58),
Govaert Flinck (1615-60), Isaac van Ostade (1617-71), Aart van der Neer
(1619-83), Pieter de Koningh (1619-89), Philip Wouvermans (1620-68),
Pieter van der Hoogh (?), Nicolas Berchem (1624-83), Paul Potter
(1625-54), Jacob Ruysdael (1625-81), Meindert Hobbema (?), Jan Steen
(1626-79), Samuel van Hoogstraeten (1627-78), Ludolf Backhuizen
(1631-1709), Jan van der Meer of Delft (1632-?), Nicholas Maes
(1632-93), William van der Velde (1633-1707), Frans van Mieris
(1635-81), Caspar Netscher (1639-84), Adrian van der Velde (1639-72).

It is strange that little is known of the lives of the great majority of
these men; they are scarcely more than names, but their memory survives
in their works. No better proof could be brought of the general
abundance of money and at the same time of the widespread culture of the
land than the fact that art found among all classes so many patrons. The
aristocratic burgher-magistrates and the rich merchants loved to adorn
their houses with portraits and a choice selection of pictures; it was a
favourite investment of capital, and there was a certain amount of
rivalry among the principal families in a town like Amsterdam in being
possessed of a fine collection. The "Six" collection still remains as an
example upon the walls of the 17th century house of Burgomaster Six,
where it was originally placed. The governing bodies of gilds and
boards, members of corporations, the officers of the town _schutterij_
or of archer companies delighted to have their portraits hung around
their council chambers or halls of assembly. In the well-to-do
farmer-homesteads and even in the dwellings of the poorer classes
pictures were to be found, as one may see in a large number of the
"interiors" which were the favourite subject of the _genre_ painters of
the day. But with all this demand the artists themselves do not seem to
have in any case been highly paid. The prices were low. Even Rembrandt
himself, whose gains were probably much larger than those of any of
his contemporaries, and whose first wife, Saskia Uilenburg, was a woman
of means, became bankrupt in 1656, and this at a time when he was still
in his prime, and his powers at their height. Some of his most famous
pictures were produced at a later date.

During the Thirty Years' War Holland became the centre of the publishing
and book-selling trade; and Leyden and Amsterdam were famed as the
foremost seats of printing in Europe. The devastation of Germany and
the freedom of the press in the United Provinces combined to bring about
this result. The books produced by the Elseviers at Leyden and by Van
Waesberg and Cloppenburch at Amsterdam are justly regarded as fine
specimens of the printer's art, while the maps of Willem Jansz Blaeu and
his Dutch contemporaries were quite unrivalled, and marked a great step
forward in cartography.

This chapter must not conclude without a reference to the part taken by
the Netherlanders in the development of modern music and the modern
stage. The love of music was widespread; and the musicians of the
Netherlands were famed alike as composers and executants. It was from
its earlier home in the Low Countries that the art of modern music
spread into Italy and Germany and indeed into all Europe. Similarly in
the late Middle Ages the people of the Netherlands were noted for their
delight in scenic representations and for the picturesque splendour with
which they were carried out. The literary gilds, named Chambers of
Rhetoric, never took such deep root elsewhere; and in the performance of
Mystery Plays and Moralities and of lighter comic pieces (_chuttementen_
and _cluyten_) many thousands of tradespeople and artisans took part. In
the 17th century all the Chambers of Rhetoric had disappeared with the
single exception of the famous "Old Chamber" at Amsterdam, known as _The
Blossoming Eglantine_, to which the leading spirits of the Golden Age of
Dutch Literature belonged and which presided over the birth of the Dutch
Stage. From the first the stage was popular and well-supported; and the
new theatre of Amsterdam, the Schouburg (completed in 1637), became
speedily renowned for the completeness of its arrangements and the
ability of its actors. Such indeed was their reputation that travelling
companies of Dutch players visited the chief cities of Germany, Austria
and Denmark, finding everywhere a ready welcome and reaping a rich
reward, whilst at Stockholm for a time a permanent Dutch theatre was
established.

       *       *       *       *       *




CHAPTER XIII

THE STADHOLDERATE OF WILLIAM II.

THE GREAT ASSEMBLY


Upon the death of Frederick Henry of Orange (March, 1647), his only son
succeeded to his titles and estates and also by virtue of the Act of
Survivance to the offices of Stadholder in six provinces and to the
Captain-Generalship and Admiral-Generalship of the Union. William was
but twenty-one years of age and, having been excluded during Frederick
Henry's lifetime from taking any active part in affairs of state, he had
turned his energies into the pursuit of pleasure, and had been leading a
gay and dissolute life. His accession to power was, however, speedily to
prove that he was possessed of great abilities, a masterful will and a
keen and eager ambition. He had strongly disapproved of the trend of the
peace negotiations at Münster, and would have preferred with the help of
the French to have attempted to drive the Spaniards out of the southern
Netherlands. The preliminaries were, however, already settled in the
spring of 1647; and the determination of the province of Holland and
especially of the town of Amsterdam to conclude an advantageous peace
with Spain and to throw over France rendered the opposition of the young
Stadholder unavailing. But William, though he had perforce to acquiesce
in the treaty of Münster, was nevertheless resolved at the earliest
opportunity to undo it. Thus from the outset he found himself in a
pronounced antagonism with the province of Holland, which could only
issue in a struggle for supremacy similar to that with which his uncle
Maurice was confronted in the years that followed the truce of 1609,
and, to a less degree, his father after 1640.

Commerce was the predominant interest of the burgher-aristocracies who
held undisputed sway in the towns of Holland; and they, under the
powerful leadership of Amsterdam, were anxious that the peace they had
secured should not be disturbed. They looked forward to lightening
considerably the heavy load of taxation which burdened them, by reducing
the number of troops and of ships of war maintained by the States. To
this policy the young prince was resolutely opposed, and he had on his
side the prestige of his name and a vast body of popular support even
in Holland itself, among that great majority of the inhabitants, both of
town and country, who were excluded from all share in government and
administration and were generally Orangist in sympathy. He had also with
him the officers of the army and navy and the preachers. His chief
advisers were his cousin William Frederick, Stadholder of Friesland, and
Cornelis van Aerssens (son of Francis) lord of Sommelsdijk. By the
agency of Sommelsdijk he put himself in secret communication with Count
d'Estrades, formerly French ambassador at the Hague, now Governor of
Dunkirk, and through him with Mazarin, with the view of concluding an
alliance with France for the conquest of the Spanish Netherlands, and
for sending a joint expedition to England to overthrow the Parliamentary
forces and establish the Stewarts on the throne. Mazarin was at this
time, however, far too much occupied by his struggle with the Fronde to
listen to the overtures of a young man who had as yet given no proof of
being in a position to give effect to his ambitious proposals.
Nevertheless the prince was in stern earnest. In April, 1648, his
brother-in-law, James, Duke of York, had taken refuge at the Hague, and
was followed in July by the Prince of Wales. William received them with
open arms and, urged on by his wife, the Princess Royal, and by her aunt
the exiled Queen of Bohemia, who with her family was still residing at
the Hague, he became even more eager to assist in effecting a Stewart
restoration than in renewing the war with Spain. The difficulties in his
way were great. In 1648 public opinion in the States on the whole
favoured the Parliamentary cause. But, when the Parliament sent over Dr
Doreslaer and Walter Strickland as envoys to complain of royal ships
being allowed to use Dutch harbours, the States-General, through the
influence of the prince, refused them an audience. The Estates of
Holland on this gave a signal mark of their independence and antagonism
by receiving Doreslaer and forbidding the royal squadron to remain in
any of the waters of the Province.

The news of the trial of King Charles for high-treason brought about a
complete revulsion of feeling. The Prince of Wales himself in person
begged the States-General to intervene on his father's behalf; and the
proposal met with universal approval. It was at once agreed that Adrian
Pauw, the now aged leader of the anti-Orange party in Holland, should go
to London to intercede for the king's life. He was courteously received
on January 26 o.s., and was granted an audience by the House of Commons,
but the decision had already been taken and his efforts were
unavailing. The execution of the king caused a wave of horror to sweep
over the Netherlands, and an address of condolence was offered by the
States-General to the Prince of Wales; but, to meet the wishes of the
delegates of Holland, he was addressed not as King of Great Britain, but
simply as King Charles II, and it was agreed that Joachimi, the resident
ambassador in London, should not be recalled at present. The new English
Government on their part sent over once more Dr Doreslaer with friendly
proposals for drawing the two republics into closer union. Doreslaer,
who had taken part in the trial of Charles I, was specially obnoxious to
the royalist exiles, who had sought refuge in Holland. He landed on May
9. Three days later he was assassinated as he was dining at his hotel.
The murderers, five or six in number, managed to make their escape and
were never apprehended.

Although highly incensed by this outrage, the English Government did not
feel itself strong enough to take decided action. The Estates of Holland
expressed through Joachimi their abhorrence at what had occurred; and
the Parliament instructed Strickland to approach the States-General
again with friendly advances. The States-General refused to grant him an
audience, while receiving the envoy despatched by Charles II from
Scotland to announce his accession. The English Council of State had no
alternative but to regard this as a deliberate insult. Strickland was
recalled and left Holland, July 22. On September 26 Joachimi was ordered
to leave London. The breach between the two countries seemed to be
complete, but the Estates of Holland, who for the sake of their commerce
dreaded the thought of a naval war, did all in their power to work for
an accommodation. They received Strickland in a public audience before
his departure, and they ventured to send a special envoy to Whitehall,
Gerard Schaep, January 22, to treat with the Parliament. By this action
the Provincial Estates flouted the authority of the States-General and
entered into negotiations on their own account, as if they were an
independent State. The Hollanders were anxious to avoid war almost at
any price, but circumstances proved too strong for them.

In order to carry out this pacifist policy the Estates of Holland now
resolved to effect a large reduction of expenditure by disbanding a
portion of the troops and ships. When the peace of Münster was signed
the States possessed an army of 60,000 men, and all parties were agreed
that this large force might safely be reduced. In July 1648, a drastic
reduction was carried out, twenty-five thousand men being disbanded. The
Estates of Holland, however, demanded a further retrenchment of military
charges, but met with the strong opposition of the Prince and his cousin
William Frederick, who declared that an army of at least 30,000 was
absolutely necessary for garrisoning the frontier fortresses and
safeguarding the country against hostile attack. Their views had the
support of all the other provinces, but Holland was obdurate. In Holland
commerce reigned supreme; and the burgher-regents and merchants were
suspicious of the prince's warlike designs and were determined to thwart
them. Finding that the States-General refused to disband at their
dictation some fifty-five companies of the excellent foreign troops who
formed the kernel of the States' army, the Provincial Estates proceeded
to take matters into their own hands, and discharged a body of 600
foreign troops which were paid by the Province. In doing this they were
acting illegally. The old question of the sovereign rights of the
Provinces, which had been settled in 1619 by the sword of Maurice, was
once more raised. The States-General claimed to exercise the sole
authority in military matters. There were not seven armies in the Union,
but one army under the supreme command of the captain-general appointed
by the States-General. The captain-general was now but a young and
inexperienced man, but he had none of the hesitation and indecision
shown by his uncle Maurice in the troubles of 1618-19, and did not
shrink from the conflict with the dominant province to which he was
challenged.

For some time, indeed, wrangling went on. There was a strong minority in
the Estates of Holland opposed to extreme measures; and the
council-pensionary, Jacob Cats, was a moderate man friendly to the House
of Orange. An accommodation was reached on the subject of the disbanding
of the 600 foreign troops, but the conflict was renewed, and in the
middle of 1650 it assumed grave proportions. The heart and soul of the
opposition to the prince was Amsterdam. William had for some time been
urged by his Friesland cousin to take action, since the attitude of
Amsterdam threatened the dissolution of the Union. The prince was at
this time engaged in negotiating with France, but nothing had as yet
been settled, and his projects were not ripe for execution. Nevertheless
it was absolutely necessary for their realisation that the military
forces should not be excessively reduced. Under his influence the
States-General decided that, though the number of troops in the several
regiments should be decreased, the _cadres_ of all regiments with their
full quota of officers should be retained. To this the Estates of
Holland dissented, and finding that they could not prevail, they
determined on a daring step. Orders were sent (June 1, 1650) to the
colonels of the regiments on the Provincial war-sheet to disband their
regiments on pain of stoppage of pay. The colonels refused to take any
orders save from the Council of State and the captain-general. The
prince accordingly, with William Frederick and the Council of State,
appeared in the States-General and appealed to them to uphold the
colonels in their refusal. There could be no question that the Estates
of Holland were hopelessly in the wrong, for their representatives in
the States-General had in 1623,1626,1630 and 1642 voted for the
enforcement on recalcitrant provinces of the full quota at which they
were assessed for the payment of the army of the Union. The
States-General, June 5, therefore determined to send a "notable
deputation" to the towns of Holland. The prince was asked to head the
deputation, the members of which were to be chosen by him; and he was
invested with practically dictatorial powers to take measures for the
keeping of the peace and the maintenance of the Union. In doing this the
Generality were themselves acting _ultra vires_. The States-General was
an assembly consisting of the representatives of the Provincial Estates.
It could deal or treat therefore only with the Estates of the several
provinces, not with the individual towns within a province. In resisting
the interference of the Estates of Holland with matters that concerned
the Union as a whole, they were themselves infringing, by the commission
given to the "notable deputation," the jurisdiction of the Provincial
Estates over their own members.

The prince set out on June 8, and visited all the "privileged" towns.
The result was more than disappointing. The Council of the premier
municipality, Dordrecht, set the example by declaring that they were
answerable only to the Estates of the Province. Schiedam, Alkmaar, Edam
and Monnikendam gave the same reply. Delft and Haarlem were willing to
receive the prince as stadholder, but not the deputation. Amsterdam,
under the influence of the brothers Andries and Cornelis Bicker, went
even further and after some parleying declined to admit either the
deputation or the prince. On June 25 William returned to the Hague
bitterly chagrined by his reception and determined to crush resistance
by force.

The stroke he planned was to seize the representatives of six towns
which had been specially obstinate in their opposition, and at the same
time to occupy Amsterdam with an armed force. His preparations were
quickly made. On July 30 an invitation was sent to Jacob de Witt,
ex-burgomaster of Dordrecht, and five other prominent members of the
Estates of Holland, to visit the prince. On their arrival they were
arrested by the stadholder's guard, and carried off as prisoners to the
Castle of Loevestein. William had meanwhile left the execution of the
_coup-de-main_ against Amsterdam to his cousin William Frederick. The
arrangements for gathering together secretly a large force from various
garrisons were skilfully made, and it was intended at early dawn to
seize unexpectedly one of the gates, and then to march in and get
possession of the town without opposition. The plan, however,
accidentally miscarried. Some of the troops in the night having lost
their way, attracted the notice of a postal messenger on his way to
Amsterdam, who reported their presence to the burgomaster, Cornelis
Bicker. Bicker at once took action. The gates were closed, the council
summoned, and vigorous measures of defence taken. William Frederick
therefore contented himself with surrounding the city, so as to prevent
ingress or egress from the gates. On the next morning, July 31, William,
having learnt that the surprise attack had failed, set out for
Amsterdam, determined to compel its surrender. The council, fearing the
serious injury a siege would cause to its commerce, opened negotiations
(August 1). The prince, however, insisting on unconditional submission,
no other course was open. Amsterdam undertook to offer no further
opposition to the proposals of the States-General, and was compelled to
agree to the humiliating demand of the stadholder that the brothers
Bicker should not only resign their posts in the municipal government,
but should be declared ineligible for any official position in the
future.

The Prince of Orange had now secured the object at which he had aimed.
His authority henceforth rested on a firm basis. His opponents had been
overthrown and humiliated. The Estates of six provinces thanked him for
the success of his efforts, and he on his part met the general wish for
economy by agreeing to a reduction of the foreign troops in the pay of
the States on the distinct understanding that only the States-General
had the right to disband any portion of the forces, not the provincial
paymasters. In the flush of triumph William at the end of August left
the Hague for his country seat at Dieren, nominally for hunting and for
rest, in reality to carry on secret negotiations with France for the
furtherance of his warlike designs. The complete defeat of Charles II at
the battle of Worcester, September 3, must have been a severe blow to
his hopes for the restoration of the Stuarts, but it did not deter him
from pursuing his end. With d'Estrades, now Governor of Dunkirk, the
prince secretly corresponded, and through him matters were fully
discussed with the French Government. In a letter written from the Hague
on October 2, William expressed a strong wish that d'Estrades should
come in person to visit him; and it was the intention of d'Estrades to
accept this invitation as soon as he had received from Paris the copy of
a draft-treaty, which was being prepared. This draft-treaty, which was
probably drawn up by Mazarin, reached d'Estrades in the course of
October, but circumstantial evidence proves that it was never seen by
William. Its provisions were as follows. Both Powers were to declare war
on Spain and attack Flanders and Antwerp. The Dutch were to besiege
Antwerp, which city, if taken, was to become the personal appanage of
the Prince, of Orange. When the Spanish power in the southern
Netherlands had been overthrown, then France and the United Provinces
were to send a joint expedition to England to place Charles II on the
throne. Whether the prince would have approved these proposals we know
not; in all probability he would have declined to commit himself to a
plan of such a far-reaching and daring character, for he was aware of
the limitations of his power, and knew that even his great influence
would have been insufficient to obtain the consent of the States-General
to an immediate renewal of war. Speculation however is useless, for an
inexorable fate raised other issues.

On October 8 the stadholder returned to Dieren, on the 27th he fell ill
with an attack of small-pox. He was at once taken back to the Hague and
for some days he progressed favourably, but the illness suddenly took a
turn for the worse and he expired on November 6. The news of the
prince's death fell like a shock upon the country. Men could scarcely
believe their ears. William was only 24 years old; and, though his wife
gave birth to a son a week later, he left no heir capable of succeeding
to the high offices that he had held. The event was the more tragic,
following, as it did, so swiftly upon the _coup d'état_ of the previous
summer, and because of the youth and high promise of the deceased
prince. William II was undoubtedly endowed with high and brilliant
qualities of leadership, and he had proved his capacity for action with
unusual decision and energy. Had his life not been cut short, the course
of European politics might have been profoundly changed.

As was to be expected, the burgher-regents of Holland, when once the
first shock was over, lost no time in taking advantage of the
disappearance of the man who had so recently shown that he possessed the
power of the sword and meant to be their master. The States-General at
once met and requested the Provincial Estates to take steps to deal with
the situation. The Estates of Holland proposed that an extraordinary
assembly should be summoned. This was agreed to by the States-General;
and "the Great Assembly" met on January 11, 1651. In the meantime the
Holland regents had been acting. The Estates of that province were
resolved to abolish the stadholderates and to press the States-General
to suspend the offices of Captain-and Admiral-General of the Union.
Utrecht, Gelderland, Overyssel and Zeeland were induced to follow their
example. Groningen, however, elected William Frederick of Friesland to
be stadholder in the place of his cousin.

The "States party" in Holland had for their leaders the aged Adrian
Pauw, who had for so many years been the moving spirit of the opposition
in powerful Amsterdam to Frederick Henry's authority, and Jacob de Witt,
the imprisoned ex-burgomaster of Dordrecht. The "Orange party" was for
the moment practically impotent. Stunned by the death of their youthful
chief, they were hopelessly weakened and disorganised by the
dissensions and rivalries which surrounded the cradle of the infant
Prince of Orange. The princess royal quarrelled with her mother-in-law,
Amalia von Solms, over the guardianship of the child. Mary asserted her
right to be sole guardian; the dowager-princess wished to have her
son-in-law, the Elector of Brandenburg, associated with her as
co-guardian. After much bickering the question was at last referred to
the Council of State, who appointed the princess royal, the
dowager-princess and the elector jointly to the office. This decision
however was far from effecting a reconciliation between the mother and
the grandmother. Mary did not spare the Princess Amalia the humiliation
of knowing that she regarded her as inferior in rank and social standing
to the eldest daughter of a King of England. There was rivalry also
between the male relatives William Frederick, Stadholder of Friesland,
and Joan Maurice, the "Brazilian," both of them being ambitious of
filling the post of captain-general, either in succession to the dead
prince, or as lieutenant in the name of his son. In these circumstances
a large number of the more moderate Orangists were ready to assist the
"States party" in preventing any breach of the peace and securing that
the government of the republic should be carried on, if not in the
manner they would have wished, at least on stable and sound lines, so
far as possible in accordance with precedent.

The Great Assembly met on January 11,1651, in the Count's Hall in the
Binnenhof at the Hague. The sittings lasted until September, for there
were many important matters to be settled on which the representatives
of the seven provinces were far from being in entire agreement. The
chief controversies centred around the interpretation of the Utrecht Act
of Union, the Dordrecht principles, and military affairs. The last-named
proved the most thorny. The general result was decentralisation, and the
strengthening of the Provincial Estates at the expense of the
States-General. It was agreed that the established religion should be
that formulated at Dordrecht, that the sects should be kept in order,
and the placards against Roman Catholicism enforced. In accordance with
the proposal of Holland there was to be no captain-or admiral-general.
Brederode, with the rank of field-marshal, was placed at the head of the
army. The Provincial Estates were entrusted with considerable powers
over the troops in their pay. The effect of this, and of the decision
of five provinces to dispense with a stadholder and to transfer his
power and prerogatives to the Estate