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Party Government, by T. R. Ashworth and H. P. C. Ashworth

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Title: Proportional Representation Applied To Party Government

Author: T. R. Ashworth and H. P. C. Ashworth

Release Date: December 25, 2004 [EBook #14459]

Language: English

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PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION APPLIED TO PARTY GOVERNMENT

A NEW ELECTORAL SYSTEM

BY

T.R. ASHWORTH (_President of the Victorian Division, Australian Free
Trade and Liberal Association_)

AND

H.P.C. ASHWORTH (_Civil Engineer_)



LONDON

SWAN SONNENSCHEIN & CO., LIM.

PATERNOSTER SQUARE

1901




CONTENTS.


CHAPTER                                               PAGE

I.--THE TRUE PRINCIPLES OF POLITICAL REPRESENTATION      1

II.--THE SO-CALLED REPRESENTATIVE PRINCIPLE             22

III.--THE PRESENT POSITION or PARTY GOVERNMENT          47

IV.--THE REFORM: TRUE PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION       97

V.--HOW THE EVILS OF THE PRESENT SYSTEM WILL
       BE REMEDIED                                     122

VI.--THE HARE SYSTEM OF PROPORTIONAL DELEGATION        141

VII.--THE FREE LIST SYSTEM OF PROPORTIONAL
       DELEGATION                                      162

VIII.--PREFERENTIAL VOTING, THE BLOCK VOTE,
       THE LIMITED VOTE, &C.                           172

IX.--ATTEMPTS TO IMPROVE THE PRESENT SYSTEM            188

X.--APPLICATION OF THE REFORM TO AUSTRALIAN
       LEGISLATURES                                    194

XI.--THE CONDITIONS OF SOCIAL PROGRESS                 208




     "Majority and minority, in and for themselves, are the first
     requisite of popular government, and not the development or
     representation of separate groups."--Bradford's "Lesson of Popular
     Government," vol. ii., page 179.




PREFACE.


The subject of electoral reform has been brought into prominence in
Australia by a clause in the Commonwealth Bill which provides that the
Federal Senate shall consist of six senators from each State, directly
chosen by the people, voting as one electorate. The problem thus
presented has been keenly discussed. On the one hand we have the
advocates of the Block Vote asserting that the party in a majority is
entitled to return all six senators; and on the other, a small band of
ardent reformers pressing the claims of the Hare system, which would
allow the people in each State to group themselves into six sections,
each returning one senator. The claim that every section of the people
is entitled to representation appears at first sight so just that it
seems intolerable that a method should have been used all these years
which excludes the minority in each electorate from any share of
representation; and, of course, the injustice becomes more evident when
the electorate returns several members. But in view of the adage that
it is the excellence of old institutions which preserves them, it is
surely a rash conclusion that the present method of election has no
compensating merit. We believe there is such a merit--namely, that _the
present method of election has developed the party system_. Once this
truth is grasped, it is quite evident that the Hare system would be
absolutely destructive to party government, since each electorate would
be contested, not by two organized parties, but by several groups. For
it is precisely this splitting into groups which is causing such anxiety
among thoughtful observers as to the future of representative
institutions; Mr. Lecky has attributed to it, in his "Democracy and
Liberty," the decline in the parliamentary system which has accompanied
the progress of democracy all over the world. The object of this book is
to suggest a reform, which possesses the advantages of both methods and
the disadvantages of neither; which will still ensure that each
electorate is contested by the two main parties, but will allow its just
share of representation to each; and which will, by discouraging the
formation of minor groups, provide a remedy for the evil instead of
aggravating it.

                                                                T.R.A.
                                                                H.P.C.A.

325 COLLINS STREET, MELBOURNE.




PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION

APPLIED TO

PARTY GOVERNMENT.




CHAPTER I.

THE TRUE PRINCIPLES OF POLITICAL REPRESENTATION.


Old establishments, like the British Constitution, said Edmund Burke,
"are not often constructed after any theory; theories are rather drawn
from them." In setting out on an endeavour to understand the principles
underlying political representation, the saying expresses exactly the
course which should be followed. The inquiry is the more necessary as,
although representation more than anything else in the domain of
government distinguishes the modern from the ancient world, the ideas
which prevail as to the part it has played, is playing, and is destined
to play on the world's stage are not merely hazy, but extremely
inaccurate. The intimate connection of representation with the progress
which has followed its introduction is so little recognized that the
most advanced democracies are now willing to listen to any proposal to
return to direct government. In spite of the fact that the nineteenth
century has witnessed the triumph of the historical method in most
fields of social inquiry, the dangers of _a priori_ speculation on
political institutions are as much in evidence as when Burke wrote.

If we would understand, then, the meaning of representative
institutions, it is in the gradual development of the "mother of
parliaments" that we must seek for the most reliable information. We
must be careful, however, to leave out of sight those features of the
growth of the British Constitution which are merely the expression of
transitory social conditions, and to confine our attention to the
landmarks which bear directly on the inquiry. The subject is best
divided into two stages; the first characterized by the origin of
representation; and the second by the division into parties, and the
creation of cabinet government.

+The First Stage of Representation.+--Rightly to understand the
conditions which led to the introduction and development of the
representative principle, we must look back to the period immediately
following the signing of the Great Charter by the tyrant King John.

The Charter reaffirmed the ancient principle that free Englishmen should
not be taxed without their consent, and representation was the natural
outcome of that provision. A brief glance at the social conditions of
the time is necessary to understand why this was so. First, it must be
remembered that the true political unit of ancient times was the city
or local community. England at that time was a collection of local
communities, having more or less a corporate life. Then, again, there
were the three estates of the realm--the clergy, the lords, and the
commons--who were accustomed to confer with the King on public affairs.
The stage which marks the birth of representation was when these
different estates and communities were asked to tax themselves to
relieve the necessities of the King. It was obviously impossible that
the consent of every freeman should be obtained, hence the duty had to
be deputed to agents. Now, the idea of agency was not unknown in the
ancient world, but that agents should have power to bind those for whom
they acted was something entirely new. It was necessary, however, that
they should have this power, and it suited the King's convenience that
they should exercise it. Already, in the earliest writ of which we have
knowledge, summoning each shire to send two good and discreet knights,
it was provided that they should be chosen in the stead of each and all.
This happened in 1254, and in the following year the clergy were also
summoned for the same purpose of granting aid to the King. In the
meantime the merchants and trade guilds in the cities were growing rich.
The King cast longing eyes on their possessions, and wished to tax them.
So we find that in 1264 Simon de Montfort, Earl of Leicester, issued the
celebrated writ summoning each of the cities and boroughs to send two
of its more discreet and worthy citizens and burgesses. This is
sometimes regarded as the beginning of the House of Commons, but it was
really not until the fourteenth century that these several assemblies,
each of which up till then taxed itself separately and legislated in its
own sphere, coalesced into the present Houses. First the lower clergy
fell out, and, with the knights, citizens, and burgesses, were merged
into the House of Commons; and the higher prelates with the earls and
barons formed the House of Lords.

This, then, is the first stage of representation. What was the nature of
this new force which had come into the world and was destined to so
profoundly affect the whole course of human affairs? One result of
immense importance is apparent at a glance. It solved a problem which
had baffled the ancients--that of the nationalization of local
communities on a free basis. But it is generally assumed that the only
difficulty overcome was that of size; that the representative assembly
is a mere substitute for the larger assembly of the whole nation.
Starting with this assumption, it is claimed that the representative
assembly should be a mirror of the people on a small scale, and the more
faithfully it reflects their faults as well as their virtues, their
ignorance as well as their intelligence, the more truly representative
it is said to be. It is even asserted that with the modern facilities
for taking a poll, representative government might be dispensed with
and the people allowed to govern themselves. Democracy, we are assured,
means that every man should exercise an equality of political power.
Now, if this conception is correct, we should at once insist that every
law should be submitted to a direct referendum of the people; that
legislators should be mere agents for drawing up laws; and that the
executive should be directly responsible to and elected by the people.
But if representation is not a mere substitute for the direct action of
the people this idea as to the true line of democratic progress falls to
the ground. The whole question, therefore, hinges on what representation
is and what are the principles underlying it.

Looking back to the history of its introduction, we have seen that it
was only in proportion as the deputies of the local communities were not
regarded as delegates or agents that they became representatives.
Professor E. Jenks has written an interesting article in the
_Contemporary Review_ for December, 1898, in which he advances the
theory that representation is a union of the ideas of agency, borrowed
from the Roman law, and of vicarious liability from barbaric sources. As
to the latter he points out that in Anglo-Saxon times the only way for
the King to control the free local communities was to exact hostages
till crimes were punished or fines paid. In England, where these ideas
were combined, constitutional monarchy was firmly established; but in
France, Germany, &c, in whose medieval parliaments the idea of agency
prevailed, and where in consequence the parliamentary idea was weak,
absolute monarchy held its ground. When Edward I. desired for purposes
of his own to emphasize the unlimited liability of political
representatives, and insisted that they should have "full and sufficient
power to do what of common council shall be ordained," he probably never
realized that a body having power to bind the shires and towns was a
formidable institution, or that the trembling hostages would become in
time haughty plenipotentiaries. But whatever may have been the social
conditions which gave rise to the idea, it is certain that it was the
power of binding those to whom they owed their selection which enabled
the representatives to resist the encroachments of the monarchy on the
liberties of the people. At first they were not legislators, but merely
sought to uphold the ancient laws. They presented petitions to redress
their grievances; but in time these petitions became demands; and they
refused to grant the King's subsidies till the demands were complied
with. It was, therefore, this first stage of representation which
enabled the people to start that long struggle against the power of the
King and nobles which has ended in complete self-government; nay, more,
it was necessary that they should pass through this first stage before
they could learn to govern themselves. Yet we have seen that if we apply
the modern ideas on representation the start could never have been
made. In what respects, then, did these early representative
institutions differ from the modern conception as a reproduction of the
people on a small scale? One obvious difference at once suggests itself.
The representatives were not average members of the communities; they
were the most influential; they were selected because of their special
fitness for the work to be done; they were leaders of the people, not
followers; they did not take inspiration from the people, but brought it
to them; and having selected these men the people deferred to their
judgment to act for them and protect their interests. Here, then, we
arrive at the first principle involved in representation, which is
leadership.

But there is another and still more important difference between a
representative assembly and a primary assembly of the people. It is
this: that a representative cannot be a violent partisan of a small
section of his constituents; he must be in general favour with all
sections. Therefore a representative assembly is composed of moderate
men, representing a compromise of the views of their individual
supporters. Moreover, the representatives appeal to the people to sink
their minor differences for the general welfare. This feature is very
prominent in the early parliaments. The local communities were arrayed
as a united people against the aggression of the monarchy. The principle
which is here apparent is that of organization. In the first stage of
English parliamentary history we may say at once that these two
principles--organization and leadership--were most conspicuous. The
people, sinking all minor differences, formed one united party; and
recognised that their struggle against the party of prerogative depended
on the ability, influence, and integrity of their deputies.

+The Second Stage of Representation.+--There is no need to enter into
that long struggle between the nation and the monarchy which followed.
We pass on, then, to the time when the parliaments, having wrested a
share of power, began to split up into parties. It was natural that when
power became divided two parties should arise; one upholding the
authority of the Parliament against the King; and the other favouring
the divine right of Kings. The Puritans and Cavaliers in the troublous
times of Charles I. were the earliest signs of this tendency. The Long
Parliament, which met in 1640, was divided on these lines; the
misdemeanors of the King brought on civil war; the parliamentary troops
defeated the royal troops after a bloody struggle; and the King was
brought to execution. The succeeding events were full of instruction.
The Parliament attempted to govern the nation--or, rather, we should say
the House of Commons did, for the House of Lords was abolished. But it
proved quite unfit for the purpose. It was thoroughly disorganized, and
rent by violent factions. The anarchy which ensued was ended by a
military despot, Oliver Cromwell, who entered the House of Commons in
1653 with his soldiers. The Speaker was pulled from his chair; the
members were driven from the House; and Cromwell was proclaimed
dictator. It is strange, indeed, that the lesson which is to be drawn
from this event, and which has been repeated in France time after time
since the Revolution, has not yet been learned: the only escape from
continued political anarchy is despotism. But the weakness of despotism
is that it ends with the life of the despot. Cromwell's son was forced
to abdicate, and the monarchy was restored. The same division of parties
in the Parliament continued, and they began to take the names of Whigs
and Tories. Towards the end of the seventeenth century, the dissensions
of these two factions again threatened to make government impossible. In
administration the evil was felt most; the union of ministers of both
parties was proving unworkable. So fickle did legislation become that no
one could say one day what the House would do the next. It was at this
crisis, and about the year 1693, that William III., who cared more for a
strong administration than for political differences, created what is
known as cabinet government, and, as Professor Gardiner says, "refounded
the government of England on a new basis." Recognizing that power should
not be separated from responsibility, he affirmed the principle that the
ministers of state should be selected from the party which had a
majority in the House of Commons. But the time was not yet ripe for the
complete application of this principle. Early in the eighteenth century
Sir Robert Walpole set the example of resigning when he no longer
possessed the confidence of a majority of the House of Commons; but in
the latter half of the century the great Earl of Chatham introduced
again the practice of selecting ministers irrespective of party. Despite
the fact that he was supported by the personal influence of George III.,
the attempt failed. A succession of weak ministries followed; and out of
the confusion the modern division of Liberals and Conservatives emerged.
Thus it was not until the beginning of the present century that the
doctrines of the solidarity of the Cabinet and its complete dependence
on a majority of the House of Commons were thoroughly developed in their
present form. England, now grown into the United Kingdom, had at last,
after six centuries of strife, won her national independence, and for
one brief century has enjoyed a full measure of self-government.

+Comparison of the Two Stages.+--How do the conditions presented by the
nineteenth century differ from those of the fourteenth? And how is the
problem of representation affected? We have seen that the great forces
which animated the nation in the fourteenth century were organization
and leadership. Have these forces ceased to operate? Assuredly not. In
the fourteenth century we had a united people organized under its chosen
leaders against the encroachments of the King and nobility on its
national liberty. In the nineteenth century the people have won their
political independence, but the struggle is now carried on between two
great organized parties. The principle of leadership is still as strong
as ever. The careers of Pitt, Peel, Palmerston, Beaconsfield, and
Gladstone attest that fact. The one great difference, then, between the
fourteenth and the nineteenth centuries is that instead of one party
there are two. The problem of representation in the fourteenth century
was to keep the people together in one united party, and to allow them
to select their most popular leaders. Surely the problem is different in
the nineteenth century. The requirements now are to organize the people
into two great parties, and to allow each party separately to elect its
most popular leaders. And yet we are still using the same method of
election as our forefathers used six centuries ago. Although the
conditions have entirely changed, we have not adapted the electoral
machinery to the change. The system of single-membered electorates was
rational in the fourteenth century, because there was only one party. Is
it not on the face of it absurd to-day, when there are two parties?

+The Meaning of Party Government.+--Why should there be two parties
instead of one in order that the people should be able to govern
themselves? To answer this question we must start at the beginning, and
consider what is the problem of popular government. The best definition
is that it is to promote the general welfare--to reconcile or average
the real interests of all sections of the community. Now, if the people
could all agree what is best in the interests of all, unity of action
might certainly be obtained; but even then the problem would not be
solved, for the people are not infallible. The greater part of the
problem consists in finding out what is best in the interests of all,
and no amount of mere abstract speculation can solve this part. So
diverse and so complex are the interests to be reconciled, so interwoven
and interdependent one with another, that the problem of securing a just
balance is incapable of solution by anything short of omniscience. But
in any case the people cannot be always got to agree to one course of
action. Therefore the people cannot govern themselves as one united
party. The only workable basis is, then, the rule of the majority, and
the problem of popular government is how to ensure that the majority
shall rule in the interests of all.

Party government provides the best known means of solving this problem.
The only way of finding out what is best for the whole people is by the
incessant action and interaction of two great organized parties under
their chosen leaders; each putting forth its energies to prove its
fitness to hold the reins of government; each anxious to expose the
defects of the other. This healthy emulation as to what is best for all,
with the people to judge, is the real secret of free government. The
two parties are virtually struggling as to which shall be king. Each is
striving to gain the support of a majority of the people; and the
grounds on which it appeals for support are that the measures it
proposes are the best for the country, and that the men it puts forward
are the best men for passing those measures into law and carrying on the
administration of the country. This constant agitation, and this mutual
competition to devise new measures, and to bring forward new men,
prevent stagnation. Both sides of every leading public question of the
day are presented in the rival party policies, and the people are
invited to decide between them. The forces on which the parties rely to
move the people are enthusiasm for measures and enthusiasm for
men--party and personality, or, in other words, organization and
leadership. It is in opposing these forces to counteract the selfish and
anti-social passions that party government acquires its virtue. By
appealing to their higher nature it induces the people to subordinate
their class prejudices to the general welfare, and by setting before
them definite moral ideals, and appealing to them by the force of
personality, it raises the character of public opinion, and moulds
individual and national character to an extent that is seldom
appreciated. Here, then, is the key of human progress. Direct
democracies may hold together so long as there are external enemies to
induce the people to sink their differences in the common interest, or
so long as there is a slave caste to do the menial work, as in the
ancient democracies; but representative democracy offers the only hope
of welding together a free people into a united whole. The unrestrained
rule of the majority under direct democracy must degenerate into the
tyranny of the majority. Instead of the equality of political power
which it promises, the minority is deprived of all power. Representative
democracy, on the other hand, deprives the people of the personal
exercise of political power, in order to save them from the free play of
their self-assertive passions, but still leaves to every man an equality
of influence in deciding the direction of progress. Thus every man is
induced to express his opinion as to the direction of progress; and the
party policy is the resultant direction of progress of all the party
electors, and therefore represents their organized opinion. Now, bear in
mind that the true direction of progress is not known, and can only be
found out by constant experiment directed by the most far-seeing and
capable minds. It is the means of carrying on this experiment which
party government provides. The party representing the organized opinion
of the majority has, rightly, complete control of the direction of
progress so long as it remains in a majority. But, although deliberation
is the work of many, execution is the work of one. Hence the creation of
a small committee of the party in power--the cabinet--associated with
the leader of the party, who becomes for the time being the Prime
Minister, the cabinet ministers being jointly responsible for the
control of administration and the initiation of measures for the public
good. But an organized minority is quite as essential to progress as an
organized majority--not merely to oppose, but to criticise and expose
the errors of the party in power, and to supplant it when it ceases to
possess the confidence of the country. Hence progress under party
government may be compared to a zigzag line, in which the changes in
direction correspond to changes in ministry. By this mutual action and
alternation of parties every vote cast has, in the long run, an equal
influence in guiding progress. The only justification for majority rule
sanctioned by free government is that when two parties differ as to what
is best for the whole people the majority shall prevail, and party
government tends to realize this condition. But direct government by the
people offers no check whatever on the power of the majority, which is
as absolute as that of the Czar of Russia. As Calhoun, the American
statesman, writes in his "Disquisition on Government," "the principle by
which constitutional governments are upheld, is _compromise_, that of
absolute governments is _force_!" Now, the significance of party
government as a guarantee of free government lies in this: that party
policies represent a compromise of what every section composing each
party supposes to be the interests of the whole people; and the parties
are engaged in fighting out a compromise of the real interests of every
section of the people.

Lest it be thought that in this panegyric on party government we have
been indulging in a wild flight into the region of speculative politics,
we hasten to add that the ideal condition we have pictured has never
been reached. The British Parliament has perhaps most nearly approached
it, but already shows signs of retrogression. America and the Australian
colonies are drifting further away from it. Already political
philosophers are shaking their heads and predicting the failure of
popular government. The cry everywhere is for a stronger executive.
Party organization is breaking down; small factions actuated by
self-interest hold the balance of power between the main parties, and
render government unstable and capricious. The main parties themselves
tend to degenerate into factions. Personality is declining--the demand
is for followers, not leaders. Compromise is supplanted by log-rolling
and lobbying. And, to crown all, the rumbling of class strife grows
ominously louder. The danger is that these tendencies may be allowed to
go too far before reform is attempted--that the confidence between
classes may be destroyed.

+Organization and Leadership.+--We have shown that the two great
principles underlying representation are organization and leadership.
Now, after all, there is nothing very profound in this conclusion. Is
there a single department of concerted human action in which these same
principles are not apparent? What would be thought of an army without
discipline and without generals; or of a musical production in which
every performer played his own tune? Even in the region of sport, can a
cricket or a football team dispense with its captain and its places? And
yet many people imagine that a disorganized collection of delegates of
various sections can rule a nation? Such an assembly would be as much a
mob as any primary assembly of the people, and would in no sense be a
representative assembly. The fact is that the growing intensity of the
evils which beset representative institutions throughout the civilized
world to-day is due to imperfect expression of these two principles.
Representative assemblies are not properly organized into two coherent
parties, nor is each party allowed free play to select its most popular
leaders. What is the remedy?

+A Change in Electoral Machinery the Key to Reform.+--The great mistake
made by all writers on electoral reform is that they have failed to
recognize that the character of public opinion depends upon the way it
is expressed. If the electoral machinery be adapted to give effect to
those principles of organization and leadership which lie at the root of
representation, then the character of public opinion will be improved.
Representation, in fact, is not only a means of expressing public
opinion, but also of guiding, informing, educating, and organizing it.
Therefore, the method of election is an all-important factor.

The first and greatest necessity is to counteract the tendency of the
people to split up into factions. It may seem a startling conclusion
that this is a mere matter of electoral machinery, but it is
nevertheless quite true. It must be remembered that we are dealing with
human beings and not with insentient figures. If the method of election
allows representation to two sections only, the people will group
themselves into two sections. But if it allows representation to a large
number of sections, then the people will group themselves into as many
sections as are allowed. Now, party government offers every hope of
preventing two sections degenerating into factions, but with a number of
sections there is absolutely none.

Here, then, we see the one great merit of the present system of
election, which explains why it has persisted so long, with all its
faults. It is that it tends to confine representation to the two main
parties, since each electorate is generally contested by them; but in so
far as it does not completely effect that object and allows
representation to independent factions it is defective. Moreover, the
merit we have indicated is purchased at too high a price. It is these
defects which are causing the degradation of representative institutions
throughout the world to-day.

It is obviously impossible to give a just share of representation to two
parties and allow each party to elect its most popular leaders, in an
electorate which returns only a single representative. Hence the first
necessity for reform is to enlarge electorates, so that each may return
several representatives. Now, the requirements for giving effect to the
principles of organization and leadership in such an electorate are:--

     1. Proportional representation to the two main parties--Ministerial
     and Opposition, the majority and the minority.

     2. The election by each party of its most popular
     candidates--_i.e._, those most in general favour with all sections
     of the party.

This is the problem of representation as it presents itself to us.
Leaving a detailed account of the means by which it is proposed to give
effect to these great desiderata to a later chapter, let us indicate
briefly where they strike at the root of the evils of the present
system.

+Enlarged Electorates.+--With enlarged electorates the minority will not
be excluded. Each party will secure its just share of representation.
When both parties are represented in each electorate the interests of
the electorate will not be bargained for as the price of support.
Members will cease to be mere local delegates.

+Proportional Representation to the Two Main Parties.+--Representation
must be absolutely confined to the two main parties, and each party must
be allowed its just share. Every candidate should be required to
nominate either as a Ministerialist or Oppositionist, and each party
should be allotted a number of representatives proportional to the total
amount of support received. If democracy means that every man's opinion,
as expressed by his vote, is to have the same weight, it follows that
the parties should be represented in the Legislature in the same
proportion as among the people, otherwise it is ridiculous to talk of
the rule of the majority. The present system sometimes results in
minority rule and sometimes in minority extermination; it is difficult
to say which alternative is the worse.

+Election of its Most Popular Candidates by each Party.+--It would be
little use to confine representation to the two main parties if the
parties were allowed to split up into factions. The only way to prevent
this is to provide such electoral machinery as will ensure the return of
the candidates most in general favour with all sections, and will
exclude the favourites of sections within the party. This distinction is
vital. The general favourite is a representative; the favourite of a
faction is a delegate. A representative is not only independent of any
one section, but if he does favour a faction he will sink in general
favour. He therefore represents a compromise of the demands of all
sections. But a delegate is the mouthpiece of a faction--a follower, not
a leader of the people.

No section will be disfranchised by this proposal, for the true
function of all minor sections is to influence the policies of the two
main parties. Thus every section will be proportionally represented in
one or the other policy and by all the party candidates. Not only will
each party be proportionally represented but all the sections which
compose each party will be proportionally represented in its policy.
This is the only true meaning of proportional representation.




CHAPTER II.

THE SO-CALLED REPRESENTATIVE PRINCIPLE.


All schemes of electoral reform hitherto proposed under the name of
proportional representation are based on the so-called "representative
principle"--viz., that every section of the people is entitled to
separate representation in proportion to its numbers. The ideal varies
somewhat, but the usual conception, is that if each member represents a
different section or interest the assembly will represent all sections
or all interests. Now this is simply an attempt to return to what we
have described as the first stage of representation, but without the
fear of the monarchy to keep the sections together. For a deliberative
body or a king's council it might be suitable, but for an assembly
charged with the complete control of government in the interests of all
it is utterly impracticable. Each representative must represent all
interests; he must be elected on a definite policy as to what is best
for all the people. If he is sent in as the agent of one interest or one
section of the people, he ceases to be a representative and becomes a
delegate. All these schemes are therefore not proportional
representation at all, but proportional delegation.

We have shown that representation means the organization of public
opinion into two definite lines of policy, and that this is the only way
to prevent political anarchy. But the proportionalists (as they like to
call themselves) say that it means representing men and the opinions
they hold in proportion to their numbers. The fundamental error is that
they neglect the all-important factor of human nature. They look on
public opinion as something having an independent existence apart from
the questions about which it is expressed and from the means of
expressing it; and they fail to recognize that the character of public
opinion depends on the manner in which it is expressed and organized. It
is but a natural consequence that they also conceive the number of
sections of opinion awaiting representation as pre-existing and
independent of the electoral machinery.

In short, they reduce the whole problem to a nice little exercise in
mathematics, requiring only for its clear exposition some columns of
figures and a few coloured diagrams to represent the different shades of
public opinion. No better example of the dangers of _a priori_
speculation could be adduced than this chimerical idea of the
proportionalists that public opinion is something to be divided into
fractions like a mathematical quantity, unless it be, perhaps, the
conclusion that if you gather together delegates representing these
fractions you will have an assembly representing the sum total of public
opinion.

The issue is quite clear. Are we to have two parties aiming at the
control of administration and appealing to all sections for support, or
the separate delegation of a number of sections? In the one case we will
have parties based on national policies, and in the other case we will
have a number of factions, each wanting something different and
determined to block progress till it gets it. Remember that it is a mere
matter of electoral machinery which will determine the choice. It is
true that at present we do not have two very coherent parties, but that
is the fault of the present electoral system.

It would seem that there can be but one answer to this question, and yet
the "representative principle" shows such wonderful vitality that it is
worth while considering the arguments on which it is based, and the
various stages through which the idea has passed.

+Mr. Hare's Scheme.+--The "representative principle" was first
propounded in England in 1857 by Mr. Thomas Hare. He proposed that the
United Kingdom should be constituted one huge electorate for the return
of the 654 members of the House of Commons. The people were to group
themselves into 654 voluntary unanimous sections, each returning one
member, and each gathered from every corner of the kingdom. We propose
to consider here not the scheme itself but only the principle on which
it was founded. Mr. Hare rightly conceived that the great evil of the
present system is the exclusion of the minority in each electorate, but
he altogether failed to appreciate that the excluded minority nearly
always represented one of the two main parties. He could not see, in
fact, that to divide each electorate into majority and minority is to
divide the whole country into majority and minority, nor that the
injustice is tolerated because it is usually as bad for one party as the
other. Instead, therefore, of proposing to do justice to both the
majority and the minority in each electorate, he proposed to allow
representation to as many minorities as possible. To him, the rule of
the majority was the rule of a majority of interests; this he called the
constitutional majority, as opposed to the "mere rule of numbers." Now,
at the time Mr. Hare wrote party government was rather weak in England.
He quotes with approval a statement of Mr. Sidney Herbert, M.P., that
the House was divided into many parties, or rather no party, because the
country was divided into many parties or no party, and that the division
into two parties would never be restored again. It is amusing, in view
of after events, to find Mr. Hare asking what would be the result of any
contrivance to re-establish party. Assuming that _party_ representation
was dead, Mr. Hare proposed to substitute _personal_ representation. It
is positively ludicrous at this interval of time to note how the
electors were expected to group themselves. They were to take personal
merit as the basis of representation; every vote cast was to be a
spontaneous tribute to the qualities and attainments of the person for
whom it was given. And in order, presumably, that they should choose
good men in preference to corrupt men, the polling-day was to be set
apart as a sacred holiday, and church services were to be held to
solemnize the public act and seek for the Divine blessing!

The maintenance of a responsible ministry in such a House presented no
difficulty to Mr. Hare. The electors were to indicate whom they
considered the most illustrious statesmen, and no one would dare to
question their decision!

It seems strange now that this scheme should have received serious
consideration. Mr. Hare was so much under the spell of the apparent
justice of the underlying principle that he was blind to its results.
But it was soon perceived that the electors would not group themselves
as Mr. Hare supposed; that the personal ideal of every class of electors
would be simply men of their own class. It was further pointed out that
cranks and faddists and every organization founded on questions of the
remotest interest would combine to secure representation. Mr. Disraeli
declared it to be "opposed to every sound principle, its direct effect
being to create a stagnant representation ... an admirable scheme for
bringing crotchety men into the House." Mr. Shaw-Lefevre condemned it
as "a vicious principle based upon a theory of classes," and Mr.
Gladstone said that it regarded electors "not as rational and thinking
beings, but merely as the equivalents of one another." Walter Bagehot,
in his standard work on the "English Constitution," opposes the
principle of voluntary constituencies, because it would promote a
constituency-making trade. "But upon the plan suggested," he writes,
"the House would be made up of party politicians selected by a party
committee, chained to that committee, and pledged to party violence, and
of characteristic, and therefore unmoderate, representatives for every
'ism' in all England. Instead of a deliberate assembly of moderate and
judicious men, we should have a various compound of all sorts of
violence. I may seem to be drawing a caricature, but I have not reached
the worst. Bad as these members would be if they were left to
themselves--if in a free Parliament they were confronted with the perils
of government, close responsibility might improve them, and make them
tolerable. But they would not be left to themselves. A voluntary
constituency will nearly always be a despotic constituency."

The practical difficulties in the application of Mr. Hare's scheme are
almost insuperable, but it is not worth while pursuing the subject,
since it is now admitted by recent advocates that the faddist argument
is fatal. This is an admission that Mr. Hare completely neglected the
factor of human nature. Professor Nanson writes:--"Hare proposed that
there should be only one electorate, consisting of the whole State. It
is unfortunate that this proposal was made. There can be no doubt that
it has retarded the progress of true electoral reform for at least a
generation ... it would inevitably lead to the election of a certain
number of faddists."

+John Stuart Mill.+--The great vogue which the Hare system has obtained
is to be traced more to the influence of John Stuart Mill than to that
of anyone else. Mill was captivated by the apparent justice of the
proposal, and devoted a chapter of his "Representative Government" to
it, wherein he declared:--"Mr. Hare's scheme has the almost unparalleled
merit of carrying out a great principle of government in a manner
approaching to ideal perfection, while it attains incidentally several
other things of scarcely inferior importance." Believing in the absolute
justice of the principle, Mill and Hare were certainly consistent in
setting no limit to its application except the size of the assembly.
Mill is emphatic on this point. "Real equality of representation," he
asserted, "is not obtained unless any set of electors, amounting to
average number of a constituency, wherever they happen to reside, have
the power of combining with one another to return a representative."
Now, the recent disciples of Mr. Hare are never tired of claiming the
support of Mill, although they have thrown this definition to the
winds. But they are guilty of far more than that, for in another chapter
of Mill's book we find that his conception of a representative assembly
elected by the Hare system is a purely deliberative body. He expressly
declares it to be radically unfit for legislation, which he proposes to
hand over to a commission appointed by the Crown. The value of his
testimony is very much discounted by this fact.

+Sir John Lubbock.+[1]--We have asserted that the proportional principle
should be applied to two parties only--the majority and the minority,
and that every section can then be represented. Mill and Hare thought
that no limit should be set except the size of the assembly. All the
recent advocates of the system take up an intermediate position.
Appreciating the serious objections against allowing independent
representation to a large number of small sections, Sir John Lubbock,
president of the English Proportional Representation Society, proposes
to constitute electorates returning only three to five members each,
thus confining representation to only three to five sections in each
electorate, and sacrificing to a great extent accurate proportional
representation. In his book on "Representation," he writes:--"I have
assumed that Parliament should be 'a mirror of the nation;' if the
object were to secure unity of action rather than freedom of discussion,
to form an executive body such as a Government, a Board of Directors, or
a Vestry, the case would be quite different. It is, however, I presume,
our wish that Parliament should be a deliberative assembly in which all
parties should be fairly represented." But to make Parliament a
deliberative body is to destroy its power to secure unity of action at
all, and to render it useless as a working machine.

+Miss Spence.+--An active campaign has for some time been carried on for
the adoption of the Hare system in Australia. Miss C.H. Spence, of South
Australia, was the pioneer reformer, and has laboured in the cause by
pen and voice for no less than forty years. Great credit is undoubtedly
due to Miss Spence for the clear and simple manner in which she has
expounded the system, and for the good work she has done in exposing the
defects of the present methods. Not only has she lectured in all parts
of Australia, but she has made visits to England, where she met Mr. Hare
and Sir John Lubbock, and also to America. But we may admire Miss
Spence's courage and devotion to principle without agreeing with her
conclusions.

At a meeting held at River House, Chelsea, London, in 1894, Miss Spence
submitted an analysis of 8,824 votes recorded at 50 public meetings in
South Australia. The audiences were in each case asked to select six
representatives out of twelve candidates. The result of a scrutiny of
all the votes combined was that the following six "parties" secured one
"representative" each--viz., Capital, Labour, Single Tax, Irish
Catholic, Prohibition, and Women's Suffrage. Miss Spence frankly
confesses that these "parties" are minorities, but holds that a majority
can be formed by the union of minorities, and that party responsible
government can still be carried on. Now, can any sensible man or woman
imagine a working ministry formed by a union of any four of these
"parties?" Capital would certainly be permanently opposed to Labour and
to Single Tax, and as for the others, there is not a single principle in
common. How, then, could a union be formed? The only possible way is by
log-rolling; they must make a bargain to support one another's demands.
Such a union could not possibly be stable, because the minority is free
to offer a better bargain to any one of the "parties" to induce it to
desert. Again, it may be called the rule of the majority, but what sort
of a majority? Is it not plainly the rule of a majority in the interests
of minorities? That is very different to the rule of the majority in the
interests of all, which free government demands. The simple truth is
that the "parties" are factions, and that the "representatives" are mere
delegates of those factions.

But in practice the case would be far worse than we have assumed. There
is not the slightest guarantee that the same six factions would be
elected in each six-seat electorate. We might have an unlimited number
of delegates of various religions, classes, races, localities, and
political organizations on all kinds of single questions. An assembly
formed on these lines could hardly be dignified with the name of a
representative assembly.

Mr. G. Bradford, in his work on "The Lesson of Popular Government,"
displays a more intimate knowledge of human nature than any other recent
writer. Of these schemes for the representation of minorities he says:--

     As an illustration of the effect in popular government of looking
     to popular impulse for the initiation of measures, it may be
     observed that perhaps the worst of all expedients for remedying the
     defective working of a government by a legislature like ours, that
     which combines the evils of them all, is one which is urged by
     perfectly disinterested advocates of reform, and is known as
     proportional representation. If there is one principle at the base
     of popular government it is that the majority shall rule. If the
     largest of three or four fractions is to rule it ceases to be
     popular government, and becomes government by faction. If the
     tyranny of the majority is bad a tyranny of the minority is still
     worse. (Vol. i., p. 505.)

And the following picture could hardly be better drawn:--

     If the basis of carrying on the government is to be the wishes of
     some millions of units, it is evident that they must to a greater
     or less extent agree in wishing for something. It is equally
     evident that they cannot all agree in wishing for the same thing at
     the same time, while if they, or any considerable number of groups,
     want different things at the same time, the result in so far is
     anarchy. Government is paralysed, and with the well-known
     excitability of humanity in groups men begin to confound the
     importance of the thing wanted with the importance of getting what
     they want. The clash of contending factions is apt to suggest the
     clash of arms. The first necessity, therefore, is the formation of
     large and coherent parties, not merely for the purpose of
     accomplishing what is desired by the majority of the people, but
     also for suppressing agitation and social disturbance on behalf of
     what may be called merely objects of passion or private interest
     with comparatively small groups, at least until those objects
     enlist the support of a large minority. (Vol. i., pp. 492, 493.)

+Professor Nanson.+--In Victoria the Hare system is championed by Mr.
E.J. Nanson, Professor of Mathematics at Melbourne University. Professor
Nanson approaches the subject entirely from a mathematical standpoint,
and resolutely refuses to admit the factor of human nature into his
calculations. Following Mr. Hare, he is a declared opponent of party
government, and "would like to see it pushed further into the
background." Moreover, he regards every step in the process as an end in
itself. Thus the act of voting is one end, representation is another,
and the rule of the majority a third. Leaving aside for the present,
however, the elaborate mathematical devices which are proposed for
attaining these supposed ends, let us take only the principles on which
they are based. These are laid down as follows:--

     (_a_) The rule of the majority.

     (_b_) The fair representation of all parties in proportion to their
     strength.

     (_c_) Perfect freedom to every elector to vote exactly as he
     pleases.

     (_d_) The emancipation of the voters from the tyranny of the
     political "boss" or caucus.

     (_e_) The full value of his vote to each voter without loss or
     waste.

The principles involved, we are assured, "must appeal to every democrat,
to every Liberal, to every lover of true and just representation."

As to the first claim, we are willing to grant the rule of the majority,
if the words are added "in the interests of minorities." The second
could also be granted if by "all parties" were meant both parties, for
there cannot be more than two parties in the true sense of the word. But
Professor Nanson proposes such large electorates that any small section,
from one-sixth to one-twelfth, can secure independent representation.
Notwithstanding this, he claims that it is quite possible to give fair
representation to the main parties and to small sections at the same
time. In illustrating the system he avoids the issue as to the character
of these sections by giving them a "scientific" nomenclature, such as
Colour, Place, Pursuits, Qualities, &c. These abstractions are very
misleading, as attention is diverted from the fact that they refer to
voluntary groups of men united for some political purpose. The real
question is, on what basis are these groups likely to be formed? When
the element of human nature is taken into account it must be apparent
that they will be formed for the propaganda of some sectional interest;
some on a religious basis, others on a class basis, &c. Now, if we were
to ask each candidate to declare his religion, we could easily take
religions as the basis of representation and allow proportional
representation to each religion; and similarly with classes, races, and
so on. But we could only take one basis at a time, and the important
deduction is that if we were to take religions as the basis of
representation, the people would be induced to vote according to
religion; if we were to take classes, according to class, and so on.
Now, no one but the fanatic or the demagogue will claim that the
majority is entitled to rule where religions only or classes only are
represented. The questions then arise--What is the correct basis of
representation? How should the people be induced to vote? And the answer
is clearly that the people should be induced to vote on questions of
general public policy, on the leading questions of the day which decide
the party lines, and that, therefore, _the policies of the two main
parties should form the primary basis of proportional representation_.
But the Hare system, by taking individual candidates as the basis of
representation, induces the elector to vote on any basis or on sectional
lines. It promotes dissension instead of repressing it, and instead of
encouraging all sections to express their opinion as to what is best for
the general well-being, it encourages them to express their opinion as
to what they imagine to be best for themselves. Public opinion expressed
on these lines would be worse than useless. But Professor Nanson thinks
that the electors would still have regard for the main parties, even
though they grouped themselves into small sections. He declares that
"any party amounting to anything like a quota would not only have two
candidates of its own--one Liberal and one Conservative--but would also
be wooed by candidates of both leading parties." We may well question
whether factions would trouble themselves about the main parties; but,
granting the assumption, the small parties might just as well be single
electorates as far as the main parties are concerned. The Liberal
candidates might be successful in all of them, and the Conservatives be
unrepresented. The peculiar feature is that the defeated Conservatives
are expected to transfer their votes to the Liberals to make up the
quotas for the small parties!

The third claim is that electors should have perfect freedom to vote
exactly as they please, and yet Professor Nanson, in condemning Mr.
Hare's original scheme, has denied that they are free to vote as
faddists; but he still holds that they are free to vote on any basis if
only they form one-sixth to one-twelfth of an electorate. Thus the
amount of freedom is variable and a matter of opinion. Now, we
altogether deny that electors should be given the opportunity to
subordinate the national interests to factious interests. Just as the
faddist argument is fatal to Mr. Hare's original scheme, so the
splitting up into factions is fatal to Professor Nanson's present
scheme. Where is the freedom which Professor Nanson claims under the
present system of election? Is it not the fact that throughout England,
America, and Australia the electors have very often a choice between two
candidates only--one Ministerialist and one Oppositionist? By all means
let us have as many political organizations as possible to make known
the wishes of all sections; but the true function of all such
organizations is to influence the policies of the two main parties, and
not to secure independent delegates in Parliament. This means simply
that the compromise among the different sections supporting a party must
be effected in the electors' minds, and at the elections, and not on the
floor of the Legislature.

The fourth claim is the emancipation of the voters from the tyranny of
the "boss." Now, the power of the "boss" lies in the control of
nominations, and although to some extent this control is necessary with
the present system of election, it is not essential to party government,
as we hope to show. But with government by faction there would be no
escape from this control. The tyranny of a faction is worse than the
tyranny of the "boss." The voters need saving from their own selfish
passions far more than from the "boss."

The final claim that each elector is entitled to the full value of his
vote, regardless of the way in which it is used, is really a claim to an
equality of political power, _i.e._, to direct government. It means
that electors are absolutely free to combine for their own interests, or
for their interest as a class, in opposition to the public welfare.
These combinations would, with an equality of direct political power,
soon bring on social disruption.

+Professor Jethro Brown.+--In the preface to "The New Democracy," by
Professor Jethro Brown, the two fundamental difficulties of present-day
politics are correctly stated to be--how to express public opinion, and
how to improve its value. For the first of these Professor Brown
recommends the Hare system, and for the second the study of history.
Later on he writes:--"How is the amelioration of popular sovereignty to
be effected? Not, I venture to believe, by the pursuit of the policy
which hopes to play off ignorance against ignorance and prejudice
against prejudice, and to secure good government by the arts of
flattery, manipulation, and intrigue; nor, indeed, by the improvement of
democratic machinery, though this is extremely desirable, and calls for
immediate attention. For, above all, towers the question of character."
It is quite evident that Professor Brown shares the delusion of the
other advocates of the Hare system, that the manner of expressing public
opinion has nothing to do with the character of public opinion. The two
difficulties laid down are essentially one. The cardinal fact underlying
representation is that it is a real social force, capable of reacting
upon and moulding character, and therefore of improving the value of
public opinion. The independence, love of freedom, respect for
minorities, and capacity for self-government, which are the most
distinctive traits in the English character, are not innate, but are
largely the products of the British Constitution. If the only chance of
improving the value of public opinion lay in the hope of inducing the
individual electors to study the lessons of history, the prospect would
be indeed gloomy.

Professor Brown regards party government as a necessary evil, resulting
from the mechanical difficulty of securing unity of action from a
plurality of wills. This is practically equivalent to saying that
legislation itself is a necessary evil. But he writes:--"Whatever may be
the evils of party government, there can be no doubt of the utility as
well as of the necessity of the institution itself. The alternative to
party government is the system of government by small groups. In
Australia the evils of this alternative have been occasionally displayed
in practical politics; but it is to France that we must look for their
supreme illustration." Turning to the chapter on the Hare system, we
find that Professor Brown believes that the electors would still divide
themselves into two parties, even if given the opportunity to form small
groups. "I cannot believe," he writes, "that the reputation of our race
for sound common-sense is so far misplaced that a provision for the
faithful representation of the people would end in an immoderate
Legislature! For, although the Hare system is not perfect, it does
undoubtedly afford an opportunity for an absolutely _fair
representation_. Of course the opportunity would be abused by some; but
to argue that the abuse would be general, or if at all general, would
long continue, is to argue that the people would prove themselves
unworthy of the opportunity offered." While he was at the University of
Tasmania the first election under the Hare system was held, and
Professor Brown's opinions are based on the result. A second election
has, however, just been held, which shows the futility of his hopes.

+The Tasmanian Experiment.+--Despite the fact that it has been advocated
for over forty years, the trial now being made of the Hare system in
Tasmania is the first application of the "representative principle" to
any assembly modelled on the English plan of party government, and
therefore deserves more than passing notice. But the experiment is on
such a small scale, and has been conducted for such a short time, that
the result can hardly be expected to be conclusive as yet. The objection
against the Hare system is not so much that it is not suitable to
present conditions as that it will speedily bring about altered
conditions. It is interesting to find that this is exactly what is
taking place. The system is applied in two electorates only, at Hobart
and Launceston the former returning six members and the latter four. At
the first election, in 1897, the possibilities of the system were not
appreciated, and electors voted on the old lines; and although the
results were rather erratic and unexpected, they were considered fairly
satisfactory. But the second election, held early in the present year,
proved a great blow to the system. No less than three of the successful
candidates were intensely unpopular; and one of them, an ex-minister,
had recently been banished from public life on the report of a select
committee of the House. His reinstatement aroused a storm of indignation
throughout the colony, and he was forced to retire again before
Parliament met. It will be as well to take the evidence of a strong
advocate of the system--the _Argus_ correspondent. Of one candidate he
writes:--"Judging by all available definite evidences, it seemed that
five-sixths of the electors of Hobart were directly in favour of the
construction of the railway by the present Great Western Railway
Syndicate; while those of the remaining sixth were variously opposed to
the company or to the project of constructing such a railway by private
enterprise at all. This sixth is represented by Mr. R.C. Patterson, who
headed the poll." Of another candidate we learn that "Mr. Mulcahy had
fought a hard fight, and it is a fair assumption that on the list of the
elected he represents the Roman Catholic vote. As a member of a
generally popular Government, the extent of Mr. Mulcahy's personal
unpopularity was remarkable and probably unique." But it was over the
return of Mr. Miles that the storm raged most. The excuse is made that
"the fault of Mr. Miles's return (assuming that it is a fault) lies with
the electors who returned him, and not with the system under which his
return was accomplished.... Once grant that a section of Hobart electors
have the right to select for their representative whom they choose, and
it would seem that the Hare system must be held free of all
responsibility for the return of Mr. Miles." But this is precisely what
cannot be granted for a moment, as we have endeavoured to show. The
assertion is made that Mr. Miles would have been returned as easily
under the old system, but this is not a fact. He polled only one-eighth
of the votes, so that, even supposing that his supporters were twice as
strong in a single electorate, he would have had only one-fourth of the
votes. It is safe to say, from the small proportion of second and third
preferences which he secured, that if the Block Vote had been adopted he
would have been at the bottom of the poll. Commenting on these results,
the _Argus_ declares that the Hare system does not pretend to reform or
guide the people. Very likely not! But is it not quite evident that it
has the opposite effect?

Is it too much to say that, if the Hobart experiment be persevered with,
the ultimate tendency will be the return of six members, each acceptable
to one-sixth of the electors, and obnoxious to the other five-sixths?
It is quite obvious already that the usual party lines are entirely
disregarded.

+Professor Commons.+--The best book on the subject yet published is the
"Proportional Representation" of John E. Commons, Professor of Sociology
in Syracuse University, U.S. Its great merit is that the political and
social bearings of the reform are fully treated. Professor Commons
rejects the Hare system in favour of the Free List system. He
writes:--"The Hare system is advocated by those who, in a too
_doctrinaire_ fashion, wish to abolish political parties. They
apparently do not realize the impossibility of acting in politics
without large groupings of individuals." He makes a great step in
advance of the disciples of Mr. Hare in recognizing that the
proportional principle should be applied to parties, and not to
individuals, and he even defines parties correctly as being based "not
altogether on sectional divisions, but on social and economic problems
of national scope;" but, unfortunately, he fails to see that there can
be only two parties, and that the representation of small parties would
not reform the main parties, but break them up altogether. At the same
time he is no mere theorist, for he declares:--"If a practicable and
effective method of proportional representation cannot be discovered,
the theoretical principle is a mere dream." Moreover, he prudently
recognizes that his arguments as regards Federal and State Legislatures
in America are in advance of what the public is ready to accept, and
adds:--"We, as a people are not yet ready to abandon the notion that
party responsibility in Federal affairs is essential to safety." His
immediate object is, therefore, the reform of city councils, which in
America are controlled by the national parties, and are exploited by the
notorious "machine" organizations. We may sympathize with this object,
for parties in an administrative body are a serious evil, but with
legislatures the case is quite different. Professor Commons admits that
third and fourth parties, if given their proportionate weight in
legislation, would hold the balance of power, but he declares that "the
weight of this objection, the most serious yet presented against
proportional representation, varies in different grades of government."
He then proceeds to examine the objection "as applied to Congress (and
incidentally to the State Legislatures), where it has its greatest
force, and where pre-eminently party responsibility may be expected to
be decisive." And the only answer he can find is that the objection
"overlooks the principle of equality and justice in representation. It
may prove here that justice is the wisest expediency. It is a curious
anomaly, showing confusion of thought regarding democracy, that a people
who insist on universal suffrage, and who go to ludicrous limits in
granting it, should deny the right of representation to those minor
political parties whose existence is the natural fruit of this
suffrage." But these minor parties would not be denied representation if
they were allowed to exercise freely their true function, which is to
influence the policies of the main parties; and it is essential to the
working of the political machine that they be limited to that function.
Professor Commons continues:--"The argument, however, of those who fear
that third parties will hold the balance of power is not based solely on
a dread of the corrupt classes, but rather of the idealists, the
reformers, 'faddists,' and 'cranks,' so called. They would retain
exclusive majority rule and party responsibility in order to prevent the
disproportionate influence of these petty groups. They overlook, of
course, the weight of the argument already made that individual
responsibility is more important for the people than the corporate
responsibility of parties." The assumption is here made that the
complete suppression of individuality is an essential feature of party
government, whereas it is in fact a peculiar feature of American
politics, due to "machine" control of nominations. The one point which
Professor Commons has missed is that individual candidature can be
permitted and representation still be confined to the two main parties.

+Conclusion.+--The advocates of proportional delegation have failed to
grasp the importance of the principles of organization and leadership,
which underlie representation. Mr. Hare thought that the effect of doing
away with organization would be to improve leadership. But he reckoned
without his host--Human Nature. Organization cannot be dispensed with
without destroying leadership and bringing on the strife of factions.

FOOTNOTE:

[1] Now Lord Avebury.




CHAPTER III.

THE PRESENT POSITION OF PARTY GOVERNMENT.


+England.+--We have seen that the fundamental error of the
proportionalists is that they have failed to distinguish between the two
stages of representation. In constantly appealing back to the earlier
parliaments they altogether overlook the fact that the functions which
Parliament now exercises were then vested in the King. But this error is
not confined to the proportionalists, most of whom, indeed, however
inconsistently, favour party government. It is also put forth as an
argument by those who lay all the blame of present evils on the party
system, and who think that all sections should work together as one
united party. Take, for instance, the diatribe of Mr. W.S. Lilly on "The
Price of Party Government" in the _Fortnightly Review_ for June, 1900.
Mr. Lilly complains bitterly that the infallible oracle in politics
to-day is "the man in the street." He asserts that all issues are
settled "by counting heads, in entire disregard of what the heads
contain." His bugbear is the extension of the franchise. "Representative
institutions, for example," he asks, "what do they represent? The true
theory unquestionably is that they should represent all the features of
national life, all the living forces of society, all that makes the
country what it is; and that in due proportion. And such was the
Constitution of England up to the date of the first _Parliamentary
Reform Act_. Its ideal was, to use the words of Bishop Stubbs, 'an
organized collection of the several orders, states, and conditions of
men, recognized as possessing political power.'" Could anything be more
ridiculous? Political power is to be apportioned in the nineteenth
century as it was in the fourteenth century! The people are to be always
governed by their superiors! Mr. Lilly continues:--"It appears to me
that the root of the falsification of our parliamentary system by the
party game is to be found in the falsification of our representative
system by the principle of political atomism. Men are not equal in
rights any more than they are equal in mights. They are unequal in
political value. They ought not to be equal in political power."

The mistake here is in the premise. Has not the demagogue more power
than his dupes, or the Member of Parliament more power than the elector?
We have hardly yet reached, and are never likely to reach, that ideal of
direct government. But what is this price which Mr. Lilly is railing at?
"The price may be stated in eight words. 'The complete subordination of
national to party interests.' The _complete_ subordination. I use the
adjective advisedly. Party interests are not only the first thought of
politicians in England, but, too often, the last and only thought." All
this is sheer nonsense. The coincidence of party aims with the real
interests of the people which the British Parliament has displayed since
the _Reform Act_ of 1832 has never been even remotely approached by any
other country. Two causes have contributed to this great result; first,
the gradual extension of the franchise to all sections of the people,
and second, the fact that the principles of organization and leadership
have been highly developed. In one respect, however, Mr. Lilly is right.
The zenith has been passed. Party government is not the same to-day in
England as it was twenty years ago. But the fault lies not with the
extension of the suffrage, but with the fact that the principles of
organization and leadership are less operative. True, the extension of
the franchise is indirectly concerned in the failure, but the primary
cause is that the present system of election is unable to bear the
increased strain. It no longer suffices to organize the people into two
coherent parties. The effect on the parties is correctly noted by Mr.
Lilly. "A danger which ever besets them," he declares, "is that of
sinking into factions."

Now, the result of the want of organization is the presence in
Parliament of small independent factions, which, by holding the balance
of power, cause the main parties to degenerate into factions.

This tendency is apparent even in England, and the rock on which the
parties have split is the Irish faction. Into the merits of the Irish
question we do not propose to enter; it is the career of the faction in
Parliament which interests us. But it may be noted that the Irish party
rests on a three-fold basis as a faction; it is based mainly on a class
grievance, and is also partly racial and partly religious. It was the
Irish party in the House of Commons which first discovered that, by
keeping aloof from the two main parties, it could terrorize both; and
thus found out the weak spot in party government. Its tactics were
successful up to a certain point, for Mr. Gladstone succumbed to the
temptation to purchase its support, and brought in the Home Rule Bill.
The result is known to all; the historical Liberal party was rent in
twain; party lines were readjusted; Mr. Gladstone was left in a hopeless
minority; and the remnant of his following is to-day in the same
condition. What is the lesson to be learned from these events? That
these tactics cannot succeed in the long run. All interests suffer, but
the culprits most of all. Moreover, such tactics are unconstitutional,
and would in some circumstances justify retaliatory measures. Let us
trace the constitutional course. The Irish members could have exerted a
considerable influence on the policies of both Liberals and
Conservatives, just as the Scotch did. If they had followed this course,
might they not have been in a better position to-day?

Of course, the Irish faction can hardly be said to be the result of the
present system of election; it is mainly the expression of old wrongs.
But it has set the example, and the disintegration of the old parties is
rapidly proceeding. One feature, however, in connection with the present
system in Ireland may be mentioned, and that is the permanent
disfranchisement of the minority. In the greater part of Ireland there
is no such thing as a contest between the main parties. If a system were
introduced by which the minority could get its share of representation
the parties would compete on even terms for the support of the people,
and good feeling would tend to be restored.

To return to Mr. Lilly. The present position of party government in
England is not due to defects in the institution itself, still less to
the extension of the suffrage, but to imperfect organization. The true
remedy is, therefore, to improve organization, not to restrict the
suffrage. By this means such a condition will be brought about that if
either party favours a faction it will lose in general favour; then,
indeed, we may hope that the main parties themselves will cease to
degenerate into factions.

The same number of the _Fortnightly_ contains an unsigned article on
"Lord Rosebery and a National Cabinet," in which the party system is
alluded to as defunct, and in which the suggestion is thrown out that on
the retirement of Lord Salisbury a national cabinet should be formed,
comprising both Mr. Chamberlain and Lord Rosebery. Impending foreign
complications are given as the excuse for terminating party action. Now,
it is not to be denied that party government is more suitable for what
Mr. Herbert Spencer calls the industrial type of society than for the
militant type. Quite recently Lord Salisbury blamed the British
Constitution for the state of unpreparedness for the present war. But it
is equally true that in foreign affairs party action is generally
suspended: in the control of India, for instance, it is so. The real
question, then, is this: Is the danger of foreign aggression so serious
that all questions of internal policy can be permanently set aside? If
we have reached this stage, the end of modern civilization is in sight.
In effect, the proposal is a return to the first stage of
representation, with the difference that all sections of the people are
expected to be held together by the fear of foreign aggression, instead
of the fear of the aggression of the monarchy.

Mr. David Syme is a censor of a very different type. So far from wishing
to take control from the people, he would give the people absolute
control over everything, and at all times. Seldom has the case against
party government been more powerfully presented than in his work on
"Representative Government in England." But Mr. Syme founds his proposed
remedies on a theory of representation which is based on the literal
meaning of the word. No one has put the delegation theory more clearly
than in the following passage, or gone so far in applying it:--

     Representation is a mental act; it is the presentation or
     reproduction of the state of mind of another person; and before one
     person can represent another person he must first know what the
     opinions of that other person are. A representative is a
     substitute; he stands in the place of, and acts for, another
     person. But one man cannot act for another unless he knows what
     that other would do were he acting for himself. In other words, he
     requires to know the motives which actuate that other person, or
     what influences his motives, namely, his principles and beliefs.
     The House of Commons is a representative body, not because every
     individual member of it represents the opinions of the whole
     nation, but because members in the aggregate represent those
     opinions, (p. 170).

This position is diametrically opposed to the principles we have laid
down, for it eliminates entirely the ideas of organization and
leadership. Again, Mr. Syme says:--"If the government is to be carried
on for the benefit of all classes, representatives should be chosen from
all classes. We had class representation in the early parliaments, but
then all classes were fairly represented." We have shown that the
analogy from early parliaments is fallacious. Representatives should now
be chosen irrespective of class, and not as class delegates. But Mr.
Syme does not carry his theory to its logical conclusion. For if
representatives merely express the thoughts of others, and should be
class delegates, surely all classes are entitled to have their thoughts
"represented;" and Mr. Syme should range himself among the disciples of
Mr. Hare. But here comes in an interesting difference. Mr. Syme would
retain the present system and make members continually responsible to a
majority of their constituents; he would even give this majority power
to dismiss them at any time. Now, this is practically an admission that
representation involves the existence of a majority and a minority, or,
in other words, is a means of organizing the people into a majority and
a minority. Again, as regards leadership, the theory will hardly bear
the test of facts. Could a man like Gladstone be said to merely express
the thoughts of his constituents? Was he not rather a guide and leader
of the thoughts of a great part of the British nation?

In addition to the continual responsibility of members to their
constituents, Mr. Syme would also make the individual ministers of state
responsible to a majority of the members. He adds:--"The whole system of
party government could in this manner be quietly and effectively got rid
of." We do not propose to criticise the latter suggestion, as we do not
believe it would be put forward to-day, in the light of fuller
knowledge. Mr. Syme's book was written nearly twenty years ago. But, as
regards the continual responsibility of members, we consider it
important that the electors should not have their way on single
questions. They should periodically express their opinion as to the
general line of progress, and the representatives should then have
complete control. The necessity for this is to save the people from
their anti-social tendencies, which we have already stated as the great
objection to all forms of direct government. Lord Macaulay once defined
the position exactly in a letter addressed to the electors of Edinburgh.
"My opinion," he declared, "is that electors ought at first to choose
cautiously; then to confide liberally; and when the term for which they
have selected their member has expired to review his conduct equitably,
and to pronounce on the whole taken together."

We hope to have left on the reader's mind by this time no doubt as to
the intimate connection between the machinery of election and the
resulting character of the legislature. Now it is a most extraordinary
fact that this connection is hardly noticed by the leading
constitutional authorities. It is true they often recognize that
suggested changes like the Hare system would debase our legislatures,
but it never seems to occur to them that present evils might be cured by
a change in the electoral machinery. They point out the evils indeed,
but only to indulge in gloomy forebodings at the onward march of
democracy, or as warnings of the necessity for placing checks on the
people.

Take Bagehot's study of the House of Commons in his standard work on
"The English Constitution," where he classifies the functions exercised
by the House. He insists that the most important of these is the
elective function--its power to elect and dismiss the ministry. In
addition, it exercises an expressive function, a teaching function, an
informing function, and, lastly, the function of legislation. But not a
word is said of the relation of these functions to representation, or to
the method of election. It is asserted that the reason the House of
Commons is able to exercise these functions is because England is a
deferential nation, and the people leave government in the hands of
their betters, the higher classes. On one point he is emphatic, and that
is the absolute necessity of party. He writes:--

     The moment, indeed, that we distinctly conceive that the House of
     Commons is mainly and above all things an elective assembly, we at
     once perceive that party is of its essence. The House of Commons
     lives in a state of perpetual potential choice; at any moment it
     can choose a ruler and dismiss a ruler. And therefore party is
     inherent in it, is bone of its bone, and breath of its breath.

As to the present trend of affairs, the opinion of a foreign observer,
Gneist--"History of the English Constitution"--may be quoted:--

     England, too, will experience the fact that the transition to the
     new order of industrial society is brought about through a process
     of dissolution of the old cohesions, upon which the constitution of
     Parliament is based. The unrepresented social mass, which is now
     flooding the substructure of the English Constitution, will only
     stay its course at a universal suffrage, and a thorough and
     arithmetical equalization of the constituencies, and will thus
     attempt, and in a great measure achieve, a further dissolution of
     the elective bodies. To meet the coming storm a certain fusion of
     the old parties seems to be immediately requisite, though the
     propertied classes, in defending their possessions, will certainly
     not at first display their best qualities. As, further, a regular
     formation in two parties cannot be kept up, a splitting up into
     fractions, as in the parliaments of the Continent, will ensue, and
     the changing of the ministry will modify itself accordingly, so
     that the Crown will no longer be able to commit the helm of the
     state in simple alternation to the leader of the one or the other
     majority. And then a time will recur in which the _King in Council_
     may have to undertake the actual leadership. (Vol. ii., pp. 452,
     453.)

In other words, that an industrial society is incapable of
self-government! Note the reason for this remarkable conclusion--a
splitting up into fractions, _i.e._, imperfect organization.

Take now the evidence of the distinguished historian and publicist, Mr.
W.E.H. Leeky, M.P., as given in his recent work on "Democracy and
Liberty":--

     After all due weight has been given to the possible remedies that
     have been considered, it still seems to me that the parliamentary
     system, when it rests on manhood suffrage, or something closely
     approaching to manhood suffrage, is extremely unlikely to be
     permanent. This was evidently the opinion of Tocqueville, who was
     strongly persuaded that the natural result of democracy was a
     highly concentrated, enervating, but mild despotism. It is the
     opinion of many of the most eminent contemporary thinkers in France
     and Germany, and it is, I think, steadily growing in England. This
     does not mean that parliaments will cease, or that a wide suffrage
     will be abolished. It means that parliaments, if constructed on
     this type, cannot permanently remain the supreme power among the
     nations of the world. Sooner or later they will sink by their own
     vices and inefficiencies into a lower plane. They will lose the
     power of making and unmaking ministries, and it will be found
     absolutely necessary to establish some strong executive
     independently of their fluctuations. Very probably this executive
     may be established, as in America and under the French Empire, upon
     a broad basis of an independent suffrage. Very possibly upper
     chambers, constituted upon some sagacious plan, will again play a
     great restraining and directing part in the government of the
     world. Few persons who have watched the changes that have passed
     over our own House of Commons within the last few years will either
     believe or wish that in fifty years' time it can exercise the power
     it now does. It is only too probable that some great catastrophe or
     the stress of a great war may accelerate the change. (Vol. i., pp.
     300, 301.)

And the reason assigned for this very unsatisfactory state of affairs is
precisely as before:

     All the signs of the times point to the probability in England as
     elsewhere of many ministries resting on precarious majorities
     formed out of independent or heterogeneous groups. There are few
     conditions less favourable to the healthy working of parliamentary
     institutions or in which the danger of an uncontrolled House of
     Commons is more evident. One consequence of this disintegration of
     Parliament is a greatly increasing probability that policies which
     the nation does not really wish for may be carried into effect. The
     process which the Americans call "log-rolling" becomes very easy.
     One minority will agree to support the objects of another minority
     on condition of receiving in return a similar assistance, and a
     number of small minorities aiming at different objects, no one of
     which is really desired by the majority of the nation, may attain
     their several ends by forming themselves into a political syndicate
     and mutually co-operating. (Vol. i., pp. 152, 153.)

Mr. Lecky, too, holds out very little hope for the future:--

     When the present evils infecting our parliamentary system have
     grown still graver; when a democratic House, more and more broken
     up into small groups, more and more governed by sectional and
     interested motives, shall have shown itself evidently incompetent
     to conduct the business of the country with honour, efficiency, and
     safety; when the public has learned more fully the enormous danger
     to national prosperity as well as individual happiness of
     dissociating power from property and giving the many an unlimited
     right of confiscating by taxation the possessions of the few--some
     great reconstruction of government is sure to be demanded. Fifty or
     even twenty-five years hence the current of political opinion in
     England will be as different from that of our own day as
     contemporary political tendencies are different from those in the
     generation of our fathers. Experience and arguments that are now
     dismissed may then revive, and play no small part in the politics
     of the future.

Why make democracy the scapegoat for all these evils, when they are
simply due to the imperfect organization of democracy? In any case, the
most that could rightly be urged would be that universal suffrage had
come before its time. The conclusion that its time will never come is
certainly not warranted. Universal suffrage cannot be condemned till it
has had a fair trial under a rational system of election. Mr. Lecky
appreciates so little the connection between the method of election and
the splitting up into groups that he views without alarm the Hare
system, which would still further develop groups.

But perhaps no one has caught the spirit of party government more truly
than Mr. Lecky. Dealing with the motives which should actuate the
statesman, in his latest work, "The Map of Life," he writes:--

     In free countries party government is the best if not the only way
     of conducting public affairs, but it is impossible without a large
     amount of moral compromise; without a frequent surrender of private
     judgment and will. A good man will choose his party through
     disinterested motives, and with a firm and honest conviction that
     it represents the cast of policy most beneficial to the country. He
     will on grave occasions assert his independence of party, but in
     the large majority of cases he must act with his party, even if
     they are pursuing courses in some degree contrary to his own
     judgment.

     Everyone who is actively engaged in politics--everyone especially
     who is a member of the House of Commons--must soon learn that if
     the absolute independence of individual judgment were pushed to its
     extreme, political anarchy would ensue. The complete concurrence of
     a large number of independent judgments in a complicated measure is
     impossible. If party government is to be carried on there must be,
     both in the Cabinet and in Parliament, perpetual compromise. The
     first condition of its success is that the Government should have a
     stable, permanent, disciplined support behind it, and in order that
     this should be attained the individual member must in most cases
     vote with his party. Sometimes he must support a measure which he
     knows to be bad, because its rejection would involve a change of
     government, which he believes would be a still greater evil than
     its acceptance, and in order to prevent this evil he may have to
     vote a direct negative to some resolution containing a statement
     which he believes to be true, (p. 112.)

Mr. Lecky goes on to point out that "many things have to be done from
which a very rigid and austere nature would recoil;" but he
adds:--"Those who refuse to accept the conditions of parliamentary life
should abstain from entering into it." Moreover, he holds that
"inconsistency is no necessary condemnation of a politician, and
parties as well as individual statesmen have abundantly shown it." But
still "all this curious and indispensable mechanism of party government
is compatible with a high and genuine sense of public duty."

The American theory of government is that checks must be placed on a
democratic legislature by a fixed Constitution and a separate executive
exercising a veto. The late Professor Freeman Snow, of Harvard
University, was a strong supporter of this school. His objections to
cabinet government are given in the "Annals of the American Academy of
Political and Social Science" for July, 1892:--

     Cabinet government is the government of a party; and for its
     successful operation it must have at all times a majority at its
     back in Parliament. If it were possible to direct the current of
     public opinion into exactly two channels, there would be but two
     parties, one of which would generally be in the ascendency; but in
     practice this is found to be a very difficult thing to accomplish,
     and it becomes the more difficult as the right of suffrage is
     extended to the mass of the people, with their ever-varying
     interests. In the countries of continental Europe parties, if
     indeed they may be said to exist, are broken up into groups, no two
     or more of which ever act together for any considerable length of
     time; and ministries are without a moment's notice confronted at
     brief intervals with opposing majorities, and must give place to
     others, whose tenure of office is, however, equally unstable and
     ephemeral. There is no other alternative; one of the two great
     parties must yield to any faction which becomes strong enough to
     hold the balance of power between them, or suffer the inevitable
     consequences--instability and impotence of government.

Dr. Snow evidently thought that it is not possible to direct the
current of public opinion into exactly two channels. He certainly had
not the slightest idea that it might be a matter of electoral machinery.

Finally, we may quote the opinion of Mr. James Bryce, M.P., whose
"American Commonwealth" is one of the most complete studies of the
tendencies of democracy in existence. Comparing the English and American
systems, he writes of the former:--

     That system could not be deemed to have reached its maturity till
     the power of the people at large had been established by the Reform
     Act of 1832. For its essence resides in the delicate equipoise it
     creates between the three powers, the ministry, the House of
     Commons, and the people. The House is strong because it can call
     the ministry to account for every act, and can by refusing supplies
     compel their resignation. The ministry are not defenceless, because
     they can dissolve Parliament, and ask the people to judge between
     it and them. Parliament, when it displaces a ministry, does not
     strike at executive authority; it merely changes its agents. The
     ministry when they dissolve Parliament do not attack Parliament as
     an institution; they recognise the supremacy of the body in asking
     the country to change the individuals who compose it. Both the
     House of Commons and the ministry act and move in the full view of
     the people, who sit as arbiters, prepared to judge in any
     controversy that may arise. The House is in touch with the people,
     because every member must watch the lights and shadows of sentiment
     which play over his own constituency. The ministry are in touch
     with the people, because they are not only themselves
     representatives, but are heads of a great party, sensitive to its
     feelings, forced to weigh the effect of every act they do upon the
     confidence which the party places in them.... The drawback to this
     system of exquisite equipoise is the liability of its equilibrium
     to be frequently disturbed, each disturbance involving either a
     change of government, with immense temporary inconvenience to the
     departments, or a general election, with immense expenditure of
     money and trouble in the country. It is a system whose successful
     working presupposes the existence of two great parties and no more,
     parties each strong enough to restrain the violence of the other,
     yet one of them steadily predominant in any given House of Commons.
     Where a third, perhaps a fourth, party appears, the conditions are
     changed. The scales of Parliament oscillate as the weight of this
     detached group is thrown on one side or the other; dissolutions
     become more frequent, and even dissolutions may fail to restore
     stability. The recent history of the French Republic has shown the
     difficulties of working a Chamber composed of groups, nor is the
     same source of difficulty unknown in England. (Vol. i., pp. 286,
     287.)

Thus we find the opinion unanimously held that the one great fault to
which cabinet government is liable is instability of the ministry, owing
to imperfect organization of public opinion into two definite lines of
policy. Bagehot called it a case of unstable equilibrium, and Bradford,
in "The Lesson of Popular Government," goes further when he
declares:--"Not to speak disrespectfully, the ministry is like a company
of men who, after excessive conviviality, are able to stand upright only
by holding on to each other."

Yet, after all, the amount of stability simply depends on the state of
organization; and England has demonstrated in the golden period of her
political history (about the middle of the present century) that the
cabinet form of government can be quite as stable as the presidential
form. Therefore, if the present position gives cause for alarm, it is
not in the abolition of the cabinet or the restriction of the suffrage
that the remedy must be sought, but in improved organization. And this,
we hope to show, involves improved electoral machinery.

+France.+--Turn to France. Is there no lesson to be drawn from the
history of that unstable country since the Revolution let loose its
flood of human passions, ambitions, and aspirations? Has not every
attempt at popular government failed for the same cause--want of
organization?

France before the Revolution had groaned for centuries under the burden
of a decayed feudalism and an absolute monarchy. The last vestige of
constitutional forms had disappeared. The representatives of the estates
had not been convened since the meeting of the States-General in 1614.
The widespread and unprecedented misery of the people caused them to
revolt against being taxed without their consent, and a cry went up for
a convocation of the estates. The finances were in such a bad way that
Louis XVI. was forced to consent, and the three estates--clergy, nobles,
and commons--met at Versailles in 1789. At first they called themselves
the National Assembly, but the King foolishly took up such a position
with regard to the people's representatives that they swore solemnly
that they would not separate till they had laid the foundation of a new
Constitution, and henceforth were known as the Constituent Assembly. It
was determined that the King should no longer be absolute, and the
choice lay between a constitutional monarchy and a republic. The
Declaration of the Rights of Man was first drawn up, and the Assembly
settled down to its task. The leading spirit was Mirabeau. He had been
to England, and had studied the British Constitution, and he rightly saw
that France was too distracted by faction to maintain an independent
executive. He therefore openly advocated a constitutional monarchy with
a cabinet chosen from among the majority of the representatives. But,
unfortunately, the Assembly refused to follow his lead; nor would the
King take his advice to make a separate appeal to the people. In the
midst of the negotiations Mirabeau died, and the last chance of
establishing a constitutional monarchy disappeared. The King realized
this, and tried to escape to the German frontier but was brought back.
He then accepted the new Constitution, and the Legislative Assembly was
elected in 1791. From the first it had no elements of stability, being
split up into groups, and subject to the fear of the Paris mob. The King
continued to plot with the emigrant nobles against the Constitution, and
the foreign armies massed on the frontier. The danger brought on the
triumph of the revolutionary spirit in 1792. The Paris commune
overwhelmed both the King and the Assembly, and the republic was
proclaimed. Then followed the execution of the King, the Reign of
Terror, the control of the Committee of Public Safety, till finally the
anarchy was ended by the military despotism of Bonaparte, who became
First Consul and afterwards Emperor.

What is the significance of these events in the light of our previous
examination of English history? Simply this: That the French, in passing
at once from absolutism and feudalism to complete self-government, were
trying to jump to the Second stage of representation without passing
through the first stage. Mirabeau was right; the republic was foredoomed
to failure because the people had learned neither the power of nor the
necessity for organization.

In many respects the French Revolution parallels the English Revolution.
In each case the King was beheaded; in each case the anarchy of a
disorganized representative body was succeeded by a military despotism;
and in each case the monarchy was restored.

It was after the restoration that the English system of party government
was developed. Why did this system not now take root in France? Partly
because France was not blessed with a king like William of Orange, and
partly because the new _systeme de bascule_, the balance system, in
which the king allows each faction in turn to hold the reins of power,
was discovered. So, instead of the gradual growth of constitutional
liberty which took place in England, the tendency in France was back to
absolutism. In 1830 Charles X., finding that he could not manage the
Chamber of Deputies, issued the ordinances of St. Cloud, suspending the
liberty of the press and dissolving the Legislature. Paris immediately
broke out into insurrection, and the King was forced to abdicate. The
crown was offered to Louis Philippe, and a second attempt at
constitutional monarchy was made. But France was too divided by her
unfortunate legacy of faction to maintain a continuous policy. The
Legitimists, the Republicans, and the Bonapartists were all awaiting
their opportunity. In 1848 the second revolution broke out in Paris; the
king fled to England, and a republic was again tried. But the
imperialist idea revived when Louis Napoleon was elected President. In
1851 he carried out his famous _coup d'etat,_ and again the Constitution
was swept away. In the following year he was accepted as Emperor by an
almost unanimous vote. Thus France again elected to be ruled by an
irresponsible head. The Third Empire ended with the capture of Napoleon
III. at Sedan in 1870, and since then France has carried on her third
experiment in republicanism. But still the fatal defect of
disorganization retards her progress; the Legislature is still split up
into contending factions, and in consequence it has been found
impossible to maintain a strong executive. Occasionally the factions
sink their differences for a time when their patriotism is appealed to,
as they have agreed to do during the currency of the present Exhibition,
but it is abundantly evident that France can never be well governed
till the people are able to organize two coherent parties. There is
ground for hope that the monarchical and imperialist ideas are
declining, and that the people are settling down to the conviction that
there is nothing left but the republic. What makes recovery difficult is
that the national character has been affected by the continual strife in
the direction of excitability and desire for change.

Those who wish to understand the forces which brought about the
different changes and revolutions, traced by one who has grasped their
meaning, should read the account in the first volume of Mr. Bradford's
"Lesson of Popular Government." His conclusion only need be quoted
here:--

     As has been said, that which constitutes the strength of the
     English. Government, that which has made up its history for the
     last two hundred years, is the growth and continuity of two solid
     and coherent parties. Occasionally they have wavered when available
     leaders and issues were wanting, but as soon as a strong man came
     forward to take the reins the ranks closed up and the work of
     mutual competition again went on. On the other hand, the curse and
     the cause of failure of representative government on the Continent
     of Europe is the formation within the legislature of unstable and
     dissolving groups. In France the Extreme Eight, the Eight, the
     Eight Centre, the Left Centre, the Left, and the Extreme Left are
     names of differing factions which unite only for temporary purposes
     and to accomplish a victory over some other unit, but which are
     fatal to stable and firm government. The same is true of Italy,
     Spain, and Austria, and if not of Germany it is because military
     despotism holds all alike in subjection.

Mr. Bodley has come to the same conclusion in his work on "France." He
writes:--

     There is no restraining power in the French parliamentary system to
     arrest a member on his easy descent, and he knows that if he
     escapes penal condemnation he will enjoy relative impunity. Many
     deputies are men of high integrity; but virtue in a large assembly
     is of small force without organization, and, moreover, a group of
     legislators leagued together as a vigilance committee would have
     neither consistency nor durability, which the discipline of party
     can alone effect. Corruption of this kind, which has undermined the
     republic, could not co-exist with party government. A party whose
     ministers or supporters had incurred as much suspicion as fell on
     the politicians acquitted in the Panama affair would under it be
     swept out of existence for a period. When the first denunciations
     appeared, the leaders of the party, to avert that fate, would have
     said to their implicated colleagues--"In spite of your abilities
     and of the manifest exaggeration of these charges we must part
     company, for though you may have been culpable only of
     indiscretion, we cannot afford to be identified with doubtful
     transactions;" and the Opposition, eager not to lose its vantage,
     would scan with equal keenness the acts of its own members. With
     party government the electorate would not have appeared to condone
     those scandals. But as it was, when a deputy involved in them went
     down before his constituents, whose local interest he had well
     served, with no opponent more formidable than the nominee of some
     decayed or immature group, they gave their votes to the old member,
     whose influence with the prefecture in the past had benefited the
     district, rather than to the new comer, whose denunciations had no
     authority; whereas, had each electoral district been the scene of a
     contest between organized parties, the same spectacle would not
     have been presented." (Vol. ii., pp. 302, 303.)

Mr. Bodley has, in this last sentence, touched the heart of the
problem. If the salvation of France depends on making each electoral
district the scene of a contest between two organized parties, is not
electoral machinery destined to play an important part in the solution?

+The United States.+--The third great experiment in representative
democracy which the nineteenth century has furnished is that which is
being conducted in the United States. The contrast with France is
remarkable. Just as France is the supreme example of want of
organization, so America is the most conspicuous instance of perfect
organization into two great national parties which the world has seen.
Yet both experiments were started by a revolution, and practically at
the same time. The difference lay in the fact that the Americans
inherited the capacity for self-government from their British ancestors,
and had already practised it in colonial times, while the French only
inherited innumerable causes of dissension.

But organization is not the only characteristic feature of American
politics. Strange to say, it is accompanied by a suppression of
individuality just as complete. It is organization without responsible
leadership. For, in the first place, the politicians look on themselves
not as leaders but as followers of the people; and in the second place,
there are no leaders in Congress, corresponding to the cabinet ministers
of British countries.

Now, the view which we wish to emphasize here is that the present
position of American politics is the natural result of the principles
embodied in the Constitution adopted in 1789, when the Union was formed.
The complete organization and the want of leadership are directly to be
traced to the labours of George Washington and his associates. A brief
glance at the Constitution and the early history of its working will
make this clear.

The thirteen States which revolted from England worked fairly well
together under the "Articles of Confederation and Perpetual Union" as
long as the war lasted, but as soon as peace was proclaimed it was, as
Washington said, no better than anarchy. The famous Convention of 1787
was therefore held, and the Constitution was drawn up. One guiding
principle of its framers was to divide power so as to place checks on
the will of the people, and on outbursts of popular passion, which were
then greatly dreaded. One means of attaining this object was the
attempted separation of the legislative and executive functions. We say
attempted advisedly, for time has but shown that the two are
inseparable. But the framers of the Constitution divided the legislative
function between the two Houses, and vested the executive function
almost entirely, as they thought, in the President. Montesquieu, in his
"_Esprit des Lois_" had laid down that the great merit of the English
Constitution was the separation of these functions, and the Americans
accepted this view. But, in truth, the English cabinet system had not
then been fully developed. The King was still, not only in appearance,
but to some extent also in fact, the head of the executive, and there
was nothing to indicate that ministers were so soon to become the real
leaders.

The effect of this provision was a struggle between the two branches for
supremacy, and the legislatures have won. The President has been
degraded to a mere agent, and the legislatures have absorbed the greater
part of executive functions, even to the control of finance. Now, the
framers of the Constitution were apprehensive that the President might
become a mere party agent, and they tried to strengthen his position by
two devices. First, they gave him the power to veto statutes unless
overruled by a two-thirds majority of Congress; and, secondly, they
provided for his election by an electoral college, or by a double system
of election. This second provision was designed to ensure the election
of a President for personal instead of for party reasons; but it has
proved a complete failure. Almost from the first the electoral delegates
have had to pledge themselves to support the party nominee. The veto,
therefore, has also become practically useless. Thus it has come about
that Congress is a body entirely without leaders.

A second defect in the Constitution was that it said nothing about the
right of any State to withdraw from the Union. After nearly 70 years
this omission was responsible for the Civil War. The legal basis for
secession was then abandoned, but combinations of States have since been
regarded with the greatest apprehension. This conviction that the Union
must be maintained at any price has had very important consequences on
the party system. The danger of allowing combinations of States to
dominate party lines was demonstrated; and the division of each State by
the same national parties was recognized as essential to safety.

In the meantime, as we have seen, Congress had practically got control
of the executive functions, which were supposed to be exercised by the
President, including the nominations to office. Thus every member of the
party in a majority had a share of the plunder, and "the spoils to the
victors" became the basis of party organization. The system soon
underwent such a remarkable development that nearly 200,000 public
offices were at the disposal of the victors at each election. The party
organizations immediately became omnipotent. The secret of their power
lay in the control of nominations. Each party would nominate one
candidate only, and the electors voted neither for men nor measures, but
blindly for party. As Mr. Bryce declares:--"The class of professional
politicians was therefore the first crop which the spoils system--the
system of using public office as private prize of war--bore. Bosses
were the second crop."

The development which these party organizations have now reached is
extraordinary. Practically we may say that there are only two
parties--Republicans and Democrats--and they dominate not only Federal
and State politics but also city government. Each party has its list of
registered electors, and each holds a primary election before the real
election, to decide the party candidate. But these primary elections are
a mere matter of form. Only a small fraction of the electors attend
them, and only those who have always supported the party are allowed to
vote. The nominations are therefore really controlled, by fraud if
necessary, by the "ring" of party managers. Generally there is one man
who can pull the most strings, and he becomes the "boss." All power is
centred in the hands of this irresponsible despot. The men who are
elected owe their positions to him, and are responsible to him, not to
the public.

Remember that these "machine" organizations have absolute sway in every
electorate, from one end of the United States to the other. It may be
wondered why the people tolerate them, but they are powerless. Sometimes
an independent movement is attempted, but it very rarely succeeds, and
even when it does the two "machines" combine against it and agree to
divide the spoils. Mr. Bryce writes:--

     The disgust is less than a European expects, for it is mingled
     with amusement. The "boss" is a sort of joke, albeit an expensive
     joke. "After all," people say, "it is our own fault. If we all went
     to the primaries, or if we all voted an independent ticket, we
     could make an end of the 'boss.'" There is a sort of fatalism in
     their view of democracy. (Vol ii., p. 241.)

What is the meaning of all this wonderful party machinery? It is this:
that organization without responsible leadership can only be founded on
corruption. In other words, _the spoils system is the price which the
United States pay for maintaining the Union under the present
Constitution_. The fault lies ultimately, therefore, in the
Constitution, which tends to repress responsible leadership.

Now, the mass of public opinion in America, as Mr. Bryce continually
points out, is sound, and attempts have not been wanting to put an end
to the system of rotation in public offices. A sustained agitation for
civil service reform was entered upon, and the system of competitive
examination was applied to a large number of offices. Now at last, the
reformers thought, American politics would be purified. But, no! The
corruption, simply took a new and more alarming turn. Direct money
contributions took the place of the spoils. It became the practice to
levy blackmail on corporations either to be let alone, or for the
purpose of fleecing the public. The monopolies granted to protected
industries are the source of a large share of these "campaign funds."
The Legislatures are crowded by professional lobbyists, and it is, in
consequence, impossible to obtain justice against the corporations.
Surely no stronger proof can be needed that corruption is and must
remain the basis of organization so long as there is no responsible
leadership.

It would be a mistake, however, to suppose that the Americans are not
alive to the failure of their representative institutions. Since Mr.
Bryce's great work on "The American Commonwealth" was published two
books by American authors have appeared which are very outspoken in
condemnation. These are "The Unforeseen Tendencies of Democracy," by Mr.
E.L. Godkin; and "The Lesson of Popular Government," by Mr. Gamaliel
Bradford. The keynote of the first of these two books is to abolish
corruption by destroying the power of the "machine" and the "boss," and
of the second to introduce responsible leadership. Mr. Godkin traces the
disappearance of distinguished men from public life to the control of
all entrance to it by the "machine." The reform of primary elections, he
holds, is then the first necessity, since "independent voting" has
ceased to be a remedy. But he fails to find a solution. The conclusion
he comes to is as follows:--

     Is the situation then hopeless? Are we tied up inexorably simply to
     a choice of evils? I think not. It seems to me that the nomination
     of candidates is another of the problems of democracy which are
     never seriously attacked without prolonged perception and
     discussion of their importance. One of these was the formation of
     the federal government; another was the abolition of slavery;
     another was the reform of the civil service. Every one of them
     looked hopeless in the beginning; but the solution came in each
     case, through the popular determination to find some better way.
     (Pp. 92, 93.)

But the evil goes far deeper than Mr. Godkin appears to think. To
abolish corruption is to take away the present basis of organization
without substituting any other. If irresponsible leadership is to be
abandoned, responsible leadership must be introduced. Mr. Bradford's
plan, therefore, promises more, for if responsible leadership could be
introduced into Congress corruption would then be abolished also.

Mr. Bradford's whole book may be said to be a study of the relations of
the executive to the legislature, and the conclusions at which he
arrives are a complete vindication of cabinet government. But he finds
one fault, and that is the instability of ministries, which he confesses
has not been apparent so far in the British House of Commons. He holds,
however, that it will become more apparent with the rising tide of
democracy. It is rather amusing to find that the greatest obstacle which
has to be overcome in proposing a responsible executive is the
veneration in which the Constitution is still held and the dislike to
copying anything from England. His plan is, therefore, an adaptation of
the cabinet to the conditions imposed by the Constitution. He holds that
the ministers appointed by the President should sit in Congress and have
control of the initiation of legislation. It is to be feared that this
would hardly realize the idea of responsible leadership. Mr. Bradford
establishes a chain of responsibility by the fact that the ministers are
responsible to the President and the President is responsible to the
people; but that is a very different thing to the continual
responsibility of the cabinet to a majority of the legislature. It is
probable that the President's ministers would have to encounter the
opposition of a majority in one or both Houses, and it is difficult to
see how a deadlock could be avoided. Mr. Bradford contemplates that the
people would settle any issues which arise between the two branches at
the end of the Presidential term of four years; but it is just as likely
that there would then be a new President in any case. We are driven to
the conclusion, therefore, that responsible leadership is incompatible
with the American system of divided powers and fixed terms of office.

Mr. Bryce comments on the proposal as follows:--

     It is hard to say, when one begins to make alterations in an old
     house, how far one will be led on in rebuilding, and I doubt
     whether this change in the present American system, possibly in
     itself desirable, might not be found to involve a reconstruction
     large enough to put a new face upon several parts of that system.
     (Vol. i, pp. 290, 291.)

This is very true, but is not a new building required? Is not the old
house built on a rotten foundation? Mr. Bradford has certainly
overlooked the effect of his proposal on party organization for one
thing. If the power over legislation, and especially over expenditure of
public money, is to be taken away from the irresponsible committees of
Congress, the basis of party organization would cease to be corruption,
and both representatives and parties would have to take on an entirely
new character. As to the present character of representatives, Mr. Bryce
advances a number of reasons why the best men do not go in for politics,
such as the want of a social and commercial capital, the residential
qualification, the comparative dullness of politics, the attractiveness
of other careers, &c, but Mr. Bradford declares that the one explanation
which goes further than all these is the absorption of all the powers of
the government by the legislature, and the consequent suppression of
individuality. He writes:--

     The voters are urged to send to Congress men of character, ability,
     and public spirit. They might as well be asked to select men of
     that quality to follow the profession of burglars, a comparison
     which is not intended to convey any disrespect to the number of
     honest and respectable men who constantly are sent to Congress.
     Chosen as burglars, they would fail just the same in the
     business.... It is the organization of Congress which offers every
     facility to those who wish to buy and those who wish to be bought.

Again, as to the present character of parties, Mr. Bradford declares:--

     The names of the two great parties, Republicans and Democrats, have
     in themselves and at the present time no meaning at all.

Simply because the basis of organization is corruption, and not
questions of public policy. For the same reason recent elections have
been fought on popular "crazes," such as the silver question. But Mr.
Bradford says:--

     New parties cannot be formed on constantly changing issues, since
     to have any strength they must have a certain degree of permanence.
     The only two nations which have succeeded in forming great national
     parties are Great Britain and the United States. In other European
     countries the splitting into groups has almost made representative
     government impossible.

What Mr. Bradford has failed to appreciate is that the absolutely rigid
division into two camps which prevails in America is founded on
corruption, and will disappear when corruption is abolished. In the
United States such a thing as a Congressman deserting one party for the
other is practically unknown. In Great Britain, on the contrary, party
lines do continually change as new issues arise; and when they are
founded on questions of public policy it must be so. What gives them
permanence is that certain principles underlie most questions, and men
who have the same political principles are likely to think the same on
any single question; and further that a member would rather follow his
party and sacrifice his opinion on a single question than sacrifice most
of his principles.

Therefore, even if the Americans do succeed in purifying their politics,
they will be faced with the same difficulty as exists elsewhere--namely,
such improved organization as will secure the return of representatives
on questions of general public policy only. The present system of
single-membered electorates will not suffice. The only remedy lies in
enlarged electorates with electoral machinery which will organize public
opinion into two definite lines of policy, and will, by allowing
individual candidature merge the primary election into the actual
election.

All this involves a radical alteration, both in the Constitution and in
the methods of election. But the United States have the great advantage
over France that it does not involve also a serious change in the
national character. It is not unlikely that some such reform must be
brought about before long.

The present position cannot last. The Republican party has so long
identified itself with Capital in all its forms, with the protected
monopolists, the trusts and the corporations, that the mass of Labour
threatens to support the Democrats; and as the latter party maintains
the doctrines of direct government and the infallibility of the
majority, the result will be such a financial crisis and such an
industrial revolution that the Americans will have at last to admit that
their government needs total reconstruction.

+Australia.+--On the first day of the nineteenth century the Union of
the Parliaments of Great Britain and Ireland was accomplished; on the
first day of the twentieth century Britain's daughters in the southern
seas will inaugurate, under her aegis, a new experiment in
democracy--the Australian Commonwealth. The time is opportune, then, for
a review of the tendencies of Australian politics, and for a comparison
with the other great democracies. Thus only can we attempt to cast the
horoscope of the new nation.

Australia starts with many advantages over France and America. The
science of government is better understood now than when they started;
the folly of placing too many checks on the people is recognized; and
the British system of responsible leadership by a cabinet in the
legislature is fully developed. All these features are embodied in the
Constitution, and it only remains for the people to prove their fitness
to work it.

Applying the same tests as we have used in the case of the great
democracies to the present position of Australian politics, what is the
result? First, as regards organization, where do we stand? It must be
confessed that we are far behind Great Britain and America, though
certainly we are not in the same sad plight as France. Still there is
the fact that we are classed among the failures. Take the evidence of
Mr. E.L. Godkin in "Unforeseen Tendencies of Democracy:"--

     In his Journals during a visit to Turin in 1850, Senior records a
     conversation with Cesare Balbo, a member of the Chamber in the
     first Piedmontese Parliament, in which Balbo said, after an
     exciting financial debate:--"We have not yet acquired parliamentary
     discipline. Most of the members are more anxious about their own
     crotchets or their own consistency than about the country. The
     ministry has a large nominal majority, but every member of it is
     ready to put them in a minority for any whim of his own." This was
     probably true of every legislative body on the Continent, and it
     continues true to this day in Italy, Greece, France, Austria,
     Germany, and the new Australian d