The Project Gutenberg EBook of Military Reminiscences of the Civil War V2
by Jacob Dolson Cox

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Title: Military Reminiscences of the Civil War V2

Author: Jacob Dolson Cox

Release Date: November, 2004  [EBook #6962]
[This file was first posted on February 17, 2003]

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MILITARY REMINISCENCES OF THE CIVIL WAR

BY JACOB DOLSON COX, A.M., LL.D.

_Formerly Major-General commanding Twenty-Third Army Corps_

VOLUME II.

NOVEMBER 1863-JUNE 1865




CONTENTS


CHAPTER XXVII

GRANT IN COMMAND--ROSECRANS RELIEVED

Importance of unity in command--Inevitable difficulties in a double
organization--Burnside's problem different from that of
Rosecrans--Co-operation necessarily imperfect--Growth of Grant's
reputation--Solid grounds of it--Special orders sent him--Voyage to
Cairo--Meets Stanton at Louisville--Division of the Mississippi
created--It included Burnside's and Rosecrans's
departments--Alternate forms in regard to Rosecrans--He is
relieved--Thomas succeeds him--Grant's relations to the change--His
intellectual methods--Taciturnity--Patience--Discussions in his
presence--Clear judgments--His "good anecdote"--Rosecrans sends
Garfield to Washington--Congressman or General--Duplication of
offices--Interview between Garfield and Stanton--Dana's
dispatches--Garfield's visit to me--Description of the rout of
Rosecrans's right wing--Effect on the general--Retreat to
Chattanooga--Lookout Mountain abandoned--The President's
problem--Dana's light upon it--Stanton's use of it--Grant's
acquiescence--Subsequent relations of Garfield and
Rosecrans--Improving the "cracker line"--Opening the
Tennessee--Combat at Wauhatchie.


CHAPTER XXVIII

SIEGE OF KNOXVILLE--END OF BURNSIDE'S CAMPAIGN

Departments not changed by Grant--Sherman assigned to that of the
Tennessee--Burnside's situation and supplies--His
communications--Building a railroad--Threatened from Virginia--His
plans--Bragg sends Longstreet into East Tennessee--Their
cross-purposes--Correspondence of Grant and Burnside--Dana and
Wilson sent to consult--Grant approves Burnside's course--Latter
slowly retires on Knoxville--The place prepared for a siege--Combat
at Campbell's station--Within the lines at Knoxville--Topography of
the place--Defences--Assignment of positions--The forts--General
Sanders killed--His self-sacrifice--Longstreet's lines of
investment--His assault of Fort Sanders--The combat--The
repulse--The victory at Missionary Ridge and results--Division of
Confederate forces a mistake--Grant sends Sherman to raise the siege
of Knoxville--East Tennessee a "horror"--Longstreet retreats toward
Virginia--Sherman rejoins Grant--Granger's unwillingness to
remain--General Foster sent to relieve Burnside--Criticism of this
act--Halleck's misunderstanding of the real situation--Grant's easy
comprehension of it--His conduct in enlarged responsibility--General
Hunter's inspection report.


CHAPTER XXIX

AFFAIRS IN DISTRICT OF OHIO--PLOT TO LIBERATE PRISONERS AT JOHNSON'S
ISLAND

Administrative duties--Major McLean adjutant-general--His loyalty
questioned--Ordered away--Succeeded by Captain Anderson--Robert
Anderson's family--Vallandigham canvass--Bounty-jumping--Action of
U. S. Courts--of the local Probate Court--Efforts to provoke
collision--Interview with the sheriff--Letter to Governor
Tod--Shooting soldiers in Dayton--The October election--Great
majority against Vallandigham--The soldier vote--Wish for field
service--Kinglake's Crimean War--Its lessons--Confederate plots in
Canada--Attempt on military prison at Johnson's Island--Assembling
militia there--Fortifying Sandusky Bay--Inspection of the
prison--Condition and treatment of the prisoners.


CHAPTER XXX

A WINTER RIDE ON THE CUMBERLAND MOUNTAINS

Ordered to East Tennessee--Preparation for a long ride--A small
party of officers--Rendezvous at Lexington, Ky.--Changes in my
staff--The escort--A small train--A gay cavalcade--The blue-grass
country--War-time roads--Valley of the Rockcastle--Quarters for the
night--London--Choice of routes-Longstreet in the way--A turn
southward--Williamsburg--Meeting Burnside--Fording the
Cumberland--Pine Mountain--A hard pull--Teamsters' chorus--Big Creek
Gap--First view of East Tennessee--Jacksboro--A forty-mile
trot--Escape from unwelcome duty--In command of Twenty-third
Corps--The army-supply problem--Siege bread--Starved
beef--Burnside's dinner to Sherman.


CHAPTER XXXI

WINTER BIVOUACS IN EAST TENNESSEE

Blain's Cross-roads--Hanson's headquarters--A hearty
welcome--Establishing field quarters--Tents and houses--A good
quartermaster--Headquarters' business--Soldiers' camps--Want of
clothing and shoes--The rations--Running the country
mills--Condition of horses and mules--Visit to Opdycke's camp--A
Christmas dinner--Veteran enlistments--Patriotic spirit--Detachment
at Strawberry Plains--Concentration of corps there--Camp on a
knoll--A night scene--Climate of the valley--Affair at Mossy
Creek--New Year's blizzard--Pitiful condition of the
troops--Patience and courage--Zero weather.


CHAPTER XXXII

GRANT'S VISIT--THE DANDRIDGE AFFAIR

Grant at Knoxville--Comes to Strawberry Plains--A gathering at
Parke's quarters--Grant's quiet manner--No conversational
discussion--Contrast with Sherman--Talk of cadet days--Grant's
riding-school story--No council of war--Qualities of his
dispatches--Returns by Cumberland Gap--Longstreet's
situation--Destitution of both armies--Railroad repairs and improved
service--Light-draught steamboats--Bridges--Cattle herds on the
way--Results of Grant's inspection tour--Foster's movement to
Dandridge on the French Broad--Sheridan--His qualities--August
Willich--Hazen--His disagreement with Sheridan--Its causes and
consequences--Combat at Dandridge--A mutual surprise--Sheridan's
bridge--An amusing blunder--A consultation in Dandridge--Sturgis's
toddy--Retreat to Strawberry Plains--A hard night march--A rough
day--An uncomfortable bivouac--Concentration toward
Knoxville--Rumors of reinforcement of Longstreet--Expectation of
another siege--The rumors untrue.


CHAPTER XXXIII

WINTER QUARTERS IN EAST TENNESSEE--PREPARATIONS FOR a NEW CAMPAIGN

Sending our animals to Kentucky--Consultations--Affair with enemy's
cavalry--Roughing it--Distribution of troops--Cavalry engagement at
Sevierville--Quarters in Knoxville--Leading Loyalists--Social and
domestic conditions--Discussion of the spring campaign--Of Foster's
successor--Organization of Grant's armies--Embarrassments in
assignment of officers to duty--Discussion of the system-Cipher
telegraphing--Control of the key--Grant's collision with
Stanton--Absurdity of the War Department's method--General Stoneman
assigned to Twenty-third Corps--His career and character--General
Schofield succeeds to the command of the Department of the Ohio.


CHAPTER XXXIV

SCHOFIELD IN EAST TENNESSEE---DUTIES AS CHIEF OF STAFF--FINAL
OPERATIONS IN THE VALLEY

Fresh reports of Longstreet's advance--They are unfounded--Grant's
wish to rid the valley of the enemy--Conference with
Foster--Necessity for further recuperation of the army--Continuance
of the quiet policy--Longstreet's view of the situation--His
suggestions to his government--He makes an advance again-Various
demonstrations--Schofield moves against Longstreet--My appointment
as chief of staff in the field--Organization of the active
column--Schofield's purposes--March to Morristown--Going the Grand
Rounds--Cavalry outpost--A sleepy sentinel--Return to New
Market--Once more at Morristown--Ninth Corps sent East--Grant
Lieutenant-General--Sherman commands in the West--Study of plans of
campaign--My assignment to Third Division, Twenty-third
Corps--Importance of staff duties--Colonel Wherry and Major
Campbell--General Wood--Schofield and the politicians--Post at
Bull's Gap--Grapevine telegraph--Families going through the
lines--Local vendetta--The Sanitary Commission--Rendezvous assigned
by Sherman--Preliminary movements--Marching to Georgia--A spring
camp on the Hiwassee--The Atlanta campaign begun.


CHAPTER XXXV

GRANT, HALLECK, AND SHERMAN--JOHNSTON AND MR. DAVIS

Grant's desire for activity in the winter--Scattering to
live--Subordinate movements--The Meridian expedition--Use of the
Mississippi--Sherman's estimate of it--Concentration to be made in
the spring--Grant joins the Potomac Army--Motives in doing so--Meade
as an army commander--Halleck on concentration--North Carolina
expedition given up--Burnside to join Grant--Old relations of
Sherman and Halleck--Present cordial friendship--Frank
correspondence--The supply question--Railway administration--Bridge
defences--Reduction of baggage--Tents--Sherman on spies and
deserters--Changes in Confederate army--Bragg
relieved--Hardee--Beauregard--Johnston--Davis's suggestion of
plans--Correspondence with Johnston--Polk's
mediation--Characteristics--Bragg's letters--Lee writes
Longstreet--Johnston's dilatory discussion--No results--Longstreet
joins Lee--Grant and Sherman have the initiative--Prices in the
Confederacy.


CHAPTER XXXVI

ATLANTA CAMPAIGN: DALTON AND RESACA

The opposing forces--North Georgia
triangle--Topography--Dalton--Army of the Ohio enters
Georgia--Positions of the other armies--Turning Tunnel Hill--First
meeting with Sherman--Thomas--Sherman's plan as to
Dalton--McPherson's orders and movement--Those of Thomas and
Schofield--Hopes of a decisive engagement--Thomas attacks north end
of Rocky Face--Opdycke on the ridge--Developing Johnston's
lines--Schofield's advance on 9th May--The flanking march through
Snake Creek Gap--Retiring movement of my division--Passing
lines--Johnston's view of the situation--Use of temporary
intrenchments and barricades--Passing the Snake Creek defile-Camp
Creek line--A wheel in line--Rough march of left flank--Battle of
Resaca--Crossing Camp Creek--Storming Confederate line--My division
relieved by Newton's--Incidents--Further advance of left
flank--Progress of right flank--Johnston retreats.


CHAPTER XXXVII

ATLANTA CAMPAIGN: ADVANCE TO THE ETOWAH

Tactics modified by character of the country--Use of the
spade--Johnston's cautious defensive--Methods of Grant and
Sherman--Open country between Oostanaula and Etowah--Movement in
several columns--Sherman's eagerness--Route of left wing--Of
McPherson on the right--Necessity of exact system in such
marches--Route of Twenty-third Corps--Hooker gets in the way--Delays
occasioned--Closing in on Cassville--Our commanding
position--Johnston's march to Cassville--His order to fight
there--Protest of Hood and Polk--Retreat over the Etowah--Sherman
crosses near Kingston--My reconnoissance to the Allatoona
crossing--Destruction of iron works and mills--Marching without
baggage--Barbarism of war--Desolation it causes--Changes in our
corps organization--Hascall takes Judah's division--Our place of
crossing the Etowah--Interference again--Kingston the new
base--Rations--Camp coffee.


CHAPTER XXXVIII

ATLANTA CAMPAIGN: NEW HOPE CHURCH AND THE KENNESAW LINES

Sherman's plan for June--Movements of 24th May-Johnston's position
at Dallas and New Hope Church--We concentrate to attack--Pickett's
Mill--Dallas--Flanking movements--Method developed by the character
of the country--Closer personal relations to Sherman--Turning
Johnston's right--Crossroads at Burnt Church-A tangled
forest--Fighting in a thunderstorm--Sudden freshet--Bivouac in a
thicket---Johnston retires to a new line--Formidable character of
the old one--Sherman extends to the railroad on our left--Blair's
corps joins the army--General Hovey's retirement--The principles
involved--Politics and promotions.


CHAPTER XXXIX

ATLANTA CAMPAIGN: MARIETTA LINES--CROSSING THE CHATTAHOOCHEE

Continuous rains in June--Allatoona made a field depot on the
railway and fortified--Johnston in the Marietta lines--That from
Pine Mountain to Lost Mountain abandoned--Swinging our right
flank--Affair at Kolb's farm--Preparing for a general attack--Battle
of Kennesaw-The tactical problem--Work of my division--Topography
about Cheney's--Our advance on the 27th--Nickajack valley
reached--The army moves behind us--Johnston retreats to the
Chattahoochee--Twenty-third Corps at Smyrna Camp-ground--Crossing
the Chattahoochee at Soap Creek--At Roswell--Johnston again
retreats--Correspondence with Davis--Mission of B. H. Hill--Visit of
Bragg to Johnston--Johnston's unfortunate reticence--He is relieved
and Hood placed in command--Significance of the change to the
Confederacy and to us.


CHAPTER XL

HOOD'S DEFENCE OF ATLANTA--RESULTS OF ITS CAPTURE

Lines of supply by field trains--Canvas pontoons--Why replaced by
bridges--Wheeling toward Atlanta--Battle of Peachtree Creek--Battle
of Atlanta--Battle of Ezra Church--Aggressive spirit of Confederates
exhausted--Sherman turns Atlanta by the south--Pivot position of
Twenty-third Corps--Hood's illusions--Rapidity of our troops in
intrenching--Movements of 31st August--Affair at Jonesboro--Atlanta
won--Morale of Hood's army--Exaggerating difference in
numbers--Examination of returns--Efforts to bring back
absentees--The sweeping conscription--Sherman's candid
estimates--Unwise use of cavalry--Forrest's work--Confederate
estimate of Sherman's campaign.


CHAPTER XLI

THE REST AT ATLANTA--STAFF ORGANIZATION AND CHANGES

Position of the Army of the Ohio at Decatur--Refitting for a new
campaign--Depression of Hood's army--Sherman's reasons for a
temporary halt--Fortifying Atlanta as a new base--Officers detailed
for the political campaign-Schofield makes inspection tour of his
department--My temporary command of the Army of the Ohio--Furloughs
and leaves of absence--Promotions of several colonels--General
Hascall resigns--Staff changes--My military family--Anecdote of
Lieutenant Tracy--Discipline of the army--Sensitiveness to approval
or blame--Illustration--Example of skirmishing advance--Sufferings
of non-combatants within our lines--A case in point--Pillaging and
its results--Citizens passing through the lines--"The rigors of the
climate"--Visit of Messrs. Hill and Foster--McPherson's death--The
loss to Sherman and to the army--His personal traits--Appointment of
his successor.


CHAPTER XLII

CAMPAIGN OF OCTOBER--HOOD MOVES UPON OUR COMMUNICATIONS

Hood's plan to transfer the campaign to northern Georgia--Made
partly subordinate to Beauregard--Forrest on a raid--Sherman makes
large detachments--Sends Thomas to Tennessee--Hood across the
Chattahoochee--Sherman follows--Affair at Allatoona--Planning the
March to the Sea--Sherman at Rome--Reconnoissance down the
Coosa--Hood at Resaca--Sherman in pursuit--Hood retreats down the
Chattooga valley--We follow in two columns--Concentrate at
Gaylesville--Beauregard and Hood at Gadsden--Studying the
situation--Thomas's advice--Schofield rejoins--Conference regarding
the Twenty-third Corps--Hood marches on Decatur--His explanation of
change of plan--Sherman marches back to Rome--We are ordered to join
Thomas--Hood repulsed at Decatur marches to Tuscumbia--Our own march
begun--Parting with Sherman--Dalton--Chattanooga--Presidential
election--Voting by steam--Retrospect of October camp-life--Camp
sports--Soldiers' pets--Story of a lizard.


CHAPTER XLIII

NASHVILLE CAMPAIGN--HOOD'S ADVANCE FROM THE TENNESSEE

Schofield to command the army assembled at Pulaski--Forrest's
Tennessee River raid--Schofield at Johnsonville--My division at
Thompson's--Hastening reinforcements to Thomas--Columbia--The
barrens--Pulaski--Hood delays--Suggests Purdy as a base--He advances
from Florence--Our march to Columbia--Thomas's distribution of the
forces--Decatur evacuated--Pontoon bridge there--Withdrawing from
Columbia--Posts between Nashville and Chattanooga--The cavalry on
29th November--Their loss of touch with the army.


CHAPTER XLIV

NASHVILLE-HOOD'S ARMY ROUTED

Defensive works of Nashville--Hood's lines--The ice
blockade--Halleck on remounts for cavalry--Pressing horses and its
abuse--The cavalry problem--Changes in organization--Assignment of
General Couch--Confederate cavalry at Nashville--Counter-movements
of our own--Detailed movements of our right--Difference of
recollection between Schofield and Wilson--The field
dispatches--Carrying Hood's works--Confederate rout.


CHAPTER XLV

PURSUIT OF HOOD--END OF THE CAMPAIGN

Night after the battle--Unusual exposure--Hardships of company
officers--Bad roads--Halt at Franklin--Visiting the
battlefield--Continued pursuit--Decatur reoccupied--Hood at Tupelo,
Miss.--Summary of captures--Thomas suggests winter-quarters--Grant
orders continued activity--Schofield's proposal to move the corps to
the East--Grant's correspondence with Sherman--Schofield's
suggestion adopted--Illness--I ask for "sick-leave"--Do not use
it--Promotion--Reinforcements--March from Columbia to
Clifton--Columns on different roads--Western part of the
barrens--Fording Buffalo River--An illumined camp--Dismay of the
farmer--Clifton on the Tennessee--Admiral Lee--Methods of
transport--Weary waiting--Private grumbling--Ordered East--Revulsion
of spirits--On the transport fleet--Thomas's frame of mind at close
of the campaign.


CHAPTER XLVI

CAMPAIGN IN NORTH CAROLINA--CAPTURE OF WILMINGTON

Rendezvous at Washington--Capture of Fort Fisher--Schofield ordered
to North Carolina--Grant and Schofield visit Terry--Department of
North Carolina--Army of the Ohio in the field--Correspondence of
Grant and Sherman--Sherman conscious of his risks but hopeful of
great results--His plan of march from Savannah--Relation of
Wilmington to New Berne--Our arrival at Washington--The Potomac
frozen--Peace conference at Fort Monroe--Interview with Mr.
Stanton--The thirteenth amendment of the Constitution--Political
excitement at the capital--A little dinner-party--Garfield, H. W.
Davis, and Schenck--Davis on Lincoln--Destination of our
army--Embarkation--Steamship "Atlantic"--Visit to Fort Monroe--The
sea-voyage--Cape Fear Inlet--General Terry's lines--Bragg the
Confederate commander--Reconnoitring his lines--The colored
troops--"Monitor" engaged with Fort Anderson--Alternate
plans--Marching on Wilmington by the west bank of the river--My
column opposite the town--Orders not applicable to the
situation--Difficulty of communication--Use of
discretion--Wilmington evacuated--A happy result.


CHAPTER XLVII

THE CONFEDERACY IN STRAITS--JOHNSTON COMMANDS IN THE CAROLINAS--OUR
OPERATIONS FROM NEW BERNE--BATTLE OF KINSTON

The Confederates lose Charleston and Columbia--Facing a
crisis--Hopeless apathy of Southern people--Mr. Davis's
perplexity--Beauregard startles him--Lee calls Johnston to
command--Personal relations of leading officers--Dwindling
armies--The cavalry--Assignments of generals--The Beaufort and New
Berne line--Am ordered to New Berne--Provisional corps--Advance to
cover railway building--Dover and Gum swamps--Bragg concentrates to
oppose us--Position near Kinston--Bragg's plan of attack--Our own
movements--Condition of railroad and river--Our advance to Wise's
Forks and Southwest Creek--Precautions--Conference with
Schofield--Battle of Kinston--Enemy attack our left front--Rout of
Upham's brigade--Main line firm--Ruger's division reaches the field
Enemy repulsed--End of first day's fight--Extending our trenches on
the left--Sharp skirmishing of the 9th--Bragg's reinforcements--His
attack of the 10th--Final repulse and retreat of the enemy.


CHAPTER XLVIII

JUNCTION WITH SHERMAN AT GOLDSBOROUGH--THE MARCH ON
RALEIGH--CESSATION OF HOSTILITIES

Occupation of Kinston--Opening of Neuse River--Rebel ram
destroyed--Listening to the distant battle at Bentonville--Entering
Goldsborough--Meeting Sherman--Grant's congratulations--His own
plans--Sketch of Sherman's march--Lee and Johnston's
correspondence--Their gloomy outlook--Am made commandant of
Twenty-third Corps--Terry assigned to Tenth--Schofield promoted in
the Regular Army--Stanton's proviso--Ill effects of living on the
country--Stopping it in North Carolina--Camp jubilee over the fall
of Richmond--Changes in Sherman's plans--Our march on
Smithfield--House-burning--News of Lee's surrender--Overtures from
Governor Vance--Entering Raleigh--A mocking-bird's greeting--Further
negotiations as to North Carolina--Johnston proposes an
armistice--Broader scope of negotiations--The Southern people desire
peace--Terrors of non-combatants assuaged--News of Lincoln's
assassination--Precautions to preserve order--The dawn of peace.


CHAPTER XLIX

THE SHERMAN-JOHNSTON CONVENTION

Sherman's earlier views of the slavery question--Opinions in
1864--War rights vs. statesmanship--Correspondence with
Halleck--Conference with Stanton at Savannah--Letter to General
Robert Anderson--Conference with Lincoln at City Point--First effect
of the assassination of the President--Situation on the Confederate
side--Davis at Danville--Cut off from Lee--Goes to
Greensborough--Calls Johnston to conference--Lee's surrender--The
Greensborough meeting--Approach of Stoneman's cavalry raid--Vance's
deputation to Sherman--Davis orders their arrest--Vance asserts his
loyalty--Attempts to concentrate Confederate forces on the
Greensborough-Charlotte line--Cabinet meeting--Overthrow of the
Confederacy acknowledged--Davis still hopeful--Yields to the
cabinet--Dictates Johnston's letter to Sherman--Sherman's
reply--Meeting arranged--Sherman sends preliminary correspondence to
Washington--The Durham meeting--The negotiations--Two points of
difficulty--Second day's session--Johnston's power to promise the
disbanding of the civil government--The terms agreed
upon--Transmittal letters--Assembling the Virginia
legislature--Sherman's wish to make explicit declaration of the end
of slavery--The assassination affecting public sentiment--Sherman's
personal faith in Johnston--He sees the need of modifying the
terms--Grant's arrival.


CHAPTER L

THE SECOND SHERMAN-JOHNSTON CONVENTION--SURRENDER

Davis's last cabinet meeting--Formal opinions approving the
"Basis"--"The Confederacy is conquered"--Grant brings disapproval
from the Johnston administration--Sherman gives notice of the
termination of the truce--No military disadvantage from
it--Sherman's vindication of himself--Grant's admirable
conduct--Johnston advises Davis to yield--Capitulation assented to,
but a volunteer cavalry force to accompany Davis's flight--A new
conference at Durham--Davis's imaginary treasure--Grant's return to
Washington--Terms of the parole given by Johnston's army--The
capitulation complete--Schofield and his army to carry out the
details--The rest of Sherman's army marches north--His farewell to
Johnston--Order announcing the end of the war--Johnston's fine
reply--Stanton's strange dispatch to the newspapers--Its tissue of
errors--Its baseless objections--Sherman's
exasperation--Interference with his military authority over his
subordinates--Garbling Grant's dispatch--Sherman strikes
back--Breach between Sherman and Halleck--It also grew out of the
published matter--Analysis of the facts--My opinion as recorded at
the time.


CHAPTER LI

PAROLING AND DISBANDING JOHNSTON'S ARMY--CLOSING SCENES OF THE WAR
IN NORTH CAROLINA

General Schofield's policy when left in command--Lincoln's
Emancipation Proclamation in force--Davis's line of flight from
Charlotte, N. C.--Wade Hampton's course of conduct--Fate of the
cabinet officers--Bragg, Wheeler, and Cooper--Issuing paroles to
Johnston and his army--Greensborough in my district--Going there
with Schofield--Hardee meets and accompanies us--Comparing
memories--We reach Johnston's headquarters--Condition of his
army--Our personal interview with him--The numbers of his
troops--His opinion of Sherman's army--Of the murder of
Lincoln--Governor Morehead's home--The men in gray march
homeward--Incident of a flag--The Salisbury prison site--Treatment
of prisoners of war--Local government in the interim--Union
men--Elements of new strife--The negroes--Household service--Wise
dealing with the labor question--No money--Death of
manufactures--Necessity the mother of invention--Uses of
adversity--Peace welcomed--Visit to Greene's battle-field at
Guilford-Old-Court-House.



APPENDIX C

INDEX




MILITARY REMINISCENCES OF THE CIVIL WAR




CHAPTER XXVII

GRANT IN COMMAND--ROSECRANS RELIEVED


Importance of unity in command--Inevitable difficulties in a double
organization--Burnside's problem different from that of
Rosecrans--Cooperation necessarily imperfect--Growth of Grant's
reputation--Solid grounds of it--Special orders sent him--Voyage to
Cairo--Meets Stanton at Louisville--Division of the Mississippi
created--It included Burnside's and Rosecrans's
departments--Alternate forms in regard to Rosecrans--He is
relieved--Thomas succeeds him--Grant's relations to the change--His
intellectual methods--Taciturnity--Patience--Discussions in his
presence--Clear judgments--His "good anecdote"--Rosecrans sends
Garfield to Washington--Congressman or General--Duplication of
offices--Interview between Garfield and Stanton--Dana's
dispatches--Garfield's visit to me--Description of the rout of
Rosecrans's right wing--Effect on the general--Retreat to
Chattanooga--Lookout Mountain abandoned--The President's
problem--Dana's light upon it--Stanton's use of it--Grant's
acquiescence--Subsequent relations of Garfield and
Rosecrans--Improving the "cracker line"--Opening the
Tennessee--Combat at Wauhatchie.


It is very evident that, at the close of September, Mr. Lincoln and
Mr. Stanton had become satisfied that a radical change must be made
in the organization of the Western armies. The plan of sending
separate armies to co-operate, as Rosecrans's and Burnside's had
been expected to do, was in itself vicious. It is, after a fashion,
an attempt of two to ride a horse without one of them riding behind.
Each will form a plan for his own army, as indeed he ought to do,
and when one of them thinks the time has come for help from the
other, that other may be out of reach or committed to operations
which cannot readily be dropped. It is almost axiomatic that in any
one theatre of operations there must be one head to direct.
[Footnote: Napoleon used to ridicule the vicious practice of
subdividing armies in the same theatre of war. He called it putting
them up in small parcels, "_des petits paquets_." Memoirs of Gouvion
St.-Cyr, vol. iv.] In the present case it ought to have been evident
to the authorities at Washington that as soon as Burnside occupied
East Tennessee, both distance and the peculiar conditions of his
problem would forbid any efficient cooperation with Rosecrans. The
latter was the junior in rank, and knew that, whatever might be
Burnside's generosity, there were many possible contingencies in
such a campaign in which the War Department might find it the easy
solution of a difficulty to direct the senior officer to assume the
command of both armies. So long as matters went well, Rosecrans had
little or no communication with Burnside; but as soon as the enemy
began to show a bold front, he became impatient for assistance. The
perplexities of his own situation made him blind to those of
Burnside. This is human nature, and was, no doubt, true of both in
varying degrees. Halleck, at Washington, was in no true sense a
commander of the armies. He had given peremptory orders to advance
in June and again in July, but when asked whether this relieved the
subordinate of responsibility and took away his discretion, could
make no distinct answer. The unpleasant relations thus created
necessarily affected the whole campaign. Halleck hesitated to advise
a halt when he learned that Longstreet had gone to reinforce Bragg,
and Rosecrans dreaded the blame of halting without such suggestion.
So the battle had to be fought, and the ill consequences had to be
repaired afterward as best they could.

The official correspondence of the summer shows a constantly growing
faith in Grant. His great success at Vicksburg gave him fame and
prestige, but there was beside this a specific effect produced on
the President and the War Department by his unceasing activity, his
unflagging zeal, his undismayed courage. He was as little inclined
to stop as they at Washington were inclined to have him. He was as
ready to move as they were to ask it, and anticipated their wish. He
took what was given him and did the best he could with it. The
result was that the tone adopted toward him was very different from
that used with any other commander. It was confidently assumed that
he was doing all that was possible, and there was no disposition to
worry him with suggestions or orders.

When the operations in the Mississippi valley were reduced to
secondary importance by the surrender of Vicksburg, it was certain
that Grant would be called to conduct one of the great armies which
must still make war upon the rebellion. In a visit to New Orleans to
consult with Banks, he had been lamed by a fractious horse and was
disabled for some days. As soon as he was able to ride in an
ambulance he was on duty, and was assured by General Halleck that
plenty of work would be cut out for him as soon as he was fully
recovered. [Footnote: Official Records, vol. xxx. pt. iv. p. 274.]
At the beginning of October he was ordered to take steamboat and go
to Cairo, where he would find special instructions. This dispatch
reached him on the 9th, and the same day he sailed for Cairo,
arriving there on the 16th, when he learned that an officer of the
War Department would meet him at Louisville. Hastening to Louisville
by rail, he met Mr. Stanton himself, who had travelled _incognito_
from Washington. The Secretary of War produced the formal orders
which had been drawn at the War Department creating the Division of
the Mississippi, which included Rosecrans's, Burnside's, and his own
departments, and put him in supreme command of all. [Footnote:
_Id_., p. 404.] The order was drawn in two forms, one relieving
Rosecrans and putting Thomas in command of the Department of the
Cumberland, and the other omitting this. After consultation with Mr.
Stanton, the order relieving Rosecrans was issued and Grant
published his own assumption of command. His staff had accompanied
him, on a hint contained in an earlier dispatch, and after a day
spent with the Secretary of War (October 18-19) he immediately
proceeded to Chattanooga. He was hardly able to mount a horse, and
when on foot had to get about on crutches.

It has been commonly assumed that the choice whether he would remove
Rosecrans was submitted to Grant as a personal question affecting
his relations with his subordinates, and that he decided it on the
ground of his dislike of Rosecrans. The records of the official
correspondence seem to me to show the fact rather to be that
Rosecrans's removal was thought best by the Secretary, the doubt
being whether Grant would prefer to retain him instead of meeting
the embarrassments incident to so important a change in the
organization of the beleaguered army. Grant was always disposed to
work with the tools he had, and through his whole military career
showed himself averse to meddling much with the organization of his
army. He had strong likes and dislikes, but was very reticent of his
expression of them. He would quietly take advantage of vacancies or
of circumstances to put men where he wanted them, but very rarely
made sweeping reorganization. If any one crossed him or became
antagonistic without open insubordination, he would bear with it
till an opportunity came to get rid of the offender. He hated verbal
quarrelling, never used violent language, but formed his judgments
and bided his time for acting on them. This sometimes looked like a
lack of frankness, and there were times when a warm but honest
altercation would have cleared the air and removed
misunderstandings. It was really due to a sort of shyness which was
curiously blended with remarkable faith in himself. From behind his
wall of taciturnity he was on the alert to see what was within
sight, and to form opinions of men and things that rooted fast and
became part of his mental constitution. He sometimes unbent and
would talk with apparent freedom and ease; but, so far as I
observed, it was in the way of narrative or anecdote, and almost
never in the form of discussion or comparison of views. It used to
be said that during the Vicksburg campaign he liked to have Sherman
and McPherson meet at his tent, and would manage to set them to
discussing the military situation. Sherman would be brilliant and
trenchant; McPherson would be politely critical and intellectual;
Rawlins would break in occasionally with some blunt and vigorous
opinion of his own: Grant sat impassable and dumb in his camp-chair,
smoking; but the lively discussion stimulated his strong
commonsense, and gave him more assured confidence in the judgments
and conclusions he reached. He sometimes enjoyed with a spice of
real humor the mistaken assumption of fluent men that reticent ones
lack brains. I will venture to illustrate it by an anecdote of a
date subsequent to the war. One day during his presidency, he came
into the room where his cabinet was assembling, quietly laughing to
himself. "I have just read," said he, "one of the best anecdotes I
have ever met. It was that John Adams after he had been President
was one day taking a party out to dinner, at his home in Quincy,
when one of his guests noticed a portrait over the door and said,
'You have a fine portrait of Washington there, Mr. Adams!' 'Yes,'
was the reply, 'and that old wooden head made his fortune by keeping
his mouth shut;'" and Grant laughed again with uncommon enjoyment.
The apocryphal story gained a permanent interest in Grant's mouth,
for though he showed no consciousness that it could have any
application to himself, he evidently thought that keeping the mouth
shut was not enough in itself to ensure fortune, and at any rate was
not displeased at finding such a ground of sympathy with the Father
of his country. Grant's telling the story seemed to me, under the
circumstances, infinitely more amusing than the original.

During the month which followed the battle of Chickamauga, Rosecrans
had elaborated his report of the campaign. On the 15th of October he
ordered General Garfield to proceed to Washington with it and to
explain personally to the Secretary of the War and the
General-in-Chief the details of the actual condition of the army,
its lines of communication, the scarcity of supplies and especially
of forage for horses and mules, with all other matters which would
assist the War Department in fully appreciating the situation.
Garfield's term as member of Congress began with the 4th of March
preceding, but the active session would only commence on the first
Monday of December. There was some doubt as to the status of army
officers who were elected to Congress. General Frank P. Blair had
been elected as well as Garfield, and it was in Blair's case that
the issue was made by those who objected to the legality of what
they called a duplication of offices. Later in the session of
Congress it was settled that the two commissions were incompatible,
and that one must choose between them. Blair resigned his seat at
Washington and returned to Sherman's army. Garfield, who had found
camp life a cause of oft-recurring and severe disease of his
digestive system, resigned his army commission and retained his
place in Congress. When he left Rosecrans, however, he was still
hopeful that the two duties might be found consistent, and looked
forward to further military employment.

On his way to Nashville, Garfield made a careful inspection of the
road to Jasper and Bridgeport, and reported it with recommendations
for the improvement of the transportation service. He arrived at
Nashville on the 19th of October, and was met by the rumor that the
Secretary of War and General Grant were at Louisville, and that
Grant would come down the road by special train next day. He
telegraphed the news to Rosecrans with the significant question,
What does it mean? Rosecrans knew what it meant, for Grant's order
assuming command and relieving him had been earlier telegraphed to
him, and he had already penned his dignified and appropriate
farewell order to the Army of the Cumberland.

Mr. Stanton awaited Garfield's coming at Louisville, and there was a
full and frank interview between them. The order relieving Rosecrans
ended Garfield's official connection with him, and, even if it had
not been so, it would have been his duty to make no concealments in
answering the earnest and eager cross-questioning of the Secretary.
Mr. Stanton had not only had dispatches full of information from
General Meigs, who now also met him at Louisville, but his
assistant, Mr. Charles A. Dana, had gone early to Chattanooga, had
been present at the battle of Chickamauga, and had there some
perilous experiences of his own. Dana was still with Rosecrans, and
had sent to the Secretary a series of cipher dispatches giving a
vivid interior view of affairs and of men. [Footnote: Official
Records, vol. xxx. pt. i. pp. 220, etc.; vol. xxxi. pt. i. pp.
69-74, 265; pt. ii. pp. 52-70.] The talented journalist had known
how to give his communications the most lively effect, and they had
great weight with the Secretary. They were not always quite just,
for they were written at speed under the spell of first impressions,
and necessarily under the influence of army acquaintances in whom he
had confidence. There is, however, no evidence that he was
predisposed to judge harshly of Rosecrans, and the unfavorable
conclusions he reached were echoed in Mr. Stanton's words and acts.
[Footnote: Since this was written Mr. Dana has published his
Recollections, based on his dispatches, but the omissions make it
still important to read the originals.] The Secretary of War was
consequently prepared to show such knowledge of the battle of
Chickamauga and the events which followed it, that it would be
impossible for Garfield to avoid mention of incidents which bore
unfavorably upon Rosecrans. He might have been silent if Mr. Stanton
had not known so well how to question him, but when he found how
full the information of the Secretary was, his duty as a military
subordinate coincided with his duty as a responsible member of
Congress, and he discussed without reserve the battle and its
results. Mr. Stanton also questioned General Steedman, who was on
his way home, and wrote to his assistant in Washington for the
information of the President, that his interview with these officers
more than confirmed the worst that had reached him from other
sources as to the conduct of Rosecrans, and the strongest things he
had heard of the credit due to Thomas. [Footnote: Official Records,
vol. xxxi. pt. i. p. 684.]

Garfield came from Louisville to Cincinnati, where I was on duty at
headquarters of my district, and found me, as may easily be
believed, full of intense interest in the campaign. I had been kept
informed of all that directly affected Burnside, my immediate chief,
but my old acquaintance with Rosecrans and sincere personal regard
for him made me desire much more complete information touching his
campaign than was given the public. Garfield's own relations to it
were hardly less interesting to me, and our intimacy was such that
our thoughts at that time were common property. He spent a day with
me, and we talked far into the night, going over the chief points of
the campaign and his interview with Mr. Stanton. His friendship for
Rosecrans amounted to warm affection and very strong personal
liking. Yet I found he had reached the same judgment of his mental
qualities and his capacity as a commander which I had formed at an
earlier day. Rosecrans's perceptions were acute and often
intuitively clear. His fertility was great. He lacked poise,
however, and the steadiness of will necessary to handle great
affairs successfully. Then there was the fatal defect of the
liability to be swept away by excitement and to lose all efficient
control of himself and of others in the very crisis when complete
self-possession is the essential quality of a great general.

We sat alone in my room, face to face, at midnight, as Garfield
described to me the scene on the 20th of September on the
battlefield, when through the gap in the line made by the withdrawal
of Wood's division the Confederates poured. He pictured the
astonishment of all who witnessed it, the doubt as to the evidence
of their own senses; the effort of Sheridan further to the right to
change front and strike the enemy in flank; the hesitation of the
men; the wavering and then the breaking of the right wing into a
panic-stricken rout, each man running for life to the Dry Valley
road, thinking only how he might reach Chattanooga before the enemy
should overtake him, officers and men swept along in that most
hopeless of mobs, a disorganized army. He described the effort of
Rosecrans and the staff to rally the fugitives and to bring a
battery into action, under a shower of flying bullets and crashing
shells. It failed, for men were as deaf to reason in their mad panic
as would be a drove of stampeded cattle. What was needed was a fresh
and well-organized division to cover the rout, to hold back the
enemy, and to give time for rallying the fugitives. But no such
division was at hand, and the rush to the rear could not be stayed.
The enemy was already between the headquarters group and Brannan's
division which Wood had joined, and these, throwing back the right
flank, were presenting a new front toward the west, where
Longstreet, preventing his men from pursuing too far, turned his
energies to the effort to break the curved line of which Thomas at
the Snodgrass house was the centre.

The staff and orderlies gathered about Rosecrans and tried to make
their way out of the press. With the conviction that nothing more
could be done, mental and physical weakness seemed to overcome the
general. He rode silently along, abstracted, as if he neither saw
nor heard. Garfield went to him and suggested that he be allowed to
try to make his way by Rossville to Thomas, the sound of whose
battle seemed to indicate that he was not yet broken. Rosecrans
assented listlessly and mechanically. As Garfield told it to me, he
leaned forward, bringing his excited face close to mine, and his
hand came heavily down upon my knee as in whispered tones he
described the collapse of nerve and of will that had befallen his
chief. The words burned themselves into my memory.

Garfield called for volunteers to accompany him, but only a single
orderly with his personal aide-de-camp followed him; and he made his
way to the right, passed through the gap at Rossville, saw Granger,
who was preparing to move Steedman's division to the front, and rode
on to join Thomas, running the gantlet of the enemy's fire as he
passed near them on the Kelley farm. He never tired of telling of
the calm and quiet heroism of Thomas, holding his position on the
horse-shoe ridge till night put an end to the fighting, and then
retiring in perfect order to the Rossville Gap, to which he was
ordered. This part of the story has been made familiar to all. An
eyewitness has told how, when Rosecrans reached Chattanooga, he had
to be helped from his horse. His nerves were exhausted by the strain
he had undergone, and only gradually recovered from the shock.
[Footnote: Cist, The Army of the Cumberland, p. 226.] His first
dispatch to Washington was the announcement that his army had met
with a serious disaster, the extent of which he could not himself
tell. [Footnote: Official Records, vol. xxx. pt. i. p. 142.] The
most alarming feature of the news was that he was himself a dozen
miles from the battlefield and had evidently lost all control of
events. The truth turned out to be that two divisions would include
all the troops that were broken,--namely, Sheridan's, two brigades
of Davis's, and one of Van Cleve's,--whilst seven other divisions
stood firm and Thomas assumed command of them. As these retired in
order, and as the enemy had suffered more in killed and wounded than
our army, Bragg was entitled to claim a victory only because the
field was left in his hands with large numbers of wounded and
numerous trophies of cannon. It was then claimed by some of our best
officers, and is still an open question whether, if Rosecrans had
been with Thomas and, calling to him Granger's troops, had resumed
the offensive, the chances were not in our favor, and whether Bragg
might not have been the one to retreat.

Unfortunately there was no doubt that the general was defeated,
whether his army was or not. The most cursory study of the map
showed that the only practicable road by which the army could be
supplied was along the river from Bridgeport. Lookout Mountain
commanded this; and not to hold Lookout was practically to announce
a purpose to retreat into middle Tennessee. Dana informed the
Secretary of War that Garfield and Granger had urged Rosecrans to
hold the mountain, but that he would not listen to it. [Footnote:
Official Records, vol. xxx. pt. i. p. 215.] He could much better
afford to intrench a division there than Bragg could, for the
Confederates were tied to Mission Ridge by the necessity of covering
the Atlanta Railroad, which was their line of supply, and any troops
put across the Chattanooga valley were in the air and likely to be
cut off if the long and thin line which connected them were broken.
Had Lookout Mountain been held, Hooker could have come at once into
his place in line when he reached the Tennessee, and the reinforced
army would have been ready, as soon as it was rested and supplied,
to resume an offensive campaign. Instead of this, the country was
for a month tortured with the apprehension that the Army of the
Cumberland must retreat because it could not be fed by means of the
mountain road over Walden's Ridge. After the fortifications at
Chattanooga were strong enough to put the place beyond danger from
direct assault, it would only be adding to the danger of starvation
to send more men there before a better line of supply was opened.

The problem which the President and Secretary of War pondered most
anxiously was the capacity and fitness of Rosecrans to conduct the
new campaign. Would he rise energetically to the height of the great
task, or would he sink into the paralysis of will which so long
followed the battle of Stone's River? Dana's dispatches were studied
for the light they threw on this question more than for all the
other interesting details they contained. For the first three or
four days, they teemed with impressions of the battle itself and the
cause of the disaster to the right wing. Then came the assurance
that Chattanooga was safe and could withstand a regular siege. Next,
in logical order as in time, was the attempt to look into the future
and to estimate the commander by the way he grappled with the
difficulties of the situation. On the 27th of September Dana
discussed at some length the army feeling toward the corps and
division commanders who had been involved in the rout, and the
embarrassment of Rosecrans in dealing with the subject. "The defects
of his character," he wrote, "complicate the difficulty. He abounds
in friendliness and approbativeness, and is greatly lacking in
firmness and steadiness of will. He is a temporizing man, dreads so
heavy an alternative as is now presented." [Footnote: Official
Records, vol. xxx. pt. i p. 202.] On the 12th of October he returned
to the subject of Rosecrans's characteristics, mentioning his
refusal to listen to the urgent reasons why he should hold Lookout
Mountain to protect his supply line. "Rosecrans," he said, "who is
sometimes as obstinate and inaccessible to reason as at others he is
irresolute, vacillating, and inconclusive, rejected all their
arguments, and the mountain was given up." [Footnote: Official
Records, vol. xxx. pt. i. p. 215.] Picturing the starvation of the
horses and mules and the danger of it for the soldiers, he added:
"In the midst of this the commanding general devotes that part of
the time which is not employed in pleasant gossip, to the
composition of a long report to prove that the government is to
blame for his failure. It is my duty to declare that while few
persons exhibit more estimable social qualities, I have never seen a
public man possessing talent with less administrative power, less
clearness and steadiness in difficulty, and greater practical
incapacity than General Rosecrans. He has inventive fertility and
knowledge, but he has no strength of will and no concentration of
purpose. His mind scatters. There is no system in the use of his
busy days and restless nights, no courage against individuals in his
composition, and with great love of command he is a feeble
commander." [Footnote: _Ibid_.]

It needs no proof that such a report would have great influence at
Washington, and if it at all harmonized with the drift of
impressions caused by the inaction and the wrangling of the summer,
it would be decisive. It was with it in his pocket that Mr. Stanton
had cross-questioned Garfield, and drew out answers which, as he
said, corroborated it. The same correspondence had set forth the
universal faith in Thomas's imperturbable steadiness and courage,
and the admiring faith in him which had possessed the whole army.
The natural and the almost necessary outcome of it all was that
Thomas should be placed in command of the Department and Army of the
Cumberland, and Grant in supreme control of the active operations in
the whole valley of the Mississippi. As to Rosecrans's removal,
Grant did not bring it about, he only acquiesced in it; willingly,
no doubt, but without initiative or suggestion on his part.
[Footnote: Grant's Personal Memoirs, vol. ii. p. 18.]

It may be well here to say a word upon the subsequent relations of
Garfield and Rosecrans. In the next winter a joint resolution was
offered in Congress thanking General Thomas and the officers and men
under his command for their conduct in the battle of Chickamauga.
The established etiquette in such matters is to name the general
commanding the army, whose services are recognized, and not his
subordinates; these are included in the phrase, "officers and men
under his command." To omit Rosecrans's name and to substitute
Thomas's was equivalent to a public condemnation of the former.
Garfield had been promoted to be major-general for his conduct in
the battle, and it was popularly understood that this meant his
special act in volunteering to make his way to Thomas after
Rosecrans and the staff were swept along the Dry Valley road in the
rout. The promotion was recognized as a censure by implication on
his chief. As Garfield was now chairman of the committee of the
House of Representatives on military affairs, he was placed in a
peculiarly embarrassing position. His sincere liking for Rosecrans
made him wish to spare him the humiliation involved in the passage
of such a resolution, and his generosity was the more stimulated by
the knowledge that his own promotion had been used to emphasize the
shortcoming of his friend. He could not argue that on the
battlefield itself there had been no faults committed; but he was
very earnest in insisting that the general strategy of the campaign
had been admirable, and the result in securing Chattanooga as a
fortified base for future operations had been glorious. He therefore
moved to amend the resolution by inserting Rosecrans's name and
modifying the rest so as to make it apply to the campaign and its
results. He supported this in an eloquent speech which dwelt upon
the admirable parts of Rosecrans's generalship and skilfully avoided
the question of personal conduct on the field. He carried the House
with him, but a joint resolution must pass the Senate also, and it
never came to a vote in that body.

When in 1880 Garfield was elected President, and in the midst of a
heated campaign had to run the gantlet of personal attacks
infinitely worse than the picket fire under which he had galloped
across the Kelley farm, a letter was produced which he had written
to Mr. Chase, Secretary of the Treasury, in June, 1863, when he was
urging Rosecrans to terminate the inglorious delays at Murfreesboro
by marching on Tullahoma. In his letter to Mr. Chase he had
expressed in warmest terms his personal affection for Rosecrans, but
had also condemned the summer's delays as unnecessary and contrary
to military principles. In the violence of partisan discussion the
letter was seized upon as evidence of a breach of faith toward his
chief, who was now acting with the political party opposed to
Garfield's election. The letter was a personal one, written in
private friendship to Mr. Chase, with whom Garfield had kept up an
occasional correspondence since the beginning of the war. I had done
the like, for Mr. Chase had admitted us both to his intimacy when he
was Governor of Ohio. It cannot for a moment be maintained that
military subordination is inconsistent with temperate and respectful
criticism (for such this was) of a superior, in private
communications to a friend. But it was argued that the relation of
chief of staff involved another kind of confidence. It
unquestionably involved the duty of observing and maintaining
perfectly every confidence actually reposed in him. But the public
acts of the chief were anything but confidential. They were in the
face of all the world, and these only were the subject of his
private and friendly criticism. That criticism he had, moreover,
expressed to Rosecrans himself as distinctly as he wrote it to Mr.
Chase, and had declared it publicly in the written consultation or
council of war to which the corps and division commanders were
called. [Footnote: _Ante_, vol. i. p. 483.]

But Garfield was also at that time a member of Congress, having
duties to the President, the Cabinet, and his colleagues and fellow
members growing out of that relation. Rosecrans not only knew this,
but was supposed by many to have invited Garfield to take the staff
appointment partly by reason of this. Under all the circumstances,
therefore, the ground of complaint becomes shadowy and disappears.
Rosecrans, however, was made to think he had suffered a wrong. He
forgot the generosity with which Garfield had saved him from
humiliation in the session of 1863-64, and said bitter things which
put an end to the friendly relations which had till then been
maintained.

To return to Chattanooga in October, 1863: one thing remained to be
done before a new campaign could begin. A better mode of supplying
the army must be found. Thomas had answered Grant's injunction to
hold Chattanooga at all hazards by saying, "I will hold the town
till we starve." The memorable words have been interpreted as a
dauntless assurance of stubborn defence; but they more truly meant
that the actual peril was not from the enemy, but from hunger.
Rosecrans had begun to feel the necessity of opening a new route to
Bridgeport before he was relieved, and on the very day he laid down
the command, he had directed Brigadier-General W. F. Smith, sent to
him to be chief engineer of his army since the battle, to examine
the river banks in the vicinity of Williams Island, six or seven
miles below the town by the river, and to report upon the
feasibility of laying a pontoon bridge there which could be
protected. The expectation had been that Hooker would concentrate
his two corps at Bridgeport, make his own crossing of the Tennessee,
and push forward to the hills commanding Lookout Valley. By
intrenching himself strongly in the vicinity of Wauhatchie, he would
confine the Confederates to Lookout Mountain on the west, and cover
the roads along the river so as to make them safe for supply trains.
The only interruption in the connected communications would then be
around the base of Lookout itself, where the road could not be used,
of course, so long as Bragg should be able to hold the mountain. If,
however, a bridge could be laid somewhere in rear of such a
fortified position, the road on the north bank of the river could be
used, for this road ran across the neck of Moccasin Point, out of
range of a cannonade from the mountain, and after a short haul of a
mile or two, the wagon trains could recross the river by the bridge
at the town.

Hooker had showed no eagerness to take the laboring oar in this
business, and excused his delay in concentrating at Bridgeport by
the lack of wagons. General Smith's reconnoissance satisfied him
that Brown's Ferry, a little above the island, would admirably serve
the purpose. A roadway to the river on each side already existed. On
the south side was a gorge and a brook, which sheltered the landing
there, and would cover and hide troops moving toward the top of the
ridge commanding Lookout Valley. Smith reported his discovery to
Thomas and suggested that pontoons be built in Chattanooga, and used
to convey a force by night to the ferry, where they might be met by
Hooker coming from below. Thomas approved the plan, and as soon as
Grant arrived, he inspected the ground in company with Thomas and
Smith, and ordered it to be executed. The boats were completed by
the end of a week, and on the night of the 26th of October the
expedition started under the command of General Smith in person.
Brigadier-Generals Hazen and Turchin and Colonel T. R. Stanley of
the Eighteenth Ohio [Footnote: Colonel Stanley had been one of my
associates in the Ohio Senate in the winter of 1860-61. On the
origin and development of the plan and its complete execution, see
Reports of General Smith and others, Official Records, vol. xxxi.
pt. i. pp. 77-137.] were assigned to command the three detachments
of troops and boats assigned to the duty, and reported to Smith.
Covered by the darkness and in absolute silence, they were to float
down the stream which flowed around Moccasin Point in a great curve
under the base of Lookout, on which batteries commanded long reaches
of the river both above and below. Reaching the ferry on the enemy's
side, they would land and carry the picket posts with a rush, Hazen
to move to the left and seize the ridge facing the mountain, and
Turchin to do the like toward the right, facing down stream. Colonel
Stanley's detachment had the charge of the boats, which were fitted
with row-locks and oars, and these were to do the ferrying when the
proper place was reached. Each boat contained a corporal and four
men as a crew, and twenty-five armed soldiers. They were fifty in
number, besides two flatboats to be used as a ferry to cross the
artillery. The whole force consisted of 5000 men and three batteries
of artillery. The boats carried about a third of the whole, and the
principal columns marched by the road on the north bank to the
places assigned and were concealed in the forest. The plan worked
beautifully. Starting at three o'clock in the morning of the 27th,
the darkness of the night and a slight fog hid the boats from the
Confederate pickets. The oars were only used to keep the boats in
proper position in the current, and great care was taken to move
silently. Colonel Stanley took the lead with General Hazen in one of
the flatboats, having a good guide. The landing on the south bank
was found, and the troops landed and drove off the enemy's picket,
which was taken completely by surprise. The boats were swiftly
pulled to the north bank, where the troops which marched by the road
were already in position. The ferrying was hurried with a will, and
before the Confederates had time to bring any considerable force to
oppose, strong positions were taken covering the ferry, these were
covered by an abatis of slashed forest trees and intrenched. The
surprise had been complete, and the success had been perfect.

Hooker crossed the river on the bridge at Bridgeport, and on the
morning of the 28th marched by way of Running Waters and Whitesides
to Wauhatchie. Geary's division reached Wauhatchie about five in the
afternoon, and about midnight was fiercely attacked by Jenkins'
division of Longstreet's corps. The combat continued for some time,
the enemy having some advantage at first as they attacked Geary's
left flank in a direction from which he did not expect them. Other
troops were urged forward to Geary's assistance, but the enemy
retired as they approached the scene of action and only his division
was seriously engaged. He reported a list of 216 casualties, whilst
the Confederates admitted a loss of about 400. [Footnote: Official
Records, vol. xxxi. pt. i. pp. 119, 233.] Hooker's position was made
strongly defensible, so that Bragg did not again venture to disturb
it, and the easy lines of supply for Chattanooga were opened. The
subsistence problem was solved.




CHAPTER XXVIII

SIEGE OF KNOXVILLE--END OF BURNSIDE'S CAMPAIGN


Departments not changed by Grant--Sherman assigned to that of the
Tennessee--Burnside's situation and supplies--His
communications--Building a railroad--Threatened from Virginia--His
plans--Bragg sends Longstreet into East Tennessee--Their
cross-purposes--Correspondence of Grant and Burnside--Dana and
Wilson sent to consult--Grant approves Burnside's course--Latter
slowly retires on Knoxville--The place prepared for a siege--Combat
at Campbell's station--Within the lines at Knoxville--Topography of
the place--Defences--Assignment of positions-The forts--General
Sanders killed--His self-sacrifice--Longstreet's lines of
investment--His assault of Fort Sanders--The combat--The
repulse--The victory at Missionary Ridge and results--Division of
Confederate forces a mistake--Grant sends Sherman to raise the siege
of Knoxville--East Tennessee a "horror"--Longstreet retreats toward
Virginia--Sherman rejoins Grant--Granger's unwillingness to
remain--General Foster sent to relieve Burnside--Criticism of this
act--Halleck's misunderstanding of the real situation--Grant's easy
comprehension of it--His conduct in enlarged responsibility--General
Hunter's inspection report.


One of the first questions which General Grant had to decide was
that of the continuance of the three separate departments of the
Ohio, the Cumberland, and the Tennessee. It was very undesirable to
concentrate the ordinary administrative work of these departments at
his own headquarters. It would overburden him with business routine
which need not go beyond a department commander. He needed to be
free to give his strength to the conduct of military affairs in the
field. It was also convenient to have the active army under a triple
division of principal parts. All these reasons led him to a prompt
determination to preserve the department organizations if the War
Department would consent. The very day of his arrival at Chattanooga
(October 23) he recommended Sherman for the Department of the
Tennessee and the continuance of the others. His wish was approved
at Washington, and acted upon, so that from this time to the end of
the war the organization in the West remained what he now made it.

Before reaching Chattanooga, Grant had telegraphed to Burnside and
had received from him a detailed statement of the numbers and
positions of his troops. [Footnote: Official Records, vol. xxxi. pt.
i. pp. 680, 681.] Burnside also laid before him the dearth of
supplies and short stock of ammunition, with the great need of
clothing. Unless the railroad to Chattanooga could be fully
reopened, he suggested making a depot at McMinnville, where was the
end of one of the branches of the railway, from which the road to
Knoxville would be considerably shorter than from Kentucky. He also
informed Grant that he had taken steps to repair the wagon road from
Clinton in East Tennessee to the mouth of South Fork of the
Cumberland, the head of steamboat navigation when the stream should
be swollen by the winter rains. [Footnote: _Id_., pt. iii. pp. 33,
34.] The problem of supplies for him was as difficult as for the
Cumberland army, and was not so soon solved. It grew more serious
still when the siege of Knoxville interrupted for a month all
communication with a base in Kentucky, in middle Tennessee, or at
Chattanooga.

In reply to an inquiry from General Grant, Burnside, on the 22d,
[Footnote: _Id_., pt. i. p. 702.] gave his opinion as to the
relative importance of points in East Tennessee, pointing out that
unless communication with Kentucky were to be wholly abandoned, the
valley must be held nearly or quite to the Virginia line; Knoxville
would be the central position, and Loudon would be the intermediate
one between him and Chattanooga. In a dispatch to the President of
the same date, Burnside said that his command had been on half
rations of everything but fresh beef ever since his arrival in the
valley. [Footnote: _Id_., p. 701.] He also explained that he was
improving the wagon road along the line of projected railroad down
the South Fork of the Cumberland, so that sections of it could be
laid with rails and the wagoning gradually shortened. He had been
able to make an arrangement with the railroad company in Kentucky to
assume the cost of the extension of the line from the northward, and
by using his military power to call out negro laborers and to
provide the engineering supervision, was making considerable
progress without any money appropriations from Congress for this
specific purpose. The quartermaster's department had taken issue
with the general as to his authority to do this; but the President
and Secretary of War sanctioned his acts and would not allow him to
be interfered with. [Footnote: Official Records, vol. xxx. pt iii,
p. 787.] The work stopped when he was relieved of command; but so
long as he was in power, his clear apprehension of the vital
necessity of a railway line to feed and clothe his army kept him
persistent and indomitable in his purpose. The withdrawal of the
enemy southward from Chattanooga, and the conversion of that place
into a great military depot in the spring superseded Burnside's
plan, but he had been right in concluding that East Tennessee could
not be held if the troops depended upon supply by wagon trains.

Grant had hardly reached Chattanooga when Halleck informed him that
it was pretty certain that Ewell's corps of 20,000 or 25,000 men had
gone from Lee's army toward East Tennessee by way of southwestern
Virginia. [Footnote: _Id_., vol. xxxi. pt. i. p. 712.] There thus
seemed to be strong confirmation of rumors which Burnside had before
reported. Before the end of the month there were also signs of a
concentration south of Loudon, and the question became a pressing
one, what line of action should be prescribed for Burnside if the
Confederates should thus attack him from both ends of the valley. He
did not credit the rumor as to Ewell's corps, but began to think
that a large detachment from Bragg's army would attack him from the
south. It is curious to find the report rife that Longstreet would
march against Burnside, even before Bragg had issued orders to that
effect. [Footnote: Official Records, vol. xxxi. pt. i. p. 718. Oct.
24.] Burnside himself proposed to take up the pontoon bridge at
Loudon, and move it to Knoxville, for both the Holston and the
Little Tennessee were now unfordable and would protect his flank
against small expeditions of the enemy. [Footnote: 2 _Id_., p. 756.]
His plan was to hold all the country he could and to concentrate at
Knoxville and stand a siege whenever the enemy should prove too
strong for him in the open field. Grant was not yet persuaded that
this was best, and wanted the line of the Hiwassee held for the
present, so that Burnside should draw nearer to Thomas rather than
increase the distance before the Cumberland army should be prepared
for active work in the field. [Footnote: _Id_., p. 770.]

Bragg's order to Longstreet to march against Burnside was issued on
the 4th of November. [Footnote: _Id_. pt. iii. p. 634.] Railway
transportation was provided for the first stages of the movement,
but it was not efficiently used. Longstreet had no confidence in the
result of the expedition, as his correspondence with Bragg very
plainly shows. Stevenson's division of Hardee's corps was at
Sweetwater, the end of the railway at that time, and about a day's
march from the crossing of the Holston at Loudon. Ten days had been
wasted in getting Longstreet's corps to Sweetwater, and Bragg and he
each charged the other with the responsibility for it. Longstreet
asserted that he had been given no control over the railway, and
Bragg insisted that the control was ample. Then the former had urged
that Stevenson's division should be attached to his command, saying
this was his understanding at the start. Bragg replied that he never
had any such intention and that Stevenson could not be spared.
Longstreet retorted that with his present force it would be
unreasonable to expect great results. [Footnote: Official Records,
vol. xxxi. pt. iii. pp. 635-637, 644, 670, 671, 680, 681, 687:
Longstreet's Report, _Id_., pt. i. pp. 455, etc.]

Meanwhile Sherman was hastening to Chattanooga, and the chances for
making the diversion against Burnside profitable to the Confederate
cause were rapidly diminishing. They soon vanished entirely, and
Grant's great opportunity came instead. Longstreet's corps consisted
of nine brigades of infantry in two strong divisions under
Major-General McLaws and Brigadier-General Jenkins, two battalions
of artillery aggregating nine batteries, and a cavalry corps of
three divisions and three batteries of artillery under Major-General
Wheeler. [Footnote: _Id_., pp. 451, 454.] Besides these troops a
force was collected in the upper Holston valley to operate from the
northeast in conjunction with Longstreet and under his command. At
its head was Major-General Ransom, and it consisted of three
brigades of infantry and three of cavalry, with six batteries of
artillery. The column with Longstreet numbered 14,000 infantry and
artillery, and about 6000 cavalry. It was strengthened when before
Knoxville by Buckner's division about 3300 strong. Ransom's forces
numbered 7500. [Footnote: These numbers are taken from the official
returns for October 31st, except Wheeler's cavalry, which was not
then reported and is estimated. Longstreet's corps is given in the
tables, Official Records, vol. xxxi. pt. ii. p. 656. Ransom's,
_Id_., pt. iii. p. 644.] On November 22d Bragg wrote to Longstreet
that nearly 11,000 reinforcements were moving to his assistance, but
of what these were made up (except Buckner's division) does not
clearly appear. [Footnote: _Id_., p. 736.]

The information Halleck collected at Washington indicated that
Longstreet's column was a strong one, possibly numbering 40,000, but
he urged that Burnside should not retreat. [Footnote: _Id_., p.
145.] The National forces in East Tennessee consisted, first, of the
troops under General Willcox at Cumberland Gap and the vicinity,
4400; the Ninth Corps, Brigadier-General Potter commanding, 6350;
and part of the Twenty-third Corps, 7800, with two bodies of cavalry
numbering 7400. [Footnote: Official Records, vol. xxxi. pt. i. p.
811.] Willcox's troops and part of the cavalry were ordered to hold
in check the Confederates under Ransom, one brigade of cavalry under
Colonel Byrd was posted at Kingston to keep up communication with
Chattanooga, and the rest was available to meet Longstreet, either
in the field or behind intrenchments at Knoxville, as Grant should
direct.

Longstreet's army was considerably overrated in the information
received from Washington, but not unnaturally. [Footnote: Halleck to
Grant, _Id_., pt. iii. p. 145.] It was assumed that he had with him
all three divisions of his corps, and it was not known that Walker's
division was detached. It had also been known that Stevenson's
division was at Sweetwater two or three weeks before Longstreet
assembled his forces there, and it seemed certain that it was the
advance-guard of his whole command. Indeed Longstreet himself
supposed so, and complained because it was not allowed to remain
with him. [Footnote: _Id_., p. 635.] Concluding, therefore, that
Burnside could not safely meet Longstreet in the field, Grant
proposed that he should hold the Confederates in check, retreating
slowly. He believed that in a week from the time Longstreet showed
himself at the Holston River, he could assume the aggressive against
Bragg so vigorously as to bring Longstreet back at speed and relieve
Burnside of the pressure. [Footnote: _Id_., p. 143; to Halleck, p.
154.] Bragg also expected this, and had ordered that the railway
connection should be maintained as far as possible, looking for a
crushing blow at Burnside and a quick reassembling of his forces.
The delays between the 4th and 14th of November had been fatal to
this plan, and it would have been the part of wisdom to abandon it
frankly.

Neither the authorities at Washington nor Grant gave Burnside
credit, at first, for the cheerful courage with which he was ready
to take the losing side of the game, if need be, and thus give a
glorious opportunity to the co-operating army. His chivalrous
self-forgetfulness in such matters was perfect, when it was likely
to lead to the success of the larger cause he had at heart. To reach
a more perfect understanding than could be had by correspondence
Grant sent Colonel J. H. Wilson of his staff to Knoxville to consult
personally with Burnside. This officer was accompanied by Mr. Dana,
and their dispatches to Grant and to the Secretary of War give a
clear and vivid picture of the situation. [Footnote: Official
Records, vol. xxxi. pt. i. pp. 258, etc; pt. iii. pp. 146, 154.]
Burnside clearly saw the importance of making his stand at
Knoxville, and proposed to fortify that place so that he could stand
a siege there. [Footnote: Burnside to Willcox, _Id_., p. 177. B.'s
Report, _Id_., pt. i. p. 273.] He proposed to draw back slowly from
the Holston at Loudon, tolling Longstreet on and getting him beyond
supporting distance of Bragg. When Grant should have disposed of the
weakened enemy in his front, he could easily drive Longstreet out of
East Tennessee into Virginia. Grant approved without qualification
the course taken by Burnside. [Footnote: Grant to Burnside, _Id_.,
pt. iii. p. 177.] During the siege which followed, there was a good
deal of solicitude about Burnside, but it should be remembered in
justice to him that his own confidence never faltered and was fully
justified by the result.

Prior to the visit of Wilson and Dana he had sent his engineer,
Captain O. M. Poe, to Loudon to remove the pontoon bridge before the
occupation of the south bank of the Holston by the enemy should make
it impossible to save it. The bridge had been made of unusually
large and heavy boats, and it was a difficult task to haul them out
of the water and drag them half a mile to the railway. The south end
of the bridge was loosened and the whole swung with the current
against the right bank, where the dismantling and removal of the
boats was successfully accomplished under the eyes of a cavalry
force of the enemy which watched the performance from the opposite
bank. The bridge was carried to Knoxville and laid across the
Holston there. Its size and weight proved to be great points in its
favor for the special use there, and it was of inestimable value
during the partial investment of the town. [Footnote: Poe's Report,
Official Records, vol. xxxi. pt. i. p. 294. Century War Book, vol.
iii.]

On the 13th of November Longstreet brought up his own pontoons and
laid a bridge near Loudon, and the next day began a vigorous advance
upon Knoxville. Burnside had matured his plans, and opposed the
advance of Longstreet with one division, Hartranft's of the Ninth
Corps, and another, White's of the Twenty-third Corps. He was weak
in cavalry, however, and could only meet Wheeler's corps with a
single division under Brigadier-General Sanders. Burnside had
secured Sanders's promotion from Mr. Stanton when the Secretary was
at Louisville in October, in recognition of the ability and
gallantry shown in the expedition to East Tennessee in June and his
other services during the campaign. By giving Shackelford charge of
the cavalry operating in the upper valley and putting Sanders in
command of those resisting Wheeler, Burnside was sure of vigor and
courage in the leadership of both divisions. Longstreet kept Wheeler
on the left bank of the Holston, directing him to overwhelm Sanders
and move directly opposite Knoxville, taking the city by a surprise
if possible. But Sanders opposed a stubborn resistance, falling back
deliberately, and held the hills south of Knoxville near the river.
Wheeler was thus baffled, and returned to Longstreet on the 17th of
November. The absence of his cavalry had been a mistake, as it
turned out; for the Confederate infantry, after crossing at Loudon
to the right bank, had not been able to push Burnside back as fast
as Bragg's plans required, nor had they succeeded at all in getting
in the rear of the National forces.

As soon as it was definitely known at Knoxville that Longstreet was
over the Holston, Burnside went to the front at Lenoir's to take
command in person. [Footnote: Burnside's Report, Official Records,
vol. xxxi. pt. i. p. 273.] He left General Parke as chief of staff
in general charge of affairs at headquarters, with Captain Poe in
charge of the engineer work of preparing lines of defence connecting
the forts already planned and partly constructed. Wilson and Dana
stayed in Knoxville till the 15th, and then rode rapidly to the
westward, passing around Longstreet's columns and rejoining Grant at
Chattanooga on the night of the 17th, with latest assurances from
Burnside that he would hold Knoxville stubbornly. Longstreet's
tactics were to move one of his infantry divisions directly at
Burnside's position, while with the other he turned its flank and
sought to get to the rear. Burnside met the plan by the analogous
one of alternate withdrawals of a division, one holding the enemy at
bay while the other took post in echelon in the rear and opposed the
flanking column till a concentration could be made.

At Campbell's Station Longstreet attacked with vigor, determined to
finish matters with the force before him. Ferrero's division of the
Ninth Corps had now joined. Hartranft repulsed an attack by McLaws,
whilst the trains and the division of Ferrero passed on, and Ferrero
took a strong position half a mile in rear covering the junction of
roads. White then retired and came into line on Ferrero's left. When
these were solidly in place Hartranft took an opportune moment to
withdraw and came into line on the left of White. The manoeuvres
were perfectly performed, and the fighting of our troops had been
everything that could be desired, meeting and matching Longstreet's
veterans in a way to establish the soldierly reputation of all. The
comparatively new organization of the Twenty-third Corps proved
itself equal to the best, and Burnside declared that he could desire
no better soldiers. The same tactics were continued through the day,
and Burnside followed the hard labor and the fighting of the day
with a night march which brought him to Knoxville on the morning of
the 17th. [Footnote: Official Records, vol. xxxi. pt. i. pp. 274,
275, 296.] He had personally handled his little army through the day
with coolness and success, and had raised to enthusiasm the
confidence and devotion of his men. Each side had a casualty list of
about 300.

Wheeler had marched back along the left bank of the Holston half-way
to Lenoir's and crossed at Louisville, joining Longstreet again near
Knoxville on the 17th, as has been already stated. He now took the
advance and pressed sharply in upon the town. General Sanders had
been recalled by Burnside from the south, and entering Knoxville by
the pontoon bridge, passed out to the westward on the Loudon road,
meeting the enemy as he advanced, and gradually falling back to a
position a mile beyond the lines, where he made a stubborn stand and
held Wheeler at bay till night closed the combat. From the fortified
points about the city the cavalry engagement had been in full view,
and the heroism of Sanders and his men was in the presence of a
cloud of witnesses. They made little barricades of rail piles, and
though these were frequently sent flying by the cannon balls and
shells with which Alexander's artillery pounded them all day, they
held at nightfall the line Sanders had been directed to hold in the
morning, and had not given back an inch. [Footnote: Colonel O. M.
Poe, in "Century War Book," vol. iii. p. 737.]

Knoxville was so situated that its outline was a sort of
parallelogram of high ground, averaging a hundred and fifty feet or
more above the river which ran along the town on the south. Two
creeks ran through the town in little valleys, and in the northern
suburbs where the land was much lower than the town it had been
practicable, by damming these streams to make inundations which
covered a considerable part of the northern front and added very
materially to the defences. At the four corners of the
parallelogram, enclosed works had been planned for use by a small
garrison, and these had been partly constructed. Captain Poe, the
chief engineer, had staked out infantry lines connecting these
forts, with epaulements for artillery at intervals, and work had
been hastened during the days from the 13th of November, as soon as
Burnside's plan of holding the city had been approved. When the
troops approached the city on the morning of the 17th, the position
for every brigade and every battery had been assigned, and officers
were in waiting to lead each to its place. All the infantry was put
in line except Reilly's brigade of the Twenty-third Corps, which was
placed in reserve in the streets of the town. [Footnote: Poe's
Report, Official Records, vol. xxxi. pt. i. p. 295.]

The most important of the forts was at the northwest angle of the
works, upon a commanding hill. It was afterward called Fort Sanders
in honor of the cavalry commander who lost his life in front of its
western face. This work was planned as approximately a square with
sides of about a hundred yards and bastions at the corners. The
eastern front had not been completed, and was now left entirely
open, as the northern face connected with the infantry trench. The
ditch was twelve feet wide and about eight deep, and the parapet was
about twelve feet high, making its crest about twenty feet above the
bottom of the ditch. The berme usually left between the bottom of
the parapet slope and the ditch was cut away so as to leave no level
standing-place at the top of the scarp. This was the work which
Longstreet afterward assaulted. Its chief defect was due to the
situation and the contour of the ground around, which made its
position so prominent a salient in the lines that the flanking fire
was necessarily imperfect, leaving a considerable sector without
fire beyond the angle of the northwest bastion. The point of the
bastion was truncated, and a single gun put in the _pan coupé_. The
three other forts were less elaborate but of similar profile.

As soon as the infantry took position, the men were set
industriously to work to strengthen the defences. The first infantry
trench between the forts had been a mere rifle-pit two and one half
feet deep with the earth heaped in front as it was thrown out, to
raise a parapet. Every hour made the line stronger, and work on it
was continued till nearly every part of it was a good cover against
artillery fire. The critical time was during the 18th of November,
when as yet there was practically no cover between the forts. The
cavalry was ordered to oppose the most determined resistance to the
establishment of close investing lines by the enemy, and Sanders set
his men a most inspiring example. He was a classmate of Captain Poe
at West Point, and on the night of the 17th he shared Poe's blanket.
Before dawn he went to the front, and passed from one to another of
the little barricades held by his dismounted troopers. The
Confederates increased the vigor of their attacks, and if any of our
men were driven back by the hot fire, Sanders would walk
deliberately up to the rail-pile and stand erect and exposed till
his men rallied to him. For hours he did this, and his life seemed
to be charmed, but about the middle of the afternoon he was mortally
wounded, and the screen he had so resolutely interposed between the
enemy and our infantry digging in the trenches was rolled aside.
[Footnote: Paper by General Poe in "Century War Book," vol. iii. p.
737.] The time thus gained had been precious, though it was bought
at so high a price. The lines were already safe against a _coup de
main_. [Footnote: Poe's Report, Official Records, vol. xxxi. pt. i.
p. 296.]

Longstreet's principal lines were north of Knoxville beyond the
railway and the station buildings. He also occupied a line of hills,
but pushed forward strong skirmish lines and detachments to cover
the making of intrenchments closer to the town. There were frequent
bickering combats, but no general engagement. The enemy made efforts
to destroy the pontoon bridge by sending down logs and rafts from
above. These were met by an iron cable boom stretched across the
river above the bridge, borne on wooden floats to keep it at the
surface. [Footnote: Century War Book, vol. iii. p. 739.] Several
efforts were made to drive Burnside's men from the hills covering
the town on the south side of the river, but they were defeated, and
communication was kept up with the valley of the French Broad River,
and supplies enough were brought in to make it certain that Burnside
could not be starved out, although the rations were reduced to the
smallest quantity and the fewest elements which would support life.

A week passed thus, Burnside being shut off from all communication
with the outer world. The 25th of November came with the almost
miraculous storming of Missionary Ridge by the army under Grant at
Chattanooga. Bragg retreated southward and Longstreet had no longer
a possibility of rejoining him. Yet Burnside knew nothing of it, and
did not dream of the more than complete justification his slow
defensive campaign was having, in the tout and demoralization of the
Confederate army in Georgia in Longstreet's absence. The latter was
now forced to attack the fortifications or to raise the siege of
Knoxville. He knew, at least by rumor, what Burnside was ignorant
of,--not only the defeat of Bragg, but that a force was already
moving from Grant's army to the relief of Knoxville. Bragg had also
sent to him a staff officer with exhortations to prompt action. For
a day or two Longstreet tried to attract Burnside's attention to the
south of the river and to other parts of the lines, and then on the
28th prepared a desperate assault upon the great salient of Fort
Sanders.

The artillery in the fort was under the command of Lieutenant Samuel
N. Benjamin, Second U. S. Artillery, whose battery of twenty-pounder
Parrotts had done good service at South Mountain and Antietam. The
infantry was of Ferrero's division of the Ninth Corps. There was a
slight abatis in front of the fort, and on the suggestion of Mr.
Hoxie, an officer of the railway, some old telegraph wire left at
the depot was used by Captain Poe to make an entanglement by
fastening it between small stumps of a grove which had been felled
along the slope northwest of the bastion at the salient.
Longstreet's plan of assault was to attack the northwest angle of
the fort with two columns of regiments, consisting of Wofford's and
Humphrey's brigades of McLaws's division. Anderson's brigade was to
attack the infantry trench a little east of the fort. Longstreet's
instructions were to make the assault at break of day on the 29th.
The columns were to move silently and swiftly without firing and
endeavor to carry the parapet by the bayonet. [Footnote:
Longstreet's Report, Official Records, vol. xxxi. pt. i. p. 461.]
The determined advance of the enemy's rifle pits by his skirmishers
in the night of the 28th gave warning of what was to be expected.
The morning of the 29th was damp and foggy, but the watchful pickets
detected the formation of the enemy's columns. About six o'clock the
Confederate batteries opened a heavy fire on the fort, which did not
reply, ammunition being too precious to be wasted. In about twenty
minutes the cannonade ceased and the columns moved to the assault.
The fire of our lines was concentrated upon them, and they lost
heavily; but they kept on, somewhat disordered by the entanglement
as well as by their losses, and came to the ditch. No doubt its
depth and the high face of the parapet surprised them, for they had
no scaling ladders. They jumped into the ditch and tried to scramble
up the slope of the earthwork. Some got to the top, only to be shot
down or captured. The guns flanking the ditch raked it with double
charges of canister. Shells were lighted and thrown as hand-grenades
into the practically helpless crowd below. Those who had not entered
the ditch soon wavered and fell back, at first sullenly and slowly,
then in despair running for life to cover. Those who remained and
could walk surrendered and were marched to the southwest angle of
the fort, where they were brought within the lines.

The remnants of the broken columns were rallied behind their outer
lines, but no effort was made to renew the assault. They had done
all that was possible for flesh and blood. The casualties in the
assault had been about 1000, whilst within the fortifications only
13 killed and wounded were reported. [Footnote: Official Records,
vol. xxxi. pt. i. pp. 277, 278, 344, 461, 487, 490, 519, 520.]
Buckner's division had joined Longstreet a day or two before the
assault, but took no active part in it. Their absence from
Missionary Ridge still further reduced Bragg's army, whilst it did
not give to Longstreet any practical benefit. The division of the
Confederate forces had thus proved to be a great military mistake.
Its only chance had been in a swift attack upon Burnside and a
prompt return, and this chance had vanished with the delays in the
railroad transportation of Longstreet's men to Sweetwater. Prudence
dictated that the expedition should be abandoned on the 13th of
November; but the fear of seeming vacillating, a weakness of
second-rate minds as great as vacillation itself, had made Bragg
order the column forward. Burnside's well-conducted retreat, on the
other hand, had lured Longstreet forward, and the patient endurance
of a siege had kept the enemy in front of Knoxville, and even led to
the further depletion of Bragg by the detachment of Buckner, giving
to Grant the very opportunity he desired. The good fortune of the
National commander culminated at Missionary Ridge. Soldiers believe
in good luck quite as much as in genius, and follow a leader whose
star is in the ascendant with a confidence which is the guaranty of
victory. Great opportunities, however, come to all. The difference
between a great soldier and an inferior one is that the great man
uses his opportunities to the full, and so fortune seems to be in
league with him. When Grant had driven Bragg back on Dalton, the
latter could realize what he had lost by his errors. It was now
impossible for Longstreet to rejoin him. It was even doubtful if
Wheeler's cavalry could do so. The whole National army was between
the widely separated Confederate wings, and nothing was left to
Longstreet but a humiliating march back to Lee by way of the upper
Holston and the headwaters of the James River. Pride delayed it, and
the depth of winter favored the delay; but it was a foregone
conclusion from the hour that Wood's and Sheridan's divisions
crowned Missionary Ridge.

For two weeks there had been no communication between Burnside and
the outer world. Lincoln had been full of anxiety, but had found
some comfort in the reports from Cumberland Gap that cannonading was
still heard in the direction of Knoxville. It proved that Burnside
held out, and gave additional earnestness to the President's
exhortation to hurry a column to his relief immediately after
Grant's victory. Grant needed no urging. A report had reached him
that Burnside still was confident on the 23d, and had supplies for
ten or twelve days on the scale of short rations he was issuing. On
the very evening of his success he wrote to Sherman, "The next thing
now will be to relieve Burnside." He directed Thomas to detach
Granger's Corps, and this with part of the Army of the Tennessee
would make a column of 20,000 men to march at once for Knoxville
under Granger's command. Three days passed, and Grant, being
dissatisfied that the relieving column was not already far on its
way, directed Sherman on the 29th to take command in person and push
it energetically toward Burnside. [Footnote: Official Records, vol.
xxxi. pt. ii. pp. 45, 49; Sherman's Memoirs, vol. i. pp. 366, 368.]
Sherman immediately went forward, and on the 1st of December he was
over the Hiwassee River, approaching Loudon. He telegraphed Grant
that he would let Burnside hear his guns on the 3d or 4th at
farthest; but he added what throws much light on the feeling of
military men in regard to campaigning in East Tennessee. In his
frank and familiar style he said, "Recollect that East Tennessee is
my horror. That any military man should send a force into East
Tennessee puzzles me. Burnside is there and must be relieved; but
when relieved, I want to get out and he should come out too."
[Footnote: Official Records, vol. xxxi. pt. iii. p. 297.] From a
strictly military point of view this was sound; but Burnside had
been sent there more from political than from military reasons, and
it was now too late to think of letting the loyal mountaineers
return under Confederate rule.

Meanwhile at Knoxville Burnside was closely watching the evidences
of Longstreet's purposes and eagerly listening for news from
Chattanooga. On the 1st of December wagon trains began to move
eastward from the besiegers' camp, and on the 3d and 4th more of
them, so that it became probable that Longstreet was about to raise
the siege. In the night of the 3d Captain Audenried, Sherman's
aide-de-camp, came into Knoxville from the south, having made a long
circuit with a small body of cavalry, from Sherman's camp, which on
the night of the 2d was forty miles from the city by the direct
road. Colonel Long, commanding Sherman's cavalry, had selected part
of his best mounted men for the expedition, and Audenried had
accompanied him. The good news of Sherman's approach was thus made
certain, and it was evident that Longstreet's information was
earlier than Burnside's. The Confederate camps were evacuated on the
night of the 4th, and on the 5th Burnside, sending a detachment to
follow up Longstreet's retreat toward the east, sent one of his
staff with an escort in the other direction to meet Sherman. The
messenger from Burnside met the head of the relieving column at
Marysville, a day's march for infantry. Sherman halted his little
army, and wrote Burnside that he felt disposed to stop, "for a stern
chase is a long one," since Longstreet had retreated. He rode in to
Knoxville the next day and consulted with Burnside. He was evidently
dubious of any advantage from a pursuit of Longstreet, and
Burnside's disposition was to avoid urging any comrade to undertake
an unpleasant task for his sake. He therefore cordially assisted
Sherman in solving his doubts in favor of taking back all his troops
except Granger's Fourth Corps, and wrote a letter of warm thanks for
the prompt march to his relief, adding his opinion that the Fourth
Corps would make him strong enough to meet Longstreet, and that it
was advisable for Sherman to rejoin Grant with the rest. [Footnote:
Official Records, vol. xxxi. pt. ii. p. 36.] This was accordingly
done, and Sherman was free to give his attention to a winter
campaign toward the Gulf, from which he hoped important results.

Granger did not relish the prospect of a protracted absence from the
Army of the Cumberland, and protested in vigorous and long
dispatches to Thomas, to Grant, to Burnside, to Sherman, and later
to Foster, [Footnote: _Id_., pt. iii. pp. 358, 365, 391-393;
Sherman's Memoirs, vol. i. p. 368.] but with no effect, except that
Grant was displeased with his original reluctance to march to
Burnside's relief as well as with these protests. The result showed
itself in the spring, when Granger was relieved from the command of
the corps, which was conferred upon Howard.

The raising of the siege brought Burnside into communication with
Cumberland Gap, and he learned that Major-General John G. Foster was
at Tazewell, under orders to relieve him of the command of the
department. This was in apparent accord with the wish which Burnside
had expressed, [Footnote: _Ante_, vol. i. pp. 527, 528.] but as
action had been postponed it was reasonable to expect that further
consultation would be had before he should be relieved, and that
Grant's judgment would be asked in regard to it. After the
controversies which followed the battle of Fredericksburg, Halleck
was habitually unfriendly to Burnside, and we have seen how
uniformly a wrong interpretation was given to the events of the
current campaign. Foster's appointment to succeed Burnside was dated
the 16th of November, [Footnote: Official Records, vol. xxxi. pt.
iii. p. 166.] and he had been in Kentucky or near Cumberland Gap
during the siege of Knoxville. The day the order was made relieving
Burnside was that on which he was battling with Longstreet at
Campbell's Station, holding him at bay in the slow retreat upon
Knoxville, where he arrived on the 17th. On this morning Grant was
writing him, "So far you are doing exactly what appears to me
right," [Footnote: _Id_., p. 177.] and this was written after the
receipt of Dana and Wilson's full dispatches of the 13th and 14th,
as well as Burnside's of the 13th. [Footnote: _Id_., p. 138.] Yet so
strangely was the same information misread by Halleck, that on the
16th he was telegraphing Grant that Burnside was hesitating whether
to fight or retreat out of East Tennessee. "I fear he will not
fight," he added, "although strongly urged to do so. Unless you can
give him immediate assistance, he will surrender his position to the
enemy." [Footnote: _Id_., p. 163. This dispatch of Halleck seems to
have been called out by one of Dana to Stanton on the 14th in which
he said, "Burnside has determined to retreat toward the Gaps."
(Official Records, vol. xxxi. pt. i. p. 259.) Halleck failed to
interpret this in connection with one of the 13th in which Dana had
stated alternate lines of retreat, "if finally compelled," and
Burnside's judgment in favor of the line of Cumberland Gap in such
last resort rather than toward Kingston. (_Ibid_.) Dana had fully
conveyed, however, Burnside's determination to hold Knoxville "as
long as possible," and his reasons for making a stubborn fight
there. By failing to keep this in mind, the Secretary and
General-in-Chief became unnecessarily agitated, and forgot in their
conduct what was due to Grant almost as much as what was due to
Burnside.] On the next day Burnside entered Knoxville, where
fortifications had been hurriedly built, and the siege began. The
heroic defence of Knoxville lasted three weeks, and when Longstreet
withdrew toward Virginia, the successful general learned that he had
been removed from command at the very moment he was completing, with
Grant's unqualified approval, the preparation for that stubborn
resistance which saved East Tennessee and averted the "terrible
misfortune" which Halleck feared. [Footnote: _Id_., pt. iii. p.
145.] The importance of holding East Tennessee, now that it had been
liberated, was urged upon the War Department by Burnside from the
beginning. He had pointed it out when ordered to abandon it and
march to Rosecrans's assistance. [Footnote: _Id_., vol. xxx. pt.
iii. p. 904.] So far from hesitating to fight Longstreet, Dana found
him determined to "expose his whole force to capture rather than
withdraw from the country." [Footnote: _Id_., vol. xxxi. pt. i. p.
260.] It was not till Mr. Dana's later dispatches were received that
the misapprehensions were corrected at Washington. Then the story of
the occupation and defence of East Tennessee was explained, and
justice was done the wisdom of the general's course as well as his
patriotic and unselfish spirit. A part of the trouble had been due
to the fact that after Grant reached Nashville Burnside's
correspondence was with him, and, in accord with military usage, he
dropped direct correspondence with Washington, except when addressed
from there.

It was too late, however, to undo what had been done. Foster was in
Kentucky, carrying forward into East Tennessee such detachments as
could be picked up. He reached Knoxville on the 10th of December,
and the next day Burnside turned over the command to him, and
started for Cincinnati by way of Jacksboro and Williamsburg.
[Footnote: Official Records, vol. xxxi. pt. iii. pp. 372, 384.] The
President was most hearty in his approval of Burnside's conduct when
once he understood it, and insisted that after a brief rest he
should again enter into active service. Congress passed strong
resolutions of thanks to him and to his troops, [Footnote: _Id_.,
pt. i. p. 281.] and it began to be understood that the campaign had
been a creditable one.

It was in such a command that Burnside appeared at his best. The
independence of his campaign gave full play to his active energy,
whilst the bodies of troops were not so large as to prevent his
personal leadership in their combats. In a great army he was at a
disadvantage from lack of true system in handling great and
complicated affairs when he was in chief command; and if his
position was a subordinate one he lacked the sort of responsibility
which called out his best qualities, and he was therefore liable to
become the formal intermediary for the transmission of orders. In
such cases, too, he was in danger of suffering from faults of
subordinates whom his kind heart had permitted to retain important
positions for which they were not fit. When acting immediately under
his eye, he could give them energy and courage which they would lack
when left to themselves. The sore spot in his experience in 1864 was
the failure to make full use of the explosion of the mine at
Petersburg, and the Court of Inquiry made it clear that the fault
lay with inefficient subordinates. One of the most prominent of
these was said to have stayed in a bomb-proof instead of leading his
command. But the same officer had done the same thing in Fort
Sanders at Knoxville, as had been officially reported by Captain
Benjamin, the Chief of Artillery; [Footnote: Official Records, vol.
xxxi. pt. i. p. 344.] and Benjamin was an officer of such military
and personal standing that a court-martial should certainly have
investigated the case. A mistaken leniency brought bitter fruit.

The campaign had been a new test for General Grant also, and it is
instructive to follow him in grasping the details of his enlarged
responsibility. When communication with Burnside became difficult
and infrequent, he gave orders to Willcox at Cumberland Gap and to
subordinates of Burnside in Kentucky and Ohio. He provided for
starting supplies to Knoxville by all practicable routes as soon as
the siege should be raised. He cut trenchantly through pretences
where he thought a lack of vigorous performance was covered up by
verbosity of reports. [Footnote: _Id_., pt. iii. p. 233.] He was
quietly but easily master, and showed no symptom of being
overweighted by his task or flurried by the excitements of a
critical juncture in affairs. He does not impress one as brilliant
in genius, but as eminently sound and sensible. His quality of
greatness was that he handled great affairs as he would little ones,
without betraying any consciousness that this was a great thing to
do. He reminds one of Wellington in the combination of lucid and
practical common-sense with aggressive bull-dog courage. Some
telling lines, developing his traits as he appeared to a critical
observer, are found in a dispatch of General David Hunter to the
Secretary of War, giving a report of his visit to Chattanooga where
he was sent to inspect the army. Hunter was one of the oldest of the
regular officers in service, knew thoroughly Grant's history and
early army reputation, and his words have peculiar significance.
Grant had received him with a sort of filial kindness, making him at
home in his quarters, and opening his mind and his purposes to him
with his characteristic modesty and simplicity of manner. Hunter
says: "I saw him almost every moment, except when sleeping, of the
three weeks I spent in Chattanooga.... He is a hard worker, writes
his own dispatches and orders, and does his own thinking. He is
modest, quiet, never swears, and seldom drinks, as he took only two
drinks during the three weeks I was with him. He listens quietly to
the opinions of others and then judges promptly for himself; and he
is very prompt to avail himself in the field of all the errors of
his enemy. He is certainly a good judge of men, and has called
around him valuable counsellors." He naively adds: "Prominent as
General Grant is before the country, these remarks of mine may
appear trite and uncalled for, but having been ordered to inspect
his command, I thought it not improper for me to add my testimony
with regard to the commander." [Footnote: Official Records, vol.
xxxi. pt. iii. p. 402.]




CHAPTER XXIX

AFFAIRS IN DISTRICT OF OHIO--PLOT TO LIBERATE PRISONERS AT JOHNSON'S
ISLAND.


Administrative duties--Major McLean adjutant-general--His loyalty
questioned--Ordered away--Succeeded by Captain Anderson--Robert
Anderson's family--Vallandigham canvass--Bounty-jumping--Action of
U. S. Courts--of the local Probate Court--Efforts to provoke
collision--Interview with the sheriff--Letter to Governor
Tod--Shooting soldiers in Dayton--The October election--Great
majority against Vallandigham--The soldier vote--Wish for field
service--Kinglake's Crimean War--Its lessons--Confederate plots in
Canada--Attempt on military prison at Johnson's Island--Assembling
militia there--Fortifying Sandusky Bay--Inspection of the
prison--Condition and treatment of the prisoners.


In the sketch I have given of the campaign in East Tennessee, I have
reached the time when I joined the Twenty-third Corps in front of
Knoxville, and became part of the organization with which my
fortunes were to be united till the end of the war. It is necessary,
however, to go back and pick up the threads of personal experience
during this autumn of 1863.

The arrangement of the business of the department which I have
mentioned [Footnote: _Ante_, vol. i. p. 492.] gave me some work in
addition to that which properly belonged to the District of Ohio and
Michigan. I did not appear officially in it, but under Burnside's
instructions to his adjutant-general on leaving Cincinnati, the
questions arising in daily administration were submitted to me, and
on my advice current orders were issued in Burnside's name. This
kept me in close communication with the general personally as well
as officially, and made me aware of the progress of events more
perfectly than I could otherwise have been. The adjutant-general in
charge of the Cincinnati headquarters was Major N. H. McLean, an
experienced officer of the regular army, and most systematic and
able in his administrative duties. He was punctilious in his
performance of duty, and was especially averse to having his
military conduct seem in any way influenced by political motives.
Like many other officers of the army, he made his devotion to his
government as a soldier the basis of all his action, and disclaimed
any interest in politics. But in the summer of 1863 politics in Ohio
became too heated to allow any neutrality or even any hesitation in
open declarations of principle. Vallandigham was a candidate for
governor, although an exile under the judgment of the military
court. Local politicians were not always discreet, and some of them
demanded avowals of Major McLean, which he refused to make, not
because of any sympathy with Vallandigham's partisans, but because
he thought it unbecoming his military character to submit to
catechising. This was enough to condemn him in the eyes of those who
literally enforced the proverb that "he that is not for us is
against us," and they sent to the War Department a highly colored
statement of McLean's conduct, accusing him of disloyalty. Mr.
Stanton, in his characteristic way, condemned him first and tried
him afterward. The first we knew of it, an order came sending McLean
off to the Pacific coast,--to Oregon, I believe. General Burnside
protested, and warmly sustained the major as a loyal man and able
officer; but the mischief was done, and it was months before it
could be undone. Indeed it was years before the injury done him in
his professional career was fully recognized and a serious attempt
was made to recompense him.

When Major McLean was thus removed, the business of his office fell
into the hands of Captain William P. Anderson of the
adjutant-general's department, who issued the orders and conducted
the correspondence in General Burnside's name. The captain was a
nephew of General Robert Anderson, and though the general had no
sons himself, his near kinsmen gave striking evidence of the earnest
and militant patriotism of a loyal Kentucky stock closely allied to
a well-known Ohio family. The roster of the members of the family
who saw military service is an exceptional one. [Footnote: Colonel
Charles Anderson, brother of the general, was in Texas when the
Civil War began, but abandoned his interests there, and coming back
to Ohio was made colonel of the Ninety-third Ohio Infantry, which he
led in the battle of Stone's River, where he was wounded. He was in
1863 made the Union candidate for lieutenant-governor on the ticket
with John Brough, whom he succeeded as governor when Brough died in
1865.

Colonel Latham Anderson, son of Charles, graduated at West Point in
1859 and became a captain in the Fifth U. S. Infantry and colonel of
the Eighth California Volunteers. His war service was mostly in New
Mexico and on the frontier.

Larz Anderson, another brother of the general, was represented in
the War of the Rebellion by five sons who had honorable records: (1)
Nicholas Longworth Anderson was adjutant, lieutenant-colonel, and
colonel of the Sixth Ohio Infantry. He was severely wounded at
Stone's River and Chickamauga. He left the service at the close of
the war as brevet-major-general.

(2) William Pope Anderson enlisted as a private in the Sixth Ohio
Infantry, became sergeant-major and second lieutenant. He was then
appointed assistant-adjutant-general with rank of captain. He was
slightly wounded in the battle of Shiloh.

(3) Edward Lowell Anderson was first lieutenant and captain in the
Fifty-second Ohio Infantry. He was wounded at Jonesboro, but
continued in service to the end of the war.

(4) Frederick Pope Anderson was first lieutenant in the One Hundred
and Eighty-first Ohio Infantry.

(5) Larz Anderson, Jr., was a mere lad, but served without
commission as volunteer aide-de-camp on the staff of
Brigadier-General N. C. McLean.

William Marshall Anderson, of Chillicothe, Ohio, another brother of
the general, had two sons in the war service: (1) Thomas McArthur
Anderson was captain in the Fourteenth U.S. Infantry, and after the
war became its colonel, and later a general officer in the
Philippines.]

Including the general himself, his brother Charles, and the nephews,
ten kinsmen supported the flag of the country in the field. Such a
family record is so remarkable as to be worthy of preservation.

To return to the affairs of our military administration of the
department and district, the situation was complicated by the fact
that Vallandigham had openly declared a purpose to return to Ohio
during his candidacy. I did not hesitate to let it be known that
upon his doing so, the alternative in his sentence would be
enforced, and that he would be sent to Fort Warren for imprisonment.
Mr. Pugh, who had been induced to accept the nomination for
lieutenant-governor with him, made a visit to Windsor, in Canada
(opposite Detroit), where Vallandigham met him. The result of the
conference was that Vallandigham remained quietly in Canada till the
election was over, leaving it to his friends to make as much
political capital out of his exile as they could.

As evidence of the fierceness of the passions roused among his
partisans, a few significant facts may be mentioned. The
conscription law had led, as we have seen, [Footnote: Henry Reuben
Anderson was second lieutenant in the Forty-third Ohio Infantry,
captain in the Sixth U.S. Volunteer Infantry, and after the war was
transferred to the Fourth U.S. Artillery as first lieutenant.] to
wholesale frauds in the form of "bounty-jumping." It was of course
the duty of the military authorities to prevent this by arresting
deserters and holding them to military service and discipline under
their enlistment. A common form of fraud was for a well-grown young
man to offer himself as a recruit, take the oath that he was of
lawful age, receive the hundreds of dollars of bounty, and then
bring forward his parents to claim him as a minor enlisting without
their permission. We always recognized promptly the authority of a
writ of _habeas corpus_ from the Federal courts in such cases, and
the judges examined the recruit and his friends carefully, to detect
a fraudulent conspiracy if there was one. If the case appeared to be
free from collusion and the evidence of minority sufficient, an
order of release was made, conditioned on the repayment to the
government of the bounty received and the expenses of the
proceeding.

The depot of recruits for the army was on the south side of the
river in Kentucky; but in any case that was not palpably fraudulent
I directed the officers in charge to bring the recruit to
Cincinnati, where Judge Leavitt's writ could reach him, and to
submit the case to the United States District Court. The following
letter will illustrate this, being one addressed by me to General
Tillson, who commanded in Covington, which, with the region within a
radius of some fifteen miles, was part of my district:--

"HEADQUARTERS, DISTRICT OF OHIO, CINCINNATI,

9th September, 1863.


GENERAL,--Judge Leavitt of the United States District Court called
this morning with a Mr. Eckmann, who wishes to get his son, a minor,
out of the First Heavy Artillery. The boy is named Summerfield
Eckmann, and is in Company C. As you have stated to me that it is
practicable to fill up the place of minors and invalids as fast as
they can be got rid of, I would like to have the case looked into at
once, and unless some reason unknown to me exists, have him sent to
report to Colonel Boone at Kemper Barracks, where the writ from the
Federal Court may be served. By agreement with the father, if the
judge should discharge him, the bounty will be paid back, and you
will please send a statement of what amount was paid and how his
account with the government stands.

Very respectfully, your obed't serv't,
(Signed) J. D. Cox,
B. G. Commanding.

Brig. Gen. Davis Tillson,
Com'g, etc., Covington, Ky."


All honest and deserving cases could be satisfactorily disposed of
in this way. But the fraudulent "bounty-jumpers" wanted nothing so
little as a full investigation before the United States Courts.
These cases, therefore, if they appeared in court at all, would be
brought before local judges supposed to be prejudiced against the
government and who would not require restitution. To prevent this,
the War Department issued instructions based on the decision of the
United States Supreme Court in Ableman v. Booth, in which Chief
Justice Taney had delivered the opinion. These instructions directed
that in cases arising under the conscription and recruiting laws,
the writ of habeas corpus should be obeyed only when issued by
United States courts. With full knowledge of these instructions and
of the Supreme Court decision which had been a party shibboleth in
the fugitive-slave cases before the war, the Probate judge of the
county seemed bent on provoking a collision with the National
authorities. His court was, among courts of record, that of inferior
jurisdiction in the county, and the higher courts gave us no
trouble. A letter which I wrote to Governor Tod at the close of
August so fully gives the details of the matter and of the view I
then took of it, that I prefer to let it stand as my statement of
it, rather than any paraphrase I could now make. I said:--

"I have the honour to call your attention to a persistent effort on
the part of the Probate Judge of the county to produce a collision
between the sheriff and posse of the vicinity and the United States
government.

"You have probably noticed the newspaper accounts of a habeas corpus
case before Judge ------ some time since, in which the writ was
issued to Lieutenant-Colonel Boone, One Hundred and Fifteenth Ohio
Volunteer Infantry, commanding at Kemper barracks in this city,
directing him to bring before the court one Hicks, held as a
deserter from the army.

"In accordance with instructions from the War Department, based upon
the decision of Chief Justice Taney in the case of Ableman v. Booth,
Lieutenant-Colonel Boone answered in writing, stating that the man
was held by the authority of the United States as a deserter, and
that, without intending any disrespect to the court, it was
impossible for him to deliver the prisoner to the officers of a
State court. Lieutenant-Colonel Boone further attached to his answer
and made part of it the instructions from Washington and the order
of Major-General Burnside promulgating the same, and it was thus
made matter of record in the court that the case was one directly
affecting the government of the United States. The judge was also
notified by counsel that it was the purpose of the Federal officers
to take the case to the courts of last resort should his decision be
in accordance with that which he had rendered in other cases, and
that the matter would thus, without doubt, be ultimately determined
by the judicial decision of the highest courts having cognizance,
and that there could be no occasion for collision between himself
and the military authorities.

"The judge issued an attachment against Lieutenant-Colonel Boone for
contempt, and directed Major-General Burnside to be made party to
the record. General Burnside answered in a similar manner to Colonel
Boone. The court made no personal order in General B.'s case, but
directed the sheriff of the county to arrest Lieutenant-Colonel
Boone and bring him before the court. The sheriff went to Colonel
Boone's quarters and was there informed that the writ could not be
executed, as, under orders received, the military authorities would
not permit it. The sheriff so made return to the court, and has, as
he informs me this morning, been again directed peremptorily by the
judge to execute the writ at every hazard.

"The sheriff came to me to know what would be our course if he
should raise the posse comitatus in obedience to the writ. My answer
was that the United States forces would use no aggression, but that
I wished him and the judge to understand distinctly that the writ
could only be executed by overpowering the United States troops in
open fight, and that it became all concerned to consider well before
they became overt traitors by levying war against the Federal
government; that I should regard them as public enemies at the first
overt act and use the utmost vigor against them; and that after
suppressing any disturbance they might create, my first duty would
be to arrest the judge and himself and hand them over to the United
States courts to be tried for treason. I likewise expressed my
surprise that in a matter which was avowedly an undisguised attempt
to bring the State authorities into open conflict with the National
government, he had not appealed to the governor of the State, its
chief executive (he being himself but a subordinate), for
instructions. As he professed embarrassment as to his duty, I told
him I would state what in my opinion a loyal sheriff should do in
such a case; and that was to make a written return upon the writ
saying that it could not be obeyed without levying open war against
the United States, and was therefore returned unexecuted.... In view
of the circumstances, I have thought best to lay the matter before
you, that you may, if you see proper, direct the sheriff to take no
steps calculated to bring the State and National authorities into
collision, without full communication with and instruction from
yourself as chief executive. I have no concern as to the success of
any forcible attempt upon Colonel Boone, but regard it as very
desirable that no such attempt should be made, and especially that
it should not be precipitated, without your knowledge, by the action
of the Probate Court of this county in overruling a decision of the
Supreme Court of the United States.

"I shall forward a copy of this letter to the Secretary of War for
his information, and have the honor to remain," etc.

There were some amusing incidents connected with the sheriff's
embarrassment which could not properly appear in my letter to the
governor. Both he and the Probate judge were candidates for
re-election, and it seemed certain that the aggressive Vallandigham
faction in the party would control the nominations in the party
convention. In such excited times extreme men are almost sure to
take the lead. The sheriff saw very clearly that there was nothing
profitable to him in a forcible attack upon the United States troops
in barracks, and knew that a call upon the _posse_ would be
responded to by nobody but ruffians of the criminal class who might
like an opportunity to gather as a mob with a pretext of lawful
authority. He complained to me with a comical distress that the
judge had taken advantage of him to gain with the extremists of his
party the credit for bold defiance of the government, whilst he, the
sheriff, was left to bear the brunt of the real danger. I had told
him in an earlier interview that if he called out the _posse_ it
would be his duty to lead it in person, and had intimated that I
should direct the soldiers to save bloodshed by carefully marking
the leaders in an attack. I now suggested that if he should inform
the judge that he should summon him first as one of the _posse_ and
require him to march beside him, he would probably find the zeal for
a collision diminished.

Whatever were the reasons which controlled, there was no _posse_
summoned, and I heard no more of the arrest of Colonel Boone. Both
judge and sheriff lived to look back upon the episode in their lives
with other feelings than those which excited them nearly to
desperation in that singular political campaign. It was not always
easy to draw a satisfactory line in dealing practically with such
powdery elements and social conditions as those of 1863, but the
best results seemed to come from carefulness not to provoke
unnecessary collision with political prejudices and not to interfere
with personal liberty more than was necessary, whilst showing
inexorable firmness in carrying out such measures as we had to
adopt. Two cases which arose in Dayton made it necessary to
distinguish between two possible courses, and though there was a
good deal of difference in judgment among loyal men I thought the
event fully justified us in that which we pursued.

The arrest of Vallandigham had left a certain class of people in
Dayton on the verge of violent outbreak. A mob had wrecked the
publishing office of the Union party paper, and we had kept a small
garrison at the city to preserve the peace, The "roughs" of the
place were insolent to the soldiers and their officers, and it
required firm discipline to keep our men as patient as we wished
them to be. One day a wrangle began, and one of the city "rowdies"
pulled a pistol and fired upon a soldier. We arrested the criminal,
but whilst we held him, an indictment was found against him in the
local court, and he was demanded by the civil authorities for trial.
We knew very well that in any jury of that county enough partisans
of Vallandigham would be found to prevent a conviction, but I
ordered the man to be delivered up. This was pretty sharply
criticised by the more ardent Union men, but I answered that it was
necessary to find out whether justice could be administered by the
civil authorities before applying military rule.

The delivery of the man was no doubt looked upon as an act of
timidity, and it was not long before we had a repetition of the
offence. I had taken pains to have the garrison at Dayton carefully
instructed that they must be patient and cool, avoiding every
provocation, but if attacked, the aggressor must be punished on the
spot. In the second case, the man who drew his weapon was instantly
shot down. There was now a demand for the soldier to be tried by the
local civil court; but I said that the boot was on the other foot.
The charge against the soldier was for an act performed in the line
of his military duty, and of this our military courts had
cognizance. The case was investigated by a military tribunal and the
man justified. The result was every way satisfactory. Assaulting
soldiers lost its attractiveness to town bullies, and the case in
which the civilian had been left to the action of the civil courts
was a standing proof of the inefficiency of those tribunals in
matters where partisan passions entered, and where the unanimity of
a jury was consequently impossible.

The State election occurred in October, and although there had been
great fears of rioting and bloodshed, these fears were happily
disappointed. There had been enough of the preliminary education as
to the relations of the military authorities to the preservation of
the peace, to make it generally understood that disturbances would
be dangerous. The soldiers were, however, kept carefully out of
sight except as they exercised their personal right to vote. They
were under arms at their barracks, and no leaves of absence were
given. These precautions were all that was needed. In Cincinnati the
election was said to be one of the quietest and most orderly ever
known. The people seemed to appreciate the gravity of the situation
and to realize that it must be soberly and thoughtfully met. Hosts
of men who would willingly have been in opposition to the
administration party on questions of economy or of details in the
conduct of the war declined to vote for Vallandigham, whose
utterances had been the great matter of debate during the canvass,
and whose disloyalty being thus brought home to the voters in every
neighborhood, had repelled all but the most passionate of his party
friends. John Brough, the Union party candidate, himself a "war
democrat," was elected governor by an unprecedented majority of over
a hundred thousand. The soldiers' vote had helped to swell this
majority, and as returns had to be made from polling-places opened
for each Ohio regiment in the field, there was considerable delay
before the extent of the political victory was fully known. The home
vote was enough for every practical purpose, and it, of course, was
known at once. The returns from the army vote kept adding to the
majority, and gave, day by day, a new stimulus to political
interest, one party rejoicing over the unanimity of the country's
defenders, and the other affecting to see dangers of military
despotism. For this reason it was fortunate that the soldiers' vote
was not necessary to decide the election, and that without it
Brough's triumph went beyond any ordinary measure of party success.

The remarkable result of the election was felt throughout the
country as an indication of renewed determination of the people that
the war must be fought out to the complete crushing of the Rebellion
and the restoration of the Union. There was a noticeable
crystallization of public opinion after it. Reasonable men in the
defeated party found it easy to accept conclusions which were backed
up by so great majorities. Agitation was quieted, and there was an
evident disposition to acquiesce in what was so evidently the
popular current.

My aversion for the anomalous position of a military commandant out
of the actual field of war had not been lessened by my experiences
of the summer, and both directly and indirectly I renewed my
requests for a field command. I had been told that the Secretary of
War awaited only an opening which would permit him to assign me to
duty with the advanced grade which had been given me after Antietam,
and I had been advised, in a way that seemed authoritative, to wait
patiently for this. It became evident in the autumn that such
waiting was likely to be profitless as well as wearisome. A regular
army officer had a backing in the _esprit de corps_ at the
departments, and Halleck was watchful to give the full weight of his
official influence in favor of such a one. It was, perhaps
naturally, assumed that a volunteer would be assisted by political
friends, and if he did not make use of such influence he would fall
between two stools. After my first appointment I was never aware of
receiving any help from these personal influences, and had gotten
whatever recognition I had from my immediate commanders in the
field. Burnside had intimated that if Hartsuff's ill health should
make that officer retire from the command of the Twenty-third Corps,
he would assign me to it in the expectation that the corresponding
rank would then be conferred by the President. If I have any regret
respecting my own action in seeking active duty, it is that I did
not ask for the command of one of the divisions in the corps on the
movement into East Tennessee. It was Burnside's wish that I should
remain in Cincinnati and I acquiesced; but I have had a lingering
belief that my influence with him would have helped decide him to
remain in the West had I been with him in Knoxville in October and
November. Be that as it may, I was fully determined after the Ohio
election was over to cease looking for anything more than a field
command, according to my present rank, and to be urgent till I
obtained it.

In this year the first volume of Kinglake's "History of the Crimean
War" was published, and reading it in the intervals of other duty in
Cincinnati, I found in it lessons of hope and confidence in our
armies that were to me both stimulating and encouraging. It would
not be strange if an English soldier should feel that Kinglake was
quite too frank in his revelation of the mistakes and
discouragements which attended England's first military operations
after the "forty years' peace." But it was precisely this
photographic realism and unreserve which gave the book its peculiar
value. I found Lord Raglan and his subordinates intelligent men,
feeling their way through doubts and mistakes to a new experimental
knowledge of their task. I compared them and their work with what I
had seen in our own service when a great army had to be organized
and put in the field and everything had to be created anew. I saw
that we had been no worse off than our neighbors, and that our
tuition in the school of experience had gone on quite as rapidly as
theirs. I thanked Kinglake in my heart for telling us that Raglan
tested what he was doing by asking himself how "the Duke" would have
done had he been there. It was only another way of applying the
lessons of past experience to the present duty; but it seemed
peculiarly human that the English general in the perplexities of his
troublesome problem in the Crimea should summon up the shade of
Wellington and ask how the practical soldier of the Spanish
Peninsular War would act were he deciding for his old staff officer
what he must do at the Alma or in front of Sebastopol.

The student of military history sees that the weak points in the
British army on the peace establishment had been that systematic and
continuous preparation for active war had not been insisted on. It
needed the organizing genius of Roon and Moltke in the Prussian army
to make such a mobilization as that of 1866 and that of 1870, and to
show what is possible in preparing an armed host to take the field.
Preparation for war has had a totally different meaning since those
campaigns, and the start of a day or two in reaching the field was
shown to involve the winning and losing a great campaign. As matters
stood in 1854, however, the great military powers of Europe should
be considered as having only the raw material of armies as they had
depots of military stores, and true organization in every department
had to be effected after a declaration of war. Studying it in 1863,
it seemed to me that the only advantage England or France would have
had over us at the outbreak of the Rebellion would have been in the
greater number of men partly drilled and the greater quantities of
arms and ammunition in store. Kinglake taught us that others would
have had to go through most of the discouragements we had
experienced, and that our aptitude in learning had been perhaps
greater than theirs would have been. His unreserved disclosure of
the errors and the miseries of the siege of Sebastopol was
infinitely more instructive than any history which hid the
humiliating facts and covered all with the glamour and glory of the
final success. His faithful dealing was in the line of true
discipline, though the reading of his story must have been a sore
chastisement of spirit for many an English soldier and statesman. It
was more effective than the comments of any "war correspondent,"
however capable; for it was free from every suspicion of
unfriendliness, and was written with the fullest access to official
evidence. I cannot help believing that the book was no small factor
in the general movement in Europe toward a much more scientific
comprehension and a much better practical mastery of the elements of
army organization and administration in times of peace.

But what I am quite sure of is that its perusal was a source of
great comfort and encouragement to me in the midst of our own
struggle; because it assured me, as I compared Raglan's experience
with ours, that we had not gone so far astray in learning our
lesson, and were not so completely on the dunces' bench, as I had
been disposed to fear. We had plenty of blunders to confess, and
there was no room for over-confidence; but the book prompted every
earnest soldier among us to believe that we could make still better
use of our experience, and to feel bolder in relying on his own
judgment and courage in drawing new expedients from our peculiar
circumstances and in developing new adaptations of military science
to our own campaigns. Staff schools cannot turn out great generals
to order, and the man who leads will continue to be more important
than any other element of an army; but no leader can work well with
dull and antiquated tools, and the present generation can hardly see
a great war begun with so little adequate preparation for it as was
common before our great civil strife.

On the 9th of November the humdrum routine at my district
headquarters was interrupted by a dispatch from the officer
commanding at Detroit, Michigan, giving warning of what was more
explicitly reported in one of the 10th, saying that he was
positively informed that within forty-eight hours two armed steamers
would attack Johnson's Island and release the prisoners held there.
[Footnote: Official Records, series ii. vol. vi. pp. 491, 495, 635.]

The military prison at Johnson's Island was built for the
confinement of Confederate officers who had been captured in battle,
and their number was so large that to release them would be an
enterprise of no little importance, if successful. The island lay in
Sandusky Bay, within a few hours' sail of several Canadian ports.
Its garrison consisted of a single regiment which had all the
employment it needed to furnish the ordinary prison guards, and
would be entirely too weak to oppose any considerable force
attacking from without, especially as it would be prudent to assume
that such an attack would be accompanied by an outbreak of the
prisoners within.

I immediately communicated with Governor Tod and with the Commissary
of Prisoners at Washington, Colonel Hoffman, and on the same day
sent a battery of three-inch rifled cannon and 500 newly raised
recruits to Sandusky. I telegraphed the Hon. Joshua R. Giddings, our
consul-general at Montreal, asking what he could learn in Canada as
to the threatened expedition. He thought it was the mere "bombast"
of Confederate emissaries and refugees in the Canadian provinces,
and made light of it. On the 12th, however, the Secretary of War
telegraphed me that Lord Lyons, the British ambassador, confirmed
the report, and directed me to take energetic action to defeat the
expected raid. The dispatch reached me at nine o'clock in the
morning, and as it would be necessary to consult with the governor
and get him to call out a force of State militia, I telegraphed him
that I would go to Columbus on the half-past-ten train from
Cincinnati, and asked him to be ready to call out the militia as
soon as I could see him. I then sent messages to the commandants of
militia regiments near the railway line, requesting them to call out
their men at once in anticipation of an order from the governor to
proceed to Sandusky. I also communicated with my subordinates in
command at Detroit, Sandusky, and Columbus, giving a hint of my
purposes. Finding I was likely to be late at the railway station, I
sent a message to Mr. Woodward, the superintendent of the Little
Miami Railroad, asking him to hold the train for me. The train had
gone when the message reached him, but he ordered out an extra
locomotive, and when I reached the station it was under orders to
overtake the regular train. With an aide-de-camp I mounted the
locomotive, and we were off at speed. The train was overtaken at
Xenia, half-way to Columbus, and I was able to keep my appointment
with the governor.

It happened that there was at this time a plot also to take the camp
of military prisoners at Columbus, indicating a wide-spread scheme
among the Confederate prisoners in Ohio, and General Mason, who
commanded there, did not think it would be safe to reduce his
garrison. The governor acted at once upon my suggestion, and ordered
out the militia regiments which I had warned before leaving
Cincinnati. My regular train had gone on, but Mr. Woodward had
provided for a special one from Columbus, and we were soon speeding
on in the hope of making the connection with a train going West on
the Lake Shore Railway. The connection was made, though it became
necessary to make what was then regarded as extraordinary speed to
do it. Over one stretch of the road we ran twenty miles in eighteen
minutes by the watch, and our average rate was high enough to make
it a noteworthy journey. I reached Sandusky at midnight, and found
reports of the militia regiments already on the way, and that the
hostile expedition had not yet left Canada.

There is always a considerable amount of business labor connected
with the sudden assembly of new troops in a city like Sandusky.
Provision must be made for quarters and for their subsistence. The
militia were not like troops accustomed to take the field, and were
not provided with tents. The autumn was well advanced, and severe
winter weather was likely to come at any time. Competent officers
had to be selected to take responsible charge of each of the supply
departments, including arms and ammunition. A battery of
Parrott-rifled cannon was ordered to report to me as well as some
heavy coast artillery. The first organization of means to look after
the coming troops and the artillery being made, the next duty was a
personal reconnoissance of my field of operations. A gentleman put
at my disposal a small sailing yacht of light draught, and with a
good crew and a fresh breeze the principal points of the lower bay
were visited, including Johnson's Island.

Sandusky Bay is the largest land-locked body of water connected with
Lake Erie. It is some twenty miles long by three or four wide, its
length running east and west, and narrow tongues of land separating
it from the lake. The mouth of the bay is about a mile wide, but the
water is quite shallow except in the narrow channel, which is
sinuous and runs very close to Cedar Point, the extremity of the
long, low sandy cape which separates the eastern part of the bay
from the open water. A lighthouse on the point and range lights near
it give direction to vessels approaching, which run from the
northwest, head on, till they seem almost ashore at the foot of the
lighthouse tower, when they turn sharply to the southwest, the
channel being zigzag up to the city, which lies on the southeast
shore. It did not need a second glance to determine that Cedar Point
was the place to fortify, and that batteries there would rake any
vessel approaching the harbor, as well as on its way in, if it
should succeed in passing the point.

Johnson's Island lies a mile or two inside the entrance to the bay
on the western side. A narrow channel separates it from the land on
that side, which is a high rocky peninsula called Marblehead. The
island had been cultivated as a farm, containing a hundred acres or
more, with some pleasant groves amid the fields, and with a gently
undulating surface which gave it an agreeable variety and a
picturesque appearance. The landing at the island was on the bay
side, three or four miles from the city wharves. If a hostile force
should land on the peninsula at Marblehead, it could not reach the
island by reason of the channel which separates it from the land on
the west. The only chance of success for such a raid was to make a
surprise of it before Cedar Point could be fortified, to enter the
bay and land a force sufficient to overpower the prison garrison
before it should be reinforced.

Under the terms of the treaty with Great Britain, our navy was
represented by a single vessel of war on Lake Erie, the steamer
"Michigan," which carried a battery of eight or ten guns. She was
ordered to Sandusky to co-operate with me at the same time that I
was directed to go there. She was commanded by Captain John Carter,
a bluff and hearty seaman of the old school, whom I found cordially
ready to work with me in the most perfect harmony and mutual
understanding. I lost no time in transporting my two rifled
batteries to Cedar Point, and throwing up hasty earthworks to cover
them. From the moment they were in position it was certain that no
unarmed steamboat could enter the harbor. A part of my infantry was
encamped in rear of the batteries, covered by a grove of evergreen
trees, near enough to support the guns if an effort were made to
land there. The rest of the infantry was assigned to increase the
garrison on Johnson's Island itself. The news had spread that there
was a concentration of our forces at Sandusky, and by the time we
were ready for an attack the raiders were well aware that their
plans had failed.

Their project had not been a hopeless one if they could have kept it
secret, but that was almost impossible. The leaders in it were
commonly reported to have been some of Morgan's men who had made
their way to Canada when he was captured. By the aid of Confederate
agents they had procured the means to organize a considerable band
of adventurers, and had chartered two steamboats which were to meet
them at the mouth of the Detroit River. The assembly of such a body
of men attracted the attention of the Canadian authorities, and
information was sent to Lord Lyons at Washington. Our officers at
Detroit also got wind of it, and employed the police and detectives
to ferret out the facts. The raiders had assembled, and the boats
were ready, when, on the 14th of November, they learned that their
plans were exposed and the chance to succeed was lost. The less
eager ones were quick to abandon the enterprise, and the bolder
spirits found themselves reduced to a handful. So they scattered,
threatening to try it again at some more convenient time.

As soon as the work of preparation at Cedar Point was well under
way, I accepted the invitation of Captain Carter to make a
reconnoissance in the "Michigan." We sailed out of the harbor and
made the tour of the beautiful group of islands known as the Bass
Islands, in the midst of which is the little harbor of Put-in-Bay.
We were on the classic ground where Perry had won his naval victory
in the War of 1812, and although we found no trace of the threatened
raid, the circumstances which took us there added to the interest
with which we examined the scene of Perry's glory. On my return I
reported to the Secretary of War that all present danger had passed,
and asked to be allowed to send the militia home. The weather had
become stormy, and the State troops naturally became impatient when
the need of their continued exposure seemed to be at an end. They
were soon allowed to go, but it was wisely determined to put the
heavy guns in a fortification on the island, where they could
command the entrance to the bay and yet be so connected with the
permanent garrison as to avoid the establishment of two camps with
the necessary increase of expense as well as numbers.

This delayed me a fortnight at Sandusky, and the delay was quite as
unwelcome to me as to the militia. I had been away from Cincinnati
but a few days when I received a dispatch from General Burnside,
saying that if I was still minded to accept a field command he
thought he could give me one of his corps. As this was exactly what
I had been wishing for, it will be easily believed that I chafed at
the circumstances which seemed to tie me to the shore of Lake Erie
when I longed to be on my way to East Tennessee. I laid the matter
before the War Department by telegraph, and begged to be allowed to
go. Mr. Stanton answered on the 22d that I could not yet leave
Sandusky. I hurried the work to be done there with all possible
energy, so as to remove the cause of delay, and on the 3d of
December was gratified to learn that the order had been issued
directing me to report in person to the general in command at
Knoxville. I was not informed that I should not find Burnside there
when I should arrive, and assumed that my work at Sandusky was the
only cause of delay in my orders to go; but I was soon to learn of
other changes which I did not anticipate.

My stay at Sandusky gave me the opportunity to make an inspection of
the military prison at Johnson's Island, and I availed myself of it.
As only officers were confined there, the high average intelligence
and character of these would of course show itself in their personal
habits and in their methods of employing the time, which hung heavy
on their hands. In all such situations the energy and hopefulness of
the individual are the best guaranty for continued good health,
whilst ennui, listlessness, and idleness are the pretty sure
forerunners of melancholy and homesickness, which lead to serious
maladies. It would be hard to find a more salubrious site for a camp
than Johnson's Island. Naturally well drained, diversified with
grove and meadow, open to the breeze from every quarter, washed by
the pure waters of Lake Erie, it is to-day, as it was then, a
beautiful and attractive spot. The winter there is not usually
severe. The vast body of water comprising the Great Lakes modifies
the climate and tempers it so that the autumn is generally prolonged
and pleasant. Winter begins late, but is apt to be changeable and
disagreeable, and a raw and backward spring, with chilling winds off
the frozen waters, is the part of the year most to be dreaded.
Native Ohioans insist that there is no climate more wholesome and
pleasant than this lake-shore belt, which is now the land of
continuous vineyards and peach orchards. A native of the Gulf States
would, however, find its winter and spring severe and trying, more
from sudden changes than from any extremely low temperature. Taking
it all in all, it is probable that no place for a prison camp could
be found in the Northern States which would be liable to fewer
objections.

The prison itself was constructed in the manner which seemed
simplest and cheapest. A large square on the sloping hillsides was
surrounded with a high wooden fence. On the outside of this, near
the top, was a gallery or balcony supported on brackets.

This was the walk for the sentinels, and from it they had a
commanding view of the interior of the enclosure. Sentry-boxes,
looking like turrets, were at the corners and at intervals on the
sides. Within, the barracks for the prisoners were on the west or
northwest side, leaving the larger space open in front for exercise.
The buildings were of pine boards, roughly but well constructed, so
that they were dry and tight. Rows of bunks ran along the sides,
filled with beds of straw. The shelter and accommodation was
decidedly better than that which we made for our own troops at Camp
Dennison, our first camp of instruction. Through most of the year
there was no ground for complaint. In winter, and especially on
winter nights, it would be impossible to keep up anything like a
steady temperature, and the thin shell of the building would soon
chill through in a nipping and frosty air. We had to meet this
difficulty in all winter quarters for troops, and there seemed to be
no way to remove it. If one could be heavily clad, it was generally
more healthful to endure a steady low temperature, than to meet the
alternations of heat and cold which came of the replenishing and
dying out of the fires in stoves during the long winter night. As
many men have many minds, it was almost impossible to secure
anything like system in a long shed-like building occupied by a
little democracy of hundreds of persons.

The food was plain but good in quality, similar to the army ration,
and at the time of my visit was abundant. I took occasion to go
through the barracks unattended by the officers of the garrison, and
encouraged the prisoners to make known any complaints. There were
practically none that were not necessarily incident to the position
of a prisoner of war in actual confinement. The loss of liberty, the
weary pacing of the enclosure in front of their barracks, the lack
of interesting occupation, home-sickness, and general
discomfort,--these were the ills of which they spoke. Among the
prisoners was General Jeff. Thompson, of Missouri,--the ranking
officer among them, as I recollect,--and I sought an introduction to
him and talked with him in regard to the prison life. He was
depressed and ailing, though not consenting to go into hospital, and
spoke feelingly of the discouraging monotony and ennui of their
existence, but made no complaint of the administration of the prison
in any way. To be exchanged was the burden of their wishes and
prayers, and in this every one with ordinary human sympathies must
feel with them. Games of chess, draughts, dominoes, and cards were
their indoor amusements, and some of the more energetic kept up an
attempt at regular out-door exercise.

It happened that the chief surgeon of the camp was an old neighbor
of mine, Dr. M. C. Woodworth, and I questioned him closely as to the
medical and sanitary condition. He was a man of the highest
character in his profession and as a citizen. I had absolute
confidence in his uprightness as well as his ability. His statements
fully corroborated the conclusions I drew from my own observation. I
was fully satisfied that the garrison administration was honest and
humane, and that the prisoners suffered only such evils as were
necessarily incident to confinement in a narrow space, and to life
in temporary barracks of the kind used in all military camps.

I learned that those prisoners who had means of their own were
permitted to open private accounts with merchants and bankers in the
city of Sandusky, and had little difficulty in increasing their
physical comforts in many ways. Since the war I have conversed with
business men of that town who personally knew of these arrangements,
and who have given me details of remittances and credits furnished
to prisoners, and of some considerable investments made for them. A
certain surveillance was necessary in such cases to give assurance
that no unlawful advantage was taken of such opportunities, but
there was very little if any reason to believe such leniency was
abused.




CHAPTER XXX

A WINTER RIDE ON THE CUMBERLAND MOUNTAINS


Ordered to East Tennessee--Preparation for a long ride--A small
party of officers--Rendezvous at Lexington, Ky.--Changes in my
staff--The escort-A small train--A gay cavalcade--The blue-grass
country--War-time roads--Valley of the Rockcastle--Quarters for the
night--London--Choice of routes--Longstreet in the way--A turn
southward--Williamsburg--Meeting Burnside--Fording the
Cumberland--Pine Mountain--A hard pull--Teamsters' chorus--Big Creek
Gap--First view of East Tennessee--Jacksboro--A forty-mile
trot--Escape from unwelcome duty--In command of Twenty-third
Corps--The army-supply problem--Siege bread--Starved
beef--Burnside's dinner to Sherman.


The order of the War Department directing me to report in person to
the general commanding in East Tennessee was issued on the 2nd of
December. [Footnote: Official Records, vol. xxxi. pt. iii. p. 314.]
It was to take effect when I should have completed my duties at
Sandusky, but as I had pressed all my work forward to completion
some days before, in the expectation of the order, I was prepared to
leave at once. A copy of the order was telegraphed to me on the 3rd,
and I left for Cincinnati the same evening. On reaching the district
and department headquarters, I learned that Burnside was relieved,
and that General Foster had passed through the city, going on toward
East Tennessee to assume command of the department. Longstreet
raised the siege of Knoxville the very day I reached Cincinnati, but
this was not yet known, and several days passed before we had
authentic information that the way to Knoxville was open. There was
work to do in closing up the business of the district, packing
papers and books pertaining to my headquarters, and providing for
their safe-keeping. A number of officers belonging to Burnside's
command were waiting an opportunity to rejoin the army, and I
arranged a rendezvous for these at Lexington, Ky., where I would
join them. A small troop of cavalry was detailed to act as our
escort, and the quartermaster's department promised wagons for our
baggage and supplies. On the 8th the news of Longstreet's retreat
indicated that the road through Cumberland Gap to Knoxville was
probably open, and sending our horses and baggage to Lexington by
railroad, I left Cincinnati with my staff on Wednesday, the 9th, for
the same place. Reaching there at evening, the next day was spent in
packing our wagons and organizing our little party, and the
cavalcade marched out of the pretty town of Lexington early on the
11th.

My staff was not altogether the same as it was in my Virginia
campaigns. I had lost my friend, Surgeon Holmes, by death. He had
been assigned to duty with me in Cincinnati, but his lungs had
become diseased through exposure in the field, and he had died of
consumption a few weeks before. My aide Captain Christie was
similarly affected, and resigned to prolong his life. He ultimately
died of the illness thus contracted. My aide Lieutenant Conine was
appointed colonel of one of the new colored regiments, and went with
it to Virginia. Major Bascom, my adjutant-general, Major Treat, my
commissary, and Lieutenant Theodore Cox, my aide-de-camp, were
ordered to accompany me, and were all that remained of my old staff.
In the place of Conine I secured the detail of Captain E. D.
Saunders, assistant-adjutant-general, who had served temporarily on
my staff during the preceding season. He was the son of an old
resident of Cincinnati, an excellent officer in his department as
well as a gallant soldier, and he remained with me in closest
relations till he fell by my side in the Atlanta campaign in the
following year. His assignment as aide-de-camp was out of the usual
course, but it was allowed in view of the contingency that Major
Bascom could not remain with me if I should not continue in command
of an army corps. In this case Saunders would become my
adjutant-general, and this was what in fact occurred a little later.

At Lexington I found a group of ten or a dozen officers who were
eager to join my party in the ride over the mountains. The one of
highest rank was Lieutenant-Colonel J. H. Strong of General Foster's
staff, who had been allowed a short leave of absence when his chief
started for the West, and was now hastening back to duty. I found a
ground for pleasant acquaintance with him in his relationship to
Bishop Bedell of Ohio, a venerated friend of mine as long as he
lived. Colonel Strong was a brother of Mrs. Bedell, and was a
refined and cultivated gentleman. Lieutenant-Colonel James T.
Sterling of the One Hundred and Third Ohio Infantry was also on his
way to join his regiment at Knoxville. He had been a captain in the
Seventh Ohio Volunteer Infantry, and served with me in my first
campaign in West Virginia, where I had become attached to him for
his military as well as his personal character. He became my
inspector-general in the field. Captain D. W. H. Day, assistant
quartermaster, was also en route to the Twenty-third Corps in the
field, and was directed to take charge of our little train. His
unbounded energy and his power to surmount obstacles so impressed me
that on our reaching Knoxville I had him also assigned to permanent
duty with me in his department. The others passed out of the circle
of permanent acquaintances when the journey was over, but they were
all pleasant travelling companions, and one or two of them would
have been remarkable anywhere for their wit and cheerfulness. It was
as happy and jolly a party as one need wish for in a rough ride of a
couple of hundred miles over the mountains.

Our escort turned out to be only twenty horsemen instead of a full
troop, but these were enough for protection against mere marauders,
and we had to take the chance of meeting organized bodies of the
enemy. Four army wagons were furnished us. One of these was loaded
with oats for our horses, and carried the personal baggage of the
cavalry troop. Another was loaded with ordinary army rations. A
third was devoted to mess supplies of the officers of the party, and
as we were going into a country wasted by war and almost
famine-stricken, we each tried to carry with us a small stock of
choice provisions which might eke out a little comfort to the mess.
The fourth wagon carried our personal baggage. Captain Day had
carefully selected strong and serviceable horses for the teams, and
the wagons were minutely inspected to see that they were fit for the
mountain work in a wilderness where wheelwrights could not be found.
It was our purpose to get both forage and provisions on the road if
we could buy them, and to save the stock in our wagons for a time of
necessity or to carry as much as possible into Knoxville.

I had telegraphed to Burnside as soon as I reached Cincinnati,
formally reporting myself as under his orders for duty in the field
by permission of the Secretary of War. I expressed my regret to hear
of his leaving the command, and urged my assignment to duty before
he laid down his authority. No answer to my dispatch was received,
and the fact was that full communication with Burnside by the
Cumberland Gap route was not opened till the 9th of December, so
that my letter was among the correspondence received by Burnside the
day he turned over the command to Foster. Another cause of
uneasiness to me was the change of department boundaries made in the
order assigning General Foster to command. The States north of the
Ohio were separated from the department, and I was apprehensive that
other changes might occur which would make me fall between two
stools. That there was danger of just such disappointments turned
out to be very true. My anxious determination to get forward to
Knoxville with the least possible delay was justified, and I had
reason to congratulate myself on acting promptly upon it.

Our cavalcade presented a gay appearance as we marched out of
Lexington on Friday morning. There were twelve or fifteen officers,
all well mounted and followed by a group of servants riding and
leading our extra horses. Part of the cavalry troop led the way, the
guidons fluttering in the van. Behind us came an ambulance and the
army wagons with clean white canvas covers and well-groomed teams of
four horses each, driven in army fashion by a driver astride of the
near wheel-horse, a mounted wagon-master superintending the whole.
The little column was closed by a squad of the cavalry acting as
rear-guard. There had not been any severe winter weather as yet, and
though the road was sloppy, the sun was bright overhead, and its
beams flashed from our side-arms and equipments. Our first day's
ride was to take us to Richmond, a thriving town twenty-five miles
away, the county-seat of Madison County, and a good turnpike road
made this an easy day's journey. We were in the rich blue-grass
region, and though all of central Kentucky showed the marks of war's
ravages, this region was comparatively unscathed, and the beautiful
rolling country was neither abandoned nor untilled. Horses and
cattle were noticeably few, for raids like Morgan's had been
frequent enough to teach the peril of having flocks and herds to
tempt the enemy. Farmers gave more attention than before to
agriculture proper and the raising of crops which would directly
support the family. There was nothing dispiriting in the view of the
country on this first day's ride, and though a winter landscape can
hardly be exhilarating when it is leafless and bare, gray, and a
little sombre in color, we found ourselves under no stress of
sympathy with misfortune or want, as is so often the case with the
soldier.

On leaving Richmond our really rough work began. The roads would
have been bad enough at any time, but the hard use by army trains in
bad weather and the entire lack of repair had made them execrable.
All the ordinary methods of keeping highways in order by local
administration were suspended by the war, and the only work done
upon them was what each wagon-master could do with his drivers to
mend the worst places so that his train could get through. As we
could not be sure of finding food for man or beast on the road, it
was necessary to gauge our speed by the distance our wagons could
make, so that we should not be separated from them. About twenty
miles a day was the maximum, and though we sometimes got a little
further, there were days when our journey was much less. South of
Richmond and on the border between Madison and Rockcastle counties,
we crossed Big Hill, the first of the outlying ranges of the
Cumberland Mountains. These great ridges are nearly parallel to each
other, and even the "gaps" in them are so high that there is always
a long and hard pull for wagon teams in surmounting them. Over the
summit we came down into the valleys tributary to the Rockcastle
River. Twenty or twenty-five miles away another summit marks the
boundary between this valley and the principal depression in which
the Cumberland River finds its devious course to the south and west.
The rocks are sandstone through which the Rockcastle River has cut
deep gorges and chasms, and the weathering of the cliffs has left
the strata and crevices exposed with so much of the regularity of
layers of masonry as to tell at once the story of the impression
made on the early explorers of the region, and the suggestion by
Nature herself of a name for the beautiful stream that dashes along
to join the Cumberland many miles below.

Our second day's journey ended far from any village or tavern, in
this romantic valley. A pouring rain had begun about noon, and we
plodded and splashed along till we reached a large log house which
seemed a convenient halting-place as far advanced as our wagons
could be brought. The house belonged to a thrifty widow. Half of it
was simply furnished, and in this part she and her children lived.
The other half was a large unfurnished room with the walls of hewn
logs and a great fireplace of stone in the middle of the long side
of the room. Out of this opened a little bedroom, a mere closet, in
which the spare bed for guests was placed. The widow put these two
rooms at our disposal. A roaring fire was soon burning on the
hearth, our saddles and horse trappings were arranged on the sides
of the room to serve as pillows, and blankets were brought in from
the ambulance. Supper was got, partly from our own stores, cooked
with the help of the family, and we were early ready for bed. The
guest chamber was assigned to me, but it was so small that for the
sake of ventilation the door was kept open, and the ruddy firelight
flashed upon as picturesque and as merry a group as one could wish
to see. A weary day in the saddle made all of us ready for sleep,
and quips and jokes soon died out as one after another seemed to
drop off into forgetfulness. The physical fatigue of the day made
one of the party develop a phenomenal capacity for snoring in his
heavy sleep, and in the quiet his nasal trumpeting grew more
pronounced. It proceeded by phrases, as it were, each effort
stronger than the preceding, till a fortissimo passage came and
ended with a snort which echoed through the room and was followed by
perfect silence. From the corner of the room came a drawling voice
with a sigh as of deep relief, "Thank God _he's_ dead." The shout of
laughter which followed showed that nearly all had roused themselves
for the _finale_, and the badgered performer of the music lost much
of the real comfort of his night's rest by his fear of committing
himself to a complete oblivion which might subject him to another
chaffing bout from his companions.

Another wet and uncomfortable day's ride brought us to London, an
unattractive village at the parting of the ways, the principal road
leading on to Cumberland Gap, and another on the right going to a
ford of the Cumberland River at Williamsburg, where there would be
again a choice of routes up the Elk Fork of the Cumberland between
the ridges known as Jellico Mountain and Pine Mountain. The left
wing of Burnside's column had taken this route in October, and after
crossing the Cumberland had climbed Jellico Mountain on their right
hand, and reached the headwaters of Emory River, a tributary of the
Tennessee which breaks through the mountains at Emory Gap, the
easiest route into East Tennessee. Another road kept in the valley
of Elk Fork till a place was reached where Pine Mountain, on the
left, could be scaled, and once over its summit a hard road led to
Big Creek Gap in the Cumberland Mountains, and thence by way of
Jacksboro to Knoxville.

At London we were met with news from East Tennessee which made me
reconsider the question of our route. We heard from Cumberland Gap
that after General Foster had joined Burnside at Knoxville,
Longstreet had moved in force to Rutledge, where he intercepted this
line of communication, and that Knoxville could not be reached by
that road for some time to come. This seemed to make it necessary to
turn off to the south. As between the road to Emory Gap over Jellico
Mountain and that to Big Creek Gap over Pine Mountain, the best
evidence seemed to indicate the latter as the easier, but with the
qualification which travellers in so wild a region have often to
face, that whichever way you go you will wish you had gone the
other. The name of Williamsburg on the Cumberland sounded as if it
might be a considerable town, but the man who gave us the route
warned us that we should find "it's not much of a 'burg neither when
you git thar." Our ride into London had been on Sunday, and was
surely a work of necessity if not of mercy. Captain B. had found his
horse a little shaky in coming down the steep hills, and at one
little stream the jaded beast came down on his knees in the water.
The captain with affected seriousness argued that it was a
punishment for travelling on the day of rest, but was effectually
silenced by the wag of the party, who humorously remarked, "Ah! if
your horse is so weak on Sunday what would have become of him and
you on a week day?" London did not afford us any lodgings that
tempted us indoors, and we wrapped ourselves in our blankets and
slept on the open veranda of a dilapidated house, building a
camp-fire in the yard in front. The rain had ceased, and we
preferred the frosty air to the narrow and stuffy quarters we should
otherwise have had to take.

The evening of the 14th of December brought us to the Cumberland
River, and as it was rising from the heavy rain of the preceding
week, we should have been glad to get over at once, but the wagons
could not overtake us till night, and we stopped at a country-house
on the north side where we were made quite comfortable. About one
o'clock in the morning, however, I was awakened by voices in the
room below me, and recognized that of Captain French of Burnside's
staff, who was asking the farmer to light a fire and prepare to
receive the general and his party, who were a little behind, wet and
nearly frozen. I got up and dressed myself, went downstairs to greet
the captain, who was soon joined by the rest of the party. The
general had come by the route I was taking, but his wagons had
broken down on the mountain-side, and he had been obliged to abandon
them. The party had picked up somewhere an old-fashioned stage-coach
on thorough braces, and this was drawn by ten mules. They had packed
on the backs of other mules such of their personal effects and
stores as they could, and had left the rest by the roadside. They
had halted for the night on the south side of the river, but at
midnight had been roused by the news that the river was rising, and
that they must pass the ford at once if they expected to get over.
In the darkness of the night it had been both difficult and
perilous, for the ford was diagonal to the course of the stream, and
there was great danger of getting into deep water. They were all
soaking wet and chilled, covered with mud, and as forlorn and
unkempt a set of men as was ever seen. They warmed and partly dried
themselves by the fire, and pushed on as soon as day began to break,
for the general was impatient to get forward. Colonel Goodrich,
Colonel Richmond, Major Van Buren, and the personal staff were with
him, and as my own staff had been well acquainted with them, it was
an interesting rencounter with all the events of the Knoxville
campaign to discuss. The general had sent his proposal to me to join
him, the very day Longstreet reached the Holston River at Loudon,
and when it had become evident that the Confederates were committed
to an active campaign in East Tennessee. General Hartsuff had found
that he could not endure the work, and had decided to leave before
Knoxville should be invested. My regret that I could not start at
once was diminished by the fact that the investment was complete
before I could possibly have reached Knoxville, so that no time had
been lost. But all the circumstances showed that Burnside had
regarded his request to be relieved as indefinitely postponed, and
the appointment of General Foster to succeed him was unexpected. He
had not heard that I was on my way, but after meeting me sent a
dispatch to Foster as soon as he reached the telegraph line. He had
informed Foster at Knoxville of his purpose in having me join him,
and sent this message in a friendly wish to promote my interests.

As soon as the general and his party were off, we began our
preparation to cross the river. Their experience had shown that the
increase of difficulty in keeping the ford at night was more than
would probably come from the rise of the water. I therefore ordered
everything to be ready as soon as it was broad daylight. We had
eaten our breakfast and were in the saddle as soon as we could see
clearly. Captain Day carefully examined the ford with a few of the
cavalrymen, and fixed the landmarks which would guide us to the
shallowest places. With these precautions and by carefully following
directions we got over without mishap. The water did not quite reach
the bodies of the wagons, and by lifting our feet out of our
stirrups we got over dryshod. The stream was swift, and the only way
to keep one's direction safely was to look ahead and not downward.
Had we tried it in the night, we should no doubt have fared as badly
as our friends who had preceded us.

A day's hard journey for the wagon teams brought us to the foot of
Pine Mountain at the point where the road leaves the bed of Elk Fork
to climb the steep ascent. We were now only nineteen miles from
Jacksboro, in the valley of the Clinch, but the distance was
multiplied by the cumulating difficulties of the way. We were not
far from Cross Mountain, a ridge which, as its name indicates,
connects the long parallel ranges of Jellico, Pine, and Cumberland
mountains. We must climb Pine Mountain to its crest, descend along
the shoulders of Cross Mountain near the head of the valley, then
scale the side of Cumberland Mountain to reach Big Creek Gap, from
which the valley of East Tennessee would open before us. We camped
for the night and prepared for an early start in the morning. The
teams were well fed and groomed, and the whole equipment was
carefully inspected to see that everything was ready for the strain
of the rough work of the morrow.

The morning of the 16th was fair and frosty, and we were astir
early. Pine Mountain loomed before us like the steep roof of some
vast gothic cathedral. The ridge seemed as straight as a house
ridge, and we could not see that any natural depression made the
ascent much easier in one place than another. Our road ran up a spur
of the mountain till the regular slope was reached, then turning to
the right it gradually mounted the steep incline by a diagonal
course on a long shelf cut in the hillside, with here and there a
level spot on which the teams could breathe. From where we stood in
the valley the mountain face looked precipitous, and the road a mere
line gradually rising along its front. It would have been bad enough
if it had been a metalled road in good order; but it was only a
rough track alternating in mud and rock, that had never been good
even in mid-summer, and it was now next to impassable. Under the
direction of Captain Day and the wagonmaster the teams were doubled,
two of the wagons being left in the valley till the others should
reach the summit, when the teams were to be brought back. When they
came to the long and hard pull, the drivers gave us a good sample of
army wagoning, their yelling and cracking of whips keeping up a
continual chorus, and at specially hard points the quartermaster and
wagon-master joined in the music like the baying of a pack of
hounds, while the horses seemed to be stimulated to almost frantic
action. This could not be kept up long, and when one of the level
breathing-places was reached all subsided into quiet, while the
steaming and puffing horses regained their wind for another effort.

Five miles of advance was the utmost we could make on that day, but
this was fifteen for the teams, as they had to be brought down the
mountain over the same road and drag up the wagons which had been
left at the foot. Our party of cavaliers waited lazily in the valley
till the first of the wagons were near the summit, and then rode on
to overtake them on the other side of the ridge. It was an easy and
picturesque ride for us who were well mounted, but a wearing labor
and strain for the teamsters and their animals. We congratulated
ourselves on the care with which the "outfit" had been selected at
Lexington, for we came through without accident on a road where
wrecks were plentier than milestones.

We had sweet slumber that night in the keen air of the mountain top,
and were ready for the last day of mountain work. We were fourteen
miles from Jacksboro, and were resolved to reach the little town
before night. The road was unlike the long inclined plane cut in the
side of Pine Mountain. We were in the midst of a mass of irregular
stony hills, all of them part of the highlands between the summits
of the two ranges. It was hard and rough work, but we were not
obliged to double the teams again. The last ascent of the Cumberland
Mountains toward Big Creek Gap was over bare rock much of the way,
the sandstone strata lying horizontal, and the road being a gigantic
staircase in which the steps were sometimes a foot each, but oftener
more, with an occasional rise of fully four feet in the edge of the
rocky outcrop. In the road the sharp edges of these stairs had been
rounded off, partly by wear and a little by mechanical means, but
they distinctly retained the stair-like character and looked
absolutely impracticable. At the worst places the teamsters would
halt and throw together stones or branches of trees to fill the
angle in the rock, then mounting, a whoop and a crack of the whip
was the signal for the team to dash at the obstacle. The horses'
shoes would strike fire from the level rock of the long "treader"
above, the wagon would be bounced up the step, when a little bit of
level would bring them to another rise in the staircase. We
zigzagged along as the road sought the easiest places among the
rocks, and perseverance at last had its reward when we crowned the
summit and looked down into the broad and beautiful valleys of the
Clinch and the Holston, the lovely tributaries which form the
Tennessee River.

Our first look into Big Creek Gap was a startling and pleasurable
surprise which has remained indelibly fixed in memory. Clouds had
been hanging about the top of the mountain, and as we ascended the
last slope and reached the crest, they hung so low over us that we
could almost touch them. It was not like going into a fog, as is
usually the case in climbing mountains, but these seemed smooth as
silk on the under surface and hung over us as well defined as the
covering of a tent. This gave to the prospect an accidental and very
peculiar effect that one might not see again in crossing the pass a
hundred times. As we looked eastward from the depression in the
crest in which our roadway ran, a great circling amphitheatre lay
before us, almost perfect in the symmetry of its curves. The ridge
on right and left which formed its outer margin was higher than the
spot on which we stood, and the silky clouds over our heads rested
on it as on the walls of a natural coliseum, like the _velum_ of
canvas of the ancient gigantic structure in Rome, except that here,
nature outdoing all art, spread the lovely awning over the whole
vast and cavernous auditorium a mile or more across. The gloom of
the interior threw the retreating slopes into a mysterious shadow in
which it were easy to imagine them peopled with ranks of ghostly
auditors gazing upon the stage. It was there, full in our faces,
that the most startling and almost incredible effect was visible.
The circle of the mountains was there broken by an opening flanked
on either side by stupendous perpendicular cliffs, and we looked
through it upon a charming landscape bathed in glorious sunshine. A
blue stream dashed foaming through the great gap and wandered off to
join the river beyond. The broad and undulating valley fifty miles
across was backed by another mountain wall which towered opposite to
that from whose battlements we were gazing, not a long and level
ridge like so many of those in the Alleghanies, but a picturesque
Alpine mountain scene, with peaks snow-clad and dazzling in the
sunlight,--the Great Smokies, the noblest of all the mountain groups
of the Appalachian chain. The gloom and shadow of our vast
amphitheatre held us in awe, while the brilliancy of the scene
beyond the great stage opening seemed to draw us to it as to a
promised land. We sat upon our horses, spellbound, gazing upon what
seemed at once too grand and too beautiful to be real. Had we been
superstitious like soldiers of an ancient time, we might have seen a
miraculous portent in it; and even as it was, such sentiment as may
be permitted in the sceptical spirit of our own day could find a
happy omen in the scene. We were entering upon a new chapter in our
military lives, and it was cheering to us, in entering East
Tennessee, through the great gate that opened before us, to have so
charming a picture to lure us on. We wound down the mountain side,
happy but quiet. There was no one among us so lacking in earnest
character as to be unmoved. We had left the wagons far behind, and
the clinking of our horses' shoes upon the rocks was the only sound
which broke the silence till the roaring and laughing brook that
gives a name to the pass met us and rollicked beside us, as we went
out between the giant cliffs into the broad and cheerful valley.

At Jacksboro we entered the theatre of active warlike operations,
and found ourselves in the usual atmosphere of rumors. It was of
course known that Longstreet had retreated to the northeast after
raising the siege, but some insisted that he was moving down the
valley again, and that Foster was to be shut up in Knoxville as
Burnside had been. It was evident that there was no definite
information on which any of these local opinions were based, and I
was satisfied that our road was open and safe. The only risk was
from some raiding column of cavalry, and we must take our chances as
to that. After a good night's rest, I decided on the morning of the
18th to take with me Colonel Strong of General Foster's staff and
Colonel Sterling, and leaving the wagons behind, to make the forty
miles to Knoxville in a single day's ride. What we had heard of the
destitution in the city made it seem best that most of the party
should remain with the wagons and the supplies, and so avoid the
risk of throwing too many guests upon the hospitality of
headquarters. We took a few of the cavalry as an escort, and both
horses and men were in such good condition and so hardened to the
road that we scarcely broke from a trot in the whole distance,
except to stop for resting and feeding our nags at noon.

We reached Knoxville in the afternoon, and Colonel Strong was warmly
welcomed by those of the staff who were present, but the general was
absent at the front. He was expected back the next night, however,
and comfortable quarters were provided for us meanwhile. My
instinctive fears of complications in regard to my own assignment to
duty proved to be true. The very day I left Lexington General Foster
had issued an order assigning me to command the District of
Kentucky, and it had passed me on the road. [Footnote: Official
Records, vol. xxxi. pt. iii. pp. 383, 394.] My determination to obey
literally the order from the War Department to report in person, and
the haste with which I had started, proved my salvation from the
kind of duty at the rear which I was bent on escaping. The District
of Kentucky would have been even worse than that of Ohio, for the
strife between political factions embroiled every one who commanded
there, and the order to me had been issued because the officer in
command was obnoxious to one of these factions.

General Foster returned on the 19th, and on my reporting to him I
found at once the benefit of General Burnside's representations in
regard to me. Colonel Strong was also well aware of my earnest wish
for field service, and the friendship which had grown up on the
road, no doubt, made him an influential advocate with his chief. The
general received me very kindly, and said that his action had been
based on the supposition that I would prefer duty in Kentucky during
the winter rather than make the rough journey over the mountains at
that season. On my assuring him that my coming without waiting to
communicate with him was because of my earnest request to the War
Department for service in the field, he was evidently pleased and
immediately revoked the orders already made, and assigned me to the
Twenty-third Corps, to command it as the senior general officer
present. [Footnote: Official Records, vol. xxxi. pt. iii, p. 457.]

I had been eight days on the road from Lexington, and the rest of
the party who remained with the wagons were a day longer in reaching
Knoxville. It had given me a vivid appreciation of the impossibility
of supplying an army in East Tennessee by wagon trains over the
mountains. The roads by Cumberland Gap or by Emory Gap were less
precipitous, but they were more muddy. The forage was exhausted
along all the routes, and till grass should grow large trains of
supplies were not to be thought of. The effort to force trains
through in the autumn had been most destructive to the teams.
Noticing how the way was lined by the carcasses of dead horses and
mules, we kept an accurate count one day of the number of these. In
the twenty miles of that day's journey we counted a hundred and
fifty dead draught animals. The movement of wagon-trains had, of
course, been suspended when Longstreet advanced upon Knoxville, and
bad weather had hardly begun then. Beef cattle could be driven in
herds, but the country was so stripped of forage that the danger of
starvation by the way made this mode of supply nearly as hopeless as
the other.

The only permanent solution of the subsistence problem was to be
found in enlarging the facilities for railway communication at
Chattanooga so that that town might become a great depot from which
the East Tennessee troops could draw as soon as the railroad to
Knoxville should be repaired, or light steamboats be brought to the
upper Tennessee and Holston rivers. They showed us at Knoxville
samples of the bread issued to the garrison during the siege. It was
made of a mixture of all the breadstuffs which were in store or
could be procured, but the chief ingredient was Indian corn ground
up cob and all. It was not an attractive loaf, but it would support
life, though the bulk was out of proportion to the nutriment. The
cattle had been kept in corral till they were too thin and weak to
be fit for food, but there was no other, and the commissaries killed
the weakest and issued them as rations because these would otherwise
die a natural death. Sherman and his staff had expressed their
astonishment that an appetizing dinner had been spread for them at
Burnside's headquarters; [Footnote: Sherman's Memoirs, vol. i. p.
368.] but they would have wondered more if they had known of the way
in which the town and vicinity had been ransacked to do honor to the
welcome guests who had relieved the beleaguered army. General Poe
vividly describes the straits they were in, and the heroic sort of
hospitality which had hunted far and wide for something fit to set
before the leader of the column which had raised the siege.
[Footnote: Battles and Leaders of the Civil War, vol. iii. p. 745.]
There had been no danger of actual starvation, but only the coarsest
of bread and the poorest of beef could be distributed. Eating, in
such circumstances, was not a pleasure, and the pangs of real hunger
were necessary to make the ration at all palatable. The withdrawal
of the enemy relieved the situation somewhat, for it opened the
country to foraging parties, and every kind of produce which money
could tempt the people to part with was bought and brought into the
camps. It was little enough at best, and three months of pinching
want were to be endured before anything like regular supplies could
be furnished to the army. It was to such a house of destitution we
had come, but we had come voluntarily to share the labors and the
triumphs of our comrades in the field and we had no regrets.




CHAPTER XXXI

WINTER BIVOUACS IN EAST TENNESSEE


Blain's Cross-roads--Hanson's headquarters--A hearty
welcome--Establishing field quarters--Tents and houses--A good
quartermaster--Headquarters' business--Soldiers' camps--Want of
clothing and shoes--The rations--Running the country
mills--Condition of horses and mules--Visit to Opdycke's camp--A
Christmas dinner--Veteran enlistments--Patriotic spirit--Detachment
at Strawberry Plains--Concentration of corps there--Camp on a
knoll-A night scene-Climate of the valley--Affair at Mossy
Creek--New Year's blizzard--Pitiful condition of the
troops--Patience and courage--Zero weather.


The Twenty-third Corps was encamped at Blain's Cross-roads,
seventeen miles northeast of Knoxville, on the road to Rutledge,
where Longstreet was supposed to be. The Fourth Corps, under General
Granger, and the Ninth, under General Parke, were in the same
neighborhood. The cavalry corps covered the front and flanks on both
sides of Holston River. A concentration of the Army of the Ohio and
its reinforcements had been made there to meet a rumored return of
the Confederates toward Knoxville after an affair at Rutledge in
which Longstreet had captured a wagon-train loaded with supplies for
us. I left Knoxville on the morning of the 21st of December,
accompanied by my staff officers, and rode to Blain's Cross-roads. I
found the corps under temporary command of Brigadier-General Mahlon
D. Manson, of Indiana, who had commanded one of the divisions in the
preceding campaign. Manson occupied an old log house too small for
himself and staff. There was but one bed in it, and at night the
general occupied this, whilst his staff slept in their blankets on
the floor. We had travelled leisurely, as I wished to study the
country between Knoxville and the camp, and we reached the corps too
late to make any arrangement for the night, and had to cast
ourselves on our comrades' hospitality. I was most heartily welcomed
by General Manson, who did the best he could for me by offering me
the half of his own bed, whilst the staff took similar lodgings with
his officers in a shed veranda at the back of the house lying snugly
together, wrapped in their blankets. Manson was a burly,
whole-souled man, brave and loyally unselfish, and turned over the
command to me with a sincerity of subordination which won my
confidence at once. [Footnote: Official Records, vol. xxxi. pt. iii.
pp. 462, 463.] It was not a comfortable night in the overcrowded log
house for either hosts or guests, but it was made cheery by the
hearty soldiers' welcome we received, and we sat late around the
crackling fire in the stone chimney after we had eaten with a
relish, known only in camp, the best supper which the meagre rations
of the army could furnish.

Our first occupation next day was to establish my own headquarters,
for a military man does not feel at home until his little camp is
set in some decent nook with the regularity and order which shows
good system, and with the sentinel pacing before the entrance. I
have always found it most comfortable and most healthful to live
under canvas, even in winter, in the sparsely settled parts of the
country. It might be different in Europe or in the more densely
peopled States at the East, but in the West and South a house cannot
always be found in proper proximity to the line, and changing from
house to tent and back again is much more dangerous to health than
adherence to what seems the more exposed kind of life. There is also
a question of discipline and _morale_ involved, and the effect of
example at headquarters is felt through the whole command. With no
little difficulty we found four old tents without flies, but these
were carefully pitched in a clean place accessible to all parts of
the corps, and when we were installed in them we had a real
satisfaction in being at home and ready for business. Our difficulty
in procuring four poor tents was simply an index of the scarcity of
all supplies and equipments. The depots at Cincinnati and Nashville
were packed with everything we wanted, but there had been no time to
get them forward when the siege began, and now the impassable
mountain roads cut us off as completely as a circle of hostile
camps. We especially felt the lack of the flies for the tents in
roughing it. This extra roof makes as great a difference in keeping
a tent habitable in wet weather, as an extra cape or a poncho does
in keeping the rain off one's person, or in civil life the
omnipresent umbrella. Our overcoats and ponchos kept out the wet in
the longest march, but without a fly the tent roof and walls would
drip with moisture. In Captain Day, however, I had a quartermaster
whose indomitable energy would not be long baffled, and in his
journeys to and fro in charge of the supply trains of the corps he
kept a sharp eye out for whatever would make our headquarters outfit
more efficient. The warehouses at Knoxville were searched, and a
better tent found in one place and a fly in another gradually
brought our little camp into what soldiers regard as a home-like
condition. The clerical work and the official correspondence of the
command could then go on; for the headquarters of an army corps in
the field is as busy a place as a bank or counting-house in a city.
It is the business centre for a military population of 12,000 or
15,000 men, where local government is carried on, and where their
feeding, clothing, arming, and equipping are organized and directed,
to say nothing of the military conduct in regard to the enemy, or of
the administration of affairs relating to the neighboring
inhabitants.

The troops were in bivouac, generally in the woods about us, where
shelter could be made in ways well known to lumbermen and hunters.
The most common form was a lean-to, made by setting a couple of
crotched posts in the ground with a long pole for a ridge. Against
this were laid other poles and branches of trees sloping to the
ground on the windward side. The roof was roughly thatched with
evergreen branches laid so that rain would be shed outward. A bed of
small evergreen twigs within made a comfortable couch, and unlimited
firewood from the forest made a camp fire in front that kept
everybody toasting warm in ordinary weather. The regimental and
company officers had similar quarters, improved sometimes by a roof
of canvas or tarpaulin beneath the evergreen thatch. There were but
few days in the East Tennessee winters when such shelter was not a
sufficient protection for men young and accustomed to hardship. It
was in fact more comfortable than life in tents at division and
corps headquarters, but with us tents were a necessity on account of
the clerical business which I have mentioned.

The want most felt was that of clothing and shoes. The supply of
these had run very low by the time Burnside had marched through
Kentucky and Tennessee to Knoxville, and almost none had been
received since. Many of the soldiers were literally in rags, and
none were prepared for winter when Longstreet interrupted all
communication with the base of supplies. Their shoes were worn out,
and this, even more than their raggedness, made winter marching out
of the question. The barefooted men had to be left behind, and of
those who started the more poorly shod would straggle, no matter how
good their own will was or how carefully the officers tried to
enforce discipline and keep their men together.

The food question was in a very unsatisfactory way, but had improved
a good deal after the siege of Knoxville was raised. Some herds had
been brought part of the way, and had been kept together, so that
they were driven in as soon as the road was open. Some were captured
and some were lost, but enough arrived so that the meat ration was
pretty regularly issued in full weight. A large amount of pork had
been salted and packed at Knoxville, and was issued as an occasional
change from the ordinary ration of fresh beef. The "small rations"
of coffee, sugar, salt, etc., were almost wholly wanting, and our
soldiers had been so accustomed to a regular issue of these that the
deprivation was a very serious matter. As to breadstuffs, none could
be got from our depots and we were wholly dependent upon the
country. We put all the mills within our lines under military
supervision, and systematized the grinding so that the supply of
meal and flour should be equitably distributed to the army and to
the inhabitants. As the people were loyal, there was no wish on the
part of the military authorities to take corn or other grain without
payment, and the people brought in freely or sold to us on their
farms all that they could spare. Still the supply was short, and was
soon exhausted in the vicinity of the army, so that we had to send
forage trains to great distances and with very unsatisfactory
results. During the whole winter we rarely succeeded in obtaining
half rations of bread, and oftentimes the fraction was so small as
to be hardly worth estimating. In such a situation corn could not be
taken for horse-feed, and as the long forage in our vicinity was
exhausted, the animals were in pitiful condition. In many instances
artillery horses dropped dead of starvation at the picket rope.

The Fourth Corps was no better off than ourselves. Granger had left
the Army of the Cumberland immediately after the battle of
Missionary Ridge, and although the situation at Chattanooga had been
a good deal mitigated, no considerable supplies of clothing had then
arrived. The distress was therefore universal in our East Tennessee
army. Learning that Sheridan's division was encamped not far from us
at Blain's Cross-roads, I rode over to find Colonel Emerson Opdycke
of the One Hundred and Twenty-fifth Ohio, who was in that division.
He was a townsman of mine, and our families were intimate, and other
neighbors and friends were with him. I could give them later news
from home than any of them had, for until the end of the year the
newspapers I brought from Cincinnati were the latest in camp. I
found Opdycke's camp like our own. He was in the woods, under a
lean-to shelter such as I have described, with a camp-fire of great
logs in front of it. He was just opening the first letters he had
got from home since the battle of Chickamauga in September, and
these had been a long time on the way, for they had gone to
Chattanooga and had come by casual conveyance from there. His
statements fully agreed with the reports I had got from the
Twenty-third Corps officers in regard to the condition of the
troops. It was the same with all. They would not suffer greatly if
they could remain in the forest encampments till shoes and clothing
could come to us, but any active campaigning must produce
intolerable suffering.

Our mess wished to celebrate Christmas by a dinner at which a few of
our comrades might share the luxury of some canned vegetables and
other stores we had brought from Ohio, and we sent a man with a
foraging party that was going twenty miles away for hay and corn.
After a diligent search he succeeded in getting a turkey and a pair
of fowls, and we kept the festival in what seemed luxurious style to
our friends who had been through the campaign. The spirit of
officers and men was all that could be wished, for they thoroughly
understood the causes of their privation, and knew that it was
unavoidable. Their patriotism and their moral tone were
magnificently shown in the re-enlistments which were at this time
going on. The troops of the original enlistment of 1861 were now
near the end of their term of three years, and it was the wise
policy of the government to let the question of a new term be
settled now while the winter was interrupting active operations.
Regiments whose term of service would expire in the spring or summer
of 1864 were offered a month's furlough at home and the title of
"veterans" if they would re-enlist. The furlough was to be enjoyed
before the opening of the next campaign, and the regiments were to
be sent off as fast as circumstances would permit. We knew that the
home visit would be a strong inducement to many, but we were
astonished and awed at the noble unanimity of the popular spirit of
the men. Almost to a man they were determined to "see it out," as
they said. The re-enlistment was accepted by companies, but there
was great pride in preserving the regimental organization as well.
The closing week of the year was devoted to this business, other
duty being suspended as far as circumstances would permit. When a
company had "veteranized" by the re-enlistment of a majority, they
announced it by parading on the company street and giving three
rousing cheers. These cheers were the news of the day, and the
company letter and the number of the regiment passed eagerly from
mouth to mouth as the signal of a new veteran company was heard.
Some companies re-enlisted without an exception. In one regiment
there were only 15 men in the ten companies who did not sign the new
rolls. In fact only the physically disabled with here and there a
discontented man were omitted in the veteran enlistment. It was a
remarkable incident in the history of the war and a speaking one. It
illustrates better than anything, except the original outburst of
patriotism in 1861, the character of the men who formed our rank and
file. Could we only have had then an efficient system of filling up
these veteran regiments by new recruits, the whole would have made
an incomparable army; but, alas, we were to see them reduced to a
handful while new regiments were organized, only (as it looked to us
in the field) to give the "patronage" of the appointments to
politicians, or to reward successful recruiting instead of soldierly
ability tested in action.

Soon after General Foster was assigned to the department he reissued
an order which Burnside had made earlier but had revoked, by which
Brigadier-General Samuel D. Sturgis was appointed to the command of
the cavalry corps. [Footnote: Official Records, vol. xxxi. pt. iii,
p. 394.] Sturgis had commanded a division of the Ninth Corps in
Maryland and Virginia, and was one of those whose dismissal Burnside
had demanded for the insubordination which followed the battle of
Fredericksburg. Good policy would have dictated that he should be
sent to some other command; but he was ordered to report to
Burnside, and had no active employment until Foster arrived. The
cavalry corps had had several lively engagements with the
Confederate horse, and was now concentrated near Mossy Creek, where
it was supported by a brigade of infantry from the second division
of the Twenty-third Corps, in command of Colonel Mott of the One
Hundred and Eighteenth Ohio. [Footnote: _Id_., pp. 488, 489, 562.]
Our information showed that Longstreet's forces were now
concentrated about Morristown, and that nothing larger than scouting
parties came across to the west side of the Holston. It became
prudent, therefore, to transfer part of our forces from the Rutledge
road over to that which runs from Knoxville along the line of the
railroad to Morristown. Both the railroad and the wagon-road cross
the Holston at Strawberry Plains and go up the valley on the east
side of the river by way of New Market and Mossy Creek. On the 24th
and 25th I was directed to send two more brigades to Strawberry
Plains, [Footnote: _Id_., p. 490.]one of which was put over the
river to cover the reconstruction of the railway bridge which was
going on. This was the long trestle which had been burned by Sanders
in the preceding summer, and had since been repaired and destroyed
by the opposing armies alternately. On the 27th I was ordered to
move the other division of the corps to Strawberry Plains, thus
concentrating my command in that vicinity. Our distance from
Knoxville would be about the same as at Blain's Cross-roads, but the
divergence of the roads made our march some six or eight miles
across the country.

It was a great hardship to the men to abandon the huts they had made
with a good deal of labor, and which were the more necessary for
them by reason of the destitution which I have described. Nor was it
pleasant for us at headquarters, for we had got our own
establishment into a condition of tolerable comfort. Some brick had
been got from a ruined and abandoned house, and with them a chimney
with an open fireplace had been built at the back of one of our
tents, which thus made a cheerful sitting-room for our mess. It is a
soldier's proverb that comfortable quarters are sure to bring
marching orders, and we were only illustrating the rule. The march
was made in the afternoon through rain and mud, and we reached
Strawberry Plains just before nightfall in the short midwinter day.
The Plains were a nearly level space in a curve of the river, though
the village of the name was on some rough hills on the other bank at
the end of the long trestle bridge. The level lands had been for
some time occupied by the cavalry, and were so cut into mud-holes
and defiled in every way as to be unfit for an infantry camp. A
little on one side, however, was an isolated gently rounded hill
covered with a mixed forest of oak and pine. With a little crowding
this would make a clean and well-drained camp for the division I had
brought with me. The brigades were placed so that they encircled the
hill on the lower slopes with openings between leading to the top,
on which I placed my headquarters. The little quadrangle of tents on
the top, the forest-covered slopes, the busy soldiery below making
new camps for themselves, made a romantic picture despite the
discomforts. I cannot better show the impression made at the moment
than by quoting from a letter written home the next day: "When we
arrived, the rain was pouring in torrents, the dead leaves, wet and
deep, soaked our boots and made it slow work to kindle a fire, and
as we stood about in our overcoats heavy with water, we were not
especially impressed with the romance of the scene; but when we had
found a few old pine-knots to start the fire with, and the heavy
smoke of the damp leaves changed to a bright flame,--when the tents
were pitched, a cup of hot coffee made, and we sat about the fire
watching the flashing light on the deep green of the pines and the
beautiful russet of the oak leaves with the white of the tents
beneath, the few square yards about us were made as lovely as a
fairy scene shut in by the impenetrable gloom beyond. The old
witchery of camp life now came over us, we forgot rain and cold,
singing and chatting as merrily as if care were dead, till finally
rolling in our blankets under our tents, we went to sleep as sweetly
and soundly as children."

A day or two of bright mild weather followed, and the troops got
themselves fairly well sheltered again. The cutting of trees for
huts and for firewood thinned out the forest, and the elevation of
the camp above the surrounding country exposed us to the wind, as we
soon learned to our cost. Whilst the fair days lasted, we had a
favorable example of an East Tennessee winter, as is shown by the
further quotation from the home letter just cited. "I am sitting in
the open air," I said, "before the camp-fire of great logs, writing
upon my atlas on my knee, which is more comfortable than doing it in
the chilly shade of the tent. I wish you could have seen our camp
last night. We were grouped around the fire, some sitting and
lolling on the logs drawn up for fuel, some in camp chairs. The
smoke from the camps about us made the whole air hazy. Over the
tents through a vista of pine-trees the moon was rising red through
the thickened air, while overhead the stars were shining. The
wonderful perspective the firelight makes in the forest, here
brought out and deepened the mass of color of the evergreens, there
made the bare trunk and limbs of a leafless oak stand like a chalk
drawing against the black background, and again it gave rich velvety
warmth to the brown of the dead leaves which hung thick on some
trees, while the gloom beyond and the snug enclosure of our little
quadrangle of tents shut us in with a sense of shelter, and
completed a picture that would have made Rembrandt die of envy." We
were hardened by our continuous exposure so that we felt no
discomfort in sitting thus in the open air till late in the evening,
though we woke in the morning to find the dead leaves which made our
carpet stiff and crisp with the frost. Still, it was much milder
than the Christmas weather of northern Ohio, or we could not have
taken it so easily.

On the 29th the cavalry had a lively affair with the enemy at Mossy
Creek, some twenty miles above us. General Sturgis was making a
reconnoissance of the country between the French Broad and the
Holston rivers, sending the cavalry partly toward Dandridge on the
former stream, under command of Colonel Foster, and partly toward
Morristown, under Brigadier-General W. L. Elliott of the Cumberland
army. Elliott was supported by Mott's brigade of infantry, part of
which acted under his orders. Foster found no enemy, but Elliott had
advanced about three miles beyond Mossy Creek when he encountered
the cavalry corps of the Confederates, advancing, apparently, with a
purpose similar to ours. The infantry were posted by Sturgis upon a
ridge half a mile beyond the railway bridge at Mossy Creek, and the
cavalry with the artillery were ordered to retire slowly to the same
position. The enemy under Major-General William T. Martin consisted
of two divisions of horsemen and two batteries of artillery. They
closely followed our retiring troops, who made cool resistance and
drew back slowly and in order. When the position of the infantry was
reached, the whole force was halted to receive the Confederate
attack. Sturgis had two batteries of artillery with his corps, but
had sent a section of each with Colonel Foster, and Elliott now
placed the remaining sections on right and left of the road, each
supported by infantry. Martin boldly attacked till he found himself
confronted by Mott's infantry, which opened upon him with a
withering fire. The artillery also fired canister upon the advancing
enemy, and our horsemen, dismounting, extended the line and did good
execution with their carbines. The first assault being repulsed,
Martin was unwilling to give it up so, and bringing his artillery
into better position renewed the fight. A sharp skirmishing combat
was kept up for several hours, when the enemy retreated. Darkness
came on soon after, and the pursuit was not pushed far. Our losses
had been 17 killed and 87 wounded. That of the enemy was reported to
be much more severe. The result of the engagement was to repress the
enterprise of the Confederates, so that Mossy Creek remained for
some time our undisturbed outpost in the valley. [Footnote: Official
Records, vol. xxxi. pt. i. pp. 625-641.]

On New Year's eve we had a change of weather which rudely broke in
upon our dream of a steady and mild winter. It had been raining
nearly all day, and we had just turned in about ten o'clock in the
evening when a sudden gale sprung up from the northward. The
water-soaked ground did not hold the tent pins very well, and the
rattling of canvas warned us to look after the fastenings. The staff
were all quickly at work, the servants being, as usual, slow in
answering a call in the night. The front of our mess tent blew in,
and the roof and sides were bellying out and flapping like a ship's
sail half clewed up. I caught the door-flaps and held them down to
the pole with all my strength, shouting to the black boys to turn
out before the whole should fly away. Then we had a lively time for
an hour, going from tent to tent to drive the pins tighter and make
things secure. We had just got them snug, as we thought, and began
to listen to the roaring of the wind with something like defiance,
when a "stick-and-clay" chimney, which Colonel Sterling and my
brother had at the back of their tent, took fire and was near
setting the whole encampment in a blaze. This made another shout and
rush, till the chimney was torn away from the canvas and the fire
extinguished. The gale was so fierce that the sparks from the
camp-fires rolled along the ground instead of rising, and we should
have burned up had not the rain kept the tents soaking wet. It grew
cold so fast that by the time we had made the encampment safe, the
wet canvas froze stiff. It must be confessed that we did not sleep
well that night, and we got up in the morning aching with cold. It
still blew a gale, though the sky was clear and the thermometer had
fallen to zero. It was a typical cyclone coming as a cold wave from
the North, and, as we afterward learned, was exceptional in its
suddenness and bitterness along the whole line from Minnesota to
northern Georgia.

The soldiers in the camps had slept but little, for they were
obliged to keep awake and near the fires to escape freezing. No one
who has not lived in tents or in bivouac in such a time can
understand what real suffering from cold is. Exposure by day is easy
to bear compared with the chill by night when camp-fires burn low
and men lie shivering, their teeth chattering, while extreme
drowsiness makes exertion painful and there is danger of going off
into the sleep that knows no waking. On New Year's day morning the
ground was frozen solid. All huddled about the fires, but the gale
was so fierce that on the windward side there seemed to be no
radiation of heat, so completely was the fire blown away from that
side of the logs. On the leeward side the smoke suffocated and the
sparks burned one, and men passed from one side to the other
doubting which was the more tolerable.

I spent a good part of the morning going through the regimental
camps and giving such encouragement and cheer as I could. The
patience and courage of the troops were marvellous, though many of
the men were in a pitiable condition as to clothing. They were
tatterdemalions in appearance, but heroes at heart. Some had nothing
but drawers upon their legs, their trousers being utterly worn to
rags. Some had no coats and drew their tattered blankets about them,
sitting upon their haunches, like Indians, about the camp-fires. I
do not recall a single querulous or ill-natured complaint. It was
heart-breaking work to see their misery, but they were so
intelligent that they knew as well as I did that it had grown out of
the inevitable fortunes of war, in spite of the utmost efforts of
their commanders to get supplies forward as soon as the siege of
Knoxville had been raised. I estimated that fully one-third of the
command had lost and worn out some material portion of their
clothing, so as to be suffering for lack of it. A little thing which
added greatly to the discomfort of the men was that in some whole
brigades they had been without soap for two months. This made
cleanliness impossible, and clustering about the fires as they were
forced to do, they became so begrimed that a liberal supply of soap
would have been necessary to restore their color and show to what
race they belonged. Yet, hungry, cold, ragged, and dirty, they
responded cheerily to my New-Year's greetings, and at this very time
the "veteranizing" was going on without a check until nearly every
one of the old regiments re-enlisted for another term.

At our headquarters on the hill-top we realized that our picturesque
situation had its disadvantages, for we were doubly exposed to the
force of the wind. We were on a high dome, as it were, with nothing
whatever to make a lee or break the power of the icy gale. In one or
two of the tents, furnaces or stoves of stone had been made, on the
pattern of those we had used in West Virginia in 1861. The trench in
the ground with flat stone covering level with the tent floor and
connected with an opening on the outside, proved the most successful
device. We collected in these, and used every manner of pastime to
kill the tedious hours till the subsidence of the wind made our
usual outdoor life and activity possible again. Our efforts at meals
were a woeful sort of failure. Cooking under such difficulties was
more a name than a fact, and we left the mess tent shivering and
hardly less hungry than we entered it. But all things have an end,
however tedious they seem in passing, and the 2d of January seemed
pleasant in the comparison, for the "blizzard" was over, and the
weather was calm though cold.




CHAPTER XXXII

GRANT'S VISIT--THE DANDRIDGE AFFAIR


Grant at Knoxville--Comes to Strawberry Plains--A gathering at
Parke's quarters--Grant's quiet manner--No conversational
discussion--Contrast with Sherman--Talk of cadet days--Grant's
riding-school story--No council of war--Qualities of his
dispatches--Returns by Cumberland Gap--Longstreet's
situation--Destitution of both armies--Railroad repairs and improved
service--Light-draught steamboats--Bridges--Cattle herds on the
way--Results of Grant's inspection tour--Foster's movement to
Dandridge on the French Broad--Sheridan--His qualities--August
Willich--Hazen--His disagreement with Sheridan--Its causes and
consequences--Combat at Dandridge--A mutual surprise--Sheridan's
bridge--An amusing blunder--A consultation in Dandridge--Sturgis's
toddy--Retreat to Strawberry Plains--A hard night march--A rough
day--An uncomfortable bivouac--Concentration toward
Knoxville--Rumors of reinforcement of Longstreet--Expectation of
another siege--The rumors untrue.


In the midst of the severest suffering of the army from cold and
want, General Grant came in person to inspect the condition of
affairs in East Tennessee. He reached Knoxville on the 30th of
December, and after spending two or three days with General Foster,
came up to Strawberry Plains. The first intensity of the cold wave
had passed by, but it was still "zero weather" when he came: indeed
he had waited in Knoxville for a little moderating of the
temperature, but finding that it continued very cold, his desire to
complete the inspection hurried him on. The corps and division
commanders accompanied him in a ride through the camps that he might
see the destitution of the army, and the necessity for sparing the
troops all unnecessary exposure. The great trestle bridge across the
Holston was examined, and the features of the topography which made
Strawberry Plains an important point in military operations covering
Knoxville and the line of communication with Cumberland Gap.

At the end of the ride we gathered in General Parke's quarters for
what I supposed would be a discussion of the situation and a
comparison of views as to our future work. It was my first meeting
with Grant, and I was full of interest in observing him. On the ride
he had been quietly attentive, making no show of curiosity, asking
few questions, carrying himself in an unpretentious business-like
way. In the social meeting at General Parke's I was disappointed
that the conversation did not take the direction of a military
discussion. Grant did not seem to desire further information, but
was satisfied with what he had seen. He took no lead in
conversation, and it was evident that he almost wholly lacked
facility in that way. What he said was kindly; there was nothing
like surliness in his manner; but he seemed to be without the
faculty of drawing other people out and putting himself in easy
accord with them. No doubt his interviews with General Foster had
contained all that was necessary for making up his mind as to our
situation except the personal inspection he was now engaged in; but
had he been Sherman, he would have gone over the phases of the
matter which could properly be made the subject of general
discussion, would have emphasized whatever could be made
encouraging, and exhorted to patience and courage in doing the
present duty. Grant did nothing of the kind. He smoked and listened,
and did not accept any of the openings which others made for
conversation upon the campaign.

A majority of the officers in the group were West Point men, and
college life is always a resource for small-talk when other subjects
fail. The experiences of the military school, the characteristics of
friends and classmates there, the qualities of the officers and
professors, escapades and larks at Benny Havens' were found to have
perennial freshness and interest. Grant evidently enjoyed this, and
began to talk more freely. One could see that he did not lack the
sense of humor, and he told an anecdote simply but without failing
to make its points tell. His voice lacked volume, and seemed thin
and rather high-keyed. It was half-deprecatory in tone, with an air
of shyness, and he had a way of glancing quickly from one to
another, as if looking for signs of response to his venture into
talk. As he went on, this wore off to some extent, and he laughed
quietly over the reminiscences he was telling. He told very well a
story of his experience in the riding-school, where the
riding-master in his time was an amusing sort of tyrant. Grant's
strong point was horsemanship, and the riding-master, whether
seriously or as a joke, determined to "take down" the young cadet.
At the exercise Grant was mounted on a powerful but vicious brute
that the cadets fought shy of, and was put at leaping the bar. The
bar was raised higher and higher as he came round the ring, till it
passed the "record." The stubborn rider would not say enough, but
the stubborn horse was disposed to shy and refuse to leap. Grant
gritted his teeth and spurred at it, but just as the horse gathered
for the spring, his swelling body burst the girth and rider and
saddle tumbled into the ring. Half stunned, he gathered himself up
from the dust only to hear the strident, cynical voice of the
riding-master calling out, "Cadet Grant, six demerits for
dismounting without leave!"

I believe Grant's story is the only memory I brought away from what
I had imagined would be a council of war presided over by the most
prominent figure in our armies, soon to command them all. As a
council of war it certainly did not fill the ideal of an eager and
earnest young officer; but if we supplement it by a reading of the
daily and hourly dispatches in which the clear practical judgment,
the unswerving faith in final success, the unbending will, the
restless energy and industry, the power to master numberless
details, and a consciousness of capacity to command, all plainly
stand forth as traits of Grant's character, we can see that a
judgment based only on the incidents of the meeting around the
fireplace in the shabby house at Strawberry Plains after our ride on
that bitter winter's day would be very misleading.

Grant's visit had plainly shown him that the great problem with us
was the clothing and subsistence of the troops, and that our very
existence depended on it. He therefore determined to ride over the
mountains by way of Cumberland Gap, and form his own judgment as to
the truth of the reports of the impassable condition of the roads.
The weather had hardly moderated at all when he left us on the 4th
of January, and this long and severe journey was proof of his
forgetfulness of personal comfort in his devotion to duty. Before
following him further in his investigation, it may be profitable to
go back and note some of the circumstances which brought him to
Knoxville.

When Longstreet raised the siege of Knoxville, he took position near
Rogersville, where he would be in reach of the unbroken part of the
railway connecting him with Virginia, which now became his base. His
force continued unchanged, and was not materially increased or
diminished until the winter was nearly over, when the cavalry which
belonged to the Army of Tennessee was ordered back into Georgia.
Like Foster, he was reduced to inaction for lack of clothing and
supplies. Forage had become very scarce in every part of Tennessee,
and it was with great difficulty that the horses were kept alive in
either army. [Footnote: Official Records, vol. xxxi. pt. iii. pp.
817, 819.] To go into cantonments, sheltering the men as well as
possible, to send all extra horses to the rear and wait for the
springing of the grass and the settling of the roads when winter
should be over, was the dictate of common-sense, as was clearly seen
by everybody on the ground. It was not pleasant to leave the loyal
men of the upper counties of the valley to suffer under the
Confederate occupation; but nothing short of a continuous and
reliable line of supplies would enable Foster to occupy the country
up to the Virginia line. There was no gate to be shut behind
Longstreet if he were driven out. He could come back as soon as our
troops withdrew. Marching and countermarching would destroy the
nearly naked and barefoot troops without accomplishing any permanent
good.

The authorities at Washington were beset by the well-grounded
complaints of the loyal representatives of the upper valley, and had
become blind by habit to the difficulties of supplying and moving
troops among the mountains in winter. From the first week after
Foster relieved Burnside, Halleck complained that Longstreet was not
driven beyond the Virginia line and kept there. These complaints
were repeated to Grant, and the latter promised, in dispatches of
the 23d and 24th of December, to go to Knoxville in person.
[Footnote: Official Records, vol. xxxi. pt. iii. pp. 472, 479.] In
the last of these he said, "If Longstreet is not driven from
Tennessee, it shall not be my fault." He came, and saw that it was
not Foster's fault, and that no more than Foster could he make a
winter campaign with men in such a state of destitution. As I have
already said, droves of beef, cattle, and hogs could be brought "on
the hoof," in poor condition it is true, but fit to be eaten. Yet
soldiers could not campaign on fresh beef and pork only, and bread
stuffs and all vegetable food were practically not to be had; so of
coffee, sugar, salt, and the small rations generally. This, however,
was the least part of the trouble, for the condition of the army as
to clothing and shoes was simply appalling. When many had not even
rags to cover their nakedness, and none were clad as civilized men
should be to face the winter's snows and rains, it was nonsense to
talk of campaigning. Grant saw this at a glance when he reached our
camps. [Footnote: Official Records, vol. xxxii. pt. ii. pp. 19, 43.]
We have not the whole situation when even this is told. Wagons and
teams, artillery with their horses, cavalry with theirs, are as
necessary as infantry; and when foraging trains could hardly collect
forage enough to feed the animals seeking it, those that were left
at the picket rope had to die there. To talk, then, of hauling
supplies for man and beast in a marching column was preposterous.

It was quite proper to ask whether the impracticability of bringing
wagon trains over the mountains was as complete as we reported, and
Grant's horseback journey back into Kentucky when the thermometer
was at zero is sufficient proof that he found it imperatively
necessary to settle that question also with his own eyes and without
delay. We shall see presently what he reported. He knew before he
left Chattanooga that the railroad from Nashville was hardly
supplying Thomas's army. To Foster's appeals for at least some
clothing and shoes by that route, General Meigs, who was there,
replied that it could only be done "at the cost of starvation to our
animals or short rations to our men" in the Army of the Cumberland.
[Footnote: _Id_., vol. xxxi. pt. iii. p. 476.] He said that the
railroad must be "not only repaired, but rebuilt," before it could
do more than supply the troops already dependent on it. General
McCallum, the superintendent of military railroads, had gone west,
and was inspecting the Nashville and Chattanooga Road, and carefully
studying the problem of its possible capacity. [Footnote: _Id_., pp.
422, 444.] In consequence of this a change was made in the local
superintendence, and Mr. Adna Anderson was put in charge of
operating the line, while Mr. W. W. Wright was made constructing
engineer. [Footnote: _Id_., vol. xxxii. pt. ii. pp. 371, 372.] Under
their energy and ability it was repaired and operated so that East
Tennessee as well as Sherman's army in Georgia were abundantly
supplied during the Atlanta campaign; but this is part of the
history of the next spring and summer. To reduce the number of
mouths to feed at Chattanooga, Grant sent portions of the Army of
the Tennessee into northern Alabama, where they could be supplied by
boats coming up the Tennessee River. [Footnote: Official Records,
vol. xxxi. pt. iii. pp. 429, 496, 502.] The same considerations
influenced him in assenting to Sherman's plan of the Meridian
Expedition, where the troops engaged in it could live partly at
least on a country not yet ravaged by armies, whilst they would make
a diversion in favor of the weakened army left with Thomas. It is
safe to say that no such division of efforts would have occurred if
the railroad had been ready to supply the concentrated army on an
advance into Georgia. Sherman understood it to be an interlude, and
expected to be back and join the main army by the time the railroad
should be repaired and supplies accumulated. [Footnote: _Id_., p.
498.] As auxiliary to the line of supplies, the railroad from
Bridgeport to Decatur was also to be repaired, so as to connect with
steamboats at the latter place.

In Foster's department the same energy was directed toward improving
the communication with Chattanooga. The hull of the light-draught
steamboat which Colonel Byrd had found under construction at
Kingston was taken as a model, and two more were put on the stocks.
[Footnote: _Ante_, vol. i. p.523. Official Records vol. xxxi. pt.
iii. p. 483.] Pontoon bridges were prepared for use at different
points on the river. Lumber was cut to rebuild the great railway
bridge at Loudon and the long trestle at Strawberry Plains. The
little train of "twenty-odd cars" which Burnside had captured was
carefully guarded and kept running on the only bit of railroad in
East Tennessee that was now open, viz., that from Loudon through
Knoxville to Strawberry Plains. Herds of cattle were threading
mountain paths to avoid the deep mud of the wagon roads from
Kentucky, and on those roads desperate but too often fruitless
efforts were making to push forward some wagon-loads of shoes and
clothing.

In the consultations at Knoxville Foster had plainly stated his own
conviction that the only wise course was to abandon the thought of
aggressive warfare until spring; to station the troops so as to
cover Knoxville, but to select their positions chiefly with
reference to collecting forage and breadstuffs; to send all
unnecessary animals to the rear and in every way to simplify to the
utmost the problem of carrying the army through the winter,
preserving it for active use when the change of season and the
improvement of the railway line should make regular supplies
possible. [Footnote: Official Records, vol. xxxi. pt. i. pp. 281 _et
seq_.] Grant listened and suspended his judgment till he had
examined the situation for himself. An accident to General Foster
had increased the complication of affairs. He was occasionally
suffering from lameness resulting from an old wound in the leg, and
had found on his first journey over the mountains that he was in
danger of being disabled by it. Within a fortnight after he reached
Knoxville, his horse fell with him in passing over some slippery
rocks, and caught the wounded leg under him. [Footnote: _Id_., pt.
iii. p. 502.] This completely disabled the general for active field
service, and on the advice of his surgeon he asked to be relieved.
This request was forwarded on the 26th of December, and Grant had
been notified of it on the same day. It could not be acted on at
once, and during the few weeks that Foster remained at the head of
the department, he was obliged to remain in Knoxville, entrusting to
General Parke, as senior officer, the active command of combined
movements in the field.

When General Grant reached Nashville, he reported to the War
Department the results of his visit to us. [Footnote: _Id_., vol.
xxxii. pt. ii. p. 99.] He said that he found the troops so destitute
of clothing and shoes that not more than two-thirds of them could
march; that the difficulty of supplying them even with food was so
great that it was not advisable to send reinforcements; consequently
that the policy advised by Foster must be followed and active
operations suspended. Of his own journey he said, "From the personal
inspection made, I am satisfied that no portion of our supplies can
be hauled by teams from Camp Nelson [Ky.]." He proposed, on the
first rise of the Cumberland River, to send supplies by steamboat up
the Cumberland to the mouth of the Big South Fork, in the hope that
as this was a new route some forage for the teams could be got along
it, and that wagoning would be possible by that line into East
Tennessee. It did not turn out to be so, and the only relief we got
was by way of Chattanooga, where light-draught steamboats added
something to the facilities for supply. As his own most pressing
needs were relieved, General Thomas sent the steamboat "Lookout"
with a small cargo of shoes and clothing to Loudon. There our little
railway train met the boat and brought the goods to Knoxville, so
that in my own command we began to receive a little about the 10th
of January. It was very little, but it was greatly encouraging as a
foretaste of better things to come.

On the 12th General Foster was obliged to telegraph Grant that
things had grown worse rather than better since his visit.
[Footnote: Official Records, vol. xxxii. pt. ii. pp. 71, 72.] Many
animals were dying daily. The weather was still intensely cold, and
floating ice combined with high water, in the Holston had twice
broken the pontoon bridge at Knoxville. Food for man and beast was
all eaten out on the north side of the Holston River, and he
proposed to move most of the troops to the south and east of the
French Broad, in the hope of finding a region in which some corn and
forage might still remain. The great trestle bridge at Strawberry
Plains was completed, and a strong post would be left there to
protect it. A regiment was at work upon the bridge at Loudon. To
diminish the number of mouths to be fed, Foster gave the "veteran
furlough" at this time to several more of the regiments which had
re-enlisted. Trustworthy evidence showed that Longstreet was quite
as badly off as we were, and that he was not likely to move unless,
like us, he was forced to do so to find forage. Cavalry parties had
reported to us that there were considerable quantities of corn in
the neighborhood of Sevierville, and this was the inducement to send
most of our troops to that side of the French Broad River. To avoid
any appearance of retreat, it was ordered that we march from
Strawberry Plains to Dandridge, which was a flank movement to our
right, one day's march. There we should extemporize some sort of
ferry to cross the French Broad and seek camps in regions which
promised some supplies, but within supporting distance of our
several detachments. The men whose clothing was most lacking and who
were without shoes would remain in our present camp and be
temporarily attached to the post established to protect the bridge.
The cavalry, which had been near Mossy Creek (fourteen miles up the
Holston), was directed to move straight across the angle between the
two rivers, and cover the flank march of the infantry to Dandridge.
It was thought probable that the cavalry might subsist for a short
time in the neighborhood of Dandridge and in the valley of the
Nolachucky, the principal tributary of the French Broad from the
north; indeed, the time of crossing the larger river by the infantry
was not fixed, but would be determined by our good or bad fortune in
finding forage and bread-stuffs near Dandridge. [Footnote: Official
Records, vol. xxxii. pt. ii. pp. 82, 87, 99, 101.]

The 15th of January was the day fixed for the march. The weather was
not so cold as it had been, but was very raw and uncomfortable. At
the last moment General Foster found it necessary to have a
consultation with Parke and Granger; and Sheridan, whose division of
the Fourth Corps led off on the road, was directed to select
positions for the infantry of that corps and mine as we reached
Dandridge. He was also authorized to assign mills to the use of the
different commands so as to systematize our means of supply and
prevent disorder. [Footnote: Official Records, vol. xxxii. pt. ii.
p. 102.] The march was nineteen miles to Dandridge, and our
positions were about a mile in front of the village, on the hills
covering it. Both the Fourth and the Ninth Corps had remained in
their camps at Blain's Crossroads up to this time, and the Ninth now
took my place at Strawberry Plains, covering Knoxville from that
direction. It had less than 4000 men present for duty. [Footnote:
_Id_., p. 292.] Our moving column consisted of Sheridan's and Wood's
divisions of the Fourth Corps and parts of three brigades from the
Twenty-third; less than 10,000 men in all. The ground was frozen,
and as we were moving over roads which had not been much travelled,
the way was comparatively smooth for our artillery and wagons. It
was not so much so for the infantry, and the little unevenness being
sharpened by frost, quickly cut through the men's old shoes. Those
who were barefoot were ordered to stay behind, but the shoes of
others were in so bad a state that there were places where I saw the
road marked with bloody tracks from the wounded feet of the
soldiers.

Reaching Dandridge a little in advance of my command, I reported to
Sheridan, and he showed me the line he had selected, on which we
were to occupy the left. Colonel Sterling, my inspector-general, was
assigned the duty of placing the brigades in position as they
arrived. The cavalry had preceded us, and we found them occupying
the town and picketing the roads toward Morristown and the elbow of
the Nolachucky River northeast of us, locally called the Bend o'
Chucky. A range of hills known as Bay's Mountain was the water-shed
between the valleys of the Holston and the French Broad, and we
expected the cavalry to cover the front on a line from Kimbrough's
Cross-roads near the mountain to the Bend o' Chucky. This line would
be nine or ten miles from Dandridge, and would communicate also with
Mott's brigade of my command, which had been left in its post at
Mossy Creek, on the Holston, under orders to fall back deliberately
to Strawberry Plains if attacked by superior forces. [Footnote:
Official Records, vol. xxxii. pt. ii. p. 99.] If these positions
could be held, the cavalry could not only collect the forage in the
Nolachucky valley as far up as their detachments could reach, but
would also threaten the left flank of Longstreet's position at
Morristown.

Those who only knew Sheridan after the war would hardly recognize
him in the thin and wiry little man I met at Dandridge. His hollow
cheeks made his cheekbones noticeably prominent, and his features
had a decided Milesian cast. His reputation at that time was that of
an impetuous and vehement fighter when engaged, rousing himself to a
belligerent wrath and fury that made his spirit contagious and
stimulated his troops to a like vigor. At other times he was
unpretentious and genial, and whilst regarded as a good division
commander was not thought of as specially fitted for large and
independent responsibilities. He was not considered cool enough for
the broader duties of a commander, and indeed had had rather bad
luck in the great battles of Stone's River and Chickamauga, where
the qualities called for were those which enable a perfectly
self-possessed officer to extricate his command from a perilous
position. He has told me himself that he was slow in learning to
have confidence in his own power to direct in such cases, and that
it was only after he had tested himself, step by step, that he came
to rely on his own judgment and will, as he did in the Shenandoah
valley and at Five Forks. It was his blazing impetuosity in action
that made Grant think of him as specially fitted for a cavalry
leader, and his growth into the able commander of an army was a
later development of his talents. He received me very cordially, and
in our trying wintry experience at Dandridge began a friendly
acquaintance which continued unbroken till his death.

General Thomas J. Wood was not with his division, and it was under
the command of General August Willich, whom I had seen drilling
Robert McCook's German regiment, the Ninth Ohio, as its adjutant, at
Camp Dennison in the spring of 1861. I had expected to find
Brigadier-General William B. Hazen in temporary command during
Wood's leave of absence, but when I went to his quarters was
surprised to find him in arrest. Hazen had been one of the first of
the officers of the regular army with whom I became acquainted at
the beginning of the war, and he had offered to accept a staff
position with me. I had a real regard for him, and naturally offered
my friendly services in his present predicament. It seemed that
Sheridan had called on him for a report as to the condition of
things in his front, and Hazen had taken advantage of some
peculiarity of the situation which he thought Sheridan did not
sufficiently understand, to make a report which was ironical and so
irritating that Sheridan's answer was to order him to keep his
quarters in arrest. Their quarrel, however, dated from the battle of
Missionary Ridge, where Sheridan accused Wood's division, and Hazen
in particular, with usurping the honors of being first on the crest
and capturing part of Bragg's artillery. Sheridan honestly thought
his division entitled to the honor, but the official evidence seems
to me to be against him. At any rate, it began a very pretty quarrel
which never was wholly made up, and which had many queer little
episodes, in war and in peace, on the Indian frontier and at
Washington, for many years thereafter. Hazen was an officer of real
ability, of brilliant courage and splendid personal presence. His
fault was that he was too keen in seeing flaws in other people's
performance of duty, and apt to dilate upon them in his official
reports when such officers were wholly independent of him. This made
him a good many enemies notwithstanding his noble qualities and his
genial kindliness to his friends. A military officer usually finds
it hard enough to submit gracefully to the criticisms of his
superiors, and naturally takes it ill if this prerogative is
exercised by those of equal grade without authority. Such a practice
puts into the official records matter which does not belong there,
and which, however honestly stated, may be very unjust, because all
the explanatory circumstances are not likely to be known to the
critic. At any rate, the person criticised is not amenable to that
tribunal, and this is enough in itself to cause a sense of injury.
[Footnote: See Review of General Hazen's Narrative of Military
Service, "The Nation," Nov. 5, 1885.] Sheridan took very kindly my
mediation in Hazen's behalf, and probably had never intended more
than a temporary arrest. After Granger came to the front and resumed
command of the corps, I heard no more of the trouble.

We had escorted a small train in which were some wagon-loads of
clothing and shoes for the cavalry, and the mounted corps remained
at Dandridge during the 15th of January, issuing these supplies. The
rear of our infantry column came up on the next day, so that we were
assembled and in position before evening. The cavalry moved out in
the afternoon of the 16th, part on the right toward the Nolachucky
River, and the left toward Kimbrough's Cross-roads on the Morristown
road. The right wing found the enemy's cavalry in their front about
five miles from town, but the left wing found Kimbrough's occupied
by Longstreet's infantry. His whole force, except Ransom's division,
had advanced upon information of the movement of our cavalry on the
14th. In doing this Longstreet had turned the position of the
brigade of infantry left at Mossy Creek, and Colonel Mott retired on
the 16th to Strawberry Plains in accordance with his orders. Toward
evening the cavalry on our right were driven back in a lively
skirmish, and those on the left were recalled to give them support.
The whole were united and repulsed the enemy's horsemen, taking
position for the night about a mile in front of our infantry camps.
On the 17th the enemy's infantry advanced, and reached the posts of
our cavalry in the afternoon. Longstreet now made a vigorous attack
with his troops of both arms, and gradually drove back our horsemen,
who resisted him with their carbines, fighting dismounted. Sheridan
supported the cavalry with some infantry and a lively skirmishing
combat continued for an hour or two till darkness came on. The
affair was something of a surprise to both parties. Longstreet had
evidently made his movement in the hope of giving our cavalry a
lesson which might check their enterprise and make them keep their
distance, and was astonished to come upon our infantry at Dandridge.
We were in motion to put our infantry on the south side of the
French Broad, and were equally surprised to find the enemy in force
on the same route.

General Parke and General Granger had ridden over from Strawberry
Plains and reached Dandridge in the afternoon. Hearing of the
presence of what was reported to be the whole of Longstreet's army,
and not liking to accept battle with superior forces with the river
at his back, Parke had caused an examination of the river to be
made, and learned that just below the town was a shallow, fordable
at an ordinary stage of water, and now about waist-deep for the men.
In the low physical condition of our troops and their lack of
clothing he very wisely thought it would not do to make them march
through the river, but devised a foot-bridge by putting army wagons
end to end and making a path over the boxes of the wagons. Sheridan
was ordered to detach a brigade immediately to make this bridge, and
it set to work at once. The plan was to march the infantry to the
south side of the river and afterward remove the wagons, covering
the operation by the cavalry who could then ford the stream, which
though very cold and running with ice was not impracticable for
horsemen.

About dusk, as the skirmishing in front ceased, Sheridan and myself,
with Sturgis, the commandant of the cavalry, were called to meet
Generals Parke and Granger at a house in the town to report the
condition of affairs in our front and to receive orders for
marching. The bridge had been completed, as was supposed, and the
brigade which had made it had been ordered across, when, on reaching
the land on the left bank, they found, to their amazement, that they
were upon an island with an equally deep and wide channel beyond!
This news had just been received when we assembled at headquarters.
Sheridan was greatly mortified at the blunder, but there was then no
help for it. [Footnote: Official Records, vol. xxxii. pt. i. p. 79.]
It was impracticable to complete the bridge before morning, and it
was doubtful if wagons enough could be got together. My own command
was on the extreme left of the line, partly covering the road back
to Strawberry Plains, and we had not been engaged. The fighting had
been in front of the centre and right. I could therefore throw no
light on the question of the enemy's force. The information from
other parts of the line and from prisoners left no doubt that
infantry had engaged in the attack late in the afternoon and that
Longstreet was present in force. There was therefore no dissent from
the conclusion that it would be unwise to accept a battle with the
river behind us, and orders were given to leave the position in the
night and retire to Strawberry Plains. The wagons and most of the
artillery were to follow the advance-guard, which was Sheridan's
division, my command to march next, and Willich's (Wood's) division
of the Fourth Corps to be the rear-guard. The cavalry were to march
on a road a little to the right, leading to New Market, and would
thus cover our flank. [Footnote: For the Dandridge expedition, see
Official Records, vol. xxxii. pt. i. pp. 79 _et seq_.]

Granger had been ailing for a day or two and had not been with the
troops. He was lying on a bed in the room where we met, and the rest
of us sat about the fireplace, a tallow candle being on a rude table
in the middle of the floor. Sturgis came in later than the others,
having had a longer ride. He was a handsome fellow, with full, round
features, sharp black eyes, and curly black hair and mustache. He
had been seated but a few minutes when he noticed a bottle of
whiskey on the table and a glass which had been placed there as camp
hospitality for any one that wanted it, but had apparently been
neglected. Glancing that way, Sturgis said, "If I had a little bit
of sugar, I believe I'd take a toddy." A colored boy produced a
sugar-bowl and the toddy was taken. The conversation ran on a few
moments, when, as if it were a wholly new suggestion, the same voice
repeated, "If I had a little bit of sugar, I believe I'd take a
toddy;" and again the attendant did the honors. Our orders were
received and we were about ready to go to our commands, when again,
with polite intonation and a most amusing unconsciousness of any
repetition, came the words, "If I had a little bit of sugar, I
believe I'd take a toddy." The incident was certainly a funny one in
itself, but I should not have cared to repeat it had not the
official records of Sturgis's defeat by Forrest in the Tishimingo
affair later in the year emphasized the mischief of lax habits as to
temperance. The judgment of his superiors and of those who knew him
well was made severer by the knowledge of his weakness in this
respect. Railway officers insist upon absolute sobriety in
locomotive engineers; but if there be one employment in which such
coolness of head is more absolutely essential than in another, I
believe it is in commanding troops in the field. [Footnote: See
Marbot's Memoirs, vol. ii. p. 242, for results of Wittgenstein's
reliance on an intemperate officer, Kulnieff, in the Russian
campaign of 1812.] Sturgis's military downfall was a severe lesson,
but he gave every evidence afterward of having learned it, and
"lived cleanly" through many years of service after the Civil War
was over.

The march back to Strawberry Plains began by starting the wagon
train to the rear as soon as it was dark. Sheridan's division was
drawn out soon afterward. My command was ordered to leave the line
at eight o'clock, and Willich's to follow when the road should be
clear as far as the first defensible ridge beyond the village where
a rear-guard could make a successful stand. The cavalry were to
maintain their position till morning and cover the movement. It was
about half-past eight when my column closed up upon the wagons ahead
of me, but as they had not yet climbed the first hill, we found
ourselves necessarily halted in the main street of the village.
General Willich had prudently placed a tent a little to the right of
the road where it leaves the town, and there he made his quarters
until the column should completely pass that point. He could thus
keep his division in their bivouac in support of the cavalry till he
knew the rest of the little army had cleared the place and could
secure some rest, whilst he was still in easy communication with
both the marching column and his own men. He reaped the advantage of
his forethought. As my command had to assist the wagons and the
artillery, no such means of bettering the situation was possible for
us. I had notified Willich that I would be in person at the extreme
rear of my command so that he could communicate with me most
promptly and obtain my support if he were seriously attacked. The
brigade in the lead was directed to give the wagons and cannon every
help in getting forward, and the column was ordered to keep well
closed up.

The day had been a mild one in comparison with the fortnight
preceding, and rain set in early in the evening. The surface of the
clayey roads soon became very slippery, then cut into deep ruts, and
the moisture was just enough to give the mud the consistency of
tenacious putty. The teams, half starved, were very weak, and it
seemed as if they would never mount the hills before them, which
were the southern end of the ridge of Bay's Mountain, separating the
Holston valley from the Nolachucky. Three or four teams had to be
united to drag up a single cannon or caisson, and the time as well
as the distance was thus trebled or quadrupled. In some instances
more than twenty horses were thus hitched to a single piece, besides
having infantrymen at the wheels as thick as they could cluster,
pushing and lifting. The column which was halted thus waiting for
the wagon trains and artillery to climb a hill, grew weary of
standing. The men would break ranks and sit down in the fence
corners, where they built little camp-fires, and, rainy as it was,
they fell asleep leaning against each other in these little
bivouacs. Then would come word from the front to close up, and the
regimental officers would give the command to fall in. The men would
rouse themselves, the column would march, perhaps less than a
hundred yards, when the road would be blocked again, the men would
again seek the fence corners and stir up the fires that had been
left by those who were now in advance. Thus in cold and wet and
weariness the night wore on, till when day broke about six o'clock
next morning we had put a distance of less than two miles between us
and the village, and Willich's division had barely reached the first
wooded ridge beyond the town.

During all the last hours of the night we were anxious lest we
should be attacked by the enemy, who by crowning the hills above the
road would have had us at great disadvantage. I had concerted with
General Willich a plan of action if we were assailed, but the enemy
took no advantage of our situation, and I have always believed that
as the meeting at Dandridge was a mutual surprise, by a similar
coincidence both parties were retiring at the same time. Our cavalry
moved off toward New Market at daybreak, but it was not till late in
the forenoon, when we had toiled on several miles further, that the
Confederate cavalry approached our infantry rear-guard and
accompanied its march for a time with some light skirmishing.

The weather grew colder during the day, and in the afternoon the
rain changed to moist driving snow. The sleepy, weary troops toiled
doggedly on; the wagons and the cannon were helped over the bad
places in the way, for we were determined not to abandon any, and
the enemy was not hurrying us. When night fell, on the 18th, my own
command and Willich's division were still three miles from
Strawberry Plains, though Sheridan's division and part of the wagon
train had reached that place and crossed the Holston. We halted the
men here and went into bivouac for the night. It had been a
wretchedly cheerless and uncomfortable march, but the increasing
cold and flying snow made the camp scarcely less inclement. The
officers were, as was frequently the case, worse off than the men,
for they could not carry their rations in haversacks, and the
separation from the wagons in such a desolate country meant a
prolonged fast. The delay caused by the rain and mud had been
unexpected, and the march we had hoped to make in the night had
taken more than twenty-four hours. During that time myself and staff
had not eaten a mouthful, and we had no expectation of seeing food
till we should get across the Holston next day and reach our
headquarters wagons. Better luck happened us, however. We found a
deserted and unfinished log cabin which had a roof and a
stick-and-clay chimney, though it had no floor or chinking. The snow
drove through between the logs, but the roof was over our heads and
we soon had a lively fire roaring in the chimney. Some bundles of
corn-stalks were found in a field near by, and of these we made a
bed on the ground in front of the fire, and began to think we might
forget our hunger in thankfulness for fire and shelter such as it
was. But still better was in store for us. One of our tired forage
trains had gone into park near us, and the teamsters offered to
share their supper with us. They had corn "pone," some salt pork,
and for a rarity some newly arrived coffee. We sat on the
corn-stalks around the fire with an iron camp-kettle in the midst
containing the black coffee which we dipped out with battered tin
cups, and we held in our hands pieces of the corn-pone and slices of
fried pork, congratulating each other on the unexpected luxury of
our supper. Hunger and fatigue were so good a sauce that it seemed
really a luxury, and we banished care with an ease which now seems
hardly credible. The supper ended, sleep was not long a-wooing,
though my rest was more broken than that of the others, for frequent
dispatches came from headquarters which I had to answer, and orders
had to be sent to the troops to continue the march on the morrow in
accordance with the directions which I had received. I had provided
myself in Cincinnati with a field dispatch book in form of a
manifold letter-writer which I myself carried in a sabretasch during
all the rest of the war. In this, by means of the carbon sheets and
agate-pointed stylus, a dispatch and its copy were written at once,
and a valuable record kept of every day's business. I could sit by
the bivouac fire and write upon my knee without troubling a weary
aide-de-camp to make a copy. I had in my saddle portmanteau also a
little pair of brass candlesticks screwing together in form of a
large watch-case, so that I could be provided with a light at the
root of a tree in the darkness, if it was necessary to send or
receive dispatches where there was neither shelter nor fire. These
were necessaries; for food we could take our chances.

We halted the troops in wooded slopes where they were sheltered from
the storm and where the evergreen boughs were speedily converted
into tents of a sort, as well as soft and fragrant beds. Their
ration was still scant, but nearly all of them picked up some
addition to it on a day's march, so that the camps were more
cheerful than they had been in the intensely severe weather of the
first half of the month. On the next day we continued the movement,
passing through Strawberry Plains and three miles further on the
road to Knoxville. The Fourth Corps troops were ordered to go to the
last-named city, there to cross the Holston and move out toward
Sevierville into the country we had expected to reach by way of
Dandridge. The Ninth Corps remained a little longer at Strawberry
Plains.

On the 18th of January General Foster's plans were unsettled by a
dispatch received from General Grant, dated at Nashville on the
16th, but in some manner delayed in transmittal. This conveyed the
rather startling information that Longstreet had been reinforced by
a division of Ewell's Corps with expectation of another also, and
that the Confederate commander was in fact moving in force on
Knoxville. [Footnote: Official Records, vol. xxxii. pt. ii. pp. 109,
127.] The source of the information is not disclosed, but the news
was stated with a positiveness uncommon with Grant. It reached
Foster just as he had Parke's report of our having most unexpectedly
met Longstreet's infantry at Dandridge and of our retreat on
Strawberry Plains. The news was without foundation, for Longstreet
had not been reinforced and his movement had no other significance
than that which I have given it; but, coming on the heels of the
accidental collision at Dandridge, there was a curious coincidence
in the events which gave strong apparent confirmation to the report,
and it was a matter of course that Foster should accept it as true
and act upon it.

He directed the sick and all extra baggage to be sent at once to
Knoxville. Part of the Fourth Corps troops were ordered to the same
place. The cavalry, except two regiments left with General Parke for
picket duty, was ordered to pass through Knoxville toward
Sevierville to obstruct any further movement of the enemy on the
Dandridge line. Parke was ordered to hold the rest of the army
together, resisting Longstreet's advance, and retiring deliberately
on Knoxville. Preparations were made to destroy the long trestle
bridge at Strawberry Plains, and this important structure was
devoted to ruin for the third or fourth time since Sanders entered
the valley in the preceding summer. [Footnote: Official Records,
vol. xxxii. pt. ii. pp. 129, 162.] Grant had said to Foster that the
impossibility of supplying more troops in East Tennessee made it
useless to send reinforcements, and that he must keep between
Longstreet and Thomas, retiring toward Chattanooga if necessary.
Halleck complicated the situation by telegraphing direct to Thomas
that he must aid Foster to any extent needed, and that the line from
Knoxville to Cumberland Gap must be maintained at all hazards.
[Footnote: _Id_., p. 130.] Foster reported to Grant that he had so
greatly improved the defences and armament of Knoxville that it
could not be taken, and that he would not retire further than this
place unless it were explicitly ordered. [Footnote: _Id_., p. 138.]
This was in accordance with General Grant's wish, and his confidence
in the information as to Longstreet's reinforcement was such that he
telegraphed Halleck on the 20th that the siege of Knoxville was
about to be renewed. [Footnote: Official Records, vol. xxxii. pt.
ii. p. 149.] The chronic inability of Halleck to understand East
Tennessee affairs is shown in his insistence on still maintaining
the Cumberland Gap line, which was necessarily uncovered whenever
the enemy approached Strawberry Plains. Chattanooga had now become
our base, and remained so for all troops in East Tennessee till the
end of the war. We at the front got the first authentic information
which disproved the report of Longstreet's reinforcement and showed
that he had retired to Morristown. Foster was thus enabled to
telegraph Grant on the 20th that the evidence did not sustain the
report, and that he doubted whether the Confederate commander would
again attempt Knoxville. [Footnote: _Id._, p. 151.]




CHAPTER XXXIII

WINTER QUARTERS IN EAST TENNESSEE--PREPARATIONS FOR A NEW CAMPAIGN


Sending our animals to Kentucky--Consultations--Affair with enemy's
cavalry--Roughing it--Distribution of troops--Cavalry engagement at
Sevierville--Quarters in Knoxville--Leading Loyalists--Social and
domestic conditions--Discussion of the spring campaign--Of Foster's
successor--Organization of Grant's armies--Embarrassments in
assignment of officers to duty--Discussion of the system--Cipher
telegraphing--Control of the key--Grant's collision with
Stanton--Absurdity of the War Department's method--General Stoneman
assigned to Twenty-third Corps--His career and character--General
Schofield succeeds to the command of the Department of the Ohio.


In connection with the movements of concentration about Knoxville,
General Foster carried out his scheme of sending back to pasture in
Kentucky and Tennessee all the horses and mules, except a very few
teams needed to distribute supplies and two or three horses at each
division headquarters for the commanding officer and an aide or two.
[Footnote: Official Records, vol. xxxii. pt. ii. pp. 203-204.] The
animals were herded and driven together, an escort of cavalry
accompanying them, and the whole put in charge of Captain Day of my
staff, as quartermaster, the same whose energy in our journey over
the mountains I have already noted. This measure definitely
committed us, of course, to a quiet and defensive line of conduct
for the next three months. On the 21st of January we were
deliberately closing in around Knoxville, where the Fourth Corps was
already concentrated, and General Foster had called upon the three
corps commanders to meet him at his headquarters in the city for the
purpose of putting in official form our opinion upon the necessity
of suspending active operations in view of the condition of the
troops and animals. We met there on the next day, and submitted our
reports in response to interrogatories on several points. My own
statement summarized the facts in regard to the supplies of food,
forage, clothing, and the impossibility of drawing anything more
from the country except some very limited quantities of
bread-stuffs. My conclusion was that economy of life, animals,
property, and (taking the next six months together) of time also,
required that the troops should go into permanent quarters for a
short period to be devoted to recuperation, drill, and instruction,
organization of means of supply, and general preparation for an
active campaign in the spring. [Footnote: Official Records, vol.
xxxii. pt. ii. p. 176.] I, however, added that this was on the
hypothesis that no imperative military reasons existed for continued
active campaigning; for in presence of such a necessity every
officer and man of the corps would most cheerfully continue to
undergo every hardship and endure every privation. There was
complete unanimity among us in regard to the subject, and General
Foster's orders were issued accordingly.

Whilst we were in conference, reports came in from General Willcox,
who had been left in command of the Ninth Corps at Strawberry
Plains, that the enemy were pressing him rather vigorously. Word
came also from General Spears that hostile infantry and cavalry had
appeared in large force at Blain's Cross-roads. Sturgis also
reported from the direction of Sevierville that the whole rebel army
had gone to Strawberry Plains. [Footnote: _Id_., pp. 163, 174.]
Toward evening of the 22d our troops had come within some five or
six miles of Knoxville, but the enemy showed so strong a disposition
to attack that Foster ordered me to return to the front, take
command of both corps (Ninth and Twenty-third) and of the cavalry
with them, and check the Confederates, as there was some danger that
our troops would change the concerted movement into a precipitate
retreat. General Parke was suffering in health from recent exposure
and remained in Knoxville. Galloping out from the town, I reached
the troops a little before dark, halted them, and by a personal
reconnoissance satisfied myself that only cavalry were before us.
Our men had passed some wooded hills which were important to cover
our position and give a starting-point for an aggressive movement on
our part. Reversing their movement, I reoccupied these hills,
brusquely driving back the enemy's advance-guard and checking their
main body. It was now dark, and putting our forces in line of battle
ready for an advance at daybreak, they were allowed to bivouac for
the night, whilst I rode rapidly back to Knoxville, in accordance
with my arrangement with General Foster to report to him in person
the particulars of the situation. He approved my suggestion that I
should advance the whole line in the morning and settle the question
what force was before us. The wagons had come into the town, and my
headquarters with them; so taking each of us a blanket, myself and
the two staff officers who had accompanied me (Colonel Sterling and
my brother) rode back again at midnight to the front, and rested
till daybreak on the rough floor of a log cabin. The line then was
advanced, but the enemy had taken the hint from the preparations of
the evening and had decamped. [Footnote: Official Records, vol.
xxxii. pt. ii. p. 184.] Detachments went in pursuit some eight
miles, but the Confederates had definitely withdrawn, and we
obtained conclusive proof that only their cavalry had followed us
across the Holston River.

The interrupted movement toward Knoxville was resumed, but it
required me to remain another night in roughest bivouac, and another
day without food, except as a mouthful could be found at hazard. I
had begun the Dandridge movement with a cold which threatened
pneumonia, but had grown steadily better through all the exposure,
finding, as often happened to me in the course of the war, that the
physical and mental stimulus of active campaigning even in the worst
of weather was tonic and health-giving.

As soon as the situation was cleared up by trustworthy information
of Longstreet's movements, General Foster resumed his plans for
winter quarters. His first intention of sending the Fourth Corps
toward Sevierville was modified by Grant's directions to put that
corps where it could most readily rejoin the Army of the Cumberland.
He therefore ordered me to move the Twenty-third Corps in that
direction, and formally united to the corps the brigade of East
Tennessee troops under Brigadier-General James G. Spears, which had
theretofore been an independent organization. [Footnote: Official
Records, vol. xxxii. pt. ii. p. 162.] Sturgis, who had marched with
most of the cavalry on the route thus assigned to me, reported that
the road was the worst he ever saw, and, with all the experience of
bad roads we had had, this meant that it was impracticable for our
few and weak teams. [Footnote: _Ibid._] This put an end to all hope
of living on the country, and Foster accepted the necessity of
distributing his troops about Knoxville and along the lines leading
to Chattanooga.

On the 22d of January orders were issued assigning the Fourth Corps
to quarters extending from Kingston to Loudon along the river and
railroad. The Ninth Corps took post between Campbell's Station and
Knoxville. The Twenty-third Corps encamped at Knoxville and in the
immediate vicinity. [Footnote: _Id._, p. 183.] The cavalry occupied
the country southeast of the Holston holding a front on the French
Broad River. A few small outposts further up the valley were
maintained for observation.

A brilliant cavalry combat near Sevierville on the 27th ended the
active work under General Foster's command. Longstreet, hearing of
the presence of our cavalry south of the French Broad, directed
General Martin, commanding his cavalry corps, to get his forces
across the river and meet Sturgis at once. [Footnote: Official
Records, vol. xxxii. pt. ii. p. 611.] The latter had McCook's
division in advance, supported by Garrard's near Pigeon River.
Martin advanced upon McCook, but was surprised to find his adversary
seize the initiative. Learning of the Confederate advance, McCook
marched to meet them on the road leading to Fair Garden. Martin was
driven back, his right (Morgan's division) being routed by a gallant
charge led by Colonel La Grange, First Wisconsin Cavalry, who
commanded a brigade. [Footnote: Id. pt. i. pp. 139, 141.] Two
regimental commanders, seven other commissioned officers, over a
hundred privates, and two pieces of artillery were captured by the
charge. General Morgan's battle-flag was also among the trophies.
Our own casualties amounted to only thirty-one. Martin beat a hasty
retreat across the French Broad to Dandridge, and Longstreet frankly
admitted Martin's defeat with a loss of 200 men and the two guns.
[Footnote: _Id_. pp. 149-150.] He attributed it to the inefficiency
of his cavalry commander, and urged that one more competent be sent
him. [Footnote: _Id_pt. ii. p. 632.] Sturgis followed on the 28th to
Fair's Island Ford near Dandridge, where he was met by Armstrong's
division of the Confederates. Longstreet now passed over an infantry
force in rear of our cavalry, and they fell back to Maryville.
[Footnote: _Id_., p. 653.] Both parties found the winter work too
costly, and were now glad to take a few weeks for rest and
recuperation.

As my headquarters were assigned to Knoxville, I had the opportunity
of increasing my knowledge of the people and of the social
complications which grew out of the war. I found quarters for myself
and Lieutenant Theodore Cox, my aide, at the house of Mr. Cowen, a
young merchant of the city, whose father was one of the prominent
business men. The house was on the north side of a suburban street
running parallel to the river, and not far from the buildings of the
East Tennessee University, which were partially fortified and
connected with Fort Sanders by a line of infantry trench. The fields
on the opposite side of the road were open, and sloped down to the
river bank, and in these my headquarters guard pitched their tents
and the general quarters of the staff were also placed. A near
neighbor, in the direction of the college, was the Rev. Dr. Humes,
rector of the Episcopal parish, and after the war President of the
University. General Burnside had spoken of him as a noble man, of
devoted loyalty as well as earnest piety, and I was glad to know him
as one who by his high intelligence and character was an authority
on all that related to Holston valley. [Footnote: Thomas W. Humes,
S.T.D. He has, since the war (1888), published a volume devoted to
the East Tennessee loyalists, entitled "The Loyal Mountaineers of
Tennessee."] John Williams, John M. Fleming, and O. P. Temple were
among those who represented the Union sentiment of Knoxville, as did
Perez Dickinson among the merchants. [Footnote: Since this chapter
was written, Chancellor Temple has contributed a valuable work to
the history of the Rebellion, in his "East Tennessee and the Civil
War," Cincinnati. 1899.] John Baxter, afterward Judge of the United
States Circuit Court, was a strong and wise friend of the
government. Horace Maynard represented the district in Congress both
before and after the war, and was regarded at Washington as its
official representative even in the period when the Confederate
occupation made him an exile from his home. William G. Brownlow was
in Knoxville also, having returned as soon as our army had opened
the way. His son, "Colonel Jim," was doing gallant service at the
head of the First East Tennessee Cavalry. Around this group of
leading men were arrayed the great majority of the people, devoted
in their attachment to the Union. The men of property among them had
sometimes been forced to dissimulate in order to protect their
persons and their possessions; but now that the National army was in
the valley, there was no mistaking the earnest satisfaction and the
hearty sympathy of these people. There was a minority who had been
open Secessionists, and these had been influential beyond their
numbers, by reason of their wealth and social standing; for here, as
well as everywhere else in the South, owners of slaves easily became
champions of the extreme doctrines of what they called the
constitutional guaranty of their property. They claimed to include
most of the "upper class" in their numbers, though this was by no
means true in this region.

The feelings of both Union men and Secessionists were very bitter,
and social life was as strongly marked by these divisions as the
hostile camps. The number of slaves was comparatively small, but
they were the house servants in the towns, and their disposition to
assert their liberty added to the social turmoil. The mistress of
the house where I lodged hired her cook from a neighbor who claimed
the woman as a slave; but the employer found herself obliged to make
another bargain with the cook, and to pay her a second wage in order
to keep her at work at all. The Unionists of East Tennessee were not
yet fully advanced to the emancipation of the slaves as a result of
the war. Parson Brownlow had fiercely denounced the Secessionists
for arguing that secession was necessary to preserve property in
slaves. Our army commanders thought it prudent not to agitate this
question, and contented themselves with keeping within the limits of
the statutes and the general orders of the War Department, which
forbade military interference to return fugitives to the masters or
to compel their obedience. The matter was left to work itself out,
as it rapidly did.

After the first of February the weather became settled and gave us a
more favorable opinion of the East Tennessee climate. We had sharp
frosts at night with occasional light flurries of snow, but the days
were usually bright, it thawed about midday, and the average
temperature was such as to make active exercise delightful. The
summits of the Great Smoky Mountains were covered with snow, and
made a picturesque framing for the natural loveliness of the
valleys. The roads were nowhere metalled, and the alternate freezing
and thawing made them nearly impassable; but if we had been able to
bring forward proper forage and supplies, we should have overcome
the other obstacles to active campaigning. As it was, we could only
await the approach of spring, when the settling of the roads and the
opening of railroad communication with Chattanooga and Nashville
would make it possible to bring back from Kentucky and feed our
horses which had been sent to the rear.

There was, beside, the question of the change necessary in the
command of the department, since there was no probability that
General Foster's health would permit him to retain it and he had
urgently requested that his successor should be assigned to duty.
Indeed, the question of organization reached down to the regiments
and brigades, and was a burning one in all the armies of Grant's
Military Division. Besides this, the revival of the grade of
Lieutenant-General was already mooted in Congress, and it was nearly
a foregone conclusion that Grant would have the command of all the
armies and the task of co-ordinating their movements. Our little
army in East Tennessee was agitated not only with the speculations
as to our new commander, but with debates as to our probable part in
the next campaign, and the forces which would be given to us with
which to do our work. Would the Ninth Corps remain in the
department, or would it be ordered to the East for duty under
Burnside, as was already rumored? Would our task be simply to
garrison East Tennessee; should we make Longstreet's army our
objective and follow him into Virginia; or should we be united to
Sherman's and Thomas's armies for a campaign in Georgia? We eagerly
listened for every hint which might be dropped at headquarters, but
Grant's proverbial reticence left us to our conjectures, and each
question was answered only when official orders were finally
published. Much that was very blind to us is now easily traced in
the Official Records.

When General Foster informed the War Department that the opening of
his old wound made it necessary to relieve him of command in East
Tennessee, the President was in some perplexity in regard to several
prominent officers. He was disposed to find some adequate employment
for Rosecrans, who was still backed by a very strong political
coterie in Washington. He was convinced that injustice had been done
Burnside, and was thinking of sending him with the Ninth Corps,
largely increased in numbers, to his old field of successful work on
the Carolina coast. The opposition of influential politicians of
Kansas and Missouri to Schofield, whose confirmation as
major-general was still obstructed in the Senate, he felt as a
personal hostility to himself. Grant was also desirous of suitable
assignments to command for McPherson, W. F. Smith, and Sheridan. The
almost certain passage of the bill to give a higher grade in the
army, and the assumption that Grant would be promoted to it, gave
the opportunity to make a satisfactory arrangement of all these
cases. Burnside's return to active work and the removal to the East
of the Ninth Corps were determined on, with General Parke's return,
at his own desire, to the position of Burnside's chief of staff.
McPherson was to take the Army of the Tennessee when Sherman should
be promoted to the command of the Military Division of the
Mississippi. Smith and Sheridan were to have high assignments in the
Eastern army. Rosecrans was sent to Missouri, and Schofield, to his
great content, was appointed to command the Army of the Ohio. These
changes were gradually shaped in the correspondence of Grant with
army headquarters during the fall and winter. [Footnote: Official
Records, vol. xxxi. pt. iii. pp. 122, 277, 458, 529, 571; vol.
xxxii. pt. ii. pp. 79, 80, 182, 202, 209, 229, 230, 251, 336; also a
curious letter of Hooker to Stranton, _id_., pp. 467-469. See also
Schofield's "Forty-six Years in the Army," pp. 108-110. I have
treated these changes more in detail in chapter vii. of Force's
"General Sherman" (Great Commanders' series). See preface of the
work last named.] They were followed by others in the corps
divisions and brigades, so that the organization of all the Western
armies took permanent form before Grant was called to Washington to
assume his new rank at the beginning of March.

In regard to general officers the question of assignments and
promotions was always an embarrassing one for commanders of armies
in the field. As the law prescribed the maximum number of
major-generals and of brigadiers, political and military pressure
combined to keep the list always full. [Footnote: In reply to
Grant's request for the promotion of General W.F. Smith, Halleck
Informed him, on Jan. 13, 1864, that there was not only no vacancy,
but that by some error more had again been appointed that the law
authorized, and some already in service would have to be dropped.
Official Records, vol. xxxii. pt. ii. p. 80. As to brigaders, see
Halleck to Grant, _Id_., p. 481.] Closest watch was kept by
politicians and others at Washington, and if a vacancy occurred, the
pressure to fill it was exactly such as would be made for a civil
office in the gift of the government. Officers of the regular army
found in General Halleck a powerful support, and it was assumed that
those appointed from civil life would be looked after by their
political friends. The effort which was made by the War Department
in the winter to force into active service or into retirement all
officers who for any cause had been "shelved" was well intended, but
in practice it accentuated the feeling of experienced commanders
that a radical reform was essential. An intelligent system was
demanded, reaching from top to bottom of the army, separating its
discipline, its assignments to duty, its promotions and its removals
from political influences, and making merit alone the basis of
advancement. In the condition of public affairs no such thorough
work was possible. The embarrassments of army commanders had been
very bluntly explained to the War Department in the confidential
dispatches of Mr. Dana from Chattanooga. His judgments may sometimes
have been hasty, but he gives a very vivid picture of the mischiefs
which follow from having incompetent, intemperate, or inefficient
men saddled upon an army. The same dispatches, however, showed also
how unwillingly the commanders resorted to extreme severity with men
toward whom they had feelings of personal kindness. In strong hands
like Grant's or Sherman's the power to get promptly rid of such
incumbrances (which Dana recommended) would be ably used and work
well. As to political considerations, the President on more than one
occasion admitted that he felt obliged, at times, to let these
control his action, instead of reasons based on the efficiency of
the army. [Footnote: For Dana's dispatches on this subject, see
Official Records, vol. xxx. pt. i. p. 220; vol. xxxi. pt. i. pp. 69,
73, 265; pt. ii. pp. 54, 63. In his published "Recollections of the
Civil War" (1898), Mr. Dana has omitted some of his most trenchant
personal criticisms.]

Along with the graver embarrassments which General Grant found in
organizing his armies for a new campaign were smaller ones, which
though sometimes concerned with trivial matters were not on that
account likely to be less annoying. When the general visited us at
Knoxville and Strawberry Plains in the severe weather of early
January, he came practically unattended. He had with him
Lieutenant-Colonel C. B. Comstock of the engineers, who continued in
confidential staff relations to him to the end of the war, well
known then and ever since as an officer of rare ability and
discretion. At Knoxville Grant received a dispatch in cipher which
he could not read because the telegraph operator at his headquarters
at Nashville alone had the key. This gave him great annoyance and
might have had very serious consequences. When therefore he reached
Nashville on his return ride over the mountains, he directed the
operator to reveal the key to Colonel Comstock, who was always with
him. The operator of course reported the fact to the superintendent
of military telegraphs at Washington (Colonel Anson Stager), and on
the report of the latter to the Secretary of War, Mr. Stanton
ordered the operator summarily dismissed from his employment, and
formally reprimanded Colonel Comstock as if the revelation had been
merely on his personal order. Of course Grant, who had never dreamed
that he was treading upon anybody's toes, immediately assumed the
full responsibility. He showed the folly of making details of method
override the public necessity to which they were subservient, and
asked that the operator should be restored to his employment and not
made to suffer for obeying his personal order. He said: "I could see
no reason why I was not as capable of selecting a proper person to
intrust with this secret as Colonel Stager." One would think this
ought to have ended the matter, but it did not, though the operator
was restored to duty. Mr. Stanton had the old cipher thrown away,
issued a new one, and stuck to the plan of trusting it to an
ordinary civilian operator, whilst it was not allowed to be known to
the commanding general or the most responsible staff officer. Grant
made the sensible suggestion that the key be given to military
officers only, and be kept from the civilian operators; but Mr.
Stanton adhered to the farcical notion of carrying on a cipher
correspondence which should be open to the irresponsible
transmitter, but secret as to the responsible commanding general to
whom it was addressed. If it were meant for a system of espionage
upon the general by thus inseparably tying to him a civilian over
whom he had no control, like an agent of a secret police reporting
to a Fouche or a Savary, it would be an intelligible though bungling
contrivance; but as a means of secret communication with a general
it was ridiculous in the extreme. [Footnote: Official Records, vol.
xxxii. pt. ii. pp. 150, 159, 161, 172, 323, 324, 361.]

The telegraph operators were young men who had learned the art
usually in the northern telegraph offices and were hired for
military service like other civilian employees. The operator at
Grant's headquarters at Nashville had a busy place, and could not be
spared to accompany the general whenever he visited a distant post,
even if such inseparable attendance had been agreeable to the
commander. Many of the operators were faithful and intelligent men,
but there were some who were not; and an incident occurred in the
Nashville campaign in the next year which showed what mischiefs were
likely to happen when a telegraph operator was cowardly or
untrustworthy. [Footnote: See "The Battle of Franklin," by the
present writer, pp. 29, 30.]

Returning to the affairs of the Army of the Ohio, at the same time
that General Schofield was ordered to report to Grant for duty,
Major-General George Stoneman was sent from the East with a similar
order. [Footnote: Official Records, vol. xxxii. pt. ii. pp. 166,
182.] It had not then been announced that the Ninth Corps would
return to the East, and apparently assuming that the Army of the
Ohio would include more than one corps of infantry, General Grant
suggested the assignment of Schofield to the department and Stoneman
to the Twenty-third Corps. This was ordered accordingly on the 28th
of January. [Footnote: _Id_., pp. 229, 251.] Stoneman's last service
had been as Hooker's chief of cavalry in the Chancellorsville
campaign, and under Hooker's orders he had been upon a separate
expedition of cavalry during that unfortunate battle. In the general
miscarriage of the campaign, he was, with questionable justice, held
responsible in part for the failure and was displaced. In the
general plan of setting everybody to work again, he was sent to
Grant, though, as time had brought about a more favorable judgment
regarding him, it would have been fair to assign him to duty again
with the Army of the Potomac. I think he expected the command of the
cavalry of the western army, but Grant had selected
Brigadier-General William Sooy Smith for that position, and looking
about for suitable duty for Stoneman, the Twenty-third Corps was
seen to have no permanent commander assigned by the President, and
Stoneman was nominated for it. As events turned out, the appointment
was for a very short period.

My command of the corps with the rank of brigadier was of course
anomalous, and would necessarily be temporary unless the appropriate
rank were restored to me. Had Burnside remained in East Tennessee,
it is probable that his wish would have prevailed; but he was
absent, and I was a comparative stranger, forming new relations to
Grant and his principal subordinates. Foster had also assured me
that he would wish no change in the corps command if he stayed at
the head of the Department, but as his health caused his withdrawal,
the new arrangements were made without consulting him. Under these
circumstances there was nothing for me to do but to accept the
inevitable and take such active work as my seniority in my present
rank would give.

When General Foster learned that he would soon be relieved, he very
cordially offered to do anything in his power to further my wishes
in regard to any choice of duty when I should be superseded in the
corps. I replied that my strong desire was to get the most active
field service, and as it was doubtful whether the corps would not be
kept to garrison East Tennessee, I would like to be transferred to
the Army of the Cumberland, which was certain to make the next
campaign in Georgia. On his suggestion I wrote a letter to General
Grant asking the transfer on the grounds stated. This application
General Foster forwarded with a letter of his own supporting it in
very friendly manner. Nothing came of this, but it was the reason
for the delay which occurred in my assignment to permanent work in
the Army of the Ohio. Some of my friends in the Fourth Corps,
knowing that Sheridan was to leave his division, had suggested my
appointment there, but the surplus of general officers prevented.
Major-General Newton, one of those who came west from the Potomac
army, was assigned to that division. [Footnote: Official Records,
vol. xxxii. pt. i. p.18.]

Generals Schofield and Stoneman reached Knoxville on the 9th of
February, and the changes in command were promptly made. [Footnote:
_Id._, pt. ii. pp. 356, 358, 359, 364, 365.] For a fortnight I was
off duty, awaiting orders. General Foster took his leave of us,
thoroughly respected by all, though his crippled physical condition
had interfered with his personal activity.

My separation from the corps command only affected myself and my two
personal aides-de-camp. I had recommended Major Bascom, my
adjutant-general, and Major Treat, my commissary, for permanent
positions on the corps staff, and these recommendations were kindly
adopted by General Stoneman, so that they ceased to belong to my
military family, though both offered to follow my fortunes. The
other staff appointments were in the nature of details, most of
which were temporarily continued. Pending General Grant's action on
my application, I remained at Knoxville, looking on and making the
acquaintance of the officers newly arrived.

General Stoneman was a tall, thin man, full bearded, with large
eyes. He had an air of habitual sadness, or gravity approaching it,
and was commonly reputed to have an irritable temper, but I saw
nothing of it. I think he would have made an acceptable commander of
the corps if fortune had left him in that position. His place in the
regular army (Major of the Fourth United States Cavalry [Footnote:
He and General Sturgis were the two majors of the same regiment.])
had led to his assignment to a cavalry command at the East, and he
returned to that arm of the service a little later. Grant took a
dislike to Stoneman, partly on account of the manner in which he had
been sent to him from the East. When the suggestion was made that,
if the opposition in the Senate to Schofield's confirmation should
defeat his promotion, Stoneman should succeed to his command, Grant
dryly replied that he did not know General Stoneman's merits.
[Footnote: Official Records, vol. xxxii. pt. ii. p. 394] Even a year
later he showed the same distrust by speaking of him as an officer
who had failed. This was by no means just, but showed the
persistence of Grant's impressions. [Footnote: General Stoneman
retired from the army at the close of the war and made his home in
California, of which State he became governor.]

With General Schofield's arrival began my close association with him
which was to last until the end of the war. In person he was a
solid, rather stout man, of medium height, with a round bald head
and long black beard coming down on his breast. He had a reputation
for scientific tastes, and had, after his graduation at West Point,
been instructor in astronomy there. He was two or three years my
junior in age, and was among the younger general officers. The
obstruction, thus far, to his confirmation in his higher grade so
far resembled my own experience as to be a ground of sympathy
between us. As I was glad of his better luck in his prompt
reappointment, I may also say that his hearty recognition of my own
service and experience inspired me with sincere friendship. I look
back to my service as his subordinate with unmixed satisfaction.




CHAPTER XXXIV

SCHOFIELD IN EAST TENNESSEE--DUTIES AS CHIEF OF STAFF--FINAL
OPERATIONS IN THE VALLEY


Fresh reports of Longstreet's advance--They are unfounded--Grant's
wish to rid the valley of the enemy--Conference with
Foster--Necessity for further recuperation of the army--Continuance
of the quiet policy--Longstreet's view of the situation--His
suggestions to his government--He makes an advance again--Various
demonstrations--Schofield moves against Longstreet--My appointment
as chief of staff in the field--Organization of the active
column--Schofield's purposes--March to Morristown--Going the Grand
Rounds--Cavalry outpost--A sleepy sentinel--Return to New
Market--Once more at Morristown--Ninth Corps sent East--Grant
Lieutenant-General--Sherman commands in the West--Study of plans of
campaign--My assignment to Third Division, Twenty-third
Corps--Importance of staff duties--Colonel Wherry and Major
Campbell--General Wood--Schofield and the politicians--Post at
Bull's Gap--Grapevine telegraph--Families going through the
lines--Local vendetta--The Sanitary Commission--Rendezvous assigned
by Sherman--Preliminary movements--Marching to Georgia--A spring
camp on the Hiwassee--The Atlanta campaign begun.


On assuming command in East Tennessee, Schofield was met by
directions from General Grant, full of fresh urgency that Longstreet
should be driven beyond the Virginia line. The occasion for this was
the receipt of new intelligence that Longstreet was reinforced from
the East, and would make another effort at an aggressive campaign.
[Footnote: Official Records, vol. xxxii. pt. ii. p. 337.] The
recurrence of this stereotyped form of alarm looked very much like
information sent from the Confederates themselves for the purpose of
keeping us on the defensive; but perhaps it is only of a piece with
other evidence which shows the slight value of all information which
is not got by contact with the enemy. The truth was that none of the
reports that Ewell and others had been sent to Longstreet had any
foundation. He was left to his own resources, with only the
authority to call his next neighbor in southwestern Virginia to his
assistance if he were in danger of being overwhelmed. But Grant was
annoyed by these recurrent alarms, and his aggressive nature chafed
at it. "I intend to drive him out or get whipped this month," he
said to Thomas before Schofield's arrival; and on the 11th of
February he wrote to the latter: "I deem it of the utmost importance
to drive Longstreet out immediately, so as to furlough the balance
of our veterans and to prepare for a spring campaign of our own
choosing, instead of permitting the enemy to dictate it for us."
[Footnote: Official Records, vol. xxxii. pt. ii. p. 367.]

Nothing would have pleased Schofield better than to have had
Longstreet come down to Knoxville and fight there, but the cogent
reasons which had made Foster suspend active operations and devote
every energy to getting his men and animals in condition for a
vigorous spring campaign, had lost none of their force. Our animals
had already been sent away to save their lives, and by the help of
the little steamboats built at Kingston and for which General Meigs
had sent engines from the North, we were beginning to receive at
Knoxville some of the clothing for which our men were suffering.

Grant had already ordered Thomas to be prepared to march at once to
reinforce Schofield, [Footnote: _Id._, p. 359.] when he had a
personal interview at Nashville with General Foster, who was on his
way home. Foster so fully explained the impossibility of supplying
troops much further up the valley than Knoxville, and the absolute
need of building up the physical strength of man and beast after the
half starvation since winter set in, that Grant yielded to the
inevitable and directed Schofield to remain on the defensive till
the approach of spring should give a prospect of activity which
should not be destructive to the little army. [Footnote: Official
Records, vol. xxxii. pt. ii. pp. 373-375.] He ordered that the
re-enlisting veterans should have their furloughs as soon as
possible, and that men and animals should have all the rest they
could get, preparatory for early operations in the spring.

After his retreat from Knoxville, Longstreet had kept up an active
correspondence with Mr. Davis, and with Lee, Johnston, and
Beauregard, in reference to further plans of campaign. The ease with
which Thomas could reinforce Schofield was so plain to him that he
saw nothing attractive in another advance on Knoxville. The plan
which seemed to attract him most was to mount his infantry on mules
and make a dash through the mountains into Kentucky by way of Pound
Gap. [Footnote: _Id._, pp. 652-789, 790-792.] To collect ten
thousand mules and send them to him, to make a depot for rations and
forage at Abingdon sufficient to support the column on its journey
through the mountains, to furnish a train to carry it,--all this
seemed evidently chimerical to those to whom he proposed it.
[Footnote: _Id._, p. 760.] The Confederacy had all it could do to
feed its existing armies where they were, and was living from hand
to mouth.

The thing which the Confederate government seemed most to desire was
that Longstreet should effect a junction with Johnston and the two
open an offensive campaign against Thomas. [Footnote: _Id._ pp. 806,
808, 810.] The evil consequences of Bragg's blunder in detaching
Longstreet before the battle of Missionary Ridge became more evident
every day; but how were the commands to be reunited? A long and
perilous flank march must be made by both armies, with an almost
certainty that Grant would concentrate first and fall upon them in
succession.

Longstreet was restless and anxious to do something pending this
discussion, [Footnote: Official Records, vol. xxxii. pt. ii. p.
699.] and resolved to try an advance from Morristown upon Knoxville.
He began his movement just as Grant had concluded to allow
Schofield's army to remain quiet till spring. On the 19th of
February he reached New Market, seven or eight miles above
Strawberry Plains and twenty-five from Knoxville. The information he
got gave him the idea that our troops were "demoralized," and that
it was a favorable opportunity for an effort to capture Schofield's
army. [Footnote: _Id.,_ p. 735.] He was quite wrong as to the
_morale_ of our troops, though we were depleted by furloughs and
were nearly immovable for lack of train animals. He urged Johnston
to move toward Knoxville to co-operate with him, [Footnote: _Id.,_
p. 744.] but Polk was now in trouble by reason of Sherman's march
from Vicksburg upon Meridian and Johnston was ordered to assist
Polk. [Footnote: _Id.,_ p. 763.] Then Grant, to balk both efforts,
ordered Thomas to make a demonstration against Johnston, which was
effective in preventing co-operation in either direction. [Footnote:
_Id.,_ p. 480.]

Schofield was at first disposed to regard the enemy's advance as an
effort to find forage and to strip the country more bare than it
already was, if that were possible. On the 18th, however, Longstreet
advanced again, and threatened to cross the Holston at Strawberry
Plains, scouring the country in the angle between that river and the
French Broad. The rumors which reached Schofield were [Footnote:
_Id.,_ p. 415.] that his real purpose was to cross the French Broad,
move along the foot of Chilhowee Mountains and make his way to
Johnston. It is very probable that this was his real purpose. On the
19th he was ordered to send at any rate Martin's cavalry to rejoin
Johnston, [Footnote: _Id.,_ p. 772.] and to make the junction
complete would so evidently please the Confederate government that
it may be assumed Longstreet would do it if he saw the way open.
Schofield therefore prepared to concentrate and move in either
direction, but took no active step for a few days. On the 23d the
information was sufficient to make it clear that Longstreet was not
moving in force toward Georgia, but was retiring toward Morristown,
[Footnote: Official Records, vol. xxxii. pt. ii. pp. 449, 455.] and
Schofield immediately issued orders of march to his troops to
follow. The fact was that Longstreet was so much disturbed by the
withdrawal of Martin's cavalry [Footnote: Martin's cavalry at this
time was what remained of Wheeler's corps which had accompanied
Longstreet from Bragg's army the previous autumn.] that he declared
this forced him to leave East Tennessee and place his forces at
Bristol on the Virginia border. On getting a second dispatch from
Mr. Davis, he modified his reasons, saying that Schofield had been
reinforced from Chattanooga. [Footnote: _Id._, pp. 788-790.] This
was incorrect, for the Fourth Corps was the only part of the Army of
the Cumberland which joined the Army of the Ohio at any time during
the winter, and only Wood's division of it participated in
Schofield's present movement. He also wrote as if he had been near
enough to Knoxville to discover for himself that the fortifications
were greatly strengthened;[Footnote: _Id._, p. 810.] but as he had
not approached nearer than seventeen miles, he could hardly have
gained much information on this subject. No doubt rumors of work on
the defences of the city had spread through the country during the
winter, but there could hardly have been any discovery at this time.
The use of it to smooth the appearance of an abortive effort was
only a passage in military apologetics.

I had been awaiting orders in Knoxville a fortnight when the advance
against Longstreet began, and as no definite answer had come to my
application for transfer, General Schofield invited me to act as his
chief of staff in the field during active operations or until my
assignment to permanent duty should be settled. I gladly accepted
the general's proposal and joined headquarters at once. [Footnote:
See Official Records vol. xxxii. pt. ii. p. 495.] Our little army
consisted nominally of parts of three corps, but the column in the
field consisted of one division of the Twenty-third Corps, under the
immediate command of General Stoneman, one of the Fourth Corps under
Brigadier-General Thomas J. Wood, and the skeleton of the Ninth
Corps under General Parke. [Footnote: _Id_. p. 455.] We had also
Colonel Garrard's division of cavalry. Another division of the
Twenty-third Corps under Brigadier-General Milo S. Hascall was left
as the garrison of Knoxville, with the heavy artillery organization
under Brigadier-General Davis Tillson and a small detachment of
cavalry. Hascall was particularly directed to scout far out to the
eastward, watching for any attempt of the enemy to pass along the
mountain base, as well as against any effort to capture the city by
a _coup de main_.

Our marching column numbered 13,873 officers and men, distributed
thus: Wood's division, 5477; Parke's detachments of two divisions of
the Ninth Corps, 3031; Stoneman with the second division of the
Twenty-third Corps, 3363; Garrard's cavalry, 2002. [Footnote: _Id_.
pp. 502, 504.] Longstreet's forces were 20,787, of which 5034 were
cavalry. Schofield's purpose was essentially that of a
reconnoissance in force to learn definitely the composition and
apparent plans of the enemy, though willing to accept a defensive
battle if a favorable opportunity should occur. If Longstreet were
finally leaving East Tennessee, Grant's intention was to send all
troops of the Fourth Corps back to Thomas, so as to concentrate the
Army of the Cumberland in preparation for the spring campaign in
Georgia. [Footnote: _Id_., pp. 456, 490.]

On the 24th of February we were at Strawberry Plains. The long
trestle bridge of the railway had been destroyed when our forces had
concentrated at Knoxville a month before, and our first task was to
complete a wagon bridge across the Holston so that we could move
onward toward New Market and Morristown with a possibility of
keeping up a supply of food. We did not wait for the bridge to be
completed, however, and orders were issued on the 26th to begin
crossing, [Footnote: Official Records, vol. xxxii. pt. ii. p. 474.]
using flatboats for the men, whilst the artillery and wagons used a
ford that was then passable. Grant did not expect Schofield to march
his infantry farther than Strawberry Plains, but to push the
reconnoissance beyond that point with cavalry. [Footnote: Id., p.
495.] Schofield, however, felt that to do his work thoroughly, his
horsemen should be strongly and closely supported. On the 29th our
headquarters were at New Market and the column on its way to
Morristown. We overtook it in the afternoon and occupied the town
that evening. As so often happens in war, our movement had hardly
begun when the fine weather ended, and we marched from Strawberry
Plains in pouring rain, over wretched roads which rapidly became
worse. This delayed the troops and only part were at Morristown when
darkness fell. These were disposed so as to cover the town in front
with pickets well out, and a detachment of cavalry a mile or two
farther forward. Most of the horsemen were on our flanks, covering
roads by which our position could be turned.

All the information we could get pointed to an abandonment of East
Tennessee by the enemy, but it was hard for us to believe that the
sudden retreat of Longstreet, after his announced intention to
attack Knoxville, was not under orders which indicated a plan we
ought to fathom. We had heard of his first purpose at many places on
our road, for it is almost impossible to keep the people of the
country from learning the destination of a moving column, and now
the inhabitants who remained at Morristown were aware that
Longstreet's men regarded Bristol as their destination. There were,
however, rumors and some evidence that Longstreet had stopped his
retreat and was about to turn upon us. This called for a careful
disposal of our troops and preparation for supporting them promptly
with those that were still on the road. As nothing came of it, there
would be no reason for mentioning it, except that it was the
occasion for an amusing bit of personal experience of my own.

Some of the more pronounced Secessionists had left the town with
Longstreet, through fear that the loyalists might take vengeance on
them for some of the wrongs they had suffered. We occupied as
headquarters a house thus vacated, but it was absolutely empty and
gave us only a roof over our heads. We had a few camp stools and a
camp desk or two, and slept on the bare floor wrapped in our
blankets, with our saddles for pillows. Late in the evening some
loyal men brought in such reports of the enemy advancing to attack
us at daybreak, that as a measure of prudence determined to go the
"grand rounds" an hour or two before day, and especially to visit
the cavalry outpost at the front and send forward a reconnoissance
from it to make sure of full warning if there was any need of it.
When I was roused by the sergeant of the headquarters guard and my
horse was brought to the door, it was not a night for a pleasure
excursion. A cold winter rain was pouring down, and the blackness of
darkness was intense. I took only a single orderly with me, buttoned
my cape close over my great-coat, pulled down the rim of my felt hat
and started off, trusting to my horse to keep the road till my eyes
should get a little used to the darkness. As both armies had
encamped around the town, the fences were of course all gone and the
wagons had cut so many tracks to right and left that it seemed all
road, or rather all mire and no road. Whilst we were among the camps
the smouldering camp-fires were of some help, but when we got beyond
these we could only splash along cautiously, steering for the
smaller fires which marked the picket reserves. Beyond the line of
sentries there was nothing to guide us, and keeping our direction as
well as we could, we plodded on until a faint glimmer showed the
camp of the cavalry outpost. It was in an open wood, and the dying
camp-fires gave only light enough to show the tall trunks of the
forest trees, black against a background of dull red. Part of
Longstreet's army had been in cantonments here during the winter,
and many of the huts were still standing, their dim outlines and
irregular forms hardly visible, but giving an air of weird mystery
to the surroundings. Some of these huts were occupied by the
cavalry, and the first we came upon had as its tenant an Irish
dragoon, and him we turned out to guide us to the captain's
quarters. The occasionally flashing light only seemed to make the
darkness visible, and the Irishman told us to follow him closely,
"and look out," says he, "for there's pits every little way where
thim ribils dug foundations for their chimbleys." He started on and
I followed, keeping my horse's nose close to his shoulder. Suddenly
he disappeared, and as I jerked my horse back on his haunches, Paddy
sung out: "Och! I've found one, sorr!" and sure enough he had gone
in, head and heels, in one of the "pits." He scrambled out and
cautiously led my horse around the hole, but we had hardly gone a
rod further before Pat went out again, like a candle, with "Be
jabers, I've found another." But he took his mud baths
good-humoredly, and led us without further accident to the captain.
From him I got the reports from the vedettes at the front, and after
ordering a reconnoissance to be pushed well forward, turned back to
inspect the infantry line of sentinels. These were generally found
on the alert and well instructed, but as we went across ditches and
miry fields we came suddenly upon one asleep in a fence corner where
he had tried to make some shelter from the storm. When the horses
halted beside him, he sprang up bewildered, and stood bolt upright,
trying to look at us, evidently uncertain whether we were rebels,
but too confused to utter a single word. I ordered him to call the
corporal of the guard, and asked him if that was the way he guarded
the camp. He began to stammer out denials of being asleep with a
foreign accent and in broken English, which made his stupidity seem
more stupid. I reported him to the officer of the guard, but finding
he was a raw recruit, I refrained from ordering him before a general
court-martial, and directed a lighter summary punishment that his
regimental officers could impose.

After examining the more important part of the line, we splashed
back to quarters as day was breaking, got a fire built in our
cheerless room, hung my coat, which was heavy with water, before it
to dry, and crossing my mud-cased legs, sat down for half an hour of
rest and revery, listening for carbine shots at the front that would
tell if the scouting party had found an enemy. The rest of the staff
were still sleeping, oblivious of war's alarms and preparing for the
work of the day by trusting the watching to those on duty, as they
would be trusted in turn when similarly on guard. How often were
such incidents repeated, night and day, through campaign after
campaign, till they became so familiar that it seems almost puerile
to mention them!

On beginning the movement to Morristown, orders had been given to
press the rebuilding of the railroad bridge at Strawberry Plains,
for our continuance so far from our supplies depended upon it. We
had no trains of wagons to keep up our communication with our base,
and the utmost we could do was to carry four or five days' supply
with us. We therefore spent three or four days in vigorous efforts
to gain information of the enemy by means of our cavalry. We learned
that Longstreet held the line of Bays Mountain, where the railway
passes through Bull's Gap, thirteen miles above Morristown. His
right flank seemed to be at Rogersville on the Holston, and his left
rested near the Nolachucky beyond Greeneville. We could not learn
that any of his forces except Martin's cavalry had left him, though
we were mystified by the disappearance of Ransom's division from the
accounts of the enemy's organization. The fact was that that officer
was transferred to the cavalry command, and the organization of his
division was merged in the others.

On the 2d of March Grant directed that McCook's division of cavalry
should go back to Thomas as soon as they could possibly be spared,
and on Schofield's reporting the results of our reconnoissances, he
advised the latter not to bring on an engagement, but to content
ourselves with holding as much of the country as we could.
[Footnote: Official Records, vol. xxxii. pt. iii. p. 14.] The bill
creating the grade of lieutenant-general was now the law, and Grant
had been promoted to it. On the invitation of the President he was
about to go to Washington for consultation, keeping in telegraphic
communication with his department commanders. [Footnote: _Id_., p.
17.] Consequently it agreed well with his views to let affairs
remain quiet during his absence. The rains continued, however, and
even if he had desired further advance it would have been out of the
question till the bridge at Strawberry Plains was rebuilt. The
rations brought with us were exhausted, and on the 4th we withdrew
the infantry fourteen miles, to a position four miles above New
Market, where we hoped to be able to feed the troops with our few
wagons, until the railroad should again be available.

Headquarters in the field were established at New Market, and I
remained there with authority to direct and support the cavalry
movements actively kept up in our front. General Schofield was thus
enabled to spend part of his time at Knoxville attending to the
clothing and supply of the troops, the gathering of reinforcements,
return of veterans, and all the matters of department administration
which centred there. In case of the necessity of combined action in
Grant's absence, Thomas was authorized to assume command.

The Holston bridge at Strawberry Plains was completed on March 11th,
and our forces were at once put in motion for Morristown, where we
once more encamped on the 12th. Nothing new had been learned of the
enemy; but there was nothing to learn, for Longstreet quietly
occupied the line of Bays Mountain, and, like ourselves, was busy
getting his troops clothed and shod, while he discussed with the
Richmond authorities various plans of campaign. The cavalry ordered
back to Johnston was making its way along the base of the mountains,
and occasional news of their advance was exaggerated into stories of
all Longstreet's army being in motion. Schofield very wisely thought
the best way to know what his enemy was doing was to be as near him
as practicable without assaulting his strong positions with an
inferior force, and therefore ordered the fresh advance as soon as
the railway could be made to transport supplies.

On the 14th Grant was again at Nashville, and took immediate steps
to send the Ninth Corps to Burnside at Annapolis, [Footnote:
Official Records, vol. xxxii. pt. iii. p. 67.] in accordance with an
arrangement which was settled at the Washington conferences.
Schofield was directed to have no delay in getting the Ninth Corps
off, and he issued his formal orders to that effect on the 16th.
[Footnote: _Id_., p. 82.] This reduced the forces in East Tennessee
to a very small number, but a bold front was preserved and active
reconnoitering kept up. On the 18th Stoneman's infantry was placed
at Mossy Creek, between New Market and Morristown, and Wood with two
brigades of his division was ordered to Rutledge about half-way to
Cumberland Gap. The other brigade was placed at Strawberry Plains to
protect the stores accumulated there. The cavalry which remained to
Schofield was divided, part reporting to Stoneman and part to Wood,
and the country was carefully watched from the Nolachucky on the
east to Cumberland Gap on the northwest. [Footnote: Official
Records, vol. xxxii. pt. iii. pp. 88, 89.] I was personally directed
to keep headquarters in the field, with power to act, in emergencies
and in matters of detail, in Schofield's name, while the general
returned to the department headquarters at Knoxville, where he made
to Sherman, as his now superior, a full report of the situation,
with suggestions as to the future work of the army of the Ohio.
[Footnote: _Id_., p. 96.] It was now settled that a new campaign,
both East and West, should open in April, if possible, and
everything else was to be made subservient to preparation for it.
Steps were taken to bring back the furloughed veterans, to remount
the cavalry in Kentucky and bring it forward, and to secure such
additional infantry as should enable Schofield to take the field
with three strong divisions of foot, and at least two of horse,
besides leaving about ten thousand men in Kentucky and five thousand
in East Tennessee.

The question what should be the work of the Army of the Ohio had
naturally interested us who belonged to it, and while Grant was in
Washington I prepared and submitted to General Schofield a sketch of
a plan of campaign. It was based on the assumption that the Army of
the Potomac would not operate by its left along the lowlands of
Virginia, as McClellan had done, but would follow the railway
through Culpepper and Orange Court House to Richmond. This route was
in a high and healthy country, the streams would be crossed where
they were comparatively insignificant, and the natural obstacles to
an advance seemed much less formidable than upon the coast line.
True, the army would have to depend upon the railway for its
supplies, but so must Sherman in the West, and the Virginia line was
only a fraction of his in length. It had the advantage of covering
the Shenandoah valley as it advanced, and saving the large
detachment which had to be devoted to that region and to the
protection of Washington. But besides this (and this was the feature
directly affecting us in East Tennessee), it opened for the Army of
the Ohio a rôle of usefulness which seemed to me very important.

If Schofield were to take the field in Georgia, he could carry to
Sherman, at most, some twelve or fourteen thousand infantry and six
or eight of cavalry. The proper protection of Kentucky and East
Tennessee required just about the same number of troops. His active
column in the decisive campaign would therefore be only half of the
forces in his department. Whenever it should be apparent that
Georgia was our field of operations, Longstreet's twenty thousand
men would be set free to join Lee in Virginia (as actually
happened), or could be used in any other theatre of operations,
whilst our garrisons could not be greatly reduced because small
raids of mounted men could harry the wide expanse of country behind
us unless all the important points were fully guarded. This also was
demonstrated by our actual experience, and was a plain deduction
from facts and principles. To drive Longstreet into Virginia and
destroy the railroad so that he could not return was, therefore, to
force the enemy to do the thing most advantageous to himself; that
is, to concentrate his forces at the East in entire security that he
would not be troubled by any advance on our part into southwestern
Virginia.

If, on the other hand, we could move eastward along the railroad, we
could bring our supplies to our camps as we advanced. Sherman's army
behind us would make our base at Chattanooga safe; the great
mountain barrier on the right would so cover our flank that scarce
any force need be left in Tennessee, but all could be put in the
aggressive column: the troops in Kentucky could be brought forward
as we progressed, for our movement would cover that district;
finally, on reaching the New River valley we could be joined by the
forces in West Virginia. The advance, therefore, instead of being
with a dwindling column would be with a growing one, and when the
Army of the Potomac should approach the valley of the James, we
should be ready with about forty thousand to come into line as the
right wing of that army. Approaching Richmond from the north and
west, the south side railroad would be at once in our grasp, and
that to Petersburg within easy reach.

The objection to such a plan which would first occur to a critic,
would be that convergent movements from so distant bases are
proverbially uncertain; but this objection is greatly weakened by a
study of the topography of the country. The Holston valley is so
isolated that, approached by the railway line with a good base
behind the column, it is strongly defensible, and if the advance is
so timed as not to pass the New River before the Army of the Potomac
should be swinging in toward Richmond from the northwest, Lee's army
would be too fully occupied to make a detachment strong enough to
oppose us, and the line by which he would operate against us would
be threatened by the army of our friends. There would also be a safe
line of retreat always open for us, in case of check. [Footnote:
Napoleon was a master of strategy who fully appreciated the
objections to exterior lines, but in the campaign of Wagram in 1809
he ordered Marmont to lead a column from Italy to Vienna by a route
having strong resemblances to that which I have sketched. He
regarded the character of the route itself, protected as it was by
mountain ranges, and giving the assurance of a line of retreat, as
making an exception to ordinary cases and overcoming the objections
which would have been conclusive against attempting it in an open
country.] Another interesting feature in this plan is that if
railway communication between Sherman and the Potomac Army had been
opened in the summer of 1864, it would have been an interior line of
immense importance, not improbably modifying essentially the final
campaign of the war.

General Schofield thought well enough of my sketch to adopt it as a
suggestion to General Grant, which he submitted as soon as the
latter returned from the East. The General-in-Chief had, however,
already made arrangements which committed him to operating by the
left of the Potomac Army. He had sent General W. F. Smith to
Fortress Monroe for the purpose of taking the field at the head of
the movable part of Butler's Army of the James, and Burnside's
command at Annapolis was at that time expected to make another line
of operations from the seacoast in North Carolina. There was also a
disposition to leave in Sherman's hands all the departments which
constituted the Military Division of the Mississippi, and allow him
to concentrate the movable forces of all in his operations against
Johnston. Grant therefore adhered to his original purpose of
destroying enough of the railroad near the Watauga River to make a
serious obstruction to hostile movements against East Tennessee from
the east, and turn everything that could be spared into the advance
upon Atlanta. Another thing which had weight with him was the fact
that Schofield's confirmation as major-general was still delayed and
opposed in the Senate, and he intended, if it were finally defeated,
to consolidate the Department of the Ohio with that of the
Cumberland under General Thomas. [Footnote: Official Records, vol.
xxxii. pt. iii. p. 11.]

On the 29th of March General Sherman visited Schofield at Knoxville,
and a full understanding was reached regarding the place the Army of
the Ohio was to take in the great campaign of the spring. All the
troops in the department were to constitute the Twenty-third Corps,
and Schofield was to command the moving column in the field as well
as the department. To avoid the inconvenience of having a double
head to this column, Stoneman was to be transferred to the command
of the cavalry in place of Sturgis, and Schofield was to be assigned
to the formal command of the corps. [Footnote: Official Records,
vol. xxxii. pt. iii. pp. 221, 268, 312.] Sturgis was then to be sent
to Memphis to take command of the column there organizing for the
purpose of operating against Forrest.

As to operations in the upper valley of the Holston, it was
determined to occupy Bull's Gap at an early day, and to keep up such
an apparent purpose of advancing as should detain Longstreet in East
Tennessee as long as possible. If he retreated he was to be
followed, so as to induce him to burn the railway bridges, and thus
to avoid disclosing our own purpose of leaving that portion of the
valley which we should plainly proclaim if we ourselves should
destroy the railway. Everything was to be ready for movement, and at
the last moment, if the enemy had not already done it, we were to
burn railway bridges and tear up the track for a considerable
distance. Then the divisions which were to take the field in Georgia
were to march rapidly to Cleveland, and come in on the left of
Sherman's grand army as he advanced from Chattanooga.

As the plan of campaign thus took definite shape, it gave the
occasion also for a settlement of my personal problem of permanent
assignment to duty. It had become evident that there was no room for
transfer to another command, and the active part marked out for the
Twenty-third Corps removed the only ground for wishing it. No better
soldiers could be found than those which made up our divisions, and
my acquaintance with General Schofield had ripened into a confidence
which made me entirely content to follow him as my commander. He
warmly invited me to continue permanently in the position of chief
of staff, but gave me the alternate choice of one of the divisions
of the active column. My preference for responsible command in the
field decided me to take a division, and by his further permission I
chose the third, in which were a considerable number of officers who
had served with me in other campaigns. [Footnote: Official Records,
vol. xxxii. pt. iii. p. 245.] I would not be understood, however, to
depreciate the position of chief of staff of such a department and
army. Properly filled, few positions in active service could be
pleasanter or more useful. I had tested this during the six weeks
preceding, and had found the associations and the duty every way
most agreeable. The general was always prompt to assume his proper
responsibility and to order the movements or the administrative acts
which are peculiarly the province of the commander; but he gave me
the task of arranging the subordinate details, and the authority to
direct them in his name. To distribute the parts each corps or
division was to perform; to co-ordinate all the arrangements so that
they should move harmoniously; to bring to a common centre all the
information, external and internal, which affected the conduct and
efficiency of the whole; to supervise the matters of organization,
of equipment, and of supply; to consult with the medical director as
to hospital work and the sanitary condition of the army, and to be
guarantor that the common end is vigorously and intelligently
pursued by every part of the army,--all this, as scarcely needs
telling, makes a chief of staff the right arm of the commander, and
his most trusted adviser and confidant. He makes his commander feel
free to give his own thought to the larger problems of a campaign,
with confidence that the whole machinery of the army will work
smoothly toward the object which he has in view. I did not then, nor
do I now, underestimate the importance of the duty which an
industrious staff officer may thus perform, and I had found it made
personally pleasant by the even temper and appreciative justice of
General Schofield's rule. I had, however, formed so strong a
predilection for the immediate and active conduct of troops in the
field, that this determined me to choose the division command. In
the new organization of the corps I should, in this, report directly
to the general, and should be next in rank to him (in the infantry)
by virtue of seniority, so that in his absence, or when two
divisions were temporarily detached from the army, I should exercise
a superior command. These were advantages which every experienced
soldier estimates highly, and I was to enjoy them, until good
fortune and the steady friendship of my superiors gave me, a second
time, and this time in permanent form, the corps command with the
rank belonging to it. There was no mistake, therefore, in my choice
of duty; and considering the part Sherman's whole army was to play
in the remaining campaigns of the war, it was a matter of personal
good fortune also that the Army of the Ohio became an integral part
of the great western organization, and marched southward, not
eastward.

On the staff I had been thrown into intimate relations to Colonel
William M. Wherry, senior aide-de-camp, and Major J. A. Campbell,
adjutant-general. These officers continued to the end of the war in
these positions, which they filled with great credit and usefulness.
Major Campbell was admirably fitted for the supervision of the
records and the correspondence of the army, and for reducing to the
form of clear and succinct orders the directions of the general. He
was accurate, systematic, and untiring; always at his post, whether
it were at his desk in camp, or by the side of his chief in the
field. Of slight, almost frail body, with an intellectual face, he
looked unequal to rough field work, but showed a stamina in fact
which many a more robust man envied. Colonel Wherry was the
incessantly active personal representative of the general, intrusted
with his oral orders, and making for him those examinations and
investigations which are only satisfactory when the commander has
learned to trust the eye and the cool judgment of his assistant as
his own. Wherry had been with General Schofield from the first
campaign in Missouri in 1861, and both were with Lyon when he fell
at Wilson's Creek. He remained his confidential aide through the
whole war, and for years afterward, being early appointed from
Missouri to the line of one of the new regiments of the regular
army. Lithe, graceful, and genial, he was always welcome, when he
came to a point where fighting was going on, to learn for the
general the actual situation or to bring his orders. [Footnote:
Wherry is now (1899) Brigadier-General of the United States Army,
retired, after brilliant service in the campaign of Santiago, Cuba.]

During the winter the division of the Fourth Corps commanded by
Brigadier-General Thomas J. Wood had been in closest connection with
us. It had taken part in all the marchings and countermarchings of
the period when I was chief of staff, and I had thus begun an
acquaintance with its commander which was to grow into lasting
friendship. General Wood was colonel of the Second Regular Cavalry,
a Kentuckian who had earnestly taken the National side, and an
influential officer of the old army. His intelligence and activity
were very marked, and his courage was of the cool indomitable
character most highly prized in divisions of a great army. Of medium
height, solid but not large build, dark hair and complexion, high
forehead, he was a noticeable man in any assemblage of officers. A
fluent talker, attentive to polite forms of speech as well as of
conduct, he was liked and respected throughout the army, and
especially in the Army of the Cumberland, where he had served
throughout the war. He had won promotion by gallant and meritorious
services again and again, when at the battle of Chickamauga it was
his ill fortune to receive the famous order to "close up on Brannan
and support him." The situation made the order ambiguous, but Wood
understood it to mean that he should move to the left till he should
find himself in rear of Brannan's division, since another division
was between them in the line. He thought it a strange order, but
thought also that Rosecrans must know why he sent it, and that it
was "his not to reason why" but to obey. The obedience opened the
gap through which Longstreet's men poured, breaking the line and
routing part of the right wing. Wood took the place assigned him by
Thomas in the horse-shoe curve around the Snodgrass hill, and did
his full share of the desperate fighting which held that part of the
field. But he had thus become the subject of a controversy, and the
friends of Rosecrans charged him with a too literal obedience, and a
failure to use a sound discretion in his action. The result was that
whilst Rosecrans was removed from active field service, Wood still
found himself under a cloud, and opposed by influences which stood
in the way of his promotion till the war was almost ended. He
continued to be distinguished in every engagement of the Atlanta
campaign and that of Nashville, and no division saw harder or more
honorable service than his.

The first week in April saw the changes in the organization of the
Twenty-third Corps which I have indicated. On the 3d I was relieved
of staff duty and assigned to the third division, with orders to
proceed at once to Bull's Gap and take temporary command of the
corps whilst General Stoneman should hasten to Kentucky to prepare
the cavalry corps for active service. [Footnote: Official Records,
vol. xxxii. pt. iii. pp. 245, 259, 268.] I think the change was
agreeable to Stoneman, for he was most at home with mounted troops
and liked that service. Schofield's permanent assignment to the
Twenty-third Corps was made on April 4th by the President, though
the general had still to await for some time the action of the
Senate on the confirmation of his promotion. [Footnote: Official
Records, vol. xxxii. pt. iii. p. 258.] His enemies were still
persistent, and even succeeded in obtaining a report of the Senate
committee against his confirmation. General Sherman wrote to his
brother, the senator, in behalf of his subordinate;[Footnote: _Id_.,
pp. 332, 343.] but it was not till General Grant was back in
Washington and used his powerful personal influence that the
confirmation was finally secured after the campaign had opened. It
seemed at one time that not even the manifest mischief of deranging
the organization of the army, as deliberately settled by both Grant
and Sherman, would overcome the political hostility arrayed against
him. This was without any reasonable foundation. Although Schofield
was not given to political discussion, my closeness to him enabled
me to know that he was an earnestly loyal man whose heart was warmly
engaged in the National cause. He believed in emancipation as a
right and politic war measure, and in fighting the rebellion
vigorously till it should be conquered. He had made enemies among
the Kansas politicians because he tried to prevent the war on that
frontier from degenerating into a vendetta when murder and robbery
should take the place of civilized warfare. Some influential
radicals in Missouri were hostile because he held the scales even
between them and the conservative Union men.

At Bull's Gap I found the corps headquarters in a shingle-palace
which had been built for a hotel at the railway station, and which
was now the only house there. It was empty as a barn and fast going
to ruin, but it gave shelter for our office work. Wood's division of
the Fourth Corps was put in march to join the Army of the
Cumberland, and we were left to watch the enemy and await the moment
when the destruction of the railway and our own march southward
should begin. We soon had a curious bit of evidence that Longstreet
had finally abandoned the expectation of re-occupying East
Tennessee. It was found in the applications made by women to join
their husbands who were in the Confederate service. The "grapevine
telegraph" was an "institution" during the whole war. News which was
either interesting or important was passed on through the lines, and
it was impossible to be so rigid in precautions as greatly to delay
it. To stop it was utterly futile. Longstreet had hardly received
the orders from his government to prepare to rejoin Lee's army in
Virginia, when the headquarters of our army at Knoxville felt the
pressure of applications for leave to pass the lines. On the 6th of
April a party of forty women and children came up by railway, to be
sent through the lines under a flag. They were of course without
tents or any means of camping out, and the crazy building in which I
had my quarters was that night as crowded and as picturesque as an
Asiatic caravanserai. The rain and the almost impassable roads made
their journey anything but one of pleasure, but by the aid of the
few wagons at the post they went forward in a day or two. A second
party, about as large, followed in the course of a week, and had
even a rougher time than the first. There were delays on the part of
their friends, in sending trains and escort to meet them at the
break in the railway, but the hope of rejoining loved ones gave them
courage, and they bore cheerfully their sufferings and privations.

The bitterness of the feud between the loyalists and disunionists in
the Holston valley can hardly be imagined by those who did not
witness it. The persecutions of the loyal mountaineers had been such
that when their turn of ruling came they would have been more than
human if they had not retaliated. The organization of home-guards
gave to these armed bodies of men the power, and with it came the
temptation to abuse it. The memory of the men who had been hanged
for bridge-burning, and of those who had languished and died in
prison charged with no crime but disloyalty to the Confederacy, was
a constant stimulus to severity. Their blood seemed to cry from the
ground. We found a constant necessity for moderating their passions,
and it was not always possible to keep them within the bounds of
civilized warfare. My experience in West Virginia was repeated with
some phases of still greater intensity. When we got these loyal men
away from home, campaigning on distant fields, there was no trouble
in enforcing discipline, and they showed no more fierceness of
personal retaliation than other troops. I suspect this will
everywhere be true, in greater or less measure, and that in all wars
it will be found for the interest of humanity not to allow local
troops to garrison their own homes.

The scouts and irregular organizations were, as usual, the most
likely to fall into excesses. I had an example of this, falling
under my own eye at the time I am speaking of, and showing how,
under this intense exasperation, the "bush-whacking" degenerated
into guerilla war in which no quarter was given on either side. I
had sent out a reconnoissance of a party of Indiana cavalry
accompanied by some thirty of the Tennessee scouts, the whole force
about a hundred in number. They had encountered a hostile party of
"irregulars" some thirty strong, and had routed them. They brought
in fifteen prisoners, and reported ten of the enemy killed. Those
who were captured had all surrendered to the Indiana men, and the
Tennesseeans were disposed to complain that quarter had been given.
True, the party which had been attacked was said to have committed
great outrages, and to have been engaged in forcing loyal men into
the Confederate Army under their conscription laws. The chief of the
scouts came to my quarters, and I put to him the ordinary question
as to the luck of his last expedition. "Oh," said he, in a dejected
nasal tone; "some pretty good luck and some bad luck." "What bad
luck?" said I, thinking some of his men had got hurt. "Oh, them
Indiana cavalry fellows let the captain of the gang and fourteen of
his men surrender to 'em." "And what became of the rest?" "_We_ had
to deal with them," said he, significantly; "and they didn't
surrender." Such is civil war when it becomes a deadly feud between
old neighbors and acquaintances.

The month of April ran on with continued activity of reconnoitring
parties, but no larger movements. The spring was unusually backward.
There was a flurry of snow on the 16th, but it did not lie on the
ground, and about the 20th lovely spring weather began in earnest.
The best evidence we had that our lines of communication were
getting in more efficient condition, was the arrival of an agent of
the Sanitary Commission with a large shipment of fresh vegetables
for gratuitous distribution. We were sorely in need of them. There
was a good deal of incipient scurvy in camp, and scarce any one was
wholly free from disorders caused by too restricted diet. Our
regular rations were bacon and flour, varied occasionally by a small
issue of dried white beans or rice. This was nutritious enough, but
after some months' steady use, nature pretty imperatively demanded a
change. The noble organization of the Commission had been watching
for the opportunity, and the arrival of a generous supply of
potatoes, onions, and pickled cabbage made feast days for everybody
from the general down. At my headquarters we had been confined to
the soldiers' rations, and it was impossible to get anything else.
The only ferment to raise our bread was saleratus, and we had become
very tired of saleratus biscuit. No luxuries ever tasted so well as
these plain vegetables. Our physical condition craved them, and they
were food and medicine at once. The sauerkraut was finely shaved
cabbage laid down in brine, and a steaming platter of it made the
_pièce de résistance_ of our camp dinner as long as it lasted. The
onions we sliced and ate raw with a dressing of vinegar. The gusto
with which we enjoyed this change of diet remains a vivid
remembrance after a quarter of a century, and is the best proof of
our need of it. The health of the whole camp was restored, and we
were "hard as nails" during the year of rough campaigning that was
to follow.

The first week in May was the time of rendezvous for Sherman's grand
army in northern Georgia, and with the opening of the last week in
April the signal was given to destroy the railroad between Bull's
Gap and the Watauga River, or further if the enemy should leave the
crossing of that stream unharmed. Our position at the gap was high
in the cleft of Bays Mountain through which the railway passes and
then turns southeastward to the Nolachucky. The road then goes up
the valley of that stream and over a ridge to the Watauga, which
runs to the northwest, joining the Holston again by a route which is
nearly at right angles to the general trend of the valley. The
Watauga is not easily fordable at an ordinary stage of water, and
thus the triangle between the Holston on the left, the Watauga in
front, and the Nolachucky on the right, made the debatable ground of
the upper valley. Whilst we held the barrier at Bull's Gap the enemy
could not stay on the hither side of the Watauga, nor could we pass
the river and stop short of a strong position an equal distance
beyond.

We made a strong demonstration of cavalry supported by infantry, as
if we were determined to cross the Watauga and push on into
Virginia. The Confederate cavalry set fire to the bridge, as we
expected them to do. One brigade was ordered to Jonesboro, to march
back destroying all the railway bridges and tearing up and twisting
the iron rails as far as possible. [Footnote: Official Records, vol.
xxxii. pt. iii. pp. 477, 492.] With another force I began in person
a similar work of destruction on the section nearest Bull's Gap.
Time could only be given us for this work till the 27th of April,
but on the evening of that day my division was reunited at the gap,
having torn up and twisted about one third of the track over a space
of fifty miles, and thoroughly destroyed all the wooden bridges.
[Footnote: _Id_., pp. 500, 512.]

The footsore and sick were put on a railway train, and with the rest
I began the march for Knoxville. As General Sherman was urgent for
speed in our movement, the columns were kept near the railway and
the trains were run to meet them, taking the men in detachments. The
first day of May found us at Charleston, the crossing of the
Hiwassee River, with two divisions of the Twenty-third corps and
with General Schofield in our midst. A new division from Indiana was
on its way, by rail, to join us at Cleveland, and it was certain
that we could be in our place as left wing, before the 5th, the day
assigned by Sherman. Two days were given to getting up and
organizing our trains, and on Tuesday, the 3d, we marched at
daybreak, with our field organization complete. The Atlanta campaign
was begun. General Schofield went over to Chattanooga to meet
Sherman, and the command of the corps on the march was committed to
me. [Footnote: _Id_., xxxviii. pt. iv. pp. 5, 22, 32, 48.] On the
4th, leaving Cleveland, we crossed the Georgia line and advanced to
Red Clay, where, with the Army of the Cumberland on our right, the
union of Sherman's forces in the field was completed.

At the Hiwassee we were a hundred and forty miles from Bull's Gap,
and had made the distance in three days, marching half the way and
being carried the other half by rail. In going south we seemed to
meet the advancing spring. In the upper valley we could only see a
suspicion of green, here and there, on an early tree, but at our
Sunday camp at Charleston in a fine bend of the Hiwassee, a fresh
green robe covered all the hills, and the sun was so bright and warm
that the shade of my clean new tent was very comfortable. It would
be hard to find a scene better making a romance of campaigning than
that about us. Chilhowee and the great Smoky Mountains piled their
deep blue masses against the eastern horizon, whilst at our feet
rolled as beautiful a river as ever bore a musical Indian name. The
grassy banks rise about a hundred feet above the water, and then the
hills roll and rise around us in charming variety. Near the water's
edge a great spring pours out from the bank in a swift steady stream
two yards wide and six inches deep, giving sweet and pure water
enough for a whole army, and the zigzag paths to it are filled with
picturesque groups of soldiers loaded with camp kettles or canteens.
We should have been dull indeed if we had not felt the exhilaration
of the scene.




CHAPTER XXXV

GRANT, HALLECK AND SHERMAN--JOHNSTON AND MR. DAVIS


Grant's desire for activity in the winter--Scattering to
live--Subordinate movements--The Meridian expedition--Use of the
Mississippi--Sherman's estimate of it--Concentration to be made in
the spring--Grant joins the Potomac Army--Motives in doing so--Meade
as an army commander--Halleck on concentration--North Carolina
expedition given up--Burnside to join Grant--Old relations of
Sherman and Halleck--Present cordial friendship--Frank
correspondence--The supply question--Railway administration--Bridge
defences--Reduction of baggage--Tents--Sherman on spies and
deserters--Changes in Confederate army--Bragg
relieved--Hardee--Beauregard--Johnston--Davis's suggestion of
plans--Correspondence with Johnston--Polk's
mediation--Characteristics--Bragg's letters--Lee writes
Longstreet--Johnston's dilatory discussion--No results--Longstreet
joins Lee--Grant and Sherman have the initiative--Prices in the
Confederacy.


The threshold of the new campaign is a fit place to pick up the
threads of the relations of Sherman to his superiors and his
subordinates, and to notice the manner in which he laid out the
responsible work before him.

Grant had no thought of suspending operations in winter, further
than circumstances should make it imperative. As soon as the siege
of Knoxville was raised, he applied himself earnestly to the
question, What next? His first choice would have been to start from
Chattanooga as a base, and make the Confederate Army his object. The
insuperable obstacle to this was the impossibility, at the time, of
supplying the forces already collected on the upper Tennessee.
[Footnote: Official Records, vol. xxxi. pt. iii. p. 503.] The
railroad to Nashville must be practically rebuilt and made much more
efficient than it was, or both Thomas's and Foster's armies would be
tied fast without the possibility of advancing. To make it possible
to feed Sherman's auxiliary force, he sent it down the river to
Bellefonte, some thirty miles below Bridgeport, opened steamboat
communication with it, and set it at work repairing the railway from
Nashville to Decatur and from Decatur to Stevenson. This would
furnish an additional line to Chattanooga when completed, and would
make an accumulation of stores there a possibility. He saw the risks
involved in this scattering of forces, but he had no choice; they
must scatter to live. He did not mean that the army should be
inactive, however; as early as the 7th of December, 1863, he wrote
quite fully to Halleck suggesting a movement from the lower
Mississippi on Mobile, using for this purpose the forces that would
be relieved from guarding the lines about Chattanooga. [Footnote:
Official Records, vol. xxxi. pt. iii. p. 349.]

By the middle of the month he had begun to organize a cavalry force
under Gen. W. Sooy Smith, to move against Forrest in West Tennessee,
and was giving shape to other plans of activity. [Footnote: _Id._,
pp. 429, 431, 473.] Sherman had taken a short leave of absence to
visit his family upon the death of one of his sons, a bright lad,
whose loss was a severe bereavement. On his return to duty, he was
directed to go down the Mississippi, visit the important posts of
his department, and take steps to suppress guerilla interference
with the navigation of the Mississippi. Before leaving his command,
he had suggested an active movement of part of his army in northern
Alabama, to break up the railroad in the neighborhood of Corinth,
whilst he himself led a force up the Yazoo River to attack Granada
from the south, with a similar purpose. He thought he could do this
and get back in time to take part in the "plan of grand campaign"
which Grant was studying. In the same letter he said he deemed Sooy
Smith "too mistrustful of himself for a leader against Forrest," and
suggested Brigadier-General Joseph A. Mower, of whose energy and
courage he had a high opinion. [Footnote: Official Records, vol.
xxxi. pt. iii. p. 445.]

On the subject of the necessity of protecting the river navigation
by every means, Sherman expressed himself in superlatives, as he was
apt to do, but his meaning was plain and sensible. He said to Logan,
to secure its safety "I would slay millions. On that point I am not
only insane, but mad," and will convince the natives that "though to
stand behind a big cotton-wood and shoot at a passing boat is good
sport and safe, it may still reach and kill their friends and
families hundreds of miles off." [Footnote: _Id._ vol. xxx. pt. iii.
p. 459.] Out of this discussion came finally his suggestion of an
extensive movement from Vicksburg upon Meridian for the purpose of
destroying the railway lines, especially in the vicinity of the
latter place, and of isolating the region bordering on the
Mississippi, so that a small force could garrison it and protect
commerce. The suggestion was adopted by Grant. With Sherman's column
the cavalry under Sooy Smith was to co-operate. [Footnote: _Id._,
pp. 473, 527.]

Meridian was made the objective point of this movement, though Grant
intimated to Halleck that if Sherman found it would not too greatly
prolong the subordinate campaign, he might march on Mobile.
[Footnote: _Id._, vol. xxxii. pt. ii. p. 100.] When the march began,
Sherman allowed it to be given out that he would attack Mobile, but
this was to deceive the enemy. In his correspondence with General
Banks he limited his task to that which has been stated, though he
asked Banks to help him keep up the notion that Mobile was aimed at,
as it would deter the enemy from heavily reinforcing General Polk by
the garrison there and by troops sent from Atlanta. "I must return
to the army in the field in Alabama in February," said he, "but
propose to avail myself of the short time allowed me here in the
department, to strike a blow at Meridian and Demopolis." [Footnote:
Official Records, vol. xxxii. pt. ii. p. 114.] In this view the
movement was a success, notwithstanding the failure of the cavalry
column to co-operate. [Footnote: _Id._, p. 498.] The biographer of
General Polk disputes the importance and the permanence of the
interruption of railway communication in Mississippi; [Footnote:
Leonidas Polk, Bishop and General, vol. ii. p. 309.] but it is
certain that no important hostile movement from that region was made
again till Hood's campaign against Thomas a year later, and that was
seriously if not fatally delayed by the want of railway
communication between Florence or Tuscumbia and the interior of the
Gulf States.

On his first visit to Washington after he became lieutenant-general,
Grant found that it was the general expectation of members of
Congress that he should infuse his personal energy into the next
campaign of the army in Virginia. He learned also that the
President, the Cabinet, and General Halleck despaired of the
accomplishment of this by any stringency of orders from a distance,
and thought it could be done only when he should be near enough to
solve questions as they arose by his personal presence and
influence. As a subordinate, few men could do better service than
General Meade; but he seemed to develop a caution amounting almost
to inaction in the presence of the Confederate Army under General
Lee. This had allowed the Richmond government to send Longstreet's
corps to reinforce Bragg at the west; and it was because the grand
opportunity was not improved by Meade that it became necessary to
send Hooker a thousand miles with the Eleventh and Twelfth Corps to
reinforce Rosecrans. Halleck expressed the sentiment of the
administration and of the country when he wrote to Grant on December
13th, "As General Meade's operations have failed to produce any
results, Lee may send by rail reinforcements to Longstreet without
our knowing it. This contingency must also be considered."
[Footnote: Official Records, vol. xxxi. pt. iii. p. 396.] It was, in
fact, what Longstreet strenuously urged his government to do. As
late as February 17th, when it was certain that Grant would soon be
in command of all the National armies, Halleck, in a long letter of
which the burden was that Lee's army must be made the objective in
the Eastern campaign, plainly intimated that Meade could not give
the Army of the Potomac the necessary aggressive energy. "Meade
retreated before Lee with a very much larger force," he said, "and
he does not now deem himself strong enough to attack Lee's present
army." [Footnote: _Id_., vol. xxxii. pt. ii. pt. ii. p. 411] After
mentioning the opportunities to break or defeat the enemy which had
been lost or not improved at Antietam and Chancellorsville, he adds
that of Meade after Gettysburg, and continues: "I am also of opinion
that General Meade could have succeeded recently at Mine Run had he
persevered in his attack." [Footnote: _Id_., p. 412.] Pointing out
that McClellan had operated by exterior lines, and Burnside, Hooker,
and Meade by interior ones, and that all had alike failed, he argues
that this does not prove anything against either line of operation,
whether by the James River or by Culpepper; but the sound military
principle still is to avoid scattering the eastern army by North
Carolina expeditions and the like, which were then mooted, and to
concentrate the forces in the east against Lee's army and fight it
out to a finish. [Footnote: _Id_. p. 413.] The letter is an able
one, but the reference to it is now made for the sole purpose of
showing how the problem was placed before General Grant when the
supreme responsibility was cast upon him. He accepted the view so
ably presented. He did not allow the proposed expedition to be made
by Burnside, though he had himself favored it before; but united his
troops to the army on the Rapidan. [Footnote: Official Records, vol.
xxxii. pt. ii. p. 143.] He kept up for a time a nominal duality of
organization, not putting Burnside under Meade or Meade under
Burnside. This made an ostensible reason for the next step, which
was to take the field there in person and try what effect his own
inflexible will might have in giving an aggressive impetus to that
army. It seemed to him to be a choice between that and a continued
dead-lock to the end of the chapter. Thus it was that Grant gave up
his own desire to continue at the head of the western armies which
he had led to successive and glorious victories. Thus it was that
Sherman was right in saying to him, "Like yourself, you take the
biggest load." [Footnote: _Id_., pt. iii. p. 313.] The decision was
not prompted by egotism. There was no vanity in Grant's composition.
He simply saw, as he thought, that in that way decisive progress
might be made, and so he quietly went that way.

Sherman's relations to Halleck had always been close and most
friendly. Outside of official communications they had kept up a
personal correspondence, part of which is found in the Official
Records. From the day when it became apparent that Grant was to
become lieutenant-general, Sherman yielded to his impulse to comfort
and reassure his older friend on what must necessarily involve
disappointment if not humiliation. In a long letter from the
Mississippi in January, he takes pleasure in telling how he had
spoken in public of Halleck's good qualities and talents. "I spoke
of your indomitable industry and called to mind how, when Ord,
Loeser, Spotts, and I were shut up in our stateroom, trying to keep
warm with lighted candles and playing cards on the old Lexington,
off Cape Horn, you were lashed to your berth studying, boning harder
than you ever did at West Point." [Footnote: _Id_., pt. ii. p. 261.]
This was on their voyage out to California during the Mexican War.
In a cordial answer (February 16th), Halleck said he expected Grant
to receive the promotion, and should most cordially welcome him to
the chief command, glad himself to be relieved from so thankless and
disagreeable a position. [Footnote: Official Records, vol. xxxii.
pt. ii. p. 408.] He enlarged upon its difficulties, though he did
not see, apparently, that it had been in his power to take the field
as Grant afterward did, and that it was by his own act that he had
become "simply a military adviser of the Secretary of War and the
President." He bore witness to the fact that there was more harmony
in the western army than in the eastern, saying, "There is less
jealousy and backbiting and a greater disposition to assist each
other." [Footnote: _Ibid_.] In reply Sherman assured Halleck of his
own belief that Grant would prefer to command the "army of the
centre" which was to advance from Chattanooga, and did not want the
position of general-in-chief at Washington. [Footnote: _Id_., p.
498.]

At the beginning of April Sherman wrote again to Halleck, expressing
his belief that he could make his army a unit in action and feeling.
"We have never had," he said, "and God grant we never may have the
dissensions which have so marred the usefulness of our fellows whom
a common cause and common interests alone ought to unite as
brothers." [Footnote: _Id_., pt. iii. p. 222.] It was in this letter
that he asked Halleck to say to the President that he would prefer
not to be nominated to the vacant major-generalship in the regular
army. "I have now all the rank necessary to command, and I believe
all here concede to me the ability, yet accidents may happen, and I
don't care about increasing the distance of my fall. The moment
another appears on the arena better than me, I will cheerfully
subside. Indeed, now, my preference would be to have my Fifteenth
Corps, which was as large a family as I feel willing to provide for;
yet I know Grant has a mammoth load to carry. He wants here some one
who will fulfil his plans, whole and entire and at the time
appointed, and he believes I will do it. I hope he is not mistaken.
I know my weak points, and thank you from the bottom of my heart for
past favors and advice, and will in the future heed all you may
offer, with the deepest confidence in your ability and sincerity."

A single reference more will complete this sketch of the relations
of those prominent men. The week before the opening of his campaign
(April 24th) Sherman wrote again: "I see a mischievous paragraph
that you are dissatisfied and will resign; of course I don't believe
it. If I did, I would enter my protest. You possess a knowledge of
law and of the principles of war far beyond that of any other
officer in our service. You remember that I regretted your going to
Washington for your own sake, but now that you are there you should
not leave." [Footnote: Official Records, vol. xxxii. pt. iii. p.
469.] This hearty friendship and cordial comradeship lasted unbroken
till Halleck's too famous advice to Mr. Stanton after Lincoln was
assassinated, to direct Sherman's subordinates in the Gulf States
and in the West not to obey the orders he might issue in pursuance
of his convention with the Confederate General Johnston. That was a
sore blow which shattered this lifelong friendship, though it now
seems probable that had Halleck's dispatch to Stanton not been
published without the rest of the correspondence, Sherman might have
found possible a more innocent meaning for his words than they
seemed to have when they were read by themselves. This, however, is
not the place to discuss that subject. [Footnote: See Chap. L.,
_post_.]

In considering Sherman's means of supplying his army in the field,
we must note the situation and connections of Nashville, which made
it naturally the principal depot for operations in Alabama and
Georgia. A hundred and eighty-six miles by rail south of the Ohio
River, centrally situated as the capital of Tennessee, it was
directly connected with Chattanooga by a hundred and fifty miles of
railroad, and indirectly by way of Decatur, Alabama, and Stevenson,
a line thirty-five miles longer. These railway connections would of
themselves make Nashville an important post, but it had also the
advantage of water communication with the Ohio. It lies at the
southern bend of the Cumberland River, the course of which is nearly
due north from the city to its mouth, and the stream is navigable
for steamboats the greater part of the year. The Tennessee, a much
larger river, is nearly parallel to the Cumberland in this part of
its course, and a partially constructed railroad from its banks at
Johnsonville to Nashville, seventy-odd miles, was completed during
the winter. With these three lines of communication, there was very
little danger that the great Nashville depot could run short of
munitions or rations, or be seriously isolated by raids of the
enemy. It was to communication between Chattanooga and Nashville
that Sherman had to give his best thought and will. The War
Department had sent out Colonel McCallum, the General Superintendent
of Military Railways in January, and improvements had then been
begun, which under Sherman's energetic command made a brilliant
success of this part of the military administration through the
whole campaign. [Footnote: See "Sherman" (Great Commanders Series),
pp. 199 _et seq_. Also letter of McCallum to Stanton, Official
Records, vol. xxxii. pt. ii. pp. 143-145: Order appointing Adna
Anderson general superintendent of transportation and W. W. Wright
chief engineer of construction, _Id_., p. 365: Sherman's order
organizing the military use of the railways, _Id_., pt. iii. p.
279.] The management of the railways in use was given to Adna
Anderson, and the engineering and bridge-construction to W. W.
Wright. These gentlemen were both civil engineers and experts in
railroad building and management. Military rank was given them later
in order to enable them to control officers and men of the army on
proper occasions. Their skill and energy were of inestimable value
to the army, and gave them brilliant reputations which they fully
earned. They remained in their military railway duties to the end of
the war, and were distinguished in the same profession in civil life
to the end of their lives. When Sherman assumed command of the
Division of the Mississippi, about eighty carloads a day was the
limit of the capacity of the road and the delivery at Chattanooga.
It was only half of what was needed to insure rapid progress of the
campaign. By the 1st of May it had increased to a hundred and thirty
cars a day, with exceptional days on which the delivery ran higher;
but a steady average of a hundred and fifty (the needed quantity)
had not been reached, and every day's advance into Georgia would
increase the length of the line. [Footnote: Official Records, vol.
xxxii. pt. iii. pp. 466, 490.]

In a characteristic letter to General Thomas, Sherman explained the
necessity of having the railway management directed from his own
headquarters instead of those of the Army of the Cumberland, and in
one to Mr. Lincoln he tersely repelled the idea that he was unduly
hard on the inhabitants of the country and their business.
[Footnote: _Id_., p. 489; and vol. xxxviii. pt. iv. pp. 25, 33.]
General Meigs, the quartermaster-general, who knew the country by
personal inspection, fully agreed with Sherman and wrote him on
April 20th, advising him to "resist the pressure of civilians and
private donations and supplies; march your troops, and devote the
cars solely to transportation of military necessities.... Many
civilians," he added, "can give charitable, patriotic, benevolent,
and religious reasons to be allowed to go to the front; the reasons
are so good that nothing but an absolute and unchangeable
prohibition of all such travel will do any good." [Footnote: _Id_.,
vol. xxxii. pt. iii. p. 434.]

The business management of the military railways was a matter of
greatest importance, but it must be supplemented by an adequate
system of defence. To cut the long line and interrupt the
communications of the army would, of course, be the constant effort
of the enemy. Every wooden bridge across a stream was a most
vulnerable point. A burnt bridge meant a delay of trains till it
could be rebuilt, and Sherman's estimate that he must receive at the
front a hundred and fifty car-loads daily, shows how soon trouble
would be caused if the steady roll of car-wheels should cease. For
the freight cars of that day, ten tons made a load, and with the
light locomotives and iron rails then in use, twenty or thirty cars
made a full train. A system of blockhouses for the protection of the
bridges had been gradually developed by the engineers of the Army of
the Cumberland on suggestions made by General Halleck and others,
and was under the charge of Colonel W. E. Merrill, who enlarged and
improved it. This able officer was retained at the head of the
defensive system, and his success in it was noteworthy. [Footnote:
Colonel Merrill has given a valuable memoir on the construction and
use of the blockhouses, in "Ohio Loyal Legion Papers," vol. iii. p.
389. After the war, he was for many years United States Engineer in
charge of Ohio River improvements.]

With a careful system of railway work went also thorough study of
the wagon trains necessary in the field to carry the baggage of the
army, its ammunition, and a few days' rations, its hospital
supplies, and the records and papers of all the business
departments. Besides the supplies for men, the food for the teams,
for the cavalry horses, and for the horses of mounted officers makes
in the aggregate a bulk and weight astonishing to those who for the
first time undertake the calculation. Great droves of beef cattle
accompanied the march, and were coming forward on all the roads from
the country in the rear where they could be bought and collected.
The purchase, driving, coralling, feeding, and distributing of these
made, of itself, a great business for the commissaries of
subsistence. The introduction of the shelter tent of two
india-rubber blankets got us rid of the regimental trains, which at
the beginning of the war had been the most unwieldy of all our
_impedimenta_. The two soldiers who were thus partners in the little
house they carried on their backs, clubbed all their arrangements
for comfort, and by working together greatly reduced the hardships
of campaigning. Sherman applied the full force of his mind and the
strong impulse of his personal example to discarding everything not
essential to the army work, and to securing the utmost mobility in
his columns. Throughout the campaign his own headquarters looked
small and bare compared with those of many of his subordinates. Some
writers have ridiculed this, as if it were a mere "fad" of the
general; but it was both wise and shrewd to keep before the army the
constant lesson that privation was necessary, and that the orders on
the subject must be obeyed, since the commander set the example of
obedience. It was akin to Bonaparte's marching on foot through the
burning sands of Syria after his repulse from St. Jean d'Acre. It
was speaking to the soldiers in the ranks a language which they
understood, and which helped them in their arduous work more than
proclamations.

A marked trait of Sherman's military intellect was his accurate
judgment of the force of his enemy, and his freedom from the common
fault of overestimating the army opposed to him. In his
correspondence with General Thomas in April, discussing the
preparations for the campaign and the severe reduction of burdens to
a scale which was "rather the limit of our aim than what we can
really accomplish," he had occasion to acknowledge the receipt of
information concerning the enemy which Thomas had collected. "I read
the reports of your scouts with interest," he said, but added, "I
usually prefer to make my estimate of the enemy from general
reasoning rather than from the words of spies or deserters."
[Footnote: Official Records, vol. xxxii. pt. iii. p. 323.] The
remark is significant. Prior to the opening of a campaign, whilst
affairs are quiet, pretty reliable information of an enemy's
strength and positions may usually be got; but when the time of
action comes, the very air is full of excitement, and the "secret
service" is apt to be a machine for self-delusion. Precedent
knowledge supplemented by actual contact with the enemy is the best
reliance for a capable general. His own reasoning from trustworthy
data at the earlier point of departure, is, with such aids, his best
guide. He knows where his enemy must be and what his force ought to
be, better than his spies, or the enemy's deserters who, by a common
stratagem, may be really hostile spies stuffed with the disturbing
information they are sent to reveal.

In the Confederate Army changes had also been occurring under the
stress of Bragg's great defeat which culminated in the loss of
Missionary Ridge on the 25th of November. Dissatisfaction with the
conduct of the campaign was prevalent in both military and civil
circles. Lee pointed out the embarrassment which must result to
Longstreet from Bragg's misfortune, especially as the retreat of the
latter had been promptly followed by Grant's occupation of
Cleveland. Communication between Longstreet and Bragg was thus
interrupted, and unless short work was made of Burnside, Longstreet
would have to retreat into Virginia or North Carolina. [Footnote:
_Id_., vol. xxxi. pt. iii. p. 779.] In the letter to President Davis
which contained these suggestions, Lee added a strong hint that
Beauregard was the most available officer of proper rank to succeed
to the command of which Bragg asked to be relieved on the 29th.
[Footnote: _Id_., pt. ii. p. 682.] The unfortunate Bragg coupled
with this request another; namely, that the causes of the defeat
should be investigated. In his official report [Footnote: Official
Records, vol. xxxi. pt. ii. p. 665] he attributed it to a panic
amongst the troops holding the apparently impregnable heights of
Missionary Ridge, and he characterized the conduct as shameful. "The
position was one," he said, "which ought to have been held by a line
of skirmishers against any assaulting column." He declared that our
troops reached the crest so exhausted by climbing as to be
powerless, and that "the slightest effort would have destroyed
them." One who stands on that ridge and looks down into the valley
can easily agree with this opinion, and believe that no commander
would order his troops to attack the position in front. The impulse
of Wood's and Sheridan's divisions to attack, and the feebleness of
the resistance of the astonished Confederates, are both phenomenal,
and in a superstitious age would certainly have been attributed to
supernatural influences.

The truth, however, seems to be that the confidence of the
Confederate Army in its leader had declined so far that it lost hope
when opposed to the prestige of the conqueror of Vicksburg, and was
morally prepared for disaster. Mr. Davis's prompt acceptance of
Bragg's retirement can only be understood in this way, for the
general was with good reason reckoned a favorite with the
Confederate President. Except for this loss of prestige he would
have been answered as Lee was when he made a similar suggestion
after Gettysburg,-that confidence was undiminished, and that neither
the army nor the people wished for a change.

Bragg was directed to turn over the command to Lieutenant-General
William J. Hardee, next in rank, and the evidence indicates that
Hardee could have retained it, had he been willing. But, surpassed
by none in ability and soldierly quality in command of a corps, he
shrunk from the burden of chief responsibility for a campaign, and
declined the permanent appointment. [Footnote: Official Records,
vol. xxxi. pt. iii. p. 764.] Mr. Davis seems to have taken no notice
of Lee's suggestion of Beauregard, but asked whether Lee himself
could not, even temporarily, go to the West and by a vigorous
campaign restore the prestige of the Army of Tennessee. Lee calmly
presented the objections to this, from the point of view of the army
of northern Virginia as well as that of the western army; though he
submitted fully to the decision the President might reach after
further consideration. [Footnote: _Id_., pp. 785, 792.] Mr. Davis
was convinced that it would be unwise to transfer Lee, but he did
not take kindly to the idea of appointing Beauregard. The
estrangement between them which began in the first campaign in
Virginia had not been removed, but had rather been intensified by
the fact that Beauregard had, as he thought, failed in the command
of the army after A. S. Johnston fell at Shiloh, and now seemed to
have a party of friends and supporters in the Confederate Congress
who were looked upon as an organized opposition to his
administration. [Footnote: For some indications of this, see
Beauregard's letters to Pierre Soulé and to W. Porcher Miles,
Official Records, vol. xxxi. pt. iii. pp. 812, 843. Davis's Rise and
Fall of the Southern Confederacy, vol. ii. p. 69.]

Whilst the subject was under consideration, General Polk, who was a
warm friend both of President Davis and of General Johnston, wrote
to Mr. Davis a strong letter urging Johnston's appointment. He
advocated it on the double ground of the wish of the army and of the
country. He did not ignore the fact that the personal friendship
once existing between Davis and Johnston had been broken, but
appealed to the sense of public duty to yield to a general desire,
and to motives of magnanimity to overlook personal differences.
[Footnote: Official Records, vol. xxxi. pt. iii. p. 796.]

Beauregard and Johnston were in fact the only ones, out of the five
officers of the full rank of general, who were available to take
Bragg's place; for the Confederate grades were much less flexible
than ours, where any major-general by assignment of the President
acquired the legal right to command an army, and a superiority over
him who had just laid down the power. [Footnote: Official Records,
vol. xxxi. pt. iii. p. 835.] Mr. Davis felt the embarrassment
keenly, but finally decided to appoint Johnston. On the 16th of
December the latter was ordered to turn over the command of the Army
of the Mississippi to Lieutenant-General Polk, and proceed to Dalton
to assume command of the Army of Tennessee. [Footnote: General W. W.
Mackall, who had been chief of staff to Johnston and Bragg in turn,
wrote to Johnston on December 9th: "I never did believe that Mr. D.
would give you your place as long as he can help it; but he can't."
The letter has other piquant passages. _Id_., p. 801.]

The result of conferences with Lee, and correspondence with
Longstreet and others, had been the conviction on the part of the
Confederate President that the only promising military policy in the
West was for the Army of Tennessee to take early aggressive action,
turning Chattanooga by the east, getting between Thomas and
Schofield by the occupation of Cleveland, and, if both the National
commanders kept within their fortifications, move boldly over the
Cumberland Mountains by way of the gaps near Kingston. As part of
this plan Longstreet should advance close to Knoxville, and join
Johnston either by turning Knoxville on the east before Johnston
passed far beyond Cleveland, or by the west if Johnston had got to
Kingston.

This indication of the wishes of the Richmond Government was
gradually developed. The earliest suggestions were of the necessity
for a prompt renewal of the aggressive. Mr. Seddon, Secretary of
War, in the letter informing Johnston of his transfer (December
18th), had said it was hoped that he would assume the offensive as
soon as the condition of the army would allow it. [Footnote:
Official Records, vol. xxxi. pt. iii. p. 843.] A few days later
(December 23d) Mr. Davis himself wrote, quoting General Bragg as to
the good effect a prompt resumption of the initiative would have on
the _morale_ of the army, and General Hardee as to the fit condition
of the troops for action. [Footnote: _Id_., p. 856.] To this he
added that an "imperative demand for prompt and vigorous action
arises, not only from the importance of restoring the prestige of
the army, and averting the dispiriting and injurious results that
must attend a season of inactivity, but from the necessity of
reoccupying the country upon the supplies of which the proper
subsistence of our armies materially depends."

Johnston's reply (January 2d) was a presentation of the difficulties
in the way of action. [Footnote: _Id_., vol. xxxii. pt ii. p. 510.]
He said that Bragg and Hardee had made the considerable
reinforcement of the army a precedent condition of resuming the
offensive. His conclusion was that without large reinforcements
there was "no other mode of taking the offensive here than to beat
the enemy when he advances and then move forward." A fortnight later
he said: "My recent telegrams to you have shown, not only that we
cannot hope soon to assume the offensive from this position, but
that we are in danger of being forced back from it by the want of
food and forage, especially the latter." [Footnote: _Id_., p. 559.]
The shortness of forage he attributed to bad management of the
Georgia Railroad, owned by the State. Supposing this were remedied
(as a little later he said it was), he compared the advantages of
two routes of advance into Middle Tennessee,--one by Rome,
Gunterville, and Huntsville, the other by East Tennessee through the
Cumberland Mountains. He pronounced in favor of the former, which
would turn the mountains by the south and save the task of
surmounting them. If, whilst this was going on, the National army
should push for Atlanta, two or three thousand cavalry could, he
thought, prevent it from reaching that place in less than a month.
Large reinforcements were, however, essential for any aggressive
movement. He was willing to try the East Tennessee route and unite
with Longstreet, if he were satisfied that the country could furnish
the provisions and forage for the march. To both of these routes, he
preferred one which should make a base still farther west, in
northern Mississippi.

At the beginning of February he reviewed the situation as he then
believed it to be, and concluded that it was impracticable to assume
the offensive from northern Georgia. He advised the collection of as
large an army as possible in northern Mississippi, with a bridge
equipage for the passage of the Tennessee. This army, he thought,
should be larger than his and Folk's united. [Footnote: Official
Records, vol. xxxii. pt. ii. p. 644.]

Sherman's Meridian expedition now interrupted the discussion of
plans for a month, except that Mr. Davis suggested a movement of
Johnston's army to strike Sherman's column in co-operation with
General Polk. [Footnote: _Id_., p. 729.] Assuming that Sherman was
aiming at Mobile, Johnston declared it impossible to strike him
before he should establish a new base. Hardee's corps was, however,
put in motion to reinforce Polk. [Footnote: _Id_., p. 769.]
Beauregard was ordered to send ten thousand men from his department
on the southern seacoast to Johnston, if possible, but he reported
that it was not practicable. [Footnote: _Id_., p. 772.]

It must be said that making the correspondence a personal one on the
part of Mr. Davis, instead of carrying it on through the War
Department, was a waiving of etiquette, and thus it was also a step
toward a cordial and frank understanding. It must equally be noted
that General Johnston's tone remained that of cold formality, and
his letters do not show the hearty readiness to bend his views to
meet those of the President which is always apparent (for instance)
in the letters of General Lee. The situation was not one in which a
general may say, "I need certain supplies, equipment, transportation
or pontoon bridges, and must have them before I can move." The
Confederate cause was unquestionably in great straits, and calling
for men and means was a good deal like Glendower's call, "Will they
come?" Every commanding officer was expected to act with what he had
or could get, were it much or little. Very warm friends of Johnston
saw that his attitude was one likely to increase estrangement.
General Polk, the mutual friend who had probably thrown the casting
influence which gave Johnston the command, wrote to him through a
confidential intimate of both (Colonel Harvie, Johnston's
inspector-general), suggesting that he take private steps toward a
reconciliation with Mr. Davis. He urged the general, as he had urged
the President, that private feeling and personal pride should be
sacrificed to the cause in which both were engaged. [Footnote:
Official Records, vol. xxxii. pt. ii. p. 593.] The appeal seems to
have failed, and cold formality continued to be the tone of
Johnston's communications with the government. About the first of
March Mr. Davis dropped the correspondence, turning it over to
General Bragg, now his chief of staff.

Johnston had written to Bragg (February 27th) that the President's
letters had given him the impression that a forward movement was
intended _in the spring_; but if this were so, much preparation
would be necessary, and large reinforcements and equipment.
[Footnote: _Id_., p. 808.] He assumed that Longstreet was to unite
with him, if the President's plan had not changed. This treatment of
the matter as problematic and intended only as a plan for the
spring, must be admitted to be somewhat exasperating to Mr. Davis,
as the pressure from Richmond since the 18th of December had been
for immediate aggressive action, and had been so emphatically put
that to speak of it as creating only "an impression" sounded very
like a sneer, and was unfortunate if not so intended.

Bragg answered in good temper, and after disposing of the matters of
business, he added: "The enemy is not prepared for us, and if we can
strike him a blow before he recovers, success is almost certain. The
plan which is proposed has long been my favorite, and I trust our
efforts may give you the means to accomplish what I have ardently
desired but never had the ability to undertake. Communicate your
wants to me freely and I will do all I can to give you strength and
efficiency. We must necessarily encounter privations and hardships,
and run some risk; but the end will justify the means." [Footnote:
Official Records, vol. xxxii. pt. iii. p. 592.]

This, of course, implied prompt action whilst Grant's forces
remained scattered and were still suffering from the dearth of
supplies which had so nearly approached starvation and nakedness.
Schofield's forces were at Knoxville, over a hundred miles northeast
of Chattanooga. Part of Sherman's were on the Meridian expedition or
now returning to Vicksburg on the Mississippi. Another part, under
Logan, were about Huntsville, as far to the southwest as Schofield
was to the northeast. In this condition of things a quick blow at
Thomas would find him isolated. He could be turned by the north
before Schofield could join him if he stayed in his fortifications,
and he could be fought on equal terms in the field if he came out of
his lines. This made the southern opportunity. To wait for spring
was to wait for Grant and Sherman to concentrate the now scattered
armies, to have them clothed and fed, and to have the horses and
mules ready for a campaign. It is no wonder the government at
Richmond thought it worth while to "encounter privations and
hardships and to run some risk."

Lee had been in Richmond and was in accord with this plan. He wrote
to Longstreet on the day after the date of Bragg's letter just
quoted, urging him to drop all other schemes and to unite in
influencing Johnston to adopt it. "If you and Johnston could unite
and move into Middle Tennessee," he said, "it would cut the armies
of Chattanooga and Knoxville in two and draw them from those points,
where either portion could be struck at as opportunity offered....
By covering your fronts well with your cavalry, Johnston could move
quietly and rapidly through Benton, cross the Hiwassee, and then
push forward in the direction of Kingston, while you, taking such a
route as to be safe from a flank attack, would join him at or after
his crossing the Tennessee River. The two commands, upon reaching
Sparta, would be in position to select their future course; would
necessitate the evacuation of Chattanooga and Knoxville, and by
rapidity and skill unite on either army." [Footnote: Official
Records, vol. xxxii. pt. iii. p. 594.]

There were no doubt difficulties in the way--when are there not? But
we who were in Grant's command are glad that we were not called upon
to meet the enemy under this plan of campaign vigorously executed.
We did not lack faith that we could defeat it, but we were much
better pleased to have the enemy await the completion of our own
preparation and allow us to take the initiative. It cannot be denied
that it was based on sound strategy. With his usual considerateness,
Lee said that Johnston and Longstreet on the ground should be better
able to judge the plan and to decide; but he urged it with much more
earnestness than was common in his letters. That Johnston rejected
it must be admitted to be very strong evidence that he lacked
enterprise. His abilities are undoubted, and when once committed to
an offensive campaign, he conducted it with vigor and skill. The
bent of his mind, however, was plainly in favor of the course which
he steadily urged,--to await his adversary's advance, and watch for
errors which would give him a manifest opportunity to ruin him.

Longstreet had written to Johnston on the 5th of March that Mr.
Davis had directed a conference between them on the practicability
of uniting their armies between Knoxville and Chattanooga, with a
view to the movement into Middle Tennessee. Longstreet thinks he can
make his part of the movement, but must leave the question of
supplies to Johnston after they unite. [Footnote: Official Records,
vol. xxxiii. pt. ii. p. 587.] Lieutenant-General John B. Hood, who
had been assigned to a corps in Johnston's army, wrote to Mr. Davis
on the 7th that the army was well clothed, well fed, with abundant
transportation, in high spirits, anxious for battle, and needing
only a few artillery horses. A junction with Longstreet's army he
thought would make it strong enough to take the initiative, and he
strongly supported the plan of moving before Grant could
concentrate. [Footnote: _Id_., p. 606.]

Johnston wrote to Bragg on the 12th that no particular plan of
campaign had been communicated to him. [Footnote: _Id_., p. 613.] He
does not appear to have telegraphed a brief inquiry on this subject,
but wrote at some length in regard to his requirements before he
could be in condition to take the field. He referred to his first
opinion in favor of a defensive campaign as unchanged. The ordinary
course of mail seems to have required about a week for a letter to
reach Richmond. It happened that on the same day Bragg at Richmond
was writing to Johnston outlining the plan of campaign mentioned
above, adding that it was intended to throw a heavy column of
cavalry into West Tennessee as a diversion, and that if by rapid
movement Johnston could capture Nashville, Grant would be in a
precarious position. The President, on assurance of the immediate
execution of the plan, would order to him 5000 men from General
Polk, 10,000 from Beauregard, and Longstreet's command estimated at
16,000, but which was really nearer 20,000. Putting these
reinforcements and Johnston's own army at lowest figures, his column
would amount to 75,000 men. [Footnote: Official Records, vol. xxxii.
pt. iii. p. 614.]

After posting his letter of the 12th, Johnston went on an inspection
tour to Atlanta, and there on the 13th he received and answered
Longstreet's letter of the 5th. He pronounced impracticable the plan
submitted to them, and reiterated his fixed opinion that it was best
to wait for Grant's advance. In any event, he thought a forward
movement should "wait for the grass of May." [Footnote: _Id_., p.
618.] He argued that it was better to let the enemy's forces
advance, and fight them far from their base and near his own. Bragg,
on the other hand, had urged the recovery of the populous region of
Middle Tennessee as necessary both for obtaining army subsistence
and forage, and for the recruitment of the ranks. Both these
resources he estimated very highly, and as Tennessee was still
claimed as a seceding State, the Confederate conscription laws would
be enforced there. On the other hand, every movement in retreat cut
off a part of their area for supplies and men, was discouraging to
the army, and was followed by numerous desertions of soldiers whose
families were within our lines.

In answering Longstreet, Johnston had said that he would execute
zealously any plan the President would order; but he evidently
insisted on definite and formal commands if he were to depart from
his preconceived views to which he held tenaciously. On the 16th of
March he wrote again, this time in answer to Bragg's of the 7th.
After telling of the impossibility of collecting artillery horses in
northern Georgia, he mentions Longstreet's letter to him, to say
that he thinks the point of junction suggested is too near the
enemy, and that his army should have an accumulation of eighteen or
twenty days' supplies before entering upon such a movement. They
must also have ordnance stores for a campaign, and wagon trains to
carry it all. [Footnote: Official Records, vol. xxxii. pt. iii. p.
636.] Two days later he received Bragg's full letter of the 12th
sent by the hand of Colonel Sale as special messenger, and he now
answers by telegraph. He says that Grant is back at Nashville, and
is not likely to stand on the defensive. To meet at Dalton his
expected advance, the reinforcements that had been spoken of must be
sent at once. "Give us those troops," he says; "and if we beat him
we follow. Should he not advance, we will thus be ready for the
offensive. The troops can be fed as easily here as where they now
are." [Footnote: _Id_., p. 649.] Next day he elaborated the same
ideas in a letter, adding the suggestion before made by him that the
line of advance by way of North Alabama was a preferable one to the
route through East Tennessee.

The telegram was answered from Richmond whilst the longer letter was
on its way. The answer conveyed the information that Grant would not
personally lead the western army, but would turn over its command to
Sherman. It also briefly noted the fact that Johnston had not
accepted the aggressive policy on which the large reinforcements
were made conditional. [Footnote: I do not find this dispatch in the
Official Records. It is given in Johnston's "Narrative of Military
Operations," p. 298.] He replied that his dispatch expressly
accepted taking the offensive, and the only difference was as to
details. He therefore repeats the urgent request that the troops be
sent at once. [Footnote: Official Records, vol. xxxii. pt. iii. p.
666.]

It is not easy to accept his interpretation of his former dispatch.
Waiting indefinitely to see whether the National army would advance,
and declaring the administration plan impracticable, hardly looks
like assuming the initiative. It was not a difference as to details.
The very gist of the subject under discussion was a prompt advance
against the parts of our army before they could be united for any
purpose. The question would naturally arise, What might happen in
the places from which troops were drawn, if they were not used by
Johnston immediately? The latter had already said to Longstreet that
his requisitions on the commissaries and quartermaster's departments
for supplies and wagon-trains were so large as to make filling them
"a greater undertaking than anything yet accomplished by those
departments, and if they succeed, it will not be very soon."
[Footnote: Official Records, vol. xxxii. pt. iii. p. 618.] Yet these
were only part of the conditions which he considered essential to
any advance.

There seems to have been no rejoinder to Johnston's last telegram,
and the subject was dropped. Longstreet was persuaded by his
correspondence with Johnston that the combined movement could not be
made, and turned to the scheme (already mentioned), of mounting his
troops and making an expedition from southwestern Virginia into
Kentucky. This was decisively rejected by the Richmond government.
[Footnote: _Id._, p. 748.] Grant was now known to be in Virginia,
inspecting the commands there and preparing for an active campaign.
Concentration on both sides, and not further morselling of armies
was to be the wholesome order of the day, and Longstreet was soon
ordered to report to Lee. Between Bragg and Johnston correspondence
was limited to the current business of the army, and general plans
of campaign were not again mentioned. In April, Johnston became
uneasy at the silence which indicated that the President regarded it
unprofitable to discuss plans with him, and sent Colonel B. S. Ewell
of his staff to Richmond to make explanations in person. He was
politely received, and his visit no doubt tended to relax a little
the strain in the relations between Mr. Davis and Ewell's chief; but
it was too late to accomplish what had been hoped for in January.
[Footnote: Official Records, vol. xxxii. pt. iii. pp. 839, 842.]
Spring had come, and Sherman's concentration was in progress; indeed
it was almost completed. Ewell reported to Johnston again on the
29th of April. On the 1st of May Schofield was at the Hiwassee River
in touch with the left wing of Thomas's army, whilst McPherson was
closing in on the right.

The certainty that Grant was in Virginia had brought the Confederate
government to the conclusion that Lee must be reinforced by
Longstreet and by whatever troops Beauregard could spare. The
Atlantic coast States were thus to supply Lee with men and means.
About four thousand men were to be immediately added to Johnston's
army, mostly drawn from Mobile. Polk's infantry would be sent to him
also, if, as was nearly certain, Sherman's advance on Atlanta should
prove to be our great effort in the West. [Footnote: _Id._, p. 841.]
The doubt whether one of our columns might not move through Alabama
made it necessary to continue to the last moment ready for either
event. The Gulf States would then become the feeders of Johnston's
army in the campaign.

The very unsatisfactory relations between Mr. Davis and General
Johnston cannot be overlooked if we would judge intelligently the
events of the Atlanta campaign. It may be that the general was right
in thinking a winter advance impracticable, though Lee's concurrence
in the President's plan is no small argument in its favor. It is,
nevertheless, the indisputable province of a government to
determine, in view of the whole situation, political and military,
whether continued operations are necessary. The army is organized
for the sole purpose of reaching the ends at which its government
aims in the war. The expenditure of life and treasure should be
stopped and the government should sue for peace, unless its armies
can be relied upon to act in hearty subordination to its view of the
existing exigencies. The general should meet it with absolute
ingenuousness and the promptest and clearest decision. He should act
at once or ask to be relieved in time to let another carry out the
plan. Mr. Davis, like Mr. Lincoln on several occasions, had reason
to feel that a prolonged discussion had in fact thwarted him, and
that he had not the cordial service he might fairly expect.

One of the results of the financial embarrassments of the
Confederacy was the great and growing depreciation of its paper
currency. Its officers in the field found their pay a merely nominal
pittance, and those who had no independent fortune were reduced to
the greatest straits. Interesting evidence of this has been
preserved in petitions forwarded to the War Department in February,
asking that rations might be issued to them as to the private
soldiers. The scale of prices attached to their petition was that at
which the government sold the enumerated articles to its officers,
and was supposed to show the average cost and not a market price
fixed by the retail trade. They paid for bacon $2.20 per pound, for
beef 75 cents, for lard $2.20, for molasses $6 per gallon, for sugar
$1.50 per pound, for a coat $350, for a pair of boots $250, for a
pair of pantaloons $125, for a hat from $80 to $125, for a shirt
$50, for a pair of socks $10. [Footnote: Official Records, vol.
xxxii. pt. ii. p. 658.] Their statements were verified and approved
by their superiors, and General Johnston, in forwarding the
petitions, said that at existing prices the pay of company officers
was worth less than that of the private soldiers. [Footnote: _Id._,
p. 661.]




CHAPTER XXXVI

ATLANTA CAMPAIGN: DALTON AND RESACA


The opposing forces--North Georgia
triangle--Topography--Dalton--Army of the Ohio enters
Georgia--Positions of the other armies--Turning Tunnel Hill--First
meeting with Sherman--Thomas--Sherman's plan as to
Dalton--McPherson's orders and movement--Those of Thomas and
Schofield--Hopes of a decisive engagement--Thomas attacks north end
of Rocky Face--Opdycke on the ridge--Developing Johnston's
lines--Schofield's advance on 9th May--The flanking march through
Snake Creek Gap--Retiring movement of my division--Passing
lines--Johnston's view of the situation--Use of temporary
intrenchments and barricades--Passing the Snake Creek defile--Camp
Creek line--A wheel in line--Rough march of left flank--Battle of
Resaca--Crossing Camp Creek--Storming Confederate line--My division
relieved by Newton's--Incidents--Further advance of left
flank--Progress of right flank--Johnston retreats.


The history of the campaigns of 1864-1865 under Sherman have been
given in another form, and I need not repeat the narrative of the
connected movements of his forces. [Footnote: See "Atlanta," and
"The March to the Sea, Franklin and Nashville."] I shall confine
myself to the more personal view of events as they came under my own
eye, and to such additional knowledge as the publication of the
Records has brought within our reach.

Nashville and Chattanooga, being large depots of supply, were
fortified and furnished with garrisons. A few other points had also
to be garrisoned in some force, besides the numerous small posts and
blockhouses. But after all deductions, Sherman still expected to
take the field with an army of a hundred thousand men of all arms,
and this was what he did. His returns for the 30th of April show his
strength to have been 93,131 infantry, 12,455 cavalry, and 4537
artillery. [Footnote: Official Records, vol. xxxviii. pt. i. p.
115.] His cavalry were not all at the front, and fell short of the
nominal strength. [Footnote: Memoirs, vol. ii. pp. 23, 24; Official
Records, vol. xxxviii. pt. iv. p. 26.]

General Johnston's similar returns for the end of April show his
army actually present at Dalton to have consisted of 54,500
infantry, cavalry, and artillery, not including part of a brigade at
Resaca and some detachments _en route_. [Footnote: _Id._, vol.
xxxii. pt. iii. p. 866.] General Polk was on his way to join with
14,000 men, [Footnote: _Id._, vol. xxxviii. pt. iv. pp. 670, 737,
740.] and these with about 5000 increase of Hardee's and Hood's
corps reached Johnston before he was seriously engaged with Sherman,
giving him an army of 75,000 men. [Footnote: For a careful analysis
of these forces, see "Century War Book," vol. iv. p. 281, a
statistical paper by Major E. C. Dawes; also "Atlanta," Appendix A.
For the meaning of "effective total" in Confederate returns, see
_ante_, p. 482.] The Richmond government only delayed ordering Polk
to join Johnston until it was certain that Sherman intended to
operate with a single army upon the Atlanta line, and Polk went even
beyond what they seemed to expect of him in carrying the troops of
his department to the army at Dalton.

Although he was not aware of the urgency of the Confederate
government with Johnston to induce him to take the initiative and
operate by turning our left flank, Sherman had considered the
possibility of this. The Fourth Corps had been concentrated at
Cleveland on the East Tennessee and Georgia Railway about a dozen
miles north of the Georgia state line and thirty-five miles from
Dalton. The line of this railway was the easy road out of northern
Georgia into Tennessee, and pretty closely followed the old Federal
road. Had Johnston marched northward, he must have taken this route,
and would have found his way barred by the Fourth Corps, which was
strong enough to retard his advance till Sherman could have
concentrated to meet him. The railways made a nearly equilateral
triangle of the country between Cleveland, Chattanooga, and Dalton.
It was thirty-eight miles from Chattanooga to Dalton, and
twenty-seven to Cleveland. The east side of the triangle was near
the Cooyehuttee Creek, a stream heading quite close to Cleveland and
uniting, below Dalton, with the Connasauga. This valley is narrow
west of the river, and is, much of the way, separated by a high and
sharp ridge from the very broken country, which makes up the greater
part of the triangle, where the branches of the Chickamauga run
northward in parallel valleys till they unite near Chattanooga, and
empty into the Tennessee. For nearly forty miles, therefore, the
waters on the east side of the dividing ridge run southward to the
Gulf of Mexico, whilst on the west side they run northward to the
Ohio.

Going south from Chattanooga, the railroad and the wagon roads have
to thread their way from one valley to another, the latter climbing
painfully the high ridges intervening, the former taking shorter
cuts by deep excavations and tunnels. Within sight of Chattanooga
the north end of Missionary Ridge is pierced for the railway where
Grant's left wing fought in the battle which closed General Bragg's
career as a commander in the field. Some twenty miles further on,
another ridge is tunnelled where the railroad passes from the
Chickamauga valley into that of Mill Creek, a small tributary of the
Cooyehuttee, flowing eastward into that river in front of Dalton.
Here, at Tunnel Hill, had been Johnston's advanced post during the
winter, and Thomas's had been above Ringgold on the top of Taylor's
ridge facing it on the west. But as Tunnel Hill did not extend many
miles northward, and could be turned in that direction, the
Confederates had made Dalton their intrenched camp, and were
prepared to retire from Tunnel Hill whenever Sherman should advance
in force.

[Illustration: Map]

The position at Dalton was an impregnable one to an attack in front
on the Chattanooga road. Mill Creek breaks through the Chattanooga
Mountains (here known by the local name of Rocky Face), by a crooked
gorge flanked by precipitous cliffs called the Buzzards Roost. The
west side of Rocky Face is a nearly perpendicular wall, and in the
Mill Creek gorge, spurs from the sides so project as to enfilade the
entrance like bastions. A little north of the gorge a larger spur
from the ridge runs down to the east, connecting with a subordinate
parallel ridge, and from the lower slope a line of heavy earthworks
continued the defences toward the Cooyehuttee. Mill Creek had been
dammed so as to make an inundation in the gorge, and the
Confederates held the ridge and cliffs on both sides as well as the
fortified line in the lower ground. Some three miles north of Mill
Creek Gap, Rocky Face and Tunnel Hill break down into smaller
disconnected hills, and here about Catoosa Springs a bit of more
open country made a practicable connection between the centre of the
Union Army at Ringgold and its left wing advancing from Cleveland.
Johnston hoped that Sherman would dash himself against the walls of
Rocky Face and suffer severe loss in doing so; and if the ridge was
turned on the north by part of the Union Army, this wing would find
itself in presence of the strong earthworks skirting Mill Creek, and
would be so separated from the centre that he could reasonably hope
to crush it. Sherman, of course, could know little of the
Confederate position till he was near enough to reconnoitre it, and
must find out by experiment how the nut was to be cracked.

On Thursday, the 5th of May, the Army of the Ohio under General
Schofield was at Red Clay, a hamlet just south of the Georgia state
line. My own division (the third) was encamped a mile in advance, at
some springs which furnished a good supply of water. General Judah's
division (the second) was at Red Clay. General Hovey's division (the
first) was still at Blue Springs, Tennessee, covering the army
trains and the repairs of the railway. The cavalry covered the left
flank and reconnoitred forward toward Varnell's Station, skirmishing
with the enemy's horse. The valley was a narrow one, tributary to
the principal valley of the Connasauga, and, near my camp, was
filled with a dense thicket of loblolly pine, a second growth which
came up in the exhausted light soil of abandoned fields, and which
we were to become very familiar with as we advanced into Georgia. As
we could not see out in any direction except that of the road, I
covered my front with a slashing of the trees by way of a rough
abatis to prevent a surprise. We were now the left flank of the
grand army.

When we passed Cleveland, the Fourth Corps took up its line of
march, bearing away to the westward of ours and went into position
at Catoosa Springs, about eight miles southwest of Red Clay, with a
ridge intervening. Here General Howard became the left of the Army
of the Cumberland, having Palmer's Corps (the Fourteenth), next
beyond him facing Tunnel Hill, and Hooker's (the Twentieth) still
farther to the southwest, marching by way of Woods Station over
Taylor's Ridge upon Trickum in the upper valley of the East
Chickamauga. Thomas's army was the heavy centre of the grand army,
and his infantry was about two-thirds of the whole. This great
preponderance of one organization was faulty in a purely military
point of view, but Grant and Sherman both felt that it would not be
wise to disturb the _esprit de corps_ of the Cumberland Army by
subdividing it, or to offend Thomas by diminishing it, and, anyhow,
no such change could have been made without the concurrence of the
President.

General McPherson's Army of the Tennessee was to constitute
Sherman's right, but was a little delayed in its concentration. At
this time it contained only Logan's Corps (the Fifteenth) and the
left wing of the Sixteenth (Brigadier-General G. M. Dodge in
command). It was moving behind the Army of the Cumberland, to Lee
and Gordon's Mills, and thence upon Villanow. [Footnote: Official
Records, vol. xxxviii. pt. iv. p. 39.] General Kenner Garrard's
strong division of cavalry accompanied McPherson's movement.

Sherman was anxious to allow the enemy as little time for
preparation as might be, yet, as he had to give McPherson a day or
two to come into line, he set Saturday the 7th of May as the time
for the more complete concentration, and an attack upon Tunnel Hill
if Johnston should continue to hold it. [Footnote: _Id_., p. 38.]
Accordingly, on Saturday morning all the columns were in motion.
Palmer advanced against the ridge of Tunnel Hill in front, and
Howard coming from the north turned the flank of the ridge. The hill
was held by the Confederate cavalry under Wheeler, supported by
Stewart's division of infantry, who were ordered to resist our
advance with stubbornness enough to force the display of Thomas's
forces. [Footnote: _Id_., p. 672.] A lively skirmishing fight was
kept up till Howard's men advanced toward the flank and rear of the
position, when the enemy retreated within Mill Creek Gap. Wheeler
was ordered to let a brigade of cavalry retire up the valley of Mill
Creek, outside of Rocky Face, and to cover Dug Gap, through which
runs the road from Villanow to Dalton. [Footnote: _Ibid_.]

My division marched from its camp in front of Red Clay over the
ridge by Ellidge's Mill to Dr. Lee's on the main road from Varnell's
Station to Ringgold, and near the northern end of Tunnel Hill ridge.
Here we came into close connection with the Fourth Corps. The rest
of the Army of the Ohio followed, the rear-guard holding a gap
looking eastward above Ellidge's Mill, and the cavalry covering the
front and flank to Varnell's Station. [Footnote: _Id_., pp. 48, 54.]
Our supply station was moved over to Ringgold on the Chattanooga
line, and the railroad at Red Clay was soon abandoned. In the
movement all the division commanders were ordered to report to me in
the absence of General Schofield.

At Dr. Lee's I met Sherman and Thomas for the first time. They had
come over from Ringgold to reconnoitre for themselves and observe
the effect of Howard's movement turning Tunnel Hill. The house stood
upon a knoll looking southward over farm fields and rolling country
to the sharp end of Rocky Face, and when my column halted near by, I
rode forward with General Schofield to meet the army commander. It
was a bright May morning, and a picturesque group was gathered on
the sloping lawn in front of the house. The principal officers were
dismounted, their horses and escort in the background. An occasional
puff of white smoke on the slope of Tunnel Hill in the distance
marked the attack going on there, but it was too far away for the
cannonade to be more than a muffled sound, not interrupting the
conversation. Sherman was tall, lithe, and active, with light brown
hair, close-cropped sandy beard and moustache, and every motion and
expression indicated eagerness and energy. His head was apt to be
bent a little forward as if in earnest outlook or aggressive
advance, and his rapid incisive utterance hit off the topics of
discussion in a sharp and telling way. His opinions usually took a
strong and very pronounced form, full of the feeling that was for
the moment uppermost, not hesitating at even a little humorous
extravagance if it added point to his statement; but in such cases
the keen eye took a merry twinkle accentuated by the crow-foot lines
in the corner, so that the real geniality and kindliness that
underlay the brusque exterior were sufficiently apparent. The
general effect was of a nature of intense, restless activity, both
physical and mental. In conversation he poured out a wealth of
original and striking ideas, from a full experience, observation,
and reading; his assertions would be strong and confident, highly
colored by the glow of momentary feeling, unsoftened by the
modifications and exceptions which have to tame down broad
generalizations before they are put in practice. One did not know
him long before discovering that in responsible action he did not
lack the prudence which took all probable contingencies into
account. His practical work in the field was never reckless, but his
boldest outlines of plan were worked out with thoughtful caution in
detail and full provision for possible disappointment. When
discussing a situation with his familiars, after strongly stating
his own view he would add, "Now what is Joe Johnston's game?" and he
would analyze his adversary's possible moves with a candor and
insight that left no doubt of his full comprehension of the problem
before him. In carrying out a plan he was free from the common
weakness of giving increased weight to doubts when the conflict is
joined, and making a timid execution of a strong purpose; he knew
when it was time for debate to stop (even with his own thoughts),
and to bend every energy to decisive action. All this was, of
course, not visible in the first meeting at Dr. Lee's, but no one
could doubt that here was a most original and interesting character,
and I soon acquired an undoubting conviction that of all the men I
had met, he was the one to whose leadership in war I would commit my
own life and the lives of my men with most complete confidence. In
him the combination of intellectual insight with fertility of
invention and with force of will in execution was of the highest
order. I felt that if the end we aimed at was a noble and worthy
one, the price he asked us to pay was reasonable, and the object was
worth the sacrifices he called for: we were therefore enthusiastic
in our obedience.

General Thomas was in person and manner a strong contrast to
Sherman. Equally tall, he was large and solidly stout, with an air
of dignified quiet and deliberation. His full beard was not of so
stubbly a cut as Sherman's, his countenance was almost impassive,
and the lines of his brow gave an air of sternness. His part in the
conversation was less, his words much fewer and less expressive, but
always clear and intelligent. His manner was kindly, but rather
reserved, and one felt that his acquaintance must be gradually
cultivated. His reputation for cool intrepidity and stubborn
tenacity could not be excelled, and no soldier could approach him
without a deep interest and respect that was not diminished by his
natural modesty of demeanor. Better acquaintance with him made one
learn that his intellect was strong and broad, and his mind had been
expanded by general reading, with some special scientific tastes
beyond his military profession. He was a noble model of patriotic
devotion to country, and of the private virtues that make a great
citizen. His military career had been an important one from the
beginning of the war. Second in rank in the armies of Buell and
Rosecrans in 1862 and 1863, at the great battles of Stone's River
and Chickamauga he had held his wing of the army defiant and
invincible when other parts were swept back by the Confederate
impetuosity. No sobriquet conferred by an admiring soldiery was more
characteristic than the "Rock of Chickamauga." Between him and
Sherman the old affection of schoolmates at the Military Academy was
still warm. Sherman still called him "Tom," the nickname of cadet
days, and Thomas evidently enjoyed, in his quiet way, the vivacious
talk and brilliant ideas of his old friend, now his commander. His
army so much outnumbered the organizations of McPherson and
Schofield that, as a massive centre, it was necessarily the chief
reliance of Sherman for the results of the campaign, and was
personified in its leader's weight and deliberation; while the
lighter organizations of the Tennessee and the Ohio were thrown from
flank to flank in zigzag movements from one strategic position to
another as we penetrated into Georgia.

Grant's plan of having the armies of the East and West begin
simultaneous movements on the first days of May had been responded
to by Sherman with the information that on the first of the month
his three armies were in mutual support, and that he would "draw the
enemy's fire within twenty-four hours of May 5th." [Footnote:
Official Records, vol. xxxviii. pt. iv. p. 1.] The delay in
McPherson's reaching his position, slight as it was, had to be
considered in ordering other movements in view of the promise to
Grant to get into immediate contact with the enemy, and helped in
the decision to let Thomas's army advance strongly in the centre and
engage the enemy if the chance seemed at all favorable, while
McPherson made the flanking movement by way of Snake Creek Gap. On
the 4th Sherman had telegraphed Grant that he would "first secure
the Tunnel Hill, then throw McPherson rapidly on his (the enemy's)
communications, attacking at the same time cautiously and in force."
[Footnote: _Id_., p. 25.]

McPherson's orders went to him on the evening of the 5th, directing
that whilst the movements of Thomas and Schofield already described
were in progress, on Saturday the 7th he should "secure Snake Creek
Gap, and from it make a bold attack on the enemy's flank or his
railroad at any point between Tilton and Resaca." [Footnote: _Id_.,
p. 39.] Sherman expressed the hope that Johnston would fight at
Dalton, but should he fall back along the railroad McPherson was to
hit him in flank. "Do not fail, in that event," he continued, "to
make the most of the opportunity by the most vigorous attack
possible, as it may save us what we have most reason to apprehend, a
slow pursuit, in which he gains strength as we lose it." McPherson
was assured that Thomas and Schofield would prevent Johnston from
turning on him alone, and the sound of battle at the north would
show the greater necessity for rapid movement on the railroad. "If
once broken to an extent that would take them days to repair, you
can withdraw to Snake Creek Gap, and come to us or await the
development according to your judgment or information you may
receive." [Footnote: Official Records, vol. xxxviii. pt. iv. p. 39.]

Sherman's orders to Thomas were to take Tunnel Hill, and threaten
Dalton in front, but not to attack its defences "unless the enemy
assume the offensive against either of our wings, when all must
attack directly in front toward the enemy's main army, and not
without orders detach to the relief of the threatened wing."
[Footnote: _Id_., p. 40.] With similar orders to Schofield, Sherman
added: "As soon as Tunnel Hill is secured to us, I shall pause to
give McPherson time for his long march; but we must occupy the
attention of all the enemy, lest he turn his whole force on
McPherson, which must be prevented. Therefore, on the sound of heavy
battle always close up on Howard and act according to circumstances.
We will not be able to detach to McPherson's assistance, but can
press so closely from this direction that he (Johnston) cannot
detach but a part of his command against him." [Footnote: _Id_., p.
38.]

These lucid orders show that Sherman was not contemplating merely a
flanking movement to make Johnston retreat and yield territory; on
the other hand he strongly expressed the desirability of forcing
conclusions as near his own base as possible, and showed his
apprehension of the disadvantages which must come from stretching
still further his long line of communications. The same desire and
the same apprehension were constant with him throughout the
campaign, and it was with an unwillingness growing at times into
impatience that he found himself compelled to follow Johnston's slow
and skilful retreat. It was not till the change of the Confederate
commanders that aggressive tactics on the part of the enemy gave the
opportunity for severe punishment and led to the speedy destruction
of the hostile army. Herein lies the key of the whole campaign.

The possession of Tunnel Hill enabled Sherman to look into Mill
Creek Gap, the break in Rocky Face, and the first look was enough to
show how desperate would be an attack either upon the precipitous
cliffs or into the fortified gorge. His orders for the 8th of May
were for Thomas to threaten the Buzzard Roost pass and try to get a
small force on Rocky Face ridge. Schofield from Dr. Lee's was to
feel along the same ridge southward toward the gap and the signal
station which the enemy had established above it on Buzzard Roost.
It was to be a skirmishing advance, but no battle, attracting the
enemy's attention whilst McPherson was seizing on Snake Creek Gap in
Johnston's rear. [Footnote: Official Records, vol. xxxviii. pt. iv.
p. 56.]

On our part, Schofield ordered Judah's division to ascend the north
point of Rocky Face and press along the sharp ridge southward. My
own division was to occupy the passes looking toward Varnell's
Station, sending a regiment to support the cavalry there. [Footnote:
_Id_., pp. 55, 66, 85.] General Thomas, seeing no chance of getting
to the top of Rocky Face from the west, had ordered the Fourth Corps
to attempt it from the north, and Howard had sent in Newton's
division to do this before Schofield received his orders for the
day. The latter therefore put Judah's division in support of
Newton's, extending the line along the east base of the ridge, and
called up Hovey's division into close support. With my own division
I advanced southeastwardly to hills in that direction, keeping
abreast of the movement on Rocky Face. [Footnote: _Id_., pp. 82, 83;
pt. ii. p. 675.]

Sherman had conjectured that the hill-tops would be found to be
plateaus on which troops might manoeuvre to some extent, but they
proved to be sharp and steep to the very summits, and composed of
loose rock of every size, but all as angular as if from fresh
cleavage. [Footnote: Official Records, vol. xxxviii. pt. ii. p. 675;
pt. iv. p. 84.] Harker's brigade of Newton's division had the
advance, but even a brigade was too large a body for combined
action, and Colonel Opdycke with his regiment (One Hundred and
Twenty-fifth Ohio) took the lead. He made a demonstration as if to
turn the north point and go up the eastern side; then leaving the
brigade skirmish line to continue to push there, he rapidly moved
again to the west side and climbed swiftly to the ridge. Here was
only room for four men to march abreast, but charging from rock to
rock he succeeded in advancing about a third of a mile southward
along the ridge to a breastwork of stone where the enemy, who had
fought bravely for every "coign of vantage," were finally enabled to
check him. He also threw together a heap of stones to cover and
enable him to hold the ground he had gained. [Footnote: _Id_., pt.
i. p. 367.]

Schofield in person had followed the advance of Judah's division,
and reconnoitred along the ridge parallel to Rocky Face on the east.
It was plain that there was little chance of getting near Buzzard
Roost by following Harker's path along the knife-like summit, and he
was disposed to let Judah try the effect of a night attack upon the
fortified outpost at the enemy's signal station in front of Harker.
[Footnote: _Id_., pt. iv. p. 83.] Sherman realized that he could not
hope to carry the Dalton lines from the west and north, and that
Johnston was too well satisfied with his defensive position to leave
it unless some part of our army was compromised by making a false
move. McPherson, however, was entering Snake Creek Gap with so
little opposition as to show that the importance of that pass was
not understood by Johnston, if indeed he knew of its existence.
Sherman therefore determined to keep up active demonstrations with
watchful observation of the enemy for another day, whilst the
decisive part of McPherson's movement should go on, and was already
planning to transfer Hooker's Corps to McPherson's column as soon as
the latter should hold the outlet of his gap. He wrote to Schofield,
"We must not let Johnston amuse us here by a small force whilst he
turns on McPherson." He sometimes suspected this was being done, and
had been uneasy during the day at the absence of cannonade from
Johnston's lines. [Footnote: Official Records, vol. xxxviii. pt. iv.
pp. 83, 84.] The orders for the 9th were that Thomas should continue
to push along the crest of Rocky Face from the north and make
demonstrations on other parts of his line, whilst Schofield
cautiously swung his left flank out toward the east at right angles
to the principal ridge and made a strong reconnoissance of the
enemy's lines in the immediate front of the town. At midnight
Sherman learned that Hooker had made an effort to carry Rocky Face
at Dug Gap, two or three miles south of Buzzard Roost, and had
failed with considerable loss to Geary's division, which was
engaged.

At daybreak on the 9th, my own camp was astir. The division advanced
beyond the left flank of the position of Hovey's, then swung the
left forward and moved southward astride of the ridge parallel to
Rocky Face on the east. Judah's division connected our movement with
the left flank of the Fourth Corps across the intervening valley.
Hovey's division marched in rear of my left flank as a reserve.
McCook's division of cavalry covered the extreme flank at Varnell's
Station, under orders to demonstrate on the direct road to Dalton as
our infantry advanced. [Footnote: _Id_., pp. 98-100.] The enemy
resisted with strong outposts and skirmish lines posted in several
strong barricades of timber and stones. We drove him from these and
continued the movement till we confronted the main line of
intrenchments. Schofield intended to attack these as soon as
Newton's division of the Fourth Corps (which was our pivot) should
be able to force the position in its immediate front on the crest of
Rocky Face, but Newton was obliged to report that Harker's brigade
had failed in its effort, [Footnote: Official Records, vol. xxxviii.
pt. iv. p. 102.] and Schofield ordered us to stand fast where we
were.

McCook had found a superior force of Confederate cavalry under
Wheeler on the Dalton road; his advanced brigade under Colonel La
Grange had been roughly handled, and that officer was captured.
[Footnote: _Id_., p. 96.] General Stoneman was, however, advancing
from Charleston with the cavalry of the Army of the Ohio, and the
affair was of no great significance, though the Confederates claimed
a considerable victory for their horse. [Footnote: _Id_., p. 683.]

Our movement had been an interesting one. As we went forward on the
ridge, we could see Judah's line keeping pace with us in the valley
and on the lower slopes of Rocky Face, whilst Newton's men continued
the line to the summit, where Harker was having a sharp combat in
which both artillery and small arms were brought into play. Off
beyond our left was a separate rounded height, Potato Hill, on which
the enemy had artillery which annoyed us, and to which our own guns
answered. The space between was filled with skirmishers, horse and
foot, and a rattling fusillade accompanied our march. It was evident
that the lines before us were very formidable and held in force, and
that the reconnoissance had been pushed as far as possible; to go
further would commit us to a desperate attack upon intrenchments.
[Footnote: When Johnston's retreat gave us possession of Dalton, we
found the works of a very strong character, putting that front quite
beyond a _coup-de-main_. I examined them myself later in the
campaign.] But Sherman did not desire to do this. He wished to keep
the enemy employed so that he could not send a great force against
McPherson, and thus to give the latter a chance to make a success of
the movement against Resaca. [Footnote: Official Records, vol.
xxxviii. pt. iv. p. 98.] Toward evening he directed Schofield to
fall back to a strong defensive position again, as from the news he
got from McPherson he was sure Johnston must either attack us or
retreat on the next day, and he wished to be ready for a prompt
transfer of his army to Snake Creek Gap. But Schofield thought a
night movement too uncertain in that broken and tangled country,
especially as he had not been pleased with the handling of Hovey's
division during the day, and obtained permission to bivouac for the
night where we were, sending a couple of infantry regiments to
support McCook's cavalry and cover our flank. [Footnote: _Id_., pp.
99, 119.]

During the night Sherman learned that McPherson had not succeeded in
taking Resaca or breaking the railroad, and had retired to the mouth
of Snake Creek Gap. Johnston was, of course, now aware of the
turning movement, and before morning we had evidence that he was
changing the positions of his army to meet the new situation.
Sherman immediately turned his whole energy to transferring his army
to McPherson's position. Hooker's Corps leading off was followed by
Palmer's, and this by ours. Howard's was ordered to remain in
position covering the Chattanooga railway, and to follow Johnston
directly through Dalton when he left his intrenchments. The movement
could not be begun till the 11th, as Stoneman with the cavalry of
the Army of the Ohio was marching from Cleveland, and another day
was needed to enable him to get upon our left flank, the place
assigned him in the combined advance. [Footnote: _Id_., pp. 112,
113, 126.] Three days' rations in haversacks and seven more in
wagons gave provisions for a short separation from our base, and
orders to send back all baggage to Ringgold were strictly enforced.

At daybreak of the 10th I advanced my skirmishers to reconnoitre the
enemy's lines, which were found to be still held in force, and his
troops on the alert. We then proceeded to wheel the whole of the
corps backward in line of battle, ready to halt at any moment, and
engage the enemy if he should come out and attack us. My division
being on the flank, it was to regulate the movement, Judah's
conforming to mine on the right, and Hovey's in reserve immediately
in rear of mine. [Footnote: Official Records, vol. xxxviii. pt. iv.
pp. 123, 131.] We were under a warm skirmish fire of infantry in
front, and the enemy's cavalry on our left flank also followed up
the movement sharply. Reinforcing the skirmish line till the enemy
was driven back, a good position in rear was selected for my second
line and it was made to lie down. My first line was then marched
slowly to the rear over the other, to another position, where it
halted and lay down in turn, whilst the other rose and marched to
the rear in a similar manner. Making the troops lie down avoided the
danger, incident to such a manoeuvre under fire, that the men in
second line would be confused by the passing of the first line
through their ranks and break their organization. [Footnote:
Officers experienced in war know that manoeuvres which are easy and
of fine effect on parade are difficult and even dangerous under
fire, and that it is wise to simplify the tactics as much as
possible. Marshal Saint-Cyr, whose reputation for tactical skill was
second to none in the wars of the French Republic and Empire, thus
speaks of the matter in his comments on the battle of Novi, apropos
to the break of the French division Watrin, which was in two brigade
lines: "La première, attaquée avec vigueur par le général Lusignan
appuyé par Laudon, ne soutint qu'un moment le choc, et se rabattit
sur la seconde; elle espérait se reformer en arrière de celle-ci, en
faisant ce qu'on appelle une passage de ligne; mais il fut démontré
une fois de plus, que cette manoeuvre, qui fait un assez bel effet à
la parade, ne peut réussir à la guerre lorsqu'on est suivi par un
ennemi actif. La premiere entraîna la seconde dans un mouvement
rétrograde; de plus elle y apporta assez de confusion pour que ces
deux lignes réunies crussent n'avoir d'autre parti à prendre que
celui de la fuite," etc. Mémoires, vol. i. p. 257. There can be no
question as to the general soundness of this criticism, and we
should not have continued the movement described if we had been
attacked in force. We should then have fought where we stood,
bringing the reserves to support the front line. It justifies,
however, the precaution of selecting carefully the alternate
positions and making the rear line lie down.] When we came opposite
the positions assigned us in the extension of the Fourth Corps line,
the division changed front to rear on right battalion and so swung
into its place. [Footnote: Official Records, vol. xxxviii. pt. ii.
p. 675.] Sherman had sent Captain Poe, his chief engineer, to
observe our movement from the crest of Rocky Face held by Newton's
troops, and congratulated Schofield upon it, saying it "was
described to me by Captain Poe, as seen from the mountain, as very
handsome." [Footnote: _Id_., pt. iv. p. 121.] In his full report
made at the close of the campaign, General Schofield referred to it
as "a delicate and difficult one, owing to the character of the
ground, the position and strength of the enemy, and our comparative
isolation from the main army." He adds: "I regarded it as a complete
test of the quality of my troops, which I had not before had
opportunity of seeing manoeuvre in presence of the enemy."
[Footnote: _Id_., pt. ii. p. 510.]

Schofield had been so dissatisfied with General Hovey that on the
same day he asked to have him removed from the command of the
division, notwithstanding his high personal esteem for him and his
confidence in his personal gallantry. The trouble seemed to be in
the comprehension of orders and in the grasp of the surrounding
circumstances. Sherman did not feel at liberty to act on the
request, as Hovey had been assigned to the new division, before it
took the field, in fulfilment of a promise of General Grant under
whom Hovey had served in the Vicksburg campaign, and had been
recommended for promotion as a recognition of good conduct at the
affair of Champion Hill. [Footnote: _Id_., pt. iv. p. 122.
Brigadier-General Alvin P. Hovey had been a Judge of the Supreme
Court of Indiana, and a "War Democrat" in politics. His subsequent
withdrawal from the army and his connection with Sherman's famous
protest against promotions given under stress of personal and
political influences at Washington would not be entirely clear
without mention of the incident here told.]

Johnston seems to have heard rumors of Sherman's original plan to
send McPherson's column against Rome, much further in rear, and he
remained under the impression that this was the meaning of the
movements he now heard of, until McPherson was in possession of
Snake Creek Gap. [Footnote: Official Records, vol. xxxviii. pt. iv.
pp. 674, 675.] On the 7th he had urged Polk to hasten his
concentration at Rome, and ordered Martin's division of cavalry to
Calhoun to cover the communications with Polk, and protect the
railroad south of the Oostanaula. Brigadier-General Cantey was at
Resaca with at least four thousand men, his own and Reynolds's
brigades with fourteen pieces of artillery. [Footnote: _Id_., pp.
679, 682.] Movements toward his rear were reported to Johnston, and
all his subordinates were on the alert to find out what it meant;
the cavalry was ordered to watch all gaps south of Dug Gap, but no
mention is made of Snake Creek Gap till McPherson had passed through
it. [Footnote: _Id_., pp. 681, 683, 686, 687.] Then Cantey was told
to hold Resaca firmly, and call on Martin for assistance if he
needed it. Cars were sent to bring a brigade from Rome,
intrenchments were made to cover the south end of the Resaca bridge;
Major Presstman, chief engineer, was sent to mark out more extensive
works about Resaca, and Hood was ordered there with considerable
reinforcements. As soon, however, as it was known that McPherson had
retired to Sugar Valley, Hood was called back to Dalton, and
Johnston requested Polk to hasten in person to Resaca and take
command, hurrying forward his corps as fast as possible. [Footnote:
_Id_., pp. 687, 689.] This was the situation on the evening of the
10th of May.

When we took our position on the ridge of Rocky Face as the left of
the line, the division was somewhat exposed to a flank attack, and I
ordered the fallen timber on the hillside to be thrown together to
make obstruction to any hostile advance, besides the usual tactical
precautions of outposts and reserves. This, like the slashing made
at Red Clay a few days before, was suggested by the difficulty of
knowing what was going on around us in a country covered by dense
forests with only small cultivated openings here and there. In this
instance it was only the gathering of logs and tree-tops already
lying on the ground, and utilizing them as a means of delaying an
enemy till our lines could be formed. From such beginnings grew up
our more and more elaborate system of intrenched camps; a natural
evolution of campaigning in a country only partially cleared, with
no roads worthy of the name.

To pass such a defile as Snake Creek Gap with an army was no small
undertaking. Hooker was ordered to clear a second track, so that two
lines could march by the flank at once, but this could only be
imperfectly done in the time at command. [Footnote: Official
Records, vol. xxxviii. pt. iv. pp. 126, 135, 145.] Careful orders in
detail were made, fixing the time for each corps and division to
move, keeping the roads filled night and day. Wagons were sent by
the rear to Villanow, and the regular subsistence trains were
stopped at Ringgold and Tunnel Hill till the Confederate army should
be dislodged. For night marching men were stationed with torches at
the forking of paths, and boards were nailed to trees as
finger-posts.

Early on the morning of the 12th May, my division left its position
on Rocky Face and marched through Tunnel Hill station. General
Schofield, finding the shorter road to Snake Creek Gap blocked by
wagons of the Cumberland Army, ordered a detour to the west, and we
marched over to the Trickum and Villanow road, some two miles, and
then pushing southward got within three miles of Villanow. It was
evident that our movement and that of the whole army were visible
from the high ridge of Rocky Face. Johnston was aware of them, and
telegraphed to Richmond that Sherman was moving to Calhoun or to
some point on the Oostanaula. [Footnote: Official Records, vol.
xxxviii. pt. iv. p. 698.] He put everything in motion upon his
interior line to Resaca, and the last of his infantry left Dalton
that night, covered by a cavalry rear-guard. [Footnote: _Id_., p.
160.] Howard entered the place next morning.

[Illustration: Map]

Taking only a short rest, my division marched again at one o'clock
through Villanow and Snake Creek Gap into Sugar Valley, followed by
Judah's division of our corps, the other (Hovey's) being left to
guard the gap and the trains. McPherson's army covered the direct
road to Resaca, having Kilpatrick's cavalry on its right flank
toward the Oostanaula; Thomas's army was in the centre, consisting
of two corps (Hooker's and Palmer's) in Howard's absence; and
Schofield was ordered to continue the curve to the left, my own
division being the flank and directed to rest the left upon the
ridge or near it, facing northward.

The different corps advanced from McPherson's intrenchments to the
new line which was near Camp Creek on the Resaca road, facing east,
thence curving north and west through a quarter circle to my
position on the left close to the dominant ridge, and about four
miles north of Sugar Valley P. O. on the main Dalton road. I sent
Hanson's brigade forward to reconnoitre toward Tilton (where Howard
was), and it reached Martin's store, at the forks of the Dalton and
Tilton roads and the crossing of Swamp Creek. A Confederate division
had left that position only an hour before, marching toward Resaca.
[Footnote: Official Records, vol. xxxviii. pt. ii. p. 675. In the
official Atlas (compiled after the war), plate lvii. map 2, Martin's
Store is given as Roberts' Store, and the position of the enemy
there is marked.]

Later in the afternoon the centre and left of the whole army swung
forward toward the east into the line along Camp Creek, quite away
from the Dalton road. Reilly's brigade of my division was therefore
left as a detachment covering that road until we should know that
Howard had advanced beyond Tilton. A regiment of Hanson's brigade
was left as an outpost at Martin's store, and the rest of the
brigade marched across country by the right of companies to the
front, keeping touch with Judah's division and this with the left of
the Army of the Cumberland. It was a rough march over ridges and
streams through the forest, on the long outer curve, of which the
pivot was several miles to the southeast.

Sherman had hoped to be in time to interpose between Resaca and
Johnston's army, as he had said in his orders of the 12th,
[Footnote: _Id_., pt. iv. p. 158.] but the Confederates had the
short interior line, and Johnston had been able to concentrate about
Resaca in the course of the 13th, his rear-guard resisting Howard's
advance at Tilton, and his left under Polk holding some high hills
west of Camp Creek in front of Resaca which commanded the railroad
bridge over the Oostanaula. With the latter exception his chosen
line of defence was on the broken ridge between the Connasauga River
and Camp Creek, which were nearly parallel to each other for some
miles.

On the morning of the 14th the advance was renewed, guided as before
by the progress of the Army of the Tennessee on the right and
continuing the wheeling movement toward the east. My right brigade
(Manson) continued its connection with the rest of the army, but
Reilly's had a very difficult and laborious march. I ordered it to
advance a mile upon the road it had covered during the night, and
then by the right flank to position in line with the rest of the
command. After leaving the road Reilly had to break his way through
the woods, crossing sharp and deep ravines and watercourses, with no
path or landmark to guide him. It was especially difficult for the
artillery, and that they got through at all proved that the officers
and men were experts in woodcraft. The regiment at Martin's store
remained there as an outpost during the day.

Reilly came into line about ten o'clock, and we rested an hour till
our flankers reported Howard's corps within supporting distance
coming from Tilton. We were on the west bank of the main stream of
Camp Creek, where its upper course makes an angle with the lower,
some small branches coming into it from the northeast. The valley
itself was open, and the change in its direction allowed it to be
enfiladed by the enemy's batteries at the angle. Generals Thomas and
Schofield were together upon a hill having a commanding view, and at
the word from them, "The line will advance," we moved forward into
the valley from the slope before them. Each brigade was in two
lines, and the artillery was left on the hither side of the valley
to cover the movement and reply to the enemy's cannonade. The
skirmish line had been advanced to the edge of the woods on the far
side, and kept the lead until we approached the Confederate
trenches. We passed over two or three ridges and ravines, driving
back the skirmishers of the enemy, and charged the line of
earthworks on the crest of a higher ridge. Our men dropped fast as
we went forward, but the line was carried and the Confederates broke
from the next ridge in rear, some two hundred yards away. The
direction of these ridges was such that our left was constantly
thrown forward as we passed from one to another.

Judah's division on our right had not succeeded in crossing Camp
Creek, and our flank was exposed to a galling artillery fire, as the
ridge on which we were had its shoulder bare when it came out into
the valley, whose curve gave the enemy an enfilading fire upon us.
His infantry sought also to drive us out of the position we had
captured, and the fighting was heavy for an hour or two. But
Howard's corps came up on our left, and we made firm our hold on the
hills we had gained, forcing the Confederates to adopt a new line
curving to the eastward.

The division had lost 562 men, and our ammunition was nearly
exhausted. [Footnote: Official Records, vol. xxxviii. pt. ii. pp.
676-679.] Wagons could not follow us, and toward evening Generals
Thomas and Schofield arranged to relieve us with Newton's division
of Howard's corps, let us replenish the cartridge boxes, and then
pass to the left. This brought again the Army of the Cumberland
together, and gave us our usual position on the flank. Newton's men
came over part of the ground we had traversed, and as they crossed
the open we saw them under the enemy's cannonade, the balls here and
there bowling them over like tenpins. Harker's brigade came up to
relieve Manson's, which was the most exposed, and Manson and I were
standing together arranging the details, our horses being under
cover in the edge of the wood. Harker rode up to confer with us and
learn the situation, and as we talked, a shell exploded among us,
the concussion stunning Manson and a fragment slightly wounding
Harker. Manson's experience was a curious illustration of the effect
of such an accident. He was unaware of his hurt, and only thought,
in the moment of failing consciousness as he fell, that the motion
was that of his companions flying upward instead of his own falling;
and on coming to himself in the hospital began to speak his sorrow
for what he supposed was the death of his friends. He himself never
fully recovered from the effects of the concussion. Colonel
Opdycke's regiment was one of the first in the winning column, and
his men were hardly placed in the line before he was led back,
wounded; but as soon as his wound was dressed and he had recovered a
little from the shock, he was back at his post. The place was so hot
a one that Harker's brigade also exhausted its ammunition and had to
be relieved before the left of my own line was moved.

The captured position was firmly held by Howard's corps, whilst
Hooker's, which had been relieved by the Army of the Tennessee, was
marched to the left of Howard's, extending the line across the ridge
toward the Connasauga and turning the enemy's flank. The whole
Twenty-third Corps was also united during the night and moved to
Hooker's support, where next day Hood made strong efforts to drive
our line back. My own and Judah's division were held in reserve, but
Hovey's was put in on Hooker's left, extending the line practically
to the river, and the division took a gallant part in repulsing
Hood. [Footnote: Official Records, vol. xxxviii. pt. ii. p. 511.]

On the extreme right McPherson had bridged the Oostanaula at Lay's
Ferry and made demonstrations on Calhoun. The whole Army of the
Tennessee had pressed forward to Camp Creek, and toward evening of
the 14th forced a crossing and carried some hills near its mouth
which commanded the railway bridge. [Footnote: Official Records,
vol. xxxviii. pt. iii. pp. 92, 377.] Polk's Confederate corps made
strong efforts to dislodge McPherson's men, but failed, and the
latter intrenched the position. As Johnston had not succeeded in
dislodging Sherman at either flank of the position, and the course
of the Oostanaula made it possible for Sherman to put himself upon
the railway near Calhoun, the Confederate general evacuated the
Resaca position in the night of the 15th, retreating southward
toward Kingston and Cassville.




CHAPTER XXXVII

ATLANTA CAMPAIGN: ADVANCE TO THE ETOWAH


Tactics modified by character of the country--Use of the
spade--Johnston's cautious defensive--Methods of Grant and
Sherman--Open country between Oostanaula and Etowah--Movement in
several columns--Sherman's eagerness--Route of left wing--Of
McPherson on the right--Necessity of exact system in such
marches--Route of Twenty-third Corps--Hooker gets in the way--Delays
occasioned--Closing in on Cassville--Our commanding
position--Johnston's march to Cassville--His order to fight
there--Protest of Hood and Polk--Retreat over the Etowah--Sherman
crosses near Kingston--My reconnoissance to the Allatoona
crossing--Destruction of iron works and mills--Marching without
baggage--Barbarism of war--Desolation it causes--Changes in our
corps organization--Hascall takes Judah's division--Our place of
crossing the Etowah--Interference again--Kingston the new
base--Rations--Camp coffee.


The opening period of the campaign had developed the conditions of
warfare in so broken and difficult a country, and they were only
emphasized by the later experiences of both armies. Positions for
defence could be intrenched with field-works whilst the hostile army
was feeling its way forward through dense forests and over mountain
ridges. To carry such positions by direct assault was so costly that
the lesson of prudence was soon learned and such attacks were more
and more rarely resorted to. Sherman had moved upon the enemy at
Resaca as promptly as the deployment and advance could be made after
the turning movement and the passage of the Snake Creek defile; but
we found Johnston strongly placed, on ground naturally difficult of
approach, with works which gave his men such cover as to overcome
any advantage we had in numbers. Still, the enemy found in turn that
we could make counter-intrenchments and quickly extend them till we
turned his flanks and threatened his communications, when he must
either retreat or assault our works, and that, if he assaulted, the
balance of losses would turn so heavily against him as to fatally
deplete his army. Johnston carefully and systematically maintained
this defensive, and in Virginia, after Lee had tried the policy of
attack in the Wilderness, he became as cautiously defensive as
Johnston. Grant was slower than Sherman in learning the
unprofitableness of attacking field-works, and his campaign was by
far the more costly one. The difference in such cases goes much
farther than the casualty list; it was shown in October, when
Sherman's army was strong and well-seasoned, but Grant's was so full
of raw recruits as almost to have lost its veteran quality. There
were special reasons which led Grant to adhere so long to the more
aggressive tactics, which would need to be weighed in any full
treatment of the subject; but I am now only pointing out the fact
that in both the East and the West the lesson was practically the
same. Aggressive strategy had the advantage it always has, but
defensive tactics proved generally the better in so peculiar a field
of operations.

Between the Oostanaula and the Etowah was the most open portion of
northern Georgia, and it was possible for Sherman to move his army
southward in several columns of pursuit on parallel roads (such as
they were) without extending his front over a width of more than
eight or ten miles. He was eager to bring the Confederates to battle
in this region, and urged his subordinates to make haste. The
assignment of routes to the different columns gave the centre to
General Thomas, following the railroad in general, but putting his
three corps upon as many country roads, when they could be found.
General Schofield with the Twenty-third Corps was ordered to get
over to the old Federal road which runs through Spring Place (east
of Dalton) to Cassville. General McPherson with his two corps was
sent by the Rome road and such parallel road as might be available,
keeping communication with the centre. [Footnote: Official Records,
vol. xxxviii. pt. iv. p. 216.] Beyond him, on the extreme right,
Davis's division of the Cumberland Army supported Garrard's cavalry
division in a movement upon Rome by the west side of the Oostanaula.
[Footnote: _Id_., pp. 198, 202-204.] The object of the
last-mentioned movement was the destruction of the Confederate
machine-shops and factories at Rome, as well as to cover the flank
against movements along the main route of travel from Alabama. The
extreme left flank was to be covered by the cavalry of the Ohio Army
under General Stoneman.

In making such an advance, success as well as comfort depends upon
the care with which the several columns are led, so that each shall
keep its place, progressing equally with the others, and avoid above
all things cutting into and interrupting those moving on its right
or left. Each must keep the common purpose in view, and avoid
obstructing the rest, for nothing is more wearisome to the troops
and ruinous to the plans of the commander than to have the lines of
advance cross each other. In our march of the 17th our own corps was
fated to feel the full annoyance and delay of such an interference.

General Thomas ordered Howard's corps to cross by the bridges at
Resaca, followed by Palmer's, which was diminished by the absence of
Davis's division. He also ordered Hooker's corps to march by the
long neck between the Oostanaula and Connasauga rivers to Newtown,
and cross the Oostanaula there. Hooker would then follow such roads
as he could find within two or three miles of Howard's line of march
toward Adairsville. Sherman and Thomas both were with Howard.
[Footnote: _Id_., pp. 202, 209, 210, 216, 217.]

Schofield ordered the divisions of the Twenty-third Corps to cross
the Connasauga at different places, and make their way by different
roads eastward to the Federal road crossing of the Coosawattee,
turning south after crossing that river and marching till abreast of
Adairsville and some four or five miles distant from it. As we had
to gain several miles of easting and to cross two rivers before
marching southward, ours was, of course, much the longer route; and
as the pontoons were all in use at Resaca and Lay's Ferry, we had to
find fords or build trestle-bridges.

I marched my own division to Hogan's Ford on the Connasauga, two
miles below Tilton, and there crossed in water so deep that the men
had to strip and carry their clothes and arms on their heads. Once
over we pushed for the Federal road and the crossing of the
Coosawattee at Field's Ferry. The other two divisions of the corps
crossed the Connasauga at or near Fite's Ferry, where were
trestle-bridges. [Footnote: Official Records, vol. xxxviii. pt. iv.
p. 210.]

General Hooker started upon the Newtown road, which runs southward
some miles upon a long, narrow ridge which here separates the
Oostanaula from its tributary; but before he had gone far he learned
that the crossing at Newtown (the mouth of the Connasauga) was
unfordable, and other means of getting over doubtful. He now turned
abruptly to the east, crossed the Connasauga at Fite's, and marched
toward McClure's Ford on the Coosawattee. [Footnote: _Id_., pp. 205,
206.] In moving out from Hogan's (or Hobart's) Ford, I had learned
that the road from the north which crosses the Coosawattee at
McClure's was probably the principal and shortest route to Cassville
and had reported this to General Schofield, who ordered Judah's and
Hovey's division to take the most direct roads to McClure's. These
columns, however, ran into Hooker's, which were making for the same
point and had headed Schofield's off, having the inner of the
concentric routes on which we were marching. Neither at McClure's
nor the more distant ferry at Field's Mill was there any bridge or
tolerable ford, and Hooker was no better off than he would have been
at Newtown. This movement had wholly disjointed Sherman's plan of
keeping the three armies upon separate lines of march. Finding no
means for rapid crossing at McClure's, he pushed one of his
divisions to Field's, and so occupied and blocked both of the
Coosawattee crossings, which by the orders should have been wholly
at Schofield's disposal. We found ourselves obliged therefore to
camp on the north side of the Coosawattee on the night of the 16th,
instead of being well over that river and ready for a prompt advance
on the 17th. [Footnote: Official Records, vol. xxxviii. pt. iv. pp.
210, 211, 220, 221, 225, 226.] Hooker himself might much better have
obeyed his original orders. He reported to Thomas at ten o'clock on
the morning of the 17th that he was not yet over, and had not the
means of constructing a bridge that would stand; in short, that he
had been "bothered beyond parallel." [Footnote: _Id_., p. 221.] When
Schofield requested that he would allow our troops to take
precedence of the Twentieth Corps wagons at either the ferry or the
bridge, so that Sherman's expectation might not be disappointed,
Hooker suggested that we should march back to Resaca and follow
Thomas across the bridges there, thus getting into the place he
himself should have taken if the Newtown crossing had been really
impossible! [Footnote: _Id_., p. 227.]

Modern systems lay great stress upon the most scrupulous care on the
part of corps commanders to follow the roads assigned them, and to
avoid trespassing upon those assigned to others. Moltke has even
condensed the whole strategic art of moving troops into "marching
divided in order to fight united," and to avoid interference and
confusion of columns _en route_ is quite as essential as to keep
tactical manoeuvres on the battle-field from crossing each other.
[Footnote: See Prince Hohenlohe-Ingelfingen's Letters on Strategy
(Wolseley Series), vol. ii. pp. 160, 161, 185, 237, etc.] No better
proof of the necessity of the rule could be given than this. Sherman
was most anxious to bring Johnston to battle in the open country
between the two rivers, and ordered his subordinates to press the
pursuit and to engage the enemy wherever he might be overtaken,
trusting to the quick advance of the several columns to their
support. [Footnote: Official Records, vol. xxxviii. pt. iv. pp. 201,
202, 211, 220, 232, 242.] Anything which delayed the columns or put
them on different roads from those indicated by the commanding
general, directly tended to thwart his plans. All of Sherman's
dispatches during the 17th, 18th, and 19th of May show his
disappointment at not getting forward more rapidly.

Johnston seemed disposed, in the afternoon of the 17th, to meet
Sherman's wish for a decisive battle, and had selected a position a
mile or two north of Adairsville, where the valley of the Oothcaloga
Creek seemed narrow enough to give strong positions for his flanks
on the hills bordering it. Preliminary orders were given and the
cavalry was strongly supported by infantry to hold back Sherman's
advance-guard till the deployment should be completed. The
skirmishing was so brisk that, at a distance, it sounded like a
battle; but upon testing the position by a partial deployment,
Johnston concluded that his army would not fill it, and he resumed
his retreat on Cassville and Kingston, hoping that Sherman's columns
would be so separated that he could concentrate upon one of them,
and so fight his adversary in detail. [Footnote: Narrative, pp. 319,
320.]

Schofield had pressed the march of his troops after getting over the
Coosawattee, but the interruptions had been such that the distance
made was not great, though the time was long and the troops were
more tired than if they had made double the number of miles on an
unobstructed road. My division was on the extreme left flank and in
advance. After crossing the river at Field's Mill, the infantry by
Hooker's foot-bridge and the artillery by the flat-boat ferry, I
marched at ten o'clock in the evening and reached Big Spring Creek
at two o'clock in the morning of the 18th. Resting only till five
o'clock, we marched again, going southward on the Cassville road
three miles, thence westward on the Adairsville road five miles to
Marsteller's Mill. The other divisions of our corps took roads
westward of that which I followed, and the cavalry under Stoneman
passed beyond our left flank, scouting up the valley of Salequa
Creek as far as Fairmount and Pine Log Post-Office. Hooker moved two
of his divisions toward Calhoun after getting over the Coosawattee,
and these regained the position relative to the rest of Thomas's
army which the corps had been ordered to take. The other division
(Butterfield's), which had crossed in advance of my own at Field's
Mill, was necessarily on roads assigned to Schofield's command, and
a good deal of interference was inevitable. Hooker was personally
with this division, and in the afternoon of the 18th met General
Schofield at Marsteller's Mill, and then went forward about six
miles to the foot of the Gravelly Plateau, Butterfield's division
going still further forward on its top. [Footnote: Official Records,
vol. xxxviii. pt. iv. pp. 238-242. The Atlas of the Official Records
does not give the routes of all the columns of either Hooker's or
Schofield's corps, nor does it give the line of march of the cavalry
on our left. The march of my own division is fixed by the memoranda
of my personal diary of the campaign. The official "Atlas" (Plate
lviii.) gives two mills as Marsteller's. It is difficult to identify
the several roads, but my own line of march was the principal
Cassville road leading from Field's Mills and ferry through Sonora
until we reached the road running directly to Adairsville. On this
last we marched to Marsteller's Mills. Our route on the 19th is also
incorrectly marked on the map. See Official Records, vol. xxxviii.
pt. iv. p. 256.]

General Schofield assembled the corps at the mills and rested for
the night. Early on the 19th my division took the advance and
marched southward on by-roads till we overtook Hooker's corps and
found it in line of battle, its movement being disputed by the
enemy's cavalry. Schofield deployed his corps on Hooker's left, my
division taking the extreme flank and advancing in line to the south
fork of Two Run Creek. Crossing this, we went forward to a position
a mile northeast of Cassville, briskly skirmishing with part of
Hood's corps. We found that we were opposite the extreme right of
the Confederate position, which was a strong one on the hills behind
Cassville; but an exchange of artillery shots satisfied us that we
to some extent enfiladed their intrenchments. [Footnote: Official
Records, vol. xxxviii. pt. ii. p. 680.] The concentration of
Thomas's army with Schofield's made a continuous line facing the
enemy on the north and west. Night was falling as we took position.

Johnston had followed the railroad to Kingston, where he was joined
by French's division coming to Polk's corps from Rome, and still
stuck to the general line of the railway to Cassville, though this
led him by a considerable detour to the east. His manifest policy
was to make the largest use of the railroad to move his baggage and
supply his troops, for wagon trains were not over-abundant with the
Confederates. He naturally reckoned also that Sherman could not go
far from the same line, and as the road crossed the Etowah near the
gorges of the Allatoona hills, he wished to lead the national
commander into that difficult country from the north, instead of
taking the more direct wagon-roads from Kingston toward Marietta.
Could Sherman have been sure of the route his adversary would take,
no doubt he would have concentrated his columns by shortest roads on
Cassville, gaining possibly a day thereby. [Footnote: _Id_., pt. iv.
pp. 242, 266.]

The position on the hills behind the village of Cassville was so
strong a one, and Johnston so much desired to offer battle at an
early day, that he resolved to retreat no further and to try
conclusions with Sherman here. He signified this in an unusually
formal manner by issuing a brief and stirring address to his troops,
in which he said that as their communications were now secure, they
would turn and meet our advancing columns. "Fully confiding in the
conduct of the officers and the courage of the soldiers," he said,
"I lead you to battle" [Footnote: Official Records, vol. xxxviii.
pt. iv. p. 728.] But when our left flank crossed Two Run Creek and
partly turned the right of his position, his corps commanders, Hood
and Polk, became so uneasy that they protested against giving battle
there, and induced Johnston to continue the retreat through
Cartersville across the Etowah River. He saw the mistake he had made
as soon as it was done, and never ceased to regret it. [Footnote:
Narrative, p. 323, etc.] The Richmond government had been
disappointed at his retreat from Dalton and Resaca and its
continuation through Adairsville. His strained relations with Mr.
Davis were rapidly tending toward his deprivation of command. But
more strictly military reasons made his change of purpose very
undesirable. Hardly anything is more destructive of the confidence
of an army than vacillation. The order to fight had been published,
and even a defeat might be less mischievous than the sudden retreat
in the night without joining the battle which had been so formally
announced. Either the order had been an error or the retreat was
one. Every soldier in the army knew this, and the _morale_ of the
whole was necessarily affected by it.

Sherman had no mind to follow the enemy into the defiles of
Allatoona from Cartersville. His position at Kingston offered a far
more easy way to turn that fastness by the south, if he could
replenish his stores, rebuild the bridges behind him, and make
Kingston the base for a march upon Dallas and thence on Marietta. On
the 20th of May his orders were issued for the new movement, to
begin on the 23d with preparation for a twenty days' separation from
the railroad. [Footnote: Official Records, vol. xxxviii. pt. iv. p.
271.] My own duty on the 20th was to follow the enemy's rear-guard
to the river and learn the condition of the bridges and crossings.
The division marched early, most of the distance to Cartersville
being made in line of battle, the opposition being at times
stubborn. The purpose of this was probably to prepare for the
destruction of the bridges, which were burned as soon as the
rear-guard crossed. We sent detachments to destroy the Etowah Mills
and Iron Works a few miles above; [Footnote: _Id_., pp. 286, 298.]
meanwhile General Schofield concentrated the Army of the Ohio at
Cartersville, General Thomas occupied Kingston as the centre, and
McPherson came into position on the right near the same place.
General J. C. Davis's division had occupied Rome, finding there
important iron-works and machine-shops as well as considerable
depots of supplies. [Footnote: _Id_., p. 264.] General Blair was
advancing from Decatur, Ala., with the Seventeenth Corps, under
orders to relieve Davis at Rome, when the latter would rejoin
Palmer's corps at the front.

The ten days which had passed since the movement to turn the enemy's
position at Dalton was begun, had been in literal obedience to the
order to march without baggage. At my headquarters we were, in fact,
worse off than the men in the ranks, for, although the private
soldier finds his knapsack, haversack, canteen, and coffee-kettle a
burden and a clattering annoyance, he soon learns to bear them
patiently, for they are the necessary condition of the comparative
comfort of his bivouac when the day's march is over. The veteran,
indeed, clings to them with eager tenacity, when he has fully
learned that they are his salvation from utter misery. But the
officer, whose hours of halting are crowded with important business,
and whose movements must be light and quick whenever occasion
arises, cannot carry on his person or on his horse the outfit
necessary for his cooking and his shelter. We had been full of the
most earnest zeal to respond thoroughly to the general's wishes, and
had not tried to smuggle into wagons or ambulances any extra
comforts. We had left mess chests behind, and had used our fingers
for forks and our pocket-knives for carving, turning sardine boxes
into dishes, and other tins in which preserved meats are put up into
coffee-cups. Such roughing can be kept up for a week or two, but it
is not a real economy of means to make it permanent. A compromise
must be found in which the wholesome cooking of food and the shelter
in a rainstorm, without which no dispatches can be written or
records kept, may be made to consist with the lightness of
transportation which active campaigning requires. The simple,
closely packed kitchen kit of a Rob-Roy canoe voyager was more or
less completely anticipated by the devices and inventions born of
necessity in our campaign in Georgia. The remainder of the season
bore witness that we could organize our camp life so as to secure
cleanliness of person and healthful living without transgressing the
reasonable rules as to weight and bulk of baggage which Sherman
insisted on. Every day proved the reasonableness of his system,
without which the campaign could not have been made.

The tendency of war to make men relapse into barbarism becomes most
evident when an army is living in any degree upon the enemy's
country. Desolation follows in its track, and the utmost that
discipline can do is to mitigate the evil. The habit of disregarding
rights of property grows apace. The legitimate exercise of the rules
of war is not easily distinguished from their abuse. The crops are
trampled down, the fences disappear, the timber is felled for
breastworks and for camp-fires, the green forage is used for the
army horses and mules, barns and houses may be dismantled to build
or to floor a bridge,--all this is necessary and lawful. But the
pigs and the poultry also disappear, though the subsistence officers
are issuing full and abundant rations to the troops; the bacon is
gone from the smoke-house, the flour from the bin, the delicacies
from the pantry. These things, though forbidden, are half excused by
sympathy with the soldier's craving for variety of food. Yet, as the
habit of measuring right by might goes on, pillage becomes wanton
and arson is committed to cover the pillage. The best efforts of a
provost-marshal with his guard will be useless when superior
officers, and especially colonels of regiments, encourage or wink at
license. The character of different commands becomes as notoriously
different as that of the different men of a town. Our armies were
usually free from the vagabond class of professional camp-followers
that scour a European battlefield and strip the dead and the
wounded. We almost never heard of criminal personal assaults upon
the unarmed and defenceless; but we cannot deny that a region which
had been the theatre of active war became desolate sooner or later.
A vacant house was pretty sure to be burned, either by malice or by
accident, until, with fences gone, the roads an impassable mire, the
fields bare and cut up with innumerable wagon-tracks, no living
thing to be seen but carrion birds picking the bones of dead horses
and mules, Dante's "Inferno" could not furnish a more horrible and
depressing picture than a countryside when war has swept over it.
[Footnote: Official Records, vol. xxxviii. pt. iv. pp. 273, 297,
298.]

The orders issued from our army headquarters in Georgia forbade
soldiers from entering houses or stripping families of the
necessaries of life. Most of the officers honestly tried to enforce
this rule; but in an army of a hundred thousand men, a small
fraction of the whole would be enough to spoil the best efforts of
the rest. The people found, too, that it was not only the enemy they
had to fear. The worse disciplined of their own troops and the horde
of stragglers were often as severe a scourge as the enemy.
[Footnote: See Hood's orders, Official Records, vol. xxxviii. pt. v.
pp. 960, 963.] Yet I believe that nowhere in the world is respect
for person and property more sincere than among our own people. The
evils described are those which may be said to be necessarily
incident to the waging of war, and are not indications of ferocity
of nature or uncommon lack of discipline.

In the organization of the Army of the Ohio, General Schofield made
an important change by assigning Brigadier-General Hascall to
command the second division in place of General Judah. In the battle
of Resaca the division suffered severe loss without accomplishing
anything, and General Schofield found, on investigation, that it was
due to the incompetency of the officer commanding it. [Footnote:
Official Records, vol. xxxviii. pt. iv. p. 243.] The brigade
commanders, in their reports, complained severely of the way in
which the division had been handled, and the army commander felt
obliged to examine and to act promptly. [Footnote: _Id_., pt. ii.
pp. 581, 610, 611.] Judah was a regular officer, major of the Fourth
Infantry, a graduate of West Point in the class of 1843, but lacked
the judgment and coolness in action necessary in grave
responsibilities. General Schofield kindly softened the treatment of
the matter in his report of the campaign, but in his personal
memoirs he repeats the judgment he originally acted upon. [Footnote:
Schofield's Report, _Id_., pt. ii. p. 511; Forty-two Years in the
Army, p. 182. In the passage of his memoirs last referred to,
General Schofield had been using the case of General Wagner at
Franklin to give point to "the necessity of the higher military
education, and the folly of intrusting high commands to men without
such education" (p. 181); but he also distinctly recognizes the fact
that such education is gained by experience, and the fault of those
he uses as illustrations was that they had not learned either by
experience or theoretically. I have discussed the subject in vol. i.
chapter ix., _ante_. There must be knowledge; but even this will be
of no use unless there are the personal qualities which fit for high
commands.] The crossing of the Etowah River on May 23d was again the
occasion of an interference of columns, because Sherman's orders
were not faithfully followed. To McPherson was assigned a country
bridge near the mouth of Connasene Creek, to Thomas one four miles
southeast of Kingston, known as Gillem's Bridge, and to Schofield
two pontoon bridges to be laid at the site of Milam's Bridge, which
had been burned. There were fords near all these crossings which
were also to be utilized as far as practicable. [Footnote: Sherman's
general plan was given to his subordinates in person, but he
repeated it to Halleck, Official Records vol. xxxviii. pt. iv. p.
274. Thomas's order is given, _Id._, p. 289, and accompanying
sketch, p. 290. Gillem's Bridge in the Atlas is called Free Bridge,
plate lviii. Schofield's place for pontoon bridges is fixed by his
dispatch to Sherman, _Id._, p. 284, my own dispatch, _Id._, p. 298,
and my official report, _Id._, pt. ii. p. 680. The line of march and
place of crossing as given in the Atlas are incorrect.] We marched
from Cartersville on the Euharlee road by the way of the hamlet of
Etowah Cliffs, till we reached the direct road from Cassville to
Milam's Bridge, when we found the way blocked by Hooker's corps,
which had possession of the pontoons which Schofield's engineer had
placed. Hooker, however, was not responsible for this, as he had
been ordered to change his line of march by a dispatch from Thomas's
headquarters written without stopping to inquire how such a change
might conflict with Schofield's right of way and with Sherman's
plans. Halted thus about noon, we were not able to resume the march
till next day, as Hooker had ordered his supply trains to follow his
column. [Footnote: _Id._, pt. iv. pp. 283, 291. Schofield to Sherman
and reply, _Id._, pp. 296, 297. When I wrote "Atlanta," I supposed
Hooker acted without orders.] The incident only emphasizes the way
in which we learned by experience the importance of strict system in
such movements, and the mischiefs almost sure to follow when there
is any departure from a plan of march once arranged. There was, of
course, no intention to make an interference, and the difficulty
rarely, if ever, occurred in the subsequent parts of the campaign.

In preparation for the movement to turn Johnston's new position at
Allatoona we were ordered to provide for twenty days' absence from
direct railway communication. Within that time Sherman expected to
regain the railway again and establish supply depots near the camps.
Meanwhile Kingston was made the base, and was garrisoned with a
brigade. [Footnote: Official Records, vol. xxxviii. pt. iv. pp. 272,
274, 278.] The returning veterans were coming back by regiments and
were fully supplying the losses of the campaign with men of the very
best quality and full of enthusiasm. Nine regiments joined the
Twenty-third Corps or were _en route_ during the brief halt at the
Etowah. [Footnote: _Id._, p. 291.] The ration was the full supply of
fresh beef from the herds driven with the army, varied by bacon two
days in the week, a pound of bread, flour, or corn-meal per man each
day, and the small rations of coffee, sugar and salt. [Footnote:
_Id._, p. 272.] Vegetables and forage were to some extent gathered
from the country. The coffee was always issued roasted, but in the
whole berry, and was uniformly first-rate in quality. The soldiers
carried at the belt a tin quart-pail, in which the coffee was
crushed as well as boiled. The pail was set upon a flat stone like a
cobbler's lapstone, and the coffee berries were broken by using the
butt of the bayonet as a pestle. At break of day every camp was
musical with the clangor of these primitive coffee-mills. The coffee
was fed to the mill a few berries at a time, and the veterans had
the skill of gourmands in getting just the degree of fineness in
crushing which would give the best strength and flavor. The cheering
beverage was the comfort and luxury of camp life, and we habitually
spoke of halting to make coffee, as in the French army they speak of
their _soupe_.




CHAPTER XXXVIII

ATLANTA CAMPAIGN: NEW HOPE CHURCH AND THE KENNESAW LINES


Sherman's plan for June--Movements of 24th May--Johnston's position
at Dallas and New Hope Church--We concentrate to attack--Pickett's
Mill--Dallas--Flanking movements--Method developed by the character
of the country--Closer personal relations to Sherman--Turning
Johnston's right--Cross-roads at Burnt Church--A tangled
forest--Fighting in a thunderstorm--Sudden freshet--Bivouac in a
thicket--Johnston retires to a new line--Formidable character of the
old one--Sherman extends to the railroad on our left--Blair's corps
joins the army--General Hovey's retirement--The principles
involved--Politics and promotions.


Sherman's general plan of campaign for the month of June was to move
his army in several columns upon Dallas, and then along the ridge
between the Etowah and Chattahooche rivers on Marietta. As Johnston
was at Allatoona and his cavalry was active all along the south bank
of the Etowah, our left flank was not only covered by Stoneman's
cavalry, but Schofield was purposely held back a day's march so as
to cover the rear as well as the flank, which was exposed to a
possible attack from Johnston as we marched south and opened a space
between us and the river, uncovering the supply trains which filled
the roads over which the troops had passed.

After crossing the river at Milam's bridge on May 24th, we turned
eastward through Stilesborough, to and across Richland Creek,
reaching the road on the upland which runs from Cassville to
Marietta by way of Rowland's Ferry. Stoneman, who had crossed the
Etowah with his division of horse at Shellman's Ford on the 22d, and
covered the laying of the pontoon bridges at Milam's, went back to
look after a raid by the Confederate cavalry at Cass Station, and
was not able to return to his position south of the river until the
evening of the 24th, when he scouted the road toward Allatoona.
Having the advance, my division marched southward on the Marietta
road to Sligh's Mill, where the road forks, the right-hand branch
turning southwest, along the ridge, to Huntsville, better known in
the neighborhood as Burnt Hickory. This place was about half-way on
the direct road from Kingston to Dallas, and was the rendezvous for
the Cumberland Army for the night. We camped at Sligh's Mill, being
joined by Hascall's division of our corps. Hovey's division and the
corps trains took the road from Stilesborough up Raccoon Creek, some
miles west of us and covered by our march. The Army of the Tennessee
reached VanWert, some miles west of Burnt Hickory, on the Rome and
Dallas road.

We lay at Sligh's Mill during the 25th, till five P.M., [Footnote:
Official Records, vol. xxxviii. pt. iv. p. 311.] giving time for
McPherson to approach Dallas, and for Thomas to continue his
movement of the centre upon the same place. We were then to march to
Burnt Hickory and follow Thomas to Dallas. But the enemy was also
active and modified our program. His cavalry had reported our
concentration in front of Kingston, and the laying of our pontoons
at Milam's bridge on the 23d. [Footnote: _Id._, p. 737.] They had
also made a reconnoissance to Cass Station, and found nothing there
but the wagons of the Twenty-third Corps, of which a number were
captured and destroyed. Satisfied that Sherman was marching
southward in force, Johnston immediately put his army in motion.
Hardee's Corps, being his left, marched to Dallas and took position
south of the town, covering the main road to Atlanta and extending
its line northeast toward New Hope Church. Hood was assigned to the
right at the church, and Polk had the interval in the centre, upon
the main road they had travelled from Allatoona. The line was along
the ridge dividing the headwaters of Pumpkin Vine Creek, which flows
northward into the Etowah, from the sources of the Sweetwater and
Powder-spring creeks which empty into the Chattahoochee at the
south.

The movement was begun on the 24th, and in the forenoon of the 25th
the Confederate troops were taking the positions assigned them,
covered by their cavalry. A captured dispatch gave Sherman useful
information, and he directed that instead of marching straight to
Dallas, Hooker should test the appearance of hostile force toward
New Hope Church, turning off on the Marietta road at Owen's Mill.
This brought on the fierce combat at New Hope Church, where Hood's
Corps held its line against Hooker's very vigorous attack. The
fighting began about four o'clock in the afternoon and lasted till
darkness put an end to it. All the other troops of the grand army
were hurried forward. McPherson continued his march to Dallas,
Thomas hastened the Fourth Corps to Hooker's support, holding part
of the Fourteenth as a general reserve, and Schofield was directed
to hasten the march of the Twenty-third Corps by way of Burnt
Hickory.

My division marched from Sligh's Mill at five o'clock, and on
reaching Burnt Hickory took the road Hooker had travelled to Owen's
Mill, accompanied by Hascall's division, Hovey's being left near
Burnt Hickory to protect the trains. A thunderstorm with pouring
rain came on soon after we started and lasted through the night. On
reaching the road behind Hooker, we found it filled with his wagons,
and the storm, the darkness, and the obstructed road produced a
combination of miseries which made the march slow and fatiguing to
the last degree. We plodded on till midnight, but had not yet
reached Pumpkin Vine Creek, when we halted for a little rest, and to
get further orders from Schofield, who had before nightfall gone on
to communicate with Sherman. Word came that he was disabled by an
accident when on his way back to us, and I was directed to lead the
two divisions forward and report to Sherman. After a halt of an hour
the men fell into ranks again, and pressing the toilsome march,
reached the field at daybreak. [Footnote: Official Records, vol.
xxxviii. pt. iv. pp. 303, 311, 320. The official Atlas is again
inaccurate in making our line of advance from Sligh's Mill follow
the Marietta road instead of that to Burnt Hickory (Huntsville).]

By Sherman's orders we joined the Fourth Corps (Howard's), extending
its line to the left, and the whole swung forward through a terribly
tangled forest till we passed Brown's saw-mill and reached the open
valley which was the continuation of that in front of Hooker, and
took our extreme left over the Dallas and Allatoona road. We had met
with a strong skirmishing resistance, for Johnston was manifestly
unwilling to give up the control of the road we had crossed. Having
thus partly turned the Confederate position on our left, Sherman
hoped that McPherson might complete their dislodgment by a similar
flanking movement through Dallas on our right. [Footnote: _Id._, pp.
321, 322.] The distances, however, were greater than we estimated,
and though McPherson kept with him Davis's division of Palmer's
Corps (greatly to Palmer's disgust), [Footnote: _Id._, pp. 316,
324.] he was still unable to connect his line with Hooker's, and
occupied an isolated, salient position in front of Dallas which
would be perilous if Johnston were able to concentrate upon him.

The enemy's line was along one of the smaller branches of Pumpkin
Vine Creek, and Sherman ordered for the 27th that McPherson should
press toward the left down the little valley, whilst Howard, with
one division of his own corps withdrawn from the line and one
division of Palmer's which had been in reserve, should push out
beyond our left and turn the enemy's right near Pickett's Mill. A
brigade of the Twenty-third Corps moved in the interval to cover
Howard's flank and keep connection with the intrenched line. The
almost impenetrable character of the forest made the movement slow,
and it was late in the afternoon when Howard reached the enemy's
position. He found they too had been busy in extending their lines,
though pretty sharply recurved, to the eastward. The fierce combat
did not succeed in carrying the Confederate position, but it gained
good ground near the mill, better covering all the roads toward the
railway. The left wing of the Twenty-third Corps swung forward to
Howard's position, and all intrenched strongly upon it.

On May 28th McPherson was ordered to prepare for moving to the
extreme left, continuing the extension of our line toward the
railroad. Suspecting this, the Confederates made a fierce attack
upon the position in front of Dallas, but were repulsed with heavy
loss. At McPherson's request his movement was delayed a little, lest
it should seem to be forced by Johnston's attack. [Footnote:
Official Records, vol. xxxviii. pt. iv. pp. 339, 340.]

Sherman had been very unwilling to give up the hope of putting
Johnston's army to rout in a decisive engagement, and to accept,
instead, the patient flanking movements by which he should force
upon his adversary the dilemma of abandoning more and more of
Georgia, or of himself making attacks upon intrenched lines. In
writing to Halleck after the battle of Resaca, he had said that
although the campaign was progressing favorably, he knew that his
army "must have one or more bloody battles such as have
characterized Grant's terrific struggles." [Footnote: _Id._, p.
219.] But the affairs at New Hope Church and Pickett's Mill show
that the country was so impracticable that it was not possible to
deliver an attack by his whole army at once, and so to give real
unity to a great battle. He was therefore brought, perforce, to
accept the systematic advance by flanking movements, and to avoid
assaults upon intrenched positions on the forest-covered hills. He
knew that this policy would bring a time when the enemy could no
longer afford to retreat and must resort to aggressive tactics, even
at the risk of destruction to his army. It was a curious repetition
of the ancient colloquy,--"If thou art a great general, come down
and fight me.--If thou art a great general, make me come down and
fight thee." It may be readily admitted that in such a country as
Central Europe other methods would have been feasible and
preferable; but in the tangled wildernesses of Virginia and Georgia
the matter was brought to the test by leaders who had courage and
will equal to any, and the result was a system which may be
confidently said to be the natural evolution of warfare in such
environment. Johnston knew that his retreat, though slow, was giving
dissatisfaction to President Davis at Richmond, but he saw also that
to assault Sherman's lines meant final and irretrievable disaster,
and he continued his patient and steady defence. Our progress around
his right warned him that the New Hope Church position must soon be
abandoned, and a new one was already selected, closer to Marietta,
with Kennesaw, Pine and Lost mountains, for its strongholds.

The two or three days during which General Schofield had been
disabled had brought me into closer personal relations with Sherman
than I had enjoyed before, and was the beginning of an intimate
friendship which lasted as long as he lived. I had the opportunity
of learning more of his characteristics and his methods, and saw how
sound his judgment was, and how cool a prudence there was behind his
apparent impulsiveness. The untiring activity of his mind turned
every problem over and over until he had viewed it from every point
and considered the probable consequences of each mode of solving it.
At bottom of all lay the indomitable courage and will which were
only stimulated by obstacles, and which stuck to the inexorable
purpose of keeping the initiative and making each day bring him
nearer to a successful end of the campaign.

By the 1st of June McPherson had brought the Army of the Tennessee
into close connection with the centre, where Palmer's Corps of the
Cumberland Army had its three divisions reunited (except one
brigade), relieving us and enabling Thomas to draw out Hooker's
Corps as a reserve. The orders for the 2d were that we were to pass
to the left beyond Howard's Corps, and push out upon the Burnt
Hickory and Marietta road, turning the enemy's flank and reaching,
if possible, the cross-roads where it intersected a second road
leading from New Hope Church to Ackworth, a little in rear of the
enemy's lines. The object was to cover more completely the
connections with the railroad south of the Etowah, and to gain
positions which would take in reverse portions of the Confederate
lines. Hooker's Corps was ordered to support this movement on our
extreme left. The cavalry were ordered to make a combined effort to
reach Allatoona Pass on the railroad, and to hold it till Blair's
(Seventeenth) Corps, coming from Alabama by way of Rome, could
arrive and occupy it in force. [Footnote: Official Records, vol.
xxxviii. pt. iv. pp. 348, 349, 362, 366, 367.]

Stoneman with the cavalry of the Army of the Ohio entered Allatoona
on June 1st, and reported the gorge a place he could hold against a
superior force. [Footnote: _Id_., p. 379.] General Johnston was so
well persuaded that his position was no longer tenable that he
issued the same day a confidential order directing a withdrawal, but
recalled it late in the day in view of the changes evidently going
on at our extreme right, and so remained a few days longer.
[Footnote: _Id_., p. 753.] On the morning of the 2d, the preliminary
changes in the line being completed, Schofield marched with the
Twenty-third Corps to the left until he reached the Burnt Hickory
and Marietta road, near the Cross Roads Church, or Burnt Church,
[Footnote: _Id_., p. 396.] then turning to the east and guiding his
left on the road he pushed forward through an almost impenetrable
forest where it was impossible to see two rods. There was great
difficulty in keeping the movement of the invisible skirmish line in
accord with the line of battle, which we directed by compass, like a
ship at sea. In the advance, my adjutant-general, Captain Saunders,
was mortally wounded by my side, as we were riding, unconscious of
our danger, through an opening out of our skirmishers in a momentary
loss of direction. There were extensive thickets of the loblolly
pine occasionally met, where these scrub trees were so thick and
their branches so interlaced that neither man nor horse could force
a way through them, and the movement would be delayed till these
densest places were turned by marching around them. The connection
would then be made again, the direction of the skirmishers
rectified, and the advance resumed. The regiments advanced by the
right of companies in columns of fours at deploying distance, but
not even the men of a company could see those on right or left, so
dense was the tangle.

We passed over the divide separating Pumpkin Vine Creek, and its
branches from Allatoona Creek, and the sharp skirmishing began as we
approached the latter. The afternoon was well advanced when we
reached the creek, and a heavy thunderstorm broke as our line forded
the stream and pushed up the hill on the other side. We now drew the
artillery fire from an intrenched line on the crest which we could
not see, and for a time the mingled roar of the thunder and of the
enemy's cannon was such that it was hard to tell the one from the
other. My advanced line closed in as near the intrenchments as
possible, whilst the second remained on the hither side of the
creek. At my request Hascall's division swung still farther out to
the left to develop the line of the enemy's works, and Schofield
asked Butterfield's division of Hooker's Corps to advance on the
extreme flank. He found that Hascall developed the full extent of
the Confederate line, and thought it a good opportunity to take the
position in reverse. Butterfield, however, declined to do more than
move up to Hascall's support in rear, and night fell before
Schofield could accomplish anything decisive. [Footnote: Official
Records, vol. xxxviii. pt. iv. p. 386. In this instance the question
of relative rank by date of commission was slightly involved.
Butterfield claimed to rank Schofield and declined to do more than
is stated. Schofield's Report, _Id_., pt. ii. p. 512; Schofield's
Forty-six Years in the Army, p. 130.]

The downpour of rain had been such that the creek, which was
insignificant when we first came to it, became unfordable before
sunset, and gave me no little concern for the first line of my
division, which was over it. It was ordered to cover itself with
such abatis as could be speedily made and to intrench, whilst we
improvised footbridges for crossing to its support if it should be
attacked. I announced that my headquarters for the night would be
immediately in rear of the centre of my second line; but when the
pressure of duty was off and I was at liberty to go to the position
I had named, I found that it was one of the densest parts of a pine
thicket, and I could not even get back of the troops in line till a
path was cut for me by a detachment of men with axes. They cleared a
narrow way for a few rods, and then widened it out into a circular
space at the foot of the trunk of a great tree so that there was
room for a camp-fire, and for two or three of us to bivouac, but
most of the staff remained at a more approachable place a little in
rear. [Footnote: Official Records, vol. xxxviii. pt. iv. p. 396.] We
regarded it so important that the notice given to subordinates of
our whereabouts at night should not be misleading, that we stuck to
the place that had been named, in spite of the inconvenience and
discomfort. The fall of rain is amusingly illustrated by the fact
that in the height of the storm my knee-boots filled with the water
running off me, and I emptied them as I sat in the saddle by lifting
first one leg and then the other up in front of me till the water
ran out of the boot-top in a stream. I had been a little ailing for
a day or two, and my sleep was not as sound as it usually was even
in close contact with the hostile lines. In the wakeful hours the
loss of my friend and able staff officer, Captain Saunders, filled
me with mournful thoughts; for though the daily work under fire had
exposed all the little circle at headquarters to casualties, our
good fortune hitherto had bred a sort of confidence in immunity, and
the sudden fall of him who had been the centre of the staff group
and a personal favorite with all was a heavy blow to us when we had
time to think of it.

Next morning Schofield arranged with General Thomas to relieve
Hovey's division of our corps which had been on our right, and
marching this division beyond Hascall's on our extreme left, the
whole line went forward. The Confederate intrenchment in my
immediate front was completely outflanked, and was found to be a
detached position which the enemy abandoned when threatened by
Hascall's advance, and my men at once occupied it. The movement was
continued until Hovey's division was upon the interior Dallas and
Ackworth road near Allatoona church, whilst my division and
Hascall's held the cross roads which had been covered by the
fortifications we had captured. Hooker's Corps passed beyond Hovey,
covering the flank to the eastward. Sherman now hastened the
extension of the line toward the railroad by passing the whole army
behind us, till by the 6th we became the extreme right flank of the
army. [Footnote: Official Records, vol. xxxviii. pt. ii. p. 681;
_Id._, pt. iv. p. 407.] Johnston had abandoned his position on the
night of the 4th, falling back on the new line he had selected with
his left resting on Lost Mountain and his right upon Brush Mountain,
the next eminence north of Kennesaw. [Footnote: _Id._, pt. iv. pp.
408, 758.]

The abandonment of the New Hope line gave us the opportunity to
examine it, which, of course, we did with great interest. It was
about six miles long, of the most formidable character of field
fortifications. The entry in my diary says of them that we found
them "very strong, both for artillery and infantry, with abatis
carefully sharpened and staked down. They have never before shown so
much industry and finished their defensive works with so much care."
When it is remembered that these lines could only be approached
through forests which hid everything till we were right upon them,
it will easily be believed that we congratulated ourselves that the
enemy was manoeuvred out of them and was being crowded back till he
must soon assume the aggressive and assault our works.

Sherman's new positions placed McPherson's army on Proctor's Creek,
a branch of the Allatoona in front of Ackworth on the railroad,
Thomas's army between Mt. Olivet Church and Golgotha, covering the
principal roads from Cassville and Kingston to Marietta and Lost
Mountain, whilst Schofield was placed in echelon on the right flank,
covering the hospitals and trains until the base could be
transferred to the railway. [Footnote: Official Records, vol.
xxxviii. pt. iv. pp. 423, 428, 430.] My own division was left for
some days in the position we had carried on the 3d, about a mile
separated from the rest of the line. A pontoon bridge was laid at
the Etowah railway crossing till the great bridge could be
constructed, and General Blair, who was on the 6th at Kingston, with
two divisions of the Seventeenth Corps, was ordered to march to
Ackworth by this direct road. [Footnote: _Id_., p. 424.] Blair's
command was the only important reinforcement received by Sherman
during the campaign, and just about made up for the losses by battle
and by sickness up to the time of its arrival. A more open belt of
country lay along the western side of the line from Kennesaw to Lost
Mountain, and Sherman hurried the readjustment of his forces in the
hope of a decisive engagement with Johnston by the 9th of June or
soon afterward.

A change now occurred in the organization of our corps which
afterward became a matter of so much historical notoriety that it
may be worth while to give the particulars with accuracy. General
Hovey tendered his resignation as a division commander, and asked a
leave of absence to await the action of the President upon it. The
reasons assigned by him were his dissatisfaction and unwillingness
to serve longer with his division, which he claimed should be
increased by five regiments of Indiana cavalry, recruited at the
same time and in connection with his infantry regiments, and, as he
asserted, with some assurance that they should be one organization
under him. He also intimated that he had reason to expect promotion
which had not been given him.

I have already mentioned some dissatisfaction on General Schofield's
part with him at the beginning of the campaign, [Footnote: _Ante_,
p. 214.] but the middle of the campaign seemed so inconvenient a
time to make a change that Schofield sought earnestly to smooth the
matter over, and tried to obtain for Hovey other troops to increase
the size of his division. [Footnote: Official Records, vol. xxxviii.
pt. iv. p. 439.] Sherman had no infantry which was not a regular
part of other divisions, and could not increase Hovey's command in
that way. He said that he could not tolerate the anomaly of
combining five cavalry regiments with infantry in a division of
foot, and that, in fact, the regiments were along the railroad,
protecting our communications and could not be spared. He invited
Hovey to a personal conference, and urged him to withdraw his
resignation, to take time at least for reflection, and not insist
upon changes in the midst of a campaign and in the presence of the
enemy. The appeal was unsuccessful, and Sherman telegraphed to the
War Department that Hovey was discontented because he was not made a
major-general, and that, though he esteemed him as a man, he should
recommend the acceptance of the resignation. On the paper itself he
endorsed a full statement of the circumstances and his
recommendation that General Hovey be allowed to resign. [Footnote:
Official Records, vol. xxxviii. pt. iv. pp. 433, 439, 443, 448.]

The official censure of General Sherman having been thus spread upon
the records of the War Department, and that department having made a
tender of resignation in the presence of the enemy a cause for
summary dismissal of inferior officers, the surprise of the army may
be imagined when, on July 25th, Sherman was notified from Washington
that Hovey and Osterhaus had been promoted to be
major-generals,--the first by brevet, the other to the full grade.
To Sherman himself the thing was exceedingly galling, for not only
was his action in Hovey's case reversed, and that which he condemned
made the occasion for reward, but he had, only the day before, in
asking to have Howard transferred to the command of the Army of the
Tennessee, made vacant by McPherson's death, added a special request
on the general subject of promotions. "After we have taken Atlanta,"
he had said, "I will name officers who merit promotion. In the mean
time I request that the President will not give increased rank to
any officer who has gone on leave from sickness, or cause other than
wounds in battle." [Footnote: _Id_., pt. v. p. 241.] This language
had manifest reference to the cases in hand, and was, no doubt,
based on rumors of what was about to happen: but it was too late,
for a dispatch from Colonel Hardie, Inspector-General, was already
on the way to him, announcing the promotions by order of the War
Department.

Sherman's indignation boiled over in his reply, which said: "I wish
to put on record this, my emphatic opinion, that it is an act of
injustice to officers who stand by their posts in the day of danger
to neglect them and advance such as Hovey and Osterhaus, who left us
in the midst of bullets to go to the rear in search of personal
advancement. If the rear be the post of honor, then we had better
all change front on Washington." [Footnote: Official Records, vol.
xxxviii. pt. v. p. 247.] The vigor of this protest carried it to Mr.
Lincoln's personal attention, and he answered it, admitting that it
was well taken, but urging reasons for his action which show only
too well that they were more political than military. A Presidential
campaign had just begun, and with all his great qualities, Mr.
Lincoln was susceptible to reasons of political policy in the use of
appointments to office. He referred to the recommendations for
promotion that Grant and Sherman had given these officers in a
former campaign, and to "committals" which had been drawn from him
which he "could neither honorably nor safely disregard." [Footnote:
_Id_., p. 259.] In the case of Osterhaus the President added that
his promise had been given "on what he thought was high merit and
somewhat on his nationality." In short, Indiana and Missouri were
doubtful States, and the German vote was important. But what idea of
military promotions was that which, in such a war and in the midst
of such a campaign, advanced officers to the highest grade upon
personal importunity, not only without consultation with their
commanding general in the field but in spite of his protest; which
does not seem even to have asked the question what was going on in
Georgia and what would be the effect of such action upon the army
there! If there had been unlimited power of promotion, the case
might have been less mischievous; but Congress had limited the
number of officers, so that vacancies were now filled, and, for the
Atlanta campaign and Sherman's army in Georgia, these two were the
only promotions that could be given, and of those whom Sherman
recommended for the grade of major-general for service in that
campaign when Atlanta was taken, not one then received it. When
these things are remembered, Sherman's indignation will be seen to
be righteous, and his protest a memorable effort in favor of good
military administration. In replying to the President he apologized
for the freedom of his language and assured Mr. Lincoln of his
confidence in the conscientiousness of his general course, but he
did not soften or blink the facts. "You can see," said he, "how
ambitious aspirants for military fame regard these things. They come
to me and point them out as evidence that I am wrong in encouraging
them to a silent, patient discharge of duty. I assure you that every
general of my army has spoken of it, and referred to it as evidence
that promotion results from importunity and not from actual service.
I have refrained from recommending any thus far in the campaign, as
I think we should reach some stage in the game before stopping to
balance accounts or to write history." [Footnote: Official Records,
vol. xxxviii. pt. v. p. 271.]

Some promotions to the rank of brigadier were made in the Potomac
Army at this time, and Grant was notified that there were three or
four other vacancies in that grade. This led him to say he would
like to have them given to such men as Sherman might recommend. He
added: "No one can tell so well as one immediately in command the
disposition that should be made of the material on hand. Osterhaus
has proved himself a good soldier, but if he is not in the field I
regret his promotion." [Footnote: _Id_., p. 260.] As it had been
Grant's former recommendation which had been the strongest
ostensible ground of the promotion, this remark of his is important
as pointing out the true principle in such matters. Recommendations
of such a sort are always on the implied condition that the claim
shall not be forfeited by subsequent conduct, and Grant said in
substance that the circumstances had altered the cases and relieved
him (and the administration too) of any obligation.

To complete the discussion, it must be noted that there were three
brigadiers from Indiana in the Twenty-third Corps at this time, and
Hovey was not only the junior of the three but had been the least
actively employed in the campaign. Manson had been stricken down in
the battle of Resaca whilst heroically leading his men to the
capture of the rebel position, and never fully recovered from the
injury. [Footnote: _Ante_, p. 221.] Hascall distinguished himself at
every step of the campaign. Both left the service at last without
any further recognition. It was common fame in the army that they
were not favored by Governor O. P. Morton, the dominant political
influence in their State. Hovey's further service was not in the
field, but as commandant of the District of Indiana. Osterhaus
returned to the Fifteenth Corps and served creditably in Sherman's
remaining campaigns. Hovey's division was broken up, one brigade
being added to Hascall's division and the other to mine. [Footnote:
Official Records, vol. xxxviii. pt. iv. p. 448.]




CHAPTER XXXIX

ATLANTA CAMPAIGN: MARIETTA LINES--CROSSING THE CHATTAHOOCHEE


Continuous rains in June--Allatoona made a field depot on the
railway and fortified--Johnston in the Marietta lines--That from
Pine Mountain to Lost Mountain abandoned--Swinging our right
flank--Affair at Kolb's farm--Preparing for a general attack--Battle
of Kennesaw--The tactical problem--Work of my division--Topography
about Cheney's--Our advance on the 27th--Nickajack valley
reached--The army moves behind us--Johnston retreats to the
Chattahoochee--Twenty-third Corps at Smyrna Camp-ground--Crossing
the Chattahoochee at Soap Creek--At Roswell--Johnston again
retreats--Correspondence with Davis--Mission of B. H. Hill--Visit of
Bragg to Johnston--Johnston's unfortunate reticence--He is relieved
and Hood placed in command--Significance of the change to the
Confederacy and to us.


In the month of June we had more than three weeks of pouring rains,
making a quagmire of the whole country. The "dirt roads," which were
the only ones, were soon destroyed by the heavy army wagons, and
even the place where they had been could not be distinguished in the
waste of mud and ruts which spread far and wide. Sherman found the
intrenchments Johnston had left "an immense line of works," and
congratulated himself that they had been turned with less loss to
himself than he had inflicted on the enemy. [Footnote: Official
Records, vol. xxxviii. pt. iv. p. 408.] The first reconnoissances
found that Johnston had retreated so far that, from the commander
downward, we all harbored the hope that he had retreated beyond the
Chattahoochee. [Footnote: _Id_., p. 427.] To prepare for our next
step, the railway crossing of the Etowah must be completed and our
depot of supplies advanced to Allatoona. The gorge there was almost
as defensible on the south as on the north, and Sherman set Captain
Poe, his engineer, to work laying out fortifications to cover its
southern mouth and thus prepare for holding it by a small garrison
as a secondary base if we should have to leave it again to make a
wide turning movement. [Footnote: Official Records, vol. xxxviii.
pt. iv. p. 428.]

[Illustration: Vicinity of Marietta, June 20,--July 4, 1864.]

We were not long in learning that Johnston was not over the
Chattahoochee, but had only fallen back to a shorter and more
formidable line about Marietta, covering the railway where it passed
through the defiles of Kennesaw Mountain, extending his left centre
to the isolated knob of Pine Mountain, and thence recurving his
flank by way of Gilgal (Hard-Shell Church in local nomenclature)
toward Lost Mountain, which was held by his cavalry.

At the first appearance of a retreat by the Confederates beyond the
Chattahoochee, Sherman's mind naturally turned to the plans of
campaign which should follow his approach to Atlanta as they had
been indicated by General Grant at the beginning of operations in
the spring, and he inquired of Halleck whether the intended mov