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Title: The Philippines: Past and Present (vol. 1 of 2)

Author: Dean C. Worcester

Release Date: April 19, 2004 [EBook #12077]

Language: English

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THE PHILIPPINES PAST AND PRESENT


Peace and Prosperity.

This chance photograph showing General Emilio Aguinaldo as he is
to-day, standing with Director of Education Frank L. Crone, beside a
field of corn raised by Emilio Aguinaldo, Jr., in a school contest,
typifies the peace, prosperity, and enlightenment which have been
brought about in the Philippine Islands under American rule.





The Philippines Past and Present


By

Dean C. Worcester

Secretary of the Interior of the Philippine Islands 1901-1913; Member
of the Philippine Commission, 1900-1913

Author of "The Philippine Islands and Their People"



In Two Volumes -- With 128 Plates
Volume I
1914






Contents

VOL. I


Chapter
I.      View Point and Subject-Matter
II.     Was Independence Promised?
III.    Insurgent "Coöperation"
IV.     The Premeditated Insurgent Attack
V.      Insurgent Rule and the Wilcox-Sargent Report
VI.     Insurgent Rule in the Cagayan Valley
VII.    Insurgent Rule in the Visayas and Elsewhere
VIII.   Did We Destroy a Republic?
IX.     The Conduct of the War
X.      Mr. Bryan and Independence
XI.     The First Philippine Commission
XII.    The Establishment of Civil Government
XIII.   The Philippine Civil Service
XIV.    The Constabulary and Public Order
XV.     The Administration of Justice
XVI.    Health Conditions
XVII.   Baguio and the Benguet Road
XVIII.  The Coördination of Scientific Work




List of Illustrations

VOL. I


Peace and Prosperity
Fort San Antonio Abad, showing the Effect of the Fire from Dewey's
Fleet
Felipe Buencamino
The San Juan Bridge
Insurgent Prisoners
Typical Insurgent Trenches
Inside View of Insurgent Trenches at the Bagbag River
General Henry W. Lawton
Feeding Filipino Refugees
The First Philippine Commission
The Second Philippine Commission
The Return of Mr. Taft
Governor-general James F. Smith with a Bontoc Igorot Escort
Governor-general Forbes in the Wild Man's Country
The Philippine Supreme Court
An Unsanitary Well
A Flowing Artesian Well
An Unimproved Street in the Filipino Quarter of Manila
An Improved Street in the Filipino Quarter of Manila
Disinfecting by the Acre
An Old-style Provincial Jail
Retreat at Bilibid Prison, Manila
Bilibid Prison Hospital
Modern Contagious Disease Ward, San Lazaro Hospital
Filipina Trained Nurses
Staff of the Bontoc Hospital
A Victim of Yaws before and after Treatment with Salvarsan
The Culion Leper Colony
Building the Benguet Road
Freight Autos on the Benguet Road
The Famous Zig-zag on the Benguet Road
A Typical Baguio Road
One of the First Benguet Government Cottages
Typical Cottages at Baguio
A Baguio Home
The Baguio Hospital
Government Centre at Baguio
A Scene in the Baguio Teachers' Camp
The Baguio Country Club
The Bureau of Science Building, Manila
The Philippine General Hospital
The College of Medicine and Surgery, Manila
An Old-style Schoolhouse, with Teachers and Pupils
A Modern Primary School Building
Old-style Central School Building
Modern Central School Building
Typical Scene in a Trade School
An Embroidery Class
Philippine Embroidery
Filipino Trained Nurses
A School Athletic Team
Filipina Girls playing Basket-ball
University Hall, Manila
Bakídan
In Hostile Country
Travel under Difficulties
Dangerous Navigation
A Negrito Family and their "House"
A Typical Negrito
Typical Kalingas
Settling a Head-hunting Feud
Entertaining the Kalingas
An Ifugao Family
Ifugao Dancers
An Ifugao Dancer
Ifugao Rice Terraces






THE PHILIPPINES PAST AND PRESENT


CHAPTER I

View Point and Subject-Matter

It is customary in Latin countries for a would-be author or orator to
endeavour, at the beginning of his book or his speech, to establish
his status. Possibly I have become partially Latinized as the result
of some eighteen years of residence in the Philippines. At all events
it is my purpose to state at the outset facts which will tend to
make clear my view point and at the same time briefly to outline the
subject-matter which I hereinafter discuss.

As a boy I went through several of the successive stages of collector's
fever from which the young commonly suffer. First it was postage
stamps; then birds' nests, obtained during the winter season when no
longer of use to their builders. Later I was allowed to collect eggs,
and finally the birds themselves. At one time my great ambition was to
become a taxidermist. My family did not actively oppose this desire
but suggested that a few preliminary years in school and college
might prove useful.

I eventually lost my ambition to be a taxidermist but did not lose my
interest in zoölogy and botany. While a student at the University of
Michigan I specialized in these subjects. I was fortunate in having
as one of my instructors Professor Joseph B. Steere, then at the
head of the Department of Zoölogy. Professor Steere, who had been a
great traveller, at times entertained his classes with wonderfully
interesting tales of adventure on the Amazon and in the Andes, Peru,
Formosa, the Philippines and the Dutch Moluccas. My ambition was
fired by his stories and when in the spring of 1886 he announced his
intention of returning to the Philippines the following year to take
up and prosecute anew zoölogical work which he had begun there in
1874, offering to take with him a limited number of his students who
were to have the benefit of his knowledge of Spanish and of his wide
experience as a traveller and collector, and were in turn to allow him
to work up their collections after their return to the United States,
I made up my mind to go.

I was then endeavouring to get through the University on an allowance
of $375 per year and was in consequence not overburdened with surplus
funds. I however managed to get my life insured for $1500 and to
borrow $1200 on the policy, and with this rather limited sum upon
which to draw purchased an outfit for a year's collecting and sailed
with Doctor Steere for Manila. Two other young Americans accompanied
him. One of these, Doctor Frank S. Bourns, was like myself afterwards
destined to play a part in Philippine affairs which was not then
dreamed of by either of us.

We spent approximately a year in the islands. Unfortunately we had
neglected to provide ourselves with proper official credentials and
as a result we had some embarrassing experiences. We were arrested by
suspicious Spanish officials shortly after our arrival and were tried
on trumped-up charges. On several subsequent occasions we narrowly
escaped arrest and imprisonment.

The unfriendly attitude of certain of our Spanish acquaintances
was hardly to be wondered at. They could not believe that sensible,
civilized human beings would shoot tiny birds, pay for eggs the size
of the tip of one's little finger more than hens' eggs were worth,
undergo not a few hardships and run many risks while living in the
simplest of native houses on very inadequate food, unless actuated by
some hidden purpose. At different times they suspected us of looking
for gold deposits, of designing to stir up trouble among the natives,
or of being political spies.

When Doctor Bourns came back with the American troops in 1908 and
I returned as a member of the first Philippine Commission in 1909,
this last supposition became a fixed belief with many of our former
Spanish acquaintances who still remained in the islands, and they
frankly expressed their regret that they had not shot us while they
had the chance.

Over against certain unpleasant experiences with those who could
not understand us or our work I must set much kind and invaluable
assistance rendered by others who could, and did.

All in all we spent a most interesting year, visiting eighteen of
the more important islands. [1]

Throughout this trip we lived in very close contact with the Filipinos,
either occupying the _tribunales_, the municipal buildings of their
towns, where they felt at liberty to call and observe us at all hours
of the day and night, or actually living in their houses, which in
some instances were not vacated by the owners during our occupancy.

Incidentally we saw something of several of the wild tribes, including
the Tagbanuas of Palawan, the Moros of Joló, Basilan and Mindanao,
and the Mangyans of Mindoro.

We experienced many very real hardships, ran not a few serious risks
and ended our sojourn with six weeks of fever and starvation in the
interior of Mindoro. While we would not have cut short our appointed
stay by a day, we were nevertheless delighted when we could turn our
faces homeward, and Doctor Bourns and I agreed that we had had quite
enough of life in the Philippines.

Upon my arrival at my home in Vermont a competent physician told my
family that I might not live a week. I however recuperated so rapidly
that I was able to return to the University of Michigan that fall
and to complete the work of my senior year. I became a member of the
teaching staff of the institution before my graduation.

Little as I suspected it at the time, the tropics had fixed their
strangely firm grip on me during that fateful first trip to the Far
East which was destined to modify my whole subsequent life. I had
firmly believed that if fortunate enough to get home I should have
sense enough to stay there, but before six months had elapsed I was
finding life at Ann Arbor, Michigan, decidedly prosaic, and longing
to return to the Philippines and finish a piece of zoölogical work
which I knew was as yet only begun.

Doctor Bourns, like myself, was eager to go back, and we set out to
raise $10,000 to pay the expenses of a two-years collecting tour, in
the course of which we hoped to visit regions not hitherto penetrated
by any zoölogist.

Times were then getting hard, and good Doctor Angell, the president
of the university, thought it a great joke that two young fellows
like ourselves should attempt to raise so considerable a sum to be
spent largely for our own benefit. Whenever he met me on the street he
used to ask whether we had obtained that $10,000 yet, and then shake
with laughter. One of the great satisfactions of my life came when,
on a beautiful May morning in 1890, I was able to answer his inquiry
in the affirmative.

He fairly staggered with amazement, but promptly recovering himself
warmly congratulated me, and with that kindly interest which he has
always shown in the affairs of young men, asked how he could help
us. Through his kindly offices and the intervention of the State
Department we were able to obtain a royal order from the Spanish
government which assured us a very different reception on our return
to the Philippines in August from that which had been accorded us on
the occasion of our first visit to the islands.

There was now revealed to us a pleasing side of Spanish character
which we had largely missed during our first visit. Satisfied
as to our identity and as to the motives which actuated us, the
Spanish officials, practically without exception, did everything
in their power to assist us and to render our sojourn pleasant and
profitable. Our mail was delivered to us at points fifty miles distant
from provincial capitals. When our remittances failed to reach us
on time, as they not infrequently did, money was loaned to us freely
without security. Troops were urged upon us for our protection when we
desired to penetrate regions considered to be dangerous. Our Spanish
friends constantly offered us the hospitality of their homes and
with many of them the offer was more than _pro forma_. Indeed, in
several instances it was insisted upon so strongly that we accepted
it, to our great pleasure and profit.

Officials were quite frank in discussing before us the affairs of
their several provinces, and we gained a very clear insight into
existing political methods and conditions.

During this trip we lived in even closer contact with the Filipino
[2] population than on the occasion of our first visit. Our rapidly
growing knowledge of Spanish, and of Visayan, one of the more important
native dialects, rendered it increasingly easy for us to communicate
with them, gain their confidence and learn to look at things from
their view point. They talked with us most frankly and fully about
their political troubles.

During this our second sojourn in the Philippines, which lengthened to
two years and six months, we revisited the islands with which we had
become more or less familiar on our first trip and added six others
to the list. [3] We lived for a time among the wild Bukidnons and
Negritos of the Negros mountains.

After my companion had gone to Borneo I had the misfortune to contract
typhoid fever when alone in Busuanga, and being ignorant of the nature
of the malady from which I was suffering, kept on my feet until I
could no longer stand, with the natural result that I came uncommonly
near paying for my foolishness with my life, and have ever since
suffered from resulting physical disabilities. When able to travel,
I left the islands upon the urgent recommendation of my physician,
feeling that the task which had led me to return there was almost
accomplished and sure that my wanderings in the Far East were over.

Shortly after my return to the United States I was offered a position
as a member of the zoölogical staff of the University of Michigan,
accepted it, received speedy promotion, and hoped and expected to
end my days as a college professor.

In 1898 the prospect of war with Spain awakened old memories. I fancy
that the knowledge then possessed by the average American citizen
relative to the Philippines was fairly well typified by that of a
good old lady at my Vermont birthplace who had spanked me when I was a
small boy, and who, after my first return from the Philippine Islands,
said to me, "Deanie, are them Philippians you have been a visitin'
the people that Paul wrote the Epistle to?"

I endeavoured to do my part toward dispelling this ignorance. My
knowledge of Philippine affairs led me strongly to favour armed
intervention in Cuba, where similar political conditions seemed to
prevail to a considerable extent, and I fear that I was considered
by many of my university colleagues something of a "jingo." Indeed,
a member of the University Board of Regents said that I ought to be
compelled to enlist. As a matter of fact, compulsion would have been
quite unnecessary had it not been for physical disability.

My life-long friend and former travelling companion, Doctor Bourns,
was not similarly hampered. He promptly joined the army as a medical
officer with the rank of major, and sailed for the islands on the
second steamer which carried United States troops there. As a natural
result of his familiarity with Spanish and his wide acquaintanceship
among the Filipinos, he was ordered from the outset to devote his
time more largely to political matters than to the practice of his
profession. He did all that he could to prevent misunderstandings
between Filipinos and Americans. He assisted as an interpreter at
the negotiations for the surrender of Manila on August 13, 1898,
after taking part in the attack on the city. Later he was given
the rather difficult task of suppressing a bad outbreak of smallpox
among the Spanish prisoners of war, which he performed with great
success. He was finally made chief health officer of Manila, although
he continued to devote himself largely to political matters, got
numberless deserving Filipinos out of trouble, and rapidly increased
his already wide circle of Filipino friends. Through his letters I
was kept quite closely in touch with the situation.

Meanwhile I decided that the Philippines were not for me, asked for
and obtained leave for study in Europe, and in December 1898 set
out for New York to engage passage for myself and my family. I went
by way of Washington in order to communicate to President McKinley
certain facts relative to the Philippine situation which it seemed
to me ought to be brought to his attention.

I believed that there was serious danger of an outbreak of hostilities
between Filipinos and Americans, and that such a catastrophe, resulting
from mutual misunderstanding, might be avoided if seasonable action
were taken. I have since learned how wrong was this latter belief. My
previous experience had been almost exclusively with the Visayans and
the wild tribes, and the revolution against the United States was at
the outset a strictly Tagálog affair, and hence beyond my ken.

President McKinley very kindly gave me all the time I wanted, displayed
a most earnest desire to learn the truth, and showed the deepest and
most friendly interest in the Filipinos. Let no man believe that then
or later he had the slightest idea of bringing about the exploitation
of their country. On the contrary, he evinced a most earnest desire
to learn what was best for them and then to do it if it lay within
his power.

To my amazement, at the end of our interview he asked me whether I
would be willing to go to the islands as his personal representative.

I could not immediately decide to make such a radical change in my
plans as this would involve, and asked for a week's time to think
the matter over, which was granted. I decided to go.

Meanwhile, the President had evolved the idea of sending out a
commission and asked me if I would serve on it. I told him that I would
and left for my home to make preparations for an early departure. A
few days later he announced the names of the commissioners. They were
Jacob Gould Schurman, President of Cornell University; Major-General
Elwell S. Otis, then the ranking army officer in the Philippines;
Rear-Admiral George Dewey, then in command of the United States fleet
in Philippine waters; Colonel Charles Denby, who had for fourteen
years served as United States Minister to China, and myself.

Colonel Denby was delayed in Washington by public
business. Mr. Schurman and I reached Yokohama on the morning of
February 13, and on arrival there learned, to our deep regret, that
hostilities had broken out on the fourth instant. We reached Manila on
the evening of March 4, but Colonel Denby was unable to join us until
April 2. Meanwhile, as we could not begin our work in his absence,
I had an exceptional opportunity to observe conditions in the field,
of which I availed myself.

I served with the first Philippine Commission until it had completed
its work, and was then appointed to the second Philippine Commission
without a day's break in my period of service.

The members of this latter body were William H. Taft of Ohio; Luke
E. Wright of Tennessee; Henry C. Ide of Vermont; Bernard Moses of
California, and myself. Briefly stated, the task before us was to
establish civil government in the Philippine Islands. After a period
of ninety days, to be spent in observation, the commission was to
become the legislative body, while executive power continued to be
vested for a time in the military.

This condition endured until the 4th of July, 1901, on which
day Mr. Taft was appointed civil governor. On September 1, 1901,
each of the remaining original members of the commission became
an executive officer as well. Mr. Wright was appointed secretary
of commerce and police; Mr. Ide, secretary of finance and justice;
Mr. Moses, secretary of public instruction, and I myself, Secretary
of the Interior. On the same day three Filipino members were added
to the commission: Dr. T. H. Pardo de Tavera, Sr. Benito Legarda and
Sr. José R. de Luzuriaga.

Until the 16th of October, 1907, the Commission continued to serve as
the sole legislative body. It is at the present time the upper house
of the Philippine Legislature, the Philippine Assembly, composed of
eighty-one elective members, constituting the lower house.

I have therefore had a hand in the enactment of all legislation put
in force in the Philippine Islands since the American occupation, with
the exception of certain laws passed during my few and brief absences.

As secretary of the interior it fell to my lot to organize and
direct the operations of a Bureau of Health, a Bureau of Govermnent
Laboratories, a Bureau of Forestry, a Bureau of Public Lands, a Bureau
of Agriculture, a Bureau of Non-Christian Tribes, a Mining Bureau
and a Weather Bureau. Ultimately, the Bureau of Non-Christian Tribes
and the Mining Bureau were incorporated with the Bureau of Government
Laboratories to form the Bureau of Science, which continued under my
executive control. The Bureau of Agriculture was transferred to the
Department of Public Instruction in 1909.

I was at the outset given administrative control of all matters
pertaining to the non-Christian tribes, which constitute, roughly
speaking, an eighth of the population of the Philippines, and until
my resignation retained such control throughout the islands, except
in the Moro Province, which at an early day was put directly under
the governor-general.

I participated in the organization of civil government in the several
provinces of the archipelago, and myself drafted the Municipal Code
for the government of the towns inhabited by Filipinos, as well as
the Special Provincial Government Act and the Township Government
Act for that of the provinces and settlements inhabited chiefly by
the non-Christian tribes.

At the outset we did not so much as know with certainty the names
of the several wild and savage tribes inhabiting the more remote and
inaccessible portions of the archipelago. As I was unable to obtain
reliable information concerning them on which to base legislation
for their control and uplifting, I proceeded to get such information
for myself by visiting their territory, much of which was then quite
unexplored.

After this territory was organized into five so-called "Special
Government Provinces," some of my Filipino friends, I fear not
moved solely by anxiety for the public good, favoured and secured a
legislative enactment which made it my official duty to visit and
inspect these provinces at least once during each fiscal year. I
shall always feel indebted to them for giving me this opportunity to
become intimately acquainted with some of the most interesting, most
progressive, and potentially most important peoples of the Philippines.

When in 1901 I received the news that a central government was soon to
be established, I was in the Sub-province of Lepanto on my first trip
through the wilder and less-known portions of northern Luzon. During
each succeeding year I have spent from two to four months in travel
through the archipelago, familiarizing myself at first hand with
local conditions.

I have frequently taken with me on these inspection trips
representatives of the Bureaus of Forestry, Agriculture, Science
and Health to carry on practical investigations, and have made it my
business to visit and explore little known and unknown regions. There
are very few islands worthy of the name which it has not been my
privilege to visit.

The organization of an effective campaign against diseases like bubonic
plague, smallpox, Asiatic cholera and leprosy in a country where no
similar work had ever previously been undertaken, inhabited by people
profoundly ignorant of the benefits to be derived from modern methods
of sanitation, and superstitious to a degree, promptly brought me
into violent conflict with the beliefs and prejudices of a large
portion of the Filipino population.

A similar result followed the inauguration of an active campaign for
the suppression of surra, foot and mouth disease, and rinderpest,
which were rapidly destroying the horses and cattle.

From the outset I was held responsible for the enforcement of marine
and land quarantine regulations, which were at first very obnoxious
to the general public.

When the Pure Food and Drugs Act adopted by Congress for the United
States was made applicable to the Philippines without any provision for
its enforcement, this not altogether pleasant duty was assigned to me.

I did not seek appointment to the Philippine service in the first
instance. The political influence at my command has never extended
beyond my own vote. During a period of twelve years my removal was
loudly and frequently demanded, yet I saw President Schurman, Colonel
Denby, General Otis, Admiral Dewey, Commissioner Moses, Governor Taft,
Governor Wright, Governor Ide, Governor Smith, Secretary Shuster,
Commissioner Tavera, Commissioner Legarda and Governor Forbes, all my
colleagues on one or the other of the Philippine commissions, leave
the service, before my own voluntary retirement on September 15, 1913.

I had long expected a request for my resignation at any time, and
had often wished that it might come. Indeed I once before tendered
it voluntarily, only to have President Taft say that he thought I
should withdraw it, which I did. I am absolutely without political
ambition save an earnest desire to earn the political epitaph,
"He did what he could."

During my brief and infrequent visits to the United States I have
discovered there widespread and radical misapprehension as to
conditions in the Philippines, but have failed to find that lack of
interest in them which is commonly said to exist. On the contrary,
I have found the American public keenly desirous of getting at the
real facts whenever there was an opportunity to do so.

The extraordinary extent to which untrue statements have been accepted
at their face value has surprised and deeply disturbed me. I have
conversed with three college presidents, each of whom believed that
the current expenses of the Philippine government were paid from the
United States Treasury.

The preponderance of false and misleading statements about the
Philippines is due, it seems to me, primarily to the fact that it is
those persons with whom the climate disagrees and who in consequence
are invalided home, and those who are separated from the service in
the interest of the public good, who return to the United States and
get an audience there; while those who successfully adapt themselves to
local conditions, display interest in their work and become proficient
in it, remain in the islands for long periods during which they are
too busy, and too far from home, to make themselves heard.

Incidentally it must be remembered that if such persons do attempt to
set forth facts which years of practical experience have taught them,
they are promptly accused of endeavouring to save their own bread and
butter by seeking to perpetuate conditions which insure them fat jobs.

When I think of the splendid men who have uncomplainingly laid down
their lives in the military and in the civil service of their country
in these islands, and of the larger number who have given freely of
their best years to unselfish, efficient work for others, this charge
fills me with indignation.

The only thing that kept me in the Philippine service for so long
a time was my interest in the work for the non-Christian tribes and
my fear that while my successor was gaining knowledge concerning it
which can be had only through experience, matters might temporarily
go to the bad. It has been my ambition to bring this work to such a
point that it would move on, for a time at least, by its own momentum.

I am now setting forth my views relative to the past and present
situation in the islands because I believe that their inhabitants
are confronted by a danger graver than any which they have before
faced since the time when their fate wavered in the balance, while the
question whether the United States should acquire sovereignty over them
or should allow Spain to continue to rule them was under consideration.

It is my purpose to tell the plain, hard truth regardless of the effect
of such conduct upon my future career. It has been alleged that my
views on Philippine problems were coloured by a desire to retain my
official position. Nothing could be further from the truth. Indeed,
no man who has not served for long and sometimes very weary years
as a public official, and has not been a target for numerous more
or less irresponsible individuals whose hands were filled with mud
and who were actuated by a fixed desire to throw it at something,
can appreciate as keenly as I do the manifold blessings which attend
the life of a private citizen.

I trust that I have said enough to make clear my view point, and
now a word as to subject-matter. It is my intention to correct some
of the very numerous misstatements which have been made concerning
past and present conditions in the Philippines. I shall quote, from
time to time, such statements, both verbal and written, and more
especially some of those which have recently appeared in a book
entitled "The American Occupation of the Philippines, 1898-1912,"
by James H. Blount, who signs himself "Officer of the United States
Volunteers in the Philippines, 1899-1901; United States District
Judge in the Philippines, 1901-1905."

Judge Blount has indulged so freely in obvious hyperbole, and has made
so very evident the bitter personal animosities which inspire many
of his statements, that it has been a genuine surprise to his former
associates and acquaintances that his book has been taken seriously.

It should be sufficiently evident to any unprejudiced reader that in
writing it he has played the part of the special pleader rather than
that of the historian. He has used government records freely, and as
is usually the case when a special pleader quotes from such records,
the nature of the matter which he has omitted is worthy of more than
passing attention. I shall hope to be able to fill some of the gaps
that he has left in the documentary history of the events which he
discusses and by so doing, very materially to change its purport.

As public documents have been so misused, and as a new administration
is bestowing on Filipinos political offices, and giving them
opportunities, for which they are as yet utterly unprepared, thus
endangering the results of years of hard, patient, self-sacrificing
work performed by experienced and competent men, it becomes necessary
to strike home by revealing unpleasant facts which are of record
but have not heretofore been disclosed because of the injury to
reputations and the wounding of feelings which would result from their
publication. In doing this I feel that I am only discharging a duty to
the people of the United States, who are entitled to know the truth if
the present possibility of Philippine independence is to be seriously
considered, and to the several Filipino peoples who are to-day in
danger of rushing headlong to their own utter and final destruction.

At the outset I shall discuss the oft-asserted claim that the Filipino
leaders were deceived and betrayed by American officials whom they
assisted, and that this unpardonable conduct led to the outbreak of
active hostilities which occurred just prior to the arrival at Manila
of the first Philippine Commission.

I shall then show that these leaders never established a
government which adequately protected life and property, or gave
to their people peace, happiness or justice, but on the contrary
inaugurated a veritable reign of terror under which murder became a
governmental institution, while rape, inhuman torture, burying alive
and other ghastly crimes were of common occurrence, and usually went
unpunished. The data which I use in establishing these contentions
are for the most part taken directly from the Insurgent records,
in referring to which I employ the war department abbreviation
"P.I.R." followed by a number.

I next take up some of the more important subsequent historical events,
describing the work of the first Philippine Commission, and showing
in what manner the government established by the second Philippine
Commission has discharged its stewardship, subsequently discussing
certain as yet unsolved problems which confront the present government,
such as that presented by the existence of slavery and peonage, and
that of the non-Christian tribes. For the benefit of those who, like
Judge Blount, consider the Philippines "a vast straggly archipelago of
jungle-covered islands in the south seas which have been a nuisance to
every government that ever owned them," I give some facts as to the
islands, their climate, their natural resources and their commercial
possibilities, and close by setting forth my views as to the present
ability of the civilized Cagayans, Ilocanos, Pampangans, Zambals,
Pangasináns, Tagálogs, Bicols and Visayans, commonly and correctly
called _Filipinos_, to establish, or to maintain when established,
a stable government throughout Filipino territory, to say nothing
of bringing under just and effective control, and of protecting and
civilizing, the people of some twenty-seven non-Christian tribes which
constitute an eighth of the population, and occupy approximately half
of the territory, of the Philippine Islands.

I wish here to acknowledge my very great indebtedness to Major
J. R. M. Taylor, who has translated and compiled the Insurgent [4]
records, thereby making available a very large mass of reliable
and most valuable information without which a number of chapters of
this book would have remained unwritten. Surely no man who bases his
statements concerning Filipino rule on the facts set forth in these
records can be accused of deriving his information from hostile or
prejudiced sources.

Of them, Major Taylor says:--

"No one reading the Insurgent records can fail to be impressed with
the difference between the Spanish and the Tagálog documents. Many of
the former are doubtless written with a view to their coming into the
hands of the Americans, or with deliberate purpose to have them do so,
and are framed accordingly. All Tagálog documents, intended only for
Filipinos, say much that is not said in the Spanish documents. The
orders of the Dictator [5] to his subjects were conveyed in the latter
series of documents."



CHAPTER II

Was Independence Promised?

It has long been the fashion in certain quarters to allege, or to
insinuate, that American consuls and naval officers promised the
Insurgent leaders that the independence of the Philippines would be
recognized by the United States. It has been claimed by some that
the coöperation of the Insurgents in the military operations against
Manila was sought for and secured. Others say that they were at least
_de facto_ allies of the United States, and that they were in the
end shamelessly betrayed and wantonly attacked.

These are very serious charges. I shall prove, chiefly by the Insurgent
records, that each of them is false. I ask the forbearance of my
readers if, in the three chapters which I devote to these matters,
I quote documentary evidence at length. When original documents
or extracts from them tell a clear and reasonably concise story,
I sometimes insert them bodily in the text. In other cases I give my
own version of the facts which they set forth, but give the full text
in foot-notes. In nearly all instances references are given to sources
of documentary information. I greatly regret that Taylor's narrative,
with its very numerous supporting documents, is not readily accessible
to the student of history. It ought to have been published, but never
got beyond the galley-proof stage. In referring to it, I am therefore
obliged to use the word Taylor followed by the letters and figures
designating the page of this galley proof on which the passage referred
to is found. Whenever possible I give the War Department numbers [6]
of Insurgent documents, but in a few cases can give only the exhibit
numbers assigned by Taylor in printing the documents.

As his exhibits are serially arranged it is easy to find any one of
them. Copies of his work may be found in the War Department and in
the office of the Chief of the Philippine Constabulary.

Referring to the charge that the Insurgents were deceived, even had
deceit been practised as claimed, Aguinaldo would have had no just
ground for complaint, for he himself not only frankly advocated its
use, but deliberately employed it in his dealings with the Americans,
as clearly appears in records hereinafter cited. [7] However, most
Americans hold to a standard very different from his. Was it departed
from in this instance?

Aguinaldo has specifically and repeatedly charged that Pratt and Dewey
promised him the recognition of the independence of the Philippines
by the United States. [8]

Judge Blount has referred to the "_de facto_ alliance between the
Americans and Aguinaldo," and has dwelt at length on "promises,
both expressed and implied," which were subsequently repudiated
by Consul Pratt, Admiral Dewey and Generals Anderson and Merritt,
constantly suggesting, even when he does not specifically charge,
bad faith on the part of these officers of the United States. [9]

On analyzing his statements we find that he is disereetly non-committal
as to exactly what were the expressed promises, nor does he make it so
plain as might be desired what legitimate inferences were deducible
from the acts of the Americans in question. He quotes an alleged
statement of General Anderson to the effect that:--

"Whether Admiral Dewey and Consuls Pratt, Wildman, [10] and Williams
[11] did or did not give Aguinaldo assurances that a Philippino
government would be recognized, the Phillippinos certainly thought
so, judging from their acts rather than from their words. Admiral
Dewey gave them arms and ammunition, as I did subsequently at his
request." [12]

Before discussing these charges I will briefly review certain
historical facts, knowledge of which will be useful in considering
them.

In August, 1896, an insurrection against Spain had broken out in the
Philippines under the leadership of Emilio Aguinaldo, a resident of
Cavite Viejo, who had been a school teacher, and was, at that time,
_gobernadorcillo_ [13] of his town.

It had been terminated by the so-called "Treaty of Biacnabató,"
signed in Manila on December 15, 1897.

This document provided for the surrender of "Don Emilio Aguinaldo,
Supreme Chief of the Insurgents in arms," and Don Marciano Llanera
and Don Baldomero Aguinaldo, his subordinates, together with their
soldiers and arms.

"The Excellent Seńor General in Chief" of the Spanish forces was to
"provide the necessary means for supporting the lives" of those who
surrendered before a certain fixed date.

In actual practice what was done was to agree to pay them $800,000
[14] in three instalments, the first of $400,000, the second and
third of $200,000 each.

Aguinaldo and certain other leaders were to take up their residence
outside the islands. Their deportation was duly provided for, and
Aguinaldo and twenty-six of his companions were taken to Hongkong,
on the Spanish steamer _Uranus_; arriving there on December 31, 1897.

On January 2, 1898, $400,000 were deposited in the Hongkong Bank,
to the credit of Aguinaldo and Co.

The Insurgent leaders remaining at Biacnabató had a meeting under the
presidency of Isabelo Artacho, an Ilocano [15] who was the ranking
officer in the absence of Aguinaldo, and requested that the second
instalment, of $200,000, be paid to them. The Spanish governor-general,
Primo de Rivera, acceded to their request, and they divided the money,
although Aguinaldo denied their right to do so, claiming that it
should have been sent to Hongkong.

The third payment of $200,000 was apparently never made. Primo de
Rivera says that he turned over a check for $200,000 to his successor,
General Augustin, in April, 1898; giving as his reason for refusing to
pay it to the Insurgents that there seemed to him to be no prospect of
its being equitably divided among those who were entitled to receive
it under the agreement.

Aguinaldo and his associates claimed that certain reforms were promised
by the Spanish government at the time the treaty of Biacnabató
was negotiated, and as these measures were not put into effect,
they organized a junta or revolutionary committee at Hongkong. It
included in its membership a number of Filipino political exiles,
then residing at that place.

The men who composed this organization soon fell to quarrelling and
it became necessary to come to a definite understanding as to its
aims. Under the arrangement finally reached, the junta, as a whole,
was charged with the work of propaganda outside of the archipelago;
with all diplomatic negotiations with foreign governments; and
with the preparation and shipment of such articles as were needed
to carry on the revolution in the Philippines. It was to be allowed
voice by Aguinaldo's government in any serious question which might
arise abroad, and would aid that government in bringing the civil
administration of the Philippines to the level of that of the most
advanced nations.

Trouble soon arose among the former Insurgent leaders over the division
of the funds deposited at Hongkong.

Taylor gives a trustworthy and concise account of the events of this
period, and as it is of historic interest, and makes clear just
how Aguinaldo came to go to Singapore, meet Pratt, and enter into
negotiations with him, I quote extensive extracts from it. [16]

"From January 4 to April 4, Aguinaldo withdrew from the banks 5786.46
pesos in part interest on the money he had deposited. This was used
to pay the expenses of himself and his companions in Hongkong. These
expenses were kept at a minimum; the money was drawn and spent
by him. If one of the men with him needed a new pair of shoes,
Aguinaldo paid for them; if another wanted a new coat, Aguinaldo
bought it. Minute accounts were kept, which are on file among his
papers, and it is seen from them that his expenses were exceeding
his income, which could only be 12,000 pesos a year, while he was
living at the rate of 22,000, with constant demands being made upon
him by men who came from the Philippines. Life was not easy under
these conditions. Aguinaldo's companions were entirely dependent
upon him. Their most trivial expenses had to be approved by him,
and he held them down with a strong hand. They were men living in
a strange land, among a people whose language they did not speak,
having nothing to do but quarrel among themselves, exiles waiting
for a chance to return to their own country, which they watched with
weary eyes while they guarded the embers by which they hoped to light
the fires of a new insurrection.

"The men who had accompanied Aguinaldo to Hongkong were not the only
Filipinos domiciled there; a number of men had taken refuge in that
British colony after the events of 1872, and some of them at least
had prospered. Some of them, like the members of the Cortes family,
seem to have had almost no relations with the followers of Aguinaldo;
some, like J. M. Basa, knew them and took part in some of the meetings
of the governing groups, but were probably not admitted to their full
confidence, as Aguinaldo and his immediate following wanted and were
working for independence and independence alone, while the Filipinos
who had long lived in Hongkong wanted to see the archipelago lost to
Spain, but had no confidence in the ability of the country to stand
alone or in the fitness of Aguinaldo and his following to direct
the councils of a state. The character of the new refugees did not
inspire confidence in these older men, who hoped for a protectorate
by or annexation to the United States.

"On May 6, 1898, the consul-general of the United States there informed
the State Department that D. Cortés, M. Cortés, A. Rosario, Gracio
Gonzaga, and José Maria Basa (50), all very wealthy land-owners,
bankers, and lawyers of Manila, desired to tender their allegiance
and the allegiance of their powerful families in Manila to the
United States, and that they had instructed all their connections
to render every aid to the United States forces in Manila. On May
14 he forwarded statements of other Filipinos domiciled in Hongkong,
not members of the junta, that they desired to submit their allegiance
and the allegiance of their families in the Philippine Islands to the
United States. One of Aguinaldo's followers, writing somewhat later,
spoke with bitterness of the rich old men who went about calling
their companions 'beggarly rebels,' but these men were rich, and
their names and their apparent adhesion to the cause represented by
Aguinaldo would inspire confidence in him among men of property in
the Philippines. They were, accordingly, not to be lightly alienated;
therefore, at first, at least, no open break took place with them,
but their attitude toward the leaders of the insurrection is shown
by the fact that after the early summer of 1898 they took no, or very
little, part in the insurgent movement, although they were living in
Hongkong, the seat of the junta, which conducted the propaganda for
the insurgent government of the Philippines.

       *       *       *       *       *

"But, in fact, Aguinaldo had no just conception of the conditions and
of the opportunities which were about to open before the Hongkong
junta, for although war between Spain and the United States was
imminent and a United States squadron was in Hongkong threatening
Manila, Aguinaldo was chiefly concerned in finding how to avoid
losing the money which had been received from the Spanish government
as the price of his surrender. The importance of his presence near the
Philippines in case of war did not occur to him, or if it did occur to
him anything which he could obtain there from the aid of the United
States probably seemed for the moment of little consequence compared
with escaping from his wrangling companions with enough money to live
on in Paris.

"Artacho, who had received 5000 pesos as his share of the second
payment, arrived in Hongkong and on April 5 demanded 200,000 pesos
of the insurgent funds, probably under the agreement that he should
establish a company in Hongkong for the benefit of the former leaders
and not merely of those who had accompanied Aguinaldo. But the leaders
in Hongkong had denounced that agreement, and refused to pay. He
then entered suit before the supreme court of Hongkong, calling upon
Aguinaldo for an accounting of the trust funds deposited in his hands
for the benefit of Artacho and others, and asked for an injunction
restraining Aguinaldo or any member of the junta from handling or
disposing of any part of said funds. He filed as evidence copies of
the Biacnabató agreement and of the agreement made by the leaders on
December 19. This suit was brought not merely in the name of Artacho,
but in that of all the exiles who were described as living in exile
in Hongkong in accordance with an agreement made with the Spanish
Government. Artacho probably had adherents among these men, some at
least of whom were utterly weary of waiting in Hongkong and of living
upon what was doled out to them. Some at least saw no chance of any
other fate than indefinite exile spent in dependence upon the inner
group for even the means of existence.

"The suit was in equity, and called for an accounting for the trust
funds which the complainant recognized were legally in the hands of
Aguinaldo. It could be carried on only with great difficulty without
his presence and without his account books. Meetings were held, and
Artacho was denounced as attempting to extort blackmail, but he refused
to yield, and Aguinaldo, rather than explain the inner workings of the
Hongkong junta before a British court, prepared for flight. A summons
was issued for his appearance before the supreme court of Hongkong
on April 13, 1898, but he was by that time beyond its jurisdiction.

"He drew out the 50,000 pesos from the Chartered Bank, which had become
due according to the terms of the deposit, and perhaps such other
sums as could be drawn upon by check, engaged passage for Europe by
way of Singapore for G. H. del Pilar, J. M. Leyba, and himself under
assumed names, appointed V. Belarmino to succeed to his functions,
and gave him checks signed in blank to draw the interest of the sums
on deposit to provide for the support of the exiles. He gave as his
reason for departure that he was going to remain under cover until
Artacho could be bought off, but he intended to go far afield for this
purpose, as he gave his destination as Europe and the United States.

"Aguinaldo and his companions probably sailed from Hongkong on April
8, 1898, and arrived in Singapore on April 21, after stopping in
Saigon. War between the United States and Spain had been rendered
inevitable by the resolution of Congress demanding that Spain should
withdraw her forces from Cuba, and was declared on April 21. Although
Aguinaldo and his followers did not appreciate the influence which
conditions on the other side of the world might have upon the future of
the Philippines, it happened that in Singapore at that time there was
an Englishman named Bray who did. He had been a member of the civil
service in India, and had lived for some years in the Philippines,
but he had fallen upon evil days and was engaged in writing letters
to the Singapore _Free Press_ upon the Philippines, and in retailing
such information as was in his possession concerning them to the
United States consul-general in Singapore, Mr. E. Spencer Pratt, for
transmittal to Commodore Dewey. Bray heard of the arrival of Aguinaldo
and realized what could be done with him, and that if the matter were
well handled it might be to his own advantage. He went at once to see
Aguinaldo and informed him that the United States consul-general was
anxious to see him. He went to the consul-general and informed him of
the importance of Aguinaldo, and that he was in Singapore. Aguinaldo
had to be persuaded to agree to a meeting. The consul-general
was anxious for it, and it took place, according to Aguinaldo, on
the night of April 22 (according to Pratt, on the morning of April
24). The statement made by Aguinaldo is probably correct. According
to his account book, he paid $11 on April 23, 1898, for a telegram
to the Hongkong junta concerning the negotiations 'with America.'

"Aguinaldo knew but little English, Pratt knew no Spanish, so in
their interview Bray acted as interpreter. An interpreter who is
interested in the subject of the discussion may be a dangerous man. It
is impossible to say what he told Aguinaldo. Certainly Pratt did not
know; but whatever was said during these conversations it is within
the limits of possibility that Pratt may have been made to say by
the interpreter more than he intended, and that his statements of
what would probably be granted by the United States Government and
his expression of good wishes for the cause of Filipino independence
may have been translated as assurances and as promises. Bray, who,
according to his Filipino former friends, was apt to talk too much, may
have talked too much on this occasion, and so the myth of the formal
agreement between Aguinaldo on behalf of the Filipino insurgents
and Pratt on behalf of the United States grew up, a fiction which
Bray himself, with a natural desire to add to his own importance,
did his best to circulate.

"Bray did not ask for his reward at the time, but probably reckoned
upon making himself indispensable as an adviser, so that later he could
make his own terms. For a time he wrote letters of advice to Aguinaldo,
which may have had some influence upon the line of conduct which he
adopted, and later was employed in furnishing from Hongkong news to
various newspapers of events and conditions in the Philippines. His
cablegrams shortly before the outbreak of hostilities between the
United States and the insurgents were more picturesque than veracious,
but they were apparently considered effective, as Aguinaldo ordered
that he should be given $5000. He wanted more, but the Hongkong junta
did not trust him, and he ceased to be in their employment." [17]

As we shall see, Bray did not do all of the interpreting at Singapore,
and we shall be able to determine with some accuracy what actually
transpired there.

We can now consider understandingly the charges made against Pratt
and Dewey.

It has been claimed over and over again, that Pratt promised Aguinaldo
recognition of tile independence of the Philippines if he and his
people would cooperate with the United States forces against Spain.

Aguinaldo himself made the charge in his "Reseńa Verídica" [18]
in the following words:--

"In this interview Consul Pratt told me that because the Spaniards
had not complied with the agreement of Biac-na-bató, the Filipinos had
a right to renew their interrupted revolution and advised me to take
up arms anew against Spain, assuring me that America would give the
Filipinos the greatest advantages (mayores ventajas). Then I asked
the Consul what advantages the United States would concede to the
Philippines, suggesting, when I had the proper opening, the propriety
of making an agreement in writing, to which the Consul answered that
he would report, by telegraph, on the subject to Mr. Dewey, who was
the chief of the expedition against the Philippines, and who had
ample powers from President McKinley.

"On the following day, between 10 and 12 in the morning, we again took
up the matter, Consul Pratt saying that the admiral had answered my
inquiry by saying that the United States would at least recognize the
independence of the Philippine government under a naval protectorate,
but that there was no necessity to put it in writing, as the words
of the admiral and the American consul were sacred and would be
fulfilled, not being like those of the Spaniards, and finally, that
the Government of North America was a very honourable Government,
a very just and very powerful one." [19]

On April 27, 1908, Pratt telegraphed the Secretary of State as
follows:--

"General Aguinaldo gone my instance Hongkong arrange with Dewey
coöperation insurgents Manila.

"_Pratt_."


On the 28th he wrote the Secretary, explaining how he had come to
meet Aguinaldo, and stating just what he had done. He said:--

"At this interview, after learning from General Aguinaldo the state
of an object sought to be obtained by the present insurrectionary
movement, which, though absent from the Philippines, he was still
directing, I took it upon myself, whilst explaining that I had no
authority to speak for the Government, to point out the danger of
continuing independent action at this stage; and, having convinced
him of the expediency of cooperating with our fleet, then at Hongkong,
and obtained the assurance of his willingness to proceed thither and
confer with Commodore Dewey to that end, should the latter so desire,
I telegraphed the Commodore the same day as follows, through our
consul-general at Hongkong:--

"'Aguinaldo, insurgent leader, here. Will come Hongkong arrange
with Commodore for general cooperation insurgents Manila if
desired. Telegraph.

"'_Pratt_.'"


The Commodore's reply read thus:--

"'Tell Aguinaldo come soon as possible.

"'_Dewey_.'"


Pratt adds:--

"I received it late at night, and at once communicated to General
Aguinaldo, who, with his aide-de-camp and private secretary, all
under assumed names, I succeeded in getting off by the British Steamer
_Malacca_, which left here on Tuesday the 26th.

"Just previous to his departure, I had a second and last interview
with General Aguinaldo, the particulars of which I shall give you by
next mail.

"The general impressed me as a man of intelligence, ability, and
courage, and worthy the confidence that had been placed in him.

"I think that in arranging for his direct cooperation with the
commander of our forces, I have prevented possible conflict of
action and facilitated the work of occupying and administering the
Philippines.

"If this course of mine meets with the Government's approval, as
I trust it may, I shall be fully satisfied; to Mr. Bray, however,
I consider there is due some special recognition for most valuable
services rendered.

"How that recognition can best be made I leave to you to decide.

"I have, etc." [20]

It will be noted that Pratt explained to Aguinaldo that he had no
authority to speak for the government; that there was no mention in
the cablegrams between Pratt and Dewey of independence or indeed of
any conditions on which Aguinaldo was to coöperate, these details
being left for future arrangement with Dewey; and that Pratt thought
that he had prevented possible conflict of action and facilitated
the work of occupying and administering the Philippines.

The particulars as to the second and last interview between Aguinaldo
and Pratt were embodied in the following letter:--

"No. 213. _Consulate-General of the United States._

"_Singapore_, April 30, 1898.

"_Sir_: Referring to my dispatch No. 212, of the 28th instant, I
have the honor to report that in the second and last interview I had
with Gen. Emilio Aguinaldo on the eve of his departure for Hongkong,
I enjoined upon him the necessity, under Commodore Dewey's direction,
of exerting absolute control over his forces in the Philippines, as no
excesses on their part would be tolerated by the American Government,
the President having declared that the present hostilities with
Spain were to be carried on in strict accord with modern principles
of civilized warfare.

"To this General Aguinaldo fully assented, assuring me that he intended
and was perfectly able, once on the field, to hold his followers,
the insurgents, in check and lead them as our commander should direct.

"The general stated that he hoped the United States would assume
protection of the Philippines for at least long enough to allow the
inhabitants to establish a government of their own, in the organization
of which he would desire American advice and assistance.

"These questions I told him I had no authority to discuss.

"I have, etc.,

"_E. Spencer Pratt_,

"_United States Consul-General_."


In a subsequent communication written on July 28, 1898, Pratt made
the following statement:--

"I declined even to discuss with General Aguinaldo the question of the
future policy of the United States with regard to the Philippines, that
I held out no hopes to him of any kind, committed the government in no
way whatever, and, in the course of our confidences, never acted upon
the assumption that the Government would cooperate with him--General
Aguinaldo--for the furtherance of any plans of his own, nor that,
in accepting his said cooperation, it would consider itself pledged
to recognize any political claims which he might put forward." [21]

What reason if any is there for denying the truth of this allegation?

I will give in full Blount's statement as to what occurred at a
meeting held at Singapore, to celebrate the early successes of Dewey
and Aguinaldo, as it constitutes his nearest approach to a direct
claim, that any one at any time promised independence:--

"First there was music by the band. Then followed the formal reading
and presentation of the address by a Dr. Santos, representing the
Filipino community of Singapore. The address pledged the 'eternal
gratitude' of the Filipino people to Admiral Dewey and the honored
addressee; alluded to the glories of independence, and to how Aguinaldo
had been enabled; by the arrangement so happily effected with Admiral
Dewey by Consul Pratt, to arouse eight millions of Filipinos to take up
arms 'in defence of those principles of justice and liberty of which
your country is the foremost champion' and trusted 'that the United
States... will efficaciously second the programme arranged between you,
sir, and General Aguinaldo in this port of Singapore, and secure to
us our independence under the protection of the United States.'

"Mr. Pratt arose and 'proceeded, speaking in French,' says the
newspaper--it does not say Alabama French, but that is doubtless
what it was--'to state his belief that the Filipinos would prove
and were now proving themselves fit for self-government.' The
gentleman from Alabama then went on to review the mighty events and
developments of the preceding six weeks, Dewey's victory of May Ist,
'the brilliant achievements of your own distinguished leader, General
Emilio Aguinaldo, _cooperating on land with the Americans at sea_,'
etc. 'You have just reason to be proud of what has been and is being
accomplished by General Aguinaldo and your fellow-countrymen under
his command. When, six weeks ago, I learned that General Aguinaldo had
arrived _incognito_ in Singapore, I immediately _sought him out_. An
hour's interview convinced me that he _was the man for the occasion_;
and, having communicated with Admiral Dewey, I accordingly arranged
for him to join the latter, which he did at Cavite. The rest you
know.'" [22]

Now, it happens that Dr. Santos himself forwarded his speech, and
his version of Pratt's reply thereto, in a letter to Aguinaldo, dated
Singapore, June 9, 1898. As he served as interpreter, he, if any one,
should know what Pratt said. After describing the change in tone of
the Singapore _Free Press_, with which strained relations had formerly
existed, and the subsequent friendliness of the editor of this paper
and that of the _Straits Times_, he says that on the previous afternoon
he went with the other Filipinos to greet Pratt. He continues:--

"This occasion was unusually opportune by reason of ours having
been victorious and immediately after the cry of our worthy chief
which found an echo in this colony. For this purpose 30 or more
Filipinos--9 of the higher class, 15 musicians and the remainder of the
middle class--went to greet Consul A., here, and on the invitation of
Mr. Bray we ascended. He received us in his private office, and it was
imposing to see that the only decoration was the American flag which
covered the desk, and in its centre, a carved wooden frame holding
the portrait of our worthy chief. He shook hands with all of us,
and I introduced them all. We found there also, and were introduced
to, the Editor of the _Straits Times_ and the _Free Press_ of here,
and after being thus assembled, after a musical selection, I read
the following speech in French:--

"'_His Excellency, The Consul General of the United States of America
in Singapore_:

"'_Your Excellency_: The Filipinos of all social classes residing
in this port, have come to greet Your Excellency as the genuine
representative of the great and powerful American Republic in
order to express to you our eternal gratitude for the moral and
material support given by Admiral Dewey to our General Aguinaldo
in his campaign for the liberty of eight million Filipinos. The
latter and we ourselves hope that the United States, your nation,
persevering in its humanitarian policy, will without cessation and
(with) decided energy continue to support the programme agreed upon
in Singapore between Your Excellency and General Aguinaldo, that is
to say, the Independence of the Philippine Islands, under an American
protectorate. Accept our cordial acknowledgments and congratulations
on being the first one in accepting and supporting this idea which
time and events have well developed to the great satisfaction of our
nation. Finally, we request you, Most Excellent Sir, to express to your
worthy President and the American Republic, our sincere acknowledgments
and our fervent wishes for their prosperity. I have concluded.'

"The Consul replied hereto in French, in more or less the following
terms:--

"'You have nothing to thank me for, because I have only faithfully
followed the instructions received from my Government; the fact of
the sudden departure of your General will permit you to infer that
I have done so. I shall in any case inform my Government of your
good wishes and I thank you in its name. You know that your wishes
are mine also, and for this reason at the last interview I had with
Mr. Aguinaldo, I repeated to him that he should observe the greatest
humanity possible in the war, in order that our army, our soldiers,
our nation and all the other nations may see that you are humane and
not savages, as has erroneously been believed.'

"After this there was enthusiastic applause for the Consul; he
offered us all cigars, glasses of very fine sherry, and lemonade
for the musicians and the majority. The toasts were offered with the
sherry by your humble servant, Sres. Cannon, Enríquez, Celio, Reyes,
the Consul, the editors of the _Free Press_, _Straits Times_ and
Mr. Bray. We drank to America and her humanitarian work of redemption;
to the Philippines with America; we gave thanks to the Consul, to
Mr. Bray as an important defender; we drank to the _Free Press_ for
taking such an interest in our affairs, and to the _Straits Times_
(sarcastically); but I was very careful not to propose a toast to our
general, which was done at the proper time by 'Flaco' [23] when we
gave three cheers; for the sake of courtesy we cheered for England,
which had been so hospitable to us, and when everybody had become
quiet, the Editor of the _Straits Times_ took his glass in his hand
and cried in a loud voice, 'The Philippine Republic,' to which we
all responded. 'Flaco' disappeared a moment, and when he returned
he brought with him the American flag, and formally presented it to
us in French, which I interpreted to all in Spanish, as follows:
'Gentlemen: The American Consul, with his deep affection for us,
presents us this flag as the greatest and most expressive remembrance
which he can give us. The red stripes stand for the generous blood of
her sons, shed to obtain her liberty; the white stripes stand for her
virginity and purity as our country; the blue background indicates
the sky and each star represents a free and independent State; this
is America, and the Consul is desirous that we also should have so
glorious a history as hers and that it may be as brilliant as could
be wished, securing peace with respect, and may God be our help and
guide in securing liberty. Viva and with it our most sincere thanks
for so signal a courtesy.' Hereupon, to the surprise of everybody
as no one expected it, the Consul requested that some Filipino airs
be played which seemed to please him very much. Finally, about 6.15,
we left, very well satisfied with the reception accorded us and the
kindness of the Consul. Mr. Bray asked me for the text of my speech,
which I insert above and I secured from the Consul his French text,
which I enclose in my letter to Naning. Without anything further for
the present, awaiting your reply and your opinion as to the above,
as also orders and instructions for the future, I am,

"Yours, etc.

(Signed) "_Isidoro de los Santos_."

To this letter Major Taylor has appended the following note:--

"(_Note by Compiler._--In a letter written in Tagalog to Aguinaldo on
June 6 by Santos he describes the American consul general as having
cried out 'Hurrah for General Aguinaldo, hurrah for the Republic of
the Philippines' and then, having apparently taken several drinks,
he passed up and down the room waving the American flag before giving
it to the assembled Filipinos (P.I.R., 406.7).)" [24]

This final statement does not present the representative of the United
States government at Singapore in a very favourable light, but I take
the facts as I find them. If now we compare the speech actually made
by Dr. Santos with Blount's version of it, we shall find that with
the exception of the words "eternal gratitude" the passages which
he encloses in quotation marks are not in the original at all. The
glories of independence are not alluded to, nor is there so much as
a suggestion that Aguinaldo had been enabled to arouse eight millions
of Filipinos to take up arms, which he certainly had not done.

Dr. Santos in his speech did resort to a stereotyped Filipino procedure
so very commonly employed that those of us who have dealt much with
his people have learned to meet it almost automatically. It consists
in referring to one's having said just exactly what one did not say,
and then if one fails to note the trap and avoid it, in claiming that
because one did not deny the allegation one has admitted its truth.

Aguinaldo himself later repeatedly resorted to this procedure in his
dealings with Dewey and others.

In the present instance Santos employed it rather cleverly when he
expressed the hope that the United States would "continue to support
the programme agreed upon in Singapore, between your Excellency and
General Aguinaldo, that is to say, the independence of the Philippine
Islands under an American protectorate."

Now if this was agreed to, Aguinaldo later constantly violated his
part of the agreement, for we shall see that he stated over and
over again, in correspondence with members of the junta and others,
that a protectorate would be considered only if absolute independence
finally proved unattainable, but there is no reason to believe that
any such agreement was made.

Dr. Santos read his speech to Mr. Pratt in French. Blount implies,
whether rightly or wrongly I do not know, that Pratt's knowledge
of French was poor. At all events Pratt in his reply made not the
slightest reference to the hope expressed by Santos that the United
States would continue to support the programme which Santos said
had been agreed upon between Pratt and Aguinaldo, and claim of a
promise of independence based on these speeches must obviously be
abandoned. There is no doubt that Pratt personally sympathized with
the ambitions of the Filipino leaders, and openly expressed his
sympathy on this and other occasions, but to do this was one thing
and to have attempted to compromise his government would have been
another and very different one. The shrewd Filipinos with whom he
was dealing understood this difference perfectly well.

It is a regrettable fact that there exists some reason to believe that
his sympathy was not purely disinterested. Aguinaldo claims that Pratt
wished to be appointed "representative of the Philippines in the United
States to promptly secure the official recognition of our independence"
and that he promised him "a high post in the customs service." [25]

It will be noted that several sentences and phrases in Blount's
statement are enclosed in quotation marks. From what were they
quoted? The next paragraph in his book tells us:--

"Says the newspaper clipping which has preserved the Pratt oration:
At the conclusion of Mr. Pratt's speech, refreshments were served,
and as the Filipinos, _being Christians, drink alcohol_, there was
no difficulty in arranging as to refreshments." [26]

The use of this clipping from the Singapore _Free Press_ illustrates
admirably Blount's methods. The _Free Press_ had at first displayed
a marked coldness toward the insurgent cause, but its editor,
Mr. St. Clair, was opportunely "seen" by Bray, who reported that as a
result of his visit, both the editor and the paper would thereafter be
friendly, and they were. In other words, the _Free Press_ became the
Singapore organ of the insurrection, and its editor, according to Bray,
"a true and loyal friend" of Aguinaldo.

Blount claims to have made "an exhaustive examination of the records
of that period." [27] Why then did he use as evidence a newspaper
clipping from an Insurgent organ, instead of Santos's letter?

Blount endeavours to make capital out of the fact that Pratt forwarded
to the State Department a proclamation which he says was gotten up
by the Insurgent leaders at Hongkong and sent to the Philippines in
advance of Aguinaldo's coming. He says that it was headed "America's
Allies" and quotes from it as follows:--

"Compatriots: Divine Providence is about to place independence within
our reach.... The Americans, not from mercenary motives, but for the
sake of humanity and the lamentations of so many persecuted people,
have considered it opportune, etc. [Here follows a reference to
Cuba.] At the present moment an American squadron is preparing to sail
for the Philippines.... The Americans will attack by sea and prevent
any reënforcements coming from Spain; ... we insurgents must attack by
land. Probably you will have more than sufficient arms, because the
Americans have arms and will find means to assist us. _There where
you see the American flag flying, assemble in numbers; they are our
redeemers!_" [28]

The translation that he used is that given in Senate Document No. 62,
L. 60, and is none too accurate. He allows it to be inferred that
this proclamation was actually issued. It was not. Its history is
as follows:--

On May 16, 1898, J. M. Basa, a Filipino, who had lived in Hongkong
since 1872, on account of his connection with the troubles of that
year, wrote letters [29] to a number of friends recommending the
widest possible circulation of a proclamation enclosed therewith, as
an aid to the American policy in the Philippines "in the war against
the tyrannical friars and the Spaniards."

With these letters there were sent two different proclamations,
each beginning with the words "Fellow Countrymen." The first, which
is the one referred to by Blount, continues:--

"Divine Providence places us in a position to secure our independence,
and this under the freest form to which all individuals, all people,
all countries, may aspire.

"The Americans, more for humanity than for self-interest, attentive
to the complaints of so many persecuted Filipinos, find it opportune
to extend to our Philippines their protective mantle, now that they
find themselves obliged to break their friendship with the Spanish
people, because of the tyranny they have exercised in Cuba, causing
all Americans, with whom they have great commercial relations,
enormous damages.

"At this moment an American fleet is prepared to go to the Philippines.

"We, your fellow-countrymen, fear that you will make use of your arms
to fire upon the Americans. No, brothers; do not make such a mistake;
rather (shoot) kill yourselves than treat our liberators as enemies.

"Do not pay attention to the decree of Primo de Rivera, calling on
you to enlist for the war, for that will cost you your lives: rather
die than act as ingrates toward our redeemers, the Americans.

       *       *       *       *       *

"Note well that the Americans have to attack by sea, at the same
time avoiding reinforcements which may come from Spain; therefore
the insurrection must attack by land. Perhaps you will have more than
sufficient arms, as the Americans have arms, and will find the means
to aid you.

"Whenever you see the American flag, bear in mind that they are our
redeemers." [30]

On the margin is written: "Viva, for America with the Philippines!"

Apparently what Basa here means by independenee is independence from
Spain, for it is known that he was in favour of annexation to the
United States, and in the second proclamation we find the following:--

"This is the best opportunity which we have ever had for eontriving
that our country (all the Philippine Archipelago) may be counted
as another Star in the Great Republic of the United States, great
because of its wisdom, its wealth, and its constitutional laws.

"Now is the time to offer ourselves to that great nation. With America
we shall have development in the broadest sense (of advancement)
in civilization.

"With America we shall be rich, civilized and happy.

"Fellow patriots, add your signatures to those which have already
been given. Explain to all our fellow eountrymen the benefits of this
change, which will be blessed by Heaven, by men and by our children.

"Viva America with the Philippines!!!" [31]

The letters were undoubtedly given to Aguinaldo for delivery on his
arrival. They were never delivered, and it is reasonable to suppose,
espeeially as Basa, who was a man of importance and means, was a
member of the group who desired annexation to the United States, that
Aguinaldo took the letters along in order to avoid a rupture with him
and then quietly suppressed them. Obviously, however, he sent or gave
a copy of the first one to Pratt, presumably without the written words:
"Viva, for America with the Philippines!"

And now comes a bit of evidence as to what occurred at Singapore
which I consider incontrovertible.

Aguinaldo returned promptly to Hongkong and on May 4, 1898, a meeting
of the junta was held. The minutes of this meeting, [32] signed by
each of the several Filipinos present, form a part of the Insurgent
records which have come into the possession of the United States
Government. They state among other things that:--

"The temporary Secretary read the minutes of the preceding meeting,
which were approved. The temporary President reported that D. Emilio
Aguinaldo had just arrived from Singapore and it became necessary
for him to take possession of the office to which he has been elected."

After the transaction of some further business Aguinaldo was summoned,
appeared at the meeting, and was duly installed as President. Then:--

"The President described the negotiations which took place during
his absence in Singapore with the American Consul of that English
colony. Both agreed that the President should confer with the Admiral
commanding the American squadron in Mirs Bay, and if the latter
should accept his propositions, advantageous, in his judgment, to
the Philippines, he would go to said country in one of the cruisers
which form the fleet for the purpose of taking part in the present
events. And as he did not find the Admiral, he thought it well to
have an interview with the American Consul of this colony on the day
of his arrival, but was not satisfied with such interview.

"Considering the critical conditions in the Philippines at present,
he begged the committee to discuss the advisability of his going to
said islands with all the leaders of prominence in the last rebellion
residing in this colony, in case the Admiral gave them an opportunity
to do so."

Note that there is here absolutely not one word of any promise
of independence made to Aguinaldo by Pratt or any one else. Is it
conceivable that Aguinaldo in describing "the negotiations which
took place during his absence in Singapore with the American Consul
of the English Colony" would, by any chance, have failed to inform
his associates in Hongkong of such an extraordinary and fortunate
occurrence as the promising by Mr. Pratt and Admiral Dewey that the
United States would recognize Philippine independence?

Sandico [33] thought that Aguinaldo ought to go, for--

"From conferences which he had with the Admiral of the American fleet
and with the American Consul in this colony, he believed that under
present conditions it was absolutely necessary for the President
to go to the Philippines, since, according to the American Consul,
Manila had been taken by said fleet, and a provisional government was
now being formed in that capital. The intervention of the President
in the formation of that government is undoubtedly essential, since
his prestige, which everybody recognizes, would evidently prevent
dissensions among the sons of the country, and it would be possible
thereby to obtain a perfect organization both for the military and
civil evolution of that country.

"Srs. Garchitorena [34] and Apacible [35] expressed themselves in
similar terms. Notwithstanding the previous remarks, the President
insisted that he considered it reckless for him to go to the
Philippines without first making a written agreement with the Admiral,
as it might happen, if he placed himself at his orders, that he might
make him subscribe to or sign a document containing proposals highly
prejudicial to the interests of the country, from which might arise
the following two very grave contingencies:

"1st. If he should accept them, he would undoubtedly commit an
unpatriotic act, and his name would justly be eternally cursed by
the Filipinos.

"2d. If he should refuse, then the break between the two would
be evident.

"And to avoid this sad dilemma, he proposed to the committee that
the four parties (?) of the insurgents now here, under charge of
the competent chiefs authorized in writing by him, should go to
the Philippines to intervene, after a conference with the Admiral,
in these important questions; such means, in his opinion, should
be first employed to ascertain in an authentic manner what the
intentions of the United States in regard to that country are; and
if his intervention is absolutely necessary, he would not object to
go at once to the Philippines, endeavouring by all the means in his
power to remedy the critical condition of the country, to which he
had offered, and always would willingly offer, to sacrifice his life."

Why adopt means to learn from the admiral what the intentions of the
United States were in regard to the Philippines if both he and Pratt
had already promised recognition of independence?

"Srs. Sandico, Garchitorena, Gonzaga [36] and Apacible replied that
they were fully convinced the Admiral of the American squadron
would furnish the President all the arms which he might desire,
since the former was convinced that the fleet could do nothing
in the Philippines unless it were used in conjunction  with the
insurgents in the development of their plans of war against the Spanish
government.... The authority to treat which the President desired to
give to the other chiefs, without reflecting at all upon their personal
qualifications, they did not believe would be as efficacious as his
personal intervention which is necessary in grave affairs, such as
those the subject of discussion; there would be no better occasion
than that afforded them to insure the landing of the expeditionary
forces on those islands and to arm themselves at the expense of the
Americans and to assure the situation of the Philippines in regard
to our legitimate aspirations against those very people. The Filipino
people, unprovided with arms, would be the victims of the demands and
exactions of the United States; but, provided with arms, would be able
to oppose themselves to them, struggling for independence, in which
consists the true happiness of the Philippines. And they finished
by saying that it made no difference if the Spanish government did
demand the return of the P400,000, and if the demand were allowed
in an action, since the object of the sum would be obtained by the
Admiral furnishing the Filipinos the arms which they required for
the struggle for their legitimate aspirations."

Here, then, was a definite plan to obtain arms from the Americans to
be used if necessary "against those very people" later.

"The President, with his prestige in the Philippines, would be
able to arouse those masses to combat the demands of the United
States, if they colonized that country, and would drive them, if
circumstances rendered it necessary, to a Titanic struggle for their
independence, even if they should succumb in shaking off the yoke of
a new oppressor. If Washington proposed to carry out the fundamental
principles of its constitution, there was no doubt that it would not
attempt to colonize the Philippines, or even to annex them. It was
probable then that it would give them independence and guarantee
it; in such case the presence of the President was necessary,
as he would prevent dissensions among the sons of the country who
sought office, who might cause the intervention of European powers,
an intervention which there was no reason to doubt would be highly
prejudicial to the interests of the country.... What injury could
come to the Philippines, even if we admitted that the Admiral would
not give arms to the President on account of his refusal to sign a
document prejudicial to the country, after he had taken all means
to provide for her defence? None. Such an act of the President could
not be censured, but, on the other hand, would be most meritorious,
because it would be one proof more of his undoubted patriotism."

Not one word of any promise of independence do we find in this
remarkable document. On the contrary it furnishes conclusive proof
that no such promise had been made and that the future relations
between Filipinos and Americans were still completely uncertain.

And now comes some direct evidence. Bray and St. Clair, the latter
the editor of the Insurgent organ in Singapore, were present on
the occasion when independence was said to have been promised by
Pratt. Bray subsequently declared in the most positive terms that it
was promised. St. Clair wrote him a letter taking him roundly to task
for this claim, in the following very interesting terms:--

"I felt it to be my duty to let Pratt know that you still hold that
you and Santos have evidence that will controvert his, (and) he was,
of course, extremely disappointed, because he (is) quite aware of
what took place in Spanish, and as to turning of his conversation
into a pretense of agreement he knows nothing. He says very truly:
'My own party, the Democrats, will say if they read this book--If this
man takes it upon himself to be a Plenipotentiary without authority,
we had better not employ him any more--I frankly cannot understand
your action, as to its unwisdom I have no doubt at all.'

"Admiral Dewey goes home, it is believed, to advise the President on
Naval and Colonial Affairs, he knows exactly what did take place and
what did not, and I should know if he had any ground to think that the
slightest promise was made by Pratt to Aguinaldo he would declare it
unauthorized and decline to sanction it. I am certain Pratt reported
what he supposed took place accurately; he had no surety on what you
might have said, naturally.

"And, curiously, you never mentioned to me anything of the agreement
as having taken place then, nor in the paper you communicated to me
was there any mention of one, nor did Pratt know of any. It is only
more recently that the fiction took shape. 'The wish father to the
thought,' or the statement repeated till it has become believed by
the--, [37] this is common.

"Now I would like to urge you, from the practical point of view, to
drop any such foolishness. The vital thing, and nothing else counts,
is what Dewey said and did when he at last met Aguinaldo. That, that,
that, is the thing, all else is empty wind.

"Supposing that Pratt and Wildman had covered inches of paper with
'Clauses' and put on a ton of sealing wax as consular seals,
what, pray, to any common sense mind would all that have been
worth? Nothing!! Nothing!! And yet, where is the agreement, where is
the seal? Where are there any signatures? And if you had them--waste
paper--believe me, that all this potter about Pratt and Wildman is
energy misdirected. The sole thing to have impressed upon the public
in America would be the chaining of Dewey and Aguinaldo together as
participants in common action; you surely comprehend this means! Think
and think again; it means success as far as it is possible. The other
work is not only lost, but does not gain much sympathy, especially
this criticism of the conduct of American troops; things may be true
that are not expedient to say. Sink everything into Dewey-Aguinaldo
coöperation, that was on both sides honest even if it did not imply
any actual arrangement, which, of course, Dewey himself could not
make. That here you have the facts,--undenied--incontrovertible." [38]

The following letter of Bray to Aguinaldo, dated January 12, 1899,
seems to me to throw much light on the question of how these claims
relative to the promised recognition of Filipino independence sometimes
originated and were bolstered up:--

"With regard to your proclamation, there is still a trump card to
be played. Did you not say that the basis of any negotiation in
Singapore was the Independence of the Philippines under an American
protectorate? This is what Consul Pratt telegraphed and to which Dewey
and Washington agreed; as I figured up the 'price' of the telegram,
I know very well what occurred, and I am ready to state it and to
swear to it when the proper time comes. There are five of us against
one in the event of Consul Pratt receiving instructions to deny
it. Furthermore, Mr. St. Clair knows what happened and I am certain
that he also would testify. St. Clair still has the rough draft as an
histerical relic, and St. Clair is a true and loyal friend of yours,
as is your humble servant." [39]

The utter unscrupulousness of Bray is shown by his claim that St. Clair
would confirm his false statements, made as it was after receiving
St. Clair's letter above quoted.

But Bray did not wait for Aguinaldo to play this trump card. He tried
to play it himself by cabling Senator Hoar, on the same day, that as
the man who introduced General Aguinaldo to the American government
through the consul at Singapore he was prepared to swear that the
conditions under which Aguinaldo promised to cooperate with Dewey
were independence under a protectorate. [40]

Let us now trace Aguinaldo's subsequent movements, and see what
promises, if any, were made to him by Wildman and Dewey. He had
returned to Hongkong with two companions, all travelling under assumed
names. Only his most trusted friends among the members of the junta
were at first allowed to know where he was living.

His situation was a difficult one. It was necessary for him to come
to some sort of a temporary arrangement with Artacho, if he was to
avoid legal difficulties, and to reëstablish himself with some of
his companions, who had accused him of deserting with the intention
of going to Europe to live on money which belonged to them. When
harmony had been temporarily restored through the good offices of
Sandico, Aguinaldo had an interview with Consul General Wildman. He
has since claimed that Wildman, too, promised him independence, but
the truth seems to be that he himself said he was anxious to become
an American citizen. This being impossible, he wanted to return to
the Philippines and place himself under Dewey's orders. He wanted to
help throw off the yoke of Spain, and this done, would abide by the
decision of the United States as to the fate of the Philippines. [41]

Any claim that Aguinaldo had been promised independence by Wildman, or,
indeed, that the latter had been allowed to know that the Filipinos
desired it, seems to me to be negatived, not only by Wildman's own
statements, but by a letter from Agoncillo to Aguinaldo written on
August 5, 1908, in which he says:--

"The American consul left my house to-day at 3 o'clock, as I had
requested an interview with him before his departure, and I was unable
to go to the Consulate on account of the swelling of my feet. From our
conversation I infer that independence will be given to us. I did not,
however, disclose to him our true desires.... Said consul approved my
telegram to McKinley, which has been sent to-day through him, a copy
of which is herewith enclosed. If they accept our representative in
the commission, we may arrive at a friendly understanding, and it will
enable us to prepare for the fight in case they refuse to listen to
our request. On the other hand, if at the very beginning they refuse
to admit our representative, we will at once be in a position to know
what should be done, _i.e._ to prepare for war." [42]

On May 4, 1898, the Hongkong junta voted that Aguinaldo ought to go
to the Philippines, and go he did. It would seem that he at first gave
up the idea of joining Dewey, for on May 11 he wrote a cipher letter,
giving minute directions for the preparation of signals to assist
his ship in making land, by day or by night, at Dingalan Bay on the
east coast of Luzon; directing the capture of the town of San Antonio,
just back of Capones Islands, in Zambales, and ending with the words:
"We will surely arrive at one of the two places above mentioned,
so you must be prepared."

Something led him again to change his mind, and he finally sailed on
the _McCulloch_.

In his "Reseńa Verídica" written later for political purposes,
Aguinaldo has definitely claimed that Dewey promised him that
the United States would recognize the independence of the Filipino
people. I will let him tell his own story, confronting his statements
with those of the admiral.

"May 19, 1898.

"The _McCulloch_ started at eleven o'clock on the morning of the
17th of May for the Philippines; we anchored, between twelve and
one o'clock on the afternoon of the 19th, in the waters of Cavite,
and immediately the launch of the Admiral--with his aid and private
secretary--came to convey me to the _Olympia_, where I was received,
with my aid, Sr. Leyva, with the honors of a general, by a section
of marine guards." [43]

Relative to this matter, Admiral Dewey has testified: [44]

"_The Chairman_. You, of course, never saluted the flag?

_Admiral Dewey_. Certainly not; and I do not think I ever called
Aguinaldo anything but Don Emilio; I don't think I ever called him
'General.'

_The Chairman_. And when he came on board ship was he received with
any special honors at the side?

_Admiral Dewey_. Never."

The "Reseńa Verídica" continues:--

"The Admiral received me in a salon, and after greetings of courtesy
I asked him 'if all the telegrams relative to myself which he had
addressed to the Consul at Singapore, Mr. Pratt, were true.' He
replied in the affirmative, and added, 'that the United States had
come to the Philippines to protect its natives and free them from
the yoke of Spain.'

"He said, moreover, that 'America was rich in territory and money,
and needed no colonies,' concluding by assuring me, 'to have no
doubt whatever about the recognition of Philippine independence by
the United States.' Thereupon he asked me if I could get the people
to arise against the Spaniards and carry on a rapid campaign." [45]

As we have seen, Dewey sent only one telegram to Pratt about
Aguinaldo. It merely directed that the latter be sent.

"I then expressed to him my profound acknowledgement for the
generous help which the United States was giving the Filipino people,
as well as my admiration for the magnificence and goodness of the
American people. I also stated to him that 'before leaving Hongkong,
the Filipino Colony had held a meeting, at which was discussed and
considered the possibility that--after defeating the Spaniards--the
Filipinos might have a war with the Americans, if they should refuse
to recognize our independence, who were sure to defeat us because
they should find us tired out, poor in ammunitions and worn out in
the war against the Spaniards,' requesting that he pardon my frankness.

"The Admiral replied that he 'was delighted at my sincerity, and
believed that both Filipinos and Americans should treat each other
as allies and friends, clearly explaining all doubts for the better
understanding between both parties,' and added that, 'so he had
been informed, the United States would recognize the independence
of the Filipino people, guaranteed by the word of honor of the
Americans,--more binding than documents which may remain unfulfilled
when it is desired to fail in them as happened with the compacts
signed by the Spaniards, advising me to form at once a Filipino
national flag, offering in virtue thereof to recognize and protect
it before the other nations, which were represented by the various
squadrons then in the Bay; although he said we should conquer the
power from the Spaniards before floating said flag, so that the act
should be more honourable in the sight of the whole world, and, above
all, before the United States, in order that when the Filipino ships
with their national flag would pass before the foreign squadrons they
should inspire respect and esteem.'

"Again I thanked the Admiral for his good advice and generous offers,
informing him that if the sacrifice of my life was necessary to honor
the Admiral before the United States, I was then ready to sacrifice it.

"I added that under such conditions I could assure him that all the
Filipino people would unite in the revolution to shake off the yoke
of Spain; that it was not strange that some few were not yet on his
side on account of lack of arms or because of personal expediency.

"Thus ended this first conference with Admiral Dewey, to whom I
announced that I would take up my residence at the Naval Headquarters
in the Cavite Arsenal." [46]

Further on, in the same document, Aguinaldo advances the claim that
on the occasion of the visit of General Anderson and Admiral Dewey
the latter again promised him independence.

He says:--

"In the same month of July, the Admiral, accompanied by General
Anderson, presented himself, and after greetings of courtesy said
to me: 'You have seen confirmed all of what I promised and said to
you. How pretty your flag is. It has a triangle, and it looks like
Cuba's. Will you give me one as a reminder when I return to America?'

"I replied to him that I was convinced of his word of honour and that
there was no necessity whatever to draw up in documentary form his
agreements, and as for the flag, that he could count on it, even at
that very moment.

"Dewey continued: 'Documents are not complied with when there is
no honour, as has happened with your agreement with the Spaniards,
who have failed in what was written and signed. Trust in my word for
I hold myself responsible that the United States will recognize the
independence of the country. But I recommend to you [plural.--TR.] to
keep everything which we have talked about and agreed upon with a
great deal of secrecy for the present. And, moreover, I entreat
you [plural.--TR.] to be patient if our soldiers should insult
some Filipino, because, as volunteers, they are yet lacking in
discipline.'" [47]

Admiral Dewey has testified as follows, concerning the recognition
of Philippine independence by him:--

"_The Chairman_. You remember the question of your recognizing his
republic was a good deal discussed and you wrote me a letter, which
I read in the senate. Of course, I am only asking now about what you
said in the letter. There was no recognition of the republic?

"_Admiral Dewey_. Never. I did not think I had any authority to do
it and it never occurred to me to do it. There was a sort of a reign
of terror; there was no government. These people had got power for
the first time in their lives and they were riding roughshod over
the community. The acts of cruelty which were brought to my notice
were hardly credible. I sent word to Aguinaldo that he must treat
his prisoners kindly, and he said he would."

He has further testified that he never as much as heard of independence
until the appearance of Aguinaldo's proclamation of June 15, 1898:--

"_Admiral Dewey_.... Then when I heard that our troops were coming
I asked him to withdraw his troops from Cavite and make room for
our men. He demurred at this, but finally withdrew and established
headquarters across the bay at a place called Bacoor, from which
place on the 15th of June he sent me a proclamation declaring the
independence of the Philippines.

"_The Chairman_. Was that the first?

"_Admiral Dewey_. That was the first intimation; the first I had ever
heard of independence of the Philippines.

"_The Chairman_. He had said something to you--

"_Admiral Dewey_. Not a word. He had done what I told him. He was
most obedient; whatever I told him to do he did. I attached so little
importance to this proclamation that I did not even cable its contents
to Washington, but forwarded it through the mails. I never dreamed
that they wanted independence."

Remembering that Admiral Dewey was not being interrogated as to the
statements of the "Reseńa Veridica," it will be seen that he has,
nevertheless, covered them fully.

It was my good fortune to be long and intimately associated with
Admiral Dewey while serving on the first Philippine commission. He
always grew indignant when the subject of any promises relative to
independence said to have been made by him was so much as mentioned,
and gave to the commission in writing the following:--

"The statement of Emilio Aguinaldo, under date of Sept. 23, published
in the _Springfield Republican_, so far as it relates to reported
conversations with me, or actions of mine, is a tissue of falsehood. I
never, directly or indirectly, promised the Filipinos independence. I
never received Aguinaldo with military honors, or recognized or
saluted the so-called Filipino flag. I never considered him as an
ally, although I did make use of him and the natives to assist me in
my operations against the Spaniards." [48]

As Dewey's allegations flatly contradict those of Aguinaldo, we
must choose between the two. While I have no doubt as to where
the choice will fall, I will now submit some additional matter of
interest. Let us first consider the history of the "Reseńa Verídica"
in which Aguinaldo makes the charges above quoted. On September 12,
1899, Buencamino wrote of it to Apacible in Hongkong, saying:--

"This work is entitled 'Reseńa Verídica de la Revolución Filipina' in
which Don Emilio relates in detail his acts with Admiral Dewey. It has
been distributed to the Consuls and you are ordered to reprint it there
translated into English and send some copies to the United States,
even though only a thousand, if you deem it advisable. Send copies
also to Europe, Seńor Agoncillo taking charge of the publication. If
the Agent you may have selected for the United States should still be
there, it would be advisable for him to take a copy of the pamphlet
with him for its publication.

"This is an order of the Government which I take pleasure in
transmitting to you for due execution." [49]

But there was a change of heart about giving the pamphlet to the
consuls, for under date of September 30 Buencamino wrote:--

"We have not distributed them here in order that Otis may not
counteract the effects that we desire to produce with this publication,
through his usual machinations. Nor do we believe it advisable to
make this pamphlet public in those colonies before your arrival in
the United States." [50]

To this letter he added in cipher the following postscript to Pablo
Ocampo, in charge of Aguinaldo's correspondence in Manila:--

"At last moment--Nota bene:

"Don't deliver any copy of the 'Reseńa Verídica' to the Consuls,
even though it was so directed in the beginning of the letter. All
except one, which is for you, will be sent to Hong-kong, Don Pedro de
la Vińa being bearer of the same, as also of the other documents. The
copy intended for you is neither to be divulged nor published, for
strict reserve is required until those which are being sent arrive
at their destination." [51]

The reason for preserving such secrecy relative to this document
until it could reach its destination and work its harm is of course
obvious. Its statements were so outrageously false that they would
have been instantly and authoritatively contradicted had it been
issued seasonably at Manila.

The truth is that Aguinaldo's claim that he had been promised
independence was a gradual growth. Let us trace it.

On May 21, he wrote a circular letter to "My dear brother," inviting
the recipients and their companions to meet him at once, and arrange
the best way to entrap all the enemy in their homes.

In this he says that he has promised the American admiral that they
will "carry on modern war" and adds: "Even if a Spaniard surrenders,
he must be pardoned and treated well, and then you will see that
our reputation will be very good in all Europe, which will declare
for our independence; but if we do not conduct ourselves thus, the
Americans will decide to sell us or else divide up our territory. As
they will hold us incapable of governing our land, we shall not secure
our liberty, rather the contrary; our own soil will be delivered over
to other hands." [52]

In this letter, written on the very day of the interview at which he
subsequently claimed that Admiral Dewey had promised independence,
does he make any claim that this had occurred? No, he very distinctly
implies the contrary. Is it believable that if he could truly have
said "The United States, through its representatives Dewey and Pratt,
has promised to recognize our independence" he would have failed to
do so when this would instantly have secured him the vigorous support
which he was then uncertain of obtaining? I think not.

In this letter Aguinaldo specifically directs that deceit be employed
and that Spanish officers be treacherously attacked. The practising of
deceit was a carefully considered part of the insurgent policy. In a
letter from Hongkong dated July 21, 1898, Agoncillo writes as follows
to Mabini: [53]--

*   *   *   *   *

"the time will come when disguises must be set aside and we will see
who is deceiving whom. The statements made by some of the commanders
of the fleet here to Don Emilio and myself were to the effect that
the exclusive purpose of the Government at Washington with regard to
the Filipinos, is to grant this country independence, without any
conditions, although I said to myself that such a purpose was too
philanthropical. Don Emilio knew what I thought then, and I still
think the same; that is to say that we are the ones who must secure
the independence of our country by means of unheard of sacrifices
and thus work out its happiness." [54]

Aguinaldo himself frankly advocated the use of deceit. He practised
what he preached. Simeon Villa, one of his companions on his
subsequent flight through Northern Luzon, before he finally took
refuge at Palanan, kept a diary, which constitutes an official record
of this long journey. In it he has inserted some bits of history of
other days, of which none is more interesting than his account of the
beginning of hostilities against the Spaniards, in August, 1896. From
it we learn that Aguinaldo, who was known to the friar of his town to
be both a mason and a chief of the Katipúnan, was in danger during
August, and on the night of the 29th of that month called a meeting
of all the compromised persons of the place, who agreed that on the
following day he should "make representations to the governor of the
province." Villa says that he was greatly beloved by the governor and
his wife. Early on the following morning, he "presented himself to the
governor, and in the name of the people of Cavite Viejo, offered him
their respects and their loyalty to Spain," at the same time asking
a garrison of a hundred men for his town, which the governor promised
to send at once if the captain-general approved.

That afternoon he reported the results of his efforts to his
fellow-conspirators, "and told them that then was the opportune moment
for rising against the Spaniards." He initiated the uprising himself
the next morning. [55]

Could deceit be more deliberately practised or treachery more frankly
employed?

I have indulged in this digression to show that Aguinaldo could
hardly have complained had the methods which he used against others
been employed against him. He was never deceived by the Americans,
but his claims relative to independence grew rapidly, and he was soon
deceiving his own people.

On May 24th, he issued no less than four proclamations. One of
these, doubtless intended to be seen by Americans, made no mention
of Independence, but said: [56]--

"The great powerful North American nation has offered its disinterested
protection to secure the liberty of this country."

In another proclamation, doubtless intended for a different use,
he made the statement that the great North American nation had come
to give decisive and disinterested protection, "considering us as
sufficiently civilized and capable of governing ourselves." [57]

On June 5, having practically gained control of Cavite Province, he
felt strong enough to announce that independence would be proclaimed
on June 12, and on that date he did proclaim it in a decree.

The Admiral of the American Squadron, with the commanders and officers
of his command, was invited to the ceremonies, but none of them
went. As it was important for Aguinaldo to have some one there to
pose as a representative of the United States, he utilized for this
purpose a certain "Colonel" Johnson, an ex-hotel keeper of Shanghai,
who was running a cinematograph show. He appeared as Aguinaldo's chief
of artillery and the representative of the North American nation. [58]





Even as late as October 3, 1898, Agoncillo in a memorandum addressed to
President McKinley did not claim that independence had been promised,
but said:--

"As soon as the Spanish-American war began, the American
representatives and officials in Singapore, Hongkong and Manila,
invited the natives of the Philippines to assist the American arms,
which they did gladly and loyally, as allies, with the conviction that
their personality would be recognized, as well as their political,
autonomous and sovereign rights." [59]

In it he does, however, claim that the organization of a government
independent of America and Spain was accomplished with the tacit
consent of the admiral commanding the fleet and with that of the
general and military and political commanders of the United States
of North America in the Philippines.

"Who, knowing these facts, not only did not object but accepted them
as a consummated legal act, and maintained official relations with
the new organization, making use thereof in its subsequent actions and
for the subsequent development of the campaign, which was consequently
brought to such a happy end." [60]

This is a second illustration of the stereotyped insurgent procedure
of announcing a policy and then claiming that failure to attack it
meant acquiescence in it. Admiral Dewey says that he did not even read
this proclamation. There was no reason why he should have done so,
as it did not deal with matters which he was authorized to settle. He
had no instructions relative to the recognition of new governments,
and he sent this document to Washington without comment, as he should
have done. [61]

Apropos of this claim that American officers tacitly recognized
the Insurgent government, certain passages from an unsigned
document in the handwriting of Mabini, prepared about July 15,
1898, are of interest. Mabini, speaking of the attitude of the
Americans, says, "Notwithstanding all this and in spite of their
protestations of friendship, they have always refused to recognize
that government." Also, "If they persist in refusing to recognize our
government, we shall see ourselves compelled to come to an agreement
with any other government that will consent to recognize us on friendly
terms." [62]

This statement is certainly sufficiently specific as to whether
Americans had recognized the Insurgent government on or before the
date when it was written.

Let us now consider the relations between Aguinaldo and General
Anderson.

Blount attempts to make much of a cablegram, sent by the latter, in
which, after describing the Filipinos, he adds, "The people expect
independence." Blount says:--

"That cablegram of July 22nd, above quoted, in which the commanding
general of our forces in the Philippines advises the Washington
Government, 'The people expect independence' is the hardest thing in
the public archives of our government covering that momentous period
for those who love the memory of Mr. McKinley to get around. After
the war with the Filipinos broke out, McKinley said repeatedly in
public speeches, 'I never dreamed they would turn against us.'" [63]

If there is nothing harder than this to get around the memory of
President McKinley will not suffer, as the important thing is not
what Aguinaldo had led his people to expect, but what the American
officials had promised him. The President was certainly not bound to
believe that the Filipinos would turn against us even if they did
then expect independence. Blount has seen fit to leave unmentioned
certain other facts which are very pertinent in this connection.

Apparently sometime during September, 1898, Sandico made the following
statement in a letter to Aguinaldo:--

"I also have to inform you that Seńores Basa, Cortés and Co. have
congratulated the Government of the United States upon the capture
of Manila, stating at the same time that now that Filipino soil had
been soaked with American blood, the Islands must remain American. I
believe that a telegram should be sent immediately, to counteract
that sent by them." [64]

Probably Sandico did not know that on August 15, 1898, Agoncillo
had transmitted another telegram to President McKinley through
Consul-General Wildman, reading as follows:--

"Agoncillo, my Commissioner and Ambassador-Extraordinary, representing
the provisional government of the Philippine Islands, in its name
and the name of its President, Emilio Aguinaldo, congratulates you on
the successful termination of the war, and commends the occupancy of
Manila. I assure the United States of the allegiance and unquestioning
support of our people, and petition that we be granted one or more
representatives on the commission that is to decide the future of
our Islands." [65]

It would appear, therefore, that the President had more information
on this subject than was transmitted by General Anderson!

Not only did the latter passively refrain from recognizing Aguinaldo's
pretensions, but on July 22, 1898, he wrote to him as follows:--

"I observe that your Excellency has announced yourself Dictator and
proclaimed martial law. As I am here simply in a military capacity,
I have no authority to recognize such an assumption. I have no orders
from my government on the subject." [66]

The effort to keep Americans in ignorance of the true state of affairs
was kept up until further deception was useless. Consul Williams,
for instance, wrote on June 16, 1898:--

"For future advantage, I am maintaining cordial relations with General
Aguinaldo, having stipulated submissiveness to our forces when treating
for their return here. Last Sunday, 12th, they held a council to
form provisional government. I was urged to attend, but thought best
to decline. A form of government was adopted, but General Aguinaldo
told me today that his friends all hoped that the Philippines would
be held as a colony of the United States of America." [67]

Yet on Sunday, June 12, Aguinaldo had in reality proclaimed the
independence of the Philippines. Few Americans at this time knew any
Spanish and none understood Tagalog, so that it was comparatively
easy to deceive them. What Consul Williams reported was what Aguinaldo
considered it expedient to have him believe.

The following undated letter from Aguinaldo to Mabini, supposed to have
been sent at this time, is of especial interest in this connection:--

"My dear Brother: I do not want to go there [where the addressee is]
until after the visit of the American Consul, because I do not wish
the negotiations to end in an ultimatum, and in order that you may
tell him all that is favourable for the cause of our Nation. I charge
you with the task of giving him a reply, and if he should ask about
me tell him that since the time of his last visit there I have not
recovered from my illness. If anything important should happen we
can communicate with each other by telegraph, using a code in matters
that require secrecy." [68]

In a letter supposed to have been written during November, 1898,
prepared for Aguinaldo's signature and addressed to Seńor McKinley,
President of the Republic of the United States of North America, but
apparently never sent, Aguinaldo renews the charge [69] previously
made in his "Reseńia Verídica," that Pratt and Dewey promised
independence. It need not be further discussed.

The climax was finally reached in an official protest against the
Paris Treaty written by Agoncillo in Paris on the 12th of December,
1898, in which occurs the following:--

"The United States of America, on their part, cannot allege a better
right to constitute themselves as arbitrators as to the future of
the Philippines.

"On the contrary, the demands of honour and good faith impose on them
the explicit recognition of the political status of the people, who,
loyal to their conventions, were a devoted ally of their forces in the
moments of danger and strife. The noble general Emilio Aguinaldo and
the other Filipino chiefs were solicited to place themselves at the
head of the suffering and heroic sons of that country, to fight against
Spain and to second the action of the brave and skilful Admiral Dewey.

"At the time of employing their armed coöperation, both the Commander
of the _Petrel_ and Captain Wood in Hongkong, before the declaration of
war, the American Consuls-General Mr. Pratt in Singapore, Mr. Wildman,
in Hongkong, and Mr. Williams in Cavite, acting as international
agents of the great American nation, at a moment of great anxiety
offered to recognize the independence of the Filipino nation, as soon
as triumph was obtained.

"Under the faith of such promises, an American man-of-war, the
_McCulloch_ was placed at the disposal of the said leaders and
which took them to their native shores; and Admiral Dewey himself,
by sending the man-of-war; by not denying to General Aguinaldo and
his companions the exacting of his promises, when they were presented
to him on board his flag-ship in the Bay of Manila; by receiving the
said General Aguinaldo before and after his victories and notable
deeds of arms, with the honours due the Commander-in-Chief of an
allied army, and chief of an independent state; by accepting the
efficacious coöperation of that Army and of those Generals; by
recognizing the Filipino flag, and permitting it to be hoisted on
sea and land, consenting that their ships should sail with the said
flag within the places which were blockaded; by receiving a solemn
notification of the formal proclamation of the Philippine nation,
without protesting against it, nor opposing in any way its existence;
by entering into relations with those Generals and with the national
Filipino authorities recently established, recognized without question
the corporated body and autonomous sovereignty of the people who had
just succeeded in breaking their fetters and freeing themselves by
the impulse of their own force." [70]

It will be noted that the claim constantly grows. The commander of
the _Petrel_ Captain Wood, Consul Wildman and Consul Williams are
now included among those alleged to have promised independence, and
it is claimed that Aguinaldo was received with the honours due the
chief of an independent state when he visited Admiral Dewey, whereas
his own original claim was that he was received with the honours due
a general, which is quite a different matter.

As a matter of fact, American officers usually addressed and treated
Aguinaldo as a general. The extent to which they were able to use
his organization to further the ends of their government will be set
forth later.

In a letter to Wildman, dated August 7, 1898, Aguinaldo admits that
there is no agreement, but says that he cannot tell the peoples that
it does not exist, "fearing that I may not be able to restrain the
popular excitement." [71] He begs Wildman to use his influence on his
government so that it will realize the inadvisability of deciding the
fate of the people "without considering their will duly represented by
my government." Is it conceivable that, if there had been any ground
for claiming a promise of independence, Aguinaldo would have failed
to mention it at this time?

We may summarize the well-established facts as follows:--

Consul-General Pratt was, or professed to be, in hearty sympathy
with the ambition of the Filipino leaders to obtain independence, and
would personally have profited from such a result, but he refrained
from compromising his government and made no promises in its behalf.

Admiral Dewey never even discussed with Aguinaldo the possibility
of independence.

There is no reason to believe that any subordinate of the Admiral
ever discussed independence with any Filipino,  much less made any
promise concerning it.

Neither Consul Wildman nor Consul Williams promised it, and both
were kept in ignorance of the fact that it was desired up to the last
possible moment.

It is not claimed that either General Anderson or General Merritt
made any promise concerning it.

The conclusion that no such promise was ever made by any of these
men is fully justified by well-established facts.

Aguinaldo himself carefully refrained at the outset from saying,
in any document which Americans could read, that independence
had been promised, and advanced this claim only when the growing
strength of his land force had given him confidence. He repeated it,
with increasing emphasis, as his army increased in size, ultimately
openly threatening war if his pretensions were not recognized. In
doing this, he was merely carrying out a carefully prearranged plan,
agreed upon by the Hongkong junta.

And now let us examine the claim that the insurgents were our "faithful
allies" and "coöperated" with us in the taking of Manila. We shall
find that this subject richly repays investigation.



CHAPTER III

Insurgent "Coöperation"

I have previously [72] called attention to the minutes of a session
of the Hongkong junta held on May 4, 1898, from which it indirectly
appears that the Filipino leaders at that time hoped to secure arms
at the expense of the Americans and purposed to attack them later if
it seemed advisable.

The treacherous policy then outlined was never departed from by
Aguinaldo and his associates, who sailed for Manila with their eyes
wide open, knowing full well that they had been promised nothing;
prepared to match their wits against those of Admiral Dewey, and
intent on deceiving him and on securing from him arms to be used
first against the Spaniards and later against the Americans, after
they had been employed to help bring about the downfall of Spain.

There exists a significant circular signed "J.M.B." [73] believed
to have been an outright forgery, both from its tenor and from the
fact that the signature "J.M.B." is not in the handwriting of Basa's
letter hereinbefore quoted.

It contains the following statements:--

"The true patriots have organized a committee to which I belong,
naming Aguinaldo as President and Agoncillo as Vice-President. The
latter and three others have commenced diplomatic negotiations
with the Admiral and American Consul, and we infer that they are
trying to make colonies of us, although they said they would give us
independence. The Committee deemed it advisable to simulate belief,
at the same time equipping ourselves with arms.

"We have accepted arms offered by the Admiral which will be disembarked
in the Philippines by the squadron.

"A part of our forces will aid the Americans by fighting with them
in order to conceal our real intentions, and part will be held in
reserve. If America triumphs and proposes a colony, we shall reject
such offer and rise in arms.

"A separate expedition will disembark at whatever point may be
considered suitable.

"José Alejandrino embarked with the American squadron in order to
give secret instructions to the Chiefs.

"Be very cautious about this exceedingly delicate point; you will
communicate with prudent and intelligent chiefs who will recognize
the gravity of the subject." [74]

Here, then, in a faked-up letter on which Basa's initials were forged
in order to gain the prestige of his name for this treacherous plan,
we have definitely set forth the purpose of the Filipinos to deceive
the Americans by allowing a part of the Insurgent force to fight with
them, and then to attack them.

Reference has already been made to Agoncillo's advice to Aguinaldo,
given under date of August 26, 1898, to the effect that friendly
relations should be maintained with the Americans until the diplomatic
negotiations at Paris should end; that an effort should be made
to find out the future status of the islands "by deceitful means,"
and that confidence should never be put in the Americans.

Aguinaldo put the whole matter in a nutshell in a postscript  to this
letter, saying:--

"You should issue an order commanding that all our chiefs should
employ a policy of friendship toward the Americans until our status
is defined; but said order should be confidentially  given. Try to
mislead them." [75]

Bray also very strongly advised awaiting the results of the Paris
conference. [76]

Blount claims that the Filipinos hoped that the Treaty of Paris
would leave their country to them as it left Cuba to the Cubans,
[77] and adds that having helped us take the city of Manila, they
"felt that they had been 'given the double cross,'" "believed that
the Americans had been guilty of a duplicity rankly Machiavellian,
and that was the cause of the war." [78]

The quotations already given from Insurgent records show plainly
that the principal thing for which the Filipinos were waiting was
the ousting of Spain from the Philippines by the United States; those
which follow show that war was by no means inevitable as a result of
a a decision at Paris adverse to Filipino hopes, for the question of
whether a United States protectorate, or even annexation to the United
States, might be considered, was left open to a very late date. [79]

It has been claimed not only that the Insurgents whipped the Spaniards
without our assistance, but whipped them so thoroughly that Spanish
sovereignty had practically disappeared from the islands at the time
Manila surrendered. It has further been alleged that "decrepit"
Spain "could not possibly have sent any reinforcements to the
Philippines. Besides, the Filipinos would have 'eaten them up.'" [80]

But the Filipinos had fought Spain before and were by no means
sanguine. Their more intelligent and reasonable men clearly foresaw
that they could not win unaided. Seńor Antonio Regidor was at the
time residing in London. He was a Filipino of unusual intelligence and
exceptionally good education. He took a keen interest in the situation,
and on July 28, 1898, telegraphed Agoncillo as follows:--

"In the name of the Filipinos, you should immediately send a
telegraphic message to MacKinley, requesting him not to abandon the
islands, after having fought as brothers for a common cause. Pledge
him our unconditional adhesion, especially of well-to-do people. To
return to Spain, in whatever form, would mean annihilation, perpetual
anarchy. Filipinos en masse should visit the consuls at Hongkong,
Singapore. London commerce support it. Influence Aguinaldo to
accept American flag, flying it everywhere, thus obliging them to
remain." [81]

This leaves no room for doubt as to Regidor's views, but Agoncillo
did not share them. He replied on July 29:--

"Provisional government's aspiration is independence. Make this
campaign." [82]

Regidor was not to be persuaded. On July 30 he replied as follows,
addressing his communication to Basa:

"America vacillating as to remaining fears conflicts later with natives
international question other difficulties necessary to encourage
her all of you submit united unconditionally raising American flag
great demonstrations necessary to influence outside opinion show
islands resolved united America high circles advise in view present
circumstances only feasible programme is protectorate." [83]

Obviously, Agoncillo was somewhat impressed by this cablegram, for
on August 1 in a letter to Aguinaldo he made the following statements
and inquiries:--

"If the American troops leave us alone there, the questions which will
arise are these: Have we sufficient arms to maintain the war against
Spain in order to secure our independence? If the other nations are
opposed to our independence and wish that we should continue under
the Spanish sovereignty, have we sufficient strength to wage a war
and obtain victory over Spain and over them in the future? If you
think that we have not sufficient strength to fight against them,
should we accept independence under the American protectorate? And
if so, what conditions or advantages should we give to the United
States? You should carefully consider the preceding questions, and
I suggest that you should, in a confidential manner, consult them
with your cabinet-in-banc, as well as with your private secretary
and military chiefs of rank; and your decision be notified to our
representatives abroad in order that they may know what they must
do in their negotiations. You will see from the telegram addressed
to me by Regidor that he suggests to me to send a message to
MacKinley requesting him not to abandon us, and to submit to them
[the U. S.] unconditionally. As I do not agree with him and as
I cannot take any action which is against the instructions of the
government, I replied to him that the only desire of our government is
independence. This may be seen from the enclosed telegram. On account
of this reply, he was, I think, somewhat offended, as he afterwards
sent a telegram to Joviales [Basa] instead of to me. The latter,
upon receiving the telegram, convened all the boastful patriots, and
they adopted a resolution to send a message to MacKinley requesting
annexation. Fortunately, in the meeting there was present Dr. Justo
Lucban, who protested against such measure. In view of this protest,
they again agreed that I should be present in the meeting, since I
am the representative of our government. At the meeting where I was
present, I pointed out the inadvisability of their resolution, stating,
as one of the reasons, that we should await your instructions in regard
to the matter before sending any message of that character. So the
message was not sent; but I was later informed that Basa had, after
all, sent it yesterday, because he believed that it would not injure
our cause. Upon learning this, I was carried away by passion and went
so far as to say to Basa the following: 'Many of us, especially myself,
think ourselves to be wise, without being so; politicians for what
we hear from others; we claim to be patriots, but we are only so in
words; we wish to be chiefs, but none of us act in a way worthy of
a chief.' To this he did not reply. Perhaps his conscience accused
him of an act of treachery, since we agreed in the meeting to await
your letter. What union can you expect from this people?" [84]

Note that the Basa here referred to is the man whose initials were
forged on the letter quoted on page 67.

In the course of the above-mentioned letter Agoncillo came back once
more to the question of independence under a protectorate and made
it very clear that at this late day he did not know whether this was
or was not what the Filipinos desired. [85]

On August 21, Apacible obviously did not think that it would be an
easy matter to escape from Spanish domination, much less that the
islands were already rid of it, for he wrote to Mabini that the United
States were likely again to deliver the Filipinos into the hands of
Spain. He said that "if events will be what their telegrams indicate,
we have a dark and bloody future before us. To be again in the hands
of Spain will mean a long and bloody war, and it is doubtful whether
the end will be favourable to us... Spain free from Cuba and her
other colonies will employ her energy to crush us and will send here
the 150,000 men she has in Cuba." [86] Apacible thought that the best
thing was independence under an American protectorate.

On August 7, 1898, Aguinaldo warned Agoncillo that in the United States
he should "not accept any contracts or give any promises respecting
protection or annexation, because we will see first if we can obtain
independence." [87]

Even annexation to the United States was not excluded by Aguinaldo
from the possible accepted solutions, for in outlining the policy of
the Philippine government to Sandico on August 10, 1898, he wrote:--

"The policy of the government is as follows: 1st. To struggle for
the independence of 'the Philippines' as far as our strength and our
means will permit. Protection or annexation will be acceptable only
when it can be clearly seen that the recognition of our Independence,
either by force of arms or diplomacy, is impossible." [88]

On August 26, 1898, Aguinaldo was still ready to consider annexation
if necessary. [89] He was apparently not sanguine at this time as
to the result of a continued struggle with Spain. At all events,
he wanted the help of the Americans if such a struggle was to come,
and desired to know on what terms it could be had. [90]

Meanwhile the Filipinos in Hongkong who favoured annexation made
themselves heard.

On July 18, 1898, Consul-General Wildman wrote from that place:--

"I believe I know the sentiments of the political leaders and of the
moneyed men among the insurgents, and, in spite of all statements to
the contrary, I know that they are fighting for annexation to the
United States first, and for independence secondly, if the United
States decides to decline the sovereignty of the Islands. In fact,
I have had the most prominent leaders call on me and say they would
not raise one finger unless I could assure them that the United
States intended to give them United States citizenship if they wished
it." [91]

We have already noted the action of Basa and the Cortez family who
insisted that the Islands must remain American, [92] and that of
Agoncillo, who cabled President McKinley in Aguinaldo's name and his
own, congratulating him on the outcome of the war, commending the
occupation of Manila, and assuring the people of the United States
of the allegiance and unquestioning support of the Filipinos, [93]
but it is to be feared that the sending of this cablegram was only
one more move in the Insurgent game of deceit.

There were annexationists in Manila as well as in Hongkong. [94]
Indeed we know that some of the strongest and best of the Filipinos
there were in favour of it.

Felipe Buencamino, writing in 1901, said:--

"In June of 1898, Don Cayetano Arellano [95] addressed to Don
Felipe Buencamino and Don Ambrosio Rianzares Bautista a letter
written from the town of Pagsanján, province of Laguna, in reply
to one addressed to him by those two gentlemen. In this letter Don
Cayetano outlined the idea of union with the United States and said:
'Avoid all doing and undoing, and when America has established a stable
order of affairs, then it will be time enough to make laws.' Mabini,
whose influence at that time was in the ascendant in Aguinaldo's
government, paid no heed to this wise advice. In October of 1898,
while the Philippine government was established in Malolos, and before
congress had promulgated a Philippine constitution, Messrs. Arellano
and Pardo [96] still more earnestly advocated union with America,
the first as secretary of foreign affairs and the latter as chief
diplomat. Their plan consisted in asking the United States to
acknowledge the independence of the country under a protectorate
through the mediation of General Otis, and this plan was accepted at
a cabinet meeting by Don Emilio Aguinaldo. But on the following day
Sandico came and told Aguinaldo that he had had a conference with
the Japanese consul and had been told by him: 'that if Aguinaldo
would support absolute independence the Japanese Government would
help.' Aguinaldo believed Sandico's story (which turned out to be
absolutely false) and did not carry out the resolution adopted by the
cabinet. Messrs. Arellano and Pardo, after this affront, separated
themselves from the Malolos government. Aguinaldo told me afterwards
that he had received a letter from Agoncillo, dated Washington,
assuring him that a majority of the American people were inclined to
acknowledge the independence of the Philippines and of Cuba." [97]

But annexationists were not confined, in the Philippines, to the
vicinity of Manila.

As late as September 6 Consul Williams reported that a delegation from
four thousand Visayan soldiers, a delegation which also represented
southern business interests, had come to him and pledged loyalty to
annexation. [98]

Clearly, then, the situation early in September was as follows: All
were agreed that the assistance of the United States was necessary
in getting rid of Spanish sovereignty.

Under the plan of Aguinaldo and his followers friendly relations were
to be maintained with the United States, if possible, until Spain
was ousted from her Philippine territory, and then they were to "show
their teeth," and see "who was deceiving whom," resorting to "force of
arms" if necessary. Protection or annexation would be accepted only
when it could be clearly seen that the recognition of independence,
won either by force of arms or by diplomacy, was impossible.

Other influential and patriotic Filipinos favored annexation to the
United States or a United States protectorate, but their views were
in the end ignored by Aguinaldo and his following, and as the latter
had the guns their ideas prevailed.

The Treaty of Paris, which terminated Spanish sovereignty in the
Philippines, was signed on December 10, 1898. It is important to
bear this date in mind later, when considering the Insurgent records
relative to the preparations which were so carefully made for attacking
the American troops.

And now let us consider the actual facts as to the coöperation alleged
to have been asked by Americans and given by Filipinos. The following
points are not in dispute:--

Pratt asked Aguinaldo to coöperate with Dewey.

Aguinaldo was taken to Manila with the understanding that he would
do so.

Dewey assisted Aguinaldo by destroying the main Spanish fleet; by
bringing him and his associates back to the Philippines; by furnishing
them arms and ammunition; by blockading Manila and by keeping at a safe
distance the Spanish mosquito fleet, which would have made dangerous,
or impossible, the landing of the arms subsequently imported by
the Insurgents.

Aguinaldo successfully attacked the Spanish garrisons in the provinces
and used the arms and ammunition captured, or brought in by deserters,
to equip a force which surrounded and attacked Manila, drove large
numbers of people into the walled city, thus rendering the position
of the Spanish garrison very difficult in the face of a possible
bombardment, and prevented this garrison from betaking itself to the
provinces, as it might otherwise have done, leaving Manila to shift
for itself.

Aguinaldo was powerless to take the place by assault.

It lay at the mercy of Dewey's guns, and it would have been possible
for the Admiral to take it at any time, but he could not at first
have garrisoned it with United States forces, and never thought of
attempting to use Insurgent forces for this purpose.

Did Dewey really want or need Aguinaldo's help? Let us consider his
testimony on the subject:--

"_Senator Carmack_. You did want a man there who could organize and
rouse the people?

"_Admiral Dewey_. I didn't want anybody. I would like to say now that
Aguinaldo and his people were forced on me by Consul Pratt and Consul
Wildman; I didn't do anything--

"_Senator Carmack_. Did they have any power to force him upon you?

"_Admiral Dewey_. Yes; they had in a way. They had not the official
power, but one will yield after a while to constant pressure. I did
not expect anything of them; I did not think they would do anything. I
would not have taken them; I did not want them; I did not believe in
them; because, when I left Hongkong, I was led to suppose that the
country was in a state of insurrection, and that at my first gun,
as Mr. Williams put it, there would be a general uprising, and I
thought these half dozen or dozen refugees at Hongkong would play a
very small part in it." [99]

The picture of the poor admiral, busy getting his fleet ready
for battle, pestered by officious consuls on the one hand and by
irresponsible Filipinos on the other, is pathetic; but it had its
humorous features, which were not lost on the Admiral himself. I
quote the following:--

"_Senator Patterson_. Was there any communication between you and
Pratt in which the matter of a written pledge or agreement with
Aguinaldo was discussed with reference to the Philippine Islands?

"_Admiral Dewey_. No.

"_Senator Patterson_. What became of the correspondence, Admiral,
if you know?

"_Admiral Dewey_. It is all in the Navy Department. When I turned
over my command my official correspondence was all sent to the Navy
Department.

"_Senator Patterson_. You retained all of your letters from any United
States officials?

"_Admiral Dewey_. No; they went to the Department.

"_Senator Patterson_. I mean you did not destroy them.

"_Admiral Dewey_. No; I did not destroy them.

"_Senator Patterson_. And you turned them over to the Navy Department?

"_Admiral Dewey_. Yes; our regulations require that. I may say
that for my own information I kept copies of certain telegrams and
cablegrams. I don't think I kept copies of Mr. Pratt's letters,
as I did not consider them of much value. He seemed to be a sort of
busybody there and interfering in other people's business and I don't
think his letters impressed me.

"_Senator Patterson_. He was the consul-general?

"_Admiral Dewey_. Yes; but he had nothing to do with the attack on
Manila, you know.

"_Senator Patterson_. I understand that.

"_Admiral Dewey_. I received lots of advice, you understand, from
many irresponsible people.

"_Senator Patterson_. But Pratt was the consul-general of the
Government there?

"_Admiral Dewey_. Yes; he was consul-general.

"_Senator Patterson_. And he communicated with you, giving you such
information as he thought you might be interested in, and among other
information he gave you was this concerning Aguinaldo?

"_Admiral Dewey_. I don't remember; no, I really don't remember his
telling me anything about Aguinaldo more than that cablegram there,
and I said he might come. And you see how much importance I attached
to him; I did not wait for him.

"_Senator Patterson_. What you said was: 'Tell Aguinaldo to come as
soon as possible.'

"_Admiral Dewey_. Yes; but I did not wait a moment for him.

"_Senator Patterson_. Yes; but there was a reason for that.

"_Admiral Dewey_. I think more to get rid of him than anything else.

"_Senator Carmack_. Rid of whom?

"_Admiral Dewey_. Of Aguinaldo and the Filipinos. They were bothering
me. I was very busy getting my squadron ready for battle, and these
little men were coming on board my ship at Hongkong and taking a good
deal of my time, and I did not attach the slightest importance to
anything they could do, and they did nothing; that is, none of them
went with me when I went to Mirs Bay. There had been a good deal of
talk, but when the time came they did not go. One of them didn't go
because he didn't have any toothbrush.

"_Senator Burrows_. Did he give that as a reason?

"_Admiral Dewey_. Yes; he said, 'I have no toothbrush.'" [100]

However, Dewey ultimately yielded to the pressure exercised on him by
Pratt and Wildman, and allowed Aguinaldo and some of his associates to
be brought to Manila. Having them there he proposed to get assistance
from them, not as allies, but as a friendly force attacking a common
enemy, in its own way.

Let us continue with his testimony as to cooperation between Aguinaldo
and the naval forces of the United States:--

"_Senator Patterson_. Then, Admiral, until you knew that they were
going to send land forces to your assistance you thought there was
a necessity to organize the Filipinos into land forces, did you?

"_Admiral Dewey_. No; not a necessity.

"_Senator Patterson_. You thought it might prove of value to you?

"_Admiral Dewey_. I testified here, I think, in a way that answers
that. I said to Aguinaldo, 'There is our enemy; now, you go your way
and I will go mine; we had better act independently.' That was the
wisest thing I ever said.

"_Senator Patterson_. But you stated that you were using these people
and they were permitted to organize, that you might use them.

"_Admiral Dewey_. They were assisting us.

"_Senator Patterson_. Very well, they were to assist you. Did you
not either permit them or encourage them--I do not care which term
you use--to organize into an army, such as it was, that they might
render you such assistance as you needed?

"_Admiral Dewey_. They were assisting us, but incidentally they were
fighting their enemy; they were fighting an enemy which had been
their enemy for three hundred years.

"_Senator Patterson_. I understand that, Admiral.

"_Admiral Dewey_. While assisting us they were fighting their own
battles, too.

"_The Chairman_. You were encouraging insurrection against a common
enemy with which you were at war?

"_Admiral Dewey_. I think so. I had in my mind an illustration
furnished by the civil war. I was in the South in the civil war, and
the only friends we had in the South were the negroes, and we made
use of them; they assisted us on many occasions. I had that in mind;
I said these people were our friends, and 'we have come here and they
will help us just exactly as the negroes helped us in the civil war.'

"_Senator Patterson_. The negroes were expecting their freedom--

"_Admiral Dewey_. The Filipinos were slaves, too.

"_Senator Patterson_. What were the Filipinos expecting?

"_Admiral Dewey_. They wanted to get rid of the Spaniards; I do not
think they looked much beyond that. I cannot recall but I have in
mind that the one thing they had in their minds was to get rid of
the Spaniards and then to accept us, and that would have occurred--I
have thought that many times--if we had had troops to occupy Manila
on the 1st day of May before the insurrection got started; these
people would have accepted us as their friends, and they would have
been our loyal friends--I don't know for how long, but they would
have been our friends then.

"_Senator Patterson_. You learned from Pratt, or Wildman, or Williams,
very early, did you not, that the Filipinos wanted their own country
and to rule their own country; that that is what they were expecting?

"_Admiral Dewey_. I heard from Williams that there was an insurrection
there against the Spaniards. The Spaniards were very cruel to them,
and I think they did not look much beyond getting rid of them. There
was one, Dr. Rizal, who had the idea of independence, but I don't
think that Aguinaldo had much idea of it.

"_Senator Carmack_. Then what useful purpose did the Filipino army
serve; why did you want the Filipino army at all?

"_Admiral Dewey_. I did not want them.

"_Senator Carmack_. Did you not want the Filipino forces?

"_Admiral Dewey_. No, not really. It was their own idea coming over
there. We could have taken the city at any moment we had the troops
to occupy it."

Admiral Dewey has made the following statements relative to the
importance of Aguinaldo's military operations:--

"Then he began operations toward Manila, and he did wonderfully
well. He whipped the Spaniards battle after battle, and finally put
one of those old smoothbore guns on a barge, and he wanted to take
this up--wanted me to tow it up so he could attack the city with
it. I said, 'Oh, no, no; we can do nothing until our troops come.' I
knew he could not take the city without the assistance of the navy,
without my assistance, and I knew that what he was doing--driving the
Spaniards in--was saving our own troops, because our own men perhaps
would have had to do that same thing. He and I were always on the most
friendly terms; we had never had any differences. He considered me as
his liberator, as his friend. I think he had the highest admiration
for us because we had whipped the Spaniards who had been riding them
down for three hundred years.

       *       *       *       *       *

"_Senator Patterson_ (continuing). You sent this short dispatch to
the Secretary of the Navy:--

"'Aguinaldo, the revolutionary leader, visited the _Olympia_
yesterday. He expects to make general attack on May 31. Doubt his
ability to succeed. Situation remains unchanged.'

"Do you recall that visit?

"_Admiral Dewey_. Yes.

"_Senator Patterson_. He came to tell you, did he, that he was going
to make a general attack, and you--

"_Admiral Dewey_. Yes.

"_Senator Patterson_. And you doubted his ability to succeed?

"_Admiral Dewey_. And he wanted me to assist him. He wanted me to tow
one of his guns up into position. I knew he could not take the city;
of course he could not.

"_Senator Patterson_. Did you urge that he should not make the attack?

"_Admiral Dewey_. I do not remember that; very likely I did.

"_Senator Patterson_. And was he not persuaded or restrained by you
from doing so?

"_Admiral Dewey_. I do not remember; but it is very likely. I did
not want to see a lot of them killed unnecessarily, because I knew
they could not take that walled city. They had no artillery, and they
could not take it, I knew very well, and I wanted the situation to
remain as it was until our troops came to occupy it.

"_Senator Patterson_. But you found that whenever you expressed a
strong objection to anything being done at that time that Aguinaldo
yielded to your request?

"_Admiral Dewey_. Up to the time the army came he did everything I
requested. I had not much to do with him after the army came." [101]

But Dewey's influence over Aguinaldo was not sufficient to prevent
his looting, as the following extracts from his testimony show:--

"_Senator Patterson_. Is that what you mean when you say he
looted--that he made reprisals for his army, took provisions and
whatever was necessary? That is what you meant?

"_Admiral Dewey_. That is one part of it.

"_Senator Carmack_. This was taking provisions for the use of the army?

"_Admiral Dewey_. That is one thing he did.

"_Senator Carmack_. You said you did not object to that at the time?

"_Admiral Dewey_. No. It would have been useless; he got beyond me
very soon--he got out of my hands very soon. [102]

"_Senator Carmack_. You said yesterday you suspected that Aguinaldo
took the lion's share of the provisions that were gathered for the
army. What was the ground upon which you made that accusation?

"_Admiral Dewey_. Because he was living in Malolos like a prince,
like a king, in a way that could only have come about by his taking
the lion's share. Then, in regard to his looting, I repeat what I
said yesterday. He began within forty-eight hours after he landed in
Cavite to capture and take everything he wanted. I know these things
of my own knowledge, because I saw the loot brought in; and I know
that every dollar that was taken from the workingmen at the navy-yard
was taken at the threat of death. [103]

       *       *       *       *       *

"_Senator Patterson_. Do you believe in this proclamation he was
uttering falsehoods to the Filipino people?

"_Admiral Dewey_. Yes; I do absolutely. I think he was there for
gain--for money--that independence had never up to that time entered
his head. He was there for loot and money. That is what I believe,
since you ask me my belief; I believe that implicitly. [104]

       *       *       *       *       *

"_Senator Patterson_. And you found nothing to cause any doubt as to
his loyalty up to the time until after Manila surrendered?

"_Admiral Dewey_. His loyalty to whom?

"_Senator Patterson_. To you and to the cause for which he was
fighting?

"_Admiral Dewey_. I began to suspect he was not loyal to us about the
time our troops arrived, when he demurred at moving out of Cavite to
make room for our troops.

"_Senator Patterson_. Do you mean by that that you feared that he
was commencing to think more of independence than the success of the
American cause?

"_Admiral Dewey_. Yes." [105]

We have seen to what extent Aguinaldo coöperated with the marine
forces of the United States. Now let us examine the claim that he
cooperated with the land forces after their arrival.

One of the things which the Insurgents are said to have accomplished
was the maintenance of an effective land blockade which prevented the
entrance of provisions, and produced a very serious food shortage. Both
Otis and Dewey have stated that they did this, but we learn from the
Insurgent records how erroneous was this conclusion. [106]

The landing of the American troops for the attack on Manila was
not actively opposed by the Filipinos, but it was narrowly and
distrustfully watched.

Necessary transportation requested by General Anderson was ultimately
furnished by Aguinaldo, but only grudgingly after a three weeks'
delay, and as a result of threats that it would be seized if not
voluntarily supplied.

The necessary positions in the trenches around Manila from which to
make the attack on that city were, in part at least, yielded to the
Americans by the Filipinos upon the request of the former.

The Insurgents twice informed the Spaniards in advance of projected
American attacks.

They carried out their own attack on the city without regard to the
plans, or the requests, of the Americans. They secretly treated with
the Spaniards in the endeavour to secure the surrender of the city
to themselves.

After the capitulation to the Americans had been agreed upon, and
on the very morning of the day of the surrender, they endeavoured
to push home an attack. Disregarding the request that they keep out
of the final assault, they crowded into the city with, and after,
the American troops. They fired on Spanish soldiers on the city wall
while a flag of truce was flying, provoking a return fire which killed
and wounded American soldiers.

They demanded for themselves Malacańang palace and other buildings
and a share in "the war booty." They promptly looted the parts of the
city which they occupied, and ultimately retired from their positions
within the city limits on the evening of their last day of grace
after being warned by General Otis that if they did not do so they
would be driven out.

I will now quote from the records in support of these statements.

The following is the programme of  "coöperation" outlined to Aguinaldo
by Bray in a letter dated June 30, 1898:--

"I am very anxious to receive the news of the capitulation of Manila
and I hope that General Augustín will be obliged to turn over his sword
to you in person and not to the Americans. You are by right entitled
to it and I should like to see it so from a political standpoint,
as I am of the opinion that you should declare the independence of
the Philippines before the arrival of General Merritt, appointed
by the President to be Governor with full powers to establish a
provisional government.

       *       *       *       *       *

Any attempt on the part of the Americans to garrison the interior
towns with their troops or any other act which might be construed as
a conquest, should meet with resistance.

       *       *       *       *       *

"After having written these lines, I had another conference with
Mr. St. Clair of the Free Press, who sent for me regarding the
question of independence. He has had a consultation with the Supreme
Judge of this place, and he is of opinion that you should proclaim
independence at once, notwithstanding what Admiral Dewey and Consul
Williams say against it, and this should be done before General Merritt
can arrive. A Government having been thus constituted in due form,
the Americans would have no right to invade the Philippines without
committing a violation of international law. They are no longer
fighting against the Spaniards against whom they declared war. The
advice of Consul Williams to delay this, is a diplomatic play to
gain time until the arrival of General Merritt, because he is well
aware of the false position said General would find himself in. The
key to the situation is now in your hands; do not permit any one to
take it away from you. The Americans have done nothing but bombard and
destroy the Spanish fleet on the high seas; they have not conquered any
land, but in the meantime the control of the Philippines has passed
by conquest from the hands of the Spaniards and the Americans have
no right to enter further. Under certain conditions and guarantees,
permit the landing of American troops; but be very careful, they must
not be permitted to land until they execute an agreement with the
duly constituted government of the Philippines, respecting all its
institutions, and they must under no pretext whatever be permitted
to garrison any place except the municipal limits of Manila, Cebú,
and Iloílo, and even therein care should be observed ... You must not
permit a single soldier to land without having these guarantees." [107]

When General Anderson, with the first United States troops of
occupation, arrived at Manila Bay, Aguinaldo did not call on him,
as an "ally" might have been expected to do. Later, however, Admiral
Dewey and General Anderson went to see Aguinaldo, but without any
of the ceremony of an official military call, the Admiral saying to
General Anderson:--

"Do not take your sword or put on your uniform, but just put on your
blouse. Do not go with any ceremony." [108]

And they went in that way.

On July 4, 1898, General Anderson wrote Aguinaldo definitely requesting
his coöperation in the following words:--

"For these reasons I desire to have the most amicable relations with
you, and to have you and your force coöperate with us in the military
operations against the Spanish forces." [109]

On July 5 Aguinaldo replied, thanking General Anderson for the

"amicable sentiments which the natives of these islands inspire in
the Great North American nation," [110]

and also for his desire to have friendly relations with the Filipinos
and treat them with justice, courtesy and kindness. There is,
however, not a word relative to coöperation in his reply, and
Anderson apparently never renewed his request for coöperation in
military operations.

On July 6 he wrote to Aguinaldo again, saying:--

"I am encouraged by the friendly sentiment expressed by Your Excellency
in your welcome letter received on the 5th instant, to endeavour to
come to a definite understanding, which I hope will be advantageous to
both. Very soon we expect large additional land forces, and it must be
apparent to you as a military officer that we will require much more
room to camp our soldiers and also store room for our supplies. For
this I would like to have Your Excellency's advice and coöperation,
as you are best acquainted with the resources of the country." [111]

To this letter there was no reply. However, in a letter dated July
9, 1898, to the Adjutant-General of the United States Army, General
Anderson says of Aguinaldo:--

"When we first landed he seemed very suspicious, and not at all
friendly, but I have now come to a better understanding with him and
he is much more friendly and seems willing to coöperate. But he has
declared himself Dictator and President, and is trying to take Manila
without our assistance. This is not probable, but if he can effect
his purpose he will, I apprehend, antagonize any attempt on our part
to establish a provisional government." [112]

Evidently, however, coöperation, even in the matter of getting
necessary transportation, did not materialize, for on July 17
S. R. Jones, Chief Quartermaster, wrote Aguinaldo as follows:--

"We will want horses, buffaloes, carts, etc., for transportation,
bamboo for shelter, wood to cook with, etc. For all this we are willing
to pay a fair price, but no more. We find so far that the native
population are not willing to give us this assistance as promptly
as required. But we must have it, and if it becomes necessary we
will be compelled to send out parties to seize what we may need. We
would regret very much to do this, as we are here to befriend the
Filipinos. Our nation has spent millions in money to send forces here
to expel the Spaniards and to give good government to the whole people,
and the return we are asking is comparatively slight.

"General Anderson wishes you to inform your people that we are here
for their good, and that they must supply us with labor and material
at the current market prices. We are prepared to purchase five hundred
horses at a fair price, but cannot undertake to bargain for horses
with each individual owner."

Aguinaldo sent this letter by a staff officer to General Anderson
inquiring whether it was sent by authority of the latter, who then
indorsed on it in a statement that it was. Nevertheless, Major Jones
reported on July 20 that it was impossible to secure transportation
except upon Aguinaldo's order and that the natives had removed their
cart wheels and hidden them, from which it is to be inferred that
the transportation requested had not been furnished.

Obviously General Anderson was informed that Aguinaldo had given
orders against furnishing the transportation desired, for on July 21
he wrote the Adjutant-General of the Army as follows:--

"Since I wrote last, Aguinaldo has put in operation an elaborate system
of military government, under his assumed authority as Dictator, and
has prohibited any supplies being given us, except by his order. As Go
this last, I have written to him that our requisitions on the country
for horses, ox carts, fuel, and bamboo (to make scaling ladders)
must be filled, and that he must aid in having them filled."

On July 23 General Anderson wrote Aguinaldo as follows:--

"_General_: When I came here three weeks ago I requested Your
Excellency to give what assistance you could to procure means of
transportation for the American Army, as it was to fight the cause
of your people. So far we have received no response.

"As you represent your people, I now have the honor to make requisition
on you for five hundred horses and fifty oxen and ox carts. If you
cannot secure these I will have to pass you and make requisition
directly on the people.

"I beg leave to request an answer at your earliest convenience.

"I remain with great respect, etc." [113]

To this letter, Aguinaldo replied as follows:--

"Replying to your letter of yesterday, I have the honor to manifest to
Your Excellency that I am surprised beyond measure at that which you
say to me in it, lamenting the non-receipt of any response relative
to the assistance that you have asked of me in the way of horses,
carabaos, and carts, because I did reply through the bearer that I
was disposed to issue proper orders whenever you advised me of the
number of these, giving me notice in advance.

"I have sent orders to the nearest provinces in order that within the
shortest time possible horses be brought for sale, but I cannot assure
Your Excellency that we will have the number of 500 that you need,
because there are not many horses in this vicinity, owing to deaths
from epizoötic diseases in January, February, and March last.

"Whenever we have them collected, I shall have the pleasure to advise
Your Excellency.

"I have also ordered to be placed at my disposal 50 carts that I shall
place at your disposition when you need them, provided you give me
previous notice four days in advance." [114]

General Anderson replied:--

"Your favour of the 26th ultimo in relation to requisitions for cattle,
horses, etc., is satisfactory I regret that there should have been
any misunderstanding about it. The people to whom we applied even for
the hiring of carromatas, etc., told our people that they had orders
to supply nothing except by your orders. I am pleased to think that
this was a misapprehension on their part." [115]

From this series of communications it appears that it took three
weeks, and a very direct threat to seize transportation, to bring
about Aguinaldo's promise of assistance in securing it. What help
had he given, meanwhile, in other matters?

On July 14, 1899, General Anderson wrote asking him to assist American
officers in making reconnaissance of the approaches to Manila, and
to favor them with his advice. [116]

On July 19, 1899, he again wrote Aguinaldo asking him to allow Major
J. F. Bell, [117] who was gathering information for General Merritt,
to see maps, and further requesting him to place at Bell's disposal any
available information about the force of the enemy and the topography
of the country. [118]

On July 21 he wrote again asking for passes for a Lieutenant
E. I. Bryan and party, who were making a reconnaissance. [119]

Such records as I have been able to find do not show what response,
if any, Aguinaldo made to these several requests, but General
Anderson's original views as to the willingness of the Insurgents to
coöperate with him underwent an early change, for on July 18, 1898,
in a letter to the Adjutant-General of the United States Army he
makes the following statement:--

"The Insurgent chief, Aguinaldo, has declared himself Dictator and
self-appointed President. He has declared martial law and promulgated
a minute method of rule and administration under it.

"We have observed all official military courtesies, and he and his
followers express great admiration and gratitude to the great American
republic of the north, yet in many ways they obstruct our purposes
and are using every effort to take Manila without us.

"I suspect also that Aguinaldo is secretly negotiating with the
Spanish authorities, as his confidential aide is in Manila." [120]

This suspicion was entirely justified, as we shall see later.

On July 24 Aguinaldo wrote a letter to General Anderson in effect
warning him not to disembark American troops in places conquered by
the Filipinos from the Spaniards without first communicating in writing
the places to be occupied and the object of the occupation. [121]

Aguinaldo's assumption of civil authority on July 15, 1899, did not
pass unnoticed. On July 21 General Anderson wrote the Adjutant-General
of the army concerning it:--

"His assumption of civil authority I have ignored, and let him know
verbally that I could, and would, not recognize it, while I did
not recognize him as a military leader. It may seem strange that I
have made no formal protest against his proclamation as Dictator, his
declaration of martial law, and publication and execution of a despotic
form of government. I wrote such a protest, but did not publish
it, at Admiral Dewey's request, and also for fear of wounding the
susceptibilities of Major-General Merritt, but I have let it be known
in every other way that we do not recognize the Dictatorship. These
people only respect force and firmness. I submit, with all deference,
that we have heretofore underrated the natives. They are not ignorant,
savage tribes, but have a civilization of their own; and although
insignificant in appearance, are fierce fighters, and for a tropical
people they are industrious. A small detail of natives will do more
work in a given time than a regiment of volunteers."

Because he was invited as general rather than as president, Aguinaldo
refused to attend a parade and review on the 4th of July. This fact
is, in itself, an answer to his claim that the Americans were tacitly
recognizing his pretensions.

After referring to this incident, Blount says:--

"On subsequent anniversaries of the day in the Philippines it was
deemed wise simply to prohibit the reading of our declaration before
gatherings of the Filipino people. It saved discussion." [122]

This statement is incorrect. I myself was present the following
year when the declaration was read on the Luneta to a considerable
gathering of Filipinos among whom were many school children, and it
has often been read since.

The landing of American troops at Parańaque and their going into
camp near that town on July 15 caused much excitement, and a lively
interchange of telegrams between Insurgent officers followed. [123]

They were suspicious of the intentions of the Americans, [124] and
trouble soon began.

On July 16 General Noriel telegraphed Aguinaldo as follows:--

"An American has come here who says that he is a Colonel of the Army
whom we should obey; and that it is your desire. We did not listen
to him, awaiting your order."

On the back of the telegram is written the following:--

"Reply.--You should not obey. What this American Colonel says is a
lie. Be cautious so as not to be deceived. You should require from
him proof. Be always vigilant, but upright, also all of the officers
and soldiers must be strict and not timid." [125]

Obviously there was no real coöperation between American and Filipino
troops at this time. General Anderson ignored General Aguinaldo's
request for information as to places where American troops were to
land in Filipino territory and the objects of disembarking them.

The Americans proceeded with their plans for the attack upon Manila,
and it became desirable to occupy some of the Insurgent trenches. On
July 29 Arévalo telegraphed Aguinaldo as follows:--

"In conference with General Greene I asked for an official
letter, a copy of which I send you: 'Headquarters 2nd Brigade,
U. S. Expeditionary Forces, Camp Dewey, near Manila, July 29th,
1898. _El Seńor Noriel, General de Brigade_. Sir: In pursuance of our
conversation of yesterday and the message which Captain Arévalo brought
to me during the night, I beg to inform you that my troops will occupy
the intrenchments between the Camino Real and the beach, leaving camp
for that purpose at 8.00 o'clock this morning. I will be obliged if you
will give the necessary orders for the withdrawal of your men. Thanking
you for your courtesy, I remain, very respectfully, your obedient
servant, _F. V. Greene, Brigadier General_, commanding.'" [126]

This clear direct declaration of intention by General Greene is the
actual transaction referred to by Blount as "Jockeying the Insurgents
out of their trenches." He bases his statements concerning the matter
on a newspaper report.

The attitude of the army officers in the matter of obtaining permission
to occupy the trenches needed in preparing for the assault on the
city could not have been more correct.

On August 10 General Merritt gave the following emphatic instructions
relative to the matter:--

"No rupture with Insurgents. This is imperative. Can ask Insurgent
generals or Aguinaldo for permission to occupy their trenches, but
if refused not to use force."

On the same day General Anderson wrote to Aguinaldo, asking
permission to occupy a trench facing blockhouse No. 14, in order
to place artillery to destroy it. The permission was granted on the
following day.

During the early part of August, Aguinaldo seems to have avoided
conferences with American officers. On the second of the month Mabini
wrote him how he had put off Admiral Dewey's aid with a false statement
that he did not know Aguinaldo's whereabouts. [127]

The landing of American troops at Parańaque for the assault on Manila
led to the concentration of Insurgent troops at the neighbouring town
of Bacoor. [128]

On August 8 Fernando Acevedo [129] wrote to General Pío del Pilar
that the Americans were going to attack the next day and that,--

"It is requisite and necessary before their attack takes place
to-morrow, that you to-morrow or to-night annihilate them, sparing
none, for the way they have deceived us, and will again without fail,
in the contract signed by Sr. Emilio; and convince yourself, my friend,
that it is necessary to do this; and when it is done the whole world
will wonder and say that we have done well, and will not be able to
give out that the people here are fools spending the time sucking
their fingers." [130]

Worse yet, information was sent to the Spaniards of the proposed
American attack on the 13th instant, as is shown by the following
letter:--

"(Battalion of Cazadores, No. 2. Expeditionary. Office of the
Lieutenant-Colonel. Private.)

"_Seńor Don Artemio Ricarte_: [131]

"My Dear Sir: I have received to-day your kind letter giving warning
of the attack on Manila, and I thank you for your personal interest
in me, which, on my part, I reciprocate. I assure you that I am yours,
most truly and sincerely,

"_Luis Martinez Alcobendas_.

"_Singalon_, August 10, 1898." [132]

According to Taylor, this was not the first occurrence of this
sort. He says:--

"The officers of the United States Army who believed that the
insurgents were informing the Spaniards of the American movements were
right. Sastrón has printed a letter from Pío del Pilar, dated July
30, to the Spanish officer commanding at Santa Ana, in which Pilar
said that Aguinaldo had told him that the Americans would attack
the Spanish lines on August 2 and advised that the Spaniards should
not give way, but hold their positions. Pilar added, however, that
if the Spaniards should fall back on the walled city and surrender
Santa Ana to himself, he would hold it with his own men. Aguinaldo's
information was correct, and on August 2 eight American soldiers were
killed or wounded by the Spanish fire." [133]

Taylor continues:--

"And yet Aguinaldo claimed to be an ally of the Americans. It is not
probable that these were the only two such letters written. Aguinaldo
had by this time found out that although he could defeat the scattered
Spanish detachments, he could not defeat the Spanish force holding the
lines of Manila. He did not want the Americans in the Philippines. They
were in his way, and he had already made up his mind that if they
did not give him what he wanted, he would drive them out by force. He
saw very early that it was extremely improbable that he should obtain
from them what he wanted; accordingly all losses both among Spaniards
and Americans would, from Aguinaldo's point of view, inure to his
benefit. The best possible thing for him would be to hold his own
force intact while they wore each other out. The Spanish losses,
small as they were, occurred in front of the American lines, not in
front of the Filipinos. There is no reason, accordingly, for believing
that the Filipinos suffered heavily. To arrange that the Spaniards
should inflict losses upon the Americans, while he saved his own men,
showed ingenuity on the part of Aguinaldo; but it was decidedly not
the conduct of an ally." [134]

The feeling toward the American troops at this time is further shown
by a telegram from General Pío del Pilar, sent from San Pedro Macati
on August 10, 1898:--

"Commandant Acebedo writes that the Spaniards are about to surrender
because they want to turn over the place; the Americans want them to
leave only the batteries and say that they will station themselves
in said batteries. It appears that they want to deceive us; they do
not want to give us arms, and if they do not give us arms, we shall
attack them and drive them out. I await your reply." [135]

This is perhaps not quite the kind of coöperation that Admiral Dewey
and Generals Anderson and Merritt had expected.

The truth is that the Insurgents were determined to capture Manila for
themselves, not only because of the "war booty," for which they were
hungry, but because of the status which they felt that the taking of
the capital of the Philippines would assure them. The great importance
which they attached to this plan is shown in communications written
by Agoncillo, Aguinaldo and others. [136]

Of conditions at this time, Taylor says:--

"On July 7, Aguinaldo appointed Artemio Ricarte and Pantaleón García
to negotiate the surrender of Manila by the Spaniards to him (Exhibit
155). On July 5 Pantaleón García was planning to enter Manila by way of
Tondo or of Santa Cruz (P.I.R., 243.7). On the 9th Aguinaldo ordered
that rice should be gathered from the towns of Manila Province for
the use of his troops in the decisive attack upon Manila which he
intended making in a few days (P.I.R., 1087. 5).

"Aguinaldo, finding that his chance of obtaining Manila for himself was
growing steadily less, now determined to force himself into the city
with the Americans and demand a consideration for the assistance he
had rendered them during the siege. It is true he had assisted them,
but his assistance had not been intentional. It was the result of
the operations he was carrying on for his own ends. The operations of
the Filipinos and the Americans were against Spain as a common enemy
of both; but the operations were not joint operations, and although
their purpose was a common purpose, it was not a mutual one. On August
8 Aguinaldo appointed General Ricarte commander in the operations
about Manila, ordered him to respect the property of all foreigners,
and told him that in case his troops succeeded in entering Manila they
were to carry their flag and plant it there (P.I.R., 703. 2). Judging
from an unsigned draft of a letter, he must have warned the foreign
consuls in Manila about the same time to gather under the protection
of their flags all of their fellow-citizens who had not taken refuge
on the vessels in the bay, so that when his troops entered the city
no foreign lives would be taken, and no foreign property would be
injured. The earnestness with which he urged that all foreigners not
Spaniards should take steps to identify themselves and their property
shows that he considered the persons and property of Spanish civilians
as fair booty of war." [137]

There was certmnly no need of Insurgent assistance in the assault
on Manila.

The reports which reached Aguinaldo that the surrender of Manila had
been agreed upon in advance were correct, as is shown by the following
testimony of Admiral Dewey:

"_Senator Patterson_. When did you reach an understanding with the
Spanish commander upon the subject, [138]--how long before the 12th
or 13th of August?

"_Admiral Dewey_. Several days before.

"_Senator Patterson_. To whom did you eommunieate the arrangement
that you had?

"_Admiral Dewey_. General Merritt and, of course, all of my own
captains--General Merritt, and I think a council of officers on board
of one of the steamers. I think there were several army officers
present when I told the General that; and I may say here that I do
not think General Merritt took much stock in it.

"_Senator Patterson_. What statement did you make to them, Admiral,
in substance?

"_Admiral Dewey_. That the Spaniards were ready to surrender, but
before doing so I must engage one of the outlying forts. I selected one
at Malate, away from the city. [139] They said I must engage that and
fire for a while, and then I was to make a signal by the international
code, 'Do you surrender?' Then they were to hoist a white flag at
a certain bastion; and I may say now that I was the first one to
discover the white flag. We had 50 people looking for that white flag,
but I happened to be the first one who saw it. I fired for a while,
and then made the signal according to the programme. We could not see
the white flag--it was rather a thick day--but finally I discovered
it on the south bastion; I don't know how long it had been flying
there when I first saw it." [140]

On August 12, the day before Manila surrendered, Buencamino telegraphed
Aguinaldo, urging him in the strongest terms to attack that night so
that Americans might be obliged to ask him to stop, with the result
that the Insurgents would be included in the official negotiations. He
further advised Aguinaldo that he must not suspend his attack because
the Americans suspended theirs. [141]

General Anderson tells us that, on the evening of August 12,
he received an order from General Merritt to notify Aguinaldo to
forbid the Insurgents under his command from entering Manila. This
notification was delivered to Aguinaldo that night, and was received
by him with anger. [142]

On the following morning the Insurgents actually made an independent
attack of their own, as planned. [143] It promptly led to trouble
with the Americans, and at 8 A.M. Aguinaldo received a telegram from
General Anderson sternly warning him not to let his troops enter
Manila without the consent of the American commander on the south
side of the Pasig River. [144]

Aguinaldo apparentiy took no action in response to this request,
except to direct General Riego de Dios, who was at Cavite, to go
with Buencamino without losing a moment and ask for an explanation,
in writing if possible. [145]

At 10.50 A.M. he telegraphed General Anderson saying that his troops
were being forced, by threats of violence, to retire from positions
which they had taken, and asking Anderson to order his troops to
avoid difficulty with the Insurgent forces. Aguinaldo said that he
had directed his men to aid the American forces if the latter are
attacked by a common enemy, but was discreetly silent on the subject
of their entering Manila. [146]

Fifteen minutes later, at 11.05, he received a reply to his telegram
to General Riego de Dios, in which that officer communicated the
views of Araneta [147] and Buencamino, who had been unable to find
General Anderson. This important communication follows:--

"Most urgent. Araneta and Buencamino having been consulted in regard
to your telegram of to-day, they confirm capitulation, and in regard to
the telegraphic note of General Anderson they are of the opinion, first
that we should continue hostilities while we ask for an explanation;
second, that explanation should be in the following terms: Inquire
reason for note and ask why our troops are not to enter Manila
without permission of the American commander; third, in case the
(terms of?) capitulation is given as the reason, to answer that we
do not suspend our attempt to enter Manila. Its capitulation is not
favourable to our independence. General Anderson is not here. General
Merritt is probably in Manila. Only Admiral Dewey is in the Bay. We
ask authorization to express our explanation in the proposed terms
and to have a conference with Admiral Dewey in order to have our
claims reach General Merritt." [148]

An endorsement written by Mabini and signed by Aguinaldo on the above
paper reads:--

"I authorize every assertion of right, but state that we believe that
we have the right to enter Manila without permission as we have a part
in the surrender of the Spaniards. They would not have surrendered if
our troops had not cut off their retreat to the interior. Besides but
for us the landing of troops would have cost them much blood. Obtain
an answer as soon as possible in order to lay a protest before the
consuls in case it is necessary." [149]

Naturally, trouble followed. At 1.30 P.M. General Ricarte telegraphed
to Aguinaldo:--

"Americans wish to put us out. Give directions." [150]

Apparently about the same hour he wired more at length, as follows:--

"Most urgent. American troops rearguard our trenches. Mabolo and San
José warn us that they will fire on us when the time comes. Impossible
to remain there without disagreeing with them. Since 5 o'clock this
morning we have been furiously attacking. Americans firing incessantly,
Spaniards silent. No losses yet." [151]

At 3.52 he wired again:--

"General Pío del Pilar informs me of the following: 'Come here,
if possible, as our soldiers at the barrio of Concepción are not
allowed to go out and we are prohibited to move on any farther. We
it was who succeeded in capturing that place. Come here or there will
be trouble, since they are driving me away, and refusing to listen to
what I say.' I am at this very moment going to aforesaid place." [152]

At 5 P.M. another was sent by Ricarte to Aguinaldo as follows:--

"Colonel San Miguel arrived here from Ermita. Regional Exposition,
Agricultural College and other buildings are ours. Our flag flies
already at Ermita. Colonel Agapito Donzón with his troops is in the
Pérez building, Paco. Colonels Julian Ocampo and Isidoro Tolentino
are in the convent of Ermita. All houses without flag are guarded by
our soldiers." [153]

At 6.15 P.M. he telegraphed as follows:--

"I inform you that the chiefs of our troops have reported to
me that our flag at Singalong church (_visita_) was removed by
the Americans and they hoisted theirs instead, not allowing us to
approach thereto. General Pío del Pilar is at present at the barrio
of Concepción. Americans prohibited him to move on any farther. How
can he enter Manila?" [154]

No attention was paid to General Anderson's request that the Insurgent
troops should not enter Manila without permission. They crowded forward
with and after the American forces. Coming out on Bagumbayan drive,
they found American and Spanish troops confronting each other but not
firing, the former on the drive, the latter on the neighbouring city
wall. A flag of truce was waving from the south bastion, nevertheless
the Insurgents fired on the Spanish forces, provoking a return fire
which killed and wounded American soldiers. Of this incident General
Greene has said:--

"At this point the California regiment a short time before had met
some insurgents who had fired at the Spaniards on the walls, and the
latter, in returning the fire, had caused a loss in the California
regiment of 1 killed and 2 wounded." [155]

Some of these matters must have come to the attention of General
Anderson, for he sent Aguinaldo a telegram, received by the latter
at 6.35 P.M., as follows:--

"Dated Ermita Headquarters 2nd Division 13 to
Gen. Aguinaldo. Commanding Filipino Forces.--Manila, taken. Serious
trouble threatened between our forces. Try and prevent it. Your troops
should not force themselves in the city until we have received the
full surrender then we will negotiate with you.

"_Anderson_, commanding." [156]

It appears that the Insurgent troops took the suburb of Santa Ana,
and captured Spanish and Filipino officers and men. [157]

In view of the known facts, how absurd becomes the following contention
of Aguinaldo, advanced in his "Reseńa Verídica:--

"Our own forces could see the American forces land on the beach of
the Luneta and of the Paseo de Santa Lucía. The Spanish soldiers,
who were on the walls of the city, drew the attention of every one
because they did not fire on the former, a mystery which was explained
at nightfall of that day, by the news of the capitulation of the place
by General Seńor Jáudenes [158] to the American General, Mr. Merritt,
a capitulation which the American Generals claimed for themselves,
an infraction of what had been agreed upon with Admiral Dewey, in
regard to the formation of plans for the attack and taking of Manila
by the two armies, American and Filipino, together and in combination.

"This inexplicable line of conduct on the part of the American officers
was made clearer by the telegrams, which General Anderson addressed
to me, from Maytubig on the said 13th day, requesting that I should
order our troops not to enter Manila, which request was refused,
inasmuch as it was contrary to what was agreed upon, and to the high
ends of the Revolutionary Government, which, on taking upon itself the
immense work of besieging Manila, during the two months and a half,
sacrificing thousands of lives and millions in material interests,
could not surely have done so with any object other than that of
capturing Manila and the Spanish garrison which with firmness and
tenacity defended that place." [159]

On August 14 Aguinaldo telegraphed General Anderson as follows:--

"My troops, who have been for so long besieging Manila, have always
been promised that they could appear in it, as you know and cannot
deny, and for this reason, and on account of the many sacrifices made
of money, and lives, I do not consider it prudent to issue orders to
the contrary, as they might be disobeyed against my authority. Besides,
I hope that you will allow the troops to enter because we have given
proofs many times of our friendship, ceding our positions at Parańaque,
Pasay, Singálon and Maytubig. Nevertheless, if it seems best to you,
and in order to enter into a frank and friendly understanding and
avoid any disagreeable conflict before the eyes of the Spaniards,
I will commission Don Felipe Buencamino and others, who will to-day
go out from our lines and hold a conference with you, and that they
will be safe during the conference." [160]

Aguinaldo and his associates pressed the demand for joint
occupation. On August 13 Admiral Dewey and General Merritt informed
the government that since the occupation of Manila and its suburbs
the Insurgents outside had been insisting on this, and asked how far
they might proceed in enforcing obedience in the matter.

They were informed by a telegram dated August 17 that the President
of the United States had directed:--

"That there must be no joint occupation with the Insurgents. The
United States in the possession of Manila city, Manila bay and harbor
must preserve the peace and protect persons and property within the
territory occupied by their military and naval forces. The insurgents
and all others must recognize the military occupation and authority
of the United States and the cessation of hostilities proclaimed by
the President. Use whatever means in your judgment are necessary to
this end." [161]

This left the military and naval commanders no option in the premises,
and in any event dual occupation was out of the question because of
the lawlessness of the Insurgent troops.

At this very time they were looting the portions of the city which
they occupied, and as is abundantly shown by their own records were
not confining their attacks to Spaniards, but were assaulting their
own people and raiding the property of foreigners as well. [162] The
continuation of such a condition of affairs was manifestly impossible.

The Insurgents promptly demanded their share in the "war booty,"
and asked certain other extraordinary concessions as follows:--

"(4) Our sacrifices in coöperating in the siege and taking of Manila
being well known, it is just that we should share in the war booty.

"(5) We demand for our use the palace of Malacańang and the Convents
of Malate, Ermita and Paco or San Fernando de Dilao.

"(6) We demand that the civil offices of Manila be filled by North
Americans and never by Spaniards; but if General Merritt should require
some Filipinos we should be pleased if he will grant our President,
Don Emilio Aguinaldo, the favour of recommending select and skilled
Filipinos. The jurisdiction of the authorities of Manila shall not
be recognized beyond the municipal radius.

"(7) The American forces shall not approach nor penetrate our military
positions without permission of the respective commanders thereof
and shall evacuate all the positions which they occupy at the present
time beyond the municipal radius; Spaniards who pass our lines without
permission of the commander will be considered as spies.

       *       *       *       *       *

"(10) Lastly we state clearly that our concessions and petitions do not
signify on our part that we recognize the sovereignty of North America
in these islands, as they are made necessary by the present war." [163]

Under the instructions of the President these demands could not be
acceded to. Nor could they have been acceded to had there been no
such instructions. In this connection the following extract from
General Jáudenes's cablegram for June 8th to his home government is
highly significant:--

"Population of suburbs have taken refuge in walled city from fear
of outrages of insurgents, preferring to run risks of bombardment,
which has not yet begun." [164]

It would seem that the population of the suburbs did not have a high
idea of Insurgent discipline.

That their apprehensions were not groundless is shown by a passage
in a letter sent the following day to Governor-General Augustin
by Buencamino:--

"Manila being surrounded by land and by sea, without hope of assistance
from anywhere, and Seńor Aguinaldo being disposed to make use of
the fleet in order to bombard, if Your Excellency should prolong
the struggle with tenacity, I do not know, frankly, what else to
do other than to succumb dying, but Your Excellency knows that the
entrance of 100,000 Indians, [165] inflamed with battle, drunk with
triumph and with blood, will produce the hecatomb from which there
will not be allowed to escape either women, children, or Peninsular
friars,--especially the friars; and, I believe that the rights of
humanity, imperilled in such a serious way, should be well considered
by Your Excellency, for however dear glory and military duty may be,
although worth as much or more than existence itself there is no right
by which they should be won at the cost of the rights of humanity,
and the latter outweigh every consideration and all duty." [166]

Don Felipe knew his own people. He also knew, none better, what they
had in mind at this time.

As it was the Insurgent forces made the most of such opportunity as
they had, and their own records show it.

In the suburbs of Manila they sacked and committed outrages,
threatening people with their arms, and this was still going on a
week after the fall of Manila. [167]

General Pío del Pilar was believed to be responsible for much of this
misconduct, and Mabini proposed that as it was necessary for him to
leave the vicinity of Manila, and they could not remove him by force,
he be promoted. [168]

Some time during this month Sandico wrote Aguinaldo as follows:--

"The Americans have already heard of the frequent cases of kidnapping
(_dukut_) occurring in Tondo, San Sebastián and San Miguel. Last night
some of ours were surprised in the act of kidnapping a person. I have
also heard that many persons are asking for contributions of war. I
tell them [169] that you know nothing of all this and that if some
persons are kidnapped it is due to the hate of the natives for the
Spanish spies and secret police, which is great." [170]

Evidently Sandico continued to interest himself in the matter of
preventing disorder, for on September 24, 1898, he wrote Aguinaldo
from Manila as follows:--

"By authority of General Don Pío del Pilar and accompanied by the
War Auditor, Seńor Urbano, we entered a prison where the individuals
Mariano de la Cruz and Mariano Crisóstomo were kept. They were almost
prostrated. They had lately been released from Bilibid where they
had been confined for political crimes. On being asked the reason for
their imprisonment they began by showing us their bodies from which
blood still issued as the result of the barbarous treatment received
from Major Carmona who, by the way, is the same person of whom I
spoke to you in one of my previous letters; I declared to you then
that he had assaulted, revolver in hand, a man in the middle of one
of the most frequented streets of the suburb of Paco on pure suspicion.

"The prisoners in question stated that if they admitted the accusations
made against them it was for fear of greater punishments promised
by said Major. The officer of the guard took the liberty of striking
with his fist the one who dared to express himself so.

"Before such a spectacle Major Bell found himself forced to tell them
that brutal acts are not precisely a recommendation for a country
that wished to be free and that they, the Americans, do not arrest
any one without just cause. [171]

"I take the liberty of calling your attention to the matter in
question and other abuses in order that the measures you may think
fit be adopted to remedy this evil. In fact, we are making a target
of ourselves in the sight of all nations, especially so in that of
the Americans who note any act of ours and judge us secretly now in
order to do so later in public. To make light of this is to plant
a seed of future injury to us, because many will desire to place
themselves under the protection of the American flag, seeing that
ours refuses to defend the citizens' individual rights.

"I, for my part, ask that Major Carmona be arrested together with
his accomplices in the matter so that it may serve as a lesson not
only for him but also for those who think like him." [172]

Obviously Sandico's protest of September 24 did not produce the
desired result, for on September 28 he wrote Aguinaldo a long letter
complaining that in Manila personal security did not exist, people
were being tortured and murdered, kidnapping and theft were very
frequent, and these abuses were being committed by Filipino officers
and men. Some of the things which had come to his knowledge were of
such a nature that he preferred to speak to Aguinaldo privately about
them. [173]

Murder, pillaging, torture of prisoners, kidnapping, theft--these
are not pleasant things, but they continued to occur, and Aguinaldo,
who apparently desired to prevent them, was powerless to do so. He
did not dare discipline General Pío del Pilar, nor remove him from
the vicinity of Manila, and the soldiers of that officer continued
to work their will on their own unfortunate and helpless people.

Aguinaldo at first flatly refused to direct the disorderly Insurgent
forces to leave Manila. The American commander showed great forbearance
and negotiations continued.

On August 16, 1898, the Diplomatic Commission (Buencamino and Gregorio
Araneta) telegraphed Aguinaldo that a clause in a proposed agreement
requiring prior permission of Insurgent officers before American
troops could pass or approach their lines had greatly displeased
General Anderson who declined to treat until after the withdrawal of
Noriel's troops from Manila. [174]

Aguinaldo's reply, sent on August 17, 1898, shows that he had
alreadymade up his mind to fight the Americans, for it contains the
following significant words: "The conflict is coming sooner or later
and we shall gain nothing by asking as favours of them what are really
our rights." [175]

While negotiations were pending General Merritt sent Major J. F. Bell
to Aguinaldo with a letter and also with a memorandum in which were
the words:--

"In case you find Aguinaldo inclined to be generous in his arrangements
with us, you may communicate to him as follows: ..."

There follow six paragraphs, of which the third is of special
importance. It reads as follows:--

"(3) That I have every disposition to represent liberally the
Government at Washington, which I know is inclined to deal fairly with
him and his people; but not knowing what the policy of that Government
will be, I am not prepared to make any promises, except that in the
event of the United States withdrawing from these islands care will
be taken to leave him _in as good condition as he was found by the
forces of the Government_. [176]

Relative to the italicized portion of this statement Major Bell says:--

"I was pressed to explain further just what meaning General M. meant
to convey by the underscored portion of this remark, but I replied
that I had repeated the language General M. had used to me, and I
preferred they should seek any further explanation from him, lest
I might unwittingly fall into error if I undertook to explain his
meaning myself. Their lack of definiteness and my unwillingness to
comment upon the language seemed to arouse their apprehensions and
suspicions. They have been trying ever since to obtain in writing
some definite promise on this subject." [177]

Aguinaldo ordered that the machinery of the water works be started up
at once, a thing which was very necessary as Manila was suffering from
lack of water. I should be glad if I could leave this matter here,
but I cannot, for Major Bell elsewhere makes the further statement:--

"Attention is invited to General Merritt's promise made known to
Aguinaldo by me verbally, namely, that in the event of the United
States withdrawing from these islands, care would be taken to leave
Aguinaldo in as good condition as he was found by the forces of
the Government. From a remark the General made to me I inferred he
intended to interpret the expression 'forces of the Government' to
mean the naval forces, should future contingencies necessitate such
an interpretation." [178]

Let us hope that Major Bell misunderstood General Merritt's
intention. If this is not the case, I must say in all frankness that
in my opinion it was General Merritt's intention to indulge in sharp
practice.

Obviously, the American naval forces did not find Aguinaldo in any
"condition," in the sense in which General Merritt uses the term. On
the contrary, they brought him from Hongkong and assisted him in
starting a revolution. The negotiations in question were relative
to the positions held by the Insurgents at the time the negotiations
took place, and General Merritt's promise could not legitimately be
interpreted to refer to anything else.

Had Aguinaldo accepted his offer, a most embarrassing situation would
have resulted. General Merritt was obviously not authorized to make
such a proposition in the first instance, and the only honourable
course left open to him would have been to advise Washington of his
improper action and beg the Government to support him in it and thus
save the honour of the country.

Fortunately, Aguinaldo did not act upon the promise nor accept the
offer. On the contrary, he promptly and indignantly denied that he
was committed to anything, and sought to impose new conditions which
were not acceded to.

Meanwhile some one doubtless got hold of General Merritt and called
his attention to the fact that in making this offer he had grossly
exceeded his authority, for in his reply to Aguinaldo's protest
General Merritt says:--

"So far as any promises as to what should be done in the event
of a conclusion of a treaty between the United States and Spain
are concerned, it is utterly impossible for me as the military
representative only of the United States to make any promises such as
you request. As you have already been informed, you may depend upon
the good will of the Americans out here and the Government, of which
you already know the beneficence, to determine these matters in the
future." [179]

Coming, as this statement did, after the offer made in the memorandum
hereinbefore referred to, it must have aroused the suspicions of
Aguinaldo and his associates, and in my opinion Merritt's conduct in
making such a proposal in the first instance was inexcusable.

Before he could terminate the negotiations which followed he was called
away, and turned this matter, together with other unfinished business,
over to his successor, General E. S. Otis.

On August 31, 1898, the latter official wrote to Aguinaldo as
follows:--

"_General Aguinaldo, Bacoor_:

"Referring to promise made by General Merritt to reply to your
letter of August 27 within four days, I desire to state that he was
unexpectedly ordered away and had not opportunity to reply. Being
unacquainted with the situation, I must take time to inform myself
before answering, which I will do at the earliest opportunity.

"_Otis_."

On September 8 General Otis wrote Aguinaldo a long letter fully
discussing the whole situation in the light of the complete information
which he had meanwhile obtained. Since so much has been made of this
incident by Blount and others, I invite attention to the following
extracts from General Otis's letter, which embody a fair and judicial
statement of the conditions which existed:--

"You designate certain lines within the suburbs of the city of Manila,
to which you promise to retire your troops, and name as conditions
precedent: First, protection to your shipping by the United States
Navy, and the free navigation of your vessels within the waters in
United States occupation; second, restitution to your forces of all
positions which are now occupied by your troops, in the event that
treaty stipulations between the United States and Spain surrender
to the last-named government the territory occupied by the former;
and thirdly, that United States troops now occupying positions beyond
the lines you name shall retire within the same.

"A discussion of your proposition to hold, jointly, with the United
States Government, the city of Manila, involves consideration of some
of the other concessions you desire to be made, and to that I will
at once refer. I wish to present the matter, in the first instance,
in its legal aspect, although, from remarks contained in former
correspondence, I am of the opinion that you are fully aware how
untenable the proposition is. The United States and Spain were and are
belligerent parties to a war, and were so recognized by the civilized
world. In the course of events the entire city of Manila, then in
full possession of Spanish forces, was surrendered to the first-named
belligerent power. The articles of agreement and capitulation gave the
United States Government full occupancy of the city and defences of
Manila, and that Government obligated itself to insure the safety of
the lives and property of the inhabitants of the city to the best of
its ability. By all the laws of war and all international precedents
the United States authority over Manila and its defences is full and
supreme, and it cannot escape the obligations which it has assumed.

       *       *       *       *       *

"But conceding, as you do, the strictly legal right of my Government to
hold and administer the affairs of the city of Manila and its suburbs
(I thus conclude from expressions contained in former correspondence
and from my appreciation of your intellectual attainments), you
base your proposition--a joint occupation--upon supposed equitable
grounds, referring to the sacrifices your troops have made and the
assistance they have rendered the American forces in the capture
of Manila. It is well known they have made personal sacrifices,
endured great hardships, and have rendered aid. But is it forgotten
that my Government has swept the Spanish navy from the seas of both
hemispheres; sent back to Spain the Spanish army and navy forces,
recently embarked for your destruction, and the secure holding of
the Philippine possessions; that since May 1 last its navy has held
the city of Manila at its mercy, but out of consideration of humanity
refused to bombard it, preferring to send troops to demand surrender,
and thereby preserve the lives and property of the inhabitants? Is it
forgotten that the destruction of the Spanish navy and the retention
of Spanish armed men in its European possessions has opened up to you
the ports of the Island of Luzon and held Spain helpless to meet its
refractory subjects?

       *       *       *       *       *

"Apart from all legal and equitable considerations, and those
having their origin in personally conceived ideas of justice, I
wish respectfully to call your attention to the impracticability of
maintaining a joint occupation of Manila and its suburbs, and in this
I know that I shall have the approval of your excellent judgment. It
would be extremely difficult to prevent friction between our respective
forces, which might result in unfortunate consequences, labor as we
may for continued harmonious relations. Located in close proximity,
irresponsible members of our organizations, by careless or impertinent
action, might be the means of inciting grave disturbances; and in
this connection I call to your attention the recent shooting affair
at Cavite, which still requires investigation. There might also arise
conflict of authority between our subordinate officers. Even now,
within precincts in entire actual possession of our troops, I find
that permits are given to citizens, who are styled local presidents,
to make arrests, to carry arms, etc., in violation of our instructions
and authority, and that several cases of kidnapping have taken
place. In pursuance of our obligations to maintain, in so far as
we can, domestic tranquillity, our officers have arrested suspected
parties, and they have asserted (with what element of truth I know
not) that the insurgent forces are the offenders. I have declined
to accept their statements, as I prefer to believe the contrary,
although it would appear that officers connected with those forces
have issued the permits to which I allude. Such interference with
our administration of civil affairs must eventually result in conflict.

"... And here permit me to remark upon a view of the subject you have
advocated in support of the plea for dual occupation of the city's
suburbs. Your forces, you say in substance, should have a share in
the booty resulting from the conquest of the city, on account of
hardships endured and assistance rendered. The facts on which you
base your conclusion granted, your conclusion, under the rules of
war which are binding on my Government, does not follow, for it has
never recognized the existence of spoils of war, denominated 'booty,'
as have many European governments. No enemy's property of any kind,
public or private, can be seized, claimed by, or awarded to, any
of its officers or men, and should they attempt to appropriate any
of it for their individual benefit, they would be very severely
punished through military tribunals, on which have been conferred by
law very sweeping jurisdiction. The enemy's money and property (all
that is not necessary to be expended in administering local affairs
in the enemy's territory) must be preserved for final arbitrament
or settlement by and between the supreme authorities of the nations
concerned. My troops cannot acquire booty nor any individual benefit
by reason of the capture of an enemy's territory. I make this comment,
believing that you hold erroneous opinions in respect to individual
advantages which occupation bestows.

"I request your indulgence while I briefly consider the concessions
you ask us to make as conditions precedent to the retirement of your
forces to the lines indicated by your note of the 27th ultimo.

"The first is: Protection to your shipping and free navigation to
your vessels. Neither the extent of protection nor the limit of free
navigation you request is understood. Certainly you could not mean
protection on the high seas, or in the ports not in the rightful
possession of the United States. That, as you are fully aware, could
only be effected by treaty, or guarantee, following international
recognition of the belligerent rights of the Philippine revolutionary
government. While the existing armistice continues, the United
States are in rightful possession, in so far as the navigable waters
of the Philippine Islands are concerned, only of the bay of Manila
and its navigable tributaries. Within the same all vessels of trade
and commerce and the war vessels of recognized national powers sail
freely as long as the sovereignty of my Government is not assailed
nor the peace of the locality threatened. In this respect, whatever
concessions are extended by way of relaxation of trade restrictions,
incident to war, to the citizens of these islands will be extended
to all alike, and discrimination in this regard is neither intended
nor permitted. Admiral Dewey exercises supervision over all naval
matters, and they are in no way related to the duties conferred
upon me by law. Nor would it avail should I seek his consent for
greater latitude of action, for even if disposed to grant special
concessions he could not do so, and I doubt if the supreme authority
of my Government could now, under the prevailing truce with Spain,
invest him with the requisite powers to do so and at the same time
preserve its international obligations.

"The second concession named by you is restitution of positions in the
city of Manila to your forces, in case the treaty of peace remands to
Spain the territory surrendered under the late capitulatory articles;
and the third and last is a promise to retire our troops within the
lines indicated by you, as the lines on which you desire your troops
to remain permanently. These propositions, having a kindred nature,
may be considered together, and, indeed, have already been impliedly
answered. From previous statements of facts and logical conclusions
made and stated in this communication, concerning the nature of the
obligations resting on the United States with regard to the territory
to which they have the legal right of possession under contracting
articles with Spain, it is evident that neither in law or morals
can the concessions be made. I would be powerless to grant them in
any aspect of the case, being nothing more than an agent to carry
out the instructions of the executive head of my Government and not
being vested with discretionary power to determine matters of such
moment. In the present instance I am not only powerless to accede to
your request, but have been strictly enjoined by my Government, mindful
of its international promises and national honour, which it has never
broken nor sacrificed, not to accede joint occupation of the city and
suburbs of Manila and am directed specially to preserve the peace and
protect persons and property within the territory surrendered under
the terms of the Spanish capitulation. These mandates must be obeyed.

"Thus have I endeavoured with all candor and sincerity, holding nothing
in reserve, to place before you the situation as understood by me,
and I doubt not by the Republic which I represent. I have not been
instructed as to what policy the United States intends to pursue in
regard to its legitimate holdings here, and hence I am unable to give
you any information on the subject. That it will have a care and labor
conscientiously for the welfare of your people I sincerely believe. It
remains for you, beneficiaries of its sacrifices, to adopt a course
of action which will manifest your good intentions and show to the
world the principles which actuate your proceedings.

       *       *       *       *       *

"It only remains for me to respectfully notify you that I am compelled
by my instructions to direct that your armed forces evacuate the
entire city of Manila, including its suburbs and defences, and that
I shall be obliged to take action with that end in view within a very
short space of time should you decline to comply with my Government's
demands; and I hereby serve notice on you that unless your troops are
withdrawn beyond the line of the city's defences before Thursday,
the 15th instant, I shall be obliged to resort to forcible action,
and that my Government will hold you responsible for any unfortunate
consequences which may ensue.

       *       *       *       *      *

"In conclusion, I beg to inform you that I have conferred freely
with Admiral Dewey upon the contents of this communication and am
delegated by him to state that he fully approves of the same in all
respects; that the commands of our Government compel us to act as
herein indicated, and that between our respective forces there will
be unanimity and complete concert of action."

This calm and temperate discussion of the situation, coupled with
the firm statement of intention with which it closed, produced a
decided effect on Aguinaldo. Concerning the events to which it led,
General Otis has made this statement:--

"On September 13, a commission sent by Aguinaldo and consisting
of three members, one of whom was the treasurer and another the
attorney-general of the insurgent government, called for the purpose
of discussing the subject of my letter of the 8th. They asked me to
withdraw it and simply request in writing that the insurgent troops
retire to the line designated by General Merritt, which I refused
to do, stating that unless they withdrew as directed we would be
obliged to resort to force. They then asked that I withdraw the
letter and issue a request unaccompanied by any threat to use force,
as Aguinaldo was fearful that he would be unable to remove his troops
upon a demand. To which I replied that the letter of the 8th instant
would stand. They then said that as the demands of that letter must
remain unchanged, the insurgents would withdraw as directed therein,
but that if I would express in writing a simple request to Aguinaldo
to withdraw to the lines which I designated--something which he
could show to the troops and induce them to think that he was simply
acting upon a request from these headquarters--he would probably be
able to retire his men without much difficulty; that, of course,
they themselves understood the direction to withdraw, which would
be obeyed, and thereupon repeated their desire to obtain a note of
request, whereupon I furnished them with the following:--

"'_Office U. S. Military Governor in the_

"'_Philippine Islands_,

"'_Manila_, P. I., September 13, 1898.

"'_The Commanding General of the Philippine Forces_:

"'_Sir_: Referring to my communication of September 8, I have the
honour to inform you that I have had a most agreeable conversation
with certain gentlemen who are in the interests of your revolutionary
government upon the matters therein contained. We have discussed
at length the complications now existing, which will exist, and will
doubtless increase, while our troops continue to occupy jointly certain
districts of the city of Manila. I have urged upon them the necessity
of the withdrawal of your troops in order that the friendly relations
which have always been maintained by and between them and the forces
of the United States Government may be perpetuated. I am sure that
the gentlemen fully appreciate my sentiments and will clearly report
them to you. May I ask you to patiently listen to their report of
our conversation?

"'It is my desire that our friendly intercourse and mutual amicable
relations be continued; that they be not jeopardized if we can by
consistent action avoid it, and such, I am certain, is the desire of
yourself and associates.

"'May I ask, therefore, that you withdraw your troops from Manila?

"'Permit me to add in conclusion that I have that confidence in your
ability and patriotism which will lead you to accede to this request.

"'I am, with great respect, your most obedient servant,

(Signed) "'_E. S. Otis_,

"'Major-General, U. S. V.,

"'United States Military Governor in the Philippines.'

"In reply to which, on the 16th, the following was received:--

"'_Malolos, Bulacan_, September 16, 1898.

"'_The Commanding General of the American Forces_:

"'_My Dear Sir_: Referring to your esteemed communication, dated
the 13th instant, I have the honour to inform you that I have given
appropriate orders that my troops should abandon their most advanced
positions within some of the suburbs, and that they should retire to
points where contact with yours would be more difficult, in order to
avoid all occasion for conflict.

"'I hope that by these presents you will be fully convinced of my
constant desire to preserve amicable relations with the American
forces, even at the risk of sacrificing a part of the confidence
placed in my government by the Philippine people.

"'A consideration of my many occupations will serve to excuse me for
not having answered with the promptness desired.

"'Your very respectful servant,

(Signed) "'_Emilio Aguinaldo_.'


"On the evening of the 15th the armed insurgent organizations withdrew
from the city and all of its suburbs, as acknowledged by their leaders,
excepting from one small outlying district. This certain agents
of Aguinaldo asked on the previous day to be permitted to retain
for a short time, on the plea that the general officer in command
[180] would not obey instructions, and they proposed to remove his
men gradually by organizations and thereafter to punish him for his
disobedience. The withdrawal was effected adroitly, as the insurgents
marched out in excellent spirits, cheering the American troops." [181]

I have given the facts thus fully for the reason that this is the one
instance I have found in which a promise was made, fortunately in the
form of an offer which was not accepted, and then withdrawn. It has
seemed to me that the reasons why General Merritt should never have
made it, and why General Otis could not possibly have renewed it,
should be fully set forth.

On September 7, 1898, General Otis had cabled to Washington that
Admiral Dewey and he considered conditions critical, and that
the number of armed Insurgents in the city was large and rapidly
increasing. He stated that on the 8th he would send a notification
to Aguinaldo that unless the latter's troops were withdrawn beyond
the line of the suburbs of the cry before September 15 he would be
obliged to resort to forcible action and that the United States would
hold Aguinaldo responsible for any unfortunate consequences which
might ensue.

Aguinaldo still hoped to obtain recognition of his government by the
United States, but did not consider such recognition probable, and
pushed preparations to attack if a favorable opportunity should offer.

Before occupying ourselves with these preparations, let us briefly
review the results of our investigations as to Insurgent coöperation
with the American forces up to this time.

Taylor has made the following excellent summary of the case:--

"Up to this time Aguinaldo had continued a desultory warfare with the
Spanish troops in Manila. That none of his attacks were very serious
is shown from the Spanish reports of casualties; but although he had
failed to secure the surrender of the city to himself, he had kept
its garrison occupied and within their works. The American force on
land was now strong enough to begin offensive operations. So far the
relations between the Americans and Aguinaldo had not been really
friendly. They were in his way, and yet he could not break with them,
for he hoped to use them for the attainment of the designs which
he had by this time frankly declared. The Americans had listened to
these declarations, and had not answered them, nor was it possible to
answer them. The American forces were there under the instructions
of the President to make war on Spain and to establish a military
government in the Philippines. Aguinaldo had declared himself a
dictator and the Philippines independent. To have recognized him in
his civil capacity, to have dealt with him in his civil capacity,
would have meant a recognition of his government by the military
commander in the field--a thing impossible and unlawful. Officers of
the United States forces are not empowered to recognize governments;
that function is reserved to the President of the United States;
and in this case he, in his orders to the Secretary of War, dated
May 19, copies of which were forwarded to General Merritt for his
guidance, informed him that the army of occupation was sent to the
Philippines 'for the twofold purpose of completing the reduction of
the Spanish power in that quarter and of giving order and security
to the islands while in the possession of the United States.' These
instructions contemplated the establishment of a military government
in the archipelago by military officials of the United States.

       *       *       *       *       *

"it is true that in spite of the date of these instructions General
Merritt in San Francisco had received no copy of them on August 28,
three days after the departure of General Anderson, and what that
officer knew of them could only have been what General Merritt
remembered of the contents of an unsigned copy of them shown him
at the White House, but they were in accordance with the practice
of the United States Government in occupying conquered territory,
that practice General Anderson well knew, and his relations with
Aguinaldo were guided by it.

      *       *       *       *       *

"It has been claimed that Aguinaldo and his followers received the
impression at this time from their conversation with American officers
that the United States would undoubtedly recognize the independence of
the Philippines, and that the cooperation of the insurgents was due to
this impression. There was no cooperation. That he attempted in vain to
secure the surrender of Manila to himself was not cooperation. That he
refrained from attacking the Americans and occasionally permitted them
to be furnished supplies, for which they paid, was not cooperation. The
fact that for a time their plans and his plans were parallel does
not mean cooperation. Aguinaldo was forced by the exigencies of
the situation, by the necessity of strengthening his hold upon the
people, by the necessities of his operations against the Spaniards,
to make Spaniards and natives alike believe that all that he did was
with the aid of the Americans by whom he would be supported in all
his acts. He needed their support, and if he could not obtain that
he needed the appearance of their support for the attainment of his
ends; and this he was forced to purchase by compliance, or apparent
compliance, with their demands. But his compliance with them, as
all American officers serving there well knew, was never willing,
was never complete, and was never given except under pressure. It
is true that writers upon the subject, speaking with the confidence
which is born of insufficient and incomplete information, assure
their readers that any government but that of the United States, any
colonial administrators but Americans, would have been able to obtain
the hearty cooperation of Aguinaldo and his followers by judicious
concessions to them at this time. The only concession which would have
obtained that hearty cooperation would have been the recognition of
the independence of the Philippines under a United States protectorate,
of Aguinaldo clothed with the plenitude of the powers of the Katipúnan
as dictator, and a promise to promptly withdraw from the islands. This
promise the Government of the United States could not make. Until the
ratification of a treaty of peace with Spain the insurgents of the
Philippine Islands were rebellious subjects of Spain, and with them,
except as fighting men, no relations could be had.

       *       *       *       *       *

"No report of operations or returns of strength were rendered by
Aguinaldo at this or any other time to any American commander, and
no American commander ever rendered such returns to him. At the time
of General Merritt's arrival, and until Manila was occupied by the
Americans, the insurgents and United States troops were united solely
by the fact that they had Manila as a common objective. Conditions
were such that the Americans, in order to obtain its surrender, had to
avoid doing anything which might cause the insurgents to attack them
and perhaps make terms with Spain; while Aguinaldo and his followers,
in order to accomplish the surrender of Manila to themselves, had
to maintain such relations with the Americans as would induce the
Spaniards to believe that their fleet was at his disposal, [182]
and also such apparent harmony and cooperation with them in the
execution of their plans that the recalcitrant among the Filipinos
would be forced to believe that the Americans would in all ways use
their forces to support Aguinaldo in the attainment of his desires.

"General Merritt saw this and the necessity for immediately taking such
steps as would lead to his occupation of Manila. With the arrival of
the third expedition he was able to pass through the insurgent lines
between Camp Dewey and Manila, for he had sufficient force to accept
no refusal from Aguinaldo.

"In his report he said that the insurgents had obtained positions
of investment opposite the Spanish lines along their full extent,
and that on the bay front their lines ran within 800 yards of San
Antonio Abad. The approaches to the beach and village of Pasay were
in their possession.

"'This anomalous state of affairs, namely, having a line of
quasi-hostile native troops between our forces and the Spanish
position, was, of course, very objectionable, but it was difficult to
deal with owing to the peculiar conditions of our relations with the
insurgents.... As General Aguinaldo did not visit me on my arrival
nor offer his services as a subordinate military leader, and as my
instructions from the President fully contemplated the occupation of
the islands by the American land forces, and stated that "the powers of
the military occupant are absolute and supreme and immediately operate
upon the political condition of the inhabitants," I did not consider it
wise to hold any direct communication with the insurgent leader until
I should be in possession of the city of Manila, especially as I would
not until then be in a position to issue a proclamation and enforce
my authority in the event that his pretensions should clash with my
designs. For these reasons the preparations for the attack on the city
were pressed and the military operations conducted without reference
to the situation of the insurgent forces. The wisdom of this course
was subsequently fully established by the fact that when the troops
at my command carried the Spanish entrenchments, extending from the
sea to the Pasay road on the extreme Spanish right, we were under no
obligation, by prearranged plans of the mutual attack, to turn to the
right and clear the front still held by the insurgents, but were able
to move forward at once and occupy the city and the suburbs.'" [183]

All that the Insurgents and the Americans ever had in common was an
enemy. They each fought that enemy in their own way. There was no
coöperation. On the part of the Insurgents there was treachery. I
will submit further evidence of this fact.



CHAPTER IV

The Premeditated Insurgent Attack

It will be remembered that the minutes of the session of the Hong
Kong junta at which Aguinaldo reported the result of his negotiations
with Pratt and received his instructions relative to the trip to
Manila, recorded the fact that there would be no better occasion for
the expeditionary forces "to arm themselves at the expense of the
Americans," and that provided with arms the Filipino people would
be able to oppose themselves to the United States and combat their
demands if they attempted to colonize the country. [184]

The possible, if not the probable, desirability of attacking the
United States troops was, it is evident, clearly foreseen from the
beginning. Active preparations for doing this now soon began.

Although Insurgent officers in full uniform freely visited Manila at
all times, Aguinaldo wrote on October 1 to his commander in Laguna
Province that he must not permit Americans there without passes. He
was to get rid of them civilly, but he was to keep them out and inform
all authorities there of his instructions.

On August 24 an American soldier was killed and others were wounded in
Cavite by Insurgent troops who fired from behind. An Insurgent officer
in Cavite at the time reported on his record of services that he--

"took part in the movement against the Americans on the afternoon of
the 24th of August, under the orders of the commander of the troops
and the adjutant of the post."

This shows that the movement was ordered, but the Insurgents promptly
realized that it was ill advised.

On August 28 General Llanera was reported to be preparing for
operations against the Americans. He was ordered to suspend his
preparations. The same day General P. Mercado Rizal, commanding in
Laguna Province, wrote Mabini asking whether they were to consider
the Americans as their allies or their enemies. He wanted to know
whether the war was to stop or continue becoming more furious. This
not because he desired to ask questions about the secrets of the
government, but because he wished to prepare the minds of the people
for the future. Mabini's answer has not been found.

We have already noted that on August 8 Fernando Acevedo wrote General
Pío del Pilar recommending that he attack and annihilate the American
troops; that on August 10 Pilar wrote Aguinaldo suggesting that
the Americans be attacked, and that on August 17 Aguinaldo stated"
"The conflict is coming sooner or later." [185]

At this time Sandico entered the service of the Americans as an
interpreter and acted as a spy, endeavouring to keep his people fully
informed relative to the plans and acts of his employers. Incidentally
he endeavoured to convince the latter that the barbarities really
committed by Insurgent officers and troops in Manila were perpetrated
by enemies of the Insurgent cause who wished to discredit it.

In a letter dated September 21, 1898, Apacible says that the conflict
will come sooner or later and asks Aguinaldo if it would not be
better for them to provoke it before the Americans concentrate their
troops. [186]

On September 10 General Garcia reported to Aguinaldo that on the
previous night the Americans had attempted to push back his line
at San Lazaro, and that morning had concentrated and penetrated the
Insurgent territory, making a reconnaissance through the fields about
Sampaloc. Aguinaldo put an endorsement on this communication saying
that he had long since ordered that the Insurgent line should not
be passed. He instructed Garcia to throw troops in front of the
Americans at Sampaloc, and order them to leave, and to warn the
bolo men. Obviously, little more was needed to provoke an Insurgent
attack. [187]

An unsigned draft of an order in Aguinaldo's handwriting dated Malolos,
September 13 (?), 1898, [188] shows how tense was the situation
while the question of withdrawal of the Insurgent forces from the
city of Manila was under consideration. It contains instructions
for General Pío del Pilar, General P. Garcia and General Noriel or
Colonel Cailles. Their purpose is hardly open to doubt.

General Pío del Pilar was directed:--

"To have a detachment posted in the interval from the branch of the
river of Paco in a northerly direction to the bridge and so on up
to the Pasig river in the direction of Pandacan, the river serving
as a line until the suburb of Panque is reached which will be under
our jurisdiction. Proceed to execute this order on its receipt,
posting detachments where they are necessary and trenches will be
made without loss of time working day and night. Do not rest for by
doing so we may lose the opportunity; beg of the troops to assist
in the formation of intrenchments. Matters have a bad aspect, we
especially expect something Wednesday and Thursday, the 15th and
16th of this month. The danger is imminent on the mentioned days,
also in the time that follows.

"Keep strict vigilance at all hours. In case you receive orders to
leave that place, do not do so on any account without my orders,
happen what may....

"Concentrate all your forces in Santa Ana before the day arrives.

"Warn your soldiers against firing at random as the Spaniards did,
if possible have them calculate the number of their antagonists and
how much ammunition there is in comparison with the number of the
attacking force, in fact, there are occasions when each shot fired
kills as many as four men.

"I hope you will see to the execution of these instructions and that
you will maintain the honour of the Philippines by your courage and
in no way permit your rights to be trampled underfoot." [189]

General Garcia was instructed as follows:--

"On Wednesday, the 14th of this month, you will post detachments in
the points indicated by lines on the enclosed plan. On receipt of this
and as soon as you learn its contents, proceed secretly to determine
the most suitable places to post detachments and immediately post
our troops and have intrenchments made employing day and night in
this work. Beg this of our soldiers." [190]

The instructions to Noriel or Cailles read as follows:--

"At eight o'clock in the morning of Wednesday, the 14th, withdraw your
command from the town of Malate as indicated on the enclosed plan,
from the bridge in Singalong and in a straight line from there to
the branch of the river in Paco will be the line of our jurisdiction
even though we may not be of one mind in the matter. On receipt
of this proceed to determine the most suitable places to post our
troops even if they are not supplied with batteries; on posting the
detachments give instructions to have intrenchments made immediately
without resting, especially on the days of the 15th and 16th. Since
affairs have a serious aspect, do not lose vigilance and be on the
alert at all times....

"Concentrate all the forces and have a call to arms in Cavite so that
all the troops may be in Pasay on Wednesday night.

"In case the Americans attempt to order you out do not leave your
posts, happen what may, but exercise prudence and be prepared leaving
them to give the provocation. Answer them that you have no instructions
given you with regard to what they ask." [191]

Obviously the maintenance of peace at this time hung by a very slender
thread. On September 14 the governor of Cavite telegraphed Aguinaldo
as follows:--

"Most urgent. I desire to know from you the result of the
ultimatum. Advise me if we must prepare our troops for action
to-morrow. I await a reply." [192]

But war was not to begin at this time. On September 23 Bray wrote
to Aguinaldo advising him to maintain a defensive attitude until
the result of the negotiations at Paris should become known, giving
way to the Americans and not showing his teeth. He could take the
offensive later if advisable and should have little difficulty in
settling accounts with the American soldiers. [193]

Bray suggested the possibility of an alliance between the American and
the Spanish soldiers if a conflict should arise before the departure
of the latter. [194]

Meanwhile preparations for the attack progressed. During September,
Sandico wrote Aguinaldo suggesting the urgent necessity of reorganizing
the "masons" and the Katipúnan, [195] and that all be furnished with
knives, to be kept hidden so that they might be "ready for any event."

In spite of efforts to keep the Insurgent soldiers in hand, feeling
among them ran high, and they wanted to fight. [196] On November 30,
1898, General Mascardo telegraphed from San Fernando to Aguinaldo
asking if he might begin firing in order to prevent the American
troops from disembarking, and Aguinaldo promptly answered in the
affirmative. [197]

On December 5 Malvar telegraphed from Lipa that according to a despatch
from Batangas, American divers were working unceasingly and that a
subordinate had ordered that they be fired on if they attempted to
land. Aguinaldo replied that he did not mind their working at sea, but
that they must not be allowed to land under any circumstances. [198]

On December 6 Sandico telegraphed Aguinaldo as follows:--

"The difficulty of last night at the San Juan picket with the American
troops has been adjusted without prejudice. Our preparations ought
to continue. Awaiting orders." [199]

San Juan was where the firing commenced on February 4, 1899.

On December 9 Cailles wired Aguinaldo as follows:--

"Report to you that there are 3000 Americans in front of our position
at Singalong. I do not know what they wish; if they enter Pineda I
open fire." [200]

By this time the Insurgents had made up their minds that the
Americans, who had been bearing their insults in silence, were
cowards. Aguinaldo's indorsement on this telegram reads:--

"Answered: Nevertheless the 3000 American soldiers are few against
my Colonel and his 300 soldiers, and I believe you have more than
that number. E.A., Dec. 12, 1898." [201]

Relative to the insults which were at this time showered upon
Americans, Taylor has made the following statement: [202]--

"Fortune had been good to Aguinaldo and his associates in the
eight months during which the United States had prevented Spain from
relieving her beleaguered garrisons in the Philippines, and she might
still be kind. The men about Aguinaldo who had risen farthest and
fastest could not endure the thought of having to accept subordinate
positions in a government not directed by themselves. The halberdiers
at the door of the palace of the president saluted them as the
halberdiers at the doorway of his lordship the governor-general in
Manila had struck the marble steps with their halberds at the coming
of the Spanish generals. They swaggered down the streets of Malolos,
clashing their swords behind them, and they knew that if they won,
the Philippines would be divided into fiefs which they, as dukes and
marquises, would hold in feudal tenure from a Malay potentate. They
were confident. They held Luzón. They held the people. They had no
intention of returning to office stools or to the life of outlaws and
hunted men. The United States force in Manila was small and America
was far. It was true that they might have to fight for the prize
which they had seized, but the military leaders about Aguinaldo were
confident of winning in case they fought. They believed the Americans
were afraid of them and would be easily beaten. American soldiers had
been seized and had been insulted by the followers of Aguinaldo and
no resort had been made to force. The Americans had been ordered to
avoid bringing on an engagement and had obeyed. It is also probable
that many of the insults to which they had been subjected were not
appreciated by them. A tall soldier from western America paid no
attention to the insults hurled at him in a language which he did not
understand. And yet the small excited Filipinos might retire feeling
that the American had tamely submitted to insult worse than a blow."

By the middle of December, Aguinaldo had placed in position in the
vicinity of Manila all of the field guns in his possession.

The Treaty of Paris was signed on December 10. It provided for the
termination of Spanish sovereignty in the Philippines. This was what
the Insurgents had been waiting for, and thereafter things moved
rapidly. It is obvious that an attack was definitely planned for
at this time, for on December 21, Commandant F. E. Rey telegraphed
Aguinaldo that the second chief of the second zone of Manila had
directed him to assist by entering that city as soon as they opened
fire against the American troops. [203]

On the following day Cailles reported that he had occupied blockhouse
No. 12, which was within the American lines, and added the following
significant statement:--

"The order of yesterday was, on hearing the first shots from Santa
Ana, for my whole force to hurl themselves on the American line of
trenches, and to follow the living to Manila. The dead can lie with
the dead. Yesterday we were content waiting for the arming of the
San Quintin." [204]

San Quintin's Day was the anniversary of the Sicilian vespers, the
massacre of the French in Sicily in 1268. Obviously the Insurgents
were planning something similar for Manila.

For some reason the attack was not made as planned, but there was
no intention of abandoning it. Within fifteen days of January 1 some
40,000 Filipinos left Manila. Why? On January 7, Aguinaldo wrote to
Seńor Benito Legarda at Manila, saying:--

"I beg you to leave Manila with your family and come here to Malolos,
but not because I wish to frighten you--I merely wish to warn you for
your satisfaction, although it is not yet the day or the week." [205]

Many details of the plan of attack have come into our
possession. Doctor Manuel Xeres Burgos wrote Aguinaldo during January
relative to a plan for an uprising of the prisoners in Bilibid Prison,
saying that it should by all means come "before the movement is begun
anywhere else," and calling attention to the necessity of stationing
men to prevent the American soldiers near by in the Zorilla theatre
from coming to the rescue. On the back of this letter there is a
sketch plan showing where bolo men were to be stationed, ready to
attack these soldiers. [206]

In his message to Congress dated January 1, 1899, Aguinaldo said:--

"I consider arguments unnecessary in support of the proposed
amendments, every one knows that our newborn Republic now has to
fight for its existence against giants in ambition and in power." [207]

An unsigned letter addressed to Apacible on January 4, 1899, contains
the following statement:--

"It appears that conflict with the Americans is imminent
and inevitable. Several of their vessels with thousands of
soldiers commanded by General Miller were sent to Iloilo on
December 20th last to take that port together with the whole
of Visayas and Mindanao." [208]

On January 4 the following significant telegram was sent out:--

"Circular Telegram from the Secretary of the Interior to Provincial
Presidents, wherever there may be Telegraphic Service, to be
communicated to the Local Chiefs of each Town.

"_Malolos_, January 4, 1899, 9.35 A.M.

"To the Provincial President of the Province of Pangasinán:

"Hasten the preparation of all the towns in order to oppose the
American invasion. See that all the inhabitants prepare their bolos
and daggers; also that in each street and barrio national militia
is organized, each six of whom should be commanded by a corporal,
each thirteen by a sergeant, each twenty-six by a second lieutenant,
each fifty-two by a first lieutenant, and each one hundred and four
by a captain, directing that the soldiers of the national militia
elect their own officers, informing all that upon our attitude depends
our salvation.

_Lingayen_, January 4, 1899."

There is a note thereon which reads:--

"Communicate this to all of the local chiefs, and to the commanding
general."

(Signed by initials which are illegible, but evidently those of the
Provincial President.) [209]

On January 5, 1899, Aguinaldo issued a proclamation which contains
the following statement:--

"The said generals accepted my concessions in favor of peace and
friendship as indications of weakness. Thus it is, that with rising
ambition, they ordered forces to Iloilo on December 26, with the
purpose of acquiring for themselves the title of conquerors of that
portion of the Philippine Islands occupied by my govermnent.

       *       *       *       *       *

"My government cannot remain indifferent in view of such a violent and
aggressive seizure of a portion of its territory by a nation which has
arrogated to itself the title, 'champion of oppressed nations.' Thus
it is that my government is ready to open hostilities if the American
troops attempt to take forcible possession of the Visayan Islands. I
announce these rights before the world, in order that the conscience
of mankind may pronounce its infallible verdict as to who are the
true oppressors of nations and the tormentors of human kind.

"Upon their heads be all the blood which may be shed." [210]

Three days later this proclamation, which was rather dangerously like
a declaration of war, was reissued with a significant change in the
last one of the passages quoted, the words "attempt to take forcible
possession of any part of the territory submitted to its jurisdiction"
being substituted for the words "attempt to take forcible possession
of the Visayan Islands."

On January 8, 1899, at 9.40 P.M., Sandico telegraphed Aguinaldo
as follows:--

"_Note_.--In consequence of the orders of General Rios to his officers,
as soon as the Filipino attack begins the Americans should be driven
into the Intramuros district and the Walled city should be set on
fire." [211]

Preparations for the attack, which was to begin inside the city
of Manila, were now rapidly pushed to conclusion. I quote Taylor's
excellent summary of them:--

"After Aguinaldo's proclamation of January 5 the number of
organizations charged with an attack within the city increased rapidly
and it is possible that those which had been formed during Spanish rule
had never been disbanded. Sandico's clubs for athletic exercises and
mutual improvement formed a nucleus for these bodies and the directing
boards of the popular committees took up the work of recruiting, while
some of the members became officers of the militia or sandatahan. On
January 6 the commander of militia in Trozo, Manila, reported that
1130 soldiers had been enrolled by the popular committee. On January
7 Bonifacio Arévalo forwarded to the head of the central committee a
list of the officers of the battalion which had just been organized
in Sampaloc for the defence of their liberties. Apparently about the
same time J. Limjap submitted to Sandico a project for arming the
prisoners in Bilibid Prison with the arms of the American soldiers
quartered in the Zorrilla Theatre across the street. He said:--

"'Jacinto Limjap having been proclaimed commander of the volunteers
of the penitentiary, I ask you to authorize the creation of a
disciplinary battalion and the provisional appointments of officers
for 600 sandatahan, or militia, ready to provide themselves by force
with the American rifles in the Zorrilla Theatre.'

"He followed by a statement of the officers desired. It was not
difficult for him to obtain volunteers there to rob, to burn, to
rape and to murder. These were the crimes for which they were serving
sentences. The political prisoners had been released....

"On January 18 Sandico approved of the officers for the first battalion
organized by the committees of Sampaloc; on January 27 he approved
those of the second battalion. By January 22 two battalions had
been organized in Quiapo. At least one regiment of eight companies
was raised in Binondo, for on January 23 its commander forwarded a
roll of the officers to Aguinaldo for his approval.... On January 25
T. Sandico, at Malolos, submitted for approval the names of a number of
officers of the territorial militia in the city of Manila. On January
30, 1899, a roll of four companies just organized in Malate was
forwarded approved by T. Sandico, and on the same day the committee
of Trozo, Manila, applied to T. Sandico for permission to recruit a
body for the defence of the country. The regiment of 'Armas Blancas'
had already been raised in Tondo and Binondo. It was in existence
there in December, 1898, and may have been originally organized to act
against Spain. On February 2 all officers of the territorial militia
in Manila reported at Caloocan, in accordance with orders of Sandico,
for the purpose of receiving their commissions and taking the oath to
the flag. A man who took part in this ceremony wrote that a multitude
of men were present in uniform, and that the oath was administered
by Gen. Pantaleón García. There is no reason for believing that this
is a complete statement of sandatahan organized in Manila by the end
of January, and yet this statement gives a force of at least 6330
men. General Otis said that this force had been reported to him as
being 10,000 men. It is probably true that only a small number of
them had rifles; but armed with long knives and daggers they could
have inflicted much damage in a sudden night attack in the narrow
and badly lighted streets of Manila. On January 9, 1899, Aguinaldo
wrote his instructions for the sandatahan of Manila. Members of this
body were to enter the houses of the American officers on the pretext
of bringing them presents. Once in they were to kill. The sentinels
at the gates of the barracks were to be approached by men dressed as
women and killed. The gates of the barracks held and as many officers
as possible treacherously murdered, the sandatahan were to rise
throughout the city, and by attacking in the rear the United States
troops on the outer line were to aid in opening a way for Aguinaldo's
force. To further increase the confusion and perhaps to punish the
natives who had not joined them, the sandatahan were to fire the city.

       *       *       *       *       *

"It is a fair deduction from Luna's orders for an uprising in Manila,
from Aguinaldo's instructions for the sandatahan, from other documents
among the papers of the insurgents and from what was done in Manila
on February 22 that Aguinaldo and his advisers about the middle of
January, 1899, drew up a plan of attack upon Manila which would, if
carried out, have inflicted a severe blow upon the Americans. It was
not carried out, but that was not the fault of Aguinaldo or of Luna.

"It is true that the instructions were general; but that particular
instructions were given by Aguinaldo himself for the murder of General
Otis is shown by his note on the back of a document presented to
him. [212]

"... And then there was nothing abhorrent to Aguinaldo and the men
about him in beginning a war by the murder of the commanding general
on the other side.

       *       *       *       *       *

"... Aguinaldo and all his followers have declared that on February
4 the Americans attacked the unsuspecting Filipinos who were using
their utmost efforts to avoid a war. And yet here in Aguinaldo's
own handwriting is the record of the fact that on January 10, 1899,
he ordered the murder of the American commander.

"The attack which Aguinaldo was preparing to deliver upon and in Manila
was not to be a mere raid such as the bandits of Cavite were in the
habit of making upon the defenceless towns. The plan was a piece of
calculated savagery in which murder and outrage were considered means
to accomplish a purpose. The servants were to kill their employers;
organized bands, dressed in the dress of civilians, living in the
city of Manila under the government of the Americans, in many cases
employed by the Americans, were to suddenly fall upon the barracks
of the American soldiers and massacre the inmates; all Americans in
the streets were to be killed, the city was to be fired and its loot
was to be the reward of loyalty to Aguinaldo. If this plan had been
carried out no white man and no white woman would have escaped. The
reinforcements from the United States would have arrived to find
only the smoking ruins of Manila. Buencamino had warned General
Augustín what the fate of Manila would be if taken by a horde of
Indians drunk with victory. That fate was now deliberately planned
for the city. Aguinaldo planned to occupy the capital not as it had
been occupied by the Americans. He planned to take it as Count Tilly
took Magdeburg.

"The authors of this plan were not savages. Mabini, Sandico, and Luna,
Asiatics educated in European schools, were men of trained and subtle
minds. With them cruelty and assassination was not a matter of savage
impulse but of deliberate calculation; with them assassination was
employed as an effective addition to political propaganda, and murder
as an ultimate resource in political manoeuvres." [213]

Some portions of Aguinaldo's instructions to the _sandatahan_ are
particularly worthy of perpetuation, as they illustrate his ideas
as to the conduct which should be observed by cultured, patriotic,
honourable and very humane men, who were not cruel:--

"_Art_. 3. The chief of those who go to attack the barracks
should send in first four men with a good present for the American
commander. Immediately after will follow four others who will make a
pretence of looking for the same officer for some reason and a larger
group shall be concealed in the corners or houses in order to aid
the other groups at the first signal. This wherever it is possible
at the moment of attack.

"_Art_. 4. They should not, prior to the attack, look at the Americans
in a threatening manner. To the contrary, the attack on the barracks
by the sandatahan should be a complete surprise and with decision
and courage. One should go alone in advance in order to kill the
sentinel. In order to deceive the sentinel one of them should dress
as a woman and must take great care that the sentinel is not able
to discharge his piece, thus calling the attention of those in the
barracks. This will enable his companions who are approaching to
assist in the general attack.

"_Art_. 5. At the moment of the attack the sandatahan should not
attempt to secure rifles from their dead enemies, but shall pursue,
slashing right and left with bolos until the Americans surrender,
and after there remains no enemy who can injure them, they may take
the rifles in one hand and the ammunition in the other.

"_Art_. 6. The officers shall take care that on the tops of the
houses along the streets where the American forces shall pass there
will be placed four to six men, who shall be prepared with stones,
timbers, red-hot iron, heavy furniture, as well as boiling water,
oil and molasses, rags soaked in coal oil ready to be lighted
and thrown down, and any other hard and heavy objects that they
can throw on the passing American troops. At the same time in the
lower parts of the houses will be concealed the sandatahan, who will
attack immediately. Great care should be taken not to throw glass in
the streets, as the greater part of our soldiers go barefooted. On
these houses there will, if possible, be arranged, in addition to
the objects to be thrown down, a number of the sandatahan, in order
to cover a retreat or to follow up a rout of the enemy's column,
so that we may be sure of the destruction of all the opposing forces.

"_Art_. 7. All Filipinos, real defenders of their country, should live
on the alert to assist simultaneously the inside attack at the very
moment that they note the first movement in whatever barrio or suburb,
having assurance that all the troops that surround Manila will proceed
without delay to force the enemy's line and unite themselves with their
brothers in the city. With such a general movement, so firm and decided
against the Americans, the combat is sure to be a short one, and I
charge and order that the persons and goods of all foreigners shall
be respected and that the American prisoners shall be treated well.

       *       *       *       *       *

"_Art_. 9. In addition to the instructions given in paragraph 6, there
shall be in the houses vessels filled with boiling water, tallow,
molasses and other liquids, which shall be thrown as bombs on the
Americans who pass in front of their houses, or they can make use of
syringes or tubes of bamboo. In these houses shall be the sandatahan
who shall hurl the liquids that shall be passed to them by the women
and children.

"_Art_. 10. In place of bolos or daggers, if they do not possess the
same, the sandatahan can provide themselves with lances and arrows
with long sharp heads, and these should be shot with great force
in order that they may penetrate well into the bodies of the enemy,
and these should be so made that in withdrawal from the body the head
will remain in the flesh.

       *       *       *       *       *

"_Art_. 12.... Neither will you forget your sacred oath and immaculate
banner; nor will you forget the promises made by me to the civilized
nations, whom I have assured that we Filipinos are not savages, nor
thieves, nor assassins, nor are we cruel, but on the contrary, that we
are men of culture and patriotism, honourable and very humane." [214]

Aguinaldo enjoined order on his subordinates. [215]

The Filipinos were now ready to assume the offensive, but desired, if
possible, to provoke the Americans into firing the first shot. They
made no secret of their desire for conflict, but increased their
hostile demonstrations and pushed their lines forward into forbidden
territory. Their attitude is well illustrated by the following extract
from a telegram sent by Colonel Cailles to Aguinaldo on January 10,
1899:--

"Most urgent. An American interpreter has come to tell me to withdraw
our forces in Maytubig fifty paces. I shall not draw back a step, and
in place of withdrawing, I shall advance a little farther. He brings
a letter from his general, in which he speaks to me as a friend. I
said that from the day I knew that Maquinley (McKinley) opposed our
independence I did not want any dealings with any American. War, war,
is what we want. The Americans after this speech went off pale." [216]

Aguinaldo approved the hostile attitude of Cailles, for there is a
reply in his handwriting which reads:--

"I approve and applaud what you have done with the Americans,
and zeal and valour always, also my beloved officers and soldiers
there. I believe that they are playing us until the arrival of their
reinforcements, but I shall send an ultimatum and remain always on
the alert.--E. A. Jan. 10, 1899." [217]

On this same day Aguinaldo commissioned Feliciano Cruz and Severino
Quitiongco to assassinate General Otis. [218]

On January 13 Noriel and Cailles telegraphed Aguinaldo as follows:--

"We desire to know results of ultimatum which you mention in your
telegram, and we also wish to know what reward our Government is
arranging for the forces that will be able first to enter Manila."

This telegram is endorsed in Aguinaldo's handwriting:

"As to the contents of your telegram, those who will be the heroes
will have as their rewards a large quantity of money, extraordinary
rewards, promotions, crosses of Biak-na-bató, Marquis of Malate,
Ermita, Count of Manila, etc., besides the congratulations of our
idolizing country on account of their being patriotic, and more,
if they capture the regiments with their generals, and, if possible,
the chief of them all who represents our future enemies in Manila,
which (lot?) falls to you, or, better said, to General Noriel and
Colonel Cailles.

"The ultimatum has not been sent, but it will be within a few days.

(Signed) "E. A.

"_Malolos_, Jan. 14, 1899." [219]

On January 14, 1899, the people at Aparri shouted: "Death to the
Americans," and held a review to celebrate the rupture of friendly
relations with the United States. [220]

At this time Aguinaldo had a dream about a victorious attack upon
Manila and telegraphed it to some of his officers. General García
replied from Caloocan on January 17 that the dream would come true
as soon as the conflict with the Americans began. [221]

In January 21, 1899, Aguinaldo was still not quite ready, and ordered
that the Filipino soldiers in the walled city keep on good terms with
the Americans, in order to deceive them, "since the hoped-for moment
has not yet arrived." [222]

The Insurgents grew surer and surer that the Americans were cowards,
[223] and openly boasted that when the attack began they would drive
them into the sea.

On January 21 General Otis wrote to Admiral Dewey that:--

"The insurgents will not now permit us to cross their lines and
have been very insulting to our officers, calling to them that very
shortly they will give us battle. My best information is that they
have fully determined to attack both outside and within the city
before our additional troops arrive, and the least spark may start
a conflagration." [224]

As the date of the proposed attack drew near, the work of strengthening
the Insurgent positions around Manila was pushed with all possible
speed. [225]

About the middle of January General Otis stationed the First Nebraska
Regiment upon the high ground at Santa Mesa for sanitary reasons. Of
conditions at this time, and of the circumstances leading to the
actual outbreak of hostilities Taylor says:--

"During the latter part of January General Otis was informed on
good insurgent authority that the insurgents meditated an attack
upon those troops, and he was advised to remove them, as in their
exposed position they would kill them all. General MacArthur, under
whose command the regiment was, placed two guns in position there,
as it was fully expected that the insurgents would direct their attack
upon that point, as in fact they did. On February 4, 1899, the tents
of the regiment covered the ridge, and its outposts extended along
the San Juan River, a small stream which formed part of the line of
delimitation between the Americans and the insurgents.

"For some days before the outbreak of hostilities the pressure of the
insurgents was constant along this position, so constant indeed that
in the light of subsequent events it indicated a premeditated purpose
on the part of some one in the insurgent army to force a collision at
that point. On February 2 General MacArthur, commanding the Second
Division of the Eighth Army Corps, wrote to the commanding general
of the Filipino troops in the third zone in front of him that--

"'An armed party from your command now occupies the village in front of
blockhouse No. 7, at a point considerably more than a hundred yards
on my side of the line, and is very active in exhibiting hostile
intentions. This party must be withdrawn to your side of the line at
once. From this date if the line is crossed by your men with arms in
their hands they must be regarded as subject to such action as I may
deem necessary.'

"Colonel San Miguel, who commanded at San Juan del Monte, replied
upon the receipt of this communication that the action of his troops
was foreign to his wishes and that he would give immediate orders
for them to retire. At about half past 8 on the night of February 4 a
small insurgent patrol entered the territory within the American lines
at blockhouse No. 7 and advanced to the little village of Santol in
front of an outpost of the Nebraska regiment. This was the same point
from which the insurgents had been compelled to retire on February
2. An American outpost challenged, and then as the insurgent patrol
continued to advance the sentinel fired, whereupon the insurgent
patrol retired to blockhouse No. 7, from which fire was immediately
opened upon the Americans. This fire spread rapidly down the American
and insurgent lines and both forces at once sprang to arms." [226]

General Otis's account of the opening of active hostilities follows:--

"On the night of February 2 they sent in a strong detachment to draw
the fire of our outposts, which took up a position immediately in
front and within a few yards of the same. The outpost was strengthened
by a few of our men, who silently bore their taunts and abuse the
entire night. This was reported to me by General MacArthur, whom I
directed to communicate with the officer in command of the insurgent
troops concerned. His prepared letter was shown me and approved,
and the reply received was all that could be desired. However, the
agreement was ignored by the insurgents and on the evening of February
4 another demonstration was made on one of our small outposts, which
occupied a retired position at least 150 yards within the line which
had been mutually agreed upon, an insurgent approaching the picket
and refusing to halt or answer when challenged. The result was that
our picket discharged his piece, when the insurgent troops near Santa
Mesa opened a spirited fire on our troops there stationed.

"The insurgents had thus succeeded in drawing the fire of a small
outpost, which they had evidently labored with all their ingenuity
to accomplish, in order to justify in some way their premeditated
attack. It is not believed that the chief insurgent leaders wished to
open hostilities at this time, as they were not completely prepared to
assume the initiative. They desired two or three days more to perfect
their arrangements, but the zeal of their army brought on the crisis
which anticipated their premeditated action. They could not have
delayed long, however, for it was their object to force an issue
before American troops, then en route, could arrive in Manila." [227]

Thus began the Insurgent attack, so long and so carefully planned
for. We learn from the Insurgent records that the shot of the American
sentry missed its mark. There was no reason why it should have provoked
a hot return fire, but it did.

The result of the ensuing combat was not at all what the Insurgents
had anticipated. The Americans did not drive very well. It was but a
short time before they themselves were routed and driven from their
positions.

Aguinaldo of course promptly advanced the claim that his troops had
been wantonly attacked. The plain fact is that the Insurgent patrol in
question deliberately drew the fire of the American sentry, and this
was just as much an act of war as was the firing of the shot. Whether
the patrol was acting under proper orders from higher authority is
not definitely known.

In this connection the following telegram sent by Captain Zialcita
from Santa Ana on February 4, 1899, at 9.55 P.M., to Major Gray,
San Juan del Monte, is highly interesting:

"I received the telegram forwarded from Malolos. General Ricarte
is not here. I believe (that if the) Americans open fire we shall
attack. Will ask instructions (of) Malolos." [228]

This looks as if Zialcita at least knew that something was to be done
to draw the American fire.

Aguinaldo's first statement relative to the opening of hostilities
is embodied in a general order dated Malolos, February 4, 1899,
and reads in part as follows:--

"Nine o'clock P.M., this date, I received from Caloocan  station a
message communicated to me that the American forces, without prior
notification or any just motive, attacked our camp at San Juan del
Monte and our forces garrisoning the blockhouses around the outskirts
of Manila, causing losses among our soldiers, who in view of this
unexpected aggression and of the decided attack of the aggressors,
were obliged to defend themselves until the firing became general
all along the line.

"No one can deplore more than I this rupture of hostilities. I
have a clear conscience that I have endeavoured to avoid it at all
costs, using all my efforts to preserve friendship with the army
of occupation, even at the cost of not a few humiliations and many
sacrificed rights.

       *       *       *       *       *

"... I order and command:--

"1. Peace and friendly relations between the Philippine forces and
the American forces of occupation are broken, and the latter will be
treated as enemies, with the limits prescribed by the laws of war.

"2. American soldiers who may be captured by the Philippine forces
will be treated as prisoners of war.

"3. This proclamation shall be communicated to the accredited consuls
of Manila, and to congress, in order that it may accord the suspension
of the constitutional guarantees and the resulting declaration of
war." [229]

Aguinaldo's protestations relative to his efforts to avoid hostilities
are absurd, in view of his own instructions concerning the attack to
be made simultaneously within and without the city of Manila.

There is other correspondence which throws light on the situation which
existed immediately prior to the outbreak of hostilities. On January
25, 1899, Agoncillo cabled from Washington to Apacible in Hongkong:
"Recommend you await beginning American aggression, justifying our
conduct nations." [230]

Apacible apparently did not take this view of the matter, for on
January 31 he wrote to Aguinaldo that the Senate in Washington would
take final vote upon the treaty of peace between the United States
and Spain on February 6, and said:--

"It is urgently necessary for America to answer us immediately before
the ratification of the treaty. A conflict after the ratification of
the treaty would be unfavorable to us in public opinion." [231]

Obviously this letter might be interpreted as a recommendation
that hostilities begin before February 6 if America did not answer
meanwhile. It was evidently well understood in Hongkong that
Aguinaldo's receipt of Apacible's letter might cause war to begin,
for on February 3, 1899, Bray, anticipating the outbreak of hostilities
of the following day, cabled Senator Hoar at Washington as follows:--

"Receive caution news hostilities Manila discredited here denied
Filipino circles supposed political move influence vote Senate to-day
any ease insignificant skirmish due intentional provocation.

"_Bray_." [232]

The extracts from the Insurgent records above quoted leave no escape
from the conclusion that the outbreak of hostilities which occurred on
February 4, 1899, had been carefully prepared for and was deliberately
precipitated by the Filipinos themselves.

Blount says:--

"It would be simply wooden-headed to affirm that they ever expected
to succeed in a war with us." [233]

It may have been wooden-headed for the Filipinos to expect this, but
expect it they certainly did. We have seen how they held their soldiers
in check until after Spain had been ousted from the Philippines by
the Treaty of Paris as they had originally planned to do. It now only
remained to carry out the balance of their original plan to get rid
of the Americans in one way or another.

General Otis states that "when Aguinaldo had completed his preparations
for attack he prepared the outlines of his declaration of war, the
full text of which was published at Malolos on the evening, and very
shortly after, hostilities began. This declaration was circulated in
Manila on the morning of February 5." [234]

The Insurgents brought down upon themselves the punishment which they
received on February 4 and 5.

Blount has stated [235] that if the resolutions of Senator Bacon
introduced on January 11, 1899, had passed, we never should have had
any war with the Filipinos. The resolutions in question concluded
thus:--

"That the United States hereby disclaim any disposition or intention
to exercise sovereignty, jurisdiction, or control over said islands
except for the pacification thereof, and assert their determination
when an independent government shall have been duly erected therein
entitled to recognition as such, to transfer to said government,
upon terms which shall be reasonable and just, all rights secured
under the cession by Spain, and to thereupon leave the government
and control of the islands to their people."

I must take issue with Blount as to the effect which these resolutions
might have had if passed. The Insurgents felt themselves to be fully
competent to bring about such pacification of the islands as they
deemed necessary. At the time the resolutions were presented in the
Senate their soldiers were straining at the leash, ready to attack
their American opponents upon the most slender excuse. Aguinaldo
himself could not have held them much longer, and it is not impossible
that they got away from him as it was. They would have interpreted the
passage of the Bacon resolutions as a further evidence of weakness,
and hastened their attack. As we have seen, "war, war, war" was what
they wanted.

Blount has endeavoured to shift the responsibility for the outbreak
of hostilities to the United States by claiming that certain words
italicized by him in what he calls the "Benevolent Assimilation
Proclamation" were necessarily, to the Insurgents, "fighting
words." The expressions referred to have to do with the establishment
of United States sovereignty and the exercise of governmental control
in the Philippine Islands.

These words were not "fighting words," the Insurgent policy being,
as I have shown by the records, to consider the acceptance of a
protectorate or of annexation in the event that it did not prove
possible to negotiate absolute independence, or probable that the
American troops could be driven from the islands.

The growing confidence of the Insurgents in their ability to whip
the cowardly Americans, rather than any fixed determination on their
part to push a struggle for independence to the bitter end, led to
their attack.



CHAPTER V

Insurgent Rule and the Wilcox-Sargent Report

The Good Book says, "By their fruits ye shall know them, whether
they be good or evil," and it seems proper to apply this test to the
Insurgents and their government.

The extraordinary claim has been advanced that the United States
destroyed a republic in the Philippines and erected an oligarchy on
its ruins. Various writers and speakers who have not gone so far as
this have yet maintained that Aguinaldo and his associates established
a real, effective government throughout the archipelago during the
interim between his return and the outbreak of hostilities with the
United States.

In summarizing conditions on September 15, 1898, Judge Blount says:
[236]--

"Absolute master of all Luzon outside Manila at this time, with
complete machinery of government in each province for all matters of
justice, taxes, and police, an army of some 30,000 men at his beck, and
his whole people a unit at his back, Aguinaldo formally inaugurated his
permanent government--permanent as opposed to the previous provisional
government--with a Constitution, Congress, and Cabinet, patterned after
our own, [237] just as the South American republics had done before
him when they were freed from Spain, at Malolos, the new capital."

He refers to our utter failure to understand "what a wonderfully
complete 'going concern' Aguinaldo's government had become
throughout the Philippine Archipelago before the Treaty of Paris was
signed." [238]

He bases his claim as to the excellent state of public order in the
Insurgent territory at this time on a report of Paymaster W. E. Wilcox
and Naval Cadet L. R. Sargent of the United States Navy, who between
October 8 and November 20, 1898, made a long, rapid trip through
northern Luzon, traversing the provinces of Bulacan, Pampanga,
Tarlac, Pangasinán, Nueva Ecija, Nueva Vizcaya, Isabela, Cagayan,
South Ilocos and Union, in the order named, thence proceeding to
Dagupan and down the railroad through Pangasinán, Tarlac, Pampanga
and Bulacan to Manila.

He says that these gentlemen found the authority of Aguinaldo's
government universally acknowledged, the country in a state of perfect
tranquillity and public order, [239] with profound peace and freedom
from brigandage and the like. [240]

Now if it be true that Aguinaldo established complete machinery of
government throughout all of Luzon outside of Manila for all matters
of justice, taxes and police, so that life and property were safe
and peace, tranquillity and justice assured, we may well dispense
with quibbling as to whether the proper name was applied to such
government. But did he?

Let us examine with some care the history of the Wilcox-Sargent trip,
and see if we can gain further light from other sources relative to
the condition of public order in the territory which they traversed.

I propose, for the most part, to let the captured Insurgent records
speak for themselves, as it is fair to assume that Insurgent officers
were at no pains to represent conditions as worse than they really
were. In view of the fragmentary character of these records, we may
also assume that the complete story would be still more interesting
and instructive than the one which I have been able to reconstruct.

Messrs. Sargent and Wilcox were almost everywhere hospitably received,
and were entertained with dinners and dances after the inimitable
fashion of the hospitable Filipino everywhere. They gained a very
favourable impression of the state of public order in the provinces
through which they passed for the reason that from the very start
their trip was strictly personally conducted. They saw exactly what
it was intended that they should see and very little more. Their
progress was several times interrupted for longer or shorter periods
without adequate explanation. We now know that on these occasions the
scenery so carefully prepared in advance for them had become a little
disarranged and needed to be straightened up. Facts which I will cite
show that most shocking and horrible events, of which they learned
nothing, were occurring in the territory through which they passed.

For a considerable time before their departure American visitors
had been carefully excluded from the Insurgent territory, but the
Filipino leaders decided to let these two men go through it to the
end that they might make as favourable a report as possible. How
carefully the way was prepared for American visitors is shown by the
following telegram:--

"_San Pedro, Macati_,

"July 30, 1898.

"To the Local Presidente of Pasig:

"You are hereby informed that the Americans are going to your town
and they will ask your opinion [of what the people desire.--Tr.] You
should answer them that we want a republican government. The same
answer must be given throughout your jurisdiction.

(Signed) "Pío Del Pilar,

"General of the Second Zone." [241]

Now General Pilar had an uncomfortable way of killing people who did
not obey his orders, and under the rules of the Insurgent government
he was abundantly justified in so doing. His suggestions as to what
visiting Americans should be told or shown would be likely to be
acceded to. Certainly this seems to have been the case in the present
instance, for on the same day General Noriel reported as follows: [242]

"President R. G., Bacoor, from Gen. Noriel, Pineda, July 30, 12.10
P.M.: I inform your excellency that some commissioners of the American
admiral are making investigations in the region around Pasay as to
the wishes and opinion of the people as to the government. To-day I
received a statement from some, giving the answer: 'Free government
under American protectorate [copy mutilated, two or three words
missing here] the President.'"

Blount quotes with approval Admiral Dewey's statement made shortly
after the return of Wilcox and Sargent that in his opinion their report
"contains the most complete and reliable information obtainable
in regard to the present state of the northern part of Luzon
Island." [243] This was true.

The admiral might have gone further and said that it contained
practically the only information then obtainable in regard to
conditions in the territory in question, but as I shall conclusively
show it was neither complete nor reliable.

Judge Blount in describing the experiences of Messrs. Wilcox and
Sargent naďvely makes the statement that:

"The tourists were provided at Rosales by order of Aguinaldo with
a military escort, 'which was continued by relays all the way to
Aparri.'" [244]

It certainly was!

Very little Spanish was then spoken in Nueva Vizcaya, Isabela or
Cagayan. What opportunity had these two men, ignorant as they were
of the native dialects, to learn the sinister facts as to what had
been and was occurring in the territory which they visited?

No one can fail to be delighted with Filipino hospitality, which
was lavishly bestowed upon them everywhere, and it is only natural
that they should have reported favourably upon what they saw. It
was about this time that an order was issued [245] that fronts of
buildings should be whitewashed, streets cleaned and fences repaired
with a view to showing every one, and especially travellers through
the territory of the Insurgents, that they were "not opposed to a
good such as a refined and civilized people should have." Doubtless
the report of the two men from Dewey's fleet was made in the best
of faith. I will now endeavour to show what were some of the actual
conditions in the territory through which they passed.

_Bulacan_

They first visited Bulacan. They do not mention hearing of the
activities of a Chinaman named Ignacio Paua, who had been given
the rank of colonel by Aguinaldo and assigned the task of extorting
contributions for the revolution from his countrymen. In a letter to
Aguinaldo written on July 6, 1898, Paua states that he has collected
more than $1,000 from the Chinese of these small towns, but asks
for an order "prohibiting the outrages that are being committed
against such merchants as are not our enemies." He further says,
"When the contributions from the Chinamen of all the pueblos shall
have been completed I wish to publish a proclamation forbidding any
injury to the Chinamen and any interference with their small business
enterprises," and adds that "the natives hereabouts themselves are
the people who are committing said abuses." [246]

Apparently Paua had no objection to the committing of outrages against
merchants that were the enemies of the cause, nor does he seem to have
objected to injury to Chinamen before contributions were completed. His
own methods were none too mild. On August 27, 1898, General Pío del
Pilar telegraphed Aguinaldo that five Insurgent soldiers, under a
leader supposed to be Paua, had entered the store of a Chinaman,
and tried to kidnap his wife, but had left on the payment of $10 and
a promise to pay $50 later, saying that they would return and hang
their fellow countryman if the latter amount was not forthcoming. [247]

Paua was later made a general in consideration of his valuable
services!


_Pampanga_

Our travellers next visited Pampanga. Here they apparently overlooked
the fact that Aguinaldo did not have "his whole people a unit at
his back." The citizens of Macabebe seem not to have approved of the
Aguinaldo regime, for the Insurgent records show that:--

"Representatives of the towns of Pampanga assembled in San Fernando
on June 26, 1898, and under the presidency of General Maximino
Hizon agreed to yield him complete 'obedience as military governor
of the province and representative of the illustrious dictator of
these Philippine Islands.' The town of Macabebe refused to send any
delegates to this gathering." [248]

It may be incidentally mentioned that Blount has passed somewhat
lightly over the fact that he himself during his army days commanded
an aggregation of sturdy citizens from this town, known as Macabebe
scouts, who diligently shot the Insurgents full of holes whenever they
got a chance. He incorrectly refers to them as a "tribe or clan." [249]
It is absurd to call them a tribe. They are merely the inhabitants
of a town which has long been at odds with the neighbouring towns of
the province.

Things had come to a bad pass in Pampanga when its head wrote that
the punishment of beating people in the plaza and tying them up so
that they would be exposed to the full rays of the sun should be
stopped. He argued that such methods would not lead the people of
other nations to believe that the reign of liberty, equality and
fraternity had begun in the Philippines. [250]

When it is remembered that persons tied up and exposed to the full rays
of the sun in the Philippine lowlands soon die, in a most uncomfortable
manner, we shall agree with the head of this province that this custom
has its objectionable features!

_Tarlac_

While the failure of Messrs. Wilcox and Sargent to learn of the
relations between the Tagalogs of Macabebe and their neighbours,
or of the fact that people were being publicly tortured in Pampanga,
is perhaps not to be wondered at under the circumstances, it is hard
to see how they could have failed to hear something of the seriously
disturbed conditions in Tarlac if they so much as got off the train
there.

On August 24 the commissioner in charge of elections in that province
asked for troops to protect him, in holding them in the town of
Urdaneta, against a party of two thousand men of the place, who were
going to prevent them.

On September 22 the secretary of the interior ordered that the
requirements of the decree of June 18, establishing municipal
governments, should be strictly complied with, as in many of the towns
"the inhabitants continue to follow the ancient methods by which the
friars exploited us at their pleasure and which showed their great
contempt for the law." [251]

The following letter to Aguinaldo, from Juan Nepomuceno, Representative
from Tarlac, speaks for itself as to conditions in that province
on December 27, 1898, shortly after the American travellers passed
through it on their return:--

"I regret exceedingly being compelled to report to you that since
Sunday the 25th instant scandalous acts have been going on in the
Province of Tarlac, which I represent. On the night of the Sunday
mentioned the entire family of the Local Chief of Bamban was murdered,
and his house and warehouse were burned. Also the Tax Commissioner
and the Secretary, Fabian Ignacio, have been murdered. Last night
Seńor Jacinto Vega was kidnapped at the town of Gerona; and seven
travellers were murdered at O'Donnel, which town was pillaged, as
well as the barrio of Matayumtayum of the town of La Paz. On that day
various suspicious parties were seen in the town of Pańique and in the
same barrio, according to reliable reports which I have just received.

"All this general demoralization of the province, according to
the information which I have obtained, is due to the fact that the
province is dissatisfied with the Provincial Chief, Seńor Alfonso
Ramos, and with Major Manuel de León; for this is substantiated by
the fact that all the events described occurred since last Sunday,
when Seńor Alfonso Ramos returned, to take charge of the Office of
Provincial President, after having been detained for several days in
this town. Wherefore, I believe that in order to restore tranquillity
in the province, consideration be given to various documents that have
been presented to the Government and to the standing Committee of
Justice; and that there be removed from office Seńor Alfonso Ramos,
as well as said Seńor Manuel de León, who has no prestige whatever
in this province. Moreover on the day when fifty-four soldiers of the
command deserted, he himself left for San Fernando, Pampanga." [252]

On November 30, 1898, General Macabulos sent Aguinaldo a telegram [253]
from which it evidently appears that there was an armed uprising in
Tarlac which he was endeavouring to quell and that he hoped for early
success. Apparently, however, his efforts to secure tranquillity were
not entirely successful, for on December 18 he telegraphed Aguinaldo
as follows:--

"In a telegram dated to-day Lieut. Paraso, commanding a detachment
at Camilin, informs me that last night his detachment was attacked
by Tulisanes (robbers). The fire lasted four hours without any
casualties among our men. This afternoon received another from
the captain commanding said detachment, informing me of the same,
and that nothing new has occurred. The people of the town await with
anxiety the result of the charges they have made, especially against
the local president and the justice of the peace, the original of
which I sent to your high authority." [254]

Obviously the police machinery was not working quite smoothly when
a detachment of Insurgent troops could be kept under fire for four
hours by a robber band, and perhaps the attacking party were not all
"robbers." Soldiers do not ordinarily carry much to steal.

We obtain some further information from the following telegram of
December 27, 1898, sent by the secretary of the interior to the
President of the Revolutionary Government:--

"Most urgent. According to reports no excitement except in Bangbang,
Tarlac, which at 12 A.M., 25th, was attacked by Tulisanes [bandits
or robbers,--D.C.W.]. The local presidente with his patrols arrested
six of them. On continuing the pursuit he met in Talacon a party too
large to attack. At 7 A.M. of the 26th the town was again attacked by
criminals, who killed the tax collector, and others who burnt some
houses, among them that of the local presidente, and his stables,
in which he lost two horses. I report this for your information." [255]

Evidently tax collectors were not popular in Tarlac.

Still further light is shed on the situation by a telegram from the
secretary of the interior to Aguinaldo, dated December 28, 1898:--

"According to my information the excitement in Tarlac increases. I
do not think that the people of the province would have committed
such barbarities by themselves. For this reason the silence of
General Macabulos is suspicious; to speak frankly, it encourages
the rebels. Some seven hundred of them, with one hundred and fifty
rifles, entered Pańique, seized the arms of the police, the town
funds, and attacked the houses of the people. I report this for your
information. All necessary measures will be taken." [256]

Note also the following from the secretary of the interior, under
date of December 27, 1898, to Aguinaldo:--

"I have just learned that not only in Bangbang, but also in Gerona,
Onell, and other places in Tarlac, men have been assaulted by
numerous Tulisanes, armed with rifles and bolos, who are killing
and capturing the inhabitants and attacking travellers, robbing
them of everything they have. The President should declare at once
that that province is in state of siege, applying martial law to the
criminals. That--(remainder missing)." [257]

The secretary of agriculture took a more cheerful view of the
situation. Under date of December 28 he telegraphed Aguinaldo as
follows:--

"The events in Bangbang, Tarlac Province, according to a witness here
worthy of credit, have arisen from an attempt to procure vengeance
on the local presidente, and robbery of Chinese shops. Hence they
are without political importance. The tax collector killed, and
a countryman servant of the local presidente wounded. They burnt
two houses of the local presidente, a stable, and a warehouse for
sugar-cane." [258]

Obviously the robbery of Chinese shops and the killing of a few
individuals was at first considered by the secretary of agriculture
to be without political importance. Evidently he changed his mind,
however, for on the same day, December 28, 1898, he telegraphed
Aguinaldo as follows:--

"I think it necessary to send Aglipay [259] to quiet Tarlac. Send for
him. If you desire, I will go to Tarlac to investigate the causes of
the disorders, in order to find a remedy for them." [260]

At this stage of events Aguinaldo was summoned to Malolos by a telegram
from Mabini under date of December 29, which reads as follows:--

"Most urgent. You must come here immediately. Trías is sick. We can
come to no decision in regard to the Tarlac matter. Cannot constitute
a government without you." [261]

The measures which were actually taken are set forth in another
telegram of the same date from the secretaries of war and interior
to Aguinaldo, which reads as follows:--

"We have sent civil and military commissioners to Tarlac; among them
the Director of War and persons of much moral influence, in order
to stifle the disturbances. The necessary instructions have been
given them and full powers for the purpose, and as far as possible
to satisfy the people. Have also sent there six companies of soldiers
with explicit instructions to their commander to guard only the towns,
and make the people return to a peaceful life, using a policy of
attraction for the purpose." [262]

Let us hope that the commander was able to attract the people with
his six companies of soldiers, and make them return to a peaceful life.

Still further light is thrown on the situation in Tarlac by the
following extract from "Episodios de la Revolucion Filipina" by Padre
Joaquin D. Duran, an Augustinian priest, Manila, 1901, page 71:--

"At that period the Filipinos, loving order, having been deceived
of the emancipation promise, changed by the Katipúnan into crimes
and attacks on the municipality of the pueblos, discontent broke
out in all parts, and, although latent in some provinces, in that of
Tarlac was materialized in an ex-sergeant of the late Spanish civil
guard. A valorous and determined man, he lifted up his flag against
that of Aguinaldo. One hundred rifles were sufficient to terrorize
the inhabitants of said province, crushing the enthusiastic members
of the revolutionary party.... Having taken possession of four towns,
Pecheche would have been everywhere successful if ambition and pride
had not directed his footsteps. In January, 1899, the Aguinaldista
commander of Tarlac province, afraid that his whole province would
espouse the cause of the sergeant, attempted by every means in his
power to interrupt his career, not hesitating to avail himself of
crime to destroy the influence of Pecheche with the many people
who had been incensed by the Katipúnan and had in turn become firm
partisans of the Guards of Honour.

"The Ilocano Tranquilino Pagarigan, local presidente at that
time of Camiling, served as an admirable instrument for this
purpose.... Pecheche was invited to a solemn festivity organized
by Tranquilino, who pretended to recognize him as his chief, and
rendering himself a vassal by taking an oath to his flag. He accepted
the invitation, and after the mass which was celebrated went to a
meal at the convent, where, after the meal was over, the members of
the K.K.K. surrounded Pecheche and 10 of his officers and killed them
with bolos or tied them and threw them out of the windows and down
the staircase. Some priests were held captive in the building where
this took place and were informed of what had taken place immediately
afterwards."

This extract shows how easy it then was for any man of determination
to acquire a following, especially if he could dispose of a few
rifles. It also gives an excellent idea of the methods employed by
the Insurgents in dealing with those who opposed their rule.

General Fred D. Grant once told me, with much amusement, of an
interesting experience during a fight on Mt. Arayat in Pampanga. His
men took a trench and captured some of its occupants. Several of these
were impressed as guides and required to show the attacking forces
the locations of other trenches. At first they served unwillingly,
but presently became enthusiastic and rushed the works of their
quondam fellow-soldiers in the van of the American attack. Finally
they begged for guns. Grant added that he could start from Bacolor
for San Fernando any morning with a supply of rifles and pick up
volunteers enough to capture the place, and that on the return trip
he could get enough more to attack Bacolor!

_Pangasinán_

And now we come to Pangasinán, the most populous province of Luzon,
and the third in the Philippines in number of inhabitants.

"In July, 1898, the officer in Dagupan wrote to the commanding general
of Tarlac Province that he would like to know whom he was required
to obey, as there were so many officials of all ranks who gave him
orders that it was impossible for him to know where he stood." [263]

In a letter dated August 17, 1898, to Aguinaldo, Benito Legarda
complained that a bad impression had been produced by the news from
Dagupan that when the Insurgents entered there, after many outrages
committed upon the inmates of a girls' school, every officer had
carried off those who suited him. [264]

What should we say if United States troops entered the town of
Wellesley and raped numerous students at the college, the officers
subsequently taking away with them the young ladies who happened
to suit them? Yet things of this sort hardly caused a ripple in the
country then under the Insurgent flag, and I learned of this particular
incident by accident, although I have known Legarda for years.

I quote the following general description of conditions in Pangasinán
from a letter addressed by Cecilio Apóstol to General Aguinaldo on
July 6, 1898:--

"You probably know that in the Province of Pangasinán, of one of the
towns in which your humble servant is a resident, the Spanish flag
through our good fortune has not flown here for the past few months,
since the few Spaniards who lived here have concentrated in Dagupan,
a place not difficult of attack, as is said.

"But this is what is going on in this Province" There exist here two
Departmental Governments, one calling itself that of Northern Luzón and
of which Don Vicente del Prado is the President, and the other which
calls itself that of Northern and Central Luzón, presided over by Don
Juliano Paraiso. Besides these two gentlemen, there are two governors
in the province(!) one Civil Political Military, living in Lingayen,
named Don Felipe J. Bartolomé, and another living in Real Guerrero,
a town of Tayug, named Don Vicente Estrella. And in addition there
are a large number of Administrators, Inspectors, Military Judges,
Generals,... they cannot be counted. It is a pandemonium of which even
Christ, who permits it, cannot make anything. Indeed, the situation
is insupportable. It reminds me of the schism in the middle ages when
there were two Popes, both legitimate, neither true. Things are as
clear as thick chocolate, as the Spaniards say. In my poor opinion,
good administration is the mother-in-law of disorder, since disorder is
chaos and chaos produces nothing but confusion, that is to say, death.

"I have had an opportunity, through the kindness of a friend, to read
the decree of that Government, dated June 18th, of the present year,
and the accompanying 'Instructions for the government of towns and
provinces.' Article 9 of the said decree says that the Superior
Government will name a commissioner for each province with the
special duty of establishing there the organization set forth in the
decree. Very well so far: which of the so-called Presidents of Northern
or of Northern and Central Luzón is the commissioner appointed by that
government to establish the new organization in that province? Are
military commanders named by you for Pangasinán? I would be very
much surprised if either of them could show his credentials. Aside
from these, the fact remains that in those instructions no mention is
made of Presidents of Departments, there is a manifest contradiction
in their jurisdictions, since while one calls himself president of
a Departmental Government, of Northern Luzón, the other governs the
Northern and Central portion of the Island, according to the seals
which they use.

"And, nevertheless, a person calling himself the General Administrator
of the Treasury and the said Governor of the Province, both of whom
live in Tayug, came to this town when the Spaniards voluntarily
abandoned it and gathered all the people of means, and drew up an act
of election, a copy of which is attached. From it you will see how this
organization violates the provisions of the decree of the 18th of June.

"Another item: They got up a contract with the people of means of this
town, and did the same thing in the other towns, in which contract
they exact from us $1250 which they call contributions of war (see
document No. 2 attached). Among the doubtful powers of these gentlemen
is the one to exact these sums included?

Have they express orders from that Government?

"Perhaps these blessed gentlemen--they are high flyers there is no
doubt about that,--have struck the clever idea of calling themselves
generals, governors, etc., in order to enjoy a certain prestige and to
give a certain color of legality to their acts--this, although they
don't know an iota of what they are doing. But what I am sure of,
and many other men also, is that there is no order, that here there
is not a single person in authority whom to obey. This superfluity
of rulers will finally lead to strained relations between them and
the towns of this province will end by paying the piper.

"But we poor ignorant creatures in so far as the republican form of
government is concerned, in order to avoid worse evils took them at
their word, obeyed them like automatons, hypnotized by the title of
'Insurgents' which they applied to themselves. But when I had an
opportunity to read the said decree, doubts were forced upon me, I
began to suspect--may God and they pardon me--that they were trying
to impose upon us nicely, that, shielded by the motto, 'have faith
in and submit to the will of the country' they came to these towns
'for business.'

"In order to dissipate this doubt, in order to do away with abuses,
if there are abuses, I made up my mind to send you this account
of the condition of things here. I flatter myself that when you
learn of the lamentable situation of this province, you will soon
deign to take steps to establish order, because thereon depends the
tranquillity of Pangasin~n and in the end a strict compliance with
your superior orders.

"There will be no limit to the thanks of the people of this province
if their petitions secure favourable consideration and an immediate
response from the high patriotism and honourable standpoint of the
Supreme Dictator of the Philippines." [265]

It will be noted that the picture thus drawn by Seńor Apóstol differs
in certain important particulars from that painted in such engaging
colours by Judge Blount.

In September, 1898, the civil governor of Pangasinán had to have an
escort of troops in passing through his province. [266]

On November 20, 1898, the head of the town of San Manuel wrote the
provincial governor that his people could no longer support the troops
quartered on them, as the adherents of the Katipúnan had burned or
stolen all of their property. [267]

The sum total of Blount's description of affairs in this, the
most populous province of Luzón, is derived from the narrative of
Messrs. Wilcox and Sargent and reads as follows:--

"In Pangasinán 'the people were all very respectful and polite and
offered the hospitality of their homes.'" [268]

Doubtless true, but as a summary of conditions perhaps a trifle
sketchy.


_Nueva Ecija_

Nueva Ecija was the next province visited by Wilcox and Sargent. They
have failed to inform us that:--

"In December, 1899, certain men charged with being members of this
society [Guards of Honour] were interrogated in Nueva Ecija as to
their purposes. One of those questioned said:--

"'That their purpose was one day, the date being unknown to the
deponent, when the Ilocanos of Batac came, to rise up in arms and
kill the Tagálos, both private individuals and public employees,
excepting those who agreed to the former, for the reason that honours
were granted only to the Tagálos, and but few to the Ilocanos.'" [269]

Blount has assured us that the Filipinos were a unit at Aguinaldo's
back and were and are an united people, and here are the Ilocanos of
Nueva Ecija spoiling his theory by remembering that they are Ilocanos
and proposing to kill whom? Not certain individual Filipinos, who
might have offended them, but the Tagálogs!

That there were other troubles in Nueva Ecija is shown by the following
statement:--

"On January 7, 1899, the commissioner of Aguinaldo's treasury sent to
collect contributions of war in Nueva Ecija Province reported that the
company stationed in San Isidro had become guerillas under command
of its officers and opposed his collections, stating that they were
acting in compliance with orders from higher authority." [270]

And now, in following the route taken by our tourist friends, we
reach Nueva Vizcaya and the Cagayan valley.



CHAPTER VI

Insurgent Rule in the Cagayan Valley

Nueva Vizcaya is drained by the Magát River, a branch of the
Cagayan. While the provinces of Isabela and Cagayan constitute the
Cagayan valley proper, Blount includes Nueva Vizcaya in the territory
covered by this designation, and for the purpose of this discussion
I will follow his example.

Especial interest attaches to the history of Insurgent rule, in the
Cagayan valley, as above defined, for the reason that Blount himself
served there as a judge of the court of first instance. He says:
[271]--

"The writer is perhaps as familiar with the history of that
Cagayan valley as almost any other American."

He was. For his action in concealing the horrible conditions which
arose there under Insurgent rule, with which he was perfectly familiar,
and in foisting on the public the account of Messrs. Wilcox and
Sargent, as portraying the conditions which actually existed there,
I propose to arraign him before the bar of public opinion. In so
doing I shall consider these conditions at some length. We have much
documentary evidence concerning them in addition to that furnished
by the Insurgent records, although the latter quite sufficiently
demonstrate many of the more essential facts.

In describing the adventures of Messrs. Wilcox and Sargent in this
region, Judge Blount says: [272]--

"There [273] they were met by Simeon Villa, military commander
of Isabela province, the man who was chief of staff to Aguinaldo
afterwards, and was captured by General Funston along with Aguinaldo
in the spring of 1901."

The facts as to Villa's career in the Cagayan valley are especially
worthy of note as they seem to have entitled him, in the opinion of
his superiors, to the promotion which was afterward accorded him. He
was an intimate friend of Aguinaldo and later accompanied him on his
long flight through northern Luzon.

On August 10, 1898, Colonel Daniel Tirona, a native of Cavite Province
and one of the intimates of Aguinaldo, was ordered to proceed to Aparri
in the Insurgent steamer _Filipinas_ and establish the revolutionary
government in northern Luzon. In doing this he was to hold elections
for office-holders under Aguinaldo's government and was authorized
to approve or disapprove the results, his action being subject to
subsequent revision by Aguinaldo. His forces were composed of four
companies armed with rifles.

Tirona reached Aparri on August 25 and promptly secured the surrender
of the Spaniards there.

He was accompanied by Simeon Villa, the man under discussion, and by
Colonel Leyba, who was also very close to Aguinaldo.

Abuse of the Spanish prisoners began at once. It is claimed that the
governor of North Ilocos, who was among those captured, was grossly
mistreated.

Taylor briefly summarizes subsequent events as follows: [274]--

"Whatever the treatment of the Spanish governor of Ilocos may
really have been, there is testimony to show that some of the other
prisoners, especially the priests, were abused and outraged under the
direction of S. Villa and Colonel Leyba, both of whom were very close
to Aguinaldo. Some of the Spanish civil officials were put in stocks
and beaten, and one of the officers who had surrendered at Aparri was
tortured to death. This was done with the purpose of extorting money
from them, for it was believed that they had hidden funds in place
of turning them over. All the Spaniards were immediately stripped
of everything they had. The priests were subjected to a systematic
series of insults and abuse under the direction of Villa in order
to destroy their influence over the people by degrading them in
their eyes. It was for this that they were beaten and exposed naked
in the sun; and other torture, such as pouring tile wax of burning
candles into their eyes, was used to make them disclose where they
had hidden church vessels and church funds. The testimony of a friar
who suffered these outrages is that the great mass of the people saw
such treatment of their parish priests with horror, and were present
at it only through fear of the organized force of the Katipúnan."

Taylor's statement is mildness itself in view of the well-established
facts.

The question of killing the Spanish prisoners, including the friars,
had previously been seriously considered, [275] but it was deemed wiser
to keep most of the friars alive, extort money from them by torture,
and offer to liberate them in return for a large cash indemnity, or for
political concessions. Day after day and week after week Villa presided
at, or himself conducted, the torture of ill-fated priests and other
Spaniards who fell into his hands. Even Filipinos whom he suspected
of knowing the where-abouts of hidden friar money did not escape.

The following information relative to the conduct of the Insurgents in
the Cagayan valley is chiefly taken from manuscript copy of _"Historia
de la Conquista de Cagayan por los Tagalos Revolucionarios,"_ in
which the narratives of certain captured friars are transcribed and
compiled by Father Julian Malumbres of the Dominican Order.

The formal surrender of Aparri occurred on August 26. Tirona, his
officers and his soldiers, promptly pillaged the _convento_. [276]
The officers left the Bishop of Vigan ten pesos, but the soldiers
subsequently took them away from him. Wardrobes and trunks were
broken open; clocks, shoes, money, everything was carried off. Even
personal papers and prayer-books were taken from some of the priests,
many of whom were left with absolutely nothing save the few remaining
clothes in which they stood.

On the same day Villa, accompanied by Victa and Rafael Perea, [277]
went to the _convento_ and told the priests who were imprisoned
there that their last hour had come. He shut all of them except the
bishop and five priests in a room near the church, then separated
the Augustinians, Juan Zallo, Gabino Olaso, Fidel Franco, Mariano
Rodriguez, and Clemente Hidalgo, from the others and took them into
the lower part of the _convento_ where he told them that he intended
to kill them if they did not give him more money. The priests told
him that they had given all they had, whereupon he had their arms
tied behind their backs, kicked them, struck them and whipped them
with rattans.

Father Zallo was thrown on his face and savagely beaten. Meanwhile
two shots were fired over the heads of the others and a soldier called
out "One has fallen," badly frightening the priests who had remained
shut in the room. Villa then returned with soldiers to this room,
ordered his men to load, and directed that one priest step forward
to be shot. Father Mariano Ortiz complied with this request, asking
that he be the first victim. Villa, however, contented himself with
threatening him with a revolver and kicking and striking him until
he fell to the floor. He was then beaten with the butts of guns.

Father José Vazquez, an old man of sixty years, who had thrown some
money into a privy to keep it from falling into the hands of the
Insurgents, was stripped and compelled to recover it with his bare
hands, after which he was kicked, and beaten with rattans.

Father Aquilino García was unmercifully kicked and beaten to make
him give up money, and this sort of  thing continued until Villa,
tired out with the physical exertion involved in assaulting these
defenceless men, departed, leaving his uncompleted task to others,
who continued it for some time.

The net result to the Insurgents of the sacking of the _convento_
and of the tortures thus inflicted was approximately $20,000 gold in
addition to the silver, bank notes, letters of credit, jewels, etc.,
which they obtained.

On September 5 Villa had Fathers Juan Recio and Buenaventura Macia
given fifty blows each, although Father Juan was ill.

Villa then went to Lalloc, where other priests were imprisoned. On
September 6 he demanded money of them, causing them to be kicked and
beaten. Father Angel was beaten in an especially cruel manner for
the apparent purpose of killing him, after which he was thrust into
a privy. Father Isidro Fernandez was also fearfully abused. Stripped
of his habit, and stretched face down on the floor, he was horribly
beaten, and was then kicked, and struck with the butt of a revolver
on the forehead.

A little later the priests were offered their liberty for a million
dollars, which they were of course unable to furnish. Meanwhile the
torture continued from time to time.

On August 30 Tuguegarao was taken by the Insurgents without
resistance. Colonel Leyba promptly proceeded to the _convento_
and demanded the money of the friars as spoil of war. He found only
eight hundred pesos in the safe. Father Corujedo was threatened with
death if he did not give more. Other priests were threatened but not
tortured at this time. The prisoners in the jail were liberated,
but many of them had promptly to be put back again because of the
disorder which resulted, and that same evening Leyba was obliged to
publish a notice threatening robbers with death.

At midnight on September 3 Father Corujedo was taken from the
_convento_ by Captain Diego and was again asked for money. Replying
that he had no more to give, he was beaten with the hilt of a sabre
and stripped of his habit, preparatory to being executed. A mock
sentence of death was pronounced on him and he was placed facing to
the west to be shot in the back. Diego ordered his soldiers to load,
adding, "When I count three all fire," but the fatal count was not
completed. Three priests from Alcala were given similar treatment.

The troubles of the priests imprisoned at Tuguegarao were sufficiently
great, but they were augmented a thousand fold when Villa arrived on
September 11. He came to the building where they were imprisoned,
bearing a revolver, a sabre and a great quantity of rattans. He
ordered the priests into the corner of the room in which they were
confined, and beat those who did not move quickly enough to suit
him. He threatened them with a very rigorous examination, at the same
time assuring them that at Aparri he had hung up the bishop until
blood flowed from his mouth and his ears, and that he would do the
same with them if they did not tell him where they had their money
hidden. There followed the usual rain of kicks and blows, a number
of the priests being obliged to take off their habits in order that
they might be punished more effectively.

Fathers Calixto Prieto and Daniel Gonzales, professors in educational
institutions, he ordered beaten because they were friars.

Fathers Corujedo and Caddedila were beaten, kicked and insulted. Both
were gray-haired old men and the latter was at the time very weak,
and suffering from a severe attack of asthma. Father Pedro Vincente
was also brutally beaten.

The following is the description given by an eye-witness of conditions
at Tuguegarao:--

"Even the Indios of Cagayan complained and were the victims of looting
and robbery on the part of the soldiery. So lacking in discipline and
so demoralized was that army that according to the confession of a
prominent Filipino it was of imperative necessity to disarm them. [278]
On the other hand we saw with real astonishment that instead of warlike
soldiers accustomed to battle they were nearly all raw recruits and
apprentices. From an army lacking in discipline, and lawless, only
outrages, looting and all sorts of savagery and injustice were to
be expected. Witnesses to their demoralization are, aside from the
natives themselves who were the first to acknowledge it, the Chinese
merchants whose losses were incalculable; not a single store or
commercial establishment remained that was not looted repeatedly. As
to the Spaniards it goes without saying because it is publicly known,
that between soldiers and officers they despoiled them to their
heart's content, without any right except that of brute force, of
everything that struck their fancy, and it was of no avail to complain
to the officers and ask for justice, as they turned a deaf ear to such
complaints. At Tuguegarao they looted in a manner never seen before,
like Vandals, and it was not without reason that a prominent Filipino
said, in speaking to a priest: 'Vandalism has taken possession of the
place.' These acts of robbery were generally accompanied by the most
savage insults; it was anarchy, as we heard an eye-witness affirm,
who also stated that no law was recognized except that of danger,
and the vanquished were granted nothing but the inevitable duty of
bowing with resignation to the iniquitous demands of that soulless
rabble, skilled in crime."

Villa now set forth for Isabela. Meanwhile the jailer of the priests
proceeded to steal their clothes, including shirts, shoes and even
handkerchiefs. Isabela was taken without resistance on September
12. Dimas Guzman [279] swore to the priests on his life that he would
work without rest to the end that all friars and all Spaniards might
be respected, but he perjured himself.

On September 12 Villa and others entered the town of Cabagan Viejo,
where Villa promptly assaulted Father Segundo Rodriguez, threatening
him with a revolver, beating him unmercifully, insulting him in every
possible way and robbing him of his last cent. After the bloody scene
was over he sacked the _convento_, even taking away the priests'
clothes.

Villa also cruelly beat a Filipino, Quintin Agansi, who was taking
care of money for masses which the priests wished to save from the
Insurgents.

After Father Segundo had suffered torture and abuse for two hours he
was obliged to start at once on a journey to Auitan. The suffering
priest, after being compelled to march through the street shouting
"Vivas!" for the Republic and Aguinaldo, spent the night without a
mouthful of food or a drink of water.

Father Deogracias García, a priest of Cabagan Nuevo, was subjected to
torture because he had sent to Hongkong during May a letter of credit
for $5000 which belonged to the Church. Villa and Leyba entered his
_convento_ and after beating him ordered his hands and feet to be
tied together, then passed a pole between them and had him lifted
from the ground, after which two great jars of water were poured down
his nose and throat without interruption. [280] In order to make the
water flow through his nose better, they thrust a piece of wood into
the nasal passages until it came out in his throat. From time to time
the torture was suspended while they asked him whether he would tell
the truth as to where he had concealed his money. This unfortunate
priest was so sure he was going to die that while the torture was
in progress he received absolution from a fellow priest. After the
torture with water there followed a long and cruel beating, and the
unhappy victim was finally thrust into a filthy privy.

Meanwhile Father Calzada was assaulted by a group of soldiers and
badly beaten, after which he was let down into the filth of a privy,
first by the feet and afterwards by the head.

On the 14th a lieutenant with soldiers entered the _convento_ of
Tumauini and as usual demanded money of the occupants, who gave him
$80, all they had at the time. This quantity not being satisfactory,
a rope was sent for and the hands of the two priests were tied while
they were whipped, kicked and beaten. They were, however, released
when Father Bonet promised to get additional money. They had a short
respite until the arrival of Villa, who still demanded more money of
Father Blanco, and failing to get it for the reason that the father
had no more, leaped upon him and gave him a dreadful beating, his
companions joining in with whips, rattans and the butts of guns. They
at last left their victim stretched on the ground almost dead. This
priest showed the marks of his ill treatment six months afterward. Not
satisfied with this, Villa gave him the so-called "water cure."

Meanwhile his followers had also beaten Father Bonet. Villa started to
do likewise but was too tired, having exhausted his energies on Father
Blanco. While the tortures were going on, the _convento_ was completely
sacked. Father Blanco's library was thrown out of the window.

Villa entered Ilagan on the 15th of September at 8 o'clock at
night. Hastening to the _convento_, with a company of well-armed
soldiers, he had his men surround the three priests who awaited him
there, then summoned the local priest to a separate room and demanded
money. The priest gave him all he had. Not satisfied, Villa leaped
upon him, kicking him, beating him and pounding him with the butt of
a gun. Many of his associates joined in the disgraceful attack. The
unfortunate victim was then stripped of his habit, obliged to lie down
and received more than a hundred lashes. When he was nearly senseless
he was subjected to torture by water, being repeatedly lifted up when
filled with water, and allowed to fall on the floor. While some were
pouring water down his nose and throat, others spilled hot wax on his
face and head. The torment repeatedly rendered the priest senseless,
but he was allowed to recover from time to time so that he might
suffer when it was renewed.

The torturing of this unhappy man lasted for three hours, and
the horrible scene was immediately succeeded by another quite as
bad. Villa called Father Domingo Campo and, after taking from him
the little money that he had, ordered him stripped. He was then given
numberless kicks and blows from the butts of rifles and 150 lashes,
after which he was unable to rise. There followed the torture with
water, on the pretext that he had money hidden away.

Meanwhile the houses of Spaniards and the shops of the Chinese were
completely sacked, and the men who objected were knocked down or cut
down with bolos. Numerous girls and women were raped.

On September 15 Leyba received notice of the surrender of Nueva
Vizcaya. I quote the following from the narrative above referred to:--

"Delfin's soldiers [281] were the most depraved ever seen: their
thieving instincts had no bounds; so they had hardly entered Nueva
Vizcaya when they started to give themselves up furiously to robbery,
looking upon all things as loot; in the very shadow of these soldiers
the province was invaded by a mob of adventurous and ragged persons
from Nueva Ecija; between the two they picked Nueva Vizcaya clean. When
they had grown tired of completely shearing the unfortunate Vizcayan
people, leaving them poverty-stricken, they flew in small bands to the
pueblos of Isabela, going as far as Angadanan, giving themselves up
to unbridled pillage of the most unjust and disorderly kind. Some of
these highwaymen demanded money and arms from the priest of Angadanan,
but Father Marciano informed them 'that it could not be, as Leyba
already knew what he had and would be angry.'

"To this very day the people of Nueva Vizcaya have been unable to
recover from the stupendous losses suffered by them as regards their
wealth and industries. How many curses did they pour forth and still
continue to level against the Katipúnan that brought them naught
but tribulations!"

Confirmation of these statements is found in the following brief but
significant passage from the Insurgent records:--

"At the end of December, 1898, when the military commander of Nueva
Vizcaya called upon the Governor of that province to order the police
of the towns to report to him as volunteers to be incorporated in the
army which was being prepared for the defence of the country, the
Governor protested against it and informed the government that his
attempt to obtain volunteers was in fact only a means of disarming
the towns and leaving them without protection against the soldiers
who did what they wanted and took what they wished and committed
every outrage without being punished for it by their officers." [282]

The effect of the surrender of Nueva Vizcaya on Leyba and Villa is
thus described by Father Malumbres:--

"Mad with joy and swollen with pride Leyba and company were like
men who travelled flower-strewn paths, crowned with laurels, and were
acclaimed as victors in all the towns on their road, their intoxication
of joy taking a sudden rise when they came to believe themselves kings
of the valley. It was then that their delirium reached its brimful
measure and their treatment of those whom they had vanquished began
to be daily more cruel and inhuman. In Cagayan their fear of the
forces in Nueva Vizcaya kept them from showing such unqualifiable
excesses of cruelty and nameless barbarities, but the triumph of
the Katipúnan arms in Nueva Vizcaya completely broke down the wall
of restraint which somewhat repressed those sanguinary executioners
thirsting to fatten untrammelled on the innocent blood of unarmed
and defenceless men. From that melancholy time there began an era of
unheard of outrages and barbarous scenes, unbelievable were they not
proved by evidence of every description. The savage acts committed
in Isabela by the inhuman Leyba and Villa cannot possibly be painted
true to life and in all their tragic details. The blackest hues, the
most heartrending accents, the most vigorous language and the most
fulminating anathemas would be a pale image of the truth, and our
pen cannot express with true ardour the terrifying scenes and cruel
torments brought about by such fierce chieftains on such indefensive
religious. It seems impossible that a fleshly heart could hold so
much wickedhess, for these petty chiefs were veritable monsters of
cruelty who surpassed a Nero; men who were entire strangers to noble
and humane sentiments and who in appearance having the figure of a
man were in reality tigers roaring in desperation, or mad dogs who
gnashed their teeth in fury."

On September 18 Leyba continued his march, while Villa remained
behind at Ilagan to torture the prisoners who might be brought in
from Isabela.

On arrival at Gamut, Leyba at once entered the _convento_ and as usual
immediately demanded money from the priests. Father Venancio gave
him all he had. He was nevertheless given a frightful whipping, six
persons holding him while others rained blows upon him. A determined
effort was made to force the priest to recant, and when this failed
Leyba leaped upon him, kicking and beating him. He then ordered him
thrown down face uppermost, and asked for a knife with the apparent
intention of mutilating him. He did not use the knife, however, but
instead, assisted by his followers, gave the unhappy priest another
terrific beating, even standing upon him and leaping up and down. The
priest was left unable to speak, and did not recover for months.

Later Leyba had torture by water applied to Father Gregorio Cabrero
and lay brother Venancio Aguinaco, while Father Sabanda was savagely
beaten.

On the 19th of September Father Miguel Garcia of Reina Mercedes was
horribly beaten in his _convento_ by a captain sent there to get what
money he had.

In Cauayan, on September 20, Fathers Perez and Aguirrezabal were
beaten and compelled to give up money by five emissaries of Leyba,
and the latter priest was cut in the face with a sabre. The _convento_
was sacked. On the 25th Leyba arrived and after kicking and beating
Father Garcia compelled him to give up $1700. He then informed the
priests that if it were not for Aguinaldo's orders he would kill all
the Spaniards.

On the afternoon of the 24th three priests and a Spaniard named Soto
arrived at Ilagan. The following is the statement of an eye-witness
as to what happened:--

"They led the priests to the headquarters of the commanding officer
where the tyrant Villa, always eager to inflict suffering on humanity,
awaited them. The scene witnessed by the priests obeisant to the
cruel judge was horrifying in the extreme. Four lions whose thirst
for vengeance was extreme in all, threw themselves, blind with fury,
without a word and with the look of a basilisk, upon poor Seńor Soto
giving him such innumerable and furious blows on head and face that
weary as he was from his past journey, the ill-treatment received
at Angadanan and weighted down by years, he was soon thrown down
by his executioners under the lintel of the door getting a terrible
blow on the head as he fell; even this did not satisfy nor tame down
those fierce-hearted men, who on the contrary continued with their
infamous work more furious than before, and their cruelty did not
flag on seeing their victim at their feet. They could have done no
worse had they been Silípan savages dancing in triumph around the
palpitating head cut from the body of some enemy.

"The priests who witnessed this blood-curdling scene trembled like
the weak reed before the gale, waiting their turn to be tortured,
but God willed that cruel Villa should be content with the butchery
perpetrated upon unhappy Sr. Soto. Villa dismissed the priests after
despoiling them of their bags and clothes telling them, to torment
them: 'Go to the _convento_ until the missing ones turn up so that
I may shoot you all together.'"

Leyba entered Echague on September 22, promptly going to the _convento_
as usual and demanding money of the priest, Father Mata. When the
latter had given him all he had, he received three terrific beatings
at the hands of some twelve men armed with whips and sticks, after
which Leyba himself struck him with his fist and his sabre. He was
finally knocked down by a blow with the sabre and left disabled. It
took six months for him to recover.

Shortly after Leyba's arrival in Nueva Vizcaya on the afternoon of
the 25th, five priests were summoned to Solano and there abused in
the usual fashion in an effort to extort money from them. Only one
escaped ill treatment and one was nearly killed.

Leyba now went to Bayombong to carry out the established programme
with the priests. There he found Governor Perez of Isabela, who had
taken with him certain government moneys and employed them to pay
salaries of soldiers and other employees. He insisted on the return
of the total amount and threatened to shoot Perez if it was not
forthcoming. The Spaniards of the vicinity subscribed $700 which they
themselves badly needed and saved him from being shot. The priests
of the place were then summoned to Leyba's quarters and were beaten
and tortured. One of them was thrown on the floor and beaten nearly
to death, Leyba standing meanwhile with his foot on the unfortunate
man's neck. Another was given six hundred lashes and countless blows
and kicks. Leyba stood on this man's neck also. When the victim's back
ceased to have any feeling, his legs were beaten. Leyba terminated
this period of diversion by kicking Father Diez in the solar plexus
and then mocking him as he lay gasping on the floor. That afternoon
one of the priests, so badly injured that he could not rise unaided,
was put on a horse and compelled to ride in the hot sun to Solano.

Villa and Leyba had their able imitators, as is shown by the following
description of the torturing of Father Ceferino by Major Delfin at
Solano, Nueva Vizcaya, on September 27:--

"They wished to give brave evidence of their hate for the friar before
Leyba left, and show him that they were as brave as he when it came
to oppressing and torturing the friar. This tragedy began by Jimenez
again asking Father Ceferino for the money. The priest answered as
he had done before. Then Jimenez started to talk in Tagalog to the
commanding officer and surely it was nothing good that he told him,
for suddenly Delfin left the bench and darting fire from his eyes,
fell in blind fury upon the defenceless priest; what harsh words he
uttered in Tagalog while he vented his fury on his victim, striking him
with his clenched fist, slapping him and kicking him, I do not know,
but the religious man fell at the feet of his furious executioner who,
being now the prey of the most stupendous rage, could scarcely get
his tongue to stutter and continued to kick the priest, without seeing
where he kicked him. Getting deeper and deeper in the abyss and perhaps
not knowing what he was about, this petty chief made straight for a
sabre lying on a table to continue his bloody work. In the meantime
the priest had risen to his feet and awaited with resignation new
torments which certainly were even worse than the first, for he gave
him so many and such hard blows with the sabre that the blade was
broken close to the hilt. This accident so infuriated Delfin that
he again threw himself upon the priest, kicking him furiously and
striking him repeatedly until he again threw him to the ground, and
not yet satisfied, his vengefulness led him to throw himself upon his
victim with the fury of a tiger after his prey, beating him on the head
with the hilt of the saber until the blood ran in streams and formed
pools upon the pavement. The priest, more dead than alive, shuddered
from head to foot, and appeared to be struggling in a tremendous
fight between life and death; he had hardly enough strength to get
his tongue to ask for God's mercy. At this most critical juncture,
and when it seemed as if death were inevitable, the martyr received
absolution from Father Diez, who witnessed the blood-curdling picture
with his heart pierced with grief at the sight of the sufferings of
his innocent brother, feeling as must the condemned man preparing for
death who sees the hours fly by with vertiginous rapidity. The blood
flowing from the wounds on the priest's head appeared to infuriate
and blind the heart of Delfin who, rising from his victim's body,
sped away to the armory in the court house, seized a rifle, and came
back furious to brain him with the butt and finish killing the priest;
but God willed to free his servant from death at the hands of those
cannibals, so that generous Lieutenant Navarro interfered, took the
rifle away from him and caught Delfin by the arm, threatening him with
some words spoken in Tagalog. Then Navarro, to appease Delfin's anger,
turned the priest over with his face to the ground and gave him a
few strokes with the bamboo, and feigning anger and indignation,
ordered him away.

"Those who witnessed the horrible tragedy, the brutality of the tyrant
and the prostration of the friar were persuaded that the latter would
never survive his martyrdom. The religious man himself holds it as
a veritable portent that he outlived such a terrible trial; but even
this did not satisfy them as subsequently the Secretary again called
Father Ceferino to subject him to a further scrutiny, as ridiculous
as it was malicious, though it did not go beyond words or insults."

Seńor Perez, the governor of Isabela, and Father Diez were compelled
to go to Ilagan. After they had arrived there on October 2d, Villa
proceeded to torture them. At the outset ten soldiers, undoubtedly
instructed beforehand, beat the governor down to the earth, with the
butts of their guns. Villa himself struck him three times in the chest
with the butt of a gun and Father Diez gave him absolution, thinking
he was dying. Father Diez was then knocked down repeatedly with the
butts of guns, being made to stand up promptly each time in order
that he might be knocked down again. Not satisfied with this, Villa
compelled the suffering priest to kneel before him and kicked him in
the nose, repeating the operation until he left him stretched on the
floor half-senseless with his nose broken. He next had both victims
put in stocks with their weight supported by their feet alone. While
in this position soldiers beat them and jumped onto them and one set
the governor's beard on fire with matches. Father Diez was kept in
the stocks four days. He was then sent to Tuguegarao in order that
personal enemies there might take vengeance on him, Villa bidding
him good-by with the following words: "Go now to Tuguegarao and see
if they will finish killing you there." Seńor Perez was kept in the
stocks eight days and it is a wonder that he did not die.

Upon the 25th of September Villa went to the _convento_ in Ilagan
prepared to torture the priests, but he succeeded in compelling a
number of them to sign indorsements in his favour on various letters
of credit payable by the Tabacalera Company and departed again in
fairly good humour, having done nothing worse than strike one of them.

Later, however, on the pretext that Fathers Aguado and Labanda had
money hidden away, he determined to torture them with water. The first
to be tortured was Father Labanda. Villa had him taken to the prison
where the priest found his two faithful Filipino servants who had
been beaten cruelly and were then hanging from a beam, this having
been done in order to make them tell where his money was.

He was tied after the usual fashion and water poured down his nose
and throat. During the brief respites necessary in order to prevent
his dying outright he was cruelly beaten. They finally dragged him
out of the prison by the feet, his head leaving a bloody trail on
the stones. After he had been taken back to his companions, one of
the men who had tortured him came to beg his pardon, saying that he
had been compelled to do it by Villa.

Father Aguado was next tortured in one of the rooms of the
_convento_. Villa finished the day's work by announcing to the band
of priests that he would have them all shot the next day on the plaza,
and ordering them to get ready.

On the 29th the barbarities practised by this inhuman fiend reached
their climax in the torturing to death of Lieutenant Piera. The
following description gives some faint idea of one of the most
diabolical crimes ever committed in the Philippines:--

"Villa's cruelty and sanguinary jeering grew without let or hindrance
from day to day; it seemed that this hyena continually cudgelled his
brains to invent new kinds of torture and to jeer at the friars. On
the night of the 29th of September the diabolical idea occurred to
him of giving the _coup de grace_ to the prestige of the friars by
making them pass through the streets of Ilagan conducting and playing
a band of music. He carried out his nonsensical purpose by calling
upon Father Diograeias to play the big drum, and when this priest
had started playing Villa learned that Father Primo was a musician
and could therefore play the drum and lead the band with all skill,
so he called upon Father Primo to come forward, and with one thing
and another this ridiculous function was carried on until the late
hours of the night.

       *       *       *       *       *

"While these two priests were serenading Villa and his gang, the most
dreadful shrieks were heard from the jail, accompanied by pitiful
cries that would melt the coldest heart. The priests hearing these
echoes of sorrow and pain, and who did not know for what purpose
Fathers Deogracias and Primo had been separated from them, seemed
to recognize the voices of these two priests among the groans,
believing them to be cruelly tortured; for this reason they began
to say the rosary in order that the Most Holy Virgin might imbue
them with patience and fortitude in their martyrdom. Great was their
surprise when these priests returned saying that they had contented
themselves with merely making fun of them by obliging them to play
the big drum and lead the band.

"Although this somewhat tempered their sorrow, a thorn remained in
their hearts, fearing that the moving lamentations and the mortal
groans came from the lips of some hapless Spaniard. This fatidical
presentiment turned out unfortunately to be a fact. The victim
sacrificed that melancholy night, still remembered with a shudder by
the priests, was Lieutenant Salvador Piera. This brave soldier, who had
made up his mind to die in the breach rather than surrender the town
of Aparri, was persuaded to capitulate only by the prayers and tears
of certain Spanish ladies who had been instructed to do so by a man
who should have been the first one to shoulder a rifle. After having
been harassed in Aparri he was taken to Tuguegarao at the request of
Esteban Quinta or Isidoro Maquigat, two artful filibusters thirsting
to revenge themselves on the Lieutenant, who during the time of the
Spanish government had justly laid his heavy hand upon them. In the
latter part of September they conducted him on foot and without any
consideration whatever to the capital of Isabela. In this town he
was at once placed in solitary confinement in one of the rooms of
the _convento_ and allowed no intercourse with any one. The sin for
which they recriminated Piera was his having charged Dimas [283] with
being a filibuster, and their revengefulness reached an incredible
limit. The heartrending moans of this martyr to his duty still resound
in that _convento_ converted into the scene of an orgy of blood. The
unfortunate man was heard to shout: 'For God's sake, for God's sake,
have pity,' and trustworthy persons tell that under the strain of
torture he would challenge them to fight in a fair field by saying:
'I will fight alone against twenty of you;' but the cowardly torturers,
a reproach to the Filipino race, looked upon it as an amusement to
glut their spite on a defenceless man whose hands were tied. They
had him strung up all night with but insignificant refreshment and
rest, sometimes being suspended by his arms which finally became
disjointed and useless, and at others he was hung up by his feet,
the blood rushing to his head and placing him in imminent danger
of sudden death. It was the intention of these brutes to torture
him as much as possible before killing him, just as a member of the
feline race plays with, tosses in the air and pirouettes around the
victim which falls into his claws. If to the torture of the rope
are added the blows with cudgels and the butts of rifles which were
frequently rained upon the victim it will be no surprise that early
on the morning of the 30th he was in the throes of death in the midst
of which the sufferer had just enough strength to say that he was
hungry and thirsty; then those cannibals (the heart is filled with
fury in setting forth such cruelty) cut a piece of flesh from the
calf of the dying man's leg and conveyed it to his mouth and instead
of water they gave him to drink some of his own urine. What savagery!

"The blood from the wound finished the killing of the fainting
Piera. The blood shed served to infuriate more the barbarous
executioners who in order to give the finishing stroke to the martyr,
as an unrivalled expression of their savage ferocity, thrust a red-hot
iron into his mouth and eyes. That same night these treacherous and
ferocious tyrants whose sin made them hate the light, buried the
body in the darkness of the night in a patch of cogon grass adjoining
the _convento_."

Piera's torture was by no means confined to this last night of his
life, as the following account of it shows:--

"In the first days of this accursed month, while the padres were
bemoaning their fate in jail, a dark drama was being enacted in the
_convento_, whose hair-raising scenes would have inspired terror to
Montepiu himself.

"Lieutenant Salvador Piera of the Guardia Civil, commanding officer at
Aparri, who, realizing that all resistance was useless, gave way to the
persistent solicitations of Spaniards and natives and surrendered that
town on honourable terms, which the Katipúnan forces did not respect
after the capitulation had been signed, was sent for by Villa, the
military authority of Isabela. Something terrible was going to happen
as Piera himself felt confident, for it is said that before leaving
Aparri he went to confession where he settled the important business
of his conscience in a Christian manner with a representative of God.

"And so it turned out, for as soon as he arrived in Ilagan he
was taken to the _convento_ and placed incomunicado in one of its
apartments. Soon after, three or four vile fiends,--for they do not
deserve the name of men,--bound him with strong cords and hanged him to
a beam. Then they began to charge him with having prosecuted a certain
Mason, and inflicted upon him the most frightful tortures. The pen
refuses to set forth so many atrocities. For three days they had him
in that position while his vile assassins made a martyr of him. Our
hair stands on end to think of such crimes. The heart-rending cries
of this unfortunate man while prey to such barbarous torments could
be heard in every part of the town and carried panic to the homes of
all the inhabitants.

"The late hours of the night were always chosen by those treacherous
fiends to give Piera the _trato de cuerda_ (this form of torture
consists in tying the hands of the victim behind his back and hanging
him by them by a rope passed through a pulley attached to a beam;
his body is lifted as high as it will go and then allowed to fall
by its own weight without reaching the ground); but this torture was
administered to him in a form so terrible that all the pictures of this
kind of torment found in the dreadful narratives of the calumniators
of the Holy Office, pale into insignificance in comparison with the
atrocious details of the tortures here recited; at each violent jerk
the unhappy victim feeling that his limbs were being torn asunder
would cry out 'My God! My God!' This terrifying cry reverberating
through the jail would freeze the very blood of the poor priests
therein incarcerated.

"On the third day, when those infuriated hyenas appeared to have
spent their diabolical rage; after they had thrust a red-hot iron
into his eyes and left him with sightless sockets; the poor martyr,
the prey of delirium, cried out that he was hungry, and one of those
_sicarii_ cut a piece of flesh from Piera's thigh and was infamous
enough to carry it to his mouth. On the night of the seventh of the
month very late a number of wretches buried in the _convento_ garden
a body still dripping warm blood from the lips of which there escaped
the feeble plaints of anguish of a dying man."

The feeling of the Spaniards relative to this matter is well shown
by the following statement of Father Malumbres:--

"This horrible crime cannot be pardoned by God or man, and is still
uninvestigated, crying to Heaven for vengeance with greater reason
than the blood of the innocent Abel. So long as the criminals remain
unpunished it will be a black and indelible stigma and an ugly stain
on the race harbouring in its midst the perpetrators of this unheard-of
sin. Words of reprobation are not enough, justice demands exemplary and
complete reparation, and if the powers of earth do not take justice
into their own hands, God will send fire from Heaven and will cause
to disappear from the face of the earth the criminals and even their
descendants. A murder so cruel and premeditated can be punished in
no other way.

"If the courts here should wish to punish the guilty persons it would
not be a difficult task; the public points its finger at those who
dyed their hands in the blood of the heroic soldier, and we shall
set them forth here echoing the voice of the people. The soulless
instigator was Dimas Guzman. The executioners were a certain José
Guzman (alias Pepin, a nephew of Dimas) and Cayetano Pérez."

The matter was duly taken up in the courts, and Judge Blount himself
tried the cases.

The judge takes a very mild and liberal view of the occurrence. He
says of it: [284]--

"Villa was accompanied by his aide, Lieutenant Ventura Guzman. The
latter is an old acquaintance of the author of the present volume,
who tried him afterwards, in 1901, for playing a minor part in the
murder of an officer of the Spanish army committed under Villa's orders
just prior to, or about the time of, the Wilcox-Sargent visit. He
was found guilty, and sentenced, but later liberated under President
Roosevelt's amnesty of 1902. He was guilty, but the deceased, so
the people in the Cagayan Valley used to say, in being tortured to
death, got only the same sort of medicine he had often administered
thereabouts. At any rate, that was the broad theory of the amnesty
in wiping out all these old cases."

He adds:--

"I sentenced both Dimas and Ventura to life imprisonment for being
accessory to the murder of the Spanish officer above named, Lieutenant
Piera. Villa officiated as arch-fiend on the grewsome occasion. I am
quite sure I would have hung Villa without any compunction at that
time, if I could have gotten hold of him. I tried to get hold of
him, but Governor Taft's attorney-general, Mr. Wilfley, wrote me
that Villa was somewhere over on the mainland of Asia on British
territory, and extradition would involve application to the London
Foreign Office. The intimation was that we had trouble enough of
our own without borrowing any from feuds that had existed under our
predecessors in sovereignty. I have understood that Villa is now
practising medicine in Manila. More than one officer of the American
army that I know afterwards did things to the Filipinos almost
as cruel as Villa did to that unhappy Spanish officer, Lieutenant
Piera. On the whole, I think President Roosevelt acted wisely and
humanely in wiping the slate. We had new problems to deal with, and
were not bound to handicap ourselves with the old ones left over from
the Spanish régime." [285]

But it happens that this was the Filipino régime. Piera's torture
occurred at the very time when, according to Blount, Aguinaldo had
"a wonderfully complete 'going concern' throughout the Philippine
archipelago."

Furthermore, it occurred in the Cagayan valley where Blount says
"perfect tranquillity and public order" were then being maintained
by "the authority of the Aguinaldo government" in a country which
Messrs. Wilcox and Sargent, who arrived on the scene of this barbarous
murder by torture four weeks later, found so "quiet and orderly."

Not only was Blount perfectly familiar with every detail of this
damnable crime, but he must of necessity have known of the torturing
of friars to extort money, which preceded and followed it.

The following statement seems to sum up his view of the whole matter:--

"It is true there were cruelties practised by the Filipinos on the
Spaniards. But they were ebullitions of revenge for three centuries of
tyranny. They do not prove unfitness for self-government. I, for one,
prefer to follow the example set by the Roosevelt amnesty of 1902,
and draw the veil over all those matters." [286]

The judge drew the veil not only over this, but, as we have seen,
over numerous other pertinent matters which occurred in this land of
"profound peace and tranquillity" just at the time Wilcox and Sargent
were making their trip. My apologies to him for withdrawing the
veil and for maintaining that such occurrences as those in question
demonstrate complete and utter unfitness for self-government on the
part of those who brought them about!

If it be true that Blount knew more than one officer of the American
army who did things to the Filipinos almost as cruel as Villa did to
Lieutenant Piera, why did he not report them and have the criminals
brought to justice?

Such an attack on the army, in the course of which there is not given
a name or a fact which could serve as a basis for an investigation,
is cowardly and despicable.

I do not for a moment believe that Blount speaks the truth, but if
he does, then his failure to attempt to bring to justice the human
fiends concerned brands him!

It has been the fashion in certain quarters to make vile allegations
of this sort against officers of the United States army, couching them
in discreetly general terms. This is a contemptible procedure, for
it frees those who make reckless charges from danger of the criminal
proceedings which would otherwise doubtless be brought against them.

On arrival at Ilagan, the town where Piera was tortured to death,
Blount says [287] that Messrs. Wilcox and Sargent were

"given a grand _baile_ [ball] and _fiesta_ [feast], a kind of
dinner-dance, we would call it.... From Ilagan they proceeded to
Aparri, cordially received everywhere, and finding the country in
fact, as Aguinaldo always claimed in his proclamations of that period,
seeking recognition of his government by the Powers, in a state of
profound peace and tranquillity--free from brigandage and the like."

Within sight of the banquet hall, within hearing of the music, lay
a lighter on which were huddled eighty-four priests of the Catholic
Church, many of them gray-haired old men, innocent of any evil conduct,
who for weeks had suffered, mentally and physically, the tortures of
the damned.

Of the events of this evening and the following day Father Malumbres
says:--

"From the river the _convento_ could be seen profusely illuminated and
the strains of music could be heard, an evident sign that they were
engaged in revelry. This gave us a bad start, as we came to fear that
Villa had returned from the expedition undertaken to come up with two
Americans who had crossed the Caraballo range and were thinking of
coming down as far as Aparri. It was late to announce to Villa our
arrival at Ilagan, so that we were obliged to pass the night on the
lighter. In the morning our boat was anchored in front of the pueblo of
Ilagan, where we were credibly informed that Villa had returned. This
accursed news made us begin to fear some disagreeable incident.

"Our Matias went ashore and delivered the official communication
regarding our transfer to Villa, while we waited impatiently for
his decision. Sergeant Matias at length returned with orders for
our disembarkation; we put on the best clothes we had and the rowers
placed a broad plank between the lighter and the arsenal and we left
our floating prison two abreast. Matias called the roll and the order
to march, we were eighty-four friars in a long column climbing the
steep ascent to Ilagan.

"When we had arrived in front of the building used for headquarters, we
faced about in front thereof, and the first thing we saw in one of the
windows were the sinister features of Falaris, who with a thundering
brow and black look was delighting himself in the contemplation of
so many priests surrounded by bayonets and filled with misery. Any
other person but Villa would have melted on seeing such a spectacle,
which could but incite compassion. The two American tourists were
also looking on at this horrible scene as if stupefied, but they soon
withdrew in order, perhaps, not to look upon such a painful picture. It
was, indeed, heartrending to contemplate therein old gray-haired men
who had passed their lives in apostolic work side by side with young
men who had just arrived in this ungrateful land, and many sick who
rather than men seemed to be marble statues, who had no recourse but
to stand in line, without one word of consolation; therein figured
some who wore religious garb, others in secular dress limited to
a pair of rumpled trousers and a cast-off coat, the lack of this
luxurious garment being replaced in some instances by a native shirt.

"For two long hours we were detained in the middle of the street
under the rays of a burning sun and to the scandal of the immense
crowd which had been gathered together to witness the denouement of
the tragedy. The priests had hardly come into the presence of Villa
when Fathers Isidro and Florentino were called out for the purpose of
having heaped upon them a flood of insults and affronts. Father Isidro
was ordered by Villa to interview Sr. Sabas Orros, who, Villa supposed,
would wreak his revenge blindly upon him, but he was greatly mistaken,
as said gentleman treated the priest with great respect; the tyrant
remained talking to Father Florentino in the reception room of the
headquarters building, and when it appeared that such talk would come
to blows, the elder of the Americans left one of the rooms toward
the reception room, and the scene suddenly changing, Villa arose
and addressing the priest said: 'I am pleased to introduce to you
an American Brigadier-General, Mr. N.' The latter returned a cordial
greeting in Spanish to the priest who made a courteous acknowledgment;
after this exchange of courtesies, Villa resumed his defamatory work,
pouring out a string of absurdities and infamous insults upon the
friars, going so far as to say in so many words: 'from the bishop down
you are all thieves and depraved' he added another word which it would
be shameful to write down, and so he went on from one abyss to another
without regard to reputations or the respect due to venerated persons.

"The American let his disgust be seen while Villa was talking,
and the latter understood these protests and ordered the priest to
withdraw, the comedy coming to an end by the American shaking hands
with the priest and offering him assistance. Villa would not shake
hands with him, as was natural, but the priest was able to see that
he was confused when he saw the distinction and courtesy with which
an American general had treated a helpless friar. What a narrow idea
did the Americans form of the government of Aguinaldo, represented
by men as savage and inhuman as Villa!

"The natives averred that the Americans referred to were spies who had
come to explore those provinces and were making maps of the strategic
points and principal roads, so that a very careful watch was kept upon
them and Villa took measures to have them go down the river without
landing at any place between Echague and Ilagan. At Ilagan they were
given an entertainment and dance, Villa being a skilled hand in this
sort of thing, and a few days later he accompanied them to Aparri
[288] without allowing them to set foot on land. The government of
Aguinaldo no longer had everything its own way, and secret orders
had been given to have every step of the explorers followed. The
commanding and other leading officers of the Valley, supporting the
orders of the government, circulated an order throughout the towns
which read as follows:--

"'_To All Local Officers_:

"'You will not permit any maps to be made or notes to be taken of
strategic points by Americans or foreigners; nor will you allow them
to become acquainted with the points of defence; you will endeavour
to report immediately to this Government any suspicious persons;
you will make your investigations secretly, accompanying suspected
persons and feigning that their investigations are approved, and
finally when it shall seem to you that such suspected persons have
finished their work, you will advise without loss of time, in order
that their notes may be seized.'

"Despite this order the Americans were able to inform themselves very
thoroughly of the forces in the Valley and its state of defence,
and Filipinos were not lacking who for a few pesos would put them
abreast of all information regarding the plans and projects of
Aguinaldo's government."

Relative to this Wilcox-Sargent trip Taylor says:--

"In October and November, 1898, Paymaster W. B. Wilcox, U.S.N.,
and Naval Cadet L. R. Sargent, U.S.N., travelled through Northern
Luzon from which they returned with a favourable impression of the
government which had been set up by Aguinaldo's agents.

"It was realized by the subtle men whom they met that it was highly
expedient that they should make a favourable report and accordingly
they were well received, and although constant obstacles were thrown
in the way of their seeing what it was not considered well for them
to see yet the real reasons for the delays in their journey were
carefully kept from them. At least some of their letters to the
fleet were taken, translated, and sent to Aguinaldo, who kept them,
and constant reports upon them and their movements were made."

Blount refers to the fact that Mr. Sargent tells a characteristic
story of Villa, [289] whose vengeful feeling toward the Spaniards
showed on all occasions.

It would doubtless have interested the travellers to know that the
"robbery" consisted in taking the funds out of the province to save
them from falling into Villa's hands, and in paying them to soldiers in
Nueva Vizcaya to whom money was due. It would further have interested
them to know that this unfortunate Spaniard had been twice tortured
within an inch of his life by Villa.

But let us continue our interrupted narrative:--

"The presence of the Americans in Ilagan soon freed us from certain
forms of savagery and barbarous intentions on the part of Villa. There
can be no doubt that the tyrant was constantly cudgelling his brains
to invent new methods of showing his contempt for the friars; at the
unlucky time we write of he conceived the infamous plan of ordering
a circular enclosure of cane to be made, put a pig into it--we trust
the reader will pardon the details--with a bell hung to his neck,
blindfolded the priests and compelled them to enter the enclosure with
sticks in their hands, and in this ridiculous attitude, obliged them to
strike about when the sound of the bell appraised them of the animal's
proximity; it is obvious that the principal purpose of the fiendish
Villa was to have the priests lay about them in such a way as to
deal each other the blows instead of the pig. The tyrant also had the
idea of making us and the other priests in Ilagan parade the streets
of that town dancing and playing the band. The wish to consummate
his plan was not lacking but he was deterred by the presence of the
Americans and the arguments of Sr. Sabas Orros to whom we also owed
the signal favour that Villa did not take us to our prisons at Tumauini
and Gamut on foot and with our clothing in a bundle at our backs."

On October 2 a banquet was given in Villa's honour at Ilagan and the
pleasant idea occurred to him to have four of the friars dance at
it for his amusement. The people of the town put their handkerchiefs
before their faces to shut out the sight, and some wept. Father Campo,
one of the priests who was obliged to dance, had great ulcers on his
legs from the wounds caused by the cords with which he had been bound
when he was tortured with water, and was at first unable to raise his
feet from the floor; but Villa threatened him with a rattan until he
finally did so. This caused the sores on his legs to burst open so
that the bones showed.

On the 3d of October a number of the friars were compelled to get up a
band and go out and meet Leyba with music on his arrival. The people
of the towns closed their windows in disgust at the sight. A great
crowd had gathered to receive Leyba, and the priests were compelled
to dance in the middle of the street, but this again only caused
disgust. A couple of priests were then beaten in the usual fashion
in a private house. This caused murmuring even among those of the
soldiers who were natives of the Cagayan valley. At the same time
two other priests were horribly whipped in the prison.

This has been a long story, but the half has not been told. Those
who escaped torture had their feelings harrowed by the sight of
the sufferings of their fellows. They were constantly and grossly
insulted; were often confined in the most unsanitary quarters; given
poor and insufficient food and bad water, or none at all; robbed of
their clothing; compelled to march long distances under a tropical
sun when sick, wounded and suffering; obliged to do servants' work
publicly; forced to make a ridiculous spectacle of themselves in the
public streets; ordered to recant, and heaven knows what not!

The torments practised on them had two principal objects: to
compel them to give up money, and to discredit them with the common
people. They failed to accomplish this latter result. There is abundant
evidence that the natives of the Cagayan valley clothed and fed
them when they could, and wept over the painful humiliations and the
dreadful sufferings which they were powerless to prevent or relieve.

The tormentors were men from distant provinces, with no possible
personal grievances against the priests whom they martyrized. Their
action was the result, not of an "ebullition of revenge for three
centuries of tyranny" as stated by Blount, but of insensate greed
of gold and damnable viciousness. I believe the American people will
hold that such cruelities brand those who practise them as unfit to
govern their fellows, or themselves.

Lest I be accused of basing my conclusions on _ex parte_ statements
I will now return to the Insurgent record of events in the Cagayan
valley.

At the outset the Spanish officers of the Tabacalera Company [290]
fared comparatively well. In a letter dated September 27, 1898, and
addressed to the secretary of war of the revolutionary government,
Leyba says of the taking of Tuguegarao that the only terms of the
surrender were to respect life. He therefore felt at liberty to seize
all the money that the friars had hidden, "which was accomplished
by applying the stick." He adds that they did nothing to the agents
of the great Tabacalera Company, then the most powerful commercial
organization in the Islands, for the significant reason that they
had found that its stock was largely held by Frenchmen and feared
trouble. [291]

On December 4, 1898, Leyba, concerning whose ideas as to public order
we are already informed, wrote a most illuminating letter setting
forth the conditions which had existed there. He does not claim that
there had been Octavian peace!

It should be borne in mind that this letter covers the very time
during which Messrs. Wilcox and Sargent passed through the Cagayan
valley. It paints a vivid picture of conditions, and as the painter
was the ranking Insurgent officer in the valley during this entire
period, he cannot be accused of hostile prejudice. I therefore give
the letter in full'--

"_Aparri_, December 4, 1898.

"_Don Baldomero Aguinaldo_,

"_The Secretary of War_:

"_Dear Sir and of My Greatest Esteem_: I take the liberty of addressing
this to you in order to state that owing to the lack of discipline
in the soldiers whom we have brought, since they are all volunteers
and whom I am not able to reduce to rigorous subordination, for the
revolution would find itself without soldiers with whom to win triumph,
they committed many abuses and misdeed which, for the lack of evidence,
I was not able to punish, although I knew of these abuses but had
no proof, and as a lover of my country and of the prestige of the
Revolutionary Army, I took care not to disclose the secret to any one,
in this way avoiding the formation of an atmosphere against the cause
of our Independence to the grave injury of us all. But it happened
that, in spite of the good advice which I have given them and the
punishments which I have given to some of the 3d Company of Cauit,
they did not improve their conduct but have gone to the extreme of
committing a scandalous robbery of 20,800 pesos which sum the German,
Otto Weber, was taking to the capital, which deed has caused me to
work without ceasing, without sleeping entire nights, for I understood
what a serious matter it was to take money from a foreigner. After
making many inquiries, it was discovered that a very large part of
the money which reached the sum of $10,000, a little more or less,
was buried under the quarters which the said company occupied, this
with the sanction of all the officers, it appears to me, because it
is impossible that such a sum could be brought into a house where so
many soldiers are living without the knowledge of the officers.

"Indignant at such shameful behaviour, I reprimanded the officers
and preferred charges against the ones I deemed to blame in the matter.

"Afterwards I found out that they had attempted to murder me for trying
to find out the originators of the crime. On account of this, and in
order to prevent a civil war which would have broken out against the
said soldiers if precautions had not been taken, I decided to disarm
them, to the great displeasure of the Colonel who was not aware of
my motives.

"This bad conduct has been copied by the soldiers of the 4th Company
stationed in Ilagan, and I believe the Colonel, guided by my warning,
will take the same measures in regard to them.

"As the officers are the first ones to commit abuses and misdeeds, it
is easily seen that the soldiers under their orders, guided by them,
will commit worse ones than the chiefs, and as these seem to lack
the moral strength to control and reprimand them, I propose to you,
if it meets your approval, that all these soldiers and some of the
officers be returned to their homes by the steamer _Luzon_, if there
should be sufficient coal, or in another if you order it, since they
tell me themselves that because they are far away from their homes
they do not wish to continue in the service in this province. This is
easily arranged as there are now men stationed in this province for
instructing the native volunteers, many of whom have been students,
and will therefore make good officers and non-commissioned officers,
and in this way a battalion could be formed, well disciplined from the
beginning and disgraceful things would be avoided not only towards
the natives of this province but also towards foreigners, which is
the most important. Having stated my case, I place myself always at
your disposal, requesting you will attend to this affair.

"With reference to the 4th Company stationed in the Province of
Isabela, whose captain is Don Antonio Monzon of Panamitan, there are
many complaints of thefts and assaults committed by the soldiers,
and in answer to my questions, Don Simeón Adriano y Villa, Major
and Sanitary Inspector and doctor of this battalion, whom I have
stationed there for lack of a competent person, tells me that he
has always punished and offered advice to officers and soldiers in
order to prevent the recurrence of thefts and assaults, but he has
never been able to suppress them completely, because the soldiers are
abandoned by their officers, and because of lack of example on the
part of the latter; they do not understand that it is a great blot
when they commit these abuses, since when they discover the goods
or house of a Spaniard they believe they have a right to appropriate
everything which they encounter.

"I have learned lately, that some foreigners, residents in that
province, among them some employees of the Tobacco Factory, 'El
Oriente' and of the firm of Baer Senior & Co., who have Spanish
employees in various pueblos of that province, have some very serious
complaints to make of assaults committed against them prejudicial
to their interests; however, I hope that now with the arrival of
General Tirona he will regulate matters, although I believe that this
gentleman is not sufficiently energetic in proceeding against the
officers and soldiers, as I have seen when I reprimanded and punished
them for faults committed he has pardoned them, and it appears that
he censures energetic acts which we must use in order to subject them
to rigorous discipline. The same thing happened when Major Sr. Victa
wished to discipline them; it appears that the Colonel reprimanded
him when he punished some soldiers for gambling in their quarters,
since, as you know, that gentleman believes that he who is right is
the one who comes to him first, and who is best able to flatter him.

"The Colonel has agreed with me that his first act on arrival at the
province of Isabela should be to disarm and take all the money he
finds among the soldiers of the 4th Company (Panamitan) in order to
serve as indemnity for the property of the foreigners in case they
should make any claim.

"I request that you send some leader or officer in order to superintend
our actions, and to lift the doubt which hangs over the person who
has worked faithfully and honourably in the sacred cause of our
Independence.

"I am filling the position of First Chief in the Port of Aparri
temporarily on account of the absence of the Colonel who has conferred
on me all his duties and power. After the military operations which
were carried on as far as the last town in Isabela, being tired and
somewhat sick, I was put in charge of these military headquarters,
which I found to be very much mixed up, the town, moreover, being
desperate on account of the assaults committed by my predecessor,
Rafael Perca, who was appointed by the Colonel, and who was formerly
2d Captain of the steamer _Filipinas._ After arriving and taking
charge, having received numerous complaints against him, I had him
arrested and I found that he had been guilty of robbery, unlawful
use of insignia, illegal marriage, rape and attempted rape. I hold
him in custody only awaiting the arrival of the Colonel in order to
convene a court-martial for his trial, in which the Colonel will act
as President and I as Judge Advocate.

"With nothing more to communicate, I hope you will attend to my just
claim and send a special delegate to investigate our acts and see
the truth, for perhaps if a statement comes direct from me you will
not believe it.

"I am your affectionate and faithful subordinate, who kisses your hand,

(Signed) "_J. N. Leyba_." [292]

Blount states that conditions existed "just like this, all over Luzon
and the Visayan Islands." [293] Unfortunately this was only too true!

The troops complained of by Leyba were made up of Aguinaldo's fellow
townsmen. They never obeyed any one else, and left a trail of murder
and rapine behind them. Aguinaldo never punished them, and from the
time when one of them tried to murder their commander until a guard
composed of them murdered General Antonio Luna in June, 1899, they
are mentioned only with fear and execration.

Blount describes with enthusiasm the establishment of civil government
in Cagayan.

Perhaps Americans will be interested in knowing who was its head and
how it worked. The "elections" were held on December 9, 1898, and Dimas
Guzman was chosen head of the province. He was the man subsequently
sentenced to life-imprisonment by Blount, for complicity in the
murder of Lieutenant Piera. In describing his method of conducting his
government he says that the people doubted the legality of attempts
to collect taxes; that the abuses of heads of towns caused rioting in
the towns, in which only Ilocanos took part; and that he not only did
not report these things but contrived to conceal them from foreigners
in the province. [294]

His failure to report these troubles and disorders to his government
is of interest, as Blount alleges [295] that differences between the
local authorities were in a number of cases referred to the Malolos
government for settlement.

Blount says [296] that General Otis's reports were full of inexcusable
blunders about the Tagálogs taking possession of provinces and making
the people do things, and cites the relations between Villa and Dimas
Guzman to illustrate the error of these allegations.

He has elsewhere [297] referred to Villa as the "arch-fiend" in the
matter of torturing the unhappy Spaniards as well as the Filipinos who
incurred his ill-will. We have seen that Guzman proved an apt pupil
and did credit to his instructor in connection with the torturing
of Lieutenant Piera, but it nevertheless appears from Guzman's own
statements that his relations with the Insurgent officers and their
subordinates involved some rather grave difficulties. Of Major Canoy,
for instance, he says:--

"I must add that the said Major Canoy is such a remarkable character
that he saw fit to give my cook a beating for not taking off his hat
when he met him. He insulted the delegate of rents of Cabagan Viejo
for the same reason. He struck the head man of the town of Bagabag in
the face. He put some of the members of the town council of Echague
in the stocks, and he had others whipped." [298]

It was really incautious for Governor Guzman to complain of these
conditions because Major Canoy and his party won, and the Governor
had to resign.

But the day of reckoning came. It was in consequence of the atrocities
committed by the Tagálog soldiers in the Cagayan valley that Captain
Batchelder was able a little later to march practically unopposed
through the provinces of Nueva Vizcaya, Isabela and Cagayan with one
battalion of American negro troops, for whom he had neither food nor
extra ammunition, and that Tirona surrendered the Insurgent forces
in the valley without attempting resistance!




CHAPTER VII

Insurgent Rule in the Visayas and Elsewhere

Referring to the conditions alleged to have been found by Sargent
and Wilcox in the Cagayan valley, Blount says:--

"Had another Sargent and another Wilcox made a similar trip through
the provinces of southern Luzón about this same time, under similar
friendly auspices, before we turned friendship to hate and fear and
misery, in the name of Benevolent Assimilation, they would, we now
know, have found similar conditions." [299]

So far as concerns the provinces of Mindoro and Palawan, and the great
island of Mindanao, he dodges the issue, alleging the unimportance
of Mindoro and Palawan, and claiming that "Mohammedan Mindanao"
presents a problem by itself. Under such generalities he hides the
truth as to what happened in these regions.

I agree with him that there was essential identity between actual
conditions in the Cagayan valley and those which prevailed under
Insurgent rule elsewhere in Luzón and in the Visayas. I will go
further and say that conditions in the Cagayan valley did not differ
essentially from those which prevailed throughout all portions of
the archipelago which fell under Insurgent control, except that in
several provinces captured friars and other Spaniards were quickly
murdered whereas in the Cagayan valley no friar was quite killed
outright by torture. Those who ultimately died of their injuries
lived for some time.

Let us now consider some of the actual occurrences in these other
provinces, continuing to follow the route of our tourists until it
brings us back to Manila.

_South Ilocos_

The first province visited by Messrs. Wilcox and Sargent after
leaving Aparri was South Ilocos. The conditions which had prevailed
at Vigan, the capital of the province, shortly before their arrival,
are described in a letter signed "Mariano" and addressed under date
of September 25, 1898, to Seńor Don Mena Crisólogo, from which I
quote extracts:--

"_Dear Mena_: I read with a happy heart your letter of the 3rd instant,
and in answer I have to say:--

"On the 22nd of August a mass meeting was held for the election of
the local presidente of this town, and I was elected to the office;
and on the 1st instant the Colonel appointed me Provisional Provincial
President of this province, so that you can imagine the position I
am in and the responsibilities which weigh on me.

"Your house is occupied by the Colonel, in view of the fact that it
is not rented.

"I have here eleven friar prisoners and the damned priests who escaped
from here have not as yet been returned, but it is known that they
are prisoners in Cagayan, and as soon as they arrive here I will
treat them as they deserve.

"It is with great regret that I have to relate the events and
misfortunes which we have been suffering here since the arrival of the
troops, as all the detachments are supported by the towns, and here
in the capital where the commissary is established, our resources
are exhausted, owing to the unreasonable demands of the commissary,
because he never asks what is only just and necessary, but if he
needs provisions for 200 men, he always asks enough for 1000. And
notwithstanding this, the most lamentable and sad occurrences are
taking place almost daily in the different barrios, and often in the
town itself; the soldiers are guilty of many abuses and disorderly
acts, such as rapes and murders, which usually remain unpunished by
reason of the real authors thereof not being found, and when they are
found and reported to their commanders, the latter do nothing. One
night the house and estate of Sario Tinon in Anannam was sacked by
six armed men, who threatened him and took his money, his wife's
jewels and the best horses he had. Thank God that his family was at
the time in the capital, and it appears that now the authors of this
act are being discovered.

"I am at the present time working with Father Aglipay to have
the forces stationed here replaced by our volunteers which I am
recruiting, in order to prevent in so far as possible the frequent
acts of barbarity which the former are committing in the province.

"When the friars from Lepanto arrived here, they were made to publish
the following proclamation:--

"'_Proclamation_.--We, the friars, declare that all the acts committed
by us against the honest Filipinos when we discharged our respective
offices, were false and in contravention of the rights of the Holy
Church, because we only wished to deceive and prejudice the honest
inhabitants of the Philippines; for which reason we now suffer what we
are suffering, as you see, according to the old adage that "he who owes
must pay." And now we inform all you honest Filipinos that we repent
for the acts above referred to, which are in contravention of the laws
and good customs, and ask your pardon.--_Vigan_, September 13, 1898.'

"All of which I communicate to you in order that you may form an
idea of what is taking place here, and take such steps as may be
proper for the common good, and especially for the good of this town,
hoping that with the aid of your valuable protection the abuses and
disorders suffered by the residents will be stopped." [300]

The province of Abra, now a subprovince of South Ilocos, was evidently
no exception to the general rule, for there is on file a letter to
Aguinaldo with twenty-six signatures, protesting bitterly against the
oppression of the poor, in the effort to compel them to contribute war
taxes, complaining against the misuse of supplies gathered ostensibly
for the soldiers, and stating that the petitioners will be obliged to
take refuge with the Igorots and Negritos, if not granted relief. [301]

Apparently the trouble grew, for on December 27, 1898, the "Director
of Diplomacy" telegraphed to Aguinaldo concerning it, saying:--

"Most urgent. The discontent in the provinces of Pangasinán, Tarlac and
Yloco (Ilocos) is increasing. The town of Bangbang rose in revolt the
25th and 26th of this month, and killed all of the civil officials. It
is impossible to describe the abuses committed by the military and
civil authorities of the said provinces. I urge you to send a force
of 100 men and a diplomatic officer to reëstablish order. The matter
is urgent." [302]

I find nothing important in the Insurgent records concerning conditions
in La Union at this time. Pangasinán, Tarlac, Pampanga and Bulacan,
which were now revisited by our tourists, have already been discussed.

_The Province of Manila_

Conditions in Manila Province, as distinguished from Manila City,
left much to be desired.

Admiral Dewey made a statement applicable to the territory adjacent
to the city and bay of Manila in a cablegram to Washington dated
October 14, 1898, which reads as follows:--

"It is important that the disposition of the Philippine Islands should
be decided as soon as possible. . . . General anarchy prevails without
the limits of the city and bay of Manila. Natives appear unable to
govern." [303]

Of it Blount says:--

"In this cablegram the Admiral most unfortunately repeated as true some
wild rumours then currently accepted by the Europeans and Americans
at Manila which, of course, were impossible of verification. I say
'unfortunately' with some earnestness, because it does not appear on
the face of his message that they were mere rumours. And, that they
were wholly erroneous, in point of fact, has already been cleared
up in previous chapters, wherein the real state of peace, order, and
tranquillity which prevailed throughout Luzón at that time has been,
it is believed, put beyond all doubt." [304]

Blount seems here to have overlooked the fact that the admiral
himself was in Manila Bay and in Manila City at the time he sent
this cablegram. The statements in question were not rumours, they
were deliberate expressions of opinion on the part of a man who had
first-hand information and knew what he was saying.

They were not the Admiral's only allegations on this subject. When
testifying before the Senate committee he said:--

"_Admiral Dewey_. I knew that there was no government in the whole of
the Philippines. Our fleet had destroyed the only government there
was, and there was no other government; there was a reign of terror
throughout the Philippines, looting, robbing, murdering; a reign of
terror throughout the islands."

_La Laguna_

Having brought our tourist friends safely back to Manila, we must
now leave them there and strike out by ourselves if we are to see
other provinces.

La Laguna lies just east of Manila. Of it we learn that:

"Laguna Province was so overrun by bands of robbers that the head of
the pueblo of San Pablo ordered the people to concentrate in the town
to avoid their attacks." [305]

_Bataan_

The province of Bataan lies just across the bay from Manila.

"On January 10, 1899, the secretary of the interior directed the
governor of Bataan Province to ascertain the whereabouts of a number
of men who had just deserted with their rifles from the commands
there. He was to appeal to their patriotism and tell them that if
they would but return to their companies their complaints would be
attended to and they would be pardoned." [306]

_Zambales_

Zambales joins Bataan on the west and north. On November 13, 1898,
Wenceslao Vinvegra wrote to Aguinaldo describing the state of affairs
in this province. From his letter we learn that two brothers named
Teodoro and Doroteo Pansacula, claiming to be governor and brigadier
general respectively, who are charged with abandonment of their
posts in the field, disobedience and attempts against the union
of the Insurgents, had been committing all manner of abuses. They
had organized a band of cut-throats, armed with rifles and bolos,
and were terrorizing the towns, committing robberies and murders and
ordering that money be furnished for themselves and food for their men.

They were also encouraging the people to disobey the local authorities
and refuse to pay taxes, and were promulgating a theory, popular with
the masses, that the time had come for the rich to be poor and the
poor rich.

They had furthermore induced regular Insurgent troops to rise up in
arms. [307]

From this communication it would appear that the Insurgent government
had not been entirely effective in Zambales up to November 13th, 1898.

From other communications we learn that the soldiers at Alaminos were
about to desert on November 30th, 1898; [308] that it was deemed
necessary to restrict travel between Tarlac, Pampanga, Bataan and
Zambales in order to prevent robberies; [309] and that on January 9,
1899, the governor of the province found it impossible to continue
the inspection of a number of towns, as many of their officials had
fled to escape the abuses of the military. [310] Conditions were
obviously very serious in Zambales at this time.

_Cavite_

Cavite province lies immediately south of Manila province as the
latter was then constituted. On August 24, 1898, the secretary of
war wired Aguinaldo that two drunken Americans had been killed by
Insurgent soldiers. [311] On the same day General Anderson advised
the governor of Cavite that one American soldier had been killed and
three wounded by his people, and demanded his immediate withdrawal,
with his guard, from the town. [312]  The governor asked Aguinaldo for
instructions. Aguinaldo replied instructing the governor to deny that
the American had been killed by Insurgent soldiers and to claim that
he had met death at the hands of his own companions. The governor was
further directed to give up his life before leaving the place. [313]

In view of the definite statement from one of his own officers that
the soldier in question was killed by Filipino soldiers, Aguinaldo's
instructions to say that he was killed by Americans are interesting
as showing his methods.

Not only were the Insurgents obviously unable to control their own
soldiers in Cavite town sufficiently to prevent them from committing
murder, but conditions in the province of the same name left much to
be desired. On December 29, 1898, the governor wired Aguinaldo that
the town of Marigondong had risen in arms. [314]

It is a well-known fact that land records were destroyed in Cavite. Of
this matter Taylor says:--

"In Cavite, in Cavite Province, and probably in most of the other
provinces, one of the first acts of the insurgents who gathered
about Aguinaldo was to destroy all the land titles which had been
recorded and filed in the Spanish administrative bureaus. In case the
independence of the Philippines was won, the land of the friars, the
land of the Spaniards and of those who still stood by Spain, would
be in the gift of Aguinaldo or of any strong man who could impose
his will upon the people. And the men who joined this leader would
be rich in the chief riches of the country, and those who refused to
do so would be ruined men." [315]

_Sorsogón_

"The native civil officials who took charge of the government of
Sorsogón Province when the Spaniards abandoned it did not think it
worth while to hoist the insurgent flag until a force of four companies
arrived there to take station early in November, 1898. The officer in
command promptly ordered the Chinamen in the town of Sorsogón, who are
prosperous people, to contribute to the support of his troops. They at
once gave him cloth for uniforms, provisions, and 10,000 pesos. This
was not sufficient, for on November 8 Gen. Ignacio Paua, who seems to
have been the insurgent agent in dealing with the Chinese, complained
that the troops in Sorsogón were pillaging the Chinamen there. They
had killed 13, wounded 19, and ruined a number of others." [316]

In January, 1899, a correspondent wrote Aguinaldo that it was very
difficult to collect taxes as every one was taking what he could lay
his hands on. [317]

_Ambos Camarines_

On September 18, 1898, Elias Angeles, a corporal of the _guardia
civil_, headed an uprising against the Spaniards. The Spanish officer
in command, and all of his family, were killed by shooting up through
the floor of the room which they occupied. Angeles then assumed the
title of Politico-Military-Governor.

When the Tagálog Vicente Lucban arrived on his way to Samar, he ordered
Angeles to meet him at Magarao, with all his troops and arms, disarmed
the troops, giving their rifles to his own followers, marched into
Nueva Caceres and took possession of the entire government. Aguinaldo
subsequently made Lucban a general, and sent him on his way to Samar.

Lucban was succeeded by another Tagálog, "General" Guevara, a very
ignorant man, who displayed special ability in making collections,
and is reported to have kept a large part of the funds which came
into his possession.

Colonel Peńa, who called himself "General," was one of the worst of
the Tagálog invaders, for they were practically that. He threatened
all who opposed him with death, and summarily shot at least one man
in Tigaon. That town subsequently rose against him, and he was badly
cut up by the Bicols. [318] On getting out of the hospital he was
sent away.

The daughters of prominent families suffered at the hands of these
villains. Peńa abducted one, a son of Guevara another. Her brother
followed young Guevara and killed him. If girls of the best families
were so treated, how must those of the common people have fared?

Braganza ordered the killing of all Spaniards and Chinese at
Minalabag. Some forty-eight Spaniards were murdered.

Many Chinese were killed at Pasacao; about thirty at Libmanan by
order of Vicente Ursua a Tagálog; more than twenty at Calabanga.

Conditions became so unbearable that Faustino Santa Ana gathered
around him all Bicols who were willing to fight the TagŁlogs, but
the troubles were finally patched up.

American troops had little difficulty in occupying Ambos Camarines
and other Bicol provinces, owing to the hatred in which the Tagálogs
were held.

_Mindoro_

Conditions in the important island of Mindoro may be inferred from
the fact that it became necessary for its governor to issue a decree
on November 10, 1898, which contained the following provisions among
others:--

"2nd. The local presidentes of the pueblos will not permit any one
belonging to their jurisdiction to pass from one pueblo to another nor
to another province without the corresponding pass, with a certificate
upon its back that the taxes of its holder have been paid.

"3rd. That from this date no one will be allowed to absent himself from
his pueblo without previously informing its head who will give him an
authorization on which will be noted the approval of the presidente
of the pueblo. . . .

"5th. Persons arriving from a neighboring town or province in any
pueblo of this province will immediately present themselves before the
presidente of said pueblo with their passes. He will without charge,
stamp them with his official seal." [319]

These are peculiar regulations for a province which is at peace,
and as Major Taylor has truly remarked:--

"The form of liberty contemplated by the founders of the Philippine
Republic was not considered incompatible with a very considerable
absence of personal freedom." [320]

Later, when travelling through Mindoro, I was told how an unfortunate
legless Spaniard, who had been running a small shop in one of the towns
and who was on good terms with his Filipino neighbors, was carried
out into the plaza, seated in a chair, and then cut to pieces with
bolos in the presence of his wife and children who were compelled to
witness the horrible spectacle!

On this same trip Captain R.G. Offley, then the American Governor
of Mindoro, told me while I was at Pinamalayan that the people there
were greatly alarmed because a murderer, liberated under the amnesty,
had returned and was prowling about in that vicinity. This man had a
rather unique record. He had captured one of his enemies, and after
stripping him completely had caused the top of an immense ant-hill to
be dug off. The unfortunate victim was then tied, laid on it, and the
earth and ants which had been removed were shovelled back over his
body until only his head projected. The ants did the rest! Another
rather unusual achievement of this interesting individual was to tie
the feet of one of his enemies to a tree, fasten a rope around his
neck, hitch a carabao to the rope, and start up the carabao, thus
pulling off the head of his victim. Yet this man and others like
him were set at liberty under the amnesty proclamation, in spite of
the vigorous protests of the Philippine Commission, who thought that
murderers of this type ought to be hanged.

And now I wish to discuss briefly an interesting and highly
characteristic statement of Judge Blount. In referring to conditions
in the Visayan Islands, he says:--

"Of course the Southern Islands were a little slower. But as Luzón
goes, so go the rest. The rest of the archipelago is but the tail to
the Luzón kite. Luzón contains 4,000,000 of the 8,000,000 people out
there, and Manila is to the Filipino people what Paris is to the French
and to France. Luzón is about the size of Ohio, and the other six
islands that really matter, are in size mere little Connecticuts and
Rhode Islands, and in population mere Arizonas or New Mexicos." [321]

This paragraph is no exception to the general rule that the statements
of this author will not bear analysis. One of the other six islands
that he says really matters is Samar. Its area is 5031 square
miles. The area of Rhode Island is 1250 square miles. The smallest of
the six islands named is Bohol, with an area of 1411 square miles. It
cannot be called a little Rhode Island.

As regards population, Arizona has 122,931. It is hardly proper to
call either Panay with a population of 743,646, Cebu with 592,247,
Negros with 460,776, Leyte with 357,641, Bohol with 243,148 or even
Samar with only 222,690, a mere Arizona, and New Mexico with 195,310
is also a bit behind.

Luzón really has an area of 40,969 square miles and a population
of 3,798,507. [322] What Blount is pleased to call "the tail to the
Luzón kite," is made up as follows:--


    Island       Area (Square Miles)   Population
    Samar        5,031                  222,690
    Negros       4,881                  460,776
    Panay        4,611                  743,646
    Leyte        2,722                  357,641
    Cebu         1,762                  592,247
    Bohol        1,411                  243,148
    Totals      20,419                2,620,148


Even so, the tail is a trifle long and heavy for the kite, but if we
are going to compare Luzón with "the Southern Islands," by which Blount
can presumably only mean the rest of the archipelago, why not really do
it? The process involves nothing more complicated than the subtraction
of its area and population from those of the archipelago as a whole.


                    Area (Square Miles)    Population
    Philippines     115,026                 7,635,426
    Luzón            40,969                 3,798,507
    Difference       74,057                 3,836,919


Performing this operation, we discover that the tail would fly away
with the kite, as Luzón has less than half of the total population
and only a little more than a third of the total area.

To compare the area or the population of one large island with those of
individual small ones, in determining the relative importance of the
former in the country of which it makes up a part, is like comparing
the area and population of a great state with those of the individual
counties going to make up other states.

Blount resorts to a similar questionable procedure in trying to show
the insignificance of Mindoro and Palawan. There are an island of
Mindoro and a province of Mindoro; an island of Palawan and a province
of Palawan. In each case the province, which includes numerous small
islands, as well as the large one from which it takes its name, is
much larger and more populous than is the main island, and obviously
it is the province with which we are concerned.

Even if Blount wished to limit discussion to the Christian natives
commonly called Filipinos, his procedure is still wholly unfair. Of
these there are 3,575,001 in Luzón and 3,412,685 in the other
islands. In other words, the Filipino population is almost equally
divided between the two regions.

As he would not have found it convenient to discuss the conditions
which arose in Mindanao under Insurgent rule, he attempts to show
that no political importance attaches to them. In the passage above
quoted he does not so much as mention either Mindoro or Palawan
(Paragua). Elsewhere, however, he attempts to justify his action by
making the following statements:--

"The political or governmental problem being now reduced from 3141
islands to eleven, the last three [323] of the nine contained in the
above table may also be eliminated as follows: [324]--

"Mindoro, the large island just south of the main bulk of Luzón,
pierced by the 121st meridian of longitude east of Greenwich, is
thick with densely wooded mountains and jungle over a large part
of its area, has a reputation of being very unhealthy (malarious),
is also very sparsely settled, and does not now, nor has it ever,
cut any figure politically as a disturbing factor." [325]

Apart from the fact that the political problem involved in the
government of the important islands which Blount would thus leave
out of consideration, is not solved by ignoring it, certain of his
further statements cannot be allowed to go uncorrected.

The allegation that the island has never "cut any figure politically
as a disturbing factor" is absurd. In the Spanish days its forests
furnished a safe refuge for evildoers who were from time to time
driven out of Cavite and Batangas. A large proportion of its
Filipino inhabitants were criminals who not infrequently organized
regular piratical expeditions and raided towns in Masbate, Romblon
and Palawan. The people of the Cuyos and Calamianes groups lived
in constant terror of the Mindoro pirates, and _tulisanes_, [326]
who paid them frequent visits. I myself have been at Calapan, the
capital of the province, when the Spanish officials did not dare to
go without armed escort as far as the outskirts of the town for fear
of being captured and held for ransom. During considerable periods
they did not really pretend to exercise control over the criminal
Filipinos inhabiting the west coast of the island. Conditions as
to public order were worse in Mindoro than anywhere else in the
archipelago north of Mindanao and Joló.

No less absurd are Blount's suggestions as to the general
worthlessness of the island. There are high mountains in its
interior, and there are great stretches of the most fertile land in
the world along its coast. Its northern and eastern portions have
a very heavy and evenly distributed rainfall, and are admirably
suited to the growing of cocoanuts, hemp, cacao, rubber and similar
tropical products. In this region rice flourishes wonderfully without
irrigation. There was a time in the past when Mindoro was known as
"the granary of the Philippines." Later its population was decimated
by constant Moro attacks, and cattle disease destroyed its draft
animals, with the result that the cultivated lands were abandoned
to a considerable extent and again grew up to jungle, from which,
however, it is easy to redeem them. The west coast has strongly marked
wet and dry seasons similar to those at Manila. There is abundant
water available for irrigation, furnished by streams which never run
dry. Much of the soil is rich, and will grow the best of sugar in
large quantity. The forests, which now cover extensive areas, abound
in fine woods, and produce rubber and other valuable gums. There are
outcroppings of lignite at numerous points on the island, and in the
vicinity of Mt. Halcon is found the finest marble yet discovered in
this part of the world. Gold is also present in some quantity at
various places. In short, Mindoro is naturally one of the richest
islands in the Archipelago. If its tillable lands were under high
cultivation, it would support half the population of the Philippines.

_Palawan_

In endeavouring to show that Palawan is without political importance
Blount has followed precisely the procedure which he adopted in the
case of Mindoro. First, he gives the area and the population of the
island, when he should concern himself with the province. The area of
the island is 4027 square miles; that of the province, 5238 square
miles. According to the 1903 census, the population of the island
was 10,918, while that of the province, which contains such thickly
settled and fertile islands as Cuyo and Agutaya, was 39,582. Of course,
if one wishes to emphasize the unimportance of Palawan, it is more
convenient to take the figures for the island.

Blount says:--

"Paragua, [327] the long narrow island seen at the extreme lower
left of any map of the archipelago, extending northeast-southwest
at an angle of about 45°, is practically worthless, being fit for
nothing much except a penal colony, for which purpose it is in fact
now used." [328]

I must deny the truthfulness of his statements, even if we limit
our consideration to the island of Palawan. Only 159 of its 4027
square miles are utilized for a penal colony. Its natural wealth
is simply enormous. It is covered throughout the greater part of
its extent with virgin forest containing magnificent stands of the
best timber. Damar, a very valuable varnish gum, is abundant in its
mountains. Much of the so-called "Singapore cane," so highly prized by
makers of rattan and wicker furniture, comes from its west coast. It
is a well-watered island, and its level plains, which receive the
wash from its heavily forested mountains, have a soil of unsurpassed
fertility in which cocoanuts come to bearing in five years or even
less. Incidentally, the greater part of the island lies south of
the typhoon belt. Malampaya Sound, situated near its northwestern
extremity, is one of the world's great harbors. But should we wish to
rid ourselves of this wonderful island, I may say, without violating
any official confidences, that there was a time when Germany would
have been more than pleased to take it off our hands; and indeed our
British friends, who were sufficiently interested in it to survey it
some decades ago, might possibly be prevailed upon to accept it!

There are good reasons why Blount thought it convenient to make it
appear that Palawan was politically unimportant. Shortly after the
outbreak of hostilities with Spain the Filipino garrison at Puerto
Princesa mutinied, and the things which they did were not nice. Among
others, they liberated the convicts, Puerto Princesa being at the time
a penal colony, and the latter, together with some of the soldiers,
started up the east coast of the island, leaving a trail of devastation
in their wake. The prosperous town of Tinitian was abandoned as they
approached it, and was so thoroughly cleaned out by them that it has
never since been reoccupied except by a few stragglers. Other towns,
including Tay-Tay, were raided.

On November 27, 1899, Aguinaldo's representative in this province wrote
him that the inhabitants were preparing to kill all the Tagálogs and
revolt against Insurgent rule. [329] Later when some of the latter
were anxious to get the people of one of the northern settlements to
take them on a short boat journey, these Visayans consented to give
them a lift only on condition that they first allow themselves to be
bound, and then took them out to sea and threw them overboard.

Another thing which Blount would have found it inconvenient to discuss
is the conduct of the people of Cuyo, at one time the capital of
the province. On this island, which contains but twenty-one square
miles, there were in 1903 no less than 7545 inhabitants. They hated
and feared the people of Mindoro and sent messengers to Iloilo,
after the Americans had occupied that place, to beg for a garrison of
American troops, and to say that if furnished with an American flag
they themselves would defend it. For some reason they were not given
the flag, and the sending of a garrison was long delayed. Having grown
weary of waiting, they made an American flag of their own, hoisted
it, and when the Insurgents from Mindoro came intrenched themselves
and defended it. They were actually being besieged when the American
garrison finally arrived. Here is one more fact inconsistent with
the theory that the Filipino people were a unit at Aguinaldo's back,
and of course the easiest way to get around such an occurrence is to
forget to mention it!

_Mindanao_

And now we come to the great island of Mindanao, which all but equals
Luzón in size, having an area of 36,292 square miles as against the
40,969 of Luzón. Blount's first mention of it is peculiar.

In connection with the words "the other six islands that really
matter," in the passage above cited on page 116 of his book, he has
inserted a foot-note reading as follows:--

"The six main Visayan Islands. Mohammedan Mindanao is always dealt
with in this book as a separate and distinct problem." [330]

But it was hardly possible for him to dismiss this great island, which
is a little continent by itself, quite so cavalierly and I will quote
the more important of his further and later statements regarding it:--

"While the great Mohammedan island of Mindanao, near Borneo, with its
36,000 square miles of area, requires that the Philippine archipelago
be described as stretching over more than one thousand miles from
north to south, still, inasmuch as Mindanao only contains about 500,000
people all told, half of them semi-civilized, the governmental problem
it presents has no more to do with the main problem of whether, if
ever, we are to grant independence to the 7,000,000 Christians of the
other islands, than the questions that have to be passed on by our
Commissioner of Indian Affairs have to do with the tariff. Mindanao's
36,000 square miles constitute nearly a third of the total area of
the Philippine archipelago, and more than that fraction of the 97,500
square miles of territory to a consideration of which our attention
is reduced by the process of elimination above indicated. Turning
over Mindanao to those crudely Mohammedan semi-civilized Moros would
indeed be 'like granting self-government to an Apache reservation
under some local chief,' as Mr. Roosevelt, in the campaign of 1900,
ignorantly declared it would be to grant self-government to Luzón
under Aguinaldo. Furthermore, the Moros, so far as they can think,
would prefer to owe allegiance to, and be entitled to recognition as
subjects of, some great nation. Again, because the Filipinos have no
moral right to control the Moros, and could not if they would, the
latter being fierce fighters and bitterly opposed to the thought of
possible ultimate domination by the Filipinos, the most uncompromising
advocate of the consent of the governed principles has not a leg to
stand on with regard to Mohammedan Mindanao. Hence I affirm that as
to it, we have a distinct separate problem, which cannot be solved in
the lifetime of anybody now living. But it is a problem which need not
in the least delay the advent of independence for the other fourteen
fifteenths of the inhabitants of the archipelago--all Christians living
on islands north of Mindanao. It is true that there are some Christian
Filipinos on Mindanao, but in policing the Moros, our government
would of course protect them from the Moros. If they did not like our
government, they could move to such parts of the islands as we might
permit to be incorporated in an ultimate Philippine republic. Inasmuch
as the 300,000 or so Moros of the Mohammedan island of Mindanao and
the adjacent islets called Jolo (the 'Sulu archipelago,' so called,
'reigned over' by the sultan of comic opera fame) originally
presented, as they will always present, a distinct and separate
problem, and never did have anything more to do with the Philippine
insurrection against us than their cousins and co-religionists over
in near-by Borneo, the task which confronted Mr. Root in the fall of
1899, to wit, the suppression of the Philippine insurrection, meant
practically the subjugation of one big island, Luzón, containing half
the population and one third of the total area of the archipelago,
and six neighbouring small ones, the Visayan Islands." [331]

Now as a matter of fact Mindanao is by no means Mohammedan. The
Mohammedan Malays, called Moros, are found here and there along the
western coast of the Zamboanga peninsula and along the southern coast
of the island as far as Davao. They also extend far up the Cotabato
River and occupy the Lake Lanao region, but that is all. The interior
of the island is for the most part occupied by the members of a
number of non-Christian, non-Mohammedan tribes, while its northern
and eastern coasts are inhabited by Visayan Filipinos, of whom there
are many in Zamboanga itself.

While, as Blount says, the Moros took no part in the insurrection
against the United States, the Visayans of Mindanao did, and we had
some lively tussles with them in Misamis and in Surigao.

It is indeed unthinkable that we should turn Mindanao over to the
Moros. Abandonment of it by us would in the end result in this,
as they would take possession of the entire island in the course of
time. Neither the other wild tribes nor the Filipinos could stand
against them. I heartily agree with the conclusion that we must retain
this island for many years before we can settle the problems which it
presents. It is further true that we might retain it and still grant
independence to the remainder of the Philippine Archipelago, but if
we are to eliminate Mindanao from consideration because the Filipinos
have no right to control the Moros, of whom there are in reality
only about a hundred and fifty-four thousand [332] on the island,
and could not if they would, what about Luzón, where there are in
reality no less than four hundred and sixty thousand non-Christians,
[333] many of whom, like the Ifugaos, Bontoc Igorots, Kalingas and
wild Tingians, are fierce fighters and practically all of whom are
bitterly opposed to the thought of possible ultimate domination by
Filipinos, while most of them welcome American rule?

Have the Filipinos any more moral right to control them than they
have to control the Moros? Could they control them if they would? And
has the most uncompromising advocate of the consent of the governed
principle "a leg to stand on" in the one case if he lacks it in
the other?

The Filipino politicians are not ready to admit that Filipinos could
not satisfactorily govern Moros and have even alleged that they did
so govern them during the period now under discussion. Let us examine
the facts.

Aguinaldo attempted to enter into negotiations with the Sultan of Joló,
addressing him as his "great and powerful brother," [334] but this
brother does not seem to have received his advances with enthusiasm,
and the other brothers proceeded to do things to the Filipinos at
the first opportunity.

José Roa in writing Aguinaldo on January 26, 1899, of conditions in
the province of Misamis says: [335]--

"Hardly had said evacuation of Iligan taken place on the 28th of
last month, when the Moros or Mohammedans of the interior, our mortal
enemies since times immemorial on account of their religious fanaticism
which they carry to extremes, as do their co-religionists in Europe
and Asia, and on account of their objection to leading a civilized
life, began to harry the town of Iligan which is the nearest town
to the lake around which is the densest Moro population. Due to the
prestige of the local president of that town, Seńor Carloto Sariol,
and the energy that he showed, after some days of constant firing
against groups who descended upon the suburbs of the town, he was
successful in having them abandon their hostile attitude and promise
to live in peace and harmony with said towns, this verbal agreement
being participated in by the Dattos of some settlements who did not
wish to treat with the Spanish Government.

"Being acquainted nevertheless with these people, we know by experience
that the more friendly they appear, the more we must watch against
them, because as soon as they find a good opportunity they do not
fail to take advantage of it to enter the towns for the purpose of
sacking them and kidnapping as many of their inhabitants as possible
in order to reduce them to slavery."

Immediately after the abandonment of Cotabato by the Spaniards the
Filipino residents set up a government there. A few days later the Moro
datos, Piang, Ali and Djimbangan, dropped in with their followers,
cut off the head of the Filipino _presidente_, served a few other
leading officials and citizens in the same manner, and proceeded to
set up a government of their own which was the only government that
the place had prior to the arrival of the American troops.

Dato Djimbangan promptly caused the Filipina women of the place to
be stripped and compelled to march before him on the public plaza in
a state of nudity.

At Zamboanga the Moros could have taken the town at any time after
the Spaniards left had they desired to do so. On the arrival of the
Americans Dato Mandi offered to take it and turn it over to them,
but his proposition was declined.

He subsequently swore to an affidavit relative to conditions under
Insurgent rule. It reads as follows:--

"We always had peace in Zamboanga District; except during the
revolution of the Filipinos in the year 1899, when for seven or eight
months there was in existence the so-called Filipino Republic. During
that time there was much robbing and killing; the life of a man was
worth no more than that of a chicken; men killed one another for
personal gain; enemies fought one another with the bolo instead of
settling their differences before the law. It was a time of bloodshed
and terror. There was no justice. Because of this the Moros were
opposed to the Filipinos. There was conflict between the better class
of Filipinos and the revolutionists, who had gained control of the
local government." [336]

Elsewhere throughout the Moro territory those Filipinos who did
not promptly make their escape were murdered or enslaved. In short,
the lion and the lamb lay down together, with the lamb inside as usual.

Thus it will be seen that this first and last attempt of Filipinos
to govern Moros did not result in complete success.

Baldomero Aguinaldo made a subsequent attempt to open communication
with the Sultan of Joló, authorizing him to establish in all the
_rancherias_ of Mindanao and Joló a government in accordance with a
decree duly transmitted. The Sultan was requested to report the result
of his efforts and to give the number of his forces with their arms,
and was advised that, "if in this war, which I consider to be the last,
we secure our independence and with the opposition of our brothers
in that region, with yourself at their head, we are successful in
preventing the enemy from gaining a foothold, the grateful country will
always render a tribute of homage and gratitude to your memory." [337]
Curiously, the Sultan seems to have remained unmoved by the appeal.

_Masbate_

This tight little island of 1236 square miles had in 1903 a Visayan
population of 29,451. Its people are all Filipinos, and are on the
whole rather an unusually orderly and worthy set. There is no reason
why it should have been excluded in considering "the human problem
in its broader governmental aspect," whatever that may be, nor can I
understand why Blount should have desired to exclude it except that
he seems to have been endeavouring to exclude everything possible
outside of Luzón, in order to increase the apparent importance of
the Christian provinces of that island. Masbate should of course be
taken into account in connection with the Visayan Islands, of which
it is one.

The islands ordinarily included in the group known as "The Visayas"
from the ancient tribal name of the civilized Filipino people who
inhabit them, who are called Visayans, are Samar, Panay, Negros,
Leyte, Cebú, Bohol, Masbate, Tablas, Romblon, Ticao, Burias, Siquijor
and numerous smaller islands adjacent to those named. Although their
inhabitants are all rated as one people, they speak a number of more or
less distinct dialects. Only Panay, Negros, Samar, Tablas and Sibuyan
have non-Christian inhabitants, and in the three islands last named
their number is so small as to be negligible. In the mountains of Panay
and Negros, however, Negritos are to be found in considerable numbers,
as are the representatives of a tribe sometimes called _Monteses_ [338]
and sometimes Bukidnon. The latter tribal designation I have thought
it best to reserve for certain inhabitants of northern Mindanao.

In the Visayas, Palawan and Mindanao the government of Aguinaldo
was established at various places and different times, without
consulting or considering the will of the people. The men who went as
his delegates were supported by armed forces, hence their authority
was not at first questioned, but soon there arose murmurings which
might easily have grown into a war cry.

The attitude of the Visayan Filipinos is clearly foreshadowed in the
following extract from a letter dated January 14, 1899, in which Mabini
discussed the advisability of putting the constitution in force:--

"And even if this change is made, I fear that Negros and Iloílo will
form a federal Republic and not one in conformity with the centralized
Republic provided for by the Constitution." [339]

The action later taken by Negros shows that there was abundant reason
for this fear.

As late as February 26, 1899, the Insurgent government was still
ignorant as to the real conditions in Negros and Mindanao. [340]

From a letter written on March 18, 1899, to Apacible at Hongkong, we
learn that Aguinaldo and his followers were even then still uninformed
as to events in the Visayan Islands. [341] In view of these facts,
how ridiculous become the contentions of those who claim that the
Malolos government represented the archipelago as a whole. And what
shall we say of the following statement, remembering that the Treaty
of Paris was signed December 10, 1899?

"When the Treaty of Paris was signed, General Otis was in possession
of Cavite and Manila, with less than twenty thousand men under his
command, and Aguinaldo was in possession of practically all of the
rest of the archipelago with between 35,000 and 40,000 men under his
command, armed with guns, and the whole Filipino population were in
sympathy with the army of their country." [342]

Ultimately, by one means or another, and chiefly by the use of armed
emissaries, the Visayan Islands, with the exception of Negros, were
brought into the Insurgent fold.

Mabini's fear that Negros and Iloilo would form a federal republic
was not realized, but Negros set up its own government, applied to the
local commander of the United States forces for help, endeavoured with
almost complete success to keep out Tagálog invaders, and presently
settled down contentedly under American rule, facts of which Blount
makes no mention. On the contrary, without just cause, he includes
this great island, with its 4881 square miles of territory and its
560,776 inhabitants, in the area over which he claims that Aguinaldo
exercised complete control.

At Iloilo the American troops encountered opposition when they planned
to land. Negotiations had been entered into with the local Filipino
officers, but the latter, under the influence of representatives
whom Aguinaldo had sent from Luzón, announced themselves as adherents
of his government, and when the American troops finally disembarked
fired the town ahead of them. It has been claimed that in doing this
they were inspired by pure patriotism, but the facts shown by their
own records present a very different picture.

In writing to Aguinaldo on April 8, 1899, Mabini says:

"We have received a communication forwarded from Iloílo, from General
Martin Delgado and Francisco Soriano, your commissioner. Soriano states
that the troops of Diocno have done nothing except commit excesses
and steal money during the attack by the Americans upon the town of
Iloílo, even going so far as to break their guns by using them as
poles to carry the stolen money which they took to Cápiz. It is said
that these forces, besides being unwilling to fight the Americans,
refuse to give their guns to those who do wish to fight and do not want
Cápiz to aid the people of Iloílo, who are the ones who support the
entire forces, including the troops of Diocno who went there." [343]

This same letter contains the following brief reference to conditions
in Cebu and Leyte:--

"Also a native priest, Seńor Pascual Reyes, has arrived here from
Cebú, and says that in Leyte General Lucban is committing many abuses
and that Colonel Mójica is only a mere figurehead. In Cebú, he says,
things are also in a chaotic condition, because the military chief,
Magsilum [Maxilom,--TR.], and the people are not in harmony."

Further details as to conditions in Cebu are given in a letter to
Aguinaldo from the commissioner whom he put in charge of elections
in that island, who on February 19, 1899, writes: [344]--

"Having arrived in this province the 8th of last month, I left on the
11th for the northern pueblos of this Island to hold the elections
for the offices ordered by the Superior Decree of June 18, last.

       *       *       *       *       *

"The news spread like an electric spark, as in all the pueblos I
visited later I found that almost all of the residents were in their
homes, so that when the elections were held in the town hall, all the
principal residents attended, requesting me to inform you that they
were disposed to sacrifice even their dearest affections whenever
necessary for our sacred cause; they only asked me to inform those
who hold the reins of government at the present time in this province,
that some steps be taken to put a stop to the arbitrary acts which had
been and still are being committed by the so-called Captains, Majors,
Colonels, Generals and Captains General, who abusing in the most
barefaced manner the positions they claimed to hold, were depriving
them of their horses and their carabaos, or cattle. I promised them
that I would do this, as I do now, by sending a communication at once
to Sres. Flores and Maxilom, who are at the head of the provincial
government, impressing upon them the fact that if they continue to
grant ranks and titles to persons of this character, as they have done,
it would end in the utter ruin of this wealthy province."

He adds that these men did not remedy the evils complained of. It
would be possible to cover in detail all of this and the remaining
Insurgent territory, and to show that Judge Blount was quite right in
stating that conditions similar to those encountered in Luzón arose
there, but the limitations of time and space forbid, and I must ask
my readers to accept on faith the statements of Blount and myself
that such was the case!

Taylor thus summarizes the conditions which ultimately arose:--

"The Insurgent soldiers lived in their own land as they would have
lived in a conquered country. They were quartered on the towns and
the towns had to feed them whether they would or not.

"Peace there was where Aguinaldo's soldiers had not penetrated,
but there does not seem to have been progress. Life went very well
in a long siesta in the shady villages under the palm trees, but not
only the structure of the State, its very foundations were falling
apart. When Aguinaldo's soldiers came they brought cruelty and license
with them. Proud of their victories and confident in themselves they
felt that the labourers in the fields, the merchants in the towns,
were for the purpose of administering to their necessities and
their desires. Aguinaldo, having seen this force gather about him,
was forced to entreat it, to appeal to it; he was never strong enough
to enforce discipline, even if he cared to do it."

Aguinaldo himself finally became disheartened over his inability to
maintain a decent state of public order in the territory which he
claimed to govern, and in December, 1898, tendered his resignation,
giving among other reasons odious favouritism on the part of some of
the military chiefs, together with a desire to enrich themselves by
improper means, such as accepting bribes, making prisoners a source
of gain, and decreasing the allowance of the soldiers. He said that
many soldiers had received sums of money as their share of booty,
and intimated that officers must have done the same. He made charges
against civil as well as military officers and ended by saying that
he retained the evidence for presentation when called on. [345]

Aguinaldo was later persuaded to withdraw his resignation. No wonder
that he wished to tender it!

In referring to the report of Wilcox and Sargent, Blount has said:--

"This report was submitted by them to Admiral Dewey under date of
November 23, 1898, and by him forwarded to the Navy Department for
its information, with the comment that it 'in my opinion contains the
most complete and reliable information obtainable in regard to the
present state of the northern part of Luzon Island.' The Admiral's
indorsement was not sent to the Senate along with the report." [346]

He thus gives it to be understood that the admiral believed that the
report truthfully set forth the conditions which actually existed in
these provinces, and that his indorsement was suppressed. Not only was
it true that this report when rendered contained the most complete
and reliable information then available in regard to the existing
state of the northern part of Luzon Island, but it contained the only
first-hand information available. The facts ultimately leaked out and
led the admiral radically to change his opinion as to the conditions
which arose under Insurgent rule. Of them he later said:--

"There was a sort of a reign of terror; there was no government. These
people had got power for the first time in their lives and they were
riding roughshod over the community. The acts of cruelty which were
brought to my notice were hardly credible. I sent word to Aguinaldo
that he must treat his prisoners kindly, and he said he would."

I believe that I have fully demonstrated the truth of these
statements. Blount was thoroughly familiar with Dewey's testimony
before the Senate Committee, in which they occur, but he did not
mention them.

I cannot close this discussion of Insurgent rule without quoting
extracts from a remarkable document written by Isabelo Artacho
in October, [347] 1899. It was entitled "Declaration Letter and
Proclamation" and was addressed to the Filipino people. While it is
probable that Artacho was impelled to tell the truth by his hatred for
Aguinaldo, tell the truth he did, and his rank and standing entitle
his statements to consideration:--

"Study the work of the insurrection; see if it is, as is said, the
faithful interpretation of your wishes and desires.

"Go through your towns, fields, and mountains. Wherever you see an
insurgent gun or bolo you will find girls and faithful wives violated,
parents and brothers crying for the murder of a son or of a brother;
honest families robbed and in misery; villages burned and plundered
for the benefit of a chief or a General; you will see fresh and living
signs yet of those horrible crimes perpetrated with the greatest
cynicism by those who call themselves your liberators! Liberators
because they wear red pants, or a red shirt, or carry on their hats
a piece of red cloth or a triangular figure!

"Here, a president stabs a man, perhaps the most honest of the village,
simply for having implored mercy for a creature arbitrarily inflicted
with the _cepo_ [an oblong square piece of heavy wood divided into two
parts, with a lock at each end and six or more holes in the middle
to confine the feet of prisoners]; there, a dying man, suspended
by the feet in a _cepo_, raised from the level of the ground, by
another president who has charged him with an unproved crime; there
a poor woman falsely charged and driven by petty officers with their
bayonets for having objected to their invasion into her house, or shop,
they being supposed to be, each, Justice itself, '_Justicia_,' and to
be obeyed as images of the Gods; there, generals who murder without
fear, for an insignificant motive, creatures whose members are being
mutilated, or their flesh cut in slices and afterwards roasted and
given them to eat; there, officers braining a girl who has refused
to accede to their sensual wishes, the lifeless body of the victim,
pierced with shots, after having been made use of, is thrown into the
river. It is not unusual to witness officers burying people alive
in a tomb prepared by the victim, by order of the murderer; it is
not unusual to see a _Puisne_-Judge pointing a revolver at a man who
is about to give evidence, and threatening to brain him for having
dared to ask: 'Why and to whom am I to declare?' And finally, on his
tottering throne, you will see the Magistrate of the Philippines, so
called by his worshippers, with his mephistophelian smile, disposing
and directing the execution of a murder, of a plunder, of a robbery, or
the execution of some other crimes against those who are indifferent or
do not care to worship him, such indifference being considered a crime.

"Putting aside the many other murders, I may mention that one recently
committed on the person of the renowned and by many called the worthy
General, Antonio Luna, which took place just at the entrance of the
palace of the Republic Presidency, and also the assassination at Kavite
of the ever remembered martyr, Andrés Bonifacio, the founder of the
'Katipúnan' Society, and the one who initiated the Revolution of 1896;
against the memory of whom it has been committed, in the proclamation
of that falsely called Republic, the criminal and unjust omission to
render the smallest manifestation of Filipinos' feelings towards him,
to prevent that same might dislike his murderers!

"Study the ordinances and constitution of this so-called democratic
Government of the Republic, that grand work of the wise Filipinos;
admire with me that beautiful monument erected on a sheet of paper
and consecrated to the conquest of reason and labour, especially in
connection with human rights and property, the basis for the well-being
of social life; but, lament and deplore with me its palpable nullity
when brought to practice and you will again see that the laws were
made for the people and not the people for the laws!

"Under this republic called democratic it is a crime to think, to wish,
to say, anything which does not agree with what the said Gods think,
wish and say. Nobody and nothing is attended to, whilst those who
have your lives in their hands must be respected.

"Under this Goverment there cannot be the slightest notice taken of
family, property, morality and iustice, but confusion and disorder
appear everywhere like a dreadful shadow, produced by the ignorance of
the subordinate officers, and of the powers that be in the villages
and provinces, who are supported by a special committee, or special
commissioners empowered to impoverish and to ruin all and with the
right of disposing, at their own accord, life, family and individual
property without responsibility whatsoever on their part.

       *       *       *       *       *

"Let the peaceful annexation of the whole of the Southern Islands of
Joló, Mindanao, Iloílo, Negros, Cebú and others where now the American
flag is hoisted and under whose shadow tranquillity and well-being
are experienced, speak for itself.

"Let it speak for itself, the proceeding observed by the whole people
of Imus, who were asking protection when the American troops took
possession of the town of Bacoor, whilst the insurgent troops there
located were hostile.

"Let them speak for themselves, the protests against the war made by
the numerous persons of S. Francisco de Malabón, Sta. Cruz de Malabón,
Perez Dasmarińias and other towns, before the Worthy Chief Mariano
Trías, who ultimately refused, with dignity, the high position of
Secretary of War, for which rank he was promoted for reasons which
are not worth publishing here. In fine, let it speak for itself, the
non-resistance shown by the people of Old Kavite [Kawit], Noveleta,
and Rozario of the heroic province of Kavite, notwithstanding the
many intrenchments and troops there located, as well as the identical
behaviour observed by other towns of Luzon provinces who are ready
to follow when the American troops are in them.

     *       *       *       *       *       *       *

"In fact no one would believe it, and the Philippine people are
tired of waiting for the day when Haring Gavino will shake a napkin
to produce suddenly horses vomiting fire and lightning and troops of
dangerous insects; that day in which they will witness the realization
of that famous telegraphed dream to the effect that two hours after
the commencement of the war the insurgents will take their breakfast
in the Palace of 'Malacańang,' their tiffin in the Senate House, and
their dinner on board the _Olympia_ or in Kavite; that day in which
the celebrated _Pequenines_ army, with their invisible Chief-leader,
will exterminate the American troops by means of handfuls of dust
and sand thrown at them, which process, it is said, has caused the
smallpox to the Americans; that day in which the _Colorum_ army will
capture the American fleet with the cords their troops are provided
with, in combination with a grand intrenchment of Tayabas made of
husks of paddy, by a Nazarene, who will then, by merely touching,
convert each husk into a Bee with a deadly sting; that day in which
the insurgents, like their leaders, provided with hosts of flour,
or of paper, pieces of candles of the holy-week matins, holy water,
pieces of consecrated stones; of vestments belonging to a miraculous
Saint or with some other Anting-Anting or talisman or _amuletos_,
will make themselves invulnerable to bullets; also have power to
convert into any of the four elements, like those personages of the
Philippine legends and comedies,--Ygmidio, Teńoso, Florante, Barnardo,
Carpio, etc.

"Yes, the people of the Philippines are quite tired of waiting for
the predicted European conflict, which it is said would give them
their independence; if not, perhaps, divide the Islands as they are
now amongst cousins, brothers, nephews, uncles and godfathers.

"In the near future, when we have acquired the necessary political and
social education and the habit of behaving justly towards ourselves
and towards our fellow-brothers; when free from all superstition,
healthy, strong and vigorous, we find ourselves capable of governing
ourselves, without there being the possibility of the preponderance
of our passions in the consideration, direction, and administration
of the interests of our country, then, and only then, we will be
free! we will be independent! [348]

"_Hongkong_, 1st October, 1899."

Most of the men who perpetrated the outrages I have detailed are alive
to-day, and are powers in their respective communities. Simeon Villa
was recently elected a member of the municipal board from the south
district of Manila, but fortunately an American governor-general
prevented him from taking his seat. Just prior to my departure from
Manila he was appointed, by Speaker Osmeńa, a member of a committee
on reception for Governor-General Harrison.

The kind of independent "government" these men established is the
kind that they would again establish if they had the chance, [349]
but among the persons to be tortured and murdered would now be those
Americans who failed to escape seasonably. I do not mean to say
that such a state of affairs would come about immediately, but it
would certainly arise within a comparatively short time. Sooner yet
"the united Filipino people" would split up on old tribal lines,
and fly at each other's throats.



CHAPTER VIII

Did We Destroy a Republic?

The claim has frequently been made that the United States government
destroyed a republic in the Philippine Islands, [350] but some of
the critics seem to entertain peculiar ideas as to what a republic
is. Blount states [351] that Aguinaldo declined to hear our declaration
of independence read "because we would not recognize his right to
assert the same truths," and then apparently forgetting the Insurgent
chief's alleged adherence to the principles of this dacument, he
lets the cat out of the bag by saying that "the war satisfied us all
that Aguinaldo would have been a small edition of Porfirio Diaz,"
and would himself have been "The Republic." [352]

He would doubtless have set up just this sort of a government, if
not assassinated too soon, but it would hardly have accorded with the
principles of the declaration of independence, nor would it have been
exactly "a government of the people, by the people, for the people."

Blount truly says [353] that the educated Filipinos, admittedly
very few in number, absolutely control the masses. He adds [354]
that _presidentes_ of pueblos are as absolute bosses as is Murphy
in Tammany Hall, and that the towns taken collectively constitute
the provinces. The first statement is true, and the second, which
is tantamount to a declaration that the _presidentes_ control every
square foot of the provinces and every man in them, is not so far
from the truth as it might be. I have been old-fashioned enough to
retain the idea that a republic is "a state in which the sovereign
power resides in the whole body of the people, and is exercised by
representatives elected by them."

Blount labored under no delusion as to the fitness of the common
people to govern. [355]

Not only did the Filipinos themselves understand perfectly well that
they had no republic, but there were many of them who were fully
aware of the fact that they could establish none. Fernando Acevedo,
in writing to General Pío del Pilar on August 8, 1898, said: [356]--

"There could be no republic here, even though the Americans should
consent, because, according to the treaties, the Filipinos are not in
condition for a republic. Besides this, all Europe will oppose it,
and if it should be that they divide our country as though it were
a round cake, what would become of us and what would belong to us?"

I will now trace the evolution of the government which Aguinaldo did
set up. In doing so I follow Taylor's argument very closely, drawing
on his unpublished Ms., not only for ideas, but in some instances for
the words in which they are clothed. I change his words in many cases,
and do not mean to unload on him any responsibility for my statements,
but do wish to acknowledge my indebtedness to him and at the same
time to avoid the necessity for the continual use of quotation marks.

Aguinaldo's methods in establishing his republic are shown by his order
[357] that "any person who fights for his country has absolute power
to kill any one not friendly to our cause" and the further order
[358] prescribing that twelve lashes should be given to a soldier
who lost even a single cartridge, while if he continued to waste
ammunition he should be severely punished. In March, 1899, workmen
who had abandoned their work in the arsenal at Malolos were arrested,
returned, given twenty-five lashes each and then ordered to work. [359]

The news that an American expedition was about to sail for the
Philippines made him realize that he had not much more than a month
in which to place himself in a position in which he would have to be
consulted and assisted, and this he tried to do. The arms he received
from Hongkong on May 23 enabled him to begin an insurrection, not
as an ally of the United States, but on his own account. From May 21
to May 24 he issued orders for the uprising against Spain. On May 24
he declared himself Dictator of the Philippines in a proclamation in
which he promised to resign his power into the hands of a president
and cabinet, to be appointed when a constitutional assembly was
convened, which would be as soon as the islands had passed into
his control. He further announced that the North American nation
had given its disinterested protection in order that the liberty of
the Philippines should be gained. [360] On May 25, 1898, the first
American troops sailed from San Francisco for the Philippines.

Aguinaldo still had a month in which to seize enough Spanish territory
to erect thereon what would appear to the Americans on their arrival to
be a government of Luzón, of which he was the head. The Hongkong junta
and Aguinaldo himself intended to ask for the recognition of their
government, but they had first to create it. To obtain recognition
it was necessary that the American commander on land should be able
to report that wherever he or his troops had gone the country was
ruled by Aguinaldo according to laws which showed that the people
were capable of governing themselves.

As the United States is a republic it was natural that the directing
group of insurgent leaders should decide upon a republican form of
government. That form would appeal to the people of the United States;
the first "Christian Asiatic Republic" was a description which would
inevitably awaken sympathy in that mother of republics. The idea was a
wise and subtle one; but Aguinaldo's republic was merely an elaborate
stage-setting, arranged for the contemplation of the people of the
United States.

By June 5, 1898, the success of the insurgent arms had been such that
Aguinaldo felt that he could throw down the mask. He would still
be glad of American assistance, but he felt himself strong enough
to do without it. He saw that "there can now be proclaimed before
the Filipino people and the civilized nations its only aspiration,
namely, the independence of this country, which proclamation should
not be delayed for any ulterior object of this government" [361] and
ordered that the independence of the Philippines should be proclaimed
at his birthplace, Cavite Viejo, on June 12, 1898. On that date he
formally proclaimed it. The provinces of Cavite, Bataan, Pampanga,
Batangas, Bulacan, Laguna and Morong were about to fall into his hands,
the Spanish troops in them being besieged, and about to surrender.

From the same place on June 18, 1898, Aguinaldo promulgated his decree
for the creation and administration of municipalities. [362] In brief,
this provided that as soon as the territory of the archipelago, or any
portion thereof, had passed from the possession of Spanish forces, the
people in the towns who were most conspicuous for their intelligence,
social position and upright conduct were to meet and elect a town
government. The heads of the towns in every province were to elect
a head for the province and his three counsellors. The provincial
council, composed of these four officials, with the presidente of the
capital of the province, were to see to the execution in that province
of the decrees of the central government and to advise and suggest.

This provincial council was to elect representatives for the
revolutionary congress, which was to be charged with submitting
suggestions to the central government upon interior and exterior
affairs, and was to be heard by the government upon serious matters
which admitted of delay and discussion.

Before any person elected to office was permitted to discharge
his functions, his election was to be approved by the central
government. The military commanders, except in time of war, were
to have no jurisdiction over the civil authorities. They could,
however, demand such supplies as they might need, and these could
not be refused. The government was to appoint commissioners to carry
these regulations into effect.

On June 20 Aguinaldo issued his regulations for the government of
provinces and municipalities [363] as supplemental to the decree
of two days before. It went into the details of government, under
the following heads: police, justice, taxation and registration
of property.

On June 23 he proclaimed the establishment of a revolutionary
government, with himself as "president." In this capacity he had all
the powers of the Spanish governor-general, unhampered by any orders
from Spain. It is true that the scheme provided for the eventual
formation of a republic, but it is doubtful if the people who drew it
up really knew what that word meant. What was provided for in practice
was a strong and highly centralized military dictatorship, in which,
under the form of election, provision was made for the filling of
all offices by men devoted to the group which had seized control.

According to this decree the dictatorial government was in future to
be entitled the revolutionary government. Its duty was to struggle
for the independence of the Philippines in order to estabish a
true republic. The dictator was to be known as the president of the
revolutionary government. There were to be four secretaries--one of
foreign affairs, commerce and marine; one of war and public works;
one of police and interior order, justice, education and hygiene;
one of the treasury, agriculture and manufactures. The government
could increase the number of secretaries if necessary. They were to
assist the president in the despatch of business coming under their
departments.

In addition to the president and his secretaries, there was to be a
revolutionary congress composed of representatives from the provinces
of the Philippine Archipelago, elected as provided by the decree of
June 18. In case a province was not able to elect representatives,
the government would appoint them for such province. The congress
was to discuss and advise, to approve treaties and loans, and to
examine and approve the accounts of the secretary of the treasury. If
important matters admitted of delay, the congress would be heard
concerning them; but if they did not admit of delay, the president of
the government was to act at once. Projects of law could be presented
by any representative, and by the secretaries of the government.

A permanent committee of congress presided over by the vice-president
was to be chosen by that body. This was to serve as a court of appeal
in criminal cases and as a court of final jurisdiction in cases
arising between the secretaries of the government and provincial
officials. The acts of congress were not to go into effect until the
president of the government ordered their execution. He was also to
have the right of veto.

This was a well-devised plan to secure control for the central
group about Aguinaldo. His commissioners, under a form of election
in which the electors were carefully selected men, established
municipal governments devoted to the cause of the revolution. These
were to choose provincial officials and members of the congress. All
elections were subject to Aguinaldo's approval, and every province
was under the command of a military representative of his, who could
and did call upon the civil authorities for such supplies as he deemed
fit. All real power was vested in the central group, and the central
group was composed of Emilio Aguinaldo and his public and private
advisers. By this time he had gathered about him men who were trained
in the law, some of whom had served the Spanish government in various
capacities. They were accustomed to the methods that had previously
prevailed under the Spanish régime, and were now ready to draw up
constitutions and regulations for the new government. Mabini wrote
the three organic decrees. Copies of them were sent to the foreign
consuls in Manila, and on July 15, 1898 to Admiral Dewey.

Although the title of "president" was assumed by Aguinaldo, as
more likely to be favourably considered in the United States than
"dictator," the tendency of his followers who had not been educated
in Europe was to speak of and to regard him not as a president,
but as an overlord holding all power in his hands. The people did
not feel themselves citizens of a republic, copartners in an estate;
they considered themselves subject to a ruler who sometimes called
himself president, and sometimes dictator. Indeed, there is much to
show that if Aguinaldo and his followers had succeeded in their plans,
even the name "republic" would not have been long continued as the
title of his government. [364]

Aguinaldo's claim as to the effectiveness of his government on August
6, 1898, was as follows: [365] "The government of the revolution
actually rules in the provinces of Cavite, Batangas, Mindoro,
Tayabas, Laguna, Morong, Bulacan, Bataan, Pampanga, Infanta and
besieges the capital, Manila. The most perfect order and tranquillity
reign in these provinces, governed by authorities elected by the
inhabitants in conformity with the organic decrees dated June 18 and
23 last. Moreover, the revolution has about nine thousand prisoners of
war who are treated humanely and according to the rules of civilized
warfare. We can muster more than thirty thousand men organized as a
regular army."

It may have been that in the majority of these provinces municipal
governments, formed in accordance with the provisions of the decree of
June 18, had been established; but provincial governments had not been
established in all of them, and tranquillity did not reign in any of
them, as they were the scene of operations against the Spaniards. There
could not well have been nine thousand prisoners in his hands at this
time, as that was claimed later when a large additional number of
Spaniards had surrendered. As for the thirty thousand men organized as
a regular army, there may be a certain difference of opinion as to what
constitutes a regular army; the men who saw Aguinaldo's force then,
and who have read the papers of its leaders, must be of the opinion
that that force was not a regular army. Probably only Manila Province
had a provincial government on August 6. Its local presidentes met at
Cavite Viejo on August 3 and elected three members of congress from
the province, and also the members of the provincial government. The
election took place under the supervision of Colonel Teodoro Gonzales,
whom Aguinaldo had appointed governor of Manila Province on August
1. He remained governor after the election was held. Not until August
17 did the local presidentes of Bulacan assemble under the presidency
of the secretary of the interior and proceed to elect two members to
congress and the members of the provincial government. Not until August
20 was there an election for the members of the provincial government
of Cavite Province. This was held in the town of Cavite. Isaac Fernando
Rios, who was afterwards a member of the Filipino junta in Madrid,
was chosen a representative of the province; but as he wrote that he
was in favour of coming to some agreement with Spain which would permit
the development of the Philippines, without abandoning the sovereignty
of that country, Aguinaldo promptly disapproved his election [366]
and ordered a new one held for the office thus left vacant. On October
2, 1899, Aguinaldo approved the result of a new election held there
because four of the five high officials of the province had absented
themselves, while one of them had died. Of the men who had so absented
themselves one had gone abroad, while the other three had remained
in Manila or Cavite under the government of the United States. [367]

The people of the provinces obeyed the men who had arms in their
hands. It is not probable that many of them had any conviction
concerning the form of government which would be best for the
Philippines. There were no signs of a spontaneous desire for a
republic. Orders came from the group about Aguinaldo, and the people
accepted a dictator and a republic as they accepted a president and
a republic, without knowing, and probably without caring very much,
what it all meant, except that they hoped that taxes would cease with
the departure of the friars. A determined and well-organized minority
had succeeded in imposing its will upon an unorganized, heterogeneous,
and leaderless majority.

As soon as a province was occupied by the Insurgents it was divided
into territorial zones within which command was exerted by military
officers. On July 20, 1898, Cavite had been divided into four zones,
and next day Brigadier-General Artemio Ricarte was placed in command
of the province and the first zone.

By July 7 Bulacan Province had been divided into six zones, and Nueva
Ecija into four zones, with a separate commander for each zone. These
men established the government prescribed by Aguinaldo's decrees of
the middle of June. Probably by the end of July Aguinaldo's municipal
governments had been established in the greater part of the towns
of Luzón. These governments were not established by the mass of the
people. The mass of the people were not consulted, but they were not
in the habit of being consulted in such matters and probably saw no
necessity for it in this case. As an evidence of this we have the fact
that from the beginning the acts of election were almost always drawn
up in Spanish, although by far the greater portion of the people of
the archipelago spoke only the native dialects.

The method of establishing these municipal governments employed in
Cavite in June, 1898, was continued to the end of Aguinaldo's rule. It
was the same in different places and at different times. Data obtained
from reports and documents written in towns far removed from each
other follow. They must be considered together in order to obtain an
idea of what this method really was.

When the Insurgent movement had progressed sufficiently far, the
leaders collected their adherents and obtained recognition as the
heads of their provinces or districts. For example, representatives
of the towns of Pampanga assembled at San Fernando on June 26,
1898, and under the presidency of General Maximo Hizon agreed to
yield him "complete obedience as military governor of the province
and representative of the illustrious dictator of these Philippine
Islands." [368] The town of Macabebe refused to send any delegates
to this gathering. Commissioners, in almost every case officers of
Aguinaldo's army, were empowered by him to establish the so-called
republican government. They appointed delegates who proceeded to
the smaller towns and held elections; but whenever possible the
commissioner of Aguinaldo presided. In many cases these delegates were
lieutenants of the army. The commissioners selected the electors,
for they had all to be "marked out by their good conduct, their
wealth, and their social position," and they had all to be in favour
of independence. They then presided at the elections, which were
_viva voce_. They apparently selected the people to be elected, and
forwarded a record of the proceedings to the central government. The
election had to be approved by the dictator or president before the
successful candidates could assume the duties of their offices. Later
on, the military commanders remote from the seat of government were
authorized to approve elections and install the successful candidates,
but the records of election had even then to be forwarded to the
capital for approval, the action of the commissioner not being final.

The commissioners do not seem to have been able to find many men
who had the necessary requisites for electors. In the town of Lipa,
Batangas Province, with a population of forty thousand seven hundred
forty-three, at the election held July 3, 1898, a presidente was chosen
for whom twenty-five votes were cast. On November 23, 1898, an election
was held at Vigan, Ilocos Sur, for a presidente to succeed one who had
been elected representative in congress. One hundred and sixteen votes
were cast. The population of Vigan is nineteen thousand. On October 5,
1898, at Echague, Isabela Province, a presidente was elected for whom
fifty-four votes were cast. The population of Echague is fifty-four
thousand. On October 2, 1898, at Cabagan Nuevo, Isabela, one hundred
and eleven men voted out of a population of sixty-two hundred and
forty. On January 29, 1899, the town of Hernani, in Samar, elected its
municipal officials under the supervision of V. Lukban. Fifty-four men
voted. The town has a population of twenty-five hundred and fifty-five.

The elections, so-called, were not always held without protest. For
example, the town of San José, Batangas, protested unavailingly
to Aguinaldo against the result of an election held at 10 P.M.,
in a storm of rain. Men who had been on friendly terms with the
Spaniards were usually excluded from all participation. If in spite
of the precautions taken men were elected who were disliked by the
commissioner or his supporters, the election could be set aside on the
ground that the person elected was not an adherent of the revolution.

The elections were often held in a singular manner, as in the following
case: [369]--

"On August 20, 1898, four men of Tondo appeared before Aguinaldo on
Bacoor and announced that they were representatives of the people
of the district, who loved liberty. Then in accordance with the
directions of the president of the republic under the supervision of
the secretary of the interior, they drew lots from a hat to decide how
the offices of the head of the district, delegate of police, delegate
of the treasury and delegate of justice were to be distributed. The
decision having been made in this simple fashion, Aguinaldo gravely
approved the election as expressing the will of the people. Perhaps
it did, for they seem to have continued, at least for a time, to obey
them. On November 14, 1898, Aguinaldo again approved an election for
local officials in Tondo which since August 13 had been within the
American lines."

On August 23 San Carlos, in Pangasinán Province, a town of twenty-three
thousand people, elected its officials under the new form of
government. The presidente chosen was a well-known member of the
Katipúnan, and before the election was held announced his intention
of killing any one who was chosen for the position for which he was a
candidate. [370] He was accordingly elected. In spite of this grave
informality, an informality which formed one ground for a protest
on the part of some of the people of the town, Aguinaldo approved
the election.

On October 21, 1898, an election was held under the supervision of
the military commander in Camarines for the municipal officials of the
town of Yriga. [371] The voting was oral, and a secretary wrote down
the votes for the two candidates under direction of the commissioner,
who finally announced that the candidate whose friend he was had been
elected, but without stating how many votes he had received. This
newly elected head of the town had the town crier on the following
night publish through the streets an address to the people, in which
he thanked those who had voted for him and warned those who had not
that it would be well for them to beware. The Spanish law known as
the Maura Law, which regulated the elections in the municipalities
under the Spanish government, provided for a limited electoral body,
composed largely of ex-officials of the municipalities. The choosing of
an electoral body by the military commander of a district probably did
not seem strange to the people. The provincial and municipal officials
were established in office by armed men, and they were obeyed because
they had been installed by armed men; but it was a form of election
to which people, as a rule, saw no reason to object. There were,
however, in many cases bitter complaints of the abuses committed by
the officers thus "elected."

This form of government spread with the advance of Aguinaldo's
arms. Municipal elections were held in Tarlac in July, in Ilocos
Norte and Tayabas in August, in Benguet and the Batanes Islands in
September, 1898, in Panay in December, 1898, and in Leyte and Samar
in January, 1899.

On December 27 Antonio Luna wrote that all the provinces of Luzón,
Mindoro, Marinduque, Masbate, and Ticao, Romblón, part of Panay,
the Batanes, and Babuyanes Islands were under the jurisdiction of
the insurgent government. [372]

By October 7, 1898, 14 of the 36 provinces and districts into
which Luzón had been divided by the Spanish government had civil
governors. [373] These 14 were Tagálog provinces or provinces which
the Tagálogs controlled. The other provinces were still under military
rule, and, indeed, even the provinces under civilians were dominated
by their military commanders. With the manner of holding elections
which prevailed, the governors must have been men who were in favour
of the military party in force, for otherwise they would not have
been elected. [374]

It is not probable that the number of provinces under civil
governors much increased. If in Pangasinán Province, where there
are many Tagálogs, organizations opposed to the rule of Aguinaldo
could cause serious disorders, as was the case, it must have been
considered expedient for the success of the attempt of the Tagálogs,
who form only a fifth of the population, to dominate the archipelago,
that all provinces in which an effective majority of the people were
not of that tribe, should be kept under military rule. The municipal
governments which had been established in Luzón were in the hands of
Aguinaldo's adherents, or of men who it was hoped would prove loyal
to him. They were men of the Spanish-speaking group, which has always
dominated the people of the islands. They were probably not as a rule
men of means. Many of them,   perhaps most of them, had been clerks
and employees under the Spanish government, and they saw no reason
for changing the methods of town administration which had then been
followed. The municipal taxes, the estimates for expenditures, and
the regulations for town government, were but little modified from
those they found in force. In many ways such changes as were made
were for the worse.

Once installed in power, Aguinaldo's officials were required to
exercise over the mass of the people about the same control that
had always been exercised over them. The governing group considered
that they were perfectly capable of providing for the welfare of
the islands, and that it was the duty of the people to obey them
without question.

When the insurgent force was increased in preparation for war with
the Americans a large number of municipal officials resigned, or
attempted to do so. It was not easy for a municipal official under
Aguinaldo's government to resign. A resignation, to be accepted, had
to be accompanied by the certificate of a physician that the person
concerned was unfit to perform the duties of his office. Judging by
the record, [375] an epidemic seems to have attacked the municipal
officials in January, 1899. It is probable that they saw that war
was inevitable and that they did not wish to remain in charge of
the towns and be responsible for providing for the necessities of
"the liberating army." In Pangasinán in that month men could not
leave their barrios without obtaining the permission of the headman,
and in one town men who had attempted to sell their property for the
purpose of going to Manila were, on January 17, ordered to be arrested
and their conduct investigated. [376]

Aguinaldo, having established himself at Malolos, ordered the congress
provided for in his decree of June 23, 1898, to  assemble at the
capital on September 15,1898, and appointed a number of provisional
representatives for provinces and islands not under his control. [377]
It has often been claimed that Aguinaldo's government controlled at
this time the whole archipelago, except the bay and city of Manila
and the town of Cavite. [378]

Blount quotes the following statement from the report of the First
Philippine Commission:--

"While the Spanish troops now remained quietly in Manila, the Filipino
forces made themselves masters of the entire island except that
city." [379]

I signed that statement, and signed it in good faith; nevertheless,
it is untrue. The Filipino forces never controlled the territory
now known as Ifugao, Bontoc, Kalinga or Apayao, much less that
occupied by the Negritos on the east coast of Luzón, but this is
not all. There exists among the  Insurgent records a very important
document, prepared by Mabini, showing that when the call for the
first session of the Filipino congress was issued, there were no less
than sixty-one provinces and _commandancias_, which the Insurgents,
when talking among themselves, did not even claim to control, and
twenty-one of these were in or immediately adjacent to Luzón. [380]

The men who composed this congress were among the ablest natives of
the archipelago; but representative institutions mean nothing unless
they represent the people; if they do not, they are a conscious lie
devised either to deceive the people of the country or foreign nations,
and it is not possible for any system founded upon a lie to endure. A
real republic must be founded not upon a few brilliant men to compose
the governing group but upon a people trained in self-restraint and
accustomed to govern by compromise and concession, not by force. To
endure it must be based upon a solid foundation of self-control, of
self-respect and of respect for the rights of others upon the part of
the great majority of the common people. If it is not, the government
which follows a period of tumult, confusion and civil war will be a
government of the sword. The record the Philippine republic has left
behind it contains nothing to confirm the belief that it would have
endured, even in name, if the destinies of the islands had been left
in the hands of the men who set it up.

The national assembly met on the appointed day in the parish church
of Barasoain, Malolos, which had been set aside for the meetings
of congress. This body probably had then more elected members than
at its subsequent meetings, but even so it contained a large number
of men who were appointed by Aguinaldo after consultation with his
council to represent provinces which they had never even seen.

From a "list of representatives of the provinces and districts,
selected by election and appointment by the government up to July
7, 1899, with incomplete list of October 6, 1899" [381] I find
that there were 193 members, of whom forty-two were elected and one
hundred fifty-one were appointed. This congress was therefore not an
elective body. Was it in any sense representative? The following table,
showing the distribution of delegates between the several peoples,
will enable us to answer this question.

In considering this table it must be remembered that the relationship
given between the number of delegates assigned to a given people
and the number of individuals composing it is only approximate, as
no one of these peoples is strictly limited to the provinces where
it predominates.

I have classified the provinces as Tagálog, Visayan, etc., according
to census returns showing the people who form a majority of their
inhabitants in each case. [382]


    People          Number          Elected     Appointed
                                    Delegates   Delegates
    Visayans        3,219,030        0           68
    Tagálogs        1,460,695       18           19
    Ilocanos          803,942        7           11
    Bicols            566,365        4            7
    Pangasináns       343,686        2            2
    Pampangans        280,984        2            2
    Cagayans          159,648        4            6
    Zambalans          48,823        1            2
    Non-Christians    647,740        4           34
                                    42          151


It will be noted that the Tagálog provinces had eighteen out of a
total of forty-two elected delegates. The Visayans, by far the most
numerous people in the islands, did not have one. The non-Christian
provinces had a very disproportionately large total of delegates, of
whom four are put down as elected, but on examination we find that one
of these is from Lepanto, the capital of which was an Ilocano town; one
is from Nueva Vizcaya, where there is a considerable Cagayan-Ilocano
population; one is from Benguet, the capital of which was an Ilocano
town, and one from Tiagan, which was an Iloeano settlement. These
delegates should therefore really be credited to the Ilocanos.

If the individual relationships of the several members are considered,
the result is even more striking. Of the thirty-eight delegates
assigned to the non-Christian provinces, one only, good old Lino
Abaya of Tiagan, was a non-Christian. Many of the non-Christian
_comandancias_ were given a number of delegates wholly disproportionate
to their population, and in this way the congress was stuffed full
of Tagálogs.

Think of Filipe Buencamino, of Aguinaldo's cabinet, representing the
Moros of Zamboanga; of the mild, scholarly botanist Leon Guerrero
representing the Moros, Bagobos, Mandayas and Manobos of Davao; of
José M. Lerma, the unscrupulous politician of the province of Bataan,
just across the bay from Manila, representing the wild Moros of
Cotabato; of Juan Tuason, a timid Chinese _mestizo_ Manila business
man, representing the Yacan and Samal Moros of Basilan; of my good
friend Benito Legarda, since a member of the Philippine Commission,
and a resident delegate from the Philippines to the congress of the
United States, representing the bloody Moros of Jolo! Yet they appear
as representatives of these several regions.

Few, indeed, of the delegates from non-Christian territory had ever
set foot in the provinces or _comandancias_ from which they were
appointed, or would have been able to so much as name the wild tribe
or tribes inhabiting them.

I have been furnished a list, made up with all possible care by
competent persons, from which it appears that there were eighty-five
delegates actually present at the opening of congress, of whom
fifty-nine were Tagálogs, five Bicols, three Pampangans, two Visayans,
and one a Zambalan. For the others there are no data available. Yet
it has been claimed that this was a representative body! It was a
Tagálog body, without enough representatives of any other one of the
numerous Philippine peoples to be worth mentioning.

With a congress thus organized, Aguinaldo should have had no difficulty
in obtaining any legislation he desired.

The committee of congress appointed to draw up a constitution set
to work promptly, and by October 16,1898, had proceeded so far
with their work that Buencamino was able to write to Aguinaldo that
while he had been of the opinion that it would have been best for
him to continue as a dictator aided by a committee of able men,
yet it would now be a blow to the prestige of congress to suspend
its sessions. Aguinaldo noted upon this letter the fact that he did
not approve of a constitution. [383]

Apparently early in December the committee submitted their project. In
presenting it to congress they said [384] that--

"The work whose results the commission has the honour to present for
the consideration of congress has been largely a matter of selection;
in executing it not only has the French constitution been used,
but also those of Belgium, Mexico, Brazil, Nicaragua, Costa Rica,
and Guatemala, as we have considered those nations as most resembling
the Filipino people."

The most important difference between this project and the actual
constitution adopted was that, although the project provided that
the Dominican, Recollect, Franciscan and Augustinian friars should
be expelled from the country and that their estates should become
the property of the state, yet it recognized the Catholic religion
as that of the state and forbade state contribution to the support
of any other, although it permitted the practice in private of any
religion not opposed to morality, which did not threaten the safety of
the country. The government was authorized to negotiate a concordat
with the Pope for the regulation of the relations between church and
state. A strong party was in favour of this recognition, but it finally
failed of adoption, and the constitution as promulgated provided
for the freedom and equality of religion and for free and compulsory
education which had not been provided for in the original project. The
constitution as approved forbade the granting of titles of nobility,
decorations or honorary titles by the state to any Filipino. This
paragraph did not exist in the original project, which merely forbade
any Filipino to accept them without the consent of the government.

Mabini, the ablest of all Aguinaldo's advisers, did not approve of the
constitution. He himself had drawn up a project for a constitution
during June, 1898, but it was not accepted by the committee, the
greater part of whom were Catholics and for that reason opposed to
Mabini, who was a bitter antagonist of that church. And yet when
separation of church and state was finally provided for it did not
please Mabini, who, although he was opposed to church control, wrote
to Aguinaldo [385] that the constitution as passed by congress was not
acceptable and should not be promulgated because the constitutional
guarantees of individual liberty could not be maintained, as the
army had to be in control for the time being, and furthermore it was
not expedient to separate church and state, as this separation would
alienate many of their adherents. Indeed, there was not much in the
constitution which he thought ought to take immediate effect, [386]
and he wrote that congress was ill-disposed toward him because he had
refused to agree to its promulgation. Existing conditions were such
that he believed that all powers should be vested in one person. He
warned Aguinaldo that if the constitution were put in force, he would
be at the mercy of his secretaries. On January 1, 1899, Aguinaldo,
probably at the suggestion of Mabini, proposed certain changes in
it. [387]

Evidently the provisions of the constitution did not worry Aguinaldo
much, as is shown by his reply to the request by some of his officers
for information as to what reward those who were first in the attack
on Manila should receive. He promised them such titles as marquis,
duke, etc. [388]

On January 2, 1899, Aguinaldo announced the formation of a new cabinet
made up as follows: Apolinario Mabini president and secretary of
foreign affairs; Teodoro Sandico, secretary of the interior; Mariano
Trias, secretary of the treasury; Baldomero Aguinaldo, secretary
of war and navy, and Gracio Gonzaga, secretary of _fomento_. [389]
On January 4 Mabini took the oath of office as the president of the
council of government. This body met twice a week at Malolos on set
days, and at the close of its deliberations forwarded to Aguinaldo
a statement of the subjects discussed and the conclusions reached
for his decision. The president of the republic did not preside at,
or take part in, its deliberations.

On January 4, 1899, General Otis issued a proclamation in which
he announced that the United States had obtained possession of the
Philippines and that its government would beextended over the islands
of the archipelago. Aguinaldo replied next day with one which, if
not intended to be a declaration of war, was at least a warning that
hostilities were imminent. This proclamation was carried into Manila
by his emissaries and posted up over the one issued by the American
commander. It was a challenge to a trial of strength, and Aguinaldo
and his advisers hastened their preparations for the coming combat.

The secretary of the interior on the same day sent an order to the
heads of all provinces directing the organization of territorial
militia to resist the American invasion, and ordering the heads of the
towns to hold meetings of the people to protest against the aggression
of the United States. They were held in accordance with these orders,
and records of the proceedings were sent to Malolos and published in
the official organ of the government as evidence of the feeling of the
people. It was, however, not considered necessary in publishing them
to mention the fact that they had been held in compliance with orders.

On January 14, 1899, Mabini wrote to Aguinaldo [390] recommending
changes in the proposed constitution, which he still liked as little
as ever. He was afraid that Negros and Panay would refuse to accept
the form of government it prescribed. The worst thing about it was
that the Americans would be less disposed to recognize Aguinaldo's
government; for when they saw the constitution they would know, as it
made no mention of them, that the Filipinos wanted independence. Mabini
thought that it was possible that the wording of the constitution
might have been deliberately planned by members of the congress in
favour of annexation to the United States, so that that country would
be warned, would become more mistrustful, and would refuse to recognize
Aguinaldo's government. Whatever the president of the council may have
thought about the theoretical advisability of a congress to represent
the people, he found one much in the way when he had obtained it.

Buencamino advised that the constitution should be approved and
promulgated; one argument was that the congress had been consulted in
the matter of a national loan, and if it was dissolved, there could
be no loan. This was apparently the only matter upon which it had
been consulted. [391]

The constitution of the Philippine Republic was ratified at a session
of the congress on January 20, 1899.

On January 21, 1899, Aguinaldo sanctioned it and ordered that it should
be "kept, complied with and executed in all its parts because it is
the sovereign will of the Philippine people." [392] The constitution
provided for a government of three coördinate powers, executive,
legislative and judicial. Whether it provided for a form of government
which would have succeeded in the Philippines was not determined by
actual experience. It was never really put in force for war with the
United States began in two weeks and the constitution must stand as the
expression of the ideas of a certain group of educated natives rather
than as the working formula for the actual conduct of the political
life of a nation. One proof of this is the fact that not until June 8,
1899, were Aguinaldo's decrees upon the registration of marriages and
upon civil marriage, dated June 20,1898, revoked, and the provisions
of the constitution concerning marriage put in effect. [393]

Aguinaldo had approved the constitution; he had informed the foreign
consuls and General Otis that it had been promulgated and become the
law of the land. It was not promulgated. It had not become the law of
the land. It served one important purpose. It passed into the hands
of the Americans and showed them the ability and the aspirations of
certain individuals of the archipelago, but Mabini and his followers
did not believe in its form or in its provisions, and Mabini at least
was emphatic in his declarations that the time had not yet come for it
to be put into effect. On January 24, 1899, he wrote to Aguinaldo that
if it should be promulgated it would be absolutely necessary to give
the president the veto power, and replace the elected representatives
by others appointed by the government. If this were not done the
president would be at the mercy of congress, and the people, seeing
that disagreement between the executive government and the congress
was the cause of its misfortunes, would start another revolutionary
movement to destroy both of them. [394]

As long as Mabini remained in power the constitution was mere
paper. Its adoption was not indicative of the capacity of the people to
maintain self-government. It expressed only the academic aspirations
of the men who drafted it. There is not the slightest evidence from
any previous or subsequent experience of the people that it would have
worked in practice. It was enacted for the misleading of Americans
rather than for the benefit of the Filipinos.

While the government of Aguinaldo was called a republic, it was in
fact a Tagálog military oligarchy in which the great mass of the
people had no share. Their duty was only to give soldiers for the
army and labourers for the fields, and to obey without question the
orders they received from the military heads of their provinces.

There is no cause for vain regrets. We did not destroy a republic in
the Philippines. There never was anything there to destroy which even
remotely resembled a republic.



CHAPTER IX

The Conduct of the War

It is not my intention to attempt to write a history of the war which
began on February 4, 1899, nor to discuss any one of its several
campaigns. I propose to limit myself to a statement of the conditions
under which it was conducted, and a description of the two periods
into which it may be divided.

From the outset the Insurgent soldiers were treated with marked
severity by their leaders. On June 17, 1898, Aguinaldo issued an order
to the military chiefs of certain towns in Cavite providing that a
soldier wasting ammunition should be punished with twelve lashes for
a first offence, twenty-four for a second, and court-martialled and
"severely punished" for a third. [395]

On November 16, 1900, General Lacuna ordered that any officer allowing
his soldiers to load their rifles when not before the enemy should be
liable to capital punishment, [396] which in practice was frequently
inflicted on soldiers for very minor offences.

Men of means were drafted into the ranks and then excused from service
on the payment of cash.

The soldiery, quartered on the towns, committed endless
abuses. Conditions were bad enough before the outbreak of hostilities,
as I have shown in the chapters dealing with Insurgent rule. They
grew rapidly worse thereafter, and human life became cheap indeed.

"The documents of this period show that the insurgent troops driven
from the front of Manila fell upon the people of the neighbouring
towns and burnt, robbed, and murdered. Either their officers lost
all control over them, or else they directed these outrages. It was
not for some days that control was regained." [397]

Endless orders were issued by Aguinaldo and other high Insurgent
officers, prohibiting rape, brigandage and robbery, and there was
grave need of them. Unfortunately they could not be enforced. Indeed
it was often impossible to distinguish between Insurgent soldiers, who
removed their uniforms or had none, and brigands pure and simple. [398]

Many men were soldiers at one time and brigands at
another. Unquestionably soldiers and brigands sometimes
coöperated. Garrisons were withdrawn from towns which did not promptly
and fully comply with the demands of Insurgent commanders, [399]
and armed bandits appeared and plundered them.

There were some Insurgent leaders, like Cailles, who suppressed
brigandage with a heavy hand, [400] but many of them were indifferent,
even if not in alliance with the evil doers.


The Visayas

Feeling between Tagálog soldiers and Visayan people grew constantly
more bitter, and before many months had passed they fell to killing
each other. The highest officers of the "Regional Revolutionary
Government of the Visayas" protested vigorously to Aguinaldo, [401]
but without result. The situation was entirely beyond his control.

On April 20, 1899, General Delgado issued an order which tells a
significant story of conditions, and of his own weakness in dealing
with them. [402]

In Luzón General Trias of Cavite accused the soldiers and citizens
of his province of committing "robberies, assaults, kidnappings and
crimes which are committed only by barbarous and savage tribes." [403]

That very serious conditions promptly became general is conclusively
shown by the record of Aguinaldo's government for February 24, 1899,
when it decided--

"that the president of the council shall study such measures as will
put an end to the continual discord and friction between the civil
and military authorities of every province, in order that fatal
consequences may be avoided."

With such conditions prevailing among the Filipinos themselves, it was
to be expected that the laws of civilized warfare would be violated and
that American soldiers taken prisoners would sometimes be treated with
barbarity. Flags of truce were deliberately violated. [404] American
soldiers were trapped, poisoned [405] and murdered in other ways. [406]

It was promptly charged in the United States that American soldiers
were committing barbarities, and Blount has revived these old tales.

I know personally that during the early days of the war Insurgent
prisoners and wounded were treated with the greatest humanity and
kindness.

A part of the Insurgent plan of campaign was the circulation of the
most shocking statements concerning the abuses committed by American
soldiers. I have elsewhere described [407] the fate that overtook
Colonel Arguelles, in part because he told the truth as to the humane
treatment by the Americans of prisoners and wounded.

Not only did some of those who did this forfeit their lives, but
newspaper articles, military orders, and proclamations issued by civil
officers informed the people that the American soldiers stole, burned,
robbed, raped and murdered. Especial stress was laid on their alleged
wholesale violations of women, partly to turn the powerful influence of
the women as a whole against them, and partly to show that they were
no better than the Insurgents themselves, who frequently committed
rape. [408]

These horrible tales were at first believed even by some of the
responsible Insurgent officers in remote regions, [409] but all such
men soon learned the truth, which was known to most of them from
the start.

In official correspondence between them, not intended for the public,
orders were given to use women as bearers of despatches for the
reason that Americans did not search them. [410] More significant
yet, when conditions became bad in the provinces, Insurgent officers
sent their women and children to seek American protection in Manila
or elsewhere. Cartload after cartload of them came in at Angeles,
shortly after General Jacob H. Smith took that place. Aguinaldo himself
followed this procedure, as is shown by the following extracts from
Villa's famous diary: [411]--

"_December 22._--It was 7 A.M. when we arrived in Ambayuan. Here
we found the women worn out from the painful journey they had
suffered. They were seated on the ground. In their faces were observed
indications of the ravages of hunger; but they are always smiling,
saying they would prefer suffering in these mountains to being under
the dominion of the Americans, and that such sacrifices are the duties
of every patriot who loves his country.

"We secured some camotes in this settlement, cooked them immediately,
and everybody had breakfast. Our appetites were satisfied.

"The honorable president had already decided some days before to send
all the women to Manila, including his family, and this was his motive
in hurrying his family forward with him.

       *       *       *       *       *

"_December 24._--We find ourselves still in Talubin. About 8 o'clock
this morning a report came saying the Americans had arrived at Bontoc,
the provincial capital, the nearest town to Talubin, and distant
from it two hours by the road. An immediate decision was made. The
honourable president told his family and the other women that they
should remain in the settlement and allow themselves to be caught by
the Americans, and he named Seńors Sytiar and Paez to remain also,
with the obligation of conducting the women to Manila. As soon as the
arrangement was effected, the honourable president prepared himself
for the march. The parting was a very sad one for himself and for
his family.

"The honourable president left Talubin at 11 o'clock in the morning,
his family and the other women remaining behind with two gentlemen
charged with conducting them to Manila." [412]

In this, as in all other similar cases, the women were kindly treated
and safely conducted to their destination. Aguinaldo and his fellows
knew the happy fate of the members of his own family, as is shown by
a later entry:--

"_February 6._--We have been informed that the mother and son of the
honourable president are at Manila, living in the house of Don Benito
Legarda, and that they reached that capital long before the wife and
sister of the honourable president. We have also learned that Seńor
Buencamino, and Tirona, and Concepcion are prisoners of the American
authorities in Manila. With reference to the wife and sister of the
honourable president and the two Leyba sisters, it is said that they
went to Vigan and from there went by steamer to Manila." [413]

The mother and son, accompanied by Buencamino, had allowed themselves
to be captured at an earlier date. What shall we say of a leader who
would turn his mother, wife, sister and son over to American soldiers
for safekeeping, and then continue to denounce the latter as murderers,
and violaters of women? Aguinaldo did just this. That the Insurgent
leaders were early and fully aware of the treatment accorded their
wounded is shown by the following extract from a letter to General
Moxica of Leyte, dated March 2, 1900, giving instructions as to what
should be done with wounded men:--

"If by chance any of our men are wounded on the field or elsewhere,
efforts must be made to take away the rifles and ammunition at once and
carry them away as far as possible, so that they may not be captured by
the enemy; and if the wounded cannot be immediately removed elsewhere
or retreat from the place, let them be left there, because it is better
to save the arms than the men, as there are many Filipinos to fill up
the ranks, but rifles are scarce and difficult to secure for battle;
and besides the Americans, coming upon any wounded, take good care
of them, while the rifles are destroyed; therefore, I repeat, they
must endeavour to save the arms rather than the men." [414]

There were some rare individual instances in which uninjured Filipinos
were treated with severity, and even with cruelty, by American
soldiers. They occurred for the most part late in the war when the
"water cure" in mild form was sometimes employed in order to compel
persons who had guilty knowledge of the whereabouts of firearms to
tell what they knew, to the end that the perpetration of horrible
barbarities on the common people, and the assassination of those who
had sought American protection, might the more promptly cease. Usually
the sufferers were themselves bloody murderers, who had only to tell
the truth to escape punishment. The men who performed these cruel
acts knew what treatment was being commonly accorded to Filipinos,
and in some instances to their own comrades. I mention these facts to
explain, not to excuse, their conduct. Cruel acts cannot be excused,
but those referred to seldom resulted in any permanent injury to the
men who suffered them, and were the rare and inevitable exceptions
to the general rule that the war was waged, so far as the Americans
were concerned, with a degree of humanity hitherto unprecedented under
similar conditions. The Insurgents violated every rule of civilized
warfare, yet oathbreakers, spies and men fighting in citizens' clothes
not only were not shot by the Americans, as they might very properly
have been, but were often turned loose with a mere warning not to
offend again.

The false news circulated to aid the Insurgent cause was by no means
limited to such matters. Every time their troops made a stand they were
promptly defeated and driven back, but their faltering courage was
bolstered up by glorious tidings of wonderful, but wholly imaginary,
victories won elsewhere. It was often reported that many times more
Americans had fallen in some insignificant skirmish than were actually
killed in the whole war, while generals perished by the dozen and
colonels by the thousand. Our losses on March 27, 1899, in fighting
north of Manila, were said to be twenty-eight thousand. In reality
only fifty-six Americans were killed in all northern Luzón during
the entire month.

On April 26, 1899, the governor of Iloilo published the following
remarkable news items among others:--

"_Pavia_, April 6th, 1899.

"The Liberating Army of the Visayan Islands to the Local Presidents
of the towns shown on the margin:

"_Towns:_ Santa Barbara, Pavia, Leganes, Zárraga, Dumangas, Batac
Viejo, Tuilao, Batac Nuevo, Banate.

       *       *       *       *       *

"Santa Ana taken by Americans burning town our troops advancing to
Rosario and Escolta Americans request parley account death General
and officers and many soldiers.

       *       *       *       *       *

"At 3 P.M. of the 14th battle at Santolan 500 American prisoners who
are to be taken to Malolos.

"At 9.45 P.M. Commissioner Laguna details 6000 more Americans dead
and 600 prisoners.

"Otis requests parley, and our representatives being present, he tells
them to request peace and conditions, to which they replied that he,
and not they, should see to that, so the parley accomplished nothing.

"To-day, Wednesday, a decisive battle will be fought.

"Among the 5000 prisoners there are two generals. Tomorrow 7.15 Pasig
in our power. Americans little by little leaving for Manila.

"General Malbar to Provincial Chief Batangas.

"According to reports by telegraph hostilities have commenced and
all at Santa Mesa have fallen into our hands, also Pasay and Maytubig.

"American boat surrendered at Laguna de Bay many prisoners taken.

"General Ricarte to Provincial Chief of Batangas: Battle stopped by
truce Japan and Germany intervene to learn who provoked war.

"Foreigners favor parley one American general and chiefs and officers
dead." [415]

Santa Ana is a suburb of Manila. The Rosario and Escolta are the main
business streets of the city.

Apparently the Insurgents must have thought that colonels were as
numerous in our army as in theirs, for they reported two thousand of
them killed on February 6, 1899, and threw in one general for good
measure. [416]





We learn from the _Filipino Herald_ for February 23, 1899, that on that
day the Filipino army captured and occupied the suburbs of Manila,
while American troops were besieged in the outskirts of the city,
at La Loma, and in the neighbouring town of Caloocan. [417]

But why continue. No tale concerning American losses in the Philippines
was too fantastic to be told by the leaders and believed by the
soldiery and the populace. The American soldiers were even said to
be refusing to fight, and great prisons were being constructed in
order properly to punish them.

General MacArthur and his entire staff were captured before March 2,
1900, according to a letter sent to General Moxica of Leyte on that
date. [418]

And what of conditions in the United States during this troubled
period? We learn from the Insurgent records that prior to January 15,
1900, "the Union Army" had met with a new disaster, as a result of
which President McKinley tendered his resignation, being succeeded
by Mr. Bryan. Philippine independence was to be proclaimed on
February 4, 1899. On January 20, "General Otis's successor, John
Waterly, of the democratic party," arrived at Manila with papers and
instructions relative to proclaiming the Philippine Republic. [419]
Things now went from bad to worse. The trouble between democrats
and republicans resulted in an insurrection. Before August, 1901,
President McKinley had brought about strained relations between
Germany and the United States by bribing an anarchist to assassinate
the German Emperor. [420] Before September 15, 1901, he had been
killed by a member of the Democratic party, and the Filipinos could
acclaim their independence. [421]

The first period of the war, which we may term the period of organized
armed resistance, drew rapidly to its close, and there followed the
second period, characterized by guerrilla tactics on the part of
the Insurgents.

On September 14, 1899, Aguinaldo accepted the advice of General Pío
del Pilar, ex-bandit, if indeed he had ever ceased to rob and murder,
and authorized this man, whom he had been again and again asked to
remove, to begin guerrilla warfare in Bulacan. Guerrilla tactics
were duly authorized for, and had been adopted by, Insurgent forces
everywhere before the end of November.

Of this style of fighting Taylor has truly said:--

"If war in certain of its aspects is a temporary reversion to
barbarism, guerrilla warfare is a temporary reversion to savagery. The
man who orders it assumes a grave responsibility before the people
whose fate is in his hands, for serious as is the material destruction
which this method of warfare entails, the destruction to the orderly
habits of mind and thought which, at bottom, are civilization, is
even more serious. Robbery and brigandage, murder and arson follow
in its wake.

Guerrilla warfare means a policy of destruction, a policy of terror,
and never yet, however great may have been the injury caused by it,
however much it may have prolonged the war in which it has been
employed, has it secured a termination favorable to the people who
have chosen it." [422]

The case under discussion furnished no exception to the general rule.

Such semblance of discipline as had previously existed among the
Insurgent soldiers rapidly disappeared. Conditions had been very
bad under the "Republic" and worse during the first period of the
war. During the second period they rapidly became unendurable in
many regions, and the common people were driven into the arms of
the Americans, in spite of threats of death, barbarously carried out
by Insurgent officers, soldiers and agents in thousands of cases. I
have described at some length the conditions which now arose in the
chapter on Murder as a Governmental Agency, to which the reader is
referred for details. [423]

In the effort to protect the towns which showed themselves friendly,
the American forces were divided, subdivided and subdivided again. On
March 1, 1901, they were occupying no less than five hundred two
stations. By December of the same year the number had increased
to six hundred thirty-nine, with an average of less than sixty men
to a post. As a result of the protection thus afforded and of the
humane conduct of our troops, the people turned to us in constantly
increasing numbers.

It remained to stamp out the dying embers of insurrection, while
continuing to seek to protect those who put their trust in us. Further
subdivision of the troops in order to garrison more points was hardly
possible, but field operations were actively pushed. One after another
the Insurgent leaders were captured or voluntarily surrendered. Most
officers of importance issued explanatory statements to the people
shortly after giving up active field operations, whether they
surrendered voluntarily or were taken prisoners. Aguinaldo himself
was captured on March 23, 1901, at Palanan, the northernmost point
on the east coast of Luzon inhabited by civilized people. No place
in the islands, inhabited by Filipinos, is more completely isolated,
and he had long been almost entirely cut off from his followers,
many of whom believed him to be dead. On April 19, 1901, he issued
an address to the Filipino people, in which he clearly recognized
the fact that they wanted peace. He said:--

"_Manila_, April 19, 1901.

"To the Filipino People:--

"I believe that I am not in error in presuming that the unhappy fate
to which my adverse fortune has led me is not a surprise to those
who have been familiar day by day with the progress of the war. The
lessons thus taught, the full meaning of which has recently come to my
knowledge, suggested to me with irresistible force that the complete
termination of   hostilities and a lasting peace are not only desirable
but  absolutely essential to the welfare of the Philippines.

"The Filipinos have never been dismayed by their weakness, nor have
they faltered in following the path pointed out by their fortitude
and courage. The time has come, however, in which they find their
advance along the path impeded by an irresistible force--a force
which, while it restrains them, yet enlightens the mind and opens
another course by presenting to them the cause of peace. This cause
has been joyfully embraced by a majority of our fellow-countrymen,
who have already united around the glorious and sovereign banner of
the United States. In this banner they repose their trust in the
belief that under its protection our people will attain all the
promised liberties which they are even now beginning to enjoy.

"The country has declared unmistakably in favor of peace; so be
it. Enough of blood; enough of tears and desolation. This wish
cannot be ignored by the men still in arms if they are animated by no
other desire than to serve this noble people which has thus clearly
manifested its will.

"So also do I respect this will now that it is known to me, and
after mature deliberation resolutely proclaim to the world that I
cannot refuse to heed the voice of a people longing for peace, nor
the lamentations of thousands of families yearning to see their dear
ones in the enjoyment of the liberty promised by the generosity of
the great American nation.

"By acknowledging and accepting the sovereignty of the United States
throughout the entire Archipelago, as I now do without any reservation
whatsoever, I believe that I am serving thee, my beloved country. May
happiness be theirs.

"_Emilio Aguinaldo_. [424]

"_Manila_, April 19, 1901."

This announcement of Aguinaldo, published in Spanish, Tagálog and
English, undoubtedly hastened the end of the war, but it did not lead
to immediate general surrender, for as Taylor has very truly said:--

"A force like Aguinaldo's could not be surrendered. It had been torn by
internal dissensions and the bonds of discipline had always been very
lax. It had originally been held together by a lively expectation of
the advantages to be obtained from the pillage of Manila. That hope had
disappeared, and the leaders had become the lords of life and property
each in his own province. It was a force which could disintegrate,
but which could not surrender. Only armies can do that. Forces over
which their leaders have lost all except nominal control when beaten
do not surrender. They disintegrate by passing through the stages of
guerrilla warfare, of armed bands of highwaymen, of prowling groups
of thieves, of sturdy beggars who at opportune moments resort to
petty larceny." [425]

Aguinaldo's forces now passed through these several stages. Some of
his more important subordinates had previously been captured or had
surrendered. Others, still remaining in the field, now acted on his
advice, more or less promptly. A few remained obdurate for a time,
but as a rule not for long, and soon there remained in the field only
a very limited number of real military leaders, like General Malvar in
Batangas and General Lukban in Samar, and a very considerable number
of bandit chiefs, some of whom had posed as Insurgents. The forces
of the latter were now materially and rapidly augmented by men who
had been Insurgent officers or soldiers and  while serving in this
capacity had become so enamoured of a lawless life that they were now
unwilling to settle down and work for their daily bread, preferring
to continue to live off their long-suffering fellow-countrymen,
whom they robbed and murdered more mercilessly than ever.

The war was practically over. The insurrection had failed. In my
opinion no Filipino who held out to the end for independence compared
in intellectual power with Mabini, and I deem his views as to why
it failed worthy of special attention. At the time of his death,
he left behind a memoir from which I quote the following:--

"The revolution failed because it was poorly led, because its head
conquered his place, not by meritorious, but by reprehensible actions,
because in place of supporting the men most useful to the people,
he rendered them useless because he was jealous of them. Believing
that the aggrandizement of the people was nothing more than his own
personal aggrandizement, he did not judge the merits of men by their
capacity, character, or patriotism, but by the degree of friendship
and relationship which bound them to him; and wishing to have his
favorites always ready to sacrifice themselves for him, he showed
himself complaisant to their faults. Having thus secured the people,
the people deserted him. And the people having deserted him, he had
to fall like a wax idol melted by the heat of adversity. God forbid
that we should forget so terrible a lesson learned at the cost of
unspeakable sufferings." [426]

These are by no means the only reasons why the revolution failed,
but they foredoomed it to failure.

The surrender or capture of the more respectable military element
left the unsurrendered firearms in the hands of men most of whom
were ignorant, many of whom were criminal, and nearly all of whom
were irresponsible and unscrupulous.

Strict enforcement of the rules of civilized warfare against them
was threatened, but not actually resorted to.

The situation was particularly bad in Batangas. General J. F. Bell
was put in charge there, and he found a humane and satisfactory
solution of the existing difficulties in reconcentration--not the
kind of reconcentration which made the Spaniards hated in Cuba, but
a measure of a wholly different sort. This measure and its results
have been concisely described by Taylor, as follows:--

"General Bell said he was as anxious as any one could be to avoid
making war against those who really wanted the termination of
hostilities, and it was his duty to protect them against the vengeance
of others. Over and above all these considerations in importance,
however, was the absolute necessity of making it impossible for
insurgents to procure food by levying contributions. Therefore, in
order to give those who were pacifically inclined an opportunity to
escape hardship, as far as possible, and preserve their food supply for
themselves and their families, it was determined to establish zones
of protection with limits sufficiently near all towns to enable the
small garrisons thereof to give the people living within these zones
efficient protection against ruinous exactions by insurgents. He
accordingly, 'in order to put an end to enforced contributions
now levied by insurgents upon the inhabitants of sparsely settled
and outlying barrios and districts by means of intimidation and
assassination,' ordered the commanding officers of all towns in
the provinces of Batangas and Laguna to 'immediately specify and
establish plainly marked limits surrounding each town bounding a zone
within which it may be practicable, with an average-sized garrison,
to exercise sufficient supervision over and furnish protection to
inhabitants (who desire to be peaceful) against the depredation of
armed insurgents. The limits may include the barrios which exist
sufficiently near the town to be given protection and supervision
by the garrison, and should include some ground on which live
stock could graze, but so situated that it can be patrolled and
watched. All ungarrisoned towns will be garrisoned as soon as troops
become available.

"'Commanding officers will also see that orders are at once given and
distributed to all the inhabitants within the jurisdiction of towns
over which they exercise supervision, informing them of the danger
of remaining outside of these limits, and that unless they move by
December 25 from outlying barrios and districts, with all their movable
food supplies, including rice, _palay_, [427] chickens, live stock,
etc., to within the limits of the zone established at their own or
nearest town, their property (found outside of said zone at said
date) will become liable to confiscation or destruction. The people
will be permitted to move houses from outlying districts should they
desire to do so, or to construct temporary shelter for themselves
on any vacant land without compensation to the owner, and no owner
will be permitted to deprive them of the privilege of doing so. In
the discretion of commanding officers the prices of necessities of
existence may also be regulated in the interest of those thus seeking
protection. As soon as peaceful conditions have been reëstablished in
the brigade these persons will be encouraged to return to their homes,
and such assistance be rendered them as may be found practicable.'

"It was deemed best not to compel the people to enter these zones;
but they were warned that unless they accepted that protection
their property, which consisted almost entirely of food supplies,
would become liable to confiscation or destruction, because it
might be impossible to determine whether it belonged to hostile
or peaceful people. To put an end to vengeance by assassination,
it was determined to make use of the right of retaliation conferred
by General Order 100 issued by President Lincoln in 1863. A circular
telegram was published announcing an intention to retaliate by the
execution of prisoners of war in case any more were assassinated by
insurgents for political reasons. It was not found necessary to do
this. Assassinations stopped at once.

"As the campaign progressed it became more and more apparent that
a large number of poor people had contributed through fear, for the
power of the insurgents to collect came to an end after they had lost
their power of intimidation. The efficiency of the