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Title: The Naval War of 1812
       Or The History of the United States Navy during the Last War with Great
       Britain to Which Is Appended an Account of the Battle of New Orleans

Author: Theodore Roosevelt

Release Date: October, 2005 [EBook #9104]
[Yes, we are more than one year ahead of schedule]
[This file was first posted on September 6, 2003]

Edition: 10

Language: English

Character set encoding: ISO-8859-1

*** START OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK THE NAVAL WAR OF 1812 ***




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                   The Naval War of 1812

                           or the
           History of the United States Navy during
               the Last War with Great Britain
              to Which Is Appended an Account of
                  the Battle of New Orleans

                    By Theodore Roosevelt

                   With an Introduction by
                       Edward K. Eckert



CONTENTS

List of Illustrations

Acknowledgments

Introduction

_The Naval War of 1812_

Index



ILLUSTRATIONS

Captain Isaac Hull

_Constitution_ vs. _Guerrière_: "The Engagement"

_Constitution_ vs. _Guerrière_: "In Action"

_Constitution_ vs. _Guerrière_: "Dropping Astern"

_Constitution_ vs. _Guerrière_: "She Fell in the Sea"

_Wasp_ vs. _Frolic_

Captain Stephen Decatur

Captain William Bainbridge

_Constitution_ vs. _Java_

Captain James Lawrence

_Chesapeake_ vs. _Shannon_

_Argus_ vs. _Pelican_

The Battle of Lake Erie

The _Essex_

Captain David Porter

Master Commandant Lewis Warrington

Captain Samuel C. Reid

The Battle of Lake Borgne

Commodore Thomas Macdonough

Capture of the _President_

Captain Charles Stewart

_Constitution_ vs. _Cyane_ and _Levant_

Master Commandant James Biddle

_Hornet_ vs. _Penguin_



ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

For their amiable and expert assistance in the selection of the
illustrations in this volume, thanks are due to Mr. James W. Cheevers,
curator of the U.S. Naval Academy Museum; Ms. Sigrid Trumpy, curator of
the museum's Beverley R. Robinson Collection of naval prints; and Mrs.
Patty Maddocks, director of the Naval Institute Library and Photographic
Service.

JS



PREFACE

The history of the naval events of the War of 1812 has been repeatedly
presented both to the American and the English reader. Historical
writers have treated it either in connection with a general account of
the contest on land and sea, or as forming a part of the complete record
of the navies of the two nations. A few monographs, which confine
themselves strictly to the naval occurrences, have also appeared. But
none of these works can be regarded as giving a satisfactorily full or
impartial account of the war--some of them being of he "popular" and
loosely-constructed order, while others treat it from a purely partisan
standpoint. No single book can be quoted which would be accepted by the
modern reader as doing justice to both sides, or, indeed, as telling
the whole story. Any one specially interested in the subject must read
all; and then it will seem almost a hopeless task to reconcile the
many and widely contradictory statements he will meet with.

There appear to be three works which, taken in combination, give the
best satisfaction on the subject. First, in James' "Naval History of
Great Britain" (which supplies both the material and the opinions of
almost every subsequent English or Canadian historian) can be found
the British view of the case. It is an invaluable work, written with
fulness and care; on the other hand it is also a piece of special
pleading by a bitter and not over-scrupulous partisan. This, in the
second place, can be partially supplemented by Fenimore Cooper's
"Naval History of the United States." The latter gives the American
view of the cruises and battles; but it is much less of an authority
than James', both because it is written without great regard for
exactness, and because all figures for the American side need to be
supplied from Lieutenant (now Admiral) George E. Emmons' statistical
"History of the United States Navy," which is the third of the works
in question.

But even after comparing these three authors, many contradictions
remain unexplained, and the truth can only be reached in such cases
by a careful examination of the navy "Records," the London "Naval
Chronicle," "Niles' Register," and other similar documentary
publications. Almost the only good criticisms on the actions are
those incidentally given in standard works on other subjects, such as
Lord Howard Douglass' "Naval Gunnery," and Admiral Jurien de la
Gravière's "Guerres Maritimes." Much of the material in our Navy
Department has never been touched at all. In short, no full, accurate,
and unprejudiced history of the war has ever been written.

The subject merits a closer scrutiny than it has received. At present
people are beginning to realize that it is folly for the great
English-speaking Republic to rely for defence upon a navy composed
partly of antiquated hulks, and partly of new vessels rather more
worthless than the old. It is worth while to study with some care
that period of our history during which our navy stood at the highest
pitch of its fame; and to learn any thing from the past it is necessary
to know, as near as may be, the exact truth. Accordingly the work
should be written impartially, if only from the narrowest motives.
Without abating a jot from one's devotion to his country and flag,
I think a history can be made just enough to warrant its being
received as an authority equally among Americans and Englishmen. I
have endeavored to supply such a work. It is impossible that errors,
both of fact and opinion, should not have crept into it; and
although I have sought to make it in character as non-partisan as
possible, these errors will probably be in favor of the American
side.

As my only object is to give an accurate narrative of events, I shall
esteem it a particular favor if any one will furnish me with the
means of rectifying such mistakes; and if I have done injustice to
any commander, or officer of any grade, whether American or British,
I shall consider myself under great obligations to those who will set
me right.

I have been unable to get access to the original reports of the
British commanders, the logs of the British ships, or their
muster-rolls, and so have been obliged to take them at second hand
from the "Gazette," or "Naval Chronicle," or some standard history.
The American official letters, log-books, original contracts,
muster-rolls, etc., however, being preserved in the Archives at
Washington, I have been able, thanks to the courtesy of the Hon.
Wm. H. Hunt, Secretary of the Navy, to look them over. The set of
letters from the officers is very complete, in three series,--"Captains'
Letters," "Masters' Commandant Letters," and "Officers' Letters,"
there being several volumes for each year. The books of contracts
contain valuable information as to the size and build of some of
the vessels. The log-books are rather exasperating, often being very
incomplete. Thus when I turned from Decatur's extremely vague
official letter describing the capture of the Macedonian to the
log-book of the Frigate _United States_, not a fact about the fight
could be gleaned. The last entry in the log on the day of the fight
is "strange sail discovered to be a frigate under English colors,"
and the next entry (on the following day) relates to the removal
of the prisoners. The log of the _Enterprise_ is very full indeed,
for most of the time, but is a perfect blank for the period during
which she was commanded by Lieutenant Burrows, and in which she
fought the Boxer. I have not been able to find the Peacock's log
at all, though there is a very full set of letters from her commander.
Probably the fire of 1837 destroyed a great deal of valuable material.
When ever it was possible I have referred to printed matter in
preference to manuscript, and my authorities can thus, in most cases,
be easily consulted. In conclusion I desire to express my sincerest
thanks to Captain James D. Bulloch, formerly of the United States
Navy, and Commander Adolf Mensing, formerly of the German Navy,
without whose advice and sympathy this work would probably never
have been written or even begun.

NEW YORK CITY, 1882.



PREFACE TO THIRD EDITION

I originally intended to write a companion volume to this, which
should deal with the operations on land. But a short examination
showed that these operations were hardly worth serious study.
They teach nothing new; it is the old, old lesson, that a miserly
economy in preparation may in the end involve a lavish outlay of
men and money, which, after all, comes too late to more than partially
offset the evils produced by the original short-sighted parsimony.
This might be a lesson worth dwelling on did it have any practical
bearing on the issues of the present day; but it has none, as far
as the army is concerned. It was criminal folly for Jefferson, and
his follower Madison, to neglect to give us a force either of regulars
or of well-trained volunteers during the twelve years they had in
which to prepare for the struggle that any one might see was
inevitable; but there is now far less need of an army than there was
then. Circumstances have altered widely since 1812. Instead of the
decaying might of Spain on our southern frontier, we have the still
weaker power of Mexico. Instead of the great Indian nations of the
interior, able to keep civilization at bay, to hold in check strong
armies, to ravage large stretches of territory, and needing
formidable military expeditions to overcome them, there are now only
left broken and scattered bands, which are sources of annoyance
merely. To the north we are still hemmed in by the Canadian
possessions of Great Britain; but since 1812 our strength has
increased so prodigiously, both absolutely and relatively, while
England's military power has remained almost stationary, that we
need now be under no apprehensions from her land-forces; for, even
if checked in the beginning, we could not help conquering in the
end by sheer weight of numbers, if by nothing else. So that there
is now no cause for our keeping up a large army; while, on the
contrary, the necessity for an efficient navy is so evident that
only our almost incredible short-sightedness prevents our at once
preparing one.

Not only do the events of the war on land teach very little to the
statesman who studies history in order to avoid in the present the
mistakes of the past, but besides this, the battles and campaigns
are of little interest to the student of military matters. The British
regulars, trained in many wars, thrashed the raw troops opposed to
them whenever they had any thing like a fair chance; but this is not
to be wondered at, for the same thing has always happened the world
over under similar conditions. Our defeats were exactly such as
any man might have foreseen, and there is nothing to be learned
from the follies committed by incompetent commanders and untrained
troops when in the presence of skilled officers having under them
disciplined soldiers. The humiliating surrenders, abortive attacks,
and panic routs of our armies can all be paralleled in the campaigns
waged by Napoleon's marshals against the Spaniards and Portuguese
in the years immediately preceding the outbreak of our own war. The
Peninsular troops were as little able to withstand the French veterans
as were our militia to hold their own against the British regulars.
But it must always be remembered, to our credit, that while seven
years of fighting failed to make the Spaniards able to face the
French,[Footnote: At the closing battle of Toulouse, fought between
the allies and the French, the flight of the Spaniards was so rapid
and universal as to draw from the Duke of Wellington the bitter
observation, that "though he had seen a good many remarkable things
in the course of his life, yet this was the first time he had ever
seen ten thousand men running a race."] two years of warfare gave us
soldiers who could stand against the best men of Britain. On the
northern frontier we never developed a great general,--Brown's claim
to the title rests only on his not having committed the phenomenal
follies of his predecessors,--but by 1814 our soldiers had become
seasoned, and we had acquired some good brigade commanders, notably
Scott, so that in that year we played on even terms with the British.
But the battles, though marked by as bloody and obstinate fighting
as ever took place, were waged between small bodies of men, and were
not distinguished by any feats of generalship, so that they are not
of any special interest to the historian. In fact, the only really
noteworthy feat of arms of the war took place at New Orleans, and
the only military genius that the struggle developed was Andrew
Jackson. His deeds are worthy of all praise, and the battle he won
was in many ways so peculiar as to make it well worth a much closer
study than it has yet received. It was by far the most prominent
event of the war; it was a victory which reflected high honor on
the general and soldiers who won it, and it was in its way as
remarkable as any of the great battles that took place about the
same time in Europe. Such being the case, I have devoted a chapter
to its consideration at the conclusion of the chapters devoted to
the naval operations.

As before said, the other campaigns on land do not deserve very
minute attention; but, for the sake of rendering the account of the
battle of New Orleans more intelligible, I will give a hasty sketch
of the principal engagements that took place elsewhere.

The war opened in mid-summer of 1812, by the campaign of General
Hull on the Michigan frontier. With two or three thousand raw
troops he invaded Canada. About the same time Fort Mackinaw was
surrendered by its garrison of 60 Americans to a British and Indian
force of 600. Hull's campaign was unfortunate from the beginning.
Near Brownstown the American Colonel Van Horne, with some 200 men,
was ambushed and routed by Tecumseh and his Indians. In revenge
Col. Miller, with 600 Americans, at Maguaga attacked 150 British
and Canadians under Capt. Muir, and 250 Indians under Tecumseh,
and whipped them,--Tecumseh's Indians standing their ground longest.
The Americans lost 75, their foes 180 men. At Chicago the small
force of 66 Americans was surprised and massacred by the Indians.
Meanwhile, General Brock, the British commander, advanced against
Hull with a rapidity and decision that seemed to paralyze his
senile and irresolute opponent. The latter retreated to Detroit,
where, without striking a blow, he surrendered 1,400 men to Brock's
nearly equal force, which consisted nearly one half of Indians under
Tecumseh. On the Niagara frontier, an estimable and honest old
gentleman and worthy citizen, who knew nothing of military matters,
Gen. Van Rensselaer, tried to cross over and attack the British at
Queenstown; 1,100 Americans got across and were almost all killed or
captured by a nearly equal number of British, Canadians, and Indians,
while on the opposite side a large number of their countrymen looked
on, and with abject cowardice refused to cross to their assistance.
The command of the army was then handed over to a ridiculous
personage named Smythe, who issued proclamations so bombastic that
they really must have come from an unsound mind, and then made a
ludicrously abortive effort at invasion, which failed almost of
its own accord. A British and Canadian force of less than 400 men
was foiled in an assault on Ogdensburg, after a slight skirmish,
by about 1,000 Americans under Brown; and with this trifling
success the military operations of the year came to an end.

Early in 1813, Ogdensburg was again attacked, this time by between
500 and 600 British, who took it after a brisk resistance from some
300 militia; the British lost 60 and the Americans 20, in killed
and wounded. General Harrison, meanwhile, had begun the campaign
in the Northwest. At Frenchtown, on the river Raisin, Winchester's
command of about 900 Western troops was surprised by a force of
1,100 men, half of them Indians, under the British Colonel Proctor.
The right division, taken by surprise, gave up at once; the left
division, mainly Kentucky riflemen, and strongly posted in houses
and stockaded enclosures, made a stout resistance, and only
surrendered after a bloody fight, in which 180 British and about
half as many Indians were killed or wounded. Over 300 Americans
were slain, some in battle, but most in the bloody massacre that
followed. After this, General Harrison went into camp at Fort Meigs,
where, with about 1,100 men, he was besieged by 1,000 British and
Canadians under Proctor and 1,200 Indians under Tecumseh. A force
of 1,200 Kentucky militia advanced to his relief and tried to cut
its way into the fort while the garrison made a sortie. The sortie
was fairly successful, but the Kentuckians were scattered like
chaff by the British regulars in the open, and when broken were
cut to pieces by the Indians in the woods. Nearly two thirds of
the relieving troops were killed or captured; about 400 got into
the fort. Soon afterward Proctor abandoned the siege. Fort Stephenson,
garrisoned by Major Croghan and 160 men, was attacked by a force
of 391 British regulars, who tried to carry it by assault, and
were repulsed with the loss of a fourth of their number. Some four
thousand Indians joined Proctor, but most of them left him after
Perry's victory on Lake Erie. Then Harrison, having received large
reinforcements, invaded Canada. At the River Thames his army of 3,500
men encountered and routed between 600 and 700 British under Proctor,
and about 1,000 Indians under Tecumseh. The battle was decided at
once by a charge of the Kentucky mounted riflemen, who broke through
the regulars, took them in rear, and captured them, and then
dismounting attacked the flank of the Indians, who were also
assailed by the infantry. Proctor escaped by the skin of his teeth
and Tecumseh died fighting, like the hero that he was. This battle
ended the campaign in the Northwest. In this quarter it must be
remembered that the war was, on the part of the Americans, mainly
one against Indians; the latter always forming over half of the
British forces. Many of the remainder were French Canadians, and
the others were regulars. The American armies, on the contrary,
were composed of the armed settlers of Kentucky and Ohio, native
Americans, of English speech and blood, who were battling for lands
that were to form the heritage of their children. In the West the
war was only the closing act of the struggle that for many years
had been waged by the hardy and restless pioneers of our race, as
with rifle and axe they carved out the mighty empire that we their
children inherit; it was but the final effort with which they wrested
from the Indian lords of the soil the wide and fair domain that now
forms the heart of our great Republic. It was the breaking down of
the last barrier that stayed the flood of our civilization; it
settled, once and for ever, that henceforth the law, the tongue,
and the blood of the land should be neither Indian, nor yet French,
but English. The few French of the West were fighting against a
race that was to leave as little trace of them as of the doomed
Indian peoples with whom they made common cause. The presence of
the British mercenaries did not alter the character of the contest;
it merely served to show the bitter and narrow hatred with which
the Mother-Island regarded her greater daughter, predestined as
the latter was to be queen of the lands that lay beyond the Atlantic.

Meanwhile, on Lake Ontario, the Americans made successful descents
on York and Fort George, scattering or capturing their comparatively
small garrisons; while a counter descent by the British on Sackett's
Harbor failed, the attacking force being too small. After the capture
of Fort George, the Americans invaded Canada; but their advance guard,
1,400 strong, under Generals Chandler and Winder, was surprised in
the night by 800 British, who, advancing with the bayonet, broke up
the camp, capturing both the generals and half the artillery. Though
the assailants, who lost 220 of their small number, suffered much
more than the Americans, yet the latter were completely demoralized,
and at once retreated to Fort George. Soon afterward, Col. Boerstler
with about 600 men surrendered with shamefully brief resistance to
a somewhat smaller force of British and Indians. Then about 300
British crossed the Niagara to attack Black Rock, which they took,
but were afterward driven off by a large body of militia with the
loss of 40 men. Later in the season the American General McClure
wantonly burned the village of Newark, and then retreated in panic
flight across the Niagara. In retaliation the British in turn crossed
the river; 600 regulars surprised and captured in the night Fort
Niagara, with its garrison of 400 men; two thousand troops attacked
Black Rock, and after losing over a hundred men in a smart engagement
with somewhat over 1,500 militia whom they easily dispersed, captured
and burned both it and Buffalo. Before these last events took place
another invasion of Canada had been attempted, this time under General
Wilkinson, "an unprincipled imbecile," as Scott very properly
styled him. It was mismanaged in every possible way, and was a
total failure; it was attended with but one battle, that of Chrystler's
Farm, in which 1,000 British, with the loss of less than 200 men,
beat back double their number of Americans, who lost nearly 500 men
and also one piece of artillery. The American army near Lake
Champlain had done nothing, its commander, General Wade Hampton,
being, if possible, even more incompetent than Wilkinson. He remained
stationary while a small force of British plundered Plattsburg and
Burlington; then, with 5,000 men he crossed into Canada, but returned
almost immediately, after a small skirmish at Chauteaugay between
his advance guard and some 500 Canadians, in which the former lost
41 and the latter 22 men. This affair, in which hardly a tenth of
the American force was engaged, has been, absurdly enough, designated
a "battle" by most British and Canadian historians. In reality it
was the incompetency of their general and not the valor of their
foes that caused the retreat of the Americans. The same comment,
by the way, applies to the so-called "Battle" of Plattsburg, in the
following year, which may have been lost by Sir George Prevost, but
was certainly not won by the Americans. And, again, a similar
criticism should be passed on General Wilkinson's attack on La
Colle Mill, near the head of the same lake. Neither one of the
three affairs was a stand-up fight; in each a greatly superior
force, led by an utterly incapable general, retreated after a slight
skirmish with an enemy whose rout would have been a matter of
certainty had the engagement been permitted to grow serious.

In the early spring of 1814 a small force of 160 American regulars,
under Captain Holmes, fighting from behind felled logs, routed 200
British with a loss of 65 men, they themselves losing but 8. On
Lake Ontario the British made a descent on Oswego and took it by
fair assault; and afterward lost 180 men who tried to cut out some
American transports, and were killed or captured to a man. All
through the spring and early summer the army on the Niagara frontier
was carefully drilled by Brown, and more especially by Scott, and
the results of this drilling were seen in the immensely improved
effectiveness of the soldiers in the campaign that opened in July.
Fort Erie was captured with little resistance, and on the 4th of
July, at the river Chippeway, Brown, with two brigades of regulars,
each about 1,200 strong, under Scott and Ripley, and a brigade of
800 militia and Indians under Porter, making a total of about 3,200
men, won a stand-up fight against the British General Riall, who
had nearly 2,500 men, 1,800 of them regulars. Porter's brigade
opened by driving in the Canadian militia and the Indians; but was
itself checked by the British light-troops. Ripley's brigade took
very little part in the battle, three of the regiments not being
engaged at all, and the fourth so slightly as to lose but five men.
The entire brunt of the action was borne by Scott's brigade, which
was fiercely attacked by the bulk of the British regulars under
Riall. The latter advanced with great bravery, but were terribly
cut up by the fire of Scott's regulars; and when they had come
nearly up to him, Scott charged with the bayonet and drove them
clean off the field. The American loss was 322, including 23 Indians;
the British loss was 515, excluding that of the Indians. The number
of Americans actually engaged did not exceed that of the British;
and Scott's brigade, in fair fight, closed by a bayonet charge,
defeated an equal force of British regulars.

On July 25th occurred the Battle of Niagara, or Lundy's Lane, fought
between General Brown with 3,100 [Footnote: As near as can be found
out; most American authorities make it much less; Lossing, for
example, says only 2,400.] Americans and General Drummond with
3,500 [Footnote: General Drummond in his official letter makes it
but 2,800; James, who gives the details, makes it 3,000 rank and
file; adding 13 per cent, for the officers, sergeants, and drummers,
brings it up to 3,400; and we still have to count in the artillery
drivers, etc.] British. It was brought on by accident in the evening,
and was waged with obstinate courage and savage slaughter till
midnight. On both sides the forces straggled into action by
detachments. The Americans formed the attacking party. As before,
Scott's brigade bore the brunt of the fight, and over half of his
men were killed or wounded; he himself was disabled and borne from
the field. The struggle was of the most desperate character, the
combatants showing a stubborn courage that could not be surpassed.
[Footnote: General Drummond writes: "In so determined a manner were
their attacks directed against our guns that our artillerymen were
bayoneted while in the act of loading, and the muzzle of the enemy's
guns were advanced within a few yards of ours." Even James says:
"Upon the whole, however, the American troops fought bravely; and the
conduct of many of the officers, of the artillery corps especially,
would have done honor to any service."] Charge after charge was made
with the bayonet, and the artillery was taken and retaken once and
again. The loss was nearly equal; on the side of the Americans,
854 men (including Generals Brown and Scott, wounded) and two guns;
on that of the British, 878 men (including General Riall captured)
and one gun. Each side claimed it as a victory over superior numbers.
The truth is beyond question that the British had the advantage in
numbers, and a still greater advantage in position; while it is
equally beyond question that it was a defeat and not a victory for
the Americans. They left the field and retired in perfect order to
Fort Erie, while the British held the field and the next day pursued
their foes.

Having received some reinforcements General Drummond, now with
about 3,600 men, pushed forward to besiege Fort Erie, in which was
the American army, some 2,400 strong, under General Gaines. Col.
Tucker with 500 British regulars was sent across the Niagara to
destroy the batteries at Black Rock, but was defeated by 300
American regulars under Major Morgan, fighting from behind a strong
breastwork of felled trees, with a creek in front. On the night of
the 15th of August, the British in three columns advanced to storm
the American works, but after making a most determined assault
were beaten off. The assailants lost 900 men, the assailed about
80. After this nothing was done till Sept. 17th, when General
Brown, who had resumed command of the American forces, determined
upon and executed a sortie. Each side had received reinforcements;
the Americans numbered over 3,000, the British nearly 4,000. The
fighting was severe, the Americans losing 500 men; but their
opponents lost 600 men, and most of their batteries were destroyed.
Each side, as usual, claimed the victory; but, exactly as Lundy's
Lane must be accounted an American defeat, as our forces retreated
from the ground, so this must be considered an American victory,
for after it the British broke up camp and drew off to Chippeway.
Nothing more was done, and on November 5th the American army
recrossed the Niagara. Though marked by some brilliant feats of
arms this four months' invasion of Canada, like those that had
preceded it, thus came to nothing. But at the same time a British
invasion of the United States was repulsed far more disgracefully.
Sir George Prevost, with an army of 13,000 veteran troops, marched
south along the shores of Lake Champlain to Plattsburg, which was
held by General Macomb with 2,000 regulars, and perhaps double
that number of nearly worthless militia;--a force that the British
could have scattered to the winds, though, as they were strongly
posted, not without severe loss. But the British fleet was captured
by Commodore MacDonough in the fight on the lake; and then Sir George,
after some heavy skirmishing between the outposts of the armies, in
which the Americans had the advantage, fled precipitately back to
Canada.

All through the war the sea-coasts of the United States had been
harried by small predatory excursions; a part of what is now the
State of Maine was conquered with little resistance, and kept until
the close of hostilities; and some of the towns on the shores of
Chesapeake Bay had been plundered or burnt. In August, 1814, a more
serious invasion was planned, and some 5,000 troops--regulars,
sailors, and marines--were landed, under the command of General
Ross. So utterly helpless was the Democratic Administration at
Washington, that during the two years of warfare hardly any steps
had been taken to protect the Capitol, or the country round about;
what little was done, was done entirely too late, and bungled badly
in addition. History has not yet done justice to the ludicrous and
painful folly and stupidity of which the government founded by
Jefferson, and carried on by Madison, was guilty, both in its
preparations for, and in its way of carrying on, this war; nor is
it yet realized that the men just mentioned, and their associates,
are primarily responsible for the loss we suffered in it, and the
bitter humiliation some of its incidents caused us. The small British
army marched at will through Virginia and Maryland, burned Washington,
and finally retreated from before Baltimore and reembarked to take
part in the expedition against New Orleans. Twice, at Bladensburg
and North Point, it came in contact with superior numbers of militia
in fairly good position. In each case the result was the same.
After some preliminary skirmishing, manoeuvring, and volley firing,
the British charged with the bayonet. The rawest regiments among
the American militia then broke at once; the others kept pretty
steady, pouring in quite a destructive fire, until the regulars had
come up close to them, when they also fled. The British regulars
were too heavily loaded to pursue, and, owing to their mode of
attack, and the rapidity with which their opponents ran away, the
loss of the latter was in each case very slight. At North Point,
however, the militia, being more experienced, behaved better than
at Bladensburg. In neither case were the British put to any trouble
to win their victory.

The above is a brief sketch of the campaigns of the war. It is not
cheerful reading for an American, nor yet of interest to a military
student; and its lessons have been taught so often by similar
occurrences in other lands under like circumstances, and, moreover,
teach such self-evident truths, that they scarcely need to be
brought to the notice of an historian. But the crowning event of
the war was the Battle of New Orleans; remarkable in its military
aspect, and a source of pride to every American. It is well worth
a more careful study, and to it I have devoted the last chapter of
this work.

New York City, 1883.

[Illustration: Fig. 1.--Long gun.]

[Illustration: Fig. 2.--Carronade.]

[Illustration: Fig. 3.--Section of flush-decked corvette or sloop,
carrying long guns. Such was the armament of the _Pike_ and _Adams_,
but most flush-decked ships mounted carronades.]

[Illustration: Fig. 4.--Section of frigate-built ship, with long
gun on main-deck and carronade on spar-deck. Taken from the
_American Artillerist's Companion_, by Louis de Toussard
(Philadelphia, 1811).]



PRINCIPAL AUTHORITIES REFERRED TO

(_See also in alphabetical place in index_.)

American State Papers.

Brenton, E. P. Naval History of Great Britain, 1783 to 1836. 2 vols.,
octavo. London, 1837.

Broke, Adm., Memoir of, by Rev. J. G. Brighton. Octavo, London, 1866.

"Captains' Letters" in Archives at Washington.

Codrington, Adm. Sir E. Memoirs, edited by his daughter. 2 vols.,
octavo. London, 1873.

Coggeshall, George. History of American Privateers. New York, 1876.

Cooper, J. F. Naval History of the United States. New York, 1856.

Dundonald, Earl. Autobiography of a Seaman. London, 1860.

Douglass, Lord Howard. Naval Gunnery. Octavo. London, 1860.

Emmons, Lieut. G. E. Statistical History of United States Navy, 1853.

Farragut, Adm. D. G., Life of, by his son, Loyall Farragut. Octavo.
New York, 1878.

Gravière, Adm., J. de la. Guerres Maritimes. 2 vols., octavo. Paris, 1881.

James, William. Naval History of Great Britain. 6 vols., octavo.
London, 1837.

James, William. Naval Occurrences with the Americans. Octavo,
London, 1817.

Lossing, Benson J. Field-book of the War of 1812. Octavo. New York, 1869.

Low, C. R. History of the Indian Navy, 1613 to 1863. 2 vols., octavo.
London, 1877.

_London Naval Chronicle_.

Marshall. Royal Naval Biography. 12 vols., octavo. London, 1825.

"Masters-Commandant Letters" in the Archives at Washington.

Morris, Com. Charles. Autobiography. Annapolis, 1880.

Naval Archives at Washington.

Niles. _Weekly Register_.

Pielat. B. La Vie et les Actions Mémorables du St. Michel de Ruyter.
Amsterdam, 1677.

Rivière, Lieut. H. La Marine Française sous le Régime de Louis XV.
Paris, 1859.

Tatnall, Commod., Life, by C. C. Jones, Jr. Savannah, 1878.

Toussard, L. de. American Artillerists' Companion. Phila., 1811.

Troude, O. Batailles Navales de la France. Paris, 1868.

Ward, Com. J. H. Manual of Naval Tactics. 1859.

Yonge, Charles Duke. History of the British Navy. 3 vols., octavo.
London, 1866.



AUTHORITIES REFERRED TO IN CHAPTER X

Alison, Sir A. History of Europe. Ninth edition. 20 vols. London, 1852.

Butler, Adjutant-General Robert. Official Report for the Morning
of Jan. 8, 1815.

Codrington, Admiral Sir Edward. Memoir of, by Lady Bourchier.
London, 1873.

Cole, John William. Memoirs of British Generals Distinguished
during the Peninsular War. London, 1856.

Court of Inquiry on Conduct of General Morgan. Official Report.

Gleig, Ensign H. R. Narrative of the Campaigns of the British
Army at Washington, Baltimore, and New Orleans. Philadelphia, 1821.

Jackson, Andrew. As a Public Man. A sketch by W G. Sumner. Boston, 1882.

Jackson, General Andrew. Official Letters.

James, William. Military Occurrences of the Late War. 2 vols.
London, 1818.

Keane, Major-General John. Letter, December 26, 1814.

Lambert, General. Letters, January 10 and 28, 1815.

Latour, Major A. Lacarriex. Historical Memoir of the War in West
Florida and Louisiana. Translated from the French by H. P. Nugent.
Philadelphia, 1816.

Lossing, Benson J. Field-Book of the War of 1812. New York, 1859.

Patterson, Com. Daniel G. Letters, Dec. 20, 1814, and Jan. 13, 1815.

Monroe, James. Sketch of his Life, by Daniel C. Gilman. 16mo. Boston, 1883.

Napier, Maj.-Gen. Sir W. F. P. History of the War in the Peninsula.
5 vols. New York, 1882.

Scott, Lieut.-Gen. W. Memoirs, by himself, 2 vols. New York, 1864.

Thornton, Col. W. Letter, Jan. 8, 1815.



CONTENTS


PREFACE

Chapter I

INTRODUCTORY

Causes of the war of 1812--Conflicting views of America and Britain
as regards neutral rights--Those of the former power right--Impossibility
of avoiding hostilities--Declaration of war June 18, 1812--Slight
preparations made--General features of the contest--Race identity
of combatants--The treaty of peace nominally leaves the situation
unchanged--But practically settles the dispute in our favor in respect
to maritime rights--The British navy and its reputation prior to
1812--Comparison with other European navies--British and American
authorities consulted in the present work

Chapter II

Overwhelming naval supremacy of England when America declared war
against her--Race identity of the combatants--American navy at the
beginning of the war--Officers well trained--Causes tending to make
our seamen especially efficient--Close similarity between British
and American sailors--Our ships manned chiefly by native Americans,
many of whom had formerly been impressed into the British navy--Quotas
of seamen contributed by the different States--Navy yards--Lists
of officers and men--List of vessels--Tonnage--Different ways of
estimating it in Britain and America--Ratings--American ships
properly rated--Armaments of the frigates and corvettes--Three
styles of guns used--Difference between long guns and carronades--Short
weight of American shot--Comparison of British frigates rating 38
and American frigates rating 44 guns--Compared with a 74

Chapter III

1812 ON THE OCEAN

Commodore Rodgers' cruise and unsuccessful chase of the
_Belvidera_--Engagement between _Belvidera_ and _President_--_Hornet_
captures a privateer--Cruise of the _Essex_--Captain Hull's cruise
and escape from the squadron of Commodore Broke--_Constitution_
captures _Guerrière_--Marked superiority shown by the Americans--_Wasp_
captures _Frolic_--Disproportionate loss on British side--Both
afterward captured by _Poictiers_--Second unsuccessful cruise of
Commodore Rodgers--_United States_ captures _Macedonian_--_Constitution_
captures _Java_--Cruise of _Essex_--Summary

Chapter IV

1812 ON THE LAKES

PRELIMINARY.--The combatants starting nearly on an equality--Difficulties
of creating a naval force--Difficulty of comparing the force of the
rival squadrons--Meagreness of the published accounts--Unreliability
of authorities, especially James.--ONTARIO--Extraordinary nature of
the American squadron--Canadian squadron a kind of water
militia--Sackett's Harbor feebly attacked by Commodore Earle--Commodore
Chauncy attacks the Royal George--And bombards York.--ERIE--Lieutenant
Elliot captures the _Detroit_ and _Caledonia_--Lieutenant Angus'
unsuccessful attack on Red House barracks

Chapter V

1813 ON THE OCEAN

Blockade of the American coast--Commodore Porter's campaign with
the _Essex_ in the South Pacific--_Hornet_ blockades Bonne
Citoyenne--_Hornet_ captures _Resolution_--_Hornet_ captures
_Peacock_--Generous treatment shown to the conquered--_Viper_
captured by _Narcissus_--American privateers cut out by British
boats--Third cruise of Commodore Rodgers--_United States_,
_Macedonian_, and _Wasp_ blockaded in New London--Broke's challenge
to Lawrence--The _Chesapeake_ captured by the _Shannon_--Comments
and criticisms by various authorities--_Surveyor_ captured by
boats of _Narcissus_--Futile gun-boat actions--British attack on
Craney Island repulsed--Cutting out expeditions--The _Argus_ captured
by the _Pelican_--The _Enterprise_ captures the _Boxer_--Ocean warfare
of 1813 in favor of British--Summary

Chapter VI

1813 ON THE LAKES

ONTARIO--Comparison of the rival squadrons--Chauncy's superior in
strength--Chauncy takes York and Fort George--Yeo is repulsed at
Sackett's Harbor, but keeps command of the lake--_The Lady of the
Lake_ captures _Lady Murray_--_Hamilton_ and _Scourge_ founder in a
squall--Yeo's partial victory off Niagara--Indecisive action off
the Genesee--Chauncy's partial victory off Burlington, which gives
him the command of the lake--Yeo and Chauncy compared--Reasons
for American success.--ERIE--Perry's success in creating a
fleet--His victory--"Glory" of it overestimated--Cause of his
success--CHAMPLAIN--The _Growler_ and _Eagle_ captured by
gun-boats--Summary of year's campaign

Chapter VII

1814 ON THE OCEAN

Strictness of the blockade--Cruise of Rodgers--Cruise of the
_Constitution_--Chased into Marblehead--Attempt to cut-out the
_Alligator_--The _Essex_ captured after engagement with _Phoebe_ and
_Cherub_--The _Frolic_ captured--The _Peacock_ captures the
_Epervier_--Commodore Barney's flotilla afloat--The British in
the Chesapeake--Capture of Washington, and burning of the public
buildings--The _Wasp_ captures the _Reindeer_--The _Wasp_ sinks the
_Avon_--Cruise and loss of the _Adams_--The privateer _General
Armstrong_--The privateer _Prince de Neufchatel_--Loss of the gun-boats
on Lake Borgne--Fighting near New Orleans--Summary

Chapter VIII

1814 ON THE LAKES

ONTARIO--The contest one of ship-building merely--Statistics of
the two squadrons--Serious sickness among the Americans--Extreme
caution of the commanders, verging on timidity--Yeo takes Oswego
and blockades Sackett's Harbor--British gun-boats captured--Chauncy
blockades Kingston.--ERIE--Captain Sinclair burns St. Joseph--Makes
unsuccessful expedition against Mackinaw--Daring and successful
cutting-out expeditions of the British--Capture of the _Ohio_ and
_Somers_.--CHAMPLAIN--Macdonough's and Downie's squadrons--James'
erroneous statements concerning them--Gallant engagement and
splendid victory of Macdonough--Macdonough one of the greatest
of American sea-captains

Chapter IX

1815 CONCLUDING OPERATIONS

The _President_ captured by Captain Hayes' squadron--Successful
cutting-out expedition of the Americans--American privateer
_Chasseur_ captures _St. Lawrence_--The _Constitution_ engages the
_Cyane_ and the _Levant_ and captures both--Escapes from a British
squadron--The _Hornet_ captures the _Penguin_ and escapes from pursuit
of the _Cornwallis_--The _Peacock's_ wanton attack on the
_Nautilus_--Wanton attack on American gun-boat after treaty of
peace--Summary of events in 1815--Remarks on the war--Tables of
comparative loss, etc.--Compared with results of Anglo-French struggle

Chapter X

1815 THE BATTLE OF NEW ORLEANS

The war on land generally disastrous--British send great expedition
against New Orleans--Jackson prepares for the defence of the city--Night
attack on the British advance guard--Artillery duels--Great Battle
of Jan. 8th, 1815--Slaughtering repulse of the main attack--Rout of
the Americans on the right bank of the river--Final retreat of the
British--Observations on the character of the troops and commanders
engaged

APPENDIX



Chapter I


INTRODUCTORY

_Causes of the War of 1812--Conflicting views of America and Britain
as regards neutral rights--Those of the former power right--Impossibility
of avoiding hostilities--Declaration of war--General features
of the contest--Racial identity of the contestants--The treaty of
peace nominally leaves the situation unchanged--But practically
settles the dispute in our favor in respect to maritime rights--The
British navy and its reputation prior to 1812--Comparison with other
European navies--British and American authorities consulted in the
present work._

The view professed by Great Britain in 1812 respecting the rights
of belligerents and neutrals was diametrically opposite to that held
by the United States. "Between England and the United States of
America," writes a British author, "a spirit of animosity, caused
chiefly by the impressment of British seamen, or of seamen asserted
to be such, from on board of American merchant vessels, had unhappily
subsisted for a long time" prior to the war. "It is, we believe,"
he continues, "an acknowledged maxim of public law, as well that
no nation but the one he belongs to can release a subject from his
natural allegiance, as that, provided the jurisdiction of another
independent state be not infringed, every nation has a right to
enforce the services of her subjects wherever they may be found.
Nor has any neutral nation such a jurisdiction over her merchant
vessels upon the high seas as to exclude a belligerent nation from
the right of searching them for contraband of war or for the property
or persons of her enemies. And if, in the exercise of that right,
the belligerent should discover on board of the neutral vessel a
subject who has withdrawn himself from his lawful allegiance, the
neutral can have no fair ground for refusing to deliver him up;
more especially if that subject is proved to be a deserter from
the sea or land service of the former." [Footnote: "The Naval History
of Great Britain," by William James, vol. iv, p. 324. (New edition
by Captain Chamier, R. N., London, 1837.)]

Great Britain's doctrine was "once a subject always a subject." On
the other hand, the United States maintained that any foreigner,
after five years' residence within her territory, and after having
complied with certain forms, became one of her citizens as completely
as if he was native born. Great Britain contended that her war
ships possessed the right of searching all neutral vessels for the
property and persons of her foes. The United States, resisting this
claim, asserted that "free bottoms made free goods," and that
consequently her ships when on the high seas should not be molested
on any pretext whatever. Finally, Great Britain's system of
impressment, [Footnote: The best idea of which can be gained by
reading Marryatt's novels.] by which men could be forcibly seized
and made to serve in her navy, no matter at what cost to themselves,
was repugnant to every American idea.

Such wide differences in the views of the two nations produced
endless difficulties. To escape the press-gang, or for other
reasons, many British seamen took service under the American flag;
and if they were demanded back, it is not likely that they or their
American shipmates had much hesitation in swearing either that they
were not British at all, or else that they had been naturalized as
Americans. Equally probable is it that the American blockade-runners
were guilty of a great deal of fraud and more or less thinly veiled
perjury. But the wrongs done by the Americans were insignificant
compared with those they received. Any innocent merchant vessel
was liable to seizure at any moment; and when overhauled by a
British cruiser short of men was sure to be stripped of most of
her crew. The British officers were themselves the judges as to
whether a seaman should be pronounced a native of America or of
Britain, and there was no appeal from their judgment. If a captain
lacked his full complement there was little doubt as to the view
he would take of any man's nationality. The wrongs inflicted on our
seafaring countrymen by their impressment into foreign ships formed
the main cause of the war.

There were still other grievances which are thus presented by the
British Admiral Cochrane. [Footnote: "Autobiography of a Seaman,"
by Thomas, tenth Earl of Dundonald, Admiral of the Red; Rear-Admiral
of the Fleet, London, 1860, vol. i, p. 24.] "Our treatment of its
(America's) citizens was scarcely in accordance with the national
privileges to which the young Republic had become entitled. There
were no doubt many individuals among the American people who, caring
little for the Federal Government, considered it more profitable
to break than to keep the laws of nations by aiding and supporting
our enemy (France), and it was against such that the efforts of the
squadron had chiefly been directed; but the way the object was
carried out was scarcely less an infraction of those national laws
which we were professedly enforcing. The practice of taking English
(and American) seamen out of American ships without regard to the
safety of navigating them when thus deprived of their hands has
been already mentioned. To this may be added the detention of
vessels against which nothing contrary to international neutrality
could be established, whereby their cargoes became damaged; the
compelling them, on suspicion only, to proceed to ports other than
those to which they were destined; and generally treating them as
though they were engaged in contraband trade. * * * American ships
were not permitted to quit English ports without giving security
for the discharge of their cargoes in some other British or neutral
port." On the same subject James [Footnote: _L. c._, iv, 325.]
writes: "When, by the maritime supremacy of England, France could
no longer trade for herself, America proffered her services, as a
neutral, to trade for her; and American merchants and their agents,
in the gains that flowed in, soon found a compensation for all the
perjury and fraud necessary to cheat the former out of her
belligerent rights. The high commercial importance of the United
States thus obtained, coupled with a similarity of language and,
to a superficial observer, a resemblance in person between the
natives of America and Great Britain, has caused the former to be
the chief, if not the only sufferers by the exercise of the right
of search. Chiefly indebted for their growth and prosperity to
emigration from Europe, the United States hold out every allurement
to foreigners, particularly to British seamen, whom, by a process
peculiarly their own, they can naturalize as quickly as a dollar
can exchange masters and a blank form, ready signed and sworn to,
can be filled up. [Footnote: This is an exaggeration.] It is the
knowledge of this fact that makes British naval officers when
searching for deserters from their service, so harsh in their
scrutiny, and so sceptical of American oaths and asseverations."

The last sentence of the foregoing from James is an euphemistic
way of saying that whenever a British commander short of men came
across an American vessel he impressed all of her crew that he
wanted, whether they were citizens of the United States or not. It
must be remembered, however, that the only reason why Great Britain
did us more injury than any other power was because she was better
able to do so. None of her acts were more offensive than Napoleon's
Milan decree, by which it was declared that any neutral vessel which
permitted itself to be searched by a British cruiser should be
considered as British, and as the lawful prize of any French vessel.
French frigates and privateers were very apt to snap up any American
vessel they came across and were only withheld at all by the memory
of the sharp dressing they had received in the West Indies during
the quasi-war of 1799-1800. What we undoubtedly ought to have done
was to have adopted the measure actually proposed in Congress, and
declared war on both France and England. As it was, we chose as a
foe the one that had done, and could still do, us the greatest injury.

The principles for which the United States contended in 1812 are
now universally accepted, and those so tenaciously maintained by
Great Britain find no advocates in the civilized world. That England
herself was afterward completely reconciled to our views was amply
shown by her intense indignation when Commodore Wilkes, in the
exercise of the right of search for the persons of the foes of his
country, stopped the neutral British ship _Trent_; while the applause
with which the act was greeted in America proves pretty clearly
another fact, that we had warred for the right, not because it
_was_ the right, but because it agreed with our self-interest to do
so. We were contending for "Free Trade and Sailors' Rights": meaning
by the former expression, freedom to trade wherever we chose without
hindrance save from the power with whom we were trading; and by the
latter, that a man who happened to be on the sea should have the
same protection accorded to a man who remained on land. Nominally,
neither of these questions was settled by, or even alluded to, in
the treaty of peace; but the immense increase of reputation that
the navy acquired during the war practically decided both points
in our favor. Our sailors had gained too great a name for any one
to molest them with impunity again.

Holding views on these maritime subjects so radically different
from each other, the two nations could not but be continually dealing
with causes of quarrel. Not only did British cruisers molest our
merchant-men, but at length one of them, the 50-gun ship _Leopard_,
attacked an American frigate, the _Chesapeake_, when the latter was
so lumbered up that she could not return a shot, killed or disabled
some twenty of her men and took away four others, one Briton and
three Americans, who were claimed as deserters. For this act an
apology was offered, but it failed to restore harmony between
the two nations. Soon afterward another action was fought. The
American frigate _President_, Commodore Rodgers, attacked the
British sloop _Little Belt_, Captain Bingham, and exchanged one
or two broadsides with her,--the frigate escaping scot-free
while the sloop was nearly knocked to pieces. Mutual recriminations
followed, each side insisting that the other was the assailant.

When Great Britain issued her Orders in Council forbidding our
trading with France, we retaliated by passing an embargo act, which
prevented us from trading at all. There could be but one result to
such a succession of incidents, and that was war. Accordingly, in
June, 1812, war was declared; and as a contest for the rights of
seamen, it was largely waged on the ocean. We also had not a little
fighting to do on land, in which, as a rule, we came out second-best.
Few or no preparations for the war had been made, and the result
was such as might have been anticipated. After dragging on through
three dreary and uneventful years it came to an end in 1815, by a
peace which left matters in almost precisely the state in which
the war had found them. On land and water the contest took the form
of a succession of petty actions, in which the glory acquired by
the victor seldom eclipsed the disgrace incurred by the vanquished.
Neither side succeeded in doing what it intended. Americans declared
that Canada must and should be conquered, but the conquering came
quite as near being the other way. British writers insisted that
the American navy should be swept from the sea; and, during the
sweeping process it increased fourfold.

When the United States declared war, Great Britain was straining
every nerve and muscle in a death struggle with the most formidable
military despotism of modern times, and was obliged to entrust the
defence of her Canadian colonies to a mere handful of regulars, aided
by the local fencibles. But Congress had provided even fewer trained
soldiers, and relied on militia. The latter chiefly exercised their
fighting abilities upon one another in duelling, and, as a rule,
were afflicted with conscientious scruples whenever it was
necessary to cross the frontier and attack the enemy. Accordingly,
the campaign opened with the bloodless surrender of an American
general to a much inferior British force, and the war continued
much as it had begun; we suffered disgrace after disgrace, while
the losses we inflicted, in turn, on Great Britain were so slight
as hardly to attract her attention. At last, having crushed her
greater foe, she turned to crush the lesser, and, in her turn,
suffered ignominious defeat. By this time events had gradually
developed a small number of soldiers on our northern frontier,
who, commanded by Scott and Brown, were able to contend on equal
terms with the veteran troops to whom they were opposed, though
these formed part of what was then undoubtedly the most formidable
fighting infantry any European nation possessed. The battles at
this period of the struggle were remarkable for the skill and
stubborn courage with which they were waged, as well as for the
heavy loss involved; but the number of combatants was so small
that in Europe they would have been regarded as mere outpost
skirmishes, and they wholly failed to attract any attention
abroad in that period of colossal armies.

When Great Britain seriously turned her attention to her
transatlantic foe, and assembled in Canada an army of 14,000 men
at the head of Lake Champlain, Congressional forethought enabled
it to be opposed by soldiers who, it is true, were as well
disciplined, as hardy, and as well commanded as any in the world,
but who were only a few hundred strong, backed by more or less
incompetent militia. Only Macdonough's skill and Sir George
Prevost's incapacity saved us from a serious disaster; the sea-fight
reflected high honor on our seamen, but the retreat of the British
land-forces was due to their commander and not their antagonists.
Meanwhile a large British fleet in the Chesapeake had not achieved
much glory by the destruction of local oyster-boats and the burning
of a few farmers' houses, so an army was landed to strike a decisive
blow. At Bladensburg [Footnote: See the "Capture of Washington,"
by Edward D. Ingraham (Philadelphia. 1849).] the five thousand
British regulars, utterly worn out by heat and fatigue, by their
mere appearance, frightened into a panic double their number of
American militia well posted. But the only success attained was
burning the public buildings of Washington, and that result was
of dubious value. Baltimore was attacked next, and the attack
repulsed, after the forts and ships had shelled one another with
the slight results that usually attend that spectacular and harmless
species of warfare.

The close of the contest was marked by the extraordinary battle of
New Orleans. It was a perfectly useless shedding of blood, since
peace had already been declared. There is hardly another contest of
modern times where the defeated side suffered such frightful carnage,
while the victors came off almost scatheless. It is quite in
accordance with the rest of the war that the militia, hitherto worse
than useless, should on this occasion win against great odds in point
of numbers; and, moreover, that their splendid victory should have
been of little consequence in its effects upon the result. On the
whole, the contest by land, where we certainly ought to have been
successful, reflected greater credit on our antagonists than upon
us, in spite of the services of Scott, Brown, and Jackson. Our small
force of regulars and volunteers did excellently; as for the militia,
New Orleans proved that they _could_ fight superbly, and the other
battles that they generally _would not_ fight at all.

At sea, as will appear, the circumstances were widely different.
Here we possessed a small but highly effective force, the ships
well built, manned by thoroughly trained men, and commanded by
able and experienced officers. The deeds of our navy form a part
of history over which any American can be pardoned for lingering.

       *       *        *       *        *

Such was the origin, issue, and general character of the war. It
may now be well to proceed to a comparison of the authorities on
the subject. Allusion has already been made to them in the preface,
but a fuller reference seems to be necessary in this connection.

At the close of the contest, the large majority of historians who
wrote of it were so bitterly rancorous that their statements must
be received with caution. For the main facts, I have relied,
wherever it was practicable, upon the official letters of the
commanding officers, taking each as authority for his own force
and loss.[Footnote: As where Broke states his own force at 330,
his antagonists at 440, and the American court of inquiry makes
the numbers 396 and 379, I have taken them as being 330 and 379
respectively. This is the only just method; I take it for granted
that each commander meant to tell the truth, and of course knew
his own force, while he might very naturally and in perfect good
faith exaggerate his antagonist's.] For all the British victories
we have British official letters, which tally almost exactly, as
regards matters of _fact_ and not of _opinion_, with the corresponding
American accounts. For the first year the British also published
official accounts of their defeats, which in the cases of the
_Guerrière_, _Macedonian_ and _Frolic_, I have followed as closely
as the accounts of the American victors. The last British official
letter published announcing a defeat was that in the case of the
_Java_, and it is the only letter that I have not strictly accepted:
The fact that no more were published thereafter is of itself
unfortunate; and from the various contradictions it contains it
would appear to have been tampered with. The surgeon's report
accompanying it is certainly false. Subsequent to 1812 no letter
of a defeated British commander was published, [Footnote: Except
about the battles on the Lakes, where I have accordingly given the
same credit to the accounts both of the British and of the Americans.]
and I have to depend upon the various British historians, especially
James, of whom more anon.

The American and British historians from whom we are thus at
times forced to draw our material regard the war from very different
stand-points, and their accounts generally differ. Each writer
naturally so colored the affair as to have it appear favorable to
his own side. Sometimes this was done intentionally and sometimes
not. Not unfrequently errors are made against the historian's own
side; as when the British author, Brenton, says that the British
brig _Peacock_ mounted 32's instead of 24's, while Lossing in his
"Field-Book of the War of 1812" makes the same mistake about the
armament of the American brig _Argus_. Errors of this description
are, of course, as carefully to be guarded against as any others.
Mere hearsay reports, such as "it has been said," "a prisoner on
board the opposing fleet has observed," "an American (or British)
newspaper of such and such a date has remarked," are of course to
be rejected. There is a curious parallelism in the errors on both
sides. For example, the American, Mr. Low, writing in 1813, tells
how the _Constitution_, 44, captured the _Guerrière_ of 49 guns,
while the British Lieutenant Low, writing in 1880, tells how the
_Pelican_, 18, captured the _Argus_ of 20 guns. Each records the
truth but not the whole truth, for although rating 44 and 18 the
victors carried respectively 54 and 21 guns, of heavier metal than
those of their antagonists. Such errors are generally intentional.
Similarly, most American writers mention the actions in which the
privateers were victorious, but do not mention those in which they
were defeated; while the British, in turn, record every successful
"cutting-out" expedition, but ignore entirely those which terminated
unfavorably. Other errors arise from honest ignorance. Thus, James
in speaking of the repulse of the _Endymion's_ boats by the
_Neufchatel_ gives the latter a crew of 120 men; she had more than
this number originally, but only 40 were in her at the time of the
attack. So also when the captain of the _Pelican_ writes that the
officers of the _Argus_ report her loss at 40, when they really
reported it at 24 or when Captain Dacres thought the _Constitution_
had lost about 20 men instead of 14. The American gun-boat captains
in recounting their engagements with the British frigates invariably
greatly overestimated the loss of the latter. So that on both sides
there were some intentional misstatements or garblings, and a much
more numerous class of simple blunders, arising largely from an
incapacity for seeing more than one side of the question.

Among the early British writers upon this war, the ablest was
James. He devoted one work, his "Naval Occurrences," entirely to
it; and it occupies the largest part of the sixth volume of his more
extensive "History of the British Navy." [Footnote: A new edition,
London, 1826.] Two other British writers, Lieutenant Marshall
[Footnote: "Royal Naval Biography," by John Marshall (London,
1823-1835).] and Captain Brenton, [Footnote: "Naval History of
Great Britain," by Edward Pelham Brenton (new edition, London,
1837).] wrote histories of the same events, about the same time;
but neither of these naval officers produced half as valuable a
work as did the civilian James. Marshall wrote a dozen volumes,
each filled with several scores of dreary panegyrics, or memoirs
of as many different officers. There is no attempt at order, hardly
any thing about the ships, guns, or composition of the crews; and
not even the pretence of giving both sides, the object being to
make every Englishman appear in his best light. The work is
analogous to the numerous lives of Decatur, Bainbridge, Porter,
etc., that appeared in the United States about the same time, and
is quite as untrustworthy. Brenton made a far better and very
interesting book, written on a good and well-connected plan, and
apparently with a sincere desire to tell the truth. He accepts the
British official accounts as needing nothing whatever to supplement
them, precisely as Cooper accepts the American officials'. A more
serious fault is his inability to be accurate. That this inaccuracy
is not intentional is proved by the fact that it tells as often
against his own side as against his opponents. He says, for example,
that the guns of Perry's and Barclay's squadrons "were about equal
in number and weight," that the _Peacock_ (British) was armed with
32's instead of 24's, and underestimates the force of the second
_Wasp_. But the blunders are quite as bad when distributed as when
confined to one side; in addition, Brenton's disregard of all
details makes him of but little use.

James, as already said, is by far the most valuable authority on
the war, as regards _purely British_ affairs. He enters minutely
into details, and has evidently laboriously hunted up his authorities.
He has examined the ships' logs, the Admiralty reports, various
treatises, all the _Gazette_ reports, gives very well-chosen
extracts, has arranged his work in chronological order, discriminates
between the officers that deserve praise and those that deserve
blame, and in fact writes a work which ought to be consulted by
every student of naval affairs. But he is unfortunately afflicted
with a hatred toward the Americans that amounts to a monomania. He
wishes to make out as strong a case as possible against them. The
_animus_ of his work may be gathered from the not over complimentary
account of the education of the youthful seafaring American, which
can be found in vol. vi, p. 113, of his "History." On page 153 he
asserts that he is an "impartial historian"; and about three lines
before mentions that "it may suit the Americans to invent any
falsehood, no matter how barefaced, to foist a valiant character
on themselves." On page 419 he says that Captain Porter is to be
believed, "so far as is borne out by proof (the only safe way where
an American is concerned),"--which somewhat sweeping denunciation
of the veracity of all of Captain Porter's compatriots would seem
to indicate that James was not, perhaps, in that dispassionate
frame of mind best suited for writing history. That he should be
biassed against individual captains can be understood, but when he
makes rabid onslaughts upon the American people as a whole, he
renders it difficult for an American, at any rate, to put implicit
credence in him. His statements are all the harder to confute
when they are erroneous, because they are intentionally so. It is
not, as with Brenton and Marshall, because he really thinks a
British captain _cannot_ be beaten, except by some kind of distorted
special providence, for no man says worse things than he does about
certain officers and crews. A writer of James' undoubted ability
must have known perfectly well that his statements were untrue in
many instances, as where he garbles Hilyar's account of Porter's
loss, or misstates the comparative force of the fleets on Lake
Champlain.

When he says (p. 194) that Captain Bainbridge wished to run
away from the _Java_, and would have done so if he had not been
withheld by the advice of his first lieutenant, who was a renegade
Englishman, [Footnote: Who, by the way, was Mr. Parker, born in
Virginia, and never in England in his life.] it is not of much
consequence whether his making the statement was due to excessive
credulity or petty meanness, for, in either case, whether the
defect was in his mind or his morals, it is enough to greatly
impair the value of his other "facts." Again, when James (p. 165)
states that Decatur ran away from the _Macedonian_ until, by some
marvellous optical delusion, he mistook her for a 32, he merely
detracts a good deal from the worth of his own account. When the
Americans adopt boarding helmets, he considers it as proving
conclusively that they are suffering from an acute attack of
cowardice. On p. 122 he says that "had the _President_, when she
fell in with the _Belvidera_, been cruising alone * * * Commodore
Rodgers would have magnified the British frigate into a line-of-battle
ship, and have done his utmost to avoid her," which gives an excellent
idea of the weight to be attached to the various other anecdotes he
relates of the much-abused Commodore Rodgers.

But it must always be remembered that untrustworthy as James is in
any thing referring purely to the Americans, he is no worse than
his compeers of both nationalities. The misstatements of Niles in
his "Weekly Register" about the British are quite as flagrant, and
his information about his own side even more valuable. [Footnote:
In Niles, by the way, can be found excellent examples of the
traditional American "spread-eagle" style. In one place I remember
his describing "The Immortal Rodgers," baulked of his natural prey,
the British, as "soaring about like the bold bald eagle of his
native land," seeking whom he might devour. The accounts he gives of
British line-of-battle ships fleeing from American 44's quite match
James' anecdotes of the latter's avoidance of British 38's and 36's
for fear they might mount twenty-four-pounders. The two works taken
together give a very good idea of the war; separately, either is
utterly unreliable, especially in matters of opinion.] Every little
American author crowed over Perry's "Nelsonic victory over a greatly
superior force." The _Constitution_ was declared to have been at a
disadvantage when she fought the _Guerrière_, and so on _ad
infinitum_. But these writers have all faded into oblivion, and
their writings are not even referred to, much less believed. James,
on the contrary, has passed through edition after edition, is
considered as unquestionable authority in his own country, and
largely throughout Europe, and has furnished the basis for every
subsequent account by British authors. From Alison to Lieutenant
Low, almost every English work, whether of a popular character or
not, is, in so far as it touches on the war, simply a "rehash" of
the works written by James. The consequence is that the British
and American accounts have astonishingly little resemblance. One
ascribes the capture of the British frigates simply to the fact
that their opponents were "cut down line-of-battle ships"; the
other gives all the glory to the "undaunted heroism," etc., of
the Yankee sailors.

One not very creditable trait of the early American naval historians
gave their rivals a great advantage. The object of the former was
to make out that the _Constitution_, for example, won her victories
against an equal foe, and an exact statement of the forces showed
the contrary; so they always avoided figures, and thus left the
ground clear for James' careful misstatements. Even when they
criticised him they never went into details, confining themselves
to some remark about "hurling" his figures in his face with
"loathing." Even Cooper, interesting though his work is, has gone
far less into figures than he should, and seems to have paid little
if any attention to the British official statements, which of
course should be received as of equal weight with the American.
His comments on the actions are generally very fair, the book never
being disfigured by bitterness toward the British; but he is
certainly wrong, for example, in ascribing the loss of the
_Chesapeake_ solely to accident, that of the _Argus_ solely to her
inferiority in force, and so on. His disposition to praise _all_
the American commanders may be generous, but is nevertheless unjust.
If Decatur's surrender of the _President_ is at least impliedly
praised, then Porter's defence of the _Essex_ can hardly receive
its just award. There is no weight in the commendation bestowed
upon Hull, if commendation, the same in kind though less in degree,
is bestowed upon Rodgers. It is a great pity that Cooper did not
write a criticism on James, for no one could have done it more
thoroughly. But he never mentions him, except once in speaking of
Barclay's fleet. In all probability this silence arose from sheer
contempt, and the certainty that most of James' remarks were false;
but the effect was that very many foreigners believe him to have
shirked the subject. He rarely gives any data by which the statements
of James can be disproved, and it is for this reason that I have
been obliged to criticise the latter's work very fully. Many of
James' remarks, however, defy criticism from their random nature,
as when he states that American midshipmen were chiefly masters and
mates of merchantmen, and does not give a single proof to support
the assertion. It would be nearly as true to assert that the
British midshipmen were for the most part ex-members of the
prize-ring, and as much labor would be needed to disprove it. In
other instances it is quite enough to let his words speak for
themselves, as where he says (p. 155) that of the American sailors
one third in number and one half in point of effectiveness were in
reality British. That is, of the 450 men the _Constitution_ had when
she fought the _Java_ 150 were British, and the remaining 300 could
have been as effectively replaced by 150 more British. So a very
little logic works out a result that James certainly did not intend
to arrive at; namely, that 300 British led by American officers
could beat, with ease and comparative impunity, 400 British led by
their own officers. He also forgets that the whole consists of the
sum of the parts. He accounts for the victories of the Americans
by stating (p. 280) that they were lucky enough to meet with frigates
and brigs who had unskilful gunners or worthless crews; he also
carefully shows that the _Macedonian_ was incompetently handled,
the _Peacock_ commanded by a mere martinet, the _Avon's_ crew
unpractised weak and unskilful, the _Java's_ exceedingly poor, and
more to the same effect. Now the Americans took in single fight
three frigates and seven sloops, and when as many as ten vessels
are met it is exceedingly probable that they represent the fair
average; so that James' strictures, so far as true, simply show
that the average British ship was very apt to possess, comparatively
speaking, an incompetent captain or unskilful crew. These
disadvantages were not felt when opposed to navies in which they
existed to an even greater extent, but became very apparent when
brought into contact with a power whose few officers knew how to
play their own parts very nearly to perfection, and, something
equally important, knew how to make first-rate crews out of what
was already good raw material. Finally, a large proportion of
James' abuse of the Americans sufficiently refutes itself, and
perhaps Cooper's method of contemptuously disregarding him was the
best; but no harm can follow from devoting a little space to
commenting upon him.

Much the best American work is Lieutenant George E. Emmons'
statistical "History of the United States Navy." Unfortunately it
is merely a mass of excellently arranged and classified statistics,
and while of invaluable importance to the student, is not interesting
to the average reader. Almost all the statements I have made of
the force, tonnage, and armament of the American vessels, though
I have whenever practicable taken them from the Navy Records, etc.,
yet could be just as well quoted from Emmons. Copies of most of
the American official letters which I have quoted can be found in
"Niles' Register," volumes 1 to 10, and all of the British ones in
the "London Naval Chronicle" for the same years. It is to these two
authorities that I am most indebted, and nearly as much so to the
"American State Papers," vol. xiv. Next in order come Emmons,
Cooper, and the invaluable, albeit somewhat scurrilous, James; and
a great many others whose names I have quoted in their proper
places. In commenting upon the actions, I have, whenever possible,
drawn from some standard work, such as Jurien de la Gravière's
"Guerres Maritimes," Lord Howard Douglass' "Naval Gunnery,"
or, better still, from the lives and memoirs of Admirals Farragut,
Codrington, Broke, or Durham. The titles of the various works will
be found given in full as they are referred to. [Footnote: To get
an idea of the American seamen of that time Cooper's novels,
"Miles Wallingford," "Home as Found," and the "Pilot," are far
better than any history; in the "Two Admirals" the description of
the fleet manoeuvring is unrivalled. His view of Jack's life is
rather rose-colored however. "Tom Cringle's log" ought to be read
for the information it gives. Marryatt's novels will show some of
the darker aspects of sailor life.] In a few cases, where extreme
accuracy was necessary, or where, as in the case of the _President's_
capture, it was desirable that there should be no room for dispute
as to the facts, I have given the authority for each sentence; but
in general this would be too cumbersome, and so I have confined
myself to referring, at or near the beginning of the account of
each action, to the authorities from whom I have taken it. For the
less important facts on which every one is agreed I have often given
no references.



Chapter II


_Overwhelming naval supremacy of England when America declared war
against her--Race identity of the combatants--The American navy at
the beginning of the war--Officers well trained--Causes tending to
make our seamen especially efficient--Close similarity between the
British and American sailors--Our ships manned chiefly by native
Americans, many of whom had formerly been impressed into the British
navy--Quotas of seamen contributed by the different
States--Navy-yards--Lists of officers and men--List of
vessels--Tonnage--Different ways of estimating it in Britain and
America--Ratings--American ships properly rated--Armaments of the
frigates and corvettes--Three styles of guns used--Difference
between long guns and carronades--Short weight of American
shot--Comparison of British frigates rating 38, and American
frigates rating 44 guns--Compared with a 74._

During the early years of this century England's naval power stood
at a height never reached before or since by that of any other
nation. On every sea her navies rode, not only triumphant, but
with none to dispute their sway. The island folk had long claimed
the mastery of the ocean, and they had certainly succeeded in
making their claim completely good during the time of bloody
warfare that followed the breaking out of the French Revolution.
Since the year 1792 each European nation, in turn, had learned to
feel bitter dread of the weight of England's hand. In the Baltic,
Sir Samuel Hood had taught the Russians that they must needs keep
in port when the English cruisers were in the offing. The descendants
of the Vikings had seen their whole navy destroyed at Copenhagen.
No Dutch fleet ever put out after the day when, off Camperdown, Lord
Duncan took possession of De Winter's shattered ships. But a few
years before 1812, the greatest sea-fighter of all time had died
in Trafalgar Bay, and in dying had crumbled to pieces the navies
of France and of Spain.

From that day England's task was but to keep in port such of her
foes' vessels as she had not destroyed. France alone still possessed
fleets that could be rendered formidable, and so, from the Scheldt
to Toulon, her harbors were watched and her coasts harried by the
blockading squadrons of the English. Elsewhere the latter had no
fear of their power being seriously assailed; but their vast commerce
and numerous colonies needed ceaseless protection. Accordingly in
every sea their cruisers could be found, of all sizes, from the
stately ship-of-the-line, with her tiers of heavy cannon and her
many hundreds of men, down to the little cutter carrying but a
score of souls and a couple of light guns. All these cruisers, but
especially those of the lesser rates, were continually brought into
contact with such of the hostile vessels as had run through the
blockade, or were too small to be affected by it. French and Italian
frigates were often fought and captured when they were skirting
their own coasts, or had started off on a plundering cruise through
the Atlantic, or to the Indian Ocean; and though the Danes had lost
their larger ships they kept up a spirited warfare with brigs and
gun-boats. So the English marine was in constant exercise, attended
with almost invariable success.

Such was Great Britain's naval power when the Congress of the United
States declared war upon her. While she could number her thousand
sail, the American navy included but half a dozen frigates, and six
or eight sloops and brigs; and it is small matter for surprise that
the British officers should have regarded their new foe with
contemptuous indifference. Hitherto the American seamen had never
been heard of except in connection with two or three engagements
with French frigates, and some obscure skirmishes against the Moors
of Tripoli; none of which could possibly attract attention in the
years that saw Aboukir, Copenhagen, and Trafalgar. And yet these
same petty wars were the school which raised our marine to the
highest standard of excellence. A continuous course of victory, won
mainly by seamanship, had made the English sailor overweeningly
self-confident, and caused him to pay but little regard to manoeuvring
or even to gunnery. Meanwhile the American learned, by receiving
hard knocks, how to give them, and belonged to a service too young
to feel an over-confidence in itself. One side had let its training
relax, while the other had carried it to the highest possible point.
Hence our ships proved, on the whole, victorious in the apparently
unequal struggle, and the men who had conquered the best seamen of
Europe were now in turn obliged to succumb. Compared with the great
naval battles of the preceding few years, out bloodiest conflicts
were mere skirmishes, but they were skirmishes between the hitherto
acknowledged kings of the ocean, and new men who yet proved to be
more than their equals. For over a hundred years, or since the time
when they had contended on equal terms with the great Dutch admirals,
the British had shown a decided superiority to their various foes,
and during the latter quarter of the time this superiority, as
already said, was very marked, indeed; in consequence, the victories
of the new enemy attracted an amount of attention altogether
disproportionate to their material effects. And it is a curious fact
that our little navy, in which the art of handling and fighting the
old broadside, sailing frigate in single conflict was brought to
the highest point of perfection ever reached, that this same navy
should have contained the first representative of the modern war
steamer, and also the torpedo--the two terrible engines which were
to drive from the ocean the very whitewinged craft that had first
won honor for the starry flag. The tactical skill of Hull or Decatur
is now of merely archaic interest, and has but little more bearing
on the manoeuvring of a modern fleet than have the tactics of the
Athenian gallies. But the war still conveys some most practical
lessons as to the value of efficient ships and, above all, of
efficient men in them. Had we only possessed the miserable gun-boats,
our men could have done nothing; had we not possessed good men, the
heavy frigates would have availed as little. Poor ships and impotent
artillery had lost the Dutch almost their entire navy; fine ships
and heavy cannon had not saved the French and Spanish from the like
fate. We owed our success to putting sailors even better than the
Dutch on ships even finer than those built by the two Latin seaboard
powers.

The first point to be remembered in order to write a fair account
of this war is that the difference in fighting skill, which certainly
existed between the two parties, was due mainly to training, and
not to the nature of the men. It seems certain that the American
had in the beginning somewhat the advantage, because his surroundings,
partly physical and partly social and political, had forced him into
habits of greater self-reliance. Therefore, on the average, he
offered rather the best material to start with; but the difference
was very slight, and totally disappeared under good training. The
combatants were men of the same race, differing but little from one
another. On the New England coast the English blood was as pure as
in any part of Britain; in New York and New Jersey it was mixed with
that of the Dutch settlers--and the Dutch are by race nearer to the
true old English of Alfred and Harold than are, for example, the
thoroughly anglicized Welsh of Cornwall. Otherwise, the infusion
of new blood into the English race on this side of the Atlantic has
been chiefly from three sources--German, Irish, and Norse; and these
three sources represent the elemental parts of the composite English
stock in about the same proportions in which they were originally
combined,--mainly Teutonic, largely Celtic, and with a Scandinavian
admixture. The descendant of the German becomes as much an
Anglo-American as the descendant of the Strathclyde Celt has already
become an Anglo-Briton. Looking through names of the combatants it
would be difficult to find any of one navy that could not be matched
in the other--Hull or Lawrence, Allen, Perry, or Stewart. And among
all the English names on both sides will be found many Scotch, Irish,
or Welsh--Macdonough, O'Brien, or Jones. Still stranger ones appear:
the Huguenot Tattnall is one among the American defenders of the
_Constellation_, and another Huguenot Tattnall is among the British
assailants at Lake Borgne. It must always be kept in mind that the
Americans and the British are two substantially similar branches of
the great English race, which both before and after their separation
have assimilated, and made Englishmen of many other peoples. [Footnote:
The inhabitants of Great Britain are best designated as
"British"--English being either too narrow or too broad a term, in
one case meaning the inhabitants of but a part of Britain, and in
the other the whole Anglo-Saxon people.] The lessons taught by the
war can hardly be learned unless this identity is kept in mind.
[Footnote: It was practically a civil war, and was waged with much
harshness and bitterness on both sides. I have already spoken of
the numerous grievances of the Americans; the British, in turn,
looked upon our blockade-runners which entered the French ports
exactly as we regarded, at a later date, the British steamers that
ran into Wilmington and Charleston. It is curious to see how illogical
writers are. The careers of the _Argus_ and _Alabama_ for example,
were strikingly similar in many ways, yet the same writer who speaks
of one as an "heroic little brig," will call the other a "black
pirate." Of course there can be no possible comparison as to the
causes for which the two vessels were fighting; but the cruises
themselves were very much alike, both in character and history.]

To understand aright the efficiency of our navy, it is necessary to
take a brief look at the character and antecedents of the officers
and men who served in it.

When war broke out the United States Navy was but a few years old,
yet it already had a far from dishonorable history. The captains
and lieutenants of 1812 had been taught their duties in a very
practical school, and the flag under which they fought was endeared
to them already by not a few glorious traditions--though these,
perhaps, like others of their kind, had lost none of their glory
in the telling. A few of the older men had served in the war of the
Revolution, and all still kept fresh in mind the doughty deeds of
the old-time privateering war craft. Men still talked of Biddle's
daring cruises and Barney's stubborn fights, or told of Scotch Paul
and the grim work they had who followed his fortunes. Besides
these memories of an older generation, most of the officers had
themselves taken part, when younger in years and rank, in deeds
not a whit less glorious. Almost every man had had a share in some
gallant feat, to which he, in part at least, owed his present
position. The captain had perhaps been a midshipman under Truxtun
when he took the _Vengeance_, and had been sent aboard the captured
French frigate with the prize-master; the lieutenant had borne a
part in the various attacks on Tripoli, and had led his men in the
desperate hand-to-hand fights in which the Yankee cutlass proved
an overmatch for the Turkish and Moorish scimitars. Nearly every
senior officer had extricated himself by his own prowess or skill
from the dangers of battle or storm; he owed his rank to the fact
that he had proved worthy of it. Thrown upon his own resources, he
had learned self-reliance; he was a first-rate practical seaman,
and prided himself on the way his vessel was handled. Having reached
his rank by hard work, and knowing what real fighting meant, he was
careful to see that his men were trained in the _essentials_ of
discipline, and that they knew how to handle the guns in battle as
well as polish them in peace. Beyond almost any of his countrymen,
he worshipped the "Gridiron Flag," and, having been brought up in
the Navy, regarded its honor as his own. It was, perhaps, the Navy
alone that thought itself a match, ship against ship, for Great
Britain. The remainder of the nation pinned its faith to the army,
or rather to that weakest of weak reeds, the militia. The officers
of the navy, with their strong _esprit de corps,_ their jealousy
of their own name and record, and the knowledge, by actual experience,
that the British ships sailed no faster and were no better handled
than their own, had no desire to shirk a conflict with any foe, and
having tried their bravery in actual service, they made it doubly
formidable by cool, wary skill. Even the younger men, who had never
been in action, had been so well trained by the tried veterans over
them that the lack of experience was not sensibly felt.

The sailors comprising the crews of our ships were well worthy of
their leaders. There was no better seaman in the world than American
Jack; he had been bred to his work from infancy, and had been off
in a fishing dory almost as soon as he could walk. When he grew
older, he shipped on a merchant-man or whaler, and in those warlike
times, when our large merchant-marine was compelled to rely pretty
much on itself for protection, each craft _had_ to be well handled;
all who were not were soon weeded out by a process of natural
selection, of which the agents were French picaroons, Spanish
buccaneers, and Malay pirates. It was a rough school, but it
taught Jack to be both skilful and self-reliant; and he was all the
better fitted to become a man-of-war's man, because he knew more
about fire-arms than most of his kind in foreign lands. At home he
had used his ponderous ducking gun with good effect on the flocks
of canvasbacks in the reedy flats of the Chesapeake, or among the
sea-coots in the rough water off the New England cliffs; and when
he went on a sailing voyage the chances were even that there would
be some use for the long guns before he returned, for the American
merchant sailor could trust to no armed escort.

The wonderful effectiveness of our seamen at the date of which I
am writing as well as long subsequently to it was largely due to
the curious condition of things in Europe. For thirty years all
the European nations had been in a state of continuous and very
complicated warfare, during the course of which each nation in turn
fought almost every other, England being usually at loggerheads
with all. One effect of this was to force an enormous proportion
of the carrying trade of the world into American bottoms. The old
Massachusetts town of Salem was then one of the main depots of
the East India trade; the Baltimore clippers carried goods into the
French and German ports with small regard to the blockade; New
Bedford and Sag Harbor fitted out whalers for the Arctic seas as
well as for the South Pacific; the rich merchants of Philadelphia
and New York sent their ships to all parts of the world; and every
small port had some craft in the coasting trade. On the New England
seaboard but few of the boys would reach manhood without having
made at least one voyage to the Newfoundland Banks after codfish;
and in the whaling towns of Long Island it used to be an old saying
that no man could marry till he struck his whale. The wealthy merchants
of the large cities would often send their sons on a voyage or two
before they let them enter their counting-houses. Thus it came about
that a large portion of our population was engaged in seafaring
pursuits of a nature strongly tending to develop a resolute and
hardy character in the men that followed them. The British
merchant-men sailed in huge convoys, guarded by men-of-war, while,
as said before, our vessels went alone, and relied for protection
on themselves. If a fishing smack went to the Banks it knew that it
ran a chance of falling in with some not over-scrupulous Nova
Scotian privateer. The barques that sailed from Salem to the Spice
Islands kept their men well trained both at great guns and musketry,
so as to be able to beat off either Malay proas, or Chinese junks.
The New York ships, loaded for the West Indies, were prepared to
do battle with the picaroons that swarmed in the Spanish main;
while the fast craft from Baltimore could fight as well as they
could run. Wherever an American seaman went, he not only had to
contend with all the legitimate perils of the sea, but he had also
to regard almost every stranger as a foe. Whether this foe called
himself pirate or privateer mattered but little. French, Spaniards,
Algerines, Malays, from all alike our commerce suffered, and against
all, our merchants were forced to defend themselves. The effect of
such a state of things, which made commerce so remunerative that
the bolder spirits could hardly keep out of it, and so hazardous
that only the most skilful and daring could succeed in it, was to
raise up as fine a set of seamen as ever manned a navy. The stern
school in which the American was brought up, forced him into habits
of independent thought and action which it was impossible that the
more protected Briton could possess. He worked more intelligently
and less from routine, and while perfectly obedient and amenable
to discipline, was yet able to judge for himself in an emergency.
He was more easily managed than most of his kind--being shrewd,
quiet, and, in fact, comparatively speaking, rather moral than
otherwise; if he was a New Englander, when he retired from a sea
life he was not unapt to end his days as a deacon. Altogether there
could not have been better material for a fighting crew than cool,
gritty American Jack. Moreover, there was a good nucleus of veterans
to begin with, who were well fitted to fill the more responsible
positions, such as captains of guns, etc. These were men who had
cruised in the little _Enterprise_ after French privateers, who had
been in the _Constellation_ in her two victorious fights, or who,
perhaps, had followed Decatur when with only eighty men he cut out
the _Philadelphia_, manned by fivefold his force and surrounded by
hostile batteries and war vessels,--one of the boldest expeditions
of the kind on record.

It is to be noted, furthermore, in this connection, that by a
singular turn of fortune, Great Britain, whose system of impressing
American sailors had been one of the chief causes of the war, herself
became, in consequence of that very system, in some sort, a nursery
for the seamen of the young Republican navy. The American sailor
feared nothing more than being impressed on a British ship--dreading
beyond measure the hard life and cruel discipline aboard of her;
but once there, he usually did well enough, and in course of time
often rose to be of some little consequence. For years before 1812,
the number of these impressed sailors was in reality greater than
the entire number serving in the American navy, from which it will
readily be seen that they formed a good stock to draw upon. Very
much to their credit, they never lost their devotion to the home
of their birth, more than two thousand of them being imprisoned at
the beginning of the war because they refused to serve against their
country. When Commodore Decatur captured the _Macedonian_, that
officer, as we learn from Marshall's "Naval Biography" (ii. 1019),
stated that most of the seamen of his own frigate, the _United
States_, had served in British war vessels, and that some had been
with Lord Nelson in the _Victory_, and had even been bargemen to
the great Admiral,--a pretty sure proof that the American sailors
did not show a disadvantage when compared with others. [Footnote:
With perfect gravity, James and his followers assume Decatur's
statement to be equivalent to saying that he had chiefly British
seamen on board; whereas, even as quoted by Marshall, Decatur
merely said that "his seamen had served on board a British
man-of-war," and that some "had served under Lord Nelson." Like
the _Constitution_, the _United States_ had rid herself of most of
the British subjects on board, before sailing. Decatur's remark
simply referred to the number of his American seamen who had been
impressed on board British ships. Whenever James says that an
American ship had a large proportion of British sailors aboard,
the explanation is that a large number of the crew were Americans
who had been impressed on British ships. It would be no more absurd
to claim Trafalgar as an American victory because there was a
certain number of Americans in Nelson's fleet, than it is to assert
that the Americans were victorious in 1812, because there were a
few renegade British on board their ships.]

Good seaman as the impressed American proved to be, yet he seldom
missed an opportunity to escape from the British service, by
desertion or otherwise. In the first place, the life was very hard,
and, in the second, the American seaman was very patriotic. He had
an honest and deep affection for his own flag; while, on the contrary,
he felt a curiously strong hatred for England, as distinguished from
Englishmen. This hatred was partly an abstract feeling, cherished
through a vague traditional respect for Bunker Hill, and partly
something very real and vivid, owing to the injuries he, and others
like him, had received. Whether he lived in Maryland or Massachusetts,
he certainly knew men whose ships had been seized by British cruisers,
their goods confiscated, and the vessels condemned. Some of his
friends had fallen victims to the odious right of search, and had
never been heard of afterward. He had suffered many an injury to
friend, fortune, or person, and some day he hoped to repay them
all; and when the war did come, he fought all the better because
he knew it was in his own quarrel. But, as I have said, this hatred
was against England, not against Englishmen. Then, as now, sailors
were scattered about over the world without any great regard for
nationality; and the resulting intermingling of natives and
foreigners in every mercantile marine was especially great in those
of Britain and America, whose people spoke the same tongue and wore
the same aspect. When chance drifted the American into Liverpool
or London, he was ready enough to ship in an Indiaman or whaler,
caring little for the fact that he served under the British flag;
and the Briton, in turn, who found himself in New York or
Philadelphia, willingly sailed in one of the clipper-built barques,
whether it floated the stars and stripes or not. When Captain Porter
wrought such havoc among the British whalers in the South Seas,
he found that no inconsiderable portion of their crews consisted
of Americans, some of whom enlisted on board his own vessel; and
among the crews of the American whalers were many British. In fact,
though the skipper of each ship might brag loudly of his nationality,
yet in practical life he knew well enough that there was very little
to choose between a Yankee and a Briton. [Footnote: What choice
there was, was in favor of the American. In point of courage there
was no difference whatever. The _Essex_ and the _Lawrence_, as
well as the _Frolic_ and the _Reindeer_, were defended with the
same stubborn, desperate, cool bravery that marks the English race
on both sides of the Atlantic. But the American was a free citizen,
any one's equal, a voter with a personal interest in his country's
welfare, and, above all, without having perpetually before his eyes
the degrading fear of the press-gang. In consequence, he was more
tractable than the Englishman, more self-reliant, and possessed
greater judgment. In the fight between the _Wasp_ and the _Frolic_,
the latter's crew had apparently been well trained at the guns, for
they aimed well; but they fired at the wrong time, and never
corrected the error; while their antagonists, delivering their
broadsides far more slowly, by intelligently waiting until the
proper moment, worked frightful havoc. But though there was a
certain slight difference between the seamen of the two nations,
it must never be forgotten that it was very much less than that
between the various individuals of the same nation; and when the
British had been trained for a few years by such commanders as
Broke and Manners, it was impossible to surpass them, and it needed
our best men to equal them.] Both were bold and hardy, cool and
intelligent, quick with their hands, and showing at their best in
an emergency. They looked alike and spoke alike; when they took
the trouble to think, they thought alike; and when they got drunk,
which was not an infrequent occurrence, they quarrelled alike.

Mingled with them were a few seamen of other nationalities. The
Irishman, if he came from the old Dano-Irish towns of Waterford,
Dublin, and Wexford, or from the Ulster coast, was very much like
the two chief combatants; the Celto-Turanian kern of the west did
not often appear on shipboard. The French, Danes, and Dutch were
hemmed in at home; they had enough to do on their own seaboard,
and could not send men into foreign fleets. A few Norse, however,
did come in, and excellent sailors and fighters they made. With
the Portuguese and Italians, of whom some were to be found serving
under the union-jack, and others under the stars and stripes, it
was different; although there were many excellent exceptions they
did not, as a rule, make the best of seamen. They were treacherous,
fond of the knife, less ready with their hands, and likely to lose
either their wits or their courage when in a tight place.

In the American navy, unlike the British, there was no impressment;
the sailor was a volunteer, and he shipped in whatever craft his
fancy selected. Throughout the war there were no "picked crews" on
the American side, [Footnote: James' statements to the contrary
being in every case utterly without foundation. He is also wrong
in his assertion that the American ships had no boys; they had nearly
as many in proportion as the British. The _Constitution_ had 31,
the _Adams_ 15, etc. So, when he states that our midshipmen were
generally masters and mates of merchantmen; they were generally
from eleven to seventeen years old at the beginning of the war,
and besides, had rarely or never been in the merchant marine.]
excepting on the last two cruises of the _Constitution_. In fact
(as seen by the letter of Captains Stewart and Bainbridge to
Secretary Hamilton), there was often much difficulty in getting
enough men. [Footnote: Reading through the volumes of official
letters about this war, which are preserved in the office of the
Secretary of the Navy, one of the most noticeable things is the
continual complaints about the difficulty of getting men. The
_Adams_ at one time had a crew of but nineteen men--"fourteen of
whom are marines," adds the aggrieved commander. A log-book of
one of the gun-boats records the fact that after much difficulty
_two_ men were enlisted--from the jail, with a parenthetical
memorandum to the effect that they were both very drunk. British
ships were much more easily manned, as they could always have
recourse to impressment.

The _Constitution_ on starting out her last cruises had an
extraordinary number of able seamen aboard, viz., 218, with but 92
ordinary seamen, 12 boys, and 44 marines, making, with the officers,
a total of 440 men. (See letter of Captain Bainbridge, Oct. 16,
1814; it is letter No. 51, in the fortieth volume of "Captains'
Letters," in the clerk's office of the Secretary of the Navy.)]
Many sailors preferred to serve in the innumerable privateers, and,
the two above-mentioned officers, in urging the necessity of
building line-of-battle ships, state that it was hard work to
recruit men for vessels of an inferior grade, so long as the enemy
had ships of the line.

One of the standard statements made by the British historians about
this war is that our ships were mainly or largely manned by British
sailors. This, if true, would not interfere with the lessons which
it teaches; and, besides that, it is _not_ true.

In this, as in every thing else, all the modern writers have merely
followed James or Brenton, and I shall accordingly confine myself
to examining their assertions. The former begins (vol. iv, p. 470)
by diffidently stating that there is a "similarity" of language between
the inhabitants of the two countries--an interesting philological
discovery that but few will attempt to controvert. In vol. vi, p.
154, he mentions that a number of blanks occur in the American Navy
List in the column "Where Born"; and in proof of the fact that these
blanks are there because the men were not Americans, he says that
their names "are all English and Irish." [Footnote: For example,
James writes: "Out of the 32 captains one only, Thomas Tingey, had
England marked as his birthplace.... Three blanks occur, and we
consider it rather creditable to Captains John Shaw, Daniel S.
Patterson, and John Ord Creighton, that they were ashamed to tell
where they were born." I have not been able to find out the latter's
birth-place, but Captain Shaw was born in New York, and I have seen
Captain Patterson incidentally alluded to as "born and bred in
America." Generally, whenever I have been able to fill up the
vacancies in the column "Where Born," I have found that it was in
America. From these facts it would appear that James was somewhat
hasty in concluding that the omission of the birth-place proved the
owner of the name to be a native of Great Britain.] They certainly
are; and so are all the other names in the list. It could not well
be otherwise, as the United States Navy was not officered by Indians.
In looking over this same Navy List (of 1816) it will be seen that
but a little over 5 per cent, of the officers were born abroad--a
smaller proportion by far than would exist in the population of the
country at large--and most of these had come to America when under
ten years of age. On p. 155 James adds that the British sailors
composed "one third in number and one half in point of effectiveness"
of the American crews. Brenton in his "Naval History" writes: "It
was said, and I have no reason to doubt the fact, that there were
200 British seamen aboard the _Constitution_." [Footnote: New
edition, London, 1837, vol. ii, p. 456.] These statements are mere
assertions unsupported by proof, and of such a loose character as
to be difficult to refute. As our navy was small, it may be best
to take each ship in turn. The only ones of which the British could
write authoritatively were, of course, those which they captured.
The first one taken was the _Wasp_. James says many British were
discovered among her crew, instancing especially one sailor named
Jack Lang; now Jack Lang was born in the town of Brunswick, New
Jersey, _but had been impressed and forced to serve in the British
Navy_. The same was doubtless true of the rest of the "many British"
seamen of her crew; at any rate, as the only instance James mentions
(Jack Lang) was an American, he can hardly be trusted for those
whom he does not name.

Of the 95 men composing the crew of the _Nautilus_ when she was
captured, "6 were detained and sent to England to await examination
as being suspected of being British subjects." [Footnote: Quoted
from letter of Commodore Rodgers of September 12, 1812 (in Naval
Archives, "Captains' Letters," vol xxv, No. 43), enclosing a "List
of American prisoners of war discharged out of custody of Lieutenant
William Miller, agent at the port of Halifax," in exchange for
some of the British captured by Porter. This list, by the way,
shows the crew of the _Nautilus_ (counting the six men detained
as British) to have been 95 in number, instead of 106, as stated
by James. Commodore Rodgers adds that he has detained 12 men of
the _Guerrière's_ crew as an offset to the 6 men belonging to the
_Nautilus_.] Of the other small brigs, the _Viper_, _Vixen_,
_Rattlesnake_, and _Syren_, James does not mention the composition
of the crew, and I do not know that any were claimed as British.
Of the crew of the _Argus_ "about 10 or 12 were believed to be
British subjects; the American officers swore the crew contained
none" (James, "Naval Occurrences," p. 278). From 0 to 10 per cent
can be allowed. When the _Frolic_ was captured "her crew consisted
of native Americans" (_do_, p. 340). James speaks ("History," p.
418) of "a portion of the British subjects on board the _Essex_,"
but without giving a word of proof or stating his grounds of belief.
One man was claimed as a deserter by the British, but he turned out
to be a New Yorker. There were certainly a certain number of British
aboard, but the number probably did not exceed thirty. Of the
_President's_ crew he says ("Naval Occurrences," p. 448): "In the
opinion of several British officers there were among them many
British seamen" but Commodore Decatur, Lieutenant Gallagher, and
the other officers swore that there were none. Of the crew of the
_Chesapeake_, he says, "about 32" were British subjects, or about
10 per cent. One or two of these were afterward shot, and some 25,
together with a Portuguese boatswain's mate, entered into the
British service. So that of the vessels captured by the British,
the _Chesapeake_ had the largest number of British (about 10 per
cent. of her crew) on board, the others ranging from that number
down to none at all, as in the case of the _Wasp_. As these eleven
ships would probably represent a fair average, this proportion, of
0 to 10 per cent., should be taken as the proper one. James, however,
is of the opinion that those ships manned by Americans were more
apt to be captured than those manned by the braver British; which
calls for an examination of the crews of the remaining vessels.
Of the American sloop _Peacock_, James says ("Naval Occurrences,"
p. 348) that "several of her men were recognized as British seamen";
even if this were true, "several" could not probably mean more
than sixteen, or 10 per cent. Of the second _Wasp_ he says,
"Captain Blakely was a native of Dublin, and, along with some
English and Scotch, did not, it may be certain, neglect to have
in his crew a great many Irish." Now Captain Blakely left Ireland
when he was but 16 months old, and the rest of James' statement is
avowedly mere conjecture. It was asserted positively in the American
newspapers that the _Wasp_, which sailed from Portsmouth, was
manned exclusively by New Englanders, except a small draft of men
from a Baltimore privateer, and that there was not a foreigner in
her crew. Of the _Hornet_ James states that "some of her men were
natives of the United Kingdom"; but he gives no authority, and the
men he refers to were in all probability those spoken of in the
journal of one of the _Hornet's_ officers, which says that "Many
of our men (Americans) had been impressed in the British service."
As regards the gun-boats, James asserts that they were commanded
by "Commodore Joshua Barney, a native of Ireland." This officer,
however, was born at Baltimore on July 6, 1759. As to the
_Constitution_, Brenton, as already mentioned, supposes the number
of British sailors in her crew to have been 200; James makes it
less, or about 150. Respecting this, the only definite statements
I can find in British works are the following: In the "Naval
Chronicle," vol. xxix, p. 452, an officer of the _Java_ states
that most of the _Constitution's_ men were British, many being
from the _Guerrière_; which should be read in connection with
James' statement (vol. vi, p. 156) that but eight of the _Guerrière's_
crew deserted, and but two shipped on board the _Constitution_.
Moreover, as a matter of fact, these eight men were all impressed
Americans. In the "Naval Chronicle" it is also said that the
_Chesapeake's_ surgeon was an Irishman, formerly of the British
navy; he was born in Baltimore, and was never in the British navy
in his life. The third lieutenant "was supposed to be an Irishman"
(Brenton, ii, 456). The first lieutenant "was a native of Great
Britain, we have been informed" (James, vi, 194); he was Mr. George
Parker, born and bred in Virginia. The remaining three citations,
if true, prove nothing. "One man had served under Mr. Kent" of the
_Guerrière_ (James, vi, p. 153). "One had been in the _Achille_"
and "one in the _Eurydice_" (Brenton, ii, 456). These three men
were most probably American seamen who had been impressed on British
ships. From Cooper (in "Putnam's Magazine," vol. I, p. 593) as well
as from several places in the _Constitution's_ log, [Footnote: See
her log-book (vol. ii, Feb. 1, 1812 to Dec. 13, 1813); especially
on July 12th, when twelve men were discharged. In some of Hull's
letters he alludes to the desire of the British part of the crew
to serve on the gun boats or in the ports; and then writes that
"in accordance with the instructions sent him by the Secretary of
the Navy," he had allowed the British-born portion to leave the
ship. The log-books are in the Bureau of Navigation.] we learn
that several of the crew who were British deserters were discharged
from the _Constitution_ before she left port, as they were afraid
to serve in a war against Great Britain. That this fear was
justifiable may be seen by reading James, vol. iv, p. 483. Of the
four men taken by the _Leopard_ from the _Chesapeake_, as deserters,
one was hung and three scourged. In reality the crew of the
_Constitution_ probably did not contain a dozen British sailors;
in her last cruises she was manned almost exclusively by New
Englanders. The only remainder vessel is the _United States_,
respecting whose crew some remarkable statements have been made.
Marshall (vol. ii, p. 1019) writes that Commodore Decatur "declared
there was not a seaman in his ship who had not served from 5 to 12
years in a British man-of-war," from which he concludes that they
were British themselves. It may be questioned whether Decatur ever
made such an assertion; or if he did, it is safe to assume again
that his men were long-impressed Americans. [Footnote: At the
beginning of the war there were on record in the American State
Department 6,257 cases of impressed American seamen. These could
represent but a small part of the whole, which must have amounted
to 20,000 men, or more than sufficient to man our entire navy five
times over. According to the British Admiralty Report to the House
of Commons, February 1, 1815, 2,548 impressed American seamen, who
refused to serve against their country, were imprisoned in 1812.
According to Lord Castlereagh's speech in the House, February 18,
1813, 3,300 men claiming to be American subjects were serving in
the British navy in January, 1811, and he certainly did not give
any thing like the whole number. In the American service the term
of enlistment extended for two years, and the frigate, _United
States_, referred to, had not had her crew for any very great
length of time as yet. If such a crew were selected at random
from American sailors, among them there would be, owing to the
small number serving in our own navy and the enormous number
impressed into the British navy, probably but one of the former
to two of the latter. As already mentioned the American always
left a British man-of-war as soon as he could, by desertion or
discharge; but he had no unwillingness to serve in the home navy,
where the pay was larger, and the discipline far more humane, not
to speak of motives of patriotism. Even if the ex-British
man-of-war's man kept out of service for some time, he would be
very apt to enlist when a war broke out, which his country
undertook largely to avenge his own wrongs.]

Of the _Carolina's_ crew of 70 men, five were British. This fact
was not found out till three deserted, when an investigation was
made and the two other British discharged. Captain Henly, in
reporting these facts, made no concealment of his surprise that
there should be any British at all in his crew. [Footnote: See
his letter in "Letters of Masters' Commandant," 1814, I. No. 116.]

From these facts and citations we may accordingly conclude that
the proportion of British seamen serving on American ships _after
the war broke out_, varied between none, as on the _Wasp_ and
_Constitution_, to ten per cent., as on the _Chesapeake_ and
_Essex_. On the average, nine tenths of each of our crews were
American seamen, and about one twentieth British, the remainder
being a mixture of various nationalities.

On the other hand, it is to be said that the British frigate
_Guerrière_ had ten Americans among her crew, who were permitted
to go below during action, and the _Macedonian_ eight, who were
not allowed that privilege, three of them being killed. Three of
the British sloop _Peacock's_ men were Americans, who were forced
to fight against the _Hornet_: one of them was killed. Two of the
_Epervier's_ men were Americans, who were also forced to fight.
When the crew of the _Nautilus_ was exchanged, a number of other
American prisoners were sent with them; among these were a number
of American seamen who had been serving in the _Shannon_, _Acasta_,
_Africa_, and various other vessels. So there was also a certain
proportion of Americans among the British crews, although forming
a smaller percentage of them than the British did on board the
American ships. In neither case was the number sufficient to at all
affect the result.

The crews of our ships being thus mainly native Americans, it may
be interesting to try to find out the proportions that were
furnished by the different sections of the country. There is not
much difficulty about the officers. The captains, masters commandant,
lieutenants, marine officers, whose birthplaces are given in the
Navy List of 1816,--240 in all,--came from the various States as
follows:

              .- N.H..   5-.
              |  Mass.. 20 |
New England  -|  R.I.   11 |- 42
              '- Conn..  6-'

              .- N.Y..  17-.
              |  N.J..  22 |
Middle States-|  Penn.. 35 |- 78
              '- Del..   4-'

District of Columbia -[D.C..  4]- 4


                .- Md..   46-.
                |  Va..   42 |
                |  N.C..   4 |
Southern States-|  S.C..  16 |-116
                |  Ga..    2 |
                |  La..    4 |
                '- Ky..    2-'
                               ---------
Total of given birthplaces      240


Thus, Maryland furnished, both absolutely and proportionately, the
greatest number of officers, Virginia, then the most populous of
all the States, coming next; four fifths of the remainder came
from the Northern States.

It is more difficult to get at the birthplaces of the sailors.
Something can be inferred from the number of privateers and letters
of marque fitted out. Here Baltimore again headed the list; following
closely came New York, Philadelphia, and the New England coast
towns, with, alone among the Southern ports, Charleston, S.C. A
more accurate idea of the quotas of sailors furnished by the
different sections can be arrived at by comparing the total amount
of tonnage the country possessed at the outbreak of the war.
Speaking roughly, 44 per cent, of it belonged to New England, 32
per cent, to the Middle States, and 11 per cent, to Maryland. This
makes it _probable_ (but of course not certain) that three fourths
of the common sailors hailed from the Northern States, half the
remainder from Maryland, and the rest chiefly from Virginia and
South Carolina.

Having thus discussed somewhat at length the character of our
officers and crews, it will now be necessary to present some
statistical tables to give a more accurate idea of the composition
of the navy; the tonnage, complements, and armaments of the ships, etc.

At the beginning of the war the Government possessed six navy-yards
(all but the last established in 1801) as follows: [Footnote: Report
of Naval Secretary Jones, Nov. 30. 1814.]

       Place               Original Cost.          Minimum number of
                                                    men employed.

1. Portsmouth. N. H.,           $ 5,500                    10

2. Charleston, Mass.,            39,214                    20

3. New York,                     40,000                   102

4. Philadelphia,                 37,000                    13

5. Washington,                    4,000                    36

6. Gosport,                      12,000                    16

In 1812 the following was the number of officers in the navy:
[Footnote: "List of Vessels" etc., by Gen. H Preble U.S.N (1874)]

 12 captains
 10 masters commandant
 73 lieutenants
 53 masters
310 midshipmen
 42 marine officers
-----
500

At the opening of the year, the number of seamen, ordinary seamen,
and boys in service was 4,010, and enough more were recruited to
increase it to 5,230, of whom only 2,346 were destined for the
cruising war vessels, the remainder being detailed for forts,
gun-boats, navy yards, the lakes, etc. [Footnote: Report of Secretary
Paul Hamilton, Feb. 21, 1812.] The marine corps was already ample,
consisting of 1,523 men. [Footnote: _Ibid_.]

No regular navy lists were published till 1816, and I have been
able to get very little information respecting the increase in
officers and men during 1813 and 1814; but we have full returns
for 1815, which may be summarized as follows: [Footnote: Seybert's
"Statistical Annals," p. 676 (Philadelphia, 1818)]

     30 captains,
     25 masters commandant,
    141 lieutenants,
     24 commanders,
    510 midshipmen,
    230 sailing-masters,
     50 surgeons,
     12 chaplains,
     50 pursers,
     10 coast pilots,
     45 captain's clerks,
     80 surgeon's mates,
    530 boatswains, gunners, carpenters, and sailmakers,
    268 boatswain's mates, gunner's mates, etc.,
  1,106 quarter gunners, etc.,
  5,000 able seamen,
  6,849 ordinary seamen and boys.
        Making a total of 14,960, with 2,715 marines.
[Footnote: Report of Secretary B. W. Crowninshield, April 18, 1816.]

Comparing this list with the figures given before, it can be seen
that during the course of the war our navy grew enormously,
increasing to between three and four times its original size.

At the beginning of the year 1812, the navy of the United States
on the ocean consisted of the following vessels, which either
were, or could have been, made available during the war. [Footnote:
Letter of Secretary Benjamin Stoddart to Fifth Congress, Dec. 24,
1798; Letter of Secretary Paul Hamilton, Feb. 21, 1812; "American
State Papers," vol. xix, p. 149. See also The "History of the Navy
of the United States," by Lieut. G. E. Emmons, U. S. N. (published
in Washington, MDCCCLIII, under the authority of the Navy Department.)]

 Rate                                    When
(Guns).     Name.         Where Built.   Built.  Tonnage.   Cost.
  44    _United States_,  Philadelphia,   1797     1576   $299,336
  44    _Constitution_,   Boston,         1797     1576    302,718
  44    _President_,      New York,       1800     1576    220,910
  38    _Constellation_,  Baltimore,      1797     1265    314,212
  38    _Congress_,       Portsmouth,     1799     1268    197,246
  38    _Chesapeake_,     Norfolk,        1799     1244    220,677
  32    _Essex_,          Salem,          1799      860    139,362
  28    _Adams_,          New York,       1799      560     76,622
  18    _Hornet_,         Baltimore,      1805      480     52,603
  18    _Wasp_,           Washington,     1806      450     40,000
  16    _Argus_,          Boston,         1803      298     37,428
  16    _Syren_,          Philadelphia,   1803      250     32,521
  14    _Nautilus_,       Baltimore,      1803      185     18,763
  14    _Vixen_,          Baltimore,      1803      185     20,872
  12    _Enterprise_,     Baltimore,      1799      165     16,240
  12    _Viper_,          Purchased,      1810      148

There also appeared on the lists the _New York_, 36, _Boston_, 28,
and _John Adams_, 28. The two former were condemned hulks; the latter
was entirely rebuilt after the war. The _Hornet_ was originally a
brig of 440 tons, and 18 guns; having been transformed into a ship,
she was pierced for 20 guns, and in size was of an intermediate
grade between the _Wasp_ and the heavy sloops, built somewhat later,
of 509 tons. Her armament consisted of 32-pound carronades, with
the exception of the two bow-guns, which were long 12's. The whole
broadside was in nominal weight just 300 pounds; in actual weight
about 277 pounds. Her complement of men was 140, but during the war
she generally left port with 150. [Footnote: In the _Hornet's_ log
of Oct. 25, 1812, while in port, it is mentioned that she had 158
men; four men who were sick were left behind before she started.
(See, in the Navy Archives, the Log-book, _Hornet_, _Wasp_, and
_Argus_, July 20, 1809, to Oct. 6, 1813.)] The _Wasp_ had been a
ship from the beginning, mounted the number of guns she rated (of
the same calibres as the _Hornet's_) and carried some ten men less.
She was about the same length as the British 18-gun brig-sloop, but,
being narrower, measured nearly 30 tons less. The _Argus_ and _Syren_
were similar and very fine brigs, the former being the longer. Each
carried two more guns than she rated; and the _Argus_, in addition,
had a couple thrust through the bridle-ports. The guns were 24-pound
carronades, with two long 12's for bow-chasers. The proper complement
of men was 100, but each sailed usually with about 125. The four
smaller craft were originally schooners, armed with the same number
of light long guns as they rated, and carrying some 70 men apiece;
but they had been very effectually ruined by being changed into
brigs, with crews increased to a hundred men. Each was armed with
18-pound carronades, carrying two more than she rated. The
_Enterprise_, in fact, mounted 16 guns, having two long nines thrust
through the bridle-ports. These little brigs were slow, not very
seaworthy, and overcrowded with men and guns; they all fell into
the enemy's hands without doing any good whatever, with the single
exception of the _Enterprise_, which escaped capture by sheer good
luck, and in her only battle happened to be pitted against one of
the corresponding and equally bad class of British gun-brigs. The
_Adams_ after several changes of form finally became a flush-decked
corvette. The _Essex_ had originally mounted twenty-six long 12's
on her main-deck, and sixteen 24-pound carronades on her spar-deck;
but official wisdom changed this, giving her 46 guns, twenty-four
32-pound carronades, and two long 12's on the main-deck, and
sixteen 32-pound carronades with four long 12's on the spar-deck.
When Captain Porter had command of her he was deeply sensible of
the disadvantages of an armament which put him at the mercy of any
ordinary antagonist who could choose his distance; accordingly he
petitioned several times, but always without success, to have his
long 12's returned to him.

The American 38's were about the size of the British frigates of
the same rate, and armed almost exactly in the same way, each
having 28 long 18's on the main-deck and 20 32-pound carronades on
the spar-deck. The proper complement was 300 men, but each carried
from 30 to 80 more. [Footnote: The _Chesapeake_, by some curious
mistake, was frequently rated as a 44, and this drew in its train
a number of attendant errors. When she was captured, James says
that in one of her lockers was found a letter, dated in February,
1811, from Robert Smith, the Secretary of War, to Captain Evans,
at Boston, directing him to open houses of rendezvous for manning
the _Chesapeake_, and enumerating her crew at a total of 443.
Naturally this gave British historians the idea that such was the
ordinary complement of our 38-gun frigates. But the ordering so
large a crew was merely a mistake, as may be seen by a letter from
Captain Bainbridge to the Secretary of the Navy, which is given in
full in the "Captains' Letters," vol. xxv. No. 19 (Navy Archives).
In it he mentions the extraordinary number of men ordered for the
_Chesapeake_, saying, "There is a mistake in the crew ordered for
the _Chesapeake_, as it equals in number the crews of our 44-gun
frigates, whereas the _Chesapeake_ is of the class of the _Congress_
and _Constellation_."]

Our three 44-gun ships were the finest frigates then afloat (although
the British possessed some as heavy, such as the _Egyptienne_, 44).
They were beautifully modelled, with very thick scantling, extremely
stout masts, and heavy cannon. Each carried on her main-deck thirty
long 24's, and on her spar-deck two long bow-chasers, and twenty
or twenty-two carronades--42-pounders on the _President_ and _United
States_, 32-pounders on the _Constitution_. Each sailed with a crew
of about 450 men--50 in excess of the regular complement. [Footnote:
The _President_ when in action with the _Endymion_ had 450 men
aboard, as sworn by Decatur; the muster-roll of the _Constitution_,
a few days before her action with the _Guerrière_ contains 464
names (including 51 marines); 8 men were absent in a prize, so she
had aboard in the action 456. Her muster-roll just before the
action with the _Cyane_ and _Levant_ shows 461 names.]

It may be as well to mention here the only other class of vessels
that we employed during the war. This was composed of the ship-sloops
built in 1813, which got to sea in 1814. They were very fine vessels,
measuring 509 tons apiece, [Footnote: The dimensions were 117 feet
11 inches upon the gun-deck, 97 feet 6 inches keel for tonnage,
measuring from one foot before the forward perpendicular and along
the base line to the front of the rabbet of the port, deducting
3/5 of the moulded breadth of the beam, which is 31 feet 6 inches;
making 509 21/95 tons. (See in Navy Archives, "Contracts," vol. ii.
p. 137.)] with very thick scantling and stout masts and spars. Each
carried twenty 32-pound carronades and two long 12's with a crew
nominally of 160 men, but with usually a few supernumeraries.
[Footnote: The _Peacock_ had 166 men, as we learn from her commander
Warrington's letter of June 1st (Letter No. 140 in "Masters'
Commandant Letters," 1814, vol. i). The _Frolic_ took aboard "10
or 12 men beyond her regular complement" (see letter of Joseph
Bainbridge, No. 51, in same vol.). Accordingly when she was
captured by the _Orpheus_, the commander of the latter, Captain
Hugh Pigot, reported the number of men aboard to be 171. The
_Wasp_ left port with 173 men, with which she fought her first
action; she had a much smaller number aboard in her second.]

The British vessels encountered were similar, but generally
inferior, to our own. The only 24-pounder frigate we encountered
was the _Endymion_ of about a fifth less force than the _President_.
Their 38-gun frigates were almost exactly like ours, but with
fewer men in crew as a rule. They were three times matched against
our 44-gun frigates, to which they were inferior about as three is
to four. Their 36-gun frigates were larger than the _Essex_, with
a more numerous crew, but the same number of guns; carrying on
the lower deck, however, long 18's instead of 32-pound carronades,--a
much more effective armament. The 32-gun frigates were smaller,
with long 12's on the main-deck. The largest sloops were also
frigate-built, carrying twenty-two 32-pound carronades on the
main-deck, and twelve lighter guns on the quarter-deck and
forecastle, with a crew of 180. The large flush-decked ship-sloops
carried 21 or 23 guns, with a crew of 140 men. But our vessels
most often came in contact with the British 18-gun brig-sloop;
this was a tubby craft, heavier than any of our brigs, being about
the size of the _Hornet_. The crew consisted of from 110 to 135 men;
ordinarily each was armed with sixteen 32-pound carronades, two
long 6's, and a shifting 12-pound carronade; often with a light
long gun as a stern-chaser, making 20 in all. The _Reindeer_ and
_Peacock_ had only 24-pound carronades; the _Epervier_ had but
eighteen guns, all carronades. [Footnote: The _Epervier_ was taken
into our service under the same name and rate. Both Preble and
Emmons describe her as of 477 tons. Warrington, her captor, however,
says: "The surveyor of the port has just measured the _Epervier_
and reports her 467 tons." (In the Navy Archives, "Masters'
Commandant Letters," 1814, i. No. 125.) For a full discussion of
tonnage, see Appendix, A.]

Among the stock accusations against our navy of 1812, were, and
are, statements that our vessels were rated at less than their
real force, and in particular that our large frigates were "disguised
line-of-battle ships." As regards the ratings, most vessels of
that time carried more guns than they rated; the disparity was
less in the French than in either the British or American navies.
Our 38-gun frigates carried 48 guns, the exact number the British
38's possessed. The worst case of underrating in our navy was the
_Essex_, which rated 32, and carried 46 guns, so that her real was
44 per cent, in excess of her nominal force; but this was not as
bad as the British sloop _Cyane_, which was rated a 20 or 22, and
carried 34 guns, so that she had either 55 or 70 per cent, greater
real than nominal force. At the beginning of the war we owned two
18-gun ship-sloops, one mounting 18 and the other 20 guns; the
18-gun brig-sloops they captured mounted each 19 guns, so the
average was the same. Later we built sloops that rated 18 and
mounted 22 guns, but when one was captured it was also put down in
the British navy list as an 18-gun ship-sloop. During all the
combats of the war there were but four vessels that carried as
few guns as they rated. Two were British, the _Epervier_ and
_Levant_, and two American, the _Wasp_ and _Adams_. One navy was
certainly as deceptive as another, as far as underrating went.

The force of the statement that our large frigates were disguised
line-of-battle ships, of course depends entirely upon what the
words "frigate" and "line-of-battle ship" mean. When on the 10th
of August, 1653, De Ruyter saved a great convoy by beating off Sir
George Ayscough's fleet of 38 sail, the largest of the Dutch admiral's
"33 sail of the line" carried but 30 guns and 150 men, and his own
flag-ship but 28 guns and 134 men. [Footnote: La Vie et les Actions
Memorables du Sr. Michel de Ruyter, à Amsterdam, Chez Henry et
Theodore Boom. MDCLXXVII. The work is by Barthelemy Pielat, a
surgeon in de Ruyter's fleet, and personally present during many
of his battles. It is written in French, but is in tone more
strongly anti-French than anti-English.] The Dutch book from which
this statement is taken speaks indifferently of frigates of 18, 40,
and 58 guns. Toward the end of the eighteenth century the terms had
crystallized. Frigate then meant a so-called single-decked ship;
it in reality possessed two decks, the main- or gun-deck, and the
upper one, which had no name at all, until our sailors christened
it spar-deck. The gun-deck possessed a complete battery, and the
spar-deck an interrupted one, mounting guns on the forecastle and
quarter-deck. At that time all "two-decked" or "three-decked" (in
reality three- and four-decked) ships were liners. But in 1812
this had changed somewhat; as the various nations built more and
more powerful vessels, the lower rates of the different divisions
were dropped. Thus the British ship _Cyane_, captured by the
_Constitution_, was in reality a small frigate, with a main-deck
battery of 22 guns, and 12 guns on the spar-deck; a few years
before she would have been called a 24-gun frigate, but she then
ranked merely as a 22-gun sloop. Similarly the 50- and 64-gun ships
that had fought in the line at the Doggerbank, Camperdown, and
even at Aboukir, were now no longer deemed fit for the purpose,
and the 74 was the lowest line-of-battle ship.

The _Constitution_, _President_, and _States_ must then be compared
with the existing European vessels that were classed as frigates.
The French in 1812 had no 24-pounder frigates, for the very good
reason that they had all fallen victims to the English 18-pounder's;
but in July of that year a Danish frigate, the _Nayaden_, which
carried long 24's, was destroyed by the English ship _Dictator_, 64.

The British frigates were of several rates. The lowest rated 32,
carrying in all 40 guns, 26 long 12's on the main-deck and 14
24-pound carronades on the spar-deck--a broadside of 324 pounds.
[Footnote: In all these vessels there were generally two long 6's
or 9's substituted for the bow-chase carronades.] The 36-gun
frigates, like the _Phoebe_, carried 46 guns, 26 long 18's on the
gun-deck and 32-pound carronades above. The 38-gun frigates, like
the _Macedonian_, carried 48 or 49 guns, long 18's below and
32-pound carronades above. The 32-gun frigates, then, presented in
broadside 13 long 12's below and 7 24-pound carronades above; the
38-gun frigates, 14 long 18's below and 10 32-pound carronades
above; so that a 44-gun frigate would naturally present 15 long
24's and 12 42-pound carronades above, as the _United States_ did
at first. The rate was perfectly proper, for French, British, and
Danes already possessed 24-pounder frigates; and there was really
less disparity between the force and rate of a 44 that carried 54
guns than there was in a 38 that carried 49, or, like the
_Shannon_, 52. Nor was this all. Two of our three victories were
won by the _Constitution_, which only carried 32-pound carronades,
and once 54 and once 52 guns; and as two thirds of the work was
thus done by this vessel, I shall now compare her with the largest
British frigates. Her broadside force consisted of 15 long 24's on
the main-deck, and on the spar-deck one long 24, and in one case
10, in the other 11 32-pound carronades--a broadside of 704 or 736
pounds. [Footnote: Nominally; in reality about 7 per cent, less on
account of the short weight in the metal.] There was then in the
British navy the _Acasta_, 40, carrying in broadside 15 long 18's
and 11 32-pound carronades; when the spar-deck batteries are equal,
the addition of 90 pounds to the main-deck broadside (which is all
the superiority of the _Constitution_ over the _Acasta_) is
certainly not enough to make the distinction between a frigate and
a disguised 74. But not considering the _Acasta_, there were in the
British navy three 24-pounder frigates, the _Cornwallis_,
_Indefatigable_, and _Endymion_. We only came in contact with the
latter in 1815, when the _Constitution_ had but 52 guns. The
_Endymion_ then had an armament of 28 long 24's, 2 long 18's, and
20 32-pound carronades, making a broadside of 674 pounds, [Footnote:
According to James 664 pounds; he omits the chase guns for no
reason.] or including a shifting 24-pound carronade, of 698
pounds--just _six pounds_, or 1 per cent, less than the force of
that "disguised line-of-battle ship" the _Constitution_! As the
_Endymion_ only rated as a 40, and the _Constitution_ as a 44, it
was in reality the former and not the latter which was underrated.
I have taken the _Constitution_, because the British had more to
do with her than they did with our other two 44's taken together.
The latter were both of heavier metal than the _Constitution_,
carrying 42-pound carronades. In 1812 the _United States_ carried
her full 54 guns, throwing a broadside of 846 pounds; when captured,
the _President_ carried 53, having substituted a 24-pound carronade
for two of her 42's, and her broadside amounted to 828 pounds, or
16 per cent _nominal_, and, on account of the short weight of her
shot, 9 per cent, _real_ excess over the _Endymion_. If this
difference made her a line-of-battle ship, then the _Endymion_ was
doubly a line-of-battle ship compared to the _Congress_ or
_Constellation_. Moreover, the American commanders found their
42-pound carronades too heavy; as I have said the _Constitution_
only mounted 32's, and the _United States_ landed 6 of her guns.
When, in 1813, she attempted to break the blockade, she carried
but 48 guns, throwing a broadside of 720 pounds--just 3 per cent
more than the _Endymion_. [Footnote: It was on account of this
difference of 3 per cent that Captain Hardy refused to allow the
_Endymion_ to meet the _States_ (James, vi. p. 470). This was
during the course of some challenges and counter-challenges which
ended in nothing, Decatur in his turn being unwilling to have the
_Macedonian_ meet the _Statira_, unless the latter should agree
not to take on a picked crew. He was perfectly right in this; but
he ought never to have sent the challenge at all, as two ships but
an hour or two out of port would be at a frightful disadvantage
in a fight.] If our frigates were line-of-battle ships the disguise
was certainly marvellously complete, and they had a number of
companions equally disguised in the British ranks.

The 44's were thus _true frigates_, with one complete battery of
long guns and one interrupted one of carronades. That they were
better than any other frigates was highly creditable to our
ingenuity and national skill. We cannot, perhaps, lay claim to
the invention and first use of the heavy frigate, for 24-pounder
frigates were already in the service of at least three nations,
and the French 36-pound carronnade, in use on their spar-decks,
threw a heavier ball than our 42-pounder. But we had enlarged and
perfected the heavy frigate, and were the first nation that ever
used it effectively. The French _Forte_ and the Danish _Nayaden_
shared the fate of ships carrying guns of lighter calibre; and
the British 24-pounders, like the _Endymion_, had never accomplished
any thing. Hitherto there had been a strong feeling, especially
in England, that an 18-pound gun was as effective as a 24- in
arming a frigate; we made a complete revolution in this respect.
England had been building only 18-pounder vessels when she ought
to have been building 24-pounders. It was greatly to our credit
that our average frigate was superior to the average British frigate;
exactly as it was to our discredit that the _Essex_ was so
ineffectively armed. Captain Porter owed his defeat chiefly to his
ineffective guns, but also to having lost his topmast, to the
weather being unfavorable, and, still more, to the admirable
skill with which Hilyar used his superior armament. The _Java_,
_Macedonian_, and _Guerrière_ owed their defeat partly to their
lighter guns, but much more to the fact that their captains and
seamen did not display either as good seamanship or as good gunnery
as their foes. Inferiority in armament was a factor to be taken
into account in all the four cases, but it was more marked in that
of the _Essex_ than in the other three; it would have been fairer
for Porter to say that he had been captured by a line-of-battle
ship, than for the captain of the _Java_ to make that assertion.
In this last case the forces of the two ships compared almost
exactly as their rates. A 44 was matched against a 38; it was not
surprising that she should win, but it _was_ surprising that she
should win with ease and impunity. The long 24's on the
_Constitution's_ gun-deck no more made her a line-of-battle ship
than the 32-pound carronades mounted on an English frigate's
quarter-deck and forecastle made _her_ a line-of-battle ship when
opposed to a Frenchman with only 8's and 6's on his spar-deck.
When, a few years before, the English _Phoebe_ had captured the
French _Nereide_, their broadsides were respectively 407 and 258
pounds, a greater disparity than in any of our successful fights;
yet no author thought of claiming that the _Phoebe_ was any thing
but a frigate. So with the _Clyde_, throwing 425 lbs., which took
the _Vestale_, throwing but 246. The facts were that 18-pounder
frigates had captured 12-pounders, exactly as our 24-pounders in
turn captured the 18-pounders.

Shortly before Great Britain declared war on us, one of her
18-pounder frigates, the _San Florenzo_, throwing 476 lbs. in a
broadside, captured the 12-pounder French frigate _Psyché_, whose
broadside was only 246 lbs. The force of the former was thus
almost double that of the latter, yet the battle was long and
desperate, the English losing 48 and the French 124 men. This
conflict, then, reflected as much credit on the skill and seamanship
of the defeated as of the victorious side; the difference in loss
could fairly be ascribed to the difference in weight of metal.
But where, as in the famous ship-duels of 1812, the difference in
force is only a fifth, instead of a half and yet the slaughter,
instead of being as five is to two, is as six to one, then the
victory is certainly to be ascribed as much to superiority in skill
as to superiority in force. But, on the other hand, it should always
be remembered that there was a very decided superiority in force.
It is a very discreditable feature of many of our naval histories
that they utterly ignore this superiority, seeming ashamed to
confess that it existed. In reality it was something to be proud
of. It was highly to the credit of the United States that her
frigates were of better make and armament than any others; it
always speaks well for a nation's energy and capacity that any of
her implements of warfare are of superior kind. This is a perfectly
legitimate reason for pride.

It spoke well for the Prussians in 1866 that they opposed
breech-loaders to the muzzle-loaders of the Austrians; but it would
be folly to give all the credit of the victory to the breech-loaders
and none to Moltke and his lieutenants. Thus, it must remembered
that two things contributed to our victories. One was the excellent
make and armament of our ships; the other was the skilful seamanship,
excellent discipline, and superb gunnery of the men who were in
them. British writers are apt only to speak of the first, and Americans
only of the last, whereas both should be taken into consideration.

To sum up: the American 44-gun frigate was a true frigate, in build
and armament, properly rated, stronger than a 38-gun frigate just
about in the proportion of 44 to 38, and not exceeding in strength
an 18-pounder frigate as much as the latter exceeded one carrying
12-pounders. They were in no way whatever line-of-battle ships;
but they were superior to any other frigates afloat, and, what is
still more important, they were better manned and commanded than
the _average_ frigate of any other navy. Lord Codrington says
("Memoirs," i, p. 310): "But I well know the system of favoritism
and borough corruption prevails so very much that many people are
promoted and kept in command that should be dismissed the service,
and while such is the case the few Americans chosen for their merit
may be expected to follow up their successes except where they meet
with our best officers on even terms." [Footnote: To show that I am
not quoting an authority biassed in our favor I will give Sir
Edward Codrington's opinion of our rural better class (i, 318).
"It is curious to observe the animosity which prevails here among
what is called the better order of people, which I think is more
a misnomer here than in any other country I have ever been. Their
_whig_ and _tory_ are democrat and federalist, and it would seem
for the sake of giving vent to that bitterness of hatred which
marks the Yankee character, every gentleman (God save the term)
who takes possession of a property adopts the opposite political
creed to that of his nearest neighbor."] The small size of our
navy was probably to a certain extent effective in keeping it up
to a high standard; but this is not the only explanation, as can
be seen by Portugal's small and poor navy. On the other hand, the
champions or pick of a large navy _ought_ to be better than the
champions of a small one. [Footnote: In speaking of tonnage I wish
I could have got better authority than James for the British side
of the question. He is so bitter that it involuntarily gives one
a distrust of his judgment. Thus, in speaking of the _Penguin's_
capture, he, in endeavoring to show that the _Hornet's_ loss was
greater than she acknowledged, says, "several of the dangerously
wounded were thrown overboard because the surgeon was afraid to
amputate, owing to his want of experience" ("Naval Occurrences,"
492). Now what could persuade a writer to make such a foolish
accusation? No matter how utterly depraved and brutal Captain
Biddle might be, he would certainly not throw his wounded over
alive because he feared they might die. Again, in vol. vi, p. 546,
he says: "Captain Stewart had caused the _Cyane_ to be painted to
resemble a 36-gun frigate. The object of this was to aggrandize his
exploit in the eyes of the gaping citizens of Boston." No matter
how skilful an artist Captain Stewart was, and no matter how great
the gaping capacities of the Bostonians, the _Cyane_ (which by the
way went to New York and not Boston) could no more be painted to
look like a 36-gun frigate than a schooner could be painted to look
like a brig. Instances of rancor like these two occur constantly
in his work, and make it very difficult to separate what is matter
of fact from what is matter of opinion. I always rely on the British
official accounts when they can be reached, except in the case of
the _Java_, which seem garbled. That such was sometimes the case
with British officials is testified to by both James (vol. iv,
p. 17) and Brenton (vol. ii, p. 454, note). From the "Memoir of
Admiral Broke" we learn that his public letter was wrong in a number
of particulars. See also any one of the numerous biographies of
Lord Dundonald, the hero of the little _Speedy's_ fight. It is
very unfortunate that the British stopped publishing official
accounts of their defeats; it could not well help giving rise to
unpleasant suspicions.

It may be as well to mention here, again, that James' accusations do not
really detract from the interest attaching to the war, and its value for
purposes of study. If, as he says, the American commanders were cowards,
and their crews renegades, it is well worth while to learn the lesson that
good training will make such men able to beat brave officers with loyal
crews. And why did the British have such bad average crews as he makes
out? He says, for instance, that the Java's was unusually bad; yet
Brenton says (vol. ii, p. 461) it was like "the generality of our crews."
It is worth while explaining the reason that such a crew was generally
better than a French and worse than an American one.]

Again, the armaments of the American as well as of the British
ships were composed of three very different styles of guns. The
first, or long gun, was enormously long and thick-barrelled in
comparison to its bore, and in consequence very heavy; it possessed
a very long range, and varied in calibre from two to forty-two
pounds. The ordinary calibres in our navy were 6, 9, 12, 18, and
24. The second style was the carronade, a short, light gun of
large bore; compared to a long gun of the same weight it carried
a much heavier ball for a much shorter distance. The chief calibres
were 9, 12, 18, 24, 32, 42, and 68-pounders, the first and the
last being hardly in use in our navy. The third style was the
columbiad, of an intermediate grade between the first two. Thus
it is seen that a gun of one style by no means corresponds to a
gun of another style of the same calibre. As a rough example, a
long 12, a columbiad 18, and a 32-pound carronade would be about
equivalent to one another. These guns were mounted on two different
types of vessel. The first was flush-decked; that is, it had a
single straight open deck on which all the guns were mounted.
This class included one heavy corvette, (the _Adams_), the
ship-sloops, and the brig-sloops. Through the bow-chase port, on
each side, each of these mounted a long gun; the rest of their guns
were carronades, except in the case of the _Adams_, which had all
long guns. Above these came the frigates, whose gun-deck was
covered above by another deck; on the fore and aft parts (forecastle
and quarter-deck) of this upper, open deck were also mounted guns.
The main-deck guns were all long, except on the _Essex_, which
had carronades; on the quarter-deck were mounted carronades, and
on the forecastle also carronades, with two long bow-chasers.

Where two ships of similar armament fought one another, it is easy
to get the comparative force by simply comparing the weight in
broadsides, each side presenting very nearly the same proportion
of long guns to carronades. For such a broadside we take half the
guns mounted in the ordinary way; and all guns mounted on pivots
or shifting. Thus Perry's force in guns was 54 to Barclay's 63;
yet each presented 34 in broadside. Again, each of the British
brig-sloops mounted 19 guns, presenting 10 in broadside. Besides
these, some ships mounted bow-chasers run through the bridle-ports,
or stern-chasers, neither of which could be used in broadsides.
Nevertheless, I include them, both because it works in about an
equal number of cases against each navy, and because they were
sometimes terribly effective. James excludes the _Guerrière's_
bow-chaser; in reality he ought to have included both it and its
fellow, as they worked more damage than all the broadside guns
put together. Again, he excludes the _Endymion's_ bow-chasers,
though in her action they proved invaluable. Yet he includes those
of the _Enterprise_ and _Argus_, though the former's were probably
not fired. So I shall take the half of the fixed, plus all the
movable guns aboard, in comparing broadside force.

But the chief difficulty appears when guns of one style are
matched against those of another. If a ship armed with long 12's,
meets one armed with 32-pound carronades, which is superior in
force? At long range the first, and at short range the second; and
of course each captain is pretty sure to insist that "circumstances"
forced him to fight at a disadvantage. The result would depend
largely on the skill or luck of each commander in choosing position.

One thing is certain; long guns are more formidable than carronades
of the same calibre. There are exemplifications of this rule on
both sides; of course, American writers, as a rule, only pay
attention to one set of cases, and British to the others. The _Cyane_
and _Levant_ threw a heavier broadside than the _Constitution_ but
were certainly less formidably armed; and the _Essex_ threw a heavier
broadside than the _Phoebe_, yet was also less formidable. On Lake
Ontario the American ship _General Pike_ threw less metal at a
broadside than either of her two chief antagonists, but neither
could be called her equal; while on Lake Champlain a parallel case
is afforded by the British ship _Confiance_. Supposing that two
ships throw the same broadside weight of metal, one from long guns,
the other from carronades, at short range they are equal; at long,
one has it all her own way. Her captain thus certainly has a great
superiority of force, and if he does not take advantage of it it
is owing to his adversary's skill or his own mismanagement. As a
mere approximation, it may be assumed, in comparing the broadsides
of two vessels or squadrons, that long guns count for at least
twice as much as carronades of the same calibre. Thus on Lake
Champlain Captain Downie possessed an immense advantage in his
long guns, which Commodore Macdonough's exceedingly good arrangements
nullified. Sometimes part of the advantage may be willingly foregone,
so as to acquire some other. Had the _Constitution_ kept at long
bowls with the _Cyane_ and _Levant_ she could have probably captured
one without any loss to herself, while the other would have escaped;
she preferred to run down close so as to insure the capture of both,
knowing that even at close quarters long guns are somewhat better
than short ones (not to mention her other advantages in thick
scantling, speed, etc.). The British carronades often upset in
action; this was either owing to their having been insufficiently
secured, and to this remaining undiscovered because the men were
not exercised at the guns, or else it was because the unpractised
sailors would greatly overcharge them. Our better-trained sailors
on the ocean rarely committed these blunders, but the less-skilled
crews on the lakes did so as often as their antagonists.

But while the Americans thus, as a rule, had heavier and better-fitted
guns, they labored under one or two disadvantages. Our foundries
were generally not as good as those of the British, and our guns,
in consequence, more likely to burst; it was an accident of this
nature which saved the British _Belvidera_; and the _General Pike_,
under Commodore Chauncy, and the new American frigate _Guerrière_
suffered in the same way; while often the muzzles of the guns would
crack. A more universal disadvantage was in the short weight of
our shot. When Captain Blakely sunk the _Avon_ he officially
reported that her four shot which came aboard weighed just 32
pounds apiece, a pound and three quarters more than his _heaviest_;
this would make his average shot about 2 1/2 pounds less, or
rather over 7 per cent. Exactly similar statements were made by
the officers of the _Constitution_ in her three engagements.
Thus when she fought the _Java_, she threw at a broadside, as
already stated, 704 pounds; the _Java_ mounted 28 long 18's, 18
32-pound carronades, 2 long 12's, and one shifting 24-pound
carronade, a broadside of 576 pounds. Yet by the actual weighing
of all the different shot on both sides it was found that the
difference in broadside force was only about 77 pounds, or the
_Constitution's_ shot were about 7 per cent, short weight. The
long 24's of the _United States_ each threw a shot but 4 1/4 pounds
heavier than the long 18's of the _Macedonian_; here again the
difference was about 7 per cent. The same difference existed in
favor of the _Penguin_ and _Epervier_ compared with the _Wasp_
and _Hornet_. Mr. Fenimore Cooper [Footnote: See "Naval History,"
i, p. 380.] weighed a great number of shot some time after the war.
The later castings, even weighed nearly 5 per cent, less than the
British shot, and some of the older ones, about 9 per cent. The
average is safe to take at 7 per cent. less, and I shall throughout
make this allowance for ocean cruisers. The deficit was sometimes
owing to windage, but more often the shot was of full size but
defective in density. The effect of this can be gathered from the
following quotation from the work of a British artillerist: "The
greater the density of shot of like calibres, projected with equal
velocity and elevation, the greater the range, accuracy, and
penetration." [Footnote: "Heavy Ordnance," Captain T. F. Simmons,
R. A., London, 1837. James supposes that the "Yankee captains"
have in each case hunted round till they could get particularly
small American shot to weigh; and also denies that short weight
is a disadvantage. The last proposition carried out logically
would lead to some rather astonishing results.] This defectiveness
in density might be a serious injury in a contest at a long
distance, but would make but little difference at close quarters
(although it may have been partly owing to their short weight
that so many of the Chesapeake's shot failed to penetrate the
_Shannon's_ hull). Thus in the actions with the _Macedonian_ and
_Java_ the American frigates showed excellent practice when the
contest was carried on within fair distance, while their first
broadsides at long range went very wild; but in the case of the
_Guerrière_, the _Constitution_ reserved her fire for close
quarters, and was probably not at all affected by the short
weight of her shot.

As to the officers and crew of a 44-gun frigate, the following was
the regular complement established by law: [Footnote: See State
Papers, vol. xiv, 159 (Washington, 1834).]

  1 captain,
  4 lieutenants,
  2 lieutenants of marines,
  2 sailing-masters,
  2 master's mates,
  7 midshipmen,
  1 purser,
  1 surgeon,
  2 surgeon's mates,
  1 clerk,
  1 carpenter,
  2 carpenter's mates,
  1 boatswain,
  2 boatswain's mates,
  1 yeoman of gun-room,
  1 gunner,
 11 quarter gunners,
  1 coxswain,
  1 sailmaker,
  1 cooper,
  1 steward,
  1 armorer,
  1 master of arms,
  1 cook,
  1 chaplain.
 __
 50

120 able seamen,
150 ordinary seamen,
 30 boys,
 50 marines.
___
400 in all.

An 18-gun ship had 32 officers and petty officers, 30 able seamen,
46 ordinary seamen, 12 boys, and 20 marines--140 in all. Sometimes
ships put to sea without their full complements (as in the case of
the first _Wasp_), but more often with supernumeraries aboard.
The weapons for close quarters were pikes, cutlasses, and a few
axes; while the marines and some of the topmen had muskets, and
occasionally rifles.

In comparing the forces of the contestants I have always given
the number of men in crew; but this in most cases was unnecessary.
When there were plenty of men to handle the guns, trim the sails,
make repairs, act as marines, etc., any additional number simply
served to increase the slaughter on board. The _Guerrière_
undoubtedly suffered from being short-handed, but neither the
_Macedonian_ nor _Java_ would have been benefited by the presence
of a hundred additional men. Barclay possessed about as many men
as Perry, but this did not give him an equality of force. The
_Penguin_ and _Frolic_ would have been taken just as surely had
the _Hornet_ and _Wasp_ had a dozen men less apiece than they did.
The principal case where numbers would help would be in a
hand-to-hand fight. Thus the _Chesapeake_ having fifty more men
than the _Shannon_ ought to have been successful; but she was not,
because the superiority of her crew in numbers was more than
counterbalanced by the superiority of the _Shannon's_ crew in
other respects. The result of the battle of Lake Champlain, which
was fought at anchor, with the fleets too far apart for musketry
to reach, was not in the slightest degree affected by the number
of men on either side, as both combatants had amply enough to
manage the guns and perform every other service.

In all these conflicts the courage of both parties is taken for
granted: it was not so much a factor in gaining the victory, as
one which if lacking was fatal to all chances of success. In the
engagements between regular cruisers, not a single one was gained
by superiority in courage. The crews of both the _Argus_ and
_Epervier_ certainly flinched; but had they fought never so
bravely they were too unskilful to win. The _Chesapeake's_ crew
could hardly be said to lack courage; it was more that they were
inferior to their opponents in discipline as well as in skill.

There was but one conflict during the war where the victory could
be said to be owing to superiority in pluck. This was when the
_Neufchatel_ privateer beat off the boats of the _Endymion_. The
privateersmen suffered a heavier proportional loss than their
assailants, and they gained the victory by sheer ability to stand
punishment.

For convenience in comparing them I give in tabulated form the
force of the three British 38's taken by American 44's (allowing
for short weight of metal of latter).

CONSTITUTION.                          GUERRIÈRE.
30 long 24's,                          30 long 18's,
 2 long 24's,                           2 long 12's,
22 short 32's.                         16 short 32's,
___________________________             1 short 18.
Broadside, nominal, 736 lbs.           __________________
              real. 684 lbs.           Broadside, 556 lbs.

UNITED STATES                     MACEDONIAN
30 long 24's,                     28 long 18's,
 2 long 24's,                      2 long 12's,
22 short 42's.                     2 long 9's,
___________________________       16 short 32's,
Broadside, nominal, 846 lbs.       1 short 18.
              real, 786 lbs.      ___________________
                                  Broadside, 547 lbs.

CONSTITUTION                      JAVA
30 long 24's,                     28 long 18's,
 2 long 24's,                      2 long 12's,
20 short 32's.                    18 short 32's,
____________________________       1 short 24.
Broadside, nominal, 704 lbs.      ___________________
              real. 654 lbs.      Broadside. 576 lbs.

The smallest line-of-battle ship, the 74, with only long 18's on
the second deck, was armed as follows:

28 long 32's,
28 " 18's,
 6 " 12's.
14 short 32's
 7 " 18's

or a broadside of 1,032 lbs., 736 from long guns, 296 from
carronades; while the _Constitution_ threw (in reality) 684 lbs.,
356 from long guns, and 328 from her carronades, and the _United
States_ 102 lbs. more from her carronades. Remembering the difference
between long guns and carronades, and considering sixteen of the
74's long 18's as being replaced by 42-pound carronades [Footnote:
That this change would leave the force about as it was, can be
gathered from the fact that the _Adams_ and _John Adams_ both of
which had been armed with 42 pound carronades (which were sent to
Sackett's Harbor), had them replaced by long and medium 18 pounders,
these being considered to be formidable: so that the substitution
of 42-pound carronades would, if any thing, reduce the force of
the 74] (so as to get the metal on the ships distributed in similar
proportions between the two styles of cannon), we get as the 74's
broadside 592 lbs from long guns, and 632 from carronades. The
_United States_ threw nominally 360 and 486, and the _Constitution_
nominally 360 and 352; so the 74 was superior even to the former
nominally about as three is to two; while the _Constitution_, if
"a line-of-battle ship," was disguised to such a degree that she
was in reality of but little more than _one half_ the force of one
of the smallest _true_ liners England possessed!



Chapter III


1812

ON THE OCEAN

_Commodore Rodgers' cruise and unsuccessful chase of the_
Belvidera--_Cruise of the _Essex--_Captain Hull's cruise, and
escape from the squadron of Commodore Broke_--Constitution _captures_
Guerrière--Wasp _captures_ Frolic--_Second unsuccessful cruise of
Commodore Rodgers_--United States _captures_ Macedonian--Constitution
_captures_ Java--Essex _starts on a cruise--Summary_

At the time of the declaration of war, June 18, 1812, the American
navy was but partially prepared for effective service. The _Wasp_,
18, was still at sea, on her return voyage from France; the
_Constellation_, 38, was lying in the Chesapeake river, unable to
receive a crew for several months to come; the _Chesapeake_, 38,
was lying in a similar condition in Boston harbor; the _Adams_,
28, was at Washington, being cut down and lengthened from a frigate
into a corvette. These three cruisers were none of them fit to go
to sea till after the end of the year. The _Essex_, 32, was in
New York harbor, but, having some repairs to make, was not yet
ready to put out. The _Constitution_, 44, was at Annapolis, without
all of her stores, and engaged in shipping a new crew, the time of
the old one being up. The _Nautilus_, 14, was cruising off New
Jersey, and the other small brigs were also off the coast. The
only vessels immediately available were those under the command
of Commodore Rodgers, at New York, consisting of his own ship, the
_President_, 44, and of the _United States_, 44, Commodore Decatur,
_Congress_, 38, Captain Smith, _Hornet_, 18, Captain Lawrence,
and _Argus_, 16, Lieut. Sinclair. It seems marvellous that any
nation should have permitted its ships to be so scattered, and
many of them in such an unfit condition, at the beginning of
hostilities. The British vessels cruising off the coast were not
at that time very numerous or formidable, consisting of the
_Africa_, 64, _Acasta_, 40, _Shannon_, 38, _Guerrière_, 38,
_Belvidera_, 36, _Aeolus_, 32, _Southampton_, 32, and _Minerva_,
32, with a number of corvettes and sloops; their force was,
however, strong enough to render it impossible for Commodore
Rodgers to make any attempt on the coast towns of Canada or the
West Indies. But the homeward bound plate fleet had sailed from
Jamaica on May 20th, and was only protected by the _Thalia_, 36,
Capt. Vashon, and _Reindeer_, 18, Capt. Manners. Its capture or
destruction would have been a serious blow, and one which there
seemed a good chance of striking, as the fleet would have to pass
along the American coast, running with the Gulf Stream. Commodore
Rodgers had made every preparation, in expectation of war being
declared, and an hour after official intelligence of it, together
with his instructions, had been received, his squadron put to sea,
on June 21st, and ran off toward the south-east [Footnote: Letter
of Commodore John Rodgers to the Secretary of the Navy, Sept. 1,
1812.] to get at the Jamaica ships. Having learned from an
American brig that she had passed the plate fleet four days before
in lat. 36° N., long. 67° W., the Commodore made all sail in that
direction. At 6 A.M. on June 23d a sail was made out in the N. E.,
which proved to be the British frigate _Belvidera_, 36, Capt.
Richard Byron. [Footnote: Brenton, v. 46.] The latter had sighted
some of Commodore Rodgers' squadron some time before, and stood
toward them, till at 6.30 she made out the three largest ships to
be frigates. Having been informed of the likelihood of war by a New
York pilot boat, the _Belvidera_ now stood away, going N. E. by E.,
the wind being fresh from the west. The Americans made all sail in
chase, the _President_, a very fast ship off the wind, leading,
and the _Congress_ coming next. At noon the _President_ bore S. W.,
distant 2 3/4 miles from the _Belvidera_, Nantucket shoals bearing
100 miles N. and 48 miles E [Footnote: Log of _Belvidera_, June 23,
1812.]. The wind grew lighter, shifting more toward the south-west,
while the ships continued steadily in their course, going N.E. by E.
As the _President_ kept gaining, Captain Byron cleared his ship
for action, and shifted to the stern ports two long eighteen-pounders
on the main-deck and two thirty-two pound carronades on the
quarter-deck.

At 4:30 [Footnote: Cooper, ii, 151. According to James, vi, 117,
the _President_ was then 600 yards distant from the _Belvidera_,
half a point on her weather or port quarter.] the _President's_
starboard forecastle bowgun was fired by Commodore Rodgers himself;
the corresponding main-deck gun was next discharged, and then
Commodore Rodgers fired again. These three shots all struck the
stern of the _Belvidera_, killing and wounding nine men,--one of
them went through the rudder coat, into the after gun-room, the
other two into the captain's cabin. A few more such shots would
have rendered the _Belvidera's_ capture certain, but when the
_President's_ main-deck gun was discharged for the second time it
burst, blowing up the forecastle deck and killing and wounding 16
men, among them the Commodore himself, whose leg was broken. This
saved the British frigate. Such an explosion always causes a half
panic, every gun being at once suspected. In the midst of the
confusion Captain Byron's stern-chasers opened with spirit and
effect, killing or wounding six men more. Had the _President_ still
pushed steadily on, only using her bow-chasers until she closed
abreast, which she could probably have done, the _Belvidera_ could
still have been taken; but, instead, the former now bore up and
fired her port broadside, cutting her antagonist's rigging slightly,
but doing no other damage, while the _Belvidera_ kept up a brisk
and galling fire, although the long bolts, breeching-hooks, and
breechings of the guns now broke continually, wounding several of
the men, including Captain Byron. The _President_ had lost ground
by yawing, but she soon regained it, and, coming up closer than
before, again opened from her bow-chasers a well-directed fire,
which severely wounded her opponent's main-top mast, cross-jack
yard, and one or two other spars; [Footnote: James, vi, 119. He
says the _President_ was within 400 yards.] but shortly afterward
she repeated her former tactics and again lost ground by yawing
to discharge another broadside, even more ineffectual than the
first. Once more she came up closer than ever, and once more yawed;
the single shots from her bow-chasers doing considerable damage,
but her raking broadsides none. [Footnote: Lord Howard Douglass,
"Naval Gunnery," p. 419 (third edition).] Meanwhile the active
crew of the _Belvidera_ repaired every thing as fast as it was
damaged, while under the superintendence of Lieutenants Sykes,
Bruce, and Campbell, no less than 300 shot were fired from her
stern guns. [Footnote: James, vi, 118.] Finding that if the
_President_ ceased yawing she could easily run alongside, Captain
Byron cut away one bower, one stream, and two sheet anchors, the
barge, yawl, gig, and jolly boat, and started 14 tons of water.
The effect of this was at once apparent, and she began to gain;
meanwhile the damage the sails of the combatants had received had
enabled the _Congress_ to close, and when abreast of his consort
Captain Smith opened with his bow-chasers, but the shot fell short.
The _Belvidera_ soon altered her course to east by south, set her
starboard studding-sails, and by midnight was out of danger; and
three days afterward reached Halifax harbor.

Lord Howard Douglass' criticisms on this encounter seem very just.
He says that the President opened very well with her bow-chasers
(in fact the Americans seem to have aimed better and to have done
more execution with these guns than the British with their
stern-chasers); but that she lost so much ground by yawing and
delivering harmless broadsides as to enable her antagonist to
escape. Certainly if it had not been for the time thus lost to no
purpose, the Commodore would have run alongside his opponent, and
the fate of the little 36 would have been sealed. On the other hand
it must be remembered that it was only the bursting of the gun on
board the _President_, causing such direful confusion and loss,
and especially harmful in disabling her commander, that gave the
_Belvidera_ any chance of escape at all. At any rate, whether the
American frigate does, or does not, deserve blame, Captain Byron
and his crew do most emphatically deserve praise for the skill
with which their guns were served and repairs made, the coolness
with which measures to escape were adopted, and the courage with
which they resisted so superior a force. On this occasion Captain
Byron showed himself as good a seaman and as brave a man as he
subsequently proved a humane and generous enemy when engaged in
the blockade of the Chesapeake. [Footnote: Even Niles, unscrupulously
bitter as he is toward the British, does justice to the humanity
of Captains Byron and Hardy--which certainly shone in comparison
to some of the rather buccaneering exploits of Cockburn's followers
in Chesapeake Bay.]

This was not a very auspicious opening of hostilities for America.
The loss of the _Belvidera_ was not the only thing to be regretted,
for the distance the chase took the pursuers out of their course
probably saved the plate fleet. When the _Belvidera_ was first
made out, Commodore Rodgers was in latitude 39° 26' N., and
longitude 71° 10' W.; at noon the same day the _Thalia_ and her
convoy were in latitude 39° N., longitude 62° W. Had they not
chased the _Belvidera_ the Americans would probably have run
across the plate fleet.

The American squadron reached the western edge of the Newfoundland
Banks on June 29th, [Footnote: Letter of Commodore Rodgers, Sept.
1st.] and on July 1st, a little to the east of the Banks, fell in
with large quantities of cocoa-nut shells, orange peels, etc.,
which filled every one with great hopes of overtaking the quarry.
On July 9th, the _Hornet_ captured a British privateer, in latitude
45° 30' N., and longitude 23° W., and her master reported that he
had seen the Jamaica-men the previous evening; but nothing further
was heard or seen of them, and on July 13th, being within twenty
hours' sail of the English Channel, Commodore Rodgers reluctantly
turned southward, reaching Madeira July 21st. Thence he cruised
toward the Azores and by the Grand Banks home, there being
considerable sickness on the ships. On August 31st he reached
Boston after a very unfortunate cruise, in which he had made but
seven prizes, all merchant-men, and had recaptured one American vessel.

On July 3d the _Essex_, 32, Captain David Porter, put out of New
York. As has been already explained she was most inefficiently
armed, almost entirely with carronades. This placed her at the
mercy of any frigate with long guns which could keep at a distance
of a few hundred yards; but in spite of Captain Porter's petitions
and remonstrances he was not allowed to change his armament. On the
11th of July at 2 A. M., latitude 33° N., longitude 66° W., the
_Essex_ fell in with the _Minerva_, 32, Captain Richard Hawkins,
convoying seven transports, each containing about 200 troops, bound
from Barbadoes to Quebec. The convoy was sailing in open order,
and, there being a dull moon, the _Essex_ ran in and cut out
transport No. 299, with 197 soldiers aboard. Having taken out the
soldiers, Captain Porter stood back to the convoy, expecting
Captain Hawkins to come out and fight him; but this the latter
would not do, keeping the convoy in close order around him. The
transports were all armed and still contained in the aggregate
1,200 soldiers. As the _Essex_ could only fight at close quarters
these heavy odds rendered it hopeless for her to try to cut out
the _Minerva_. Her carronades would have to be used at short range
to be effective, and it would of course have been folly to run in
right among the convoy, and expose herself to the certainty of
being boarded by five times as many men as she possessed. The
_Minerva_ had three less guns a side, and on her spar-deck carried
24-pound carronades instead of 32's, and, moreover, had fifty men
less than the _Essex_, which had about 270 men this cruise; on the
other hand, her main-deck was armed with long 12's, so that it is
hard to say whether she did right or not in refusing to fight. She
was of the same force as the _Southampton_ whose captain, Sir James
Lucas Yeo, subsequently challenged Porter, but never appointed a
meeting-place. In the event of a meeting, the advantage, in ships
of such radically different armaments, would have been with that
captain who succeeded in outmanoeuvring the other and in making
the fight come off at the distance best suited to himself. At long
range either the _Minerva_ or _Southampton_ would possess an immense
superiority; but if Porter could have contrived to run up within
a couple of hundred yards, or still better, to board, his superiority
in weight of metal and number of men would have enabled him to carry
either of them. Porter's crew was better trained for boarding than
almost any other American commander's; and probably none of the
British frigates on the American station, except the _Shannon_ and
_Tenedos_, would have stood a chance with the _Essex_ in a
hand-to-hand struggle. Among her youngest midshipmen was one, by
name David Glasgow Farragut, then but thirteen years old, who
afterward became the first and greatest admiral of the United States.
His own words on this point will be read with interest. "Every
day," he says, [Footnote: "Life of Farragut" (embodying his journal
and letters), p. 31. By his son, Loyall Farragut, New York. 1879.]
"the crew were exercised at the great guns, small arms, and single
stick. And I may here mention the fact that I have never been on
a ship where the crew of the old _Essex_ was represented but that
I found them to be the best swordsmen on board. They had been so
thoroughly trained as boarders that every man was prepared for
such an emergency, with his cutlass as sharp as a razor, a dirk
made by the ship's armorer out of a file, and a pistol." [Footnote:
James says: "Had Captain Porter really endeavored to bring the
_Minerva_ to action we do not see what could have prevented the
_Essex_ with her superiority of sailing, from coming alongside of
her. But no such thought, we are sure, entered into Captain Porter's
head." What "prevented the _Essex_" was the _Minerva's_ not
venturing out of the convoy. Farragut, in his journal writes: "The
captured British officers were very anxious for us to have a fight
with the _Minerva_, as they considered her a good match for the
_Essex_, and Captain Porter replied that he should gratify them
with pleasure if his majesty's commander was of their taste. So
we stood toward the convoy and when within gunshot hove to, and
awaited the _Minerva_, but she tacked and stood in among the convoy,
to the utter amazement of our prisoners, who denounced the commander
as a base coward, and expressed their determination to report him
to the Admiralty." An incident of reported "flinching" like this
is not worth mentioning; I allude to it only to show the value of
James' sneers.]

On August 13th a sail was made out to windward, which proved to be
the British ship-sloop _Alert_, 16, Captain T. L. O. Laugharne,
carrying 20 eighteen-pound carronades and 100 men. [Footnote:
James (History, vi, p. 128) says "86 men." In the Naval Archives
at Washington in the "Captains' Letters" for 1812 (vol. n. No.
182) can be found enclosed in Porter's letter the parole of the
officers and crew of the _Alert_ signed by Captain Laugharne; it
contains either 100 or 101 names of the crew of the _Alert_ besides
those of a number of other prisoners sent back in the same cartel.]
As soon as the _Essex_ discovered the _Alert_ she put out drags
astern, and led the enemy to believe she was trying to escape by
sending a few men aloft to shake out the reefs and make sail.
Concluding the frigate to be a merchant-man, the _Alert_ bore down
on her; while the Americans went to quarters and cleared for action,
although the tompions were left in the guns, and the ports kept
closed. [Footnote: "Life of Farragut," p. 16.] The _Alert_ fired
a gun and the _Essex_ hove to, when the former passed under her
stern, and when on her lee quarter poured in a broadside of grape
and canister; but the sloop was so far abaft the frigate's beam
that her shot did not enter the ports and caused no damage.
Thereupon Porter put up his helm and opened as soon as his guns
would bear, tompions and all. The _Alert_ now discovered her error
and made off, but too late, for in eight minutes the _Essex_ was
along side, and the _Alert_ fired a musket and struck, three men
being wounded and several feet of water in the hold. She was
disarmed and sent as a cartel into St. Johns. It has been the
fashion among American writers to speak of her as if she were
"unworthily" given up, but such an accusation is entirely
groundless. The _Essex_ was four times her force, and all that
could possibly be expected of her was to do as she did--exchange
broadsides and strike, having suffered some loss and damage. The
_Essex_ returned to New York on September 7th, having made 10
prizes, containing 423 men. [Footnote: Before entering New York
the _Essex_ fell in with a British force which, in both Porter's
and Farragut's works, is said to have been composed of the
_Acasta_ and _Shannon_, each of fifty guns, and _Ringdove_, of
twenty. James says it was the _Shannon_, accompanied by a merchant
vessel. It is not a point of much importance, as nothing came of
the meeting, and the _Shannon_, alone, with her immensely superior
armament, ought to have been a match twice over for the _Essex_:
although, if James is right, as seems probable, it gives rather a
comical turn to Porter's account of his "extraordinary escape."]

The _Belvidera_, as has been stated, carried the news of the war
to Halifax. On July 5th Vice-Admiral Sawyer despatched a squadron
to cruise against the United States, commanded by Philip Vere
Broke, of the _Shannon_, 38, having under him the _Belvidera_, 36,
Captain Richard Byron, _Africa_, 64, Captain John Bastard, and
_Aeolus_. 32, Captain Lord James Townsend. On the 9th, while off
Nantucket, they were joined by the _Guerrière_, 38, Captain James
Richard Dacres. On the 16th the squadron fell in with and captured
the United States brig _Nautilus_, 14, Lieutenant Crane, which,
like all the little brigs, was overloaded with guns and men. She
threw her lee guns overboard and made use of every expedient to
escape, but to no purpose. At 3 P.M. of the following day, when
the British ships were abreast of Barnegat, about four leagues
off shore, a strange sail was seen and immediately chased, in the
south by east, or windward quarter, standing to the northeast.
This was the United States frigate _Constitution_, 44, Captain
Isaac Hull. [Footnote: For the ensuing chase I have relied mainly
on Cooper; see also "Memoir of Admiral Broke," p. 240; James, vi,
133: and Marshall's "Naval Biography" (London, 1825), ii. 625.]
When the war broke out he was in the Chesapeake River getting a
new crew aboard. Having shipped over 450 men (counting officers),
he put out of harbor on the 12th of July. His crew was entirely
new, drafts of men coming on board up to the last moment. [Footnote:
In a letter to the Secretary of the Navy ("Captains' Letters."
1812. ii, No. 85), Hull, after speaking of the way his men were
arriving, says: "The crew are as yet unacquainted with a ship of
war, as many have but lately joined and have never been on an
armed ship before. * * * We are doing all that we can to make
them acquainted with their duty, and in a few days we shall have
nothing to fear from any single-decked ship."] On the 17th, at
2 P.M., Hull discovered four sail, in the northern board, heading
to the westward. At 3, the wind being very light, the _Constitution_
made sail and tacked, in 18-1/2 fathoms. At 4, in the N. E., a
fifth sail appeared, which afterward proved to be the _Guerrière_,
The first four ships bore N. N. W., and were all on the starboard
tack; while by 6 o'clock the fifth bore E. N. E. At 6.15 the
wind shifted and blew lightly from the south, bringing the American
ship to wind-ward. She then wore round with her head to the
eastward, set her light studding-sails and stay-sails, and at
7.30 beat to action, intending to speak the nearest vessel, the
_Guerrière_. The two frigates neared one another gradually and at
10 the _Constitution_ began making signals, which she continued
for over an hour. At 3.30 A. M. on the 18th the _Guerrière_, going
gradually toward the _Constitution_ on the port tack, and but
one half mile distant, discovered on her lee beam the _Belvidera_
and the other British vessels, and signalled to them. They did
not answer the signals, thinking she must know who they were--a
circumstance which afterward gave rise to sharp recriminations
among the captains--and Dacres, concluding them to be Commodore
Rodgers' squadron, tacked, and then wore round and stood away
from the _Constitution_ for some time before discovering his mistake.

[Illustration: Captain Isaac Hull: a miniature by an unknown artist,
circa 1807-1812. (Courtesy The New-York Historical Society)]

At 5 A. M. Hull had just enough steerage way on to keep his head
to the east, on the starboard tack; on his lee quarter, bearing
N. E. by N., were the _Belvidera_ and _Guerrière_ and astern the
_Shannon_, _Aeolus_, and _Africa_. At 5.30 it fell entirely calm,
and Hull put out his boats to tow the ship, always going southward.
At the same time he whipped up a 24 from the main-deck, and got
the forecastlechaser aft, cutting away the taffrail to give the
two guns more freedom to work in and also running out, through
the cabin windows, two of the long main-deck 24's. The British
boats were towing also. At 6 A. M. a light breeze sprang up, and
the _Constitution_ set studding-sails and stay-sails; the _Shannon_
opened at her with her bow guns, but ceased when she found she
could not reach her. At 6.30, the wind having died away, the
_Shannon_ began to gain, almost all the boats of the squadron
towing her. Having sounded in 26 fathoms, Lieutenant Charles
Morris suggested to Hull to try kedging. All the spare rope was
bent on to the cables, payed out into the cutters, and a kedge
run out half a mile ahead and let go; then the crew clapped on
and walked away with the ship, overrunning and tripping the kedge
as she came up with the end of the line. Meanwhile, fresh lines
and another kedge were carried ahead, and the frigate glided away
from her pursuers. At 7.30 A. M. a little breeze sprang up, when
the _Constitution_ set her ensign and fired a shot at the _Shannon_.
It soon fell calm again and the _Shannon_ neared. At 9.10 a light
air from the southward struck the ship, bringing her to windward.
As the breeze was seen coming, her sails were trimmed, and as soon
as she obeyed her helm she was brought close up on the port tack.
The boats dropped in alongside; those that belonged to the davits
were run up, while the others were just lifted clear of water, by
purchases on the spare spars, stowed outboard, where they could be
used again at a minute's notice. Meanwhile, on her lee beam, the
_Guerrière_ opened fire; but her shot fell short, and the Americans
paid not the slightest heed to it. Soon it again fell calm, when
Hull had 2000 gallons of water started, and again put out his boats
to tow. The _Shannon_ with some of the other boats of the squadron
helping her, gained on the _Constitution_ but by severe exertion
was again left behind. Shortly afterward, a slight wind springing
up, the _Belvidera_ gained on the other British ships, and when it
fell calm she was nearer to the _Constitution_ than any of her
consorts, their boats being put on to her. [Footnote: Cooper speaks
as if this was the _Shannon_; but from Marshall's "Naval Biography"
we learn that it was the _Belvidera_. At other times he confuses
the _Belvidera_ with the _Guerrière_. Captain Hull, of course,
could not accurately distinguish the names of his pursuers. My
account is drawn from a careful comparison of Marshall, Cooper,
and James. ] At 10.30, observing the benefit that the _Constitution_
had derived from warping, Captain Byron did the same, bending all
his hawsers to one another, and working two kedge anchors at the
same time by paying the warp out through one hawse-hole as it was
run in through the other opposite. Having men from the other frigates
aboard, and a lighter ship to work, Captain Byron at 2 P. M. was
near enough to exchange bow--and stern-chasers with the
_Constitution_, out of range however. Hull expected to be overtaken,
and made every arrangement to try in such case to disable the
first frigate before her consorts could close. But neither the
_Belvidera_ nor the _Shannon_ dared to tow very near for fear of
having their boats sunk by the American's stern-chasers.

The _Constitution's_ crew showed the most excellent spirit. Officers
and men relieved each other regularly, the former snatching their
rest any where on deck, the latter sleeping at the guns. Gradually
the _Constitution_ drew ahead, but the situation continued most
critical. All through the afternoon the British frigates kept
towing and kedging, being barely out of gunshot. At 3 P. M. a light
breeze sprung up, and blew fitfully at intervals; every puff was
watched closely and taken advantage of to the utmost. At 7 in the
evening the wind almost died out, and for four more weary hours
the worn-out sailors towed and kedged. At 10.45 a little breeze
struck the frigate, when the boats dropped alongside and were
hoisted up, excepting the first cutter. Throughout the night the
wind continued very light, the _Belvidera_ forging ahead till she
was off the _Constitution's_ lee beam; and at 4 A. M., on the
morning of the 19th, she tacked to the eastward, the breeze being
light from the south by east. At 4.20 the _Constitution_ tacked
also; and at 5.15 the _Aeolus_, which had drawn ahead, passed on
the contrary tack. Soon afterward the wind freshened so that
Captain Hull took in his cutter. The _Africa_ was now so far to
leeward as to be almost out of the race; while the five frigates
were all running on the starboard tack with every stitch of canvas
set. At 9 A. M. an American merchant-man hove in sight and bore
down toward the squadron. The _Belvidera_, by way of decoy,
hoisted American colors, when the _Constitution_ hoisted the
British flag, and the merchant vessel hauled off. The breeze
continued light till noon, when Hull found he had dropped the
British frigates well behind; the nearest was the _Belvidera_,
exactly in his wake, bearing W. N. W. 2 1/2 miles distant. The
_Shannon_ was on his lee, bearing N. by W. 1/2 W. distant 3 1/2
miles. The other two frigates were five miles off on the lee quarter.
Soon afterward the breeze freshened, and "old Ironsides" drew
slowly ahead from her foes, her sails being watched and tended with
the most consummate skill. At 4 P. M. the breeze again lightened,
but even the _Belvidera_ was now four miles astern and to leeward.
At 6.45 there were indications of a heavy rain squall, which once
more permitted Hull to show that in seamanship he excelled even
the able captains against whom he was pitted. The crew were
stationed and every thing kept fast till the last minute, when
all was clewed up just before the squall struck the ship. The
light canvas was furled, a second reef taken in the mizzen top-sail,
and the ship almost instantly brought under short sail. The British
vessels seeing this began to let go and haul down without waiting
for the wind, and were steering on different tacks when the first
gust struck them. But Hull as soon as he got the weight of the
wind sheeted home, hoisted his fore and main-top gallant sails,
and went off on an easy bowline at the rate of 11 knots. At 7.40
sight was again obtained of the enemy, the squall having passed
to leeward; the _Belvidera_, the nearest vessel, had altered her
bearings two points to leeward, and was a long way astern. Next
came the _Shannon_; the _Guerrière_ and _Aeolus_ were hull down,
and the _Africa_ barely visible. The wind now kept light, shifting
occasionally in a very baffling manner, but the _Constitution_
gained steadily, wetting her sails from the sky-sails to the
courses. At 6 A. M., on the morning of the 20th the pursuers were
almost out of sight; and at 8.15 A. M. they abandoned the chase.
Hull at once stopped to investigate the character of two strange
vessels, but found them to be only Americans; then, at midday,
he stood toward the east, and went into Boston on July 26th.

In this chase Captain Isaac Hull was matched against five British
captains, two of whom, Broke and Byron, were fully equal to any
in their navy; and while the latter showed great perseverance,
good seamanship, and ready imitation, there can be no doubt that
the palm in every way belongs to the cool old Yankee. Every daring
expedient known to the most perfect seamanship was tried, and tried
with success; and no victorious fight could reflect more credit on
the conqueror than this three days' chase did on Hull. Later, on
two occasions, the _Constitution_ proved herself far superior in
gunnery to the average British frigate; this time her officers and
men showed that they could handle the sails as well as they could
the guns. Hull out-manoeuvred Broke and Byron as cleverly as a
month later he out-fought Dacres. His successful escape and victorious
fight were both performed in a way that place him above any single
ship captain of war.

On Aug. 2d the _Constitution_ made sail from Boston [Footnote:
Letter of Capt. Isaac Hull, Aug. 28, 1812.] and stood to the
eastward, in hopes of falling in with some of the British cruisers.
She was unsuccessful, however, and met nothing. Then she ran down
to the Bay of Fundy, steered along the coast of Nova Scotia,
and thence toward Newfoundland, and finally took her station off
Cape Race in the Gulf of St. Lawrence, where she took and burned
two brigs of little value. On the 15th she recaptured an American
brig from the British ship-sloop _Avenger_, though the latter
escaped; Capt. Hull manned his prize and sent her in. He then
sailed southward, and on the night of the 18th spoke a Salem
privateer which gave him news of a British frigate to the south;
thither he stood, and at 2 P. M. on the 19th, in lat. 41° 30' N.
and 55° W., made out a large sail bearing E. S. E. and to leeward,
[Footnote: Letter of Capt. Isaac Hull, Aug. 30, 1812.] which proved
to be his old acquaintance, the frigate _Guerrière_, Captain Dacres.
It was a cloudy day and the wind was blowing fresh from the
northwest. The _Guerrière_ was standing by the wind on the
starboard tack, under easy canvas; [Footnote: Letter of Capt. James
R. Dacres, Sept. 7, 1812.] she hauled up her courses, took in her
top-gallant sails, and at 4.30 backed her main-top sail. Hull then
very deliberately began to shorten sail, taking in top-gallant sails,
stay-sails, and flying jib, sending down the royal yards and putting
another reef in the top-sails. Soon the Englishman hoisted three
ensigns, when the American also set his colors, one at each
mast-head, and one at the mizzen peak.

The _Constitution_ now ran down with the wind nearly aft. The
_Guerrière_ was on the starboard tack, and at five o'clock opened
with her weather-guns, [Footnote: Log of _Guerrière_.] the shot
falling short, then wore round and fired her port broadside, of
which two shot struck her opponent, the rest passing over and
through her rigging. [Footnote: See in the Naval Archives (Bureau
of Navigation) the _Constitution's_ Log-Book (vol. ii, from Feb. 1,
1812, to Dec. 13, 1813). The point is of some little importance
because Hull, in his letter, speaks as if both the first broadsides
fell short, whereas the log distinctly says that the second went
over the ship, except two shot, which came home. The hypothesis of
the _Guerrière_ having damaged powder was founded purely on this
supposed falling short of the first two broadsides.] As the British
frigate again wore to open with her starboard battery, the
_Constitution_ yawed a little and fired two or three of her port
bow-guns. Three or four times the _Guerrière_ repeated this
manoeuvre, wearing and firing alternate broadsides, but with little
or no effect, while the _Constitution_ yawed as often to avoid
being raked, and occasionally fired one of her bow guns. This
continued nearly an hour, as the vessels were very far apart when
the action began, hardly any loss or damage being inflicted by either
party. At 6.00 the _Guerrière_ bore up and ran off under her
top-sails and jib, with the wind almost astern, a little on her
port quarter; when the _Constitution_ set her main-top gallant sail
and foresail, and at 6.05 closed within half pistol-shot distance
on her adversary's port beam. [Footnote: "Autobiography of Commodore
Morris" (Annapolis, 1880), p. 164.] Immediately a furious cannonade
opened, each ship firing as the guns bore. By the time the ships
were fairly abreast, at 6.20, the _Constitution_ shot away the
_Guerrière's_ mizzen-mast, which fell over the starboard quarter,
knocking a large hole in the counter, and bringing the ship round
against her helm. Hitherto she had suffered very greatly and the
_Constitution_ hardly at all. The latter, finding that she was ranging
ahead, put her helm aport and then luffed short round her enemy's
bows, [Footnote: Log of _Constitution_.] delivering a heavy raking
fire with the starboard guns and shooting away the _Guerrière's_
main-yard. Then she wore and again passed her adversary's bows,
raking with her port guns. The mizzen-mast of the _Guerrière_,
dragging in the water, had by this time pulled her bow round till
the wind came on her starboard quarter; and so near were the two
ships that the Englishman's bowsprit passed diagonally over the
_Constitution's_ quarter-deck, and as the latter ship fell off it
got foul of her mizzen-rigging, and the vessels then lay with the
_Guerrière's_ starboard bow against the _Constitution's_ port, or
lee quarter-gallery. [Footnote: Cooper, in "Putnam's Magazine."
i. 475.] The Englishman's bow guns played havoc with Captain Hull's
cabin, setting fire to it; but the flames were soon extinguished
by Lieutenant Hoffmann. On both sides the boarders were called
away; the British ran forward, but Captain Dacres relinquished
the idea of attacking [Footnote: Address of Captain Dacres to the
court-martial at Halifax.] when he saw the crowds of men on the
American's decks. Meanwhile, on the _Constitution_, the boarders
and marines gathered aft, but such a heavy sea was running that
they could not get on the _Guerrière_. Both sides suffered heavily
from the closeness of the musketry fire; indeed, almost the entire
loss on the _Constitution_ occurred at this juncture. As Lieutenant
Bush, of the marines, sprang upon the taffrail to leap on the
enemy's decks, a British marine shot him dead; Mr. Morris, the
first Lieutenant, and Mr. Alwyn, the master, had also both leaped
on the taffrail, and both were at the same moment wounded by the
musketry fire. On the _Guerrière_ the loss was far heavier, almost
all the men on the forecastle being picked off. Captain Dacres
himself was shot in the back and severely wounded by one of the
American mizzen topmen, while he was standing on the starboard
forecastle hammocks cheering on his crew [Footnote: James, vi,
144.]; two of the lieutenants and the master were also shot down.
The ships gradually worked round till the wind was again on the
port quarter, when they separated, and the _Guerrière's_ foremast
and main-mast at once went by the board, and fell over on the
starboard side, leaving her a defenseless hulk, rolling her
main-deck guns into the water. [Footnote: Brenton, v, 51.] At
6.30 the _Constitution_ hauled aboard her tacks, ran off a little
distance to the eastward, and lay to. Her braces and standing and
running rigging were much cut up and some of the spars wounded,
but a few minutes sufficed to repair damages, when Captain Hull
stood under his adversary's lee, and the latter at once struck,
at 7.00 P. M., [Footnote: Log of the _Constitution_.] just two
hours after she had fired the first shot. On the part of the
_Constitution_, however, the actual fighting, exclusive of six
or eight guns fired during the first hour, while closing, occupied
less than 30 minutes.

[Illustration: _Constitution_ vs. _Guerrière_ (1): "The Engagement"
is the original title of this, the first in a series of four
paintings of the action done for Captain Hull by Michele F. Corné.
(Courtesy US. Naval Academy Museum)]

[Illustration: _Constitution_ vs. _Guerrière_ (2): "In Action."
The _Guerrière's_ mizzenmast goes down. (Courtesy U.S. Naval
Academy Museum)]

[Illustration: _Constitution_ vs. _Guerrière_ (3): "Dropping
Astern." The _Guerrière's_ mainmast and foremast follow. (Courtesy
U.S. Naval Academy Museum)]

[Illustration: _Constitution_ vs. _Guerrière_ (4): "She Fell in
the Sea, A Perfect Wreck." The puff of smoke over the _Guerrière's_
bow is from a gun being fired to leeward to signal her surrender,
the customary practice when a vessel no longer had a flag to strike.
(Courtesy New Haven Historical Society)]

The tonnage and metal of the combatants have already been referred
to. The _Constitution_ had, as already said, about 456 men aboard,
while of the _Guerrière's_ crew, 267 prisoners were received aboard
the _Constitution_; deducting 10 who were Americans and would not
fight, and adding the 15 killed outright, we get 272; 28 men were
absent in prizes.

                     COMPARATIVE FORCE
                                                          Comparative
                              Broad-        Comparative      loss
                    Tons Guns side Men Loss Force          Inflicted

_Constitution_  1576  27   684 456  14   1.00              1.00
_Guerrière_     1338  25   556 272  79    .70               .18

The loss of the _Constitution_ included Lieutenant William S. Bush,
of the marines, and six seamen killed, and her first lieutenant,
Charles Morris, Master, John C. Alwyn, four seamen, and one marine,
wounded. Total, seven killed and seven wounded. Almost all this
loss occurred when the ships came foul, and was due to the
_Guerrière's_ musketry and the two guns in her bridle-ports.

The _Guerrière_ lost 23 killed and mortally wounded, including her
second lieutenant, Henry Ready, and 56 wounded severely and slightly,
including Captain Dacres himself, the first lieutenant, Bartholomew
Kent, Master, Robert Scott, two master's mates, and one midshipman.

The third lieutenant of the _Constitution_, Mr. George Campbell
Read, was sent on board the prize, and the _Constitution_ remained
by her during the night; but at daylight it was found that she was
in danger of sinking. Captain Hull at once began removing the
prisoners, and at three o'clock in the afternoon set the _Guerrière_
on fire, and in a quarter of an hour she blew up. He then set sail
for Boston, where he arrived on August 30th. "Captain Hull and his
officers," writes Captain Dacres in his official letter, "have treated
us like brave and generous enemies; the greatest care has been taken
that we should not lose the smallest trifle."

The British laid very great stress on the rotten and decayed
condition of the _Guerrière_; mentioning in particular that the
mainmast fell solely because of the weight of the falling foremast.
But it must be remembered that until the action occurred she was
considered a very fine ship. Thus, in Brighton's "Memoir of Admiral
Broke," it is declared that Dacres freely expressed the opinion
that she could take a ship in half the time the _Shannon_ could.
The fall of the main-mast occurred when the fight was practically
over; it had no influence whatever on the conflict. It was also
asserted that her powder was bad, but on no authority; her first
broadside fell short, but so, under similar circumstances, did the
first broadside of the _United States_. None of these causes account
for the fact that her shot did not hit. Her opponent was of such
superior force--nearly in the proportion of 3 to 2--that success
would have been very difficult in any event, and no one can doubt
the gallantry and pluck with which the British ship was fought; but
the execution was very greatly disproportioned to the force. The
gunnery of the _Guerrière_ was very poor, and that of the
_Constitution_ excellent; during the few minutes the ships were
yard-arm and yard-arm; the latter was not hulled once, while no
less than 30 shot took effect on the former's engaged side,
[Footnote: Captain Dacres' address to the court-martial.] five
sheets of copper beneath the bends. The _Guerrière_, moreover,
was out-manoeuvred; "in wearing several times and exchanging
broadsides in such rapid and continual changes of position, her
fire was much more harmless than it would have been if she had
kept more steady." [Footnote: Lord Howard Douglass, "Treatise on
Naval Gunnery" (London, 1851), p. 454.] The _Constitution_ was
handled faultlessly; Captain Hull displayed the coolness and skill
of a veteran in the way in which he managed, first to avoid being
raked, and then to improve the advantage which the precision and
rapidity of his fire had gained. "After making every allowance
claimed by the enemy, the character of this victory is not essentially
altered. Its peculiarities were a fine display of seamanship in the
approach, extraordinary efficiency in the attack, and great readiness
in repairing damages; all of which denote cool and capable officers,
with an expert and trained crew; in a word, a disciplined man-of-war."
[Footnote: Cooper, ii. 173.] The disparity of force, 10 to 7, is
not enough to account for the disparity of execution, 10 to 2. Of
course, something must be allowed for the decayed state of the
Englishman's masts, although I really do not think it had any
influence on the battle, for he was beaten when the main mast fell;
and it must be remembered, on the other hand, that the American
crew was absolutely new, while the _Guerrière_ was manned by old
hands. So that, while admitting and admiring the gallantry, and,
on the whole, the seamanship of Captain Dacres and his crew, and
acknowledging that he fought at a great disadvantage, especially
in being short-handed, yet all must acknowledge that the combat
showed a marked superiority, particularly in gunnery, on the part
of the Americans. Had the ships not come foul, Captain Hull would
probably not have lost more than three or four men; as it was, he
suffered but slightly. That the _Guerrière_ was not so weak as she
was represented to be can be gathered from the fact that she mounted
two more main-deck guns than the rest of her class; thus carrying
on her main-deck 30 long 18-pounders in battery, to oppose to the
30 long 24's, or rather (allowing for the short weight of shot)
long 22's, of the _Constitution_. Characteristically enough, James,
though he carefully reckons in the long bow-chasers in the
bridle-ports of the _Argus_ and _Enterprise_, yet refuses to count
the two long eighteens mounted through the bridle-ports on the
_Guerrière's_ main-deck. Now, as it turned out, these two bow guns
were used very effectively, when the ships got foul, and caused
more damage and loss than all of the other main-deck guns put together.

[Illustration: This diagram is taken from Commodore Morris'
autobiography and the log of the _Guerrière_: the official accounts
apparently consider "larboard" and "starboard" as interchangeable
terms.]

Captain Dacres, very much to his credit, allowed the ten Americans
on board to go below, so as not to fight against their flag; and
in his address to the court-martial mentions, among the reasons
for his defeat, "that he was very much weakened by permitting the
Americans on board to quit their quarters." Coupling this with the
assertion made by James and most other British writers that the
_Constitution_ was largely manned by Englishmen, we reach the
somewhat remarkable conclusion, that the British ship was defeated
because the Americans on board would _not_ fight against their
country, and that the American was victorious because the British
on board _would_. However, as I have shown, in reality there were
probably not a score of British on board the _Constitution_.

In this, as well as the two succeeding frigate actions, every one
must admit that there was a great superiority in force on the side
of the victors, and British historians have insisted that this
superiority was so great as to preclude any hopes of a successful
resistance. That this was not true, and that the disparity between
the combatants was not as great as had been the case in a number of
encounters in which English frigates had taken French ones, can be
best shown by a few accounts taken from the French historian Troude,
who would certainly not exaggerate the difference. Thus on March 1,
1799, the English 38-gun 18-pounder frigate _Sybille_, captured the
French 44-gun 24-pounder frigate _Forte_, after an action of two
hours and ten minutes. [Footnote: "Batailles Navales de la France."
O. Troude (Paris, 1868), iv, 171.] In _actual_ weight the shot
thrown by one of the main-deck guns of the defeated _Forte_ was
over six pounds heavier than the shot thrown by one of the main-deck
guns of the victorious _Constitution_ or _United States_. [Footnote:
See Appendix B, for actual weight of French shot.]

There are later examples than this. But a very few years before
the declaration of war by the United States, and in the same
struggle that was then still raging, there had been at least two
victories gained by English frigates over French foes as superior
to themselves as the American 44's were to the British ships they
captured. On Aug. 10, 1805, the _Phoenix_, 36, captured the _Didon_,
40, after 3 1/2 hours' fighting, the comparative broadside force
being: [Footnote: Ibid., lii, 425.]

           _PHOENIX_            _DIDON_
             13×18               14×18
              2× 9                2× 8
              6×32                7×36
        -----------------    -----------------
        21 guns, 444 lbs.    23 guns, 522 lbs.
                              (nominal; about
                               600, real)

On March 8, 1808, the _San Florenzo_, 36, captured the _Piedmontaise_,
40, the force being exactly what it was in the case of the _Phoenix_
and Didon.[Footnote: Ibid., in, 499.] Comparing the real, not the
nominal weight of metal, we find that the _Didon_ and _Piedmontaise_
were proportionately of greater force compared to the _Phoenix_
and _San Florenzo_, than the _Constitution_ was compared to the
_Guerrière_ or _Java_. The French 18's threw each a shot weighing
but about two pounds less than that thrown by an American 24 of
1812, while their 36-pound carronades each threw a shot over 10
pounds heavier than that thrown by one of the _Constitution's_
spar-deck 32's.

That a 24-pounder can not always whip an 18-pounder frigate is
shown by the action of the British frigate _Eurotas_ with the
French frigate _Chlorinde_, on Feb. 25, 1814. [Footnote: James,
vi, 391.] The first with a crew of 329 men threw 625 pounds of
shot at a broadside, the latter carrying 344 men and throwing 463
pounds; yet the result was indecisive. The French lost 90 and the
British 60 men. The action showed that heavy metal was not of much
use unless used well.

To appreciate rightly the exultation Hull's victory caused in the
United States, and the intense annoyance it created in England, it
must be remembered that during the past twenty years the Island
Power had been at war with almost every state in Europe, at one
time or another, and in the course of about two hundred single
conflicts between ships of approximately equal force (that is, where
the difference was less than one half), waged against French, Spanish,
Italian, Turkish, Algerine, Russian, Danish, and Dutch antagonists,
her ships had been beaten and captured in but five instances. Then
war broke out with America, and in eight months five single-ship
actions occurred, in every one of which the British vessel was
captured. Even had the victories been due solely to superior force
this would have been no mean triumph for the United States.

On October 13, 1812, the American 18-gun ship-sloop _Wasp_, Captain
Jacob Jones, with 137 men aboard, sailed from the Delaware and ran
off southeast to get into the track of the West India vessels; on
the 16th a heavy gale began to blow, causing the loss of the
jib-boom and two men who were on it. The next day the weather
moderated somewhat, and at 11.30 P.M., in latitude 37° N., longitude
65° W., several sail were descried. [Footnote: Capt. Jones' official
letter, Nov. 24, 1812.] These were part of a convoy of 14
merchant-men which had quitted the bay of Honduras on September
12th, bound for England, [Footnote: James' History, vi, 158.] under
the convoy of the British 18-gun brig-sloop _Frolic_, of 19 guns
and 110 men, Captain Thomas Whinyates. They had been dispersed by
the gale of the 16th, during which the _Frolic's_ main-yard was
carried away and both her top-sails torn to pieces [Footnote: Capt.
Whinyates' official letter, Oct. 18, 1812.]; next day she spent in
repairing damages, and by dark six of the missing ships had joined
her. The day broke almost cloudless on the 18th (Sunday), showing
the convoy, ahead and to leeward of the American ship, still some
distance off, as Captain Jones had not thought it prudent to close
during the night, while he was ignorant of the force of his antagonists.
The _Wasp_ now sent down to her top-gallant yards, close reefed her
top-sails, and bore down under short fighting canvas; while the
_Frolic_ removed her main-yard from the casks, lashed it on deck,
and then hauled to the wind under her boom main-sail and close-reefed
foretop-sail, hoisting Spanish colors to decoy the stranger under
her guns, and permit the convoy to escape. At 11.32 the action
began--the two ships running parallel on the starboard tack, not
60 yards apart, the _Wasp_, firing her port, and the _Frolic_ her
starboard, guns. The latter fired very rapidly, delivering three
broadsides to the _Wasp's_ two, [Footnote: Cooper, 182.] both crews
cheering loudly as the ships wallowed through the water. There was
a very heavy sea running, which caused the vessels to pitch and
roll heavily. The Americans fired as the engaged side of their ship
was going down, aiming at their opponent's hull [Footnote: Miles'
Register, in, p. 324.]; while the British delivered their broadsides
while on the crests of the seas, the shot going high. The water
dashed in clouds of spray over both crews, and the vessels rolled
so that the muzzles of the guns went under. [Footnote: _Do_.] But
in spite of the rough weather, the firing was not only spirited
but well directed. At 11.36 the _Wasp's_ maintop-mast was shot
away and fell, with its yard, across the port fore and foretop-sail
braces, rendering the head yards unmanageable; at 11.46 the gaff
and mizzentop-gallant mast came down, and by 11.52 every brace and
most of the rigging was shot away. [Footnote: Capt. Jones' letter.]
It would now have been very difficult to brace any of the yards.
But meanwhile the _Frolic_ suffered dreadfully in her hull and lower
masts, and had her gaff and head braces shot away.[Footnote: Capt.
Whinyates' letter.] The slaughter among her crew was very great,
but the survivors kept at their work with the dogged courage of
their race. At first the two vessels ran side by side, but the
American gradually forged ahead, throwing in her fire from a
position in which she herself received little injury; by degrees
the vessels got so close that the Americans struck the _Frolic's_
side with their rammers in loading, [Footnote: Capt. Jones' letter.]
and the British brig was raked with dreadful effect. The Frolic
then fell aboard her antagonist, her jib-boom coming in between
the main- and mizzen-rigging of the _Wasp_ and passing over the
heads of Captain Jones and Lieutenant Biddle, who were standing
near the capstan. This forced the _Wasp_ up in the wind, and she
again raked her antagonist, Captain Jones trying to restrain his
men from boarding till he could put in another broadside. But they
could no longer be held back, and Jack Lang, a New Jersey seaman,
leaped on the _Frolic's_ bowsprit. Lieutenant Biddle then mounted
on the hammock cloth to board, but his feet got entangled in the
rigging, and one of the midshipmen seizing his coat-tails to help
himself up, the lieutenant tumbled back on the deck. At the next
swell he succeeded in getting on the bowsprit, on which there were
already two seamen whom he passed on the forecastle. But there was
no one to oppose him; not twenty Englishmen were left unhurt.
[Footnote: Capt. Whinyates' letter.] The man at the wheel was still
at his post, grim and undaunted, and two or three more were on deck,
including Captain Whinyates and Lieutenant Wintle, both so severely
wounded that they could not stand without support. [Footnote: James,
vi, 161.] There could be no more resistance, and Lieutenant Biddle
lowered the flag at 12.15--just 43 minutes after the beginning of
the fight. [Footnote: Capt. Jones' letter.] A minute or two afterward
both the _Frolic's_ masts went by the board--the foremast about
fifteen feet above the deck, the other short off. Of her crew, as
already said, not twenty men had escaped unhurt. Every officer was
wounded; two of them, the first lieutenant, Charles McKay, and
master, John Stephens, soon died. Her total loss was thus over
90 [Footnote: Capt. Whinyates' official letter thus states it, and
is, of course, to be taken as authority; the Bermuda account makes
it 69, and James only 62;] about 30 of whom were killed outright
or died later. The _Wasp_ suffered very severely in her rigging
and aloft generally, but only two or three shots struck her hull;
five of her men were killed--two in her mizzen-top and one in her
maintop-mast rigging--and five wounded, [Footnote: Capt. Jones'
letter.] chiefly while aloft.

[Illustration: _Wasp_ vs. _Frolic_: a contemporary painting by
Thomas Birch, believed to have been done for the _Wasp's_ captain,
James Biddle. (Courtesy Peabody Museum of Salem)]

The two vessels were practically of equal force. The loss of the
_Frolic's_ main-yard had merely converted her into a brigantine,
and, as the roughness of the sea made it necessary to fight under
very short canvas, her inferiority in men was fully compensated for
by her superiority in metal. She had been desperately defended; no
men could have fought more bravely than Captain Whinyates and his
crew. On the other hand, the Americans had done their work with a
coolness and skill that could not be surpassed; the contest had
been mainly one of gunnery, and had been decided by the greatly
superior judgment and accuracy with which they fired. Both officers
and crew had behaved well; Captain Jones particularly mentions
Lieutenant Claxton, who, though too ill to be of any service,
persisted in remaining on deck throughout the engagement.

The _Wasp_ was armed with 2 long 12's and 16 32-pound carronades;
the _Frolic_ with 2 long 6's, 16 32-pound carronades, and 1 shifting
12-pound carronade.

                     COMPARATIVE FORCE.

        Tons.   No. Guns. Weight Metal. Crews. Loss.
_Wasp_   450        9           250       135    10
_Frolic_ 467       10           274       110    90

Vice-Admiral Jurien de la Gravière comments on this action as
follows [Footnote: "Guerres Maritimes," ii, 287 (Septième Édition,
Paris, 1881).]:

DIAGRAM [Footnote: It is difficult to reconcile the accounts of
the manoeuvres in this action. James says "larboard" where Cooper
says "starboard"; one says the _Wasp_ wore, the other says that
she could not do so, etc.]

[Illustration: Shows the paths of the _Wasp_ and the _Frolic_ during
their battle and the positions of the ships at various times during
the battle from 11.32 to 12.15]

"The American fire showed itself to be as accurate as it was rapid.
On occasions when the roughness of the sea would seem to render
all aim excessively uncertain, the effects of their artillery were
not less murderous than under more advantageous conditions. The
corvette _Wasp_ fought the brig _Frolic_ in an enormous sea, under
very short canvas, and yet, forty minutes after the beginning of
the action, when the two vessels came together, the Americans who
leaped aboard the brig found on the deck, covered with dead and
dying, but one brave man, who had not left the wheel, and three
officers, all wounded, who threw down their swords at the feet of
the victors." Admiral de la Gravière's criticisms are especially
valuable, because they are those of an expert, who only refers to
the war of 1812 in order to apply to the French navy the lessons
which it teaches, and who is perfectly unprejudiced. He cares for
the lesson taught, not the teacher, and is quite as willing to
learn from the defeat of the _Chesapeake_ as from the victories
of the _Constitution_--while most American critics only pay heed
to the latter.

The characteristics of the action are the practical equality of the
contestants in point of force and the enormous disparity in the
damage each suffered; numerically, the _Wasp_ was superior by 5 per
cent., and inflicted a ninefold greater loss.

Captain Jones was not destined to bring his prize into port, for
a few hours afterward the _Poictiers_, a British 74, Captain John
Poer Beresford, hove in sight. Now appeared the value of the _Frolic's_
desperate defence; if she could not prevent herself from being
captured, she had at least ensured her own recapture, and also the
capture of the foe. When the _Wasp_ shook out her sails they were
found to be cut into ribbons aloft, and she could not make off with
sufficient speed. As the _Poictiers_ passed the _Frolic_, rolling
like a log in the water, she threw a shot over her, and soon
overtook the _Wasp_. Both vessels were carried into Bermuda. Captain
Whinyates was again put in command of the _Frolic_. Captain Jones
and his men were soon exchanged; 25,000 dollars prize-money was
voted them by Congress, and Captain and Lieutenant Biddle were
both promoted, the former receiving the captured ship _Macedonian_.
Unluckily the blockade was too close for him to succeed in getting
out during the remainder of the war.

On Oct. 8th Commodore Rodgers left Boston on his second cruise, with
the _President_, _United States_, _Congress_, and _Argus_, [Footnote:
Letter of Commodore Rodgers. Jan. 1. 1813.] leaving the _Hornet_
in port. Four days out, the _United States_ and _Argus_ separated,
while the remaining two frigates continued their cruise together.
The _Argus_, [Footnote: Letter of Capt. Arthur Sinclair, Jan. 4,
1813.] Captain Sinclair, cruised to the eastward, making prizes
of 6 valuable merchant-men, and returned to port on January 3d.
During the cruise she was chased for three days and three nights
(the latter being moonlight) by a British squadron, and was obliged
to cut away her boats and anchors and start some of her water. But
she saved her guns, and was so cleverly handled that during the
chase she actually succeeded in taking and manning a prize, though
the enemy got near enough to open fire as the vessels separated.
Before relating what befell the _United States_, we shall bring
Commodore Rodgers' cruise to an end.

On Oct. 10th the Commodore chased, but failed to overtake, the
British frigate _Nymphe_, 38, Captain Epworth. On the 18th, off
the great Bank of Newfoundland, he captured the Jamaica packet
_Swallow_, homeward bound, with 200,000 dollars in specie aboard.
On the 31st, at 9 A. M., lat. 33° N., long. 32° W., his two frigates
fell in with the British frigate _Galatea_, 36, Captain Woodley
Losack, convoying two South Sea ships, to windward. The _Galatea_
ran down to reconnoitre, and at 10 A. M., recognizing her foes,
hauled up on the starboard tack to escape. The American frigates
made all sail in chase, and continued beating to windward, tacking
several times, for about three hours. Seeing that she was being
overhauled, the _Galatea_ now edged away to get on her best point
of sailing; at the same moment one of her convoy, the _Argo_, bore
up to cross the hawse of her foes, but was intercepted by the
_Congress_, who lay to to secure her. Meanwhile the _President_
kept after the _Galatea_; she set her top-mast, top-gallant mast
and lower studding-sails, and when it was dusk had gained greatly
upon her. But the night was very dark, the _President_ lost sight
of the chase, and, toward midnight, hauled to the wind to rejoin
her consort. The two frigates cruised to the east as far as 22° W.,
and then ran down to 17° N.; but during the month of November they
did not see a sail. They had but slightly better luck on their
return toward home. Passing 120 miles north of Bermuda, and cruising
a little while toward the Virginia capes, they reentered Boston
on Dec. 31st, having made 9 prizes, most of them of little value.

When four days out, on Oct. 12th, Commodore Decatur had separated
from the rest of Rodgers' squadron and cruised east; on the 25th,
in lat. 29° N., and long. 29° 30' W. while going close-hauled on
the port tack, with the wind fresh from the S. S. E., a sail was
descried on the weather beam, about 12 miles distant. [Footnote:
Official letter of Commodore Decatur, Oct. 30. 1812.] This was the
British 38-gun frigate _Macedonian_, Captain John Surnam Carden.
She was not, like the _Guerrière_, an old ship captured from the
French, but newly built of oak and larger than any American
18-pounder frigate; she was reputed (very wrongfully) to be a
"crack ship." According to Lieut. David Hope, "the state of
discipline on board was excellent; in no British ship was more
attention paid to gunnery. Before this cruise, the ship had been
engaged almost every day with the enemy; and in time of peace the
crew were constantly exercised at the great guns." [Footnote:
Marshall's "Naval Biography," vol. iv, p. 1018.] How they could have
practised so much and learned so little is certainly marvellous.

The Macedonian set her foretop-mast and top-gallant studdings sails
and bore away in chase, [Footnote: Capt. Carden to Mr. Croker,
Oct. 28, 1812.] edging down with the wind a little aft the starboard
beam. Her first lieutenant wished to continue on this course and
pass down ahead of the _United States_, [Footnote: James, vi. 165.]
but Capt. Carden's over-anxiety to keep the weather-gage lost him
this opportunity of closing. [Footnote: Sentence of Court-martial
held on the _San Domingo_, 74. at the Bermudas. May 27, 1812.]
Accordingly he hauled by the wind and passed way to windward of the
American. As Commodore Decatur got within range, he eased off and
fired a broadside, most of which fell short [Footnote: Marshall,
iv, 1080.]; he then kept his luff, and, the next time he fired, his
long 24's told heavily, while he received very little injury himself.
[Footnote: Cooper, 11, 178.] The fire from his main-deck (for he
did not use his carronades at all for the first half hour) [Footnote:
Letter of Commodore Decatur.] was so very rapid that it seemed as
if the ship was on fire; his broadsides were delivered with almost
twice the rapidity of those of the Englishman. [Footnote: James, vi,
169.] The latter soon found he could not play at long bowls with any
chance of success; and, having already erred either from timidity
or bad judgment, Captain Carden decided to add rashness to the
catalogue of his virtues. Accordingly he bore up, and came down
end on toward his adversary, with the wind on his port quarter.
The _States_ now (10.15) laid her main-topsail aback and made heavy
play with her long guns, and, as her adversary came nearer, with
her carronades also.

[Illustration: Shows the paths of the _United States_ and the
_Macedonian_ during their battle and the positions of the ships
at various times during the battle from 09.45 to 11.15]

The British ship would reply with her starboard guns, hauling up
to do so; as she came down, the American would ease off, run a
little way and again come to, keeping up a terrific fire. As the
_Macedonian_ bore down to close, the chocks of all her forecastle
guns (which were mounted on the outside) were cut away [Footnote:
Letter of Captain Carden.]; her fire caused some damage to the
American's rigging, but hardly touched her hull, while she herself
suffered so heavily both alow and aloft that she gradually dropped
to leeward, while the American fore-reached on her. Finding herself
ahead and to windward, the _States_ tacked and ranged up under her
adversary's lee, when the latter struck her colors at 11.15, just
an hour and a half after the beginning of the action. [Footnote:
Letter of Commodore Decatur.]

[Illustration: Captain Stephen Decatur: a charcoal drawing done
in 1809 by Charles B.J.F. St.-Memin. (Courtesy Library of Congress)]

The _United States_ had suffered surprisingly little; what damage
had been done was aloft. Her mizzen top-gallant mast was cut away,
some of the spars were wounded, and the rigging a good deal cut;
the hull was only struck two or three times. The ships were never
close enough to be within fair range of grape and musketry, [Footnote:
Letter of Commodore Decatur.] and the wounds were mostly inflicted
by round shot and were thus apt to be fatal. Hence the loss of the
Americans amounted to Lieutenant John Messer Funk (5th of the ship)
and six seamen killed or mortally wounded, and only five severely
and slightly wounded.

The _Macedonian_, on the other hand, had received over a hundred
shot in her hull, several between wind and water; her mizzen-mast
had gone by the board; her fore--and maintop-masts had been shot
away by the caps, and her main-yard in the slings; almost all her
rigging was cut away (only the fore-sail being left); on the
engaged side all of her carronades but two, and two of her main-deck
guns, were dismounted. Of her crew 43 were killed and mortally
wounded, and 61 (including her first and third lieutenants) severely
and slightly wounded. [Footnote: Letter of Captain Carden.] Among
her crew were eight Americans (as shown by her muster-roll); these
asked permission to go below before the battle, but it was refused
by Captain Carden, and three were killed during the action. James
says that they _were_ allowed to go below, but this is untrue; for
if they had, the three would not have been slain. The others
testified that they had been forced to fight, and they afterward
entered the American service--the only ones of the _Macedonian's_
crew who did, or who were asked to.

The _Macedonian_ had her full complement of 301 men; the _States_
had, by her muster-roll of October 20th, 428 officers, petty officers,
seamen, and boys, and 50 officers and privates of marines, a total
of 478 (instead of 509 as Marshall in his "Naval Biography" makes
it).

                     COMPARATIVE FORCE.

                        Broadside  Weight
                  Size. Guns.      Metal.  Men. Loss.
_United States_   1576   27         786    478    12
_Macedonian_      1325   25         547    301   104

                  Comparative      Comparative Loss
                    Force.           Inflicted.
_States_             100               100
_Macedonian_          66                11

That is, the relative force being about as three is to two,
[Footnote: I have considered the _United States_ as mounting her
full allowance of 54 guns; but it is possible that she had no more
than 49. In Decatur's letter of challenge of Jan. 17, 1814 (which
challenge, by the way, was a most blustering affair, reflecting
credit neither on Decatur, nor his opponent, Captain Hope, nor on
any one else, excepting Captain Stackpole of H. M. S. _Statira_),
she is said to have had that number; her broadside would then be
15 long 24's below, 1 long 24, 1 12-pound, and 8 42-pound carronades
above. Her _real_ broadside weight of metal would thus be about
680 lbs., and she would be superior to the _Macedonian_ in the
proportion of 5 to 4. But it is possible that Decatur had landed
some of his guns in 1813, as James asserts; and though I am not at
all sure of this, I have thought it best to be on the safe side in
describing his force.] the damage done was as nine to one!

Of course, it would have been almost impossible for the _Macedonian_
to conquer with one third less force; but the disparity was by no
means sufficient to account for the ninefold greater loss suffered,
and the ease and impunity with which the victory was won. The
British sailors fought with their accustomed courage, but their
gunnery was exceedingly poor; and it must be remembered that though
the ship was bravely fought, still the defence was by no means so
desperate as that made by the _Essex_ or even the _Chesapeake_,
as witnessed by their respective losses. The _Macedonian_, moreover,
was surrendered when she had suffered less damage than either the
_Guerrière_ or _Java_. The chief cause of her loss lay in the fact
that Captain Carden was a poor commander. The gunnery of the _Java_,
_Guerrière_, and _Macedonian_ was equally bad; but while Captain
Lambert proved himself to be as able as he was gallant, and Captain
Dacres did nearly as well, Captain Carden, on the other hand, was
first too timid, and then too rash, and showed bad judgment at all
times. By continuing his original course he could have closed at
once; but he lost his chance by over-anxiety to keep the weather-gage,
and was censured by the court-martial accordingly. Then he tried
to remedy one error by another, and made a foolishly rash approach.
A very able and fair-minded English writer says of this action:
"As a display of courage the character of the service was nobly
upheld, but we would be deceiving ourselves were we to admit that
the comparative expertness of the crews in gunnery was equally
satisfactory. Now, taking the difference of effect as given by
Captain Carden, we must draw this conclusion--that the comparative
loss in killed and wounded (104 to 12), together with the dreadful
account he gives of the condition of his own ship, while he admits
that the enemy's vessel was in comparatively good order, must have
arisen from inferiority in gunnery as well as in force." [Footnote:
Lord Howard Douglass, "Naval Gunnery." p. 525]

On the other hand, the American crew, even according to James, were
as fine a set of men as ever were seen on shipboard. Though not one
fourth were British by birth, yet many of them had served on board
British ships of war, in some cases voluntarily, but much more
often because they were impressed. They had been trained at the
guns with the greatest care by Lieutenant Allen. And finally
Commodore Decatur handled his ship with absolute faultlessness.
To sum up: a brave and skilful crew, ably commanded, was matched
against an equally brave but unskilful one, with an incompetent
leader; and this accounts for the disparity of loss being so much
greater than the disparity in force.

At the outset of this battle the position of the parties was just
the reverse of that in the case of the _Constitution_ and _Guerrière_:
the Englishman had the advantage of the wind, but he used it in a
very different manner from that in which Captain Hull had done. The
latter at once ran down to close, but manoeuvred so cautiously that
no damage could be done him till he was within pistol shot. Captain
Carden did not try to close till after fatal indecision, and then
made the attempt so heedlessly that he was cut to pieces before he
got to close quarters. Commodore Decatur, also, manoeuvred more
skilfully than Captain Dacres, although the difference was less
marked between these two. The combat was a plain cannonade; the
_States_ derived no advantage from the superior number of her men,
for they were not needed. The marines in particular had nothing
whatever to do, while they had been of the greatest service against
the _Guerrière_. The advantage was simply in metal, as 10 is to 7.
Lord Howard Douglass' criticisms on these actions seem to me only
applicable in part. He says (p. 524): "The Americans would neither
approach nor permit us to join in close battle until they had gained
some extraordinary advantage from the superior faculties of their
long guns in distant cannonade, and from the intrepid, uncircumspect,
and often very exposed approach of assailants who had long been
accustomed to contemn all manoeuvring. Our vessels were crippled
in distant cannonade from encountering rashly the serious
disadvantage of making direct attacks; the uncircumspect
gallantry of our commanders led our ships unguardedly into the
snares which wary caution had spread."

These criticisms are very just as regards the _Macedonian_, and I
fully agree with them (possibly reserving the right to doubt Captain
Carden's gallantry, though readily admitting his uncircumspection).
But the case of the _Guerrière_ differed widely. There the American
ship made the attack, while the British at first avoided close
combat; and, so far from trying to cripple her adversary by a
distant cannonade, the _Constitution_ hardly fired a dozen times
until within pistol shot. This last point is worth mentioning,
because in a work on "Heavy Ordnance," by Captain T. F. Simmons,
R. A. (London, 1837), it is stated that the _Guerrière_ received
her injuries _before_ the closing, mentioning especially the "thirty
shot below the water-line"; whereas, by the official accounts of
both commanders, the reverse was the case. Captain Hull, in his
letter, and Lieutenant Morris, (in his autobiography) say they only
fired a few guns before closing; and Captain Dacres, in his letter,
and Captain Brenton, in his "History," say that not much injury was
received by the _Guerrière_ until about the time the mizzen-mast
fell, which was three or four minutes after close action began.

Lieutenant Allen was put aboard the _Macedonian_ as prize-master;
he secured the fore- and main-masts and rigged a jury mizzen-mast,
converting the vessel into a bark. Commodore Decatur discontinued
his cruise to convoy his prize back to America; they reached New
London Dec. 4th. Had it not been for the necessity of convoying
the _Macedonian_, the _States_ would have continued her cruise,
for the damage she suffered was of the most trifling character.

Captain Garden stated (in Marshall's "Naval Biography") that the
_States_ measured 1,670 tons, was manned by 509 men, suffered so
from shot under water that she had to be pumped out every watch,
and that two eighteen-pound shot passed in a horizontal line through
her main-masts; all of which statements were highly creditable to
the vividness of his imagination. The _States_ measured but 1,576
tons (and by English measurement very much less), had 478 men aboard,
had not been touched by a shot under water-line, and her lower masts
were unwounded. James states that most of her crew were British,
which assertion I have already discussed; and that she had but one
boy aboard, and that he was seventeen years old,--in which case 29
others, some of whom (as we learn from the "Life of Decatur") were
only twelve, must have grown with truly startling rapidity during
the hour and a half that the combat lasted.

During the twenty years preceding 1812 there had been almost
incessant warfare on the ocean, and although there had been
innumerable single conflicts between French and English frigates,
there had been but one case in which the French frigate, single-handed,
was victorious. This was in the year 1805 when the _Milan_ captured
the _Cleopatra_. According to Troude, the former threw at a broadside
574 pounds (actual), the latter but 334; and the former lost 35 men
out of her crew of 350, the latter 58 out of 200. Or, the forces
being as 100 to 58, the loss inflicted was as 100 to 60; while the
_States'_ force compared to the _Macedonian's_ being as 100 to 66,
the loss she inflicted was as 100 to 11.

British ships, moreover, had often conquered against odds as great;
as, for instance, when the _Sea Horse_ captured the great Turkish
frigate _Badere-Zaffer_; when the _Astrea_ captured the French
frigate _Gloire_, which threw at a broadside 286 pounds of shot,
while she threw but 174; and when, most glorious of all, Lord
Dundonald, in the gallant little _Speedy_, actually captured the
Spanish xebec _Gamo_ of over five times her own force! Similarly,
the corvette _Comus_ captured the Danish frigate _Fredrickscoarn_,
the brig _Onyx_ captured the Dutch sloop _Manly_, the little cutter
_Thorn_ captured the French _Courier-National_, and the _Pasly_
the Spanish _Virgin_; while there had been many instances of drawn
battles between English 12-pound frigates and French or Spanish
18-pounders.

Captain Hull having resigned the command of the _Constitution_,
she was given to Captain Bainbridge, of the _Constellation_, who
was also entrusted with the command of the _Essex_ and _Hornet_.
The latter ship was in the port of Boston with the _Constitution_,
under the command of Captain Lawrence. The _Essex_ was in the
Delaware, and accordingly orders were sent to Captain Porter to
rendezvous at the Island of San Jago; if that failed several other
places were appointed, and if, after a certain time, he did not
fall in with his commodore he was to act at his own discretion.

[Illustration: Captain William Bainbridge: a portrait by John
Wesley Jarvis, circa 1814. (Courtesy U.S. Naval Academy Museum)]

On October 26th the _Constitution_ and _Hornet_ sailed, touched
at the different rendezvous, and on December 13th arrived off San
Salvador, where Captain Lawrence found the _Bonne Citoyenne_, 18,
Captain Pitt Barnaby Greene. The _Bonne Citoyenne_ was armed with
18 32-pound carronades and 2 long nines, and her crew of 150 men
was exactly equal in number to that of the _Hornet_; the latter's
short weight in metal made her antagonist superior to her in about
the same proportion that she herself was subsequently superior to
the _Penguin_, or, in other words, the ships were practically equal.
Captain Lawrence now challenged Captain Greene to single fight,
giving the usual pledges that the _Constitution_ should not
interfere. The challenge was not accepted for a variety of reasons;
among others the _Bonne Citoyenne_ was carrying home half a million
pounds in specie. [Footnote: Brenton and James both deny that
Captain Greene was blockaded by the _Hornet_, and claim that he
feared the _Constitution_. James says (p. 275) that the occurrence
was one which "the characteristic cunning of Americans turned greatly
to their advantage"; and adds that Lawrence only sent the challenge
because "it could not be accepted," and so he would "suffer no
personal risk." He states that the reason it was sent, as well as
the reason that it was refused, was because the _Constitution_ was
going to remain in the offing and capture the British ship if she
proved conqueror. It is somewhat surprising that even James should
have had the temerity to advance such arguments. According to his
own account (p. 277) the _Constitution_ left for Boston on Jan. 6th,
and the _Hornet_ remained blockading the _Bonne Citoyenne_ till the
24th, when the _Montagu_, 74, arrived. During these eighteen days
there could have been no possible chance of the _Constitution_ or
any other ship interfering, and it is ridiculous to suppose that
any such fear kept Captain Greene from sailing out to attack his
foe. No doubt Captain Greene's course was perfectly justifiable,
but it is curious that with all the assertions made by James as to
the cowardice of the Americans, this is the only instance throughout
the war in which a ship of either party declined a contest with an
antagonist of equal force (the cases of Commodore Rodgers and Sir
George Collier being evidently due simply to an overestimate of the
opposing ships.)] Leaving the _Hornet_ to blockade her, Commodore
Bainbridge ran off to the southward, keeping the land in view.

At 9 A. M., Dec. 29, 1812, while the _Constitution_ was running
along the coast of Brazil, about thirty miles offshore in latitude
13° 6' S., and longitude 31° W., two strange sail were made,
[Footnote: Official letter of Commodore Bainbridge, Jan. 3, 1813.]
inshore and to windward. These were H. B. M. frigate _Java_, Captain
Lambert, forty-eight days out of Spithead, England, with the captured
ship _William_ in company. Directing the latter to make for San
Salvador, the _Java_ bore down in chase of the _Constitution_.
[Footnote: Official letter of Lieutenant Chads, Dec. 31, 1812.] The
wind was blowing light from the N.N.E., and there was very little
sea on. At 10 the _Java_ made the private signals, English, Spanish,
and Portuguese in succession, none being answered; meanwhile the
_Constitution_ was standing up toward the _Java_ on the starboard
tack; a little after 11 she hoisted her private signal, and then,
being satisfied that the strange sail was an enemy, she wore and
stood off toward the S.E., to draw her antagonist away from the
land, [Footnote: Log of the _Constitution_.] which was plainly
visible. The _Java_ hauled up, and made sail in a parallel course,
the _Constitution_ bearing about three points on her lee bow.
The _Java_ gained rapidly, being much the swifter.

At 1.30 the _Constitution_ luffed up, shortened her canvas to
top-sails, top-gallant sails, jib, and spanker, and ran easily off
on the port tack, heading toward the southeast; she carried her
commodore's pendant at the main, national ensigns at the mizzenpeak
and main top-gallant mast-head, and a Jack at the fore. The _Java_
also had taken in the main-sail and royals, and came down in a
lasking course on her adversary's weather-quarter, [Footnote:
Lieutenant Chads' Address to the Court-martial, April 23, 1813.]
hoisting her ensign at the mizzen-peak, a union Jack at the mizzen
top-gallant mast-head, and another lashed to the main-rigging. At
2 P. M., the _Constitution_ fired a shot ahead of her, following
it quickly by a broadside, [Footnote: Commodore Bainbridge's
letter.] and the two ships began at long bowls, the English firing
the lee or starboard battery while the Americans replied with their
port guns. The cannonade was very spirited on both sides, the ships
suffering about equally. The first broadside of the _Java_ was very
destructive, killing and wounding several of the _Constitution's_
crew. The _Java_ kept edging down, and the action continued, with
grape and musketry in addition; the swifter British ship soon
forereached and kept away, intending to wear across her slower
antagonist's bow and rake her; but the latter wore in the smoke,
and the two combatants ran off to the westward, the Englishman
still a-weather and steering freer than the _Constitution_, which
had luffed to close. [Footnote: Log of the _Constitution_.] The
action went on at pistol-shot distance. In a few minutes, however,
the _Java_ again forged ahead, out of the weight of her adversary's
fire, and then kept off, as before, to cross her bows; and, as
before, the _Constitution_ avoided this by wearing, both ships
again coming round with their heads to the east, the American
still to leeward. The Java kept the weather-gage tenaciously,
forereaching a little, and whenever the __Constitution_ luffed
up to close, [Footnote: Log of _Constitution_.] the former tried
to rake her. But her gunnery was now poor, little damage being
done by it; most of the loss the Americans suffered was early in
the action. By setting her foresail and main-sail the _Constitution_
got up close on the enemy's lee beam, her fire being very heavy
and carrying away the end of the _Java's_ bowsprit and her jib-boom.
[Footnote: Lieutenant Chads' letter.] The _Constitution_ forged
ahead and repeated her former manoeuvre, wearing in the smoke. The
_Java_ at once hove in stays, but owing to the loss of head-sail
fell off very slowly, and the American frigate poured a heavy raking
broadside into her stern, at about two cables' length distance. The
_Java_ replied with her port guns as she fell off. [Footnote:
Lieutenant Chads' letter.] Both vessels then bore up and ran off
free, with the wind on the port quarter; the _Java_ being abreast
and to windward of her antagonist, both with their heads a little
east of south. The ships were less than a cable's length apart, and
the _Constitution_ inflicted great damage while suffering very little
herself. The British lost many men by the musketry of the American
topmen, and suffered still more from the round and grape, especially
on the forecastle, [Footnote: Testimony of Christopher Speedy, in
minutes of the Court-martial on board H. M. S. _Gladiator_, at
Portsmouth, April 23, 1813] many marked instances of valor being
shown on both sides. The _Java's_ masts were wounded and her rigging
cut to pieces, and Captain Lambert then ordered her to be laid
aboard the enemy, who was on her lee beam. The helm was put a-weather,
and the _Java_ came down for the _Constitution's_ main-chains. The
boarders and marines gathered in the gangways and on the forecastle,
the boatswain having been ordered to cheer them up with his pipe
that they might make a clean spring. [Footnote: Testimony of James
Humble, in _do., do._] The Americans, however, raked the British
with terrible effect, cutting off their main top-mast above the cap,
and their foremast near the cat harpings. [Footnote: Log of
_Constitution_.] The stump of the _Java's_ bowsprit got caught in
the _Constitution's_ mizzen-rigging, and before it got clear the
British suffered still more.

[Illustration: _Constitution_ vs. _Java_: a comptemporary American
engraving done under the supervision of a witness to the action.
(Courtesy Beverley R. Robinson Collection, U.S. Naval Academy Museum)]

Finally the ships separated, the _Java's_ bowsprit passing over the
taffrail of the _Constitution_; the latter at once kept away to
avoid being raked. The ships again got nearly abreast, but the
_Constitution_, in her turn, forereached; whereupon Commodore
Bainbridge wore, passed his antagonist, luffed up under his quarter,
raked him with the starboard guns, then wore, and recommenced the
action with his port broadside at about 3.10. Again the vessels
were abreast, and the action went on as furiously as ever. The wreck
of the top hamper on the _Java_ lay over her starboard side, so that
every discharge of her guns set her on fire, [Footnote: Lieut. Chads'
Address.] and in a few minutes her able and gallant commander was
mortally wounded by a ball fired by one of the American main-top-men.
[Footnote: Surgeon J. C. Jones' Report.] The command then devolved
on the first lieutenant, Chads, himself painfully wounded. The
slaughter had been terrible, yet the British fought on with stubborn
resolution, cheering lustily. But success was now hopeless, for
nothing could stand against the cool precision of the Yankee fire.
The stump of the _Java's_ foremast was carried away by a double-headed
shot, the mizzen-mast fell, the gaff and spanker boom were shot away,
also the main-yard, and finally the ensign was cut down by a shot,
and all her guns absolutely silenced; when at 4.05 the _Constitution_,
thinking her adversary had struck, [Footnote: Log of the _Constitution_
(as given in Bainbridge's letter).] ceased firing, hauled aboard
her racks, and passed across her adversary's bows to windward, with
her top-sails, jib, and spanker set. A few minutes afterward the
_Java's_ main-mast fell, leaving her a sheer hulk. The _Constitution_
assumed a weatherly position, and spent an hour in repairing damages
and securing her masts; then she wore and stood toward her enemy,
whose flag was again flying, but only for bravado, for as soon as
the _Constitution_ stood across her forefoot she struck. At 5.25
she was taken possession of by Lieutenant Parker, 1st of the
_Constitution_, in one of the latter's only two remaining boats.

The American ship had suffered comparatively little. But a few round
shot had struck her hull, one of which carried away the wheel; one
18-pounder went through the mizzen-mast; the fore-mast, main-top-mast,
and a few other spars were slightly wounded, and the running rigging
and shrouds were a good deal cut; but in an hour she was again in
good fighting trim. Her loss amounted to 8 seamen and 1 marine
killed; the 5th lieutenant, John C. Alwyn, and 2 seamen, mortally,
Commodore Bainbridge and 12 seamen, severely, and 7 seamen and 2
marines, slightly wounded; in all 12 killed and mortally wounded,
and 22 wounded severely and slightly. [Footnote: Report of Surgeon
Amos A. Evans.]

"The _Java_ sustained unequalled injuries beyond the _Constitution_,"
says the British account. [Footnote: "Naval Chronicle," xxix. 452.]
These have already been given in detail; she was a riddled and
entirely dismasted hulk. Her loss (for discussion of which see
farther on) was 48 killed (including Captain Henry Lambert, who
died soon after the close of the action, and five midshipmen),
and 102 wounded, among them Lieutenant Henry Ducie Chads, Lieutenant
of Marines David Davies, Commander John Marshall, Lieut. James
Saunders, the boatswain. James Humble, master, Batty Robinson, and
four midshipmen.

In this action both ships displayed equal gallantry and seamanship.
"The _Java_," says Commodore Bainbridge, "was exceedingly well
handled and bravely fought. Poor Captain Lambert was a distinguished
and gallant officer, and a most worthy man, whose death I sincerely
regret." The manoeuvring on both sides was excellent; Captain
Lambert used the advantage which his ship possessed in her superior
speed most skilfully, always endeavoring to run across his adversary's
bows and rake him when he had forereached, and it was only owing
to the equal skill which his antagonist displayed that he was foiled,
the length of the combat being due to the number of evolutions. The
great superiority of the Americans was in their gunnery. The fire
of the _Java_ was both less rapid and less well directed than that
of her antagonist; the difference of force against her was not
heavy, being about as ten is to nine, and was by no means enough
to account for the almost fivefold greater loss she suffered.

[Illustration: This differs somewhat from the English diagram:
the American officers distinctly assert that the Java kept the
weather-gage in every position.]

The foregoing is a diagram of the battle. It differs from both of
the official accounts, as these conflict greatly both as to time
and as regards some of the evolutions. I generally take the mean
in cases of difference; for example, Commodore Bainbridge's report
makes the fight endure but 1 hour and 55 minutes, Lieutenant Chads'
2 hours and 25 minutes: I have made it 2 hours and 10 minutes, etc.,
etc.

The tonnage and weight of metal of the combatants have already
been stated; I will give the complements shortly. The following is
the

                COMPARATIVE FORCE AND LOSS.
                                                       Relative
                       Weight   No.         Relative     Loss
                Tons.   Metal.  Men.  Loss.   Force.   Inflicted.
_Constitution_    1576     654    475     34     100        100
_Java_            1340     576    426    150      89         23

In hardly another action the war do the accounts of the respective
forces differ so widely; the official British letter makes their
total of men at the beginning of the action 377, of whom Commodore
Bainbridge officially reports that he paroled 378! The British
state their loss in killed and mortally wounded at 24; Commodore
Bainbridge reports that the dead alone amounted to nearly 60!
Usually I have taken each commander's account of his own force
and loss, and I should do so now if it were not that the British
accounts differ among themselves, and whenever they relate to the
Americans, are flatly contradicted by the affidavits of the latter's
officers. The British first handicap themselves by the statement
that the surgeon of the _Constitution_ was an Irishman and lately
an assistant surgeon in the British navy ("Naval Chronicle," xxix,
452); which draws from Surgeon Amos A. Evans a solemn statement in
the Boston _Gazette_ that he was born in Maryland and was never in
the British navy in his life. Then Surgeon Jones of the _Java_, in
his official report, after giving his own killed and mortally wounded
at 24, says that the Americans lost in all about 60, and that 4 of
their amputations perished under his own eyes; whereupon Surgeon
Evans makes the statement (_Niles' Register_, vi, p. 35), backed
up by affidavits of his brother officers, that in all he had but
five amputations, of whom only one died, and that one, a month
after Surgeon Jones had left the ship. To meet the assertions of
Lieutenant Chads that he began action with but 377 men, the
_Constitution's_ officers produced the _Java's_ muster-roll, dated
Nov. 17th, or five days after she had sailed, which showed 446
persons, of whom 20 had been put on board a prize. The presence of
this large number of supernumeraries on board is explained by the
fact that the _Java_ was carrying out Lieutenant-General Hislop,
the newly-appointed Governor of Bombay, and his suite, together
with part of the crews for the _Cornwallis_, 74, and gun-sloops
_Chameleon_ and _Icarus_; she also contained stores for those two ships.

Besides conflicting with the American reports, the British statements
contradict one another. The official published report gives but two
midshipmen as killed; while one of the volumes of the "Naval Chronicle"
(vol. xxix, p. 452) contains a letter from one of the _Java's_
lieutenants, in which he states that there were five. Finally,
Commodore Bainbridge found on board the _Constitution_, after the
prisoners had left, a letter from Lieutenant H. D. Cornick, dated
Jan. 1, 1813, and addressed to Lieutenant Peter V. Wood, 22d Regiment,
foot, in which he states that 65 of their men were killed. James
("Naval Occurrences") gets around this by stating that it was
probably a forgery; but, aside from the improbability of Commodore
Bainbridge being a forger, this could not be so, for nothing would
have been easier than for the British lieutenant to have denied
having written it, which he never did. On the other hand, it would
be very likely that in the heat of the action, Commodore Bainbridge
and the _Java's_ own officers should overestimate the latter's loss.
[Footnote: For an account of the shameless corruption then existing
in the Naval Administration of Great Britain, see Lord Dundonald's
"Autobiography of a seaman." The letters of the commanders were
often garbled, as is mentioned by Brenton. Among numerous cases
that he gives, may be mentioned the cutting out of the _Chevrette_,
where he distinctly says, "our loss was much greater than was ever
acknowledged." (Vol. i, p. 505, edition of 1837.)]

Taking all these facts into consideration, we find 446 men on board
the _Java_ by her own muster-list; 378 of these were paroled by
Commodore Bainbridge at San Salvador; 24 men were acknowledged by
the enemy to be killed or mortally wounded; 20 were absent in a
prize, leaving 24 unaccounted for, who were undoubtedly slain.

The British loss was thus 48 men killed and mortally wounded, and
102 wounded severely and slightly. The _Java_ was better handled
and more desperately defended than the _Macedonian_ or even the
_Guerrière_. and the odds against her were much smaller; so she
caused her opponent greater loss, though her gunnery was no better
than theirs.

Lieutenant Parker, prize-master of the _Java_, removed all the
prisoners and baggage to the _Constitution_, and reported the prize
to be in a very disabled state; owing partly to this, but more to
the long distance from home and the great danger there was of
recapture, Commodore Bainbridge destroyed her on the 31st, and
then made sail for San Salvador. "Our gallant enemy," reports
Lieutenant Chads, "has treated us most generously"; and
Lieutenant-General Hislop presented the Commodore with a very
handsome sword as a token of gratitude for the kindness with which
he had treated the prisoners.

Partly in consequence of his frigate's injuries, but especially
because of her decayed condition, Commodore Bainbridge sailed from
San Salvador on Jan. 6, 1813, reaching Boston Feb. 27th, after his
four months' cruise. At San Salvador he left the _Hornet_ still
blockading the _Bonne Citoyenne_.

In order "to see ourselves as others see us," I shall again quote
from Admiral Jurien de la Gravière, [Footnote "Guerres Maritimes,"
ii, 284 (Paris, 1881).] as his opinions are certainly well worthy
of attention both as to these first three battles, and as to the
lessons they teach. "When the American Congress declared war on
England in 1812," he says, "it seemed as if this unequal conflict
would crush her navy in the act of being born; instead, it but
fertilized the germ. It is only since that epoch that the United
States has taken rank among maritime powers. Some combats of frigates,
corvettes, and brigs, insignificant without doubt as regards
material results, sufficed to break the charm which protected the
standard of St. George, and taught Europe what she could have
already learned from some of our combats, if the louder noise of our
defeats had not drowned the glory, that the only invincibles on the
sea are good seamen and good artillerists.

"The English covered the ocean with their cruisers when this
unknown navy, composed of six frigates and a few small craft
hitherto hardly numbered, dared to establish its cruisers at the
mouth of the Channel, in the very centre of the British power. But
already the _Constitution_ had captured the _Guerrière_ and _Java_,
the _United States_ had made a prize of the _Macedonian_, the _Wasp_
of the _Frolic_, and the _Hornet_ of the _Peacock_. The honor of
the new flag was established. England, humiliated, tried to
attribute her multiplied reverses to the unusual size of the
vessels which Congress had had constructed in 1799, and which did
the fighting in 1812. She wished to refuse them the name of frigates,
and called them, not without some appearance of reason, disguised
line-of-battle ships. Since then all maritime powers have copied
these gigantic models, as the result of the war of 1812 obliged
England herself to change her naval material; but if they had
employed, instead of frigates, cut-down 74's (vaisseaux rasés),
it would still be difficult to explain the prodigious success of
the Americans. * * *

"In an engagement which terminated in less than half an hour, the
English frigate _Guerrière_, completely dismasted, had fifteen men
killed, sixty-three wounded, and more than thirty shot below the
water-line. She sank twelve hours after the combat. The
_Constitution_, on the contrary, had but seven men killed and seven
wounded, and did not lose a mast. As soon as she had replaced a few
cut ropes and changed a few sails, she was in condition, even by
the testimony of the British historian, to take another _Guerrière_.
The _United States_ took an hour and a half to capture the
_Macedonian_, and the same difference made itself felt in the damage
suffered by the two ships. The _Macedonian_ had her masts shattered,
two of her main-deck and all her spar-deck guns disabled; more than
a hundred shot had penetrated the hull, and over a third of the
crew had suffered by the hostile fire. The American frigate, on the
contrary, had to regret but five men killed and seven wounded; her
guns had been fired each sixty-six times to the _Macedonian's_
thirty-six. The combat of the _Constitution_ and the _Java_ lasted
two hours, and was the most bloody of these three engagements. The
_Java_ only struck when she had been razed like a sheer hulk; she
had twenty-two men killed and one hundred and two wounded.

       *       *       *       *       *

"This war should be studied with unceasing diligence; the pride of
two peoples to whom naval affairs are so generally familiar has
cleared all the details and laid bare all the episodes, and through
the sneers which the victors should have spared, merely out of care
for their own glory, at every step can be seen that great truth, that
there is only success for those who know how to prepare it.

       *       *       *       *       *

"It belongs to us to judge impartially these marine events, too
much exalted perhaps by a national vanity one is tempted to excuse.
The Americans showed, in the War of 1812, a great deal of skill
and resolution. But if, as they have asserted, the chances had
always been perfectly equal between them and their adversaries, if
they had only owed their triumphs to the intrepidity of Hull,
Decatur, and Bainbridge, there would be for us but little interest
in recalling the struggle. We need not seek lessons in courage
outside of our own history. On the contrary, what is to be well
considered is that the ships of the United States constantly fought
with chances in their favor, and it is on this that the American
government should found its true title to glory. * * * The Americans
in 1812 had secured to themselves the advantage of a better
organization [than the English]."

The fight between the _Constitution_ and the _Java_ illustrates
best the proposition, "that there is only success for those who
know how to prepare it." Here the odds in men and metal were only
about as 10 to 9 in favor of the victors, and it is safe to say
that they might have been reversed without vitally affecting the
result. In the fight Lambert handled his ship as skilfully as
Bainbridge did his; and the _Java's_ men proved by their indomitable
courage that they were excellent material. The _Java's_ crew was
new shipped for the voyage, and had been at sea but six weeks; in
the _Constitution's_ first fight her crew had been aboard of her
but _five_ weeks. So the chances should have been nearly equal,
and the difference in fighting capacity that was shown by the
enormous disparity in the loss, and still more in the damage
inflicted, was due to the fact that the officers of one ship had,
and the officers of the other had not, trained their raw crews.
The _Constitution's_ men were not "picked," but simply average
American sailors, as the _Java's_ were average British sailors.
The essential difference was in the training.

During the six weeks the _Java_ was at sea her men had fired but
six broadsides, of blank cartridges; during the first five weeks
the _Constitution_ cruised, her crew were incessantly practised
at firing with blank cartridges and also at a target. [Footnote:
In looking through the logs of the _Constitution_, _Hornet_, etc.,
we continually find such entries as "beat to quarters, exercised
the men at the great guns," "exercised with musketry," "exercised
the boarders," "exercised the great guns, blank cartridges, and
afterward firing at mark."] The Java's crew had only been exercised
occasionally, even in pointing the guns, and when the captain of
a gun was killed the effectiveness of the piece was temporarily
ruined, and, moreover, the men did not work together. The
_Constitution's_ crew were exercised till they worked like machines,
and yet with enough individuality to render it impossible to
cripple a gun by killing one man. The unpractised British sailors
fired at random; the trained Americans took aim. The British
marines had not been taught any thing approximating to skirmishing
or sharp-shooting; the Americans had. The British sailors had not
even been trained enough in the ordinary duties of seamen; while
the Americans in five weeks had been rendered almost perfect. The
former were at a loss what to do in an emergency at all out of
their own line of work; they were helpless when the wreck fell over
their guns, when the Americans would have cut it away in a jiffy.
As we learn from Commodore Morris' "Autobiography," each Yankee
sailor could, at need, do a little carpentering or sail-mending,
and so was more self-reliant. The crew had been trained to act as
if guided by one mind, yet each man retained his own individuality.
The petty officers were better paid than in Great Britain, and so
were of a better class of men, thoroughly self-respecting; the
Americans soon got their subordinates in order, while the British
did not. To sum up: one ship's crew had been trained practically
and thoroughly, while the other crew was not much better off than
the day it sailed; and, as far as it goes, this is a good test of
the efficiency of the two navies.

The U.S. brig _Vixen_, 12, Lieutenant George U. Read, had been
cruising off the southern coast; on Nov. 22d she fell in with the
_Southampton_, 32, Captain Sir James Lucas Yeo, and was captured
after a short but severe trial of speed. Both vessels were wrecked
soon afterward.

The _Essex_, 32, Captain David Porter, left the Delaware on Oct.
28th, two days after Commodore Bainbridge had left Boston. She
expected to make a very long cruise and so carried with her an
unusual quantity of stores and sixty more men than ordinarily, so
that her muster-roll contained 319 names. Being deep in the water
she reached San Jago after Bainbridge had left. Nothing was met with
until after the Essex had crossed the equator in longitude 30° W.
on Dec. 11th. On the afternoon of the next day a sail was made out
to windward, and chased. At nine in the evening it was overtaken,
and struck after receiving a volley of musketry which killed one
man. The prize proved to be the British packet _Nocton_, of 10
guns and 31 men, with $55,000 in specie aboard. The latter was
taken out, and the _Nocton_ sent home with Lieutenant Finch and
a prize crew of 17 men, but was recaptured by a British frigate.

The next appointed rendezvous was the Island of Fernando de Noronha,
where Captain Porter found a letter from Commodore Bainbridge,
informing him that the other vessels were off Cape Frio. Thither
cruised Porter, but his compatriots had left. On the 29th he
captured an English merchant vessel; and he was still cruising
when the year closed.

The year 1812, on the ocean, ended as gloriously as it had begun.
In four victorious fights the disparity in loss had been so great
as to sink the disparity of force into insignificance. Our successes
had been unaccompanied by any important reverse. Nor was it alone
by the victories, but by the cruises, that the year was noteworthy.
The Yankee men-of-war sailed almost in sight of the British coast
and right in the tract of the merchant fleets and their armed
protectors. Our vessels had shown themselves immensely superior
to their foes.

The reason of these striking and unexpected successes was that our
navy in 1812 was the exact reverse of what our navy is now, in 1882.
I am not alluding to the personnel, which still remains excellent;
but, whereas we now have a large number of worthless vessels,
standing very low down in their respective classes, we then
possessed a few vessels, each unsurpassed by any foreign ship of
her class. To bring up our navy to the condition in which it stood
in 1812 it would not be _necessary_ (although in reality both very
wise and in the end very economical) to spend any more money than
at present; only instead of using it to patch up a hundred antiquated
hulks, it should be employed in building half a dozen ships on the
most effective model. If in 1812 our ships had borne the same relation
to the British ships that they do now, not all the courage and skill
of our sailors would have won us a single success. As it was, we
could only cope with the lower rates, and had no vessels to oppose
to the great "liners"; but to-day there is hardly any foreign ship,
no matter how low its rate, that is not superior to the corresponding
American ones. It is too much to hope that our political shortsightedness
will ever enable us to have a navy that is first-class in point of
size; but there certainly seems no reason why what ships we have
should not be of the very best quality. The effect of a victory is
two-fold, moral and material. Had we been as roughly handled on water
as we were on land during the first year of the war, such a succession
of disasters would have had a most demoralizing effect on the nation
at large. As it was, our victorious seafights, while they did not
inflict any material damage upon the colossal sea-might of England,
had the most important results in the feelings they produced at home
and even abroad. Of course they were magnified absurdly by most of
our writers at the time; but they do not need to be magnified, for
as they are any American can look back upon them with the keenest
national pride. For a hundred and thirty years England had had no
equal on the sea; and now she suddenly found one in the untried navy
of an almost unknown power.

BRITISH VESSELS CAPTURED OR DESTROYED IN 1812.

   Name.      Guns. Tonnage. Remarks.
_Guerrière_    49    1,340
_Macedonian_   49    1,325
_Java_         49    1,340
_Frolic_       19      477   Recaptured.
_Alert_        20      323
             _____  _______
              186    4,807
               19      477   Deducting Frolic.
             _____  _______
              167    4,330

AMERICAN VESSELS CAPTURED OR DESTROYED.

   Name.      Guns. Tonnage.
_Wasp_         18      450
_Nautilus_     14      185
_Vixen_        14      185
             _____  _______
               46      820

VESSELS BUILT IN 1812.

  Name.        Rig.   Guns. Tonnage.  Where Built.    Cost.
_Nonsuch_    Schooner  14      148     Charleston   $15,000
_Carolina_   Schooner  14      230         "          8,743
_Louisiana_    Ship    16      341    New Orleans    15,500

PRIZES MADE. [Footnote: These can only be approximately given;
the records are often incomplete or contradictory, especially
as regards the small craft. Most accounts do not give by any
means the full number.]

   Ship.      No. of Prizes.

_President_       1
_United States_   2
_Constitution_    9
_Congress_        2
_Chesapeake_      1
_Essex_          11
_Wasp_            2
_Hornet_          1
_Argus_           6
_Small Craft_     5
                 __
                 46




Chapter IV


1812

ON THE LAKES

_PRELIMINARY.--The combatants starting nearly on an
equality--Difficulties of creating a naval force--Difficulty of
comparing the force of the rival squadrons--Meagreness of the
published accounts--Unreliability of James--ONTARIO--Extraordinary
nature of the American squadron--Canadian squadron forming only a
kind of water militia--Sackett's Harbor feebly attacked by Commodore
Earle--Commodore Chauncy bombards York--ERIE--Lieutenant Elliott
captures the_ Detroit _and_ Caledonia--_Unsuccessful expedition of
Lieutenant Angus._

At the time we are treating of, the State of Maine was so sparsely
settled, and covered with such a dense growth of forest, that it
was practically impossible for either of the contending parties to
advance an army through its territory. A continuation of the same
wooded and mountainous district protected the northern parts of
Vermont and New Hampshire, while in New York the Adirondack region
was an impenetrable wilderness. It thus came about that the
northern boundary was formed, for military purposes, by Lake
Huron, Lake Erie, the Niagara, Lake Ontario, the St. Lawrence,
and, after an interval, by Lake Champlain. The road into the States
by the latter ran close along shore, and without a naval force the
invader would be wholly unable to protect his flanks, and would
probably have his communications cut. This lake, however, was
almost wholly within the United States, and did not become of
importance till toward the end of the war. Upon it were two
American gun-boats, regularly officered and manned, and for such
smooth water sufficiently effective vessels.

What was at that time the western part of the northern frontier
became the main theatre of military operations, and as it presented
largely a water front, a naval force was an indispensable adjunct,
the command of the lakes being of the utmost importance. As these
lakes were fitted for the manoeuvring of ships of the largest size,
the operations upon them were of the same nature as those on the
ocean, and properly belong to naval and not to military history.
But while on the ocean America started with too few ships to enable
her really to do any serious harm to her antagonist, on the inland
waters the two sides began very nearly on an equality. The chief
regular forces either belligerent possessed were on Lake Ontario.
Here the United States had a man-of-war brig, the _Oneida_, of 240
tons, carrying 16 24-pound carronades, manned by experienced seamen,
and commanded by Lieutenant M. T. Woolsey. Great Britain possessed
the _Royal George_, 22, _Prince Regent_, 16, _Earl of Moira_, 14,
_Gloucester_, 10, _Seneca_, 8, and _Simco_, 8, all under the command
of a Commodore Earle; but though this force was so much the more
powerful it was very inefficient, not being considered as belonging
to the regular navy, the sailors being undisciplined, and the officers
totally without experience, never having been really trained in
the British service. From these causes it resulted that the struggle
on the lakes was to be a work as much of creating as of using a navy.
On the seaboard success came to those who made best use of the ships
that had already been built; on the lakes the real contest lay in
the building. And building an inland navy was no easy task. The
country around the lakes, especially on the south side, was still
very sparsely settled, and all the American naval supplies had to
be brought from the seaboard cities through the valley of the Mohawk.
There was no canal or other means of communication, except very
poor roads intermittently relieved by transportation on the Mohawk
and on Oneida Lake, when they were navigable. Supplies were thus
brought up at an enormous cost, with tedious delays and great
difficulty; and bad weather put a stop to all travel. Very little
indeed, beyond timber, could be procured at the stations on the
lakes. Still a few scattered villages and small towns had grown up
on the shores, whose inhabitants were largely engaged in the carrying
trade. The vessels used for the purpose were generally small sloops
or schooners, swift and fairly good sailors, but very shallow and
not fitted for rough weather. The frontiersmen themselves, whether
Canadian or American, were bold, hardy seamen, and when properly
trained and led made excellent man-of-war's men; but on the American
side they were too few in number, and too untrained to be made use
of, and the seamen had to come from the coast. But the Canadian
shores had been settled longer, the inhabitants were more numerous,
and by means of the St. Lawrence the country was easy of access to
Great Britain; so that the seat of war, as regards getting naval
supplies, and even men, was nearer to Great Britain than to us. Our
enemies also possessed in addition to the squadron on Lake Ontario
another on Lake Erie, consisting of the _Queen Charlotte_, 17,
_Lady Prevost_, 13, _Hunter_, 10, _Caledonia_, 2, _Little Belt_, 2,
and _Chippeway_, 2. These two squadrons furnished training schools
for some five hundred Canadian seamen, whom a short course of
discipline under experienced officers sufficed to render as good
men as their British friends or American foes. Very few British
seamen ever reached Lake Erie (according to James, not over fifty);
but on Lake Ontario, and afterward on Lake Champlain, they formed
the bulk of the crews, "picked seamen, sent out by government
expressly for service on the Canada lakes." [Footnote: James, vi,
353.] As the contrary has sometimes been asserted it may be as well
to mention that Admiral Codrington states that no want of seamen
contributed to the British disasters on the lakes, as their
sea-ships at Quebec had men drafted from them for that service
till their crews were utterly depleted. [Footnote: Memoirs, i, 322,
referring especially to battle of Lake Champlain.] I am bound to
state that while I think that on the ocean our sailors showed
themselves superior to their opponents, especially in gun practice,
on the lakes the men of the rival fleets were as evenly matched,
in skill and courage, as could well be. The difference, when there
was any, appeared in the officers, and, above all, in the builders;
which was the more creditable to us, as in the beginning we were
handicapped by the fact that the British already had a considerable
number of war vessels, while we had but one.

The Falls of Niagara interrupt navigation between Erie and Ontario;
so there were three independent centres of naval operations on the
northern frontier. The first was on Lake Champlain, where only the
Americans possessed any force, and, singularly enough, this was the
only place where the British showed more enterprise in ship-building
than we did. Next came Lake Ontario, where both sides made their
greatest efforts, but where the result was indecisive, though the
balance of success was slightly inclined toward us. Our naval
station was at Sackett's Harbor; that of our foes at Kingston. The
third field of operations was Lake Erie and the waters above it.
Here both sides showed equal daring and skill in the fighting, and
our advantage must be ascribed to the energy and success with which
we built and equipped vessels. Originally we had no force at all
on these waters, while several vessels were opposed to us. It is
a matter of wonder that the British and Canadian governments should
have been so supine as to permit their existing force to go badly
armed, and so unenterprising as to build but one additional ship,
when they could easily have preserved their superiority.

It is very difficult to give a full and fair account of the lake
campaigns. The inland navies were created especially for the war,
and, after it were allowed to decay, so that the records of the
tonnage, armament, and crews are hard to get at. Of course, where
everything had to be created, the services could not have the regular
character of those on the ocean. The vessels employed were of widely
different kinds, and this often renders it almost impossible to
correctly estimate the relative force of two opposing squadrons.
While the Americans were building their lake navy, they, as
makeshifts, made use of some ordinary merchant schooners, which
were purchased and fitted up with one or two long, heavy guns each.
These gun-vessels had no quarters, and suffered under all the other
disadvantages which make a merchant vessel inferior to a regularly
constructed man-of-war. The chief trouble was that in a heavy sea
they had a strong tendency to capsize, and were so unsteady that
the guns could not be aimed when any wind was blowing. Now, if a
few of these schooners, mounting long 32's, encountered a couple
of man-of-war brigs, armed with carronades, which side was strongest?
In smooth water the schooners had the advantage, and in rough
weather they were completely at the mercy of the brigs; so that it
would be very hard to get at the true worth of such a contest, as
each side would be tolerably sure to insist that the weather was
such as to give a great advantage to the other. In all the battles
and skirmishes on Champlain. Erie, and Huron, at least there was
no room left for doubt as to who were the victors. But on Lake
Ontario there was never any decisive struggle, and whenever an
encounter occurred, each commodore always claimed that his adversary
had "declined the combat" though "much superior in strength." It
is, of course, almost impossible to rind out which really did decline
the combat, for the official letters flatly contradict each other;
and it is often almost as difficult to discover where the superiority
in force lay, when the fleets differed so widely in character as
was the case in 1813. Then Commodore Chauncy's squadron consisted
largely of schooners; their long, heavy guns made his total foot
up in a very imposing manner, and similar gun-vessels did very
good work on Lake Erie; so Commodore Yeo, and more especially
Commodore Yeo's admirers, exalted these schooners to the skies,
and conveyed the impression that they were most formidable craft,
by means of which Chauncy ought to have won great victories. Yet
when Yeo captured two of them he refused to let them even cruise
with his fleet, and they were sent back to act as coast gun-boats
and transports, which certainly would not have been done had they
been fitted to render any effectual assistance. Again, one night
a squall came on and the two largest schooners went to the bottom,
which did not tend to increase the confidence felt in the others.
So there can be no doubt that in all but very smooth water the
schooners could almost be counted out of the fight. Then the question
arises in any given case, was the water smooth? And the testimony
is as conflicting as ever.

It is not too easy to reconcile the official letters of the commanders,
and it is still harder to get at the truth from either the American
or British histories. Cooper is very inexact, and, moreover, paints
every thing _couleur de rose_, paying no attention to the British
side of the question, and distributing so much praise to everybody
that one is at a loss to know where it really belongs. Still, he
is very useful, for he lived at the time of the events he narrates,
and could get much information about them at first hand, from the
actors themselves. James is almost the only British authority on
the subject; but he is not nearly as reliable as when dealing with
the ocean contests, most of this part of his work being taken up
with a succession of acrid soliloquies on the moral defects of the
American character. The British records for this extraordinary
service on the lakes were not at all carefully kept, and so James
is not hampered by the necessity of adhering more or less closely
to official documents, but lets his imagination run loose. On the
ocean and seaboard his account of the British force can generally
be relied upon; but on the lakes his authority is questionable in
every thing relating either to friends or foes. This is the more
exasperating because it is done wilfully, when, if he had chosen,
he could have written an invaluable history; he must often have
known the truth when, as a matter of preference, he chose either
to suppress or alter it. Thus he ignores all the small "cutting
out" expeditions in which the Americans were successful, and where
one would like to hear the British side. For example, Captain Yeo
captured two schooners, the _Julia_ and _Growler_, but Chauncy
recaptured both. We have the American account of this recapture
in full, but James does not even hint at it, and blandly puts down
both vessels in the total "American loss" at the end of his smaller
work. Worse still, when the _Growler_ again changed hands, he counts
it in again, in the total, as if it were an entirely different boat,
although he invariably rules out of the American list all recaptured
vessels. A more serious perversion of facts are his statements
about comparative tonnage. This was at that time measured arbitrarily,
the depth of hold being estimated at half the breadth of beam; and
the tonnage of our lake vessels was put down exactly as if they
were regular ocean cruisers of the same dimensions in length and
breadth. But on these inland seas the vessels really did not draw
more than half as much water as on the ocean, and the depth would
of course be much less. James, in comparing the tonnage, gives that
of the Americans as if they were regular ocean ships, but in the
case of the British vessels, carefully allows for their shallowness,
although professing to treat the two classes in the same way; and
thus he makes out a most striking and purely imaginary difference.
The best example is furnished by his accounts of the fleets on Lake
Erie. The captured vessels were appraised by two captains and the
ship-builder, Mr. Henry Eckford; their tonnage being computed
precisely as the tonnage of the American vessels. The appraisement
was recorded in the Navy Department, and was first made public by
Cooper, so that it could not have been done for effect. Thus
measured it was found that the tonnage was in round numbers as
follows: _Detroit_, 490 tons; _Queen Charlotte_, 400; _Lady Prevost_,
230; _Hunter_, 180; _Little Belt_, 90; _Chippeway_, 70. James makes
them measure respectively 305, 280, 120, 74, 54, and 32 tons, but
carefully gives the American ships the regular sea tonnage. So
also he habitually deducts about 25 percent, from the real number
of men on board the British ships; as regards Lake Erie he contradicts
himself so much that he does not need to be exposed from outside
sources. But the most glaring and least excusable misstatements
are made as to the battle of Lake Champlain, where he gives the
American as greatly exceeding the British force. He reaches this
conclusion by the most marvellous series of garblings and
misstatements. First, he says that the _Confiance_ and the _Saratoga_
were of nearly equal tonnage. The _Confiance_ being captured was
placed on our naval lists, where for years she ranked as a 36-gun
frigate, while the _Saratoga_ ranked among the 24-gun corvettes;
and by actual measurement the former was half as large again as the
latter. He gives the _Confiance_ but 270 men; one of her officers,
in a letter published in the _London Naval Chronicle_, [Footnote: Vol.
xxxii, p. 272. The letter also says that hardly five of her men
remained unhurt.] gives her over 300; more than that number of dead
and prisoners were taken out of her. He misstates the calibre of
her guns, and counts out two of them because they were used through
the bow-ports; whereas, from the method in which she made her attack,
these would have been peculiarly effective. The guns are given
accurately by Cooper, on the authority of an officer [Footnote:
Lieutenant E. A. F. Lavallette.] who was on board the _Confiance_
within 15 minutes after the _Linnet_ struck, and who was in charge
of her for two months.

Then James states that there were but 10 British gallies, while
Sir George Prevost's official account, as well as all the American
authorities, state the number to be 12. He says that the _Finch_
grounded opposite an American battery before the engagement began,
while in reality it was an hour afterward, and because she had been
disabled by the shot of the American fleet. The gallies were largely
manned by Canadians, and James, anxious to put the blame on these
rather than the British, says that they acted in the most cowardly
way, whereas in reality they caused the Americans more trouble
than Downie's smaller sailing vessels did. His account of the
armament of these vessels differs widely from the official reports.
He gives the _Linnet_ and _Chubb_ a smaller number of men than the
number of prisoners that were actually taken out of them, not
including the dead. Even misstating Downie's force in guns,
underestimating the number of his men, and leaving out two of his
gun-boats, did not content James; and to make the figures show a
proper disproportion, he says (vol. vi, p. 504) that he shall exclude
the _Finch_ from the estimate, because she grounded, and half of
the gun-boats, because he does not think they acted bravely. Even
were these assertions true, it would be quite as logical for an
American writer to put the _Chesapeake's_ crew down as only 200,
and say he should exclude the other men from the estimate because
they flinched; and to exclude all the guns that were disabled by
shot, would be no worse than to exclude the _Finch_. James'
manipulation of the figures is a really curious piece of audacity.
Naturally, subsequent British historians have followed him without
inquiry. James' account of this battle, alone, amply justifies
our rejecting his narrative entirely, as far as affairs on the lakes
go, whenever it conflicts with any other statement, British or
American. Even when it does not conflict, it must be followed with
extreme caution, for whenever he goes into figures the only thing
certain about them is that they are wrong. He gives no details at
all of most of the general actions. Of these, however, we already
possess excellent accounts, the best being those in the "Manual of
Naval Tactics," by Commander J. H. Ward, U. S. N. (1859), and in
Lossing's "Field-Book of the War of 1812," and Cooper's "Naval
History." The chief difficulty occurs in connection with matters
on Lake Ontario, [Footnote: The accounts of the two commanders on
Lake Ontario are as difficult to reconcile as are those of the
contending admirals in the battles which the Dutch waged against
the English and French during the years 1672-1675. In every one of
De Ruyter's last six battles each side regularly claimed the victory,
although there can be but little doubt that on the whole the
strategical, and probably the tactical, advantage remained with
De Ruyter. Every historian ought to feel a sense of the most lively
gratitude toward Nelson; in his various encounters he never left
any possible room for dispute as to which side had come out first
best.] where I have been obliged to have recourse to a perfect
patchwork of authors and even newspapers, for the details, using
_Niles' Register_ and James as mutual correctives. The armaments
and equipments being so irregular I have not, as in other cases,
made any allowance for the short weight of the Americans shot, as
here the British may have suffered under a similar disadvantage;
and it may be as well to keep in mind that on these inland waters
the seamen of the two navies seem to have been as evenly matched
in courage and skill as was possible. They were of exactly the
same stock, with the sole exception that among and under, but
entirely distinct from, the Canadian-English, fought the descendants
of the conquered Canadian-French; and even these had been trained
by Englishmen, were led by English captains, fought on ships built
by English gold, and with English weapons and discipline.

On Lake Ontario.

There being, as already explained, three independent centres of
inland naval operations, the events at each will be considered
separately.

At the opening of the war Lieutenant Woolsey, with the _Oneida_,
was stationed at Sackett's Harbor, which was protected at the
entrance by a small fort with a battery composed of one long 32.
The Canadian squadron of six ships, mounting nearly 80 guns, was
of course too strong to be meddled with. Indeed, had the _Royal
George_, 22, the largest vessel, been commanded by a regular
British sea-officer, she would have been perfectly competent to
take both the _Oneida_ and Sackett's Harbor; but before the
Canadian commodore, Earle, made up his mind to attack, Lieut.
Woolsey had time to make one or two short cruises, doing some
damage among the merchant vessels of the enemy.

On the 19th of July Earle's ships appeared off the Harbor; the
_Oneida_ was such a dull sailor that it was useless for her to try
to escape, so she was hauled up under a bank where she raked the
entrance, and her off guns landed and mounted on the shore, while
Lieut. Woolsey took charge of the "battery," or long 32, in the
fort. The latter was the only gun that was of much use, for after
a desultory cannonade of about an hour, Earle withdrew, having
suffered very little damage, inflicted none at all, and proved
himself and his subordinates to be grossly incompetent.

Acting under orders, Lieut. Woolsey now set about procuring merchant
schooners to be fitted and used as gun-vessels until more regular
cruisers could be built. A captured British schooner was christened
the _Julia_, armed with a long 32 and two 6's, manned with 30 men,
under Lieut. Henry Wells, and sent down to Ogdensburg. "On her way
thither she encountered and actually beat off, without losing a man,
the _Moira_, of 14, and _Gloucester_, of 10 guns." [Footnote: James,
vi, 350.] Five other schooners were also purchased; the _Hamilton_,
of 10 guns, being the largest, while the other four, the _Governor
Tompkins_, _Growler_, _Conquest_, and _Pert_ had but 11 pieces
between them. Nothing is more difficult than to exactly describe
the armaments of the smaller lake vessels. The American schooners
were mere makeshifts, and their guns were frequently changed,
[Footnote: They were always having accidents happen to them that
necessitated some alteration. If a boat was armed with a long 32,
she rolled too much, and they substituted a 24; if she also had an
18-pound carronade, it upset down the hatchway in the middle of a
fight, and made way for a long 12, which burst as soon as it was
used, and was replaced by two medium 6's. So a regular gamut of
changes would be rung.] as soon as they could be dispensed with
they were laid up, or sold, and forgotten.

It was even worse with the British, who manifested the most
indefatigable industry in intermittently changing the armament,
rig, and name of almost every vessel, and, the records being very
loosely kept, it is hard to find what was the force at any one time.
A vessel which in one conflict was armed with long 18's, in the
next would have replaced some of them with 68-pound carronades;
or, beginning life as a ship, she would do most of her work as a
schooner, and be captured as a brig, changing her name even oftener
than any thing else.

On the first of September Commodore Isaac Chauncy was appointed
commander of the forces on the lakes (except of those on Lake
Champlain), and he at once bent his energies to preparing an
effective flotilla. A large party of ship-carpenters were immediately
despatched to the Harbor; and they were soon followed by about a
hundred officers and seamen, with guns, stores, etc. The keel of a
ship to mount 24 32-pound carronades, and to be called the _Madison_,
was laid down, and she was launched on the 26th of November, just
when navigation had closed on account of the ice. Late in the
autumn, four more schooners were purchased, and named the _Ontario_,
_Scourge_, _Fair American_, and _Asp_, but these were hardly used
until the following spring. The cruising force of the Americans
was composed solely of the _Oneida_ and the six schooners first
mentioned. The British squadron was of nearly double this strength,
and had it been officered and trained as it was during the ensuing
summer, the Americans could not have stirred out of port. But as
it was, it merely served as a kind of water militia, the very
sailors, who subsequently did well, being then almost useless, and
unable to oppose their well-disciplined foes, though the latter
were so inferior in number and force. For the reason that it was
thus practically a contest of regulars against militia, I shall not
give numerical comparisons of the skirmishes in the autumn of 1812,
and shall touch on them but slightly. They teach the old lesson
that, whether by sea or land, a small, well-officered, and
well-trained force, can not, except very rarely, be resisted by a
greater number of mere militia; and that in the end it is true
economy to have the regular force prepared beforehand, without
waiting until we have been forced to prepare it by the disasters
happening to the irregulars. The Canadian seamen behaved badly,
but no worse than the American land-forces did at the same time;
later, under regular training, both nations retrieved their reputations.

Commodore Chauncy arrived at Sackett's Harbor in October, and
appeared on the lake on Nov. 8th, in the _Oneida_. Lieutenant
Woolsey, with the six schooners _Conquest_, Lieutenant Elliott;
_Hamilton_, Lieutenant McPherson; _Tompkins_, Lieutenant Brown;
_Pert_, Sailing-master Arundel; _Julia_, Sailing-master Trant;
_Growler_, Sailing-master Mix. The Canadian vessels were engaged
in conveying supplies from the westward. Commodore Chauncy
discovered the _Royal George_ off the False Duck Islands, and
chased her under the batteries of Kingston, on the 9th. Kingston
was too well defended to be taken by such a force as Chauncy's;
but the latter decided to make a reconnaissance, to discover the
enemy's means of defence and see if it was possible to lay the
_Royal George_ aboard. At 3 P.M. the attack was made. The
_Hamilton_ and _Tompkins_ were absent chasing, and did not arrive
until the fighting had begun. The other four gun-boats, _Conquest_,
_Julia_, _Pert_, and _Growler_, led, in the order named, to open
the attack with their heavy guns, and prepare the way for the
_Oneida_, which followed. At the third discharge the _Pert's_ gun
burst, putting her nearly _hors de combat_, badly wounding her
gallant commander, Mr. Arundel (who shortly afterward fell overboard
and was drowned), and slightly wounding four of her crew. The other
gun-boats engaged the five batteries of the enemy, while the _Oneida_
pushed on without firing a shot till at 3.40 she opened on the
_Royal George_, and after 20 minutes' combat actually succeeded in
compelling her opponent, though of double her force, to cut her
cables, run in, and tie herself to a wharf, where some of her
people deserted her; here she was under the protection of a large
body of troops, and the Americans could not board her in face of
the land-forces. It soon began to grow dusk, and Chauncy's squadron
beat out through the channel, against a fresh head-wind. In this
spirited attack the American loss had been confined to half a dozen
men, and had fallen almost exclusively on the _Oneida_. The next
day foul weather came on, and the squadron sailed for Sackett's
Harbor. Some merchant vessels were taken, and the _Simco_, 8, was
chased, but unsuccessfully.

The weather now became cold and tempestuous, but cruising continued
till the middle of November. The Canadian commanders, however,
utterly refused to fight; the _Royal George_ even fleeing from the
_Oneida_, when the latter was entirely alone, and leaving the
American commodore in undisputed command of the lake. Four of the
schooners continued blockading Kingston till the middle of November;
shortly afterward navigation closed. [Footnote: These preliminary
events were not very important, and the historians on both sides
agree almost exactly, so that I have not considered it necessary
to quote authorities.]

Lake Erie.

On Lake Erie there was no American naval force; but the army had
fitted out a small brig, armed with six 6-pounders. This fell into
the hands of the British at the capture of Detroit, and was named
after that city, so that by the time a force of American officers
and seamen arrived at the lake there was not a vessel on it for
them to serve in, while their foes had eight. But we only have to
deal with two of the latter at present. The _Detroit_, still
mounting six 6-pounders, and with a crew of 56 men, under the
command of Lieutenant of Marines Rolette, of the Royal Navy,
assisted by a boatswain and gunner, and containing also 30 American
prisoners, and the _Caledonia_, a small brig mounting two 4-pounders
on pivots, with a crew of 12 men, Canadian-English, under Mr. Irvine,
and having aboard also 10 American prisoners, and a very valuable
cargo of furs worth about 200,000 dollars, moved down the lake,
and on Oct. 7th anchored under Fort Erie. [Footnote: Letter of Captain
Jesse D. Elliott to Secretary of Navy. Black Rock. Oct. 5, 1812.]
Commander Jesse D. Elliott had been sent up to Erie some time before
with instructions from Commodore Chauncy to construct a naval force,
partly by building two brigs of 300 tons each, [Footnote: That is,
of 300 tons actual capacity; measured as if they had been ordinary
sea vessels they each tonned 480. Their opponent, the ship _Detroit_,
similarly tonned 305, actual measurement, or 490, computing it in
the ordinary manner.] and partly by purchasing schooners to act as
gun-boats. No sailors had yet arrived; but on the very day on which
the two brigs moved down and anchored under Fort Erie, Captain
Elliott received news that the first detachment of the promised
seamen, 51 in number, including officers, [Footnote: The number of
men in this expedition is taken from Lossing's "Field-Book of the
War of 1812," by Benson L. Lossing, New York, 1869, p. 385, note,
where a complete list of the names is given.] was but a few miles
distant. He at once sent word to have these men hurried up, but
when they arrived they were found to have no arms, for which
application was made to the military authorities. The latter not
only gave a sufficiency of sabres, pistols, and muskets to the
sailors, but also detailed enough soldiers, under Captain N.
Towson and Lieutenant Isaac Roach, to make the total number of men
that took part in the expedition 124. This force left Black Rock
at one o'clock on the morning of the 8th in two large boats, one
under the command of Commander Elliott, assisted by Lieutenant Roach,
the other under Sailing-master George Watts and Captain Towson.
After two hours' rowing they reached the foe, and the attack was
made at three o'clock. Elliott laid his boat alongside the _Detroit_
before he was discovered, and captured her after a very brief
struggle, in which he lost but one man killed, and Midshipman
J. C. Cummings wounded with a bayonet in the leg. The noise of the
scuffle roused the hardy provincials aboard the _Caledonia_, and
they were thus enabled to make a far more effectual resistance to
Sailing-master Watts than the larger vessel had to Captain Elliott.
As Watts pulled alongside he was greeted with a volley of musketry,
but at once boarded and carried the brig, the twelve Canadians
being cut down or made prisoners; one American was killed and four
badly wounded. The wind was too light and the current too strong
to enable the prizes to beat out and reach the lake, so the cables
were cut and they ran down stream. The _Caledonia_ was safely
beached under the protection of an American battery near Black
Rock. The _Detroit_, however, was obliged to anchor but four hundred
yards from a British battery, which, together with some flying
artillery, opened on her. Getting all his guns on the port side,
Elliott kept up a brisk cannonade till his ammunition gave out,
when he cut his cable and soon grounded on Squaw Island. Here the
_Detroit_ was commanded by the guns of both sides, and which ever
party took possession of her was at once driven out by the other.
The struggle ended in her destruction, most of her guns being
taken over to the American side. This was a very daring and
handsome exploit, reflecting great credit on Commander Elliott,
and giving the Americans, in the _Caledonia_, the nucleus of their
navy on Lake Erie; soon afterward Elliott returned to Lake Ontario,
a new detachment of seamen under Commander S. Angus having arrived.

On the 28th of November, the American general, Smith, despatched
two parties to make an attack on some of the British batteries.
One of these consisted of 10 boats, under the command of Captain
King of the 15th infantry, with 150 soldiers, and with him went
Mr. Angus with 82 sailors, including officers. The expedition left
at one o'clock in the morning, but was discovered and greeted with
a warm fire from a field battery placed in front of some British
barracks known as the Red House. Six of the boats put back; but
the other four, containing about a hundred men, dashed on. While
the soldiers were forming line and firing, the seamen rushed in
with their pikes and axes, drove off the British, capturing their
commander, Lieut. King, of the Royal Army, spiked and threw into
the river the guns, and then took the barracks and burned them,
after a desperate fight. Great confusion now ensued, which ended
in Mr. Angus and some of the seamen going off in the boats. Several
had been killed; eight, among whom were Midshipmen Wragg, Dudley,
and Holdup, all under 20 years old, remained with the troops under
Captain King, and having utterly routed the enemy found themselves
deserted by their friends. After staying on the shore a couple of
hours some of them found two boats and got over; but Captain King
and a few soldiers were taken prisoners. Thirty of the seamen,
including nine of the twelve officers, were killed or wounded--among
the former being Sailing-masters Sisson and Watts, and among the
latter Mr. Angus, Sailing-master Carter, and Midshipmen Wragg,
Holdup, Graham, Brailesford, and Irvine. Some twenty prisoners
were secured and taken over to the American shore; the enemy's
loss was more severe than ours, his resistance being very stubborn,
and a good many cannon were destroyed, but the expedition certainly
ended most disastrously. The accounts of it are hard to reconcile,
but it is difficult to believe that Mr. Angus acted correctly.

Later in the winter Captain Oliver Hazard Perry arrived to take
command of the forces on Lake Erie.



Chapter V


1813

ON THE OCEAN

_Blockade of the American coast--The_ Essex _in the South
Pacific--The_ Hornet _captures the_ Peacock--_American privateers
cut out by British boats--Unsuccessful cruise of Commodore
Rodgers--The_ Chesapeake _is captured by the_ Shannon--_Futile
gun boat actions--Defence of Craney Island--Cutting out
expeditions--The_ Argus _is captured by the_ Pelican--_The_
Enterprise _captures the_ Boxer--_Summary._

By the beginning of the year 1813 the British had been thoroughly
aroused by the American successes, and active measures were at once
taken to counteract them. The force on the American station was
largely increased, and a strict blockade begun, to keep the American
frigates in port. The British frigates now cruised for the most part
in couples, and orders were issued by the Board of Admiralty that
an 18-pounder frigate was not to engage an American 24-pounder.
Exaggerated accounts of the American 44's being circulated, a new
class of spar-deck frigates was constructed to meet them, rating
50 and mounting 60 guns; and some 74's were cut down for the same
purpose. [Footnote: 1. James. vi, p. 206] These new ships were all
much heavier than their intended opponents.

As New England's loyalty to the Union was, not unreasonably, doubted
abroad, her coasts were at first troubled but little. A British
squadron was generally kept cruising off the end of Long Island
Sound, and another off Sandy Hook. Of course America had no means
of raising a blockade, as each squadron contained generally a 74
or a razee, vessels too heavy for any in our navy to cope with.
Frigates and sloops kept skirting the coasts of New Jersey, the
Carolinas, and Georgia. Delaware Bay no longer possessed the
importance it had during the Revolutionary War, and as the only war
vessels in it were some miserable gun-boats, the British generally
kept but a small force on that station. Chesapeake Bay became the
principal scene of their operations; it was there that their main
body collected, and their greatest efforts were made. In it a number
of line-of-battle ships, frigates, sloops, and cutters had been
collected, and early in the season Admiral Sir John Warren and Rear
Admiral Cockburn arrived to take command. The latter made numerous
descents on the coast, and frequently came into contact with the
local militia, who generally fled after a couple of volleys. These
expeditions did not accomplish much, beyond burning the houses and
driving off the live-stock of the farmers along shore, and destroying
a few small towns--one of them, Hampton, being sacked with revolting
brutality. [Footnote: James (vi, 340) says: The conduct of the
British troops on this occasion was "revolting to human nature"
and "disgraceful to the flag."] The government of the United States
was, in fact, supported by the people in its war policy very largely
on account of these excesses, which were much exaggerated by American
writers. It was really a species of civil war, and in such a contest,
at the beginning of this century, it was impossible that some
outrages should not take place.

The American frigate _Constellation_ had by this time got ready for
sea, and, under the command of Captain Stewart, she prepared to put
out early in January. As the number of blockaders rendered a fight
almost certain within a few days of her departure, her crew were
previously brought to the highest state of discipline, the men being
exercised with especial care in handling the great guns and in firing
at a target. [Footnote: Life of Commodore Tatnall, by C. C. Jones
(Savannah, 1878), p. 15.] However, she never got out; for when she
reached Hampton Roads she fell in with a British squadron of
line-of-battle ships and frigates. She kedged up toward Norfolk,
and when the tide rose ran in and anchored between the forts; and
a few days later dropped down to cover the forts which were being
built at Craney Island. Here she was exposed to attacks from the
great British force still lying in Hampton Roads, and, fearing they
would attempt to carry her by surprise, Captain Stewart made every
preparation for defence. She was anchored in the middle of the
narrow channel, flanked by gun-boats, her lower ports closed, not
a rope left hanging over the sides; the boarding nettings, boiled in
half-made pitch till they were as hard as wire, were triced outboard
toward the yard arms, and loaded with kentledge to fall on the
attacking boats when the tricing lines were cut, while the carronades
were loaded to the muzzle with musket balls, and depressed so as
to sweep the water near the ship. [Footnote: For an admirable account
of these preparations, as well as of the subsequent events, see Cooper,
ii, 242.] Twice, a force of British, estimated by their foes to number
2,000 men, started off at night to carry the _Constellation_ by
surprise; but on each occasion they were discovered and closely
watched by her guard-boats, and they never ventured to make the
attack. However, she was unable to get to sea, and remained
blockaded to the close of the war.

At the beginning of the year several frigates and smaller craft were
at sea. The _Chesapeake_, Captain Evans, had sailed from Boston on
Dec. 13, 1812. [Footnote: Statistical "History of the U. S. Navy,"
by Lieutenant G. E. Emmons.] She ran down past Madeira, the Canaries,
and Cape de Verde, crossed the equator, and for six weeks cruised
to the south of the line between longitudes 16° and 25°. Thence she
steered to the west, passing near Surinam, over the same spot on
which the _Hornet_ had sunk the _Peacock_ but a day previous.
Cruising northward through the West Indies, she passed near the
Bermudas, where she was chased by a 74 and a frigate; escaping
from them she got into Boston on April 9th, having captured five
merchantmen, and chased unsuccessfully for two days a brigsloop.
The term of two years for which her crew were enlisted now being up,
they, for the most part, left, in consequence of some trouble about
the prize-money. Captain Evans being in ill health, Captain James
Lawrence was appointed to command her. He reached Boston about the
middle of May [Footnote: He was still on the _Hornet_ at New York
on May 10th, as we know from a letter of Biddle's, written on that
date (in letters of "Masters' Commandant," 1813, No. 58), and so
could hardly have been with the _Chesapeake_ two weeks before he
put out; and had to get his crew together and train them during
that time.] and at once set about enlisting a new crew, and tried,
with but partial success, to arrange matters with the old sailors,
who were now almost in open mutiny.

When the year 1812 had come to an end, the _Essex_, 32, was in the
South Atlantic, and Captain Porter shortly afterward ran into St.
Catherines to water. Being at a loss where to find his consorts,
he now decided to adopt the exceedingly bold measure of doubling
Cape Horn and striking at the British whalers in the Pacific. This
was practically going into the enemy's waters, the Portuguese and
Spanish countries being entirely under the influence of Britain,
while there were no stations where Porter could revictual or repair
in safety. However, the _Essex_ started, doubled the Horn, and on
March 13th anchored in the harbor of Valparaiso. Her adventurous
cruise in the Pacific was the most striking feature of the war; but
as it has been most minutely described by Commodore Porter himself,
by his son, Admiral Porter, by Admiral Farragut, and by Cooper, I
shall barely touch upon it.

On March 20th the _Essex_ captured the Peruvian corsair _Nereyda_,
16, hove her guns and small arms overboard, and sent her into port.
She made the island of San Gallan, looked into Callao, and thence
went to the Gallipagos, getting every thing she wanted from her
prizes. Then she went to Tumbez, and returned to the Gallipagos;
thence to the Marquesas, and finally back to Valparaiso again. By
this year's campaign in the Pacific, Captain Porter had saved all
our ships in those waters, had not cost the government a dollar,
living purely on the enemy, and had taken from him nearly 4,000
tons of shipping and 400 men, completely breaking up his whaling
trade in the South Pacific.

The cruise was something _sui generis_ in modern warfare, recalling
to mind the cruises of the early English and Dutch navigators. An
American ship was at a serious disadvantage in having no harbor of
refuge away from home; while on almost every sea there were British,
French, and Spanish ports into which vessels of those nations could
run for safety. It was an unprecedented thing for a small frigate
to cruise a year and a half in enemy's waters, and to supply herself
during that time, purely from captured vessels, with every
thing--cordage, sails, guns, anchors, provisions, and medicines,
and even money to pay the officers and men! Porter's cruise was the
very model of what such an expedition should be, harassing the enemy
most effectually at no cost whatever. Had the _Essex_ been decently
armed with long guns, instead of carronades, the end might have
been as successful as it was glorious. The whalers were many of them
armed letters-of-marque, and, though of course unable to oppose the
frigate, several times smart skirmishes occurred in attacking them
with boats, or in captured ships; as when Lieutenant Downs and 20
men in the prize _Georgiana_ after a short brush captured the _Hector_,
with 25 men, two of whom were killed and six wounded; and when, under
similar circumstances, the prize _Greenwich_, of 25 men, captured
the _Seringapatam_ of 40. The cruise of the _Essex_, the first
American man-of-war ever in the Pacific, a year and a half out and
many thousand miles away from home, was a good proof of Porter's
audacity in planning the trip and his skill and resource in
carrying it out.

[Illustration: Captain James Lawrence: a portrait by Gilbert Stuart
painted in Boston in 1812, shortly before Lawrence's promotion to
captain, showing him wearing the single epaulet of a master
commandant. (Courtesy U.S. Naval Academy Museum) ]

To return now to the _Hornet_. This vessel had continued blockading
the _Bonne Citoyenne_ until January 24th, when the _Montagu_, 74,
arrived toward evening and chased her into port. As the darkness
came on the _Hornet_ wore, stood out to sea, passing into the open
without molestation from the 74, and then steered toward the
northeast, cruising near the coast, and making a few prizes, among
which was a brig, the _Resolution_, with $23,000 in specie aboard,
captured on February 14th. On the 24th of February, while nearing
the mouth of the Demerara River, Captain Lawrence discovered a
brig to leeward, and chased her till he ran into quarter less five,
when, having no pilot, he hauled off-shore. Just within the bar a
man-of-war brig was lying at anchor; and while beating round Caroband
Bank, in order to get at her, Captain Lawrence discovered another
sail edging down on his weather-quarter. [Footnote: Letter of
Captain Lawrence, March 29, 1813.] The brig at anchor was the
_Espiègle_, of 18 guns, 32-pound carronades, Captain John Taylor
[Footnote: James, vi, 278.]; and the second brig seen was the _Peacock_,
Captain William Peake, [Footnote: _Do_.] which, for some unknown
reason, had exchanged her 32-pound carronades for 24's. She had
sailed from the _Espiègle's_ anchorage the same morning at 10 o'clock.
At 4.20 P.M. the _Peacock_ hoisted her colors; then the _Hornet_
beat to quarters and cleared for action. Captain Lawrence kept close
by the wind, in order to get the weather-gage; when he was certain
he could weather the enemy, he tacked, at 5.10, and the _Hornet_
hoisted her colors. The ship and the brig now stood for each other,
both on the wind, the _Hornet_ being on the starboard and the
_Peacock_ on the port tack, and at 5.25 they exchanged broadsides,
at half pistol-shot distance, while going in opposite directions,
the Americans using their lee and the British their weather battery.
The guns were fired as they bore, and the _Peacock_ suffered severely,
while her antagonist's hull was uninjured, though she suffered
slightly aloft and had her pennant cut off by the first shot fired.
[Footnote: Cooper, p. 200.] One of the men in the mizzen-top was
killed by a round shot, and two more were wounded in the main-top.
[Footnote: See entry in her log for this day (In "Log-Book of _Hornet_,
_Wasp_, and _Argus_, from July 20, 1809, to October 6, 1813,") in
the Bureau of Navigation, at Washington.] As soon as they were clear,
Captain Peake put his helm hard up and wore, firing his starboard
guns; but the _Hornet_ had watched him closely, bore up as quickly,
and coming down at 5.35, ran him close aboard on the starboard quarter.
Captain Peake fell at this moment, together with many of his crew,
and, unable to withstand the _Hornet's_ heavy fire, the _Peacock_
surrendered at 5.39, just 14 minutes after the first shot; and
directly afterward hoisted her ensign union down in the forerigging
as a signal of distress. Almost immediately her main-mast went by
the board. Both vessels then anchored, and Lieutenant J. T Shubrick,
being sent on board the prize, reported her sinking. Lieutenant D.
Connor was then sent in another boat to try to save the vessel; but
though they threw the guns overboard, plugged the shot holes, tried
the pumps, and even attempted bailing, the water gained so rapidly
that the _Hornet's_ officers devoted themselves to removing the
wounded and other prisoners; and while thus occupied the short
tropical twilight left them. Immediately afterward the prize settled,
suddenly and easily, in 51/2 fathoms water, carrying with her three
of the _Hornet's_ people and nine of her own, who were rummaging
below; meanwhile four others of her crew had lowered her damaged
stern boat, and in the confusion got off unobserved and made their
way to the land. The foretop still remained above water, and four
of the prisoners saved themselves by running up the rigging into it.
Lieutenant Connor and Midshipman Cooper (who had also come on board)
saved themselves, together with most of their people and the
remainder of the _Peacock's_ crew, by jumping into the launch, which
was lying on the booms, and paddling her toward the ship with pieces
of boards in default of oars.

The _Hornet's_ complement at this time was 150, of whom she had 8
men absent in a prize and 7 on the sick list, [Footnote: Letter of
Captain Lawrence.] leaving 135 fit for duty in the action; [Footnote:
Letter of Lieutenant D. Connor, April 26, 1813] of these one man
was killed, and two wounded, all aloft. Her rigging and sails were
a good deal cut, a shot had gone through the foremast, and the
bowsprit was slightly damaged; the only shot that touched her hull
merely glanced athwart her bows, indenting a plank beneath the
cat-head. The _Peacock's_ crew had amounted to 134, but 4 were absent
in a prize, and but 122 [Footnote: Letter of Lieutenant F. W. Wright
(of the _Peacock_), April 17, 1813.] fit for action; of these she
lost her captain, and seven men killed and mortally wounded, and
her master, one midshipman, and 28 men severely and slightly
wounded,--in all 8 killed and 30 wounded, or about 13 times her
antagonist's loss. She suffered under the disadvantage of light
metal, having 24's opposed to 32's; but judging from her gunnery
this was not much of a loss, as 6-pounders would have inflicted
nearly as great damage. She was well handled and bravely fought;
but her men showed a marvellous ignorance of gunnery. It appears
that she had long been known as "the yacht," on account of the
tasteful arrangement of her deck; the breechings of the carronades
were lined with white canvas, and nothing could exceed in brilliancy
the polish upon the traversing bars and elevating screws. [Footnote:
James, vi, 280.] In other words, Captain Peake had confounded the
mere _incidents_ of good discipline with the essentials. [Footnote:
Codrington ("Memoirs," i. 310) comments very forcibly on the
uselessness of a mere martinet.]

The _Hornet's_ victory cannot be regarded in any other light than
as due, _not_ to the heavier metal, but to the far more accurate
firing of the Americans; "had the guns of the _Peacock_ been of the
largest size they could not have changed the result, as the weight
of shot that do not hit is of no great moment." Any merchant-ship
might have been as well handled and bravely defended as she was; and
an ordinary letter-of-marque would have made as creditable a defence.

During the entire combat the _Espiégle_ was not more than 4 miles
distant and was plainly visible from the _Hornet_; but for some
reason she did not come out, and her commander reported that he knew
nothing of the action till the next day. Captain Lawrence of course
was not aware of this, and made such exertions to bend on new sails,
stow his boats, and clear his decks that by nine o'clock he was again
prepared for action, [Footnote: Letter of Captain Lawrence.] and at
2 P.M. got underway for the N.W. Being now overcrowded with people
and short of water he stood for home, anchoring at Holmes' Hole in
Martha's Vineyard on the 19th of March.

On their arrival at New York the officers of the _Peacock_ published
a card expressing in the warmest terms their appreciation of the way
they and their men had been treated. Say they: "We ceased to consider
ourselves prisoners; and every thing that friendship could dictate
was adopted by you and the officers of the _Hornet_ to remedy the
inconvenience we would otherwise have experienced from the unavoidable
loss of the whole of our property and clothes owing to the sudden
sinking of the _Peacock_." [Footnote: Quoted in full in "Niles'
Register" and Lossing's "Field Book."] This was signed by the first
and second lieutenants, the master, surgeon and purser.

[Illustration of _Peacock_ and _Hornet_ action from 5.10 to 5.35.]

                                Weight
             Tonnage.   Guns.   Metal.    Men.   Loss.
_Hornet_      480        10      279      135     3
_Peacock_     477        10      210      122    38

                       Relative              Relative Loss
                        Force.                Inflicted.
_Hornet_                 1.00                   1.00
_Peacock_                 .83                    .08

That is, the forces standing nearly as 13 is to 11, the relative
execution was about as 13 is to 1.

The day after the capture Captain Lawrence reported 277 souls aboard,
including the crew of the English brig _Resolution_ which he had
taken, and of the American brig _Hunter_, prize to the _Peacock_.
As James, very ingeniously, tortures these figures into meaning what
they did not, it may be well to show exactly what the 277 included.
Of the _Hornet's_ original crew of 150, 8 were absent in a prize, 1
killed, and 3 drowned, leaving (including 7 sick) 138; of the _Peacock's_
original 134, 4 were absent in a prize, 5 killed, 9 drowned, and 4
escaped, leaving (including 8 sick and 3 mortally wounded) 112; there
were also aboard 16 other British prisoners, and the _Hunter's_ crew
of 11 men--making just 277. [Footnote: The 277 men were thus divided
into: _Hornet's_ crew, 138; _Peacock's_ crew, 112; _Resolution's_
crew, 16; _Hunter's_ crew, 11. James quotes "270" men, which he divides
as follows: _Hornet_ 160, _Peacock_ 101, _Hunter_ 9,--leaving out
the _Resolution's_ crew, 11 of the _Peacock's_, and 2 of the _Hunter's_.]
According to Lieutenant Connor's letter, written in response to one
from Lieutenant Wright, there were in reality 139 in the _Peacock's_
crew when she began action; but it is, of course, best to take each
commander's account of the number of men on board his ship that were
fit for duty.

On Jan. 17th the _Viper_, 12, Lieutenant J. D. Henly was captured
by the British frigate _Narcissus_, 32, Captain Lumly.

On Feb. 8th, while a British squadron, consisting of the four frigates
_Belvidera_ (Captain Richard Byron), _Maidstone_, _Junon_, and
_Statira_, were at anchor in Lynhaven Bay, a schooner was observed
in the northeast standing down Chesapeake Bay. [Footnote: James,
vi, 325.] This was the _Lottery_, letter-of-marque, of six 12-pounder
carronades and 25 men, Captain John Southcomb, bound from Baltimore
to Bombay. Nine boats, with 200 men, under the command of Lieutenant
Kelly Nazer were sent against her, and, a calm coming on, overtook
her. The schooner opened a well-directed fire of round and grape,
but the boats rushed forward and boarded her, not carrying her till
after a most obstinate struggle, in which Captain Southcomb and 19
of his men, together with 13 of the assailants, were killed or wounded.
The best war ship of a regular navy might be proud of the discipline
and courage displayed by the captain and crew of the little _Lottery_.
Captain Byron on this, as well as on many another occasion, showed
himself to be as humane as he was brave and skilful. Captain Southcomb,
mortally wounded, was taken on board Byron's frigate, where he was
treated with the greatest attention and most delicate courtesy, and
when he died his body was sent ashore with every mark of the respect
due to so brave an officer. Captain Stewart (of the _Constellation_)
wrote Captain Byron a letter of acknowledgment for his great courtesy
and kindness. [Footnote: The correspondence between the two captains
is given in full in "Niles' Register," which also contains fragmentary
notes on the action, principally as to the loss incurred.]

On March 16th a British division of five boats and 105 men, commanded
by Lieutenant James Polkinghorne, set out to attack the privateer
schooner _Dolphin_ of 12 guns and 70 men, and the letters-of-marque,
_Racer_, _Arab_, and _Lynx_, each of six guns and 30 men. Lieutenant
Polkinghorne, after pulling 15 miles, found the four schooners all
prepared to receive him, but in spite of his great inferiority in
force he dashed gallantly at them. The _Arab_ and _Lynx_ surrendered
at once; the _Racer_ was carried after a sharp struggle in which
Lieutenant Polkinghorne was wounded, and her guns turned on the
_Dolphin_. Most of the latter's crew jumped overboard; a few rallied
round their captain, but they were at once scattered as the British
seamen came aboard. The assailants had 13, and the privateersmen 16
men killed and wounded in the fight. It was certainly one of the most
brilliant and daring cutting-out expeditions that took place during
the war, and the victors well deserved their success. The privateersmen
(according to the statement of the _Dolphin's_ master, in "Niles'
Register") were panic-struck, and acted in any thing but a brave
manner. All irregular fighting-men do their work by fits and starts.
No regular cruisers could behave better than did the privateers
_Lottery_, _Chasseur_, and _General Armstrong_; none would behave
as badly as the _Dolphin_, _Lynx_, and _Arab_. The same thing appears
on shore. Jackson's irregulars at New Orleans did as well, or almost
as well, as Scott's troops at Lundy's Lane; but Scott's troops would
never have suffered from such a panic as overcame the militia at
Bladensburg.

On April 9th the schooner _Norwich_, of 14 guns and 61 men,
Sailing-master James Monk, captured the British privateer _Caledonia_,
of 10 guns and 41 men, after a short action in which the privateer
lost 7 men.

On April 30th Commodore Rodgers, in the _President_. 44, accompanied
by Captain Smith in the Congress, 38, sailed on his third cruise.
[Footnote: Letter of Commodore Rodgers, Sept. 30, 1813.] On May 2d
he fell in with and chased the British sloop _Curlew_, 18, Captain
Michael Head, but the latter escaped by knocking away the wedges of
her masts and using other means to increase her rate of sailing. On
the 8th, in latitude 39° 30' N., long. 60° W., the _Congress_ parted
company, and sailed off toward the southeast, making four prizes,
of no great value, in the North Atlantic; [Footnote: Letter of Captain
Smith, Dec. 15, 1813.] when about in long. 35 ° W. she steered south,
passing to the south of the line. But she never saw a man-of-war,
and during the latter part of her cruise not a sail of any kind;
and after cruising nearly eight months returned to Portsmouth Harbor
on Dec. 14th, having captured but four merchant-men. Being unfit to
cruise longer, owing to her decayed condition, she was disarmed and
laid up; nor was she sent to sea again during the war. [Footnote:
James states that she was "blockaded" in port by the _Tenedos_,
during part of 1814; but was too much awed by the fate of the
_Chesapeake_ to come out during the "long blockade" of Captain
Parker. Considering the fact that she was too decayed to put to sea,
had no guns aboard, no crew, and was, in fact, laid up, the feat of
the _Tenedos_ was not very wonderful; a row-boat could have "blockaded"
her quite as well. It is worth noticing, as an instance of the way
James alters a fact by suppressing half of it.]

Meanwhile Rodgers cruised along the eastern edge of the Grand Bank
until he reached latitude 48°, without meeting any thing, then stood
to the southeast, and cruised off the Azores till June 6th. Then
he crowded sail to the northeast after a Jamaica fleet of which he
had received news, but which he failed to overtake, and on June 13th,
in lat. 46°, long. 28°, he gave up the chase and shaped his course
toward the North Sea, still without any good luck befalling him.
On June 27th he put into North Bergen in the Shetlands for water,
and thence passed the Orkneys and stretched toward the North Cape,
hoping to intercept the Archangel fleet. On July 19th, when off the
North Cape, in lat. 71° 52' N., long. 20° 18' E., he fell in with
two sail of the enemy, who made chase; after four days' pursuit the
commodore ran his opponents out of sight. According to his letter
the two sail were a line-of-battle ship and a frigate; according
to James they were the 12-pounder frigate _Alexandria_, Captain
Cathcart, and _Spitfire_, 16, Captain Ellis. James quotes from the
logs of the two British ships, and it would seem that he is correct,
as it would not be possible for him to falsify the logs so utterly.
In case he is true, it was certainly carrying caution to an excessive
degree for the commodore to retreat before getting some idea of what
his antagonists really were. His mistaking them for so much heavier
ships was a precisely similar error to that made by Sir George Collier
and Lord Stuart at a later date about the _Cyane_ and _Levant_. James
wishes to prove that each party perceived the force of the other,
and draws a contrast (p. 312) between the "gallantry of one party
and pusillanimity of the other." This is nonsense, and, as in similar
cases, James overreaches himself by proving too much. If he had made
an 18-pounder frigate like the _Congress_ flee from another 18-pounder,
his narrative would be within the bounds of possibility and would
need serious examination. But the little 12-pounder _Alexandria_,
and the ship-sloop with her 18-pound carronades, would not have stood
the ghost of a chance in the contest. Any man who would have been
afraid of them would also have been afraid of the _Little Belt_, the
sloop Rodgers captured before the war. As for Captains Cathcart and
Ellis, had they known the force of the _President_, and chased her
with a view of attacking her, their conduct would have only been
explicable on the ground that they were afflicted with emotional
insanity.

The _President_ now steered southward and got into the mouth of the
Irish Channel; on August 2d she shifted her berth and almost circled
Ireland; then steered across to Newfoundland, and worked south along
the coast. On Sept. 23d, a little south of Nantucket, she decoyed
under her guns and captured the British schooner _Highflyer_, 6,
Lieut. William Hutchinson, and 45 men; and went into Newport on the
27th of the same month, having made some 12 prizes.

On May 24th Commodore Decatur in the _United States_, which had sent
ashore six carronades, and now mounted but 48 guns, accompanied by
Captain Jones in the _Macedonian_, 38, and Captain Biddle in the
_Wasp_, 20, left New York, passing through Hell Gate, as there was
a large blockading force off the Hook. Opposite Hunter's Point the
main-mast of the _States_ was struck by lightning, which cut off
the broad pendant, shot down the hatchway into the doctor's cabin,
put out his candle, ripped up the bed, and entering between the skin
and ceiling of the ship tore off two or three sheets of copper near
the waterline, and disappeared without leaving a trace! The
_Macedonian_, which was close behind, hove all aback, in expectation
of seeing the _States_ blown up.

At the end of the sound Commodore Decatur anchored to watch for a
chance of getting out. Early on June 1st he started; but in a couple
of hours met the British Captain R. D. Oliver's squadron, consisting
of a 74, a razee, and a frigate. These chased him back, and all his
three ships ran into New London. Here, in the mud of the Thames river,
the two frigates remained blockaded till the close of the war; but
the little sloop slipped out later, to the enemy's cost.

We left the _Chesapeake_, 38, being fitted out at Boston by Captain
James Lawrence, late of the _Hornet_. Most of her crew, as already
stated, their time being up, left, dissatisfied with the ship's ill
luck, and angry at not having received their due share of prize-money.
It was very hard to get sailors, most of the men preferring to ship
in some of the numerous privateers where the discipline was less
strict and the chance of prize-money much greater. In consequence
of this an unusually large number of foreigners had to be taken,
including about forty British and a number of Portuguese. The latter
were peculiarly troublesome; one of their number, a boatswain's mate,
finally almost brought about a mutiny among the crew which was only
pacified by giving the men prize-checks. A few of the _Constitution's_
old crew came aboard, and these, together with some of the men who
had been on the _Chesapeake_ during her former voyage, made an excellent
nucleus. Such men needed very little training at either guns or sails;
but the new hands were unpractised, and came on board so late that
the last draft that arrived still had their hammocks and bags lying
in the boats stowed over the booms when the ship was captured. The
officers were largely new to the ship, though the first lieutenant,
Mr. A. Ludlow, had been the third in her former cruise; the third
and fourth lieutenants were not regularly commissioned as such, but
were only midshipmen acting for the first time in higher positions.
Captain Lawrence himself was of course new to all, both officers and
crew. [Footnote: On the day on which he sailed to attack the _Shannon_,
Lawrence writes to the Secretary of the Navy as follows: "Lieutenant
Paige is so ill as to be unable to go to sea with the ship. At the
urgent request of Acting-Lieutenant Pierce I have granted him, also,
permission to go on shore; one inducement for my granting his request
was his being at variance with every officer in his mess." "Captains'
Letters," vol. 29, No. 1, in the Naval Archives at Washington. Neither
officers nor men had shaken together.] In other words, the _Chesapeake_
possessed good material, but in an exceedingly unseasoned state.

Meanwhile the British frigate _Shannon_, 38, Captain Philip Bowes
Vere Broke, was cruising off the mouth of the harbor. To give some
idea of the reason why she proved herself so much more formidable
than her British sister frigates it may be well to quote, slightly
condensing, from James:

"There was another point in which the generality of British crews,
as compared with any one American crew, were miserably deficient;
that is, skill in the art of gunnery. While the American seamen
were constantly firing at marks, the British seamen, except in
particular cases, scarcely did so once in a year; and some ships
could be named on board which not a shot had been fired in this way
for upward of three years. Nor was the fault wholly the captain's.
The instructions under which he was bound to act forbade him to use,
during the first six months after the ship had received her armament,
more shots per month than amounted to a third in number of the
upper-deck guns; and, after these six months, only half the quantity.
Many captains never put a shot in the guns till an enemy appeared;
they employed the leisure time of the men in handling the sails and
in decorating the ship. Captain Broke was not one of this kind.
From the day on which he had joined her, the 14th of September, 1806,
the _Shannon_ began to feel the effect of her captain's proficiency
as a gunner and zeal for the service. The laying of the ship's
ordnance so that it may be correctly fired in a horizontal direction
is justly deemed a most important operation, as upon it depends in
a great measure the true aim and destructive effect of the shot;
this was attended to by Captain Broke in person. By draughts from
other ships, and the usual means to which a British man-of-war is
obliged to resort, the _Shannon_ got together a crew; and in the
course of a year or two, by the paternal care and excellent regulations
of Captain Broke, the ship's company became as pleasant to command
as it was dangerous to meet." The _Shannon's_ guns were all carefully
sighted, and, moreover, "every day, for about an hour and a half
in the forenoon, when not prevented by chase or the state of the
weather, the men were exercised at training the guns, and for the
same time in the afternoon in the use of the broadsword, pike, musket,
etc. Twice a week the crew fired at targets, both with great guns
and musketry; and Captain Broke, as an additional stimulus beyond
the emulation excited, gave a pound of tobacco to every man that
put a shot through the bull's eye." He would frequently have a cask
thrown overboard and suddenly order some one gun to be manned to sink
the cask. In short, the _Shannon_ was very greatly superior, thanks
to her careful training, to the average British frigate of her rate,
while the _Chesapeake_, owing to her having a raw and inexperienced
crew, was decidedly inferior to the average American frigate of the
same strength.

In force the two frigates compared pretty equally, [Footnote: Taking
each commander's account for his own force.] the American being the
superior in just about the same proportion that the _Wasp_ was to
the _Frolic_, or, at a later date, the _Hornet_ to the _Penguin_.
The _Chesapeake_ carried 50 guns (26 in broadside), 28 long 18's
on the gun-deck, and on the spar-deck two long 12's, one long 18,
eighteen 32-pound carronades, and one 12-pound carronade (which was
not used in the fight however). Her broadside, allowing for the short
weight of metal was 542 lbs.; her complement, 379 men. The _Shannon_
earned 52 guns (26 in broadside), 28 long 18's on the gun-deck, and
on the spar-deck four long 9's, one long 6, 16 32-pound carronades,
and three 12-pound carronades (two of which were not used in the
fight). Her broadside was 550 lbs.; her crew consisted of 330 men,
30 of whom were raw hands. Early on the morning of June 1st, Captain
Broke sent in to Captain Lawrence, by an American prisoner, a letter
of challenge, which for courteousness, manliness, and candor is the
very model of what such an epistle should be. Before it reached Boston,
however, Captain Lawrence had weighed anchor, to attack the _Shannon_,
which frigate was in full sight in the offing. It has been often said
that he engaged against his judgment, but this may be doubted. His
experience with the _Bonne Citoyenne_, _Espiègle_, and _Peacock_
had not tended to give him a very high idea of the navy to which he
was opposed, and there is no doubt that he was confident of capturing
the _Shannon_. [Footnote: In his letter written just before sailing
(already quoted on p. 177) he says: An English frigate is now in
sight from our deck. * * * I am in hopes to give a good account of
her before night. My account of the action is mainly taken from
James' "Naval History" and Brighton's "Memoir of Admiral Broke"
(according to which the official letter of Captain Broke was tampered
with); see also the letter of Lieut. George Budd, June 15, 1813;
the report of the Court of Inquiry. Commodore Bainbridge presiding,
and the Court-martial held on board frigate _United States_, April 15,
1814, Commodore Decatur presiding.] It was most unfortunate that he
did not receive Broke's letter, as the latter in it expressed himself
willing to meet Lawrence in any latitude and longitude he might
appoint; and there would thus have been some chance of the American
crew having time enough to get into shape.

At midday of June 1, 1813, the _Chesapeake_ weighed anchor, stood
out of Boston Harbor, and at 1 P.M. rounded the Light-house. The
_Shannon_ stood off under easy sail, and at 3.40 _Shannon_ up and
reefed top-sails. At 4 P.M. she again bore away with her foresail
brailed up, and her main top-sail braced flat and shivering, that
the _Chesapeake_ might overtake her. An hour later, Boston Light-house
bearing west distant about six leagues, she again hauled up, with
her head to the southeast and lay to under top-sails, top-gallant
sails, jib, and spanker. Meanwhile, as the breeze freshened the
_Chesapeake_ took in her studding-sails, top-gallant sails, and
royals, got her royal yards on deck, and came down very fast under
top-sails and jib. At 5.30, to keep under command and be able to
wear if necessary, the _Shannon_ filled her main top-sail and kept
a close luff, and then again let the sail shiver. At 5.25 the
_Chesapeake_ hauled up her foresail, and, with three ensigns flying,
steered straight for the _Shannon's_ starboard quarter. Broke was
afraid that Lawrence would pass under the _Shannon's_ stern, rake
her, and engage her on the quarter; but either overlooking or waiving
this advantage, the American captain luffed up within 50 yards upon
the _Shannon's_ starboard quarter, and squared his main-yard. On
board the _Shannon_ the captain of the 14th gun, William Mindham,
had been ordered not to fire till it bore into the second main-deck
port forward; at 5.50 it was fired, and then the other guns in quick
succession from aft forward, the _Chesapeake_ replying with her
whole broadside. At 5.53 Lawrence, finding he was forging ahead,
hauled up a little. The _Chesapeake's_ broadsides were doing great
damage, but she herself was suffering even more than her foe; the
men in the _Shannon's_ tops could hardly see the deck of the
American frigate through the cloud of splinters, hammocks, and other
wreck that was flying across it. Man after man was killed at the
wheel; the fourth lieutenant, the master, and the boatswain were
slain; and at 5.56, having had her jib sheet and foretop-sail tie
shot away, and her spanker brails loosened so that the sail blew
out, the _Chesapeake_ came up into the wind somewhat, so as to expose
her quarter to her antagonist's broadside, which beat in her
stern-ports and swept the men from the after guns. One of the arm
chests on the quarter-deck was blown up by a hand-grenade thrown
from the _Shannon_. [Footnote: This explosion may have had more effect
than is commonly supposed in the capture of the _Chesapeake_.
Commodore Bainbridge, writing from Charleston, Mass., on June 2,
1813 (see "Captains' Letters," vol. xxix. No. 10), says: "Mr. Knox,
the pilot on board, left the _Chesapeake_ at 5 P.M. * * * At 6 P.M.,
Mr. Knox informs me, the fire opened, and at 12 minutes past six
both ships were laying alongside one another as if in the act of
boarding; at that moment an explosion took place on board the
_Chesapeake_, which spread a fire on her upper deck from the foremast
to the mizzen-mast, as high as her tops, and enveloped both ships
in smoke for several minutes. After it cleared away they were seen
separate, with the British flag hoisted on board the _Chesapeake_
over the American." James denies that the explosion was caused by
a hand-grenade, though he says there were some of these aboard the
_Shannon_. It is a point of no interest.] The _Chesapeake_ was now
seen to have stern-way on and to be paying slowly off; so the
_Shannon_ put her helm a-starboard and shivered her mizzen top-sail,
so as to keep off the wind and delay the boarding. But at that moment
her jib stay was shot away, and her head-sails becoming becalmed, she
went off very slowly. In consequence, at 6 P.M. the two frigates fell
aboard, the _Chesapeake's_ quarter pressing upon the _Shannon's_ side
just forward the starboard main-chains, and the frigates were kept
in this position by the fluke of the _Shannon's_ anchor catching
in the _Chesapeake's_ quarter port.

The _Shannon's_ crew had suffered severely, but not the least panic
or disorder existed among them. Broke ran forward, and seeing his
foes flinching from the quarter-deck guns, he ordered the ships to
be lashed together, the great guns to cease firing, and the boarders
to be called. The boatswain, who had fought in Rodney's action, set
about fastening the vessels together, which the grim veteran succeeded
in doing, though his right arm was literally hacked off by a blow
from a cutlass. All was confusion and dismay on board the _Chesapeake_.
Lieutenant Ludlow had been mortally wounded and carried below;
Lawrence himself, while standing on the quarterdeck, fatally conspicuous
by his full-dress uniform and commanding stature, was shot down, as
the vessels closed, by Lieutenant Law of the British marines. He fell
dying, and was carried below, exclaiming: "Don't give up the ship"--a
phrase that has since become proverbial among his countrymen. The
third lieutenant, Mr. W. S. Cox, came on deck, but, utterly demoralized
by the aspect of affairs, he basely ran below without staying to
rally the men, and was court-martialled afterward for so doing. At
6.02 Captain Broke stepped from the _Shannon's_ gangway rail on to
the muzzle of the _Chesapeake's_ aftermost carronade, and thence over
the bulwark on to her quarter-deck, followed by about 20 men. As they
came aboard, the _Chesapeake's_ foreign mercenaries and the raw natives
of the crew deserted their quarters; the Portuguese boatswain's mate
removed the gratings of the berth-deck, and he ran below, followed
by many of the crew, among them one of the midshipmen named Deforest.
On the quarter-deck almost the only man that made any resistance was
the chaplain, Mr. Livermore, who advanced, firing his pistol at Broke,
and in return nearly had his arm hewed off by a stroke from the latter's
broad Toledo blade. On the upper deck the only men who behaved well
were the marines, but of their original number of 44 men, 14, including
Lieutenant James Broom and Corporal Dixon, were dead, and 20, including
Sergeants Twin and Harris, wounded, so that there were left but one
corporal and nine men, several of whom had been knocked down and
bruised, though reported unwounded. There was thus hardly any resistance,
Captain Broke stopping his men for a moment till they were joined by
the rest of the boarders under Lieutenants Watt and Falkiner. The
_Chesapeake's_ mizzen-topmen began firing at the boarders, mortally
wounding a midshipman, Mr. Samwell, and killing Lieutenant Watt; but
one of the _Shannon's_ long nines was pointed at the top and cleared
it out, being assisted by the English main-topmen, under Midshipman
Coshnahan. At the same time the men in the _Chesapeake's_ main-top
were driven out of it by the fire of the _Shannon's_ foretopmen,
under Midshipman Smith. Lieutenant George Budd, who was on the
main-deck, now for the first time learned that the English had boarded,
as the upper-deck men came crowding down, and at once called on his
people to follow him; but the foreigners and novices held back, and
only a few of the veterans followed him up. As soon as he reached
the spar-deck, Budd, followed by only a dozen men, attacked the
British as they came along the gangways, repulsing them for a moment,
and killing the British purser, Aldham, and captain's clerk, Dunn;
but the handful of Americans were at once cut down or dispersed,
Lieutenant Budd being wounded and knocked down the main hatchway.
"The enemy," writes Captain Broke, "fought desperately, but in
disorder." Lieutenant Ludlow, already mortally wounded, struggled
up on deck followed by two or three men, but was at once disabled
by a sabre cut. On the forecastle a few seamen and marines turned
to bay. Captain Broke was still leading his men with the same
brilliant personal courage he had all along shown. Attacking the
first American, who was armed with a pike, he parried a blow from
it, and cut down the man; attacking another he was himself cut down,
and only saved by the seaman Mindham, already mentioned, who slew
his assailant. One of the American marines, using his clubbed musket,
killed an Englishman, and so stubborn was the resistance of the little
group that for a moment the assailants gave back, having lost several
killed and wounded; but immediately afterward they closed in and slew
their foes to the last man. The British fired a volley or two down
the hatchway, in response to a couple of shots fired up; all resistance
was at an end, and at 6.05, just fifteen minutes after the first gun
had been fired, and not five after Captain Broke had come aboard, the
colors of the _Chesapeake_ were struck. Of her crew of 379 men, 61
were killed or mortally wounded, including her captain, her first
and fourth lieutenants, the lieutenant of marines, the master (White),
boatswain (Adams), and three midshipmen, and 85 severely and slightly
wounded, including both her other lieutenants, five midshipmen, and
the chaplain; total, 148; the loss falling almost entirely upon the
American portion of the crew.

[Illustration: Chesapeake vs. _Shannon_: an engraving published in
London in or before 1815 from a painting done under the supervision
of the _Shannon's_ first lieutenant. (Courtesy Beverly R. Robinson
Collection, U.S. Naval Academy Museum)]

Of the _Shannon's_ men, 33 were killed outright or died of their
wounds, including her first lieutenant, purser, captain's clerk,
and one midshipman, and 50 wounded, including the captain himself
and the boatswain; total, 83.

The _Chesapeake_ was taken into Halifax, where Captain Lawrence and
Lieutenant Ludlow were both buried with military honors. Captain
Broke was made a baronet, very deservedly, and Lieutenants Wallis
and Falkiner were both made commanders.

The British writers accuse some of the American crew of treachery;
the Americans, in turn, accuse the British of revolting brutality.
Of course in such a fight things are not managed with urbane courtesy,
and, moreover, writers are prejudiced. Those who would like to hear
one side are referred to James; if they wish to hear the other, to
the various letters from officers published in "Niles' Register,"
especially vol. v, p. 142.

[Illustration of _Chesapeake_ and _Shannon_ action from 5.50 to 6.04.]

 "CHESAPEAKE" STRUCK BY            "SHANNON" STRUCK BY
  29 eighteen-pound shot,           12 eighteen-pound shot,
  25 thirty-two-pound shot,         13 thirty-two pound shot,
   2 nine-pound shot,               14 bar shot,
 306 grape,                        119 grape,
 ----------                        ----------
 362-shot.                         158 shot.

Neither ship had lost a spar, but all the lower masts, especially
the two mizzen-masts, were badly wounded. The Americans at that
period were fond of using bar shot, which were of very questionable
benefit, being useless against a ship's hull, though said to be
sometimes of great help in unrigging an antagonist from whom one
was desirous of escaping, as in the case of the _President_ and
_Endymion_.

It is thus seen that the _Shannon_ received from shot alone only
about half the damage the _Chesapeake_ did; the latter was thoroughly
beaten at the guns, in spite of what some American authors say to
the contrary. And her victory was not in the slightest degree to be
attributed to, though it may have been slightly hastened by, accident.
Training and discipline won the victory, as often before; only in
this instance the training and discipline were against us.

It is interesting to notice that the _Chesapeake_ battered the
_Shannon's_ hull far more than either the _Java_, _Guerrière_, or
_Macedonian_ did the hulls of their opponents, and that she suffered
less in return (not in _loss_ but in _damage_) than they did. The
_Chesapeake_ was a better fighter than either the _Java_, _Guerrière_,
or _Macedonian_, and could have captured any one of them. The
_Shannon_ of course did less damage than any of the American 44's,
probably just about in the proportion of the difference in force.

Almost all American writers have treated the capture of the
_Chesapeake_ as if it was due simply to a succession of unfortunate
accidents; for example, Cooper, with his usual cheerful optimism,
says that the incidents of the battle, excepting its short duration,
are "altogether the results of the chances of war," and that it was
mainly decided by "fortuitous events as unconnected with any particular
merit on the one side as they are with any particular demerit on the
other." [Footnote: The worth of such an explanation is very aptly
gauged in General Alexander S. Webb's "The Peninsula; McClellan's
Campaign of 1862" (New York, 1881), p. 35, where he speaks of "those
unforeseen or uncontrollable agencies which are vaguely described
as the 'fortune of war,' but which usually prove to be the superior
ability or resources of the antagonist."] Most naval men consider
it a species of treason to regard the defeat as due to any thing
but extraordinary ill fortune. And yet no disinterested reader can
help acknowledging that the true reason of the defeat was the very
simple one that the _Shannon_ fought better than the _Chesapeake_.
It has often been said that up to the moment when the ships came
together the loss and damage suffered by each were about the same.
This is not true, and even if it was, would not affect the question.
The heavy loss on board the _Shannon_ did not confuse or terrify
the thoroughly trained men with their implicit reliance on their
leaders; and the experienced officers were ready to defend any point
that was menaced. An equal or greater amount of loss aboard the
_Chesapeake_ disheartened and confused the raw crew, who simply had
not had the time or chance to become well disciplined. Many of the
old hands, of course, kept their wits and their pluck, but the novices
and the disaffected did not. Similarly with the officers; some, as
the Court of Inquiry found, had not kept to their posts, and all
being new to each other and the ship, could not show to their best.
There is no doubt that the _Chesapeake_ was beaten at the guns before
she was boarded. Had the ships not come together, the fight would have
been longer, the loss greater, and more nearly equal; but the result
would have been the same. Cooper says that the enemy entered with
great caution, and so slowly that twenty resolute men could have
repulsed him. It was no proof of caution for Captain Broke and his
few followers to leap on board, unsupported, and then they only
waited for the main body to come up; and no twenty men could have
repulsed such boarders as followed Broke. The fight was another
lesson, with the parties reversed, to the effect that want of
training and discipline is a bad handicap. Had the _Chesapeake's_
crew been in service as many months as the _Shannon's_ had been years,
such a captain as Lawrence would have had his men perfectly in hand;
they would not have been cowed by their losses, nor some of the
officers too demoralized to act properly, and the material advantages
which the _Chesapeake_ possessed, although not very great, would
probably have been enough to give her a good chance of victory. It
is well worth noticing that the only thoroughly disciplined set of
men aboard (all, according to James himself, by the way, native
Americans), namely, the marines, did excellently, as shown by the
fact that three fourths of their number were among the killed and
wounded. The foreigners aboard the _Chesapeake_ did not do as well
as the Americans, but it is nonsense to ascribe the defeat in any
way to them; it was only rendered rather more disastrous by their
actions. Most of the English authors give very fair accounts of the
battle, except that they hardly allude to the peculiar disadvantages
under which the _Chesapeake_ suffered when she entered into it. Thus,
James thinks the _Java_ was unprepared because she had only been to
sea six weeks; but does not lay any weight on the fact that the
_Chesapeake_ had been out only as many hours.

Altogether the best criticism on the fight is that written by M. de
la Gravière. [Footnote: "Guerres Maritimes," ii, 272.] "It is
impossible to avoid seeing in the capture of the _Chesapeake_ a new
proof of the enormous power of a good organization, when it has
received the consecration of a few years' actual service on the sea.
On this occasion, in effect, two captains equally renowned, the honor
of two navies, were opposed to each other on two ships of the same
tonnage and number of guns. Never had the chances seemed better
balanced, but Sir Philip Broke had commanded the _Shannon_ for nearly
seven years, while Captain Lawrence had only commanded the _Chesapeake_
for a few days. The first of these frigates had cruised for eighteen
months on the coast of America; the second was leaving port. One had
a crew long accustomed to habits of strict obedience; the other was
manned by men who had just been engaged in mutiny. The Americans were
wrong to accuse fortune on this occasion. Fortune was not fickle,
she was merely logical. The _Shannon_ captured the _Chesapeake_ on
the first of June, 1813, but on the 14th of September, 1806, the day
when he took command of his frigate, Captain Broke had begun to
prepare the glorious termination to this bloody affair."

Hard as it is to breathe a word against such a man as Lawrence,
a very Bayard of the seas, who was admired as much for his dauntless
bravery as he was loved for his gentleness and uprightness, it must
be confessed that he acted rashly. And after he had sailed, it was,
as Lord Howard Douglass has pointed out, a tactical error, however
chivalric to neglect the chance of luffing across the _Shannon's_
stern to rake her; exactly as it was a tactical error of his equally
chivalrous antagonist to have let him have such an opportunity. Hull
would not have committed either error, and would, for the matter of
that, have been an overmatch for either commander. But it must always
be remembered that Lawrence's encounters with the English had not
been such as to give him a high opinion of them. The only foe he
had fought had been inferior in strength, it is true, but had hardly
made any effective resistance. Another sloop, of equal, if not
superior force, had tamely submitted to blockade for several days,
and had absolutely refused to fight. And there can be no doubt that
the _Chesapeake_, unprepared though she was, would have been an
overmatch for the _Guerrière_, _Macedonian_, or _Java_. Altogether
it is hard to blame Lawrence for going out, and in every other respect
his actions never have been, nor will be, mentioned, by either friend
or foe, without the warmest respect. But that is no reason for
insisting that he was ruined purely by an adverse fate. We will do
far better to recollect that as much can be learned from reverses
as from victories. Instead of flattering ourselves by saying the
defeat was due to chance, let us try to find out what the real cause
was, and then take care that it does not have an opportunity to act
again. A little less rashness would have saved Lawrence's life and
his frigate, while a little more audacity on one occasion would have
made Commodore Chauncy famous for ever. And whether a lesson is to
be learned or not, a historian should remember that his profession
is not that of a panegyrist. The facts of the case unquestionably
are that Captain Broke, in fair fight, within sight of the enemy's
harbor, proved conqueror over a nominally equal and in reality slightly
superior force; and that this is the only single-ship action of the
war in which the victor was weaker in force than his opponent. So
much can be gathered by reading only the American accounts. Moreover
accident had little or nothing to do with the gaining of the victory.
The explanation is perfectly easy; Lawrence and Broke were probably
exactly equal in almost every thing that goes to make up a first-class
commander, but one had trained his crew for seven years, and the
other was new to the ship, to the officers, and to the men, and the
last to each other. The _Chesapeake's_ crew must have been of fine
material, or they would not have fought so well as they did.

So much for the American accounts. On the other hand, the capture
of the _Chesapeake_ was, and is, held by many British historians
to "conclusively prove" a good many different things; such as, that
if the odds were anything like equal, a British frigate could always
whip an American, that in a hand-to-hand conflict such would invariably
be the case, etc.; and as this was the only single-ship action of
the war in which the victor was the inferior in force, most British
writers insist that it reflected more honor on them than all the
frigate actions of 1812 put together did on the Americans.

These assertions can be best appreciated by reference to a victory
won by the French in the year of the Battle of the Nile. On the 14th
of December, 1798, after two hours' conflict, the French 24-gun
corvette _Bayonnaise_ captured, by boarding, the English 32-gun
frigate _Ambuscade_. According to James the _Ambuscade_ threw at
a broadside 262 pounds of shot, and was manned by 190 men, while
the _Bayonnaise_ threw 150 pounds, and had on board supernumeraries
and passenger soldiers enough to make in all 250 men. According
to the French historian Rouvier [Footnote: "Histoire des Marins
Français sous la République," par Charles Rouvier, Lieutenant de
Vaisseau. Paris, 1868.] the broadside force was 246 pounds against
80 pounds; according to Troude [Footnote: "Batailles Navales."] it
was 270 pounds against 112. M. Léon Guérin, in his voluminous but
exceedingly prejudiced and one-sided work, [Footnote: "Histoire
Maritime de France" (par Léon Guérin, Historien titulaire de la
Marine, Membre de la Legion d'Honneur), vi. 142 (Paris, 1852).] makes
the difference even greater. At any rate the English vessel was
vastly the superior in force, and was captured by boarding, after
a long and bloody conflict in which she lost 46, and her antagonist
over 50, men. During all the wars waged with the Republic and the
Empire, no English vessel captured a French one as much superior
to itself as the _Ambuscade_ was to the _Bayonnaise_, precisely as
in the war of 1812 no American vessel captured a British opponent
as much superior to itself as the _Chesapeake_ was to the _Shannon_.
Yet no sensible man can help acknowledging, in spite of these and
a few other isolated instances, that at that time the French were
inferior to the English, and the latter to the Americans.

It is amusing to compare the French histories of the English with
the English histories of the Americans, and to notice the similarity
of the arguments they use to detract from their opponents' fame.
Of course I do not allude to such writers as Lord Howard Douglass
or Admiral de la Gravière, but to men like William James and Léon
Guérin, or even O. Troude. James is always recounting how American
ships ran away from British ones, and Guérin tells as many anecdotes
of British ships who fled from French foes. James reproaches the
Americans for adopting a "Parthian" mode of warfare, instead of
"bringing to in a bold and becoming manner." Precisely the same
reproaches are used by the French writers, who assert that the English
would not fight "fairly," but acquired an advantage by manoeuvring.
James lays great stress on the American long guns; so does Lieutenant
Rouvier on the British carronades. James always tells how the
Americans avoided the British ships, when the crews of the latter
demanded to be led aboard; Troude says the British always kept at
long shot, while the French sailors "demandérent, à grands cris,
l'abordage." James says the Americans "hesitated to grapple" with
their foes "unless they possessed a twofold superiority"; Guérin
that the English "never dared attack" except when they possessed
"une supériorité énorme." The British sneer at the "mighty dollar";
the French at the "eternal guinea." The former consider Decatur's
name as "sunk" to the level of Porter's or Bainbridge's; the latter
assert that the "presumptuous Nelson" was inferior to any of the
French admirals of the time preceding the Republic. Says James:
"The Americans only fight well when they have the superiority of
force on their side"; and Lieutenant Rouvier: "Never have the
English vanquished us with an undoubted inferiority of force."

On June 12, 1813, the small cutter _Surveyor_, of 6 12-pound
carronades, was lying in York River, in the Chesapeake, under the
command of Mr. William S. Travis; her crew consisted of but 15 men.
[Footnote: Letter of W. S. Travis, June 16, 1813.] At nightfall
she was attacked by the boats of the _Narcissus_ frigate, containing
about 50 men, under the command of Lieutenant John Creerie. [Footnote:
James, vi. 334.] None of the carronades could be used; but Mr. Travis
made every preparation that he could for defence. The Americans
waited till the British were within pistol shot before they opened
their fire; the latter dashed gallantly on, however, and at once
carried the cutter. But though brief, the struggle was bloody;
5 of the Americans were wounded, and of the British 3 were killed
and 7 wounded. Lieutenant Creerie considered his opponents to have
shown so much bravery that he returned Mr. Travis his sword, with
a letter as complimentary to him as it was creditable to the writer.
[Footnote: The letter, dated June 13th, is as follows: "Your gallant
and desperate attempt to defend your vessel against more than double
your number, on the night of the 12th instant, excited such admiration
on the part of your opponents as I have seldom witnessed, and induced
me to return you the sword you had so nobly used, in testimony of
mine. Our poor fellows have suffered severely, occasioned chiefly,
if not solely, by the precautions you had taken to prevent surprise.
In short, I am at a loss which to admire most, the previous arrangement
aboard the _Surveyor_, or the determined manner in which her deck
was disputed inch by inch. I am, sir," etc.]

As has been already mentioned, the Americans possessed a large force
of gun-boats at the beginning of the war. Some of these were fairly
sea-worthy vessels, of 90 tons burden, sloop--or schooner-rigged,
and armed with one or two long, heavy guns, and sometime with several
light carronades to repel boarders. [Footnote: According to a letter
from Captain Hugh G. Campbell (in the Naval Archives, "Captains'
Letters," 1812, vol. ii. Nos. 21 and 192), the crews were distributed
as follows: ten men and a boy to a long 32. seven men and a boy to
a long 9. and five men and a boy to a carronade, exclusive of petty
officers. Captain Campbell complains of the scarcity of men, and
rather naively remarks that he is glad the marines have been
withdrawn from the gun boats, as this may make the commanders of
the latter keep a brighter lookout than formerly.] Gun-boats of this
kind, together with the few small cutters owned by the government,
were serviceable enough. They were employed all along the shores
of Georgia and the Carolinas, and in Long Island Sound, in protecting
the coasting trade by convoying parties of small vessels from one
port to another, and preventing them from being molested by the
boats of any of the British frigates. They also acted as checks
upon the latter in their descents upon the towns and plantations,
occasionally capturing their boats and tenders, and forcing them to
be very cautious in their operations. They were very useful in
keeping privateers off the coast, and capturing them when they
came too far in. The exploits of those on the southern coast will
be mentioned as they occurred. Those in Long Island Sound never
came into collision with the foe, except for a couple of slight
skirmishes at very long range; but in convoying little fleets of
coasters, and keeping at bay the man-of-war boats sent to molest
them, they were invaluable; and they also kept the Sound clear of
hostile privateers.

Many of the gun-boats were much smaller than those just mentioned,
trusting mainly to their sweeps for motive power, and each relying
for offence on one long pivot gun, a 12- or 18-pounder. In the
Chesapeake there was a quite a large number of these small gallies,
with a few of the larger kind, and here it was thought that by
acting together in flotillas the gun-boats might in fine weather
do considerable damage to the enemy's fleet by destroying detached
vessels, instead of confining themselves to the more humble tasks
in which their brethren elsewhere were fairly successful. At this
period Denmark, having lost all her larger ships of war, was confining
herself purely to gun-brigs. These were stout little crafts, with
heavy guns, which, acting together, and being handled with spirit
and skill, had on several occasions in calm weather captured small
British sloops, and had twice so injured frigates as to make their
return to Great Britain necessary; while they themselves had frequently
been the object of successful cutting-out expeditions. Congress
hoped that our gun-boats would do as well as the Danish; but for
a variety of reasons they failed utterly in every serious attack that
they made on a man-of-war, and were worse than useless for all but
the various subordinate employments above mentioned. The main
reason for this failure was in the gun-boats themselves. They were
utterly useless except in perfectly calm weather, for in any wind
the heavy guns caused them to careen over so as to make it difficult
to keep them right side up, and impossible to fire. Even in smooth
water they could not be fought at anchor, requiring to be kept in
position by means of sweeps; and they were very unstable, the recoil
of the guns causing them to roll so as to make it difficult to aim
with any accuracy after the first discharge, while a single shot
hitting one put it _hors de combat_. This last event rarely happened,
however, for they were not often handled with any approach to
temerity, and, on the contrary, usually made their attacks at a
range that rendered it as impossible to inflict as to receive harm.
It does not seem as if they were very well managed; but they were
such ill-conditioned craft that the best officers might be pardoned
for feeling uncomfortable in them. Their operations throughout the
war offer a painfully ludicrous commentary on Jefferson's remarkable
project of having our navy composed exclusively of such craft.

The first aggressive attempt made with the gun-boats was
characteristically futile. On June 20th 15 of them, under Captain
Tarbell, attacked the _Junon_, 38, Captain Sanders, then lying becalmed
in Hampton Roads, with the _Barossa_, 36, and _Laurestinus_, 24,
near her. The gun-boats, while still at very long range, anchored,
and promptly drifted round so that they couldn't shoot. Then they
got under way, and began gradually to draw nearer to the _Junon_.
Her defence was very feeble; after some hasty and ill-directed
vollies she endeavored to beat out of the way. But meanwhile, a
slight breeze having sprung up, the _Barossa_, Captain Sherriff,
approached near enough to take a hand in the affair, and at once
made it evident that she was a more dangerous foe than the _Junon_,
though a lighter ship. As soon as they felt the effects of the
breeze the gun-boats became almost useless and, the _Barossa's_ fire
being animated and well aimed, they withdrew. They had suffered
nothing from the _Junon_, but during the short period she was engaged,
the _Barossa_ had crippled one boat and slightly damaged another;
one man was killed and two wounded. The _Barossa_ escaped unscathed
and the _Junon_ was but slightly injured. Of the combatants, the
_Barossa_ was the only one that came off with credit, the _Junon_
behaving, if any thing, rather worse than the gun-boats. There was
no longer any doubt as to the amount of reliance to be placed on the
latter. [Footnote: Though the flotilla men did nothing in the boats,
they acted with the most stubborn bravery at the battle of Bladensburg.
The British Lieutenant Graig, himself a spectator, thus writes of
their deeds on that occasion ("Campaign at Washington," p. 119).
"Of the sailors, however, it would be injustice not to speak in the
terms which their conduct merits. They were employed as gunners, and
not only did they serve their guns with a quickness and precision
which astonished their assailants, but they stood till some of them
were actually bayoneted with fuses in their hands; nor was it till
their leader was wounded and taken, and they saw themselves deserted
on all sides by the soldiers, that they quitted the field." Certainly
such men could not be accused of lack of courage. Something else is
needed to account for the failure of the gun-boat system.]

On June 20, 1813, a British force of three 74's, one 64, four frigates,
two sloops, and three transports was anchored off Craney Island.
On the north-west side of this island was a battery of 18-pounders,
to take charge of which Captain Cassin, commanding the naval forces
at Norfolk, sent ashore one hundred sailors of the _Constellation_,
under the command of Lieutenants Neale, Shubrick, and Saunders, and
fifty marines under Lieutenant Breckenbridge.[Footnote: Letter of
Captain John Cassin, June 23, 1813.] On the morning of the 22d they
were attacked by a division of 15 boats, containing 700 men,
[Footnote: James, vi, 337.] seamen, marines, chasseurs, and soldiers
of the 102d regiment, the whole under the command of Captain Pechell,
of the _San Domingo_, 74. Captain Hanchett led the attack in the
_Diadem's_ launch. The battery's guns were not fired till the British
were close in, when they opened with destructive effect. While still
some seventy yards from the guns the _Diadem's_ launch grounded,
and the attack was checked. Three of the boats were now sunk by shot,
but the water was so shallow that they remained above water; and while
the fighting was still at its height, some of the _Constellation's_
crew, headed by Midshipman Tatnall, waded out and took possession
of them. [Footnote: "Life of Commodore Josiah Tatnall," by Charles
C. Jones, Jr. (Savannah, 1878), p. 17.] A few of their crew threw
away their arms and came ashore with their captors; others escaped
to the remaining boats, and immediately afterward the flotilla made
off in disorder having lost 91 men. The three captured barges were
large, strong boats, one called the Centipede being fifty feet long,
and more formidable than many of the American gun-vessels. The
_Constellation's_ men deserve great credit for their defence, but
the British certainly did not attack with their usual obstinacy. When
the foremost boats were sunk, the water was so shallow and the bottom
so good that the Americans on shore, as just stated, at once waded
out to them; and if in the heat of the fight Tatnall and his seamen
could get _out_ to the boats, the 700 British ought to have been
able to get _in_ to the battery, whose 150 defenders would then have
stood no chance. [Footnote: James comments on this repulse as "a
defeat as discreditable to those that caused it as honorable to those
that suffered in it." "Unlike most other nations, the Americans in
particular, the British, when engaged in expeditions of this nature,
always rest their hopes of success upon valor rather than on numbers."
These comments read particularly well when it is remembered that
the assailants outnumbered the assailed in the proportion of 5 to 1.
It is monotonous work to have to supplement a history by a running
commentary on James' mistakes and inventions; but it is worth while
to prove once for all the utter unreliability of the author who is
accepted in Great Britain as the great authority about the war. Still,
James is no worse than his compeers. In the American Coggeshall's
"History of Privateers," the misstatements are as gross and the
sneers in as poor taste--the British, instead of the Americans,
being the objects.]

On July 14, 1813, the two small vessels _Scorpion_ and _Asp_, the
latter commanded by Mr. Sigourney, got under way from out of the
Yeocomico Creek, [Footnote: Letter of Midshipman McClintock, July
15, 1813.] and at 10 A.M. discovered in chase the British brig-sloops
_Contest_, Captain James Rattray, and _Mohawk_, Captain Henry D.
Byng. [Footnote: James, vi, 343.] The _Scorpion_ beat up the
Chesapeake, but the dull-sailing _Asp_ had to reenter the creek;
the two brigs anchored off the bar and hoisted out their boats,
under the command of Lieutenant Rodger C. Curry; whereupon the _Asp_
cut her cable and ran up the creek some distance. Here she was
attacked by three boats, which Mr. Sigourney and his crew of twenty
men, with two light guns, beat off; but they were joined by two
others, and the five carried the _Asp_, giving no quarter. Mr.
Sigourney and 10 of his men were killed or wounded, while the
British also suffered heavily, having 4 killed and 7 (including
Lieutenant Curry) wounded. The surviving Americans reached the shore,
rallied under Midshipman H. McClintock (second in command), and when
the British retired after setting the _Asp_ on fire, at once boarded
her, put out the flames, and got her in fighting order; but they
were not again molested.

On July 29th, while the _Junon_, 38, Captain Sanders, and _Martin_,
18, Captain Senhouse, were in Delaware Bay, the latter grounded on
the outside of Crow's Shoal; the frigate anchored within supporting
distance, and while in this position the two ships were attacked by
the American flotilla in those waters, consisting of eight gun-boats,
carrying each 25 men and one long 32, and two heavier block-sloops,
[Footnote: Letter of Lieutenant Angus, July 30, 1813.] commanded by
Lieutenant Samuel Angus. The flotilla kept at such a distance that
an hour's cannonading did no damage whatever to anybody; and during
that time gun-boat No. 121, Sailing-master Shead, drifted a mile
and a half away from her consorts. Seeing this the British made a
dash at her, in 7 boats, containing 140 men, led by Lieutenant Philip
Westphal. Mr. Shead anchored and made an obstinate defence, but at
the first discharge the gun's pintle gave way, and the next time
it was fired the gun-carriage was almost torn to pieces. He kept
up a spirited fire of small arms, in reply to the boat-carronades
and musketry of the assailants; but the latter advanced steadily
and carried the gun-boat by boarding, 7 of her people being wounded,
while 7 of the British were killed and 13 wounded. [Footnote: Letter
of Mr. Shead. Aug. 5, 1813.] The defence of No. 121 was very creditable,
but otherwise the honor of the day was certainly with the British;
whether because the gun-boats were themselves so worthless or because
they were not handled boldly enough, they did no damage, even to
the grounded sloop, that would seem to have been at their mercy.
[Footnote: The explanation possibly lies in the fact that the
gun-boats had worthless powder. In the Naval Archives there is a
letter from Mr. Angus ("Masters' Commandant Letters," 1813, No. 3:
see also No. 91), in which he says that the frigate's shot passed
over them, while theirs could not even reach the sloop. He also
encloses a copy of a paper, signed by the other gun-boat officers,
which runs: "We, the officers of the vessels comprising the Delaware
flotilla, protest against the powder as being unfit for service."]

On June 18th the American brig-sloop _Argus_, commanded by Lieutenant
William Henry Allen, late first of the _United States_, sailed from
New York for France, with Mr. Crawford, minister for that country,
aboard, and reached L'Orient on July 11th, having made one prize
on the way. On July 14th she again sailed, and cruised in the chops
of the Channel, capturing and burning ship after ship, and creating
the greatest consternation among the London merchants; she then
cruised along Cornwall and got into St. George's Channel, where the
work of destruction went on. The labor was very severe and harassing,
the men being able to get very little rest. [Footnote: Court of
Inquiry into loss of _Argus_, 1815.] On the night of August 13th,
a brig laden with wine from Oporto was captured and burnt, and
unluckily many of the crew succeeded in getting at some of the
cargo. At 5 A.M. on the 14th a large brig-of-war was discovered
standing down under a cloud of canvas. [Footnote: Letter of Lieutenant
Watson, March 2, 1815.] This was the British brig-sloop _Pelican_,
Captain John Fordyce Maples, which, from information received at
Cork three days previous, had been cruising especially after the
_Argus_, and had at last found her; St. David's Head bore east
five leagues (lat. 52° 15' N. and 5° 50' W.)

The small, fine-lined American cruiser, with her lofty masts and
long spars, could easily have escaped from her heavier antagonist:
but Captain Allen had no such intention, and, finding he could not
get the weather-gage, he shortened sail and ran easily along on the
starboard tack, while the _Pelican_ came down on him with the wind
(which was from the south) nearly aft. At 6 A.M. the _Argus_ wore
and fired her port guns within grape distance, the _Pelican_ responding
with her starboard battery, and the action began with great spirit
on both sides. [Footnote: Letter of Captain Maples to Admiral
Thornborough, Aug. 14, 1813.] At 6.04 a round shot carried off Captain
Allen's leg, inflicting a mortal wound, but he stayed on deck till
he fainted from loss of blood. Soon the British fire carried away
the main-braces, main-spring-stay, gaff, and try-sail mast of the
_Argus_; the first lieutenant, Mr. Watson, was wounded in the head
by a grape-shot and carried below; the second lieutenant, Mr. U. H.
Allen (no relation of the captain), continued to fight the ship
with great skill. The _Pelican's_ fire continued very heavy, the
_Argus_ losing her spritsail-yard and most of the standing rigging
on the port side of the foremast. At 6.14 Captain Maples bore up
to pass astern of his antagonist, but Lieutenant Allen luffed into
the wind and threw the main-top-sail aback, getting into a beautiful
raking position [Footnote: Letter of Lieutenant Watson.]; had the
men at the guns done their duty as well as those on the quarter-deck
did theirs, the issue of the fight would have been very different;
but, as it was, in spite of her favorable position, the raking
broadside of the _Argus_ did little damage. Two or three minutes
afterward the _Argus_ lost the use of her after-sails through having
her preventer-main-braces and top-sail tie shot away, and fell off
before the wind, when the _Pelican_ at 6.18 passed her stern, raking
her heavily, and then ranged up on her starboard quarter. In a few
minutes the wheel-ropes and running-rigging of every description were
shot away, and the _Argus_ became utterly unmanageable. The _Pelican_
continued raking her with perfect impunity, and at 6.35 passed her
broadside and took a position on her starboard bow, when at 6.45
the brigs fell together, and the British "were in the act of boarding
when the _Argus_ struck her colors," [Footnote: Letter of Captain
Maples.] at 6.45 A.M. The _Pelican_ carried, besides her regular
armament, two long 6's as stern-chasers, and her broadside weight
of metal was thus: [Footnote: James, vi, 320.]

1 X 6
1 X 6
1 X 12
8 X 32

or 280 lbs. against the _Argus_':

1 X 12
9 X 24

or, subtracting as usual 7 per cent. for light weight of metal, 210
lbs. The _Pelican's_ crew consisted of but 116 men, according to
the British account, though the American reports make it much larger.
The _Argus_ had started from New York with 137 men, but having manned
and sent in several prizes, her crew amounted, as near as can be
ascertained, to 104. Mr. Low in his "Naval History," published just
after the event, makes it but 99. James makes it 121; as he placed
the crew of the _Enterprise_ at 125, when it was really 102; that
of the _Hornet_ at 162, instead of 135; of the _Peacock_ at 185,
instead of 166; of the _Nautilus_ at 106 instead of 95, etc., etc.,
it is safe to presume that he has overestimated it by at least 20,
which brings the number pretty near to the American accounts. The
_Pelican_ lost but two men killed and five wounded. Captain Maples
had a narrow escape, a spent grape-shot striking him in the chest
with some force, and then falling on the deck. One shot had passed
through the boatswain's and one through the carpenter's cabin; her
sides were filled with grape-shot, and her rigging and sails much
injured; her foremast, main-top-mast, and royal masts were slightly
wounded, and two of her carronades dismounted.

The injuries of the _Argus_ have already been detailed; her hull
and lower masts were also tolerably well cut up. Of her crew, Captain
Allen, two midshipmen, the carpenter, and six seamen were killed or
mortally wounded; her first lieutenant and 13 seamen severely and
slightly wounded: total, 10 killed and 14 wounded.

In reckoning the comparative force, I include the Englishman's
six-pound stern-chaser, which could not be fired in broadside with
the rest of the guns, because I include the _Argus_' 12-pound
bow-chaser, which also could not be fired in broadside, as it was
crowded into the bridle-port. James, of course, carefully includes
the latter, though leaving out the former.

[Illustration: _Argus_ vs. _Pelican_: an engraving published in
London in 1817. (Courtesy Beverley R. Robinson Collection, U.S.
Naval Academy Museum)]

COMPARISON.

                                                      Comparative
                No.    Weight             Comparative Loss
          Tons. Guns.  Metal.  Men. Loss. Force.      Inflicted.
_Argus_   298   10     210     104  24     .82         .29
_Pelican_ 467   11     280     116   7    1.00        1.00

[Illustration of _ARGUS_ and _PELICAN_ action from 6.00 A.M. to 6.45]

Of all the single-ship actions fought in the war this is the least
creditable to the Americans. The odds in force, it is true, were
against the _Argus_, about in the proportion of 10 to 8, but this
is neither enough to account for the loss inflicted being as 10 to
3, nor for her surrendering when she had been so little ill used.
It was not even as if her antagonist had been an unusually fine
vessel of her class. The _Pelican_ did not do as well as either
the _Frolic_ previously, or the _Reindeer_ afterward, though perhaps
rather better than the _Avon_, _Penguin_, or _Peacock_. With a
comparatively unmanageable antagonist, in smooth water, she ought
to have sunk her in three quarters of an hour. But the _Pelican's_
not having done particularly well merely makes the conduct of the
Americans look worse; it is just the reverse of the _Chesapeake's_
case, where, paying the highest credit to the British, we still
thought the fight no discredit to us. Here we can indulge no such
reflection. The officers did well, but the crew did not. Cooper
says: "The enemy was so much heavier that it may be doubted whether
the _Argus_ would have captured her antagonist under any ordinary
circumstances." This I doubt; such a crew as the _Wasp's_ or _Hornet's_
probably would have been successful. The trouble with the guns of
the _Argus_ was not so much that they were too small, as that they
did not hit; and this seems all the more incomprehensible when it
is remembered that Captain Allen is the very man to whom Commodore
Decatur, in his official letter, attributed the skilful gun-practice
of the crew of the frigate _United States_. Cooper says that the
powder was bad; and it has also been said that the men of the _Argus_
were over-fatigued and were drunk, in which case they ought not to
have been brought into action. Besides unskilfulness, there is
another very serious count against the crew. Had the _Pelican_ been
some distance from the _Argus_, and in a position where she could
pour in her fire with perfect impunity to herself, when the surrender
took place, it would have been more justifiable. But, on the contrary,
the vessels were touching, and the British boarded just as the
colors were hauled down; it was certainly very disgraceful that the
Americans did not rally to repel them, for they had still four fifths
of their number absolutely untouched. They certainly _ought_ to have
succeeded, for boarding is a difficult and dangerous experiment;
and if they had repulsed their antagonists they might in turn have
carried the _Pelican_. So that, in summing up the merits of this
action, it is fair to say that both sides showed skilful seamanship
and unskilful gunnery; that the British fought bravely and that the
Americans did not.

It is somewhat interesting to compare this fight, where a weaker
American sloop was taken by a stronger British one, with two or three
others, where both the comparative force and the result were reversed.
Comparing it, therefore, with the actions between the _Hornet_ and
_Peacock_ (British), the _Wasp_ and _Avon_, and the _Peacock_
(American) and _Epervier_, we get four actions, in one of which, the
first-named, the British were victorious, and in the other three the
Americans.

                      Comparative   Comparative Loss   Per cent.
                         Force.       Inflicted.         Loss.

_Pelican_ (British)        1.00           1.00           .06
_Argus_ (American)          .82            .29           .23

_Hornet_ (American)        1.00           1.00           .02
_Peacock_ (British)         .83            .07           .31

_Wasp_ (American)          1.00           1.00           .02
_Avon_ (British)            .80            .07           .33

_Peacock_ (American)        1.00          1.00           .01
_Epervier_ (British)         .81           .08           .20

It is thus seen that in these sloop actions the superiority of force
on the side of the victor was each time about the same. The _Argus_
made a much more effectual resistance than did either the _Peacock_,
_Avon_, or _Epervier_, while the _Pelican_ did her work in poorer
form than either of the victorious American sloops; and, on the other
hand, the resistance of the _Argus_ did not by any means show as much
bravery as was shown in the defence of the _Peacock_ or _Avon_,
although rather more than in the case of the _Epervier_.

This is the only action of the war where it is almost impossible
to find out the cause of the inferiority of the beaten crew. In
almost all other cases we find that one crew had been carefully
drilled, and so proved superior to a less-trained antagonist; but
it is incredible that the man, to whose exertions when first lieutenant
of the _States_ Commodore Decatur ascribes the skilfulness of that
ship's men, should have neglected to train his own crew; and this
had the reputation of being composed of a fine set of men. Bad powder
would not account for the surrender of the _Argus_ when so little
damaged. It really seems as if the men _must_ have been drunk or
over-fatigued, as has been so often asserted. Of course drunkenness
would account for the defeat, although not in the least altering its
humiliating character.

"Et tu quoque" is not much of an argument; still it may be as well
to call to mind here two engagements in which British sloops suffered
much more discreditable defeats than the _Argus_ did. The figures
are taken from James; as given by the French historians they make
even a worse showing for the British.

A short time before our war the British brig _Carnation_, 18, had
been captured, by boarding, by the French brig _Palinure_, 16, and
the British brig _Alacrity_, 18, had been captured, also by boarding,
by the corvette _Abeille_, 20.

The following was the comparative force, etc., of the combatants:

              Weight Metal.    No. Crew.   Loss.
_Carnation_        262            117       40
_Palmure_          174            100       20

_Alacrity_         262            100       18
_Abeille_          260            130       19

In spite of the pride the British take in their hand-to-hand prowess
both of these ships were captured by boarding. The _Carnation_ was
captured by a much smaller force, instead of by a much larger one,
as in the case of the _Argus_; and if the _Argus_ gave up before
she had suffered greatly, the _Alacrity_ surrendered when she had
suffered still less. French historians asserted that the capture of
the two brigs proved that "French valor could conquer British
courage"; and a similar opinion was very complacently expressed by
British historians after the defeat of the _Argus_. All that the
three combats really "proved" was, that in eight encounters between
British and American sloops the Americans were defeated once, and
in a far greater number of encounters between French and British
sloops the British were defeated twice. No one pretends that either
navy was invincible; the question is, which side averaged best?

At the opening of the war we possessed several small brigs; these
had originally been fast, handy little schooners, each armed with
12 long sixes, and with a crew of 60 men. As such they were effective
enough; but when afterward changed into brigs, each armed with a
couple of extra guns, and given 40 additional men, they became too
slow to run, without becoming strong enough to fight. They carried
far too many guns and men for their size, and not enough to give
them a chance with any respectable opponent; and they were almost
all ignominiously captured. The single exception was the brig
_Enterprise_. She managed to escape capture, owing chiefly to good
luck, and once fought a victorious engagement, thanks to the fact
that the British possessed a class of vessels even worse than our
own. She was kept near the land and finally took up her station off
the eastern coast, where she did good service in chasing away or
capturing the various Nova Scotian or New Brunswick privateers,
which were smaller and less formidable vessels than the privateers
of the United States, and not calculated for fighting.

By crowding guns into her bridle-ports, and over-manning herself,
the _Enterprise_, now under the command of Lieutenant William
Burrows, mounted 14 eighteen-pound carronades and 2 long 9's, with
102 men. On September 5th, while standing along shore near Penguin
Point, a few miles to the eastward of Portland, Me., she discovered,
at anchor inside, a man-of-war brig [Footnote: Letter from Lieutenant
Edward R. McCall to Commodore Hull, September 5, 1813.] which proved
to be H.M.S. _Boxer_, Captain Samuel Blyth, of 12 carronades,
eighteen-pounders and two long sixes, with but 66 men aboard, 12 of
her crew being absent.[Footnote: James, "Naval Occurrences," 264.
The American accounts give the _Boxer_ 104 men, on very insufficient
grounds. Similarly, James gives the _Enterprise_ 123 men. Each side
will be considered authority for its own force and loss.] The _Boxer_
at once hoisted three British ensigns and bore up for the _Enterprise_,
then standing in on the starboard tack; but when the two brigs were
still 4 miles apart it fell calm. At midday a breeze sprang up from
the southwest, giving the American the weather-gage, but the latter
manoeuvred for some time to windward to try the comparative rates
of sailing of the vessels. At 3 P.M. Lieutenant Burrows hoisted three
ensigns, shortened sail, and edged away toward the enemy, who came
gallantly on. Captain Blyth had nailed his colors to the mast, telling
his men they should never be struck while he had life in his body.
[Footnote: "Naval Chronicle," vol. xxxii, p. 462.] Both crews cheered
loudly as they neared each other, and at 3.15, the two brigs being
on the starboard tack not a half pistol-shot apart, they opened fire,
the American using the port, and the English the starboard, battery.
Both broadsides were very destructive, each of the commanders falling
at the very beginning of the action. Captain Blyth was struck by
an eighteen-pound shot while he was standing on the quarter-deck;
it passed completely through his body, shattering his left arm and
killing him on the spot. The command, thereupon, devolved on Lieutenant
David McCreery. At almost the same time his equally gallant antagonist
fell. Lieutenant Burrows, while encouraging his men, laid hold of
a gun-tackle fall to help the crew of a carronade run out the gun;
in doing so he raised one leg against the bulwark, when a canister
shot struck his thigh, glancing into his body and inflicting a
fearful wound. [Footnote: Cooper, "Naval History," vol. ii, p. 259.]
In spite of the pain he refused to be carried below, and lay on the
deck, crying out that the colors must never be struck. Lieutenant
Edward McCall now took command. At 3.30 the _Enterprise_ ranged
ahead, rounded to on the starboard tack, and raked the _Boxer_ with
the starboard guns. At 3.35 the _Boxer_ lost her main-top-mast and
top-sail yard, but her crew still kept up the fight bravely, with
the exception of four men who deserted their quarters and were
afterward court-martialed for cowardice. [Footnote: Minutes of
court-martial held aboard H.M.S. _Surprise_, January 8, 1814.] The
_Enterprise_ now set her fore-sail and took position on the enemy's
starboard bow, delivering raking fires; and at 3.45 the latter
surrendered, when entirely unmanageable and defenceless. Lieutenant
Burrows would not go below until he had received the sword of his
adversary, when he exclaimed, "I am satisfied, I die contented."

[Illustration of action between _ENTERPRISE_ and _BOXER_ from
3.15 to 3.45]

Both brigs had suffered severely, especially the _Boxer_, which had
been hulled repeatedly, had three eighteen-pound shot through her
foremast, her top-gallant forecastle almost cut away, and several
of her guns dismounted. Three men were killed and seventeen wounded,
four mortally. The _Enterprise_ had been hulled by one round and
many grape; one 18-pound ball had gone through her foremast, and
another through her main-mast, and she was much cut up aloft. Two
of her men were killed and ten wounded, two of them (her commander
and Midshipman Kervin Waters) mortally. The British court-martial
attributed the defeat of the _Boxer_ "to a superiority in the enemy's
force, principally in the number of men, as well as to a greater
degree of skill in the direction of her fire, and to the destructive
effects of the first broadside." But the main element was the
superiority in force, the difference in loss being very nearly
proportional to it; both sides fought with equal bravery and equal
skill. This fact was appreciated by the victors, for at a naval dinner
given in New York shortly afterward, one of the toasts offered was:
"The crew of the _Boxer_; enemies by law, but by gallantry brothers."
The two commanders were both buried at Portland, with all the honors
of war. The conduct of Lieutenant Burrows needs no comment. He was
an officer greatly beloved and respected in the service. Captain
Blyth, on the other side, had not only shown himself on many occasions
to be a man of distinguished personal courage, but was equally noted
for his gentleness and humanity. He had been one of Captain Lawrence's
pall-bearers, and but a month previous to his death had received a
public note of thanks from an American colonel, for an act of great
kindness and courtesy. [Footnote: "Naval Chronicle," xxxii, 466.]

The _Enterprise_, under Lieut.-Com. Renshaw, now cruised off the
southern coast, where she made several captures. One of them was
a heavy British privateer, the _Mars_, of 14 long nines and 75 men,
which struck after receiving a broadside that killed and wounded 4
of her crew. The _Enterprise_ was chased by frigates on several
occasions; being once forced to throw overboard all her guns but
two, and escaping only by a shift in the wind. Afterward, as she
was unfit to cruise, she was made a guard-ship at Charlestown; for
the same reason the _Boxer_ was not purchased into the service.

On October 4th some volunteers from the Newport flotilla captured,
by boarding, the British privateer _Dart_, [Footnote: Letter of
Mr. Joseph Nicholson, Oct. 5, 1813.] after a short struggle in
which two of the assailants were wounded and several of the
privateersmen, including the first officer, were killed.

On December 4th, Commodore Rodgers, still in command of the
_President_, sailed again from Providence, Rhode Island. On the
25th, in lat. 19° N. and long. 35° W., the _President_, during the
night, fell in with two frigates, and came so close that the head-most
fired at her, when she made off. These were thought to be British,
but were in reality the two French 40-gun frigates _Nymphe_ and
_Meduse_, one month out of Brest. After this little encounter Rodgers
headed toward the Barbadoes, and cruised to windward of them.

On the whole the ocean warfare of 1813 was decidedly in favor of
the British, except during the first few months. The _Hornet's_
fight with the _Peacock_ was an action similar to those that took
place in 1812, and the cruise of Porter was unique in our annals,
both for the audacity with which it was planned, and the success
with which it was executed. Even later in the year the _Argus_ and
the _President_ made bold cruises in sight of the British coasts,
the former working great havoc among the merchant-men. But by that
time the tide had turned strongly in favor of our enemies. From the
beginning of summer the blockade was kept up so strictly that it
was with difficulty any of our vessels broke through it; they were
either chased back or captured. In the three actions that occurred,
the British showed themselves markedly superior in two, and in the
third the combatants fought equally well, the result being fairly
decided by the fuller crew and slightly heavier metal of the
_Enterprise_. The gun-boats, to which many had looked for harbor
defence, proved nearly useless, and were beaten off with ease
whenever they made an attack.

The lessons taught by all this were the usual ones. Lawrence's
victory in the _Hornet_ showed the superiority of a properly trained
crew to one that had not been properly trained; and his defeat in
the _Chesapeake_ pointed exactly the same way, demonstrating in
addition the folly of taking a raw levy out of port, and, before
they have had the slightest chance of getting seasoned, pitting them
against skilled veterans. The victory of the _Enterprise_ showed
the wisdom of having the odds in men and metal in our favor, when
our antagonist was otherwise our equal; it proved, what hardly
needed proving, that, whenever possible, a ship should be so
constructed as to be superior in force to the foes it would be likely
to meet. As far as the capture of the _Argus_ showed any thing, it
was the advantage of heavy metal and the absolute need that a crew
should fight with pluck. The failure of the gun-boats _ought_ to
have taught the lesson (though it did not) that too great economy
in providing the means of defence may prove very expensive in the
end, and that good officers and men are powerless when embarked
in worthless vessels. A similar point was emphasized by the strictness
of the blockade, and the great inconvenience it caused; namely,
that we ought to have had ships powerful enough to break it.

We had certainly lost ground during this year; fortunately we
regained it during the next two.

BRITISH VESSELS SUNK OR TAKEN.

 Name.        Guns.  Tonnage.
_Peacock_      20      477
_Boxer_        14      181
_Highflyer_     6       96
              ___     ____
               40      754

AMERICAN VESSELS SUNK OR TAKEN.

 Name.        Guns.  Tonnage.
_Chesapeake_   50     1,265
_Argus_        20       298
_Viper_        10       148
              ___     _____
               80     1,711

VESSELS BUILT OR PURCHASED.

 Name.          Rig.     Guns.  Tonnage.  Where Built.   Cost.
_Rattlesnake_  Brig       14       278    Medford, Pa.  $18,000
_Alligator_    Schooner    4        80
_Asp_          Sloop       3        56                    2,600

PRIZES MADE.

Name of Ship.  No. of Prizes.
_President_            13
_Congress_              4
_Chesapeake_            6
_Essex_                14
_Hornet_                3
_Argus_                21
Small craft            18
                      ___
                       79



Chapter VI


1813

ON THE LAKES

_ONTARIO--Comparison of the rival squadrons---Chauncy takes York
and Fort George--Yeo is repulsed at Sackett's Harbor, but keeps
command of the lake--Chauncy sails--Yeo's partial victory off
Niagara---Indecisive action off the Genesee--Chauncy's partial
victory off Burlington, which gives him the command of the
lake--ERIE--Perry's success in creating a fleet--His
victory--CHAMPLAIN--Loss of the Growler and Eagle--Summary._

ONTARIO.

Winter had almost completely stopped preparations on the American
side. Bad weather put an end to all communication with Albany or
New York, and so prevented the transit of stores, implements, etc.
It was worse still with the men, for the cold and exposure so thinned
them out that the new arrivals could at first barely keep the ranks
filled. It was, moreover, exceedingly difficult to get seamen to
come from the coast to serve on the lakes, where work was hard,
sickness prevailed, and there was no chance of prize-money. The
British government had the great advantage of being able to move
its sailors where it pleased, while in the American service, at
that period, the men enlisted for particular ships, and the only
way to get them for the lakes at all was by inducing portions of
crews to volunteer to follow their officers thither. [Footnote:
Cooper, ii, 357. One of James' most comical misstatements is that
on the lakes the American sailors were all "picked men." On p. 367,
for example, in speaking of the battle of Lake Erie he says:
"Commodore Perry had picked crews to all his vessels." As a matter
of fact Perry had once sent in his resignation solely on account of
the very poor quality of his crews, and had with difficulty been
induced to withdraw it. Perry's crews were of hardly average
excellence, but then the average American sailor was a very good
specimen.] However, the work went on in spite of interruptions.
Fresh gangs of shipwrights arrived, and, largely owing to the energy
and capacity of the head builder, Mr. Henry Eckford (who did as
much as any naval officer in giving us an effective force on Ontario),
the _Madison_ was equipped, a small despatch sloop, The _Lady of the
Lake_ prepared, and a large new ship, the _General Pike_, 28, begun,
to mount 13 guns in each broadside and 2 on pivots.

Meanwhile Sir George Prevost, the British commander in Canada, had
ordered two 24-gun ships to be built, and they were begun; but he
committed the mistake of having one laid down in Kingston and the
other in York, at the opposite end of the lake. Earle, the Canadian
commodore, having proved himself so incompetent, was removed; and
in the beginning of May Captain Sir James Lucas Yeo arrived, to act
as commander-in-chief of the naval forces, together with four captains,
eight lieutenants, twenty-four midshipmen, and about 450 picked
seamen, sent out by the home government especially for service on
the Canada lakes. [Footnote: James, vi, 353.]

The comparative force of the two fleets or squadrons it is hard to
estimate. I have already spoken of the difficulty in finding out
what guns were mounted on any given ship at a particular time, and
it is even more perplexing with the crews. A schooner would make
one cruise with but thirty hands; on the next it would appear with
fifty, a number of militia having volunteered as marines. Finding
the militia rather a nuisance, they would be sent ashore, and on
her third cruise the schooner would substitute half a dozen frontier
seamen in their place. It was the same with the larger vessels. The
_Madison_ might at one time have her full complement of 200 men;
a month's sickness would ensue, and she would sail with but 150
effectives. The _Pike's_ crew of 300 men at one time would shortly
afterward be less by a third in consequence of a draft of sailors
being sent to the upper lakes. So it is almost impossible to be
perfectly accurate; but, making a comparison of the various authorities
from Lieutenant Emmons to James, the following tables of the forces
may be given as very nearly correct. In broadside force I count
every pivot gun, and half of those that were not on pivots.

CHAUNCY'S SQUADRON.

                                       Broadside
Name.        Rig.   Tonnage.   Crew.  Metal; lbs   Armament

_Pike_,      Ship     875       300        360      28 long 24's
_Madison_,    "       593       200        364      24 short 32's
_Oneida_,    brig     243       100        172      16   "  24's
                                                -+- 1  long 32
_Hamilton_,  schooner 112        50         80   |  1    "  24
                                                 -  8    "  6's
                                                -+- 1    " 32
_Scourge_,      "     110        50         80   -  8  short 12's
                                                -+- 1  long 32
_Conquest_,     "      82        40         56   |  1    "  12
                                                 -  4    "   6's
                                                -+- 1    "  32
_Tompkins_,     "      96        40         62   |  1    "  12
                                                 -  6    "   6's
                                                -+- 1    "  32
_Julia_,        "      82        35         44   -  1    "  12
                                                -+- 1    "  32
_Growler_,      "      81        35         44   -  1    "  12
                                                -+- 1  long 32
_Ontario_,   schooner  53        35         44   -  1    "  12

_Fair                                           -+- 1    "  24
 American_,     "      53        30         36   -  1    "  12
_Pert_,         "      50        25         24      1    "  24
_Asp_,          "      57        25         24      1    "  24
_Lady of
 the Lake_,     "      89        15          9      1    "   9
_________________________________________________________________

 14                 2,576       980      1,399      112

This is not materially different from James' account (p. 356), which
gives Chauncy 114 guns, 1,193 men, and 2,121 tons. The _Lady of the
Lake_, however, was never intended for anything but a despatch boat,
and the _Scourge_ and _Hamilton_ were both lost before Chauncy
actually came into collision with Yeo. Deducting these, in order
to compare the two foes, Chauncy had left 11 vessels of 2,265 tons,
with 865 men and 92 guns throwing a broadside of 1,230 pounds.

YEO'S SQUADRON.

                                         Broadside
Name.        Rig.    Tonnage.    Crew.    Metal; lbs.    Armament.

_Wolfe_,     ship     637         220      392       -+-  1 long  24
                                                      |   8 "     18's
                                                      |   4 short 68's
                                                      '- 10 "     32's
_Royal        "       510         200      360       -+-  3 long  18's
 George_,                                             |   2 short 68's
                                                      '- 16 "     32's
_Melville_,  brig     279         100      210       -+-  2 long  18's
                                                      '- 12 short 32 s
_Moira_,      "       262         100      153       -+-  2 long  9's
                                                      '- 12 short 24's
_Sydney      schooner 216          80      172       -+-  2 long  12's
 Smith_,                                              '- 10 short 32's
_Beresford_,  "       187          70       87       -+-  1 long  24
                                                      |   1 "     9
                                                      '-  6 short 18's
___________         _____        _____    _____        _________________
 6                  2,091         770     1,374        92

This differs but slightly from James, who gives Yeo 92 guns throwing
a broadside of 1,374 pounds, but only 717 men. As the evidence in
the court-martial held on Captain Barclay, and the official accounts
(on both sides) of Macdonough's victory, convict him of very much
underrating the force in men of the British on Erie and Champlain,
it can be safely assumed that he has underestimated the force in
men on Lake Ontario. By comparing the tonnage he gives to Barclay's
and Downie's squadrons with what it really was, we can correct his
account of Yeo's tonnage.

The above figures would apparently make the two squadrons about
equal, Chauncy having 95 men more, and throwing at a broadside 144
pounds shot less than his antagonist. But the figures do not by any
means show all the truth. The Americans greatly excelled in the number
and calibre of their long guns. Compared thus, they threw at one
discharge 694 pounds of long-gun metal and 536 pounds of carronade
metal; while the British only threw from their long guns 180 pounds,
and from their carronades 1,194. This unequal distribution of metal
was very much in favor of the Americans. Nor was this all. The
_Pike_, with her 15 long 24's in battery was an overmatch for any
one of the enemy's vessels, and bore the same relation to them that
the _Confiance_, at a later date, did to Macdonough's squadron. She
should certainly have been a match for the _Wolfe_ and _Melville_
together, and the _Madison_ and _Oneida_ for the _Royal George_ and
_Sydney Smith_. In fact, the three heavy American vessels ought to
have been an overmatch for the four heaviest of the British squadron,
although these possessed the nominal superiority. And in ordinary
cases the eight remaining American gun-vessels would certainly seem
to be an overmatch for the two British schooners, but it is just
here that the difficulty of comparing the forces comes in. When the
water was very smooth and the wind light, the long 32's and 24's of
the Americans could play havoc with the British schooners, at a
distance which would render the carronades of the latter useless.
But the latter were built for war, possessed quarters and were good
cruisers, while Chauncy's schooners were merchant vessels, without
quarters, crank, and so loaded down with heavy metal that whenever
it blew at all hard they could with difficulty be kept from upsetting,
and ceased to be capable even of defending themselves. When Sir James
Yeo captured two of them he would not let them cruise with his other
vessels at all, but sent them back to act as gun-boats, in which
capacity they were serving when recaptured; this is a tolerable test
of their value compared to their opponents. Another disadvantage
that Chauncy had to contend with, was the difference in the speed
of the various vessels. The _Pike_ and _Madison_ were fast, weatherly
ships; but the _Oneida_ was a perfect slug, even going free, and
could hardly be persuaded to beat to windward at all. In this respect
Yeo was much better off; his six ships were regular men-of-war, with
quarters, all of them seaworthy, and fast enough to be able to act
with uniformity and not needing to pay much regard to the weather.
His force could act as a unit; but Chauncy's could not. Enough wind
to make a good working breeze for his larger vessels put all his
smaller ones _hors de combat_: and in weather that suited the latter,
the former could not move about at all. When speed became necessary
the two ships left the brig hopelessly behind, and either had to do
without her, or else perhaps let the critical moment slip by while
waiting for her to come up. Some of the schooners sailed quite as
slowly; and finally it was found out that the only way to get all
the vessels into action at once was to have one half the fleet tow
the other half. It was certainly difficult to keep the command of
the lake when, if it came on to blow, the commodore had to put into
port under penalty of seeing a quarter of his fleet founder before
his eyes. These conflicting considerations render it hard to pass
judgment; but on the whole it would seem as if Chauncy was the
superior in force, for even if his schooners were not counted, his
three square-rigged vessels were at least a match for the four
square-rigged British vessels, and the two British schooners would
not have counted very much in such a conflict. In calm weather he
was certainly the superior. This only solves one of the points in
which the official letters of the two commanders differ: after every
meeting each one insists that he was inferior in force, that the
weather suited his antagonist, and that the latter ran away, and
got the worst of it; all of which will be considered further on.

In order to settle toward which side the balance of success inclined,
we must remember that there were two things the combatants were trying
to do viz.:

(1) To damage the enemy directly by capturing or destroying his vessels.
This was the only object we had in view in sending out ocean cruisers,
but on the lakes it was subordinated to:--

(2) Getting the control of the lake, by which invaluable assistance
could be rendered to the army. The most thorough way of accomplishing
this, of course, was by destroying the enemy's squadron; but it could
also be done by building ships too powerful for him to face, or by
beating him in some engagement which, although not destroying his
fleet, would force him to go into port. If one side was stronger,
then the weaker party by skillful manoeuvring might baffle the foe,
and rest satisfied by keeping the sovereignty of the lake disputed;
for, as long as one squadron was not undisputed master it could not
be of much assistance in transporting troops attacking forts, or
otherwise helping the military.

In 1813 the Americans gained the first point by being the first to
begin operations. They were building a new ship, afterward the _Pike_,
at Sackett's Harbor; the British were building two new ships, each
about two thirds the force of the _Pike_, one at Toronto (then called
York), one at Kingston. Before these were built the two fleets were
just on a par; the destruction of the _Pike_ would give the British
the supremacy; the destruction of either of the British ships, provided
the _Pike_ were saved, would give the Americans the supremacy. Both
sides had already committed faults. The Americans had left Sackett's
Harbor so poorly defended and garrisoned that it invited attack,
while the British had fortified Kingston very strongly, but had done
little for York, and, moreover, ought not to have divided their forces
by building ships in different places.

Commodore Chauncy's squadron was ready for service on April 19th,
and on the 25th he made sail with the _Madison_, Lieutenant-Commander
Elliott, floating his own broad pennant, _Oneida_, Lieutenant Woolsey,
_Hamilton_, Lieutenant McPherson, _Scourge_, Mr. Osgood, _Tompkins_,
Lieutenant Brown, _Conquest_, Lieutenant Pettigrew, _Growler_, Mr. Mix,
_Julia_, Mr. Trant, _Asp_, Lieutenant Smith, _Pert_, Lieutenant Adams,
_American_, Lieutenant Chauncy, _Ontario_, Mr. Stevens, _Lady of the
Lake_, Mr. Hinn, and _Raven_, transport, having on board General
Dearborn and 1700 troops, to attack York, which was garrisoned by
about 700 British regulars and Canadian militia under Major-General
Sheafe. The new 24-gun ship was almost completed, and the _Gloucester_
10-gun brig was in port; the guns of both vessels were used in defence
of the port. The fleet arrived before York early on April 27th, and
the debarkation began at about 8 A.M. The schooners beat up to the
fort under a heavy cannonade, and opened a spirited fire from their
long guns; while the troops went ashore under the command of
Brigadier-General Pike. The boats were blown to leeward by the strong
east wind, and were exposed to a galling fire, but landed the troops
under cover of the grape thrown by the vessels. The schooners now
beat up to within a quarter of a mile from the principal work, and
opened heavily upon it, while at the same time General Pike and the
main body of the troops on shore moved forward to the assault, using
their bayonets only. The British regulars and Canadian militia,
outnumbered three to one (including the American sailors) and with
no very good defensive works, of course had to give way, having lost
heavily, especially from the fire of the vessels. An explosion
immediately afterward killed or wounded 250 of the victors, including
General Pike. The Americans lost, on board the fleet, 4 killed,
including midshipmen Haifield and Thompson, and 8 wounded; [Footnote:
Letter of Commodore Chauncy, April 28, 1813.] and of the army,
[Footnote: James, "Military Occurrences" (London, 1818), vol. i, p.
151.] 14 killed and 32 wounded by the enemy's fire, and 52 killed
and 180 wounded by the explosion: total loss, 288. The British
regulars lost 130 killed and wounded, including 40 by the explosion;
[Footnote: Lossing's "Field-Book of the War of 1812," p. 581. The
accounts vary somewhat.] together with 50 Canadians and Indians,
making a total of 180, besides 290 prisoners. The 24-gun ship was
burned, her guns taken away, and the _Gloucester_ sailed back to
Sackett's Harbor with the fleet. Many military and naval stores were
destroyed, and much more shipped to the Harbor. The great fault that
the British had committed was in letting the defences of so important
a place remain so poor, and the force in it so small. It was impossible
to resist very long when Pike's troops were landed, and the fleet
in position. On the other hand, the Americans did the work in good
style; the schooners were finely handled, firing with great precision
and completely covering the troops, who, in turn, were disembarked
and brought into action very handsomely.

After being detained in York a week by bad weather the squadron got
out, and for the next fortnight was employed in conveying troops
and stores to General Dearborn. Then it was determined to make an
attack on Fort George, where the British General Vincent was stationed
with from 1,000 [Footnote: James, "Military Occurrences," i, p. 151.]
to 1,800 [Footnote: Lossing, 596.] regulars, 600 militia, and about
100 Indians. The American troops numbered about 4,500, practically
under the command of Colonel Scott. On May 26th Commodore Chauncy
carefully reconnoitred the place to be attacked, and in the night
made soundings along the coast, and laid buoys so as to direct the
small vessels, who were to do the fighting. At 3 A.M. on the 27th
the signal was made to weigh, the heavy land artillery being on the
_Madison_, and the other troops on the _Oneida_, the _Lady of the
Lake_, and in batteaux, many of which had been captured at York.
The _Julia_, _Growler_, and _Ontario_ moved in and attacked a battery
near the light-house, opening a cross-fire which silenced it. The
troops were to be disembarked farther along the lake, near a battery
of one long 24, managed by Canadian militia. The _Conquest_ and
_Tompkins_ swept in under fire to this battery, and in 10 minutes
killed or drove off the artillerymen, who left the gun spiked, and
then opened on the British. "The American ships with their heavy
discharges of round and grape too well succeeded in thinning the
British ranks." [Footnote: James, "Military Occurrences," i, p. 151.]
Meanwhile the troop-boats, under Captain Perry and Colonel Scott
dashed in, completely covered by a heavy fire of grape directed
point-blank at the foe by the _Hamilton_, _Scourge_, and _Asp_.
"The fire from the American shipping committed dreadful havoc among
the British, and rendered their efforts to oppose the landing of
the enemy ineffectual." [Footnote: _Loc. cit_] Colonel Scott's troops,
thus protected, made good their landing and met the British regulars;
but the latter were so terribly cut up by the tremendous discharges
of grape and canister from the schooners, that in spite of their
gallantry and discipline they were obliged to retreat, blowing up
and abandoning the fort. One sailor was killed and two wounded
[Footnote: Letter of Commodore Chauncy, May 29, 1813.]; seventeen
soldiers were killed and forty-five wounded [Footnote: Letter of
General Dearborn, May 27, 1813.]; making the total American loss
sixty-five. Of the British regulars 52 were killed, 44 wounded, and
262 "wounded and missing," [Footnote: Letter of Brig.-Gen. Vincent,
May 28, 1813.] in addition to about forty Canadians and Indians
_hors de combat_ and nearly 500 militia captured; so that in this
very brilliant affair the assailants suffered hardly more than a
fifth of the loss in killed and wounded that the assailed did;
which must be attributed to the care with which Chauncy had
reconnoitred the ground and prepared the attack, the excellent
handling of the schooners, and the exceedingly destructive nature
of their fire. The British batteries were very weak, and, moreover,
badly served. Their regular troops fought excellently; it was
impossible for them to stand against the fire of the schooners,
which should have been engaged by the batteries on shore; and they
were too weak in numbers to permit the American army to land and
then attack it when away from the boats. The Americans were greatly
superior in force, and yet deserve very much credit for achieving
their object so quickly, with such slight loss to themselves, and
at such a heavy cost to the foe. The effect of the victory was most
important, the British evacuating the whole Niagara frontier, and
leaving the river in complete possession of the Americans for the
time being. This offered the opportunity for despatching Captain
Perry up above the falls to take out one captured brig (the
_Caledonia_) and four purchased schooners, which had been lying in
the river unable to get past the British batteries into Lake Erie.
These five vessels were now carried into that lake, being tracked
up against the current by oxen, to become a most important addition
to the American force upon it.

While Chauncy's squadron was thus absent at the west end of the lake
the _Wolfe_, 24, was launched and equipped at Kingston, making the
British force on the lake superior to that of the Americans.
Immediately Sir George Prevost, and Sir James Lucas Yeo, the
commanders-in-chief of the land and water forces in the Canadas,
decided to strike a blow at Sackett's Harbor and destroy the _General
Pike_, 28, thus securing to themselves the superiority for the rest
of the season. Accordingly they embarked on May 27th, in the _Wolfe_,
_Royal George_, _Moira_, _Prince Regent_, _Simco_, and _Seneca_,
with a large number of gun-boats, barges, and batteaux; and on the
next day saw and attacked a brigade of 19 boats transporting troops
to Sackett's Harbor, under command of Lieutenant Aspinwall. Twelve
boats were driven ashore, and 70 of the men in them captured; but
Lieutenant Aspinwall and 100 men succeeded in reaching the Harbor,
bringing up the total number of regulars there to 500 men, General
Brown having been summoned to take the chief command. About 400
militia also came in, but were of no earthly service. There were,
however, 200 Albany volunteers, under Colonel Mills, who could be
relied on. The defences were miserably inadequate, consisting
of a battery of one long gun and a block-house.

On the 29th Sir George Prevost and 800 regulars landed, being covered
by the gun-boats under Sir James Lucas Yeo. The American militia
fled at once, but the regulars and volunteers held their ground in
and around the block-house. "At this point the further energies of
the [British] troops became unavailing. The [American] block-house
and stockade could not be carried by assault nor reduced by
field-pieces, had we been provided with them; the fire of the
gun-boats proved insufficient to attain that end; light and adverse
winds continued, and our larger vessels were still far off."
[Footnote: Letter of Adj.-Gen. Baynes, May 30. 1813.] The British
reëmbarked precipitately. The American loss amounted to 23 killed
and 114 wounded; that of the British to 52 killed and 211 wounded,
[Footnote: James, "Military Occurrences," p. 173.] most of the
latter being taken prisoners. During the fight some of the frightened
Americans set fire to the store-houses, the _Pike_ and the _Gloucester_;
the former were consumed, but the flames were extinguished before
they did any damage to either of the vessels. This attack differed
especially from those on Fort George and York, in that the attacking
force was relatively much weaker; still it ought to have been
successful. But Sir George could not compare as a leader with Col.
Scott or Gen. Pike; and Sir James did not handle the gun-boats by
any means as well as the Americans did their schooners in similar
attacks. The admirers of Sir James lay the blame on Sir George, and
_vice versa_; but in reality neither seems to have done particularly
well. At any rate the affair was the reverse of creditable to the British.

The British squadron returned to Kingston, and Chauncy, having heard
that they were out, came down the lake and went into port about June
2d. So far the Americans had had all the success, and had controlled
the lake; but now Yeo's force was too formidable to be encountered
until the _Pike_ was built, and the supremacy passed undisputed into
his hands, while Chauncy lay in Sackett's Harbor. Of course with the
_Pike_ soon to be built, Yeo's uncontested superiority could be of
but short duration; but he used his time most actively. He sailed
from Kingston on the 3d of June, to coöperate with the British army
at the head of the lake, and intercept all supplies going to the
Americans. On the 8th he discovered a small camp of the latter near
Forty Mile Creek, and attacked it with the _Beresford_, _Sydney
Smith_, and gun-boats, obliging the Americans to leave their camp,
while their equipages, provisions, stores, and batteaux fell into
the hands of the British, whose troops occupied the post, thus
assisting in the series of engagements which ended in the humiliating
repulse of General Wilkinson's expedition into Canada. On the 13th
two schooners and some boats bringing supplies to the Americans were
captured, and on the 16th a depot of provisions at the Genesee River
shared the same fate. On the 19th a party of British soldiers were
landed by the fleet at Great Sodas, and took off 600 barrels of flour.
Yeo then returned to Kingston, where he anchored on the 27th having
done good service in assisting the land forces. [Footnote: Letter of
Sir James Lucas Yeo to Mr. Croker, June 29, 1813.] As a small
compensation, on the 18th of the same month the _Lady of the Lake_,
Lieut. Wolcott Chauncy, captured off Presqu' Isle the British schooner
_Lady Murray_, containing 1 ensign, 15 soldiers, and 6 sailors,
together with stores and ammunition. [Footnote: Letter of Lieut.
Wolcott Chauncy to Com. Chauncy, June 18, 1813.]

During the early part of July neither squadron put out in force;
although on the first of the month Commodore Yeo made an abortive
attempt to surprise Sackett's Harbor, but abandoned it when it was
discovered. Meanwhile the Americans were building a new schooner,
the _Sylph_, and the formidable corvette _Pike_ was made ready to
sail by July 21st. On the same day the entire American squadron, or
fleet, sailed up to the head of the lake, and reached Niagara on the
27th. Here Col. Scott and some of his regulars were embarked, and on
the 30th a descent was made upon York, where 11 transports were
destroyed, 5 cannon, a quantity of flour, and some ammunition carried
off, and the barracks burned. On the 3d of August the troops were
disembarked at the Niagara, and 111 officers and men were sent up
to join Perry on Lake Erie. As this left the squadron much deranged
150 militia were subsequently lent it by General Boyd, but they proved
of no assistance (beyond swelling the number of men Yeo captured in
the _Growler_ and _Julia_ from 70 individuals to 80), and were again
landed.

Commodore Yeo sailed with his squadron from Kingston on Aug. 2d,
and on the 7th the two fleets for the first time came in sight of
one another, the Americans at anchor off Fort Niagara, the British
six miles to windward, in the W. N. W. Chauncy's squadron contained
one corvette, one ship sloop, one brig sloop, and ten schooners,
manned by about 965 men, and throwing at a broadside 1,390 lbs. of
shot, nearly 800 of which were from long guns. Yeo's included two
ship sloops, two brig sloops, and two schooners, manned by 770 men,
and throwing at a broadside 1,374 lbs., but 180 being from long guns.
But Yeo's vessels were all built with bulwarks, while ten of Chauncy's
had none; and, moreover, his vessels could all sail and manoeuvre
together, while, as already remarked, one half of the American fleet
spent a large part of its time towing the other half. The _Pike_
would at ordinary range be a match for the _Wolfe_ and _Melville_
together; yet in actual weight of metal she threw less than the former
ship alone. In calm weather the long guns of the American schooners
gave them a great advantage; in rough weather they could not be used
at all. Still, on the whole, it could fairly be said that Yeo was
advancing to attack a superior fleet.

All through the day of the 7th the wind blew light and variable,
and the two squadrons went through a series of manoeuvres, nominally
to bring on an action. As each side flatly contradicts the other
it is hard to tell precisely what the manoeuvres were; each captain
says the other avoided him and that _he_ made all sail in chase. At
any rate it was just the weather for Chauncy to engage in.

That night the wind came out squally; and about 1 A.M. on the morning
of the 8th a heavy gust struck the _Hamilton_ and _Scourge_, forcing
them to careen over till the heavy guns broke loose, and they foundered,
but 16 men escaping,--which accident did not open a particularly
cheerful prospect to the remainder of the schooners. Chauncy's force
was, by this accident, reduced to a numerical equality with Yeo's,
having perhaps a hundred more men, [Footnote: This estimate as to men
is a mere balancing of probabilities. If James underestimates the
British force on Ontario as much as he has on Erie and Champlain,
Yeo had as many men as his opponent. Chauncy, in one of his letters
(preserved with the other manuscript letters in the Naval Archives),
says: "I enclose the muster-rolls of all my ships," but I have not
been able to find them, and in any event the complements were
continually changing completely. The point is not important, as each
side certainly had plenty of men on this occasion.] and throwing 144
lbs. less shot at a broadside. All through the two succeeding days
the same manoeuvring went on; the question as to which avoided the
fight is simply one of veracity between the two commanders, and of
course each side, to the end of time, will believe its own leader.
But it is not of the least consequence, as neither accomplished any thing.

On the 10th the same tedious evolutions were continued, but at 7 P.M.
the two squadrons were tolerably near one another, Yeo to windward,
the breeze being fresh from the S. W. Commodore Chauncy formed his
force in two lines on the port tack, while Commodore Yeo approached
from behind and to windward, in single column, on the same tack.
Commodore Chauncy's weather line was formed of the _Julia_, _Growler_,
_Pert_, _Asp_, _Ontario_, and _American_, in that order, and the
lee line of the _Pike_, _Oneida_, _Madison_, _Tompkins_, and
_Conquest_. Chauncy formed his weather line of the smaller vessels,
directing them, when the British should engage, to edge away and
form to leeward of the second line, expecting that Sir James would
follow them down. At 11 the weather line opened fire at very long
range; at 11.15 it was returned, and the action became general and
harmless; at 11.30 the weather line bore up and passed to leeward,
except the _Julia_ and _Growler_, which tacked. The British ships
kept their luff and cut off the two that had tacked; while Commodore
Chauncy's lee line "edged away two points, to lead the enemy down,
not only to engage him to more advantage, but to lead him from the
_Julia_ and _Growler_." [Footnote: Letter of Commodore Isaac Chauncy.
Aug. 13, 1813.] Of course, the enemy did not come down, and the
_Julia_ and _Growler_ were not saved. Yeo kept on till he had cut
off the two schooners, fired an ineffectual broadside at the other
ships, and tacked after the _Growler_ and _Julia_. Then, when too
late, Chauncy tacked also, and stood after him. The schooners,
meanwhile, kept clawing to windward till they were overtaken, and,
after making a fruitless effort to run the gauntlet through the
enemy's squadron by putting before the wind, were captured. Yeo's
account is simple: "Came within gunshot of _Pike_ and _Madison_,
when they immediately bore up, fired their stern-chase guns, and
made all sail for Niagara, leaving two of their schooners astern,
which we captured." [Footnote: Letter of Sir James Lucas Yeo, Aug.
10, 1813.] The British had acted faultlessly, and the honor and
profit gained by the encounter rested entirely with them. On the
contrary, neither Chauncy nor his subordinates showed to advantage.

Cooper says that the line of battle was "singularly well adapted
to draw the enemy down," and "admirable for its advantages and
ingenuity." In the first place it is an open question whether the
enemy needed drawing down; on this occasion he advanced boldly
enough. The formation may have been ingenious, but it was the
reverse of advantageous. It would have been far better to have had
the strongest vessels to windward, and the schooners, with their
long guns, to leeward, where they would not be exposed to capture
by any accident happening to them. Moreover, it does not speak well
for the discipline of the fleet, that two commanders should have
directly disobeyed orders. And when the two schooners did tack, and
it was evident that Sir James would cut them off, it was an
extraordinary proceeding for Chauncy to "edge away two points * * *
to lead the enemy from the _Growler_ and _Julia_." It is certainly
a novel principle, that if part of a force is surrounded the true
way to rescue it is to run away with the balance, in hopes that the
enemy will follow. Had Chauncy tacked at once, Sir James would have
been placed between two fires, and it would have been impossible for
him to capture the schooners. As it was, the British commander had
attacked a superior force in weather that just suited it, and yet had
captured two of its vessels without suffering any injury beyond a few
shot holes in the sails. The action, however, was in no way decisive.
All next day, the 11th, the fleets were in sight of one another, the
British to windward, but neither attempted to renew the engagement.
The wind grew heavier, and the villainous little American schooners
showed such strong tendencies to upset, that two had to run into
Niagara Bay to anchor. With the rest Chauncy ran down the lake to
Sackett's Harbor, which he reached on the 13th, provisioned his
squadron for five weeks, and that same evening proceeded up the lake again.

[Illustration: The ships are shown just before the weather line bore
up; the dotted lines show the courses the vessels kept, and the crosses
indicate their positions shortly after the _Julia_ and _Growler_
had tacked, and after Chauncy's lee line had "kept off two points."]

The advantage in this action had been entirely with the British,
but it is simple nonsense to say, as one British historian does,
that "on Lake Ontario, therefore, we at last secured a decisive
predominance, which we maintained until the end of the war."
[Footnote: "History of the British Navy," by Charles Duke Yonge
(London, 1866), vol. iii. p. 24. It is apparently not a work of any
authority, but I quote it as showing probably the general feeling
of British writers about the action and its results, which can only
proceed from extreme partizanship and ignorance of the subject.]
This "decisive" battle left the Americans just as much in command of
the lake as the British; and even this very questionable "predominance"
lasted but six weeks, after which the British squadron was blockaded
in port most of the time. The action has a parallel in that fought
on the 22d of July, 1805, by Sir Robert Calder's fleet of 15 sail
of the line against the Franco-Spanish fleet of 20 sail of the line,
under M. Villeneuve.[Footnote: "Batailles Navales de la France," par O.
Troude, iii, 352. It seems rather ridiculous to compare these lake
actions, fought between small flotillas, with the gigantic contests
which the huge fleets of Europe waged in contending for the supremacy
of the ocean; but the difference is one of degree and not of kind, and
they serve well enough for purposes of illustration or comparison.]
The two fleets engaged in a fog, and the English captured two ships,
when both sides drew off, and remained in sight of each other the
next day without either renewing the action. "A victory therefore
it was that Sir Robert Calder had gained, but not a 'decisive' nor
a 'brilliant' victory." [Footnote: James' "Naval History," iv, 14.]
This is exactly the criticism that should be passed on Sir James
Lucas Yeo's action of the 10th of August.

From the 13th of August to the 10th of September both fleets were
on the lake most of the time, each commodore stoutly maintaining
that he was chasing the other; and each expressing in his letters
his surprise and disgust that his opponent should be afraid of
meeting him "though so much superior in force." The facts are of
course difficult to get at, but it seems pretty evident that Yeo was
determined to engage in heavy, and Chauncy in light, weather; and
that the party to leeward generally made off. The Americans had
been re-inforced by the _Sylph_ schooner, of 300 tons and 70 men,
carrying four long 32's on pivots, and six long 6's. Theoretically
her armament would make her formidable; but practically her guns
were so crowded as to be of little use, and the next year she was
converted into a brig, mounting 24-pound carronades.

On the 11th of September a partial engagement, at very long range,
in light weather, occurred near the mouth of the Genesee River; the
Americans suffered no loss whatever, while the British had one
midshipman and three seamen killed and seven wounded, and afterward
ran into Amherst Bay. One of their brigs, the _Melville_, received
a shot so far under water that to get at and plug it, the guns had
to be run in on one side and out on the other. Chauncy describes
it as a running fight of 3 1/2 hours, the enemy then escaping into
Amherst Bay. [Footnote: Letter to the Secretary of the Navy, Sept.
13, 1813.] James (p. 38) says that "At sunset a breeze sprang up
from the westward, when Sir James steered for the American fleet;
but the American commodore avoided a close action, and thus the affair
ended." This is a good sample of James' trustworthiness; his account
is supposed to be taken from Commodore Yeo's letter, [Footnote: Letter
to Admiral Warren, Sept. 12. 1813.] which says: "At sunset a breeze
sprang up from the westward, when I steered for the False Duck Islands,
under which the enemy could not keep the weather-gage, but be obliged
to meet us on equal terms. This, however, he carefully avoided doing."
In other words Yeo did _not_ steer _for_ but _away from_ Chauncy.
Both sides admit that Yeo got the worst of it and ran away, and it
is only a question as to whether Chauncy followed him or not. Of
course in such light weather Chauncy's long guns gave him a great
advantage. He had present 10 vessels; the _Pike_, _Madison_,
_Oneida_, _Sylph_, _Tompkins_, _Conquest_, _Ontario_, _Pert_, _American_,
and _Asp_, throwing 1,288 lbs. of shot, with a total of 98 guns. Yeo
had 92 guns, throwing at a broadside 1,374 lbs. Nevertheless, Chauncy
told but part of the truth in writing as he did: "I was much
disappointed at Sir James refusing to fight me, as he was so much
superior in point of force, both in guns and men, having upward of
20 guns more than we have, and heaves a greater weight of shot."
His inferiority in the long guns placed Yeo at a great disadvantage
in such a very light wind; but in his letter he makes a marvellous
admission of how little able he was to make good use of even what
he had. He says: "I found it impossible to bring them to close
action. We remained in this mortifying situation five hours, having
only six guns in all the squadron that would reach the enemy (not
a carronade being fired)." Now according to James himself ("Naval
Occurrences," p. 297) he had in his squadron 2 long 24's, 13 long
18's, 2 long 12's, and 3 long 9's, and, in a fight of five hours,
at very long range, in smooth water, it was a proof of culpable
incompetency on his part that he did not think of doing what Elliott
and Perry did in similar circumstances on Lake Erie--substitute all
his long guns for some of the carronades on the engaged side.
Chauncy could place in broadside 7 long 32's, 18 long 24's, 4 long
12's, 8 long 6's; so he could oppose 37 long guns, throwing 752 lbs.
of shot, to Yeo's 20 long guns, throwing 333 lbs. of shot. The odds
were thus more than two to one against the British in any case; and
their commander's lack of resource made them still greater. But it
proved a mere skirmish, with no decisive results.

The two squadrons did not come in contact again till on the 28th,
in York Bay. The Americans had the weather-gage, the wind being
fresh from the east. Yeo tacked and stretched out into the lake,
while Chauncy steered directly for his centre. When the squadrons
were still a league apart the British formed on the port tack, with
their heavy vessels ahead; the Americans got on the same tack and
edged down toward them, the _Pike_ ahead, towing the _Asp_; the
_Tompkins_, under Lieut. Bolton Finch, next; the _Madison_ next,
being much retarded by having a schooner in tow; then the _Sylph_,
with another schooner in tow, the _Oneida_, and the two other
schooners. The British, fearing their sternmost vessels would be
cut off, at 12.10 came round on the starboard tack, beginning with
the _Wolfe_, Commodore Yeo, and _Royal George_, Captain William
Howe Mulcaster, which composed the van of the line. They opened
with their starboard guns as soon as they came round. When the
_Pike_ was a-beam of the _Wolfe_, which was past the centre of the
British line, the Americans bore up in succession for their centre.

The _Madison_ was far back, and so was the _Sylph_, neither having
cast off their tows; so the whole brunt of the action fell on the
_Pike_, _Asp_, and _Tompkins_. The latter kept up a most gallant
and spirited fire till her foremast was shot away. But already the
_Pike_ had shot away the _Wolfe's_ main-top-mast and main-yard, and
inflicted so heavy a loss upon her that Commodore Yeo, not very
heroically, put dead before the wind, crowding all the canvas he
could on her forward spars, and she ran completely past all her own
vessels, who of course crowded sail after her. The retreat of the
commodore was most ably covered by the _Royal George_, under Captain
Mulcaster, who was unquestionably the best British officer on the
lake. He luffed up across the commodore's stern, and delivered
broadsides in a manner that won the admiration even of his foes.
The _Madison_ and _Sylph_, having the schooners in tow, could not
overtake the British ships, though the _Sylph_ opened a distant fire;
the _Pike_ kept on after them, but did not cast off the _Asp_, and
so did not gain; and at 3.15 the pursuit was relinquished, [Footnote:
Letter of Commodore Chauncy. Sept. 28, 1813.] when the enemy were
running into the entirely undefended port of Burlington Bay, whence
escape would have been impossible. The _Tompkins_ had lost her
foremast, and the _Pike_ her foretop-gallant mast, with her bowsprit
and main-mast wounded; and of her crew five men were killed or wounded,
almost all by the guns of the _Royal George_. These were the only
injuries occasioned by the enemy's fire, but the _Pike's_ starboard
bow-chaser burst, killing or wounding 22 men, besides blowing up
the top-gallant forecastle, so that the bow pivot gun could not be
used. Among the British ships, the _Wolfe_ lost her main-top-mast,
mizzen-top-mast, and main-yard, and the _Royal George_ her foretop-mast;
both suffered a heavy loss in killed and wounded, according to the
report of the British officers captured in the transports a few days
afterward.

[Illustration of the action between _TOMPKINS_, _ASP_, and _PIKE_,
and the _WOLFE_, _ROYAL GEORGE_, and small gun-boats.]

As already mentioned, the British authorities no longer published
accounts of their defeats, so Commodore Yeo's report on the action
was not made public. Brenton merely alludes to it as follows (vol.
ii, p. 503): "The action of the 28th of September, 1813, in which
Sir James Yeo in the _Wolfe_ had his main- and mizzen-top-masts
shot away, and was obliged to put before the wind, gave Mulcaster
an opportunity of displaying a trait of valor and seamanship which
elicited the admiration of friends and foes, when he gallantly
placed himself between his disabled commodore and a superior enemy."
James speaks in the vaguest terms. He first says, "Commodore Chauncy,
having the weather-gage, kept his favorite distance," which he did
because Commodore Yeo fled so fast that he could not be overtaken;
then James mentions the injuries the _Wolfe_ received, and says that
"it was these and not, as Mr. Clark says, 'a manoeuvre of the
commodore's' that threw the British in confusion." In other words,
it was the commodore's shot and not his manoeuvring that threw the
British into confusion--a very futile distinction. Next he says that
"Commodore Chauncy would not venture within carronade range," whereas
he _was_ within carronade range of the _Wolfe_ and _Royal George_,
but the latter did not wait for the _Madison_ and _Oneida_ to get
within range with _their_ carronades. The rest of his article is
taken up with exposing the absurdities of some of the American
writings, miscalled histories, which appeared at the close of the
war. His criticisms on these are very just, but afford a funny instance
of the pot calling the kettle black. This much is clear, that the
British were beaten and forced to flee, when but part of the American
force was engaged. But in good weather the American force was so
superior that being beaten would have been no disgrace to Yeo, had
it not been for the claims advanced both by himself and his friends,
that on the whole he was victorious over Chauncy. The _Wolfe_ made
any thing but an obstinate fight, leaving almost all the work to the
gallant Mulcaster, in the _Royal George_, who shares with Lieutenant
Finch of the _Tompkins_ most of the glory of the day. The battle,
if such it may be called, completely established Chauncy's supremacy,
Yeo spending most of the remainder of the season blockaded in Kingston.
So Chauncy gained a victory which established his control over the
lakes; and, moreover, he gained it by fighting in succession, almost
single-handed, the two heaviest ships of the enemy. But gaining the
victory was only what should have been expected from a superior force.
The question is, did Chauncy use his force to the best advantage?
And it can not be said that he did. When the enemy bore up it was
a great mistake not to cast off the schooners which were being towed.
They were small craft, not of much use in the fight, and they entirely
prevented the _Madison_ from taking any part in the contest, and
kept the _Sylph_ at a great distance; and by keeping the _Asp_ in
tow the _Pike_, which sailed faster than any of Yeo's ships, was
distanced by them. Had she left the _Asp_ behind and run in to engage
the _Royal George_ she could have mastered, or at any rate disabled,
her; and had the swift _Madison_ cast off her tow she could also
have taken an effective part in the engagement. If the _Pike_ could
put the British to flight almost single-handed, how much more could
she not have done when assisted by the _Madison_ and _Oneida_? The
cardinal error, however, was made in discontinuing the chase. The
British were in an almost open roadstead, from which they could not
possibly escape. Commodore Chauncy was afraid that the wind would
come up to blow a gale, and both fleets would be thrown ashore; and,
moreover, he expected to be able to keep a watch over the enemy and
to attack him at a more suitable time. But he utterly failed in
this last; and had the American squadron cast off their tows and
gone boldly in, they certainly ought to have been able to destroy
or capture the entire British force before a gale could blow up.
Chauncy would have done well to keep in mind the old adage, so
peculiarly applicable to naval affairs: "L'audace! toujours l'audace!
et encore l'audace!" Whether the fault was his or that of his
subordinates, it is certain that while the victory of the 28th of
September definitely settled the supremacy of the lake in favor of
the Americans, yet this victory was by no means so decided as it
should have been, taking into account his superiority in force and
advantage in position, and the somewhat spiritless conduct of his foe.

Next day a gale came on to blow, which lasted till the evening of
the 31st. There was no longer any apprehension of molestation from
the British, so the troop transports were sent down the lake by
themselves, while the squadron remained to watch Yeo. On Oct. 2d
he was chased, but escaped by his better sailing; and next day
false information induced Chauncy to think Yeo had eluded him
and passed down the lake, and he accordingly made sail in the
direction of his supposed flight. On the 5th, at 3 P.M., while near
the False Ducks, seven vessels were made out ahead, which proved
to be British gun-boats, engaged in transporting troops. All sails
was made after them; one was burned, another escaped, and five were
captured, the _Mary_, _Drummond_, _Lady Gore_, _Confiance_, and
_Hamilton_, [Footnote: Letter of Commodore Chauncy, Oct. 8, 1813.]--the
two latter being the rechristened _Julia_ and _Growler_. Each
gun-vessel had from one to three guns, and they had aboard in all
264 men, including seven naval (three royal and four provincial)
and ten military officers. These prisoners stated that in the action
of the 28th the _Wolfe_ and _Royal George_ had lost very heavily.

After this Yeo remained in Kingston, blockaded there by Chauncy for
most of the time; on Nov. 10th he came out and was at once chased
back into port by Chauncy, leaving the latter for the rest of the
season entirely undisturbed. Accordingly, Chauncy was able to convert
his small schooners into transports. On the 17th these transports
were used to convey 1,100 men of the army of General Harrison from
the mouth of the Genesee to Sackett's Harbor, while Chauncy blockaded
Yeo in Kingston. The duty of transporting troops and stores went
on till the 27th, when every thing had been accomplished; and a day
or two afterward navigation closed.

As between the Americans and British, the success of the season was
greatly in favor of the former. They had uncontested control over
the lake from April 19th to June 3d, and from Sept. 28th to Nov.
29th, in all 107 days; while their foes only held it from June 3d
to July 21st, or for 48 days; and from that date to Sept. 28th, for
69 days, the two sides were contending for the mastery. York and
Fort George had been taken, while the attack on Sackett's Harbor
was repulsed. The Americans lost but two schooners, both of which
were recaptured; while the British had one 24-gun-ship nearly ready
for launching destroyed, and one 10-gun brig taken, and the loss
inflicted upon each other in transports, gun-boats, store-houses,
stores, etc., was greatly in favor of the former. Chauncy's fleet,
moreover, was able to co-operate with the army for over twice the
length of time Yeo's could (107 days to 48).

It is more difficult to decide between the respective merits of the
two commanders. We had shown so much more energy than the
Anglo-Canadians that at the beginning of the year we had overtaken
them in the building race, and the two fleets were about equally
formidable. The _Madison_ and _Oneida_ were not quite a match for
the _Royal George_ and _Sydney Smith_ (opposing 12 32-pound and 8
24-pound carronades to 2 long 18's, 1 long 12, 1 68-pound and 13
32-pound carronades); and our ten gun-schooners would hardly be
considered very much of an overmatch for the _Melville_, _Motra_,
and _Beresford_. Had Sir James Yeo been as bold and energetic as
Barclay or Mulcaster he would certainly not have permitted the
Americans, when the forces were so equal, to hold uncontested sway
over the lake, and by reducing Fort George, to cause disaster to
the British land forces. It would certainly have been better to risk
a battle with equal forces, than to wait till each fleet received
an additional ship, which rendered Chauncy's squadron the superior
by just about the superiority of the _Pike_ to the _Wolfe_. Again,
Yeo did not do particularly well in the repulse before Sackett's
Harbor; in the skirmish off Genesee river he showed a marked lack
of resource; and in the action of the 28th of September (popularly
called the "Burlington Races" from the celerity of his retreat) he
evinced an amount of caution that verged toward timidity, in allowing
the entire brunt of the fighting to fall on Mulcaster in the _Royal
George_, a weaker ship than the _Wolfe_. On the other hand, he gave
able co-operation to the army while he possessed control of the lake;
he made a most gallant and successful attack on a superior force on
the 10th of August; and for six weeks subsequently by skilful manoeuvring
he prevented this same superior force from acquiring the uncontested
mastery. It was no disgrace to be subsequently blockaded; but it is
very ludicrous in his admirers to think that he came out first best.

Chauncy rendered able and invaluable assistance to the army all the
while that he had control of the water; his attacks on York and Fort
George were managed with consummate skill and success, and on the
28th of September he practically defeated the opposing force with
his own ship alone. Nevertheless he can by no means be said to have
done the best he could with the materials he had. His stronger fleet
was kept two months in check by a weaker British fleet. When he first
encountered the foe, on August 10th, he ought to have inflicted such
a check upon him as would at least have confined him to port and
given the Americans immediate superiority on the lake; instead of
which he suffered a mortifying, although not at all disastrous, defeat,
which allowed the British to contest the supremacy with him for six
weeks longer. On the 28th of September, when he only gained a rather
barren victory, it was nothing but excessive caution that prevented
him from utterly destroying his foe. Had Perry on that day commanded
the American fleet there would have been hardly a British ship left
on Ontario. Chauncy was an average commander; and the balance of
success inclined to the side of the Americans only because they showed
greater energy and skill in shipbuilding, the crews and commanders
on both sides being very nearly equal.


Lake Erie.

Captain Oliver Hazard Perry had assumed command of Erie and the upper
lakes, acting under Commodore Chauncy. With intense energy he at once
began creating a naval force which should be able to contend successfully
with the foe. As already said, the latter in the beginning had exclusive
control of Lake Erie; but the Americans had captured the _Caledonia_,
brig, and purchased three schooners, afterward named the _Somers_,
_Tigress_, and _Ohio_, and a sloop, the _Trippe_. These at first
were blockaded in the Niagara, but after the fall of Fort George and
retreat of the British forces, Captain Perry was enabled to get them
out, tracking them up against the current by the most arduous labor.
They ran up to Presque Isle (now called Erie), where two 20-gun brigs
were being constructed under the directions of the indefatigable
captain. Three other schooners, the _Ariel_, _Scorpion_, and
_Porcupine_, were also built.

The harbor of Erie was good and spacious, but had a bar on which
there was less than seven feet of water. Hitherto this had prevented
the enemy from getting in; now it prevented the two brigs from
getting out. Captain Robert Heriot Barclay had been appointed
commander of the British forces on Lake Erie; and he was having
built at Amherstburg a 20-gun ship. Meanwhile he blockaded Perry's
force, and as the brigs could not cross the bar with their guns in,
or except in smooth water, they of course could not do so in his
presence. He kept a close blockade for some time; but on the 2d of
August he disappeared. Perry at once hurried forward every thing;
and on the 4th, at 2 P.M., one brig, the _Lawrence_, was towed to
that point of the bar where the water was deepest. Her guns were
whipped out and landed on the beach, and the brig got over the bar
by a hastily improvised "camel."

"Two large scows, prepared for the purpose, were hauled alongside,
and the work of lifting the brig proceeded as fast as possible.
Pieces of massive timber had been run through the forward and after
ports, and when the scows were sunk to the water's edge, the ends
of the timbers were blocked up, supported by these floating foundations.
The plugs were now put in the scows, and the water was pumped out
of them. By this process the brig was lifted quite two feet, though
when she was got on the bar it was found that she still drew too
much water. It became necessary, in consequence, to cover up every
thing, sink the scows anew, and block up the timbers afresh. This
duty occupied the whole night." [Footnote: Cooper, ii, 389. Perry's
letter of Aug. 5th is very brief.]

Just as the _Lawrence_ had passed the bar, at 8 A.M. on the 5th,
the enemy reappeared, but too late; Captain Barclay exchanged a few
shots with the schooners and then drew off. The _Niagara_ crossed
without difficulty. There were still not enough men to man the vessels,
but a draft arrived from Ontario, and many of the frontiersmen
volunteered, while soldiers also were sent on board. The squadron
sailed on the 18th in pursuit of the enemy, whose ship was now ready.
After cruising about some time the _Ohio_ was sent down the lake,
and the other ships went into Put-in Bay. On the 9th of September
Captain Barclay put out from Amherstburg, being so short of provisions
that he felt compelled to risk an action with the superior force
opposed. On the 10th of September his squadron was discovered from
the mast-head of the _Lawrence_ in the northwest. Before going into
details of the action we will examine the force of the two squadrons,
as the accounts vary considerably.

The tonnage of the British ships, as already stated, we know exactly,
they having been all carefully appraised and measured by the builder
Mr. Henry Eckford, and two sea-captains. We also know the dimensions
of the American ships. The _Lawrence_ and _Niagara_ measured 480
tons apiece. The _Caledonia_, brig, was about the size of the _Hunter_,
or 180 tons. The _Tigress_, _Somers_, and _Scorpion_ were subsequently
captured by the foe and were then said to measure, respectively,
96, 94, and 86 tons; in which case they were larger than similar
boats on Lake Ontario. The _Ariel_ was about the size of the _Hamilton_;
the _Porcupine_ and _Trippe_ about the size of the _Asp_ and _Pert_.
As for the guns, Captain Barclay in his letter gives a complete
account of those on board his squadron. He has also given a complete
account of the American guns, which is most accurate, and, if any
thing, underestimates them. At least Emmons in his "History" gives
the _Trippe_ a long 32, while Barclay says she had only a long 24;
and Lossing in his "Field-Book" says (but I do not know on what
authority) that the _Caledonia_ had 3 long 24's, while Barclay gives
her 2 long 24's and one 32-pound carronade; and that the _Somers_
had two long 32's, while Barclay gives her one long 32 and one
24-pound carronade. I shall take Barclay's account, which corresponds
with that of Emmons; the only difference being that Emmons puts a
24-pounder on the _Scorpion_ and a 32 on the _Trippe_, while Barclay
reverses this. I shall also follow Emmons in giving the _Scorpion_
a 32-pound carronade instead of a 24.

It is more difficult to give the strength of the respective crews.
James says the Americans had 580, all "picked men." They were just
as much picked men as Barclay's were, and no more; that is, the ships
had "scratch" crews. Lieutenant Emmons gives Perry 490 men; and Lossing
says he "had upon his muster-roll 490 names." In vol. xiv, p. 566,
of the American State Papers, is a list of the prize-monies owing
to each man (or to the survivors of the killed), which gives a grand
total of 532 men, including 136 on the _Lawrence_ and 155 on the
_Niagara_, 45 of whom were volunteers--frontiersmen. Deducting these
we get 487 men, which is pretty near Lieutenant Emmons' 490. Possibly
Lieutenant Emmons did not include these volunteers; and it may be
that some of the men whose names were down on the prize list had
been so sick that they were left on shore. Thus Lieutenant Yarnall
testified before a Court of Inquiry in 1815, that there were but
131 men and boys of every description on board the _Lawrence_ in
the action; and the _Niagara_ was said to have had but 140. Lieutenant
Yarnall also said that "but 103 men on board the _Lawrence_ were
fit for duty"; as Captain Perry in his letter said that 31 were unfit
for duty, this would make a total of 134. So I shall follow the
prize-money list; at any rate the difference in number is so slight
as to be immaterial. Of the 532 men whose names the list gives, 45
were volunteers, or landsmen, from among the surrounding inhabitants;
158 were marines or soldiers (I do not know which, as the list gives
marines, soldiers, and privates, and it is impossible to tell which
of the two former heads include the last); and 329 were officers,
seamen, cooks, pursers, chaplains, and supernumeraries. Of the total
number, there were on the day of action, according to Perry's report,
116 men unfit for duty, including 31 on board the _Lawrence_, 28 on
board the _Niagara_, and 57 on the small vessels.

All the later American writers put the number of men in Barclay's
fleet precisely at "502," but I have not been able to find out the
original authority. James ("Naval Occurrences," p. 289) says the
British had but 345, consisting of 50 seamen, 85 Canadians, and 210
soldiers. But the letter of Adjutant-General E. Bayne, Nov. 24, 1813,
states that there were 250 soldiers aboard Barclay's squadron, of
whom 23 were killed, 49 wounded, and the balance (178) captured;
and James himself on a previous page (284) states that there were
102 Canadians on Barclay's vessels, not counting the _Detroit_, and
we know that Barclay originally joined the squadron with 19 sailors
from the Ontario fleet, and that subsequently 50 sailors came up
from the _Dover_, James gives at the end of his "Naval Occurrences"
some extracts from the court-martial held on Captain Barclay. Lieut.
Thomas Stokes, of the _Queen Charlotte_, there testified that he
had on board "between 120 and 130 men, officers and all together,"
of whom "16 came up from the _Dover_ three days before." James, on
p. 284, says her crew already consisted of 110 men; adding these
16 gives us 126 (almost exactly "between 120 and 130"). Lieutenant
Stokes also testified that the _Detroit_ had more men on account
of being a larger and heavier vessel; to give her 150 is perfectly
safe, as her heavier guns and larger size would at least need 24
men more than the _Queen Charlotte_. James gives the _Lady Prevost_
76, _Hunter_ 39, _Little Belt_ 15, and _Chippeway_ 13 men, Canadians
and soldiers, a total of 143; supposing that the number of British
sailors placed on them was proportional to the amount placed on board
the _Queen Charlotte_, we could add 21. This would make a grand
total of 440 men, which must certainly be near the truth. This number
is corroborated otherwise: General Bayne, as already quoted, says
that there were aboard 250 soldiers, of whom 72 were killed or wounded.
Barclay reports a total loss of 135, of whom 63 must therefore have
been sailors or Canadians, and if the loss suffered by these bore
the same proportion to their whole number as in the case of the
soldiers, there ought to have been 219 sailors and Canadians, making
in all 469 men. It can thus be said with certainty that there were
between 440 and 490 men aboard, and I shall take the former number,
though I have no doubt that this is too small. But it is not a point
of very much importance, as the battle was fought largely at long
range, where the number of men, provided there were plenty to handle
the sails and guns, did not much matter. The following statement
of the comparative force must therefore be very nearly accurate:

PERRY'S SQUADRON.

                                        Crew    Broad
                               Total   fit for  side;
Name.          Rig.    Tons.   Crew.    Duty.    lbs.   Armament.

_Lawrence_,    brig     480     136      105     300  -+- 2 long 12's
                                                       '-18 short 32's
_Niagara_,      "       480     155      127     300  -+- 2 long 12's
                                                       |-18 short 32's
_Caledonia_,    "       180      53-+             80  -+- 2 long 24's
                                    |                  '- 1 short 32
_Ariel_,     schooner   112      36 |             48      4 long 12's
_Scorpion_,     "        86      35 |             64  -+- 1  " 32
                                    |                  '- 1 short 32
_Somers_,       "        86      35 +-   184      56  -+- 1 long 24
                                    |                  '- 1 short 32
_Porcupine_,    "        83      25 |             32      1 long 32
_Tigress_,      "        96      27 |             32      1  " 32
_Trippe_,     sloop      60      35-+             24      1  " 24
---------              ----     ---     ----     ---   ---------------
9 vessels,            1,671     532     (416)    936 lbs.

During the action, however, the _Lawrence_ and _Niagara_ each fought
a long 12 instead of one of the carronades on the engaged side, making
a broadside of 896 lbs., 288 lbs. being from long guns.

BARCLAY'S SQUADRON.

                                           Broadside;
Name.              Rig.    Tons.   Crew.      lbs.      Armament.

                                                       ,- 1 long 18
                                                       |  2 " 24's
_Detroit_,         Ship     490     150       138     -+  6 " 12's
                                                       |  2 " 24's
                                                       |  8 " 9's
                                                       |  1 short 24
                                                       '- 1 " 18
                                                       ,- 1 long 12
_Queen Charlotte_,  "       400     126       189     -+  2 " 9's
                                                       '-14 short 24's
_Lady Prevost_,   schooner  230    86         75      -+- 1 long 9
                                                       |  2 " 6's
                                                       '- 10 short 12's
_Hunter_,         brig      180    45         30      -+- 4 long 6's
                                                       |  2 " 4's
                                                       |  2 " 2's
                                                       '- 2 short 12's
_Chippeway_,      schooner   70    15          9          1 long 9
_Little Belt_,    sloop      90    18         18      -+- 1 " 12
                                                       '- 2 " 6's
--------                   ----   ---        ------
6 vessels                  1460   440        459 lbs.

These six vessels thus threw at a broadside 459 lbs., of which 195
were from long guns.

The superiority of the Americans in long-gun metal was therefore
nearly as three is to two, and in carronade metal greater than two
to one. The chief fault to be found in the various American accounts
is that they sedulously conceal the comparative weight of metal,
while carefully specifying the number of guns. Thus, Lossing says:
"Barclay had 35 long guns to Perry's 15, and possessed greatly the
advantage in action at a distance"; which he certainly did not. The
tonnage of the fleets is not so very important; the above tables are
probably pretty nearly right. It is, I suppose, impossible to tell
exactly the number of men in the two crews. Barclay almost certainly
had more than the 440 men I have given him, but in all likelihood
some of them were unfit for duty, and the number of his effectives
was most probably somewhat less than Perry's. As the battle was
fought in such smooth water, and part of the time at long range,
this, as already said, does not much matter. The Niagara might be
considered a match for the Detroit, and the Lawrence and Caledonia
for the five other British vessels; so the Americans were certainly
very greatly superior in force.

At daylight on Sept. 10th Barclay's squadron was discovered in the
N. W., and Perry at once got under weigh; the wind soon shifted to
the N. E., giving us the weather-gage, the breeze being very light.
Barclay lay to in a close column, heading to the S. W in the
following order: _Chippeway_, _Master's Mate J. Campbell; _Detroit_,
Captain R. H. Barclay; _Hunter_, Lieutenant G. Bignall; _Queen
Charlotte_, Captain R. Finnis; _Lady Prevost_, Lieutenant Edward
Buchan; and _Little Belt_, by whom commanded is not said. Perry
came down with the wind on his port beam, and made the attack in
column ahead, obliquely. First in order came the _Ariel_, Lieut.
John H. Packet, and _Scorpion_, Sailing-Master Stephen Champlin,
both being on the weather bow of the _Lawrence_, Captain O. H.
Perry; next came the _Caledonia_, Lieut. Daniel Turner; _Niagara_,
Captain Jesse D. Elliott; _Somers_, Lieutenant A. H. M. Conklin;
_Porcupine_, Acting Master George Serrat; _Tigress_, Sailing-Master
Thomas C. Almy, and _Trippe_, Lieutenant Thomas Holdup. [Footnote:
The accounts of the two commanders tally almost exactly. Barclay's
letter is a model of its kind for candor and generosity. Letter of
Captain R. H. Barclay to Sir James. Sept. 2, 1813; of Lieutenant
Inglis to Captain Barclay, Sept. 10th; of Captain Perry to the
Secretary of the Navy, Sept. 10th and Sept. 13th, and to General
Harrison, Sept. 11th and Sept. 13th. I have relied mainly on Lossing's
"Field-Book of the War of 1812" (especially for the diagrams furnished
him by Commodore Champlin), on Commander Ward's "Naval Tactics," p. 76,
and on Cooper's "Naval History." Extracts from the court-martial on
Captain Barclay are given in James' "Naval Occurrences," lxxxiii.]

As, amid light and rather baffling winds, the American squadron
approached the enemy, Perry's straggling line formed an angle of
about fifteen degrees with the more compact one of his foes. At 11.45
the Detroit opened the action by a shot from her long 24, which fell
short; at 11.50 she fired a second which went crashing through the
_Lawrence_, and was replied to by the _Scorpion's_ long 32. At 11.55
the _Lawrence_, having shifted her port bow-chaser, opened with both
the long 12's, and at meridian began with her carronades, but the
shot from the latter all fell short. At the same time the action
became general on both sides, though the rearmost American vessels
were almost beyond the range of their own guns, and quite out of
range of the guns of their antagonists. Meanwhile the _Lawrence_
was already suffering considerably as she bore down on the enemy.

[Illustration: The Battle of Lake Eire: a painting done for Thomas
Brownell, sailing master of the _Ariel_, by George I. Cook in 1815-16.
The composition was inspected for accuracy by Commodore Perry and
three other officers as well as by Brownell himself, "all of whom,"
he wrote years later, "were in the battle, and in whose minds all
its incidents, the positions of the fleets & appearance of the vessels
was fresh. In the last two particulars the picture is the product
of our joined opinions and recollections; it is, therefore, to be
presumed that it is a correct representation of that naval combat."
Here published for the first time, it depicts the second stage of
the battle, in which Perry, having transferred his flag to the
_Niagara_, brought the entire American squadron into action. The
vessels, from left to right, are American unless denoted (Br):
_Lady Prevost_ (Br), _Trippe_, _Chippeway_ (Br), _Caledonia_,
_Niagara_, _Detroit_ (Br), _Queen Charlotte_ (Br), _Hunter_ (Br),
_Scorpion_, _Ariel_, _Porcupine_, and _Lawrence_. (Courtesy U.S.
Naval Academy Museum)]

It was twenty minutes before she succeeded in getting within good
carronade range, and during that time the action at the head of the
line was between the long guns of the _Chippeway_ and _Detroit_,
throwing 123 pounds, and those of the _Scorpion_, _Ariel_, and
_Lawrence_, throwing 104 pounds. As the enemy's fire was directed
almost exclusively at the _Lawrence_ she suffered a great deal. The
_Caledonia_, _Niagara_, and _Somers_ were meanwhile engaging, at
long range, the _Hunter_ and _Queen Charlotte_, opposing from their
long guns 96 pounds to the 39 pounds of their antagonists, while
from a distance the three other American gun-vessels engaged the
_Prevost_ and _Little Belt_. By 12.20 the _Lawrence_ had worked
down to close quarters, and at 12.30 the action was going on with
great fury between her and her antagonists, within canister range.
The raw and inexperienced American crews committed the same fault
the British so often fell into on the ocean, and overloaded their
carronades. In consequence, that of the _Scorpion_ upset down the
hatchway in the middle of the action, and the sides of the _Detroit_
were dotted with marks from shot that did not penetrate. One of the
_Ariel's_ long 12's also burst. Barclay fought the _Detroit_
exceedingly well, her guns being most excellently aimed, though they
actually had to be discharged by flashing pistols at the touchholes,
so deficient was the ship's equipment. Meanwhile the _Caledonia_
came down too, but the _Niagara_ was wretchedly handled, Elliott
keeping at a distance which prevented the use either of his carronades
or of those of the _Queen Charlotte_, his antagonist; the latter,
however, suffered greatly from the long guns of the opposing schooners,
and lost her gallant commander, Captain Finnis, and first lieutenant,
Mr. Stokes, who were killed early in the action; her next in command,
Provincial Lieutenant Irvine, perceiving that he could do no good,
passed the _Hunter_ and joined in the attack on the _Lawrence_, at
close quarters. The _Niagara_, the most efficient and best-manned
of the American vessels, was thus almost kept out of the action by
her captain's misconduct. At the end of the line the fight went on
at long range between the _Somers_, _Tigress_, _Porcupine_, and
_Trippe_ on one side, and _Little Belt_ and _Lady Prevost_ on the
other; the _Lady Prevost_ making a very noble fight, although her
12-pound carronades rendered her almost helpless against the long
guns of the Americans. She was greatly cut up, her commander, Lieutenant
Buchan, was dangerously, and her acting first lieutenant, Mr. Roulette,
severely wounded, and she began falling gradually to leeward.

The fighting at the head of the line was fierce and bloody to an
extraordinary degree. The _Scorpion_, _Ariel_, _Lawrence_, and
_Caledonia_, all of them handled with the most determined courage,
were opposed to the _Chippeway_, _Detroit_, _Queen Charlotte_,
and _Hunter_, which were fought to the full as bravely. At such
close quarters the two sides engaged on about equal terms, the
Americans being superior in weight of metal, and inferior in number
of men. But the _Lawrence_ had received such damage in working down
as to make the odds against Perry. On each side almost the whole
fire was directed at the opposing large vessel or vessels; in
consequence the _Queen Charlotte_ was almost disabled, and the
_Detroit_ was also frightfully shattered, especially by the raking
fire of the gun-boats, her first lieutenant, Mr. Garland, being
mortally wounded, and Captain Barclay so severely injured that he
was obliged to quit the deck, leaving his ship in the command of
Lieutenant George Inglis. But on board the _Lawrence_ matters had
gone even worse, the combined fire of her adversaries having made
the grimmest carnage on her decks. Of the 103 men who were fit for
duty when she began the action, 83, or over four fifths, were killed
or wounded. The vessel was shallow, and the ward-room, used as a
cockpit, to which the wounded were taken, was mostly above water,
and the shot came through it continually, killing and wounding many
men under the hands of the surgeon.

The first lieutenant, Yarnall, was three times wounded, but kept
to the deck through all; the only other lieutenant on board, Brooks,
of the marines, was mortally wounded. Every brace and bowline was
shot away, and the brig almost completely dismantled; her hull was
shattered to pieces, many shot going completely through it, and the
guns on the engaged side were by degrees all dismounted. Perry kept
up the fight with splendid courage. As the crew fell one by one,
the commodore called down through the skylight for one of the
surgeon's assistants; and this call was repeated and obeyed till
none were left; then he asked, "Can any of the wounded pull a rope?"
and three or four of them crawled up on deck to lend a feeble hand
in placing the last guns. Perry himself fired the last effective
heavy gun, assisted only by the purser and chaplain. A man who did
not possess his indomitable spirit would have then struck. Instead,
however, although failing in the attack so far, Perry merely determined
to win by new methods, and remodelled the line accordingly. Mr. Turner,
in the _Caledonia_, when ordered to close, had put his helm up, run
down on the opposing line, and engaged at very short range, though the
brig was absolutely without quarters. The _Niagara_ had thus become
the next in line astern of the _Lawrence_, and the sloop _Trippe_,
having passed the three schooners in front of her, was next ahead.
The _Niagara_ now, having a breeze, steered for the head of Barclay's
line, passing over a quarter of a mile to windward of the _Lawrence_,
on her port beam. She was almost uninjured, having so far taken very
little part in the combat, and to her Perry shifted his flag. Leaping
into a row boat, with his brother and four seamen, he rowed to the
fresh brig, where he arrived at 2.30, and at once sent Elliott astern
to hurry up the three schooners. The _Trippe_ was now very near the
_Caledonia_. The _Lawrence_, having but 14 sound men left, struck her
colors, but could not be taken possession of before the action
re-commenced. She drifted astern, the _Caledonia_ passing between
her and her foes. At 2.45, the schooners having closed up, Perry,
in his fresh vessel, bore up to break Barclay's line.

The British ships had fought themselves to a standstill. The _Lady
Prevost_ was crippled and sagged to leeward, though ahead of the
others. The _Detroit_ and _Queen Charlotte_ were so disabled that
they could not effectually oppose fresh antagonists. There could
thus be but little resistance to Perry, as the _Niagara_ stood down,
and broke the British line, firing her port guns into the _Chippeway_,
_Little Belt_, and _Lady Prevost_, and the starboard ones into the
_Detroit_, _Queen Charlotte_, and _Hunter_, raking on both sides.
Too disabled to tack, the _Detroit_ and _Charlotte_ tried to wear,
the latter running up to leeward of the former; and, both vessels
having every brace and almost every stay shot away, they fell foul.
The _Niagara_ luffed athwart their bows, within half pistol-shot,
keeping up a terrific discharge of great guns and musketry, while
on the other side the British vessels were raked by the _Caledonia_
and the schooners so closely that some of their grape shot, passing
over the foe, rattled through Perry's spars. Nothing further could
be done, and Barclay's flag was struck at 3 P.M., after three and
a quarter hours' most gallant and desperate fighting. The _Chippeway_
and _Little Belt_ tried to escape, but were overtaken and brought
to respectively by the _Trippe_ and _Scorpion_, the commander of
the latter, Mr. Stephen Champlin, firing the last, as he had the
first, shot of the battle. "Captain Perry has behaved in the most
humane and attentive manner, not only to myself and officers, but
to all the wounded," writes Captain Barclay.

The American squadron had suffered severely, more than two thirds
of the loss falling upon the _Lawrence_, which was reduced to the
condition of a perfect wreck, her starboard bulwarks being completely
beaten in. She had, as already stated, 22 men killed, including
Lieutenant of Marines Brooks and Midshipman Lamb; and 61 wounded,
including Lieutenant Yarnall, Midshipman (acting second lieutenant)
Forrest, Sailing-Master Taylor, Purser Hambleton, and Midshipmen
Swartout and Claxton. The _Niagara_ lost 2 killed and 25 wounded
(almost a fifth of her effectives), including among the latter the
second lieutenant, Mr. Edwards, and Midshipman Cummings. The
_Caledonia_ had 3, the _Somers_ 2, and _Trippe_ 2, men wounded. The
_Ariel_ had 1 killed and 3 wounded; the _Scorpion_ 2 killed, including
Midshipman Lamb. The total loss was 123; 27 were killed and 96 wounded,
of whom 3 died.

The British loss, falling most heavily on the _Detroit_ and _Queen
Charlotte_, amounted to 41 killed (including Capt. S. J. Garden,
R.N., and Captain R. A. Finnis), and 94 wounded (including Captain
Barclay and Lieutenants Stokes, Buchan, Rolette, and Bignall): in
all 135. The first and second in command on every vessel were killed
or wounded, a sufficient proof of the desperate nature of the defence.

[Illustration: The following diagrams will serve to explain the movements.]

[Illustration: 2 P.M.]

[Illustration: 2:30 P.M.]

The victory of Lake Erie was most important, both in its material
results and in its moral effect. It gave us complete command of all
the upper lakes, prevented any fears of invasion from that quarter,
increased our prestige with the foe and our confidence in ourselves,
and ensured the conquest of upper Canada; in all these respects its
importance has not been overrated. But the "glory" acquired by it
most certainly _has_ been estimated at more than its worth. Most
Americans, even the well educated, if asked which was the most
glorious victory of the war, would point to this battle. Captain
Perry's name is more widely known than that of any other commander.
Every school-boy reads about _him_, if of no other sea-captain;
yet he certainly stands on a lower grade than either Hull or
Macdonough, and not a bit higher than a dozen others. On Lake Erie
our seamen displayed great courage and skill; but so did their
antagonists. The simple truth is, that, where on both sides the
officers and men were equally brave and skilful, the side which
possessed the superiority in force, in the proportion of three to
two, could not well help winning. The courage with which the
_Lawrence_ was defended has hardly ever been surpassed, and may fairly
be called heroic; but equal praise belongs to the men on board the
_Detroit_, who had to discharge the great guns by flashing pistols at
the touchholes, and yet made such a terribly effective defence.
Courage is only one of the many elements which go to make up the
character of a first-class commander; something more than bravery
is needed before a leader can be really called great.

There happened to be circumstances which rendered the bragging of
our writers over the victory somewhat plausible. Thus they could
say with an appearance of truth that the enemy had 63 guns to our
54, and outnumbered us. In reality, as well as can be ascertained
from the conflicting evidence, he was inferior in number; but a few
men more or less mattered nothing. Both sides had men enough to work
the guns and handle the ships, especially as the fight was in smooth
water, and largely at long range. The important fact was that though
we had nine guns less, yet, at a broadside, they threw half as much
metal again as those of our antagonist. With such odds in our favor
it would have been a disgrace to have been beaten. The water was
too smooth for our two brigs to show at their best; but this very
smoothness rendered our gun-boats more formidable than any of the
British vessels, and the British testimony is unanimous, that it
was to them the defeat was primarily due. The American fleet came
into action in worse form than the hostile squadron, the ships
straggling badly, either owing to Perry having formed his line badly,
or else to his having failed to train the subordinate commanders
how to keep their places. The Niagara was not fought well at first,
Captain Elliott keeping her at a distance that prevented her from
doing any damage to the vessels opposed, which were battered to pieces
by the gun-boats without the chance of replying. It certainly seems
as if the small vessels at the rear of the line should have been
closer up, and in a position to render more effectual assistance;
the attack was made in too loose order, and, whether it was the fault
of Perry or of his subordinates, it fails to reflect credit on the
Americans. Cooper, as usual, praises all concerned; but in this
instance not with very good judgment. He says the line-of-battle
was highly judicious, but this may be doubted. The weather was
peculiarly suitable for the gun-boats, with their long, heavy guns;
and yet the line-of-battle was so arranged as to keep them in the
rear and let the brunt of the assault fall on the _Lawrence_, with
her short carronades. Cooper again praises Perry for steering for
the head of the enemy's line, but he could hardly have done any thing
else. In this battle the firing seems to have been equally skilful
on both sides, the _Detroit's_ long guns being peculiarly well served;
but the British captains manoeuvred better than their foes at first,
and supported one another better, so that the disparity in damage
done on each side was not equal to the disparity in force. The chief
merit of the American commander and his followers was indomitable
courage, and determination not to be beaten. This is no slight merit;
but it may well be doubted if it would have ensured victory had
Barclay's force been as strong as Perry's. Perry made a headlong
attack; his superior force, whether through his fault or his
misfortune can hardly be said, being brought into action in such
a manner that the head of the line was crushed by the inferior force
opposed. Being literally hammered out of his own ship, Perry brought
up its powerful twin-sister, and the already shattered hostile squadron
was crushed by sheer weight. The manoeuvres which marked the close
of the battle, and which ensured the capture of all the opposing
ships, were unquestionably very fine.

The British ships were fought as resolutely as their antagonists,
not being surrendered till they were crippled and helpless, and
almost all the officers, and a large proportion of the men placed
_hors de combat_. Captain Barclay handled his ships like a first-rate
seaman. It was impossible to arrange them so as to be superior to
his antagonist, for the latter's force was of such a nature that in
smooth water his gun-boats gave him a great advantage, while in any
sea his two brigs were more than a match for the whole British squadron.
In short, our victory was due to our heavy metal. As regards the
honor of the affair, in spite of the amount of boasting it has given
rise to, I should say it was a battle to be looked upon as in an
equally high degree creditable to both sides. Indeed, if it were
not for the fact that the victory was so complete, it might be said
that the length of the contest and the trifling disparity in loss
reflected rather the most credit on the British. Captain Perry showed
indomitable pluck, and readiness to adapt himself to circumstances;
but his claim to fame rests much less on his actual victory than on
the way in which he prepared the fleet that was to win it. Here his
energy and activity deserve all praise, not only for his success in
collecting sailors and vessels and in building the two brigs, but
above all for the manner in which he succeeded in getting them out
on the lake. On _that_ occasion he certainly out-generalled Barclay;
indeed the latter committed an error that the skill and address he
subsequently showed could not retrieve. But it will always be a
source of surprise that the American public should have so glorified
Perry's victory over an inferior force, and have paid comparatively
little attention to Macdonough's victory, which really was won
against decided odds in ships, men, and metal.

There are always men who consider it unpatriotic to tell the truth,
if the truth is not very flattering; but, aside from the morality
of the case, we never can learn how to produce a certain effect unless
we know rightly what the causes were that produced a similar effect
in times past. Lake Erie teaches us the advantage of having the odds
on our side; Lake Champlain, that, even if they are not, skill can
still counteract them. It is amusing to read some of the pamphlets
written "in reply" to Cooper's account of this battle, the writers
apparently regarding him as a kind of traitor for hinting that the
victory was not "Nelsonic," "unsurpassed," etc. The arguments are
stereotyped: Perry had 9 fewer guns, and also fewer men than the
foe. This last point is the only one respecting which there is any
doubt. Taking sick and well together, the Americans unquestionably
had the greatest number in crew; but a quarter of them were sick.
Even deducting these they were still, in all probability, more
numerous than their foes.

But it is really not a point of much consequence, as both sides had
enough, as stated, to serve the guns and handle the ships. In
sea-fights, after there are enough hands for those purposes additional
ones are not of so much advantage. I have in all my accounts summed
up as accurately as possible the contending forces, because it is
so customary with British writers to follow James' minute and
inaccurate statements, that I thought it best to give every thing
exactly; but it was really scarcely necessary, and, indeed, it is
impossible to compare forces numerically. Aside from a few exceptional
cases, the number of men, after a certain point was reached, made
little difference. For example, the _Java_ would fight just as
effectually with 377 men, the number James gives her, as with 426,
the number I think she really had. Again, my figures make the _Wasp_
slightly superior in force to the _Frolic_, as she had 25 men the
most; but in reality, as the battle was fought under very short sail,
and decided purely by gunnery, the difference in number of crew was
not of the least consequence. The Hornet had nine men more than the
_Penguin_, and it would be absurd to say that this gave her much
advantage. In both the latter cases, the forces were practically equal,
although, numerically expressed, the odds were in favor of the
Americans. The exact reverse is the case in the last action of the
_Constitution_. Here, the _Levant_ and _Cyane_ had all the men they
required, and threw a heavier broadside than their foe. Expressed
in numbers, the odds against them were not great, but numbers could
not express the fact that carronades were opposed to long guns, and
two small ships to one big one. Again, though in the action on Lake
Champlain numbers do show a slight advantage both in weight of metal
and number of men on the British side, they do not make the advantage
as great as it really was, for they do not show that the British
possessed a frigate with a main-deck battery of 24-pounders, which
was equal to the two chief vessels of the Americans, exactly as the
_Constitution_ was superior to the _Cyane_ and _Levant_. [Footnote:
It must always be remembered that these rules cut both ways. British
writers are very eloquent about the disadvantage in which carronades
placed the _Cyane_ and _Levant_, but do not hint that the _Essex_
suffered from a precisely similar cause, in addition to her other
misfortunes; either they should give the _Constitution_ more credit
or the _Phoebe_ less. So the _Confiance_, throwing 480 pounds of
metal at a broadside, was really equal to both the _Eagle_ and
_Saratoga_, who jointly threw 678. From her long guns she threw 384
pounds, from her carronades 96. Their long guns threw 168, their
carronades 510. Now the 32-pound carronade mounted on the spar-deck
of a 38-gun frigate, was certainly much less formidable than the
long 18 on the main-deck; indeed, it probably ranked more nearly
with a long 12, in the ordinary chances of war (and it must be
remembered that Downie was the attacking party and chose his own
position, so far as Macdonough's excellent arrangements would let
him.) So that in comparing the forces, the carronades should not
be reckoned for more than half the value of the long guns, and we
get, as a mere approximation, 384 + 48 = 432, against 168 + 255 =
423. At any rate, British writers, as well as Americans, should
remember that if the _Constitution_ was greatly superior to her
two foes, then the _Confiance_ was certainly equal to the _Eagle_
and __Saratoga; and _vica versa_.] And on the same principles I think
that every fair-minded man must admit the great superiority of Perry's
fleet over Barclay's, though the advantage was greater in carronades
than in long guns.

But to admit this by no means precludes us from taking credit for
the victory. Almost all the victories gamed by the English over the
Dutch in the 17th century were due purely to great superiority in
force. The cases have a curious analogy to this lake battle. Perry
won with 54 guns against Barclay's 63; but the odds were largely
in his favor. Blake won a doubtful victory on the 18th of February,
1653, with 80 ships against Tromp's 70; but the English vessels were
twice the size of the Dutch, and in number of men and weight of metal
greatly their superior. The English were excellent fighters, but no
better than the Dutch, and none of their admirals of that period
deserve to rank with De Ruyter. Again, the great victory of La Hogue
was won over a very much smaller French fleet, after a day's hard
fighting, which resulted in the capture of _one_ vessel! This victory
was most exultingly chronicled, yet it was precisely as if Perry had
fought Barclay all day and only succeeded in capturing the _Little
Belt_. Most of Lord Nelson's successes were certainly won against
heavy odds by his great genius and the daring skill of the captains
who served under him; but the battle of the Baltic, as far as the
fighting went, reflected as much honor on the defeated Danes as on
the mighty sea-chief who conquered them. Many a much-vaunted victory,
both on sea and land, has really reflected less credit on the victors
than the battle of Lake Erie did on the Americans. And it must always
be remembered that a victory, honorably won, if even over a weaker
foe, _does_ reflect credit on the nation by whom it is gained. It
was creditable to us as a nation that our ships were better made
and better armed than the British frigates, exactly as it was creditable
to them that a few years before their vessels had stood in the same
relation to the Dutch ships. [Footnote: After Lord Duncan's victory
at Camperdown, James chronicled the fact that all the captured
line-of-battle ships were such poor craft as not to be of as much
value as so many French frigates. This at least showed that the Dutch
sailors must have done well to have made such a bloody and obstinate
fight as they did, with the materials they had. According to his
own statements the loss was about proportional to the forces in action.
It was another parallel to Perry's victory.] It was greatly to our
credit that we had been enterprising enough to fit out such an effective
little flotilla on Lake Erie, and for this Perry deserves the highest
praise. [Footnote: Some of my countrymen will consider this but scant
approbation, to which the answer must be that a history is not a
panegyric.]

Before leaving the subject it is worth while making a few observations
on the men who composed the crews. James, who despised a Canadian
as much as he hated an American, gives as one excuse for the defeat,
the fact that most of Barclay's crew were Canadians, whom he considers
to be "sorry substitutes." On each side the regular sailors, from
the seaboard, were not numerous enough to permit the battle to be
fought purely by them. Barclay took a number of soldiers of the regular
army, and Perry a number of militia, aboard; the former had a few
Indian sharp-shooters, the latter quite a number of negroes. A great
many men in each fleet were lake sailors, frontiersmen, and these
were the especial objects of James' contempt; but it may be doubted
if they, thoroughly accustomed to lake navigation, used to contests
with Indians and whites, naturally forced to be good sailors, and
skilful in the use of rifle and cannon, were not, when trained by
good men and on their own waters, the very best possible material.
Certainly the battle of Lake Erie, fought mainly by Canadians, was
better contested than that of Lake Champlain, fought mainly by British.

The difference between the American and British seamen on the Atlantic
was small, but on the lakes what little there was disappeared. A
New Englander and an Old Englander differed little enough, but they
differed more than a frontiersman born north of the line did from
one born south of it. These last two resembled one another more nearly
than either did the parent. There had been no long-established naval
school on the lakes, and the British sailors that came up there were
the best of their kind; so the combatants were really so evenly matched
in courage, skill, and all other fighting qualities, as to make it
impossible to award the palm to either for these attributes. The
dogged obstinacy of the fighting, the skilful firing and manoeuvring,
and the daring and coolness with which cutting-out expeditions were
planned and executed, were as marked on one side as the other. The
only un-English element in the contest was the presence among the
Canadian English of some of the descendants of the Latin race from
whom they had conquered the country. Otherwise the men were equally
matched, but the Americans owed their success--for the balance of
success was largely on their side--to the fact that their officers
had been trained in the best and most practical, although the smallest,
navy of the day. The British sailors on the lakes were as good as
our own, but no better. None of their commanders compare with Macdonough.

Perry deserves all praise for the manner in which he got his fleet
ready; his victory over Barclay was precisely similar to the
quasi-victories of Blake over the Dutch, which have given that admiral
such renown. Blake's success in attacking Spanish and Algerian forts
is his true title to fame. In his engagements with the Dutch fleets
(as well as in those of Monk, after him) his claim to merit is no
greater and no less than Perry's. Each made a headlong attack, with
furious, stubborn courage, and by dint of sheer weight crushed or
disabled a greatly inferior foe. In the fight that took place on
Feb. 18, 1653, De Ruyter's ship carried but 34 guns, [Footnote:
"La Vie et Les Actio