OBSERVATIONS
ON THE PRESENT STATE
OF THE
AFFAIRS
OF
THE RIVER PLATE.

BY

THOMAS BAINES.

LIVERPOOL:
PRINTED AND PUBLISHED AT THE LIVERPOOL TIMES OFFICE,
CASTLE STREET.

1845.

[Pg 3]

OBSERVATIONS
ON
THE PRESENT STATE OF
THE AFFAIRS OF THE RIVER PLATE.

The destructive war which has now been waged for so many years, by the Chief of the Province of Buenos Ayres against the Republic of Uruguay, involves questions of so much importance to the commercial interests, and to the national honour of England, that nothing can account for the very slight attention which it has received from Parliament and the press, except the fact that many of the principal considerations connected with it have never yet been fully brought before the British public. In order to supply this deficiency, and to show how much it concerns the character of this country that this war should at once be brought to a close in the only manner in which it can be ended; that is, by the prompt and decided interference of the Governments of France and England, I have thought that it might be useful to lay before the public the following observations and documents, explanatory of the principles involved in the war; of the conduct pursued by Mr. Mandeville, the British Minister to the Argentine Confederation, at the most critical period of its progress; and of the strong and rapidly-increasing interest which this country, and more especially the port of Liverpool, has in the preservation of the threatened independence of the Republic of Uruguay.

Most of the readers of these remarks are no doubt aware that the Province of the Banda Oriental, or eastern bank of the River Plate, was first constituted an independent state, under the title of the Republic of Uruguay, at the close of the war between the Argentine Confederation and the Empire of Brazil, in the year 1828. This arrangement was in a great measure brought about by the good offices of Lord Ponsonby, the Ambassador of the British Government to the Court of Rio, and the result of his negociations [Pg 4] was so agreeable to the English Government, that the peace thus concluded was made a subject of congratulation in the speech from the throne in the year 1829. The principal object in forming this new Republic was, to put an end to the destructive war between Buenos Ayres and Brazil, originating in the claims put forward by both these countries to the possession of the Province of the Banda Oriental. The Brazilians, who had had possession of it for several years, were naturally unwilling to have so warlike and powerful a state as the Argentine Republic on their most vulnerable frontier, and the Argentines were not less unwilling to have the Brazilian frontier pushed more than a hundred leagues up the River Plate, and within the limits of the ancient Viceroyalty of Paraguay, which had for ages been occupied by the Spanish race. As the only effectual solution of these difficulties, the English Government proposed that the Banda Oriental should be rendered independent of both countries, and this, after some negociation, was agreed to by all the parties concerned.

The primary object of the mediation of the English Government was the re-establishment and preservation of peace and amity between two nations, with both of which England had valuable commercial relations; and this object has been completely gained by the arrangement then effected. During the sixteen years which have elapsed since the treaty was concluded, no serious difference has occurred between Brazil and the Argentine Confederation, nor is any likely to occur so long as the barrier of an independent state is interposed between them. It is only during the last two years that serious discussions have arisen between them, and these have originated in the fears of Brazil, lest the successes of the Buenos Ayrean army, now before Monte Video, should be such as to break down the barrier established by the Ponsonby treaty, and again to bring the Buenos Ayreans on the frontiers of Rio Grande. From apprehension of this event, the Brazilian Government has allowed General Paz, with his military staff, to pass through its territory to place himself at the head of the Correntino insurgents, who have risen against Rosas, and made common cause with Monte Video; it has also recalled Admiral Grenfell, its commander in the River Plate, as well as its diplomatic agent at Monte Video, for engaging in an ill-timed quarrel with the [Pg 5] Monte Videan Government; and if the Buenos Ayrean army should succeed in gaining possession of the city of Monte Video, it will in all probability, whether backed or not by England and France, decide to take part in the war, rather than allow General Rosas to succeed in the designs which he now avows on the Republics of Uruguay and Paraguay, the two bulwarks of the western provinces of the Brazilian empire. Notwithstanding the recent victories of the Brazilian General, Baron Caxias, over the rebels of Rio Grande dó Sul, that province is still in a very unsettled state—far too much so to be safely exposed to the machinations of such dangerous neighbours as Generals Rosas and Oribe. It may, therefore, be confidently expected, that if the great naval powers do not interpose, the progress of events will again bring on a war between Brazil, strengthened by the army of Uruguay, under General Rivera, that of Corrientes under General Paz, and the forces of Paraguay on one side; and Buenos Ayres on the other, backed by those other provinces of the Argentine Confederation, which still follow the fortunes of General Rosas.

What the result of such a war would be no one can predict, but its first consequence would be another blockade of Buenos Ayres, by the Brazilian fleet, its next the reinforcement of the garrison of Monte Video by a detachment of Brazilian troops, and its probable final result, after the whole of the countries engaged in it had been thoroughly ruined, the establishment of the ascendancy either of the government of Buenos Ayres, or of that of Brazil at Monte Video. This would be alike opposed to the wishes and the interests of the Monte Videans themselves, to the interests of a large portion of South America, and to those of the nations trading with it. A small Independent State, like the Republic of Uruguay, governed as it has ever been since the date of its independence on the most liberal commercial principles, is the best of all checks on the commercial illiberality of the neighbouring countries, and is much too valuable to be sacrificed by the Government of any commercial nation which has at heart the prosperity of its subjects.

If it should be said that neutral nations have no right to interpose between belligerents, even for the purpose of preserving the national independence of the weaker, I answer, that no longer since [Pg 6] than last year, the Government of this country was prepared to have interposed, if it had been necessary, in order to preserve the independence of the Empire of Morocco; and that the Government of France fully admitted the right of England to do so in such a case, by giving a promise beforehand that it would not use its victory either to conquer the territory or to destroy the independence of the offending state. The reason why England was prepared to resist the conquest of Morocco was, that such a conquest would have seriously endangered her interests and influence in the Mediterranean; and one principal reason why she should interfere to prevent the conquest of Monte Video by the army and squadron of Buenos Ayres is, that such a conquest would jeopardise her valuable commerce and her influence in the River Plate, the only outlet of regions larger than all the great Kingdoms of Western Europe united. Brazil has the same right to interpose that Austria would have to resist the conquest of Sardinia, or Prussia the conquest of Belgium, by France.

Many advantages have resulted both to the commerce of foreign nations, and to the prosperity of the people of Uruguay, from the recognition of its independence both of Buenos Ayres and Brazil, which were not anticipated at the time when it was established, the whole of which, as we shall show, will be lost if it is allowed to be absorbed by or placed in dependence on Buenos Ayres. Amongst these advantages are the following:—

The creation of an Independent State on the eastern bank of the River Plate has given the commercial nations of Europe trading with those vast countries of South America, whose only means of intercourse with the rest of the world is through that River, a greatly increased security against being again cut off from communication with them, as they were during the Brazilian blockade, in the years 1825, 6, and 7. At that time, both banks of the river were involved in the war, the city of Monte Video being in the hands of the Brazilians, and the Province which now forms the Republic of Uruguay being in arms against them. The consequence of this state of things was, that the whole of the countries watered by the great rivers Parana, Paraguay, Uruguay, and their innumerable tributary streams, as well as the provinces of Buenos Ayres and Monte Video, [Pg 7] were cut off from all communication with Europe for nearly three years, and that the great commerce which even then was carried on by England and other nations with those countries, was for the time destroyed. Some notion may be formed of the inconvenience which this country alone sustained from the blockade of the river, from the following facts. In the years 1822, 3, 4, and 5, the four years preceding it, the average annual value of the exports from England to the River Plate, was £909,330, whilst in 1826, 7, and 8, during the blockade, it fell to £279,463, and in 1827, to £150,000, and even that small remnant of trade was carried on by vessels which broke the blockade. At a subsequent period, namely, in the years 1838-9, and 40, there was again a blockade in the River Plate, established by France, a power much more capable of making a blockade respected than Brazil, but as the east bank of the river was no longer under the control of Buenos Ayres, which was the power against whom the blockade was directed, the evils resulting from it were comparatively small. Foreign ships were still able to proceed to Monte Video, (thanks to the independence of Uruguay), and thus, although one line of intercourse with the interior was cut off by the blockade of the port of Buenos Ayres, the other up the river Uruguay was kept open. In consequence of this, the evils of the blockade were, in a great measure, confined to the city of Buenos Ayres and its immediate neighbourhood, for the eastern bank of the river flourished more than ever, the communication with the interior was never closed, and the commerce of the nations trading with those countries continued to increase. When it is considered (and it ought never to be lost sight of,) that the commerce of foreign nations with the whole of the central regions of South America depends entirely on the keeping open one or other of these lines of communication, it will be seen that it is a matter, not merely of national but of universal importance, though in an especial manner to England, to maintain the entire independence of Monte Video of Buenos Ayres, so as to diminish as much as possible the danger of both being closed at the same time and by the same political events. We say the entire independence of Monte Video, for though the nominal [Pg 8] independence of the country might be preserved, even if the Buenos Ayrean army, under General Oribe, should get possession of the city of Monte Video, that officer would be compelled to lean on General Rosas for support to protect him against the majority of his fellow countrymen, who are now in arms against him quite as much as the chiefs of the Banda Oriental were in 1826, 7, and 8, compelled to lean on Buenos Ayres for protection against the arms of Brazil; and to follow the fortunes of Buenos Ayres in any war in which General Rosas might involve himself, either with Brazil or any of the nations of Europe. This would again be fatal to the trade of the River Plate.

It is not generally known, although it is very important that it should be, that this trade amounted in 1842, including both imports and exports, to upwards of Three Millions sterling, at the port of Monte Video alone. It is still, however, in its infancy, and requires nothing but a few years of peace, with the introduction of steam navigation on the Parana, the Uruguay, and their tributaries,[A] to give it an extension which will render it of vital importance to the merchants and manufacturers of England. The Parana and the Paraguay, together, are known to be navigable to Assumption, which is fifteen hundred miles above Buenos Ayres, to vessels drawing nine feet water, and there is every reason to believe that both those rivers might be navigated a thousand miles higher by iron steamers, such as those recently built at Birkenhead, by order of the East India Company, for the navigation of the Indus and the Sutlej, the former of which, when carrying guns and troops, draw only four feet water, the latter of which, when loaded in the same manner, not more than two and a half. The Uruguay is equally navigable for several hundred miles to the Salto Chico, (the little leap), and if a short canal was cut, to turn that rapid and the much more formidable one of the Salto Grande,[B] it would be navigable for many hundred miles above the Falls. Several [Pg 9] of the tributaries of these gigantic streams are larger than the Rhine, the Elbe, or the Tagus, and great numbers of them than the Thames or the Mersey, and the whole of this vast net-work of waters is connected with the still more stupendous river of the Amazons, by a short portage to the Madeira, one of the principal tributaries of that king of rivers. The natural products which these unrivalled lines of river communication might be made the means of bringing to the ports on the Rivers Plate and Amazons are varied and inexhaustible. In addition to the large supplies of hides, wool, tallow, and provisions, which these countries now furnish, Paraguay and Corrientes are capable of supplying the finest timber for ship-building purposes, sugar the growth of free labour, the best kinds of tobacco, cotton-wool, dyewoods, drugs, the tea of Paraguay, and the precious metals from Bolivia and the back provinces of Brazil. It is now only twenty or thirty years since steam navigation was introduced on the Mississippi, and the consequence of its introduction has been an extension of cultivation and population such as the world never before saw. The natural resources of the great valleys of the Parana, Paraguay, and Uruguay, merely require to be developed by the same means to make Monte Video and Buenos Ayres as flourishing as New Orleans, and to make the commerce of the River Plate rival that of the Mississippi. It is perhaps vain to hope that anything will induce the present Governor of Buenos Ayres to abandon the suicidal policy which is at once impeding the intercourse with the interior, and depriving that city of the principal benefits of its unrivalled position, but this only renders it the more necessary to keep open the only other course, namely, that through the Uruguay, by which the resources of these vast countries can be brought into activity.

For another of the great advantages which has resulted from the independence of Monte Video, has been the opening of a new channel for the commercial intercourse between Europe and the central states of South America, in peace as well as in war; and this channel the Monte Videan Government has laboured to improve and keep open, as zealously and as successfully as the Buenos Ayrean Government has laboured to narrow and impede [Pg 10] the old ones. The Buenos Ayrean Government has been warned repeatedly by its warmest friends of the consequences which would result from its illiberal commercial policy; but they might just as well have reasoned with the winds; for, the only effect of the contrast between the rapidly increasing prosperity of Monte Video and the declining state of Buenos Ayres, has been to excite the most deadly hatred and jealousy towards Monte Video on the part of the Buenos Ayrean Government, and a settled determination to drag down that rapidly improving city to its own level. The following sketch of the commercial policy of the two countries will show what have been the principal causes of the prosperity of Monte Video, and what of the decline of Buenos Ayres; and also how strong a claim the policy of the former gives it on the sympathy and support of this country.

A large portion of the revenue, both of Monte Video and of Province of Buenos Ayres, is raised by taxes on the importation of foreign goods, and the rate of duties is not excessive in either case. It is not on this account that any one complains of the Buenos Ayrean Government, but because it confines foreign commerce to the single port of Buenos Ayres, and excludes both foreigners and foreign vessels from the other ports of the Confederation, as strictly as the Chinese formerly excluded them from every port except Canton. This it is able to effect by its command over the entrance to the river Parana, the direct route to Entre Rios, Corrientes, and the other provinces of the Confederation. Whilst the provincial Government of Buenos Ayres thus excludes all foreign vessels from the Parana, and as far as its control extends from the Uruguay, it claims the right to expend the whole of the customs' revenue raised at Buenos Ayres. The upper provinces very naturally consider this unjust, and insist on having either a share of the revenue collected at Buenos Ayres (somewhat on the principle adopted amongst the states of the German Zollverein), or on having a general Congress of all the provinces of the Confederation to decide how the money shall be distributed. This General Rosas and his adherents refuse, and this refusal, coupled with the equally positive refusal of the same parties to allow foreign vessels to ascend the river, is one principal cause of the frequent wars between the states of the Argentine Confederation on the banks of the river and the Government of [Pg 11] Buenos Ayres, one of which is now raging between it and Corrientes. In this way the commerce with the interior is continually interrupted. The policy of the Monte Videan Government is in every respect the reverse of this, for it not only throws open the ports of Monte Video, Maldonado, and Colonia, on the River Plate, but those of Soriano and Paysandú, on the Uruguay, the Yaguaron, on the Laguna Merin, and the dry port of Taquarembó on the Brazilian frontier to all the world, and thus gives every part of the republic all the advantages of foreign commerce.

There is a still greater difference, if it is possible, in the policy adopted by the two governments with regard to the transit trade. At Monte Video goods may be landed without the payment of any duty, may be there deposited in the Custom-house stores for any length of time, on the payment of a smaller warehouse rent than is usually paid in Liverpool, and may be sent to any of the independent countries in the interior, or re-shipped to foreign parts, without the payment of a dollar. The Government goes even further than this, for it allows goods in transit to be conveyed through the whole territory of the Republic, with a guia or Custom-house Permit to all parts of the frontier, and to be forwarded into the Argentine provinces of Entre Rios and Corrientes, into the Republic of Paraguay, and into the back provinces of the empire of Brazil, perfectly free from duty. Hence goods are constantly forwarded up the Uruguay, instead of going to Buenos Ayres to pay duty to General Rosas. The natural consequence of this is, that the people of all the adjoining states have a friendly feeling towards Monte Video. Corrientes has several times risen against the connection with General Rosas, in support of Monte Video, and Brazil is prepared, if necessary, to interfere to save it from his grasp. In fact, it is quite evident that nothing but an entire change of policy on the part of Buenos Ayres can prevent a general war against its usurpations. The policy of Rosas with regard to goods in transit to the Independent States of the interior is altogether different from that of Monte Video, for, when landed at Buenos Ayres, they pay the same duties as if they were intended for consumption there, and not a sixpence, or what is less than a sixpence, a Buenos Ayrean [Pg 12] paper dollar, is ever returned. When goods are intended for re-exportation by sea, the difference is in appearance less, but much the same in reality, for whilst they can be landed at Monte Video without paying any duty, can remain there as long as the owners like, and can then be re-exported duty free, at Buenos Ayres they cannot be landed without paying the full duties, their owners lose all claim to have any part of those duties returned, if they are not re-exported within six months, and it is only with the greatest difficulty and after waiting many months that they obtain any return at all, even if they are exported within that time.

A similar contrast is also seen in the spirit in which the Governments of Buenos Ayres and Monte Video treat the diplomatic agents of foreign nations. Soon after the death of the Dictator Francia, the English Government determined to send a diplomatic agent to the Republic of Paraguay. This gentleman, Mr. Gordon, first landed at Buenos Ayres, hoping to be allowed to proceed up the Parana to Assumption, the capital, but he soon found that it was no part of General Rosas's policy to allow any such communication. The consequence was, that after remaining at Buenos Ayres for some time combatting the pretences under which permission was refused, he found that there was no hope of his being allowed to proceed to the seat of his mission, through the countries subject to the dominion of General Rosas, and crossed over to Monte Video. There he was received with every attention, and furnished by General Rivera with a guard of honour, under whose escort he travelled to the frontiers of Paraguay. Mr. Gordon's letter of acknowledgement to General Rivera will be found in the Appendix, and it would be difficult to find a stronger illustration of the opposite spirit of the two Governments than is presented by this transaction. Not Francia himself was ever more determined to cut off Paraguay from communication with the rest of the world than is General Rosas, and the key to his conduct is, that he is determined, if possible, to reduce the people of that Republic to subjection to his authority. No longer since than the 15th of January last, a long article appeared in the official Gazette of Buenos Ayres, censuring the Governments of Brazil and Bolivia for recognizing the independence of Paraguay.[Pg 13]

In addition to all these advantages arising out of the independence of the Republic of Uruguay, it ought to be mentioned that the Government of Monte Video has preserved an undepreciated silver currency through all its difficulties, whilst the Buenos Ayrean Government has issued such masses of paper without ever redeeming it, that the Buenos Ayrean paper dollar is not worth more than 4-1/4d. at the present time. The other states of the Argentine Confederation positively refuse to take the Buenos Ayrean paper money, but foreign merchants are compelled to take it, or to dispose of their goods by barter, which is seldom possible.

The consequence of the liberal commercial system adopted by Monte Video, aided by the excellence of its situation has been to raise that city, in fourteen years, to the position of one of the first commercial places in America, as will be seen from the following summary of the export and import trade in 1842, the year before the commencement of the siege:—

EXPORTS.

How much this extensive trade has increased since the establishment of the independence of Monte Video, will be seen from the following statement of the increase of British shipping from 1830 to 1842:—

[Pg 14]

BRITISH SHIPPING.

Up to the 6th of September, 1842, 128 British vessels had arrived at Monte Video during that year.

COMPARISON OF THE COMMERCE OF MONTE VIDEO AND BUENOS AYRES.

Number of merchant vessels arrived at the Ports of Monte Video and Buenos Ayres during the half-year ending June 30th, 1842:—

Great as this trade is, there is no reason why its future increase should not be as rapid as its past. There are at present several millions of cattle roving over the boundless pastures watered by the Uruguay, the Rio Negro, the St. Lucia, and the two hundred arroyos or rivulets which flow into them, and with a few years of peace, this number would be doubled, or if it was found more profitable, flocks of sheep might be introduced instead. The repeal of the duty on foreign wool, by the Act of 1844, gives additional encouragement to the raising of this kind of stock, and the reduction in the duty on foreign provisions made by the tariff of 1842, would, if this country was at peace, throw a considerable portion of the provision trade created by that reduction of duty, and at present monopolized by the United States, into Monte Video. Enormous quantities of meat are now wasted, which it [Pg 15] might be worth while to prepare for this market, in a way suited for the English taste.

Pastoral countries, such as the territory of Uruguay, New South Wales, Van Dieman's Land, and South Africa, have this great advantage over arable countries that their resources can be developed much more rapidly, with a much smaller amount of labour, and with much less capital. This is one of the causes of the sudden rise of the trade with Australia, and it is also a considerable cause of the rapid development of the prosperity of Monte Video. Its power of producing hides, wool, tallow, and provisions is unlimited, by any thing except the deficient numbers of its population; and whilst on this subject, I may mention that Monte Video is the only one of all the Republics formed out of the ancient possessions of Spain which has been sufficiently well governed to attract to its shores any considerable number of emigrants from Europe. It will be seen from the following table extracted from the books of the Custom House at Monte Video, that not less than 33,607 emigrants arrived in that port between November, 1835, and December, 1842:—

Table made from the books at the Sala de Comercio of the number of passengers who arrived at Monte Video from Nov. 1835 inclusive, to the end of 1842.

[Pg 16]

Of this large number of emigrants, 13,676, it will be seen, were from the Basque provinces; 696 from France; 3806 from Spain; 6789 from Genoa; 5152 from the Canary Islands; 2247 from Portugal and Brazil, and 1241 from other parts of the world. If, as has been said by one of our greatest writers, there is no worse sign of the condition of a country than the fact of large masses of its subjects leaving it, surely it must be considered an equally strong proof of the goodness of a Government and the resources of a country when great masses of foreign emigrants are pouring into it. In this respect, Monte Video stands pre-eminent above all the States of America, except those founded by the British race, and considering the limited extent of its territory, and the short period of its independent existence, it can scarcely be said to yield to them.

Having thus shown the grounds on which the Government and people of Monte Video are entitled to the sympathies and support of England, I shall now proceed to say a few words on the present disastrous position of the affairs of that Republic.

For the last two years, the city of Monte Video has been besieged by an army composed almost entirely of Buenos Ayrean troops, commanded by General Manuel Oribe, the expatriated President of Uruguay, who claims to be the legal President of the Republic, and whose avowed object is to overturn the present Government, and to seize on supreme power for himself, and blockaded by sea by a Buenos Ayrean squadron, commanded by William Brown, a British subject in the pay of General Rosas. If the army of General Oribe was composed of Monte Videans, England could have nothing to say in this matter, as his success would be merely the substitution of the chief of one native party for another; but this is not the case. Oribe has neither army, fleet, nor treasures of his own, and owes every thing to General Rosas as absolutely as if he was a Buenos Ayrean citizen. To allow him, therefore, to get and to retain possession of Monte Video, would be to establish the authority of Buenos Ayres on the east bank of the river as effectually as on the west, and this I have already shown would be most injurious to the interests of England, of Brazil, and the other adjoining [Pg 17] States, as well as to Monte Video itself, and to the upper States of the Argentine confederation.

Whatever might be the wishes of General Oribe, it is evident that he would have no chance of retaining power any longer than he made himself agreeable to General Rosas. In the city he has a considerable number of supporters amongst the shopkeepers and a few amongst the merchants, but in the country, the landed proprietors and gauchos or peasantry are all opposed to him, and are enrolled in the armies of General Rivera, or his lieutenants. When President, he was besieged and deposed by this class, against which the mere townsmen can effect nothing. If he got possession of the city, he would not be able to raise such a native force as would sustain him. He must, therefore, retain the Buenos Ayrean army in his pay, or he could not stir a mile from the walls without being attacked by the army of Rivera. Hence he would continue in a state of dependence on General Rosas for many years, if indeed he ever became entirely independent of him. Thus, it will be seen, that this is not a struggle to decide whether Oribe or Rivera shall be chief of the Republic, but whether the Republic shall remain independent or become subservient to the will of its bitterest enemy.

If the will of General Rosas should thus be allowed to become the law of Monte Video, the prosperity of that country is at an end. A very large revenue would be required for the support of the Buenos Ayrean mercenaries, and it is not at all unlikely that Rosas, who confiscated the property of the whole of the Unitarian or Centralist Party to pay the expense of a former civil war, would insist on the repayment of the whole, or at least of a part of the expenses of the present war, in carrying on which the finances of Buenos Ayres have been brought to the verge of ruin. To raise the money required for these purposes, there are only two ways; the first, the confiscation of the property of Oribe's opponents; the second, a great increase of the taxes on foreign imports. The first of these measures would destroy all the best connections of the English merchants, and ruin all the most respectable men in the Republic, whilst the second would quite as effectually destroy its foreign commerce.

It is by no means certain, however, that even the name of [Pg 18] independence would long be left to Monte Video, if General Oribe should succeed. General Rosas would, in all probability, soon grow tired of supplying troops and money to support another man's authority, whilst General Oribe's necessities would compel him to submit to anything which his patron might propose, even if he went the length of proposing the annexation of Monte Video to Buenos Ayres, in humble imitation of the annexation of Texas to the United States. The last letters from Monte Video state, that Oribe has been getting together, at the Buceo, all the members of his former Legislative Assembly, who had followed him to Buenos Ayres or joined him there, and with their aid he will soon form an assembly quite capable of performing any act which it may suit his convenience to have performed. With such materials we shall scarcely fail to have a repetition of the annexation of Texas on the banks of the River Plate, whenever it may suit the plans of General Rosas and the necessities of General Oribe to effect it.

It is not, however, merely on grounds of policy and humanity that England is called upon to interfere in this contest, but it is bound to do so by the distinct pledges of assistance given by Mr. Mandeville, the English Minister at Buenos Ayres, to the Government of Monte Video, in the name of his own Government. In December, 1842, at the most critical period of the war, that gentleman formally announced, both to the Governments of Monte Video and Buenos Ayres, that England and France had determined to put an end to the war, and demanded that they should both cease from hostilities.[C] Not content with this, he addressed [Pg 19] an official letter to Senor Vidal, the Secretary of State to the Republic of Uruguay, urging him and his Government not to relax, but rather to redouble their efforts to resist the Buenos Ayreans, until the arrival of the assistance which, he stated, might be expected daily from Europe.[D] The letters of Mr. Mandeville [Pg 20] will be found in the appendix to this pamphlet, and it will be for the public to decide whether promises so distinct and emphatic, accompanied by exhortations so strong, do not justify the Government of Monte Video, and the merchants trading with that country, in calling on the British Government to fulfil the engagements of its representative. Indeed it is impossible that the Government of England can allow Monte Video to be taken and plundered, the leading men of the Republic to be murdered or driven into exile, and the Republic itself to be annihilated, without destroying the high reputation which England has so long possessed in all those countries for honour and uprightness.

That these consequences will be justly chargeable either on the Representative or the Government of this country, if Monte Video should be taken, is evident from a consideration of the circumstances under which Mr. Mandeville gave his promises and his urgent recommendation quoted above. The letters containing them were written in the period which intervened between the total defeat of the Monte Videan army at Arroyo Grande, and the advance of General Oribe and the Buenos Ayrean forces on that city. When they were given, the Monte Videan Government was in a state of the utmost uncertainty as to whether further resistance would not be a useless waste of human life, and whether it could have any other effect than to render its own position more desperate. The infantry of Rivera, the only force up to that time available for the defence of the city was destroyed, and the cavalry was broken, and discouraged, besides being totally useless for the purpose of resisting a siege. Within the city were a considerable number of Oribe's supporters, and many neutrals, including nine-tenths of the foreign population. At this critical moment the letters of Mr. Mandeville, given above, were written, and it is the opinion of those who were at Monte Video at the time, that it was those letters which induced [Pg 21] the Government to forego all attempts at negotiation, and to call upon the whole population to rise and resist to the last. With this view, besides calling on those classes of the people which had previously taken part in the struggle, to rally round the Government, it declared all the negro slaves in the Republic free, and formed them into regiments of infantry for the defence of the capital, and it also gave every encouragement to the foreign population which had emigrated for the purpose of following the pursuits of peaceful industry, to take up arms. By these means, an army of some thousand men was formed within the city, chiefly from classes not before compromised, whilst in the open country, the landed proprietors and peasantry, were encouraged to take arms again under the command of their favourite chief Rivera. Thus the war was renewed, and the whole population of the Republic was again engaged in a struggle which, from the great disproportion of the forces, nothing but the promised intervention of England and France can bring to a close which will not be fatal to them.

My object in referring to these facts is not to excite odium against Mr. Mandeville, who could have had no object in making the promises contained in his letters of the 28th December and 12th of January, except that of preserving the independence of Monte Video, until the forces which he expected from Europe had arrived. In a previous letter, quoted in the Appendix, he positively refused to give any such promises without the permission of his own Government; and in his letter of the 12th of January he bases his promises of aid to the Monte Videan Government on this assertion:—"The Interview between the British Ambassador (at Paris) and Guizot took place on the 9th September, when he agreed to all that Lord Cowley proposed of uniting their forces to put an end to the war." I will not suppose, even for the sake of argument, that an English Minister made such a statement as the above without believing it to be true, still less that he made it for the sake of exciting fallacious and unfounded hopes in the minds of men struggling for existence. He must have believed his own assertions, and he must have had some strong, if not conclusive reasons for believing them.[Pg 22]

It is just as little my wish to cast odium on the English Government as on Mr. Mandeville. Its foreign policy in other parts of the world has been wise, dignified, and honest, and all that is asked is that it will act on the same principles in this transaction. No one can doubt that it is sincerely desirous of restoring peace in the River Plate. The reason which Sir Robert Peel gives for the non-fulfilment of Mr. Mandeville's promises is that he had exceeded his orders in giving them. That there was a mistake somewhere or other cannot be doubted, though whether it arose from want of explicitness in the directions given to Mr. Mandeville or from want of comprehension on his part no one is in a position to decide, except those who have seen them. What, however, is perfectly clear is this, that the promises given by him to the Monte Videan Government and the assurances given by him to his own countrymen have had a most important influence on their conduct, and have so far compromised the British Government as to add greatly to the other many and strong reasons for interposing. It is no longer a question of whether an independent Government, formed under the mediation of England shall be sacrificed, and along with it the peace which it has so long been the means of preserving between two of the most important states of South America, neither is it a mere question of whether the commercial intercourse with the finest regions of that great continent shall be carried on without impediment; it is not now even a question of whether a friendly Government shall be destroyed and all connected with it ruined; these considerations, great as they are, yield to the consideration that the honour of this country has been pledged by its authorized representative, and that promises have been given which cannot be violated without deep disgrace to the hitherto unsullied honour of the English name.

Postscript.—Since the above observations were written, explanations have been given by the Prime Minister in Parliament which encourage us to hope that her Majesty's Ministers have at last decided to fulfil the promises made by their late representative Mr. Mandeville, by taking effectual steps to terminate the war, and to secure the independence of the [Pg 23] Republic of Uruguay. They have only to speak the word, and to make such a display of force as will show that they are in earnest, and Monte Video is saved. Admiral Brown, or as Commodore Purvis calls him, "Mr. Brown, the British subject, commanding the Buenos Ayrean squadron before Monte Video," will never run the double risk of being sunk by an English broadside, or of being hung as a traitor by resisting the orders of his own Government, if he is convinced that his Government means to be obeyed, and the moment that he strikes his flag, Oribe will have nothing left but to make the best terms for himself and his army. He draws all his provisions from the fleet, and must retire when his supplies are cut off.

Within the last few days information has been received from Buenos Ayres strongly confirmatory of some of the views stated above. According to letters from that city of the 7th February, the Governments of Brazil and Paraguay have formed a treaty offensive and defensive, in which they stipulate for the freedom of the rivers flowing through the territories of both. This is a movement of the greatest commercial as well as political importance, and if the independence of Monte Video is preserved, there can be no doubt that it will join this league, and that the line of communication with the interior of South America up the River Uruguay will be kept open, even if General Rosas should persist in his illegal anti-social policy of closing the Parana against foreign nations.

[Pg 24]

APPENDIX.

CORRESPONDENCE OF H. J. MANDEVILLE, ESQ.,
British Minister to the Argentine Confederation,

WITH

SENHOR VIDAL,
Secretary of State of the Republic of Uruguay.

Buenos Ayres, May 26th, 1842.

My dear M. de Vidal,—I have received your official letter of the 20th May, with the enclosure which you have had the goodness and frankness to communicate to me,—and also the two private letters of the same date, which you have done me the honour to write to me.

I beg you to believe that I share with you all the disagreeableness of the suspense which the silence of the British Government to my despatches of the 4th December last causes to us both. To me it is only a matter of a little personal inconvenience that I ought not, nor do I, regard; to you it is very different—and all that I can say to you on the subject is, that the moment that I hear from England respecting it, I will not lose a moment in communicating it to you—of this be assured, as of the sincere esteem and consideration with which I remain,

My dear M. de Vidal, always truly yours,

J. H. MANDEVILLE.

(PRIVATE AND CONFIDENTIAL.)

Buenos Ayres, June 8th,1842.

My dear M. de Vidal,—Although I have not received any official answer to the proposals which I transmitted by your Excellency's desire to her Majesty's Government, on the 6th of December last, as a basis for the conclusion of a Treaty of Amity and Commerce with the Republic of the Uruguay, I am led to believe and know that they will not be accepted, for the reasons which I stated to your Excellency at the time these proposals were made to me—namely, that the acceptance of this offer would be at variance with the policy and practice of her Majesty's Government, whose wish, in matters of commerce, is to stand on the same footing as other nations, and to enjoy no advantages but such as would, upon similar terms, be conceded to any other friendly power, and that accordingly her Majesty's Government have no intention of availing themselves of this proposal.[Pg 25]

I therefore again most pressingly renew, to your Excellency, the proposals I made when I first had the honour to see your Excellency, to negociate with me a Treaty of Amity, Commerce, and Navigation, upon the basis which was presented to the Monte Videan Government by Mr. Hamilton, in the year 1835, and brought forward by me at a later period.

I am enabled to assure your Excellency that Her Majesty's Government is not indifferent to the welfare and prosperity of the Republic of the Uruguay, as your Excellency will shortly see by the measures which will be taken for its preservation, and to which I am sure you will be a willing party, and I beg your Excellency to believe that nothing will strengthen these good intentions on the part of Her Majesty's Government so much as a frank and cordial acceptance of the terms of the above mentioned Treaty.

I have the honour to be with the highest consideration, Sir,

Your Excellency's obedient humble servant,

J. H. MANDEVILLE.

    To his Excellency, Don Jose Antonino Vidal, &c. &c. &c.

(MOST CONFIDENTIAL.)

Buenos Ayres, June 10th, 1842.

My dear M. de Vidal,—My Government has seen with regret that the results of my visits to Monte Video, in December and January last, was not concession of a Treaty of Amity, Commerce and Navigation between Great Britain and the Republic of Uruguay upon the footing proposed by my predecessor Mr. Hamilton, and subsequently by me, and I have been represented as not having been sufficiently urgent with your Excellency to conclude this treaty with me, and I have been blamed in consequence.

I therefore appeal to your Excellency if I did not do my utmost to induce you to negociate it with me, observing, that once concluded, it would not prejudice the acceptance of any other additional proposal on your part which might be added to it afterwards and form additional articles—and that I only desisted from urging it upon you, when I saw that my solicitations were of no avail, and you were resolved to await the answer to the proposition which I transmitted to London by your Excellency's desire.

I am anxious that this circumstance should be put in its true light, and that I may be exonerated from an undeserved censure—and still more that your Excellency should commence the negociations of the treaty with me, which would be the best answer to the reports of the lukewarmness of my wishes in this business.

Believe me to be, my dear M. de Vidal, with great truth and regard, most sincerely and faithfully yours,

J. H. MANDEVILLE.

    To his Excellency Don Antonino Vidal.

[Pg 26]

(SECRET AND CONFIDENTIAL)

Buenos Ayres, June 18th, 1842.

My dear M. de Vidal,—The measures which I alluded to in my private letter to your Excellency of the 10th instant—that her Majesty's Government will take for the effectual protection of the Republic of Uruguay are a joint mediation of Great Britain and France, which I am formally to tender to the Buenos Ayrean Government, upon the arrival of the French Minister here, Baron de Lurde, to adjust the difference between Monte Video and Buenos Ayres.

I did not acquaint you of this important intelligence in my last letters, on account of the possibility of their falling into other hands; and as I am not to make the formal offer of joint mediation of Great Britain and France, until the arrival of the French Minister at Buenos Ayres, I think, for many reasons, which I am sure you will share with me, that it should not be made known; but I have taken the first safe opportunity of communicating it to you, for your own satisfaction and for that of your colleagues.

Believe me always, my dear M. de Vidal, with great regard and esteem, most faithfully yours,

J. H. MANDEVILLE.

    To his Excellency M. de Vidal, &c. &c. &c.

Buenos Ayres, June 23d,1842.

Sir,—I have had the honour to receive your Excellency's dispatch, marked confidential, of the 18th instant, in answer to mine of the 8th, which was delivered to me this morning, the contents of which will cause great satisfaction to her Majesty's Government, as to me they have procured the highest gratification. Her Majesty's Ministers will see, in the determination of the Monte Videan Government to conclude a Treaty of Amity, Commerce, and Navigation, with Great Britain, on the terms proposed by Mr. Hamilton and by me, the most unequivocal proof of the loyalty of its intentions towards the British Empire, and of its friendly sentiments towards her Majesty's Government.

I shall, in consequence, avail myself of the friendly dispositions of the Monte Videan Government for the adjustment and conclusion of the treaty which your Excellency has done me the honour to communicate to me, and I propose, in a few days, to embark for Monte Video, for the termination of so honourable and desirable an event.

I have the honour to be, with the highest consideration, Sir,

Your Excellency's obedient humble servant,

J. H. MANDEVILLE.

    To his Excellency D. Jose Antonino Vidal, &c. &c. &c.

[Pg 27]

(PRIVATE.)

Buenos Ayres, June 24th, 1842.

My dear M. de Vidal,—I have received your two most amiable and friendly letters of the 18th and 20th instant; it is needless for me to tell you the delight and gratification which they have procured to me.

I have little more to add to my acknowledgement of the receipt of these letters, as I shall so very soon have, God willing, the satisfaction of seeing you, except to renew to my heartfelt thanks for their contents, which only serve to increase the sentiments of friendship and esteem which your conduct to me has inspired me with, since the first day of our personal acquaintance.

I reserve all communications upon any other subject until we meet, which will be about the middle of next week, but rely upon it, and it is with pride I tell you, you and your Government will be satisfied.

Believe me ever, my dear M. de Vidal, with the highest regard and consideration,

Most faithfully yours,

J. H. MANDEVILLE.

(CONFIDENTIAL.)

Buenos Ayres, June 25th, 1842.

My dear M. de Vidal,—Would you have any objections to have the treaty copied immediately?

I have motives so strong not for coming back to Buenos Ayres, but for being able to return at the moment when it becomes necessary, that I should impart them to you, which I cannot well by this conveyance.

I will answer for your concurrence with me in this desire to be ready, at a moment's notice, to come back here.

Another motive, which is a very secondary one, and that is, having no steward at this moment, the one who was with me for six years having left me to set up a coffee-house. I cannot bring my establishment with me, even if I had a house to go to at Monte Video, and therefore I am obliged to live at the Consul's, which is a great inconvenience to him, and consequently very disagreeable to me; but, as I have said, this is a trifling consideration, which may be got over very easily. Again, Mr. Hood may come by the next packet—where shall I go then?

All these considerations, put together, make me very anxious, not so much to get through the treaty, for the sake of concluding it, as to be ready, when circumstances require my departure, to come back here.

Ever, my dear M. de Vidal, your faithful and sincere friend,

J. H. MANDEVILLE.

[Pg 28]

(PRIVATE.)

Buenos Ayres, August 18th, 1842.

My dear M. de Vidal,—I had the greatest pleasure in receiving your friendly letter, without date, which was accompanied by an official note brought to me by M. le Comte de Lurde, to which you require an answer.

If you will weigh the contents of this note, you will find that it is impossible that I can answer it in any other way, than has done the French Plenipotentiary by that of acknowledging the receipt of it.

In the first place, no formal tender of mediation has as yet been made by the French Plenipotentiary and me, and therefore, until it has been positively refused, it would be as unusual as it would be impolitic to have recourse to threats to enforce the acceptance of it. But other and more powerful reasons forbid this line of conduct; you who are accustomed to give directions to your foreign Ministers and agents, know that they must act by their instructions, and by their instructions alone. I cannot take upon myself to say what means are at the disposal of the Comte de Lurde, but I know I have no more the power of constraining General Rosas to pay respect to the wishes of the mediatory powers, as far as physical force goes than you have.

If I were to ask the British naval officer on this station to land his men and garrison Monte Video, or prevent any power blockading the port, (which in my opinion, you may rely upon it, will never be done by General Rosas), he would laugh at me, unless I could show that I had positive orders from my Government to require it of him.

To make a declaration to this effect to General Rosas, without having the means of carrying it into execution, would be only exposing myself to ridicule, and my future communications to this Government as unworthy of belief.

And as it is unnecessary, unless you require it, that I should put these reasons, for not acceding to what you demand, in an official note, I have answered it word for word, as the Comte de Lurde has informed me he has done, by simply acknowledging the receipt of it, thus privately stating to you my reasons for so doing.

Believe me, my dear M. de Vidal, always and faithfully,

Your sincere Friend,

J. H. MANDEVILLE.

(PRIVATE.)

Buenos Ayres, August 25th, 1842.

My M. de Vidal,—I have to thank you for your letter of the 15th instant, and for the information you gave me in it with[Pg 29] regard to Ellauri's proceedings in London, and to the assurances made to him by Lord Aberdeen of his determination to put an end to the war. His, M. Ellauri's project of a treaty rather surprises me, considering that he was unauthorized by you to propose it, but I suppose Republican Ministers take upon themselves a little more in their negotiations than we Ministers of Monarchs, at all events I hope that they will send me an outline of it from the Foreign Office, as I am very anxious to see what M. Ellauri would have liked to have had.

You may rely upon it, my dear M. de Vidal, that in spite of all your opposers and enemies may say, your confidence in the mediation has not been vain and groundless: Count de Lurde and I are determined to uphold the respectability of the mediation, but we must wait until it be rejected before other measures can be taken.

Yesterday the mediation was formally proposed by M. de Lurde, and by me to Don Felipe de Arana on the part of our respective Sovereigns, and supported by arguments which seemed to make an impression on the Minister. He, of course, could give neither answer nor opinion upon the proposal, and I do not think it very likely that we shall obtain one before the departure of the packet which is fixed for the day after to-morrow.

The picture you give me of the state of your armies in Entre Rios, leaves you little to apprehend.—A private letter from a friend of mine in the Foreign Office says, "By the accounts from Monte Video, we expect to receive by the next packet a demand from the Buenos Ayrean Government to defend it from the troops of General Rivera."

Be assured, my dear M. de Vidal, that I will leave no opportunity neglected to write to you whenever I have any thing to communicate worth your knowing, and that I am always,

Your sincere and faithful Friend,

J. H. MANDEVILLE.

    To his Excellency M. de Vidal, &c. &c. &c.

(PRIVATE.)

Buenos Ayres, October 19th, 1842.

My dear M. de Vidal,—I received by the last packet a letter from Mr. Hood, a part of which I will communicate to you, as I think it right that you should be literally and truly informed of what is going at the Foreign Office, in London, between Lord Aberdeen and M. Ellauri, on the subject of negociation, with respect to a treaty of commerce.[Pg 30]

Mr. Hood says "I am employed modifying the treaty and talking Ellauri into acquiescence to our views. Yesterday, (August 2nd), we had an interview with Lord Canning, and during it I heard that he said he would not hesitate to sign the treaty as now prepared. If it should come to a bargain, I think it may be very likely that the Foreign Office may wish me to take it out to get ratified."

Now, my dear friend, tell me, if you can, how is it possible for M. Ellauri to sign and conclude a treaty, or even to say that he will, unless he has full powers to do so? I am confident that he has neither one nor the other, because you told me he has not, but still it is so very extraordinary his whole conduct that I should like if possible to have it explained.

I had a discourse the other day with a gentleman on the right of the Government of the Republic of Uruguay and this country, to expel any foreigner from their territory, at their pleasure. I know that it is never done but under very grave circumstances; but what I contended for was, the power and the right they possess to do so.

I suppose you have not written to me lately because I did not answer your letter of the 20th ult., but if you have no other, it does not resemble you. Always, my dear M. de Vidal,

Sincerely yours,

J. H. MANDEVILLE.

(PRIVATE AND CONFIDENTIAL.)

Buenos Ayres, October 20th, 1842.

My dear M. de Vidal,—I have not before acknowledged the receipt of your letter of the 20th of last month, for until now I have had nothing to communicate to you that was worth the trouble of taking your time to read.

I am greatly pained by the sad termination of Count de Lurde's and my most strenuous efforts, as far as argument and persuasion could go, to induce the Buenos Ayrean Government to listen to the dictates of sound policy as well as of humanity and accept the mediation of Great Britain and France to put an end to the war. It will grievously disappoint the great expectations of her Majesty's Government, but for which disappointment from my previous dispatches they will be, in a great measure, prepared.

I have set Messrs. Ball and Diehl to work to copy the answer, that no time may be lost in communicating it to you, and I shall send down the Cockatrice with it the moment it is done.

Believe me, my dear M. de Vidal,

Always your sincere faithful Friend,

J. H. MANDEVILLE.

    To his Excellency D. Antonino de Vidal, &c. &c.

[Pg 31]

Buenos Ayres, October 26th, 1842

My dear M. de Vidal,—Neither you nor I were, nor could be surprised at the wretchedness of our negociation, or rather of M. de Lurde's and my attempt to make this Government accept the mediation of Great Britain and France, to put an end to the war, and I am happy to think that when I was last at Monte Video, I prepared her Majesty's Government for this result.

I feel the greatest pleasure to find that my unceasing efforts to obtain the acceptance by the Buenos Ayrean Government of our joint mediation have satisfied you. I can conscientiously say that I have done every thing in my power to make it succeed.

Of course I never meant but that the note should be immediately communicated to the Government, all I requested, and in which I was sure your own discernment and good feelings would make you concur in, was, that it should not be published until it has come out here.

I observe, in all your letters, you write mediation for mediators, as applicable to my expressions.

"My words in one of my preceding letters were, that your reliance on the mediators should not be vain or unfounded." This you have seen and can rely upon. I never hoped or gave you reason to hope that the mediation would be successful, but the results, according to my opinion and belief, (I am no prophet to predict), will not be vain nor illusory. The feelings of the British Government (and as you tell me Lord Aberdeen has himself said) towards the Banda Oriental will be very different since the conclusion of a treaty between it and great Britain to what they were before.

Believe me, my dear M. de Vidal,

Always your sincere and faithful Friend,

J. H. MANDEVILLE.

    To his Excellency M. de Vidal, &c. &c. &c.

Buenos Ayres, November 28th, 1842.

Sir,—I have the honour to transmit to your Excellency a copy of the note from the Buenos Ayrean Minister for Foreign Affairs, transmitting to me the resolution of the Chamber upon the correspondence between me and the French Minister on one part, and M. Arana on the other, upon the subject of the me[Pg 32]diation which was transmitted to the Chamber for its consideration, and a decree which it has issued.

Thus, notwithstanding all my efforts, the Buenos Ayrean Government still continues to refuse her Majesty's mediation, and persist in a war not justified by any national object.

I have the honour to be with the highest consideration, Sir,

Your Excellency's most obedient humble Servant,

J. H. MANDEVILLE.

    To his Excellency Don Jose Antonino Vidal, &c. &c. &c.

(PRIVATE AND CONFIDENTIAL.)

Buenos Ayres, September 2nd, 1842.

My dear M. de Vidal,—I had not time, before the departure of the packet, to answer your private letter of the 24th ult., and now keep my promise made to you in my letter of the 25th ult., of replying to it.

I must first begin by telling you that, some days before the packet sailed, Count de Lurde and I made the formal tender of the mediation in the manner presented to me by my instructions with which I made you acquainted when I was last at Monte Video.

I told M. de Arana that he was doubtless acquainted with the object of our visit, to which he assented, of which he had been informed by previous conversations which he had with me, and which was no longer a secret, for it had formed articles in the Monte Video newspapers, and the topic of conversation in the streets of that Town for weeks. But public or private the object is the same, one of the greatest importance to this country and of serious consideration to Great Britain and to France,—that of urging General Rosas to accept the mediation of France and Great Britain, of which the Count de Lurde and I then made the formal offer to the Buenos Ayrean Government in order to put an end to the deplorable conflict in which Buenos Ayres and Monte Video have for such a length of time been engaged. That Monte Video to my knowledge is anxious and willing to make peace with Buenos Ayres upon fair and reasonable terms, and I could produce authority for what I advanced, if required, that the proposal which General Rosas had formerly made, of accepting the mediation of Great Britain upon the condition that General Oribe should be returned to power, was inadmissible, and that it was obviously impossible that either the British or French Governments could sanction, by their mediation, the desire of General Rosas to place in the Presidency of Monte Video a particular individual, who, however meritorious in other respects, may not be acceptable to the majority of the inhabitants of the Oriental State, and that those Governments can only agree to offer to either of the belligerent powers such conditions as one independent State can, consistently with its honour, accept from another.[Pg 33]

I then acquainted his excellency that it was the confident expectation of her Majesty's Government that the Argentine Government will accept the offer of Great Britain and France to mediate between Buenos Ayres and Monte Video, upon just and reasonable conditions, and that the Buenos Ayrean Government will authorize us, the Count de Lurde and me, to propose moderate and honourable terms of peace to the Government of the Republic of the Uruguay. I stated to M. de Arana that this offer is dictated by the feelings of humanity and of warm interest in the prosperity of the two neighbouring Republics, and her Majesty's Government earnestly hope, as M. de Lurde said does that of France, that the Government of Buenos Ayres will maturely reflect before they reject the friendly intervention which is now offered to them by two such powerful states, and I concluded by conjuring his Excellency to use his whole influence with General Rosas, as his friend and adviser, to accept the offer of mediation in the manner just proposed to him.

M. de Arana replied, that of course we could not expect from him any other answer than that he would hasten to lay the object of the communication we had just made to him before General Rosas, which he would do on that evening, and addressing himself to M. de Lurde, he said, you know the answer which was addressed to the British Minister last year, a copy of it having been given to M. de Becourt. Neither the French Minister nor myself were anxious to recur to that answer nor to discuss it, but he joined with me in soliciting the good offices of M. de Arana to obtain a happy issue to our joint offer. M. de Lurde said, and with reason, that it would be of the greatest importance to obtain the acquiescence of General Rosas to the mediation as soon as possible, in which I joined him in pressing terms. M. de Arana immediately replied that he would render an account to the Governor of the earnest desire of the two Ministers with all the interest that demands an affair as delicate as it is important.

With this last observation of M. de Arana the conference ended, and we took leave full in hope that General Rosas, with the soundness of his judgment and the generosity of his disposition, aided by his Excellency's influence and good offices will not hesitate to accept the offer of Great Britain and France to terminate a war which, for the sake of humanity and the prosperity of the two Republics, is so earnestly desired by all Europe, as well as by the people and Government of Monte Video, who ask only for peace, and the power the most legitimate in the world, that of choosing its own rulers, and its form of government themselves.

Two days after the packet sailed we, the Count de Lurde and I, called upon M. de Arana; he told us that in a question of such great importance, as is the joint offer of mediation of Great Britain and France, it should, he thought be communicated in writing, and he asked us if we had any objection to make it in that manner, I said by no means, and the French Minister and I sent in a note[Pg 34] on the following day, 30th August, beginning with "In consequence of your Excellency's desire to have the communication we verbally made to you on the 24th instant, committed to writing, we have the honour, &c., &c., and I repeated in writing word for word what I had said to him verbally, and the French Minister did the same. You have now, dear M. de Vidal, a faithful and exact account of every thing that has taken place in this important business.

Now as to what you ask of me with respect to answering the official note you sent to me by the French Minister, I agree with you perfectly, that Her Majesty's Government would not make a second offer of its mediation, without being resolved to support it, more especially since you say that Lord Aberdeen has declared to M. Ellauri, that he will put a stop to the war.

But this assurance on the part of Lord Aberdeen does not give me the power either to take measures for carrying this declaration into effect, or to make such a declaration to General Rosas. I must wait for instructions from my Government before I inform the Buenos Ayrean Government what they will direct shall be done, as it is not for me to say in what manner the war shall be put a stop to.

M. de Lurde, when I spoke to him about the purport of the official note to me from you, of which he was the bearer, told me that he had simply acknowledged the receipt of it, because he could give no other answer, and I feel that I am in exactly a similar position.

You are now, as you have always been, in possession of my public and private sentiments upon this most important question, the mediation, and you may be most confident that my conduct upon it, whilst it is pending, will be as satisfactory to your Government as to yourself.

Believe me, my dear M. de Vidal, always your faithful and sincere friend,

J. H. MANDEVILLE.

    To his Excellency Don Jose Antonino Vidal, &c. &c. &c.

(PRIVATE.)

Buenos Ayres, December 23rd, 1842.

My dear M. de Vidal,—I received this morning your private letter of the 20th,—after thanking you for it, I have little to add, except that Count de Lurde and I have received an answer to our note, demanding an armistice, stating that a demand of this nature, menacing as it does the Argentine Confederation, requires time for consideration before a reply can be given.

In the meantime, I trust that the step which I and the French Minister have taken will in no manner weaken, but, on the contrary, hasten and encourage the zealous efforts of your Government[Pg 35] to resist invasion, because, where winds and waves are concerned, no man can say, when he leaves Europe, in what week or in what month he will arrive at Monte Video.

I know nothing of the operations of the armies on either side of the Uruguay; I thank you for the information which you send me about them—I know nothing from any other source.

Believe me ever, my dear M. de Vidal,

Your faithful and sincere friend,

J. H. MANDEVILLE.

    To his Excellency M. de Vidal, &c., &c., &c.

(CONFIDENTIAL.)

Buenos Ayres, 24th December, 1842.

My Dear M. de Vidal,—I took the liberty, when I sent you a copy of our note to this Government, demanding a cessation of hostilities, to beg the favour of you not to make it public. Communications of this nature are not intended at the time to be made public.

If I had intended that Mr. Dale should have a copy of it, I would have sent one to him; but copies have been given—for the commander of the Fantome has written a letter to me of complaint, that I had not communicated the circumstance to him, when some one had shown him a copy which he had read.

People sometimes think that by giving publicity to a document they bind down more the persons who have signed it to their engagement; this is a mistake. The only result which comes out of it is, that it makes them much more cautious and reserved in future in communicating them.

Believe me ever, my dear M. de Vidal,

Your sincere friend,

J. H. MANDEVILLE.

(PRIVATE AND CONFIDENTIAL.)

Buenos Ayres, January 12th, 1843.

My dear M. de Vidal,—My thanks for your letter of the 28th ult. in answer to mine of the complaints of the captain of the Fantome. It was perfectly satisfactory.

I have received a despatch from Lord Aberdeen, acquainting me that the Vidal and Ellauri treaties are under the consideration of her Majesty's Government, and that he will not fail by next packet to communicate to me the result of their deliberations.

The under Secretary of State writes me that the latter is in some measure preferred, and, therefore, it is right for me to[Pg 36] mention this circumstance to you, in order that you may not be unprepared, should it be adopted.

Believe me, my dear M. de Vidal, ever your sincere Friend,

J. H. MANDEVILLE.

(PRIVATE.)

Buenos Ayres, January 12th, 1843.

My dear M. de Vidal,—When I received M. Gelly's official letter, upon the entry of Oribe's troops into the Banda Oriental, I was myself too unwell to thank you for your letter of the 28th ult. on the subject of your resignation, and too sad and discouraged by it at the idea of your retirement from office at the present moment. But now I see by the Nacional of the 3rd that you have nobly decided upon still retaining the Foreign and Home Departments, I am as anxious to congratulate you and your country upon this resolution, as I was averse on the day I wrote to M. Gelly to take up my pen for any body or any thing, but for this letter of yours above mentioned. The two official communications which I send you by this opportunity, would have gone with my letter to M. Gelly, luckily, its of little consequence whether you receive them now or this day month.

What has prevented the British and French naval forces from coming long before this to the River Plate, I can have no conception. The interview between the British Ambassador and Guizot took place on the 9th September, when he agreed to all that Lord Cowley proposed of uniting their forces to put an end to the war. Before the end of December, I would have sworn that they would have been here. I cannot conclude my letter without expressing to you my truest thanks for the expression of your friendship towards me,—and my confidence that, happen what may, you will always duly appreciate my public and private conduct to you.

Believe me, my dear M. de Vidal, that my sentiments and my utmost efforts will always be in unison to draw closer the ties of friendship which have been so happily established, through you in great part, between the two countries where we first drew our breath, and my labour will be unceasing to preserve them unchanged.

J. H. MANDEVILLE.

    To his Excellency Don Jose Antonino Vidal.

MR. GORDON'S LETTER TO GENERAL RIVERA.

Ytapua, September 26th, 1842.

Having arrived safely at this town on the 20th instant, I forwarded, on the same evening, a despatch to the Government of this Republic with my passports soliciting the necessary license for myself and my companions to continue our journey[Pg 37] to Assumption. By the same opportunity I forwarded to the Consuls of the Republic the despatch with which I was charged by your Excellency.

The answer from the Consuls reached me yesterday afternoon, and with it I have received, for my own person, my two companions and servant, permission to proceed to the capital, with the assurance that every assistance and protection will be afforded me. I regret having to add that this license is not extended to the Oriental escort, under whose protection and with whose assistance I have been able so fortunately to complete my journey to the Paraguay territory—for the reason (in the words of the Consuls note) of the said escort being no longer necessary.

On this account the Government of this Republic has granted a passport, which Don Blas Acevedo takes with him, ordering the Paraguay authorities to render to this officer and to the men under his command every necessary assistance on his return to the camp of your Excellency, and has also forwarded the despatch which I have now the honour to transmit in answer to that of your Excellency, with which I accompanied my above-mentioned letters to the Consuls of Paraguay.

It only remains for me to express to your Excellency my perfect satisfaction in regard to the conduct of the escort, generally and individually, during the whole time that we have journeyed together. I am perfectly well aware, Excellent Sir, that such a declaration is unnecessary on my part, being confident that soldiers chosen by your Excellency for any service, would necessarily act as these have done, but I should neither satisfy my grateful feeling nor my duty, did I not state that in fulfilling their commission, both the escort and the officer that accompanied me from Monte Video, have, in every occasion and in all circumstances, been constantly active, obedient and ready to exert themselves to the utmost, and that in no instance have they given cause of complaint, either to myself or to the parties at whose houses we have stayed, or through whose lands we have passed.

I cannot conclude without calling the attention of your Excellency to the case of the soldier José Arillu and to that of the coachman Antonio, both of whom have been seriously hurt in the service just completed: at present I can do no more than to recommend them to the consideration of your Excellency, but I purpose communicating the affair to my Government.

Repeating my sincere thanks, and saluting your Excellency with the expression of my highest esteem and most distinguished consideration, I have the honour to subscribe myself,

Your Excellency's most obedient humble servant,

G. J. R. GORDON.

    To His Excellency Don Fructuoso Rivera, President of the Oriental Republic of the Uruguay, General in Chief of the army, &c. &c.

[Pg 38]

REPUBLIC OF PARAGUAY.

Assumption, September 23d, 1842.

The undersigned supreme Government has received the estimable note of his Excellency the President of the Oriental Republic of the Uruguay, dated the 1st of August last, informing this Government of the visit of George J. R. Gordon, Esq., and his companion recommended by his Excellency to this Government, who therefore assure his Excellency that nothing is more gratifying to them than to accept the recommendation his Excellency has been pleased to direct, for the purpose indicated; and will correspond, in acting upon it, to the sentiments of friendship by which it is animated towards the Government of the Oriental Republic.

The Government has disposed that the escort given by his Excellency to Mr. Gordon, shall be provided with the proper passport for his return, as it is a duty incumbent on this Government to give due fulfilment to the necessary attentions on Mr. Gordon's leaving the country.

The request of his Excellency being satisfied in all respects this Government repeats its expression of true friendship and esteem and affectionately salutes his Excellency.

CARLOS ANTONIO LOPEZ.
MARIANO ROQUE ALONSO.

    To his Excellency the President of the Oriental Republic of the Uruguay, Don Fructuoso Rivera.

STEAM NAVIGATION ON THE RIVERS OF THE REPUBLIC OF URUGUAY.
(OFFICIAL.)

DECREE.

Art. 1.—It is granted to Mr. John Halton Buggeln to hold the exclusive privilege of navigating with ships propelled by steam or other mechanical power, in the ports and on the rivers of the Republic, during the period of twelve years from the time of the arrival of those ships at the port of Monte Video, under the conditions and restrictions to be expressed in the following articles; reckoning the arrival of the first steam-vessel at twenty months after the sanction of this project, save in case of unforeseen impediment, and the contractor obliging himself to prove his inculpableness by publishing the privilege in England and soliciting the advance of the requisite capital; if in thirty months from the date mentioned in the sanction of the[Pg 39] project, he shall not have verified that justification before the Executive, Mr. Halton Buggeln shall incur the penalty of a fine of 10,000 dollars to the public treasury, the same to be guaranteed by his person and goods.

Art. 2.—Vessels of the said description of less than fifty tons burthen, are not comprehended in the exclusion of this privilege.

Art. 3.—The undertaking shall be commenced by two vessels of three hundred or more tons, and one hundred horse power. The latest discoveries that shall have been made both for the acceleration of speed and for the prevention of accidents of explosion or others, are to be applied to their construction and machinery.

Art. 4.—The vessels of this undertaking shall convey, free of all charge, the mails of the Republic to and from all the ports of their transit; the captains or masters being responsible for their safety, unless the Government shall appoint a person for this object.

Art. 5.—Each vessel shall maintain on board two young Oriental citizens as apprentices to instruct them as engineers and pilots.

Art. 6.—The vessels of this undertaking shall navigate free of all tonnage dues, under the British flag, having liberty to deposit on shore or on board of hulks, such coals, machinery or other matters intended for use and consumption on board, not including provisions, the Executive to determine the measures necessary to prevent the abuse of this liberty, and it being understood that the said deposits shall not be entitled to any other guarantee than such as belong to foreign property on shore.

Art. 7—Whatever may be the state of the relations of this Republic with Great Britain, this undertaking, its funds and property, and the men employed in it, shall never under any pretext be an object of sequestration, indemnification, nor guarantee of any kind of reclamations or reprisals, which may occur between the two nations, but rather during the whole term of the contract until its dissolution, it shall be under the protection of the laws as if such misunderstandings did not exist; but the navigation may be temporally suspended and with it the term of the privilege, if the defence of the Republic or other similar interests should so require.

Art. 8.—If there should be national contractors or shareholders the undertaking shall admit them to the number of one third of the shares.

Act. 9—This privilege shall become of no effect by the voluntary interruption of its exercise, by the contractor, during a period of six months continuously.

Art. 10.—Let it be communicated, &c.

And in making this known to the Executive Power, the[Pg 40] undersigned President takes the opportunity of saluting the Executive with his most distinguished consideration.

Dr. PEDRO PABLO VIDAL,
Juan Manuel de la Sota,
Secretary.        

        Monte Video, February 7th, 1844.

    To H. E. the Vice-President of the Republic, Don Joaquin Suarez.

Monte Video, February 8th, 1844.

Be it fulfilled, the receipt thereof acknowledged, let be communicated to whom it may concern, published and inserted in the National Register.

SUAREZ.        
Santiago Vazquez.

Printed at the Liverpool Times Office, Castle-street.

TRANSCRIBER'S NOTES

1. Footnotes have been moved from the middle of the text to just before appendix.

2. Other than the corrections listed below, printer's inconsistencies in spelling, punctuation, and ligature usage have been retained:

        "the the" corrected to "the" (page 6)
        "it" corrected to "its" (page 13)
        "on" corrected to "of" (page 28)
        "notwithsanding" corrected to "notwithstanding" (page 32)