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Title: Plutarch's Lives Volume III.

Author: Plutarch

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PLUTARCH'S LIVES.

Translated from the Greek

WITH

_NOTES AND A LIFE OF PLUTARCH_.

BY

AUBREY STEWART, M.A.,
_Late Fellow of Trinity College, Cambridge_,

AND THE LATE

GEORGE LONG, M.A.,
_Formerly Fellow of Trinity College, Cambridge_,.

IN FOUR VOLUMES.

VOL. III.

LONDON:

GEORGE BELL & SONS, YORK ST., COVENT GARDEN,
AND NEW YORK.

1892.

LONDON:

REPRINTED FROM THE STEREOTYPE PLATES BY WM. CLOWES & SONS, LTD.,

STAMFORD STREET AND CHARING CROSS.




CONTENTS.

  LIFE OF NIKIAS                                    1
  LIFE OF CRASSUS (_By G. Long_.)                  36
  COMPARISON OF NIKIAS AND CRASSUS                 89
  LIFE OF SERTORIUS (_By G. Long_.)                94
  LIFE OF EUMENES                                 130
  COMPARISON OF SERTORIUS AND EUMENES             150
  LIFE OF AGESILAUS                               152
  LIFE OF POMPEIUS (_By G. Long_.)                195
  COMPARISON OF AGESILAUS AND POMPEIUS            295
  LIFE OF ALEXANDER                               300
  LIFE OF C. CAESAR (_By G. Long_.)                379
  LIFE OF PHOKION                                 466
  LIFE OF CATO (_By G. Long_.)                    500



PLUTARCH'S LIVES.




LIFE OF NIKIAS.

As it appears to me that the life of Nikias forms a good parallel to
that of Crassus, and that the misfortunes of the former in Sicily may
be well compared with those of the latter in Parthia, I must beg of my
readers to believe that in writing upon a subject which has been
described by Thucydides with inimitable grace, clearness, and pathos,
I have no ambition to imitate Timaeus, who, when writing his history,
hoped to surpass Thucydides himself in eloquence, and to show that
Philistius was but an ignorant bungler, and so plunges into an account
of the speeches and battles of his heroes, proving himself not merely
one

    "Who toils on foot afar
    Behind the Lydian car,"

as Pindar has it, but altogether unfit for the office of historian,
and, in the words of Diphilus,

     "Dull-witted, with Sicilian fat for brains."

He often seeks to shelter himself behind the opinions of Xenarchus, as
when he tells us that the Athenians thought it a bad omen that the
general whose name was Victory refused to command the expedition to
Sicily; and when he says that by the mutilation of the Hennas the gods
signified that the Athenians would suffer their chief disasters at the
hands of Hermokrates the son of Hermon; or, again, when he observes
that Herakles might be expected to take the side of the Syracusans
because of Proserpine, the daughter of Demeter, who gave him the dog
Kerberus, and to be angry with the Athenians because they protected
the people of Egesta, who were descended from the Trojans, whereas he
had been wronged by Laomedon, king of Troy, and had destroyed that
city. Timaeus was probably led to write this sort of nonsense by the
same critical literary spirit which led him to correct the style of
Philistius, and to find fault with that of Aristotle and Plato. My own
opinion is that to pay too much attention to mere style and to
endeavour to surpass that of other writers, is both trifling and
pedantic, while any attempt to reproduce that of the unapproachable
masterpieces of antiquity springs from a want of power to appreciate
their real value. With regard, then, to the actions of Nikias
described by Thucydides and Philistius, more especially those which
illustrate his true character, having been performed under the stress
of terrible disasters, I shall briefly recapitulate them, lest I be
thought a careless biographer, adding to them whatever scattered
notices I have been able to collect from the writings of other
historians and from public documents and inscriptions; and of these
latter I shall quote only those which enable us to judge what manner
of man he was.

II. The first thing to be noted in describing Nikias is the saying of
Aristotle, that there had been in Athens three citizens of great
ability and patriotism, namely, Nikias, the son of Nikeratus,
Thucydides, the son of Melesias, and Theramenes, the son of Hagnon;
though the latter was not equal to the two former, but was reproached
with being a foreigner from the island of Keos; and, also, because he
was not a stable politician but always inclined to change sides, he
was nicknamed Kothornos, which means a large boot which will fit
either leg. Of these three statesmen the eldest was Thucydides, who
was the leader of the conservative opposition to Perikles; while
Nikias, who was a younger man, rose to a certain eminence during the
life of Perikles, as he acted as his colleague in the command of a
military force, and also filled the office of archon. On the death of
Perikles, Nikias at once became the foremost man in Athens, chiefly by
the favour of the rich and noble, who wished to make use of him to
check the plebeian insolence of Kleon; yet Nikias had the good-will
of the common people, and they were eager to further his interests.
Kleon, indeed, became very powerful by caressing the people and giving
them opportunities for earning money from the State, but in spite of
this, many of the lower classes whose favour he especially strove to
obtain, became disgusted with, his greed and insolence, and preferred
to attach themselves to Nikias. Indeed, there was nothing harsh or
overbearing in the pride of Nikias, which arose chiefly from his fear
of being thought to be currying favour with the people. By nature he
was downhearted and prone to despair, but in war these qualities were
concealed by his invariable success in whatever enterprise he
undertook; while in political life his retiring manner and his dread
of the vulgar demagogues, by whom he was easily put out of
countenance, added to his popularity; for the people fear those who
treat them with haughtiness, and favour those who respect and fear
them. The reason of this is that the greatest honour which the
populace can receive from a great man is not to be treated with
contempt by him.

III. Perikles, indeed, used to govern Athens by sheer force of
character and eloquence, and required no tricks of manner or plausible
speeches to gain him credit with the populace; but Nikias had no
natural gifts of this sort, and owed his position merely to his
wealth. As he could not vie with Kleon in the versatile and humorous
power of speech by which the latter swayed the Athenian masses, he
endeavoured to gain the favour of the people by supplying choruses for
the public dramatic performances and instituting athletic sports on a
scale of lavish expenditure which never before had been equalled by
any citizen. The statue of Pallas, erected by him in the Acropolis, is
standing at this day, although it has lost the gold with which it was
formerly adorned, and also the building which supports the choragic
tripods in the temple of Dionysus, for he often gained a victory when
choragus, and never was vanquished.

It is said that once during the performance of a play at his expense,
a slave of his appeared upon the stage habited as Dionysus; a tall and
handsome youth, and still beardless. The Athenians were charmed with
his appearance, and applauded for a long time, at the end of which
Nikias rose and said that he did not think it right that one whose
body was thus consecrated to a god should be a slave; and consequently
he gave him his freedom. Tradition also tells us how magnificently and
decorously he arranged the procession at Delos. In former times the
choruses sent by the cities of Ionia to sing to the glory of the god
used to sail up to the island in a disorderly fashion, and were at
once met by a rude mob, who called upon, them to sing, so that they
disembarked in a hurry, huddling on their garlands and robes with
unseemly haste and confusion. Nikias disembarked with his chorus upon
the little island of Rhenea close by, with all their vestments and
holy things, and then during the night bridged the strait--which is
very narrow--with a bridge of boats which he had had made at Athens
expressly, which was beautifully ornamented with gilding and rich
tapestry. Next morning at daybreak, he led the procession to the god
over this bridge, with his chorus very richly dressed, and singing as
they passed over the strait. After the sacrifice, the public games,
and the banquet, he set up the brazen palm-tree as an offering to the
god, and also set apart an estate which he had bought for ten thousand
drachmas, as sacred to the god. With the revenues of this land the
people of Delos were to offer sacrifice and to provide themselves with
a feast, and were to pray the gods to bestow blessings on Nikias. All
these injunctions to the people of Delos were inscribed upon a pillar
which he left there to guard his bequest. The palm-tree was afterwards
overturned by a high wind, and in its fall destroyed the great statue
which had been set up by the people of Naxos.

IV. These acts of Nikias may have been prompted by ambition and desire
for display, but when viewed in connection with his superstitious
character they seem more probably to have been the outcome of his
devotional feelings; for we are told by Thucydides that he was one who
stood greatly in awe of the gods, and was wholly devoted to religion.
In one of the dialogues of Pasiphon, we read that he offered sacrifice
daily, and that he kept a soothsayer in his house, whom he pretended
to consult upon affairs of state, but really sought his advice about
his own private concerns, especially about his silver mines. He had
extensive mines at Laurium, the working of which afforded him very
large profits, but yet was attended with great risks. He maintained a
large body of slaves at the works; and most of his property consisted
of the silver produced by them. For this reason he was surrounded by
hangers-on, and persons who endeavoured to obtain a share of his
wealth, and he gave money to all alike, both to those who might do him
harm, and to those who really deserved his liberality, for he gave to
bad men through fear, and to good men through good nature. We may find
proof of this in the writings of the comic poets. Telekleides,
speaking of some informer, says:

    "Charikles a mina gave him, fearing he might say
    Charikles himself was born in a suspicious way;
    And Nikias five minas gave. Now, what his reasons were
    I know full well, but will not tell, for he's a trusty fere."

Eupolis, too, in his comedy of Marikas has a scene where an informer
meets with a poor man who is no politician, and says:

    "A. Say where you last with Nikias did meet.
    B. Never. Save once I saw him in the street.
    A. He owns he saw him. Wherefore should he say
    He saw him, if he meant not to betray
    His crimes?
    C.          My friends, you all perceive the fact,
    That Nikias is taken in the act.
    B. Think you, O fools, that such a man as he
    In any wicked act would taken be."

Just so does Kleon threaten him in Aristophanes's play:

     "The orators I'll silence, and make Nikias afraid."

Phrynichus, too, sneers at his cowardice and fear of the popular
demagogues, when he says:

    "An honest citizen indeed he was,
    And not a coward like to Nikias."

V. Nikias feared so much to give the mob orators grounds for
accusation against him, that he dared not so much as dine with his
follow citizens, and pass his time in their society. Nor did he have
any leisure at all for such amusements, but when general, he used to
spend the whole day in the War office, and when the Senate met he
would be the first to come to the house and the last to leave it. When
there was no public business to be transacted, he was hard to meet
with, as he shut himself up in his house and seldom stirred abroad.
His friends used to tell those who came to his door that they must
pardon him for not receiving them, as he was not at leisure, being
engaged on public business of great importance. One Hieron, whom he
had brought up in his house and educated, assisted him greatly in
throwing this air of mystery and haughty exclusiveness over his life.
This man gave out that he was the son of Dionysius, called Chalkus,
whose poems are still extant, and who was the leader of the expedition
to Italy to found the city of Thurii. Hiero used to keep Nikias
supplied with prophetic responses from the soothsayers, and gave out
to the Athenians that Nikias was toiling night and day on their
behalf, saying that when he was in his bath or at his dinner he was
constantly being interrupted by some important public business or
other, so that, said he, "His night's rest is broken by his labours,
and his private affairs are neglected through his devotion to those of
the public. He has injured his health, and besides losing his fortune,
has been deserted by many of his friends on account of his not being
able to entertain them and make himself agreeable to them; while other
men find in politics a means of obtaining both friends and fortune, at
the expense of the state." In very truth the life of Nikias was such
that he might well apply to himself the words of Agamemnon.

    "In outward show and stately pomp all others I exceed,
    And yet the people's underling I am in very deed."

VI. Perceiving that the Athenian people were willing enough to make
use of the talents of men of ability, and yet ever viewed them with
suspicion and checked them when in full career, as we may learn from
their condemnation of Perikles, their banishment of Damon by
ostracism, and their mistrust of Antiphon the Rhamnusian, and
especially in their treatment of Paches the conqueror of Lesbos, who
while his conduct as general was being enquired into, stabbed himself
in the open court--perceiving this, Nikias always avoided, as far as
he could, taking the command in any important military expedition.
Whenever he was employed as general, he acted with extreme caution,
and was usually successful. He was careful to attribute his success,
not to any skill or courage of his own, but to fortune, being willing
to lessen his glory to avoid the ill-will of mankind. His good fortune
was indeed shown in many remarkable instances: for example, he never
was present at any of the great defeats sustained by the Athenians at
that time, as in Thrace they were defeated by the Greeks of
Chalkidike, but on that occasion Kalliades and Xenophon were acting as
generals, while the defeat in AEtolia took place when Demosthenes was
in command, and at Delium, where a thousand men were slain, they were
led by Hippokrates. For the pestilence Perikles was chiefly blamed,
because he shut up the country people in the city, where the change of
habits and unusual diet produced disease among them. In all these
disasters Nikias alone escaped censure: while he achieved several
military successes, such as the capture of Kythera, an island
conveniently situated off the coast of Laconia, and inhabited by
settlers from that country. He also captured several of the revolted
cities in Thrace, and induced others to return to their allegiance. He
shut up the people of Megara in their city, and thereby at once made
himself master of the island of Minoa, by means of which he shortly
afterwards captured the port of Nisaea, while he also landed his troops
in the Corinthian territory, and beat a Corinthian army which marched
against him, killing many of them, and amongst others Lykophron their
general. On this occasion he accidentally neglected to bury the
corpses of two of his own men who had fallen. As soon as he discovered
this omission, he at once halted his army, and sent a herald to the
enemy to demand the bodies for burial, notwithstanding that by Greek
custom the party which after a battle demand a truce for the burial of
the dead, are understood thereby to admit that they have been
defeated, and it is not thought light for them to erect a trophy in
commemoration of their victory; for the victors remain in possession
of the field of battle, and of the bodies of the dead, and the
vanquished ask for their dead because they are not able to come and
take them. Nevertheless, Nikias thought it right to forego all the
credit of his victory rather than leave two of his countrymen
unburied. He also laid waste the seaboard of Laconia, defeated a
Lacedaemonian force which opposed him,and took Thyrea, which was
garrisoned by AEginetans, whom he brought prisoners to Athens.

VII. Now when Demosthenes threw up a fortification at Pylos, and after
the Peloponnesians had attacked him by sea and by land, some four
hundred Spartans wore left on the island of Sphakteria, the Athenians
thought that it was a matter of great importance, as indeed it was, to
take them prisoners. Yet, as it proved laborious and difficult to
blockade them on the island, because the place was desert and
waterless, so that provisions had to be brought from a great distance
by sea, which was troublesome enough in summer, and would be quite
impossible in winter, they began to be weary of the enterprise, and
were sorry that they had rejected the proposals for peace which had
shortly before been made by the Tasmanians. These proposals were
rejected chiefly because Kleon opposed them. Kleon's opposition was
due to his personal dislike to Nikias; and when he saw him
enthusiastically exerting himself on behalf of the Lacedaemonians, he
at once took the other side, and persuaded the people to reject the
proffered peace. Now as the blockade dragged on for a long time, and
the Athenians learned to what straits their army was reduced, they
became angry with Kleon. He threw the blame upon Nikias, asserting
that it was through his remissness and want of enterprise that the
Spartans still held out, and declaring that, were he himself in chief
command they would soon be captured. Upon this the Athenians turned
round upon him and said, "Why, then, do not you yourself proceed
thither and capture them?" Nikias at once offered to transfer his
command to Kleon, and bade him take what troops he thought necessary,
and, instead of swaggering at home where there was no danger, go and
perform some notable service to the state. At first Kleon was
confused by this unexpected turn of the debate, and declined the
command; but as the Athenians insisted upon it, and Nikias urged him
to do so, he plucked up spirit, accepted the office of general, and
even went so far as to pledge himself within twenty days either to
kill the Spartans on the island or to bring them prisoners to Athens.
The Athenians were more inclined to laugh at this boast than to
believe it; for they were well acquainted with the vainglorious
character of the man, and had often amused themselves at his expense.
It is said that once the public assembly met early and sat for a long
time waiting for Kleon, who came at last very late with a garland on
his head, and begged them to put off their debate till the next day.
"To-day," said he, "I am not at leisure, as I have just offered a
sacrifice, and am about to entertain some strangers at dinner." The
Athenians laughed at his assurance, and broke up the assembly.

VIII. However, on this occasion, by good fortune and good generalship,
with the help of Demosthenes, he brought home prisoners all those
Spartans who had not fallen in the battle, within the time which he
had appointed. This was a great reproach to Nikias. It seemed worse
even than losing his shield in battle that he should through sheer
cowardice and fear of failure give up his office of general, and give
his personal enemy such an opportunity of exalting himself at his
expense, depriving himself voluntarily of his honourable charge.
Aristophanes sneers at him in his play of the 'Birds,' where he says:

    "We must not now, like Nikias, delay,
    And see the time for action pass away."

And again in the play of the 'Farmers,' where this dialogue occurs:

    "A. I want to till my farm.
     B.           And wherefore no?
     A. 'Tis you Athenians will not let me go;
        A thousand drachmas I would give, to be
        From office in the state for ever free.
     B. Your offer we accept. The state will have
        Two thousand, with what Nikias just gave."

Moreover, Nikias did Athens much harm by permitting Kleon to attain
to such a height of power and reputation, which gave him such
exaggerated confidence in himself that he grew quite unmanageable, and
caused many terrible disasters, by which Nikias suffered as much as
any man. Kleon also was the first to break through the decorum
observed by former public speakers, by shouting, throwing back his
cloak, slapping his thigh, and walking up and down while speaking,
which led to the total disregard of decency and good manners among
public speakers, and eventually was the ruin of the state.

IX. About this time Alkibiades began to gain credit in Athens as a
public speaker, less licentious than Kleon, and like the soil of Egypt
described by Homer, which bears

     "A mingled crop of good and bad alike."

Thus Alkibiades, with immense powers both for good and evil, produced
great changes in the affairs of Athens. Nikias, even if he had been
freed from the opposition of Kleon, could not now have quietly
consolidated the power of the state, for as soon as he had arranged
matters in a fair way to produce peace and quiet, Alkibiades, to
satisfy his own furious ambition, threw them again into confusion and
war. This was brought about by the following circumstances. The two
chief hindrances to peace were Kleon and Brasidas; as war concealed
the baseness of the former, and added to the glory of the latter.
Kleon was able to commit many crimes undetected, and Brasidas
performed many great exploits while the war lasted; wherefore, when
both of these men fell before the walls of Amphipolis, Nikias,
perceiving that the Spartans had long been desirous of peace, and that
the Athenians no longer hoped to gain anything by continuing the war,
and that both parties were weary of it, began to consider how he might
reconcile them, and also pacify all the other states of Greece, so as
to establish peace upon a durable and prosperous basis. At Athens, the
richer classes, the older men, and the country farmers all wished for
peace. By constantly arguing with the others he gradually made them
less eager for war, and at length was able to intimate to the Spartans
that there were good hopes of coming to terms. They willingly believed
him because of his high character for probity, and more especially
because he had shown great kindness to the Spartan prisoners taken at
Pylos. A truce for one year had already been arranged between them,
and during this they conversed freely with one another, and, enjoying
a life of leisure and freedom from the restraints and alarms of war,
began to long for an unbroken period of peace, and to sing:

     "My spear the spider's home shall be,"

remembering with pleasure the proverb that in time of peace men are
awakened, not by trumpets, but by crowing cocks. They railed at those
who said that it was fated that the war should last thrice nine years,
and, having thus accustomed themselves to discuss the whole question,
they proceeded to make peace, and thought that now they were indeed
free from all their troubles. The name of Nikias was now in every
man's mouth, and he was called the favourite of heaven, and the man
chosen by the gods for his piety to confer the greatest of blessings
upon the Greeks. For they regarded the peace as the work of Nikias,
just as the war had been the work of Perikles. The latter, they
thought, for no adequate reasons, had involved the Greeks in the
greatest miseries, while the former had relieved them of their
troubles by persuading them to become friends. For this reason this
peace is to this day called the peace of Nikias.

X. The terms of the peace were that each party should restore the
cities and territory which it had taken, and that it should be
determined by lot which side should restore its conquests first. We
are told by Theophrastus that Nikias, by means of bribery, arranged
that the lot should fall upon the Lacedaemonians to make restitution
first. When, however, the Corinthians and Boeotians, dissatisfied with
the whole transaction, seemed likely by their complaints and menaces
to rekindle the war, Nikias induced Athens and Sparta to confirm the
peace by entering upon an alliance, which enabled them to deal with
the malcontents with more authority, and give them more confidence in
one another.

All these transactions greatly displeased Alkibiades, who was
naturally disinclined to peace, and who hated the Lacedaemonians
because they paid their court to Nikias and disregarded him. For this
reason, Alkibiades from the very outset opposed the peace, but
ineffectually at first. When, however, he observed that the
Lacedaemonians were no longer regarded with favour by the Athenians,
and were thought to have wronged them by forming an alliance with the
Boeotians, and not restoring to Athens up the cities of Panaktus and
Amphipolis, he seized the opportunity of exciting the people by
exaggerated accounts of the misdeeds of the Lacedaemonians. Moreover he
prevailed upon the people of Argos to send ambassadors to Athens to
conclude an alliance. As, however, at the same time ambassadors, with
full powers to settle all matters in dispute, came from Lacedaemon, and
in a preliminary conference with the Senate were thought to have made
very reasonable and just proposals, Alkibiades, fearing that they
might create an equally favourable impression when they spoke before
the popular assembly, deceived them by solemnly declaring with an oath
that he would assist them in every way that he could, provided that
they would deny that they came with full powers to decide, saying that
by this means alone they would effect their purpose. The ambassadors
were deceived by his protestations, and, forsaking Nikias, relied
entirely upon him. Upon this Alkibiades brought them into the public
assembly, and there asked them if they came with full powers to treat.
When they said that they did not, he unexpectedly turned round upon
them, and calling both the Senate and the people to witness their
words, urged them to pay no attention to men who were such evident
liars, and who said one thing in one+ assembly and the opposite in
another. The ambassadors, as Alkibiades expected, were thunderstruck,
and Nikias could say nothing on their behalf. The people at once
called for the ambassadors from Argos to be brought before them, in
order to contract an alliance with that city, but an earthquake which
was felt at this moment greatly served Nikias's purpose by causing
the assembly to break up. With great difficulty, when the debate was
resumed on the following day, he prevailed upon the people to break
off the negotiations with Argos, and to send him as ambassador to
Sparta, promising that he would bring matters to a prosperous issue.
Accordingly he proceeded to Sparta, where he was treated with great
respect as a man of eminence and a friend of the Lacedaemonians, but
could effect nothing because of the preponderance of the party which
inclined to the Boeotian alliance. He was therefore forced to return
ingloriously, in great fear of the anger of the Athenians, who had
been persuaded by him to deliver up so many and such important
prisoners to the Lacedaemonians without receiving any equivalent. For
the prisoners taken at Pylos were men of the first families in Sparta,
and related to the most powerful statesmen there. The Athenians,
however, did not show their dissatisfaction with Nikias by any harsh
measures, but they elected Alkibiades general, and they entered into a
treaty of alliance with the Argives, and also with the states of Elis
and Mantinea, which had revolted from the Lacedaemonians, while they
sent out privateers to Pylos to plunder the Lacedaemonian coasts in the
neighbourhood of that fortress. These measures soon produced a renewal
of the war.

XI. As the quarrel between Nikias and Alkibiades had now reached such
a pitch, it was decided that the remedy of ostracism must be applied
to them. By this from time to time the people of Athens were wont to
banish for ten years any citizen whose renown or wealth rendered him
dangerous to the state. Great excitement was caused by this measure,
as one or the other must be utterly ruined by its application. The
Athenians were disgusted by the licentiousness of Alkibiades, and
feared his reckless daring, as has been explained at greater length in
his Life, while Nikias was disliked because of his great wealth and
his reserved and unpopular mode of life. Moreover he had frequently
offended the people by acting in direct opposition to their wishes,
forcing them in spite of themselves to do what was best for them. On
the one side were arrayed the young men and those who wished for war,
and on the other the older men and the party of peace, who would be
sure to vote respectively, one for the banishment of Nikias, the other
for that of Alkibiades. Now

     "In revolutions bad men rise to fame,"

and it appears that the violence of these factions at Athens gave an
opportunity for the lowest and basest citizens to gain reputation.
Amongst these was one Hyperbolus, of the township of Peirithois, a man
of no ability or power, but who owed his elevation to sheer audacity,
and whose influence was felt to be a disgrace to Athens. This man, who
never dreamed that ostracism would be applied to him, as the pillory
would have been more suitable to his deserts, openly showed his
delight at the discord between Nikias and Alkibiades, and excited the
people to deal severely with them, because he hoped that if one of
them were to be banished, he might succeed to his place, and become a
match for the one who was left behind. But the parties which supported
Nikias and Alkibiades respectively made a secret compact with one
another to suppress this villain, and so arranged matters that neither
of their leaders, but Hyperbolus himself was banished by ostracism for
ten years. This transaction delighted and amused the people for the
moment, but they were afterwards grieved that they had abused this
safeguard of their constitution by applying it to an unworthy object,
as there was a kind of dignity about the punishment which they had
inflicted. Ostracism in the case of men like Thucydides and
Aristeides, was a punishment, but when applied to men like Hyperbolus,
it became an honour and mark of distinction, as though his crimes had
put him on a par with the leading spirits of the age. Plato, the comic
poet, wrote of him

    "Full worthy to be punished though he be,
    Yet ostracism's not for such as he."

The result was that no one was ever again ostracised at Athens, but
Hyperbolus was the last, as Hipparchus of Cholargus, who was some
relation to the despot of that name, was the first. Thus the ways of
fortune are inscrutable, and beyond our finding out. If Nikias had
undergone the trial of ostracism with Alkibiades, he would either
have driven him into banishment, and governed Athens well and wisely
during his absence, or he would himself have left the city, and
avoided the terrible disaster which ended his life, and would have
continued to enjoy the reputation of being an excellent general. I am
well aware that Theophrastus says that Hyperbolus was ostracised in
consequence of a quarrel of Alkibiades with Phaeax and not with Nikias;
but my account agrees with that given by the best historians.

XII. When ambassadors came to Athens from Egesta and Leontini,
inviting the Athenians to commence a campaign in Sicily, Nikias
opposed the project, but was overruled by Alkibiades and the war
party. Before the assembly met to discuss the matter, men's heads were
completely turned with vague hopes of conquest, so that the youths in
the gymnasia, and the older men in their places of business or of
recreation, did nothing but sketch the outline of the island of Sicily
and of the adjacent seas and continents. They regarded Sicily not so
much as a prize to be won, but as a stepping-stone to greater
conquests, meaning from it to attack Carthage, and make themselves
masters of the Mediterranean sea as far as the Columns of Herakles.
Public opinion being thus biassed, Nikias could find few to help him
in opposing the scheme. The rich feared lest they should be thought to
wish to avoid the burden of fitting out ships and the other expensive
duties which they would be called upon to fulfil, and disappointed him
by remaining silent. Yet Nikias did not relax his exertions, but even
after the Athenian people had given their vote for the war, and had
elected him to the chief command, with Alkibiades and Lamachus for his
colleagues--even then, on the next meeting of the assembly, he made a
solemn appeal to them to desist, and at last accused Alkibiades of
involving the city in a terrible war in a remote country merely to
serve his own ambition and rapacity. However, he gained nothing by
this speech, for the Athenians thought that he would be the best man
to command the expedition because of his experience in war, and that
his caution would serve as a salutary check upon the rashness of
Alkibiades and the easy temper of Lamachus; so that, instead of
dissuading them his words rather confirmed them in their intention.
For Demostratus, who of all the popular orators was the most eager
promoter of the expedition, rose, and said that he would put an end to
these excuses of Nikias: and he prevailed upon the people to pass a
decree that the generals, both at home and in the field, should be
invested with absolute irresponsible power.

XIII. Yet it is said that the expedition met with great opposition
from the priests; but Alkibiades found certain soothsayers devoted to
his own interests, and quoted an ancient oracle which foretold that
the Athenians should one day win great glory in Sicily. Special
messengers also came from the shrine of Ammon,[1] bringing an oracular
response to the effect that the Athenians would take all the
Syracusans. Those oracles which made against the project, people dared
not mention, for fear of saying words of ill-omen. Yet even the most
obvious portents would not turn them from their purpose, such as the
mutilation of all the Hermae, or statues of Hermes, in Athens, in a
single night, except only one, which is called the Hermes of
Andokides, which was erected by the tribe AEgeis, and stands before the
house in which Andokides lived at that time. A man likewise leaped
upon the altar of the Twelve Gods, sat astride upon it, and in that
posture mutilated himself with a sharp stone. At Delphi too there is a
golden statue of Pallas Athene standing upon a brazen palm tree, an
offering made by the city of Athens from the spoils taken in the
Persian war. This was for many days pecked at by crows, who at last
pecked off and cast upon the ground the golden fruit of the palm tree.
This was said to be merely a fable invented by the people of Delphi,
who were bribed by the Syracusans. Another oracle bade the Athenians
bring to Athens the priestess of Athena at Klazomenae, and accordingly
they sent for her. Her name happened to be Hesychia, signifying
Repose; and this is probably what the oracle meant that the Athenians
had better remain quiet. The astronomer, Meton, who was appointed to
some office in the army, either because of these adverse omens and
prophecies, or because he was convinced that the expedition would
miscarry, pretended to be mad and to set fire to his house. Some
historians relate that he did not feign madness, but that he burned
down his house one night, and next morning appeared in the
market-place in a miserable plight, and besought his countrymen that,
in consideration of the misfortune which had befallen him, they would
allow his son, who was about to sail for Sicily in command of a
trireme, to remain at home. We are told that Sokrates the philosopher
was warned by one of the signs from heaven which he so often received
that the expedition would be the ruin of the city. And many were
filled with consternation at the time fixed for the departure of the
armament. It was during the celebration of the Adonia, or mourning for
the death of Adonis, and in all parts of the city were to be seen
images of Adonis carried along with funeral rites, and women beating
their breasts, so that those who were superstitious enough to notice
such matters became alarmed for the fate of the armament, and foretold
that it would start forth gloriously, but would wither untimely away.

XIV. The conduct of Nikias in opposing the war when it was being
deliberated upon, and his steadfastness of mind in not being dazzled
by the hopes which were entertained of its success, or by the splendid
position which it offered himself, deserves the utmost praise; but
when, in spite of his exertions, he could not persuade the people to
desist from the war, or to remove him from the office of general, into
which he was as it were driven by main force, his excessive caution
and slowness became very much out of place. His childish regrets, his
looking back towards Athens, and his unreasonable delays disheartened
his colleagues, and spoiled the effect of the expedition, which ought
at once to have proceeded to act with vigour, and put its fortune to
the test. But although Lamachus begged him to sail at once to Syracuse
and fight a battle as near as possible to the city walls, while
Alkibiades urged him to detach the other Sicilian states from their
alliance with Syracuse, and then attack that place, he dispirited his
men by refusing to adopt either plan, and proposed to sail quietly
along the coast, displaying the fleet and army to the Sicilians, and
then, after affording some slight assistance to the people of Egesta,
to return home to Athens. Shortly after this, the Athenians sent for
Alkibiades to return home for his trial on a charge of treason, and
Nikias, who was nominally Lamachus's colleague, but really absolute,
proceeded to waste time in idle negotiations and languid manoeuvres,
until his troops had quite lost the high spirits and hopes with which
they had arrived at Sicily; while the enemy, who were at first
terrified, began to recover their spirits, and despise the Athenians.
While Alkibiades was still with them they had sailed to Syracuse with
sixty ships, and while the rest remained in line of battle outside,
ten of these had entered the harbour to reconnoitre. These ships,
approaching the city, made a proclamation by a herald that they were
come to restore the people of Leontini to their city, and they also
captured a Syracusan vessel, in which they found tables on which were
written the names of all the inhabitants of Syracuse, according to
their tribes and houses. These tables were kept far away from the
city, in the temple of the Olympian Zeus, but at that time the
Syracusans had sent for them in order to discover the number of men
able to bear arms. These tables were now taken by the Athenians, and
carried to their general. When the soothsayers saw this roll of names,
they were much alarmed, fearing that this was the fulfilment of the
prophecy that the Athenians should capture all the Syracusans.
However, some declare that the prophecy was really fulfilled when the
Athenian Kallippus slew Dion, and captured Syracuse.

XV. Shortly after this, Alkibiades left Sicily, and the supreme
command devolved upon Nikias. For Lamachus, though a brave and honest
man, and one who always freely risked his life in battle, was but a
plain simple man, and was so excessively poor, that whenever he was
appointed general he was forced to ask the Athenians to advance him a
small sum of money to provide him with clothes and shoes. Now Nikias
was excessively haughty, both on account of his great wealth, and his
military renown. It is said that once when the generals were debating
some question together, Nikias bade Sophokles the poet give his
opinion first, because he was the eldest man present, to which
Sophokles answered, "I am the eldest, but you are the chief." Thus
when in Sicily he domineered over Lamachus, although the latter was a
far abler soldier, and by sailing about the coast at the point
furthest removed from the enemy, gave them confidence, which was
turned into contempt, when he was repulsed from Hybla, a little fort
in the interior. At last he returned to Katana, without having
effected anything, except the reduction of Hykkara, a town of the
aborigines, not of the Greeks, from which it is said the celebrated
courtezan Lais, then a very young girl, was carried away captive and
sent to Peloponnesus.

XVI. As the summer advanced, and Nikias remained inactive, the
Syracusans gained so much confidence that they called upon their
generals to lead them to the attack of the Athenian position at
Katana, since the Athenians did not dare approach Syracuse; while
Syracusan horsemen even went so far as to insult the Athenians in
their camp, riding up to ask if they were come to settle as peaceful
citizens in Katana, instead of restoring the Leontines. This
unexpected humiliation at length forced Nikias to proceed to Syracuse,
and he devised a stratagem by which he was able to approach that city
and pitch his camp before it unmolested.

He despatched to Syracuse a citizen of Katana, who informed the
Syracusans that if they desired to seize the camp and arms of the
Athenians, they would only have to appoint a day and to march in force
to Katana. Many of the Athenians, he said, spent all their time within
the walls of Katana, and it would be easy for the Syracusan party
there to close the gates, assail the Athenians within, and set fire to
their ships. A numerous body of Kataneans, he added, were eager to
co-operate in the plan now proposed.

This was by far the ablest piece of strategy accomplished by Nikias
during all the time that he remained in Sicily. The Syracusans were
induced to march out their entire force, leaving their city with
scarcely any defenders. Meanwhile, Nikias sailed round from Katana,
took possession of the harbour, and encamped his forces on the
mainland in a position where he could not be attacked by the enemy's
cavalry. When the Syracusan army returned from Katana, he marched out
the Athenians and defeated them, but with little loss on their side,
as their cavalry covered their retreat. Nikias now broke down the
bridges over the river Anapus, which gave occasion to Hermokrates to
say, when he was making a speech to encourage the Syracusans, that it
was a ridiculous thing for Nikias to try to avoid fighting, as though
it were not for the express purpose of fighting that he had been sent
thither. But in spite of all that Hermokrates could say, the
Syracusans were very much cast down and disheartened. Instead of the
fifteen generals who usually commanded their troops they chose three,
upon whom they conferred absolute powers, and swore a solemn oath that
they would leave them unfettered in the exercise of those powers.

The Athenians were very anxious to occupy the temple of Olympian Zeus,
which was near their camp, and full of offerings of gold and silver.
Nikias, however, purposely delayed the attack until a force was sent
from Syracuse to defend the temple. He thought that if the soldiers
did succeed in plundering it, the state would be none the better for
it, and he himself would have to bear all the blame of sacrilege.

Nikias made no use of his boasted victory, and after a short time drew
off his forces to Naxos, where he passed the winter, expending an
enormous sum of money for the maintenance of so large a force, and
effecting little or nothing except the reduction of a few disorderly
tribes in the interior. The Syracusans now took heart again, marched
into the Katanean territory and laid it waste, and attempted to burn
the camp of the Athenians. Upon this all men blamed Nikias for
deliberating and taking precautions until the time for action was gone
by. No one could find any fault with him when he was actually
fighting; but though a bold and energetic man in action, he was slow
to form plans and begin an enterprise.

XVII. Thus when he did at length return to Syracuse, he managed the
operation so swiftly and so skilfully that he disembarked his troops
at Thapsus before the enemy were aware of his approach, took Epipolae
by surprise, took prisoners three hundred of the force of picked men
who endeavoured to recapture that fort, and routed the Syracusan
cavalry, which had hitherto been supposed to be invincible. Moreover,
what chiefly terrified the Sicilians, and seemed wonderful to all
Greeks, was the speed with which he built a wall round Syracuse, a
city quite as large as Athens itself, but one which is much more
difficult to invest completely, because of the sea being so near to
it, and the rough ground and marshes by which it is surrounded on the
land side. Yet he all but succeeded in accomplishing this feat,
although he was not in a condition of body to superintend such works
personally, for he suffered greatly from a disease of the kidneys, to
which we must attribute whatever was left undone by his army. For my
own part I feel great admiration for the diligence and skill of the
general, and for the bravery of the soldiers, which enabled them to
gain such successes. The poet Euripides, after their defeat and utter
overthrow wrote this elegy upon them:

    "Eight times they beat the Syracusan host,
    Before the gods themselves declared them lost."

Indeed, they beat the Syracusans far more than eight times, before the
gods turned against the Athenians and dashed them to the ground when
at the height of their pride.

XVIII. Nikias was present, in spite of his sufferings, at most of
these actions; but when his disease grew worse, he was forced to stay
in the camp with a small guard, while Lamachus took the command of the
army, and fought a battle with the Syracusans, who were endeavouring
to build a counter-wall which would obstruct the Athenians in building
their wall of circumvallation. The Athenians were victorious, but
followed up their success in such a disorderly manner that Lamachus
was left alone and exposed to the attacks of the Syracusan cavalry. He
at once challenged their leader, a brave man named Kallimachus, to
single combat, and both received and inflicted a mortal wound. His
dead body and arms fell into the hands of the Syracusans, who at once
charged up to the Athenian walls, where Nikias lay helpless. The
extremity of the danger roused him, and he ordered his attendants to
set fire to a quantity of timber which had been brought thither to
construct military engines, and to some of the engines themselves.
This desperate expedient checked the Syracusans, and saved Nikias and
the Athenians; for the rest of the Syracusan forces on perceiving so
great a body of flame returned in haste to their city.

This affair left Nikias in sole command, and he had great hopes of
taking the place; for many cities in Sicily had formed alliances with
him, ships laden with corn kept arriving to supply his camp, and all
began to be eager to be on his side, and to share in the fruits of his
success. The Syracusans themselves sent to propose terms of peace, for
they despaired of being able to defend their city any longer against
him. At this time Gylippus too, a Lacedaemonian who was sent to assist
them, heard during his voyage that they were completely enclosed and
reduced to great straits, but held on his voyage notwithstanding, in
order that even if, as he imagined, all Sicily had fallen into the
hands of the Athenians, he might at any rate defend the Greek cities
in Italy from sharing its fate. The air indeed was full of rumours
that the Athenians were carrying all before them, and that the good
fortune and skill of their general rendered him invincible. Even
Nikias himself was so elated by his apparent good fortune, that he
forgot his wonted prudence, and imagining from the secret intelligence
which he had from his friends within Syracuse that it was on the point
of surrender, neglected Gylippus altogether, and kept so bad a watch
at the straits of Messina with his fleet, that Gylippus managed to
cross there and land in Sicily. Here he at once proceeded to gather an
army together, but in a quarter of the island far away from Syracuse,
so that the people of Syracuse knew nothing of his arrival. They even
appointed a day for the public assembly to meet and discuss terms of
surrender with Nikias, and were about to attend it, as they thought
that it would be best for them to come to terms before the city was
quite surrounded by the wall of the Athenians. There was now only a
very small portion of this left to be finished, and all the materials
for building it were collected on the spot.

XIX. At this crisis there arrived at Syracuse Gongylus, a Corinthian,
in one trireme. All crowded round him, to hear what news he brought.
He informed them that Gylippus would soon come to their aid by land,
and that other triremes besides his own were on their way by sea. This
intelligence was scarcely believed, until it was confirmed by a
message from Gylippus himself, bidding them march out and meet him.
They now took courage and prepared for battle. Gylippus marched into
the town, and at once led the Syracusans out to attack the Athenians.
When Nikias had likewise brought his army out of their camp, Gylippus
halted his men, and sent a herald to offer them an armistice for five
days, on condition that they would collect their effects and withdraw
from Sicily. Nikias disdained to answer this insulting message; but
some of his soldiers jeeringly enquired whether the presence of one
Spartan cloak and staff had all at once made the Syracusans so strong
that they could despise the Athenians, who used to keep three hundred
such men, stronger than Gylippus and with longer hair, locked up in
prison, and feared them so little that they delivered them up to the
Lacedaemonians again. Timaeus says that the Sicilian Greeks despised
Gylippus for his avaricious and contemptible character, and that when
they first saw him, they ridiculed his long hair and Spartan cloak.
Afterwards, however, he tells us that as soon as Gylippus appeared
they flocked round him as small birds flock round an owl, and were
eager to take service under him. This indeed is the more probable
story; for they rallied round him, regarding his cloak and staff to be
the symbols of the authority of Sparta. And not only Thucydides, but
Philistus, a Syracusan citizen by birth, who was an eye-witness of the
whole campaign, tells us that nothing could have been done without
Gylippus. In the first battle after his arrival, the Athenians were
victorious, and slew some few Syracusans, amongst whom was the
Corinthian Gongylus, but on the following day Gylippus displayed the
qualities of a true general. He used the same arms, horses, and ground
as before, but he dealt with them so differently that he defeated the
Athenians. Checking the Syracusans, who wished to chase them back to
their camp, he ordered them to use the stones and timber which had
been collected by the Athenians, to build a counter-wall, reaching
beyond the line of circumvallation, so that the Athenians could no
longer hope to surround the city. And now the Syracusans, taking fresh
courage, began to man their ships of war, and to cut off the
stragglers with their cavalry. Gylippus personally visited many of the
Greek cities in Sicily, all of whom eagerly promised their aid, and
furnished him with troops; so that Nikias, perceiving that he was
losing ground, relapsed into his former desponding condition, and
wrote a despatch to Athens, bidding the people either send out another
armament, or let the one now in Sicily return to Athens, and
especially beseeching them to relieve him from his command, for which
he was incapacitated by disease.

XX. The Athenians had long before proposed to send out a reinforcement
to the army in Sicily, but as all had gone on prosperously, the
enemies of Nikias had contrived to put it off. Now, however, they were
eager to send him assistance. It was arranged that Demosthenes should
employ himself actively in getting ready a large force, to go to
reinforce Nikias in the early spring, while Eurymedon, although it was
winter, started immediately with a supply of money, and with a decree
naming Euthydemus and Menander, officers already serving in his army,
to be joint commanders along with him. Meanwhile, Nikias was suddenly
attacked by the Syracusans both by sea and land. His ships were at
first thrown into confusion, but rallied and sank many of the enemy,
or forced them to run on shore; but on land Gylippus managed at the
same time to surprise the fort of Plemmyrium, where there was a
magazine of naval stores and war material of all kinds. A considerable
number of the garrison, also, were either slain or taken prisoners;
but the most serious result was the stoppage of Nikias's supplies,
which heretofore had been easily and quickly brought through the Great
Harbour, while it remained in the hands of the Athenians, but which
now could not reach his camp by sea without a convoy and a battle.[2]
Moreover, the Syracusan fleet had not been defeated by any superiority
of force of the Athenians, but by the disorder into which it had been
thrown by pursuing the enemy. They therefore determined to renew the
conflict with better success.

Nikias, on his part, was unwilling to fight a second time, thinking it
was folly to fight with a diminished and disheartened force when he
knew that Demosthenes was hurrying to his aid with a large and
unbroken armament. However, Menander and Euthydemus, the newly-elected
generals, were eager to distinguish themselves by performing some
brilliant action before the arrival of Demosthenes, and to eclipse the
fame of Nikias himself. The pretext they used was the glory of Athens,
which they said would be dishonoured for ever if they should now
appear afraid to accept the Syracusans' offer of battle. The battle
was fought: and the Athenian left wing, we are told by Thucydides, was
utterly defeated by the skilful tactics of the Corinthian steersman
Aristion. Many Athenians perished, and Nikias was greatly
disheartened, for he had now proved unfortunate both when sole
commander and when acting with colleagues.

XXI. Matters were in this posture when Demosthenes was descried in the
offing, approaching with a splendid armament which struck terror into
the hearts of the enemy. His fleet consisted of seventy-three ships,
on board of which were five thousand heavy-armed troops, and three
thousand javelin men, archers, and slingers. The glittering arms of
the troops, the flaunting banners of the ships of war, and the music
of the flutes to which the rowers kept time with their oars, made a
gallant display, which delighted the Athenians as much as it depressed
the Syracusans. These latter, indeed, were struck with dismay, and
thought that their last victory had been won in vain, and that they
were labouring to no purpose against a foe whose ranks were
continually reinforced.

Nikias was not long allowed to feast his eyes on this welcome
spectacle undisturbed. Demosthenes, as soon as he landed, insisted on
the necessity of instantly attacking Syracuse, and putting an end to
the siege, either by capturing the place, or by returning at once to
Athens in case of failure. Against this Nikias, who was alarmed at the
idea of such vigorous action, urged that it would be unwise to run
such a risk. Delay, he argued, favoured the besiegers more than the
besieged, as their resources must soon fail, in which case their
allies would desert them and they would again be brought to the
necessity of capitulating. Nikias adopted this view because of what he
heard from his secret correspondents within the city, who urged him to
continue the siege, telling him that already the Syracusans began to
feel the war too great a burden for them to support, and that Gylippus
was very unpopular among them, so that in a short time they would
utterly refuse to hold out any longer, and would come to terms with
the Athenians. Nikias could only hint at these secret sources of
information, and so his counsels were thought by his colleagues to be
mere cowardice. They declared loudly that the original mistake was
about to be repeated, and the first terror-stricken impression of the
armament frittered away, until familiarity with the sight of it had
bred contempt in the breasts of their enemies. They therefore eagerly
seconded the proposal of Demosthenes, and forced Nikias, though sorely
against his will, to yield to their representations. Accordingly,
Demosthenes with the land force assaulted the outlying fort on the
high ground of Epipolae by night, and took it by surprise, killing part
of its garrison and putting the remainder to flight. He did not halt
there, but followed up his success by marching further on towards the
city, until he was met by some Boeotian heavy-armed troops, who had
been the first to rally, and now in a compact mass met the Athenians
with their spears levelled, and with loud shouts forced them to give
way with severe loss. The whole Athenian army was by this thrown into
confusion and panic, as the fugitives broke the formation of those
troops who were still marching to the front, so that in some cases
they actually fought with one another, each believing the others to be
enemies. Thus the Athenians fell into sad disorder and ruin; for they
were unable to distinguish friends from foes in the uncertain light,
as the moon, now nearly setting, glanced upon spear-points and armour
without showing them clearly enough to enable men to see with whom
they had to deal. The moon was behind the backs of the Athenians: and
this circumstance was greatly against them, for it made it hard for
them to see the numbers of their own friends, but shone plainly on the
glittering shields of their antagonists, making them look taller and
more terrible than they were. Finally, attacked as they were on every
side, they gave way and fled. Some were slain by the enemy, some by
their own countrymen, and some were dashed to pieces by falling down
the precipices; while the rest, as they straggled about the country,
were cut off by the Syracusan cavalry. Two thousand men perished, and
of the survivors few brought back their arms.

XXII. Nikias, who had expected this reverse, now cast the blame of it
upon Demosthenes; and he, admitting his error, besought Nikias to
embark his army and sail away as quickly as possible, pointing out
that no further reinforcement could be hoped for, and that they could
not hope for success with the force now at their disposal. Even had
they been victorious, he argued, they had intended to leave their
present camp, which was unhealthy at all times, and was now in the hot
season becoming pestilential. The time was the beginning of autumn,
and many of the Athenians were sick, while all were disheartened.
Nikias, however, opposed the idea of retreat, not because he did not
fear the Syracusans, but because he feared the Athenians more, and the
treatment which as an unsuccessful general he would probably meet
with. He declared that he saw no reason for alarm, and that even if
there was, that he would rather perish by the hands of the enemy than
those of his countrymen. A very different sentiment to that which was
afterwards uttered by Leon the Byzantine, who said, "My countrymen, I
had rather be put to death by you than to be put to death together
with you."

With regard to the place to which it would be best for them to remove
their camp, that, Nikias said, was a question which they might take
time to discuss.

Demosthenes, seeing that Nikias was thus obstinate, and conscious that
his own project, when adopted, had led to a frightful disaster, ceased
pressing him to raise the siege, and gave the other generals to
understand that Nikias must have secret reasons, from his
correspondents within the city, which led him to persevere thus
obstinately in remaining where he was. This caused them also to
withdraw their objections to remaining; but when another army came to
assist the Syracusans, and the Athenians began to perish from malaria,
even Nikias himself agreed that it was time to retreat, and issued
orders to his men to hold themselves in readiness to embark.

XXIII. When all was ready, and the enemy off their guard, as they did
not expect the Athenians to retreat, an eclipse of the moon took
place, which greatly terrified Nikias and some others who, from
ignorance or superstition, were in the habit of taking account of such
phenomena. That the sun should be sometimes eclipsed even the vulgar
understood to be in some way due to the moon intercepting its light:
but what body could intercept the moon's light, so that suddenly the
full moon should pale its light and alter its colour, they could not
explain, but thought that it was a sinister omen and portended some
great calamity.

The treatise of Anaxagoras, the first writer who has clearly and
boldly explained the phases and eclipses of the moon, was then known
only to a few, and had not the credit of antiquity, while even those
who understood it were afraid to mention it to their most trusted
friends. Men at that time could not endure natural philosophers and
those whom they called in derision stargazers, but accused them of
degrading the movements of the heavenly bodies by attributing them to
necessary physical causes. They drove Protagoras into exile, and cast
Anaxagoras into prison, from whence he was with difficulty rescued by
Perikles; while Sokrates, who never took any part in these
speculations, was nevertheless put to death because he was a
philosopher. It was not until after the period of which I am writing
that the glorious works of Plato shed their light upon mankind,
proving that Nature obeys a higher and divine law, and removing the
reproach of impiety which used to attach to those who study these
matters, so that all men might thereafter investigate natural
phenomena unreproved. Indeed, Plato's companion Dion, although the
moon was eclipsed when he was starting from the island of Zakynthus to
attack the despot Dionysius, was not in the least disturbed by the
omen, but sailed to Syracuse and drove out the despot. Nikias at this
time was without a competent soothsayer, for his intimate friend,
Stilbides, who used to check a great deal of his superstition, died
shortly before this. Indeed, the omen, if rightly explained, as
Philochorus points out, is not a bad one but a very good one for men
who are meditating a retreat; for what men are forced to do by fear,
requires darkness to conceal it, and light is inimical to them.
Moreover men were only wont to wait three days after an eclipse of the
moon, or of the sun, as we learn from Autokleides in his book on
divination; but Nikias persuaded them to wait for another complete
circuit of the moon, because its face would not shine upon them
propitiously before that time after its defilement with the gross
earthy particles which had intercepted its rays.[3] XXIV. Nikias now
put all business aside, and kept offering sacrifices and taking omens,
until the enemy attacked him. Their infantry assailed the camp and
siege works, while their fleet surrounded the harbour, not in ships of
war; but the very boys and children embarked in what boats they could
find and jeered at the Athenians, challenging them to come out and
fight. One of these boys, named Herakleides, the son of noble parents,
ventured too far, and was captured by an Athenian ship. His uncle
Pollichus, fearing for his safety, at once advanced with ten triremes
which were under his command; and this movement brought forward the
rest of the Syracusan fleet to support him. An obstinate battle now
took place, in which the Syracusans were victorious, and many of the
Athenians perished, amongst whom was their admiral Eurymedon. And now
the Athenians refused to remain before Syracuse any longer, and called
upon their generals to lead them away by land, for the Syracusans
after their victory had at once blockaded the entrance to the harbour,
so that no passage was left. Nikias and the other generals refused to
agree to this proposal, as they thought it would be a pity to abandon
a fleet of so many transports, and nearly two hundred ships of war.
They placed the flower of the land force on board the ships, with the
best of the slingers and darters, and manned one hundred and ten
triremes, for they had not sufficient oars for a larger number.
Nikias now abandoned the great camp and walls of investment, which
reached as far as the temple of Herakles, and drew the army up on the
beach as spectators of the battle. Thus the Syracusan priests and
generals were able for the first time since the siege began to
sacrifice to Herakles, as they were wont to do, while the people were
manning their fleet.

XXV. The Syracusan soothsayers promised them the victory if they
awaited attack and did not begin the attack: for Herakles himself
never struck the first blow, but always waited for his enemies to
attack him. The sea-fight which now took place was the fiercest and
most obstinately contested of all those which took place throughout
the war, and its varying fortunes were shared with agonizing interest
by the Athenian army and the citizens on the walls of Syracuse, who
were able from their respective positions to overlook the whole battle
and watch the manoeuvres of each ship. The Athenians were placed at a
great disadvantage by having all their ships collected into one mass,
where they were attacked from all sides by the lighter and more
manageable vessels of the enemy. The Syracusans also used stones as
missiles, which strike with equal effect, however they are thrown,
while the Athenians replied with volleys of arrows and javelins, whose
aim was often spoiled by the motion of the vessels, and which are
useless unless they fly with the point foremost. All these details had
been foreseen and taught to the Syracusans by Aristion the Corinthian
steersman, who fell in the moment of victory. The Athenians were
finally routed and driven ashore with great slaughter, and their
retreat by sea completely cut off. Knowing how difficult it would be
to make their way to any place of safety by land, they allowed
themselves to be so paralyzed by despair, that they let the Syracusans
tow away their ships as prizes, without making an effort to save them,
and actually neglected to ask for a truce for the burial of their
dead. They seemed to think that the case of the sick and wounded whom
they saw amongst them, and whom they must perforce abandon when they
left their camp, was even more pitiable than that of the floating
corpses, and they actually envied the lot of the slain, knowing well
that after a few more days of suffering they themselves were all
destined to share their fate.

XXVI. They were all eager to depart during the night which followed
this disastrous day; but Gylippus, perceiving that the people of
Syracuse were so given up to feasting and merry-making, celebrating
both their victory and the festival of their national hero Herakles,
to whom the day was sacred, that they could not be either forced or
persuaded into attempting to harass the enemy's retreat, sent some of
those men who had formerly been in correspondence with Nikias to tell
him not to attempt to retreat that night, as all the roads were
occupied by Syracusans lying in wait to attack him. Deceived by this
intelligence, Nikias waited to find what he feared in the night turned
into a reality on the following day. At daybreak the passes were
occupied by the Syracusans, who also threw up entrenchments at all the
places where rivers had to be forded, and broke all the bridges,
stationing their cavalry upon the level ground, so that the Athenians
could not advance a step without fighting. The Athenians remained for
all that day and the following night in their camp, and then set out,
with such weeping and lamentation that it seemed rather as if they
were leaving their native country than a hostile one, so distressed
were they to see the miseries of their friends and relatives, and of
the sick and wounded who were unable to accompany their march and had
to be left to their fate, while they themselves had a presentiment
that their present sufferings were nothing in comparison with those
which awaited them. Among all these piteous sights, Nikias himself
offered a glorious example. Worn out by disease, compelled by the
exigencies of the retreat to forego the medicines and treatment which
his condition required, he nevertheless, weak as he was, did more than
many strong men could do, while all his men knew well that he made
those efforts, not from any wish or hope to save his own life, but
that it was solely on their behalf that he did not give way to
despair. The tears and lamentations of the rest were prompted by their
own private sorrows and fears, but the only grief shown by Nikias was
that so splendid an expedition should have ended in such miserable
failure. Those who watched his noble bearing and remembered how
earnestly he had opposed the whole scheme, were filled with compassion
for his undeserved sufferings. They began to despair of the favour of
Heaven being shown to themselves, when they reflected that this man,
careful as he had always been to perform every religious duty, was now
no better off than the humblest or the most wicked soldier in his
army.

XXVII. Nikias made heroic efforts by cheerful looks, encouraging
speeches, and personal appeals to his followers, to show himself
superior to fortune. Throughout the retreat, although for eight days
in succession he was constantly harassed by the attacks of the enemy,
he nevertheless kept the division under his command unbroken and
undefeated, until the other part of the army under Demosthenes was
forced to surrender, being completely surrounded in an enclosed
olive-ground, the property of Polyzelus, brother of the despot Gelon.
Demosthenes himself drew his sword and stabbed himself, but not
mortally, for the Syracusans quickly interposed and forced him to
desist. When the Syracusans told Nikias of this disaster, and allowed
him to send horsemen to convince him of its truth, he proposed terms
to Gylippus, which were that the Athenians should be allowed to leave
Sicily, on condition of the repayment of the whole expenses of the
war, for which he offered to give hostages. These terms were refused,
and the enemy with insulting cries and threats proceeded to shoot with
missiles of all kinds at the Athenians, who were now completely
without food or drink. Yet Nikias prevailed upon them to hold out
during that night, and on the following day he led them, still under
fire from the enemy, across the plain leading to the river Asinarus.
There some were forced into the stream by the enemy, while others cast
themselves in to quench their thirst. A most dreadful slaughter now
took place, the Athenians being wild with thirst, and the Syracusans
killing them as they drank, until Nikias surrendered himself to
Gylippus, saying, "I beseech you, now that you are victorious, to show
some mercy, not to me, but to the Athenian troops. Consider how
changeful is the fortune of war, and how gently the Athenians dealt
with your men in their hour of victory."

Gylippus was visibly affected by the words, and by the sight of
Nikias; for he knew how well the Spartan prisoners had been treated by
him, when the peace was made with Athens; moreover, he thought that it
would be a great honour to him if he could carry home the enemy's
commander-in-chief as a prisoner. He received Nikias with kindness,
and gave orders to take the rest of the Athenians alive. It was long,
however, before these orders were understood and obeyed, so that more
Athenians were slain than survived, although many were spared by the
Syracusans in order that they might be sold for slaves.

The prisoners were now assembled together, and their arms and armour
hung upon the trees by the river side, as a trophy of the victory. The
victors next crowned themselves with garlands, decorated their horses,
cut off the manes and tails of the captured horses, and marched back
into their own city, having by their courage and skill won the most
complete victory ever gained by one Greek state over another.

XXVIII. At a public assembly of the Syracusans and their allies which
was shortly afterwards held, the orator Eurykles proposed that the day
on which Nikias was taken should be kept as a festival for ever, upon
which no work should be done, and sacrifice should be offered to the
gods, and that the feast should be called the Asinaria, from the name
of the river where the victory was won. The day was the twenty-sixth
of the Dorian month Karneius, which the Athenians call Metageitnion
(September 21st). Furthermore, he proposed that the Athenian slaves
and allies should be sold, that the Athenians themselves, with what
native Sicilians had joined them, should be confined in the stone
quarries within the city of Syracuse, and that their generals should
be put to death.

These propositions wore accepted by the Syracusans, who treated
Hermokrates with contempt when he urged that to be merciful in victory
would be more honourable to them than the victory itself. Gylippus
too, when he begged that he might carry the Athenian generals alive to
Sparta, was shamefully insulted by the excited Syracusans, who had
long disliked the irritating Spartan airs of superiority natural to
Gylippus, and now, flushed with victory, no longer cared to conceal
their feelings. Timaeus tells us that they accused him of avarice and
peculation, a hereditary vice, it appears, in his family since his
father Kleandrides was banished from Sparta for taking bribes, while
he himself afterwards stole thirty of the hundred talents which
Lysander sent home to Sparta, and hid them under the roof of his
house, but was informed against, and exiled in disgrace. This will be
found described at greater length in the Life of Lysander.

In his account of the death of Nikias and Demosthenes, Timaeus does not
exactly follow the narrative of Thucydides and Philistus, as he
informs us that while the assembly was still sitting, Hermokrates sent
to their prison to inform them that they were condemned to death, and
to afford them the means of dying by their own hands, while the other
historians state that the Syracusans put them to death.[4] Be this as
it may, their dead bodies were exposed before the gates of Syracuse as
a spectacle for the citizens. I have heard also that at the present
day a shield is shown in one of the temples at Syracuse, which is said
to be that of Nikias, and which is beautifully adorned with woven
coverings of purple and gold.

XXIX. Of the Athenians, the most part perished in the stone quarries
of disease and insufficient food, for they received only a pint of
barley-meal and half-a-pint of water each day. Not a few, however,
were sold into slavery, being stolen for that purpose by Syracusans,
or having escaped disguised as slaves. The rest were at length branded
upon their foreheads with the figure of a horse, and sold into
slavery. Yet even in this extremity their well-bred and dignified
behaviour came to their aid; for they soon either obtained their
freedom, or gained the confidence and respect of their masters. Some
gained their freedom by their knowledge of Euripides. It appears that
the dramas of Euripides were especially popular in Sicily, but that
only a few fragments of his works had hitherto reached the Greek
cities in that island. We are told that many of these captives on
their return to Athens affectionately embraced Euripides, and told
him how some of them had been sold into slavery, but had been set free
after they had taught their masters as much of his poetry as they
could remember, while others, when wandering about the country as
fugitives after the battle, had obtained food and drink by reciting
passages from his plays. We need not then wonder at the tale of the
people of Kaunus, who, when a ship pursued by pirates was making for
their harbour at first refused to admit it, but afterwards enquired
whether any on board knew the plays of Euripides; and on hearing that
they did, allowed them to enter the harbour and save themselves.

XXX. At Athens the news of the catastrophe was at first disbelieved,
because of the unsatisfactory way in which it reached the city. A
stranger, it is said, disembarked at Peiraeus, went into a barber's
shop, and began to converse about what had happened as upon a theme
which must be uppermost in every man's mind. The astonished barber,
hearing for the first time such fearful tidings, ran up to Athens to
communicate it to the archons, and to the public in the market-place.
All were shocked and astonished at hearing this, and the archons
immediately convoked the public assembly, and brought the barber
before it. When he was asked to explain from whom he had heard this
intelligence, as he could give no satisfactory account, he was
regarded as a disturber of the public tranquillity by fabricating idle
tales, and was even put to the torture. Soon, however, men arrived who
confirmed his tale, and described all the details of the catastrophe
as far as they had witnessed them. Then at last the countrymen of
Nikias believed, after his death, what he had so often foretold to
them during his life.

FOOTNOTES:

[Footnote 1: In North Africa, the modern oasis of Siwah.]

[Footnote 2: Plemmyrium on one side, and the city of Syracuse on the
other, command the entrance of the gulf known as the Great Harbour,
inside of which lay the Athenian fleet and camp.]

[Footnote 3: Grote.]

[Footnote 4: Grote, Part II. ch. lx, points out that there is no real
contradiction between the statement cited from Timaeus, and the
accounts gives of the transaction by Thucydides and Philistus.]




LIFE OF CRASSUS.


I. Marcus Crassus[5] was the son of a father who had been censor, and
enjoyed a triumph; but he was brought up with his two brothers in a
small house. His brothers were married in the lifetime of their
parents, and all had a common table, which seems to have been the
chief reason that Crassus was a temperate and moderate man in his way
of living. Upon the death of one of his brothers, Crassus married the
widow,[6] and she became the mother of his children; for in these
matters also he lived as regular a life as any Roman. However, as he
grew older, he was charged with criminal intercourse with Licinia,[7]
one of the Vestal Virgins, who was brought to trial; the prosecutor
was one Plotinus. Licinia had a pleasant estate in the suburbs, which
Crassus wished to get at a small price, and with this view he was
continually about the woman and paying his court to her, which brought
on him the suspicion of a criminal intercourse; but he was acquitted
by the judices, being indebted in some degree to his love of money for
his acquittal from the charge of debauching the vestal. But he never
remitted his attentions to Licinia till he got possession of the
property.

II. Now, the Romans say that the many good qualities of Crassus were
obscured by one vice, avarice; but the fact appears to be that one
vice, which was more predominant in his character than all the rest
hid his other vices. They allege, as the chief proof of his avarice,
the mode in which he got his money and the amount of his property.
Though he did not at first possess above three hundred talents, and
during his first consulship he dedicated the tenth part of his
property to Hercules,[8] and feasted the people, and gave every Roman
out of his own means enough to maintain him for three months; yet,
before the Parthian expedition, upon making an estimate of his
property, he found it amount to seven thousand one hundred talents.
The greatest part of this, if one must tell the truth, though it be a
scandalous story, he got together out of the fire and the war, making
the public misfortunes the source of his wealth; for, when Sulla took
the city, and sold the property of those whom he put to death,
considering it and calling it spoil, and wishing to attach the infamy
of the deed to as many of the most powerful men as he could, Crassus
was never tired of receiving or buying. Besides this, observing the
accidents that were indigenous and familiar at Rome, conflagrations,
and tumbling down of houses owing to their weight and crowded state,
he bought slaves, who were architects and builders. Having got these
slaves to the number of more than five hundred, it was his practice to
buy up houses on fire, and the houses which were adjoining to those on
fire; for the owners, owing to fear and uncertainty, would sell them
at a low price; and thus the greatest part of Rome fell into the hands
of Crassus: but, though he had so many artizans, he built no house
except his own; for he used to say that those who were fond of
building were ruined by themselves, without the aid of any opponent.
Though he had many silver mines, and much valuable land, and many
labourers on it, still one would suppose that all this was of little
value, compared with the value of his slaves: so many excellent slaves
he possessed,--readers, clerks, assayers of silver,[9] house-managers,
and table-servants; and he himself superintended their education, and
paid attention to it and taught them, and, in short, he considered
that a master was mainly concerned in looking after his slaves, who
were the living implements of domestic economy. And here Crassus was
right, if, as he used to say, it was his opinion that he ought to
effect everything by the instrumentality of slaves, and that he
himself should direct the slaves; for, we observe, that what is
economical with respect to things lifeless is political with respect
to men. But he was not right in thinking and saying that nobody was
rich who could not maintain an army out of his substance; for war
feeds not by a fixed allowance, according to Archidamus;[10] and,
consequently, the wealth that is required for war is unlimited; and
this opinion of Crassus was very different from the opinion of Marius;
for when Marius, after giving to each man fourteen jugera of land,
found that they wanted more, he said, "May there never be a Roman who
thinks that too little which is enough to maintain him."

III. Besides this, Crassus was hospitable to strangers, for his house
was open to all, and he used to lend money to his friends without
interest; but he would demand it back immediately on the expiration of
the time of the borrower, which made the gratuitous loan more
burdensome than heavy interest. In his entertainments the invitation
was usually to persons of the plebeian class, and general: and the
frugality of the banquet, which was accompanied with neatness and a
friendly welcome, made it more agreeable than a sumptuous feast. In
his literary pursuits he mainly studied oratory,[11] and that kind
which was of practical use; and, having attained an ability in
speaking equal to the first among the Romans, he surpassed in care and
labour those who had the greatest talents; for they say, there was no
case, however mean and contemptible, which he approached without
preparation; and often, when Pompeius, and Caesar, and Cicero, were
unwilling to get up to speak, he would perform all the duties of an
advocate: and for this reason he became more popular, being considered
a careful man, and always ready to give his help. He pleased people,
also, by his friendly and affable manner in taking them by the hand,
and addressing them; for Crassus never met a Roman, however low and
humble his condition might be, without returning his salute,[12] and
addressing him by his name. He is also said to have been well versed
in history, and to have paid some attention to philosophy by studying
the writings of Aristoteles, in which he had for his teacher
Alexander, a man who gave a proof of his moderation and easy temper in
his intercourse with Crassus; for it was not easy to say whether he
was poorer when he became acquainted with Crassus, or after the
acquaintance was made. He was, indeed, the only friend of Crassus, who
always accompanied him when he travelled abroad; and he used to wear a
cloak,[13] lent him for the purpose, which on his return he was asked
to give back. Oh, the submission[14] of the man! for the poor fellow
did not consider poverty among the things that are indifferent. But
this belongs to a later period.

IV. When Marius and Cinna had got the upper hand, and it was soon
apparent that they would reinstate themselves in Rome, not for the
benefit of their country, but plainly for the destruction and ruin of
the nobles, those who were caught in the city were put to death: among
whom were the father and brother of Crassus. Crassus, being very
young, escaped immediate danger; but, seeing that he was hemmed in on
all sides, and hunted by the tyrants, he took with him three friends
and ten slaves; and, using wonderful expedition, made his escape to
Iberia, having been there before, when his father was Praetor,[15] and
having made himself friends. Finding all in great alarm and trembling
at the cruelty of Marius, as if he were close at hand, he did not
venture to make himself known, but sought refuge in a tract bordering
on the sea, belonging to Vibius Pacianus,[16] where he hid himself in
a large cave. He sent a slave to Vibius to sound his disposition; for
the provisions that Crassus brought with him were now exhausted. On
hearing the news, Vibius was pleased that Crassus had escaped; and
inquiring about the number of persons with him, and where the place
was, he did not go himself to see them, but he took his villicus near
the spot, and ordered him to have food daily prepared, and to carry it
and place it near the rock, and to go away without speaking a word,
and not to be curious about the matter, or make any inquiries; and he
gave him notice, that if he did meddle at all he should be put to
death, but if he faithfully helped in the matter he should have his
freedom. The cave is not far from the sea, and the precipices which
shut it in leave a small and hardly perceptible path[17] which leads
into the cave; but when you have entered, it opens to a wonderful
height, and spreads out wide, with recesses which open into one
another, and are of a large circuit. It is also neither without water
nor light: for a spring of the purest water oozes out at the base of
the precipice; and there are natural clefts about that part where the
rock closes, by which the external light is admitted, and in the
daytime the spot is fully illuminated. The air within is free from all
moisture caused by dropping, and is quite pure, owing to the
compactness of the rock, which diverts all the wet and droppings to
the spring.

V. While Crassus stayed in the cave, the slave came daily to bring
provisions; but he did not see the persons who were concealed, or know
who they were; though he was seen by them, inasmuch as they knew, and
watched the times of his coming. Now, the provision that was made for
their meals was ample enough even for luxury, and not merely
sufficient for their necessities. But Vibius determined to show
Crassus every kind of friendly attention; and it occurred to him to
consider the youth of Crassus, that he was a very young man, and that
provision should be made in some degree also for the pleasures
suitable to his age, and that merely to supply his wants would argue
that he was serving Crassus as little as he could, rather than with
hearty zeal; accordingly, he took with him two handsome female slaves,
and went down to the sea-coast. When he came to the place, he pointed
to the road that led up to it, and told them to go in boldly. Crassus,
seeing them approach, was afraid that the spot was known, and had been
discovered; and, accordingly, he asked them what they wanted, and who
they were. The women replied, as they had been instructed, that they
were looking for their master, who was concealed there; on which
Crassus perceived the joke which Vibius was playing off upon him, and
his kind attentions, and received the women; and they stayed with him
for the rest of the time, telling and reporting to Vibius what he
requested them. Fenestella[18] says, that he saw one of these slaves
when she was an old woman, and that he had often heard her mention
this, and tell the story with pleasure.

VI. In this way Crassus spent eight months in concealment; but as
soon as he heard of Cinna's end, he showed himself, and out of the
numbers that flocked to him he selected two thousand five hundred,
with whom he went round to the cities; and one city, Malaca,[19] he
plundered, according to the testimony of many authors, though they say
that he denied the fact, and contradicted those who affirmed it. After
this he got together some vessels, and crossed over to Libya, to
Metellus Pius,[20] a man of reputation who had collected a force by no
means contemptible. But he stayed no long time there; for he
quarrelled with Metellus, and then set out to join Sulla, by whom he
was treated with particular respect. When Sulla had passed over the
sea to Italy, he wished all the young men who were with him to aid him
actively, and he appointed them to different duties. Crassus, on being
sent into the country of the Marsi to raise troops, asked for a guard,
because the road lay through a tract which was occupied by the enemy;
Sulla replied to him in passion and with vehemence, "I give thee as
guards thy father, thy brother, thy friends, thy kinsmen, who were cut
off illegally and wrongfully, and whose murderers I am now pursuing."
Stung by these words, and pricked on to the undertaking, Crassus
immediately set out, and, vigorously making his way through the enemy,
he got together a strong force, and showed himself active in the
battles of Sulla. The events of that war, it is said, first excited
him to rivalry and competition with Pompeius for distinction. Pompeius
was younger than Crassus, and his father had a bad repute at Rome, and
had been bitterly hated by the citizens; but still Pompeius shone
conspicuous in the events of that period and proved himself to be a
great man, so that Sulla showed him marks of respect which he did not
very often show to others of more advanced years and of his own rank,
by rising from his seat when Pompeius approached, and uncovering his
head, and addressing him by the title of Imperator. All this set
Crassus in a flame, and goaded him, inasmuch as he was thus slighted
in comparison with Pompeius; and with good reason; Crassus was
deficient in experience, and the credit that he got by his military
exploits was lost by his innate vices,--love of gain and meanness;
for, upon taking Tudertia,[21] a city of the Umbri, it was suspected
that he appropriated to himself most of the spoil, and this was made a
matter of charge against him to Sulla. However, in the battle near
Rome,[22] which was the greatest in all the war, and the last, Sulla
was defeated, the soldiers under his command being put to flight, and
some of them trampled down in the pursuit: Crassus, who commanded the
right wing, was victorious, and, after continuing the pursuit till
nightfall, he sent to Sulla to ask for something for his soldiers to
eat, and to report his success. But, during the proscriptions and
confiscations, on the other hand, he got a bad name, by buying at low
prices large properties, and asking for grants. It is said that, in
the country of the Bruttii, he also proscribed a person, not pursuant
to Sulla's orders, but merely to enrich himself thereby, and that, on
this account, Sulla, who disapproved of his conduct, never employed
him again in any public business. However, Crassus was most expert in
gaining over everybody by flattery; and, on the other hand, he was
easily taken in by flattery from any person. It is further mentioned
as a peculiarity in his character, that, though very greedy of
gain,[23] he hated and abused those most who were like himself.

VII. But Crassus was most annoyed at the military success of Pompeius,
and his enjoying a triumph before he became a senator, and being
called by the citizens Magnus, which means Great. On one occasion,
when somebody observed that Pompeius the Great was approaching,
Crassus smiled, and asked, How great he was? But, as Crassus despaired
of equalling Pompeius in military reputation, he entered upon a
political career, and, by his activity, by pleading in the courts, and
lending money, and by canvassing for candidates, and subjecting
himself to all kinds of scrutiny in conjunction with those who wanted
anything of the people, he acquired a power and reputation equal to
what Pompeius had got by his many and great military services. And the
result to each of them was something unusual; for, when Pompeius was
absent from Rome, his name and his influence in the State, by reason
of his military exploits, was superior to that of Crassus; but when
Pompeius was at Rome, he often fell short of Crassus in influence, for
his haughty temper and habitual pride made him avoid crowds and retire
from the Forum, and seldom give his aid to those who sought it, and
then not readily; his object being to keep his power at a higher
pitch, by exercising it only on his own behalf. But Crassus was always
ready to make himself useful, and he did not keep himself retired, nor
was he difficult of access, but he was always busy in everything that
was going on, and by the general kindness of his behaviour he got the
advantage over the proud bearing of Pompeius. In personal dignity, in
persuasive speech, and attractive expression of countenance it is said
they were both equally fortunate. However, this rivalry did not hurry
Crassus into any personal enmity or ill-will, and though, he was
annoyed at Pompeius and Caesar receiving greater honour than himself,
he never allowed this jealous feeling to be associated with any
hostility or ill disposition. It is true that when Caesar was taken and
detained by the pirates, he cried out, "What pleasure you will have,
Crassus, when you hear of my capture!" But afterwards, at least, they
were on friendly terms, and, when Caesar was going to Iberia, as
praetor,[24] and had no money in consequence of his creditors having
come upon him and seizing all his outfit, Crassus did not leave him in
this difficulty, but got him released, by becoming security for him to
the amount of eight hundred and thirty talents. When all Rome became
divided into three parties,--that of Pompeius, Caesar and
Crassus,--(for Cato[25] had more reputation than power, and was more
admired than followed), the sober and conservative part of the
citizens adhered to Pompeius; the violent and those who were lightly
moved, were led by the hopes that they had from Caesar; Crassus, by
keeping a middle position, used both parties for his purposes, and, as
he very often changed in his political views, he was neither a firm
friend nor an irreconcilable enemy, but he would readily give up
either his friendship or his enmity on calculation of interest; so
that within a short interval, he often came forward to speak both for
and against the same men and the same measures. He had also great
influence, both because he was liked and feared, but mainly because he
was feared. Accordingly Sicinius,[26] who was the most violent in his
attacks on the magistrates and popular leaders of the day, in reply to
one who asked, "Why Crassus was the only person whom he did not worry,
and why he let him alone?" said, "That he had hay on his horn:" now,
the Romans were accustomed to tie some hay round the horn of an ox
that butted, as a warning to those who might meet it.

VIII. The insurrection of the gladiators and their devastation of
Italy, which is generally called the war of Spartacus,[27] originated
as follows:--One Lentulus Batiates kept gladiators in Capua, of whom
the majority, who were Gauls and Thracians, had been closely confined,
not for any misbehaviour on their part, but through the villainy of
their purchaser, for the purpose of fighting in the games. Two hundred
of these resolved to make their escape; but their design being
betrayed, those who had notice of the discovery, and succeeded in
getting away, to the number of seventy-eight, took knives and spits
out of a cook's shop, and sallied out. Meeting on the way with some
waggons that were conveying gladiators' arms to another city, they
plundered the waggons, and armed themselves. Seizing on a strong
position, they chose three leaders, of whom the first was Spartacus, a
Thracian of nomadic race, a man not only of great courage and
strength, but, in judgment and mildness of character, superior to his
condition, and more like a Greek than one would expect from his
nation. They say that when Spartacus was first taken to Rome to be
sold, a snake was seen folded over his face while he was sleeping, and
a woman, of the same tribe with Spartacus, who was skilled in
divination, and possessed by the mysterious rites of Dionysus,
declared that this was a sign of a great and formidable power which
would attend him to a happy termination. This woman was at that time
cohabiting with Spartacus, and she made her escape with him.

IX. The gladiators began by repelling those who came against them from
Capua and getting a stock of military weapons, for which they gladly
exchanged their gladiators' arms, which they threw away as a badge of
dishonour, and as barbaric. Clodius[28] the praetor was next sent
against them from Rome, with three thousand men, and he blockaded them
on a mountain which had only one ascent, and that was difficult and
narrow, and Clodius had possession of it; on all other sides there
were steep smooth-faced precipices. On the top of the hill there grew
a great quantity of wild vines, and the men of Spartacus cutting off
all the shoots that were adapted to their purpose, and, intertwining
them, made strong and long ladders, so that when fastened above, they
reached along the face of the precipice to the level ground, and they
all safely descended by them except one man, who stayed to take care
of the arms; and, when all the rest had descended, he let the arms
down, and, having done this, he got down safe himself. The Romans did
not know what was going on; and accordingly, when the gladiators
surrounded them, they were put in alarm by the surprise, and fled, on
which the enemy took their camp. Many of the herdsmen and shepherds in
those parts also joined the gladiators, men ever ready for a quarrel,
and light of foot, some of whom the gladiators armed, and others they
employed as scouts and light troops. Publius Barinus[29] the praetor
was next sent against them, whose legatus, one Furius, at the head of
two thousand soldiers, the gladiators engaged and put to flight.
Cossinus was then despatched, with a large force, to advise with
Barinus, and to be associated in the command; but Spartacus, watching
his opportunity, while Cossinus was bathing at Salenae,[30] was very
near seizing him. Cossinus made his escape with great difficulty, and
Spartacus, seizing the baggage, closely followed up the pursuit, with
great slaughter of the Romans, and he took the camp. Cossinus also
fell. Spartacus, after defeating the praetor himself in many other
battles, and at last seizing his lictors and his horse, now became
great and formidable: but still he formed a just judgment of the state
of affairs and, not expecting to get the advantage over the power of
the Romans, he designed to lead his forces to the Alps; thinking that
it was advisable for them to cross the mountains and to go to their
several homes, some to Thrace and some to Gaul. But the gladiators
being strong in numbers, and confident, would not listen to him, and
they went about ravaging Italy. The Senate were now no longer troubled
merely at the humiliation and disgrace that they suffered by the
revolt; but, moved by fear and the danger, they sent out both the
consuls[31] as to a war of the utmost difficulty and importance.
Gellius, suddenly falling on the Germans, who, by reason of their
arrogance and self-confidence, had separated from the troops of
Spartacus, destroyed the whole body; and after Lentulus had hemmed in
Spartacus with large armies, Spartacus, rushing upon them and joining
battle, defeated the legates and got all the baggage. Spartacus now
attempted to force his way towards the Alps; and Cassius[32] who "was
the governor of Gaul upon the Padus, met him with ten thousand men,
and a battle was fought, in which Cassius was defeated with great
lose, and with difficulty made his escape.

X. The Senate, on receiving this news, angrily bade the consuls keep
quiet, and they appointed Crassus to the command of the war, whose
reputation and popularity induced many of the nobles to serve under
him. Crassus took his station on the frontiers of Picenum, with the
view of waiting for Spartacus, who was moving in that direction; and
he sent Mummius, his legatus, at the head of two legions, to make a
circuit, and with orders to follow the enemy, but not to engage with
them, nor come to close quarters. But Mummius, as soon as he got what
he thought a favourable opportunity, fought a battle, and was
defeated; many of his men fell, and many, flying without their arms,
made their escape. Crassus received Mummius himself roughly, and
arming the soldiers again, he required of them security for their
arms, that they would keep them; and five hundred, who had been the
first to run, and had shown most cowardice, he distributed into fifty
decades,[33] and out of each decade he took one man, by lot, and put
him to death; thus inflicting on the soldiers this ancient mode of
punishment which had long fallen into disuse; for disgrace also is
added to the manner of death, and many things horrible and dreadful to
see accompany the punishment, in the presence of all the spectators.
After inflicting this punishment, he made his men again face about and
march against the enemy. Spartacus, however, avoided Crassus, and made
his way through Lucania to the sea, and, falling in with some Cilician
piratical vessels, in the Straits, he formed a design to seize Sicily,
and by throwing two thousand men into the island, to kindle again the
servile war there, the flames of which had not long since been
quenched, and required only a few sparks to set it again in a blaze.
The Cilicians[34] came to terms with Spartacus, and received his
presents; but they deceived him, and sailed off. Under these
circumstances, he marched back from the coast, and fixed his army in
the peninsula of the Rhegine territory. Crassus now came up, and
observing that the nature of the ground suggested what was to be done,
he resolved to build a wall across the isthmus, for the purpose of
keeping his soldiers employed, and cutting off the supplies of the
enemy. Though the undertaking was great and difficult, he accomplished
it, and completed the work, contrary to all expectation, in a short
time, by digging a ditch[35] from sea to sea, through the neck of
land, three hundred stadia in length, fifteen feet deep, and as many
wide; and above the ditch he raised a rampart of surprising height and
strength. At first Spartacus paid no attention to what was going on,
and treated it with contempt; but when forage began to fail, and he
wanted to advance further into the interior, he discovered the lines
of Crassus; and as there was nothing to be got in the peninsula,
taking advantage of a night when there was a fall of snow and a wintry
storm, he filled up a small part of the ditch with earth, and wood,
and the branches of trees, and so carried over a third part of his
army.

XI. Now Crassus was afraid that Spartacus might form a design to march
against Rome; but he was encouraged by many of the followers of
Spartacus quitting their leader, in consequence of some disputes, and
encamping by themselves upon the banks of the lake Lucanis,[36] which
they say is subject to changes, at certain intervals becoming sweet,
and then again salt, and not potable. Crassus coming upon this band,
drove them from the lake; but he was prevented from cutting them to
pieces and pursuing them, by the sudden appearance of Spartacus, who
checked the flight. Crassus had, before this, written to the Senate,
to say that they ought to summon Lucullus[37] from Thrace, and
Pompeius from Iberia; but he now changed his mind, and made every
effort to put an end to the war before they arrived, knowing that the
success would be attributed to him who came last, and brought help,
and not to himself. Accordingly, he determined to attack first those
who had separated from the main body, and were carrying on the
campaign by themselves, under the command of Caius Cannicius and
Castus; and he dispatched six thousand men, with orders to occupy a
certain hill, and keep themselves concealed. The men of Crassus
endeavoured to escape notice by covering their helmets; but, being
seen by two women, who were sacrificing for the enemy, they would have
been in danger, if Crassus had not quickly appeared, and fought a
battle, the most severely contested of all in this war, in which he
destroyed twelve thousand three hundred men, of whom he found only two
wounded in the back: all the rest died in the ranks, fighting against
the Romans. After the defeat of this body, Spartacus retired to the
mountains of Petilia,[38] followed by Quintius,[39] one of the
generals of Crassus, and Scrofas, his quaestor, who hung close on his
rear. But, upon Spartacus facing about, the Romans were thrown into
disorderly flight, and made their escape, after having with difficulty
rescued their quaestor, who was wounded. This success was the ruin of
Spartacus, in consequence of the self-confidence which it infused into
the slaves: they would not now consent to avoid a battle, nor yet
would they obey their commanders, whom they surrounded, with arms in
their hands, on the march, and compelled to lead them back through
Lucania against the Romans, wherein they did the very thing that
Crassus desired; for it was reported that Pompeius was now
approaching, and there were not a few who openly said that the victory
in this war belonged to him; for he would fight as soon as he arrived,
and put an end to the campaign. While Crassus, therefore, who was
eager to decide the affair by a battle, and to fix his camp near the
enemy, was engaged in digging his trenches, the slaves came up to
them and attacked the men who were at work. As fresh men from both
sides kept coming up to help their comrades, Spartacus, seeing that he
must fight, arranged all his army in order of battle. When his horse
was brought to him, he drew his sword and said, that if he won the
battle he should have plenty of fine horses from the enemy, and if he
was defeated he should not want one; upon which he killed his horse,
and then he made his way towards Crassus himself, through many men,
and inflicting many wounds; but he did not succeed in reaching
Crassus, though he engaged with and killed two centurions. At last,
after those about him had fled, he kept his ground, and, being
surrounded by a great number, he fought till he was cut down. But,
though Crassus had been successful, and had displayed the skill of a
great general, and had exposed his person to danger, yet the credit of
the victory did not escape being appropriated to Pompeius; for those
who fled from the battle were destroyed by him, and Pompeius wrote to
the Senate that Crassus had defeated the slaves in the open field, but
he had cut up the war by the roots.[40] Now Pompeius had a splendid
triumph for his victory over Sertorius and his exploits in Iberia; but
Crassus did not venture to ask for the greater triumph; and even as to
the foot triumph called the ovation, which he did enjoy, it was
considered but a mean thing, and below his dignity that he had a
triumph for a servile war. But how the ovation differs from the other
triumph, and about the name, I have spoken in the 'Life of
Marcellus.'[41] XII. After these events, Pompeius was forthwith
invited to the consulship,[42] and, though Crassus had hopes of
becoming his colleague, still he did not hesitate to solicit the
assistance of Pompeius. Pompeius gladly listened to his proposal, for
he was desirous in any way always to have Crassus his debtor for some
obligation, and he actively exerted himself on behalf of Crassus; and
finally he said, in his address to the public assembly, that he should
feel no less grateful for the return of Crassus as his colleague than
for his own election. They did not, however, continue in this harmony
after entering on their office, but they differed on almost every
subject, and quarrelled about everything, and by their disputes
rendered their consulship unfruitful in all political measures, and
ineffectual: however, Crassus made a great festival in honour of
Hercules, and feasted the people at ten thousand tables, and gave them
an allowance of corn for three months. It was at the close of their
consulship, when Pompeius and Crassus happened to be addressing the
public assembly, that a man, not of any distinction, a Roman eques, a
rustic in his mode of life, and one who did not meddle with public
affairs, Onatius Aurelius,[43] got up on the rostra, and, coming
forward, told a dream which he had had. "Jupiter," he said, "appeared
to me, and bade me tell the citizens not to let the consuls lay down
their office before they have become friends." Upon the man saying
this, and the assembly bidding the consuls be reconciled, Pompeius
stood silent; but Crassus offering his right hand first, said,
"Citizens, I do not consider that I am humbling myself or doing
anything unworthy of me when I make the advance towards good-will and
friendship to Pompeius, to whom you gave the name of Magnus before he
had a beard, and voted a triumph before he was a senator."

XIII. These were the things worthy of commemoration in the consulship
of Crassus. But his censorship[44] passed over altogether without
results, and without any active measures; for he neither revised the
senate, nor inspected the equites, nor made a census of the citizens,
though he had for his colleague Lutatius Catulus, the mildest of the
Romans. But it is said that Crassus designed a shameful and violent
measure, to make Egypt tributary to the Romans, and that Catulus
opposed him vigorously, on which a difference arising between them,
they voluntarily laid down their office. In the affair of
Catiline,[45] which was a serious matter, and one that came near
overthrowing Rome, some suspicion, it is true, attached to Crassus,
and a man came forward to name him as implicated in the conspiracy,
but nobody believed him. However, Cicero, in one of his orations,
evidently imputed to Crassus and Caesar participation in the plot; but
this oration was not published till after the death of both of them.
But in the oration on his consulship, Cicero says that Crassus came to
him by night and brought a letter[46] which contained information on
the affair of Catiline, as if his object was to establish the truth of
the conspiracy. Now Crassus always hated Cicero for this, but his son
stood in the way of his doing Cicero any open injury. For
Publius,[47] who was fond of oratory and of improving himself, was
much attached to Cicero, and went so far as to change his dress when
Cicero did at the time of his trial, and he induced the other young
men to do the same. At last he prevailed upon his father, and
reconciled him to Cicero.

XIV. When Caesar returned from his province,[48] he made preparations
to be a candidate for the consulship; but, observing that Crassus and
Pompeius were again at enmity, he did not choose by applying to one of
them for his help to have the other for his enemy, and he did not
think that he could succeed if neither of them assisted him.
Accordingly, he set about reconciling them, by continually urging upon
them, and showing that by their attempts to ruin one another they
would increase the power of the Ciceros, and Catuli, and Catos, who
would lose all their influence if they would unite their friends and
adherents, and so direct the administration with combined strength,
and one purpose. By persuasion and effecting a reconciliation, he
brought them together, and he formed out of the union of all three an
irresistible power by which he put down the Roman senate and the
people, though he did not make Pompeius and Crassus more powerful, one
through the other, but by means of the two he made himself most
powerful; for immediately on being supported by Pompeius and Crassus,
he was elected consul by a great majority. While Caesar was ably
discharging the business of the consulship, Crassus and Pompeius, by
procuring for him the command of armies, and by delivering Gaul into
his hands, fixed him in a kind of acropolis, thinking that they should
administer the rest of the State as they mutually agreed, after
securing to Caesar the authority which the lot had given him. Now
Pompeius did all this through unbounded love of power; but to the old
vice of Crassus, his avarice, there was now added a new passion,
ambition for trophies and triumphs excited by the great exploits of
Caesar, since it was in this alone that he was Caesar's inferior; for he
had the superiority in everything else; and his passion remitted not
nor diminished till it resulted in an inglorious death and public
misfortunes. Caesar had come down from Gaul to the city of Luca, and
many of the Romans went to him there, and Pompeius and Crassus had
private conferences with him, in which they agreed to take affairs in
hand more vigorously, and to hold the whole power of the State at
their disposal, to which end Caesar was to remain in his military
command, and Pompeius and Crassus were to have other provinces and
armies. To this object there was only one road, which was to ask for a
second consulship, and Caesar was to assist them in their canvass by
writing to his friends and sending many of his soldiers to support
them at the comitia.

XV. As soon as Crassus and Pompeius[49] returned to Rome, suspicion
was excited, and there was much talk through the whole city that their
meeting had been held for no good. In the Senate Marcellinus and
Domitius asked Pompeius if he intended to be a candidate for the
consulship, to which Pompeius replied that perhaps he should, and
perhaps he should not; being asked again, he said that he was a
candidate for the votes of the good citizens, but not a candidate for
the votes of the bad. It was considered that Pompeius had made a
haughty and arrogant answer; but Crassus said, in a more modest tone,
that he would be a candidate, if it was for the interest of the State;
if it was not, he would decline. This encouraged certain persons to
become candidates, among whom was Domitius. However, when Pompeius
and Crassus had openly declared themselves candidates, the rest were
afraid and withdrew; but Domitius was encouraged by Cato, who was his
kinsman and friend, and stimulated and urged him to stick to his
hopes, with the view of defending the common liberties; he said "it
was not the consulship that Pompeius and Crassus wanted, but a
tyranny; that their conduct showed they were not asking for the
consulship, but aiming to seize on the provinces and the armies." By
such arguments, which were also his real opinions, Cato, all but by
force, brought Domitius to the Forum, and many sided with them. And
those who were surprised at the canvassing of Pompeius and Crassus
were no small number. "Why then do they want a second consulship? And
why do they wish to be colleagues again? And why will they not have
the consulship with other colleagues? There are many men among us who
are surely not unworthy to be colleagues with Crassus and Pompeius."
This alarmed the partizans of Pompeius, who now abstained from no
proceeding, however disorderly and violent; but, in addition to all
the rest, they placed a body of men to lie in wait and attack Domitius
as he was going down to the Forum, while it was still dark, with his
partizans, and they killed the man that held the light, and wounded
many, among whom was Cato. After putting the party of Domitius to
flight, and driving them back to the house,[50] Pompeius and Crassus
were proclaimed consuls. Shortly after, they again surrounded the
Senate-house with armed men, and, after driving Cato out of the Forum,
and killing some persons who opposed them, they procured another five
years[51] of administration to be added to Caesar's term, and the two
provinces of Syria and Iberia to be given to them. When the lots were
cast, Crassus got Syria, and Pompeius had Iberia.

XVI. The result of the lot was not universally disliked; for the
majority wished Pompeius not to be far from the city, and Pompeius,
who was much attached to his wife,[52] intended to spend his time
chiefly in Rome. Crassus showed by his joy, immediately on the falling
out of the lot, that he considered no greater good fortune had ever
befallen him, and he could scarcely keep quiet before strangers and in
public; to his friends he uttered many foolish and puerile expressions
quite inconsistent with his years and temper, for he had never before
shown himself in the least degree a braggart or arrogant. But now,
being mightily elated, and his head completely turned, he was not for
making Syria or Palestine the limit of his victories; but, designing
to make the exploits of Lucullus against Tigranes, and those of
Pompeius against Mithridates appear mere child's play, he extended his
hopes as far as to the Bactrians, and the Indians, and the external
sea. And yet there was no mention of a Parthian war in the law[53]
that was drawn up on this occasion. But everybody knew that Crassus
was passionately bent on a Parthian war, and Caesar wrote to him from
Gaul, approving of his design, and urging him to it. When it was known
that Ateius,[54] the tribune, intended to offer some opposition to his
leaving the city, and many persons joined him who complained that
Crassus was going to make war upon a people who were doing the Romans
no wrong, and had a treaty with them, Crassus in alarm prayed Pompeius
to accompany him, and escort him out of the city. Now, the reputation
of Pompeius with the multitude was great, and, by showing himself in
front of Crassus, with cheerful looks and countenance, he
tranquillized a numerous body of people who were prepared to obstruct
Crassus, and to raise a shout against him, so that they made way and
let him pass through them quietly. But Ateius met Crassus, and, first
of all, endeavoured to stop him by words, and he protested against his
marching out: in the next place, he ordered his attendant to lay hold
of Crassus, and to detain him; but, as the rest of the tribunes would
not allow this, the attendant quitted his hold of Crassus, and Ateius
running to the gate, placed there a burning brazier, and, as soon as
Crassus arrived, he threw incense and poured libations upon it, and,
at the same time, he denounced against Crassus curses, in themselves
dreadful and terrific, and, in addition thereto, he uttered the names
of certain awful and inauspicious deities. The Romans say that these
mysterious and ancient curses have great efficacy, that no man can
escape upon whom they are laid, and that he who utters them also has
an unlucky end, and, accordingly, they are not denounced either on
ordinary occasions, or by many persons. Ateius was blamed for letting
loose such imprecations and religious fears upon a State, on behalf of
which he was hostile to Crassus.

XVII. When Crassus arrived at Brundisium, though the sea was still
rough owing to the wintry weather, he would not wait, but he set sail,
and so lost many of his vessels. After getting together the remnant of
his forces, he marched through Galatia.[55] Finding King Deiotarus,
who was now a very old man, founding a new city, Crassus said
sarcastically, "King, you are beginning to build at the twelfth hour."
The Galatian, with a smile, replied, "You, too, Imperator, I observe,
are not very early with your Parthian expedition." Now Crassus was
past sixty, and he looked older than he was. On his arrival, matters
at first turned out fully equal to his expectation; for he easily
threw a bridge over the Euphrates, and got his army across safely, and
he also obtained possession of many cities in Mesopotamia which
surrendered. Before one of them, of which Apollonius was tyrant, he
lost a hundred men, upon which he brought his force against the place,
and, having got possession of it, he made plunder of all the property,
and sold the people: the Greeks called the city Zenodotia.[56] On the
capture of the city, Crassus allowed his soldiers to proclaim him
Imperator, wherein he greatly disgraced himself, and showed the
meanness of his spirit, and that he had no good hopes of greater
things, as he was content with so slight a success. Having put
garrisons in the cities that had surrendered, to the amount of seven
thousand infantry and a thousand cavalry, he retired to winter in
Syria, and there to await his son,[57] who was coming from Caesar in
Gaul, with the decorations that he had gained by his valour, and with
a thousand picked horsemen. This seemed to be the first blunder of
Crassus, or at least, it was the greatest blunder that he committed
next to the expedition itself; for he ought to have advanced and to
have secured Babylon and Seleukeia,[58] two cities which were always
hostile to the Parthians; instead of which, he gave his enemies time
to make preparation. The next thing the people blamed was his waste of
time in Syria, which was employed more for purposes of money profit
than for military purposes; for he did not occupy himself in reviewing
the numbers of his troops, nor establishing games to keep the soldiers
in exercise, but he busied himself about estimating the revenues of
cities, and he was for many days with weights and scales in his hands
among the treasures of the goddess in Hierapolis,[59] and, after
requiring from the towns and princes contingents of men, he would
remit his requisitions for a sum of money; by all which he lost his
reputation, and fell into contempt. The first sign that happened to
him proceeded from this goddess herself, whom some consider to be
Aphrodite (Venus); and others Hera (Juno); others again believe her to
be the cause that has supplied from moisture the seeds for all things,
and nature, and the power that has pointed out the source of all good
things for men; for, as they were going out of the temple, young
Crassus first stumbled at the gate, and then his father fell upon him.

XVIII. While Crassus was getting together his forces out of the winter
quarter, there came ambassadors from Arsakes[60] with a short message.
They said, if the army was sent by the Romans, there was nothing but
war without truce, and without any terms; but if Crassus, contrary to
the wish of his country, as they heard, had brought arms against the
Parthians and occupied territory for his private profit, Arsakes would
act with moderation, and would take pity on the old age of Crassus,
and give up to the Romans the men whom he had in his power, and who
were rather under guard themselves than keeping guard over others.
Crassus haughtily replied, that he would give an answer in Seleukeia;
on which Vagises, the oldest of the ambassadors, smiled, and, showing
the palm of his hand, said, "From here, Crassus, hair will grow before
you see Seleukeia." The ambassadors now returned to Hyrodes, to inform
him that he must be ready for war. From the cities of Mesopotamia, in
which there were Roman garrisons, some soldiers, who made their escape
at great hazard, brought reports that caused much anxiety, having been
eye-witnesses of the numbers of the enemy, and of their mode of
attacking the cities; and, as is usual, they magnified everything
which they reported. "When the enemy pursued," they said, "no man
could escape from them, and when they fled, they could not be
overtaken; that strange missiles preceded the appearance of the enemy,
and before one could see who sent them, they pierced through
everything that they struck; and as to the arms of the mailed[61]
soldiers, some were made to push through every obstacle, and others to
give way to nothing." When the soldiers heard this their courage sank;
for they had been led to believe that the Parthians did not differ at
all from the Armenians and Cappadocians, whom Lucullus plundered and
robbed till he was weary, and they thought that the hardest part of
the war would be a long march, and the pursuit of men who would not
come to close quarters; but now, contrary to their hopes, they were in
expectation of a contest and great danger, so that some of the
officers thought that Crassus ought to stop, and again submit to their
deliberation the general state of affairs. Among these was Cassius[62]
the quaestor. The seers, also, in gentle terms showed that bad and
unfavourable signs were always prognosticated to Crassus by the
victims. But Crassus paid no attention to them, nor to those who
advised anything else except to move on.

XIX. But Crassus was in no small degree encouraged by Artabazes[63]
the king of the Armenians, who came to the camp with six thousand
horsemen. These were said to be the guards and attendants of the king;
and he promised ten thousand men clothed in mail and thirty thousand
infantry, who were to be maintained at his own cost. He attempted to
persuade Crassus to invade Parthia through Armenia; for, he said, the
army would not only have abundance of provision in its march through
the country by reason of him supplying them, but would also advance
safely, having in their front many mountains and continuous hills, and
ground unfavourable for cavalry, in which alone lay the strength of
the Parthians. Crassus was well enough satisfied with the zeal of the
king and the splendour of the proffered aid; but he said he would
march through Mesopotamia, where he had left many brave Romans; upon
this the Armenian went away. As Crassus was taking his army over at
the Zeugma,[64] many extraordinary claps of thunder broke around, and
many flashes of lightning came right in front of the army; and a wind,
mingled with cloud and hurricane,[65] falling on the raft, broke up
and crushed to pieces a large part of it. The spot also, on which
Crassus intended to encamp, was struck with two thunderbolts.[66] A
horse, belonging to the general, which was caparisoned in splendid
style, violently dragged along the man who held the reins, and
plunging into the stream, disappeared. It is said also, that the first
eagle which was raised, turned round spontaneously. Added to this, it
happened that, as they were giving out the rations to the soldiers
after crossing the river, lentils and salt were given first, which the
Romans consider to be symbols of lamentation, and are accustomed to
place before the dead; and, as Crassus was haranguing the soldiers, an
expression escaped him which greatly alarmed the army. He said he
would destroy the raft over the river, that no one among them might
return; and though he ought, upon seeing the imprudence of his words,
to have recalled what he had said and explained it to the soldiers, he
neglected to do so, through his arrogant temper. Finally, when he was
offering the usual expiatory sacrifice, and the priest had put the
viscera into his hands, he threw them away, on which, observing that
the standers-by were greatly disturbed, he said with a smile, "Such is
old age; but no arms at least shall drop from its hands."

XX. After this he advanced along the river, with seven legions and
nearly four th