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Title: A History of Indian Philosophy, Vol. 1

Author: Surendranath Dasgupta

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nikhilam anujachittaM jńānasūtrair naverya@h
 sajabhiva kusumānāM kālandhhrair vidhatte/
 sa laghum api mamaitaM prAchyavijńānatantuM
upah@rtamatibhaktyā modatāM mai g@rhītvā//

May He, who links the minds of all people,
through the apertures of time, with new threads
of knowledge like a garland of flowers, be pleased
to accept this my thread of Eastern thought, offered,
though it be small, with the greatest devotion.



A HISTORY OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHY


SURENDRANATH DASGUPTA



VOLUME I

First Edition: Cambridge, 1922



DEDICATION

The work and ambition of a life-time is herein humbly
dedicated with supreme reverence to the great sages
of India, who, for the first time in history, formulated
the true principles of freedom and devoted themselves
to the holy quest of truth and the final assessment
and discovery of the ultimate spiritual essence of
man through their concrete lives, critical thought,
dominant will and self-denial.



NOTE ON THE PRONUNCIATION OF
TRANSLITERATED SANSKRIT
AND PĀLI WORDS


The vowels are pronounced almost in the same way
as in Italian, except that the sound of _a_ approaches
that of _o_ in _bond_ or _u_ in _but_, and _ā_ that of _a_ as in _army_.
The consonants are as in English, except _c_, _ch_ in church;
_@t_, _@d_, _@n_ are cerebrals, to which English _t_, _d_, _n_ almost
correspond; _t_, _d_, _n_ are pure dentals; _kh_, _gh_, _ch_, _jh_,
_@th_, _@dh_, _th_, _dh_, _ph_, _bh_ are the simple sounds plus an
aspiration; _ń_ is the French _gn_; _@r_ is usually pronounced
as _ri_, and _s'_, _@s_ as _sh_.



PREFACE

The old civilisation of India was a concrete unity of many-sided
developments in art, architecture, literature, religion, morals, and
science so far as it was understood in those days. But the most important
achievement of Indian thought was philosophy. It was regarded as the goal
of all the highest practical and theoretical activities, and it indicated
the point of unity amidst all the apparent diversities which the complex
growth of culture over a vast area inhabited by different peoples produced.

It is not in the history of foreign invasions, in the rise of independent
kingdoms at different times, in the empires of this or that great monarch
that the unity of India is to be sought. It is essentially one of
spiritual aspirations and obedience to the law of the spirit, which were
regarded as superior to everything else, and it has outlived all the
political changes through which India passed.

The Greeks, the Huns, the Scythians, the Pathans and the Moguls who
occupied the land and controlled the political machinery never ruled
the minds of the people, for these political events were like hurricanes
or the changes of season, mere phenomena of a natural or physical order
which never affected the spiritual integrity of Hindu culture. If after
a passivity of some centuries India is again going to become creative it
is mainly on account of this fundamental unity of her progress and
civilisation and not for anything that she may borrow from other
countries. It is therefore indispensably necessary for all those who
wish to appreciate the significance and potentialities of Indian culture
that they should properly understand the history of Indian philosophical
thought which is the nucleus round which all that is best and highest in
India has grown. Much harm has already been done by the circulation of
opinions that the culture and philosophy of India was dreamy and abstract.
It is therefore very necessary that Indians as well as other peoples
should become more and more acquainted with the true characteristics
of the past history of Indian thought and form a correct estimate of its
special features.

But it is not only for the sake of the right understanding of India

viii

that Indian philosophy should be read, or only as a record of the past
thoughts of India. For most of the problems that are still debated in
modern philosophical thought occurred in more or less divergent forms
to the philosophers of India. Their discussions, difficulties and
solutions when properly grasped in connection with the problems of our
own times may throw light on the course of the process of the future
reconstruction of modern thought. The discovery of the important features
of Indian philosophical thought, and a due appreciation of their full
significance, may turn out to be as important to modern philosophy as
the discovery of Sanskrit has been to the investigation of modern
philological researches. It is unfortunate that the task of
re-interpretation and re-valuation of Indian thought has not yet been
undertaken on a comprehensive scale. Sanskritists also with very few
exceptions have neglected this important field of study, for most of
these scholars have been interested more in mythology, philology, and
history than in philosophy. Much work however has already been done in
the way of the publication of a large number of important texts, and
translations of some of them have also been attempted. But owing to the
presence of many technical terms in advanced Sanskrit philosophical
literature, the translations in most cases are hardly intelligible to
those who are not familiar with the texts themselves.

A work containing some general account of the mutual relations of the
chief systems is necessary for those who intend to pursue the study
of a particular school. This is also necessary for lay readers interested
in philosophy and students of Western philosophy who have no inclination
or time to specialise in any Indian system, but who are at the same time
interested to know what they can about Indian philosophy. In my two books
_The Study of Patanjali_ and _Yoga Philosophy in relation to other Indian
Systems of Thought_ I have attempted to interpret the Sämkhya and Yoga
systems both from their inner point of view and from the point of view
of their relation to other Indian systems. The present attempt deals with
the important features of these as also of all the other systems and seeks
to show some of their inner philosophical relations especially in regard
to the history of their development. I have tried to be as faithful to
the original texts as I could and have always given the Sanskrit or Pāli
technical terms for the help of those who want to make this book a guide

ix

for further study. To understand something of these terms is indeed
essential for anyone who wishes to be sure that he is following the actual
course of the thoughts.

In Sanskrit treatises the style of argument and methods of treating the
different topics are altogether different from what we find in any modern
work of philosophy. Materials had therefore to be collected from a large
number of works on each system and these have been knit together and
given a shape which is likely to be more intelligible to people
unacquainted with Sanskritic ways of thought. But at the same time I
considered it quite undesirable to put any pressure on Indian thoughts
in order to make them appear as European. This will explain much of what
might appear quaint to a European reader. But while keeping all the
thoughts and expressions of the Indian thinkers I have tried to arrange
them in a systematic whole in a manner which appeared to me strictly
faithful to their clear indications and suggestions. It is only in very
few places that I have translated some of the Indian terms by terms of
English philosophy, and this I did because it appeared to me that those
were approximately the nearest approach to the Indian sense of the term.
In all other places I have tried to choose words which have not been made
dangerous by the acquirement of technical senses. This however is
difficult, for the words which are used in philosophy always acquire
some sort of technical sense. I would therefore request my readers to
take those words in an unsophisticated sense and associate them with
such meanings as are justified by the passages and contexts in which
they are used. Some of what will appear as obscure in any system may I
hope be removed if it is re-read with care and attention, for
unfamiliarity sometimes stands in the way of right comprehension. But
I may have also missed giving the proper suggestive links in many places
where condensation was inevitable and the systems themselves have also
sometimes insoluble difficulties, for no system of philosophy is without
its dark and uncomfortable corners.

Though I have begun my work from the Vedic and Brāhma@nic stage, my
treatment of this period has been very slight. The beginnings of the
evolution of philosophical thought, though they can be traced in the
later Vedic hymns, are neither connected nor systematic.

x


More is found in the Brāhmanas, but I do not think it worth while to
elaborate the broken shreds of thought of this epoch. I could have dealt
with the Upani@sad period more fully, but many works on the subject have
already been published in Europe and those who wish to go into details
will certainly go to them. I have therefore limited myself to the dominant
current flowing through the earlier Upani@sads. Notices of other currents
of thought will be given in connection with the treatment of other systems
in the second volume with which they are more intimately connected. It
will be noticed that my treatment of early Buddhism is in some places of
an inconclusive character. This is largely due to the inconclusive
character of the texts which were put into writing long after Buddha
in the form of dialogues and where the precision and directness required
in philosophy were not contemplated. This has given rise to a number of
theories about the interpretations of the philosophical problems of early
Buddhism among modern Buddhist scholars and it is not always easy to
decide one way or the other without running the risk of being dogmatic;
and the scope of my work was also too limited to allow me to indulge in
very elaborate discussions of textual difficulties. But still I also
have in many places formed theories of my own, whether they are right
or wrong it will be for scholars to judge. I had no space for entering
into any polemic, but it will be found that my interpretations of the
systems are different in some cases from those offered by some European
scholars who have worked on them and I leave it to those who are
acquainted with the literature of the subject to decide which of us may
be in the right. I have not dealt elaborately with the new school of
Logic (Navya-Nyāya) of Bengal, for the simple reason that most of the
contributions of this school consist in the invention of technical
expressions and the emphasis put on the necessity of strict exactitude
and absolute preciseness of logical definitions and discussions and these
are almost untranslatable in intelligible English. I have however
incorporated what important differences of philosophical points of view
I could find in it. Discussions of a purely technical character could not
be very fruitful in a work like this. The bibliography given of the
different Indian systems in the last six chapters is not exhaustive but
consists mostly of books which have been actually studied or consulted in
the writing of those chapters. Exact references to the pages of the

xi

texts have generally been given in footnotes in those cases where a
difference of interpretation was anticipated or where it was felt that
a reference to the text would make the matter clearer, or where the
opinions of modern writers have been incorporated.

It gives me the greatest pleasure to acknowledge my deepest gratefulness
to the Hon'ble Maharaja Sir Manindrachandra Nundy, K.C.I.E. Kashimbazar,
Bengal, who has kindly promised to bear the entire expense of the
publication of both volumes of the present work.

The name of this noble man is almost a household word in Bengal for
the magnanimous gifts that he has made to educational and other causes.
Up till now he has made a total gift of about £300,000, of which those
devoted to education come to about £200,000. But the man himself is far
above the gifts he has made. His sterling character, universal sympathy
and friendship, his kindness and amiability make him a veritable
Bodhisattva--one of the noblest of men that I have ever seen. Like many
other scholars of Bengal, I am deeply indebted to him for the
encouragement that he has given me in the pursuit of my studies and
researches, and my feelings of attachment and gratefulness for him are
too deep for utterance.

I am much indebted to my esteemed friends Dr E.J. Thomas of the Cambridge
University Library and Mr Douglas Ainslie for their kindly revising the
proofs of this work, in the course of which they improved my English in
many places. To the former I am also indebted for his attention to the
transliteration of a large number of Sanskrit words, and also for the
whole-hearted sympathy and great friendliness with which he assisted me
with his advice on many points of detail, in particular the exposition
of the Buddhist doctrine of the cause of rebirth owes something of its
treatment to repeated discussions with him.

I also wish to express my gratefulness to my friend Mr N.K. Siddhanta,
M.A., late of the Scottish Churches College, and Mademoiselle Paule Povie
for the kind assistance they have rendered in preparing the index. My
obligations are also due to the Syndics of the Cambridge University Press
for the honour they have done me in publishing this work.

To scholars of Indian philosophy who may do me the honour of reading my
book and who may be impressed with its inevitable

xii

shortcomings and defects, I can only pray in the words of Hemacandra:

  Pramā@nasiddhāntaviruddham atra
  Yatkińciduktam matimāndyado@sāt
  Mātsaryyam utsāryya tadāryyacittā@h
  Prasādam ādhāya vis'odhayantu. [Footnote ref 1]


S.D.

TRINITY COLLEGE,
CAMBRIDGE.

_February_, 1922.

_____________________________________________________________________

[Footnote 1: May the noble-minded scholars instead of cherishing ill
feeling kindly correct whatever errors have been here committed through
the dullness of my intellect in the way of wrong interpretations and
misstatements.]


CONTENTS


CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTORY.....................................................1

CHAPTER II

THE VEDAS, BRĀHMA@NAS AND THEIR PHILOSOPHY

 1 The Vedas and their antiquity.................................10
 2 The place of the Vedas in the Hindu mind......................10
 3 Classification of the Vedic literature........................11
 4 The Sa@mhitās.................................................12
 5 The Brāhma@nas................................................13
 6 The Āra@nyakas................................................14
 7 The @Rg-Veda, its civilization................................14
 8 The Vedic gods................................................16
 9 Polytheism, Henotheism, and Monotheism........................17
10 Growth of a Monotheistic tendency; Prajāpati, Vis'vakarma.....19
11 Brahma........................................................20
12 Sacrifice; the First Rudiments of the Law of Karma............21
13 Cosmogony--Mythological and Philosophical.....................23
14 Eschatology; the Doctrine of Ātman............................25
15 Conclusion....................................................26

CHAPTER III

THE EARLIER UPANI@SADS (700 B.C.-600 B.C.)

 1 The place of the Upani@sads in Vedic literature...............28
 2 The names of the Upani@sads; Non-Brahmanic influence..........30
 3 Brāhma@nas and the Early Upani@sads...........................31
 4 The meaning of the word Upani@sad.............................38
 5 The composition and growth of diverse Upani@sads..............38
 6 Revival of Upani@sad studies in modern times..................39
 7 The Upani@sads and their interpretations......................41
 8 The quest after Brahman: the struggle and the failures........42
 9 Unknowability of Brahman and the Negative Method..............44
10 The Ātman doctrine............................................45
11 Place of Brahman in the Upani@sads............................48
12 The World.....................................................51
13 The World-Soul................................................52
14 The Theory of Causation.......................................52
15 Doctrine of Transmigration....................................53
16 Emancipation..................................................58

CHAPTER IV

GENERAL OBSERVATIONS ON THE SYSTEMS OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHY

1 In what sense is a History of Indian Philosophy possible?......62
2 Growth of the Philosophic Literature...........................65
3 The Indian systems of Philosophy...............................67
4 Some fundamental points of agreement...........................71
 1 _The Karma theory_.........................................71
 2 _The Doctrine of Mukti_....................................74
 3 _The Doctrine of Soul_.....................................75
5 The Pessimistic Attitude towards the World and the Optimistic
 Faith in the end...............................................75
6 Unity in Indian Sādhana (philosophical, religious and ethical
 endeavours)....................................................77

xiv


CHAPTER V

BUDDHIST PHILOSOPHY


 1 The State of Philosophy in India before Buddha.................78
 2 Buddha: his Life...............................................81
 3 Early Buddhist Literature......................................82
 4 The Doctrine of Causal Connection of early Buddhism............84
 5 The Khandhas...................................................93
 6 Avijjā and Āsava...............................................99
 7 Sīla and Samādhi..............................................100
 8 Kamma.........................................................106
 9 Upani@sads and Buddhism.......................................109
10 The Schools of Theravāda Buddhism.............................112
11 Mahāyānism....................................................125
12 The Tathatā Philosophy of As'vagho@sa (80 A.D.)...............129
13 The Mādhyamika or the Sūnyavāda school--Nihilism..............138
14 Uncompromising Idealism or the School of Vijńānavāda Buddhism.145
15 Sautrāntika theory of Perception..............................151
16 Sautrāntika theory of Inference...............................155
17 The Doctrine of Momentariness.................................158
18 The Doctrine of Momentariness and the Doctrine of Causal
 Efficiency (Arthakriyākāritva)..................................163
19 Some Ontological Problems on which the Different Indian Systems
 diverged........................................................164
20 Brief Survey of the Evolution of Buddhist Thought.............166


CHAPTER VI

THE JAINA PHILOSOPHY

 1 The Origin of Jainism.........................................169
 2 Two Sects of Jainism..........................................170
 3 The Canonical and other Literature of the Jains...............171
 4 Some General Characteristics of the Jains.....................172
 5 Life of Mahāvīra..............................................173
 6 The Fundamental Ideas of Jaina Ontology.......................173
 7 The Doctrine of Relative Pluralism (Anekāntavāda).............175
 8 The Doctrine of Nāyas.........................................176
 9 The Doctrine of Syādvāda......................................179
10 Knowledge, its value for us...................................181
11 Theory of Perception..........................................183
12 Non-Perceptual knowledge......................................185
13 Knowledge as Revelation.......................................186
14 The Jīvas.....................................................188
15 Karma Theory..................................................190
16 Karma, Āsrava and Nirjarā.....................................192
17 Pudgala.......................................................195
18 Dharma, Adharma, Ākās'a.......................................197
19 Kāla and Samaya...............................................198
20 Jaina Cosmography.............................................199
21 Jaina Yoga....................................................199
22 Jaina Atheism.................................................203
23 Mok@sa (emancipation).........................................207

xv


CHAPTER VII

THE KAPILA AND THE PĀTAŃJALA SĀ@MKHYA (YOGA)

 1 A Review......................................................208
 2 The Germs of Sā@mkhya in the Upani@sads.......................211
 3 Sā@mkhya and Yoga Literature..................................212
 4 An Early School of Sā@mkhya...................................213
 5 Sā@mkhya kārikā, Sā@mkhya sūtra, Vācaspati Mis'ra and Vijńāna
 Bhiksu..........................................................222
 6 Yoga and Patańjali............................................226
 7 The Sā@mkhya and the Yoga doctrine of Soul or Purusa..........238
 8 Thought and Matter............................................241
 9 Feelings, the Ultimate Substances.............................242
10 The Gunas.....................................................243
11 Prak@@rti and its evolution...................................245
12 Pralaya and the disturbance of the Prak@rti Equilibrium.......247
13 Mahat and Ahamkāra............................................248
14 The Tanmātras and the Paramāńus...............................251
15 Principle of Causation and Conservation of Energy.............254
16 Change as the formation of new collocations...................255
17 Causation as Satkāryavāda (the theory that the effect
 potentially exists before it is generated by the movement
 of the cause)...................................................257
18 Sā@mkhya Atheism and Yoga Theism..............................258
19 Buddhi and Purusa.............................................259
20 The Cognitive Process and some characteristics of Citta.......261
21 Sorrow and its Dissolution....................................264
22 Citta.........................................................268
23 Yoga Purificatory Practices (Parikarma).......................270
24 The Yoga Meditation...........................................271


CHAPTER VIII

THE NYĀYA-VAISESIKA PHILOSOPHY

1 Criticism of Buddhism and Sā@mkhya from the Nyāya standpoint...274
2 Nyāya and Vais'e@sika sūtras...................................276
3 Does Vais'e@sika represent an old school of Mīmā@msā?..........280
4 Philosophy in the Vais'e@sika sūtras...........................285
5 Philosophy in the Nyāya sūtras.................................294
6 Philosophy of Nyāya sūtras and Vais'e@sika sūtras..............301
7 The Vais'e@sika and Nyāya Literature...........................305
8 The main doctrine of the Nyāya-Vais'e@sika Philosophy..........310
9 The six Padārthas: Dravya, Gu@na, Karma, Sāmānya, Vis'e@sa,
 Samavāya........................................................313
10 The Theory of Causation.......................................319
11 Dissolution (Pralaya) and Creation (S@r@s@ti).................323
12 Proof of the Existence of Is'vara.............................325
13 The Nyāya-Vais'e@sika Physics.................................326
14 The Origin of Knowledge (Pramā@na)............................330
15 The four Pramā@nas of Nyāya...................................332
16 Perception (Pratyak@sa).......................................333
17 Inference.....................................................343
18 Upamāna and S'abda............................................354
19 Negation in Nyāya-Vais'e@sika.................................355
20 The necessity of the Acquirement of debating devices for
 the seeker of Salvation.........................................360
21 The Doctrine of Soul..........................................362
22 Īs'vara and Salvation.........................................363

xvi


CHAPTER IX

MĪMĀ@MSĀ PHILOSOPHY


1 A Comparative Review...........................................367
2 The Mīmā@msā Literature........................................369
3 The Parata@h-prāmā@nya doctrine of Nyāya and the
 Svata@h-prāmā@nya doctrine of Mīmā@msā..........................372
4 The place of Sense-organs in Perception........................375
5 Indeterminate and Determinate Perception.......................378
6 Some Ontological Problems connected with the Doctrine of
 Perception......................................................379
7 The Nature of Knowledge........................................382
8 The Psychology of Illusion.....................................384
9 Inference......................................................387
10 Upamāna, Arthāpatti...........................................391
11 S'abda-pramā@na...............................................394
12 The Pramā@na of Non-perception (anupalabdhi)..................397
13 Self, Salvation, and God......................................399
14 Mīmā@msā as Philosophy and Mimā@msā as Ritualism..............403



CHAPTER X

THE S'A@NKARA SCHOOL OF VEDĀNTA


1 Comprehension of the Philosophical Issues more essential than
 the Dialectic of Controversy....................................406
2 The philosophical situation: a Review..........................408
3 Vedānta Literature.............................................418
4 Vedānta in Gau@dapāda..........................................420
5 Vedānta and Sa@nkara (788-820 A.D.)............................429
6 The main idea of the Vedānta philosophy........................439
7 In what sense is the world-appearance false?...................443
8 The nature of the world-appearance, phenomena..................445
9 The Definition of Ajńāna (nescience)...........................452
10 Ajńāna established by Perception and Inference................454
11 Locus and Object of Ajńāna, Aha@mkāra and Anta@hkara@na.......457
12 Anirvācyavāda and the Vedānta dialectic.......................461
13 The Theory of Causation.......................................465
14 Vedānta theory of Perception and Inference....................470
15 Ātman, Jīva, Is'vara, Ekajīvavāda and D@r@s@tis@r@s@tivāda....474
16 Vedānta theory of Illusion....................................485
17 Vedānta Ethics and Vedānta Emancipation.......................489
18 Vedānta and other Indian systems..............................492

INDEX............................................................495

1



CHAPTER I


INTRODUCTORY

The achievements of the ancient Indians in the field of philosophy are
but very imperfectly known to the world at large, and it is unfortunate
that the condition is no better even in India. There is a small body
of Hindu scholars and ascetics living a retired life in solitude, who
are well acquainted with the subject, but they do not know English and
are not used to modern ways of thinking, and the idea that they ought
to write books in vernaculars in order to popularize the subject does
not appeal to them. Through the activity of various learned bodies and
private individuals both in Europe and in India large numbers of
philosophical works in Sanskrit and Pāli have been published, as well as
translations of a few of them, but there has been as yet little
systematic attempt on the part of scholars to study them and judge their
value. There are hundreds of Sanskrit works on most of the systems of
Indian thought and scarcely a hundredth part of them has been translated.
Indian modes of expression, entailing difficult technical philosophical
terms are so different from those of European thought, that they can
hardly ever be accurately translated. It is therefore very difficult
for a person unacquainted with Sanskrit to understand Indian philosophical
thought in its true bearing from translations. Pāli is a much easier
language than Sanskrit, but a knowledge of Pāli is helpful in
understanding only the earliest school of Buddhism, when it was in its
semi-philosophical stage. Sanskrit is generally regarded as a difficult
language. But no one from an acquaintance with Vedic or ordinary literary
Sanskrit can have any idea of the difficulty of the logical and abstruse
parts of Sanskrit philosophical literature. A man who can easily
understand the Vedas. the Upani@sads, the Purānas, the Law Books and
the literary works, and is also well acquainted with European
philosophical thought, may find it literally impossible to understand
even small portions of a work of advanced Indian logic, or the
dialectical Vedānta. This is due to two reasons, the use of
technical terms and of great condensation in expression, and
the hidden allusions to doctrines of other systems. The

2

tendency to conceiving philosophical problems in a clear and unambiguous
manner is an important feature of Sanskrit thought, but from the ninth
century onwards, the habit of using clear, definite, and precise
expressions, began to develop in a very striking manner, and as a result
of that a large number of technical terms began to be invented. These
terms are seldom properly explained, and it is presupposed that the reader
who wants to read the works should have a knowledge of them. Any one in
olden times who took to the study of any system of philosophy, had to do
so with a teacher, who explained those terms to him. The teacher himself
had got it from his teacher, and he from his. There was no tendency to
popularize philosophy, for the idea then prevalent was that only the
chosen few who had otherwise shown their fitness, deserved to become
fit students (_adhikārī_) of philosophy, under the direction of a
teacher. Only those who had the grit and high moral strength to devote
their whole life to the true understanding of philosophy and the
rebuilding of life in accordance with the high truths of philosophy
were allowed to study it.

Another difficulty which a beginner will meet is this, that sometimes
the same technical terms are used in extremely different senses in
different systems. The student must know the meaning of each technical
term with reference to the system in which it occurs, and no dictionary
will enlighten him much about the matter [Footnote ref 1]. He will have
to pick them up as he advances and finds them used. Allusions to the
doctrines of other systems and their refutations during the discussions
of similar doctrines in any particular system of thought are often very
puzzling even to a well-equipped reader; for he cannot be expected to
know all the doctrines of other systems without going through them, and
so it often becomes difficult to follow the series of answers and
refutations which are poured forth in the course of these discussions.
There are two important compendiums in Sanskrit giving a summary of some
of the principal systems of Indian thought, viz. the
_Sarvadars'anasa@mgraha_, and the _@Sa@ddars'anasamuccaya_ of
Haribhadra with the commentary of Gu@naratna; but the former is very
sketchy and can throw very little light on the understanding
of the ontological or epistemological doctrines of any of the
systems. It has been translated by Cowell and Gough, but I

____________________________________________________________________

[Footnote 1: Recently a very able Sanskrit dictionary of technical
philosophical terms called Nyāyakos'a has been prepared by M.M.
Bhīmācārya Jhalkikar, Bombay, Govt. Press.]

3

am afraid the translation may not be found very intelligible.
Gu@naratna's commentary is excellent so far as Jainism is concerned,
and it sometimes gives interesting information about other systems,
and also supplies us with some short bibliographical notices, but it
seldom goes on to explain the epistemological or ontological doctrines
or discussions which are so necessary for the right understanding of any
of the advanced systems of Indian thought. Thus in the absence of a book
which could give us in brief the main epistemological, ontological, and
psychological positions of the Indian thinkers, it is difficult even for
a good Sanskrit scholar to follow the advanced philosophical literature,
even though he may be acquainted with many of the technical philosophical
terms. I have spoken enough about the difficulties of studying Indian
philosophy, but if once a person can get himself used to the technical
terms and the general positions of the different Indian thinkers and their
modes of expression, he can master the whole by patient toil. The
technical terms, which are a source of difficulty at the beginning, are
of inestimable value in helping us to understand the precise and definite
meaning of the writers who used them, and the chances of misinterpreting
or misunderstanding them are reduced to a minimum. It is I think
well-known that avoidance of technical terms has often rendered
philosophical works unduly verbose, and liable to misinterpretation.
The art of clear writing is indeed a rare virtue and every philosopher
cannot expect to have it. But when technical expressions are properly
formed, even a bad writer can make himself understood. In the early days
of Buddhist philosophy in the Pāli literature, this difficulty is greatly
felt. There are some technical terms here which are still very elastic and
their repetition in different places in more or less different senses
heighten the difficulty of understanding the real meaning intended to be
conveyed.

But is it necessary that a history of Indian philosophy should be
written? There are some people who think that the Indians never rose
beyond the stage of simple faith and that therefore they cannot have
any philosophy at all in the proper sense of the term. Thus Professor
Frank Thilly of the Cornell University says in his _History of Philosophy_
[Footnote ref 1], "A universal history of philosophy would include
the philosophies of all peoples. Not all peoples, however

__________________________________________________________________

[Footnote 1: New York, 1914, p. 3.]

4

have produced real systems of thought, and the speculations of only a
few can be said to have had a history. Many do not rise beyond the
mythological stage. Even the theories of Oriental peoples, the Hindus,
Egyptians, Chinese, consist, in the main, of mythological and ethical
doctrines, and are not thoroughgoing systems of thought: they are shot
through with poetry and faith. We shall, therefore, limit ourselves to
the study of the Western countries, and begin with the philosophy of the
ancient Greeks, on whose culture our own civilization in part, rests."
There are doubtless many other people who hold such uninformed and
untrue beliefs, which only show their ignorance of Indian matters.
It is not necessary to say anything in order to refute these views,
for what follows will I hope show the falsity of their beliefs. If
they are not satisfied, and want to know more definitely and elaborately
about the contents of the different systems, I am afraid they will have
to go to the originals referred to in the bibliographical notices of
the chapters.

There is another opinion, that the time has not yet come for an attempt
to write a history of Indian philosophy. Two different reasons are given
from two different points of view. It is said that the field of Indian
philosophy is so vast, and such a vast literature exists on each of the
systems, that it is not possible for anyone to collect his materials
directly from the original sources, before separate accounts are prepared
by specialists working in each of the particular systems. There is some
truth in this objection, but although in some of the important systems
the literature that exists is exceedingly vast, yet many of them are more
or less repetitions of the same subjects, and a judicious selection of
twenty or thirty important works on each of the systems could certainly
be made, which would give a fairly correct exposition. In my own
undertaking in this direction I have always drawn directly from the
original texts, and have always tried to collect my materials from those
sources in which they appear at their best. My space has been very limited
and I have chosen the features which appeared to me to be the most
important. I had to leave out many discussions of difficult problems
and diverse important bearings of each of the systems to many
interesting aspects of philosophy. This I hope may be excused
in a history of philosophy which does not aim at completeness.
There are indeed many defects and shortcomings, and

5

these would have been much less in the case of a writer abler than the
present one. At any rate it may be hoped that the imperfections of the
present attempt will be a stimulus to those whose better and more
competent efforts will supersede it. No attempt ought to be called
impossible on account of its imperfections.

In the second place it is said that the Indians had no proper and
accurate historical records and biographies and it is therefore impossible
to write a history of Indian philosophy. This objection is also partially
valid. But this defect does not affect us so much as one would at first
sight suppose; for, though the dates of the earlier beginnings are very
obscure, yet, in later times, we are in a position to affirm some dates
and to point out priority and posteriority in the case of other thinkers.
As most of the systems developed side by side through many centuries their
mutual relations also developed, and these could be well observed. The
special nature of this development has been touched on in the fourth
chapter. Most of the systems had very early beginnings and a continuous
course of development through the succeeding centuries, and it is not
possible to take the state of the philosophy of a particular system at
a particular time and contrast it with the state of that system at a
later time; for the later state did not supersede the previous state,
but only showed a more coherent form of it, which was generally true to
the original system but was more determinate. Evolution through history
has in Western countries often brought forth the development of more
coherent types of philosophic thought, but in India, though the types
remained the same, their development through history made them more and
more coherent and determinate. Most of the parts were probably existent
in the earlier stages, but they were in an undifferentiated state; through
the criticism and conflict of the different schools existing side by side
the parts of each of the systems of thought became more and more
differentiated, determinate, and coherent. In some cases this development
has been almost imperceptible, and in many cases the earlier forms have
been lost, or so inadequately expressed that nothing definite could be
made out of them. Wherever such a differentiation could be made
in the interests of philosophy, I have tried to do it. But I
have never considered it desirable that the philosophical interest
should be subordinated to the chronological. It is no

6

doubt true that more definite chronological information would be
a very desirable thing, yet I am of opinion that the little
chronological data we have give us a fair amount of help in forming
a general notion about the growth and development of the different
systems by mutual association and conflict. If the condition of the
development of philosophy in India had been the same as in Europe,
definite chronological knowledge would be considered much more
indispensable. For, when one system supersedes another, it is
indispensably necessary that we should know which preceded and which
succeeded. But when the systems are developing side by side, and when
we are getting them in their richer and better forms, the interest with
regard to the conditions, nature and environment of their early origin
has rather a historical than a philosophical interest. I have tried as
best I could to form certain general notions as regards the earlier
stages of some of the systems, but though the various features of
these systems at these stages in detail may not be ascertainable,
yet this, I think, could never be considered as invalidating the
whole programme. Moreover, even if we knew definitely the correct dates
of the thinkers of the same system we could not treat them separately,
as is done in European philosophy, without unnecessarily repeating the
same thing twenty times over; for they all dealt with the same system,
and tried to bring out the same type of thought in more and more
determinate forms.

The earliest literature of India is the Vedas. These consist mostly of
hymns in praise of nature gods, such as fire, wind, etc. Excepting in
some of the hymns of the later parts of the work (probably about 1000
B.C.), there is not much philosophy in them in our sense of the term.
It is here that we first find intensely interesting philosophical
questions of a more or less cosmological character expressed in terms
of poetry and imagination. In the later Vedic works called the
Brāhmaf@nas and the Āra@nyakas written mostly in prose, which followed
the Vedic hymns, there are two tendencies, viz. one that sought to
establish the magical forms of ritualistic worship, and the other which
indulged in speculative thinking through crude generalizations. This
latter tendency was indeed much feebler than the former, and it might
appear that the ritualistic tendency had actually swallowed up what
little of philosophy the later parts of the Vedic hymns were trying
to express, but there are unmistakable marks that this tendency

7

existed and worked. Next to this come certain treatises written in prose
and verse called the Upani@sads, which contain various sorts of
philosophical thoughts mostly monistic or singularistic but also some
pluralistic and dualistic ones. These are not reasoned statements, but
utterances of truths intuitively perceived or felt as unquestionably real
and indubitable, and carrying great force, vigour, and persuasiveness with
them. It is very probable that many of the earliest parts of this
literature are as old as 500 B.C. to 700 B.C. Buddhist philosophy began
with the Buddha from some time about 500 B.C. There is reason to believe
that Buddhist philosophy continued to develop in India in one or other of
its vigorous forms till some time about the tenth or eleventh century A.D.
The earliest beginnings of the other Indian systems of thought are also to
be sought chiefly between the age of the Buddha to about 200 B.C. Jaina
philosophy was probably prior to the Buddha. But except in its earlier
days, when it came in conflict with the doctrines of the Buddha, it
does not seem to me that the Jaina thought came much in contact with
other systems of Hindu thought. Excepting in some forms of Vai@s@nava
thought in later times, Jaina thought is seldom alluded to by the Hindu
writers or later Buddhists, though some Jains like Haribhadra and
Gu@naratna tried to refute the Hindu and Buddhist systems. The
non-aggressive nature of their religion and ideal may to a certain
extent explain it, but there may be other reasons too which it is
difficult for us to guess. It is interesting to note that, though there
have been some dissensions amongst the Jains about dogmas and creeds,
Jaina philosophy has not split into many schools of thought more or less
differing from one another as Buddhist thought did.

The first volume of this work will contain Buddhist and Jaina philosophy
and the six systems of Hindu thought. These six systems of orthodox
Hindu thought are the Sā@mkhya, the Yoga, the Nyāya, the Vais'e@sika,
the Mimā@msā (generally known as Pūrva Mimā@msā), and the Vedānta (known
also as Uttara Mimā@msā). Of these what is differently known as Sā@mkhya
and Yoga are but different schools of one system. The Vais'e@sika and
the Nyāya in later times became so mixed up that, though in early times
the similarity of the former with Mimā@msā was greater than that
with Nyāya, they came to be regarded as fundamentally almost the
same systems. Nyāya and Vais'e@sika have therefore been treated

8

together. In addition to these systems some theistic systems began
to grow prominent from the ninth century A.D. They also probably
had their early beginnings at the time of the Upani@sads. But at
that time their interest was probably concentrated on problems
of morality and religion. It is not improbable that these were
associated with certain metaphysical theories also, but no works
treating them in a systematic way are now available. One of their most
important early works is the _Bhagavadgātā_. This book is rightly
regarded as one of the greatest masterpieces of Hindu thought. It is
written in verse, and deals with moral, religious, and metaphysical
problems, in a loose form. It is its lack of system and method which
gives it its peculiar charm more akin to the poetry of the Upani@sads
than to the dialectical and systematic Hindu thought. From the ninth
century onwards attempts were made to supplement these loose theistic
ideas which were floating about and forming integral parts of religious
creeds, by metaphysical theories. Theism is often dualistic and
pluralistic, and so are all these systems, which are known as different
schools of Vai@s@nava philosophy. Most of the Vai@s@nava thinkers wished
to show that their systems were taught in the Upani@sads, and thus
wrote commentaries thereon to prove their interpretations, and also wrote
commentaries on the _Brahmasūtra_, the classical exposition of the
philosophy of the Upani@sads. In addition to the works of these Vai@s@nava
thinkers there sprang up another class of theistic works which were of a
more eclectic nature. These also had their beginnings in periods as old
as the Upani@sads. They are known as the S'aiva and Tantra thought, and are
dealt with in the second volume of this work.

We thus see that the earliest beginnings of most systems of Hindu thought
can be traced to some time between 600 B.C. to 100 or 200 B.C. It is
extremely difficult to say anything about the relative priority of the
systems with any degree of certainty. Some conjectural attempts have
been made in this work with regard to some of the systems, but how far
they are correct, it will be for our readers to judge. Moreover during
the earliest manifestation of a system some crude outlines only are
traceable. As time went on the systems of thought began to develop
side by side. Most of them were taught from the time in which they
were first conceived to about the seventeenth century A.D. in an
unbroken chain of teachers and pupils. Even now each system of
Hindu thought has its own adherents, though few people now

9

care to write any new works upon them. In the history of the growth of
any system of Hindu thought we find that as time went on, and as new
problems were suggested, each system tried to answer them consistently
with its own doctrines. The order in which we have taken the
philosophical systems could not be strictly a chronological one. Thus
though it is possible that the earliest speculations of some form of
Sā@mkhya, Yoga, and Mīmā@msā were prior to Buddhism yet they have been
treated after Buddhism and Jainism, because the elaborate works of these
systems which we now possess are later than Buddhism. In my opinion the
Vais'e@sika system is also probably pre-Buddhistic, but it has been
treated later, partly on account of its association with Nyāya, and
partly on account of the fact that all its commentaries are of a much
later date. It seems to me almost certain that enormous quantities of
old philosophical literature have been lost, which if found could have
been of use to us in showing the stages of the early growth of the systems
and their mutual relations. But as they are not available we have to be
satisfied with what remains. The original sources from which I have drawn
my materials have all been indicated in the brief accounts of the
literature of each system which I have put in before beginning the study
of any particular system of thought.

In my interpretations I have always tried to follow the original sources
as accurately as I could. This has sometimes led to old and unfamiliar
modes of expression, but this course seemed to me to be preferable to
the adoption of European modes of thought for the expression of Indian
ideas. But even in spite of this striking similarities to many of the
modern philosophical doctrines and ideas will doubtless be noticed.
This only proves that the human mind follows more or less the same modes
of rational thought. I have never tried to compare any phase of Indian
thought with European, for this is beyond the scope of my present
attempt, but if I may be allowed to express my own conviction, I might
say that many of the philosophical doctrines of European philosophy are
essentially the same as those found in Indian philosophy. The main
difference is often the difference of the point of view from which the
same problems appeared in such a variety of forms in the two countries.
My own view with regard to the net value of Indian philosophical
development will be expressed in the concluding chapter of the second
volume of the present work.

10




CHAPTER II


THE VEDAS, BRĀHMANAS AND THEIR PHILOSOPHY

The Vedas and their antiquity.

The sacred books of India, the Vedas, are generally believed to be the
earliest literary record of the Indo-European race. It is indeed
difficult to say when the earliest portions of these compositions came
into existence. Many shrewd guesses have been offered, but none of them
can be proved to be incontestably true. Max Müller supposed the date to
be 1200 B.C., Haug 2400 B.C. and Bāl Ga@ngādhar Tilak 4000 B.C. The
ancient Hindus seldom kept any historical record of their literary,
religious or political achievements. The Vedas were handed down from
mouth to mouth from a period of unknown antiquity; and the Hindus
generally believed that they were never composed by men. It was
therefore generally supposed that either they were taught by God to the
sages, or that they were of themselves revealed to the sages who were the
"seers" (_mantradra@s@tā_) of the hymns. Thus we find that when some
time had elapsed after the composition of the Vedas, people had come to
look upon them not only as very old, but so old that they had,
theoretically at least, no beginning in time, though they were believed
to have been revealed at some unknown remote period at the beginning of
each creation.


The place of the Vedas in the Hindu mind.

When the Vedas were composed, there was probably no system of writing
prevalent in India. But such was the scrupulous zeal of the Brahmins,
who got the whole Vedic literature by heart by hearing it from their
preceptors, that it has been transmitted most faithfully to us through
the course of the last 3000 years or more with little or no interpolations
at all. The religious history of India had suffered considerable changes
in the latter periods, since the time of the Vedic civilization, but such
was the reverence paid to the Vedas that they had ever remained as
the highest religious authority for all sections of the Hindus at
all times. Even at this day all the obligatory duties of the Hindus
at birth, marriage, death, etc., are performed according to the old

11

Vedic ritual. The prayers that a Brahmin now says three times a day
are the same selections of Vedic verses as were used as prayer verses
two or three thousand years ago. A little insight into the life of an
ordinary Hindu of the present day will show that the system of
image-worship is one that has been grafted upon his life, the regular
obligatory duties of which are ordered according to the old Vedic rites.
Thus an orthodox Brahmin can dispense with image-worship if he likes,
but not so with his daily Vedic prayers or other obligatory ceremonies.
Even at this day there are persons who bestow immense sums of money
for the performance and teaching of Vedic sacrifices and rituals.
Most of the Sanskrit literatures that flourished after the Vedas
base upon them their own validity, and appeal to them as authority.
Systems of Hindu philosophy not only own their allegiance to the Vedas,
but the adherents of each one of them would often quarrel with others
and maintain its superiority by trying to prove that it and it alone
was the faithful follower of the Vedas and represented correctly their
views. The laws which regulate the social, legal, domestic and religious
customs and rites of the Hindus even to the present day are said to be
but mere systematized memories of old Vedic teachings, and are held to
be obligatory on their authority. Even under British administration, in
the inheritance of property, adoption, and in such other legal
transactions, Hindu Law is followed, and this claims to draw its authority
from the Vedas. To enter into details is unnecessary. But suffice it to
say that the Vedas, far from being regarded as a dead literature of the
past, are still looked upon as the origin and source of almost all
literatures except purely secular poetry and drama. Thus in short we may
say that in spite of the many changes that time has wrought, the orthodox
Hindu life may still be regarded in the main as an adumbration of the
Vedic life, which had never ceased to shed its light all through the past.


Classification of the Vedic literature.

A beginner who is introduced for the first time to the study
of later Sanskrit literature is likely to appear somewhat confused
when he meets with authoritative texts of diverse purport and
subjects having the same generic name "Veda" or "S'ruti" (from
_s'ru_ to hear); for Veda in its wider sense is not the name of any

12

particular book, but of the literature of a particular epoch extending
over a long period, say two thousand years or so. As this literature
represents the total achievements of the Indian people in different
directions for such a long period, it must of necessity be of a
diversified character. If we roughly classify this huge literature from
the points of view of age, language, and subject matter, we can point out
four different types, namely the Sa@mhitā or collection of verses (_sam_
together, _hita_ put), Brāhma@nas, Āra@nyakas ("forest treatises")
and the Upani@sads. All these literatures, both prose and verse,
were looked upon as so holy that in early times it was thought
almost a sacrilege to write them; they were therefore learnt by
heart by the Brahmins from the mouth of their preceptors and
were hence called _s'ruti_ (literally anything heard)[Footnote ref 1].


The Sa@mhitās.

There are four collections or Sa@mhitās, namely @Rg-Veda, Sāma-Veda,
Yajur-Veda and Atharva-Veda. Of these the @Rg-Veda is probably the
earliest. The Sāma-Veda has practically no independent value, for
it consists of stanzas taken (excepting only 75) entirely from the
@Rg-Veda, which were meant to be sung to certain fixed melodies, and
may thus be called the book of chants. The Yajur-Veda however contains
in addition to the verses taken from the @Rg-Veda many original prose
formulas. The arrangement of the verses of the Sāma-Veda is solely with
reference to their place and use in the Soma sacrifice; the contents
of the Yajur-Veda are arranged in the order in which the verses were
actually employed in the various religious sacrifices. It is therefore
called the Veda of Yajus--sacrificial prayers. These may be contrasted
with the arrangement in the @Rg-Veda in this, that there the verses are
generally arranged in accordance with the gods who are adored in them.
Thus, for example, first we get all the poems addressed to Agni or the
Fire-god, then all those to the god Indra and so on. The fourth
collection, the Atharva-Veda, probably attained its present form
considerably later than the @Rg-Veda. In spirit, however, as Professor
Macdonell says, "It is not only entirely different from the _Rigveda_
but represents a much more primitive stage of thought. While the
_Rigveda_ deals almost exclusively with the higher gods as conceived by a

_____________________________________________________________________

[Footnote 1: Pā@nini, III. iii. 94.]

13

comparatively advanced and refined sacerdotal class, the _Atharva-Veda_
is, in the main a book of spells and incantations appealing to the demon
world, and teems with notions about witchcraft current among the lower
grades of the population, and derived from an immemorial antiquity. These
two, thus complementary to each other in contents are obviously the most
important of the four Vedas [Footnote ref 1]."


The Brāhma@nas. [Footnote ref 2]

After the Sa@mhitās there grew up the theological treatises called the
Brāhma@nas, which were of a distinctly different literary type. They
are written in prose, and explain the sacred significance of the
different rituals to those who are not already familiar with them.
"They reflect," says Professor Macdonell, "the spirit of an age in
which all intellectual activity is concentrated on the sacrifice,
describing its ceremonies, discussing its value, speculating on its
origin and significance." These works are full of dogmatic assertions,
fanciful symbolism and speculations of an unbounded imagination in the
field of sacrificial details. The sacrificial ceremonials were probably
never so elaborate at the time when the early hymns were composed.
But when the collections of hymns were being handed down from generation
to generation the ceremonials became more and more complicated. Thus
there came about the necessity of the distribution of the different
sacrificial functions among several distinct classes of priests. We may
assume that this was a period when the caste system was becoming
established, and when the only thing which could engage wise and religious
minds was sacrifice and its elaborate rituals. Free speculative thinking
was thus subordinated to the service of the sacrifice, and the result
was the production of the most fanciful sacramental and symbolic

____________________________________________________________________

[Footnote 1: A.A. Macdonell's _History of Sanskrit Literature_, p. 31.]

[Footnote 2: Weber (_Hist. Ind. Lit_., p. 11, note) says that the word
Brāhma@na signifies "that which relates to prayer _brahman_." Max Muller
(_S.B.E._, I.p. lxvi) says that Brāhma@na meant "originally the sayings
of Brahmans, whether in the general sense of priests, or in the more
special sense of Brahman-priests." Eggeling (S.B.E. XII. Introd. p. xxii)
says that the Brhāma@nas were so called "probably either because
they were intended for the instruction and guidance of priests (brahman)
generally; or because they were, for the most part, the authoritative
utterances of such as were thoroughly versed in Vedic and sacrificial
lore and competent to act as Brahmans or superintending priests." But
in view of the fact that the Brāhma@nas were also supposed to be as
much revealed as the Vedas, the present writer thinks that Weber's view
is the correct one.]

14

system, unparalleled anywhere but among the Gnostics. It is now
generally believed that the close of the Brāhma@na period was not later
than 500 B.C.


The Āra@nyakas.

As a further development of the Brāhma@nas however we get the Āra@nyakas
or forest treatises. These works were probably composed for old men who
had retired into the forest and were thus unable to perform elaborate
sacrifices requiring a multitude of accessories and articles which could
not be procured in forests. In these, meditations on certain symbols
were supposed to be of great merit, and they gradually began to supplant
the sacrifices as being of a superior order. It is here that we find
that amongst a certain section of intelligent people the ritualistic ideas
began to give way, and philosophic speculations about the nature of
truth became gradually substituted in their place. To take an
illustration from the beginning of the B@rhadāra@nyaka we find that
instead of the actual performance of the horse sacrifice (_as'vamedha_)
there are directions for meditating upon the dawn (_U@sas_) as the head
of the horse, the sun as the eye of the horse, the air as its life, and
so on. This is indeed a distinct advancement of the claims of speculation
or meditation over the actual performance of the complicated ceremonials
of sacrifice. The growth of the subjective speculation, as being capable
of bringing the highest good, gradually resulted in the supersession of
Vedic ritualism and the establishment of the claims of philosophic
meditation and self-knowledge as the highest goal of life. Thus
we find that the Āra@nyaka age was a period during which free thinking
tried gradually to shake off the shackles of ritualism which had fettered
it for a long time. It was thus that the Āra@nyakas could pave the way
for the Upani@sads, revive the germs of philosophic speculation in the
Vedas, and develop them in a manner which made the Upani@sads the source
of all philosophy that arose in the world of Hindu thought.


The @Rg-Veda, its civilization.

The hymns of the @Rg-Veda are neither the productions of a
single hand nor do they probably belong to any single age. They
were composed probably at different periods by different sages,
and it is not improbable that some of them were composed

15

before the Aryan people entered the plains of India. They were handed
down from mouth to mouth and gradually swelled through the new additions
that were made by the poets of succeeding generations. It was when the
collection had increased to a very considerable extent that it was
probably arranged in the present form, or in some other previous forms
to which the present arrangement owes its origin. They therefore reflect
the civilization of the Aryan people at different periods of antiquity
before and after they had come to India. This unique monument of a long
vanished age is of great aesthetic value, and contains much that is
genuine poetry. It enables us to get an estimate of the primitive
society which produced it--the oldest book of the Aryan race.
The principal means of sustenance were cattle-keeping and the
cultivation of the soil with plough and harrow, mattock and hoe,
and watering the ground when necessary with artificial canals.
"The chief food consists," as Kaegi says, "together with bread,
of various preparations of milk, cakes of flour and butter, many
sorts of vegetables and fruits; meat cooked on the spits or in pots,
is little used, and was probably eaten only at the great feasts and
family gatherings. Drinking plays throughout a much more important
part than eating [Footnote ref 1]." The wood-worker built war-chariots
and wagons, as also more delicate carved works and artistic cups.
Metal-workers, smiths and potters continued their trade. The
women understood the plaiting of mats, weaving and sewing;
they manufactured the wool of the sheep into clothing for men
and covering for animals. The group of individuals forming a
tribe was the highest political unit; each of the different families
forming a tribe was under the sway of the father or the head of
the family. Kingship was probably hereditary and in some cases
electoral. Kingship was nowhere absolute, but limited by the
will of the people. Most developed ideas of justice, right and
law, were present in the country. Thus Kaegi says, "the hymns
strongly prove how deeply the prominent minds in the people
were persuaded that the eternal ordinances of the rulers of the
world were as inviolable in mental and moral matters as in the
realm of nature, and that every wrong act, even the unconscious,
was punished and the sin expiated."[Footnote ref 2] Thus it is only right
and proper to think that the Aryans had attained a pretty high degree

___________________________________________________________________

[Footnote 1: _The Rigveda_, by Kaegi, 1886 edition, p. 13.]

[Footnote 2: _Ibid_. p. 18.]

16

of civilization, but nowhere was the sincere spirit of the Aryans
more manifested than in religion, which was the most essential and
dominant feature of almost all the hymns, except a few secular
ones. Thus Kaegi says, "The whole significance of the Rigveda
in reference to the general history of religion, as has repeatedly
been pointed out in modern times, rests upon this, that it presents
to us the development of religious conceptions from the earliest
beginnings to the deepest apprehension of the godhead and its
relation to man [Footnote ref 1]."


The Vedic Gods.

The hymns of the @Rg-Veda were almost all composed in
praise of the gods. The social and other materials are of secondary
importance, as these references had only to be mentioned incidentally
in giving vent to their feelings of devotion to the god.
The gods here are however personalities presiding over the diverse
powers of nature or forming their very essence. They have
therefore no definite, systematic and separate characters like the
Greek gods or the gods of the later Indian mythical works, the
Purā@nas. The powers of nature such as the storm, the rain, the
thunder, are closely associated with one another, and the gods
associated with them are also similar in character. The same
epithets are attributed to different gods and it is only in a few
specific qualities that they differ from one another. In the later
mythological compositions of the Purā@nas the gods lost their
character as hypostatic powers of nature, and thus became actual
personalities and characters having their tales of joy and sorrow
like the mortal here below. The Vedic gods may be contrasted
with them in this, that they are of an impersonal nature, as the
characters they display are mostly but expressions of the powers
of nature. To take an example, the fire or Agni is described, as
Kaegi has it, as one that "lies concealed in the softer wood, as
in a chamber, until, called forth by the rubbing in the early
morning hour, he suddenly springs forth in gleaming brightness.
The sacrificer takes and lays him on the wood. When the priests
pour melted butter upon him, he leaps up crackling and neighing
like a horse--he whom men love to see increasing like their own
prosperity. They wonder at him, when, decking himself with

___________________________________________________________________

[Footnote 1: _The Rigveda_, by Kaegi, p. 26.]

17

changing colors like a suitor, equally beautiful on all sides, he
presents to all sides his front.

   "All-searching is his beam, the gleaming of his light,
   His, the all-beautiful, of beauteous face and glance,
   The changing shimmer like that floats upon the stream,
   So Agni's rays gleam over bright and never cease."

[Footnote ref 1] R.V.I. 143. 3.

They would describe the wind (Vāta) and adore him and say

   "In what place was he born, and from whence comes he?
   The vital breath of gods, the world's great offspring,
   The God where'er he will moves at his pleasure:
   His rushing sound we hear--what his appearance, no one."

[Footnote ref 2] R.V.X. 168. 3, 4.

It was the forces of nature and her manifestations, on earth
here, the atmosphere around and above us, or in the Heaven
beyond the vault of the sky that excited the devotion and
imagination of the Vedic poets. Thus with the exception of a
few abstract gods of whom we shall presently speak and some
dual divinities, the gods may be roughly classified as the
terrestrial, atmospheric, and celestial.


Polytheism, Henotheism and Monotheism.

The plurality of the Vedic gods may lead a superficial enquirer
to think the faith of the Vedic people polytheistic. But an intelligent
reader will find here neither polytheism nor monotheism but a simple
primitive stage of belief to which both of these may be said to owe
their origin. The gods here do not preserve their proper places as in
a polytheistic faith, but each one of them shrinks into insignificance
or shines as supreme according as it is the object of adoration or not.
The Vedic poets were the children of nature. Every natural phenomenon
excited their wonder, admiration or veneration. The poet is struck
with wonder that "the rough red cow gives soft white milk." The appearance
or the setting of the sun sends a thrill into the minds of the Vedic
sage and with wonder-gazing eyes he exclaims:

   "Undropped beneath, not fastened firm, how comes it
   That downward turned he falls not downward?
   The guide of his ascending path,--who saw it?"

[Footnote Ref 1] R.V. IV. 13. 5.

The sages wonder how "the sparkling waters of all rivers flow
into one ocean without ever filling it." The minds of the Vedic

____________________________________________________________________

[Footnote 1: _The Rigveda_, by Kaegi, p. 35.]

[Footnote 2: _Ibid_, p. 38.]

18

people as we find in the hymns were highly impressionable and
fresh. At this stage the time was not ripe enough for them to
accord a consistent and well-defined existence to the multitude
of gods nor to universalize them in a monotheistic creed. They
hypostatized unconsciously any force of nature that overawed
them or filled them with gratefulness and joy by its beneficent or
aesthetic character, and adored it. The deity which moved the devotion
or admiration of their mind was the most supreme for the
time. This peculiar trait of the Vedic hymns Max Muller has called
Henotheism or Kathenotheism: "a belief in single gods, each in turn
standing out as the highest. And since the gods are thought of
as specially ruling in their own spheres, the singers, in their special
concerns and desires, call most of all on that god to whom they
ascribe the most power in the matter,--to whose department if I
may say so, their wish belongs. This god alone is present to the mind
of the suppliant; with him for the time being is associated everything
that can be said of a divine being;--he is the highest, the only
god, before whom all others disappear, there being in this, however,
no offence or depreciation of any other god [Footnote ref 1]." "Against
this theory it has been urged," as Macdonell rightly says in his _Vedic
Mythology_ [Footnote ref 2], "that Vedic deities are not represented as
'independent of all the rest,' since no religion brings its gods into
more frequent and varied juxtaposition and combination, and that even
the mightiest gods of the Veda are made dependent on others. Thus
Varu@na and Sūrya are subordinate to Indra (I. 101), Varu@na and
the As'vins submit to the power of Vi@s@nu (I. 156)....Even when a
god is spoken of as unique or chief (_eka_), as is natural enough in
laudations, such statements lose their temporarily monotheistic
force, through the modifications or corrections supplied by the context
or even by the same verse [Footnote Ref 3]. "Henotheism is therefore an
appearance," says Macdonell, "rather than a reality, an appearance
produced by the indefiniteness due to undeveloped anthropomorphism,
by the lack of any Vedic god occupying the position of a Zeus as the
constant head of the pantheon, by the natural tendency of the priest
or singer in extolling a particular god to exaggerate his greatness
and to ignore other gods, and by the

____________________________________________________________________

[Footnote 1: _The Rigveda_, by Kaegi, p. 27.]

[Footnote 2: See _Ibid._ p. 33. See also Arrowsmith's note on it for other
references to Henotheism.]

[Footnote 3: Macdonell's _Vedic Mythology_, pp. 16, 17.]

19

growing belief in the unity of the gods (cf. the refrain of 3, 35)
each of whom might be regarded as a type of the divine [Footnote ref 1]."
But whether we call it Henotheism or the mere temporary exaggeration
of the powers of the deity in question, it is evident that this
stage can neither be properly called polytheistic nor monotheistic,
but one which had a tendency towards them both, although it
was not sufficiently developed to be identified with either of them.
The tendency towards extreme exaggeration could be called a
monotheistic bias in germ, whereas the correlation of different
deities as independent of one another and yet existing side by side
was a tendency towards polytheism.

Growth of a Monotheistic tendency; Prajāpati, Vis'vakarma.

This tendency towards extolling a god as the greatest and
highest gradually brought forth the conception of a supreme
Lord of all beings (Prajāpati), not by a process of conscious
generalization but as a necessary stage of development of the mind,
able to imagine a deity as the repository of the highest moral and
physical power, though its direct manifestation cannot be perceived.
Thus the epithet Prajāpati or the Lord of beings, which
was originally an epithet for other deities, came to be recognized
as a separate deity, the highest and the greatest. Thus it is said
in R.V.x. 121 [Footnote Ref 2]:

  In the beginning rose Hira@nyagarbha,
  Born as the only lord of all existence.
  This earth he settled firm and heaven established:
  What god shall we adore with our oblations?
  Who gives us breath, who gives us strength, whose bidding
  All creatures must obey, the bright gods even;
  Whose shade is death, whose shadow life immortal:
  What god shall we adore with our oblations?
  Who by his might alone became the monarch
  Of all that breathes, of all that wakes or slumbers,
  Of all, both man and beast, the lord eternal:
  What god shall we adore with our oblations?
  Whose might and majesty these snowy mountains,
  The ocean and the distant stream exhibit;
  Whose arms extended are these spreading regions:
  What god shall we adore with our oblations?
  Who made the heavens bright, the earth enduring,
  Who fixed the firmament, the heaven of heavens;
  Who measured out the air's extended spaces:
  What god shall we adore with our oblations?

_________________________________________________________________

[Footnote 1: Macdonell's _Vedic Mythology_, p. 17.]

[Footnote 2: _The Rigveda_, by Kaegi, pp. 88, 89.]

20

Similar attributes are also ascribed to the deity Vis'vakarma
(All-creator) [Footnote ref 1]. He is said to be father and procreator of
all beings, though himself uncreated. He generated the primitive waters.
It is to him that the sage says,

  Who is our father, our creator, maker,
  Who every place doth know and every creature,
  By whom alone to gods their names were given,
  To him all other creatures go to ask him [Footnote ref 2]
                                          R.V.x.82.3.


Brahma.

The conception of Brahman which has been the highest glory
for the Vedānta philosophy of later days had hardly emerged in
the @Rg-Veda from the associations of the sacrificial mind. The
meanings that Sāya@na the celebrated commentator of the Vedas
gives of the word as collected by Haug are: (_a_) food, food offering,
(_b_) the chant of the sāma-singer, (_c_) magical formula or text,
(_d_) duly completed ceremonies, (_e_) the chant and sacrificial gift
together, (_f_) the recitation of the hot@r priest, (_g_) great. Roth
says that it also means "the devotion which manifests itself as
longing and satisfaction of the soul and reaches forth to the
gods." But it is only in the S'atapatha Brāhma@na that the conception
of Brahman has acquired a great significance as the
supreme principle which is the moving force behind the gods.
Thus the S'atapatha says, "Verily in the beginning this (universe)
was the Brahman (neut.). It created the gods; and, having
created the gods, it made them ascend these worlds: Agni this
(terrestrial) world, Vāyu the air, and Sūrya the sky.... Then the
Brahman itself went up to the sphere beyond. Having gone up
to the sphere beyond, it considered, 'How can I descend again
into these worlds?' It then descended again by means of these
two, Form and Name. Whatever has a name, that is name; and
that again which has no name and which one knows by its form,
'this is (of a certain) form,' that is form: as far as there are Form
and Name so far, indeed, extends this (universe). These indeed
are the two great forces of Brahman; and, verily, he who knows
these two great forces of Brahman becomes himself a great force [Footnote
ref 3]. In another place Brahman is said to be the ultimate thing in the
Universe and is identified with Prajāpati, Puru@sa and Prā@na

__________________________________________________________________

[Footnote 1: See _The Rigveda_, by Kaegi, p. 89, and also Muir's _Sanskrit
Texts_, vol. IV. pp. 5-11.]

[Footnote 2: Kaegi's translation.]

[Footnote 3: See Eggeling's translation of S'atapatha Brāhmana _S.B.E._
vol. XLIV. pp. 27, 28.]

21

(the vital air [Footnote ref 1]). In another place Brahman is described as
being the Svayambhū (self-born) performing austerities, who offered
his own self in the creatures and the creatures in his own self,
and thus compassed supremacy, sovereignty and lordship over
all creatures [Footnote ref 2]. The conception of the supreme man (Puru@sa)
in the @Rg-Veda also supposes that the supreme man pervades the
world with only a fourth part of Himself, whereas the remaining
three parts transcend to a region beyond. He is at once the
present, past and future [Footnote ref 3].


Sacrifice; the First Rudiments of the Law of Karma.

It will however be wrong to suppose that these monotheistic
tendencies were gradually supplanting the polytheistic sacrifices.
On the other hand, the complications of ritualism were gradually
growing in their elaborate details. The direct result of this growth
contributed however to relegate the gods to a relatively unimportant
position, and to raise the dignity of the magical characteristics
of the sacrifice as an institution which could give the
desired fruits of themselves. The offerings at a sacrifice were not
dictated by a devotion with which we are familiar under Christian
or Vai@s@nava influence. The sacrifice taken as a whole is conceived
as Haug notes "to be a kind of machinery in which every
piece must tally with the other," the slightest discrepancy in the
performance of even a minute ritualistic detail, say in the pouring
of the melted butter on the fire, or the proper placing of utensils
employed in the sacrifice, or even the misplacing of a mere straw
contrary to the injunctions was sufficient to spoil the whole
sacrifice with whatsoever earnestness it might be performed.
Even if a word was mispronounced the most dreadful results
might follow. Thus when Tva@s@t@r performed a sacrifice for the
production of a demon who would be able to kill his enemy
Indra, owing to the mistaken accent of a single word the object
was reversed and the demon produced was killed by Indra. But if
the sacrifice could be duly performed down to the minutest
detail, there was no power which could arrest or delay the fruition
of the object. Thus the objects of a sacrifice were fulfilled not
by the grace of the gods, but as a natural result of the sacrifice.
The performance of the rituals invariably produced certain
mystic or magical results by virtue of which the object desired

___________________________________________________________________

[Footnote 1: See _S.B.E._ XLIII. pp.59,60,400 and XLIV. p.409.]

[Footnote 2: See _Ibid_., XLIV, p. 418.]

[Footnote 3: R.V.x.90, Puru@sa Sūkta.]

22

by the sacrificer was fulfilled in due course like the fulfilment of
a natural law in the physical world. The sacrifice was believed
to have existed from eternity like the Vedas. The creation of
the world itself was even regarded as the fruit of a sacrifice performed
by the supreme Being. It exists as Haug says "as an invisible thing at
all times and is like the latent power of electricity in an
electrifying machine, requiring only the operation of a suitable
apparatus in order to be elicited." The sacrifice is not offered
to a god with a view to propitiate him or to obtain from him welfare
on earth or bliss in Heaven; these rewards are directly produced by
the sacrifice itself through the correct performance of complicated
and interconnected ceremonies which constitute the sacrifice. Though
in each sacrifice certain gods were invoked and received the offerings,
the gods themselves were but instruments in bringing about the sacrifice
or in completing the course of mystical ceremonies composing it.
Sacrifice is thus regarded as possessing a mystical potency superior even
to the gods, who it is sometimes stated attained to their divine rank
by means of sacrifice. Sacrifice was regarded as almost the only
kind of duty, and it was also called _karma_ or _kriyā_ (action) and
the unalterable law was, that these mystical ceremonies for good
or for bad, moral or immoral (for there were many kinds of
sacrifices which were performed for injuring one's enemies or
gaining worldly prosperity or supremacy at the cost of others)
were destined to produce their effects. It is well to note here that
the first recognition of a cosmic order or law prevailing in nature
under the guardianship of the highest gods is to be found in the
use of the word @Rta (literally the course of things). This word
was also used, as Macdonell observes, to denote the "'order'
in the moral world as truth and 'right' and in the religious
world as sacrifice or 'rite'[Footnote ref 1]" and its unalterable law of
producing effects. It is interesting to note in this connection that it
is here that we find the first germs of the law of karma, which exercises
such a dominating control over Indian thought up to the present
day. Thus we find the simple faith and devotion of the Vedic
hymns on one hand being supplanted by the growth of a complex
system of sacrificial rites, and on the other bending their course
towards a monotheistic or philosophic knowledge of the ultimate
reality of the universe.

____________________________________________________________________

[Footnote 1: Macdonell's _Vedic Mythology_, p. 11.]

23


Cosmogony--Mythological and philosophical.

The cosmogony of the @Rg-Veda may be looked at from two
aspects, the mythological and the philosophical. The mythological
aspect has in general two currents, as Professor Macdonell says,
"The one regards the universe as the result of mechanical production,
the work of carpenter's and joiner's skill; the other
represents it as the result of natural generation [Footnote ref. 1]."
Thus in the @Rg-Veda we find that the poet in one place says, "what was
the wood and what was the tree out of which they built heaven
and earth [Footnote ref. 2]?" The answer given to this question in
Taittirīya-Brāhma@na is "Brahman the wood and Brahman the tree from
which the heaven and earth were made [Footnote ref 3]." Heaven and Earth
are sometimes described as having been supported with posts [Footnote
ref 4]. They are also sometimes spoken of as universal parents, and
parentage is sometimes attributed to Aditi and Dak@sa.

Under this philosophical aspect the semi-pantheistic Man-hymn
[Footnote ref 5] attracts our notice. The supreme man as we have already
noticed above is there said to be the whole universe, whatever
has been and shall be; he is the lord of immortality who has become
diffused everywhere among things animate and inanimate, and
all beings came out of him; from his navel came the atmosphere;
from his head arose the sky; from his feet came the earth; from
his ear the four quarters. Again there are other hymns in which
the Sun is called the soul (_ātman_) of all that is movable and
all that is immovable [Footnote ref 6]. There are also statements to the
effect that the Being is one, though it is called by many names by the
sages [Footnote ref 7]. The supreme being is sometimes extolled as the
supreme Lord of the world called the golden egg (Hira@nyagarbha [Footnote
ref 8]). In some passages it is said "Brahma@naspati blew forth these
births like a blacksmith. In the earliest age of the gods, the existent
sprang from the non-existent. In the first age of the gods, the
existent sprang from the non-existent: thereafter the regions
sprang, thereafter, from Uttānapada [Footnote ref 9]." The most remarkable
and sublime hymn in which the first germs of philosophic speculation

___________________________________________________________________

[Footnote 1: Macdonell's _Vedic Mythology_, p. 11.]

[Footnote 2: R.V.x. 81. 4.]

[Footnote 3: Taitt. Br. II. 8. 9. 6.]

[Footnote 4: Macdonell's _Vedic Mythology_, p. 11; also R.V. II. 15 and IV.
56.]

[Footnote 5: R.V.x. 90.]

[Footnote 6: R.V.I. 115.]

[Footnote 7: R.V.I. 164. 46.]

[Footnote 8: R.V.X. 121.]

[Footnote 9: Muir's translation of R.V.x. 72; Muir's _Sanskrit Texts_, vol.
v.p. 48.]

24

with regard to the wonderful mystery of the origin of the world
are found is the 129th hymn of R.V.x.

1. Then there was neither being nor not-being.
   The atmosphere was not, nor sky above it.
   What covered all? and where? by what protected?
   Was there the fathomless abyss of waters?

2. Then neither death nor deathless existed;
   Of day and night there was yet no distinction.
   Alone that one breathed calmly, self-supported,
   Other than It was none, nor aught above It.

3. Darkness there was at first in darkness hidden;
   The universe was undistinguished water.
   That which in void and emptiness lay hidden
   Alone by power of fervor was developed.

4. Then for the first time there arose desire,
   Which was the primal germ of mind, within it.
   And sages, searching in their heart, discovered
   In Nothing the connecting bond of Being.

6. Who is it knows? Who here can tell us surely
   From what and how this universe has risen?
   And whether not till after it the gods lived?
   Who then can know from what it has arisen?

7. The source from which this universe has risen,
   And whether it was made, or uncreated,
   He only knows, who from the highest heaven
   Rules, the all-seeing lord--or does not He know [Footnote ref 1]?

The earliest commentary on this is probably a passage in the
S'atapatha Brāhma@na (x. 5. 3.I) which says that "in the beginning
this (universe) was as it were neither non-existent nor existent;
in the beginning this (universe) was as it were, existed and did
not exist: there was then only that Mind. Wherefore it has been
declared by the Rishi (@Rg-Veda X. 129. I), 'There was then neither
the non-existent nor the existent' for Mind was, as it were, neither
existent nor non-existent. This Mind when created, wished to
become manifest,--more defined, more substantial: it sought after
a self (a body); it practised austerity: it acquired consistency [Footnote
ref 2]." In the Atharva-Veda also we find it stated that all forms of
the universe were comprehended within the god Skambha [Footnote ref 3].

Thus we find that even in the period of the Vedas there sprang
forth such a philosophic yearning, at least among some who could

____________________________________________________________________

[Footnote 1: _The Rigveda_, by Kaegi, p. 90. R.V.x. 129.]

[Footnote 2: See Eggeling's translation of _S'.B., S.B.E._ vol. XLIII. pp.
374, 375.]

[Footnote 3: _A.V._ x. 7. 10.]

25

question whether this universe was at all a creation or not, which
could think of the origin of the world as being enveloped in the
mystery of a primal non-differentiation of being and non-being;
and which could think that it was the primal One which by its
inherent fervour gave rise to the desire of a creation as the first
manifestation of the germ of mind, from which the universe sprang
forth through a series of mysterious gradual processes. In the
Brāhma@nas, however, we find that the cosmogonic view generally
requires the agency of a creator, who is not however always the
starting point, and we find that the theory of evolution is combined
with the theory of creation, so that Prajāpati is sometimes
spoken of as the creator while at other times the creator is said
to have floated in the primeval water as a cosmic golden egg.


Eschatology; the Doctrine of Ātman.

There seems to be a belief in the Vedas that the soul could
be separated from the body in states of swoon, and that it could
exist after death, though we do not find there any trace of the
doctrine of transmigration in a developed form. In the S'atapatha
Brāhma@na it is said that those who do not perform rites with
correct knowledge are born again after death and suffer death
again. In a hymn of the @Rg-Veda (X. 58) the soul (_manas_) of a man
apparently unconscious is invited to come back to him from the
trees, herbs, the sky, the sun, etc. In many of the hymns there
is also the belief in the existence of another world, where the
highest material joys are attained as a result of the performance
of the sacrifices and also in a hell of darkness underneath
where the evil-doers are punished. In the S'atapatha
Brāhma@na we find that the dead pass between two fires which burn the
evil-doers, but let the good go by [Footnote ref 1]; it is also said
there that everyone is born again after death, is weighed in a balance,
and receives reward or punishment according as his works are good or bad.
It is easy to see that scattered ideas like these with regard to
the destiny of the soul of man according to the sacrifice that he
performs or other good or bad deeds form the first rudiments of
the later doctrine of metempsychosis. The idea that man enjoys
or suffers, either in another world or by being born in this world
according to his good or bad deeds, is the first beginning of the
moral idea, though in the Brahmanic days the good deeds were

_____________________________________________________________________

[Footnote 1: See _S.B._ I. 9.3, and also Macdonell's _Vedic Mythology_,
pp. 166, 167.]

26

more often of the nature of sacrificial duties than ordinary good
works. These ideas of the possibilities of a necessary connection
of the enjoyments and sorrows of a man with his good and bad
works when combined with the notion of an inviolable law or
order, which we have already seen was gradually growing with
the conception of @rta, and the unalterable law which produces
the effects of sacrificial works, led to the Law of Karma and the
doctrine of transmigration. The words which denote soul in the
@Rg-Veda are _manas_, _ātman_ and _asu_. The word _ātman_ however
which became famous in later Indian thought is generally used
to mean vital breath. Manas is regarded as the seat of thought
and emotion, and it seems to be regarded, as Macdonell says, as
dwelling in the heart[Footnote ref 1]. It is however difficult to
understand how ātman as vital breath, or as a separable part of man
going out of the dead man came to be regarded as the ultimate essence
or reality in man and the universe. There is however at least one
passage in the @Rg-Veda where the poet penetrating deeper and
deeper passes from the vital breath (_asu_) to the blood, and thence
to ātman as the inmost self of the world; "Who has seen how
the first-born, being the Bone-possessing (the shaped world), was
born from the Boneless (the shapeless)? where was the vital
breath, the blood, the Self (_ātman_) of the world? Who went to
ask him that knows it [Footnote ref 2]?" In Taittīrya Āra@nyaka I. 23,
however, it is said that Prajāpati after having created his self (as
the world) with his own self entered into it. In Taittīrya Brāhma@na
the ātman is called omnipresent, and it is said that he who knows
him is no more stained by evil deeds. Thus we find that in the
pre-Upani@sad Vedic literature ātman probably was first used to
denote "vital breath" in man, then the self of the world, and then
the self in man. It is from this last stage that we find the traces
of a growing tendency to looking at the self of man as the omnipresent
supreme principle of the universe, the knowledge of which
makes a man sinless and pure.


Conclusion.

Looking at the advancement of thought in the @Rg-Veda we
find first that a fabric of thought was gradually growing which
not only looked upon the universe as a correlation of parts or a

____________________________________________________________________

[Footnote 1: Macdonell's _Vedic Mythology_, p.166 and R.V. viii.89.]

[Footnote 2: R.V.i. 164. 4 and Deussen's article on Ātman in
_Encyclopaedia of Religion and Ethics_.

27

construction made of them, but sought to explain it as having
emanated from one great being who is sometimes described as
one with the universe and surpassing it, and at other times as
being separate from it; the agnostic spirit which is the mother
of philosophic thought is seen at times to be so bold as to express
doubts even on the most fundamental questions of creation--"Who
knows whether this world was ever created or not?" Secondly
the growth of sacrifices has helped to establish the unalterable
nature of the law by which the (sacrificial) actions produced their
effects of themselves. It also lessened the importance of deities
as being the supreme masters of the world and our fate, and the
tendency of henotheism gradually diminished their multiple
character and advanced the monotheistic tendency in some
quarters. Thirdly, the soul of man is described as being separable
from his body and subject to suffering and enjoyment in another
world according to his good or bad deeds; the doctrine that the
soul of man could go to plants, etc., or that it could again be reborn
on earth, is also hinted at in certain passages, and this may
be regarded as sowing the first seeds of the later doctrine of
transmigration. The self (_ātman_) is spoken of in one place as the
essence of the world, and when we trace the idea in the Brāhma@nas
and the Āra@nyakas we see that ātman has begun to mean the
supreme essence in man as well as in the universe, and has thus
approached the great Ātman doctrine of the Upani@sads.




CHAPTER III


THE EARLIER UPANI@SADS [Footnote ref 1]. (700 B.C.-600 B.C.)

The place of the Upani@sads in Vedic literature.

Though it is generally held that the Upani@sads are usually
attached as appendices to the Āra@nyakas which are again attached
to the Brāhma@nas, yet it cannot be said that their distinction as
separate treatises is always observed. Thus we find in some cases
that subjects which we should expect to be discussed in a Brāhma@na
are introduced into the Āra@nyakas and the Āra@nyaka materials
are sometimes fused into the great bulk of Upani@sad teaching.
This shows that these three literatures gradually grew up in one

___________________________________________________________________

[Footnote 1: There are about 112 Upani@sads which have been published by
the "Nir@naya-Sāgara" Press, Bombay, 1917. These are 1 Ķsā, 2 Kena,
3 Katha, 4 Pras'na, 5 Mun@daka, 6 Mā@n@dukya, 7 Taittirīya, 7 Aitareya,
9 Chāndogya, 10 B@rhadāra@nyaka, 11 S'vetās'vatara, 12 Kau@sitaki,
13 Maitreyī, 14 Kaivalya, 15 Jābāla, 16 Brahmabindu, 17 Ha@msa,
18 Āru@nika, 19 Garbha, 20 Nārāya@na, 21 Nārāya@na, 22 Paramaha@msa,
23 Brahma, 24 Am@rtanāda, 25 Atharvas'iras, 26 Atharvas'ikhā,
27 Maitrāya@nī, 28 B@rhajjābāla, 29 N@rsi@mhapūrvatāpinī,
30 N@rsi@mhottaratāpinī, 31 Kālāgnirudra, 32 Subāla, 33 K@surikā,
34 Yantrikā, 35 Sarvasāra, 36 Nirālamba, 37 S'ukarahasya, 38 Vajrasūcikā,
39 Tejobindu, 40 Nādabindu, 41 Dhyānabindu, 42 Brahmavidyā, 43 Yogatattva,
44 Atmabodha, 45 Nāradaparivrājaka, 46 Tris'ikhibrāhma@na, 47 Sītā,
48 Yogacū@dama@ni, 49 Nirvāna, 50 Ma@ndalabrāhma@na, 51 Dak@si@nāmūrtti,
52 S'arabha, 53 Skanda, 54 Tripādvibhūtimahānārya@na, 55 Advayatāraka,
56 Ramarahasya, 57 Rāmapūrvatāpinī, 58 Rāmottaratāpinī, 59 Vāsudeva,
60 Mudgala, 61 Sā@n@dilya, 62 Pai@ngala, 63 Bhik@suka, Mahā, 65 S'ārīraka,
66 Yogas'ikhā, 67 Turiyātīta, 68 Sa@mnyāsa, 69 Paramaha@msaparivrājaka,
70 Ak@samālā, 71 Avyakta, 72 Ekāk@sara, 73 Annapūrnā, 74 Sūrya, 75 Aksi,
76 Adhyātma, 77 Ku@n@dika, 78 Sāvitrī, 79 Ātman, 80 Pā'supatabrahma,
81 Parabrahma, 82 Avadhūta, 83 Tripurārāpini, 84 Devī, 85 Tripurā,
86 Ka@tharudra, 87 Bhāvanā, 88 Rudrah@rdaya, 89 Yogaku@n@dali,
90 Bhasmajābāla, 91 Rudrāk@sajābāla, 92 Ga@napati, 93 Jābāladars'ana,
94 Tāiasāra, 95 Mahāvakya, 96 Paficabrahma, 97 Prā@nāgnihotra,
98 Gopālapūrvatāpinī, 99 Gopālottaratāpinī, 100 K@r@s@na, 101 Yājńavalkya,
102 Varāha, 103 S'āthyāyanīya, 104 Hayagrīva, 105 Dattātreya, 106 Garu@da,
107 Kalisantara@na, 108 Jābāli, 109 Saubhāgyalak@smī, 110 Sarasvatīrahasya,
111 Bahvrca, 112 Muktika.

The collection of Upani@sads translated by Dara shiko, Aurangzeb's brother,
contained 50 Upani@sads. The Muktika Upani@sad gives a list of 108
Upani@sads. With the exception of the first 13 Upani@sads most of them are
of more or less later date. The Upani@sads dealt with in this chapter are
the earlier ones. Amongst the later ones there are some which repeat the
purport of these, there are others which deal with the S'aiva, S'ākta,
the Yoga and the Vai@s@nava doctrines. These will be referred to in
connection with the consideration of those systems in Volume II. The
later Upani@sads which only repeat the purport of those dealt with in this
chapter do not require further mention. Some of the later Upani@sads were
composed even as late as the fourteenth or the fifteenth century.]

29

process of development and they were probably regarded as parts
of one literature, in spite of the differences in their subject-matter.
Deussen supposes that the principle of this division was to be
found in this, that the Brāhma@nas were intended for the householders,
the Āra@nyakas for those who in their old age withdrew
into the solitude of the forests and the Upani@sads for those who
renounced the world to attain ultimate salvation by meditation.
Whatever might be said about these literary classifications the
ancient philosophers of India looked upon the Upani@sads as being
of an entirely different type from the rest of the Vedic literature
as dictating the path of knowledge (_jńāna-mārga_) as opposed
to the path of works (_karma-mārga_) which forms the content
of the latter. It is not out of place here to mention that the
orthodox Hindu view holds that whatever may be written in the
Veda is to be interpreted as commandments to perform certain
actions (_vidhi_) or prohibitions against committing certain others
(_ni@sedha_). Even the stories or episodes are to be so interpreted
that the real objects of their insertion might appear as only to
praise the performance of the commandments and to blame the
commission of the prohibitions. No person has any right to argue
why any particular Vedic commandment is to be followed, for no
reason can ever discover that, and it is only because reason fails
to find out why a certain Vedic act leads to a certain effect that
the Vedas have been revealed as commandments and prohibitions
to show the true path of happiness. The Vedic teaching belongs
therefore to that of the Karma-mārga or the performance of Vedic
duties of sacrifice, etc. The Upani@sads however do not require
the performance of any action, but only reveal the ultimate truth
and reality, a knowledge of which at once emancipates a man.
Readers of Hindu philosophy are aware that there is a very strong
controversy on this point between the adherents of the Vedānta
(_Upani@sads_) and those of the Veda. For the latter seek in analogy
to the other parts of the Vedic literature to establish the principle
that the Upani@sads should not be regarded as an exception, but
that they should also be so interpreted that they might also be
held out as commending the performance of duties; but the
former dissociate the Upani@sads from the rest of the Vedic literature
and assert that they do not make the slightest reference to
any Vedic duties, but only delineate the ultimate reality which
reveals the highest knowledge in the minds of the deserving.

30

S'a@nkara the most eminent exponent of the Upani@sads holds that
they are meant for such superior men who are already above
worldly or heavenly prosperities, and for whom the Vedic duties
have ceased to have any attraction. Wheresoever there may be
such a deserving person, be he a student, a householder or an
ascetic, for him the Upani@sads have been revealed for his ultimate
emancipation and the true knowledge. Those who perform the
Vedic duties belong to a stage inferior to those who no longer
care for the fruits of the Vedic duties but are eager for final
emancipation, and it is the latter who alone are fit to hear the
Upani@sads [Footnote ref 1].

The names of the Upani@sads; Non-Brahmanic influence.

The Upani@sads are also known by another name Vedānta, as
they are believed to be the last portions of the Vedas (_veda-anta_,
end); it is by this name that the philosophy of the Upani@sads,
the Vedānta philosophy, is so familiar to us. A modern student
knows that in language the Upani@sads approach the classical
Sanskrit; the ideas preached also show that they are the culmination
of the intellectual achievement of a great epoch. As they
thus formed the concluding parts of the Vedas they retained their
Vedic names which they took from the name of the different
schools or branches (_s'ākhā_) among which the Vedas were studied
[Footnote ref 2]. Thus the Upani@sads attached to the Brāhma@nas
of the Aitareya and Kau@sītaki schools are called respectively
Aitareya and Kau@sītaki Upani@sads. Those of the Tā@n@dins and
Talavakāras of the Sāma-veda are called the Chāndogya and Talavakāra
(or Kena) Upani@sads. Those of the Taittirļya school of the Yajurveda

___________________________________________________________________

[Footnote 1: This is what is called the difference of fitness
(_adhikāribheda_). Those who perform the sacrifices are not fit to
hear the Upani@sads and those who are fit to hear the Upani@sads
have no longer any necessity to perform the sacrificial duties.]

[Footnote 2: When the Sa@mhitā texts had become substantially fixed,
they were committed to memory in different parts of the country and
transmitted from teacher to pupil along with directions for the
practical performance of sacrificial duties. The latter formed the
matter of prose compositions, the Brāhma@nas. These however were
gradually liable to diverse kinds of modifications according to the
special tendencies and needs of the people among which they were recited.
Thus after a time there occurred a great divergence in the readings of
the texts of the Brāhma@nas even of the same Veda among different people.
These different schools were known by the name of particular S'ākhās
(e.g. Aitareya, Kau@sītaki) with which the Brāhma@nas were associated
or named. According to the divergence of the Brāhma@nas of the different
S'ākhās there occurred the divergences of content and the length of the
Upani@sads associated with them.]

31

form the Taittirīya and Mahānāraya@na, of the Ka@tha school
the Kā@thaka, of the Maitrāya@nī school the Maitrāya@nī. The
B@rhadāra@nyaka Upani@sad forms part of the S'atapatha Brāhma@na
of the Vājasaneyi schools. The Īs'ā Upani@sad also belongs to the
latter school. But the school to which the S'vetās'vatara belongs
cannot be traced, and has probably been lost. The presumption
with regard to these Upani@sads is that they represent the
enlightened views of the particular schools among which they
flourished, and under whose names they passed. A large number
of Upani@sads of a comparatively later age were attached to the
Atharva-Veda, most of which were named not according to the
Vedic schools but according to the subject-matter with which
they dealt [Footnote ref 1].

It may not be out of place here to mention that from the
frequent episodes in the Upani@sads in which the Brahmins are
described as having gone to the K@sattriyas for the highest knowledge
of philosophy, as well as from the disparateness of the
Upani@sad teachings from that of the general doctrines of the
Brāhma@nas and from the allusions to the existence of philosophical
speculations amongst the people in Pāli works, it may be
inferred that among the K@sattriyas in general there existed earnest
philosophic enquiries which must be regarded as having exerted
an important influence in the formation of the Upani@sad doctrines.
There is thus some probability in the supposition that though the
Upani@sads are found directly incorporated with the Brāhma@nas
it was not the production of the growth of Brahmanic dogmas
alone, but that non-Brahmanic thought as well must have either
set the Upani@sad doctrines afoot, or have rendered fruitful assistance
to their formulation and cultivation, though they achieved
their culmination in the hands of the Brahmins.


Brāhma@nas and the Early Upani@sads.

The passage of the Indian mind from the Brāhmanic to the
Upani@sad thought is probably the most remarkable event in the
history of philosophic thought. We know that in the later Vedic
hymns some monotheistic conceptions of great excellence were
developed, but these differ in their nature from the absolutism of
the Upani@sads as much as the Ptolemaic and the Copernican

_____________________________________________________________________

[Footnote 1: Garbha Upani@sad, Ātman Upani@sad, Pras'na Upani@sad, etc.
There were however some exceptions such as the Mā@n@dūkya, Jābāla,
Pai@ngala, S'aunaka, etc.]

32

systems in astronomy. The direct translation of Vis'vakarman or
Hira@nyagarbha into the ātman and the Brahman of the Upani@sads
seems to me to be very improbable, though I am quite willing
to admit that these conceptions were swallowed up by the ātman
doctrine when it had developed to a proper extent. Throughout
the earlier Upani@sads no mention is to be found of Vis'vakarman,
Hira@nyagarbha or Brahma@naspati and no reference of such a
nature is to be found as can justify us in connecting the Upani@sad
ideas with those conceptions [Footnote ref l]. The word puru@sa no doubt
occurs frequently in the Upani@sads, but the sense and the association
that come along with it are widely different from that of the
puru@sa of the Puru@sasūkta of the @Rg-Veda.

When the @Rg-Veda describes Vis'vakarman it describes him
as a creator from outside, a controller of mundane events,
to whom they pray for worldly benefits. "What was the position, which
and whence was the principle, from which the all-seeing Vis'vakarman
produced the earth, and disclosed the sky by his might? The
one god, who has on every side eyes, on every side a face, on every
side arms, on every side feet, when producing the sky and earth,
shapes them with his arms and with his wings....Do thou, Vis'vakarman,
grant to thy friends those thy abodes which are the highest,
and the lowest, and the middle...may a generous son remain here
to us [Footnote ref 2]"; again in R.V.X. 82 we find "Vis'vakarman is
wise, energetic, the creator, the disposer, and the highest object of
intuition....He who is our father, our creator, disposer, who knows
all spheres and creatures, who alone assigns to the gods their names,
to him the other creatures resort for instruction [Footnote ref 3]."
Again about Hira@nyagarbha we find in R.V.I. 121, "Hira@nyagarbha arose
in the beginning; born, he was the one lord of things existing. He
established the earth and this sky; to what god shall we offer our
oblation?... May he not injure us, he who is the generator of the
earth, who ruling by fixed ordinances, produced the heavens, who
produced the great and brilliant waters!--to what god, etc.? Prajāpati,
no other than thou is lord over all these created things: may we
obtain that, through desire of which we have invoked thee; may we
become masters of riches [Footnote ref 4]." Speaking of the puru@sa the
@Rg-Veda


__________________________________________________________________________

[Footnote 1: The name Vis'vakarma appears in S'vet. IV. 17.
Hira@nyagarbha appears in S'vet. III. 4 and IV. 12, but only as the
first created being. The phrase Sarvāhammānī Hira@nyagarbha which
Deussen refers to occurs only in the later N@rsi@m@h. 9. The word
Brahma@naspati does not occur at all in the Upani@sads.]

[Footnote 2: Muir's _Sanskrit Texts_, vol. IV. pp. 6, 7.]

[Footnote 3: _Ibid._ p, 7.]

[Footnote 4: _Ibid._ pp. 16, 17.]

33

says "Purusha has a thousand heads...a thousand eyes, and a thousand
feet. On every side enveloping the earth he transcended [it]
by a space of ten fingers....He formed those aerial creatures, and
the animals, both wild and tame [Footnote ref 1]," etc. Even that
famous hymn (R.V.x. 129) which begins with "There was then neither
being nor non-being, there was no air nor sky above" ends with saying
"From whence this creation came into being, whether it was
created or not--he who is in the highest sky, its ruler, probably
knows or does not know."

In the Upani@sads however, the position is entirely changed,
and the centre of interest there is not in a creator from outside
but in the self: the natural development of the monotheistic position
of the Vedas could have grown into some form of developed
theism, but not into the doctrine that the self was the only reality
and that everything else was far below it. There is no relation
here of the worshipper and the worshipped and no prayers are
offered to it, but the whole quest is of the highest truth, and the true
self of man is discovered as the greatest reality. This change of
philosophical position seems to me to be a matter of great interest.
This change of the mind from the objective to the subjective does
not carry with it in the Upani@sads any elaborate philosophical
discussions, or subtle analysis of mind. It comes there as a matter
of direct perception, and the conviction with which the truth has
been grasped cannot fail to impress the readers. That out of the
apparently meaningless speculations of the Brāhma@nas this doctrine
could have developed, might indeed appear to be too improbable
to be believed.

On the strength of the stories of Bālāki Ga'rgya and Ajātas'atru
(B@rh. II. i), S'vetaketu and Pravāha@na Jaibali (Chā. V. 3 and B@rh.
VI. 2) and Āru@ni and As'vapati Kaikeya (Chā. V. 11) Garbe thinks
"that it can be proven that the Brahman's profoundest wisdom, the
doctrine of All-one, which has exercised an unmistakable influence
on the intellectual life even of our time, did not have its origin
in the circle of Brahmans at all [Footnote ref 2]" and that "it took
its rise in the ranks of the warrior caste [Footnote ref 3]." This
if true would of course lead the development of the Upani@sads away
from the influence of the Veda, Brāhma@nas and the Āra@nyakas. But do
the facts prove this? Let us briefly examine the evidences that Garbe
himself

___________________________________________________________________

[Footnote 1: Muir's _Sanskrit Texts_, vol. v. pp. 368, 371.]

[Footnote 2: Garbe's article, "_Hindu Monism_," p. 68.]

[Footnote 3: _Ibid._ p. 78.

34

self has produced. In the story of Bālāki Gārgya and Ajātas'atru
(B@rh. II. 1) referred to by him, Bālāki Gārgya is a boastful man
who wants to teach the K@sattriya Ajātas'atru the true Brahman,
but fails and then wants it to be taught by him. To this
Ajātas'atru replies (following Garbe's own translation) "it is
contrary to the natural order that a Brahman receive instruction
from a warrior and expect the latter to declare the Brahman to
him [Footnote ref l]." Does this not imply that in the natural order of
things a Brahmin always taught the knowledge of Brahman to the
K@sattriyas, and that it was unusual to find a Brahmin asking a
K@sattriya about the true knowledge of Brahman? At the beginning
of the conversation, Ajātas'atru had promised to pay Bālāki one
thousand coins if he could tell him about Brahman, since all people
used to run to Janaka to speak about Brahman [Footnote ref 2]. The
second story of S'vetaketu and Pravāha@na Jaibali seems to be fairly
conclusive with regard to the fact that the transmigration doctrines,
the way of the gods (_devayāna_) and the way of the fathers
(_pit@ryāna_) had originated among the K@sattriyas, but it is without
any relevancy with regard to the origin of the superior knowledge
of Brahman as the true self.

The third story of Āru@ni and As'vapati Kaikeya (Chā. V. 11)
is hardly more convincing, for here five Brahmins wishing to
know what the Brahman and the self were, went to Uddālaka
Āru@ni; but as he did not know sufficiently about it he accompanied
them to the K@sattriya king As'vapati Kaikeya who was studying
the subject. But As'vapati ends the conversation by giving them
certain instructions about the fire doctrine (_vaisvānara agni_) and
the import of its sacrifices. He does not say anything about the
true self as Brahman. We ought also to consider that there are
only the few exceptional cases where K@sattriya kings were instructing
the Brahmins. But in all other cases the Brahmins were
discussing and instructing the ātman knowledge. I am thus led
to think that Garbe owing to his bitterness of feeling against the
Brahmins as expressed in the earlier part of the essay had been
too hasty in his judgment. The opinion of Garbe seems to have
been shared to some extent by Winternitz also, and the references
given by him to the Upani@sad passages are also the same as we

____________________________________________________________________

[Footnote 1: Garbe's article, "_Hindu Monism_," p. 74.]

[Footnote 2: B@rh. II., compare also B@rh. IV. 3, how Yājńavalkya
speaks to Janaka about the _brahmavidyā_.]

35

just examined [Footnote ref 1]. The truth seems to me to be this, that
the K@sattriyas and even some women took interest in the
religio-philosophical quest manifested in the Upani@sads. The enquirers
were so eager that either in receiving the instruction of Brahman
or in imparting it to others, they had no considerations of sex and
birth [Footnote ref 2]; and there seems to be no definite evidence for
thinking that the Upani@sad philosophy originated among the K@sattriyas
or that the germs of its growth could not be traced in the
Brāhma@nas and the Āra@nyakas which were the productions of
the Brahmins.

The change of the Brāhma@na into the Āra@nyaka thought is
signified by a transference of values from the actual sacrifices to
their symbolic representations and meditations which were regarded
as being productive of various earthly benefits. Thus we
find in the B@rhadāra@nyaka (I.1) that instead of a horse sacrifice
the visible universe is to be conceived as a horse and meditated
upon as such. The dawn is the head of the horse, the sun is the
eye, wind is its life, fire is its mouth and the year is its soul,
and so on. What is the horse that grazes in the field and to what good
can its sacrifice lead? This moving universe is the horse which is
most significant to the mind, and the meditation of it as such is
the most suitable substitute of the sacrifice of the horse, the mere
animal. Thought-activity as meditation, is here taking the place
of an external worship in the form of sacrifices. The material
substances and the most elaborate and accurate sacrificial rituals
lost their value and bare meditations took their place. Side
by side with the ritualistic sacrifices of the generality of the
Brahmins, was springing up a system where thinking and symbolic
meditations were taking the place of gross matter and
action involved in sacrifices. These symbols were not only
chosen from the external world as the sun, the wind, etc., from
the body of man, his various vital functions and the senses, but
even arbitrary alphabets were taken up and it was believed that
the meditation of these as the highest and the greatest was productive
of great beneficial results. Sacrifice in itself was losing
value in the eyes of these men and diverse mystical significances
and imports were beginning to be considered as their real truth
[Footnote ref 3].

_______________________________________________________________________

[Footnote 1: Winternitz's _Geschichte der indischen Litteratur_, I.
pp. 197 ff.]

[Footnote 2: The story of Maitryī and Yājńavalikya (B@rh. II. 4)
and that of Satyakāma son of Jabālā and his teacher (Chā. IV. 4).]

[Footnote 3: Chā. V. II.]

36

The Uktha (verse) of @Rg-Veda was identified in the Aitareya
Āra@nyaka under several allegorical forms with the Prā@na [Footnote
ref 1], the Udgītha of the Sāmaveda was identified with Om, Prā@na,
sun and eye; in Chāndogya II. the Sāman was identified with Om, rain,
water, seasons, Prā@na, etc., in Chāndogya III. 16-17 man was
identified with sacrifice; his hunger, thirst, sorrow, with initiation;
laughing, eating, etc., with the utterance of the Mantras;
and asceticism, gift, sincerity, restraint from injury, truth, with
sacrificial fees (_dak@si@nā_). The gifted mind of these cultured Vedic
Indians was anxious to come to some unity, but logical precision
of thought had not developed, and as a result of that we find in the
Āra@nyakas the most grotesque and fanciful unifications of things
which to our eyes have little or no connection. Any kind of
instrumentality in producing an effect was often considered as pure
identity. Thus in Ait. Āra@n. II. 1. 3 we find "Then comes the origin
of food. The seed of Prajāpati are the gods. The seed of the gods
is rain. The seed of rain is herbs. The seed of herbs is food. The
seed of food is seed. The seed of seed is creatures. The seed of
creatures is the heart. The seed of the heart is the mind. The seed
of the mind is speech. The seed of speech is action. The act done
is this man the abode of Brahman [Footnote ref 2]."

The word Brahman according to Sāya@na meant mantras
(magical verses), the ceremonies, the hot@r priest, the great.
Hillebrandt points out that it is spoken of in R.V. as being new,
"as not having hitherto existed," and as "coming into being from
the fathers." It originates from the seat of the @Rta, springs forth
at the sound of the sacrifice, begins really to exist when the soma
juice is pressed and the hymns are recited at the savana rite,
endures with the help of the gods even in battle, and soma is its
guardian (R.V. VIII. 37. I, VIII. 69. 9, VI. 23. 5, 1. 47. 2, VII. 22.
9, VI. 52. 3, etc.). On the strength of these Hillebrandt justifies the
conjecture of Haug that it signifies a mysterious power which can
be called forth by various ceremonies, and his definition of it, as
the magical force which is derived from the orderly cooperation of
the hymns, the chants and the sacrificial gifts [Footnote ref 3]. I am
disposed to think that this meaning is closely connected with the
meaning as we find it in many passages in the Āra@nyakas and the
Upani@sads. The meaning in many of these seems to be midway between

________________________________________________________________

[Footnote 1: Ait. Āra@n. II 1-3.]

[Footnote 2: Keith's _Translation of Aitareya Āranyaka_.]

[Footnote 3: Hillebrandt's article on Brahman, _E.R.E._.]

37

"magical force" and "great," transition between which is
rather easy. Even when the sacrifices began to be replaced by
meditations, the old belief in the power of the sacrifices still
remained, and as a result of that we find that in many passages
of the Upani@sads people are thinking of meditating upon this
great force "Brahman" as being identified with diverse symbols,
natural objects, parts and functions of the body.

When the main interest of sacrifice was transferred from its
actual performance in the external world to certain forms of
meditation, we find that the understanding of particular allegories
of sacrifice having a relation to particular kinds of bodily functions
was regarded as Brahman, without a knowledge of which nothing
could be obtained. The fact that these allegorical interpretations
of the Pańcāgnividyā are so much referred to in the Upani@sads
as a secret doctrine, shows that some people came to think that
the real efficacy of sacrifices depended upon such meditations.
When the sages rose to the culminating conception, that he is
really ignorant who thinks the gods to be different from him, they
thought that as each man was nourished by many beasts, so the
gods were nourished by each man, and as it is unpleasant for a
man if any of his beasts are taken away, so it is unpleasant for
the gods that men should know this great truth. [Footnote ref 1].

In the Kena we find it indicated that all the powers of
the gods such as that of Agni (fire) to burn, Vāyu (wind) to
blow, depended upon Brahman, and that it is through Brahman
that all the gods and all the senses of man could work. The
whole process of Upani@sad thought shows that the magic power
of sacrifices as associated with @Rta (unalterable law) was being
abstracted from the sacrifices and conceived as the supreme power.
There are many stories in the Upani@sads of the search after the
nature of this great power the Brahman, which was at first only
imperfectly realized. They identified it with the dominating power
of the natural objects of wonder, the sun, the moon, etc. with
bodily and mental functions and with various symbolical
representations, and deluded themselves for a time with the idea
that these were satisfactory. But as these were gradually found
inadequate, they came to the final solution, and the doctrine of
the inner self of man as being the highest truth the Brahman
originated.

___________________________________________________________________

[Footnote 1: B@rh. I. 4. 10.]

38


The meaning of the word Upani@sad.

The word Upani@sad is derived from the root _sad_ with the prefix
_ni_ (to sit), and Max Muller says that the word originally meant the
act of sitting down near a teacher and of submissively listening to
him. In his introduction to the Upani@sads he says, "The history
and the genius of the Sanskrit language leave little doubt that
Upani@sad meant originally session, particularly a session consisting
of pupils, assembled at a respectful distance round their teacher
[Footnote ref 1]." Deussen points out that the word means "secret" or
"secret instruction," and this is borne out by many of the passages of
the Upani@sads themselves. Max Muller also agrees that the word was used
in this sense in the Upani@sads [Footnote ref 2]. There we find that
great injunctions of secrecy are to be observed for the communication
of the doctrines, and it is said that it should only be given to a
student or pupil who by his supreme moral restraint and noble desires
proves himself deserving to hear them. S'ankara however, the
great Indian exponent of the Upani@sads, derives the word from
the root _sad_ to destroy and supposes that it is so called because it
destroys inborn ignorance and leads to salvation by revealing the
right knowledge. But if we compare the many texts in which the
word Upani@sad occurs in the Upani@sads themselves it seems that
Deussen's meaning is fully justified [Footnote ref 3].


The composition and growth of diverse Upani@sads.

The oldest Upani@sads are written in prose. Next to these we
have some in verses very similar to those that are to be found in
classical Sanskrit. As is easy to see, the older the Upani@sad the
more archaic is it in its language. The earliest Upani@sads have
an almost mysterious forcefulness in their expressions at least to
Indian ears. They are simple, pithy and penetrate to the heart.
We can read and read them over again without getting tired.
The lines are always as fresh as ever. As such they have a charm
apart from the value of the ideas they intend to convey. The word
Upani@sad was used, as we have seen, in the sense of "secret
doctrine or instruction"; the Upani@sad teachings were also intended
to be conveyed in strictest secrecy to earnest enquirers of
high morals and superior self-restraint for the purpose of achieving

______________________________________________________________________

[Footnote 1: Max Muller's _Translation of the Upanishads, S.B.E._ vol.
I.p. lxxxi.]

[Footnote 2: _S. B.E._ vol. I, p lxxxi.]

[Footnote 3: Deussen's _Philosophy of the Upanishads,_ pp. 10-15.]

39

emancipation. It was thus that the Upani@sad style of expression,
when it once came into use, came to possess the greatest charm and
attraction for earnest religious people; and as a result of that we
find that even when other forms of prose and verse had been
adapted for the Sanskrit language, the Upani@sad form of composition
had not stopped. Thus though the earliest Upani@sads
were compiled by 500 B C., they continued to be written even so
late as the spread of Mahommedan influence in India. The
earliest and most important are probably those that have been
commented upon by S'ankara namely B@rhadāra@nyaka, Chāndogya,
Aitareya, Taittiriya, Īs'a, Kena, Katha, Pras'na, Mundaka and
Māndūkya [Footnote ref 1]. It is important to note in this connection
that the separate Upani@sads differ much from one another with regard
to their content and methods of exposition. Thus while some of
them are busy laying great stress upon the monistic doctrine of
the self as the only reality, there are others which lay stress upon
the practice of Yoga, asceticism, the cult of S'iva, of Visnu and
the philosophy or anatomy of the body, and may thus be
respectively called the Yoga, S'aiva, Visnu and S'ārīra Upani@sads.
These in all make up the number to one hundred and eight.


Revival of Upani@sad studies in modern times.

How the Upani@sads came to be introduced into Europe is an
interesting story Dāra Shiko the eldest son of the Emperor
Shah Jahan heard of the Upani@sads during his stay in Kashmir
in 1640. He invited several Pandits from Benares to Delhi, who
undertook the work of translating them into Persian. In 1775
Anquetil Duperron, the discoverer of the Zend Avesta, received
a manuscript of it presented to him by his friend Le Gentil, the
French resident in Faizabad at the court of Shujā-uddaulah.
Anquetil translated it into Latin which was published in 1801-1802.
This translation though largely unintelligible was read by
Schopenhauer with great enthusiasm. It had, as Schopenhauer
himself admits, profoundly influenced his philosophy. Thus he

______________________________________________________________________

[Footnote 1: Deussen supposes that Kausītaki is also one of the earliest.
Max Müller and Schroeder think that Maitrāy@anī also belongs to the
earliest group, whereas Deussen counts it as a comparatively later
production. Winternitz divides the Upani@sads into four periods. In
the first period he includes B@rhadāra@nyaka, Chāndogya, Taittirīya,
Aitareya, Kausītaki and Kena. In that second he includes Kā@thaka, Ķs'ā,
S'vetās'vatara, Mu@ndaka, Mahānārāyana, and in the third period he
includes Pras'na, Maitrāya@nī and Mān@dūkya. The rest of the Upani@sads
he includes in the fourth period.]

40

writes in the preface to his _Welt als Wille und Vorstellung_
[Footnote ref 1], "And if, indeed, in addition to this he is a partaker
of the benefit conferred by the Vedas, the access to which, opened to
us through the Upanishads, is in my eyes the greatest advantage which
this still young century enjoys over previous ones, because I believe
that the influence of the Sanskrit literature will penetrate not less
deeply than did the revival of Greek literature in the fifteenth
century: if, I say, the reader has also already received and
assimilated the sacred, primitive Indian wisdom, then is he best
of all prepared to hear what I have to say to him....I might express
the opinion that each one of the individual and disconnected
aphorisms which make up the Upanishads may be deduced as
a consequence from the thought I am going to impart, though
the converse, that my thought is to be found in the Upanishads
is by no means the case." Again, "How does every line display
its firm, definite, and throughout harmonious meaning! From every
sentence deep, original, and sublime thoughts arise, and the whole
is pervaded by a high and holy and earnest spirit....In the whole
world there is no study, except that of the originals, so beneficial
and so elevating as that of the Oupanikhat. It has been the solace
of my life, it will be the solace of my death! [Footnote ref 2]" Through
Schopenhauer the study of the Upani@sads attracted much attention in
Germany and with the growth of a general interest in the study
of Sanskrit, they found their way into other parts of Europe as
well.

The study of the Upani@sads has however gained a great
impetus by the earnest attempts of our Ram Mohan Roy who
not only translated them into Bengali, Hindi and English and
published them at his own expense, but founded the Brahma
Samaj in Bengal, the main religious doctrines of which were
derived directly from the Upani@sads.

______________________________________________________________

[Footnote 1: Translation by Haldane and Kemp, vol. I. pp. xii and xiii.]

[Footnote 2: Max Muller says in his introduction to the Upanishada
(­_S.B.E._ I p. lxii; see also pp. lx, lxi) "that Schopenhauer should
have spoken of the Upanishads as 'products of the highest wisdom'...that
he should have placed the pantheism there taught high above the
pantheism of Bruno, Malebranche, Spinoza and Scotus Erigena, as brought
to light again at Oxford in 1681, may perhaps secure a more considerate
reception for those relics of ancient wisdom than anything that I could
say in their favour."]

41


The Upani@sads and their interpretations.

Before entering into the philosophy of the Upani@sads it may
be worth while to say a few words as to the reason why diverse
and even contradictory explanations as to the real import of the
Upani@sads had been offered by the great Indian scholars of past
times. The Upani@sads, as we have seen, formed the concluding
portion of the revealed Vedic literature, and were thus called the
Vedānta. It was almost universally believed by the Hindus that
the highest truths could only be found in the revelation of the
Vedas. Reason was regarded generally as occupying a comparatively
subservient place, and its proper use was to be found in its
judicious employment in getting out the real meaning of the
apparently conflicting ideas of the Vedas. The highest knowledge
of ultimate truth and reality was thus regarded as having
been once for all declared in the Upani@sads. Reason had only to
unravel it in the light of experience. It is important that readers
of Hindu philosophy should bear in mind the contrast that it
presents to the ruling idea of the modern world that new truths
are discovered by reason and experience every day, and even in
those cases where the old truths remain, they change their hue
and character every day, and that in matters of ultimate truths no
finality can ever be achieved; we are to be content only with as
much as comes before the purview of our reason and experience
at the time. It was therefore thought to be extremely audacious
that any person howsoever learned and brilliant he might be
should have any right to say anything regarding the highest
truths simply on the authority of his own opinion or the reasons
that he might offer. In order to make himself heard it was necessary
for him to show from the texts of the Upani@sads that they
supported him, and that their purport was also the same. Thus
it was that most schools of Hindu philosophy found it one of their
principal duties to interpret the Upani@sads in order to show that
they alone represented the true Vedānta doctrines. Any one
who should feel himself persuaded by the interpretations of any
particular school might say that in following that school he was
following the Vedānta.

The difficulty of assuring oneself that any interpretation is
absolutely the right one is enhanced by the fact that germs of
diverse kinds of thoughts are found scattered over the Upani@sads

42

which are not worked out in a systematic manner. Thus each
interpreter in his turn made the texts favourable to his own
doctrines prominent and brought them to the forefront, and tried
to repress others or explain them away. But comparing the
various systems of Upani@sad interpretation we find that the
interpretation offered by S'a@nkara very largely represents the view
of the general body of the earlier Upani@sad doctrines, though
there are some which distinctly foreshadow the doctrines of other
systems, but in a crude and germinal form. It is thus that Vedānta
is generally associated with the interpretation of S'a@nkara and
S'a@nkara's system of thought is called the Vedānta system, though
there are many other systems which put forth their claim as representing
the true Vedānta doctrines.

Under these circumstances it is necessary that a modern interpreter
of the Upani@sads should turn a deaf ear to the absolute
claims of these exponents, and look upon the Upani@sads not as
a systematic treatise but as a repository of diverse currents of
thought--the melting pot in which all later philosophic ideas were
still in a state of fusion, though the monistic doctrine of S'a@nkara,
or rather an approach thereto, may be regarded as the purport of
by far the largest majority of the texts. It will be better that a
modern interpreter should not agree to the claims of the ancients
that all the Upani@sads represent a connected system, but take the
texts independently and separately and determine their meanings,
though keeping an attentive eye on the context in which they
appear. It is in this way alone that we can detect the germs of
the thoughts of other Indian systems in the Upani@sads, and thus
find in them the earliest records of those tendencies of thoughts.


The quest after Brahman: the struggle and the failures.

The fundamental idea which runs through the early Upani@sads
is that underlying the exterior world of change there is an unchangeable
reality which is identical with that which underlies
the essence in man [Footnote ref 1]. If we look at Greek philosophy in
Parmenides or Plato or at modern philosophy in Kant, we find the
same tendency towards glorifying one unspeakable entity as the
reality or the essence. I have said above that the Upani@sads are

_______________________________________________________________________

[Footnote 1: B@rh. IV. 4. 5. 22.

43

no systematic treatises of a single hand, but are rather collations
or compilations of floating monologues, dialogues or anecdotes.
There are no doubt here and there simple discussions but there
is no pedantry or gymnastics of logic. Even the most casual
reader cannot but be struck with the earnestness and enthusiasm
of the sages. They run from place to place with great eagerness
in search of a teacher competent to instruct them about the nature
of Brahman. Where is Brahman? What is his nature?

We have noticed that during the closing period of the Sa@mhitā
there were people who had risen to the conception of a single
creator and controller of the universe, variously called Prajāpati,
Vis'vakarman, Puru@sa, Brahma@naspati and Brahman. But this
divine controller was yet only a deity. The search as to the
nature of this deity began in the Upani@sads. Many visible objects
of nature such as the sun or the wind on one hand and the various
psychological functions in man were tried, but none could render
satisfaction to the great ideal that had been aroused. The sages
in the Upani@sad had already started with the idea that there was
a supreme controller or essence presiding over man and the
universe. But what was its nature? Could it be identified with
any of the deities of Nature, was it a new deity or was it no deity
at all? The Upani@sads present to us the history of this quest and
the results that were achieved.

When we look merely to this quest we find that we have not
yet gone out of the Āra@nyaka ideas and of symbolic (_pratīka_)
forms of worship. _Prā@na_ (vital breath) was regarded as the most
essential function for the life of man, and many anecdotes are
related to show that it is superior to the other organs, such as the
eye or ear, and that on it all other functions depend. This
recognition of the superiority of prā@na brings us to the meditations
on prā@na as Brahman as leading to the most beneficial results.
So also we find that owing to the presence of the exalting
characters of omnipresence and eternality _ākās'a_ (space) is
meditated upon as Brahman. So also manas and Āditya (sun)
are meditated upon as Brahman. Again side by side with the
visible material representation of Brahman as the pervading Vāyu,
or the sun and the immaterial representation as ākās'a, manas or
prā@na, we find also the various kinds of meditations as substitutes
for actual sacrifice. Thus it is that there was an earnest quest
after the discovery of Brahman. We find a stratum of thought

44

which shows that the sages were still blinded by the old ritualistic
associations, and though meditation had taken the place of sacrifice
yet this was hardly adequate for the highest attainment of
Brahman.

Next to the failure of the meditations we have to notice the
history of the search after Brahman in which the sages sought to
identify Brahman with the presiding deity of the sun, moon,
lightning, ether, wind, fire, water, etc., and failed; for none of
these could satisfy the ideal they cherished of Brahman. It is
indeed needless here to multiply these examples, for they are
tiresome not only in this summary treatment but in the original
as well. They are of value only in this that they indicate how
toilsome was the process by which the old ritualistic associations
could be got rid of; what struggles and failures the sages had to
undergo before they reached a knowledge of the true nature of
Brahman.


Unknowability of Brahman and the Negative Method.

It is indeed true that the magical element involved in the
discharge of sacrificial duties lingered for a while in the symbolic
worship of Brahman in which He was conceived almost as a deity.
The minds of the Vedic poets so long accustomed to worship
deities of visible manifestation could not easily dispense with the
idea of seeking after a positive and definite content of Brahman.
They tried some of the sublime powers of nature and also many
symbols, but these could not render ultimate satisfaction. They
did not know what the Brahman was like, for they had only a
dim and dreamy vision of it in the deep craving of their souls
which could not be translated into permanent terms. But this
was enough to lead them on to the goal, for they could not be
satisfied with anything short of the highest.

They found that by whatever means they tried to give a
positive and definite content of the ultimate reality, the Brahman,
they failed. Positive definitions were impossible. They could not
point out what the Brahman was like in order to give an utterance
to that which was unutterable, they could only say that it was not
like aught that we find in experience. Yājńavalkya said "He
the ātman is not this, nor this (_neti neti_). He is inconceivable,
for he cannot be conceived, unchangeable, for he is not changed,
untouched, for nothing touches him; he cannot suffer by a stroke

45

of the sword, he cannot suffer any injury [Footnote ref 1]." He is
_asat_, non-being, for the being which Brahman is, is not to be
understood as such being as is known to us by experience; yet he is
being, for he alone is supremely real, for the universe subsists by
him. We ourselves are but he, and yet we know not what he is. Whatever
we can experience, whatever we can express, is limited, but he is the
unlimited, the basis of all. "That which is inaudible, intangible,
invisible, indestructible, which cannot be tasted, nor smelt, eternal,
without beginning or end, greater than the great (_mahat_), the fixed.
He who knows it is released from the jaws of death [Footnote ref 2]."
Space, time and causality do not appertain to him, for he at once forms
their essence and transcends them. He is the infinite and the vast, yet
the smallest of the small, at once here as there, there as here; no
characterisation of him is possible, otherwise than by the denial
to him of all empirical attributes, relations and definitions. He
is independent of all limitations of space, time, and cause which
rules all that is objectively presented, and therefore the empirical
universe. When Bāhva was questioned by Va@skali, he expounded
the nature of Brahman to him by maintaining silence--"Teach
me," said Va@skali, "most reverent sir, the nature of Brahman."
Bāhva however remained silent. But when the question was put
forth a second or third time he answered, "I teach you indeed but
you do not understand; the Ātman is silence [Footnote ref 3]." The way
to indicate it is thus by _neti neti_, it is not this, it is not this.
We cannot describe it by any positive content which is always limited
by conceptual thought.


The Ātman doctrine.

The sum and substance of the Upani@sad teaching is involved
in the equation Ātman=Brahman. We have already seen that the
word Ātman was used in the @Rg-Veda to denote on the one hand
the ultimate essence of the universe, and on the other the vital
breath in man. Later on in the Upani@sads we see that the word
Brahman is generally used in the former sense, while the word
Ātman is reserved to denote the inmost essence in man, and the

_________________________________________________________________

[Footnote 1: B@rh. IV. 5. 15. Deussen, Max Muller and Roer have all
misinterpreted this passage; _asito_ has been interpreted as an
adjective or participle, though no evidence has ever been adduced;
it is evidently the ablative of _asi_, a sword.]

[Footnote 2: Ka@tha III. 15.]

[Footnote 3: Sa@nkara on _Brahmasūtra_, III. 2. 17, and also Deussen,
_Philosophy of the Upanishads_, p. 156.]

46

Upani@sads are emphatic in their declaration that the two are one
and the same. But what is the inmost essence of man? The self
of man involves an ambiguity, as it is used in a variety of senses.
Thus so far as man consists of the essence of food (i.e. the physical
parts of man) he is called _annamaya_. But behind the sheath of
this body there is the other self consisting of the vital breath
which is called the self as vital breath (_prā@namaya ātman_).
Behind this again there is the other self "consisting of will" called
the _manomaya ātman_. This again contains within it the self
"consisting of consciousness" called the _vijńānamaya ātman_. But
behind it we come to the final essence the self as pure bliss (the
_ānandamaya ātman_). The texts say: "Truly he is the rapture;
for whoever gets this rapture becomes blissful. For who could
live, who could breathe if this space (_ākās'a_) was not bliss? For
it is he who behaves as bliss. For whoever in that Invisible,
Self-surpassing, Unspeakable, Supportless finds fearless support, he
really becomes fearless. But whoever finds even a slight difference,
between himself and this Ātman there is fear for him [Footnote ref 1]."

Again in another place we find that Prajāpati said: "The self
(_ātman_) which is free from sin, free from old age, from death and
grief, from hunger and thirst, whose desires are true, whose cogitations
are true, that is to be searched for, that is to be enquired;
he gets all his desires and all worlds who knows that self [Footnote
ref 2]." The gods and the demons on hearing of this sent Indra and
Virocana respectively as their representatives to enquire of this self
from Prajāpati. He agreed to teach them, and asked them to look
into a vessel of water and tell him how much of self they could
find. They answered: "We see, this our whole self, even to the
hair, and to the nails." And he said, "Well, that is the self, that
is the deathless and the fearless, that is the Brahman." They went
away pleased, but Prajāpati thought, "There they go away,
without having discovered, without having realized the self."
Virocana came away with the conviction that the body was the
self; but Indra did not return back to the gods, he was afraid and
pestered with doubts and came back to Prajāpati and said, "just
as the self becomes decorated when the body is decorated, well-dressed
when the body is well-dressed, well-cleaned when the
body is well-cleaned, even so that image self will be blind when
the body is blind, injured in one eye when the body is injured in
one eye, and mutilated when the body is mutilated, and it perishes

_____________________________________________________________________

[Footnote 1: Taitt. II. 7.]

[Footnote 2: Chā. VIII. 7. 1.]

47

when the body perishes, therefore I can see no good in this theory."
Prajāpati then gave him a higher instruction about the self, and
said, "He who goes about enjoying dreams, he is the self, this
is the deathless, the fearless, this is Brahman." Indra departed
but was again disturbed with doubts, and was afraid and came
back and said "that though the dream self does not become blind
when the body is blind, or injured in one eye when the body is
so injured and is not affected by its defects, and is not killed by
its destruction, but yet it is as if it was overwhelmed, as if it
suffered and as if it wept--in this I see no good." Prajāpati gave a
still higher instruction: "When a man, fast asleep, in total
contentment, does not know any dreams, this is the self, this is the
deathless, the fearless, this is Brahman." Indra departed but was
again filled with doubts on the way, and returned again and said "the
self in deep sleep does not know himself, that I am this, nor does
he know any other existing objects. He is destroyed and lost.
I see no good in this." And now Prajāpati after having given a
course of successively higher instructions as self as the body, as
the self in dreams and as the self in deep dreamless sleep, and
having found that the enquirer in each case could find out that this
was not the ultimate truth about the self that he was seeking,
ultimately gave him the ultimate and final instruction about the
full truth about the self, and said "this body is the support of the
deathless and the bodiless self. The self as embodied is affected
by pleasure and pain, the self when associated with the body cannot
get rid of pleasure and pain, but pleasure and pain do not
touch the bodiless self [Footnote ref 1]."

As the anecdote shows, they sought such a constant and unchangeable
essence in man as was beyond the limits of any change.
This inmost essence has sometimes been described as pure
subject-object-less consciousness, the reality, and the bliss. He is
the seer of all seeing, the hearer of all hearing and the knower of all
knowledge. He sees but is not seen, hears but is not heard, knows
but is not known. He is the light of all lights. He is like a lump
of salt, with no inner or outer, which consists through and through
entirely of savour; as in truth this Ātman has no inner or outer,
but consists through and through entirely of knowledge. Bliss is
not an attribute of it but it is bliss itself. The state of Brahman
is thus likened unto the state of dreamless sleep. And he who
has reached this bliss is beyond any fear. It is dearer to us than

____________________________________________________________________

[Footnote 1: Chā. VIII. 7-12.]

48

son, brother, wife, or husband, wealth or prosperity. It is for it
and by it that things appear dear to us. It is the dearest _par
excellence_, our inmost Ātman. All limitation is fraught with pain;
it is the infinite alone that is the highest bliss. When a man
receives this rapture, then is he full of bliss; for who could breathe,
who live, if that bliss had not filled this void (_ākās'a_)? It is he
who behaves as bliss. For when a man finds his peace, his fearless
support in that invisible, supportless, inexpressible, unspeakable
one, then has he attained peace.


Place of Brahman in the Upani@sads.

There is the ātman not in man alone but in all objects of the
universe, the sun, the moon, the world; and Brahman is this ātman.
There is nothing outside the ātman, and therefore there is no
plurality at all. As from a lump of clay all that is made of clay
is known, as from an ingot of black iron all that is made of
black iron is known, so when this ātman the Brahman is known
everything else is known. The essence in man and the essence
of the universe are one and the same, and it is Brahman.

Now a question may arise as to what may be called the nature
of the phenomenal world of colour, sound, taste, and smell. But
we must also remember that the Upani@sads do not represent so
much a conceptional system of philosophy as visions of the seers
who are possessed by the spirit of this Brahman. They do not
notice even the contradiction between the Brahman as unity and
nature in its diversity. When the empirical aspect of diversity
attracts their notice, they affirm it and yet declare that it is all
Brahman. From Brahman it has come forth and to it will it
return. He has himself created it out of himself and then entered
into it as its inner controller (_antaryāmin_). Here is thus a glaring
dualistic trait of the world of matter and Brahman as its controller,
though in other places we find it asserted most emphatically that
these are but names and forms, and when Brahman is known
everything else is known. No attempts at reconciliation are made
for the sake of the consistency of conceptual utterance, as
S'a@nkara the great professor of Vedānta does by explaining away
the dualistic texts. The universe is said to be a reality, but the
real in it is Brahman alone. It is on account of Brahman that
the fire burns and the wind blows. He is the active principle in
the entire universe, and yet the most passive and unmoved. The

49

world is his body, yet he is the soul within. "He creates all,
wills all, smells all, tastes all, he has pervaded all, silent and
unaffected [Footnote ref 1]." He is below, above, in the back, in front,
in the south and in the north, he is all this [Footnote ref 2]." These
rivers in the east and in the west originating from the ocean, return
back into it and become the ocean themselves, though they do not know
that they are so. So also all these people coming into being from the
Being do not know that they have come from the Being...That which
is the subtlest that is the self, that is all this, the truth, that self
thou art O S'vetaketu [Footnote ref 3]." "Brahman," as Deussen points out,
"was regarded as the cause antecedent in time, and the universe
as the effect proceeding from it; the inner dependence of the
universe on Brahman and its essential identity with him was
represented as a creation of the universe by and out of Brahman."
Thus it is said in Mund. I.I. 7:

  As a spider ejects and retracts (the threads),
  As the plants shoot forth on the earth,
  As the hairs on the head and body of the living man,
  So from the imperishable all that is here.
  As the sparks from the well-kindled fire,
  In nature akin to it, spring forth in their thousands,
  So, my dear sir, from the imperishable
  Living beings of many kinds go forth,
  And again return into him [Footnote ref 4].

Yet this world principle is the dearest to us and the highest
teaching of the Upani@sads is "That art thou."

Again the growth of the doctrine that Brahman is the "inner
controller" in all the parts and forces of nature and of mankind as
the ātman thereof, and that all the effects of the universe are the
result of his commands which no one can outstep, gave rise to a
theistic current of thought in which Brahman is held as standing
aloof as God and controlling the world. It is by his ordaining, it
is said, that the sun and moon are held together, and the sky and
earth stand held together [Footnote ref 5]. God and soul are distinguished
again in the famous verse of S'vetās'vatara [Footnote ref 6]:

  Two bright-feathered bosom friends
  Flit around one and the same tree;
  One of them tastes the sweet berries,
  The other without eating merely gazes down.

______________________________________________________________

[Footnote 1: Chā. III. 14. 4.]

[Footnote 2: _Ibid._ VII. 25. i; also Mu@n@daka II. 2. ii.]

[Footnote 3: Chā. VI. 10.]

[Footnote 4: Deussen's translation in _Philosophy of the Upanishads_, p.
164.]

[Footnote 5: B@rh. III. 8. i.]

[Footnote 6: S'vetās'vatara IV. 6, and Mu@n@daka III. i, 1, also Deussen's
translation in _Philosophy of the Upanishads_, p. 177.]

50

But in spite of this apparent theistic tendency and the occasional
use of the word _Īs'a_ or _Īs'āna_, there seems to be no doubt
that theism in its true sense was never prominent, and this acknowledgement
of a supreme Lord was also an offshoot of the exalted
position of the ātman as the supreme principle. Thus we read in
Kau@sītaki Upani@sad 3. 9, "He is not great by good deeds nor low
by evil deeds, but it is he makes one do good deeds whom he
wants to raise, and makes him commit bad deeds whom he wants
to lower down. He is the protector of the universe, he is the
master of the world and the lord of all; he is my soul (_ātman_)."
Thus the lord in spite of his greatness is still my soul. There are
again other passages which regard Brahman as being at once
immanent and transcendent. Thus it is said that there is that
eternally existing tree whose roots grow upward and whose
branches grow downward. All the universes are supported in it
and no one can transcend it. This is that, "...from its fear the fire
burns, the sun shines, and from its fear Indra, Vāyu and Death
the fifth (with the other two) run on [Footnote ref 1]."

If we overlook the different shades in the development of the
conception of Brahman in the Upani@sads and look to the main
currents, we find that the strongest current of thought which has
found expression in the majority of the texts is this that the
Ātman or the Brahman is the only reality and that besides this
everything else is unreal. The other current of thought which is
to be found in many of the texts is the pantheistic creed that
identifies the universe with the Ātman or Brahman. The third
current is that of theism which looks upon Brahman as the Lord
controlling the world. It is because these ideas were still in the
melting pot, in which none of them were systematically worked
out, that the later exponents of Vedānta, S'a@nkara, Rāmānuja,
and others quarrelled over the meanings of texts in order to
develop a consistent systematic philosophy out of them. Thus it
is that the doctrine of Māyā which is slightly hinted at once in
B@rhadāra@nyaka and thrice in S'vetās'vatara, becomes the foundation
of S'a@nkara's philosophy of the Vedānta in which Brahman
alone is real and all else beside him is unreal [Footnote ref 2].

_________________________________________________________________

[Footnote 1: Ka@tha II. 6. 1 and 3.]

[Footnote 2: B@rh. II. 5. 19, S'vet. I. 10, IV. 9, 10.]

51


The World.

We have already seen that the universe has come out of
Brahman, has its essence in Brahman, and will also return back
to it. But in spite of its existence as Brahman its character as
represented to experience could not be denied. S'a@nkara held
that the Upani@sads referred to the external world and accorded
a reality to it consciously with the purpose of treating it as merely
relatively real, which will eventually appear as unreal as soon
as the ultimate truth, the Brahman, is known. This however
remains to be modified to this extent that the sages had not
probably any conscious purpose of according a relative reality to
the phenomenal world, but in spite of regarding Brahman as the
highest reality they could not ignore the claims of the exterior
world, and had to accord a reality to it. The inconsistency of this
reality of the phenomenal world with the ultimate and only
reality of Brahman was attempted to be reconciled by holding
that this world is not beside him but it has come out of him, it
is maintained in him and it will return back to him.

The world is sometimes spoken of in its twofold aspect, the
organic and the inorganic. All organic things, whether plants,
animals or men, have souls [Footnote ref 1]. Brahman desiring to be many
created fire (_tejas_), water (_ap_) and earth (_k@siti_). Then the
self-existent Brahman entered into these three, and it is by their
combination that all other bodies are formed [Footnote ref 2]. So all
other things are produced as a result of an alloying or compounding
of the parts of these three together. In this theory of the threefold
division of the primitive elements lies the earliest germ of the later
distinction (especially in the Sā@mkhya school) of pure infinitesimal
substances (_tanmātra_) and gross elements, and the theory that each
gross substance is composed of the atoms of the primary elements. And
in Pras'na IV. 8 we find the gross elements distinguished from their
subtler natures, e.g. earth (_p@rthivī_), and the subtler state of earth
(_p@rthivīmātra_). In the Taittirīya, II. 1, however, ether (_ākās'a_)
is also described as proceeding from Brahman, and the other elements,
air, fire, water, and earth, are described as each proceeding
directly from the one which directly preceded it.

____________________________________________________________________

[Footnote 1: Chā. VI.11.]

[Footnote 2: _ibid._ VI.2,3,4.]

52


The World-Soul.

The conception of a world-soul related to the universe as the
soul of man to his body is found for the first time in R.V.X. 121. I,
where he is said to have sprung forth as the firstborn of creation
from the primeval waters. This being has twice been referred
to in the S'vetās'vatara, in III. 4 and IV. 12. It is indeed very strange
that this being is not referred to in any of the earlier Upani@sads.
In the two passages in which he has been spoken of, his mythical
character is apparent. He is regarded as one of the earlier
products in the process of cosmic creation, but his importance
from the point of view of the development of the theory of
Brahman or Ātman is almost nothing. The fact that neither the
Puru@sa, nor the Vis'vakarma, nor the Hira@nyagarbha played an
important part in the earlier development of the Upani@sads
leads me to think that the Upani@sad doctrines were not directly
developed from the monotheistic tendencies of the later @Rg-Veda
speculations. The passages in S'vetās'vatara clearly show how from
the supreme eminence that he had in R.V.X. 121, Hira@nyagarbha
had been brought to the level of one of the created beings. Deussen
in explaining the philosophical significance of the Hira@nyagarbha
doctrine of the Upani@sads says that the "entire objective universe is
possible only in so far as it is sustained by a knowing subject. This
subject as a sustainer of the objective universe is manifested in
all individual objects but is by no means identical with them. For
the individual objects pass away but the objective universe continues
to exist without them; there exists therefore the eternal
knowing subject also (_hira@nyagarbha_) by whom it is sustained.
Space and time are derived from this subject. It is itself accordingly
not in space and does not belong to time, and therefore
from an empirical point of view it is in general non-existent; it
has no empirical but only a metaphysical reality [Footnote ref 1]." This
however seems to me to be wholly irrelevant, since the Hira@nyagarbha
doctrine cannot be supposed to have any philosophical importance
in the Upani@sads.



The Theory of Causation.

There was practically no systematic theory of causation in the
Upani@sads. S'a@nkara, the later exponent of Vedānta philosophy,
always tried to show that the Upani@sads looked upon the cause

___________________________________________________________________

[Footnote 1: Deussen's _Philosophy of the Upanishads_, p. 201.]

53

as mere ground of change which though unchanged in itself in
reality had only an appearance of suffering change. This he did
on the strength of a series of examples in the Chāndogya
Upani@sad (VI. 1) in which the material cause, e.g. the clay, is
spoken of as the only reality in all its transformations as the pot,
the jug or the plate. It is said that though there are so many
diversities of appearance that one is called the plate, the other the
pot, and the other the jug, yet these are only empty distinctions of
name and form, for the only thing real in them is the earth which
in its essence remains ever the same whether you call it the pot,
plate, or Jug. So it is that the ultimate cause, the unchangeable
Brahman, remains ever constant, though it may appear to suffer
change as the manifold world outside. This world is thus only
an unsubstantial appearance, a mirage imposed upon Brahman,
the real _par excellence_.

It seems however that though such a view may be regarded
as having been expounded in the Upani@sads in an imperfect
manner, there is also side by side the other view which looks
upon the effect as the product of a real change wrought in the
cause itself through the action and combination of the elements
of diversity in it. Thus when the different objects of nature have
been spoken of in one place as the product of the combination
of the three elements fire, water and earth, the effect signifies a real
change produced by their compounding. This is in germ (as we
shall see hereafter) the Pari@nāma theory of causation advocated
by the Sā@mkhya school [Footnote ref 1].


Doctrine of Transmigration.

When the Vedic people witnessed the burning of a dead body
they supposed that the eye of the man went to the sun, his breath
to the wind, his speech to the fire, his limbs to the different parts
of the universe. They also believed as we have already seen in
the recompense of good and bad actions in worlds other than our
own, and though we hear of such things as the passage of the
human soul into trees, etc., the tendency towards transmigration
had but little developed at the time.

In the Upani@sads however we find a clear development in
the direction of transmigration in two distinct stages. In the one
the Vedic idea of a recompense in the other world is combined with

____________________________________________________________________

[Footnote 1: Chā. VI. 2-4.]

54

the doctrine of transmigration, whereas in the other the doctrine
of transmigration comes to the forefront in supersession of the
idea of a recompense in the other world. Thus it is said that
those who performed charitable deeds or such public works as the
digging of wells, etc., follow after death the way of the fathers
(_pit@ryāna_), in which the soul after death enters first into smoke,
then into night, the dark half of the month, etc., and at last reaches
the moon; after a residence there as long as the remnant of his
good deeds remains he descends again through ether, wind, smoke,
mist, cloud, rain, herbage, food and seed, and through the assimilation
of food by man he enters the womb of the mother and is
born again. Here we see that the soul had not only a recompense
in the world of the moon, but was re-born again in this world [Footnote
ref 1].

The other way is the way of gods (_devayāna_), meant for those
who cultivate faith and asceticism (_tapas_). These souls at death
enter successively into flame, day, bright half of the month, bright
half of the year, sun, moon, lightning, and then finally into
Brahman never to return. Deussen says that "the meaning of
the whole is that the soul on the way of the gods reaches regions
of ever-increasing light, in which is concentrated all that is bright
and radiant as stations on the way to Brahman the 'light of
lights'" (_jyoti@sā@m jyoti@h_) [Footnote ref 2].

The other line of thought is a direct reference to the doctrine
of transmigration unmixed with the idea of reaping the fruits of
his deeds (_karma_) by passing through the other worlds and without
reference to the doctrine of the ways of the fathers and gods,
the _Yānas_. Thus Yājńavalkya says, "when the soul becomes
weak (apparent weakness owing to the weakness of the body with
which it is associated) and falls into a swoon as it were, these senses
go towards it. It (Soul) takes these light particles within itself and
centres itself only in the heart. Thus when the person in the eye
turns back, then the soul cannot know colour; (the senses) become
one (with him); (people about him) say he does not see; (the senses)
become one (with him), he does not smell, (the senses) become
one (with him), he does not taste, (the senses) become one (with
him), he does not speak, (the senses) become one (with him), he
does not hear, (the senses) become one (with him), he does not
think, (the senses) become one with him, he does not touch, (the
senses) become one with him, he does not know, they say. The

___________________________________________________________________

[Footnote 1: Chā. V. 10.]

[Footnote 2: Deussen's _Philosophy of the Upanishads_, p. 335.]

55

tip of his heart shines and by that shining this soul goes out.
When he goes out either through the eye, the head, or by any
other part of the body, the vital function (_prā@na_) follows and all
the senses follow the vital function (_prā@na_) in coming out. He
is then with determinate consciousness and as such he comes
out. Knowledge, the deeds as well as previous experience (_prajńā_)
accompany him. Just as a caterpillar going to the end of a blade
of grass, by undertaking a separate movement collects itself, so
this self after destroying this body, removing ignorance, by a
separate movement collects itself. Just as a goldsmith taking a
small bit of gold, gives to it a newer and fairer form, so the soul
after destroying this body and removing ignorance fashions a
newer and fairer form as of the Pit@rs, the Gandharvas, the gods,
of Prajāpati or Brahma or of any other being....As he acts and
behaves so he becomes, good by good deeds, bad by bad deeds,
virtuous by virtuous deeds and vicious by vice. The man is full
of desires. As he desires so he wills, as he wills so he works, as
the work is done so it happens. There is also a verse, being
attached to that he wants to gain by karma that to which he
was attached. Having reaped the full fruit (lit. gone to the
end) of the karma that he does here, he returns back to this
world for doing karma [Footnote ref 1]. So it is the case with those who
have desires. He who has no desires, who had no desires, who has
freed himself from all desires, is satisfied in his desires and in
himself, his senses do not go out. He being Brahma attains
Brahmahood. Thus the verse says, when all the desires that are
in his heart are got rid of, the mortal becomes immortal and
attains Brahma here" (B@rh. IV. iv. 1-7).

A close consideration of the above passage shows that the
self itself destroyed the body and built up a newer and fairer
frame by its own activity when it reached the end of the present
life. At the time of death, the self collected within itself all
senses and faculties and after death all its previous knowledge,
work and experience accompanied him. The falling off of the
body at the time of death is only for the building of a newer
body either in this world or in the other worlds. The self which
thus takes rebirth is regarded as an aggregation of diverse categories.
Thus it is said that "he is of the essence of understanding,

__________________________________________________________________

[Footnote 1: It is possible that there is a vague and obscure reference
here to the doctrine that the fruits of our deeds are reaped in other
worlds.]

56

of the vital function, of the visual sense, of the auditory sense, of
the essence of the five elements (which would make up the
physical body in accordance with its needs) or the essence of desires,
of the essence of restraint of desires, of the essence of anger, of
the essence of turning off from all anger, of the essence of dharma,
of the essence of adharma, of the essence of all that is this
(manifest) and that is that (unmanifest or latent)" (B@rh. IV. iv. 5).
The self that undergoes rebirth is thus a unity not only of moral
and psychological tendencies, but also of all the elements which
compose the physical world. The whole process of his changes
follows from this nature of his; for whatever he desires, he wills
and whatever he wills he acts, and in accordance with his acts
the fruit happens. The whole logic of the genesis of karma and
its fruits is held up within him, for he is a unity of the moral
and psychological tendencies on the one hand and elements of
the physical world on the other.

The self that undergoes rebirth being a combination of diverse
psychological and moral tendencies and the physical elements
holds within itself the principle of all its transformations. The
root of all this is the desire of the self and the consequent fruition
of it through will and act. When the self continues to desire and
act, it reaps the fruit and comes again to this world for performing
acts. This world is generally regarded as the field for performing
karma, whereas other worlds are regarded as places where the
fruits of karma are reaped by those born as celestial beings. But
there is no emphasis in the Upani@sads on this point. The Pit@ryāna
theory is not indeed given up, but it seems only to form a part
in the larger scheme of rebirth in other worlds and sometimes in
this world too. All the course of these rebirths is effected by the
self itself by its own desires, and if it ceases to desire, it suffers no
rebirth and becomes immortal. The most distinctive feature of
this doctrine is this, that it refers to desires as the cause of rebirth
and not karma. Karma only comes as the connecting link between
desires and rebirth--for it is said that whatever a man desires he
wills, and whatever he wills he acts.

Thus it is said in another place "he who knowingly desires is
born by his desires in those places (accordingly), but for him whose
desires have been fulfilled and who has realized himself, all his
desires vanish here" (Mu@n@d III. 2. 2). This destruction of desires
is effected by the right knowledge of the self. "He who knows

57

his self as 'I am the person' for what wish and for what desire
will he trouble the body,...even being here if we know it, well if
we do not, what a great destruction" (B@rh. IV. iv. 12 and 14). "In
former times the wise men did not desire sons, thinking what
shall we do with sons since this our self is the universe" (B@rh. IV.
iv. 22). None of the complexities of the karma doctrine which
we find later on in more recent developments of Hindu thought
can be found in the Upani@sads. The whole scheme is worked
out on the principle of desire (_kāma_) and karma only serves as
the link between it and the actual effects desired and willed by
the person.

It is interesting to note in this connection that consistently
with the idea that desires (_kāma_) led to rebirth, we find that
in some Upani@sads the discharge of the semen in the womb of a
woman as a result of desires is considered as the first birth of
man, and the birth of the son as the second birth and the birth
elsewhere after death is regarded as the third birth. Thus it is
said, "It is in man that there comes first the embryo, which is
but the semen which is produced as the essence of all parts of
his body and which holds itself within itself, and when it is put
in a woman, that is his first birth. That embryo then becomes
part of the woman's self like any part of her body; it therefore
does not hurt her; she protects and develops the embryo within
herself. As she protects (the embryo) so she also should be
protected. It is the woman who bears the embryo (before birth)
but when after birth the father takes care of the son always, he
is taking care only of himself, for it is through sons alone that
the continuity of the existence of people can be maintained. This
is his second birth. He makes this self of his a representative
for performing all the virtuous deeds. The other self of his after
realizing himself and attaining age goes away and when going
away he is born again that is his third birth" (Aitareya, II. 1-4)
[Footnote ref 1]. No special emphasis is given in the Upani@sads to
the sex-desire or the desire for a son; for, being called kāma, whatever
was the desire for a son was the same as the desire for money and the
desire for money was the same as any other worldly desire (B@rh.
IV. iv. 22), and hence sex-desires stand on the same plane as any
other desire.

_____________________________________________________________________

[Footnote 1: See also Kau@sītaki, II. 15.]

58


Emancipation.

The doctrine which next attracts our attention in this connection
is that of emancipation (_mukti_). Already we know that the
doctrine of Devayāna held that those who were faithful and performed
asceticism (_tapas_) went by the way of the gods through
successive stages never to return to the world and suffer rebirth.
This could be contrasted with the way of the fathers (_pit@ryāna_)
where the dead were for a time recompensed in another world and
then had to suffer rebirth. Thus we find that those who are faithful
and perform _s'raddhā_ had a distinctly different type of goal from
those who performed ordinary virtues, such as those of a general
altruistic nature. This distinction attains its fullest development
in the doctrine of emancipation. Emancipation or Mukti means
in the Upani@sads the state of infiniteness that a man attains
when he knows his own self and thus becomes Brahman. The
ceaseless course of transmigration is only for those who are
ignorant. The wise man however who has divested himself of all
passions and knows himself to be Brahman, at once becomes
Brahman and no bondage of any kind can ever affect him.

  He who beholds that loftiest and deepest,
  For him the fetters of the heart break asunder,
  For him all doubts are solved,
  And his works become nothingness [Footnote ref 1].

The knowledge of the self reveals the fact that all our passions
and antipathies, all our limitations of experience, all that is
ignoble and small in us, all that is transient and finite in us is
false. We "do not know" but are "pure knowledge" ourselves.
We are not limited by anything, for we are the infinite; we do
not suffer death, for we are immortal. Emancipation thus is not
a new acquisition, product, an effect, or result of any action, but
it always exists as the Truth of our nature. We are always
emancipated and always free. We do not seem to be so and
seem to suffer rebirth and thousands of other troubles only because
we do not know the true nature of our self. Thus it is that the
true knowledge of self does not lead to emancipation but is
emancipation itself. All sufferings and limitations are true only
so long as we do not know our self. Emancipation is the natural
and only goal of man simply because it represents the true nature
and essence of man. It is the realization of our own nature that

_____________________________________________________________________

[Footnote 1: Deussen's _Philosophy of the Upanishads_, p. 352.]

59

is called emancipation. Since we are all already and always in
our own true nature and as such emancipated, the only thing
necessary for us is to know that we are so. Self-knowledge is therefore
the only desideratum which can wipe off all false knowledge,
all illusions of death and rebirth. The story is told in the Ka@tha
Upani@sad that Yama, the lord of death, promised Naciketas,
the son of Gautama, to grant him three boons at his choice.
Naciketas, knowing that his father Gautama was offended with
him, said, "O death let Gautama be pleased in mind and forget
his anger against me." This being granted Naciketas asked the
second boon that the fire by which heaven is gained should be
made known to him. This also being granted Naciketas said,
"There is this enquiry, some say the soul exists after the death
of man; others say it does not exist. This I should like to know
instructed by thee. This is my third boon." Yama said, "It was
inquired of old, even by the gods; for it is not easy to understand
it. Subtle is its nature, choose another boon. Do not
compel me to this." Naciketas said, "Even by the gods was it
inquired before, and even thou O Death sayest that it is not easy
to understand it, but there is no other speaker to be found like
thee. There is no other boon like this." Yama said, "Choose sons
and grandsons who may live a hundred years, choose herds of
cattle; choose elephants and gold and horses; choose the wide
expanded earth, and live thyself as many years as thou wishest.
Or if thou knowest a boon like this choose it together with wealth
and far-extending life. Be a king on the wide earth. I will make
thee the enjoyer of all desires. All those desires that are difficult
to gain in the world of mortals, all those ask thou at thy pleasure;
those fair nymphs with their chariots, with their musical instruments;
the like of them are not to be gained by men. I will give
them to thee, but do not ask the question regarding death."
Naciketas replied, "All those enjoyments are of to-morrow and
they only weaken the senses. All life is short, with thee the
dance and song. Man cannot be satisfied with wealth, we could
obtain wealth, as long as we did not reach you we live only as
long as thou pleasest. The boon which I choose I have said."
Yama said, "One thing is good, another is pleasant. Blessed is
he who takes the good, but he who chooses the pleasant loses
the object of man. But thou considering the objects of desire,
hast abandoned them. These two, ignorance (whose object is

60

what is pleasant) and knowledge (whose object is what is good),
are known to be far asunder, and to lead to different goals.
Believing that this world exists and not the other, the careless
youth is subject to my sway. That knowledge which thou hast
asked is not to be obtained by argument. I know worldly happiness
is transient for that firm one is not to be obtained by what
is not firm. The wise by concentrating on the soul, knowing him
whom it is hard to behold, leaves both grief and joy. Thee
O Naciketas, I believe to be like a house whose door is open to
Brahman. Brahman is deathless, whoever knows him obtains
whatever he wishes. The wise man is not born; he does not die;
he is not produced from anywhere. Unborn, eternal, the soul is
not slain, though the body is slain; subtler than what is subtle,
greater than what is great, sitting it goes far, lying it goes everywhere.
Thinking the soul as unbodily among bodies, firm among
fleeting things, the wise man casts off all grief. The soul cannot
be gained by eloquence, by understanding, or by learning. It
can be obtained by him alone whom it chooses. To him it reveals
its own nature [Footnote ref 1]." So long as the Self identifies itself
with its desires, he wills and acts according to them and reaps the
fruits in the present and in future lives. But when he comes to know the
highest truth about himself, that he is the highest essence and principle
of the universe, the immortal and the infinite, he ceases to have
desires, and receding from all desires realizes the ultimate truth
of himself in his own infinitude. Man is as it were the epitome
of the universe and he holds within himself the fine constituents
of the gross body (_annamaya ko@sa_), the vital functions (_prā@namaya
ko@sa_) of life, the will and desire (_manomaya_) and the
thoughts and ideas (_vijńānamaya_), and so long as he keeps himself
in these spheres and passes through a series of experiences
in the present life and in other lives to come, these experiences
are willed by him and in that sense created by him. He suffers
pleasures and pains, disease and death. But if he retires from
these into his true unchangeable being, he is in a state where he
is one with his experience and there is no change and no movement.
What this state is cannot be explained by the use of
concepts. One could only indicate it by pointing out that it is
not any of those concepts found in ordinary knowledge; it is not

_________________________________________________________________

[Footnote 1: Ka@tha II. The translation is not continuous. There are some
parts in the extract which may be differently interpreted.]

61

whatever one knows as this and this (_neti neti_). In this infinite
and true self there is no difference, no diversity, no _meum_ and
_tuum_. It is like an ocean in which all our phenomenal existence
will dissolve like salt in water. "Just as a lump of salt when put
in water will disappear in it and it cannot be taken out separately
but in whatever portion of water we taste we find the salt, so,
Maitreyī, does this great reality infinite and limitless consisting
only of pure intelligence manifesting itself in all these (phenomenal
existences) vanish in them and there is then no phenomenal knowledge"
(B@rh. II. 4. 12). The true self manifests itself in all the
processes of our phenomenal existences, but ultimately when it
retires back to itself, it can no longer be found in them. It is a
state of absolute infinitude of pure intelligence, pure being, and
pure blessedness.

62



CHAPTER IV


GENERAL OBSERVATIONS ON THE SYSTEMS
OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHY


In what Sense is a History of Indian Philosophy possible?

It is hardly possible to attempt a history of Indian philosophy
in the manner in which the histories of European philosophy have
been written. In Europe from the earliest times, thinkers came
one after another and offered their independent speculations
on philosophy. The work of a modern historian consists in
chronologically arranging these views and in commenting upon
the influence of one school upon another or upon the general
change from time to time in the tides and currents of philosophy.
Here in India, however, the principal systems of philosophy had
their beginning in times of which we have but scanty record, and
it is hardly possible to say correctly at what time they began,
or to compute the influence that led to the foundation of so many
divergent systems at so early a period, for in all probability these
were formulated just after the earliest Upani@sads had been composed
or arranged.

The systematic treatises were written in short and pregnant
half-sentences (_sūtras_) which did not elaborate the subject in
detail, but served only to hold before the reader the lost threads
of memory of elaborate disquisitions with which he was already
thoroughly acquainted. It seems, therefore, that these pithy half-sentences
were like lecture hints, intended for those who had had
direct elaborate oral instructions on the subject. It is indeed
difficult to guess from the sūtras the extent of their significance,
or how far the discussions which they gave rise to in later days were
originally intended by them. The sūtras of the Vedānta system,
known as the S'ārīraka-sūtras or Brahma-sūtras of Bādarāya@na
for example were of so ambiguous a nature that they gave rise
to more than half a dozen divergent interpretations, each one
of which claimed to be the only faithful one. Such was the high
esteem and respect in which these writers of the sūtras were held
by later writers that whenever they had any new speculations to

63

offer, these were reconciled with the doctrines of one or other of
the existing systems, and put down as faithful interpretations of
the system in the form of commentaries. Such was the hold of
these systems upon scholars that all the orthodox teachers since
the foundation of the systems of philosophy belonged to one or
other of these schools. Their pupils were thus naturally brought
up in accordance with the views of their teachers. All the independence
of their thinking was limited and enchained by the faith of the school
to which they were attached. Instead of producing a succession of
free-lance thinkers having their own systems to propound and establish,
India had brought forth schools of pupils who carried the traditionary
views of particular systems from generation to generation, who explained
and expounded them, and defended them against the attacks of other
rival schools which they constantly attacked in order to establish
the superiority of the system to which they adhered. To take an
example, the Nyāya system of philosophy consisting of a number
of half-sentences or sūtras is attributed to Gautama, also called
Ak@sapāda. The earliest commentary on these sūtras, called the
_Vātsyāyana bhā@sya_, was written by Vātsyāyana. This work was
sharply criticized by the Buddhist Di@nnāga, and to answer these
criticisms Udyotakara wrote a commentary on this commentary
called the _Bhā@syavāttika_ [Footnote ref 1]. As time went on the original
force of this work was lost, and it failed to maintain the old dignity of
the school. At this Vācaspati Mis'ra wrote a commentary called
_Vārttika-tātparya@tīkā_ on this second commentary, where he tried
to refute all objections against the Nyāya system made by other
rival schools and particularly by the Buddhists. This commentary,
called _Nyāya-tātparya@tīkā_, had another commentary called
_Nyāya-tātparya@tīkā-paris'uddhi_ written by the great Udayana. This
commentary had another commentary called _Nyāya-nibandha-prakās'a_
written by Varddhamāna the son of the illustrious Ga@nges'a. This
again had another commentary called _Varddha-mānendu_ upon it by
Padmanābha Mis'ra, and this again had another named
_Nyāya-tātparyama@n@dana_ by S'a@nkara Mis'ra. The names of
Vātsyāyana, Vācaspati, and Udayana are indeed very great,
but even they contented themselves by writing commentaries
on commentaries, and did not try to formulate any

_______________________________________________________________________

[Footnote 1: I have preferred to spell Di@nnāga after Vācaspati's
_Tātparyatīkā_ (p. I) and not Dignnāga as it is generally spelt.]

64

original system. Even S'a@nkara, probably the greatest man of
India after Buddha, spent his life in writing commentaries on the
_Brahma-sūtras_, the Upani@sads, and the _Bhagavadgītā_.

As a system passed on it had to meet unexpected opponents
and troublesome criticisms for which it was not in the least prepared.
Its adherents had therefore to use all their ingenuity and
subtlety in support of their own positions, and to discover the
defects of the rival schools that attacked them. A system as it was
originally formulated in the sūtras had probably but few problems
to solve, but as it fought its way in the teeth of opposition of
other schools, it had to offer consistent opinions on other problems
in which the original views were more or less involved but to
which no attention had been given before.

The contributions of the successive commentators served to
make each system more and more complete in all its parts, and
stronger and stronger to enable it to hold its own successfully
against the opposition and attacks of the rival schools. A system
in the sūtras is weak and shapeless as a newborn babe, but if
we take it along with its developments down to the beginning
of the seventeenth century it appears as a fully developed man
strong and harmonious in all its limbs. It is therefore not possible
to write any history of successive philosophies of India, but it is
necessity that each system should be studied and interpreted in
all the growth it has acquired through the successive ages of
history from its conflicts with the rival systems as one whole [Footnote
ref 1]. In the history of Indian philosophy we have no place for systems
which had their importance only so long as they lived and were
then forgotten or remembered only as targets of criticism. Each
system grew and developed by the untiring energy of its adherents
through all the successive ages of history, and a history of this
growth is a history of its conflicts. No study of any Indian system
is therefore adequate unless it is taken throughout all the growth
it attained by the work of its champions, the commentators whose
selfless toil for it had kept it living through the ages of history.

______________________________________________________________________

[Footnote 1: In the case of some systems it is indeed possible to suggest
one or two earlier phases of the system, but this principle cannot be
carried all through, for the supplementary information and arguments
given by the later commentators often appear as harmonious elaborations
of the earlier writings and are very seldom in conflict with them.]

65


Growth of the Philosophic Literature.

It is difficult to say how the systems were originally formulated,
and what were the influences that led to it. We know that a
spirit of philosophic enquiry had already begun in the days of the
earliest Upani@sads. The spirit of that enquiry was that the final
essence or truth was the ātman, that a search after it was our
highest duty, and that until we are ultimately merged in it we
can only feel this truth and remain uncontented with everything
else and say that it is not the truth we want, it is not the truth we
want (_neti neti_). Philosophical enquires were however continuing
in circles other than those of the Upani@sads. Thus the Buddha
who closely followed the early Upani@sad period, spoke of and enumerated
sixty-two kinds of heresies [Footnote ref 1], and these can hardly be
traced in the Upani@sads. The Jaina activities were also probably
going on contemporaneously but in the Upani@sads no reference
to these can be found. We may thus reasonably suppose that there
were different forms of philosophic enquiry in spheres other than
those of the Upani@sad sages, of which we have but scanty records.
It seems probable that the Hindu systems of thought originated
among the sages who though attached chiefly to the Upani@sad
circles used to take note of the discussions and views of the antagonistic
and heretical philosophic circles. In the assemblies of these
sages and their pupils, the views of the heretical circles were probably
discussed and refuted. So it continued probably for some time
when some illustrious member of the assembly such as Gautama
or Kanada collected the purport of these discussions on various
topics and problems, filled up many of the missing links, classified
and arranged these in the form of a system of philosophy and
recorded it in sūtras. These sūtras were intended probably for
people who had attended the elaborate oral discussions and thus
could easily follow the meaning of the suggestive phrases contained
in the aphorisms. The sūtras thus contain sometimes
allusions to the views of the rival schools and indicate the way in
which they could be refuted. The commentators were possessed
of the general drift of the different discussions alluded to and
conveyed from generation to generation through an unbroken
chain of succession of teachers and pupils. They were however
free to supplement these traditionary explanations with their own

__________________________________________________________________

[Footnote 1: _Brahmajāla-sutta, Dīgha_, 1. p. 12 ff.]

66

views or to modify and even suppress such of the traditionary
views with which they did not agree or which they found it difficult
to maintain. Brilliant oppositions from the opposing schools
often made it necessary for them to offer solutions to new problems
unthought of before, but put forward by some illustrious adherent
of a rival school. In order to reconcile these new solutions with
the other parts of the system, the commentators never hesitated to
offer such slight modifications of the doctrines as could harmonize
them into a complete whole. These elaborations or modifications
generally developed the traditionary system, but did not effect any
serious change in the system as expounded by the older teachers,
for the new exponents always bound themselves to the explanations
of the older teachers and never contradicted them. They
would only interpret them to suit their own ideas, or say new things
only in those cases where the older teachers had remained silent.
It is not therefore possible to describe the growth of any system
by treating the contributions of the individual commentators separately.
This would only mean unnecessary repetition. Except
when there is a specially new development, the system is to be
interpreted on the basis of the joint work of the commentators
treating their contributions as forming one whole.

The fact that each system had to contend with other rival
systems in order to hold its own has left its permanent mark
upon all the philosophic literatures of India which are always
written in the form of disputes, where the writer is supposed to
be always faced with objections from rival schools to whatever
he has got to say. At each step he supposes certain objections
put forth against him which he answers, and points out the defects
of the objector or shows that the objection itself is ill founded. It
is thus through interminable byways of objections, counter-objections
and their answers that the writer can wend his way to his
destination. Most often the objections of the rival schools are
referred to in so brief a manner that those only who know the
views can catch them. To add to these difficulties the Sanskrit
style of most of the commentaries is so condensed and different
from literary Sanskrit, and aims so much at precision and brevity,
leading to the use of technical words current in the diverse systems,
that a study of these becomes often impossible without the aid
of an expert preceptor; it is difficult therefore for all who are not
widely read in all the different systems to follow any advanced

67

work of any particular system, as the deliberations of that particular
system are expressed in such close interconnection with
the views of other systems that these can hardly be understood
without them. Each system of India has grown (at least in
particular epochs) in relation to and in opposition to the growth
of other systems of thought, and to be a thorough student of Indian
philosophy one should study all the systems in their mutual
opposition and relation from the earliest times to a period at
which they ceased to grow and came to a stop--a purpose for
which a work like the present one may only be regarded as
forming a preliminary introduction.

Besides the sūtras and their commentaries there are also independent
treatises on the systems in verse called _kārikās_, which
try to summarize the important topics of any system in a succinct
manner; the _Sā@mkhya kārikā_ may be mentioned as a work of this
kind. In addition to these there were also long dissertations,
commentaries, or general observations on any system written in
verses called the vārttikas; the _S'lokavārttika_, of Kumarila or the
_Vārttika_ of Sures'vara may be mentioned as examples. All these
of course had their commentaries to explain them. In addition
to these there were also advanced treatises on the systems in prose
in which the writers either nominally followed some selected
sūtras or proceeded independently of them. Of the former class
the _Nyāyamańjarī_ of Jayanta may be mentioned as an example
and of the latter the _Pras'astapāda bhā@sya_, the _Advaitasiddhi_ of
Madhusūdana Sarasvatī or the _Vedānta-paribhā@sā_ of Dharmarājādhvarīndra.
The more remarkable of these treatises were of a masterly nature in
which the writers represented the systems they adhered to in a highly
forcible and logical manner by dint of their own great mental powers
and genius. These also had their commentaries to explain and elaborate
them. The period of the growth of the philosophic literatures of India
begins from about 500 B.C. (about the time of the Buddha) and practically
ends in the later half of the seventeenth century, though even now some
minor publications are seen to come out.


The Indian Systems of Philosophy.

The Hindus classify the systems of philosophy into two classes,
namely, the _nāstika_ and the _āstika_. The nāstika (_na asti_ "it is
not") views are those which neither regard the Vedas as infallible

68

nor try to establish their own validity on their authority. These are
principally three in number, the Buddhist, Jaina and the Cārvāka.
The āstika-mata or orthodox schools are six in number, Sā@mkhya,
Yoga, Vedānta, Mīmā@msā, Nyāya and Vais'e@sika, generally known
as the six systems (_@sa@ddars'ana_ [Footnote ref 1]).

The Sā@mkhya is ascribed to a mythical Kāpila, but the
earliest works on the subject are probably now lost. The Yoga
system is attributed to Patańjali and the original sūtras are called
the _Pātańjala Yoga sūtras_. The general metaphysical position
of these two systems with regard to soul, nature, cosmology and
the final goal is almost the same, and the difference lies in this
that the Yoga system acknowledges a god (_Īs'vara_) as distinct
from Ātman and lays much importance on certain mystical
practices (commonly known as Yoga practices) for the achievement
of liberation, whereas the Sā@mkhya denies the existence of
Īs'vara and thinks that sincere philosophic thought and culture
are sufficient to produce the true conviction of the truth and
thereby bring about liberation. It is probable that the system
of Sā@mkhya associated with Kāpila and the Yoga system
associated with Patańjali are but two divergent modifications of
an original Sā@mkhya school, of which we now get only references
here and there. These systems therefore though generally counted
as two should more properly be looked upon as two different
schools of the same Sā@mkhya system--one may be called the
Kāpila Sā@mkhya and the other Pātańjala Sā@mkhya.

The Pūrva Mīmā@msā (from the root _man_ to think--rational
conclusions) cannot properly be spoken of as a system of philosophy.
It is a systematized code of principles in accordance with
which the Vedic texts are to be interpreted for purposes of sacrifices.

______________________________________________________________________

[Footnote 1: The word "_dars'ana_" in the sense of true philosophic
knowledge has its earliest use in the _Vais'e@sika sūtras_ of Ka@nāda
(IX. ii. 13) which I consider as pre-Buddhistic. The Buddhist pi@takas
(400 B.C.) called the heretical opinions "_ditthi_" (Sanskrit--dr@sti
from the same root _d@rs'_ from which dars'ana is formed). Haribhadra
(fifth century A.D.) uses the word Dars'ana in the sense of systems of
philosophy (_sarvadars'anavācyo' rtha@h--@Sa@ddars'anasamuccaya_ I.).
Ratnakīrtti (end of the tenth century A.D.) uses the word also in the
same sense ("_Yadi nāma dars'ane dars'ane nānāprakāram sattvatak-@sanam
uktamasti._" _K@sa@nabha@ngasiddhi_ in _Six Buddhist Nyāya tracts_, p.20).
Mādhava (1331 A.D.) calls his Compendium of all systems of philosophy,
_Sarvadars'anasa@mgra@na_. The word "_mata_" (opinion or view) was also
freely used in quoting the views of other systems. But there is no word
to denote 'philosophers' in the technical sense. The Buddhists used to call
those who held heretical views "_tairthika._" The words "siddha,"
"_jńānin_," etc. do not denote philosophers, in the modern sense, they are
used rather in the sense of "seers" or "perfects."]

69

The Vedic texts were used as mantras (incantations) for sacrifices,
and people often disputed as to the relation of words in a
sentence or their mutual relative importance with reference to the
general drift of the sentence. There were also differences of view
with regard to the meaning of a sentence, the use to which it may
be applied as a mantra, its relative importance or the exact
nature of its connection with other similar sentences in a complex
Vedic context. The Mīmā@msā formulated some principles according
to which one could arrive at rational and uniform solutions
for all these difficulties. Preliminary to these its main objects, it
indulges in speculations with regard to the external world, soul,
perception, inference, the validity of the Vedas, or the like, for in
order that a man might perform sacrifices with mantras, a definite
order of the universe and its relation to man or the position and
nature of the mantras of the Veda must be demonstrated and
established. Though its interest in such abstract speculations is
but secondary yet it briefly discusses these in order to prepare a
rational ground for its doctrine of the mantras and their practical
utility for man. It is only so far as there are these preliminary
discussions in the Mīmā@msā that it may be called a system of
philosophy. Its principles and maxims for the interpretation of
the import of words and sentences have a legal value even to this
day. The sūtras of Mīmā@msā are attributed to Jaimini, and S'abara
wrote a bhā@sya upon it. The two great names in the history of
Mīmā@msā literature after Jaimini and S'abara are Kumārila Bha@t@ta
and his pupil Prabhākara, who criticized the opinions of his master
so much, that the master used to call him guru (master) in sarcasm,
and to this day his opinions pass as _guru-mata_, whereas the views
of Kumārila Bha@t@ta pass as _bha@t@ta-mata_ [Footnote ref 1]. It may not
be out of place to mention here that Hindu Law (_sm@rti_) accepts without
any reservation the maxims and principles settled and formulated
by the Mīmā@msā.

__________________________________________________________________

[Footnote 1: There is a story that Kumārila could not understand the
meaning of a Sanskrit sentence "_Atra tunoktam tatrāpinoktam iti
paunaraktam_" (hence spoken twice). _Tunoktam_ phonetically admits of
two combinations, _tu noktam_ (but not said) and _tunāuktam_ (said by
the particle _tu_) and _tatrāpi noktam_ as _tatra api na uktam_ (not
said also there) and _tatra apinā uktam_ (said there by the particle
_api_). Under the first interpretation the sentence would mean, "Not
spoken here, not spoken there, it is thus spoken twice." This puzzled
Kumārila, when Prabhākara taking the second meaning pointed out to him
that the meaning was "here it is indicated by _tu_ and there by _api,_
and so it is indicated twice." Kumārila was so pleased that he called
his pupil "Guru" (master) at this.]

70


The _Vedānta sūtras_, also called Uttara Mīmā@msā, written by
Bādarāya@na, otherwise known as the _Brahma-sūtras_, form the
original authoritative work of Vedānta. The word Vedānta means
"end of the Veda," i.e. the Upani@sads, and the _Vedānta sūtras_ are
so called as they are but a summarized statement of the general
views of the Upani@sads. This work is divided into four books or
adhyāyas and each adhyāya is divided into four pādas or chapters.
The first four sūtras of the work commonly known as _Catu@hsūtrī_
are (1) How to ask about Brahman, (2) From whom proceed birth
and decay, (3) This is because from him the Vedas have come forth,
(4) This is shown by the harmonious testimony of the Upani@sads.
The whole of the first chapter of the second book is devoted to
justifying the position of the Vedānta against the attacks of the
rival schools. The second chapter of the second book is busy in
dealing blows at rival systems. All the other parts of the book are
devoted to settling the disputed interpretations of a number of individual
Upani@sad texts. The really philosophical portion of the work is thus
limited to the first four sūtras and the first and second chapters
of the second book. The other portions are like commentaries
to the Upani@sads, which however contain many theological
views of the system. The first commentary of the _Brahma-sūtra_
was probably written by Baudhāyana, which however is not
available now. The earliest commentary that is now found is that
of the great S'a@nkara. His interpretations of the _Brahma-sūtras_
together with all the commentaries and other works that follow
his views are popularly known as Vedānta philosophy, though
this philosophy ought more properly to be called Vis'uddhādvaitavāda
school of Vedānta philosophy (i.e. the Vedānta philosophy
of the school of absolute monism). Variant forms of dualistic
philosophy as represented by the Vai@s@navas, S'aivas, Rāmāyatas,
etc., also claim to express the original purport of the Brahma
sūtras. We thus find that apostles of dualistic creeds such as
Rāmānuja, Vallabha, Madhva, S'rīka@n@tha, Baladeva, etc., have
written independent commentaries on the _Brahma-sūtra_ to show
that the philosophy as elaborated by themselves is the view of
the Upani@sads and as summarized in the _Brahma-sūtras_. These
differed largely and often vehemently attacked S'a@nkara's interpretations
of the same sūtras. These systems as expounded by them also pass by
the name of Vedānta as these are also claimed to be the real
interpretations intended by the Vedānta (Upani@sads)

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and the _Vedānta sūtras_. Of these the system of Rāmānuja has
great philosophical importance.

The _Nyāya sūtras_ attributed to Gautama, called also Ak@sapāda,
and the _Vais'e@sika sūtras_ attributed to Ka@nāda, called also Ulūka,
represent the same system for all practical purposes. They are
in later times considered to differ only in a few points of minor
importance. So far as the sūtras are concerned the _Nyāya sūtras_
lay particular stress on the cultivation of logic as an art, while
the _Vais'e@sika sūtras_ deal mostly with metaphysics and physics.
In addition to these six systems, the Tantras had also philosophies
of their own, which however may generally be looked upon
largely as modifications of the Sā@mkhya and Vedānta systems,
though their own contributions are also noteworthy.


Some fundamental Points of Agreement.

I. _The Karma Theory._

It is, however, remarkable that with the exception of the
Cārvāka materialists all the other systems agree on some fundamental
points of importance. The systems of philosophy in India
were not stirred up merely by the speculative demands of the
human mind which has a natural inclination for indulging in
abstract thought, but by a deep craving after the realization of
the religious purpose of life. It is surprising to note that the
postulates, aims and conditions for such a realization were found
to be identical in all the conflicting systems. Whatever may be
their differences of opinion in other matters, so far as the general
postulates for the realization of the transcendent state, the _summum
bonum_ of life, were concerned, all the systems were practically in
thorough agreement. It may be worth while to note some of them
at this stage.

First, the theory of Karma and rebirth. All the Indian systems
agree in believing that whatever action is done by an individual
leaves behind it some sort of potency which has the power to
ordain for him joy or sorrow in the future according as it is good
or bad. When the fruits of the actions are such that they cannot
be enjoyed in the present life or in a human life, the individual
has to take another birth as a man or any other being in order to
suffer them.

The Vedic belief that the mantras uttered in the correct accent
at the sacrifices with the proper observance of all ritualistic

72

details, exactly according to the directions without the slightest
error even in the smallest trifle, had something like a magical
virtue automatically to produce the desired object immediately
or after a lapse of time, was probably the earliest form of the
Karma doctrine. It postulates a semi-conscious belief that certain
mystical actions can produce at a distant time certain effects
without the ordinary process of the instrumentality of visible
agents of ordinary cause and effect. When the sacrifice is performed,
the action leaves such an unseen magical virtue, called
the _ad@r@s@ta_ (the unseen) or the _apūrva_ (new), that by it the desired
object will be achieved in a mysterious manner, for the _modus
operandi_ of the _apūrva_ is unknown. There is also the notion
prevalent in the Sa@mhitās, as we have already noticed, that he
who commits wicked deeds suffers in another world, whereas he
who performs good deeds enjoys the highest material pleasures.
These were probably associated with the conception of _@rta_, the
inviolable order of things. Thus these are probably the elements
which built up the Karma theory which we find pretty well
established but not emphasized in the Upani@sads, where it is said
that according to good or bad actions men will have good or bad
births.

To notice other relevant points in connection with the Karma
doctrine as established in the āstika systems we find that it was
believed that the unseen (_ad@r@s@ta_) potency of the action generally
required some time before it could be fit for giving the doer the
merited punishment or enjoyment. These would often accumulate
and prepare the items of suffering and enjoyment for the doer in
his next life. Only the fruits of those actions which are extremely
wicked or particularly good could be reaped in this life. The
nature of the next birth of a man is determined by the nature of
pleasurable or painful experiences that have been made ready for
him by his maturing actions of this life. If the experiences determined
for him by his action are such that they are possible to be
realized in the life of a goat, the man will die and be born as a
goat. As there is no ultimate beginning in time of this world
process, so there is no time at which any person first began his
actions or experiences. Man has had an infinite number of past
lives of the most varied nature, and the instincts of each kind of
life exist dormant in the life of every individual, and thus whenever
he has any particular birth as this or that animal or man,

73

the special instincts of that life (technically called _vāsanā_) come
forth. In accordance with these vāsanās the person passes through
the painful or pleasurable experiences as determined for him by
his action. The length of life is also determined by the number
and duration of experiences as preordained by the fructifying
actions of his past life. When once certain actions become fit for
giving certain experiences, these cannot be avoided, but those
actions which have not matured are uprooted once for all if the
person attains true knowledge as advocated by philosophy. But
even such an emancipated (_mukta_) person has to pass through
the pleasurable or painful experiences ordained for him by the
actions just ripened for giving their fruits. There are four kinds
of actions, white or virtuous (_s'ukla_), black or wicked (_k@r@s@na_),
white-black or partly virtuous and partly vicious (_s'ukla-k@r@s@na_) as
most of our actions are, neither black nor white (_as'uklāk@r@s@na_),
i.e. those acts of self-renunciation or meditation which are not
associated with any desires for the fruit. It is only when a person
can so restrain himself as to perform only the last kind of action
that he ceases to accumulate any new karma for giving fresh fruits.
He has thus only to enjoy the fruits of his previous karmas which
have ripened for giving fruits. If in the meantime he attains true
knowledge, all his past accumulated actions become destroyed,
and as his acts are only of the as'uklāk@r@s@na type no fresh karma
for ripening is accumulated, and thus he becomes divested of all
karma after enjoying the fruits of the ripened karmas alone.

The Jains think that through the actions of body, speech
and mind a kind of subtle matter technically called karma is produced.
The passions of a man act like a viscous substance that
attracts this karma matter, which thus pours into the soul and
sticks to it. The karma matter thus accumulated round the soul
during the infinite number of past lives is technically called
_kārmas'arīra_, which encircles the soul as it passes on from birth
to birth. This karma matter sticking to the soul gradually ripens
and exhausts itself in ordaining the sufferance of pains or the enjoyment
of pleasures for the individual. While some karma matter is being
expended in this way, other karma matters are accumulating by
his activities, and thus keep him in a continuous process of
suffering and enjoyment. The karma matter thus accumulated
in the soul produces a kind of coloration called _les'yā_, such as
white, black, etc., which marks the character of the soul. The

74

idea of the s'ukla and k@r@s@na karmas of the Yoga system was probably
suggested by the Jaina view. But when a man is free from
passions, and acts in strict compliance with the rules of conduct,
his actions produce karma which lasts but for a moment and is
then annihilated. Every karma that the sage has previously
earned has its predestined limits within which it must take effect
and be purged away. But when by contemplation and the strict
adherence to the five great vows, no new karma is generated, and
when all the karmas are exhausted the worldly existence of the
person rapidly draws towards its end. Thus in the last stage of
contemplation, all karma being annihilated, and all activities
having ceased, the soul leaves the body and goes up to the top
of the universe, where the liberated souls stay for ever.

Buddhism also contributes some new traits to the karma
theory which however being intimately connected with their
metaphysics will be treated later on.


2. _The Doctrine of Mukti_.

Not only do the Indian systems agree as to the cause of the
inequalities in the share of sufferings and enjoyments in the case
of different persons, and the manner in which the cycle of births
and rebirths has been kept going from beginningless time, on the
basis of the mysterious connection of one's actions with the
happenings of the world, but they also agree in believing that
this beginningless chain of karma and its fruits, of births and rebirths,
this running on from beginningless time has somewhere
its end. This end was not to be attained at some distant time or
in some distant kingdom, but was to be sought within us. Karma
leads us to this endless cycle, and if we could divest ourselves of
all such emotions, ideas or desires as lead us to action we should
find within us the actionless self which neither suffers nor enjoys,
neither works nor undergoes rebirth. When the Indians, wearied
by the endless bustle and turmoil of worldly events, sought for and
believed that somewhere a peaceful goal could be found, they
generally hit upon the self of man. The belief that the soul could
be realized in some stage as being permanently divested of all
action, feelings or ideas, led logically to the conclusion that the
connection of the soul with these worldly elements was extraneous,
artificial or even illusory. In its true nature the soul is untouched
by the impurities of our ordinary life, and it is through ignorance

75

and passion as inherited from the cycle of karma from beginningless
time that we connect it with these. The realization of this
transcendent state is the goal and final achievement of this endless
cycle of births and rebirths through karma. The Buddhists did
not admit the existence of soul, but recognized that the final
realization of the process of karma is to be found in the ultimate
dissolution called Nirvā@na, the nature of which we shall discuss
later on.


3. _The Doctrine of Soul_.

All the Indian systems except Buddhism admit the existence
of a permanent entity variously called atman, puru@sa or jīva.
As to the exact nature of this soul there are indeed divergences
of view. Thus while the Nyāya calls it absolutely
qualityless and characterless, indeterminate unconscious entity,
Sā@mkhya describes it as being of the nature of pure consciousness,
the Vedānta says that it is that fundamental point of unity
implied in pure consciousness (_cit_), pure bliss (_ānanda_), and pure
being (_sat_). But all agree in holding that it is pure and unsullied
in its nature and that all impurities of action or passion do not
form a real part of it. The _summum bonum_ of life is attained
when all impurities are removed and the pure nature of the self
is thoroughly and permanently apprehended and all other extraneous
connections with it are absolutely dissociated.


The Pessimistic Attitude towards the World and the
Optimistic Faith in the end.

Though the belief that the world is full of sorrow has not been
equally prominently emphasized in all systems, yet it may be
considered as being shared by all of them. It finds its strongest
utterance in Sā@mkhya, Yoga, and Buddhism. This interminable
chain of pleasurable and painful experiences was looked upon as
nearing no peaceful end but embroiling and entangling us in the
meshes of karma, rebirth, and sorrow. What appear as pleasures
are but a mere appearance for the attempt to keep them steady is
painful, there is pain when we lose the pleasures or when we are
anxious to have them. When the pleasures are so much associated
with pains they are but pains themselves. We are but duped
when we seek pleasures, for they are sure to lead us to pain. All
our experiences are essentially sorrowful and ultimately sorrow-begetting.
Sorrow is the ultimate truth of this process of the

76

world. That which to an ordinary person seems pleasurable
appears to a wise person or to a yogin who has a clearer vision as
painful. The greater the knowledge the higher is the sensitiveness
to sorrow and dissatisfaction with world experiences. The yogin
is like the pupil of the eye to which even the smallest grain of
disturbance is unbearable. This sorrow of worldly experiences cannot
be removed by bringing in remedies for each sorrow as it comes,
for the moment it is remedied another sorrow comes in. It cannot
also be avoided by mere inaction or suicide, for we are continually
being forced to action by our nature, and suicide will but lead to
another life of sorrow and rebirth. The only way to get rid of
it is by the culmination of moral greatness and true knowledge
which uproot sorrow once for all. It is our ignorance that the self
is intimately connected with the experiences of life or its pleasures,
that leads us to action and arouses passion in us for the enjoyment
of pleasures and other emotions and activities. Through
the highest moral elevation a man may attain absolute dispassion
towards world-experiences and retire in body, mind, and speech
from all worldly concerns. When the mind is so purified, the self
shines in its true light, and its true nature is rightly conceived.
When this is once done the self can never again be associated
with passion or ignorance. It becomes at this stage ultimately
dissociated from _citta_ which contains within it the root of all
emotions, ideas, and actions. Thus emancipated the self for ever
conquers all sorrow. It is important, however, to note in this
connection that emancipation is not based on a general aversion
to intercourse with the world or on such feelings as a disappointed
person may have, but on the appreciation of the state of mukti
as the supremely blessed one. The details of the pessimistic
creed of each system have developed from the logical necessity
peculiar to each system. There was never the slightest tendency
to shirk the duties of this life, but to rise above them through
right performance and right understanding. It is only when a
man rises to the highest pinnacle of moral glory that he is fit for
aspiring to that realization of selfhood in comparison with which
all worldly things or even the joys of Heaven would not only
shrink into insignificance, but appear in their true character as
sorrowful and loathsome. It is when his mind has thus turned from
all ordinary joys that he can strive towards his ideal of salvation.
In fact it seems to me that a sincere religious craving after some

77

ideal blessedness and quiet of self-realization is indeed the fundamental
fact from which not only her philosophy but many of the
complex phenomena of the civilization of India can be logically
deduced. The sorrow around us has no fear for us if we remember
that we are naturally sorrowless and blessed in ourselves. The
pessimistic view loses all terror as it closes in absolute optimistic
confidence in one's own self and the ultimate destiny and goal of
emancipation.


Unity in Indian Sādhana (philosophical, religious
and ethical endeavours).

As might be expected the Indian systems are all agreed upon
the general principles of ethical conduct which must be followed
for the attainment of salvation. That all passions are to be controlled,
no injury to life in any form should be done, and that all
desire for pleasures should be checked, are principles which are
almost universally acknowledged. When a man attains a very
high degree of moral greatness he has to strengthen and prepare
his mind for further purifying and steadying it for the attainment
of his ideal; and most of the Indian systems are unanimous with
regard to the means to be employed for the purpose. There are
indeed divergences in certain details or technical names, but the
means to be adopted for purification are almost everywhere essentially
the same as those advocated by the Yoga system. It is only
in later times that devotion (_bhakti_) is seen to occupy a more
prominent place specially in Vai@s@nava schools of thought. Thus
it was that though there were many differences among the various
systems, yet their goal of life, their attitude towards the world and
the means fur the attainment of the goal (_sādhana_) being fundamentally
the same, there was a unique unity in the practical sādhana
of almost all the Indian systems. The religious craving has been
universal in India and this uniformity of sādhana has therefore
secured for India a unity in all her aspirations and strivings.

78



CHAPTER V


BUDDHIST PHILOSOPHY

Many scholars are of opinion that the Sā@mkhya and the Yoga
represent the earliest systematic speculations of India. It is also
suggested that Buddhism drew much of its inspiration from them.
It may be that there is some truth in such a view, but the
systematic Sā@mkhya and Yoga treatises as we have them had
decidedly been written after Buddhism. Moreover it is well-known
to every student of Hindu philosophy that a conflict with the
Buddhists has largely stimulated philosophic enquiry in most of
the systems of Hindu thought. A knowledge of Buddhism is
therefore indispensable for a right understanding of the different
systems in their mutual relation and opposition to Buddhism. It
seems desirable therefore that I should begin with Buddhism
first.


The State of Philosophy in India before the Buddha.

It is indeed difficult to give a short sketch of the different
philosophical speculations that were prevalent in India before
Buddhism. The doctrines of the Upani@sads are well known, and
these have already been briefly described. But these were not the
only ones. Even in the Upani@sads we find references to diverse
atheistical creeds [Footnote ref 1]. We find there that the origin of the
world and its processes were sometimes discussed, and some thought
that "time" was the ultimate cause of all, others that all these
had sprung forth by their own nature (_svabhāva_), others that
everything had come forth in accordance with an inexorable
destiny or a fortuitous concourse of accidental happenings, or
through matter combinations in general. References to diverse
kinds of heresies are found in Buddhist literature also, but no
detailed accounts of these views are known. Of the Upani@sad
type of materialists the two schools of Cārvākas (Dhūrtta
and Sus'ik@sita) are referred to in later literature,
though the time in which these flourished cannot rightly
be discovered [Footnote ref 2]. But it seems

____________________________________________________________________

[Footnote 1: S'vetās'vatara, I. 2, _kāla@h svabhābo niyatiryad@rcchā
bhutāni yoni@h puru@sa iti cintyam._]

[Footnote 2: Lokāyata (literally, that which is found among people in
general) seems to have been the name by which all carvāka doctrines
were generally known. See Gu@naratna on the Lokāyatas.]

79

probable however that the allusion to the materialists contained
in the Upani@sads refers to these or to similar schools. The
Cārvākas did not believe in the authority of the Vedas or any
other holy scripture. According to them there was no soul. Life
and consciousness were the products of the combination of matter,
just as red colour was the result of mixing up white with
yellow or as the power of intoxication was generated in molasses
(_madas'akti_). There is no after-life, and no reward of actions, as
there is neither virtue nor vice. Life is only for enjoyment. So
long as it lasts it is needless to think of anything else, as everything
will end with death, for when at death the body is burnt
to ashes there cannot be any rebirth. They do not believe in
the validity of inference. Nothing is trustworthy but what can
be directly perceived, for it is impossible to determine that the
distribution of the middle term (_hetu_) has not depended upon
some extraneous condition, the absence of which might destroy
the validity of any particular piece of inference. If in any case
any inference comes to be true, it is only an accidental fact and
there is no certitude about it. They were called Cārvāka because
they would only eat but would not accept any other religious or
moral responsibility. The word comes from _carv_ to eat. The
Dhūrtta Cārvākas held that there was nothing but the four
elements of earth, water, air and fire, and that the body was but the
result of atomic combination. There was no self or soul, no
virtue or vice. The Sus'ik@sita Cārvākas held that there was
a soul apart from the body but that it also was destroyed with
the destruction of the body. The original work of the Cārvākas
was written in sūtras probably by B@rhaspati. Jayanta and Gu@naratna
quote two sūtras from it. Short accounts of this school may be
found in Jayanta's _Nyāyamańjarī_, Mādhava's _Sarvadars'anasa@mgraha_
and Gu@naratna's _Tarkarahasyadīpikā_. _Mahābhārata_ gives
an account of a man called Cārvāka meeting Yudhi@s@thira.

Side by side with the doctrine of the Cārvāka materialists we
are reminded of the Ājīvakas of which Makkhali Gosāla, probably
a renegade disciple of the Jain saint Mahāvīra and a contemporary
of Buddha and Mahāvīra, was the leader. This was a thorough-going
determinism denying the free will of man and his moral
responsibility for any so-called good or evil. The essence of
Makkhali's system is this, that "there is no cause, either proximate
or remote, for the depravity of beings or for their purity. They

80

become so without any cause. Nothing depends either on one's
own efforts or on the efforts of others, in short nothing depends
on any human effort, for there is no such thing as power or energy,
or human exertion. The varying conditions at any time are due
to fate, to their environment and their own nature [Footnote ref 1]."

Another sophistical school led by Ajita Kesakambali taught
that there was no fruit or result of good or evil deeds; there is no
other world, nor was this one real; nor had parents nor any
former lives any efficacy with respect to this life. Nothing that
we can do prevents any of us alike from being wholly brought to
an end at death [Footnote ref 2].

There were thus at least three currents of thought: firstly the
sacrificial Karma by the force of the magical rites of which any
person could attain anything he desired; secondly the Upani@sad
teaching that the Brahman, the self, is the ultimate reality and
being, and all else but name and form which pass away but do
not abide. That which permanently abides without change is the
real and true, and this is self. Thirdly the nihilistic conceptions
that there is no law, no abiding reality, that everything comes
into being by a fortuitous concourse of circumstances or by some
unknown fate. In each of these schools, philosophy had probably
come to a deadlock. There were the Yoga practices prevalent in
the country and these were accepted partly on the strength of
traditional custom among certain sections, and partly by virtue
of the great spiritual, intellectual and physical power which they
gave to those who performed them. But these had no rational
basis behind them on which they could lean for support. These
were probably then just tending towards being affiliated to the
nebulous Sā@mkhya doctrines which had grown up among certain
sections. It was at this juncture that we find Buddha erecting
a new superstructure of thought on altogether original lines which
thenceforth opened up a new avenue of philosophy for all posterity
to come. If the Being of the Upani@sads, the superlatively motionless,
was the only real, how could it offer scope for further new
speculations, as it had already discarded all other matters of
interest? If everything was due to a reasonless fortuitous concourse
of circumstances, reason could not proceed further in the
direction to create any philosophy of the unreason. The magical

___________________________________________________________________

[Footnote 1: _Sāmańńaphala-sutta_, _Dīgha_, II. 20. Hoernlé's article on
the Ājīvakas, E.R.E.]

[Footnote 2: _Sāmańńaphala-sutta_, II. 23.]

81

force of the hocus-pocus of sorcery or sacrifice had but little that
was inviting for philosophy to proceed on. If we thus take into
account the state of Indian philosophic culture before Buddha,
we shall be better able to understand the value of the Buddhistic
contribution to philosophy.


Buddha: his Life.

Gautama the Buddha was born in or about the year 560 B.C.
in the Lumbini Grove near the ancient town of Kapilavastu in
the now dense terai region of Nepal. His father was Suddhodana,
a prince of the Sākya clan, and his mother Queen Mahāmāyā.
According to the legends it was foretold of him that he would
enter upon the ascetic life when he should see "A decrepit old
man, a diseased man, a dead man, and a monk." His father tried
his best to keep him away from these by marrying him and
surrounding him with luxuries. But on successive occasions,
issuing from the palace, he was confronted by those four
things, which filled him with amazement and distress, and
realizing the impermanence of all earthly things determined to
forsake his home and try if he could to discover some means to
immortality to remove the sufferings of men. He made his "Great
Renunciation" when he was twenty-nine years old. He travelled
on foot to Rājag@rha (Rajgir) and thence to Uruvelā, where in
company with other five ascetics he entered upon a course of
extreme self-discipline, carrying his austerities to such a length
that his body became utterly emaciated and he fell down senseless
and was believed to be dead. After six years of this great
struggle he was convinced that the truth was not to be won by
the way of extreme asceticism, and resuming an ordinary course
of life at last attained absolute and supreme enlightenment. Thereafter
the Buddha spent a life prolonged over forty-five years in
travelling from place to place and preaching the doctrine to
all who would listen. At the age of over eighty years Buddha
realized that the time drew near for him to die. He then entered
into Dhyana and passing through its successive stages attained
nirvāna [Footnote ref 1]. The vast developments which the system of this
great teacher underwent in the succeeding centuries in India and in
other countries have not been thoroughly studied, and it will
probably take yet many years more before even the materials for

__________________________________________________________________

[Footnote 1: _Mahāparinibbānasuttanta_, _Dīgha_, XVI. 6, 8, 9.]

82

such a study can be collected. But from what we now possess
it is proved incontestably that it is one of the most wonderful and
subtle productions of human wisdom. It is impossible to overestimate
the debt that the philosophy, culture and civilization
of India owe to it in all her developments for many succeeding
centuries.


Early Buddhist Literature.

The Buddhist Pāli Scriptures contain three different collections:
the Sutta (relating to the doctrines), the Vinaya (relating to the
discipline of the monks) and the Abhidhamma (relating generally
to the same subjects as the suttas but dealing with them in a
scholastic and technical manner). Scholars of Buddhistic religious
history of modern times have failed as yet to fix any definite dates
for the collection or composition of the different parts of the
aforesaid canonical literature of the Buddhists. The suttas were
however composed before the Abhidhamma and it is very
probable that almost the whole of the canonical works were
completed before 241 B.C., the date of the third council during
the reign of King Asoka. The suttas mainly deal with the doctrine
(Dhamma) of the Buddhistic faith whereas the Vinaya deals
only with the regulations concerning the discipline of the monks.
The subject of the Abhidhamma is mostly the same as that
of the suttas, namely, the interpretation of the Dhamma.
Buddhaghos@a in his introduction to _Atthasālinī_, the commentary
on the _Dhammasa@nga@ni_, says that the Abhidhamma is so called
(_abhi_ and _dhamma_) because it describes the same Dhammas as are
related in the suttas in a more intensified (_dhammātireka_) and
specialized (_dhammavisesatthena_) manner. The Abhidhammas
do not give any new doctrines that are not in the suttas, but
they deal somewhat elaborately with those that are already found
in the suttas. Buddhagho@sa in distinguishing the special features
of the suttas from the Abhidhammas says that the acquirement
of the former leads one to attain meditation (_samādhi_) whereas
the latter leads one to attain wisdom (_pańńāsampadam_). The force
of this statement probably lies in this, that the dialogues of the
suttas leave a chastening effect on the mind, the like of which is
not to be found in the Abhidhammas, which busy themselves in
enumerating the Buddhistic doctrines and defining them in a
technical manner, which is more fitted to produce a reasoned

85

insight into the doctrines than directly to generate a craving
for following the path of meditation for the extinction of sorrow.
The Abhidhamma known as the _Kathāvatthu_ differs from the
other Abhidhammas in this, that it attempts to reduce the views
of the heterodox schools to absurdity. The discussions proceed
in the form of questions and answers, and the answers of the
opponents are often shown to be based on contradictory
assumptions.

The suttas contain five groups of collections called the Nikāyas.
These are (1) _Dīgha Nikāya_, called so on account of the length
of the suttas contained in it; (2) _Majjhima Nikāya_ (middling
Nikāya), called so on account of the middling extent of the
suttas contained in it; (3) _Sa@myutta Nikāya_ (Nikāyas relating
to special meetings), called sa@myutta on account of their being
delivered owing to the meetings (_sa@myoga_) of special persons which
were the occasions for them; (4) _A@nguttara Nikāya_, so called because
in each succeeding book of this work the topics of discussion
increase by one [Footnote ref 1]; (5) _Khuddaka Nikāya_ containing
_Khuddaka pā@tha, Dhammapada, Udāna, Itivuttaka, Sutta Nipāta,
Vimāna-vatthu, Petavatthu, Theragathā, Therīgathā, Jātaka, Niddesa,
Pa@tisambhidāmagga, Apadāna, Buddhava@msa, Caryāpi@taka._

The Abhidhammas are _Pa@t@thāna, Dhammasa@nga@ni, Dhātukathā,
Puggalapańńatti, Vibha@nga, Yamaka_ and _Kathāvatthu_.
There exists also a large commentary literature on diverse parts
of the above works known as atthakathā. The work known as
_Milinda Pańha_ (questions of King Milinda), of uncertain date, is
of considerable philosophical value.

The doctrines and views incorporated in the above literature
is generally now known as Sthaviravāda or Theravāda. On the
origin of the name Theravāda (the doctrine of the elders)
_Dīpava@msa_ says that since the Theras (elders) met (at the first council)
and collected the doctrines it was known as the Thera Vāda [Footnote ref
2]. It does not appear that Buddhism as it appears in this Pāli literature
developed much since the time of Buddhagho@sa (4OO A.D.), the
writer of _Visuddhimagga_ (a compendium of theravāda doctrines)
and the commentator of _Dīghanikāya, Dhammasa@nga@ni_, etc.

Hindu philosophy in later times seems to have been influenced
by the later offshoots of the different schools of Buddhism, but
it does not appear that Pāli Buddhism had any share in it. I

_________________________________________________________________

[Footnote 1: See Buddhagho@sa's _Atthasālini_, p. 25.]

[Footnote 2: Oldenberg's _Dīpava@msa_, p. 31.]

84

have not been able to discover any old Hindu writer who could
be considered as being acquainted with Pāli.


The Doctrine of Causal Connection of early Buddhism [Footnote ref 1].

The word Dhamma in the Buddhist scriptures is used generally
in four senses: (1) Scriptural texts, (2) quality (_gu@na_), (3) cause
(_hetu_) and (4) unsubstantial and soulless (_nissatta nijjīva_ [Footnote
ref 2]). Of these it is the last meaning which is particularly important,
from the point of view of Buddhist philosophy. The early Buddhist
philosophy did not accept any fixed entity as determining all
reality; the only things with it were the unsubstantial phenomena
and these were called dhammas. The question arises that
if there is no substance or reality how are we to account for the
phenomena? But the phenomena are happening and passing
away and the main point of interest with the Buddha was to find
out "What being what else is," "What happening what else
happens" and "What not being what else is not." The phenomena
are happening in a series and we see that there being
certain phenomena there become some others; by the happening
of some events others also are produced. This is called
(_pa@ticca-samuppāda_) dependent origination. But it is difficult to
understand what is the exact nature of this dependence. The question as
_Sa@myutta Nikāya_ (II. 5) has it with which the Buddha started
before attaining Buddhahood was this: in what miserable condition
are the people! they are born, they decay, they die, pass away
and are born again; and they do not know the path of escape
from this decay, death and misery.

How to know the Way to escape from this misery of decay
and death. Then it occurred to him what being there, are decay
and death, depending on what do they come? As he thought
deeply into the root of the matter, it occurred to him that decay
and death can only occur when there is birth (_jāti_), so they depend

_____________________________________________________________________

[Footnote 1: There are some differences of opinion as to whether one could
take the doctrine of the twelve links of causes as we find it in the
_Sa@myutta Nikāya_ as the earliest Buddhist view, as Sa@myutta does not
represent the oldest part of the suttas. But as this doctrine of the
twelve causes became regarded as a fundamental Buddhist doctrine and
as it gives us a start in philosophy I have not thought it fit to enter
into conjectural discussions as to the earliest form. Dr E.J. Thomas drew
my attention to this fact.]

[Footnote 2: _Atthasātinī_, p. 38. There are also other senses in which
the word is used, as _dhamma-desanā_ where it means religious teaching.
The _La@nkāvatāra_ described Dharmma as _gu@nadravyapūrvakā dharmmā_, i.e.
Dharmmas are those which are associated as attributes and substances.]

85

on birth. What being there, is there birth, on what does birth
depend? Then it occurred to him that birth could only be if
there were previous existence (_bhava_) [Footnote ref 1]. But on what does
this existence depend, or what being there is there _bhava_. Then it
occurred to him that there could not be existence unless there
were holding fast (_upādāna_) [Footnote ref 2]. But on what did upādāna
depend? It occurred to him that it was desire (_ta@nhā_) on which upādāna
depended. There can be upādāna if there is desire (_tanhā_) [Footnote ref
3]. But what being there, can there be desire? To this question it
occurred to him that there must be feeling (_vedanā_) in order that
there may be desire. But on what does vedanā depend, or rather
what must be there, that there may be feeling (_vedanā_)? To this
it occurred to him that there must be a sense-contact (_phassa_)
in order that there may be feeling [Footnote ref 4]. If there should be no
sense-contact there would be no feeling. But on what does sense-contact
depend? It occurred to him that as there are six sense-contacts,
there are the six fields of contact (_āyatana_) [Footnote ref 5]. But on
what do the six āyatanas depend? It occurred to him that
there must be the mind and body (_nāmarūpa_) in order that there
may be the six fields of contact [Footnote ref 6]; but on what does
nāmarūpa depend? It occurred to him that without consciousness
(_vińńāna_) there could be no nāmarūpa [Footnote ref 8].
But what being there would there

___________________________________________________________________

[Footnote 1: This word bhava is interpreted by Candrakīrtti in his
_Mādhyamīka v@rtti,_ p. 565 (La Vallée Poussin's edition) as the deed
which brought about rebirth (_punarbhavajanaka@m karma samutthāpayali
kāyena vācā manasā ca_).]

[Footnote 2: _Atthasālinī_, p. 385, upādānantida@lhagaha@na@m. Candrakīrtti
in explaining upādāna says that whatever thing a man desires he holds fast
to the materials necessary for attaining it (_yatra vastuni
sat@r@s@nastasya vastuno 'rjanāya vi@dhapanāya upādānamupādatte tatra
tatra prārthayate_). _Mādhyamīka v@rtti_, p. 565.]

[Footnote 3: Candrakīrtti describes t@r@s@nā as
_āsvadanābhinandanādhyavasānasthānādātmapriyarūpairviyogo mā bhūt,
nityamaparityāgo bhavediti, yeyam prārthanā_--the desire that there
may not ever be any separation from those pleasures, etc., which
are dear to us. _Ibid._ 565.]

[Footnote 4: We read also of phassāyatana and phassakāya. _M. N._ II. 261,
III. 280, etc. Candrakīrtti says that _@sa@dbhirāyatanadvārai@h
k@rtyaprak@riyā@h pravarttante prajńāyante. tannāmarūpapratyaya@m
@sa@dāyatanamucyate. sa@dbhyas`cāyatanebhya@h @sa@tspars`akāyā@h
pravarttante. M.V._ 565.]

[Footnote 5: Āyatana means the six senses together with their objects.
Āyatana literally is "Field of operation." Sa@lāyatana means six senses
as six fields of operation. Candrakīrtti has _āyatanadvārai@h_.]

[Footnote 6: I have followed the translation of Aung in rendering nāmarūpa
as mind and body, _Compendium_, p. 271. This seems to me to be fairly
correct. The four skandhas are called nāma in each birth. These together
with rūpa (matter) give us nāmarūpa (mind and body) which being developed
render the activities through the six sense-gates possible so that there
may be knowledge. Cf. _M. V._ 564. Govindānanda, the commentator on
S'a@nkara's bhāsya on the _Brahma sūtras_ (II. ii. 19), gives a different
interpretation of Namarūpa which may probably refer to the Vijńanavada
view though we have no means at hand to verify it. He says--To think
the momentary as the permanent is Avidya; from there come the samskaras
of attachment, antipathy or anger, and infatuation; from there the first
vijńana or thought of the foetus is produced, from that alayavijnana,
and the four elements (which are objects of name and are hence called nama)
are produced, and from those are produced the white and black, semen
and blood called rūpa. Both Vacaspati and Amalananda agree with
Govindananda in holding that nama signifies the semen and the ovum
while rūpa means the visible physical body built out of them. Vijńańa
entered the womb and on account of it namarupa were produced through
the association of previous karma. See _Vedantakalpataru_, pp 274,
275. On the doctrine of the entrance of vijńańa into the womb compare
_D N_ II. 63.]

86

be vińńāna. Here it occurred to him that in order that there
might be vińńāna there must be the conformations (_sa@nkhāra_) [Footnote
ref 1]. But what being there are there the sa@nkhāras? Here it occurred
to him that the sa@nkhāras can only be if there is ignorance
(_avijjā_). If avijjā could be stopped then the sa@nkhāras will be
stopped, and if the sa@nkhāras could be stopped vińńāna could be
stopped and so on [Footnote ref 2].

It is indeed difficult to be definite as to what the Buddha
actually wished to mean by this cycle of dependence of existence
sometimes called Bhavacakra (wheel of existence). Decay and
death (_jarāmarana_) could not have happened if there was no
birth [Footnote ref 3]. This seems to be clear. But at this point the
difficulty begins. We must remember that the theory of rebirth was

_____________________________________________________________________

[Footnote 1: It is difficult to say what is the exact sense of the word
here. The Buddha was one of the first few earliest thinkers to introduce
proper philosophical terms and phraseology with a distinct philosophical
method and he had often to use the same word in more or less different
senses. Some of the philosophical terms at least are therefore rather
elastic when compared with the terms of precise and definite meaning
which we find in later Sanskrit thought. Thus in _S N_ III. p. 87,
"_Sankhata@m abdisa@nkharonta_," sa@nkhara means that which synthesises
the complexes. In the _Compendium_ it is translated as will, action.
Mr. Aung thinks that it means the same as karma; it is here used
in a different sense from what we find in the word sa@nkhāta khandha
(viz mental states). We get a list of 51 mental states forming sa@nkhāta
khandha in _Dhamma Sangam_, p 18, and another different set of 40 mental
states in _Dharmasamgraha_, p. 6. In addition to these forty
_cittasamprayuktasa@mskāra_, it also counts thirteen
_cittaviprayuktasa@mskara_. Candrakirtti interprets it as meaning
attachment, antipathy and infatuation, p 563. Govindananda, the
commentator on S'a@nkara's _Brahma sutra_ (II. ii. 19), also interprets
the word in connection with the doctrine of _Pratityasamutpada_ as
attachment, antipathy and infatuation.]

[Footnote 2: _Samyutta Nikaya_, II. 7-8.]

[Footnote 3: Jara and marana bring in s'oka (grief), paridevanā
(lamentation), duhkha (suffering), daurmanasya (feeling of wretchedness
and miserableness) and upayasa (feeling of extreme destitution) at
the prospect of one's death or the death of other dear ones. All
these make up suffering and are the results of jāti (birth). _M. V._
(B.T.S.p. 208). S'a@nkara in his bhāsya counted all the terms from
jarā, separately. The whole series is to be taken as representing
the entirety of duhkhaskandha.]

87

enunciated in the Upani@sads. The B@rhadāra@nyaka says that just
as an insect going to the end of a leaf of grass by a new effort
collects itself in another so does the soul coming to the end of
this life collect itself in another. This life thus presupposes
another existence. So far as I remember there has seldom been
before or after Buddha any serious attempt to prove or disprove
the doctrine of rebirth [Footnote ref 1]. All schools of philosophy
except the Cārvākas believed in it and so little is known to us of
the Cārvāka sūtras that it is difficult to say what they did to
refute this doctrine. The Buddha also accepts it as a fact and does
not criticize it. This life therefore comes only as one which had an
infinite number of lives before, and which except in the case of
a few emancipated ones would have an infinite number of them
in the future. It was strongly believed by all people, and the
Buddha also, when he came to think to what our present birth
might be due, had to fall back upon another existence (_bhava_).
If bhava means karma which brings rebirth as Candrakīrtti takes
it to mean, then it would mean that the present birth could only
take place on account of the works of a previous existence which
determined it. Here also we are reminded of the Upani@sad note
"as a man does so will he be born" (_Yat karma kurute tadabhisampadyate_,
Brh IV. iv. 5). Candrakīrtti's interpretation of "bhava"
as Karma (_punarbhavajanakam karma_) seems to me to suit
better than "existence." The word was probably used rather
loosely for _kammabhava_. The word bhava is not found in the
earlier Upani@sads and was used in the Pāli scriptures for the
first time as a philosophical term. But on what does this
bhava depend? There could not have been a previous existence
if people had not betaken themselves to things or works they
desired. This betaking oneself to actions or things in accordance
with desire is called upādāna. In the Upani@sads we read,
"whatever one betakes himself to, so does he work" (_Yatkraturbhavati
tatkarmma kurute_, B@rh. IV. iv. 5). As this betaking to
the thing depends upon desire {_t@r@s@nā_}, it is said that in order
that there may be upādāna there must be tanhā. In the Upani@sads
also we read "Whatever one desires so does he betake
himself to" (_sa yathākāmo bhavati tatkraturbhavati_). Neither
the word upādāna nor t@rs@nā (the Sanskrit word corresponding

______________________________________________________________________

[Footnote 1: The attempts to prove the doctrine of rebirth in the Hindu
philosophical works such as the Nyāya, etc., are slight and inadequate.]

88

to ta@nhā) is found in the earlier Upani@sads, but the ideas contained
in them are similar to the words "_kratu_" and "_kāma_." Desire
(ta@nhā) is then said to depend on feeling or sense-contact.
Sense-contact presupposes the six senses as fields of operation [Footnote
ref 1]. These six senses or operating fields would again presuppose the
whole psychosis of the man (the body and the mind together)
called nāmarūpa. We are familiar with this word in the Upani@sads
but there it is used in the sense of determinate forms and
names as distinguished from the indeterminate indefinable
reality [Footnote ref 2]. Buddhagho@sa in the _Visuddhimagga_ says that by
"Name" are meant the three groups beginning with sensation
(i.e. sensation, perception and the predisposition); by "Form"
the four elements and form derivative from the four elements [Footnote
ref 3]. He further says that name by itself can produce physical
changes, such as eating, drinking, making movements or the like. So
form also cannot produce any of those changes by itself. But like
the cripple and the blind they mutually help one another and
effectuate the changes [Footnote ref 4]. But there exists no heap or
collection of material for the production of Name and Form; "but just
as when a lute is played upon, there is no previous store of sound;
and when the sound comes into existence it does not come from
any such store; and when it ceases, it does not go to any of the
cardinal or intermediate points of the compass;...in exactly the
same way all the elements of being both those with form and
those without, come into existence after having previously been
non-existent and having come into existence pass away [Footnote ref 5]."
Nāmarūpa taken in this sense will not mean the whole of mind and
body, but only the sense functions and the body which are found
to operate in the six doors of sense (_sa@lāyatana_). If we take
nāmarūpa in this sense, we can see that it may be said to depend
upon the vińńāna (consciousness). Consciousness has been compared
in the _Milinda Pańha_ with a watchman at the middle of

_____________________________________________________________________

[Footnote 1: The word āyatana is found in many places in the earlier
Upani@sads in the sense of "field or place," Chā. I. 5, B@rh. III. 9.
10, but @sa@dāyatana does not occur.]

[Footnote 2: Candrakīrtti interprets nāma as _Vedanādayo'
rūpi@nas'catvāra@h skandhāstatra tatra bhave nāmayantīli nāma. saha
rūpaskandhena ca nāma rūpam ceti nāmarūpamucyate._ The four skandhas
in each specific birth act as name. These together with rūpa make
nāmarūpa. _M. V._ 564.]

[Footnote 3: Warren's _Buddhism in Translations_, p. 184.]

[Footnote 4: _Ibid._ p. 185, _Visuddhimagga_, Ch. XVII.]

[Footnote 5: _Ibid._ pp. 185-186, _Visuddhimagga_, Ch. XVII.]

89

the cross-roads beholding all that come from any direction [Footnote ref
1]. Buddhagho@sa in the _Atthasālinī_ also says that consciousness means
that which thinks its object. If we are to define its characteristics
we must say that it knows (_vijānana_), goes in advance (_pubba@ngama_),
connects (_sandhāna_), and stands on nāmarūpa (_nāmarūpapada@t@thānam_).
When the consciousness gets a door, at a place the objects of sense
are discerned (_ārammana-vibhāvana@t@thāne_) and it goes first as the
precursor. When a visual object is seen by the eye it is known only
by the consciousness, and when the dhammas are made the objects of
(mind) mano, it is known only by the consciousness [Footnote ref 2].
Buddhagho@sa also refers here to the passage in the _Milinda Pańha_
we have just referred to. He further goes on to say that when states
of consciousness rise one after another, they leave no gap between
the previous state and the later and consciousness therefore appears
as connected. When there are the aggregates of the five khandhas it
is lost; but there are the four aggregates as nāmarūpa, it stands on
nāma and therefore it is said that it stands on nāmarūpa. He further
asks, Is this consciousness the same as the previous consciousness or
different from it? He answers that it is the same. Just so, the sun shows
itself with all its colours, etc., but he is not different from those
in truth; and it is said that just when the sun rises, its collected
heat and yellow colour also rise then, but it does not mean that
the sun is different from these. So the citta or consciousness
takes the phenomena of contact, etc., and cognizes them. So
though it is the same as they are yet in a sense it is different
from them [Footnote ref 3].

To go back to the chain of twelve causes, we find that jāti (birth)
is the cause of decay and death, _jarāmara@na_, etc. Jāti is the
appearance of the body or the totality of the five skandhas [Footnote
ref 4]. Coming to bhava which determines jāti, I cannot think of any
better rational explanation of bhava, than that I have already

________________________________________________________________________

[Footnote 1: Warren's _Buddhism in Translations_, p. 182, _Milinda Pańha_
(628).]

[Footnote 2: _Atthasālinī_, p. 112...]

[Footnote 3: _Ibid._ p. 113, _Yathā hi rūpādīni upādāya pańńattā
suriyādayo na atthato rūpādīhi ańńe honti ten' eva yasmin samaye
suriyo udeti tasmin samaye tassa tejā-sa@nkhātam rūpa@m pīti eva@m
vuccamāne pi na rūpādihi ańńo suriyo nāma atthi. Tathā cittam
phassādayo dhamme upādāya pańńapiyati. Atthato pan' ettha tehi
ańńam eva. Tena yasmin samaye cittam uppanna@m hoti eka@msen eva
tasmin samaye phassādihi atthato ańńad eva hotī ti_.]

[Footnote 4: "_Jātirdehajanma pańcaskandhasamudāya@h,_" Govindānanda's
_Ratnaprabhā_ on S'a@nkara's bhā@sya, II. ii. 19.]

90

suggested, namely, the works (_karma_) which produce the birth [Footnote
ref 1]. Upādāna is an advanced t@r@s@nā leading to positive clinging
[Footnote ref 2]. It is produced by t@r@s@nā (desire) which again is
the result of vedanā (pleasure and pain). But this vedanā is of course
vedanā with ignorance (_avidyā_), for an Arhat may have also vedanā
but as he has no avidyā, the vedanā cannot produce t@r@s@nā in turn. On
its development it immediately passes into upādāna. Vedanā means
pleasurable, painful or indifferent feeling. On the one side it leads
to t@r@s@nā (desire) and on the other it is produced by sense-contact
(_spars'a_). Prof. De la Vallée Poussin says that S'rīlābha distinguishes
three processes in the production of vedanā. Thus first there is the
contact between the sense and the object; then there is the knowledge
of the object, and then there is the vedanā. Depending on _Majjhima
Nikāya_, iii. 242, Poussin gives the other opinion that just as in
the case of two sticks heat takes place simultaneously with rubbing,
so here also vedanā takes place simultaneously with spars'a for they
are "produits par un mźme complexe de causes (_sāmagrī_) [Footnote
ref 3]."

Spars'a is produced by @sa@dāyatana, @sa@dāyatana by nāmarūpa,
and nāmarūpa by vijńāna, and is said to descend in the womb
of the mother and produce the five skandhas as nāmarūpa, out
of which the six senses are specialized.

Vijńāna in this connection probably means the principle or
germ of consciousness in the womb of the mother upholding the
five elements of the new body there. It is the product of the
past karmas (_sa@nkhāra_) of the dying man and of his past
consciousness too.

We sometimes find that the Buddhists believed that the last
thoughts of the dying man determined the nature of his next

_______________________________________________________________

[Footnote 1: Govindananda in his _Ratnaprabhā_ on S'a@nkara's bhā@sya, II.
ii. 19, explains "bhava" as that from which anything becomes, as merit
and demerit (_dharmādi_). See also _Vibhanga_, p. 137 and Warren's
_Buddhism in Translations_, p. 201. Mr Aung says in
_Abhidhammatthasa@ngaha_, p. 189, that bhavo includes kammabhavo (the
active side of an existence) and upapattibhavo (the passive side).
And the commentators say that bhava is a contraction of "_kammabhava_"
or Karma-becoming i.e. karmic activity.]

[Footnote 2: Prof. De la Vallée Poussin in his _Théoric des Douze Causes_,
p. 26, says that _S'ālistambhasūtra_ explains the word "upādāna" as
"t@r@s@nāvaipulya" or hyper-t@r@s@nā and Candrakīrtti also gives the
same meaning, _M. V._ (B.T.S.p. 210). Govmdānanda explains "upādāna"
as prav@rtti (movement) generated by t@r@s@nā (desire), i.e. the active
tendency in pursuance of desire. But if upādāna means "support" it would
denote all the five skandhas. Thus _Madhyamaka v@rtti_ says _upādānam
pańcaskandhalak@sa@nam...pańcopādānaskandhākhyam upādānam. M.V._ XXVII. 6.]

[Footnote 3: Poussin's _Théorie des Douze Causes_, p. 23.

91

birth [Footnote ref 1]. The manner in which the vijńāna produced in the
womb is determined by the past vijńāna of the previous existence is
according to some authorities of the nature of a reflected image,
like the transmission of learning from the teacher to the disciple,
like the lighting of a lamp from another lamp or like the impress
of a stamp on wax. As all the skandhas are changing in life,
so death also is but a similar change; there is no great break,
but the same uniform sort of destruction and coming into being.
New skandhas are produced as simultaneously as the two scale
pans of a balance rise up and fall, in the same manner as a lamp
is lighted or an image is reflected. At the death of the man the
vijńāna resulting from his previous karmas and vijńānas enters
into the womb of that mother (animal, man or the gods) in which
the next skandhas are to be matured. This vijńāna thus forms
the principle of the new life. It is in this vijńāna that name
(_nāma_) and form (_rūpa_) become associated.

The vijńāna is indeed a direct product of the sa@mskāras and
the sort of birth in which vijńāna should bring down (_nāmayati_)
the new existence (_upapatti_) is determined by the sa@mskāras [Footnote
ref 2], for in reality the happening of death (_mara@nabhava_) and the
instillation of the vijńāna as the beginning of the new life
(_upapattibhava_) cannot be simultaneous, but the latter succeeds just
at the next moment, and it is to signify this close succession that
they are said to be simultaneous. If the vijńāna had not entered
the womb then no nāmarūpa could have appeared [Footnote ref 3].

This chain of twelve causes extends over three lives. Thus
avidyā and sa@mskāra of the past life produce the vijńāna, nāmarupa,

_____________________________________________________________________

[Footnote 1: The deities of the gardens, the woods, the trees and the
plants, finding the master of the house, Citta, ill said "make your
resolution, 'May I be a cakravarttī king in a next existence,'"
_Sa@myutta_, IV. 303.]

[Footnote 2: "_sa cedānandavijńāna@m mātu@hkuk@sim nāvakrāmeta, na tat
kalalam kalalatvāya sannivartteta_," _M. V._ 552. Compare _Caraka,
S'ārīra_, III. 5-8, where he speaks of a "upapīduka sattva" which
connects the soul with body and by the absence of which the character
is changed, the senses become affected and life ceases, when it is
in a pure condition one can remember even the previous births;
character, purity, antipathy, memory, fear, energy, all mental
qualities are produced out of it. Just as a chariot is made by the
combination of many elements, so is the foetus.]

[Footnote 3: _Madhyamaka v@riti_ (B.T.S. 202-203). Poussin quotes from
_Dīgha_, II. 63, "si le vijńāna ne descendait pas dans le sein maternel
la namarupa s'y constituerait-il?" Govindānanda on S'a@nkara's commentary
on the _Brahma-sūtras_ (II. ii. 19) says that the first consciousness
(vijńāna) of the foetus is produced by the sa@mskāras of the previous
birth, and from that the four elements (which he calls nāma) and from that
the white and red, semen and ovum, and the first stage of the foetus
(_kalala-budbudāvasthā_} is produced.]

92

@sa@dāyatana, spars'a, vedanā, t@r@s@nā, upādāna and the bhava
(leading to another life) of the present actual life. This bhava
produces the jāti and jarāmara@na of the next life [Footnote ref l].

It is interesting to note that these twelve links in the chain
extending in three sections over three lives are all but the
manifestations of sorrow to the bringing in of which they naturally
determine one another. Thus _Abhidhammatthasa@ngaha_
says "each of these twelve terms is a factor. For the composite
term 'sorrow,' etc. is only meant to show incidental consequences
of birth. Again when 'ignorance' and 'the actions of the
mind' have been taken into account, craving (_t@r@s@nā_), grasping
(_upādāna_) and (_karma_) becoming (_bhava_) are implicitly accounted
for also. In the same manner when craving, grasping
and (_karma_) becoming have been taken into account, ignorance
and the actions of the mind are (implicitly) accounted for, also;
and when birth, decay, and death are taken into account, even
the fivefold fruit, to wit (rebirth), consciousness, and the rest are
accounted for. And thus:

Five causes in the Past and Now a fivefold 'fruit.'

Five causes Now and yet to come a fivefold 'fruit' make up
the Twenty Modes, the Three Connections (1. sa@nkhāra and
vińńāna, 2. vedanā and tanhā, 3. bhava and jāti) and the four
groups (one causal group in the Past, one resultant group in the
Present, one causal group in the Present and one resultant
group in the Future, each group consisting of five modes) [Footnote ref
2]."

These twelve interdependent links (_dvādas'ā@nga_) represent
the pa@ticcasamuppāda (_pratātyasamutpāda_) doctrines (dependent
origination) [Footnote ref 3] which are themselves but sorrow and lead to
cycles of sorrow. The term pa@ticcasamuppāda or pratītyasamutpāda has
been differently interpreted in later Buddhist literature [Footnote ref
4].

___________________________________________________________________________

[Footnote 1: This explanation probably cannot be found in the early Pāli
texts; but Buddhagho@sa mentions it in _Suma@ngalavilāsinī_ on _Mahānidāna
suttanta_. We find it also in _Abhidhammatthasa@ngaha_, VIII. 3. Ignorance
and the actions of the mind belong to the past; "birth," "decay and death"
to the future; the intermediate eight to the present. It is styled as
tri@kā@n@daka (having three branches) in _Abhidkarmakos'a_, III. 20-24.
Two in the past branch, two in the future and eight in the middle "_sa
pratītyasamutpādo dvādas'ā@ngastrikā@n@daka@h pūrvāparāntayordve dve
madhye@s@tau_."]

[Footnote 2: Aung and Mrs Rhys Davids' translation of
_Abhidhammatthasa@ngaha_, pp. 189-190.]

[Footnote 3: The twelve links are not always constant. Thus in the list
given in the _Dialogues of the Buddha_, II. 23 f., avijjā and sa@nkhāra
have been omitted and the start has been made with consciousness, and it
has been said that "Cognition turns back from name and form; it goes
not beyond."]

[Footnote 4: _M. V._ p. 5 f.]

93

Samutpāda means appearance or arising (_prādurbhdāva_) and pratītya
means after getting (_prati+i+ya_); combining the two we
find, arising after getting (something). The elements, depending
on which there is some kind of arising, are called hetu (cause) and
paccaya (ground). These two words however are often used in
the same sense and are interchangeable. But paccaya is also
used in a specific sense. Thus when it is said that avijjā is the
paccaya of sa@nkhāra it is meant that avijjā is the ground (_@thiti_)
of the origin of the sa@nkhāras, is the ground of their movement,
of the instrument through which they stand (_nimitta@t@thiti_), of
their ayuhana (conglomeration), of their interconnection, of their
intelligibility, of their conjoint arising, of their function as cause
and of their function as the ground with reference to those which
are determined by them. Avijjā in all these nine ways is
the ground of sa@nkhāra both in the past and also in the future,
though avijjā itself is determined in its turn by other grounds [Footnote
ref 1]. When we take the betu aspect of the causal chain, we cannot
think of anything else but succession, but when we take the
paccaya aspect we can have a better vision into the nature of the
cause as ground. Thus when avijjā is said to be the ground
of the sa@nkhāras in the nine ways mentioned above, it seems
reasonable to think that the sa@nkhāras were in some sense
regarded as special manifestations of avijjā [Footnote ref 2]. But as this
point was not further developed in the early Buddhist texts it would
be unwise to proceed further with it.


The Khandhas.

The word khandha (Skr. skandha) means the trunk of a tree
and is generally used to mean group or aggregate [Footnote ref 3]. We
have seen that Buddha said that there was no ātman (soul). He said
that when people held that they found the much spoken of soul,
they really only found the five khandhas together or any one of
them. The khandhas are aggregates of bodily and psychical
states which are immediate with us and are divided into five

________________________________________________________________

[Footnote 1: See _Pa@tisambhidāmagga_, vol. I.p. 50; see also _Majjhima
Nikāya_, I. 67, _sa@nkhāra...avijjānidānā avijjāsamudayā avijjājātikā
avijjāpabhavā_.]

[Footnote 2: In the Yoga derivation of asmitā (egoism), rāga (attachment),
dve@sa (antipathy) and abhinives'a (self love) from avidyā we find also
that all the five are regarded as the five special stages of the growth
of avidyā (_pańcaparvī avidyā_).]

[Footnote 3: The word skandha is used in Chāndogya, II. 23 (_trayo
dharmaskandhā@h yajńa@h adhyayanam dānam_) in the sense of branches
and in almost the same sense in Maitrī, VII. II.]

94

classes: (1) rūpa (four elements, the body, the senses), sense
data, etc., (2) vedanā (feeling--pleasurable, painful and indifferent),
(3) sańńā (conceptual knowledge), (4) sa@nkhāra (synthetic
mental states and the synthetic functioning of compound
sense-affections, compound feelings and compound concepts),
(5) vińńāna (consciousness) [Footnote ref 1].

All these states rise depending one upon the other (_pa@ticcasamuppanna_)
and when a man says that he perceives the self he only deludes himself,
for he only perceives one or more of these. The word rūpa in rūpakhandha
stands for matter and material qualities, the senses, and the sense
data [Footnote ref 2]. But "rūpa" is also used in the sense of pure
organic affections or states of mind as we find in the _Khandha Yamaka_,
I.p. 16, and also in _Sa@myutta Nikāya_, III. 86. Rūpaskandha according
to _Dharmasa@mgraha_ means the aggregate of five senses, the five
sensations, and the implicatory communications associated in sense
perceptions _vijńapti_).

The elaborate discussion of _Dhammasa@nga@ni_ begins by defining
rūpa as "_cattāro ca mahābhūtā catunnańca mahābhntanam
upādāya rūpam_" (the four mahābhūtas or elements and that
proceeding from the grasping of that is called rūpa) [Footnote ref 3].
Buddhagho@sa explains it by saying that rūpa means the four mahābhūtas
and those which arise depending (_nissāya_) on them as
a modification of them. In the rūpa the six senses including
their affections are also included. In explaining why the four
elements are called mahābhūtas, Buddhagho@sa says: "Just as a
magician (_māyākāra_) makes the water which is not hard appear
as hard, makes the stone which is not gold appear as gold;
just as he himself though not a ghost nor a bird makes himself
appear as a ghost or a bird, so these elements though not themselves
blue make themselves appear as blue (_nīlam upādā rūpam_),
not yellow, red, or white make themselves appear as yellow, red
or white (odātam upādārūpam), so on account of their similarity
to the appearances created by the magician they are called
mahābhūta [Footnote ref 4]."

In the _Sa@myutta Nikāya_ we find that the Buddha says, "O
Bhikkhus it is called rūpam because it manifests (_rūpyati_); how

___________________________________________________________________

[Footnote 1: _Sa@myutta Nikāya_, III. 86, etc.]

[Footnote 2: _Abhidhammatthasangaha_, J.P.T.S. 1884, p. 27 ff.]

[Footnote 3: _Dhammasa@nga@ni_, pp. 124-179.]

[Footnote 4: _Atthasālinī_, p. 299.]

95

does it manifest? It manifests as cold, and as heat, as hunger and
as thirst, it manifests as the touch of gnats, mosquitos, wind, the
sun and the snake; it manifests, therefore it is called rūpa
[Footnote ref 1]."

If we take the somewhat conflicting passages referred to above
for our consideration and try to combine them so as to understand
what is meant by rūpa, I think we find that that which manifested
itself to the senses and organs was called rūpa. No distinction
seems to have been made between the sense-data as colours, smells,
etc., as existing in the physical world and their appearance as
sensations. They were only numerically different and the appearance
of the sensations was dependent upon the sense-data and the senses
but the sense-data and the sensations were "rūpa." Under certain
conditions the sense-data were followed by the sensations. Buddhism
did not probably start with the same kind of division of matter and
mind as we now do. And it may not be out of place to mention that
such an opposition and duality were found neither in the Upani@sads
nor in the Sā@mkhya system which is regarded by some as pre-Buddhistic.
The four elements manifested themselves in certain forms and
were therefore called rūpa; the forms of affection that appeared
were also called rūpa; many other mental states or features
which appeared with them were also called rūpa [Footnote ref 2]. The
āyatanas or the senses were also called rūpa [Footnote ref 3]. The
mahābhūtas or four elements were themselves but changing manifestations,
and they together with all that appeared in association with them were
called rūpa and formed the rūpa khandha (the classes of sense-materials,
sense-data, senses and sensations).

In _Sa@myutta Nikāya_ (III. 101) it is said that "the four
mahābhūtas were the hetu and the paccaya for the communication
of the rūpakkhandha (_rūpakkhandhassa pańńāpanāya_). Contact
(sense-contact, phassa) is the cause of the communication of
feelings (_vedanā_); sense-contact was also the hetu and paccaya
for the communication of the sańńākkhandha; sense-contact is
also the hetu and paccaya for the communication of the
sa@nkhārakkhandha. But nāmarūpa is the hetu and the paccaya for
the communication of the vińńānakkhandha." Thus not only feelings
arise on account of the sense-contact but sańńā and sa@nkhāra
also arise therefrom. Sańńā is that where specific knowing or

_________________________________________________________________

[Footnote 1: _Sa@myutta Nikāya_, III. 86.]

[Footnote 2: _Khandhayamaka_.]

[Footnote 3: _Dhammasanga@ni_, p. 124 ff.]

96

conceiving takes place. This is the stage where the specific distinctive
knowledge as the yellow or the red takes place.

Mrs. Rhys Davids writing on sańńā says: "In editing the
second book of the Abhidhamma pi@taka I found a classification
distinguishing between sańńā as cognitive assimilation on occasion
of sense, and sańńā as cognitive assimilation of ideas by way of
naming. The former is called perception of resistance, or opposition
(_patigha-sańńā_). This, writes Buddhagho@sa, is perception on
occasion of sight, hearing, etc., when consciousness is aware of the
impact of impressions; of external things as different, we might
say. The latter is called perception of the equivalent word or
name (_adhivachānā-sańńā_) and is exercised by the _sensus communis_
(mano), when e.g. 'one is seated...and asks another who
is thoughtful: "What are you thinking of?" one perceives through
his speech.' Thus there are two stages of sańńā-consciousness,
1. contemplating sense-impressions, 2. ability to know what they
are by naming [Footnote ref 1]."

About sa@nkhāra we read in _Sa@myutta Nikāya_ (III. 87) that it
is called sa@nkhāra because it synthesises (_abhisa@nkharonti_), it is
that which conglomerated rūpa as rūpa, conglomerated sańńā
as sańńā, sa@nkhāra as sa@nkhāra and consciousness (_vińńāna_)
as consciousness. It is called sa@nkhāra because it synthesises
the conglomerated (_sa@nkhatam abhisa@nkharonti_). It is thus a
synthetic function which synthesises the passive rūpa, sańńā,
sa@nkhāra and vińńāna elements. The fact that we hear of 52
sa@nkhāra states and also that the sa@nkhāra exercises its synthetic
activity on the conglomerated elements in it, goes to show
that probably the word sa@nkhāra is used in two senses, as mental
states and as synthetic activity.

Vińńāna or consciousness meant according to Buddhagho@sa,
as we have already seen in the previous section, both the stage
at which the intellectual process started and also the final
resulting consciousness.

Buddhagho@sa in explaining the process of Buddhist psychology
says that "consciousness(_citta_)first comes into touch (_phassa_) with
its object (_āramma@na_) and thereafter feeling, conception (_sańńā_)
and volition (_cetanā_) come in. This contact is like the pillars of
a palace, and the rest are but the superstructure built upon it
(_dabbasambhārasadisā_). But it should not be thought that contact

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[Footnote 1: _Buddhist Psychology_, pp. 49, 50.]

97

is the beginning of the psychological processes, for in one whole
consciousness (_ekacittasmi@m_) it cannot be said that this comes
first and that comes after, so we can take contact in association
with feeling (_vedanā_), conceiving (_sańńā_) or volition (_cetanā_);
it is itself an immaterial state but yet since it comprehends
objects it is called contact." "There is no impinging on one side
of the object (as in physical contact), nevertheless contact causes
consciousness and object to be in collision, as visible object and
visual organs, sound and hearing; thus impact is its _function_; or
it has impact as its _essential property_ in the sense of attainment,
owing to the impact of the physical basis with the mental object.
For it is said in the Commentary:--"contact in the four planes of
existence is never without the characteristic of touch with the
object; but the function of impact takes place in the five doors.
For to sense, or five-door contact, is given the name 'having the
characteristic of touch' as well as 'having the function of impact.'
But to contact in the mind-door there is only the characteristic
of touch, but not the function of impact. And then this Sutta is
quoted 'As if, sire, two rams were to fight, one ram to represent
the eye, the second the visible object, and their collision contact.
And as if, sire, two cymbals were to strike against each other, or
two hands were to clap against each other; one hand would
represent the eye, the second the visible object and their collision
contact. Thus contact has the characteristic of touch and the
function of impact [Footnote ref 1]'. Contact is the manifestation of the
union of the three (the object, the consciousness and the sense) and its
effect is feeling (_vedanā_); though it is generated by the objects
it is felt in the consciousness and its chief feature is experiencing
(_anubhava_) the taste of the object. As regards enjoying the taste
of an object, the remaining associated states enjoy it only
partially. Of contact there is (the function of) the mere touching,
of perception the mere noting or perceiving, of volition the mere
coordinating, of consciousness the mere cognizing. But feeling
alone, through governance, proficiency, mastery, enjoys the taste
of an object. For feeling is like the king, the remaining states
are like the cook. As the cook, when he has prepared food of
diverse tastes, puts it in a basket, seals it, takes it to the king,
breaks the seal, opens the basket, takes the best of all the soup
and curries, puts them in a dish, swallows (a portion) to find out

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[Footnote 1: _Atthasālinī_, p. 108; translation, pp. 143-144.]

98

whether they are faulty or not and afterwards offers the food of
various excellent tastes to the king, and the king, being lord,
expert, and master, eats whatever he likes, even so the mere tasting
of the food by the cook is like the partial enjoyment of the object
by the remaining states, and as the cook tastes a portion of the
food, so the remaining states enjoy a portion of the object, and
as the king, being lord, expert and master, eats the meal according
to his pleasure so feeling being lord expert, and master, enjoys
the taste of the object and therefore it is said that enjoyment or
experience is its function [Footnote ref 1]."

The special feature of sańńā is said to be the recognizing
(_paccabhińńā_) by means of a sign (_abhińńānena_). According to
another explanation, a recognition takes place by the inclusion
of the totality (of aspects)--_sabbasa@ngahikavasena_. The work of
volition (_cetanā_) is said to be coordination or binding together
(_abhisandahana_). "Volition is exceedingly energetic and makes
a double effort, a double exertion. Hence the Ancients said
'Volition is like the nature of a landowner, a cultivator who taking
fifty-five strong men, went down to the fields to reap. He was
exceedingly energetic and exceedingly strenuous; he doubled his
strength and said "Take your sickles" and so forth, pointed out
the portion to be reaped, offered them drink, food, scent, flowers,
etc., and took an equal share of the work.' The simile should be
thus applied: volition is like the cultivator, the fifty-five moral
states which arise as factors of consciousness are like the fifty-five
strong men; like the time of doubling strength, doubling effort
by the cultivator is the doubled strength, doubled effort of
volition as regards activity in moral and immoral acts [Footnote ref 2]."
It seems that probably the active side operating in sa@nkhāra was
separately designated as cetanā (volition).

"When one says 'I,' what he does is that he refers either to
all the khandhas combined or any one of them and deludes himself
that that was 'I.' Just as one could not say that the
fragrance of the lotus belonged to the petals, the colour or the
pollen, so one could not say that the rūpa was 'I' or that the
vedanā was 'I' or any of the other khandhas was 'I.' There is
nowhere to be found in the khandhas 'I am [Footnote ref 3]'."

___________________________________________________________________

[Footnote 1: _Atthasālinī_, pp. 109-110; translation, pp. 145-146.]

[Footnote 2: _Ibid._ p. 111; translation, pp. 147-148.]

[Footnote 3: _Samyutta Nikāya_, III. 130.]

99


Avijjā and Āsava.

As to the question how the avijjā (ignorance) first started
there can be no answer, for we could never say that either
ignorance or desire for existence ever has any beginning [Footnote ref 1].
Its fruition is seen in the cycle of existence and the sorrow that comes
in its train, and it comes and goes with them all. Thus as we
can never say that it has any beginning, it determines the elements
which bring about cycles of existence and is itself determined by
certain others. This mutual determination can only take place
in and through the changing series of dependent phenomena, for
there is nothing which can be said to have any absolute priority
in time or stability. It is said that it is through the coming into
being of the āsavas or depravities that the avijjā came into
being, and that through the destruction of the depravities (_āsava_)
the avijjā was destroyed [Footnote ref 2]. These āsavas are classified in
the _Dhammasa@nga@ni_ as kāmāsava, bhavāsava, di@t@thāsava and avijjāsava.
Kāmāsava means desire, attachment, pleasure, and thirst
after the qualities associated with the senses; bhavāsava means
desire, attachment and will for existence or birth; di@t@thāsava
means the holding of heretical views, such as, the world is eternal
or non-eternal, or that the world will come to an end or will not
come to an end, or that the body and the soul are one or are
different; avijjāsava means the ignorance of sorrow, its cause, its
extinction and its means of extinction. _Dhammasa@nga@ni_ adds
four more supplementary ones, viz. ignorance about the nature of
anterior mental khandhas, posterior mental khandhas, anterior
and posterior together, and their mutual dependence [Footnote ref 3].
Kāmāsava and bhavāsava can as Buddhagho@sa says be counted as one, for
they are both but depravities due to attachment [Footnote ref 4].

________________________________________________________________________

[Footnote 1: Warren's _Buddhism in Translations_ (_Visuddhimagga_, chap.
XVII.), p. 175.]

[Footnote 2: _M. N._ I.p. 54. Childers translates "āsava" as "depravities"
and Mrs Rhys Davids as "intoxicants." The word "āsava" in Skr. means
"old wine." It is derived from "su" to produce by Buddhagho@sa and the
meaning that he gives to it is "_cira pārivāsika@t@thena_" (on account
of its being stored up for a long time like wine). They work through the
eye and the mind and continue to produce all beings up to Indra.
As those wines which are kept long are called "āsavas" so these are also
called āsavas for remaining a long time. The other alternative that
Buddhagho@sa gives is that they are called āsava on account of their
producing sa@msāradukkha (sorrows of the world), _Atthasālinī_, p. 48.
Contrast it with Jaina āsrava (flowing in of karma matter). Finding it
difficult to translate it in one word after Buddhagho@sa, I have
translated it as "depravities," after Childers.]

[Footnote 3: See _Dhammasa@nga@ni_, p. 195.]

[Footnote 4: Buddhagho@sa's _Atthasālinī_, p. 371.]

100


The di@t@thāsavas by clouding the mind with false metaphysical
views stand in the way of one's adopting the true Buddhistic doctrines.
The kāmasāvas stand in the way of one's entering into
the way of Nirvā@na (_anāgāmimagga_) and the bhavāsavas and
avijjāsavas stand in the way of one's attaining arha or final
emancipation. When the _Majjhima Nikāya_ says that from the
rise of the āsavas avijjā rises, it evidently counts avijjā there as
in some sense separate from the other āsavas, such as those of
attachment and desire of existence which veil the true knowledge
about sorrow.

The afflictions (_kilesas_) do not differ much from the āsavas
for they are but the specific passions in forms ordinarily familiar
to us, such as covetousness (_lobha_), anger or hatred (_dosa_),
infatuation (_moha_), arrogance, pride or vanity (_māna_), heresy
(_di@t@thi_), doubt or uncertainty (_vicikicchā_), idleness (_thīna_),
boastfulness (_udhacca_), shamelessness (_ahirika_) and hardness of heart
_anottapa_); these kilesas proceed directly as a result of the āsavas.
In spite of these varieties they are often counted as three (lobha,
dosa, moha) and these together are called kilesa. They are
associated with the vedanākkhandha, sańńākkhandha, sa@nkhārakkhandha
and vińńānakkhandha. From these arise the three kinds
of actions, of speech, of body, and of mind [Footnote ref 1].


Sīla and Samādhi.

We are intertwined all through outside and inside by the
tangles of desire (_ta@nhā ja@tā_), and the only way by which these
may be loosened is by the practice of right discipline (_sīla_),
concentration (_samādhi_) and wisdom (_pańńā_). Sīla briefly means
the desisting from committing all sinful deeds (_sabbapāpassa
akara@nam_). With sīla therefore the first start has to be made,
for by it one ceases to do all actions prompted by bad desires
and thereby removes the inrush of dangers and disturbances.
This serves to remove the kilesas, and therefore the proper performance
of the sīla would lead one to the first two successive
stages of sainthood, viz. the sotāpannabhāva (the stage in which
one is put in the right current) and the sakadāgāmibhāva (the
stage when one has only one more birth to undergo). Samādhi
is a more advanced effort, for by it all the old roots of the old
kilesas are destroyed and the ta@nhā or desire is removed and

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[Footnote 1: _Dhammasa@nga@ni,_ p. 180.]

101

by it one is led to the more advanced states of a saint. It
directly brings in pańńā (true wisdom) and by pańńā the saint
achieves final emancipation and becomes what is called an
arhat [Footnote ref 1]. Wisdom (_pańńā_) is right knowledge about the
four āriya saccas, viz. sorrow, its cause, its destruction and its cause
of destruction.

Sīla means those particular volitions and mental states, etc.
by which a man who desists from committing sinful actions
maintains himself on the right path. Sīla thus means 1. right
volition (_cetanā_), 2. the associated mental states (_cetasika_),
3. mental control (_sa@mvara_) and 4. the actual non-transgression
(in body and speech) of the course of conduct already in the mind
by the preceding three sīlas called avītikkama. Sa@mvara is
spoken of as being of five kinds, 1. Pā@timokkhasa@mvara (the
control which saves him who abides by it), 2. Satisa@mvara (the
control of mindfulness), 3. Ńānasa@mvara (the control of knowledge),
4. Khantisa@mvara (the control of patience), 5. Viriyasa@mvara
(the control of active self-restraint). Pā@timokkhasa@mvara
means all self-control in general. Satisa@mvara means
the mindfulness by which one can bring in the right and good
associations when using one's cognitive senses. Even when
looking at any tempting object he will by virtue of his mindfulness
(_sati_) control himself from being tempted by avoiding to
think of its tempting side and by thinking on such aspects of it
as may lead in the right direction. Khantisa@mvara is that by
which one can remain unperturbed in heat and cold. By the
proper adherence to sīla all our bodily, mental and vocal activities
(_kamma_) are duly systematized, organized, stabilized (_samādhānam,
upadhāra@na@m, pati@t@thā_) [Footnote ref 2].

The sage who adopts the full course should also follow a
number of healthy monastic rules with reference to dress, sitting,
dining, etc., which are called the dhūta@ngas or pure disciplinary
parts [Footnote ref 3]. The practice of sīla and the dhūtangas help the
sage to adopt the course of samādhi. Samādhi as we have seen means
the concentration of the mind bent on right endeavours (_kusalacittekaggatā
samādhi@h_) together with its states upon one particular
object (_ekāramma@na_) so that they may completely cease to
shift and change (_sammā ca avikkhipamānā_) [Footnote ref 4].

_______________________________________________________________

[Footnote 1: _Visuddhimagga Nidānādikathā_.]

[Footnote 2: _Visuddhimagga-sīlaniddeso_, pp. 7 and 8.]

[Footnote 3: _Visuddhimagga_, II.]

[Footnote 4: _Visuddhimagga_, pp. 84-85.]

102


The man who has practised sīla must train his mind first
in particular ways, so that it may be possible for him to acquire
the chief concentration of meditation called jhāna (fixed and
steady meditation). These preliminary endeavours of the mind
for the acquirement of jhānasamādhi eventually lead to it
and are called upacāra samādhi (preliminary samādhi) as distinguished
from the jhānasamādhi called the appanāsamādhi (achieved samādhi)
[Footnote ref 1]. Thus as a preparatory measure, firstly he
has to train his mind continually to view with disgust the appetitive
desires for eating and drinking (_āhāre pa@tikkūlasańńā_) by
emphasizing in the mind the various troubles that are associated
in seeking food and drink and their ultimate loathsome transformations
as various nauseating bodily elements. When a man
continually habituates himself to emphasize the disgusting
associations of food and drink, he ceases to have any attachment
to them and simply takes them as an unavoidable evil,
only awaiting the day when the final dissolution of all sorrows
will come [Footnote ref 2]. Secondly he has to habituate his mind to the
idea that all the parts of our body are made up of the four elements,
k@siti (earth), ap (water), tejas (fire) and wind (air), like the carcase
of a cow at the butcher's shop. This is technically called
catudhātuvavatthānabhāvanā (the meditation of the body as being
made up of the four elements) [Footnote ref 3]. Thirdly he has to
habituate his mind to think again and again (_anussati_) about the
virtues or greatness of the Buddha, the sa@ngha (the monks following
the Buddha), the gods and the law (_dhamma_) of the Buddha, about
the good effects of sīla, and the making of gifts (_cāgānussati_),
about the nature of death (_mara@nānussati_) and about
the deep nature and qualities of the final extinction
of all phenomena (_upasamānussati_) [Footnote ref 4].

___________________________________________________________________

[Footnote 1: As it is not possible for me to enter into details, I follow
what appears to me to be the main line of division showing the
interconnection of jhāna (Skr. _dhyāna_) with its accessory stages
called parikammas (_Visuddhimagga,_ pp. 85 f.).]

[Footnote 2: _Visuddhimagga_, pp. 341-347; mark the intense pessimistic
attitude, "_Imań ca pana āhāre pa@tikulasańńā@m anuyuttassa bhikkhu@no
rasata@nhāya cittam pa@tilīyati, pa@tiku@t@tati, pa@tiva@t@tati; so,
kantāranitthara@na@t@thiko viya puttama@msa@m vigatamado āhāra@m āhāreti
yāvad eva dukkhassa ni@t@thara@natthāya_," p. 347. The mind of him who
inspires himself with this supreme disgust to all food, becomes free from
all desires for palatable tastes, and turns its back to them and flies off
from them. As a means of getting rid of all sorrow he takes his food
without any attachment as one would eat the flesh of his own son to
sustain himself in crossing a forest.]

[Footnote 3: _Visuddhimagga_, pp. 347-370.]

[Footnote 4: _Visuddhimagga_, pp. 197-294.]

103


Advancing further from the preliminary meditations or preparations
called the upacāra samādhi we come to those other
sources of concentration and meditation called the appanāsamādhi
which directly lead to the achievement of the highest samādhi.
The processes of purification and strengthening of the mind
continue in this stage also, but these represent the last attempts
which lead the mind to its final goal Nibbāna. In the first part
of this stage the sage has to go to the cremation grounds and
notice the diverse horrifying changes of the human carcases and
think how nauseating, loathsome, unsightly and impure they are,
and from this he will turn his mind to the living human bodies
and convince himself that they being in essence the same as the
dead carcases are as loathsome as they [Footnote ref.1] This is called
asubhakamma@t@thāna or the endeavour to perceive the impurity of our
bodies. He should think of the anatomical parts and constituents of the
body as well as their processes, and this will help him to enter
into the first jhāna by leading his mind away from his body.
This is called the kayagatasati or the continual mindfulness
about the nature of the body [Footnote ref 2]. As an aid to concentration
the sage should sit in a quiet place and fix his mind on the inhaling
(_passāsa_) and the exhaling (_āssāsa_) of his breath, so that instead
of breathing in a more or less unconscious manner he may be
aware whether he is breathing quickly or slowly; he ought to
mark it definitely by counting numbers, so that by fixing his
mind on the numbers counted he may fix his mind on the whole
process of inhalation and exhalation in all stages of its course.
This is called the anapānasati or the mindfulness of inhalation
and exhalation [Footnote ref 3]

Next to this we come to Brahmavihāra, the fourfold meditation
of metta (universal friendship), karu@nā (universal pity),
muditā (happiness in the prosperity and happiness of all) and
upekkhā (indifference to any kind of preferment of oneself, his
friend, enemy or a third party). In order to habituate oneself to
the meditation on universal friendship, one should start with thinking
how he should himself like to root out all misery and become
happy, how he should himself like to avoid death and live cheerfully,
and then pass over to the idea that other beings would also
have the same desires. He should thus habituate himself to think
that his friends, his enemies, and all those with whom he is not

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[Footnote 1: _Visuddhimagga,_ VI.]

[Footnote 2: _Ibid._ pp. 239-266.]

[Footnote 3: _Ibid._ pp. 266-292.]

104

connected might all live and become happy. He should fix himself
to such an extent in this meditation that he would not find any
difference between the happiness or safety of himself and of others.
He should never become angry with any person. Should he at any
time feel himself offended on account of the injuries inflicted on
him by his enemies, he should think of the futility of doubling
his sadness by becoming sorry or vexed on that account. He
should think that if he should allow himself to be affected by
anger, he would spoil all his sīla which he was so carefully practising.
If anyone has done a vile action by inflicting injury,
should he himself also do the same by being angry at it? If he
were finding fault with others for being angry, could he himself
indulge in anger? Moreover he should think that all the dhammas
are momentary (_kha@nikattā_); that there no longer existed the
khandhas which had inflicted the injury, and moreover the infliction
of any injury being only a joint product, the man who was
injured was himself an indispensable element in the production
of the infliction as much as the man who inflicted the injury, and
there could not thus be any special reason for making him responsible
and of being angry with him. If even after thinking
in this way the anger does not subside, he should think that by
indulging in anger he could only bring mischief on himself through
his bad deeds, and he should further think that the other man
by being angry was only producing mischief to himself but not
to him. By thinking in these ways the sage would be able to
free his mind from anger against his enemies and establish himself
in an attitude of universal friendship [Footnote ref 1]. This is called
the mettā-bhāvana. In the meditation of universal pity (_karu@nā_)
also one should sympathize with the sorrows of his friends and
foes alike. The sage being more keen-sighted will feel pity for
those who are apparently leading a happy life, but are neither
acquiring merits nor endeavouring to proceed on the way to
Nibbāna, for they are to suffer innumerable lives of sorrow [Footnote
ref 2].

We next come to the jhānas with the help of material things
as objects of concentration called the Kasi@nam. These objects of
concentration may either be earth, water, fire, wind, blue colour,
yellow colour, red colour, white colour, light or limited space
(_parīcchinnākāsa_). Thus the sage may take a brown ball of earth
and concentrate his mind upon it as an earth ball, sometimes

____________________________________________________________________

[Footnote 1: _Visuddhimagga_, pp. 295-314.]

[Footnote 2: _Ibid._ pp. 314-315.]

105

with eyes open and sometimes with eyes shut. When he finds
that even in shutting his eyes he can visualize the object in his
mind, he may leave off the object and retire to another place to
concentrate upon the image of the earth ball in his mind.

In the first stages of the first meditation (_pathamam jhānam_)
the mind is concentrated on the object in the way of understanding
it with its form and name and of comprehending it with its diverse
relations. This state of concentration is called vitakka (discursive
meditation). The next stage of the first meditation is that in
which the mind does not move in the object in relational terms
but becomes fixed and settled in it and penetrates into it without
any quivering. This state is called vicāra (steadily moving). The
first stage vitakka has been compared in Buddhagho@sa's _Visuddhimagga_
to the flying of a kite with its wings flapping, whereas
the second stage is compared to its flying in a sweep without the
least quiver of its wings. These two stages are associated with
a buoyant exaltation (_pīti_) and a steady inward bliss called sukha
[Footnote ref 1] instilling the mind. The formation of this first
jhāna roots out five ties of avijjā, kamacchando (dallying with
desires), vyāpādo (hatred), thinamiddham (sloth and torpor),
uddhaccakukkuccam (pride and restlessness), and vicikicchā (doubt).
The five elements of which this jhāna is constituted are vitakka,
vicāra, plti, sukham and ekaggata (one pointedness).

When the sage masters the first jhāna he finds it defective
and wants to enter into the second meditation (_dutiyam jhānam_),
where there is neither any vitakka nor vicāra of the first jhāna,
but the mind is in one unruffled state (_ekodibhāvam_). It is a
much steadier state and does not possess the movement which
characterized the vitakka and the vicāra stages of the first jhāna
and is therefore a very placid state (_vitakka-vicārakkhobha-virahe@na
ativiya acalatā suppasannatā ca_). It is however associated
with pīti, sukha and ekaggatā as the first jhāna was.

When the second jhāna is mastered the sage becomes disinclined
towards the enjoyment of the pīti of that stage and becomes
indifferent to them (_upekkhako_). A sage in this stage sees the
objects but is neither pleased nor displeased. At this stage all
the āsavas of the sage become loosened (khī@nāsava). The
enjoyment of sukha however still remains in the stage and the

___________________________________________________________________

[Footnote 1: Where there is pīti there is sukha, but where there is sukha
there may not necessarily be pīti. _Vīsuddhimagga_, p. 145.]

106

mind if not properly and carefully watched would like sometimes
to turn back to the enjoyment of pīti again. The two characteristics
of this jhāna are sukha and ekaggatā. It should however
be noted that though there is the feeling of highest sukha here,
the mind is not only not attached to it but is indifferent to it
(_atimadhhurasukhe sukhapāramippatte pi tatiyajjhāne upekkhako,
na tattha sukhābhisangena āka@d@dhiyati_) [Footnote ref 1]. The earth
ball (_pa@thavī_) is however still the object of the jhāna.

In the fourth or the last jhāna both the sukha (happiness) and
the dukkha (misery) vanish away and all the roots of attachment
and antipathies are destroyed. This state is characterized by
supreme and absolute indifference (_upekkhā_) which was slowly
growing in all the various stages of the jhānas. The characteristics
of this jhāna are therefore upekkhā and ekaggatā. With the
mastery of this jhāna comes final perfection and total extinction
of the citta called cetovimutti, and the sage becomes thereby an
arhat [Footnote ref 2]. There is no further production of the khandhas,
no rebirth, and there is the absolute cessation of all sorrows and
sufferings--Nibbāna.


Kamma.

In the Katha (II. 6) Yama says that "a fool who is blinded
with the infatuation of riches does not believe in a future life; he
thinks that only this life exists and not any other, and thus he
comes again and again within my grasp." In the Digha Nikāya
also we read how Pāyāsi was trying to give his reasons in support
of his belief that "Neither is there any other world, nor are there
beings, reborn otherwise than from parents, nor is there fruit or
result of deeds well done or ill done [Footnote ref 3]." Some of his
arguments were that neither the vicious nor the virtuous return to tell
us that they suffered or enjoyed happiness in the other world, that
if the virtuous had a better life in store, and if they believed
in it, they would certainly commit suicide in order to get it at
the earliest opportunity, that in spite of taking the best precautions
we do not find at the time of the death of any person that
his soul goes out, or that his body weighs less on account of
the departure of his soul, and so on. Kassapa refutes his arguments
with apt illustrations. But in spite of a few agnostics of

_______________________________________________________________________

[Footnote 1: _Visuddhimagga_, p. 163.]

[Footnote 2: _Majjhima Nikāya_, I.p. 296, and _Visuddhimagga_, pp.
167-168.]

[Footnote 3: _Dialogues of the Buddha_, II. p. 349; _D. N._ II. pp. 317
ff.]

107

Pāyāsi's type, we have every reason to believe that the doctrine
of rebirth in other worlds and in this was often spoken of in the
Upani@sads and taken as an accepted fact by the Buddha. In
the _Milinda Pańha_, we find Nāgasena saying "it is through a
difference in their karma that men are not all alike, but some
long lived, some short lived, some healthy and some sickly, some
handsome and some ugly, some powerful and some weak, some
rich and some poor, some of high degree and some of low degree,
some wise and some foolish [Footnote ref 1]." We have seen in
the third chapter that the same soil of views was enunciated by the
Upani@sad sages.

But karma could produce its effect in this life or any
other life only when there were covetousness, antipathy and infatuation.
But "when a man's deeds are performed without covetousness, arise
without covetousness and are occasioned without covetousness, then
inasmuch as covetousness is gone these deeds are abandoned, uprooted,
pulled out of the ground like a palmyra tree and become non-existent
and not liable to spring up again in the future [Footnote ref 2]."
Karma by itself without craving (_ta@nhā_) is incapable of bearing good
or bad fruits. Thus we read in the _Mahāsatipa@t@thāna sutta_, "even
this craving, potent for rebirth, that is accompanied by lust and
self-indulgence, seeking satisfaction now here, now there, to wit,
the craving for the life of sense, the craving for becoming (renewed
life) and the craving for not becoming (for no new rebirth) [Footnote
ref 3]." "Craving for things visible, craving for things audible,
craving for things that may be smelt, tasted, touched, for things in
memory recalled. These are the things in this world that are dear,
that are pleasant. There does craving take its rise, there does it
dwell [Footnote ref 4]." Pre-occupation and deliberation of sensual
gratification giving rise to craving is the reason why sorrow comes.
And this is the first ārya satya (noble truth).

The cessation of sorrow can only happen with "the utter
cessation of and disenchantment about that very craving, giving
it up, renouncing it and emancipation from it [Footnote ref 5]."

When the desire or craving (_ta@nhā_) has once ceased the
sage becomes an arhat, and the deeds that he may do after
that will bear no fruit. An arhat cannot have any good or bad

_________________________________________________________________

[Footnote 1: Warren's _Buddhism in Translations_, p. 215.]

[Footnote 2: _Ibid._ pp. 216-217.]

[Footnote 3: _Dialogues of the Buddha_, II. p. 340.]

[Footnote 4: _Ibid._ p. 341.]

[Footnote 5: _Ibid._ p. 341.]

108

fruits of whatever he does. For it is through desire that karma
finds its scope of giving fruit. With the cessation of desire all
ignorance, antipathy and grasping cease and consequently there
is nothing which can determine rebirth. An arhat may suffer the
effects of the deeds done by him in some previous birth just as
Moggallāna did, but in spite of the remnants of his past karma
an arhat was an emancipated man on account of the cessation of
his desire [Footnote ref 1].

Kammas are said to be of three kinds, of body, speech and
mind (_kāyika_, _vācika_ and _mānasika_). The root of this kamma
is however volition (_cetanā_) and the states associated with it
[Footnote ref 2]. If a man wishing to kill animals goes out into
the forest in search of them, but cannot get any of them there
even after a long search, his misconduct is not a bodily one, for
he could not actually commit the deed with his body. So if he gives
an order for committing a similar misdeed, and if it is not actually
carried out with the body, it would be a misdeed by speech (_vācika_)
and not by the body. But the merest bad thought or ill will alone whether
carried into effect or not would be a kamma of the mind (_mānasika_)
[Footnote ref 3]. But the mental kamma must be present as the root of
all bodily and vocal kammas, for if this is absent, as in the case
of an arhat, there cannot be any kammas at all for him.

Kammas are divided from the point of view of effects into
four classes, viz. (1) those which are bad and produce impurity,
(2) those which are good and productive of purity, (3) those
which are partly good and partly bad and thus productive of
both purity and impurity, (4) those which are neither good nor
bad and productive neither of purity nor of impurity, but which
contribute to the destruction of kammas [Footnote ref 4].

Final extinction of sorrow (_nibbāna_) takes place as the natural
result of the destruction of desires. Scholars of Buddhism have
tried to discover the meaning of this ultimate happening, and
various interpretations have been offered. Professor De la Vallée
Poussin has pointed out that in the Pāli texts Nibbāna has
sometimes been represented as a happy state, as pure annihilation,
as an inconceivable existence or as a changeless state [Footnote ref 5].

__________________________________________________________________________

[Footnote 1: See _Kathāvatthu_ and Warren's _Buddhism in Translations_, pp,
221 ff.]

[Footnote 2: _Atthasālinī_, p. 88.]

[Footnote 3: See _Atthasālinī_, p. 90.]

[Footnote 4: See _Atthasālinī_, p. 89.]

[Footnote 5: Prof. De la Vallįe Poussin's article in the _E. R.E._ on
Nirvā@na. See also _Cullavagga_, IX. i. 4; Mrs Rhys Davids's _Psalms
of the early Buddhists_, I. and II., Introduction, p. xxxvii; _Dīgha_,
II. 15; _Udāna_, VIII.; _Sa@myutta_, III. 109.]

109

Mr Schrader, in discussing Nibbāna in _Pali Text Society Journal_,
1905, says that the Buddha held that those who sought to become
identified after death with the soul of the world as infinite space
(_ākāsa_) or consciousness (_vińńāna_) attained to a state in which
they had a corresponding feeling of infiniteness without having
really lost their individuality. This latter interpretation of
Nibbāna seems to me to be very new and quite against the spirit
of the Buddhistic texts. It seems to me to be a hopeless task
to explain Nibbāna in terms of worldly experience, and there
is no way in which we can better indicate it than by saying that
it is a cessation of all sorrow; the stage at which all worldly
experiences have ceased can hardly be described either as positive
or negative. Whether we exist in some form eternally or do not
exist is not a proper Buddhistic question, for it is a heresy to
think of a Tathāgata as existing eternally (_s'ās'vata_) or not-existing
(_as'ās'vata_) or whether he is existing as well as not
existing or whether he is neither existing nor non-existing. Any
one who seeks to discuss whether Nibbāna is either a positive
and eternal state or a mere state of non-existence or annihilation,
takes a view which has been discarded in Buddhism as heretical.
It is true that we in modern times are not satisfied with it, for
we want to know what it all means. But it is not possible to
give any answer since Buddhism regarded all these questions as
illegitimate.

Later Buddhistic writers like Nāgārjuna and Candrakīrtti
took advantage of this attitude of early Buddhism and interpreted
it as meaning the non-essential character of all existence.
Nothing existed, and therefore any question regarding the existence
or non-existence of anything would be meaningless. There
is no difference between the worldly stage (_sa@msāra_) and Nibbāna,
for as all appearances are non-essential, they never existed during
the sa@msāra so that they could not be annihilated in Nibbāna.


Upani@sads and Buddhism.

The Upani@sads had discovered that the true self was ānanda
(bliss) [Footnote ref 1]. We could suppose that early Buddhism tacitly
presupposes some such idea. It was probably thought that if there was
the self (_attā_) it must be bliss. The Upani@sads had asserted that
the self(_ātman_) was indestructible and eternal [Footnote ref 2]. If we
are allowed



__________________________________________________________________________

[Footnote 1: Tait, II.5.]

[Footnote 2: B@rh. IV. 5. 14. Ka@tha V. 13.]

110

to make explicit what was implicit in early Buddhism we could
conceive it as holding that if there was the self it must be bliss,
because it was eternal. This causal connection has not indeed
been anywhere definitely pronounced in the Upani@sads, but he
who carefully reads the Upani@sads cannot but think that the
reason why the Upani@sads speak of the self as bliss is that it is
eternal. But the converse statement that what was not eternal
was sorrow does not appear to be emphasized clearly in the
Upani@sads. The important postulate of the Buddha is that that
which is changing is sorrow, and whatever is sorrow is not self
[Footnote ref 1]. The point at which Buddhism parted from the
Upani@sads lies in the experiences of the self. The Upani@sads
doubtless considered that there were many experiences which we often
identify with self, but which are impermanent. But the belief is
found in the Upani@sads that there was associated with these a
permanent part as well, and that it was this permanent essence
which was the true and unchangeable self, the blissful. They considered
that this permanent self as pure bliss could not be defined
as this, but could only be indicated as not this, not this (_neti
neti_) [Footnote ref 2]. But the early Pali scriptures hold that we could
nowhere find out such a permanent essence, any constant self, in our
changing experiences. All were but changing phenomena and
therefore sorrow and therefore non-self, and what was non-self
was not mine, neither I belonged to it, nor did it belong to me
as my self [Footnote ref 3].

The true self was with the Upani@sads a matter of transcendental
experience as it were, for they said that it could not
be described in terms of anything, but could only be pointed out
as "there," behind all the changing mental categories. The
Buddha looked into the mind and saw that it did not exist. But
how was it that the existence of this self was so widely spoken
of as demonstrated in experience? To this the reply of the
Buddha was that what people perceived there when they said
that they perceived the self was but the mental experiences
either individually or together. The ignorant ordinary man did
not know the noble truths and was not trained in the way of wise
men, and considered himself to be endowed with form (_rūpa_)
or found the forms in his self or the self in the forms. He

________________________________________________________________

[Footnote 1: _Sa@myutta Nikūya_, III. pp. 44-45 ff.]

[Footnote 2: See B@rh. IV. iv. Chāndogya, VIII. 7-12.]

[Footnote 3: _Sa@myutta Nikaya_, III 45.]

111

experienced the thought (of the moment) as it were the self or
experienced himself as being endowed with thought, or the thought
in the self or the self in the thought. It is these kinds of
experiences that he considered as the perception of the self
[Footnote ref 1].

The Upani@sads did not try to establish any school of discipline
or systematic thought. They revealed throughout the dawn of an
experience of an immutable Reality as the self of man, as the only
abiding truth behind all changes. But Buddhism holds that this
immutable self of man is a delusion and a false knowledge.
The first postulate of the system is that impermanence is sorrow.
Ignorance about sorrow, ignorance about the way it originates,
ignorance about the nature of the extinction of sorrow, and ignorance
about the means of bringing about this extinction represent
the fourfold ignorance (_avijjā_) [Footnote ref 2]. The avidyā, which
is equivalent to the Pāli word avijjā, occurs in the Upani@sads also,
but there it means ignorance about the ātman doctrine, and it is
sometimes contrasted with vidyā or true knowledge about the self
(_ātman_) [Footnote ref 3]. With the Upani@sads the highest truth
was the permanent self, the bliss, but with the Buddha there was
nothing permanent; and all was change; and all change and impermanence
was sorrow [Footnote ref 4]. This is, then, the cardinal truth of
Buddhism, and ignorance concerning it in the above fourfold ways
represented the fourfold ignorance which stood in the way of the
right comprehension of the fourfold cardinal truths (_āriya
sacca_)--sorrow, cause of the origination of sorrow, extinction of
sorrow, and the means thereto.

There is no Brahman or supreme permanent reality and no
self, and this ignorance does not belong to any ego or self as we
may ordinarily be led to suppose.

Thus it is said in the _Visuddhimagga_ "inasmuch however
as ignorance is empty of stability from being subject to a coming
into existence and a disappearing from existence...and is empty
of a self-determining Ego from being subject to dependence,--...or
in other words inasmuch as ignorance is not an Ego, and
similarly with reference to Karma and the rest--therefore is it
to be understood of the wheel of existence that it is empty with
a twelvefold emptiness [Footnote ref 5]."

___________________________________________________________________

[Footnote 1: _Samyutta Nikāya_, II. 46.]

[Footnote 2: _Majjhima Nikāya_, I.p. 54.]

[Footnote 3: Chā. I.i. 10. B@rh. IV. 3.20. There are some passages where
vidyā and avidyā have been used in a different and rather obscure sense,
I's'ā 9-11.]

[Footnote 4: _A@ng. Nikāya_, III. 85.]

[Footnote 5 Warren's _Buddhism in Translations_ (_Visuddhimagga_, chap.
XVII.), p. 175.]

112


The Schools of Theravāda Buddhism.

There is reason to believe that the oral instructions of the
Buddha were not collected until a few centuries after his death.
Serious quarrels arose amongst his disciples or rather amongst
the successive generations of the disciples of his disciples about
his doctrines and other monastic rules which he had enjoined
upon his followers. Thus we find that when the council of Vesāli
decided against the V@rjin monks, called also the Vajjiputtakas,
they in their turn held another great meeting (Mahāsa@ngha) and
came to their own decisions about certain monastic rules and thus
came to be called as the Mahāsa@nghikas [Footnote ref 1]. According to
Vasumitra as translated by Vassilief, the Mahāsa@nghikas seceded in
400 B.C. and during the next one hundred years they gave rise
first to the three schools Ekavyavahārikas, Lokottaravādins, and
Kukkulikas and after that the Bahus'rutīyas. In the course of the
next one hundred years, other schools rose out of it namely the
Prajńaptivādins, Caittikas, Aparas'ailas and Uttaras'ailas. The
Theravāda or the Sthaviravāda school which had convened the
council of Vesāli developed during the second and first century B.C.
into a number of schools, viz. the Haimavatas, Dharmaguptikas,
Mahīs'āsakas, Kās'yapīyas, Sa@nkrāntikas (more well known as
Sautrāntikas) and the Vātsiputtrīyas which latter was again split up
into the Dharmottarīyas, Bhadrayānīyas, Sammitīyas and Channāgarikas.
The main branch of the Theravāda school was from
the second century downwards known as the Hetuvādins or
Sarvāstivādins [Footnote ref 2]. The _Mahābodhiva@msa_ identifies the
Theravāda school with the Vibhajjavādins. The commentator of the
_Kathāvatthu_ who probably lived according to Mrs Rhys Davids sometime
in the fifth century A.D. mentions a few other schools of
Buddhists. But of all these Buddhist schools we know very little.
Vasumitra (100 A.D.) gives us some very meagre accounts of

____________________________________________________________________

[Footnote 1: The _Mahāva@msa_ differs from _Dīpava@msa_ in holding that
the Vajjiputtakas did not develop into the Mahāsa@nghikas, but it was
the Mahāsa@nghikas who first seceded while the Vajjiputtakas seceded
independently of them. The _Mahābodhiva@msa_, which according to
Professor Geiger was composed 975 A.D.--1000 A.D., follows the
Mahava@msa in holding the Mahāsa@nghikas to be the first seceders
and Vajjiputtakas to have seceded independently.

Vasumitra confuses the council of Vesali with the third council of
Pā@taliputra. See introduction to translation of _Kathāvatthu_ by
Mrs Rhys Davids.]

[Footnote 2: For other accounts of the schism see Mr Aung and Mrs Rhys
Davids's translation of _Kathāvatthu_, pp. xxxvi-xlv.]

113

certain schools, of the Mahāsa@nghikas, Lokottaravādins,
Ekavyavahārikas, Kakkulikas, Prajńaptivādins and Sarvāstivādins, but
these accounts deal more with subsidiary matters of little philosophical
importance. Some of the points of interest are (1) that the
Mahāsa@nghikas were said to believe that the body was filled with
mind (_citta_) which was represented as sitting, (2) that the
Prajńaptivādins held that there was no agent in man, that there was
no untimely death, for it was caused by the previous deeds of man,
(3) that the Sarvāstivādins believed that everything existed. From
the discussions found in the _Kathāvatthu_ also we may know the
views of some of the schools on some points which are not always
devoid of philosophical interest. But there is nothing to be found
by which we can properly know the philosophy of these schools. It
is quite possible however that these so-called schools of Buddhism
were not so many different systems but only differed from one
another on some points of dogma or practice which were considered
as being of sufficient interest to them, but which to us now
appear to be quite trifling. But as we do not know any of their
literatures, it is better not to make any unwarrantable surmises.
These schools are however not very important for a history of later
Indian Philosophy, for none of them are even referred to in any
of the systems of Hindu thought. The only schools of Buddhism
with which other schools of philosophical thought came in direct
contact, are the Sarvāstivādins including the Sautrāntikas and
the Vaibhā@sikas, the Yogācāra or the Vijńānavādins and the
Mādhyamikas or the S'ūnyavādins. We do not know which of the
diverse smaller schools were taken up into these four great schools,
the Sautrāntika, Vaibhā@sika, Yogācāra and the Mādhyamika
schools. But as these schools were most important in relation
to the development of the different systems in Hindu thought,
it is best that we should set ourselves to gather what we can
about these systems of Buddhistic thought.

When the Hindu writers refer to the Buddhist doctrine in
general terms such as "the Buddhists say" without calling them
the Vijńānavādins or the Yogācāras and the S'ūnyavādins,
they often refer to the Sarvūstivūdins by which they mean
both the Sautrūntikas and the Vaibhū@sikas, ignoring the difference
that exists between these two schools. It is well to
mention that there is hardly any evidence to prove that the
Hindu writers were acquainted with the Theravūda doctrines

114

as expressed in the Pāli works. The Vaibhā@sikas and the Sautrāntikas
have been more or less associated with each other. Thus
the _Abhidharmakos'as'āstra_ of Vasubandhu who was a Vaibhā@sika
was commented upon by Yas'omitra who was a Sautrāntika. The
difference between the Vaibhā@sikas and the Sautrāntikas that
attracted the notice of the Hindu writers was this, that the former
believed that external objects were directly perceived, whereas
the latter believed that the existence of the external objects could
only be inferred from our diversified knowledge [Footnote ref 1].
Gu@naratna (fourteenth century A.D.) in his commentary
_Tarkarahasyadīpikā on @Sa@ddars'anasamuccaya_ says that the Vaibhāsika
was but another name of the Āryasammitīya school. According to
Gu@naratna the Vaibhā@sikas held that things existed for four moments,
the moment of production, the moment of existence, the moment of
decay and the moment of annihilation. It has been pointed out
in Vastlbandhu's _Abhidharmakos'a_ that the Vaibhā@sikas believed
these to be four kinds of forces which by coming in combination
with the permanent essence of an entity produced its impermanent
manifestations in life (see Prof. Stcherbatsky's translation
of Yas'omitra on _Abhidharmakos'a kārikā_, V. 25). The self called
pudgala also possessed those characteristics. Knowledge was
formless and was produced along with its object by the very
same conditions (_arthasahabhāsī ekasamāgryadhīnah_). The Sautrāntikas
according to Gu@naratna held that there was no soul but
only the five skandhas. These skandhas transmigrated. The past,
the future, annihilation, dependence on cause, ākās'a and pudgala
are but names (_sa@mjńāmātram_), mere assertions (_pratijńāmātram_),
mere limitations (_samv@rtamātram_) and mere phenomena (_vyavahāramātram_).
By pudgala they meant that which other people called eternal
and all pervasive soul. External objects are never directly
perceived but are only inferred as existing for explaining the
diversity of knowledge. Definite cognitions are valid; all
compounded things are momentary (_k@sa@nikāh sarvasa@mskārāh_).

___________________________________________________________________

[Footnote 1: Mādhavācārya's _Sarvadars'anasa@mgraha_, chapter II.
_S'āstradīpikā_, the discussions on Pratyak@sa, Amalańanda's commentary
(on _Bhāmatī_) _Vedāntakalpataru_, p 286. "_vaibhā@sikasya bāhyo'rtha@h
pratyak@sa@h, sautrāntikasya jńānagatākāravaicitrye@n anumeya@h_." The
nature of the inference of the Sautrāntikas is shown thus by
Amalānanda (1247-1260 A.D.) "_ye yasmin satyapi kādācitkā@h te
tadatiriktāpek@sā@h_" (those [i.e. cognitions] which in spite of certain
unvaried conditions are of unaccounted diversity must depend on other
things in addition to these, i.e. the external objects)
_Vedāntakalpataru_, p. 289.]

115

The atoms of colour, taste, smell and touch, and cognition are
being destroyed every moment. The meanings of words always
imply the negations of all other things, excepting that which is
intended to be signified by that word (_anyāpoha@h s'abdārtha@h_).
Salvation (_mok@sa_) comes as the result of the destruction of the
process of knowledge through continual meditation that there
is no soul [Footnote ref 1].

One of the main differences between the Vibhajjavādins, Sautrāntikas
and the Vaibhā@sikas or the Sarvāstivādins appears to
refer to the notion of time which is a subject of great interest
with Buddhist philosophy. Thus _Abhidharmakos'a_ (v. 24...)
describes the Sarvāstivādins as those who maintain the universal
existence of everything past, present and future. The Vibhajjavādins
are those "who maintain that the present elements and
those among the past that have not yet produced their fruition,
are existent, but they deny the existence of the future ones and
of those among the past that have already produced fruition."
There were four branches of this school represented by Dharmatrāta,
Gho@sa, Vasumitra and Buddhadeva. Dharmatrāta maintained
that when an element enters different times, its existence
changes but not its essence, just as when milk is changed into curd
or a golden vessel is broken, the form of the existence changes
though the essence remains the same. Gho@sa held that "when
an element appears at different times, the past one retains its
past aspects without being severed from its future and present
aspects, the present likewise retains its present aspect without
completely losing its past and future aspects," just as a man in
passionate love with a woman does not lose his capacity to love
other women though he is not actually in love with them. Vasumitra
held that an entity is called present, past and future according
as it produces its efficiency, ceases to produce after having
once produced it or has not yet begun to produce it. Buddhadeva
maintained the view that just as the same woman may
be called mother, daughter, wife, so the same entity may be
called present, past or future in accordance with its relation to the
preceding or the succeeding moment.

All these schools are in some sense Sarvāstivādins, for they
maintain universal existence. But the Vaibhā@sika finds them all
defective excepting the view of Vasumitra. For Dharmatrāta's

___________________________________________________________________

[Footnote 1: Gu@naratna's _Tarkarahasyadīpikā_, pp. 46-47.]

116

view is only a veiled Sā@mkhya doctrine; that of Gho@sa is
a confusion of the notion of time, since it presupposes the coexistence
of all the aspects of an entity at the same time, and
that of Buddhadeva is also an impossible situation, since it would
suppose that all the three times were found together and included
in one of them. The Vaibhā@sika finds himself in agreement
with Vasumitra's view and holds that the difference in time
depends upon the difference of the function of an entity; at the
time when an entity does not actually produce its function it is
future; when it produces it, it becomes present; when after having
produced it, it stops, it becomes past; there is a real existence
of the past and the future as much as of the present. He thinks
that if the past did not exist and assert some efficiency it could
not have been the object of my knowledge, and deeds done in
past times could not have produced its effects in the present
time. The Sautrāntika however thought that the Vaibhā@sika's
doctrine would imply the heretical doctrine of eternal existence,
for according to them the stuff remained the same and the time-difference
appeared in it. The true view according to him was,
that there was no difference between the efficiency of an entity,
the entity and the time of its appearance. Entities appeared
from non-existence, existed for a moment and again ceased to
exist. He objected to the Vaibhā@sika view that the past is to
be regarded as existent because it exerts efficiency in bringing
about the present on the ground that in that case there should
be no difference between the past and the present, since both
exerted efficiency. If a distinction is made between past, present
and future efficiency by a second grade of efficiencies, then we
should have to continue it and thus have a vicious infinite. We
can know non-existent entities as much as we can know existent
ones, and hence our knowledge of the past does not imply
that the past is exerting any efficiency. If a distinction is
made between an efficiency and an entity, then the reason why
efficiency started at any particular time and ceased at another
would be inexplicable. Once you admit that there is no difference
between efficiency and the entity, you at once find that
there is no time at all and the efficiency, the entity and the
moment are all one and the same. When we remember a thing
of the past we do not know it as existing in the past, but in the
same way in which we knew it when it was present. We are

117

never attracted to past passions as the Vaibhā@sika suggests, but
past passions leave residues which become the causes of new
passions of the present moment [Footnote ref.1].

Again we can have a glimpse of the respective positions of
the Vātsiputtrīyas and the Sarvāstivādins as represented by
Vasubandhu if we attend to the discussion on the subject of
the existence of soul in _Abhidharmakos'a_. The argument of
Vasubandhu against the existence of soul is this, that though
it is true that the sense organs may be regarded as a determining
cause of perception, no such cause can be found which
may render the inference of the existence of soul necessary.
If soul actually exists, it must have an essence of its own and
must be something different from the elements or entities of a
personal life. Moreover, such an eternal, uncaused and unchanging
being would be without any practical efficiency (_arthakriyākāritva_)
which alone determines or proves existence. The
soul can thus be said to have a mere nominal existence as a
mere object of current usage. There is no soul, but there are
only the elements of a personal life. But the Vātsiputtrīya
school held that just as fire could not be said to be either the
same as the burning wood or as different from it, and yet it is
separate from it, so the soul is an individual (_pudgala_) which has
a separate existence, though we could not say that it was
altogether different from the elements of a personal life or the
same as these. It exists as being conditioned by the elements
of personal life, but it cannot further be defined. But its existence
cannot be denied, for wherever there is an activity, there must
be an agent (e.g. Devadatta walks). To be conscious is likewise
an action, hence the agent who is conscious must also exist.
To this Vasubandhu replies that Devadatta (the name of a
person) does not represent an unity. "It is only an unbroken
continuity of momentary forces (flashing into existence), which
simple people believe to be a unity and to which they give the
name Devadatta. Their belief that Devadatta moves is conditioned,
and is based on an analogy with their own experience,
but their own continuity of life consists in constantly moving
from one place to another. This movement, though regarded as

_________________________________________________________________

[Footnote 1: I am indebted for the above account to the unpublished
translation from Tibetan of a small portion of _Abhidharmakoia_ by
my esteemed friend Prof. Th. Stcherbatsky of Petrograd. I am grateful
to him that he allowed me to utilize it.]

118

belonging to a permanent entity, is but a series of new productions
in different places, just as the expressions 'fire moves,'
'sound spreads' have the meaning of continuities (of new productions
in new places). They likewise use the words 'Devadatta
cognises' in order to express the fact that a cognition (takes place
in the present moment) which has a cause (in the former moments,
these former moments coming in close succession being called
Devadatta)."

The problem of memory also does not bring any difficulty,
for the stream of consciousness being one throughout, it produces
its recollections when connected with a previous knowledge of
the remembered object under certain conditions of attention,
etc., and absence of distractive factors, such as bodily pains or
violent emotions. No agent is required in the phenomena of
memory. The cause of recollection is a suitable state of mind
and nothing else. When the Buddha told his birth stories saying
that he was such and such in such and such a life, he only
meant that his past and his present belonged to one and the
same lineage of momentary existences. Just as when we say
"this same fire which had been consuming that has reached this
object," we know that the fire is not identical at any two
moments, but yet we overlook the difference and say that it is
the same fire. Again, what we call an individual can only be
known by descriptions such as "this venerable man, having this
name, of such a caste, of such a family, of such an age, eating
such food, finding pleasure or displeasure in such things, of such
an age, the man who after a life of such length, will pass away
having reached an age." Only so much description can be
understood, but we have never a direct acquaintance with the
individual; all that is perceived are the momentary elements of
sensations, images, feelings, etc., and these happening at the
former moments exert a pressure on the later ones. The individual
is thus only a fiction, a mere nominal existence, a mere
thing of description and not of acquaintance; it cannot be
grasped either by the senses or by the action of pure intellect.
This becomes evident when we judge it by analogies from other
fields. Thus whenever we use any common noun, e.g. milk, we
sometimes falsely think that there is such an entity as milk, but
what really exists is only certain momentary colours, tastes, etc.,
fictitiously unified as milk; and "just as milk and water are

119

conventional names (for a set of independent elements) for some
colour, smell (taste and touch) taken together, so is the designation
'individual' but a common name for the different elements
of which it is composed."

The reason why the Buddha declined to decide the question
whether the "living being is identical with the body or not" is
just because there did not exist any living being as "individual,"
as is generally supposed. He did not declare that the living
being did not exist, because in that case the questioner would
have thought that the continuity of the elements of a life was
also denied. In truth the "living being" is only a conventional
name for a set of constantly changing elements [Footnote ref 1].

The only book of the Sammitīyas known to us and that by
name only is the _Sammitīyas'āstra_ translated into Chinese between
350 A.D. to 431 A.D.; the original Sanskrit works are however
probably lost [Footnote ref 2].

The Vaibhā@sikas are identified with the Sarvāstivādins who
according to _Dīpava@msa_ V. 47, as pointed out by Takakusu,
branched off from the Mahīs'āsakas, who in their turn had
separated from the Theravāda school.

From the _Kathāvatthu_ we know (1) that the Sabbatthivādins
believed that everything existed, (2) that the dawn of right attainment
was not a momentary flash of insight but by a gradual
process, (3) that consciousness or even samādhi was nothing but

________________________________________________________________________

[Footnote 1: This account is based on the translation of
_A@s@tamakos'asthānanibaddha@h pudgolavinis'caya@h_, a special appendix
to the eighth chapter of Abhidharmakos'a, by Prof Th. Stcherbatsky,
_Bulletin de l' Académie des Sciences de Russie_, 1919.]

[Footnote 2: Professor De la Vallée Poussin has collected some of the
points of this doctrine in an article on the Sammitīyas in the _E. R.E._
He there says that in the _Abhidharmakos'avyākhyā_ the Sammitīyas have
been identified with the Vātsīputtrīyas and that many of its texts were
admitted by the Vaibhā@sikas of a later age. Some of their views are as
follows: (1) An arhat in possession of nirvāna can fall away; (2) there is
an intermediate state between death and rebirth called _antarābhava_; (3)
merit accrues not only by gift (_tyagānvaya_) but also by the fact of the
actual use and advantage reaped by the man to whom the thing was given
(_paribhogānvaya pu@nya_); (4) not only abstention from evil deeds but a
declaration of intention to that end produces merit by itself alone; (5)
they believe in a pudgala (soul) as distinct from the skandhas from
which it can be said to be either different or non-different. "The pudgala
cannot be said to be transitory (_anitye_) like the skandhas since it
transmigrates laying down the burden (_skandhas_) shouldering a new burden;
it cannot be said to be permanent, since it is made of transitory
constituents." This pudgala doctrine of the Sammitīyas as sketched by
Professor De la Vallée Poussin is not in full agreement with the pudgala
doctrine of the Sammitīyas as sketched by Gu@naratna which we have
noticed above.]

120

a flux and (4) that an arhat (saint) may fall away [Footnote ref 1].
The Sabbatthivādins or Sarvāstivādins have a vast Abhidharma literature
still existing in Chinese translations which is different from the
Abhidharma of the Theravāda school which we have already mentioned
[Footnote ref 2]. These are 1. _Jńānaprasthāna S'āstra_ of
Kātyāyanīputtra which passed by the name of _Mahā Vibhā@sā_ from which
the Sabbatthivādins who followed it are called Vaibhā@sikas [Footnote ref
3]. This work is said to have been given a literary form by As'vagho@sa.
2. _Dharmaskandha_ by S'āriputtra. 3. _Dhātukāya_ by Pūr@na.
4. _Prajńaptis'āstra_ by Maudgalyāyana. 5. _Vijńānakāya_ by Devak@sema.
6. _Sa@ngītiparyyāya_ by Sāriputtra and _Prakara@napāda_ by Vasumitra.
Vasubandhu (420 A.D.-500 A.D.) wrote a work on the Vaibhā@sika [Footnote
ref 4] system in verses (_kārikā_) known as the _Abhidharmakos'a_,
to which he appended a commentary of his own which passes by the name
_Abhidharma Kos'abhā@sya_ in which he pointed out some of the defects
of the Vaibhā@sika school from the Sautrāntika point of view [Footnote
ref 5]. This work was commented upon by Vasumitra and Gu@namati and
later on by Yas'omitra who was himself a Sautrāntika and called his
work _Abhidharmakos'a vyākhyā_; Sa@nghabhadra a contemporary of Vasubandhu
wrote _Samayapradipa_ and _Nyāyānusāra_ (Chinese translations of which
are available) on strict Vaibhā@sika lines. We hear also of other
Vaibhā@sika writers such as Dharmatrāta, Gho@saka, Vasumitra and
Bhadanta, the writer of _Sa@myuktābhidharmas'āstra_ and _Mahāvibhā@sā_.
Di@nnāga(480 A.D.), the celebrated logician, a Vaibhā@sika
or a Sautrāntika and reputed to be a pupil of Vasubandhu,
wrote his famous work _Pramā@nasamuccaya_ in which he
established Buddhist logic and refuted many of the views of Vātsyāyana
the celebrated commentator of the _Nyāya sūtras_; but we regret

____________________________________________________________________

[Footnote 1: See Mrs Rhys Davids's translation _Kathāvatthu_, p. xix,
and Sections I.6,7; II. 9 and XI. 6.]

[Footnote 2: _Mahāvyutpatti_ gives two names for Sarvāstivāda, viz.
Mūlasarvāstivāda and Āryyasarvāstivāda. Itsing (671-695 A.D.) speaks
of Āryyamūlasarvāstivāda and Mūlasarvāstivāda. In his time he found
it prevailing in Magadha, Guzrat, Sind, S. India, E. India. Takakusu
says (_P.T.S._ 1904-1905) that Paramārtha, in his life of Vasubandhu,
says that it was propagated from Kashmere to Middle India by Vasubhadra,
who studied it there.]

[Footnote 3: Takakusu says (_P.T.S._ 1904-1905) that Kātyāyanīputtra's work
was probably a compilation from other Vibhā@sās which existed before the
Chinese translations and Vibhā@sā texts dated 383 A.D.]

[Footnote 4: See Takakusu's article _J.R.A.S._ 1905.]

[Footnote 5: The Sautrāntikas did not regard the Abhidharmas of the
Vaibhā@sikas as authentic and laid stress on the suttanta doctrines
as given in the Suttapi@taka.]

121

to say that none of the above works are available in Sanskrit,
nor have they been retranslated from Chinese or Tibetan into
any of the modern European or Indian languages.

The Japanese scholar Mr Yamakami Sogen, late lecturer at
Calcutta University, describes the doctrine of the Sabbatthivādins
from the Chinese versions of the _Abhidharmakos'a, Mahāvibhā@sās'āstra_,
etc., rather elaborately [Footnote ref 1]. The following is a short sketch,
which is borrowed mainly from the accounts given by Mr Sogen.

The Sabbatthivādins admitted the five skandhas, twelve
āyatanas, eighteen dhātus, the three asa@msk@rta dharmas of
pratisa@mkhyānirodha apratisa@mkhyānirodha and ākās'a, and the
sa@msk@rta dharmas (things composite and interdependent) of rūpa
(matter), citta (mind), caitta (mental) and cittaviprayukta (non-mental)
[Footnote ref 2]. All effects are produced by the coming together
(sa@msk@rta) of a number of causes. The five skandhas, and the
rūpa, citta, etc., are thus called sa@msk@rta dharmas (composite
things or collocations--_sambhūyakāri_). The rūpa dharmas are
eleven in number, one citta dharma, 46 caitta dharmas and 14
cittaviprayukta sa@mskāra dharmas (non-mental composite things);
adding to these the three asa@msk@rta dharmas we have the seventy-five
dharmas. Rūpa is that which has the capacity to obstruct the
sense organs. Matter is regarded as the collective organism or
collocation, consisting of the fourfold substratum of colour, smell,
taste and contact. The unit possessing this fourfold substratum
is known as paramā@nu, which is the minutest form of rūpa. It
cannot be pierced through or picked up or thrown away. It is
indivisible, unanalysable, invisible, inaudible, untastable and intangible.
But yet it is not permanent, but is like a momentary
flash into being. The simple atoms are called _dravyaparamā@nu_
and the compound ones _sa@mghātaparamā@nu_. In the words of
Prof. Stcherbatsky "the universal elements of matter are manifested
in their actions or functions. They are consequently more
energies than substances." The organs of sense are also regarded
as modifications of atomic matter. Seven such paramā@nus combine
together to form an a@nu, and it is in this combined form
only that they become perceptible. The combination takes
place in the form of a cluster having one atom at the centre and

____________________________________________________________________

[Footnote 1: _Systems of Buddhistic Thought_, published by the Calcutta
University.]

[Footnote 2: S'a@nkara in his meagre sketch of the doctrine of the
Sarvāstivādins in his bhā@sya on the _Brahma-sūtras_ II. 2 notices some
of the categories mentioned by Sogen.]

122

others around it. The point which must be remembered in connection
with the conception of matter is this, that the qualities
of all the mahābhūtas are inherent in the paramā@nus. The special
characteristics of roughness (which naturally belongs to earth),
viscousness (which naturally belongs to water), heat (belonging
to fire), movableness (belonging to wind), combine together to
form each of the elements; the difference between the different
elements consists only in this, that in each of them its own special
characteristics were predominant and active, and other characteristics
though present remained only in a potential form. The
mutual resistance of material things is due to the quality of
earth or the solidness inherent in them; the mutual attraction of
things is due to moisture or the quality of water, and so forth.
The four elements are to be observed from three aspects, namely,
(1) as things, (2) from the point of view of their natures (such as
activity, moisture, etc.), and (3) function (such as _dh@rti_ or
attraction, _sa@mgraha_ or cohesion, _pakti_ or chemical heat, and
_vyūhana_ or clustering and collecting). These combine together
naturally by other conditions or causes. The main point of distinction
between the Vaibhā@sika Sarvāstivadins and other forms of Buddhism
is this, that here the five skandhas and matter are regarded
as permanent and eternal; they are said to be momentary
only in the sense that they are changing their phases constantly,
owing to their constant change of combination. Avidyā is not
regarded here as a link in the chain of the causal series of
pratītyasamutpāda; nor is it ignorance of any particular individual,
but is rather identical with "moha" or delusion and
represents the ultimate state of immaterial dharmas. Avidyā,
which through sa@mskāra, etc., produces nāmarūpa in the case of
a particular individual, is not his avidyā in the present existence
but the avidyā of his past existence bearing fruit in the present
life.

"The cause never perishes but only changes its name, when
it becomes an effect, having changed its state." For example,
clay becomes jar, having changed its state; and in this case the
name clay is lost and the name jar arises [Footnote ref 1]. The
Sarvāstivādins allowed simultaneousness between cause and effect only in
the case of composite things (_sa@mprayukta hetu_) and in the case of

__________________________________________________________________

[Footnote 1: Sogen's quotation from Kumārajīva's Chinese version of
Āryyadeva's commentary on the _Mādhyamika s'āstra_ (chapter XX. Kārikā 9).]

123

the interaction of mental and material things. The substratum
of "vijńāna" or "consciousness" is regarded as permanent and
the aggregate of the five senses (_indriyas_) is called the perceiver.
It must be remembered that the indriyas being material had a
permanent substratum, and their aggregate had therefore also a
substratum formed of them.

The sense of sight grasps the four main colours of blue, yellow,
red, white, and their combinations, as also the visual forms of
appearance (_sa@msthāna_) of long, short, round, square, high, low,
straight, and crooked. The sense of touch (_kāyendriya_) has for
its object the four elements and the qualities of smoothness,
roughness, lightness, heaviness, cold, hunger and thirst. These
qualities represent the feelings generated in sentient beings by
the objects of touch, hunger, thirst, etc., and are also counted
under it, as they are the organic effects produced by a touch
which excites the physical frame at a time when the energy of
wind becomes active in our body and predominates over other
energies; so also the feeling of thirst is caused by a touch which
excites the physical frame when the energy of the element of fire
becomes active and predominates over the other energies. The
indriyas (senses) can after grasping the external objects arouse
thought (_vijńāna_); each of the five senses is an agent without
which none of the five vijńānas would become capable of perceiving
an external object. The essence of the senses is entirely
material. Each sense has two subdivisions, namely, the principal
sense and the auxiliary sense. The substratum of the principal
senses consists of a combination of paramā@nus, which are extremely
pure and minute, while the substratum of the latter is
the flesh, made of grosser materials. The five senses differ from
one another with respect to the manner and form of their respective
atomic combinations. In all sense-acts, whenever an act is
performed and an idea is impressed, a latent energy is impressed
on our person which is designated as avijńapti rūpa. It is called
rūpa because it is a result or effect of rūpa-contact; it is called
avijńapti because it is latent and unconscious; this latent energy
is bound sooner or later to express itself in karma effects and is
the only bridge which connects the cause and the effect of karma
done by body or speech. Karma in this school is considered
as twofold, namely, that as thought (_cetana karma_) and that as
activity (_caitasika karma_). This last, again, is of two kinds, viz.

124

that due to body-motion (_kāyika karma_) and speech (_vācika
karma_). Both these may again be latent (_avijńapti_) and patent
(_vijńapti_), giving us the kāyika-vijnńpti karma, kāyikāvijńapti
karma, vācika-vijńapti karma and vācikāvijńapti karma. Avijńapti
rūpa and avijńapti karma are what we should call in modern
phraseology sub-conscious ideas, feelings and activity. Corresponding
to each conscious sensation, feeling, thought or activity
there is another similar sub-conscious state which expresses itself
in future thoughts and actions; as these are not directly known but
are similar to those which are known, they are called avijńapti.

The mind, says Vasubandhu, is called cittam, because it
wills (_cetati_), manas because it thinks (_manvate_) and vijńāna
because it discriminates (_nirdis'ati_). The discrimination may be
of three kinds: (1) svabhāva nirdes'a (natural perceptual discrimination),
(2) prayoga nirdes'a (actual discrimination as present,
past and future), and (3) anusm@rti nirdes'a (reminiscent discrimination
referring only to the past). The senses only possess the
_svabhāva nirdes'a_, the other two belong exclusively to manovijńāna.
Each of the vijńānas as associated with its specific sense discriminates
its particular object and perceives its general characteristics;
the six vijńānas combine to form what is known as the
Vijńānaskandha, which is presided over by mind (_mano_). There
are forty-six caitta sa@msk@rta dharmas. Of the three asa@msk@rta
dharmas ākās'a (ether) is in essence the freedom from obstruction,
establishing it as a permanent omnipresent immaterial substance
(_nīrūpākhya_, non-rūpa). The second asa@msk@rta dharma, apratisa@mkhyā
nirodha, means the non-perception of dharmas caused
by the absence of pratyayas or conditions. Thus when I fix my
attention on one thing, other things are not seen then, not because
they are non-existent but because the conditions which would
have made them visible were absent. The third asa@msk@rta
dharma, pratisa@mkhyā nirodha, is the final deliverance from
bondage. Its essential characteristic is everlastingness. These
are called asa@msk@rta because being of the nature of negation
they are non-collocative and hence have no production or dissolution.
The eightfold noble path which leads to this state consists of right
views, right aspirations, right speech, right conduct, right livelihood,
right effort, right mindfulness, right rapture [Footnote ref 1].

___________________________________________________________________

[Footnote 1: Mr Sogen mentions the name of another Buddhist Hīnayāna
thinker (about 250 A.D.), Harivarman, who founded a school known as
Satyasiddhi school, which propounded the same sort of doctrines as
those preached by Nāgārjuna. None of his works are available in Sanskrit
and I have never come across any allusion to his name by Sanskrit writers.]

125


Mahāyānism.

It is difficult to say precisely at what time Mahāyānism took
its rise. But there is reason to think that as the Mahāsa@nghikas
separated themselves from the Theravādins probably some time in
400 B.C. and split themselves up into eight different schools, those
elements of thoughts and ideas which in later days came to be
labelled as Mahāyāna were gradually on the way to taking their
first inception. We hear in about 100 A.D. of a number of works
which are regarded as various Mahāyāna sūtras, some of which
are probably as old as at least 100 B.C. (if not earlier) and others
as late as 300 or 400 A.D.[Footnote ref 1]. These Mahāyānasūtras, also
called the Vaipulyasūtras, are generally all in the form of instructions
given by the Buddha. Nothing is known about their authors or
compilers, but they are all written in some form of Sanskrit and
were probably written by those who seceded from the Theravāda
school.

The word Hīnayāna refers to the schools of Theravāda, and
as such it is contrasted with Mahāyāna. The words are generally
translated as small vehicle (_hīna_ = small, _yāna_ = vehicle) and great
vehicle (_mahā_ = great, _yāna_ = vehicle). But this translation by
no means expresses what is meant by Mahāyāna and Hīnayāna
[Footnote ref 2]. Asa@nga (480 A.D.) in his _Mahāyānasūtrāla@mkāra_ gives

__________________________________________________________________________

[Footnote 1: Quotations and references to many of these sūtras are found in
Candrakīrtti's commentary on the _Mādhyamīka kārikās_ of Nāgārjuna; some of
these are the following: _A@s@tasāhasrikāprajńāpāramitā_ (translated into
Chinese 164 A.D.-167 A.D.), _S'atasāhasrikāprajńāpāramitā, Gaganagańja,
Samādhisūtra, Tathāgataguhyasūtra, D@r@dhādhyās'ayasańcodanāsūtra,
Dhyāyitamu@s@tisūtra, Pitāputrasamāgamasūtra, Mahāyānasūtra,
Māradamanasūtra, Ratnakū@tasūtra, Ratnacū@dāparip@rcchāsūtra,
Ratnameghasūtra, Ratnarās`isūtra, Ratnākarasūtra,
Rā@s@trapālaparip@rcchāsūtra, La@nkāvatārasūtra, Lalitavistarasūtra,
Vajracchedikāsūtra, Vimalakīrttinirdes'asūtra, S'ālistambhasūtra,
Samādhirajasutra, Sukhāvatīvyūha, Suvar@naprabhāsasūtra,
Saddharmapu@n@darika (translated into Chinese A.D. 255),
Amitāyurdhyānasūtra, Hastikākhyasūtra, etc.]

[Footnote 2: The word Yāna is generally translated as vehicle, but a
consideration of numerous contexts in which the word occurs seems to
suggest that it means career or course or way, rather than vehicle
(_Lalitavistara_, pp. 25, 38; _Prajńāpāramitā_, pp. 24, 319;
_Samādhirājasūtra_, p. 1; _Karu@nāpu@ndarīka_, p. 67; _La@nkāvatārasūtra_,
pp. 68, 108, 132). The word Yāna is as old as the Upani@sads where we read
of Devayāna and Pit@ryāna. There is no reason why this word should be
taken in a different sense. We hear in _La@nkāvatāra_ of S'rāvakayāna
(career of the S'rāvakas or the Theravādin Buddhists), Pratyekabuddhayāna
(the career of saints before the coming of the Buddha), Buddha
yāna (career of the Buddhas), Ekayāna (one career), Devayāna (career of
the gods), Brahmayāna (career of becoming a Brahmā), Tathāgatayāna
(career of a Tathāgata). In one place _Lankāvatāra_ says that ordinarily
distinction is made between the three careers and one career and no career,
but these distinctions are only for the ignorant (_Lankāvatāra_, p. 68).]

126

us the reason why one school was called Hīnayāna whereas the
other, which he professed, was called Mahāyāna. He says that,
considered from the point of view of the ultimate goal of religion,
the instructions, attempts, realization, and time, the Hīnayāna
occupies a lower and smaller place than the other called Mahā
(great) Yāna, and hence it is branded as Hīna (small, or low).
This brings us to one of the fundamental points of distinction
between Hīnayāna and Mahāyāna. The ultimate good of an
adherent of the Hīnayāna is to attain his own nirvā@na or salvation,
whereas the ultimate goal of those who professed the Mahāyāna
creed was not to seek their own salvation but to seek the
salvation of all beings. So the Hīnayāna goal was lower, and in
consequence of that the instructions that its followers received,
the attempts they undertook, and the results they achieved were
narrower than that of the Mahāyāna adherents. A Hīnayāna man
had only a short business in attaining his own salvation, and this
could be done in three lives, whereas a Mahāyāna adherent was
prepared to work for infinite time in helping all beings to attain
salvation. So the Hīnayana adherents required only a short period
of work and may from that point of view also be called _hīna,_ or
lower.

This point, though important from the point of view of the
difference in the creed of the two schools, is not so from the point
of view of philosophy. But there is another trait of the Mahāyānists
which distinguishes them from the Hīnayānists from the
philosophical point of view. The Mahāyānists believed that all
things were of a non-essential and indefinable character and
void at bottom, whereas the Hīnayānists only believed in the
impermanence of all things, but did not proceed further than
that.

It is sometimes erroneously thought that Nāgārjuna first
preached the doctrine of S'ūnyavāda (essencelessness or voidness
of all appearance), but in reality almost all the Mahāyāna sūtras
either definitely preach this doctrine or allude to it. Thus if we
take some of those sūtras which were in all probability earlier than
Nāgārjuna, we find that the doctrine which Nāgārjuna expounded

127

with all the rigour of his powerful dialectic was quietly accepted
as an indisputable truth. Thus we find Subhūti saying to
the Buddha that vedanā (feeling), samjńā (concepts) and the
sa@mskāras (conformations) are all māyā (illusion) [Footnote ref 1]. All
the skandhas, dhätus (elements) and āyatanas are void and absolute
cessation. The highest knowledge of everything as pure void
is not different from the skandhas, dhātus and āyatanas, and this
absolute cessation of dharmas is regarded as the highest knowledge
(_prajńāpāramitā_) [Footnote ref 2]. Everything being void there is in
reality no process and no cessation. The truth is neither eternal
(_s'ās'vata_) nor non-eternal (_as'ās'vata_) but pure void. It should
be the object of a saint's endeavour to put himself in the "thatness"
(_tathatā_) and consider all things as void. The saint (_bodhisattva_)
has to establish himself in all the virtues (_pāramitā_), benevolence
(_dānapāramitā_), the virtue of character (_s'īlapāramitā_), the virtue
of forbearance (_k@sāntipāramitā_), the virtue of tenacity and strength
(_vīryyapāramitā_) and the virtue of meditation (_dhyānapāramitā_).
The saint (_bodhisattva_) is firmly determined that he will
help an infinite number of souls to attain nirvā@na. In reality,
however, there are no beings, there is no bondage, no salvation;
and the saint knows it but too well, yet he is not afraid
of this high truth, but proceeds on his career of attaining for
all illusory beings illusory emancipation from illusory bondage.
The saint is actuated with that feeling and proceeds in his
work on the strength of his pāramitās, though in reality there
is no one who is to attain salvation in reality and no one who
is to help him to attain it [Footnote ref 3]. The true prajńapāramitā is
the absolute cessation of all appearance (_ya@h anupalambha@h
sarvadharmā@nām sa prajńāpāramitā ityucyate_) [Footnote ref 4].

The Mahāyāna doctrine has developed on two lines, viz. that
of S'ūnyavāda or the Mādhyamika doctrine and Vijńānavāda.
The difference between S'ūnyavāda and Vijńānavāda (the theory
that there is only the appearance of phenomena of consciousness)
is not fundamental, but is rather one of method. Both of them
agree in holding that there is no truth in anything, everything
is only passing appearance akin to dream or magic. But
while the S'ūnyavādins were more busy in showing this
indefinableness of all phenomena, the Vijńānavādins, tacitly accepting

_______________________________________________________________

[Footnote 1: _A@s@tesāhasiihāprajńāpāramita_, p. 16.]

[Footnote 2: Ibid p. 177.]

[Footnote 3: Ibid p. 21.]

[Footnote 4: Ibid p. 177.]

128

the truth preached by the S'ūnyavādins, interested themselves in
explaining the phenomena of consciousness by their theory of
beginningless illusory root-ideas or instincts of the mind (_vāsanā_).

As'vagho@sa (100 A.D.) seems to have been the greatest teacher
of a new type of idealism (_vijńānavāda_) known as the Tathatā
philosophy. Trusting in Suzuki's identification of a quotation in
As'vagho@sa's _S'raddhotpādas'āstra_ as being made from
_La@nkāvatārasūtra_, we should think of the _La@nkāvatārasūtra_ as
being one of the early works of the Vijńānavādins [Footnote ref 1].
The greatest later writer of the Vijńānavāda school was Asa@nga
(400 A.D.), to whom are attributed the _Saptadas'abhūmi sūtra,
Mahāyāna sūtra, Upades'a, Mahāyānasamparigraha s'āstra, Yogācārabhūmi
s'āstra_ and _Mahāyānasūtrāla@mkāra_. None of these works excepting the
last one is available to readers who have no access to the
Chinese and Tibetan manuscripts, as the Sanskrit originals are
in all probability lost. The Vijńānavāda school is known to
Hindu writers by another name also, viz. Yogācāra, and it does
not seem an improbable supposition that Asa@nga's _Yogācārabhūmi
s'āstra_ was responsible for the new name. Vasubandhu,
a younger brother of Asa@nga, was, as Paramārtha (499-569) tells
us, at first a liberal Sarvāstivādin, but was converted to Vijńānavāda,
late in his life, by Asa@nga. Thus Vasubandhu, who
wrote in his early life the great standard work of the Sarvāstivādins,
_Abhidharmakos'a_, devoted himself in his later life to Vijńānavāda
[Footnote ref 2]. He is said to have commented upon a number of
Mahāyāna sūtras, such as _Avata@msaka, Nirvā@na, Saddharmapu@n@darīka,
Prajńāpāramitā, Vimalakīrtti_ and _S'rīmālāsi@mhanāda_, and
compiled some Mahāyāna sūtras, such as _Vijńānamātrasiddhi,
Ratnatraya_, etc. The school of Vijńānavāda continued for at
least a century or two after Vasubandhu, but we are not in
possession of any work of great fame of this school after him.

We have already noticed that the S'ūnyavāda formed the fundamental
principle of all schools of Mahāyāna. The most powerful
exponent of this doctrine was Nāgārjuna (1OO A.D.), a brief account
of whose system will be given in its proper place. Nāgārjuna's
kārikās (verses) were commented upon by Āryyadeva, a disciple
of his, Kumārajīva (383 A.D.). Buddhapālita and Candrakīrtti
(550 A.D.). Āryyadeva in addition to this commentary wrote at

________________________________________________________________

[Footnote 1: Dr S.C. Vidyābhūshana thinks that _Lankāvatāna_ belongs to
about 300 A.D.]

[Footnote 2: Takakusu's "A study of the Paramārtha's life of Vasubandhu,"
_J.R.A.S_. 1905.]

129

least three other books, viz. _Catu@hs'ataka, Hastabālaprakara@nav@rtti_
and _Cittavis`uddhiprakara@na_ [Footnote ref 1]. In the small work called
_Hastabālaprakara@nav@rtti_ Āryyadeva says that whatever depends
for its existence on anything else may be proved to be illusory;
all our notions of external objects depend on space perceptions
and notions of part and whole and should therefore be regarded
as mere appearance. Knowing therefore that all that is dependent
on others for establishing itself is illusory, no wise man
should feel attachment or antipathy towards these mere phenomenal
appearances. In his _Cittavis'uddhiprakara@na_ he says
that just as a crystal appears to be coloured, catching the reflection
of a coloured object, even so the mind though in itself
colourless appears to show diverse colours by coloration of imagination
(_vikalpa_). In reality the mind (_citta_) without a touch
of imagination (_kalpanā_) in it is the pure reality.

It does not seem however that the S'ūnyavādins could produce
any great writers after Candrakīrtti. References to S'ūnyavāda
show that it was a living philosophy amongst the Hindu writers
until the time of the great Mīmā@msā authority Kumārila who
flourished in the eighth century; but in later times the S'ūnyavādins
were no longer occupying the position of strong and active disputants.


The Tathataā Philosophy of As'vagho@sa (80 A.D.) [Footnote ref 2].

As'vagho@sa was the son of a Brahmin named Sai@mhaguhya
who spent his early days in travelling over the different parts of
India and defeating the Buddhists in open debates. He was probably
converted to Buddhism by Pār@sva who was an important
person in the third Buddhist Council promoted,
according to some authorities, by the King of Kashmere
and according to other authorities by Pu@nyayas'as [Footnote ref 3].

___________________________________________________________________

[Footnote 1: Āryyadeva's _Hastabālaprakara@nav@rtti_ has been reclaimed by
Dr. F.W. Thomas. Fragmentary portions of his _Cittavis'uddhiprakara@na_
were published by Mahāmahopādhyāya Haraprasāda s'āstrī in the Bengal
Asiatic Society's journal, 1898.]

[Footnote 2: The above section is based on the _Awakening of Faith_, an
English translation by Suzuki of the Chinese version of
_S'raddhotpādas`āstra_ by As'vagho@sa, the Sanskrit original of which
appears to have been lost. Suzuki has brought forward a mass of evidence
to show that As'vagho@sa was a contemporary of Kani@ska.]

[Footnote 3: Tāranātha says that he was converted by Aryadeva, a disciple
of Nāgārjuna, _Geschichte des Buddhismus_, German translation by Schiefner,
pp. 84-85. See Suzuki's _Awakening of Faith_, pp. 24-32. As'vagho@sa wrote
the _Buddhacaritakāvya_, of great poetical excellence, and the
_Mahāla@mkāras'āstra_. He was also a musician and had invented a musical
instrument called Rāstavara that he might by that means convert the
people of the city. "Its melody was classical, mournful, and melodious,
inducing the audience to ponder on the misery, emptiness, and non-ātmanness
of life." Suzuki, p. 35.]

130


He held that in the soul two aspects may be distinguished
--the aspect as thatness (_bhūtatathatā_) and the aspect as the cycle
of birth and death (_sa@msāra_). The soul as bhūtatathatā means
the oneness of the totality of all things (_dharmadhātu_). Its essential
nature is uncreate and external. All things simply on account
of the beginningless traces of the incipient and unconscious
memory of our past experiences of many previous lives (_sm@rti_)
appear under the forms of individuation [Footnote ref 1]. If we could
overcome this sm@rti "the signs of individuation would disappear and
there would be no trace of a world of objects." "All things in their
fundamental nature are not nameable or explicable. They cannot
be adequately expressed in any form of language. They
possess absolute sameness (_samatā_). They are subject neither to
transformation nor to destruction. They are nothing but one soul"
--thatness (_bhūtatathatā_). This "thatness" has no attribute and
it can only be somehow pointed out in speech as "thatness."
As soon as you understand that when the totality of existence is
spoken of or thought of, there is neither that which speaks nor
that which is spoken of, there is neither that which thinks nor
that which is thought of, "this is the stage of thatness." This
bhūtatathatā is neither that which is existence, nor that which is
non-existence, nor that which is at once existence and non-existence,
nor that which is not at once existence and non-existence;
it is neither that which is plurality, nor that which is
at once unity and plurality, nor that which is not at once unity
and plurality. It is a negative concept in the sense that it is
beyond all that is conditional and yet it is a positive concept
in the sense that it holds all within it. It cannot be comprehended
by any kind of particularization or distinction. It is
only by transcending the range of our intellectual categories of
the comprehension of the limited range of finite phenomena that
we can get a glimpse of it. It cannot be comprehended by the
particularizing consciousness of all beings, and we thus may call
it negation, "s'ūnyatā," in this sense. The truth is that which

____________________________________________________________________

[Footnote 1: I have ventured to translate "_sm@rti_" in the sense of vāsanā
in preference to Suzuki's "confused subjectivity" because sm@rti in the
sense of vāsanā is not unfamiliar to the readers of such Buddhist works
as _La@nkāvatāra_. The word "subjectivity" seems to be too European a
term to be used as a word to represent the Buddhist sense.]

131

subjectively does not exist by itself, that the negation (_s'ūnyatā_) is
also void (_s'ūnya_) in its nature, that neither that which is negated
nor that which negates is an independent entity. It is the pure
soul that manifests itself as eternal, permanent, immutable, and
completely holds all things within it. On that account it may be
called affirmation. But yet there is no trace of affirmation in it,
because it is not the product of the creative instinctive memory
(_sm@rti_) of conceptual thought and the only way of grasping the
truth--the thatness, is by transcending all conceptual creations.

"The soul as birth and death (_sa@msāra_) comes forth from
the Tathāgata womb (_tathāgatagarbha_), the ultimate reality.
But the immortal and the mortal coincide with each other.
Though they are not identical they are not duality either. Thus
when the absolute soul assumes a relative aspect by its self-affirmation
it is called the all-conserving mind (_ālayavijńāna_).
It embraces two principles, (1) enlightenment, (2) non-enlightenment.
Enlightenment is the perfection of the mind when it is
free from the corruptions of the creative instinctive incipient
memory (_sm@rti_). It penetrates all and is the unity of all
(_dharmadhātu_). That is to say, it is the universal dharmakāya of all
Tathāgatas constituting the ultimate foundation of existence.

"When it is said that all consciousness starts from this fundamental
truth, it should not be thought that consciousness had any
real origin, for it was merely phenomenal existence--a mere imaginary
creation of the perceivers under the influence of the
delusive sm@rti. The multitude of people (_bahujana_) are said to be
lacking in enlightenment, because ignorance (_avidyā_) prevails
there from all eternity, because there is a constant succession of
sm@rti (past confused memory working as instinct) from which
they have never been emancipated. But when they are divested
of this sm@rti they can then recognize that no states of mentation,
viz. their appearance, presence, change and disappearance, have
any reality. They are neither in a temporal nor in a spatial relation
with the one soul, for they are not self-existent.

"This high enlightenment shows itself imperfectly in our corrupted
phenomenal experience as prajńā (wisdom) and karma
(incomprehensible activity of life). By pure wisdom we understand
that when one, by virtue of the perfuming power of dharma,
disciplines himself truthfully (i.e. according to the dharma), and
accomplishes meritorious deeds, the mind (i.e. the _ālayavijńāna_)

132

which implicates itself with birth and death will be broken down
and the modes of the evolving consciousness will be annulled, and
the pure and the genuine wisdom of the Dharmakāya will manifest
itself. Though all modes of consciousness and mentation are
mere products of ignorance, ignorance in its ultimate nature is
identical and non-identical with enlightenment; and therefore
ignorance is in one sense destructible, though in another sense
it is indestructible. This may be illustrated by the simile of the
water and the waves which are stirred up in the ocean. Here
the water can be said to be both identical and non-identical
with the waves. The waves are stirred up by the wind, but the
water remains the same. When the wind ceases the motion of
the waves subsides, but the water remains the same. Likewise
when the mind of all creatures, which in its own nature is pure and
clean, is stirred up by the wind of ignorance (_avidyā_), the waves
of mentality (_vijńāna_) make their appearance. These three (i.e.
the mind, ignorance, and mentality) however have no existence,
and they are neither unity nor plurality. When the ignorance is
annihilated, the awakened mentality is tranquillized, whilst the
essence of the wisdom remains unmolested." The truth or the
enlightenment "is absolutely unobtainable by any modes of relativity
or by any outward signs of enlightenment. All events in
the phenomenal world are reflected in enlightenment, so that they
neither pass out of it, nor enter into it, and they neither disappear
nor are destroyed." It is for ever cut off from the hindrances both
affectional (_kles'āvara@na_) and intellectual (_jńeyāvara@na_), as well
as from the mind (i.e. _ālayavijńāna_) which implicates itself with
birth and death, since it is in its true nature clean, pure, eternal,
calm, and immutable. The truth again is such that it transforms
and unfolds itself wherever conditions are favourable in the form
of a tathāgata or in some other forms, in order that all beings
may be induced thereby to bring their virtue to maturity.

"Non-elightenment has no existence of its own aside from its
relation with enlightenment _a priori_." But enlightenment _a priori_
is spoken of only in contrast to non-enlightenment, and as
non-enlightenment is a non-entity, true enlightenment in turn loses
its significance too. They are distinguished only in mutual relation
as enlightenment or non-enlightenment. The manifestations
of non-enlightenment are made in three ways: (1) as a disturbance
of the mind (_ālayavijńāna_), by the avidyākarma (ignorant

133

action), producing misery (_du@hkha_); (2) by the appearance of an
ego or of a perceiver; and (3) by the creation of an external world
which does not exist in itself, independent of the perceiver. Conditioned
by the unreal external world six kinds of phenomena
arise in succession. The first phenomenon is intelligence (sensation);
being affected by the external world the mind becomes
conscious of the difference between the agreeable and the disagreeable.
The second phenomenon is succession. Following upon
intelligence, memory retains the sensations, agreeable as well
as disagreeable, in a continuous succession of subjective states.
The third phenomenon is clinging. Through the retention and
succession of sensations, agreeable as well as disagreeable, there
arises the desire of clinging. The fourth phenomenon is an attachment
to names or ideas (_sa@mjńā_), etc. By clinging the mind
hypostatizes all names whereby to give definitions to all things.
The fifth phenomenon is the performance of deeds (_karma_). On
account of attachment to names, etc., there arise all the variations
of deeds, productive of individuality. "The sixth phenomenon
is the suffering due to the fetter of deeds. Through deeds suffering
arises in which the mind finds itself entangled and curtailed of
its freedom." All these phenomena have thus sprung forth through
avidyā.

The relation between this truth and avidyā is in one sense
a mere identity and may be illustrated by the simile of all kinds
of pottery which though different are all made of the same clay
[Footnote ref 1]. Likewise the undefiled (_anāsrava_) and ignorance
(_avidyā_) and their various transient forms all come from one and the
same entity. Therefore Buddha teaches that all beings are from all
eternity abiding in Nirvā@na.

It is by the touch of ignorance (_avidyā_) that this truth assumes
all the phenomenal forms of existence.

In the all-conserving mind (_ālayavijńāna_) ignorance manifests
itself; and from non-enlightenment starts that which sees, that
which represents, that which apprehends an objective world, and
that which constantly particularizes. This is called ego (_manas_).
Five different names are given to the ego (according to its different
modes of operation). The first name is activity-consciousness
(_karmavijńāna_) in the sense that through the agency of
ignorance an unenlightened mind begins to be disturbed (or

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[Footnote 1: Compare Chāndogya, VI. 1. 4.]

134

awakened). The second name is evolving-consciousness (_prav@rttiivijńāna_)
in the sense that when the mind is disturbed, there
evolves that which sees an external world. The third name is
representation-consciousness in the sense that the ego (_manas_}
represents (or reflects) an external world. As a clean mirror
reflects the images of all description, it is even so with the
representation-consciousness. When it is confronted, for instance,
with the objects of the five senses, it represents them instantaneously
and without effort. The fourth is particularization-consciousness,
in the sense that it discriminates between different things defiled
as well as pure. The fifth name is succession-consciousness, in the
sense that continuously directed by the awakening consciousness
of attention (_manaskāra_) it (_manas_) retains all experiences and
never loses or suffers the destruction of any karma, good as well
as evil, which had been sown in the past, and whose retribution,
painful or agreeable, it never fails to mature, be it in the present
or in the future, and also in the sense that it unconsciously
recollects things gone by and in imagination anticipates things
to come. Therefore the three domains (_kāmaloka_, domain of
feeling--_rūpaloka_, domain of bodily existence--_arūpaloka_, domain
of incorporeality) are nothing but the self manifestation of the
mind (i.e. _ālayavijńāna_ which is practically identical with
_bhūtatathatā_). Since all things, owing the principle of their
existence to the mind (_ālayavijńāna_), are produced by sm@rti,
all the modes of particularization are the self-particularizations
of the mind. The mind in itself (or the soul) being however free from
all attributes is not differentiated. Therefore we come to the conclusion
that all things and conditions in the phenomenal world, hypostatized
and established only through ignorance (_avidyā_) and memory
(_sm@rti_), have no more reality than the images in a mirror. They
arise simply from the ideality of a particularizing mind. When
the mind is disturbed, the multiplicity of things is produced; but
when the mind is quieted, the multiplicity of things disappears.
By ego-consciousness (_manovijńāna_) we mean the ignorant mind
which by its succession-consciousness clings to the conception of
I and Not-I and misapprehends the nature of the six objects of
sense. The ego-consciousness is also called separation-consciousness,
because it is nourished by the perfuming influence of the
prejudices (_āsrava_), intellectual as well as affectional. Thus believing
in the external world produced by memory, the mind becomes

135

oblivious of the principle of sameness (_samatā_) that underlies all
things which are one and perfectly calm and tranquil and show no
sign of becoming.

Non-enlightenment is the _raison d'étre_ of samsāra. When
this is annihilated the conditions--the external world--are also
annihilated and with them the state of an interrelated mind is also
annihilated. But this annihilation does not mean the annihilation
of the mind but of its modes only. It becomes calm like an unruffled
sea when all winds which were disturbing it and producing
the waves have been annihilated.

In describing the relation of the interaction of avidyā (ignorance),
karmavijńāna (activity-consciousness--the subjective mind),
vi@saya (external world--represented by the senses) and the tathatā
(suchness), As'vaghosa says that there is an interperfuming of
these elements. Thus As'vaghosa says, "By perfuming we mean
that while our worldly clothes (viz. those which we wear) have no
odour of their own, neither offensive nor agreeable, they can yet
acquire one or the other odour according to the nature of the substance
with which they are perfumed. Suchness (_tathatā_) is likewise
a pure dharma free from all defilements caused by the perfuming
power of ignorance. On the other hand ignorance has nothing to
do with purity. Nevertheless we speak of its being able to do the
work of purity because it in its turn is perfumed by suchness.
Determined by suchness ignorance becomes the _raison d'étre_ of
all forms of defilement. And this ignorance perfumes suchness
and produces sm@rti. This sm@rti in its turn perfumes ignorance.
On account of this (reciprocal) perfuming, the truth is misunderstood.
On account of its being misunderstood an external world
of subjectivity appears. Further, on account of the perfuming
power of memory, various modes of individuation are produced.
And by clinging to them various deeds are done, and we suffer
as the result miseries mentally as well as bodily." Again "suchness
perfumes ignorance, and in consequence of this perfuming
the individual in subjectivity is caused to loathe the misery of
birth and death and to seek after the blessing of Nirvāna. This
longing and loathing on the part of the subjective mind in turn
perfumes suchness. On account of this perfuming influence we
are enabled to believe that we are in possession within ourselves
of suchness whose essential nature is pure and immaculate; and
we also recognize that all phenomena in the world are nothing

136

but the illusory manifestations of the mind (_ālayavijńāna_) and
have no reality of their own. Since we thus rightly understand
the truth, we can practise the means of liberation, can perform
those actions which are in accordance with the dharma. We
should neither particularize, nor cling to objects of desire. By
virtue of this discipline and habituation during the lapse of innumerable
āsa@nkhyeyakalpas [Footnote ref 1] we get ignorance annihilated. As
ignorance is thus annihilated, the mind (_ālayavijńāna_) is no longer
disturbed, so as to be subject to individuation. As the mind is no
longer disturbed, the particularization of the surrounding world
is annihilated. When in this wise the principle and the condition
of defilement, their products, and the mental disturbances are all
annihilated, it is said that we attain Nirvā@na and that various
spontaneous displays of activity are accomplished." The Nirvā@na
of the tathatā philosophy is not nothingness, but tathatā (suchness
or thatness) in its purity unassociated with any kind of disturbance
which produces all the diversity of experience.

To the question that if all beings are uniformly in possession
of suchness and are therefore equally perfumed by it, how is it
that there are some who do not believe in it, while others do,
As'vagho@sa's reply is that though all beings are uniformly in
possession of suchness, the intensity of ignorance and the principle
of individuation, that work from all eternity, vary in such
manifold grades as to outnumber the sands of the Ganges, and
hence the difference. There is an inherent perfuming principle
in one's own being which, embraced and protected by the love
(_maitrī_) and compassion (_karu@nā_) of all Buddhas and Bodhisattvas,
is caused to loathe the misery of birth and death, to believe
in nirvā@na, to cultivate the root of merit (_kus'alamūla_), to habituate
oneself to it and to bring it to maturity. In consequence
of this, one is enabled to see all Buddhas and Bodhisattvas and, receiving
instructions from them, is benefited, gladdened and induced
to practise good deeds, etc., till one can attain to Buddhahood and
enter into Nirvā@na. This implies that all beings have such perfuming
power in them that they may be affected by the good wishes
of the Buddhas and Bodhisattvas for leading them to the path
of virtue, and thus it is that sometimes hearing the Bodhisattvas
and sometimes seeing them, "all beings thereby acquire (spiritual)
benefits (_hitatā_)" and "entering into the samādhi of purity, they

_____________________________________________________________________

[Footnote 1: Technical name for a very vast period of time.]

137

destroy hindrances wherever they are met with and obtain all-penetrating
insight that enables them to become conscious of the absolute oneness
(_samatā_) of the universe (_sarvaloka_) and to see innumerable Buddhas
and Bodhisattvas."

There is a difference between the perfuming which is not in
unison with suchness, as in the case of s'rāvakas (theravādin
monks), pratyekabuddhas and the novice bodhisattvas, who only
continue their religious discipline but do not attain to the state
of non-particularization in unison with the essence of suchness.
But those bodhisattvas whose perfuming is already in unison with
suchness attain to the state of non-particularization and allow
themselves to be influenced only by the power of the dharma.
The incessant perfuming of the defiled dharma (ignorance from
all eternity) works on, but when one attains to Buddhahood one
at once puts an end to it. The perfuming of the pure dharma
(i.e. suchness) however works on to eternity without any interruption.
For this suchness or thatness is the effulgence of great
wisdom, the universal illumination of the dharmadhātu (universe),
the true and adequate knowledge, the mind pure and clean in its
own nature, the eternal, the blessed, the self-regulating and the
pure, the tranquil, the inimitable and the free, and this is called
the tathāgatagarbha or the dharmakāya. It may be objected that
since thatness or suchness has been described as being without
characteristics, it is now a contradiction to speak of it as embracing
all merits, but it is held, that in spite of its embracing all merits,
it is free in its nature from all forms of distinction, because all
objects in the world are of one and the same taste; and being
of one reality they have nothing to do with the modes of particularization
or of dualistic character. "Though all things in their
(metaphysical) origin come from the soul alone and in truth are
free from particularization, yet on account of non-enlightenment
there originates a subjective mind (_ālayavijńāna_) that becomes
conscious of an external world." This is called ignorance or
avidyā. Nevertheless the pure essence of the mind is perfectly
pure and there is no awakening of ignorance in it. Hence we assign
to suchness this quality, the effulgence of great wisdom. It is
called universal illumination, because there is nothing for it to
illumine. This perfuming of suchness therefore continues for ever,
though the stage of the perfuming of avidyā comes to an end with
the Buddhas when they attain to nirvā@na. All Buddhas while at

138

the stage of discipline feel a deep compassion (_mahākaru@nā_) for all
beings, practise all virtues (_pāramitās_) and many other meritorious
deeds, treat others as their own selves, and wish to work out a
universal salvation of mankind in ages to come, through limitless
numbers of _kalpas_, recognize truthfully and adequately the
principle of equality (_samatā_)among people; and do not cling
to the individual existence of a sentient being. This is what is
meant by the activity of tathatā. The main idea of this tathatā
philosophy seems to be this, that this transcendent "thatness" is
at once the quintessence of all thought and activity; as avidyā veils
it or perfumes it, the world-appearance springs forth, but as the
pure thatness also perfumes the avidyā there is a striving for the
good as well. As the stage of avidyā is passed its luminous
character shines forth, for it is the ultimate truth which only
illusorily appeared as the many of the world.

This doctrine seems to be more in agreement with the view
of an absolute unchangeable reality as the ultimate truth than
that of the nihilistic idealism of _La@nkāvatāra_. Considering the
fact that As'vagho@sa was a learned Brahmin scholar in his early
life, it is easy to guess that there was much Upani@sad influence in
this interpretation of Buddhism, which compares so favourably
with the Vedānta as interpreted by S'a@nkara. The _La@nkāvatāra_
admitted a reality only as a make-believe to attract the Tairthikas
(heretics) who had a prejudice in favour of an unchangeable self
(_ātman_). But As'vagho@sa plainly admitted an unspeakable reality
as the ultimate truth. Nāgārjuna's Mādhyamika doctrines which
eclipsed the profound philosophy of As'vagho@sa seem to be more
faithful to the traditional Buddhist creed and to the Vijńānavāda
creed of Buddhism as explained in the La@nkāvatāra [Footnote ref 1].


The Mādhyamika or the S'ūntavāda school.--Nihilism.

Candrakīrtti, the commentator of Nāgārjuna's verses known as
"_Mādhyamika kārikā_," in explaining the doctrine of dependent
origination (_pratītyasamutpāda_) as described by Nāgārjuna starts
with two interpretations of the word. According to one the word
pratītyasamutpāda means the origination (_utpāda_) of the nonexistent
(_abhāva_) depending on (_pratītya_) reasons and causes

________________________________________________________________________

[Footnote 1: As I have no access to the Chinese translation of
As'vagho@sa's _S'raddhotpāda S'āstra_, I had to depend entirely on
Suzuki's expressions as they appear in his translation.]

139

(hetupratyaya). According to the other interpretation pratītya
means each and every destructible individual and pratītyasamutpāda
means the origination of each and every destructible individual.
But he disapproves of both these meanings. The second meaning does
not suit the context in which the Pāli Scriptures generally speak
of pratītyasamutpāda (e.g. _cak@su@h pratītya rūpāni ca utpadyante
cak@survijńānam_) for it does not mean the origination of each and
every destructible individual, but the originating of specific
individual phenomena (e.g. perception of form by the operation in
connection with the eye) depending upon certain specific conditions.

The first meaning also is equally unsuitable. Thus for example
if we take the case of any origination, e.g. that of the visual percept,
we see that there cannot be any contact between visual
knowledge and physical sense, the eye, and so it would not be
intelligible that the former should depend upon the latter. If we
interpret the maxim of pratītyasamutpāda as this happening that
happens, that would not explain any specific origination. All
origination is false, for a thing can neither originate by itself nor
by others, nor by a co-operation of both nor without any reason.
For if a thing exists already it cannot originate again by itself.
To suppose that it is originated by others would also mean
that the origination was of a thing already existing. If again
without any further qualification it is said that depending on
one the other comes into being, then depending on anything any
other thing could come into being--from light we could have darkness!
Since a thing could not originate from itself or by others,
it could not also be originated by a combination of both of them
together. A thing also could not originate without any cause,
for then all things could come into being at all times. It is therefore
to be acknowledged that wherever the Buddha spoke of this
so-called dependent origination (_pratītyasamutpāda_) it was referred
to as illusory manifestations appearing to intellects and
senses stricken with ignorance. This dependent origination is
not thus a real law, but only an appearance due to ignorance
(_avidyā_). The only thing which is not lost (_amo@sadharma_) is
nirvā@na; but all other forms of knowledge and phenomena
(_sa@mskāra_) are false and are lost with their appearances
(_sarvasa@mskārās'ca m@r@sāmo@sadharmā@na@h_).

It is sometimes objected to this doctrine that if all appearances

140

are false, then they do not exist at all. There are then no
good or bad works and no cycle of existence, and if such is the
case, then it may be argued that no philosophical discussion
should be attempted. But the reply to such an objection is that the
nihilistic doctrine is engaged in destroying the misplaced confidence
of the people that things are true. Those who are really
wise do not find anything either false or true, for to them clearly
they do not exist at all and they do not trouble themselves with
the question of their truth or falsehood. For him who knows thus
there are neither works nor cycles of births (_sa@msāra_) and also he
does not trouble himself about the existence or non-existence of
any of the appearances. Thus it is said in the Ratnakū@tasūtra that
howsoever carefully one may search one cannot discover consciousness
(_citta_); what cannot be perceived cannot be said to exist,
and what does not exist is neither past, nor future, nor present, and
as such it cannot be said to have any nature at all; and that which
has no nature is subject neither to origination nor to extinction.
He who through his false knowledge (_viparyyāsa_) does not comprehend
the falsehood of all appearances, but thinks them to be
real, works and suffers the cycles of rebirth (_sa@msāra_). Like all
illusions, though false these appearances can produce all the harm
of rebirth and sorrow.

It may again be objected that if there is nothing true
according to the nihilists (_s'ūnyavādins_), then their statement that
there is no origination or extinction is also not true. Candrakirtti
in replying to this says that with s'ūnyavādins the truth is absolute
silence. When the S'ūnyavādin sages argue, they only accept for
the moment what other people regard as reasons, and deal with
them in their own manner to help them to come to a right
comprehension of all appearances. It is of no use to say, in spite
of all arguments tending to show the falsehood of all appearances,
that they are testified by our experience, for the whole thing that
we call "our experience" is but false illusion inasmuch as these
phenomena have no true essence.

When the doctrine of pratītyasamutpāda is described as "this
being that is," what is really meant is that things can only be
indicated as mere appearances one after another, for they have
no essence or true nature. Nihilism (_s'ūnyavāda_) also means just
this. The true meaning of pratītyasamutpāda or s'ūnyavāda is
this, that there is no truth, no essence in all phenomena that

141

appear [Footnote ref 1]. As the phenomena have no essence they are neither
produced nor destroyed; they really neither come nor go. They
are merely the appearance of maya or illusion. The void (_s'ūnya_)
does not mean pure negation, for that is relative to some kind of
position. It simply means that none of the appearances have any
intrinsic nature of their own (_ni@hsvabhāvatvam_).

The Madhyamaka or S'ūnya system does not hold that anything
has any essence or nature (svabhāva) of its own; even
heat cannot be said to be the essence of fire; for both the heat
and the fire are the result of the combination of many conditions,
and what depends on many conditions cannot be said to be the
nature or essence of the thing. That alone may be said to be the
true essence or nature of anything which does not depend on
anything else, and since no such essence or nature can be pointed
out which stands independently by itself we cannot say that it
exists. If a thing has no essence or existence of its own, we cannot
affirm the essence of other things to it (_parabhāva_). If we
cannot affirm anything of anything as positive, we cannot consequently
assert anything of anything as negative. If anyone first
believes in things positive and afterwards discovers that they are
not so, he no doubt thus takes his stand on a negation (_abhāva_),
but in reality since we cannot speak of anything positive, we cannot
speak of anything negative either [Footnote ref 2].

It is again objected that we nevertheless perceive a process
going on. To this the Madhyamaka reply is that a process of
change could not be affirmed of things that are permanent. But we
can hardly speak of a process with reference to momentary things;
for those which are momentary are destroyed the next moment
after they appear, and so there is nothing which can continue to
justify a process. That which appears as being neither comes
from anywhere nor goes anywhere, and that which appears as destroyed
also does not come from anywhere nor go anywhere,
and so a process (_sa@msāra_) cannot be affirmed of them. It cannot
be that when the second moment arose, the first moment had
suffered a change in the process, for it was not the same as the
second, as there is no so-called cause-effect connection. In fact
there being no relation between the two, the temporal determination
as prior and later is wrong. The supposition that there is a
self which suffers changes is also not valid, for howsoever we

________________________________________________________________

[Footnote 1: See _Mādhyamikav@rtti_ (B.T.S.), p. 50.]

[Footnote 2: _Ibid_. pp. 93-100.]

142

may search we find the five skandhas but no self. Moreover if
the soul is a unity it cannot undergo any process or progression,
for that would presuppose that the soul abandons one character
and takes up another at the same identical moment which is
inconceivable [Footnote ref 1].

But then again the question arises that if there is no process,
and no cycle of worldly existence of thousands of afflictions, what
is then the nirvā@na which is described as the final extinction of
all afflictions (_kles'a_)? To this the Madhyamaka reply is that it does
not agree to such a definition of nirvā@na. Nirvā@na on the Madhyamaka
theory is the absence of the essence of all phenomena, that
which cannot be conceived either as anything which has ceased
or as anything which is produced (_aniruddham anntpannam_}. In
nirvā@na all phenomena are lost; we say that the phenomena cease
to exist in nirvā@na, but like the illusory snake in the rope they
never existed [Footnote ref 2]. Nirvā@na cannot be any positive thing or
any sort of state of being (_bhāva_), for all positive states or things
are joint products of combined causes (_sa@msk@rta_) and are liable to
decay and destruction. Neither can it be a negative existence, for since
we cannot speak of any positive existence, we cannot speak of a
negative existence either. The appearances or the phenomena are
communicated as being in a state of change and process coming
one after another, but beyond that no essence, existence, or truth
can be affirmed of them. Phenomena sometimes appear to be
produced and sometimes to be destroyed, but they cannot be
determined as existent or non-existent. Nirvā@na is merely the
cessation of the seeming phenomenal flow (_prapańcaprav@rtti_). It
cannot therefore be designated either as positive or as negative for
these conceptions belong to phenomena (_na cāprav@rttimatram
bhāvābhāveti parikalpitum pāryyate evam na bhāvābhāvanirvā@nam_,
M.V. 197). In this state there is nothing which is known,
and even the knowledge that the phenomena have ceased to
appear is not found. Even the Buddha himself is a phenomenon,
a mirage or a dream, and so are all his teachings [Footnote ref 3].

It is easy to see that in this system there cannot exist any
bondage or emancipation; all phenomena are like shadows, like
the mirage, the dream, the māyā, and the magic without any real
nature (_ni@hsvabhāva_). It is mere false knowledge to suppose that

___________________________________________________________________

[Footnote 1: See _Madhyamikav@rtti_ (B.T.S.), pp. 101-102.]

[Footnote 2: _Ibid_. p. 194.]

[Footnote 3: _Ibid_. pp.162 and 201.]

143

one is trying to win a real nirvā@na [Footnote ref 1]. It is this false
egoism that is to be considered as avidyā. When considered deeply it is
found that there is not even the slightest trace of any positive existence.
Thus it is seen that if there were no ignorance (_avidyā_), there
would have been no conformations (_sa@mskāras_), and if there were
no conformations there would have been no consciousness, and so
on; but it cannot be said of the ignorance "I am generating the
sa@mskāras," and it can be said of the sa@mskāras "we are being
produced by the avidyā." But there being avidyā, there come the
sa@mskarās and so on with other categories too. This character of
the pratītyasamutpāda is known as the coming of the consequent
depending on an antecedent reason (_hetūpanibandha_).

It can be viewed from another aspect, namely that of dependence
on conglomeration or combination (_pratyayopanibandh_).
It is by the combination (_samavāya_) of the four elements, space
(_ākās'a_) and consciousness (_vijńāna_) that a man is made. It is
due to earth (_p@rthivī_) that the body becomes solid, it is due to
water that there is fat in the body, it is due to fire that there is
digestion, it is due to wind that there is respiration; it is due
to ākās'a that there is porosity, and it is due to vijńāna that
there is mind-consciousness. It is by their mutual combination
that we find a man as he is. But none of these elements think
that they have done any of the functions that are considered to be
allotted to them. None of these are real substances or beings or
souls. It is by ignorance that these are thought of as existents and
attachment is generated for them. Through ignorance thus come
the sa@mskāras, consisting of attachment, antipathy and thoughtlessness
(_rāga, dve@sa, moha_); from these proceed the vijńāna and
the four skandhas. These with the four elements bring about name
and form (_nāmarūpa_), from these proceed the senses (_@sa@dayatana_),
from the coming together of those three comes contact (_spars'a_);
from that feelings, from that comes desire (_tr@s@nā_) and so on.
These flow on like the stream of a river, but there is no essence
or truth behind them all or as the ground of them all [Footnote ref 2].
The phenomena therefore cannot be said to be either existent or
non-existent, and no truth can be affirmed of either eternalism
(_s'ās'vatavāda_) or nihilism (_ucchedavāda_), and it is for this reason

____________________________________________________________________

[Footnote 1: See _Mādhyamikav@rtti_ (B.T.S.), pp. 101-108.]

[Footnote: _Ibid._ pp. 209-211, quoted from _Sālistambhasūtra_.
Vācaspatimis'ra also quotes this passage in his _Bhāmatī_ on
S'a@nkara's _Brahma-sūtra_.]

144

that this doctrine is called the middle doctrine (_madhyamaka_) [Footnote
ref 1]. Existence and non-existence have only a relative truth
(_samv@rtisatya_) in them, as in all phenomena, but there is no true
reality (_paramārthasatya_) in them or anything else. Morality
plays as high a part in this nihilistic system as it does in any
other Indian system. I quote below some stanzas from Nāgārjuna's
_Suk@rllekha_ as translated by Wenzel (P.T.S. 1886) from
the Tibetan translation.

6. Knowing that riches are unstable and void (_asāra_) give according to
the moral precepts, to Bhikshus, Brahmins, the poor and friends for there
is no better friend than giving.

7. Exhibit morality (_s'īla_) faultless and sublime, unmixed and spotless,
for morality is the supporting ground of all eminence, as the earth is of
the moving and immovable.

8. Exercise the imponderable, transcendental virtues of charity, morality,
patience, energy, meditation, and likewise wisdom, in order that, having
reached the farther shore of the sea of existence, you may become a Jina
prince.

9. View as enemies, avarice (_mātsaryya_), deceit (_s'ā@thya_), duplicity
(_māyā_), lust, indolence (_kausīdya_), pride (_māna_), greed (_rāga_),
hatred (_dve@sa_) and pride (_mada_) concerning family, figure, glory,
youth, or power.

15. Since nothing is so difficult of attainment as patience, open no door
for anger; the Buddha has pronounced that he who renounces anger shall
attain the degree of an anāgāmin (a saint who never suffers rebirth).

21. Do not look after another's wife; but if you see her, regard her,
according to age, like your mother, daughter or sister.

24. Of him who has conquered the unstable, ever moving objects of the
six senses and him who has overcome the mass of his enemies in battle, the
wise praise the first as the greater hero.

29. Thou who knowest the world, be equanimous against the eight worldly
conditions, gain and loss, happiness and suffering, fame and dishonour,
blame and praise, for they are not objects for your thoughts.

37. But one (a woman) that is gentle as a sister, winning as a friend,
careful of your well being as a mother, obedient as a servant her (you
must) honour as the guardian god(dess) of the family.

40. Always perfectly meditate on (turn your thoughts to) kindness, pity,
joy and indifference; then if you do not obtain a higher degree you
(certainly) will obtain the happiness of Brahman's world (_brahmavihāra_).

41. By the four dhyānas completely abandoning desire (_kāma_), reflection
(_vicāra_), joy (_prīti_), and happiness and pain (_sukha, du@hkha_) you
will obtain as fruit the lot of a Brahman.

49. If you say "I am not the form, you thereby will understand I am
not endowed with form, I do not dwell in form, the form does not dwell in
me; and in like manner you will understand the voidness of the other four
aggregates."

50. The aggregates do not arise from desire, nor from time, nor from

___________________________________________________________________

[Footnote 1: See _Mādhyamikav@rtti_ (B.T.S.), p. 160.]

145

nature (_prak@rti_), not from themselves (_svabhāvāt_), nor from the Lord
(_īs'vara_), nor yet are they without cause; know that they arise from
ignorance (_avidyā_) and desire (_t@r@s@nā_).

51. Know that attachment to religious ceremonies (_s'īlabrataparāmars'a_),
wrong views (_mithyād@r@s@ti_) and doubt (_vicikitsā_) are the three
fetters.

53. Steadily instruct yourself (more and more) in the highest morality,
the highest wisdom and the highest thought, for the hundred and fifty one
rules (of the _prātimok@sa_) are combined perfectly in these three.

58. Because thus (as demonstrated) all this is unstable (_anitya_) without
substance (_anātma_) without help (_as'ara@na_) without protector
(_anātha_) and without abode (_asthāna_) thou O Lord of men must become
discontented with this worthless (_asāra_) kadali-tree of the orb.

104. If a fire were to seize your head or your dress you would extinguish
and subdue it, even then endeavour to annihilate desire, for there is no
other higher necessity than this.

105. By morality, knowledge and contemplation, attain the spotless dignity
of the quieting and the subduing nirvā@na not subject to age, death or
decay, devoid of earth, water, fire, wind, sun and moon.

107. Where there is no wisdom (_prajńā_) there is also no contemplation
(_dhyana_), where there is no contemplation there is also no wisdom; but
know that for him who possesses these two the sea of existence is like a
grove.


Uncompromising Idealism or the School
of Vijńānavāda Buddhism.

The school of Buddhist philosophy known as the Vijńānavāda
or Yogācāra has often been referred to by such prominent teachers
of Hindu thought as Kumārila and S'a@nkara. It agrees to a great
extent with the S'ūnyavādins whom we have already described.
All the dharmas (qualities and substances) are but imaginary
constructions of ignorant minds. There is no movement in the
so-called external world as we suppose, for it does not exist. We
construct it ourselves and then are ourselves deluded that it exists
by itself (_nirmmitapratimohi_) [Footnote ref 1]. There are two functions
involved in our consciousness, viz. that which holds the perceptions
(_khyāti vijńāna_), and that which orders them by imaginary constructions
(_vastuprativikalpavijńāna_). The two functions however mutually
determine each other and cannot be separately distinguished
(_abhinnalak@sa@ne anyonyahetuke_). These functions are set to work
on account of the beginningless instinctive tendencies inherent
in them in relation to the world of appearance
(_anādikāla-prapańca-vāsanahetukańca_) [Footnote ref 2].

All sense knowledge can be stopped only when the diverse

__________________________________________________________________

[Footnote 1: _Lankāvatārasūtra_, pp. 21-22.]

[Footnote 2 _Ibid._ p. 44.]

146

unmanifested instincts of imagination are stopped
(_abhūta-parikalpa-vāsanā-vaicitra-nirodha_)
[Footnote ref 1]. All our phenomenal knowledge
is without any essence or truth (_nihsvabhāva_) and is but a
creation of māyā, a mirage or a dream. There is nothing which
may be called external, but all is the imaginary creation of the
mind (_svacitta_), which has been accustomed to create imaginary
appearances from beginningless time. This mind by whose movement
these creations take place as subject and object has no
appearance in itself and is thus without any origination, existence
and extinction (_utpādasthitibha@ngavarjjam_) and is called the
ālayavijńāna. The reason why this ālayavijńāna itself is said to be
without origination, existence, and extinction is probably this,
that it is always a hypothetical state which merely explains all
the phenomenal states that appear, and therefore it has no existence
in the sense in which the term is used and we could not
affirm any special essence of it.

We do not realize that all visible phenomena are of nothing
external but of our own mind (_svacitta_), and there is also the
beginningless tendency for believing and creating a phenomenal world
of appearance. There is also the nature of knowledge (which
takes things as the perceiver and the perceived) and there is also
the instinct in the mind to experience diverse forms. On account
of these four reasons there are produced in the ālayavijńāna (mind)
the ripples of our sense experiences (_prav@rttivijńana_) as in a lake,
and these are manifested as sense experiences. All the five skandhas
called _pańchavijńānakāya_ thus appear in a proper synthetic
form. None of the phenomenal knowledge that appears is either
identical or different from the ālayavijńāna just as the waves cannot
be said to be either identical or different from the ocean. As
the ocean dances on in waves so the citta or the ālayavijńāna
is also dancing as it were in its diverse operations (_v@rtti_). As
citta it collects all movements (_karma_) within it, as manas it
synthesizes (_vidhīyate_) and as vijńāna it constructs the fivefold
perceptions (_vijńānān vijānāti d@rs'yam kalpate pańcabhi@h_) [Footnote
ref 2].

It is only due to māyā (illusion) that the phenomena appear in their
twofold aspect as subject and object. This must always be regarded as
an appearance (_samv@rtisatyatā_) whereas in the real aspect we could
never say whether they existed (_bhāva_) or did not exist [Footnote ref 3].

________________________________________________________________

[Footnote 1: _Pańcāvatārasūtra_, p. 44.]

[Footnote 2: _Ibid_., pp. 50-55.]

[Footnote 3: Asa@nga's _Mahāyānasūtrāla@mkāra_, pp. 58-59.]

147


All phenomena both being and non-being are illusory (_sadasanta@h
māyopamā@h_). When we look deeply into them we find that
there is an absolute negation of all appearances, including even
all negations, for they are also appearances. This would make the
ultimate truth positive. But this is not so, for it is that in which
the positive and negative are one and the same (_bhāvābhāvasamānatā_)
[Footnote ref 1]. Such a state which is complete in itself and has no
name and no substance had been described in the La@nkāvatārasūtra
as thatness (_tathatā_) [Footnote ref 2]. This state is also described in
another place in the _La@nkāvatāra_ as voidness (_s'ūnyatā_) which is one
and has no origination and no essence [Footnote ref 3]. In another place
it is also designated as tathāgatagarbha [Footnote ref 4].

It may be supposed that this doctrine of an unqualified
ultimate truth comes near to the Vedantic ātman or Brahman
like the tathatā doctrine of As'vagho@sa; and we find in La@nkavatāra
that Rāva@na asks the Buddha "How can you say that
your doctrine of tathāgatagarbha was not the same as the ātman
doctrine of the other schools of philosophers, for those heretics
also consider the ātman as eternal, agent, unqualified, all pervading
and unchanged?" To this the Buddha is found to reply
thus--"Our doctrine is not the same as the doctrine of those
heretics; it is in consideration of the fact that the instruction
of a philosophy which considered that there was no soul or substance
in anything (nairatmya) would frighten the disciples, that
I say that all things are in reality the tathāgatagarbha. This
should not be regarded as ātman. Just as a lump of clay is made
into various shapes, so it is the non-essential nature
of all phenomena and their freedom from all characteristics
(_sarvavikalpalak@sa@navinivrttam_) that is variously described as
the garbha or the nairātmya (essencelessness). This explanation of
tathāgatagarbha as the ultimate truth and reality is given in order to
attract to our creed those heretics who are superstitiously
inclined to believe in the ātman doctrine [Footnote ref 5]."

So far as the appearance of the phenomena was concerned,
the idealistic Buddhists (_vijńānavādins_) agreed to the doctrine of
pratītyasamutpāda with certain modifications. There was with
them an external pratītyasamutpāda just as it appeared in the

__________________________________________________________________

[Footnote 1: Asa@nga's _Mahāyānasūtrāla@mkāra_, p. 65.]

[Footnote 2: _Lankāvatārasūtra_, p. 70.]

[Footnote 3: _Ibid._ p. 78.]

[Footnote 4: _Ibid._ p. 80.]

[Footnote 5: _Ibid._ pp. 80-81.]

148

objective aspect and an internal pratītyasamutpāda. The external
pratītyasamutpāda (dependent origination) is represented in the
way in which material things (e.g. a jug) came into being by the
co-operation of diverse elements--the lump of clay, the potter,
the wheel, etc. The internal (_ādhyātmika_) pratītyasamutpāda
was represented by avidyā, t@r@s@nā, karma, the skandhas, and the
āyatanas produced out of them [Footnote ref 1].

Our understanding is composed of two categories called the
_pravichayabuddhi_ and the
_vikalpalak@sa@nagrahābhinives'aprati@s@thapikābuddhi_. The
pravicayabuddhi is that which always seeks to take things in either
of the following four ways, that they are either this or the other
(_ekatvānyaiva_); either both or not both (_ubhayānubhaya_), either
are or are not (_astināsti_), either eternal or non-eternal (_nityānitya_).
But in reality none of these can be affirmed of the phenomena. The second
category consists of that habit of the mind by virtue of which it
constructs diversities and arranges them (created in their turn by
its own constructive activity--_parikalpa_) in a logical order of diverse
relations of subject and predicate, causal and other relations. He who
knows the nature of these two categories of the mind knows that there
is no external world of matter and that they are all experienced only
in the mind. There is no water, but it is the sense construction of
smoothness (_sneha_) that constructs the water as an external substance;
it is the sense construction of activity or energy that
constructs the external substance of fire; it is the sense construction
of movement that constructs the external substance of air.
In this way through the false habit of taking the unreal as the
real (_mithyāsatyābhinives'a_) five skandhas appear. If these were
to appear all together, we could not speak of any kind of causal
relations, and if they appeared in succession there could be
no connection between them, as there is nothing to bind them
together. In reality there is nothing which is produced or
destroyed, it is only our constructive imagination that builds up
things as perceived with all their relations, and ourselves as
perceivers. It is simply a convention (_vyavahāra_) to speak of things
as known [Footnote ref 2]. Whatever we designate by speech is mere
speech-construction (_vāgvikalpa_) and unreal. In speech one could not
speak of anything without relating things in some kind of causal

___________________________________________________________________

[Footnote 1: _La@nkāvatārasūtra_, p. 85.]

[Footnote 2: _Lankāvatārasūtra_, p. 87, compare the term "vyavahārika" as
used of the phenomenal and the conventional world in almost the same
sense by S'a@nkara.]

149

relation, but none of these characters may be said to be true;
the real truth (_paramartha_) can never be referred to by such
speech-construction.

The nothingness (_s'ūnyata_) of things may be viewed from
seven aspects--(1) that they are always interdependent, and hence
have no special characteristics by themselves, and as they cannot
be determined in themselves they cannot be determined in terms
of others, for, their own nature being undetermined, a reference
to an "other" is also undetermined, and hence they are all indefinable
(_laksanas'ūnyata_); (2) that they have no positive essence
(_bhāvasvabhāvas'ūnyatā_), since they spring up from a natural
non-existence (_svabhāvābhāvotpatti_); (3) that they are of an unknown
type of non-existence (_apracaritas'ūnyatā_), since all the skandhas
vanish in the nirvana; (4) that they appear phenomenally as connected
though non-existent (_pracaritas'ūnyatā_), for their skandhas
have no reality in themselves nor are they related to others, but
yet they appear to be somehow causally connected; (5) that none
of the things can be described as having any definite nature,
they are all undemonstrable by language (_nirabhilapyas'ūnyatā_);
(6) that there cannot be any knowledge about them except that
which is brought about by the long-standing defects of desires
which pollute all our vision; (7) that things are also non-existent
in the sense that we affirm them to be in a particular place and
time in which they are not (_itaretaras'ūnyatā_).

There is thus only non-existence, which again is neither eternal
nor destructible, and the world is but a dream and a māyā; the
two kinds of negation (_nirodha_) are ākās'a (space) and nirvana;
things which are neither existent nor non-existent are only
imagined to be existent by fools.

This view apparently comes into conflict with the doctrine of
this school, that the reality is called the tathāgatagarbha (the
womb of all that is merged in thatness) and all the phenomenal
appearances of the clusters (_skandhas_), elements (_dhātus_), and
fields of sense operation (_āyatanas_) only serve to veil it with
impurities, and this would bring it nearer to the assumption of a
universal soul as the reality. But the _La@nkāvatāra_ attempts to
explain away this conflict by suggesting that the reference to
the tathāgatagarbha as the reality is only a sort of
false bait to attract those who are afraid of listening
to the nairātmya (non-soul doctrine) [Footnote ref 1].

___________________________________________________________________

[Footnote 1: _La@nkāvatārasūtra_, p. 80.

150


The Bodhisattvas may attain their highest by the fourfold
knowledge of (1) _svacittad@rs'hyabhāvanā_, (2)
_utpādasthitibha@ngavivarjjanatā_,
(3) _bāhyabhāvābhāvopalak@sa@natā_ and
(4) _svapratyāryyajńānādhigamābhinnalak@sa@natā_. The first means
that all things are but creations of the imagination of one's mind.
The second means that as things have no essence there is no origination,
existence or destruction. The third means that one should
know the distinctive sense in which all external things are said
either to be existent or non-existent, for their existence is merely
like the mirage which is produced by the beginningless desire
(_vāsanā_) of creating and perceiving the manifold. This brings us
to the fourth one, which means the right comprehension of the
nature of all things.

The four dhyānas spoken of in the _Lankāvatāra_ seem to be
different from those which have been described in connection with
the Theravāda Buddhism. These dhyānas are called (1) _bālopacārika_,
(2) _arthapravichaya_, (3) _tathatālambana_ and (4) _tathāgata_.
The first one is said to be that practised by the s'rāvakas
and the pratyekabuddhas. It consists in concentrating upon the
doctrine that there is no soul (_pudgalanairātmya_), and that everything
is transitory, miserable and impure. When considering all
things in this way from beginning to end the sage advances on
till all conceptual knowing ceases (_āsa@mjńānirodhāt_); we have
what is called the vālopacārika dhyāna (the meditation for beginners).

The second is the advanced state where not only there is
full consciousness that there is no self, but there is also the
comprehension that neither these nor the doctrines of other heretics
may be said to exist, and that there is none of the dharmas that
appears. This is called the _arthapravicayadhyāna_, for the sage
concentrates here on the subject of thoroughly seeking out
(_pravichaya_) the nature of all things (_artha_).

The third dhyāna, that in which the mind realizes that the
thought that there is no self nor that there are the appearances,
is itself the result of imagination and thus lapses into the thatness
(_tathatā_). This dhyāna is called _tathatālambana_, because it has for
its object tathatā or thatness.

The last or the fourth dhyāna is that in which the lapse of
the mind into the state of thatness is such that the nothingness
and incomprehensibility of all phenomena is perfectly realized;

151

and nirvāna is that in which all root desires (_vāsanā_) manifesting
themselves in knowledge are destroyed and the mind with knowledge
and perceptions, making false creations, ceases to work. This
cannot be called death, for it will not have any rebirth and it cannot
be called destruction, for only compounded things (_sa@msk@rta_)
suffer destruction, so that it is different from either death or
destruction. This nirvāna is different from that of the s'rāvakas
and the pratyekabuddhas for they are satisfied to call that state
nirvā@na, in which by the knowledge of the general characteristics
of all things (transitoriness and misery) they are not attached to
things and cease to make erroneous judgments [Footnote ref 1].

Thus we see that there is no cause (in the sense of ground)
of all these phenomena as other heretics maintain. When it is
said that the world is māyā or illusion, what is meant to be
emphasized is this, that there is no cause, no ground. The phenomena
that seem to originate, stay, and be destroyed are mere
constructions of tainted imagination, and the tathatā or thatness
is nothing but the turning away of this constructive activity or
nature of the imagination (_vikalpa_) tainted with the associations
of beginningless root desires (_vāsanā_) [Footnote ref 2]. The tathatā has
no separate reality from illusion, but it is illusion itself when the
course of the construction of illusion has ceased. It is therefore
also spoken of as that which is cut off or detached from the mind
(_cittavimukta_), for here there is no construction of imagination
(_sarvakalpanavirahitam_) [Footnote ref 3].


Sautrāntika Theory of Perception.

Dharmottara (847 A.D.), a commentator of Dharmakīrtti's [Footnote ref 4]
(about 635 A.D.) _Nyāyabindu_, a Sautrantika logical and epistemological
work, describes right knowledge (_samyagjńāna_) as an
invariable antecedent to the accomplishment of all that a man

__________________________________________________________________

[Footnote 1: _Lankāvatarasūtra_, p. 100.]

[Footnote 2: _Ibid._ p. 109.]

[Footnote 3: This account of the Vijńanavada school is collected mainly
from _Lankāvatārasūtra_, as no other authentic work of the Vijńānavāda
school is available. Hindu accounts and criticisms of this school may be
had in such books as Kumarila's _S'loka vārttika_ or S'a@nkara's bhasya,
II. ii, etc. Asak@nga's _Mahāyānasūtralamkāra_ deals more with the duties
concerning the career of a saint (_Bodhisattva_) than with the metaphysics
of the system.]

[Footnote 4: Dharmakīrtti calls himself an adherent of Vijńanavāda in his
_Santānāntarasiddhi_, a treatise on solipsism, but his _Nyāyabindu_ seems
rightly to have been considered by the author of _Nyāyabindu@tīkā@tippani_
(p. 19) as being written from the Sautrāntika point of view.]

152

desires to have (_samyagjńānapūrvikā sarvapuru@sārthasiddhi_) [Footnote
ref 1]. When on proceeding, in accordance with the presentation of any
knowledge, we get a thing as presented by it we call it right
knowledge. Right knowledge is thus the knowledge by which one
can practically acquire the thing he wants to acquire (_arthādhigati_).
The process of knowledge, therefore, starts with the perceptual
presentation and ends with the attainment of the thing
represented by it and the fulfilment of the practical need by it
(_arthādhigamāt samāpta@h pramā@navyāpārah_). Thus there are
three moments in the perceptual acquirement of knowledge:
(1) the presentation, (2) our prompting in accordance with it,
and (3) the final realization of the object in accordance with
our endeavour following the direction of knowledge. Inference
is also to be called right knowledge, as it also serves our practical
need by representing the presence of objects in certain connections
and helping us to realize them. In perception this presentation
is direct, while in inference this is brought about indirectly
through the li@nga (reason). Knowledge is sought by men for the
realization of their ends, and the subject of knowledge is discussed
in philosophical works only because knowledge is sought
by men. Any knowledge, therefore, which will not lead us to
the realization of the object represented by it could not be called
right knowledge. All illusory perceptions, therefore, such as the
perception of a white conch-shell as yellow or dream perceptions,
are not right knowledge, since they do not lead to the realization
of such objects as are presented by them. It is true no doubt
that since all objects are momentary, the object which was perceived
at the moment of perception was not the same as that
which was realized at a later moment. But the series of existents
which started with the first perception of a blue object finds itself
realized by the realization of other existents of the same series
(_nīlādau ya eva santāna@h paricchinno nilajńānena sa eva tena
prāpita@h tena nilajńānam pramā@nam_) [Footnote ref 2].

When it is said that right knowledge is an invariable antecedent
of the realization of any desirable thing or the retarding
of any undesirable thing, it must be noted that it is not meant

____________________________________________________________________

[Footnote 1: Brief extracts from the opinions of two other commentators of
_Nyāyaybindu_, Vinītadeva and S'antabhadra (seventh century), are found in
_Nyāyabindu@tīkātippanī_, a commentary of _Nyayabindutikā_ of Dharmmottara,
but their texts are not available to us.]

[Footnote 2: _Nyāyabindu@tīkā@tippanī_, p. 11.]

153

that right knowledge is directly the cause of it; for, with the rise
of any right perception, there is a memory of past experiences,
desire is aroused, through desire an endeavour in accordance with
it is launched, and as a result of that there is realization of the
object of desire. Thus, looked at from this point of view, right
knowledge is not directly the cause of the realization of the object.
Right knowledge of course directly indicates the presentation, the
object of desire, but so far as the object is a mere presentation it
is not a subject of enquiry. It becomes a subject of enquiry only in
connection with our achieving the object presented by perception.

Perception (_pratyaks'a_) has been defined by Dharmakīrtti as
a presentation, which is generated by the objects alone, unassociated
by any names or relations (_kalpanā_) and which is not erroneous
(_kalpanāpo@dhamabhrāntam_) [Footnote ref 1]. This definition does not
indeed represent the actual nature (_svarūpa_) of perception, but only
shows the condition which must be fulfilled in order that anything
may be valid perception. What is meant by saying that a perception
is not erroneous is simply this, that it will be such that
if one engages himself in an endeavour in accordance with it,
he will not be baffled in the object which was presented to him
by his perception (_tasmādgrāhye arthe vasturūpe yadaviparyastam
tadabhrāntamiha veditavyam_}. It is said that a right perception
could not be associated with names (_kalpanā_ or _abhilāpa_). This
qualification is added only with a view of leaving out all that is not
directly generated by the object. A name is given to a thing
only when it is associated in the mind, through memory, as being
the same as perceived before. This cannot, therefore, be regarded
as being produced by the object of perception. The senses present
the objects by coming in contact with them, and the objects also
must of necessity allow themselves to be presented as they are
when they are in contact with the proper senses. But the work
of recognition or giving names is not what is directly produced
by the objects themselves, for this involves the unification of
previous experiences, and this is certainly not what is presented

___________________________________________________________________

[Footnote 1: The definition first given in the _Pramānasamucaya_ (not
available in Sanskrit) of Di@nnāga (500 A.D.) was "_Kalpanāpodham_."
According to Dharmakirtti it is the indeterminate knowledge (_nirvikalpa
jńāna_) consisting only of the copy of the object presented to the senses
that constitutes the valid element presented to perception. The determinate
knowledge (_savikalpa jńāna_), as formed by the conceptual activity of
the mind identifying the object with what has been experienced before,
cannot be regarded as truly representing what is really presented to
the senses.]

154

to the sense
(_pūrvad@r@s@tāparad@r@s@tańcārthamekīkurvadvijńānamasannihitavi@sayam
pūrvad@r@s@tasyāsannihitatvāt_). In all illusory perceptions it is the
sense which is affected either by extraneous or by inherent physiological
causes. If the senses are not perverted they are bound to present the
object correctly. Perception thus means the correct presentation through
the senses of an object in its own uniqueness as containing only those
features which are its and its alone (_svalak@sa@nam_). The validity of
knowledge consists in the sameness that it has with the objects presented
by it (_arthena saha yatsārūpyam sād@rs'yamasya jńānasya tatpramā@namiha_).
But the objection here is that if our percept is only
similar to the external object then this similarity is a thing which
is different from the presentation, and thus perception becomes
invalid. But the similarity is not different from the percept which
appears as being similar to the object. It is by virtue of their
sameness that we refer to the object by the percept (_taditi sārūpyam
tasya vas'āt_) and our perception of the object becomes possible.
It is because we have an awareness of blueness that we speak of
having perceived a blue object. The relation, however, between
the notion of similarity of the perception with the blue object and
the indefinite awareness of blue in perception is not one of
causation but of a determinant and a determinate
(_vyavasthāpyavyavasthāpakabhāvena_). Thus it is the same cognition
which in one form stands as signifying the similarity with the object
of perception and is in another indefinite form the awareness as the
percept (_tata ekasya vastuna@h kińcidrūpam pramā@nam kińcitpramā@naphalam
na virudhyate_). It is on account of this similarity
with the object that a cognition can be a determinant of the
definite awareness (_vyavasthāpanaheturhi sārūpyam_), so that by
the determinate we know the determinant and thus by the
similarity of the sense-datum with the object {_pramā@na_) we come
to think that our awareness has this particular form as "blue"
(_pramā@naphala_). If this sameness between the knowledge and its
object was not felt we could not have spoken of the object from
the awareness (_sārūpyamanubhūtam vyavasthāpanahetu@h_). The
object generates an awareness similar to itself, and
it is this correspondence that can lead us to the realization
of the object so presented by right knowledge [Footnote ref l].

____________________________________________________________________

[Footnote 1: See also pp. 340 and 409. It is unfortunate that, excepting
the _Nyāyabindu, Nyāyabindu@tīkā, Nyāyabindu@tīkā@tippanī_ (St Petersburg,
1909), no other works dealing with this interesting doctrine of perception
are available to us. _Nyāyabindu_ is probably one of the earliest works in
which we hear of the doctrine of _arthakriyākāritva_ (practical fulfilment
of our desire as a criterion of right knowledge). Later on it was regarded
as a criterion of existence, as Ratnakīrtti's works and the profuse
references by Hindu writers to the Buddhistic doctrines prove. The word
_arthakriyā_ is found in Candrakīrtti's commentary on Nāgārjuna and also
in such early works as _Lalitavistara_ (pointed out to me by Dr E.J.
Thomas of the Cambridge University Library) but the word has no
philosophical significance there.]

155


Sautrāntika theory of Inference [Footnote ref 1].

According to the Sautrāntika doctrine of Buddhism as described
by Dharmakīrtti and Dharmmottara which is probably the
only account of systematic Buddhist logic that is now available to
us in Sanskrit, inference (_anumāna_) is divided into two classes,
called svārthānumāna (inferential knowledge attained by a person
arguing in his own mind or judgments), and parārthānumāna (inference
through the help of articulated propositions for convincing
others in a debate). The validity of inference depended, like the
validity of perception, on copying the actually existing facts of
the external world. Inference copied external realities as much
as perception did; just as the validity of the immediate perception
of blue depends upon its similarity to the external blue thing
perceived, so the validity of the inference of a blue thing also,
so far as it is knowledge, depends upon its resemblance to the
external fact thus inferred (_sārūpyavas'āddhi tannīlapratītirūpam
sidhyati_).

The reason by which an inference is made should be such
that it may be present only in those cases where the thing to
be inferred exists, and absent in every case where it does not
exist. It is only when the reason is tested by both these joint
conditions that an unfailing connection (_pratibandha_) between
the reason and the thing to be inferred can be established. It is
not enough that the reason should be present in all cases where
the thing to be inferred exists and absent where it does not
exist, but it is necessary that it should be present only in the
above case. This law (_niyama_) is essential for establishing the
unfailing condition necessary for inference [Footnote ref 2]. This
unfailing natural connection (_svabhāvapratibandha_) is found in two types

___________________________________________________________________

[Footnote 1: As the _Pramā@nasamuccaya_ of Dińnāga is not available in
Sanskrit, we can hardly know anything of developed Buddhist logic except
what can be got from the _Nyāyabindu@tīkā_ of Dharmmottara.]

[Footnote 2: _tasmāt niyamavatorevānvayavyatirekayo@h prayoga@h karttavya@h
yena pratibandho gamyeta sādhanyasa sādhyena. Nyāyabindu@tīkā_, p. 24.]

156

of cases. The first is that where the nature of the reason is contained
in the thing to be inferred as a part of its nature, i.e. where
the reason stands for a species of which the thing to be inferred
is a genus; thus a stupid person living in a place full of tall pines
may come to think that pines are called trees because they are
tall and it may be useful to point out to him that even a small
pine plant is a tree because it is pine; the quality of pineness
forms a part of the essence of treeness, for the former being
a species is contained in the latter as a genus; the nature of the
species being identical with the nature of the genus, one could
infer the latter from the former but not _vice versa_; this is called
the unfailing natural connection of identity of nature (_tādātmya_).
The second is that where the cause is inferred from the effect
which stands as the reason of the former. Thus from the smoke
the fire which has produced it may be inferred. The ground of
these inferences is that reason is naturally indissolubly connected
with the thing to be inferred, and unless this is the case, no
inference is warrantable.

This natural indissoluble connection (_svabhāvapratibandha_),
be it of the nature of identity of essence of the species in the
genus or inseparable connection of the effect with the cause, is
the ground of all inference [Footnote ref 1]. The svabhāvapratibandha
determines the inseparability of connection (avinābhāvaniyama) and
the inference is made not through a series of premisses, but
directly by the li@nga (reason) which has the inseparable connection
[Footnote ref 2].

The second type of inference known as parārthānumāna
agrees with svārthānumāna in all essential characteristics; the
main difference between the two is this, that in the case of
parārthānumāna, the inferential process has to be put verbally in
premisses.

Pandit Ratnākarasānti, probably of the ninth or the tenth century
A.D., wrote a paper named _Antarvyāptisamarthana_ in which

____________________________________________________________________

[Footnote 1: _na hi yo yatra svabhāvena na pratibaddha@h sa tam
apratibaddhavi@sayamavs'yameva na vyabhicaratīti nāsti
tayoravyabhicāraniyama. Nyāyabindu@tīkā_, p. 29.]

[Footnote 2: The inseparable connection determining inference is only
possible when the li@nga satisfies the three following conditions,
viz. (1) pak@sasattva (existence of the li@nga in the pak@sa--the thing
about which something is inferred); (2) sapak@sasattva (existence of the
li@nga in those cases where the sādhya oc probandum existed), and
(3) vipak@sāsattva (its non-existence in all those places where the sādhya
did not exist). The Buddhists admitted three propositions in a syllogism,
e.g. The hill has fire, because it has smoke, like a kitchen but unlike
a lake.]

157

he tried to show that the concomitance is not between those
cases which possess the li@nga or reason with the cases which
possess the sādhya (probandum) but between that which has the
characteristics of the li@nga with that which has the characteristics
of the sādhya (probandum); or in other words the concomitance
is not between the places containing the smoke such as kitchen,
etc., and the places containing fire but between that which has the
characteristic of the li@nga, viz. the smoke, and that which has the
characteristic of the sādhya, viz. the fire. This view of the nature
of concomitance is known as inner concomitance (_antarvyāpti_),
whereas the former, viz. the concomitance between the thing
possessing li@nga and that possessing sādhya, is known as outer
concomitance (_bahirvyāpti_) and generally accepted by the Nyāya
school of thought. This antarvyāpti doctrine of concomitance is
indeed a later Buddhist doctrine.

It may not be out of place here to remark that evidences of
some form of Buddhist logic probably go back at least as early
as the _Kathāvatthu_ (200 B.C.). Thus Aung on the evidence of
the _Yamaka_ points out that Buddhist logic at the time of As'oka
"was conversant with the distribution of terms" and the process
of conversion. He further points out that the logical premisses
such as the udāhara@na (_Yo yo aggimā so so dhūmavā_--whatever is
fiery is smoky), the upanayana (_ayam pabbato dhūmavā_--this
hill is smoky) and the niggama (_tasmādayam aggimā_--therefore
that is fiery) were also known. (Aung further sums up the
method of the arguments which are found in the _Kathāvatthu_ as
follows:

"Adherent. Is _A B_? (_@thāpanā_).
Opponent. Yes.

Adherent. Is _C D_? (_pāpanā_).
Opponent. No.

Adherent. But if _A_ be _B_ then (you should have said) _C_ is _D_.
That _B_ can be affirmed of _A_ but _D_ of _C_ is false.
Hence your first answer is refuted.")

The antecedent of the hypothetical major premiss is termed @thāpanā,
because the opponent's position, _A_ is _B_, is conditionally
established for the purpose of refutation.

The consequent of the hypothetical major premiss is termed
pāpanā because it is got from the antecedent. And the conclusion

158

is termed ropa@na because the regulation is placed on the
opponent. Next:

  "If _D_ be derived of _C_.
  Then _B_ should have been derived of _A_.
  But you affirmed _B_ of _A_.
  (therefore) That _B_ can be affirmed of _A_ but not of _D_ or _C_ is
  wrong."

This is the pa@tiloma, inverse or indirect method, as contrasted
with the former or direct method, anuloma. In both methods the
consequent is derived. But if we reverse the hypothetical major
in the latter method we get

  "If _A_ is _B_ _C_ is _D_.
  But _A_ is _B_.
  Therefore _C_ is _D_.

By this indirect method the opponent's second answer is reestablished
[Footnote ref 1]."


The Doctrine of Momentariness.

Ratnakīrtti (950 A.D.) sought to prove the momentariness of
all existence (_sattva_), first, by the concomitance discovered by the
method of agreement in presence (_anvayavyāpti_), and then by the
method of difference by proving that the production of effects
could not be justified on the assumption of things being permanent
and hence accepting the doctrine of momentariness
as the only alternative. Existence is defined as the capacity of
producing anything (_arthakriyākāritva_). The form of the first
type of argument by anvayavyāpti may be given thus: "Whatever
exists is momentary, by virtue of its existence, as for example
the jug; all things about the momentariness of which we are discussing
are existents and are therefore momentary." It cannot
be said that the jug which has been chosen as an example of an
existent is not momentary; for the jug is producing certain
effects at the present moment; and it cannot be held that these
are all identical in the past and the future or that it is producing
no effect at all in the past and future, for the first is impossible,
for those which are done now could not be done again in the
future; the second is impossible, for if it has any capacity to

___________________________________________________________________

[Footnote: 1: See introduction to the translation of _Kathāvatthu_
(_Points of Controversy_) by Mrs Rhys Davids.]

159

produce effects it must not cease doing so, as in that case one
might as well expect that there should not be any effect even at
the present moment. Whatever has the capacity of producing
anything at any time must of necessity do it. So if it does produce
at one moment and does not produce at another, this
contradiction will prove the supposition that the things were
different at the different moments. If it is held that the nature
of production varies at different moments, then also the thing at
those two moments must be different, for a thing could not have
in it two contradictory capacities.

Since the jug does not produce at the present moment the
work of the past and the future moments, it cannot evidently do
so, and hence is not identical with the jug in the past and in the
future, for the fact that the jug has the capacity and has not the
capacity as well, proves that it is not the same jug at the two
moments (_s'aktās'aktasvabhavatayā pratik@sa@nam bheda@h_). The
capacity of producing effects (_arthakriyās'akti_), which is but the
other name of existence, is universally concomitant with momentariness
(_k@sa@nikatvavyāpta_).

The Nyāya school of philosophy objects to this view and says
that the capacity of anything cannot be known until the effect
produced is known, and if capacity to produce effects be regarded
as existence or being, then the being or existence of the effect
cannot be known, until that has produced another effect and
that another _ad infinitum_. Since there can be no being that has
not capacity of producing effects, and as this capacity can
demonstrate itself only in an infinite chain, it will be impossible
to know any being or to affirm the capacity of producing effects
as the definition of existence. Moreover if all things were
momentary there would be no permanent perceiver to observe
the change, and there being nothing fixed there could hardly be
any means even of taking to any kind of inference. To this
Ratnakirtti replies that capacity (_saāmarthya_) cannot be denied,
for it is demonstrated even in making the denial. The observation
of any concomitance in agreement in presence, or agreement in
absence, does not require any permanent observer, for under
certain conditions of agreement there is the knowledge of the
concomitance of agreement in presence, and in other conditions
there is the knowledge of the concomitance in absence. This
knowledge of concomitance at the succeeding moment holds within

160

itself the experience of the conditions of the preceding moment,
and this alone is what we find and not any permanent observer.

The Buddhist definition of being or existence (_sattva_) is
indeed capacity, and we arrived at this when it was observed that
in all proved cases capacity was all that could be defined of
being;--seed was but the capacity of producing shoots, and
even if this capacity should require further capacity to produce
effects, the fact which has been perceived still remains, viz. that
the existence of seeds is nothing but the capacity of producing
the shoots and thus there is no vicious infinite [Footnote ref l].
Though things are momentary, yet we could have concomitance between
things only so long as their apparent forms are not different
(_atadrūpaparāv@rttayoreva sādhyasādhanayo@h pratyak@se@na
vyāptigraha@nāt_). The vyāpti or concomitance of any two things
(e.g. the fire and the smoke) is based on extreme similarity and not
on identity.

Another objection raised against the doctrine of momentariness
is this, that a cause (e.g. seed) must wait for a number of other
collocations of earth, water, etc., before it can produce the effect
(e.g. the shoots) and hence the doctrine must fail. To this Ratnakīrtti
replies that the seed does not exist before and produce the
effect when joined by other collocations, but such is the special
effectiveness of a particular seed-moment, that it produces both
the collocations or conditions as well as the effect, the shoot.
How a special seed-moment became endowed with such special
effectiveness is to be sought in other causal moments which
preceded it, and on which it was dependent. Ratnakīrtti wishes to
draw attention to the fact that as one perceptual moment reveals
a number of objects, so one causal moment may produce a number
of effects. Thus he says that the inference that whatever has
being is momentary is valid and free from any fallacy.

It is not important to enlarge upon the second part of
Ratnakīrtti's arguments in which he tries to show that the production
of effects could not be explained if we did not suppose

___________________________________________________________________

[Footnote 1: The distinction between vicious and harmless infinites
was known to the Indians at least as early as the sixth or the seventh
century. Jayanta quotes a passage which differentiates the two clearly
(_Nyāyamańjarī_, p. 22):

"_mūlak@satikarīmāhuranavasthām hi dū@sa@nam.
mūlasiddhau tvarucyāpi nānavasthā nivāryate._"

The infinite regress that has to be gone through in order to arrive
at the root matter awaiting to be solved destroys the root and is hence
vicious, whereas if the root is saved there is no harm in a regress
though one may not be willing to have it.]

161

all things to be momentary, for this is more an attempt to refute
the doctrines of Nyāya than an elaboration of the Buddhist
principles.

The doctrine of momentariness ought to be a direct corollary
of the Buddhist metaphysics. But it is curious that though all
dharmas were regarded as changing, the fact that they were all
strictly momentary (_k@sa@nika_--i.e. existing only for one moment)
was not emphasized in early Pāli literature. As'vagho@sa in his
_S'raddhotpādas'āstra_ speaks of all skandhas as k@sa@nika (Suzuki's
translation, p. 105). Buddhaghosa also speaks of the meditation
of the khandhas as kha@nika in his _Visuddhimagga._ But from the
seventh century A.D. till the tenth century this doctrine together
with the doctrine of arthakriyākāritva received great attention at
the hands of the Sautrāntikas and the Vaibhā@sikas. All the
Nyāya and Vedānta literature of this period is full of refutations
and criticisms of these doctrines. The only Buddhist account
available of the doctrine of momentariness is from the pen of
Ratnakīrtti. Some of the general features of his argument in
favour of the view have been given above. Elaborate accounts of it
may be found in any of the important Nyāya works of this period
such as _Nynyamanjari, Tātparyya@tīkā_ of Vācaspati Mis'ra, etc.

Buddhism did not at any time believe anything to be permanent.
With the development of this doctrine they gave great
emphasis to this point. Things came to view at one moment and
the next moment they were destroyed. Whatever is existent is
momentary. It is said that our notion of permanence is derived
from the notion of permanence of ourselves, but Buddhism denied
the existence of any such permanent selves. What appears as
self is but the bundle of ideas, emotions, and active tendencies
manifesting at any particular moment. The next moment these
dissolve, and new bundles determined by the preceding ones
appear and so on. The present thought is thus the only thinker.
Apart from the emotions, ideas, and active tendencies, we cannot
discover any separate self or soul. It is the combined product of
these ideas, emotions, etc., that yield the illusory appearance of
self at any moment. The consciousness of self is the resultant product
as it were of the combination of ideas, emotions, etc., at any
particular moment. As these ideas, emotions, etc., change every
moment there is no such thing as a permanent self.

The fact that I remember that I have been existing for

162

a long time past does not prove that a permanent self has been
existing for such a long period. When I say this is that book, I
perceive the book with my eye at the present moment, but that
"this book" is the same as "that book" (i.e. the book arising in
memory), cannot be perceived by the senses. It is evident
that the "that book" of memory refers to a book seen in the
past, whereas "this book" refers to the book which is before
my eyes. The feeling of identity which is adduced to prove permanence
is thus due to a confusion between an object of memory
referring to a past and different object with the object as perceived
at the present moment by the senses [Footnote ref 1]. This is true not only
of all recognition of identity and permanence of external objects but
also of the perception of the identity of self, for the perception of
self-identity results from the confusion of certain ideas or emotions
arising in memory with similar ideas of the present moment. But
since memory points to an object of past perception, and the perception
to another object of the present moment, identity cannot
be proved by a confusion of the two. Every moment all objects
of the world are suffering dissolution and destruction, but yet
things appear to persist, and destruction cannot often be noticed.
Our hair and nails grow and are cut, but yet we think that we
have the same hair and nail that we had before, in place of old
hairs new ones similar to them have sprung forth, and they leave
the impression as if the old ones were persisting. So it is that
though things are destroyed every moment, others similar to
these often rise into being and are destroyed the next moment
and so on, and these similar things succeeding in a series produce
the impression that it is one and the same thing which has been
persisting through all the passing moments [Footnote ref 2]. Just as the
flame of a candle is changing every moment and yet it seems to us as
if we have been perceiving the same flame all the while, so
all our bodies, our ideas, emotions, etc., all external objects
around us are being destroyed every moment, and new ones are
being generated at every succeeding moment, but so long as the
objects of the succeeding moments are similar to those
of the preceding moments, it appears to us that things
have remained the same and no destruction has taken place.

___________________________________________________________________

[Footnote 1: See pratyabhijńānirāsa of the Buddhists, _Nyāyamańjarī_, V.S.
Series, pp. 449, etc.]

[Footnote 2: See _Tarkarahasyadīpikā_ of Gu@naratna, p. 30, and also
_Nyāyamańjarī,_ V.S. edition, p. 450.]

163


The Doctrine of Momentariness and the Doctrine
of Causal Efficiency (Arthakriyākāritva).

It appears that a thing or a phenomenon may be defined from
the Buddhist point of view as being the combination of diverse
characteristics [Footnote ref 1]. What we call a thing is but a
conglomeration of diverse characteristics which are found to affect,
determine or influence other conglomerations appearing as sentient or
as inanimate bodies. So long as the characteristics forming the
elements of any conglomeration remain perfectly the same, the
conglomeration may be said to be the same. As soon as any of
these characteristics is supplanted by any other new characteristic,
the conglomeration is to be called a new one [Footnote ref 2]. Existence or
being of things means the work that any conglomeration does or
the influence that it exerts on other conglomerations. This in
Sanskrit is called _arthakriyākāritva_ which literally translated
means--the power of performing actions and purposes of some
kind [Footnote ref 3]. The criterion of existence or being is the
performance of certain specific actions, or rather existence means
that a certain effect has been produced in some way (causal efficiency).
That which has produced such an effect is then called existent or _sat_.
Any change in the effect thus produced means a corresponding
change of existence. Now, that selfsame definite specific effect

_________________________________________________________________

[Footnote 1: Compare _Milindapańha,_ II. I. 1--The Chariot Simile.]

[Footnote 2: Compare _Tarkarahasyadīpikā_ of Gu@naratna, A.S.'s edition,
pp. 24, 28 and _Nyāyamańjarī,_ V.S. edition, pp. 445, etc., and also the
paper on _K@sa@nabha@ngasiddhi_ by Ratnakīrtti in _Six Buddhist Nyāya
tracts_.]

[Footnote 3: This meaning of the word "arthakriyākāritva" is different
from the meaning of the word as we found in the section "sautrāntika
theory of perception." But we find the development of this meaning both
in Ratnakīrtti as well as in Nyāya writers who referred to this doctrine.
With Vinītadeva (seventh century A.D.) the word "_arthakrīyāsiddhi_"
meant the fulfilment of any need such as the cooking of rice by fire
(_arthas'abdena prayojanamucyate puru@sasya praycjana@m dārupākādi
tasya siddhi@h ni@spatti@h_--the word _artha_ means need; the need of
man such as cooking by logs, etc.; _siddhi_ of that, means accomplishment).
With Dharmottara who flourished about a century and a half later
_arthasiddhi_ means action (anu@s@thiti) with reference to undesirable
and desirable objects (_heyopādeyārthavi@sayā_). But with Ratnakīrtti
(950 A.D.) the word _arthakriyākāritva_ has an entirely different sense.
It means with him efficiency of producing any action or event, and as
such it is regarded as the characteristic definition of existence
_sattva_). Thus he says in his _K@sa@nabha@ngasiddhi,_ pp. 20, 21, that
though in different philosophies there are different definitions of
existence or being, he will open his argument with the universally accepted
definition of existence as _arthakriyākāritva_ (efficiency of causing any
action or event). Whenever Hindu writers after Ratnakīrtti refer to the
Buddhist doctrine of _arthakriyākāritva_ they usually refer to this
doctrine in Ratnakīrtti's sense.]

164

which is produced now was never produced before, and cannot
be repeated in the future, for that identical effect which is once
produced cannot be produced again. So the effects produced in
us by objects at different moments of time may be similar but
cannot be identical. Each moment is associated with a new effect
and each new effect thus produced means in each case the coming
into being of a correspondingly new existence of things. If things
were permanent there would be no reason why they should be
performing different effects at different points of time. Any
difference in the effect produced, whether due to the thing itself
or its combination with other accessories, justifies us in asserting
that the thing has changed and a new one has come in its place.
The existence of a jug for example is known by the power it
has of forcing itself upon our minds; if it had no such power
then we could not have said that it existed. We can have no
notion of the meaning of existence other than the impression
produced on us; this impression is nothing else but the power
exerted by things on us, for there is no reason why one should
hold that beyond such powers as are associated with the production
of impressions or effects there should be some other
permanent entity to which the power adhered, and which existed
even when the power was not exerted. We perceive the power
of producing effects and define each unit of such power as
amounting to a unit of existence. And as there would be
different units of power at different moments, there should also
be as many new existences, i.e. existents must be regarded as
momentary, existing at each moment that exerts a new power.
This definition of existence naturally brings in the doctrine of
momentariness shown by Ratnakīrtti.


Some Ontological Problems on which the Different Indian Systems Diverged.

We cannot close our examination of Buddhist philosophy
without briefly referring to its views on some ontological problems
which were favourite subjects of discussion in almost all philosophical
circles of India. These are in brief: (1) the relation of
cause and effect, (2) the relation of the whole (_avayavi_) and the
part (_avayava_), (3) the relation of generality (_samanya_) to the
specific individuals, (4) the relation of attributes or qualities and
the substance and the problem of the relation of inherence, (5) the


165

relation of power (_s'akti_) to the power-possessor (_s'aktimān_). Thus
on the relation of cause and effect, S'a@nkara held that cause alone
was permanent, real, and all effects as such were but impermanent
illusions due to ignorance, Sā@mkhya held that there was no
difference between cause and effect, except that the former was
only the earlier stage which when transformed through certain
changes became the effect. The history of any causal activity is
the history of the transformation of the cause into the effects.
Buddhism holds everything to be momentary, so neither cause nor
effect can abide. One is called the effect because its momentary
existence has been determined by the destruction of its momentary
antecedent called the cause. There is no permanent reality
which undergoes the change, but one change is determined by
another and this determination is nothing more than "that
happening, this happened." On the relation of parts to whole,
Buddhism does not believe in the existence of wholes. According
to it, it is the parts which illusorily appear as the whole, the
individual atoms rise into being and die the next moment and
thus there is no such thing as "whole [Footnote ref 1]. The Buddhists
hold again that there are no universals, for it is the individuals alone
which come and go. There are my five fingers as individuals but there
is no such thing as fingerness (_a@ngulitva_) as the abstract universal
of the fingers. On the relation of attributes and substance we
know that the Sautrāntika Buddhists did not believe in the existence
of any substance apart from its attributes; what we call a
substance is but a unit capable of producing a unit of sensation.
In the external world there are as many individual simple units
(atoms) as there are points of sensations. Corresponding to each
unit of sensation there is a separate simple unit in the objective
world. Our perception of a thing is thus the perception of the
assemblage of these sensations. In the objective world also there
are no substances but atoms or reals, each representing a unit of
sensation, force or attribute, rising into being and dying the next
moment. Buddhism thus denies the existence of any such relation
as that of inherence (_samavāya_) in which relation the attributes
are said to exist in the substance, for since there are no
separate substances there is no necessity for admitting the relation
of inherence. Following the same logic Buddhism also does not

166

believe in the existence of a power-possessor separate from the
power.


Brief survey of the evolution of Buddhist Thought.

In the earliest period of Buddhism more attention was paid
to the four noble truths than to systematic metaphysics. What
was sorrow, what was the cause of sorrow, what was the cessation
of sorrow and what could lead to it? The doctrine of _pa@ticcasamuppāda_
was offered only to explain how sorrow came in and
not with a view to the solving of a metaphysical problem. The
discussion of ultimate metaphysical problems, such as whether
the world was eternal or non-eternal, or whether a Tathāgata
existed after death or not, were considered as heresies in early
Buddhism. Great emphasis was laid on sīla, samādhi and pańńā
and the doctrine that there was no soul. The Abhidhammas
hardly give us any new philosophy which was not contained in
the Suttas. They only elaborated the materials of the suttas with
enumerations and definitions. With the evolution of Mahāyāna
scriptures from some time about 200 B.C. the doctrine of the
non-essentialness and voidness of all _dhammas_ began to be preached.
This doctrine, which was taken up and elaborated by Nagārjuna,
Āryyadeva, Kumārajīva and Candrakīrtti, is more or less a corollary
from the older doctrine of Buddhism. If one could not
say whether the world was eternal or non-eternal, or whether a
Tathāgata existed or did not exist after death, and if there was
no permanent soul and all the dhammas were changing, the only
legitimate way of thinking about all things appeared to be to
think of them as mere void and non-essential appearances. These
appearances appear as being mutually related but apart from
their appearance they have no other essence, no being or reality.
The Tathatā doctrine which was preached by As'vagho@sa oscillated
between the position of this absolute non-essentialness of all
dhammas and the Brahminic idea that something existed as the
background of all these non-essential dhammas. This he called
tathatā, but he could not consistently say that any such permanent
entity could exist. The Vijńānavāda doctrine which also
took its rise at this time appears to me to be a mixture of the
S'ūnyavāda doctrine and the Tathatā doctrine; but when carefully
examined it seems to be nothing but S'ūnyavāda, with an attempt
at explaining all the observed phenomena. If everything was

167

non-essential how did it originate? Vijńānavāda proposes to give an
answer, and says that these phenomena are all but ideas of the mind
generated by the beginningless vāsanā (desire) of the mind. The
difficulty which is felt with regard to the Tathatā doctrine that
there must be some reality which is generating all these ideas
appearing as phenomena, is the same as that in the Vijńānavāda
doctrine. The Vijńānavādins could not admit the existence of such
a reality, but yet their doctrines led them to it. They could not
properly solve the difficulty, and admitted that their doctrine was
some sort of a compromise with the Brahminical doctrines of
heresy, but they said that this was a compromise to make the
doctrine intelligible to the heretics; in truth however the reality
assumed in the doctrine was also non-essential. The Vijńānavāda
literature that is available to us is very scanty and from that we
are not in a position to judge what answers Vijńānavāda could give
on the point. These three doctrines developed almost about the
same time and the difficulty of conceiving s'ūnya (void), tathatā,
(thatness) and the ālayavijńāna of Vijńānavāda is more or less
the same.

The Tathatā doctrine of As'vagho@sa practically ceased with
him. But the S'ūnyavāda and the Vijńānavāda doctrines which
originated probably about 200 B.C. continued to develop probably
till the eighth century A.D. Vigorous disputes with S'ūnyavāda
doctrines are rarely made in any independent work of Hindu
philosophy, after Kumārila and S'a@nkara. From the third or
the fourth century A.D. some Buddhists took to the study of
systematic logic and began to criticize the doctrine of the Hindu
logicians. Di@nnāga the Buddhist logician (500 A.D.) probably
started these hostile criticisms by trying to refute the doctrines
of the great Hindu logician Vātsyāyana, in his Pramā@nasamuccaya.
In association with this logical activity we find the
activity of two other schools of Buddhism, viz. the Sarvāstivādins
(known also as Vaibhā@sikas) and the Sautrāntikas. Both the
Vaibhā@sikas and the Sautrāntikas accepted the existence of the
external world, and they were generally in conflict with the
Hindu schools of thought Nyāya-Vais'e@sika and Sā@mkhya which
also admitted the existence of the external world. Vasubandhu
(420-500 A.D.) was one of the most illustrious names of this school.
We have from this time forth a number of great Buddhist
thinkers such as Yas'omitra (commentator of Vasubandhu's work),

168

Dharmmakīrtti (writer of Nyāyabindu 635 A.D.), Vinītadeva and
S'āntabhadra (commentators of Nyāyabindu), Dharmmottara
(commentator of Nyāyabindu 847 A.D.), Ratnakīrtti (950 A.D.),
Pa@n@dita As'oka, and Ratnākara S'ānti, some of whose contributions
have been published in the _Six Buddhist Nyāya Tracts_, published
in Calcutta in the _Bibliotheca Indica_ series. These Buddhist
writers were mainly interested in discussions regarding the nature
of perception, inference, the doctrine of momentariness, and
the doctrine of causal efficiency (_arthakriyākāritva_) as demonstrating
the nature of existence. On the negative side they were
interested in denying the ontological theories of Nyāya and
Sā@mkhya with regard to the nature of class-concepts, negation,
relation of whole and part, connotation of terms, etc. These
problems hardly attracted any notice in the non-Sautrāntika and
non-Vaibhā@sika schools of Buddhism of earlier times. They of
course agreed with the earlier Buddhists in denying the existence
of a permanent soul, but this they did with the help of their
doctrine of causal efficiency. The points of disagreement between
Hindu thought up to S'a@nkara (800 A.D.) and Buddhist thought
till the time of S'a@nkara consisted mainly in the denial by the
Buddhists of a permanent soul and the permanent external world.
For Hindu thought was more or less realistic, and even the
Vedānta of S'a@nkara admitted the existence of the permanent
external world in some sense. With S'a@nkara the forms of the
external world were no doubt illusory, but they all had a permanent
background in the Brahman, which was the only reality
behind all mental and the physical phenomena. The Sautrāntikas
admitted the existence of the external world and so their quarrel
with Nyāya and Sā@mkhya was with regard to their doctrine
of momentariness; their denial of soul and their views on the
different ontological problems were in accordance with their
doctrine of momentariness. After the twelfth century we do not
hear much of any new disputes with the Buddhists. From this
time the disputes were mainly between the different systems of
Hindu philosophers, viz. Nyāya, the Vedānta of the school of
S'a@nkara and the Theistic Vedānta of Rāmānuja, Madhva, etc.

169




CHAPTER VI


THE JAINA PHILOSOPHY


The Origin of Jainism.

Notwithstanding the radical differences in their philosophical
notions Jainism and Buddhism, which were originally both orders
of monks outside the pale of Brahmanism, present some resemblance
in outward appearance, and some European scholars
who became acquainted with Jainism through inadequate samples
of Jaina literature easily persuaded themselves that it was an offshoot
of Buddhism, and even Indians unacquainted with Jaina
literature are often found to commit the same mistake. But it
has now been proved beyond doubt that this idea is wrong
and Jainism is at least as old as Buddhism. The oldest Buddhist
works frequently mention the Jains as a rival sect, under their
old name Nigantha and their leader Nātaputta Varddhamāna
Mahāvīra, the last prophet of the Jains. The canonical books of
the Jains mention as contemporaries of Mahāvīra the same kings
as reigned during Buddha's career.

Thus Mahāvīra was a contemporary of Buddha, but unlike
Buddha he was neither the author of the religion nor the founder
of the sect, but a monk who having espoused the Jaina creed
afterwards became the seer and the last prophet (Tļrtha@nkara) of
Jainism[Footnote ref 1]. His predecessor Pārs'va, the last Tīrtha@nkara but
one, is said to have died 250 years before Mahāvīra, while Pārs'va's
predecessor Ari@s@tanemi is said to have died 84,000 years before
Mahāvīra's Nirvā@na. The story in _Uttarādhyayanasūtra_ that a
disciple of Pārs'va met a disciple of Mahāvīra and brought about
the union of the old Jainism and that propounded by Mahāvīra
seems to suggest that this Pārs'va was probably a historical person.

According to the belief of the orthodox Jains, the Jaina religion
is eternal, and it has been revealed again and again in every one
of the endless succeeding periods of the world by innumerable
Tirthankaras. In the present period the first Tīrtha@nkara was
@R@sabha and the last, the 24th, was Vardhamāna Mahāvīra. All

__________________________________________________________________

[Footnote 1: See Jacobi's article on Jainism, _E. R.E._]

170

Tīrtha@nkaras have reached mok@sa at their death, and they
neither care for nor have any influence on worldly affairs, but yet
they are regarded as "Gods" by the Jains and are worshipped [Footnote ref
1].


Two Sects of Jainism [Footnote ref 2].

There are two main sects of Jains, S'vetāmbaras (wearers of
white cloths) and Digambaras (the naked). They are generally
agreed on all the fundamental principles of Jainism. The tenets
peculiar to the Digambaras are firstly that perfect saints such as
the Tīrtha@nkaras live without food, secondly that the embryo of
Mahāvīra was not removed from the womb of Devanandā to that
of Tris'alā as the S'vetāmbaras contend, thirdly that a monk
who owns any property and wears clothes cannot reach Mok@sa,
fourthly that no woman can reach Mok@sa [Footnote ref 3]. The Digambaras
deny the canonical works of the S'vetāmbaras and assert that
these had been lost immediately after Mahāvīra. The origin of
the Digambaras is attributed to S'ivabhūti (A.D. 83) by the
S'vetāmbaras as due to a schism in the old S'vetāmbara church,
of which there had already been previous to that seven other
schisms. The Digambaras in their turn deny this, and say that
they themselves alone have preserved the original practices, and
that under Bhadrabāhu, the eighth sage after Mahāvīra, the last
Tīrtha@nkara, there rose the sect of Ardhaphālakas with laxer
principles, from which developed the present sect of S'vetāmbaras
(A.D. 80). The Digambaras having separated in early times
from the S'vetāmbaras developed peculiar religious ceremonies of
their own, and have a different ecclesiastical and literary history,
though there is practically no difference about the main creed.
It may not be out of place here to mention that the Sanskrit
works of the Digambaras go back to a greater antiquity than
those of the S'vetāmbaras, if we except the canonical books of
the latter. It may be noted in this connection that there developed
in later times about 84 different schools of Jainism differing from
one another only in minute details of conduct. These were called
_gacchas_, and the most important of these is the Kharatara Gaccha,
which had split into many minor gacchas. Both sects of Jains have

___________________________________________________________________

[Footnote 1: See "_Digumbara Jain Iconography (1. A, xxxii [1903] p. 459"
of J. Burgess, and Būhler's "Specimens of Jina sculptures from Mathurā,"
in _Epigraphica Indica_, II. pp. 311 etc. See also Jacobi's article on
Jainism, _E.R.E._]

[Footnote 2: See Jacobi's article on Jainism, _E.R.E._]

[Footnote 3: See Gu@naratna's commentary on Jainism in
_@Sa@ddars'anasamuccaya_.]

171

preserved a list of the succession of their teachers from Mahāvīra
(_sthavirāvali, pa@t@tāvali, gurvāvali_) and also many legends about
them such as those in the _Kalpasūtra_, the _Paris'i@s@ta-parvan_ of
Hemacandra, etc.


The Canonical and other Literature of the Jains.

According to the Jains there were originally two kinds of
sacred books, the fourteen Pūrvas and the eleven A@ngas. The
Pūrvas continued to be transmitted for some time but were
gradually lost. The works known as the eleven A@ngas are now
the oldest parts of the existing Jain canon. The names of these
are _Ācāra, Sūtrak@rta, Sthāna, Samavāya Bhagavatī, Jńātadharmakathās,
Upāsakadas'ās, Antak@rtadas'ās Anuttaraupapātikadas'ās,
Pras'navyākara@na, Vipāka_. In addition to these there are the twelve
_Upā@ngas_ [Footnote ref 1], the ten _Prakīr@nas_ [Footnote ref 2], six
_Chedasūtras_ [Footnote ref 3], _Nāndī_ and _Anuyogadvāra_
and four _Mūlasūtras_ (_Uttarādhyayana, Āvas'yaka,
Das'avaikālika_, and _Pi@n@daniryukti_). The Digambaras however
assert that these original works have all been lost, and that the
present works which pass by the old names are spurious. The
original language of these according to the Jains was Ardhamāgadhī,
but these suffered attempts at modernization and it is best
to call the language of the sacred texts Jaina Prākrit and that
of the later works Jaina Mahārā@s@trī. A large literature of glosses
and commentaries has grown up round the sacred texts. And
besides these, the Jains possess separate works, which contain
systematic expositions of their faith in Prākrit and Sanskrit.
Many commentaries have also been written upon these independent
treatises. One of the oldest of these treatises is Umāsvāti's
_Tattvārthādhigamasūtra_(1-85 A.D.). Some of the most important
later Jaina works on which this chapter is based are
_Vis'e@sāvas'yakabhā@sya_, Jaina _Tarkavārttika_, with the commentary
of S'āntyācāryya, _Dravyasa@mgraha_ of Nemicandra (1150 A.D.),
_Syādvādamańjarī_ of Malli@sena (1292 A.D.), _Nyāyāvatāra_ of
Siddhasena Divākara (533 A.D.), _Parīk@sāmukhasūtralaghuv@rtti_ of
Anantavīryya (1039 A.D.), _Prameyakamalamārta@n@da_ of Prabhācandra

___________________________________________________________________

[Footnote 1: _Aupapātika, Rājapras'nīya, Jīvābhigama, Prajńāpanā,
Jambudvīpaprajńapti, Candraprajńapti, Sūryaprajńapti, Nirayāvali,
Kalpāvata@msikā, Pu@spikā, Pu@spacūlikā, V@r@s@nida@sās_.]

[Footnote 2: _Catu@hs'ara@na, Sa@mstāra, Āturapratyākhyāna, Bhaktāparijńā,
Ta@ndulavaiyālī, Ca@n@dāvīja, Devendrastava, Ga@nivīja, Mahāpratyākhyāna,
Vīrastava_.]

[Footnote 3: _Nis'ītha, Mahānis'ītha, Vyavahāra, Das'as'rutaskandha,
B@rhatkalpa, Pańcakalpa_.]

172

(825 A.D.), _Yogas'āstra_ of Hemacandra (1088-1172 A.D.), and
_Pramā@nanayatattvālokāla@mkāra_ of Deva Sūri (1086-1169 A.D.).
I am indebted for these dates to Vidyābhū@sa@na's _Indian Logic_.

It may here be mentioned that the Jains also possess a secular
literature of their own in poetry and prose, both Sanskrit and
Prākrit. There are also many moral tales (e.g. _Samarāicca-kahā,
Upamitabhavaprapańca-kathā_ in Prākrit, and the _Yas'astilaka_ of
Somadeva and Dhanapāla's _Tilakamańjarī_); Jaina Sanskrit poems
both in the Purā@na and Kāvya style and hymns in Prākrit and
Sanskrit are also very numerous. There are also many Jaina
dramas. The Jaina authors have also contributed many works,
original treatises as well as commentaries, to the scientific literature
of India in its various branches: grammar, biography, metrics,
poetics, philosophy, etc. The contributions of the Jains to logic
deserve special notice [Footnote ref 1].


Some General Characteristics of the Jains.

The Jains exist only in India and their number is a little less
than a million and a half. The Digambaras are found chiefly in
Southern India but also in the North, in the North-western provinces,
Eastern Rājputāna and the Punjab. The head-quarters of
the S'vetāmbaras are in Gujarat and Western Rājputāna, but they
are to be found also all over Northern and Central India.

The outfit of a monk, as Jacobi describes it, is restricted to
bare necessaries, and these he must beg--clothes, a blanket, an alms-bowl,
a stick, a broom to sweep the ground, a piece of cloth to cover
his mouth when speaking lest insects should enter it [Footnote ref 2]. The
outfit of nuns is the same except that they have additional clothes. The
Digambaras have a similar outfit, but keep no clothes, use brooms
of peacock's feathers or hairs of the tail of a cow (_cāmara_) [Footnote
ref 3]. The monks shave the head or remove the hair by plucking it out.
The latter method of getting rid of the hair is to be preferred, and is
regarded sometimes as an essential rite. The duties of monks
are very hard. They should sleep only three hours and spend
the rest of the time in repenting of and expiating sins, meditating,
studying, begging alms (in the afternoon), and careful inspection of
their clothes and other things for the removal of insects. The
laymen should try to approach the ideal of conduct of the monks

___________________________________________________________________

[Footnote 1: See Jacobi's article on Jainism. _E.R.E._]

[Footnote 2: See Jacobi, _loc. cat._]

[Footnote 3: See _@Sa@ddars'anasamuccaya_, chapter IV.]

173

by taking upon themselves particular vows, and the monks are
required to deliver sermons and explain the sacred texts in
the upās'rayas (separate buildings for monks like the Buddhist
vihāras). The principle of extreme carefulness not to destroy any
living being has been in monastic life carried out to its very
last consequences, and has shaped the conduct of the laity in a
great measure. No layman will intentionally kill any living being,
not even an insect, however troublesome. He will remove it carefully
without hurting it. The principle of not hurting any living
being thus bars them from many professions such as agriculture,
etc., and has thrust them into commerce [Footnote ref 1].


Life of Mahāvīra.

Mahāvīra, the last prophet of the Jains, was a K@sattriya of
the Jńāta clan and a native of Vais'āli (modern Besarh, 27 miles
north of Patna). He was the second son of Siddhārtha and Trīs'alā.
The S'vetāmbaras maintain that the embryo of the Tīrtha@nkara
which first entered the womb of the Brahmin lady Devanandā
was then transferred to the womb of Trīs'alā. This story the
Digambaras do not believe as we have already seen. His parents
were the worshippers of Pārs'va and gave him the name Varddhamāna
(Vīra or Mahāvīra). He married Yas'odā and had a daughter
by her. In his thirtieth year his parents died and with the permission
of his brother Nandivardhana he became a monk. After
twelve years of self-mortification and meditation he attained
omniscience (_kevala_, cf. _bodhi_ of the Buddhists). He lived to
preach for forty-two years more, and attained mok@sa (emancipation)
some years before Buddha in about 480 B.C. [Footnote ref 2].


The Fundamental Ideas of Jaina Ontology.

A thing (such as clay) is seen to assume various shapes and
to undergo diverse changes (such as the form of a jug, or
pan, etc.), and we have seen that the Chāndogya Upani@sad held
that since in all changes the clay-matter remained permanent,
that alone was true, whereas the changes of form and state
were but appearances, the nature of which cannot be rationally

_________________________________________________________________

[Footnote 1: See Jacobi's article on Jainism, _E. R.E._]

[Footnote 2: See Hoernlé's translation of _Uvāsagadasāo_, Jacobi, _loc.
cit_., and Hoernlé's article on the Ājīvakas, _E. R.E._ The S'vetāmbaras,
however, say that this date was 527 B.C. and the Digambaras place it
eighteen years later.]

174

demonstrated or explained. The unchangeable substance (e.g.
the clay-matter) alone is true, and the changing forms are mere
illusions of the senses, mere objects of name (_nāma-rūpa_) [Footnote ref
1]. What we call tangibility, visibility, or other sense-qualities,
have no real existence, for they are always changing, and are like mere
phantoms of which no conception can be made by the light of reason.

The Buddhists hold that changing qualities can alone be perceived
and that there is no unchanging substance behind them.
What we perceive as clay is but some specific quality, what we
perceive as jug is also some quality. Apart from these qualities
we do not perceive any qualitiless substance, which the Upani@sads
regard as permanent and unchangeable. The permanent
and unchangeable substance is thus a mere fiction of ignorance,
as there are only the passing collocations of qualities. Qualities
do not imply that there are substances to which they adhere,
for the so-called pure substance does not exist, as it can neither
be perceived by the senses nor inferred. There are only the
momentary passing qualities. We should regard each change of
quality as a new existence.

The Jains we know were the contemporaries of Buddha and
possibly of some of the Upani@sads too, and they had also a solution
to offer. They held that it was not true that substance
alone was true and qualities were mere false and illusory appearances.
Further it was not true as the Buddhists said that
there was no permanent substance but merely the change of
passing qualities, for both these represent two extreme views
and are contrary to experience. Both of them, however, contain
some elements of truth but not the whole truth as given in
experience. Experience shows that in all changes there are
three elements: (1) that some collocations of qualities appear
to remain unchanged; (2) that some new qualities are generated;
(3) that some old qualities are destroyed. It is true that qualities
of things are changing every minute, but all qualities are not
changing. Thus when a jug is made, it means that the clay-lump
has been destroyed, a jug has been generated and the clay is
permanent, i.e. all production means that some old qualities have
been lost, some new ones brought in, and there is some part in
it which is permanent The clay has become lost in some form,
has generated itself in another, and remained permanent in still

__________________________________________________________________

[Footnote 1: See Chāndogya, VI. 1.]

175

another form. It is by virtue of these unchanged qualities that a
thing is said to be permanent though undergoing change. Thus
when a lump of gold is turned into a rod or a ring, all the specific
qualities which come under the connotation of the word "gold"
are seen to continue, though the forms are successively changed,
and with each such change some of its qualities are lost and some
new ones are acquired. Such being the case, the truth comes to
this, that there is always a permanent entity as represented by the
permanence of such qualities as lead us to call it a substance in
spite of all its diverse changes. The nature of being (_sat_) then is
neither the absolutely unchangeable, nor the momentary changing
qualities or existences, but involves them both. Being then, as is
testified by experience, is that which involves a permanent unit,
which is incessantly every moment losing some qualities and
gaining new ones. The notion of being involves a permanent
(_dhruva_) accession of some new qualities (_utpāda_) and loss of
some old qualities (_vyaya_) [Footnote ref.1]. The solution of Jainism is
thus a reconciliation of the two extremes of Vedantism and Buddhism on
grounds of common-sense experience.


The Doctrine of Relative Pluralism (anekāntavāda).

This conception of being as the union of the permanent and
change brings us naturally to the doctrine of Anekāntavāda or
what we may call relative pluralism as against the extreme absolutism
of the Upani@sads and the pluralism of the Buddhists.
The Jains regarded all things as _anekānta_ (_na-ekānta_), or in
other words they held that nothing could be affirmed absolutely,
as all affirmations were true only under certain conditions and
limitations. Thus speaking of a gold jug, we see that its existence
as a substance (_dravya_) is of the nature of a collocation
of atoms and not as any other substance such as space (_ākās'a_),
i.e. a gold jug is a _dravya_ only in one sense of the term and
not in every sense; so it is a _dravya_ in the sense that it is a
collocation of atoms and not a _dravya_ in the sense of space or
time (_kāla_). It is thus both a dravya and not a dravya at one
and the same time. Again it is atomic in the sense that it is a
composite of earth-atoms and not atomic in the sense that it is

___________________________________________________________________

[Footnote: 1: See _Tattvārthādhigamasūtra_, and Gu@naratna's treatment of
Jainism in _@Sa@ddars'anasamuccaya_.]

176

not a composite of water-atoms. Again it is a composite of earth-atoms
only in the sense that gold is a metallic modification of
earth, and not any other modification of earth as clay or stone.
Its being constituted of metal-atoms is again true in the sense
that it is made up of gold-atoms and not of iron-atoms. It
is made up again of gold-atoms in the sense of melted and unsullied
gold and not as gold in the natural condition. It is again
made up of such unsullied and melted gold as has been hammered
and shaped by the goldsmith Devadatta and not by Yajńadatta.
Its being made up of atoms conditioned as above is again only
true in the sense that the collocation has been shaped as a jug
and not as a pot and so on. Thus proceeding in a similar manner
the Jains say that all affirmations are true of a thing only in a
certain limited sense. All things (_vastu_) thus possess an infinite
number of qualities (_anantadharmātmaka@m vastu_), each of which
can only be affirmed in a particular sense. Such an ordinary thing
as a jug will be found to be the object of an infinite number of
affirmations and the possessor of an infinite number of qualities
from infinite points of view, which are all true in certain restricted
senses and not absolutely [Footnote ref l]. Thus in the positive relation
riches cannot be affirmed of poverty but in the negative relation such
an affirmation is possible as when we say "the poor man has no
riches." The poor man possesses riches not in a positive but in
a negative way. Thus in some relation or other anything may be
affirmed of any other thing, and again in other relations the very
same thing cannot be affirmed of it. The different standpoints
from which things (though possessed of infinite determinations)
can be spoken of as possessing this or that quality or as appearing
in relation to this or that, are technically called _naya_ [Footnote ref
2].


The Doctrine of Nayas.

In framing judgments about things there are two ways open
to us, firstly we may notice the manifold qualities and characteristics
of anything but view them as unified in the thing; thus when
we say "this is a book" we do not look at its characteristic
qualities as being different from it, but rather the qualities or
characteristics are perceived as having no separate existence from

____________________________________________________________________

[Footnote 1: See Gu@naratna on Jainamata in _@Sa@ddarsanasamuccaya_, pp.
211. etc., and also _Tattvārthādhigamasūtra_.]

[Footnote 2: See _Tattvārthādhigamasūtra_, and _Vis'e@sāvalyaka bhā@sya_,
pp. 895-923.]

177

the thing. Secondly we may notice the qualities separately and
regard the thing as a mere non-existent fiction (cf. the Buddhist
view); thus I may speak of the different qualities of the book
separately and hold that the qualities of things are alone perceptible
and the book apart from these cannot be found. These two
points of view are respectively called _dravyanaya_ and _paryāyanaya_
[Footnote ref 1]. The dravyanaya again shows itself in three forms,
and paryayanaya in four forms, of which the first form only is important
for our purposes, the other three being important rather from the
point of view of grammar and language had better be omitted
here. The three nayas under dravyanaya are called naigama-naya,
sa@mgraha-naya and vyavahāra-naya.

When we speak of a thing from a purely common sense point
of view, we do not make our ideas clear or precise. Thus I may
hold a book in my hand and when asked whether my hands are
empty, I may say, no, I have something in my hand, or I may say,
I have a book in my hand. It is evident that in the first answer
I looked at the book from the widest and most general point of
view as a "thing," whereas in the second I looked at it in its
special existence as a book. Again I may be reading a page of
a book, and I may say I am reading a book, but in reality I was
reading only one of the pages of the book. I may be scribbling
on loose sheets, and may say this is my book on Jaina philosophy,
whereas in reality there were no books but merely some loose
sheets. This looking at things from the loose common sense view,
in which we do not consider them from the point of view of their
most general characteristic as "being" or as any of their special
characteristics, but simply as they appear at first sight, is technically
called the naigama standpoint. This empirical view probably
proceeds on the assumption that a thing possesses the most
general as well as the most special qualities, and hence we may
lay stress on any one of these at any time and ignore the other
ones. This is the point of view from which according to the
Jains the Nyāya and Vais'e@sika schools interpret experience.

Sa@mgraha-naya is the looking at things merely from the
most general point of view. Thus we may speak of all individual
things from their most general and fundamental aspect as "being."
This according to the Jains is the Vedānta way of looking at things.

___________________________________________________________________

[Footnote 1: _Syādvādama@njarī_, pp. 171-173.]

178


The vyavahāra-naya standpoint holds that the real essence
of things is to be regarded from the point of view of actual practical
experience of the thing, which unifies within it some general
as well as some special traits, which has been existing from past
times and remain in the future, but yet suffer trifling changes
all the while, changes which are serviceable to us in a thousand
ways. Thus a "book" has no doubt some general traits, shared
by all books, but it has some special traits as well. Its atoms are
continually suffering some displacement and rearrangement, but
yet it has been existing as a book for some time past and will
exist for some time in the future as well. All these characteristics,
go to make up the essence of the "book" of our everyday experience,
and none of these can be separated and held up as being
the concept of a "book." This according to the Jains is the
Sā@mkhya way of looking at things.

The first view of paryāya-naya called _@rjusūtra_ is the Buddhist
view which does not believe in the existence of the thing in the
past or in the future, but holds that a thing is a mere conglomeration
of characteristics which may be said to produce effects at
any given moment. At each new moment there are new collocations
of new qualities and it is these which may be regarded as
the true essence of our notion of things [Footnote ref 1].

The nayas as we have already said are but points of view, or
aspects of looking at things, and as such are infinite in number.
The above four represent only a broad classification of these. The
Jains hold that the Nyāya-Vais'e@sika, the Vedānta, the Sā@mkhya,
and the Buddhist, have each tried to interpret and systematize
experience from one of the above four points of view, and each regards
the interpretation from his point of view as being absolutely
true to the exclusion of all other points of view. This is their error
(_nayābhāsa_), for each standpoint represents only one of the many
points of view from which a thing can be looked at. The affirmations
from any point of view are thus true in a limited sense and
under limited conditions. Infinite numbers of affirmations may
be made of things from infinite points of view. Affirmations or
judgments according to any naya or standpoint cannot therefore
be absolute, for even contrary affirmations of the very selfsame

_________________________________________________________________

[Footnote 1: The other standpoints of paryāya-naya, which represent
grammatical and linguistic points of view, are _s'abda-naya,
samabhirū@dha-naya_, and _evambhūla-naya_. See _Vis'e@sāvas'yaka
bhā@sya_, pp. 895-923.]

179

things may be held to be true from other points of view. The
truth of each affirmation is thus only conditional, and inconceivable
from the absolute point of view. To guarantee correctness
therefore each affirmation should be preceded by the phrase _syāt_
(may be). This will indicate that the affirmation is only relative,
made somehow, from some point of view and under some reservations
and not in any sense absolute. There is no judgment
which is absolutely true, and no judgment which is absolutely
false. All judgments are true in some sense and false in another.
This brings us to the famous Jaina doctrine of Syādvāda [Footnote ref 1].


The Doctrine of Syādvāda.

The doctrine of Syādvāda holds that since the most contrary
characteristics of infinite variety may be associated with a thing,
affirmation made from whatever standpoint (_naya_) cannot be regarded
as absolute. All affirmations are true (in some _syādasti_ or
"may be it is" sense); all affirmations are false in some sense;
all affirmations are indefinite or inconceivable in some sense
(_syādavaktavya_); all affirmations are true as well as false in some
sense (_syādasti syānnāsti_); all affirmations are true as well as
indefinite (_syādasti cāvaktavyas'ca_); all affirmations are false as
well as indefinite; all affirmations are true and false and indefinite
in some sense (_syādasti syānnāsti syādavaktavyas'ca_). Thus we may
say "the jug is" or the jug has being, but it is more correct to
say explicitly that "may be (syāt) that the jug is," otherwise if
"being" here is taken absolutely of any and every kind of being,
it might also mean that there is a lump of clay or a pillar, or a
cloth or any other thing. The existence here is limited and defined
by the form of the jug. "The jug is" does not mean absolute
existence but a limited kind of existence as determined by the
form of the jug, "The jug is" thus means that a limited kind of
existence, namely the jug-existence is affirmed and not existence
in general in the absolute or unlimited sense, for then the sentence
"the jug is" might as well mean "the clay is," "the tree is," "the
cloth is," etc. Again the existence of the jug is determined by the
negation of all other things in the world; each quality or characteristic
(such as red colour) of the jug is apprehended and defined
by the negation of all the infinite varieties (such as black, blue,
golden), etc., of its class, and it is by the combined negation of all

___________________________________________________________________

[Footnote 1: See _Vis'e@sāvas'yaka bhā@sya_, pp. 895, etc., and
_Syādvādamańjarī_, pp. 170, etc.]

180

the infinite number of characteristics or qualities other than those
constituting the jug that a jug may be apprehended or defined.
What we call the being of the jug is thus the non-being of all the
rest except itself. Thus though looked at from one point of view
the judgment "the jug is" may mean affirmation of being, looked
at from another point of view it means an affirmation of non-being
(of all other objects). Thus of the judgment "the jug is" one may
say, may be it is an affirmation of being (_syādasti_), may be it is a
negation of being (_syānnāsti_); or I may proceed in quite another
way and say that "the jug is" means "this jug is here," which
naturally indicates that "this jug is not there" and thus the judgment
"the jug is" (i.e. is here) also means that "the jug is not
there," and so we see that the affirmation of the being of the jug
is true only of this place and false of another, and this justifies us
in saying that "may be that in some sense the jug is," and "may
be in some sense that the jug is not." Combining these two
aspects we may say that in some sense "may be that the jug is,"
and in some sense "may be that the jug is not." We understood
here that if we put emphasis on the side of the characteristics
constituting being, we may say "the jug is," but if we put emphasis
on the other side, we may as well say "the jug is not." Both the
affirmations hold good of the jug according as the emphasis is
put on either side. But if without emphasis on either side we try
to comprehend the two opposite and contradictory judgments
regarding the jug, we see that the nature of the jug or of the existence
of the jug is indefinite, unspeakable and inconceivable--_avaktavya,_ for
how can we affirm both being and non-being of the same thing, and yet
such is the nature of things that we cannot but do it. Thus all
affirmations are true, are not true, are both true and untrue, and are
thus unspeakable, inconceivable, and indefinite. Combining these four
again we derive another three, (1) that in some sense it may be that
the jug is, and (2) is yet unspeakable, or (3) that the jug is not and
is unspeakable, or finally that the jug is, is not, and is unspeakable.
Thus the Jains hold that no affirmation, or judgment, is absolute in its
nature, each is true in its own limited sense only, and for each one of
them any of the above seven alternatives (technically called _saptabha@ngī_
holds good [Footnote ref 1]. The Jains say that other Indian systems each
from its own point of view asserts itself to be the absolute and the only

__________________________________________________________________

[Footnote 1: See _Syādvādamańjarī_, with Hemacandra's commentary, pp. 166,
etc.]

181

point of view. They do not perceive that the nature of reality
is such that the truth of any assertion is merely conditional,
and holds good only in certain conditions, circumstances, or
senses (_upādhi_). It is thus impossible to make any affirmation
which is universally and absolutely valid. For a contrary or
contradictory affirmation will always be found to hold good of
any judgment in some sense or other. As all reality is partly
permanent and partly exposed to change of the form of losing
and gaining old and new qualities, and is thus relatively permanent
and changeful, so all our affirmations regarding truth are also
only relatively valid and invalid. Being, non-being and indefinite,
the three categories of logic, are all equally available in some sense
or other in all their permutations for any and every kind of
judgment. There is no universal and absolute position or negation,
and all judgments are valid only conditionally. The relation of
the naya doctrine with the syādvāda doctrine is therefore this,
that for any judgment according to any and every naya there are as
many alternatives as are indicated by syādvāda. The validity of
such a judgment is therefore only conditional. If this is borne
in mind when making any judgment according to any naya,
the naya is rightly used. If, however, the judgments are made absolutely
according to any particular naya without any reference to
other nayas as required by the syādvāda doctrine the nayas are
wrongly used as in the case of other systems, and then such
judgments are false and should therefore be called false nayas
(_nayābhāsa_) [Footnote ref 1].


Knowledge, its value for us.

The Buddhist Dharmottara in his commentary on _Nyāyabindu_
says that people who are anxious to fulfil some purpose or end in
which they are interested, value the knowledge which helps them
to attain that purpose. It is because knowledge is thus found
to be useful and sought by men that philosophy takes upon it the
task of examining the nature of true knowledge (_samyagjńāna_ or
_pramā@na_). The main test of true knowledge is that it helps us
to attain our purpose. The Jains also are in general agreement with the
above view of knowledge of the Buddhists [Footnote ref 2]. They also

___________________________________________________________________

[Footnote 1: The earliest mention of the doctrine of syādvāda and
saptabha@ngī probably occurs in Bhadrabāhu's (433-357 B.C.) commentary
_Sūtrak@rtānganiryukti_.

[Footnote 2: See _Pramā@na-naya-tattvālokāla@mkāra_ (Benares), p. 16; also
_Parīk@sā-mukha-sūira-v@rtti_ (Asiatic Society), ch. I.]

182

say that knowledge is not to be valued for its own sake. The
validity (_prāmā@nya_) of anything consists in this, that it directly
helps us to get what is good for us and to avoid what is bad
for us. Knowledge alone has this capacity, for by it we can
adapt ourselves to our environments and try to acquire what
is good for us and avoid what is bad [Footnote ref 1]. The conditions that
lead to the production of such knowledge (such as the presence
of full light and proximity to the eye in the case of seeing an
object by visual perception) have but little relevancy in this connection.
For we are not concerned with how a cognition is
produced, as it can be of no help to us in serving our purposes.
It is enough for us to know that external objects under certain
conditions assume such a special fitness (_yogyatā_) that we can
have knowledge of them. We have no guarantee that they
generate knowledge in us, for we are only aware that under
certain conditions we know a thing, whereas under other conditions
we do not know it [Footnote ref 2]. The enquiry as to the nature of the
special fitness of things which makes knowledge of them possible
does not concern us. Those conditions which confer such
a special fitness on things as to render them perceivable have but
little to do with us; for our purposes which consist only in the
acquirement of good and avoidance of evil, can only be served by
knowledge and not by those conditions of external objects.

Knowledge reveals our own self as a knowing subject as well
as the objects that are known by us. We have no reason to
suppose (like the Buddhists) that all knowledge by perception of
external objects is in the first instance indefinite and indeterminate,
and that all our determinate notions of form, colour, size and other
characteristics of the thing are not directly given in our perceptual
experience, but are derived only by imagination (_utprek@sā_), and
that therefore true perceptual knowledge only certifies the validity
of the indefinite and indeterminate crude sense data (_nirvikalpa
jńāna_). Experience shows that true knowledge on the one hand
reveals us as subjects or knowers, and on the other hand gives
a correct sketch of the external objects in all the diversity of
their characteristics. It is for this reason that knowledge is our
immediate and most prominent means of serving our purposes.

__________________________________________________________________

[Footnote 1: _Pramā@na-naya-tattvālokāla@mkāra,_ p. 26.]

[Footnote 2: See _Parī@sa-mukha-sūtra,_ II. 9, and its v@rtti, and also the
concluding v@rtti of ch. II.]

183

Of course knowledge cannot directly and immediately bring to
us the good we want, but since it faithfully communicates to us
the nature of the objects around us, it renders our actions for the
attainment of good and the avoidance of evil, possible; for if
knowledge did not possess these functions, this would have been
impossible. The validity of knowledge thus consists in this, that
it is the most direct, immediate, and indispensable means for
serving our purposes. So long as any knowledge is uncontradicted
it should be held as true. False knowledge is that which represents
things in relations in which they do not exist. When a rope in a
badly lighted place gives rise to the illusion of a snake, the illusion
consists in taking the rope to be a snake, i.e. perceiving a snake
where it does not exist. Snakes exist and ropes also exist, there is
no untruth in that [Footnote ref 1]. The error thus consists in this,
that the snake is perceived where the rope exists. The perception of a
snake under relations and environments in which it was not then existing
is what is meant by error here. What was at first perceived as a snake
was later on contradicted and thus found false. Falsehood therefore
consists in the misrepresentation of objective facts in experience. True
knowledge therefore is that which gives such a correct and faithful
representation of its object as is never afterwards found to be
contradicted. Thus knowledge when imparted directly in association
with the organs in sense-perception is very clear, vivid, and
distinct, and is called perceptional (_pratyak@sa_); when attained
otherwise the knowledge is not so clear and vivid and is then
called non-perceptional (_parok@sa_ [Footnote ref 2]).


Theory of Perception.

The main difference of the Jains from the Buddhists in the
theory of perception lies, as we have already seen, in this, that the
Jains think that perception (_pratyak@sa_) reveals to us the external
objects just as they are with most of their diverse characteristics of
colour, form, etc., and also in this, that knowledge arises in the soul

________________________________________________________________

[Footnote 1: Illusion consists in attributing such spatial, temporal or
other kinds of relations to the objects of our judgment as do not actually
exist, but the objects themselves actually exist in other relations. When
I mistake the rope for the snake, the snake actually exists though its
relationing with the "this" as "this is a snake" does not exist, for the
snake is not the rope. This illusion is thus called
_satkhyāti_ or misrelationing of existents (_sat_)].

[Footnote 2: See _Jaina-tarka-vārttika_ of Siddhasena, ch. I., and v@rtti
by S'antyācārya, Pramā@nanayatattvālokāla@mkāra, ch. I.,
_Parīksā-mukha-sūtra-v@rtti,_ ch. I.]

184

from within it as if by removing a veil which had been covering it
before. Objects are also not mere forms of knowledge (as the Vijńānavādin
Buddhist thinks) but are actually existing. Knowledge
of external objects by perception is gained through the senses.
The exterior physical sense such as the eye must be distinguished
from the invisible faculty or power of vision of the soul, which
alone deserves the name of sense. We have five such cognitive
senses. But the Jains think that since by our experience we are
only aware of five kinds of sense knowledge corresponding to the
five senses, it is better to say that it is the "self" which gains
of itself those different kinds of sense-knowledge in association with
those exterior senses as if by removal of a covering, on account
of the existence of which the knowledge could not reveal itself
before. The process of external perception does not thus involve
the exercise of any separate and distinct sense, though the rise
of the sense-knowledge in the soul takes place in association with
the particular sense-organ such as eye, etc. The soul is in touch
with all parts of the body, and visual knowledge is that knowledge
which is generated in the soul through that part of it which is
associated with, or is in touch with the eye. To take an example,
I look before me and see a rose. Before looking at it the knowledge
of rose was in me, but only in a covered condition, and
hence could not get itself manifested. The act of looking at the
rose means that such a fitness has come into the rose and into
myself that the rose is made visible, and the veil over my knowledge
of rose is removed. When visual knowledge arises, this
happens in association with the eye; I say that I see through
the visual sense, whereas in reality experience shows that I have
only a knowledge of the visual type (associated with eye). As
experience does not reveal the separate senses, it is unwarrantable
to assert that they have an existence apart from the self. Proceeding
in a similar way the Jains discard the separate existence of manas
(mind-organ) also, for manas also is not given in experience, and the
hypothesis of its existence is unnecessary, as self alone can serve
its purpose [Footnote ref 1]. Perception of an object means

___________________________________________________________________

[Footnote 1: _Tanna indriyam bhautikam kim tu ātmā ca
indriyam...anupahatacak@surādides'e@su eva ātmana@h
karmak@sayopas'amaslenāsthagitagavāk@satulyāni cak@surādīni
upakara@nāni. Jaina-Vāttika-V@rtti,_ II. p. 98. In many places,
however, the five senses, such as eye, ear, etc., are mentioned as
senses, and living beings are often classified according to the number
of senses they possess. (See _Pramā@namīmā@msā._ See also
_Tattvārthā-dhigamasūtra_, ch. II. etc.) But this is with reference to
the sense organs. The denial of separate senses is with reference to
admitting them as entities or capacities having a distinct and separate
category of existence from the soul. The sense organs are like
windows for the soul to look out. They cannot thus modify the
sense-knowledge which rises in the soul by inward determination;
for it is already existent in it; the perceptual process only means that
the veil which as observing it is removed.]

185

that the veil of ignorance upon the "self" regarding the object has
been removed. Inwardly this removal is determined by the
karma of the individual, outwardly it is determined by the presence
of the object of perception, light, the capacity of the sense
organs, and such other conditions. Contrary to the Buddhists
and many other Indian systems, the Jains denied the existence
of any nirvikalpa (indeterminate) stage preceding the final savikalpa
(determinate) stage of perception. There was a direct
revelation of objects from within and no indeterminate sense-materials
were necessary for the development of determinate
perceptions. We must contrast this with the Buddhists who
regarded that the first stage consisting of the presentation of
indeterminate sense materials was the only valid part of perception.
The determinate stage with them is the result of the application
of mental categories, such as imagination, memory, etc., and hence
does not truly represent the presentative part [Footnote ref 1].


Non-Perceptual Knowledge.

Non-perceptual knowledge (_parok@sa_) differs from pratyak@sa
in this, that it does not give us so vivid a picture of objects as the
latter. Since the Jains do not admit that the senses had any function
in determining the cognitions of the soul, the only distinction
they could draw between perception and other forms of knowledge
was that the knowledge of the former kind (perception) gave us
clearer features and characteristics of objects than the latter.
Parok@sa thus includes inference, recognition, implication, memory,
etc.; and this knowledge is decidedly less vivid than perception.

Regarding inference, the Jains hold that it is unnecessary to
have five propositions, such as: (1) "the hill is fiery," (2) "because
of smoke," (3) "wherever there is smoke there is fire, such as the
kitchen," (4) "this hill is smoky," (5) "therefore it is fiery," called
respectively _pratijńā, hetu, drs@tānta, upanaya_ and _nigamana_, except
for the purpose of explicitness. It is only the first two
propositions which actually enter into the inferential process
(_Prameyakamalamārta@n@da,_ pp. 108, 109). When we make an

____________________________________________________________________

[Footnote 1 _Prameyakamalamārta@n@da,_ pp. 8-11.]

186

inference we do not proceed through the five propositions as
above. They who know that the reason is inseparably connected
with the probandum either as coexistence (_sahabhāva_) or as invariable
antecedence (_kramabhāva_) will from the mere statement
of the existence of the reason (e.g. smoke) in the hill jump to the
conclusion that the hill has got fire. A syllogism consisting of
five propositions is rather for explaining the matter to a child
than for representing the actual state of the mind in making an
inference [Footnote ref 1].

As regards proof by testimony the Jains do not admit the
authority of the Vedas, but believe that the Jaina scriptures give
us right knowledge, for these are the utterances of persons who
have lived a worldly life but afterwards by right actions and
right knowledge have conquered all passions and removed all
ignorance [Footnote ref 2].


Knowledge as Revelation.

The Buddhists had affirmed that the proof of the existence of
anything depended upon the effect that it could produce on us.
That which could produce any effect on us was existent, and that

_____________________________________________________________________

[Footnote 1: As regards concomitance (_vyāpti_) some of the Jaina logicians
like the Buddhists prefer _antarvyāpti_ (between smoke and fire) to
bahirvyāptī (the place containing smoke with the place containing fire).
They also divide inference into two classes, svārthānumāna for one's own
self and _parārthānumāna_ for convincing others. It may not be out of
place to note that the earliest Jaina view as maintained by Bhadrabāhu
in his Das'avaikālikaniryukti was in favour of ten propositions for
making an inference; (1) _Pratijńā_ (e.g. non-injury to life is the
greatest virtue), (2) _Pratijńāvibhakti_ (non-injury to life is the
greatest virtue according to Jaina scriptures), (3) _Hetu_ (because
those who adhere to non-injury are loved by gods and it is meritorious
to do them honour), (4) _Hetu vibhakti_ (those who do so are the only
persons who can live in the highest places of virtue), (5) _Vipak@sa_
(but even by doing injury one may prosper and even by reviling Jaina
scriptures one may attain merit as is the case with Brahmins),
(6) _Vipak@sa prati@sedha_ (it is not so, it is impossible that those
who despise Jaina scriptures should be loved by gods or should deserve
honour), (7) _D@r@s@ānta_ (the Arhats take food from householders as
they do not like to cook themselves for fear of killing insects),
(8) _Ās'a@nkā (but the sins of the householders should touch the arhats,
for they cook for them), (9) _Ās'a@nkāprati@sedha_ (this cannot be,
for the arhats go to certain houses unexpectedly, so it could not be
said that the cooking was undertaken for them), (10) _Naigamana_
(non-injury is therefore the greatest virtue) (Vidyābhū@sa@na's _Indian
Logic_). These are persuasive statements which are often actually
adopted in a discussion, but from a formal point of view many of these
are irrelevant. When Vātsyāyana in his _Nyāyasūtrabhā@sya_, I. 1. 32,
says that Gautama introduced the doctrine of five propositions as
against the doctrine of ten propositions as held by other logicians, he
probably had this Jaina view in his mind.]

[Footnote 2: See _Jainatarkavārttika_, and _Parīk@sāmukhasūtrav@rtti_, and
_@Sa@ddars'anasamuccaya_ with Gu@naratna on Jainism.]

187

which could not non-existent. In fact production of effect was
with them the only definition of existence (being). Theoretically
each unit of effect being different from any other unit of effect
they supposed that there was a succession of different units of
effect or, what is the same thing, acknowledged a succession of
new substances every moment. All things were thus momentary.
The Jains urged that the reason why the production of effect
may be regarded as the only proof of being is that we can assert
only that thing the existence of which is indicated by a corresponding
experience. When we have a unit of experience we
suppose the existence of the object as its ground. This being so,
the theoretical analysis of the Buddhists that