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Vol. 21, Editor: Charles F. Horne

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Title: The Great Events by Famous Historians, Vol. 21
       The Recent Days (1910-1914)

Author: Charles F. Horne, Editor

Release Date: November 30, 2003 [EBook #10341]

Language: English

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THE GREAT EVENTS

BY

FAMOUS HISTORIANS

A COMPREHENSIVE AND READABLE ACCOUNT OF THE WORLD'S HISTORY,
EMPHASIZING THE MORE IMPORTANT EVENTS, AND PRESENTING THESE AS COMPLETE
NARRATIVES IN THE MASTER-WORDS OF THE MOST EMINENT HISTORIANS

NON-SECTARIAN NON-PARTISAN NON-SECTIONAL

ON THE PLAN EVOLVED FROM A CONSENSUS OF OPINIONS GATHERED FROM THE MOST
DISTINGUISHED SCHOLARS OF AMERICA AND EUROPE, INCLUDING BRIEF
INTRODUCTIONS BY SPECIALISTS TO CONNECT AND EXPLAIN THE CELEBRATED
NARRATIVES. ARRANGED CHRONOLOGICALLY. WITH THOROUGH INDICES.
BIBLIOGRAPHIES, CHRONOLOGIES, AND COURSES OF READING


EDITED BY

CHARLES F. HORNE, Ph.D.

_Aided by a staff of specialists_


CONTENTS


VOLUME XXI

_An Outline Narrative of the Great Events_
  CHARLES F. HORNE

_The United States House of Governors_ (_A.D. 1910_)
  WILLIAM S. JORDAN
  THE GOVERNORS

_Union of South Africa_ (_A.D. 1910_)
  PROF. STEPHEN LEACOCK

_Portugal Becomes a Republic_ (_A.D. 1910_)
  WILLIAM ARCHER

_The Crushing of Finland_ (_A.D. 1910_)
  JOHN JACKOL
  BARON SERGIUS WITTE
  BARON VON PLEHVE
  J.H. REUTER

_Man's Fastest Mile_ (_A.D. 1911_)
  C.F. CARTER
  ISAAC MARCOSSON

_The Fall of Diaz_ (_A.D. 1911_)
  MRS. E.A. TWEEDIE
  DOLORES BUTTERFIELD

_Fall of the English House of Lords_ (_A.D. 1911)
  ARTHUR PONSONBY
  SYDNEY BROOKS
  CAPTAIN GEORGE SWINTON

_The Turkish-Italian War_ (_A.D. 1911_)
  WILLIAM T. ELLIS
  THE WAR CORRESPONDENTS

_Woman Suffrage_ (_A.D. 1911_)
  IDA HUSTED HARPER
  ISRAEL ZANGWILL
  JANE ADDAMS
  DAVID LLOYD-GEORGE
  ELBERT HUBBARD

_Militarism_ (_A.D. 1911_)
  NORMAN ANGELL
  SIR MAX WAECHTER

_Persia's Loss of Liberty_ (_A.D. 1911_)
  W. MORGAN SHUSTER

_Discovery of the South Pole_ (_A.D. 1911_)
  ROALD AMUNDSEN

_The Chinese Revolution_ (_A.D. 1912_)
  ROBERT MACHRAY
  R.F. JOHNSTON
  TAI-CHI QUO

_A Step Toward World Peace_ (_A.D. 1912_)
  HON. WILLIAM H. TAFT

_Tragedy of the "Titanic"_ (_A.D. 1912_)
  W.A. INGLIS

_Our Progressing Knowledge of Life Surgery_ (_A.D. 1912_)
  GENEVIEVE GRANDCOURT
  PROFESSOR R. LEGENDRE

_Overthrow of Turkey by the Balkan States_ (_A.D. 1912_)
  J. ELLIS BARKER
  FREDERICK PALMER
  PROF. STEPHEN P. DUGGAN

_Mexico Plunged Into Anarchy_ (_A.D. 1913_)
  EDWIN EMERSON
  WILLIAM CAROL

_The New Democracy_ (_A.D. 1913_)
  PRESIDENT WOODROW WILSON

_The Income Tax in America_ (_A.D. 1913_)
  JOSEPH A. HILL

_The Second Balkan War_ (_A.D. 1913_)
  PROF. STEPHEN P. DUGGAN
  CAPT. A.H. TRAPMANN

_Opening of the Panama Canal_ (_A.D. 1914_)
  COL. GEORGE W. GOETHALS
  BAMPFYLDE FULLER

_Universal Chronology_ (_1910-1914_)




AN OUTLINE NARRATIVE

TRACING BRIEFLY THE CAUSES, CONNECTIONS, AND CONSEQUENCES OF

THE GREAT EVENTS


THE RECENT DAYS (1910-1914)


CHARLES F. HORNE

The awful, soul-searing tragedy of Europe's great war of 1914 came to
most men unexpectedly. The real progress of the world during the five
years preceding the war had been remarkable. All thinkers saw that the
course of human civilization was being changed deeply, radically; but
the changes were being accomplished so successfully that men hoped that
the old brutal ages of military destruction were at an end, and that we
were to progress henceforth by the peaceful methods of evolution rather
than the hysterical excitements and volcanic upheavals of revolution.

Yet even in the peaceful progress of the half-decade just before 1914
there were signs of approaching disaster, symptoms of hysteria. This
period displayed the astonishing spectacle of an English parliament,
once the high example for dignity and the model for self-control among
governing bodies, turned suddenly into a howling, shrieking mob. It
beheld the Japanese, supposedly the most extravagantly loyal among
devotees of monarchy, unearthing among themselves a conspiracy of
anarchists so wide-spread, so dangerous, that the government held their
trials in secret and has never dared reveal all that was discovered. It
beheld the women of Persia bursting from the secrecy of their harems
and with modern revolvers forcing their own democratic leaders to stand
firm in patriotic resistance to Russian tyranny. It beheld the English
suffragettes.

Yet the movement toward universal Democracy which lay behind all these
extravagances was upon the whole a movement borne along by calm
conviction, not by burning hatreds or ecstatic devotions. A profound
sense of the inevitable trend of the world's evolution seemed to have
taken possession of the minds of the masses of men. They felt the
uselessness of opposition to this universal progress, and they showed
themselves ready, sometimes eager, to aid and direct its trend as best
they might.

If, then, we seek to give a name to this particular five years, let us
call it the period of humanitarianism, of man's really awakened
kindliness toward his brothers of other nationalities. The universal
peace movement, which was a child in 1910, had by 1914 become a
far-reaching force to be reckoned with seriously in world politics. Any
observer who studied the attitude of the great American people in 1898
on the eve of their war with Spain, and again in 1914 during the
trouble with Mexico, must have clearly recognized the change. There was
so much deeper sense of the tragedy of war, so much clearer
appreciation of the gap between aggressive assault and necessary
self-defense, so definite a recognition of the fact that murder remains
murder, even though it be misnamed glory and committed by wholesale,
and that any one who does not strive to stop it becomes a party to the
crime.

While the sense of brotherhood was thus being deepened among the people
of all the world, the associated cause of Democracy also advanced. The
earlier years of the century had seen the awakening of this mighty
force in the East; these later years saw its sudden decisive renewal of
advance in the West. The center of world-progress once more shifted
back from Asia to America and to England. The center of resistance to
that progress continued, as it had been before, in eastern Europe.

PROGRESS OF DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA

Let us note first the forward movement in the United States. The
Conservation of Natural Resources, that striking step in the new
patriotism, which had been begun in the preceding decade, was carried
forward during these years with increasing knowledge. A new idea
developed from it, that of establishing a closer harmony among the
States by means of a new piece of governmental machinery, the House of
Governors.[1] This was formed in 1910.

[Footnote 1: See _The United States House of Governors_, page 1.]

To a nation bred as the Americans have been in an almost superstitious
reverence for a particular form of government, this change or any
change whatever becomes a matter of great moment. It is their final
recognition that the present can not be molded to fit the machinery of
the past. The nearer a Constitution comes to perfection in fitting the
needs of one century, the more wholly it is likely to fail in fitting
the needs of the next. The United States Government was not at its
beginning a genuine Democracy, though approaching it more nearly than
did any other great nation of the day. Putting aside the obvious point
that the American Constitution deliberately protected slavery, which is
the primal foe of all Democracy, the broader fact remains that the
entire trend of the Constitution was intended to keep the educated and
aristocratic classes in control and to protect them from the dangers of
ignorance and rascally demagoguery.

The weapons of self-defense thus reserved by the thoughtful leaders
were, in the course of generations, seized upon as the readiest tools
of a shrewd plutocracy, which entrenched itself in power. Rebellion
against that plutocracy long seemed almost hopeless; but at last, in
the year 1912, the fight was carried to a successful issue. In both the
great political parties, the progressive spirit dominated. The old
party lines were violently disrupted, and President Wilson was elected
as the leader of a new era seeking new ideals of universal equality.[2]

[Footnote 2: See _The New Democracy_, page 323.]

Nor must we give to the President's party alone the credit of having
recognized the new spirit of the people. Even before his election, his
predecessor, Mr. Taft, had led the Republican party in its effort to
make two amendments to the Constitution, one allowing an Income Tax,
the other commanding the election of Senators by direct vote of the
people. Both of these were assaults upon entrenched "Privilege." The
Constitution had not been amended by peaceful means for over a century;
yet both of these amendments were now put through easily.[1] This
revolt against two of the most undemocratic of the features of the
ancient and honored Constitution was almost like a second declaration
of American independence.

[Footnote 1: See _The Income Tax in America_, page 338.]

Perhaps, too, the change in the Senate may prove a help to the cause of
universal peace. The governments of both Taft and Wilson were
persistent in their efforts to establish arbitration treaties with
other nations, and the Senate, jealous of its own treaty-making
authority, had been a frequent stumbling-block in their path. Yet,
despite the Senate's conservatism, arbitration treaties of
ever-increasing importance have been made year after year. A war
between the United States and England or France, or indeed almost any
self-ruling nation, has become practically impossible.[2]

[Footnote 2: See _A Step Toward World Peace_, page 259.]

In her dealing with her Spanish-American neighbors, the United States
has been less fortunate. She has, indeed, achieved a labor of
world-wide value by completing the "big ditch" between the Oceans.[3]
Yet her method of acquiring the Panama territory from Colombia had been
arbitrary and had made all her southern neighbors jealous of her power
and suspicious of her purposes. Into the midst of this era of
unfriendliness was injected the Mexican trouble. Diaz, who had ruled
Mexico with an iron hand for a generation, was overthrown.[4] President
Madero, who conquered him, was supported by the United States; and
Spanish America began to suspect the "Western Colossus" of planning a
protectorate over Mexico.

[Footnote 3: See _Opening of the Panama Canal_, page 374.]

[Footnote 4: See _The Fall of Diaz_, page 96.]

Then came a counter-revolution. Madero was betrayed and slain, and the
savage and bloody Indian general, Huerta, seized the power.[1] The
antagonism of the United States Government against Huerta was so marked
that at length the anxious South American Powers urged that they be
allowed to mediate between the two; and the United States readily
accepted this happy method of proving her real devotion to arbitration
and of reestablishing the harmony of the Americas.

[Footnote 1: See _Mexico Plunged into Anarchy_, page 300.]

In itself the entire Mexican movement may be regarded as another great,
though confused, step in the world-wide progress of Democracy. The
upheaval has been repeatedly compared to the French Revolution. The
rule of Diaz was really like that of King Louis XVI in France, a
government by a narrow and wealthy aristocracy who had reduced the
ignorant Mexican peasants or "peons" to a state of slavery. The bloody
battles of all the recent warfare have been fought by these peons in a
blind groping for freedom. They have disgraced their cause by excesses
as barbarous as those perpetrated by the French peasantry; but they
have also fought for their ideal with a heroism unsurpassed by that of
any French revolutionist.

DEMOCRACY IN THE WORLD

Equally notable as forming part of this unceasing march of Democracy
was the progress of both Socialism and Woman Suffrage. But with these
two movements we must look beyond America; for their advance was not
limited to any single country. It became world-wide. When Woman
Suffrage was first established in New Zealand and Australia, the fact
made little impression upon the rest of the globe; but when northern
Europe accepted the idea, and Finland and Norway granted women full
suffrage and Sweden and Denmark gave them almost as much, the movement
was everywhere recognized as important. In Asia women took an active
and heroic part in the struggles for liberty both in Persia and in
China. In England the "militant" suffragists have forced Parliament to
deal with their problem seriously, amid much embarrassment. In the
United States, the movement, regarded rather humorously at first,
became a matter of national weight and seriousness when in 1910 the
great State of California enfranchised its women, half a million of
them. Woman Suffrage now dominates the Western States of America and is
slowly moving eastward.[1]

[Footnote 1: See _Woman Suffrage_, page 156.]

Socialism, also, though some may call it a mistaken and confused dream,
is yet a manifestation of Democracy and as such will have its voice
along with other forms of the great world-spirit. It has made
considerable advance in America, where there have recently been
Socialist mayors in some cities, and even Socialist Congressmen. But
its main progress has been in Europe. There it can no longer be
discussed as an economic theory; it has become a stupendous and
unevadable fact. It is the laboring man's protest against the tyranny
of that militarism which terrorizes Europe.[2] And since military
tyranny is heaviest in Germany, Socialism has there risen to its
greatest strength. The increase of the Socialist vote in German
elections became perhaps the most impressive political phenomenon of
the past twenty years. In 1912 this vote was more than one-third of the
total vote of the Empire, and the Socialists were the largest single
party in Germany. The Socialists of France are almost equally strong;
and so are those in Italy. When war recently threatened Europe over the
Morocco dispute, the Socialists in each of these countries made solemn
protest to the world, declaring that laboring men were brothers
everywhere and had no will to fight over any governmental problem. Many
extremists among the brotherhood even went so far as to defy their
governments openly, declaring that if forced to take up arms they would
turn them against their tyrannous oppressors rather than against their
helpless brothers of another nation. Thus the burden of militarism did
by its own oppressive weight rouse the opposing force of Socialism to
curb it.

[Footnote 2: See _Militarism_, page 186.]

In Italy the Socialists were growing so powerful politically that it
was largely as a political move against them that the government in
1911 suddenly declared war against Turkey.

Thus was started the series of outbreaks which recently convulsed
southeastern Europe.[1] Seldom has a war been so unjustifiable, so
obviously forced upon a weaker nation for the sake of aggrandizement,
as that of Italy against the "Young Turks" who were struggling to
reform their land. The Italians seized the last of Turkey's African
possessions, with scarce a shadow of excuse. This increase of territory
appealed to the pride and so-called "patriotism" of the Italian people.
The easy victories in Africa gratified their love of display; and many
of the ignorant poor who had been childish in their attachment to the
romantic ideals of Socialism now turned with equal childishness to
applaud and support their "glorious" government. Yet even here
Democracy made its gain; for under shelter of this popularity the
government granted a demand it had long withheld. Male suffrage,
previously very limited in Italy, was made universal.

[Footnote 1: See _The Turkish-Italian War_, page 140.]

The humiliation of Turkey in this Italian war led to another and far
larger contest, and to that practical elimination of Turkey from
European affairs which had been anticipated for over a century. The
Balkan peoples, half freed from Turkey in 1876, took advantage of her
weakness to form a sudden alliance and attack her all together.[2]
This, also, was a Democratic movement, a people's war against their
oppressors. The Bulgars, most recently freed of the victims of Turkish
tyranny, hated their opponents with almost a madman's frenzy. The
Servians wished to free their brother Serbs and to strengthen
themselves against the persistent encroachments of Austria. The Greeks,
defeated by the Turks in 1897, were eager for revenge, hopeful of
drawing all their race into a single united State. Never was a war
conducted with greater dash and desperation or more complete success.
The Turks were swept out of all their European possessions except for
Constantinople itself; and they yielded to a peace which left them
nothing of Europe except the mere shore line where the continents come
together.

[Footnote 2: See _The Overthrow of Turkey_, page 282.]

But then there followed what most of the watchers had expected, a
division among the victorious allies. Most of these were still half
savage, victims of centuries of barbarity. In their moment of triumph
they turned upon one another, snarling like wild beasts over the spoil.
Bulgaria, the largest, fiercest, and most savage of the little States,
tried to fight Greece and Servia together. She failed, in a strife
quite as bloody as that against Turkey. The neighboring State of
Roumania also took part against the Bulgars. So did the Turks, who,
seeing the helplessness of their late tigerish opponent, began
snatching back the land they had ceded to Bulgaria.[1] The exhausted
Bulgars, defeated upon every side, yielded to their many foes.

[Footnote 1: See _The Second Balkan War_, page 350.]

Thus we face to-day a new Balkan Peninsula, consisting of half a dozen
little independent nations, all thoroughly democratic, except Turkey.
And even Turkey, we should remember, has made a long stride toward
Democracy by substituting for the autocracy of the Sultan the
constitutional rule of the "Young Turks," These still retain their
political control, though sorely shaken in power by the calamities
their country has undergone under their brief régime.

From this semi-barbarity of southeastern Europe, let us turn to note
the more peaceful progress which seemed promising the West. Little
Portugal suddenly declared herself a Republic in 1910.[2] She had been
having much anarchistic trouble before, killing of kings and hurling of
bombs. Now there was a brief, almost bloodless, uprising; and the young
new king fled. Prophets freely predicted that the unpractical and
unpractised Republic could not last. But instead of destroying itself
in petty quarrels, the new government has seemed to grow more able and
assured with each passing year.

[Footnote 2: See _Portugal Becomes a Republic_, page 28.]

In Spain also, the party favoring a Republic grew so strong that its
leaders declared openly that they could overturn the monarchy any time
they wished. But they said the time was not ripe, they must wait until
the people had become more educated politically, and had learned more
about self-government, before they ventured to attempt it. Here,
therefore, we have Democracy taking a new and important step. To man's
claim of the right of self-government was subjoined the recognition of
the fact that until he reaches a certain level of intelligence he is
unfit to exercise that right, and with it he is likely to bring himself
more harm than happiness.

Perhaps even more impressive was the struggle toward Democracy in
England. Here, from the year 1905 onward, a "Liberal" government in
nominal power was opposed at every turn persistently, desperately,
sometimes hysterically, by a "Conservative" opposition. The Liberals,
after years of worsted effort, saw that they could make no possible
progress unless they broke the power of the always Conservative House
of Lords. They accomplished this in 1911 amid the weeping and wailing
of all Britain's aristocracy, who are thoroughly committed to the
doctrine of the mighty teacher, Carlyle, that men should find out their
great leaders and then follow these with reverent obedience. Of course
the doctrine has in the minds of the British aristocracy the very
natural addendum that _they_ are the great leaders.[1]

[Footnote 1: See _Fall of the English House of Lords_, page 133.]

With the power of the nobles thus swept aside, the British Liberals
went on to that long-demanded extension of Democracy, the granting of
Home Rule to Ireland. Here, too, England's Conservatives fought the
Liberals desperately. And here there was a subtler issue to give the
Conservatives justification. The great majority of Irish are of the
Roman Catholic faith, and so would naturally set up a Catholic
government; but a part of northern Ireland is Protestant and bitterly
opposed to Catholic domination. These Protestants, or "Ulsterites,"
demanded that if the rest of Ireland got home rule, they must get it
also, and be allowed to rule themselves by a separate Parliament of
their own. The Conservatives accepted this democratic demand as an ally
of their conservative clinging to the "good old laws." They encouraged
the Ulsterites even to the point of open rebellion. But despite every
obstacle, the Liberals continued their efforts until the Home Rule bill
was assured in 1914.

Let us look now beyond Europe. England deserves credit for the big
forward step taken by her colonies in South Africa. All of these joined
in 1910 in a union intended to be as indissoluble as that of the United
States. Thus to the mighty English-speaking nations developing in a
united Australia and a united Canada, there was now added a third, the
nation of South Africa.[1]

[Footnote 1: See _Union of South Africa_, page 17.]

In Asia, too, there was a most surprising and notable democratic step.
China declared itself a Republic. Considerable fighting preceded this
change, warfare of a character rather vague and purposeless; for China
is so huge that a harmony of understanding among her hundreds of
millions is not easily attained. Yet, on the whole, with surprisingly
little conflict and confusion the change was made. The oldest nation in
the world joined hands with the youngest in adopting this modern form
of "government by the people."[2] The world is still watching, however,
to see whether the Chinese have passed the level of political wisdom
awaited by the Spanish republicans, and can successfully exercise the
dangerous right they have assumed.

[Footnote 2: See _The Chinese Revolution_, page 238.]

Turn back, for a moment, to review all the wonderful advance in popular
government these brief five years accomplished: in the United States, a
political revolution with changes of the Constitution and of the
machinery of government; in Britain, similar changes of government even
more radical in the direction of Democracy; two wholly new Republics
added to the list, one being China, the oldest and most populous
country in the world, the other little Portugal, long accounted the
most spiritless and unprogressive nation in Europe; a shift from
autocratic British rule toward democratic home rule through all the
vast region of South Africa; a similar shift in much-troubled Ireland;
Socialism reaching out toward power through all central Europe; Woman
Suffrage taking possession of northern Europe and western America and
striding on from country to country, from state to state; a bloody and
desperate people's revolution in Mexico; and a similar one of the
Balkan peoples against Turkey! Individuals may possibly feel that some
one or other of these steps was reckless, even perhaps that some may
ultimately have to be retraced in the world's progress. But of their
general glorious trend no man can doubt.

Were there no reactionary movements to warn us of the terrible
reassertion of autocratic power so soon to deluge earth with horror?
Yes, though there were few democratic defeats to measure against the
splendid record of advance. Russia stood, as she has so long stood, the
dragon of repression. In the days of danger from her own people which
had followed the disastrous Japanese war, Russia had courted her
subject nations by granting them every species of favor. Now with her
returning strength she recommenced her unyielding purpose of
"Russianizing" them. Finland was deprived of the last spark of
independence; so that her own chief champions said of her sadly in
1910, "So ends Finland."[1]

[Footnote 1: See _The Crushing of Finland_, page 47.]

In southern Russia the persecutions of the Jews were recommenced, with
charges of "ritual murder" and other incitements of the ignorant
peasantry to massacre. In Asia, Russia reached out beyond her actual
territory to strangle the new-found voice of liberty in Persia. Russia
coveted the Persian territory; Persia had established a constitutional
government a few years before; this government, with American help,
seemed likely to grow strong and assured in its independence. So
Russia, in the old medieval lawlessness of power, reached out and
crushed the Persian government.[2] At this open exertion of tyranny the
world looked on, disapproving, but not resisting. England, in
particular, was almost forced into an attitude of partnership with
Russia's crime. But she submitted sooner than precipitate that
universal war the menace of which came so grimly close during the
strain of the outbreaks around Turkey. The millennium of universal
peace and brotherhood was obviously still far away. Not yet could the
burden of fleets and armaments be cast aside; though every crisis thus
overpassed without the "world war" increased our hopes of ultimately
evading its unspeakable horror.

[Footnote 2: See _Persia's Loss of Liberty_, page 199.]

MAN'S ADVANCE IN KNOWLEDGE

Meanwhile, in the calm, enduring realm of scientific knowledge, there
was progress, as there is always progress.

No matter what man's cruelty to his fellows, he has still his
curiosity. Hence he continues forever gathering more and more facts
explaining his environment. He continues also molding that environment
to his desires. Imagination makes him a magician.

Most surprising of his recent steps in this exploration of his
surroundings was the attainment of the South Pole in 1911.[1] This came
so swiftly upon the conquest of the North Pole, that it caught the
world unprepared; it was an unexpected triumph. Yet it marks the
closing of an era. Earth's surface has no more secrets concealed from
man. For half a century past, the only remaining spaces of complete
mystery, of utter blankness on our maps, were the two Poles. And now
both have been attained. The gaze of man's insatiable wonderment must
hereafter be turned upon the distant stars.

[Footnote 1: See _Discovery of the South Pole_, page 218.]

But man does not merely explore his environment; he alters it. Most
widespread and important of our recent remodelings of our surroundings
has been the universal adoption of the automobile. This machine has so
increased in popularity and in practical utility that we may well call
ours the "Automobile Age." The change is not merely that one form of
vehicle is superseding another on our roads and in our streets. We face
an impressive theme for meditation in the fact that up to the present
generation man was still, as regarded his individual personal transit,
in the same position as the Romans of two thousand years ago, dependent
upon the horse as his swiftest mode of progress. With the automobile we
have suddenly doubled, quadrupled the size of our "neighborhood," the
space which a man may cover alone at will for a ramble or a call. As
for speed, we seem to have succumbed to an actual mania for
ever-increasing motion. The automobile is at present the champion
speed-maker, the fastest means of propelling himself man has yet
invented. But the aeroplane and the hydroplane are not far behind, and
even the electric locomotive has a thrill of promise for the speed
maniac.[2]

[Footnote 2: See _Man's Fastest Mile_, page 73.]

In thus developing his mastery over Nature man sometimes forgets his
danger, oversteps the narrow margin of safety he has left between
himself and the baffled forces of his ancient tyrants, Fire and Water,
Earth and Air. Then indeed, in his moments of weakness, the primordial
forces turn upon him and he becomes subject to tragic and terrific
punishment. Of such character was the most prominent disaster of these
years, the sinking of the ocean steamer _Titanic_. The best talent of
England and America had united to produce this monster ship, which was
hailed as the last, the biggest, the most perfect thing man could do in
shipbuilding. It was pronounced "unsinkable." Its captain was reckless
in his confidence; and Nature reached down in menace from the regions
of northern ice; and the ship perished.[1] Since then another great
ship has sunk, under almost similar conditions, and with almost equal
loss of life.

[Footnote 1: See _Tragedy of the Titanic_, page 265.]

Oddly enough at the very moment when we have thus had reimpressed upon
us the uncertainty of our outward mechanical defenses against the
elements, we have been making a curious addition to our knowledge of
inner means of defense. The science of medicine has taken several
impressive strides in recent years, but none more suggestive of future
possibilities of prolonging human life than the recent work done in
preserving man's internal organs and tissues to a life of their own
outside the body.[2] Already it is possible to transfer healthy tissues
thus preserved, or even some of the simpler organs, from one body to
another. Men begin to talk of the probability of rejuvenating the
entire physical form. Thus science may yet bring us to encounter as
actual fact the deep philosophic thought of old, the thought that
regards man as merely a will and a brain, and the body as but the
outward clothing of these, mere drapery, capable of being changed as
the spirit wills. There is no visible limit to this wondrous drama in
which man's patient mastering of his immediate environment is gradually
teaching him to mold to his purpose all the potent forces of the
universe.

[Footnote 2: See _Our Progressing Knowledge of Life Surgery_, page
273.]

In this assurance of ultimate success, let us find such consolation as
we may. Though world-war may continue its devastation, though its
increasing horrors may shake our civilization to the deepest depths,
though its wanton destruction may rob us of the hoarded wealth of
generations and the art treasures of all the past, though its beastlike
massacres may reduce the number of men fitted to bear onward the torch
of progress until of their millions only a mere pitiable handful
survive, yet the steps which science has already won cannot be lost.
Knowledge survives; and a happier generation than ours standing some
day secure against the monster of militarism shall continue to uplift
man's understanding till he dwells habitually on heights as yet
undreamed.




THE UNITED STATES HOUSE OF GOVERNORS

A NEW MACHINERY ADDED TO THE FEDERAL FORM OF GOVERNMENT

A.D. 1910

WILLIAM G. JORDAN

THE GOVERNORS

The formal establishment of the "House of Governors," which took place
in January of 1910, marked the climax of a definite movement which has
swept onward through the entire history of the United States.

When in 1775 the thirteen American colonies made their first effort
toward united action, they were in truth thirteen different nations,
each possessed of differing traditions and a separate history, and each
suspicious and jealous of all the others. Their widely diverging
interests made concerted action almost impossible during the
Revolutionary War. And when necessity ultimately drove them to join in
the close bond of the present United States, their constitution was
planned less for union than for the protection of each suspicious State
against the aggressions of the others.

Gradually the spread of intercourse among the States has worn away
their more marked differential points of character and purpose. Step by
step the course of history has forced our people into closer harmony
and union. To-day the forty-eight States look to one another in true
brotherhood. And as the final bond of that brotherhood they have
established a new organization, the House of Governors. This
constitutes the only definite change made in the United States
machinery of government since the beginning.

The House of Governors sprang first from the suggestion of William
George Jordan, who was afterward appropriately selected as its
permanent secretary. Hence we give here Mr. Jordan's own account of the
movement, as being its clearest possible elucidation. Then we give a
series of brief estimates of the importance of the new step from the
pens of those Governors who themselves took part in the gathering. In
their ringing utterances you hear the voice of North and South,
Illinois and Florida, of East and West, Massachusetts and Oregon, and
of the great central Mississippi Valley, all announcing the
fraternizing influence of the new step.

Governor Willson, of Kentucky, chairman of the committee which arranged
the gathering, in an earnest speech to its members declared that, "If
this conference of Governors had been in existence as an institution in
1860, there would never have been a war between the States. The issues
of the day would have been settled by argument, adjustment, and
compromise." It would be hard to find stronger words for measuring the
possible importance of the new institution.

WILLIAM G. JORDAN

The conference of the Governors at Washington this month marks the
beginning of a new epoch in the political history of the nation. It is
the first meeting ever held of the State Executives as a body seeking,
by their united influence, to secure uniform laws on vital subjects for
the welfare of the entire country. It should not be confused with the
Roosevelt conferences of May and December, 1908. It is in no sense a
continuation of them. It is essentially different in aim, method, and
basis, and is larger, broader, and more far-reaching in its
possibilities.

The nation to-day is facing a grave crisis in its history. Vital
problems affecting the welfare of the whole country, remaining unsolved
through the years, have at last reached an acute stage where they
_demand_ solution. This solution must come now in some form--either in
harmony with the Constitution or in defiance of it. The Federal
Government has been and still is absolutely powerless to act because of
constitutional limitation; the State governments have the sole power,
but heretofore no way has been provided for them to exercise that
power.

Senator Elihu Root points out fairly, squarely, and relentlessly the
two great dangers confronting the Republic: the danger of the National
Government breaking down in its effective machinery through the burdens
that threaten to be cast upon it; and the danger that the local
self-government of the States may, through disuse, become inefficient.
The House of Governors plan seems to have in it possibilities of
mastering both of these evils at one stroke.

There are three basic weaknesses in the American system of government
as we know it to-day. There are three insidious evils that are creeping
like a blood-poison through the body politic, threatening the very life
of the Republic. They are killing the soul of self-government, though
perhaps not its form; destroying its essence, though perhaps not its
name.

These three evils, so intertwined as to be practically one, are: the
growing centralization at Washington, the shifting, undignified,
uncertain status of State rights, and the lack of uniform laws.

It was to propose a possible cure for these three evils that the writer
sent in February, 1907, to President Roosevelt and to the Governors of
the country a pamphlet on a new idea in American politics. It was the
institution of a new House, a new representation of the people and of
the States to secure uniform legislation on those questions wherein the
Federal Governments could not act because of Constitutional limitation.
The plan proposed, so simple that it would require no Constitutional
amendment to put it into effect, was the organization of the House of
Governors.

More than thirty Governors responded in cordial approval of the plan.
Eight months later, October, 1907, President Roosevelt invited the
State Executives to a conference at Washington in May, 1908. The writer
pointed out at that time what seemed an intrinsic weakness of the
convention, that it could have little practical result, because it
would be, after all, only a conference, where the Federal Government,
by its limitations, was powerless to carry the findings of the
conference into effect, and the Governors, acting not as a co-operative
body, but as individuals, would be equally powerless in effecting
uniform legislation. It was a conference of conflicting powers.

The Governors were then urged to meet upon their own initiative, as a
body of peers, working out by united State action those problems where
United States action had for more than a century proved powerless. At
the close of the Roosevelt conference the Governors, at an adjourned
meeting, appointed a committee to arrange time and place for a session
of the Governors in a body of their own, independently of the
President. This movement differentiated the proposed meeting absolutely
from that with the President in every fundamental. It essentially
became more than a conference; it meant a deliberative body of the
Governors uniting to initiate, to inspire, and to influence uniform
laws. The committee then named, consisting of three members, later
increased to five, set the dates January 18, 19, and 20, 1910, for the
first session of the Governors as a separate body.

WILLIAM G. JORDAN[1]

[Footnote 1: Reproduced from _The Craftsman_ of October, 1910, by
permission of Gustav Stickley.]

When a new idea or a new institution confronts the world it must answer
all challenges, show its credentials, specify its claims for
usefulness, and prove its promise by its performance. As an idea the
House of Governors has won the cordial approval of the American press
and public; as an institution it must now justify this confidence. To
grasp fully its powers and possibilities requires a clear, definite
understanding of its spirit, scope, plan, and purpose, and its attitude
toward the Federal Government.

The House of Governors is a union of the Governors of all the States,
meeting annually in conference as a deliberative body (with no
lawmaking power) for initiative, influence, and inspiration toward a
better, higher, and more unified Statehood. Its organization will be
simple and practical, avoiding red-tape, unnecessary formality, and
elaborate rules and regulations. It will adopt the few fundamental
expressions of its principles of action and the least number of rules
that are absolutely essential to enunciate its plan and scope, to
transmute its united wisdom into united action and to guarantee the
coherence, continuity, and permanence of the organization despite the
frequent changes in its membership due to the short terms of the
Executives in many of the States.

With the House of Governors rests the power of securing through the
cooperative action of the State legislatures uniform laws on vital
questions demanded by the whole country almost since the dawn of our
history, but heretofore impossible of enactment. The Federal Government
is powerless to pass these laws. For many decades, tight held by the
cramping bonds of Constitutional limitation, it has strained and
struggled, like Samson in the temple, to find some weak spot at which
it could free itself, and endangered the very supporting columns of the
edifice of the Republic. It was bound in its lawmaking powers to the
limitation of eighteen specific phrases, beyond which all power
remained with the States and the people. In the matter of enacting
uniform laws the States have been equally powerless, for, though their
Constitutional right to make them was absolute and unquestioned, no way
had been provided by which they could exercise that right. The States
as individuals, passing their own laws, without considering their
relation or harmony with the laws of other States, brought about a
condition of confusion and conflict. Laws that from their very nature
should be common to all of the States, in the best interests of all,
are now divergent, different, and antagonistic. We have to-day the
strange anomaly of forty-six States united in a union as integral parts
of a single nation, yet having many laws of fundamental importance as
different as though the States were forty-six distinct countries or
nationalities.

Facing the duality of incapacity--that of the Government because it was
not permitted to act and the States because they did not know how to
exercise the power they possessed--the Federal Government sought new
power for new needs through Constitutional amendments. This effort
proved fruitless and despairing, for with more than two thousand
attempts made in over a century only three amendments were secured, and
these were merely to wind up the Civil War. The whole fifteen
amendments taken together have not added the weight of a hair of
permanent new power to the Federal Government. The people and the
States often sleep serenely on their rights, but they never willingly
surrender them, yet the surrender of a right is often the brave
recognition of a higher duty, the fine assumption of a higher
privilege. In many phases the need grew urgent, something had to be
done. By ingeniously tapping the Constitution to find a weak place and
hammering it thin by decisions, by interpretations, by liberal
readings, by technical evasions and other methods, needed laws were
passed in the interests of the people and the States. Many of these
laws would not stand the rigid scrutiny of the Supreme Court; to many
of them the Government's title may now be valid by a kind of
"squatter's sovereignty" in legislation,--merely so many years of
undisputed possession.

This was not the work of one administration; it ran with intermittent
ebb and flow through many administrations. Then the slumbering States,
turning restlessly in their complacency, at last awoke and raised a
mighty cry of "Centralization." They claimed that the Government was
taking away their rights, which may be correct in essence but hardly
just in form; they had lost their rights, primarily, not through
usurpation but through abrogation; the Government had acted because of
the default of the States, it had practically been forced to exercise
powers limited to the States because the States lapsed through neglect
and inaction. Then the Government discovered the vulnerable spot in our
great charter, the Achilles heel of the Constitution. It was just six
innocent-looking words in section eight empowering Congress to
"regulate commerce between the several States." It was a rubber phrase,
capable of infinite stretching. It was drawn out so as to cover
antitrust legislation, control and taxation of corporations,
water-power, railroad rates, etc., pure-food law, white-slave traffic,
and a host of others. But even with the most generous extension of this
phrase, which, though it may be necessary, was surely not the original
intent of the Constitution, the greatest number of the big problems
affecting the welfare of the people are still outside the province of
the Government and are up to the States for solution.

It was to meet this situation, wherein the Government and the States as
individuals could not act, that the simple, self-evident plan of the
House of Governors was proposed. It required no Constitutional
amendment or a single new law passed in any State to create it or to
continue it. It can not make laws; it would be unwise for it to make
them even were it possible. Its sole power is as a mighty moral
influence, as a focusing point for public opinion and as a body equal
to its opportunity of transforming public opinion into public sentiment
and inspiring legislatures to crystallize this sentiment into needed
laws. It will live only as it represents the people, as it has their
sympathy, support, and cooperation, as it seeks to make the will of the
people prevail. But this means a longer, stronger, finer life than any
mere legal authority could give it.

The House of Governors has the dignity of simplicity. It means merely
the conference of the State Executives, the highest officers and truest
representatives of the States, on problems that are State and
Interstate, and concerted action in recommendations to their
legislatures. The fullest freedom would prevail at all meetings; no
majority vote would control the minority; there would have to be a
quorum decided upon as the number requisite for an initial impulse
toward uniform legislation. If the number approving fell below the
quorum the subject would be shown as not yet ripe for action and be
shelved. Members would be absolutely free to accept or reject, to do
exactly as they please, so no unwilling legislation could be forced on
any State. But if a sufficient number agreed these Governors would
recommend the passage of the desired law to their legislatures in their
next messages. The united effort would give it a greater importance, a
larger dynamic force, and a stronger moral influence with each. It
would be backed by the influence of the Governors, the power of public
sentiment, the leverage of the press, so that the passage of the law
should come easily and naturally. With a few States passing it, others
would fall in line; it would be kept a live issue and followed up and
in a few years we would have legislation national in scope, but not in
genesis.

The House of Governors, in its attitude toward the Federal Government,
is one of right and dignified non-interference. It will not use its
influence with the Government, memorialize Congress, or pass
resolutions on national matters. What the Governors do or say
individually is, of course, their right and privilege, but as a body it
took its stand squarely and positively at its first conference which
met in Washington in January of this year as one of "securing greater
uniformity of State action and better State Government." Governor
Hughes expressed it in these words: "We are here in our own right as
State Executives; we are not here to accelerate or to develop opinion
with regard to matters which have been committed to Federal power." The
States in their relation to the Federal Government have all needed
representation in their Senators and Congressmen.

The attitude of the Governors in their conferences is one of
concentration on State and Interstate problems which are outside of the
domain and Constitutional rights of the Federal Government to solve.
There can be no interference when each confines itself to its own
duties. In keeping the time of the nation the Federal Government
represents the hour-hand, the States, united, the minute-hand. There
will be correct time only as each hand confines itself strictly to its
own business, neither attempting to jog the other, but working in
accord with the natural harmony wrapped up in the mechanism.

We need to-day to draw the sharpest clear-cut line of demarcation
between Federal and State powers. This is in no spirit of antagonism,
but in the truest harmony for the best interests of both. It means an
illumination which will show that the "twilight zone," so called, does
not exist. This dark continent of legislation belongs absolutely to the
States and to the people in the unmistakable terms of the Tenth
Amendment: "The powers not delegated to the United States by the
Constitution or prohibited by it to the States are reserved to the
States, respectively, and to the people." This buffer territory of
legislation, the domain of needed uniform laws, belongs to the States
and through the House of Governors they may enter in and possess their
own. The Federal Government and the States are parts of one great
organization, each having its specific duties, powers, and
responsibilities, and between them should be no conflict, no inharmony.

Let the Federal Government, through Congress, make laws up to the very
maximum of its rights and duties under the Constitution; let the
States, taking up their neglected duties and privileges, relieve the
Government of those cares and responsibilities forced upon it by the
inactivity of the States and which it should never have had to assume.
With the burden thus equitably readjusted, with the dignity of the two
powers of Government working out their individual problems in the
harmony of a fuller understanding, let us face the results. If it then
seem, in the light of changed conditions from those of the time of the
writing of the Constitution, that certain control now held by the
States can not properly be exercised by them, that in final decision of
the best wisdom of the people this power should be vested in the
Federal Government, let the States not churlishly hold on to the casket
of a dead right, but surrender the living body of a responsibility and
a duty to the power best able to be its guardian. There are few, if
any, of their neglected powers of legislation that the States and the
people acting in cooperation, through the House of Governors, will not
be able to handle.

Some of the subjects upon which free discussion tending toward uniform
laws seems desirable are: marriage and divorce, rights of married
women, corporations and trusts, insurance, child labor, capital
punishment, direct primaries, convict labor and labor in general,
prison reforms, automobile regulations, contracts, banking,
conveyancing, inheritance tax, income tax, mortgages, initiative,
referendum and recall, election reforms, tax adjustment, and similar
topics. In great questions, like Conservation, the Federal Government
has distinct problems it must carry out alone; there are some problems
that must be solved by the States alone, some that may require to be
worked out in cooperation. But the greatest part of the needed
conservation is that which belongs to the States, and which they can
manage better, more thoroughly, more judiciously, with stronger appeal
to State pride, upbuilding, and prosperity, with less conflict and
clearer recognition of local needs and conditions and harmony with them
than can the Federal Government. Four-fifths of the timber standing in
the country to-day is owned, not by the States or the Government, but
by private interests.

The House of Governors will not seek uniformity merely for the sake of
uniformity. There are many questions whereon uniform laws would be
unnecessary, and others where it would be not only unwise, but
inconceivably foolish. Many States have purely individual problems that
do not concern the other States and do not come in conflict with them,
but even in these the Governors may gain an occasional incidental
sidelight of illumination from the informal discussion in a conference
that may make thinking clearer and action wiser. The spirit that should
inspire the States is the fullest freedom in purely State problems and
the largest unity in laws that affect important questions in Interstate
relations.

While uniform law is an important element in the thought of the
Conference it is far from being the only one. The frank, easy
interchange of view, opinion, and experience brings the Governors
closely together in the fine fellowship of a common purpose and a
common ideal. They are broadened, stimulated, and inspired to a keener,
clearer vision on a wider outlook. The most significant, vital, and
inspiring phases of these conferences, those which really count for
most, and are the strongest guaranties of the permanence and power of
this movement, must, however, remain intangible. This fact was manifest
in every moment of that first Conference last January.

The fading of sectional prejudice in the glow of sympathetic
understanding was clearly evident. Some of the Western Governors in
their speeches said that their people of the West had felt that they
were isolated, misrepresented, misunderstood, and misjudged; but now
these Governors could go back to their States and their people with
messages of good will and tell them of the identity of interest, the
communion of purpose, the kinship of common citizenship, and the closer
knowledge that bound them more firmly to the East, to the South, and to
the North. Other Governors spoke of the facilitating of official
business between the States because of these meetings. They would no
longer, in correspondence, write to a State Executive as a mere name
without personality, but their letters would carry with them the
memories of close contact and cordial association with those whom they
had learned to know. There was no faintest tinge of State jealousies or
rivalry. The Governors talked frankly, freely, earnestly of their
States and for them, but it was ever with the honest pride of
trusteeship, never the petty vanity of proprietorship.

Patriotism seemed to throw down the walls of political party and
partizanship and in the three days' session the words Republican or
Democrat were never once spoken. The Governors showed themselves an
able body of men keenly alive to the importance of their work and with
a firm grasp on the essential issues. The meeting added a new dignity
to Statehood and furnished a new revelation of the power, prestige, and
possibilities of the Governor's office. The atmosphere of the session
was that of States' rights, but it was a new States' rights, a
purified, finer, higher recognition by the States of their individual
right and duty of self-government within their Constitutional
limitations. It meant no lessening of interest in the Federal
Government or of respect and honor of it. It was as a family of sons
growing closer together, strengthened as individuals and working to
solve those problems they have in common, and to make their own way
rather than to depend in weakness on the father of the household to
manage all their affairs and do their thinking for them. To him should
be left the watchfulness of the family as a whole, not the dictation of
their individual living.

President Taft had no part in the Conference, but in an address of
welcome to the Governors at the White House showed his realization of
the vital possibility of the meeting in these words:

"I regard this movement as of the utmost importance. The Federal
Constitution has stood the test of more than one hundred years in
supplying the powers that have been needed to make the central
Government as strong as it ought to be, and with this movement toward
uniform legislation and agreement between the States I do not see why
the Constitution may not serve our purpose always."

AUGUSTUS E. WILLSON[1]

Governor of Kentucky

[Footnote 1: The following letters are reprinted by permission from a
collection of such commentaries from _Cottier's Weekly_.]

President Roosevelt held two conferences of Governors, and as a member
of a committee chosen to do so, I have invited the Governors of all of
the States and Territories to meet at the White House in Washington,
January 18th, 19th, and 20th.

The conference has no legal authority of any kind. At the previous
conferences, the conservation subject was the one chiefly thought of,
and it will be brought up in the next conference. The question of what
the Governors will recommend on the income-tax constitutional amendment
may come up. The matter of handling extradition papers is important.
Uniform State laws on matters of universal interest, school laws, road
laws, tax laws, commercial paper, warehouse receipts, bills of lading,
etc.; the control of corporations, of which taxation is one branch, the
action of the States in regard to water-powers within the States;
marriage, divorce, wills, schools, roads, are all within the range of
this conference, and the agreement of all of the Governors on some of
these subjects, and by many of them on any, would be of useful
influence.

The meeting has further interest and importance in being for two days
in touch with the National Civic Federation, which will afford all of
the Governors a chance to learn what that association of many of the
most prominent men of this country is doing, and get the benefit of its
discussions and the pleasure of being acquainted with many leaders of
thought and action in the country, who will attend its sessions.

I am sure that I speak the sentiment of all of the Governors that they
do not wish any legal power or any authority except that of the weight
of their opinion as chosen State officers. They only wish the benefit
of discussion of important subjects interesting to all of the States,
and to establish kindly and mutually helpful relations between the
Governors and the Governments of the States.

EBEN S. DRAPER

Governor of Massachusetts

I believe that a meeting of Governors may accomplish much good for
every section of the country. They naturally can not legislate, nor
should they attempt to. They can discuss and can learn many things
which are now controlled by law in different States and which would be
improvements to the laws of their own States; and they can recommend to
the legislatures of their own States the enactment of laws which will
bring about these improvements.

These Governors will be the forty-six [now forty-eight] representative
units of the States of this great nation. By coming together they will
be more than ever convinced that they are integral parts of one nation,
and I believe their meeting will tend to remove all notions of
sectionalism and will help the patriotism and solidarity of the
country.

CHARLES S. DENEEN

Governor of Illinois

The conservation of natural resources often necessitates the
cooperation of neighboring States. In such cases, the discussion of
proposed conservation work by the representatives of the States
concerned is of great importance. It brings to the consideration of
these subjects the views and opinions of those most interested and best
informed in regard to the questions involved.

The same is true in relation to many subjects of State legislation in
which uniformity is desirable. This is especially the case with regard
to industrial legislation. The great volume of domestic business is
interstate, and the industrial legislation of one State frequently
affects, and sometimes fixes, industrial conditions elsewhere. An
example of the advantage of cooperation of States in the amendment and
revision of laws affecting industry is seen in the agreement by the
commissions recently appointed by New York, Wisconsin, and Minnesota to
investigate the subjects of employers' liability and workmen's
compensation to meet for the joint discussion of these matters. The
General Assembly of Illinois is now convened in extraordinary session,
and has under consideration the appointment of a similar commission in
order that it may meet and cooperate with the commissions of the States
named.

Along these and other similar lines it seems to me that the House of
Governors will be of practical advantage in the beneficial influence it
will exert in the promotion of joint action where that is necessary to
secure desired ends.

FRANK W. BENSON Governor of Oregon

President Roosevelt rendered the American people a great service when
he invited the Governors of the various States to a conference at the
White House in 1908. The subject of conservation of our natural
resources received such attention from the assembled Governors that the
conservation movement has spread to all parts of the country, and has
gained such headway that it will be of lasting benefit to our people.
This one circumstance alone proves the wisdom of the conference of
Governors, and it is my earnest hope that the organization be made
permanent, with annual meetings at our national capital.

Such meetings can not help but have a broadening effect upon our State
Executives, for, by interchanging ideas and by learning how the
governments of other States are conducted, our Governors will gain
experience which ought to prove of great benefit, not only to
themselves, but to the commonwealths which they represent. Matters
pertaining to interstate relations, taxation, education, conservation,
irrigation, waterways, uniform legislation, and the management of State
institutions are among the subjects that the conference of Governors
will do well to discuss; and such discussions will prove of inestimable
value, not only to the people of our different States, but to our
country as a whole.

The West is in the front rank of all progressive movements and welcomes
the conference of Governors as a step in the right direction.

ALBERT W. GILCHRIST

Governor of Florida

I can only estimate the significance and importance of this conference
of Governors by my experience from such a conference in the past. It
was my good fortune to be for a week last October on the steamer
excursion down the Mississippi River. The Governors held daily
conferences. Several elucidated the manner in which some particular
governmental problems were solved in their respective States, all of
which was more or less interesting. Of the several Federal matters
discussed, it was specially interesting to me to hear the various
Republican Governors discussing State rights, disputing the right of
interference of the General Government on such lines. It "kinder" made
me smile. In formal discussions of such matters in public, in
Washington, it is probable that such expressions would not be made.

The result of this conference made me feel as if I knew the Governors
and the people of the various States therein represented far better
than I had before. Such discussions, with the attending personal
intercourse, naturally tend to give those participating in them a
broader nationality.

The House of Governors will convene; there will be many pleasant social
functions and many pleasant associations will be formed. Some of the
Governors will speak; all of them will resolute. They will behold
evidences of the greatness of our common country and the evidence of
the greatness of our public men, as displayed in the rollicking debates
in the House, and the "knot on the log" discussions of the Senate.
Everything will be as lovely as a Christmas tree. The House will then
adjourn.

HERBERT S. HADLEY

Governor of Missouri

During recent years, the development of the National idea has carried
with it a marked tendency on the part of the people to look to the
National Government for the correction of all evils and abuses existing
in commercial, industrial, and political affairs. The importance of the
State Governments in the solution of such questions has been minimized,
and, in some cases, entirely overlooked, although Congress has been
behind, rather than in advance of, public sentiment upon many questions
of national importance. The Congressmen are elected by the people of
the different Congressional Districts, and regard their most important
duty as looking after the interests of their respective districts. The
United States Senators are elected by the legislatures of the several
States, and do not feel that sense of responsibility to the people that
is incident to an election by the people. The Governors of the various
States are elected by all of the people of the State, and they are more
directly "tribunes of the people" than any other officials, either in
our National or State Governments. These officers will thus give a
correct expression of the sentiment of the people of the States upon
public questions.

While these expressions of opinion will naturally vary according to the
sentiments and opinions of the people of the various States
represented, yet, on the whole, they will represent more of progress
and more of actual contact with present-day problems than could be
secured from any similar number of public officials. And the addresses
and discussions will also tend to mold the opinions of the people and
have a marked influence not only upon State, but also upon National
legislation.




UNION OF SOUTH AFRICA A.D. 1910

PROF. STEPHEN LEACOCK

Few historical events have been so impressive as the sudden and
complete union of the South-African States. Seldom have men's minds
progressed so rapidly, their life purposes changed so completely. In
1902 England, with the aid of her African colonists in Cape Colony and
Natal, was ending a bitter war, almost of extermination, against the
Dutch "Boers" of the Transvaal and the Orange Free State. In that year
the ablest and most dreaded of England's enemies in Africa was the
Dutch General, Louis Botha, leader of the fiercest and most
irreconcilable Boers, who still waged a hopeless guerrilla warfare
against all the might of the British Empire. As one English paper
dramatically phrases it: "One used to see pictures of Botha in the
illustrated papers in those days, a gaunt, bearded, formidable figure,
with rifle and bandoliers--the most dangerous of our foes. To-day he is
the chief servant of the King in the Federation, the loyal head of the
Administration under the Crown, one of the half-dozen Prime Ministers
of the Empire, the responsible representative and virtual ruler of all
races, classes, and sects in South Africa, acclaimed by the men he led
in the battle and the rout no less than by the men who faced him across
the muzzles of the Mausers ten years ago. Was ever so strange a
transformation, so swift an oblivion of old enmities and rancors, so
rapid a growth of union and concord out of hatred and strife!"

Necessity has in a way compelled this harmony. The old issue of Boer
independence being dead, new and equally vital issues confronted the
South-Africans. The whites there are scarcely more than a million in
number, and they dwell amid many times their number of savage blacks.
They must unite or perish. Moreover, the folly and expense of
maintaining four separate governments for so small a population were
obvious. So was the need of uniform tariffs in a land where all
sea-coast towns found their prosperity in forwarding supplies to the
rich central mining regions of Kimberley and Johannesburg. Hence all
earnest men of whatever previous opinion came to see the need of union.
And when this union had been accomplished, Lord Gladstone, the British
viceroy over South Africa, wisely selected as the fittest man for the
land's first Prime Minister, General Botha. Botha has sought to unite
all interests in the cabinet which he gathered around him.

The clear analysis of the new nation and its situation which follows is
reproduced by permission from the _American Political Science Review_,
and is from the pen of Professor Stephen Leacock, head of the
department of Political Economy of McGill University in Montreal,
Canada. A distinguished citizen of one great British federation may
well be accepted as the ablest commentator on the foundation of
another.

On May 31, 1910, the Union of South Africa became an accomplished fact.
The four provinces of Cape Colony, Natal, the Orange Free State (which
bears again its old-time name), and the Transvaal are henceforth
joined, one might almost say amalgamated, under a single government.
They will bear to the central government of the British Empire the same
relation as the other self-governing colonies--Canada, Newfoundland,
Australia, and New Zealand. The Empire will thus assume the appearance
of a central nucleus with four outlying parts corresponding to
geographical and racial divisions, and forming in all a ground-plan
that seems to invite a renewal of the efforts of the Imperial
Federationist. To the scientific student of government the Union of
South Africa is chiefly of interest for the sharp contrast it offers to
the federal structure of the American, Canadian, and other systems of
similar historical ground. It represents a reversion from the idea of
State rights, and balanced indestructible powers and an attempt at
organic union by which the constituent parts are to be more and more
merged in the consolidated political unit which they combine to form.

But the Union and its making are of great interest also for the general
student of politics and history, concerned rather with the development
of a nationality than with the niceties of constitutional law. From
this point of view the Union comes as the close of a century of strife,
as the aftermath of a great war, and indicates the consummation, for
the first time in history, of what appears as a solid basis of harmony
between the two races in South Africa. In one shape or other union has
always been the goal of South-African aspiration. It was "Union" which
the "prancing proconsuls" of an earlier time--the Freres, the
Shepstones, and the Lanyons--tried to force upon the Dutch. A united
Africa was at once the dream of a Rhodes and (perhaps) the ambition of
a Kruger. It is necessary to appreciate the strength of this desire for
union on the part of both races and the intense South-African
patriotism in which it rests in order to understand how the different
sections and races of a country so recently locked in the
death-struggle of a three years' war could be brought so rapidly into
harmonious concert.

The point is well illustrated by looking at the composition of the
convention, which, in its sessions at Durban, Cape Town, and
Bloemfontein, put together the present constitution. South Africa, from
its troubled history, has proved itself a land of strong men. But it
was reserved for the recent convention to bring together within the
compass of a single council-room the surviving leaders of the period of
conflict to work together for the making of a united state. In looking
over the list of them and reflecting on the part that they played
toward one another in the past, one realizes that we have here a grim
irony of history. Among them is General Louis Botha, Prime Minister at
the moment of the Transvaal, and now the first prime minister of South
Africa. Botha, in the days of Generals Buller and the Dugela, was the
hardest fighter of the Boer Republic. Beside him in the convention was
Dr. Jameson, whom Botha wanted to hang after the raid in 1896. Another
member is Sir George Farrar, who was sentenced to death for complicity
in the raid, and still another, Sir Percy Fitzpatrick, once the
secretary of the Reform League at Johannesburg and well known as the
author of the "Transvaal from Within." One may mention in contrast
General Jan Smuts, an ex-leader of the Boer forces, and since the war
the organizing brain of the Het Volk party. There is also Mr. Merriman,
a leader of the British party of opposition to the war in 1899 and
since then a bitter enemy of Lord Milner and the new regime.

Yet strangely enough after some four months of session the convention
accomplished the impossible by framing a constitution that met the
approval of the united delegates. Of its proceedings no official
journal was kept. The convention met first at Durban, October 12, 1908,
where it remained throughout that month; after a fortnight's interval
it met again at Capetown, and with a three weeks' interruption at
Christmas continued and completed its work at the end of the first week
of February. The constitution was then laid before the different
colonial parliaments. In the Transvaal its acceptance was a matter of
course, as the delegates of both parties had reached an agreement on
its terms. The Cape Parliament passed amendments which involved giving
up the scheme of proportional representation as adopted by the
convention. Similar amendments were offered by the Orange River Colony
in which the Dutch leader sympathized with the leader of the
Afrikanderbond at the Cape in desiring to swamp out, rather than
represent, minorities. In Natal, which as an ultra-British and
ultra-loyal colony, was generally supposed to be in fear of union, many
amendments were offered. The convention then met again at Bloemfontein,
made certain changes in the draft of the constitution, and again
submitted the document to the colonies. This time it was accepted. Only
in Natal was it thought necessary to take a popular vote, and here,
contrary to expectation, the people voted heavily in favor of union.
The logic of the situation compelled it. In the history of the movement
Natal was cast for the same role as Rhode Island in the making of the
Federal Union of the United States of America. The other colonies, once
brought together into a single system, with power to adopt arrangements
in their own interests in regard to customs duties and transportation
rates, sheer economic pressure would have compelled the adhesion of
Natal. In the constitution now put in force in South Africa the central
point of importance is that it established what is practically a
unitary and not a federal government. The underlying reason for this is
found in the economic circumstances of the country and in the situation
in which the provinces found themselves during the years after the war.
Till that event the discord of South Africa was generally thought of
rather as a matter of racial rivalry and conflicting sovereignties than
of simple questions of economic and material interests.

But after the conclusion of the compact of Vereiniging in 1902 it was
found that many of the jealousies and difficulties of the respective
communities had survived the war, and rested rather upon economic
considerations than racial rivalries.

To begin with, there was the question of customs relations. The
colonies were separate units, each jealous of its own industrial
prosperity. Each had the right to make its own tariff, and yet the
division of the country, with four different tariff areas, was
obviously to its general disadvantage. Since 1903 the provinces had
been held together under the Customs Union of South Africa--made by the
governments of the Cape and Natal and the Crown Colony governments of
the conquered provinces. This was but a makeshift arrangement, with a
common tariff made by treaty, and hence rigidly unalterable, and with a
pro-rata division of the proceeds.

Worse still was the railroad problem, which has been in South Africa a
bone of contention ever since the opening of the mines of the Rand
offered a rich prize to any port and railway that could capture the
transit trade.

The essence of the situation is simple. The center of the wealth of
South Africa is the Johannesburg mines. This may not be forever the
case, but in the present undeveloped state of agriculture and
industrial life, Johannesburg is the dominating factor of the country.

Now, Johannesburg can not feed and supply itself. It is too busy. Its
one export is gold. Its quarter of a million people must be supplied
from the outside. But the Transvaal is an inland country dependent on
the seaports of other communities. In position Johannesburg is like the
hub of a wheel from which the railways radiate as spokes to the
seaports along the rim. The line from Cape Town to Johannesburg, a
distance of over 700 miles, was the first completed, and until 1894 the
Cape enjoyed a monopoly of carrying the whole trade of Johannesburg.
But with the completion of the tunnel through the mountains at Laing's
Nek the Natal government railway was able to connect with Johannesburg
and the port of Durban entered into competition with the Cape Ports of
Cape Town and East London over a line only 485 miles long.

Finally, the opening of the Delagoa Bay Railway in 1894 supplied
Johannesburg with an access to the sea over a line 396 miles long, of
which 341 was in the Transvaal itself. This last line, it should be
noticed, led to a Portuguese seaport, and at the time of its building
traversed nowhere British territory. Hence it came about that in the
all-important matter of railroad communication the interests of the
Transvaal and of the seaboard colonies were diametrically opposed.

To earn as large a revenue as possible it naturally adjusted the rates
on its lines so as to penalize the freight from the colonies and favor
the Delagoa Bay road. When the colonies tried in 1895 to haul freight
by ox-team from their rail-head at the frontier to Johannesburg
President Kruger "closed the drifts" and almost precipitated a conflict
in arms. Since the war the same situation has persisted, aggravated by
the completion of the harbor works and docks at Lorenzo Marques, which
favors more than ever the Delagoa route. The Portuguese seaport at
present receives some 67 per cent, of the traffic from the Rand, while
the Cape ports, which in 1894 had 80 per cent, of the freight, now
receive only n per cent.

Under Lord Milner's government the unification of the railways of the
Transvaal and the Orange River colony with the Central South-African
Railways amalgamated the interests of the inland colonies, but left
them still opposed to those of the seaboard. The impossibility of
harmonizing the situation under existing political conditions has been
one of the most potent forces in creating a united government which
alone could deal with the question.

An equally important factor has been the standing problem of the native
races, which forms the background of South-African politics. In no
civilized country is this question of such urgency. South Africa, with
a white population of only 1,133,000 people, contains nearly 7,000,000
native and colored inhabitants, many of them, such as the Zulus and the
Basutos, fierce, warlike tribes scarcely affected by European
civilization, and wanting only arms and organization to offer a grave
menace to the welfare of the white population. The Zulus, numbering a
million, inhabiting a country of swamp and jungle impenetrable to
European troops, have not forgotten the prowess of a Cetewayo and the
victory of Isandhwana.

It may well be that some day they will try the fortune of one more
general revolt before accepting the permanent over-lordship of their
conquerors. Natal lives in apprehension of such a day. Throughout all
South Africa, among both British and Dutch, there is a feeling that
Great Britain knows nothing of the native question.

The British people see the native through the softly tinted spectacles
of Exeter Hall. When they have given him a Bible and a breech-cloth
they fondly fancy that he has become one of themselves, and urge that
he shall enter upon his political rights. They do not know that to a
savage, or a half-civilized black, a ballot-box and a voting-paper are
about as comprehensible as a telescope or a pocket camera--it is just a
part of the white man's magic, containing some particular kind of devil
of its own. The South-Africans think that they understand the native.
And the first tenet of their gospel is that he must be kept in his
place. They have seen the hideous tortures and mutilations inflicted in
every native war. If the native revolts they mean to shoot him into
marmalade with machine guns. Such is their simple creed. And in this
matter they want nothing of what Mr. Merriman recently called the
"damnable interference" of the mother country. But to handle the native
question there had to be created a single South-African Government
competent to deal with it.

The constitution creates for South Africa a union entirely different
from that of the provinces of Canada or the States of the American
Republic. The government is not federal, but unitary. The provinces
become areas of local governments, with local elected councils to
administer them, but the South-African Parliament reigns supreme. It is
to know nothing of the nice division of jurisdiction set up by the
American constitution and by the British North America Act. There are,
of course, limits to its power. In the strict sense of legal theory,
the omnipotence of the British Parliament, as in the case of Canada,
remains unimpaired. Nor can it alter certain things,--for example, the
native franchise of the Cape, and the equal status of the two
languages,--without a special majority vote. But in all the ordinary
conduct of trade, industry, and economic life, its power is unhampered
by constitutional limitations.

The constitution sets up as the government of South Africa a
legislature of two houses--a Senate and a House of Assembly--and with
it an executive of ministers on the customary tenure of cabinet
government. This government, strangely enough, is to inhabit two
capitals: Pretoria as the seat of the Executive Government and Cape
Town as the meeting-place of the Parliament. The experiment is a novel
one. The case of Simla and Calcutta, in each of which the Indian
Government does its business, and on the strength of which Lord Curzon
has defended the South-African plan, offers no real parallel. The truth
is that in South Africa, as in Australia, it proved impossible to
decide between the claims of rival cities. Cape Town is the mother city
of South Africa. Pretoria may boast the memories of the fallen
republic, and its old-time position as the capital of an independent
state. Bloemfontein has the advantage of a central position, and even
garish Johannesburg might claim the privilege of the money power. The
present arrangement stands as a temporary compromise to be altered
later at the will of the parliament.

The making of the Senate demanded the gravest thought. It was desired
to avoid if possible the drowsy nullity of the Canadian Upper House and
the preponderating "bossiness" of the American. Nor did the example of
Australia, where the Senate, elected on a "general ticket" over huge
provincial areas, becomes thereby a sort of National Labor Convention,
give any assistance in a positive direction. The plan adopted is to
cause each present provincial parliament, and later each provincial
council, to elect eight senators. The plan of election is by
proportional representation, into the arithmetical juggle of which it
is impossible here to enter. Eight more senators will be appointed by
the Governor, making forty in all. Proportional representation was
applied also in the first draft of the constitution to the election of
the Assembly.

It was thought that such a plan would allow for the representation of
minorities, so that both Dutch and British delegates would be returned
from all parts of the country. Unhappily, the Afrikanderbond--the
powerful political organization supporting Mr. Merriman, and holding
the bulk of the Dutch vote at the Cape--took fright at the proposal.
Even Merriman and his colleagues had to vote it down.

Without this they could not have saved the principle of "equal rights,"
which means the more or less equal (proportionate) representation of
town and country. The towns are British and the country Dutch, so the
bearing of equal rights is obvious. Proportional representation and
equal rights were in the end squared off against one another.

South Africa will retain duality of language, both Dutch and British
being in official use. There was no other method open. The Dutch
language is probably doomed to extinction within three or four
generations. It is, in truth, not one linguistic form, but several: the
Taal, or kitchen Dutch of daily speech, the "lingua franca" of South
Africa; the School Taal, a modified form of it, and the High Dutch of
the Scriptural translations brought with the Boers from Holland. Behind
this there is no national literature, and the current Dutch of Holland
and its books varies some from all of them. English is already the
language of commerce and convenience. The only way to keep Dutch alive
is to oppose its use. Already the bitterness of the war has had this
effect, and language societies are doing their best to uphold and
extend the use of the ancestral language. It is with a full knowledge
of this that the leaders of the British parties acquiesced in the
principle of duality.

The native franchise was another difficult question. At present neither
natives nor "colored men" (the South-African term for men of mixed
blood) can vote in the Transvaal, the Orange River, and Natal. Nor is
there the faintest possibility of the suffrage being extended to them,
both the Dutch and the British being convinced that such a policy is a
mistake. In the Cape natives and colored men, if possessed of the
necessary property and able to write their names, are allowed to vote.
The name writing is said to be a farce, the native drawing a picture of
his name under guidance of his political boss. Some 20,000 natives and
colored people thus vote at the Cape, and neither the Progressives nor
the Bond party dared to oppose the continuance of the franchise, lest
the native vote should be thrown solid against them. As a result each
province will retain its own suffrage, at least until the South-African
Parliament by a special majority of two-thirds in a joint session shall
decide otherwise.

The future conformation of parties under the union is difficult to
forecast. At present the Dutch parties--they may be called so for lack
of a better word--have large majorities everywhere except in Natal. In
the Transvaal General Botha's party--Het Volk, the Party of the
People--is greatly in the ascendant. But it must be remembered that Het
Volk numbers many British adherents. For instance, Mr. Hull, Botha's
treasurer in the outgoing Government, is an old Johannesburg
"reformer," of the Uitlander days, and fought against the Boers in the
war. In the Orange Free State the party called the Unie (or United
party) has a large majority, while at the Cape Dr. Jameson's party of
progressives can make no stand against Mr. Merriman, Mr. Malan, Mr.
Sauer, and the powerful organization of the Afrikanderbond.

How the new Government will be formed it is impossible to say. Botha
and Merriman will, of course, constitute its leading factors. But
whether they will attempt a coalition by taking in with them such men
as Sir Percy Fitzpatrick and Dr. Jameson, or will prefer a more united
and less universal support is still a matter of conjecture. From the
outsider's point of view, a coalition of British and Dutch leaders,
working together for the future welfare of a common country, would seem
an auspicious opening for the new era. But it must be remembered that
General Botha is under no necessity whatever to form such a coalition.
If he so wishes he can easily rule the country without it as far as a
parliamentary majority goes. Not long since an illustrious
South-African, a visitor to Montreal, voiced the opinion that Botha's
party will rule South Africa for twenty years undisturbed. But it is
impossible to do more than conjecture what will happen. _Ex Africa
semper quid novi_.

Most important of all is the altered relation in which South Africa
will now stand to the British Empire.

The Imperial Government may now be said to evacuate South Africa, and
to leave it to the control of its own people. It is true that for the
time being the Imperial Government will continue to control the native
protectorates of Basutoland, Bechuanaland, and Swaziland. But the
Constitution provides for the future transfer of these to the
administration of a commission appointed by the colonial Government.
Provision is also made for the future inclusion of Rhodesia within the
Union. South Africa will therefore find itself on practically the same
footing as Canada or Australia within the British Empire. What its
future fate there will be no man can yet foretell. In South Africa, as
in the other Dominions, an intense feeling of local patriotism and
"colonial nationalism" will be matched against the historic force and
the practical advantages of the Imperial connection. Even in Canada,
there is no use in denying it, there are powerful forces which, if
unchecked, would carry us to an ultimate independence. Still more is
this the case in South Africa.

It is a land of bitter memories. The little people that fought for
their republics against a world in arms have not so soon forgotten. It
is idle for us in the other parts of the Empire to suppose that the
bitter memory of the conflict has yet passed, that the Dutch have
forgotten the independence for which they fought, the Vier Klur flag
that is hidden in their garrets still, and the twenty thousand women
and children that lie buried in South Africa as the harvest of the
conqueror. If South Africa is to stay in the Empire it will have to be
because the Empire will be made such that neither South Africa nor any
other of the dominions would wish to leave it. For this, much has
already been done. The liberation of the Transvaal and Orange River
from the thraldom of their Crown Colony Government, and the frank
acceptance of the Union Constitution by the British Government are the
first steps in this direction. Meantime that future of South Africa, as
of all the Empire, lies behind a veil.




PORTUGAL BECOMES A REPUBLIC A.D. 1910

WILLIAM ARCHER

The wave of democratic revolt which had swept over Europe during the
first decade of the twentieth century was continued in 1910 by the
revolution in Portugal. This, as the result of long secret planning,
burst forth suddenly before dawn on the morning of October 4th. Before
nightfall the revolution was accomplished and the young king, Manuel,
was a fugitive from his country.

The change had been long foreseen. The selfishness and blindness of the
Portuguese monarchs and their supporters had been such as to make
rebellion inevitable, and its ultimate success certain. Mr. William
Archer, the noted English journalist, who was sent post-haste to watch
the progress of the revolution, could not reach the scene before the
brief tumult was at an end; but he here gives a picture of the joyous
celebration of freedom that followed, and then traces with power and
historic accuracy the causes and conduct of the dramatic scene which
has added Portugal to the ever-growing list of Republics.

When the poet Wordsworth and his friend Jones landed at Calais in 1790
they found

   "France standing on the top of golden years
   And human nature seeming born again."

Not once, but fifty times, in Portugal these lines came back to my
mind. The parallel, it may be said, is an ominous one, in view of
subsequent manifestations of the reborn French human nature. But there
is a world of difference between Portugal and France, between the House
of Braganza and the House of Bourbon.

It was nearly one in the morning when my train from Badajoz drew into
the Rocio station at Lisbon; yet I had no sooner passed the barrier
than I heard a band in the great hall of the station strike up an
unfamiliar but not unpleasing air, the rhythm of which plainly
announced it to be a national anthem--a conjecture confirmed by a wild
burst of cheering at the close. The reason of this midnight
demonstration I never ascertained; but, indeed, no one in Lisbon asks
for a reason for striking up "A Portugueza," the new patriotic song.
Before twenty-four hours had passed I was perfectly familiar with its
rather plaintive than martial strains, suited, no doubt, to the
sentimental character of the people. An American friend, who arrived a
day or two after me, made acquaintance with "A Portugueza" even more
immediately than I did. Soon after passing the frontier he fell into
conversation with a Portuguese fellow traveler, who, in the course of
ten minutes or so, asked him whether he would like to hear the new
national anthem, and then and there sang it to him, amid great applause
from the other occupants of the compartment. In the cafés and theaters
of Lisbon "A Portugueza" may break out at any moment, without any
apparent provocation, and you must, of course, stand up and uncover;
but there is in some quarters a movement of protest against these
observances as savoring of monarchical flunkyism. When I left Lisbon at
half-past seven A.M. there was no demonstration such as had greeted my
arrival; but at the first halting-place a man stepped out from a little
crowd on the platform and shouted "Viva Machado dos Santos! Viva a
Republica Portugueza!"--and I found that the compartment adjoining my
own was illumined by the presence of the bright particular star of the
revolt. At the next station--Torres Vedras of historic fame--the
platform was crowded and scores of red and green flags were waving. As
the train steamed in, two bands struck up "A Portugueza," and as one
had about two minutes' start of the other, the effect was more
patriotic than harmonious. The hero had no sooner alighted than he was
lifted shoulder-high by the crowd, and carried in triumph from the
station, amid the blaring of the bands and the crackling of innumerable
little detonators, which here enter freely into the ritual of
rejoicing. Next morning I read in the papers a full account of the
"Apoteose" of Machado dos Santos, which seems to have kept Torres
Vedras busy and happy all day long.

One can not but smile at such simple-minded ebullitions of feeling; yet
I would by no means be understood to laugh at them. On the contrary,
they are so manifestly spontaneous and sincere as to be really
touching. Whatever may be the future of the Portuguese Republic, it has
given the nation some weeks of unalloyed happiness. And amid all the
shouting and waving of flags, all the manifold "homages" to this hero
and to that, there was not the slightest trace of rowdyism or of
"mafficking." I could not think without some humiliation of the
contrast between a Lisbon and a London crowd. It really seemed as
though happiness had ennobled the man in the street. I am assured that
on the day of the public funeral of Dr. Bombarda and Admiral dos Reis,
though the crowd was enormous and the police had retired into private
life, there was not the smallest approach to disorder. The
police--formerly the sworn enemies of the populace--had been reinstated
at the time of my visit, without their swords and pistols; but they
seemed to have little to do. That Lisbon had become a strictly virtuous
city it would be too much to affirm, but I believe that crime actually
diminished after the revolution. It seemed as though the nation had
awakened from a nightmare to a sunrise of health and hope.

And the nightmare took the form of a poor bewildered boy, guilty only
of having been thrust, without a spark of genius, into a situation
which only genius could have saved. In that surface aspect of the case
there is an almost ludicrous disproportion between cause and effect.
But it is not what the young King was that matters--it is what he stood
for. Let us look a little below the surface--even, if we can, into the
soul of the people.

Portugal is a small nation with a great history; and the pride of a
small nation which has anything to be proud of is apt to amount to a
passion. It is all the more sensitive because it can not swell and
harden into arrogance. It is all the more alert because the great
nations, in their arrogance, are apt to ignore it.

What are the main sources of Portugal's pride? They are two: her
national independence and her achievements in discovery and
colonization.

A small country, with no very clear natural frontier, she has
maintained her independence under the very shadow of a far larger and
at one time an enormously preponderant Power. Portugal was Portugal
long before Spain was Spain. It had its Alfred the Great in Alfonso
Henriques (born 1111--a memorable date in two senses), who drove back
the Moors as Alfred drove back the Danes. He founded a dynasty of able
and energetic kings, which, however, degenerated, as dynasties will,
until a vain weakling, Ferdinand the Handsome, did his best to wreck
the fortunes of the country. On his death in 1383, Portugal was within
an ace of falling into the clutches of Castile, but the Cortes
conferred the kingship on a bastard of the royal house, John, Master of
the Knights of Aviz; and he, aided by five hundred English archers,
inflicted a crushing defeat on the Spaniards at Aljubarrota, the
Portuguese Bannockburn. John of Aviz, known as the Great, married
Philippa of Lancaster, daughter of John of Gaunt; and from this union
sprang a line of princes and kings under whom Portugal became one of
the leading nations of Europe. Prince Henry the Navigator, son of John
the Great, devoted his life to the furthering of maritime adventure and
discovery. Like England's First Lords of the Admiralty, he was a
navigator who did not navigate; but it was unquestionably owing to the
impulse he gave to Portuguese enterprise that Vasco da Gama discovered
the sea route to India and Pedro Alvarez Cabral secured for his country
the giant colony of Brazil. Angola, Mozambique, Diu, Goa, Macao--these
names mean as much for Portugal as Havana, Cartagena, Mexico, and Lima,
for Spain. The sixteenth century was the "heroic" age of Portuguese
history, and the "heroes"--notably the Viceroys of Portuguese
India--were, in fact, a race of fine soldiers and administrators. No
nation, moreover, possesses more conspicuous and splendid memorials of
its golden age. It was literally "golden," for Emmanuel the Fortunate,
who reaped the harvest sown by Henry the Navigator, was the wealthiest
monarch in Europe, and gave his name to the "Emmanueline" style of
architecture, a florid Gothic which achieves miracles of ostentation
and sometimes of beauty. As the glorious pile of Batalha commemorates
the victory of Aljubarrota, so the splendid church and monastery of
Belem mark the spot where Vasco da Gama spent the night before he
sailed on his epoch-making voyage. But it was not gold that raised the
noblest memorial to Portugal's greatness: it was the genius of Luis de
Camoens. If Spenser, instead of losing himself in mazes of allegoric
romance, had sung of Crécy and Agincourt, of Drake, Frobisher, and
Raleigh, he might have given us a national epic in the same sense in
which the term applies to _The Lusiads_. With such a history, so
written in stone and song, what wonder if pride of race is one of the
mainsprings of Portuguese character!

But the House of Aviz, like the legitimate line of Affonso Henriques,
dwindled into debility. It flickered out in Dom Sebastian, who dragged
his country into a mad invasion of Morocco and vanished from human ken
on the disastrous battlefield of Alcazar-Khebir. Then, for sixty years,
not by conquest, but by intrigue, Portugal passed under the sway of
Spain, and lost to the enemies of Spain--that is to say, to England and
Holland--a large part of her colonial empire. At last, in 1640, a
well-planned and daring revolution expelled the Spanish intruders, and
placed on the throne John, Duke of Braganza. As the house of Aviz was
an illegitimate branch of the stock of Affonso Henriques, so the
Braganzas were an illegitimate branch of the House of Aviz, with none
of the Plantagenet blood in them. Only one prince of the line, Pedro
II., can be said to have attained anything like greatness. Another,
Joseph, had the sense to give a free hand to an able, if despotic,
minister, the Marquis of Pombal. But, on the whole, the history of the
Braganza rule was one of steady decadence, until the second half of the
nineteenth century found the country one of the most backward in
Europe.

Nor was there any comfort to be found in the economic aspect of the
case. A country of glorious fertility and ideal climatic conditions,
inhabited by an industrious peasantry, Portugal was nevertheless so
poor that much of its remaining strength was year by year being drained
away by emigration. The public debt was almost as heavy per head of
population as that of England. Taxation was crushing. The barest
necessaries of life were subject to heavy imposts. Protection
protected, not industries, but monopolies and vested interests.

In short, the material condition of the country was as distressing as
its spiritual state to any one with the smallest sense of enlightened
patriotism.

King Charles I.--name of evil omen!--ascended the throne in 1889. His
situation was not wholly unlike that of the English Charles I.,
inasmuch as--though he had not the insight to perceive it--his lot was
cast in times when Portugal was outgrowing the traditions and methods
of his family. Representative government, as it had shaped itself since
1852, was a fraud and a farce. To every municipality a Government
administrator was attached (at an annual cost to the country of
something like Ł70,000), whose business it was to "work" the elections
in concert with the local _caciques_ or bosses. Thus, except in the
great towns, the Government candidate was always returned. The efficacy
of the system may be judged from the fact that in a country which was
at heart Republican, as events have amply shown, the Republican party
never had more than fourteen representatives in a chamber of about 150.
For the rest, the Monarchical parties, "Regeneradores" and
"Progresistas," arranged between them a fair partition of the loaves
and fishes. This "rotative" system, as it is called, is in effect that
which prevails, or has prevailed, in Spain; but it was perfected in
Portugal by a device which enabled Ministers, in stepping out of office
under the crown, to step into well-paid posts in financial
institutions, more or less associated with the State. Anything like
real progress was manifestly impossible under so rotten a system; and
with this system the Monarchy was identified.

Then came the scandal of the _adeantamentos_, or illegal advances made
to the King, beyond the sums voted in the civil list. It is only fair
to remember that the king of a poor country is nowadays in a very
uncomfortable position, more especially if the poor country has once
been immensely rich. The expenses of royalty, like those of all other
professions, have enormously increased of late years; and a petty king
who is to rub shoulders with emperors is very much in the position of a
man with Ł2,000 a year in a club of millionaires. He has always the
resource, no doubt, of declining the society of emperors, and even
fixing his domestic budget more in accord with present exigencies than
with the sumptuous traditions, the palaces and pleasure-houses, of his
millionaire predecessors. It is said of Pedro II. that "he had the
wisdom and self-restraint not to increase the taxes, preferring to
reduce the expenses of his household to the lowest possible amount."
But Dom Carlos was not a man of this kidney. Easy-going and
self-indulgent, he had no notion of appearing _in forma pauperis_ among
the royalties of Europe, or sacrificing his pleasures to the needs of
his country. Even his father, Dom Luis, and his uncle, Dom Pedro, had
not lived within their income; and expenses had gone up since their
times. The king's income, under the civil list, was a "conto of reis" a
day, or something over Ł80,000 a year. Additional allowances to other
members of the royal family amounted to about half as much again; and
there was, I believe, an allowance for the upkeep of palaces. One would
suppose that a reasonably frugal royal family, with no house-rent to
pay, could subsist in tolerable comfort on some Ł2,250 a week; but as a
matter of fact, Dom Carlos made large additional drafts on the
treasury, which servile ministries honored without protest. He had
expensive fantasies, which he was not in the habit of stinting. The
total of his "anticipations" I do not know, but it is estimated in
millions of pounds.

These eccentricities, combined with other abuses of finance and
administration, rendered even the _cacique_-chosen Cortes unruly, and
our Charles I. looked about for a Strafford who should apply a
"thorough" remedy to what he called the parliamentary _gâchis_. He
found his man in Joăo Franco. This somewhat enigmatic personage can not
as yet be estimated with any impartiality. No one accuses him of
personal corruption or of sordidly interested motives. His great
private wealth enabled him the other day to find bail, at a moment's
notice, to the amount of Ł40,000. On the other hand, his enemies
diagnose him after the manner of Lombroso, and find him to be a
degenerate and an epileptic, ungovernably irritable, vain, mendacious,
arrogant, sometimes quite irresponsible for his actions. A really
strong man he can scarcely be; scarcely a man of true political
insight, else he would not have tried to play the despot with no
plausible ideal to allege in defense of his usurpation. Be that as it
may, he agreed with the King that it was impossible to carry on the
work of government with a fractious Cortes in session, and that the
only way to keep things going was to try the experiment of a
dictatorship. Dom Carlos, in his genial fashion, overcame by help of an
anecdote any doubt his minister may have felt. "When the affairs of
Frederick the Great were at a low ebb," said the King, "he one day, on
the eve of a decisive battle, caught a grenadier in the act of making
off from the camp. 'What are you about?' asked Frederick. 'Your
Majesty, I am deserting,' stammered the soldier. 'Wait till to-morrow,'
replied Frederick calmly, 'and if the battle goes against us, we will
desert together.'" Thus lightly was the adventure plotted; and, in
fact, the minister did not desert until the King lay dead upon the
field of battle.

Franco dissolved the Cortes, and on May 10, 1907, published a decree
declaring the "administration to be a dictatorship." The Press was
strictly gagged, and all the traditional weapons of despotism were
polished up. In June, the dictator went to Oporto to defend his policy
at a public banquet, and on his return a popular tumult took place in
the Rocio, the central square of Lisbon, which was repressed with
serious bloodshed. This was made the excuse for still more galling
restrictions on personal and intellectual liberty, until it was hard to
distinguish between "administrative dictatorship" and autocracy. As
regards the _adeantamentos_, Franco's declared policy was to make a
clean slate of the past, and, for the future, to augment the civil
list. In the autumn of that year, a very able Spanish journalist and
deputy, Seńor Luis Morote, visited most of the leading men in Portugal,
and found among the Republicans an absolute and serene confidence that
the Monarchy was in its last ditch and that a Republic was inevitable.
Seldom have political prophecies been more completely fulfilled than
those which Morote then recorded in the _Heraldo_ of Madrid. Said
Bernardino Machado:

"The Republic is the fatherland organized for its prosperity.... I
believe in the moral forces of Portugal, which are carrying us directly
toward the new order of things.... We shall triumph because the right
is on our side, and the moral idealism; peacefully if we can, and I
think it pretty sure that we can, since no public force can stop a
nation on the march."

Said Guerra Junqueiro, the leading poet of the day: "Within two years
there will be no Braganzas or there will be no Portugal....The
revolution, when it comes, will be a question of hours, and it will be
almost bloodless."

I could cite many other deliverances to the same effect, but one must
suffice. Theophilo Braga, the "grand old man" of Portugal, said: "To
stimulate the faith, conscience, will, and revolutionary energies of
the country, I have imposed on myself a plan of work, and a mandate not
to die until I see it accomplished."

The Paris _Temps_ of November 14, 1907, published an interview with Dom
Carlos which embittered feeling and alienated many of his supporters.
"Everything is quiet in Lisbon," declared the King, echoing another
historic phase: "Only the politicasters are agitating themselves.... It
was necessary that the _gâchis_--there is no other word for it--should
one day come to an end.... I required an undaunted will which should be
equal to the task of carrying my ideas to a happy conclusion.... I am
entirely satisfied with M. Franco. _Ça marche_. And it will continue;
it must continue for the good of the country.... In no country can you
make a revolution without the army. Well, the Portuguese Army is
faithful to its King, and I shall always have it at my side.... I have
no shadow of doubt of its fidelity." Poor Charles the First!

At the end of January, 1908, a revolutionary plot was discovered, and
was put down with severity. After signing some decrees to that end, at
one of his palaces beyond the Tagus, the King, with his whole family,
returned to Lisbon and the party drove in open carriages from the wharf
toward the Necessidades Palace. In the crowd at the corner of the great
riverside square, the Praça do Comercio, stood two men named Buiça and
Costa, with carbines concealed under their cloaks. They shot dead the
King and the Crown Prince, and slightly wounded Dom Manuel. Both the
assassins were killed on the spot.

It is said that there was no plot, and that these men acted entirely on
their own initiative and responsibility. At any rate, none of the
Republican leaders was in any way implicated in the affair. But on All
Saints' day of 1910, Buiça's grave shared to the full in the rain of
wreaths poured upon the tombs of the martyrs of the new Republic; and
relics of the regicides hold an honored place in the historical museum
which commemorates the revolution.

Franco vanished into space, and Dom Manuel, aged nineteen, ascended the
throne. Had he possessed strong intelligence and character, or had he
fallen into the hands of really able advisers, it is possible that the
revulsion of feeling following on so grim a tragedy might have
indefinitely prolonged the life of the Monarchy. But his mother was a
Bourbon, and what more need be said? The opinion in Lisbon, at any
rate, was that "under Dom Carlos the Jesuits entered the palace by the
back door, under Dom Manuel by the front door." The Republican
agitation in public, the revolutionary organization in secret, soon
recommenced with renewed vigor; and the discovery of new scandals in
connection with the tobacco monopoly and a financial institution, known
as the "Credito Predial," added fuel to the fire of indignation. The
Government, or rather a succession of Governments, were perfectly aware
that the foundations of the Monarchy were undermined; but they seemed
to be paralyzed by a sort of fatalistic despair. They persecuted,
indeed, just enough to make themselves doubly odious; but they always
laid hands on people who, if not quite innocent, were subordinate and
uninfluential. Not one of the real leaders of the revolution was
arrested.

The thoroughness with which the Republican party was organized says
much for the practical ability of its leaders. The moving spirits in
the central committee were Vice-Admiral Candido dos Reis, Affonso Costa
(now Minister of Justice), Joao Chagas, and Dr. Miguel Bombarda. Simoes
Raposo spoke in the name of the Freemasons; the Carbonaria Portugueza,
a powerful secret society, was represented by Machado dos Santos, an
officer in the navy. There was a separate finance committee, and funds
were ample. The arms bought were mostly Browning pistols, which were
smuggled over the Spanish frontier by Republican railway conductors.
Bombs also were prepared in large numbers, not for purposes of
assassination, but for use in open warfare, especially against cavalry.
Meanwhile an untiring secret propaganda was going on in the army, in
the navy, and among the peasantry. Almost every seaman in the navy, and
in many regiments almost all the non-commissioned officers and men,
were revolutionaries; while commissioned officers by the score were won
over. It is marvelous that so wide-spread a propaganda was only vaguely
known to the Government, and did not beget a crowd of informers. One
man, it is true, who showed a disposition to use his secret knowledge
for purposes of blackmail, was found dead in the streets of Cascaes. On
the whole, not only secrecy but discipline was marvelously maintained.

At last the propitious moment arrived. Three ships of war--the _Dom
Carlos_, the _Adamastor_, and the _San Raphael_--were in the Tagus to
do honor to the President-elect of Brazil, who was visiting King
Manuel; but the Government knew that their presence was dangerous, and
would certainly order them off again as soon as possible. The blow must
be struck before that occurred. At a meeting of the committee on
October 2, 1910, it was agreed that the signal should be given in the
early morning of October 4th. All the parts were cast, all the duties
were assigned: who should call this and that barrack to arms, who
should cut this and that railway line, who should take possession of
the central telegraph-office, and so forth. The whole scheme was laid
down in detail in a precious paper, in the keeping of Simôes Raposo.
"You had better give it to me," said Dr. Bombarda, "for I am less
likely than you to be arrested. Even if they should think of searching
at Rilhafolles [the asylum of which he was director], I can easily hide
it in one of the books of my library." His suggestion was accepted, the
paper on which their lives and that of the Republic depended was handed
to him, and the meeting broke up.

On the morning of Monday, October 3d, all was as quiet in Lisbon as
King Carlos himself could have desired. At about eleven o'clock Dr.
Bombarda sat in his office at the asylum, when a former patient, a
young lieutenant who had suffered from the persecution mania, was
announced to see him. Bombarda rose and asked him how he was. Without a
word the visitor produced a Browning pistol and fired point blank at
the physician, putting three bullets in his body. Bombarda had strength
enough to seize his assailant by the wrists and hand him over to the
attendants who rushed in. He then walked down-stairs unaided before he
realized how serious were his wounds. It soon appeared, however, that
he had not many hours to live; and when this became clear to him, he
took a paper from his pocketbook and insisted that it should be burned
before his eyes. What the paper was I need not say. At about six in the
evening he died.

Bombarda was a passionate anticlerical, and his murderer was a
fanatical Catholic. The citizens, with whom he was very popular, jumped
at the conclusion that the priests had inspired the deed. As soon as
his death was announced in the transparency outside the office of _O
Seculo_, there were demonstrations of anger among the crowd and some
conflicts with the police.

Meanwhile the Revolutionary Committee, to the number of fifty or
thereabouts, were sitting in the Rua da Esperança, discussing the
question, "To be or not to be." The military members counseled delay,
for the Government had ordered all officers to be at their quarters in
the various barracks which are scattered over the city. The intention
had been to choose a time when most of the officers were off duty and
the men could mutiny at their ease; but this plan had for the moment
been frustrated. The military view might have carried the day, but for
the determination shown by Candido dos Reis, who pointed out that it
would be madness to give the Government time to order the ships out of
the Tagus. Finally, he turned to the military group, saying, "If you
will not go out, I will go out alone with the sailors. I shall have the
honor of getting myself shot by my comrades of the army." His
insistence carried all before it, and it was decided that the signal
should be given, as previously arranged, at one o'clock in the morning.

That evening, at the Palace of Belem, some two miles down the Tagus
from the Necessidades Palace, Marshal Hermes da Fonseca,
President-elect of Brazil, was entertaining King Manuel at a State
dinner. There was an electrical sense of disquiet in the air. Several
official guests were absent, and every few minutes there came
telephone-calls for this or that minister or general, some of whom
reappeared, while some did not. At last the tension got so much on the
nerves of the young King that he scribbled on his menu-card a request
that the banquet might be shortened; and, in fact, one or two courses
were omitted. Then followed the dreary ritual of toasts; and at last,
at half-past eleven, Dom Manuel parted from his host and set off in his
automobile, escorted by a troop of cavalry. Two bands played the royal
anthem. Had he known, poor youth, that he was never to hear it again,
there might have been a crumb of consolation in the thought.

It would be impossible without a map to make clear the various phases
of the Battle of Lisbon. Nor would there be any great interest in so
doing. There was no particular strategy in the revolutionary plans, and
what strategy there was fell to pieces at an early point. It is not
clear that the signal was ever formally given, but about the appointed
hour mutinies broke out in several barracks. In some cases the Royalist
officers were put under arrest, in one case a colonel and two other
officers were shot. A mixed company of soldiers and civilians, with ten
or twelve guns, marched, as had been arranged, upon the Necessidades
Palace, to demand the abdication of the King; but they were met on the
heights behind the palace by a body of the "guardia municipal," and,
after a sharp skirmish, were forced to retire, leaving three of their
guns disabled behind them. They retreated to the general rallying-point
of the Republican forces, the Rotunda, at the upper end of the
mile-long Avenida da Liberdade. This avenue stands to the Rocio very
much in the relation of Charing Cross Road to Trafalgar Square: there
is a curve at their junction which prevents you from seeing--or
shooting--from the one into the other. On reaching the Rotunda, the
insurgents learned that the Rocio had been occupied by Royalist troops,
from the Citadel of St. George and another barrack, with one or two
machine guns, but no cannon.

There, then, the two forces lay, with a short mile of sloping ground
between them, awaiting the dawn. Under cover of darkness, a body of
mounted gendarmes attempted to charge the insurgent position, but they
were repulsed by bombs.

Meanwhile, what had become of the naval cooperation, on which so much
reliance had been placed? It had failed, through the tragic weakness of
one man. Candido dos Reis is one of the canonized saints of the
Republic; but I think it shows a good deal of generosity in the
Portuguese character that the Devil's Advocate has not made himself
heard in the case. Dos Reis had undertaken the command of the naval
side of the revolt; but oddly enough, he seems to have arranged no
method of conveyance to his post of duty. He found at the wharf a small
steamer, the captain of which agreed to take him off to the ships; but
there was some delay in getting up steam. During this pause, some one
as yet unidentified, but evidently a friend of Dos Reis, rushed down to
the wharf and shouted to him that the revolt was crushed and all was
lost. Dos Reis, who had assumed his naval uniform on board the steamer,
took it off again, and, in civilian attire, went ashore. He proceeded
to his sister's house, where he spent an hour; then he sallied forth
again, and was found next morning in a distant quarter of the city with
a bullet through his brain.

There is no doubt that he committed suicide. The theory of foul play is
quite abandoned. As it was he who had vetoed the proposed postponement
of the rising, one can understand that the sense of responsibility lay
heavy upon him; but that, without inquiry into the alleged disaster,
without the smallest attempt to retrieve it, he should have left his
comrades in the lurch and taken the easiest way of escape, is surely a
proof of almost criminal instability. The Republic lost in him an
ardent patriot, but scarcely a great leader.

The dawn of Tuesday, October 4th, showed the fortunes of the revolt at
rather a low ebb. The land forces were dismayed by the inaction of the
ships; the sailors imagined, from the non-appearance of their leader,
that some disaster must have occurred on land. It was in these hours of
despondency that the true heroes of the revolution showed their mettle.

In the bivouac at the Rotunda, as the morning wore on, the Republican
officers declared that the game was up, and that there was nothing for
it but to disperse and await the consequences. They themselves actually
made off; and it was then that Machado dos Santos came to the front,
taking command of the insurgent force and reviving their drooping
spirits. The position was not really a strong one. For one thing, it is
commanded by the heights of the Misericordia; and there was, in fact,
some long-range firing between the insurgents and the Guardia Municipal
stationed on that eminence. Again, the gentle slope of the Avenida, a
hundred yards wide, is clothed by no fewer than ten rows of low trees,
acacias, and the like, five rows on each side of the comparatively
narrow roadway, which is blocked at the lower end by a massive monument
to the liberators of 1640. Thus the insurgents could not see their
adversaries even when they ventured out of their sheltered position in
the Rocio; and the artillery fire from the Rotunda did much more damage
to the hotels that flanked the narrow neck of the Avenida than to the
Royalist forces. On the other hand, it would have been comparatively
easy for the Royalists, with a little resolution, to have crept up the
Avenida under cover of the trees, and driven the insurgents from their
position. Fortunately for the revolt, there was a total lack of
leadership on the Royalist side, excusable only on the ground that the
officers could not rely on their men.

While things were at a deadlock on the Avenida, critical events were
happening on the Tagus. On all three ships, the officers knew that the
men were only awaiting a signal to mutiny; but the signal did not come.
At this juncture, and while it seemed that the Republican cause was
lost, a piece of heroic bluff on the part of a single officer saved the
situation. Lieutenant Tito de Moraes put off in a small boat from the
naval barracks at Alcantara, rowed to the _San Raphael_, boarded it,
and calmly took possession of it in the name of the Republic! He gave
the officers a written guaranty that they had yielded to superior
force, and then sent them off under arrest to the naval barracks. He
now asked for orders from the Revolutionary Committee; and early in the
afternoon the _San Raphael_ weighed anchor and moved down the river in
the direction of the Necessidades Palace. In doing so she had to pass
the most powerful ship of the squadron, the _Dom Carlos_: would she get
past in safety? Yes; the _Dom Carlos_ made no sign. The officers were
almost all Royalists, but they knew they could do nothing with the
crew. As a matter of fact when the crew ultimately mutinied, the
captain and a lieutenant were severely wounded; but I can find no
evidence for the picturesque legend of a group of officers making a
last heroic stand on the quarter-deck, and ruthlessly mowed down by the
insurgents' fire. It is certain, at any rate, that no lives were lost.

In the Palace, on its bluff above the river, King Manuel was
practically alone. No minister, no general, was at his side. It is
said, on what seems to be good authority, that when he saw the _San
Raphael_ moving down-stream under the Republican colors, he telephoned
to the Prime Minister, Teixeira de Sousa, to ask whether there was not
a British destroyer in the river that could be got to sink the mutinous
vessel. Even if this scheme had been otherwise feasible, it would have
demanded an effort of which the minister was no longer capable. At
about two in the afternoon the _San Raphael_, cruising slowly up and
down, opened fire upon the Palace, and her second shot brought down the
royal standard from its roof. What could the poor boy do? To sit still
and be blown to pieces would have been heroic, but useless. Had he had
the stuff of a soldier in him, he might have made his way to the Rocio
and tried to put some energy into the officers, some spirit into the
troops. But he had no one to encourage and support him. Such counselors
as he had were all for flight. He stepped into his motor-car, set off
for Cintra and Mafra, and is henceforth out of the saga.

The flight of Dom Manuel meant the collapse of his cause. It is true
that the Royalists were reenforced by certain detachments of troops who
came in from the country, and, beaten off by the insurgents at the
Rotunda, made their way to the Rocio by a circuitous route. The Guardia
Municipal, too, were stanch, and showed fight at several points. It was
the total lack of spirited leadership that left the insurgents masters
of the field. Having done its work at the Necessidades, the _San
Raphael_ moved up stream again, and began dropping shells over the
intervening parallelogram of the "Low City" into the crowded Rocio.
They caused little loss of life, for they were skilfully timed to
explode in air; the object being, not to massacre, but to dismay. There
is nothing so trying to soldiers as to remain inactive under fire; and
as there had never been much fight in the garrison of the Rocio, the
little that was left speedily evaporated. At eleven in the morning of
Wednesday, October 5th, the Republic was proclaimed from the balcony of
the Town Hall, and before night fell all was once more quiet in Lisbon.

The first accounts of the fighting which appeared in the European Press
were, as was only natural, greatly exaggerated. A careful enumeration
places the number of the killed at sixty-one and of the wounded at 417.
Some of the latter, indeed, died of their wounds, but the whole
death-roll certainly did not exceed a hundred.

The Portuguese Monarchy was dead; and the causes of death, as disclosed
by the autopsy, were moral bankruptcy and intellectual inanition. It
could not point to a single service that it rendered to the country in
return for the burdens it imposed. Some of its defenders professed to
see in it a safeguard for the colonies, which would somehow fly off
into space in the event of a revolution. As yet there are no signs of
this prophecy coming true; but the prophets may cling, if they please,
to the hope of its fulfilment. For the rest, it was perfectly clear
that the monarchy had done nothing for the material or spiritual
advancement of the country, which remained as poverty-stricken and as
illiterate as it well could be. Dom Carlos had not even the common
prudence to affect, if he did not feel, a sympathy with the nation's
pride in its "heroes." The Monarchy could boast neither of good deeds
nor of good intentions. Its cynicism was not tempered by intelligence.
It drifted toward the abyss without making any reasonable effort to
save itself; for the dictatorship was scarcely an effort of reason.
"The dictatorship," said Bernardino Machado, the present Foreign
Minister, "left us only one liberty--that of hatred." And again, "The
monarchy had not even a party--it had only a _clientčle_." That one
word explains the disappearance of Royalism.

For it has simply disappeared. Even the Royalist Press is almost
extinct. Some papers have ceased to appear, some have become
Republican, the few who stick to their colors do so rather from
clerical than from specifically Royalist conviction. All the leading
papers of the country had long been Republican; and excellent papers
they are. Both in appearance and in matter, _O Mundo_ and _A Lucta_
("The Struggle") would do credit to the journalism of any country. In
size, in excellence of production, and in the well-considered weight of
their articles, they contrast strangely with the flimsy, ill-printed
sheets that content the Spanish public.

The Provisional Government has been sneered at as a clique of
"intellectuals"; but it is scarcely a reproach to the Republic that it
should command the adhesion of the whole intelligence of the country.
Nor is there any sign of lack of practical sense in the admirable
organization which not only insured the success of the revolution (in
spite of certain cross accidents) but secured its absolutely peaceful
acceptance throughout the country. There are no doubt visionary and
fantastic spirits in the Republican ranks, and ridiculous proposals
have already been mooted. For instance, it has been gravely suggested
that all streets bearing the names of saints--and there are hundreds
of them--should be renamed in commemoration of Republican heroes,
dates, exploits, etc. But the common sense of the people and Press is
already on the alert, and such whimsies are being laughed out of court.

Of the Provisional Government I saw only the President and the Foreign
Secretary. The President, an illustrious scholar, historian, and poet,
is a delightful old man of the simplest, most unassuming manners, and
eagerly communicative on the subjects which have been the study of his
life. When I asked him to explain to me the difference of national
character which made the Portuguese attitude toward the Church so
different from the Spanish, he took me right back to the Ligurians--far
out of my ethnological depth--and gave me a most interesting sketch of
the development of the two nations. But when we came to topics of more
immediate importance, he showed, if I may venture to say so, a clear
practical sense, quite remote from visionary idealism. The Foreign
Minister, Dr. Machado, is of more immediately impressive personality.
Younger than the President by at least ten years, yet little short, I
should guess, of sixty, he is extremely neat and dapper in person,
while his very handsome face has a birdlike keenness and alertness of
expression betokening not only great intelligence but high-strung
vitality. He is a copious, eloquent, and witty talker, and his
remarkable charm of manner accounts, in part at any rate, for his
immense popularity. Assuredly no monarchy could have more distinguished
representatives than this Republic.

The desire of the Republic to "play fair" was manifested in another
little trait that interested me a good deal. In the window of every
book-shop in Spain a translation from the Portuguese, entitled _Los
Escandalos de la Corte de Portugal_, is prominently displayed. It is a
ferocious lampoon upon the royal family and upon Franco; but in Lisbon
I looked for it in vain. On inquiry I learned that it had been
prohibited under the Monarchy, as it could not fail to be; but, had
there been any demand for it, no doubt it might have been reprinted
since the revolution. There was apparently no demand. The people to
whom I spoke of it evidently regarded it as "hitting below the belt."
"We do not fight with such weapons," said a leading journalist. In no
one, in fact, did I discover the slightest desire or willingness to
retail personal gossip with respect to the hated Braganzas.




THE CRUSHING OF FINLAND

A.D. 1910

JOHN JACKOL           BARON VON PLEHVE
BARON SERGIUS WITTE   J.N. REUTER

In the midst of progress comes reaction. The far northern European
country of Finland had for a century been progressing in advance of its
neighbors. It was a true democracy. It had even established, first of
European lands, the full suffrage for women; and numerous women sat in
its parliament. But Finland was tributary to Russia; and Russia, as far
back as 1898, began a deliberate policy of crushing Finland,
"nationalizing" it, was the Russian phrase, by which was meant
compelling it to abandon its independence, adopt the Russian language,
and become an integral part of the empire under Russian officials and
Russian autocracy.

Under pressure of this repressive policy, the Finns began leaving their
country as early as 1903, emigrating to America in despair of
successful resistance to Russia's tyranny. Many of them were exiled or
imprisoned by the Czar's Government. Then came the days of the Russian
Revolution; and the Czar and his advisers hurried to grant Finland
everything she had desired, under fear that her people would swell the
tide of revolution. But that danger once passed, the old policy of
oppression was soon renewed, and was carried onward until in November
of 1909 the Finnish Parliament was dismissed by imperial command. All
through 1910 repressive laws were passed, reducing Finland step by step
to a mere Russian province, so that before the close of that year the
Finlanders themselves surrendered the struggle. One of their leaders
wrote, "So ends Finland."

We give here first the despairing cry written in 1903 by a well-known
Finn who fled to America. Then follows the official Russian statement
by the "Minister of the Interior," Von Plehve, who held control of
Finland in the early stages of the struggle, and was later slain by
Russian revolutionists. Then we give the very different Russian view
expressed by the great liberal Prime Minister, Baron Sergius Witte, who
rescued Russia from her domestic disaster after the Japanese War. The
story is then carried to its close by a well-known Finnish sympathizer.


JOHN JACKOL

"Russia is the rock against which the sigh for freedom breaks," said
Kossuth, the great statesman and patriot of Hungary. Although fifty
years have passed, and sigh after sigh has broken against it, the rock
still stands like a colossal monument of bygone ages. It is pointing
toward the northern star, as if to remind one of the all-enduring
fixity. Other stars may go round as they will; there is one fixed in
its place, and under that star the shadow of despotism hopes to endure
forever.

While yet in Finland I used to fancy Russia as a giant devil-fish,
whose arms extended from the Baltic to the Pacific, from the Black Sea
to the Arctic Ocean. Then I would think of my native land as a
beautiful mermaid, about whom the giant's cold, chilly arms were slowly
creeping, and I feared that some day those arms would crush her. That
day has come. The helpless mermaid lies prostrate in the clutch of the
octopus. Not that the constitution of Finland has been annulled, as has
been so often erroneously stated, and quite generally believed. The
Russian Government has made only a few inroads upon it. The great
grievance of the Finns is not with what has been absolutely done in
opposition to their ancient rights and privileges, nor in the number of
their rights which have in reality been curtailed, but with the fact
that they have henceforth no security. The real grievance of the Finns
is that the welfare of their country no longer rests upon an inviolable
constitution, but upon the caprice of the ministers.

In 1898 the reactionists succeeded in getting one of their tools
appointed as Governor-General. No sooner had General Bobrikoff taken
his high office than he declared that the Finnish right to separate
political existence was an illusion; that there was no substantial
foundation for it in any of the acts or words of Alexander I. The
people were amazed, appalled. But this was not all. Pobiedonostseff,
the Procurator of the Holy Synod, and other men as reactionary as he,
discovered the fact, or gave birth to the idea, that the fundamental
rights of Finland could be interfered with if these fundamental rights
interfered with the welfare of the Russian Empire. In other words, they
discovered a loophole which they termed legal, on the principle that
the parts should suffer for the whole, and that this principle was an
integral part of the plan of Russian government.

The abrogation of maintenance of Finland's ancient rights would seem by
this decision to rest on the arbitrary interpretation on the part of
Russia as to whether or not they interfered with the welfare of the
empire. It is possible that, according to the individual opinions of
Russian autocrats, they might all interfere with the standard of
welfare which certain individuals have arbitrarily established to fit
the occasion.

In justice to the Russian Government it should be stated, however, that
the joy of persecution was not the motive which led to the arbitrary
acts. During the time that Finland was under Swedish control, the Finns
had learned to dislike everything Russian. These anti-Russian
tendencies were accentuated, after Finland became an appanage of the
Russian crown, by the restrictive and often reactionary policy of the
Imperial Government. Such a form of government was repugnant to the
Finns, who had learned to be governed by good laws well administered,
and by an enlightened public opinion. At the same time, owing to their
larger liberties, their higher culture, and their susceptibility to
western ideals, the Finns exerted an attractive influence over the
peoples of the Baltic provinces, and even of Russia proper. A Finn
would very seldom become Russianized, while many Russians became
Finnicized. Unlike his Russian brother, the Finn enjoyed the privileges
of free conscience, free speech, and free press.

To the average Russian such a life was enchanting, and many were so
fascinated that they became citizens of Finland. In order to do so,
however, they were obliged to go through the formality of changing
their nationality and becoming subjects of the Grand Duchy. Doubtless
this was distasteful to the Russians, but so many and so great were the
advantages accruing from such a change that not a few renounced their
nationality.

Such a state of affairs seemed unnatural and antagonistic to the
propaganda of the Panslavistic party. Instead of Russian ideals
pervading the province, provincial ideals, manners, and customs were
gradually spreading into the empire. But there seemed to be no
honorable way of checking the progress of the rapidly growing Finnish
nationality. The Finns maintained that their rights and privileges and
their laws rested upon an inviolable constitution, which could be
changed only by a vote of the four estates of the Landtag. That body
would never yield.

It was at this juncture that the Procurator of the Holy Synod conceived
the idea that the fundamental rights of the Finns can be curtailed in
so far as they interfere with those of the empire. Acting according to
this new idea the Imperial Government in 1899 took for its pretext the
army service of the Finns. Heretofore, according to a hereditary
privilege, the Finns had not been called upon to serve in the Russian
Army, and their army service had been only three years to the Russian's
five. The officers of the Finnish Army were to be Finns, and this army
could not be called upon to serve outside of the Grand Duchy. This was
the first fundamental right of the Finns to be attacked by the Russian
Government. In some mysterious way the very insignificant army of
Finland "interfered with the general welfare of the Russian Empire."

Immediately following the Czar's startling proposal for a disarmament
conference in 1899 came his call for a special session of the Finnish
Landtag to extend the laws of conscription and the time of regular
service from three to five years. Furthermore, the new law provided
that instead of serving in their own country, the Finnish soldiers were
to be scattered among the various troops of the empire. By this means
it was hoped to Russianize them.

The representatives of the people had no time to consider the measure
before the Czar's decree was issued, February 17, 1899, declaring that
thenceforth the laws governing the Grand Duchy be made in the same
manner as those of the empire.

It is not necessary to dwell upon the deep feeling of indignation and
grief that pervaded the country. It has found a freer expression
outside of the Grand Duchy than within its boundaries. Wherever the
human heart is beating in sympathetic harmony with universal progress,
the oppressed Finnish people have found moral support. In spite of
this, one by one the Finns have been deprived of their hereditary
rights and privileges. To the Finns this new order of things seems
appalling. It is like the drawing of the veil of the dark ages over
their beloved country. They have lost everything that is dear to the
human heart: their language, their religion, and their independence.
They can do nothing but mourn in silence and mortification, for a
strict Russian censorship prevents the expression of their just
indignation and grief.

The present condition of Finland is apathetic. Last fall the loss of
crops was almost complete, and pestilence and famine are devastating
the country, which has been drained of its vitality by an excessive
migration and military conscription. The young men of Finland are
forced to serve five years in the Russian Army, and the country is
suffering from a lack of men to till the soil. The credit of the
country has been mined, and panic is spreading rapidly. Wholesale
migration of the more thrifty has made the already difficult problem of
readjustment more complicated. Those who remain behind are literally
suffering from physical, intellectual, and moral starvation. There is
left nothing to refresh, fertilize, and energize the nation's vitality.
The Finns are utterly helpless. In this sad extremity of their people
the best men of Finland are exerting their utmost in the endeavor to
alleviate suffering and infuse hope and inspiration among the masses.
The young Finnish party has become exasperated by the humiliation that
has been heaped upon the long-suffering people of their native land,
and its leaders have advised active resistance. The old Finnish party
has adopted the policy of passive resistance and protest. But the
inroads upon the constitution of Finland, in the form of imperial
decrees, rules, and regulations by the Governor-General and his
subordinates, have been so many and so sweeping in their character that
even the most conservative are beginning to lose patience. As long as
the unconstitutional acts affected only the political life of the
people, many were able to bear it, but when the new rules attacked the
time-honored social institutions and customs, indignation could no
longer be suppressed. For instance, the order to open private mail
caused a general protest. The postal director and his secretary refused
to sign the order and resigned. No less obnoxious was the order
forbidding public meetings and directing the governors of the different
provinces of Finland to appoint only such men to fill municipal rural
offices as will be subservient to the Governor-General. The governor of
the province of Ulrasborg resigned, while several other provinces were
already governed by pliant tools of General Bobrikoff.

The long-suppressed anxiety of the people has changed into a
heartrending sigh of anguish. These words of a national poet express
the general sentiment, "Better far than servitude a death upon the
gallows." A vicious circle has been established. The high-handed
measures cause indignation, and the Governor-General is determined to
suppress its expression. There is no safety in Finland for honest and
patriotic men. The judiciary has been made subservient to General
Bobrikoff. Latest advices are ominous. April 24, 1903, was a black day
in the history of Finland. It witnessed the inauguration of a reign of
terror which, by the ordinance of April 2d and the rescript of April
9th, General Bobrikoff had been authorized to establish.

Bobrikoff returned to Finland with authority, if necessary, to close
hotels, stores, and factories, to forbid general meetings, to dissolve
clubs and societies, and to banish without legal process any one whose
presence in the country he considered objectionable.

For 700 years Finns have been free men; now they have become Russian
serfs, and it is well to make closer connections between the Finnish
railway system and the trans-Siberian road. Finns are long-suffering
and patient, but who could endure all this?

While the expression of indignation is suppressed in Finland, outside
of the Grand Duchy, especially in Sweden, Norway, and Denmark, Russia's
relentless tyranny has made the highest officers of state as resentful
as the man in the street. Indeed entire Scandinavia is aflame with
indignation and apprehension. The leading journals are warning
Scandinavians "that the fate of Finland implies other tragedies of
similar character, unless Pan-Scandinavia becomes something more than a
political dream."


VON PLEHVE[1]

[Footnote 1: Reprinted by permission from the _American Review of
Reviews_.]

In criticizing Russian policy in Finland a distinction should be made
between its fundamental principles--_i.e.,_ the ends which it is meant
to attain, and its outward expression, which depends upon
circumstances.

The former,--_i.e.,_ the aims and principles, remain _unalterable_; the
latter,--_i.e.,_ the way in which this policy finds expression--is of
an incidental and temporary character, and does not always depend on
the Russian authority alone. This is what should be taken into
consideration by Russia's western friends when estimating the value of
the information which reaches them from Finland.

As to the program of the Russian Government in the Finland question, it
is substantially as follows:

The fundamental problem of every supreme authority--the happiness and
prosperity of the governed--can be solved only by the mutual
cooperation of the government and the people. The requirements
presented to the partners in this common task are, on the one hand,
that the people should recognize the unity of state principle and
policy and the binding character of its aims; and, on the other, that
the Government should acknowledge the benefit accruing to the state
from the public activity, along the lines of individual development, of
its component elements.

Such are the grounds on which the government and the people should
unite in the performance of their common task. The combination of
imperial unity with local autonomy, of autocracy with self-government,
forms the principle which must be taken into consideration in judging
the action of the Russian Government in the Grand Duchy of Finland. The
manifesto of February 3-15, 1899, is not a negation of such a peaceful
cooperation, but a confirmation of the aforesaid leading principle of
our Government in its full development. It decides that the issue of
imperial laws, common both to Russia and Finland, must not depend
altogether on the consent of the members of the Finland Diet, but is
the prerogative of the Imperial Council of State, with the
participation on such occasions of members of the Finland Senate. There
is nothing in this manifesto to shake the belief of Russia's friends in
the compatibility of the principles of autocracy with a large measure
of local self-government and civic liberty. The development of the
spiritual and material powers of the population by its gradual
introduction to participation in the conscious public life of
the state, as a healthy, conservative principle of government,
has always entered into the plans of the sovereign leaders of the life
of Russia as a state. These intentions were announced afresh from the
throne by the manifesto of February 26, 1903. In our country this
process takes place in accordance with the historical basis of the
empire, with the national peculiarities of its population.

The result is that in Russia we have the organization of local
institutions which give self-government in the narrow sense of the
word--_i.e.,_ the right of the people to see to the satisfaction of
their local economic needs. In Finland the idea of local autonomy was
developed far earlier and in a far wider manner. Its present scope,
which has grown and developed under Russian rule, embraces all sides,
not only of the economic, but of the civil, life of the land. Russian
autocracy has thus given irrefragable proof of its constructive powers
in the sphere of civic development. The historian of the future will
have to note its ethical importance in a far wider sphere as well: the
greatest of social problems have found a peaceable solution in Russia,
thanks to the conditions of its political organization.

For a full comprehension, however, of the manifesto of 1899, it must be
regarded as one of the phases in the development of Finland's relations
to Russia. It will then become evident that as a legacy of the past it
is the outcome of the natural course of events which sooner or later
must have led up to it. The initiation of Finland into the historical
destinies of the Russian Empire was bound to lead to the rise of
questions calling for a general solution common both to the empire and
to Finland. Naturally, in view of the subordinate status of the latter,
such questions could be solved only in the order appointed for imperial
legislation. At the same time, neither the fundamental laws of the
Swedish period of rule in Finland, which were completely incompatible
with its new status, nor the Statutes of the Diet, introduced by
Alexander II., and determining the order of issue of local laws,
touched, or could touch, the question of the issue of general imperial
laws. This question arose in the course of the legislative work
on the systematization of the fundamental laws of Finland. This task,
undertaken by order of the Emperor Alexander II. for the more precise
determination of the status of Finland as an indivisible part of our
state, was continued during the reign of his august successor, the
Emperor Alexander III., and led to the question of determining the
order of issue of general imperial laws. The rules drafted for this
purpose in 1893 formed the contents of the manifesto of 1899. Thus we
see that during six years they remained without application, there
being no practical necessity for their publication. When, however, this
necessity arose, owing to the lapse of the former military law, the
manifesto was issued. It was, therefore, the finishing touch to the
labor of many years at the determination of the manner in which the
principle of a united empire was to find expression within the limits
of Finland, and remained substantially true to the traditions which for
a century had reigned in the relations between Russia and Finland. It
presented a combination of the principle of autocracy with that of
local self-government without any serious limitations of the rights of
the latter. Moreover, while preserving the historical principle of
Russian empire-building, this law determined the form of the expression
of the autocratic power within the limits of the Grand Duchy in a
manner so much in accord with the conditions of life in Finland that it
did not touch the organization of a single one of the national local
institutions of the duchy.

This law, in its application to the new conscription regulations, has
alleviated the condition of the population of Finland. The military
burden laid on the population of the land has been decreased from 2,000
men to 500 per annum, and latterly to 280. As you will see, there is in
reality no opposition between the will of the Emperor of Russia as
announced to Finland in 1899 and his generous initiative at The Hague
Conference. But, you ask me, has not this confirmation of the ancient
principles of Russian state policy in Finland been bought at too dear a
price? I shall try to answer you. The hostility of public opinion
toward us in the West in connection with Finnish matters is much to be
regretted, but hopes may be entertained that under the influence of
better information on Finnish affairs this hostility may lose its
present bitterness. We are accustomed, moreover, to see that the West,
while welcoming the progressive development of Russia along the old
lines it, Europe, has followed itself, is not always as amicably
disposed toward the growth of the political and social
self-consciousness of Russia and toward the independent historical
process taking place in her in the shape of the concentration of her
forces for the fulfilment of her peaceful vocation in the history of
the human race.

The attitude of the population of Finland toward Russia is not at all
so inimical as would appear on reading the articles in the foreign
press proceeding from the pen of hostile journalists. To the honor of
the best elements of the Finnish population, it must be said that the
degree of prosperity attained by Finland during the past century under
the egis of the Russian throne is perfectly evident to them; they know
that it is the Russian Government which has resuscitated the Finnish
race, systematically crushed down as it had been in the days of Swedish
power. The more prudent among the Finlanders realize that now, as
before, the characteristic local organization of Finland remains
unaltered, that the laws which guarantee the provincial autonomy of
Finland are still preserved, and that now, as before, the institutions
are active which satisfy its social and economic needs on independent
lines.

They understand, likewise, the real causes of the increasing emigration
from Finland. If, along with them, political agitation has also played
a certain part, alarming the credulous peasantry with the specter of
military service on the distant borders of Russia, yet their emigration
was and remains an economic phenomenon. Having originated long before
the issue of the manifesto of 1899, it kept increasing under the
influence of bad harvests, industrial crises, and the demand for labor
in foreign lands. Such is also the case in Norway, where the percentage
of emigration is even greater than in Finland.

Having elucidated the substantially unalterable aims of Russian policy
in Finland, let us proceed to the causes which have led to its present
incidental and temporary form of expression. This, undoubtedly, is
distinguished by its severity, but such are the requirements of an
utilitarian policy. By the bye, the total of these severe measures
amounts to twenty-six Finlanders expelled from the country and a few
officials dismissed the service without the right to a pension. It was
scarcely possible, however, to retain officials in the service of the
state once they refused to obey their superiors. Nor was it possible to
bear with the existence of a conspiracy which attempted to draw the
peaceful and law-abiding population into a conflict with the
Government, and that, too, at a moment when the prudent members of the
population of the duchy took the side of lawful authority, thereby
calling forth against themselves persecution on the part of the secret
leaders of the agitation party. The upholders of the necessity for a
pacific policy toward Russia were subjected to moral and sometimes
physical outrage, and their opponents were not ashamed to institute
scandalous legal processes against them for the purpose of damaging
their reputations.

Very different is the attitude of the great mass of the population, as
the following incident shows: The president of the Abo Hofgericht,
declining to follow the instructions of the party hostile to Russia,
was, on his arrival in Helsingfors, subjected to a variety of insults
from the mob gathered at the railway station. On his return to Abo he
was, on the contrary, presented with an address from the peasantry and
local landowners, in which the following words occur: "We understand
very well that you have been led to your patriotic resolve to continue
your labors in obedience to the government by deep conviction, and do
not require gratitude either from us or from any others; but at the
important crisis our people is now experiencing it may be of some
relief to you to learn that the preponderating majority of the people,
and especially in broader classes, gratefully approve of the course you
have taken."

It will scarcely be known to any one in the West that when signatures
were being gathered for the great mass-address of protest dispatched to
St. Petersburg in 1899, those who refused their signatures numbered
martyrs among them. There are some who for their courage in refusing
their signatures suffered ruin and disgrace and were imprisoned on
trumped-up charges. Moreover, the agitators aimed at infecting the
lower classes of the population with their intolerance and their hatred
of Russians, but, it must be said, with scant success.

With regard to the essence of the question, I repeat that in matters of
government temporary phenomena should be distinguished from permanent
ones. The incidental expression of Russian policy, necessitated by an
open mutiny against the Government in Finland, will, undoubtedly, be
replaced by the former favor of the sovereign toward his Finnish
subjects as soon as peace is finally restored and the current of social
life in that country assumes its normal course. Then, certainly, all
repressive measures will be repealed. But the realization of the
fundamental aim which the Russian Government has set itself in
Finland--_i.e._, the confirming in that land of the principle of
imperial unity--must continue, and it would be best of all if this end
were attained with the trustful cooperation of local workers under the
guidance of the sovereign to whom Divine Providence has committed the
destinies of Russia and Finland.


SERGIUS WITTE

When we talk of the means requisite for assimilating Finland we can not
help reckoning, first and foremost, with this fact, that by the will of
Russian emperors that country has lived its own particular life for
nearly a century and governed itself in quite a special manner. Another
consideration that should be taken to heart is this: the administration
of the conquered country on lines which differed from the organization
of other territories forming part of the empire, and which gave to
Finland the semblance of a separate state, was shaped by serious
causes, and did good service in the political history of the Russian
Empire. One is hardly justified, therefore, in blaming this work of
Alexander I., as is now so often done.... The annexation of Finland,
poor by nature and at that time utterly ruined by protracted wars, was
of moment to Russia, not so much from an economic or financial as from
a strategical point of view. And what in those days was important was
not its Russification, but solely the military position which it
afforded. Besides, the incorporation of Finland took place at a
calamitous juncture--for Russia. On the political horizon of Europe the
clouds were growing denser and blacker, and there was a general
foreboding of the coming events of the year 1812. If, at that time,
Czar Alexander I. had applied to Finland the methods of administration
which are wont to be employed in conquered countries, Finland would
have become a millstone round Russia's neck during the critical period
of her struggle with Napoleon, which demanded the utmost tension of our
national forces. Fear of insurrections and risings would have compelled
Russia to maintain a large army there and to spend considerable sums in
administering the country. But Alexander I. struck out a different
course. His Majesty recognized the necessity of "bestowing upon the
people, by means of internal organization, incomparably more advantages
than it had had under the sway of Sweden." And the Emperor held that an
effective means of achieving this would be to give the nation such a
status "that it should be accounted not enthralled by Russia, but
attached to her in virtue of its own manifest interests." "This valiant
and trusty people," said Czar Alexander I., when winding up the Diet of
Borgo, "will bless Providence for establishing the present order of
things. And I shall garner in the best fruits of my solicitude when I
shall see this people tranquil from without, free within, devoting
itself to agriculture and industry under the protection of the laws and
their own good conduct, and by its very prosperity rendering justice in
my intentions and blessing its destiny."

Subsequent history justified the rosiest hopes of the Emperor. The
immediate consequence of the policy he adopted toward Finland was that
the country quickly became calmed and settled after the fierce war that
had been waged there, and that in this way Russia was enabled to
concentrate all her forces upon the contest with Napoleon. According to
the words of Alexander I. himself, the annexation of Finland "was of
the greatest advantage to Russia; without it, in 1812, we might not,
perhaps, have won success, because Napoleon had in Bernadotte his
steward, who, being within five days' march of our capital, would have
been inevitably compelled to join his forces with those of Napoleon.
Bernadotte himself told me so several times, and added that he had
Napoleon's order to declare war against Russia." And afterward, during
almost a century, Finland never occasioned any worries, political or
economic, to the Russian Government, and did not require special
sacrifices or special solicitude on its part.

If we may judge, not by the speeches and articles of particular
Separatists, but by overt acts, during that long period of time the
Finnish people never failed in their duty as loyal subjects of their
monarch or citizens of the common fatherland, Russia. The successors of
the conqueror of Finland spoke many times from the height of the throne
"of the numerous proofs of unalterable attachment and gratitude which
the citizens of this country have given their monarchs." And in effect,
neither general insurrections against Russia's dominions, nor political
plots, nor the tumults of an ignorant rabble--such as our cholera
riots, workmen's outbreaks, Jewish pogroms, and other like
disturbances--have ever occurred in Finland; and when disorders of that
kind broke out in other parts of the empire or alarming tidings from
abroad came in they never evoked the slightest dangerous echo there. It
is a most remarkable fact that during the trying time the Russian
Government had when the Polish insurrection was going on, and later, in
the equally difficult period through which we passed at the close of
the seventies, Finland remained perfectly calm; and in the long list of
political criminals sprung from the various nationalities of Russia, we
do not find a single Finlander.

In like manner fear of Finland's aspirations toward independence, of
her inordinate demands in the matter of military legislation, of her
turning her population into an armed nation; in a word, all the
apprehensions felt that Finland may break loose from Russia are, down
to the present moment, devoid of foundation in fact.

"Finland under the egis of the Russian realm," our present Emperor has
said, "and strong in virtue of Russia's protection through the lapse of
almost a whole century, has advanced along the way of peaceful progress
unswervingly, and in the hearts of the Finnish people lived the
consciousness of their attachment to the Russian monarchs and to
Russia." In moments of stress and of Russia's danger, the Finnish
troops have always come forward as the fellow soldiers of our armies,
and Finland has shared with us unhesitatingly our military triumphs and
also the irksome consequences and tribulations of war-time. Thus, in
the year 1812 and in the Crimean campaign, her armies grew in number
considerably; in that eastern war almost her entire mercantile marine
was destroyed--a possession which was one of the principal sources of
the revenue of the country. During the Polish insurrection and the war
for the emancipation of Bulgaria Finnish troops took part in the
expeditions, and when in 1885 the Diet was opened, the Emperor
Alexander III., in his speech from the throne, bore witness to "the
unimpeachable way in which the population of the country had discharged
its military obligations," and he gave utterance to his conviction that
the Finnish troops would attain the object for which they existed.

By way of proving Finland's striving to cut herself apart from Russia,
people point to the doctrine disseminated about the Finnish State, to
its unwillingness to establish military conscription on the same lines
as the empire, and to the speeches of the Deputies of the Diets of
1877-1878 and 1879. But none of these arguments carries conviction.

The theory about the independence of Finland, as a separate realm,
which was worked out for the purpose of devising "the means of
safeguarding its idiosyncrasies," is far from proving that "Finland
aims at separation from Russia." Down to the present moment separation
has not been in her interests. She was never an independent State; her
historical traditions do not move her to play a political part in
Europe. Besides, her population is mixed. The Swedish element
constitutes only the topmost layer, and is not powerful enough to move
toward an independent existence or toward union with the Power which
belongs to the same race as that layer, while the mass of Finns,
dreading the oppression of the Swedish party, is drawn more to Russia
by the simple instinct of self-preservation. That is why the Finnish
patriot may well be a true and devoted citizen of the Russian Empire,
and being, as Alexander III. termed it, "a good Finlander," can also
"bear in mind that he is a member of the Russian family, at the head of
which stands the Russian Emperor."

The unfavorable attitude of the Finns toward the proposal of the War
Ministry for extending to them the general regulations that deal with
the obligation to serve in the army is also intelligible. That
obligation of military service is exceedingly irksome; and it is not
only the Finns who desire to fight shy of it, nor can one discover any
specially dangerous symptom in their wish to preserve the privileged
position which they have hitherto enjoyed as to the way of discharging
their military duties. They seek to perpetuate the privileges conferred
upon them in the form of fundamental laws, and they strive to avoid
being incorporated in the Russian Army, because service there would be
very much more onerous for them than in their own Finnish regiments...

If we now turn from the political to the economic aspect of the matter,
to the question how far the order of things as at present established
in Finland has proved advantageous to Russia from the financial point
of view, we shall search in vain for data capable of bearing out the
War Minister's opinion that, for the period of a century the Budget of
Finland has been sedulously husbanded at the cost of the Russian
people.

Ever since Finland has had an independent State Budget, she has never
required any sacrifices on the part of Russia for her economic
development. Ill-used by nature and ruined by wars, the country, by
dint of its own efforts, has advanced toward cultural and material
prosperity. Without subsidies or guaranties from the Imperial Treasury,
the land became furrowed with a network of carriage roads and railways;
industries were created; a mercantile fleet was built, and the work of
educating the nation was so successfully organized that one can hardly
find an illiterate person throughout the length and breadth of the
principality. It is also an interesting fact worth recording that,
whereas the Russian Government has almost every year to feed a starving
population, now in one district of the empire, now in another, and is
obliged from time to time to spend enormous sums of money for the
purpose, Finland, in spite of its frequent bad harvests, has generally
dispensed with such help on the part of the State Treasury...

Under these circumstances it is hardly fair to assert that Finland has
been living at Russia's expense. On the contrary, Finland is perhaps
the only one of our borderlands which has not required for its economic
or cultural development funds taken from the population of Russia
proper. The Caucasus, the Kingdom of Poland, Turkestan, part of
Siberia, and other portions of our border districts--nay, even the
northern provinces themselves--are sources of loss to us, or, at any
rate, they have cost the Russian Treasury very much, and some of them
still continue to cost it much, but the expenses they involve are
hidden in the totals of the Imperial Budget. A few data will throw
adequate light on this aspect of the situation. It is enough, for
instance, to call to mind what vast, what incalculable sacrifices the
pacification of the Caucasus required from Russia and what worry and
expense it still causes us. No less imposing is the expenditure which
the Kingdom of Poland with its two insurrections necessitated in the
course of last century.... And if we cast a glance at the youngest of
our borderlands--Turkestan--we shall find that here also the outlay
occasioned by the political situation of the country has already become
sharply outlined.... When we set those figures and data side by side we
shall find it hard to speak of "our expenditure on Finland" or of "the
vast privileges" we have conferred on the principality.

It follows, then, that the system of administration established for
Finland by the Emperor Alexander I. has not yet had any harmful
political results for Russia, and that it has dispensed the Russian
Government from incurring heavy expenditure for the administration and
the well-being of the country, and in this way has enabled Russia to
concentrate her forces and her care on other parts of the empire and to
devote her attention to other State problems.

One can not, of course, contend that the system of government adopted
in Finland satisfies, in each and all its parts, the requirements and
the needs of the present time. On the contrary, it is indubitable that
the independent existence of the principality, disconnected as it is
from the general interests of the empire, has led to a certain
estrangement between the Russian and the Finnish populations. That an
estrangement really exists can not be doubted; but the explanation of
it is to be found in the difference of the two cultures which have
their roots in history. To the protracted sway of Sweden and Finland's
continuous relations through her intermediary with Western Europe, the
circumstance is to be ascribed that the thinking spirits among the
Finns gravitate--in matters of culture--not to Russia but to the West,
and in particular to Sweden, with whom Finland is linked by bonds of
language--through her highest social class--and of religion, laws, and
literature. For that reason the views, ideas, and interests of
Western--and in particular of Scandinavian--peoples are more
thoroughly familiar and more intelligible to them than ours. That also
is why, when working out any kind of reforms and innovations, they seek
for models not among us but in Western Europe.

It is, doubtless, impossible to look upon that state of things with
approval. It is highly desirable that a closer union should take place
between the interests, cultural and political, of the principality and
those of the empire: that is postulated by the mutual advantages of
both countries. As I have already remarked, Russians could not
contemplate otherwise than with pleasure the possible union and
assimilation--in principle--of the borderland with the other parts of
our vast fatherland: they will also be unanimous in wishing this task
as successful an issue as is possible.....

But what is not feasible is to demolish at one swoop everything that
has been created and preserved in the course of a whole century. A
change of policy, if it is not to provoke tumults and disorganization,
must be carried out gradually and with extreme circumspection. The
assimilation of Finland can never be efficacious if achieved by
violence and constraint instead of by pacific means. The Finnish people
should be left to appreciate the benefits which would accrue to them
from union with a powerful empire: for an adequate understanding of
their own interests will, in the words of the Imperial rescript of
February 28, 1891, "inspire them with a desire to draw more closely the
bonds that link Finland with Russia." There is no doubt that even at
present a certain tendency is noticeable among the Finns in favor of
closer relations with Russia: the knowledge of the Russian tongue is
spreading more and more widely among them, and business relations
between them and us are growing brisker from year to year. The
desirable abolition of the customs cordon between the two countries is
bound to give a powerful fillip to the growth of commerce, which is the
most trustworthy and most pacific means of bringing about a better
understanding and strengthening the ties that bind Finland to Russia.

Harsh, drastic expedients may easily loosen the threads that have begun
to get tied, foster national hate, arouse mutual distrust and
suspicion, and lead to results the reverse of those aimed at.
Assimilative measures adopted by the Government, therefore, should be
thought out carefully and applied gradually.

J.N. REUTER

"Might can not dominate right in Russia," said M. Stolypin, Russian
Minister of the Interior and President of the Council of Ministers, in
the speech which he delivered in the Duma on May 18, 1908, when pressed
by the various parties to declare his policy with regard to Finland.
This noble sentiment has the familiar ring of Russian officialdom. It
may, perhaps, be worth while to consider it in the light of recent
history and present-day issues.

Alexander I., the first Russian sovereign of Finland, addressed a
Rescript to Count Steinheil on his appointment to the post of
Governor-General. Therein he wrote: "My object in Finland has been to
give the people a political existence so that they shall not regard
themselves as subject to Russia, but as attached to her by their own
obvious interests." It is not the place here to give an historical
account of subsequent events. It may, however, be briefly stated that
the political ideal expressed in the words quoted here was at times
forgotten, but was again revived, and, in such times, even resulted in
the extension of Finland's constitutional rights. Then, again, this
ideal was abandoned, and gave way to a totally different one, which
found its most acute expression in February, 1899, when the Czar, a
year after the issue of his invitations to the first Peace Conference
at The Hague, suppressed by an Imperial manifesto the constitutional
right of Finland. The arbitrary and corrupt Russian bureaucratic regime
little by little forced its way into the country, while Finlanders
watched with bitter resentment the suppression, one by one, of their
most cherished national institutions.

This manifesto was condemned in many European countries at the time,
and a protest against it was signed by over a thousand prominent
publicists and constitutional lawyers, who presented an international
address to the Czar begging him to restore the rights of the Grand
Duchy.

In 1905, however, it seemed at last that a new era was about to dawn.
The change was brought about by the domestic crisis through which
Russia herself was then passing. An Imperial manifesto promulgated in
October, containing the principles of a constitutional form of
government in Russia, was followed as an inevitable sequel by the
manifesto of November 4th, which practically restored to Finland its
full political rights. In 1906, a new Law of the Diet was enacted.
Instead of triennial sessions of the Estates, annual sessions of the
Diet were introduced, while an extension of the franchise to every
citizen over twenty-four years of age without distinction of sex gave
to women active electoral rights. Moreover, the door was opened to new
and far-reaching reforms, the fulfilment of which infused fresh life
into the democratic spirit of Finnish national institutions. While,
however, so much was done to improve the political, social, and
economic condition of the country, the promises which were then made
have not been fulfilled. The principal reason for this failure to
redeem their pledges lies in a change of attitude among Russian
officials and their interference in Finnish affairs. It is by
consideration of this change and of its effect upon Finland that we may
best judge how much truth there is in M. Stolypin's claim that in
Russia "might can not dominate right."

Ominous signs of a reversal of policy had appeared before, but the
first official expression to it was given in the speech of M. Stolypin
already referred to. In this speech he claimed for Russia as the
sovereign power the right of control over Finnish administration and
legislation whenever the interests of the empire were concerned. This
claim meant practically the restoration of the old Bobrikoff régime and
was based on the same ideas as those underlying the February manifesto
of 1899. M. Stolypin attempts to justify his attitude by arguing that
the constitutional relations between Russia and Finland are determined
only by Clause 4 of the Treaty of Peace between Russia and Sweden,
dated September 17,1809. This clause runs as follows:

"His Majesty the King of Sweden renounces irrevocably and forever, on
behalf of himself as well as on behalf of his successors to the Swedish
throne and realm, and in favor of his Majesty the Emperor of Russia and
his successors to the Russian throne and empire, all his rights and
titles of the governments enumerated hereafter which have been
conquered by the arms of his Imperial Majesty from the Swedish Army, to
wit: the Provinces of Kymmenegard, etc.

"These provinces, with all their inhabitants, towns, ports, forts,
villages, and islands, with their appurtenances, privileges, and
revenues, shall hereafter under full ownership and sovereignty belong
to the Russian Empire and be incorporated with the same."

After quoting this clause, M. Stolypin exclaimed, "This is the act, the
title, by which Russia possesses Finland, the one and only act which
determines the mutual relations between Russia and Finland."

Now this clause contains no reference whatever to the autonomy of the
Grand Duchy, and if it were the only act by which the mutual relations
of Russia and Finland were determined, then Finland would have no
constitution. The political autonomy of Finland, which has been
recognized for exactly one hundred years, would have been without legal
foundation. Even M. Stolypin admits that Finland enjoys autonomy.
"There must be no room for the suspicion," he said, "that Russia would
violate the rights of autonomy conferred on Finland by the monarch." On
what, then, does the claim to Finnish autonomy rest and how was it
conferred? Clause 6 of the Treaty of Peace contains the following
passage:

"His Majesty the Emperor of all the Russias, having already given the
most manifest proofs of the clemency and justice with which he has
resolved to govern the inhabitants of the provinces which he has
acquired, by generosity and by his own spontaneous act assuring to them
the free exercise of their religion, rights, property, and privileges,
his Swedish Majesty considers himself thereby released from performing
the otherwise sacred duty of making reservations in the above respects
in favor of his former subjects."

This entry in the Treaty of Peace refers to the settlement made at the
Borgo Diet a few months earlier, and it is under this settlement,
confirmed by deeds of a later date, that Finland claims her right to
autonomy. M. Stolypin recognizes the claim of Finland to autonomy, but
refuses to recognize the binding force of the acts of the Borgo Diet on
which alone it can legally be based. This claim gives Finland no voice
in her external relations. All international treaties, including
matters relating to the conduct of war (though laws on the liability of
Finnish citizens to military service fall under the competency of the
Finnish Diet), are matters common to Russia and Finland as one empire,
one international unit, and are dealt with by the proper Russian
authorities. This is admitted by all Finlanders. But M. Stolypin
extended Russian authority by making it paramount in all matters which
have a bearing on Russian or Imperial interests.

The attempt to curtail Finnish constitutional liberty has taken
different forms. Early in 1908 the Russian Council of Ministers, over
which M. Stolypin presides, drew up a "Journal," or Protocol, to which
the Czar on June 2d gave his sanction. The chief provisions of this
Protocol were briefly as follows: All legislative proposals and all
administrative matters "of general importance," before being brought to
the Sovereign for his sanction, or, as is the case with Bills to be
presented to the Diet, for his preliminary approval, as well as all
reports drawn up by Finnish authorities for the Czar's inspection, must
be communicated to the Russian Council of Ministers. The Council will
then decide "which matters concerning the Grand Duchy of Finland also
have a bearing on the interests of the empire, and, consequently, call
for a fuller examination on the part of the Ministries and Government
Boards." If the Council decide that a matter has a bearing on the
interests of the empire the Council prepare a report on it, and, should
the Council differ from the views taken up by the Finnish authorities,
the Finnish Secretary of State, who alone should be the constitutional
channel for bringing Finnish matters before the Sovereign's notice, can
do so only in the presence of the President of the Council of Ministers
or another Russian Minister. But in practise it has frequently happened
that the Council send in their report beforehand, and the Czar's
decision is practically taken when the Finnish Secretary is permitted
an audience.

This important measure was brought about by the exclusive
recommendation of Russian Ministers. Neither the Finnish Diet nor the
Senate nor the Secretary of State for Finland, who resides in St.
Petersburg, was consulted or had the slightest idea of what was going
on before the Protocol was published in Russia. It has never been
promulgated in Finland, and no Finnish authority has been officially
advised of it. The whole matter has been treated as a private affair
between the Czar and his Russian Ministers.

The excuse has been made that the Czar must be permitted to seek
counsel with whomsoever he chooses in regard to the government of
Finland. But this is not a question of privately consulting one man or
the other. The new measure amounts to an official recognition of the
Russian Council of Ministers as an organ of government exercising a
powerful control over Finnish legislation, administration, and finance.
The center of gravity of Finnish administration has, in fact, been
shifted from the Senate for Finland, composed of Finnish men, to the
Russian Council of Ministers.

The Finnish Senate protested to the Czar in three separate memoranda,
dated respectively June 19, 1908, December 22, 1908, and February
25,1909. The Finnish Diet adopted on October 13, 1908, a petition to
the Czar to reconsider the matter. On the occasion of the opening of
the Diet's next session the Speaker, in his reply to the Czar's
message, briefly referred to the anxiety prevailing in Finland, with
the result that the Diet was immediately punished by an order of
dissolution from the Czar. The Senate's memoranda, as well as the
Diet's petition, were rejected, the Czar acting on the exclusive
recommendation of the Russian Council of Ministers. They were not even
brought before him through the constitutional channels, the Finnish
Secretary of State having been refused a hearing. As a result all
members of the Department of Justice, or half the number of the
Senators, resigned.

In the same year another but less successful attack was made on the
Finnish Constitution. In the autumn of 1908 the Finnish Diet adopted a
new Landlord and Tenant Bill, but before it was brought up for the
Czar's sanction the Diet was dissolved in the manner just described.
The Bill being of a pressing nature, the Council of Ministers was at
last prevailed upon to report on it to the Czar. The latter then gave
his sanction to it, but, on the recommendation of the Council, added a
rider in the preamble. This was to the effect that, though the Bill,
having been adopted by a Diet which was dissolved before the expiration
of the three years' period for which it was elected, should not have
been presented for his consideration at all, the Czar would
nevertheless make an exception from the rule and sanction it, prompted
by his regard for the welfare of the poorer part of the population.

The Senate decided to postpone promulgation of this law in view of the
constitutional doctrine involved in the preamble. It was pointed out
that this doctrine was entirely foreign to Finnish law. The preamble
which, according to custom, should have contained nothing beyond the
formal sanction to the law in question, embodied an interpretation of
constitutional law. Such an interpretation could only legally be made
in the same manner as the enactment of a constitutional law, _i.e.,_
through the concurrent decision of the Sovereign and the Diet. The
Senate, therefore, petitioned the Czar to modify the preamble in such a
way as to remove from it what could be construed as an interpretation
of constitutional law.

In reply, the Czar reprimanded the Senate for delaying promulgation,
recommended it to do so immediately, but promised later on to take the
representations made by the Senate into his consideration. Five of the
Senators then voted against, while the Governor-General and five others
voted for promulgation of, the law. The minority then tendered their
resignations. The inconveniences resulting from this new constitutional
doctrine proved, however, of so serious a practical nature that the
Czar eventually, in July, 1909, issued a declaration that "the gracious
expressions in the preamble to the Landlord and Tenant Law concerning
the invalidity of the decisions of a dissolved Diet do not constitute
an interpretation of the constitutional law and shall not in the future
be binding in law."

A third and most important encroachment by the Russian Council of
Ministers on the autonomy of Finland was also carried out at the
instigation of M. Stolypin. The Finnish Constitution makes no
distinction between matters that may have, or may not have, a bearing
on the interests of Russia. At the same time Russian interests have
never been disregarded in Finnish legislation. It had been the
practise, when a legislative proposal was brought forward in Finland,
and a Russian interest might be affected by it, to communicate with the
Russian Minister whom the matter most closely concerned, in order that
he might make his observations. This practise was confirmed by law in
1891. In its memoranda of 1908 and 1909, on the interference of the
Russian Council of Ministers in Finnish affairs, the Senate suggested
that, in case the procedure under the ordinance of 1891 were not
satisfactory, a committee of Russian and Finnish members should be
appointed to discuss a _modus procedendi_ of such a nature that the
Constitution of Finland should not be violated. On the recommendation
of the Council of Ministers, the Czar rejected these suggestions, but
the Council of Ministers took the matter in hand and summoned a
"Special Conference," consisting of several Russian Ministers, other
high Russian functionaries, the Governor-General of Finland, who is
also a Russian, with M. Stolypin as President. Their business was to
draw up a program for a joint committee to be appointed "for the
drafting of proposals for regulations concerning the procedure of
issuing laws of general Imperial interest concerning Finland." This
conference accordingly drew up a program, approved by the Czar on April
10, 1909, in which it was resolved that the joint committee should
suggest a definition of the term "laws of general Imperial interest
concerning Finland." These laws, it was proposed, should be totally
withdrawn from the competency of the Finnish Diet and should be passed
by the legislative bodies of Russia, that is, the Council of State and
the Duma. The only safeguard for the interests of Finland suggested in
the program is that a representative for Finland should be admitted to
these two bodies when Finnish questions were discussed there.

It is impossible to say what laws concerning Finland will be defined as
being of "general interest." Having regard, however, to the wide
interpretation which Russian reactionaries are wont to put on the
expression, there is every reason to suppose that the Russian members
of the committee will insist on its extension so as to include every
important category of law.

The Finnish members through their spokesman, Archbishop Johansson,
declared that they proceeded to work on the committee on the assumption
that in case alterations in the law of Finland should be found
necessary, having regard to Imperial interests, such alterations should
be made through modifications in the constitutional laws of Finland.
The Finlanders are prepared to do their duty by the empire, but, the
Archbishop said: "Sacrifices have been demanded from us to which no
people can consent. The Finnish people can not forego their
Constitution, which is a gift of the Most High, and which, next to the
Gospel, is their most cherished possession."

M. Deutrich, who spoke on behalf of the Russian members, explained that
any law resulting from the labors of the committee would not be
submitted to the ratification of the Finnish Diet.

So M. Stolypin's way was now clear. The sanction of the people will not
be required. The Finlanders have practically no other help than that
given by a consciousness of the justice of their cause. They have no
appeal.

In November of 1909 the Finnish Diet was dissolved by a ukase of the
Czar. Since then the Russian Government has been passing decree after
decree for Finland, giving the constitutional authorities no voice even
of protest. So ends Finland.




MAN'S FASTEST MILE THE AUTOMOBILE AGE

A.D. 1911

C.F. CARTER ISAAC MARCOSSON

On April 23, 1911, an automobile was driven along the hard, smooth sand
of a Florida sea beach, covering a mile in 25-2/5 seconds. And it
continued for a second mile at the same tremendous speed. These were
the fastest two miles ever made by man. They were at the rate of a
trifle over 140 miles an hour. As this record was not equaled in the
three years that followed, it may be regarded as approaching the
maximum speed of which automobiles are capable. And as another
automobile, in endeavoring to reach such a speed, dissolved into its
separate parts, practically disintegrated, and left an astonished
driver floundering by himself upon the sand, we may assume that no
noticeably greater speed can be attained except by some wholly
different method or new invention.

In contrast to this picture of "speed maniacs" darting more swiftly
than ever eagle swooped or lightning express-train ran, let us
contemplate for a moment that first automobile race held in Chicago in
1894. A twenty-four horse-power Panhard machine showed a speed of
thirty miles an hour and was objected to by the newspapers as a "racing
monster" likely to cause endless tragedy, menacing death to its owners
and to the public. Thus in the brief space of seventeen years did the
construction of automobiles improve and the temper of the world toward
them change. The present day may almost be called the "automobile age."
The progress by which this has come about, and the enormous development
of this new industry is here traced by two men who have followed it
most closely. The narrative of the "auto's" triumphs by Mr. C.F. Carter
appeared first in the _Outing Magazine_. The account of the industry's
growth by Mr. Isaac Marcosson appeared in _Munsey's Magazine_, of which
he was the editor. Both are given here by the permission of the
magazines.

C.F. CARTER

When the marine architects and engineers catch up with the automobile
makers they can build a ship capable of crossing the Atlantic in
twenty-three hours; or, if we forget to make allowance for the
difference in longitude, capable of making the run from Liverpool to
New York in the same apparent time in which the Twentieth Century
Limited makes the run from New York to Chicago. That is, the vessel
leaving Liverpool at three o'clock in the afternoon would arrive at New
York at nine o'clock the following morning, which, allowing for the
five hours' difference in time, would make twenty-three hours.

When the railroad engineers provide improved tracks and motive power
that will enable them to parallel the feats of the automobile men, if
they ever do, the running time for the fastest trains between New York
and Chicago will be reduced to seven hours, while San Francisco will be
but a day's run from the metropolis.

And when the airship enthusiasts are able to dart through the air at
the speed attained by the automobile, it will be time enough to think
of taking seriously the extravagant claims made in behalf of aviation.

For the automobile is the swiftest machine ever built by human hands.
It is so much swifter than its nearest competitor that those who read
these lines to-day are likely to be some years older before its speed
is even equaled, to say nothing of being surpassed, by any other kind
of vehicle.

So far as is known, but one human being ever traveled faster than
Robert Burman did in his racing auto on the beach at Daytona, Florida,
on April 23, 1911. This solitary exception was a Hindu carrier who
chanced to tumble off the brink of a chasm in the Himalayas. His name
has not been preserved, he never made any claim to the record, he was
not officially timed, and altogether the event has no official
standing. Still, as he is the only man who is ever alleged to have
covered so great a distance as six thousand feet in an obstructed fall,
the matter is not without interest; for, according to the accepted rule
for finding the velocity of a body falling freely from rest, he must
have been going at the rate of seven miles a second when he reached the
bottom.

About Burman's record there can be no doubt, for it was made in the
presence of many witnesses, and it was duly timed with stop-watches by
men skilled in the art. The straightaway mile over the smooth, hard
beach was covered from a running start in the almost incredibly short
time of 25.40 seconds.

The next fastest mile ever traveled by human beings who lived to tell
about it was made in an electric-car on the experimental track between
Berlin and Zossen, in 1902. As the engineers who achieved this record
for the advancement of scientific knowledge of the railroad considered
such speed dangerous, it is not at all likely to become standard
practise. The fastest time ever made by a steam locomotive of which
there is any record, was the run of five miles from Fleming to
Jacksonville, Florida, in two and a half minutes by a Plant system
locomotive in March, 1901. This was at the rate of 120 miles an hour.
As for steamships, the record of 30.53 miles per hour is held by the
_Mauretania_.

These things, if borne in mind, will serve to throw into stronger
relief the things that an automobile can do, and to supply a
substantial basis for the premise that, at least in some respects, the
automobile is the most marvelous machine the world has yet seen. It can
go anywhere at any time, floundering through two feet of snow, ford any
stream that isn't deep enough to drown out the magneto, triumph over
mud axle deep, jump fences, and cavort over plowed ground at fifteen
miles an hour. It has been used with brilliant success in various kinds
of hunting, including coyote coursing on the prairies of Colorado,
where it can run all around the bronco, formerly in favor, since it
never runs any risk of breaking a leg in a prairie-dog hole. Educated
automobiles have been trained to shell corn, saw wood, pump water,
churn, plow, and, in short, do anything required of them except figure
out where the consumer gets off under the new tariff law.

But to get back to the subject of speed, as automobile talk always
does, the supremacy of the motor-car has been established by so many
official records that any attempt to select the most striking only
results in bewilderment. The best that can be done is to recite a few
representative ones.

That was a most interesting illustration, for instance, of the capacity
for sustained high speed made by a Stearns car on the mile track at
Brighton Beach in 1910. In twenty-four hours the car covered the
amazing distance of 1,253 miles, which was at the average speed of
52-1/5 miles per hour. This record is all the more remarkable from the
fact the car was not a racer, but a stock car which had been driven for
some months by its owner before it was borrowed for the race, and did
not have any special preparation. The men who drove it were not
notified that their services were wanted until the morning of the race.

While this is about the average rate per hour of the fastest train
between New York and Chicago, it should be remembered that the trains
run on steel rails, that curves are comparatively few, and they are not
sharp, while the automobile was spinning around a mile track made of
plain dirt, and was obliged to negotiate 2,506 sharp curves. Besides,
the locomotives on the fast trains are changed every 120 to 150 miles,
while the entire run of 1,253 miles was made by one auto which had
already run 7,500 miles in ordinary service before it was entered in
the race.

Unfortunately for the automobile, it has achieved so many remarkable
speed records that its name is suggestive of swiftness. If the English
language were not the stereotyped, inelastic vehicle for the
communication of thought that it is we should now be speaking of
"automobiling" a shady bill through the city council instead of
"railroading" it. There are few places where it is permissible to
attain record speed, and fewer men who, with safety to others, may be
entrusted with the attempt. The true value of the automobile to the
average man lies in its ability to keep right on going indefinitely at
moderate speed under any and all conditions.

One of the innumerable tests in which the staying qualities of the
automobile were brought out was the trip from Pittsburg to Philadelphia
by way of Gettysburg by S.D. Waldon and four passengers in a Packard
car, September 20, 1910. This run of 303 miles over three mountain
ranges, with the usual accompaniments of steep grades, rocks, ruts, and
thank-you-ma'ms to rack the machinery and bruise the feelings of the
riders, was made in 12 hours and 51 minutes.

A little run of three or four hundred miles, though, is scarcely worth
mentioning by way of showing what an auto can do in a real endurance
contest. A much more notable trip was the non-stop run from Jackson,
Michigan, to Bangor, Maine, in November, 1909, by E.P. Blake and Dr.
Charles Percival. The distance of 1,600 miles was covered in 123 hours,
which meant traveling at an average speed of 13 miles an hour in rain
and snow and mud over country roads at their worst. In all that time
the motor never once stopped. In the Munsey historical tour of 1910 a
Brush single-cylinder car covered the 1,550 miles of a schedule
designed for big cars and came through with a perfect score. If you
know the hill roads of Pennsylvania you'll realize what that means in
the way of car performance.

Still more remarkable endurance tests are the transcontinental trips
which are undertaken so frequently nowadays that they no longer attract
attention. One such trip which shows what very little trouble an
automobile gives when handled with reasonable care was that made in
1909 by George C. Rew, W.H. Aldrich, Jr., R.A. Luckey, and H.G. Toney.
Traveling by daylight only, they made the journey of 2,800 miles from
San Francisco to Chicago in nineteen days in a Stearns car. They might
have done better if they had not loitered along the way. On one
occasion they stopped to haul water a distance of twenty-five miles for
some cowboys on a round-up. The motor gave no trouble whatever, while
the only trouble with tires was a single puncture caused by a spike
when they tried to avoid a bad stretch of road by running on a railroad
track.

The time record from ocean to ocean was held by L.L. Whitman, who left
New York in a Reo four-thirty at 12.01 A.M. on Monday, August 8, 1910,
and arrived in San Francisco on the 18th, covering the 3,557 miles in
10 days 15 hours and 13 minutes. This achievement may be more fully
appreciated by comparing it with the transcontinental relay race in
which a courier carried a message from President Taft to President
Chilberg, of the Alaska-Yukon-Pacific Exposition, in September-October,
1909, in 10 days 5 hours, by using thirty-two cars and as many
different drivers who knew the roads over which they ran.

Those who are fortunate enough to have friends who own cars know that
automobiles can climb hills; and that the accepted way to do it is to
throw in the extra special high gear, tear the throttle out by the
roots, advance the spark twenty minutes, and push hard on the steering
wheel. The fact that the car will overlook such treatment and go ahead
is a source of never-failing wonder. Indeed, when it comes to
hill-climbing the automobile is so far ahead of the locomotive that it
seems like wanton cruelty to drag the latter into the discussion at
all.

The steepest grade on a railroad doing a miscellaneous transportation
business climbed by a locomotive relying on adhesion only is on the
Leopoldina system in Brazil between Bocca do Monte and Theodoso, where
there is a stretch of 8-1/3 per cent. grade with curves of 130 feet
radius. There are some logging roads in the United States with grades
of 16 per cent. How trifling this seems when compared with the feat of
a Thomas car which climbed Fillmore Street, San Francisco, which is
alleged to have a gradient of 34 per cent., with twenty-three persons
on board. As 25 per cent. is regarded as the maximum safe gradient for
an Abt rack railway, since the cog-wheel is liable to climb out of the
rack on any steeper grade, it will be seen that the strain upon the
credulity of the hearer of this story is almost as great as that upon
the car must have been.

Enthusiasm may be expected to run high in the presence of such
astounding triumphs, and it should, therefore, not be deemed surprising
that accounts of hill-climbing contests are generally lacking in
definiteness. The name of the car and the driver are always given with
scrupulous care, but such incidental details as length of ascent,
minimum, maximum, and average gradient, maximum curvature, and so on,
are generally left to the imagination.

Among the few exceptions to this rule was the hill-climbing contest at
Port Jefferson, Long Island, in which Ralph de Palma went up an ascent
of two thousand feet with an average gradient of 10 per cent. and a
maximum of 15 per cent. in 20.48 seconds in his 190-horse-power Fiat. A
little Hupmobile, one of the lightest cars built, reached the top in 1
minute 10 seconds. De Palma climbed the "Giant's Despair" near
Wilkesbarre, Pennsylvania, an ascent six thousand feet long, with
grades varying from 10 to 22 per cent., in his big machine in 1 minute
28-2/5 seconds. A Marmon stock car reached the top in 1 minute 50-1/5
seconds. Pike's Peak, Mount Washington, Ensign Mountain, in Utah, and
lesser mountains elsewhere have also been climbed repeatedly by
automobiles. As the mere announcement of the fact vividly exhibits the
staying powers of the auto in a long, stiff climb, the engineering
details may be disregarded.

Next to its ability to do the exceptional things when required, the
most useful accomplishment of the automobile is its wonderful capacity
for standing up to its work day in and day out in fair weather or foul,
regardless of the condition of the roads. This is shown every year in
the spectacular Glidden tours, otherwise the National Reliability
tests, in which a number of cars of various makes cover a scheduled
route of two or three thousand miles, in which are included all the
different kinds of abominations facetiously termed "roads." Other tests
without number are constantly being evolved to demonstrate the already
established fact that an automobile can do anything required of it.

There was the New York to Paris race, for instance. Starting from New
York on February 12, 1908, when traveling was at its worst, and
arriving in Paris July 30, the winner floundered in snow, mud, sand,
and rocks, over mountain ranges and through swamps, in eighty-eight
days' running time for the 12,116 miles of land travel. That was a
demonstration of what an automobile can do that has never been
surpassed. Yet the Thomas car that did it was restored to its original
condition at a cost of only $90 after the trip was ended.

Another remarkable demonstration of endurance was that given by a
Chalmers-Detroit touring car, which was driven 208 miles every day for
a hundred consecutive days over average roads. When the 20,800 miles
were finished, just to show that it still felt its oats, the car which
had already covered 6,000 miles of roads through Western States before
the test began, ran over to Pontiac, Michigan, and hauled the Mayor 26
miles to Detroit. Then it was run into the shops and taken down for
examination. Being found to be in perfect condition except for the
valves, which required some trifling adjustment to take up the wear on
the valve stems, and for the piston rings, which needed setting out, it
was reassembled and started on another test.

But, after all, the most wonderful thing about an automobile is its
almost infinite capacity to endure cruel and inhuman treatment. No
matter whether the brutality is inflicted through ignorance or
awkwardness, or, rarest of all, through unavoidable accident, the
effect on steel and wood and rubber is the same. Yet the auto stands
it.

In brake tests it has been demonstrated that a car traveling at the
rate of eighteen miles an hour can be stopped in a distance of
twenty-five feet. The knowledge that this can be done in an emergency
is a great comfort, but it should be equally well known that it does
not improve the car to make all stops that way. Yet how often are
drivers seen tearing up to the curb at twenty miles an hour or more to
slam on the brakes at the last instant with a violence that nearly
causes the car to turn a somersault, bringing it to a standstill in
twenty feet, when there was no earthly reason why they should not have
used four times that distance. Or if occasion arises for slowing down
in a crowded street, the same kind of driver throws out his clutch and
applies the brakes with the throttle wide open so the motor can race
unhindered.

With the greenhorn the automobile is long-suffering. There was a new
owner in Boston, whose name is mercifully suppressed, who took his
family out for a first ride. In going down a hill on which the clay was
slippery from recent rain it became necessary to turn out for a car
coming up. The new driver made the turn so successfully that he turned
clear over the edge of the embankment. Having nothing but air to
support it, the auto turned completely over without spilling a
passenger and landed right side up and on an even keel in a marsh
fifteen feet below. It was necessary to get a team to pull the car out
of the mud, but once on the solid road the new owner simply cranked 'er
up and went on his way rejoicing.

Another new owner could not find the key to fasten one rear wheel on
the axle when he unloaded his auto from the car in which it had been
shipped from the factory. Nevertheless, he started up the motor
according to directions and traveled twelve miles with one wheel
driving. By this time the outraged motor was red hot. Whereupon the new
owner stopped at a farm-house and dashed several buckets of cold water
on it. Then he plugged around the country a week or so before he
decided to go to the agent to lodge a complaint that his derned car
didn't "pull" well.

Still another new owner complained that his car did not give
satisfactory service. The agent was not at all surprised that it didn't
when, upon investigation, he found that the car had been driven five
hundred miles without a single drop of oil being applied to
transmission gear and rear axle.

George Robertson, the racing driver, in tuning up for the Vanderbilt
race, went over the embankment at the Massapequa turn on Long Island at
the rate of sixty miles an hour. The car turned over twice, but finally
stopped right side up. Robertson received a cut on one arm in the
fracas, but neither he nor the car was so badly injured but what they
could get back to New York, a distance of twenty-five miles, under
their own power. There the steering wheel was repaired at a cost of $5,
the radiator at a cost of $3, and Robertson's arm at $2.

But the prize-winner was the Fiat racing machine which threw a tire
while going fifty-five miles an hour on the Brighton Beach track. The
flying racer, now utterly uncontrollable, dashed through two fences,
one of them pretty substantial, cut down a tree eight inches in
diameter, and finally came to a stop right side up. E.H. Parker, the
driver, and his mechanician, were somewhat surprised, but otherwise
undamaged. They put on a new tire and in twenty minutes were back in
the race again.

What the automobile can do in the way of cheapness was shown by the
cost tests, sanctioned and confirmed by the American Automobile
Association, between a Maxwell runabout and a horse and buggy. In seven
days, in all kinds of weather and over city and country roads, the
horse and buggy traveled 197 miles at a cost per passenger mile of
2-1/2 cents. The runabout made 457 miles in the same time, and the cost
per passenger mile was 1.8 cents. This covered operation, maintenance,
and depreciation, and, incidentally, all speed laws were observed.

The Winton Company, which conducts a sort of private Automobile Humane
Society, offers prizes for chauffeurs who can show the greatest mileage
on the lowest charge for upkeep. The first prize winner in the contest
for the eight months ending June 30, 1909, drove his car 17,003 miles
with no expense whatever for up-keep. The second prize winner drove
11,000 miles at an outlay of thirty cents, while the third man drove
10,595 miles without any expense. This makes a total of 38,598 miles by
three cars at a cost of thirty cents for repairs. And all the cars were
two years old when the contest began.

The moral for those who really want to see what an automobile can do is
obvious.


ISAAC F. MARCOSSON

Every automobile that you see is a link in a chain of steel and power
which, if stretched out, would reach from New York to St. Louis. What
was considered a freak fifteen years ago, and a costly toy within the
present decade, is now a necessity in business and pleasure. A
mechanical Cinderella, once rejected, despised, and caricatured, has
become a princess.

Few people realize the extent of her sway. Hers is perhaps the only
industry whose statistics of to-day are obsolete to-morrow, so rapid is
its growth. In 1895 the value of the few hundred cars produced in the
United States was one hundred and fifty thousand dollars; in 1910 the
year's output of approximately two hundred thousand machines was worth
two hundred and twenty-five millions. Behind them is a stalwart
business representing, with parts and accessory makers, an investment
of more than a billion and a quarter of dollars. Four hundred thousand
men, or more than five times the strength of our standing army, depend
upon it for a livelihood, and more than five millions of people are
touched or affected by it every day.

Through its phenomenal expansion new industries have been created and
old ones enriched. It withstood panic and rode down depression; it has
destroyed the isolation of the farm and made society more intimate.
There is a car for every one hundred and sixty persons in the United
States; twenty-five States have factories; the _honk_ of the horn on
the American car is heard around the world.

Such, in brief, is the miracle of the motor's advance. Its development
is a real epic of action and progress.

Before going further, it might be well to ask why and how the
automobile has achieved such a remarkable development. One reason,
perhaps, is that it appeals to vanity and stirs the imagination. A man
likes to feel that by a simple pressure of the hand he can control a
ton of quivering metal. Besides, we live, work, and have our being in a
breathless age, into which rapid transit fits naturally. So universal
is the impress of the automobile that there are in reality but two
classes of people in the United States to-day--those who own motor-cars
and those who do not.

It must be kept in mind, too, in analyzing the causes of the
automobile's amazing expansion, that it is the first real improvement
in individual transportation since the chariot rattled around the Roman
arena. The horse had his century-old day, but when the motor came man
traded him for a gas-engine.

Characteristic of the pace at which the automobile has traveled to
success is the somewhat astonishing fact that while it took inventive
genius nearly fifty years to develop a locomotive that would run fifty
miles an hour on a specially built track, it has taken less than ten
years to perfect an automobile that will run the same distance in less
time on a common road.

Since this business is so invested with human interest, let us go back
for a moment to its beginnings. Here you find all the properties,
accessories, and environment to fit the launching of a great drama.

Toward the close of the precarious nineties, a few men wrestled with
the big vision of a horseless age. Down in Ohio and Indiana were Winton
and Haynes; Duryea was in Pennsylvania; over in Michigan were Olds,
Ford, Maxwell, with the brilliant Brush, dreaming mechanical dreams; in
New York Walker kept to the faith of the motor-car.

At that time some of the giants of to-day were outside the motor fold.
Benjamin Briscoe was making radiators and fenders; W.C. Durant was
manufacturing buggies; Walter Flanders was selling machinery on the
road; Hugh Chalmers was making a great cash-register factory hum with
system; Fred W. Haines was struggling with the problem of developing a
successful gasoline engine.

Scarcely anybody dreamed that man was on the threshold of a new era in
human progress that would revolutionize traffic and set a new mark for
American enterprise and achievement. And yet it was little more than
ten years ago.

Those early years were years of experimentation, packed with mistakes
and changes. Few of the cars would run long or fast. It was inevitable
that the automobile should take its place in jest and joke. Hence the
comic era. With the development of the mechanism came the speed mania,
which hardly added to the machine's popularity.

You must remember in this connection that the automobile was a new
thing with absolutely no precedent. The makers groped in the dark, and
every step cost something. New steels had to be welded; new machinery
made; a whole new engineering system had to be created. The model of
to-day was in the junk heap to-morrow. But just as curious instinct led
the hand of man to the silver heart of the Comstock Lode, so did
circumstance, destiny, and invention combine to point the way to the
commercially successful car.

Out of the wreck, the chaos, and the failure of the struggling days
came a cheap and serviceable car that did not require a daily renewal
of its parts. It proved to be the pathfinder to motor popularity, for
with its appearance, early in this decade, the automobile began to find
itself.

Now began the "shoe-string" period, the most picturesque in the whole
dazzling story of the automobile. There could be no god in the car
without gold. Here, then, was the situation--on the one hand was the
enthusiastic inventor; on the other was the conservative banker.

"We will make four thousand machines this year," said the inventor.

"Who will buy them?" asked the banker in amazement; he refused to lend
the capital that the inventor so sorely needed.

The idea of selling four thousand motor-cars in a year seemed
incredible. Yet within ten years they were selling fifty times as many,
and were unable to supply the demand. No fabulous gold strike ever had
more episodes of quick wealth than this business. Here is an incident
that will show what was going on:

A Detroit engineer, who had served his apprenticeship in an
electric-light plant, evolved a car which he believed would sell for a
popular price. He tried to interest capitalists in vain. Finally, he
fell in with a stove-manufacturer, who agreed to lend him twenty-seven
thousand dollars.

"But I can't afford to be identified with your project," said the
backer, who feared ridicule for his hardihood.

That small investment paid a dividend as high as thirteen hundred per
cent. in a year. To-day the name of the struggling inventor is known
wherever cars are run, and his output is measured by thousands. This,
in substance, is the story of Henry Ford.

A young machinist worked in one of the first Detroit automobile
factories, earning three dollars and fifty cents a day. One day he said
to himself: "I can build a better car than we are making here."

He did so, and the car succeeded. Then he went to his employers, and
said: "I am worth three thousand dollars a year."

They did not think so, and he left, to go into business on his own
account. A manufacturer staked him at the start. Later, through a
friend, some Wall Street capital was interested. Such was the start of
J.D. Maxwell, whose interests to-day are merged in a company with a
capitalization of sixteen million dollars.

A curly haired Vermont machinery salesman, who had sweated at the
lathe, became factory manager for a Detroit automobile-maker. His
genius for production and organization made him the wonder and the
admiration of the automobile world. He was making others rich. "If I
can do this for others, why can't I do it for myself?" he reasoned one
day.

With a stake of ninety-five thousand dollars, supplemented with a
hundred thousand dollars which he borrowed from some bankers, he built
up a business that in twenty months sold for six millions. This was the
feat of Walter E. Flanders. I might cite others. The "shoe-strings"
became golden bands that bound men to fortune.

All the while the years were speeding on, but not quite so fast as the
development of the automobile. The production of ten thousand cars in
1903 had leaped to nearly twenty thousand in 1905. The thirty-thousand
mark was passed in 1906. Bankers began to sit up, take notice, and feed
finance to this swelling industry, which had emerged from fadhood into
the definite, serious proportions of a great national business.

The reign of the inventor-producer became menaced, because men of
trained and organized efficiency in other activities joined the ranks
of the motor-makers. With them there came a vivifying and broadening
influence that had much to do with giving assured permanency to the
industry.

But other things had happened which contributed to the stability of the
automobile. One was the fact that automobile-selling, from the start,
had been on a strictly cash basis. Yet how many people save those in
the business, or who have bought cars, know this interesting fact?

No automobile-buyer has credit for a minute, and John D. Rockefeller
and the humblest clerk with savings look alike to the seller. It was
one constructive result of those early haphazard days. Every car that
is shipped has a sight draft attached to the bill of lading, and the
consignee can not get his car until he has paid the draft.

Why was the cash idea inaugurated? Simply because there was so much
risk in a credit transaction. If a man bought a car on thirty days'
time, and had a smash-up the day after he received it, there would be
little equity left behind the debt. The owner might well reason that it
was the car's fault, and refuse to pay. Besides, the early makers
needed money badly. In addition to the cash stipulation, they compelled
all the agents to make a good-sized deposit, and these deposits on
sales gave more than one struggling manufacturer his first working
capital.

Another reason why the business developed so tremendously was that good
machines were produced. They had to be good--first, because of the
intense rivalry, and then because the motor-buyer became the best
informed buyer in the world.

This reveals a striking fact that few people stop to consider. If a man
owns a cash-register or an adding-machine, it never occurs to him to
wonder how, or of what, it is made. But let him buy an automobile, and
ten minutes after it is in his possession he wants to know "what is
inside." He is like a boy with his first watch. Hence the
automobile-purchaser knows all about his car, and when he buys a second
one it is impossible to fool him.

Perhaps the first real test of the stability of the automobile business
came with the panic of 1907. It resisted the inroads of depression more
than any other industry. Most of the big factories kept full working
hours, and the only reason why some others stopped was because of their
inability to secure currency for the pay-rolls.

Still another significant thing has happened--more important, perhaps,
than all the rest of the changes that have crowded thick and fast upon
this leaping industry. It began to be plain that certain features must
be present in every first-class car. Hence came the standardization of
the mechanism, which is a big step forward.

What is the result to-day? The automobile has become less of a
designing proposition and more of a manufacturing proposition; less of
an engineering problem and more of a factory problem. The whole, wide
throbbing range of the business is bending to one great end--to meet a
demand which, up to the present time, has exceeded the supply.

You have only to go to Detroit to see this pulsating drama of
production in action. Here beats the heart of the motor world; here a
mighty army is evolving a vast industrial epic.

Its banners are the smoke that trails from a hundred soaring stacks;
its music is the clang of a thousand forges and the rattle of a maze of
machinery.

You feel this quickening life the moment you enter the city, for the
tang of its uplift is in the air. There is an automobile for every
fifty people in Detroit. The children on the streets know the name,
make, and model of nearly all the cars produced. You can stand in front
of the Hotel Pontchartrain, in the public square, and see the whole
automobile world chug by.

Formerly our cities were motor-mad; now, as in the case of Detroit,
they are motor-made. Ten years ago the proudest boast of the Michigan
metropolis was that she produced more pills, paint, stoves, and
freight-cars than any other American city. The volume of the largest of
these industries did not exceed eighteen million dollars a year. To-day
she leads the world in automobile production. Her twenty-five factories
turn out, in a year, more than ninety thousand cars, or more than sixty
per cent, of the total output of the United States. These cars alone
would stretch from New York to Boston.

But these figures do not convey any adequate idea of what the motor-car
has done for Detroit. You must go to the spot to feel the galvanic and
compelling force that the industry projects. The city is like a
mining-camp in the days of a fabulous strike. Instead of new mines,
there are new factories every day, and the record of this industrial
high tide is being made in brick, stone, and mortar. Energy, resource,
and ingenuity are being pushed to the last limit to take advantage of
the golden opportunity that the overwhelming demand for the automobile
has created. It is a thrilling and distinctively American spectacle,
and it makes one feel proud and glad to be part of the people who are
achieving it.

Some of the new plants have risen almost overnight, and on every hand
there are miracles of rapid construction. The business is overshadowing
all other activities. A leading merchant of Detroit asked a contractor
the other day if he could do some work for him. On receiving a negative
reply, he asked the reason, whereupon the man said: "These automobile
people keep me so busy that I can't do anything else. I have a year's
work ahead now."

A visit to any one of the great automobile factories reveals an
inspiring picture of cheerful labor. As you wind through the
wildernesses of lathes, hearing a swirling industry singing its iron
song of swelling progress, you find enthusiasm blending with organized
ability in a marvelous attack on work. Plants with a daily capacity of
forty cars turn out sixty. You can behold a complete machine produced
every three minutes; you can see the evolution from steel billet to
finished car in six days. Formerly it took five months.

While the development of the automobile business is in itself a wonder
story, no less amazing is its effect on all the allied industries. On
rubber alone it has wrought a revolution.

Ten years ago practically all the rubber that we imported went into
boots, shoes, hose, belting, and kindred products, The introduction of
rubber tires on horse-drawn vehicles only drew slightly on the supply.
To-day more than eighty per cent. of the crude article that reaches our
shores goes into automobile tires; and the biggest problem in the whole
automobile situation is not a question of steel and output, but a fear
that we may not be able to get enough rubber to shoe the expanding host
of cars. You have only to look at the change in price to get a hint of
the growth of this feature of the business. In 1900 crude rubber sold
at sixty-five cents a pound; now it brings about two dollars and fifty
cents.

The facts about rubber have a peculiar human interest. When you sit
back comfortably in your smooth-running car, you may not realize that
the rubber in the tire that stands between you and the jolting of the
road was carried on the back of a native for a thousand miles out of
the Amazon jungle; that for every twenty pounds of the crude juice
brought in from the wilds, one human life has been sacrificed. No crop
is garnered with so great a hazard; none takes so merciless a toll.

The natives who gather rubber in the wilds of Brazil, in the Congo, in
Ceylon, and elsewhere must combat disease, insects, war, flood, and a
hundred hardships. The harvest is slow and costly. Only the planting of
vast new areas in Ceylon has prevented what many believe would have
been a famine in rubber, and this would have been a serious check to
the development of the whole automobile business, for as yet no man has
found a substitute for it. In such a substitute, or in a puncture-proof
tire, lies one of the unplucked fortunes of the future.

Meanwhile, it has started a speculative mania that almost rivals the
tulip excitement in Holland. In London alone hundreds of fortunes have
been made by daring plungers in a crude article which only a few years
ago was regarded as being absolutely outside the pale of the gambling
marketplace.

Closely allied with the rubber end of the trade is the growing demand
for sea-island cotton, which is used in the tires. A few years ago we
used only fifty thousand yards a year; now we absorb ten million yards,
worth seven and one-half millions of dollars.

Now take machinery, and you find that the automobile business has
created a whole new phase of this time-tried industry. In many
motor-cars there are three thousand parts. In view of the extraordinary
demand for cars, the machinery to produce them must be both swift and
accurate. The old standard tools and engine lathes were inadequate to
perform the service. The automobile-makers had to have new machinery,
and have it in a hurry.

This demand came at a heaven-sent moment for the tool-manufacturers.
They were staggering under the depression of 1907, and many were
tottering toward failure. Here came, almost out of the blue sky, a
condition that at once taxed their brains, their resource, and their
energy, and at the same time rescued them from bankruptcy.

You have only to go to any of the great factories in Detroit, in
Cleveland, in Indianapolis, in Buffalo, in Flint, or elsewhere to see
the result of this hurry call for tools and machinery. You find
automatics cutting the finest gears by the score, while one man
operates a whole battery; you see drills doing from fifteen to twenty
operations on a piston or a flywheel; you see an almost human machine
making seventeen holes at one time without observation or care.

Through these machines run rivers of oil. From them streams a steady
line of parts. The whole scope of the tool business is broadened. In
the old days--which means, in the automobile business, about ten years
ago--an order for ten turret-lathes was considered large; now the
motor-makers order seventy-five at a time by telegraph, and do not
regard it as more than part of the day's work.

The whole effect of this revolution in machinery is that time is saved,
labor is economized, and it is possible to achieve quantity production.
This, in turn, enables the large manufacturer to turn out a good car at
a moderate price.

So with steel, where likewise wonders have been wrought. Ten years ago
the great mass of the steel output in this country was in structural
metal and rails. We had to import our fine alloy and carbon steels from
Germany and France. But the automobile-makers had to have the lightest
and toughest metal, and they did not want to import it. The result was
that our mills began to produce the finer quality to meet all motor
needs, and it is now one of the biggest items in the business.

In half a dozen other allied industries you find the same expansion as
you saw in rubber, steel, and machinery. For instance, the
automobile-makers buy twenty million dollars' worth of leather a year.
So great is the demand that a composition substitute was created, which
is used on sixty per cent. of the tops. A new industry in colored
leather for upholstery has been evolved.

Wood, too, has had the same kind of experience. Whole forest areas in
the South have been denuded for hickory for spokes. A few years ago,
aluminum was used on ash-trays and exposition souvenirs. Now hundreds
of thousands of pounds are employed each year for sheathing and casings
on motor-cars.

No essential of the automobile, however, is of more importance than
gasoline. Here is the life-blood of the car. It is estimated that there
are to-day three hundred thousand cars in the United States that travel
fifteen miles a day. There are fifteen miles of travel in each gallon
of gasoline. This makes the daily consumption three hundred thousand
gallons. At an average price of fourteen cents a gallon, here is an
expenditure of forty-two thousand dollars for gasoline each day, or
more than fifteen million dollars a year. To this must be added the
excess used in cars that work longer and harder, and in the host of
taxicabs that are in business almost all the time, which will probably
swell the annual expenditure for gasoline well beyond twenty millions.

As in the case of rubber, there is beginning to be some apprehension
about the future supply of high-power gasoline, so great is the demand.
Many students of this fuel problem believe that before many years there
will be substitutes in the shape of alcohol and kerosene. The
efficiency of alcohol has been proved in commercial trucks in New York,
but its present price is prohibitive for a general automobile fuel. If
denatured alcohol can be produced cheaply and on a large scale, it will
help to solve the problem.

This brings us to the maker of parts and accessories, who has been
termed "the father of the automobile business." Without him, there
might be no such industry; for it was he that gave the early makers
credit and materials which enabled them to get their machines together.

Ten years ago, the parts were all turned out in the ordinary forge and
machine-shops; to-day there are six hundred manufacturers of parts and
accessories, and their investment, including plants, is more than a
billion dollars. They employ a quarter of a million people.

No one was more surprised at the growth of the automobile business than
the parts-makers themselves. A leading Detroit manufacturer summed it
up to me as follows:

"Ten years ago I was in the machine-shop business, making gas engines.
Along came the demand for automobile parts. I thought it would be a
pretty good and profitable specialty for a little while, but I
developed my general business so as to have something to fall back on
when it ended. To-day my whole plant works night and day to fill
automobile orders, and we can't keep up with the demand."

What was looked upon as the tail now wags the whole dog, and is the
dog. The volume of business is so large, and the interests concerned so
wide, that the manufacturers have their own organization, called the
Motor and Accessory Manufacturers. It includes one hundred and eighty
makers, whose capitalization is three hundred millions, and whose
investment is more than half a billion dollars.

There still remain to be discussed two phases of the automobile which
have tremendous significance for the future of the industry--its
commercial adaptability and its relation with the farmer and the farm.
Let us consider the former first.

No matter in what town you live, something has been delivered at your
door by a motor-driven wagon or truck. These vehicles at work to-day
are only the forerunners of what many conservative makers believe will
be the great body of the business. Here is a field that is as yet
practically unscratched. Now that the pleasure-car has practically been
standardized, vast energy will be concentrated on the development of
the truck. Wherever I went on a recent trip through the
automobile-making zone, I found that the manufacturers had been
experimenting in this direction, and were laying plans for a big output
within the next few years. This year's production will be about five
thousand vehicles.

The ability and efficiency of the commercial truck for hard city work
are undisputed. It has had its test in New York, where traffic is dense
and most difficult to handle. Here, of course, are the ideal conditions
for the successful use of the motor-truck--which are a full load, a
long haul, and a good road. In a city, a horse vehicle can make only
about five miles an hour, while a motor-truck makes twelve miles, and
carries three times the load.

Some idea of motor-truck possibilities in New York may be gained when
it is stated that there are nearly three hundred thousand licensed
carrying vehicles there.

The amount of work to be got out of a motor-truck is astonishing. John
Wanamaker, for instance, gets a hundred miles of travel per day out of
some of his delivery-wagons. The average five-ton truck, in a ten-hour
day, can make eighty miles, and keep constantly at work. On the other
hand, a one-horse wagon can scarcely average half that mileage.

Already your doctor whirls around in an automobile, and he can make
five times more visits than with a horse. So, too, with the contractor
and the builder. The drummer carries his samples in a gasoline
runabout, and, in addition to seeing twice the number of customers, he
can get their goodwill by taking them for a spin. Fire-engines,
hose-wagons, and police patrols race to conflagrations propelled by
motors, and get there quicker than ever before.

Just as practically every great American activity ultimately harks back
to the soil and has its real root there, so, in a certain sense, may
the farmer be regarded as the backbone of the automobile business. We
have six million farms, and more than forty-five millions of our
population live on the farm, or in communities of less than four
thousand people. To these dwellers in the country the automobile has
already proved an agency for uplift, progress, and prosperity.

It began as a pleasure-car; now it is a necessity on many farms. In
Kansas you can see it hitched up to the alfalfa-stacker; in Illinois
and Iowa it is harnessed up to the corn-cutter; in Indiana it runs the
dairy machinery. But these are slight compared with the other services
it performs for the farmer.

For years the curse of farm life was its isolation. Its workers were
removed from the shops, the theaters, the libraries, and good schools.
More farm women went insane than any other class. The horses worked in
the fields all week, and had to rest on Sunday, so that the farmer
could not go to church.

The automobile provided a vehicle not excessive in cost, and able to
provide pleasure for the farmer's whole family. It annihilated the
distance between town and country. Contact with his coworkers and
proximity to the market made the fanner more efficient and prosperous.
More than this, the motor-car has made the whole rural life more
attractive, and offers the one inducement that will keep the boy on the
farm.

A hundred instances could be cited of the automobile's aid to the farm.
One will suffice. In times of harvest, when a big gang is at work, the
breakdown of a thresher will stop operations for a whole day, if the
farmer has to drive to town behind a horse to get needed parts. With an
automobile, he can dash in and out in a few hours.

No one expects the automobile to replace the horse on the farm. But for
work that the horse can not do efficiently--such as the quick transit
of milk, butter, and garden products to the markets--the motor-car has
a future of wide utility. Incidentally, the farmer may be the first to
solve the fuel problem, for by means of cooperative distilling he could
produce denatured alcohol for almost nothing.

The more you go into the study of the automobile on the farm, the
bigger becomes its significance. In the United States, four hundred and
twenty-five million acres of land are uncultivated, largely on account
of their inaccessibility. The motor-car will make them more accessible.
Through the wide use of automobiles by the farmer we shall get, in
time, that most valuable agency for prosperity, the good road.

One emerges from an investigation of the automobile industry in wonder
over its expansion, and with admiration for the men behind it.
Clear-cut youth, fresh vigor, compelling action galvanize it. Yet what
seems to be a miracle at the end of less than ten years of growth may
only be the prelude to a vaster era.

Meanwhile, each day records a new chapter of its triumphant progress.




THE DOWNFALL OF DIAZ

MEXICO PLUNGES INTO REVOLUTION

A.D. 1911

MRS. E.A. TWEEDIE

DOLORES BUTTERFIELD

On May 25, 1911, Porfirio Diaz resigned the Presidency of Mexico, under
the compulsion of a revolution headed by Francisco Madero. This act
ended an era, the Diaz era, in Mexican history. Diaz had been President
for over thirty years. He had found Mexico an impoverished barbarism;
he raised it to be a wealthy and at least outwardly civilized state.
Some able critics, even among Europeans, had declared that Diaz, "the
grand old man," was the greatest leader of the past century. All
Mexicans honored him. But unfortunately for his fame he grew too old:
he outlived his wisdom and his power.

Of the downfall of such a man there must naturally be conflicting
views. We give here the story from the pathetic Diaz side by a
well-known English writer upon Mexico, Mrs. Tweedie. Then we give the
warm picture of Madero's heroic struggle against tyranny, as it
appeared to Dolores Butterfield, a young lady brought up in Mexico, but
driven thence by the more recent revolution which resulted in Madero's
death.

MRS. E. A. TWEEDIE

Diaz has been hurled from power in his eighty-first year! The rising
against him in Mexico has the character of a national revolutionary
movement, the aims of which, perhaps, Madero himself has not clearly
understood. One thing the nation wanted apparently was the stamping out
of what the party considered political immorality, fostered and abetted
by the acts of what they called the _grupo cientifico_, or grafters,
and by the policy of the Minister of Finance, Limantour, in particular.
Therefore, when Madero stood up as the chieftain of the revolution,
inscribing on his banner the redress of this grievance, with some
Utopias, the people followed him without stopping to measure his
capabilities. His promises were enough.

It is one of the saddest episodes in the history of great rulers, and
at the same time one of the most important in the history of a country.
Mexico, which has pushed so brilliantly ahead in finance, industry, and
agriculture, has still lagged behind in political development. The man
who made a great nation out of half-breeds and chaos was so sure of his
own position, his own strength, and I may say his own motives, that he
did not encourage antagonism at the polls, and "free voting" remained a
name only.

A German author has said that all rulers become obsessed with the
passion of rule. They lose their balance, clearness of sight, judgment,
and only desire to rule, rule, _rule!_ He was able to quote many
examples. I thought of him and his theory when following, as closely as
one is able to do six thousand miles away, the recent course of events
in Mexico. Would he in a new edition add General Diaz to his list?

Diaz has reached a great age. On the 15th September, 1910, he
celebrated his eightieth birthday. He has ruled Mexico, with one brief
interval of four years, since 1876. For thirty-five years, therefore,
with one short break, the country has known no other President; and
Madero, who has laid him low, was a man more or less put into office by
Diaz himself. A new generation of Mexicans has grown up under the rule
of Diaz. Time after time he has been reelected with unanimity, no other
candidate being nominated--nor even suggested. Is it to be wondered at
that, by the time his seventh term expired in 1910, he should have at
last come to regard himself as indispensable?

That he was so persuaded permits of no doubt. "He would remain in
office so long as he thought Mexico required his services," he said in
the course of the first abortive negotiations for peace--before the
capture of the town of Juarez by the insurrectionists, and the
surrender of the Republican troops under General Navarro took the
actual settlement out of his hand.

It was a fatal mistake, and it has shrouded in deep gloom the close of
a career of unexampled brilliancy, both in war and statesmanship. The
Spanish-American Republics have produced no man who will compare with
Porfirio Diaz. Simon Bolivar for years fought the decaying power of
Spain, and to him what are now the Republics of Colombia, Venezuela,
Ecuador, Bolivia, and Peru owe their liberation. But Diaz has been more
than a soldier, and his great achievement in the redemption of modern
Mexico from bankruptcy and general decay completely overshadows his
successes in the field during the ceaseless struggles of his earlier
years.

Had he retired in 1910 he would have done so with honor, and every
hostile voice in Mexico would have been stilled. All would have been
forgotten in remembrance of the immense debt that his country owed him.
He would have stood out as the great historic figure of a glorious era
in the national annals. It was the first time he had broken his word
with the people. Staying too long, he has been driven from office by a
movement of ideas, the strength of which it is evident that he never
realized until too late, and by a rebellion that in the days of his
vigorous autocracy he would have stamped out with his heel.

It is a sad picture to look on, especially when I turn to that other
one of the simple palace-home in Mexico City, with the fine old
warrior, with dilating nostrils like a horse at the covert side, his
face aglow, his eyes flashing as he told me of bygone battles, escapes
from imprisonment and death, and deeds of wild adventure and romance.
These inspiriting recollections he freely gave me for the "authentic
biography" which he had given me permission to write. Up to that time
he had refused that favor to every one; and in spite of his grateful
recognition of the "honesty and veracity" of the volume I had written
about his country five years before, he was long in giving his consent.
"I have only done what I thought right," he said, "and it is my country
and my ministers who have really made Mexico what she is." In the days
of his strength, corruption was unknown in his country, and even now no
finger can point at him. He retires a poor man, to live on his wife's
little fortune. Diaz had the right to be egotistical, but he was
modesty itself.

Yet he had risen from a barefoot lad of humble birth and little
education to the dictatorship of one of the most turbulent states in
the world, and this by powers of statesmanship for which, owing to want
of opportunity, he had shown no aptitude before he reached middle life.
Before that he seemed but a good soldier, true as steel, brave, hardy,
resourceful in the field, and nothing more. It was not until he was
actually President, when nearing fifty, that his gifts for government
asserted themselves. Such late developments are rare, although Cromwell
was forty before he made any mark. Chatham, again, was fifty before he
was heard outside his own circle, and yet a few years, barely months,
later, the world was at his feet.

It is rather the cry nowadays that men's best work is done before
forty; and even their good work no later than sixty; but among endless
exceptions General Diaz must take high rank.

His real career began at forty-six. Up to that time he had been an
officer in a somewhat disorganized army, and his ambition at the outset
never soared beyond a colonelcy.

He was nearly fifty when he entered Mexico City at the head of a
revolutionary force. Romance and adventure were behind him, although
personal peril still dogged his steps. He had to forget that he was a
soldier, and to be born again as leader and politician, a maker and not
a destroyer. In that capacity he had absolutely no experience of public
affairs, but such as he had gained in a smaller way in early years
spent in Oaxaca. Yet Diaz became a ruler, and a diplomat, and assumed
the courtly manners of a prince.

Paradoxical as it may seem, his overthrow is the result of a revolution
mainly pacific in its nature, and in substance a revolt of public
feeling against abuses that have become stereotyped in the system of
government by the too long domination of one masterful will. The
military rising was but its head, spitting fire. Behind was an immense
body of opinion, in favor of effecting the retirement of the President
by peaceful means, and with all honor to one who had served his country
well.

In 1908 General Diaz had stated frankly, in an interview granted to an
American journalist, that he was enjoying his last term of office, and
at its expiration would spend his remaining years in private life.
There is no reason to doubt that this assurance represented his settled
intention. The announcement was extensively published in the Mexican
Press, and was never contradicted by the President himself. Then rumors
gained currency that Diaz was not unprepared to accept nomination for
the Presidency for an eighth term. The statement was at first
discredited, then repeated without contradiction in a manner that could
hardly have failed to excite alarm. At length came the fatal
announcement that the President would stand again.

Hardly had the bell of Independence ceased ringing out in joyous clang
on September 15, 1910, in celebration of free Mexico's centenary,
hardly had the gorgeous _fętes_ for the President's birthday or the
homage paid him by the whole world run their course, when the spark of
discontent became a blaze. He had mistaken the respect and regard of
his people for an invitation to remain in office.

By the time the Presidential election approached, signs of agitation
had increased. A political party rose in direct hostility, not so much
to General Diaz himself or Limantour, as to the Vice-President, who, as
next in the succession, in the event of the demise of the President,
would have been able to rivet the autocracy on the country.

Corral was the Vice-President. What little I saw of him I liked; but
then he had hardly taken up the reins of power. He did not make himself
popular; in fact, a large part of the country hated and distrusted him.
But for that, probably nothing would have been heard of the troubles
which ensued. As the party anxious for the introduction of new blood
into the Government increased in vigor, the people showed themselves
more and more determined to get rid of Corral. They wanted a younger
man than Diaz in the President's chair: they wanted, above all, the
prospect of a better successor.

But the official group whose interests depended on the maintenance of
the Diaz régime was, for the moment, too powerful, and it succeeded in
inducing the President to accept reelection.

To the general hatred of this group on the part of the nation, Madero
owed his success. He was almost unknown, but the malcontents were
determined to act, and to act at once, and they could not afford to
pick and choose for a leader. As a proof that the country thought less
of the democratic principles invoked than of the destruction of the
official "cientificos," may be cited the fact that it at first placed
all its trust and confidence in General Reyes, who is just as despotic
and autocratic as General Diaz, but has at the same time, to them, a
redeeming quality--his avowed opposition to the gang. Reyes refused to
head the insurrection, and it was then Madero or nobody.

In the spring of 1910 Francis I. Madero came to the front. He was a man
of education, of fortune, of courage, and a lawyer by profession. He
had written a book entitled the _Presidential Succession_, and although
without experience in the management of State affairs, he had shown
that he had the courage of his convictions. He consented to stand
against Diaz in a contest for the Presidency of the Republic.

The malcontents had found their leader. Madero not only accepted
nomination, but began an active campaign, making speeches against the
Diaz administration, denouncing abuses, more especially the retention
of office by the Vice-President and the tactics of Limantour, and
showing the people that as General Diaz was then eighty years of age,
and his new term would not expire until 1916, Corral would almost
certainly succeed to the inheritance of the Diaz regime.

Energetic, courageous, and outspoken, Madero had full command of the
phraseology of the demagog. His only shortcoming in the eyes of his own
party was that he had not been persecuted by the Government. The
officials, alas, soon supplied this deficiency. A few days before the
Presidential election in July, 1910, when making a speech in Monterey,
Madero was arrested as a disturber of the peace and thrown into prison,
where he was kept until the close of the poll.

The election resulted, as usual, in a triumphant majority for General
Diaz, though votes were recorded, even in the capital itself, for the
anti-reelectionist leader.

As soon as opportunity offered, Madero escaped to the United States,
and from that vantage-ground kept up a correspondence with his friends
and partizans. Though the election had been held in July, the
inauguration of the President did not take place until December, 1910.
A fortnight before that date, a conspiracy, at which Madero probably
connived, was discovered in Puebla. The first victim was the Chief of
the Police at Puebla. He was shot dead by a woman who at his knock had
opened the door of a house wherein the revolutionists were holding a
meeting. The revolution had begun. Risings took place in different
parts of the Republic, but were quickly quelled, with the exception of
one in the State of Chihuahua, where the rebels had a special grievance
against the all-powerful family of the great landowner, General
Terrazas. These large landed proprietors are a subject of hatred to the
new Socialist party.

Trouble followed trouble in the north, which, be it remembered, runs to
a distance of over a thousand miles from Mexico City itself. But
nothing very serious occurred, until suddenly, in the early weeks of
1911, President Taft mobilized a force of 20,000 American troops to
watch the Mexican frontier. From that time events developed rapidly
till the end of the Diaz regime in May. One thing became clear, that
the revolution was rapidly making its way to victory, and that Diaz,
prostrate with an agonizing disease, an abscess of the jaw, was in no
condition to rally his disheartened followers in person. He saved his
honor, as the phrase goes, by a declaration that he would not retire
from office until peace was declared, and he kept his word. He was too
ill to leave his simple home in one of the chief streets of the city,
where he lived less ostentatiously than many of his fellow citizens,
but this did not prevent the mob from firing upon his home. On the
afternoon of May 25, 1911, he resigned, and Seńor De La Barra, formerly
Minister at Washington, became provisional President until the next
election, fixed for October.

Madero was the hero of the hour. He entered Mexico City in triumphal
procession, June 7, 1911. His entrance was preceded by the most severe
earthquake the capital had known in years. Many buildings were wrecked
and some hundreds of people killed. An arch of the National Palace
fell, one beneath which Diaz had often passed.

Three days after signing his abdication, General Diaz was well enough
to leave Mexico City. In the early hours of the morning three trains
drew up filled with his own solders and friends, in the middle one of
which the ex-President, his wife, the clever and beautiful Carmelita,
Colonel Porfirio Diaz, his son, with his young wife, several children,
and their ten-days-old baby, were seated. Along the route the train
came upon a force of seven hundred rebels. A sharp encounter ensued.
The revolutionists left thirty dead upon the field; the escort, which
numbered but three hundred, lost only three men. The old fighting
spirit returned to the old lion, and, unarmed, the ex-President
descended from his car and took part in the engagement. He entered
Mexico City fighting, and he has left her shores with bullets ringing
in the air. This was but the second time that Diaz had left the land of
his birth.

His work is now imperishable. Mexicans, I am sure, will regret the
pitiful circumstances under which his fall has come about, and he will
live long in the hearts of his countrymen. Nothing can alter the fact
that he made modern Mexico. It was no easy task; the Mexicans are a
cross-breed of Spaniards and countless Indian tribes. There are still
half a million Aztecs. Diaz has given this strange mixed race
education, and a high order of education for such a people; he has
brought his country to a financial position in which the Government
can, or could, borrow all the money it wanted at four per cent.
Railways intersect the land in every direction. The largest financial
interests are American, the next in importance are British. Except
Germany, no other foreign country has much capital invested in Mexico.

Thus closes one of the most wild and romantic episodes of the world's
history--a peasant boy who became a soldier, a general who became a
President--a President who became a great autocrat, who raised a
country from obscurity to greatness, and was finally driven from power
by the very people he had educated, and to whom he had brought vast
blessings.

The great Diaz in his eighty-first year has passed from power, the
power he used so well. Verily a moving spectacle from first to last.

DOLORES BUTTERFIELD[1]

[Footnote 1: Reproduced by permission from the _North American
Review_.]

In contemplating the present situation in Mexico there is a tendency of
late to deplore the Madero revolution and the overthrow of Diaz, and to
overlook the fact that the Diaz regime itself not only made and forced,
by its political abuses, the revolution that overthrew it, but, by its
economic abuses, prepared the country for the anarchy now rife in it;
and also that it is the very same ring of men who surrounded Diaz and
finally rendered his rule unbearable who are now financing and
fomenting the present rebellion against a Government not in sympathy
with them nor subservient to their interests.

Porfirio Diaz attained the presidency of Mexico thirty-five years ago
by overthrowing Lerdo de Tejada. He put an end to brigandage, which was
at that time wide-spread. Such bandits as he could not buy he
exterminated. His political opponents he also bought or exterminated,
so that without the slightest disturbance to the national peace he
could be unanimously reelected whenever his term expired. Out of
bankruptcy he established credit; he put up schools; he invited foreign
capital into his country and made it possible for foreign capital to go
in; and so he gradually built up a material progress which won him the
name of "nation-builder." There were railroads and telegraphs; the
cities were graced with beautiful edifices, with theaters and parks,
with electricity and asphalt. There was the appearance of a
civilization and progress, which, considering the time in which it was
compassed, was indeed marvelous.

But all this was only a shell and a semblance. The economic condition
of the Mexican lower classes was not touched--the process of
"nation-building" seemed not to include them. In the shadow of a modern
civilization stalked poverty and ignorance worthy of the Middle Ages.
And it was notorious that in the capital city itself, under the very
eyes of the central Government, was where the very worst conditions and
the most glaring extremes of poverty and wealth were to be seen. On the
one hand, splendid _paseos_ lined with magnificent palaces, where, in
their automobiles, the pleasure-seeking women of the rich displayed
their raiment worth thousands of dollars; and, on the other, streets
filled with beggars, their clothes literally dropping off them in
filthy rags, reeking with the typhus which for years has been endemic
in the City of Mexico.

Let it be said to Diaz's credit that he did try, in a measure, at first
to better those conditions. Hence the public schools which, though
inadequate for the scattered rural population, have accomplished much
in the cities. He also attempted years ago a division of the lands, but
dropped it when he saw that the great landowners were stronger than he
and that to persist might cost him the Presidency.

It was natural and inevitable that a Government in which there was
never any change or movement should stagnate and become corrupt.
Porfirio Diaz was not a President, but, in all save the name, an
absolute monarch, and inevitably there formed about his throne a cordon
of men as unpatriotic and self-interested as he may have been patriotic
and disinterested--as to a great extent he undeniably was. These men
were the Cientificos.

The term is, of course, not their own. It was applied to them by the
Anti-reelectionists, meaning that they were scientific grafters and
exploiters. The full-fledged Cientifico was at once a tremendous
landholder and high government official. To illustrate, the land of the
State of Chihuahua is almost entirely owned by the Terrazas family. In
the days of Diaz, Don Luis Terrazas was always the governor, being
further reenforced by his relative, Enrique C. Creel, high in the Diaz
ministry. In Sonora the land was held by Ramon Corral, Luis Torres, and
Rafael Izabal. These three gentlemen, who were called "The Trinity,"
used to rotate in the government of the state until Corral was made
vice-president, when Torres and Izabal took turn about until the death
of the latter shortly before the Madero revolution. In every state
there was either one perpetual governor or a combine of them.

Thus in each state a small group of men were the absolute masters
politically, economically, and industrially. They made and unmade the
laws at their pleasure. For instance, Terrazas imposed a prohibitory
tax upon cattle which forced the small owners to dispose of their
stock, which he, being the only purchaser, bought at his own price,
after which he repealed the law. They adjusted taxation to suit
themselves, assessing their own huge estates at figures nothing short
of ridiculous, while levying heavily upon the small farmer, and
especially upon enterprise and improvements. They practised peonage,
though peonage is contrary to the Constitution of the Republic, to the
Federal laws, and, in many cases, to the laws of the separate states as
well. They drew public salaries for perverting the government to their
private benefit and enrichment; and as the dictator grew older and
surrendered to his satellites more and more of his once absolute power,
the conditions became so intolerable, and the tyranny and greed of the
Cientificos so shameless and unbridled (infinitely more so in the
southern than in the northern states), that it would have been a
reversal of the history of the world if there had been no revolution.

In 1910 the aged Diaz declared his intention of resigning. Perhaps he
even intended to keep that promise when he made it; but if so, the
Cientificos, who knew that his prestige and the love of the nation for
him were their only shield, induced him to think better of it. The
strongest of the opposing parties was the Anti-reelectionist party. It
embodied the best elements and the best ideals of the country and from
the first was the one of which the Diaz regime was most afraid.

Now by its very name this party was pledged to no reelection, and yet
it so far compromised with the regime as to nominate Diaz for
President, only repudiating Corral, who was odious to the entire
nation. However, the Cientificos saw that this was to be the entering
wedge, and they promptly prepared to crush the new political faction.
Anti-reelectionists were arrested right and left; their newspapers were
suppressed, the presses wrecked, and the editors thrown into prison.
But the party's blood was up. It did not dissolve. It did not nominate
Corral. Instead it struck Porfirio Diaz's name from its ticket and
tendered to Francisco Madero, Jr., not the vice-presidential but the
presidential nomination. The bare fact that he accepted it speaks
volumes for his courage.

Francisco Madero was born October 4, 1873. He was educated from
childhood in the United States and Europe; and upon returning to his
country, imbued with the advanced ideas of the most broad-minded men of
the most enlightened countries in the world, it was perhaps only
natural that he should resent the conditions which he saw in his own
country. The Madero family owns great tracts of land in Coahuila,
besides properties in other states. Madero introduced modern methods
and modern machinery in the management of his estates. Already a
millionaire, he made more millions, at the same time doing much toward
the betterment of conditions for his own immediate dependents among the
lower class.

Madero first attracted attention by writing _The Presidential
Succession in 1910_. The Cientifico clique laughed at him as a
visionary. Suddenly they awoke to the fact that his book, with its
calm, dispassionate logic and democratic tone, was doing them more harm
than a thousand soldiers, and they suppressed its publication. It was
the writing of this book that led to Madero's nomination for President
by the Anti-reelectionist party when every one else had failed it.

Madero took the attitude that he was a presidential candidate in a free
republic and began what he called his democratic campaign. He went from
city to city, delivering speeches and laying his platform before the
people. He was called "the apostle of democracy," and the multitudes
followed him like an apostle indeed. But he did not carry out his
democratic campaign without sacrifice and risk. When he passed through
Hermosillo, Sonora, the hotel-keepers closed their-doors to him.
Torres, feudal lord of the state, had given out the necessary hint and
Madero, for all his millions, could find no apartments for himself and
his wife until a Spaniard--relying upon the fact of being a foreigner--
offered them lodgings, "not wishing to lend himself to so ignoble an
intrigue." This was but one city of many. In all places he had the most
tremendous difficulty in renting halls for his addresses. Frequently he
was reduced to speaking in tumble-down sheds or mule-yards or vacant
lots, the local authorities often hiring rowdies to create disturbances
at his meetings. He was ridiculed, he was threatened, he was
persecuted, but he went on unafraid.

Just before and during the elections every known Maderista, from Madero
down, was arrested on charges of "sedition." Things came to such a pass
that in the city where I lived some sixty prominent Maderistas were
arrested at two o'clock one morning without warrants and on no charge,
it being noteworthy that the men arrested were almost without exception
some of the best and most honorable men in the state. And this happened
at the same hour of the same day in every city in Mexico. But in spite
of the fact that many votes were lost to Madero through intimidation or
actual imprisonment, so strong a vote was registered for the Madero
electors that fraud was resorted to to cover his gains. The result of
the elections was that Diaz and Corral were _unanimously_
reelected--the former for his eighth term and the latter for his
second.

The Anti-reelectionists then appealed to Congress and the Senate to
annul the elections, alleging fraud and intimidation. Without the
slightest pretense of considering or investigating these charges
Congress and Senate--long the mouthpieces of Cientificismo--ratified
the elections as just and legal. Every peaceful measure to bring about
justice in the elections and insure the free expression of the nation's
will was now exhausted. The only recourse left to the people by the
Cientifico regime was war. Their leader at the polls became their
leader in the preparations for that war.

In the midst of this riot of tyranny, while the nation yet seethed with
indignation at the outrageous electoral farce imposed upon it, the
first Centennial of Mexican independence was being celebrated before
the foreign diplomats with unprecedented pomp and display. The
Anti-reelectionists declared that Liberty was dead and that instead of
celebrating they were going to don deep mourning. They were thus a mark
for all manner of persecutions from petty annoyances to the most
unprovoked armed attacks. Some students were fired upon by troops while
they were carrying wreaths to the monument of the boy heroes of
Chapultepec; a young lawyer was arrested for making a speech beneath
the statue of Juarez; and in Tlaxcala a procession of unarmed working
men was fired upon and ridden down by _rurales_, several men and a
woman being killed. Consecrating hypocritical hymns to liberty that did
not exist and heaping with wreaths the tombs and monuments of the
heroes of Mexico, while violating all the ideals for which those heroes
died, drunk with the power they had wielded so long, the Cientificos
pressed blindly on, following the path that Privilege has taken since
the beginning of history and which has only one end.

These are some of the causes and circumstances that made the revolution
of 1910-11--not all of them, for there must be remembered in addition
the Yaqui slave traffic, the contract-labor system of the great
southern haciendas, and a dozen other iniquities, greater and lesser,
which also contributed to precipitating the revolt. It was fortunate
that that revolt was captained by a man of Francisco Madero's _type_--a
man who knew how to win the world's sympathy for his cause and how to
make his subordinates merit that sympathy by their observance of the
rules of civilized warfare.

The actual armed contention of the Madero revolution was singularly
brief, culminating in the capture of Ciudad Juarez, which was followed
by the resignation of Diaz and Corral. There can be no doubt that the
dictatorship could have held together for a considerable time longer
and that Diaz surrendered before he actually had to. But he could
probably see by this time that it was inevitable in any case, and he
was willing to sacrifice his personal pride and ambition sooner than
necessary to avoid bloodshed in Mexico if he could. And also he had it
upon his conscience, and it was brought home to him by the mobs outside
his palace, that he was not the constitutional President of Mexico, but
the tool of the betrayers of her Constitution. That he had been
shamelessly deceived and played upon by the impassable cordon of
Cientificos about him is easy to judge. His message of resignation was
one to touch any heart, combining pathos with absolute dignity.

The resignation of Diaz and Corral was taken by many to signify the
complete surrender of the old régime and the triumph of the revolution.
Indeed, for the moment it so appeared. But although the Cientificos
were ousted from direct political control, their wealth and power and
the tremendous machinery of their domination were still to be contended
with before the revolution could follow up its political success with
the economic reforms which were its real object.

Madero had pledged himself primarily to the division of the lands. He
realized that only by the abolition of the landed aristocracy, and an
equitable distribution among moderate holders for active development of
the huge estates, held idle in great part or worked by peons, could the
progress and prosperity of the nation be put upon a solid basis. He
knew exactly what the remedy was and, though a landed aristocrat
himself by birth and inheritance, was not afraid of it.

As soon as he was elected to the presidency he set a committee of
competent, accredited engineers to work appraising property values in
the different states, and great tracts of hundreds of thousands and
millions of acres, previously assessed at half as many thousands as
they were worth millions, were revalued and reassessed at their true
inherent value. The _haciendados_ raised a frightful cry. They tried
threats, intrigue, and bribery. It was useless; the revaluation went
on. The new administration reclaimed as national property all that it
could of the _terrenos baldios_, or public lands, which under Diaz had
been rapidly merging into the great estates. It established a
government bank for the purpose of making loans on easy terms, and thus
assisting the poor to take up and work these public lands in small
parcels. Even before becoming President, Madero had advised the working
men to organize and demand a living wage, which they did. He attacked
the lotteries, the bull-fights, the terrible pulque trust, the
unbridled traffic of which, more than any other one factor, has
contributed to the degradation of the lower classes. He began to extend
the public-school system.

From the first the Cientificos hampered and impeded him. To foment a
counter-revolution they took advantage of the fact that in various
parts of the country there were disorderly bands of armed men
committing numerous depredations. These men had risen up in the shadow
of the Maderista revolution, and at its close, instead of laying down
their arms, they devoted themselves to the looting of ranches and
ungarrisoned isolated towns. Of these brigands--for they were neither
more nor less, whatever they may have called themselves then or may
call themselves now--the most formidable was Emiliano Zapata. His
alleged reason for continuing in arms after the surrender of the
dictatorship was that his men had not been paid for their services.
President De la Barra paid them, but their brigandage continued. And at
the most critical moment Pascual Orozco, Jr., Madero's trusted
lieutenant, in command of the military forces of Chihuahua, issued--on
the heels of reiterated promises of fealty to the Government--a
_pronunciamiento_ in favor of the revolution and delivered the state
which had been entrusted to his keeping to the revolutionists, at whose
head he now placed himself.

The new malcontents declared that Madero had betrayed the revolution,
and that they were going to overthrow him and themselves carry out the
promises he had made. This sounds heroic, noble, and patriotic, but
will not bear close inspection. In the first place, many of the
revolutionists with whom the new faction allied itself had been in arms
since before Madero was even elected--a trivial circumstance, however,
which did not seem to shake their logic. Moreover, as any honest,
fair-minded person must have recognized, the promises of Madero were
not such as he could fulfil with a wave of his hand or a stroke of his
pen. They were big promises and they required time and careful study
for their successful undertaking and the cooperation of the people at
large against the public enemies, whereas Madero was not given time nor
favorable circumstances nor the intelligent cooperation of any but a
small proportion of the population.

As a matter of fact, Madero himself, far from overstating the benefits
of the revolution led by him or making unwise promises of a Utopia
impossible of realization, addressed these words to the Mexican people
at the close of that conflict: "You have won your political freedom,
but do not therefore suppose that your _economic_ and social liberty
can be won so suddenly. This can only be attained by an earnest and
sustained effort on the part of all classes of society."

It is to be feared that for long years to come Mexico must stand judged
in the eyes of the world by the disgraceful and uncivilized conduct of
the various rebels, or so-called rebels, and simon-pure bandits who are
contributing to the revolt and running riot over the country; but there
is, nevertheless, in Mexico a class of people as educated, as refined,
as honorable as those existing anywhere. And these people--the
_obreros_ (skilled working men) and the professional middle class, as
well as the better elements of the laboring classes, are supporting
Madero--not all in the spirit of his personal adherents, but because
they realize the tremendous peril to Mexico of continued revolution. In
1911 the revolution was necessary--the peril had to be incurred,
because nothing but arms could move the existing despotism; but none of
the pretended principles of the revolution can now justify that peril
when the man attacked is the legal, constitutional, duly elected
President, overwhelmingly chosen by the people, and venomously turned
upon immediately following his election without being given even an
approach to a fair chance to prove himself.

All the better elements of the country realize that Madero no longer
represents an individual or even a political administration. He
represents the civilization of Mexico struggling against the unreined
savagery of a population which has known no law but abject fear, and
having lost that fear and the restraint which it imposed upon it,
threatens to deliver Mexico to such a reign of anarchy, rapine, and
terror as would be without a parallel in modern history. He represents
the dignity and integrity of Mexico before the world.

Whatever the outcome, whether it triumphs or fails, the new
administration, assailed on every side by an enemy as treacherous and
unscrupulous as it is powerful, and making a last stand--perhaps a vain
one--for Mexico's economic liberty and political independence, merits
the support and comprehension of all the progressive elements of the
world.




FALL OF THE ENGLISH HOUSE OF LORDS

GREAT BRITAIN CHANGES HER CONSTITUTION BY RESTRICTING THE POWER OF THE
LORDS

A.D. 1911

ARTHUR PONSONBY SYDNEY BROOKS CAPTAIN GEORGE SWINTON

On August 10, 1911, the ancient British House of Lords gathered in
somber and resentful session and solemnly voted for the "Parliament
Bill," a measure which reduced their own importance in the government
to a mere shadow. This vote came as the climax of a five-year struggle.
The Lords have for generations been a Conservative body, holding back
every Liberal measure of importance in England. Of late years the
Liberal party has protested with ever-increasing vehemence against the
unfairness of this unbalanced system, by means of which the
Conservatives when elected to power by the people could legislate as
they pleased, whereas the Liberals, though they might carry elections
overwhelmingly, were yet blocked in all their chief purposes of
legislation.

When the Liberals found themselves elected to power by a vast majority
in 1905, they were still seeking to get on peaceably with the Lords,
but this soon proved impossible. In January of 1910 the Liberals
deliberately adjourned Parliament and appealed to the people in a new
election. They were again returned to power, though by a reduced
majority; yet the Lords continued to oppose them. Again they appealed
to the people in December of 1910, this time with the distinct
announcement that if re-elected to authority they would pass the
"Parliament Bill" destroying the power of the Lords. In this third
election they were still upheld by the people. Hence when the Lords
resisted the Parliament Bill, King George stood ready to create as many
new Peers from the Liberal party as might be necessary to pass the
offensive bill through the House of Lords. It was in face of this
threat that the Lords yielded at last, and voted most unwillingly for
their own loss of power.

Of this great step in the democratizing of England, we give three
characteristic British views--first, that of a well-known Liberal
member of Parliament, who naturally approves of it; secondly, that of a
fair-minded though despondent Conservative; and thirdly, that of a
rabid Conservative who can see nothing but shame, ruin, and the extreme
of wickedness in the change. He speaks in the tone of the "Die-hards,"
the Peers who refused all surrender and held out to the last, raving at
their opponents, assailing them with curses and even with fists, and in
general aiding the rest of the world to realize that the manners of
some portion of the British Peerage needed reform quite as much as
their governmental privileges.


ARTHUR PONSONBY, M.P.

A great and memorable struggle has ended with the passage of the
Parliament Bill into law. In the calm atmosphere of retrospect we may
now look back on the various stages of this prolonged conflict, from
its inception to its completion, and further, with the whole scene
before us, we may reflect on the wider meaning and real significance of
the victory which has been gained on behalf of democracy, freedom, and
popular self-government.

In the progressive cause there can be no finality, no termination to
the combat, no truce, no rest. But we may fairly regard the conclusion
of this particular struggle as the achievement of a notable step in
advance and as the acquisition of territory that can not well be
recaptured. The admission of the Parliament Bill to the statute-book
marks an epoch and fills the hearts of those who are pursuing high
ideals in politics and sociology with great hopes for the future. The
long sequence of the events which have led up to this achievement has
not been smooth or without incident. There have been moments of
failure, of rebuff, and even of disaster. It would almost seem as if
the motive power which has carried the party of progress through the
storm and stress, and landed it in security, had been outside the
control of any one man or any set of men. Although distinguished men
have led and there have been many valiant workers in the field, a
movement that has extended over nearly a hundred years must have its
origin and energy deeper down than in any mere party policy. It is the
inevitable outcome of the steady but inexorable evolution of free
institutions among a liberty-loving people.

In order, first of all, to trace the course of the actual controversy
as it has been carried on in the House of Commons and in the country,
it is not necessary to go further back than 1883. In that year the
Lords had rejected the Franchise Bill, and it was then that Mr. Bright,
in a speech at Leeds dealing with the deadlocks between the two Houses,
sketched a plan which was really the essence and origin of the
principle adopted in the Parliament Act that has just become law. The
Lords had rejected many Liberal measures before then; attempts had been
made to get round or overcome their opposition; but not till then was
any practical method formulated for dealing with the serious and
permanent obstruction to progressive legislation. Mr. Bright himself
had condemned the peers and declared that "their arrogance and class
selfishness had long been at war with the highest interests of the
nation," and now he advocated a specific remedy, which he declared
would be obtained by "limiting the veto which the House of Lords
exercises over the proceedings of the House of Commons." The actual
plan was that a Bill rejected by the Lords should be sent up to them
again, "but when the Bill came down to the House of Commons in the
second session, and the Commons would not agree to the amendments of
the Lords, then the Lords should be bound to accept the Bill." This
method of procedure, it will be seen, was more expeditious and drastic
than the scheme in the Parliament Act.

Mr. Chamberlain joined vigorously in the campaign against the Peers.
Telling passages from his speeches are quoted to this day, such as when
he declared that "the House of Lords had never contributed one iota to
popular liberty and popular freedom, or done anything to advance the
common weal," but "had protected every abuse and sheltered every
privilege."

No further mention of the Bright scheme was made for some time. Six
years of Conservative rule (1886-1892) diverted the attention of
Liberals as a party in opposition to other matters, and the Lords
subsided, as they always have done in such periods, into an entirely
innocuous, negligible, and utterly useless adjunct of the Conservative
Government.

In the brief period between 1892-1895, the animus against the House of
Lords was kindled afresh. Several Liberal Bills were mutilated or lost,
and the rejection of the second Home Rule Bill served to fan the flames
into a dangerous blaze. The Bright plan was recalled by Lord Morley. "I
think," he said (at Newcastle on May 21, 1894), "there will have to be
some definite attempt to carry out what Mr. Bright at the Leeds
Conference of 1883 suggested, by which the power of the House of
Lords--this non-elected, this non-representative, this hereditary, this
packed Tory Chamber--by which the veto of that body shall be strictly
limited." Mr. Gladstone, too, in his last speech in the House of
Commons on the wrecking amendments which the Lords had made on the
Parish Councils Bill, dwelt on the fundamental differences between the
two Houses, and said that "a state of things had been created which
could not continue," and declared it to be "a controversy which once
raised must go forward to an issue."

But by far the most formidable, the most vigorous, the most animated,
and, at the time, apparently sincere attack was contained in a series
of speeches delivered in 1894 by Lord Rosebery, who was then in a
position of responsibility as leader of the Liberal party. If, as
subsequent events have shown, he was unmoved by the underlying
principle and cause for which his eloquent pleading stood, anyhow we
must believe he was deeply impressed by the prospect of his personal
ambition as the leader of a party being thwarted by the contemptuous
action of an irresponsible body. His words, however, stand, and have
been quoted again and again as the most effective attack against the
partizan nature of the Second Chamber:--"What I complain of in the
House of Lords is that during the tenure of one Government it is a
Second Chamber of an inexorable kind, but while another Government is
in, it is no Second Chamber at all... Therefore the result, the effect
of the House of Lords as it at present stands, is this, that in one
case it acts as a Court of Appeal, and a packed Court of Appeal,
against the Liberal party, while in the other case, the case of the
Conservative Government, it acts not as a Second Chamber at all. In the
one case we have the two Chambers under a Liberal Government, under a
Conservative Government we have a single Chamber. Therefore, I say, we
are face to face with a great difficulty, a great danger, a great peril
to the State." So vehement and repeated were Lord Rosebery's
denunciations that grave anxiety is said to have been caused in the
highest quarters.

But for the next ten years (1895-1905) the Conservatives were in
office, and again it was impossible to bring the matter to a head,
though the past was not forgotten. When the Liberals were returned in
1906 with their colossal majority, every Liberal was well aware that
before long the same trouble would inevitably arise, and that a
settlement of the question could not be long delayed. The record of the
House of Lords' activities during the last five years has been so
indelibly impressed on the public mind that only a very brief
recapitulation of events is necessary.

At the outset their action was tentative. This was shown by the
conferences and negotiations to arrive at a settlement on the Education
Bill, which was the first Liberal measure in 1906. But these broke
down, and defiance was found to be completely successful. Mr. Balfour,
the leader of the Conservative party, realized that although he was in
a small minority in the House of Commons, yet he could still control
legislation, and when he saw how effectively the destructive weapon of
the veto could be used he became bolder, and, as with all vicious
habits, increased indulgence encouraged appetite. Had Mr. Balfour
played his trump-card--the Lords' veto--with greater foresight and
restraint, it may safely be said that the House of Lords might have
continued for another generation, or, at any rate, for another decade,
with its authority unimpaired, though sooner or later it was bound to
abuse its power; but the temptation was too great, and Mr. Balfour
became reckless.

The three crucial mistakes on the part of the Opposition from the point
of view of pure tactics were: First, the destruction of the Education
Bill of 1906. In view of the historic attitude of the Lords to all
questions of religious freedom and general enlightenment, it was not
surprising that they should stand in the way of a greater equality of
opportunity for all denominations in matters of education. Six times
between 1838 and 1857 they rejected Bills for removing Jewish
disabilities; three times between 1858 and 1869 they vetoed the
abolition of Church Rates. For thirty-six years (1835-1871) the
admission of Nonconformists to the universities by the abolition of
tests was delayed by them. It was only to be expected, therefore, that
they would be deaf to the popular outcry that had been caused by the
Balfour Education Bill of 1902. But in the very first session of the
Parliament in which the Government had been returned to power by the
immense majority of 354, that they should immediately show their teeth
and claws was, from their own point of view, as events proved, a vital
error. Their second mistake was the rejection in 1908 by a body of
Peers at Lansdowne House of the Licensing Bill, which had occupied many
weeks of the time of the House of Commons. This was rightly regarded as
a gratuitous insult to the House of elected representatives. Finally,
their culminating act of folly was the rejection of the Budget in 1909.
It was an outrageous breach of acknowledged constitutional practise,
which alienated from them a large body of moderate opinion. In addition
to these three notable measures there were, of course, a number of
other Bills on land, electoral, and social reform that were either
mutilated or thrown out during this period. How could any politician in
his senses suppose that a party who possessed any degree of confidence
in the country would tamely submit to treatment such as this? While the
Lords proceeded light-heartedly with their wrecking tactics, the
Liberal Government slowly and cautiously, but with great deliberation,
took action step by step. A provocative move on the part of the Lords
was met each time by a counter-move, and thus gradually the final and
decisive phase of the dispute was reached.

After the loss of the Education Bill of 1906, the first note of warning
was sounded by Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman. "The resources of the
House of Commons," he declared, "are not exhausted, and I say with
conviction that a way must be found, and a way will be found, by which
the will of the people expressed through their elected representatives
in this House will be made to prevail."

The first mention of the subject in a King's Speech occurred in March,
1907, when this significant phrase was used: "Serious questions
affecting the working of our party system have arisen from unfortunate
differences between the two Houses. My Ministers have this important
subject under consideration with a view to the solution of the
difficulty."

On June 24, 1907, the matter was first definitely brought before the
House. Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman moved that "in order to give effect
to the will of the people as expressed by their elected
representatives, it is necessary that the power of the other House to
alter or reject Bills passed by this House should be so restricted by
law as to secure that within the limits of a single Parliament the
final decision of the Commons shall prevail." To the evident surprize
of the Opposition he sketched a definite plan for curtailing the veto
of the House of Lords. This was followed in July by the introduction of
resolutions laying down in full detail the exact procedure. In his
statement Sir Henry made it very clear that the issue was confined to
the relations between the two Houses:--"Let me point out that the plan
which I have sketched to the House does not in the least preclude or
prejudice any proposals which may be made for the reform of the House
of Lords. The constitution and composition of the House of Lords is a
question entirely independent of my subject. My resolution has nothing
to do with the relations of the two Houses to the Crown, but only with
the relations of the two Houses to each other."

In 1908, Mr. Asquith became Prime Minister, but no further action was
taken. On the rejection of the Licensing Bill, however, he showed that
the Government were fully aware of the extreme gravity of the question,
but intended to choose their own time to deal with it. Speaking at the
National Liberal Club in December, he said: "The question I want to put
to you and to my fellow Liberals outside is this: Is this state of
things to continue? We say that it must be brought to an end, and I
invite the Liberal party to-night to treat the veto of the House of
Lords as the dominating issue in politics--the dominant issue, because
in the long run it overshadows and absorbs every other." When pressed
on the Address at the beginning of the following session by his
supporters, who were impatient for action, he explained the position of
the Government: "I repeat we have no intention to shirk or postpone the
issue we have raised.... I can give complete assurance that at the
earliest possible moment consistent with the discharge by this
Parliament of the obligations I have indicated, the issue will be
presented and submitted to the country."

The rejection of the Budget in 1909 led to a general election, in which
the Government's method of dealing with the Lords was the main issue.
The Liberals were returned again, but when the King's Speech was read
some confusion was caused by the distinct question of the relations
between the two Houses being coupled with a suggested reform of the
Second Chamber. This was a departure from the very clear and wise
policy of Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman, and had it been persisted in it
might have broken up the ranks of the Liberal party--very varied and
different opinions being held as to the constitution of a Second
Chamber. But the stronger course was adopted, and the resolutions
subsequently introduced and passed in the House of Commons dealt only
with the veto and were to form the preliminary to the introduction of
the Bill itself.

Just as matters seemed about to result in a final settlement, King
Edward died, and a conference between the leaders of both parties was
set up to tide over the awkward interval. The conference was an
experiment doomed to failure, as the Liberals had nothing to give away
and compromise could only mean a sacrifice of principle. The House met
in November to wind up the business, and the Prime Minister announced
that an appeal would be made to the country on the single issue of the
Lords' veto, the specific proposals of the Government being placed
before the electorate. A Liberal Government was returned to power for
the third time in December, 1910, with practically the same majority as
in January. The Parliament Bill was introduced and passed in all its
stages through the House of Commons with large majorities.

Meanwhile, the Conservatives made no attempt to defend either the
action or composition of the House of Lords, but adopted an apologetic
attitude. They agreed that the Second Chamber must be reformed, and
during the second general election in 1910 some of them declared for
the Referendum as a solution of the difficulty of deadlocks between the
two Houses. But there was an entire absence of sincerity about their
proposals, which were not thought out, but obviously only superficial
expedients hurriedly grasped at by a party in distress. Their reform
scheme, introduced by Lord Lansdowne, was revolutionary, and, at the
same time, fanciful and confused. It was ridiculed by their opponents,
and received with frigid disapproval by their supporters. Still, they
acted as if they were confident that in the long run they could ward
off the final blow. They were persuaded that the Liberal Government
would neither have the courage nor the power to accomplish their
purpose. "Why waste time over abstract resolutions?" asked Mr.
Balfour. "The Liberal party," he said, "has a perfect passion for
abstract resolutions"--and again, "it is quite obvious they do not mean
business." Even when the Bill itself was introduced, they still did not
believe that its passage through the House of Lords could be forced.
The opposition to the Bill was not so much due to hatred of the actual
provisions as fear of its consequences. The prospect of a Liberal
Government being able to pass measures which for long have been part of
their program, such as Home Rule, Welsh Disestablishment, or Electoral
Reform, exasperated the party who had hitherto been secured against the
passage of measures of capital importance introduced by their
opponents. The anti-Home Rule cry and the supposed dictatorship of the
Irish Nationalist leader were utilized to the full, and were useful
when constitutional and reasoned argument failed. At the same time as
much as possible was made of the composite character of the majority
supporting the Government.

Throughout the latter part of the controversy there is little doubt
that the Conservatives would have been in a far stronger position had
they acted as a united party with a definite policy and a strong leader
ready at a moment's notice to form an alternative Government. But they
were deplorably led, they could agree on no policy, and their warmest
supporters in the Press and in the country were the first to admit that
the formation of an alternative Conservative Administration was
unthinkable. Nevertheless, there could be no rival for the leadership.
Mr. Balfour, aloof, indifferent, without enthusiasm, and without
convictions, although discredited in the country and harassed in his
attempts to save his party from Protection, remains in ability,
Parliamentary knowledge, experience and skill, head and shoulders above
his very mediocre band of colleagues in the House of Commons.

The Bill went up to the House of Lords, where Lord Morley, with the
tact and skill of an experienced statesman and the unflinching firmness
of a lifelong Liberal, conducted it through a very rough career. The
Lords' amendments were destructive of the principle, and therefore
equivalent to rejection. But even a few days before those amendments
were returned to the Commons the Conservatives refused to believe that
the passage of the Bill in its original form was guaranteed. When at
last it was brought home to them that, if necessary, the King would be
advised to create a sufficient number of Peers to insure the passage of
the Bill into law, a howl of indignation went up. Scenes of confusion
and unmannerly exhibitions of temper took place in the House of
Commons. A party of revolt was formed among the Peers, and the Prime
Minister was branded as a traitor who was guilty of treason and whose
advice to the King in the words of the vote of censure was "a gross
violation of constitutional liberty."

As a matter of fact, Mr. Asquith was adhering very strictly to the
letter and spirit of the Constitution. Lord Grey, who was confronted
with a similar problem in 1832, very truly said: "If a majority of this
House (House of Lords) is to have the power whenever they please of
opposing the declared and decided wishes both of the Crown and the
people without any means of modifying that power, then this country is
placed entirely under the influence of an uncontrollable oligarchy. I
say that if a majority of this House should have the power of acting
adversely to the Crown and the Commons, and was determined to exercise
that power without being liable to check or control, the Constitution
is completely altered, and the Government of the country is not a
limited monarchy; it is no longer, my Lords, the Crown, the Lords and
Commons, but a House of Lords--a separate oligarchy--governing
absolutely the others."

Had the Prime Minister submitted to the Lords' dictation after two
general elections, in the second of which the verdict of the country
was taken admittedly and exclusively on the actual terms of the
Parliament Bill, he would have basely betrayed the Constitution in
acknowledging by his submission that the Peers were the supreme rulers
over the Crown and over the Commons, and could without check overrule
the declared expression of the people's will. The Lord Chancellor
pointed out the danger in one sentence. "This House alone in the
Constitution is to be free of all control." No doubt the creation of
ten Peers would not have caused such a commotion as the creation of
400, but the principle is precisely the same, and it was only the
magnitude of partizan bias in the Second Chamber that made the creation
of a large number necessary in the event of there being determined
opposition. It was a most necessary and salutary lesson for the Lords
that they should be shown, in as clear and pronounced a way as
possible, that the Constitution provided a check against their attempt
at despotism, just as the marked disapproval of the electorate, as
shown, for instance, in the remarkable series of by-elections in
1903-1905, or by a reverse at a general election, is the check provided
against the arbitrary or unpopular action of any Government. The Peers
were split up into two parties, those who accepted Lord Lansdowne's
pronouncement that, as they were no longer "free agents," there was
nothing left for them but to submit to the inevitable, and those who
desired to oppose the Bill to the last and force the creation of Peers.
The view of the latter section, led by Lord Halsbury, was an expression
of the wide-spread impatience and annoyance with Mr. Balfour's weak and
vacillating leadership. All the counting of heads and the guesses as to
how each Peer would behave afforded much material for sensational press
paragraphs and rather frivolous speculation and intrigue. The action of
any Peer in any circumstance is always supposed to be of national
importance. The vision of large numbers of active Peers was a perfect
feast for the public mind, at least so the newspapers thought. But in
reality the final outcry, the violent speeches, the sectional meetings,
the vituperation and passion were quite unreal and of very little
consequence. One way or the other, the passage of the Bill was secure.

The Vote of Censure brought against the Government afforded the Prime
Minister a convenient opportunity of frankly taking the House into his
confidence. With the King's consent, he disclosed all the
communications, hitherto kept secret, which had passed between the
Sovereign and his Ministers. He rightly claimed that all the
transactions had been "correct, considerate, and constitutional." Mr.
Asquith's brilliant and sagacious leadership impressed even his
bitterest opponents. It only remained for the Lords not to insist on
their amendments. Unparalleled excitement attended their final
decision. The uncompromising opponents among the Unionist Peers, rather
than yield at the last moment, threw over Lord Lansdowne's leadership.
They were bent on forcing a creation of Peers, although Lord Morley
warned them of the consequences. "If we are beaten on this Bill
to-night," he declared, "then his Majesty will consent to such a
creation of Peers as will safeguard the measure against all possible
combinations in this House, and the creation will be prompt." In
numbers the "Die-hards," as they were called, were known to exceed a
hundred, and it was extremely doubtful right up to the actual moment
when the division was taken if the Government would receive the support
of a sufficient number of cross-bench Peers, Unionist Peers, and
Bishops to carry the Bill. After a heated debate, chiefly taken up by
violent recriminations between the two sections of the Opposition, the
Lords decided by a narrow majority of seventeen not to insist on their
amendments, and the Bill was passed and received the Royal assent.

Now that the smoke has cleared off the field of battle, let us state in
a few sentences what the Parliament Bill which has caused all this
uproar really is. It is by no means unnecessary to do this, as those
who take a close interest in political events are, perhaps, unaware of
the incredible ignorance which exists as to the cause and essence of
the whole controversy, especially among that class of society who read
head-lines but not articles, who never attend political meetings, but
whose strong prejudices make them active and influential. The
Parliament Bill, or rather the Act, does not even place a Liberal
Government on an equal footing with a Unionist Government. It insures
that Liberal measures, if persisted in, may become law in the course of
two years in spite of the opposition of the Second Chamber. It lays
down once and for all that finance or money Bills can not be vetoed or
amended by the House of Lords--which, after all, is only an indorsement
of what was accepted till 1909 as the constitutional practise--and it
limits the duration of Parliament to five years. The preamble of the
Bill, which is regarded with a good deal of suspicion by advanced
Radicals, indicates that the reform of the Second Chamber is to be
undertaken subsequently.

This is the bare record of the sequence of events in the Parliamentary
struggle between the two Houses, each supported by one of the two great
political parties. In the course of the controversy the real
significance of the conflict was liable to be hidden under the mass of
detail connected with constitutional law, constitutional and political
history, and Parliamentary procedure, which had to be quoted in
speeches on every platform and referred to repeatedly in debate. The
serious deadlock between the Lords and Commons was not a mere
inconvenience in the conduct of legislation, nor was it purely a
technical constitutional problem. The issue was not between the 670
members of the House of Commons and the 620 members of the House of
Lords, nor between the Liberal Government and the Tory Opposition. The
full purport of the contest is broader and far more vital; it must be
sought deeper down in the wider sphere of our social and national life.
In a word, the rising tide of democracy has broken down another
barrier, and the privileges and presumptions of the aristocracy have
received a shattering blow. This aspect of the case is worth studying.

There could be no conflict of any importance between the two Houses so
long as the Commons were practically nominees of the Lords. At the end
of the eighteenth century no fewer than 306 members of the House of
Commons were virtually returned by the influence of 160 persons,
landowners and boroughmongers, most of whom were members of the other
House. Things could work smoothly enough in these circumstances, as the
two Houses represented the same interests and the same class, and the
territorial aristocracy dominated without effort over a silent and
subservient people.

The Reform Bill of 1832 was the real beginning of the change. By its
provisions not only was the franchise extended, but fifty-six rotten
boroughs, represented by 143 members, were swept away. There was
something more in this than electoral reform. It was the first step
toward alienation between the two Houses. There was a bitter fight at
the time because the Lords foresaw that if they once lost their hold
over the Commons the eventual results might be serious for them. It was
far more convenient to have a subordinate House of nominees than an
independent House of possible antagonists. The enfranchisement and
emancipation of the people once inaugurated, however, were destined to
proceed further. The introduction of free education served more than
anything, and is still serving, to create a self-conscious democracy
fully alive to its great responsibilities, for knowledge means courage
and strength. Changes in the industrial life of the country led to
organization among the workers and the formation of trade-unions. The
extension of local government brought to the front men of ability from
all classes of society, and the franchise became further extended at
intervals. The House of Commons, now completely free and independent,
kept in close touch with the real national awakening and reflected in
its membership the changes in social development. But the House of
Lords, unlike any other institution in the country, remained unchanged
and quite unaffected by outside circumstances. Its stagnation and
immobility naturally made it increasingly hostile to democratic
advance. The number of Liberal Peers or Peers who could remain Liberal
under social pressure gradually diminished. Friction caused by
diversity of aim and interest became consequently more and more
frequent. There were times of reaction, times of stagnation, times when
the national attention was diverted by wars, but the main trend taken
by the course of events was unalterable. The aristocracy, finding that
it was losing ground, made attempts to reenforce itself with commercial
and American wealth, thereby sacrificing the last traces of its old
distinction. Money might give power of a sort--a dangerous power in its
way--but not-power to recover the loss of political domination. The
South African War and the attempt to obliterate the resentment it
caused in the country by instituting a campaign for the revival of
Protection brought about the downfall of the Tory party. The electoral
_débâcle_ of 1906 was the consequence and served as a signal of alarm
in the easy-going Conservative world. Till then many who were
accustomed to hold the reins of government in their hands, as if by
right, had not fully realized that the control was slipping from them.
The cry went up that socialism and revolution were imminent. _The
Times_ quoted _The Clarion_. Old fogies shook their heads and declared
the country would be ruined and that a catastrophe was at hand. But it
was soon found, on the contrary, that the government of the country was
in the hands of men of great ability, enlightenment, and imagination;
trade prospered, social needs were more closely attended to, and, most
important of all, peace was maintained. The House of Commons had opened
its doors to men of moderate means, and the Labor party, consisting of
working men, miners, and those with first-hand knowledge of industrial
conditions, came into existence as an organized political force.

The last six years have shown the desperate attempts of the ancient
order to strain every nerve against the inevitable, and to thwart and
destroy the projects and ambitions of those who represented the new
thought and the new life of the nation. Though apparently successful at
first, the rash action of the Chamber which still represented the
interest, privileges, and prejudices of the wealthier class and of
vested interests, only helped in the long run to hasten the day when
they were to be deprived of their most formidable weapon. They still
retain considerable power: their interests are guarded by one of the
political parties, and socially they hold undisputed sway. In an
amazing defense of the past action of the House of Lords, Lord
Lansdowne in 1906 said: "It is constantly assumed that the House of
Lords has always shown itself obstructive, reluctant, an opponent to
all useful measures for the amelioration of the condition of the people
of this island. Nothing is further from the truth. You will find that
in the past with which we are concerned the House of Lords has shown
itself not only tolerant of such measures but anxious to promote them
and to make them effectual to the best of its ability. _And that, I
believe, has been, and I am glad to think it, from time immemorial, the
attitude of what I suppose I may call the aristocracy toward the people
of this country_" The last sentence is a fair statement of their case.
The aristocracy are _not_ the people. They are by nature a superior
class which Providence or some unseen power has mercifully provided to
govern, to rule, and to dominate. They are kind, charitable, and
patronizing, and expect gratitude and subservience in return. As a
mid-Victorian writer puts it: "What one wants to see is a kind and
cordial condescension on the one side, and an equally cordial but still
respectful devotedness on the other." But these are voices from a time
that has passed.

Democracy has many a fight before it. False ideals and faulty
educational systems may handicap its progress as much as the forces
that are avowedly arrayed against it. Its achievements may be arrested
by the discord of factions breaking up its ranks. Conceivably it may
have to face a severe conflict with a middle-class plutocracy. But
whatever trials democracy has to undergo it can no longer be subjected
to constant defeat at the hands of a constitutionally organized force
of hostile aristocratic opinion. At least, it may now secure expression
in legislation for its noblest ideals and its most cherished ambitions.
A check on progressive legislation is harmful to the national welfare,
especially when there is no check on the real danger of reaction. To
devise a Second Chamber which will be a check on reaction as well as on
so-called revolution is a problem for the future. For the time being,
therefore, the best security for the country against the perils of a
reactionary regime is to allow freer play to the forces of progress,
which only tend to become revolutionary when they are resisted and
suppressed. The curtailment of the veto of the Second Chamber fulfils
this purpose. Whatever further adjustment of the Constitution may be
effected in time to come, the door can no longer be closed persistently
against the wishes of the people when they entrust the work of
legislation to a Liberal Government.


SYDNEY BROOKS

The first but by no means the last or most crucial stage of our
twentieth-century Revolution has now been completed; the old
Constitution, which was perhaps the most adaptable and convenient
system of government that the world has ever known, is definitely at an
end; the powers of an ancient Assembly have been truncated with a
violence that in any other land would have spelled barricades and
bloodshed long ago; and the road has been cleared, or partially
cleared, for developments that must profoundly affect, and that in all
probability will absolutely transform, the whole scheme of the British
State.

Thus far, with their usual effective, good-humored, shortsighted common
sense, with few pauses for inquiry, and with a characteristically
indifferent grasp on the ultimate trend of things, have our politicians
brought us. Our politicians, I say, and not our people, because one of
the distinctive features of the Revolution so far is that it has been a
political rather than a popular movement. It did not originate in the
constituencies, but in the Cabinet; it was not forced upon the caucus
by an aroused and indignant country, but by the caucus upon the
country; nine-tenths of its momentum has been derived from above and
not from below; the true centers of excitement throughout its polite
and orderly progress have been the lobbies of the House and the
correspondence columns of _The Times;_ it was only at the last that the
urbanities of the struggle between the "Die-hards" and their fellow
Unionists furnished the public as a whole with material for a mild
sporting interest. When Roundheads and Cavaliers were lining up for the
battle of Edgehill a Warwickshire squire was observed between the
opposing forces placidly drawing the coverts for a fox. The British
people during the past twenty months have seemed more than once to
resemble that historic huntsman. They have answered the screaming
exhortations of the politicians with whispers of more than Delphic
ambiguity; they have gone unconcernedly about their pleasures and their
business, to all appearances unvexed by the din of Revolution in their
ears; they have presented the spectacle, more common in France than in
England, of a tranquil nation with agitated legislators.

The Ministerial explanation of this lethargy and indifference is that
the people had no occasion to grow excited; their "mandate" was being
fulfilled, they were getting what they wanted, demonstrations were
superfluous. But no one who has read the history of the Reform Bill of
1832 or of the Chartist movement or who remembers the passions stirred
up by the Franchise agitation and the Home Rule struggle of the
eighties will swallow that explanation without mentally choking.

The truth probably is, first, that the multiplication of cheap
distractions and enjoyments and of cheaper newspapers has not only
weakened the popular interest in politics, but has impaired that
faculty of concentrated and continuous thought which used to invest
affairs of State with an attractiveness not so greatly inferior to that
of football; secondly, that for the great masses of the democracy the
politics of bread and butter have completely ousted the politics of
ideas and abstractions; and thirdly, that the Constitutional issue was
precisely the kind of issue in which our people had had no previous
training, either actual or theoretical, and which found them therefore
without any intellectual preparation for its advent. Up till the end of
1909 we had always taken the Constitution for granted, and were for the
most part comfortably unaware that it even existed. We had never as a
nation, or never rather within living memory, troubled ourselves about
"theories of State," or whetted our minds on the fundamentals of
government. There is nothing in our educational curriculum that
corresponds with the _instruction civique_ of the French schools, nor
have we the privilege which the Americans enjoy of carrying a copy of
our organic Act of Government in our pockets, of reading it through in
twenty minutes, and of hearing it incessantly expounded in the
class-room and the Press, debated in the national legislature, and
interpreted by the highest judicial tribunal in the land.

When, therefore, we were suddenly called upon to decide the infinitely
delicate problems of the place, powers, and composition of a Second
Chamber in our governing system, the task proved as bewildering as it
was unappetizing. Any nation which regarded its Constitution as a vital
and familiar instrument would have heavily resented so gross an
infraction of it as the Lords perpetrated in rejecting the 1909 Budget.
But our own electorate, so far from punishing the party responsible for
the outrage, sent them back to the House over a hundred stronger, a
result impossible in a country with any vivid sense, or any sense at
all, of Constitutional realities, and only possible in Great Britain
because the people adjudged the importance of the various issues
submitted to them by standards of their own, and placed the
Constitutional problem at the bottom, or near the bottom, of the list.
In no single constituency that I have ever heard of was the House of
Lords question the supreme and decisive factor at the election of
January, 1910. It deeply stirred the impartial intelligence of the
country, but it failed to move the average voter even in the towns,
while in the rural parts it fell unmistakably flat.

Even at the election of December, 1910, when all other issues were
admittedly subordinate to the Constitutional issue, it was exceedingly
difficult to determine how far the stedfastness of the electorate to
the Liberal cause was due to a specific appreciation and approval of
the Parliament Bill and of all it involved, and how far it was an
expression of general distrust of the Unionists, of irritation with the
Lords, and of sympathy with the social and fiscal policies pursued by
the Coalition. That the Liberals were justified, by all the rules of
the party game, in treating the result of that election as, for all
political and Parliamentary purposes, a direct indorsement of their
proposals, may be freely granted. It was as near an approach to an _ad
hoc_ Referendum as we are ever likely to get under our present system.
Party exigencies, or at any rate party tactics, it is true, hurried on
the election before the country was prepared for it, before it had
recovered from the somnolence induced by the Conference, and before the
Opposition had time or opportunity to do more than sketch in their
alternative plan. But though the issue was incompletely presented, it
was undoubtedly the paramount issue put before the electorate, and the
Liberals were fairly entitled to claim that their policy in regard to
it had the backing of the majority of the voters of the United Kingdom.

Whether, however, this backing represented a reasoned view of the
Constitutional points involved and of the position, prerogatives, and
organization of a Second Chamber in the framework of British
Government, whether it implied that our people were really interested
in and had deeply pondered the relative merits of the Single and Double
Chamber systems, is much more doubtful. "When he was told," said the
Duke of Northumberland on August 10th, "that the people of England were
very anxious to abolish the House of Lords, his reply was that they did
not understand the question, and did not care two brass farthings about
it." That perhaps is putting it somewhat too strongly. The country
within the last two years has unquestionably felt more vividly than
ever before the anomaly of an hereditary Upper Chamber embedded in
democratic institutions. It has been stirred by Mr. Lloyd-George's
rhetoric to a mood of vague exasperation with the House of Lords and of
ridicule of the order of the Peerage. It has accepted too readily the
Liberal version of the central issue as a case of Peers _versus_
People. But while it was satisfied that something ought to be done, I
do not believe it realizes precisely what has been accomplished in its
name or the consequences that must follow from the passing of the
Parliament Bill. There are no signs that it regards the abridgment of
the powers of the Upper House as a great democratic victory. There are,
on the contrary, manifold signs that it has been bored and bewildered
by the whole struggle, and that the extraordinary lassitude with which
it watched the debates was a true reflex of its real attitude.


CAPTAIN GEORGE SWINTON, L.C.C.

It has been more like a bull-fight than anything else, or perhaps the
bull-baiting, almost to the death, which went on in England in days of
old. For the Peerage is not quite dead, but sore stricken, robbed of
its high functions, propped up and left standing to flatter the fools
and the snobs, a kind of painted screen, or a cardboard fortification,
armed with cannon which can not be discharged for fear they bring it
down about the defenders' ears. And in the end it was all effected so
simply, so easily could the bull be induced to charge. A rag was waved,
first here, then there, and the dogs barked. That was all.

It is not difficult to be wise after the event. Everybody knows now
that with the motley groups of growing strength arrayed against them it
behooved the Peers to walk warily, to look askance at the cloaks
trailed before them, to realize the danger of accepting challenges,
however righteous the cause might be. But no amount of prudence could
have postponed the catastrophe for any length of time, for indeed the
House of Lords had become an anachronism. Everything had changed since
the days when it had its origin, when its members were Peers of the
King, not only in name but almost in power, princes of principalities,
earls of earldoms, barons of baronies. Then they were in a way
enthroned, representing all the people of the territories they
dominated, the people they led in war and ruled in peace. They came
together as magnates of the land, sitting in an Upper House as Lords of
the shire, even as the Knights of the shire sat in the Commons. And
this continued long after the feudal system had passed away, carried on
not only by the force of tradition, but by a sentiment of respect and
real affection; for these feelings were common enough until designing
men laid themselves out to destroy them.

Many things combined to make the last phase pass quickly. It was
impossible that the Peerage could long survive the Reform Bill, for it
took from the great families their pocket boroughs, and so much of
their influence. And there followed hard upon it the educational effect
of new facilities for exchange of ideas, the railway trains, the penny
post, and the halfpenny paper, together with the centralization of
general opinion and all government which has resulted therefrom. But
above all reasons were the loss of the qualifying ancestral lands, a
link with the soil; and the ennobling of landless men. Once divorced
from its influence over some countryside a peerage resting on heredity
was doomed; for no one can defend a system whereby men of no
exceptional ability, representative of nothing, are legislators by
inheritance. Should we summon to a conclave of the nations a king who
had no kingdom? But the pity of it! Not only the break with eight
centuries of history--nay, more, for when had not every king his
council of notables?--not only the loss of picturesqueness and
sentiment and lofty mien, but the certainty, the appalling certainty,
that, when an aristocracy of birth falls, it is not an aristocracy of
character or intellect, but an aristocracy--save the mark--of money,
which is bound to take its place.

Five short years and four rejected measures. Glance back over it all.
The wild blood on both sides, and the cunning on one. The foolish
comfortable words spoken in every drawing-room throughout the United
Kingdom. "Yes, they are terrible: what a lot of harm they would do if
they could. Thank God we have a House of Lords." Think now that this
was commonplace conversation only three short years ago. And all the
time the ears of the masses were being poisoned. Week after week and
month after month some laughed but others toiled. The laughers, like
the French nobles before the Revolution, said contemptuously, "They
will not dare." Why should they not? There were men among them for whom
the Ark of the Covenant had no sanctity. And then, when the
combinations were complete, when those who stood out had been
kicked--there can be no other word--into compliance, the blows fell
quickly. A Budget was ingeniously prepared for rejection, and, the
Lords falling into the trap, the storm broke, with its hurricane of
abuse and misrepresentation. We had one election which was
inconclusive. Then befell the death of King Edward. There was a second
election, carefully engineered and prepared for, rushed upon a nation
which had been denied the opportunity of hearing the other side. The
Government had out-maneuvered the Opposition and muzzled them to the
last moment in a Conference sworn to secrecy. It was remarkably clever
and incredibly unscrupulous. They won again. They had not increased
their numbers, but they had maintained their position, and this time
their victory, however achieved, could not be gainsaid. For a moment
there was a lull, only some vague talk of "guaranties," asserted,
scoffed at and denied, for the ordinary business of the country was in
arrears, and the Coronation, with all its pomp of circumstance and
power, all its medieval splendor and appeal to history and sentiment,
turned people's thoughts elsewhere.

And then, on the day the pageantry closed, Mr. Asquith launched his
Thunderbolt. Few men living will ever learn the true story of the
guaranties, suffice it that somehow he had secured them. Whatever the
resistance of the Second Chamber might be, it could be overcome. At his
dictation the Constitution was to fall. There was no escape; the Bill
must surely pass. It rested with the Lords themselves whether they
should bow their heads to the inevitable, humbly or proudly,
contemptuously or savagely--characterize it as you will--or whether
there should be red trouble first.

Surely never in our time has there been a situation of higher
psychological interest, for never before have we seen a body of some
six hundred exceptional men called on to take each his individual line
upon a subject which touched him to the core. I say "individual line"
and "exceptional men." Does either adjective require defending?

The Peers are not a regiment, they are still independent entities, with
all the faults and virtues which this implies; free gentlemen subject
to no discipline, responsible to God and their own consciences alone.
At times they may combine on questions which appeal to their sense of
right, their sentiment, perhaps some may say their self-interest; but
this was no case for combination. Here was a sword pointed at each
man's breast. What, under the circumstances, was to be his individual
line of conduct?

And who will deny the word "exceptional"? To a seventh of them it must
perforce be applicable, for they have been specially selected to serve
in an Upper House. And to the rest, those who sit by inheritance, does
it not apply even more? It is not what they have done in life. This was
no question of capacity or achievement. By the accident of birth alone
they had been put in a position different from other men. How shall
each in his wisdom or his folly interpret that well-worn motto which
still has virtue both to quicken and control, "Noblesse oblige"?

Very curious indeed was the result. It is useless to consider the
preliminaries, the pronouncements, the meetings, the campaign which
raged for a fortnight in the Press both by letter and leading article.
It is even useless to try and discover who, if anybody, was in favor of
the Bill which was the original bone of contention. Its merits and
defects were hardly debated. On that fateful 10th of August the House
of Lords split into three groups on quite a different point. The King's
Government had seized on the King's Prerogative and uttered threats.
Should they or should they not be constrained to make good their
threats, and use it?

The first group said: "Yes. They have betrayed the Constitution and
disgraced their position. Let their crime be brought home to them and
to the world. All is lost for us except honor. Shall we lose that also?
To the last gasp we will insist on our amendments."

The second group said: "No. They have indeed betrayed the Constitution
and disgraced their position, but why add to this disaster the
destruction of what remains to safeguard the Empire? We protest and
withdraw, washing our hands of the whole business for the moment. But
our time will come."

The third group said: "No. We do not desire the King's Prerogative to
be used. We will prevent any need for its exercise. The Bill shall go
through without it."

And, the second group abstaining, by seventeen votes the last prevailed
against the first. But whether ever before a victory was won by so
divided a host, or ever a measure carried by men who so profoundly
disapproved of it, let those judge who read the scathing Protest,
inscribed in due form in the journals of the House of Lords by one who
went into that lobby, Lord Rosebery, the only living Peer who has been
Prime Minister of England.

It is unnecessary to print here more than the tenth and last paragraph
of this tremendous indictment. It runs--"Because the whole transaction
tends to bring discredit on our country and its institutions."

How under these extraordinary circumstances did the Peerage take sides,
old blood and new blood, the governing families and the so-called
"backwoodsmen," they who were carving their own names, and they who
relied upon the inheritance of names carved by others?

The first group, the "No-Surrender Peers," mustered 114 in the
division. Two Bishops were among them, Bangor and Worcester, and a
distinguished list of peers, first of their line, including Earl
Roberts and Viscount Milner. When the story of our times is written it
will be seen that there are few walks of life in which some one of
these has not borne an honorable part.

Then at a bound we are transported to the Middle Ages. At the
Coronation, when the Abbey Church of Westminster rang to the shouts,
"God Save King George!" five Lords of Parliament knelt on the steps of
the throne, kissed the King's cheek, and did homage, each as the chief
of his rank and representing every noble of it. They are all here:--

The Duke of Norfolk, Earl Marshal and premier Peer of England, head of
the great house of Howard, a name that for five centuries has held its
own with highest honor.

The Marquis of Winchester, head of the Paulets, representative of the
man who for three long years held Basing House for the King against all
the forces which Cromwell could muster, but descended also from that
earlier Marquis of Tudor creation, who, when he was asked how in those
troublous times he succeeded in retaining the post of Lord High
Treasurer, replied, "By being a willow and not an oak." To-day the boot
is on the other leg.

The Earl of Shrewsbury, head of the Talbots, a race far famed alike in
camp and field from the days of the Plantagenets.

The Viscount Falkland, representative of that noble Cavalier who fell
at Newbury.

The Baron Mowbray and Segrave and Stourton, titles which carry us back
almost to the days of the Great Charter.

Nor does the feudal train end there. We see also a St. Maur, Duke of
Somerset, whose family has aged since in the time of Henry VIII. men
scoffed at it as new; a Clinton, Duke of Newcastle; a Percy, Duke and
heir of Northumberland, that name of high romance; a De Burgh, Marquis
of Clanricarde; a Lindsay, Earl of Crawford, twenty-sixth Earl, and
head of a house which for eight centuries has stood on the steps of
thrones; a Courtenay, Earl of Devon; an Erskine, Earl of Mar, an
earldom whose origin is lost in the mists of antiquity, and many
another.

And if we come to later days we have the Duke of Bedford, head of the
great Whig house of Russell; the Dukes of Marlborough and Westminster,
heirs of capacity and good fortune; Lords Bute and Salisbury,
descendants of Prime Ministers; and not only Lord Selborne, but Lords
Bathurst and Coventry, Hardwicke and Rosslyn, representatives of past
Lord Chancellors.

These, and others such as they, inheritors of traditions bred in their
very bones, spurning the suggestion that they should purchase the
uncontamination of the Peerage by the forfeiture of their principles,
fought the question to the end. If they asked for a motto, surely
theirs would have been, "Fais ce que dois, advienne que pourra."

And so we pass to the group who abstained, the great mass of the
Peerage, too proud to wrangle where they could not win, too wise to
knock their heads uselessly against a wall, too loyal not to do their
utmost to spare their King. More than three hundred followed Lord
Lansdowne's lead, taking for their motto, perhaps, the "Cavendo tutus"
of his son-in-law. And still there was fiery blood among them, and
strong men swelling with righteous indignation. There were Gay Gordons,
as well as a cautious Cavendish, an Irish Beresford to quicken a Dutch
Bentinck, and a Graham of Montrose as well as a Campbell of Argyll.
Three Earls, Pembroke, Powis, and Carnarvon, represented the cultured
family of Herbert, and, as a counterpoise to the Duke of
Northumberland, we see six Peers of the doughty Douglas blood. Lord
Curzon found by his side three other Curzons, and the Duke of Atholl
three Murrays from the slopes of the Grampians. There were many-acred
potentates, such as the Dukes of Beaufort and Hamilton and Rutland,
Lord Bath, Lord Leicester, and Lord Lonsdale, and names redolent of
history, a Butler, Marquis of Ormonde, a Cecil, Marquis of Exeter, the
representative of Queen Elizabeth's Lord Burleigh, and a Stanley, Earl
of Derby, a name which to this day stirs Lancashire blood. If it were a
question of tactics, then Earl Nelson agreed with the Duke of
Wellington, and they were backed by seven others whose peerages had
been won in battle on land or sea in the course of the last century;
while if the Law should be considered, there were nine descendants of
Lord Chancellors. Coming to more recent times, there was the son of
John Lawrence of the Punjab, and of Alfred Tennyson the poet, Lord St.
Aldwyn and Lord Balfour of Burleigh and Lord Lister, and Lords
Rothschild, Aldenham, and Revelstoke. What need to mention more?--for
there were men representative of every interest in every quarter; but
if we wish to close this list with two names which might seem to link
together the Constitutional history of these islands, let us note that
there was agreement as to action between Viscount Peel, the sole
surviving ex-Speaker of the House of Commons, and Lord Wrottesley, the
head of the only family which can claim as of its name and blood one of
the original Knights of the Garter.

What more is there to say? As, nearly two years ago, we stood round the
telegraph-boards watching the election results coming in, many of us
saw that the Peerage was falling. The end has come quicker than we
expected. The Empire may repent, a new Constitution may spring into
being, and there may be raised again a Second Chamber destined to be
far stronger than that which has passed, but it will never be the proud
House of Peers far-famed in English history.




THE TURKISH-ITALIAN WAR

EUROPE SEIZES THE LAST OF NORTHERN AFRICA A.D. 1911

WILLIAM T. ELLIS

THE WAR CORRESPONDENTS

Italy, by her sudden action in seizing possession of Tripoli in September
of 1911, established the authority and suzerainty of western Europe over
the last unclaimed strip of territory along the African shore of the
Mediterranean.

For over a thousand years the Mohammedans, as represented by either
Arabs or Turks, held control of this southern half of the classic
Mediterranean Sea. During the past century France, England, and Spain
have been snatching this land from the helpless Turks, and
Europeanizing it. Only the barren, desert stretch between Egypt and
Tunis remained. It seemed almost too worthless for occupation. But a
few Italian colonists had settled there, and Italy resolved to annex
the land.

Few wars have ever been so obviously forced by a determined marauder
upon a helpless victim. Italy wanted to show her strength, both to her
own people and to assembled Europe. Hence she prepared her armies and
then delivered to Turkey, the nominal suzerain of Tripoli, a sudden
ultimatum. The Turks must do exactly what Italy demanded, and
immediately, or Italy would seize Tripoli. The "Young Turks" offered
every possible concession; but Italy, hurriedly rejecting every
proposition, made the seizure she had planned.

The strife that followed had its _opéra-bouffe_ aspect in the utter
helplessness of far-off Turkey, incapable of reaching the seat of war;
but it had also its tragic scandal in the accusation of cruelty made
against the Italian troops. It had also, in the Balkan wars and other
changes which sprang more or less directly from it, a permanent effect
upon the political affairs of Europe as well as upon those of Africa.


WILLIAM T. ELLIS[1]

[Footnote 1: Reprinted by permission from _Lippincott's Magazine_.]

There are conversational compensations for life in the Orient. Talk
does not grow stale when there are always the latest phases of "the
great game" of international politics to gossip about. Men do not
discuss baseball performances in the cafés of Constantinople; but the
latest story of how Von Bieberstein, the German Ambassador, bulldozed
Haaki Pasha, the Grand Vizier, and sent the latter whining among his
friends for sympathy, is far more piquant. The older residents among
the ladies of the diplomatic corps, whose visiting list extends "beyond
the curtain," have their own well-spiced tales to tell of "the great
game" as it is played behind the latticed windows of the harem. It is
not only in London and Berlin and Washington and Paris that wives and
daughters of diplomats boost the business of their men-folk. In this
mysterious, women's world of Turkey there are curious complications; as
when a Young Turk, with a Paris veneer, has taken as second or third
wife a European woman. One wonders which of these heavily veiled
figures on the Galata Bridge, clad in hideous _ezars_, is an
Englishwoman or a Frenchwoman or a Jewess.

Night and day, year in and year out, with all kinds of chessmen, and
with an infinite variety of byplays, "the great game" is played in
Constantinople. The fortunes of the players vary, and there are
occasional--very occasional--open rumpuses; but the players and the
stakes remain the same. Nobody can read the newspaper telegrams from
Tripoli and Constantinople intelligently who has not some understanding
of the real game that is being carried on; and in which an occasional
war is only a move.

The bespectacled professor of ancient history is best qualified to
trace the beginning of this game; for there is no other frontier on the
face of the globe over which there has been so much fighting as over
that strip of water which divides Europe from Asia, called, in its four
separate parts, the Bosporus, the Sea of Marmora, the Dardanelles, and
the Aegean Sea. Centuries before men began to date their calendars
"A.D.," the city on the Bosporus was a prize for which nations
struggled. All the old-world dominions--Greek, Macedonian, Persian,
Roman--fought here; and for hundreds of years Byzantium was the capital
of the Roman and Christian world. The Crusaders and the Saracens did a
choice lot of fighting over this battle-ground; and it was here that
the doughty warrior, Paul of Tarsus, broke into Europe, as first
invader in the greatest of conquests. Along this narrow line of
beautiful blue water the East menacingly confronts the West. Turkey's
capital, as a sort of Mr.-Facing-Both-Ways, bestrides the water; for
Scutari, in Asia, is essentially a part of Greater Constantinople. That
simple geographical fact really pictures Turkey's present condition: it
is rent by the struggle of the East with the West, Asia with Europe, in
its own body.

"The great game" of to-day, rather than of any hoary and romantic
yesterday, holds the interest of the modern man. Player Number One,
even though he sits patiently in the background in seeming stolidity,
is big-boned, brawny, hairy, thirsty Russia. Russia wants water, both
here and in the far East. His whole being cries from parched depths for
the taste of the salt waters of the Mediterranean and the China Sea. At
present his ships may not pass through the Dardanelles: the jealous
Powers have said so. But Russia is the most patient nation on earth;
his "manifest destiny" is to sit in the ancient seat of dominion on the
Bosporus. Calmly, amid all the turbulence of international politics, he
awaits the prize that is assuredly his; but while he waits he plots and
mines and prepares for ultimate success. A past master of secret
spying, wholesale bribery, and oriental intrigue, is the nation which
calls its ruler the "Little Father" on earth, second only to the Great
Father in heaven. If one is curious and careful, one may learn which of
the Turkish statesmen are in Russian pay.

Looming larger--apparently--than Russia amid the minarets upon the
lovely Constantinople horizon is Germany, the Marooned Nation. Restless
William shrewdly saw that Turkey offered him the likeliest open door
for German expansion and for territorial emancipation. So he played
courtier to his "good friend, Abdul Hamid," and to the Prophet Mohammed
(they still preserve at Damascus the faded remains of the wreath he
laid upon Saladin's tomb the day he made the speech which betrayed
Europe and Christendom), and in return had his vanity enormously
ministered to. His visit to Jerusalem is probably the most notable
incident in the history of the Holy City since the Crusades. Moreover,
he carried away the Bagdad Railway concession in his carpet-bag. By
this he expects to acquire the cotton and grain fields of Mesopotamia,
which he so sorely needs in his business, and also to land at the front
door of India, in case he should ever have occasion to pay a call,
social or otherwise, upon his dear English cousins.

True, the advent of the Turkish constitution saw Germany thrown crop
and heels out of his snug place at Turkey's capital, while that
comfortable old suitor, Great Britain, which had been biting his
finger-nails on the doorstep, was welcomed smiling once more into the
parlor. Great was the rejoicing in London when Abdul Hamid's
"down-and-out" performance carried his trusted friend William along.
The glee changed to grief when, within a year--so quickly does the
appearance of the chess-board change in "the great game"--Great Britain
was once more on the doorstep, and fickle Germany was snuggling close
to Young Turkey on the divan in the dimly lighted parlor. Virtuous old
Britain professed to be shocked and horrified; he occupied himself with
talking scandal about young Germany, when he should have been busy
trying to supplant him. Few chapters in modern diplomatic history are
more surprising than the sudden downfall and restoration of Germany in
Turkish favor. With reason does the Kaiser give Ambassador von
Bieberstein, "the ablest diplomat in Europe," constant access to the
imperial ear, regardless of foreign-office red tape. During the heyday
of the Young Turk party's power, this astute old player of the game was
the dominant personality in Turkey.

The disgruntled and disappointed Britons have comforted themselves with
prophecy--how often have I heard them at it in the cosmopolitan cafes
of Constantinople!--the burden of their melancholy lay being that some
day Turkey would learn who is her real friend. That is the British way.
They believe in their divine right to the earth and the high places
thereof. They are annoyed and rather bewildered when they see Germany
cutting in ahead of them, especially in the commerce of the Orient; any
Englishman "east of Suez" can give a dozen good reasons why Germany is
an incompetent upstart; but however satisfactory and soothing to the
English soul this line of philosophy may be, it drives no German
merchantmen from the sea and no German drummers from the land. The
supineness of the British in the face of the German inroads into their
ancient preserves is amazing to an American, who, as one of their own
poets has said,

     Turns a keen, untroubled face
     Home to the instant need of things.

In this case, however, the proverbial luck of the British has been with
them. The steady decline of their historic prestige in the near East
was suddenly arrested by Italy's declaration of war. For more than a
generation Turkey has been the pampered _enfant terrible_ of
international politics, violating the conventions and proprieties with
impunity; feeling safe amid the jealousies of the players of "the great
game." Every important nation has a bill of grievances to settle with
Turkey; America's claim, for instance, includes the death of two
native-born American citizens, Rogers and Maurer, slain in the Adana
massacre, under the constitution. Nobody has been punished for this
crime, because, forsooth, it happened in Turkey. Italy made a pretext
of a cluster of these grievances, and startled the world by her claims
upon Tripoli, accompanied by an ultimatum. Turkey tried to temporize.
Pressed, she turned to Germany with a "Now earn your wages. Get me out
of this scrape, and call off your ally."

And Germany could not. With the taste of Morocco dirt still on his
tongue, the Kaiser had to take another unpalatable mouthful in
Constantinople. His boasted power, upon which the Turks had banked so
heavily, and for the sake of which they had borne so much humiliation,
proved unequal to the demand. He could not help his friend the Sultan.
Italy would have none of his mediation; for reasons that will
hereinafter appear.

Then came Britain's vindication. The Turks turned to this historic and
preeminent friend for succor. The Turkish cabinet cabled frantically to
Great Britain to intercede for them; the people in mass-meeting in
ancient St. Sophia's echoed the same appeal. For grim humor, the
spectacle has scarcely an equal in modern history. Besought and
entreated, the British, who no doubt approved of Italy's move from the
first, declined to pull Turco-German chestnuts out of the fire. "Ask
Cousin William to help you," was the ironical implication of their
attitude. Well did Britain know that if the situation were saved, the
Germans would somehow manage to get the credit of it. And if the worst
should come, Great Britain could probably meet it with Christian
fortitude! For in that eventuality the Bagdad Railway concession would
be nullified, and Britain would undoubtedly take over all of the
Arabian Peninsula, which is logically hers, in the light of her Persian
Gulf and Red Sea claims. The break-up of Turkey would settle the
Egyptian question, make easy the British acquisition of southern
Persia, and put all the holy places of Islam under the strong hand of
the British power, where they would be no longer powder-magazines to
worry the dreams of Christendom. Far-sighted moves are necessary in
"the great game."

Small wonder that Germany became furious; and that the Berlin
newspapers burst out in denunciations of Italy's wicked and piratical
land-grabbing--a morsel of rhetoric following so hard upon the heels of
the Morocco episode that it gave joy to all who delight in hearing the
pot rail at the kettle. "The great game" is not without its humors. But
the sardonic joke of the business lies deeper than all this. The Kaiser
had openly coquetted with the Sultan upon the policy of substituting
Turkey for Italy in the Triple Alliance. Turkey has a potentially great
army: the one thing the Turk can do well is to fight. With a suspicious
eye upon Neighbor Russia, the Kaiser figured it out that Turkey would
be more useful to him than Italy, especially since the Abyssinian
episode had so seriously discredited the latter. Then, of a sudden,
with a poetic justice that is delicious, Italy turns around and
humiliates the nation that was to take its place The whole comic
situation resembles nothing more nearly than a supposedly defunct
spouse rising from his death-bed to thrash the expectant second husband
of his wife.

Here "the great game" digresses in another direction, that takes no
account of Turkey. Of course, it was more than a self-respecting desire
to avenge affronts that led Italy to declare war against Turkey; and
also more than a hunger for the territory of Tripoli. Italy needed to
solidify her national sentiment at home, in the face of growing
socialism and clever clericalism. Even more did she need to show the
world that she is still a first-class power. There has been a
disposition of late years to leave her out of the international
reckoning. Now, at one skilful jump, she is back in the game--and on
better terms than ever with the Vatican, for she will look well to all
the numerous Latin missions in the Turkish Empire, and especially in
Palestine. These once were France's special care, and are yet, to a
degree; but France is out of favor with the Church, and steadily
declining from her former place in the Levant, although French
continues to be the "_lingua franca"_ of merchandising, of polite
society, and of diplomacy, in the Near East.

Let nobody think that this is lugging religion by the ears into "the
great game." Religion, even more than national or racial consciousness,
is one of the principal players. In America politicians try to steer
clear of religion; although even here a cherry cocktail mixed with
Methodism has been known to cost a man the possible nomination for the
Presidency. In the Levant, however, religion _is_ politics. The
ambitions and policies of Germany, Russia, and Britain are less potent
factors in the ultimate and inevitable dissolution of Turkey than the
deep-seated resolution of some tens of millions of people to see the
cross once more planted upon St. Sophia's. Ask anybody in Greece or the
Balkans or European Russia what "the great idea" is, and you will get
for an answer, "The return of the cross to St. Sophia's." Backward and
even benighted Christians these Eastern churchmen may be, but they hold
a few fundamental ideas pretty fast, and are readier to fight for them
than their occidental brethren.

The world may as well accept, as the principal issue of "the great
game" that centers about Constantinople, the fact that the war begun
twelve hundred years ago by the dusky Arabian camel-driver is still on.
This Turco-Italian scrape is only one little skirmish in it.

      *       *       *       *       *

The outbreak of war between Italy and Turkey came as a surprize to the
great majority of the European public, and even in Italy until the last
moment few believed that the crisis would come to a head so soon. Those
who had closely followed the course of political opinion in the country
during the past year, however, saw that a change had come over the
public spirit of Italy, and that a new attitude toward questions of
foreign policy was being adopted. It may be of interest in the present
circumstances to examine the causes and the course of this development.

Since the completion of Italian unity with the fall of the Temporal
Power in 1870, the Italian people had devoted all its energies to
internal affairs, for everything had to be created--roads, railways,
ports, improved agriculture, industry, schools, scientific
institutions, the public services, were either totally lacking or quite
inadequate to the needs of a great modern nation. Above all, the
finances of the State, shattered by the wars of independence and by bad
administration, had to be placed on a sound footing. Consequently,
foreign affairs attracted but slight public interest. Such a state of
things was at that time inevitable owing to the precarious situation at
home, but it proved a most unfortunate necessity, as it was during this
very period that the great no-man's-lands of Asia and Africa were being
partitioned among the other nations, and vast uncultivated,
undeveloped, and thinly populated territories annexed by various
European Powers, and converted into important colonial empires offering
splendid outlets for trade and emigration. Italy had appeared last in
this field, when nearly all the best lands had been annexed and when
conquests could not be attempted, even in the still available regions,
without large, well-organized armed forces and a determined,
intelligent, and well-informed public opinion to back them up. In Italy
neither was to be found. The country was too poor to launch forth into
colonial and foreign politics with any chance of success, and the
people were too untraveled and too little acquainted with the
development of other countries to pay much attention to events outside
Italy, or, at all events, outside Europe.

In the meanwhile, considerable progress in the economic and social
conditions of the Italian people had been achieved, and by grinding
economy and incredible sacrifices the finances were being restored.
There came a moment, however, when the need for colonial expansion
began to be felt. As a sop to public opinion, which had been
exasperated by the French occupation of Tunis, the Italian Government
decided in 1885 to occupy Massowah and the surrounding territories on
the Red Sea coast. But that country was not suited to Italian
colonization, and Italy was not yet ready to develop a purely trading
colony at so great a distance from the homeland. A long series of
errors were committed, relieved at times by the heroism and devotion of
the army fighting against huge odds in an inhospitable and unknown
land, culminating in the disaster of Adowa in 1896. What wrought the
greatest injury to Italian prestige was not so much the defeat in
itself as the fact that it was allowed to remain unavenged. There was a
fresh Italian army on the scene under an admirable leader, General
Baldissera, who enjoyed the full confidence of his men, and it was
clear that the Abyssinian forces could not hold together much longer.
The Premier, however, Signor Crispi, a man of unquestioned ability, but
who lived in advance of his time, before the nation was ready to follow
him in his Imperial policy, was overwhelmed by a storm of indignation,
and his successor, Marchese di Rudini, terrified by the riots promoted
by unscrupulous Socialist and Anarchist agitators as a protest against
the African campaign, concluded a disastrous peace with the enemy.

In the meanwhile, Italian Socialism, which had found a suitable field
for action in the unsatisfactory condition of the working class, had
evolved a theory of government which, although common to some extent to
the Socialists of other countries, was nowhere carried to such lengths
as in Italy. Socialism in theory has everywhere adopted an attitude of
hostility to militarism, imperialism, and patriotism, and professes to
be internationalist and pacificist, and regards class hatred and civil
disorders as the only moral and praiseworthy forms of warfare. But in
countries where the masses have reached a certain degree of political
education such views, if carried to their logical conclusion, are sure
to be rejected by the majority, and even the Socialist leaders realize
that Nationalism is a vital force which has to be reckoned with, and
that a sane Imperialism and efficient military policy are as necessary
in the interests of the masses as in those of the classes. In Italy, on
the other hand, where even the bourgeoisie took but a lukewarm interest
in the wider questions of world policy, the Socialist leaders conducted
an avowedly anti-patriotic propaganda against every form of national
sentiment, against the very existence of Italy as a nation, and they
achieved considerable success. By representing patriotism and the army
as the causes of low wages, and war and colonial Imperialism as the
result of purely capitalist intrigues because it is only the
capitalists who profit by such adventures, they met with wide-spread
acceptance among a large part of the working classes.

Thus a general feeling got possession of the Italian people that war
was played out, and that even if it were to occur Italy was sure to be
defeated by any other Power, that nothing must be done to provoke the
resentment of the foreigner, that the only form of expansion to be
encouraged was emigration to foreign lands, and even the export trade
which was growing so rapidly was looked upon askance by the Socialists
as a mere capitalist instrument. This attitude, which was certainly not
conducive to a healthy public spirit, was reflected in the conduct of
the Government, which felt that it would not be backed by the nation if
it gave signs of energy. The result was that Italy found her interests
blocked at every turn by other nations which were not imbued with such
"humanitarian" theories, and that she was subjected to countless
humiliations on the part of Governments who were convinced that under
no provocation would Italy show resentment.

Gradually and imperceptibly a change came over public feeling, and the
necessity for a sane and vigorous patriotism began to be dimly
realized. One of the earliest symptoms of this new attitude was the
publication, in 1903, of Federigo Garlanda's _La terza Italia_; the
book professed to be written by a friendly American observer and critic
of Italian affairs, and the author regards the absence of militant
patriotism as the chief cause of Italy's weakness in comparison with
other nations. Mario Morasso, in his volume, _L'Imperialismo nel Secolo
XX,_ published in 1905, opened fire on the still predominant
Socialistic internationalism and sentimental humanitarianism, and
extolled the policy of conquest and expansion adopted by Great Britain,
Germany, France, and the United States as a means of strengthening the
fiber of the national character.

In December, 1910, a congress of Italian Nationalists was held in
Florence, and at that gathering, which was attended by several hundred
persons, including numerous well-known names, many aspects of Italian
national life were examined and discussed. The various speakers
impressed on their hearers the importance of Nationalism as the basis
for all political thought and action. The weakness of the country, the
contempt which other nations felt for Italy, the unsatisfactory state
both of home and foreign politics, and the poverty of a large part of
the population, were all traced to the absence of a sane and vigorous
patriotism. The strengthening of the army and navy, the development of
a military spirit among the people, a radical change of direction in
the conduct of the nation's foreign policy, and the ending of the
present attitude of subservience to all other Powers, great or small,
were regarded as the first _desiderata_ of the country. The Turks, too,
who since the revolution of 1908 had become particularly truculent
toward the Italians, especially in Tripoli, also came in for rough
treatment, and various speakers demanded that the Government should
secure adequate protection for Italian citizens and trade in the
Ottoman Empire, and that a watch should be kept on Tripoli lest others
seized it before the moment for Italian occupation arrived. Signor
Corradini insisted that there were worse things for a nation than war,
and that the occasional necessity for resort to the "dread arbitrament"
must be boldly faced by any nation worthy of the name.

The congress proved a success, and the ideas expressed in it which had
been "in the air" for some time were accepted by a considerable number
of people. The Nationalist Association was founded then and there and
soon gathered numerous adherents; a new weekly paper, _L'Idea
Nazionale_, commenced publication on March 1, 1911 (the anniversary of
Adowa), and rapidly became an important organ of public opinion, while
several dailies and reviews adopted Nationalist principles or viewed
them with sympathy. Italian Nationalism has no resemblance to the
parties of the same name in France, Ireland, or elsewhere; indeed, it
is not really a party at all, for it gathers in Liberals,
Conservatives, Radicals, Clericals, Socialists even, provided they
accept the patriotic idea and are anxious to see their country raised
to a higher place in the congress of nations even at the cost of some
sacrifice.

Italy, according to Professor Sighele _(Il Nazionalismo ed i Partiti
politici_ p. 80 sq.), must be Imperialist in order to prevent the
closing up of all the openings whence the nation receives its oxygen,
and to prevent the Adriatic from becoming more and more an Austrian
lake, to prevent even the Mediterranean from being closed around us
like a camp guarded by hostile sentinels, and to provide a field of
activity for our emigrants wherein they will enjoy that protection
which they now lack, and which only a bold foreign policy, a thorough
preparation for war, and a clear Imperialist attitude on the part of
the rulers of the State can give them.

For some time the Government continued to appear impervious to the
Nationalist spirit and professed to regard the movement as a
schoolboy's game. But it could not long remain indifferent to so
wide-spread a feeling. Italy's relations with Turkey were rapidly
approaching a crisis. The new Ottoman régime, while it was proving no
better than the old in the matter of corruption, inefficiency, and
persecution of the subject-races, had one new feature--an outburst of
rabid chauvinism and of hatred for all foreigners, but especially for
Italians, whom the Young Turks regarded as the weakest of nations.
Never had Italian prestige fallen so low in the Levant as at this
period, and the Italian Government did nothing to retrieve the
situation. In Tripoli, above all, where Italy's reversionary interest
had been sanctioned by agreements with England and France, the position
of Italian citizens and firms was rendered well-nigh intolerable.
Turkish persecution reached such a point that two Italians, the monk,
Father Giustino, and the merchant, Gastone Terreni, were assassinated
at the instigation and with the complicity of the authorities, without
any redress being obtained.

The Nationalists since the beginning of their propaganda had agitated
for a firmer attitude toward Turkey, insisting on the opening up of
Tripoli to Italian enterprise. Italy was being hemmed in on all sides
by France in Algeria and Tunisia, and by England in Egypt; Tripolitaine
alone remained as a possible outlet for her eventual expansion. The
Turkish Government did nothing for the development of that province,
but it was determined that no one else should do anything for it, and
thwarted the efforts of every Italian enterprise, the Banco di Roma
alone succeeding by ceaseless activity and untiring patience in
creating important undertakings in the African vilayet.

Had events pursued their normal course Italy would probably have been
content to develop her commercial interests in Tripolitaine to the
advantage of its inhabitants as well as of her own, waiting for the
time when in due course the country should fall to her share. But the
persistent hostility of the Turkish authorities was bringing matters to
a head, and while the Italian Government apparently refused to regard
the state of affairs as serious, the Nationalists continued to demand
the assertion of Italy's interests in Tripoli. The Press gradually
adopted their point of view, the _Idea Nazionale_ published Corradini's
vivid letters from Tripoli, and even Ministerial organs like the
_Tribuna_ of Rome and the _Stampa_ of Turin, following the lead of
their correspondents who visited Tripolitaine during the past spring
and summer and wrote of its resources and possibilities with
enthusiasm, were soon converted. If any nation has a right to colonies
it is Italy with her rapidly increasing population, her small
territory, and her streams of emigrants. Still the Government, from
fear of international complications and of alienating its Socialist
supporters, who, of course, opposed all idea of territorial expansion,
refused to do anything. Then the Franco-German Morocco bombshell burst,
and Agadir made the Italian people realize that the question of Tripoli
called for immediate solution. The whole of the rest of Mediterranean
Africa was about to be partitioned among the Powers, and Tripoli would
certainly not be left untouched if Italy failed to make good her
claims; Germany, it is believed, had cast her eyes on it, and already
her commercial agents and prospectors were on the spot. The demands for
an occupation by Italy were insistent; all classes were calling on the
Government to act, and in Genoa there were even angry mutterings of
revolt. The nation realized that it was a case of now or never, and
every one felt that the folly of Tunis must not be repeated.

At the same time the Turks, convinced that Italy would never fight,
continued in their overbearing attitude, and placed increasing
obstacles in the way of Italian enterprise in all parts of the Empire
while ostentatiously favoring other foreign undertakings. Incidents
such as the abduction of an Italian girl and her forcible conversion to
Islam and marriage to a Turk, and the attacks on Italian vessels in the
Red Sea, added fuel to the flame, and public opinion became more and
more excited. The Premier at last saw that the country was practically
unanimous on the question of Tripoli, and although personally averse to
all adventures in the field of foreign affairs which interfered with
his political action at home, he realized that unless he faced the
situation boldly his prestige was gone. On the 20th of September the
expedition to Tripoli was decided. Hastily and secretly military
preparations were made, and the Note concerning the sending of Turkish
reinforcements or arms to Tripoli was issued. Then followed the
ultimatum, and finally the declaration of war. The Socialist leaders,
who saw in this awakening of a national conscience and of a militant
Imperialist spirit a serious menace to their own predominance, were in
a state of frenzy, and they attempted to organize a general strike as a
protest against the Government. But the movement fizzled out miserably,
and only an insignificant number of workmen struck.

On the other hand, the declaration of war was greeted by an outburst of
popular enthusiasm such as no one believed possible in the Italy of
to-day. The departure or passage of the troops on their way to Tripoli
gave occasion for scenes of the most intense patriotic excitement, and
the sight of some two hundred thousand people in the streets of Rome at
one A.M. on October 7th, cheering the march past of the 82d infantry
regiment, is one not easily forgotten. The heart of the whole nation
was in the enterprise. Even many prominent Socialists, casting the
shackles of party fealty to the winds, declared themselves in favor of
the Government's African policy and accepted the occupation of Tripoli
as a necessity for the country, while the Clericals were even more
enthusiastic. But there was hardly a trace of anti-Turkish feeling; it
was simply that the people, rejoiced at having awakened from the long
nightmare of political apathy and international servility, had thrown
off the grinding and degrading yoke of Socialist tyranny, and risen to
a dawn of higher ideals of national dignity. Italy had at last asserted
herself. The extraordinary efficiency, speed, and secrecy with which
the expedition was organized, shipped across the Mediterranean, and
landed in Africa, the discipline, _moral_, and gallantry which both
soldiers and sailors displayed, were a revelation to everybody and gave
the Italians new confidence in their military forces, and made them
feel that they could hold up their heads before all the world
unashamed. A new Italy was born--the Italy of the Italian nation. In
the words of Mameli's immortal hymn, which has been revived as the
war-song of the Nationalists,

   "Fratelli d'Italia, l'Italia s'č desta,
   Dell' elmo di Scipio s'č cinta la testa."

The actual operations of the war were too one-sided to be interesting
from the military viewpoint. Turkey had no navy which could compete for
a moment with that of Italy. Hence the Turks could dispatch no troops
whatever to Tripoli, and its defense devolved solely upon the native
Arab inhabitants. These wild tribes were brave and warlike and
fanatically Mohammedan in their opposition to the Christian invaders.
But they were wholly without training in modern modes of warfare and
without modern weapons. Their frenzied rushes and antiquated guns were
helpless in the face of quick-firing artillery.

The Italians demonstrated their ability to handle their own forces, to
transport troops, land them and provision them with speed and skill.
That was about all the struggle established. On October 3d the city of
Tripoli, the only important Tripolitan harbor, was bombarded. Two days
later the soldiers landed and took possession of it. For a month
following, there were minor engagements with the Arabs of the
neighborhood, night attacks upon the Italians, rumors that they lost
their heads and shot down scores of unarmed and unresisting natives.
Then on November 5th Italy proclaimed that she had conquered and
annexed Tripoli.

The only remaining difficulty was to get the Turkish Government to give
its formal assent to this new regime, which it had been unable to
resist. Here, however, the Italians encountered a difficulty. They had
promised the rest of Europe that they would not complicate the European
Turkish problem by attacking Turkey anywhere except in Africa. In
Africa they had now done their worst, and so the Turkish Government,
with true Mohammedan serenity, defied them to do more. Turkey
absolutely refused to acknowledge the Italian claim to Tripolitan
suzerainty. True, she could not fight, but neither would she utter any
words of surrender. Let the Italians do what they pleased in Tripoli.
Turkey still continued in her addresses to her own people to call
herself its lord.

This course satisfied the ignorant Mohammedans of Constantinople, who
knew little of what was really happening; and so it enabled the Young
Turk party to retain control of the political situation at home. The
dissatisfaction of Italy, however, increased, until she withdrew her
earlier pledge to Europe and set her navy to the task of seizing one
after another the Turkish islands lying in the eastern Mediterranean,
After some months of this leisurely appropriation of helpless
territories, the Turks yielded the point at issue. In October of 1912
they signed a treaty of peace with Italy granting her entire possession
of Tripoli. By this time the Turks had become involved in their far
more deadly struggle with the united Balkan States; and the Government
was able to offer this new strife to its subjects as its excuse for
yielding to the Italians. Turkey, though she still holds a nominal
authority over Egypt, ceased to have any real power over any part of
Africa. She retained only a European and Asiatic empire.




WOMAN SUFFRAGE

THE MOVEMENT COMES TO THE FRONT BY ITS TRIUMPH IN CALIFORNIA A.D. 1911

IDA HUSTED HARPER JANE ADDAMS DAVID LLOYD-GEORGE ISRAEL ZANGWILL ELBERT
HUBBARD

When future generations look for an exact event to mark the triumphal
turning-point in the progress of the woman-suffrage movement, they will
probably select the election which took place in the great American
State of California in October, 1911. Other States had given women
votes before, but they were smaller communities, where the movement
could still be regarded as an eccentricity, a mere whimsicality. When,
however, California in 1911 granted full suffrage to her women, almost
half a million in number, the movement became obviously important. The
vote of California might well turn the scale in a Presidential
election. Moreover, other States followed California's example. Woman
suffrage soon dominated the West, and began its progress eastward. The
shrewd Lincoln said that no government could continue to exist half
slave and half free; and the axiom is equally true of a divided
suffrage. There can be little question that woman suffrage will
ultimately be adopted throughout the Eastern States, not because of
force, but through the ever-increasing pressure of political
expediency.

Hence we give here an account of the progress of the woman-suffrage
cause up to the California election as it appeared to the prominent
suffragist writer, Ida Husted Harper, and to the honored suffragist
leader, Jane Addams. The peculiarities of the movement in England seem
to necessitate separate treatment, so we present the view of its
antagonists as temperately expressed by Britain's celebrated Minister
of the Treasury, David Lloyd-George, and the defense of the "militants"
by the noted novelist, Israel Zangwill. Then comes a summary of the
entire theme by that widely known "friend of humanity," Elbert Hubbard.

For permission to quote some of these authoritative utterances which
had been previously printed, we owe cordial thanks to the publishers or
authors. Mrs. Harper's summary appeared originally in the _American
Review of Reviews_, and Miss Addams's comments in _The Survey_ of June,
1912. Both Elbert Hubbard's words and those of Lloyd-George are
reprinted from _Hearst's Magazine_ of August, 1912, and August, 1913.

IDA HUSTED HARPER

A few years ago no changes in the governments of the world would have
seemed more improbable than a constitution for China, a republic in
Portugal, and a House of Lords in Great Britain without the power of
veto, and yet all these momentous changes have taken place in less than
two years. The underlying cause is unquestionably the strong spirit of
unrest among the people of all nations having any degree of
civilization, caused by their increasing freedom of speech and press,
their larger intercourse through modern methods of travel, and the
sending of the youth to be educated in the most progressive countries.

It would be impossible for women not to be affected by this spirit of
unrest, especially as they have made greater advance during the last
few decades than any other class or body. There is none whose status
has been so revolutionized in every respect during the last
half-century. As with men everywhere, this discontent has manifested
itself in political upheaval, so it is inevitable that it should be
expressed by women in a demand for a voice in the government through
which laws are made and administered.

In 1888, when Elizabeth Cady Stanton and Susan B. Anthony, the leaders
of this movement in the United States, where it began, attempted to
cooperate with other countries, they found that in only one--Great
Britain--had it taken organized shape. By 1902, however, it was
possible to form an International Committee, in Washington, D.C., with
representatives from five countries. Two years later, in Berlin, the
International Woman Suffrage Alliance was formed with accredited
delegates from organizations in nine countries. This Alliance held a
congress in Stockholm during the summer of 1911 with delegates from
national associations in twenty-four countries where the movement for
the enfranchisement of women has taken definite, organized form.


THE UNITED STATES

At the November election, 1910, the men of Washington, by a vote of
three to one, enfranchised the women of that State. Eleven months
later, in October, 1911, a majority of the voters conferred the
suffrage on the 400,000 women of California. These two elections
doubtless marked the turning-point in this country. In 1890 Wyoming
came into the Union with suffrage for women in its constitution after
they had been voting in the Territory for twenty-one years. In 1893 the
voters of Colorado, by a majority of 6,347, gave full suffrage to
women. In 1895 the men of Utah, where as a Territory women had voted
seventeen years, by a vote of 28,618 ayes to 2,687 noes, gave them this
right in its constitution for Statehood. In 1896 Idaho, by a majority
of 5,844, fully enfranchised its women.

It was believed then that woman suffrage would soon be carried in all
the Western States, but at this time there began a period of complete
domination of politics by the commercial interests of the country,
through whose influence the power of the party "machines" became
absolute. Temperance, tariff reform, control of monopolies, all moral
issues were relegated to the background and woman suffrage went with
the rest. To the vast wave of "insurgency" against these conditions is
due its victory in Washington and California. As many women are already
fully enfranchised in this country as would be made voters by the
suffrage bill now under consideration in Great Britain, so that
American women taken as a whole can not be put into a secondary
position as regards political rights. While women householders in Great
Britain and Ireland have the municipal franchise, a much larger number
in this country have a partial suffrage--a vote on questions of special
taxation, bonds, etc., in Louisiana, Iowa, Montana, Michigan, and in
the villages and many third-class cities in New York, and school
suffrage in over half of the States.


GREAT BRITAIN

The situation in Great Britain is now at its most acute stage. There
the question never goes to the voters, but is decided by Parliament.
Seven times a woman-suffrage bill has passed its second reading in the
House of Commons by a large majority, only to be refused a third and
final reading by the Premier, who represents the Ministry, technically
known as the Government. In 1910 the bill received a majority of 110,
larger than was secured even for the budget, the Government's chief
measure. In 1911 the majority was 167, and again the last reading was
refused. The vote was wholly non-partizan--145 Liberals, 53 Unionists,
31 Nationalists (Irish), 26 Labor members. Ninety town and county
councils, including those of Manchester, Liverpool, Edinburgh, Glasgow,
Dublin, and those of all the large cities sent petitions to Parliament
to grant the final vote. The Lord Mayor of Dublin in his robes of state
appeared before the House of Commons with the same plea, but the
Liberal Government was unmoved.

In the passing years petitions aggregating over four million signatures
have been sent in. Just before the recent election the Conservative
National Association presented one signed by 300,000 voters. In their
processions and Hyde Park gatherings the women have made the largest
political demonstrations in history. There have been more meetings
held, more money raised, and more workers enlisted than to obtain
suffrage for the men of the entire world.

From the beginning the various associations have asked for the
franchise on the same terms as granted to men, not all of whom can
vote. For political reasons it seemed impossible to obtain this, and
meanwhile the so-called "militant" movement was inaugurated by women
outraged at the way the measure had been put aside for nearly forty
years. The treatment of these women by the Government forms one of the
blackest pages in English history, and the situation finally became so
alarming that the Parliament was obliged to take action. A Conciliation
Committee was formed of sixty members from all parties, who prepared a
bill that would enfranchise only women householders, those who already
had possessed the municipal franchise since 1869. This does not mean
property-owners, but includes women who may pay rent for only one room.
The associations accepted it partly because it recognized the principle
that sex should not disqualify, but principally because it was
unquestionably all that they could get at present. This is the bill
which was denied a third reading for two years on the ground that it
was not democratic enough! A careful canvass has shown that in the
different parts of the United Kingdom from 80 to 90 per cent, of those
whom it would enfranchise are wage- or salary-earning women, and not one
Labor member of Parliament voted against it.

Women in England have been eligible for School Boards since 1870; have
had the county franchise since 1888; have been eligible for parish and
district councils and for various boards and commissions since 1894,
and hundreds have served in the above offices. In 1907, as recommended
in the address of King Edward, women were made eligible as mayors and
county and city councilors, or aldermen. Three or four have been
elected mayors, and women are now sitting on the councils of London,
Manchester, and other cities. The municipal franchise was conferred on
the women of Scotland in 1882, and of Ireland in 1898.

The Irishwomen's Franchise League demands that the proposed Home Rule
bill shall give to the women of Ireland the same political rights as it
gives to men. This demand is strongly supported by many of the
Nationalist members of Parliament and some of the cabinet, and it is
not impossible that after all these years of oppression the women of
Ireland may be fully enfranchised before those of England, Scotland,
and Wales.

In the Isle of Man women property-owners have had the full suffrage
since 1881, and women rate- or rent-payers, since 1892.


ENGLISH COLONIES

The Parliament of New Zealand gave school suffrage to women in 1877,
municipal in 1886, and Parliamentary in 1893. It was the first country
in the world to grant the complete universal franchise to women.

The six States of Australia had municipal suffrage for women from the
early days of their self-government. South Australia gave them the
right to vote for its State Parliament, or legislature, in 1894, and
West Australia took similar action in 1899. The States federated in a
Commonwealth in 1902 and almost the first act of its national
Parliament was to give the suffrage for its members to all women and
make them eligible to membership. New South Wales immediately conferred
State suffrage on women, and was soon followed by Tasmania and
Queensland. Victoria yielded in 1909. Women of Australia have now
exactly the same franchise rights as men.

In all the provinces of Canada for the last twenty years widows and
spinsters who are rate-payers or property-owners have had the school or
municipal suffrage, in some instances both, and in a few this right is
given to married women. There has been some effort to have this
extended to State and Federal suffrage, but with little force except in
Toronto, where in 1909 a thousand women stormed the House of
Parliament, with a petition signed by 100,000 names.

When the South African Union was formed its constitution took away from
women tax-payers the fragmentary vote they possessed. Petitions to give
them the complete suffrage, signed by 4,000 men and women, were
ignored. Franchise Leagues are working in Cape Colony, Natal, and the
Transvaal, and their efforts are supported by General Botha, the
premier; General Smuts, Minister of the Interior; Mr. Cronwright,
husband of Olive Schreiner, and other members of Parliament, but the
great preponderance of Boer women over English will prevent this
English-controlled body from enfranchising women in the near future.

There are cities in India where women property-owners have a vote in
municipal affairs.


SCANDINAVIA

The Parliament of Norway in 1901 granted municipal suffrage to all
women who in the country districts pay taxes on an income of 300 crowns
(about $75), and in the cities on one of 400 crowns; and they were made
eligible to serve on councils and grand and petit juries. After
strenuous effort on the part of women the Parliament of 1907, by a vote
of 96 to 23, conferred the complete franchise on all who possessed the
municipal. This included about 300,000 of the half-million women. They
were made eligible for Parliament, and at the first election in 1909
one was elected as alternate or deputy, and took her seat with a most
enthusiastic welcome from the other members. In 1910, by a vote of 71
to 10, the taxpaying qualification for the municipal vote was removed.
In 1911, a bill to abolish it for the full suffrage was carried by a
large majority in Parliament, but lacked five votes of the necessary
two-thirds. More than twice as many women as voted in 1907 went to the
polls in 1910 at the municipal elections. Last year 178 women were
elected to city councils, nine to that of Christiania. This year 210
were elected and 379 alternates to fill vacancies that may occur.

Sweden gave municipal suffrage to tax-paying widows and spinsters in
1862. At that time and for many years afterward not one-tenth of the
men had a vote. Then came the rise of the Liberal party and the Social
Democracy, and by 1909 the new Franchise law had been enacted, which
immensely increased the number of men voters, extended the municipal
suffrage to wives, greatly reduced the tax qualification, and made
women eligible to all offices for which they could vote. At the last
election 37 were elected to the councils of 34 towns, 11 in the five
largest. The Woman Suffrage Association is said to be the best
organized body in the country, its branches extending beyond the arctic
circle. It has over 12,000 paid members and has held 1,550 meetings
within a year. In 1909 a bill to extend the full suffrage to women
passed the Second Chamber of the Parliament unanimously, but was
defeated by four to one in the First Chamber, representing the
aristocracy. This year the Suffrage Association made a strong campaign
for the Liberal and Social Democratic parties, and a large majority of
their candidates were elected. The Conservative cabinet was deposed and
the King has called for a new election of the First Chamber. As its
members are chosen by the Provincial Councils and those of the five
largest cities, and women have a vote for these bodies and are members
of them, they will greatly reduce the number of Conservative members of
the Upper House. On the final passage of a suffrage bill the two
chambers must vote jointly and it seems assured of a majority.

Denmark's Parliament in 1908 gave the municipal suffrage to women on
the same terms as exercised by men--that is, to all over 25 years of
age who pay any taxes. Property owned by husband or wife or in common
entitles each to a vote. At the first election 68 per cent. of all the
enfranchised women in the country, and 70 per cent. in Copenhagen,
voted. Seven were elected to the city council of 42 members and one was
afterward appointed to fill a vacancy, and 127 were elected in other
places. Women serve on all committees and are chairmen of important
ones; two are city treasurers. There are two Suffrage Associations
whose combined membership makes the organization of that country in
proportion to population the largest of the kind in the world. They
have 314 local branches and one of the associations has held 1,100
meetings during the past year. The Lower House of Parliament has passed
a bill to give women the complete franchise, which has not been acted
on by the Upper House, composed mainly of the aristocracy. The Prime
Minister and the Speakers of both houses are outspoken in advocacy of
enfranchising women, but political considerations are holding it back.
All say, however, that it will come in the near future.

Iceland, a dependency of Denmark, with its own Parliament, gave
municipal suffrage in 1882 to all widows and spinsters who were
householders or maintained a family, or were self-supporting. In 1902
it made these voters eligible to all municipal offices, and since then
a fourth of the council members of Reykjavik, the capital, have been
women. In 1909 this franchise was extended to all those who pay taxes.
A petition signed by a large majority of all the women in Iceland asked
for the complete suffrage, and during the present year the Parliament
voted to give this to all women over 25 years old. It must be acted
upon by a second Parliament, but its passage is assured, and Icelandic
women will vote on the same terms as men in 1913.


OTHER COUNTRIES

First place must be given to the Grand Duchy of Finland, far more
advanced than any other part of the empire. In 1905, by permission of
the Czar, after a wonderful uprising of the people, they reorganized
their Government and combined the four antiquated chambers of their
Diet into one body. The next year, on demand of thousands of women,
expressed by petitions and public meetings, this new Parliament, almost
without a dissenting voice, conferred the full suffrage on all women.
Since that time from 16 to 25 have been elected to the different
Parliaments by all the political parties.

In Russia women as well as men are struggling for political freedom. In
many of the villages wives cast the votes for their husbands when the
latter are away; women have some suffrage for the zemstvos, local
governing bodies; the Duma has tried to enlarge their franchise rights,
but at present these are submerged in the general chaos.

In Poland an active League for Woman's Rights is cooperating with the
Democratic party of men.

A very strong movement for woman suffrage is proceeding against great
difficulties in the seventeen provinces of Austria, where almost as
many languages are spoken and the bitterest racial feuds exist. Women
are not allowed to form political associations or hold public meetings,
but 4,000 have paraded the streets of Vienna demanding the suffrage. In
Bohemia since 1864 women have had a vote for members of the Diet and
are eligible to sit in it. In all the municipalities outside of Prague
and Liberic, women taxpayers and those of the learned professions may
vote by proxy. Women belong to all the political parties except the
Conservative and constitute 40 per cent, of the Agrarian party. They
are well organized to secure the full suffrage and are holding hundreds
of meetings and distributing thousands of pamphlets. In Bosnia and
Herzegovina women property-owners vote by proxy.

In Hungary the National Woman Suffrage Association includes many
societies having other aims also, and it has branches in 87 towns and
cities, combining all classes of women from the aristocracy to the
peasants. Men are in a turmoil there to secure universal suffrage for
themselves and women are with them in the thick of the fight.

Bulgaria has a Woman Suffrage Association composed of 37 auxiliaries
and it held 456 meetings during the past year.

In Servia women have a fragmentary local vote and are now organizing to
claim the parliamentary franchise.

In Germany it was not until 1908 that the law was changed which forbade
women to take part in political meetings, and since then the Woman
Suffrage Societies, which existed only in the Free Cities, have
multiplied rapidly. Most of them are concentrating on the municipal
franchise, which those of Prussia claim already belongs to them by an
ancient law. In a number of the States women landowners have a proxy
vote in communal matters, but have seldom availed themselves of it. In
Silesia this year, to the amazement of everybody, 2,000 exercised this
privilege. The powerful Social Democratic party stands solidly for
enfranchising women.

A few years ago when the Liberal party in Holland was in power it
prepared to revise the constitution and make woman suffrage one of its
provisions. In 1907 the Conservatives carried the election and blocked
all further progress. Two active Suffrage Associations approximate a
membership of 8,000, with nearly 200 branches, and are building up
public sentiment.

Belgium in 1910 gave women a vote for members of the Board of Trade, an
important tribunal, and made them eligible to serve on it. A Woman
Suffrage Society is making considerable progress.

Switzerland has had a Woman Suffrage Association only a few years.
Geneva and Zurich in 1911 made women eligible to their boards of trade
with a vote for its members, and Geneva gave them a vote in all matters
connected with the State Church.

Italy has a well-supported movement for woman suffrage, and a
discussion in Parliament showed a strong sentiment in favor. Mayor
Nathan, of Rome, is an outspoken advocate. In 1910 all women in trade
were made voters for boards of trade.

The woman-suffrage movement in France differs from that of most other
countries in the number of prominent men in politics connected with it.
President Fallieres loses no opportunity to speak in favor and leading
members of the ministry and the Parliament approve it. Committees have
several times reported a bill, and that of M. Dussaussoy giving all
women a vote for Municipal, District, and General Councils was reported
with full parliamentary suffrage added. In 1910, 163 members asked to
have the bill taken up. Finally it was decided to have a committee
investigate the practical working of woman suffrage in the countries
where it existed. Its extensive and very favorable report has just been
published, and the Woman Suffrage Association states that it expects
early action by Parliament. More than one-third of the wage-earners of
France are women, and these may vote for tribunes and chambers of
commerce and boards of trade. They may be members of the last named and
serve as judges.

The constitution of the new Republic of Portugal gave "universal"
suffrage, and Dr. Beatrice Angelo applied for registration, which was
refused. She carried her case to the courts, her demand was sustained,
and she cast her vote. It was too late for other women to register, but
an organization of 1,000 women was at once formed to secure definite
action of Parliament, with the approval of President Braga and several
members of his cabinet.

The Spanish Chamber has proposed to give women heads of families in the
villages a vote for mayor and council.

A bill to give suffrage to women was recently introduced in the
Parliament of Persia, but was ruled out of order by the president
because the Koran says women have no souls.

Siam has lately adopted a constitution which gives women a municipal
vote.

The leaders of the revolution in China have promised suffrage for women
if it is successful.

Several women voted in place of their husbands at the recent election
in Mexico. Belize, the capital of British Honduras, has just given the
right to women to vote for town council.

Throughout the entire world is an unmistakable tendency to accord woman
a voice in the government, and, strange to say, this is stronger in
monarchies than in republics. In Europe the republics of France and
Switzerland give almost no suffrage to women. Norway and Finland, where
they have the complete franchise; Sweden, Denmark, Iceland, and Great
Britain, where they have all but the parliamentary, and that close at
hand, are monarchies. New Zealand and Australia, where women are fully
enfranchised, are dependencies of a monarchical government.


JANE ADDAMS

The comfortable citizen possessing a vote won for him in a previous
generation, who is so often profoundly disturbed by the cry of "Votes
for Women," seldom connects the present attempt to extend the franchise
with those former efforts, as the results of which he himself became a
member of the enfranchised class. Still less does the average voter
reflect that in order to make self-government a great instrument in the
hands of those who crave social justice, it must ever be built up anew
in relation to changing experiences, and that unless this readjustment
constantly takes place self-government itself is placed in jeopardy.

Yet the adherents of representative government, with its foundations
laid in diversified human experiences, must concede that the value of
such government bears a definite relation to the area of its base and
that the history of its development is merely a record of new human
interests which have become the subjects of governmental action, and
the incorporation into the government itself of those classes who
represented the new interests.

As the governing classes have been increased by the enfranchisement of
one body of men after another, the art of government has been enriched
in human interests, and at the same time as government has become thus
humanized by new interests it has inevitably become further
democratized through the accession of new classes. The two propositions
are complementary. For centuries the middle classes in every country in
Europe struggled to wrest governmental power from the nobles because
they insisted that government must consider the problems of a rising
commerce; on the other hand, the merchants claimed direct
representation because government had already begun to concern itself
with commercial affairs. When the working men of the nineteenth
century, the Chartists in England and the "men of '48" in Germany
vigorously demanded the franchise, national parliaments had already
begun to regulate the condition of mines and the labor of little
children. The working men insisted that they themselves could best
represent their own interests, but at the same time their very entrance
into government increased the volume and pressure of those interests.

Much of the new demand for political enfranchisement arises from a
desire to remedy the unsatisfactory and degrading social conditions
which are responsible for so much wrongdoing and wretchedness. The fate
of all the unfortunate, the suffering, the criminal, is daily forced
upon public attention in painful and intimate ways. But because of the
tendency to nationalize all industrial and commercial questions, to
make the state responsible for the care of the helpless, to safeguard
by law the food we eat and the liquid we drink, to subordinate the
claim of the individual family to the health and well-being of the
community, contemporary women who are without the franchise are much
more outside the real life of the world than any set of disenfranchised
men could possibly have been in all history, unless it were the men
slaves of ancient Greece, because never before has so large an area of
life found civic expression, never has Hegel's definition of the state
been so accurate, that it is the "realization of the moral ideal."
Certain it is that the phenomenal entrance of women into governmental
responsibility in the dawn of the twentieth century is coincident with
the consideration by governmental bodies of the basic human interests
with which women have been traditionally concerned. A most advanced
German statesman recently declared in the Reichstag that it was a
reproach to the Imperial Government itself that out of two million
children born annually in Germany, 400,000 died during the first twelve
months of their existence. He proceeded to catalog various reforms
which might remedy this, such as better housing, the increase of park
areas, the erection of municipal hospitals, the provision for an
adequate milk supply, and many another, but he did not make the very
obvious suggestion that women might be of service in a situation
involving the care of children less than a year old.

Nevertheless, in spite of this lack of perception, women all over the
world are claiming and receiving a place in representative government
because they insist that they will not cease to perform their
traditional duties, simply because these duties have been taken over by
existing governments.

The contemporaneous "Votes for Women" movement is often amorphous and
sporadic, but always spontaneous. It not only appears simultaneously in
various countries, but manifests itself in widely separated groups in
the same country; in every city it embraces the "smart set" and the
hard-driven working women; sometimes it is sectarian and dogmatic, at
others philosophic and grandiloquent, but it is always vital and
constantly becoming more widespread.

In certain aspects it differs from former efforts to extend the
franchise. We recall that the final entrance of the middle class into
government was characterized by two dramatic revolutions, one in
America and one in France, neither of them without bloodshed, and that
although the final efforts of the working men were more peaceful, even
in restrained England the Chartists burned hayricks and destroyed town
property. This world-wide entrance into government on the part of women
is happily a bloodless one. Although some glass has been broken in
England it is noteworthy that the movement as a whole has been without
even a semblance of violence. The creed of the movement, however, is
similar to that promulgated by the doctrinaires of the eighteenth
century: that if increasing the size of the governing body
automatically increases the variety and significance of government,
then only when all the people become the governing class can the
collective resources and organizations of the community be consistently
utilized for the common weal.


DAVID LLOYD-GEORGE

I have long been a convinced advocate of woman suffrage and am now
firmer than ever in supporting it. It seems to me a necessary and
desirable consequence of the vast extension of the functions of
Government which the past century and a half has witnessed. The state,
nowadays, enters the homes of the people and insists on having a voice
in questions that individual men and women, acting together, taking
counsel together, used to settle for themselves in their own way.
Education and the training and feeding of children, the housing and
sanitation problems, provision against old age and sickness, the
prevention of disease--all these are questions that formerly were dealt
with, of course, in a very isolated and inadequate way, by cooperation
and discussion between the heads of each household. What reason is
there why the same cooperation should not continue now that these
matters have been raised to the sphere of legislative enactments and
official administration?

Laws to-day affect the interests of women just as deeply as they do the
interests of men. Some laws--many laws--affect them more gravely and
intimately; and I do not believe you can trust the welfare of a class
or a sex entirely to another class or sex. It is not that their
interests are not identical, but that their point of view is different.
Take the housing problem. A working man leaves home in the morning
within half an hour after he wakes. He is not there all day. He turns
up in the evening and does not always remain there. If the house is a
poor, uncomfortable, dismal one, he very often seeks consolation in the
glare and warmth of the nearest public-house, but he takes very good
care that the wife shall not do as he does. She has got to stay at home
all day, however wretched her surroundings. Who can say that her
experience, her point of view, is not much better worth consulting than
her husband's on the housing problem? Up to the present the only and
the whole share of women in the housing question has been suffering.
Slums are often the punishment of the man. They are almost always the
martyrdom of the woman. Give women the vote, give them an effective
part in the framing and administration of the laws which touch not
merely their own lives but the lives of their children, and they will
soon, I believe, cleanse the land of these foul dens.

All sorts of women's interests were affected by the National Insurance
Act, and all sorts of questions sprang up in connection with it on
which women alone could speak with real authority. But, being voteless,
there was no way in which their views could be authoritatively set
forth. Four million women workers and seven million married women have
come under the operation of the Act, yet not one of them was given the
opportunity of making their opinions known and felt through a
representative in the House of Commons. It was the experience of every
friendly society official I consulted that had it not been for the
women and their splendid self-sacrifice, the subscriptions of the men
would have lapsed long ago. Yet these women who had thus kept the
societies going were not considered worth consulting as to their status
under the Act. The House of Commons itself insisted on there being at
least one woman Commissioner. But if a woman is fit to be a
Commissioner--a very heavy and difficult position involving enormous
responsibilities and demanding great skill and judgment and
experience--how can she be said to be unfit to have a vote?

What is the meaning of democracy? It is that the citizens who are
expected to obey the law are those who make the law. But that is not
true of Great Britain. At least half the adult citizens whose lives are
deeply affected by every law that is carried on the statute-books have
absolutely no voice in making that law. They have no more influence in
the matter than the horses that drag their lords and masters to the
polling-booth.

The drunken loafer who has not earned a living for years is consulted
by the Constitution on questions like the training and upbringing of
children, the national settlement of religion in Wales and elsewhere,
and as to the best method of dealing with the licensing problem. But
the wife whose industry keeps him and his household from beggary, who
pays the rent and taxes which constitute him a voter, who is therefore
really responsible for his qualification to vote, is not taken into
account in the slightest degree. I came in contact not long ago with a
great girls' school in the south of England. It was founded by women,
and it is administered by women. It is one of the most marvelous
organizations in the whole country, and yet, when we had, in the year
1906, to give a national verdict on the question of education, the man
who split the firewood in that school was asked for his opinion about
it, while those ladies were deemed to be absolutely unfit to pass any
judgment on it at all. That is a preposterous and barbarous
anachronism, and so long as it lasts our democracy is one-sided and
incomplete. But it will not last long. No franchise bill can ever again
be brought forward in this country without raising the whole problem of
whether you are going to exclude more than half the citizens of the
land. Women have entered pretty nearly every sphere of commerce and
industry and professional activity and public employment; and there
never was a time when the nation stood more in need of the special
experience, instincts, and sympathy of womanhood in the management of
its affairs. When women get the vote the horizon of the home will be
both brightened and expanded, and their influence on moral and social
and educational questions, especially on the temperance question, and
possibly on the peace of nations, will be constant and humanizing.

Those are a few of the reasons why I favor woman suffrage. But because
I favor it I do not therefore hold myself bound to either speak or vote
for any and every suffrage bill that may be introduced into Parliament.
I voted against the so-called Conciliation Bill which proposed to give
the vote to every woman of property if she chose to take the trouble to
get it, and at the same time enfranchise only about one-tenth or
one-fifteenth of the working women of the country. That was simply a
roundabout way of doubling the plural voters and no democrat could
possibly support it, so long as there remained a single alternative.
The solution that most appeals to me is the one embodied in the
Dickinson Bill, that is to say, a measure conferring the vote on women
householders and on the wives of married electors; and I believe that
it is in that form that woman suffrage will eventually come in this
country. How soon it will come depends very largely on how soon the
militants come to their senses.

I say, unhesitatingly, that the main obstacle to women getting the vote
is militancy and nothing else. Its practitioners really seem to think
that they can terrorize and pinprick Parliament into giving it to them;
and until they learn something of the people they are dealing with,
their whole agitation, so far as the House of Commons is concerned, is
simply and utterly damned. It is perfectly astonishing to recall with
what diabolical ingenuity they have contrived to infuriate all their
opponents, to alienate all their sympathizers, and to stir up against
themselves every prejudice in the average man's breast. A few years ago
they found three-fourths of the Liberal M.P.'s on their side. They at
once proceeded to cudgel their brains as to how they could possibly
drive them into the enemy's camp. They rightly decided that this could
not be done more effectually than by insulting and assaulting the Prime
Minister, the chief of the Party, and a leader for whom all his
colleagues and followers feel an unbounded admiration, regard, and
affection. When they had thus successfully estranged the majority of
Liberals they began to study the political situation a little more
closely. They saw that the Irish Nationalists were very powerful
factors in the Ministerial Coalition. The next problem, therefore, was
how to destroy the last chance that the Irish Nationalists would
support their cause. They achieved this triumphantly first by making
trouble in Belfast where the only Nationalist member is or was a strong
Suffragist, and secondly by going to Dublin when all Nationalist
Ireland had assembled to welcome Mr. Asquith, throwing a hatchet at Mr.
Redmond, and trying to burn down a theater. That finished Ireland, but
still they were dissatisfied. There was a dangerous movement of
sympathy with their agitation in Wales, and they felt that at any cost
it had to be checked. They not only checked, but demolished, it with
the greatest ease by breaking in upon the proceedings at an Eisteddfod.
Now the Eisteddfod is not only the great national festival of Welsh
poetry and music and eloquence, it is also an oasis of peace amid the
sharp contentions of Welsh life. To bring into it any note of politics
or sectarianism or public controversy, even when these things are
rousing the most passionate emotions outside, seems to a Welshman like
the desecration of an altar. That is just what the militants did, and
Welsh interest in their cause fell dead on the spot. But even then they
were not happy. They were still encumbered by the good-will of perhaps
a hundred Tory M.P.'s. But they proved entirely equal to the task of
antagonizing them. They began smashing windows, burning country
mansions, firing race-stands, damaging golf-greens, striking as hard as
they could at the Tory idol of Property. There is really nothing more
left for them to do; they have alienated every friend they ever had;
their work is complete beyond their wildest hopes.

Well, one can not dignify such tactics and antics by the title of
"political propaganda." The proper name for them is sheer organized
lunacy. The militants have erected militancy into a principle. I am
beginning to think that a good many of them are more concerned with the
success of their method than with the success of their cause. They
would rather not have the vote than fail to win it by the particular
brand of agitation they have pinned their faith to. They don't really
want the vote to be given them; they want to get it and to get it by
force; and they are quite unable to see that the more force they use
the stronger becomes the resolve both of Parliament and of the country
to send them away empty-handed. If they had accepted Mr. Asquith's
pledge of two years ago and thanked him for it and helped him redeem
it, woman suffrage by now would be an accomplished fact. But they
preferred their own ways, and what is the result? The result is that
working for their cause in the House of Commons to-day is like swimming
not merely against a tide but against a cataract. The real reason why
the attempts to carry woman suffrage through the House of Commons
during the past two years have failed is not merely the difficulty of
trying to combine a non-party measure with the party system; it is,
above all, the impossibility of using Parliament to pass a bill that
the opinion of the country has been fomented to condemn. The fact that
in both the principal parties there is a clean division of opinion on
this issue and that no Government, or none that is at present
conceivable, can bring forward a measure for the enfranchisement of
women as a Government, is a great, but not necessarily an insuperable
obstacle. The one barrier, there is no surmounting and no getting
round, is the decided and increasing hostility of public sentiment; and
for that the militants have only themselves to thank.

Personally I always try to remember, first, that militancy is the work
of only a very small fraction of the women who want the vote and ought
to have it, and, secondly, that there have been crazy men just as there
are crazy women. Militancy has not affected my own individual attitude
toward the main question and never will. But I recognize that it has
killed the immediate Parliamentary prospects of any and every Suffrage
Bill, and that so long as militancy continues the House of Commons will
do nothing. Only a new movement altogether can now bring women to the
goal of political emancipation; and it will have to be a sane,
hard-headed, practical movement, as full of liveliness as you please,
but absolutely divorced from stones and bombs and torches. When it
arises the friends of the Women's cause will begin to take heart again.


ISRAEL ZANGWILL

THE AWKWARD AGE OF THE WOMEN'S MOVEMENT

  "And what did she get by it?" said my Uncle Toby.
  "What does any woman get by it?" said my father.
  "_Martyrdom_" replied the young Benedictine.

      TRISTRAM SHANDY.

The present situation of woman suffrage in England recalls the old
puzzle: What happens when an irresistible force meets an immovable
body? The irresistible force is the religious passion of myriads of
women, the fury of self-sacrifice, the righteous zeal that shrinks not
even from crime; the immovable body may be summed up as Mr. Asquith.
Almost as gross an incarnation of Tory prejudice as Squire Western, who
laid it down that women should come in with the first dish and go out
with the first glass, Mr. Asquith is all that stands between the sex
and the suffrage.

The answer to the old puzzle, I suppose, would be that though the
immovable body does not move, yet the impact of the irresistible force
generates heat, which, as we know from Tyndall, is a mode of motion. At
any rate, heat is the only mode in which the progress of woman suffrage
can be registered to-day. The movement has come to what Mr. Henry James
might call "the awkward age": an age which has passed beyond argument
without arriving at achievement; an age for which words are too small
and blows too big. And because impatience has been the salvation of the
movement, and because the suffragette will not believe that the fiery
charger which has carried her so far can not really climb the last
ridge of the mountain, but must be replaced by a mule--that miserable
compromise between a steed and an anti-suffragist--the awkward age is
also the dangerous age.

When the Cabinet of Clement's Inn, perceiving that if a woman suffrage
Bill did not pass this session, the last chance--under the Parliament
Act--was gone for this Parliament, resolved to rouse public opinion by
breaking tradesmen's windows, it overlooked that the English are a
nation of shopkeepers, and that the public opinion thus roused would be
for the first time almost unreservedly on the side of the Government.
And when the Cabinet of Downing Street, moved to responsive
recklessness, raided the quarters of the Women's Social and Political
Union and indicted the leaders for criminal conspiracy, it equally
overlooked an essential factor of the situation. The Cabinet of the
conspiracy was at least as much a restraint to suffragettes as an
incentive. It held in order the more violent members, the souls
naturally daring or maddened by forcible feeding. By its imposition of
minor forms of lawlessness, it checked the suggestion of major forms.
Crime was controlled by a curriculum and temper studied by a
time-table. The interruptions at meetings were distributed among the
supposed neuropaths like parts at a play, and we to the maenad who
missed her cue. With the police, too, the suffragettes lived for the
most part on terms of cordial cooperation, each side recognizing that
the other must do its duty. When the suffragettes planned a raid upon
Downing Street or the House of Commons, they gave notice of time and
place, and were provided with a sufficient force of police to prevent
it. Were the day inconvenient for the police, owing to the pressure of
social engagements, another day was fixed, politics permitting. The
_entente cordiale_ extended even in some instances to the jailers and
the bench, and, as in those early days of the Quaker persecution of
which Milton's friend, Ellwood, has left record, prisoners sometimes
left their cells for a night to attend to imperative affairs, or
good-naturedly shortened or canceled their sentences at the pressing
solicitation of perturbed magistrates. Prison was purified by all these
gentle presences, and women criminals profited by the removal of the
abuses they challenged. Holloway became a home from home, in which
beaming wardresses welcomed old offenders, and to which husbands
conducted erring wives in taxicabs, much as Ellwood and his brethren
marched of themselves from Newgate to Bridewell, explaining to the
astonished citizens of London that their word was their keeper. A
suffragette's word stood higher than consols, and the war-game was
played cards on table. True, there were brutal interludes when Home
Secretaries lost their heads, or hysterical magistrates their sense of
justice, or when the chivalrous constabulary of Westminster was
replaced by Whitechapel police, dense to the courtesies of the
situation; but even these tragedies were transfused by its humors, by
the subtle duel of woman's wit and man's lumbering legalism. The
hunger-strike itself, with all its grim horrors and heroisms, was like
the plot of a Gilbertian opera. It placed the Government on the horns
of an Irish bull. Either the law must kill or torture prisoners
condemned for mild offenses, or it must permit them to dictate their
own terms of durance. The criminal code, whose dignity generations of
male rebels could not impair, the whole array of warders, lawyers,
judges, juries, and policemen, which all the scorn of a Tolstoy could
not shrivel, shrank into a laughing-stock. And the comedy of the
situation was complicated and enhanced by the fact that the Home
Office, so far from being an Inquisition, was more or less tenanted by
sympathizers with Female Suffrage, and that a Home Secretary who
secretly admired the quixotry of the hunger-strikers was forced to feed
them forcibly. He must either be denounced by the suffragettes as a
Torquemada or by the public as an incapable. Bayard himself could not
have coped with the position. There was no place like the Home Office,
and its administrators, like the Governors of the Gold Coast, had to be
relieved at frequent intervals. As for the police, their one aim in
life became to avoid arresting suffragettes.

Such was the situation which the Governmental _coup_ transformed to
tragedy unrelieved, giving us in the place of ordered lawlessness and
responsible leadership a guerrilla warfare against society by
irresponsive individuals, more or less unbalanced. That the heroic
incendiary Mrs. Leigh, who deserved penal servitude and a statue, had
been driven wild by forcible feeding was a fact that had given
considerable uneasiness to headquarters, but she had been kept in
comparative discipline. Now that discipline has been destroyed, it is
possible that other free-lances will catch the contagion of crime; nay,
there are signs that the leaders themselves are being infected through
the difficulty of disavowing their martyrs. The wisest course for the
Government would be to pardon Miss Pankhurst, of Paris, and officially
invite her to resume control of her followers before they have quite
controlled her.

But even without such a crowning confession of the failure of its
_coup_, the humiliation of the Government has been sufficiently
complete. Forced to put Mrs. Pankhurst and the Pethick Lawrences into
the luxurious category of political prisoners, next to release them
altogether, and finally to liberate their humblest followers, their
hunger-strike on behalf of whose equal treatment set a new standard of
military chivalry, the Government succeeded only in investing the
vanished Christabel with a new glamour. The Women's Social and
Political Union has again baffled the Government, and come triumphantly
even through the window-breaking episode. For if that episode was
followed by the rejection of the second reading of the woman suffrage
Bill, second readings, like the oaths of the profane, had come to be
absolutely without significance, and the blocking of the Bill beyond
this stage has been assured long before by the tactics of Mr. Redmond,
whose passion for justice, like Mr. Asquith's passion for popular
government, is so curiously monosexual. The only discount from the
Union's winnings is that it gave mendacious M.P.'s, anxious to back out
of woman suffrage, a soft bed to lie on.

One should perhaps also add to the debit side of the account a
considerable loss of popularity on the part of the suffragettes, a loss
which would become complete were window-breaking to pass into graver
crimes, and which would entirely paralyze the effect of their tactics.

For the tactics of the prison and the hunger-strike depend for their
value upon the innocency of the prisoners. Their offense must be merely
nominal or technical. The suffragettes had rediscovered the Quaker
truth that the spirit is stronger than all the forces of Government,
and that things may really come by fasting and prayer. Even the
window-breaking, though a perilous approach to the methods of the Pagan
male, was only a damage to insensitive material for which the
window-breakers were prepared to pay in conscious suffering. But once
the injury was done to flesh and blood, the injurer would only be
paying tooth for tooth and eye for eye; and all the sympathy would go,
not to the assailant, but to the victim. Mrs. Pankhurst says the
Government must either give votes to women or "prepare to send large
numbers of women to penal servitude." That would be indeed awkward for
the Government if penal servitude were easily procurable.
Unfortunately, the women must first qualify for it, and their crimes
would disembarrass the Government. Mrs. Leigh could have been safely
left to starve had her attempted arson of that theater really come off,
especially with loss of life. Thus violence may be "militant," but it
is not "tactics." And violence against society at large is peculiarly
tactless. George Fox would hardly occupy so exalted a niche in history
if he had used his hammer to make not shoes but corpses.

The suffragettes who run amuck have, in fact, become the victims of
their own vocabulary. Their Union was "militant," but a church
militant, not an army militant. The Salvation Army might as well
suddenly take to shooting the heathen. It was only by mob
misunderstanding that the suffragettes were conceived as viragoes, just
as it was only by mob misunderstanding that the members of the Society
of Friends were conceived as desperadoes. If it can not be said that
their proceedings were as quintessentially peaceful as some of those
absolutely mute Quaker meetings which the police of Charles II.
humorously enough broke up as "riots," yet they had a thousand
propaganda meetings (ignored by the Press) to one militant action
(recorded and magnified). Even in battle nothing could be more decorous
or constitutional than the overwhelming majority of their "pin-pricks."

I remember a beautiful young lady, faultlessly dressed, who in soft,
musical accents interrupted Mr. Birrell at the Mansion House. Stewards
hurled themselves at her, policemen hastened from every point of the
compass; but unruffled as at the dinner-table, without turning a hair
of her exquisite _chévelure_, she continued gently explaining the
wishes of womankind till she disappeared in a whirlwind of hysteric
masculinity. But in gradually succumbing to the vulgar
misunderstanding, playing up to the caricature, and finally
assimilating to the crude and obsolescent methods of men, the
suffragettes have been throwing away their own peculiar glory, their
characteristic contribution to history and politics. Rosalind in search
of a vote has supplied humanity with a new type who snatched from her
testifyings a grace beyond the reach of Arden. But Rosalind with a
revolver would be merely a reactionary. Hawthorne's Zenobia, who, for
all her emancipation, drowned herself in a fit of amorous jealousy, was
no greater backslider from the true path of woman's advancement. It is
some relief to find that Mrs. Pankhurst's latest program disavows
attacks on human life, limiting itself to destruction of property, and
that the Pethick Lawrences have grown still saner.

There might, indeed, be--for force is not always brute--some excuse
and even admiration for the Terrorist, did the triumph of her cause
appear indefinitely remote, were even that triumph to be brought
perceptibly nearer by forcibly feeding us with horrors. But the
contrary is the case: even the epidemic of crime foreshadowed by Mrs.
Pankhurst could not appreciably delay woman suffrage. It is coming as
fast as human nature and the nature of the Parliamentary machine will
allow. To try to terrorize Mr. Asquith into bringing in a Government
measure is to credit him with a wisdom and a nobility almost divine. No
man is great enough to put himself in the right by admitting he was
wrong. And even if he were great enough to admit it under argument, he
would have to be godlike to admit it under menace. Rather than admit
it, Mr. Asquith has let himself be driven into a position more
ludicrous than perhaps any Prime Minister has occupied. For though he
declares woman suffrage to be "a political disaster of the gravest
kind," he is ready to push it through if the House of Commons wishes,
relying for its rejection upon the House of Lords, which he has
denounced and eviscerated. He is even not unwilling it shall pass if
only the disaster to the country is maximized by Adult Suffrage. It is
not that he loves woman more, but the Tory party less.

All things considered, I am afraid the Suffrage Movement will have to
make up its mind to wait for another Parliament. There is more hope for
the premature collapse of this Parliament than for its passing of a
Suffrage Bill or clause. And at the general election, whenever it
comes, Votes for Women will be put on the program of both parties. The
Conservatives will offer a mild dose, the Liberals a democratic.
Whichever fails at the polls, the principle of woman suffrage will be
safe.

This prognostic, it will be seen, involves the removal of the immovable
Asquith. But he must either consent to follow a plebiscite of his party
or retire, like his doorkeeper, from Downing Street, under the
intolerable burden of the suffragette. Much as his party honors and
admires him, it can not continue to repudiate the essential principles
of Liberalism, nor find refuge in his sophism that Liberalism removes
artificial barriers, but can not remove natural barriers. What natural
barrier prevents a woman from accepting or rejecting a man who proposes
to represent her in Parliament? No; after his historic innings Mr.
Asquith will sacrifice himself and retire, covered with laurels and
contradictions. Pending which event, the suffragettes, while doing
their best to precipitate it through the downfall of the Government,
may very reasonably continue their policy of pin-pricks to keep
politicians from going to sleep, but serious violence would be worse
than a crime; it would be a blunder. No general dares throw away his
men when nothing is to be gained, and our analysis shows that the
interval between women and the vote can only be shortened by bringing
on a general election.

There are, indeed, skeptics who fear that even at the next general
election both parties may find a way of circumventing woman suffrage by
secretly agreeing to keep it off both programs; but the country itself
is too sick of the question to endure this, even if the Women's Liberal
Federation and the corresponding Conservative body permitted it. That
the parties would go so far as to pair off their women workers against
each other is unlikely. At any rate, now, when other forms of agitation
are more or less futile, is the moment for these and cognate bodies to
take up the running.

But even if these women workers fail in backbone, and allow themselves,
as so often before, to be lulled and gulled by their male politicians,
there yet remains an ardent body to push forward their cause. Mrs.
Humphry Ward and the Anti-Suffragists may be trusted to continue
tireless and ever-inventive. Mrs. Ward's League to promote the return
of women as town and county councilors is her latest device to prove
the unfitness of women for public affairs, and since the Vegetarian
League for combating the carnivorous instincts of the tigress by
feeding her on blood, there has been no quite so happy adaptation of
means to end. If anything could add to the educative efficiency of the
new League, it is Mrs. Ward's scrupulousness in limiting it exclusively
to Anti-Suffragists.


ELBERT HUBBARD

There was a time in England when all the laws were made and executed by
the King.

Later he appointed certain favorites who acted for him, and these were
paid honors and emoluments accordingly.

Still later, all soldiers were allowed to express their political
preferences. And that is where we got the idea about not allowing folks
to vote who could not fight.

It was once the law in England that no Catholic should be allowed to
vote.

It was also once the law in England that no Jew could hold real estate,
could vote at elections, could hold a public office, or serve on a
jury.

Full rights of citizenship were not given to the Jews in Great Britain
until the year 1858. Deists, Theists, Quakers, and "Dissenters" were
not allowed to testify in courts, and their right to vote was
challenged in England up to 1885.

For centuries, Jews occupied the position of minors, mental defectives,
or men with criminal records.

Women now in England occupy the same position politically that the Jews
did a hundred years ago.

Until very recent times all lawmakers disputed the fact that women have
rights. Women have privileges and duties--mostly duties.

All the laws are made by men, and for the most part the rights only of
male citizens are considered. If the rights of women or children are
taken into consideration, it is only from a secondary point of view, or
because the attention of lawmakers is especially called to the natural
rights of women, children, and dumb animals.

Provisions, however, have always been made in England as well as all
other civilized countries for punishing Catholics, Jews, Quakers, and
women.

In old New England there was once a pleasing invention called a
"ducking stool," that was for "women only." For the most part, the
punishment for these individuals who were not citizens was very much
more severe than it was for the people who made and devised the
punishment for them.

Women are admitted into the full rights of citizenship in New Zealand
and Australia, and in several States in the United States.

There will surely come a time when we will look back and regard the
withholding of full political rights from women in the same way that we
now look back and regard the disfranchisement of Jews and Catholics.

There is no argument that can possibly be presented against the right
of women to express their political preferences which does not in equal
degree apply to the right of male citizens to express theirs.

Every possible logical argument has been put forward and answered.

The protest in England by certain women who are working for equal
suffrage has taken what is called a militant form.

These women, in many instances, have been guilty of violence.

The particular women who have been foremost in this matter of violence
are not criminals in any sense of the word. They are not plotting and
planning the overthrow of the government. They are not guilty of
treason; and certainly they are not guilty of disorder along any other
line than that springing out of their disapproval of the failure of the
government to grant the right of political representation to women.

"Taxation without representation" was the shibboleth of the men who
founded the government of the United States of America.

This shibboleth, or slogan, came to them from across the sea and was
first uttered in England before the days of Magna Charta.

That every adult individual, man or woman, possessed of normal
mentality, should be thoroughly interested in the government, and
should have the right of expressing his or her political preferences,
is beyond dispute, especially under any government that affects to
derive its powers from the governed.

The right to govern is conferred by the governed, and this is now
admitted even in the so-called monarchies. And the governed are not
exclusively males; the governed are men and women, for women are
responsible before the law.

So thoroughly are these facts fixed in the minds of a great many men
and women everywhere that a few men are possessed by the righteousness
of the cause to a degree that they are willing not only to live for it
and fight for it, suffer for it, but also to die for it.

Some of these women in London, who have been throwing stones into
windows, thus destroying property, have signified as great a
willingness to injure themselves as they have to injure the property of
their fellow citizens, provided by so doing they can bring to the
attention of the men in charge of the government the absolute necessity
of recognizing the political rights of women.

If certain people in the past had not been willing to stake their all
on individual rights, there would to-day be no liberty for any one.

The saviors of the world are simply those who have been willing to die
that humanity might live.

It may be hard for an individual of average purpose to understand or
comprehend this mental attitude where the individual is fired with such
zeal that he is willing to suffer physical destruction for it.

In England, the test has come to an issue of whether these women,
intent on bringing about governmental recognition of the rights of
women, should be allowed to die for the cause or not. And from all
latest reports, John Bull does seem troubled about it.




MILITARISM

ITS CLIMAX IN THE THREAT OF UNIVERSAL WAR OVER MOROCCO A.D. 1911

NORMAN ANGELL

SIR MAX WAECHTER, D.L.

Ever since Germany by the completeness of her military preparation won
so decisive a victory over France in 1870, Europe has plunged deeper
and deeper into Militarism. That is to say, each European state that
could possibly afford it has increased its army and its navy, until
to-day their military force is many times more powerful than it was
half a century ago. The theory on which this is done is that you can
secure peace only by showing you are ready to fight; that if one nation
is sure that it can thrash another, it will probably plan an
opportunity to do so. Such is the theory; but what is the tragic
result? Military expenditures have increased at a stupendous rate and
all Europe groans under a burden of almost unendurable taxation.
Moreover, the possession of such splendid machinery of warfare is a
constant temptation to employ it and so vindicate its staggering
expense. This was startlingly shown in the case of the Morocco
imbroglio.

During the early part of 1911 the French government made clear its
intent to take complete possession of the semi-independent African
state of Morocco. On July 1st, Germany sent a warship to the Moroccan
port of Agadir, as a sign that she also had interests in the country,
which France must not override. Instantly Europe buzzed like an angry
bee-hive. England and France had previously made a secret treaty
agreeing that France should be allowed to take Morocco in exchange for
keeping hands off Egypt, where England was establishing herself. Hence
England now felt compelled to uphold her ally. When Germany seemed
inclined to bully the Frenchmen, England insisted that she also must be
consulted. Germany growled that this was none of England's business.
Everybody began getting out their guns and parading their armies.
Germany sought the support of Austria and Italy, her partners in the
"Triple Alliance." France and England emphasized the fact that Russia
stood with them in an antagonistic "Triple Entente." On November 4th,
France and Germany came to a peaceful agreement, France taking Morocco
and "compensating" Germany by yielding to her some territory in Eastern
Equatorial Africa.

Thus the whole excitement passed off in rumblings; there was no war.
But it was revealed a few months later that the nations had really
approached to the very brink of a Titanic struggle, which would have
desolated the whole of Europe.

And here is the peculiar tragedy of Militarism. The mere threat of that
great "Unfought War" cost Europe billions of dollars. Moreover, as a
result of Germany's discontent at what she rather regarded as her
defeat in this Morocco affair, she in 1913 enormously increased her
army and more than doubled her already heavy military tax upon her
people. Then France and Russia felt compelled to meet Germany's move by
increasing their armies also, extending, as she had done, the time of
compulsory military service inflicted upon their poorer classes.

Norman Angell, an English writer, has recently stirred all thinking
people by a remarkable book of protest against Militarism. He here
discusses the Moroccan imbroglio under the title of "the Mirage of the
Map." Sir Max Waechter is an authority of international repute upon the
same subject.


NORMAN ANGELL

The Press of Europe and America is very busy discussing the lessons of
the diplomatic conflict which has just ended. And the outstanding
impression which one gets from most of these essays in high
politics--whether French, Italian, or British--is that we have been and
are witnessing part of a great world movement, the setting in motion of
Titanic forces "deep-set in primordial needs and impulses."

For months those in the secrets of the Chancelleries have spoken with
bated breath--as though in the presence of some vision of Armageddon.
On the strength of this mere talk of war by the three nations, vast
commercial interests have been embarrassed, fortunes have been lost and
won on the Bourses, banks have suspended payment, some thousands have
been ruined; while the fact that the fourth and fifth nations have
actually gone to war has raised all sorts of further possibilities of
conflict, not alone in Europe, but in Asia, with remoter danger of
religious fanaticism and all its sequelae. International bitterness and
suspicion in general have been intensified, and the one certain result
of the whole thing is that immense burdens will be added in the shape
of further taxation for armaments to the already heavy ones carried by
the five or six nations concerned. For two or three hundred millions of
people in Europe life, which with all the problems of high prices,
labor wars, unsolved social difficulties, is none too easy as it is,
will be made harder still.

The needs, therefore, that can have provoked a conflict of these
dimensions must be "primordial" indeed. In fact, one authority assures
us that what we have seen going on is "the struggle for life among
men"--that struggle which has its parallel in the whole of sentient
existence.

Well, I put it to you, as a matter worth just a moment or two of
consideration, that this conflict is about nothing of the sort; that it
is about a perfectly futile matter, one which the immense majority of
the German, English, French, Italian, and Turkish people could afford
to treat with the completest indifference. For, to the vast majority of
these 250,000,000 people, more or less, it does not matter two straws
whether Morocco or some vague, African swamp near the Equator is
administered by German, French, Italian, or Turkish officials, so long
as it is well administered. Or rather one should go further: if French,
German, or Italian colonization of the past is any guide, the nation
which wins in the conquest for territory of this sort has added a
wealth-draining incubus.

This, of course, is preposterous; I am losing sight of the need for
making provision for the future expansion of the race, of each party
desiring to "find its place in the sun"; and heaven knows what.

Well, let us for a moment get away from phrases and examine a few facts
usually ignored because they happen to be beneath our nose.

France has got a new empire, we are told; she has won a great victory;
she is growing and expanding and is richer by something which her
rivals are the poorer for not having.

Let us assume that she makes the same success of Morocco that she has
made of her other possessions, of, say, Tunis, which represents one of
the most successful of those operations of colonial expansion which
have marked her history during the last forty years. What has been the
precise effect on French prosperity?

In thirty years, at a cost of many million sterling (it is part of
successful colonial administration in France never to let it be known
what the colonies really cost) France has founded in Tunis a colony, in
which to-day there are, excluding soldiers and officials, about 25,000
genuine French colonists: just the number by which the French
population in France--the real France--is diminishing every six
months! And the value of Tunis as a market does not even amount to the
sum which France spends directly on its occupation and administration,
to say nothing of the indirect extension of military burden which its
conquest involves; and, of course, the market which it represents would
still exist in some form, though England--or even Germany--administered
the country.

In other words, France loses twice every year in her home population
two colonies equivalent to Tunis--if we measure colonies in terms of
communities made up of the race which has sprung from the mother
country. And yet, if once in a generation her rulers and diplomats can
point to 25,000 Frenchmen living artificially and exotically under
conditions which must in the long run be inimical to their race, it is
pointed to as "expansion" and as evidence that France is maintaining
her position as a Great Power. A few years, as history goes, unless
there is some complete change of tendencies which at present seem as
strong as ever, the French race as we now know it will have ceased to
exist, swamped without the firing, may be, of a single shot, by the
Germans, Belgians, English, Italians, and Jews. There are to-day in
France more Germans than there are Frenchmen in all the colonies that
France has acquired in the last half-century, and German trade with
France outweighs enormously the trade of France with all French
colonies. France is to-day a better colony for the Germans than they
could make of any exotic colony which France owns.

"They _tell_ me," said a French Deputy recently (in a not quite
original _mot_), "that the Germans are at Agadir. I _know_ they are in
the Champs-Elysées." Which, of course, is in reality a much more
serious matter.

And those Frenchmen who regret this disappearance of their race, and
declare that the energy and blood and money which is now poured out so
lavishly in Africa and in Asia ought to be diverted to its arrest, to
the colonization and development of France by better social,
industrial, commercial, and political organization, to the resisting of
the exploitation of the mother country by inflowing masses of
foreigners, are declared to be bad patriots, dead to the sentiment of
the flag, dead to the call of the bugle, are silenced in fact by a
fustian as senseless and mischievous as that which in some marvelous
way the politician, hypnotized by the old formulae, has managed to make
pass as "patriotism" in most countries.

The French, like their neighbors, are not interested in the Germans of
the Champs-Elysées, but only in the Germans at Agadir: and it is for
these latter that the diplomats fight, and the war budgets swell.

And from that silent and pacific expansion, which means so much both
negatively and positively, attention is diverted to the banging of the
war drum, and the dancing of the patriotic dervishes.

And on the other side we are to assume that Germany has during the
period of France's expansion--since the war--not expanded at all. That
she has been throttled and cramped--that she has not had her place in
the sun: and that is why she must fight for it and endanger the
security of her neighbors.

Well, I put it to you again that all this in reality is false: that
Germany has not been cramped or throttled; that, on the contrary, as we
recognize when we get away from the mirage of the map, her expansion
has been the wonder of the world. She has added 20,000,000 to her
population--one-half the present population of France--during a period
in which the French population has actually diminished. Of all the
nations in Europe, she has cut the biggest swath in the development of
world trade, industry, and influence. Despite the fact that she has not
"expanded" in the sense of mere political dominion, a proportion of her
population, equivalent to the white population of the whole colonial
British Empire, make their living, or the best part of it, from the
development and exploitation of territory outside her borders. These
facts are not new, they have been made the text of thousands of
political sermons preached in England itself during the last few years;
but one side of their significance seems to have been missed.

We get, then, this: On the one side a nation extending enormously its
political dominion and yet diminishing in national force, if by
national force we mean the growth of a sturdy, enterprising, vigorous
people. (I am not denying that France is both wealthy and comfortable,
to a greater degree it may be than her rival; but she has not her
colonies to thank for it--quite the contrary.) On the other side, we
get immense expansion expressed in terms of those things--a growing and
vigorous population and the possibility of feeding them--and yet the
political dominion, speaking practically, has hardly been extended at
all.

Such a condition of things, if the common jargon of high politics means
anything, is preposterous. It takes nearly all meaning out of most that
we hear about "primordial needs," and the rest of it.

As a matter of fact, we touch here one of the vital confusions, which
is at the bottom of most of the present political trouble between
nations, and shows the power of the old ideas, and the old phraseology.

In the days of the sailing ship and the lumbering wagon dragging slowly
over all but impassable roads, for one country to derive any
considerable profit from another, it had, practically, to administer it
politically. But the compound steam engine, the railway, the telegraph,
have profoundly modified the elements of the whole problem. In the
modern world political dominion is playing a more and more effaced role
as a factor in commerce; the non-political factors have in practise
made it all but inoperative. It is the case with every modern nation
actually that the outside territories which it exploits most
successfully are precisely those of which it does not "own" a foot.
Even with the most characteristically colonial of all--Great
Britain--the greater part of her overseas trade is done with countries
which she makes no attempt to "own," control, coerce, or dominate--and
incidentally she has ceased to do any of these things with her
colonies.

Millions of Germans in Prussia and Westphalia derive profit or make
their living out of countries to which their political dominion in no
way extends. The modern German exploits South America by remaining at
home. Where, forsaking this principle, he attempts to work through
political power, he approaches futility. German colonies are colonies
"pour rire." The Government has to bribe Germans to go to them; her
trade with them is microscopic; and if the twenty millions who have
been added to Germany's population since the war had had to depend on
their country's political conquest they would have had to starve. What
feeds them are countries which Germany has never "owned" and never
hopes to "own"; Brazil, Argentina, the United States, India, Australia,
Canada, Russia, France, and England. (Germany, which never spent a mark
on its political conquest, to-day draws more tribute from South America
than does Spain, which has poured out mountains of treasure and oceans
of blood in its conquest.) These are Germany's real colonies. Yet the
immense interests which they represent, of really primordial concern to
Germany, without which so many of her people would be actually without
food, are for the diplomats and the soldiers quite secondary ones; the
immense trade which they represent owes nothing to the diplomat, to
Agadir incidents, to Dreadnoughts; it is the unaided work of the
merchant and the manufacturer. All this diplomatic and military
conflict and rivalry, this waste of wealth, the unspeakable foulness
which Tripoli is revealing, are reserved for things which both sides to
the quarrel could sacrifice, not merely without loss, but with profit.
And Italy, whose statesmen have been faithful to all the old "axioms"
(Heaven save the mark!) will discover it rapidly enough. Even her
defenders are ceasing now to urge that she can possibly derive any real
benefit from this colossal ineptitude.

Italy struck at Turkey for "honor," for prestige--for the purpose of
impressing Europe. And one may hope that Europe (after reading the
reports of Reuter, _The Times_, the _Daily Mirror_, and the New York
_World_ as to the methods which Italy is using in vindicating her
"honor") is duly impressed, and that Italian patriots are satisfied
with these new glories added to Italian history. It is all they will
get.

Or rather, will they get much more: for Italy, as unhappily for the
balance of Europe, the substance will be represented by the increase of
very definite every-day difficulties--the high cost of living, the
uncertainty of employment, the very deep problems of poverty,
education, government, well-being. These remain--worsened. And
this--not the spectacular clash of arms, or even the less spectacular
killing of unarmed Arab men, women, and children--constitute the real
"struggle for life among men." But the dilettanti of "high politics"
are not interested. For those who still take their language and habits
of thought from the days of the sailing-ship, still talk of
"possessing" territory, still assume that tribute in some form is
possible, still imply that the limits of commercial and industrial
activity are dependent upon the limits of political dominion, the
struggle is represented by this futile physical collision of groups,
which, however victory may go, leaves the real solution further off
than ever.

We know what preceded this war: if Europe had any moral conscience
left, it would have been shocked as it was never shocked before. Turkey
said: "We will submit Italy's grievance to any tribunal that Europe
cares to name, and abide by the result." Italy said: "We don't intend
to have the case judged, but to take Tripoli. Hand it over--in
twenty-four hours." The Turkish Government said: "At least make it
possible for us to face our own people. Call it a Protectorate; give us
the shadow of sovereignty. Otherwise it is not robbery--to which we
should submit--but gratuitous degradation; we should abdicate before
the eyes of our own people. We will do anything you like." "In that
case," said Italy, "we will rob; and we will go to war."

It was not merely robbery that the Italian Government intended, but
they meant from the first that it should be war--to "dish the
Socialists," to play some sordid intrigue of internal politics.

The ultimatum was launched from the center of Christendom--the city
which lodges the titular head of the Universal Church--to teach to the
Mohammedan world what may be expected from a modern Christian
Government with its back to eighteen centuries of Christian teaching.

We, Christendom, spend scores of millions--hundreds of millions, it may
be--in the propagation of the Christian faith: numberless men and women
gave their lives for it, our fathers spent two centuries in unavailing
warfare for the capture of some of its symbols. Presumably, therefore,
we attach some value to its principles, deeming them of some worth in
the defense of human society.

Or do we believe nothing of the sort? Is our real opinion that these
things at bottom don't matter--or matter so little that for the sake of
robbing the squalid belongings of a few Arab tribes, or playing some
mean game of party politics, they can be set aside in a whoop of
"patriotism"?

Our press waxes indignant in this particular case, and that is the end
of it. But we do not see that we are to blame, that it is all the
outcome of a conception of politics which we are forever ready to do
our part to defend, to do daily our part to uphold.

And those of us who try in our feeble way to protest against this
conception of politics and patriotism, where everything stands on its
head; where the large is made to appear the great, and the great is
made to appear the small, are derided as sentimentalists, Utopians. As
though anything could be more sentimental, more divorced from the sense
of reality, than the principles which lead us to a condition of things
like these; as though anything could be more wildly, burlesquely
Utopian than the idea that efforts of the kind that the Italian people
are now making, the energy they are now spending, could ever achieve
anything of worth.

Is it not time that the man in the street, verily, I believe, less
deluded by diplomatic jargon than his betters, less the slave of an
obsolete phraseology, insisted that the experts in the high places
acquired some sense of the reality of things, of proportion, some sense
of figures, a little knowledge of industrial history, of the real
processes of human cooperation?

At present Europe is quite indifferent to Italy's behavior. The
Chancelleries, which will go to enormous trouble and take enormous
risks and concoct alliances and counter-alliances when there is
territory to be seized, remain cold when crimes of this sort are
committed. And they remain cold because they believe that Turkey alone
is concerned. They do not see that Italy has attacked not Turkey, but
Europe; that we, more than Turkey, will pay the broken pots.

And there is a further reason: We still believe in these piracies; we
believe they pay and that we may get our turn at some "swag" to-morrow.
France is envied for her possession of Morocco; Germany for her
increased authority over some pestilential African swamps. But when we
realize that in these international burglaries there is no "swag," that
the whole thing is an illusion, that there are huge costs but no
reward, we shall be on the road to a better tradition, which, while it
may not give us international policing, may do better still--render the
policing unnecessary. For when we have realized that the game is not
worth the candle, when no one desires to commit aggression, the
competition in armaments will have become a bad nightmare of the past.


SIR MAX WAECHTER

It is generally admitted that the present condition of Europe is highly
unsatisfactory. To any close observer it must be evident that Europe,
as a whole, is gradually losing its position in the world. Other
nations which are rapidly coming to the front will, in course of time,
displace the European, unless the latter can pull themselves together
and abandon the vicious system which now handicaps them In the economic
rivalry of nations.

The cause of this comparative decline is, in my opinion, to be found in
the fact that all the European countries are arming against one
another, either for defense, or for aggression, for the attack is
frequently the best form of defense. The motive for these excessive
armaments can clearly be found in the jealousy and mistrust existing
among the nations of Europe. Europe is spending on armaments something
like four hundred million pounds sterling per year, and there is a
tendency to increase this tremendous expenditure. In order to bring the
magnitude of this sacrifice more vividly before the reader, let us
assume that a European war is not likely to occur more frequently than
about every thirty years. We then find that the incredible sum of
twelve thousand million pounds sterling has been spent in peace in
preparation for this war, a sum which greatly exceeds the total of all
the European state debts. Such stupendous sums can not be raised
without imposing crushing taxation, and without neglecting the other
duties of the state, such as education, scientific research, and social
reform.

One serious economic result of this heavy taxation is that European
industry is placed at a considerable disadvantage in competing with
that of other nations, notably the United States of America. The late
Mr. Atkinson, an American authority, declared that, compared with the
United States, we were handicapped to the extent of five per cent, in
our production. Since then the figures have changed considerably in
favor of America. I recently had an opportunity of discussing this
point with a great German authority on political economy, and he fixed
the advantage in favor of the United States at nearly ten per cent, as
regards the cost of production.

But this is not all. The European countries withdraw permanently four
millions of men, at their best age, from productive work, thus causing
a terrible loss and waste. Besides, enterprise in Europe is crippled by
fear of war. It may break out at any time, possibly at a few hours'
notice. The present system of Europe must inevitably lead, sooner or
later, to a European war--a catastrophe which nobody can contemplate
without horror, considering the perfected means of destruction. Such a
war would leave the vanquished utterly crushed, and the victor in such
a state of exhaustion that any foreign Power could easily impose her
will upon him.

The situation is certainly most alarming, and ought to receive the
fullest attention. What, then, can be done to save Europe from these
impending dangers? The large number of "Peace Societies" which have
been established in different countries have done excellent spade work.
Their main object has been to insure that disputes among nations should
be referred to arbitration, with a view to making more difficult their
resorting to arms. The great success of these societies demonstrates
plainly that there is a strong tendency among the peoples in favor of
peace. But no attempt has been made to reorganize the whole of Europe
on a sound basis.

The Emperor of Russia has made a most praiseworthy effort to bring
about a different state of affairs, by originating and establishing The
Hague Conference, with a view to securing by this means the peace of
the world. This conference has done excellent service, and is likely to
be of increasing usefulness to mankind in the future; but the second
meeting of the conference has amply proved that it can not succeed in
its main object, which is the peace of the world. If the idea of
bringing the whole world into unison can ever be realized, it is only
by stages, of which the union of Europe would be the first.

Let us look at the position. Germany has been for centuries the
battle-field of other states, and has narrowly escaped national
annihilation. She has now at length succeeded in consolidating her
strength so far as to be able to withstand attack from any probable
combination of two of her powerful neighbors. Can Germany now be
approached with a request to reduce her armaments, unless she is given
the most solid guaranty against attack? It would be almost an insult to
the German intelligence to make such a proposal without an adequate
guaranty.

With France the case is similar. The third Republic has been eminently
peaceful, and Frenchmen have devoted their energies and brilliant
qualities principally to science, the fine arts, and social
development. Who would dare to ask them to cut down their armaments in
the present state of Europe, which makes it compulsory for every
country to arm to the fullest extent? All the other states are in a
similar position. They need not be discussed individually.

The only hope to be found is in such a coalition of the Powers as will
make these excessive armaments unnecessary. If this can be effected,
the reduction of armaments will take place naturally, and without any
external pressure. But then the question arises, how can the permanency
of such a coalition be guaranteed? The vital requisite to give
stability to any international coalition is community of interests.
Such a community of interests exists already, in a larger or smaller
degree, among many states, though it is unknown to most people.
Besides, it is not strong enough to prevent war in times of excitement.

In many countries definite war parties exist, and most extraordinary
opinions can be gathered from their representatives. I was assured by
some military leaders, and even by a diplomat in a responsible
position, that war is a blessing! In disproof of this theory it may be
desirable to state some plain facts. Mankind lives and exists on this
earth solely and entirely by the exploitation of our planet, and the
general average status of the peoples can be improved and raised to a
higher level only by a more complete exploitation of the forces of
nature. This process requires, in the present state of civilization,
capital, intelligence, and manual labor--the handmaid of intelligence.
War is bound to destroy an enormous amount of capital, and a great
number of the ablest workers. It is evident, therefore, that every war
must reduce the general well-being of the peoples who inhabit this
planet. Besides, there is the misery inflicted upon millions of people,
principally belonging to the poorer classes, who have always to bear
the brunt of a war, whether it be started by the personal ambition of
one man or by the misguided ambitions of a nation.

Some people argue that, from the days of Alexander the Great to those
of Napoleon, combinations of states have always been brought about by
armed force, and they believe this to be a natural law. I do not admit
that the case of Napoleon is a proper illustration of such a law. On
the contrary, his career seems to demonstrate clearly that the world is
too far advanced to be driven into combination by force. And as to
Alexander the Great, has the world really made no progress since his
time? Force or war is a relic of a savage age, and will be relegated to
the background with the advance of civilization.




PERSIA'S LOSS OF LIBERTY A.D. 1911

W. MORGAN SHUSTER[1]

[Footnote 1: Reprinted in condensed form from the original narrative in
_Hearst's Magazine,_ by permission.]

As told in the preceding volume, Persia in the year 1905 began a
struggle for freedom from autocratic rule. This she finally achieved in
decisive fashion and set up a parliamentary government. Her career of
liberty seemed fairly assured. She had against her, however, an
irresistible force. England and Russia had long been encroaching upon
Persian territory. Russia, in especial, had snatched away province
after province in the north. Of course Persia's revival would mean that
these territorial seizures would be stopped. Hence Russia almost openly
opposed each step in Persia's progress. In 1907, Russia and England
entered into an agreement by which each, without consulting Persia,
recognized that the other held some sort of rights over a part of
Persian territory: a "sphere of Russian influence" was thus established
in the north, and of British in the southeast.

The climax to this antagonism against Persia came in 1911. The
desperate Persians appealed to the United States Government to send
them an honest administrator to guide them, and President Taft
recommended Mr. Shuster for the task. The work of Mr. Shuster soon won
him the enthusiastic confidence and devotion of the Persians
themselves. But in proportion as his reforms seemed more and more to
strengthen the parliamentary government and bring hope to Persia, he
found himself more and more opposed by the Russian officials. Finally
Russia made his mere presence in the land an excuse for sending her
armies to assault the Persians. Seldom has the murderous attack of a
strong country upon a weak one been so open, brazen, and void of all
moral justification. Thousands of Persians were slain by the Russian
troops, and many more have since been executed for "rebellion" against
the Russian authorities. The parliamentary government of Persia was
completely destroyed; it finally disappeared in tumult and dismay on
December 24, 1911.

The country was reduced to helpless submission to the Russian armies.
Mr. Shuster's own account of the tragedy follows. He called it "The
Strangling of Persia."

Of the many changing scenes during the eight months of my recent
experiences in Persia, two pictures stand out in such sharp contrast as
to deserve special mention.

The first is a small party of Americans, of which the writer was one,
seated with their families in ancient post-chaises rumbling along the
tiresome road from Enzeli, the Persian port on the Caspian Sea, toward
Teheran. It was in the early days of May, 1911, and from these medieval
vehicles, drawn by four ratlike ponies, in heat and dust, we gained our
first physical impressions of the land where we had come to live for
some years--to mend the broken finances of the descendants of Cyrus and
Darius. We were fired with the ambition to succeed in our work, and,
viewed through such eyes, the physical discomforts became unimportant.
Hope sang loud in our hearts as the carriages crawled on through two
hundred and twenty miles of alternate mountain and desert scenery.

The second picture is eight months later, almost to the day. On January
11, 1912, I stood in a circle of gloomy American and Persian friends in
front of the Atabak palace where we had been living, about to step into
the automobile that was to bear us back over the same road to Enzeli.
The mountains behind Teheran were white with snow, the sun shone
brightly in a clear blue sky, there was life-tonic in the air, but none
in our hearts, for our work in Persia, hardly begun, had come to a
sudden end.

Between the two dates some things had happened--things that may be
written down, but will probably never be undone--and the hopes of a
patient, long-exploited people of reclaiming their position in the
world had been stamped out ruthlessly and unjustly by the armies of a
so-called Christian and civilized nation.

Prior to 1906, the masses of the Persians had suffered in comparative
silence from the ever-growing tyranny and betrayal of successive
despots, the last of whom, Muhammad Ali Shah, a vice-sodden monster of
the most perverted type, openly avowed himself the tool of Russia. The
people, finally stung to a blind desperation and exhorted by their
priests, rose in the summer of 1906, and by purely passive
measures--such as taking sanctuary, or _bast_, in large numbers in
sacred places and in the grounds of the British Legation at
Teheran--succeeded in obtaining from Muzaffarn'd Din Shah, the father
of Muhammad Ali, a constitution which he granted some six months before
his death.

The pledge given in this document his son and successor swore to fulfil
and then violated a dozen or more times, until the long-suffering
constitutionalists, who called themselves "nationalists," finally
compelled him, despite the intrigues and armed resistance of Russian
agents and officers, to abdicate in favor of his young son, Sultan
Ahmad Shah, the present constitutional monarch. This was in July, 1909.

It was this constitutional government, recognized as sovereign by the
Powers, that had determined to set its house in order, and in practise
to replace absolute monarchy with something approaching democracy.
Whence the Persians, a strictly Oriental people, had derived their
strange confidence in the potency of a democratic form of government to
mitigate or cure their ills, no one can say. We might ask the Hindus of
India, or the "Young Turks," or to-day the "Young Chinese" the same
question. The fact is that the past ten years have witnessed a truly
marvelous transformation in the ideas of Oriental peoples, and the
East, in its capacity to assimilate Western theories of government, and
in its willingness to fight for them against everything that tradition
makes sacred, has of late years shown a phase heretofore almost
unknown.

Persia has given a most perfect example of this struggle toward
democracy, and, considering the odds against the nationalist element,
the results accomplished have been little short of amazing.

Filled with the desire to perform its task, the Medjlis, or national
parliament, had voted in the latter part of 1910 to obtain the services
of five American experts to undertake the work of reorganizing Persia's
finances. They applied to the American Government, and through the good
offices of our State Department, their legation at Washington was
placed in communication with men who were considered suitable for the
task. The intervention of the State Department went no further than
this, and the Persian Government, like the men finally selected, was
told that the nomination by the American Government of suitable
financial administrators indicated a mere friendly desire to aid and
was of no political significance whatsoever.

The Persians had already tried Belgian and French functionaries and had
seen them rapidly become mere Russian political agents or, at best,
seen them lapse into a state of _dolce far niente_. Poor Persia had
been sold out so many times in the framing of tariffs and tax laws, in
loan transactions and concessions of various kinds that the nationalist
government had grown desperate and certainly most distrustful of all
foreigners coming from nations within the sphere of European diplomacy.
What they sought was a practical administration of their finances in
the interest of the Persian people and nation.

In this way the writer found himself in Teheran on the 12th of May last
year, having agreed to serve as Treasurer-General of the Persian
Empire, and to reorganize and conduct its finances.

It is difficult to describe the Persian political situation existing at
that time without going too deeply into history. It is true that in a
moment of temporary weakness after her defeat by Japan, Russia had
signed a solemn convention with England whereby she engaged herself, as
did England, to respect the independence and integrity of Persia.
Later, by the stipulations of 1909, these two Powers solemnly agreed to
prevent the ex-Shah, Muhammad Ali, from any political agitation against
the constitutional government. But, as the world and Persia have seen,
a trifle like a treaty or a convention never balks Russia when she has
taken the pulse of her possible adversaries and found it weak. What is
more painful to Anglo-Saxons is that the British Government has been no
better nor more scrupulous of its pledges.

During the first half of July, we began to learn where some of the
money was supposed to come from, and we were just beginning to control
the government expenditures after a fashion when, on July 18th, late at
night, the telegraph brought the news that Muhammad Ali, the ex-Shah,
had landed with a small force at Gumesh-Teppeh, a small port on the
Caspian, very near the Russian frontier. It was the proverbial bolt
from the blue, for while rumors of such a possibility had been rife,
most persons believed that Russia would not dare to violate so openly
her solemn stipulation signed less than two years before.


PERSIA IS TAKEN UNAWARES

The Persian cabinet at Teheran was panic-stricken, and for ten days
there ensued a period of confusion and terror that beggars description.
There was no Persian army except on paper. The gendarmerie and police
of the city did not number more than eighteen hundred men inadequately
armed. The Russian Turcomans on the northeast frontier were reported to
be flocking to the ex-Shah's standard, and it was commonly believed
that he would be at the gates of Teheran in a few weeks. This belief
was strengthened by the fact that his brother, Prince Salaru'd-Dawla,
had entered Persia from the direction of Bagdad and was known to have a
large gathering of Kurdish tribesmen ready to march toward Teheran.

After a time, however, reason prevailed and steps were taken to create
an army to defend the constitutional government against the invaders.
At this time, one of the old chiefs of the Bakhtiyari tribesmen, the
Samsamu's-Saltana, was the prime minister holding the portfolio of war,
and he called to arms several thousands of his fighting men, who
promptly started for the capital. Ephraim Khan, at that time chief of
police of Teheran, was another defender of the constitution who raised
a volunteer force, and twice, acting with the Bakhtiyari forces, he
signally defeated the troops of the ex-Shah. By September 5th, Muhammad
Ali himself was in full flight through northeastern Persia toward the
friendly Russian frontier. Whatever chances he may have formerly had
were admitted to be gone.

The hound that Russia had unleashed, with his hordes of Turcoman
brigands, upon the constitutional government of Persia had been whipped
back into his kennel. No one was more surprised than Russia, unless
indeed it was the Persians themselves. Russian officials everywhere in
Persia had openly predicted an easy victory for Muhammad Ali. They had
aided him in a hundred different ways, morally, financially, and by
actual armed force.

They still hoped, however, that the forces of Prince Salaru'd-Dawla,
which were marching from Hamadan toward Teheran, would take the
capital. But on September 28th, the news came that Ephraim Khan, and
the Bakhtiyaris had routed the Prince and his army, and the last hope
from this source was gone.

In the mean time, another encounter with Russia had occurred. There was
at Teheran an officer of the British-Indian army, Major Stokes, who for
four years had been military attache to the British Legation. He knew
Persia well; read, wrote, and spoke fluently the language and
thoroughly understood the habits, customs, and viewpoint of the Persian
people. He was the ideal man to assist in the formation of a
tax-collecting force under the Treasury, without which there was no
hope of collecting the internal taxes throughout the empire. Not only
was Major Stokes the ideal man for this work, but he was the _only_ man
possessing the necessary qualifications.

I accordingly tendered Major Stokes the post of chief of the future
Treasury gendarmerie, his services as military attache having come to
an end. After some correspondence with the British Legation, I was
informed late in July that the British Foreign Office held that he must
resign his commission in the British-Indian army before accepting the
post. This Major Stokes did, by cable, on July 31st, and the matter was
regarded as settled.

What was my surprise, therefore, to learn, on the evening of August
8th, that the British Minister, following instructions from his
Government, had that day presented a note to the Persian Foreign
Office, warning the Persian Government that any attempt to employ Major
Stokes in the "northern sphere" of Persia (which included Teheran, the
capital) would probably be followed by _retaliatory action_ (_sic_) by
Russia which England would not be in a position to deprecate. Between
individuals, such action would clearly be considered bad faith. Sir
Edward Grey, British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, shortly
thereafter explained that the appointment of Major Stokes would be a
violation of what he termed the "spirit" of the Anglo-Russian
Convention of 1907. Yet just two weeks before, when he consented to
Stokes resigning to accept the post, he had never dreamed of such a
thing.

The truth is that the semiofficial St. Petersburg press, like the
_Novoe Vremya_, had begun to bluster about the affair, egged on by the
Russian Foreign Office, and Sir Edward Grey was compelled to _invent
some pretext_ for his manifest dread of displeasing Britain's "good
friend Russia" about anything. Hence the birth of that wondrous and
fearsome child, that rubber child which could be stretched to cover any
and all things, the "spirit of the convention." It was a wonderful
discovery for the gentlemen of the so-called "forward party" of the
Russian Government, since they now beheld not only a new means of
evading the plain letter of their agreement, but gleefully found a
woful lack of spirit in their partner to the convention, Great Britain.

The British Foreign Office pretended to believe that they had checked
Russia's march to the Gulf; they knew better then, and they know still
better now. There is but one thing on earth that will check that march,
and that thing England is apparently not in a geographical or a
policial position to furnish in sufficient numbers. The British public
now know this, and unfortunately the "forward party" in Russia knows
it, and that is why bearded faces at St. Petersburg crack open and emit
rumbles of genuine merriment every time Sir Edward Grey stands up in
the House of Commons and explains to his countrymen that he has most
ample and categorical assurances from Russia that her sole purpose in
sending two or three armies into Persia is to show her displeasure with
an American finance official.

For that same reason, doubtless, she has recently massacred some
hundreds of Persians in Tabriz, Enzeli, and Resht, and has hanged
numbers of Islamic priests, provincial officials, and
constitutionalists whom she classifies as the "dregs of revolution."
That is why the Russian flag was hoisted over the government buildings
at Tabriz, the capital of the richest province of the empire, while a
Russian military governor dispensed justice at the bayonet-point and
with the noose.

But to get back to events. After the crushing defeats of the ex-Shah's
two forces and his flight, Russia was still faced by a constitutional
regime in Persia--and by a somewhat solidified and more confident
government and people at that.

Tools and puppets having dismally failed, enter the real thing. Russia
now proceeded to intervene directly and to break up the constitutional
government in Persia without risk of failure or hindrance. She did not
even intend to await a pretext--she manufactured such things as she
went along.

The first instance is the Shu'a'us-Saltana affair. On October 9th, some
twelve days after the last defeat inflicted on the ex-Shah's forces, I
was ordered by the cabinet to seize and confiscate the properties of
Prince Shu'a'us-Saltana, another brother of the ex-Shah, who had
returned to Persia with him and was actively commanding some of his
troops. The same order was given as to the estates of Prince
Salaru'd-Dawla, the other brother in rebellion.

Pursuant to this entirely proper and legal order, the purport of which
had been communicated by the Persian Foreign Office to the Russian and
British ministers several days previously, no objection having been
even hinted, I sent out six small parties, each consisting of a
civilian Treasury official and five Treasury gendarmes, to seize the
different properties in and about Teheran. As a matter of courtesy, the
British and Russian legations had been informed that all rights of
foreigners in these properties would be fully safeguarded and
respected.

The principal property was the Park of Shu'a'us-Saltana, a magnificent
place in Teheran, with a palace filled with valuable furniture. When
the Treasury officials and five gendarmes arrived there, they found on
guard a number of Persian Cossacks of the Cossack Brigade. On seeing
the order of confiscation, these men retired. My men then took
possession and began making an official inventory. An hour later, two
Russian vice-consuls, in full uniform, arrived with twelve Russian
Cossacks from the Russian Consulate guard, and with imprecations,
abuse, and threats to kill, drove off my men at the point of their
rifles. Later in the day, these same vice-consuls actually arrested
other small parties of Treasury gendarmes, took them on mules through
the streets of Teheran to the Russian Consulate-General, and after
insulting and threatening them with death if they ever returned to the
confiscated property, allowed them to go.

On hearing this, I wrote and telegraphed to my friend, M.
Poklewski-Koziell, the Russian minister, calling his attention to the
outrageous actions of his Consul-General, M. Pokhitanow, and asking the
minister to give orders to prevent any further unpleasantness on the
following day, when I would again execute the government's order. The
next day I sent a force of one hundred gendarmes in charge of two
American Treasury officials, and the order was executed.

Two hours after we were in peaceable possession of the property, the
same two Russian vice-consuls drove up to the gate and began insulting
and abusing the Persian Treasury guards, endeavoring, of course, to
provoke the gendarmes into some act against them. In other words,
finding that they had lost in the matter of retaining possession of the
property, these Russian officials deliberately sought to provoke my
gendarmes into something that they could construe as an affront to
Russian consular authority. The men, however, had received such strict
and repeated instructions that they refused even to answer. They paid
no attention to the taunts and abuse of these two dignified Russian
officials, who thereupon drove off and perjured themselves to the
effect that they had been affronted--in other words, that the incident
which they had gone there to provoke actually had occurred. These false
statements were reported to St. Petersburg by M. Pokhitanow
independently of his minister, who, I have the strongest reason to
believe, entirely disavowed the Consul-General's actions. The Russian
government thereupon publicly discredited its minister and demanded
from the Persian government an immediate apology for something that had
never occurred. The apology, after some hesitation, was made on the
advice of the British government. It was hoped that this evident
self-abasement by Persia would appease even the Russian bureaucracy.

But it now seems that a compliance with Russia's demand was exactly
what was not desired by her, since it removed all possible pretext for
taking more drastic steps against Persia's national existence. Hence,
at the very moment when the Persian Foreign Minister, in full uniform,
was at the Russian legation complying with this first ultimatum, based,
as it was, on absolutely false reports, the St. Petersburg cabinet was
formulating new and even more unjust and absurd demands, which, as some
of the public know, have resulted in the expulsion of the fifteen
American finance officials and in the destruction of the last vestiges
of constitutional government in the empire of Cyrus and Darius.

Russia called for my immediate dismissal from the post of
Treasurer-General; she required that my fourteen American assistants
already in Persia should be subject to the approval of the British and
Russian legations at Teheran; that all other foreign officials in
future employed by Persia be subjected to the approval of those two
legations; that a large indemnity should be paid to Russia for the
expense of moving her troops into Persia to hasten the acceptance of
these two ultimatums; and that all other questions between Russia and
Persia should be settled to the satisfaction of the former.

The acceptance by Persia of these demands meant, of course, a virtual
cession of her sovereignty to Russia and Great Britain. It should be
noted, also, that in this Russian ultimatum the name of the British
government was freely used, although the British minister took no part
in the presentation of the same. Sir Edward Grey was subsequently asked
in the British Parliament as to this point, and explained, in effect,
that he agreed with the Russian demands, with the possible exception of
the indemnity.

The Russian minister informed the Persian Government that this
ultimatum was based on the following two grounds: First, that I had
appointed a certain Mr. Lecoffre, a British subject, to be a tax
collector in the Russian sphere of influence; and, second, that I had
caused to be printed and circulated in Persia a translation into
Persian of my letter to the London _Times_ of October 21, 1911, thereby
greatly injuring Russian influence in northern Persia. These grounds
might be classified as "unimportant, if true." The truth is, however,
that they are both well known to have been utterly unfounded in fact. I
did not appoint Mr. Lecoffre, a British subject, to a financial post in
northern Persia. I found him in the Finance Department at Teheran (the
capital, which is in the so-called Russian sphere) when I arrived there
last May, and he had been occupying an important position there for
nearly two years, without the slightest objection ever having been
raised by the Russian Government. I proposed to transfer him to a
somewhat less important position, but one in which I thought he could
be of greater service.

As to the second ground or pretext, in effect, that I had caused to be
printed and circulated a Persian translation of my letter to the
_Times_, it was simply false. It was well known to be false--so well
known, in fact, that a newspaper in Teheran, the _Tamadun_
(_Civilization_) which did print it and circulate it, publicly admitted
the fact the minute they heard that I was charged by Russia with having
done so. So these two at best rather puerile pretexts upon which to
base an ultimatum from a powerful nation to a weaker one lacked even
the merit of truth.

This second ultimatum, despite all hypocritical attempts made to
justify it, fairly stunned the Persian people. Accustomed as they had
become in recent years to the high-handed and cynical actions of the
St. Petersburg cabinet, they had not looked for such a foul blow as
this. They had been realizing dimly that the peace of Europe was being
threatened by the open hostility of Germany and England over the
Moroccan incident, and that British foreign policy was apparently
leaving Russia absolutely free to work her will in Asia, so long, at
least, as Russia pretended to acknowledge the. Anglo-Russian _entente_
of 1907; but the Persian people had too much, far too much, confidence
in the sacredness of treaty stipulations and the solemnly pledged words
of the great Christian nations of the world to imagine that their own
whole national existence and liberty could be jeopardized overnight,
and on a pretext so shallow and farcical as to excite world-wide
ridicule. Their disillusionment came too late. The trap had been
unwittingly set by hands that made unexpected moves on the European
chessboard, and the Bear's paw had this time been skilful enough to
spring it at the proper moment.

The Persian statesmen and chieftains who formed the cabinet at this
time, whether because they perceived the gleaming, naked steel behind
Russia's threats more clearly than their legislative compatriots of the
Parliament or Medjlis, or whether they suffered from that abandon and
tired feeling which comes from playing an unequal and always losing
game, quickly decided that they would accept this second ultimatum with
all its future oppression and cruelty for their people.

On December 1st, therefore, shortly before the time limit of
forty-eight hours fixed by Russia for the acceptance of the terms had
expired, the cabinet filed into the chamber of deputies to secure
legislative approval of their intended course.

It was an hour before noon, and the Parliament grounds and buildings
were filled with eager, excited throngs, while the galleries of the
Medjlis chamber were packed with Persian notables of all ranks and with
the representatives of many of the foreign legations. At noon the fate
of Persia as a nation was to be known.

The cabinet, having made up its mind to yield, overlooked no point that
would increase their chances of securing the approval of the Medjlis.
Believing, evidently, that the ridiculously short time to elapse before
the stroke of noon announced the expiration of the forty-eight-hour
period would effectually prevent any mature consideration or discussion
of their proposals, the premier, Samsamu's-Saltana, caused to be
presented to the deputies a resolution authorizing the cabinet to
accept Russia's demands.

The proposal was read amid a deep silence. At its conclusion, a hush
fell upon the gathering. Seventy-six deputies, old men and young,
priests, lawyers, doctors, merchants, and princes, sat tense in their
seats.

A venerable priest of Islam arose. Time was slipping away and at noon
the question would be beyond their vote to decide. This servant of God
spoke briefly and to the point: "It may be the will of Allah that our
liberty and our sovereignty shall be taken from us by force, but let us
not sign them away with our own hands!" One gesture of appeal with his
trembling hands, and he resumed his seat.

Simple words, these, yet winged ones. Easy to utter in academic
discussions; hard, bitterly hard, to say under the eye of a cruel and
overpowering tyrant whose emissaries watched the speaker from the
galleries and mentally marked him down for future imprisonment,
torture, exile, or worse.

Other deputies followed. In dignified appeals, brief because the time
was short, they upheld their country's honor and proclaimed their
hard-earned right to live and govern themselves.

A few minutes before noon the public vote was taken; one or two
faint-hearted members sought a craven's refuge and slunk quietly from
the chamber. As each name was called, the deputy rose in his place and
gave his vote, there was no secret ballot here.

And when the roll-call was ended, every man, priest or layman, youth or
octogenarian, had cast his own die of fate, had staked the safety of
himself and family, and hurled back into the teeth of the great Bear
from the north the unanimous answer of a desperate and downtrodden
people who preferred a future of unknown terror to the voluntary
sacrifice of their national dignity and of their recently earned right
to work out their own salvation.

Amid tears and applause from the spectators, the crestfallen and
frightened cabinet withdrew, while the deputies dispersed to ponder on
the course which lay darkly before their people.

By this vote, the cabinet, according to the Persian constitution,
ceased to exist as a legal entity.

Great crowds of people thronged the "Lalezar," one of the principal
streets of Teheran, shouting death to the traitors and calling Allah to
witness that they would give up their lives for their country.

A few days later, in a secret conference between the deputies of the
Medjlis and the members of the deposed cabinet, a similar vote was
given to reject the Russian demands. Meanwhile, thousands of Russian
troops, with cossacks and artillery, were pouring into northern Persia,
from Tiflis and Julfa by land and from Baku across the Caspian, to the
Persian port of Enzeli, whence they took up their 220-mile march over
the Elburz mountains toward Kasvin and Teheran.

In the government at Teheran, conference followed conference. Intrigues
against the deputies gave way to threats. Through it all, with the
increasing certainty of personal injury, the members of the Medjlis
stood firmly by their vote.

It is impossible to describe within the limits of this article the days
and nights of doubt, suspense, and anxiety that followed one another in
the capital during this dark month of December. There was a lurking
dread in the very air, and the snow-covered mountains themselves seemed
afflicted with the mournful scenes through which the country was
passing.

A boycott was proclaimed by the priests against Russian and English
goods. In a day, the old-fashioned tramway of the city was deserted on
the mere suspicion that it was owned in Russia, while an excited
Belgian Minister rained protests and petitions on the Persian Foreign
Office in an endeavor to show that the tramway was owned by his
countrymen. Crowds of youths, students, and women filled the street,
dragging absent-minded passengers from the cars, smashing the windows
of shops that still displayed Russian goods, seeing that no one drank
tea because it came from Russia, although produced in India, and going
in processions before the gates of the foreign legations to demand
justice of the representatives of the world powers for a people in the
extremity of despair.

One day, the rumor would come that the chief "mullahs" or priests at
Nadjef had proclaimed the "holy war" (_jihad_) against the Russians; on
another, that the Russian troops had commenced to shoot up Kasvin on
their march to Teheran.

At one time, when rumors were thick that the Medjlis would give in
under the threats and attempted bribery which well-known Russian
proteges were employing on many of its members, three hundred veiled
and black-gowned Persian women, a large proportion with pistols
concealed under their skirts or in the folds of their sleeves, marched
suddenly to the Parliament grounds and demanded admission to the
Chamber. The president of the Medjlis consented to receive a deputation
from them. Once admitted into his presence, these honor-loving Persian
mothers, wives, and daughters exhibited their weapons, and to show the
grim seriousness of their words, they tore aside their veils, and
threatened that they would kill their own husbands and sons, and end
their own lives, if the deputies failed in their duty to uphold the
dignity and the sovereignty of their beloved country.

When neither threats nor bribes availed against the Medjlis, Russia
decreed its destruction by force.

In the early afternoon of December 24th, the deposed cabinet, having
been themselves duly _persuaded_ to take the step, executed a _coup
d'état_ against the Medjlis, and by a demonstration of gendarmes and
Bakhtiyari tribesmen, succeeded in expelling all the deputies and
employees who were within the Parliament grounds; after which the gates
were locked and barred, and a strong detachment of the so-called Royal
Regiment left in charge. The deputies were threatened with death if
they attempted to return there or to meet in any other spot, and the
city of Teheran immediately passed under military control. The
self-constituted _directoire_ of seven who accomplished this dubious
feat first ascertained that the considerable force of Bakhtiyari
tribesmen, some 2,000, who had remained in the capital after the defeat
of the ex-Shah's forces in September last, had been duly "fixed" by the
same Russian agencies who had so early succeeded in persuading the
members of the ex-cabinet that their true interests lay in siding with
Russia. It is impossible to say just what proportions of fear and
cupidity decided the members of the deposed cabinet to take the aliens'
side against their country, but both emotions undoubtedly played a
part. The premier was one of the leading chiefs or "khans" of the
Bakhtiyaris, and another chief was the self-styled Minister of War.
These chieftains have always been a strange and changing mixture of
mountain patriot and city intriguer--of loyal soldier and mercenary
looter. The mercenary instincts, possibly aided by a sense of their own
comparative helplessness against Russian Cossacks and artillery, led
them to accept the stranger's gold and fair promises, and they ended
their checkered but theretofore relatively honorable careers by selling
their country for a small pile of cash and the more alluring promise
that the "grand viziership" (_i.e.,_ post of Minister of Finance)
should be perpetual in their family or clan.

That same afternoon a large number of the "abolished" deputies came to
my office. They were men whom I had grown to know well, men of European
education, in whose courage, integrity, and patriotism I had the
fullest confidence. To them, the unlawful action of their own
countrymen was more than a political catastrophe; it was a sacrilege, a
profanation, a heinous crime. They came in tears, with broken voices,
with murder in their hearts, torn by the doubt as to whether they
should kill the members of the _directoire_ and drive out the
traitorous tribesmen who had made possible the destruction of the
government, or adopt the truly Oriental idea of killing themselves.
They asked my advice, and, hesitating somewhat as to whether I should
interfere to save the lives of notorious betrayers of their country, I
finally persuaded them to do neither the one nor the other. There
seemed to be no particular good in assassinating even their treacherous
countrymen, as it would only have given color to the pretensions of
Russia and England that the Persians were not capable of maintaining
order.


AN EXHIBITION OF SELF-RESTRAINT

When the last representative element of the constitutional government,
for which so many thousands had fought, suffered, and died, was wiped
out in an hour without a drop of blood being shed, the Persian people
gave to the world an exhibition of temperance, of moderation, of stern
self-restraint, the like of which no other civilized country could show
under similar trying circumstances.

The acceptance of Russia's terms by the Cabinet removed the last
pretext for keeping in Northern Persia the _15,000_ troops which by
that time Russia had assembled there,--at Kasvin, Resht, Enzeli,
Tabriz, Khoy, and other points in the so-called Russian sphere. Mons.
Poklewski-Koziell, the Russian Minister, had in fact given an equivocal
sort of a promise to the effect that "if no fresh incidents arose," the
Russian troops would be withdrawn when Persia accepted the conditions
of the ultimatum.

With this in mind, it is interesting to note the truly thorough
precautions which were taken by Russia to prevent any such unfortunate
necessity as the withdrawal of her troops from coming to pass.

December 24th, late in the evening, a message was received from the
Persian Acting Governor at Tabriz in which he declared that the Russian
troops, which had been stationed in that city since their entry during
the siege in 1909, _had suddenly started to massacre the inhabitants_.
Shortly after this the Indo-European telegraph lines stopped working,
and all news from Tabriz ceased. It was subsequently stated that the
wires had been cut by bullets. _Additional Russian troops_ were
immediately started for Tabriz from Julfa, which is some eight miles to
the north of the Russian frontier.

The exact way in which the fighting began is not yet clear. The Persian
government reports show that a number of Russian soldiers, claiming to
be stringing a telephone wire, climbed upon the roof of the Persian
police headquarters about _ten o'clock at night_ on December 20th. When
challenged by native guards, they replied with shots. Reenforcements
were called up by both sides, and serious street fighting broke out
early the following morning and continued for several days. The Acting
Governor stated in his official reports that the Russian troops
indulged in their usual atrocities, killing women and children and
hundreds of other noncombatants on the streets and in their homes.
There were at the time about 4,000 Russian soldiers, with two batteries
of artillery, in and around the city. Nearly I,000 of the _fidais_
("self-devoted") of Tabriz took refuge in an old citadel of stone and
mud, called the "Ark." They were without artillery or adequate
provisions, and were poorly armed, but it was certain death for one of
them to be seen on the streets.

The Russians bombarded the "Ark" for a day or more, killing a large
proportion of its defenders. The superior numbers and the artillery of
the Russians finally conquered, and there followed a reign of terror
during which no Persian's life or honor was safe. At one time during
this period the Russian Minister at Teheran, at the request of the
members of the Persian cabinet, who were horror-stricken and in fear of
their lives for having made terms with such a barbaric nation,
telegraphed to the Russian general in command of the troops at Tabriz,
telling him to cease fighting, and that the _fidais_ would receive
orders to do likewise, as matters were being arranged at the capital.
The gallant general replied that he took his orders from the Viceroy of
the Caucasus at Tiflis, and not from any one at Teheran. The massacre
went on.

On New Year's day, which was the 10th of _Muharram_, a day of great
mourning which is held sacred in the Persian religious calendar, the
Russian military governor, who had hoisted Russian flags over the
government buildings at Tabriz, hung the Sikutu'l-Islam, who was the
chief priest of Tabriz, two other priests, and five others, among them
several high officials of the Provincial Government. As one British
journalist put it, the effect of this outrage on the Persians was that
which would be produced on the English people by the hanging of the
Archbishop of Canterbury on Good Friday. From this time on, the
Russians at Tabriz continued to hang or shoot any Persian whom they
chose to consider guilty of the crime of being a "Constitutionalist."
When the fighting there was first reported, a high official of the
Foreign Office at St. Petersburg, in an interview to the press, made
the statement that Russia would take vengeance into her own hands until
the "revolutionary dregs" had been exterminated.

One more significant fact: At the same time that the fighting broke out
at Tabriz, the Russian troops at Resht and Enzeli, hundreds of miles
away, shot down the Persian police and many inhabitants without warning
or provocation of any kind. And the date also happened to be just after
the Persian cabinet had definitely informed the Russian Legation that
all the demands of Russia's ultimatum were accepted--a condition which
the British Government had publicly assured the Persians would be
followed by the withdrawal of the Russian invading forces, and which
the Russian Government had officially confirmed, "_unless fresh
incidents should arise_ in the mean time to make the retention of the
troops advisable."

I would suggest that the Powers--England and Russia--may _think_ that
they thus escape all responsibility for what goes on in Persia, but the
world has long since grown familiar with such methods. Mere cant,
however seriously put forth in official statements, no longer blinds
educated public opinion as to the facts in these acts of international
brigandage. The truth is that England and Russia are still playing a
hand in the game of medieval diplomacy.

The puerility of talking of Persia having affronted Russian consular
officers or of Persia's Treasurer-General having appointed a British
subject to be a tax collector at Tabriz, as the reasons for Russia's
aggressive and brutal policy in Persia, is only too apparent. Volumes
would not contain the bare record of the acts of aggression, deceit,
and cruelty which Russian agents have committed against Persian
sovereignty and the constitutional government since the deposition of
Muhammad Ali in 1909.




DISCOVERY OF THE SOUTH POLE A.D. 1911

ROALD AMUNDSEN

On December 16, 1911, a Norwegian exploring party headed by Captain
Roald Amundsen reached the South Pole. The discovery thus followed with
surprising closeness after Peary's triumph in reaching the North Pole
in 1909.

Antarctic exploration had never attracted so much attention as that of
the far north; partly because an almost impossible ice barrier a
hundred feet high was known to extend across the southern ocean at
about the parallel of the Antarctic Circle. In 1908, however, an
English expedition under Lieutenant Shackleton managed to penetrate
beyond this barrier in the region south of New Zealand and reached to
within less than two hundred miles of the pole. They established the
fact that in contrast to the deep waters which flow above the northern
Pole, the southern Pole is raised upon an Antarctic mountain continent
many thousand feet in height. Shackleton's success led to several other
expeditions, and in 1910 three separate parties made almost
simultaneous efforts to reach the Pole, one from Japan and one from
England, as well as the Norwegian one.

We give here Captain Amundsen's own account of his expedition as first
explained by him before the Berlin Geographical Society and published
by the New York Geographical Society in their bulletin.

The glowing success of Amundsen's expedition throws into sharpest
relief the tragedy of the parallel English expedition. Captain Scott,
the leader of this party, also reached the Pole after a far more
desperate struggle. But he reached it on January 18, 1912, only to find
that his Norwegian rival had preceded him, and he and his entire party
died of starvation and exhaustion on their return journey toward their
camp.

The first aim of my expedition was the attainment of the South Pole. I
have the honor to report the accomplishment of the plan.

I can only mention briefly here the expeditions which have worked in
the region which we had selected for our starting-point. As we wished
to reach the South Pole our first problem was to go south as far as
possible with our ship and there establish our station. Even so, the
sled journeys would be long enough. I knew that the English expedition
would again choose their old winter quarters in McMurdo Sound, South
Victoria Land, as their starting-point. From newspaper report it was
known that the Japanese had selected King Edward VII. Land. In order to
avoid these two expeditions we had to establish our station on the
Great Ice Barrier as far as possible from the starting-points of the
two other expeditions.

The Great Ice Barrier, also called the Ross Barrier, lies between South
Victoria Land and King Edward VII. Land and has an extent of about 515
miles. The first to reach this mighty ice formation was Sir James Clark
Ross in 1841. He did not dare approach the great ice wall, 100 feet
high, with his two sailing ships, the _Erebus_ and the _Terror_, whose
progress southward was impeded by this mighty obstacle. He examined the
ice wall from a distance, however, as far as possible. His observations
showed that the Barrier is not a continuous, abrupt ice wall, but is
interrupted by bays and small channels. On Ross's map a bay of
considerable magnitude may be seen.

The next expedition was that of the _Southern Cross_ in 1900. It is
interesting to note that this party found the bay mentioned above at
the same place where Ross had seen it in 1841, nearly sixty years
before; that this expedition also was able to land a few miles to the
east of the large bay in a small bay, named Balloon Bight, and from
there to ascend the Ice Barrier, which heretofore had been considered
an insurmountable obstacle to further advance toward the south.

In 1901 the _Discovery_ steamed along the Barrier and confirmed in
every respect what the _Southern Cross_ had observed. Land was also
discovered in the direction indicated by Ross, namely, King Edward VII.
Land. Scott, too, landed in Balloon Bight, and, like his predecessors,
saw the large bay to the west.

In 1908 Shackleton arrived there on the _Nimrod_. He, too, followed
along the edge of the Ice Barrier. He came to the conclusion that
disturbances had taken place in the Ice Barrier. The shore line of
Balloon Bight, he thought, had changed and merged with the large bay to
the west. This large bay, which he thought to be of recent origin, he
named Bay of Whales. He gave up his original plan of landing there, as
the Ice Barrier appeared to him too dangerous for the establishment of
winter quarters.

It was not difficult to determine that the bay shown on Ross's map and
the so-called Bay of Whales are identical; it was only necessary to
compare the two maps. Except for a few pieces that had broken off from
the Barrier, the bay had remained the same for the last seventy years.
It was therefore possible to assume that the bay did not owe its origin
to chance and that it must be underlaid by land, either in the form of
sand banks or otherwise.

This bay we decided upon as our base of operations. It lies 400 miles
from the English station in McMurdo Sound and 115 miles from King
Edward VII. Land. We could therefore assume that we should be far
enough from the English sphere of interest and need not fear crossing
the route of the English expedition. The reports concerning the
Japanese station on King Edward VII. Land were indefinite: we took it
for granted, however, that a distance of 115 miles would suffice.

On August 9, 1910, we left Norway on the _Fram_, the ship that had
originally been built for Nansen. We had ninety-seven superb Eskimo
dogs and provisions for two years. The first harbor we reached was
Madeira. There the last preparations were made for our voyage on the
Ross Barrier--truly not an insignificant distance which we had to
cover, namely, 16,000 nautical miles from Norway to the Bay of Whales.
We had estimated that this trip would require five months. The _Fram_,
which has justly been called the stanchest polar ship in the world, on
this voyage across practically all of the oceans, proved herself to be
extremely seaworthy. Thus we traversed without a single mishap the
regions of the northeast and of the southeast trades, the stormy seas
of the "roaring forties," the fogs of the fifties, the ice-filled
sixties, and reached our field of work at the Ice Barrier on January
14, 1911. Everything had gone splendidly.

The ice in the Bay of Whales had just broken up, and we were able to
advance considerably farther south than any of our predecessors had
done. We found a quiet little nook behind a projecting ice cape; from
here we could transfer our equipment to the Barrier with comparative
safety. Another great advantage was that the Barrier at this place
descended very gradually to the sea ice, so that we had the best
possible surface for our sleds. Our first undertaking was to ascend the
Barrier in order to get a general survey and to determine a suitable
place for the erection of the house which we had brought with us. The
supposition that this part of the Barrier rests on land seemed to be
confirmed immediately by our surroundings. Instead of the smooth, flat
surface which the outer wall of the Barrier presents, we here found the
surface to be very uneven. We everywhere saw sharp hills, and points
between which there were pressure-cracks and depressions filled with
large masses of drift. These features were not of recent date. On the
contrary, it was easy to see that they were very old and that they must
have had their origin at a time which long preceded the period of
Ross's visit.

Originally we had planned to establish our station several miles from
the edge of the Barrier, in order not to subject ourselves to the
danger of an unwelcome and involuntary sea trip, which might have
occurred had the part of the Barrier on which we erected our house
broken off. This precaution, however, was not necessary, as the
features which we observed on our first examination of the area offered
a sufficient guaranty for the stability of the Barrier at this point.

In a small valley, hardly two and a half miles from the ship's
anchorage, we therefore selected a place for our winter quarters. It
was protected from the wind on all sides. On the next day we began
unloading the ship. We had brought with us material for house-building
as well as equipment and provisions for nine men for several years. We
divided into two groups, the ship's group and the land group. The first
was composed of the commander of the ship, Captain Nilsen, and the nine
men who were to stay on board to take the _Fram_ out of the ice and to
Buenos Aires. The other group consisted of the men who were to occupy
the winter quarters and march on to the south. The ship's group had to
unload everything from the ship upon the ice. There the land group took
charge of the cargo and brought it to the building site. At first we
were rather unaccustomed to work, as we had had little exercise on the
long sea voyage. But before long we were all "broken in," and then the
transfer to the site of our home "Framheim" went on rapidly; the house
grew daily.

When all the material had been landed our skilled carpenters, Olav
Bjaaland and Jorgen Stubberud, began building the house. It was a
ready-made house, which we had brought with us; nothing had to be done
but to put together the various numbered parts. In order that the house
might brave all storms, its bottom rested in an excavation four feet
beneath the surface. On January 28th, fourteen days after our arrival,
the house was completed, and all provisions had been landed. A gigantic
task had been performed; everything seemed to point toward a propitious
future. But no time was to be lost; we had to make use of every minute.

The land group had in the mean time been divided into two parties, one
of which saw to it that the provisions and equipment still lacking were
taken out of the ship. The other party was to prepare for an excursion
toward the south which had in view the exploration of the immediate
environs and the establishment of a depot.

On Februar